Court Opinion

ID: 9896676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 00:00:50.071076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:11.938618
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                          Criminal Action No. 13-214 (BAH)
                        v.                                Judge Beryl A. Howell

 HIACHOR KPODI,

                        Defendant.

                               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

       Defendant Hiachor Kpodi, who was sentenced to 151 months in prison after a jury, in 2014,

convicted him of possessing with intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine base

and possession of a firearm by a felon, has filed the instant pro se motion for “an order reducing

his sentence to 121 months pursuant to 18 U.S.C.[] § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. Amendment 782.”

Def.’s Mot. Reduction Sentence at 1 (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 72. For the reasons explained

below, defendant’s motion is denied.

I.     BACKGROUND

       On December 3, 2013, a grand jury indicted defendant on one count of possessing with

intent to distribute twenty-eight grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (Count 1); one count

of possessing with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of

oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count 2); one count of possession of

a firearm and ammunition by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count 3); and one

count of using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count 4). See Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 14. On

January 10, 2014, a jury found defendant guilty on Counts 1 (cocaine distribution) and 3 (firearm
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possession) and acquitted him on Counts 2 (oxycodone distribution) and 4 (firearm possession in

furtherance of drug-trafficking offense). See Verdict Form, ECF No. 35.

         At sentencing, in June 2014, the Court determined, consistent with the Probation Office’s

Presentence Report (“PSR”), that, based on his criminal history, defendant was in criminal history

category III and that, on Count 1, his total offense level was 34, by application of U.S.S.G. §§

2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(4), see PSR ¶ 22, ECF No. 51 (“USSG §2D1.1 of the guidelines . . . provides that

an offense involving 335.3 grams of cocaine base has a base offense level of 32.”), and §

2D1.1(b)(1) (application of the two-level specific offense characteristic for possession of a

dangerous weapon). Sentencing Tr. at 26:3–19 (Jun. 3, 2014) (“2014 Sentencing Tr.”); PSR ¶¶

22, 23, 30, 39. 1 This resulted in an advisory sentencing range for defendant, on Count 1, of 188

to 235 months’ imprisonment and, on Count 3, of 120 months. 2014 Sentencing Tr. at 26:15–18;

PSR ¶ 88.

         In its sentencing memorandum, the government consented to recommend a two-level

downward variance to defendant’s base offense level in consideration of the then-proposed

amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines’ Drug Quantity Table for those convicted of drug-

trafficking offenses, on the condition that defendant “agrees on the record at the sentencing hearing

that . . . [he] will not later seek a reduced sentence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), in the event

that the proposed amendment is adopted and made retroactive by the Sentencing Commission.”

Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem. at 7–8, ECF No. 43; see also Def.’s Sentencing Mem. at 17–18, ECF

No. 42. With the parties’ consent, this reduction was considered as a downward departure under

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          The Court determined that the PSR accurately grouped Counts 1 and 3 for guideline calculation purposes,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), since “the conduct covered by [Count 3] is grouped together with and a specific
offense characteristic under the guidelines applicable to Count 1.” 2014 Sentencing Tr. at 25:20–26:2; PSR ¶ 21.
“Pursuant to USSG §3D1.3(a), the offense level applicable to the Group is the offense level which produces the highest
total offense level,” which, in defendant’s case, was the guideline for Count 1: U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. PSR ¶ 21.

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U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, “based upon the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s approval of a two-level

reduction in all offense levels in the Drug Quantity Table [pursuant to U.S.S.G. Amendment 782]

and the defendant’s agreement not to seek further reduction on this basis should that reduction be

made retroactive.” Jun. 5, 2014 Statement of Reasons (“2014 SOR”) at 5, ECF No. 49; see also

id. (observing that “[b]oth the government and defense counsel consented to this two-level

departure from the applicable offense level of 34 to offense level of 32”); 2014 Sentencing Tr. at

19:9–21, 21:3–22:5.

       With application of the two-level downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0,

defendant’s total offense level was 32, which, based on a criminal history category of III, resulted

in an advisory guidelines sentencing range of 151 to 188 months. 2014 Sentencing Tr. at 23:11–

13, 26:15–19. Defendant was then sentenced at the lowest end of the applicable guidelines range,

on Count 1 (cocaine distribution), to 151 months’ imprisonment and, on Count 3 (firearm

possession), to 120 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrently. Id. at 49:5–11; Jun. 5, 2014

Judgment as to Hiachor Kpodi at 2, ECF No. 48. As the Court explained at sentencing, this

sentence was warranted because the offense conduct and relevant conduct “involved not only a

significant distribution amount of cocaine base but also multiple firearms and evidence of use of

those firearms” and “relevant conduct, including the street gun-fight in April leading to the

investigation and search warrant of the defendant’s residence on May 9, 2013, the April 2013 car

stop, in which a loaded firearm was found in the defendant’s car, and the October 30, 2013 search

of his Maryland residence, show that the defendant was engaged in significant drug trafficking

over an extended period of time in 2013, in both D.C. and Maryland, and that he continued in this

conduct unabated even after his arrests in April and in May, 2013,” 2014 SOR at 5; see also 2014

Sentencing Tr. at 43:17–47:5, and his “prior conviction [for serious drug and gun offenses] was

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over a decade ago,” for which defendant had served “a fairly lengthy period of parole on his prior

conviction,” 2014 SOR at 5; 2014 Sentencing Tr. at 47:6–48:5.

       Defendant appealed his sentence, which the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded, based on

the panel’s view that the Court “considered, as an aggravating factor, evidence that Kpodi was

involved in an unrelated gunfight even though it had prohibited the Government from introducing

the same evidence during Kpodi’s trial.” United States v. Kpodi, 824 F.3d 122, 123 (D.C. Cir.

2016). During the pendency of this appeal, Amendment 782 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 became effective

on November 1, 2014, nearly six months after defendant’s initial sentencing. See U.S.S.G.

Amendment 782.

       On remand, at the time of defendant’s resentencing on January 6, 2017, Amendment 782

was already in effect. Thus, at defendant’s resentencing hearing, the Court determined that his

total offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (b)(1), (c)(4), was 32, after starting with a

base offense level of 30 and application of the two-level specific offense characteristic for

possession of a dangerous weapon, with the result that, with his criminal history category of III,

defendant’s advisory guidelines sentencing range was 151 to 188 months’ incarceration on Count

1 and 120 months’ incarceration on Count 3. Sentencing Tr. at 16:22–17:3 (Jan. 6, 2017) (“2017

Sentencing Tr.”); see also Jan. 9, 2017 Statement of Reasons (“2017 SOR”) at 5, ECF No. 67. The

defendant was, again, sentenced at the lowest end of the guidelines range, on Count 1, to 151

months’ imprisonment and, on Count 3, to 120 months’ imprisonment, with both sentences to run

concurrently. 2017 Sentencing Tr. at 49:15–18; Jan. 9, 2017 Judgment at 3, ECF No. 66. The

Court considered the severity of defendant’s offense conduct, “the clear need for deterrence and

protection of the public in this case given the defendant’s brazen involvement in illegal crack

dealing with a gun and ammunition,” and in light of several mitigating factors, including

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“defendant’s family situation and his desire to have a role in his children’s lives, as well as his []

medical condition” at the time. 2017 Sentencing Tr. at 37:19–42:10; 2017 SOR at 5. Defendant

again appealed his sentence, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed his sentence. United States v. Kpodi,

888 F.3d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

       On September 2, 2022, defendant filed the instant motion for resentencing, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. Amendment 782. See generally Def.’s Mot. Counsel was

appointed to represent defendant in connection with the motion, Min. Order (Sept. 8, 2022), and

the briefing schedule proposed by the parties was adopted, Min. Order (Jan. 3, 2023). Consistent

with the scheduling order, the Probation Office timely filed a report, on February 2, 2023,

explaining that because defendant “received the benefit of the two-level reduction in the Drug

Quantity Table at his original sentencing hearing on June 3, 2014 (via downward departure), as

well as at re-sentencing on January 6, 2017,” “[h]e is not eligible for a further reduction[.]” Feb.

2, 2023 Probation Mem. at 3, ECF No. 75. Defendant’s counsel filed a status report on February

23, 2023, explaining that, “[a]fter consultation with Mr. Kpodi, undersigned counsel and Mr.

Kpodi rely on the arguments made in Mr. Kpodi’s pro se motion (ECF 72), and have no further

arguments to submit.” Def.’s Status Rep. at 2, ECF No. 76. Accordingly, defendant’s motion is

now ripe for resolution.

II.    DISCUSSION

       Section 3582(c) provides that “[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it

has been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 819

(2010) (“A federal court generally ‘may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been

imposed.’”) (quoting § 3582(c)); Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 501 n.14 (2011) (“Once

imposed, a sentence may be modified only in very limited circumstances.”) (citing § 3582(c)).

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This “rule of finality,” however, “is subject to” the “narrow exceptions” set forth in § 3582(c).

Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011) (plurality), holding modified in other respects

by Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). One of those “narrow exceptions” authorizing

modification of an otherwise final federal sentence includes when a defendant was sentenced ‘to

a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the

Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which defendant’s pro se motion asserts applies

here, see Def.’s Mot. at 1–2.

        Defendant, however, already received the benefit of the guideline amendment reducing by

two-levels all offense levels in the Drug Quantity Table, both at his initial sentencing in 2014 and

at his resentencing in 2017. Feb. 2, 2023 Probation Mem. at 3. At his initial sentencing in 2014,

defendant prospectively received the benefit of Amendment 782 through a two-point downward

departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, see 2014 Sentencing Tr. at 19:9–21, 21:3–22:5, 49:5–11;

2014 SOR at 5, and Amendment 782 was in effect at his resentencing in 2017, see Jan. 2017 SOR

at 1. Furthermore, defendant incorrectly calculates his total offense level as 30, rather than the

correct total offense level of 32, see Def.’s Mot. at 2, by failing to account for application of the

two-level specific offense characteristic for possession of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), see 2017 Sentencing Tr. at 16:22–17:3; 2017 SOR at 1; PSR ¶ 23.

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for resentencing must be denied because he has already received

the full benefit of application of Amendment 782. See United States v. Wright, No. 06-cr-184,

2014 WL 12724427, at *2 (D.D.C. July 21, 2014) (denying defendant’s motion for resentencing

because his sentence already “incorporated the reduction provided by” the U.S.S.G. amendment

at issue).

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III.   CONCLUSION AND ORDER

       For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence, ECF No. 72, is

DENIED.

       SO ORDERED.

       Date: November 13, 2023

                                                  __________________________
                                                  BERYL A. HOWELL
                                                  United States District Judge

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