Court Opinion

ID: 9423199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:06:24.594904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:42.765481
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Harlan,
whom Mr. Justice Clark joins, concurring.
I agree with and join in Part I of the Court’s opinion relating to pendent jurisdiction. As to Part II, I refrain from joining the Court’s speculations about the uses to which it may put the pre-emption doctrine in similar future cases. The holding in Part III that the Norris-LaGuardia Act requires reversal here seems to me correct, but my interpretation of the statute is different and somewhat narrower than that of the Court.
The statutory requirement for union liability in this case is “clear proof of actual participation in, or actual *743authorization of . . . [the unlawful acts], or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”1 The Court construes this provision as fixing a new test of the quantum of proof, somewhere between ordinary civil and criminal standards. I do not think the admittedly vague legislative history imports this reading, and I believe it introduces -a revealing inconsistency since the new test could not be applied to criminal cases, conced-edly governed by the same statutory language, without standing the statute on its head by having it reduce present quantum-of-proof requirements in criminal cases, that is, proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The best reading I can give the statute, absent more light than has been shed upon it in this case, is one directing it against a particular type of inferential proof of authority or ratification unacceptable to those who framed the law. For me, the gist of the statute is that in the usual instance a union’s carrying on of its normal strike functions and its failure to take affirmative action to dispel misconduct are not in themselves proof of authorization or ratification of the wrongdoing.2
*744In the present case, apart from a few quite ambiguous episodes, there was nothing to bring the violence home to the union except, as the Sixth Circuit stressed (see p. 741, ante), that the union continued through its picketing the threat that the earlier violence would be renewed and did not repudiate the violence or promise to oppose its renewal. Whatever arguments could be made for imposing liability in such a situation, I think it approximates what the statute was designed to forbid. On this basis, I concur in the reversal.

 Norris-LaGuardia Act, §6, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U. S. C. §106 (1964 ed.). The section is quoted in full at p. 735, ante.