Court Opinion

ID: 9889666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 00:00:26.335347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:58.185408
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40032        Document: 00516926311             Page: 1      Date Filed: 10/10/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                     October 10, 2023
                                      No. 23-40032                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                           Clerk

   Brian Chancey,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   BASF,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:22-CV-34
                     ______________________________

   Before King, Willett, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff Brian Chancey asserts various claims under the Americans
   with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., alleging that his
   current employer, BASF Corporation, discriminated against him while
   enforcing a workplace COVID-19 policy. The district court dismissed
   Chancey’s claims with prejudice. We AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40032     Document: 00516926311           Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/10/2023

                                    No. 23-40032

                                         I
          Chancey has worked as an “I/E engineer” for BASF in Freeport,
   Texas, since June 2020. He alleges that, in August 2021, BASF began
   enforcing a COVID-19 policy in compliance with EEOC guidance. The
   policy entailed masking requirements, inquiries about vaccine status, social
   distancing, handwashing, and temperature checks. Believing these measures
   to be ineffective, Chancey declined to abide by them and requested that he
   be able to continue to work on site. Chancey also expressed concerns about
   the policy to multiple supervisors and BASF’s human resources department,
   questioning how BASF could impose “a medical intervention” on him and
   inquiring whether alternative protective measures were available. BASF
   opened an investigation into Chancey’s complaints and separated him from
   other employees for the duration of that investigation.
          According to Chancey, once BASF completed its investigation, it
   instituted a number of “accommodations,” including “demanding [he]
   remain 6 feet away from co-workers; refusing him access to the work space,
   his office, the staff room, and rest rooms; making him work remotely; limiting
   room occupancy; segregating [him] to a part of the work space; [and]
   implementing ‘first contact protocols’ and ‘quarantine’ without due
   process.” Chancey also alleges that BASF began treating him as a “safety
   hazard” and “direct threat” due to his vaccination status, requesting that he
   submit to weekly COVID testing at his own expense and endure “enhanced
   quarantine measures.”
          Based on these and other allegations, Chancey sued BASF for
   disability discrimination under the ADA, accusing BASF of regarding him
   as if he had an “impaired immune system and an impaired respiratory
   system.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) (defining disability as “being regarded
   as having” a physical or mental impairment). BASF moved to dismiss

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   Chancey’s claims under 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
   The district court granted the motion and dismissed Chancey’s claims with
   prejudice. Chancey timely appealed.
                                            II
            “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de
   novo, ‘accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the
   light most favorable to the plaintiffs.’” Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260,
   264 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333,
   338 (5th Cir. 2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
   contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
   on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
   Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We “do not accept conclusory
   allegations, unwarranted deductions, or legal conclusions.” Southland
   Securities Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir.
   2004).
                                           III
            Chancey argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
   discrimination, retaliation, and medical-examination claims with prejudice.
   We address each argument in turn.
                                            A
            In his first claim, Chancey alleges that BASF discriminated against
   him based on a “perceived disability.” Through its COVID policy, Chancey
   complains, BASF regarded him as having “a deadly and contagious disease
   or that he had an impaired immune system or an impaired respiratory
   system.” BASF’s perception of a disability was further evidenced, Chancey
   says, by its insistence that he wear a mask and isolate himself from other
   employees.

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          The ADA permits suits not only by those who are actually disabled
   but also those who are “regarded as” disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)–
   (C). To state a claim for employment discrimination under the “regarded as”
   prong of the ADA, Chancey must establish that he was “subjected to an
   action prohibited under [the ADA] because of an actual or perceived physical
   or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived
   to limit a major life activity.” Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d
   222, 230 (5th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
   § 12102(3)(A)). BASF argues, and the district court held, that merely being
   at risk of developing a condition is insufficient to state a disability-
   discrimination claim under the ADA.
          We agree. At least three other circuits have reached the same
   conclusion in analogous contexts. See, e.g., Darby v. Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d
   440, 446 (6th Cir. 2020) (holding that a condition “that might lead to a
   disability in the future” or a condition that “merely predisposes an individual
   to other conditions . . . is not itself a condition under the ADA”); Shell v.
   Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 941 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that
   the “fear” of developing an ADA-qualifying condition based on an
   underlying condition was insufficient); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v.
   STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the EEOC
   failed to state a “regarded as” claim based on an employer’s belief that an
   employee would “contract Ebola in the future”). Chancey makes no effort
   to distinguish that authority or otherwise provide any reason why we should
   depart from it. Seeing none ourselves, we cannot conclude that the district
   court erred by dismissing Chancey’s discrimination claim.
                                           B
          Chancey next contends that the district court erred by dismissing his
   claims that BASF unlawfully required medical examinations and made

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   inquiries about his “perceived” disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)
   (“A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
   make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual
   with a disability . . . .”). Much like his briefing, Chancey’s amended
   complaint below contains only passing and conclusory references to medical
   examinations and inquiries. He does not state that he was ever subjected to
   such examinations or inquiries—and indeed, by all indications, it appears
   Chancey successfully resisted them. His primary complaint—that BASF
   regarded him as a having a disability despite never conducting an
   “individualized assessment”—is consistent with that fact. These allegations
   are thus insufficient to state a claim for unlawful imposition of medical
   examination and inquiries. See Southland Securities Corp., 365 F.3d at 361.
                                         C
          Chancey also argues that BASF unlawfully retaliated against him for
   objecting to its COVID-19 policy and for filing charges of discrimination
   with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (“No person shall discriminate
   against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or
   practice made unlawful by” the ADA). Chancey alleges that BASF’s
   retaliatory acts took a number of different iterations:

          [BASF] created false employment records stating that
          [Chancey] was “a safety hazard” without assessment via a
          written safety violation warning; [BASF] threatened to accuse
          [Chancey] of “abandoning his job” while preventing him
          access to the job site; [Chancey] was threatened with
          termination on several occasions and given deadlines for
          termination such as January 4, 2022 and February 1, 2022;
          [Chancey] was refused access to job site, his office, the break
          room and rest rooms; [Chancey] was repeatedly coerced by
          management to undertake accommodations for a perceived,
          yet undiagnosed disability; [BASF] continued to harass

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          [Chancey] despite [Chancey] claiming protected opposition
          status by filing an EEOC charge; [BASF] threatened
          [Chancey] with incurring extra costs for weekly “antigen
          testing” at his own expense that other employees did not incur;
          and [BASF’s] ADA compliance officer refused to mitigate the
          retaliation or aid and encourage [Chancey] in enjoying his
          rights protected under the ADA.
          Confusingly, Chancey also asserts that BASF’s COVID-19 policy
   was itself retaliation. In any event, none of these allegations, even if true,
   amounts to a claim of retaliation. They are all either conclusory, petty slights,
   or actions we have otherwise held not to be “materially adverse.” See
   Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., No. 21-10133, —F.4th—, 2023 WL 531616, at *7
   (5th Cir. 2023) (“de minimis workplace trifles” are not actionable). The
   same goes for the allegation Chancey stresses most in his briefing—threat of
   termination. See Credeur v. Louisiana, 860 F.3d 785, 798 (5th Cir. 2017).
                                          D
          Chancey lastly argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
   claims with prejudice. He emphasizes that he is not a lawyer and that the
   district court ought to have given him leave to amend his pleadings to correct
   the deficiencies in his amended complaint. We disagree.
          True, district courts must grant leave to amend “freely,” Chitimacha
   Tribe of La. v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157, 1162 (5th Cir. 1982),
   and must have a “substantial reason” to deny a request for leave to amend.
   Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985). Ultimately, though,
   “[d]ecisions concerning motions to amend are ‘entrusted to the sound
   discretion of the district court.’” Jones v. Robinson Property Grp., L.P., 427
   F.3d 987, 994 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Quintanilla v. Tex. Television, Inc., 139
   F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1998)). And a district court acts within its discretion

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   to deny leave to amend if, for example, amending the complaint would be
   futile. Id.
           That appears to be the case here. Chancey has already amended his
   complaint once, and we do not doubt that he has put his best case forward, as
   evidenced by the nine-page affidavit and the 128 pages of exhibits attached to
   his nineteen-page complaint. More importantly, though, under the district
   court’s local rules, Chancey was already given a chance to amend his
   complaint after a pre-motion conference with BASF—which he expressly
   refused. Chancey does not argue that the district court’s motion procedure
   is unfair, see Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998), nor can we
   conclude that it was based on our independent review of the record. The
   district court thus properly dismissed Chancey’s claims with prejudice.
                                         IV
           Chancey failed to state plausible claims of discrimination under the
   ADA for his “perceived” disability, and the district court did not err in
   dismissing them with prejudice.
           AFFIRMED.

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