Court Opinion

ID: 9557876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 16:59:21.607307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:36.569357
License: Public Domain

LANDAU, P. J.,
concurring.
I think that the majority reaches the correct result, but for the wrong reason. The majority concludes that, although prescribing medication ordinarily is a professional service, when it is done for the purpose of obtaining sex, it is not a professional service and is therefore not subject to the professional services exclusion of a doctor’s homeowner’s policy. With respect, I think the majority’s reasoning is flawed and is likely to lead to much mischief down the road.
Whether a particular act is a professional service depends on its nature and character, not its purpose. Thus, in Multnomah Co. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 256 Or 24, 470 P2d 147 (1970), which the majority oddly relegates to passing mention in a footnote, the Supreme Court determined that the failure of a medical technician to prescribe a drug was a professional service within the meaning of a professional services exclusion provision in an insurance policy. The court held that a professional service is
“one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual rather than physical or manual. * * * In determining whether a particular act or omission is of a professional nature, the act or omission itself must be looked to and not the title or character of the party who performs or fails to perform the act.”
Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted).
*516Nowhere did the court mention propriety of purpose. That only makes sense. The propriety of the purpose of an act may bear on whether the actor was negligent, but it is irrelevant to whether the act triggers a duty to defend. An act that is undisputably a professional service may be undertaken for any number of purposes, proper and improper. The purpose of the act, however, does not deprive it of its professional nature. A lawyer may, for example, render legal advice for purposes of improper personal — even sexual — aggrandizement. That does not mean that the lawyer did not practice law in the process. It just means that he or she did so improperly.
As the Supreme Court held in Oregon Auto. Ins., prescribing medication is a “professional service.” Whether accomplished for a proper or improper purpose, it is an act that arises out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment that involves specialized knowledge and skill of a predominantly mental or intellectual nature. The majority errs in concluding otherwise.
In my view, the insurance company nevertheless is obliged to defend in this case. One of the allegations in the underlying negligence action is that the doctor was negligent in “[maintaining a sexual relationship” with someone to whom he had prescribed medication. Maintaining a sexual relationship with a patient, or a nonpatient to whom the doctor has prescribed medication, is not a professional service. Therefore, the underlying complaint contains at least one negligence allegation that triggers the insurer’s duty to defend. Because a duty to defend some of the allegations of a complaint imposes a duty to defend all of the allegations of that complaint, Timberline Equip. v. St. Paul Fire and Mar. Ins., 281 Or 639, 645, 576 P2d 1244 (1978), the insurer is obligated to defend the entire action, including the allegations involving improper prescriptions. I would reverse the judgment on that ground.