Court Opinion

ID: 9736830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:07:53.033221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:54.950761
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FITZGERALD, dissenting: The majority holds that, under the facts of this case, Officer Reed could not lawfully run a routine check for outstanding warrants, after he lawfully obtained identification from the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle. In reaching this conclusion, the majority purportedly relies on this court’s recent decision in People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003). In Gonzalez, we made clear that common sense was not to be abandoned in determining what is “reasonable” in the context of a vehicle stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 234-35. Today, the majority not only abandons common sense, but distorts fundamental principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence. In Gonzalez, we held that, in judging the reasonableness of police questioning during a vehicle stop, where the questioning was neither related to the purpose of the stop nor justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, “we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235. The majority first speculates that the warrant check in the present case “could well have lengthened the duration of the detention.” 207 Ill. 2d at 528. Constrained, however, by the absence of argument or evidence to that effect, the majority concludes that the warrant check “changed the fundamental nature of the traffic stop” by converting it into “an investigation of past wrongdoing by defendant.” 207 Ill. 2d at 528. The majority’s analysis and ultimate conclusion fails to recognize that not all police conduct is created equal. That is, the majority opinion overlooks the significant difference between the police conduct at issue in Gonzalez — a face-to-face exchange between a police officer and a detained passenger — and the police conduct at issue in the present case — an unobtrusive check of information that is part of the public record. Consideration of this difference leads to the inescapable conclusion that Officer Reed did not exceed the bounds of the fourth amendment when he checked for outstanding warrants. Roadside questioning by police of the passenger of a stopped vehicle can take many forms — from the totally benign to the highly intrusive. At the one extreme, an officer’s questions may constitute nothing more than casual banter that elicits a neutral response. At the other extreme, an officer’s questions may approach something akin to official interrogation that invites, or even compels, an incriminating response, possibly on matters divorced from the stop and unsupported by any newly aroused suspicion. The degree of intrusiveness permitted by the fourth amendment was the question we took up in Gonzalez. There, we were called upon to determine whether an officer’s request for identification from the passenger of a lawfully stopped vehicle offends fourth amendment principles in the absence of a particularized suspicion of criminal conduct. In short, did the officer go too far? In deciding this issue, we necessarily balanced the need for effective law enforcement, on the one hand, against the need to safeguard the privacy and security of passengers against arbitrary governmental invasions, on the other hand. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225, 234-36. We ultimately concluded that the officer’s mere request for identification from the passenger was facially innocuous, did not suggest official interrogation, and was not the type of request that would increase the confrontational nature of the encounter, thus changing the stop in some fundamental way. We held that the officer’s conduct did not make the otherwise lawful detention of the passenger unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235-36. The police conduct at issue in the present case stands in stark contrast to the conduct at issue in Gonzalez. A warrant check is simply a computerized retrieval of information in the public record — information which indicates whether a court has entered a written order commanding the arrest of a specific person. See 725 ILCS 5/107 — 1 (West 2002). Thus, a warrant check is never intrusive in the way that police questioning of a detained passenger can be. A warrant check involves no face-to-face exchange and does not even require the passenger’s participation. It is never inquisitorial, confrontational, or suggestive of official interrogation. It does not invite, much less compel, an incriminating response. Further, the passenger has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information retrieved during a warrant check, whether the police suspect the passenger of criminal activity or not. Accordingly, unless the warrant check impermissibly prolongs the passenger’s detention — which was not the case here — no fourth amendment concerns arise. I recognize that where the identity of the passenger is unknown, the officer cannot run a check for outstanding warrants unless the passenger assents to the officer’s request for identification and permits this initial de minimis intrusion on his or her privacy. A warrant check, however, represents no further intrusion on the passenger’s rights. Thus, if, under Gonzalez, a police officer may lawfully request identification from the passenger of a stopped vehicle, the additional step of a warrant check, without more, does not somehow change the “fundamental nature of the stop.” Stated another way, if a police officer lawfully detains a passenger like defendant by lawfully stopping the vehicle in which he is riding; lawfully obtains the passenger’s identification; conducts a check for information in which the passenger can claim no privacy interest (information which even the majority could not seriously contend should be unavailable to police); does not require the passenger to implicate himself in possible criminal wrongdoing (as would, for example, a series of pointed questions irrelevant to the stop); does not intrude any further on the passenger’s privacy or security (as would, for example, a search of his person or property); and does so without unnecessarily prolonging the passenger’s detention, in what conceivable way have the passenger’s fourth amendment rights been compromised? Where is the governmental intrusion? Under the majority’s reasoning, even if Officer Reed was acquainted with the passenger and made no request for identification, he would have been prohibited from running a warrant check. The absurdity of this proposition is manifest. Thus, the majority opinion achieves what we sought to avoid in Gonzalez: “stripping any notion of common sense out of the ‘reasonableness’ equation.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 234. As we stated, “Although our legal system is steeped with rules, standards, and formulas, logic and common sense should be no less a part of it.” Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 234. Moreover, the majority opinion makes no attempt to balance the competing governmental and individual interests that lie at the heart of fourth amendment analysis and drove our analysis in Gonzalez. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 224-25, 233-35, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667-68, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838, 848, 121 S. Ct. 946, 950 (2001). Instead, the majority establishes a new rule of fourth amendment jurisprudence that prohibits police from engaging in one of the most basic law enforcement techniques with no explanation other than the simple statement that it constitutes an “investigation of past wrongdoing.” 207 Ill. 2d at 528. Nowhere in Gonzalez did we intimate that police should be barred from performing enforcement and investigatory functions. That is, after all, precisely what police do. What we said, in determining the acceptable parameters of police questioning during a routine traffic stop, is that police cannot conduct a “ ‘general inquisition about past, present and future wrongdoing,’ ” absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, quoting United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Conducting a non-intrusive computerized check to determine if a judge has commanded the arrest of the passenger cannot reasonably be deemed a “general inquisition.” The majority’s conclusion to the contrary effectively creates a constitutional right to avoid justice. The majority opinion also calls into question this court’s decision in People v. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d 462 (2002). In Cox, we stated, without qualification, that an officer may conduct a speedy warrant check on the driver of a stopped vehicle. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, citing People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220 (2000); People v. Easley, 288 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491 (1997); People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 163 (1995). The appellate court cases cited in Cox for this proposition did not expound on this point, and no specific justification for permitting a warrant check on the driver of a stopped vehicle was offered. The reason, perhaps, is that there is nothing inherently objectionable about such an investigative technique. See 4 W LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.2(f), at 51-58 (3d ed. 1996). Today, the majority holds otherwise. Under the court’s present analysis, a warrant check will only comport with Terry’s scope requirement if it is either related to the purpose of the stop, or supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. A warrant check, however, will rarely, if ever, relate to the purpose of a routine traffic stop — issuing a warning or citation for an observed traffic violation. Nor will facts necessarily develop during a routine stop providing a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. Although the present case involves a passenger, rather than the driver, the same Terry principles that govern the reasonableness of the officer’s encounter with the passenger, also govern the reasonableness of the officer’s encounter with the driver. Accordingly, under the majority’s opinion, a driver can now legitimately argue that a warrant check “change[s] the fundamental nature of the traffic stop” by converting the stop “into an investigation of past wrongdoing.” 207 Ill. 2d at 528. Once again, the absurdity of the majority’s position is evident. Finally, I am compelled to comment on the majority’s conclusion that because Officer Reed did not testify that he feared for his own safety, considerations of officer safety should not color our analysis in this case. 207 Ill. 2d at 534. Officer safety is always at issue during a vehicle stop. Decades ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state’s concern for officer safety during a traffic stop is “both legitimate and weighty.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 336, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333 (1977). The Court cited the high incidence of police shootings when an officer approaches a suspect seated in an automobile, as well as the significant percentage of murders of police officers during traffic stops. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110, 54 L. Ed. 2d at 336-37, 98 S. Ct. at 333; see also United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging “the tragedy of the many officers who are shot during routine traffic stops each year”); In re Arturo D., 27 Cal. 4th 60, 85 n.23, 38 P.3d 433, 450 n.23, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 581, 600 n.23 (2002) (“Nationwide, 13 law enforcement officers feloniously were killed while enforcing traffic laws in the year 2000,” and that same year “6,234 officers were assaulted during traffic pursuits and stops”), citing FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, at 28, 83 (2000); State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 845, 875, 549 N.W.2d 218, 230 (1996) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (“From 1978-94 about twice as many officers were killed in traffic pursuits or stops as were killed in arrest situations involving drug-related matters”), citing U.S. Dept, of Justice Hindelang Criminal Justice Research Center, 1994 Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, at 357; State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 37, 573 A.2d 1376,1377 (1990) (“One study of State Police officers killed nationwide in the line of duty from September 1976 to September 1982, shows that 40 percent of the troopers killed by gunfire were fatally wounded while making traffic stops”). More recently, the Court has recognized that the possible sources of harm to an officer increase where a passenger is present. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 47, 117 S. Ct. 882, 885 (1997). This court, until today, has also considered the risk of harm to a police officer during a routine traffic stop in determining the permissible scope of the officer’s authority with respect to the passenger. See People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 418 (1998) (concluding that the public interest in officer safety outweighs the potential intrusion to the passenger’s liberty interest in being ordered to remain at the scene). The majority’s present stance, that officer safety cannot be at issue unless the officer testifies to a subjective fear, is unjustified under the case law, totally divorced from reality, and does a grave disservice to police officers. In a footnote, the majority purports to recognize the legitimacy of concerns over officer safety. 207 Ill. 2d at 531 n.4. The majority nonetheless denigrates the dissenters’ concerns, characterizing them as nothing more than an “emotional reaction” which we have allowed to “cloud” our judgment in this case. 207 Ill. 2d at 531 n.4. I freely admit that the number of police officers killed each year during traffic stops strikes a very real emotional chord. How could it not? The suggestion, however, that I, and my colleagues in dissent, have elevated emotion over legal analysis is at best unfounded, and at worst a poor attempt to direct attention away from the other significant flaws in the majority opinion. As set forth above, the majority opinion misrepresents this court’s holding in Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220. Further, it distorts basic principles of fourth amendment jurisprudence. In addition, the majority opinion is inconsistent with statements the same majority made in Cox. In response to these observations, the majority has made no attempt to shore up its tortured fourth amendment analysis, nor any attempt to reconcile today’s holding with Cox. These are weighty and legitimate matters which the majority needs to address and which are far more significant than unwarranted suggestions that the dissenting justices are ruled by emotion. I dissent. JUSTICES THOMAS and CARMAN join in this dissent.