Court Opinion

ID: 9767105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:10:08.419702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:28.649856
License: Public Domain

HUDOCK, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the majority in its disposition of the merits of this appeal. I also agree that while the belated entry of judgment by Appellant unquestionably gives this court jurisdiction, Appellant’s prior refusal to enter judgment upon notification to do so by this court requires this court to clarify our authority to address an appeal from an order upon which judgment has not been entered. My disagreement with the majority’s discussion of our authority under these circumstances results from my belief that we do have the authority to hear the appeal, while not being required to. I do not read Bonavitacola v. Cluver, supra, 422 Pa.Super. 556, 619 A.2d 1363, as *295mandating that we hear an appeal where judgment has not been entered. Rather I believe Bonavitacola leaves to our discretion whether or not to hear the appeal, and as thus interpreted, I concur with its holding.
The majority finds the entry of judgment to be a sine qua non to jurisdiction, yet it acknowledges that our Supreme Court has .found jurisdiction to exist in certain situations where judgment has not been entered. The rationale of the Court in those situations was that we may “regard as done that which ought to have been done.” McCormick v. Northeastern Bank of PA, supra, 522 Pa. 251, 561 A.2d 328. The majority distinguishes those cases on the basis that the failure to enter judgment was the result of oversight, not outright refusal as was the case in Bonavitacola and here.
But if, as the majority opines, entry of judgment is the sole and exclusive talisman creating jurisdiction, then the intent of the parties is irrelevant. Logically, the majority must hold that if there is a judgment, there is jurisdiction; if there is no judgment, there is no jurisdiction. Yet our Supreme Court has held otherwise in the very cases cited by the majority.
I believe our Supreme Court has authorized our court to overlook this defect in procedure when the interest of justice or judicial economy requires it, as with any other procedural defect.
McEWEN, DEL SOLE and SAYLOR, JJ„ join.