Court Opinion

ID: 9472100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:49:19.643184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:44.639868
License: Public Domain

*1449NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately in order to make three points.
First, I believe that the majority’s discussion of the Bank’s attack on the district court’s substantial justification determination, see supra at 1447-1448, is inappropriate. Because we remand to the district court for an explanation of this determination, the arguments raised by the Bank are not before us and any discussion of them amounts to an advisory opinion.
Second, I am troubled by the majority’s discussion of the factors the district court may consider in determining whether this case falls within the “special circumstances” exception to section 204(d)(1)(A) of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). To begin with, the majority indicates that the district court may take into account the behavior of the government attorney, as well as that of private counsel. The “special circumstances” exception, however, requires that the district court determine whether extraordinary circumstances exist such that attorneys’ fees should not be awarded. I do not see how the actions of the government are in any way relevant to this inquiry. In addition, the standards which the majority states should guide the district court’s evaluation of counsels’ actions are vague to the point of meaninglessness. The majority indicates that the district court may consider “whether counsel’s attitude and approach to the issues were inappropriate” and “whether government counsel’s attitude was helpful to the court.” Supra at 1448. These standards are so wholly subjective that they afford no guidance to the district court or the litigants.
Third and most important, I write separately to point out what I believe may be an error in Ninth Circuit law. The majority accurately states that under Ninth Circuit precedent, a district judge may exercise his discretion in determining whether attorneys’ fees should or should not be awarded under section 204(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), and that consequently his decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Hoang Ha v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1983). I believe, however, that our Ninth Circuit cases are suspect on this issue.
Our circuit first applied the abuse of discretion standard to a district judge’s attorneys’ fees ruling under section 204(d)(1)(A) in Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 90, 78 L.Ed.2d 98 (1983). In adopting the abuse of discretion standard, the court relied on the agreement of the parties without critical analysis. Id. at 1110. The court did, however, cite some authority in support of its application of the standard.
Foster first of all relies on our decision in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 1726, 48 L.Ed.2d 195 (1976). In Kerr, however, the award of attorneys’ fees under review was made pursuant to section 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 412. The relevant portion of section 102, see Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 466 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2730, 37 L.Ed.2d 144 (1973), provides that the district court may grant “such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.” This language provides clear room for the exercise of judicial discretion. An award of attorneys’ fees is never mandatory. The district court simply may award them if it deems such action appropriate.
The language of section 204(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA is quite different. The provision states:
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses ... incurred by that party in any civil action ... brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make the award unjust.
*1450In this passage, the operative phrases are “shall,” “substantially justified,” and “special circumstances.” “Shall,” in contrast to “may,” is clearly not a discretionary term. It indicates that under section 204(d)(1)(A), a district judge must award attorneys’ fees when the requisite conditions are met.1 Today’s majority appears to concede this point. The discretionary element in section 204(d)(1)(A), it argues, is contained in the phrases “substantially justified” and “special circumstances.” See supra at 1446. This contention, however, misconceives the nature of these terms. While the precise meaning of “substantially justified” and “special circumstances” may not yet be clear, because the EAJA is of relatively recent origin and the courts have not had a sufficient opportunity to apply a judicial gloss to the statute, these phrases are nonetheless legal standards with specific content. As such, they are indistinguishable from other legal terms of art, such as “exigent circumstances,” “probable cause,” and “good faith.” These standards have never been interpreted to allow for the exercise of judicial discretion, and decisions applying them have never been subjected to abuse of discretion review. I know of no reason why the requirements of section 204(d)(1)(A) should be treated in a different manner. In a given case, the government’s position is either substantially justified or it is not. There is no middle ground. Thus, Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., and its analysis of the appropriate standard of review for attorneys’ fees decisions under the LMRDA, provides us no guidance in determining the correct standard of review for decisions made pursuant to section 204(d)(1)(A).
Second, Foster cites the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Knights of the Ku Klux Klan Realm of Louisiana v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 679 F.2d 64, 68-69 (5th Cir.1982). The Fifth Circuit decision does adopt an abuse of discretion standard. It does so, however, without analysis, relying entirely on an inaccurate citation to the EAJA’s legislative history. Id. at 69. The decision cites a passage in the House Conference Report which states:
A party dissatisfied with a fee award or a denial of an award may petition the Federal Court for leave to appeal. If the petition is granted, the court may modify the award only if the failure to make the award, or the calculation of the amount of the award was an abuse of discretion.
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1434, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5003, 5012-13. While the passage in question clearly provides for an abuse of discretion standard, it does not concern the relevant section of the EAJA. The passage appears under the heading “Agency Actions — Appeal of a Denial of Fee Award” and concerns awards of attorneys’ fees made under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), a provision of the EAJA dealing with fees awarded for representation in agency proceedings.2 The House Conference Report does not contain a comparable section dealing with the appropriate standard of review for awards made pursuant to section 204(d)(1)(A). Thus, the Fifth Circuit decision is of suspect validity 3 and provides a dubious justification for Foster’s adoption of the abuse of discretion standard.
Finally, Foster relies on the same inapplicable portion of the EAJA’s legislative history that is cited in the Fifth Circuit’s Knights of the Ku Klux Klan decision. The citation is no more persuasive here than it was in the Fifth Circuit decision.
In sum, I must agree with the District of Columbia Circuit in its recent criticism of *1451both Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and Foster:
Several recent appellate opinions contain suggestions or assumptions regarding the standard of review that should apply to cases of this sort. Unfortunately, ... none is sufficiently well reasoned to be capable of providing us much guidance.
The earliest of these suggestions appears in Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 679 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. Unit A 1982). In remanding a case to district court for reconsideration, in light of the Act, of a prevailing party’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees, the Fifth Circuit there opined that “the basic role of this Court is merely to review a fee award or denial of an award under the EAJA, modifying it only if the failure to make the award, or the calculation of the amount of the award, was an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 68-69. It seems clear, however, that the issue of the proper standard of review had not been briefed, and resolution of the question certainly was not essential to the court’s decision.
[I]n two cases decided in the last two months, the Ninth Circuit devoted only cursory attention to the question of the proper standard of review. In Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (9th Cir.1983), “[t]he parties agreefd] that the basic standard to be applied to a denial of attorney’s fees is the abuse of discretion standard,” and the court (citing KKK v. Baton Rouge School Bd. ... and misciting H.R.Rep. No. 1434 ...) declined to subject that agreement to critical scrutiny.
Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 561-62 n. 80 (D.C.Cir.1983).4 I thus conclude that Foster rests on authorities which are either inapplicable or inaccurate, and that eonsequently its adoption of an abuse of discretion standard should be reexamined.
It is unnecessary at this time to determine the appropriate standard of review for district court decisions under section 204(d)(1)(A) of the EAJA. It is clear, however, that to the extent factual determinations are implicated the standard should be clearly erroneous, to the extent legal determinations are implicated review should be de novo, and to the extent mixed questions are implicated the analysis set forth in United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc), provides guidance.

. The authors of the EAJA were clearly aware of this distinction. This is convincingly demonstrated by the fact that in section 204(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a), where they apparently intended to permit the exercise of discretion, the term used is "may.”

. It should also be noted that the portion of the legislative history relied upon by the Fifth Circuit is contradicted by other passages in the legislative history. See House Report No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 4992-93 ("A purely discretionary standard was also considered. A discretionary standard, however, fails to account for the natural reluctance of agencies to award fees against themselves and also offers little direction to the exercise of agency discretion.").

. For the views of the District of Columbia Circuit on Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, see infra at page 1451.

. Spencer does ultimately adopt an abuse of discretion standard. It, however, uses the phrase abuse of discretion in a "special" manner. 712 F.2d 539, 565 (D.C.Cir.1983). By abuse of discretion, it means highly deferential review of the district court’s evaluation of the probative force of evidence and close scrutiny of the district court’s evaluation of the force or weight of legal arguments. Id. at 563-65. Whatever the merits of this position, I do not believe that this use of the abuse of discretion standard accords with our use. See, e.g., Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays, Inc. v. Clark, 720 F.2d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.1983).