Court Opinion

ID: 9940547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 18:03:11.811544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:59.480033
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/24 P. v. Amaya CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061860

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 02NF0294)

 JOSE ALFREDO AMAYA,                                                    OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Michael A. Leversen, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Joseph F. Walsh for Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Lynne G.
McGinnis and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
               In 2003, a jury found Jose Alfredo Amaya guilty of first degree murder
(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 among other offenses. The jury found true the gang-
murder special circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)), the criminal street gang
sentencing enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and the vicarious gang-related firearm
enhancement (§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1)). Amaya was sentenced to life in prison
without the possibility of parole for the murder, consecutive to a term of 25 years to life
for the vicarious firearm enhancement.
               Amaya later petitioned for relief from his murder conviction under former
section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).2 He argued the jury was instructed on theories
permitting it to impute malice to him based on the actions of his codefendant, Alex
Zapien. The trial court denied the petition for failure to state a prima facie case. We
affirm. Although Amaya was not the actual killer, the record of conviction shows the
jury found him guilty as either a direct aider and abettor or co-conspirator to murder.
Because both theories are still valid theories of murder liability, Amaya is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.
                                            FACTS
I.     The Murder of Bobby Sayamontry

               The following summary of facts are provided for background purposes.
They have been taken from this Division’s unpublished opinion, People v. Amaya
(January 26, 2016, G033029) [nonpub. opn.] (Amaya), which affirmed Amaya’s
convictions.

1              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2              Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered former section
1170.95 to section 1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
clarity, we refer to the statute as section 1172.6 throughout the opinion.

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              The victim, Bobby Sayamontry, was a Laos Boys gang member. In mid-
January 2022, he had an argument with Patti Temprasuet, the then-girlfriend of an 18th
Street gang member called “Clumsy.” The 18th Street gang sold illegal drugs.
According to a witness, Temprasuet told Sayamontry, “You better pay me my money, or
I’ll break your leg,” and then mumbled to herself, “I’ll kill you.” (Amaya, supra,
G033029.)
              On January 18, Temprasuet telephoned Sayamontry’s home and told his
sister that Amaya, who was an 18th Street gang member, would be coming to see him.
Later that night, Amaya and a second man visited Sayamontry at his home. The three
men then left together in Amaya’s red car. Shortly afterwards, witnesses heard several
gunshots at a park near Sayamontry’s home. Two people jumped into a red-colored
vehicle and the car “peel[ed] out.” Sayamontry was found in the park; he had been shot
and later died from his wounds. (Amaya, supra, G033029.)
              A couple of weeks later, police found Amaya in a red Nissan. Amaya was
carrying a loaded .357 revolver. Subsequent forensic testing determined this gun was the
weapon used to kill Sayamontry. Also in the car was Zapien, who matched the physical
description of the second man who had accompanied Amaya to Sayamontry’s home.
(Amaya, supra, G033029.)
              Amaya and Zapien were tried jointly for Sayamontry’s murder, among
other offenses. Jason Mellor, pursuant to a plea agreement and with a grant of immunity
as to certain charges, testified at trial that he overheard Amaya and Zapien “talking about
if they did the right thing by handling business. They also talked about doing it for Patti,
but actually doing it for Clumsy.” According to Mellor, when he asked Zapien about the
conversation, Zapien said “he took somebody out.” The prosecutor asked Mellor if
“‘Zapien told you that he shot the victim because [Amaya] did not have the heart to do
it?’ (Emphasis added.) Mellor answered affirmatively.” (Amaya, supra, G033029.)

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II.    Jury Instructions and Conviction

              On the murder count against Amaya, the jury was instructed on two
possible theories of liability: (1) direct aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01); and (2) an
uncharged offense of conspiracy to commit murder (CALJIC No. 6.10.5). Although
requested by the People, the trial court refused to give the instruction on aiding and
abetting under the natural and probable consequences. (CALJIC No. 3.02.)
              A jury found Amaya guilty of first degree murder of Sayamontry and other
offenses not relevant here.3 As described above, the jury found true the gang-murder
special circumstance allegation, the criminal street gang sentencing enhancement, and the
vicarious gang-related firearm enhancement. The jury, however, did not find true the
allegation Amaya discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial
court sentenced Amaya to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder,
consecutive to a term of 25 years to life for the vicarious firearm enhancement, and
stayed sentencing on the gang enhancement. This court affirmed the conviction, with
minor sentence modifications. (Amaya, supra, G033029.)
III.   Resentencing Proceedings

              In March 2022, Amaya filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. The trial court found him ineligible for relief as a matter of law and
denied the petition. The court noted “[t]he jury was instructed on the law defining
murder” and the related special circumstance allegation and enhancements based on
Amaya’s role “as a direct aider and abettor and/or co-conspirator” to murder, and not on
“any theory of liability for murder requiring that malice be imputed to him.” The court
reasoned, “In finding [Amaya] guilty of special circumstances first degree murder, the
jury necessarily found [he] acted with the intent to kill.” Amaya timely appealed.

3            The procedural history of Zapien’s convictions can be found in this
Division’s unpublished opinion, People v. Zapien (February 14, 2016, G032835)
[nonpub. opn.].

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                                      DISCUSSION

              Amaya contends the trial court erred in finding him ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law. Specifically he argues the jury instructions on
conspiracy allowed the jury to convict him under a now-invalid theory that imputes
malice to him solely based on his participation in a crime. We disagree.
              “Section 1172.6 allows individuals to petition for relief if they were
convicted of murder under theories invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437. [Citations.]
With the enactment of Senate Bill 1437, the Legislature abolished the natural and
probable consequences doctrine of murder liability.” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 400, 413.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, the trial court must issue an Order to Show Cause and hold an evidentiary hearing
to decide whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) But if the record of
conviction demonstrates a petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, a court may
summarily deny the petition. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–972.) Where
a court summarily denies the petition, our review is de novo. (People v. Harden (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
              Here, the jury was instructed on two possible theories of murder liability.
Both theories remain valid. “Senate Bill 1437 d[id] not eliminate direct aiding and
abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess
malice aforethought.” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848.) And because a
conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill (People v.
Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 183 (Medrano)), a defendant so convicted is not
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law (People v. Whitson
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 34–36).

              Amaya argues Medrano is factually distinguishable because the jury in
Medrano convicted the defendant of conspiracy to murder, whereas the jury here was

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instructed it could convict Amaya of murder based on an uncharged theory of conspiracy
to murder. We fail to see how this distinction makes a difference. “‘“[A]ll conspiracy to
commit murder is necessarily conspiracy to commit premeditated and deliberated first
degree murder.”’” (Medrano, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 183, quoting People v. Beck
and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 641.) Here, the jury was instructed that murder requires a
finding of malice aforethought. And the conspiracy instruction required the jury to find
“an agreement between two or more persons with the specific intent to agree to commit
the crime of murder, and with the further specific intent to commit that crime, followed
by an overt act committed . . . by one or more of the parties for the purpose of
accomplishing the object of the agreement.” (CALJIC No. 6.10.5) Had the jury relied on
the conspiracy theory to find Amaya guilty of murder, the jury would have necessarily
found the requisite intent to kill.
               In his reply brief, Amaya argues for the first time that “[t]he facts of the
case established that there was an underlying conspiracy to commit extortion.” He bases
this extortion theory on the inference Temprasuet asked Amaya and Zapien to collect a
drug debt from Sayamontry. Although Amaya acknowledges “[n]o one highlighted or
discussed the extortion conspiracy during the trial,” Amaya claims he “could have been
convicted of murder if the jury had concluded that murder was a natural and probable
consequence of [his] participation in the extortion conspiracy.” We reject this argument
as pure speculation. The jury was not instructed on a theory of conspiracy to commit
extortion, but a conspiracy to commit murder. We must presume the jury followed its
instructions. (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 670.)
               Finally, nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel) changes our conclusion that Amaya is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law. In Curiel, the prosecution argued Curiel was guilty of murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 445.) No such instruction was
given in Amaya’s case. Instead, the jury was instructed on direct aiding and abetting

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murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Because the jury convicted Amaya of murder
under one of these theories, not under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, he
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.4
                                        DISPOSITION

               The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

                                                    DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

4             Given our conclusion, we need not consider the parties’ arguments on
whether the jury’s true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance allegation makes
Amaya ineligible as a matter of law for section 1172.6 relief.

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