Court Opinion

ID: 9791221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:46.097109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.949455
License: Public Domain

Andersen, J.
(dissenting)—I do not agree that the trial court erred. I would affirm the defendant's conviction.
The defendant had been drinking heavily when he went to the Bethlehem Steel Corporation plant in Seattle carrying a pistol. While there, he struck his supervisor twice about the head with his fists, then followed him into his office where he shot him in the stomach. The victim was taken to the hospital where emergency surgery was required to save his life.
The King County Prosecuting Attorney charged the defendant with assault in the first degree while armed with a deadly weapon and firearm.
The central focus of the jury trial was on whether the defendant intended to kill the victim, in which event he could be found guilty of assault in the first degree, or whether the defendant had no such intent and in which *109event he could be found guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree.
At the trial, considerable defense testimony was admitted, including psychiatric opinion testimony, to the effect that the defendant's ability to form the specific intent necessary to convict him of assault in the first degree was impaired.
The jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of assault in the second degree and returned a special verdict that he was armed with a deadly weapon and firearm at the time.
Much of the defense psychiatrist's questioning was based on hypothetical questions, that is, on questions which were a combination of assumed or proved facts stated in such form as to constitute a specific state of facts upon which the expert's opinion could be given to the jury.
The appellate courts of this state have always held that the trial court has wide discretion in determining whether or not expert opinion evidence is admissible. See 5 R. Meisenholder, Wash. Prac. § 352 (Supp. 1979); ER 702. It is also basic that "[a] wide discretion must be granted the trial judge in exercising his judgment and common sense in determining limits upon expert testimony." (Italics mine.) Poston v. Clinton, 66 Wn.2d 911, 917, 406 P.2d 623 (1965).
Here the trial court exercised its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence certain of the defense psychiatrist's testimony. Such testimony was before the court by way of questioning of the witness outside of the jury's presence. In reviewing the trial court's discretionary ruling, our function is limited.

The sole issue is whether the trial judge abused his discretion. Such abuse occurs only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.

(Italics mine.) State v. Huelett, 92 Wn.2d 967, 969, 603 P.2d 1258 (1979).
I do not believe that "no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.'' I feel just the opposite is true. The psychiatrist proposed to testify in such terms *110as the following: explosive scenarios; impaired ego controls; impaired conscious perception of reality resulting in destructive attempts; the defendant being blinded by emotional factors; reacting with massive depersonalized destructiveness, etc. All of this was against a backdrop of the defendant's own testimony that something inside him simply "snapped" and he did not recall his deeds.
The experienced trial judge in denying the admission of such testimony fully explained the several bases for his ruling. Among other things, he pointed out that the court has "a responsibility to prohibit testimony that could mislead the jury and that is not probative to the legal issues before the court and jury." I agree. As illustrative of the psychiatric morass that was involved here, I have set out in the margin a brief colloquy wherein the psychiatrist characterizes his testimony concerning the "ego control" he was testifying about.8
The trial judge stated, among other cogent reasons, that the refused testimony "just sounds to me very much like irresistible impulse coming in the back door ..." Again I *111agree. Since "irresistible impulse" is not a legal defense to a criminal charge in this state, State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 591, 374 P.2d 942 (1962), the trial court's ruling was not erroneous. The defendant thus fell far short of carrying his heavy burden of proving an abuse of discretion by the trial court when it refused to admit the psychiatric testimony in question into evidence.
It is uncontroverted that the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon and firearm at the time he shot the victim. I see no merit in the defendant's further argument that his penalty should not be enhanced, as provided by law, because of that fact.
After a fairly conducted trial at which all legal defenses were fully presented and argued to the jury, the jury unanimously found beyond any reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crime of assault in the second degree. I would affirm the conviction.
Reconsideration denied March 6, 1981.
Review denied by Supreme Court May 8, 1981.

illustrative colloquy between the psychiatrist, trial court and deputy prosecuting attorney was as follows:
"The Witness: Your Honor, if it is any help, what I am talking about is a dis-associative reaction rather than a schizophrenic reaction, neurotic rather than ego autonomy, and, in my interpretation, specific intent does mean conscious and willful. I don't know if I can sit here and interpret it any other way. If you say specific intent to me, that's conscious and willful.
"The Court: All right, thank you.
"The Witness: And in psychiatric terms, it refers to ego autonomy, and in this case you can have slippage, you can lose partial control rather than a complete control as in a flagrant psychosis.
"[Deputy Prosecuting Attorney]: Excuse me, Doctor. What about general intent, is that also, is that the same thing in terms of willfulness and ego autonomy?
"The Witness: I think so, but I am not sure. I am talking about specific intent as motivation versus unconscious motivation.
"The Court: All right.
"The Witness: Talking about free will versus determinus.
"The Court: This is extremely interesting and esoteric, and, as usual, we, the law and the psychiatry are at, I hope, creative tension, but at least we do have some disagreements."