Court Opinion

ID: 9893794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 17:08:22.886022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:15.583907
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Miller, 2023-Ohio-3935.]

                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                SENECA COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

        PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                                CASE NO. 13-23-03

        v.

ROSHAWN J. MILLER,                                         OPINION

        DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                  Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 22 CR 0114

                                       Judgment Affirmed

                            Date of Decision: October 30, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Brian A. Smith for Appellant

        Derek W. DeVine for Appellee
Case No. 13-23-03

WALDICK, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Roshawn J. Miller (“Miller”), brings this appeal

from the February 14, 2023, judgment of the Seneca County Common Pleas Court

sentencing him to prison after he was convicted of Attempted Murder with a firearm

specification and Having Weapons While Under Disability. On appeal, Miller

argues that his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, that

the trial court erred by determining that he had not established the affirmative

defense of insanity, and that the Reagan Tokes Law is unconstitutional. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                    Background

       {¶2} On June 25, 2021, Dakota C. was driving on State Route 4 when he

observed a vehicle by the side of the road that he believed to be disabled. He stopped

to render assistance, but the driver of the other vehicle, Miller, fired a gun into

Dakota’s vehicle five times, striking Dakota once in the back. Dakota and Miller

had never met or communicated prior to the shooting.

       {¶3} As a result of Miller’s actions he was indicted for Attempted Murder in

violation of R.C. 2923.02(A) and R.C. 2903.02(A), a first degree felony (Count 1),

Felonious Assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a second degree felony

(Count 2), and Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation of R.C.

                                         -2-
Case No. 13-23-03

2923.13(A)(2), a third degree felony (Count 3). The first two counts in the

indictment carried firearm specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A).

         {¶4} On July 21, 2021, Miller filed a written plea of not guilty by reason of

insanity (“NGRI”) and he also challenged his competency to stand trial. Miller was

subsequently evaluated by two doctors and they both determined that he was

competent to stand trial.1 Based on the evaluations, the trial court determined that

Miller was competent to stand trial. Once he was determined competent to stand

trial, Miller pled not guilty to the charges and he maintained his NGRI plea.

         {¶5} Miller proceeded to a bench trial on February 13-14, 2023. Prior to the

conclusion of the trial, the State dismissed the Felonious Assault charge and the

accompanying firearm specification (Count 2). Ultimately, the trial court found

Miller guilty of Attempted Murder, with the accompanying firearm specification,

and guilty of Having Weapons While Under Disability.

         {¶6} On February 14, 2023, Miller was sentenced to serve an indefinite

prison term of 10-15 years on the Attempted Murder charge, a consecutive 3-year

prison term on the firearm specification, and a concurrent 18 month prison term on

the Having Weapons While Under Disability conviction. It is from this judgment

that Miller appeals, asserting the following assignments of error for our review.

1
 Miller actually requested a third evaluation, and that request was granted by the trial court but the report is
not in the record.

                                                      -3-
Case No. 13-23-03

                            First Assignment of Error

       Because the trial court, as trier of fact, lost its way and created a
       manifest miscarriage of justice in finding Appellant guilty of each
       of the counts contained in the Indictment, Appellant’s convictions
       were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       Because Appellant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
       that at the time of the commission of the offenses, he did not know,
       as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the wrongfulness
       of his acts, and thus established the affirmative defense of
       insanity, Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight
       of the evidence.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       R.C. 2967.271, also known as the “Reagan Tokes Act,” which
       allows the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to
       unilaterally extend Appellant’s sentence, is unconstitutional
       under both the United States Constitution, Arts. I, II, and III, and
       Amends. V, VI and XIV, and the Ohio Constitution, Art. I, § 10,
       and Art. IV, §§ 1 and 3(B)(2).

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶7} In his first assignment of error, Miller argues that his convictions for

Attempted Murder and Having Weapons While Under Disability were against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶8} In reviewing whether a verdict was against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and examines the conflicting

testimony. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52. In doing so,

                                         -4-
Case No. 13-23-03

this court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all of the reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.” Id.

       {¶9} Nevertheless, a reviewing court must allow the trier-of-fact appropriate

discretion on matters relating to the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10

Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly

in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’

should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d

Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio

St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

                                 Controlling Statutes

       {¶10} Miller was convicted of Attempted Murder in violation of R.C.

2923.02(A) and R.C. 2903.02(A). The controlling “attempt” statute, R.C.

2923.02(A), reads as follows:

       No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge
       is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage
       in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.

The pertinent “murder” statute, reads as follows:

       No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful
       termination of another's pregnancy.

                                          -5-
Case No. 13-23-03

Miller was also convicted of Having Weapons While Under Disability in violation

of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), which reads as follows:

       (A) Unless relieved from disability under operation of law or legal
       process, no person shall knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use any
       firearm or dangerous ordnance, if any of the following apply:

       ***

       (2) The person is under indictment for or has been convicted of any
       felony offense of violence or has been adjudicated a delinquent child
       for the commission of an offense that, if committed by an adult, would
       have been a felony offense of violence.

                            Evidence Presented at Trial

       {¶11} Dakota C. testified that after he finished work for the Village of Attica

on June 25, 2021, he drove south on State Route 4 toward Bucyrus to pick up his

daughter. While he was driving, Dakota called his mother to discuss logistics of

getting his daughter.

       {¶12} When Dakota was approximately three miles south of Attica, he saw

a silver car stopped on the side of the road facing north toward Attica. Based on

where the car was stopped, Dakota thought that the vehicle might be disabled.

Dakota drove past the vehicle and turned around, thinking he would ask the driver

if the driver needed assistance. Dakota could not see if anyone was in the car when

he passed it or when he pulled up next to it due to the tinted windows.

       {¶13} Once beside the vehicle, Dakota lowered his window, intending to

speak with the driver, but when the driver lowered his window, the driver fired a

                                         -6-
Case No. 13-23-03

gun at Dakota five times. All five bullets struck Dakota’s car. One bullet went

through the exterior of Dakota’s vehicle, through the back of Dakota’s seat, and it

struck Dakota in the back.

       {¶14} Dakota, who was still on the phone with his mother, said “what the

fuck dude, you just shot me.” (Tr. at 44). Dakota quickly drove away, back toward

Attica. He told his mother that he had been shot and that his back was bleeding.

Dakota and his mother ended their call. Dakota’s mother called 911 and Dakota also

called 911.

       {¶15} Dakota was still on the phone with 911 when he stopped at a building

in Attica and asked for assistance from a billing clerk. The clerk took the phone

from Dakota and spoke with the 911 operator until EMS arrived. According to the

clerk, who testified at trial, Dakota described the shooter as a black man with short

hair and a long neck.

       {¶16} Police officers and EMS arrived to treat Dakota’s wound. Dakota told

his story to law enforcement officers and the officers also learned from dispatch that

a silver vehicle was still stopped on the side of the road in the area where Dakota

had been shot. Numerous law enforcement officers immediately drove to the area

and surrounded the silver vehicle.

       {¶17} Initially, officers could not discern whether anyone was in the vehicle,

but as they shouted commands, Miller waived his arm out of the vehicle’s driver’s-

                                         -7-
Case No. 13-23-03

side window. Officers then ordered Miller to step out of the vehicle with his hands

up. Miller complied with all the orders officers gave him, including lifting his shirt

and spinning slowly; however, Miller did not speak at the scene. One officer who

read Miller his Miranda rights said Miller nodded his head as though he understood

when his rights were explained to him.

           {¶18} A BCI agent searched Miller’s vehicle and located a Taurus 1911 .45

caliber firearm on the floorboard under the driver’s seat.2 There were two cartridges

in the magazine and one round in the chamber. Three fired cartridges were found in

Miller’s vehicle. A spent casing was also found on the ground outside of Miller’s

vehicle.

           {¶19} The same BCI agent searched and analyzed Dakota’s vehicle, locating

five ballistic impacts on the exterior of the vehicle. The driver’s-side window of

Miller’s vehicle was shattered, and a fired bullet was located on the floorboard

behind the driver’s seat. The bullet was tested and compared with those in the

Taurus 1911 .45 caliber firearm taken from Miller’s vehicle, and the bullets were

found to be consistent. Further, DNA consistent with Miller’s was located on the

Taurus 1911 and, specifically, on the trigger. DNA of another unknown contributor

was also located on the firearm.

2
    The full search of the vehicle did not occur the day of the shooting.

                                                        -8-
Case No. 13-23-03

       {¶20} Dakota testified at trial that he did not know Miller and had never met

him. Both Dakota and Miller’s phones were analyzed and no connections between

them could be found. Dakota identified Miller at trial as the man who shot him. Due

to his injury, Dakota was taken to the hospital with a “golf ball”-sized wound in his

back. Some metal was extracted from the wound.

       {¶21} Meanwhile, Miller was also taken to the hospital because he was

largely non-responsive to law enforcement. A sheriff’s deputy testified that at the

time Miller was taken into custody, the officers did not know for sure that there had

not been some kind of struggle or if Miller had hit his head. Because Miller was not

responding verbally, he was taken to the hospital to get “medically cleared.”

       {¶22} At the hospital, Miller remained mostly non-verbal. He would shake

his head or nod in response to questions and he would look the nurses in the eyes

when they asked him to do so. Miller did verbalize his last name and birthday, and

responded to one question with “yes ma’am.” Miller also refused to give a urine

sample. Since he was showing no acute signs of distress, Miller was released from

the hospital.

       {¶23} A detective then attempted to interview Miller, but when Miller did

not communicate verbally after approximately twenty minutes, the detective ended

the interview. The detective did testify that Miller was listening and that he seemed

to understand, but he did not communicate.

                                         -9-
Case No. 13-23-03

       {¶24} Notably, the State introduced evidence that Miller had a prior

conviction for Robbery with a firearm specification, indicating that he was under a

disability that had not been removed at the time of the shooting.

       {¶25} Based on the evidence presented, the trial court convicted Miller of

Attempted Murder with a firearm specification and Having Weapons While Under

Disability.

                                     Analysis

       {¶26} Miller contends that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a

manifest miscarriage of justice in this matter because, he claims, the evidence did

not establish that he acted “purposely” with regard to the Attempted Murder or

“knowingly” with regard to Having Weapons While Under Disability. Miller

contends that because there was no prior relationship between himself and Dakota,

the State did not establish a motive. Further, he contends that his silence and his

demeanor following his arrest show that he could not have acted purposely or

knowingly at the time of the shooting. Finally, Miller contends that mental illness

and/or drugs prevented him from forming the requisite mental culpability to commit

the crimes.

       {¶27} The mental culpability elements at issue, purposely and knowingly,

are defined in R.C. 2901.22 as follows:

       (A) A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention
       to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a

                                          -10-
Case No. 13-23-03

       prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the
       offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific
       intention to engage in conduct of that nature.

       (B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person
       is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result
       or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
       circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances
       probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
       is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
       subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence
       and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid
       learning the fact.

       {¶28} Importantly, proof of intent, including proof that a person acted

purposely, can be established by circumstantial evidence. State v. Kennedy, 3d Dist.

Logan No. 8-18-01, 2018-Ohio-4172, ¶ 25. In fact, “ ‘[t]he element of purpose

required by R.C. 2903.02 [the Murder statute] may be presumed where the natural

and probable consequences of a wrongful act are to produce death.’ ” Id. quoting

State v. Shue, 97 Ohio App.3d 459, 466 (9th Dist.1994), citing State v. Robinson,

161 Ohio St. 213 (1954), paragraph five of the syllabus.

       {¶29} Here, when Miller lowered his window, he fired not one, not two, not

three, not four, but five bullets directly at Dakota. Although four shots were off

target or were deflected by the car, one went through the car’s exterior, through the

driver’s-side seat, and struck Dakota in the back. A factfinder could readily

determine that Miller’s act of pointing a firearm at Dakota and shooting five shots

directly at him, striking him once, was a purposeful attempt to cause death given

                                        -11-
Case No. 13-23-03

that the natural and probable consequences of pointing a .45 caliber firearm at

someone and shooting at them five times from a short distance are to produce death.

See State v. Kennedy, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-18-01, 2018-Ohio-4172.

        {¶30} Furthermore, the factfinder could readily determine that Miller

knowingly had the weapon while under disability given his prior conviction and

prison sentence because Miller used the firearm and it was located under his car

seat.

        {¶31} While Miller’s behavior and his relative silence after the shooting may

have been unusual, we do not find that the trial court clearly lost its way by

determining that he acted purposely and knowingly with respect to the requisite

elements of his crimes. Officers and nurses who interacted with Miller indicated

that he appeared to understand when they spoke to him, Miller just did not respond.

This could just as validly be an exercise of a right to remain silent from someone

who has been through the system as it could be unusual behavior.

        {¶32} Finally, we note that at trial Miller primarily focused his defense on

the State’s failure to prove its case, specifically the identity of the shooter, beyond

a reasonable doubt. Miller’s argument on appeal that he was the shooter but could

not have acted “knowingly” is an entirely inconsistent claim.

        {¶33} In sum, as the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of guilt in

this matter, we cannot find that the trial court clearly lost its way by convicting

                                         -12-
Case No. 13-23-03

Miller of Attempted Murder with a firearm specification and of Having Weapons

While Under Disability. Therefore, his first assignment of error is overruled.

                                      Second Assignment of Error

           {¶34} In his second assignment of error, Miller argues that the trial court

clearly lost its way by not determining that he was not guilty by reason of insanity.

                                                   Analysis3

           {¶35} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “NGRI is an affirmative

defense that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Harris,

142 Ohio St.3d 211, 2015-Ohio-166, ¶ 17. To establish the defense of insanity, a

defendant must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that at the time of the

offense he did not know, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, the

wrongfulness of his act. R.C. 2901.01(A)(14).

           {¶36} At the trial in this case, very little evidence was presented regarding

Miller’s mental state at the time of the offense. The testimony indicated that Miller

was mostly silent with the police and medical staff after the altercation, but there

was no indication specifically as to why this was the case. The medical staff noted

no physical defects with Miller after the shooting and he was released from the

hospital.

3
    The same standard of review applied in the first assignment of error is applicable here as well.

                                                      -13-
Case No. 13-23-03

       {¶37} Miller implied that because he had been institutionalized relatively

recently prior to his actions in this case, he must have been suffering from a severe

mental defect when he committed these acts. However, he presented no actual

medical testimony from anyone at trial showing that he did not know the

consequences of his actions.

       {¶38} In his appellate brief, Miller references the competency evaluations

that were entered into evidence at the competency hearing. Notably, the two

competency evaluations were not entered into evidence at trial, thus the trial court

did not have this information to consider when evaluating Miller’s claim of NGRI.

Nevertheless, these documents would not have been helpful to Miller as there was

no affirmative indication that Miller was under a temporary or permanent insanity

or some severe mental defect during the acts he committed on June 25, 2021.

       {¶39} We emphasize that Miller did not present any evidence related to his

NGRI plea at trial and he did not argue that he was insane at the time he committed

the acts in his closing argument. Rather, he focused his argument on the State’s

failure to prove the identity of the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt. Simply put,

the record before the trial court, as the trier-of-fact, contained no medical evidence

from which a trial court could have made a finding of NGRI even if he had

specifically argued it at the trial court level.

                                           -14-
Case No. 13-23-03

       {¶40} Therefore, we do not find that the trial court clearly lost its way by

determining that Miller’s relatively unusual actions after his arrest did not establish

his affirmative defense of insanity. See State v. Murphy, 4th Dist. Ross No.

15CA3475, 2016-Ohio-1165 (indicating that a factfinder does not lose its way by

finding that NGRI was not established even when there was competing expert

testimony on the issue of whether the defendant was suffering from a severe mental

defect at the time of the offense). Accordingly, Miller’s second assignment of error

is overruled.

                             Third Assignment of Error

       {¶41} In his third assignment of error, Miller argues that the Reagan Tokes

Law is unconstitutional. Recently, in State v. Hacker, ___ Ohio St.3d ____, 2023-

Ohio-2535, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the constitutional validity of the

Reagan Tokes Law and held that it does not intrude upon the separation-of-powers

doctrine, does not implicate the offender’s right to a jury trial, and does not violate

the offender’s due-process rights. Id. at ¶ 25, 28, 40. Based upon the Supreme Court

of Ohio’s determination of these issues in Hacker, Miller’s third assignment of error

is overruled.

                                         -15-
Case No. 13-23-03

                                    Conclusion

       {¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to Miller in the particulars assigned

and argued, his assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Seneca

County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

                                                               Judgment Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/jlr

                                       -16-