Court Opinion

ID: 9881000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 14:04:02.234612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:52.590518
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                            LUIS M. HARRIS,

                                Appellant,

                                    v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-1355

                           September 29, 2023

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for
Hillsborough County; Michelle Sisco, Judge.

Luis M. Harris, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Taylor A. Schell, Assistant Attorney
General, for Appellee.

NORTHCUTT, Judge.

     Luis M. Harris appeals the summary denial of his motion for
postconviction relief filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.850. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
     In January 2011, Harris was tried on charges arising from an
incident near the corner of Bayshore and Bay to Bay Boulevards in
Tampa. The jury found him guilty of sexual battery (victim over twelve)
(count one), kidnapping (count two), falsely impersonating an officer
(count three), fraudulent use of personal information (count four),
fraudulent use of a credit card (more than two times) (count five), and
grand theft ($300 to $5,000) (count six) based on the incident. The trial
court sentenced Harris to prison on counts one through five and
dismissed count six. On appeal, we per curiam affirmed his convictions
and sentences. See Munuzuri-Harris v. State, 117 So. 3d 417 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2012) (table decision). Our mandate issued on December 31, 2012.
Harris filed various postconviction motions in the following years, but his
convictions stood.
      In October 2021, Harris began the proceedings leading to this
appeal when he filed a sworn "PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
BASED ON A BRADY1 VIOLATION AND NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE . . . ." He filed an amended petition in February 2022, adding
a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. In virtually identical March
4 and 25, 2022, orders, the postconviction court treated the initial
petition as a motion filed pursuant to rule 3.850 and denied it, but it did
not address the amended petition.
      Harris's motions were untimely. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)
(providing a two-year time limit to file a motion for postconviction relief);
Beaty v. State, 701 So. 2d 856, 857 (Fla. 1997) (stating that the two-year
period for filing a motion for postconviction relief begins to run upon
issuance of the direct-appeal mandate). They were also successive. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h) (authorizing a postconviction court to dismiss a
second or successive 3.850 motion). However, Harris alleged that his

      1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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motions were based on newly discovered evidence—an exception to the
bars against untimely and successive motions in certain situations. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1), (h).
      Harris alleged that in July 2021 he received an anonymous letter
from a retired Tampa Police Department detective on city letterhead.2 In
this letter, the detective claimed that there are thirteen videos from traffic
cameras and building security cameras and two videos from news and
weather cameras from Fox News and Bay News 9 that all show that no
crimes occurred at the subject location on the night of Harris's charged
crimes. Harris alleged that after receiving the letter, he contacted the
city of Tampa via public records requests and that he was told there are
"videos in evidence" but that he would have to contact the State
Attorney's Office about them. He then requested information via a public
records request from the State Attorney's Office and received a letter
stating that surveillance videos are exempt from public disclosure.
      Harris argued that the video evidence is favorable to his defense
because it demonstrates that he did not commit a kidnapping or sexual
battery while impersonating a police officer on Bayshore Boulevard. He
alleged that the video evidence is exculpatory material and can be used
to impeach the victim's fabricated story. Specifically, he claimed the
videos would show that (1) his vehicle was never in the median of

      2 The State points out that rule 3.850(c) specifies that a defendant

who files a newly discovered evidence claim must attach an affidavit from
any person whose testimony is necessary to factually support the claim
for relief or provide an explanation why the affidavit could not be
obtained. The State argues that Harris's motion was deficient for lack of
such an affidavit or explanation. But the motion did contain an
explanation: it stated that the letter was anonymous, thus making it
impossible to obtain an affidavit from the author.

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Bayshore Boulevard; (2) he neither stood in the median nor walked out
into the traffic lanes on Bayshore; (3) there was never any "blue" strobe
light/laser; (4) he never used his vehicle to conduct a "police-style" stop
of the victim; (5) he and the victim never stood on the streets of Bayshore
or Bay to Bay; (6) the victim was never restrained by handcuffs; and (7)
the victim is shown unrestrained and not in distress, moving around
freely in the parking lot at Bay to Bay and Bayshore with her car,
cellphone, and laptop.
     Based on information in the anonymous letter, Harris further
alleged that the State acted in bad faith when three detectives willfully
suppressed and deliberately failed to disclose the video evidence. He
claimed that if the jury had been aware of the video evidence, there is a
reasonable probability that the results of the trial would have been
different or that he would have been acquitted.
     In summarily denying Harris's rule 3.850 motion, the
postconviction court found that the videos Harris identified do not qualify
as newly discovered evidence. "First, in order to be considered newly
discovered, the evidence 'must have been unknown by the trial court, by
the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that
defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by the use of
diligence.' " Jones v. State (Jones II), 709 So. 2d 512, 521 (Fla. 1998)
(quoting Torres–Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So. 2d 1321, 1324–25 (Fla.
1994)). "Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature
that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial." Jones II, 709 So.
2d at 521 (quoting Jones v. State (Jones I), 591 So. 2d 911, 915 (Fla.
1991)). In contemplating the second prong of Jones II, "the trial court
should initially consider whether the evidence would have been
admissible at trial or whether there would have been any evidentiary

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bars to its admissibility." Id. (citing Johnson v. Singletary, 647 So. 2d
106, 110–11 (Fla. 1994)).
      Here, the postconviction court found it suspicious that the
detective's letter as well as the letter from the Tampa Police Department
were unsigned, and it questioned their authenticity. The court also
found that with due diligence Harris or his counsel could have
discovered, investigated, and obtained the camera footage from traffic
cameras and building security cameras.
      On appeal, Harris argues that the postconviction court erred when
it (1) failed to rule on his timely filed amended motion; (2) failed to attach
any records that conclusively refute his claim; (3) failed to address his
Brady claim; and (4) failed to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
the authenticity of the letters. We agree.
      First, a movant may amend his postconviction motion at any time
before the postconviction court disposes of the motion or orders the State
to respond. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(e) ("A motion may otherwise be
amended at any time prior to either the entry of an order disposing of the
motion or the entry of an order pursuant to subdivision (f)(5) or directing
that an answer to the motion be filed pursuant to (f)(6), whichever occurs
first."); see also Haspel v. State, 247 So. 3d 4, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)
(reversing in part for failing to address the claims raised in a
supplemental motion filed before the court issued an order). The
postconviction court should have ruled on Harris's amended motion,
which included a new ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim regarding
counsel's failure to obtain the videos.
      Second, "[w]hen reviewing the summary denial of a motion for
postconviction relief, this court applies de novo review and 'must accept
the movant's factual allegations as true to the extent that they are not

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refuted by the record.' " Martin v. State, 205 So. 3d 811, 812 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016) (quoting Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101, 1121 (Fla.
2013)). Here, the postconviction court did not attach records that
refuted Harris's factual allegations that he had recently received the
letter from a retired detective alerting him to the existence of these
videos, that he requested records from the Tampa Police Department and
the State Attorney's Office, and that both of them appeared to confirm
the existence of the videos. The court attached nothing to reflect that the
videos were disclosed to defense counsel or that they would not be
exculpatory or impeaching.
     Third, to establish a Brady claim, the defendant must show that
"(1) the State possessed evidence favorable to the accused because it was
either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the State willfully or inadvertently
suppressed the evidence; and (3) the defendant was prejudiced." Allen v.
State, 854 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 2003) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527
U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)). Harris reasonably established a facially
sufficient Brady claim and argued that counsel exercised due diligence
by filing a demand for discovery. However, the postconviction court
failed to address the claim.
     Fourth, and finally, "[t]he determination of whether the statements
are true and meet the due diligence and probability prongs of Jones II
usually requires an evidentiary hearing to evaluate credibility unless the
affidavit is inherently incredible or obviously immaterial to the verdict
and sentence." Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 519, 526 (Fla. 2009). Although
it may be unusual that the detective's and the police department's letters
are unsigned, the letters are not inherently incredible. Harris claims that
all legal mail is inspected and verified by prison officials. He notes that
there is a machine-made postage mark on both envelopes and that the

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police department letter has a reference number. These facts suggest
that a proper evidentiary inquiry may corroborate or refute Harris's claim
that he received them. In any event, we must accept the claim as true
because it is not refuted by the record.
     On remand, the postconviction court must either hold an
evidentiary hearing or attach records that conclusively refute Harris's
claims, including the claim in his amended motion.
     Reversed and remanded.

SILBERMAN and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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