Court Opinion

ID: 9568588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:05:27.736642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:49:02.847656
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. We decided this case once. Moulton v. State, 363 N.W.2d 405 (S.D.1985). Now with a change of personnel on this Court, that decision is being reversed.
As Chief Justice Fosheim wrote for the majority in Moulton I, all permits signed in 1958, 1962, 1968, and 1973 contained the provision: “If the Commission determines that the area covered by this permit has a higher priority for public use other than as a summer-home site, the Commission reserves the right to cancel this permit upon said expiration date.” He further wrote:
“The 1978 written contract between cabin owners and the Commission called for expiration of permits in 1982. The first paragraph of the 1978 cabin permits provided “THIS PERMIT WILL NOT BE RENEWED-THE ABOVE FIVE YEAR TERM WILL CONCLUDE THE STATE’S POLICY OF ALLOWING PRIVATE SUMMER HOME SITES IN THE PARK.” Paragraph 20 provided “It is agreed and understood that THIS PERMIT EXACTLY TERMINATES ON DECEMBER 31, 1982 AND IS NOT RENEWABLE AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THIS TERM.” The cabin owners, including Mr. Harrod, all signed a permit with this provision.”
These new contracts supersede prior lease arrangements, See South Hanson Lumber Company v. DeMoss, 253 Iowa 204, 111 N.W.2d 681 (1961), and any oral representations must yield to subsequent contracts. Id.; See also, SDCL 53-8-7.
This court specifically held any prior lease agreements were superseded by the new permits and any oral representations must yield to subsequent written contracts. Having accepted the benefits of twenty-four years of permits — 1958 through 1982 — the cabin owners repudiate the agreements they signed and claim the State should be estopped.
Although the estoppel issue was not precluded by our decision in Moulton I, estop-pel is not applicable to the facts in this case. Estoppel against the public is little favored and should be used sparingly. This Court has applied an estoppel against a state governmental entity on only one occasion. Northern Improvement Company, Inc. v. South Dakota State Highway Commission, 267 N.W.2d 208, 214 (S.D.1978). The Court did not overrule its prior decisions which held that estoppel against the State is little favored and is to be invoked only in unusual circumstances. Griffis v. State, 69 S.D. 439, 11 N.W.2d 138 (1943). See also, Northwestern Public Service Company v. City of Aberdeen, 244 N.W.2d 544 (S.D.1976); City of Rapid City v. Hoogterp, 85 S.D. 176, 179 N.W.2d 15 (1970); Rhodes v. City of Aberdeen, 74 S.D. 179, 50 N.W.2d 215 (1951). In Northern Improvement the situation was unusual in that the written contract specifically provided for a great deal of discretion in the state engineer, and in district engineers. The fact situation was also clear, and there were no subsequent written contracts negating the plaintiffs position. Finally, the matter dealt with contracting for producing a public improvement. That situation was analogous to contracting between private parties. The other cases cited dealt with discretionary acts in executing public policy, as does this case. They were thus not analogous to the relationship between private contracting parties, to which § 90 of the Restatement ordinarily applies.
It is impossible to comprehend how this Court can hold there are unusual circumstances justifying estoppel against the people of this State when the cabin owners signed permits knowing they could be can-celled and when the last permit expired December 31, 1982. After accepting the benefits for twenty-four years, this Court holds there are facts to be litigated on the estoppel issue. In my opinion, that decision is contrary to the facts and the settled law of this state, and is arbitrary and capricious.
*497Plaintiffs claim constitutional violations because the State did not renew their permits. By the terms of the last five-year permit it expired on December 31, 1982. The cabin owners had no property interest subject to due process, equal protection, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before those provisions apply, there must be a deprivation of liberty or property interests. Carlson v. Hudson, 277 N.W.2d 715 (S.D.1979).
Lastly, the cabin owners appeal because the rent was raised from $35.00 to $375-$500 yearly by the Commission. The trial court dismissed this appeal from the Commission, ruling that a contested case did not exist. Although the trial court may have ruled right for the wrong reason, I would affirm because the cabin owners had no property interest once their permits expired on December 31,1982, and a property interest is necessary to trigger the contested case procedure of SDCL ch. 1-26.
I would affirm the trial court on all issues.