Court Opinion

ID: 9455743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:31:55.088771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:43.017890
License: Public Domain

NICHOLS, Judge
(concurring).
I join in the opinion of the court and in the concurring opinion of Judge Davis.
In addition to both, I would like to point out that in using the word “claims” five times in Section 2 of the Act, to designate five classes of cases over which the Commission would have jurisdiction, the Congress was not using a novel or freshly coined word. “Claim” is a word of art and it does not include, for instance, every ease or controversy that may arise between a citizen and the United States, e. g., Tracy v. Gleason, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 415, 379 F.2d 469 (1967); United States v. Bergson, 119 F.Supp. 459 (Dist.Ct.D.C.1954). Thus, when the House Committee said, as quoted by plaintiff:
* * * it is essential that the jurisdiction to hear claims which is vested in the Commission be broad enough to include all possible claims. If any class of claims is omitted, we may be sure that sooner or later that omission will lead to appeals for new special jurisdictional acts. * * *
U.S.Code Cong.Serv. 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) at pp. 1355-1356, it did not mean that the Commission was to be the arbiter of every possible dispute that might have arisen between the United States and the Indians in 170 years of history, or that it was to settle every grievance. The Congress did not in 1946 intend to fasten upon the administration of Indian affairs the system of Government by litigation that so many of our citizens seem to be coming to believe in today.