Court Opinion

ID: 9703535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:59:47.705712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:49.998244
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I am fully in accord with the majority’s conclusion as to the double jeopardy question. I do not, however, accept its view that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to that portion of the charge relating to an adverse inference.
There is no question that the statement of the law with reference to the failure of a party to produce a witness was properly stated by the court. The majority concedes this but concludes that, under the circumstances, the court should have not given the charge, or in the alternative, should have advised the jury that the witness was equally accessible to either party. Since, however, the defense, as an important part of its case, had argued that an adverse inference should have been drawn against the Commonwealth for the failure to produce the wife of the decedent, it would have been totally inconsistent for trial counsel either to have objected to the giving of the adverse inference charge or to have suggested that the court instruct the jury to disregard his own argument. I, therefore, can find no *423basis to hold counsel derelict for a failure to object to this portion of the charge.
I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
LARSEN, J., joins in this opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I.
Part I of the opinion of Mr. Justice O’Brien relies upon the opinion in support of affirmance in Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, 486 Pa. 241, 405 A.2d 881 (1979), an opinion that represents the views of three members of this Court, to reject appellant’s contention that his conviction of murder of the first degree violates the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The result is that once again the Commonwealth’s inexcusable, improper and vindictive attempt to punish appellant for successfully exercising his constitutional right to obtain relief from an involuntary and unlawfully entered guilty plea is condoned. For the reasons stated in my opinion in support of reversal in Klobuchir, and for the additional reasons stated here, I must dissent from Part I.
The opinion of Mr. Justice O’Brien states that the facts of this case are “procedurally similar” to those in Klobuchir. There is, however, a significant distinction between the cases. Both appellants were charged with homicide and pursuant to negotiated plea bargain agreements were sentenced on convictions of lesser crimes than murder of the first degree. Neither appellant took a direct appeal from his conviction but, later, on collateral attack, both were permitted by the post-conviction hearing court to withdraw their pleas after successfully establishing that the pleas did not represent voluntary waivers of their constitutional rights. The Commonwealth did not appeal from the orders of either PCHA court. Finally, each appellant was threatened by the Commonwealth with being put to trial on charges of murder of the first degree and sought dismissal of the higher charges in pre-trial motions.
*424Here, however, the similarities end. Klobuchir' appealed to this Court from denial of his motion to dismiss. See Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977). Newmiller, on the other hand, chose to proceed to trial, was convicted by a jury of murder of the first degree, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Newmiller then renewed his pre-trial motion to dismiss in post-trial motions and on direct appeal to this Court.
Thus, this appeal presents a consideration that according to the opinion in support of affirmance in Klobuchir was not present there. At 486 Pa. 248 n.5, 405 A.2d 881 n.5. Appellant has not only been placed at risk of being convicted of first degree murder on retrial, he has in fact been so convicted and has received an enhanced sentence. As Chief Justice Eagen so aptly noted in his opinion in support of reversal in Klobuchir, absent post-sentence conduct evincing changed circumstances, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2089, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), precludes the present imposition of a greater sentence than that imposed following appellant’s earlier conviction of murder of the second degree. Principles of fairness and justice certainly preclude acceptance of any suggestion that appellant’s successful collateral attack on his guilty plea provides the requisite change of circumstances.
One of the central policies embodied in the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is the principle that a defendant may not be faced with a choice of either permitting an illegal conviction to stand or gambling that he will not be convicted of greater charges on retrial:
“When a man has been convicted of second degree murder and given a long term of imprisonment it is wholly fictional to say that he ‘chooses’ to forego his constitutional defense of former jeopardy on a charge of murder in the first degree in order to secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of the lesser offense. In short, he has no meaningful choice. And as Justice Holmes observed, with regard to this same matter in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, at page 135, 24 S.Ct. 797, at page 897, 49 *425L.Ed. 114: ‘Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal error unless he should waive other rights so important as to be saved by an express clause in the Constitution of the United States.’ ”
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191-92, 78 S.Ct. 221, 226, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957).
Indeed, our system of criminal justice is based on the concept of fair play and is designed to ensure fairness and accuracy at all stages of all criminal proceedings. That system does not permit a defendant to be penalized for exercising one right by having another taken away. E. g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968) (government may not use fear of death penalty to dissuade defendant from asserting right to jury trial); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967) (prosecution cannot use statements obtained from policemen threatened with discharge if they refuse to testify); North Carolina v. Pearce, supra (accused may not be penalized for successfully exercising right of appeal by receiving enhanced sentence on retrial).
Article V, section 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania guarantees a right of appeal to all litigants in the courts of this Commonwealth. Although a guilty plea incorporates waivers of many important constitutional rights, an accused by pleading guilty does not waive the right to appeal and obtain relief from a jurisdictionally defective or involuntary guilty plea. See Commonwealth v. Maddox, 450 Pa. 406, 300 A.2d 503 (1973); Commonwealth v. Zanine, 444 Pa. 361, 282 A.2d 367 (1971); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 426 Pa. 265, 232 A.2d 193 (1967). Moreover, when the right of an accused to a direct appeal from a guilty plea is denied, relief from the invalid conviction is available on collateral attack. See Commonwealth v. Ray, 483 Pa. 377, 396 A.2d 1218 (1979). Indeed, fair and evenhanded administration of justice demands that the prospect of a more severe sentence or of conviction of an offense of higher degree upon reprosecution *426is an unacceptable deterrent to exercise of this right to appeal or collaterally attack an invalid plea. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Post-Conviction Procedures § 2.3(c)(iii).
The most basic principles of American jurisprudence forbid this Court to permit the Commonwealth to coerce those who may be serving sentences based on invalid pleas into giving up their appellate rights because they fear prosecutorial retaliation. See Commonwealth v. Klobuchir, supra (Opinion in Support of Reversal of Manderino, J.). The Commonwealth may not act as “a vindictive seeker of vengeance.” Commonwealth v. Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405, 408, 67 A. 650, 651 (1907). The prosecution must bargain in good faith, strictly and faithfully uphold its end of a plea bargain agreement, and treat the accused with fairness throughout the plea bargaining process. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 442 Pa. 516, 276 A.2d 526 (1971); ABA Standards, The Prosecution Function § 4.3; Pleas of Guilty § 2.1(a)(ii)(4), (5). The prosecutorial duty to treat the accused with the utmost good faith does not end when an invalid plea is successfully attacked. Indeed, the Commonwealth’s duty, if anything, is increased to ensure that none of the accused’s constitutional rights are once again violated during the renewed proceedings.
The plea bargaining process serves many valuable and important interests of both the accused and the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Alvarado, supra. For the accused, the ability to plead guilty to lesser charges reduces the very psychological, physical, and financial pressures inherent in facing the risk of trial against which the double jeopardy clause seeks to protect. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529-30, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). The Commonwealth, while also saved the expense and uncertainty of a trial is also provided with an effective tool to ease the administration of justice by reducing the time and burden on professional resources consumed in processing criminal cases and reducing the potential for serious back*427logs in the Commonwealth’s courts. Yet, the Commonwealth cannot overlook its primary interest in doing justice and effectively enforcing the law when entering into plea bargain agreements. See Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337, 223 A.2d 699 (1966). But is justice rendered, or effective law enforcement furthered, when an accused is forced to serve an invalid sentence imposed on an unlawful conviction? Fair play demands that unlawful convictions, obtained in violation of the constitutional rights of an accused, be remedied as quickly and effectively as possible. Certainly, the opinion of Mr. Justice O’Brien hinders correction of unlawful convictions and compels still another Pennsylvania litigant to resort to the federal courts for relief. See Ferri v. Ackerman,-U.S.--, 100 S.Ct. 402, 62 L.Ed.2d 355 (1979), reversing 483 Pa. 90, 394 A.2d 553 (1978); United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. granted-U.S.-, 100 S.Ct. 44, 62 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979).*
Permitting the Commonwealth to penalize successful appellants can only serve to chill appellate rights and hinder achievement of the vital and important goals of orderly and proper administration of justice. The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy requires that on re-trial appellant be tried on charges no greater than murder of the second degree.
II.
Part II of the majority opinion holds that appellant’s counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court’s “missing witness” charge. I agree with the majority’s conclusion on this issue.

 It must be noted that there is, of course, nothing to preclude appellant, before retrial, see Commonwealth v. Bolden, 472 Pa. 602, 373 A.2d 90 (1977) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Haefner, 473 Pa. 154, 373 A.2d 1094 (1977), from seeking to dismiss charges of murder on grounds including that of due process. See Commonwealth v. Klobichur, 486 Pa. 241, 405 A.2d 881 (1979) (Opinion of Roberts, J., in Support of Reversal); Id. (Opinion of Eagen, C. J., in Support of Reversal); see generally, North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2089, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).