Court Opinion

ID: 9898075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:19.334675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:08.875231
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 SAN JUAN COUNTY, a municipal                 No. 84941-7-I
 corporation of the State of Washington,
                                              DIVISION ONE
                        Respondent,

              v.                              UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 WASHINGTON COALITION FOR
 OPEN GOVERNMENT, a Washington
 non-profit corporation,,

                       Appellant.

      SMITH, C.J. — The purpose of the Public Records Act (PRA), ch. 42.56

RCW, is to protect the public’s interest in open and accountable government. In

2020, the Washington Coalition for Open Government (WCOG) made a PRA

request of San Juan County. San Juan County sued WCOG when it sought

unredacted attorney invoices in a format that the County did not regularly use,

concerning payments made to outside counsel representing the County in

litigation concerning the PRA. San Juan County provided the invoices but

redacted all descriptions of the work provided. Following an in camera review,

the trial court concluded that San Juan County appropriately redacted the

invoices.

      On appeal, WCOG contends that (1) San Juan County inappropriately

redacted the invoices in violation of RCW 45.26.904; (2) that the County violated

RCW 42.56.080(2) by considering WCOG’s identity; (3) that the County’s
No. 84941-7-I/2

explanations of redactions were insufficient in violation of RCW 42.56.210(3);

and (4) that WCOG is entitled to attorney fees. We find no error and affirm.

                                      FACTS

                                   Background

      In 2015, Edward Kilduff sued San Juan County alleging that a local

ordinance, which created an additional administrative exhaustion procedure to

the PRA violated it.1 During litigation, Kilduff was represented by a board

member of the Washington Coalition for Open Government (WCOG) and San

Juan County hired outside counsel.2 Our state Supreme Court ultimately

concluded that San Juan County did not possess the authority to add an

administrative exhaustion requirement to the PRA and remanded the case for

further proceedings.

                                Present Litigation

      In April 2020, while Kilduff was on remand, WCOG made a public records

request seeking invoices of the outside counsel San Juan County had hired in

Kilduff. Worried that San Juan County was misappropriating funds, WCOG

requested “all invoices, contracts, correspondence, notes, bids, proposals,

records relating to conflicts of interest, meeting minutes, and any other records

relating to [San Juan] County’s use of outside counsel in Kilduff v. San Juan

      1  The underlying facts are set forth in Kilduff v. San Juan County, 194
Wn.2d 859, 453 P.3d 719 (2019).
      2 See Kilduff v. San Juan County, 194 Wn.2d 859, 453 P.3d 719 (2019).

(Michele Lynn Earl-Hubbard, board member of WCOG, listed as counsel for
Edward Kilduff).

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No. 84941-7-I/3

County.” A month later, San Juan County provided the invoices, which were

heavily redacted, but included the hours and total dollar amounts billed.

       As part of their PRA claim, WCOG requested the documents in a format

that San Juan County did not typically use. In response to the request, the

County sued WCOG,3 seeking a declaratory judgment that it need not provide

the records in an electronic format incompatible with its tracking system. WCOG

later withdrew the formatting piece of their PRA request, instead filing a

counterclaim asserting that San Juan County’s invoices were improperly and

excessively redacted.

       During discovery, WCOG sought information about how San Juan County

responded to its original PRA request, as well as all attorney invoices that dealt

with any PRA requests starting on January 1, 2018. The County objected,

arguing that the requests were overly broad and sought documents protected by

work product and attorney-client privilege. WCOG then sought those same

records through the PRA.

       When San Juan County propounded discovery requests to WCOG, it

similarly sought production of WCOG’s invoices relating to the PRA request, its

current suit, and its participation in Kilduff. WCOG objected, arguing that such a

request called for protected work product and exceeded the scope of discovery.

       3 San Juan County initially named William Crittenden as respondent in the
suit as Crittenden made the request without disclosing that WCOG was his client.
Once San Juan County determined that WCOG was the true requestor, it
modified the complaint to name WCOG.

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No. 84941-7-I/4

       In January 2022, WCOG moved for partial summary judgment, arguing

San Juan County’s production of the redacted invoices violated the PRA.

Relying on invoices it had obtained from other agencies in separate PRA

requests, which were less heavily redacted, WCOG asserted San Juan County

had excessively redacted the invoices in violation of the PRA. WCOG asked the

court to compel the County to produce “properly redacted records” and also

sought in camera review of the documents. The County then cross-moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that the documents were relevant to an

ongoing controversy and thus, exempt under the PRA.

       The court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, concluding

that issues of fact still existed, but granted WCOG’s motion for in camera review.

Following in camera review of the redacted documents, the court found that the

redacted material was work product protected by privilege. The court stated that

“the descriptions of the work performed by attorneys on the invoices could be

redacted in its entirety and that [San Juan] County was not obligated to go line by

line to select portions for more limited redaction.”

       The court denied WCOG’s counterclaim and dismissed the matter with

prejudice. The court then denied WCOG’s motion for reconsideration. WCOG

appeals.

                                     ANALYSIS

       WCOG raises four issues on appeal, including whether San Juan County’s

invoice redactions complied with RCW 42.56.904, whether San Juan County

violated RCW 42.56.080(2) by taking WCOG’s identity into account, whether San

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No. 84941-7-I/5

Juan County’s explanations of the redactions satisfied RCW 42.56.210 (3), and

whether WCOG is entitled to attorney fees. We address each in turn.4

                                Standard of Review

       “Agency action taken or challenged under the PRA is reviewed de novo.”

RCW 42.56.550(3); Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125

Wn.2d 243, 252, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS). “[T]he appellate court stands in

the same position as the trial court where the record consists only of affidavits,

memoranda of law, and other documentary evidence.” PAWS, 125 Wn.2d

at 252.

                                  RCW 42.56.904

       WCOG contends that San Juan County violated RCW 42.56.904, which

prohibits redacting attorney invoices in their entirety and limits redactions to

specific exemptions, by redacting all descriptions in the invoices it provided,

regardless of whether they contained attorney mental impressions, legal advice,

theories, or opinions. We conclude that the invoice descriptions were exempt

under RCW 42.56.290.

       Our Supreme Court has consistently reinforced the notion that “the [PRA]

‘is a strongly worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.’ ” Soter v.

Cowles Publishing Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 731, 174 P.3d 60 (2007) (quoting Hearst

Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 127, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)). “We liberally

       4 WCOG appeals both the Findings, Conclusions, and Order Upon In
Camera Review and the Order on Reconsideration. As we find no error with the
in camera findings, there is no error on the trial court’s part for denying the
motion for reconsideration.

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No. 84941-7-I/6

construe the PRA in favor of disclosure.” RCW 42.56.030; Soter, 162 Wn.2d at

731. “The PRA requires a government agency to disclose any public record

upon request; however, an agency lawfully withholds production of records if one

of the PRA’s enumerated exemptions applies.” RCW 42.56.070(1); Sanders v.

State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 836, 240 P.3d 120 (2010). “The PRA’s numerous

exemptions protect certain records from disclosure and the PRA also

incorporates any ‘other statute’ that prohibits disclosure of records.” Dep’t of

Transp. v. Mendoza de Sugiyama, 182 Wn. App 588, 597, 330 P.3d 209 (2014)

(quoting RCW 42.56.070). Because we narrowly construe the PRA’s exemptions

in favor of disclosure, the burden is on the agency to establish that an exemption

applies. Mendoza de Sugiyama, 182 Wn. App at 597; RCW 42.56.030; RCW

42.56.550(1). “In construing the PRA, we look at the Act in its entirety in order to

enforce the law’s overall purpose.” Rental Hous. Ass’n of Puget Sound v. City of

Des Moines, 165 Wn.2d 525, 536, 199 P.3d 393 (2009). And when interpreting a

statute, the court, if possible, must “ ‘harmonize and give effect to all of the

relevant statutory language.’ ” State v. Peterson, 198 Wn.2d 643, 647, 498 P.3d

937 (2021) (quoting State v. Cyr, 195 Wn.2d 492, 502, 461 P.3d 360 (2020)).

       There are two sections of the PRA at issue here. The first, RCW

42.56.904, provides that attorney invoices may not be “withheld in their entirety”

and that “specific descriptions of work performed be redacted only if they would

reveal an attorney’s mental impressions, actual legal advice, theories, or

opinions, or are otherwise exempt under chapter 391, Laws of 2007 or other

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No. 84941-7-I/7

laws.” The burden is on the public entity to justify each redaction and narrowly

construe any exemption to full disclosure. RCW 42.56.904.

       The second, RCW 42.56.290, is one such “other law.” John Doe v. Wash.

State Patrol, 185 Wn.2d 363, 373, 374 P.3d 63 (2016). RCW 42.56.290

establishes the “controversy exemption,” which provides that “[r]ecords that are

relevant to a controversy to which an agency is a party but which records would

not be available to another party under the rules of pretrial discovery for causes

pending in the superior courts are exempt from disclosure under this chapter.”

“This is a categorical exception” that “applies to any materials that would not be

discoverable in the context of ‘a controversy under the civil rules of pretrial

discovery.’ ” Mendoza de Sugiyama, 182 Wn. App at 597 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Soter, 162 Wn.2d at 731). “Our Supreme Court has held

that the controversy exemption applies to the work product doctrine and the

attorney-client privilege.” Mendoza de Sugiyama, 182 Wn. App at 597. Attorney-

client privilege applies to communications and advice between an attorney and

client and extends to documents that contain privileged communications. Soter,

162 Wn.2d at 745. Similarly, work product extends to documents and tangible

things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. CR 26(b)(4).

       Here, WCOG sought access to attorney invoices from a case being

actively litigated and in which both WCOG and San Juan County had a stake.

        Looking first to work product, the invoices were created “by or for” San

Juan County to use in the Kilduff litigation with the County’s expectation that they

be privileged during trial. The invoices documented the actions the attorneys

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No. 84941-7-I/8

took, the hours spent, and the amount charged for the ongoing Kilduff case. As a

result, they constitute work product under CR 26(b)(4) and are not discoverable.

Neither party makes any arguments about waiver and WCOG has made no

assertion of undue hardship.

       As to attorney-client privilege, the unredacted records detail exactly the

activities counsel took in furtherance of the litigation. This includes

communications between attorney and client and highlights documents that

contain privileged communications. These are privileged materials. In

conjunction with the time and money spent, it could be relatively easy for

opposing counsel to decipher San Juan County’s litigation plan and its

communications with its attorneys.

       Because the descriptions are privileged under work product and attorney-

client privilege and are therefore not subject to pre-trial discovery, they are

similarly not subject to the PRA under RCW 42.56.290. WCOG fails to

acknowledge that the PRA exempts non-discoverable information for pending

controversies and that it sought such records. Moreover, it ignores that San

Juan County did not redact the invoices in their entirety—neither the hours spent

nor the amounts billed were redacted from the invoices. RCW 42.56.290 is

directly applicable because WCOG sought information that is not discoverable

during on-going litigation.

       WCOG’s reliance on redacted invoices from other matters is

unpersuasive. Attached as exhibits to WCOG’s counsel’s declaration, WCOG

points to copies of invoices issued by San Juan County’s attorney in other cases.

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No. 84941-7-I/9

WCOG cites no authority for the proposition that redactions must look like those

cases. And in those cases, WCOG sought invoices for work performed post-trial,

as opposed to work performed while the parties were actively litigating. The

invoices WCOG seeks in the present case concern pretrial matters protected by

attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. Why the County may

have spent a certain amount of money to pursue one legal theory over another is

information that is protected while the litigation is ongoing. Moreover, we note

that WCOG received the information it ultimately sought: the total amount of

money San Juan County paid outside counsel to litigate the Kilduff matter.

       We note that both parties dedicate a substantial portion of their briefing

and oral argument to the legislative history of RCW 42.56.904. But the statute is

unambiguous and therefore we need not consider the legislative history.

       “Where the meaning of statutory language is plain on its face, we must

give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Rental

Hous. Ass’n, 165 Wn.2d at 536. Only when a statute is ambiguous do we “resort

to aids of construction, including legislative history.” City of Spokane v. Spokane

County, 158 Wn.2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006).

       RCW 42.56.904 states,
       It is the intent of the legislature to clarify that no reasonable
       construction of chapter 42.56 RCW has ever allowed attorney
       invoices to be withheld in their entirety by any public entity in a
       request for documents under that chapter. It is further the intent of
       the legislature that specific descriptions of work performed be
       redacted only if they would reveal an attorney's mental impressions,
       actual legal advice, theories, or opinions, or are otherwise exempt
       under chapter 391, Laws of 2007 or other laws, with the burden

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No. 84941-7-I/10

       upon the public entity to justify each redaction and narrowly
       construe any exception to full disclosure.

       The statute specifically includes exemptions under “other laws.” As noted,

“other laws” includes other provisions of the PRA. As the language of the statute

is plain on its face, we do not look to the legislative history.

       At oral argument, WCOG claimed that reading RCW 42.56.290 as

exempting work product would render the entirety of the PRA meaningless

because RCW 42.56.904 was meant to limit redactions of attorney invoices as

allowed by earlier sections of the statute.5 But again, the language of the statute

is plain on its face and specifically includes exemptions provided by “other laws.”

RCW 42.56.904. We have previously held that RCW 42.56.290 is one such

other law and the rules of statutory interpretation do not require us to dig deeper

to find an ambiguity.

       Because the invoices were properly exempt under RCW 42.56.290, we

conclude that San Juan County’s redactions complied with RCW 42.56.904.

                                   RCW 42.56.080

       WCOG next contends that San Juan County violated RCW 42.56.080(2),

which prohibits distinguishing among persons requesting records, by using

WCOG’s identity as the requestor to justify withholding public records. We

conclude that San Juan County did not violate the statute.

       5Wash. Court of Appeals oral argument, San Juan County v. WCOG, No.
84941-7-I (Sept. 26, 2023), at 02:33, 03:15, 03:55, audio recording by TVW,
Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-
of-appeals-2023091214/?eventID=2023091214.

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No. 84941-7-I/11

       RCW 42.56.080(2) states that “agencies shall not distinguish among

persons requesting records.” A requestor’s use of information may not be the

basis for denying a request. DeLong v. Parmelee, 157 Wn. App. 119, 146, 236

P.3d 936 (2010). Rather, an agency “must respond to all public disclosure

requests without regard to the status or motivation of the requestor.” Livingston

v. Cedeno, 164 Wn.2d 46, 53, 186 P.3d 1055 (2008).

       Here, San Juan County responded to WCOG’s request. WCOG argues

that the County excessively redacted the invoices in response to WCOG’s

identity but this argument is unpersuasive because as discussed, the County

appropriately redacted the invoices. And apart from being an adverse party in

Kilduff, WCOG provides no evidence that the County would have, or did, treat

them differently than any other requestor. We conclude that San Juan County

did not violate RCW 42.56.080(2).

                                RCW 42.56.210(3)

       WCOG also asserts that San Juan County failed to provide sufficiently

detailed explanations of how each exemption applied to withheld or redacted

records, in violation of RCW 42.56.210(3). Because the explanations were

sufficiently detailed but high level enough to protect the privileged information, we

conclude that the County’s explanations satisfy the statutory requirement.

       RCW 42.56.210(3) states that “agency responses refusing, in whole or in

part, inspection of any public record shall include a statement of the specific

exemption authorizing the withholding of the record (or part) and a brief

explanation of how the exemption applies to the record withheld.” The brief

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No. 84941-7-I/12

explanations “need not be elaborate, but should include the type of record, it’s

date and number of pages, and, unless otherwise protected, the author and

recipient. . . Where use of any identifying features would reveal protected

content, the agency may designate the records by a numbered sequence.”

PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 608 n.18. “Another way to properly provide a brief

explanation is to have a code for each statutory exemption, place that code on

the redacted information, and attach a list of codes and the brief explanations

with the agency’s response.” WAC 44-14-04004(5)(b). These codes allow a

requestor to make a threshold determination of whether the agency has properly

invoked the exemption. Rental Housing Ass’n, 165 Wn.2d at 539.

       Here, San Juan County inserted codes for each claimed exemption into

the portion of record redacted under that exemption. The County redacted only

the descriptions of work. Because the rest of the documents remained

unredacted, the type of record and the dates and number of pages were all

accessible. The County provided the following brief explanations, coded as

either “1C” or “2”:
       1C. RCW 42.56.290 exempts from disclosure records that are
           relevant to a controversy to which an agency is a party but
           which records would not be available to another party under
           the rules of pretrial discovery for causes pending in the
           superior courts. The referenced records are relevant to a
           controversy to which San Juan County is a party and would
           not be available under the civil rules of discovery.
       2.   RCW 5.60.060(2)(a) and RCW 42.56.070(1) exempt from
            disclosure communication made by a client to an attorney, or
            the attorney’s advice given thereon in the course of
            professional employment. The referenced information is a
            confidential attorney-client communication that is exempt from

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No. 84941-7-I/13

            disclosure. See, Hangartner v. Seattle, 151 Wn.2d 439
            (2004); Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827 (2020).

       These coded explanations track directly to the Washington Administrative

Code (WAC) requirements. The explanations, in conjunction with the documents

themselves, provide enough information that the requestor can make a threshold

determination as to whether the information was appropriately redacted. To

require more detailed explanations or further identifying features would have

revealed content protected under attorney-client privilege and work product. We

conclude that San Juan County’s brief explanations satisfied the statutory

requirement.

                                   Attorney Fees

       WCOG requests attorney fees under the PRA, which provides that “[a]ny

person who prevails against an agency in any action in the courts seeking the

right to inspect or copy any public record or the right to receive a response to a

public record request within a reasonable amount of time shall be awarded all

costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in connection with such legal

action.” RCW 42.56.550(4). Because WCOG does not prevail on appeal, we

decline to award it fees.

       We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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