Court Opinion

ID: 9826221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 15:36:05.48297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:57.188635
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marion :
I concur in the result. I think so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice Fraser, as refers to and disposes of the contention that the trial Judge committed error in reading from the opinion of this Court on a former appeal, is too broadly stated in that it is open to the construction that it is always proper for a trial Court to read to the jury from an opinion of the Supreme Court in that particular case. Obviously, the trial Judge on a new trial has mo more right to refer to, state, or, comment on the facts than the trial Court had at the first trial. In disposing of the points raised on appeal, it is not only necessary for the Supreme Court to state the facts, but it is frequently necessary to analyze and discuss the evidence in relation to the contention of law — a prerogative expressly denied to the trial Judge by the provisions of the Constitution, Article 5, § 26. It is equally obvious that the trial Court is not relieved of the duty to obey the constitutional mandate by the fact that the case has been in the Supreme Court, and that an opinion stating and discussing the facts has been delivered by that Court. It follows that if the matter read to the jury from an opinion of this Court embraces any reference to or comment on the facts of the case, which it would have been improper for the trial Court to make on the first trial in declaring the law, without charging “in respect to matters *62of fact,” as required by the Constitution, such reading would constitute a plain violation of the constitutional inhibition.
As to whether the Circuit Judge’s action, complained of in the present case, should be held for reversible error, I express no opinion.