Court Opinion

ID: 9648271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:12:27.726565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:58.260123
License: Public Domain

RAY, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment and in the well-reasoned opinion of the court. But I must also write to highlight that we affirm the decision below only because Mr. Freeman did not contemporaneously perceive the accident. The court of appeals’ additional statement that Mr. Freeman could not recover because he was a stepparent and not a natural parent does not accurately reflect the current status of the law in this state.
There is no reported case in this state, other than that of the court of appeals, in which a stepchild or parent was denied bystander recovery because the relationship was not biological. Courts of appeals have denied recovery to a close friend, and to a woman whom the jury found was not a common law wife. See Hinojosa v. South Texas Drilling & Exploration, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, no writ); Hastie v. Rodriguez, 716 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). But recovery has not been denied to persons in a familial relationship. In fact, our learned colleagues on the federal court of appeals have üWe-guessed that Texas law would allow bystander recovery to stepsons for the death of their stepfather: “[t]he two stepsons were minors living with the James Grandstaff family, and we believe they stood in the close relationship required by Texas law.” Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir.1985).
The majority’s approval of Dillon v. Legg formally adopts workable factors which the courts of appeals have been using for some time.1 The third factor inquires whether the plaintiff and victim were closely related, not whether they are blood relatives. Where the plaintiff and victim are in a close familial relationship, biological or step, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover. Texas courts should not conjure up artificial abstractions which bar recovery.
*925Two other jurisdictions have addressed the question of whether step or foster parents may recover as bystanders. Construing the Dillon closeness element, both have allowed recovery. See Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal.App.3d 573, 127 CalRptr. 720 (1976), disapproved on other grounds, Baxter v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.3d 461, 138 CalRptr. 315, 563 P.2d 871 (1977) (foster mother allowed bystander); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (step grandchild allowed bystander). The purpose of the Dillon v. Legg test is to determine whether the plaintiff’s injury is foreseeable, and it is “[t]he emotional attachments of the family relationship and not legal status [that are] relevant to foreseeability.” Mobaldi, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
Unfortunately, the Andrewsian line2 on who may recover must be drawn somewhere, because the law would go too far if friends or distant relatives could recover. It would be unreasonable to compel a defendant to pay for the emotional shock of every person who witnessed an injury. Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts § 54 at 366 (5th ed. 1984). The line should be drawn to allow bystanders to recover who are in a close familial relationship, such as Mr. Freeman and Jimmy were in this case. It would be arbitrary indeed to place Mr. Freeman outside that line because he was not a natural parent. The record before us reflects that he had been Jimmy’s stepfather for thirteen years, since Jimmy was four; that the Freemans were a closely knit family unit; and that John Freeman shared a father-son relationship with his stepsons. To deny recovery to a step-parent based on his legal status, and to presume as a matter of law that emotional injury flows among those related by consanguinity runs afoul of our attempt in tort law to give a remedy to the one who is wronged. Such a dogma ignores the possibility that the true relationship between the steps is that of a close family, while that between the blood kin is hostile or distant. See generally Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: A Closer Look at the Close Relationship, 11 Western State University L.Rev. 271, 289 (1984). Applying the Dillon v. Legg test, when the plaintiff stands in a familial relationship with the victim, the jury should determine whether the two were close and award damages which would compensate the emotional shock which he suffered as a bystander.
The cause of action for bystander recovery is one for shock resulting from observing injury to a loved one. But I would point out that perhaps it is a theory which has outlived its usefulness in tort law. The concept of bystander recovery was bom of a time when mental anguish without physical manifestation thereof went uncompensated. In Texas, Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986), and St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.1987), have removed that impediment to recovery. There can now be recompense for grief caused by negligent infliction of mental anguish. As with the artificial schemes used to circumvent the harshness of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery, perhaps the need for a bystander’s cause of action is now without a basis. See, W. Prosser & W. Keeton, The Law of Torts § 54 at 366-67 (5th ed. 1984).
MAUZY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

. See, e.g., McClellan v. Boehmer, 700 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); City of Austin v. Davis, 693 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985), writ refd n.r.e.); Genzer v. City of Mission, 666 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, writ refd n.r.e.); General Motors Corp. v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837, 844 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1982, writ dism’d w.o.j.); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, no writ).

. ‘This is not logic. It is practical politics_ We may regret that the line was drawn just where it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be.” Palsgraf v. Long Island. Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 103-104 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).