Court Opinion

ID: 9930998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 00:01:51.570772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:20.703868
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Tapia CA2/8
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B325459

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. YA099077-03)
         v.

ALISHA NICOLE TAPIA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Altus W. Hudson, Judge. Vacated and
remanded with directions.

      Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Shezad H. Thakor, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                  ______________________
       In 2019, Alisha Tapia was convicted of first degree burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459) and related minor offenses.1 In that
proceeding she admitted she had suffered six prior convictions for
residential burglary alleged under the Three Strikes law and
section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court sentenced her to
25 years to life in prison, plus two 5-year enhancement terms
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a).
       Appellant appealed and we vacated the true findings on the
prior conviction allegations and remanded for resentencing. The
trial court resentenced appellant to the upper term of six years
for the burglary conviction, doubled to 12 years pursuant to the
Three Strikes law.2 Appellant now appeals the new sentence,
contending the trial court erroneously imposed the upper term
based on impermissible factors that were neither admitted by her
nor found true by a jury or the court. She also contends, and
respondent agrees, that the trial court erred in failing to stay the
sentence for her conviction of possession of burglary tools
pursuant to section 654.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Appellant was also convicted of attempted first degree burglary
(§§ 664/459), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), and possession of
burglary tools (§ 466).
2      The trial court stayed sentence on the attempted burglary
conviction and imposed concurrent terms of three years for the
vandalism conviction and 180 days for possession of burglary
tools.

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       The trial court identified two factors in support of the
upper term sentence. We hold that one of the factors was
improper and no evidence supports the second factor. We cannot
find the error harmless and so vacate the sentence and remand
for resentencing, with additional instructions to stay the sentence
for possession of burglary tools.
                        BACKGROUND
       In a bifurcated proceeding held three months after she was
convicted of the offenses against her, appellant admitted she had
suffered six prior convictions. On appeal, she contended these
admissions were not voluntary and intelligent. We agreed and
vacated the true findings related to those admissions. (People v.
Tapia (Sept. 5, 2021, B305572) [nonpub. opn.].)
       After remand but before the resentencing hearing was held,
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) became effective. It
amended section 1170 to require a court to impose the middle
term unless one or more aggravating factors were admitted by
the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury
or the court. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)
       At her August 18, 2022, resentencing hearing, appellant
admitted only two prior convictions, both of which were strikes.
The trial court dismissed appellant’s 2007 strike conviction and
used the 2013 admitted strike conviction to double her sentence.
       Effectively, then, the only issue for resentencing was
whether to impose the middle or the upper term. The trial court
chose the high term, because “Ms. Tapia is not a novice to the
criminal justice system and certainly she has an obligation to not
only the larger community but the victims at hand. For those
reasons the court will sentence to the high term of 6 years times
2 for 12 years.”

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                          DISCUSSION
       Tapia contends, and respondent agrees, that a trial court
may only impose the upper term based on recognized aggravating
factors. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(2); Cal. Rule of Court, rule 4.421.)
Tapia contends that not being a “novice” or having an "obligation”
to the community and the victim are not recognized aggravating
factors, and that the trial court failed to comply with the
requirements of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) which requires
that facts underlying any aggravating factors must be “stipulated
to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
Respondent counters that the trial court’s comments were
referring to appellant’s criminal history, which is a recognized
factor.
       Preliminarily, respondent also contends that we need not
consider the meaning of the trial court’s comments or its non-
compliance with amended section 1170 because Tapia forfeited
her claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Tapia contends
the claim is cognizable on appeal without an objection because
her sentence is unauthorized. (See People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) We agree with her.
       Turning to the merits of Tapia’s challenge, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2) provides: “The court may impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(2), italics added.) We agree with respondent that the

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reference to not being a novice is clearly a reference to appellant’s
criminal history, which is a recognized aggravating factor. (See
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2) [“The defendant’s prior
convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness.”].)
       However, the reference to “obligation” does not correspond
to any recognized aggravating factor, and it is not clear what the
trial court meant by this reference. We need not decide whether
respondent is correct that the trial court’s reference to Tapia’s
obligation is a reference to her criminal history. As we explain,
we would reach the same result whether or not the “obligation”
comment was a reference to appellant’s criminal history or was
an improper aggravating factor.
       As the parties acknowledge, there is a split of authority
concerning the correct standard of review for error in imposing
the upper term, and the California Supreme Court has granted
review to resolve this split. (People v. Lynch (May 27, 2022,
C094174), review granted August 10, 2022, S274942.) Appellant
urges us to follow the analysis set forth in People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez), while respondent contends we should
follow the approach in People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394,
review granted October 12, 2022, S275655 (Dunn).
       The difference between the two standards is not implicated
in this appeal. Under Lopez, a reviewing court must determine
whether “beyond a reasonable doubt . . . a jury would have found
true beyond a reasonable doubt every factor on which the court
relied.” (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 466.) Under Dunn,
this standard must be met for only one aggravating factor, that
is, the reviewing court must determine “beyond a reasonable

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doubt whether the jury would have found one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410, rev. granted.) The reviewing
court would then apply a lower standard to any additional
aggravating factors. (Id. at p. 410.) Since there is only one
potentially proper aggravating factor in this case included in
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421’s list of factors (Tapia’s prior
criminal history), this lower standard does not come into play.3
      Respondent contends a jury “unquestionably” would have
found true the circumstance that appellant had numerous
convictions, because appellant admitted two prior convictions
before being resentenced and the record shows she had five
additional burglary convictions. To the extent that respondent
contends the two admitted convictions are “numerous” within the
meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2), respondent
has not cited nor are we aware of any published authority so
holding. At least one case has stated that two convictions are not
“numerous.” (People v. Berry (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 184, 191.)
Three would appear to be the bare minimum. (See People v.
Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 818, citing with approval People v.

3      As we explain below, it is not clear beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have found the only proper aggravating
factor true. Taking the trial court’s reference to “obligation”
literally, a defendant’s obligation to the victim or community is
not a recognized aggravating factor. Thus, even if we were to
determine that the jury would have found an “obligation” factor
allegation true (under wither the Dunn or Lopez standard), we
would still have to vacate appellant’s sentence, because there
would be no true finding on a recognized aggravating factor.

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Searle (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1091, 1098 [three convictions are
“numerous”].)
       As for the additional, unadmitted convictions, the record to
which respondent refers is the probation report and our prior
appellate opinion. While the probation report is part of the
record of conviction, it is not a certified record of conviction
within the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (b)(3). (See
People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1114.)
       As for our prior opinion, we do not view it as establishing
that a jury would “unquestionably” have found true an allegation
that Tapia had numerous prior convictions. In the portion of the
opinion cited by respondent, we found that appellant admitted six
convictions in a bifurcated proceeding. Later in the opinion, we
found the admissions were not voluntary and intelligent and
vacated the true findings based on those admissions. We do not
see how our opinion assists respondent in any way.
       As to the other four alleged but not admitted convictions,
the record on appeal shows that on remand for resentencing, the
prosecutor referred to appellant’s prior convictions but did not
offer certified records of the prior convictions (or any other proof).
This certainly raises a doubt as to whether such evidence exists,
given that the resentencing hearing took place after the effective
date of the relevant amendments to section 1170 which requires
proof of prior convictions. Without more, we cannot say a jury
would have found true the aggravating circumstance of numerous
convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.
       Tapia’s second contention is that the trial court should
have stayed the sentence for possession of burglary tools instead
of running it concurrent with the sentence on the burglary
conviction. Respondent agrees, as do we. (People v. Correa

                                  7
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 337; People v. Alford (2010)
180 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1472–1473.)
                          DISPOSITION
      We vacate appellant’s sentence and remand for a new
sentencing hearing. Appellant’s sentence for possession of
burglary tools must be stayed pursuant to section 654 as part of
her new sentence.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, J.

             WILEY, J.

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