Court Opinion

ID: 9690056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:52:32.86383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:41.948011
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
Reginald Trieb agreed to serve twenty-two years in the North Dakota State Penitentiary, twenty-one years without any reduction for good-time credit. I would affirm the amended judgment and sentence because Trieb specifically waived his right to receive good-time credit on the first twenty-one years of his sentence, and because he has no standing to raise any right or interest of prison administrators.
As part of a plea bargain, Trieb pled guilty to murder for the 1979 brutal killing of seventeen-year-old Val Scott Blade. Trieb murdered Blade by striking him several times in the head with a metal jack handle while Blade was sleeping. Trieb and his companions then took Blade’s body to the nearby Grand River, where Trieb shot Blade several times and left him lying on the ice. See State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 651 (N.D.1982).
*293As part of the plea agreement, Trieb agreed to a twenty-two-year sentence. Trieb also agreed that he would not be “eligible for parole for a period of twenty-one (21) years ... without any reduction for good time.” The transcript of the hearing makes clear that a thirty-year sentence for Trieb was reduced by the maximum amount of good time Trieb waived. Transcript of Plea Bargain Hearing and Sentencing, September 24, 1982, p. 29.
The majority concludes Trieb was without authority to waive his future right to good time, and therefore, Trieb’s sentence is illegal. Chapter 12-54.1, N.D.C.C., is silent as to the ability of prisoners to waive their right to good time as part of plea negotiations. Based on the majority’s conclusion as to the purpose of good time, “to encourage prison discipline,” the majority concludes the legislature created good time only for the benefit of prison administrators.
The majority focuses only on prison administrators’ interest in good time, and ignores the interest prisoners have in being able to earn good-time credits. As the majority notes, good-time credits are designed “to improve the morale and well-being of each inmate in each institution, or to rehabilitate prisoners generally.” 72 C.J.S. Prisons § 145(b) (1987) (footnotes omitted).
In focusing only on prison administrators’ interest, the majority ignores this Court’s holding that a prisoner’s right to statutory good time is a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Matz v. Satran, 313 N.W.2d 740, 742 (N.D.1981); Jensen v. Satran, 332 N.W.2d 222, 226 (N.D.1983). Due process requires that before a prisoner’s good time can be revoked, the prisoner must be given advance written notice of the prohibited acts that may result in the loss of good time; advance written notice of the claimed violation; a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on; and a limited right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense. Matz; Jensen.
Chapter 12-54.1, N.D.C.C., creates statutory rights in prisoners which are protected by the United States Constitution. Like other rights, the right to receive good time can be knowingly and intelligently waived by the holder of the right. See First State Bank v. Anderson, 452 N.W.2d 90, 92 (N.D.1990); Gajewski v. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614, 628 (N.D.1974); N.D.C.C. § 1-02-28.
In August 1984, the Director of the North Dakota Department of Parole and Probation wrote to Deputy Attorney General Calvin Rolfson seeking an opinion as to whether inmates could waive their right to good time eligibility. In a February 1985 letter opinion, Deputy Attorney General Rolfson responded by concluding:
“We have found no cases which directly deal with the issue presented in your letter, namely the issue of whether a defendant can plea bargain away his guarantee statutory good time. In North Dakota, good time is purely statutory. Smith vs. Satran, 295 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1980). As a general rule, statutory rights may be waived or surrendered, in whole or in part, by the party to whom or for whose benefit they are given. 28 Am Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, Section 164, Page 185 (1966). The doctrine of waiver is applicable to all rights and privileges to which a person is legally entitled whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the constitution, provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual who has waived them and are intended for his benefit. Gajewski vs. Bratcher, 221 N.W.2d 614 (N.D.1974); Wellens vs. Beck, 103 N.W.2d 281 (N.D.1960). Therefore, according to these general rules of law, an individual could waive his statutory good time pursuant to a plea agreement.”
The Attorney General’s interpretation is persuasive, and should be adopted by this Court. See United Hospital v. D’Annunzio, 514 N.W.2d 681 (N.D.1994).
The majority concludes the prison administrators’ ability to control prisoners could be harmed if prisoners are allowed to waive good time as part of plea negotiations. The majority’s conclusion is speculative. The record is devoid of evidence supporting the majority’s conclusion that allowing the waiver of good-time credits will lead to decreased prison discipline.
*294The majority wrongly assumes prison administrators will be without tools to control prisoners if Trieb’s waiver of good time is affirmed. Prison administrators have many other tools at their disposal to encourage good behavior by prisoners. See N.D.C.C. § 12-47-12; Ennis v. Schuetzle, 488 N.W.2d 867, 872 (N.D.1992) (the warden is statutorily authorized to regulate conduct of prisoners by withholding job and housing privileges); Jensen v. Powers, 472 N.W.2d 223, 225 (N.D.1991) (the warden is authorized to deny prisoner use of privileged items of property by removing items, such as a television and a personal computer, from the prisoner’s cell); Jensen v. Satran, 332 N.W.2d 222, 226 (N.D.1983) (the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters is within authority of penitentiary officials); Havener v. Glaser, 251 N.W.2d 753, 760 (N.D.1977) (placement of prisoners in administrative isolation after prisoners were allegedly found in possession of marijuana did not constitute a deprivation of liberty interest within meaning of Due Process Clause).
Additionally, prison administrators have discretion to award sentence reductions for meritorious conduct by a prisoner. See N.D.C.C. §§ 12-54.1-03 and 12-54.1-04. I do not read Trieb’s plea agreement as precluding Trieb from earning sentence reduction credits for meritorious conduct.
The prison administrators, whose interest the majority would vindicate, have raised no objection to the sentence in question. If prison administrators believed Trieb’s sentence illegally infringed on their authority, they could have petitioned this Court for a supervisory writ directing the district court to amend Trieb’s sentence. State ex rel. Olson v. Maxwell, 259 N.W.2d 621, 629 (N.D.1977). In Maxwell, the Attorney General sought a supervisory writ requiring the district court to amend a sentence. The district court sentenced a female to imprisonment at the state penitentiary and at no other place. At that time, all female prisoners were being transported out-of-state to serve their sentences. The Attorney General, on behalf of prison administrators, claimed the sentence was an illegal infringement on executive authority. This Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Maxwell.
This Court’s authority to issue, hear, and determine remedial or original writs is found in Art. VI, § 2, N.D. Const. Although used sparingly, supervisory control over lower courts is exercised to “prevent injustices in extraordinary cases where no other remedy is adequate or allowed by law.” Odden v. O’Keefe, 450 N.W.2d 707, 708 (N.D.1990). See State ex rel. Koppy v. Graff, 484 N.W.2d 855, 857 (N.D.1992).
Prison administrators have not challenged the practice of allowing prisoners to waive their right to good time. Trieb had a statutory right to earn good time. In exchange for a reduced sentence, Trieb bargained away his right. Trieb has no standing to assert any rights of prison administrators. The amended judgment should be affirmed.
MESCHKE, J., concurs.