Court Opinion

ID: 9710005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:59:29.456702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.354784
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring: I fully concur with the well-reasoned decision of the majority, but my concurrence is a reluctant one with respect to the issues raised by the State’s delay of almost three years in proceeding with the hearing required under section 104 — 25(g)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 725 ILCS 5/104 — 25(g)(2) (West 1992). Notwithstanding the "not not guilty” finding in 1984 under section 104N25(a), defendant’s ultimate guilt on the substantive criminal charges has not been determined. (See People v. Rink (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 533, 543, 455 N.E.2d 64 ("[t]he question of guilt is to be deferred until the defendant is fit to stand trial”).) Yet defendant has been and is being detained in a penitentiary at Chester, albeit in its mental health facility under the aegis of the Department of Mental Health. Although the standards for commitment under the section 104.25(g)(2) are presumably the same as those under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1 — 100 et seq. (West 1992); People v. Polachek (1984), 128 Ill. App. 3d 200, 205, 470 N.E.2d 584), the fact is that evidence of the commission of the crime for which defendant was found unfit to stand trial may be considered in determining whether defendant is to remain institutionalized. Moreover, that determination is made by the court exercising criminal jurisdiction. See People v. Polachek, 128 Ill. App. 3d at 205. The comprehensive scheme of procedures for criminal defendants found unfit to plead or stand trial (725 ILCS 5/104 — 10 et seq. (West 1992)) culminates in a procedure under section 104 — 25(g)(2) which permits involuntary detention for a period equal to the maximum sentences to which defendant would have been subject if convicted. 725 ILCS 104 — 25(g)(2) (West 1992). Manifestly, these procedures must be implemented with caution and vigilance. Otherwise, they can be transmuted through lax enforcement into devices for indefinite detention without trial. One must not lose sight of the fact that they are designed to provide a means of enhancing and safeguarding the right of a defendant while unfit to defend himself in a criminal prosecution without endangering the public safety. Consequently, the delay by the State of almost three years in providing a fitness hearing required under section 104 — 25 (g) should not be forgiven lightly, even when, as here, there was no showing of substantial prejudice. Yet it is relatively clear that, under the present language of section 104 — 25(g), no loss of jurisdiction results from such delay. All that the current act provides is that "[i]f defendant is not committed pursuant to this Section he or she shall be released.” (725 ILCS 104— 25(g)(3) (West 1992).) The focus of this provision is not upon the timeliness of the commitment proceeding, but rather upon the ultimate occurrence of the hearing and determination of unfitness. This language stands in contrast to the provision under section 3 — 813 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code which states, "If no petition is filed prior to the expiration of the initial order, the patient shall be discharged.” (405 ILCS 5/3 — 813 (West 1992).) Under section 3 — 813, the Act specifically addresses the timeliness factor and provides for discharge in the event of delay. (See In re Hatala (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 163, 558 N.E.2d 694; In re Walker (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 159, 558 N.E.2d 691.) Yet even under the latter provision, our supreme court in In re Nau (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 406, 607 N.E.2d 134, was reluctant to mandate a release for a one-day delay. Instead the majority decision in that case appears to have temporized the requirement of timeliness by finding waiver and by proceeding to determine whether there was any resultant prejudice, a determination that would have been superfluous if, in fact, the defendant were truly bound under the waiver doctrine. I am also compelled to reject the possible contention that as of the date upon which defendant’s extended treatment expired, the presumption of defendant’s fitness was restored and resurrected. Under this approach, the time limitation under the speedy trial act (725 ILCS 5/103 — 5 (West 1992)) would commence running as of that date and, as a result of the extended delay in proceeding with any further fitness hearing, the defendant would be entitled to a complete discharge under the term limitations of that act. (725 ILCS 5/103 — 5 (West 1992).) This contention was expressly rejected in the well-reasoned opinion in People v. Cole (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 210, 383 N.E.2d 613, stating: "Our statutory protection of this right, section 103 — 5, states that the time period during which an accused must be tried tolls during the period when he is unfit to stand trial. George Cole was found unfit. While clearly improper, the fact that a review hearing was not held on schedule does not, with respect to section 103 — 5, disturb the presumption of defendant’s continuing unfitness. Therefore, the 120-day period provided by section 103 — 5 did not resume until defendant was found fit to stand trial on January 7, 1977.” People v. Cole, 66 Ill. App. 3d at 212. Clearly less than total adherence to the statutory requirements imposed upon unfitness proceedings can result in the indefinite and unwarranted detention of a defendant caught up within the reach of those proceedings, without a trial on the merits or the alternate safeguard of periodic hearings imposed by the statutory scheme to periodically test his unfitness. It would therefore make sense to build in teeth for the prompt enforcement of the statutory procedural requirements, at least to the extent of requiring that those defendants who are not heard promptly must be discharged, which would then require a new civil commitment proceeding to be initiated for any further institutionalization. This is consonant with the position of the dissent in In re Nau, wherein Justice Freeman stated: "Some might argue that following those steps amounts to an empty exercise. Quite the contrary is true. Adherence to the procedures established by the Code is the only way to ensure that the efforts taken to subject individuals to involuntary admission in a hospital or mental health facility are properly scrutinized. And only through such adherence are the Code’s goals and the liberty interests implicated in involuntary admission procedures simultaneously honored.” In re Nau, 153 Ill. 3d at 435. Nevertheless, in view of the permissive language of the Act itself and the apparent, although not conclusive, thrust of the majority opinion in In re Nau (involving language more explicit and categorical than that under section 104 — 25(g) (725 ILCS 5/104 — 25(g) (West 1992))), I feel currently compelled to concur with the majority notwithstanding my reluctance to permit a virtual three-year delay in the hearing process to pass without consequences to the State. JUSTICE McNULTY, concurring in part, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I. SPECIALLY CONCURRING I concur, reluctantly, with the majority, that a delay of almost three years beyond the time period required by section 104 — 25(g)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/104 — 25 (West 1992)) in proceeding with a fitness and discharge hearing does not require release of defendant from custody under the current state of the law in Illinois. Although the standards of commitment under section 104— 25(g)(2) appear to be the same as those under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1 — 100 et seq. (West 1992)), there are two important differences. First, evidence of the commission of a crime for which a defendant was found unfit to stand trial may be considered in determining whether defendant must remain institutionalized for further treatment. Second, the determination is made by a court exercising jurisdiction under the criminal code, a statute with far different objectives and consequences than those of the Mental Health Code. Moreover, these procedures for criminal defendants permit involuntary commitment for a period of time equal to the maximum sentence to which defendant would have been subjected had he been convicted. In this case that time period is 40 years. If defendant had been convicted and sentenced to a maximum term, if good time and other sentence reduction credits are considered, he would likely be eligible for parole or, if not, nearly so at the present time. Therefore, his potential involuntary commitment under the criminal code because of the misfortune of unfitness to stand trial can greatly exceed that to which he could be subjected if tried and convicted of the charges. For that reason it is imperative that the procedural and constitutional safeguards embodied in the criminal code be scrupulously followed. However, it is apparent that this was not done in this case and other cases cited in both the majority and specially concurring opinions. I, therefore, agree with the specially concurring opinion that some mechanism needs to be provided for enforcement of the statutory procedural requirements regarding timely hearings for unfit defendants. Discharge of unfit defendants who have not had timely hearings from criminal code jurisdiction is one such mechanism which would then require a new civil commitment procedure to determine if further institutionalization is warranted. If upon review of unfitness cases coming before this court a pattern of delay in prompt fitness hearings appears to be the rule rather than the exception, one could then reasonably conclude in the future that discharge of such defendant from criminal code jurisdiction is the only way in which constitutional procedural guarantees can be assured. II. CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART I dissent from the majority conclusion that defendant received effective assistance of counsel at his discharge hearing concluded on May 17,1984. While I would not characterize the hearing as a "sham” as defendant does in his brief, in my view, his counsel did not assert and pursue all of the procedural safeguards and defenses to which defendant was constitutionally entitled. After the murder had been committed, defendant was taken into custody, given Miranda warnings and interrogated by a police officer and then by two assistant State’s Attorneys. Because of the great potential for protracted institutionalization of an unfit defendant as established by this case and as above set forth, it was imperative that defense counsel vigorously challenge the State’s evidence against defendant at this discharge hearing by all procedural avenues reasonably available. I do not believe this was done in the case at bar. In all, four statements of defendant came in by way of stipulation. Although defendant did not admit committing the crime, these combined statements placed him at the scene, in the company of the deceased and witnessing the crime, thereby in part corroborating the statement of the State’s only other witness, William McDonald. Defendant’s counsel not only failed to make a motion to suppress statements he made to the assistant State’s Attorneys and police, but instead stipulated to their introduction into evidence. Other than the statements of defendant, the only witness against defendant was William McDonald, whose testimony also put defendant at the scene conversing with deceased. McDonald, however, did not actually observe the two together or see the commission of the crime. The record reveals that the trial judge fully recognized that McDonald left much to be desired as a witness against defendant, not only because he had criminal convictions in his background, but also because McDonald, himself, had an altercation with the deceased shortly before his death, thus giving him a motive to point the finger of guilt for the crime elsewhere. It is clear, however, that the trial judge relied heavily on defendant’s statements to law enforcement officials corroborating McDonald’s testimony putting defendant at the scene of the crime in determining that the State had met its burden in establishing defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority opinion declares that defendant offered no legal basis upon which counsel could have moved to suppress the statements. Here we have a defendant who has remained unfit for trial on the charges against him for almost 15 years after numerous examinations by several doctors. The trial judge who conducted the fitness hearing in 1984 which is part of the record on appeal refused to allow defendant to waive the assistance of counsel because he did not deem the defendant sufficiently competent mentally to make that decision. In light of defendant’s mental health history and his bizarre behavior both in and out of court replete in this record, it is reasonable to conclude that a competent attorney would have filed a motion to suppress on the basis that this defendant was competent neither to understand nor to waive the constitutional rights to which he was entitled under Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, before being subjected to custodial interrogation. If counsel had succeeded in suppressing these statements and considering the trial judge’s expressed concerns about the credibility of McDonald as the State’s sole witness against defendant, one cannot conclude from this record that the trial judge would have found the charge against defendant proved beyond a reasonable doubt. I, therefore, conclude that counsel’s failure to file such a motion and to appeal the decision of the court that the evidence against defendant was sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was both incompetent and prejudicial under the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,104 S. Ct. 2052. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new fitness hearing. III. SPECIALLY CONCURRING Since I would reverse and remand for a new fitness hearing on direct review based upon incompetence of counsel for the reasons set forth in II above, this would obviate the necessity to raise the issue again in the habeas corpus hearing. IV. CONCURRING I concur with the majority that the period of criminal court jurisdiction expires in August of 2021.