Court Opinion

ID: 9960201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 17:10:01.143498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:16.681262
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Platt, 2024-Ohio-1331.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ATHENS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Plaintiff-Appellant,                     : CASE NO. 23CA9

        v.                                       :

DONALD PLATT,                                    : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellee.                      :

________________________________________________________________

                                            APPEARANCES:

Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Merry M. Saunders, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Athens, Ohio,
for appellant.

Addison M. Spring, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus,
Ohio, for appellee1.
________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:4-2-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from an Athens County Common Pleas

Court judgment that granted judicial release to Donald Platt,

defendant below and appellee herein.                  The State of Ohio,

plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns one error for

review:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED
                 PLATT’S MOTION FOR JUDICIAL RELEASE WITHOUT
                 ARTICULATING THE REQUISITE FACTORS

        1
        Different counsel represented appellant during the trial
court proceedings.
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                   2

            SUPPORTING ITS DECISION PURSUANT TO R.C.
            2929.20(J).”

     {¶2}   On March 5, 2021, appellee’s 14-year-old son, M.P.,

removed a loaded weapon from an unlocked gun cabinet and

accidentally shot and killed 11-year-old E.S., a friend of

appellee’s 11-year-old son, L.P.    See State v. Platt, 4th Dist.

Athens No. 22CA2, ____ Ohio ____.    After a jury found appellee

guilty of involuntary manslaughter, in violation of R.C.

2903.04(A), a first-degree felony, and child endangering, in

violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), a third-degree felony, the trial

court (1) merged the endangering children offense with the

involuntary manslaughter offense, (2) sentenced appellee to

serve an indefinite four- to six-year prison term, (3) issued

the required Reagan Tokes Act notifications, and (4) ordered a

mandatory five-year post-release control term.     This court

affirmed appellee’s convictions in Platt, supra.

     {¶3}   On December 8, 2022, appellee filed a motion for

judicial release, pursuant to R.C. 2929.20.2   At appellee’s

judicial release hearing, the trial court reviewed appellee’s

rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated, heard arguments from

     2
      Appellee applied for judicial release under the former
version of R.C. 2929.20, effective March 22, 2019 to April 3,
2023. The latest version of R.C. 2929.20, effective October 3,
2023, and other versions in between, add, among other items,
language regarding state of emergency-qualifying offenders, but
otherwise is substantively the same regarding issues related to
this appeal.
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  3

the state and appellee’s counsel, and considered victim impact

statements from two of the victim’s sisters.    In addition,

appellee testified that he felt “truly remorseful” and wanted to

“get out and be a better father.”

    {¶4}   The trial court stated on the record that appellee had

“been held accountable.”    The court further noted that appellee

(1) is a “first-time felony offender,”(2) had “never [been] in

trouble previously,” (3) had “indications of drug use,” (4)

“never had a problem with the boys previously handling the

firearm,” and (5) the firearm “was removed without his knowledge

or permission.”    The court noted that appellee taught the boys

gun safety and, although appellee may have left the cabinet

unlocked that day, he did not know that they knew the gun

cabinet’s combination.

    {¶5}   The trial court also found that appellee had two

“minor” violations on his institutional summary report, one “for

being out of place the other was for not reporting to work on

time.”    The court further noted that certifications in the

record show that appellee “completed course work” while in

prison.    For example, appellee participated in the

“transformational program, how to be a responsible father, how

to cage your rage one and two,” “the only person you cheat is

you,” and Bible study.     Therefore, the court found that appellee

“made somewhat productive use of his time there as well as if I
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                   4

remember correctly working while he’s been there.”

    {¶6}   The trial court further found that appellee “has been

adequately punished” and “the chance of recidivism is low.     He

is no longer legally allowed to proses [sic.] a firearm.”     The

court concluded that the “factors reviewed” * * * [are]

“outweighed by his completion of programming while in prison”

and * * * his low security levels.”   The court stated that

judicial release would:

    protect the public from future criminal violations by
    the offender because the factors indicating a lesser
    likelihood of recidivism are present and outweigh the
    applicable factors indicating the greater likelihood of
    recidivism as well as B that a sanction other than prison
    here would be in addition to prison but not to demean
    the seriousness of the offense because the factors here
    indicating the eligible offenders conduct was less
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense
    and outweighs the factors indicating that his conduct
    was more serious than conduct normally constituting the
    offense.

    {¶7}   Accordingly, the trial court granted judicial release.

The following facts are taken from the trial court’s May 4, 2023

entry:

    The Court finds Defendant has served more than one year
    on his four to six year indeterminate sentence.     The
    Court finds as a result that Defendant is eligible to
    apply for judicial release.

    Pursuant to R.C. 2929.20 a court shall not grant a
    judicial release under this section to an eligible
    offender who is imprisoned for a felony of the first or
    second degree, or to an eligible offender who committed
ATHENS, 23CA9                                               5

    an offense under Chapter 2925 or 3719 of the Revised
    Code and for whom there was a presumption under section
    2929.13 of the Revised Code in favor of a prison term,
    unless the court makes certain findings.        See R.C.
    Section 2929.20(J)(1). After hearing from counsel,
    review of the record, after hearing from the victim’s
    family, after hearing from Defendant, the court finds
    with reference to factors under section 2929.12 of the
    Revised Code, including but not limited to, Defendant
    owed a duty of care to the victim visiting his residence,
    Defendant was remorseful for his actions (or lack of
    action in securing the cabinet lock), this was
    Defendant’s first felony offense, the victim was a minor
    visiting the residence and suffered a fatal single shot
    by the mishandling of a firearm by Defendant’s minor
    son, that the cabinet had a lock - that it was unlocked
    - and Defendant’s children knew the combination, that
    there was no animosity or ill will among any of those
    involved, that the victim’s family suffered a tragic
    loss, that the Defendant nor Defendant’s minor son did
    not expect to cause any physical harm to the victim, the
    offense was committed under circumstances unlikely to
    recur, and that the shooting itself by Defendant’s minor
    son was accidental. The Court further finds a sanction
    other than a prison term would adequately punish the
    offender and protect the public from future criminal
    violations by the eligible offender because the
    applicable factors indicating a lesser likelihood of
    recidivism outweigh the applicable factors indicating a
    greater likelihood of recidivism and that a sanction
    other than a prison term would not demean the seriousness
    of the offense because factors indicating that the
    eligible offender’s conduct in committing the offense
    was less serious than conduct normally constituting the
    offense outweigh factors indicating that the eligible
    offender’s conduct was more serious than conduct
    normally constituting the offense.

    Some underlying facts of this case include Defendant had
    firearms in his residence, Defendant had firearms in a
    closed cabinet that was typically locked, however, the
    lock was not closed on the night of the event.
    Defendant’s older minor son gained access to the cabinet
    and removed one of the firearms without permission or
    knowledge of Defendant. There was testimony at trial
    Defendant’s sons knew the combination of the lock
    although Defendant did not know that his sons knew the
    combination. The victim, also a juvenile, was visiting
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                   6

    overnight. The older of Defendant’s two boys was showing
    the firearm to the victim without the permission of
    Defendant father.    The testimony was that he did not
    know the firearm was loaded, that he dropped the firearm,
    and when he went to grab it, it accidentally discharged
    striking the victim fatally in his torso.

    Defendant testified previously at trial that he has
    taught the boys gun safety in the past, has shot firearms
    with the boys, and never had a problem with the boys
    using firearms. He also had not had any problems in the
    past with the boys taking any firearms out of the cabinet
    without his permission or knowing it. The Defendant’s
    older boy testified that he thought the lock was open,
    but that he knew the combination of the lock. Defendant
    believed the lock was closed and did not know either of
    his boys knew the combination.      Defendant previously
    testified that it was his practice to keep the gun
    cabinet locked and the guns unloaded.           Defendant
    apparently did not know that the boys knew the
    combination of the lock.        Defendant did not give
    permission for either of his boys to take any firearm or
    ammunition out of the cabinet that night or to show the
    victim the firearm.     Defendant was unaware that the
    firearm was removed from the cabinet until the event
    occurred although he was home at the time. Defendant
    testified at trial that he did not know that the gun was
    loaded and that he unloads his guns after shooting and
    that the firearm should have been unloaded. Defendant’s
    boys knew that Defendant (father) required that
    Defendant be present when they were handling any
    firearms and that they were not to have any firearms out
    without him being present.

    There is no other information from trial or at this
    hearing that the action of Defendant’s son in dropping
    and firing the firearm was anything but accidental.
    Defendant’s older juvenile son testified that he dropped
    the firearm while showing it to the victim, and as it
    dropped grabbed it around the trigger guard and
    accidentally discharged the firearm resulting in the
    victim being fatally struck. The result being that the
    minor victim lost his life as a result is truly tragic.
    At trial Defendant testified that he was in the house,
    but was unaware that the gun was removed from the cabinet
    and that it was removed without his knowledge or
    permission.
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                   7

    Defendant expressed remorse at the judicial release
    hearing and at trial testified he tried to help the
    victim unsuccessfully and appeared remorseful.

    Considering Defendant’s institutional summary report,
    there are two violations noted over the course of a year.
    One was for being out of place and the other for not
    reporting to work. Of these, the Court finds neither
    are significant.    The Court finds that both of these
    entries are minor. The Court finds this is Defendant’s
    first felony offense. The Court finds that there also
    was a showing that Defendant used suboxone without
    prescription and marijuana around the time of the event.
    The Court also notes that he is classified at the lowest
    security level and that while in prison he was housed in
    the honor dorm. He had also competed programming while
    in prison and was engaged in work details as required,
    excepting the one infraction.

    Considering all the above, the record, and the factors
    under 2929.12, under these circumstances the Court finds
    that granting judicial release herein would adequately
    punish the Defendant and that judicial release and
    sanctions would result in Defendant refraining from
    similar conduct in the future. The Court finds that the
    public is protected in that the likelihood of a similar
    event occurring is small as Defendant is ordered not to
    possess a firearm as a condition of his judicial release
    supervision. Further Defendant can no longer lawfully
    possess a firearm.    Even possessing a firearm in his
    household would be construed to be in violation of
    judicial release supervision terms.     The Court finds
    that a sanction that he complete a community based
    correctional facility program (after now serving more
    than one year in prison) adequately punishes the
    offender and protects the public from future criminal
    violations.   In   reviewing  the   applicable   factors
    including those under R.C. 2929.12, the Court finds
    under these facts it does indicate a lesser likelihood
    of   recidivism   outweighs   the   applicable   factors
    indicating a greater likelihood of recidivism. Further,
    the court finds that Defendant’s conduct was not more
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offenses
    addressed herein.      The Court finds that granting
    judicial release at this time would not demean the
    seriousness of the offenses and granting judicial
    release with additional conditions would constitute
    adequate punishment under these facts. The Court finds
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  8

    that Defendant’s conduct was not more serious than
    conduct normally found in such offenses and that such
    conduct does not outweigh factors indicating that
    Defendant’s conduct was more serious than conduct
    normally constituting these offenses. The Court finds
    at this time a sanction other than a prison term would
    not demean the seriousness of the offense because
    factors indicating that the eligible offender’s conduct
    in committing the offense was less serious than conduct
    normally constituting the offense outweigh factors
    indicating that the eligible offender’s conduct was more
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense.

    Consequently, the trial court granted judicial release and

ordered appellee: (1) be placed on five years community control,

(2) report to the Adult Parole Authority (APA), (3) obtain and

maintain employment throughout community control, (4) pay court

costs in full by December 31, 2025, (5) have no contact with the

victim or victim’s family, (6) not possess or consume alcoholic

beverages or illegal drugs, (7) contact Health Recovery Services

or TASC or Hopewell with twenty-four business hours, (8) not

possess or use any controlled substances unless prescribed, (9)

remain a law abiding citizen, (10) not leave the state without

permission of the court or APA, (11) obey all court orders, (12)

not possess any firearm personally or at his residence, (13)

serve a mandatory two-year minimum to five year maximum post-

release control term, and (14) successfully enroll and complete

STAR Community Based Correctional Facility (or equivalent),

follow all recommendations, sign all releases, and follow all

aftercare instructions.   This appeal followed.
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  9

                        Standard of Review

    {¶8}   According to R.C. 2953.08(B)(3), the state may appeal,

as a matter of right, a trial court's decision to grant judicial

release to an offender sentenced for a felony of the first or

second degree.   State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149, 77 N.E.3d 479,

¶ 11 (12th Dist.); State v. Kennedy, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

22AP-534, 22AP-536, 2023-Ohio-3078, ¶ 13; State v. Gilbert, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2022-02-021, 2022-Ohio-3387, ¶ 15.    An

appellate court applies the standard of review found in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) when it reviews a trial court's decision to grant

judicial release.   Gilbert, supra; State v. Nichter, 10th Dist.

2019-Ohio-279, 129 N.E.3d 984, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).

    {¶9}   Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may

modify or vacate a sentence on appeal “only if it determines by

clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support

the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law.”   State v. Marcum, 146

Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.    “This is

an ‘extremely deferential’ standard of review for the

restriction is on the appellate court, not the trial judge.”

Ledford at ¶ 11, citing State v. Geldrich, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2015-11-103, 2016-Ohio-3400, ¶ 6.   “Clear and convincing

evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a

mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    10

such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in

criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier

of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to

be established.”   Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d

118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

    {¶10} Judicial release is governed by R.C. 2929.20.    The

General Assembly amended R.C. 2929.20, effective October 3,

2023.   The version of the statute in effect when the trial court

decided this motion provides pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(J):

    (1) A court shall not grant a judicial release under
    this section to an eligible offender who is imprisoned
    for a felony of the first or second degree * * * unless
    the court, with reference to factors under section
    2929.12 of the Revised Code, finds both of the following:

          (a) That a sanction other than a prison term
          would adequately punish the offender and
          protect the public from future criminal
          violations by the eligible offender because
          the applicable factors indicating a lesser
          likelihood   of   recidivism  outweigh   the
          applicable factors indicating a greater
          likelihood of recidivism;

          (b) That a sanction other than a prison term
          would not demean the seriousness of the
          offense because factors indicating that the
          eligible offender’s conduct in committing the
          offense was less serious than conduct normally
          constituting the offense outweigh factors
          indicating that the eligible offender’s
          conduct was more serious than conduct normally
          constituting the offense.

    (2) A court that grants judicial release to an eligible
    offender under division (G)(1) of this section shall
    specify on the record both findings required in that
    division and also shall list all the factors described
    in that division that were presented at the hearing.
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    11

    {¶11} At the outset, we observe that the state does not

argue that appellee is ineligible for judicial release, but

rather that the trial court failed to make the necessary

findings under R.C. 2929.20(J) to permit judicial release.

Appellate courts must recognize, however, that trial courts are

empowered to “liberally and expeditiously grant appropriate

requests for judicial release.”   State ex rel. Lichtenwalter v.

DeWine, 158 Ohio St.3d 1476, 2020-Ohio-1465, 143 N.E.3d 507, ¶ 3

(Donnelly, J., concurring), State v. Burns, 9th Dist. Summit No.

29811, 2021-Ohio-3667, ¶ 15; State v. Watkins, 2020-Ohio-5203,

162 N.E.3d 141, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).

    {¶12} The state makes three arguments.    First, concerning

R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a), the state asserts that the trial court

implied that appellee had been adequately punished because he

had already served a term of imprisonment.    Second, the state

contends that the court failed to justify its findings with an

analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors.    Finally, the

state asserts that the court failed to specify both the required

findings and factors described pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(J)(2).

                      R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a)

    {¶13} We begin with the state’s argument that the trial
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                 12

court implied that appellee had been adequately punished because

he had served a term of imprisonment.   Appellee, on the other

hand, contends that the trial court made the R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)

findings and articulated reasoning based on the R.C. 2929.12(B)-

(E) factors.

    R.C. 2929.12 provides:

    * * *

    (B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the
    following that apply regarding the offender, the
    offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors,
    as indicating that the offender's conduct is more
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

         (1) The physical or mental injury suffered by
         the victim of the offense due to the conduct
         of the offender was exacerbated because of the
         physical or mental condition or age of the
         victim.

         (2) The victim of the offense suffered serious
         physical, psychological, or economic harm as
         a result of the offense.

         (3) The offender held a public office or
         position of trust in the community, and the
         offense related to that office or position.

         (4) The offender's occupation, elected office,
         or profession obliged the offender to prevent
         the offense or bring others committing it to
         justice.

         (5) The offender's professional reputation or
         occupation, elected office, or profession was
         used to facilitate the offense or is likely to
         influence the future conduct of others.

         (6) The offender's relationship      with   the
         victim facilitated the offense.

         (7) The offender committed the offense for
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                13

         hire or as a part of an organized criminal
         activity.

         (8) In committing the offense, the offender
         was motivated by prejudice based on race,
         ethnic     background,    gender,    sexual
         orientation, or religion.

         (9) If the offense is a violation of section
         2919.25 or a violation of section 2903.11,
         2903.12, or 2903.13 of the Revised Code
         involving a person who was a family or
         household member at the time of the violation,
         the offender committed the offense in the
         vicinity of one or more children who are not
         victims of the offense, and the offender or
         the victim of the offense is a parent,
         guardian, custodian, or person in loco
         parentis of one or more of those children.

    (C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the
    following that apply regarding the offender, the
    offense, or the victim, and any other relevant factors,
    as indicating that the offender's conduct is less
    serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

         (1) The victim induced or facilitated the
         offense.

         (2) In committing the offense, the offender
         acted under strong provocation.

         (3) In committing the offense, the offender
         did not cause or expect to cause physical harm
         to any person or property.

         (4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate
         the offender's conduct, although the grounds
         are not enough to constitute a defense.

    (D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the
    following that apply regarding the offender, and any
    other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the
    offender is likely to commit future crimes:

         (1) At the time of committing the offense, the
         offender was under release from confinement
         before trial or sentencing; was under a
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    14

         sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16,
         2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code; was
         under post-release control pursuant to section
         2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised
         Code for an earlier offense or had been
         unfavorably   terminated   from   post-release
         control for a prior offense pursuant to
         division (B) of section 2967.16 or section
         2929.141 of the Revised Code; was under
         transitional control in connection with a
         prior offense; or had absconded from the
         offender's   approved    community   placement
         resulting in the offender's removal from the
         transitional control program under section
         2967.26 of the Revised Code.

         (2) The offender previously was adjudicated a
         delinquent child pursuant to Chapter 2151. of
         the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or
         pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code,
         or the offender has a history of criminal
         convictions.

         (3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to
         a satisfactory degree after previously being
         adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to
         Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to
         January 1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152.
         of the Revised Code, or the offender has not
         responded favorably to sanctions previously
         imposed for criminal convictions.

         (4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of
         drug or alcohol abuse that is related to the
         offense,   and   the   offender   refuses   to
         acknowledge that the offender has demonstrated
         that   pattern,   or  the   offender   refuses
         treatment for the drug or alcohol abuse.

         (5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for
         the offense.

    (E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the
    following that apply regarding the offender, and any
    other relevant factors, as factors indicating that the
    offender is not likely to commit future crimes:

         (1)    Prior   to   committing   the   offense,   the
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  15

         offender had not been adjudicated a delinquent
         child.

         (2) Prior to committing the offense, the
         offender had not been convicted of or pleaded
         guilty to a criminal offense.

         (3) Prior to committing the offense, the
         offender had led a law-abiding life for a
         significant number of years.

         (4)   The   offense   was   committed      under
         circumstances not likely to recur.

         (5) The offender shows genuine remorse for the
         offense.

    (F) The sentencing court shall consider the offender's
    military service record and whether the offender has an
    emotional, mental, or physical condition that is
    traceable to the offender's service in the armed forces
    of the United States and that was a contributing factor
    in the offender's commission of the offense or offenses.

    {¶14} As noted above, R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) requires a court

to find that a sanction other than a prison term will adequately

punish an offender and protect the public from future criminal

violations because the applicable factors indicate that a lesser

likelihood of recidivism outweighs the applicable factors that

indicate a greater likelihood of recidivism.   The state contends

that in the case at bar the trial court did not analyze whether

a sanction other than a prison term would adequately punish the

offender as per R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a).   The state argues that

the court “only” found that recidivism is less likely because

appellee is now barred from possessing a firearm.

    {¶15} Concerning the recidivism issue, the trial court found
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                     16

that appellee’s institutional summary report contained only two

“minor” violations and “neither are significant.”    The court

noted that the institution classified appellee “at the lowest

security level” and, while in prison, appellee resided in the

honor dorm, completed appropriate programming, and engaged in

required work details.   The court emphasized that the public is

protected because the “likelihood of a similar event occurring

is small as Defendant is ordered not to possess a firearm as a

condition of his judicial release supervision.”

    {¶16} After our review in the case at bar, we cannot

conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that the record does

not support the trial court's findings.     Marcum, supra, at ¶ 1.

Other courts have faced similar situations.    For example, in

Burns, supra, 2021-Ohio-3667, the trial court found the balance

of factors indicated a less likelihood of recidivism because the

defendant (1) worked to address his substance abuse and mental

health issues in prison; (2) had grown to be a different person;

(3) expressed deep remorse for his actions; (4) participated in

significant programming to assist him when he is released; and

(5) his only prior offenses were misdemeanor offenses related to

alcohol use.    Id. at ¶ 18.   Further, the court stated at the

hearing, “I believe that * * * we are not going to have a

problem with this individual when he's released.”     Id.   The

Ninth District concluded that evidence existed in the record
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  17

that the trial court relied on to support its findings regarding

the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism.     The court determined

that the evidence in the record also supported the trial court's

decision that community control, rather than prison, would

adequately punish the defendant and protect the public from

future criminal violations.    Id. at ¶ 19.

    {¶17} Similarly, in the case at bar the trial court found

that the “sanction the court imposed adequately punishes Mr.

Platt and protects the public from future criminal violations”

and the “chance of recidivism is low” because the factors

indicated “a lesser likelihood of recidivism outweighing the

applicable factors indicat[ing] a greater likelihood of

recidivism.”    Further, the trial court’s entry states:

    After hearing from counsel, review of the record, after
    hearing from the victim’s family, after hearing from
    Defendant, the court finds with reference to factors
    under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code, including but
    not limited to, Defendant owed a duty of care to the
    victim visiting his residence, Defendant was remorseful
    for his actions (or lack of action in securing the
    cabinet lock), this was Defendant’s first felony
    offense, the victim was a minor visiting the residence
    and suffered a fatal single shot by mishandling of a
    firearm by Defendant’s minor son, that the cabinet had
    a lock - that it was unlocked - and Defendant’s children
    knew the combination, that there was no animosity or ill
    will among any of those involved, that the victim’s
    family suffered a tragic loss, that the Defendant nor
    Defendant’s minor son did not expect to cause any
    physical harm to the victim, the offense was committed
    under circumstances unlikely to recur, and that the
    shooting itself by Defendant’s minor son was accidental.
    The Court further finds that a sanction other than a
    prison term would adequately punish the offender and
    protect the public from future criminal violations by
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  18

    the eligible offender because the applicable factors
    indicating a lesser likelihood of recidivism outweigh
    the applicable factors indicating a greater likelihood
    of recidivism and that a sanction other than a prison
    term would not demean the seriousness of the offense
    because factors indicating that the eligible offender’s
    conduct in committing the offense was less serious than
    conduct normally constituting the offense outweigh
    factors indicating that the eligible offender’s conduct
    was more serious than conduct normally constituting the
    offense.

    {¶18} Thus, after our review we believe that the trial court

did, in fact, make the proper R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a)findings.

                      R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(b)

    {¶19} Concerning R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(b), the state contends

that, although the record details the reasons the trial court

believed that a sanction other than a prison term would not

demean the seriousness of the offense, the court failed to

justify its finding with an analysis of the relevant R.C.

2929.12 factors.

    {¶20} In particular, the state contends that the trial court

did not list all R.C. 2929.12 factors it considered when it

granted judicial release and cites State v. Orms, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 13AP–698, 2014-Ohio-2732 in support.   In Orms, the

Tenth District held that, in addition to the findings required

under R.C. 2929.20(J)(1) and (2), the statute “obligates the

trial court to justify its findings with an analysis of the
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    19

relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors.”    Id. at ¶ 10.    The Tenth

District concluded that the trial court did not specify the

findings as to the adequacy of the punishment and the

seriousness of the offense as required under R.C.

2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b), “nor did the court list all the

factors that were presented at the hearing.”      Id. at ¶ 11.

Therefore, without those findings and factors, the court held

that the trial court “was precluded from granting judicial

release.”   Id.   We conclude, however, that, unlike the case at

bar, the Orms court did not specify the findings regarding the

adequacy of punishment and seriousness of the offense as

required by R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b).

    {¶21} In the case sub judice, the trial court noted multiple

times that the juvenile’s death was tragic and indicated it

“still believes that [appellee] is guilty.”    However, the court

also observed that (1) the teens found the firearm in a gun

cabinet that appellee typically locked, (2) appellee had

instructed the juveniles not to touch the firearm, and (3)

appellee did not remove the gun from the cabinet.     These facts

supported the trial court’s determination that appellee’s

conduct was less serious than some involuntary manslaughter

convictions.

    {¶22} Moreover, in its entry the trial court enumerated

other facts related to the R.C. 2929.12 factors.     For example,
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                     20

the court: (1) identified appellee’s “drug use” (R.C.

2929.12(D)(4)), (2) noted that appellee had not been convicted

of or pleaded guilty to a criminal offense (R.C. 2929.12(E)(2)),

(3) observed that the offense was committed under circumstances

not likely to recur due, in part, to the prohibition of firearm

possession (R.C. 2929.12 (E)(4)), (4) noted that appellee

responded favorably to sanctions, highlighting appellee’s

“programming while in prison,” (R.C. 2929.12 (D)(3)), and (5)

stated several times that appellee had shown genuine remorse for

his actions (R.C. 2929.12(E)(5)).

    {¶23} Therefore, we conclude that in the case at bar the

trial court made the proper R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(b) findings with

an analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors.

                       R.C. 2929.20(J)(2)

    {¶24} Finally, the state asserts that pursuant to R.C.

2929.20(J)(2) the trial court failed to specify both the

required findings and the R.C. 2929.12 factors.     As we noted

above, R.C. 2929.20(J)(2) provides: “A court that grants

judicial release under division (J)(1) of this section to an

offender who is under consideration as an eligible offender

shall specify on the record both findings required in that

division and also shall list all the factors described in that

division that were presented at the hearing.”     (Emphasis added.)
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    21

    {¶25} Some appellate court decisions appear to require a

strict interpretation of R.C. 2929.20(J)(2), as the state

suggests.    For example, in State v. Gilbert, 12th Dist. Butler

No. CA2022-02-021, 2022-Ohio–3387, the trial court articulated

on the record the required R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b)

findings, but did not list all factors described in that

division presented at the judicial release hearing.    The Twelfth

District held that, although the record showed that the parties

presented evidence relating to the likelihood of recidivism and

the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct, “nowhere in the

transcript of the judicial release hearing does the trial court

specifically list the factors that were presented, as required

by R.C. 2929.20(J)(2).”    Id. at ¶ 19.   Further, the court noted

that, although the trial court's entry that granted judicial

release provided an analysis of the applicable R.C. 2929.12

factors regarding the likelihood of recidivism and seriousness

of conduct, “the court did not specifically list all the factors

that were presented, as required by R.C. 2929.20(J)(2).”

(Emphasis added).    Id.   See also State v. Edwards, 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9–04–67, 2005–Ohio–2246, ¶ 5 (“trial court was

required by statute to list all factors presented at the

hearing”).

    {¶26} By comparison, in State v. Kennedy, 10th Dist.

Franklin Nos. 22AP-534 and 22AP-536, 2023-Ohio-3078, in addition
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                    22

to the findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J)(1) and (2), the

trial court’s entry stated, “[I]n considering the recidivism

factors under R.C. 2929[.12](D) and (E), the Court finds

[appellee] had not been adjudicated a delinquent child, had a

single conviction for a misdemeanor of the fourth degree (M4),

led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years prior

to the offenses, and the offense occurred under circumstances

not likely to recur.”     Id. at ¶ 38.   The appellate court

affirmed the grant of judicial release and concluded that the

court made findings under both the seriousness and recidivism

provisions in former R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) with

reference to relevant factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (D), and

(E).    Id.

       {¶27} In the case sub judice, our review reveals that the

trial court made the required R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b)

findings.     The court’s entry provides “the court finds with

reference to factors under section 2929.12 of the Revised Code,”

and the court went on to consider the factors referenced above.

We conclude that, although the trial court may not have

correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity,

as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the

appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified

its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors.

       {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial
ATHENS, 23CA9                                                  23

release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the

seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining

whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial

release.”   State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149, 77 N.E.3d 479, ¶ 17

(12th Dist.), citing State v. Grilliot, 2d Dist. Darke No.

99CA1485, 1999 WL 812351, (Sept. 24, 1999), at *3.   The Ledford

court further found that the trial court is in the best position

to assess whether the facts support the granting of judicial

release pursuant to R.C. 2929.20.   Id. at ¶ 19.   Furthermore, a

trial court has the discretion to determine the most effective

way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.

Id., citing State v. Linz, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008–05–

052, 2009-Ohio-1652, 2009 WL 903965, ¶ 14.

    {¶29} After our review, we cannot conclude that the record

does not support the trial court’s R.C. 2929.20(J) findings, by

clear and convincing evidence, when the court granted appellee’s

motion for judicial release.   We believe that the trial court

acted appropriately and conscientiously and satisfied the

statutory requirements to grant a request for judicial release.

    {¶30} Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s assignment of error and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                                         JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
[Cite as State v. Platt, 2024-Ohio-1331.]

                                             JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed. Appellant shall
pay the costs herein taxed.

        The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Athens County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

        Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                                     For the Court

        BY:_____________________________
                                                        Peter B. Abele, Judge

                                            NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.