Court Opinion

ID: 9396791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:13.926761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.806690
License: Public Domain

J-S38008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 BARBARA MASON                           :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant            :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 DOUGLAS ROSENBLUM                       :    No. 1306 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 210201867

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED MAY 23, 2023

      Barbara Mason (“Mason”) appeals from the order granting the motion

of Douglas Rosenblum (“Rosenblum”) for judgment on the pleadings and

dismissing Mason’s complaint. We affirm.

      The trial court provided the relevant factual and procedural history as

follows:

             In . . . 2017, [Rosenblum] engaged in a child custody
      proceeding     with    [Mason’s]   daughter,    seeking    custody
      arrangements [for Mason’s] grandchild. During the course of
      these proceedings, [Rosenblum] introduced an audiotape from
      2006 which had allegedly recorded [Mason’s] husband directing
      hostile and threatening language toward [Rosenblum’s] parents.
      [Rosenblum] continued to reference this audiotape throughout the
      duration of the child custody proceedings, until the matter settled
      on February 22, 2019.

            On February 19, 2021, [Mason] filed a Writ of Summons
      against [Rosenblum] and a [c]omplaint on June 7, 2021.
      [Mason’s] suit alleged damages for intentional infliction of
      emotional distress stemming from the use of the audiotape during
      the custody proceeding. The [c]omplaint further alleged that
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      [Rosenblum] manufactured and doctored the audiotape[] for use
      in the custody proceedings, with the intent to negatively impact
      [Mason’s] relationship with her granddaughter.

             [I]n July [] 2021, [Rosenblum] filed preliminary
      objections[,] claiming that [Mason’s] [c]omplaint was legally
      insufficient, included scandalous matters, and violated the statute
      of limitations. [I]n August [] 2021, [the trial court] overruled all
      of [Rosenblum’s] preliminary objections. [Rosenblum then filed
      an answer with new matter, including a counterclaim. Mason filed
      preliminary objections to the counterclaim, which the trial court
      sustained, but no reply to the new matter.]

            On February 28, 2022, [Rosenblum] filed a [m]otion for
      [j]udgment on the [p]leadings, arguing that [Mason’s] claims
      were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. [Only thereafter,
      on March 7, 2022, did Mason file a reply to the new matter in
      Rosenbum’s answer. Mason also filed on March 21, 2022 a
      response to Rosenblum’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.]
      On April 7, 2022, [another judge of the same court] granted
      [Rosenblum’s] motion.

             [I]n April [] 2022, [Mason] filed a [m]otion for
      [r]econsideration . . .. On May 5, 2022, [Mason timely] filed [her
      n]otice [of a]ppeal and filed a [c]oncise [s]tatement of [m]atters
      [c]omplained of on [a]ppeal [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and
      the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)]. . ..

Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 1-2.

      Mason raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law in finding that
         [Rosenblum’s] conduct forming the basis of [Mason’s]
         allegations in the[] complaint was outside the two[-]year
         statute of limitations?

      2. Did the [c]ourt err as a matter of law in contradicting the law
         of the case when [Mason’s] preliminary objections raised the
         same issue of statute of limitations and were overruled?

Mason’s Brief at 4.

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      Our standard of review for orders granting judgment on the pleadings

is as follows:

             [A]ppellate review . . . is limited to determining whether the
      trial court committed an error of law or whether there were facts
      presented which warrant a jury trial. In conducting this review,
      we look only to the pleadings and any documents properly
      attached thereto. Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where
      the pleadings evidence that there are no material facts in dispute
      such that a trial by jury would be unnecessary.

             In passing on a challenge to the sustaining of a motion for
      judgment on the pleadings, our standard of review is limited. We
      must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact of the party
      against whom the motion is granted and consider against him only
      those facts that he specifically admits. We will affirm the grant of
      such a motion only when the moving party’s right to succeed is
      certain and the case is so free from doubt that the trial would
      clearly be a fruitless exercise.

John T. Gallaher Timber Transfer v. Hamilton, 932 A.2d 963, 967 (Pa.

Super. 2007) (internal citation and indentation omitted); see also Monroe

v. CBH20, LP, 286 A.3d 785, 796 (Pa. Super. 2022) (stating that “[o]ur

review [in such cases] . . . is limited to determining whether the trial court

abused its discretion or committed an error law”) (internal citation omitted).

      As both of Mason’s issues hinge on an assertion that the trial court erred

as a matter of law in granting Rosenblum’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings, we address them together. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

1034 provides:

            (a) After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such
      time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any party may move
      for judgment on the pleadings.

                                    ****

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            (b) The court shall enter such judgment or order as shall be
       proper on the pleadings.

Pa.R.C.P. 1034.

       The applicable statute of limitations for certain tortious conduct,

including intentional infliction of emotional distress,1 is two years:

             The following actions and proceedings must be commenced
       within two years:

                                         ****

                    (7) Any other action or proceeding to recover
              damages for injury to person or property which is
              founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise
              tortious conduct or any other action or proceeding
              sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud, except
              an action or proceeding subject to another limitation
              specified in this subchapter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524; see also Long v. Ostroff, 854 A.2d 524, 529 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (applying section 5524(7) to an intentional inflection of

emotional distress claim). Statutes of limitation begin to run when a claim

accrues. See, e.g., Kornfeind v. New Werner Holding Co., Inc., 280 A.3d

918, 928 (Pa. 2022).2 Generally, “for purposes of the statute of limitations,

____________________________________________

1 “The gravamen of the tort of [intentional infliction of emotional distress] is
outrageous conduct on the part of the tortfeasor. Specifically, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant[,] by extreme and outrageous conduct[,]
intentionally or recklessly cause[d] severe emotional distress.” Gray v.
Huntzinger, 147 A.3d 924, 927 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal citations and
quotations omitted; some brackets in original).

2Mason concedes that the two-year statute of limitations applies.          See
Mason’s Brief at 14.

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a cause of action accrues, and the right to institute suit arises, when an injury

is inflicted.” Bulebosh v. Flannery, 91 A.3d 1241, 1246 (Pa. Super. 2014).3

       Pursuant to the coordinate jurisdiction rule, which this Court has

described as an aspect of the law of the case doctrine, “a trial court judge may

generally not alter the resolution of a legal question previously decided by

another judge of the court.” Heart Care Consultants, LLC v. Albataineh,

239 A.3d 126, 132 (Pa. Super. 2020). This Court has further explained:

       This rule, however, applies only where the second judge rules on
       the same type of motion as the first judge; [thus,] the coordinate
       jurisdiction rule does not bar a judge at a later and different
       procedural stage of the proceedings from overruling another
       judge’s decision on preliminary objections, even on an identical
       legal issue and even where the record is unchanged.

Id. (emphasis added).         Crucially, “[w]here the motions differ in kind, as

preliminary objections differ from motions for judgment on the pleadings,

which differ from motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later

motion is not precluded from granting relief although another judge has

denied an earlier motion.” Riccio v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 705 A.2d 422,

425 (Pa. 1997) (internal citation omitted).4

____________________________________________

3 The statute of limitations may be tolled “[i]n those instances where a party
is reasonably unaware of his or her injury at the time the cause of action
accrued or the causal connection between an injury and another’s conduct . .
..” Bulebosh, 91 A.3d at 1246 (internal citation omitted).

4 Affirmative defenses, including statutes of limitation, are properly raised in
new matter, rather than in preliminary objections. Compare Pa.R.C.P. 1030
(providing that affirmative defenses, including statute of limitations, are
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Mason asserts the trial court erred in granting Rosenblum’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings because she initiated her action against Rosenblum

within the two-year statute of limitations. See Mason’s Brief at 14. Mason

maintains Rosenblum’s tortious conduct was not limited to the introduction of

the “altered tape” in 2017, but continued up until the settlement of the custody

matter on February 22, 2019. See id. As Mason filed her praecipe for a writ

of summons on February 19, 2021, she argues the statute of limitations did

not bar the action. Mason lastly asserts that because the trial court denied a

statute of limitations defense at the preliminary objections stage, the law of

the case doctrine prohibited a contrary ruling at the motion for judgment on

the pleadings stage. See id. at 16-17.

       The trial court considered Mason’s issue and concluded it merited no

relief. The court explained:

              Here, [Mason] alleges that [Rosenblum] used a recording in
       2017 with the intent to cause [her] emotional harm. The subject
       recording was made in 2006. [See] Compl. ¶ 12. [Mason] alleges
       that she came to learn of the recording through the course of the
       child custody proceedings involving her daughter and
       [Rosenblum] in 2017. [See] Compl. ¶ 12-13. [Mason] alleges in
       her complaint that, in December of 2017, a court-appointed
       evaluator made a custody recommendation based on the
       recording. [See] Compl. ¶ 18-19. In addition, [Mason’s] husband
       filed a separate suit against [Rosenblum] in 2017, also regarding
       the recording in question. [See] Compl. ¶ 20. Based on these
       events listed in [Mason’s] own complaint, [Mason] first became
____________________________________________

properly raised in new matter) with Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4), note (stating that
“[t]he defense of . . . statute of limitations can be asserted only in a responsive
pleading as new matter under Rule 1030”).

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     aware of the recording in 2017, as well as the allegedly negative
     effect it was having on her and her family.

            Therefore, [Mason’s] action accrued in 2017 as she had
     reason to know of the injuries being inflicted by this recording.
     Since [Mason] did not initiate this claim until February 19, 2021,
     the statute of limitations would bar any action that accrued prior
     to February 19, 2019. [Mason] alleged in her complaint that a
     “continuing course of conduct continued through February 22,
     2019.” Compl. ¶ 31. However, [Mason’s] conclusory allegation
     contains neither specific actions of [Rosenblum] nor dates of those
     actions on or after February 19, 2019 that would form the basis
     of a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, as required
     by [Pa.R.C.P.] 1029(f).

                                     ****

           [Regarding Mason’s law of the case issue,] a court involved
     in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen
     questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a
     higher court in the earlier phases of the matter. However, where
     motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections differ from
     motions for judgment on the pleadings . . . a judge ruling on a
     later motion is not precluded from granting relief although another
     judge has denied an earlier motion. As such, this court was not
     precluded from granting [Rosenblum’s] motion for judgment on
     the pleadings[,] even if the statute of limitations issue was
     overruled in a prior preliminary objection.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/22, at 4-6 (some internal citations, quotations,

underlining, and unnecessary capitalization omitted).

     Following our review, we discern no error of law by the trial court.

According to Mason’s complaint, the recording was created around 2006 or

2007. See Complaint, 6/7/21, at ¶ 12. Rosenblum filed a custody petition in

2017 and presented the recording to a court-appointed custody evaluator.

See id.   at   ¶¶   11-18.     The   custody   evaluator    allegedly   “made   a

recommendation . . . based largely on the fraudulent tape that was given to

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her.” Id. at ¶ 18. The evaluator also interviewed Mason and her husband

“after listening to the fraudulent tape . . ..” Id. Mason alleged, at that time,

“[t]he lies that were told during the evaluation process caused extreme stress

and suffering to [her].”          Id.     After the custody evaluator made her

recommendation, Mason’s daughter sought a trial, which was scheduled for

December 2017. See id. at ¶ 19. As the foregoing illustrates, Rosenblum

presented the recording in 2017, at which time, Mason became aware of its

existence and suffered “extreme stress and suffering.” Accordingly, Mason’s

alleged injury was first inflicted in 2017, and her cause of action therefore

accrued at that time. See Bulebosh, 91 A.3d at 1246.5 Because Mason did

not initiate suit within two years of her injury, but rather waited until 2021,

her claim fell outside of the two-year statute of limitations, and the trial court

committed no error of law in granting Rosenblum’s motion for judgment on

the pleadings.

       The trial court likewise committed no error of law in concluding that its

ruling at the preliminary objections stage did not preclude it from granting

relief following Rosenblum’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. As noted

____________________________________________

5 While Mason alleges Rosenblum’s tortious conduct continued through the
duration of the custody proceedings up to the settlement on February 22,
2019, she advanced no specific dates or separate injuries following
Rosenblum’s 2017 production of the recording; and, in any event, by Mason’s
own factual averments, she was aware of the injury in 2017. Cf. Bulebosh,
91 A.3d at 1246 (explaining that the statute of limitations may be tolled in
some instances where a party was reasonably unaware of her injury at the
time the cause of action accrued).

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above, where motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections differ from

motions for judgment on the pleadings, a judicial ruling granting relief on a

later motion is not precluded merely because an earlier motion was denied.

See Riccio, 705 A.2d at 425; see also Pa.R.C.P. 1030 (providing that a

statute of limitations defense should be raised in new matter); cf. Pa.R.C.P.

20128(a)(4), note (stating that a statute of limitations defense should not be

asserted in preliminary objections but new matter). Thus, the trial court did

not contravene the coordinate jurisdiction rule by granting Rosenblum’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the statute of limitations

defense, notwithstanding the court’s earlier overruling of Rosenblum’s

preliminary objections in which he asserted the same defense.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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