Court Opinion

ID: 9384588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 14:00:51.819717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.869837
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1984    Document: 29     Page: 1    Filed: 04/04/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                    KATHY P. WEBB,
                       Petitioner

                             v.

      OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                        2022-1984
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DA-844E-16-0084-I-1.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: April 4, 2023
                  ______________________

    KATHY P. WEBB, Pine Bluff, AR, pro se.

     JOSEPH ALAN PIXLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by REGINALD
 THOMAS BLADES, JR., BRIAN M. BOYNTON, DOUGLAS GLENN
 EDELSCHICK, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

    Before LOURIE, TARANTO, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1984    Document: 29     Page: 2    Filed: 04/04/2023

 2                                              WEBB   v. OPM

 PER CURIAM.
     Kathy P. Webb was separated from federal service on
 August 3, 2006. On May 23, 2014, almost eight years after
 her separation from federal service, Ms. Webb applied for
 disability retirement under the Federal Employees Retire-
 ment System (FERS). The Office of Personnel Manage-
 ment (OPM) disallowed Ms. Webb’s application because
 her application was not filed within the one-year statutory
 deadline prescribed by 5 U.S.C. § 8453. After unsuccess-
 fully seeking reconsideration of OPM’s decision, Ms. Webb
 appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board. An initial
 Board decision affirmed OPM’s decision, and so did the fi-
 nal Board decision. Webb v. Office of Personnel Manage-
 ment, No. DA-844E-16-0084-I-1, 2022 WL 1763200
 (M.S.P.B. May 31, 2022) (Final Order). Because Ms. Webb
 has not shown that her application was filed within the
 statutory deadline or that waiver of the one-year time limit
 is warranted, we affirm the Board decision.
                              I
      Ms. Webb was employed as a security guard by the De-
 partment of the Army in a term appointment that expired
 on August 3, 2006. On May 23, 2014, she applied for disa-
 bility retirement under FERS. OPM disallowed Ms.
 Webb’s application on May 11, 2015, because the applica-
 tion was not timely filed. She requested reconsideration of
 the OPM decision, which OPM denied on October 26, 2015,
 reciting the 2006 separation and 2014 application dates
 and explaining that 5 U.S.C. § 8453 requires an application
 for disability retirement under FERS to be filed with OPM
 “before the employee . . . is separated from the service or
 within one year thereafter.” Appx. 31. OPM also noted the
 limited basis for excusing untimeliness: a finding that the
 employee, “at the date of separation from service or within
 one year thereafter, [was] mentally incompetent.” Appx.
 31 (quoting 5 U.S.C § 8453).
Case: 22-1984    Document: 29      Page: 3    Filed: 04/04/2023

 WEBB   v. OPM                                              3

     On November 12, 2015, Ms. Webb appealed OPM’s re-
 consideration decision to the Board, asserting that OPM
 erred because Ms. Webb was “dismissed from [her] job be-
 cause of [a] medical condition.” Appx. 28. In a telephonic
 conference before the Board, Ms. Webb “did not dispute the
 fact that her application for disability retirement was un-
 timely filed and she did not claim that she was mentally
 incompetent during the relevant time period.” Appx. 11–
 12. On October 18, 2016, the assigned administrative
 judge of the Board issued an initial decision affirming
 OPM’s reconsideration decision because it was undisputed
 that Ms. Webb “untimely filed” her application, “the only
 exception to the one-year filing requirement is in the case
 where the employee is mentally incompetent,” and Ms.
 Webb did not claim, or submit evidence supporting a claim,
 “that she was prevented during the one-year time limit by
 mental incompetence from timely filing her application.”
 Appx. 12.
     Ms. Webb petitioned for full Board review on October
 25, 2016, challenging the initial decision on the ground that
 she “was laid off . . . because [she] was diagnosed with a
 medical condition” and is “disable[d].” Appx. 34. The
 Board denied Ms. Webb’s petition for full Board review on
 May 31, 2022, affirming the initial decision. The Board ex-
 plained that because it was “undisputed” that Ms. Webb
 applied for disability retirement outside the statutory one-
 year filing period, she needed to show that she was “men-
 tally incompetent during the filing period” for the time
 limit to be waived and for her application to be considered.
 Final Order at ¶ 6. The Board determined that Ms. Webb’s
 statement that she was “diagnosed with a medical condi-
 tion” and is “disable[d]” was not equivalent to a claim that
 she was “mentally incompetent during the relevant filing
 period.” Id. at ¶ 7. In the absence of any medical documen-
 tation indicating that Ms. Webb had been rendered “men-
 tally incompetent” during the relevant period, the Board
Case: 22-1984    Document: 29     Page: 4   Filed: 04/04/2023

 4                                              WEBB   v. OPM

 found that OPM properly determined that Ms. Webb was
 not entitled to a time-limit waiver. Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.
     Ms. Webb subsequently filed a petition with the Equal
 Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on June 23,
 2022, alleging that she was separated from federal service
 before her “term was . . . up” and requesting review of the
 Board’s final decision. On July 11, 2022, EEOC denied con-
 sideration of Ms. Webb’s appeal, as the Board “did not ad-
 dress any claims” within EEOC’s jurisdiction, and so,
 EEOC did not have jurisdiction to review the decision.
 EEOC Decision No. 2022003728, 2022 WL 3153856, at *1
 (July 11, 2022) (EEOC Decision); see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302.
     Ms. Webb appealed the Board’s May 31 decision to this
 court on June 29, 2022, which was within the sixty days
 permitted by 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). As explained below,
 we have jurisdiction over her appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
 1295(a)(9).
                             II
                             A
     As a threshold matter, we must address whether we
 have jurisdiction over Ms. Webb’s appeal. In her State-
 ment Concerning Discrimination, Ms. Webb indicated that
 “she argued before the Board that her adverse employment
 action was attributable to discrimination and that she
 wishes to continue to pursue her discrimination claims.”
 Order to Show Cause at 1–2, Aug. 29, 2022, ECF No. 18
 (summarizing Ms. Webb’s Statement Concerning Discrim-
 ination); Statement Concerning Discrimination, July 21,
 2022, ECF No. 8.
     We lack jurisdiction to hear a “mixed case” from the
 Board—one involving certain discrimination claims as well
 as other claims—unless the petitioner drops the discrimi-
 nation claims. Harris v. Securities & Exchange Commis-
 sion, 972 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see Perry v.
 Merit Systems Protection Board, 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1982,
Case: 22-1984     Document: 29      Page: 5    Filed: 04/04/2023

 WEBB   v. OPM                                                5

 1988 (2017) (“[I]n mixed cases . . ., the district court is the
 proper forum for judicial review.”); 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B)
 (granting our court jurisdiction over “a final order or final
 decision of the Board that raises no challenge to the Board’s
 disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel prac-
 tice” covered by, among other law, federal antidiscrimina-
 tion law); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). “A mixed case is one in
 which a federal employee (1) complains of having suffered
 a serious adverse personnel action appealable to the
 [Board] and (2) attributes the adverse action, in whole or
 in part, to bias prohibited by federal antidiscrimination
 laws.” Harris, 972 F.3d at 1317.
     On August 29, 2022, we stayed the briefing schedule in
 this case and directed the parties “to show cause whether
 this case should be dismissed or transferred” to a district
 court in light of limits on our jurisdiction to hear certain
 appeals from Board decisions. Order to Show Cause at 2,
 Aug. 29, 2022, ECF No. 18. Ms. Webb did not file a re-
 sponse to this order, and we lifted the stay on briefing on
 November 16, 2022. The government argues that this ap-
 peal is not a mixed case because Ms. Webb did not raise to
 the Board an allegation that, in disallowing her disability
 retirement application, OPM violated federal antidiscrimi-
 nation laws. We agree.
     A claim for disability retirement is not a discrimination
 claim. See, e.g., Dedrick v. Berry, 573 F.3d 1278, 1280–81
 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Although Ms. Webb claimed in some of
 her filings that her separation from federal service was due
 to a “medical condition,” Appx. 28 (appeal of OPM’s final
 decision to the Board); Appx. 34 (appeal for full Board re-
 view), or being “disable[d],” Appx. 34, neither of those
 claims allege that the OPM decision challenged before the
 Board—the decision disallowing Ms. Webb’s disability ap-
 plication—was based, in any part, on discriminatory
 grounds. See also Wallace v. Merit Systems Protection
 Board, 728 F.2d 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[W]e do not
 agree . . . that the mere pleading of discrimination totally
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 6                                                WEBB   v. OPM

 precludes the exercise of jurisdiction by this court.”). At no
 point has Ms. Webb alleged that OPM’s disallowance of her
 disability retirement application was a “serious adverse ac-
 tion prompted, in whole or in part, by . . . [a] violation of
 federal antidiscrimination laws.” See Perry, 137 S. Ct. at
 1988. This determination is consistent with EEOC’s denial
 of consideration of Ms. Webb’s appeal of the same Board
 decision because the Board did not address a discrimina-
 tion claim (and so, challenges to the Board’s decision were
 outside EEOC’s jurisdiction). EEOC Decision, 2022 WL
 3153856, at *1. Ms. Webb’s appeal challenging the Board
 decision affirming the disallowance of her disability retire-
 ment application, therefore, is not a mixed case, so we have
 jurisdiction over her appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
 See also McLaughlin v. Office of Personnel Management,
 353 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reviewing a Board
 decision affirming OPM’s denial of a request for waiver of
 the one-year time limit prescribed in 5 U.S.C. § 8453).
                               B
     We must affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) ar-
 bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed, or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”           5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). While “our review authority . . . is constrained
 regarding determinations in connection with applications
 for disability retirement,” “[w]hen the question is whether
 an applicant should be excused from normal filing dead-
 lines due to mental incompetence, our ordinary review au-
 thority is not affected.” McLaughlin, 353 F.3d at 1367.
     It remains undisputed that Ms. Webb filed her applica-
 tion for disability retirement after the one-year statutory
 window set out in 5 U.S.C. § 8453. For Ms. Webb’s appli-
 cation to be considered, therefore, this statutory time limi-
 tation would have to be waived. 5 U.S.C. § 8453. OPM may
 waive the one-year time limit, however, only if Ms. Webb
Case: 22-1984    Document: 29      Page: 7    Filed: 04/04/2023

 WEBB   v. OPM                                              7

 shows that “at the date of separation of service or within 1
 year thereafter,” she was “mentally incompetent.” Id. At
 no point has Ms. Webb claimed, or put forward evidence
 supporting a claim, that she was mentally incompetent
 during the relevant filing period. Ms. Webb’s claims that
 she was “diagnosed with a medical condition” and is “disa-
 ble[d],” Appx. 28; Appx. 34; Ms. Webb’s Br. at 3, are not
 equivalent to a claim that she was “mentally incompetent,”
 5 U.S.C. § 8453. See McLaughlin, 353 F.3d at 1367
 (“[D]isability and mental incompetence for the purposes of
 waiving the one-year filing deadline examine different
 facts. A person mentally incompetent for purposes of the
 waiver may not be, ultimately, determined disabled. More-
 over, disability under the statute does not require mental
 incompetence.” (footnote omitted)); Rapp v. Office of Per-
 sonnel Management, 483 F.3d 1339, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
 (“Notably, however, mental disability and mental incompe-
 tence are not the same thing.”). The Board’s decision,
 therefore, is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
 tion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evi-
 dence.
                             III
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the
 Board.
    The parties shall bear their own costs.
                        AFFIRMED