Court Opinion

ID: 9819433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:08.953888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:23.889780
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring: I agree that the trial court should be affirmed. However, I disagree with the majority’s analysis. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground of immunity. Specifically, they claimed that the plaintiff could not establish that they had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly unsafe condition of the road prior to the date of the plaintiffs injury. Here the issue is whether the trial court properly struck Gibson’s affidavit. As the majority notes, the defendants cited three grounds: (1) Gibson’s sworn testimony refuted the statements made in his own affidavit; (2) plaintiff improperly attempted to create an issue of fact by introducing an affidavit that contradicted her own sworn testimony; and (3) the affidavit was based on speculation and conclusions. The majority finds that Gibson’s affidavit could be struck on any of the three reasons. I disagree. I agree only with the trial court’s finding that the second reason supports striking the affidavit. The sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment is governed by Supreme Court Rule 191 (145 Ill. 2d R. 191). Rule 191 is satisfied “ ‘if from the document as a whole it appears the affidavit is based on the personal knowledge of the affiant and there is a reasonable inference that the affiant could competently testify to its contents.’ ” Allied American Insurance Co. v. Mickiewicz, 124 Ill. App. 3d 705, 708 (1984), quoting Burks Drywall, Inc. v. Washington Bank & Trust Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 569, 576 (1982). Rather than striking an affidavit in its entirety, a trial court should only strike those matters that are improper. Rinchich v. Village of Bridgeview, 235 Ill. App. 3d 614, 622 (1992). Here, the facts contained in Gibson’s affidavit were based on his personal knowledge. Specifically, Gibson stated in his affidavit that he personally observed the defect in the road in question. The fact that he stated his observations as to the length, width and depth of the defect in approximations of feet and inches does not render this testimony inadmissible. A lay opinion as to relations of space is admissible if helpful to a trier of fact in the determination of a fact in issue. See Freeding-Skokie Roll-Off Service, Inc. v. Hamilton, 108 Ill. 2d 217 (1985). Thus, Gibson could competently testify to his observations of the defect. Whether he could have opined as to the duration of time the defect existed is more problematic. However, even if that portion of the affidavit were stricken as speculative, Gibson’s observations as to the size of the defect in the road would support an inference by the trier of fact that the defect had existed for a significant period of time prior to the time of Gibson’s observation. This inference would be sufficient to establish constructive notice, at least for purposes of surviving a summary judgment motion. As to the contradictory nature of Gibson’s deposition, I would find nothing in the deposition that would render Gibson incompetent to testify at trial to the content of the affidavit. To the contrary, Gibson’s deposition is classic impeachment in that it goes to the weight of Gibson’s affidavit testimony, not its admissibility. Since Gibson’s affidavit, or at least the facts therein, was admissible as based on his personal knowledge, and those facts would support an inference that the defendants had constructive notice of the defect in the road, it would be improper to strike the affidavit. However, as the trial court noted, under the rationale articulated in Hansen v. Ruby Construction Co., 164 Ill. App. 3d 884, 887 (1987), the plaintiff cannot supply evidence (affidavit, deposition, etc.) that conflicts with a judicial admission adverse to his or her claim. As the Hansen court noted: “ ‘Having made these judicial admissions so adverse to her claim, plaintiff *** could not effectively contradict them by attempting to adopt inconsistent evidence which might be produced by other witnesses or by attempting to supply additional but inconsistent allegations to her pleading.’ ” Hansen, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 887, quoting Kosin v. Shero, 45 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1051 (1977). Here, the plaintiff gave a deposition in which she testified that the depression in the road was not unsafe on Friday, February 25, at 4 p.m. but it was unsafe at 4 p.m. the following Monday. To the extent that Gibson’s affidavit is offered to establish that the road was unsafe for “some time” prior to February 25, it is in complete contradiction with Lewis’s own deposition. For that reason alone, Gibson’s affidavit cannot stand, and the trial court was correct in striking the affidavit. Without Gibson’s affidavit, the trial court properly found that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. I would affirm the trial court.