Court Opinion

ID: 9792334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:27:18.536121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:41.233049
License: Public Domain

*1053ARABIAN, J.
—I respectfully dissent. While I am as eager as the majority to deter criminal conduct, imposing on the minor a punishment the Legislature has since abandoned will not accomplish that end. Simply yet ineluctably, nothing can deter a crime already committed; neither can an obsolete punishment prevent future offenses. The Legislature has ended its experiment and allowed the increased penalty for first offense vehicle-taking to lapse, impliedly finding the more severe punishment inappropriate. Nevertheless, purporting to distinguish three decades of decisional authority, the majority have divined a legislative intent to deny the benefit of this ameliorative change to defendants whose judgments are not yet final. This result is analytically flawed and without support either in judicial precedent or the amendatory history and language of Vehicle Code section 10851. This case is indistinguishable in any meaningful respect from appellate decisions consistently extending the reach of mitigating legislation to past conduct; and the proffered justifications fail to sustain this deviation from the well-established norm.
Wisely, the majority do not undertake to reevaluate the controlling principles enunciated by this court nearly 30 years ago in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] (Estrada). In Estrada, we disapproved the holding in People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [4 Cal.Rptr. 161, 351 P.2d 329], which had rejected the common law rule of amelioration. (See Sekt v. Justice’s Court (1945) 26 Cal.2d 297, 304-306 [159 P.2d 17, 167 A.L.R. 833]; see also People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295, 298 [134 Cal.Rptr. 64, 555 P.2d 1313], citing People v. Hayes (1894) 140 N.Y. 484 [35 N.E. 951].) Instead, the court held that when a statutory amendment reduces the punishment for a crime, the determination of retroactive application is a matter of legislative intent. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) In fathoming this question, one consideration is of “paramount importance”: “When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. . . . This intent seems obvious, because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modem theories of penology.” {Id., at pp. 744-745.) Accordingly, “where the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there is no saving clause, the rule is *1054that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the lighter punishment is imposed.” (Id., at p. 748.)1
Over the ensuing three decades, the courts have considered the rule of Estrada well settled2 and consistently implemented its principles in a multiplicity of circumstances.3 The controlling precepts were most recently reiterated in Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 301, which held that *1055certain provisions of Proposition 115 modifying the elements constituting special circumstances under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivisions (a)(ll), (a)(12), and (c), would apply retroactively in light of their ameliorative effect. Reviewing courts have found departure from this standard warranted only when new legislation has included an express saving clause or its equivalent or when some other consideration clearly dictated a contrary result.4 The Legislature has also accepted the rule of Estrada, never statutorily altering the governing principles while continuing to conform to its procedural mandate to confirm the intention to preclude retroactive application of mitigating changes. (See, ante, fn. 4.)
The present circumstances involve a run-of-the-mill penalty reduction: the statute now prescribes a less severe sentencing scheme for the same criminal *1056act that previously incurred a greater penalty. As such, the case is indistinguishable from every other, beginning with Estrada itself, in which defendants whose judgments were not then final have received the lower punishment. (See, e.g., In re Fink, supra, 67 Cal.2d 692; In re Falk (1966) 64 Cal.2d 684 [51 Cal.Rptr. 279, 414 P.2d 407]; In re Daup (1965) 63 Cal.2d 754 [48 Cal.Rptr. 181, 408 P.2d 957]; People v. Community Release Bd., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d 792; In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 931; In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 593 [136 Cal.Rptr. 718]; People v. Podesto (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 708 [133 Cal.Rptr. 409]; In re May (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 165 [133 Cal.Rptr. 33]; People v. Ramirez (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 660 [104 Cal.Rptr. 102].) I find no convincing argument that the Legislature intended a contrary result here. (See also Gov. Code, § 9611.)
Most critically, the majority never directly confront the fact that the amendatory provisions increasing the penalty for violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 (section 10851) during the experimental three-year period did not contain an express saving clause, which the analysis of Estrada virtually demands if mitigation in penalty is to operate prospectively only. (See, e.g., People v. Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 75-76.) Indeed, the omission creates a virtual presumption of retroactivity. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 748; see People v. Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 109; People v. Community Release Bd., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 799.) The same result obtains even when a sunset provision, rather than an affirmative amendment to existing law, effects the change. (See Charrot v. Municipal Court, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at p. 210.) “The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329 [256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078].)
Not only did the Legislature omit the obvious expedient of an express saving clause, it also did not extend the operative effect of the amendment or repeal the sunset clause. Any one of these measures would have easily and conclusively ensured that the higher sentencing scheme applied to all defendants committing their crimes when the greater penalty prevailed regardless of the date on which their judgments became final. However, the Legislature opted for none of them. In view of Estrada, as well as the extended opportunity to address the question of retroactivity, the failure to take any action under the circumstances reflects significantly on the question of intent.
Subsequent amendments to section 10851 also provide some useful insight supporting retroactive application of the lesser punishment. Since January 1993, when the penalties reverted to their prior term, section 10851 has been amended for a second experimental three-year period. (Stats. 1993, *1057ch. 1125, § 13.) Significantly, the sentencing range for first time offenders remains the same, i.e., at the original, “old” level of sixteen months, two years, or three years. In thus maintaining the status quo, the Legislature has strongly implied that it found the temporarily increased penalties ineffective or inefficient and has no interest in perpetuating them. Certainly, it does not rationally support the inference drawn by the majority that defendants should not benefit from the ameliorative change.
In denying defendants the lesser punishment, the majority conclude that the sunset clause, in combination with the deterrent goal of the experimental increase, somehow exempts this case from the mandate of Estrada. I find this reasoning unconvincing in several respects: first, to the extent that any degree of punishment is intended to deter criminal behavior, the majority’s analysis begs the question. Unless the Legislature completely decriminalizes the conduct at issue, some penalty will always attach as a disincentive even if it is subsequently reduced.
More importantly, the operative effect of the sunset clause essentially rendered the question of deterrence moot. Imposing the greater punishment now cannot prevent crimes already committed; patently, the minor in this case was not deterred by the higher sentencing scheme prevailing at the time of his offense. Neither will extending the benefit of the reduction in punishment encourage repetition of the crime since section 10851 currently provides for substantially increased penalties for recidivists. (See § 10851, subds. (b) & (d)(1).) As for potential violators, they are subject only to the lesser penalty in any event and therefore cannot be deterred by withholding from past offenders the mitigating change. It is thus illogical to ascribe much, if any, significance to the original goal of deterrence in attempting to determine whether the Legislature intended to preserve the higher penalty for judgments not yet final. Indeed, in purporting to discern such an intent even when any deterrent effect is no longer possible, the majority essentially impute to the Legislature the very “desire for vengeance” Estrada counsels is “not permitted in view of modem theories of penology.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)
Second, the sunset clause, in and of itself, no more rationally warrants the conclusion the Legislature desired to perpetuate the increased penalty than it does a contrary finding. It certainly does not evidence the “clear legislative intent” (People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 299) or constitute the “compelling proof” (People v. McKinney, supra, 95 Cal.App.3d at p. 745) necessary to overcome the presumption of retroactivity articulated in Estrada. If anything, utilization of a sunset provision more persuasively evinces an intention consistent with the rule of Estrada because from the outset the expectation was that the law would eventually revert to the lesser *1058punishment unless during the period of experimentation the greater punishment demonstrably deterred the targeted criminal conduct.5 The period of experimentation is the only relevant time frame within which to assess the deterrent impact: thereafter it is moot. Since the Legislature can always repeal or extend the sunset clause if the experiment “works,” its inclusion is simply a matter of legislative economy to avoid the need to repeal the change if it does not.
Third, the majority’s emphasis on the sunset clause as evidence of legislative intent misdirects the relevant inquiry. Estrada teaches that the proper focus lies closer to the legislative purpose in enacting the ameliorative change rather than the law it supersedes. After all, it is the current version of the statute the Legislature ultimately intended to prevail irrespective of the mechanism chosen to effectuate it. When the sunset clause reinstated the prior punishment for violation of section 10851, it presumably reflected a legislative assessment either that the greater penalty did not accomplish its objectives, or that on balance the lesser penalty sufficed to meet penological ends, or some combination of both. In these circumstances, the amendatory history is at least as consistent with extending the mitigation to all judgments not yet final as with denying it, which therefore should inure to the defendants’ benefit. (Cf. People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186].)
Finally, ignoring the absence of an express saving clause, the majority essentially attempt to convert the sunset provision into an implied saving clause. This analytical legerdemain finds no decisional support. In the one case involving ameliorative legislation effected by a sunset clause, the reviewing court found no impediment to applying the rule of Estrada. (Charrot v. Municipal Court, supra, 260 Cal.App.2d at pp. 209-210.) In Charrot, the change completely decriminalized the conduct in question, which violators obviously could anticipate by virtue of the sunset provision. Nevertheless, in abating the defendant’s prosecution, the court relied on the same principles that would apply had the Legislature repealed the statute by separate act.
*1059In their search for legislative intent, the majority echo the fear expressed in Justice Burke’s dissent in Estrada that “those contemplating and subsequently committing crime have all to gain and nothing to lose by seeking every avenue of delay through appeals and legal maneuvers of all kinds . . . (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 749, 753 (dis. opn. of Burke, J.).) However, this argument was consciously, if impliedly, rejected from the beginning. (See People v. Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 77; cf. People v. Enriquez, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 750 [affording defendant benefit of favorable amendment, which defense counsel had anticipated in recommending guilty plea].) It has never impeded broad and universal application of Estrada (see, ante, fn. 3); and no decision declining to apply the rule has ever relied on it (see, ante, fn. 4). Given the fact that the Legislature retains complete control over the question of retroactivity and can readily forestall “delay and manipulation” utilized solely to extend finality, this point does not logically shed light on its intent. On the contrary, in this context the courts must proceed on the assumption that the Legislature is fully aware of this consequence of omitting an express saving clause and acts accordingly, even at the risk of affording some defendants a “windfall.” It is not for the judiciary to presume to fill the void.
Indeed, the legislative history of the amendments to section 10851 indicates that such an attempt might well be unwise as well as inconsistent with the court’s proper role. The Legislative Analyst’s analysis of Assembly Bill No. 332 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.), which included the temporary increase in punishment for vehicle-taking, determined that the state could expect a yearly cost of $13 million attributable to the longer felony terms. A report by the Department of Finance similarly noted the likely increase in expense and also questioned whether the prison system could accommodate the additional inmates. The Legislature could reasonably have concluded that the fiscal impact would be too great to continue the lengthier sentences unless they clearly had a deterrent impact during the three-year experimentation period. (Cf. Morain, California’s Prison Budget: Why Is It So Voracious?, L.A. Times (Oct. 19, 1994) p. Al, col. 5.) This type of benefit/burden analysis is plainly a legislative prerogative that the courts should scrupulously avoid infringing.
For all the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 16, 1995. Mosk, J., Kennard, J., and Arabian, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Government Code section 9608 does not substitute for an express saving clause. That statute provides, “The termination or suspension (by whatsoever means effected) of any law creating a criminal offense does not constitute a bar to the indictment or information and punishment of an act already committed in violation of the law so terminated or suspended, unless the intention to bar such indictment or information and punishment is expressly declared by an applicable provision of law.” This provision “was enacted simply to authorize prosecutions under the former statute in order to avoid th[e] technically absurd result by which a defendant could be prosecuted under no law, simply because the Legislature had decided to increase the punishment for his crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 299; Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 746-748.)

See, e.g., People v. Francis (1969) 71 Cal.2d 66, 76 [75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591] (rule “repeatedly applied”); In re Fink (1967) 67 Cal.2d 692, 693 [63 Cal.Rptr. 369, 433 P.2d 161] (rule “consistently followed”); People v. Rivers (1967) 66 Cal.2d 1000, 1007 [59 Cal.Rptr. 851, 429 P.2d 171] (dis. opn. of Peters, J.) (“fundamental theory”); People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65, 69 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 368], review denied February 3, 1994 (“governing rule"); People v. Alexander (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1250,1259 [224 Cal.Rptr. 290] (“common law rule”); People v. Community Release Bd. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 792, 799 [158 Cal.Rptr. 238] (“presumption” in absence of saving clause); In re Aaron N. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 931, 938 [139 Cal.Rptr. 258] (rule “well settled”).

The rule of Estrada has not been limited to cases involving a mitigation of punishment but has been invoked in a wide variety of circumstances ranging from complete or substantial decriminalization of conduct (see, e.g., People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 212-213 [145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026]; People v. Rossi, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 299-304; Charrot v. Municipal Court (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 208, 210 [66 Cal.Rptr. 903]) to modification of the trial court’s discretionary authority (see, e.g., People v. Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 75 [Health & Saf. Code, § 11530, allowing for alternative sentencing of county jail or state prison at trial court’s discretion]; People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474, 479 [50 Cal.Rptr. 657, 413 P.2d 433] [Pen. Code, § 1305, eliminating discretion to order forfeiture of bail and making discharge mandatory]). The list also includes circumstances in which the Legislature has reduced the felony classification of a crime (see People v. Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 75; People v. Flores (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 461, 470-474 [154 Cal.Rptr. 851]; People v. Cloud (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 591,600-601 [81 Cal.Rptr. 716]), increased the dollar amount for certain offenses or enhancements (People v. Enriquez (1967) 65 Cal.2d 746, 749 [56 Cal.Rptr. 334, 423 P.2d 262] [Pen. Code, § 476a, subd. (b), “not sufficient funds” checks]; In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761, 763 [48 Cal.Rptr. 186, 408 P.2d 962] [same]; People v. Roberts (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1466 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 771], review den. Aug. 11, 1994 [Pen. Code, § 12022.6, robbery enhancement]), and narrowed the scope of the law or changed an element of a crime or enhancement in some respect that no longer included the defendant’s conduct (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 301 [279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434] [Pen. Code, § 190.2, subds. (a)(ll), (a)(12), & (c), changing elements of certain special circumstances]; People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 727-728 [216 Cal.Rptr. 123, 702 P.2d 205] [Pen. Code, § 593e, redefining piracy of over-the-air subscription television transmissions to exclude defendant’s acts]; People v. Figueroa, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69-71 [Health & Saf. Code, § 11353.6, subd. (b), limiting enhancement for drug trafficking near schoolyards *1055to specified circumstances]; People v. Vasquez (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 763, 767-768 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 255] [Pen. Code, § 12001, excluding “pellet gun” from enhancement definition of “firearm”]; South Coast Regional Com. v. Gordon (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 612, 617 [148 Cal.Rptr. 775] [Pub. Resources Code, § 27501, imposing “knowing and intentional” requirement]). The principles of Estrada also apply when changes in the law afford defendants a new benefit or eliminate a previous burden related to their criminal conduct. (See, e.g., People v. Chapman (1978) 21 Cal.3d 124,126 [145 Cal.Rptr. 672, 577 P.2d 1012] [Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, eliminating drug offense registration requirement when possession of marijuana reclassified as misdemeanor]; People v. White (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 17, 21-23 [144 Cal.Rptr. 128] [Pen. Code, § 851.8, authorizing sealing of arrest records upon finding of factual innocence]; Holder v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 314, 317 [74 Cal.Rptr. 853] [Pen. Code, § 1168, authorizing trial court to recall prison term for resentencing after diagnostic study by Department of Corrections].) The laws governing juveniles are subject to the rule of Estrada as well. (See, e.g., In re Aaron N., supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 937-938 [Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, limiting period of Youth Authority confinement]; People v. Benefield (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 51, 57-58 [136 Cal.Rptr. 465] [Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707.2, precluding sending juvenile sentenced as adult directly to state prison before evaluation by Youth Authority].)

See, e.g., People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 109 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23] (1978 death penalty initiative specified to operate prospectively only); People v. Holland (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 795, 797 [190 Cal.Rptr. 552] (same, increase in dollar amount for grand theft [Pen. Code, § 487] from $200 to $400); People v. Superior Court (Martin) (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 658, 663 [183 Cal.Rptr. 563] (same, repeal of mentally disordered sex offender statute); Talley v. Municipal Court (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 109, 113 [150 Cal.Rptr. 743] (same, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 19975.13, providing for alcohol treatment program to avoid license suspension upon conviction for driving under the influence). See also In re Griffin (1965) 63 Cal.2d 757, 760 [48 Cal.Rptr. 183, 408 P.2d 959] (net effect of changes in punishment and parole conditions did not actually benefit defendant); People v. McKinney (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 712, 745-746 [157 Cal.Rptr. 414] (subsequent initiative measure restoring original penalty in effect at time defendant’s judgment became final); Ralph Williams Ford v. New Car Dealers Policy & Appeals Bd. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 494, 498 [106 Cal.Rptr. 340] (Legislature did not merely decrease penalty but “enacted a new, comprehensive scheme which completely revised the scope of the penalties”); People v. Orozco (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 507, 515 [72 Cal.Rptr. 452, 32 A.L.R.3d 1429] (repeal of original punishment accomplished by enactment of another statute imposing same or greater penalty).

The majority imply that a potential criminal will not be deterred during the last year or more of the experimental period, anticipating that the sunset provision will become operative, with a concomitant reduction in penalty, by the time any eventual judgment becomes final. Thus, the Legislature must intend prospective application of the change to effectively measure the deterrent impact. Although for purposes of due process and ex post facto the law indulges the legal fiction that defendants are on notice of the punishment prevailing at the time they commit their offenses, conventional wisdom and common sense suggest it is most often just that, a fiction. I find it highly unlikely the minor in this case had a sufficient notion of the intricacies of criminal procedure and the rule of Estrada to plan his misconduct in the expectation of potentially avoiding a year of confinement.