Court Opinion

ID: 9726418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:11.288776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.933533
License: Public Domain

HANSON (Thaxton), J.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court as to defendant’s conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (automobile) in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a), (count I) but would remand the case for the limited purpose of resentencing for the trial court to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 433, in respect to documenting the facts and reasons for imposing the upper term.
*308In affirming the judgment of conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)), my reasoning follows:
First, there is no doubt that a car can be operated in such a manner as to constitute a “deadly weapon.” (See People v. Claborn (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 38 [36 Cal.Rptr. 132]; People v. Finney (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 705 [168 Cal.Rptr. 80].)
Second, in the recent case of Finney, noted in the majority opinion, the defendant was convicted, amongst other things, of two counts of assault on a peace officer with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)) and of reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103) arising out of defendant’s ramming of a police vehicle during a chase. The chase occurred on the Interstate 5 freeway at speeds ranging from 40 to 100 miles per hour. The appellate court in affirming the judgment as to all counts of which defendant was convicted stated in respect to the assault with a deadly weapon count at page 716 the following: “Here, ample evidence supports the jury findings that defendant assaulted Officers Peterson and McDade with a deadly weapon in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (b). Defendant’s continuous course of conduct in repeatedly ramming well-marked patrol cars while otherwise avoiding civilian vehicles strongly supports the jury’s implied finding of the general intent required for an assault; merely because such evidence may not be inconsistent with mere recklessness does not compel an inference thereof. (People v. Rocha, supra, 3 Cal.3d 893.)”
In Finney the requisite general intent for an assault was supplied by the fact of the defendant’s continuous course of conduct in repeatedly ramming well-marked patrol cars while otherwise avoiding civilian vehicles.
In the case at bench by a parity of reasoning with People v. Lathus (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 466 [110 Cal.Rptr. 921], I conclude the requisite elements for an assault are well supplied by the fact that the defendant drove a high-powered sports car through residential streets at speeds at night without lights in excess of 100 miles per hour “blowing” red lights which resulted in the complete destruction of both the police car and the new Datsun and the severe injury to Officer Rose as well as injury to the defendant himself. I see little difference from deliberately shooting a gun into a stalled car as in Lathus and the deliberate manner, inherently dangerous to others with a conscious disregard for human *309life, in which the defendant herein propelled his car (like a bullet) through residential streets in the manner described. Defendant’s conduct could have resulted in the wiping out of pedestrians or entire families lawfully crossing intersections on green lights and unquestionably his conduct was so inherently dangerous to others displaying a conscious disregard for human life as to constitute an assault with a deadly weapon as in Lathus.
Finally, I am aware of no law which provides that when a vehicle is the instrumentality of causing injury or death to another that any criminal proceedings flowing therefrom are strictly limited to the ambit of those provided by the Vehicle Code. “Symmetry of the law” is desirable. However, the basic concept that, where the facts so indicate, prosecuting authorities are not precluded from charging and proving up any crime cognizable by law should predominate over a possible “disfigurement” of such “symmetry.”
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 3, 1981. Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.