Court Opinion

ID: 9464459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:33:47.474713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:38.342667
License: Public Domain

OAKES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly states the test of law under the Equal Pay Act of 1963:1 “equal work” need not be “identical” work; as stated by Judge Friendly, “inconsequential differences can be disregarded as long as the jobs are ‘substantially equal.’ ” Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); accord, e. g., Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, 538 F.2d 859, 861 (10th Cir. 1976); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905, 90 S.Ct. 1696, 26 L.Ed.2d 64 (1970). Because I think that the district court misconceived this test, I would reverse and remand without indulging in the appellate factfinding that it seems to me otherwise becomes necessary to sustain the judgment below.2
The district court evidently thought that the fundamental question is whether the light and heavy cleaners’ jobs are the same, not whether they are substantially equal. This erroneous standard appears in the explicit language of the court’s opinion:
In any E.P.A. action the threshold question always is: are the jobs equal. Plaintiffs have the burden of proving that as the aggrieved parties they perform equal work, not merely that a wage differential exists and that the jobs are similar.
407 F.Supp. at 1374 (emphasis in original). The district court’s “equal” is not qualified by the requisite “substantially.”3 The court’s conclusory factual discussion, too, reveals an application of the wrong legal test. It finds that “[wjhile there are many similarities between the work done by the light cleaners and heavy cleaners, their work is not the same.” Id. at 1374 (emphasis added). The district court then concludes that “the jobs of light cleaner and heavy cleaner are different,” in that *963“[g]oing beyond the job descriptions . it is clear that the job of heavy cleaner involves greater effort than that of light cleaner.” Id. at 1374-75 (footnotes omitted). It is therefore apparent that in the district court’s eyes the critical inquiry is whether the work is the “same” or “different.”
The district court’s failure to use the proper test is further demonstrated by the lack of analysis relevant to the issue of substantiality. Thus, the district court concludes, without specific evidentiary findings, that “the job of heavy cleaner involves greater effort than that of light cleaner.” Id. at 1375.
But nowhere is it said that the differences between the jobs are of such magnitude that they fail to meet the judicially imposed substantiality test. As the Tenth Circuit recently explained in a similar case upholding the trial court’s determination of substantially equal custodial jobs, “[a]ll the work was within the general cleaning function and the slight differences in kinds of effort would not prevent a finding of substantially equal efforts.” Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, supra, 538 F.2d at 864.4 Nor does the district court’s opinion refer to very similar cases from other jurisdictions5 which have found maid and janitorial functions to be substantially equal under the Act. Such a discussion would seem essential because these cases analyze the degree of similarity between maid and janitor work sufficient to meet the legal test and come to a conclusion contrary to that of the district court.
In short, the opinion below indicates to me that the district judge was proceeding under a misapprehension of law. The only remaining question, then, assuming this to be true, is whether the undisputed facts are so clear that we are required as a matter of law to reach the same conclusion even under the correct, substantiality test. Cf. *964Yanish v. Barber, 232 F.2d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 1956) (remand is unnecessary when findings are insufficient if the record presents no genuine issue of material fact) (quoting Burman v. Lenkin Construction Co., 80 U.S. App.D.C. 125, 126, 149 F.2d 827, 828 (1945)); W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1138, at 570-71 (Wright ed. 1961) (same).
Without belaboring the issue I think that the facts are not so clear. They cannot be said to compel the conclusion that cleaning “public” areas such as hallways and lobbies requires more overall effort than cleaning less trafficked areas such as offices, classrooms or libraries, or that the heavier equipment necessary for the former job, which is either used for infrequent periods or jointly with other janitors or is on readily movable wheels, requires greater overall effort. The effort expended by janitors who are required to clean public areas frequently and to use a wet mop would appear to be balanced by the effort of maids who must clean larger areas, move furniture in order to vacuum, clean hard-to-reach areas, and dust, wash and wax furniture. As the majority notes, “[s]o long as the ultimate degree of exertion remains comparable, the mere fact that two jobs call for effort different in kind will not render them unequal.” Ante, at 959. .
There appear to be two differences between the work of the restroom janitors and the maids: the former use a wet mop and some of them push trash trucks out to the street. The minimal weight differential between wet and dry mops (two or three pounds as compared to one-quarter pound) hardly requires a finding of substantial extra effort, especially when the dry mops must be maneuvered around large numbers of seats and benches.6 Similarly, the pushing of trash trucks for eight' to twenty minutes a day is not so enormous a task as to require a finding of substantial difference as a matter of law. In fact these differences could be considered minor and incidental under the correct test. See Brennan v. South Davis Community Hospital, supra, 538 F.2d at 863-64; Shultz v. American Can Company-Dixie Products, 424 F.2d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 1970). I could go on, but consider it unnecessary. The cleaning jobs do not, as a matter of law, fall outside the confines of the act.
Firmly believing that Judge Owen would give the facts a different application were he to have before him the correct test of law that my brethren duly evoke, I would let him have the opportunity to do so rather than sustain him as a matter of law on the facts. I therefore dissent, and would reverse and remand.

. 29 U.S.C. “206(d)(1) (1970).

. Were I to engage in this exercise, I am doubtful that I would arrive at the same result as the majority, but I do not consider factfinding my function.

. True, the opinion quotes from Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works which enunciates the substantially equal test. The quote in its entirety is as follows:
[T]he complaint must be dismissed even if the wage differentials were unreasonably large in comparison with the actual differences in skill, effort, responsibility or working conditions and were based on discriminatory motivation; Congress did not intend to put either the Secretary or the courts in the business of evaluating jobs and determining what constituted a proper differential for unequal work.
407 F.Supp. at 1374 (quoting Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1973), aff’d sub nom. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (footnote omitted)). This portion of Hodgson, however, does not address the issue when jobs are substantially equal. It discusses the requirement of dismissal once it is determined that the work is not substantially equal, notwithstanding excessive wage differentials between the unequal jobs.

. To be sure, this particular holding was rendered after the court below decided this case. However, it rested on the Secretary’s regulations which were not alluded to, though available, below, and which had been relied on in Brennan v. Board of Educ., Jersey City, N. J., 374 F.Supp. 817, 828-29 (D.N.J.1974), in applying the substantial equality standard. The regulations provide in pertinent part:
Effort is concerned with the measurement of the physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of a job. Where jobs are otherwise equal under the Act, and there is no substantial difference in the amount or degree of effort which must be expended in performing the jobs under comparison, the jobs may require equal effort in their performance even though the effort may be exerted in different ways on the two jobs. Differences only in the kind of effort required to be expended in such a situation will not justify wage differentials.
29 C.F.R. § 800.127 (1976). These regulations also furnish examples to aid in determining whether equality of effort exists in a given case:
To illustrate the principle of equal effort exerted in different ways, suppose that a male checker employed by a supermarket is required to spend part of his time carrying out heavy packages or replacing stock involving the lifting of heavy items whereas a female checker is required to devote an equal degree of effort during a similar portion of her time to performing fill-in work requiring greater dexterity — such as rearranging displays of spices or other small items. The difference in kind of effort required of the employees does not appear to make their effort unequal in any respect which would justify a wage differential, where such differences in kind of effort expended to perform the job are not ordinarily considered a factor in setting wage levels. Further, the occasional or sporadic performance of an activity which may require extra physical or mental exertion is not alone sufficient to justify a finding of unequal effort.
29 C.F.R. § 800.128 (1976). While the regulations are not controlling upon the courts, they
do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 164, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944).

. E. g., Brennan v. Goose Creek Consol. Indep. School Dist., 519 F.2d 53, 58 (5th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Board of Educ., Jersey City, N. J., supra, 374 F.Supp. at 828-30. Subsequent to the district court’s opinion, the Tenth Circuit also found maid and janitorial efforts substantially equal. Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., supra, 538 F.2d at 863-64.

. The heavier water pails carried on dollies with a total loaded weight of 140 pounds are not significantly different from the maids’ 111-pound cleaning carts. Furthermore, the maids carry their lighter water pails by hand.