Court Opinion

ID: 9931362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 20:07:43.833881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:29.782777
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Shahin, 2024-Ohio-456.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,             :
                                                           No. 112829
                 v.                               :

MOHAMED SHAHIN,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellee.              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 8, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-22-671606-C

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, Owen W. Knapp, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellant.

                 Marein & Bradley and Cal E. Cumpstone, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                Plaintiff-appellant the state of Ohio appeals from the trial court’s

May 10, 2023 judgment dismissing its case, with prejudice, against defendant-

appellee Mohamed Shahin. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for

the trial court to enter a judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.
              In December 2022, the state charged Shahin in a one-count indictment

with grand theft of a motor vehicle, a fourth-degree felony. Trial was scheduled to

take place on May 10, 2023. On that date, the parties and counsel appeared before

the trial court and the trial court questioned the assistant prosecuting attorney as to

whether the state was prepared to proceed. Counsel responded that the state had

offered Shahin a plea to the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle, a misdemeanor

of the first degree, and if Shahin did not accept the plea offer the state would dismiss

the case without prejudice. Upon further questioning by the trial court, the assistant

prosecuting attorney informed the court that if Shahin did not accept the plea offer,

it was the state’s intention to reindict him on charges of receiving stolen property

and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

              Defense counsel informed the trial court that Shahin was rejecting the

plea offer, maintaining his innocence, and was ready for trial. According to counsel,

there was no new evidence or victims, and the state was merely attempting “to take

another bite at the apple.” Tr. 5. The assistant prosecuting attorney did not dispute

defense counsel’s statement regarding no new evidence or victims. According to the

assistant prosecuting attorney, the potential new charges were “a little mystery” to

the state. Id. at 7.

              The trial court told the parties it was going to dismiss the case without

prejudice, but it would “be mindful as to how it comes back.” Id. The court then

stated:
       So this case is dismissed without prejudice and — let me just say this
       for the record. I think it kind of shows some bad faith on the part of the
       State if you are dismissing this case solely because you can’t coerce him
       to take a plea for a misdemeanor, and so your threat is, if you don’t
       [plea], then we’re going to reindict and we’re going to add a couple
       more charges to it. I have a problem with that, I really do. And you
       know what, I’m going to dismiss it with prejudice.

Id. at 7-8.

              The hearing then concluded, without objection from the state. The

court issued its judgment, in which it denied the state’s request to dismiss without

prejudice and, instead, on its own accord, dismissed the case with prejudice. The

state appeals, raising the following two assignments of error for our review:

       I.     The trial court erred when it dismissed Appellee’s case with
              prejudice in the absence of a statutory or constitutional violation
              that would bar further prosecution.

       II.    The trial court committed plain error when it dismissed
              Appellee’s case with prejudice and when it denied the State’s
              motion to dismiss the case without prejudice.

              Under R.C. 2945.67(A), “the state may appeal the dismissal of an

indictment whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice.” State v. Craig, 116

Ohio St.3d 135, 2007-Ohio-5752, 876 N.E.2d 957, ¶ 16. Generally, “[a] trial court’s

dismissal of an indictment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Strong,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100766, 2014-Ohio-4209, ¶ 7, citing State v. Walton,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87347, 2006-Ohio-4771, ¶ 4, and State v. Tankers, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 72398 and 72399, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1724 (Apr. 23, 1998).

              Here, the state contends that it “was not afforded a meaningful

opportunity to note its objections clearly on the record.” Although it is true that the
hearing concluded directly after the trial court changed its mind about dismissing

without prejudice, there is nothing in the record indicating that the state was

prevented from objecting. Crim.R. 52(B) provides a mechanism by which parties

may obtain review of “plain errors” that affected “substantial rights” even where they

failed to object, however. “Plain error” exists only when it is clear the result would

have been otherwise but for the error. State v. Sanders, 92 Ohio St.3d 245, 263, 750

N.E.2d 90 (2001).

             Crim.R. 48 governs the dismissal of an indictment, information, or

complaint, and provides that in the instance where the dismissal is done by the

court, the court “shall state on the record its findings of fact and reasons for the

dismissal.” Crim.R. 48(B). In general, Crim.R. 48 does not provide a trial court

authority or discretion to dismiss a criminal proceeding with prejudice unless “‘there

is a deprivation of a defendant’s constitutional or statutory rights, the violation of

which would, in and of itself, bar further prosecution.’” State v. Troisi, 169 Ohio

St.3d 514, 2022-Ohio-3582, 206 N.E.3d 695, ¶ 40, quoting State v. Mills, 11th Dist.

Trumbull Nos. 2020-T-0046 and 2020-T-0047, 2021-Ohio-2722, ¶ 6, quoting State

v. Jones, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22521, 2009-Ohio-1957, ¶ 13, and citing State v.

Sutton, 64 Ohio App.2d 105, 108, 411 N.E.2d 818 (9th Dist.1979).

             Not all violations of constitutional rights require a dismissal with

prejudice, however. Troisi at id. Rather, “[t]he demarcation between a dismissal

with and without prejudice rests with the constitutional prohibition against further

prosecution.” State v. Payne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111693, 2023-Ohio-1294, ¶ 6.
As the Supreme Court of Ohio has stated, “[d]ismissals with prejudice are more

appropriate for cases involving the deprivation of a defendant’s rights to a speedy

trial or against double jeopardy, which would preclude further proceedings.” Troisi

at id., citing State v. Michailides, 2018-Ohio-2399, 114 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.),

and State v. Dunn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101648, 2015-Ohio-3138, ¶ 22.

              Here, the state contends that there is no indication in the record that

Shahin’s constitutional or statutory rights were violated and, further, the trial court

did not make such a finding. Shahin, on the other hand, contends that “dismissal

with prejudice of [his] case was supported by a violation of [his] due process rights

on the ground of prosecutorial vindictiveness.” We are not persuaded by Shahin’s

argument primarily because we find it premature.

             “In order to be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.”

Keller v. Columbus, 100 Ohio St.3d 192, 2003-Ohio-5599, 797 N.E.2d 964, ¶ 26.

“A claim is not ripe for our consideration if it rests on contingent future events that

may not occur as anticipated or may never occur at all.” State v. Loving, 180 Ohio

App.3d 424, 2009-Ohio-15, 905 N.E.2d 1234, ¶ 4 (1oth Dist.).

              While the assistant prosecuting attorney stated that it was the state’s

intention to reindict Shahin on a lesser charge than he was originally indicted on

(i.e., unauthorized use of a motor vehicle) and a new charge (i.e., receiving stolen

property), no new indictment had been filed as of the May 2023 hearing. If the state

were to reindict Shahin and add a new charge, his argument for prosecutorial

vindictiveness would then be ripe. Indeed, the trial court seemed to acknowledge as
much when it stated that it would “be mindful as to how [the case] comes back” on

reindictment. Tr. 7.

              Thus, on this record the trial court committed plain error in dismissing

the case with prejudice. See State v. Lindsey, 183 Ohio App.3d 727, 2009-Ohio-

4124, 918 N.E.2d 1020 (2d Dist.) (applying the plain-error doctrine in favor of the

state on the trial court’s dismissal of its case with prejudice). The state’s assignments

of error are sustained.

              Judgment reversed; case remanded for the trial court to enter a

dismissal without prejudice.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR