Court Opinion

ID: 9779155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:38:32.11736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:22.472735
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
For the reasons previously expressed by this court in Jamail v. State, 713 S.W.2d 776 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. pending), I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
At the outset, we must recognize that the treatment of a person charged with D.W.I. differs from the treatment of a person charged with any other crime. That significant difference is that a D.W.I. defendant is required to prove the elements of the offense with which he is charged in the D.W.I. indictment, to wit: “... not having the normal use of his mental and physical faculties ...”
When requiring the D.W.I. suspect to perform certain feats of physical dexterity and to read from a printed sheet of paper, the police are doing so for the sole purpose of using the video and audio tape against the accused in a subsequent trial on the charge of driving while intoxicated. There can be no reasonable belief that the performance by an accused in the videotape room is for investigative purposes.
*38Prior to entering the videotape room, a D.W.I. suspect has been found to be intoxicated by the arresting officer or officers. The normal procedure in Harris County is for the arresting officers to then call a special D.W.I. task force composed of supervisory personnel who also make an on the scene determination as to the accused’s state of intoxication. The accused is interviewed and observed, by way of field sobriety tests and a series of questions and answers, by two to four or more police officers prior to a determination being made that the accused is intoxicated. Only after making a determination that the accused is intoxicated, and only after arresting the accused for suspicion of driving while intoxicated, is the accused brought into the videotape room.
The adversary process has commenced.
The tests performed in the videotape room had no probative or investigative value in determining whether the accused would be formally charged with driving while intoxicated. That determination had been made prior to the time Appellant entered the videotape room. Further, Appellant herein inquired if the officer thought he was drunk or if he had passed the test and the officer replied: “You did fine, you really did.” The officer then told Appellant he would be placed in jail immediately if he refused to take a breath test.
Where the tests performed by Appellant had no relevance to whether he would be charged with a crime, and where Appellant was not able to “pass” the test and avoid prosecution, the State had, already committed itself to prosecute. Therefore, this was a “critical stage of prosecution” and Appellant had a right to counsel. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1937, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
When we recognize the true nature and purpose of the videotape room, and recognize that Appellant was not a “suspect” as that term may be used in the investigation of burglaries, rapes, murders, etc., but was indeed the man caught driving a vehicle and was actually under arrest for D.W.I., we must come to the inescapable conclusion that he was in police custody and undergoing interrogation. Therefore, Appellant had a Fifth Amendment right to be assisted by counsel during such interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Furthermore, once an accused invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, it remains in effect as long as he is in continuous police custody. United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831, 104 S.Ct. 110, 78 L.Ed.2d 111 (1983). See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986).
The majority opinion makes the erroneous conclusion that Appellant’s right to counsel did not attach during the videotape or the breath test because both were taken prior to the filing of the complaint. The majority reasons that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attaches only upon or after formal initiation of judicial proceedings, and cites McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 502 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) and Forte v. State, 707 S.W.2d 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). However, the Sixth Amendment right exists when an individual “becomes the accused. ” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 1762, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964). Further, the McCambridge opinion recognized that a due process or Miranda violation could occur when police “mix” a breath test request with custodial interrogation. McCambridge v. State, 712 S.W.2d 499, 506 n. 17 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Here, there was no break between the custodial interrogation of Appellant and the request that he submit to a breath test. Therefore, the police impermissibly “mixed” a breath test request with a continuation of police custody and custodial interrogation after Appellant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel had attached and were denied or ignored.
I submit that there is no more critical time in the processing of a D.W.I. suspect than when the State uses video and audio tapes to prove the elements alleged in the indictment. Once a person has been arrested for D.W.I., the filing of a formal complaint will inevitably follow. How then *39can we allow the State to delay the filing of a formal complaint in order to audio and videotape the accused performing acts which prove the elements of the offense with which he is charged. It is clear that we would not allow the State to engage in a procedure that would require a person accused of any other felony to perform acts in a videotape room when those very acts would prove the elements of the offense with which he was charged. This would not be allowed whether it occurred prior to or subsequent to the formal filing of the complaint. Further, it could not be allowed while the accused was denied right to counsel.
Although we are deeply embroiled in a serious battle to prevent the loss of life and serious bodily injury caused by persons driving while intoxicated, we must nonetheless vigorously oppose any infringements on the constitutional rights of those so accused.
The majority opinion holds that once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear, i.e.: “If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). However, the majority concludes that Appellant did not request an attorney but instead asked to call his father; and alternatively, the majority concludes that Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation. The majority must not have been aware that Appellant was arrested prior to being required to enter the videotape room. The Appellant was not a suspect, he was the accused.
A review of the videotape reveals that as Appellant was entering the room he said, “Can I call my lawyer?” The interviewing officer did not respond but started introducing the other police officers present in the videotape room. Appellant again asked, “Can I call my lawyer?” Again, the interviewing officer disregarded his request and asked him to wait until he concluded his introductions. The officer then completed his introductions, advised Appellant that he was under arrest and Miran-dized Appellant. At the conclusion of the Miranda warnings Appellant asked, “Can I call my father?” When asked if he understood what the officer had just told him, Appellant replied, “Yes, sir, can I call my father to see who my lawyer is?” (Appellant was age 18 at the time of his arrest.) The officer ignored the question and continued with a reading of Appellant’s rights.
The officer later advised Appellant, “You have a right to have a lawyer appointed during any questioning.” Appellant responded, “Is this questioning?” The officer asked if Appellant understood, and Appellant responded, “Yes, but is this questioning?” Finally, the officer told Appellant that he could call his attorney but that an attorney only could be called from that room. Appellant responded that he did not know who his attorney was but would like to call his father to call an attorney. At that point, another officer responded, “You’ll be allowed personal phone calls later, we have limited time here.” Appellant again stated that he did not know who his attorney was. He was then told he could use the phone book. Appellant again asked, “Can I call my father?” and he was told that he could call when he got “across the street.”
Appellant then performed the feats of physical dexterity requested of him after which the officer again read Appellant the Miranda rights. The officers stated, “You have a right to terminate this interview at any time.” Appellant responded, “I will terminate now.’’ The officer responded, “You want to terminate it now?” Appellant stated, “No, keep advising me, but I won’t say anything.” After that a colloquy occurred between the officer and Appellant wherein Appellant asked the officer if he considered him drunk or if he had passed the test, to which the officer responded, “You did fine, you really did.” The officer then immediately asked, “Now will you waive those rights and answer questions.” Appellant responded, “If you ask the right questions.”
The majority opinion concludes that when Appellant asked to terminate the in*40terview, no custodial interrogation had begun because the officer was still in the process of Mirandizing Appellant. The majority recognizes that Appellant did ask to terminate the interrogation, but they take his statement “Keep advising me” as an invitation to “keep interrogating” him.
Appellant unequivocally exercised his right to call an attorney and he exercised his right to terminate the questioning. However, instead of terminating the questioning as required by Miranda and by Edwards1 the officer calmed Appellant’s fears by telling him that he “did fine” on the tests and then continued to ask him questions such as: “Were you driving”; “were you drinking”; “were you in an accident”; “how many beers did you drink”; and, “are you under the influence of alcohol now?” The officer then advised Appellant that he was under arrest for D.W.I. which prompted additional questions on the part of Appellant. The officer responded, “I’m getting tired of your silly questions.” Appellant stated, “But I don’t understand my rights.”
The officer next asked Appellant if he would take a breath test and advised him that if he didn’t he would go to jail immediately. Appellant asked if he could call his lawyer before he took the test, and the police replied, “We gave you that chance earlier but all you wanted to do was call your dad.” Appellant then consented to the taking of a breath test.
It is my opinion that the Appellant was under arrest, that everything occurring in the videotape room occurred during custodial interrogation, that Appellant was advised of his rights to counsel but his attempts to obtain counsel were denied or ignored by the police, that Appellant terminated the custodial interrogation and the Houston Police Department continued the interrogation, and, that Appellant’s rights pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution were violated. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.

. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).