Court Opinion

ID: 9686617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:58:59.88584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:30.233876
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from division II and a portion of division VI and concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.
I believe that defendant Junko is entitled to fifty percent contribution from the joint tortfeasor driver, Robert Franke, for the $30,000 judgment to which- plaintiff Edna Franke is entitled against Junko.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The trial court found that Edna, the plaintiff passenger in the Franke car, sustained damages of $30,000 resulting from her personal injuries in the accident. There was no evidence of negligence on her part. Therefore, I agree with the majority that Edna should have judgment against defendant Junko for $30,000.
This accident occurred with both the Robert Franke and Junko vehicles failing to yield one-half of the traveled way to the other. The trial court found defendant driver Junko seventy-five percent responsible for the accident that caused Edna’s injuries and Robert Franke, the driver of the car in which Edna was riding, twenty-five percent responsible.
Junko cross-petitioned against Robert for a one-half contribution by Robert to Junko on any judgment won by Edna against Junko. I conclude the trial court should have granted that relief to Junko based on the following reasoning.
II. Equal Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors.
This negligence action was filed, tried and decided before July 1,1984, when Iowa Code chapter 668 (1985) became effective. Therefore that statute does not and should not bear on the decision in this case.
Our rule on apportionment of equitable contribution has been that ordinarily the total amount of the judgment for the plaintiff is divided equally among those liable to the injured person. Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708, 731 (Iowa 1974). In the present case both Junko and Robert have been found responsible for the accident that caused Edna’s damages. No principle of law appears to prevent Robert from being liable for contribution to Junko on Edna’s judgment.
The adoption of comparative negligence by this court in Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982), did not and should not affect the question of equitable contribution among joint tortfeasors.
As we recently stated in Glidden v. German, 360 N.W.2d 716, 719 (Iowa 1984):
The holding of Goetzman was clear and specific. We supplanted contributory negligence with a pure form of comparative negligence in cases where contributory negligence had formerly been a complete defense. 327 N.W.2d at 754. That holding delineated a new tort doctrine for a specific category of cases and displaced a single doctrine, that of *542contributory negligence. Thompson v. Stearns Chemical Corp., 345 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Iowa 1984); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983). It did not require a new and different division of a plaintiffs damage recovery among defendants, as plaintiffs here suggest. Goetzman was a landmark decision, but it did not mandate a wholesale revision of Iowa tort law. See, e.g., Thompson v. Stearns Chemical Corp., 345 N.W.2d at 133-34 (adoption of comparative negligence did not affect rule denying contribution from employer liable for worker’s compensation); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d at 849-50 (adoption of comparative negligence did not abrogate doctrine of joint and several liability).
(Emphasis supplied.)
We also should decline as we did in Glid-den to, in substance, adopt one part of the new comparative fault act prematurely. The majority, although it cites other authorities, would adopt on a common law basis, for the narrowing group of unresolved cases that were filed before July 1, 1984, the substance of Iowa Code sections 668.5 and .6 (1985).
As we said in Glidden, 360 N.W.2d at 721, concerning another provision of chapter 668:
[I]t is just one of the comparative fault act’s package of significant changes in Iowa tort law. These changes should be read and applied together, not interpreted as isolated principles reflecting separate expressions of public policy.
In addition, in Speck v. Unit Handling Division, 366 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa 1985), filed today, we again refused to apply comparative fault principles under new Iowa Code chapter 668 to a strict liability in tort case that was filed before July 1, 1984. There the contention was made that Goetzman required such an application. We disagreed and said:
When this court in Goetzman adopted comparative negligence, it did not jettison all preexisting principles of tort law. The holding was narrow.... As we thereafter said in Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1983), “that holding delineated a rule for a specific category of eases and displaced a single doctrine, the doctrine of contributory negligence.”
366 N.W.2d at 545.
We went on to say that we would decline to apply new chapter 668 piecemeal to cases filed before July 1, 1984, because to do so
would complicate the many eases arising in this interim period and create a truly anomalous situation in Iowa tort law if we ignored the statute’s explicit wording concerning its effective date on some issues but complied with that expressed legislative intent on other issues.
366 N.W.2d at 546. We also listed several cases where we refused to overturn prior tort law principles even though urged to do so after Goetzman. See Glidden v. German, 360 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Iowa 1984); Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406, 409-11 (Iowa 1984); Thompson v. Stearns Chemical Corp., 345 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Iowa 1984); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1983).
III. Necessity for Reasonable Stability in the Law.
I would keep our body of common law tort principles intact after Goetzman, as stated in Glidden and Speck, and not change them piecemeal prior to the wholesale revision of Iowa tort law in the new Iowa Code chapter 668, which applies only to eases filed after July 1, 1984.
The action of the majority in this case only adds to the confusion of the bench and bar in determining the principles of tort law that apply to a given case. It is no service to the bench and bar to keep the common law in a state of flux before chapter 668 and its comprehensive revision of tort law takes effect as scheduled by the legislature.
SCHULTZ, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent in part.