Court Opinion

ID: 9691257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:19:06.054137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:14.163385
License: Public Domain

O’NEILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s resolution of SWP’s claim under the Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act (the Act). As noted by the majority, section 2007.002(5) of the Act provides that a taking is: (a) a taking under the United States or Texas Constitutions, or (b) a governmental action that (i) affects a property owner’s private real property in a manner that restricts or limits the owner’s right to the property that would otherwise exist in the absence of government action, and (ii) is the producing cause of a reduc*13tion of at least 25 percent in market value of the affected property. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.002(5) (Vernon 2000). The Act does not, however, apply to government actions that are reasonably taken to fulfill an obligation mandated by federal or state law. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.008(b)(4) (Vernon 2000).
The District moved for summary judgment on SWP’s claim under the Act on two separate and independent grounds. First, it asserted its actions did not constitute a taking as a matter of law. Second, it asserted SWP cannot recover under the Act because the taxation was necessary to fulfill an obligation mandated by federal or state law. On appeal, SWP asserts the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its claims under the Act. The entirety of SWP’s “argument” and “analysis” under this complaint is:
The District contends the Act does not apply to the District’s taxation of [SWP’s] property because the Act exempts “an action of a political subdivision that is reasonably taken to fulfill an action mandated by state law ...” (Tex. Gov’t Code, § 2007.008(b)(4)), on the grounds that state law mandates the District to levy taxes to pay off its indebtedness. However, state law does not require that the District levy taxes on its property in violation of both the United States and Texas Constitutions. If the District is indeed mandated to levy taxes to pay off its indebtedness, it may fulfill this obligation by levying taxes against the properties that received the benefit of the expenditures.
SWP thus specifically attacks the summary judgment with respect to the Act only on the District’s ground that its actions were mandated by state or federal law. SWP does not separately argue the taxation was a taking under the Act in the first instance. SWP thus apparently relies on its earlier arguments regarding whether the taxation was a taking in the constitutional sense. We have concluded the taxation did not, as a matter of law, violate the United States or Texas Constitutions. In doing so, I would also conclude we have necessarily disposed of the issue raised in SWP’s brief with respect to whether the tax was a taking under the Act.
Nevertheless, ignoring the specific complaint raised, the majority reverses the trial court’s judgment on an issue not presented in this appeal — specifically, whether the District conclusively established its assessment of the ad valorem tax did not constitute a taking under the subsection (b) definition. Specifically, the majority concludes there is no evidence: (1) the District’s assessment of the ad valorem tax did not limit SWP’s right to the property, or (2) the taxation was not the producing cause of a reduction of at least 25 percent in the property’s market value. I would not reach whether the District showed the tax was not a taking under subsection (b) because that issue was not raised in this appeal.
In its petition, SWP alleged the District’s action in establishing the tax rate in the Fall of 1995 was a taking as defined by the Act.1 SWP did not specify whether it was relying on the Act’s subsection (a) definition which refers to a constitutional taking or the subsection (b) definition. SWP’s complaint on appeal, however, is clearly premised entirely on its assertion *14the ad valorem tax was a taking in the constitutional sense. Indeed, SWP does not even mention subsection (b) or the language used therein other than when it quotes section 2007.002(5) in its entirety. More particularly, SWP has not alleged any action of the District: (1) was an act that restricted or limited its right to the property, or (2) was the producing cause of a reduction of at least 25 percent of the market value of the property. It is axiomatic that this Court may not reverse a trial court’s judgment absent properly assigned error. Pat Baker Co. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1998). Because the majority reverses on what is, in effect, unassigned error, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the opinion. I join in the majority opinion in all other respects.

. SWP presumably relied on the district’s action in setting the Fall 1995 tax rate, rather than the ad valorem tax itself, because the Act requires a property owner to file suit within 180 days of when the owner knew or should have known that the governmental action restricted or limited the owner’s right in the property. See Tex Gov’t Code Ann. § 2007.021(b) (Vernon 2000).