Court Opinion

ID: 9702279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:04:57.083142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:36.163196
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
concurring:
The Constitution of Maryland, in Art. IV, § 22, provides that, when a party to a circuit court case desires to have a “decision or determination of any point” reserved for consideration of a court in banc, “the motion for such reservation shall be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made____” (Emphasis added).* 1 This *208Court in Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md. 122, 3 A. 285 (1886), held that the term “sitting” meant the day the decision was made, and that “this provision of the Constitution intended to give the party taking an exception ... the whole time until the Court adjourned for the day ... to determine whether he would have his appeal to the Court in banc, or to the Court of Appeals.” 65 Md. at 124, 3 A. 285.
The Court today does not take the position that the Costigin v. Bond holding was erroneous, or that the Court in Costigin mis-construed the constitutional intent. Rather, the majority today says that the final clause of Art. IV, § 22, stating that “this Section shall be. subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by law,” authorizes this Court through its rule making power2 to make “changes” in the constitutional requirements of § 22. The majority frankly acknowledges that “the practice and procedure relating to the preservation of points for appellate review, and the time for filing an election to have the review before an in banc court, have been changed” by Rule 2-551, and it says that these changes in the constitutional requirements are permissible.
*209As far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history of American constitutional jurisprudence that any appellate court has taken the position that an authorization for legislative implementation of a constitutional provision includes an authorization to contradict or amend the mandatory requirements of the constitutional provision itself. I flatly disagree with the majority’s view that the judges of this Court have been empowered to amend the Maryland Constitution. While, for the reasons set forth below, I also do not agree with the practice of commenting on a constitutional issue in a case where we lack authority to decide that issue, it is perhaps fortunate that the majority’s unprecedented constitutional theory is set forth as dicta. As such, it is not precedent within the principle of stare decisis.3
I.
Preliminarily, I disagree with the Court’s expressing any view on the constitutionality of Rule 2-551. Because Montgomery County originally sought in banc review, Article IV, § 22, bars the County’s further appeal. Acknowledging this, the Court decides only that the Court of Special Appeals correctly dismissed the appeal. I fully concur with this decision. Since the Court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits, its discussion should have ended there.
Nevertheless, the Court proceeds to the merits in this case, stating: “Although we ordinarily do not express our views on any question raised by a dismissed appeal, we occasionally do so to resolve a matter of substantial importance.” In dispensing its views on Rule 2-551, however, the majority ignores the prudential limitations on the doctrine it invokes. Our cases have repeatedly admonished that only in “rare instances” and under “the most compel*210ling of circumstances” will the Court express its views on the merits of a dismissed appeal. See, e.g., In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 680-681, 516 A.2d 976 (1986); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562, 510 A.2d 562 (1986); Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 297, 380 A.2d 12 (1977). As pointed out in the often quoted language of Judge Hammond in Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379 (1954), “only where the urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest, will there be justified a departure from the general rule and practice of not deciding academic questions____”
In recent years, those rare instances where the Court has expressed its views on the merits of dismissed appeals have involved either moot cases4 or premature appeals, and not a situation where appellate jurisdiction over the case was entirely absent. In the latter situation, we have been particularly reluctant to express our views on the merits. With regard to the identical issue on which the majority now speaks, namely the constitutionality of Rule 2-551, we recently commented in a case where appellate jurisdiction was lacking: “The constitutional question decided by the circuit court, and debated by the parties before this Court, is obviously important for future cases where circuit court in banc review may be sought. Nevertheless, we shall not be able to reach that question in this case.” Walbert v. Walbert, 310 Md. 657, 661, 531 A.2d 291 (1987). Most appropriate is Judge Smith’s statement for the Court in Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 179, 428 A.2d 454 (1981): “We may not decide the issue presented if we have no jurisdiction to decide it, notwithstanding the importance of the issue.”
*211As the majority explains, it is the Constitution itself, in Art. IV, § 22, which prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court of Special Appeals or this Court over the decision of the court in banc. For this Court to render an opinion on the holding of the court in banc, at least absent the greatest urgency, is in derogation of the constitutional limitation upon our jurisdiction. Cfi, Reyes v. Prince George’s County, supra, 281 Md. at 291-298, 380 A.2d 12.
In addition, the majority’s statements concerning the constitutionality of Rule 2-551 ignore this Court’s established policy of reaching constitutional issues only when necessary. Allgood v. State, 309 Md. 58, 82, 522 A.2d 917 (1987); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, supra, 306 Md. at 565, 510 A.2d 562, and cases there cited.
It is questionable whether any degree of urgency and importance justifies this Court’s expressing its view on a constitutional issue where there is no appellate jurisdiction under the Constitution.5 Assuming, however, that such expression may be justified under sufficiently urgent circumstances, the instant case does not fall within that category.
This is not a case like Board of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 102 A.2d 248, 251 (1954), or Roth v. House of Refuge, 31 Md. 329 (1869), cited by the majority. Those are the two cases in which this Court, although without appellate jurisdiction to do so,6 did express its view on the merits of constitutional issues. Both Roth and Steward, however, involved a lack of statutory appellate jurisdiction in this court over the type of case involved regardless of which party prevailed below. Thus the likeli*212hood that the court would be able to reach the constitutional question in a similar case was diminished. Moreover, the lower court’s ruling in each of those cases had an important and immediate adverse public impact. In Roth, the trial court had held unconstitutional statutory provisions authorizing the commitment and detention of certain types of persons by justices of the peace and the House of Refuge. In Steward, under the circuit court’s ruling, the Board of Medical Examiners would have had to have been reconstituted.
The urgency present in Roth and Steward does not exist in the case at bar. Under Article IV, § 22, of the Constitution, this Court is precluded from hearing appeals from courts in banc only if, as in this case, the appellant from the in banc court is the party who initially sought in banc review. In all other situations, the Court of Special Appeals and this Court will have appellate jurisdiction. In numerous instances this Court has properly reviewed cases decided by courts in banc. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Moten, 307 Md. 644, 516 A.2d 593 (1986); Dean v. State, 302 Md. 493, 489 A.2d 22 (1985); Estep v. Estep, 285 Md. 416, 420, 404 A.2d 1040, 1042 (1979); Buck v. Folkers, 269 Md. 185, 304 A.2d 826, 828 (1973); Costigin v. Bond, supra, 65 Md. 122, 3 A. 285. Furthermore, the issue concerning the constitutionality of Rule 2-551 is likely to arise in many in banc cases. Consequently, it is probable that a case will soon arise within our appellate jurisdiction presenting the issue of Rule 2-551’s constitutionality.
Moreover, the ruling of the in banc court in this case does not have the immediate public impact that the lower court decisions in Roth and Steward had. Until this Court decides the question of Rule 2-551’s validity, parties can fully protect their rights to in banc appeals by adhering to the procedure set forth in Art. IV, § 22, of the Constitution. And if a party fails to comply with this procedure, he can still take an appeal directly to the Court of Special Appeals. As pointed out by Judge J. Dudley Digges for the Court in Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 408, 404 A.2d *2131027 (1979), “[Art. IV,] section 22, when it is applicable, has minimal impact upon the appeal process as all dissatisfied litigants ... have the option of a normal appeal to the Court of Special Appeals____”
Merely because it may be convenient to some litigants for us to comment upon the constitutionality of Rule 2-551 at this time does not justify our doing so. Rather we should heed the words of Chief Judge Ogle Marbury in State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 66, 51 A.2d 647, 648 (1947):
“It was not the intention of the people of this State in establishing this Court through the several constitutional enactments that it should write treatises on the law. Its duty is to decide bona fide cases____”
II.
I shall comment upon the constitutionality of Rule 2-551 only because the majority of the Court has decided to do so.
Initially, the majority misstates the requirements of Art. IV, § 22, of the Constitution, as interpreted by this Court in Costigin v. Bond, supra. According to the majority opinion, “[t]he provision of § 22 ... that was later to cause confusion, was the requirement that a party desiring in banc review of a point or question enter on the record an essentially contemporaneous exception.” The majority goes on to discuss the common law requirement of an exception in order to preserve a question for appellate review and then states: “It is therefore logical and understandable that the draftsmen of § 22 included a requirement for contemporaneous exceptions as a part of an in banc appeal.” The majority seems to conclude that the “modernization” of appellate procedure, with the abolition of “exceptions,” has rendered the requirements of § 22 obsolete.
Contrary to the majority’s statements, Art. IV, § 22, does not deal with “exceptions” or with what is generally necessary to preserve a matter for appellate review. The word “exception” is nowhere contained in § 22. As the majority’s opinion explains, lawyers in 1867 and the draftsmen of *214§ 22 well understood the requirement of an “exception” to preserve a matter for appellate review. If the framers of § 22 had intended to constitutionalize this need for an exception, they would have used the word “exception” in § 22.
The pertinent language of § 22 is that “the motion for such reservation shall be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made____” Instead of dealing with what is necessary for appellate preservation, this language relates to the time for electing review by a court in banc. Regardless of whether an “exception” or an “objection” or an “argument” or no action is required for appellate preservation of a point, § 22 merely requires that, in order to have review by a court in banc, a motion to that effect be entered “during the sitting, at which decision may be made.” If a party desires to appeal to a regular appellate court instead of a court in banc, he need do nothing as far as § 22 is concerned. Nevertheless, in 1867, such party most likely would have been required to note an exception if he desired review by the Court of Appeals.
The distinction between the requirements of Art. IV, § 22, and an exception, was clearly understood by the Court in Costigan v. Bond, when it stated (65 Md. at 124, 8 A. 285):
“The exception to a ruling must properly be taken as soon as the ruling is made but this provision of the Constitution intended to give the party taking an exception the entire sitting of the Court (that is the whole time until the Court adjourned for the day) to determine whether he would have his appeal to the Court in banc, or to the Court of Appeals. It would be a very improvident construction of this section to hold that a party might have the whole term of the Court to make up his mind; and we think it is not warranted by the plain meaning of the words.”
*215Since § 22 relates to the time for an election between appellate courts, and not the matter of appellate preservation, it is no more obsolete today than it was in 1867.7
If the majority were convinced that the Court in Costigin v. Bond erroneously interpreted Art. IV, § 22, the Court could overrule Costigin. I would, however, strongly dissent from such action. As this Court has pointed out, what became Art. IV, § 22, was proposed at the Constitutional Convention of 1867 by Delegate Richard H. Alvey of Washington County. See the discussion in Dean v. State, supra, 302 Md. at 496-497, 489 A.2d 22, and Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, supra, 285 Md. at 396, 404 A.2d 1027. Delegate Alvey later became one of the most distinguished judges ever to sit on this Court. He sat in Costigin v. Bond and joined the Court’s opinion. Moreover, the Costigin interpretation of § 22 had been consistently recognized and adhered to by the General Assembly and this Court, until the unfortunate adoption of Rule 2-551(a) in 1984. Art. IV, § 22, was re-adopted by the electorate of Maryland in 1978, without any change in the Costigin interpretation of that provision.
Although I would not concur with overruling Costigin v. Bond, such action would be less drastic than the dicta embraced by the majority today.
Apparently unwilling to overrule Costigin, the majority instead asserts that § 22 “contains its own constitutional authority for procedural changes.” In support of this superficially innocuous statement, the majority observes that, by its terms, § 22 is “subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by law.” The majority concludes that, by virtue of this grant, coupled with the Court’s general rule-making authority, this Court has the power not merely *216to clarify, develop, or effectuate the terms of § 22 but also to contradict or amend them. I cannot agree.
The Maryland Rules are legislative in nature. Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 504-505, 229 A.2d 124, 126 (1967). Therefore, like all legislation, the Maryland Rules are invalid unless consistent with the Constitution. See Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, supra, 285 Md. at 411, 404 A.2d 1027; Laurel Canning Co. v. B. & O. R.R., 115 Md. 639, 642, 81 A. 126, 127 (1911). In interpreting § 22 as authorizing this Court to adopt rules that contradict § 22’s very terms, however, the majority exempts such rules from the requirement of consistency with the Constitution. In effect, the majority concludes that a constitutional provision empowering this Court or the Legislature to implement a constitutional section, constitutes authority to amend the Constitution.
The majority’s astonishing conclusion has a number of consequences. First, as to rules adopted under § 22, judicial review becomes superfluous: no rule thus adopted could be unconstitutional. More important, if the power to implement a constitutional provision includes the power to contradict the terms of that provision, the consequences for Maryland law are unsettling. For example, Article I, § 3, empowers the General Assembly “to provide by suitable enactment for voting by qualified voters of the State of Maryland ... who are absent at the time of any election in which they are entitled to vote.” Could the General Assembly thereby provide for absentee voting by voters who are neither “qualified” nor “entitled to vote”? Article II, § IB, provides that “[e]ach candidate who shall seek nomination for Governor, under any method provided by law for such nomination, ... shall at the time of filing for said office designate a candidate for Lieutenant Governor____” In regulating the procedure for obtaining a gubernatorial nomination, could the General Assembly require a candidate not to designate a candidate for Lieutenant Governor?
No court, to the best of my knowledge, has ever held that the power to implement a constitutional provision includes *217the power to contradict the terms of that provision. In fact, in an analogous situation, the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-653, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1722-1725, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966).
The majority, in an apparent effort to minimize the scope of its singular view of constitutional adjudication, emphasizes that the Art. IV, § 22, requirement, which is purportedly amended by Rule 2-551, is a procedural provision and that “Rule 2-551 do[es] not impair the right to an in banc appeal____” Of course, all of Art IV, § 22, is procedural. In fact, much of the Maryland Constitution—particularly the Declaration of Rights—is made up of procedural requirements. A noteworthy feature of constitutions in this Country is the extent which they deal with process rather than substantive political matters. Consequently, the apparent limitation placed by the majority, with regard to its view of judicial power to amend the Maryland Constitution, does not significantly minimize the effect of the majority’s position.
For all of the above reasons, I disagree with the majority’s opinion in this case. I concur in the result only.
Judges SMITH and COUCH have authorized me to state that they concur with the views expressed herein.

. Art. IV, § 22, in its entirety provides as follows:
“Section 22. Reservation of points or questions for consideration by court in banc.
Where any Term is held, or trial conducted by less than the whole number of said Circuit Judges, upon the decision or determination of any point, or question, by the Court, it shall be competent to the party, against whom the ruling or decision is made, upon motion, to *208have the point, or question reserved for the consideration of the three Judges of the Circuit, who shall constitute a court in banc for such purpose; and the motion for such reservation shall be entered of record, during the sitting, at which such decision may be made; and the several Circuit Courts shall regulate, by rules, the mode and manner of presenting such points, or questions to the Court in banc, and the decision of the said Court in banc shall be the effective decision in the premises, and conclusive, as against the party, at whose motion said points, or questions were reserved; but such decision in banc shall not preclude the right of Appeal, or writ of error to the adverse party, in those cases, civil or criminal, in which appeal, or writ of error to the Court of Appeals may be allowed by Law. The right of having questions reserved shall not, however, apply to trials of Appeals from judgments of the District Court, nor to criminal cases below the grade of felony, except when the punishment is confinement in the Penitentiary; and this Section shall be subject to such provisions as may hereafter be made by Law.”

. See Art. IV, § 18, of the Constitution.

. “Where appellate jurisdiction is absent, such statements of the appellate court [on the merits] can logically be no more than dicta, and it is improper for the order of the appellate court and the opinion on which the order is based, to be made conclusive as to the points discussed.” Eastgate Associates v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 704, 350 A.2d 661 (1976).

. The normal rule against expressing our views in moot cases is based upon policy grounds; it is not a constitutional limitation upon our jurisdiction. Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 291-299, 380 A.2d 12 (1977).

. For example, if there is a sufficient public urgency or necessity, will the Court now comply with a request by the Governor and General Assembly for an advisory opinion on an extremely important constitutional question? See the discussion in Reyes v. Prince George’s County, supra, 281 Md. at 291-298, 380 A.2d 12.

. The lack of appellate jurisdiction in those cases, however, was not rooted in the Constitution itself.

. Like the majority opinion, the dicta contained in footnote 6 in Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 393, 399, 404 A.2d 1027 (1979), confuses appellate preservation with the election requirement of Art. IV, § 22. That footnote suggested that a “duly noted objection” might by rule be deemed a "reservation” under § 22. The majority today, however, goes far beyond the suggestion in the Washabaugh footnote. The Court now purports to dispense with the need for any action on the day of the ruling or decision.