Court Opinion

ID: 9640851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:17:02.644364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.326768
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I do not believe the affidavit of Larry Jefferson proves, as a matter of law, that he was not negligent.
Plaintiffs’ petition alleged that Jefferson was guilty of medical malpractice because he did not exercise ordinary care in the diagnosis and treatment of Lora Beth Ced-illo. In particular, the plaintiffs allege Jefferson provided “poor surgical and medical care” for the following reasons:
Jefferson did not properly evaluate the patient’s condition on July 15, 1983; Jefferson discharged the patient from the hospital when the patient’s condition warranted admission on July 15, 1983; and
Jefferson delayed hospitalizing the patient during the period July 13 to July 15, 1983.
To negate these allegations as a matter of law, Jefferson must show that he acted within applicable standards of ordinary care among pediatric intensive care specialists practicing in Harris County, and in similar communities, at the time of the occurrence. See Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
The majority states that Jefferson’s affidavit showed defendant was not involved in any procedures during Lora Beth’s hospitalization that might have caused the physical injuries alleged in the plaintiffs’ petition. Yet, plaintiffs’ allege in their petition that it was Jefferson who decided on July 15 that Lora Beth’s condition did not warrant further hospitalization. Jefferson’s affidavit does not prove, as a matter of law, that he was not negligent in discharging Lora Beth on July 15.
As both an interested witness and an expert witness, Jefferson’s affidavit must *872be clear, positive, direct, credible, and free from contradiction, and must present the type of evidence that can be easily controverted. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex.1989). The supreme court has recently told us that a summary judgment is inappropriate if the credibility of the affiant is likely to be a dispositive factor in the resolution of the case. Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 558. Here, Jefferson’s statement that Lora Beth’s condition did not warrant further hospitalization will be the critical issue at trial.
Jefferson states that on the morning of July 15, 1983, he saw the patient at the hospital’s outpatient department, and his “evaluation of her respiratory and general status showed that she was stable and not in distress.” The affidavit continues, “After the completion of that appointment, the patient returned home with her parents and nurse.” In the affidavit, Jefferson does not state who discharged Lora Beth on July 15. As such, the affidavit does not even reach the issue of negligent discharge and failure to timely hospitalize, two of the issues in the lawsuit.
1. Failure to properly evaluate
The plaintiffs contend that Jefferson did not evaluate properly Lora Beth’s condition on July 15, 1983. The only evidence pertaining to Jefferson’s evaluation on July 15 was Jefferson’s self-serving statement, “My evaluation of her respiratory and general status showed that she was stable and not in distress.”
To prove facts in the affidavit of an interested person or an expert witness, the matters in the affidavit must be clear, positive, direct, credible, or free from contradiction, and be easily controverted. Tex.R. Civ.P. 166a(c). If the facts in the affidavit are not easily controverted, the affidavit will not support a summary judgment. Casso, 776 S.W.2d at 558.
The issue of Jefferson’s evaluation of Lora Beth’s condition on July 15 is not easily controverted. Generally, a person’s knowledge is not susceptible to being readily controverted. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co; v. Scott, 631 S.W.2d 228, 231 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Self-serving statements of an interested party, testifying as to what the party knew, are not readily controverted and will not support a motion for summary judgment. Allied Chem. Corp. v. DeHaven, 752 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
The majority relies on Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) to affirm this judgment. There is a significant difference in the two cases. In Tilotta, the affidavit of the defendant-doctor was corroborated by the affidavit of another doctor. Here, we have no corroborating evidence.
I think this case is more closely analogous to Mosaga, S.A. v. Baker & Botts, 780 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1989, no writ).1 Mosaga employed the law firm of Baker & Botts to handle a real estate transaction, and the law firm prepared a “Referral Services Agreement.” Later, a party to the real estate transaction sued Mosaga because the agreement violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Texas Real Estate License Act. Mosaga filed a third-party action against Baker & Botts for preparing documents for the real estate transaction without telling him that the agreement was improper or illegal. Baker & Botts filed a motion for summary judgment with supporting affidavits, listing in detail the work provided to Mosaga, and stating that the attorney “did not act below” the standard of legal care. Id. at 5. Mosaga, the nonmovant, filed a response to the summary judgment but did not file any summary judgment evidence. In the response, Mosaga merely repeated the allegations of negligence from the petition that Baker & Botts should have inforifled Mosa-*873ga if the agreement was improper or illegal. The Eastland court held that the allegations were sufficient, without any summary judgment proof, to preclude summary judgment. The court held that legal malpractice is a question of fact, not law. Id. at 6.
The allegations of negligence by the former client in Mosaga are comparable to the allegations of the plaintiffs here. The non-movant’s allegation of negligence was that the attorney should not have prepared the legal document if the legal document was improper or illegal. The allegations here are that Jefferson should not have discharged Lora Beth and should have admitted her on July 15.
2. Discharging the patient on July 15
The only summary judgment evidence to negate negligent discharge on July 15 is the one sentence in Jefferson’s affidavit that states: “After the completion of that appointment, the patient returned home with her parents and nurse.” In the affidavit, Jefferson did not even admit to discharging Lora Beth. From his one sentence, we can only conclude that Lora Beth left the hospital; we cannot discern that Jefferson made any decision about her leaving.
Because the affidavit does not even reach the issue of negligent discharge of Lora Beth, it cannot prove as a matter of law that Jefferson was not negligent in discharging her.
3. Delay in hospitalization on July 15, 1983
The negligence in the delay in the hospitalization is the other side of the issue of failure to hospitalize. Again, because Jefferson’s affidavit does not address the decision to hospitalize Lora Beth on July 15, it cannot prove as a matter of law that Jefferson was not negligent when he did not hospitalize her.
We should reverse the trial court’s summary judgment.

. The Mosaga case was a case transferred from the docket of the First Court of Appeals to the Eastland Court of Appeals pursuant to Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001 (Vernon 1988). Because this case arose in this district and was filed in this Court, we should assume the Eastland Court of Appeals applied the decisions of this Court and thus, we should be bound by the decision of Mosaga as a opinion issued by this Court.