Court Opinion

ID: 9905093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 19:01:33.954574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:39.010284
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10614       Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 11/28/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                            For the Eleventh Circuit

                              ____________________

                                    No. 23-10614
                              Non-Argument Calendar
                              ____________________

        RENARDO NEHEMIAH LEWIS,
        LUBREEZE LEWIS-FRANKLIN,
                                                         Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        CITY OF MARIETTA,
        CHIEF DAN FLYNN,
        Police Chief Individual and Professional Capacity,
        ENRIQUE MALLEN,
        JOSHUA MADISON,
        STACEY FOWLER,
        In their individual and professional capacities, et al.,
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                23-10614

                                                     Defendants-Appellees,

        MUHAMMED IFTIKHAR,
        CEO Individual and Personal, et al.,

                                                               Defendants.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-01883-ELR
                           ____________________

        Before ABUDU, ANDERSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Appellants Renardo Lewis and Lubreeze Lewis-Franklin
        (Lewis’s wife) appeal the district court’s order granting Appellees’
        motion to dismiss, pursuant to Civil Rule of Civil Procedure
        12(b)(6), Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. Appellants origi-
        nally ﬁled their complaint in state court, alleging claims of mali-
        cious prosecution, false arrest, and excessive force against the Ap-
        pellees, the City of Marietta, Marietta Police Chief Dan Flynn, City
        of Marietta police oﬃcers Joshua Madison, Stacey Fowler, Enrique
        Mallen and Noah Mack (“City Appellees”), International House of
        Pancakes (“IHOP”) employees Joseph Sudderth and David
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        23-10614              Opinion of the Court                          3

        Vanzant, IHOP’s CEO Muhammed Iftikhar and Iftikhar Enter-
        prises, Inc. (“IHOP Defendants”). Appellees/Defendants removed
        the case to federal court, and Appellants ﬁled an amended com-
        plaint raising ﬁfteen counts against the various Appellees/Defend-
        ants. The IHOP Defendants ﬁled answers, and the City Appellees
        moved to dismiss all the claims against them. The district court
        dismissed the claims against the City Appellees, and the Appellants
        appeal from this order of dismissal. Having read the parties’ briefs
        and reviewed the record, we aﬃrm in part and reverse in part the
        district court’s order.
                                            I.
               According to the complaint, early on the morning of Sun-
        day, March 31, 2019, Lewis entered an IHOP to place a take-out
        order. Lewis requested bacon as part of his order, and Sudderth,
        an employee, informed Lewis that the restaurant was out of bacon.
        Lewis returned to his vehicle to ask his wife what she wanted in
        place of bacon, and when Lewis re-entered the IHOP, Sudderth in-
        formed him that the grill was closed. Lewis and Sudderth engaged
        in a verbal exchange regarding the restaurant’s customer service.
        David Vanzant, cook and manager at the IHOP, called the police to
        report that Lewis had threatened the staﬀ and had a weapon. Of-
        ﬁcer Madison initially responded to the call, and later Oﬃcers Mal-
        len, Fowler, and Mack joined him at the IHOP. Oﬃcer Fowler re-
        quested that Lewis produce his driver’s license, and while he was
        doing so, Lewis heard Oﬃcer Madison yelling at his wife. Lewis
        pivoted to check on his wife, and at that point, Lewis alleges that
        Oﬃcer Mallen forcefully grabbed his arm and slammed him
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                         23-10614

        against the glass window. Lewis claims that the oﬃcers proceeded
        to beat him, stun him with a taser, and arrest him, although he was
        complying with the oﬃcers’ instructions and was not resisting. Of-
        ﬁcers took Lewis to the hospital and then to the Cobb County De-
        tention Center.
                Oﬃcials charged Lewis with twenty-seven criminal counts
        stemming from the IHOP incident and held him in jail for thirty-
        one days. Later, a grand jury indicted him on all charges, but the
        State entered a nolle prosequi. Subsequently, Lewis and his wife ﬁled
        their complaint against the Appellees. They asserted the following
        federal claims for: (1) excessive force against the City Oﬃcers; (2)
        Monell1 liability against the City and Chief of Police; (3) malicious
        prosecution against the City Oﬃcers; (4) false arrest against the
        City Oﬃcers; (5) false imprisonment against the City Oﬃcers and
        IHOP Defendants; state claims for (6) malicious prosecution
        against City Oﬃcers, Vanzant and Sudderth; (7) intentional inﬂic-
        tion of emotion distress against City Oﬃcers, Vanzant and Sud-
        derth, (8) assault and battery against City Oﬃcers; (9) negligent hir-
        ing and retention against the City and Chief of Police; (10) false
        arrest against the Sheriﬀ; (11) false imprisonment and false arrest
        against the Sheriﬀ; (12) federal claim of conspiracy against the City
        Oﬃcer and the IHOP Defendants; (13) state law claim of vicarious
        liability against Iftikhar and Iftikhar Enterprises; (14) state law
        claim of negligent hiring and retention against Iftikhar and Iftikhar
        Enterprises; and (15) state law claim of loss of consortium against

        1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978).
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        23-10614                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        all Appellees. The City Appellees moved to dismiss the claims un-
        der Rule 12(b)(6), and the district court granted the motion. The
        IHOP Defendants did not join in the motion to dismiss, and they
        are not parties in this appeal.
                                               II.
               We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dis-
        miss, “accepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
        construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiﬀ.” Boyd
        v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility, 856 F.3d 853, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2017)
        (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). To survive a
        Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain suﬃ-
        cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
        is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.
        1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a
        complaint need not contain detailed allegations, it must “include
        enough facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on
        the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.”
        Boyd, 856 F.3d at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted).
               “In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the district court may con-
        sider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiﬀ’s claim,
        and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Speaker v. United States
        HHS CDC & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation
        omitted). When the exhibits attached to the plaintiﬀ’s pleading
        contradict the general and conclusory allegations of the pleading,
        the exhibits govern, even at the motion to dismiss stage. See Griﬃn
        Indust. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, video
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10614

        footage that obviously contradicts the non-movant’s version of the
        facts will be considered rather than the non-movant’s account.
        Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010).
                                              III.
               A. Motion to Dismiss
               1. The City
               Appellants contend that the district court erred by granting
        the City Appellees’ motion to dismiss their federal § 1983 claims.
        Speciﬁcally, as to the City, however, the Appellants fail to include
        any arguments or authority to show how the district court erred in
        ﬁnding that the City was not liable for any claim. As such, they
        have abandoned their claims against the City. See Christmas v. Harris
        Cnty., Ga., 51 F.4th 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2022) (failure to raise an
        issue in an initial brief is a forfeiture of that issue). Further, on the
        merits, the Appellants fail to allege a direct causal link between the
        City’s policy or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.
        City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 1203
        (1989); Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir.
        2003). Appellants do not allege facts to support their contention
        that the City had an oﬃcially promulgated policy or an unoﬃcial
        custom or practice of allowing for excessive force, false arrest, or
        malicious prosecution by its oﬃcers. Rather, the Appellants make
        broad and conclusory allegations regarding the policies and train-
        ing of City oﬃcers and fail to state a § 1983 claim against the City.
              Appellants also fail to state adequately a claim against the
        City pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
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        23-10614                Opinion of the Court                          7

        658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037 (1978) (local government cannot be
        sued under § 1983 for an injury inﬂicted solely by its agents or em-
        ployees). Absent an explicit policy for inadequate training or su-
        pervision, the Appellants must show that the City’s failure to train
        evidenced a “deliberate indiﬀerence” to the rights of its inhabitants.
        Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Appel-
        lants can make this showing by presenting “some evidence that the
        [City] knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular area
        and the [City] made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Id.
        Appellants’ claim is devoid of any such showing, and we conclude
        from the record that their § 1983 claims against the City fail. Thus,
        we aﬃrm the district court’s order dismissing these claims against
        the City.
               2. Chief of Police
                Appellants claim that the district court erred in dismissing
        the federal § 1983 claim for supervisory liability and the state law
        claim of negligent hiring and retention against the Chief of Police
        in his individual capacity. However, they fail to argue or brief any
        authority to support their claim. As such, they have abandoned this
        claim. See Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1354. Assuming they did not aban-
        don these claims, the federal claim fails nonetheless because the
        Appellants make no allegations that the Chief of Police directly
        participated in any of the alleged constitutional violations. See
        Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047-48 (11th Cir. 2014)
        (stating that to be held liable under a theory of supervisory liability,
        a plaintiﬀ must show that the supervisor “either directly
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-10614

        participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal con-
        nection exists between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged con-
        stitutional violation”). As for the state claim, because the Appel-
        lants do not show malice or an intent to injure by the Chief, this
        claim also fails. See Grammens v. Dollar, 697 S.E. 2d 775, 777 (Ga.
        2010) (stating that oﬃcial is entitled to immunity unless plaintiﬀ
        can show that oﬃcer acted with actual malice or an intent to injure
        in undertaking his discretionary acts of hiring and retaining em-
        ployees). Thus, we conclude that the district court properly dis-
        missed these claims against the Chief of Police.
               3. Individual Officers
                Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing
        their federal Fourth Amendment claims of excessive force, mali-
        cious prosecution, false arrest, and conspiracy against the individ-
        ual oﬃcers. The district court conducted an analysis under quali-
        ﬁed immunity and found that there was no dispute that the oﬃcers
        were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority dur-
        ing the incident. Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1268 (11th
        Cir. 2010). The district court thus considered whether the Appel-
        lants presented suﬃcient facts to allege a violation of a constitu-
        tional right, and, if so, whether that right was clearly established.
        Finding that the Appellants failed to support their allegations, the
        district court determined that the oﬃcers were entitled to qualiﬁed
        immunity and dismissed these claims.
               We conclude, based on the record, that the district court
        erred in dismissing the Appellees’ claim of excessive force. Having
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        23-10614                Opinion of the Court                          9

        reviewed the record, particularly the videotape of the incident, we
        conclude that the oﬃcers initial use of force to secure Lewis against
        the window was reasonable under the circumstances. However,
        we disagree with the district court regarding the continued use of
        force by the oﬃcers. Although Lewis was verbally caustic toward
        the oﬃcers, he did not appear combative physically, and a reasona-
        ble oﬃcer would not have used a disproportionate amount of force
        under the circumstances as these oﬃcers did to subdue Lewis and
        handcuﬀ him. We conclude that the Appellees’ complaint contains
        suﬃcient factual matter, that accepted as true, states a claim to re-
        lief that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, we reverse the district
        court’s order of dismissal as to the excessive force claim against the
        individual oﬃcers, and remand this claim to the district court.
               However, we conclude that the district court properly dis-
        missed the malicious prosecution claim, the false arrest claim, and
        the conspiracy claim against the individual oﬃcers. The Appellants
        do not allege facts suﬃcient to establish that the legal process justi-
        fying his seizure was constitutionally inﬁrm and that his seizure
        would not otherwise be justiﬁed without legal process. See Wil-
        liams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157-59 (11th Cir. 2020) (claim of
        malicious prosecution). Appellants have not alleged that the indi-
        vidual oﬃcers intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or
        omissions necessary to support the arrest warrant for Lewis; thus,
        their malicious prosecution claim fails. Likewise, the district court
        properly dismissed the false arrest claims because the oﬃcers had
        probable cause to arrest Lewis. See Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319,
        1326 (11th Cir. 2013) (evidence of probable cause is an absolute bar
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10614

        to false arrest claims). As to the conspiracy claim, the record
        demonstrates that the Appellants failed to show that the oﬃcers
        and the IHOP employees “reached an understanding” to deny
        Lewis his constitutional rights. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555,
        1563 (11th Cir. 1990).
               Appellants also contend on appeal that the district court
        erred in dismissing the state law claims of false imprisonment, ma-
        licious prosecution, intentional inﬂiction of emotional distress, and
        assault and battery against the individual oﬃcers. The district
        court determined that the Appellants failed to allege any facts
        showing that the individual oﬃcers acted with actual malice, and,
        thus, the oﬃcers were entitled to oﬃcial immunity under Georgia
        law. See e.g., Murphy v. Bajjani, 647 S.E.2d 54, 60 (2007) (explaining
        actual malice for purposes of oﬃcial immunity). The record sup-
        ports the district court’s determination, and, thus, we conclude
        that the district court properly dismissed the state law claims
        against the individual oﬃcers.
               B. Ante Litem Notice
               Appellants contend that the district court erroneously dis-
        missed their § 1983 and state law intentional tort claims against the
        City due to their failure to serve a proper ante litem notice. See Ga.
        Code § 50-21-26 (2022) (providing that a party cannot bring an ac-
        tion against the State without giving notice of the claim and its in-
        tent to litigate). A review of the record demonstrates that this as-
        sertion is incorrect. The district court’s order clariﬁes that the only
        claim the district court dismissed for improper ante litem notice is
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        23-10614               Opinion of the Court                       11

        one claim for negligence against the City: a state law claim for neg-
        ligent hiring and retention against the Chief of Police in his oﬃcial
        capacity and the City. In a further order, the district court reiter-
        ated that it dismissed only one claim based on the improper ante
        litem notice requirement. Thus, the record demonstrates that the
        Appellants’ claim is meritless.
               C. Consideration of Police Officers’ Videos
                The Appellants argue that the district court improperly con-
        sidered the oﬃcers’ body camera videos without viewing and con-
        sidering their witness camera footage. The record shows that the
        Appellants speciﬁcally incorporated by reference the witness video
        in their amended complaint and incorporated by reference the of-
        ﬁcers’ body camera video. The district court did consider both be-
        cause it alluded to both videos in its orders. Further, the district
        court could consider any documents attached to the Rule 12 mo-
        tion if the attachment was central to one of the claims and its au-
        thenticity was undisputed. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134-
        35 (11th Cir. 2002) (discussing incorporation by reference doctrine).
        The Appellants have never challenged the authenticity of any video
        submitted to or considered by the district court nor have they ar-
        gued how the witness video casts the facts diﬀerently than the of-
        ﬁcers’ body camera video. Thus, the Appellants fail to demonstrate
        any error by the district court in its consideration of the videos.
              D. Use of Force standard
               The Appellants claim that the district court improperly re-
        lied on Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989), to
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  23-10614

        analyze their claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amend-
        ment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due pro-
        cess provision. The record shows that the district court determined
        that the oﬃcers had probable cause to arrest Lewis, regardless of
        whether he had, in fact, committed a crime. The Appellants do not
        demonstrate any error with respect to the district court’s probable
        cause analysis, and Georgia law shows that the conduct of which
        Lewis engaged establishes probable cause to arrest a suspect for ob-
        struction of justice. See Draper, 369 F.3d at 1277 (“By repeatedly
        refusing to comply with [the oﬃcer’s] reasonable instructions, and
        by acting belligerently and confrontationally, Draper hindered [the
        oﬃcer] in completing the traﬃc stop. Thus, [the oﬃcer] had ample
        probable cause to arrest Draper” for willful obstruction of an of-
        ﬁcer in the lawful discharge of his duties.). Thus, we conclude that
        the district court properly analyzed the use of force claim under
        the Fourth Amendment.
                                             IV.
                Accordingly, based on the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
        district court’s order of dismissal regarding the excessive force
        claim against the individual oﬃcers and aﬃrm the district court’s
        order in all other respects against the City, the Police Chief, and the
        individual oﬃcers. We remand this case for further proceedings
        consistent with this opinion.
            AFFIRMED           in   part,   REVERSED         in   part,    and
        REMANDED.