Court Opinion

ID: 9566750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:42:45.632676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:12.995481
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent, because I conclude that Cooper established that his trial counsel was deficient in failing to investigate and present evidence of the victim’s substantial history of violence against the defendant, his mother, and others, and that this deficiency prejudiced Cooper.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, a defendant must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.10 On appeal, this Court accepts the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.11
In this case, the defense was justification and Cooper contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence. At the motion for new trial hearing, Cooper established that the victim in the case had committed several prior acts of violence including an aggravated assault at the home of Cooper’s mother, robbery by intimidation, and assault against a uniformed police officer who was attempting to serve a warrant. Cooper also presented evidence of the victim’s violent nature when he had been drinking, the victim’s long-term abuse of Cooper’s mother, and the victim’s threatening Cooper and his brother with a gun. Additionally, Cooper established that the victim had a prior conviction for possession of a gun by a convicted felon.
Cooper’s trial counsel testified that he did not recall anything *194about the case.12 Cooper testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he told trial counsel about the victim’s violent past and extensive criminal record. Cooper’s younger brother also testified about the victim’s violent past and testified that he was never contacted by trial counsel. Trial counsel’s file showed that he knew that the victim was on “active probation,” which trial counsel admitted meant that the victim had a criminal record. However, trial counsel’s file is devoid of any evidence that counsel attempted to obtain any additional information about the victim’s criminal record.
Just a few years before the trial in this case, this Court held that a victim’s prior violent acts against the defendant and others is relevant in weighing the defendant’s claim of justification.13 Additionally, the evidence that the victim had a conviction for possession of a gun would have been admissible in light of testimony that it appeared that the victim was reaching for a gun when he was shot.14 Trial counsel offered no explanation for his failure to investigate the victim’s past or his failure to present evidence of the victim’s prior violent acts and I conclude that the failure constituted deficient performance.15
The question of whether this deficiency was prejudicial requires that this Court examine the evidence that could have been presented in light of the evidence that was before the jury.16 The evidence at trial showed that Cooper was 17 years old at the time of the shooting. According to his statement to police, which was admitted into evidence, his mother asked him to come help her leave the victim’s house, and said that the victim was beating her and she was scared. During one phone conversation that evening, the victim got on the phone and threatened to kill Cooper the next time he saw him. Cooper and his friends Catrice Watkins and Terrence Caver drove to the victim’s house to assist Cooper’s mother in leaving. When they arrived, the victim pushed Cooper, started to hit Caver, and then came charging at Cooper, at which point Cooper fired the gun.
Watkins testified that when they arrived at the victim’s home, it appeared that Cooper’s mother had been beaten. The victim started cursing at them and swung at Caver, but missed. Caver then hit the victim, who fell on to the couch. The victim then began reaching under *195the couch cushion for what Watkins believed was a gun, and threatened the group, saying “I’m going to get you m-f. I’m going to get you.” As the victim was coming towards Cooper, Cooper shot him.
No evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence against Cooper, his mother, or others came into evidence. The evidence that the majority focuses on came from Cooper’s statement and the testimony of Watkins, who admitted she was a “real close friend” of Cooper’s. The jury may well have discounted this evidence as self-serving. Furthermore, the evidence related solely to the events immediately preceding the death of the victim. If the jury had been given the independent evidence of the victim’s substantial history of violent acts, I conclude there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different — either an acquittal or a conviction on the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter.
This case is substantially similar to Johnson v. State,17 in which this Court reversed a conviction based on the failure of trial counsel to present evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence. In that case, Justice Hunstein, writing for the Court, held that
[although the jury heard evidence that, just prior to his death, the victim was drunk, enraged and threatening to kill appellant with a knife or gun, all but one of those witnesses also testified that they saw nothing in the victim’s hands. There was no testimony regarding the victim’s propensity toward violence; our review of the record fails to confirm counsel’s determination that evidence of specific prior acts would have been cumulative. Those witnesses whom counsel chose not to call would have testified to specific occasions when the victim had shot at or otherwise assaulted others or threatened them with weapons. ... In view of appellant’s justification defense, we conclude that appellant has shown a reasonable probability that his trial might have resulted in conviction of a lesser offense, if not of acquittal, had the jury heard those witnesses.18
I see no substantial difference between Johnson and this case, and accordingly, I conclude that Cooper is entitled to a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Hunstein join in this dissent.
*196Decided March 30, 2005.
Michael B. Nation, for appellant.
Dennis C. Sanders, District Attorney, William P.Doupé, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Frank M. Gaither, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

 Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 88 (526 SE2d 347) (2000).

 Trial counsel inexplicably failed to file a motion for new trial or to appeal the conviction and thus, the hearing on the motion for new trial occurred ten years after the conviction, after Cooper filed a pro se motion for an out-of-time appeal.

 See Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402, 406 (405 SE2d 669) (1991), adopting special concurrence of Weltner, J., in Lolley v. State, 256 Ga. 605, 609-610 (385 SE2d 285) (1989).

 See Wilson v. State, 152 Ga. 337 (8) (110 SE 8) (1921).

 The trial court below did not rule on whether the performance was deficient, but instead based its holding on the prejudice prong alone.

 See Johnson v. State, 266 Ga. 380, 383 (467 SE2d 542) (1996).

 266 Ga. at 383.

 Id.