Court Opinion

ID: 9564345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:58:20.807158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:21.723930
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
BRETT, Judge.
This petition for writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Court’s opinion of November 26, 1958. The matter thereafter came on for re-hearing on petitioner’s motion and oral argument was had thereon on December 17, 1958. After the court heard the oral argument on the theories advanced, the petitioner was granted twenty days in which to file a supplemental petition and support the same with affidavits. Thereafter, the supplemental petition was filed together with affidavits attached.
Said petition, in substance, alleged that petitioner was prevented by his attorney, W. L. Steger, from testifying in his own behalf for the reason Steger also represented his co-defendant, Grady Sargent; that said attorney obtained a severance for them and that petitioner was tried first; that Mr. Steger would not permit him to testify at his trial lest petitioner further implicate Sargent and stated he (Steger) had to look out for Sargent; that petitioner was warned by Sargent he should be careful what he told the authorities for the reason Fern Sargent, his wife, was going to support with sworn testimony Sargent’s alibi, that he was home with her when the crime was committed.
He further alleges that said attorney informed him the state was without sufficient evidence to convict him, and if petitioner did not testify it would work to the material advantage of both himself and Sargent. He pleads that he was denied the right to testify although he repeatedly sought so to do, and was prevented from so doing by reason of the adverse interests of Sargent and Steger and that the method employed amounted to the use of coercion or force. He also alleges that his failure to testify was through no negligence of his own but was solely by reason of. his ignorance, and had it not been for his ignorance, he would have asked for the removal of the said attorney and then demanded of his new counsel the right to be heard from the witness stand. He asserts that if he had testified in the trial it would have brought about his acquittal. He says he does not believe the said Steger was acting maliciously, but in absolute good faith, but that it resulted to his great prejudice in denial of a fair trial. He asserts Mr. Mathers, his other counsel, would corroborate his testimony relative to his failure to testify, and that Mr. Steger has indicated in a sworn statement attached to the petition he is ready to testify concerning the foregoing allegations when called upon in court so to do.
Further, the petition alleges that the widow of Grady Sargent, Fern Garnett, will, at a hearing of this petition, testify that her husband, Grady Sargent, made a deathbed declaration that at the time of the killing, the petitioner was not at the scene of the crime; that petitioner had nothing to do with the murder of Morgan Haddock; that he, Sargent, was at the scene of the crime when the killing occurred; and that he, Sargent, paid another man $500 to kill Haddock. He further asserts that this information was not made known to Mrs. Garnett and petitioner until after petitioner was tried and convicted, but remained locked within the conscience of Grady Sargent until shortly before his death. Petitioner urges that this information was likewise not known to Mr. Steger, and could not have been available to petitioner for presentation to> the jury at the time of trial; that if this evidence had been pre*451sented to the jury he would not have been convicted. In this connection, he says it has been withheld by Mrs. Garnett because of her extremely nervous condition; that her reluctance to disclose the evidence was enhanced by the severe warning of her family not to do so; that Mrs. Garnett’s affidavit alleges that finally upon her own volition and the encouragement of her present husband in good conscience she was compelled to tell of Grady Sargent’s declaration; and that her affidavit in the foregoing regards is attached to the petition. The petitioner asserts that her testimony would establish that Hiram Robinson killed Haddock and that would free him from any involvement of which he now stands convicted. Petitioner alleges that the facts of Grady Sargent’s deathbed confession, as revealed by Mrs. Garnett, would be corroborated by Rev. Ferrill Odom, the Methodist Minister in Caddo at the time of the confession, if he were called as a witness. Attached to the petition is the affidavit of the petitioner supporting the allegations of the petition.
Finally, he prays that writ of error coram nobis be granted that he may be heard by the trial court in the foregoing regards, and other witnesses’ testimony be heard in support of the petition and the supplemental petition thereto.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the evidence sought to be obtained by coram nobis from Mr. Steger and Mr. Mathers, petitioner’s attorneys at the time of trial, would not establish any ultimate fact relative to the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. Rather, by his allegation of an adverse interest on the part of Mr. Steger, he states in effect he was denied the aid of counsel, a question not of fact, but of due process. The worth of such question we do not consider, since the writ of error coram nobis is not available^to attack the validity of the judgment on jurisdictional grounds. It has been repeatedly held that the writ of error coram nobis is limited to errors of fact “unknown at the time of the trial to the party seeking relief and to the court.” Hurt v. State, Okl.Cr., 312 P.2d 169, 176.
On the first petition for rehearing by the petitioner, we were without the aid of argument and brief of the state concerning the admissibility of the alleged deathbed statement of Grady Sargent. We held that the deathbed statement of Grady Sargent, petitioner’s co-defendant, was admissible as a statement against interest and we ordered the hearing on the petition to proceed in the trial court. Thereafter, on the state’s petition for rehearing, oral argument and memorandum brief, we find we were in error, hence, that part of the opinion is stricken for the reasons hereinafter set forth. It has been called to our attention that this Court has long been committed to the rule aptly stated in Newton v. State, 61 Okl.Cr. 237, 71 P.2d 122, 127:
“The rule in respect to the admissibility of dying declarations goes no further than to make such declaration admissible where the death of the deceased is the subject of the trial and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the declaration.”
Mulkey v. State, 5 Okl.Cr. 75, 113 P. 532; Orme v. State, 63 Okl.Cr. 325, 75 P.2d 482; Graham v. State, 80 Okl.Cr. 159, 157 P.2d 758; Waller v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 294, 16 S.E.2d 808; People v. Tilley, 406 Ill. 398, 94 N.E.2d 328; Mays v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 678, 255 S.E. 257; State v. Doris, 51 Or. 136, 94 P. 44, 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 660. This evidence would not be admissible since the declaration was not concerning the death of the decedent, Sargent. Nor would it be admissible as a statement contrary to the declarant’s interest, since, as was said in Newton v. State, supra, this exception applies not to cases in which the declaration would subject the declarant to a criminal liability, but the interest must be of a pecuniary character to be admissible. The chief grounds for exclusion, however, are that the reported declaration, if made, is made without the sanction of an oath, with no re*452sponsibility on the part of the declarant for error or falsification, without opportunity for the court, jury, or parties to observe the demeanor and temperament of the witness, and to search his motives and test his accuracy and veracity by cross-examination, these being the most important safeguards of the truth where a witness testifies in person and of his own knowledge. Moreover, he who swears in court to the extrajudicial declaration does so (especially where the declarant is dead) free from the embarrassment of present contradiction and with little or no danger of successful prosecution for perjury. Relaxation of the foregoing safeguards would multiply the probability of error and the unsafe reliance upon such evidence in a court of justice. Newton v. State, supra.
The same principles apply to the testimony of Rev. Ferrill Odom.
"While it is elementary that the defendant in a criminal case may show that another person committed the crime charged, and that he had no participation in it * * *, such guilt of a third person must be shown by competent evidence.”
Newton v. State, supra. This principle is so sound it applies with equal force to evidence offered in support of a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The proposed evidence of both Mrs. Garnett and Rev. Odom under the foregoing authorities is clearly inadmissible. On second rehearing the petition for writ of error coram nobis is accordingly denied on the basis of petitioner’s failure to state any additional legal grounds for relief.
POWELL, P. J., concurs.
NIX, J., dissents.