Court Opinion

ID: 9369757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 17:08:04.285238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.914315
License: Public Domain

J-A02040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: ESTATE OF JULIANNA M.               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    GENNARO, DECEASED                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: JOSEPH GENNARO                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 758 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 24, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
                     Orphans’ Court at No(s): 02-20-03721

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED: February 9, 2023

        Joseph Gennaro (Appellant) appeals from the order denying his request

to serve as administrator of the estate of his daughter, Julianna, and granting

letters of administration to Heidi Charles, who is Julianna’s mother (Mother).

We affirm.

        The orphans’ court summarized the factual and procedural case history

as follows:

              Julianna M. Gennaro died, intestate, on June 24, 2020, at
        the age of fifteen (15). The parents of Julianna had never married
        and had long resided, separately, [M]other, residing in Allegheny
        County and the father, [Appellant], residing in adjacent Beaver
        County. It is not disputed that at all times pertinent to this matter,
        [M]other had been the primary custodial parent of Julianna and
        Julianna had resided with [M]other. Nor is it disputed that
        Julianna was, at all times, a resident of Allegheny County.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A02040-23

            Julianna’s death occurred … when she was struck by a train
     near her home in Allegheny County.         The death certificate
     identified Julianna’s residence as the residence of [M]other on
     Morgan Hollow Road, South Fayette Township, Allegheny County.
     Thereafter, on August 10, 2020, [M]other caused a caveat to be
     filed with the Allegheny County Department of Court Records,
     Orphans’ Court Division, requesting that no letters testamentary
     or letters of administration be issued without notice having first
     been provided either directly to [M]other or to her counsel. On
     August 13, 2020, Julianna’s father, [Appellant], caused a petition
     to be filed with the Register of Wills Office in Beaver County,
     Pennsylvania, entitled “Petition to Show Cause Why [Appellant]
     Should Not Be Named Sole Administrator of the Estate of Julianna
     Gennaro.” In that petition, [Appellant] averred that, at the time
     of her death, Julianna had been a resident of Beaver County.

            Approximately nine months later, on May 4, 2021, upon
     consideration of preliminary objections having been filed in
     response to [Appellant’s] Petition to Show Cause, the Beaver
     County Court of Common Pleas Orphans’ Court directed that the
     proceedings be transferred to Allegheny County. On that same
     date, the Petition to Show Cause was filed with the Orphans’ Court
     Division of Allegheny County on behalf of [Appellant], recaptioned,
     however, as an Amended Petition for Citation. Apart from a
     corrected averment that Julianna had been a resident of Allegheny
     County, rather than Beaver County, at the time of her death, the
     allegations set forth in the amended petition filed in Allegheny
     County were substantially unaltered from those contained in the
     petition that had been filed in Beaver County. In the amended
     petition, the term “Beaver” had been scratched out of the original
     petition and “Allegheny” had been handwritten above that scratch
     out.

           Subsequently, following presentation and argument before
     Hearing Officer Timothy Finnerty at the Allegheny County Register
     of Wills, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued
     regarding the Petition to Show Cause. Among the findings of fact
     set forth by Hearing Officer Finnerty was that, although Julianna’s
     death certificate stated that she had been a resident of Allegheny
     County at the time of her death, [Appellant] had alleged otherwise
     in the petition which he had earlier caused to be filed with the
     Register of Wills Office in Beaver County, asserting in that petition
     that Julianna was a resident of Beaver County.

                                     -2-
J-A02040-23

              Among the further findings made by Hearing Officer Finnerty
       was that [Appellant] had not seen Julianna regularly and that
       [Appellant’s] actions of filing in Beaver County for his Citation to
       Show Cause, signing a verification to that false pleading and
       falsely portraying the amount of time he had, in fact, spent in
       person with Julianna negatively affected the ability [of Appellant]
       to administer the Estate. Accordingly, on April 19, 2022, Hearing
       Officer Finnerty entered an order issuing [a] letter of
       administration solely to [M]other. Objections to the hearing
       officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law and order and a
       request for a de novo hearing before an Orphans’ Court judge
       followed.

             A conference went forward before the [orphans’ court] on
       June 22, 2022. At that conference, counsel for [Appellant]
       asserted that there was no basis on the existing record upon which
       to exclude [Appellant] from an appointment as, at least, a co-
       administrator of his daughter’s estate. More specifically, counsel
       urged that there are four factors to be considered when
       determining the fitness of an individual for appointment as an
       administrator and those factors are whether the individual (1) is
       a resident of Pennsylvania; (2) is insolvent; (3) has been
       convicted of a crime; or (4) has a hostile interest in the matter.
       That list of factors is derived from the decision in Fleming's
       Estate 32 Pa. D & C 245, 252 (1938). As noted in the decision
       rendered on appeal in that case, however, the bases for excluding
       or removing a fiduciary are anchored in statute and may be
       expressed more broadly than had been set forth in the common
       pleas court opinion. [See In re Fleming's Estate, 135 Pa.
       Super. 423, 427, 5 A.2d 599, 600 (1939).] …

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).

       On June 23, 2022, the orphans’ court entered an order denying

Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing on the order granting letters of

administration to Mother.1 The next day, the orphans’ court entered an order

____________________________________________

1The orphans’ court used a pen to cross through the language in the proposed
order drafted by Appellant’s counsel and handwrote “DENIED.” See Order,
6/23/22.

                                           -3-
J-A02040-23

denying Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the Register’s April

19, 2022, order should not be reversed. Order, 6/24/22. The orphans’ court

explained:

             An uncontested fact in this case is that [] Appellant, Joseph,
      opened an estate in a county that was not the last family or
      principal residence of his daughter. [Appellant]’s action was, if
      not deliberately contrary to law, then certainly an inexplicable
      disregard of the death certificate and in gross error. For that
      reason, [Appellant]’s request to be appointed administrator either
      in lieu of or jointly with [M]other was denied.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 5-6.

      Appellant timely filed a single notice of appeal to both orders on June

29, 2022, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement on July

14, 2022.

      On August 1, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause for Appellant

to address the appeal’s timeliness. We stated:

      the orders do not appear to be final or otherwise appealable under
      Pa.R.A.P. 342 (governing appealability of orphans’ court orders
      and permitting appeal from enumerated orders). See, e.g.,
      McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa.
      2002) (stating that appeal properly lies only from final order
      unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute); see also Pa.R.A.P.
      341(b)(1) (defining final order as one that disposes of all claims
      in and parties to action); see also In re: Estate of Cherwinski,
      856 A.2d 165, 166-67 (Pa. Super. 2004) … (providing that in
      estate case, generally, confirmation of final account represents
      final order, subject to filing and disposition of any exceptions).

Order, 8/1/22.

      Appellant responded that the orphans’ court “made a final decision …

when it denied Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing and denied

                                      -4-
J-A02040-23

Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the Order granting letters

of administration should not be reversed.” Appellant’s Response, 8/15/22, at

1. Appellant emphasized his challenge to the orphans’ court’s decision that

he is “not fit to administer the Estate of his daughter, who died in a train

accident.” Id. He argued:

      The Orphans’ Court granted letters of administration to [Mother]
      and [she] has instituted a lawsuit relating to the incident which
      caused decedent’s death. The claims adjudicated in the Orphans’
      Court related solely to who would administer the Estate of
      decedent. The Orphans’, Court made a final decision in this regard
      when it denied Appellant’s request for a de novo hearing and
      denied Appellant’s petition for citation to show cause why the
      Order granting letters of administration should not be reversed.
      In other words, [Mother] can administer the Estate in the
      underlying lawsuit, while the Appellant has no say in the matter.
      Therefore, Appellant’s claims have been disposed of.

                                        ***

      The basis of Appellant’s claim is that he should be able to
      administer the Estate of his daughter during the underlying
      lawsuit. Once the underlying lawsuit is over, Appellant’s claims
      are moot. If this Court were to quash Appellant’s appeal,
      Appellant would have no right to make important decisions in the
      administration of his daughter’s Estate.

Id. at 1-2 (citing In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d 453, 456–57 (Pa. Super.

2007)).

      On September 9, 2022, this Court entered an order quashing Appellant’s

appeal from the June 23, 2022, order. We stated,

      the appeal is QUASHED in part insofar as it is taken from the June
      23, 2022 order denying Appellant’s motion for de novo hearing.
      McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349 (Pa.
      2002) (reiterating that appeal properly lies only from final order
      unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute); see also Pa.R.A.P.

                                    -5-
J-A02040-23

       341(b)(1) (defining final order as one that disposes of all claims
       in and parties to action).

Order, 9/9/22.

       As to the June 24, 2022, order, we stated:

       The rule is discharged, and the appeal shall proceed only insofar
       as it is taken from the June 24, 2022 order denying Appellant’s
       petition for citation to show cause. This ruling, however, is not
       binding upon this Court as a final determination as to the propriety
       of the appeal. The parties are advised that the issues may be
       revisited by the merits panel to be assigned to this appeal, and
       the parties should be prepared to address, in their briefs or at the
       time of oral argument, any concerns the panel may have
       concerning these issues.
Id.

                                     Appealability

       We are persuaded by Appellant’s finality argument and his reliance on

In re Est. of Tigue, as well as Pa.R.A.P. 342(a)(5) (titled “Appealable

Orphans’ Court Orders” and providing “an appeal may be taken as of right …

from an order determining the status of fiduciaries, beneficiaries, or creditors

in an estate, trust, or guardianship”).2

       Appellant correctly observes that the June 24, 2022, order disposed of

Appellant’s challenge to Mother’s administration of Julianna’s estate.        It

appears that as administrator, Mother would impact “the status of fiduciaries,

beneficiaries, or creditors,” contrary to Rule 342.
____________________________________________

2Appellant cites Pa.R.A.P. 341 (Final Orders; Generally) as the basis for this
Court’s jurisdiction in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 1. However, in his
docketing statement, Appellant indicates that in addition to Rule 341,
Pa.R.A.P. 301 (Requisites for an Appealable Order) and 342 (Appealable
Orphans’ Court Orders) support this appeal.           See Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, Civil Docketing Statement, 7/14/22, at 1.

                                           -6-
J-A02040-23

      Moreover, we have stated:
      The register’s decision to issue letters is a judicial act. Estate of
      Osborne, 363 Pa. Super. 200, 525 A.2d 788, 794 n. 9 (1987). A
      party contesting that act may appeal to the orphans’ court. [In
      re Estate of] Dilbon, 690 A.2d [1216], 1218-1219 [(Pa. Super.
      1997)]. In turn, a party challenging a ruling of the orphans’
      court may, of course, appeal to this Court. See [In re
      Estate of] Klink, 743 A.2d [482,] 484 [(Pa. Super. 1999)]; 42
      Pa.C.S.A. § 742.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 456 (emphasis added).

      As indicated above, there is precedent for this Court to review a claim

that the orphans’ court improperly “determine[d] the proper individual to act

as administrator[.]” In re Est. of Klink, 743 A.2d at 485. See also Est. of

Fritz v. Fritz, 798 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. 2002) (deciding appeal and vacating

orphans’ court order affirming Register of Wills’ grant of letters of

administration to first executor and denying letters of administration to second

executor). Most recently, we affirmed the orphans’ court order affirming the

Register of Wills’ refusal to appoint the appellant as administrator of an estate

in In re Est. of Schwartz, 275 A.3d 1032 (Pa. Super. 2022). Accordingly,

we address Appellant’s substantive issue.

               Appellant’s Challenge to Mother as Administrator

      Appellant presents the following question for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s Petition for
         Citation to Show Cause Why the Register’s Order of April 19,
         2022 Should Not be Reversed, when the Hearing Officer and
         Trial Judge relied on facts that are immaterial to the analysis
         of whether one is qualified to serve as an administrator?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

                                      -7-
J-A02040-23

       We have explained:
       If the orphans’ court has held an evidentiary hearing, we will then
       afford the court’s findings the same weight as a jury verdict, and
       we will disturb the court’s decree only if it is unsupported by the
       evidence or if it includes an error of law. Dilbon, 690 A.2d at
       1218. However, if the orphans’ court did not take evidence,
       then our appellate review is limited to determining if the
       register abused its discretion. Klink, 743 A.2d at 484. An
       abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment. In Re
       Paxson Trust I, 893 A.2d 99, 112 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, it
       involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, or misapplication of
       law. Id.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 457 (emphasis added).

       Here, the orphans’ court conducted a conference and heard argument

but did not “take evidence.” See id. We thus consider whether the Register

abused its discretion. Id.

       Appellant argues he was erroneously disqualified “from serving as an

administrator of his daughter’s estate on the grounds that he failed to properly

identify her county of residence.” Appellant’s Brief at 9 (citing In re Friese’s

Estate, 176 A. 225, 227 (Pa. 1934)).3            Appellant argues the decision was

based on “external factors that do not properly indicate [A]ppellant’s ability to

serve as administrator.” Id.

       The Register of Wills grants letters of administration pursuant to the

following statutory provisions:

____________________________________________

3 Mother counters: ”Appellant was not disqualified; rather, [Mother] was
determined to be the individual who would best administer the Estate.”
Appellee’s Brief at 8.

                                           -8-
J-A02040-23

     (b) Letters of administration.--Letters of administration shall
     be granted by the register, in such form as the case shall require,
     to one or more of those hereinafter mentioned and, except for
     good cause, in the following order:

     (1)   Those entitled to the residuary estate under the will.

     (2)   The surviving spouse.

     (3) Those entitled under the intestate law as the
     register, in his discretion, shall judge will best administer
     the estate, giving preference, however, according to the sizes
     of the shares of those in this class.

     (4) The principal creditors of the decedent at the time of his
     death.

     (5)   Other fit persons.

     (6) If anyone of the foregoing shall renounce his right to letters
     of administration, the register, in his discretion, may appoint a
     nominee of the person so renouncing in preference to the
     persons set forth in any succeeding paragraph.

     (7) A guardianship support agency serving as guardian of an
     incapacitated person who dies during the guardianship
     administered pursuant to Subchapter F of Chapter 551 (relating
     to guardianship support).

     (8) A redevelopment authority formed pursuant to the act of
     May 24, 1945 (P.L. 991, No. 385), known as the Urban
     Redevelopment Law.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b) (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

     We have stated:

     As Section 3155 makes clear, it is the register who has the
     authority and duty to issue letters. When doing so, the register
     has     some     degree    of   discretion  in    selecting    the
     appointee. However, that discretion must be exercised within the
     strictures of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155. More specifically, the register
     can exercise discretion only within the class of entitled persons

                                    -9-
J-A02040-23

       and cannot, without good cause, deviate from the order of
       appointment set forth in the statute.

In re Est. of Tigue, 926 A.2d at 456 (citations omitted).

       Section 3155 “preserves a register’s ability to deny letters of

administration for ‘good cause.’ 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3155(b).”         In re Est. of

Schwartz, 275 A.3d at 1035. Referencing the note to § 3156, which governs

persons who are not qualified to administer an estate, we have observed that

       the statutory scheme was intended to be “declaratory of existing
       law [...] in allowing the register to disregard unfit persons
       [citing Friese's Estate.]” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3156 Editor’s Note (Jt.
       St. Govt. Comm. – 1949).

Id.

       Our recent decision in In re Est. of Schwartz is instructive. In that

case, the appellant was a creditor of the decedent and unsuccessfully sought

appointment as administrator of the estate.4 On appeal, this Court concluded

that “the record supports a finding of good cause for the register’s decision to

deny [a]ppellant’s petition” seeking to be granted letters of administration.

Id. at 1037. Our decision was informed by the appellant’s “lack of candor.”

Id. at 1036, n.5. We stated:

       Appellant did not disclose that he intervened in Decedent’s action
       to set aside the tax sale, and that the matter is still pending. Nor
       did Appellant disclose [the a]ppellee’s mortgage action pertaining
       to the Property. ... In other words, the record supports a
____________________________________________

4 Appellant purchased the decedent’s home “at the upset tax sale, and
[d]ecedent’s action to set the tax sale aside, in which [the a]ppellant has
intervened, remain[ed] pending.” In re Est. of Schwartz, 275 A.3d at 1035.

                                          - 10 -
J-A02040-23

     finding that Appellant was less than fully forthcoming in his
     petitions.

Id. at 1036 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).

     Here, the orphans’ court likewise observed:

     Even if, as asserted by counsel for [Appellant], there had been no
     intentional misrepresentation on [Appellant’s] part to the effect
     that his daughter was residing with him in Beaver County,
     [Appellant’s] averment of [Julianna’s] residence in Beaver County
     was nonetheless in disregard of the Register’s Certification of
     Death and indicative of either a failure to responsibly review or an
     inability to comprehend that certification. The record establishes
     the disconcerting fact of an unsupportable assertion under oath
     that Julianna resided in Beaver County.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/6/22, at 6.

     The court reasoned:

     The decision to exclude [Appellant] as administrator or co-
     administrator rested upon the uncontroverted fact of [Appellant’s]
     assertion under oath that his daughter resided in Beaver County.
     Indeed, in the Petition for Citation filed on [Appellant’s] behalf it
     is “denie[d] that [Appellant] knew that Decedent was a resident
     of Allegheny County.” A death certificate constitutes only prima
     facie evidence of its contents. Certainly, however, an application
     for letters of administration, which includes the submission of a
     death certificate as part of the necessary process, anticipates the
     applicant’s knowledge of fundamental components of the death
     certificate. An application that is inconsistent with, disregards or
     indicates an incapacity to comprehend such components of the
     death certificate would seem to suggest unfitness for competent
     administration of an estate and incapacity to serve responsibly in
     the role of administrator of an estate.

           This matter concerns a Petition to Show Cause Why the
     Resister’s Order of April 19, 2022, should not be reversed. The
     Register awarded letters of administration to [M]other and
     declined to, instead, issue letters to [Appellant]. The burden
     rested with [Appellant] to demonstrate cause for setting aside the
     Register’s Order. That burden consisted both of demonstrating
     the unfitness of the then-current administratrix and also

                                    - 11 -
J-A02040-23

      demonstrating the fitness and appropriateness of [Appellant] to
      assume the role of administrator. Even assuming that it had been
      demonstrated in this case that [M]other was unfit to serve as
      administratrix, it would not necessarily have followed that the
      [Appellant] should then, by default, be appointed as
      administrator. Based on the record presented, it could not be
      concluded that [Appellant] could serve responsibly as an
      administrator of the estate.

Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted).

      The orphans’ court’s rationale is supported by “the record presented.”

See id. Consistent with both the record and prevailing legal authority, we

discern no abuse of discretion in the Register’s appointment of Mother as

administrator. We thus affirm the denial of Appellant’s petition for citation to

show cause why the Register’s order of April 19, 2022 should not be reversed.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/9/2023

                                     - 12 -