Court Opinion

ID: 9748969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:19:07.916324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:41.155913
License: Public Domain

TIMLIN, J., Concurring.
I write this separate concurring opinion because in my view there is a further basis for reversal.
I would hold that the juvenile court erred because it did not set forth the specific reasons for its dismissal of the petition in the minutes of the 5 p.m. October 23 proceedings at which the petition was dismissed.
Both parties assumed erroneously that Penal Code section 13851 is applicable to this case. Section 1385 provides, in relevant part:
“(a) The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading.”
However, section 1385 is not the applicable statute in juvenile proceedings. Instead, Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 applies to dismissal of a petition filed to declare a minor a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6Q2. Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 provides:
“A judge of the juvenile court in which a petition was filed, at any time before the minor reaches the age of 21 years, may dismiss the petition . . . if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor require such dismissal, or if it finds that the minor is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. The court shall have jurisdiction to order such dismissal . . . regardless of whether the minor is, at the time of such order, a ward or dependent child of the court.”
*360Although Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, unlike section 1385, does not specifically provide that the court in a juvenile proceeding must state its reasons for a dismissal in an order entered upon the juvenile court minutes, an analogous requirement is found in California Rules of Court, rule 1493 (rule 1493), which provides, in relevant part, that:
“(a) At the disposition hearing, the court may:
“(1) Dismiss the petition in the interests of justice and the welfare of the child, or if the child does not need treatment or rehabilitation, with the specific reasons stated in the minutes', . . (Italics added.)
I recognize that rule 1493 refers specifically to a dismissal at the disposition hearing, not at a jurisdiction hearing, which was the proceeding at which the juvenile court dismissed the petition here. But an analysis of the public policy behind requiring a statement of reasons on the juvenile court minutes, as discussed below, persuades me that we should adopt a judicially created requirement that the specific reasons for such a dismissal be stated in the juvenile court minutes of any proceeding at which such dismissal is ordered, irrespective of the nature of the proceeding.2
My research has disclosed no relevant decisions interpreting rule 1493 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 in the context of whether the failure to specify the reasons for the dismissal in the juvenile court minutes requires reversal of the order of dismissal. However, decisional authority exists concerning the effect of the similar requirement in section 1385 for adult criminal proceedings. I turn to those decisions for guidance in the instant matter, for the same reasons that the court in Derek L. v. Superior Court (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 228 [186 Cal.Rptr. 870] found such authority persuasive in interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 in light of case law based on section 1385. It alluded to the following factors: (1) the furtherance of justice in both the criminal justice system and the juvenile justice system requires consideration of both the rights of the accused and the interests of society, as represented by the People (137 Cal.App.3d at p. 233), and (2) in both the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system, the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss a matter “in the *361furtherance of justice,” but such discretion must be based on weighing the interests of the accused against the interests of society. (Id. at pp. 233-234.)3
In cases involving the application of section 1385, it repeatedly has been held that although the trial court made an oral statement as to the reasons it chose to dismiss the criminal charges, and although that oral statement of reasons was recorded in the reporter’s transcript, such recorded oral statement was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of section 1385. (People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 943-944 [120 Cal.Rptr. 655, 533 P.2d 193]; People v. Ferguson (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1173, 1179 [267 Cal.Rptr. 528]; People v. Superior Court (Flores) (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 127, 135-136 [262 Cal.Rptr. 576].) The public policy for requiring strict compliance with this provision is “ ‘ “so that all may know why this great power was exercised’”” (People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944, quoting People v. Beasley, supra, 5 Cal.3d 617, 637; People v. Harris (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1228-1229 [278 Cal.Rptr. 391]), which in turn serves to protect the public interest against improper dismissals. (People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 944; People v. Harris, supra, 227 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1228-1229.) Further, as commented in People v. Borousk (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 147, 156, at footnote 11 [100 Cal.Rptr. 867]: “The purpose for recording the reasons is said to be . . . that there be a ‘purposeful restraint, lest magistral discretion sweep away the government of laws’ [citation]; or put another way, ‘to restrain judicial discretion and curb arbitrary action for undisclosed reasons and motives’ [citation].”
I believe the above rationale properly applies with equal force to juvenile justice matters involving the dismissal of proceedings commenced in the manner provided in Welfare and Institutions Code section 650.4
Although rule 1493 refers only to dismissals at disposition hearings, the controlling statute, Welfare and Institutions Code section 782, provides that dismissals in the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor may be made at any time, even when the minor, at the time of the order of dismissal, is not a ward of the court. I see no policy reason behind requiring specification of the reasons for dismissal in the court minutes only at disposition hearings but not at other juvenile justice proceedings. One might argue that *362the fact that rule 1493 specifically refers to disposition hearings mandates the application of the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, to indicate an intent by the Judicial Council, in the exercise of its power to adopt rules of court, to exclude all other types of hearings from the requirement of a specific statement of reasons in the minute order. Such principle, however, is inapplicable when there is no manifest reason why a statement of reasons in an order of dismissal under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 not be required in the juvenile court minutes of any type of proceeding (Estate of Banerjee (1978) 21 Cal.3d 527, 538-539, 539, fn. 10 [147 Cal.Rptr. 157, 580 P.2d 657]), especially when application of the above noted statutory interpretation rule would invade public policy. (See 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th ed., 1992 rev.) § 47.25, fn. 8.) Such is the situation here.
My colleagues understandably hesitate to judicially establish such a rule, but, in my opinion, public policy would support such an action. It makes no sense to me to require a statement of reasons for dismissal at a disposition hearing, but not for dismissals made at other hearings. I respectfully suggest the Judicial Council consider this apparent anomaly between Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 and rule 1493, and act to remedy it.

All further references to code sections shall be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

“We should not be misled by the cliche that policy is a matter for the legislature and not for the courts. There is always an area not covered by legislation in which the courts must revise old rules or formulate new ones, and in that process policy is often an appropriate and even a basic consideration.” (Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts (1957) 24 U.Chi.L.Rev. 211, 219.)

In addition, the specification of reasons also enables the appellate court to determine whether, in view of the stated reasons, a proper exercise of discretion is shown. (People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [85 Cal.Rptr. 501].) Requiring a statement of reasons to be included in the minute order makes it clear what factors the lower court weighed against each other.

Although juvenile court proceedings are confidential they are not secret, and the press and public have an interest in how such cases are handled. (See, e.g., Welf. & Inst. Code, § 676; 10 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1989) §§ 544-546, pp. 612-617.)