Court Opinion

ID: 9551649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:56:44.423717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:20.453335
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
dissenting in part.
I find that I am unable to agree with the majority’s ruling on the question of the rate of prejudgment and postjudgment interest applicable to the note executed by Riley.
Riley’s note provided for “interest after maturity at the highest lawful contract rate.” I do agree with the court’s ruling that “the highest lawful contract rate” refers to the rate prescribed by AS 45.45.-010(b) — the maximum that can be charged without having a usurious contract — rather than the rate established by AS 45.45.-010(a), which applies when a contract does not state an interest rate. I do not agree, however, that the rate established by AS 45.45.010(b) as modified in 1976 is controlling; the 1976 amendment, which raised the maximum lawful interest rate,1 is by its terms inapplicable to the note and thus the preamendment rate is controlling.
The 1976 amendment unambiguously states that it is applicable only to contracts dated after June 4, 1976; Riley’s note v/as dated December 12, 1975. Even assuming that the parties intended that changes in the statutory interest ceiling would be applicable to the note, in this case the legislature did not change the rate applicable to the note and thus the parties’ intent is irrelevant. Therefore, the appropriate interest rate is that prescribed by the pre-amendment version of AS 45.45.010(b).

. Prior to the 1976 amendment AS 45.45.010(b) provided for a maximum rate of “four percentage points above the annual rate charged member banks for advances by the 12th Federal Reserve District” at a particular time; the 1976 amendment changed “four” to “five”, thus raising the ceiling. The parties agree that “five points above the annual rate ...” is 9.5%.