Court Opinion

ID: 9763546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:48:57.193367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:45.697514
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I.The Parties’ Contentions
The parties agree that Justice Hardber-ger’s resignation letter created a vacancy for purposes of the Election Code, thus triggering an election this November for the remaining four years of Justice Hardberger’s term. They dispute, however, whether the letter, despite Justice Hardberger’s expressed intent to have his resignation be effective January 1, 1997, created a constitutional vacancy eight days after its receipt, thus allowing the Governor to appoint an immediate successor. See Tex Const, art. V, § 28.
The State argues that an elected official’s resignation letter creates a vacancy within eight days of its receipt regardless of its purported effective date. Justice Hardber-ger argues that the term “vacancy” in section 201.023 merely defines when a vacancy occurs for purposes of the electoral process. See Tex.Elec.Code § 201.021 (“[flor purposes of this title, a vacancy in office occurs at the time prescribed by this subehapter.”) (emphasis added). I am convinced that to accept Justice Hardberger’s interpretation of the Election Code would unconstitutionally infringe on the Governor’s power of appointment. Accordingly, I would grant the State’s request for quo warranto relief.
II.Unassigned Unconstitutionality
Beyond my disagreement with Justice Hardberger’s position, I question the Court’s method of resolving this dispute. The Court’s opinion considers issues and decides this case on grounds the parties did not raise, brief or argue. Appellate courts, including this Court, should not decide cases on grounds not raised, briefed or argued. See Commercial Cos. Ins. Co. v. Hamrick, 94 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex.1936); Tex.R.App.P. 74(f) and (g).
III.Constitutional and Statutory Construction
I agree with the concurring opinion that the Court’s “conclusion is inconsistent with sound principles of [statutory] construction.” 932 S.W.2d at 495 (Spector, J., concurring). Despite the fact that neither the State nor Justice Hardberger argued that section 201.023 of the Texas Election Code is unconstitutional, the Court declares it so. When evaluating a statute, the Government Code requires that we presume the Legislature has acted constitutionally. TexGov’t Code § 311.021; Travelers Indem. Co. v. Fuller, 38 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 298, 892 S.W.2d 848, 850 (1995). This Court’s function is not to search for statutory defects. Instead, it is the litigants’ burden to demonstrate constitutional infirmity. Fuller, 892 S.W.2d at 850. Our duty is to construe legislation in a manner that, if at all possible, avoids declaring a statute unconstitutional. See Key W. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. Of Ins., 163 Tex. 11, 350 S.W.2d 839, 849-50 (1961); State v. City of Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737, 746 (1960). I believe we can discharge that duty in this case.
IV.The Constitutional Scheme and the Statutory Implementation
Article V, Section 28 of the Texas Constitution provides:
Vacancies in the office of judges of the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, the Court of Civil Appeals and the District Courts shall be filled by the Governor until the next General Election.
Under this authority, Governor Bush appointed Angelini to fill the vacancy in Place 4 on the Fourth Court of Appeals. The Election Code provides that a vacancy in office may occur as the result of any one of eight *498events: (1) death, § 201.022; (2) resignation, § 201.023;1 (3) removal, § 201.024; (4) acceptance of another office that may not be held simultaneously, § 201.025; (5) declaration of ineligibility, § 201.026; (6) creation of a new office, § 201.027; (7) if the election was won by a deceased or ineligible candidate, § 201.028; and (8) if an officer-elect declines to qualify for office, § 201.029.
Only one of these provisions, section 201.023 of the Election Code, concerns a vacancy created by a prospective resignation. It provides:
If an officer submits a resignation whether to be effective immediately or .at a future date, a vacancy occurs on the date the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority or on the eighth day after the date of its receipt by the authority, whichever is earlier.
The Legislature amended section 201.023 following our decision in Texas Democratic Executive Comm. v. Rains, 756 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.1988). In Rains, a Justice of the Fourth Court of Appeals, Justice Rudy Es-quivel, submitted a prospective resignation, to be effective January 1, 1989. Governor William P. Clements, Jr. received the resignation on June 21,1988. However, Governor Clements declined to accept it, choosing instead to wait until November 1988, which would have allowed him to appoint Justice Esquivel’s successor rather than have his successor chosen at the November general election.
The Secretary of State also refused to certify Ron Carr as the Democratic candidate for Justice Esquivel’s unexpired term in the November general election. The Secretary of State claimed that he could not certify Carr’s candidacy in the absence of a “vacancy” in office. He asserted that no vacancy existed until the Governor accepted Esquivel’s resignation. Relators sought to compel the Governor to accept Esquivel’s resignation immediately, contending that given an otherwise proper resignation, the Governor had no discretion but to accept it. We agreed. Rains, 756 S.W.2d at 307.
The pivotal holding in Rains was that the Governor could not unilaterally delay acceptance of an officeholder’s resignation to manipulate the method — whether by election or appointment — by which an officeholder’s successor is chosen. In 1989, the Legislature effectively codified Rains when it amended section 201.023 of the Election Code to provide that a resignation must be accepted no later than the eighth day after it is received.
While the Legislature clearly intended by section 201.023 to limit the Governor’s ability to delay acceptance of a tendered resignation for essentially political proposes, the question before us is the other side of that coin: whether an officeholder may resign prospectively to deny the Governor an appointment and force an election to choose a successor.
It is true that many Texas judges — fifty-three percent of those currently in office— are chosen by popular, partisan elections. Forty-seven percent of the judges currently in office were appointed by a governor. Office of COURT ADMINISTRATION (information on file with Office of General Counsel). Our Constitution has expressly provided since 1876 that the Governor’s appointees fill vacancies in judicial offices until the next general election. Rather than indicating a preference for one method of judicial selection over the other, our Constitution treats these as alternative methods, each available under different circumstances. See generally, Cornyn, Ruminations on the Nature of Texas Judging, 25 St. Mary’s L.J. 367, 372-373 (1993).
It is also telling that the Constitution carves out a legislative exception to the Governor’s general authority under Article IV, Section 12 to appoint state and district offi*499cers. The Governor has no authority to appoint legislators; they must be chosen by special election. Tex. Const, art. IV, § 12. If the framers of our Constitution had determined to prefer judicial elections to interim appointments by the Governor, they could have readily provided for special elections for judicial vacancies. Instead, they chose a method combining both elections and gubernatorial appointments by the Governor, again, depending on the timing of a vacancy.
If any vacancy created by section 201.023 is solely for the purposes of an election, as Justice Hardberger contends, I believe the statute cannot be constitutionally implemented because such a statute would abridge the Governor’s constitutional appointment power. The Legislature has broad lawmaking power, but that power is circumscribed by express or implied restrictions contained in or necessarily arising from the Constitution itself. See Government Serv. Ins. Underwriters v. Jones, 368 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Tex.1963). Under Article II, Section 1, our Constitution’s express separation of powers provision, the Legislature cannot abridge or otherwise impair the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive Department. See, e.g., Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); State ex rel. Smith v. Blackwell, 500 S.W.2d 97, 104 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Walker v. Baker, 145 Tex. 121, 196 S.W.2d 324, 327 (1946). Because there is no constitutional basis for favoring elections over appointments, the Legislature cannot do so by statute, which is exactly what Justice Hardber-ger’s interpretation of section 201.023 would allow.
If a plausible alternative construction of a statute exists that will allow a court to avoid constitutional problems, we will adopt that construction. Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 442, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2560-61, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989); Key W. Life Ins. Co., 350 S.W.2d at 848-49. We should thus assume that the Legislature intended to treat the resigning officeholder and the Governor with parity. Otherwise, we would be forced to the conclusion that the Legislature intended to unconstitutionally elevate the power of the officeholder to determine whether a successor will be chosen by an election and thus deny the Governor a power the Constitution itself confers. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1994-96, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Framing the issue this way, as I believe we must, I would hold that Justice Hardberger vacated his office effective June 28, 1996.
Further, to accept Justice Hardberger’s construction of section 201.023 leads to at least one other difficulty, one that can be avoided by construing the statute as I suggest. See State v. Standard Oil Co., 130 Tex. 313, 107 S.W.2d 550 (1937) (stating that a court must construe a statute in a way that makes all relevant laws harmonious). Justice Hardberger, if his prospective resignation had been otherwise effective, intended to resign on January 1, 1997. Texas Government Code section 601.004, prevents that prospective date from being effective. That section provides:
Persons elected to unexpired terms in the various state ... offices ... shall be entitled to qualify and assume the duties of their respective offices ... immediately following the official canvass of the results of the election at which they were elected, and they shall take office as soon thereafter as possible.
In other words, the candidate elected at the November 5,1996 general election may, if he or she so chooses, assume office before Justice Hardberger intends to depart on January 1, 1997. See Texas Democratic Executive Comm. v. Rains, 756 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). Under these circumstances, Justice Hardberger’s contention that he has the unilateral right to determine the timing of his resignation is plainly untenable. Also, our consideration of this potential result, as Justice Hardberger argues and the Court appears to agree, is not merely hypothetical. In construing statutes, we are obliged to consider all laws bearing on the same subject. Jessen Assoc., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1976).
My interpretation of the Election Code and our Constitution is not only consistent with Rains, but it also resolves “the other side of the coin” presented here. My approach not only resolves the present contro*500versy and gives relevant statutes effect in harmony -with the Constitution, but it adds certainty to the law. Additionally, it carries out what I believe is the Legislature’s purpose of parity between the Governor and the officeholder vis a vis the Constitution. The Court’s holding, on the other hand, may resolve this ease, but leaves room for future guess work and political maneuvering. This, I believe, is unfortunate.
Y. Conclusion
For these reasons, I would grant the writ of quo warranto and declare Karen Angelini to be the lawful occupant of Justice Hardber-ger’s former office, effective July 14, 1996, the date she took the oath of office.
I respectfully dissent.

. By granting quo warranto, we would not "oust” Justice Hardberger from office. 932 S.W.2d at 495. He chose to resign, "of his own accord", in the face of § 201.023. 932 S.W.2d at 492. Section 201.023 works in harmony with our Constitution. It very simply deems a vacancy to exist, eight days after the Governor receives a resignation, for the purposes of initiating the electoral process to fill the vacancy. See Texas Democratic Executive Comm. v. Rains, 756 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex.1988). The Constitution provides the method for filling a vacancy in the meantime. See Tex Const, art. V, § 28; see also Tex Const, art. XVI, § 17 (allowing for holdover in office until successor is qualified).