Court Opinion

ID: 9839165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 22:04:36.718104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:58.194240
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U
                                         No. 2-22-0219
                                Order filed September 11, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
      in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

CARYN WILCOX and KYLE WILCOX,          ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                       ) of Lake County.
      Plaintiffs-Appellants,           )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 21-L-827
                                       )
HEATHER WRIGHT and COLDWELL            )
BANKER RESIDENTIAL REAL                )
ESTATE, LLC,                           ) Honorable
                                       ) Jacquelyn D. Melius,
      Defendants-Appellees.            ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Schostok and Kennedy concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1     Held: Plaintiffs’ complaint is barred by res judicata.

¶2     Plaintiffs, Caryn Wilcox and Kyle Wilcox, appeal the judgment of the circuit court of Lake

County dismissing their complaint against defendants, Heather Wright (Wright) and Coldwell

Banker Residential Real Estate, LLC (collectively, defendants), on the grounds that it was barred

by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs argue that newly discovered facts should bar the

application of res judicata in this case and that applying res judicata under the facts and

circumstances in this case would be fundamentally unfair to them. We affirm.

¶3                                    I. BACKGROUND
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

¶4     We summarize the facts appearing in the record. In January 2016, plaintiffs and Carolyn

Wright (seller) entered into a contract regarding the sale of her Lake Bluff property to plaintiffs.

Seller had resided at the subject property for over 50 years at the time of the sale. Seller engaged

Wright, her daughter-in-law, to act as her real estate agent. Wright was at the time employed by

the Coldwell Banker as a real estate agent. The sale of the subject property closed in April 2016.

As part of the sale, seller executed a residential real property disclosure report (declaration) in

which she denied any material defects in the subject property and, pertinently, denied any flooding

affecting the property or defects in the basement and foundation of the residence. Seller dated the

execution of the declaration, “11/18/15.” Wright conveyed the declaration to plaintiffs before the

completion of the sale of the subject property.

¶5     During the period of March through July 2017, plaintiffs experienced flooding in the

basement, including standing water, cracks in the basement walls, water impingement into an

electrical box, and flooding with standing water on the grounds of the subject property. Plaintiffs

also encountered outdoor flooding exceeding the height of the basement window wells and

foundation.

¶6     Plaintiffs sued seller and, on November 15, 2018, filed an amended complaint alleging

common law fraud and breach of contract stemming from the seller’s failure to disclose any

material defects in the declaration and the actual flooding and basement issues plaintiffs

experienced (2018 action). The record on appeal does not include a clear picture of the resolution

of the 2018 action. It appears that, on October 7, 2019, a hearing was held. Defendants

characterize it as a stipulated bench trial, and plaintiffs do not challenge the characterization. The

October 7, 2019, order states that the 2018 matter was before the trial court for trial, with the court

receiving written and verbal stipulations. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs and

against seller in the amount of $120,000 plus costs. The order indicated that seller was required

                                                  -2-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

to file powers of attorney for healthcare and real property within seven days of the judgment. In

the October 7, 2019, order, Sally Wright (seller’s daughter) was denominated as the agent for the

powers of attorney, and seller was denominated as the principal.

¶7      On November 5, 2020, seller’s daughter was deposed as part of plaintiffs’ citation to

discover assets. Seller’s daughter testified that Wright had knowledge of the issues affecting the

subject property and the inaccuracy of seller’s declaration. In their statement of facts on appeal

and without citation to the record on appeal, plaintiffs assert that, prior to the deposition of seller’s

daughter, they “had no reason to suspect that [Wright] possessed such knowledge or that any

representations made by [Wright], as agent for Seller, were in fact fraudulent.” 1

¶8      On November 12, 2021, plaintiffs filed the instant action against defendants. In this action,

plaintiffs substantially repeated many of the allegations from the 2018 action against seller alone.

Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants committed fraud by delivering to them seller’s

declaration, possessing actual knowledge of the flooding and basement issues and actual

knowledge that seller’s declaration was materially false regarding the flooding and basement

issues. On March 21, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of

the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)). Relevantly, pursuant to

        1
            For purposes of the statement of facts on appeal, we will not consider argument or

assertions unsupported by citation to the record on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020). Counsel is admonished to conform to the supreme court rules governing the form and

content of appellate briefs as they are not simply aspirational, rather, these rules are mandatory

carrying the force of law. In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (2d) 200454, ¶ 30. Failure to

comply results in our disregard of noncompliant portions and may result striking the brief or

dismissing the appeal for the most egregious noncompliance. Id.

                                                  -3-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

section 2-619(a)(4) of the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(4) (West 2022)), defendants argued that the instant

case was barred by res judicata because there was an identity of cause of action between the instant

case and the 2018 action, there was an identity of parties or their privies, and there was a final

judgment on the merits.

¶9     On May 18, 2022, the trial court heard arguments on defendants’ motion, and it granted

the motion based on res judicata and dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. Plaintiffs

timely appeal.

¶ 10                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11   On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in applying res judicata and dismissing

their complaint. Specifically, plaintiffs contend that the causes of action in the instant case and

the 2018 action are not the same because of the newly discovered fact that Wright (and her

employer, Coldwell Banker) had actual knowledge of the issues affecting the subject property and

that seller’s declaration was incorrect.    Plaintiffs also argue that applying the doctrine of

res judicata in this case would result in substantial unfairness to them based on their recent

discovery of defendants’ misconduct. We address these contentions in turn.

¶ 12                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 13   As an initial matter, this case arises following the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’

complaint pursuant to section 2-619. A section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the

complaint but asserts that the claim is defeated by defects or defenses outside of the pleading.

Highview Group, Ltd. v. William Ryan Homes, Inc., 2023 IL App (2d) 220019, ¶ 42. We review

de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-619. Id.

¶ 14                             B. Applicability of Res Judicata

¶ 15   We begin by noting that the doctrine of res judicata provides a viable ground with which

to dismiss a claim. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(4) (West 2022). The doctrine of res judicata acts as a

                                               -4-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

bar to the current action where the defendant can demonstrate (1) the existence of a final judgment

on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) identity of the parties or their

privies, and (3) identity of cause of action. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d

290, 302 (1998).

¶ 16    Here, the 2018 action was tried to a judgment, as evidenced by the October 7, 2019, order,

finding in favor of plaintiffs and against seller and awarding plaintiffs $120,000 plus costs. Thus,

there is a final judgment on the merits.

¶ 17    There is also an identity of parties or their privies between the 2018 action and the instant

case. Plaintiffs are the same in both actions. In the 2018 action, the defendant was seller alone.

However, seller was represented in the transaction at issue by Wright and Coldwell Banker. The

residential real estate contract listed Wright as seller’s designated agent and listed Coldwell Banker

as seller’s brokerage for purposes of the sale of the subject property. While Wright was not the

seller, she was the seller’s agent, and, therefore, she was seller’s privy for purposes of res judicata.

Harrison v. Deere & Co., 2014 IL App (3d) 130497, ¶ 36; see also Alms v. Baum, 343 Ill. App. 3d

67, 74 (2003) (in other circumstances, privity exists in relationships like master-servant or

principal-agent). Likewise, Coldwell Banker, as Wright’s employer and seller’s real estate broker

was also seller’s privy for purposes of res judicata. Id.; see also Ross Advertising, Inc. v.

Heartland Bank & Trust Co., 2012 IL App (3d) 110200, ¶ 35 (employees are in privity with their

employers).

¶ 18    In any event, plaintiffs, in their initial brief on appeal, do not challenge the element of the

identity of the parties. As such, any challenge raised in plaintiffs’ reply brief to the element of

identity of the parties is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued

are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for

rehearing.”). In their reply brief and for the first time on appeal, plaintiffs contend that whether

                                                 -5-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

seller and defendants were in privity, thereby establishing the identity of the parties, is a factual

issue to be determined at trial. Plaintiffs also cite Atherton v. Connecticut General Life Insurance

Co., 2011 IL App (1st) 090727, ¶¶ 13-14, for this proposition and for the proposition that courts

have determined that agents and principals are ordinarily not in privity with each other for the

purposes of res judicata. Placing forfeiture of this contention to the side, the Atherton court further

explains that the limitation on res judicata in the principal-agent relationship is based on the idea

that a principal is not liable for an agent’s tortious conduct unless the conduct is within the scope

of the agency; res judicata will apply to bar a subsequent action against an agent (following a

decision on the merits against the principal in a previous action) only if the previous action

concerned a matter within the agency. Id. ¶ 14. Atherton’s clarification undercuts plaintiffs’

contention because defendants’ actions were within the scope of their agency with seller, namely,

to sell the subject property. Atherton, therefore, does not support defendant’s proposition that

agents and principals are not in privity for purposes of res judicata. Thus, even if this contention

were not forfeited, it would fail.

¶ 19    The remaining element to establish res judicata is the identity of the cause of action

between the previous and the instant cases. To determine whether there is an identity in the cause

of action between two cases, our supreme court adopted the transactional test. River Park, 184 Ill.

2d at 310-11. Under the transactional test, separate claims will be considered the same cause of

action if they arise from a single group of operative facts. Id. at 311. In deciding if there is a single

group of operative facts, courts are pragmatically to consider whether the facts are related in time,

space, origin, motivation, and whether they form a convenient trial unit. Id. at 311-12. Finally,

the bar of res judicata extends only to facts and conditions as they existed at the time the previous

judgment was rendered—if new facts and conditions intervene before a second action is instituted,

thereby establishing a new basis for the claims and defenses of the parties, the issues are no longer

                                                  -6-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

the same, and the former judgment will no longer bar the subsequent action. Hayashi v. Illinois

Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 46.

¶ 20   Under the transactional test, the 2018 action and the instant case satisfy the transactional

test and thus establish the identity-of-cause-of-action element for purposes of res judicata. The

operative group of facts is that seller, with Wright’s knowledge (and imputed to Coldwell Banker),

knew of the issues of flooding in and on the property and other defects affecting the basement of

the house. Seller (again, with Wright’s knowledge) incorrectly claimed that there were no issues

with the subject property, including, specifically, flooding and defects in the basement. The

property was sold to plaintiffs, who relied on seller’s declarations. Later, plaintiffs learned of the

issues when they experienced flooding on the property and in the basement, and, in turn,

discovered the faults in the basement and foundation. From this, we conclude that the common

core of operative facts is related in time and space, namely, seller’s and defendants’ knowledge of

the issues besetting the subject property and the falsity of seller’s declaration regarding those

issues. In addition, the alleged conduct is the same for both seller and defendants: the knowing

concealment of the falsity of seller’s declaration regarding flooding and other defects in the subject

property. The motivation of both seller and defendants is the same: attempting to sell the subject

property and inducing the sale through the incorrect terms of the declaration. Finally, the issues

raised in the 2018 action and in this action could have been easily resolved at a single trial. The

transactional test strongly demonstrates that the 2018 action and the instant case grew out of a

single and common core of operative facts. Accordingly, we conclude that the doctrine of

res judicata bars the instant action.

¶ 21   Plaintiffs argue that “there is no identity of cause of action between” the 2018 action and

the instant case. To make this argument, plaintiffs devote three paragraphs covering a bit more

than a page in their initial brief on appeal. Plaintiffs argue that the fact that Heather Wright had

                                                -7-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

knowledge of the flooding at the time of the contract was not discovered until the post-judgment

deposition of Sally Wright on November 5, 2020.

¶ 22    Plaintiffs’ argument on identity of causes of action consists of providing conclusions

without conducting, in any meaningful way, analysis. For example, plaintiffs do not analyze the

operative facts of each cause of action under the River Park rubric of whether the facts are related

in time, space, origin, motivation, and whether they form a convenient trial unit. River Park, 184

Ill. 2d at 311-12. Instead, plaintiffs only assert that Sally Wright’s testimony constituted a new

fact that disrupted the identity of the 2018 action with the instant action, seemingly without

recognizing, and certainly without explaining, that Hayashi held that res judicata did not apply,

not because the plaintiff there discovered an historical fact that existed at the time of the previous

judgment, but because the law changed, and this change in the law created a new basis for the

subsequent action to proceed. Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 47. Because this argument is not

developed in their initial brief on appeal, it is forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)

(argument in the appellant’s initial brief on appeal “shall contain the contentions of the appellant

and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on. ***

Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on

petition for rehearing”); Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 50 (undeveloped arguments on appeal are

forfeited). That plaintiffs may have more fully developed their argument in their reply brief is

insufficient to avoid forfeiture, because a party may not develop an argument for the first time on

appeal in its reply. People v. Robinson, 2013 IL App (2d) 120087, ¶ 15 (argument forfeited where

the party fails to develop or support the argument in its initial brief on appeal and only fleshes out

the argument for the first time in its reply brief).

                                                  -8-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

¶ 23    Forfeiture notwithstanding, plaintiffs argue more fully in their reply brief2 that the 2018

action and the instant case are not identical causes of action for the purposes of res judicata.

Plaintiffs argue that, in this case, the claim is based on defendants’ conduct, while in the 2018

action, their successful claim was based on seller’s conduct. Plaintiffs contend that, in this case,

defendants concealed the defects in the subject property in order to “reap a commission for

themselves,” and they accomplished this by providing the seller’s declaration to plaintiffs knowing

that the declaration was false and misleading. Plaintiffs assert that this case “does not depend upon

and is not related to anything that Seller said or did,” and “[t]his makes Defendants’ actions and

intent the operative, governing facts in this case,” while the operative facts in the 2018 action “are

patently not the same” as the operative facts in this case. We disagree.

¶ 24    Instead of conducting a transactional analysis, plaintiffs appear to use a “same evidence”

approach, which our supreme court rejected as incompatible with the transactional analysis. River

Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 310 (the defendant argued that the “application of the same evidence test is

inconsistent with our adoption of the transactional test. We agree”). By focusing on defendants’

motivation and conduct, plaintiffs narrowly consider only the evidence needed to maintain their

fraud claim, and not the core of operative facts out of which both the 2018 action and the instant

case arose. Indeed, plaintiffs cite Rodgers v. St. Mary’s Hospital of Decatur, 149 Ill. 2d 302, 312

(1992), for the proposition that res judicata would not apply where the facts pertinent to the

subsequent action would not also have sustained the judgment in the first action. Plaintiffs’

proposition is taken directly from the Rodgers court’s definition of the same evidence test. Id.

        2
            To emphasize, because an argument may not be raised for the first time in the reply brief

(Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)), it follows that a contention raised but not argued in the

initial brief also may not be developed for the first time in the reply brief.

                                                  -9-
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

(under the same evidence test, “res judicata bars a second suit if the evidence needed to sustain

the second suit would have sustained the first, or if the same facts were essential to maintain both

actions”). Plaintiffs’ analysis, therefore, does not address the transaction, focusing instead on the

elements and evidence necessary to sustain the fraud claim against seller and the fraud claim

against defendants. Accordingly, even had plaintiffs not forfeited this contention for failing to

develop it in their initial brief, it incorrectly pursues the same evidence test, and we reject it.

¶ 25                    C. Substantial Unfairness Exception to Res Judicata

¶ 26    Plaintiffs argue that applying res judicata under the circumstances in this case results in

substantial unfairness. Plaintiffs contend that they could not have reasonably known about

defendants’ knowledge of the falsity of the declaration at any time before they deposed seller’s

daughter in connection with their citation to discover assets arising from the 2018 action. Plaintiffs

also contend that the application of res judicata rewards defendants for their fraudulent conduct

and punishes plaintiffs for their inability to discover the fraudulent conduct until conducting the

citation to discover assets in connection with the 2018 action.

¶ 27    Initially we note that the doctrine of res judicata comes with a built-in safety valve: it will

not be applied where it would be fundamentally unfair to do so. Nowak v. St. Rita High School,

197 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (2001). What are the contours of “fundamental unfairness” for purposes of

res judicata? In Nowak, for example, our supreme court noted that the plaintiff had timely raised

his claim in a federal court action, but the federal court declined to exercise jurisdiction and the

plaintiff did not receive his day in court. Id. at 392. In Moy, 2021 IL App (2d) 200099, ¶¶ 38-39,

this court held that it would be fundamentally unfair and unjust to allow the defendant to avoid

making mortgage payments on a property and to retain the property that secured mortgage—

effectively giving the defendant both her cake and allowing her to eat it and leaving the bank

without recourse.

                                                 - 10 -
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

¶ 28    Plaintiffs argue that this sort of unfairness is at play here. We disagree.

¶ 29    While it is true that the trial court in the 2018 action did not pass upon the claims plaintiffs

raise against defendants in the instant case, this failure is laid squarely at plaintiffs’ feet, not against

any outside entity that prevented plaintiffs from raising the claim. In their motion to dismiss,

defendants contended that plaintiffs did not conduct discovery and instead, effectively settled the

2018 action via a stipulated bench trial. This contention seems to be supported by the final order

entered in the 2018 action, and plaintiffs do not dispute defendants’ claim that they did not conduct

discovery. Plaintiffs’ inability to raise their claims against defendants in the 2018 action is thus a

result of plaintiffs failing to investigate their claims rather than an external source preventing them

from raising their claims. This is more evident when we consider that Wright is seller’s daughter-

in-law—a fact that easily could have been discovered and surely would have merited further

inquiry.

¶ 30    Plaintiffs’ contention that the application of res judicata effectively rewards defendants’

fraudulent conduct is more impactful. On the one hand, Moy supports the idea that the party

claiming res judicata should not be allowed to profit from its wrongdoing. Id. ¶ 39. On the other

hand, res judicata was inapplicable in Moy because the later action arose from the defendant’s

failure to pay on the mortgage in 2018, whereas the earlier actions were based on nonpayment

occurring in 2009. Id. ¶ 33. Thus, because there was not a common core of operative facts between

the earlier and later actions, res judicata did not apply and Moy’s discussion of fundamental

unfairness was at best an alternate rationale for its holding. Id. ¶ 39 (even if res judicata were

applicable, it would not be applied because it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the defendant

to retain the property where she had not paid on the mortgage for nine years). While there is a

sense that defendants here may be “getting away with it,” we note that plaintiffs received a

judgment from seller for the damages incurred by the seller’s actions, and so plaintiffs are not

                                                   - 11 -
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

bereft of an opportunity to recover as was the bank in Moy. There is no obvious and unfair

detriment to plaintiffs who have received a judgment for their injury.

¶ 31    We also note that the doctrine of res judicata applies not only to the claims that were raised

in the earlier action, but also to those claims that could have been raised in the earlier action.

Nowak, 197 Ill. 2d at 393. Plaintiffs could have conducted discovery and discovered defendants’

misconduct and joined them in the 2018 action.3 That plaintiffs here did not conduct discovery,

thus delaying their uncovering defendants’ conduct, cannot be interposed as a reason not to apply

res judicata to the circumstances of this case.

¶ 32    Plaintiffs argue that the discovery rule should be expressly engrafted into the doctrine of

res judicata. Normally, the discovery rule applies to ameliorate harsh and unjust effects of

mechanically applying the statute of limitations. Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB

Townhomes, LLC, 2015 IL 118139, ¶ 52. “The discovery rule postpones the start of the limitations

period until a party knows or reasonably should know that an injury has occurred and that it was

wrongfully caused.” Id. We need not decide whether to incorporate the discovery rule (or if it is

already incorporated) into the doctrine of res judicata, because, by its terms, it would be

inapplicable here. As we have discussed above, plaintiffs almost certainly would have learned

about defendants’ misconduct had they conducted discovery. That plaintiffs did not conduct

formal discovery cannot be the basis of applying the discovery rule as they should have known of

defendants’ misconduct and joined (or at least attempted to join) defendants in the 2018 action.

        3
            Even if plaintiffs were not allowed to join defendants in the 2018 action, the attempt to do

so and the refusal to allow it would be the sort of unfairness occurring in Nowak—a court

precluding the issue from being raised—and Moy—the defendant using res judicata to impact the

plaintiff’s ability to obtain recourse.

                                                  - 12 -
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

¶ 33    Plaintiffs strenuously contend that they simply had no way to learn of defendants’

misconduct until they began citation proceedings in the 2018 action and deposed seller’s daughter.

Plaintiffs argue that they could not include unresearched allegations in their 2018 complaint and

that they were entitled to rely on defendants’ representations concerning any defects in the subject

property. In other words, defendants’ conduct, as reputable real estate brokers and agents,

provided an imprimatur of legitimacy to seller’s declarations when defendants delivered it to

plaintiffs.

¶ 34    While we agree that plaintiffs, in 2015-16, were entitled to expect that the representations

of seller and defendants regarding the condition and defects of the subject property were truthful,

in 2017, when they experienced flooding and discovered other defects, that expectation was

possibly rebutted and merited further inquiry. It was incumbent upon plaintiffs to investigate the

core of operative facts concerning any potential causes of action arising from the events. This

seems especially clear because Wright both shared seller’s last name and, in fact, was her daughter-

in-law. However, plaintiffs did not conduct discovery that could have uncovered defendants’

misconduct. Plaintiffs’ contention, therefore, is misplaced.

¶ 35    Plaintiffs also argue that res judicata does not apply if a plaintiff can clearly and

convincingly demonstrate that there is an extraordinary reason that overcomes the policies behind

the doctrine. Altair Corp. v. Grand Premier Trust & Investment, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 57, 63

(2000). Without defining what might constitute an “extraordinary reason,” this court suggested it

should include situations where the new facts or conduct are learned shortly before the final

judgment in the earlier action, and there was insufficient time for the plaintiff to act. Id. Altair

Corp. is harmonious with plaintiffs’ argument that they discovered defendants’ conduct only in

2020 and instituted the instant case expeditiously thereafter. As discussed above, however,

plaintiffs’ discovery of defendants’ concealment of their knowledge of the true condition and

                                               - 13 -
2023 IL App (2d) 220219-U

defects of the subject property appears to be the result of their decision to forgo formal discovery,

and not the intervention of a final order or external agency depriving them of the opportunity to

act upon the “new” information. Whatever may be an extraordinary reason not to apply the

doctrine of res judicata, plaintiffs’ decision to forgo formal discovery, and any resultant detriment

to them, is not one. Thus, plaintiffs have not clearly and convincingly demonstrated the existence

of an extraordinary reason not to apply res judicata.

¶ 36                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 38   Affirmed.

                                               - 14 -