Court Opinion

ID: 9891679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:02:49.294868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:08.609200
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1063     Document: 56           Page: 1       Filed: 10/19/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC, DBA BRAZOS
        LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                                   v.

                      GOOGLE LLC,
                     Defendant-Appellee
                   ______________________

                         2022-1063
                   ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas in No. 6:20-cv-00574-ADA, Judge
 Alan D. Albright.

            -------------------------------------------------

      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC, DBA BRAZOS
        LICENSING AND DEVELOPMENT,
               Plaintiff-Appellant

                                   v.

                      GOOGLE LLC,
                     Defendant-Appellee
                   ______________________

                             2022-1065
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 2                        WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

                    ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Western District of Texas in No. 6:20-cv-00578-ADA, Judge
 Alan D. Albright.
                   ______________________

                   Decided: October 19, 2023
                    ______________________

     NATHAN K. CUMMINGS, Koide IP Law PLLC, Arlington,
 VA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
 BRIAN MATTHEW KOIDE; SEAN D. BURDICK, Burdick Pa-
 tents, PA, Boise, ID.

     ISRAEL SASHA MAYERGOYZ, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, ar-
 gued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by JOHN R.
 BOULE, III, EDWIN GARCIA, TRACY A. STITT, JENNIFER L.
 SWIZE, Washington, DC; THARAN GREGORY LANIER, Palo
 Alto, CA.
                 ______________________

         Before LOURIE, LINN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 STOLL, Circuit Judge.
      WSOU Investments LLC, dba Brazos Licensing and
 Development (WSOU) appeals from a judgment of the U.S.
 District Court for the Western District of Texas that con-
 strued certain claim terms in U.S. Patent Nos. 8,965,045
 and 9,335,825 in means-plus-function format and thus sub-
 ject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 1 and held those claims indefinite

     1    The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) redes-
 ignated § 112 ¶¶ 2 and 6 as, respectively, § 112(b) and (f).
 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec.
 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). We refer to the pre-AIA ver-
 sion because the applications resulting in the ’045 and ’825
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                          3

 under that construction. For the below reasons, we affirm
 the district court’s decision as to the ’045 patent, but re-
 verse its decision as to the ’825 patent and remand for fur-
 ther proceedings.
                        BACKGROUND
     The ’045 patent relates to image tracking and capture.
 Claims 1–17 are at issue on appeal. The claim limitation
 at issue is “processor configured to” perform certain func-
 tional language, which appears in claim 1 as follows:
    1. An apparatus comprising:
    a viewfinder display configured to display a first
    and second picture;
    a processor configured to move automatically a
    sub-set of pixels defining a target captured image
    that corresponds to the first picture, within a larger
    set of available pixels in a direction of an edge of
    the target captured image when a defined area of
    interest within the target captured image ap-
    proaches the edge of the target captured image,
    said processor configured to provide a pre-emp-
    tive user output when the sub-set of pixels ap-
    proaches an edge of the set of available pixels, and
    the second picture corresponds to the larger set of
    available pixels,
    wherein the viewfinder display is configured to dis-
    play the first picture within the second picture.

 patents were filed before September 16, 2012. See id.
 sec. 4(e), 125 Stat. at 297; see also Media Rights Techs.,
 Inc. v. Cap. One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1371 n.1
 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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 4                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 ’045 patent col. 14 l. 65–col. 15 l. 13 (emphases added to
 highlight disputed limitation).
     The ’825 patent relates to controlling a device using
 gestures. Claims 1–2 and 12 are at issue on appeal. The
 claim limitation at issue is “at least one memory including
 computer program code, where the at least one memory
 and the computer program code are configured, with the at
 least one processor to cause the apparatus to” perform cer-
 tain functional language, which appears in claim 1 as fol-
 lows:
     1. An apparatus comprising:
     at least one processor; and
     at least one memory including computer pro-
     gram code, where the at least one memory and
     the computer program code are configured,
     with the at least one processor, to cause the
     apparatus to at least:
        detect that an application is being started
        on the apparatus;
        in response to the application being started
        on the apparatus, turn on a continuous
        wave doppler radar at the apparatus and
        transmit radio signals that comprise the
        continuous wave doppler radar, wherein
        the radio signals are at least partially re-
        flected by a human body of a user of the ap-
        paratus;
        receive the transmitted radio signals after
        having been at least partially reflected by a
        gesture by the human body of the user;
        detect in the received radio signals a prede-
        termined time-varying modulation caused
        by the gesture by the human body of the
        user and that is present in a modulation of
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                         5

         the received radio signals as compared to a
         modulation of the transmitted radio sig-
         nals, wherein detecting the predetermined
         time-varying modulation of the received
         signal comprises detecting a doppler fre-
         quency shift in the continuous wave dop-
         pler radar of the radio signals transmitted
         from the apparatus, wherein the doppler
         frequency shift comprises a frequency mod-
         ulated continuous wave variation caused
         by the gesture by the human body of the
         user;
         associate the detected predetermined time-
         varying modulation with a predetermined
         user input command; and
         based on the associated predetermined
         user input command control at least one
         operation of the application on the appa-
         ratus.
 ’825 patent col. 10 ll. 29–61 (emphasis added to highlight
 disputed limitation).
     In its claim construction order, the district court eval-
 uated whether each of these limitations was in means-plus-
 function format subject to § 112 ¶ 6 and, if so, whether the
 respective specifications disclosed adequate corresponding
 structure to avoid indefiniteness under § 112 ¶ 2. See
 WSOU Invs. LLC v. Google LLC, No. 6-20-cv-00574-ADA,
 ECF No. 61 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2022) (“Claim Construction
 Order”). The district court determined that the disputed
 limitations in both patents were written in means-plus-
 function format; that those claims were therefore subject to
 § 112 ¶ 6; that the patents’ specifications did not disclose
 corresponding structure to perform the claimed functions;
 and, thus, that the claims were indefinite under 35 U.S.C.
 § 112. Claim Construction Order at 26–32, 37–41.
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     Based on the district court’s claim construction, the
 parties stipulated to final judgment that claims 1–17 of the
 ’045 patent and claims 1–2 and 12 of the ’825 patent are
 invalid as indefinite. WSOU timely appealed. We have ju-
 risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                          DISCUSSION
     “Regarding questions of claim construction, including
 whether claim language invokes [§ 112 ¶ 6], the district
 court’s determinations based on evidence intrinsic to the
 patent as well as its ultimate interpretations of the patent
 claims are legal questions that we review de novo.” Wil-
 liamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1346
 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citing Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
 v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331 (2015)). “To the extent
 the district court, in construing the claims, makes underly-
 ing findings of fact based on extrinsic evidence, we review
 such findings of fact for clear error.” Id.
       A means-plus-function claim construction analysis in-
 volves a two-step process. Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp.,
 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Williamson,
 792 F.3d at 1349–51). First, we determine whether the dis-
 puted limitation is drafted in means-plus-function format,
 i.e., “whether [or not] it connotes sufficiently definite struc-
 ture to a person of ordinary skill in the art.” Id. If the
 claim limitation does connote sufficiently definite struc-
 ture, it is not written in means-plus-function format and
 § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. However, if the claim limitation
 is written in means-plus-function format, we continue to
 step two, which requires us to determine “what structure,
 if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the
 claimed function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351.
     When, as is the case here, the disputed limitation does
 not include the word “means,” there is a rebuttable pre-
 sumption that the limitation is not drafted in means-plus-
 function format. Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1365. This presump-
 tion “can be overcome and § 112 [¶] 6 will apply if the
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                             7

 challenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to ‘re-
 cite[] sufficiently definite structure’ or else recites ‘function
 without reciting sufficient structure for performing that
 function.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348–49 (citing Watts
 v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
     On appeal, in both cases, WSOU makes two argu-
 ments—first, that the district court erred in concluding
 that the disputed claim limitations invoke § 112 ¶ 6; and
 second, that the district court erred in concluding that the
 specification fails to disclose adequate structure corre-
 sponding to the claimed function. We address each argu-
 ment in turn for both patents.
                                I
      First, we address the ’045 patent. Claim 1 of that pa-
 tent requires, among other things, a “processor,” “said pro-
 cessor configured to provide a pre-emptive user output
 when the sub-set of pixels approaches an edge of the set of
 available pixels.” ’045 patent col. 15 ll. 1, 7–9. As the dis-
 trict court correctly noted, and both parties agree on ap-
 peal, this claim limitation is presumed not to be in means-
 plus-function format because it lacks the word “means.”
 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1349 (explaining that the pre-
 sumption exists but is not “strong”).
     To rebut this presumption, Google relied on the ’045
 patent specification, which provides a vague understand-
 ing of what the structure of the claimed “processor” is, re-
 ferring to hardware, software, or essentially anything else
 that could perform the claimed functions. The district
 court agreed with Google, determining that this limitation
 “recites purely functional language.” Claim Construction
 Order at 31. Specifically, the court found that “the lan-
 guage of the patent leads to the conclusion that ‘processors’
 is meant to generically be anything that manipulates
 data.” Id. (cleaned up).
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 8                       WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

      We see no error in the court’s determination that the
 term “processor” in the claims of the ’045 patent does not
 recite sufficiently definite structure. To be sure, the term
 “processor” is not a nonce word and, in some circumstances,
 the term would connote sufficient structure. As we have
 explained, however, the applicability of § 112 ¶ 6 depends
 on the specific context of the patent at issue. Williamson,
 792 F.3d at 1350–51 & n.5; see also Advanced Ground Info.
 Sys. Inc. v. Life360, Inc., 830 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir.
 2016) (analyzing whether a claim term is in means-plus-
 function format by looking to the “combination of the terms
 as used in the context of the relevant claim language”) (em-
 phasis added). As such, there is no categorical rule regard-
 ing whether the term “processor” connotes sufficient
 structure to avoid interpretation in means-plus-function
 format. Indeed, district courts have found some uses of
 “processor” connote sufficient structure while others do
 not. See, e.g., St. Isodore Research, LLC v. Comerica Inc.,
 No. 2:15-cv-1390, 2016 WL 4988246, at *15 (E.D. Tex.
 Sept. 18, 2016) (stating that the court has “typically found
 ‘processor’ to connote sufficient structure to avoid the ap-
 plication of § 112, ¶ 6” but nonetheless construing the par-
 ticular “processor” claim limitation at issue as a means-
 plus-function limitation). Instead, each claim term must
 be construed on its own in light of the intrinsic and extrin-
 sic evidence of record.
      In this case, as the district court correctly noted, the
 specification treats the word “processor” so broadly as to
 generically be any structure that manipulates data. The
 specification states that “[i]mplementation of the processor
 4 can be in hardware alone . . ., have certain aspects in soft-
 ware including firmware alone or can be a combination of
 hardware and software (including firmware),” ’045 patent
 col. 13 ll. 6–9; see also id. col. 14 ll. 7–21 (repeating same),
 and that the “processor 4 may be implemented using in-
 structions that enable hardware functionality, for example,
 by using executable computer program instructions in a
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                            9

 general-purpose or special-purpose processing unit that
 may be stored on a computer readable storage medium . . .
 to be executed by such a processing unit,” id. col. 13 ll. 10–
 15. In other words, the specification teaches that the pro-
 cessor could be software, hardware, or a combination of the
 two. Other references to the “processor” in the specification
 describe it only in terms of its function, i.e., what it does—
 stating the processor “is configured to” accomplish various
 goals. See, e.g., ’045 patent col. 5 ll. 1–2, 26–36. In the con-
 text of this claim, this specification, and this specific inven-
 tion, “processor” is so generically and functionally
 described as to fail to convey a sufficiently definite meaning
 as a name for a structure. See Williamson, 792 F.3d
 at 1349. We therefore agree with the district court’s deter-
 mination that this claim limitation is written in means-
 plus-function format and is thus subject to the require-
 ments of § 112 ¶ 6.
     Having found that the claim limitation was written in
 means-plus-function format, we move to step two of the
 § 112 ¶ 6 inquiry, which asks whether the specification ad-
 equately discloses an algorithm for performing the claimed
 function. Claim Construction Order at 32 (citing Function
 Media, LLC v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
 2013) (“When dealing with a ‘special purpose computer-im-
 plemented means-plus-function limitation,’ we require the
 specification to disclose the algorithm for performing the
 function.”)).
      WSOU argues for the first time on appeal that the spec-
 ification discloses corresponding structure. Before the dis-
 trict court, WSOU did not present an argument on step
 two. In other words, WSOU did not dispute Google’s argu-
 ment that, if the claim was written in means-plus-function
 format, the specification does not disclose corresponding
 structure and thus the claims are indefinite. As we have
 explained, “argument[s] . . . not timely raised before the
 district court . . . [are] waived.” Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Sci.
 Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Accordingly,
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 10                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 we will not consider WSOU’s argument presented for the
 first time on appeal.
     We thus affirm the district court’s determination that
 because the “processor” limitation in independent claim 1
 of the ’045 patent invokes § 112 ¶ 6 and the specification
 does not disclose corresponding structure, claims 1–17 are
 indefinite under § 112 ¶ 2.
                                II
     Next, we address the ’825 patent. The limitation at is-
 sue in the asserted claims of this patent is “at least one
 memory and the computer program code are configured,
 with the at least one processor, to cause the apparatus to”
 accomplish various functions. ’825 patent col. 10 ll. 31–34.
 Like the previous claim limitation, this limitation receives
 the benefit of the presumption that it is not in means-plus-
 function format because it lacks the word “means.” Wil-
 liamson, 792 F.3d at 1349. Unlike the previous claim lim-
 itation, however, we conclude that Google has not rebutted
 the presumption.       Google asserts that the collective
 “memory,” “computer program code,” and “processor” terms
 convey no “structural character” to a person of ordinary
 skill in the art and that they are understood “solely by the
 different functions they are assigned to perform.” No. 1065
 Appellee’s Br. 24. We disagree.
      In light of the intrinsic record in this case, we conclude
 that a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand
 the structure of the claimed “computer program code,”
 “memory,” and “processor.” First, the claim language itself
 provides structural guidance. For example, the claim lim-
 itation at issue requires “at least one memory including
 computer program code,” which is configured “with the at
 least one processor” to perform various tasks. ’825 patent
 col. 10 ll. 31–34. WSOU asserts that a person of ordinary
 skill in the art reading the claim in light of the specification
 would understand that the recited computer program code
 is stored in a memory structure and running on the
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                           11

 processor. No. 1065 Appellant’s Br. 18. We agree. The
 disputed claim limitation recites multiple elements and
 their connections to one another. Though terms like “com-
 puter program code,” “memory,” and “processor” may be
 broad, the recited combination of these multiple broadly
 named structures informs the skilled artisan’s relative un-
 derstanding of what each structure is and what it is not, as
 well as how the various structures relate to one another.
     Our precedent supports this conclusion. We have ex-
 plained that claim limitations like the recited “computer
 program code,” when combined with a description of what
 the code is intended to accomplish, convey definite struc-
 ture to the ordinarily skilled artisan. For example, in Zero-
 click, LLC v. Apple Inc., 891 F.3d 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the
 district court found that the claim limitations “program”
 and “user interface code” were in means-plus-function for-
 mat. Id. at 1006–07. We reversed, explaining that the
 skilled artisan would have been able to “reasonably discern
 from the claim language” that the limitations were refer-
 ences to conventional programs or code “existing in [the]
 prior art at the time of the invention,” not just “generic
 terms or black box recitations of structure or abstractions.”
 Id. at 1008. Similarly, in Dyfan v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th
 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2022)—reversing the district court—we ex-
 plained that “[u]nlike in the mechanical arts, the specific
 structure of software code and applications is partly de-
 fined by its function.” Id. at 1368. For software-related
 claim limitations, like “code,” we explained that “we can
 look beyond the initial ‘code’ . . . term to the functional lan-
 guage to see if a person of ordinary skill would have under-
 stood the claim limitation as a whole to connote sufficiently
 definite structure.” Id. As for the term “memory,” Google
 has not cited any cases holding that the term “memory” is
 a nonce term or devoid of sufficient structure so as to in-
 voke § 112 ¶ 6 and we are aware of no such cases.
     The specification provides further support for our con-
 clusion. In contrast to the ’045 patent, the specification
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 12                      WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC

 here describes the “processor” as hardware that runs the
 computer program code. Specifically, the specification
 teaches that the term “processor” is synonymous with
 terms like controller and computer and “should be under-
 stood to encompass not only computers having different ar-
 chitectures such as single/multi-processor architectures
 and sequential (Von Neumann)/parallel architectures but
 also specialized circuits such as field-programmable gate
 arrays (FPGA), application specific circuits (ASIC), signal
 processing devices and other devices.” ’825 patent col. 5,
 ll. 50–58.
      The specification also discloses that the memory stores
 a computer program comprising computer program in-
 structions. Id. col. 5, ll. 24–25. The specification then
 states that the computer program instructions “provide the
 logic and routines that enable[] the apparatus to perform
 the methods” described in the patent. ’825 patent col. 5
 ll. 31–33. And the claimed “computer program” can be
 found, the specification explains, in commercially-available
 and well-known formats, including “a computer-readable
 storage medium, a computer program product, a memory
 device, [or] a record medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD,”
 id. col. 5 ll. 35–39, exactly the type of “references to conven-
 tional . . . programs or code, existing in prior art at the time
 of the inventions” that we explained provided structural
 detail in Zeroclick. 891 F.3d 1008.
     On this record, Google has not presented any contrary,
 “more compelling evidence of the understanding of one of
 ordinary skill in the art,” Apex, 325 F.3d at 1373, to rebut
 the presumption that this claim limitation is not in means-
 plus-function format. We therefore reverse the district
 court’s determination regarding this claim limitation and
 remand for further proceedings.
                          CONCLUSION
    We have considered both parties’ remaining arguments
 and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
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 WSOU INVESTMENTS LLC v. GOOGLE LLC                        13

 affirm the district court’s indefiniteness decision regarding
 the ’045 patent, and we reverse the district court’s indefi-
 niteness decision regarding the ’825 patent and remand for
 further proceedings.
   AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND
                 REMANDED
                            COSTS
 No costs.