Court Opinion

ID: 9950162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 15:04:17.653411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:52.791265
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                   _____________________________

                          No. 1D2022-1811
                   _____________________________

DJD INVESTMENTS OF FLORIDA
II, LLC, a Florida limited
liability company, and
COTTONDALE INVESTMENTS OF
FLORIDA II, LLC, a Florida
limited liability company,

    Petitioners,

    v.

W - ACQ. VACATION RENTALS
NORTH AMERICA, LLC, a
Delaware limited liability
company,

    Respondent.
                   _____________________________

Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Jurisdiction.

                          March 13, 2024

KELSEY, J.

    Petitioners seek our certiorari review of the trial court’s order
dismissing their counterclaim in a commercial landlord-tenant
dispute. Petitioners are the Landlords, while Respondent is the
Tenant. Landlords assert that we have certiorari jurisdiction
because the trial court’s ruling has the potential to deprive them
of their preferred measure of damages. We dismiss the petition for
lack of certiorari jurisdiction, and set forth the context in some
detail because it informs the jurisdictional question.

     Tenant vacated the leased premises with a few days
remaining in the original twenty-year lease term and ten years
remaining in an extended lease term that a predecessor-in-interest
had exercised. Tenant claimed justification to revoke the lease
extension and vacate the premises because the Landlords allegedly
had improperly failed to complete a full roof-replacement after roof
leaks were merely repaired for several years beginning in 2017. As
Tenant was aware, Landlords had been trying to secure a roof-
replacement contract for some time (during COVID). Landlords got
the roof replacement contract about a month before the original
lease term ended, and so advised Tenant. But Tenant vacated the
premises anyway, considering the Landlords’ efforts “too little, too
late.”

     Tenant filed a declaratory-judgment action two days before
the end of the original lease term, seeking a ruling on whether it
had the right to revoke the previously exercised ten-year lease
extension. In the second count of the complaint, Tenant sued in the
alternative for breach of contract damages including rent paid
while the building was allegedly untenantable, costs of moving out,
and attorneys’ fees and costs. The prayer for relief requested as an
alternative that the court terminate the lease and award
compensatory damages.

     Landlords answered, denying that Tenant had any right to
revoke the already-renewed ten-year lease extension. Landlords
also counterclaimed for damages, including unpaid rent beginning
in December of 2021 and continuing through the remaining ten-
year-extended lease term.

     Tenant moved to dismiss the counterclaim in its entirety,
arguing in pertinent part that Landlords had failed to “resume
possession and re-lease or rent” the building, which Tenant argued
was required under the damages terms of the lease, which provide
as follows:

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    18.     If any rent required by this lease is not paid by
    the beginning of the following month, LESSOR has the
    option to:

    (a) Terminate this lease, resume possession of the leased
    property for his own account, and recover immediately
    from LESSEE, the balance of the Lease amount due for
    the remainder of the term, of the Lease.

    (b) Resume possession and re-lease or rent the property
    for the remainder of the term for the account of LESSEE,
    and recover from LESSEE, at the time each payment of
    rent comes due under this lease, the difference between
    the rent specified in the lease and the rent received on
    the re-leasing or renting.

    In either event LESSOR may also recover all expenses
    incurred by reason of the breach, including reasonable
    attorney’s fees, whether or not suit may be filed, and if so,
    at trial and upon appeal.

     After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
the Landlords’ counterclaim, specifying that the flaw lay solely in
the claim for damages, thus:

    5. Defendants have twenty (20) days from the date of this
    Order to file an Amended Counterclaim, if they so choose,
    for breach of the Lease based on the non-payment of rent.
    If Defendants file an Amended Counterclaim for breach
    of the Lease based on the non-payment of rent, then
    Defendants' Amended Counterclaim must explicitly
    assert what remedy, either Lease Section 18(a) or Lease
    Section 18(b), Defendants are attempting to state a claim
    for breach of the Lease based on the non-payment of rent.
    The Court is not deciding at this time whether Lease
    Section 18(a) or Lease Section 18(b) are enforceable
    provisions under Florida law.

    Landlords did not attempt to amend their prayer for relief, but
rather moved for reconsideration. They argued that,
notwithstanding the damages clauses in the lease, they retained

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the common-law right to sue for nonpayment of rent each time it
comes due, without retaking possession or terminating the
tenancy. We have no transcript of the pertinent hearing, and the
trial court denied reconsideration in an unelaborated order.

     Because Landlords have not demonstrated that the harm
alleged cannot be remedied on appeal, we lack certiorari
jurisdiction and must dismiss. To be sure, we have constitutional
authority to issue writs of certiorari. See Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla.
Const. We also have certiorari jurisdiction over certain “nonfinal
orders of lower tribunals” that cannot be appealed. See Fla. R. App.
P. 9.030(b)(2)(A) (recognizing certiorari jurisdiction); see id. at
9.130(a) (limiting nonfinal appeals to specified categories of orders
for which the Florida Supreme Court has authorized this remedy).
But, while the trial court’s order at issue here is not among the
authorized categories of appealable nonfinal orders, the lack of a
remedy by nonfinal appeal does not automatically give rise to
certiorari jurisdiction.

     Our certiorari jurisdiction is quite narrow. This common-law
writ “is not intended to redress mere legal error . . .” M.M. v. Fla.
Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 189 So. 3d 134, 138 (Fla. 2016). The kind
of error that will support certiorari review is “exceptional”—such
as lower court action without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction. Kauffman v. King, 89 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1956).
Certiorari jurisdiction exists only for orders that create a material
injury that will continue for the remainder of the trial court
proceedings, for which relief through post-judgment appeal is
unavailable. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n v. Jeffrey,
178 So. 3d 460, 465 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). If the order in question
does not meet this jurisdictional threshold, we must dismiss with
no further analysis. Id.; see also Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1579 v. City of Gainesville, 264 So. 3d 375, 378 (Fla. 1st DCA
2019) (noting dismissal is mandatory absent irreparable harm).

     The order challenged here does not fall within this very
narrow category. Possibly, the present difficulty could have been
forestalled with an order merely striking the claim for damages
with leave to re-plead. Nevertheless, the trial court’s order
expressly identifies the issue as limited to Landlords’ theory of
damages, and expressly authorizes Landlords to amend their

                                 4
claim within one of the two damages options specified in the
parties’ lease. They have not done so, leaving us a record
insufficient to demonstrate irremediable harm. If they amend
their claim, or otherwise proceed to a judgment that they believe
compromises their damages, they have available the remedy of a
plenary appeal. See Jeffrey, 178 So. 3d at 465. They prematurely
speculate about issues not yet pleaded and injuries not yet
sustained.

      Landlords also argue entitlement to certiorari review because
their counterclaim is “inextricably intertwined” with Tenant’s
claims. They rely on cases in which improper severance or
bifurcation of issues caused counterclaims to become moot, see,
e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n for CSFB Heat 2006-7 v. Tranumn, 247
So. 3d 567, 570–72 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018); and argue that if Tenant
prevails in its claims, their counterclaim becomes moot. They also
rely on one case from outside this district granting certiorari where
a counterclaim was dismissed. See Burke v. Windjammer Barefoot
Cruises, 972 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (involving dismissal
of a counterclaim that was already pending in another case in
another jurisdiction). These cases are inapposite. While it may be
true that Tenant’s prevailing on liability would moot Landlords’
claim for damages, that result would not be attributable to
Landlords’ theory of damages, but rather to the absence of
Tenant’s liability in the first place. As to any such judgment at the
end of the litigation, Landlords can appeal and present their
arguments about both liability and damages. In this posture, we
lack certiorari jurisdiction. See Mendez v. W. Flagler Fam. Ass’n,
Inc., 303 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974); Campbell v. Gordon, 674 So. 2d
783, 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

    DISMISSED.

ROWE and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

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               _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Lindsey Lawton of Lawton Law, PLLC, Tallahassee, for
Petitioners.

Frances G. De La Guardia of Holland & Knight, LLP, Miami, and
Joshua R. Levenson and Suzanne M. Aldahan of Holland &
Knight, LLP, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent.

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