Court Opinion

ID: 9838813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 07:00:29.174915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.059862
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     FRANK PROA,                                     DOCKET NUMBERS
                         Appellant,                  CH-4324-18-0185-I-1
                                                     CH-752S-18-0188-I-1
                  v.                                 CH-1221-18-0363-W-1

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
                 Agency.
                                                     DATE: September 7, 2023

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Frank Proa, Columbia, Missouri, pro se.

           Elizabeth Handelsman, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed petitions for review of three initial decisions, all of
     which dismissed his appeals for lack of jurisdiction.           Generally, we grant
     petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). We JOIN these appeals because doing so will expedite processing
     without adversely affecting the interests of the parties. A fter fully considering
     the filings in these appeals, we conclude that the petitioner has not established
     any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition s for review. Therefore,
     we DENY the petitions for review and AFFIRM the initial decisions, which are
     now the Board’s final decisions. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). We FORWARD the
     appellant’s potential claim under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of
     1998 (VEOA) to the regional office for adjudication.

                                     BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant, who worked as a GS-11 Chemist, submitted a claim to the
     Department of Labor (DOL) in which he challenged the agency’s decision that he
     was not eligible under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
     Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335) (USERRA)
     for employment service credit for the period of time he attended college. Proa v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-4324-18-0185-I-1, Initial
     Appeal File (0185 IAF), Tab 1 at 5-6. On January 25, 2018, DOL determined that
     he was not eligible for service credit under USER RA. Id. The appellant filed a
     Board appeal challenging the agency’s decision on January 26, 2018. 0185 IAF,
     Tab 1.
¶3        On April 2, 2018, without holding his requested hearing, the administrative
     judge dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 0185 IAF , Tab 27, Initial
                                                                                       3

     Decision (0185 ID). She found that the appellant did not allege that his military
     status or any action he took to enforce a protection afforded to him under
     USERRA was a factor in the agency’s decision to deny him service credit and
     that, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board could not adjudicate his
     discrimination claims. 0185 ID at 4-5. The appellant has filed a petition for
     review of this initial decision with an accompanying supplement, the agency has
     responded in opposition to his petition, and the appellant has replied. Proa v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-4324-18-0185-I-1, Petition for
     Review (0185 PFR) File, Tabs 1-2, 5-6.
¶4         Meanwhile, on January 31, 2018, the appellant filed another Board appeal
     in which he challenged the agency’s decision to suspend him for 14 days. Proa v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-752S-18-0188-I-1, Initial
     Appeal File (0188 IAF), Tab 1.       While the appeal was pending, the agency
     initially proposed the appellant’s removal on March 6, 2018, and then
     subsequently rescinded the proposal on March 9, 2018.          0188 IAF, Tab 16
     at 57-66. On March 28, 2018, the administrative judge also dismissed the appeal
     challenging the 14-day suspension for lack of jurisdiction. 0188 IAF, Tab 32,
     Initial Decision (0188 ID). She found that the appellant failed to demonstrate
     that he was subjected to an action that could be directly appealed to the Board,
     and that he also did not establish individual right of action (IRA) jurisdiction as
     he failed to even allege that he filed an Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
     complaint regarding the matter. 0188 ID at 2-4. The appellant also has filed a
     petition for review in this appeal, the agency has responded, and the appellant has
     replied.   Proa v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-752S-18-
     0188-I-1, Petition for Review (0188 PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.
¶5         The agency proposed the appellant’s removal again on April 24, 2018.
     Proa v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-18-0363-W-1,
     Initial Appeal File (0363 IAF), Tab 1 at 8-18. On April 30, 2018, while his other
     petitions for review were still pending, the appellant filed a third appeal in which
                                                                                         4

     he challenged the agency’s proposed removal. 0363 IAF, Tab 1. In a June 13,
     2018 initial decision, the administrative judge also dismissed this appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction, stating that proposed removals are not personnel actions directly
     appealable to the Board, the appellant failed to establish jurisdiction to the extent
     he was attempting to file an IRA appeal because he did not allege or show that he
     exhausted his administrative remedies regarding the proposed removal with OSC,
     and that, absent an otherwise appealable action, she could not hear his
     discrimination claims. 0363 IAF, Tab 10, Initial Decision (0363 ID) at 4-5. The
     appellant also has filed a petition for review regarding this appeal, the agency has
     responded in opposition to his petition, and the appellant has replied. 2 Proa v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-18-0363-W-1, Petition
     for Review (0363 PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3-4.
¶6         The appellant has submitted multiple documents with his pleadings on
     review in the three appeals, which we have not considered with respect to the
     appeals in which they were submitted.       The documents that the appellant has
     submitted on review include the following: the proposals to remove him, email
     correspondence with the agency from 2016 to 2018, agency policies and
     guidance, including delegating examining policy, departmental policy on category
     rating, delegations manual, and guidance for editing personnel data, an
     after-hours sign-in sheet, the decision imposing his 14-day suspension, his
     response to the proposed removal, a job analysis interview, position descriptions,
     an evaluation that his position was properly graded, the agency’s request for
     exception to the hiring controls to fill a Chemist GS-1320-09 position for a 4-year
     term, a January 2018 furlough notice due to the lapse in Federal funding, a letter

     2
       The agency imposed the appellant’s removal on July 17, 2018. Proa v. Department of
     the Interior, MSPB Docket No. CH-0752-18-0504-I-1, Initial Appeal File, Tab 1
     at 12-20. The appellant appealed his removal to the Board, and his petition for review
     of the initial decision affirming his removal is pending and will be resolved in a
     separate decision.
                                                                                       5

     of warning that the agency issued him on the basis of unprofessional conduct, a
     May 2017 record of a human resources meeting, the Standard Form 50 reflecting
     his appointment in August 2013, and the agency’s decision imposing his removal.
     0185 PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-39, Tab 2 at 4-14, Tab 6 at 7-84; 0188 PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 26-71, Tab 4 at 7-49; 0363 PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-28, Tab 4 at 4-12.
¶7        The Board will generally not consider evidence submitted for the first time
     on review absent a showing that the documents and the in formation contained in
     the documents were unavailable before the record closed below despite due
     diligence and the evidence contained therein is of sufficient weight to warrant an
     outcome different from that of the initial decision. See Cleaton v. Department of
     Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We
     do not consider these documents with respect to the appeals in which the
     appellant submitted them because they are either not new, or, even if they are
     new, they are not material to the issue of whether the Board has jurisdiction in the
     respective appeals.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     MSPB Docket No. CH-4324-18-0185-I-1
           We affirm the dismissal of the appellant’s USERRA claim for lack of
           jurisdiction as well as the finding that, absent an otherwise appealable
           action, the Board lacks jurisdiction over his other claims.
¶8        The administrative judge correctly found that the appellant did not allege
     that his military status or any action he took to enforce a protection afforded to
     him under USERRA was a factor in the agency’s action and that, absent an
     otherwise appealable action, the Board could not adjudicate his discrimination
     claims. 0185 ID at 4-5. The appellant reasserts that the agency has violated his
     rights under USERRA and alleges a violation of the Veterans Employment
     Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA). 0185 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5.
¶9        To establish Board jurisdiction over a claim arising under 38 U.S.C.
     § 4311(a), an appellant must make nonfrivolous allegations of the following:
                                                                                        6

      (1) he performed duty or has an obligation to perform duty in a uniformed service
      of the United States; (2) the agency denied him initial employment,
      reemployment, retention, promotion, or any benefit of employment; and (3) the
      denial was due to the performance of duty or obligation to perform duty in the
      uniformed service. See Hau v. Department of Homeland Security, 123 M.S.P.R.
      620, ¶ 11 (2016), aff’d sub nom. Bryant v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      878 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Here, we agree with the administrative judge
      that the appellant did not nonfrivolously allege that his military status or any
      action he took to enforce a protection afforded under USERRA was a factor in the
      agency’s action denying him eligibility for employment service credit for the
      period he was attending college. 0185 ID at 4. Instead, the appellant alleged that
      the agency denied him service credit for a period of time during which he
      attended school, an argument that does not relate to his military status.       Cf.
      Crawford v. Department of Transportation, 95 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 3 (2003) (citing the
      administrative judge’s finding that the appellant established jurisdiction over his
      USERRA claim when he asserted that the agency denied him a benefit of
      employment, i.e., creditable service for leave accrual purposes, because of his
      prior military service) (emphasis added), aff’d, 373 F.3d 1155 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
      Further, any claims that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights do not
      constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction under USERRA because, to
      allege a claim of discrimination under USERRA, an employee must allege that he
      was treated more harshly than non-veterans as opposed to that he was not treated
      better than non-veterans, as required by VEOA. See Fahrenbacher v. Department
      of the Navy, 85 M.S.P.R. 500, ¶ 18 (2000), aff’d sub nom., Sheehan v. Department
      of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
¶10        The appellant presents a variety of other arguments, such as that the agency
      retaliated against him for equal employment opportunity (EEO) activity, engaged
      in intentional deception, manipulated his position description, and excluded
      evidence. 0185 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-23. Further, he asserts that a 27-year-old
                                                                                       7

      was hired for his position thus demonstrating that the agency discriminates
      against veterans, the evidence underlying his reprimand and suspension are
      unsubstantiated, the agency failed to properly pay him for all of the hours that he
      worked and denied him hazard pay, and his duties were improperly reassigned.
      Id. None of his arguments provide a reason for disturbing the dismissal for lack
      of jurisdiction. Specifically, absent an otherwise appealable action, the Board
      will not consider the appellant’s discrimination and retaliation claims. Wren v.
      Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980), aff’d, 681 F.2d 867, 871 73
      (D.C. Cir. 1982). Further, the appellant’s other arguments either constitute mere
      disagreement with the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or were not asserted
      below such that the Board may not consider them. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions);             Banks v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (stating that the Board
      will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review
      absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously
      available despite the party’s due diligence).

               We forward the appellant’s potential VEOA claim to the regional office for
               further adjudication.
¶11         Below, and on review, the appellant has asserted that the agency violated
      his veterans’ preference, including assertions that the agency discriminates
      against veterans by failing to consider their education and experience and that it
      failed to hire him for position ATL-2014-0720. 0185 IAF, Tab 2 at 17 at 33-40,
      45-46, Tab 5 at 16, Tab 14 at 5, Tab 17 at 1; 0185 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 7-9,
      23-24.     When an appellant raises a claim in an appeal either by checking the
      appropriate box in an appeal form, identifying an affirmative defense by name,
      such as “race discrimination,” “harmful procedural error,” or by alleging facts
      that reasonably raise such a claim, the administrative judge must address the
                                                                                        8

      claims in any close of record order or prehearing conference summary and order.
      Gath v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 124, ¶ 11 (2012). Furthermore, an
      appellant must receive explicit information on w hat is required to establish an
      appealable jurisdictional issue.   Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Here, the administrative judge did not
      address the appellant’s potential VEOA claim during the initial appeal and did not
      provide the appellant with the appropriate jurisdictional standard.
¶12        To establish Board jurisdiction over a VEOA veterans’ preference claim, an
      appellant must (1) show that he exhausted his remedy with DOL and (2) make
      nonfrivolous allegations that (i) he is a preference eligible within the meaning of
      VEOA, (ii) the action(s) at issue took place on or after the October 30, 1998
      enactment date of VEOA, and (iii) the agency violated his rights under a statute
      or regulation relating to veterans’ preference. 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A), (d);
      Goodin v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 316, ¶ 8 (2016). Because the
      appellant has raised what appears to be a potential VEOA claim, we forward it to
      the regional office for docketing as a new appeal.

      MSPB Docket No. CH-752S-18-0188-I-1
¶13        Next, we find that the appellant has failed to provide a basis for disturbing
      the initial decision in his 14-day suspension appeal. As previously stated, the
      administrative judge also dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because
      she found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was subjected to an
      appealable action and he also did not establish IRA jurisdiction. 0188 ID at 2-4.
      We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant may only challenge his
      suspension before the Board if it is more than 14 days and thus the Board lacks
      jurisdiction over this challenge as a direct Board appeal. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2);
      Cremeans v. U.S. Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 5 (2001); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.3(a)(1).
¶14        The appellant also challenges both the prior reprimand and the prior
      proposed removal and argues that his suspension constituted a reduction in his
                                                                                          9

      pay, he was subjected to a reduction in force (RIF), and the agency manipulated
      his position description such that he would not qualify for a higher grade.
      0188 PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-11, 13, 15, 17, 21, 23. However, as described below,
      none of these arguments support a finding that the appellant was subjected to an
      action within the Board’s jurisdiction.
¶15        A reprimand is not an action that is directly appealable to the Board. See
      5 U.S.C. § 7512. Additionally, the Board lacks jurisdiction over actions that were
      proposed but have not been effected.        See Cruz v. Department of the Navy,
      934 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (en banc). Further, to the extent that the
      appellant is challenging his nonselection because of the agency’s alleged
      manipulation of his position description, such a nonselection is generally not
      appealable to the Board absent another basis for review. Kazan v. Department of
      Justice, 112 M.S.P.R. 390, ¶ 6 (2009). Further, although the appellant has argued
      that he was possibly subjected to appealable actions such as a reduction in pay or
      a RIF, he has not provided evidence to support these assertions.
¶16        We also agree that the appellant has not established jurisdiction over this
      appeal as an IRA appeal.      The appellant asserts that the administrative judge
      failed to consider that he made a protected disclosure to OSC and engaged in
      protected activity in making the disclosure.     0188 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6; see
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8),(9)(C).     However, to establish jurisdiction in an IRA
      appeal, absent an otherwise appealable action, an employee must first establish,
      by preponderant evidence, that he exhausted his administrative remedy before
      OSC. 3 See Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016).
      As the administrative judge stated, the appellant did not prove that he exhausted
      his administrative remedy prior to filing this appeal and thus the Board lacks

      3
       A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable
      person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
      contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
                                                                                          10

      jurisdiction over his claim of retaliation for his disclosure and activity. 4 0188 ID
      at 3-4.

      MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-18-0363-W-1
¶17           As previously discussed, the administrative judge also dismissed the appeal
      regarding the proposed removal for lack of jurisdiction, stating that proposed
      removals are not personnel actions directly appealable to the Boar d, the appellant
      failed to establish jurisdiction to the extent he was attempting to file an IRA
      appeal because he did not allege or show that he exhausted his administrative
      remedies regarding the proposed removal with OSC, and that, absent an otherwise
      appealable action, she could not hear his discrimination claims. 0363 ID at 4-5.
      The administrative judge noted that the appellant checked the boxes for the
      following personnel actions:       removal; reduction in grade or pay; separation,
      demotion, or furlough for more than 30 days by RIF; denial of within-grade
      increase; negative suitability determination; other action or decision, “Reductions
      in Pay and Labeling”; suspension for more than 14 days; furlough of 30 days or
      less;      and     failure    to      restore/reemploy/reinstate      or     improper
      restoration/reemployment/reinstatement.      0363 IAF, Tab 1 at 3; 0363 ID at 2.
      However, she determined that, because he listed April 24, 2018 as the date that he
      received the agency’s final decision letter, he was referring to the Apri l 24, 2018
      proposed removal. 0363 ID at 3; 0363 IAF, Tab 1 at 3, 8-18. Additionally, she
      found that the appellant did not produce any evidence that the agency took any of
      the other actions against him. 0363 ID at 3.

      4
        The appellant states that the agency is requiring him to make a deposit to receive
      credit in his annuity for his military service and that its actions have had a negative
      effect on his retirement savings. 0188 PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-24. He cites 5 U.S.C.
      §§ 8331, 8347, 8461, which concern retirement and the Federal Employees’ Retirement
      System. Id. at 22. However, he has not identified any statute, regulation, or other
      authority that would give the Board jurisdiction over his challenge to either the
      agency’s requirement that he pay the deposit or the effect of its actions on his
      retirement.
                                                                                      11

¶18         We agree that the Board lacks jurisdiction over this appeal as an IRA
      appeal.   OSC’s March 1, 2018 closeout letter, which was issued prior to the
      March 6, 2018 and April 24, 2018 proposed removals, reflects the appellant’s
      allegations that the agency discriminated against him on the basis of his status as
      a veteran and that agency officials refused to allow him to dispose of some
      acids/mixed waste in the manner he deemed least hazardous. 0188 IAF, Tab 16
      at 57-65; 0363 IAF, Tab 1 at 8-18, 39-40.        The letter did not provide Board
      appeal rights. Id. Although the appellant contacted OSC, he did not assert that
      the agency took any personnel actions in retaliation for any protected disclosures
      or whistleblowing activity.     Id.   Further, OSC issued this letter prior to the
      proposed removals. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge’s decision to
      dismiss this appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to exhaust his
      administrative remedy before OSC. 0363 ID at 4-5; see Clemente v. Department
      of Homeland Security, 101 M.S.P.R. 519, ¶ 13 (2006) (finding that the appellant
      did not exhaust his administrative remedy because he did not alle ge
      whistleblower reprisal before OSC with respect to the potential personnel actions
      he raised in the appeal, which would have given OSC a sufficient basis to pursue
      an investigation that might have led to corrective action). 5
¶19         On review, the appellant requests that the Board evaluate the agency’s
      hiring actions and selection process, including its reduction in his grade upon his
      initial employment, denial of a promotion, and disparate treatment such that he
      could not qualify for a GS-13/14 position.         0363 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 7.
      However, the Board lacks jurisdiction over claims regarding the proper
      classification of the appellant’s position.     Ellis v. Department of the Navy,
      117 M.S.P.R. 511, ¶ 10 (2012).        Additionally, absent certain exceptions, the

      5
       The Whistleblower Protection Act has been amended several times, including by the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112 -19, 126 Stat.
      1465. Subsequent changes in the law do not affect the relevant holding in Clemente.
                                                                                           12

      Board generally does not have jurisdiction over the nonselection for a specific
      position. See Kazan, 112 M.S.P.R. 390, ¶ 6.
¶20         The appellant also asserts that the agency has applied RIFs to veterans in
      employment, grading, and selection. 0363 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. However, he has
      not described any such action. He also argues that the agency failed to properly
      record his schedule, refused to provide him hazard pay, sought to improperly
      garnish his wages, refused to apply its redress policy, and deducted 4.3 hours
      from his pay. Id. at 4-7. None of these claims refer to appealable actions, and
      thus, we cannot consider them. 6 See Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that the Board’s jurisdiction is limited to
      those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction by law, rule, or
      regulation).
¶21         Additionally, we agree that, absent an otherwise appealable action, the
      Board does not have jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s claims of
      discrimination.   0363 ID at 5; see Wren, 2 M.S.P.R. at 2.            The appellant’s
      remaining arguments, such as his statement that the agency intentionally denied

      6
        The appellant also argues that his previous suspension actually lasted 19 days because
      he was not permitted to report to work on the weekend, or 2.5 days prior to the official
      beginning of the suspension, and he had no email access for a total of 20 days.
      0363 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 7. In the 0188 appeal, the administrative judge determined
      that the Board lacked jurisdiction over his challenge to the 14 -day suspension as the
      Board does not have jurisdiction over a suspension that is not more than 14 days .
      0188 ID at 2-3. The appellant cannot relitigate this jurisdictional matter, as it was
      already decided in another appeal. See Hau, 123 M.S.P.R. 620, ¶ 13.
      Further, even if we did reconsider the appellant’s allegation, we would not find it
      persuasive. A “suspension” is the temporary placement of an agency employee in a
      nonpay, nonduty status; this definition covers not just unpaid disciplinary absences but
      also other types of enforced leave imposed on an employee against his will. See Engler
      v. Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6 (2014). When, as here, the appellant
      has not lost pay or a benefit of employment by being prohibited from working on the
      weekend, the agency has not suspended him during that period. Id., ¶ 8 (finding that
      the agency’s switching of an optional day off under a compressed work schedule did not
      equate to a suspension because the appellant was not losing any pay or benefit of
      employment by having to take an alternate day off).
                                                                                        13

him process and records and it owes him a lump sum, do not provide a basis for
disturbing this initial decision. 7    0363 PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6; see Crosby,
74 M.S.P.R. at 106.

                          NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
       You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.                5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described b elow do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
       Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

7
  To the extent that the appellant is alleging error below regarding the agenc y’s failure
to provide records to him, he has failed to describe how any such failure affected the
outcome of his appeals. Thus, this allegation does not provide a basis for disturbing the
initial decision. See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282
(1984) (stating that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive
rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        14

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and tha t such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
                                                                                15

receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                                                                                      16

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9    The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                 U.S. Court of Appeals
                                 for the Federal Circuit
                                717 Madison Place, N.W.
                                Washington, D.C. 20439

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by t he President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of comp etent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                               17

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.