Court Opinion

ID: 9372849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:06.128977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.005259
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KATHERINE RENEE BRIDGEFORD,                     DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0714-21-0636-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: February 13, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Katherine Renee Bridgeford, Augusta, Georgia, pro se.

           Kimberly Kaye Ward, Esquire, and Sophia E. Haynes, Esquire, Decatur,
             Georgia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her demotion appeal as moot after denying her affirmative defenses of
     discrimination (race and sex) and reprisal for equal employment opportunity

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     (EEO) activity.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, VACATE the portion of the initial decision that dismissed the
     demotion appeal as moot, AFFIRM the administrative judge’s denial of the
     appellant’s affirmative defenses of race and sex discrimination and reprisal for
     EEO activity, and REMAND the case to the regional office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant filed an appeal of her November 22, 2020 demotion from
     Supervisory Police Officer, GS-8, to Police Officer, GS-6. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1. She raised affirmative defenses of race and sex discrimination,
     reprisal for engaging in EEO activity, and harmful error.       IAF, Tab 36 at 2.
     While the appeal was pending before the administrative judge, the agency
     indicated that it was rescinding the demotion action. IAF, Tab 34. The agency
     filed, among other things, a reassignment notice dated February 23, 2022. IAF,
     Tab 35 at 7. The notice stated that the demotion was being rescinded effective
     immediately and that, “[c]oncurrent with the rescission,” the appellant was being
     reassigned from her Supervisory Police Officer, GS-8, Step 5, position to a
     Secretary, GS-8, Step 5, position effective February 27, 2022. Id. The notice
     also stated that 67.3 hours of leave without pay and 1,212 hours of absent without
     leave would be corrected to reflect the appellant’s status as on duty. Id.
¶3        At the prehearing conference, the parties discus sed the rescission of the
     demotion. IAF, Tab 36 at 1-2. The administrative judge informed the parties
     that, for the appeal to be moot, the appellant must have received all of the relief
     that she could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she had
     prevailed.   Id.    The administrative judge scheduled a hearing limited to the
     appellant’s discrimination and reprisal defenses, upon which, if she prevailed, she
     might be entitled to damages. Id. at 2. The administrative judge stated that the
                                                                                       3

     appellant’s harmful error claim would not be adjudicated to the extent that
     rescission of the demotion would encompass all potential relief on that claim. Id.
¶4        The appellant submitted a written response to the prehearing conference
     order, wherein she asserted that the demotion was not moot, in part, because the
     agency had reassigned her to a Secretary position instead of restoring her to the
     Supervisory Police Officer position that she occupied before the demotion. IAF,
     Tab 39 at 5-6.    She also asserted that she had not received “back pay with
     interest, overtime, appropriate contributions to her [Thrift Savings Plan] account,
     67.30 hours of leave without pay and 1,212 hours absent without leave,” and she
     requested compensatory damages and attorney fees.         Id. at 6.     Finally, the
     appellant asserted that she should be reinstated to a GS-9 position due to the
     agency’s reclassification of the Supervisory Police Officer position. Id. After a
     hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision. She found that the
     agency had done all it could do to rescind the demotion, and she denied on the
     merits the appellant’s affirmative defenses of race and gender discrimination and
     reprisal. IAF, Tab 48, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-9. She dismissed the appeal as
     moot. ID at 2, 4-5, 9.
¶5        The appellant has filed a petition for review, wherein she asserts that the
     demotion appeal is not moot because she has not received all of the relief that she
     could have received if the matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed .
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4-5. Specifically, she challenges the
     agency’s calculation of back pay and restoration of her leave . Id. at 4-5, 163-65.
     She cites the statute permitting the authorization of attorney fees and refiles
     documents that she submitted to the administrative judge.       Id. at 5-162.   The
     agency has not filed a response.

     We remand this appeal for further adjudication of the demotion claim.
¶6        The unilateral modification of an adverse action after an appeal has been
     filed cannot divest the Board of jurisdiction unless the appellant consents to such
     divestiture or the agency completely rescinds the action being appealed.        See
                                                                                              4

     Sredzinski v. U.S. Postal Service, 105 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 4 (2007).                   As the
     administrative judge correctly noted, for an appeal to be deemed moot, the
     appellant must have received all of the relief that she could have received if the
     matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed, and the agency must return
     her “as nearly as possible” to the status quo ante. Thomas v. U.S. Postal Service,
     73 M.S.P.R. 120, 125 (1997) (quoting Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts,
     726 F.2d 730, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). When, as here, the agency has not reinstated
     the appellant to her former position and duties, the Board will examine whether
     the agency had compelling reasons for not doing so. See Currier v. U.S. Postal
     Service, 72 M.S.P.R. 191, 199 (1996). If compelling reasons exist, the Board will
     next examine whether the duties and responsibilities of the former position are
     substantially equivalent in scope and status to those of the current position. Id.
     The administrative judge did not determine in the initial decision whether the
     agency had a compelling reason for reinstating the appellant to a Secretary
     position instead of the Supervisory Police Officer position, and the record does
     not   contain   sufficient   information    for   us   to   make    that   determination.
     Accordingly, we remand the appeal to the regional office to accept evidence and
     make findings on these issues. 2 On remand, the administrative judge shall also
     make findings on whether the appellant received appropriate back pay and
     benefits.
¶7         We also address the appellant’s argument that she should have been
     reinstated to a GS-9 position as a result of the agency’s reclassification of the
     Supervisory Police Officer position. IAF, Tab 39 at 6; PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. On

     2
       There is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be addressed on remand. The
     appellant’s demotion appears to have occurred during a supervisory probationary
     period. IAF, Tab 1 at 6 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 315.907). Although the Board normally
     lacks jurisdiction over such actions, there are various exceptions, including if the action
     was taken for reasons other than supervisory or managerial performance or if it was
     based on marital status or partisan political discrimination. 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.907-.909.
     On remand, the administrative judge shall make findings as to the Board’s jurisdiction
     over this appeal.
                                                                                        5

     remand, the administrative judge shall determine if the appellant is raising a
     constructive demotion claim. See Crum v. Department of the Navy, 75 M.S.P.R.
     75, 80-81 (1997) (explaining constructive demotion claims). If the administrative
     judge finds that the appellant is raising a constructive demotion claim, she shall
     docket the claim as a new appeal. We make no findings as to whether the Board
     has jurisdiction over a potential constructive demotion claim.

     We affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove her
     affirmative defenses.
¶8         The appellant’s petition for review does not challenge the administrative
     judge’s findings as to her affirmative defenses. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. We note
     that the appellant has filed a motion for leave to file an additional pleading on
     review, wherein she stated, for the first time, that she intends to challenge the
     administrative judge’s denial of her affirmative defenses. PFR File, Tab 4 at 4.
     The Board’s regulations do not provide for such an additional pleading, as a
     general rule. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a). The finality date of the initial decision
     was April 27, 2022. ID at 10. The appellant’s motion was filed May 5, 2022, and
     we presume her first attempt at submitting argument on her affirmative defenses
     was in the rejected pleading dated April 30, 2022. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. The
     appellant has not explained why the evidence and argument she intends to file
     could not have been included with her petition for review or at least submitted
     within the time for filing a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 4. We find no
     basis for an exception to the general rule here. Therefore, we deny her motion.
     We affirm the administrative judge’s findings as to the appellant’s race and sex
     discrimination and reprisal defenses. 3 ID at 5-9.
¶9         Finally, to the extent the appellant seeks attorney fees or a related
     determination that she is a prevailing party, her request is premature because
     there is not yet a final decision in this appeal.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 5 (citing

     3
       Nothing in this Order precludes the appellant from raising affirmative defenses in
     connection with a potential constructive demotion claim.
                                                                                         6

      5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1)); see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) (authorizing an award of attorney
      fees for a prevailing party).

                                           ORDER
¶10         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. On remand, the
      administrative judge shall make a threshold jurisdictional finding. If jurisdiction
      is found, the administrative judge shall determine whether the appellant’s
      placement in the Secretary position returns her to the status quo ante, as discussed
      above, and shall make findings as to whether the appellant received the
      appropriate back pay and benefits. If the administrative judge determines that the
      appellant has been received all of the relief that she could have received if the
      matter had been adjudicated and she had prevailed, then the administrative judge
      shall find that the demotion appeal is moot. If not, the administrative judge shall
      adjudicate the merits of the demotion appeal, including the appellant’s affirmative
      defense of harmful error.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.