Court Opinion

ID: 9772410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:16:55.772596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.879915
License: Public Domain

McCRAW, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
I join in Justice Whitham’s dissenting and concurring opinion. I, too, would hold that the mandatory jury instructions required by Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp.1986) violate the separation of powers provision of the Texas constitution. However, I would hold that this statute is unconstitutional since it allows an encroachment by the legislature upon the judicial powers of the State. Further, I would hold that this statute deprived appellant of due process under the constitutions of the United States and of this State because it allowed the jury’s punishment-hearing verdict to be predicated on something other than evidence presented in open court.
I. Separation of Powers
A constitutional problem arises when the State executive or legislative branches interfere in a field that is constitutionally committed to the control of the courts. TEX.CONST. art. 2, § 1; State Board of Insurance v. Betts, 158 Tex. 83, 308 S.W.2d 846, 851-52 (1958). The Texas constitution vests the judicial power of the State in the courts. TEX.CONST. art. 5, § 1. “Judicial power” as envisioned by the constitution embraces the power to hear facts, the power to decide the issues of fact made by the pleadings, the power to decide the questions of law involved, the power to enter a judgment on the facts found by the jury in accordance with the law as determined by the court, and the power to execute the judgment or sentence. Kelley v. State, 676 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (quoting Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (1933)).
It is mandatory under article 37.07, § 4, that the courts instruct the jury on the law concerning parole and good time credits, including the mathematical formula to calculate the law’s effect. However, the statute “does not permit the introduction of evidence on the operation of parole and good conduct time laws." Art. 37.07, § 4(d) (emphasis added). I would hold that article 37.07, § 4 constitutes an unconstitutional encroachment by the legislature upon the judicial powers of the State. See Williams v. State, 461 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Okla.Crim.App.1969) (holding statute similar to art. 37.07, § 4 unconstitutional because it violates separation of powers provision virtually identical to the Texas constitution’s separation of powers provision).
II. Due Process
A fundamental principle of due process requires that a jury’s verdict be based on evidence received in open court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961); U.S. v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197 (5th Cir.1978). Although article 37.07, § 4(d) allows jury instructions on the operation of the parole law, it prohibits the introduction of evidence on this matter. Deciding the facts is the jury’s province, and the jury system is founded upon the notion that juries decide facts in accordance with evidence, Cameron v. Hauck, 383 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir.1967), *850cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039, 88 S.Ct. 777, 19 L.Ed.2d 828 (1968), and in accordance with the rules of law as stated in the instructions of the court. Pope v. U.S., 298 F.2d 507, 508 (5th Cir.1962).
This statutory instruction scheme created by the Texas legislature requires the courts to charge on good time and the parole law, allows jury consideration during deliberation, while statutorily prohibiting the defendant from introducing evidence on the operations of these laws. Such a statute allows a jury verdict to be based upon mandated law rather than upon evidence presented. I would hold that this is an unconstitutional infringement upon the appellant’s due process rights and precludes a fair and impartial trial.
Since appellant’s punishment was assessed by a procedure authorized by an unconstitutional statute, I would reverse this case and remand for new trial.