Court Opinion

ID: 9351776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-03 17:06:38.277736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:02:45.054724
License: Public Domain

J-S27008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
             v.                          :
                                         :
                                         :
CKARON MERCEL HANDY                      :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1001 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 24, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-09-CR-0000504-2013

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                         FILED JANUARY 3, 2023

      Appellant, Ckaron Mercel Handy, appeals from the March 24, 2002

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County denying his

petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm.

      The factual background and procedural history of the instant matter

are undisputed. Briefly, following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of

second-degree murder, robbery, and possessing instruments of crime.

Appellant timely filed an appeal with this Court, alleging that the trial court

erred in denying his pre-trial motion for discharge.      We affirmed.    See

Commonwealth v. Handy, 400 EDA 2015, unpublished memorandum (Pa.

Super. filed November 18, 2016).

      As the PCRA court explained:

      On December 19, 2016, Appellant filed a counseled Petition for
      Allowance of Appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
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      [Commonwealth v. Handy, 908 MAL 2016]. On January 19,
      2017, the Bucks County Clerk of Courts sent a letter to
      Appellant, which enclosed copies of the documents available in
      their file and directed Appellant to contact the Superior Court if
      he wished further information. The Bucks County Clerk of Courts
      then received two additional pro se letters from Appellant
      requesting information on the status of his case. The Clerk
      replied with a copy of Appellant’s status sheet as requested. On
      May 10, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the
      Petition for Allowance of Appeal. [See Commonwealth v.
      Handy, 908 MAL 2016, 5/10/17].

      On November 30, 2021, Appellant filed his PCRA Petition. After
      the Commonwealth filed an answer, on March 3, 2022, [the
      PCRA court] issued a notice of Intent to Dismiss Appellant’s
      PCRA Petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 as the Petition was
      time-barred and Appellant had not pleaded any claims that
      would entitle him to relief. On March [24], 2022, [the PCRA
      court] issued an Order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA Petition.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/26/22, at 6.

      This appeal followed.    On   appeal,   Appellant   raises   the   following

issues for our review:

      I.     The petition should be deemed timely filed.
      II.    Both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing
             to argue that the verdict was against the weight of the
             evidence.
      III.   Trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the
             admission of prejudicial expert testimony baselessly
             suggesting that the gun used to kill Battista was also used
             to kill Doggett.
      IV.    Trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the
             prosecutor’s improper closing argument.
      V.     Appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising an
             argument concerning the prosecution’s concerted effort to
             improperly characterize the scene of the crime as a war
             zone.
      VI.    Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately show
             how [Appellant] was prejudiced by the pre-arrest delay in
             bringing this matter to trial.

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Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA relief,

       we consider the record in the light most favorable to the
       prevailing party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to
       determining whether the evidence of record supports the
       conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of
       legal error. We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s
       findings that are supported in the record and will not disturb
       them unless they have no support in the certified record.
       However, we afford no such deference to the post-conviction
       court’s legal conclusions. We thus apply a de novo standard of
       review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 1 “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature.     Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.”           Commonwealth v. (Frank) Chester,

895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238

A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)).          As timeliness is separate and distinct from the
____________________________________________

1  The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges
and proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-
(iii) of the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one
year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(2).

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merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we first determine whether this

PCRA petition is timely filed.       Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306,

310 (Pa. 2008).      If it is not timely, we cannot entertain the review of the

substantive claims raised in the petition. Id.

       It is undisputed that the instant petition is facially untimely.2

However, Appellant argues that it meets the newly discovered facts

exception.3     The newly discovered fact is, according to Appellant, the

____________________________________________

2 Our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on
May 10, 2017. Appellant, therefore, had ninety days from that date to file a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. See
U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.1.      Because Appellant did not file a such a petition, his
judgment of sentence became final on August 8, 2017. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3). Appellant had one year from August 8, 2017, to file a timely
PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The instant PCRA petition
was filed on November 30, 2021, more than four years from August 8, 2017.
The instant petition is, therefore, facially untimely.

3 The exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove two components: 1)
the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown, and (2) these
unknown facts could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due
diligence. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 638 (Pa. 2017);
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii). Due diligence requires that the petitioner “take
reasonable steps to protect his own interests.”          Commonwealth v.
Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
However, it does not require “perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but
rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based on the particular
circumstances to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.”
Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
omitted). As such, “the due diligence inquiry is fact-sensitive and dependent
upon the circumstances presented.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] petitioner
must explain why he could not have learned the new facts earlier with the
exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98
(Pa. 2001)

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discovery that his counsel abandoned him, depriving him of collateral review

by failing to file a timely PCRA petition.           In support, Appellant relies on

Commonwealth           v.    Bennett,      930      A.2d   1264   (Pa.   2007)    and

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018).4

       In Bennett, our Supreme Court held that while “claims of ineffective

assistance    of   counsel     do    not   invoke    the   exception   under   section

9545(b)(1)(ii), and an allegation of abandonment by counsel falls within the

ambit of that exception.”           Commonwealth v. (Carl) Chester, 163 A.3d

470, 473 (Pa. Super. 2017). For purposes of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii),
____________________________________________

4 Notably, Appellant’s discussion of the merits of the claims raised here
(Issues II through VI) spans over 17 pages of his appellate brief, whereas
the discussion of the timeliness of the instant petition is essentially one
paragraph, to wit:

       Here, as in Bennett and Peterson, [Appellant] was erroneously
       led to believe that his collateral appeal rights had been
       preserved by counsel that had actually abandoned him. Based
       on his course of communication with his appellate counsel, and
       the lack of any closing documents, [Appellant] thought his
       appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court. He labored
       under the mistaken belief for years until he filed the instant
       petition. But because of his appellate counsel’s complete failure
       to follow through and seek review from the Supreme Court, and
       if necessary, timely inform [Appellant] of any subsequently final
       decision, [Appellant] was completely deprived “of PCRA review”
       by “attorney error,” and the timeliness exception thus applies.
       See Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1130.

Appellant’s Brief at 20 (emphasis added).

In passing, we are unsure why Appellant argues that prior counsel failed to
seek review in the Supreme Court.       As noted above, he did.        See
Commonwealth v. Handy, 908 MAL 2016, 5/10/17.

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abandonment means complete deprivation of the petitioner’s right to review

by a court. See Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1131.

      In Peterson, our Supreme Court held that counsel’s negligence per se

in filing an untimely PCRA petition constitutes adequate grounds to permit

the filing of a new PCRA petition beyond the one-year time bar pursuant to

the exception in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii). Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1125.

      Bennett and Peterson both assume there is counsel, whether

appointed or privately retained, and that counsel fails to take appropriate

action. These conditions are not satisfied here.

      Regarding counsel’s failure to file a PCRA petition, Appellant assumes,

without providing any evidence of it, that counsel was appointed or retained

for the purpose of pursuing PCRA relief. Appellant, in fact, suggests that it

was more of an understanding between counsel and Appellant that counsel

would file a PCRA petition on his behalf. In other words, Appellant has no

evidence that counsel was retained or appointed to assist him in the PCRA

proceedings, or that counsel agreed to file a PCRA petition on his behalf.

      Even if we were to find that Appellant had counsel, that counsel took it

upon himself to file a PCRA petition, and that Appellant was not aware of

counsel’s misdeeds, Appellant still fails to prove the second prong of the

“newly discovered facts” exception, i.e., these unknown facts could not have

been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.

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       Here,   there    is   not   even    an   allegation   as   to   when   Appellant

“discovered” counsel’s alleged omissions,5 and what step he took to uncover

said omissions.6 Based on Appellant’s own recitation of facts, Appellant did

nothing to find out about the status of his PCRA petition. Appellant’s Brief at

16, 20.7

____________________________________________

5 Failure to identify when the facts became known to petitioner generally
results in petitioner’s inability to prove the timeliness of an otherwise
untimely PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 905 A.2d 507,
511 (Pa. Super. 2006) (concluding that the appellant did not sustain his
burden of pleading and proving the newly discovered evidence exception
because the affidavit in which the witness attested that someone else
murdered the victim did not disclose when the witness first informed the
appellant of this information).

6 In Peterson, but not here, “the PCRA court made factual findings that
Peterson did not know about the untimely filing and could not have
ascertained this fact through the exercise of due diligence.” Peterson, 192
A.3d at 1130-31. In Bennett, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner
alleged sufficient due diligence, for purposes of the Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)
time-bar exception, where petitioner provided a description of steps he took
to ascertain the status of his case, including writing to the PCRA court and
the Superior Court.

The instant matter is similar to Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164,
1168 (Pa. Super. 2001). In Carr, we found that appellant, through the
exercise of due diligence, could have ascertained counsel’s failure to file a
direct appeal prior to the one-year time limitation of the PCRA (“A phone call
to his attorney or the clerk of courts would have readily revealed that no
appeal had been filed,” id. at 1168). Accordingly, we concluded that “absent
assertions of due diligence, the mere discovery of trial counsel’s failure to
file a direct appeal, after the one-year window to file a PCRA petition, d[id]
not place [a]ppellant under subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii).” Id.

7 Compare Appellant’s interest in finding out about the status of his petition
for allowance of appeal with Appellant’s conduct regarding the status of the
PCRA petition. In connection with the petition for allowance of appeal,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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        Neither Bennett nor Peterson excuses PCRA petitioners from

pleading and proving that counsel’s ineffectiveness was unknown to

petitioner and that it could not have been discovered with the exercise of

due diligence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Harris, 2021 WL 1148521, at

*4 (Pa. Super. March 25, 2021); Commonwealth v. Lilly, 2021 WL

796682, at *2 (Pa. Super. March 2, 2021) (while claims of ineffectiveness

“per se may, in limited circumstances, qualify a petition as timely under the

newly-discovered facts exception, the petitioner must plead and prove to the

PCRA court that these new ‘facts’ were previously unknown to the petitioner

and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.”).8

        In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant failed to plead and

prove    that   the   newly   discovered       fact   exception   is   applicable   here.

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the PCRA court dismissing Appellant’s

PCRA petition as untimely.

        Order affirmed.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Appellant contacted the Bucks County Clerk of Courts on three separate
occasions; regarding the PCRA petition, Appellant, based on his own
recitation of the facts, did not contact his attorney, the lower court, this
Court, or the Supreme Court.

8 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/3/2023

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