Court Opinion

ID: 9569126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:47.235068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:49:30.697971
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In arriving at the above decision, the majority carefully applied the high probability test of Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 (230 SE2d 869). But to ensure that the language of our opinion is not taken out of context and misconstrued, we again emphasize that this court has examined the entire trial record. Compare, e.g., Johnson, supra at 61-62 with Thomas v. State, 173 Ga. App. 810 (2) (328 SE2d 422) and Jones v. City of Atlanta, 257 Ga. 727, 739 (363 SE2d 254). Merely because we, the majority, elected not to repeat the facts of this case in our published opinion, but left this task to our esteemed colleagues in dissent, does not mean that we have failed to carefully apply the relevant existing law to the existing facts of this case. To ensure that this issue is resolved forthwith, however, we again apply the “high probability” test, in strict accordance with Johnson, and we adhere to *347the case disposition reached in our original opinion.
Decided February 23, 1988
Rehearing denied March 14, 1988
Jerry C. Gray, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, T. David Motes, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Motion for rehearing denied.

Banke, P. J., Carley, Sognier, Pope, and Benham, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., and Beasley, J., dissent.