Court Opinion

ID: 9693017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:41.73357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:38.727825
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Although the majority concludes that section 434.01(A)(1) of the North Ridgeville Ordinance is substantially similar to section 3731(a) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a), the majority notes that the record in this case does not contain the complete Ordinance but only the subsection under which Smega was convicted. Based on the present state of the record, it is patently impossible for this court to determine whether or not this subsection of the Ordinance is a lesser offense as the New York and Maryland statutes were in Olmstead v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 677 A.2d 1285 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), aff'd on other grounds, 550 Pa. 578, 707 A.2d 1144 (1998) and Eck v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 713 A.2d 744 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Thus, the majority’s conclusion regarding the similarity of these statutory provisions is based squarely on the unwarranted assumption that section 434.01(A)(1) of the Ordinance is not a lesser offense of another subsection of the Ordinance.
In addition, in determining that this subsection of the ordinance is substantially similar to section 3731(a) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, the majority relies on case law interpreting provisions of the Ohio Revised Code that contain language similar to that contained in section 434.01(A)(1) of the Ordinance. However, there is absolutely no support for the proposition that the language employed in these two distinct statutory provisions promulgated by two distinct legislative bodies has ever been interpreted in the same manner. Because I do not believe that it is proper to reverse the order of the trial court based on such unsupported conjecture and speculation, I would affirm the order of that court.
Judges SMITH and FRIEDMAN join in this dissent.