Court Opinion

ID: 9890449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 00:00:38.41239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:17.982954
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30076      Document: 00516929778          Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/12/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                             United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                             FILED
                                                                   October 12, 2023
                                  No. 23-30076                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                             Clerk

   QBE Syndicate 1036,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                        versus

   Compass Minerals Louisiana, Incorporated,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Louisiana
                             USDC No. 6:20-CV-554
                   ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          The insurer of two companies that contracted for work at a Louisiana
   salt mine filed a declaratory action, asserting that the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-
   Indemnity Act applied to invalidate certain indemnification and additional-
   insured provisions in their contracts. The insurer contends that the Act
   applied to agreements that pertain to “drilling for minerals,” and that these
   agreements are thus covered because the salt mine uses a “drill-and-blast”
   method for mining salt. Finding no clear and controlling precedent on this
   issue of Louisiana law, we CERTIFY two questions to the Louisiana
   Supreme Court.
Case: 23-30076     Document: 00516929778           Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/12/2023

                                    No. 23-30076

                                         I.
          Defendant-Appellee Compass Minerals Louisiana, Inc. (“Compass”)
   is part of a “multi-national mineral company that owns and operates multiple
   salt mines in North America and the United Kingdom.” Among Compass’s
   locations is its Cote Blanche salt mine, located on Cote Blanche Island in St.
   Mary Parish, Louisiana.
          At the Cote Blanche salt mine, Compass uses a “drill-and-blast”
   mining method. On its website, Compass describes the process as follows:
          The drill-and-blast mining method begins by cutting into the
          rock salt face using specialized equipment. We then drill holes
          into the face and use explosives to break the salt into large
          rocks. Front-end loaders and trucks load and haul the salt to a
          crusher where it is reduced in size, loaded onto a conveyor belt
          and transported to a mill. The mill screens and crushes the
          rock salt to the customary size before the salt is hoisted to the
          surface.
          For underground fire-prevention and electrical support at the Cote
   Blanche salt mine, Compass contracted with Louisiana-based companies Fire
   & Safety Specialists, Inc. (“FSS”) and MC Electric, LLC (“MCE”). In its
   respective purchase orders with each contractor, Compass included an
   indemnity provision, under which FSS and MCE agreed to indemnify, hold
   harmless, and defend Compass from all claims and liabilities for any damage,
   injury, death, loss, or destruction of any kind relating to the parties’
   agreement.    Each purchase order also included an additional-insured
   provision, requiring FSS and MCE to name Compass as an additional insured
   on the insurance policies required by the contract.
          On August 15, 2019, an electrician employed by MCE died in an
   accident at the Cote Blanche salt mine. The decedent, Shawn Clements,
   “contacted an energized electrical circuit while attempting to install a new

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                                     No. 23-30076

   circuit for the fire suppression system at the salt mine.” Clements’s family
   filed a survival and wrongful-death suit in state court against Compass and
   FSS, alleging that a Compass electrician and FSS technician had incorrectly
   advised Clements that the fire-suppression system was de-energized.
   Plaintiff-appellant QBE Syndicate 1036 (“QBE”) represents that the suit
   remains pending in the 16th Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Mary,
   under Case No. 135048.
          At the time of the accident, both FSS and MCE held a commercial
   general liability policy with QBE. Compass sent a letter to QBE seeking
   defense, indemnity, and coverage for the wrongful-death suit, on the basis of
   the indemnification and additional-insured provisions of the MCE and FSS
   purchase orders.
          On May 1, 2020, QBE filed a declaratory action in federal court,
   asserting that the indemnification and additional-insured provisions in the
   FSS and MCE purchase orders are “null, void, and unenforceable” under
   the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780,
   (“LOAIA”). In its complaint, QBE contended that LOAIA renders “void
   and unenforceable” certain indemnification provisions in “agreement[s]
   pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals which occur
   in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other state.” QBE alleged that Compass uses a
   drill-and-blast mining method at the Cote Blanche Salt mine, and that
   Compass’s purchase orders with FSS and MCE are covered by the LOAIA
   because they are “agreements” “pertaining to . . . drilling for minerals.”
   QBE sought a declaration that it “owes no duties to Compass whatsoever in
   connection with the [state] lawsuit.”
          On August 22, 2022, QBE and Compass filed cross-motions for
   summary judgment. QBE argued that, because Compass’s drill-and-blast
   method of mining for salt constitutes “drilling for minerals,” as used in the

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   statute, the provisions Compass relied on in its purchase orders with FSS and
   MCE were void and unenforceable under the LOAIA. Compass disagreed,
   arguing in its motion that the LOAIA requires a nexus to a well, which
   Compass’s Cote Blanche operations did not have, and that the drill-and-blast
   method is “completely different from the exploration and drilling methods
   used by oil and gas . . . companies.”
          On December 16, 2022, the district court granted Compass’s motion
   and denied QBE’s motion, concluding that the LOAIA did not apply to the
   purchase orders and therefore did not invalidate the indemnification
   provisions.   The court concluded that, under this court’s decision in
   Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transportation Insurance Co., 953 F.2d
   985 (5th Cir. 1992), the LOAIA requires that the agreement “pertain to” a
   “well,” and it is undisputed that the mining operations at the Cote Blanche
   salt mine do not involve a well. Moreover, the court rejected QBE’s
   argument that Compass “drill[s] for” salt by using the drill-and-blast method
   for breaking a salt wall. It concluded, relatedly, that the term “drilling for
   minerals” in the LOAIA “should be construed as referring to the drilling of
   a well.” QBE appeals.
                                           II.
          The parties agree that Louisiana substantive law—here, the
   LOAIA—governs resolution of this diversity case. Gulf & Miss. River Transp.
   Co. v. BP Oil Pipeline Co., 730 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Erie R.R.
   Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). As a federal court interpreting
   Louisiana law, we would “first look to final decisions of the Louisiana
   Supreme Court.” Id. (citation omitted).
          Louisiana is one of four states that have passed an oilfield anti-
   indemnity act. The parties here dispute the meaning of Louisiana’s Act. The
   LOAIA, passed in 1981, nullifies certain contractual defense and indemnity

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                                     No. 23-30076

   provisions as contrary to public policy. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has
   explained, the LOAIA “arose out of a concern about the unequal bargaining
   power of oil companies and contractors and was an attempt to avoid
   adhesionary contracts under which contractors would have no choice but to
   agree to indemnify the oil company, lest they risk losing the contract.”
   Fontenot v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 676 So. 2d 557, 563 (La. 1996).
          To that end, the text of the Act says:
   A.     The legislature finds that an inequity is foisted on certain contractors
          and their employees by the defense or indemnity provisions, either or
          both, contained in some agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or
          water, or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous,
          or other state, to the extent those provisions apply to death or bodily
          injury to persons. It is the intent of the legislature by this Section to
          declare null and void and against public policy of the state of Louisiana
          any provision in any agreement which requires defense and/or
          indemnification, for death or bodily injury to persons, where there is
          negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee, or an
          agent or employee of the indemnitee, or an independent contractor
          who is directly responsible to the indemnitee.
   B.     Any provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement
          pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals
          which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other state, is void and
          unenforceable to the extent that it purports to or does provide for
          defense or indemnity, or either, to the indemnitee against loss or
          liability for damages arising out of or resulting from death or bodily
          injury to persons, which is caused by or results from the sole or
          concurrent negligence or fault (strict liability) of the indemnitee, or an
          agent, employee, or an independent contractor who is directly
          responsible to the indemnitee.
   C.     The term “agreement,” as it pertains to a well for oil, gas, or water,
          or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other
          state, as used in this Section, means any agreement or understanding,
          written or oral, concerning any operations related to the exploration,

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                                    No. 23-30076

          development, production, or transportation of oil, gas, or water, or
          drilling for minerals which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other
          state, including but not limited to drilling, deepening, reworking,
          repairing, improving, testing, treating, perforating, acidizing, logging,
          conditioning, altering, plugging, or otherwise rendering services in or
          in connection with any well drilled for the purpose of producing or
          excavating, constructing, improving, or otherwise rendering services
          in connection with any mine shaft, drift, or other structure intended
          for use in the exploration for or production of any mineral, or an
          agreement to perform any portion of any such work or services or any
          act collateral thereto, including the furnishing or rental of equipment,
          incidental transportation, and other goods and services furnished in
          connection with any such service or operation.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780(A)-(C) (emphases added).
          QBE argues that the LOAIA applies to Compass’s purchase orders
   with FSS and MCE because the agreements pertain to “drilling for minerals”
   at the Cote Blanche salt mine—specifically, because Compass uses the drill-
   and-blast method for mining salt.          QBE therefore contends that the
   indemnification and additional-insured provisions in the agreements are null
   and void, and it accordingly does not owe coverage for the Clements lawsuit.
          QBE’s reading of the LOAIA requires two key interpretive arguments
   about the statute. First, the statute must be read to cover operations beyond
   just those pertaining to a well. If the statute governs only those agreements
   with a nexus to a well, then it does not apply here; it is undisputed that
   Compass’s salt mining does not involve a well. Second, even if there is no
   “well” requirement, the agreements at issue in this case must “pertain to”
   “drilling for minerals,” as that term is used in the statute. If either of these
   arguments fails, then the LOAIA does not apply to the agreements here.
                                         A.

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                                     No. 23-30076

          Compass argues, and the district court agreed, that for the LOAIA to
   apply, the agreement at issue must pertain to a well. Again, this issue may be
   dispositive; it is undisputed that Compass’s operations do not involve a well.
          We first address whether this court or the Louisiana Supreme Court
   has decided this issue because, if so, we would not look further. See Kelly v.
   State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 582 F. App’x 290, 293 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[O]nce
   a panel of this court decides an issue of state law by making an Erie guess, this
   court is bound by this decision, unless a subsequent state statute or state
   court decision has rendered the panel’s interpretation ‘clearly wrong.’”
   (quoting Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2010));
   Howe ex rel. Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2000)
   (“To determine Louisiana law . . . this Court should first look to final
   decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court.” (citation omitted)). “If there is
   no ‘clear and controlling precedent’ from that court on a determinative
   question of law, then we may certify the question to the court.” Kling v.
   Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 285 (5th Cir.), certified question accepted, 359 So. 3d 499
   (La. 2023) (citing La. Stat. Ann. § 13:72.1, and La. Sup. Ct. R. XII § 1).
          We conclude that, although courts have stated in broad terms that the
   LOAIA requires that an agreement pertain to a well, neither this court nor
   the Louisiana Supreme Court has addressed the question presented by QBE.
          We are “a strict stare decisis court,” meaning that a prior panel’s
   “interpretation of state law is ‘no less binding on subsequent panels than are
   prior interpretations of federal law.’” Bustos, 599 F.3d at 462 (quoting FDIC
   v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998)). Here, Compass and the
   district court find support for the LOAIA’s “well” requirement in this
   court’s 1992 opinion in Transcontinental Gas, 953 F.2d at 985. The district
   court concluded, and Compass urges on appeal, that because the operations

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   at the Cote Blanche salt mine do not “pertain to” a well, “under
   Transcontinental Gas, ‘the inquiry ends.’”
          The Transcontinental Gas opinion weighs in Compass’s favor, but,
   because of an explicit disclaimer, the case does not do the work that Compass
   asks of it. In Transcontinental Gas, the court addressed whether the LOAIA
   covered a natural-gas transportation company’s (“Transco’s”) agreements
   with a contractor providing painting, sandblasting, and inspection work on
   Transco’s “platforms and pipelines located in the Gulf of Mexico or in the
   adjacent marshlands of Louisiana.” Transcon. Gas, 953 at 986. The court
   rejected the insurers’ and amici’s arguments that the LOAIA covers “all
   contracts touching transportation of natural gas.” Id. at 989-95. In reaching
   its conclusion, the court stated that “the threshold requirement for
   applicability of the [LOAIA] is that the contract under scrutiny pertain to a
   well.” Id. at 991. The court then set out a two-step process for assessing the
   LOAIA’s applicability and, in so doing, reiterated multiple times that the Act
   requires that the agreement pertain to a well. Id. That proposition may seem
   to resolve this case, and Compass argues as much.
          But the court in Transcontinental Gas included a footnote indicating
   that the “pertains to a well” rule is not as absolute as it seems. Specifically,
   in the main text, the court quotes the legislature’s proclamation in subsection
   (A) of the statute that “an inequity is foisted on certain contractors . . . by the
   defense or indemnity provisions . . . , contained in some [1] agreements
   pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or water, or [2] drilling for minerals.” Id. at 990
   (emphasis and alterations in original). It then included a footnote that says:
   “The APS/Transco agreement does not implicate ‘drilling for minerals,’ if
   in fact ‘drilling for minerals’ can be extricated from ‘wells.’ Therefore, the
   portion of the Act concerned with ‘drilling for minerals’ is not directly at
   issue here.” Id. at 990 n.18.

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           QBE has seized on this. Its fundamental argument is that “drilling for
   minerals” is a separate basis for LOAIA’s application, having nothing to do
   with “wells for oil, gas, or water.” Recall that the statute applies to
   “agreements pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for
   minerals.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780(A). Thus, the argument goes,
   Transcontinental Gas’s rule that an agreement must pertain to a well applies
   only if the agreement does not otherwise pertain to “drilling for minerals.”
   In other words, only if a party is invoking the “wells for oil, gas, or water”
   clause does it need to show a nexus to a well. Otherwise, LOAIA can apply
   so long as the agreement “pertain[s] to . . . drilling for minerals.” Id.
           QBE’s view appears to fairly read Transcontinental Gas. Although the
   main text speaks broadly and repeatedly about the LOAIA as a whole, 1
   footnote 18 is clear that the “drilling for minerals” language is not at issue in
   the case. More importantly, the court in footnote 18 raises the very question
   that QBE now asks this court to answer—namely, whether, “in fact, ‘drilling
   for minerals’ can be extricated from wells.” Transcon. Gas, 953 F.2d at 990
   n.18 (emphasis added). It cannot be right, then, that Transcontinental Gas on
   its own terms confirms that even a contract for “drilling for minerals”
   requires a nexus to a well.
           Accordingly, we conclude that Transcontinental Gas does not hold
   that, under all circumstances, the LOAIA requires that a contract “pertain
   to a well.” The court explicitly left that question open. Compass and the
   district court are incorrect in contending otherwise.
           Having so concluded, we must ask: Does the LOAIA apply to only
   those contracts that “pertain to a well,” even if those agreements involve
           _____________________
           1
             E.g., Transcon. Gas, 953 F.2d at 991 (“[T]he legislature intended the Act to apply
   if (but only if) an agreement pertains to a well.”); id. (“[T]he threshold requirement for
   applicability of the statute is that the contract under scrutiny pertain to a well.”).

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   “drilling for minerals”? Our court’s caselaw has not shed further light on
   this question.       We have, in numerous cases, reiterated and reinforced
   Transcontinental Gas’s rule that the LOAIA applies to those contracts that
   pertain to a well, but with no separate analysis of the “drilling for minerals”
   clause.2
           Nor do we find an answer in state law. The Louisiana Supreme Court
   appears to have discussed the meaning of the LOAIA on only three occasions
   since the Act’s passage in 1981. Two of those cases say nothing about
   whether the LOAIA applies only to agreements that pertain to a well. See
   Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 838 (La. 1987) (explaining what types
   of contractual provisions are nullified by the LOAIA but without discussion
   of what industries, services, or operations are covered); Rodrigue v. LeGros,
   563 So. 2d 248, 251-56 (La. 1990) (summarizing the LOAIA only to decide
   whether maritime law or the LOAIA should apply to an indemnity provision
   and concluding that the maritime law of indemnity applies).

           _____________________
           2
              E.g., Tetra Techs., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 733, 743-46 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
   curiam) (citing the two-step process from Transcontinental Gas and “conclud[ing] that a
   contract for salvaging a platform from a decommissioned oil well has a sufficient nexus to
   a well under [the LOAIA]”); Verdine v. Ensco Offshore Co., 255 F.3d 246, 253-54 (5th Cir.
   2001) (applying the Transcontinental Gas factors and concluding that the agreements at
   issue “pertained to specific wells and that the agreement related to the exploration,
   development, production, or transportation of oil, gas, or water”); Roberts v. Energy Dev.
   Corp., 104 F.3d 782, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the LOAIA nullifies
   “indemnity provisions [that] are part of an agreement pertaining to an oil or gas well,” and
   concluding that, there, the “nexus [was] strong enough”); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Loop,
   Inc., 961 F.2d 84, 85 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (approvingly quoting Transcontinental Gas
   as holding that the LOAIA applies “if (but only if) the agreement . . . pertains to a well”
   and holding that oil storage wells at a salt dome cavern do not qualify because “the ‘well’
   must be a well incidental to the production of oil or gas”); Broussard v. Conoco, Inc., 959
   F.2d 42, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Transcontinental Gas’s “well” requirement and
   concluding that the contract at issue “pertains to a well”).

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           The third case, Fontenot v. Chevron USA, 676 So. 2d 557 (La. 1996), is
   the only time after our court’s decision in Transcontinental Gas that the
   Louisiana Supreme Court has discussed the LOAIA in any degree of detail.
   In Fontenot, the court addressed the applicability of the Act to a provision in
   a company’s contract to provide “remedial well services” as well as drilling
   and workover operations on several of Chevron’s platforms in the Gulf of
   Mexico. Id. at 559. The court explained the purpose of the LOAIA and then
   said: “To determine the applicability of Louisiana’s Anti–Indemnity Act,
   courts have engaged in a two-step test,” citing Transcontinental Gas. Id. at
   564. “First,” the court said, “there must be an agreement that ‘pertains to’
   an oil, gas or water well.” Id. “Second, the agreement must be related to
   exploration, development, production, or transportation of oil, gas, or
   water.” As to the case before it, the parties’ “contract for remedial well
   services” “passe[d] these two tests.” Id.
           Fontenot thus enshrines the “well” requirement in Louisiana law. But
   like our court’s caselaw, it is silent as to whether an agreement for “drilling
   for minerals” must also pertain to a well.
           Lower state courts in Louisiana have followed Fontenot’s guidance3
   and applied the “well” requirement. E.g., Palmour v. Gray Ins. Co., 731 So.
   2d 911, 914 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1999) (citing Fontenot and Trancontinental Gas
   and concluding that, despite that one party was “in the business of
   performing oilfield work,” the parties’ “contract to rent a crane to be used
   in some unnamed purpose,” was “not an oilfield, gas field or water related
   agreement and does not meet the ‘pertains to’ requirement”); Rogers v.

           _____________________
           3
              Our court is “not bound by state appellate court decisions,” but “we will not
   disregard them ‘unless [we are] convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court
   of the state would decide otherwise.’” Transcon. Gas, 953 F.2d at 988 (citation omitted)
   (alteration in original).

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   Integrated Expl. & Prod., LLC, 265 So. 3d 880, 887-89 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2019)
   (citing Fontenot and Transcontinental Gas and concluding that the LOAIA did
   not apply because the pipeline operations did not sufficiently pertain to a
   well). QBE cites no state case invoking the “drilling for minerals” clause in
   a way that avoids the “well” requirement. We have similarly found no such
   case.
           Accordingly, we find no “clear and controlling precedent” on this
   issue of Louisiana law. Kling, 60 F.4th at 287. We conclude that certification
   of this question is appropriate.
                                          B.
           Moreover, if the LOAIA does not have a “well” requirement, it
   remains an open question whether the agreements in this case, which
   governed fire-suppression and electrical work at a salt mine, are agreements
   “pertaining to . . . drilling for minerals.” La. Stat. Ann. § 9:2780(B).
   Because the antecedent question has not itself been answered, it follows that
   there is no law—from our court or Louisiana state courts—addressing the
   meaning of “drilling for minerals” or the associated exemplar “operations”
   listed in subsection (C) of the statute. We conclude that this question—the
   application of the LOAIA, as construed to the agreements in this case—is fit
   for certification as well.

                                III. Questions Certified
   CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
   APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT TO THE LOUISIANA
   SUPREME COURT, PURSUANT TO RULE XII, LOUISIANA
   SUPREME COURT RULES.

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   TO    THE        LOUISIANA              SUPREME             COURT         AND      THE
   HONORABLE JUSTICES THEREOF:
                                   A. Style of the Case
         The style of the case in which this certification is made is QBE
   Syndicate 1036 v. Compass Minerals Louisiana, Inc., No. 23-30076, in the
   United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The case is on appeal
   from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
                                 B. Statement of the Facts
         The statement of facts, showing the nature of the cause and the
   circumstances out of which the questions or propositions of law arise, is
   provided above.
                         C. Questions of Law to be Answered
         We certify the following questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
         1.      Does the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, La.
                 Stat. Ann. § 9:2780, apply to provisions in agreements
                 that pertain to “drilling for minerals,” even where the
                 agreement does not “pertain[] to a well”?
         2.      If the Act applies to agreements that pertain to “drilling
                 for minerals,” irrespective of the agreement’s nexus to a
                 well,    does     the    Act    apply    to    invalidate    these
                 indemnification         and    additional-insured    provisions,
                 contained in contracts for fire suppression and electrical
                 work in a salt mine, by virtue of the salt mine’s use of a
                 “drill-and-blast” method for mining salt?

                                               IV.

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          We hereby CERTIFY the above questions to the Louisiana Supreme
   Court. We disclaim any intent that the Louisiana Supreme Court confine its
   reply to the precise form or scope of the legal questions we certify. We
   transfer to the Louisiana Supreme Court the record and appellate briefs in
   this case with our certification. This panel retains cognizance of this appeal
   pending response from the Louisiana Supreme Court.

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