Court Opinion

ID: 9959376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 16:11:22.574732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.418446
License: Public Domain

J-A03011-24

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
               v.                         :
                                          :
                                          :
 JONATHAN MARK GALLAHER                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 40 WDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-17-CR-0000572-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                      FILED: April 11, 2024

      Jonathan Mark Gallaher appeals from the judgment of sentence of life

in prison without the possibility of parole following his convictions for, inter

alia, second-degree murder and arson. We vacate Appellant’s convictions for

attempt to commit second-degree murder and otherwise affirm the judgment

of sentence.

      The trial court summarized the proceedings as follows:

            On April 16, 2021[,] around 9:00 p.m., Glendale Fire
      Department was dispatched to a house fire located [in] Coalport,
      Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. The owners of the house, Mark
      and Lacy Wolfe, were present at the time the fire started; also
      present in the house were Harold Gustafson and Matthew Troxell.
      Mark Wolfe, Lacy Wolfe, and Harold Gustafson were able to escape
      the house without any serious injury. Unfortunately, Matthew
      Troxell was not able to escape the house, and as a result, he died
      from smoke inhalation caused by the house fire.

            Immediately after the fire, the Pennsylvania State Police
      (hereinafter “PSP”) interviewed Mark and Lacy Wolfe. Mark Wolfe
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     reported that [Appellant] was present at their house shortly before
     the fire started. That evening, Mark Wolfe had told [Appellant]
     th[at] he needed to leave the residence, and the two began
     arguing. Within five minutes of Mark Wolfe telling [Appellant] to
     leave, smoke began to fill the house. Mark and Lacy Wolfe were
     able to escape the house through a window, and Mark Wolfe yelled
     for Matthew Troxell to get out of the house.            Lacy Wolfe
     corroborated Mark Wolfe’s statement and explained that after she
     escaped through the window, she went back in the house to get
     her father, Harold Gustafson. During her statement, Lacy Wolfe
     insisted that [Appellant] was responsible for starting the fire.

           Shortly after the fire began, [the] PSP received information
     that [Appellant] was present at the Central Bar, which is located
     near the Wolfes’ residence. [The] PSP located [Appellant] at
     Central Bar, and he consented to be interviewed. [Appellant]
     stated that he had been at the Wolfes’ residence that night, but
     he left their house about forty minutes before the fire started.
     However, several patrons that were in the bar at the same time
     as [Appellant] stated that they overheard [Appellant] say that he
     was responsible for starting the fire. Likewise, [Appellant] told a
     patron that he did not mean for it to happen, and he did not
     understand why Matthew Troxell did not get out of the house with
     the others.

            PSP Troop C Fire Marshall, Russel Stewart, conducted an
     investigation as to the cause of the fire. After conducting an
     interior examination of the house, Trooper Stewart opined that
     the left side of the second stair tread was the point of origin for
     the fire. Additionally, Trooper Stewart opined that the fire was
     not the result of product or utility failure. Rather, the cause of the
     fire was a person intentionally causing an open flame device to
     come into direct contact with flammable liquid located on the
     stairs.

            As a result of the investigation by [the] PSP, a criminal
     complaint was filed against [Appellant] on April 22, 2021.
     Appellant was charged with [criminal homicide as to Matthew
     Troxell; attempted criminal homicide as to the remaining three
     victims; and multiple counts of arson; aggravated arson; causing
     or    risking  catastrophe;   aggravated    assault;   recklessly
     endangering another person; and criminal mischief].             A
     preliminary hearing was held on June 7, 2021, and the charges
     were held for court. The case proceeded with the normal pre-trial

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      discovery, motions, and hearings; and the jury was ultimately
      selected November 16, 2021.

             On April 14, 2022, [nearly five months after the jury was
      empaneled, and six days before trial was scheduled to begin,
      Appellant] wrote and sent a letter to the Clearfield County Clerk
      of Courts. Within the letter, [Appellant] requested new counsel
      be appointed. A hearing on Appellant’s request was held on April
      19, 2022[, the day before trial commenced]. At the hearing,
      [Appellant] stated that he wanted new counsel because he did not
      feel like current counsel was prepared for trial. Attorney Chris
      Pentz was the assistant public defender assigned to [Appellant]’s
      case at the time of the hearing. Attorney Pentz testified that prior
      trial counsel recently retired, and he was given the case on March
      14, 2022. Despite only receiving the case one month prior to the
      hearing, Attorney Pentz testified that he met with [Appellant]
      numerous times and worked to prepare for the trial during that
      month. Ultimately, th[e] court found that [Appellant]’s intentions
      for submitting the request for new counsel were dilatory, and the
      court denied [Appellant]’s request. Additionally, Attorney Pentz
      was ordered to represent [Appellant] during the [immediately
      pending] jury trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/23, at 1-3 (cleaned up).

      A jury trial began the next day, on April 20, 2022.       Before opening

remarks were made, the Commonwealth informed the court that it was not

going to proceed on a theory of first-degree murder as to Matthew Troxell, or

attempted first-degree murder as to Mark Wolfe, Lacy Wolfe, and Harold

Gustafson. Rather, the Commonwealth indicated that it was planning to prove

the respective criminal homicide and attempted criminal homicide charges as

second-degree murder. In response, Appellant’s counsel moved for another

continuance, citing the need for additional time to prepare a defense based on

what he perceived was an amendment to the criminal information. The court

denied the request, noting that the information separately charged either

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criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide as to each victim, which

necessarily included all classifications of murder and both voluntary and

involuntary     manslaughter.          Therefore,   the   court   found   that   the

Commonwealth was not seeking to amend the information, but instead to

withdraw charges.

       At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of nearly all

offenses, which included second-degree murder as to Matthew Troxell;

criminal attempt to commit murder of the second degree as to Mark Wolfe,

Lacy Wolfe, and Harold Gustafson; and aggravated arson as to all of the

victims present in the house.             The court sentenced Appellant to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder of Matthew

Troxell and imposed an aggregate, consecutive term of twenty-four to eighty

years of incarceration for the remaining convictions.1

       Thereafter, Appellant retained private counsel and filed a timely post-

sentence motion, seeking a new trial based upon the denial of his pre-trial

continuance request and seeking the right to file supplemental motions upon

completion of the transcripts. The trial court entered an order giving Appellant

five days to supplement his motion after the transcripts were completed.

____________________________________________

1 Since the jury found Appellant guilty of attempt to commit second-degree

murder relating to the surviving victims, it did not make a finding of guilty as
to the similar charges for attempt to commit murder of the third degree. As
will be discussed more in the body of this memorandum, the trial court did
not sentence Appellant for the convictions relating to attempted second-
degree murder based upon arguments advanced by Appellant at sentencing.

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Appellant complied, filing a supplemental post-sentence motion on September

19, 2022, again seeking a new trial in light of a variety of asserted trial court

errors.     The court held a hearing and considered briefs submitted by the

parties. However, before the motion was decided, Appellant filed a praecipe

requesting that it be denied, for reasons not immediately apparent from the

record. The same day, the court denied the motion by operation of law.

         This timely appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to file a

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and he complied. The court further entered a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

         Appellant raises the following five issues on appeal:

    I.      Whether the court erred by denying Appellant’s request for a
            continuance to proceed with privately hired counsel and by
            denying him privately hired counsel of his choice without
            performing the related inquiry.

   II.      Whether the trial court erred in denying trial counsel’s two
            requests for continuance at the start of the trial after the
            Commonwealth announced [it was] not seeking first[-]degree
            murder and after the Commonwealth made additional
            confusing and prejudicial amendments.

  III.      Whether the court erred and violated Appellant’s federal and
            state due process rights requiring a new trial by erroneously
            grafting the “attempt” instruction onto the second[-] and
            third[-]degree homicide instructions[,] which enabled
            Appellant to be convicted for crimes that do not exist in
            Pennsylvania[.]

   IV.      Whether trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Appellant to
            be convicted of aggravated arson without a special verdict line
            on the verdict slip requiring the jury to find, beyond a
            reasonable doubt, that a person was present for each count.

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    V.      Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to notice and
            correct the aforementioned errors in issue[s] III and IV, which
            permitted Appellant to be erroneously convicted and
            sentenced.

Appellant’s brief at 5 (cleaned up).

         Appellant’s first two issues concern the trial court’s decision to deny his

requests for a continuance of trial. We review these claims under the following

standard:

         It is well-settled that the decision to grant or deny a request for a
         continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
         Further, a trial court’s decision to deny a request for a continuance
         will be reversed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. As
         we have consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely
         an error of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law
         is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is
         manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
         bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence or the record.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 484 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(citation omitted).

         In his first argument, Appellant more particularly contends that by

denying him a continuance, the trial court deprived him of the right to counsel

of his choosing. See Appellant’s brief at 35. In that vein, this Court stated:

         Although criminal defendants enjoy the right to choose counsel at
         their own expense, our Supreme Court has stated that this right
         is not absolute: Rather, the right of the accused to choose his
         own counsel, as well as the lawyer’s right to choose his clients,
         must be weighed against and may be reasonably restricted by the
         state’s interest in the swift and efficient administration of criminal
         justice. Thus, this Court has explained that while defendants are
         entitled to choose their own counsel, they should not be permitted
         to unreasonably clog the machinery of justice or hamper and delay
         the state’s efforts to effectively administer justice. At the same
         time, however, we have explained that a myopic insistence upon

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      expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can
      render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.

Hernandez, 230 A.3d at 484 (cleaned up).

      Further, when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a continuance motion

to obtain private representation, we consider the following factors:

      (1) whether the court conducted an extensive inquiry into the
      underlying causes of defendant’s dissatisfaction with current
      counsel; (2) whether the defendant’s dissatisfaction with current
      counsel constituted irreconcilable differences; (3) the number of
      prior continuances; (4) the timing of the motion for continuance;
      (5) whether private counsel had actually been retained; and (6)
      the readiness of private counsel to proceed in a reasonable
      amount of time.

Commonwealth v. Broitman, 217 A.3d 297, 300 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citing

Commonwealth v. Prysock, 972 A.2d 539 (Pa.Super. 2009)).

      On appeal, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion because

the court either failed to adequately address several of the Prysock factors

or neglected to recognize that they weighed in favor of granting a continuance.

See Appellant’s brief at 27-37. He contends that the court’s inquiry was not

extensive, Appellant’s own counsel determined there were irreconcilable

differences between himself and Appellant when he indicated at the hearing

that their relationship was bruised beyond mending, counsel made comments

demonstrating hostility toward Appellant at the hearing, and the timing of the

request was reasonable in light of Attorney Pentz’s recent assignment to the

case. Id. at 31-36. Appellant concludes that the court “failed to engage in

any balancing of . . . Appellant’s constitutional right to retain counsel of his

choice versus the Commonwealth’s right to the swift administration of justice.”

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Id. at 39. He also asserts that denial of his right to counsel here was structural

error that does not require a showing of prejudice. Id. at 26.

      As to its decision to deny Appellant’s request in this circumstance, the

trial court stated thusly:

      During the hearing on [Appellant]’s pro se request for a
      continuance, [Appellant] asserted that he felt that trial counsel
      was not prepared. However, Attorney Pentz testified that even
      though he was recently appointed to the case due to prior
      counsel’s retirement, he was prepared for trial, and had met with
      [Appellant] multiple times. Additionally, Attorney Pentz was not
      completely unfamiliar with the case, as he was involved with the
      case at its commencement, and the case had remained with the
      Public Defender’s Office throughout most of the case. Notably,
      none of the allegations made by [Appellant] were based on
      irreconcilable differences between himself and Attorney Pentz.
      Moreover, this court found Attorney Pentz’s testimony of
      preparedness to be credible. Attorney Pentz has practiced in front
      of this court for many years, and this court ha[s] never found
      Attorney Pentz to be unprepared or incompetent.

      Most importantly, jury selection was held on November 16, 2021,
      and the case began one year prior to [Appellant]’s request.
      However, [Appellant] testified that he had been unsatisfied with
      the Public Defender’s Office for nine months. Yet, [Appellant] did
      not submit any requests to this court for new counsel [until] the
      week before trial, nor did he make a complaint regarding counsel
      at the previous hearings in this case. Therefore, this court
      believes that [Appellant]’s request was made solely for the
      purpose of delaying trial. Jury selection had already occurred, the
      Commonwealth’s witnesses were subpoenaed to appear at the
      trial, and counsel was ready to proceed.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/23, at 7-8 (cleaned up).

      Upon review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying this request for a continuance. The court conducted an inquiry on

the record as to Appellant’s dissatisfaction with Attorney Pentz, which related

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exclusively to Appellant’s concern of counsel’s preparedness.       There was

ample testimony supporting the trial court’s conclusion that counsel had met

with Appellant numerous times, that the meetings were held to address the

upcoming trial, and that Attorney Pentz was, in fact, prepared for trial.

Therefore, the basis of the disagreement did not constitute “irreconcilable

differences.” Although Attorney Pentz made a comment at the hearing that

his relationship with Appellant was bruised based on what he stated were false

allegations made by Appellant at the hearing, it was clear that counsel could

continue to represent Appellant. Further, at the hearing, the court went so

far as to call a recess so that the Chief Public Defender could review the case

file concerning letters Appellant purportedly sent to the office regarding his

dissatisfaction with the public defender’s office.2

       The record also supports the court’s finding that the request for a

continuance was a delay tactic since it was made just days before trial, when

a jury had been selected five months before, and Appellant had been aware

for weeks that Attorney Pentz had newly taken over the case.           This is

especially underscored by the fact that, despite Appellant’s request arising

from the relatively recent appointment of Attorney Pentz and counsel’s alleged

unpreparedness, Appellant claimed for the first time at the hearing that he
____________________________________________

2 Although Appellant laments that the trial court did not enter these letters

into the record at the continuance request hearing, we note that Appellant
never sought to do so then or at any later proceeding, including the hearings
addressing his post-sentence motion, which challenged the denial of his
motion for a continuance.

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had been dissatisfied with the office for nine months. As the court stated,

Appellant did not raise this contention at any prior proceedings, including jury

selection.

       As to the remaining Prysock factors, the trial court inquired as to

whether new, privately retained counsel entered his appearance and was

informed by the Commonwealth that it was unsure and that private counsel

had only “indicated that he was picking up the case,” implying he was not yet

retained. N.T. Argument, 4/19/22, at 9. Further, while there was no direct

testimony regarding how long it would take new counsel to prepare for trial,

Attorney Pentz indicated his belief that no one could be prepared to jump in

and handle trial the next day, which is supported by the numerous serious

charges Appellant faced.         Finally, we note that the court did not discuss

whether the parties had requested prior continuances, but we do not find that

the failure to address that factor alone warrants a different outcome.3

       Based on the inquiry conducted by the court and the reasons for its

denial, we hold that it did not abuse its discretion. Compare Broitman, 217

A.3d at 300-01 (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying a continuance request when it was made on the eve of trial, which

had been scheduled two months prior; the court conducted an inquiry into the

defendant’s dissatisfaction; it determined that the request was not made in a

reasonable time; and newly retained counsel was not immediately prepared
____________________________________________

3 Our independent review of the certified record shows that Appellant
requested and was granted one continuance relating to jury selection.

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to proceed with trial); with Commonwealth v. Mackrides, 255 A.3d 1269,

2021 WL 2029820, at *4 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision)

(finding that the court abused its discretion in denying a motion to continue

when “the court did not inquire at all, let alone extensively, into Mackrides’[s]

dissatisfaction with trial counsel or whether his dissatisfaction with counsel

constituted irreconcilable differences and did not discuss the number of prior

continuances that had been granted in the matter”).

         In his next issue, Appellant argues that the court erred in denying his

continuance request lodged at the beginning of trial when the Commonwealth

stated its intention to prove criminal homicide and attempted criminal

homicide convictions under the classification of murder of the second-degree.

See Appellant’s brief at 43-52. He asserts that the continuance should have

been granted because “[t]here can be no dispute that the defense of first and

second-degree murder are vastly different,” and further because some of the

counts did not exist pursuant to Pennsylvania law, such as attempt to commit

murder of the second degree. Id. at 45. Appellant claims that counsel could

not have been expected to defend against charges that were “invented on the

spot.” Id. at 46. Further, he contends there was requisite prejudice stemming

from the fact that Appellant was ultimately convicted of fictional homicide

charges, i.e., criminal attempt to commit murder of the second degree. Id.

at 49.

         In rejecting this claim, the trial court noted that the criminal information

charged Appellant with criminal homicide, which included all degrees of

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murder, as well as both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. See Trial

Court Opinion, 3/17/23, at 8. Further, the Commonwealth’s request merely

sought to withdraw the charges of first-degree murder and involuntary

manslaughter, and did not add any new charges. Id. at 9. Accordingly, the

court opined that the Commonwealth’s request had no bearing on the factual

basis for the charges or the witnesses to be called, and therefore there was

no need for a continuance to prepare a defense.4 Id.

       We find no abuse of discretion with the court’s decision. As it correctly

indicated, criminal homicide encompasses murder of both the first and second

degrees. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501 (defining criminal homicide and indicating

that it shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary

manslaughter). Further, we have determined that “[a]n information need not

specify a degree of murder or the degrees of manslaughter in order to sustain

the verdict of second[-]degree murder.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 852

A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant was

charged with criminal homicide and numerous other felonies, including arson

and aggravated arson. Therefore, he had adequate notification that he faced

a potential conviction for second-degree murder. See Commonwealth v.

Conaway, 105 A.3d 755, 764 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“The purpose of an

____________________________________________

4 The court also acknowledged that even though Appellant may have been
improperly convicted of the charges of criminal attempt to commit second-
degree murder, he was not prejudiced because he was not sentenced on those
convictions. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/23, at 9. We address those
convictions infra.

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information or an indictment is to provide the accused with sufficient notice to

prepare a defense, and to ensure that he will not be tried twice for the same

act.” (cleaned up)). Since the Commonwealth’s withdrawal of charges did not

amount to an amendment, or otherwise affect the defenses applicable to the

counts of which he was properly on notice, the court did not err in denying

Appellant’s continuance request.

       Appellant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court

erroneously instructed the jury that it could find him guilty of criminal attempt

to commit murder of both the second and third degrees as to victims Mark

Wolfe, Lacy Wolfe, and Harold Gustafson. See Appellant’s brief at 50-56. This

court has stated:

       In examining jury instructions, our standard of review is to
       determine whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
       discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.
       A charge will be found adequate unless the issues are not made
       clear, the jury was misled by the instructions, or there was an
       omission from the charge amounting to a fundamental error.
       Moreover, in reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction the entire
       charge is considered, not merely discrete portions thereof. The
       trial court is free to use its own expressions as long as the
       concepts at issue are clearly and accurately presented to the jury.

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 232 A.3d 747, 759 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned

up). Further, “[a] specific and timely objection must be made to preserve a

challenge to a particular jury instruction. Failure to do so results in waiver.”

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 178 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned

up).

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       Citing the trial transcript, the trial court concluded that this issue was

waived because counsel never contemporaneously lodged an objection to

these jury instructions. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/17/23, at 10 (citing N.T.

Trial, 4/22/22, at 161).5 The record confirms that Appellant never objected

to the instructions in question. Therefore, we agree with both the trial court

and Appellant that this challenge is waived on that basis. See Moury, 992

A.2d at 178.

       However, to the extent that Appellant’s arguments implicate that his

three convictions for attempt to commit second-degree murder are improper

since they are not cognizable offenses under Pennsylvania law, we agree. See

Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 734 (Pa.Super. 2004) (stating

that “there simply is no such crime as attempted second . . . degree murder.”);

Commonwealth v. Brown, 276 A.3d 244, 2022 WL 792169, at *5

(Pa.Super. 2022) (non-precedential decision) (citing Geathers with approval

and indicating that attempted second degree murder is not a viable offense

under the law of the Commonwealth).                Accordingly, we vacate the three

convictions for attempt to commit second-degree murder.                  See, i.e.,

____________________________________________

5 Appellant concedes in his brief that counsel did not object to the challenged

instructions.    See Appellant’s brief at 52 (stating that “Appellant also
recognizes that jury instruction issues are waived unless objected to by
counsel” and that here “there was no objection raised by trial counsel”).
Nonetheless, he devotes the remainder of the argument in this section of his
brief to articulating why trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on
this basis, instead of the argument section pertaining to the stated question
of whether counsel was ineffective for waiving this issue. Id. at 52-56. We
address Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel below.

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Commonwealth v. McVicker, 2019 WL 4392484, at *7 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(non-precedential decision) (vacating a conviction for attempted third-degree

murder because that crime does not exist). However, since the trial court did

not impose any sentence relating to these convictions, and therefore the

sentencing scheme remains unaffected, we need not remand for resentencing.

See Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 570 (Pa.Super. 2006) (holding

that where this Court can vacate an illegal sentence without upsetting the trial

court’s overall sentencing scheme, it need not remand for resentencing).

      In his final two claims, Appellant asserts the ineffectiveness of trial

counsel. Specifically, he faults counsel for failing to object to the verdict slip

or the court’s instructions as to aggravated arson, since there was no request

that the jury make a factual finding as to whether persons were present in the

residence with respect to that offense. Additionally, he maintains that counsel

rendered ineffective assistance when he did not object to the court’s

instructions relating to attempt to commit second and third-degree murder,

as discussed above.

      This Court has summarized the appropriateness of reviewing such

ineffective assistance allegations on direct appeal as follows:

      Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of
      ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.          See
      Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577-80 (2013).
      Instead, such claims are to be deferred to PCRA review. However,
      our Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the general
      rule. In Holmes, the Court held that a trial court has discretion
      to address ineffectiveness claims on direct review in cases where
      (1) there are extraordinary circumstances in which trial counsel’s

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       ineffectiveness is apparent from the record and “meritorious to
       the extent that immediate consideration best serves the interests
       of justice;” or (2) “there is good cause shown,” and the defendant
       knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to seek
       subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. More
       recently, our Supreme Court adopted a third exception, which
       requires trial courts to address claims challenging trial counsel’s
       performance where the defendant is statutorily precluded from
       obtaining subsequent PCRA review.

Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 760-61 (Pa.Super. 2023) (cleaned

up).

       Our review of the record confirms that Appellant has not expressly

waived his ability to seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and

sentence, nor has he asserted anywhere that he is statutorily precluded from

PCRA relief. Concerning the “extraordinary circumstances” exception, the trial

court did not find any of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims meritorious or that

they warranted immediate consideration by this Court.       We agree. To the

extent Appellant’s claims rest upon errors regarding the trial court’s

instructions for attempt to commit third-degree murder, we reiterate that

Appellant was not convicted of those charges. Likewise, if his ineffectiveness

claims rely upon the convictions for attempt to commit second-degree murder,

we have hereby vacated those convictions.         Appellant therefore has not

demonstrated that “immediate consideration” of his assertions of trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness “best serves the interests of justice.” James, 297

A.3d at 761.

       Accordingly, since Appellant has not satisfied any of the above

exceptions, these claims are dismissed without prejudice and are to be

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deferred to collateral review. See Holmes, 79 A.3d at 563 (“[W]e hold that

[the] general rule of deferral to PCRA review remains the pertinent law on the

appropriate timing for review of claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel[.]”).

      In sum, we vacate Appellant’s three convictions for attempt to commit

second-degree murder.       As Appellant was never sentenced on those

convictions, we need not remand for resentencing.        With regard to the

remainder of Appellant’s claims, he has not otherwise given us cause to

disturb his judgment of sentence.

      Convictions for attempt to commit second-degree murder vacated.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 4/11/2024

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