Court Opinion

ID: 9554536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:01:16.826597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:00.997927
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-2329    Document: 50     Page: 1   Filed: 08/09/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                NORMAN F. THORNTON,
                   Claimant-Appellant

                             v.

       DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
              VETERANS AFFAIRS,
               Respondent-Appellee
              ______________________

                        2021-2329
                  ______________________

    Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for
 Veterans Claims in No. 20-882, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, Jr.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: August 9, 2023
                 ______________________

    KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter
 Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for claimant-appellant.

      EVAN WISSER, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Di-
 vision, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
 DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, PATRICIA
 M. MCCARTHY; CHRISTOPHER O. ADELOYE, Y. KEN LEE, Of-
 fice of General Counsel, United States Department of Vet-
 erans Affairs, Washington, DC.
Case: 21-2329     Document: 50     Page: 2    Filed: 08/09/2023

 2                                  THORNTON v. MCDONOUGH

                   ______________________

     Before LOURIE, CLEVENGER, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge
     Norman F. Thornton appeals from the final decision of
 the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
 (“Veterans Court”) affirming the decision of the Board of
 Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”), which denied his claim for a
 rating above 50% for his service-connected disability from
 post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Thornton v.
 McDonough, No. 20-0882, 2021 WL 2389702 (Vet. App.
 June 11, 2021). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm
 the final decision of the Veterans Court.
                               I
     Section 5107(b) of Title 38 provides that “[w]hen there
 is an approximate balance of positive and negative evi-
 dence regarding any issue material to the determination of
 a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt
 to the claimant.” If the competing evidence on a material
 issue is in “approximate balance” or “nearly equal,” the
 benefit of the doubt rule requires the Board to decide the
 material issue in favor of the veteran.           Lynch v.
 McDonough, 21 F.4th 776, 781 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (en banc).
      In this case, Mr. Thornton argued to the Board that he
 was entitled to the benefit of the doubt regarding the issue
 of his entitlement to an increased rating for his PTSD. Af-
 ter assessing the evidence of record concerning the sever-
 ity, frequency, and duration of Mr. Thornton’s symptoms,
 the Board concluded that “[t]here is no doubt to be resolved;
 a higher rating is not warranted. 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).”
     Mr. Thornton appealed the Board’s adverse decision to
 the Veterans Court. The scope of the Veterans Court’s re-
 view authority is set forth in 38 U.S.C. § 7261. Relevant to
 this case, § 7261(a)(4) requires the Veterans Court to re-
 view adverse material fact determinations by the Board for
Case: 21-2329    Document: 50      Page: 3    Filed: 08/09/2023

 THORNTON v. MCDONOUGH                                      3

 clear error. In testing such fact determinations for clear
 error, § 7261(b) requires the Veterans Court to review the
 entire record of proceedings in the case before the Secre-
 tary, including the parts of the record before the Board,
 and, as part of that review, to “take due account of the Sec-
 retary’s application of section 5107(b) of this title.” 38
 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).
      Because the overall evidence on the degree of Mr.
 Thornton’s PTSD was not in approximate balance, the Vet-
 erans Court concluded that the benefit of the doubt rule did
 not apply – the same conclusion reached by the Board after
 its assessment of the record. Thus, on review by the Vet-
 erans Court, no clear error was shown in the Board’s as-
 sessment of the balance of the factual evidence concerning
 the severity of Mr. Thornton’s PTSD.
                              II
     Mr. Thornton’s appeal to this court argues that the Vet-
 erans Court misinterpreted § 7261(b)(1)’s requirement
 that the Veterans Court, when undertaking review pursu-
 ant to § 7261(a), “take due account of the Secretary’s appli-
 cation of section 5107(b) of this title.” In addition to the
 § 7261(a) review of Mr. Thornton’s claim of entitlement to
 the benefit of the doubt which the Veterans Court con-
 ducted, Mr. Thornton argues that “taking due account” of
 the benefit of the doubt rule requires the Veterans Court to
 conduct an additional separate and independent de novo
 review of the entire record, to assure that the veteran has
 not improperly been denied the benefit of the doubt. Fur-
 ther, Mr. Thornton argues that “taking due account” re-
 quires that this additional level of review be conducted sua
 sponte by the Veterans Court even if the veteran has not
 challenged a Board’s determination that the benefit of the
 doubt rule does not apply.
     The same interpretation questions Mr. Thornton raises
 in this case recently were presented to and decided by this
 court in Bufkin v. McDonough, No. 2022-1089 (Fed. Cir.
Case: 21-2329    Document: 50      Page: 4   Filed: 08/09/2023

 4                                  THORNTON v. MCDONOUGH

 Aug. 3, 2023). As the decision in Bufkin explains, the stat-
 utory command that the Veterans Court “take due account”
 of the benefit of the doubt rule does not require the Veter-
 ans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt
 issue beyond the clear error review required by § 7261, and
 “if no issue that touches upon the benefit of the doubt rule
 is raised on appeal, the Veterans Court is not required to
 sua sponte review the underlying facts and address the
 benefit of the doubt rule.” Bufkin, slip op. at 7-9.
     Because Mr. Thornton’s preferred interpretation of
 § 7261(b)(1) was rejected in Bufkin, we must also reject it
 in this appeal. Other than the statutory interpretation is-
 sue, Mr. Thornton does not fault the decision of the Veter-
 ans Court, and we thus affirm the Veterans Court’s
 decision.
                        AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.