Court Opinion

ID: 9521203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:00:28.438554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:26.557153
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 39.] Marshall County Deputy Sheriff David Wegleitner, acting in the line of duty, was struck from behind by a drunk driver while arresting another drunk driver. He was severely injured and damaged through no fault of his own. He simply was there, doing his job.
[¶ 40.] The injuries and damages suffered by Wegleitner were caused by the drunk driver and by the bar, which allegedly continued to serve him intoxicating liquor despite his obvious intoxicated condition. The culpability of the defendants is a matter of proof at trial.
[¶ 41.] The liquor lobbyists persuaded the Legislature to prevent suits for damages against the liquor provider, no matter his negligence. What a privilege to be declared free or immune from suit without any judicial inquiry!! This legislation has been labeled everything from unwise, unreasonable, unconstitutional to outright stupidity. Is it constitutional?
[¶42.] There is no question in this case what the Legislature intended. In no uncertain terms, it said the booze providers go free, no matter their negligence. The seriously injured and damaged law enforcement officer must, figuratively speaking, lie there in his own blood without a remedy.
[¶ 43.] Since there is no question what the Legislature intended, the legal question is— Can it do that? Some might say yes, even if it is unwise. Others say no, it is unconstitutional because the legislation bears no reasonable relationship to the object sought to be achieved. Others say no, it is unconstitutional for other reasons.
[¶ 44.] We should hold that it is unconstitutional because the legislation violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. It invades the exclusive province of the judicial branch; it simply goes too far.
[¶ 45.] There are many other questions in this case which will be answered by addressing the legal question:
Whether this court will perform its constitutional duty and define the line which the Legislature should not and cannot cross.
Whether this court will live up to the South Dakota Supreme Court’s oath, its reputation, its history, and its legacy of exercising its constitutional mandate to act as a check on unconstitutional legislation as demonstrated in, among other cases, South Dakota Educ. Ass’n v. Barnett, 1998 SD 84 [582 N.W.2d 386]; Cary v. City of Rapid City, 1997 SD 18, 559 N.W.2d 891; In re Certif. of Questions of Law (Knowles v. United States), 1996 SD 10, 544 N.W.2d 183; and Poppen v. Walker, 520 N.W.2d 238 (S.D.1994).
*701If not, will it be remembered as the court which shirked its duty and abdicated its authority by looking the other way simply because the Legislature spoke?
[¶ 46.] I submit that this court should accept the challenge and the duty to point out the line the Legislature should not and cannot cross.
[¶ 47] If the Legislature is allowed to leave Deputy Wegleitner lying there in his own blood with an inadequate remedy,17 questions concerning the taking of life, liberty, or property are implicated, along with questions concerning the granting of improper privileges or immunities.
[¶ 48.] If this legislation is upheld as constitutional, then the Legislature is free to expand privileges and immunities in any area without any limitation.
[¶ 49.] SDCL 35-11-1 & 35-4-78 VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS BY ENCROACHING UPON AN EXCLUSIVE JUDICIAL FUNCTION.
[¶ 50.] This appeal involves two statutes. SDCL 35-4-78 provides:
No licensee may sell any alcoholic beverage:
(1) To any person under the age of twenty-one years; or
(2) To any person who is obviously intoxicated at the time.
A violation of this section is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
However, no licensee is civilly liable to any injured person or his estate for any injury suffered, including any action for wrongful death, or property damage suffered because of the intoxication of any person due to the sale of any alcoholic beverage in violation of the provisions of this section.18
SDCL 35-11-1 provides:
The Legislature finds that the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Therefore, the rule in Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1982) is hereby abrogated.
[¶ 51.] Wegleitner correctly argues that SDCL 35-11-1 is an unconstitutional infringement of an exclusive judicial function in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. See S.D.Const. art. II:
The powers of the government of the state are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and the powers and duties of each are prescribed by this Constitution.
The Legislature encroached on an exclusive judicial function when it enacted SDCL 35-11-1 and when it amended SDCL 35-4-78 and therefore we should reverse based upon the South Dakota Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.19
*702[¶ 52.] “The constitution is not a grant but a limitation upon the lawmaking power of the state legislature and it may enact any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by state and federal constitutions.” McDonald v. School Bd. of Yankton Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 S.D. 599, 606, 246 N.W.2d 98, 97 (S.D.1976) (citing Kramar v. Bon Homme County, 83 S.D. 112, 115, 155 N.W.2d 777, 778 (1968)); accord Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 903 (S.D.1995). “Consequently, in determining whether an act is unconstitutional we search the state and federal constitutions for provisions which prohibit its enactment rather than for grants of such power.” Clem v. City of Yankton, 83 S.D. 386, 396, 160 N.W.2d 125, 130 (1968).
[¶ 53.] The Legislature exceeds its role when it attempts to undertake any of the powers and duties textually committed to the executive or the judiciary. S.D.Const, art. II, reproduced supra ¶51. See Dunker v. Brown County Bd. of Educ., 80 S.D. 193, 203, 121 N.W.2d 10,17 (1963) (“The constitutional separation of powers cannot be done away with by legislative action.”); see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill. Dec. 636, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078-79 (1997):
Each branch of government has its own unique sphere of authority that cannot be exercised by another branch.
This court has often recognized that the separation of the three branches of government is not absolute and unyielding. The separation of powers clause is not contravened merely because separate spheres of governmental authority may overlap. However, it should be emphasized that the determination of when, and under what circumstances, a violation of the separation of powers doctrine has occurred remains with the judiciary.20 In furtherance of the authority of the judiciary to carry out its constitutional obligations, the legislature is prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe upon the inherent powers of judges.
(Citations omitted; emphasis added).
[¶ 54.] The Missouri Legislature limits liquor licensee liability by similar statutes; however, a cause of action will lie against the person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor under certain circumstances.21 The statute was *703challenged on several constitutional grounds, including the doctrine of separation of powers, in Simpson v. Kilchef, 749 S.W.2d 386 (Mo.1988). Although.the majority opinion relies on that authority, Simpson’s separation of powers analysis is really no analysis at all:
Simpson’s claim that the legislature imper-missibly interprets the law and dictates the effect to be given evidence must be rejected. To support his claim, Simpson cites State v. Burling, 224 Neb. 725, 400 N.W.2d 872 (1987), which involved a statutory provision dictating that intoxilyzer results, when the test is performed by someone with a department of health permit, are competent evidence in an alcohol-related traffic offense. The court held:
[T]he Legislature may not declare the weight to be given evidence or what evidence shall be conclusive proof of an issue* of fact; ... that is to say, determining whether evidence is of probative value is a legal question, and the legislature cannot impair judicial analysis and resolution of such questions.
Id, 400 N.W.2d at 876. In this ease section 537.053.2 does not “impair judicial analysis” because no analysis is necessary. Under the facts of this case the statute simply bars Simpson’s cause of action. The reference to proximate cause was designed to restate the reasoning used by eommon law courts in rejecting dram shop liability. By explicitly rejecting the reasoning of [Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.Ct.App.1983); Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.Ct.App.1980); and Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo.Ct.App.1981)], the legislature made it clear that dram shop liability would no longer exist in Missouri. The reference to the cases may not have been the best means available for the legislature to express its intent, 'but in this case there can be no doubt the intent was to prohibit dram shop liability. A similar attack on a dram shop act which specifically abrogated established case law was rejected and the statute upheld in Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal.3d 430, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in Baker v. Sudo, 194 Cal.App.3d 936, 240 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1987). The reasoning of Cory is persuasive.
749 S.W.2d at 390.22
[¶ 55.] The court effectively sidestepped the separation of powers question by concluding 1) the Missouri Legislature’s intent was clear; 2) another court found similar statutes constitutional on equal protection grounds; and 3) that their statutes did not “ ‘impair judicial analysis’ because no analysis is necessary.” Id. The first two statements have no bearing on the question and the third cannot withstand scrutiny.23
*704[¶ 56.] It is axiomatic that the power to make factual determinations and interpret the law in all cases and controversies is the exclusive domain of the judiciary.24 See Bandy v. Mickelson, 73 S.D. 485, 488-89, 44 N.W.2d 341, 342-43 (1950):
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the constitution.
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The legislature can create no other court; and can confer judicial power, strictly such, — that which “deprives of life, liberty, or property,” — upon no other tribunal_ A judicial power, as such, can be exercised only by the courts. The three great departments of the government are intended to be, and must be, separate and distinct.
(Citation omitted); accord In re Nelson, 83 S.D. 611, 614,163 N.W.2d 533, 535 (S.D.1968) (“[A]ll the judicial power is expressly conferred upon the courts.”). The function of this court is to interpret the laws as they affect the “life, liberty, or property of the citizens of the State.” Kyllo, 535 N.W.2d at 901 (quoting Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 426 N.W.2d 298, 303 (S.D.1988) (citing Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations 191 (8th ed.1927))); accord Sander v. Geib, Elston, Frost Prof'l Ass'n, 506 N.W.2d 107, 128 (S.D.1993) (Sabers, J., concurring in result) (“The function of the judiciary is to make factual determinations and interpret the laws of the United States and the State of South Dakota in accordance with the Constitution”).
[¶ 57.] Here, the Legislature invaded the exclusive function of the judiciary by precluding the courts from even considering eases and controversies involving alleged negligence of liquor licensees. This it cannot do.
To forego investigation into the existence of a fact because a certain officer not having judicial powers or opportunities of investigation has declared it to exist or not to exist, and to accept his statement as conclusive and indisputable, is in effect to refuse to exercise, as regards that specific fact, that function of the investigation and final determination of disputes which is the peculiar attribute of the judiciary as distinguished from the executive and the legislature. That the court may, if it chooses, in dealing with evidence, take such a step seems clear — though whether the legislature may constitutionally oblige it to do so is another question.
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[I]t is quite a different thing for the judiciary to be forbidden altogether to exercise its power in a certain class of cases. The judicial function under the constitution is to apply the law in controverted cases; to apply the law necessarily involves the determination of the facts; to determine the facts necessarily involves the investigation of evidence as a basis for that determination. To forbid investigation is to forbid the exercise of an indestructible judicial function.
*705Hence, to make a rule of conclusive evidence, compulsory upon the judiciary, is to attempt an infringement upon their exclusive province.
4 Wigmore on Evidence §§ 1348, 1353, at 810-11, 848-49 (Chadbourn rev.1972); accord Street v. Farmers’ Elevator Co. of Elkton, 34 S.D. 523, 536, 149 N.W. 429, 433 (1914) (McCoy, J., dissenting):
A statute which declares what shall be taken as conclusive evidence of a fact is one which, of course, precludes investigation into the fact, and itself determines the matter in advance of all judicial inquiry. If such statutes can be upheld, there is then little use for courts, and small room indeed for the exercise of their functions.
(Quoting Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Simonson, 64 Kan. 802, 68 P. 653, 655 (1902)).
[¶ 58.] The effect of these statutes is to make the Legislature the final adjudicator of the rights of the parties. This is clearly unconstitutional:
If ... the practical operation of a statute is to determine adversary suits pending between party and party, by substituting in place of the well-settled rules of law the arbitrary will of the legislature, and thereby controlling the action of the tribunal before which the suits are pending, no one can doubt that it would be an unauthorized act of legislation, because it directly infringes on the peculiar and appropriate functions of the judiciary.
Cooley’s, supra, 207 n. 2 (citation omitted).
[¶ 59.] The majority opinion attempts to analogize these statutes to those which govern cases concerning sovereign immunity, workers’ compensation, statutes of limitation, and volunteer immunity. ¶25. The differences are obvious; in none of those instances does the Legislature attempt to absolutely preclude the courts from conducting an inquiry into the facts. Additionally, not one of those statutes dictates the non-liability of a tortfeasor without an examination of the facts. Under these statutes and the majority opinion’s conclusion, even the hypothetical licensee described by Wegleitner cannot be sued, notwithstanding the obvious factual and causation issues his behavior raises:
By unequivocally providing that the consumption, rather than the serving of alcohol, is the proximate cause of any injury inflicted by an intoxicated person, the Legislature has precluded a person injured by an intoxicated tortfeasor from bring an action against a liquor licensee that served the tortfeasor though obviously intoxicated. This is true even if the bartender gave the tortfeasor four free shots of whiskey as he was stumbling out of the bar with his car keys in hand.
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 10 (emphasis in original).
[¶ 60.] It is undisputed that the Legislature may prescribe rules of procedure and evidence, allocate burdens of proof, and even create legal presumptions. However, it may not dictate the outcome of a judicial proceeding as it attempted to do in these statutes. Cf. Chotkowski v. State, 240 Conn. 246, 690 A.2d 368, 375 (1997):
It is the court’s duty to ensure that legislative action falls within constitutional boundaries; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch) 137, 177-78, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); even if that action involves a waiver of the immunity from suit enjoyed by the state under the common law. Consequently, the legislature cannot by mere fiat or finding, make “public” a truly, “private” purpose .... Its findings and statements about what is or is not “public” cannot be binding upon the court.
(Other citation omitted)-. Likewise, our Legislature’s “findings and Statements about what is or is not [the ‘proximate cause of any injury’ or who is ‘civilly liable’] cannot be binding upon the court.”
[¶ 61.] Professor Wigmore explains the distinction by comparing statutes which 1) establish substantive rules of law with 2) those which purport to make evidence or testimony conclusive by precluding further judicial inquiry. One example of the first category may be. found in the deed recording statutes.25 As for the second category, examples *706of- statutes purporting to make evidence or testimony conclusive by precluding further judicial inquiry are “almost inconceivable” and primarily found in discussions demonstrating their unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Wigmore, supra, § 1355, at 853 & n. 1 (collecting cases).
[¶ 62.] As noted, the Legislature has the power to prescribe purely procedural , rules governing the law of evidence. For example, this court ruled that a statute which provided that a prima facie case of contempt could be made upon affidavits was constitutional. State v. Mitchell, 3 S.D. 223, 228, 52 N.W. 1052, 1053 (1892), appeal dismissed, 163 U.S. 696, 16 S.Ct. 1204, 41 L.Ed. 306 (1896). The appellant argued the statute was unconstitutional because it precluded judicial inquiry by making the affidavits conclusive evidence. In rejecting his argument, the court stated:
This provision does not assume to interfere with or control the judgment of the court as to the effect of the allegations and denials of the affidavits and counter affidavits. It simply leaves it with the court as a question to be judicially determined.... It is still left to the court to say whether, under all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the candor and probable truthfulness of both the assertion of the facts and their denial by the defendant, such prima facie case is overcome..
[¶ 63.] The Legislature may also enact evi-dentiary presumptions, so long as they are rebuttable. See SDCL 19-11-1 (“... [w]hen substantial, credible evidence has been introduced to rebut the presumption, it shall disappear from the action or proceeding, and the jury shall not be instructed thereon.”); see also State v. Heisinger, 252 N.W.2d 899, 903 (S.D.1977) (“[T]here exists a fundamental separation of powers question in conclusive statutory presumptions[.]”) (citing Wigmore, supra).
[¶ 64.] Here, the Legislature went well beyond prescribing a procedural rule or establishing a rebuttable presumption. Instead, it invaded the exclusive function of the-judiciary by purporting to adjudicate the parties’ rights in all future contested cases. Because Wegleitner showed that the statutes clearly invade and encroach upon an exclusive judicial function, he met his burden to show “beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislature acted outside of its constitutional authority.” City of Chamberlain v. R.E. Lien, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 130, 131 (S.D.1994). Therefore, we should hold that SDCL 35-11-1 and the 1985 amendment to SDCL 35-4-78 violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
[¶ 65.] Although it is not our duty to advise the Legislature on the manner of drafting legislation to pass constitutional muster, it is clear that the test could be met if the causation question were stated as a rebuttable presumption rather than an irrefutable fact. It is this court’s duty to interpret the law and to protect the rights of individuals against unconstitutional legislation. If a statute is unconstitutional, this court is obligated to declare it invalid. This duty cannot be avoided or neglected, no matter what the intent of the Legislature in passing the legislation.
[¶ 66.] The order granting summary judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for trial, at which a jury should determine whether Bar furnished alcohol to *707an intoxicated Sattler, and if so, whether it was a proximate cause of the injuries inflicted on Wegleitner by Sattler.26
[¶ 67.] AMUNDSON, J., joins this dissent.

. If the Bar was negligent in continuing to serve Sattler after he was obviously intoxicated — a factual determination the Legislature has precluded the Judiciary from conducting' — it should pay its share of Wegleitner's damages. While Wegleit-ner and others similarly situated have the possibility of “lessening their financial burden” via various "limited remedies” (see supra n. 14), why should other tortfeasors and other insurance companies bear the entire burden? There is no constitutionally sanctioned reason to allow the Legislature to provide absolute immunity to liquor licensees and it violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers when it did so.

. The last paragraph was added by amendment in 1985. See 1985 S.D.Sess.Laws ch. 295 § 2.

. These two statutes were recently discussed in Wildeboer v. South Dakota Junior Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 1997 SD 33, ¶¶ 20-31, 561 N.W.2d 666, 670-72 (Gilbertson, J., delivering the majority opinion on Issue 2) (affirming summary judgment to bars on basis that statutes precluded the lawsuit without consideration of constitutional issues).
“The subject of liability for the furnishing of alcohol to tort-feasors has been before this Court on numerous occasions.” Id. at ¶ 22, 561 N.W.2d at 670 (citing Griffin v. Sebek, 90 S.D. 692, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976); Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1982); and Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 426 N.W.2d 298 (S.D.1988)).
The holding of the majority on Issue 2 in Wildeboer is not controlling here since the Wilde-boers did not raise constitutional issues in their appeal. In fact, these statutes have never been challenged on constitutional separation of powers grounds in a South Dakota court. However, as I stated in my dissent on Issue 2:
I dissent on this issue for the reasons expressed in Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 426 N.W.2d 298 (S.D.1988). Baatz was decided on June 15, *7021988. Baatz held that bars were subject to civil liability to those wrongfully injured by one served alcoholic beverages while intoxicated. It has been the law for eight and one-half years. Now Justice Gilbertson's writing on this issue would abandon or sidestep Baatz and provide immunity to bars until the pertinent statutes are declared unconstitutional again or changed by the Legislature.
I would not postpone the inevitable. In this instance, justice delayed is justice denied. The statutes involved in Baatz have not been corrected or modified. They contain the same defects and deserve the same treatment they received in Baatz.
Wildeboer, 1997 SD 33 at ¶¶ 35-36, 561 N.W.2d at 672 (Sabers, J., dissenting as to Issue 2) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).

. It is the role of the judiciary to declare whether a statute is unconstitutional when it is properly challenged. The fact that a statute survived the drafting of the constitution does not necessarily make it constitutional. Supra n. 3. Cf. Cary, 1997 SD 18, 559 N.W.2d 891 (declaring unconstitutional a statute which had been in effect for 50 years and withstood an identical challenge eighteen years earlier), overmling State Theatre Co. v. Smith, 276 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1979).

. Mo.Ann.Stat. § 537.053 (West 1988) provides:
1.Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop Act in 1934 (Laws of 1933-34, extra session, page 77), it has been and continues to be the policy of this state to follow the common law of England, as declared in section 1.010, RSMo, to prohibit dram shop liability and to follow the common law rule that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons.
2. The legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570 (Mo.Ct.App.1983); Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo.Ct.App.1980); and Nesbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo.Ct.App.1981) be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages, to be the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
3. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of this section, a cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered personal injury or death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink for consumption on the premises who, pursuant to section 311.310, RSMo, has been convicted, or has received a suspended imposition of the sentence arising from the conviction, of the sale of intoxicating liquor to a person under the age of twenty-one years or an obviously intoxicated person if the sale of such intoxicat*703ing liquor is the proximate cause of the personal injury or death sustained by such person.

. It is important to note that Cory involved an equal protection challenge, not a challenge based on the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Therefore, Cory lends nothing to our analysis. Whether these statutes pass constitutional muster under an equal protection analysis is not the issue.
The majority opinion also cites Cory and numerous other cases upholding similar legislation on other constitutional bases. Since we are not addressing those constitutional provisions, these holdings are completely immaterial to this case.
The majority opinion misses the point because this is a case of first impression, not only in South Dakota, but in the United States. The only possible conclusion is that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers because it invades the fact-finding process of the judicial branch. Moreover, because the statutes are inseparable, neither SDCL 35-11-1 nor SDCL 35-4-78 can withstand this challenge. This case is about separation of powers, not about public policy, legislative history, or whether other constitutional provisions are offended by these statutes. Nevertheless, the majority opinion devotes only four paragraphs (¶¶ 11, 13-14, 25) to a separation of powers discussion and concedes its other authorities do not address challenges on separation of powers grounds. ¶ 15.

. The majority opinion cites Reuter v. Korb, 248 Ill.App.3d 142, 186 Ill.Dec. 731, 616 N.E.2d 1363 (1993), for its discussion of whether the legislature infringed on the role of the judiciary by enacting a comparative fault statute which modified an earlier court decision. Reuter’s pertinence to this case is unclear; however, the challenged statute, which was held constitutional, does not preclude a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action and attempting to show the defendant was a proximate cause of his injury. Here, the Legislature has told Deputy Wegleitner and others similarly situated that they are wasting their time even filing a complaint because they will never be allowed to attempt to prove *704causation. That is not a result contemplated by Reuter. See id., 186 Ill.Dec. 731, 616 N.E.2d at 1378 (“[T]tie legislature may impose reasonable limitations and conditions upon access to the courts. Such standards do not fail on constitutional grounds simply because noncomplying actions ... may suffer dismissal."). "Reásonable limitations and conditions” is not synonymous with "no judicial inquiry, ever." See Knowles, 1996 SD 10 at ¶ 69, 544 N.W.2d at 199 (Gilbert-son, J., delivering the majority opinion on rationale for holding statute unconstitutional) ("[The Legislature] can change the remedy or the form of procedure, attach conditions precedent to its exercise (or) perhaps abolish and substitute new remedies, it cannot deny a remedy entirely.") (emphasis added & citations omitted).

. It is also axiomatic that issues of proximate causation are within the exclusive realm of the judiciary. See Baatz v. Arrow Bar, 426 N.W.2d 298, 302 (S.D.1988) (“[T]he task of determining the proximate cause of injuries in individual cases is the duty of the courts and juries, not the legislature.”); see also State v. Burling, 224 Neb. 725, 400 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1987) ("[T]he Legislature may not declare the weight to be given to evidence or what evidence shall be conclusive proof of an issue of fact ... whether evidence is of probative value is a legal question, and the Legislature cannot impair judicial analysis and resolution of such question.”); cf. Zens v. Harrison, 538 N.W.2d 794, 796 (S.D.1995) ("Determining negligence has always been the jury’s function.”); Theunissen v. Brisky, 438 N.W.2d 221, 223 (S.D.1989) (“This court has repeatedly said that issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and the comparative extent thereof, and proximate cause are ordinarily questions of fact and it must be a clear case before a trial judge is justified in taking these issues from the jury.”).

. See, e.g., SDCL 43-28-17 (assigning priority to different grantees, liens, or other claims upon the same property according to the time they were recorded without looking beyond these rec*706ords and without regard for subsequent encum-brancers' actual knowledge). As Professor Wig-more explains, this does not constitute a rule of evidence:
|T]o make a rule that as between successive grantees the recorder's certificate of the time of filing deeds shall be conclusive, is not to make a rule of evidence, but merely to provide in the law of land transfer that a deed found to be recorded as of a prior date shall take effect against a deed found to be recorded as of a subsequent date, irrespective of the actual time of entiy and record. In such cases, and countless others, the use of the term "conclusive evidence” cannot conceal the true nature of the rule as a rule of substantive law making a certain right or obligation depend upon the existence of a certain official writing irrespective of its truth. Such statutes do not in any way infringe the prerogative of the judiciary to satisfy itself by inquiries of fact, because they make no rule of evidence at all.
Wigmore, supra, § 1353, at 847; Accord Street, 34 S.D. at 526-32, 149 N.W. at 429-32 (considering constitutionality of statute which made receipt for grain storage "conclusive evidence" of ownership of grain and concluding that it did not invade the province of the judiciary since it proclaimed a rule of substantive law and not a rule of evidence).

. By upholding this legislation as constitutional, the majority opinion tells the Legislature it is free to grant immunity in any area without limitation. If the Legislature is free to grant immunity at will, it can make a person immune from suit for shooting his neighbor. Or, more on point, it can make his neighbor immune from suit for providing the gun to shoot another neighbor.
The Legislature can decree legal presumptions as a proper subject of public policy, but it cannot decree the final factual determination or conclusion of whether civil liability exists when A gives B a gun to shoot C. Whether A is civilly liable to C under the circumstances involves a question of causation which is finally and constitutionally determined by the courts, not the Legislature.
Likewise, whether Bar is civilly liable to Deputy Wegleitner is a question of causation finally and constitutionally determined by the courts, not the Legislature. Any legislation purporting to bypass the judicial branch by dictating the conclusion is unconstitutional.