Court Opinion

ID: 9743074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:25:08.759323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.166211
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. Although artfully drafted to appear otherwise, plaintiffs’ complaint seeks recovery for personal injuries which fall within the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131). I would therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
I base my conclusion in part upon my skepticism regarding the so-called "intentional torts” exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA. While I recognize that support exists in some of the decisions of this Court for such an exception, Kissinger v Mannor, 92 Mich App 572; 285 NW2d 214 (1979), I would agree that the statement of support contained in Kissinger for such an exception "has little precedential value because it is expressly limited to an intentional tort such as the one then before the Court and because the Court was careful to point out that the case fell within other exceptions to the exclusive remedy provision”. Genson v Bofors-Lakeway, Inc, 122 Mich App 470, 477; 332 NW2d 507 (1983). I agree with the Genson Court’s conclusion that:
"We cannot say either that the Legislature clearly intended a separate exception for intentional torts not falling within one of the other exceptions or that public policy so clearly requires such a result as to justify our *706creation of a legal fiction. We decline to create a separate exception to the exclusive remedy provision for intentional torts.” Genson, p 478.
The proper focus in cases where the applicability of the exclusive remedy provision is raised is on " 'whether the injuries themselves fall [sic] within the purview of the act, irrespective of the nature of the employer’s acts’ ”. Barnes v Double Seal Glass Co, Inc, 129 Mich App 66, 73; 341 NW2d 812 (1983), citing Sewell v Bathey Manufacturing Co, 103 Mich App 732, 737-738; 303 NW2d 876 (1981). See also Genson, supra; Slayton v Michigan Host, Inc, 122 Mich App 411; 332 NW2d 498 (1983). More specifically, I would reaffirm the questions proposed in Neal v Roura Iron Works, Inc, 66 Mich App 273, 275; 238 NW2d 837 (1975), as the proper method to resolve this issue:
"(1) Were the 'conditions of liability under the act’ present at the time of plaintiffs injury?, (2) Is plaintiff seeking to recover damages for personal injuries?, and (3) Is plaintiff’s suit based upon the employer-employee relationship?” Neal, p 275.
Under this test, it is clear that even the third and fourth counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint are barred by the exclusive remedy provision. Obviously, the suit is based upon the employer-employee relationship. It is also clear that, even under the breach of contract claim, plaintiffs are seeking to recover damages for personal injuries within the contemplation of the WDCA. Under both counts, plaintiffs seek damages because the claimant "has been physically and mentally affected” by the chemical exposure, "causing numerous bodily malfunctions”.
In conclusion, I repeat my observations at the outset. Plaintiffs’ complaint is nothing more than *707a clever and artful attempt to avoid the exclusive remedy provision’s bar to the maintenance of a civil action. Plaintiffs seek recovery for personal injuries which arose out of and in the course of the employment, and thus I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.