Court Opinion

ID: 9776659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:41:41.413883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:16.964993
License: Public Domain

BARROW, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. After a review of this record, I cannot agree that Judge Thomas J. Stovall and his successor, Judge Hugo Touchy, clearly abused their admittedly broad discretion in limiting Jampole’s request for discovery of several specific types of information. Further, the court’s opinion fosters matters of policy with which I disagree.
No area of civil trial law has been the subject of such heightened criticism and scrutiny over the past decade as pretrial discovery. The need for improvements in the state and federal systems have been urged by many legal writers, including the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court and members of this court.1 In response, this court recently promulgated *577amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Virtually every rule concerned with pretrial discovery was modified and updated. These amendments place upon trial judges the primary responsibility for arresting discovery abuses.
This case furnishes the court with a unique opportunity to support the efforts of Texas trial judges in curbing discovery abuses. Rather than seizing upon this opportunity and expressing confidence in trial judges, the court has now unnecessarily usurped the discretion of the trial judge. From this decision emanates a signal to the trial judge in contradiction of the court’s prior attitude in this context and of the basic purpose of the amended rules of discovery. See Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.1979).
While I or any other judge on hearing this matter might have granted more or less discovery than Judge Stovall did, it is clear that the interlocutory order signed here was the result of a full hearing by a conscientious trial judge. If this case involves a clear abuse of discretion, no trial judge is safe from the heavy hand of a mandamus action.
From a reading of the 332 page record, it is apparent that both parties in this major lawsuit had taken advocative positions that would have to be compromised during the course of discovery. Hence, Jampole’s discovery requests were unnecessarily broad, and GMC’s responses were unduly restrictive. Faced with the arduous task of determining the proper scope of discovery, Judge Stovall, an experienced trial judge, conducted a full two day hearing, including an actual examination of an allegedly similar vehicle, considered each request individually, and attempted to balance the interests and rights of both litigants. In fact, he granted, at least in part, substantially all the requests including all discovery requested relating to H-body type of vehicles irrespective of the model. It is obvious that Judge Stovall contemplated an ongoing discovery process, as he often stated that he would allow or disallow requested documents “at this level of the case.” Moreover, at the end of the second hearing, after directing GMC to produce the requested information within sixty days, Judge Stovall reiterated that both parties were free to “come back to the well” if further discovery was desired.
After oral argument of this proceeding in this court, Judge Stovall resigned and was succeeded by Judge Touchy. Only a brief hearing was held before Judge Touchy, and he simply ratified Judge Stovall’s order so that this mandamus action could be determined. It is not fair or reasonable to speculate that he will be more restrictive in permitting future discovery than Judge Stovall.
It is essential that a trial judge be permitted to conduct an orderly pretrial process without the interference of the appellate court. See Werner v. Miller, 579 S.W.2d 455. By delaying a ruling on one aspect of the case, the trial judge may subsequently be in a better position to rule correctly since he will have had the opportunity to receive more evidence and derive more facts. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 77 F.R.D. 39 (N.D.Cal.1977).
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the court’s holding is that it promotes an attitude towards discovery with which I cannot agree. Mandamus traditionally has been an extreme measure to be utilized only when there has been a violation of a clear legal right possessed by the relator, Neville v. Brewster, 163 Tex. 155, 352 S.W.2d 449, 452 (1961), and when there is a clear legal duty to act on behalf of the respondent. Pat Walker & Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d 306, 308 (Tex.1981). Unless the law dictates “an absolute and rigid duty of the trial court to follow a fixed and prescribed course not involving the exercise of judgment or discretion,” the court should be hesitant to grant relief by writ of mandamus. See State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex.1980). Thus, the discretionary nature of discovery and the amorphous notion of relevancy most often counsel against appellate court intervention into the discovery *578process. See Pat Walker & Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 623 S.W.2d at 308.
The concept of relevance is not susceptible of exact definition. Nonetheless, relevance does implicate a balancing of the probative value of the information sought and the burden upon the movant if discovery is denied weighed against the burden placed upon the respondent if discovery is granted. See General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Tex.1983); cf. Automatic Drilling Machines, Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex.1974). If relevance is shown by this balancing process, the trial judge nonetheless may direct “that requested discovery not be sought in whole or in part” if the circumstances of the case so require. Tex. R.Civ.P. 166b(4)(a). Obviously, then, the trial judge may limit discovery of relevant evidence.
Less than one year ago this court observed that over the past twenty-five years it had been flooded with mandamus actions to either compel or deny discovery. General Motors Corp. v. Lawrence, 651 S.W.2d at 734. Today’s decision effectively insures that this flood will continue and increase into a rampage. The majority has failed to heed the warning echoed by our predecessors against “entering the thicket” by constant interruptions of the trial process. See Pope v. Ferguson, 445 S.W.2d 950, 954 (Tex.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 997, 90 S.Ct. 1138, 25 L.Ed.2d 405 (1970); see also State Bar of Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d at 836. We have now not only “entered the thicket,” we have become totally enshrouded in that thicket. I respectfully dissent.

. See generally Annual Message on the Administration of Justice from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (Midyear Meeting of the American Bar Association, February 12, 1984) (available from United States Supreme Court Public Information Office); Pope & McConnico, Practicing Law with the 1981 Texas Rules, 32 Baylor L.Rev. 457, 460-68 (1980); Spears, The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure: 1981 Changes in Pre-Trial Discovery, 12 St. Mary’s L.J. 633, 647-49 (1981); Kilgarlin & Jackson, Sanctions for Discovery Abuse Under New Rule 215, 15 St. Mary’s L.J. 767 (1984); Barrow & Henderson, 1984 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Affecting Discovery, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 713 (1984).