Court Opinion

ID: 9748639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:08:47.119912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:37.923348
License: Public Domain

PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting.
I join Chief Justice Price in dissenting from the majority opinion because the facts in this case do not support a finding of unconscionability. However, I write separately because I do not agree with his finding that both procedural and substantive unconscionability are always required to find a contract unenforceable. I believe that issue has not been sufficiently resolved in Missouri. Moreover, because the issue is not necessary to the resolution of the present case, it should be left for another day.
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that a contract must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable for a contract to be invalidated. 8 Riohard A. Lord, WillistoN on Contracts § 18:10 (4th ed.1998); 7 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on ContaCts § 29.4 (Revised ed.2002). Accordingly, a number of courts have refused to apply the doctrine of unconscionability when there is merely procedural uncon-scionability but no showing of substantive unconscionability. 1 E. Allen Farns-worth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28 (3rd ed.2004). Likewise, courts have held that substantive unconscionability, standing alone, is insufficient to invalidate a contract. Id. This appears to be the conclusion reached by the court of appeals. See Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Mo.App.2009); Kansas City Urology P.A. v. United Healthcare Services, 261 S.W.3d 7, 15-16 (Mo.App.2008).
*29Other courts, however, have found a contract unenforceable on the basis of only substantive unconscionability in exceptional circumstances where the substantive unfairness in the contract is egregious. 1 Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28; 8 Willi-ston on Contracts § 18:10; 7 Corbin on Contacts § 29.4. The majority opinion contends that one of this Court’s prior decisions, State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, supports that conclusion. 194 S.W.3d 853 (Mo. banc 2006).
In Schneider, this Court considered whether an arbitration agreement in a real estate contract was unconscionable. Id. at 859-61. Ultimately, the Court found the arbitration agreement to be unconscionable on two substantive bases, but did not find procedural unconscionability. Id. at 861. However, in so ruling, the Court did not analyze the differing view of other courts or recognize that it was overruling court of appeals cases to the contrary.
The majority and dissenting opinions disagree over the significance of Schneider. In this case, the majority finds that Schneider implies that a strong finding of substantive unconscionability alone is sufficient to invalidate an unfair contractual provision. The Chief Justice’s dissent, on the other hand, believes that Schneider did not purport to overrule the requirement that a contractual provision must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable and, therefore, the law articulated by the court of appeals remains effective.
I do not believe it is necessary to the holdings of either the majority or dissenting opinions to decide whether Schneider should be interpreted as rejecting prior court of appeals decisions holding that both procedural and substantive uncon-scionability are needed to invalidate an unfair contractual provision. Such a decision is unnecessary to the Chief Justice’s dissent because it finds the arbitration waiver in Ms. Brewer’s case to be enforceable, a conclusion with which I agree. Likewise, a decision as to whether both procedural and substantive unconscionability are needed is unnecessary to the majority opinion because the majority finds the class arbitration waiver in Ms. Brewer’s case to be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Consequently, because it is unnecessary to the resolution of this case to determine if Schneider overruled prior precedent, the issue of whether substantive unconscionability alone is sufficient to invalidate a contract should be left for resolution in future cases.
I also write separately because I believe that a contract provision waiving class action arbitration, like any other contract provision, may be unconscionable under certain circumstances. However, as discussed by Chief Justice Price, the facts in this case do not support a finding of uncon-scionability.