Court Opinion

ID: 9790342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:51:57.463337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:28.966373
License: Public Domain

EAGLESON, J., Concurring.
I concur in the judgment and much of the reasoning of the majority. I write separately only to emphasize that, in the context of probation revocation proceedings, public policy would not be served by application of collateral estoppel. Contrary to the assumption inherent in the dissenting opinions, the officer who bears the responsibility for prosecution of the new charge or charges is not necessarily the officer who initiates and prosecutes the probation revocation proceedings. Although the alleged commission of an offense by a probationer may form the basis of both the revocation proceeding and the new criminal prosecution, the two proceedings may be conducted in different courts and in different counties.
A decision to seek revocation of probation may be made by a probation officer without consultation with the prosecutor of the new charge, and may be undertaken before the prosecutor has completed the investigation and marshalled all available evidence. (See Pen. Code, § 1203.2.) The prosecutor may have no control over either the extent of evidence or the manner in which evidence is presented at a probation revocation hearing. The assumption underlying the dissenting opinions, that a monolithic “state” prosecutes both the probation revocation proceeding and the new criminal charge, and thus will be given a second opportunity to prove the case under a lower standard of proof, ignores this reality.1
Recognition that different officers, with varying ability and incentive to present the strongest possible case, bear responsibility for the two *353proceedings, leads me to conclude that public policy would not be served by application of collateral estoppel.2

The majority conclude that in this case the People did have the opportunity to present their entire case at the revocation hearing. The question we address, however, is broader than whether collateral estoppel should be applied in this case based on that fact. We decide here whether, as a matter of policy, the courts of this state must apply collateral estoppel to bar prosecution after an unsuccessful attempt to establish the commission of the offense in a probation revocation proceeding.
For purposes of the multiple prosecution bar of Penal Code, section 654, the court, in an opinion authored by Justice Mosk, recognized that it would be unreasonable to treat the state as a monolith and to charge the prosecutor of a felony or serious misdemeanor with knowledge that another officer was pursuing an infraction arising out of the same incident. (See In re Dennis B. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 687, 696 [135 Cal.Rptr. 82, 557 P.2d 514].) I see no reason to adopt a different approach here.

 Having reached this conclusion, I need not consider, beyond noting doubts regarding the dictum in People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 483, footnote 13 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321], suggesting that application of collateral estoppel would not conflict with the right to jury trial apparently granted to both the People and the defendant by article I, section 16, of the California Constitution,