Court Opinion

ID: 9927564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 15:03:02.424986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:35.646003
License: Public Domain

IIN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

NA-ZER HAYMAN-COOPER,                    §
                                         § No. 236, 2023
       Defendant Below,                  §
       Appellant,                        § Court Below—Superior Court
                                         § of the State of Delaware
       v.                                §
                                         § Cr. ID Nos. 2106007748,
STATE OF DELAWARE,                       § 2106008755, 2106008838,
                                         § 2207010076
       Appellee.                         §

                          Submitted: December 11, 2023
                          Decided:   January 29, 2024

Before VALIHURA, TRAYNOR, and LEGROW, Justices.

                                   ORDER

      After consideration of the appellant’s Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, the

State’s response, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

      (1)    In September 2021, the appellant, Nazer Hayman-Cooper, was indicted

for multiple crimes in Cr. ID Nos. 2106007748 (which arose from a shooting in June

2021 that paralyzed the victim), 2106008755 (which arose from the theft of a cell

phone in May 2021), and Cr. ID No. 210600838 (which arose from the theft of a gun

in June 2021). In August 2022, Hayman-Cooper was indicted for tampering with a

witness (the shooting victim in Cr. ID No. 2106007748) in Criminal ID No.

2207010076.
      (2)   On March 13, 2023, Hayman-Cooper resolved all of these cases by

pleading guilty to first-degree assault and possession of a firearm during the

commission of a felony (“PFDCF”) in Cr. ID No. 2106007748 and tampering with

a witness in Criminal ID No. 2207010076.         The State agreed to dismiss the

remaining charges. The parties requested a presentence investigation, and the State

indicated it would be seeking consecutive Level V sentences. On June 2, 2023, the

Superior Court sentenced Hayman-Cooper as follows: (i) for first-degree assault,

twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, with credit for 317 days previously

served, suspended after seven years for decreasing levels of supervision; (ii) for

PFDCF, twenty-five years of Level V incarceration, suspended after three years for

two years of Level III probation; and (iii) for tampering with a witness, six months

of Level V incarceration to be served day-for-day under 11 Del. C. § 4204(k). This

appeal followed.

      (3)   On appeal, Hayman-Cooper’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) filed a

brief and a motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Counsel asserts

that, based upon a complete and careful examination of the record, there are no

arguably appealable issues. Counsel informed Hayman-Cooper of the provisions of

Rule 26(c) and provided Hayman-Cooper with a copy of the motion to withdraw and

the accompanying brief.

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         (4)     Counsel also informed Hayman-Cooper of his right to identify any

points he wished this Court to consider on appeal. Hayman-Cooper has submitted

points for this Court’s consideration. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief

and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment.

         (5)     When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief

under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a

conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii)

conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally

devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without an

adversary presentation.1

         (6)     In most of his points, Hayman-Cooper argues that his trial attorneys

provided ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends that his trial attorneys were

ineffective for waiving the preliminary hearing, failing to maintain consistent

communications with him, refusing to request bail hearings, mishandling plea

negotiations, failing to provide him with discovery, failing to learn that the State was

going to ask for ten years of Level V incarceration, and failing to develop effective

1
    Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996).

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trial strategies. This Court does not consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims

raised for the first time on direct appeal.2

       (7)    To the extent Hayman-Cooper claims that his guilty plea was

involuntary and uninformed, the record refutes this claim.                 In the Truth-in-

Sentencing Guilty Plea form, Hayman-Cooper indicated that he understood he was

waiving certain constitutional rights, including his right to a trial, to question the

witnesses against him, and to present evidence in his defense. During his plea

colloquy with the Superior Court judge, Hayman-Cooper affirmed that he had

reviewed the guilty plea forms with his counsel, no one threatened or forced him to

plead guilty, he understood that he was giving up certain constitutional rights, he

faced imprisonment of five to fifty-five years, and no one had promised him what

his sentence would be. He also affirmed that he committed the crimes of first-degree

assault, PFDCF, and tampering with a witness. Hayman-Cooper’s guilty plea was

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

       (8)    Finally, Hayman-Cooper argues that the sentencing judge relied on

false information provided by the State to sentence him, erred in exceeding the

Sentencing Accountability Commission (“SENTAC”) guidelines, and failed to

explain why he imposed sentences in excess of the SENTAC guidelines. These

2
 Desmond v. State, 654 A.2d 821, 829 (Del. 1994). Typically, a defendant pursues an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim by filing a motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 in the Superior Court.

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claims are without merit. In requesting an unsuspended sentence of ten years of

Level V incarceration, the State highlighted, among other things, that the shooting

victim was unwilling to come to court because he had been threatened and did not

feel safe. Hayman-Cooper did not object to this statement at sentencing. In now

claiming that this statement was false, Hayman-Cooper ignores that he pleaded

guilty to tampering with a witness in Cr. ID No. 2207010076 by knowingly

intimidating a witness or victim and that the shooting victim was the victim in

question.

      (9)    As to Hayman-Cooper’s claims concerning the SENTAC guidelines,

the guidelines are non-binding and do not provide a basis for appeal where the

sentence falls within prescribed statutory limits.3 First-degree assault is a class B

felony with a statutory sentencing range of two to twenty-five years of Level V

incarceration.4 Under the SENTAC guidelines, the presumptive sentence for first-

degree assault is two to five years of Level V incarceration, which increases if the

defendant has previous felonies.5 PFDCF is a class B felony with a statutory

sentencing range of three to twenty-five years of Level V incarceration.6 Under the

SENTAC guidelines, the presumptive sentence for PFDCF is three to five years of

3
  Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 845 (Del. 1992).
4
  11 Del. C. § 613(c); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).
5
   SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 30, 34-35 available at https://cjc.delaware.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/61/2022/12/Benchbook-2023-120122.pdf.
6
  11 Del. C. § 1447A(a), (b); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2).

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Level V incarceration, which increases if the defendant has previous felonies.7

Tampering with a witness is a class E felony with a statutory sentencing range of up

to five years of Level V incarceration.8            Under the SENTAC guidelines, the

presumptive sentence for tampering with a witness is up to one year of Level II

probation.9 Hayman-Cooper does not, and cannot, contend his sentences exceed the

prescribed statutory limits.

       (10) To the extent Hayman-Cooper contends that the sentencing judge

violated § 4204(n) by failing to explain the basis for imposing a sentence in excess

of the SENTAC guidelines, he is mistaken. The sentencing judge explained during

sentencing that the sentences imposed, including the time to be served under §

4204(k), were based on the importance of crime victims feeling safe in the court

system, Hayman-Cooper’s lack of amenability to lesser sanctions (he was on

juvenile probation and GPS monitoring at the time of the crimes), and the undue

depreciation of the shooting victim’s serious and permanent injuries if a lesser

sanction were imposed. The sentencing judge balanced the aggravating factors with

Hayman-Cooper’s unaddressed mental health issues. In this case, the sentencing

judge sufficiently explained on the record his reasons for departing from the

SENTAC guidelines.

7
  SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 30, 35, 39.
8
  11 Del. C. § 1263; 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(5).
9
  SENTAC Benchbook 2023, at 55-56.

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      (11) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that

Hayman-Cooper’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably

appealable issue. We also are satisfied that Hayman-Cooper’s counsel has made a

conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly determined

that Hayman-Cooper could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court be AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.

                                      BY THE COURT:

                                      /s/ Gary F. Traynor
                                      Justice

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