Court Opinion

ID: 9405859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:08:17.335564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.243604
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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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THE ACTION.
                                                RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2021-SC-0477-MR

BILLY CLARK, III                                                         APPELLANT

V.                 ON APPEAL FROM BUTLER CIRCUIT COURT
                   HONORABLE TIMOTHY COLEMAN, JUDGE
                              NO. 20-CR-00007

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                   APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

     This case comes before the Court on appeal as a matter of right1 by Billy

Clark, the Appellant, from the judgment and sentence of the Butler Circuit

Court. After a jury trial, Clark was convicted of first-degree rape (victim under

twelve); first-degree sodomy (victim under twelve); two counts of sexual abuse

in the first degree; and use of a minor in a sexual performance.2 The jury then

found him guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree. He was

sentenced to fifty years in prison and now appeals. For the following reasons,

we affirm.

        Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
        1
        2Clark had also been charged with kidnapping, but the trial court had granted
a directed verdict in favor of Clark on that charge.
                                          I.       Facts
   In July 2014, the victim, M.R., lived with her mother at Roger Garner’s

house.3 M.R. was eight years old. Her mother was a drug user, and Garner’s

house was frequented by other drug users who would stay at the house for

random periods of time. At this time, Billy Clark used Garner’s house to

hideout as he was wanted by law enforcement in connection with a stolen

hearse.

   Approximately five years later in July 2019, M.R. was thirteen years old and

living with her grandmother. M.R. ran away and stayed with a friend for a

couple of days. During this time M.R. first disclosed to her friend that she had

been sexually assaulted in July 2014. After that, M.R. told her grandmother,

and the latter told M.R.’s father. M.R.’s father reported the assault to the

police.

   State Trooper Carlock was the initial lead investigator of the case and he

scheduled M.R. for an interview with Dr. Patricia Faulkner-Simmons at the

Barron River Child Advocacy Center. State Trooper Edwards eventually took

over as lead investigator. He showed a 2018 photo of Billy Clark to M.R. who,

seeing the photo, identified Clark as her assailant. M.R. also testified that she

remembered the assault taking place when a hearse was on Garner’s property

and a man was staying there who was on the run from the police.

   M.R. testified as to the details of the assault. Her mother had gone to the

store, and M.R. was in a bedroom folding laundry. Clark entered the bedroom

      3   We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim.
                                               2
and she tried to leave. She testified that Clark brought a knife and gun with

him into the room but did not use them in the assault. M.R. attempted to leave

but Clark grabbed her arm and pulled her back into the room. He then

instructed her to remove her clothing and had her walk around the room. He

then forced her to bend over on the bed, where he touched various parts of her

body and held her by the wrists, threatening her with violence if she told

anyone about what was happening. Clark then put on a condom and M.R.

testified that her vagina hurt “really bad” for a number of minutes. Afterward,

Clark instructed M.R. to sit up and compelled her to remove the condom from

his penis. Although she did not identify the substance, M.R. testified something

was in the condom, presumably semen. Clark next instructed M.R. to put

another condom on his penis and forced her to perform oral sex. After that was

over, Clark noticed M.R. was bleeding and told her to go take a shower. He also

once again threatened to hurt her and her mother if she told anyone what

happened.

   Dr. Faulkner-Simmons testified that M.R. was born with an abnormally

webbed vagina which would have made sexual intercourse painful for M.R. Dr.

Faulkner-Simmons indicated that this condition would have prevented full

penetration, but her examination of M.R. after five years could not discount

whether an attempt at penetration had been made. Additionally, she testified

any wounds stemming from the assault would have been healed by the time of

her examination. In short, there is no medical evidence confirming or

disproving M.R.’s account.

                                       3
   Dr. Faulkner-Simmons testified about a statement M.R. made, which Clark

challenges as inadmissible hearsay. First, Dr. Faulkner-Simmons read from

her report summarizing M.R.’s statements during her interview of her, that

      she did disclose to me as well that she was sexually abused by an
      individual, um, and she described, where she was, who some of
      the people that were there. Uh, she also named the individual that
      she said abused her, um, and she said that he actually had a knife
      and a gun and showed them to her. And, um, she was told, excuse
      me, told not to tell anyone . . .
This testimony was objected to at trial in regard to referencing the knife and

gun, hence preserved. Later, Dr. Faulkner-Simmons testified,

      I forgot to mention that when he came in, he had turned all the
      lights off in the room where she was. He also had her to put his
      penis in her mouth, and then from there, she kind of closed down
      and said she had blocked out all the other details and couldn’t
      remember anymore. Which is not an unusual occurrence.

This last statement was not objected to at trial hence the alleged error is

unpreserved.

   Finally, there is one instance during voir dire that is subject to appeal. Clark

moved the trial court to strike Jurors 18 and 19 for cause. These motions were

denied, forcing him to use peremptory challenges which he would have used on

Jurors 32 and 3, and these jurors were identified to the trial court on the strike

sheet prior to seating the jury. Juror 32 was excused because 16 jurors had

already been selected thus mooting any challenge to Juror 18. But Juror 3 sat

on the jury, serving as foreperson. Because Juror 3 did sit on the jury, we

review for error as to Juror 19 since Clark’s preservation of this issue comports

with Neal v. Floyd, 590 S.W.3d 245, 252 (Ky. 2019). See also Gabbard v.

                                        4
Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ky. 2009) (holding that failure to strike

a juror for cause “can be shown to be non-prejudicial if the other jurors the

defendant would have used his peremptory strikes on do not actually sit on the

jury.”).

   As for Juror 19, he was a former coroner in Ohio County and had previously

served as a witness in a case which the lead prosecutor in this case had also

prosecuted. It was the prosecutor who brought this to the attention of the

Court. Juror 19 was brought to the bench and informed the Court he did not

remember the prosecutor and would not be preferential to the Commonwealth

if selected as a juror.

   Clark argues the trial court committed error by: refusing to strike Jurors 18

and 19 for cause, as noted, however, the challenge to Juror 18 is mooted

because Juror 32 did not sit on the jury; allowing Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’

hearsay statements; prohibiting Clark’s attorney from questioning M.R.

regarding her knowledge of her uncle’s alleged rape and sodomy charges; and

failing to direct a verdict on the charge for rape, as M.R. never specifically

testified to vaginal penetration by Clark and Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’ stated that

in her medical opinion M.R. was not penetrated vaginally by Clark. We now

address the merits and further facts will be developed as necessary.

                                   II.    Analysis

   A. No Abuse in Refusal to Strike Juror 19
   “When there is reasonable ground to believe that a prospective juror cannot

render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence, that juror shall be excused

                                         5
as not qualified.” RCr4 9.36. We have held time and again that partiality is a

state of mind and not a technical question, thus “the test is whether the nature

and strength of the opinion formed are such as in law necessarily . . . raise the

presumption of partiality.” Gabbard, 297 S.W.3d at 854 (quoting Montgomery v.

Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Ky. 1991)). This requires the trial court

to “weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's

responses and demeanor[,]” as well as “the credibility of the juror's answers.”

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 392 S.W.3d 907, 913 (Ky. 2013). We have also

emphasized that there is no such thing as rehabilitation. Gabbard, supra, at

853-54. Where a juror has made statements evincing a reasonable ground to

believe he or she is partial the juror ought to be disqualified, and neither the

Commonwealth, defense, nor the trial court may subject the juror in question

to a colloquy in hopes of salvaging that juror. Indeed, even where a juror’s

partiality is in a “gray area, he should be stricken.” Wallace v. Commonwealth,

478 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Ky. 2015).

   As for Juror 19, the sole basis advanced for his disqualification is that he

was a coroner in an adjacent county and had previously been a witness in a

rape and murder case that the prosecutor in this case had also prosecuted.

Clark cites no statements during voir dire by Juror 19 that could be construed

as giving a reasonable basis for partiality to the Commonwealth. We reject his

citation to Futrell v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 258, 274 (Ky. 2015) as

      4   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
                                          6
distinguishable. In that case, the juror with a previous relationship to the

assistant prosecutor had stated

      When asked during the prosecutor's voir dire whether his
      relationship with attorney Tobbe would “cause you to
      automatically give the Commonwealth's case or witnesses more
      weight than you would anything else?” Juror 75 replied, “I think
      so.” The prosecutor then asked whether Juror 75's relationship
      with attorney Tobbe would make it difficult for the juror to vote to
      acquit the defendants even if he felt the Commonwealth had failed
      to prove its case, and Juror 75 responded, “I really can't answer
      that. I'm trying to be honest with you.”
Id. at 273. No similar responses occurred here, and the Futrell court obviously

found partiality for Juror 75 based on his responses and not merely his

connection to the assistant prosecutor alone. The other juror that should have

been disqualified for his relationship to the assistant prosecutor was based on

his son being a current client of the attorney. Id. at 274. But this Court noted

other reasons existed to disqualify that juror as well. Id. at 275.

   In Fugate v. Commonwealth, we held the trial court should have disqualified

two jurors for cause because they had a previous relationship with the

prosecutor. 993 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Ky. 1999). One had had a living will and

incorporation papers for a business prepared by the prosecutor five years prior

to trial. Id. He expressed his satisfaction with the work and stated he might

seek his services in the future. The second was involved with the prosecutor

because of a bad check criminal case that was pending at the time of voir dire.

The juror and prosecutor had apparently gotten close enough to be on a first

name basis. Id. at 939. This Court explicitly endorsed the rule that “a trial

court is required to disqualify for cause prospective jurors who had a prior

                                         7
professional relationship with a prosecuting attorney and who profess that they

would seek such a relationship in the future.” Id. at 938.

   Fugate is distinguishable because Juror 19 was not professionally involved

with the prosecutor in the same manner as in Fugate. In Fugate, both jurors

had a relationship with the prosecutor in which they had a personal interest at

stake—one had a will and business incorporation papers filed on his behalf,

and the other had a criminal case pending wherein his business was the

victim. Here, the only relationship between Juror 19 and the prosecutor was

brought about by their mutual professional obligations where Juror 19 had to

testify as coroner in a murder case. Indeed, Juror 19 denied recognizing the

prosecutor despite that. Additionally, Clark has argued that Juror 19 should be

considered a member of law enforcement. But we have held that even police

officers should not be disqualified merely because they are police officers, and

thus work with the Commonwealth Attorney’s office in a professional capacity.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 597 (Ky. 2010). Because we find

Fugate distinguishable, and there being no statement identified by Clark that

could lead to a reasonable basis of partiality, we find no abuse of discretion by

the trial court in declining to strike him for cause.

   B. Harmless Error in Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’ Hearsay Statements
   The Kentucky Rules of Evidence provide an exception to hearsay for medical

treatment when the “[s]tatements [are] made for purposes of medical treatment

or diagnosis and describing medical history . . .” KRE 803(4). The

Commonwealth concedes the hearsay in this case. Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’

                                         8
mention of the gun and knife had no relation to her medical treatment or

diagnosis since there was no evidence the gun and knife were used to inflict a

physical injury upon M.R. or that they had caused her some kind of emotional

trauma. As to her statement that it was not an “unusual occurrence” when

M.R. described blocking out memories of her assault, that too is generally

prohibited because it is testimony as to a “habit of a class of individuals[,]”

Sanderson v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Kurtz v.

Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 409, 414 (Ky. 2005)), intending “to prove that the

person was a member of that class because he/she acted the same way under

similar circumstances.” Id. Sanderson gives an adequate review of this Court’s

jurisprudence demonstrating our distrust of testimony which tends to invade

the province of the jury by finding criminal conduct based on a psychological

syndrome of a victim. Id. at 612-14.

   But “[n]o error . . . is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a

verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order

unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be

inconsistent with substantial justice.” RCr 9.24. Regarding Dr. Faulkner-

Simmons’ statement about the gun and knife, the error was harmless. The

Commonwealth correctly notes that defense counsel did not ask for the

statement to be stricken from the record nor for an admonition to the jury to

disregard it. She only asked that the doctor’s testimony be kept within proper

bounds regarding medical treatment and diagnosis. The rest of her testimony

conformed (with one exception that was not objected to at trial, discussed

                                         9
below) to that request despite the trial court overruling her motion. Technically

speaking, the trial court ought to have sustained the objection but

substantively Clark “received all the relief he requested . . . thus, there is no

error to review.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 430, 441 (Ky. 2003).

   As to the “not an unusual occurrence” statement, being an unpreserved

objection, our review is for palpable error. “A palpable error must be so grave in

nature that if it were uncorrected, it would seriously affect the fairness of the

proceedings.” Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006). Only

if the reviewing court is convinced “the result in the case would have been

different without the error[,]” will palpable error be found. Id. In King v.

Commonwealth, we held that it was not palpable error when a police

investigator testified that “delayed reporting” was not unusual in child sexual

abuse cases, and in fact it was “very rare” for children to immediately report

such abuse. 472 S.W.3d 523, 527 (Ky. 2015). Although the testimony here was

qualitatively different, relating to M.R.’s blocked memory of the assault rather

than the five-year delay in reporting, both fundamentally involve typical

behavior of a victim of sexual abuse. But in like manner as in King, the

testimony here did not result in a manifest injustice. The testimony in King was

much more extensive than the one-off sentence expressed, unprompted, by Dr.

Faulkner-Simmons here. The Commonwealth did not pursue an improper line

of inquiry afterwards but rather moved Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’ testimony along

to the concrete, physical facts of M.R.’s case. We are not convinced the result in

                                         10
this case would have been different but for Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’ one short

statement.

   C. Right to Cross-Examination was not Infringed
   Clark also contends that his right to cross-examination was violated when

the trial court precluded him from asking M.R. about how she acquired

knowledge regarding the sexual acts she described as being perpetrated by

Clark. In other words, Clark alleges that M.R. had previously heard familial

discussions regarding her uncle who also had been charged with rape and

sodomy prior to her first reporting the assault. Clark contends that it was her

knowledge of these charges against her uncle that allowed M.R. to concoct the

allegations against him. Moreover, Clark implies in his briefing that M.R. made

up the story of an assault to avoid getting in trouble for running away; and her

knowledge of her uncle’s alleged rape and sodomy charges was relevant to that

alternate theory. We note that while the trial court prohibited questions

regarding her uncle, it did say Clark could cross examine M.R. regarding her

alleged motivation to accuse him of rape in order to avoid getting in trouble for

running away.

   In Basham v. Commonwealth, we held the constitutional right to cross

examination “does not give criminal defendants a right to present evidence that

is not probative, nor does it authorize a fishing expedition at trial.” 455 S.W.3d

415, 420 (Ky. 2014). Basham had sought to cross examine the victim regarding

her visiting pornographic websites in order to provide evidence that she “was

previously exposed to the sort of sexual acts that she described in her

                                        11
allegations of abuse.” Id. at 419. This has come to be known as the “sexual

innocence inference.” “[B]ecause most children of tender years are ignorant of

matters relating to sexual conduct, a child complainant's ability to describe

such conduct may persuade the jury that the charged conduct in fact

occurred.” Id. at 418 n.7 (quoting Grant v. Demskie, 75 F.Supp.2d 201, 213–16

(S.D.N.Y. 1999)). Basham, however, had only sought to ask the victim if she

had ever visited a website with naked people on it. Consequently, we held

“merely seeing images of naked people” was not an adequate alternate source

of knowledge for the sexual acts alleged in that case, thus the offer of proof was

neither probative nor relevant and therefore inadmissible. Id. at 420.

   Although Clark has not alleged the jury would have inferred from M.R.’s age

alone that her knowledge of sexual acts could only be explained by her

experiencing them because of Clark’s assault, the underlying rationale of

Basham is still applicable. Like in Basham, Clark’s offer of proof lacks the

requisite specificity for the Court to say it was relevant. There is nothing in the

record to demonstrate M.R.’s uncle’s alleged rape and sodomy were in anywise

similar to what she claims to have undergone, nor is there any avowal

testimony that she overheard any family discussions regarding her uncle’s

alleged actions. The line of questioning was irrelevant and inadmissible, and

the trial court properly excluded it.

   D. No Error in Refusal to Direct a Verdict on Rape Charge
   Finally, Clark argues the trial court should have directed a verdict in his

favor on the rape charge because Dr. Faulkner-Simmons testified she did not

                                        12
believe penetration occurred and M.R. never specifically testified to being

penetrated vaginally by Clark.

      The legal standards for a directed verdict motion are clear: ‘if under
      the evidence as a whole it would not be clearly unreasonable for a
      jury to find the defendant guilty, he is not entitled to a directed
      verdict of acquittal.’ Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530,
      533 (Ky. 1977). ‘The trial court must draw all fair and reasonable
      inferences from the evidence in favor of the party opposing the
      motion, and a directed verdict should not be given unless the
      evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The evidence
      presented must be accepted as true. The credibility and the weight
      to be given the testimony are questions for the jury
      exclusively.’ Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983).
      The standard for appellate review is equally clear: ‘on appellate
      review, the test of a directed verdict is, if under the evidence as a
      whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only
      then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of
      acquittal.’ Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.
      1991).

Eversole v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 209, 217-18 (Ky. 2020). “We construe

all evidence below in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 497 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Ky. 2016).

   Our analysis depends first and foremost on the statute. First-degree rape

occurs when one “engages in sexual intercourse with another person” by

forcible compulsion or the victim is either physically helpless or is twelve years

or younger. KRS5 510.040. “Sexual intercourse” has been defined by the

General Assembly as “its ordinary sense and includes penetration of the sex

organs of one person by any body part or a foreign object manipulated by

another person.” KRS 510.010(8). Any penetration, “however slight[,]” is all that

      5   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
                                        13
is required to meet the element of the crime. Id. Because the legislature has

also defined “deviate sexual intercourse” to mean “any act of sexual

gratification involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of

another[,]” rape in the first degree of a female is necessarily limited to

penetration of her vagina. KRS 510.010(1).

   The peculiarity of this case arises from M.R.’s vaginal abnormality. Because

of this abnormality, Dr. Faulkner-Simmons did state “I do not believe she had a

penis penetrating her vaginal area.” But that is one, isolated sentence and does

not accurately convey the whole of her testimony. Dr. Faulkner-Simmons

described M.R.’s abnormality as “The vaginal opening wasn’t a normal one-hole

opening. It was webbed, if you will, and had multiple openings because there

was tissue that criss—you know, crossed over from each side.” Because of this

she also stated, “If there was a potential for penetration, it probably would not

have gone through, but it would have been painful.” Thus, the Commonwealth

asked “Could the penis have penetrated the vagina, just not fully?” To which

she responded unequivocally “Right. Correct.” It is therefore incorrect to

describe Dr. Faulkner-Simmons’ opinion as no penetration whatsoever

occurred. She admitted an attempt at penetration could have occurred and

that it could have been less than full penetration, i.e., “however slight.” But we

have already detailed that the physical medical evidence was lacking to confirm

any kind of penetration, so the case depended upon M.R.’s own testimony.6

      6 “The testimony of a single witness is enough to support a conviction.” King,
supra, at 526.
                                          14
   M.R.’s testimony never included an explicit statement with the term

“penetration.” But “[t]he fact of penetration may be proved by circumstances.”

Jones v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Ky. 1992). Moreover,

“[a] jury may make reasonable inferences from circumstantial evidence.”

Commonwealth v. James, 586 S.W.3d 717, 721-22 (Ky. 2019). And as we have

just stated, on a motion for a directed verdict the trial court is required to make

all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, as well as

accepting M.R.’s account as true. Eversole, supra.

   M.R. testified during Clark’s attack that “I just looked down and something

hurt really, really bad.” In another colloquy with the Commonwealth she again

stated,

          M.R.: “Something really, really bad hurt.”
          Commonwealth: “What part of your body hurt?”
          M.R.: “My vagina.”
          Commonwealth: “Was that before or after he put on the
          condom?”
          M.R.: “After.”
Finally, she testified after the attack “I was bleeding and stuff . . . he told me to

go take a shower.” Dr. Faulkner-Simmons testified that M.R.’s abnormality

would have made penetration painful, and common sense tells us that an

eight-year-old would have experienced pain upon being penetrated vaginally.

There is no logical explanation for the pain M.R. described if penetration did

not occur. M.R.’s testimony of bleeding after the attack also has no logical

explanation without penetration as there was no other testimony that he

otherwise beat her or cut her. We cannot say, viewing the evidence as a whole,

                                         15
that it was unreasonable for a jury to find Clark had raped M.R. Dr. Faulkner-

Simmons’ testimony does not discount some kind of penetration occurring, and

a juror could (in fact, did) make reasonable inferences from M.R.’s testimony

that some kind of penetration of her vagina had occurred.

                                III.   Conclusion
   For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Clark’s convictions.

   All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Aaron Reed Baker
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Mark D. Berry
Assistant Attorney General

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