Court Opinion

ID: 9560115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:43:08.550232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:09.691888
License: Public Domain

TOAL, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm Grippon’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter, but see no need to recommend an entirely new circumstantial evidence charge. Accordingly, I concur in result only.
As the majority notes, the charge requested by Grippon correctly stated the law. The language concerning the necessity that the circumstantial evidence “point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis” does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. State v. Raffaldt, 318 S.C. 110, 456 S.E.2d 390 (1995), and State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E.2d 372 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 914, 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992), disapproved of circumstantial evidence charges requiring the jury to seek explanations for the circumstantial evidence other than the guilt of the accused and to find the accused not guilty if such a reasonable explanation could be found. We have held that a charge requiring the jury to “seek” explanations for the circumstantial evidence “turns the State’s burden of proof on its head by requiring the jury find a ‘reasonable explanation’ of the evidence inconsistent with appellant’s guilt before it can find him not guilty.” Manning, 305 S.C. at 417, 409 S.E.2d at 374. However, we have never held the language “to the exclusion of every other reasonable *85hypothesis” is constitutionally infirm, and I do not think it is. The majority opinion should not be read to condemn such a charge.
Although the majority states South Carolina’s traditional circumstantial evidence charge remains correct, it nevertheless recommends trial courts discontinue use of that charge in favor of the one recommended in Federal Jury Practice and Instructions. Unlike the majority, I do not believe trial judges should abandon South Carolina’s traditional charge as described in State v. Edwards, 298 S.C. 272, 379 S.E.2d 888, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 895, 110 S.Ct. 246, 107 L.Ed.2d 196 (1989). In Edwards, we cited the following charge as part of an appropriate circumstantial evidence charge:
every circumstance relied upon by the State [must] be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and ... all of the circumstances so proven [must] be consistent with each other and taken together, point conclusively to the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. It is not sufficient that they create a probability, though a strong one and if, assuming then to be true they may be accounted for upon any reasonable hypothesis which does not include the guilt of the accused, the proof has failed.
Edwards, 298 S.C. at 275, 379 S.E.2d at 889 (citing State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 89 S.E.2d 924 (1955)); see also State v. Harry, 321 S.C. 273, 468 S.E.2d 76 (Ct.App.)(finding no error in circumstantial evidence charge nearly identical to that given in Edwards), cert. denied (1996).
Relying on Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), the federal courts and a majority of state courts have abandoned the “reasonable hypothesis” language in favor of an approach that does not differentiate between direct and circumstantial evidence, but simply provides that a defendant’s guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.1 As some legal scholars have noted, howev*86er, the widescale abandonment of the special circumstantial evidence charge has resulted mostly from a “bandwagon effect” following Holland, rather than from a reasoned rejection of the longstanding rule. See Rosenberg at 1402 (“While several of the state courts substituting Holland for the common law rule have done so in detailed, analytical opinions, for the most part the old rule seems to be the victim of the bandwagon effect. Many of the states following Holland do so without meaningful discussion of the issues presented, merely citing the Supreme Court decision, quoting its final conclusory paragraphs, and pointing to the growing number of states that have already eliminated the cautionary charge.”) In contrast, many of the courts that have bucked the national trend have advanced cogent reasons for retaining the special circumstantial evidence charge.
For example, in People v. Ford, 66 N.Y.2d 428, 497 N.Y.S.2d 637, 488 N.E.2d 458 (1985), the New York Court of Appeals articulated the rationale for requiring a “reasonable hypothesis” circumstantial evidence charge. Notably, that court’s explanation did not suggest that the charge was necessary because of the alleged weakness of circumstantial evidence as compared with direct evidence.2 The court instead reasoned that the reasonable hypothesis charge highlighted the fact that *87“proof by circumstantial evidence may require careful reasoning by the trier of facts.” Id. at 644-645, 488 N.E.2d at 465. By emphasizing the need for careful reasoning, the special circumstantial evidence charge “forecloses [the] danger ... that the trier of facts may leap logical gaps in the proof offered and draw unwarranted conclusions based on probabilities of low degree.” Id.
Similarly, the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Nelson, 112 Idaho 245, 731 P.2d 788 (App.1986), aff'd, 114 Idaho 292, 756 P.2d 409 (1988), rejected the State’s argument that the “reasonable hypothesis” language was confusing to juries and should be abandoned, That court concluded the “reasonable hypothesis” instruction gave “sharpened clarity” to the meaning of reasonable doubt in a circumstantial evidence case. Id. 731 P.2d at 794. The court acknowledged such an instruction “may force a jury to think carefully about its choices of inferences,” but found that “wholly appropriate where life or liberty nay turn on the inferences drawn,” Id. See also, e.g., Nichols v. State, 591 N.E.2d 134 (Ind. 1992)(requiring special circumstantial evidence charge where the evidence presented at trial is solely circumstantial); State v. Captville, 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984)(quoting Louisiana statute giving defendant the right in cases involving circumstantial evidence to a special circumstantial evidence charge stating that each element of the offense has been established beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence).
Finally, in their law review article concerning this very issue,3 Irene and Yale Rosenberg have argued the traditional charge provides valuable information that jurors need in order to accurately analyze circumstantial evidence. Like the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Ford, these scholars find that the justification for the charge is not a difference in probative value between direct and circumstantial evidence, but a difference in the necessary methods for evaluating the evidence:
In effect, analysis of circumstantial evidence is a more intellectual process, requiring jurors to engage in lawyer-like scrutiny and forcing them to see both sides. After *88concluding that a particular fact is true, the individual juror is called upon to ask: First, can I infer guilt from that fact? Second, if so, is there any reasonable explanation other than guilt? This process may prevent the jurors individually and collectively from deciding the case on a more emotional and intuitive basis. Consequently, a cautionary charge with respect to circumstantial evidence provides a framework channeling the jury’s deliberative process along more rational lines.
The reasonable doubt charge, on the other hand, does not direct the jury’s attention to the appropriate manner in which to evaluate evidence. Instead, it permits the finder of fact to make a cumulative, comprehensive assessment of the probative value of all the evidence adduced at trial. To be sure, the concept of reasonable doubt embodies rationality, but it is not method oriented. It does not describe with any degree of precision the process the jury is to employ in reaching its ultimate conclusion. Thus, assuming as we must that jurors do in fact listen special circumstantial evidence charge, rather than being “confusing and incorrect,” complements an instruction properly defining reasonable doubt ... by delineating the appropriate basis for assessing circumstantial evidence and reaching the determination that guilt has or has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Rosenberg at 1412-13.
I agree with the logic of Ford, Nelson, and the Rosenberg article. This Court should retain the Edwards charge because juries need more detailed information about the relation of circumstantial evidence to determination of guilt than the majority’s suggested instruction provides. The question is not whether circumstantial evidence carries the same probative weight as direct evidence; of course it does. Rather, the question is the proper means for evaluating circumstantial evidence and how trial courts may best help juries understand their responsibilities. In my opinion, the Edwards charge clarifies the jury’s responsibility to evaluate circumstantial evidence carefully.
I acknowledge the special circumstantial evidence charge is an endangered species in the state courts of our nation and is *89extinct at the federal level. That having been said, I think we shall lose more than we gain if we abandon the traditional charge. Accordingly, I concur.
FINNEY, C.J., concurs.

. For an extensive discussion of the rejection of the "reasonable hypothesis” language in favor of the standard espoused in Holland, see Irene Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, “Perhaps What Ye Say Is Based Only On Conjecture” — Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1371 (1995)(hereinafter referred to as Rosenberg). For a *86list of the states that no longer require a mandatory circumstantial evidence charge, see Rosenberg at 1427 n.121.

. Many courts specifically abandoning the special circumstantial evidence charge have argued that such a charge is based on the notion that circumstantial evidence is inherently less reliable than direct evidence. For example, in State v. Gosby, 85 Wash.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680, 685 (1975), the Washington Supreme Court abandoned the special circumstantial evidence charge, reasoning that the rationale underlying the requirement of a special charge "is predicated upon the assumption that circumstantial evidence is inherently suspicious and less trustworthy than is direct evidence.” Finding it "untenable to assume that circumstantial evidence is less reliable than is direct evidence,” the Washington court concluded, based on that fact, that "there is no need to give the multiple-hypothesis instruction when circumstantial evidence is involved.” Id. See also State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 501 (1991)(citing Holland and Gosby for proposition that special circumstantial evidence charge is premised on distrust of circumstantial evidence as compared to direct evidence); State v. Derouchie, 140 Vt. 437, 440 A.2d 146 149 (1981)("[T]he 'exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence’ test is premised upon a now suspect distrust of circumstantial evidence.”).

. See supra note 1.