Court Opinion

ID: 9895976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 23:04:09.899173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:09.994161
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/8/23 Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

EUNICES ARGUETA,                                                B306910

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BC703825)
         v.

WORLDWIDE FLIGHT
SERVICES, INC.,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Monica Bachner, Judge. Reversed.
     Matern Law Group, Matthew J. Matern, Debra J. Tauger,
Joshua D. Boxer and Irina A. Kirnosova for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Howard & Howard Attorneys and Robert L. Rosenthal for
Defendant and Respondent.
                                    _________________________
       After the jury returned a defense verdict in appellant
Eunices Argueta’s action for sexual harassment against
Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. (Worldwide), she filed a motion
for a new trial and a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV). The trial court denied both motions. Argueta
now appeals, contending the trial court’s admission of evidence of
the substance of other employees’ complaints about her to
Worldwide was erroneous and warrants a new trial. She also
contends there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s
finding that Worldwide employee Dzung Nguyen’s acts of sexual
harassment were not severe or pervasive.1 On these grounds she
contends a new trial or a finding in her favor is required. We
agree admission of the substance of the complaints against
Argueta was prejudicial error and reverse the trial court’s denial
of her motion for a new trial. Accordingly, we need not and do
not consider her JNOV motion.
                        BACKGROUND
      Argueta began working at Menzies Aviation, a freight
operations company in El Segundo, California, in 2008 when she
was 18 years old. From about 2008 to 2014, Argueta and Dzung
Nguyen (Nguyen) worked for Menzies at a location near Los
Angeles International Airport. In October 2014, Worldwide
acquired Menzies; Argueta and Nguyen continued to work for
Worldwide. Argueta was a lead agent in the import department;
her supervisor was Sonia Flores. Nguyen worked as their

1     Nguyen was originally named as a defendant in this action,
but before trial the parties stipulated to dismissing him.
Argueta’s complaint alleges the sexual harassment started in
2016 and continued through 2017.

                                2
manager. When Flores was not present, Argueta worked as the
acting supervisor and oversaw the work of other agents.
      In November 2016, Worldwide hired Maria Diaz as its
Director of Human Resources for its western region. Before Diaz,
there was no human resources director at Worldwide’s Los
Angeles Airport location.
A.    The Employee Complaints
      In November 2016 and January 2017, several employees
whom Argueta supervised submitted written complaints to
Worldwide about Argueta, accusing her of bullying, harassment,
retaliation, yelling, making threats and other bad behavior,
including discriminating against a pregnant subordinate.
Although Argueta moved in limine to preclude admission of the
substance of the complaints, the trial court not only allowed their
admission but ruled that the entire text of the complaints could
be admitted. So Argueta’s attorneys preemptively asked
Worldwide’s Diaz to read the written complaints aloud to the
jury.
      Edwin Quinonez’s complaint read: “First of all, decisions
are being made based on politics and not productivity. Eunices is
a manipulative individual and takes advantage of situations to
advance her own profile. [¶] For example, she takes credit for
other people’s work to set herself up for a promotion. [¶] Second,
she abuses her power as a lead. There ha[ve] been scenarios
where we—the office agents have been threatened by her if we
don’t do things her way. She has threatened us with the
following: either moving us to night shift, changing our hours,
and our days off. . . . [¶] Also, this individual loves to create and
spread rumors. With doing so, rumors in the workplace can lead
to hurt feelings, conflict of interest among peers, tainting a

                                  3
person’s image, and is damaging to one’s reputation, not to
mention a hostile environment. [¶] Whether the rumor is true or
not, the outcome of spreading it can be very damaging. As a lead,
Eunices isn’t supposed to make false statements; instead, she
encourages it and supports such behavior.”
       Cynthia Rodriguez’s complaint read: “I, Cynthia Rodriguez,
have seen Eunices be rude to Asiana cargo agents. She leaves for
long periods at a time, she gives orders to agents, and she sits in
the back and starts using her phone while she keeps just making
orders. She had even been disrespectful to our house agents. [¶]
She has caused tension between me and China Eastern agents
because of her overhearing a situation and telling the agents
without her knowing what’s really going on.”
       Wendy Sosa’s complaint read: “HR Department, I am
writing this letter to lodge a formal complaint against my lead,
Eunices Argueta. I feel that I have been harassed and bullied by
her. This has been going on for awhile now. I have lost my
patience. She has been a very rude person to me and my
coworkers. I feel that we cannot work in that type of
environment. [¶] Eunices has threatened me to send me to the
night to change my schedule, and now I have heard that she
convinced Asian management to have me transferred from the
airline to a different airline. This, to me, makes me feel that she
has something against me. [¶] Eunices says I have an attitude
but I have it when people provoke me like her, and I have not had
attitude with no one else but her. [¶] Now I just came back from
my baby bonding on Friday, January 26, 2017, and apparently
she went ahead and told my coworkers that I went upstairs to
HR and told Maria from HR department that there was a couple
working here. What kind of person would dare to lie to my

                                4
coworkers and tell them lies and involve me in problems that I
have no idea about? And this happened when I was out on baby
bonding time. It seems like she wants us to have problems with
each other. [¶] Another thing I want to mention is that when I
was coming back from disability, Sonia asked me, on behalf of
Dzung, if I want the opportunity to move accounting department
to there. I got my hopes up. And when I did come back, I heard a
rumor that Eunices played a big role in me not being able to get
that position. [¶] It seems like she has a lot of envy toward me
and others in the office, as if she can’t or doesn’t want to see
others succeed or be happy because that’s when she acts
aggressive, rude, even destructive. I don’t understand. I have
never in my life met someone that will make lies and involve you
into drama. [¶] Another thing, I have been scared to drive the
flight since I started working, let alone when I was pregnant and
I did not feel good going to the flight with the plane fumes smell
and the plane stairs to be—to get documents. [¶] Eunices told me
that I was not disabled, that I was just pregnant, and that she
didn’t care the fact that I was pregnant and didn’t want me to
take a chance and slip while going up the stairs and just that—
that did not want me to risk my life and my baby’s life. [¶] So I
brought a doctor’s note to HR last year, and Eunices made a big
deal about it and told my coworkers that I just didn’t want to go
to the flight. At that time my coworkers got mad at me because
they feel I just didn’t want to go, but in reality, they understood
that I was pregnant. [¶] My coworkers and I have had enough of
her attitude and performance towards us. I really think she
needs to stop treating us like animals, telling us what to do, and
very bad . . . tone of voice and making us feel bad in front of
coworkers and customers. [¶] . . . [¶] As soon as Sonia leaves the

                                5
office, she just starts to attack us. [¶] I hope this complaint from
myself and coworkers that this issue get[s] resolved so we can
have a productive, peaceful environment.”
       Diana Cortez’s complaint read: “It has taken me a very long
time to find the courage to lodge this formal complaint against
lead agent Eunices Argueta. She has been emotionally abusing
many of us workers for a very long time, and we are all afraid to
speak up, but we have all decided to try to put a stop to this. [¶]
Even though multiple complaints have been made to HR in the
past, seems like no action has been taken in regards to this
matter. [¶] I am hoping that with someone new in charge of our
human resources, some kind of consequences are applied so that
this problem can finally come to an end. [¶] Eunices has a very
impolite and aggressive way of speaking to others. She shouts as
she asks for things to be done and asks for things in a very
impolite way, such as slamming papers on the desk. And when
she is mad, she begins to throw things around. [¶] She shows up
to work in a bad mood some days, and those mornings are the
worst because this is when she’s extra rude and aggressive. She
likes to slam papers on her desk when asked us to finish
something. [¶] One time I told her not to throw things at me and
she said she can do whatever she want because she is a lead. [¶]
Those mornings, she likes to purposely change our chores around
and likes to yell at us. I think this makes us feel like she is
power and helps her relieve whatever anger she showed up to
work with. [¶] We all feel very uncomfortable working in the
environment. She shouts through the intercom, and some of our
warehouse workers have also had confrontations with her in the
past about her rude behavior. [¶] Eunices has indeed threatened
us by saying she will use her power and move us to swing shift if

                                 6
we do not follow instructions. [¶] When I have confronted about
rude behavior, she is quick to state that she is a lead and she can
do whatever she desires and she does not need to . . . help out
with operations if she does not wish to. She says that regardless
of how many drivers are waiting to be helped, she does not need
to help us out if she does not want to because she is a lead. [¶] . . .
She has disrespected all of us in front of our customers. This
kind of verbal and psychological abuse are not . . . conductive to a
healthy atmosphere in the workplace and can impact our ability
to complete the work effectively. [¶] . . . [¶] She sits on her desk
and stays on her phone most of the time while we are doing all of
the work. She likes to take long lunches than the rest of us. . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] She leaves unfinished work and tells us to finish it
because she do not like to do that part. If the phone rings and
they are busy with, she will not pick up the phone, but yet, she’s
sitting there playing with her cell phone.”
        Urania Chavarria’s complaint read: “As I reported to HR
before, I continued to have issues with my lead, Eunices. Ms.
Eunices continues to belittle and disrespect me during work and
in front of customers and my colleagues. She continues to make
me aware that she is a lead and she can do whatever she wants
to do. She continues to mistreat employees with her bad attitude
communication skills. [¶] . . . [¶] On Monday, January 2nd,
around 1:22, I stepped out of the office to make a private personal
call. As I came into the office, she began to yell at me with a loud
and angry tone. ‘Where were you?’ and ‘Next time you need to
take a call, you need to let me know exactly where you are.’ [¶]
This is all going on in front of customers and employees. She
made it a point that she will disrespect me whenever she wants

                                  7
and wherever she is and in front of whoever. I have never done
anything to her for her to treat me this way.”
B.    The Employee Complaint Investigation and the Sexual
      Harassment Allegations
       In January 2017, Diaz met with Argueta to discuss these
complaints. Diaz testified she told Argueta that if her behavior
did not improve, she would be terminated. Argueta gave a
different account of the meeting, testifying she was not expressly
threatened with termination.
       In early May 2017, Chavarria became upset because she
believed that Argueta picked up and ate almost all of the
chocolate bar Chavarria had left on her desk, leaving only a tiny
piece. Argueta claimed she broke off only a small piece. When
her supervisor Flores questioned her about the chocolate,
Argueta said she only took a little piece. Flores reviewed a
surveillance video and accused Argueta of lying.
       In her complaint, Argueta alleged Nguyen began sexually
harassing her in 2016. On May 11, 2017, Nguyen placed Argueta
“out of service” while the matter was investigated; this
essentially meant she was placed on paid leave.
       While Argueta was on leave, she consulted with a lawyer
and, on May 15, 2017, the last scheduled day of her leave, she
emailed a written complaint to Worldwide accusing Nguyen of
sexually harassing her. She wrote that he “would state to close
my eyes and he would feel on my face and shoulders in a way
that gave me chills and discomfort. He would always come
behind me when I was at my desk and grab my hand in a weird
way. Call me words of affections like ‘[you’re] my baby, that’s
why I love you, [you’re] my sweet heart, [you’re] my girl[.]’ I have

                                 8
text message[s] that have emojis that are not appropriate from a
manager to a[n] employee.”
       Argueta subsequently claimed many more acts of
harassment. She testified Nguyen would trip and fall into her
which initially seemed like an accident but when it increased in
frequency, it appeared deliberate because he tried to or did touch
her, including her breasts. She would ask him, “what’s going
on?” He never stopped falling into her. He would give her back
or shoulder rubs and ask her to rub his shoulders. Once he
placed his hand on Argueta’s thigh and rubbed it “up and down.”
She pushed his hand away “and told him to never touch [her]
again.”
       Argueta told Nguyen to go away when he asked for a
massage. In response, he would get mad, walk away and not talk
to her the rest of the day. His silence impeded Argueta’s ability
to do her job because she needed him to overwrite entries in the
system and he would ignore her.
       He asked her to dinner three times and told her she could
cook dinner for him. She rejected his invitation. At one point in
2017, he started hugging her, touching her face and hair, rubbing
her back and she “could feel his body against [her].” He was
kissing her forehead cheeks and eyelids. His hands were on her
hair, face and back. His face was at her chest. She was “really
shocked [and] scared.” She pushed him away and told him to
never touch her again. After collecting herself, she returned to
work but could not concentrate. She started having attendance
problems because she did not want to go to work and see Nguyen.
She was counseled by her supervisor Flores for her tardiness and
for leaving work early.

                                9
C.    The Harassment Investigation
      Worldwide conducted an investigation of Argueta’s
complaint, although Argueta contends it was not thorough. First,
Diaz met with Argueta. According to Diaz, Argueta told her that
Nguyen came to her desk and grabbed her hand to use the
computer mouse, pretended to trip and bump into her, and
massaged her back and shoulders. According to Argueta, she told
Diaz that Nguyen blocked her path, called her to his office and
then touched her, would only help her if she let him touch her,
would tell her to close her eyes and then kiss her on the eyelids,
and ask to give her a hug.
      Diaz, facility assistant general manager Javier Trujillo,
and facility general manager John Oh then met with Nguyen.
Nguyen admitted some but not all the acts Argueta alleged. The
record cites provided by Argueta show that Nguyen admitted
generally to patting female employees on the shoulder and using
“pet names” for the women. Additionally, Nguyen admitted to
saying “I love you” or “I love you girls.” With regard to Argueta
specifically, Nguyen admitted sending emojis in texts to her.
Nguyen specifically admitted to telling Argueta to close her eyes
and then touching her face to remove smeared make-up.2 He also
admitted to standing close to Argueta and putting his hand over
hers on a mouse when she asked for help with computer issues.
Argueta contends Nguyen admitted giving back rubs. The
evidence is somewhat conflicting, but the letter sent from

2     Argueta claimed he kissed her.

                               10
Worldwide to Nguyen states that Nguyen admitted giving back
rubs.3
       Diaz also interviewed Argueta’s supervisor, Flores.
According to Diaz, Flores told her she did not observe anything.
At some later point, Flores told her Nguyen was “handsy.” Flores
testified she told Diaz initially that Nguyen was “handsy” and
gave as an example his placing his hand on hers on the mouse.
       As a result of the investigation, Worldwide issued a “Letter
of Concern” to Nguyen stating that Nguyen had admitted to some
actions “that can easily be construed as sexual harassment” and
“[t]his is a violation of our policy.” Worldwide imposed a number
of conditions on Nguyen’s continued employment: undergo
additional sexual harassment training; cease sending emojis to
subordinates; use “appropriate language”; keep a minimum of
three feet from employees; and not make any physical contact
with an employee without their express permission.
       When Argueta returned from leave in June 2017, she was
transferred to a different floor and assigned to a different client;
she worked for the client’s manager and was supervised only by
Trujillo. Her pay remained the same. There was conflicting
evidence as to whether Argueta chose to move or whether this
move was retaliation for her complaint against Nguyen.

3     Assistant general manager Trujillo attempted to minimize
Nguyen’s admission, stating the term was ambiguous and could
include pats on the shoulder; Trujillo then acknowledged Nguyen
went further than that, by which Trujillo apparently meant
shoulder massages. Diaz apparently understood Nguyen as
admitting to the face touching and hand-on-mouse touching but
not admitting any other physical touching of Argueta.

                                11
      In February 2018, Argueta resigned from Worldwide. She
stated she resigned because her new schedule was not compatible
with her family responsibilities and her new position offered
diminished potential to advance.
D.    Subsequent Sexual Harassment by Nguyen
      In 2019, three female Worldwide employees made written
complaints that Nguyen was sexually harassing them. Some of
the actions occurred as far back as 2017. One of the
complainants, Joy Faalata, had been identified by Argueta as a
witness in 2017 but Worldwide had not interviewed her. Their
complaints identified behavior similar to what Argueta had
complained about: bumping into employees and then leaning into
them, standing near them at their desks, and sometimes making
physical contact by leaning into them or touching their hands on
the mouse.
      Worldwide’s (new) local human resources manager for the
Los Angeles Airport facility investigated the complaints and
found Nguyen had violated Worldwide’s sexual harassment policy
and the conditions in the Letter of Concern. Worldwide
terminated Nguyen in March 2019.
                        DISCUSSION
      Argueta filed this action against Worldwide, alleging sexual
harassment and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), and failure to prevent both. As
relevant to this appeal, Argueta claimed she resigned due to a
hostile work environment. Such a claim requires proof that the
acts of harassment were severe or pervasive. (Lyle v. Warner
Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 283.)
A hostile work environment has a subjective component, and “a

                               12
plaintiff who does not perceive the workplace as hostile or
abusive will not prevail, even if it objectively is so.” (Id. at
p. 284.)
A.    Employee Complaints About Argueta’s Behavior Constituted
      Inadmissible Character Evidence and Prejudiced
      Appellant’s Case.
       Argueta moved for a new trial in part based on the trial
court’s error in admitting the substance of the 2016 and 2017
employee complaints against her. The trial court treated this
claim as a claim of an irregularity in the proceedings. A party is
entitled to a new trial when an irregularity in the proceedings, or
any order of the court or abuse of discretion, “materially affect[s]
the substantial rights of such party” and prevents them from
having a fair trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 657(1).)
       As a general matter, the denial of a motion for new trial is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, with the appellate court making
an independent determination as to whether any error was
prejudicial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th
826, 859; Nazari v. Ayrapetyan (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 690,
693-694.) However, “any determination underlying [the new
trial] order is scrutinized under the test appropriate to such
determination.” (Aguilar, at p. 859.) The most fundamental rule
of appellate review is that the judgment or order challenged on
appeal is presumed to be correct, and it is the appellant’s burden
to affirmatively demonstrate error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing
in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action
will be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Id. at p. 609.)

                                  13
       In her motion in limine No. 2, Argueta sought to exclude
the substance of the complaints made by other employees about
her behavior. Argueta also sought to exclude the physical
documents which reported the complaints. She did not seek to
exclude the fact that complaints had been made.
       The trial court’s tentative ruling was that the substance of
any complaint which had been communicated to Argueta would
be admissible at trial, to show “the plaintiff’s motive for making
the complaints of sexual harassment.” Specifically, the motive
was that Argueta feared for her job because these complaints had
been made against her. After hearing argument from both
parties, the court ruled that Argueta “may be examined
regarding the substance of the written complaints that were
communicated to her . . . as relevant to motive. If any other
portions are to be offered for any other purpose, i.e.
impeachment, the defense needs to address the court outside the
presence of the jury or for any other purpose, okay.”
       In a deposition taken after the court’s ruling, Diaz testified
that she read all the complaint letters to Argueta. Argueta’s
counsel asked the trial court to reconsider its ruling in light of
this testimony, which greatly increased the amount of evidence
on this topic, but the trial court declined to change its substantive
ruling. As detailed above, Worldwide’s Diaz read the entire
contents of all the complaint letters to the jury.
       The trial court gave a short limiting instruction when the
complaints were read to the jury. In her motion for a new trial,
Argueta contended that the trial court erred in admitting the
substance of the “bad behavior” complaints against her because
1) the evidence was improper and irrelevant character evidence,
2) motive is not an element of a sexual harassment claim,

                                 14
3) defendant would be strictly liable for any sexual harassment,
and 4) defendant’s HR person admitted Nguyen committed acts
of sexual harassment and so made “motive” irrelevant. She also
contended that even if the evidence had some minimal relevance,
that relevance was far outweighed by its high potential for undue
prejudice. Argueta further contended Worldwide counsel
improperly used the evidence as bad character evidence in closing
argument.
       The trial court denied the new trial motion and found that
its ruling “does not constitute an order that deprived Plaintiff of
having a fair trial. Defendant submitted evidence that
complaints made against Plaintiff amounted to evidence relating
to what Defendant asserts was her actual motive for filing her
complaint against Nguyen, and as such, were relevant to
supporting Defendant’s defenses, including that Plaintiff never
complained about Nguyen’s alleged conduct prior to filing the
complaint because she never believed it to be severe or pervasive.
(Opposition, pgs. 6-7.) In reply, Plaintiff argues that the
character evidence of complaints made against Plaintiff has
nothing to do with her harassment claim and motive is not an
element of her harassment claim nor any defense thereto.
(Reply, pgs. 7-8.) However, evidence that Plaintiff had
alternative reasons for filing a sexual harassment complaint
against Nguyen is relevant to whether Defendant’s defense, that
the harassment was not severe and/or pervasive, has merit. [¶]
The Court finds that Defendant’s use of the evidence relating to
complaints made against Plaintiff did not amount to an
irregularity in the proceedings that deprived Plaintiff from
having a fair trial. Plaintiff argues that during closing argument
Defendant’s counsel raised Plaintiff’s behavioral issues and at no

                                15
point did he tie them to her motive for complaining of sexual
harassment and that this argument was merely to inflame the
jury; however, this argument is not supported by the transcript.
(Reply, pg. 8; citing, Decl. of Boxer, Exh . K 2/28/20 Transcript 95:
12-20.) In his closing argument, Defendant’s counsel discusses
complaints lodged against Plaintiff as ‘not good behavior” and
thereafter argues that because of these complaints of bad
behavior, in January 2017, Plaintiff knew her job was on the line.
(Decl. of Boxer, Exh. K, 2/28/20 Transcript, 95.) Later in his
closing argument, Defendant’s counsel describes the timeline of
Plaintiff meeting Nguyen, working with Nguyen, discipline by
Nguyen and subsequent filing a complaint against him, which
suggests the motive for filing the complaint was not because she
found the [sic] Nguyen’s alleged harassing conduct to be severe
and pervasive, but because she wanted to retaliate for his
punishing her. (Decl. of Boxer, Exh. K, 2/28/20 Transcript,
112-113.) The Court’s admission of evidence of complaints
against Plaintiff and Defendant’s use of this evidence to
demonstrate Plaintiff had alternative reasons for complaining
about Nguyen, thereby suggesting that the harassment was not
severe and pervasive, did not constitute an irregularity in the
proceedings that deprived Plaintiff of her right to a fair trial.”
       Worldwide contends that Argueta simply repeats the
arguments of her new trial motion on appeal, and this is not
sufficient. We find her arguments on appeal sufficient. We agree
with Argueta that the high potential for undue prejudice from
admission of the substance of the complaints far outweighed the
very minimal probative value of that evidence, and a limiting
instruction would not be effective under the circumstances of this
case. Accordingly, we find the trial court abused its discretion in

                                 16
admitting the substance of the complaints. We independently
assess the effect of this error and find it prejudicial: it materially
affected appellant’s substantial rights and prevented her from
having a fair trial.
       Although Argueta contends the evidence was not relevant
because motive was not an element of any of her causes of action,
this is too narrow a view of motive. Motive need not be an
element of a cause of action to be relevant or material. This is
particularly true where, as here, the motive provides a reason to
lie or fabricate. The law is clear that the credibility of a witness
is always an issue for the trier of fact to decide and the trier of
fact “may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any
matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the
truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing.” (Evid. Code, 4
§ 780.) The matters which may be considered expressly include
“[t]he existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other
motive.” (Id., subd. (f).)5
       The fact that a number of employees complained about
Argueta’s behavior in November 2016 and January 2017, when
taken together with Diaz’s January 2017 warning that Argueta
would be terminated if her behavior did not improve, the new
complaint against Argueta in May 2017 about the chocolate bar
and Argueta’s meeting with a lawyer during the May 2017

4    Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Evidence Code.
5     The jury was instructed on evaluating the credibility of
witnesses with CACI No. 5003, which tells the jury to consider
whether “the witness have any reason to say something that was
not true?”

                                  17
investigation of that complaint do support a reasonable inference
that Argueta had a motive to fabricate her claim that Nguyen
sexually harassed her, that is, to save her job.6
       On these facts, the substance of the complaints against
Argueta are irrelevant. Under Diaz’s account of events, Argueta
had every reason to fear that the May 2017 complaint against
her, if substantiated, would result in her termination. Argueta,
however, denied that Diaz told her she would be terminated if
her behavior did not improve. Argueta testified that Diaz told
her only that she would be written up. Thus, the substance of the
complaints, and specifically the seriousness of the behavior
described in the complaints, had some arguably minimal
relevance in resolving this credibility dispute. It was also
minimally relevant in assessing how worried Argueta may or
may not have been about being fired, and thus whether she did in
fact have a reason to fabricate her complaint against Nguyen.
We note, however, that this relevance is extremely minimal in
light of respondent’s decision to put Argueta on paid leave while
investigating the May 2017 chocolate bar incident, which action
alone indicates that Argueta’s job might be in jeopardy,
regardless of whether Diaz had previously indicated Argueta’s
continued bad behavior would result in termination.

6      Argueta argues that she complained about Nguyen’s
behavior before the May 2017 chocolate bar incident. The record
shows that Argueta did testify that she complained orally to
Flores at some unspecified time in 2015, but Flores ignored her.
She also testified that she complained to Nguyen directly. We do
not find that these complaints undercut the probative value of
the fact that Argueta did not make a formal written complaint to
human resources until two years later, in May 2017, when her
job was at risk.

                               18
       Although the trial court’s order denying the new trial
motion also found the substance of the complaints relevant to
show that Argueta was not actually offended by Nguyen’s conduct
and/or did not believe it was severe or pervasive, there was no
discussion of this purpose in connection with the motion in
limine. Worldwide has not pointed to any subsequent ruling by
the trial court permitting admission of the evidence for this
specific purpose. In her reply brief in support of her new trial
motion, Argueta characterizes this as a “newly-minted” argument
by Worldwide, in response to the new trial motion. Nevertheless,
the trial court approved this purpose in its order denying the new
trial motion.
       We cannot agree with the trial court. The substance of the
complaints was not relevant at all to assessing whether Argueta
was offended by Nguyen’s actual conduct or whether she did not
perceive it as severe and pervasive or whether she had a motive
to fabricate or embellish the severity or pervasiveness of
Nguyen’s conduct. If Diaz told Argueta she would be terminated
if her behavior did not improve, that is the motive to lie.7 The
lies could involve outright fabrication of conduct or
embellishment of actual conduct, i.e., its severity or
pervasiveness. It could also involve claiming to be offended when
she was not, or claiming she found the conduct severe and
pervasive when she did not. The substance of the employee
complaints sheds no light on which might have occurred.
Relatedly, if Nguyen was responsible for disciplining Argueta for
the May 2017 chocolate bar incident, that action would give

7    Similarly, the formality of the investigation of Argueta,
which itself indicated a strong possibility of a serious adverse
consequence, would provide a motive to lie.

                                 19
Argueta a motive to fabricate or embellish accusations against
him, particularly given the potential consequences of the May
2017 incident. It would also give her a motive to claim she was
offended when she was not. But again, the substance of the prior
complaints against Argueta (that she was a bad boss and a bad
person) does not shed any light on what form any deception
might take, that is, whether it involved outright fabrication or
embellishment of the severity of Nguyen’s conduct, or fabrication
of Argueta’s own response.
       Even when evidence is relevant, a trial court has discretion
to exclude that evidence “if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.” (§ 352.) Prejudice, under section 352,
refers to “ ‘ “ ‘ “evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the [moving party] as an individual and
which has very little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ” (Donlen v. Ford
Motor Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 138, 150.) When the evidence
at issue involves prior bad acts, substantial prejudice is inherent
in the evidence and its admission requires “extremely careful
analysis.” The evidence should be examined pursuant to
section 352. Generally, such evidence is admissible only if it has
“substantial” probative value. (See Brown v. Smith (1997)
55 Cal.App.4th 767, 791 (Brown).)
       Here, the employee complaints about appellant fit the
quintessential definition of prejudice. The trial court failed to
recognize that the evidence had a high potential for undue
prejudice. It is, as Argueta contends, character evidence. The
complaints show her as mean, rude, lazy, and dishonest. In this

                                 20
context, the accusations of dishonesty are particularly
prejudicial. Sosa accused Argueta of two specific acts of
dishonesty and more generally of lying to create drama.8
Quinonez accused Argueta of lying to advance her career:
“Eunices is a manipulative individual and takes advantage of
situations to advance her own profile. [¶] For example, she takes
credit for others people’s work to set herself up for a promotion.”
Almost as troubling are the depictions of Argueta as someone
who was capable of protecting her own interests. Quinonez
described Argueta as taking advantage of situations to advance
herself. Cortez described Argueta as “aggressive” and not afraid
of confrontations. Chavarria similarly described Argueta as
confrontational. All complainants described Argueta as rude.
This paints a picture of a person who, to put it mildly, is not
afraid to speak her mind. This also has the potential to
undermine Argueta’s credibility in a different (and improper)
way, by suggesting that she would not have been afraid to
complain contemporaneously if someone were in fact harassing
her.9

8      “What kind of person would dare to lie to my coworkers and
tell them lies [about an HR visit to complain about other
employees] and involve me in problems that I have no idea
about?” and “I brought a doctor’s note to HR last year [excusing
me from going to the flight for health reasons], and Eunices made
a big deal about it and told my coworkers that I just didn’t want
to go to the flight.”
9     Although Worldwide made much of Argueta’s delay in
reporting Nguyen’s harassment, such a delay has little to no
probative value as to the truth of a victim’s harassment claim.
“[R]eporting sexual harassment can be difficult and there is no
single reasonable response to sexual harassment. For many

                                21
       As mentioned above, the trial court gave a limiting
instruction on this evidence, and such instructions can ameliorate
section 352 prejudice. Indeed, they are generally considered
effective. Limiting instructions are less effective, however, when
there is little or no probative value to the evidence and it has a
high potential for prejudice. (Cf. Alexander v. Community
Hospital of Long Beach (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 238, 259–261.)
Further, limiting instructions are less effective when the
evidence at issue is character evidence which goes to one of the
main issues in the trial. (People v. McKelvey (1927) 85 Cal.App.
769, 771.) Here, Argueta’s credibility was a key issue in the trial,
as was the timing of her complaint about Nguyen’s conduct.
       In addition, because the trial court did not embrace the
very narrow proper purpose of the evidence, it did not convey that
limitation to the jury in the instructions. It simply and vaguely
told the jury that “the complaints of other employees about Ms.
Argueta are not being received for the truth of those complaints;
rather, they are being received for the effect on Ms. Argueta
when she was told about those complaints. You are not to
consider whether the allegation in the complaints are true or
not.”10 And, while the rule against hearsay required the court to
inform the jury that the out-of-court statements could not be
considered for the truth of their content, this only underscores

reasons, harassment victims may delay or refrain from reporting
harassment. The costs of reporting can outweigh the benefits.”
(Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 586.)
10    In the final jury instructions, the court simply told the jury:
“During the trial, certain evidence was admitted for a limited
purpose. You may consider that evidence only for that purpose
and for no other.”

                                 22
the lack of relevance of the substance of the complaints, and
creates confusion. A false complaint would normally affect a
person differently than a true one, so stating that the truth did
not matter is confusing. Here, however, the truth or falsity of the
substance of the complaints did not directly matter to Argueta,
because the threat to her job came not from the complaints, but
from Worldwide’s reaction to the complaints, which was to
impose a consequence on Argueta (although it was disputed what
that consequence was).
       After this limiting instruction was given, Argueta testified
that when she was confronted by Diaz, she admitted the
substance of the complaints. She stated that she was ashamed of
herself and felt she should not have treated her subordinates like
that.11 Argueta offered expert testimony that she was behaving
aberrantly during this period due to the stress of Nguyen’s sexual
harassment. Addressing the substance of the complaints was a
tactical decision, but not one Argueta and her attorneys should
have been forced to make. Even though it appears that much of
the substance of the complaints was true, the jury should never
have learned of that substance, which was not relevant to any
issue in this action.
       We agree with Argueta that counsel for Worldwide then
seized upon the substance of the (admitted) complaints to argue
that Argueta was a bad person, which undermined any marginal
effectiveness of the limiting instruction. We cannot agree with

11     Diaz gave contradictory testimony on this topic, first
testifying that Argueta did not deny the allegations of the
complaints. Then, after Argueta testified, Diaz testified that
Argueta either denied the allegations or did not respond directly
but laughed and giggled.

                                23
the trial court that counsel’s closing argument about the
substance of the complaints was proper, even under the trial
court’s erroneous assessment of the probative value of the
substance of the complaints. In argument, Worldwide’s attorney
reminded the jury that Nguyen had testified that when he
confronted Argueta about lying, she said, “If you complain about
me, I’m going to come get you.” This argument was certainly
permissible. What followed was not. Worldwide’s attorney then
argued: “It’s exactly what she did. [¶] And you know what? This
is consistent, frankly, with who she is, because we heard from
other employees that she supervised. Mr. Quinonez, for example,
testified that she threatened him. She basically said, if you
complain about me, I’m going to transfer you or I’ll change your
shift. Okay. And other employees said exactly the same thing.
Mr. Quinonez said that started in 2014, happened, I think, three
times or four times a year for the remainder of his employment.
[¶] So when Mr. Nguyen testified that Ms. Argueta threatened
him to come after him if he placed her out of service, well, that’s
entirely consistent with what she had done to others. Okay. [¶]
And again, this isn’t character assassination, this is just the
truth. You’re here to determine the truth.”
       This use of the substance of the complaints moves far
beyond the limited purpose of showing how Argueta reacted to
the complaints. Worldwide attorneys explicitly argued both that
Argueta was a threatening person (her threats are “consistent
with who she is”) and that she was acting in conformity with the
substance of the complaints that reported she threatened others
(threatening Nguyen was “entirely consistent with what she had
done to others”).

                                24
      “Evidence of traits of his character other than honesty or
veracity, or their opposites, is inadmissible to attack or support
the credibility of a witness.” (§ 786.) Thus, even if Argueta were
a threatening person, or a bully, that character trait would not be
admissible to attack her credibility. Worldwide’s attorneys
should not have argued that “who she is” was evidence that she
threatened Nguyen.
      “[E]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her
character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of
reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)
is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a
specified occasion.” (§ 1101, subd. (a).)12 Thus, the fact that
Argueta made threats on other occasions was not admissible to
prove that she threatened Nguyen. Worldwide counsel should

12    Section 1101 does permit the use of evidence of specific
instances of conduct “to prove some fact (such as motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, [or]
absence of mistake or accident . . .) other than his or her
disposition to commit such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b).) In order
to establish a common design or plan, however, “ ‘evidence of
uncharged misconduct must demonstrate “not merely a similarity
in the results, but such a concurrence of common features that
the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a
general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.” ’ ”
(Brown, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) “ ’[T]he common
features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a
series of similar spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed
need not be distinctive or unusual.’ ” (Id. at pp. 790–791.)
Argueta’s complained-of behavior consists of a series of similar
spontaneous acts, which do not have significant common features
or suggest a general plan.

                                25
not have argued that threatening Nguyen was “entirely
consistent with what she had done to others.”
      The conduct of Worldwide counsel making these arguments
is particularly troubling in light of oral argument at the hearing
on Argueta’s motion in limine. Worldwide attorney Rosenthal
stated that the trial court’s ruling was “acceptable” as long as
Worldwide could “reference the substance of them for all
purposes, so impeachment, credibility, motive.” He then added:
“And I also think they would be admissible as character
evidence.” The court replied: “She did it once, she did it again,
which is not—[¶] . . . [¶]—proper character evidence.” Rosenthal
then agreed with the court, stating: “No. I rescind that.”
B.    The Evidence Does Not Compel a Finding that Nguyen’s
      Behavior was Severe or Pervasive as a Matter of Law
       Argueta filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the harassment claim and also contended in her
motion for a new trial that there was insufficient evidence to
support the jury’s finding that the harassment was not severe or
pervasive.
       “Ordinarily, we review the denial of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict for substantial evidence [citation]
and the denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion
[citation]. But where, as here, ‘ “the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the
question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) ’uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that
it was insufficient to support a finding.’ ” ‘ (Sonic Manufacturing

                                26
Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th
456, 466 [126 Cal.Rptr.3d 301]; see Phipps v. Copeland Corp.
LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 319 [333, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 688] [where
‘ “ ’ the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the
party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that
party appeals,’ ” generally “ ‘the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law’ ” ’].)” (SwiftAir, LLC v. Southwest
Airlines Co. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 46, 59 [motions involved a
defense verdict].)
        Here, the verdict at issue is a verdict for the defense, and
such a verdict represents a conclusion that Argueta failed to meet
her burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, we apply the standard
set forth by our colleagues in Division 7 in SwiftAir.
        On appeal, Argueta has acknowledged that Nguyen did not
admit all of the acts she alleged. Further, even respondent’s
evidence of the nature and extent of Nguyen’s admissions was
contradictory. It is true, as Argueta points out, other female
employees at Worldwide eventually complained that Nguyen
committed acts of sexual harassment against them which were
similar, if not identical, to acts which Argueta described but
Nguyen did not admit. As Argueta recognizes, such evidence,
committed outside her presence, is admissible to prove
discriminatory intent and to impeach the harasser’s credibility.
(Pantoja v. Anton (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 87, 109–110.) Of
course, such evidence does not compel a jury to find the
harasser’s denial not credible.
        Thus, Argueta’s case depended largely on her own
testimony to establish severe or pervasive conduct by Nguyen.
As we have discussed at length above, Argueta’s credibility was

                                 27
improperly undermined by the admission of the substance of the
complaints against her. At the same time, there was properly
admitted evidence which did provide her with a motive to
fabricate to save her job. Thus, even if we were to disregard the
improper evidence, we cannot say the record compels a finding in
favor of Argueta as a matter of law that Nguyen’s acts of
harassment were severe or pervasive. Rather, a jury should be
given the opportunity to evaluate Argueta’s credibility, untainted
by improper evidence.
      To the extent Argueta contends that the severity or
pervasiveness of Nguyen’s acts was established as a matter of
law by respondent’s admission that Nguyen had violated their
harassment policy, which includes the “severe or pervasive”
standard of the FEHA, we agree with the trial court that the jury
was not bound by any determination by respondent’s
representatives. The jury was required to evaluate the testimony
of respondent’s representatives relating to whether Nguyen
violated respondent’s policy and to independently decide whether
Nguyen’s conduct was severe or pervasive.
      Argueta’s reliance on Fuentes v. Autozone, Inc. (2011)
200 Cal.App.4th 1221 and Caldera v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 31 to show severity or
pervasiveness of the conduct in this case is inapt. Severity and
pervasiveness are to be determined from the totality of the
circumstances of a case. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 830, 870.) Fuentes involved a sexual
harassment claim, but the harassing conduct was far more
egregious than the conduct here. (Fuentes, at p. 1234.) In
Caldera, the harassing conduct involved mocking the plaintiff’s

                               28
disability (stuttering), and so comparisons to this case are
generally not helpful. (Caldera, at pp. 266–267.)
                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for a
new trial. Respondent to pay costs on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           STRATTON, P. J.

I concur:

            VIRAMONTES, J.

                                29
GRIMES, J., Dissenting.
       I respectfully dissent.
       I would affirm on the grounds that plaintiff in her opening
brief did not provide a full and fair summary of the record and
her opening brief presents the evidence in the light most
favorable to plaintiff, which is insufficient to demonstrate trial
court error and prejudice. I am not persuaded that the trial court
abused its discretion in the admission of the substance of the
employee complaints against plaintiff, but even if there were an
abuse of discretion, plaintiff has not provided sufficient citation
to the record and coherent argument to demonstrate prejudice.
Nor has plaintiff demonstrated trial court error in the giving of
the limiting instruction or prejudice from the instruction.
       Plaintiff does not give a full and fair explanation of the
proceedings that led to her counsel eliciting from Maria Diaz on
direction examination the full text of the employee complaints,
and that led to her counsel eliciting from plaintiff on direct
examination that the complaints accurately described her
behavior. Nor does plaintiff’s opening brief describe all the other
evidence from which the jury could conclude plaintiff was not a
credible witness.
       Appellant’s opening brief says the substance of the
complaints took 15 pages of reporter’s transcript, which, in the
context of the 18 volumes of reporter’s transcripts of the
proceedings of this lengthy jury trial, does not seem likely to have
tainted the whole trial. Notably, this part of Ms. Diaz’s
testimony was followed by 11 more days of testimony from
multiple witnesses, including plaintiff.

                                 1
      Plaintiff’s testimony was discredited in a number of ways
having nothing to do with the substance of the complaints
against her. By way of example, there was evidence, not
mentioned by plaintiff, that she had earlier—before the employee
complaints and before she complained about Dzung Nguyen’s
harassment—filed a complaint letter about other company agents
breaking rules against supervisor relationships with employees.
She complained at length about a confrontation with an agent
married to their Human Resources representative, and her letter
stated she was “reaching headquarters[] to take action on all
matters noted and if necessary will take these to a further level.”
In my view, this and other evidence clearly demonstrated
plaintiff, contrary to her testimony, would not have been afraid to
complain contemporaneously if she thought someone was
harassing her.
      In sum, a reading of the entire transcript leads me to
conclude the jury could easily decide the harassment was not
severe or pervasive, and that any error in the admission of the
substance of the employee complaints was not prejudicial. I
accordingly conclude the trial court did not err in finding there
was substantial, credible evidence on both of the critical points:
the harassment was not severe or pervasive, and there was no
adverse employment action.

                                     GRIMES, J.

                                 2