Court Opinion

ID: 9954609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:59.501081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:58.899970
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 In re L.G. CA4/2

See dissenting opinion.

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re L.G., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT
 OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,                                               E082177

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIJ2000046)

 v.                                                                       OPINION

 D.A. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mona M. Nemat, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant D.A.

                                                              1
       Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant O.G.

       Minh C. Tran, County Counsel, Teresa K.B. Beecham and Samara Silverman,

Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

       The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendants and appellants

D.A. (Mother) and O.G. (Father; collectively, Parents) to their daughter, L.G. (Welf.

& Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1 Parents contend a sufficient inquiry under the

Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) was not

conducted. Specifically, Parents assert that during the initial inquiry phase (§ 224.2,

subs. (a)-(c)) plaintiff and respondent Riverside County Department of Public Social

Services (the Department) did not inquire of L.G.’s extended paternal relatives

regarding possible Native American ancestry. We affirm.

                                         FACTS

       L.G. was born in January 2020 and placed in a neonatal intensive care unit

(NICU). Approximately one week after L.G. was born, the Department obtained and

executed a protective custody warrant for L.G., who remained in the NICU. On January

23, 2020, the juvenile court ordered L.G. detained.

       Parents resided with L.G.’s paternal grandparents and uncle. The Department

called L.G.’s paternal grandparents, but they did not answer so a voicemail was left.

       1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                             2
The Department spoke with L.G.’s paternal aunt and she agreed to notify L.G.’s

paternal grandparents about the case.

       Parents denied any knowledge of having Native American ancestry. L.G.’s

maternal grandmother claimed Native American ancestry through the Yaqui Tribe. In

February 2020, the Department notified the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Pascua

Yaqui Tribe, in Arizona, of the proceedings regarding L.G. The notice included

identifying information regarding L.G.’s maternal relatives, but very little identifying

information regarding L.G.’s paternal relatives. The Pascua Yaqui Tribe concluded

that, based on the information provided, L.G. is not eligible for membership in the

Tribe. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February 2020, the juvenile court

found ICWA inapplicable in the case.

       In July 2021, the juvenile court returned L.G. to Parents’ custody on a plan of

family maintenance. In December 2021, the Department obtained and executed a

protective custody warrant to remove L.G. from Mother, leaving L.G. in Father’s

custody on a plan of family maintenance. In October 2022, the Department obtained

and executed a protective custody warrant to remove L.G. from Father, who was still

residing with L.G.’s paternal grandparents.

       In October 2022, Father again denied any knowledge of having Native American

ancestry. In October and December 2022, the Department spoke with L.G.’s paternal

aunt regarding placement. In November 2022, Father and L.G.’s paternal grandmother,

aunt, and cousin attended a visit with L.G. in a park. L.G.’s paternal grandmother

attended a hearing in the case in December 2022. She was not questioned about

                                              3
possible Native American ancestry. The juvenile court said, “The Court is not making

an ICWA finding at this time. We’ll do an inquiry at dispo.” The disposition hearing

took place in January 2023; L.G.’s extended paternal relatives were not present at the

hearing; and the court did not make an ICWA finding.

       In April 2023, the Department again inquired of Father as to whether he had

knowledge of having any Native American ancestry; Father denied knowing of any

Native American ancestry on his side of the family. In September 2023, the juvenile

court terminated Parents’ parental rights to L.G.

                                     DISCUSSION

       Parents contend that, during the initial inquiry phase into L.G.’s possible Native

American ancestry, the Department erred by not questioning L.G.’s extended paternal

relatives. The Department concedes it did not question L.G.’s extended paternal

relatives regarding possible Native American ancestry.

       When a child is taken into protective custody pursuant to a warrant (§ 340), the

Department is typically not obligated to question extended family members about

possible Native American ancestry during the initial inquiry phase, “although case-

specific circumstances may require [a] department to interview extended family

members.” (In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, 500, 503-504, review granted

July 26, 2023, S279743 [lead case is In re Ja.O., review granted July 26, 2023,

S280572]; see also In re Andres R. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 828, 847, review granted

Nov. 15, 2023, S282054.)

                                            4
       Parents concede that on the occasions that L.G. was taken into protective custody

the Department utilized warrants. Because warrants were used, per subdivision (b) of

section 224.2, the Department was not required to question L.G.’s extended relatives

about their possible Native American ancestry. (In re Robert F., supra, 90 Cal.App.5th

at pp. 500, 503-504.) Correspondingly, the juvenile court did not err by terminating

Parents’ parental rights despite the Department not inquiring of L.G.’s extended

paternal relatives regarding possible Native American ancestry.

       Parents assert that because this issue is pending before the Supreme Court, we

should “err on the side of advancing the purpose of the ICWA . . . and apply a broad

interpretation of section 224.2, subdivision (b), to apply to the protective custody

warrant at issue in this case.” We believe Robert F. sets forth the proper interpretation

of the law. Therefore, we apply Robert F. in this case.

                                       DISPOSITION

       The order is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       MILLER
                                                                               Acting P. J.

I concur:

MENETREZ
                                  J.

                                             5
[In re L.G., E082177]

RAPHAEL, J., dissenting.

       The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) did not

inquire of any paternal extended family members about whether they have information

that the child L.G. had Native American ancestry. The majority opinion holds that they

had no duty to do so because the Department used a warrant to remove L.G.

       The method by which L.G. was removed from her home bears no connection to

the initial inquiry into whether she is an Indian child per the Indian Child Welfare Act.

Unlike the majority, I agree with the opinions from five divisions holding that the initial

inquiry duty is the same whether or not a warrant is used to remove a child. (See In re

Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953; In re Samantha F. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1062; In

re C.L. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 377; In re Jerry R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388; In re V.C.

(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 251; In re L.B. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 512.)

       This initial inquiry duty comes, first, from the text of the statute. Welfare &

Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), imposes a required inquiry duty when a

Department receives temporary custody of a child through section 306. Section 306,

subdivision (a) authorizes the Department to receive temporary custody of children

delivered by peace officers, as happened here under section 340, subdivision (c) and the
                    1
removal warrants. When L.G. was removed from her parents and placed in the

       1
           Statutory citations herein are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                               1
Department’s custody, the Department had a duty to inquire of her extended family

established by section 224.2.

       Secondly, our rules of court and administrative regulations recognize that the

reason for the Section 224.2 initial inquiry duties is that children are being removed from

their parents’ home and placed elsewhere. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1);

Department of Social Services Regulations 31-001.21 [the “requirements for inquiry into

whether a child is an Indian child . . . apply to all children placed in out-of-home care”).

ICWA promotes keeping Indian children in Indian homes (18 U.S.C. § 1902), a purpose

that is at issue to the same degree regardless of whether a warrant is used for removal.

The majority opinion requires rejecting the rules and regulations, which are sensible

interpretations of the statutory law enacted after public comment.

       As several paternal relatives were readily available and none were asked whether

the child had Native American heritage, I would not find the lack of compliance

harmless. (See In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744.)

       I respectfully dissent because I would conditionally affirm the order terminating

parental rights and order the Department to complete the initial inquiry.

                                                                 RAPHAEL
                                                                                               J.

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