Court Opinion

ID: 9621909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:09:03.397085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:14.317144
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The main opinion holds that the shoulder of the roadway between the edge of the hard-surfaced portion and the old fence line along the north side of appellants’ land was private land belonging to the predecessors of the respondents. It seems to me that such a holding ignores reality.
For many years a country road ran in an east-west direction immediately north of the Farnsworth property along the quarter section line. Sometime prior to 1946 the county placed hard-surface material upon the main traveled portion of that road, which surface was wide enough for two cars to pass each other. Inasmuch as this road was originally established by the travel of vehicles and animals, it would be totally unrealistic to believe that such a country road consisted only of the portion which was later hard surfaced. In the nature of such a practical use, there would, of necessity, be a shoulder of reasonable width on either side of the hard surface.
In the first place, horses and cows driven along such a country road do not conform to such narrow restrictions. In the second place, for many years last past it has been unlawful to park or leave standing any vehicle upon the paved or main traveled part of a highway when it is practical to stop, park, or leave such vehicle off of such part of the highway.1 For these reasons, the logical assumption is that there was included in the country road, as it was originally established and after the hard-surface material was placed upon the center of the road, a reasonable shoulder adjacent to the hard-surfaced portion, and this is especially true in view of the fact that there is testimony in the record that country roads are usually 40 feet wide.
No use by respondents’ predecessors was ever made of the few feet of land between the south side of the hard surface of the road and the Farnsworth land, nor was any claim ever made by them that the strip was not a part of the road. The respondents cannot use the strip now except by ignoring the old road which they are here trying to do.
*202. The County built a better road angling off from that part which passes near the Farnsworth land and conveyed its rights in and to the old road to the respondents herein.
When a new road is built, the owners of land abutting on the old road lose none of their rights therein,2 and so by taking the deed from the County the respondents did not cause Farnsworths to lose any of their rights of access, etc., to the old road. The fact that they had their land fenced is of no import. If their land abutted on the old road, they still have the right of access to it.
I cannot conceive of a country road without a shoulder, and I do not think the trial court was warranted in finding that the Farnsworth land did not abut on the old road. I would remand this case with directions to assess damages for past interference with appellants’ rights of access to the old road and for an order restraining any further interference with those rights in the future. I think the appellants should be awarded their costs incurred herein.
CROCKETT, C. J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of ELLETT, J.
CALLISTER and HENRIOD, JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate herein.

. Section 41-G-101, TJ.C.A.1953.

. 39 C.J.S. Highways § 141; Hague v. Juab County Mill & Elevator Company, 37 Utah 290, 107 P. 249 (1910).