Court Opinion

ID: 989537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:08:08.860133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:12.560027
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 95-5949

ANNEKA S. BARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Parkersburg.
Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
(CR-95-112)

Submitted: May 16, 1996

Decided: June 3, 1996

Before RUSSELL, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

James M. Bradley, Jr., ALBRIGHT, BRADLEY & ELLISON, Par-
kersburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Rebecca A. Betts, United
States Attorney, Susan M. Arnold, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anneka Barker appeals the 12-month sentence she received for
mail fraud, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West Supp. 1996). She contends that
the district court clearly erred in denying her an acceptance of respon-
sibility adjustment for unrelated post-arraignment marijuana use.
USSG § 3E1.1.* We affirm.

Barker and two of her brothers staged a fake automobile accident
with Barker's car in 1991, and her insurance company paid compen-
sation to all three of them for injuries they received and for damage
to the car. Barker was arraigned in July 1995 on mail fraud charges
and was released on bond with conditions, including the condition
that she submit to drug testing. She initially refused to provide urine
samples and later tested positive for marijuana use on September 18,
1995, and on September 28, 1995.

Barker entered a guilty plea to mail fraud on September 25, 1995.
The probation officer recommended that no adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility be given because her marijuana use demonstrated
that she had not voluntarily terminated or withdrawn from criminal
conduct or associations. USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(b)). Barker
objected, asserting that she ingested the marijuana in food to help her
vision (she suffers from a serious eye condition).

At the sentencing hearing, Barker testified that she ingested mari-
juana without knowing it in food provided at a party. She said she
refused at first to provide urine samples because of privacy concerns.
Because Barker tested positive on two separate occasions, the district
court found that she had not withdrawn from criminal conduct while
on release and denied her the adjustment for acceptance of responsi-
bility. On appeal, Barker contends that continued criminal activity
which is unrelated to the offense of conviction may not be a basis for
the denial of the adjustment.
_________________________________________________________________
*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1995).

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In deciding whether to grant or deny an adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility, the district court makes a factual determination
reviewable for clear error. United States v. Curtis, 934 F.2d 553, 557
(4th Cir. 1991). The defendant's truthful admission of her conduct in
the offense of conviction and her voluntary withdrawal from all crimi-
nal conduct are both factors for the court to consider under USSG
§ 3E1.1. Conduct outside the count of conviction is thus relevant to
the district court's decision. United States v. Choate, 12 F.3d 1318,
1320 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, #6D6D 6D# U.S. ___, 62 U.S.L.W. 3842
(U.S. June 20, 1994) (No. 93-8468). Only the Sixth Circuit has held,
in United States v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730, 733-35 (6th Cir. 1993),
that conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction may not be a basis
for the denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment. Other cir-
cuits have held that the adjustment may be denied because of such
conduct. See United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 142-44 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1991); United
States v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1990). Because Barker
engaged in additional criminal conduct on several occasions after her
arraignment, the district court did not clearly err in denying her the
adjustment.

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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