Court Opinion

ID: 9514725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:51:24.123161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:20.408940
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 29.] The majority opinion states that the South Dakota Legislature acted within *389the ambits of our constitution because it “created an additional nonagricultural classification, not a second agricultural class.” I respectfully disagree.
[¶30.] Less than three years ago a unanimous South Dakota Supreme Court held in Gould v. Pennington Cty. Bd. of Equal, 1997 SD 129, ¶ 18, 570 N.W.2d 846, 850:
Some statutes define methods of valuing agricultural land; some statutes define methods of assessing land; and some statutes define methods of measuring market value. SDCL 10-6-58 does none of these. It creates a new classification. It takes land that is clearly agricultural land and treats it as agricultural land held for resale or agricultural land for which the owner may have paid too much. This Court has rejected the notion that the law requires or permits an assessor to consider whether the land is economically self-sufficient. We are reluctant to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional. SDCL 10-6-58, however, is unconstitutional, because it attempts to create more than one class of agricultural land in violation of art. VIII, § 15 of the South Dakota Constitution.
How quickly things change. SDCL 10-6-33.1414 impermissibly creates two classes of agricultural land: agricultural land that is taxed as agricultural land and agricultural land that is taxed as nonagricultural land. The statute does not define methods of valuation, assessment or measurement of market value. Instead, it creates a new classification of agricultural land for taxation purposes only and is, therefore, prohibited by our constitution.
[1131.] SDCL 10-6-33.14 refers to “agricultural land, as defined in § 10-6-31.3 [.] ” (emphasis added). Under SDCL 10-6-31.3, land must meet two of the three provided criteria to be classified as agricultural land for tax purposes:
(1) At least thirty-three and one-third percent of the total family gross income of the owner is derived from the pursuit of agriculture ...;
(2) Its principal use is devoted to the raising and harvesting of crops or timber or fruit trees, the rearing, feeding, and management of farm livestock, poultry, fish, or nursery stock ...;
(3) It consists of not less than twenty acres of unplatted land or is a part of a contiguous ownership of not less than eighty acres of unplatted land.
Clearly, the legislature made great efforts to “make a meaningful distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land.” Gould, 1997 SD 129, ¶ 8, 570 N.W.2d at 848. See also SDCL 10-6-31 (distinguishing between agricultural and nonagricul-tural land for taxation purposes). Land is to be classified as agricultural or nonagri-cultural after considering the satisfaction of statutory characteristics (gross income derived from the land, principal use, and size), not solely on the purchase price. To do so violates our holding in Nielsen v. Erickson, 272 N.W.2d 82, 86 (S.D.1978):
When classifying [land], there is nothing in the law that requires or permits an assessor to consider whether the land is economically self-sufficient; whether the owner has another occupation; whether the owner’s primary source of income is connected to the land; whether the amount or value of the machinery is related to the size of the tract; whether the value of the house reflects the value of the land; and whether the size of the acreage creates a viable agricultural unit. The legislature has not identified these factors as [ ] determinative of whether land is used exclusively for ag*390ricultural purposes, and only it can do so.
(emphasis added). In other words, when classifying land as agricultural or nonagri-cultural, the county and legislature are limited to applying the criteria set forth in SDCL 10-6-31 and 10-6-31.3.15 The only way a parcel of land fails to be classified as agricultural is if it no longer meets that criteria.
[¶ 32.] Contrary to clear constitutional and statutory directives, SDCL 10T6-33.14 provides that “agricultural land ... which sells for more than [150] percent of its agricultural income value is hereby classified ... as a nonagricultural acreage.” By its plain language, this statute divides agricultural land, as defined in SDCL 10-6-31.3, into two separate classes based on the purchase price: (1) agricultural land that was purchased for more than 150% of the agricultural income value and (2) agricultural land that was purchased for less than 150% of the agricultural income value. Thus, despite meeting the agricultural land definition in SDCL 10-6-31.3 this land is considered nonagricultural land if it was purchased for more than 150 percent of its agricultural income value, under SDCL 10-6-33.14. This arbitrary method of classification is unconstitutional because, as indicated, it creates two classes of agricultural land: agricultural land taxed as agricultural land and agricultural land taxed as nonagricultural land. There is simply no constitutional basis for this segregation of agricultural land.
[¶ 33.] Our recent holding in Gould, 1997 SD 129, 570 N.W.2d 846, is controlling here. Gould held that SDCL 10-6-58, the predecessor statute to SDCL 10-6-33.14, violated article VIII, § 15 of the South Dakota Constitution.16 That statute provided:
Any agricultural land, as defined in § 10-6-31.3, which sells for more than one hundred fifty percent of its agricultural income value is hereby classified for purposes of ad valorem taxation. The agricultural income value shall be determined pursuant to § 10-6-62.
In an apparent response to our unanimous decision in Gould, the legislature repealed that statute and enacted this one, SDCL 10-6-33.14. The only difference between the two statutes is the addition of the phrase “is hereby classified for purposes of ad valorem taxation as a nonagricultural *391acreage.” SDCL 10-6-38.14 (emphasis added). This additional language does not cure the continued constitutional violation. Furthermore, constitutional compliance is not restored by the additional language in SDCL 10-6-31.3, “for tax purposes, land is not agricultural land if the land is classified pursuant to § 10-6-33.14 as a nonag-ricultural acreage.”17 Our constitution can not be circumvented by effortlessly adding similar and meaningless verbiage into two statutes for the appearance of consistency. Therefore, our analysis in Gould is applicable:
With the passage of [SDCL 10-6-33.14], any meaningful definition of agricultural property is blurred, to say the least. The statute attempts to treat land that is clearly agricultural land (as defined by [10-6-31.3] or by any other logical definition) and value it by multiplying the price for which it sold times the level of assessment of other agricultural land in the county. The adopted criteria bears no relationship to any agricultural factors (types of land, productivity, etc.) but is based almost entirely on its sales price. Valuing the agricultural land, as in the present case, based upon its sales price is to set it apart from agricultural property and treat it as ‘nonagricultural,’ or other property.
1997 SD 129, ¶ 17, 570 N.W.2d at 849-50. In other words, not only is the legislature constitutionally prohibited from creating more than one class of agricultural land, it is also constitutionally prohibited from using the purchase price as the sole distinguishing factor between agricultural properties because the purchase price “bears no relationship to any agricultural factors.” This is precisely what the legislature did here.
[¶ 34.] The County claims the legislature merely re-classified this agricultural land as “nonagricultural acreage” instead of creating a second class of agricultural land. However, SDCL 10-6-33.14 amounts to nothing more than a mere guise of constitutional compliance; it does not render the disparate treatment of agricultural property constitutional. The legislature can not do by statute what the constitution prohibits. As indicated, our constitution can not be circumvented that easily. In order to treat agricultural land as separate classes, the legislature needs to seek a constitutional amendment instead of attempting to circumvent the constitution.18 The County has proposed such an amendment, which may appear on the November 2000 general election ballot.
[¶ 35.] While noting SDCL 10-11-16, the majority opinion attempts to justify the legislature’s creation of two separate classes of agricultural land by pointing out a purported “appeal route” as a “method for taxpayers to return their land to agricultural taxation status.” However, SDCL 10-6-33.17 attempts to provide relief to Thares or to - any taxpayers similarly situated, but it does not cure the constitutional defect. It is too little, too late.
[¶ 36.] SDCL 10-6-33.17 provides that “[a]ny land which is classified [as nonagri-cultural land per SDCL 10-6-33.14] shall remain so classified for a minimum of five years.” In effect, this statute provides no immediate relief and no means of appeal*392ing the Board’s decision for five years. In conjunction with SDCL 10-6-33.14, this statute allows the County to create a separate class of agricultural land, based solely on the purchase price, and maintain that status for a minimum of five years. Thereafter, if the landowner meets the criteria in 10-6-31.3, the land may be reclassified as agricultural. The bottom line is that the taxpayer is being punished for a period of five years, without an immediate remedy, for purchasing agricultural land for more than 150 percent of its agricultural income value despite satisfying the statutory definition of agricultural land in SDCL 10-6-31.3. As indicated, too little, too late.
[¶ 37.] The goal or legislative end (parity among taxpayers) is to be commended but the means selected by the legislature is simply unconstitutional. Unconstitutional means can not justify the end, no matter how desirable. Any remedy to the problem must be by constitutional amendment, not legislation. Just as we determined SDCL 10-6-58 to be unconstitutional in Gould, SDCL 10-6-33.14 “flies in the face of the constitutional amendment,” 1997 SD 129, ¶ 16, 570 N.W.2d at 849, and we should reverse and remand.

. This statute provides:
Any agricultural land, as defined in § 10-6-31.3, which sells for more than one hundred fifty percent of its agricultural income value is hereby classified for purposes of ad valorem taxation as a nonagricultural acreage. The agricultural income value shall be determined pursuant to § 10-6-33.15. (emphasis added).

. This determination is clearly supported by the plain, statutory language used in SDCL 10-6-33.14: "Any agricultural land, as defined in § 10-6-33.14, which sells for more than one hundred fifty percent of its agricultural income value is hereby classified ... as a nonagricultural acreage." (emphasis added). If the legislature intended to use criteria other than those set forth in SDCL 10-6-31.3, it would not have chose to restrict the definition of agricultural land as “defined in § 10-6-31.3."

. The majority opinion relies on Florida Supreme Court case, Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla.1976). This case, however, is distinguished from the present case because the Florida Constitution permits multiple classifications of agricultural land. See Fla.Const. art. VII, § 4(a) (providing "[a]gricultural land ... may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use.”). The South Dakota Constitution indisputably prohibits more than one class of agricultural land.
Additionally, in Florida, "only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified as agricultural.” Fla.Stat.Ann. § 193.461(3)(b). The Florida statutes set forth seven factors to consider in determining whether land is used for "bona fide agricultural purposes,” one of which is "the purchase price paid.” Id. Our statutes do not permit such an individualized analysis.
Finally, under the Florida statutes, there is a presumption that agricultural land is not being used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes when it is purchased for three or more times the agricultural assessment. Fla. Stat.Ann. § 193.461 (4)(c). However, the presumption is rebuttable and the burden shifts to the purchaser to present evidence that "the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture.” Id. In other words, if the purchaser can prove that he intends to continue using the land for "bona fide agricultural purposes,” the agricultural classification is reinstated regardless of the purchase price. SDCL 10-6-33.17 does not allow the purchaser to challenge a nonagricultural classification until five years have passed.

. Recently, in Butte County v. Vallery, 1999 SD 142, ¶ 16, 602 N.W.2d 284, 289, we reiterated that " 'farm management decisions cannot change the earth’s value for taxation purposes.’ ” (quoting In re Butte County, 385 N.W.2d 108, 112 (S.D.1986)). Accordingly, I fail to see how the purchase price of agricultural land alters "the earth’s value for taxation purposes.’’

. The legislature may consider the purchase ' price of agricultural land when assessing or valuing land value, but not when classifying land. See Nielsen, 272 N.W.2d at 86. As we stated in Gould : "It is permissible to classify all property for assessment and valuation, but [SDCL 10-6-33.14] is an entirely new concept that attempts to value, assess, and tax agricultural land without regard to its status as agricultural land." 1997 SD 129, ¶ 16, 570 N.W.2d at 849. See also In re Butte County, 385 N.W.2d at 113 (holding that irrigated agricultural land cannot be classified separately from nonirrigated agricultural land).