Court Opinion

ID: 9522141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:18:29.327227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:20.054502
License: Public Domain

Burgess, J.,
¶ 50. dissenting in part. Certainly defendant’s sentence requires clarification. Intentionally or not, the district court misspoke when it imposed a 4-year-and-11-month-to-5-year sentence “all suspended but 5 years” to serve, which would seem to defeat the statutory prohibition on identical minimum and maximum terms. See 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a) (mandating that the court “shall not fix the term of imprisonment, . . . but shall establish a maximum and may establish a minimum term”). The majority, however, reaches beyond any argument offered by defendant to invalidate his minimum term, when that part of his sentence fully comports with the statute and our case law. Because the majority’s strained application of § 7031(a) is unnecessary, departs from the statutory language, and is practically unworkable, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the foregoing decision.
¶ 51. To begin with, defendant concedes that his underlying 4-year-and-11-month-to-5-year sentence is lawful.3 That is because, *411as was expressly recognized by defendant, our precedents interpreting 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a) are clear: “A sentence is not fixed as long as the maximum and minimum terms are not identical.” State v. Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 13, 181 Vt. 635, 928 A.2d 489 (mem.). Defendant’s minimum and maximum terms are not identical; they are different. That the difference is slight is of no import. Id. ¶ 14; see also State v. Bushway, 146 Vt. 405, 408, 505 A.2d 660, 662 (1985) (rejecting a challenge to a 18-to-20-year sentence to serve based on the “slight difference” between the maximum and minimum term, “when both are within the respective limits set by law”).
¶ 52. Why the majority pursues an approach not advocated by defendant to reach its result is unclear. Defendant explicitly did not challenge as invalid the one-month difference between his minimum and maximum terms. Defendant agreed the one-month difference was proper as a matter of law, but maintained that the trial court’s suspension of all “but five years” to serve effectively rendered the minimum the same as the maximum in violation of the statute. This claim appears to have merit, but rather than address the issue raised by defendant, the majority embarks on an unsolicited attack on a valid underlying minimum sentence through an interpretation of the statute not supported by its terms or by our prior decisions.
¶ 53. Ignoring the language of the statute, the majority invalidates defendant’s sentence on a theory that the interval between the minimum and maximum must somehow be long enough to give the parole board “the necessary discretion to release an offender who has rehabilitated himself.” Ante, ¶ 41. This is just not in the statute. As cited above, the statute directs that the court “not fix the term of imprisonment . . . [but] may establish a minimum term.” 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a).
*412¶ 54. In construing this language, we first consider its plain meaning. Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 12. Where the meaning is unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statutory language to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. State v. Thompson, 174 Vt. 172, 174-75, 807 A.2d 454, 458 (2002) (‘We will enforce the statute without resorting to statutory construction if the legislative intent is clear from the language.”). This Court has already found this section unambiguous in that “§ 7031 clearly mandates that a court may not fix the term of a sentence by imposing minimum and maximum sentences that are the same.” Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 13. Thus, a sentence meets the statutory requirement so long as the minimum and maximum terms are not identical. Id.
¶ 55. The majority posits that our past approvals of slight differences in minimum and maximum terms “have all involved intervals between the minimum and maximum terms that forward the goals behind the indeterminate sentence law by allowing the offender at least the chance to take advantage of the possibility of parole.” Ante, ¶ 44. Characterizing these sentences of 18-to-20 years to serve, Bushway, 146 Vt. at 408, 505 A.2d at 662, 8-to-9 years to serve, State v. Stanley, 2007 VT 64, ¶ 13, 182 Vt. 565, 933 A.2d 184 (mem.), or 14-to-15 years to serve, Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 5, as vindicating the rehabilitative opportunities for parole will surely prompt wry smiles within the criminal justice bar. Irony aside, the majority’s new standard for setting minimum terms that “forward the goals behind the indeterminate sentence law,” ante, ¶ 44, cannot be found in the legislation, is amorphous at best, and arrives without any instruction to the trial bench as to its application.
¶ 56. There can be no direction because this new construct defies certain or meaningful measurement. Although it is settled that a minimum term that is one year, or 7%, less than the maximum is acceptable, see Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, ¶ 13, today we learn that a minimum term’s difference of one month, or roughly 2%, less than the maximum is not acceptable. Picking the correct number between a one and twelve month interval, or between 2% and 7% differential, remains a mystery. Failure by this Court to divine a line to match its reading of the statute invites litigation *413and appeals whenever there is a difference between minimum and maximum terms falling within that range.4
¶ 57. Despite the trial court’s compliance with the statute, the majority reaches beyond the plain meaning to discover a newfound limit on the sentencing court’s authority to set a minimum term. Without any such legislative declaration, the majority relates that “the Legislature has indicated its intent to transfer some sentencing discretion from the courts to the State’s parole authority.” Ante, ¶ 40. Based on this perceived intent, defendant’s sentence is invalidated because the majority deems, without knowing, that a one-month interval between the minimum and maximum terms is too short to allow the parole board discretion to release the defendant before his maximum term is done. If this construction is correct, the question of whether enough minimum time has passed before parole can be granted must always be left to the parole board, regardless of the minimum term imposed by the sentencing court — a result clearly at odds with our case law and the statute as written.
¶ 58. There is no reason to distinguish this case from State v. Kimmick, 2007 VT 45, where this Court rejected an argument that a sentence of 14-to-15 years violated the spirit of 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a) because, after good-time credit was applied, the defendant’s effective maximum and minimum sentences were the same. Based on the plain language of the statute, Kimmick held that “even though the difference between the maximum and minimum terms is slight, the terms are not identical.” Id. ¶ 14. We declined to import the effects of the good time rule into § 7031 because there was no “clear legislative intent to impose such a requirement.” Id. ¶ 15. Exactly the same rationale applies here, and there is no need to import parole administration into the sentencing statute absent any such direction from the Legislature.
¶ 59. Sentencing and parole are separate processes; the first under the discretion of the court and the second controlled by the parole board. State v. Bensh, 168 Vt. 607, 607-08, 719 A.2d 1155, 1156 (1998) (mem.) (‘Whereas the court imposes sentences within the limits established by the Legislature, parole follows the imposition of sentence and is a purely legislative function.”). The *414board’s authority to grant parole is expressly subject to the minimum term set by the court. 28 V.S.A. § 501 (providing that an inmate with a minimum sentence is eligible for parole “after the inmate has served the minimum term of the sentence”). The parole board has discretion in deciding whether to grant parole to an eligible inmate, but nothing in the statute requires the court to promote parole by adhering to unwritten limits on its minimum sentencing authority beyond what the statute commands. Whatever rehabilitative goal the sentencing court may, or may not, consider, see State v. Corliss, 168 Vt. 333, 342, 721 A.2d 438, 445 (1998) (listing sentencing factors to include “punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation”), rehabilitation is not a per se requirement of sentencing.
¶ 60. There is no silent and implied parole-promoting limitation, as the majority would have, on the court’s authority to impose a minimum term. Nor should there be since, based on the specifics of their particular crime or their criminal history, some offenders will merit less opportunity for parole compared to others. This reality is accounted for in the Legislature’s grant of flexible trial court discretion to set a minimum and maximum term under 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a) within the range of jail time specified for a given offense, and the court’s sentence in this case is in accord with the statute. Bushway, 146 Vt. at 408, 505 A.2d at 662.
¶ 61. Finally, if such a different policy is to be drawn, it is not for the authorship of the judicial branch. No self-contradiction appears in the statutes to compel judicial revision. Rewriting the statute properly belongs to the Legislature. See Smith v. Parrott, 2003 VT 64, ¶ 14, 175 Vt. 375, 833 A.2d 843 (holding that policy questions are better suited to legislative process). Because we need not abandon the statute as written and need not impose extra-legislative limitations on sentencing discretion, I dissent from the majority’s decision to do so.
On Motion for Reargument
Skoglund, J.
¶ 62. The State moved for reargument on the question of whether defendant’s sentence violated the indeterminate sentencing statute, raising three grounds: (1) defendant may be eligible for release more than a year before he reaches his minimum sentence if he complies with the “plan preparing [him] for return to the community” adopted pursuant to 28 V.S.A. § 1(b); (2) the Legislature has not always required meaningful parole *415eligibility, and, thus, it is not clear that such meaningful eligibility is required under the indeterminate sentencing statute; and (3) our opinion may have significant consequences for the criminal justice system that have not been addressed. We granted supplemental briefing and reargument. We now reaffirm our decision and again conclude that the sentence imposed violates the indeterminate sentencing statute.
¶ 63. The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum term of four years and eleven months and a maximum term of five years on the cocaine possession charge. In concluding that this sentence violated the indeterminate sentencing statute, we looked at all the statutes governing Vermont’s sentencing laws to ascertain the legislative intent. Statutes in pari materia — those dealing with the same general subject matter or having the same general purpose — must be read together and construed as parts of a unified statutory system. See Rutz v. Essex Junction Prudential Comm., 142 Vt. 400, 405, 457 A.2d 1368, 1370 (1983).
¶ 64. Under 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a), the trial court is to establish a maximum sentence in accordance with the maximum term fixed by law for the offense and may establish a minimum sentence not less than the shortest term fixed by law for the offense. In addition, the statute provides that “the court imposing the sentence shall not fix the term of imprisonment.” Id. This clear proscription against determinate sentences has been a part of Vermont corrections law since 1898 when the Legislature passed “An Act Relating to Sentences to the State Prison or House of Correction,” which first set forth these restrictions in virtually the same language. 1898, No. 127. That same year the Legislature created the parole board. 1898, No. 126 (establishing a board of prison commissioners). Though this first parole board was later found unconstitutional, In re Conditional Discharge of Convicts, 73 Vt. 414, 429, 51 A. 10, 15 (1901) (per curiam), the Legislature formally established a parole board and parole procedures again in 1968. 1967, No. 319 (Adj. Sess.). Under this act, the parole board was granted authority to undertake an assessment of the offender and to consider such factors as an offender’s individual characteristics and culpability in deciding whether to release an inmate after the minimum term had been served. See 28 V.S.A. § 501 (providing that inmate is eligible for parole consideration subject to any minimum sentence imposed); id. § 502(a) (providing that parole board shall interview inmates eligible for parole *416considering “all pertinent information regarding an inmate” to determine whether to grant parole).
¶ 65. The State points to the several forms of supervised release now authorized by statute and suggests that the rehabilitative tools available to the Department of Corrections now include more than just parole. The State argues the Legislature effectively condoned fixed sentences in connection with its policy on reductions in term of imprisonment, citing 28 V.S.A. § 811 (2000), which provided for good time reductions off the maximum, but not the minimum term — the Legislature later repealed this provision. See 2005, No. 63, § 3. According to the State, “[b]y allowing for the reduction in maximum terms but not in the minimum terms the Legislature authorized fixed or determinate sentences notwithstanding 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a).”
¶ 66. We will not find an implied repeal of a statute so easily. See State v. Baron, 2004 VT 20, ¶ 10, 176 Vt. 314, 848 A.2d 275 (‘When interpreting statutes we presume that there has been no repeal by implication.”); State v. Scribner, 170 Vt. 537, 538, 746 A.2d 145, 146 (1999) (mem.) (“Out of judicial respect for legislative authority over lawmaking, we recognize a presumption against implied repeal”). Either we are an indeterminate sentencing state or we are not. If we permit sentences that are not, in fact, indeterminate, then we have eliminated 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a). It is for the Legislature to decide whether it is time for a change in sentencing philosophy.
¶ 67. As we noted in our opinion, the indeterminate sentence law was designed to promote rehabilitation of prisoners by allowing the offender at least the chance to take advantage of the possibility of parole. Supra, ¶ 44. We found the sentence in this case to have effectively closed the window during which the parole board could exercise its discretion, “essentially thwarting the rehabilitative purpose behind both the indeterminate sentence law and our laws governing parole.” Id. We remain convinced that, in adopting this proscription on determinate sentences, the Legislature has indicated its intent to transfer some sentencing discretion from the courts to the state’s parole authority.
¶ 68. Justice Dooley maintains the position laid out in his dissent to the original opinion: that this issue was not challenged below and should not be addressed by this Court. See supra, ¶¶ 47-49 (Dooley, J., dissenting).
*417¶ 69. Justice Burgess, likewise, holds to his original dissent on this issue founded, first, on defendant’s explicit concession that the underlying minimum and maximum terms were lawful according to the statute and our prior decisions; second, on defendant’s failure to raise the argument adopted by the majority; and alternatively, contending that the majority’s application of 13 V.S.A. § 7031(a) departs from the legislative direction, rewrites the statute, and is practically unworkable. See supra, ¶¶ 50-61 (Burgess, J., dissenting).

Upon consideration of the motion for reargument the original mandate remains unchanged.

 Defendant admits in his brief that “under this Court’s jurisprudence, a sentence of 4 years 11 months to 5 years to serve . . . would be lawful.” The majority imagines this as “simply a mischaracterization of defendant’s brief,” ante, ¶ 38 n.2, but plainly it is not. Defendant’s argument consists of but four paragraphs: the first recites § 7031 with a preface and conclusion reiterating, correctly, that this Court has “construed the statute as prohibiting a sentence with the same maximum and minimum terms of confinement” (emphasis added; quotations omitted); and the second paragraph acknowledges, correctly, that while “[c]lose minimum and maximum terms have been found proper, when both are within the respective limits of the law,” a “minimum sentence equal to the maximum” is invalid (emphasis added, quotations omitted). The entire balance of defendant’s argument, and concession, is as follows:
While, under this Court’s jurisprudence, a sentence of k years 11 months to 5 years to serve or a sentence of 4 years 11 months to 5 years all suspended but 4 years 11 months (or any unsuspended portion that was less than 5 years) would be lawful, imposition of the sentence j,\ years 11 months to 5 years, all suspended but 5 years is unlawful because the minimum sentence that [defendant] will necessarily be required to serve, involving no other considerations, is the maximum sentence.
Here as in Lambert, it was the court’s intention to create a sentence where the minimum and maximum were the same. The court imposed *411a flat sentence which is unlawful. [Defendant’s] sentences must be vacated and the matter remanded for new sentencing.
(Emphases added.) What defendant complains about is the court’s purported “suspension” of all his sentence — except for the maximum term — that melds the maximum and minimum into the same time to serve, since release could not occur until the maximum is completed. Thus, according to the court’s illusory suspension, the minimum is irrelevant because the maximum must be served. Not addressing defendant’s point, the majority instead gratuitously reverses the part of the sentence that defendant agrees is valid.

 Solution of the mystery is further clouded by our affirmance of defendant’s concurrent sentences of 5-to-6 months for marijuana possession and 11-to-12 months for false information to a police officer.