Court Opinion

ID: 9745410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:54:45.975688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.296052
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, specially concurring: Although I fully concur with the majority opinion, I write separately to address once again the subject of stipulated bench trials. In People v. Manley (1990), 196 Ill. App. 3d 153, 160-65, 552 N.E.2d 1351, 1356-60 (Steigmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), I addressed a defendant’s claim that his convictions must be reversed because his stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a plea of guilty and the trial court failed to give him Supreme Court Rule 402(a) admonitions (107 Ill. 2d R. 402(a)). In Manley, I wrote the following: “To obviate the confusion surrounding stipulated bench trials, a ‘bright line rule’ can and should be adopted. To this end, the following is respectfully offered: a stipulated bench trial is, in all cases, tantamount to a guilty plea, requiring that Rule 402(a) admonitions be given, unless after the stipulation a question remains regarding the sufficiency of the State’s evidence to sustain a conviction. An example of such a circumstance would be the defense offering to waive a jury trial and stipulate to the entire State’s case as set forth in the various police reports, while maintaining that the State fails to meet its burden of proof because all available evidence would be insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the venue of the alleged offense. Another example would be a defense stipulation to the entire State’s case in a prosecution for unlawful use of weapons, reserving for the trial court’s determination the question of whether the State’s evidence shows that the defendant was in constructive possession of a gun found under the front seat of a vehicle when the defendant was seated in the backseat. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 24 — 1(a)(4).” (Emphasis in original.) Manley, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 164-65, 552 N.E.2d at 1359 (Steigmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Manley, I had argued that defense counsel’s intention “to appeal some pretrial ruling, such as the denial in this case of the motion to suppress, is irrelevant.” (Manley, 196 Ill. App. 3d at 164, 552 N.E.2d at 1359 (Steigmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).) However, in People v. Horton (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 11, 22, 570 N.E.2d 320, 325, the supreme court adopted the rule “uniformly applied by the appellate court that a stipulated bench trial is not tantamount to a guilty plea if the defendant presented and preserved a defense.” By citing approvingly a long list of appellate court decisions that conflict with my above statement in Manley, the supreme court in Horton made clear that it did not adopt the “bright line rule” I proposed in Manley. Even though the supreme court in Horton did not go as far as I proposed in deeming Rule 402(a) admonitions to be applicable to all stipulated bench trials (except under certain limited circumstances), I write specially to point out that trial courts presented with stipulated bench trials still can (and I think should) utilize the procedures I proposed in Manley. Doing so would literally require only a few extra seconds in most cases. The present case proves this point. Surely here it would have taken the court only a few seconds to inform defendant that by stipulating to the State’s evidence, he was giving up his right to confront the witnesses who would be testifying against him. Further, for the reasons I explained in Manley, I still believe the procedures I proposed therein are fairer to defendants because those procedures ensure a defendant’s knowing and willing participation in the stipulated bench trial. Given the onerous consequences that often flow from the seemingly inevitable guilty verdicts that follow stipulated bench trials, I do not think it too much to ask trial courts that they spend the minimal time necessary to give a full Rule 402(a) admonition to a defendant before accepting the parties’ offer to present a stipulated bench trial. The trial courts owe it to themselves and to defendants to do no less when, as a result of a stipulated bench trial, a defendant who has walked into court presumed innocent of the charge against him leaves convicted of that charge pursuant to his own acquiescence.