Court Opinion

ID: 9958628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 18:03:59.820016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.898920
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                                DOYLE, P. J.,
                           HODGES and WATKINS, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                               https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                       April 9, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0083. CLEMONS v. THE STATE.

      HODGES, Judge.

      Dimitrius Clemons appeals from the denial of his request for a hearing on a

previously withdrawn, 12-year-old motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Clemons asserts

that the trial court’s order “essentially dismissed [his] motion to withdraw guilty plea

by failing to reach the merits of it.” Finding no error, we affirm.

      The undisputed record shows that Clemons pled guilty in 2010 to two counts

of armed robbery and one count of aggravated assault. He filed a timely motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, and a hearing was scheduled. At the hearing, Clemons’

counsel announced that Clemons wanted to withdraw the motion. The court swore

in Clemons and confirmed his intention to withdraw the motion on the record, since
the State was ready to proceed with the hearing. Clemons acknowledged, “I don’t feel

comfortable with taking [the motion to withdraw his plea] forward[,]” and the trial

court took the motion off the calendar and ended the hearing.

         Twelve years later, Clemons, by his own admission, “reversed course” and

sought to revive the motion to withdraw his plea by filing a “Request for hearing on

motion to withdraw guilty plea.” The trial court denied Clemons’ request for a

hearing, finding that: (i) Clemons’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea ceased to exist

when it was withdrawn; (ii) therefore, there was no pending motion to be heard; and

(iii) Clemons’ remedy, if any, was through habeas corpus. Clemons appeals from this

order.

         Clemons’ sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his

request for a hearing because he retained the right to amend his motion to withdraw

his guilty plea until the trial court entered a final order on the motion. We disagree.

         Clemons does not dispute that his motion was orally withdrawn. In fact, his

appellate brief lists the following statement of the case: “The question presented in

this case is whether a defendant may proceed on a motion to withdraw guilty plea

prior to the entry of a final order, despite his earlier oral withdrawal of the motion.”

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(Emphasis supplied.) We conclude that the trial court’s denial of Clemons’ request

for a hearing on the extinguished motion was proper. It is well settled that a criminal

defendant cannot complain of a ruling which his own conduct procured or aided in

causing. See generally Blackwell v. State, 299 Ga. 122, 125 (786 SE2d 669) (2016)

(concluding that defendant waived through agreement his right to withdraw a guilty

plea before sentence was pronounced); Mitchell v. State, 282 Ga. 416, 419 (5) (b) (651

SE2d 49) (2007) (finding that defendant could not complain about court order

granting State’s motion to exclude evidence when defendant expressly agreed to

order). That is exactly what happened here.

      Clemons appeared at the hearing on his motion to withdraw the guilty plea, his

counsel indicated Clemons wished to withdraw his motion, the trial court questioned

Clemons on the record and Clemons stated that he did not feel comfortable taking the

motion forward, the trial court took the motion off the calendar and concluded the

hearing, and then Clemons changed his mind 12 years later and attempted to revive

the motion to withdraw his plea by filing a request for a hearing on the extinguished

motion. The lengthy time between Clemons’ filing of his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea and his request for a hearing on the withdrawn motion belies his assertion

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– made in his appellate brief and not his request for a hearing in the lower court – that

he “did not intend to withdraw the motion[.]” Clemons’ acquiescence in both his trial

counsel’s proffer regarding withdrawal of the motion and the trial court’s conclusion

of the hearing on the motion to withdraw his guilty plea deprives him of the right to

complain on appeal.

      Moreover, we disagree with Clemons’ assertion that his “oral withdrawal was

not dispositive” because the trial court did not “rule[] upon” the motion and enter

an “appealable order[.]” The cases relied upon by Clemons do not support this

proposition. Those cases specifically involve motions for new trial, where an order

“granting, overruling, or otherwise finally disposing of the motion” must be filed under

OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). (Emphasis supplied.) See Heard v. State, 274 Ga. 196, 196-197 (1)

(552 SE2d 818) (2001) (holding that a party may not withdraw a motion for new trial

by filing a “dismissal” of the motion; a trial court must enter an order in connection

with that action); Long v. Truex, 349 Ga. App. 875, 876-877 (1) (a) (827 SE2d 66)

(2019) (holding that a motion for new trial remained pending because the record did

not contain a court order connected with the party’s notice to dismiss the motion).

      OCGA § 5-6-38 (a) provides as follows:

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      A notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the
      appealable decision or judgment complained of; but when a motion for
      new trial, a motion in arrest of judgment, or a motion for judgment
      notwithstanding the verdict has been filed, the notice shall be filed within
      30 days after the entry of the order granting, overruling, or otherwise
      finally disposing of the motion. . . .

The statute does not require a mandatory order otherwise disposing of a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea, and, while the better practice may be for a trial court to issue

an order noting the withdrawal of such a motion, Clemons has not cited any statutory

or case law authority requiring the trial court to issue a ruling under the circumstances

here – where counsel, with the acquiescence of his client, withdraws a motion to

withdraw a guilty plea. See Garcia v. Shaw Indus., 321 Ga. App. 48, 55 (2) (741 SE2d

285) (2013) (finding that party who withdrew a motion to compel abandoned any

argument regarding the motion); see generally Rowe v. Rowe, 228 Ga. 302, 303 (1) (185

SE2d 69) (1971) (concluding that a written demand for a jury trial can be withdrawn

orally in open court); Obiozor v. State, 213 Ga. App. 523, 524 (2) (a) (445 SE2d 553)

(1994) (holding that trial counsel expressly abandoned on the record defendant’s

speedy trial rights); State v. Davis, 196 Ga. App. 785, 786 (397 SE2d 58) (1990)

(concluding that an oral nolle prosequi was valid even though not reduced to writing).

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      We find no error in the trial court’s order denying Clemons’ request for a

hearing.

      Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Watkins, J., concur.

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