Court Opinion

ID: 9542201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:31:51.34361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:01.284294
License: Public Domain

LEVINSON, Justice,
concurring and dissenting, in which KLEIN, Justice, joins.
I fully agree with the majority’s holdings, for the. reasons stated therein, that: (1) “Buch knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights to counsel and to remain silent and that he voluntarily gave his statement to the police,” majority opinion at section H.B.; and (2) “the [circuit court’s] denial of Buch’s motion to compel a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness was not an abuse of discretion,” id. at section II.C.
I also agree with the majority’s holding that sexual assault in the fourth degree as *324defined by Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-733(l)(a) (1993) is not included in sexual assault in the third degree as defined by HRS § 707-732(l)(b) (1993), within the meaning of HRS § 701-109(4) (1993). See majority opinion at section II.A.1. I do so because: (1) the former is not “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of’ the latter, see HRS § 701—109(4)(a); (2) the injury sufficient to establish the commission of the former is not “less serious” than that sufficient to establish the commission of the latter, but, rather, is the same, see HRS § 701-109(4)(c); and (3) the former does not entail “a different state of mind indicating [a] lesser degree of culpability” than the latter, see id.
However, notwithstanding that the relevant “legislative history,” as reflected in the committee reports cited by the majority, indicates the legislature’s belief that the sexual offense laws, as codified in the Hawai'i Penal Code (HPC), establish that “where the age of the victim is an element of a sexual offense, the specified state of mind [was] not ... to apply to that element,” majority opinion at section H.A.2., the legislature’s failure to effectuate its belief impels me respectfully to disagree with the majority that
a defendant is strictly liable with respect to the attendant circumstance of the victim’s age in a sexual assault and that, consequently, Buch’s testimony that the victim appeared to be between fourteen and sixteen years of age is not a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting him of sexual assault in the third degree....
Id.1 In my view, this result is not only mistaken, but also undermines the integrity of the conceptual approach to criminal liability incorporated in the HPC. Because the HPC is a fragile organism that is subject to abuse and requires vigilant protection,2 I have no choice but to address some of the implications of the court’s decision in this matter.
I. PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION TO WHICH THIS COURT ADHERES, WE MAY LOOK BEYOND THE PLAIN, OBVIOUS, AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF A SUBSTANTIVE PROVISION—THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH IS NOT AT ISSUE—OF THE HPC, ONLY IF A LITERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THAT LANGUAGE WOULD PRODUCE AN ABSURD AND UNJUST RESULT.
I begin my analysis with some rules of statutory construction to which this court has *325consistently adhered. First, “the fundamental starting point for statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.” Mathewson v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 82 Hawai'i 57, 71, 919 P.2d 969, 983 (1996) (citation and quotation signals omitted); State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 291, 295, 909 P.2d 1106, 1110 [hereinafter, Kwak I ] (citation and quotation marks omitted), vacated in part on other grounds on reconsideration, State v. Kwak, 80 Hawai'i 297, 909 P.2d 1112 (1995) [Kwak II ]; State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted); Housing Fin. and Dev. Corp. v. Castle, 79 Hawai'i 64, 76-77, 898 P.2d 576, 588-89 (1995) (citation, quotation marks, brackets, and ellipsis points omitted); Schmidt v. Board of Directors of Ass’n of Apartment Owners of The Marco Polo Apartments, 73 Haw. 526, 531, 836 P.2d 479, 482 (1992) (citation and brackets omitted); State v. Eline, 70 Haw. 597, 601, 778 P.2d 716, 719 (1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Second, “where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” Kwak I, 80 Hawai'i at 295, 909 P.2d at 1110 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Mathewson, 82 Hawai'i at 71, 919 P.2d at 983 (citation and quotation signals omitted); Cieri v. Leticia Query Realty, Inc., 80 Hawai'i 54, 67, 905 P.2d 29, 42 (1995) (quoting State v. Ramela, 77 Hawai'i 394, 395, 885 P.2d 1135, 1136 (1994)); Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18, 904 P.2d at 903 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Castle, 79 Hawai'i at 77, 898 P.2d at 589 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Lealaimatafao v. Woodward-Clyde Consultants, 75 Haw. 544, 551, 867 P.2d 220, 224 (1994) (citation omitted).
Third, implicit in the task of statutory construction is “our foremost obligation[, namely,] to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” Mathewson, 82 Hawai'i at 71, 919 P.2d at 983 (citation and quotation signals omitted); Kwak I, 80 Hawai'i at 295, 909 P.2d at 1110 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Norton v. Administrative Director of Court, State of Hawai'i, 80 Hawai'i 197, 201, 908 P.2d 545, 549 (1995) (quoting Ramela, 77 Hawai'i at 395, 885 P.2d at 1136); Cieri, 80 Hawai'i at 67, 905 P.2d at 42 (quoting Crosby v. State Dep’t of Budget & Fin., 76 Hawai'i 332, 340, 876 P.2d 1300, 1308 (1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995)); Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18, 904 P.2d at 903 (quoting Crosby); Castle, 79 Hawai'i at 77, 898 P.2d at 589 (citation and quotation marks omitted); State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai'i 317, 320, 893 P.2d 168, 171 (1995) (citation omitted); State v. Ortiz, 74 Haw. 343, 351, 845 P.2d 547, 551, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 849 P.2d 81 (1993) (citation omitted).
It is at this point that the canons of statutory construction begin to take on the quality of Aesop’s Fables, “ ‘pulling in opposite directions’ ” and “ ‘no more enabling] difficult questions of interpretation to be answered than the maxims of everyday life enable the difficult problems of everyday living to be solved.’ ” Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 55 n. 14, 868 P.2d 1193, 1202 n. 14 (quoting R. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 280 (1990)), reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994).
For example, in State v. Meyer, 61 Haw. 74, 595 P.2d 288 (1979), despite a clear and unambiguous legislative history—as reflected in the relevant committee reports—of an intent to accomplish a particular result in amending the drug laws, this court held, by virtue of the plain language of its statutory work product, that “the [l]egislature did not carry its intention into effect.” Id. at 76, 595 P.2d at 290. Accordingly, the Meyer court quoted Queen v. San Tana, 9 Haw. 106, 108 (1893), which it analogized to HRS § 701-104 (1976),3 for the following “principle of con*326struction” that, in its view, remained “sound”:
We cannot change the language of the statute, supply a want, or enlarge upon it in order to make it suit a certain state of facts. We do not legislate or make laws. Even where the Court is convinced in its own mind that the Legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the Act, it has no authority to depart from the plain meaning of the language used.
Meyer, 61 Haw. at 77-78, 595 P.2d at 291 (emphasis added).
Thus, substantially in the tradition of Meyer, this court has frequently reaffirmed the proposition that, for purposes of gleaning the intent of the legislature, ‘“where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Mathewson, 82 Hawai'i at 71, 919 P.2d at 983 (citation and quotation signals omitted); Norton, 80 Hawai'i at 201, 908 P.2d at 549 (quoting Ramela, 77 Hawai'i at 395, 885 P.2d at 1136); State v. Baron, 80 Hawai'i 107, 113, 905 P.2d 613, 619 (quoting State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (1995)), reconsideration granted in part and denied in part, 80 Hawai'i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995); see also Aluli, 78 Hawai'i at 320, 893 P.2d at 171 (citations omitted).4
The body of case law flowing from Meyer would seem to suggest that this court is unwilling to dig for the intent of the legislature beyond the language of its enactments, assuming, of course, that the statutory language at issue is plain, obvious, and unambiguous. Indeed, one might assume—naively— that any further search would, by its very nature, be anathema to this court’s fundamental tenets of statutory construction. Such is not the case. As it happens, this court hedges its bets.
Stated most obliquely, this court subscribes to the “well settled” rule that
“where there is no ambiguity in the language of a statute, and the literal application of the language would not produce an absurd err unjust result[5], clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute, there is no room for judicial construction and interpretation, and the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning.”
Sandy Beach Defense Fund v. City Council of the City and County of Honolulu, 70 Haw. 361, 369, 773 P.2d 250, 256 (1989) (quoting State v. Palama, 62 Haw. 159, 161, 612 P.2d 1168, 1170 (1980)) (emphasis added). Thus, “[t]his court derives legislative intent primarily from the language of [the] statute and follows the general rule that[,] in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, the plain meaning of the statute will be given effect.” State v. Akina, 73 Haw. 75, 78, 828 P.2d 269, 271 (1992) (citation omitted). Similarly, “departure from the plain and unambiguous language of the statute cannot be justified without. a clear showing that the legislature intended some other meaning would be given the language.” In re Tax Appeal of Lower Mapunapuna Tenants Ass’n, 73 Haw. 63, 68, 828 P.2d 263, 266 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Stated more directly, “even absent statutory ambiguity, departure from literal construction is justified when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction in the particular action is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the act.” Franks v. City and County of Honolulu, 74 Haw. 328, 341, 843 P.2d 668, 674 (1993) (quoting Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Financial Sec. Ins. Co., 72 Haw. 80, 807 P.2d 1256 (1991)) (emphasis added).
Sandy Beach Defense Fund and Franks teach that this court is, indeed, willing to look beyond the plain, obvious, and unambiguous language of a statute, the facial constitutionality of which is not at issue, for the purpose *327of ascertaining its underlying legislative intent, but only if a literal construction of the statute “would produce an absurd and unjust result.”6 I submit that this court has never, under the banner of legislative intent, “rewritten” the clear and unambiguous language of a substantive offense proscribed by the HPC when a literal construction of the statute has not otherwise produced an absurd and unjust result and the statute, as literally construed, generates no constitutional infirmity.7 If I am correct, then the questions become (1) whether the language of HRS § 707-732(1)(b) is clear and unambiguous as written, and, if so, (2) whether a literal construction of the statute produces an absurd and unjust result. If the answer to the first question is “yes” and the answer to the second is “no,” then I respectfully suggest that, in accordance with Meyer, supra, the legislature simply “did not carry its intention into effect” regarding strict liability where the victim’s age is an element of a sexual offense (in this case, sexual assault in the third degree, as defined by HRS § 707-732(1)(b)), and we lack the “authority to depart from the plain meaning of the language used.”
II. THE LANGUAGE OF HRS § 707-732(1) (b) IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS ON ITS FACE.
The HPC proscribes the offense of sexual assault in the third degree in HRS § 707-732, which provides in relevant part:
Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if:
(a) The person recklessly subjects another person to an act of sexual penetration by compulsion;
(b) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person;
(c) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, or causes *328such a person to have sexual contact with the actor;
(d) The person, while employed in a state correctional facility, knowingly subjects to sexual contact an imprisoned person or causes such person to have sexual contact with the actor; [or]
(e) The person knowingly, by strong compulsion, has sexual contact with another person or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor[.] ...
(2) Sexual assault in the third degree is a class C felony.
HRS § 707-732 (1993) (emphasis added). Buch, of course, was charged and convicted under subsection (1)(b) of the statute.
HRS § 707-700 (1993) defines the terms material to sexual offenses in general and sexual assault in the third degree in particular. “Person” means “a human being who has been born and is alive.” Id. (Although seemingly innocuous, the definition of “person” is significant, in light of the majority’s holding regarding strict liability, because sexual assault in the third degree, within the meaning of HRS § 707-732(1)(b), may be committed either by a male or a female, irrespective of age and in the complete absence of lack of consent. This fact can, and will, lead to some truly bizarre anomalies. See infra at section III.) “Sexual contact” means “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, or of the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the person, whether directly or through the clothing or other material intended to cover the sexual or other intimate parts.” Id.
Pursuant to HRS § 702-205 (1993), the “elements of an offense” are defined as such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are (1) specified by the statutory definition of the offense and (2) negative a defense on the merits (i.e., a defense “other than one based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction”). See commentary on HRS § 702-205. Thus, the “elements” of sexual assault in the third degree, as defined by HRS § 707-732(l)(b), include the potentially mutual “conduct” of “sexual contact,” as well as the “attendant circumstances” that (1) the participants in the “sexual contact” are not married to each other and (2) the object of the “sexual contact” is “less than fourteen years old.”8 Similarly, every other variant of sexual assault in the third degree, as proscribed by HRS § 707-732(1) is composed of its own combination of “conduct,” “attendant circumstances,” and (in some instances) “results of conduct.”9
Within the framework of the HPC,
HRS § 701-114(1)(a) and (b) (1993) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense. Moreover, HRS § 702-204 (1993) provides in relevant part that “a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies with respect to each element of the offense.” ... HRS § 702-207 (1993) provides that “[when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.” In addition, pursuant to HRS § 702-205 ..., the requisite state of mind applies to such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense.
State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai'i 382, 412, 910 P.2d 695, 725 (1996) (quoting State v. Hol*329bron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 39, 904 P.2d 912, 924, reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995)) (some ellipsis points in original and some added) (brackets in original).
The parameters of the “knowing” state of mind applicable to HRS § 707-732(l)(b) are delineated in HRS § 702-206(2) (1993), entitled “Definitions of states of mind,” as follows:
(2) “Knowingly.”
(a) A person acts knowingly with respect to [the person’s] conduct when [the person] is aware that [the person’s] conduct is of that nature.
(b) A person acts knowingly with respect to attendant circumstances when [the person] is aware that such circumstances exist.
(e) A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of [the person’s] conduct when [the person] is aware that it is practically certain that [the person’s] conduct will cause such a result.
If I read its opinion correctly, the majority concedes that the foregoing analytical framework applies to every form of sexual assault in the third degree proscribed by HRS § 707-732(1), except with respect to the attendant circumstance of the “victim’s” age in the context of HRS § 707-732(1)(b), claiming that “the legislature expressly deleted the language requiring knowledge” in that regard. See Majority opinion at section II.A.2. (While I do not dispute that the legislative committee reports cited in section II.A.2. of the majority opinion say what they say, the majority does not, and cannot, deny that the legislature prescribed “knowingly” as the requisite state of mind in connection with HRS § 707-732(1)(b).) For example, the majority takes no issue with the holding of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in In re John Doe, Born on September 5, 1977, 81 Hawai'i 447, 918 P.2d 254 (1996), that
a defendant could not be found guilty of the offense [of second degree sexual assault of a mentally defective person, in violation of HRS § 707-731(1)(b) (1993)— which is a more serious analogue of HRS § 707-732(1)(c)—] unless the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complaining witness was mentally defective and the defendant was aware that the complaining witness was mentally defective.
81 Hawaii at 448-49, 918 P.2d at 255-56 (emphasis added). Neither does the majority suggest that there is any patent ambiguity in the language of HRS § 707-732(l)(b) as enacted. That being the case, if—as the majority maintains—HRS § 702-207 imposes strict liability with respect to an element of HRS § 707-732(l)(b), such strict liability is completely invisible to the naked eye; that is, the “ignorant” reader would have absolutely no way of discerning it solely on the basis of the plain, unambiguous, and obvious language of the statute.
As indicated above, a person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(l)(b), if the person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person.
Accordingly, the language of HRS § 707-732(l)(b) being clear and unambiguous, I maintain that there were five material elements of the offense of sexual assault in the third degree as charged in the indictment against Buch, each of which the prosecution ' was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These five material elements were: (1) that Buch subjected the complaining witness to sexual contact (ie., the prohibited conduct, to wit, placing his hand on the complaining witness’ penis); (2) that Buch was aware that he was doing so (ie., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to the actor’s conduct, see HRS § 702-206(2)(a)); (3) that Buch was aware that the complaining witness was not married to him (ie., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstance implicit in “sexual contact,” see HRS § 702—206(2)(b)); (4) that the complaining witness was less than fourteen years old at the time of the sexual contact (ie., the attendant circumstance of the complaining witness’ age, see HRS § 702-205); and (5) that Buch was aware that the complaining witness was less than fourteen years old at the time (ie., the requisite knowing state of *330mind with respect to attendant circumstances, see HRS § 702-206(2)(b)).
The majority’s sole authority for the deletion of the fifth element is the commentary on HRS § 702-207, which, in the majority’s view, “makes clear” that
[t]he phrase “unless a contrary purpose plainly appears” is intended to allow the courts to avoid an improper result when the language of a statute fails to indicate that the specified state of mind applies to less than all elements and legislative history indicates that this was intended.
Commentary on HRS § 702-207 (emphasis added). Relying on the commentary, the majority then looks to Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1, in 1972 House Journal, at 1038 (and contemporaneous committee reports) for its conclusion that—the clear and unambiguous language of HRS § 707—732(l)(b) to the contrary notwithstanding—“[t]he legislative history unequivocally indicates that, where age of the victim is an element of a sexual offense, the specified state of mind is not intended to apply to that element.” Majority opinion at section II.A.2.
Aside from its disregard of our established rules of statutory construction, there are at least three deficiencies in the majority’s reliance on the commentary on HRS § 702-207 to facilitate its redrafting of HRS § 707-732(l)(b). First, as far as I can determine, the appellate courts of this state have never interpreted HRS § 702-207 to authorize them to look beyond the plain and unambiguous language of a statute—i.e., to its legislative history—for the purpose of permitting a departure from the imperatives of HRS §§ 701-114(l)(a) and (b), 702-204, 702-205, and 702-206. In fact, the obverse is the case. In State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawaii 127, 890 P.2d 1167 (1995), this court expressly relied on HRS § 702-207 in ruling that “intent” was the requisite state of mind for each of the elements of a theft offense, inasmuch as “no contrary purpose ‘plainly appears’ on the face of the statute.” Id. at 137, 890 P.2d at 1177 (emphasis added).
Second, as footnote five of the majority opinion takes pains to remind the ICA, “HRS § 701-105 [(1993)] expressly provides that ‘[t]he commentary accompanying [the HPC] ... may be used as an aid in understanding the provisions of this Code, but not as evidence of legislative intent’ ” (Emphasis in original.) That being the case, it is inconsistent, at- the very least, for the majority to rely on the commentary on HRS § 702-207 in order to distill a legislative intent that is “directly contrary to the unequivocally expressed” language of a substantive penal offense. See majority opinion at 607 n. 5.
The third and by far the most profoundly troubling aspect of the manner in which the majority utilizes HRS § 702-207 to redraft HRS § 707-732(l)(b) is that it potentially renders all of the HPC’s substantive provisions unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the majority cites a number of this court’s recent decisions—all of which resort to the clear and unambiguous “preliminary provisions” of the HPC set forth in HRS ch. 701 and the clear and unambiguous “general principles of penal liability” set forth in HRS ch. 702 in order to discern the clear and unambiguous meaning of various substantive offenses contained within the HPC, which is precisely why HRS chs. 701 and 702 are included in the HPC—in support of its claim that “[t]he dissent’s contention that ‘the language of HRS § 707-732(l)(b) is clear and unambiguous on its face,’ ... is belied by the dissent’s immediate resort to HRS §§ 707-700, 702-205, 701-114(l)(a) and (b), 702-204, 702-206(2), and most significantly, to HRS § 702-207, to distill the meaning of HRS § 707-732(l)(b).” Majority opinion at 608 (emphasis in original). Having scored what it apparently regards as a direct hit, the majority then proclaims:
The intent to require knowledge of the victim’s age is not clear and unambiguous from the face of HRS § 707—732(l)(b); indeed, like the intent to impose strict liability with respect to the victim’s age, the intent to require knowledge is “completely invisible to the naked eye; that is, the ‘ignorant’ reader would have absolutely no way of discerning it solely on the basis of the plain, unambiguous, and obvious language of the statute.” Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 14. HRS § 707-732(1) (b) simply does not specify the req*331uisite state of mind with respect to the attendant circumstances ....
Majority opinion at 608 (footnote omitted) (emphases added).
I believe, by virtue of the foregoing statements, that the majority unwittingly makes my point.
Due process of law requires that a penal statute state with reasonable clarity the act it proscribes and provide fixed standards for adjudging guilt, or the statute is void for vagueness. State v. Kameenui, 69 Haw. 620, 621, 753 P.2d 1250, 1251 (1988). Statutes must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.
State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 138, 890 P.2d 1167, 1178 (1995) (quoting State v. Tripp, 71 Haw. 479, 482, 795 P.2d 280, 282 (1990)). What the majority fails to perceive is that it is precisely the HPC’s preliminary provisions and general principles of penal liability (i.e., HRS §§ 701-114(a) and (b), 702-204, 702-205 and 702-207) that make it possible—without resorting to extrinsic sources—for the HPC’s substantive penal statutes to “state with reasonable clarity the act[s they] proscribe and provide fixed standards for adjudging guilt” and for “the person of ordinary intelligence” to have “a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct.”
Indeed, but for the HPC’s preliminary provisions and general principles of penal liability, this court, not to mention “the person of ordinary intelligence,” would always be forced to ‘ consult sources extrinsic to the HPC itself “to know what conduct is prohibited.” That is the quintessence of vagueness. That is also what is so mistaken about the majority’s belief that HRS § 707-732(l)(b) “is not clear and unambiguous” on its face with respect to the requisite state of mind as to the elements of the proscribed offense. If the majority is correct, then every substantive provision of the HPC encompassing attendant circumstances, see HRS § 702-205 (as well as results of conduct, see id.), is likewise “not clear and unambiguous” on its face.
By way of example, and to illustrate my argument, let us extend the majority’s logic with respect to another sexual offense. A person commits a form of sexual assault in the second degree if “[t]he person knowingly subjects another person to an act of sexual penetration by compulsion[.]” HRS § 707-731(l)(a) (1993).10 In accordance with HRS § 702-205, the elements of one variation of HRS § 707-731(l)(a) include conduct (i.e., subjecting another person to a sexual act, in this instance, penetration), an attendant circumstance (i.e., compulsion, as manifested by “absence of consent,” see supra note 9), and a result of conduct (i.e., the state of being penetrated). I maintain that, pursuant to HRS §§ 702-204, 702-205, 702-207, and 701-114(l)(b), the burden is clearly and unambiguously placed on the prosecution to prove the requisite state of mind (in this ease, knowledge, see HRS § 702-206(2)) with respect to the proscribed conduct, attendant circumstance, and result of conduct. After all, the unadorned conduct of subjecting another person to an act of sexual penetration is not proscribed by the HPC.
According to the majority, however, I am merely indulging in an unwarranted and foolish assumption, because a clear and unambiguous legislative intent to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of knowledge with respect to the attendant circumstance of “absence of consent” can never be ascertained without combing the Senate and House Journals to insure that there is no indication of a legislative intent to impose strict liability. How, then, is a person of ordinary intelligence, who reasonably believes that his or her partner is “willing,” or even “eager,” to know whether, under the law, he or she is engaging in the ultimate physical intimacy at peril of committing a class B felony? Must he or she do research? If so, what if the legislative journals are not part of the person’s library? What if the person visits the *332law library and overlooks an ancient and long-forgotten legislative committee report? What if the person neglects to consult his or her attorney on the- subject? What if the person’s attorney does not comb the Senate and House Journals, but “merely” relies on the ostensibly reckless belief that HRS § 707-732(l)(a) means what it says? And so on. Applying the foregoing construct to the entire HPC, as the majority must necessarily do, leaves this state’s criminal law in chaos.
State v. Marley, 64 Haw. 450, 509 P.2d 1095 (1973), which is taken out of context at 610-611 of the majority opinion, fails utterly to rebut the foregoing analysis. In Marley, the defendants were convicted of criminal trespass, a petty misdemeanor, in violation of HRS § 771-1, a pre-HPC statute that provided in relevant part that
[wjhoever, without right, enters or remains in or upon the dwellinghouse, buildings, or improved or cultivated lands of another or the land of another about or near any buildings used for dwelling purposes, after having been forbidden to do so by the person who has lawful control of such premises, either directly or by notice posted thereon ... shall be fined not more than $250, or imprisoned not more than three months, or both....
54 Haw. at 454 n. 1, 509 P.2d at 1099-1100 n. 1 (emphases deleted). On appeal, the defendants challenged the statute, inter alia, on the grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague insofar as it did not impose “knowledge” as the requisite state of mind and— presumably—was therefore defined as a strict liability offense. Id. at 459, 509 P.2d at 1102. This court rejected the defendants’ contention, primarily on the bases that “the failure of a statute to provide for knowledge as an element of a crime does not ipso facto render a statute unconstitutional” and that, in any event, “the trial court actually recognized a knowledge element in the crime of trespass.” Id. at 459-60, 509 P.2d at 1103.
The relevance of this pre-HPC decision eludes me. What is relevant are the trespass offenses delineated in the HPC at HRS §§ 708-813 through -815 (1993), which proscribe variations of the same conduct addressed by the predecessor statute at issue in Marley. I defy the majority to demonstrate—in the face of HRS §§ 701-114(a) and (b), 702-204, 702-205, and 702-207—that the requisite states of mind enumerated in the post-HPC trespass offenses do not apply to each and every element of those offenses.
People v. Cash, 419 Mich. 230, 351 N.W.2d 822 (1984), cited at 611 of the majority opinion, is equally inapposite. Obviously, within constitutional limits, “the [(legislature may, pursuant to its police powers, define criminal offenses without requiring proof of a specific criminal intent and so provide that the perpetrator proceed at his own peril regardless of his defense of ignorance or an honest mistake of fact.” Id. 351 N.W.2d at 826. The fact is, however, that the Hawai'i legislature has not. See section III. of this opinion, infra. The majority’s protestations to the contrary are not self-validating.
The bottom line is that, “[e]ven where [this] [c]ourt is convinced in its own mind that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed by the phraseology of the Act, it has no authority to depart from the plain meaning of the language used.” Meyer, 61 Haw. at 77, 595 P.2d at 291.
III. THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF HRS § 707-732(1)(b) DOES NOT PRODUCE AN ABSURD AND UNJUST RESULT.
My premise in this section is that there is nothing absurd or unjust about the clear and unambiguous language of HRS § 707-732(l)(b), insofar as it requires—as a prerequisite to criminal culpability—that a defendant act “knowingly” with respect to the “attendant circumstance” of the victim’s age. Indeed, I would think the proposition uncontroversial in the extreme, being merely one application of the principles of penal liability permeating the entire HPC, much less the sexual offenses that are only one part of it.
With particular reference to the issue of strict liability in the context of the age of the victim of a sexual assault, I fully subscribe to the views expressed by the late Justice Levinson, dissenting in State v. Silva, 53 Haw. *333232, 235-44, 491 P.2d 1216, 1217-23 (1971), with which I am probably more intimately familiar than any other living person. I will not undertake to regurgitate the entirety of the analysis contained in that opinion, although I do believe that it is a virtual primer on the quintessence of criminal culpability. The following, however, bears repetition here:
The common law principle that it is not conduct alone but conduct accompanied by certain specific mental states which concerns, or should concern the law is, to say the least, primordial. A mistaken belief in facts which if they did exist would render an act innocent, negates the requisite mens rea (the state of mind required to establish an element of the offense) and constitutes a defense in criminal prosecutions. This court has recognized the rule allowing a defense to a crime considered malum in se because of a mistake of fact subject to the qualification that the mistake must not be due to the negligence or carelessness of the defendant.[11]
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... [Judicially constructed strict liability in mid-twentieth century criminal law is an anachronism; it stands as the major bar to rational solution of important social problems.
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I agree that it is time to substitute knowledge of sex offenses for emotional fixations and to reform the rules in light of sound principles of penal liability. The judicially construed strict liability which the courts have given the law of mistake, we are free to take away.
Silva, 53 Haw. at 235-36, 238, 244, 491 P.2d at 1218, 1220, 1223 (Levinson, J., dissenting) (citations, quotation marks, and ellipsis points omitted) (some brackets added and some omitted).
In promulgating the HPC, the legislature abolished the very “judicially construed strict liability” that Justice Levinson decried.
Need for revising Hawaii’s penal law is self evident. The existing criminal statutes find their origin, for the most part, in the Penal Code of 1869.... The organization of Hawaii’s penal laws defies rational explanation....
By way of contrast, the proposed [HPC] is subject to a unique organizational prin-cip[le]. The first six chapters of the [HPC] present the general part of the *334penal law: those principles and rules which have or may have application regardless of the specific type of offense involved....
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2. Chapter [702] establishes the general principles of penal liability; the criminal law is concerned both with a man’s state of mind at the time of the crime as well as his conduct. This chapter codifies the generally accepted principle that penal liability must be based on voluntary action coupled with a culpable state of mind. Here the [HPC] would eliminate the wide diversity of words and phrases used to denote or connote a state of mind sufficient to impose penal liability, limiting the provisions of the law to four states of mind: intentional, knowing, reckless and negligent.
Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 227, in 1971 House Journal, at 784-85. I repeat my suggestion that there is nothing absurd or unjust about the foregoing approach, which, as discussed above, is now super-imposed on the entire HPC by HRS §§ 702-204, 702-205, 702-206, and 702-207.
In fact, the majority’s construction of HRS § 707—732(l)(b), zealously applied, could generate results that no one would deny are not only unjust, but also absurd to the point of lunacy. I posit two extreme cases to illustrate my point. Assume two eighth graders, one a boy and the other a girl, both of whom are thirteen years of age but who reasonably believe the other to be fourteen. While “making out” after school, they knowingly engage in “sexual contact.” An indignant teacher learns of the behavior and refers the children to the family court as potential “law violators,” within the meaning of HRS ch. 571 (1993 & Supp.1995). According to the majority’s view, the children are “class C felons,” having both violated HRS § 707-732(l)(b).
Consider a more egregious hypothetical: Assume that the same two children “go all the way” one evening in a public park. A disapproving police officer happens upon them in flagrante delicto and makes a chapter 571 referral to the family court. As the majority would have it, the children are “class A felons,” having both violated HRS § 707—730(1)(b) (1993).
It is apparent, at least to me, that it is the majority’s construction of HRS § 707-732(1)(b) that is unjust, absurd, and transforms the HPC into “a rope of sand which perishes in the twisting[.]” R. Emerson, “Polities,” Essays: Second Series (1844), reprinted in Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson 3:199 (1903), reprinted in F. Shapiro, The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations 294 (1993).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because “the [legislature did not carry its intention into effect,” Meyer, 61 Haw. at 76, 595 P.2d at 290, I would hold, in accordance with HRS §§ 701-114(1)(a) and (b), 702-204, 702-205, 702-206, and 702-207, that the “knowing” state of mind prescribed by HRS § 707-732(1)(b) applies to the “attendant circumstance” of the “victim’s” age.

. It is somewhat ironic—not to mention unfortunate—that the majority reaches the issue at all. Insofar as sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of HRS § 707-733(l)(a), with respect to which Buch sought a jury instruction, is not included in sexual assault in the third degree in violation of HRS § 707-732(l)(b), for reasons wholly extraneous to the requisite state of mind regarding the "attendant circumstance” of the age of the complaining witness in this case, see HRS § 701-109(4)(a) and (c), it would have been error for the circuit court to have given an included offense instruction, despite Buch’s request for one. Cf. State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai'i 27, 45, 904 P.2d 912, 930 (holding, inter alia, that circuit court erred in giving jury instruction regarding a nonexistent offense that it mistakenly believed was included in charged offense), reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai'i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995). Moreover, because Buch was not charged with sexual assault in the fourth degree, he could not have been convicted of it under any circumstances.

. On July 1, 1993, the Hawai'i legislature declared:
The [HPC] is the fundamental document by which the State addresses crime. It is imperative that so important a body of law receive full and deliberate attention from time to time, to assure its continued force and effectiveness.
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During the [last] ten years ..., numerous amendments have been made to the [HPC] on a piecemeal basis. However, there has not been comprehensive review as to the effect these amendments have on the principles and philosophy on which the [HPC] is based. Moreover there are concerns as to the structural and systemic impact these amendments have on the entire criminal justice system.... Accordingly, the legislature has determined that the time has arrived for a ... review to take place and that this review should not only be concerned with periodic changes that have been made to the original 1972 [HPC], but also with the concept that the [HPC] is not an isolated body of law but rather a part of the entire criminal justice system of the State.
1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 284, § 1 at 525. See infra note 11.

. HRS § 701-104 (1993), which has never been amended, provides:
Principles of construction. The provisions of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order to promote justice and effect the objects of the law, all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of the words, taken in then-usual sense, in connection with the context, *326and with reference to the purpose of the provision.

. I submit that section II.A.2. of the majority opinion fails completely to address the plain and obvious meaning of HRS § 707-732(l)(b).

. HRS § 1-15(3) (1993) provides that “[e]very [statutory] construction which leads to an absurdity shall be rejected."

. Section II.A.2. of the majority opinion nowhere considers whether a literal construction of HRS § 707—732(l)(b) would produce an absurd and unjust result.

. This court has long recognized that, although “[i]t is elementary that a criminal statute be construed strictly .... where the [statutory] language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for construction,” State v. Good Guys For Fasi, 56 Haw. 88, 91, 528 P.2d 811, 813 (1974) (citations omitted), “strict” or otherwise. State v. Lee, 55 Haw. 505, 513, 523 P.2d 315, 319 (1974). Absent plain and unambiguous language, however, “we have consistently adhered in this jurisdiction to the rule of strict construction of penal statutes.” State v. Smith, 59 Haw. 456, 461, 583 P.2d 337, 341 (1978) (citations omitted); see also HRS § 701-104. Thus, “the general rule of construction [is] that ambiguous penal statutes are to be construed in favor of the accused.” Aluli, 78 Hawai'i at 321, 893 P.2d at 172 (citation omitted).
When choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct the legislature has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that the legislature should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.... [Thus, when] [i]t is virtually self-evident that the drafters of the [HPC] could easily have spoken in clearer and more definite terms ... [a]nd when language reasonably susceptible of two constructions is used in a penal law[,] ordinarily that construction which is more favorable to the offender will be adopted.
State v. Rodgers, 68 Haw. 438, 443-44, 718 P.2d 275, 277-78, reconsideration denied, 68 Haw. 688 (1986) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (some brackets added and some omitted) (some ellipsis points added and some omitted).
By the same token, we have also recognized that "the strict construction rule does not permit the court to ignore legislative intent, nor require the court to reject that construction that best harmonizes with the design of the statute or the end sought to be achieved.” State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai'i 127, 138-39, 890 P.2d 1167, 1178-79 (1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 352, 845 P.2d at 552 (citations omitted). See also State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198, 202, 787 P.2d 221, 223 (1990); State v. Kanoa, 67 Haw. 476, 477, 691 P.2d 1169, 1171, reconsideration denied, 67 Haw. 684, 744 P.2d 779 (1984); State v. Murray, 63 Haw. 12, 18, 621 P.2d 334, 339 (1980); Smith, 59 Haw. at 461, 583 P.2d at 341-42; State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 517, 572 P.2d 1222, 1224 (1977). In each of these cases, however, the foregoing proposition either (1) redounded to the defendant's benefit (Ortiz, Kanoa, and Murray) and/or (2) was invoked to (a) resolve a constitutional challenge of the statute in question (Gaylord), (b) reconcile facial ambiguity in the statutory language (Murray, Smith, and Ogata), (c) avoid an absurd result (Burgo and Ogata ), or (d) some combination of these purposes.

. Of course, both objects of the "sexual contact” could easily be "less than fourteen years old.” See infra at section III.

. For example, I note that HRS § 707-700 defines "compulsion” to mean "absence of consent, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of public humiliation, property damage, or financial loss.” The issuance of a threat is clearly "conduct.” See HRS § 701-118(4) (1993). On the other hand, "absence of consent” is an "attendant circumstance,” and the state of being placed in fear is a “result of conduct." Thus, "compulsion” may be “conduct,” an "attendant circumstance,” a “result of conduct,” or a combination thereof.

. "Sexual penetration” is defined in HRS § 707-700 and includes, inter alia, "vaginal intercourse.”

. It is worth mentioning that the December 28, 1994 Final Report of the Committee to Conduct a Comprehensive Review of the Hawai'i Penal Code, mandated by 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 284, § 2 at 525-26, recommended, inter alia, that the legislature amend HRS § 707-732(l)(b) to provide:
Sexual assault in the third degree. (1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if:
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(b) The person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person; provided that it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed that the other person was fourteen years of age of older [.]
Final Report at 131 (amending language emphasized). The comment accompanying the proposed legislation provides in relevant part:
The 1984-85 penal code revision project proposed strict liability for the “statutory rape” subsections, 707-730(l)(b) and 707-732(l)(b), but the Legislature rejected these proposals. The committee concedes that strict liability is an excessively harsh culpability criterion, but at the same time believes that the current statutes, requiring proof of knowledge and awareness that youthful victims are indeed under fourteen, are insufficiently protective of young children. To accommodate these apparently conflicting principles, the committee settled on an objective standard of culpability: It is an “affirmative defense," which according to [HRS] § 701-115(2)(b) [(1993)] must be proved by the defense by the preponderance of the evidence, "that the defendant reasonably believed that the other person was fourteen years of age or older.” The defendant must prove not only his or her honest belief that the partner was fourteen, but also that that belief was a reasonable one under the circumstances. This is negligence, and although negligence ordinarily will not justify criminal liability (negligent homicide and a few other ch. 707 offenses being exceptions), the need to protect children from sexual predation may very well, in the committee’s judgment, warrant such a strict standard here. In any event, requiring a defendant to establish that his claimed belief would have been shared by reasonable persons does not seem unduly burdensome.
Id. at 133. To date, as was true with respect to the recommendation of its predecessor committee, the legislature has not acted on the committee’s recommendation.