Court Opinion

ID: 9685432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:37:14.198691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.816927
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
I respectfully dissent. Plaintiffs claim for future pension benefits as part of her action for wrongful discharge under Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich 579; 292 NW2d 880 (1980), is precluded by the preemption provision, § 514, of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 USC 1144(a), particularly in light of the fact that a remedy relating to such benefits was available under the *228terms of the Park West pension plan and the regulations promulgated under the erisa.1
Section 514(a) of the erisa preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan . . . .” 29 USC 1144(a) (emphasis supplied). The erisa preemption provision has been characterized as the "most sweeping [federal] preemption statute ever enacted [by Congress].” Authier v Ginsberg, 757 F2d 796, 801, n 8 (CA 6, 1985).
When it enacted the erisa, Congress took into account a number of policy considerations. In addition to the goal of providing protection for employees, Congress considered it important that costs to employers be controlled so as to encourage the improvement of existing plans and the creation of new plans for the benefit of workers. For example, the following excerpts from the legislative history are revealing:
[T]he committee is aware that under our voluntary pension system, the cost of ñnancing pension plans is an important factor in determining whether any particular retirement plan will be adopted and in determining the benefít levels if a plan is adopted, and that unduly large increases in costs could impede the growth and improvement of the private retirement system. [93rd Cong (2d Sess), 1974 US Code Cong & Admin News 4682. See also pp 4670, 4890, and 4904. Emphasis added.]
[T]hese new requirements [in the erisa] have been carefully designed to provide adequate protection for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans. It is axiomatic to anyone who has worked for any time in this area that pension plans cannot be expected to develop if costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for *229employers who generally foot most of the. bill. This would be self-defeating and would be unfavorable rather than helpful to the employees for whose benefit this legislation is designed. [Statement by the Hon. A1 Ullman, Ranking Majority Member of the House Committee on Ways and Means. Id., p 5167. Emphasis supplied.]
As the Court of Appeals panel recognized in this case, "[t]he possibility of jury awards for 'lost pension benefits’ that far exceed a plaintiiFs entitlement under the pension plan itself would not create 'a favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans.’ ” 153 Mich App 520, 526-527; 396 NW2d 210 (1986).
In pursuit of its goals, Congress determined that it would be important and necessary to preempt all state laws, including judge-made law, which "may now or hereafter relate” to any employee benefit plan:
[W]ith the narrow exceptions specified in the bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conñicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee beneñt plans. This principle is intended to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof, which have the force or effect of law. [120 Cong Rec 29933 (August 22, 1974) (Sen. Williams). Emphasis supplied.]
The problems which Congress sought to avoid by enacting the preemption provision were also described by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
Any hope of uniformity in employer obligations would be lost were we to allow various states’ *230common law governing these obligations to coexist with federal common law under erisa. Under such a scheme, employers would not only be faced with dual requirements within a single state, but with different state requirements wherever they do business. Erisa surely contemplates a different result. [Holland v Burlington, 772 F2d 1140, 1147, n 5 (CA 4, 1985), aff'd sub nom Brooks v Burlington, 477 US 901; 106 S Ct 3267; 91 L Ed 2d 559 (1986).]
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the pervasive breadth of the erisa’s preemption provision. See Pilot Life Ins Co v Dedeaux, 481 US 41; 107 S Ct 1549; 95 L Ed 2d 39 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724, 739-740; 105 S Ct 2380; 85 L Ed 2d 728 (1985). Furthermore, it has not been overlooked that Congress rejected the opportunity to adopt a narrower preemption provision which would have preempted only those state laws which deal directly with erisa plans. Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 463 US 85, 98-100; 103 S Ct 2890; 77 L Ed 2d 490 (1983).
As stated by the Court in Pilot Life Ins Co, supra, p 54,
The deliberate care with which erisa’s civil enforcement remedies were drafted and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that erisa’s civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive.
Further,
Congress used the words "relate to” in § 514(a) in their broad sense. To interpret § 514(a) to preempt only state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans would be to ignore *231the remainder of § 514. It would have been unnecessary to exempt generally applicable state criminal statutes from preemption in § 514(b), for example, if § 514(a) applied only to state laws dealing specifically with erisa plans. [Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 463 US 98.]
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Shaw, 463 US 96-97,
A [state] law "relates to” an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. [Emphasis supplied.]
In the instant case, plaintiffs claim for future pension benefits as part of her wrongful discharge suit clearly had "a connection with or reference to” the defendant’s erisa pension plan because the claim was necessarily based on the existence and terms of the plan. Where the plaintiff, as in this case, introduces into evidence a pension plan covered by the erisa in order to prove damages, the plaintiffs claim necessarily and obviously "relate^] to” the plan. Insofar as under Toussaint Michigan law might otherwise allow an award in excess of entitlement under the plan, it is and should be preempted.
Article VI, § 5 of the Park West plan sets forth a defined benefit for any employee whose employment is terminated "for any reason” other than death prior to the normal retirement date. Those provisions are supplemented by erisa regulations which are incorporated into the plan by reference. Art II, § 10.
Under the Park West plan, which incorporates erisa regulations, an employee who is wrongfully terminated would be entitled to the addition of pension credits on the basis of an award of back *232pay. The plan does not contemplate the type of large jury award for future pension benefits which was awarded in this case. Contrary to positions taken in the majority and concurring opinions, I believe that by allowing such an award, different than that provided under the pension plan, Michigan’s law, as set forth in Toussaint, supra, and applied in this case, "purports to regulate,” at least indirectly, the "terms and conditions” of the Park West plan. 29 USC 1144(c)(2).
As the concurring opinion points out, "[t]here is simply no language in . . . the plan itself concerning the determination of future benefits” (ante, p 227) such as were awarded by the jury in plaintiff’s Toussaint action.2 Yet, the majority would allow the jury to utilize the plan in calculating an award of future benefits which is at odds with the terms of the plan. This amounts to state regulation of an erisa plan. In Fort Halifax Packing Co, Inc v Coyne, 482 US 1, 13, n 8; 107 S Ct 2211; 96 L Ed 2d 1 (1987), the Court held that "state laws requiring the payment of benefits also 'relate to a[n] employee benefit plan’ if they attempt to dictate what benefits shall be paid under a plan.”
The majority analysis leans heavily on the fact that this action was brought against the employer rather than the plan itself. To set aside erisa preemption on that basis not only elevates form over substance, but it ignores a line of cases which have already held that preemption applies even though the suit is directed at the employer instead of its plan. See Sorosky v Burroughs Corp, 826 F2d 794 (CA 9, 1987); Ellenburg v Brockway, Inc, *233763 F2d 1091 (CA 9, 1985); Gilbert v Burlington Industries, Inc, 765 F2d 320 (CA 2, 1985), aff'd 477 US 901; 106 S Ct 3267; 91 L Ed 2d 558 (1986); Blau v Del Monte Corp, 748 F2d 1348 (CA 9, 1985), cert den 474 US 865 (1985); Kelly v IBM Total & Permanent Disability Income Plan, 573 F Supp 366 (ED Pa, 1983), aff'd without opinion 746 F2d 1467 (CA 3, 1984); Witkowski v St Anne’s Hosp of Chicago, 113 Ill App 3d 745; 69 Ill Dec 581; 447 NE2d 1016 (1983).
Because I conclude that the award of future pension benefits under the recently developed Toussaint law in Michigan is preempted by the erisa in this case, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 Article II, § 10 of the Park West plan. 29 CFR 2530.200b-2(b)(c).

 To the extent that the concurring opinion intimates that the jury award was based on future pension benefits not contemplated by the Park West plan, such award was not for foreseeable damages, contrary to basic contract law. See, generally, 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, §42, pp 65-66.