Court Opinion

ID: 9927192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:06:28.63543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.207315
License: Public Domain

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
01/26/2024 09:06 AM CST

                                                        - 795 -
                               Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                                        315 Nebraska Reports
                                          IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                                               Cite as 315 Neb. 795

                              In re Adoption of Kate S., a minor child.
                                Kelley L. and Richard L., appellants,
                                        v. Dustin S., appellee.
                                                   ___ N.W.2d ___

                                        Filed January 26, 2024.   No. S-22-919.

                 1. Adoption: Appeal and Error. The standard of review in an appeal from
                    a court’s ruling on an adoption petition is error on the record.
                 2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
                    appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms
                    to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary,
                    capricious, nor unreasonable.
                 3. ____: ____. In instances when an appellate court is required to review
                    cases for error appearing on the record, questions of law are nonetheless
                    reviewed de novo on the record.
                 4. Evidence: Appeal and Error. Where credible evidence is in conflict on
                    a material issue of fact, the appellate court considers, and may give great
                    weight to, the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses
                    and accepted one version of the facts rather than another.
                 5. Abandonment: Evidence: Proof. In order for a court to find that
                    abandonment has occurred, the petitioning party bears the burden of
                    proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent abandoned
                    the child.
                 6. Abandonment: Proof. To constitute abandonment, it must appear that
                    there has been, by the parents, a giving up or total desertion of the minor
                    child. There must be shown an absolute relinquishment of the custody
                    and control of the minor and thus the laying aside by the parents of all
                    care for the minor.
                 7. Abandonment: Words and Phrases. Abandonment may be found
                    where there is willful or intentional conduct on the part of the parent
                    which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relin-
                    quish all parental claims to the child, or a willful neglect and refusal to
                    perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support.
                                - 796 -
          Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                   315 Nebraska Reports
                     IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                          Cite as 315 Neb. 795

8. Abandonment: Evidence. The conduct constituting abandonment must
   appear by clear and convincing evidence to be willful, intentional, or
   voluntary, without just cause or excuse.

  Appeal from the County Court for Douglas County: Derek
R. Vaughn, Judge. Affirmed.
  Lindsay R. Belmont, of Koenig  |  Dunne, P.C., L.L.O., for
appellants.
  Lisa M. Gonzalez, of Johnson & Pekny, L.L.C., for appellee.
  Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
   Papik, J.
   Kelley L. and Richard L., a married couple, filed a peti-
tion for stepparent adoption in county court. They sought to
have Richard adopt Kelley’s daughter, Kate S. They alleged
that the consent of Kate’s father, Dustin S., was not required
because Dustin had abandoned Kate. Following a hearing
at which abandonment was the sole issue, the county court
denied the petition for adoption, and Kelley and Richard
appeal. We find no error on the record, and we affirm.
                        I. BACKGROUND
               1. Events Preceding Petition
                       for Adoption
   The following evidence was presented to the county court at
the hearing on Kelley and Richard’s petition for adoption.
             (a) District Court Dissolution Decree
   Kelley and Dustin were married in 2014. They had one
child, Kate, born in 2016. According to Kelley, Dustin was
violent toward her during the marriage. In 2017, Kelley and
Dustin divorced by consent decree in district court.
   The dissolution decree gave Kelley sole physical cus-
tody of Kate and both parties joint legal custody of Kate. It
                             - 797 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

ordered Dustin to pay $600 monthly child support. It also
ordered Dustin to pay a specified portion of childcare and
medical expenses.
   The decree awarded Dustin parenting time with graduated
phases. At all times relevant here, the first phase applied. That
phase provided for supervised visits at designated times, 8
to 15 hours per week. To attain increased visitation, Dustin
agreed to abide by the parenting plan and to cooperate with
biweekly therapy for at least 4 months. The decree ordered
firearms to be secured during visits. The decree also allowed
Dustin daily telephone contact with Kate.
   Under the decree, Dustin and Kelley were to communi-
cate primarily by email or telephone and secondarily by text
message. The decree required each party to keep the other
informed of current addresses, telephone numbers, and places
of employment. It also required them to allow grandparents
and extended families reasonable access to Kate.

          (b) Protection Order; Dustin’s Incarceration
   In May 2017, Kelley obtained an ex parte protection order
against Dustin for herself and Kate. Kelley explained that
when she picked up Kate from a visit with Dustin, they were
together, unsupervised, with “a gun out next to the bed with
Kate.” Kelley testified that Dustin was suicidal and alluded to
“familicide.” Kelley, however, agreed to have the protection
order dismissed in June 2017.
   In July 2017, Dustin was incarcerated after he was charged
with second degree murder. For the first 3 to 4 months of
Dustin’s incarceration, Kelley took Kate to see him once a
week. By December 2017, Kelley was no longer taking Kate to
visit Dustin, though some telephone contact continued.
   During Dustin’s incarceration, he continued to pay monthly
child support by automatic withdrawal and contributed to
childcare and medical expenses, with assistance from his
mother, Rhonda A., as his power of attorney.
                             - 798 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

           (c) Dustin Transferred to Regional Center;
                    Communication Ceased;
                        Dustin Released
   In September 2018, Dustin was transferred to a regional
center. Kelley never took Kate to see Dustin there. Dustin
testified that when Kelley cited the distance to the regional
center as an impediment to visits, he offered to pay Kelley for
fuel and for her time, but he said Kelley “wasn’t interested
in doing it.” While Dustin was at the regional center, Kelley
called him a few times, and he initiated telephone calls with
Kate approximately twice a month. Dustin recalled that on
one occasion he had identical children’s books sent to him and
to Kate, with the intention of reading them to her.
   Dustin continued to meet his monthly child support obliga-
tion. But around December 2018, Dustin ceased contributing
to childcare and medical expenses when Kelley stopped pro-
viding him with bills and receipts. Kelley admitted that she
did not give Dustin the information he would need to pay the
expenses directly.
   In July 2019, Kelley terminated communication with
Dustin and his family. At that time, Kelley stopped answering
Dustin’s calls to Kate. Kelley testified that around that time,
she was “called to be a witness” in Dustin’s criminal matter.
For several years preceding July 2019, Kelley and Kate had
frequent contact and visits with Dustin’s mother, Rhonda.
But in July 2019, Kelley blocked Rhonda and Dustin’s other
family members on social media, and Kelley changed her
telephone number without giving her new number to Dustin
or to anyone in his family. That same month, Kelley moved
and did not update her address with Dustin, his family, or the
district court. Rhonda testified that at that time, she tried to
contact Kelley by telephone, email, and social media, but her
calls would not go through, her emails “bounce[d] back,” and
she could not view Kelley’s social media profile.
   Dustin was released from the regional center in September
2019. The criminal charges against him were dismissed and
were not refiled.
                             - 799 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

   Without Kelley’s contact information, Dustin tried to reach
her on social media in October 2019, but Kelley blocked him
and did not respond. Dustin testified that he had lost Kelley’s
email address during his incarceration. Rhonda testified that
after Dustin’s release, she assisted him in trying to contact
Kelley through telephone, email, and social media, again with-
out success.
   Kelley testified that she did not have Dustin’s contact infor-
mation after his release but did try to locate him. Kelley testi-
fied that she believed the email address she had for Dustin
was not working when he was copied on an email but did
not answer.

            (d) Dustin Seeks Modification; Kelley
               Seeks Termination; District Court
                 Orders Reunification Therapy
   In November 2019, Dustin filed a complaint to modify the
divorce decree in district court, seeking changes to parenting
time and child support. Dustin’s complaint provided the city
and state where he resided, but not his street address. It was
served on Kelley at her workplace.
   Kelley filed an answer and counterclaim to terminate
Dustin’s parental rights. “Due to safety concerns,” she
requested that Kate’s address not be disclosed. Kelley alleged
that Dustin had had no contact with Kate since 2017 and had
failed to exercise his parenting time. Kelley requested termi-
nation based on the assertion that Dustin could not discharge
his parental responsibilities due to mental illness or mental
deficiency pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(5) (Reissue
2016) and on Kate’s best interests. In the alternative, Kelley
requested appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL).
   Subsequently, Dustin filed a motion to enforce visitation,
and Kelley filed a motion for a psychological evaluation
of Dustin.
   In April 2020, the district court granted Dustin’s motion
to enforce visitation, subject to limitations. It ordered Dustin
                              - 800 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

to first exercise parenting time in a therapeutic setting, facili-
tated by therapist Glenda Cottam, and ordered Dustin’s rou-
tine parenting time under the original first graduated phase to
resume upon Cottam’s recommendation. The district court also
ordered Dustin to submit to a full psychological evaluation.
The district court held the GAL motion in abeyance.
   Kelley testified that there had been no district court orders
resolving Dustin’s complaint to modify the decree or her coun-
terclaim to terminate Dustin’s parental rights, and the record
contains no such orders.

             (e) Reunification Therapy Incomplete;
              No Current Psychological Evaluation
   Both Dustin and Kelley spoke to Cottam on the telephone
in May 2020, but therapeutic parenting time did not occur.
Dustin testified that he never heard back from Cottam after
his initial conversation with her, even though he called her
office regarding a followup session. But Cottam testified that
she was not aware that Dustin had tried to reach her through
her office. Cottam testified that the “next step” would have
been to observe Kate and Kelley in person, and Dustin testi-
fied that he paid for the session; however, the session did not
occur. According to Cottam, Kelley told her that her doctor
advised her not to have an in-person appointment for a while,
due to concerns about COVID-19 exposure. Cottam reported
she would have been able to move forward with Dustin had
he reached out, regardless of what Kelley was doing. There
was also testimony that Cottam emailed counsel for both par-
ties seeking followup information regarding Dustin, but that
Cottam did not receive any response.
   Dustin did not obtain a psychological evaluation as ordered
by the district court. Dustin testified that in response to
the order, he told the Veterans’ Administration (VA) he
needed a psychological evaluation to see his daughter and
his “doctor wrote [him] three sentences.” The county court
received documentation that Dustin obtained a copy of his VA
                             - 801 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

psychological evaluation completed in October 2019, prior
to the order requiring an evaluation. Cottam testified that a
psychological evaluation of Dustin would “[a]bsolutely” aid
in the reunification therapy between Dustin and Kate because
Cottam did not know either parent or Kate prior to her
involvement in the matter but that the absence of the psycho-
logical evaluation did not prevent her from moving forward
with reunification therapy.
              (f) Dustin Stops Paying Child Support
   Dustin remained current on his $600-per-month child sup-
port obligation until May 2020 when he stopped his automatic
payment. Dustin explained that he stopped paying child sup-
port when he learned that Kelley had received an apportion-
ment of his VA benefits in the amount of $500 per month for
25 months, starting in September 2017. When asked whether
there were conversations with child support enforcement per-
sonnel to obtain a credit for the apportionment payments
Kelley received, Dustin testified, “That’s what I want to have
happen. I don’t know that it ever—I mean, if I—if it shows me
still behind, it, you know, probably didn’t happen.” Rhonda
testified that Dustin indicated to her that once “the apportion-
ment money was kind of r[u]n out,” he would begin to pay
child support again.
            2. Kelley and Richard Petition for
                Adoption in County Court;
                Consent of District Court
   On April 1, 2021, Kelley and Richard filed a petition
for adoption in county court. They sought to have Richard,
whom Kelley married in January 2020, adopt Kate, and
they attached Kelley’s consent to the adoption. The petition
alleged that Dustin’s consent to the adoption was not required
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(2)(c) (Reissue 2016) because
Dustin had legally abandoned Kate for at least 6 months.
The petition acknowledged that a modification proceeding
was pending in the district court. On April 6, 2021, in the
                             - 802 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

district court, Kelley filed a motion seeking that court’s con-
sent to Richard’s adoption of Kate pursuant to the version of
§ 43-104(1)(b) in effect at that time. The motion was served
on Dustin’s counsel.
   On May 11, 2021, the district court granted the motion
for consent to adoption following a hearing; Kelley appeared
at the hearing with counsel, but Dustin did not appear.
Dustin testified that he was not notified of the hearing by
his counsel, who had withdrawn a few days before, or by
Kelley’s counsel.
   On June 18, 2021, the county court appointed a GAL to
investigate whether Dustin had abandoned Kate. The GAL
later met with Kate, who identified Richard as “Daddy” and
denied considering anyone else a “dad.”
   Represented by new counsel, Dustin filed an objection to
the adoption in county court in October 2021. He alleged
that he had not legally abandoned Kate and that adoption by
Richard was not in Kate’s best interests.
   The GAL testified that in November or December 2021,
Dustin talked to her about the case. Dustin expressed to the
GAL that he wanted a relationship with Kate and wanted to be
part of her life.

            3. Hearing on Petition for Adoption
   The county court conducted a hearing on the petition for
adoption in June and August 2022, identifying abandonment
as the sole issue. The preceding evidence was presented.

                    4. County Court Order
   The county court determined that Dustin had not abandoned
Kate, granted Dustin’s objection to the adoption, and denied
the petition for adoption.
   The county court reasoned that although Dustin did not
“take all the necessary steps he needed to be involved in
[Kate’s] life,” did not take all the steps to complete reunifica-
tion therapy, and had not paid the required child support, “the
                             - 803 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

evidence persuades the [county court] that [Kelley] hindered
[Dustin] and [Rhonda] from having meaningful contact or
for that matter, a relationship with Kate.” The county court
specifically noted that it found Rhonda’s testimony “most
credible.” The county court stated that based on the record,
it was unable to find that Dustin’s actions demonstrated that
he had completely deserted Kate. It continued, “Additionally,
this Court concludes that the ongoing unsettled matters in
the District Court need resolution. If [Dustin] fails to comply
with the Orders of the District Court, the issue regarding ter-
minating his parental rights could be litigated.” The county
court determined that Kelley and Richard had not established
by clear and convincing evidence that Dustin had aban-
doned Kate.

                II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
   Kelley and Richard assign that the county court erred (1) in
finding that Dustin did not abandon Kate pursuant to § 43-104
and (2) “in finding that the district court matters needed
resolution prior to litigating the issue of terminating Dustin’s
parental rights.”

                III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
   [1-3] The standard of review in an appeal from a court’s
ruling on an adoption petition is error on the record. In re
Adoption of Faith F., 313 Neb. 491, 984 N.W.2d 640 (2023).
When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record,
the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is sup-
ported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capri-
cious, nor unreasonable. Id. In instances when an appellate
court is required to review cases for error appearing on the
record, questions of law are nonetheless reviewed de novo on
the record. Id.
   [4] Where credible evidence is in conflict on a mate-
rial issue of fact, the appellate court considers, and may
give great weight to, the fact that the trial court heard and
                            - 804 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                  IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 795

observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts
rather than another. Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., 287 Neb. 617,
843 N.W.2d 820 (2014).
                         IV. ANALYSIS
                        1. Abandonment
   In Nebraska, the matter of adoption is statutory. See In re
Adoption of Micah H., 301 Neb. 437, 918 N.W.2d 834 (2018).
Amendments to the statute at issue here, § 43-104, took effect
after Kelley and Richard filed their petition for adoption but
before the county court issued its order. See 2022 Neb. Laws,
L.B. 741, § 6. Because those amendments are not mentioned
by the parties and did not substantively change the provisions
relevant here, this opinion hereafter refers to the most recent
version of the statute, § 43-104 (Cum. Supp. 2022).
   [5] Under § 43-104, an adoption cannot be decreed unless
a biological parent either consents to the adoption or comes
clearly within a statutory exception to such consent. See In
re Adoption of Micah H., supra. Kelley and Richard’s peti-
tion sought to proceed without Dustin’s consent using one
such statutory exception: abandonment. Section 43-104(4)(b)
provides that consent to adoption is not required of a parent
who has “abandoned the child for at least six months next
preceding the filing of the adoption petition.” In order for a
court to find that abandonment has occurred, the petitioning
party bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent abandoned the child. In re Adoption
of Micah H., supra. See, also, Malousek v. Meyer, 309 Neb.
803, 962 N.W.2d 676 (2021) (clear and convincing evidence
is evidence which produces in trier of fact firm belief or
conviction about existence of fact to be proved). Kelley and
Richard claim that the county court erred in finding that they
had not satisfied this burden. They essentially contend that
the county court’s order was not supported by competent evi-
dence. We disagree.
                             - 805 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

   [6-8] The 6-month statutory period in § 43-104 is not viewed
in a vacuum. See In re Adoption of Micah H., supra. A court
may consider the evidence of a parent’s conduct, either before
or after the statutory period, because this evidence is relevant
to a determination of whether the purpose and intent of that
parent was to abandon his or her child or children. See id. See,
also, Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D., supra (question of abandon-
ment is largely one of intent, to be determined in each case
from all facts and circumstances). To constitute abandonment,
it must appear that there has been, by the parent, a giving up
or total desertion of the minor child. In re Adoption of Micah
H., supra. There must be shown an absolute relinquishment
of the custody and control of the minor and thus the laying
aside by the parent of all care for the minor. Id. We have also
said that abandonment may be found where there is “willful
or intentional conduct on the part of the parent which evinces
a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all
parental claims to the child, or a willful neglect and refusal
to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care
and support.” See id. at 453, 918 N.W.2d at 848. The conduct
constituting abandonment must appear by clear and convincing
evidence to be willful, intentional, or voluntary, without just
cause or excuse. Id.
   Guided by these principles, the county court acknowledged
that Dustin could have done more to be involved in Kate’s
life, including paying child support and completing reuni-
fication therapy with Cottam. However, it found Rhonda’s
testimony to be most credible and determined that Kelley,
for reasons of which the county court was aware, hindered
Dustin from having meaningful contact with Kate. Based on
this evidence, the county court was unable to find that Dustin
demonstrated a complete desertion of Kate such that he had
abandoned her. Upon our review for errors on the record, we
conclude that the county court’s decision was supported by
competent evidence.
                            - 806 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                  IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                       Cite as 315 Neb. 795

   The county court heard evidence that during the years
preceding the statutory 6-month period, Dustin’s relationship
with Kate was indeed hampered by his 2017 incarceration and
his subsequent transfer to a regional center in 2018. However,
the record shows that during those years, Dustin continued to
pay child support. Dustin also continued to contribute toward
childcare and medical expenses until Kelley stopped provid-
ing him with the necessary information to do so in December
2018. While he was detained, Dustin attempted to maintain a
connection with Kate through visits and telephone calls, but
eventually, Kelley stopped bringing Kate for visits.
   It is undisputed that a few months before Dustin’s
September 2019 release from the regional center, Kelley
ceased all contact with Dustin and his family. She changed
her telephone number and address without notifying Dustin
and his family and blocked them on social media. Rhonda,
whom the county court found most credible, testified that
after Dustin’s release, she helped Dustin in efforts to reach
Kelley by telephone, email, and social media, without suc-
cess. At oral argument, Kelley and Richard acknowledged the
county court’s credibility determination, and they conceded
that testimony by Rhonda supported the notion that Dustin
did not pull away from Kate, but, rather, Kelley pulled Kate
away from Dustin.
   In May 2020, Dustin unilaterally stopped his child sup-
port payments, but his testimony showed that he did not view
this as a complete withdrawal of financial support for Kate.
His testimony, corroborated by Rhonda, was that he believed
he was entitled to a substantial credit for the apportionment
funds Kelley had withdrawn for 25 months without his knowl-
edge. Although we do not suggest Kelley’s actions automati-
cally freed Dustin from his child support obligations, neither
do we see Dustin’s actions as conclusively demonstrating a
settled purpose to cease supporting Kate altogether.
   We view the evidence regarding Dustin’s efforts to com-
plete reunification therapy and a psychological evaluation in
                             - 807 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

much the same way. Perhaps Dustin could have done more,
but there was nonetheless competent evidence that he did not
intend to relinquish his relationship with Kate.
   We also recognize that other than Dustin’s perceived child
support “credit,” the record does not contain any evidence that
he supported or contacted Kate during the 6 months preceding
the petition for adoption, from October 2020 to April 2021.
But this period was preceded by Kelley’s efforts to exclude
Dustin from Kate’s life by depriving him of the information
he needed to reach her, and we have previously reasoned that
such actions can bear on the question of whether a parent
intended to abandon a child. See Jeremiah J. v. Dakota D.,
287 Neb. 617, 843 N.W.2d 820 (2014). Whatever Kelley’s
reasons for her actions, under the circumstances in this case,
we conclude there was competent evidence that Dustin had
not demonstrated a “settled purpose to forgo all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims” to Kate or “a willful
neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations
of parental care and support.” In re Adoption of Micah H., 301
Neb. 437, 453, 918 N.W.2d 834, 848 (2018).
   Kelley and Richard cite other evidence that tended to sup-
port a finding that Dustin abandoned Kate. But our standard
of review does not allow us to weigh the facts anew. Our
inquiry is whether there was competent evidence to support
the county court’s finding that Dustin did not abandon Kate.
As we have explained, we conclude that there was.

                  2. Reference to District
                     Court Proceedings
   Kelley and Richard also take issue with the following state-
ment in the county court’s order: “Additionally, this Court
concludes that the ongoing unsettled matters in the District
Court need resolution. If [Dustin] fails to comply with the
Orders of the District Court, the issue regarding terminating
his parental rights could be litigated.” Kelley and Richard
assign that the county court erred “in finding that the district
                             - 808 -
         Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
                  315 Nebraska Reports
                   IN RE ADOPTION OF KATE S.
                        Cite as 315 Neb. 795

court matters needed resolution prior to litigating the issue of
terminating Dustin’s parental rights.” They argue that “[t]he
interplay between the district court matters and the adoption
matter should bear no weight on the issue of abandonment,”
brief for appellants at 28, because the district court had con-
sented to the adoption proceedings and “[t]here was nothing
legally requiring resolution of the modification matter in
district court prior to an adoption being decreed,” id. at 27.
On this point at oral argument, Kelley and Richard further
explained that the county court erred in considering the status
of the district court proceedings in its ultimate finding regard-
ing abandonment. We disagree and discern no error.
   We read the county court’s reference to unresolved pro-
ceedings in district court to acknowledge, as we mentioned
above, that abandonment is not the only path to bypass paren-
tal consent to adoption under § 43-104. Section 43-104(4)(c)
provides that parental consent to adoption is not required of a
parent whose parental rights have been terminated. Given this
framework, we understand the county court to have observed
that if Dustin’s parental rights to Kate were subsequently ter-
minated in response to Kelley’s earlier motion in the district
court modification proceedings, adoption could be pursued
without Dustin’s consent. Indeed, at oral argument, Kelley and
Richard agreed with this reading. Based on this understanding
of the county court’s statement, we are not persuaded that it
was in error. Abandonment was the only exception to consent
Kelley and Richard alleged in their petition for adoption, and
we do not understand the county court to have considered the
status of the district court proceedings in deciding that Kelley
and Richard had failed to prove that Dustin abandoned Kate.
Therefore, the county court did not err.
                     V. CONCLUSION
  Finding Kelley and Richard’s assigned errors without merit,
we affirm the county court’s order.
                                                Affirmed.