Court Opinion

ID: 9881891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 16:27:47.789994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:23.121992
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the
citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computer-
generated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of
Appeals.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40620

MARGARET PADILLA, Individually
and as Personal Representative of
the ESTATE OF BETTY J. PADILLA,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PRESBYTERIAN HEALTHCARE SERVICES
d/b/a PLAINS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER;
DR. EDWARD JOSEPH PIENKOS; DR. LESLIE
DONALDSON; and SARAH NEAL, RN,
as employees and/or contractors of PLAINS
REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, and in their
individual capacity,

      Defendants-Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Fred T. Van Soelen, District Court Judge

The Law Office of Ross R. Bettis
Ross R. Bettis
Hobbs, NM

for Appellant

Atwood, Malone, Turner & Sabin, P.A.
Carla Neusch Williams
Roswell, NM

for Appellee Presbyterian Health Care Services

Krehbiel & Barnett, P.C.
Ryan Wityak
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee Leslie Donaldson, M.D.

Edward Joseph Pienkos, MD
Clovis, NM

Pro Se Appellee

Sarah Neal, RN
Clovis, NM

Pro Se Appellee

                               MEMORANDUM OPINION

DUFFY, Judge.

{1}     Plaintiff is appealing from two district court orders dismissing the complaint. The
first order dismissed the complaint against Defendant Donaldson under the applicable
three-year statute of limitations for personal injury. [RP 118, 120] See NMSA 1978, §
37-1-8 (1880). The second order dismissed the complaint against Defendant
Presbyterian under the applicable three-year statute of repose, which applies to
qualified healthcare providers. [RP 118, 122] See NMSA 1978, § 41-5-13 (2021); Armijo
v. Tandysh, 1981-NMCA-098, ¶ 6, 98 N.M. 181, 646 P.2d 1245 (stating that this statute
of repose applies, inter alia, to wrongful death actions based on medical malpractice),
overruled on other grounds by Roberts v. Southwest Cmty. Health Servs., 1992-NMSC-
042, ¶ 19, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442. Because the district court considered matters
outside of the pleadings, we construe the court’s order as one of summary judgment.
See Tunis v. Country Club Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 2014-NMCA-025, ¶ 17, 318
P.3d 713.

{2}    “Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Self v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 1998-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 126 N.M. 396, 970 P.2d 582. “We review these legal
questions de novo.” Id.

{3}    Here, Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on September 28, 2021, alleging malpractice
for care received by Decedent on September 20, 2018. [RP 1] The motions to dismiss
were based on the fact that the complaint was filed past the three-year statutory
deadlines. [RP 14, 90] This was sufficient to establish a prima facie ground for barring
the complaint under the applicable limitation periods. See generally Blauwkamp v. Univ.
of N.M. Hosp., 1992-NMCA-048, ¶ 18, 114 N.M. 228, 836 P.2d 1249 (discussing
summary judgment burden shifting). In response, Plaintiff claimed that she was first told
by a family friend that a nurse believed Decedent was given too much medication. [RP
87] Plaintiff’s second amended complaint specifically claimed that a nurse during
Decedent’s September 20, 2018, treatment “admitted in front of two witnesses that she
must have given [Decedent] too much Fentanyl.” [RP 134] Plaintiff’s fraudulent
concealment claim is based on the alleged failure of Defendants to contemporaneously
disclose this information.

{4}    As the district court observed in its letter decision, Plaintiff never responded to
Defendant Donaldson’s motion to dismiss. [RP 118] Where a nonmovant fails to
respond to a motion for summary judgment, the district court may enter summary
judgment on the movant’s prima facie case. Freeman v. Fairchild, 2018-NMSC-023, ¶
21, 416 P.3d 264. In that circumstance, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement of
the moving party shall be deemed admitted.” Rule 1-056(D)(2) NMRA. As such, we
conclude that Defendant Donaldson was entitled to summary judgment based on the
statute of limitations.

{5}     With respect to Defendant Presbyterian, the district court relied on Plaintiff’s own
claim that the alleged concealment was discovered approximately two months after the
incident occurred. [RP 118] As a result, Plaintiff still had practically all of the statutory
period left to file her claim, which undermines fraudulent concealment as a basis for
extending the limitations period. See Blea v. Fields, 2005-NMSC-029, ¶ 28, 138 N.M.
348, 120 P.3d 430 (noting that, in considering whether the statute of limitations should
be tolled based on fraudulent concealment, the court considers whether the plaintiff
“lacked knowledge of her cause of action and could not have discovered it by exercising
reasonable diligence during the statutory period”). Given the undisputed facts with
respect to the date of alleged negligence and the asserted date of discovery, we
conclude that the district court ruling was not made in error. See Tomlinson v. George,
2005-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 13, 15, 138 N.M. 34, 116 P.3d 105 (concluding that fraudulent
concealment did not preclude the defendant from asserting the limitations period as a
defense because the defendant did not prevent the plaintiff from filing suit within the
statutory period).

{6}    For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.

{7}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

SHAMMARA H. HENDERSON, Judge