Court Opinion

ID: 9714198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:32:51.035817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.261693
License: Public Domain

Blair Moody, Jr., J.
(concurring). We generally agree with the legal analysis employed in this case by our colleague Justice Williams. However, an additional comment with respect to a key portion of the opinion of our colleague Justice Levin is warranted.
The lead dissent offers what may be deemed by *503some as an attractive compromise alternative to a vexatious economic problem. This result would remand the contested economic issues to the arbitration panel for redetermination unencumbered by the statutorily prescribed last-best-offer choice.
The redetermination of the economic awards would be based on the record already made supplemented by certain excluded economic evidence. The panel would be free to set any wage-rate or COLA award they deemed appropriate. Reduced current payments would be contemplated. The retroactive amount payable would be based on the new award. Yet any redetermination would be applied prospectively as in no event would police officers be required to repay any sum.
This proposed expedient solution, however, would require an ex post facto usurpation of the rules of the contest. It would cause the parties to debate anew over what has been resolved in accordance with original reasonable standards. One must question whether this extraordinary suggestion would have been as legally compelling had the parties presented wiser, more appealing, or compatible choices to the arbitration panel in the first place.
Key to this proffered solution is reasoning that "[t]he last-offer system yields results which are unconstitutionally arbitrary”. This conclusion does not necessarily follow in fact or law. No section of the Michigan or United States Constitution is cited as a basis for this alleged constitutional breach. Furthermore, it is even recognized by the dissent that the last-offer-system has a sound rationale for its adoption by the Legislature and Governor— "the promotion of private settlements by penalizing those who did not try hard enough to settle”.
As was succinctly stated by the majority of this *504Court in O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 543; 273 NW2d 829 (1979):
"In short, we do not sit 'as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations’. We sit as a court to determine whether there is a rational basis for the Legislature’s judgment. If there is, then that judgment must be sustained:
" 'It is not this Court’s role to decide whether the Legislature acted wisely or unwisely in enacting this statute. We will not substitute our own social and economic beliefs for those of the Legislature, which is elected by the people to pass laws.’ ” (Footnotes omitted.)
The proper test for judging the constitutionality of socioeconomic legislation such as 1969 PA 312, the police and fire compulsory arbitration act, is found in Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 612-613; 267 NW2d 72 (1978):
"The test to determine whether legislation enacted pursuant to the police power comports with due process is whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. See Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n, Inc v Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining Board, 397 Mich 337, 343-344; 245 NW2d 1 (1976).
"The test to determine whether a statute enacted pursuant to the police power comports with equal protection is, essentially, the same. As the United States Supreme Court declared in United States Dep’t of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US 528, 533; 93 S Ct 2821; 37 L Ed 2d 782 (1973):
" 'Under traditional equal protection analysis, a legislative classification must be sustained, if the classification itself is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.’ ”1 (Footnote and citations omitted.)
*505This Court does not possess the power predicated upon judicial whim to arbitrarily declare that certain legislation is unconstitutionally arbitrary. Accordingly, for this additional reason, we concur with Justice Williams that amended Act 312 is not unconstitutional.
Ryan, J., concurred with Blair Moody, Jr., J.

 It is now clear that the main center of controversy' in the present *505case is the last-best-offer feature of Act 312. The emphasis on this feature, however, is misplaced.
The question before this Court is whether Act 312 unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the chairman or arbitration panel as a whole. Under analysis and scrutiny traditionally applied in delegation cases, no such constitutional infirmity exists. Thus, the Act, including its last-best-offer feature, passes constitutional muster.
With this said, it becomes necessary to analyze the last-best-offe'r feature itself in terms of other constitutional standards to insure that there are no equal protection or due process violations. As we have seen, in applying "traditional” concepts of equal protection and due process analysis, the last-best-offer feature is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose, i.e., promotion of private settlements in labor disputes.