Court Opinion

ID: 9395603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:05:51.379652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.729417
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 128123

                                        IN THE
                               SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                   (Docket No. 128123)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        ANDREW RAMIREZ, Appellant.

                                Opinion filed May 18, 2023.

        CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, Rochford, and
     O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                        OPINION

¶1       Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant Andrew
     Ramirez was convicted of possession of a defaced firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b)
     (West 2018)). On appeal, defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on
     the basis that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the
     serial number on the firearm was defaced. The appellate court affirmed, holding
     that the State was required to prove only that defendant knowingly possessed the
     defaced firearm and not that he knew the firearm was defaced. 2021 IL App (1st)
     191392-U, ¶¶ 27-28. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the
     appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings
     consistent with this opinion.

¶2                                     BACKGROUND

¶3       On May 10, 2018, at approximately 10:30 p.m., police executed a search
     warrant at a home located at 3234 South Komensky Avenue in Chicago. The police
     forcibly entered the residence after nobody answered. Once inside, officers saw
     defendant’s mother at the bottom of the stairs and defendant descending from the
     second floor. Defendant was detained and subsequently allowed to return upstairs,
     where he retrieved his shoes from the foot of a single bed in one of the bedrooms.

¶4       After police searched the house, they recovered a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun, a
     Mossberg shotgun, a 9-millimeter handgun, and ammunition. The Benelli shotgun
     was recovered from under the mattress of the single bed in the room where
     defendant had retrieved his shoes. From the same bedroom, police recovered mail
     bearing defendant’s name and the address of the home. At trial, Adolfus Bolanos,
     one of the officers who executed the warrant, testified that the serial number on the
     Benelli shotgun had been “scratched off.”

¶5       Defendant was taken into custody, provided Miranda warnings (see Miranda v.
     Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and made a statement. He told police that he bought
     the Benelli shotgun from a coworker for $100 and lunch.

¶6       The State proceeded to trial on a single count, charging defendant with
     possession of a 20-gauge Benelli shotgun whose serial number had been “changed,
     altered, removed or obliterated” in violation of section 24-5(b) of the Criminal Code
     of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-5(b) (West 2018)). The Benelli shotgun recovered
     by police was not introduced at trial. The parties stipulated, however, that the serial
     number on the shotgun “had been changed, altered, removed, or obliterated.” The
     State did not present any direct evidence that defendant knew that the shotgun’s
     serial number was defaced. Defendant did not testify or call any witnesses.

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¶7        In finding defendant guilty, the trial court stated:

              “I do believe that the State’s evidence proves conclusively and beyond a
          reasonable doubt that [defendant] possessed that weapon. The next question is
          whether he had to have possessed it knowing that it had *** a defaced serial
          number. And pursuant to People v. Lee, [2019 IL App (1st) 162563], the State
          does not have to prove that. They only have to prove that he knowingly
          possessed the firearm and that the firearm had a defaced or obliterated serial
          number. There will be a finding of guilty.”

¶8        The trial court subsequently denied defendant’s posttrial motions and sentenced
       him to two years’ probation.

¶9         The appellate court affirmed the conviction and rejected defendant’s contention
       that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the serial
       number on the firearm was defaced. 2021 IL App (1st) 191392-U, ¶¶ 27-28. Based
       upon People v. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d 598 (2009), and its progeny, the court
       concluded that the State was required to prove only that defendant knowingly
       possessed the defaced firearm and not that he knew that the firearm was defaced.
       2021 IL App (1st) 191392-U, ¶ 21. Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the
       light most favorable to the State, the court concluded that a reasonable trier of fact
       could find that defendant constructively possessed the defaced firearm that was
       recovered by police. Id. ¶ 23.

¶ 10       We allowed defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct.
       1, 2021).

¶ 11                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 12       Defendant contends that, to secure a conviction under section 24-5(b) of the
       Code, the State was required to prove that he knew the firearm was defaced. He
       asserts that his conviction must therefore be reversed because the State failed to
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew the serial number on the Benelli
       shotgun was defaced.

¶ 13      In addressing defendant’s sufficiency of the evidence argument, this court must
       analyze the underlying provision of the Code. Our primary objective when

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       construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and give effect to that
       intent. People v. Molnar, 222 Ill. 2d 495, 518 (2006). The best evidence of
       legislative intent is the statutory language itself, which must be given its plain and
       ordinary meaning. People v. Woods, 193 Ill. 2d 483, 487 (2000). Statutes must be
       read as a whole, and all relevant parts should be considered. People v. Reed, 177
       Ill. 2d 389, 393 (1997). This court may not depart from the language of the statute
       by interjecting exceptions, limitations, or conditions tending to contravene the
       purpose of the enactment. People v. Martinez, 184 Ill. 2d 547, 550 (1998). Our
       review of matters of statutory interpretation is de novo. Id.

¶ 14      Section 24-5 of the Code is titled “Defacing identification marks of firearms.”
       720 ILCS 5/24-5 (West 2018). Subsection (a) criminalizes the changing, altering,
       removing, or obliterating of the serial numbers placed on any firearm by the
       manufacturer or importer as a Class 2 felony. Id. § 24-5(a). The mental state
       applicable to subsection (a) is specified as “knowingly or intentionally.” Id.
       Defendant was convicted of possession of a defaced firearm in violation of
       subsection (b), which provides: “A person who possesses any firearm upon which
       any such importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number has been changed, altered,
       removed or obliterated commits a Class 3 felony.” Id. § 24-5(b).

¶ 15       This court has not previously addressed whether possession of a defaced firearm
       requires proof of a mens rea or whether the element(s) of section 24-5(b) include
       both possession and defacement. The parties agree that, in contrast to subsection
       (a), subsection (b), as written, contains no specific mens rea requirement. They
       further agree that section 24-5(b) does not constitute an absolute liability offense.

¶ 16       Defendant asserts that knowledge of the defacement is, and must be, an element
       of the offense. Otherwise, innocent conduct could be criminalized, and a person
       who is unaware that a firearm’s identification marks have been defaced could be
       convicted of a Class 3 felony. The State, however, relying upon Stanley and cases
       that followed it, contends that knowledge of the firearm’s defacement is not an
       element of the offense. Instead, the State argues that section 24-5(b) should be
       interpreted by this court as requiring proof of “(1) knowing possession of a firearm
       and (2) a defaced firearm.”

¶ 17       In Stanley, the defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty of
       violating section 24-5(b) because there was no proof of his knowledge that the

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       marks had been scratched off the shotgun that he possessed. Stanley, 397 Ill. App.
       3d at 603. Alternatively, he argued that if the statute did not require proof of a
       mental state, thereby imposing absolute liability, it would be unconstitutional as
       tending to criminalize innocent conduct without a showing of a culpable mental
       state. Id. After recognizing that the statute made no reference to a mens rea
       requirement, the court examined the statutory guidelines in section 4-3 of the
       Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-3 (West 2006)), which provides the default
       rules for a culpable mental state. Stanley, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 605. Noting that the
       legislature can create absolute liability for a felony, but only if it clearly indicates
       its intent to do so, the appellate court recognized that such intent would not be
       inferred from the mere absence of a mens rea requirement in the statute. Id. at 605-
       07 (citing 720 ILCS 5/4-9 (West 2006)). The court found that section 24-5(b)
       contained no such clear statement of intent. Id. at 607.

¶ 18       To avoid absolute liability, the Stanley court found that a mens rea must be
       inferred into section 24-5(b) and concluded that the provision required the
       defendant’s knowing possession of the firearm. Id. The court ultimately held the
       knowledge requirement of the statute applied only to the possessory component of
       the offense. Id. at 608. In reaching this holding, the court stated:

          “[W]e discern that the elements of this offense are properly the mens rea and
          the possession, that is, the State must prove the knowing possession of the
          defaced firearm by defendant. The State, however, need not prove knowledge
          of the character of the firearm. Though the defacement unmistakably bears upon
          the commission of the offense, it is not an element of the offense.” Id. at 609.

¶ 19       Consequently, under Stanley, a defendant who knowingly possesses a firearm
       takes the weapon as he finds it, and if it turns out to be defaced it will constitute a
       violation of section 24-5(b), regardless of whether there was knowledge of the
       defacement. Our appellate court has reaffirmed Stanley, and its reasoning, in
       subsequent cases. See, e.g., People v. Lee, 2019 IL App (1st) 162563; People v.
       Falco, 2014 IL App (1st) 111797.

¶ 20      In construing the provision before us, section 4-9 of the Code, “Absolute
       Liability” is instructive. This section provides:

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               “A person may be guilty of an offense without having, as to each element
           thereof, one of the mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7 if the
           offense is a misdemeanor which is not punishable by incarceration or by a fine
           exceeding $1,000, or the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
           legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.” 720
           ILCS 5/4-9 (West 2018).

¶ 21        This court has instructed that the severity of the potential punishment is a
       critical factor in ascertaining whether the legislature intended to create an absolute
       liability offense. People v. Sroga, 2022 IL 126978, ¶ 20. That is because “ ‘ “[i]t
       would be unthinkable to subject a person to a long term of imprisonment for an
       offense he might commit unknowingly.” [Citation.] Therefore, “where the
       punishment is great, it is less likely that the legislature intended to create an absolute
       liability offense.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” Id. As the Stanley court correctly
       concluded and the parties agree, there is no clear legislative intent to make a
       violation of section 24-5(b), a Class 3 felony, an absolute liability offense, and thus
       a mens rea must be inferred into the statute.

¶ 22       Pursuant to the Code, when a statute neither prescribes a particular mental state
       nor creates an absolute liability offense, then either intent, knowledge, or
       recklessness applies. See 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b), 4-4, 4-5, 4-6 (West 2018). Here,
       section 24-5(b) is unmistakably a possessory offense, and this court has previously
       held that, when a possessory offense does not prescribe a particular mental state
       and is not an absolute liability offense, knowledge is the appropriate mental state.
       See People v. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d 281, 288-89 (1991). For this mental state, section
       4.5 of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that a person knows or acts knowingly
       or with knowledge of:

               “(a) The nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct, described
           by the statute defining the offense, when he or she is consciously aware that his
           or her conduct is of that nature or that those circumstances exist. Knowledge of
           a material fact includes awareness of the substantial probability that the fact
           exists.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 2018).

¶ 23       Under section 24-5(b), the State must prove defacement in order to secure a
       conviction. The fact of the defacement is what makes the possession of the firearm
       a crime. We find this essential fact is, and must be, an element of the offense.

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       Section 4-3(b) of the Code provides that if a statute prescribes a mental state with
       respect to the offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements
       thereof, the prescribed mental state applies to each such element. Id. § 4-3(b).
       Accordingly, we hold that section 24-5(b)’s implied mens rea of knowledge must
       apply to both elements of the offense, possession and defacement.

¶ 24       As Justice Ellis wrote in his special concurrence in Lee, such an interpretation
       is necessary to draw a line between lawful and unlawful conduct under the statute.
       See Lee, 2019 IL App (1st) 162563, ¶ 87 (Ellis, J., specially concurring). If section
       24-5(b) did not require knowledge of defacement, “the defendant’s otherwise
       innocent conduct (knowingly possessing a firearm) would be transformed into a
       felony by a circumstance (the defacement) of which he was unaware.” Id.
       Consequently, to avoid imposing absolute liability, the statute must be construed to
       require proof that the defendant knew the firearm was defaced. Id. We therefore
       overrule Stanley and its progeny, which erroneously interpreted section 24-5(b) to
       require only proof of knowledge of the possession for the State to meet its burden.

¶ 25        Our interpretation of section 24-5(b), requiring proof of knowledge of both
       possession and defacement, is consistent with the reasoning we applied in Gean
       when interpreting the “chop shop” statute at issue. Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 287-88.
       There, this court construed two different Class 4 felony provisions. Id. at 288. The
       first provision prohibited possession “without authority” of certain Illinois Vehicle
       Code items (such as certificates of title or salvage certificates (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987,
       ch. 95½, ¶ 4-104(b)(1))). Gean, 143 Ill. 2d at 283. The second provision prohibited
       possession of these same items “ ‘without complete assignment.’ ” Id. at 283-84
       (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95½, ¶ 4-104(b)(2)). Neither provision included
       an explicit mens rea requirement. Id. at 287. Due to the lack of a clear legislative
       intent and the severe penalties applicable to violations of the two sections, we found
       that neither were absolute liability offenses and that a mens rea of knowledge would
       be inferred. Id. at 288. After inferring a knowledge requirement into each
       subsection, we held that the State had to prove that the defendant possessed these
       certificates of title and salvage certificates knowing that he did not have authority
       or knowing it was without complete assignment. Id. at 289. In other words, similar
       to our construction here, the State had to prove that the defendant in Gean knew
       that his possession of the certificate was “without authority” under one subsection

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       and that the defendant knew that the certificates he possessed were “without
       complete assignment” in the other subsection.

¶ 26       We further find that our construction of section 24-5(b) is necessary to avoid
       this provision impermissibly burdening the federal constitutional right to keep and
       bear arms. A statute that criminalizes the knowing possession of a firearm, without
       more, would run afoul of the second amendment. See New York State Rifle & Pistol
       Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022); McDonald v. City of Chicago,
       561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Bruen,
       the Court instructed, “[w]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an
       individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The
       government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent
       with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___,
       142 S. Ct. at 2129-30.

¶ 27       It has long been recognized that defaced firearms are uniquely suited for use in
       the commission of crimes. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95 (3d
       Cir. 2010). Firearms that have been defaced so that they are untraceable by law
       enforcement, thus, are not covered by the plain text of the second amendment
       because they are not typically used by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.
       Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (“the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons
       not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-
       barreled shotguns”); see, e.g., United States v. Reyna, No. 3:21-CR-41 RLM-MGG,
       2022 WL 17714376 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 15, 2022) (holding that the second amendment
       does not extend to firearms with obliterated serial numbers because such firearms
       are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes). We
       conclude that construing section 24-5(b) to include a mens rea requirement that a
       defendant know the firearm is defaced also ensures that the provision comports with
       the second amendment.

¶ 28       Finally, defendant contends that this court should reverse his conviction
       outright because there was no evidence presented at trial that he knew the Benelli
       shotgun was defaced. In the alternative, he maintains that his conviction should be
       reversed and remanded for a new trial because the trial court misapprehended the
       law when it erroneously stated that the prosecution was not required to prove that
       he knew the serial number on the firearm was defaced. Defendant argues that this

                                               -8-
       error was not harmless, as the State claims, because the prosecution presented no
       evidence of his knowledge of the defacement.

¶ 29       “The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose
       conviction is overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings leading to the
       conviction.” People v. Casler, 2020 IL 125117, ¶ 57. “[A] second trial is permitted
       when a conviction is reversed because of a posttrial change in law. Such a reversal
       is analogous to one for procedural error and therefore does not bar retrial.” Id.

¶ 30       At the time of defendant’s trial, binding precedent from the First District
       provided that the State did not have to present evidence that a defendant knew a
       firearm was defaced. The trial court, in finding defendant guilty, specifically
       recognized this precedent and found that the State “only ha[s] to prove that he
       knowingly possessed the firearm and that the firearm had a defaced or obliterated
       serial number.” The State asserts that, had it known of the need to establish that
       defendant knew the shotgun was defaced, it might, inter alia, have introduced
       photographs of the shotgun showing that the defacement was so clear that it could
       not have escaped defendant’s notice.

¶ 31       Under the circumstances in this case, we find the proper remedy is to remand
       for a new trial, where the State would have the opportunity to prove defendant knew
       the firearm was defaced as required by this court’s construction of section 24-5(b).

¶ 32                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 33       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the appellate court and
       the circuit court and remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings.

¶ 34      Judgments reversed.

¶ 35      Cause remanded.

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