Court Opinion

ID: 9647536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:39:13.322803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.436651
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The court is correct that the issue on appeal is whether the Enterprise established its defense as a matter of law to warrant the granting of its summary judgment. The court is incorrect, however, in holding that the Enterprise did not meet its burden of proof.
Judge Smith’s recovery for libel must be predicated upon a finding that the article was both defamatory and published with actual malice. The Enterprise’s only burden was to negate either element of Smith’s cause of action.
To publish with “actual malice” is to do so with knowledge that a statement of fact is false or with reckless disregard for its truth. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). Malice may not be implied or presumed from the mere fact of publication or *731the falsity of the statement published. It must be supported by evidence in the record of subjective intent. See Foster v. Upchurch 624 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex.1981); El Paso Times, Inc. v. Trexler, 447 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex.1969).
The record is replete with evidence that Gilchriest was thorough in her research: she talked to county employees about the prospective grand jurors; she met with the grand jury commissioners that Smith had appointed; she reviewed the statutes relating to grand jury selection; and she met with several attorneys with whom she discussed the selection process. There is no evidence of actual malice in this record.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
SPEAKS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.