Court Opinion

ID: 9721643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:04:21.135588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:27.893548
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, specially concurring: I write separately because I believe that the police illegally arrested the defendant in his home, without first seeking an arrest warrant, and without a showing of exigent circumstances. I concur only because the defendant failed to raise this issue in his briefs to us and to the appellate court, although it was included in his original motion to suppress. 116 Ill. 2d at 485. Under Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 574-75, 602-03, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 643-44, 660-61, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1374-75, 1388, the police may not, absent exigent circumstances, enter a suspect’s home to arrest the suspect without a warrant for his arrest and reason to believe that he is within his home. According to the majority’s own account of the facts, the police went to the defendant’s apartment, knocked on the door, identified themselves, and then arrested the defendant when he opened the door to them. There is no showing that the defendant consented to their entry into his apartment prior to his arrest. This was an at-home arrest. It was not justified by exigent circumstances. An unnecessary and unjustified delay of at least 24 hours elapsed between the time the police supposedly obtained probable cause from Derrick Moore, on February 23, and their arrest of the defendant on the evening of February 24. Under Payton, the police need not obtain a search warrant to enter the defendant’s residence if they possess an arrest warrant for the defendant and probable cause to believe that the defendant is within the premises. (United States v. Clifford (8th Cir. 1981), 664 F.2d 1090, 1093.) Thus the police in this case could have obtained a warrant for the defendant’s arrest at any time between obtaining probable cause to arrest on February 23, and arresting the defendant on the evening of February 24. Nothing excuses their failure to do so. Moreover, it seems clear to me that the defendant’s statements and consents were not given of “sufficient free will as to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest.” (Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 600, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 425, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260.) The length of the defendant’s confinement, the lack of food and denial of sleeping accommodations would all tend to suggest that the statements and consents were derived from the exploitation of the defendant’s illegal arrest. In this bicentennial year, it is important to remember that the protections granted all of us under the Bill of Rights would be a dead letter if not enforced by the courts and respected by those charged with enforcing our criminal laws. The prohibitions against unlawful searches and seizures and against coerced self-incrimination are extremely important. They are not meaningless roadblocks thrown in the path of the police. Unless and until this court gives a strong signal that it will not tolerate such illegal activity, the police may continue to ignore the clear letter of the law. The majority’s silence with respect to the absence of a warrant in this case does not give such a signal.