Court Opinion

ID: 9744033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:52:25.891278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.317658
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
In this appeal, two instructional issues are under consideration. The first deals with the modification of an instruction by the trial court. The second deals with an instruction on damages. Judge Ratliff has dissented to Judge Hoffman’s treatment of the damage instruction, however, he has concurred with Judge Hoffman in his treatment of the modification instruction. This dissent deals only with the modified instruction. I concur in Judge Ratliff’s dissent which deals with the damage instruction.
The Majority has reversed on the grounds that the trial court did not define “justification” and “excuse” after modifying the Canfield’s tendered instruction. The modification added another statute and then left out:
“by showing by a fair preponderance of the evidence that such person did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence acting under similar circumstances who desires to comply with the law.”
but the trial court re-inserted the following language from the original instruction:
“A violation of this statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the person so violating the statute or law, unless the person shows that such violation was excusable or justifiable.”
The modified instruction left out a standard of proof to overcome the presumption — not a definition of terms.1 After the trial court made a modification to his instruction, Canfield did not tender another instruction to avoid the error of which he now complains. If error exists, he invited it by not offering another instruction with the language he felt essential to his case.
*1241I not only dissent for the reason that the error was invited by failure to offer another instruction after the modification, but I dissent because the language complained of was essentially present in other instructions. Instruction No. 4 which is found on page 359 of the transcript for example advises the jury of the standard of proof to be applied if “justification” or “excuse” were factually applicable:
Negligence, is the failure to do what a reasonably careful and prudent person would have done under the same or like circumstances, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful and prudent person would not have done under the same or like circumstances; in other words, negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable and ordinary care, which failure is a direct cause of the damage complained of.
Reasonable and ordinary care, as such are as a reasonable, careful and ordinary prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the law. If Canfield felt that an additional instruction was necessary after his instruction was modified by the trial court, he should have tendered another instruction at the trial level and not invited error on appeal. The time and expense of a re-trial in this case does not justify a reversal based upon the failure to instruct on the standard of proof to rebut a presumption. If definitions were required, they should have been tendered by Can-field; none were.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. In Reuille v. Bowers (1980), Ind.App., 409 N.E.2d 1144, at 1154, this Court quoted the Indiana Supreme Court case of Davison v. Williams, (1968) Ind., 242 N.E.2d 101 at 105. “As for the question of what will constitute proof sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence raised by violation of a safety regulation, we believe the best test for a jury to follow is:
Where a person has disobeyed a statute he may excuse or justify the violation in a civil action for negligence by sustaining the burden of showing that he did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law."