Court Opinion

ID: 9522376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:24:08.629461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:41.034721
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority's opinion with respect to issue six, ie., whether it was error to admit into evidence certain diagnostic reports concerning the Defendant's mental state.
The Defendant presented insanity as his defense. In rebuttal, the State offered the expert testimony of Dr. Norman Duly, a psychiatrist. In addition to interviewing the Defendant, Dr. Duly had utilized a number of documents and reports which had been prepared by others in forming his opinion. Three of these reports were offered by the State and admitted into evidence over Defendant's "hearsay" objection.
The first report, State's Exhibit #20, was a report of an electroencephalogram (EEG) examination of the Defendant. This exhibit had little prejudicial or probative value, and any error in its admission could be considered harmless. The second and third exhibits, however, State's Exhibits # 21 and # 22, were diagnostic evaluations of the Defendant. They contained subjective evaluations of his family, school and social attitudes, as well as the conclusions and opinions of the preparers. The information in these reports had been acquired through interviews with his family members and probation officer.
The reports had not been prepared in connection with this case; rather, they had been prepared in connection with Defendant's incarceration in the Indiana Boys School and more than one year prior to the murder. None of the individuals who had prepared the reports testified at the trial. The majority holds that these reports were not hearsay but were properly admitted not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein, but merely to establish a foundation for Dr. Duly's opinion with regard to the Defendant's sanity. I cannot accept this analysis.
Dr. Duly gave absolutely no testimony concerning which, if any, of the test results he had considered to be relevant to his inquiry or which, if any, of the facts related he had utilized in forming his opinion before the documents were admitted into evidence. Indeed, the State's entire foundation for admitting these two exhibits was the identification by the Doctor as reports that he had read while conducting his evaluation of the Defendant's mental health. Upon this pretense both exhibits were admitted in their entirety. No attempt was made to delete those portions of the reports which were clearly inadmissible. Thus, upon no more than a mere identification by Dr. Duly, highly prejudicial statements were admitted into evidence and passed among the jurors.
In State's Exhibit #21 the following opinions appeared:
"Shawn appears to be harboring an awful amount of hate and resentment. The hate appears to be the result of his father's treatment of him.... His father, according to Shawn, has also stated that he would like to put a gun to Shawn's head and kill him. This agent is not as much concerned about the accuracy of these statements, as she is with the emotions that Shawn expressed while revealing them.
*239"Shawn has talked about both suicide and homicide (concerning his father)."
(R. at 839) (State's Exhibit #21 at 4).
State's Exhibit #22 contained results from a number of personality tests, followed by the examiner's impressions, opinions and recommendations:
"He seemed to vacillate between wanting to tell his story and therefore relieve some of the mounting tensions, and his fear that by revealing himself he would both lose control and jeopardize his future stability in the home.
"Personality testing suggests that Shawn was feeling a great deal of stress and pressure at the time of testing and therefore probably exaggerated all his feelings, worries and complaints.... Shawn probably has a high energy level combined with a low frustration tolerance, easy irritability, moodiness and lack of sufficient appropriate outlets for the excess energy.
"Shawn impressed this examiner as an extremely unhappy youth who has learned to protect himself from hurt and rejection by converting all unpleasant feelings to anger.... resulting in a figurative 'powder keg'-an unpredictable individual who may rather intensely overreact (sic) to a minor threat or irritation."
(R. at 840) (State's Exhibit #22 at 2-8).
While Dr. Duly could state his opinion and support it with facts from these reports, he certainly would not have been allowed to testify as to the opinions of those persons who had prepared them. Flewallen v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 90, 96, 368 N.E.2d 239, 242; Clouse v. Fielder, (1982) Ind.App., 431 N.E.2d 148, 155. Cf. Duncan v. George Moser Leather Company, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 1332, 1343. Yet, by having Dr. Duly identify them as matters he had considered, the State was allowed to place these opinions directly into evidence and pass them among the jurors to be read. The State's questioning of Dr. Duly appears to me to have been mere subterfuge aimed at exposing the jury to inadmissible hearsay opinions. Weedman v. State, (1981) Ind., 416 N.E.2d 1268, 1269; Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. at 96, 368 N.E.2d at 242. Cf. France v. State, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 659, 664, 387 N.E.2d 66, 69; Smith v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 187, 189, 285 N.E.2d 275, 275-76, cert. denied 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 951, 35 L.Ed.2d 261.
The majority opinion misinterprets Smith. In Smith we were not presented with the question of whether or not a report was admissible directly into evidence. Nevertheless, we stated that, "medical reports containing observations and expert opinions relating to a defendant's sanity or insanity should not be admitted directly into evidence...." 259 Ind. at 189, 285 N.E.2d at 275-76 (emphasis added). Al though this statement was dicta in that case, it has subsequently been accepted by this Court and the Court of Appeals as a correct statement of the law excluding medical reports of the type involved in this case from admission into evidence. Weedman v. State, 416 N.E.2d at 1269; Flewallen v. State, 267 Ind. at 96, 368 N.E.2d at 202; Clouse v. Fielder, 481 N.E.2d at 155.
In Weedman we held that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit Defendant's offered medical record into evidence:
"The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit his medical records into evidence. The defendant interposed an insanity defense. The medical record originated from a mental health center in Kentucky, where the defendant had received treatment. It contained the conclusion of a person, who is not identified in the record, that the defendant suffered from a schizoid personality.... [Thhe defendant attempted to bring a medical record containing an observation about his sanity or insanity directly into evidence, which we have stated should not be done. Smith v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 187, 189, 285 N.E.2d 275, 55 A.L.R.8d 546, cert. denied, (1973) 409 U.S. 1129, 98 S.Ct. 951, 85 L.Ed.2d 261. *240There was no error in failing to admit the medical record."
416 N.E.2d at 1269.
In Flewallen the trial court permitted an expert witness to read into evidence an entire medical report of another doctor, including the diagnosis. We held that to be error, although harmless under the cireum-stances. Citing Smith v. State, Justice Pivarnik wrote:
"While an expert opinion as to the defendant's mental condition by a person not available for cross-examination is not admissible testimony, such report may be used as a basis of a testifying expert's opinion as to the defendant's sanity if it is in a form that he would normally use in making his professional evaluation. Smith v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 187, 285 N.E.2d 275, cert. denied 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 951, 385 L.Ed.2d 261 (1973). It was improper for the court to permit Doctor Pontace to read the entire report including Doctor Tullen's diagnosis."
Flewallen, 267 Ind. at 96, 368 N.E.2d a 242.
These cases, Weedman, Flewallen and Smith have established a sound evidentiary rule in Indiana, i.e., medical records containing observations, interpretations, diagnoses or opinions of one who is not available for cross-examination are not admissible directly into evidence. The majority opinion today would eliminate this rule.
These reports, State's Exhibits # 21 and #22, were erroneously admitted into evidence and contained highly prejudicial matter. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.