Court Opinion

ID: 9543640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:33.508328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:45.965412
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority holds that,
Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without and direct or indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of martial property after the parties have separated and after the marital family, as a practical matter, ceased to exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property would not ordinarily be consonant with the history of the purpose of the statute.
Op. at 507. The majority seeks to achieve a result that it believes is just and fair. Unable, under the existing ruling, to avoid what it considers a harsh result in this very difficult *511case—it has been observed that hard cases make bad law, Fed. Communication Comm’n v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223, 229, 67 S.Ct. 213, 216, 91 L.Ed. 204, 209 (1946); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 468, 48 L.Ed. 679, 712 (1904) (Holmes, J. dissenting); Citaramanis v. Hallowell, 328 Md. 142, 177, 613 A.2d 964, 981 (1992) (Bell, J. dissenting)—the majority simply changes the rules of the game. It puts a gloss on marital property, which, in turn, impacts how marital property is distributed, as well as judicial review of monetary awards. Heretofore, once property, whether acquired before or after separation, was determined to be marital property, the decision to make a monetary award, either as a percentage of the property or in a lump sum amount, was entrusted to the sound discretion of the chancellor, exercised after considering the factors enumerated in Maryland Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.) § 8-205(b) of the Family Law Article,1 and “in accordance with correct legal standards.” Op. at 504.
*512I.
We have held that “when a monetary award is at issue, the court is permitted to effectuate a realignment of assets via a three-step process.” Zandford v. Wiens, 314 Md. 102, 106, 549 A.2d 13, 15 (1988); Niroo v. Niroo, 313 Md. 226, 231, 545 A.2d 35, 37-38 (1988). The first step requires the court to determine which of the parties’ property is marital property. § 8-203(a). Under the second, the court has to value that property. § 8-204. Finally, the court must decide whether to make a monetary award as an adjustment of the parties’ equities and rights. § 8-205(a); Zandford, 314 Md. at 106, 549 A.2d at 15. The chancellor is not obliged to make a monetary award and, if one is made, he or she need not equally divide the property. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 203, 437 A.2d 883, 892 (1981); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md.App. 392, 405, 431 A.2d 1371, 1378 (1981). If an award is deemed appropriate, before the court may make it, it must consider each of the ten factors enumerated in section 8-205. Id. 314 Md. at 106-07 n. 5, 549 A.2d at 15 n. 5; Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54, 79, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982).
The trial court found that the lotto winnings were marital property, i.e., “property ... acquired by 1 or both parties during the marriage.” § 8-201(e)(1). See also Pope v. Pope, 322 Md. 277, 279, 587 A.2d 481, 482 (1991); Niroo, 313 Md. at 228, 545 A.2d at 36; Queen v. Queen, 308 Md. 574, 575, 521 A.2d 320, 321 (1987); Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 349, 493 A.2d 1074, 1075 (1985).2 The majority concedes that point; it *513acknowledges that, when the lotto jackpot is hit before the termination of the marriage, lotto winnings are marital property.3 See Archer, 303 Md. at 350, 493 A.2d at 1076. Having considered all the factors, a point no one disputes, the chancellor found that the respondent was entitled to a monetary award. He set the appropriate award, again, in light of the required factors, at one-half the lotto winnings. On the other hand, the chancellor could have determined, upon consideration of the factors, that no monetary award should be made, in which event, the respondent would not be entitled to any of the lotto winnings.
After today, the chancellor’s discretion to make monetary awards is significantly curtailed when the marital property is *514acquired after the parties have separated.4 The majority holds:
While no hard and fast rule can be laid down, and while each case must depend upon its own circumstances to insure that equity be accomplished, generally in a case such as this the eighth factor should be given greater weight than the others. Where one party, wholly through his or her own efforts, and without any direct or indirect contribution by the other, acquires a specific item of marital property after the parties have separated and after the marital family has, as a practical matter, ceased to exist, a monetary award representing an equal division of that particular property would not ordinarily be consonant with the history and purpose of the statute.
Op. at 507. It proffers that the history and purpose of the equitable distribution statute dictate that result. Acknowledging that the Legislature was concerned that “careful consideration [be] given to both monetary and nonmonetary contributions made by the respective spouses to the well-being of the family,” see Ch. 794, Acts of 1978, the majority asserts that
[t]he history of the statute indicates that the General Assembly was primarily concerned with achieving equity by reflecting non-monetary contributions to the acquisition of marital assets, and that principle should be a major consideration in a trial judge’s analysis.
Op. at 506-507. In the majority’s view, this translates into according “the eighth factor, relating to ‘how and when specific marital property’ was acquired and the contribution that each party made toward its acquisition ... considerable weight.” Id. The majority initially focused on what it perceived to be the chancellor’s knee jerk inclination equally to divide the lotto winnings. It then purports to acknowledge that it is the chancellor’s role to weigh the relevant factors and *515exercise discretion to make an appropriate monetary award, which under some circumstances, may be an equal division of the property. A remand for that purpose ordinarily would have been required. Rather than remanding the case for that purpose, however, the Court makes clear its real holding when it determined that “the record before us contains no evidence which would justify awarding any portion of the annuity to Mrs. Alston.” Op. at 509. Whenever a lotto ticket is purchased after separation by one of the parties, the record will contain the same evidence; hence, as a matter of law, in no such case would the non-purchasing spouse be entitled to a monetary award of any portion of the winnings.
Before today’s decision, the determination whether to make a monetary award was entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion, not to a reviewing court to determine as a matter of law. Before today, after determining which property is marital property, the chancellor was not then required further to categorize the marital property as property acquired before separation and property acquired after separation. That was not required because, by reference to the factors the Legislature defined to inform the decision whether to make a monetary award, the health of the marital family when the asset was acquired was readily and unmistakenly apparent. It was not required for another reason—nothing in the statute, or case law, for that matter, permitted the chancellor to treat marital property acquired after separation differently from marital property acquired before separation. Simply put, as a “[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose”5, “[pjroperty acquired by a party up to the date of divorce, even though the parties are separated, is marital property,” Williams v. Williams, 71 Md.App. 22, 34, 523 A.2d 1025, 1035 (1987), and as such, is accorded the same treatment, for purposes of the determination of a monetary award, as is property acquired before the separation. In Wilen v. Wilen, 61 Md.App. 337, 486 A.2d 775 (1985), the Court of Special Appeals graphically made this very point. There, the trial court determined that the mar*516riage was “factually dead” as of September 1, 1981 and concluded that property acquired after that date should not be considered marital property. Id. at 345, 486 A.2d at 779. The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the chancellor’s refusal to consider the substantial assets acquired between separation (September 1, 1981) and divorce (November 1983) was improper. Id., 486 A.2d at 779-80.
The effect of today’s decision is further to define “marital property,” to engraft onto the definition, a refinement based on when the property was acquired, and to require the chancellor to assess whether such property may be a predicate for a monetary award on the basis of one of the ten factors required to be considered when the property is acquired before separation. Being aware of the definition we have given it, had the Legislature desired to do so, it certainly could have either redefined “marital property” and excluded from that definition any property acquired after the separation, but prior to the divorce or, within the existing definition, accorded a different treatment for pre-separation marital property and post-separation marital property.
By its opinion, the majority mandates two categories of marital property ánd two standards for reviewing decisions relating to monetary awards. Property acquired before separation is one category; if a monetary award is made from that property, the reviewing court must look to determine if all ten factors in section 8-205 have been considered. Moreover, none of them is to be accorded greater weight than another as a matter of law. Thus, had the petitioner acquired the lotto ticket, pre-separation, even if by only an hour, the chancellor’s decision to weigh all of the relevant factors would not be a problem for the majority. If, however, the property were acquired after separation, even if by only an hour, a different result would obtain; factor eight would have to be weighted more heavily and even to the exclusion of the other factors. In fact, that fact, on review, would be decisive.
In no case has a court of this State held or even suggested that one of the factors in section 8-205(b) should, as a matter *517of law, weigh more heavily than another. See Prahinski v. Prahinski, 321 Md. 227, 229-30, 582 A.2d 784, 785 (1990); Herget v. Herget, 319 Md. 466, 471, 573 A.2d 798, 800 (1990); Manns v. Manns, 308 Md. 347, 351, 519 A.2d 740, 742 (1987); Archer, 303 Md. at 350, 493 A.2d at 1076; Lookingbill v. Lookingbill, 301 Md. 283, 293, 483 A.2d 1, 6 (1984); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 93 Md.App. 704, 712, 713, 614 A.2d 988, 992 (1992); John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 425, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992); Melrod v. Melrod, 83 Md.App. 180, 185, 574 A.2d 1, 3, cert. denied, 321 Md. 67, 580 A.2d 1077 (1990); Hughes v. Hughes, 80 Md.App. 216, 229, 560 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1989); Watson v. Watson, 77 Md.App. 622, 627, 551 A.2d 505, 507 (1989). The statute suggests only that each of the factors is to be given some weight: the statute states, in pertinent part, “The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetary award ... after considering each of the following factors____” § 8-205(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, the required factors are listed in the conjunctive. This, too, indicates that all of them must be considered. We have held that “the word ‘and’ should be interpreted according to its plain and ordinary meaning and that it is not interchangeable with the word ‘or.’ ” Comptroller v. Fairchild Industries, 303 Md. 280, 285-86, 493 A.2d 341, 343-44 (1985). There is nothing in the statute or case law to suggest that the Legislature intended that the factors in section 8-205(b) be interpreted other than in the conjunctive; thus, requiring the chancellor to weigh each of the factors. “Where the interpretation of a statute is such as to place it in the conjunctive, an applicant for a variance must show both practical difficulty and hardship in order to have a court interpret the statute in the disjunctive.” 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 21.14, at 128 (4th ed. 1985). Thus,
[i]n making the ... determination [of what sum of money, if any, should be awarded to one spouse or the other as an equitable adjustment], ... the chancellor is obliged to consider all of the criteria set forth in ... § 8-205.... and [h]ow much weight should be given to each factor in each *518case is a matter entirely within the chancellor’s sound discretion.
Wilen, 61 Md.App. at 355, 486 A.2d at 784 (emphasis added).
To be sure, a chancellor must and, in fact, would be remiss if he or she did not consider how, and when, marital property was acquired. This, however, does not require or, for that matter, permit the chancellor only to consider those matters. But, once it is determined that the property was acquired after separation and by the efforts of one spouse alone, that is the effect of the majority opinion. Because in that situation, the record will never “contain[ ] ... evidence which would justify awarding any portion of the annuity” to the other party, the effect of the majority opinion is to preclude, as a matter of law, such post-separation property from being the source of a marital award, whatever the result that consideration of the other factors would dictate. I agree with the intermediate appellate court, once the chancellor concludes that the property acquired during the parties’ separation was marital property, “the method of acquisition ... bec[omes] merely one factor among ten statutory factors, with its weight to be determined by the court as trier of fact.” Alston v. Alston, 85 Md.App. 176, 188, 582 A.2d 574, 510 (1990), cert. granted, 322 Md. 333, 587 A.2d 510 (1991) (emphasis supplied). I would hold that it is the chancellor’s duty, not ours, to consider all of the factors and determine the weight to be given to each factor.6
Making the determination whether particular property may be the basis of a monetary award to depend primarily on the timing of its acquisition not only flies in the face of the legislative scheme and the interpretation we have given marital property, but it has the effect, as I have shown, of treating *519the same kind of property differently based only on that factor. Moreover, as I have also shown, an unnecessary layer of review, requiring consideration of different factors depending on the timing of acquisition, is imposed.
Prior to today, a trial court’s decision to make a monetary award, the identification of the property from which it is to be made and the award itself could be reversed only where it was “clear from the record that the [court] gave no more than lip service to the [ten] factors”, Alston, 85 Md.App. at 188, 582 A.2d at 579, quoting Ward v. Ward, 52 Md.App. 336, 343-44, 449 A.2d 443, 448 (1982), or “where the court misinterpreted or dismissed as unimportant one of the factors.” Id. at 188, 582 A.2d at 579-80, citing Mount v. Mount, 59 Md.App. 538, 476 A.2d 1175, 1183 (1984). Now, when property is acquired after separation, the trial court’s monetary award decision as to that property may be reversed if factor eight is not accorded considerable weight.
If the Legislature had intended the result the majority reaches, it could, and probably would, have drawn a distinction between pre-separation and post-separation acquired property or, at least, prioritized the required factors according to importance, perhaps listing factor eight as most important. Currently, “how and when the marital property was acquired” is the eighth of the ten factors, indicating, if anything at all, that it is not to be accorded overriding importance. See Giedinghagen v. Giedinghagen, 712 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.App.1986), in which the court held
We do not hold nor intimate that husband here is entitled to any portion of the proceeds of the lottery winnings. The court is to make a just distribution of the marital property and in doing so may take into account the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the property as well as other considerations.
Id. at 714 (emphasis omitted and supplied).
The determination of whether a spouse is entitled to a monetary award in respect of the acquisition of marital property and, if so, in what amount has been entrusted by the *520Legislature to the sound discretion of the chancellor, the latter decision required to be made by the chancellor upon the consideration of the factors enumerated in section 8—205(b). That decision was not, and should not be, made to depend upon when the property was acquired or whether the reviewing court believes the result the chancellor reaches to be harsh.

. Section 8-205(b) provides:
(b) Factors in determining amount and method of payment or terms of transfer.—The court shall determine the amount and the method of payment of a monetaiy award, or the terms of the transfer of the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both, after considering each of the following factors:
(1) the contributions, monetaiy and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;
(2) the value of all property interest of each party;
(3) the economic circumstances of each party at the time the award is to be made;
(4) the circumstances that contributed to the estrangement of the parties;
(5) the duration of the marriage;
(6) the age of each party;
(7) the physical and mental condition of each party;
(8) how and when specific marital property or interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, was acquired, including the effort expended by each party in accumulating the marital property or the interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both;
(9) any award of alimony and any award or other provision that the court has made with respect to family use personal property or the family home;
*512(10) any other factor that the court considers necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award or transfer of an interest in the pension, retirement, profit sharing, or deferred compensation plan, or both.

. The husband maintains that, like damage awards for personal injury, gifts and inheritances, the lotto winnings were totally unrelated to the efforts of either party and entirely fortuitous. Thus, he argues, the chancellor’s failure to adequately consider the eighth factor was an abuse of discretion. In order to recover damages in a personal injury case, for example, the plaintiff must, in fact, have been injured; therefore, the claim is uniquely personal to the claimant, the injured party. Entitlement to damages for the injury does not directly affect, nor is it *513dependent upon, the efforts of the other spouse. See Unkle v. Unkle, 305 Md. 587, 505 A.2d 849 (1986). Lotto winnings do not share that attribute; they are quite different. See In re: Marriage of Mahaffey, 206 Ill.App.3d 859, 151 Ill.Dec. 638, 643, 564 N.E.2d 1300, 1305 (1990) (Lottery winnings were presumptively marital property because where it was undisputed that money used to purchase winning lottery ticket came from earnings of either husband or wife, purchase of ticket occurred during the marriage and the irrevocable right to receive lottery payments was established during marriage); Smith v. Smith, 162 A.D.2d 346, 557 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23 (1990) (Lottery winnings were marital property even though they were acquired by husband's efforts and husband was not entitled to greater share of prize in divorce action because lottery winnings were predominately result of fortuitous circumstances and not the result of husband’s toil or labor); Ullah v. Ullah, 161 A.D.2d 699, 555 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (1990) (Lottery jackpot, including future payments, the right to which arose during the marriage and on a wager of marital funds was “marital property’’ subject to equitable distribution). Accord Dyer v. Dyer, 370 Pa.Super. 377, 536 A.2d 453, 456 (1988) (Lottery winnings that were not acquired during the marriage were husband’s sole and separate property).

. While agreeing that the lotto winnings were marital property, the majority nonetheless, and somewhat inconsistently maintains that they may not be considered in making a monetary award because the marital family had ceased to exist when the lotto ticket was purchased. Because a separation signals and reflects the death of the marital family, at least for the time of the separation and whenever property is required after separation, it ordinarily involves the effort of but one of the spouses, the majority has developed a formula that, in effect, treats lotto winnings, and all such property, as nonmarital property, i.e., property not subject to an equitable distribution.

. The Court, to be sure, inserts the condition that the marriage, for all intents and purposes, is dead; that condition would be met, for whatever period it continues, whenever there is a separation.

. Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily, 1913.

. The majority suggests that in this case the chancellor "succumbed to the temptation to divide the property equally.” Op. at 14. There is absolutely nothing in the record to support that suggestion; in fact, the record tends to prove the opposite—that the chancellor arrived at the amount of the award after considering all the facts. The record does not read to a conclusion that the award settled upon was a knee-jerk reaction to the petitioner having hit the lotto.