Court Opinion

ID: 9832136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:39:26.806242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:42.316818
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellants with great insistence urge that we erred in our original conclusions. It is earnestly contended that we are in conflict with the cases holding to the effect that the verdict alone must constitute the basis of the judgment, to wit, with the following cases: Scott v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ National Bank, 66 S. W. 493; Crawford v. Wellington Railroad Committee, 174 S. W. 1008; Weinstein v. Acme Laundry, 166 S. W. 126; Fant v. Sullivan, 152 S. W. 515. But not so, as we think. We did not resort to the evidence for the purpose of determining that there was no consideration in fact for the agreement of ap-pellee’s agent to release its mortgage upon payment of a less sum'than was due. This was the conclusion we drew from the special finding itself. The finding was that there was consideration, but that it was the “$150 earnest money given by Lee to Barrow.” It thus appears that the verdict on its face shows that $150 was paid to Barrow, and not to or for appellee, and that it was paid as earnest money on a purchase of cattle, and not as a consideration for the agreement made by De Forrest. We considered the undisputed evidence that such payment was made before De Forrest appeared upon the scene of action as supporting, and not for the purpose of destroying or avoiding, the plain reading of the verdict. That there may have been some subsequent negotiations, as is now called to our attention, by another agent of appellee, to the effect that appellee in an indirect way should receive credit for this $150, cannot alter the effect of the verdict and the undisputed facts. To constitute a consideration the money must have been paid to or for appellee at or before the time of the agreement to release the mortgage. Otherwise the agreement was a nudum pactum. See 9 Oyc. 358, par. 14; 1 Elliott on Contracts, §§ 195, 204, 208. The specific finding of what the consideration was necessarily excluded a conclusion that there was some other consideration than that stated in the verdict, and rendered the general finding of the consideration as recited in the verdict a mere legal conclusion that it was our duty to reject; it being thought that the specific finding both limited and controlled the general. So, it is thus seen, in our original conclusion we endeavored to follow and not to depart from the rule announced in the cases hereinbefore referred to.
But it is further contended that the special finding of that which constituted the consideration should be wholly disregarded, and thus give effect to the general finding on that subject, but we know of no authority for our doing so. Appellant at the time of the return of the verdict made no exception to its form, or, if so, no assignment of error has been presented which calls upon us to review the action of the court in receiving it as written. On the contrary, appellant, apparently at least, accepted the verdict and moved the court below for a judgment upon it as it stood, and it is to the failure to do this that error was assigned before this court. It is true, as appellants now urgently contend, that they objected to the form of the issue when it was presented by the court to the jury, then contending, as now, that it was improper to call for a finding as to the nature of the consideration. But while the record shows that such objection was made, the objection was not preserved by an assignment of error so that we can review the action of the trial c’ourt in this particular.
[4] Our attention has also been called to circumstances appearing in the evidence which might, under proper allegations, have constituted a sufficient basis for a finding that appellants, in the shipment of the cattle, acted upon De Forrest’s agreement to release the mortgage in such way and under such circumstances as to make it inequitable on appellee’s part to thereafter insist upon *1064full payment of its mortgage. But, as pointed out in our original conclusions, no plea to this effect was presented, nor was there any request below for a finding on such issue, so that we fail to see how we can now give effect to the circumstances referred to.
[5] Our attention has also been called to an inaccuracy of statement in our original conclusions. We there, among other things, said that this suit was instituted “shortly before the sale 'of the cattle in question on the Ft. Worth market.” This was a mistaken inference on our part, for that the record, as is now for the first time pointed out, shows that the suit was instituted on the day following the sale of the cattle ton the Ft. Worth market. The inaccuracy, however, we regard as wholly immaterial, for it is undisputed in the record that, while the suit was instituted after the sale of the cattle, it was so instituted before the cattle were paid for, and the proceeds of the sale were collected by the receiver appointed by the court and by the receiver paid over in the manner and amount as stated in our original conclusions.
On the whole we conclude, after a consideration of the very able and insistent argument by counsel for appellants, that the motion for rehearing must be overruled; and it is so ordered.