Court Opinion

ID: 9883817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:20:59.620995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.751407
License: Public Domain

FOLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. It is my considered judgment that the verdict on liability in this case was tainted by the receipt of prejudicial evidence. The Minnesota Rules of Evidence provide that “evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Minn.R. Evid. 402. The definition of relevancy followed in Minnesota states: “ ‘Relevancy in logic is the tendency of evidence to establish a proposition which it is offered to prove.’ ” Boland v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 98, 132 N.W.2d 711, 719 (1965) (quoting McCormick, Evidence, § 152).
The key phrase in the definition of relevancy is evidence that logically tends to prove a proposition. Applying that definition to this case, certain evidence that was admitted here did not logically tend to establish a proposition which it was offered to prove and was highly prejudicial.
The record reflects that while Rowe was injured in a fall in 1979 at the Goldberg home, the trial court received into evidence reference to a fall by Rowe in 1977 as well as a medical record with a notation of that fall. Objection to this evidence was preserved, and there was no effort made by Goldberg to connect the 1977 fall in any manner to the 1979 fall. The trial court permitted the evidence of the prior fall because it thought there might be a possibility of aggravation to the left hip as a result of the left ankle injury in 1977. No connection was ever made between the two.
Even if it could be soundly argued that reference to the 1977 fall was not a sufficient error to reverse the apportionment of liability by the jury, that error together with the receipt in evidence of other irrelevant evidence from medical examinations in 1982 and 1985 concerning Rowe’s complaints of lightheadedness, was so preju*609dicial as to compel reversal. The ruling by which the trial court received the medical evidence was done before trial while reviewing the video deposition of Dr. Leslie, and the objections were preserved. Although the trial court file contains an affidavit of Dr. Leslie in connection with Rowe’s 1979 fall, the record does not reflect whether this affidavit was used in connection with the post-trial motion, or merely placed in the file.
Rowe’s counsel attempted to impeach Goldberg by making reference to her deposition and commented about the testimony she gave regarding Rowe’s lightheadedness, but at trial where use was made of that topic, medical evidence had already been introduced on that subject. Further, Goldberg’s adverse testimony was elicited through cross-examination and therefore was not binding on Rowe.
It is significant that two doctors testified, one for each party. Neither was asked to tie in the evidence of the 1977 fall or the medical evidence relating to the lightheadedness in 1982 and 1985 with the 1979 fall.
The evidence regarding the 1977 fall permitted the jury to speculate as to the reasons for the 1979 fall. There was no similarity or connection proven, and the injury which Rowe suffered in 1979 was different from the 1977 injury. The 1977 fall did not occur at the Goldberg home, and we know nothing of the circumstances surrounding that fall. The jury was permitted to fill in the gaps, however erroneous their conclusion might be. The same is true of the 1982 and 1985 medical evidence, neither of which complaints was logically tied to the 1979 fall.
When invoking the test of relevancy, even under the liberal view that is followed in Minnesota with respect to receiving evidence, the inescapable conclusion here is that the medical evidence of 1982 and 1985 and the evidence of the 1977 fall did not logically tend to prove a material fact in issue. This evidence is speculative, irrelevant, and has no connection to this case.
It is my view that the issues here cannot be resolved by applying the harmless error rule. While justice does not require a trial free of errors, it does demand a trial without errors which are prejudicial to the result. See State v. White, 295 Minn. 217, 225, 203 N.W.2d 852, 858 (1973). I believe that Rowe’s right to a fair trial was consistently compromised by the irrelevancy and error discussed in this dissent, and I conclude that Rowe was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of error in this case. See People v. Harbold, 124 Ill.App.3d 363, 79 Ill.Dec. 830, 464 N.E.2d 734 (1984). For this reason, and in the interest of justice, a new trial must be ordered. State v. Underwood, 281 N.W.2d 337 (Minn.1979).
The evidentiary rulings stressed here so tainted the jury’s apportionment of liability that it cannot stand. Since there was no challenge made regarding damages, this case should be remanded on liability alone.