Court Opinion

ID: 9461905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:27:31.212298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:19.068979
License: Public Domain

VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent because I believe Harrison’s complaint, with the attached exhibits and the pre-trial memorandum,1 states a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) as against Local 54. Reading the complaint as a whole most favorably to the pro se plaintiff, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice, $ 12.07 at n. 7, Harrison claims not only that he was removed from his union office through the libelous and slanderous statement of the International President, see majority opinion at 10, but also that he was expelled from union membership for expressing his views on the proper *1284jurisdiction of Local 54.2 Although the LMRDA gives Harrison no right to remain a union officer, Sheridan v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962), the statute does protect him as a union member from being expelled for expressing his views on union business. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). See also Semancik v. UMW, 466 F.2d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 1972).3 Thus, Harrison’s allegation is sufficient to invoke district court jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 412 if he has stated a claim against Local 54, the named defendant. The majority concludes that nothing in the complaint or the exhibits establishes that Local 54 undertook to restrict Harrison’s rights under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). However, paragraphs 1, 4, 6 and 8 of the complaint, see majority at 1278-1279 and certain of the exhibits do, in my opinion, state a claim against Local 54.4
Paragraphs 1, 6 and 8 aver that Harrison was expelled from union membership. Paragraph A alleges a “persecution” — presumably resulting in Harrison’s expulsion — engineered by Local 54 as retaliation for Harrison’s expressing his views on the Local’s jurisdiction. Exhibits 3, 23, 25, 26 and 28 establish actions taken by the Local to have Harrison expelled. Even though the actual expulsion may not have been accomplished by Local 54, see majority at 1281, the Local’s documented cooperation in effecting Harrison’s expulsion surely provides a basis for Harrison’s suit against the Local. Duncan v. Peninsula Shipbuilders Ass’n, 394 F.2d 237, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1968); see also Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1250 (2d Cir. 1970).
Exhibit 23 is a letter dated June 4, 1971, from the University of Pennsylvania Vice President for Business and Financial Affairs5 to Harrison. That letter states that Addie Flowers, Secretary-Treasurer of Local 54, had instructed the University to refund all of Harrison’s union dues collected after October 1, 1970. These instructions evidence action by the Local to enforce the expulsion verdict of the International.
Exhibit 25 is a March 4, 1971, letter from Local 54’s counsel, Stephen A. Sheller, to Harrison. That letter also demonstrates that Local 54 intended to take “appropriate steps” to “enforce the decision of the International Union Trial Board” with respect to Harrison’s status in the union.
Exhibit 26 is a letter of June 19, 1970, from officers and members of Local 54’s executive board to the International’s President Jerry Wurf. The letter states that “[t]he undersigned have prepared charges against . . . Mr. Harrison and have requested that Stephen A. Sheller represent us in this matter.” The letter continues:
“We would appreciate it if you would direct all correspondence to our attorney, Mr. Sheller, and he has full *1285authority to handle this matter on our behalf. In accordance with our request, he is sending you an original and two copies of the formal charges against . . . Mr. Harrison.”
The letter further makes clear that the Local assumed an affirmative role in Harrison’s suspension.6
Exhibit 28 makes clear that the filing of charges by the officers and members of the executive board of Local 54 was the act of the Local, rather than the personal action of the individual authors of Exhibit 26. Exhibit 28 is the Constitution of Local 54, which provides, at Art. VII, § 7, that:
“[t]he executive board shall be the governing body at the local union except when meetings of the local union are in session. All matters affecting the policies, aims, and means of accomplishing the purposes of the local not specifically provided for in this constitution or by action of the membership at a regular or special meeting shall be decided by the executive board.”
Finally, Exhibits 28 and 3 establish that the Local must have initiated the formal action culminating in Harrison’s suspension from membership. Art. VIII, § 3, of the Local’s Constitution provides that “[t]he President shall appoint five (5) members of the local union who shall act as the trial body.” This trial body is the finder of fact and, generally, the sentencing body in union disciplinary actions. See Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 1969). The Judicial Panel of the International, see Exhibit 3, is an appellate body that acts on decisions of trial bodies, which are organs of the locals. The International Convention, to which -Harrison also appealed, see Exhibit 3, is the final appellate body within the union. See also Exhibit 23, Art. X, §§ 17 and 18, of the International’s Constitution; Exhibit 3, Art. X, §§ 29-31, id.
Taken as a whole, then, the complaint alleges:
(1) action by the local union in bringing charges against Harrison and enforcing the expulsion verdict entered against him, and
(2) that such action was in retaliation for Harrison’s expressing his views as to the proper jurisdiction of Local 54.
Since the expression of such views is protected by 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), Harrison’s complaint states a claim against Local 54.
Furthermore, plaintiff’s Pre-Trial Memorandum contains this language at page 3:
“Plaintiff was . . . eventually improperly expelled from union membership because the Defendant wanted to annul the original official records of Local 54’s jurisdiction, and place Local 54 jurisdiction inside the Cafeteria of the Dining Service Department of the University of Pennsylvania, and at the same time giving aid to Local 590 to organize Local 54’s lawful jurisdiction: ‘All Non-Academic Employees of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia’.”
This court has consistently stated that the litigation will be guided by the positions which the parties take in their pretrial documents unless manifest injustice will result. See Ely v. Reading Company, 424 F.2d 758, 763-64 (3d Cir. 1970); Payne v. Nabob, 302 F.2d 803, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1962); see also Inter-American Chemicals S. A. v. Lavino Shipping Company, 48 F.R.D. 353, 354 (E.D.Pa.1969) (“. . . trial is limited to only those contentions which the parties’ pre-trial memoranda set forth”). The district court thus erred in dismissing the corn-*1286plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.7
For the foregoing reasons, I would vacate such district court order and remand for further proceedings concerning the claim that Local 54 “had improperly suspended plaintiff from union membership” (paragraph 1 of complaint and exhibits there cited; see also, inter alia, paragraph 4 and summation at page 1279 of majority opinion, as well as the above-mentioned pre-trial memorandum).

. This pre-trial memorandum (Document 4 in Civil No. 74-2126, E.D.Pa.) was filed promptly after defendant filed its answer and more than tv/o months prior to August 7, 1974, when defendant filed its motion to dismiss, which was granted by the district court.

. The majority states at 1281 that the complaint fails to allege the cause for Harrison’s suspension from union membership. I believe that the complaint and attachments thereto, read as a whole, do allege that suspension followed Harrison’s exercise of free speech rights protected by 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2). See majority at 1280-1281.
The majority also states that the time at which Harrison was expelled does not appear on the face of the complaint. However, Exhibit No. 25 establishes that Harrison was expelled from the Union on October 1, 1970.

. In the Semancik case, the court said at page 153:.
“. . . whenever a union member is to be disciplined for discussing the fitness of the union leaders, their policies or their administration, he may claim the protection of LMRDA’s Bill of Rights” (emphasis supplied).

. Not all of the exhibits which I find supportive of Harrison’s claim are cited by him in paragraph 4. However, in reviewing a grant of a motion to dismiss, the court must find the complaint, as a whole insufficient to state any ground of jurisdiction. Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1350 at 551-52. Particularly where a complaint is filed pro se, a restrictive view of the pleadings is improper. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

. The University was Harrison’s employer at the time suit was filed.

. The letter contains the following language:
“We would request that in accordance with Art. V, Section 12 of the International' union Constitution, the suspension of . Mr. Harrison be continued upon receipt of the formal charges.”

. Although the answer to the complaint averred that Harrison’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the motion to dismiss made no reference to the statute. I express no view as to whether the suit would be barred under 12 Purdon’s Pa.Stats. § 31. Dantagnan v. I. L. A. Local 1418, AFL-CIO, 496 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1974); Sewell v. International Ass’n of Machinists, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971).