Court Opinion

ID: 9567808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:03.067228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:44.552653
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Under Georgia law, “A person commits the offense of criminal attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs any act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” OCGA § 16-4-1. To reward those who have a change of heart and voluntarily abandon their criminal purpose, our law also provides: “(a) When a person’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, (b) A renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary and complete if it results from: (1) A belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the person or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or (2) A decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time.” OCGA § 16-4-5.
The remedial purpose behind OCGA § 16-4-5 (formerly OCGA § 26-1003) is explained in the Committee Notes to the 1968 Criminal Code as follows: “This section is a new provision that specifically allows a person to withdraw without criminal liability if he has a change of mind and heart and voluntarily desists from the criminal attempt before the ultimate crime is perpetrated. Theoretically, though detection might be rare and proof might be difficult, a person who, with the requisite criminal intent had gone far enough toward the commission of a crime for his act to constitute an attempt, would be guilty of a criminal attempt at that point, and without this [section], he would *294be subject to severe punishment. The philosophy of [this section] is that the person who really repents at that point and abandons the enterprise should not be punished. It should be emphasized that this defense is not available to one whose criminal activity ceases only because of difficulty, or a decision to wait for a later or safer opportunity.”
The majority takes the position that the evidence did not raise the defense of abandonment. In this regard, the majority opines: “If the defendants had a change of heart, it was after the criminal attempt was completed, and thus too late.” In my view, this approach misses the point of the abandonment defense. As the Committee Notes point out, the abandonment defense was enacted to enable a person who would otherwise be guilty of a criminal attempt to repent and abandon the criminal enterprise. That is exactly what happened in this case. The mere fact that defendants may have committed a criminal attempt before they had a change of heart is of no consequence.
In my view, the evidence presented by the State demonstrated that defendants abandoned their criminal scheme. Accordingly, I am of the view that the affirmative defense of abandonment was raised below. See generally Noles v. State, 164 Ga. App. 191, 192 (296 SE2d 768). (Indeed, the trial court must have agreed because it charged the jury on the law of abandonment.)
To overcome defendants’ affirmative abandonment defense, the State needed to introduce evidence disproving abandonment beyond a reasonable doubt. See Coleman v. State, 141 Ga. App. 193, 194 (2) (233 SE2d 42). I feel the State failed in that endeavor. The officers testified that they did not announce they were police officers until defendants started to leave the scene. They also testified that they did not know why defendants aborted their criminal enterprise.
Based on the evidence adduced below, we can only speculate as to why defendants decided they did not want to purchase the cocaine that the police were selling. Did they somehow suspect that they were being set up? Did they decide that the cocaine was overpriced? Or, did they have a real change of heart? The evidence adduced below does not answer these questions.
The State was unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants abandoned their criminal purpose because they believed they were about to be apprehended and decided to wait for a safer opportunity. Compare Padgett v. State, 170 Ga. App. 98, 100 (316 SE2d 523), in which victim’s obstructive conduct caused defendant to abandon his scheme. Accordingly, it is my view that the State failed to present evidence enabling a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendants made a criminal attempt to possess cocaine.
*295Decided November 15, 1993
Reconsideration denied December 7, 1993
Borough & Sizemore, Kermit S. Borough, Jr., for Givens.
T. Lee Bishop, Jr., for Barfield.
Britt R. Priddy, District Attorney, Johnnie M. Graham, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
I respectfully dissent.