Court Opinion

ID: 9581508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:15:37.430652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:01.186250
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially. A motion to suppress evidence was made by Ike Childers, through his attorney, William O. Carter. Motions to suppress were also made by Horace Brown, Jr., who was represented by Attorney Darryl Vandeford. The trial judge ordered that the hearing be had on all three motions at one time, following which the district attorney swore Sheriff Moore against Childers (Tr. pp. 18-21) and Sheriff Moore was cross examined by Attorney Carter (Tr. pp. 21-24). Thereafter, testimony was introduced by the district attorney against the other two defendants, and even though no opportunity had been afforded *563defendant Childers to introduce testimony in opposition to that of Sheriff Moore, the judge announced that he was overruling Childers’ motion to suppress (Tr. p. 36) as well as the motions of the other two defendants, and inquired of the district attorney as to which case he would call first for trial. The district attorney announced that he had not finished introduction of evidence, as he still had an important piece of evidence to introduce; and Attorney Carter announced that he had not finished either, as he thought the district attorney was putting up his side. The trial judge here stated that, "all of you rested,” and I am quite certain that the trial court was under that impression. However, there was no place where the defendants could have rested, and all three cases were tried together, and the district attorney, who had the burden, had not finished his case. In such circumstances, the appellant Childers was deprived of a valuable right, to wit: the right of introducing evidence on his motion to suppress. The law as to motions to suppress provides in Code Ann. § 27-313 (b) that: "The judge shall receive evidence out of the presence of the jury on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion, and the burden of proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the State.” Of course, this means evidence by both the state and defendant.
But the defendant did not object to the evidence, which he had moved to suppress, when the state offered it during the trial. This constitutes a waiver of any error made in overruling his motion to suppress. See Jackson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 529, 530 (133 SE2d 436).
The majority opinion cites the recent case of Reid v. State, 129 Ga. App. 660 (200 SE2d 456), as authority for the proper method by which a defendant must preserve his rights following a motion to suppress.
The Reid case, in what is patently obiter dictum, and consequently not binding, states that: Testimony is simply not within the scope of the motion as authorized by the statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) This is an erroneous conclusion. Testimony is within the scope of a motion to suppress. The author of the Reid decision, in the above obiter statement, misconstrued and misinterpreted the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. State, 230 Ga. 741 (1) (199 SE2d 252), which it cites as authority. The further erroneous and obiter statement is set forth in the Reid case, to wit: "Our Supreme Court [Baker v. State, 230 Ga. 741 (1)] has ruled on it: 'The testimony of eye-witnesses and victims of alleged crimes is *564outside the scope of a motion to suppress as contemplated under the provisions of Code Ann. § 27-313.” But what was the actual holding in the Baker case, supra? It is as follows (p. 742): "It is clear from the transcript of the hearing of the motion to suppress that trial defense counsel sought to suppress in its entirety the testimony of two policemen and nothing else. The testimony of eyewitnesses and victims of alleged crimes is outside the scope of a motion to suppress as contemplated under the provisions of Code Ann. § 27-313.” (Emphasis supplied.) Of course, the testimony oí the witnesses cannot be suppressed, unless the object of his testimony, to wit, the illegal drugs, or whiskey, or other contraband, is suppressed. It would be ridiculous to allow the drugs introduced without any objection and then suppress testimony respecting same. What the Supreme Court held in the Baker case was that the motion to suppress must include more than the mere testimony. But there is no reason to say that a motion to suppress the contraband and the testimony respecting same, would not be sustained, where it is shown the drugs were procured by an illegal search or seizure. It would be of no benefit whatever to a defendant to suppress the drugs, and then allow witnesses to testify that they found him in possession of the drugs.