Court Opinion

ID: 9574279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:03:52.861997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:19.663297
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
1. I cannot agree with the conclusion that the trial court failed to comply with OCGA § 17-12-4 and the implementing rules. Said statute requires all trial courts of the state to provide a procedure for determining a defendant’s eligibility for appointed counsel and to ap*221point counsel in cases where a defendant is determined to be indigent. The record shows the Superior Court of Cobb County does have such a procedure. Rule 29.5 of the Uniform Superior Court Rules requires each superior court to determine income level for eligibility for appointed counsel. The record shows the Superior Court of Cobb County had established such an eligibility scale and that defendant in this case was reviewed on several occasions by the appropriate administrative officer to determine if he met the requirements for appointed counsel. Repeatedly it was determined that defendant’s income exceeded the standard.
Rule 29.5 provides the court “may,” in special circumstances, appoint counsel even for one who does not otherwise meet the eligibility standard where, inter alia, there is “documented refusal of the case by members of the bar because of financial inability to pay for counsel.” The record shows the eligibility rules adopted by Cobb County also provide the public defender “may” accept a client for representation due to “refusal of the case by three members of the private bar.” I find no requirement in the statutes or applicable rules that a defendant be advised of this rule permitting, though not requiring, appointment of counsel when the defendant is refused representation by the private bar. Therefore, I cannot concur with the majority opinion that a failure so to advise the defendant that he might otherwise qualify for appointed counsel even if he exceeded the income guidelines constitutes a failure to comply with the applicable statutes or rules.
Nor can I agree that the trial court in this case erred in failing to appoint counsel for defendant under the special circumstances provisions. In this case, at the preliminary motions hearing on December 10, 1987, four months after he was released from jail, defendant reported to the judge he had been rehired to his job and “now I can maybe afford an attorney.” The trial judge declined to rule on defendant’s motion for a continuance but informed defendant he could have until the scheduled trial date, January 18, 1988, to obtain an attorney and prepare for trial. When the case was called in January defendant explained to the judge that he had not obtained counsel because he first had to purchase new clothes and personal belongings to replace those stolen when he was evicted from his apartment while in jail and had talked to several attorneys who required payment of between $2,500 and $5,000 to take his case, which defendant could not afford. Although the State announced ready, the record shows the case was again continued. Again defendant applied to the public defender’s office for counsel and again he was found to be ineligible. The case was not reached for trial until November 1, 1988, over one year from defendant’s release from jail during which time defendant was employed and earning income in excess of the indigent defense guidelines for the county. Defendant announced ready to commence the *222trial.
At the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial defendant admitted he was granted several continuances to afford him the opportunity to obtain counsel but defendant held to the belief that the case might be dismissed for lack of evidence. The record shows the trial court heard the evidence which arguably supports defendant’s claim for appointed counsel under the special circumstances provision of the rules and nevertheless, in its discretion, denied defendant’s request for appointed counsel. Thus, I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that defendant’s “special circumstances” were not appropriately considered. In my opinion, neither the evidence presented prior to trial nor the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial requires the trial court, as a matter of law, to appoint counsel to defendant under the “special circumstances” provision of the rules for determining eligibility for appointed counsel. Both Rule 29.5 and the guidelines adopted by Cobb County leave the decision to appoint counsel under special circumstances to the discretion of the trial court. A decision left to the discretion of the trial court will not be overturned on appellate review unless the record shows an abuse of discretion. I find no such abuse in this case and therefore believe we should hold the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for appointed counsel.
2. Neither do I believe the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground defendant’s attorney failed to provide effective assistance of counsel. Defendant points to three alleged errors to support his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: his attorney’s lack of adequate opportunity to prepare for trial, the attorney’s failure to object to certain testimony and the attorney’s mistake in raising the issue of defendant’s prior criminal record, thus opening the door to the introduction of harmful character evidence by the prosecutor. Because, as I conclude, the defendant was not entitled to appointed counsel, the attorney’s lack of an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial is due to defendant’s own failure to retain counsel prior to the commencement of trial. Defendant’s second argument for showing ineffective assistance of counsel is also meritless. The testimony of certain witnesses concerning statements made to them by the victim is admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-16 and the attorney’s failure to object on the ground such testimony impermissibly bolstered the victim’s testimony does not show attorney error. Finally, the testimony of defendant’s trial attorney at the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial shows the attorney’s decision to question defendant about his prior criminal record was not based solely on a lack of understanding that such testimony would permit the prosecution to present prejudicial character evidence but also on defendant’s own misrepresentation to the attorney that he had no prior criminal *223record as an adult. Error which is induced by the defendant proyides no basis for appeal. See Edwards v. State, 235 Ga. 603 (2) (221 SE2d 28) (1975).
Decided December 4, 1990
Rehearing denied December 20, 1990
Larry W. Yarbrough, for appellant.
Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Gary R. Pelphrey, amicus curiae.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.