Court Opinion

ID: 9487142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:09:12.809389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:06.994688
License: Public Domain

MAYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because Maxus Energy Corporation and Subsidiaries (Maxus) did not file a timely notice of appeal, this court lacks jurisdiction.
On July 11, 1991, the United States Court of Federal Claims (CFC) issued an opinion granting partial summary judgment which disallowed Maxus’ claimed income tax deductions. No. 4-89, Slip Op. (Ct.Fed.Cl. July 11, 1991) (July 11 opinion).1 Subsequent to the CFC’s opinion, but before final judgment was entered on all the claims, Maxus and the United States agreed to settle the remaining claims not subjects of the July 11 opinion. On June 30, 1992, Maxus and the United States filed a “Stipulation For Partial Dismissal” in the CFC. The stipulation states in its entirety:
It is hereby stipulated and agreed that all claims alleged in the complaint for the recovery of a refund by plaintiffs, with the exception of those claims asserted by plaintiffs which were the subject of the July 11, 1991 opinion of this court, have been settled on a basis satisfactory to both parties, and accordingly may be dismissed with prejudice except that the claims are dismissed without prejudice as to any adjustments to carrybacks from other taxable years, the parties to bear their respective costs, including any possible attorney’s fees or other expenses related to the litigation of the matters being dismissed.
The stipulation was signed by all parties to the suit. It is the filing of this stipulation and its effect that control jurisdiction.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the corresponding rule of the CFC, give the parties the right to voluntarily dismiss a case by stipulation at any stage in the proceedings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(l)(ii); RUSCC 41(a)(1)(B) (1991) (now RUSCFC 41(a)(1)(B) (1993)).2 The stipulation filed by Maxus conforms to the rule. It is in writing, is signed by all parties involved and clearly states the parties’ intention that the case is to be dis*1146missed. See 5 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶41.02[2] (2d ed. 1994).3 A stipulation of dismissal is effective immediately upon, filing and no judicial approval is required. In re Wolf, 842 F.2d 464, 466 (D.C.Cir.1988). In addition, as is clear from the rule, the dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise indicated in the stipulation. The stipulation here clearly provides that the dismissal is with prejudice except it is without prejudice as to the carrybacks. Thus the dismissal was effective and final as of June 30, 1992, the date it was filed in the CFC and the prejudice of the dismissal was as indicated in the stipulation itself.
The filing of a stipulation for dismissal deprives the court of jurisdiction over the matter stipulated. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, 511 U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (the court may not even retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement from which the stipulation derives unless that jurisdiction is expressly reserved with the consent of the parties). Because the CFC had no jurisdiction over the claims dismissed by the stipulation, the judgment entered by the court on July 21, 1992, had no effect on those claims. See In the Matter of West Texas Marketing Corp., 12 F.3d 497, 501 (5th Cir.1994) (“when the parties voluntarily agreed to a dismissal, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(h) ..., any further actions by the court were superfluous. Therefore, the dismissal order entered by the bankruptcy court is rendered irrelevant to the question of the finality of the judgment.” (Citations omitted)); In re Wolf, 842 F.2d at 466 (a judge is without authority to later alter a voluntary dismissal without prejudice to transform it into a dismissal with prejudice); McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178, 1185 (7th Cir.1985) (if the parties’ stipulation had been filed before the judge’s order, that order would have been a nullity). However, the July 21, 1992 judgment did make final the partial summary judgment granted in favor of the United States pursuant to the CFC’s July 11 opinion. This, and not the claims dismissed by stipulation, was the only substantive action affected. The merits of the summary judgment thus became final, and the time for filing a notice of appeal began to run, on July 21, 1992.
Pursuant to a motion filed by the parties on August 4, 1992, the court “amended” its July 21, 1992, judgment to conform to language used in the stipulation.4 Because the CFC’s actions could have no effect on the claims finally dismissed by the stipulation, this amendment had no substantive effect at all. See Kokkonen 511 U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 1675.5 The amendment did not relate to the summary judgment issue and so had no effect there.6 The amendment did *1147not have, and in fact could not have had, any substantive effect on the rights of the parties. Therefore, it did not extend the time for filing an appeal.
Because Maxus did not file a notice of appeal until September 22, 1992, one day after the expiration of the time limit, the notice was untimely and this court has no jurisdiction to reach the merits. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) (the time limit for filing an appeal set out in Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional).

. Maxus seeks to challenge the merits of this decision in this appeal.

. The CFC rule provides, in relevant part:
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation_ an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court ... (B) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all the parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice.... (Emphasis added).

. An oral stipulation made in open court may also be effective under the rule if the parties’ agreement to the dismissal is clear. See Moore’s at V 41.02[2] n. 19.

. The "Joint Motion to Amend Judgment” was clearly directed only to the claims that were the subject of the stipulation. The motion reads in its entirety:
Pursuant to RUSCC 60(a), the parties move to amend the July 21, 1992 judgment entered in the above-captioned case. The judgment states: "that the complaint is dismissed." The July 21, 1992 judgment does not indicate whether the complaint is dismissed with or without prejudice, and does not conform to the language contained in the parties’ stipulation for partial dismissal. The parties respectfully submit that the lack of conformity between the July 21, 1992 judgment and the parties' stipulation was the result of an oversight or omission on the part of the Clerk. Pursuant to RUSCC 60(a), the July 21, 1992 judgment should be amended by adding immediately after the words "complaint is dismissed,” the additional words “with prejudice except that the complaint is dismissed without prejudice as to any adjustments to carrybacks from other taxable years.”
As the motion focused only on the stipulated claims, and the claims subject to the July 11, 1991 opinion which were expressly excluded from the stipulation were not even mentioned by the parties' motion, or by the court in its amended judgment, the amendment was clearly not intended to, and did not affect those claims.

. The Supreme Court recognizes that some circuits have held that a case dismissed by stipulation may be reopened by a party by reason of a breach of the agreement that was the basis for the dismissal by a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). This exception to the general rule that the court lacks jurisdiction after stipulation obviously is not applicable in this case.

. Even if the motion to amend and the amended judgment could somehow be interpreted as directed also to the claims that were the subject of *1147the July 11 opinion, these claims were dismissed involuntarily in response to the government’s motion for partial summary judgment. The government is therefore correct that Rule 41(b) applies, at least as to those claims, and an unspecified dismissal in those circumstances acts as a final adjudication on the merits, i.e. is with prejudice. The July 21, 1992 order thus acted as a dismissal with prejudice as to the only claims over which the court had jurisdiction and, if anything, the amended judgment was redundant as to those claims.