Court Opinion

ID: 9353867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 22:07:03.514113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:08.950482
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2023-Ohio-80.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :

                 v.                               :        No. 110673

CURTIS JOHNSON,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: APPLICATION DENIED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 11, 2023

                           Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                 Case No. CR-20-647441-A,
                                 Application for Reopening
                                     Motion No. 558684

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, Kristen Hatcher and Kristen L. Sobieski,
                 Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Curtis Johnson, pro se.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                   On October 4, 2022, the applicant, Curtis Johnson, pursuant to

App.R. 26(B), applied to reopen this court’s judgment in State v. Johnson, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 110673, 2022-Ohio-2577, in which this court affirmed his convictions

for two counts of murder, two counts of felonious assault, and one count each of

involuntary manslaughter, discharge of a firearm on or near prohibited premises,

all with one- and three-year firearm specifications, and having weapons while under

disability. Johnson now maintains that his appellate counsel should have argued

the following: (1) Johnson was denied his constitutional right for the jury to decide

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses; (2) trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to seek jury instructions on the lesser included offense of

manslaughter; and (3) there was clear error in the record by labeling Johnson as the

“shooter” in the synthesized video of the event. The state of Ohio filed its brief in

opposition on November 21, 2022. For the following reasons, this court denies the

application to reopen.

              In the early morning hours of December 1, 2019, in the Legacy

Nightclub, Curtis Johnson got into a fight with Eric White and Catera Fowler. As

the bar emptied, Johnson went to his car, removed his sweatshirt, and waited for

White to exit. When White and Fowler left the bar, White approached in a manner

suggesting he intended to continue the fight. White pulled out a firearm, and

Johnson ran back to his car and sought refuge behind it. At that time, someone fired

shots and the crowd dispersed. White and Fowler ran past Johnson’s car and

continued down the street. Johnson retrieved a gun from his car and began shooting

down the street in the direction of White and Fowler. Fowler was struck in the lower

left back and the bullet exited ten inches higher from her right chest. She died from
this wound. During the investigation, the police found shell casings from four

different guns, and it was never determined which gun fired the fatal shot.

               The grand jury indicted Johnson for the seven charges listed above.

Defense counsel sought a jury instruction on self-defense, but the trial court

declined to give one. The jury found Johnson guilty of all charges. The trial judge

merged the two murder counts with one count of felonious assault and the

involuntary manslaughter charge. He imposed an aggregate sentence of 21 years to

life.

               Appellate counsel argued that the trial court erred in refusing to

instruct on self-defense and that the verdicts for murder, involuntary manslaughter,

and felonious assault were not supported by sufficient evidence. The failure to

identify which of the four weapons killed Fowler created a reasonable doubt as to

whether Johnson was the killer. Johnson now argues that his appellate counsel was

ineffective.

               In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, the applicant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient

and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.            Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley,

42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989); and State v. Reed, 74 Ohio St.3d 534,

1996-Ohio-21, 660 N.E.2d 456.

               In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court ruled that judicial

scrutiny of an attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court noted that it is
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess his lawyer after conviction and that

it would be all too easy for a court, examining an unsuccessful defense in hindsight,

to conclude that a particular act or omission was deficient. Therefore, “a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be

considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland at 689.

              Specifically, in regard to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the appellate advocate’s

prerogative to decide strategy and tactics by selecting what he thinks are the most

promising arguments out of all possible contentions. The court noted, “Experienced

advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of

winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if

possible, or at most on a few key issues.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-752,

103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). Indeed, including weaker arguments might

lessen the impact of the stronger ones. Accordingly, the court ruled that judges

should not second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on

appellate counsel the duty to raise every “colorable” issue. Such rules would disserve

the goal of vigorous and effective advocacy. The Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed

these principles in State v. Allen, 77 Ohio St.3d 172, 1996-Ohio-366, 672 N.E.2d 638.

              Moreover, even if a petitioner establishes that an error by his lawyer

was professionally unreasonable under all the circumstances of the case, the
petitioner must further establish prejudice: but for the unreasonable error there is a

reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome. A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of alleged

deficiencies.

                In his first proposed assignment of error, Johnson argues that the

trial court deprived him of his right to a jury trial by not instructing the jurors on

self-defense.   He proposes that his appellate counsel should have framed the

argument as the trial judge usurping the jury’s role by making his own evaluation of

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.

                However, appellate counsel directly addressed the issue by arguing

that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense.         He

incorporated the role of the jury in his argument: “Certainly the evidence was such

that the question should have gone to the jury for its consideration.” (Pg. 5 of

appellant’s brief.) “The trial court’s refusal to allow the question of self-defense to

go to the jury for its consideration was error. The jury would have been free to accept

or reject the defense, but never had the opportunity.” (Pg. 7 of appellant’s brief.)

“By refusing the self-defense instruction, the lower court failed to ‘fully and

completely give the jury all instructions which are relevant and necessary for the jury

to weigh the evidence and discharge its duty as the fact finder.’” (Pg. 8 of appellant’s

brief, quoting State v. White, 142 Ohio St.3d 277, 2015-Ohio-492, 29 N.E.3d 939.)
Appellate counsel in the exercise of professional judgment was not ineffective for

directly addressing the issue as a failure to give a necessary jury instruction and

emphasizing the role of the jury as part of the argument.

              Johnson’s second argument is that appellate counsel failed to seek a

jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. Johnson in his

application clarifies that he means involuntary manslaughter. However, the grand

jury indicted him for involuntary manslaughter, the trial judge instructed on that

charge, and the jury found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Thus, the

argument is ill-founded.

              Johnson’s final argument is that it was error to label him as the

“shooter” in the synthesized video of the event. Multiple cameras in and around the

bar captured the event from various angles. The state synthesized the videos into

one approximately four-minute video showing the event as it occurred. The state

labeled Johnson as the “shooter” in the video. Johnson argues that this unfairly

prejudiced him in front of the jury. Although Johnson’s trial counsel objected to the

label, in his closing argument he acknowledged that the video shows Johnson

shooting. Trial counsel argued that this video showed him shooting in a downward

direction, thus, making it impossible for Johnson to be the killer, because the bullet

that killed Fowler entered her in an upward trajectory. (Tr. 590-591.)

              Johnson cites Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89

L.Ed.2d 525 (1986), for the proposition that the test is whether there was an

unacceptable risk of prejudice. In that case, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that having extra uniformed officers in the courtroom was not inherently prejudicial

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. So too in the present case, the truth that

Johnson fired his gun and trial counsel’s efforts to use the video and the other

evidence to show that Johnson was not the killer did not deprive Johnson of a fair

trial by labeling him as the “shooter.” Following the admonition of the Supreme

Court, this court rules that appellate counsel in the exercise of professional judgment

could properly decline to make this argument.

               Accordingly, this court denies the application to reopen.

_______________________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR