Court Opinion

ID: 9713431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:15:21.161507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:18.726892
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN, dissenting: In my opinion there was insufficient proof offered by the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance delivered to Watkins was, in fact, cannabis, and there was also insufficient proof that defendant was guilty of a calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy. The majority holds that there was adequate circumstantial evidence introduced by the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance delivered to Watkins was, in fact, cannabis. “The basic distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is that in the former instance the witnesses testify directly of their own knowledge as to the main facts to be proved, while in the latter case proof is given of facts and circumstances from which the jury may infer other connected facts which reasonably follow, according to the common experience of mankind. * * *. The competency of circumstantial evidence is not open to question, provided it is the best evidence which the nature of the case admits. When it is disclosed that direct evidence of a material fact is probably in existence, circumstantial evidence of that fact cannot be resorted to without accounting for the absence of the direct evidence.” (29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §264 (1967).) In this case the State possessed direct evidence as to whether the substance delivered to Watkins was or was not cannabis and deliberately did not introduce it. Therefore, proof by circumstantial evidence of this fact was insufficient. At the close of the State’s case, the defense attorney argued to the trial judge that the People had failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime because there was no submission to the jury of any substance purporting to be marijuana that was alleged to have been received by Watkins. In other words, the purported cannabis obtained by Hite from Jones and delivered to Watkins was never admitted into evidence. The trial judge asked the prosecution if there was any actual test of the substance and the State’s Attorney responded that there were tests, but the tests had not been “admitted” and that the State’s case rested on the opinion of Hite and the confirmation by Jones, the defendant. I emphasize that the State did not argue as the majority now holds that the substance was admissible because it came from the same batch. Since there was direct evidence in the possession of the State concerning the identity of the substance, and since the State deliberately withheld that evidence, there arises the presumption that the test would have been unfavorable to the State. Card, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 22 (1963) and 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence §178 et seq. (1967), where it is said: “It is a well-established rule that where relevant evidence which would properly be part of a case is within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally be to produce it, and he fails to do so, without satisfactory explanation, the jury may draw an inference that such evidence would have been unfavorable to him.” For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance delivered to Watkins was cannabis. I would also hold that there was insufficient evidence produced by the State to prove defendant guilty of a calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy as charged in the information which reads: “Thomas H. Sutton, State’s Attorney in and for said County, in his own proper person, comes now again here into Court, and in the name and by the authority of the People of the State of Illinois, gives the Court to be informed and understand that BRAD JONES, heretofore, to-wit: on or about the 15th day of March A.D. 1977, and continuing until the 25th day of March, 1977, in the County of White and State of Illinois aforesaid did commit the offense of Unlawful Calculated Criminal Cannabis Conspiracy, in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 56/2, Section 709(b) in that the said defendant, as part of a conspiracy undertaken with two other persons, Kathi Jones and Louis Vas, in violation of Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 56M of Section 705(d), knowingly and unlawfully delivered to Jim Watkins, more than 30 grams, but not more than 500 grams of a substance containing Cannabis, otherwise than as authorized in the Cannabis Control Act, and he directs said violation.” The plain language of this information mandates the State to prove that Brad Jones delivered more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams of substance containing cannabis to Jim Watkins and that he did so as part of a conspiracy undertaken with Kathi Jones and Louis Vas. “In a prosecution for conspiracy the proof should be restricted to the issues properly made in the case. The proof must correspond with, and support, the material averments of the indictment, and must establish that the defendant is guilty of the particular charge made therein. It is not sufficient to sustain a conviction to prove that the defendant is guilty of some other charge or that the defendant is guilty of generally bad or criminal conduct.” 11 Ill. L. & Prac. Conspiracy §88 (1955). In Lowell v. People (1907), 229 Ill. 227, the court said: “This indictment charges the defendants with conspiring to cheat and defraud Jackson, who was unknown to the defendants, or either of them, so far as the proof shows, before he took a policy in one of their companies. * * * It cannot be said that the allegations of a conspiracy with the intent to cheat and defraud Jackson are sustained by proof of an intent to cheat and defraud the public generally. * * * In criminal cases it is not sufficient, to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, to prove that the defendant was guilty of some other charge or of general bad and criminal conduct, but the proof must establish his guilt of the particular charge set forth in the indictment.” 229 Ill. 227, 237. In People v. Mader (1924), 313 Ill. 277, the court said: “To constitute the crime of conspiracy there must be more than one person guilty thereof, and before a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy the evidence must show that there are two or more persons guilty of such conspiracy. [Citation.] It is not sufficient to sustain a conviction on a particular charge to prove that the defendant is guilty of some other charge or of generally bad and criminal conduct, but the proof must establish his guilt of the particular charge in the indictment. Lowell v. People, 229 Ill. 227.” 313 Ill. 277, 285. In People v. McChristian (1974), 18 Ill. App. 3d 87, the court said: “To sustain a conviction for conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy has to be proved as laid out in the indictment. [Citation.] In this case, since the object of the conspiracy, according to the charge, was the murder of five named persons, the State had to prove that when defendant and Bailey fired guns in the direction of the automobile in which the five were riding, they did so with knowledge that the purported victims were in there. [Citations.] * # » * * *. A conspiracy against a number of individuals must be proved by evidence which shows that the conspiracy was against all as charged; a conspiracy against a single person cannot be sustained by proof of a conspiracy against the public generally.” 18 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90-91. In this case there was no proof at trial that defendant, Kathi Jones, or Louis Vas knew Jim Watkins personally or even knew of his existence prior to the alleged delivery on March 24,1977. Nor was there a scintilla of evidence that defendant conspired with Louis Vas and Kathi Jones to deliver cannabis to Jim Watkins on March 24, 1977. There was also no proof that the defendant exercised a governing or determining influence on the transaction alleged. It is undisputed that the plan to have Jim Watkins obtain cannabis from the defendant was planned by the office of the Sheriff of White County, rather than by the alleged co-conspirators. Therefore, the defendant did not exercise a governing or determining influence on the transaction alleged as required by section 9(b) of the Cannabis Control Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56½, par. 709(b)).