Court Opinion

ID: 9714133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:31:31.131724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.699473
License: Public Domain

Shangraw, J.
Dissenting. Considering the majority view following reargument, I desire to supplement my previous dissent by the following additional comments.
The technical requirement of the statute in conducting the initial sale of the property, and its purchase by the town, were complied with. No fraud or collusion is charged. The validity of the tax is not questioned. The tax collector, without success, attempted to receive bids for less than the whole property.
*56The precise question presented is whether, in the absence of legislative direction, — is the plaintiff, defaulting taxpayer, entitled to the profit made by the town on a resale of the property. The statutes in question make no provision for such recovery.
The majority view holds that on equitable principles plaintiff should recover. I perceive no basis in equity to hold that where property is resold at a profit following a tax sale, such as here, that a former owner is entitled to enjoy such profit. A similar point of view is expressed by the Texas Court in Booty v. State, (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), 149 S.W.2d 216, 217.
The question of proper disposition of surplus proceeds from the sale of property acquired at a tax sale by a municipality has received infrequent consideration in the litigated cases. It has been held that in the absence of contrary provision by statute, (Taylor v. Monroe, 158 Ohio St. 266, 109 N.E.2d 271 (1952)) or constitution, (City of Beckley v. Matcher, 136 W.Va. 169, 67 S.E.2d 20 (1951)) a municipality’s title to such property is absolute so that a town is free from either legal or equitable claims by the taxpayer to any surplus realized. This result is supported by a recent decision of the Massachusetts Court in Kelly v. City of Boston, 348 Mass. 385, 386-87; 204 N.E.2d 123 (1965). See Oosterwyk v. County of Milwaukee, 31 Wis.2d 513, 143, N.W.2d 497 (1966).
The recent case of Spurgias v. Morrissette, 109 N.H. 275, 249 A.2d 685 (1969), decided in 1969 is comparable to that now considered. In the New Hampshire case the plaintiff was the owner of two house lots and a dwelling in the town of Exeter which the town purchased at a sale for unpaid taxes of $125.59. The town later sold the property for $3,700, leaving a net surplus, after costs, taxes, and interest, of $2,865.54.
The town voted to raise and appropriate $2,865.54 to reimburse the plaintiff, taxpayer, for the profit made by the town. The selectmen, by vote of the town, were instructed to settle with the plaintiff. The selectmen refused to comply and make payment as directed. A petition for a writ of mandamus was brought by the plaintiff to compel the selectmen to comply with the vote of the town.
The New Hampshire Court held that, in the absence of a contrary provision by statute or Constitution, a municipality’s *57title taken in default of redemption from a tax sale is absolute and that the proceeds on resale were the property of the town. As such, they were public funds, and the town lacked authority to pay them out on any theory of “equity and good conscience.”
If there should be a remedy for someone in the plaintiff’s position, it is my view that the matter rests in the legislative domain.
I would affirm the decree.