Court Opinion

ID: 9660004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:00:39.239062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:13.858419
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
WOODLEY, Judge.
Appellant urges that because of the failure of the state to *583call his eleven-year-old granddaughter as a witness, or to account for its failure to do so, this court should treat the case as one evidencing a reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence under the rule stated by Presiding Judge Morrison in Ramirez v. State, (page 110 this volume), 289 S.W. 2d 251, 261, decided since the original submission of this appeal.
While it is most unusual for a daughter to furnish the evidence to convict her father for an unlawful entry into her home, or for a father to entertain an intent to murder his daughter, the testimony of the prosecuting witness, if true, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict convicting appellant of burglary with intent to commit murder. Proof of no essential element of the offense charged was missing and the state did not rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove any element of the offense.
Reference to the authorities cited by Judge Morrison in the Ramirez case, especially 18 Tex. Jur. p. 440, Evidence Criminal Cases, Sec. 318, will reveal that the rule regarding the failure of the state to introduce or satisfactorily account for its failure to introduce testimony available to the state, which would have thrown additional light on the facts, is a rule applicable to circumstantial evidence, and is applicable especially where testimony to show the basic facts is absent. The Ramirez case was itself submitted to the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence.
We would not be justified in holding that the testimony of the daughter of appellant was not competent evidence. It was for the jury, and not for this court, to determine whether her testimony was weak or strong, or whether it was true or false.
The state produced an eye witness to the transaction. It was not under the necessity of calling another to corroborate her testimony.
We observe further that appellant testified that he did not see the child and the prosecuting witness testified that she was in another room when appellant broke in.
We remain convinced that the testimony, viewed from the standpoint of the state, is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and that this court should not disturb its findings.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.