Court Opinion

ID: 8986102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 11:46:02.314578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:47.322667
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Beennan,
with whom Me. Justice Stew-aet and Me. Justice Maeshall join, dissenting.
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of 18 U. S. C. § 1462, which makes it a federal offense to “[bring] into the United States, or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or knowingly [use] any express company or other common carrier, for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce — (a) any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, motion-picture film, paper, letter, writing, print, or other matter of indecent character.” Appellee was charged in a one-count indictment with having knowingly transported in interstate commerce over 80 reels of allegedly obscene motion picture film. Relying primarily on our decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557 (1969), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed the indictment, holding the statute unconstitutional on its face:
“To prevent the pandering of obscene materials or its exposure to children or to unwilling adults, the government has a substantial and valid interest to bar the non-private transportation of such materials. However, the statute which is now before the court does not so delimit the government’s prerogatives; on its face, it forbids the transportation of obscene materials. Thus, it applies to non-public transportation in the absence of a special governmental interest. The statute is thus overbroad, in violation of the first and ninth amendments, and is therefore unconstitutional.” 338 F. Supp. 308, 311 (ED Wis. 1970).
Under the view expressed in my dissent today in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, ante, p. 73, it is clear that the statute before us cannot stand. Whatever the extent of *148the Federal Government's power to bar the distribution of allegedly obscene material to juveniles or the offensive exposure of such material to unconsenting adults, the statute before us is clearly overbroad and unconstitutional on its face. See my dissent in Miller v. California, ante, p. 47. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court.