Court Opinion

ID: 9577516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:35:42.816646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:44.091434
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
with whom Dimond, Justice Pro Tem joins, concurring.
*425V^hile I agree that a common law privilege covering communications between patients and psychotherapists should be recognized, on the particular facts of this case, I would hold that the privilege encompasses the relationship between Mrs. Henderson and Allred.
Prior to Allred’s conversation with Mrs. Henderson at the jail, they had had numerous extended conferences concerning Allred’s emotional problems.1 Allred was specifically informed that the Langdon Clinic staff had assigned Mrs. Henderson as his counselor and that she would be acting directly under the supervision of Dr. Aaron Wolf, a psychiatrist. Allred often sought her aid in resolving mental and emotional problems. In short, the record demonstrates that Mrs. Henderson was intimately familiar with Allred’s problems and occupied a central role in Allred’s therapy.2 Given Professor Wigmore’s four canons for determining whether a common law privilege is desirable, and given the conclusion that a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized, then the reason why the privilege ought not extend to the instant case should somehow relate to Wigmore’s canons. I fail to see why the rationale which supports a common law privilege is less compelling here than in any case where the psychotherapist-patient privilege is recognized.3
The communication in question which took place between Allred and Mrs. Henderson was viewed by them as a therapeutic session in which Allred discussed his mental problems and looked to Mrs. Henderson for advice and counseling. Allred requested Mrs. Henderson’s presence for the purpose of counseling. He talked to her because he needed counseling. His candor with Mrs. Henderson was based on the belief that he was in therapy with his counselor.4 Under the circumstances confidentiality was essential to the relationship between them.
In my opinion Allred’s relationship with Mrs. Henderson, initiated to seek mental health, is one which sought to be sedulously fostered by the community. It is not necessarily relationships with psychiatrists or licensed psychologists that ought to be sedulously fostered; rather, what should be fostered is the therapeutic relationship which looks toward improvement of mental *426health. Whatever trust Allred once had in psychotherapists in general, or Mrs. Henderson in particular, would be significantly undermined if we were to exclude therapists in Mrs. Henderson’s position. Were it Dr. Wolf instead of his alter ego who testified in court, the damage to the therapy relationship could be no less in its impact. Thus, I conclude that all of the reasons which support the recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege in theory call for the application of that privilege to the circumstances of the case at bar.5
I agree with the implicit assertion of Justice Dimond that Wigmore’s four canons concerning common law privileges are descriptive and not prescriptive. As does Justice Dimond, I find them useful guides on the path to determining whether a psychotherapist-patient privilege ought to be recognized.6 As I indicated at the outset, for the reasons in Justice Connor’s opinion, I find it appropriate to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal proceedings. However, as opposed to the conclusion Justice Connor draws, I believe the privilege extends to the particular relationship between Allred and Mrs. Henderson. Nonetheless, because the statutes in question bear on the holding I reach, I consider it appropriate to comment on AS 08.86.200.
The line between substance and procedure can hardly be termed a clear one, as United States Supreme Court cases emanating from Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938), indicate. An enlightening articulation of the problem of distinguishing between substance and procedure is found in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 1469, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 2085-86 (1945), where Justice Frankfurter, in reviewing a lower court’s refusal to apply state law, asserted:
Matters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same key-words to very different problems. Neither ‘substance’ nor ‘procedure’ represents the same invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is used. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 409, 50 S.Ct. 338, 74 L.Ed. 926, 934, 74 ALR 701. And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are in common use in connection with situations turning on . different considerations ....
The question which Justice Frankfurter faced in Guaranty Trust Co., namely, how *427to adjudicate “ . . . transactions for which rights and obligations are created by one of the States, and for the assertion of which, in case of diversity of the citizenship of the parties, Congress has made a federal court another available forum” (326 U.S. at 101, 65 S.Ct. at 1466, 89 L.Ed. at 2082) relates to the issue confronting this court in the instant petition.
By virtue of its enactment of AS 08.86.-200, the legislature has created certain rights and obligations. These rights and obligations appear substantive in nature precisely because they regulate the way people order their activities.7 They also, according to Chief Justice Boochever, regulate the way the courts do business.8 Consequently, if one focuses on the operative effect of a statutory privilege upon court proceedings, support can then be mustered for the conclusion that the privilege is basically procedural in character. On the other hand, if one should focus on the rights accorded by a statutory privilege, it can be concluded that the privilege is substantive.
This distinction between substance and procedure takes on importance here because our Alaska Constitution, Article IV, Section 15, vests the power to make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in this court.9 While the power to create substantive rights is a legislative power, the power to fashion procedures to implement those rights is, by virtue of Article IV, Section 15, judicial.10 However, this judicial power to fashion rules of procedure is not absolute. Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447 (Alaska 1963). For instance, in Leege we noted that Alaska’s Constitution provides that the legislature may change court rules of procedure by a two-thirds vote of the members of each house.
Consequently, I would hold, if I were to reach the question of the appropriate construction of AS 08.86.200, that the legislative power to establish privileges as substantive rights does not normally, when exercised, by the mere fact of its exercise, create privileges assertable in the courts. Precisely because privileges are both substantive and procedural, this court should be wary of unwarranted extensions of the legislature’s power to create substantive rights which encroach upon the procedural rules arena. In short, a substantive right to silence a witness does not automatically give rise to a procedural right to assert a privilege in a court of this state, unless the law establishing the right constitutes a change of a court rule as discussed in Leege.
In ascertaining whether any legislative policy has been articulated concerning the nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship, AS 08.86.200 et seq. stands alone as a clear expression of the legislature’s position. I find no expression of a legislative intent to deny individuals in general a right to silence their therapists. Nor do I find any intent to exclude individuals in Allred’s situation from the general policy. *428In short, I find ■ no convincing expression of social policy by the legislative representatives of the people which conflicts with the common law privilege I believe Allred has a right to claim.11
In conclusion I wish to reiterate the view that since the basis for recognizing a common law psychotherapeutic privilege is a desire to protect the integrity of a commonly used process which looks to mental health, I would hold the psychotherapist-patient privilege applicable in the instant case.12

. Mrs. Henderson saw Allred daily for brief periods of time, and they engaged in some 30 to 50 extended counseling sessions. She had been his counselor for at least a year prior to Allred’s arrest.

. Mrs. Henderson was the eyes, ears, and spokeswoman for a therapy group consisting of staff members of various specialties. She would present problems weekly to the group which was led by Dr. Wolf and which consisted of staff members of various specialties. The problems of particular individuals and the resolution of those problems would be discussed among the group. Mrs. Henderson described this therapy as “community therapy.” In her own words: “. . . it’s where the entire staff works together; in other words it’s not one person working with one patient. It’s one person, with the help of the rest of the staff, working .... It’s a case of the entire staff relating everything they know about a particular patient.” Compare Comment, 61 Cal.L.Rev. 1050, 1055 (1973).

. If the problem is one of line drawing, as Justice Connor asserts, then I must take issue with the rationale which excludes the compelling factual circumstance of this case. It appears that drawing lines reflects a preoccupation with “floodgate” type arguments which this court has consistently rejected. The concern is that “everyone” should not be able to assert a privilege merely because a conversation with an acquaintance can arguably be styled as “therapeutic.” Admittedly, whenever a privilege exists, cases will arise where it is not clear whether the privilege should apply. However, the fact that such cases will arise does not justify the wholesale exclusion of relationships which deserve to be protected by the privilege.

.Allred asked the police to contact either Dr. Wolf or Mrs. Henderson. He apparently did not indicate a preference for one over the other, believing them both to be his counselors. And in fact when Mrs. Henderson permitted the conversation to be monitored, she requested that its content be ignored. In the words of the police officer who told her of the monitoring, “[s]he was concerned about the privilege.”

. Justice Connor seeks to distinguish the instant situation from the general psychotherapist-patient privilege on the grounds that relationships with psychological associates are less “intensely personal.” The reasoning which correlates the depth of the patient-therapist relationship with the therapist’s fulfillment of state licensing requirements escapes me. The purpose of our licensing requirements is to protect consumers of the service from the charlatan, not to provide the therapist with a license to become “intensely personal.” Therapists treat mental and emotional problems and do not necessarily delve into the patient’s life with a particular degree of personal intensity.
In view of the community therapy regimen he was undergoing, I cannot conclude that Allred’s interview with Mrs. Henderson must have been “less intensely personal” merely because she was neither a licensed psychologist nor a psychiatrist. I must conclude otherwise: Allred had a problem which was sufficiently related to his therapy for him to seek therapeutic help. His participation in the session in prison was in no part qualified with the provision to the effect that, “of course, I won’t be as' honest with you as I would with Dr. Wolf.” Cf. Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 504(a) (2) (1971).

. I note that in his concurring opinion, Justice Dimond asserts that he would not consider whether society sedulously fosters the relationship. This is a most difficult issue. Although I tend to disagree with Justice Dimond’s position, I am willing to give the matter more study since resolution of the question is not necessary, in this case, to the decision I would reach.

. The rationale underlying the removal of detailed laws of privilege from the Federal Rules of Evidence has been explained as based on the notion that “ . . . Federal law should not supersede that of the states in substantive areas such as privilege absent a compelling reason.” Senate Report No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., at p. 7.

. Compare the following comment found in 2 Moore’s Federal Practice Rules Pamphlet 502 (2d ed. 1975) :
Although a privilege may embody state social policies and may regulate persons’ conduct outside of the courtroom, its effect in the courtroom is to alter the normal procedural functions of the system.
See Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969).

. Art. IV, § 15 provides:
The supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts. It shall make and promulgate rules governing practice and procedure in civil and criminal cases in all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house.

. Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1969).

. Compare note 6, supra. Thus in terms of objectives I find our common law privilege to be in harmony with the statutory right. The statutory right bears witness to my conclusion that the relationship in question is one which society sedulously fosters.

. I believe the privilege applies to cases, such as the instant one, where the unlicensed therapist has engaged in a long-standing treatment routine with the patient under the supervision of a licensed therapist. Of relevance to this position is the following statement of Judge Edgerton, in Mullen v. United States, 105 U.S.App.D.C. 25, 263 F.2d 275, 281 (1958) : “I think a communication made in reasonable confidence that it will not be disclosed, and in such circumstances that disclosure is shocking to the moral sense of the community, should not be disclosed in a judicial proceeding, whether the trusted person is or is not a wife, husband, doctor, lawyer, or minister.” See also Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292, 49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692 (1929).
In another case, Taylor v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (1955), Judge Edgerton observed “ . a psychiatrist must have his patient’s- confidence or he cannot help him.” Judge Al-verson of the Superior Court of Atlanta is quoted by Professor Solvenko in his article as asserting that “without a promise of secrecy from the therapist, buttressed by a legal privilege, a patient would not be prone to reveal personal data which he fears might evoke social disapproval.” R. Solvenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 Wayne L.Rev. 186-87. Judge Alverson includes under the rubric ‘“psychotherapist” all persons who use psychoanalytic techniques, including lay social workers. Id. at 200, n. 78.