Court Opinion

ID: 9905498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:08:32.088264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:38.710436
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39134

STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

       Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MODA JAMES BENTLEY,

       Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
T. Glenn Ellington, District Judge

Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General
Teresa Ryan, Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellee

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Mark A. Peralta-Silva, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

HANISEE, Judge.

{1}     This case is again before us following our Supreme Court’s order (the remand
order) in which it vacated our original opinion and remanded the case to this Court in
light of the publication of its opinion in State v. Banghart-Portillo, 2022-NMSC-021, 519
P.3d 58. Defendant Moda James Bentley’s original sentence of incarceration was
suspended on the condition that he serve two eighteen-month probation terms, to be
served consecutively. After violating the terms of his probation, the district court filed an
amended judgment and sentence in which it revoked Defendant’s probation, imposed
the balance of the thirty-six total months of probation to be served via incarceration, and
enhanced each sentence by four years due to two prior felony convictions that
subjected Defendant to habitual offender status. Defendant appealed the amended
judgment and sentence, raising the following arguments that we address anew here in
accordance with the remand order: (1) the district court erred in enhancing Defendant’s
sentence following the revocation of his probation; and (2) the district court violated
Defendant’s due process rights by holding the evidentiary hearing related to his
probation revocation via audio-visual connection, rather than in-person, pursuant to
Supreme Court Order, No. 20-8500-013 (April 16, 2020) (the Supreme Court Order).1
Based on our renewed analysis of Defendant’s first argument under Banghart-Portillo,
as directed by the remand order, we now reverse and remand.

DISCUSSION

I.      The District Court’s Enhancement of Defendant’s Sentence

{2}     In July 2017, Defendant pleaded guilty to felonies in two different district court
cases: (1) district court cause number D-0101-CR-2016-00451 (Case 451), receiving or
transferring a stolen vehicle or motor vehicle, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30-16D-4
(2009); and (2) district court cause number D-0101-CR-2016-00473 (Case 473),
possession of a firearm or destructive device by a felon, contrary to NMSA 1978,
Section 30-7-16 (2001, amended 2020). Defendant was sentenced to two eighteen-
month terms of incarceration, which the district court suspended on the condition that
Defendant successfully complete a total of three years of probation, comprised of two
eighteen-month sentences to be served consecutively. In his plea agreement, as well as
in the district court’s original judgment and order fully suspending his sentence (the
original judgment and sentence), Defendant admitted his identity as it related to two
prior felonies, and the State reserved the right to enhance Defendant’s sentence as a
habitual offender in the event he failed to comply with the terms of his plea agreement
and probation.

1The Supreme Court Order set forth procedures related to the function of judicial proceedings in light of
the COVID-19 pandemic. See Supreme Court Order, No. 20-8500-013 (April 16, 2020),
https://www.nmcourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Order-No_-20-8500-013-Updating-and-
Consolidating-Precautionary-Measures-for-Court-Operations-in-NM-Judiciary-4-16-20.pdf. At issue on
appeal is the following provision: “All judges shall use telephonic or audio-visual attendance for court
appearances by attorneys, litigants, witnesses, and the press unless there is an emergency need for an
in-person appearance upon motion of a party. A judge may also require an in-person appearance on the
judge’s own initiative, without a motion by a party, provided that the judge shall confer with the parties and
the chief judge of the district before proceeding with an in-person appearance. Judges may continue to
take other protective measures, including the granting of continuances upon motion of any party or the
judge’s own motion, in appropriate cases when remote appearances are not feasible but an emergency
need for an in-person appearance does not exist. Any criminal procedure rules requiring the presence of
the defendant may be accomplished through remote, audio-visual appearance in the discretion of the
judge, provided that confidential communication between the defendant and defense counsel is made
available.” Supreme Court Order, No. 20-8500-013 at 4.
{3}     Defendant’s plea agreement stated in pertinent part that “Defendant shall receive
a suspended sentencing on the condition of supervised probation,” and that “the counts
shall run consecutively, for all purposes, for a total of three (3) years of potential
jurisdiction. At initial sentencing, the State will not pursue any [h]abitual [o]ffender
[e]nhancement, though the State will pursue [such enhancements] if Defendant does
not fulfill” the terms of his probation. The plea agreement further provided that both
Cases 451 and 473 carried a maximum penalty of eighteen months of incarceration and
a $5,000 fine. The details of the original judgment and sentence echo the plea
agreement, stating that Defendant was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea in Cases 451
and 473, and specifying that “Defendant admitted that he is [a] habitual criminal
offender” as to the prior felony offenses. The original judgment and sentence further
provides that Defendant “waived any objection to a subsequent filing of a supplemental
information and the State reserves its right to file such a supplemental information
should . . . Defendant fail to comply” with the conditions of his probation. The terms of
Defendant’s probation, as reflected in the original judgment and sentence, included the
following:

      Defendant shall serve:

             [Case 473]: Eighteen (18) months of incarceration with eighteen
             (18) months suspended on the condition of eighteen (18) months of
             supervised probation.

             [Case 451]: Eighteen (18) months of incarceration with eighteen
             (18) months suspended on the condition of eighteen (18) months of
             supervised probation.

            The sentences imposed above shall be served consecutively to
      each other for a total of three (3) years, all of which is to be suspended on
      the condition of three (3) years of supervised probation. Alternatively, the
      sentence in [Case 473] shall be served consecutively to the sentence
      imposed in [Case 451].

            For [Case 473,] Defendant shall receive pre-sentence confinement
      from August 2, 2016, to August 17, 2016, and from May 15, 2017, to July
      10, 2017.

            For [Case 451,] Defendant shall receive pre-sentence confinement
      from June 27, 2016, to June 28, 2017, and from May 15, 2017, to July 10,
      2017.

{4}    In January 2020, the State sought to revoke Defendant’s probation, alleging that
Defendant violated the terms of his probation by possessing a switchblade knife, which
he used to stab another individual. In May 2020, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing on Defendant’s alleged probation violation and the State filed a supplemental
criminal information charging Defendant as a habitual offender pursuant to NMSA 1978,
Section 31-18-17 (2003), based on the two prior felony convictions. Following the
evidentiary hearing, the district court revoked Defendant’s probation and filed the
amended judgment and sentence, in which Defendant was sentenced as a habitual
offender to serve eleven total years of incarceration, less applicable credit for
presentence confinement and time served. This appeal, along with both our original
opinion in this case as well as our Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Banghart-
Portillo, followed.

{5}     Here, Defendant contends the district court erred in amending and enhancing his
sentence following his probation violation. Specifically, Defendant argues first that he
completed his probation in Case 451—the first of the two probation terms that formed
the basis of his suspended sentence—prior to his probation violation and, therefore, the
district court no longer had jurisdiction to enhance that portion of his total sentence.
Defendant argues as well that he had a reasonable expectation of finality that his
probation term in Case 473 would conclude prior to the State’s revocation thereof,
based on the application of presentence confinement credits.2

{6}    As to Defendant’s argument regarding his probation term in Case 451, Defendant
contends that he completed his probation term in January 2019—months prior to the
May 2020 evidentiary hearing that resulted in the amended judgment and sentence at
issue on appeal—and that the district court, therefore, did not have jurisdiction to amend
or enhance Defendant’s sentence as it related to Case 451. We concluded in our
original opinion that neither Defendant’s plea agreement nor the original judgment and
sentence indicated that his sentence was to run in accordance with either individual
count. Rather, we concluded that the language of both the plea agreement and the
original judgment and sentence made clear the district court’s intention that Defendant’s
probation would run in total time and the district court would retain jurisdiction over both
underlying cases throughout the total three-year term of Defendant’s full sentence. See
State v. Yazzie, 2018-NMCA-001, ¶ 14, 410 P.3d 220 (explaining that “[b]ecause
neither the plea agreement nor the judgment and sentence structured [the d]efendant’s
sentence such that the time served on probation corresponded with a particular
conviction, [the d]efendant had no reasonable expectation of finality . . . or any limitation
on the enhancement . . . prior to the completion of” the probation term). Now, under our
Supreme Court’s clarifying opinion in Banghart-Portillo, we once again address this
argument and reach a different outcome.

{7}    “Whether a trial court has jurisdiction in a particular case is a question of law that
we review de novo.” Banghart-Portillo, 2022-NMSC-021, ¶ 11 (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). “Additionally, to the extent that this Court is
required to interpret a plea agreement, the terms of the plea agreement are also
reviewed de novo.” Id. “In New Mexico, the jurisdiction of a trial court to enhance a
felony sentence under the habitual offender statute expires once a defendant has
completed service of that sentence.” Id. ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation

2Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove his identity as to his prior felony convictions that were
used to enhance his sentence. The record clearly demonstrates, however, that Defendant admitted his
identity as it related to his prior felony convictions.
omitted). “This jurisdictional limitation is founded upon principles of double jeopardy:
once a sentence has been served, a defendant’s punishment for the crime has come to
an end.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Such double jeopardy
concerns are only implicated if the defendant has an objectively reasonable expectation
of finality in the sentence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A
defendant must establish that the district court did not have jurisdiction to impose the
additional enhancement by proving two things: (1) that the defendant had an
expectation of finality in the defendant’s original sentence, and (2) that the expectation
was reasonable.” Id. (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted).

{8}      In Banghart-Portillo, our Supreme Court clarified that the key inquiry in
determining whether a defendant has a reasonable expectation of finality in their original
sentence is whether the plea agreement entered into by the defendant was ambiguous
as to the consequences that would occur should the defendant violate the terms of their
probation. Id. ¶¶ 12, 17-18. “When interpreting a plea agreement, appellate courts
construe the agreement’s terms according to what the defendant reasonably
understood when the defendant entered the plea.” Id. ¶ 14 (alterations, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). Under Banghart-Portillo, even where a plea
agreement is ambiguous such that a defendant may be unable to fully and clearly
ascertain the terms thereof, the district court may cure any such ambiguity. Id. ¶¶ 14,
19. Here, then, we must determine whether Defendant had a reasonable expectation of
finality as to the completion of his probation in Case 451—that is, whether the plea
agreement was ambiguous to the extent Defendant could not reasonably understand
whether his probation terms for the two underlying cases would run in accordance with
each count rather than total time, and if the district court cured any such ambiguity.

{9}    To answer this inquiry, we look first to the plea agreement. Here, Defendant’s
plea agreement did not contain any language that made explicit whether his total
probation was to run in accordance with each count rather than total time, or vice versa.
While “a unitary probationary term encompassing more than one count is permissible,”
a defendant must be “reasonably informed of what to expect under the terms of the plea
agreement and sentence.” Id. ¶ 17. Here, not only was Defendant’s plea agreement
ambiguous as to whether his probation would run in accordance with each count rather
than total time, it was silent as to specifically how a habitual offender enhancement, if
triggered by a probation violation, would affect his sentence. To the extent the original
judgment and sentence could be informative in a case such as this—that is, a case in
which the State reserved the right to enhance a defendant’s sentence rather than
pursuing such enhancement at the time of the defendant’s plea—we note that the
original judgment and sentence in this case does little to clarify the ambiguity present in
the plea agreement. Indeed, the original judgment and sentence does not make clear
whether Defendant’s probation—imposed upon the suspension of Defendant’s
sentence—would run in accordance with each count rather than total time, providing at
times conflicting language to that end. And the original judgment and sentence is
silent—other than citing the applicable statute—as to how a habitual offender
enhancement would affect Defendant’s sentence, including any information that such an
enhancement would carry terms of incarceration. Indeed, it is not clear in either the plea
agreement or the original judgment and sentence how Defendant’s probation terms or
sentence should be construed, nor is it clear precisely what effect a potential habitual
offender enhancement would have thereon.

{10} Under Banghart-Portillo, if we determine a defendant’s plea agreement to be
ambiguous, we must look beyond the written plea agreement to determine whether the
district court cured the ambiguity. Id. ¶ 19. At Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the
district court confirmed whether Defendant understood the terms of his plea agreement,
including the potential for his sentence to be enhanced as a habitual offender if
Defendant violated the terms of his probation. While Defendant answered the district
court’s questions affirmatively, the district court stated the State could seek to “add
those four years, and you’re agreeing today not to challenge that issue down the road,”
ostensibly referring to the four years of incarceration that could be added to Defendant’s
sentence per count, in the event that Defendant violated his probation. We cannot
conclude, under the record before us and under Banghart-Portillo, that the district
court’s single admonishment to Defendant was sufficient to clarify how his probation
terms would run or to what extent enhanced sentences of incarceration would apply.
See id. ¶ 21 (concluding that the district court cured any ambiguities present in the
defendant’s plea agreement by informing the defendant on more than one occasion that
by admitting to prior felonies, “a four-year habitual offender enhancement [would be
applied to] each of her counts, totaling eight additional years of incarceration”).

{11}   Further, as stated in Banghart-Portillo,

       We caution the sentencing court and counsel for the parties to ensure that
       it is clear to a defendant accepting a plea whether probation is to be
       served in a unitary block. This will provide the defendant notice that a
       habitual offender enhancement may apply to all counts for the duration of
       the probationary period if a violation occurs. We further clarify that there
       can be no presumption that a probationary term will be served in the
       aggregate absent explicit language in the plea agreement or clarification
       by the district court. Failing to make this specification would create an
       ambiguity in the plea and undermine a defendant’s reasonable
       expectation of finality.

Id. ¶ 26. Under Banghart-Portillo—which compels the district court to specify when
probation terms are to be served in the aggregate—and given the ambiguities present in
the sentencing documents in this case as well as in the district court’s own statements
regarding Defendant’s sentence, we cannot assume that Defendant’s probation terms
were to be served in the aggregate. Id. ¶¶ 21, 26. Instead, we must assume Defendant
could only have reasonably expected his probation terms to be served separately
according to each count. This interpretation comports with the statements made by the
district court at sentencing, which specified to Defendant only that he would be subject
to an enhancement of four years, rather than eight, under the habitual offender statute.
We therefore hold that Defendant had a reasonable expectation of finality as to his
eighteen-month probation term in Case 451—which began on July 10, 2017—being
complete on January 10, 2019, prior to his eventual probation violation, the State’s
pursuit of habitual offender enhancements, and the amended judgment and sentence—
all of which occurred in the year 2020—such that the district court no longer had
jurisdiction to enhance that portion of Defendant’s sentence.

{12} We next address Defendant’s argument regarding presentence confinements.
Notwithstanding Defendant’s reasonable expectation of finality as to his probation in
Case 451, Defendant further contends that he had a reasonable expectation of finality
that his total probation—including that resulting from Case 473—would end in March
2020 based on presentence confinement credits that he asserts the district court should
have applied. Defendant argues that the court was without jurisdiction to enhance his
sentence in May 2020 because presentence confinement credits would have resulted in
his sentence being fully served before such time. In State v. Nieto, 2013-NMCA-065, ¶
8, 303 P.3d 855, we concluded that NMSA 1978, Section 31-20-12 (1977) does not
require presentence confinement credit to reduce sentences of probation as it would
sentences of incarceration. To the extent Defendant asks that we reexamine Nieto in
light of its failure to address either (1) “how presentence confinement credits affect an
expectation of finality”; or (2) a “situation where applying pre[]sentence confinement
credits would complete a probationer’s term of probation prior to revocation”; we decline
to do so considering that Defendant cites no authority to support his arguments in this
regard, including his contention that Nieto is insufficient authority on the issue of
whether presentence confinement credits apply to probation terms. Curry v. Great Nw.
Ins. Co., 2014-NMCA-031, ¶ 28, 320 P.3d 482 (“Where a party cites no authority to
support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists.”). We therefore hold
that Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of finality in his second probation
term for Case 473 based upon presentence confinement credits because the district
court is not compelled to apply such credits to terms of probation.

II.    Use of Audio-Visual Connection Pursuant to the Supreme Court Order

{13} Defendant argues that the district court violated his due process rights by holding
his evidentiary hearing via audio-visual connection, pursuant to the Supreme Court
Order. Specifically, Defendant contends that by holding the evidentiary hearing virtually,
the district court violated (1) his right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) his right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (3) his right to a public trial.

{14} The Supreme Court Order states that “[a]ll judges shall use telephonic or audio-
visual attendance for court appearances by attorneys, litigants, witnesses, and the
press unless there is an emergency need for an in-person appearance upon motion of a
party.” Supreme Court Order at 4 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court Order further
provides that the district court has discretion to order in-person appearances “on the
judge’s own initiative, without a motion by a party, provided that the judge shall confer
with the parties and the chief judge of the district before proceeding with an in-person
appearance.” Id. Specifically related to criminal proceedings, the order provides as well
that “[a]ny criminal procedure rules requiring the presence of the defendant may be
accomplished through remote, audio-visual appearance in the discretion of the judge,
provided that confidential communication between the defendant and defense counsel
is made available[.]” Id. Under these provisions, the district court has discretion to
require in-person appearances within certain parameters or when moved to do so by a
party asserting an emergency need to appear in person.

{15} In State v. Peru, 2022-NMCA-018, ¶ 7, 508 P.3d 907, we considered a similar
challenge to the district court’s compliance with the Supreme Court Order and held that
the district court did not err in holding proceedings via audio-visual connection because
the defendant failed to demonstrate emergency need for an in-person appearance. In
Peru, we clarified that under the Supreme Court Order, while “the district court has
discretion to require in-person appearances within certain parameters or when moved to
do so by a party asserting an emergency need to appear in person[, t]he Supreme
Court Order does not require the district court to grant a defendant’s motion for in-
person proceedings where such motion fails to present an emergency need.” Id. Here,
Defendant’s motion for in-person appearance does not assert an emergency need for
Defendant to appear in-person, instead merely asserting the constitutional rights
Defendant claimed would be violated by appearing at his evidentiary hearing via audio-
visual connection. Defendant further fails to articulate on appeal that his motion was
supported by an emergency need. Because Defendant fails to establish that his motion
to appear in-person was supported by emergency need, we can assign no error to the
district court’s compliance with the Supreme Court Order. See State v. Aragon, 1999-
NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (explaining that “[t]here is a
presumption of correctness in the district court’s rulings” and that it is a defendant’s
“burden on appeal to demonstrate any claimed error below” (alterations, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted)). We therefore hold that the district court did not
err in its interpretation of and in compliance with the Supreme Court Order.

{16} We note that to the extent Defendant’s arguments in this regard imply that the
Supreme Court Order is, itself, unconstitutional and conflict with existing precedent, we
remind Defendant that we are precluded from reviewing arguments challenging the
constitutionality or validity of New Mexico Supreme Court orders, and such arguments
should be made directly to the Supreme Court. See Alexander v. Delgado, 1973-NMSC-
030, ¶ 9, 84 N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (“The general rule is that a court lower in rank than
the court which made the decision invoked as a precedent cannot deviate therefrom
and decide contrary to that precedent, irrespective of whether it considers the rule laid
down therein as correct or incorrect.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted));
see also N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3 (providing that our Supreme Court is granted
“superintending control over all inferior courts”).

CONCLUSION

{17} For the above reasons, we reverse and remand to the district court to enter an
amended judgement and sentence and for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

{18}   IT IS SO ORDERED.
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JACQUELINE R. MEDINA, Judge

GERALD E. BACA, Judge