Court Opinion

ID: 9408497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 20:03:54.498624+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.242724
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/12/23 P. v. Segrest CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Shasta)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096482

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. Nos. 20F2070,
                                                                                     21F0072, 17F01393)
           v.

    AARON ARTHUR SEGREST,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Aaron Arthur Segrest pleaded no contest to multiple charges, including
assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2),1 pursuant to an
agreement between defendant and the trial court to which the prosecution objected.
Defendant also admitted violating his probation. The court deferred sentencing and
released defendant to a rehabilitation program. When defendant failed to complete the

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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program, the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 11 years four months in prison,
which included the upper term of four years on the assault charge.
        On appeal, defendant seeks remand for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567). We agree that remand is required.
                             FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
        The substantive facts underlying defendant’s conviction are not relevant to our
resolution of this appeal; thus, we need not present them in any detail. It suffices to say
that in June 2021, defendant resolved two cases by agreement with the trial court over the
objection of the prosecutor. In case No. 21F0072, defendant pleaded no contest to
corporal injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon
as a serious felony, and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); count 3) for
incidents that occurred in January 2020. As to counts 1 and 2, defendant admitted a prior
strike. In case No. 17F1393, he admitted violating his probation in a felony child abuse
case.
        The trial court and defendant agreed orally on the record to the following terms as
recited by the court: defendant would plead no contest to all charges and enhancements
(i.e., “to the sheet”), and the court would release defendant to a rehabilitation program. If
defendant followed all program rules, successfully completed the program, tested clean,
and did not leave the program without consent, the court would strike the prior strike and
sentence him to probation. If he did not complete the program, the court admonished him
that he would be “back here for sentencing and you will be getting 12 years in state
prison which you will serve at 80 percent.”
        The only count for which any sentencing term was specifically discussed was “six
years” as “the aggravated term on child endangerment,” which was briefly mentioned by

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both the trial court and defense counsel, but the mention of which was not acknowledged
by defendant.2
       A standard plea form was executed and listed the “aggregate maximum time of
imprisonment” as 12 years in state prison, although the maximum sentences listed for
each individual count added up to more than 12 years. There was nothing filled out in the
portion of the plea form that was designated for terms of any plea agreement, including
any agreed-upon sentence. The plea form further designated defendant’s plea as an
“open plea”; he initialed the form provision indicating his understanding of the maximum
and minimum sentences as well as the absence of any sentencing agreement beyond that
advisement. The prosecutor objected to the agreement and signed the plea form
“reviewed for legal sufficiency only.”
       Approximately 10 months later, defendant admitted he had left the rehabilitation
program and thus violated his agreement with the court. At the sentencing hearing held
on May 19, 2022, the prosecutor referenced the “12-year maximum based on . . . the plea
form” but without further reference then asked the trial court to sentence defendant to an
aggregate term of 11 years four months in prison, composed of the upper term of four
years for assault with a deadly weapon (count 2), doubled to eight years; one year (one-
third the midterm), doubled to two years, for corporal injury to a cohabitant (count 1);
and one year four months for “the felony VOP” (apparently a reference to the child abuse
charge to which defendant had previously pleaded no contest in case No. 17F1393).

2 This appears to have been a reference to case No. 17F1393, where defendant had
admitted violating his probation in a child abuse case, but the record is unclear. It is
clear, however, that there was no specific discussion of the upper term on the assault with
a deadly weapon charge during the plea hearing. The Attorney General suggests
otherwise, citing out of context a single reference by the trial court to “[e]ight years,” but
that reference was not expressly (or even impliedly) connected to the assault charge and
appears instead to be a reference to a different charge when read in context.

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Defense counsel objected to any prison sentence, seeking probation, but asked for a
sentence, if given, of “not . . . more than nine years and four months” in prison.
       The trial court referenced the transcript of defendant’s plea and what it
characterized as their agreement: “ ‘So you plead to the sheet. You plead to everything,
and I am going to be sentencing you to 12 years if you violate.’ [¶] You agreed to that
term. It’s contained in the transcript, and you unfortunately violated.” The court did not
indicate that it had no choice as to the sentence. The court continued to remind defendant
that he had agreed to prison if he violated the rules of the program and his “agreement”
with the court, and that he had done both, violating the court’s trust in the process.
       In case No. 21F0072, the trial court first imposed the upper term on the assault
charge, count 2, indicating only that the aggravated term was imposed “as per the
agreement.” The court added a sentence of one-third the midterm or one year, doubled to
two years, for corporal injury to a cohabitant; and one year in county jail to run
concurrent for the vandalism count. In case No. 17F1393, the court sentenced defendant
to one-third the midterm of one year four months on the child abuse charge.
       The record does not show that the trial court specifically identified any
aggravating factors at the time of the plea or at sentencing, either by name or by
California Rules of Court rule number.
       Defendant timely appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause. After this
court granted additional time to secure the augmented record and multiple requests by the
parties to continue the briefing schedule, the case was fully briefed on March 27, 2023,
and assigned to this panel shortly thereafter.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends he is entitled to resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 567,
which amended section 1170, subdivision (b) and limited the trial court’s discretion to
impose the upper term effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731.) Specifically,
defendant argues the upper term sentence on the assault charge does not comport with the

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requirements of newly amended section 1170, because he did not stipulate to any fact in
aggravation and no jury or judge found any fact in aggravation to be true beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Attorney General argues that defendant stipulated to a sentence
that included an aggravated term for the assault charge; thus, the court lacked discretion
to impose anything other than the upper term. The Attorney General adds that if this
court rejects his argument regarding lack of discretion, “the matter should be remanded
with directions for the trial court to apply section 1170, subdivision (b), at a new
sentencing hearing. At that hearing, applying the amended law, the court may again
impose the upper term on count 2.”
       Senate Bill No. 567 applies retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal on the
legislation’s effective date. (People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039 [Senate
Bill No. 567 is an ameliorative change in the law applicable to all nonfinal convictions on
appeal].) Under the amended version of section 1170, when a judgment of imprisonment
is to be imposed and a statute specifies three possible terms, “the court shall in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in [§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)].” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) Section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the
middle term “only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify
the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
       Although the Attorney General argues no discretion was exercised by the trial
court in imposing what his briefing argues was a stipulated upper term sentence on the
assault charge, the procedural circumstances of the instant case are clearly distinguishable
from those in People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051 at pages 1057 through
1059, review granted December 14, 2022, S277314 (holding there was no opportunity for
the court to exercise discretion at sentencing, because the court sentenced the defendant

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to the upper term pursuant to a stipulated plea that specifically agreed to the upper term).
First, the agreement here was not between the parties, as was the agreement in Mitchell,
which would limit the trial court to the choices of accepting or rejecting the stipulated
sentence as a package with its acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement, as explained
in Mitchell at pages 1057 through 1058. Any “stipulated sentence” here stemmed from
an oral offer by the court that was accepted by defendant over the prosecutor’s objection
and was not memorialized in the written plea agreement.
       Second, although any agreement even arguably entered here specified 12 years in
state prison if defendant did not perform as promised, the trial court did not sentence
defendant to 12 years in prison. Thus, the court not only had discretion to sentence
defendant to something other than 12 years in prison, but it also exercised its discretion to
do so, and it did so. The court’s observation that defendant had agreed to a prison term,
which at times the court specified as 12 years in prison, appears more correctly
characterized as a reason the court was exercising its discretion to impose an aggregate
sentence close to 12 years in prison (that included the upper term on the assault charge),
rather than an expression of lack of discretion to impose a lesser sentence. But the fact
that the court had a reason--and perhaps a very good one--to do what it did does not
translate to inability to exercise discretion. Rather, it translates to reluctance to exercise
discretion to reduce defendant’s sentence from the 12 years in prison discussed at the
time of the plea. This was certainly within the court’s prerogative, but in doing so the
court was required to follow the dictates of the newly amended statute.
       As we have outlined ante, no specific stipulation to the upper term sentence on the
assault charge appears in the record. Further, it does not appear the trial court lacked
discretion in sentencing defendant; indeed, its exercise of discretion is evident from our
review (and recitation, ante) of the record. The court cited no aggravating factors in
imposing the upper term sentence on count 2 as a component of the 11-year, four-month
sentence, and made no findings beyond a reasonable doubt as are now required to support

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the discretionary imposition of an upper term sentence.
       Because the court was not precluded from exercising discretion in sentencing, and
it sentenced defendant to an upper term sentence without consideration of aggravating
factors as required by Senate Bill No. 567, remand is required unless “ ‘the record
“clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion’ under
the law as it now exists.” (People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 242.)
       The Attorney General does not make this argument, and we cannot discern what,
if any, aggravating factors were relied upon by the trial court in imposing the upper term
on the assault charge. As we have explained, the court justified its decision primarily by
reference to the “agreement” and defendant’s violation thereof. However, we do not
disagree with the Attorney General’s assertion that if the current statutory provisions are
appropriately considered and applied, the court is not precluded on remand from selecting
an upper term sentence. Indeed, defendant does not argue otherwise in reply. On this
record, we conclude remand is appropriate.
                                     DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for full resentencing
in compliance with the current law. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

                                                       /s/
                                                 Duarte, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     /s/
Boulware Eurie, J.

     /s/
Mesiwala, J.

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