Court Opinion

ID: 9395918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 20:00:48.53045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:12.763049
License: Public Domain

Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                   1

                      Statement of GORSUCH, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
      ARIZONA, ET AL. v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS,
            SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
                  SECURITY, ET AL.
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
    APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
                 No. 22–592.   Decided May 18, 2023

   The December 16, 2022 order of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denying pe-
titioners’ motion to intervene is vacated, and the case is re-
manded to that court with instructions to dismiss the mo-
tion as moot.
   JUSTICE JACKSON dissents from the vacatur of the order
of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit and would instead dismiss the writ of certi-
orari as improvidently granted.
   Statement of JUSTICE GORSUCH.
   This case concerns the “Title 42 orders.” Those emer-
gency decrees severely restricted immigration to this coun-
try for the ostensible purpose of preventing the spread of
COVID–19. The federal government began issuing the or-
ders in March 2020 and continued issuing them until April
2022, when officials decided they were no longer necessary.1
   If that seems reasonable enough, events soon took a turn.
In a federal district court in Louisiana, a number of States
argued that the government’s decision to end the Title 42
orders violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U. S. C. §551 et seq., because agency officials had not pro-
vided advance notice of their decision or invited public com-
ment.2 The States did not seriously dispute that the public-
——————
  1 87 Fed. Reg. 19944–19946, 19956 (2022).
  2 Louisiana v. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 603 F. Supp.

3d 406, 412 (WD La. 2022).
2                    ARIZONA v. MAYORKAS

                     Statement of GORSUCH, J.

health justification for the orders had lapsed. The States
also understood that their lawsuit would only require the
government to take certain additional procedural steps be-
fore ending the Title 42 orders. But the States apparently
calculated that even a short, court-ordered extension of
those decrees was worth the fight. Worth it because, in
their judgment, a new and different crisis had emerged at
the border and the federal government had done too little
to address it.3 Keeping the Title 42 orders in place even
temporarily was better than the alternative. In the end, the
district court agreed with the States’ APA arguments and
entered a nationwide injunction that effectively required
the government to enforce the Title 42 orders until and un-
less it complied with the statute’s notice-and-comment pro-
cedures.4
   Meanwhile, a thousand miles away, a group of asylum
seekers filed a competing class-action lawsuit in a federal
district court in Washington, D. C. This group argued that,
from the start, the government lacked legal authority to is-
sue its Title 42 orders. Ultimately, the D. C. district court
agreed with the group’s assessment and issued an equally
sweeping form of relief—sometimes called “universal vaca-
tur”—that purported to wipe the Title 42 orders off the
books as if they never existed.5 So it is that the federal gov-
ernment found itself in an unenviable spot—bound by two
inconsistent nationwide commands, one requiring it to en-
force the Title 42 orders and another practically forbidding
it from doing so.
   If these head-spinning developments were not enough,
more followed. Displeased with the D. C. district court’s
ruling, some of the States in the Louisiana case moved to
intervene in the D. C. case. The States said they wanted to

——————
 3 Id., at 417.
 4 Id., at 441.
 5 Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 2022 WL 16948610, *15 (Nov. 15, 2022).
                     Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                    3

                       Statement of GORSUCH, J.

defend the Title 42 orders on appeal because the federal
government was unlikely to do so with sufficient vigor. Ul-
timately, the court of appeals denied the States’ motion to
intervene as untimely.6 So, late in 2022, the States turned
to this Court seeking two things. First, they asked for ex-
pedited review of the appellate court’s order denying their
motion to intervene. Second, they asked for a stay of the
D. C. district court’s decree vacating the Title 42 orders.
The Court granted both requests. In doing so, the Court
effectively extended the Title 42 orders indefinitely.7
  Now, almost five months later, the Court puts a final
twist on the tale. It vacates the appellate court’s order
denying the States’ motion to intervene and remands with
instructions to dismiss the motion as moot. Why the sud-
den about-face? Recently, Congress passed and the Presi-
dent signed into law a joint resolution declaring that the
COVID–19 emergency is over.8 The Secretary of Health
and Human Services, too, has issued his own directive an-
nouncing the end of the public-health emergency underly-
ing the Title 42 orders.9 Apparently, these developments
are enough to persuade the Court that the Title 42 orders
the government wished to withdraw a year ago are now as
good as gone and any dispute over them is moot.
  I recite all this tortured procedural history not because I
think the Court’s decision today is wrong. Nearly five
months ago, I argued that the Court erred when it granted
expedited review and issued a stay. As I explained at the
time, I do not discount the States’ concerns about what is
happening at the border, but “the current border crisis is
——————
  6 Arizona v. Mayorkas, 598 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (GORSUCH, J., dissent-

ing) (slip op., at 2).
  7 See id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).
  8 Pub. L. 118–3, 137 Stat. 6.
  9 See U. S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, COVID–19 Public

Health Emergency (PHE), https://www.hhs.gov/coronavirus/covid-19-
public-health-emergency/index.html.
4                       ARIZONA v. MAYORKAS

                        Statement of GORSUCH, J.

not a COVID crisis.”10 And the Court took a serious misstep
when it effectively allowed nonparties to this case to manip-
ulate our docket to prolong an emergency decree designed
for one crisis in order to address an entirely different one.11
Today’s dismissal goes some way to correcting that error.
   I lay out the history of this case only because it is so typ-
ical. Not just as an illustration of the quandaries that can
follow when district courts award nationwide relief, a prob-
lem I have written about before.12 Even more importantly,
the history of this case illustrates the disruption we have
experienced over the last three years in how our laws are
made and our freedoms observed.
   Since March 2020, we may have experienced the greatest
intrusions on civil liberties in the peacetime history of this
country. Executive officials across the country issued emer-
gency decrees on a breathtaking scale. Governors and local
leaders imposed lockdown orders forcing people to remain
in their homes.13 They shuttered businesses and schools,

——————
  10 Arizona, 598 U. S., at ___ (GORSUCH, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3).
  11 Id., at ___–___ (slip op., at 2–3).
  12 Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 589 U. S. ___, ___

(2020) (opinion concurring in grant of stay) (slip op., at 3).
  13 See, e.g., Republican National Committee v. Democratic National

Committee, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (slip op.,
at 2) (noting that the Governor of Wisconsin ordered residents “to stay
at home . . . to slow the spread of the disease”); see generally The Council
of State Governments, COVID–19 Resources for State Leaders: 2020–
2021 Executive Orders, https://web.csg.org/covid19/executive-orders/
(COVID–19 Resources for State Leaders) (cataloging such orders issued
throughout the country).
                      Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                        5

                         Statement of GORSUCH, J.

public and private.14 They closed churches even as they al-
lowed casinos and other favored businesses to carry on.15
They threatened violators not just with civil penalties but
with criminal sanctions too.16 They surveilled church park-
ing lots, recorded license plates, and issued notices warning
that attendance at even outdoor services satisfying all state
social-distancing and hygiene requirements could amount
to criminal conduct.17 They divided cities and neighbor-
hoods into color-coded zones, forced individuals to fight for
their freedoms in court on emergency timetables, and then
changed their color-coded schemes when defeat in court
seemed imminent.18
  Federal executive officials entered the act too. Not just
with emergency immigration decrees. They deployed a
public-health agency to regulate landlord-tenant relations
nationwide.19 They used a workplace-safety agency to issue
a vaccination mandate for most working Americans.20 They
——————
   14 See, e.g., Rossi v. Arch Ins. Co., 60 F. 4th 1189, 1192 (CA8 2023) (not-

ing that “state and local governments” across the country issued “stay-
at-home orders” that shuttered businesses); Kentucky ex rel. Danville
Christian Academy, Inc. v. Beshear, 981 F. 3d 505, 507 (CA6 2020) (not-
ing that the Governor of Kentucky prohibited “in-person instruction at
all public and private elementary and secondary schools”); see generally
COVID–19 Resources for State Leaders.
   15 Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 591 U. S. ___, ___ (2020)

(GORSUCH, J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief )
(slip op., at 1).
   16 See, e.g., D. Burke, Police Arrest Florida Pastor for Holding Church

Services Despite Stay-at-Home Order, CNN (Mar. 30, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/03/30/us/florida-pastor-arrested-river-church/index.html.
   17 Roberts v. Neace, 958 F. 3d 409, 412 (CA6 2020) (per curiam).
   18 Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U. S. ___, ___–

___ (2020) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1–7); see also South Bay United Pen-
tecostal Church v. Newsom, 592 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2021) (statement of
GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 1–6).
   19 Alabama Assn. of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human

Servs., 594 U. S. ___, ___ (2021) (per curiam) (slip op., at 1).
   20 National Federation of Independent Business v. OSHA, 595 U. S. ___,

___ (2022) (slip op., at 1).
6                      ARIZONA v. MAYORKAS

                        Statement of GORSUCH, J.

threatened to fire noncompliant employees,21 and warned
that service members who refused to vaccinate might face
dishonorable discharge and confinement.22 Along the way,
it seems federal officials may have pressured social-media
companies to suppress information about pandemic policies
with which they disagreed.23
   While executive officials issued new emergency decrees
at a furious pace, state legislatures and Congress—the bod-
ies normally responsible for adopting our laws—too often
fell silent. Courts bound to protect our liberties addressed
a few—but hardly all—of the intrusions upon them. In
some cases, like this one, courts even allowed themselves to
be used to perpetuate emergency public-health decrees for
collateral purposes, itself a form of emergency-lawmaking-
by-litigation.
   Doubtless, many lessons can be learned from this chapter
in our history, and hopefully serious efforts will be made to
study it. One lesson might be this: Fear and the desire for
safety are powerful forces. They can lead to a clamor for
action—almost any action—as long as someone does some-
thing to address a perceived threat. A leader or an expert
who claims he can fix everything, if only we do exactly as
he says, can prove an irresistible force. We do not need to
confront a bayonet, we need only a nudge, before we will-
ingly abandon the nicety of requiring laws to be adopted by
our legislative representatives and accept rule by decree.
Along the way, we will accede to the loss of many cherished
civil liberties—the right to worship freely, to debate public

——————
   21 See, e.g., K. Liptak & K. Collins, Biden Announces New Vaccine

Mandates that Could Cover 100 Million Americans, CNN (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/09/politics/joe-biden-covid-speech/index.html.
  22 Austin v. U. S. Navy Seals 1–26, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (ALITO, J.,

dissenting) (slip op., at 1).
  23 See, e.g., S. Myers, Free Speech vs. Disinformation Comes to a Head,

N. Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/09/business/
free-speech-social-media-lawsuit.html.
                     Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023)                     7

                       Statement of GORSUCH, J.

policy without censorship, to gather with friends and fam-
ily, or simply to leave our homes. We may even cheer on
those who ask us to disregard our normal lawmaking pro-
cesses and forfeit our personal freedoms. Of course, this is
no new story. Even the ancients warned that democracies
can degenerate toward autocracy in the face of fear.24
   But maybe we have learned another lesson too. The con-
centration of power in the hands of so few may be efficient
and sometimes popular. But it does not tend toward sound
government. However wise one person or his advisors may
be, that is no substitute for the wisdom of the whole of the
American people that can be tapped in the legislative pro-
cess.25 Decisions produced by those who indulge no criti-
cism are rarely as good as those produced after robust and
uncensored debate.26 Decisions announced on the fly are
rarely as wise as those that come after careful deliberation.
Decisions made by a few often yield unintended conse-
quences that may be avoided when more are consulted. Au-
tocracies have always suffered these defects. Maybe, hope-
fully, we have relearned these lessons too.
   In the 1970s, Congress studied the use of emergency de-
crees.27 It observed that they can allow executive authori-
ties to tap into extraordinary powers.28 Congress also ob-
served that emergency decrees have a habit of long
outliving the crises that generate them; some federal emer-

——————
  24 See, e.g., Aristotle’s Politics, Bk. V, chs. 2, 4 (H. Rackham transl.

1959).
  25 See, e.g., The Federalist No. 10, pp. 80–84 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961)

(J. Madison); id., No. 35, at 215–216 (A. Hamilton); id., No. 57, at 350–
356 (J. Madison).
  26 Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,

concurring).
  27 Congressional Research Service, National Emergency Powers 7

(Nov. 19, 2021) (CRS) (describing congressional studies undertaken from
1972 to 1976 regarding emergency powers).
  28 Id., at 8.
8                     ARIZONA v. MAYORKAS

                       Statement of GORSUCH, J.

gency proclamations, Congress noted, had remained in ef-
fect for years or decades after the emergency in question
had passed.29 At the same time, Congress recognized that
quick unilateral executive action is sometimes necessary
and permitted in our constitutional order.30 In an effort to
balance these considerations and ensure a more normal op-
eration of our laws and a firmer protection of our liberties,
Congress adopted a number of new guardrails in the Na-
tional Emergencies Act.31
   Despite that law, the number of declared emergencies
has only grown in the ensuing years.32 And it is hard not to
wonder whether, after nearly a half century and in light of
our Nation’s recent experience, another look is warranted.
It is hard not to wonder, too, whether state legislatures
might profitably reexamine the proper scope of emergency
executive powers at the state level. At the very least, one
can hope that the Judiciary will not soon again allow itself
to be part of the problem by permitting litigants to manip-
ulate our docket to perpetuate a decree designed for one
emergency to address another. Make no mistake—decisive
executive action is sometimes necessary and appropriate.
But if emergency decrees promise to solve some problems,
they threaten to generate others. And rule by indefinite
emergency edict risks leaving all of us with a shell of a de-
mocracy and civil liberties just as hollow.

——————
 29 Id., at 7.
 30 Id., at 1, 8–10.
 31 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U. S. C. §§1601–1651).
 32 CRS 12 (identifying dozens of existing emergencies as of 2019).