Court Opinion

ID: 9673036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:04:54.50939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.915324
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s judgment that Willis’ defamation and disability discrimination claims do not fall within the scope of our decision in Dietz v. Dodge County, 487 N.W.2d 237 (Minn.1992). However, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Willis’ breach of contract claim is controlled by Dietz.
While Willis concedes that Dietz bars a public employee from contesting the basis for his or her termination in district court, he maintains that his breach of contract claim would not require the district court to evaluate the propriety of the County’s decision, and therefore he is not limited to the writ of certiorari procedure. I agree. As stated in Dietz, judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions by administrative bodies must be invoked by writ of certiorari. Id. at 239. Moreover, review by certiorari is available only when no other adequate method of review or legal remedy exists. Id. The limited review mandated by certiorari is motivated by separation of powers concerns. Id. When an employee raises an issue limited to interpretation of the provisions of his or her employment contract, however, such concerns are not ordinarily implicated. I do not believe this court’s holding in Dietz was intended to give governmental bodies the right to breach their employment contracts free from judicial intervention. As Willis warns, such an application of the writ of certiorari procedure would, in effect, make “second class citizens” out of public employees.
Here, Willis’ Amended Complaint, which was accepted and acknowledged by the district court in its January 18, 1995 order, alleges that Willis’ employment contract required the County to follow certain termination and lay-off procedures.1 These procedures were not followed, asserts Willis, and *284therefore the County must compensate him with monetary damages. This assertion does not require the district court to delve into the County’s justifications for terminating Willis’ employment, and therefore falls outside the scope of this court’s decision in Dietz.2 See id. at 239-41.
Willis’ Amended Complaint against Sher-burne County raises a breach of contract issue by alleging that the County did not follow the lay-off procedures identified in its employee handbook when it terminated Willis’ employment, and seeks monetary damages as a result. While it is true that Willis’ prayer for relief requests reinstatement, back pay, and lost fringe benefits, these are remedies made available to him under his disability discrimination claim and should not be interpreted as indications of a wrongful termination claim “in disguise.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 363.071, subd. 2, 363.14 (1994). Therefore, as I interpret our holding in Dietz, Willis is entitled to pursue monetary damages from the County for breach of contract because the factual reasons underlying his employment termination will not be at issue.
Because I believe Stadum v. Norman County, 508 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Minn.App. 1993), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 1994), faithfully construes our decision in Dietz, I would reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ opinion granting summary judgment to the County on Willis’ breach of contract claim.

. The court of appeals may have relied upon Willis' original Complaint, dated March 1, 1994, to support its conclusion that Willis was raising a wrongful termination claim. While Willis’ original Complaint states that his employment contract required “just cause” to terminate his employment and alleges that he was wrongfully discharged, his Amended Complaint, dated January 25, 1995, simply cites the County’s failure to follow its own termination and lay-off procedures and policies, as specified in the County’s employee handbook. Thus, Willis' Amended Complaint is properly limited to a breach of contract issue and does not fall under this court’s holding in Dietz that an employee's wrongful termination claim could be reviewed by the district court only on timely writ of certiorari. See Dietz, 487 N.W.2d at 238-39.

. I take issue with the majority's characterization of Willis' Amended Complaint as "creative pleading.” The district court in this case applied the appropriate standards when considering Willis’ motion to amend his complaint, and the County has not challenged this portion of the district court's order on appeal. Rule 15.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure expressly states that leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Willis’ motion for amendment in this case was made before the completion of discovery; thus, the district court concluded that the County would not be prejudiced by the addition of a breach of contract claim. Accordingly, there is no reason to penalize Willis for amending his complaint at this stage of the appellate process.