Court Opinion

ID: 9643258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:24:09.864503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:58.907422
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Cercone, J.:
Although I concur in the opinion of Judge Watkins, I would like to supplement it with the following reason.
Plaintiffs brought suit to recover commissions from defendants for allegedly finding an investor in defendants’ business enterprise on the basis of two contracts, one oral and one written. At trial the jury returned a verdict of $340,000 in favor of plaintiffs based on the oral contract. (Plaintiffs and the lower court agree that the verdict was not based on the written agreement.) The defendants’ motions for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial having been refused, this appeal was taken.
One question presented is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict based on the oral agreement. Plaintiffs alleged that in June of 1967, they entered into an oral agreement with defendant Harry B offer, acting for the other defendants, wherein plaintiffs were promised a commission at a fixed percentage if they found an investor who was willing to invest money in a Florida real estate project which defendants were developing (hereinafter referred to as “Enterprise” ). Despite this allegation in their pleadings concerning a fixed percentage for commission, plaintiffs amended their pleadings to allege they were also entitled under the oral agreement to recover on a quantum meruit basis for the value of their services. De*284fendants denied that any such oral agreement was entered into. In March of 1968, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a written agreement in which defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs 2-1/3% of whatever money was invested in Enterprise by a Joseph Boneparth and a Bernard Kemp or their associates. Defendant Softer, also acting for the other defendants, met with Mr. Boneparth in Florida a few weeks after the written agreement was entered into. Boneparth brought with him to the meeting a Mr. Henry August and August in turn brought Avith him two men from the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company of Boston (“Hancock”). Boneparth and Henry August turned out to be real estate brokers and not investors and were only interested in finding an investor for defendants’ real estate project so that they themselves might earn a commission. There Avas no evidence at trial that either Henry August or Hancock were associates of Boneparth, Kemp or of plaintiffs. Hancock showed an interest in defendants’ Enterprise and was able to interest another firm, Arlen Properties, Inc., also in the project. At no time prior to or during the negotiations between defendants and Hancock did plaintiffs ever think of, talk to, or mention to Hancock about Enterprise, or ever mention Hancock to defendants at any time.
On June 28, 1968, plaintiffs agreed in writing to accept the sum of $75,000 in payment of all commissions that could be due them, which agreement at a later time plaintiffs rejected because, they alleged subsequently in their pleadings, defendants had misrepresented facts which led plaintiffs to agree to accept $75,-000.
Defendants met Avith representatives of Hancock on August 13, 1968 in Boston. In attendance at this meeting, in addition to defendants and a representative of *285Hancock, were Henry August, Joseph Boneparth, and Arthur Cohen of Arlen Properties, Inc. At that meeting Arlen Properties and defendants entered into a joint venture agreement. The salient provisions of this agreement were that the joint venture would acquire, develop and operate defendants’ land (Enterprise) in Florida; that Arlen Properties was to procure a commitment from Hancock and also an interim commitment from a lending institution for twenty-four million dollars; and that Arlen Properties was to loan two million dollars to the joint venture and half of any additional funds needed over the money borrowed to improve the property as required.
Arlen Properties obtained the commitment of Hancock and on August 19,1968 Hancock executed a “Land Purchase and Lease Commitment” to Arlen Properties and defendants which they accepted in writing on or before September 2, 1968. By that commitment Hancock agreed to purchase defendants’ real estate between December 1, 1971 and December 31, 1971 for a maximum of twenty-four million dollars provided certain conditions had been fulfilled to the satisfaction of Hancock including zoning approval of the master plan of the development, retaining walls, roadways, sewer, water, gas and electric lines, and other improvements. The commitment provided that if the conditions were fulfilled, Hancock would buy the property and lease it for fifty years to a joint venture limited partnership in which Arlen Properties, the defendants, and Hancock, or their nominees, would each have a 32-l/6th interest. The remaining 3-1/2% interest in this joint venture was to be assigned to Henry August and Joseph Boneparth in payment of brokerage commissions due them. Defendants obtained interim financing from Clhase-Manhattan Bank to a limit of twenty-four million dollars to be drawn as the development of the prop*286erty progressed. The bank was secured by a mortgage on the Florida real estate (Enterprise), but other than for that mortgage security the loan from the bank was obtained on defendants’ credit and not on Hancock’s.
In the pleadings defendants alleged that plaintiffs not only did not obtain Hancock as an investor, but were further barred from recovery because they were not licensed as required by the Real Estate Brokers License Act of 1929, May 1, P. L. 1216, as amended, 63 P.S. §431 et seq. Plaintiffs admitted they were not so licensed but alleged they were not required to do so.
Up to the time for trial Hancock had not invested any money in Enterprise.
On the basis of the record I concur with the majority opinion that the lower court should have granted defendants’ motion for judgment n.o.v. The jury’s verdict, concerning which plaintiffs and the lower court agree, clearly rejected plaintiffs’ claim under the written contract. This verdict, in effect, took away plaintiffs’ claim that they obtained Hancock as an investor in Enterprise because only in accordance with the written agreement could it possibly be said that Hancock came into the Enterprise picture as a possible investor.
So far as plaintiffs’ case in support of the oral agreement is concerned, there is a complete lack of evidence that plaintiffs had in any way obtained Hancock as an investor. Plaintiffs never thought of Hancock as an investor, never talked to or negotiated with Hancock at any time concerning Enterprise, nor did they ever mention Hancock to defendants as an investor in Enterprise. Therefore, since the written agreement was rejected by the jury and plaintiffs’ case in support of the oral agreement lacks any evidence that they obtained Hancock as an investor, the jury’s verdict based on the oral agreement was completely without support in the evidence.
*287Consequently, for this additional reason the judgment should be reversed and judgment n.o.v. should he entered for the appellants.