Court Opinion

ID: 9761928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:00:10.309387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.785225
License: Public Domain

Klau, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which states that there was no error in the ruling of the trial court with respect to the admission of evidence of prior convictions of felonies for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the defendant. The majority opinion cites State v. Marquez, 160 Conn. 47, 273 A.2d 689, as though it had no application to this case. It is true that the defendant’s objection on the ground that the evidence of the prior convictions would tend to incriminate him was ill-founded. This evidence was admissible under § 52-145 of the General Statutes and the proper ground of objection to the admission of the evidence was that the evidence of the prior convictions, should, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, be excluded because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. See State v. Marquez, supra, 52. Failure to state a proper ground for objection should not be controlling in a capital case in which the death penalty has been imposed. Technical infirmity in the method of rais*554ing a point in the trial court should be overlooked in a capital case in order to assure a fair trial. See State v. Davies, 146 Conn. 137, 145, 148 A.2d 251, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 921, 79 S. Ct. 1441, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1537; State v. Walters, 145 Conn. 60, 64, 138 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 46, 79 S. Ct. 70, 3 L. Ed. 2d 45; State v. Buteau, 136 Conn. 113, 115, 68 A.2d 681, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 903, 70 S. Ct. 516, 94 L. Ed. 1332.
The four prior convictions as offered in evidence by the state were: (1) August 2, 1957, attempt to kill; (2) in 1954, aggravated assault and battery; (3) in 1955, aggravated assault and battery—all of these convictions occurring in Puerto Rico—and (4) in 1961, in the Circuit Court for the twelfth circuit, aggravated assault in South Windsor. In State v. Marques, supra, this court said: “It is enough to say that the trial judge is the arbiter of the many circumstances which may arise during a trial in which his function is to assure a fair and just outcome. We believe that if a defendant testifies and, thereafter, evidence of a prior conviction is offered under circumstances in which its prejudicial effect far outweighs its materiality and relevancy on the issue of credibility in a criminal trial, its admissibility should be determined by the exercise of a sound judicial discretion.”
None of these convictions in any way has any probative relevance on the question of credibility. They were offenses remote in time, of a violent nature, of like character with the crime with which the defendant was on trial and the prejudicial tendency of the evidence of these offenses far outweighed its probative relevancy. Whether the trial judges admitted these prior convictions in evidence in the belief that they had no discretion to exclude *555them—the finding discloses the court called the attention of the defendant’s counsel to State v. Grady, 153 Conn. 26, 211 A.2d 674, where an objection on the ground that prior convictions would tend to incriminate the defendant was overruled-—or whether they failed to exercise their discretion in not admitting evidence of these prior convictions when it was plain that they should have done so; in either event, there has been an abuse of discretion. See Crowell v. Palmer, 134 Conn. 502, 512, 53 A.2d 729; Bowers, Judicial Discretion of Trial Courts §§ 19-20, pp. 31-41. “Discretion means ‘a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. In a plain case this discretion has no office to perform, and its exercise is limited to doubtful cases, where an impartial mind hesitates.’ ” Hammerberg v. Leinert, 132 Conn. 596, 604, 46 A.2d 420. I believe that the admission of these prior convictions constituted harmful and prejudicial error.
I further disagree with the majority opinion that there was no error in the conclusion of the trial court that the defendant’s arrest was a legal arrest. The majority opinion states, citing 6 C.J.S., Arrest, 1 4 (e), that there is substantial authority for the rule that an officer making an arrest pursuant to a warrant must actually have the warrant in his own possession at the time of the arrest. The majority opinion, nevertheless, declines to follow this authority. It does not distinguish between arrests made where warrants are outstanding for felonies and where they are outstanding for misdemeanors. It is only in a misdemeanor that a warrant must be in the possession of the arresting officer to constitute a valid arrest. This rule is supported by the over*556whelming weight of authority in the absence of statute in the state courts. See Smith v. State, 208 So. 2d 746, 747 (Miss.); 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1617, p. 282; Restatement (Second), 1 Torts § 126; 1 Alexander, Arrest § 92, p. 476; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest, § 72; 6 C. J.S., Arrest, § 4 (c); Fisher, Laws of Arrest § 54, pp. 114-15; Prosser, Torts (3d Ed.) § 25.
In a felony, where there is a warrant outstanding, the arresting officer may make the arrest even though he does not have the warrant in his possession, under the general principle that an officer may make a valid arrest if he has reasonable ground for belief that a felony has been committed, or that there was probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306.
Cases cited in the majority opinion of arrests made where warrants were outstanding but not in the possession of the arresting officer involved felonies, not misdemeanors. There is no great public urgency in the apprehension of criminals charged only with the commission of a misdemeanor to require the reversal of the overwhelming weight of authority, especially in a capital case where the death penalty has been imposed. At the time the defendant was placed under arrest, he had committed no crime in the presence of the officer and was not charged with the commission of a felony. The warrant at headquarters was for breach of the peace, a misdemeanor. Had he not been arrested at that time, he easily could have been arrested at a later time under the warrant, as he was not a fugitive from justice at the time and had a known place of abode. Consequently, the defendant had a right to resist the arrest. The majority opinion states *557that the defendant did not raise the question of his right to resist arrest at the time of trial. In a capital case claimed error should be considered even though not assigned in order to assure a fair trial. State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 235, 149 A.2d 698.
Section 54-2a of the General Statutes provides that “[a] 11 process issued by the [circuit] court or any judge thereof shall be served by any proper officer*, or an indifferent person when specially directed to do so, in the same manner as process issued by any other court or judge.” This would seem to require, at least in a misdemeanor, that the arresting officer have possession of the warrant. The authority to make the arrest in a misdemeanor is arrived at from the command contained in the warrant. With the warrant in his possession the arresting officer is clothed with the authority of the court and is acting pursuant to its order. See Wales v. Clark, 43 Conn. 183, 186.
Subsequent events must be viewed in the light of an illegal arrest, especially in the light of the court’s finding on the hearing with respect to the imposition of penalty that the defendant was an individual who had a brain abnormality which required dilantin to keep him under control; that he had not taken dilantin for more than a year prior to the date of the killing; and that he had a chronic brain syndrome.
I am of the opinion that the conclusion of the trial court that the arrest was legal constituted harmful error.
I believe that the judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered.