Court Opinion

ID: 9895343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:03:33.319947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:10.002726
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Jones CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B320529

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. LA086503)
           v.

 DAVID LEE JONES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic, Judge. Dismissed.
      The Law Offices of Harold W. Dickens III and Harold W.
Dickens III for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M.
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                ________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       David Lee Jones pleaded no contest to charges of elder
abuse, vandalism and possession of marijuana for sale, and was
sentenced to 36 months of summary probation. Two years later,
he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing his plea
was the result of ineffective assistance by his trial counsel. The
trial court dismissed, without prejudice, the petition for failure to
state a prima facie claim for relief. We agree Jones’s petition
does not state a claim for relief and dismiss the appeal on that
ground.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In 2014 while working as a medical technician at Tarzana
Medical Center, Jones met 83-year-old Loretta Powell. Some
time thereafter Jones moved into a room in Powell’s home. While
the parties disagree regarding whether Jones paid rent, the
People do not dispute that, on one occasion, Jones advanced
approximately $50,000 to cover past due payments on the note
secured by the home and other home expenses for Powell.
      In 2016 Jones took Powell to the hospital after she fell at
home and broke her hip. During her hospital stay Jones had an
attorney prepare documents placing Powell’s house in a trust
with Jones as trustee and beneficiary, with a life estate to Powell.
Powell signed the trust documents while in the hospital in the
presence of a notary obtained by Jones.
      Powell apparently reconsidered her arrangement with
Jones, and the record reflects that by spring of 2017 she and
Jones were parties to an unspecified lawsuit. In July of that year

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Powell called the police to complain about noise caused by Jones’s
remodeling of the room in which he lived. Jones met the police
outside the home, explained he was in a lawsuit with Powell, and
suggested the police speak to his attorney. The police returned
the next day to conduct a “welfare check” on Powell. This time a
responding officer entered the house through Jones’s open
window and found marijuana, between $10,000 and $11,000 in
cash, and a scale. Jones was arrested and charged with theft
from an elder or dependent adult in violation of Penal Code
section 368, subdivision (d); vandalism valued in excess of $400 in
violation of Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a); and
misdemeanor possession of marijuana for sale in violation of
Health & Safety Code section 11359, subdivision (b).
       A preliminary hearing was held in March 2018. Jones was
represented by counsel. During the hearing, Jones’s counsel did
not call as a witness the attorney who prepared the trust
documents. Nor did counsel move to suppress the evidence—the
marijuana, cash and scale—seized during the warrantless entry.
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the People, in exchange for
reconveying the home to Powell and transferring to her the cash
seized at the time of his arrest, the information was amended to
indicate that the elder abuse and vandalism counts were
misdemeanors, and Jones pleaded no contest to all three counts.
In August 2019 after reconveying the house and surrendering the
seized cash, Jones was sentenced to summary probation for
36 months.
       In August 2021 Jones filed a petition for writ of error coram
nobis in the trial court. The essence of his petition was his claim
he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his preliminary
hearing, both for failure to call as a witness the attorney who had

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prepared the trust documents, and failure to move to suppress
evidence seized from Jones’s room without a search warrant. At
a hearing on February 4, 2022 the court expressed a tentative
opinion to deny Jones’s petition “because it’s just nowhere near
enough at this time.” The court continued the hearing to give
Jones an opportunity to submit additional evidence. At the
continued hearing on March 11, 2022 the court determined that
“there is not a prima facie showing to rule on this case at this
time” and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
      Jones timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

       A petition for writ of error coram nobis is a request to
vacate a judgment based on new facts, not known at the time of
the judgment, that would have led to a different result. “Its
purpose is to secure relief, where no other remedy exists, from a
judgment rendered while there existed some fact which would
have prevented its rendition if the trial court had known it and
which, through no negligence or fault of the defendant, was not
then known to the court.” (People v. Adamson (1949) 34 Cal.2d
320, 326-327; accord, People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1091
(Kim).) The burden is on the petitioner to “show that the facts
upon which he relies were not known to him and could not in the
exercise of due diligence have been discovered by him at any time
substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ;
otherwise he has stated no ground for relief.” (People v. Shorts
(1948) 32 Cal.2d 502, 513; accord, Kim, at p. 1097.)
       The Supreme Court described the limited grounds on which
a litigant may obtain relief through a petition for a writ of error

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coram nobis: “‘The writ of [error] coram nobis is granted only
when three requirements are met. (1) Petitioner must “show that
some fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits,
and which if presented would have prevented the rendition of the
judgment.” [Citations.] (2) Petitioner must also show that the
“newly discovered evidence . . . [does not go] to the merits of
issues tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even though
incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial.”
[Citations.] This second requirement applies even though the
evidence in question is not discovered until after the time for
moving for a new trial has elapsed or the motion has been denied.
[Citations.] (3) Petitioner “must show that the facts upon which
he relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of
due diligence have been discovered by him at any time
substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.”’”
(Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1093, quoting People v. Shipman
(1965) 62 Cal.2d 226, 230.)
      The high court confirmed well-established law that in
California a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, like any
number of other constitutional challenges to a conviction, cannot
be vindicated on coram nobis. (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at
p. 1095.) “That a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which
relates more to a mistake of law than of fact, is an inappropriate
ground for relief on coram nobis has long been the rule.” (Id. at
p. 1104.) And it emphasized that coram nobis is not available to
correct errors of law. (Ibid.)
      “A trial court’s denial of a coram nobis petition is an
appealable order, unless the coram nobis petition failed to state a
prima facie case for relief.” (People v. Dubon (2001)

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90 Cal.App.4th 944, 950; see People v. Thornton (1965)
233 Cal.App.2d 1, 3 [trial court’s order denying coram nobis
petition that does not allege grounds for relief “did not affect the
substantial rights of the petitioner and, hence, it was not
appealable”].) Thus, “[i]n an appeal from a trial court’s denial of
an application for the writ of error coram nobis, a reviewing court
initially determines whether defendant has made a prima facie
showing of merit; if not, the court may summarily dismiss the
appeal.” (People v. Totari (2002) 28 Cal.4th 876, 885, fn. 4.)
       “To qualify as the basis for relief on coram nobis, newly
discovered facts must establish a basic flaw that would have
prevented rendition of the judgment. [Citations.] . . . New facts
that would merely have affected the willingness of a litigant to
enter a plea, or would have encouraged or convinced him or her to
make different strategic choices or seek a different disposition,
are not facts that would have prevented rendition of the
judgment.” (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1103.)
       As a general matter, a coram nobis petition alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel does not state a prima facie claim
for relief. (See, e.g., People v. Howard (1965) 62 Cal.2d 237, 238
[defendant’s allegation “that the public defender inadequately
represented him at trial . . . [¶] . . . even if true, would not meet
the requirements for a writ of error coram nobis”]; People v. Gari
(2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 510, 521 [coram nobis relief is “not
available to [a] defendant, based . . . on his contention his counsel
was ineffective by failing to investigate and to negotiate a
different plea”]; People v. Soriano (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1470,
1477 [defendant’s claim “that he was deprived of effective
assistance of counsel in making his guilty plea . . . is not an
appropriate basis for relief by writ of coram nobis”]; People v.

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Buggs (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 285, 289 [“the inadequacy of counsel
prior to judgment cannot be properly raised collaterally on a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis”].) As the court stated in
People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 982-983, “Coram
nobis will not issue to vacate a plea of guilty . . . where the claim
is that the defendant did not receive effective assistance from
counsel [citations]. Where coram nobis raises only such grounds,
an appeal from the superior court’s ruling may be dismissed as
frivolous.”
       The sole ground for relief Jones alleges in his petition is
that his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to call a
witness at the preliminary hearing and failing to move to
suppress evidence allegedly obtained through an unlawful
search. Jones conceded in his opening brief that his claims
“regarding the illegal search and the ‘advice of counsel’ defense
are legal issues and not factual ones.”
       Because Jones’s petition is based on his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and such ground is not a cognizable basis
for coram nobis relief, he fails to state a prima facie case.
Further, Jones essentially conceded his petition is based on a
mistake of law, as opposed to facts that were not presented to the
trial court. As Jones’s petition fails to allege a proper ground for
coram nobis relief, his appeal must be dismissed. (People v.
Totari, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 885, fn. 4; People v. Shorts, supra,
32 Cal.2d at pp. 506-507; People v. Kraus (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d
568, 575, fn. 4.) Additionally, to the extent Jones argues his
petition is based directly on alleged Fourth Amendment
violations, such “constitutional claims cannot be vindicated on
coram nobis.” (Kim, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1095; see, e.g.,

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People v. Parseghian (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 1, 3 [“illegal search
and seizure” not cognizable basis for coram nobis relief].)1

                         DISPOSITION

      The appeal is dismissed.

                                     MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      PERLUSS, P. J.                 FEUER, J.

1      The authorities Jones cites do not help him. People v.
Wadkins (1965) 63 Cal.2d 110, 113 (Wadkins) and People v.
Chaklader (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 407, 409 held that coram nobis
relief is available where a defendant “has pleaded guilty in
reliance on the unkept promises of reliable public officials.”
(Wadkins, at p. 113.) But Jones does not contend he pleaded no
contest based on any unkept promises, presumably from the
sentencing judge or the prosecution. Ingram v. Justice Court
(1968) 69 Cal.2d 832, 843-844 confirmed a hearing must be held
where a coram nobis petition raises “substantial legal or factual
issues,” but it further acknowledged that “the petition may be
summarily denied if its lack of merit appears from the face of the
document or the court’s own records.” Additionally, this case is
unlike People v. Welch (1964) 61 Cal.2d 786, 790 where “the
public defender who represented defendant at the trial, state[d]
that he was unaware of defendant’s medical history” and
undiagnosed mental health conditions. By contrast, here Jones
does not contend his defense counsel was unaware of the
existence of the attorney who drafted the trust documents or the
warrantless search.

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