Court Opinion

ID: 9547297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:44:46.17737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:34.704410
License: Public Domain

LANGrTRY, J.,
specially concurring.
I do not agree with the interpretation of ORS 215.130 (1) and 254.310 which either ignores or construes out of existence a part of ORS 254.310.
ORS 215.130 (1), which is a part of the county planning and zoning law, provides:
“Any ordinance adopted under ORS 215.010 to 215.190 and 215.402 to 215.422 shall be a local law within the meaning of, and subject to, ORS 254.-310.” (Emphasis supplied.)
ORS 254.310 provides:
“The people of every county are authorized to enact, amend or repeal all local laws for their *780county by the initiative and referendum process * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority argues that the legislature, by using the word “adopted” in OES 215.130 (1), quoted above, indicated that the reference to the initiative process limited it to planning and zoning ordinances already adopted by the county’s governing body. If this be so, it seems to me that we have construed out of existence the word “enact” in OES 254.310. If the legislature wants to make such a change in the county zoning laws, it may do so; we should not, however, attempt to do so.
It is obvious that, if we give effect to the plain words of the two statutes, no opportunity for a hearing of any kind is given to affected property owners in a case like that at bar. Possibly, also, the value of some property may be taken without just compensation. Serious constitutional questions are thus raised. If we can avoid possible constitutional validity questions concerning a statute, we should do so, thus giving the legislature an opportunity to remedy the statute if that be the policy it decides upon. A way to avoid the constitutional question is presented by the initiative measure in this case.
The land included in the zoning initiative was described in the ordinance which is a part of the record. It commenced:
“BEGINNING AT A POINT 300 YAEDS EASTEELY FEOM SETTLEMENT OF CAE-YEE, BEING WITHIN THE CAEVEE TO ESTACADA HIGHWAY, THENCE DUE SOUTH CEOSSING CLACKAMAS EIVEE TO CAEYEE TO SPEINGWATEE ED. # * *”
*781Mr. Hall, the Clackamas County Planning Director, testified:
“* * * [W] e were unable to find a place known as the settlement of Carver. That is, Carver is an area but a given point on the ground from which to start it from, we could not do it * *
The planning staff arbitrarily picked a point at the middle of a bridge in the unincorporated area known as Carver when it attempted to make a map of the included area. With reference to the closing of the included land description Mr. Hall testified:
“Directions within the Ballot Measure again on this point were vague and as a result, we had to take it back to where it began * *
Additionally, the description was vague about a “northeasterly” line from a Springwater Highway to and across Clackamas River and a railroad right of way.
The evidence indicates that much valuable land, including forest, sand and gravel establishments and agricultural land, is affected by the ordinance, and land use changes are required. Obviously, the vague description may be expected to give rise to endless litigation. The vagueness of the description thus gives rise to the question of the validity of the entire initiative.
State v. Hodges, 254 Or 21, 457 P2d 491 (1969), is a case in which the Supreme Court of Oregon declared a penal statute void for vagueness. A statement therein is applicable as well where constitutionally protected property rights are at stake:
“In addition to its due-process function of putting persons on notice of the law’s demands, rea-
*782sonable certainty serves a second purpose: adjudication * * *.
“A law that is too vague for reasonable adjudication is bad on two grounds. A vague statute lends itself to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the judge and jury, and, by permitting the jury to decide what the law will be, it offends the principle, if not the rule, against ex post facto laws. See Oregon Constitution, Art I, § 21.” 254 Or at 27.
Because it is impossible to ascertain the land included in the zone (a thing which could have been but was not accomplished by the initiative promoters), I would hold the entire ordinance void for vagueness. I concur in the result.