Court Opinion

ID: 9676001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:12:05.851024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:42.391839
License: Public Domain

Irwin, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the majority but write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s reasoning concerning why Ellen is not entitled to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the home which were placed into a joint account.
The majority recognizes that this court, in Gerard-Ley v. Ley, 5 Neb. App. 229, 235, 558 N.W.2d 63, 67 (1996), iterated the general rule in this state that “ ‘when a husband and wife take title to a property as joint tenants, even though one pays all the consideration therefor, a gift is presumed to be' made by the spouse furnishing the consideration to the other____’ ” This presumption is, of course, a rebuttable presumption. Id. Rather *499than applying the presumption in the present case and considering whether it was rebutted, however, the majority dismisses this proposition of law by stating that “[tjhere is no evidence that C J. placed the house in joint tenancy before it was sold, and all of the above cases are concerned with the effect of the title to real estate.” The majority then relies upon annunciations from Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2722(b) (Reissue 1995) to reach the conclusion that Ellen was not entitled to an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the house on the facts of this case.
Gerard-Ley v. Ley, supra, does not suggest that there is any distinction between whether the joint title in question is a joint title to “real estate” or personalty. I believe the general rule reiterated in that case applies equally to both situations, and I believe that to hold otherwise is to suggest a difference between the two types of property with no real distinction as to why they should be treated differently. As such, I would apply the proposition from Gerard-Ley v. Lery to the facts of this case and hold that once C J. placed the proceeds from the sale of his premarital residence into a joint account with Ellen, a rebuttable presumption arose that he intended to gift an equitable interest in the proceeds to her.
I concur with the ultimate result reached by the majority, however. As the majority points out, C.J. testified that he did not intend to make a gift to Ellen by titling the account in both names. I would conclude that this evidence is sufficient to rebut the presumption and would therefore conclude that Ellen is not entitled to an interest in the proceeds. To reach this conclusion, the majority relies on § 30-2722(b). I do not agree with the majority that a provision of the probate code dictates the result in this dissolution case. I would rely upon the evidence presented to rebut the Gerard-Ley v. Ley presumption and affirm on that basis.