Court Opinion

ID: 9730712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:21:25.733346+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:08.793116
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(concurring specially);
I agree that there was no probable cause for issuance of the arrest warrant. Conceding that appellant’s presence at the pretrial lineup was a direct result of the illegal arrest, the testimony concerning the victim’s out-of-court identification of appellant should have been excluded. It may be noted, however, that there was no connection between the illegal arrest and the victim’s in-court identification of appellant as the person who robbed her. The authorities’ knowledge of appellant’s identity and the victim’s independent recollections of him both predated the illegal arrest. The victim’s presence in the courtroom was not the result of any police misconduct, nor can appellant challenge his own presence in the courtroom. As stated in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471-72, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d 537, 546 (1980), “this is not a case in which the witness’ identity was discovered or her cooperation secured only as a result of an unlawful search or arrest of the accused.”
A determination that an independent origin existed for the in-court identification would find support in the record. The victim observed appellant at very close range for three or four minutes during the course of the robbery. She watched him closely because “when he pulled the gun on me, I froze for a minute and just looked at him.” That she noted carefully his appearance is borne out by the detailed description she gave the police. She described appellant accurately as to height and weight, and readily recalled details of his clothing style and color. The investigating officer testified that he elicited the description from her three times and that there were no discrepancies. Thus, while the intervening out-of-court identification may be conceded to be a suppressible fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation, her in-court identification was based upon the mental image formed at the time of the robbery if, at trial, “she retrieved this mnemonic representation, compared it to the figure of the defendant, and positively identified him as the robber.” United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. at 472, 100 S.Ct. at 1250, 63 L.Ed.2d at 546. The trial court, however, was not called upon to rule on the admissibility of the in-court identification. Thus, as Justice *801Morgan’s opinion points out, there is no reviewable issue concerning the existence or absence of an independent origin for the victim’s in-court identification. Cf. State v. Reiman, 284 N.W.2d 860, 872 (S.D.1979).
I am authorized to state that Justice Dunn and Justice Henderson join in this special concurrence.