Court Opinion

ID: 9906070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 20:09:00.651876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.406619
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State ex rel. Strawser v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-4327.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Robert Strawser,                          :

                 Relator,                               :

v.                                                      :              No. 22AP-330

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al.,                   :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Respondents.                           :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                   Rendered on November 30, 2023

                 On brief: Knisley Law Offices, Kurt A. Knisley, and Daniel S.
                 Knisley, for relator.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J.
                 Alatis, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

                 On brief: Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Corrine S.
                 Carman, and Alexandra T. Kubala, for respondent Jay
                 Industries, Inc.

                                   IN MANDAMUS
                    ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

EDELSTEIN, J.
        {¶ 1} This original action was brought by relator, Robert Strawser, for a writ of
mandamus compelling respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”), to
vacate its March 22, 2022 decision and grant an additional award in his workers’
compensation claim against respondent and former employer, Jay Industries, Inc. (“Jay
Industries”), for a violation of a specific safety requirement (“VSSR”).
        {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
this matter was referred to a court magistrate. On June 29, 2023, the magistrate issued a
No. 22AP-330                                                                                 2

decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. Mr.
Strawser timely filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and both the commission and
the employer filed memoranda in opposition. Accordingly, we must independently review
the magistrate’s decision to ascertain whether “the magistrate has properly determined the
factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d).
I. Background
       {¶ 3} Because Mr. Strawser objects to the magistrate’s findings of fact in addition
to his conclusions of law, we begin our discussion with a review of the record.
       {¶ 4} Mr. Strawser began working as a welder for Jay Industries on October 8,
2018—a job that primarily consisted of assembling grills for tractors. (Oct. 10, 2022
Stipulation of Evidence at 14.) According to Dannie May, the operations manager at Jay
Industries, new employees were trained for different jobs within the facility by working with
an experienced employee. (Id. at 92.) Training on the hydraulic brake press (“the press”),
for example, required 40 hours of training—time tracked by the company. (Id.) Mr.
Strawser testified that, prior to the accident, he had been told by his line manager, Dustin
Postell, that he needed to learn how to run the press located in the grill assembly area in
order to press his own parts and that any time he was finished for the day, he should “take
that time to learn how to run the press.” (Id. at 33.) Mr. May did not personally oversee
this training, but left it to individual supervisors like Mr. Postell. (Id. at 93.) Mr. Postell
himself had already trained Mr. Strawser on the press on one occasion, which Mr. Strawser
described as “just hands-on, shown how to do it.” (Id. at 35.) During that training, the
press was set up in its two-person configuration, and Mr. Postell fed the parts into the
machine while Mr. Strawser operated the controls. (Id. at 35-36.) Mr. Strawser’s co-
worker, Wallace Rhein, testified that he was trained the same way on the press when he was
a new employee. (Id. at 70.)
       {¶ 5} On November 6, 2018, Mr. Strawser was formally assigned to weld in the grill
assembly area. (Id. at 98.) Once he finished his assigned tasks, he approached Mr. Rhein,
who was formally assigned to the press that day, and asked whether he could train with him
for the remainder of his shift. (Id. at 14.) Mr. Strawser testified that on the day of the
accident, no one had instructed him to use the remainder of his shift to train on that
particular piece of equipment. (Id. at 48.)
No. 22AP-330                                                                                  3

       {¶ 6} At the time he was approached by Mr. Strawser, Mr. Rhein was fabricating
parts on the press in its one-person configuration. (Id. at 65.) The press has different
fabrication capabilities, depending on which dies are used and how the machine is set up.
One configuration is referred to in the record as the “one-person” operation or the “two-
metal part” process. (Id. at 16-17.) To use the press in this one-person configuration, the
operator inserts pieces of steel mesh that are clamped in place on either side of the press.
(Id. at 14, 16.) The operator who inserted the metal pieces then presses two buttons
simultaneously on the two-hand control device to initiate the operating cycle and activate
the dies, which bend the metal pieces into the desired shape. (Id. at 14, 41.) The other
configuration relevant to our discussion is referred to in the record as the “two-person”
operation or the “one-metal part” process. That set-up requires a second individual to hold
a piece of metal in the press while the primary operator pushes the two-palm button control
to activate the dies and bend the part. A second employee is needed to hold the metal in
place because this process does not utilize a clamp. (Id. at 14, 17, 112-13.)
       {¶ 7} Mr. Postell testified that this particular press is not exclusively used as a “one-
operator machine,” but at the time of the accident, it was configured for only one operator.
(Id. at 96.) Prior to the date of the accident, Mr. Strawser’s only experience with the press
was in its two-person configuration under Mr. Postell’s training. (Id. at 112-13.)
       {¶ 8} It is uncontroverted that on the day of the accident, the press was set up in its
“one-person” configuration with two dies. (Id. at 14.) Mr. Strawser testified that Mr. Rhein
agreed to train Mr. Strawser on the press and instructed him to insert metal pieces into the
left side while he loaded the right. (Id. at 39.) Once the parts were in place, Mr. Rhein
walked to the podium and pressed the two buttons to initiate the bending process. (Id. at
40.) Mr. Rhein and Mr. Strawser completed several cycles without issue. (Id.) However,
on a subsequent cycle, unaware that Mr. Strawser was still inserting a part, Mr. Rhein
placed both hands on the podium buttons and activated the machine. (Id. at 15, 121.) Mr.
Rhein engaged the emergency stop once he realized what had happened, but not before Mr.
Strawser’s left hand was crushed in the press, resulting in the full amputation of three
fingers and partial amputation of a fourth. (Id. at 15; June 7, 2022 Compl. at 3.)
       {¶ 9} Following allowance of his workers’ compensation claim, Mr. Strawser
applied for an additional award, alleging Jay Industries violated Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
No. 22AP-330                                                                                          4

11(E) at the worksite.1       This specific safety rule requires that hydraulic presses are
constructed or guarded “to prevent the hands or fingers of the operator from entering the
danger zone during the operating cycle.” Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E). A hearing on Mr.
Strawser’s VSSR application was held on January 24, 2022. (Compl. at 3.) On March 22,
2022, a staff hearing officer (“SHO”) for the commission issued an order denying the
application.
        {¶ 10} In its decision, the SHO concluded that Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) “does
not specify that the guarding is to prevent injury to all persons, just the operator.”
(Emphasis added.) (Stipulation of Evidence at 16.) Ultimately, the SHO applied the
definition of “operator” found in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92)—an employee who is
“assigned or authorized to work at the specific equipment”—and concluded that Mr.
Strawser “was not an operator of the press” at the time of his injury. (Id.)
        {¶ 11} From the hearing testimony of Mr. Strawser, Mr. Rhein, Mr. May, and Mr.
Postell, the SHO first concluded that Mr. Strawser was not assigned to the press on the
day of the injury and then concluded he was not authorized to work the press as well. The
SHO found as follows:
            As to whether he was assigned the job, the [SHO] finds the evidence
            supports the finding the Injured Worker was not given any assignment
            on the date of the injury to run the press. According to both Mr. Rhein
            and Mr. Postell, only the employee assigned to the press is permitted
            to operate/push the palm buttons. It was the testimony of Mr. Rhein
            that on the date of injury he was the only person assigned to run the
            press. This testimony is corroborated by Mr. Postell, as he stated on
            the date of injury Mr. Rhein was assigned to operate the press.
            Furthermore, there was testimony from Mr. Rhein and Mr. Postell
            that no one had assigned the Injured Worker to assist or help Mr.
            Rhein operate the press on the date of injury. The Injured Worker
            admitted during his testimony that no one instructed him that day to
            help Mr. Rhein run the press. Mr. Postell explained that if a worker
            completes his work for the day and is to help another worker, that
            worker is to check with him for an assignment and that did not take
            place on the date of injury. Given this testimony, the [SHO] concludes
            the Injured Worker was not assigned to run the press on the date of
            the injury. As the Injured Worker had not yet been trained to work the

1 Mr. Strawser initially alleged a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(A)(2)(b), which he voluntarily

dismissed at the commission hearing on January 24, 2022. (Stipulation of Evidence at 15.)
No. 22AP-330                                                                                   5

            press for the one-person process, the [SHO] further concludes the
            Injured Worker was not yet authorized to run the press in question.

(Internal citations omitted.) (Id. at 17.)

       {¶ 12} The SHO further found that the two-palm button control was one of the
acceptable methods of guarding listed in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E), and thus Jay
Industries complied with the applicable safety regulation. (Id. at 18.) Accordingly, the
VSSR application was denied. Mr. Strawser filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
commission denied on May 18, 2022. (Compl. at 4.)
       {¶ 13} This petition for a writ of mandamus followed. On June 29, 2023, the
assigned magistrate issued a decision concluding the commission did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the relevant safety requirement in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E)
only applied to operators and Mr. Strawser was not an operator under the definition
provided in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92). The magistrate recommended we deny
the writ.
       {¶ 14} On July 11, 2023, Mr. Strawser submitted objections to the magistrate’s
decision. While no specific objections were identified, we surmise from the brief that Mr.
Strawser contests the magistrate’s characterization of certain facts in the record and the
recitation of applicable law—errors Mr. Strawser believes resulted in an erroneous
determination that he was not an “operator” at the time of the accident. (July 11, 2023 Objs.
to Mag.’s Dec.)
II. Applicable Law
       A. Legal Standards
       {¶ 15} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Mr. Strawser must be able to establish
he has a clear legal right to the relief sought, the commission has a clear legal duty to provide
such relief, and he has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel.
Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 162-63 (1967).
       {¶ 16} “The interpretation of a specific safety requirement is within the final
jurisdiction of the commission and may be corrected in mandamus only upon a showing
that the commission abused its discretion.” State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs. v. Indus.
Comm., 145 Ohio St.3d 76, 2015-Ohio-4798, ¶ 21. The commission abuses its discretion if
No. 22AP-330                                                                                6

there is no evidence in the record to support its finding, whereas an order supported by
some evidence will not be disturbed. State ex rel. Keck v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No.
20AP-314, 2022-Ohio-2782, ¶ 6. “The presence of contrary evidence is not dispositive, so
long as the ‘some evidence’ standard has been met.” (Internal citations omitted.) State ex
rel. Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-357, 2023-Ohio-2593, ¶ 6.
       {¶ 17} R.C. 4121.13 authorizes the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to promulgate
industry-specific safety standards. The purpose of these specific safety requirements is to
provide “reasonable, not absolute, safety for employees.” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. Jeep
Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 42 Ohio St.3d 83, 84 (1989).
       {¶ 18} “To be entitled to an additional award for a VSSR, a claimant must show that
(1) a specific safety requirement applied, (2) the employer violated that requirement, and
(3) the employer’s violation caused the injury.” Precision Steel Servs. at ¶ 15. A VSSR award
is a penalty against the employer. Because it is considered a penalty, “[a] specific safety
requirement must plainly apprise an employer of its legal obligation to its employees.”
State ex rel. Sanor Sawmill, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 101 Ohio St.3d 199, 2004-Ohio-718,
¶ 25. Furthermore, a safety standard “must be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts
concerning the interpretation of the safety standard are to be construed against its
applicability to the employer.” (Internal citations omitted.) State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v.
Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-93, 2022-Ohio-2936, ¶ 7. However, “the application of
the strict-construction rule cannot justify an illogical result or one that is contrary to the
clear intention of the code.” State ex rel. Pennant Moldings, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 10th
Dist. No. 11AP-942, 2013-Ohio-3259, ¶ 16, citing State ex rel. Maghie & Savage, Inc. v.
Nobel, 81 Ohio St.3d 328, 331 (1998). The commission’s interpretation of its own safety
rules must be reasonable in order to have all doubts construed in favor of the employer. See
State ex rel. Martin Painting & Coating Co. v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 333, 342
(1997).
       B. Relevant Safety Regulations
       {¶ 19} Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) mandates that hydraulic presses “will be
constructed, or will be guarded, to prevent the hands or fingers of the operator from
entering the danger zone during the operating cycle.” “Guarded” means the press is
covered, fenced, railed, enclosed, or otherwise shielded from accidental contact. Ohio
No. 22AP-330                                                                              7

Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(70). The “danger zone” is defined as “the point of operation
where a known hazard exists.”        Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(34).       The “point of
operation” is the area where material is actually positioned and work is being performed.
Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(97). The commission has set forth certain methods of
guarding that comply with 4123:1-5-11(E)’s mandate. One such method is the use of a two-
hand control to activate the press. Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E)(3). “A two-hand control
or tripping device is commonly composed of two separately placed buttons located outside
the danger zone, which require continuous simultaneous depression by each hand to cycle
the press.” State ex rel. Advanced Metal Precision Prods. v. Indus. Comm., 111 Ohio St.3d
109, 2006-Ohio-5336, ¶ 15.
          {¶ 20} In the context of hydraulic presses, the term “operating cycle” has been
judicially defined to encompass “all operator-activated press activity, whether intentional
or accidental.” Advanced Metal Precision Prods. at ¶ 20. A successful VSSR applicant
must therefore be an “operator” of the machine to trigger 4123:1-5-11(E)’s protections. An
operator is defined in statute as “any employee assigned or authorized to work at the
specific equipment.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92).
          {¶ 21} Thus, Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) requires that every hydraulic press be
set up to prevent (1) an operator of the machine from (2) having accidental contact (3) with
a known hazard (4) at areas where material is positioned and work is being performed (5)
during all operator-activated press activity.
III. Analysis
          {¶ 22} Mr. Strawser contends the commission and the magistrate erred in finding
he was not an “operator.” (Objs. to Mag.’s Dec. at 8.) It is undisputed that Mr. Strawser
did not have a formal assignment to work the press that day and therefore was not
assigned to it under the statutory definition of operator; accordingly, our analysis is
limited to whether Mr. Strawser was authorized to operate the press on the day in
question. (See Mag.’s Dec. at 9.) Respondents asserted below that “since [Mr. Strawser]
had not been trained on the process, he was not authorized to help run the press despite
being generally instructed he was to learn how to do other jobs.” (Stipulation of Evidence
at 17.)
No. 22AP-330                                                                                 8

       {¶ 23} Citing the testimony of Mr. Strawser, Mr. Rhein, and Mr. Postell, the SHO
found the following facts determinative of whether Mr. Strawser was authorized to use the
press at the time of his injury: all employees assigned to work in grill assembly were
expected to learn how to do all of the relevant tasks, including running the press (Id. at 16);
Mr. Postell expected Mr. Strawser to learn how to press his own parts (Id.); Mr. Postell had
previously trained Mr. Strawser on that exact press when it was configured as a two-person
operation (Id. at 17); Mr. Rhein had never trained Mr. Strawser on that press before but
had trained him with other tasks (Id. at 16); on the day of the accident, Mr. Rhein was the
only person assigned to operate the press (Id. at 17); on the day of the accident, the press
was configured as a one-person operation (Id.); when the press is set up in that
configuration, it is always a one person job (Id.); and Mr. Strawser had not been trained on
the press in the one-person configuration (Id. at 16).
       {¶ 24} From this evidence, the SHO reasoned, “As the Injured Worker had not yet
been trained to work the press for the one-person process, * * * the Injured Worker was not
yet authorized to run the press in question.” (Id. at 17.) The magistrate agreed with this
analysis: “While relator may have been actively involved in the machine’s operation at the
time of the injury, this alone is not sufficient to satisfy the definition of operator in Ohio
Adm.Code 4123: 1-5-01(B)(92) as such active involvement is not determinative of whether
relator was assigned or authorized to work at the press.” (Mag.’s Dec. at 9.) Stated
otherwise, both the SHO and the magistrate concluded that Mr. Strawser could not have
been assigned or authorized to operate the press when the accident took place.
       {¶ 25} Neither “assigned” nor “authorized” is defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
01. Because the commission’s specific safety rules have the effect of legislative enactments,
we apply the ordinary rules of statutory construction and construe undefined words in
accordance with their plain meaning. State ex rel. Byington Builders, Ltd. v. Indus.
Comm., 156 Ohio St.3d 35, 2018-Ohio-5086, ¶ 23, quoting State ex rel. Parks v. Indus.
Comm., 85 Ohio St.3d 22, 25 (1999). In addition, we must give effect to both “assigned”
and “authorized” in the provided definition of operator. See Wiltshire Capital Partners v.
Reflections II, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-415, 2020-Ohio-3468, ¶ 19 (“When interpreting a
statute, a court must give effect to every word and phrase in the statute.”). Therefore, we
No. 22AP-330                                                                                 9

consider “assigned” and “authorized” to be distinct terms that must each be defined by
their ordinary meaning.
       {¶ 26} That Mr. Strawser did not receive a specific assignment from Mr. Postell to
work the press on the day he was injured is not “some evidence” that Mr. Strawser was not
authorized to operate the press. Instead, it is “some evidence” that Mr. Strawser was not
assigned to that particular press on the day of the injury, a point not contested by any of
the parties.
       {¶ 27} With respect to Mr. Strawser’s authorization to run the press on the date of
his injury, the SHO stated, “As the Injured Worker had not yet been trained to work the
press for the one-person process, the [SHO] further concludes the Injured Worker was not
yet authorized to run the press in question.” (Stipulation of Evidence at 17.)
       {¶ 28} The record provides some evidence to support that conclusion. On the day
of the accident, Mr. Rhein was assigned to the press—not Mr. Strawser. And at that time,
the press was set up in its one-person configuration so that only one person could operate
the machine. Because of this, we agree with the outcome reached by the SHO and this
court’s magistrate. The record contains evidence that only one operator may operate the
press when it is set up in the one-person configuration. Although Mr. Rhein testified it was
not uncommon for other employees to informally assist him when he used the press in its
one-person configuration, the record also contains Mr. Postell’s testimony that “[t]hose
particular dies have always been a one-person job. Always.” (Id. at 95.) Mr. Postell
instructed Mr. Strawser to learn how to operate the press and trained Mr. Strawser in the
two-person configuration, but he never instructed Mr. Strawser to learn how to operate the
press “as a two-person operation when it’s [configured for] a one-person operation.” (Id.
at 101.)
       {¶ 29} On the day of Mr. Strawser’s injury, Mr. Rhein had been operating the press
in its one-person configuration by loading the parts on the left and right sides of the press
and then returning to the podium to activate the two-palm control. (Id. at 79-81.) When
Mr. Strawser joined, Mr. Rhein did not switch tasks or adjust the configuration, but instead
instructed Mr. Strawser to load parts on one side of the machine while he loaded the other.
(Id. at 79-81, 121.) This division of labor saved time, but it did not transform the job into a
two-person operation.
No. 22AP-330                                                                              10

       {¶ 30} Even if the steps required to operate the press in that configuration could be
divided between two employees, and even if the press required two operators when used in
other ways, there is some evidence in the record to support the SHO’s conclusion that Mr.
Strawser was not authorized to operate the machine in its one-person configuration when
Mr. Rhein was already the assigned operator. The evidence that this may have been a
routine practice does not negate the other evidence in the record that it was an
unauthorized one. See, e.g., Jeld-Wen, 2023-Ohio-2593 at ¶ 6 (“The presence of contrary
evidence is not dispositive, so long as the ‘some evidence’ standard has been met.”).
Because the record supports a finding that only Mr. Rhein was assigned (and thus
authorized) to operate the press in its one-person configuration on the day of the injury, we
concur that Mr. Strawser could not have been an “operator” as defined by Ohio Adm.Code
4123:1-5-01(B)(92).
       {¶ 31} As there is some evidence to support the SHO’s finding that Mr. Strawser was
not authorized to operate the press and therefore could not qualify as an operator at the
time of his injury, we conclude the commission did not abuse its discretion in denying the
VSSR and overrule Mr. Strawser’s objections to the magistrate’s decision.
IV. Disposition
       {¶ 32} Following our independent review of the record pursuant to Civ.R. 53, we find
the magistrate did not err in determining Mr. Strawser is not entitled to the requested writ
of mandamus. Having overruled Mr. Strawser’s objections, we adopt the decision of the
magistrate and deny the requested writ of mandamus.
                                                                      Objections overruled;
                                                                 writ of mandamus denied.

                      LUPER SCHUSTER and LELAND, JJ., concur.
No. 22AP-330                                                                          11

                                        APPENDIX

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Robert Strawser,                :

              Relator,                        :

v.                                            :                    No. 22AP-330

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al.,         :               (REGULAR CALENDAR)

              Respondents.                    :

                         M A G I S T R A T E’ S D E C I S I O N

                                 Rendered on June 29, 2023

              Knisley Law Offices, Kurt A. Knisley, and Daniel S. Knisley, for
              relator.

              Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis, for
              respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

              Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Corrine S. Carman,
              and Alexandra T. Kubala, for respondent Jay Industries, Inc.

                                     IN MANDAMUS

       {¶ 33} Relator Robert Strawser seeks a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”) to vacate its order finding that respondent
Jay Industries, Inc. (“Jay Industries”) did not commit a violation of a specific safety
requirement (“VSSR”).

I. Findings of Fact
       {¶ 34} 1. Relator was employed by Spherion of Mid-Ohio (“Spherion”), a staffing
agency. Spherion assigned relator to work at Jay Industries, where he was tasked as a
No. 22AP-330                                                                                12

welder in the grille fabrication department. On November 6, 2018, four weeks and two
days after beginning to work at Jay Industries, relator finished his assigned welding tasks
with approximately 30 to 35 minutes remaining in his shift. Relator asked Wallace Rhein,
a worker assigned to operate a hydraulic press brake (“press”), if relator could help Rhein
with the press, which was used to bend parts in the grille fabrication department. Shortly
afterward, relator sustained a serious injury to his left hand when Rhein activated the
press while relator’s hand was inside.
       {¶ 35} 2. In the first report of injury, occupational disease or death form (“FROI-
1”) filed with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“bureau”), the incident resulting in
relator’s injury was described as “using a press [and] a button was pushed [and] the press
came down on his left hand, crushing it, [and] taking fingers off.” (R. 11.)
       {¶ 36} 3. Relator’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for the following:
complete traumatic transphalangeal amputation left third finger; complete traumatic
transphalangeal amputation left fifth finger; partial traumatic transphalangeal
amputation left second finger; complete traumatic transphalangeal amputation left
fourth finger; crushing injury left hand; ankylosis at distal interphalangeal joint left
second finger. (R. 14.)
       {¶ 37} 4. Relator filed an application for additional award for violation of specific
safety requirement in a workers’ compensation claim (“IC-8/9”). Relator listed violations
of (1) Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(A)(2)(b) and (2) Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E). (R.
22.)
       {¶ 38} 5. The bureau’s Safety Violations Investigations Unit released a report of
investigation dated July 23, 2020. (R. 138.)
       {¶ 39} 6. A commission staff hearing officer (“SHO”) conducted a hearing on the
application for VSSR award on January 24, 2022 and issued an interlocutory advisement
order pending receipt of the hearing transcript on January 28, 2022.
       {¶ 40} 7. At the hearing, relator testified that in the week prior to his injury, he had
been instructed to learn how to run the press at which he was injured so he could press
his own parts for the grilles, and that he was to learn how to run the press after completing
his other tasks during the day.
No. 22AP-330                                                                              13

       {¶ 41} 8. Rhein testified at the hearing that he was the only person assigned by
Dustin Postell, line leader at Jay Industries, to operate the press on the day of the injury.
According to Rhein, no one from Jay Industries informed him that relator was assigned
or authorized to help him on that day. Rhein had never helped train relator on the press
prior to the day of the injury. Following relator’s injury, Rhein received a written warning
for unsafely operating the press.
       {¶ 42} 9. Dannie May, operations manager at Jay Industries, testified at the
hearing that relator was not instructed or authorized to be an operator of the press at issue
on the day of the injury. According to May, Rhein was assigned to operate the press on
that day. May testified that the press was equipped with a palm podium which required
the pressing of both buttons with two hands in order to activate the press. The podium
was located away from the danger zone.
       {¶ 43} 10. At the hearing, Postell testified that the press was equipped with a
podium located away from the danger zone of the press and that the podium required two
hands to activate the press. Postell testified that the press could be used as either a two-
person operation or a one-person operation depending on the job in question. According
to Postell, the press was configured to be a one-person operation on the day of the injury.
The particular job that was being performed on the press on the day in question did not
require someone to hold the parts in the press while it was in operation. Postell admitted
telling relator that he would need to learn to run the press, “but not as a two-person
operation when it’s a one-person operation.” (R. 101.) Postell testified that relator would
have been required to complete 40 hours of training before he could perform the single-
operator task on the press. Prior to the date of the injury, Postell had shown relator how
the press operated in a two-person operation, but relator had not completed the training
required to operate the press. Postell answered in the negative when asked: “[W]ere any
of those hours training him to be a single operator on the brake press, the times that you
worked with him before * * * his accident?” (R. 111.)
       {¶ 44} Postell stated that relator did not follow standard operating procedure by
volunteering to help Rhein with the press. Specifically, Postell stated: “[W]hen my
workers have downtime, they come to me and I advise them what to do. [Relator] did not
come to me that day. He took it upon himself and walked over there and started helping
No. 22AP-330                                                                              14

[Rhein].” (R. 107.) Postell stated that relator did not have authorization to assist with the
press on the day of the injury. According to Postell, Rhein alone was assigned to operate
the press and that no one else was allowed to push the buttons to activate the press.
        {¶ 45} 11. On March 26, 2022, the SHO issued an order denying relator’s
application for VSSR award. The SHO found that relator dismissed the alleged violation
of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(A)(2)(b) because such section did not exist and found
there was no dispute that Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) applied because relator was
working on a hydraulic press when he was injured. In support of the order, the SHO made
the following findings: (a) while there was an environment of teamwork associated with
the grille fabrication process, relator was not an operator within the meaning of Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) on the date of the injury; (b) relator was not given any
assignment on the date of the injury to run the press; (c) because relator had not been
trained to work the press for the one-person process, he was not authorized to run the
press; (d) the two-palm button control on the press is equivalent to the two-hand control
process detailed in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E)(3); (e) on the date of the injury, Jay
Industries complied with the requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E); (f) the
proximate cause of relator’s injury was not a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E);
(g) on the date of the injury, Jay Industries was in compliance with the requirements of
Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) because there was a proper guarding mechanism in place
to protect the operator’s hands from entering the danger zone. The SHO also stated that
“[i]t appears this was an accident caused by human error, a situation that was not
specifically covered in the safety rule cited by [relator].” (R. 18.)
        {¶ 46} 12. Relator filed a motion for rehearing with the commission on April 8,
2022. In an order dated May 20, 2022, relator’s motion for rehearing was denied.
        {¶ 47} 13. Relator filed a complaint in mandamus in the instant case on June 7,
2022.
        {¶ 48} 14. On October 10, 2022, relator filed a motion to consider supplemental
certified record pursuant to Loc.R. 13(G).
        {¶ 49} 15. Jay Industries filed a response in opposition to relator’s motion to
consider supplemental certified record on October 18, 2022.
No. 22AP-330                                                                             15

II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law
       {¶ 50} Relator asserts entitlement to a writ of mandamus on the basis that the
commission erred in denying his VSSR claim.

A. Law Applicable to Violations of Specific Safety Requirements
       {¶ 51} Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution provides the commission with
authority to determine VSSR claims, providing in pertinent part:
              For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and
              their dependents, for death, injuries or occupational disease,
              occasioned in the course of such workmen’s employment,
              laws may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by
              compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and
              administered by the state, determining the terms and
              conditions upon which payment shall be made therefrom.
              * * * Such board shall have full power and authority to hear
              and determine whether or not an injury, disease or death
              resulted because of the failure of the employer to comply with
              any specific requirement for the protection of the lives, health
              or safety of employ[e]es, enacted by the General Assembly or
              in the form of an order adopted by such board, and its decision
              shall be final.
R.C. Chapter 4121 “reflects this constitutional provision of authority and addresses VSSR
violations.” Zarbana Industries v. Hayes, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-104, 2018-Ohio-4965, ¶ 17.
R.C. 4121.47(A) provides that “[n]o employer shall violate a specific safety rule adopted
by the administrator of workers’ compensation pursuant to [R.C. 4121.13] or an act of the
general assembly to protect the lives, health, and safety of employees pursuant to [Ohio
Constitution, Article II, Section 35].” A specific safety requirement is one that is (1)
enacted either by the General Assembly or through an order of the Industrial
Commission; (2) is specific, not general; and (3) is made for the protection of the lives,
health, or safety of employees. State ex rel. Cotterman v. St. Mary’s Foundry, 46 Ohio
St.3d 42, 44 (1989), citing State ex rel. Trydle, v. Indus. Comm., 32 Ohio St.2d 257 (1972),
paragraph one of the syllabus.
       {¶ 52} “A ‘specific requirement’ is more than a general course of conduct or general
duty or obligation flowing from the employer-employee relationship; rather, it ‘embraces
such lawful, specific and definite requirements or standards of conduct * * * [that] are of
a character plainly to apprise an employer of his legal obligation toward his employees.’ ”
No. 22AP-330                                                                             16

State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 145 Ohio St.3d 76, 2015-
Ohio-4798, ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Trydle v. Indus. Comm., 32 Ohio St.2d 257,
paragraph one of the syllabus. Specific safety requirements “must ‘forewarn the employer
and establish a standard which [the employer] may follow.’ ” State ex rel. G & S Metal
Prods. v. Moore, 79 Ohio St.3d 471, 476 (1997), quoting State ex rel. Howard Eng. & Mfg.
Co. v. Indus. Comm., 148 Ohio St. 165 (1947), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[S]pecific
safety requirements are ‘ “intended to protect employees against their own negligence and
folly as well as to provide them a safe place to work.” ’ ” State ex rel. Byington Builders,
Ltd. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 156 Ohio St.3d 35, 2018-Ohio-5086, ¶ 40, quoting
Cotterman at 47, quoting State ex rel. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Cook, 10 Ohio App.3d 183, 186
(10th Dist.1983). Thus, a “VSSR award is intended to penalize employers for failing to
comply with [specific safety requirements], and only those acts within the employer’s
control should serve as the basis for establishing a VSSR.” State ex rel. Ohio
Paperboard v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 152 Ohio St.3d 155, 2017-Ohio-9233, ¶ 20.
       {¶ 53} “An award for a VSSR is ‘a new, separate, and distinct award’ over and above
standard workers’ compensation benefits. It is not covered by an employer’s workers’
compensation premium.” State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 145
Ohio St.3d 76, 2015-Ohio-4798, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Newman v. Indus. Comm., 77
Ohio St.3d 271, 272 (1997). In order to prove a VSSR claim, a claimant must establish that
(1) an applicable and specific safety requirement was in effect at the time the injury
occurred, (2) the employer failed to comply with the requirement, and (3) the failure to
comply was the proximate cause of the injury in question. State ex rel. Scott v. Indus.
Comm. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 92, 2013-Ohio-2445, ¶ 11.
       {¶ 54} “Because a VSSR award is a penalty, a specific safety requirement must be
strictly construed and all reasonable doubts concerning the interpretation must be
resolved in favor of the employer.” State ex rel. 31, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 152 Ohio St.3d
350, 2017-Ohio-9112, ¶ 21, citing State ex rel. Burton v. Indus. Comm., 46 Ohio St.3d 170,
172 (1989). However, “the strict-construction rule does not apply in resolving factual
disputes,” and such rule “permits neither the commission nor a reviewing court to
construe the evidence of a VSSR strictly in the employer’s favor.” (Emphasis sic.) State ex
rel. Supreme Bumpers, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 134, 2002-Ohio-7089, ¶ 70.
No. 22AP-330                                                                                                   17

B. Requirements for Mandamus
        {¶ 55} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a
determination of the commission, a relator must establish a clear legal right to the
requested relief, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief, and the
lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Belle Tire
Distribs. v. Indus. Comm., 154 Ohio St.3d 488, 2018-Ohio-2122; State ex rel. Pressley v.
Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). In order to prevail in a mandamus action seeking
to vacate a factual determination of the commission in granting or denying a VSSR award,
the relator must demonstrate that the commission’s decision was an abuse of discretion.
State ex rel. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 144 Ohio St.3d 243, 2015-
Ohio-4525, ¶ 13. Where the commission’s factual determination is supported by some
evidence, it has not abused its discretion and this court must uphold the decision. State
ex rel. Seibert v. Richard Cyr, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 266, 2019-Ohio-3341, ¶ 44, citing State
ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376 (1996).
        {¶ 56} The commission is “exclusively responsible for assessing the weight and
credibility of evidence.” State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm., 130 Ohio St.3d 405, 2011-
Ohio-6036, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18 (1987).
Where the commission’s decision is supported by some evidence, the presence of contrary
evidence in the record is immaterial. State ex rel. West. v. Indus. Comm., 74 Ohio St.3d
354, 356 (1996), citing Burley.

C. Application
        {¶ 57} Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 4123:1-5 sets forth specific safety requirements
relating to workshop and factory safety. See Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(A). In his
application for additional award for VSSR, relator alleged a violation of Ohio Adm.Code
4123:1-5-11(E),2 which provides as follows:
                 Hydraulic or pneumatic presses.
                 Every hydraulic or pneumatic (air-powered) press shall be
                 constructed, or shall be guarded, to prevent the hands or

2 It is undisputed that relator’s initial allegation of a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(A)(2)(b) is

not at issue in the present matter because relator dismissed that alleged violation at the January 24, 2022
hearing. (R. 116.)
No. 22AP-330                                                                             18

              fingers of the operator from entering the danger zone during
              the operating cycle. Acceptable methods of guarding are:
              (1) “Fixed barrier guard” - an enclosure to prevent hands or
              fingers from entering the danger zone;
              (2) “Gate guard” - a movable gate operated with a tripping
              device to interpose a barrier between the operator and the
              danger zone and to remain closed until the down stroke has
              been completed;
              (3) “Two-hand control” - an actuating device which requires
              the simultaneous use of both hands outside the danger zone
              during the entire closing cycle of the press;
              (4) Pull guard - attached to hands or wrists and activated by
              closing of press so that movement of the ram will pull the
              operator’s hands from the danger zone during the operating
              cycle;
              (5) Restraint or hold-back guard - with attachments to the
              hands or wrists of the operator to prevent hands or fingers
              entering the danger zone during the operating cycle;
              (6) Other practices, means or methods which will provide
              safeguards, preventing the hands or fingers of the operator
              from entering the danger zone during the operating cycle and
              which are equivalent in result to one of the types specified
              above.
The term “operator” is defined in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92) as “any employee
assigned or authorized to work at the specific equipment.”
        {¶ 58} Relator asserts the commission abused its discretion in denying his
application for VSSR award for two reasons. First, relator asserts the commission erred
in determining that relator failed to meet the definition of operator. Specifically, relator
contends the commission’s construction of the term “operator” is overly narrow, arguing
that the Supreme Court of Ohio in State ex rel. Scott Fetzer Co. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio,
81 Ohio St.3d 462 (1998), has construed the term more broadly “to include any individual
‘actively involved in the machine’s operation.’ ” (Relator’s Brief at 8, quoting Fetzer at
466.)
        {¶ 59} In Fetzer, the court found that the employer “assigned its employee, [the]
claimant * * * to its number 38 die cast machine.” Id. at 462. The employer argued that
the claimant was not entitled to the protection of the specific safety requirement at issue
No. 22AP-330                                                                             19

because the claimant “was the ‘tender,’ not the ‘operator’ of the machine.” Id. at 466. The
court concluded that this contention failed because “[r]egardless of what [the employer]
chose to call claimant, he was actively involved in the machine’s operation. Claimant
started, inspected, and cleaned the die. He operated the linkage mechanism and set die
heights. He oiled the die and checked for defective parts. He was responsible for lodged
parts and correcting malfunctions. He was not, therefore, a casual observer with no
responsibility for or participation in the machine’s function.” Id.
       {¶ 60} Relator also cites to State ex rel. Gerstenslager Co. v. Wilson, 10th Dist.
No. 06AP-512, 2007-Ohio-2657, arguing that this court has previously qualified
claimants as operators when they sustain injuries in the course of training on a press. In
Gerstenslager, the assigned magistrate noted the commission’s finding that the claimant
was “assigned and authorized” by the claimant’s supervisor to train another employee on
the specific equipment at issue. Id. at ¶ 14. The court granted a writ of mandamus because
the SHO failed to set forth a brief explanation supported by some evidence to support a
finding that the injury occurred during the operating cycle.
       {¶ 61} In both Fetzer and Gerstenslager, the claimant was explicitly found to be
assigned to the equipment at issue. The courts in those cases did not consider a dispute
as to whether the claimant was assigned or authorized within the meaning of Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92). Thus, those cases differ from the present matter in which
the parties dispute whether relator was assigned or authorized to work at the press. While
relator may have been actively involved in the machine’s operation at the time of the
injury, this alone is not sufficient to satisfy the definition of operator in Ohio Adm.Code
4123:1-5-01(B)(92) as such active involvement is not determinative of whether relator was
assigned or authorized to work at the press. Thus, Fetzer and Gerstenslager are not
determinative of the question presented in this matter.
       {¶ 62} Here, the record reflects testimony supporting a finding that relator was not
assigned or authorized to work at the press in question. Rhein stated at the hearing that
he was the only person assigned by Postell to operate the press on the day of the injury.
May stated relator was not instructed or authorized to be an operator of the press on the
day of the injury. Postell stated that relator did not have authorization to assist with the
press on the day of the injury. Both May and Postell testified that only Rhein was assigned
No. 22AP-330                                                                             20

to operate the press on that day. Furthermore, Postell testified that relator was required
to check with Postell for assignment when relator had completed his previously assigned
task. There is no dispute that relator did not receive a specific instruction to work on the
press on the day of the injury. Postell also testified that relator would have been required
to complete 40 hours of training before he could perform the single-operator task on the
press and stated that relator had not completed such training.
       {¶ 63} Because some evidence supports the commission’s finding that relator was
not assigned or authorized to work at the press on the day of the injury, the commission
did not abuse its discretion in determining that relator was not an operator under Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92). As relator was not an operator of the press at the time of
the injury, he cannot establish that any failure to comply with the specific safety
requirement in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) was the proximate cause of his injury since
such provision only applies “to prevent the hands or fingers of the operator from entering
the danger zone during the operating cycle.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-
5-11(E). As a result, relator cannot establish the commission erred in denying his VSSR
claim, and, therefore, cannot demonstrate entitlement to a writ of mandamus.
       {¶ 64} Second, relator asserts the commission abused its discretion by finding Jay
Industries complied with the specific safety requirement in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
11(E). With regard to the specific safety requirement, the SHO made the following
findings:
              Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E) outlines six acceptable
              methods of guarding. There is no dispute the press in question
              was equipped with a two-palm button control on a
              podium/pedestal. The [SHO] finds that this mechanism for
              activating the press is equivalent to the two-hand control
              process outlined in subsection (3), since by utilizing this free-
              standing podium/pedestal set-up to the side of the press
              requires simultaneous use of both hands to activate the press
              and is located outside the danger zone during the entire
              closing cycle of the press. Therefore on the date of the injury,
              the [SHO] finds [Jay Industries] complied with the
              requirements of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E).
(R. 17-18.)
No. 22AP-330                                                                          21

      {¶ 65} Relator does not dispute that the press at issue in this case was equipped
with a two-palm button control located on a podium outside the danger zone. Relator
argues, however, that this method of guarding should only be considered acceptable
where the press is used by a single operator, because the method of guarding would not
be effective in preventing injury to a second operator. Therefore, relator argues Ohio
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E)(3) should not apply in this case where there is evidence that the
press was used as a two-person operation. Having found the commission did not abuse
its discretion in finding relator was not an operator under Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
01(B)(92) and, therefore, that the injury was not the proximate result of a violation of
Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E), it is unnecessary to consider whether Jay Industries
complied with the method of guarding provided in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-11(E)(3).
      {¶ 66} Finally, on October 10, 2022, relator filed a motion to consider
supplemental certified record pursuant to Loc.R. 13(G). In the motion, relator requests
the court consider a “LazerSafe Packet of Information,” which “consist[s] of the industry
accepted [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] requirements relating to the
general standards for all machinery and machine guarding.” (Relator’s Mot. to Supp. at
1-2.) Relator states that these requirements are relevant to whether Jay Industries
violated a specific safety requirement. Relator asserts the supplementary materials were
presented before the commission at the January 24, 2022 hearing and were available for
review by the commission in reaching its determination. Upon review, the materials
attached to relator’s October 10, 2022 motion to supplement are not relevant to the
question of whether the commission erred in finding relator was not an operator under
Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-01(B)(92). As such, it is not necessary to consider such
materials in resolving this mandamus action and, therefore, relator’s October 10, 2022
motion to supplement is rendered moot.

D. Conclusion
      {¶ 67} Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that
the requested writ of mandamus should be denied. Relator’s October 10, 2022 motion to
supplement is rendered moot.
No. 22AP-330                                                                   22

                                           /S/ MAGISTRATE
                                           JOSEPH E. WENGER IV

                           NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

           Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
           error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
           legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
           finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
           53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
           to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
           53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
           magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
           decision.