Court Opinion

ID: 9734558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:02.243668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.201912
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(dissenting in part). I dissent from part II and concur in part III of my brother’s opinion.
As my colleague says:
"It is necessary, therefore, to examine the roles of the labor broker and its customers to determine which is to be considered the employer for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision.”
Unfortunately, that is not what is done in the Court’s opinion. Instead, it is apparently held that "in a labor broker situation”, both the labor broker and its customer are employers within the meaning of the workers’ compensation statutes. The only authority cited for that conclusion is a 1969 Court of Appeals decision, Renfroe v Higgins Rack Coating & Mfg Co, Inc, 17 Mich App 259, 266; 169 NW2d 326 (1969), in which, in dicta, that Court "found” that both the labor broker and the customer "were employers of [the worker], each in a different way”.
Renfroe was an appeal from a trial court award of summary judgment in favor of a defendant *285customer, dismissing the worker’s third-party tort-feasor claim against the customer for the reason that, as a matter of law, the "exclusive remedy” provision of the workers’ compensation act bars the employee’s tort claim. The rule of the case is that the question whether a manufacturing company-customer was an "employer” within the meaning of the workers’ compensation statute is a question of law for the court and not for the trier of fact. It was on that basis that the decision of the trial court to that effect was affirmed. The "dual employment” language in the Court of Appeals opinion is mere dictum, unnecessary to the decision, and an inappropriate predicate for the Court’s judgment in this case.
There is no Michigan Supreme Court authority finding "dual employment” by a labor broker and its customer for workers’ compensation purposes.
In Wing v Clark Equipment Co, 286 Mich 343; 282 NW 170 (1938), this Court found "dual employment” where the worker was assigned as an "undercover efficiency expert” to work in a manufacturing plant. The plaintiff received separate wages from both employers and was under the direction and control of each. His efficiency reports were made outside of his hours of employment in the manufacturing plant. That was not a labor broker situation, however.
In a labor broker case, this Court has found that the labor broker and not the customer was the employer and, thus, was "exclusively liable for the payment of [workers’ compensation] benefits”, White v Extra Labor Power of America, 395 Mich 13, 26; 233 NW2d 1 (1975).
Other cases cited, but not analyzed in the Court’s opinion, suggest that this Court’s view has been that an employee may have but one employer *286for workers’ compensation purposes. In Goodchild v Erickson, 375 Mich 289; 134 NW2d 191 (1965), a local moving company acted as a labor broker in providing manpower to an affiliated interstate mover at a fixed rate per hour. The local moving company kept 20% of the hourly rate and paid the rest to the worker. This Court rejected the argument that the employee was "loaned” to the interstate mover and held that the local mover rather than the interstate mover was the "employer” required to pay workers’ compensation benefits. In Arnett v Hayes Wheel Co, 201 Mich 67; 166 NW 957 (1918), and Janik v Ford Motor Co, 180 Mich 557; 147 NW 510 (1914), this Court applied the old "control” test to determine which of two possible employers was the worker’s "employer”.
This Court’s adoption of the rationale and result of Renfroe, supra, is inappropriate and unwise. Under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act of 1969, "the employer” is solely and totally responsible for workers’ compensation benefits; even in the rare "dual employment” situation of Wing, supra, two separate awards based on the wages paid by each employer were appropriate. My colleague’s approach suggests that if two companies can divide the attributes of employment equally enough, both will be entitled to the "exclusive remedy” bar of the statute, even though only one set of workers’ compensation insurance premiums must be paid. In short, my colleague’s opinion advertises "two bars for the price of one”.
Moreover, from a purely policy perspective, the Court’s decision enables a company to insulate itself from the economic consequences of an unsafe workplace. It seems clear that the Legislature contemplated that either total liability or higher workers’ compensation insurance rates would pro*287vide an economic incentive for every company to care about worker safety. It now appears that the labor broker scheme may be an expedient method of avoiding either type of liability.
The Court would have been better advised today to carry out its stated duty "to examine the roles of the labor broker and its [customer] to determine which is to be considered the employer for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision [of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act]”.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.