Court Opinion

ID: 9914058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:05:35.11033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:57.401741
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2139-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AHMAR D. BUTLER, a/k/a
MAR BUTLER, and AHMAR
SPENCE,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________

                   Submitted December 19, 2023 – Decided December 29, 2023

                   Before Judges Enright and Paganelli.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Salem County, Indictment No. 12-01-0001.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on
                   the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Ahmar D. Butler appeals from the February 14, 2022 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) following an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Sandra

Lopez in her comprehensive written opinion.

                                           I.

      The evidence adduced at defendant's 2013 trial with his co-defendants,

Jonathan P. Thomas and Antwione A. Parsley, was fully detailed in our 2017

unpublished opinion, wherein we affirmed the respective convictions and

sentences of each defendant. State v. Butler, Nos. A-0381-13, A-1741-13, and

A-2051-13 (App. Div. March 30, 2017). We also provided a synopsis of the

facts and procedural history of this matter in our 2020 unpublished opinion ,

wherein we affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part, the trial court's

denial of defendant's and Parsley's PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.

State v. Butler, Nos. A-0884-18 and A-3243-18 (App. Div. Feb. 28, 2020) (slip

op. at 17). Accordingly, we incorporate by reference the recitation of facts and

procedural history contained in our prior unpublished opinions.

      As we concluded in our 2020 opinion, defendant and his co-defendant,

Parsley, were entitled to evidentiary hearings on remand "to develop the record

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more fully concerning the alibi evidence" they discussed in their respective PCR

petitions. Id. at 10. Therefore, we directed the remand judge to consider

testimony from alibi witnesses named in defendant's and Parsley's petitions, as

well as "testimony from the respective [defense counsel], explaining whether

they investigated these potential alibis and, if so, why they chose not to present

these witnesses for strategic or other reasons." Id. at 13. We also directed the

remand judge to address defendant's alleged newly discovered evidence as it

related to third-party guilt. Id. at 15-16.

      In September 2021, Judge Lopez commenced a four-day evidentiary

hearing on defendant's PCR petition to address his alibi and third-party guilt

claims. The judge heard from alibi witnesses, Lanika Booker and Jermaine

Spence, as well as third-party guilt witnesses, Charlene Daniels and Oreader

Callaway, Jr. Defendant and his trial counsel also testified at the evidentiary

hearing.

      On February 14, 2022, Judge Lopez entered an order, denying defendant's

PCR petition. In her accompanying eighty-five-page opinion, the judge first

recounted in painstaking detail the testimony of the witnesses who appeared

before her.   She determined the testimonies provided by Booker, Spence,

Daniels and Callaway were not credible.

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      However, as to defendant's claim trial counsel was ineffective, Judge

Lopez credited counsel's testimony that he "investigated Booker as a potential

alibi witness" prior to trial, and for tactical reasons, chose not to call her to

testify at trial. Additionally, the judge found counsel's decision not to call

Booker as a witness did "not amount to unsound trial strategy."

      Next, the judge believed trial counsel's testimony that "defendant never

identified Jermaine Spence as a potential alibi witness" and that even though

"Spence attended the trial," Spence "never approached" trial counsel "at any

point before or during the trial." Further, the judge credited trial counsel's

testimony that prior to trial, Spence "did not go to the police, the prosecution,

or to [trial counsel]" to disclose Spence's alibi evidence.

      Similarly, the judge accepted trial counsel's testimony that prior to trial,

he reviewed "information provided by Daniels that was in discovery" and

concluded "[t]he information . . . Daniels initially provided [to the] police was

unhelpful."    The judge also credited trial counsel's testimony that he

"determined . . . further investigation of Daniels was not warranted."

      Further, the judge determined defendant "signed a letter [for his trial

attorney,] foregoing an alibi defense," even though the certification defendant

submitted with his PCR petition "made no mention of discussing an alibi

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                                         4
defense" with trial counsel, "[n]or did his certification contain information about

what he was doing at the time of the murder."

      Considering this evidence, Judge Lopez concluded "defendant did not

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel's performance

was deficient" nor did he "prove that the result of [his trial] would have been

different had [trial counsel] called Booker, Spence, or Daniels to testify at trial ."

Accordingly, after referencing the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),1 Judge Lopez found defendant failed to

establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

      Judge Lopez also considered and rejected defendant's alternative

argument that he was entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Although the judge acknowledged "[t]he statements of Callaway and Daniels

suggest[ed] a third party—not . . . defendant—committed the murder," Judge

Lopez found a new trial was not warranted because defendant failed to satisfy

the three-pronged test set forth in State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300 (1981). 2

1
   To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the
deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
2
 To be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must demonstrate the newly discovered evidence is: "(1) material to the issue

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                                          5
      Judge Lopez explained Callaway testified at the evidentiary hearing that

"a few weeks after [he and a fellow inmate, Maurice Brown] were housed

together as cellmates," Brown confessed to murdering Hayes. But the judge also

credited trial counsel's testimony that "Brown gave three different statements

about the murder of Hayes" and "was indicted for false swearing based on two

of those statements." Moreover, Judge Lopez found "Callaway testified quite

candidly to his criminal history[,] which include[d ninety-one] indictable

convictions," and he admitted "he [did] not fear a false swearing conviction

because" he could not "add anything to" the extended term of life imprisonment

he was serving. Accordingly, the judge concluded "defendant failed to satisfy

prong [three] of the Carter test" as to Callaway because "Callaway's testimony

lacked the credibility and veracity of evidence that would 'probably change the

jury's verdict if a new trial were granted.'" Id. at 314.

      Similarly,    Judge      Lopez     found     "Daniels'[s]    testimony       at

th[e] . . . evidentiary hearing . . . did not provide newly discovered evidence that

and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since
the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the
sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted."
Carter, 85 N.J. at 314. Each prong must be satisfied before a new trial is
warranted, ibid., and a defendant bears "the burden to establish each prong is
met," State v. Fortin, 464 N.J. Super. 193, 216 (App. Div. 2020).

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                                         6
would change the jury's verdict."          The judge explained that on cross-

examination, "Daniels testified that she d[id] not remember the date on which

Hayes was murdered," even though she lived across the street from the victim,

"she d[id] not remember . . . Maurice . . . Brown" or "being asked to go down to

the [police] station on the night of the murder," and could only "testify to . . . the

words written in" the affidavit she submitted in support of defendant's PCR

petition.

      The judge also determined Daniels "did not provide th[e c]ourt with

testimony suggesting that a third-party committed the murder." Instead, she

merely established "she did[ not] see" defendant on the night of the murder, and

did "not remember the night of the murder[,] or other events relevant to the

case." Thus, the judge stated, "as it pertains to Daniels, defendant failed to

establish prongs [two] and [three] of the Carter test, and in the alternative, failed

to establish prong [three] of the Carter test."

      Having found defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel or "satisfy the Carter standard for a new

trial based on newly discovered evidence," Judge Lopez denied defendant's PCR

petition.

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                             II.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

     POINT I

     TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE
     AND PURSUE AN ALIBI DEFENSE AND/OR
     THIRD-PARTY      GUILT     CONSTITUTED
     INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND
     MANDATES THAT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS
     BE REVERSED.

         A.   TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO HAVE
     LANIKA BOOKER TESTIFY AS AN ALIBI
     WITNESS.

         B.   TRIAL    COUNSEL    FAILED TO
     INVESTIGATE JERMAINE SPENCE AND HAVE
     HIM TESTIFY AS AN ALIBI WITNESS.

         C.   TRIAL  COUNSEL    FAILED    TO
     INVESTIGATE AND HAVE CHARLENE DANIELS
     TESTIFY REGARDING THIRD-PARTY GUILT.

     POINT II

     NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE MANDATES
     THAT   DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS  BE
     REVERSED.

         A.   OREADER    CALLAWAY,    JR.'S
     AFFIDAVIT AND TESTIMONY REGARDING
     MAURICE       BROWN'S     CONFESSION
     CONSTITUTED     NEWLY     DISCOVERED
     EVIDENCE.

                                                       A-2139-21
                                   8
                  B.CHARLENE DANIELS' AFFIDAVIT
            AND TESTIMONY REGARDING MAURICE
            BROWN CONSTITUTED NEWLY DISCOVERED
            EVIDENCE.

     Having considered defendant's contentions in view of the applicable law,

we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons set

forth by Judge Lopez in her thoughtful and well-reasoned opinion.

     Affirmed.

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