Court Opinion

ID: 9567624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:14.75545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:44.009124
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Sharp
concurring:
Had this been a close case on the facts I would have dissented and voted for a new trial on the ground that the solici*603tor’s argument as set out in the opinion of the Court was both improper and prejudicial. Because the evidence of the defendants’ guilt is so decisive and overwhelming that I am entirely-convinced there was no way for the State to have lost this case, I concur in the Court’s opinion that the solicitor’s argument did not affect the verdict. However, I am constrained to express my view that the Court’s treatment of defendants’ exceptions to this argument is not commensurate with the solicitor’s infraction of the rules it reiterates in the opinion.
The only suggestion in the Court’s opinion that it has any criticism of the challenged portions of the solicitor’s argument is the statement, “While we do not approve the language used by the district attorney, we do not think its use, in light of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record, constitutes prejudical error requiring a new trial.” This mild disparagement, read in connection with the Court’s characterization of the challenged argument as “alleged improprieties,” and its comment that “zeal in the prosecution of criminal cases is to be commended and not condemned,” is not likely to emphasize the Court’s statement that it is the solicitor’s duty “to hold himself under proper restraint . . . and avoid misconduct which may tend to deprive the defendant of the fair trial to which he is entitled. ...”
The solicitor’s argument added nothing to the State’s case. It merely created a totally unnecessary situation to be dealt with on appeal. Under all the circúmstances the argument can only be characterized as an egregious blunder which, in a case involving less conclusive evidence of defendants’ guilt, would have resulted in all the expense, delay, and other strains upon the administration of justice which are inherent in retrials. In my view, the argument in this case deserves censure and should not be dismissed with only the comment, “We do not approve.”
Justices Copeland and Exum join in this concurring opinion.