Court Opinion

ID: 9911419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 20:10:47.545497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:43.814415
License: Public Domain

J-A21014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ALLEN R. DANIELY                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2699 EDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 11, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0001875-2008

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 19, 2023

       Appellant Allen R. Daniely appeals from the order denying his timely first

Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant argues that the PCRA

court erred in rejecting his ineffectiveness claims against both trial counsel

and direct appeal counsel. We affirm.

       We adopt the PCRA court’s summary of the facts and procedural history

underlying this matter. See PCRA Ct. Op., 1/9/23, at 1-5. Briefly, Appellant

was convicted of first-degree murder and related offenses following the 2007

shooting death of Darryl Jones. After the trial court imposed a mandatory

sentence of life imprisonment in 2009, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Daniely,

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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1200 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11259170 (Pa. Super. filed July 16, 2013)

(unpublished mem.).

       Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in 2014.           Appellant

subsequently retained PCRA counsel,2 who filed an amended petition on

Appellant’s behalf.      Therein, Appellant argued that (1) trial counsel was

ineffective for advising Appellant that he would receive a twenty-to-forty-year

prison sentence if he waived his right to a jury trial; and (2) both trial counsel

and direct appeal counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the

sufficiency of the identification evidence. See Am. PCRA Pet., 3/23/22, at 9-

26.

       On October 11, 2022, the PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing

to address Appellant’s jury trial waiver claim. At the hearing, the PCRA court

heard testimony from Appellant, Appellant’s parents, and trial counsel.

Ultimately, the PCRA court found trial counsel credible and concluded that trial

counsel did not promise Appellant any specific sentence in exchange for

waiving his right to a jury trial. See N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 10/11/22, at 104-06.

That same day, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing Appellant’s petition.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant has been represented by numerous attorneys since

he filed his PCRA petition in 2014. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 1-3. In June of 2021,
the PCRA court conducted a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier,
713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) and granted Appellant’s petition to proceed pro se.
However, Appellant subsequently retained Teri Himebaugh, Esq., who was
granted leave to file an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf.

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      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The PCRA court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for review:

      1. Did the PCRA court err when, after a hearing, it denied
         Appellant’s claim that he was denied his rights under Article 1
         § 9 [of the Pennsylvania Constitution] and the Sixth and
         Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
         States of America when trial counsel ineffectively represented
         to the Appellant that he should waive his constitutional right to
         a trial by jury and that if he did so, he would receive no more
         than a 20 to 40 year sentence?

      2. Did the PCRA court err when it denied Appellant’s claim that he
         was denied his rights under Article 1 § 9 [of the Pennsylvania
         Constitution] and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
         Constitution of the United States of America when trial counsel
         failed to properly argue insufficiency of the evidence in the
         motion for judgment of acquittal on the first-degree murder
         charges; counsel on direct appeal ineffectively failed to
         challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to the
         first-degree murder conviction [without a hearing]?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some formatting altered).

                            Waiver of Jury Trial

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in rejecting

his claim that trial counsel was ineffective in connection with Appellant’s jury

trial waiver. Id. at 12. Specifically, Appellant reiterates his assertion that

trial counsel told Appellant that he would receive a twenty-to-forty-year prison

sentence if he waived his right to a jury trial.    Id. at 19-20.    In support,

Appellant relies on his own testimony at the PCRA hearing and the testimony

from his parents.     Id. at 16-22.   Further, he argues that trial counsel’s

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“testimony at the PCRA hearing was highly self-serving and incredible” and

that the circumstances surrounding the jury trial waiver clearly indicate that

he waived his right to a jury trial solely based on trial counsel’s advice. Id.

at 24-26, 30.    He also claims that “[t]here was no reasonable, rational

evidentiary basis” for trial counsel’s advice to proceed with a waiver trial and

that “[h]ad [he] received objectively reasonable advice from [trial counsel] .

. . he would have elected a jury trial, satisfying the prejudice requirement.”

Id. at 24, 29. Finally, although Appellant acknowledges that he participated

in an on-the-record waiver colloquy, he claims that the colloquy “goes to the

‘voluntariness’ of the waiver and not whether [his decision] was ‘intelligent.’”

Id. at 30.

      Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).         “The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court;

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted).

      We     presume    that   the    petitioner’s   counsel   was    effective.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 732 A.2d 1167, 1177 (Pa. 1999). To establish

a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the

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circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(citations omitted).

      The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following

prongs: “(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had

no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for

the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”            Id. (citations

omitted). Moreover, “[a] failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness

test requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.” Commonwealth v.

Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa. 2009) (citation omitted).

      Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

      A claim that trial counsel was ineffective by coercing a defendant
      to waive his right to a jury trial ordinarily will be unsuccessful
      where it is “contradicted by testimony elicited from [defendant]
      during his waiver colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Bishop, 645
      A.2d 274, 277 (Pa. Super. 1994). Under this rule, where the
      record shows that defendant testified during his waiver colloquy
      “that his jury trial waiver was not the product of threats, coercion,
      or promises . . . . [a defendant’s] claim is unsupported by the
      record, [and] must fail.” Id.

      However, our Superior Court has recognized a narrow exception
      to the general rule outlined above. Where a defendant claims that
      he waived his right to a jury trial because of a specific promise
      made to him by defense counsel as to what his sentence would
      be, then the misrepresentation by counsel may invalidate the
      waiver. Commonwealth v. Carey, 340 A.2d 509, 511 (Pa.
      Super. 1975). However, because a disappointed defendant may
      often claim that he was misled by his counsel, defendant’s claim

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     must be corroborated by another source that is accepted as
     truthful. “Thus, if defense counsel denies any inducement, and if
     no other corroborating evidence is produced, the waiver will be
     upheld.” Id.

     At the evidentiary hearing, the Commonwealth presented
     testimony from trial counsel, Michael Coard, Esq. [(trial counsel)].
     [Appellant] presented testimony from his parents, Bonita Crabbe
     and Alan Crabbe, and [Appellant] also testified on his own behalf.

     First, [trial counsel] testified that he had been practicing criminal
     defense for 26 years. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 10/11/22, at 7-8. He stated
     that prior to [Appellant’s] trial, he unsuccessfully attempted to
     persuade the Commonwealth to agree to allow [Appellant] to
     plead to third-degree murder. Id. at 10. After that, [trial counsel]
     began preparing in earnest for trial, and he explained to
     [Appellant] the advantages and disadvantages of a jury trial
     versus a waiver trial. Id. at 11-12, 28. Following that discussion,
     [Appellant] decided to go with a waiver trial. Id. at 13. [Trial
     counsel] further testified that he never told [Appellant], or
     [Appellant’s] parents, that [Appellant] would receive any
     guaranteed sentence if [Appellant] proceeded with a waiver trial,
     and that he had never made such a promise in his career as a
     criminal defense attorney. Id. at 13-14. [Trial counsel] also
     stated that he went through the written waiver form with
     [Appellant,] and [Appellant] did not have any questions regarding
     the form. Id. at 14-15. Moreover, [trial counsel] testified that
     during Judge Hughes’ oral colloquy regarding the waiver of
     [Appellant’s] rights to a jury trial, there was no indication that the
     [Appellant] was confused or wished to proceed with a jury trial.
     Id. at 15-16. Lastly, [trial counsel] testified that he did not
     pressure [Appellant] to proceed with a bench trial, and if
     [Appellant] wanted to have a jury trial, then he would have taken
     that course of action. Id. at 16.

     Next, [Appellant’s] mother, Bonita Crabbe, testified. N.T. PCRA
     Hr’g, 10/11/22, at 31. Ms. Crabbe stated that she spoke with
     [trial counsel] in [trial counsel’s] office and they discussed
     [Appellant’s] possible guilty plea to third degree murder. Id. at
     31-32. She also said that she spoke to [trial counsel] another
     time in the courtroom hallway just before the trial. Id. at 32-33.
     Ms. Crabbe testified that during that conversation, [trial counsel]
     told her that if [Appellant] pled guilty to third[-]degree murder,
     he would receive a twenty-to-forty-year sentence. Id. at 33.
     When asked if [trial counsel] ever discussed whether [Appellant]

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     should go with a judge or a jury trial, Ms. Crabbe testified that
     [trial counsel] said it was better for [Appellant] to go with a judge
     because “he would get a better plea deal if he goes with the
     judge.” Id. at 33-34. Ms. Crabbe testified that she understood
     that to mean if [Appellant] went with a judge trial, he would
     receive a twenty-to-forty-year sentence, and if he went with a jury
     trial, he would get life without parole. Id. at 34. She further
     testified that she believed if [Appellant] decided to have a waiver
     trial with Judge Hughes, he would not be convicted of anything
     higher than third-degree murder. Id. at 34

     Next, [Appellant’s] father, Alan Crabbe, testified. N.T. PCRA Hr’g,
     10/11/22, at 45. He stated that he spoke with [trial counsel] twice
     before [Appellant’s] trial. Id. at 45. Mr. Crabbe testified that his
     first conversation with [trial counsel] was in [trial counsel’s] office,
     and they discussed whether the [Appellant] should go with a jury
     trial or judge trial. Id. at 45. Mr. Crabbe testified that [trial
     counsel] said [Appellant] should go with a judge trial, and that
     [Appellant] would receive 20 years if he went with a judge as
     opposed to a jury. Id. at 45, 54. Mr. Crabbe stated that during
     the meeting, they also discussed a possible deal for [Appellant] to
     plead to third[-]degree murder and receive a twenty-to-forty-year
     sentence. Id. at 46. Mr. Crabbe testified that his second
     conversation with [trial counsel] was in the hallway outside the
     courtroom, at which time [trial counsel] told Mr. Crabbe that
     [Appellant] was not going to be able to plead to third[-]degree
     murder. Id. at 46-47. Mr. Crabbe stated that during that
     conversation, [trial counsel] also discussed the advantages and
     disadvantages of going with a judge versus a jury. Id. at 47. Mr.
     Crabbe testified that it was his understanding that it would be
     better for [Appellant] to go with a judge trial. Id. at 48. When
     asked if [trial counsel] explained why it would be better for
     [Appellant] to be tried in front of a judge, Mr. Crabbe stated that
     if he went with a judge, [Appellant] would receive a twenty-to-
     forty-year sentence. Id. at 49.

     [Appellant] testified next. He stated that he and [trial counsel]
     had two meetings in the District Attorney’s office prior to his trial.
     N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 10/11/22, at 58. [Appellant] stated that the
     purpose of those meetings was to discuss a possible plea
     agreement. Id. at 59. [Appellant] testified that [trial counsel]
     told him the Commonwealth offered him a plea deal of [twenty-
     to-forty] years if he identified the shooter. Id. at 59. However,
     [Appellant] stated that on the morning of the trial, [trial counsel]
     informed [Appellant] that they would be going to trial because the

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     Commonwealth was no longer offering the plea deal. Id. at 60.
     [Appellant] testified that [trial counsel] told [Appellant] that [trial
     counsel] and the prosecutor had a conversation with Judge
     Hughes in her chambers. Id. at 60. During the conversation,
     [trial counsel] told Judge Hughes that [Appellant] was prepared
     to plead to [twenty-to-forty years], but the prosecutor was no
     longer offering the plea deal. Id. [Appellant] stated that [trial
     counsel] then told Judge Hughes that the reason the plea deal was
     not going forward was because the Commonwealth wanted
     [Appellant] to “tell on his own brother.” Id. Judge Hughes
     allegedly responded by saying, “Is that true? Not even I would do
     that, not even I would tell on my own brother.” Id. Judge Hughes
     then allegedly continued, “Well, this is a unique case. So if
     [Appellant] elects to go with a waiver trial, I’ll sentence him to
     [twenty-to-forty].” Id. at 60-61. [Appellant] stated that [trial
     counsel] also conveyed this conversation to [Appellant’s] parents,
     and they agreed with [trial counsel] that [Appellant] should
     proceed with a waiver trial. Id. at 61. [Appellant] testified that
     [trial counsel] did not go over the advantages and disadvantages
     of a judge or jury trial, and that the only reason [Appellant]
     elected to waive his jury trial was because Judge Hughes said she
     would give him [twenty-to-forty years]. Id. at 61-62.

     In its findings of fact rendered at the conclusion of the hearing,
     the court found [trial counsel’s] testimony to be credible and
     credited his emphatic testimony that he had never guaranteed
     anybody a result of a waiver trial. N.T. PCRA Hr’g, 10/11/22, at
     104-105.     The court stated that the scenario described by
     [Appellant] was contradicted by the trial record, the waiver
     colloquy, [trial counsel’s] testimony, and the actions of Judge
     Hughes. Id. at 107. Therefore, the court found that [trial
     counsel] did not promise [Appellant] that he would get a sentence
     of [twenty-to-forty] years if he waived his right to a jury trial. Id.
     The court further concluded that [Appellant] failed to meet his
     burden that his waiver was not knowing, intelligent, and
     voluntary. Id. at 107-08.

     The court’s rejection of [Appellant’s] ineffective assistance of
     counsel claim premised upon alleged promises made to him about
     his sentence is fully supported by record. Accordingly, there is no
     basis to disturb it on appeal. See Green, 14 A.3d at 116.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 6-10 (some formatting altered).

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      Following our review of the record, we discern no error of law in the

PCRA court’s conclusions, which are supported by the record. See Lawson,

90 A.3d at 4. The record confirms that Appellant participated in an on-the-

record waiver colloquy during which time he confirmed that no one had made

“any promises of any form to get [him] to waive [his] right to a jury trial.”

See N.T. Trial, 7/20/09, at 5-8.       Further, the PCRA court credited trial

counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing and concluded that trial counsel “did

not promise [Appellant] that he would get a sentence of [twenty-to-forty]

years if he waived his right to a jury trial.” See PCRA Ct. Op. at 10. As noted

previously, the PCRA court’s credibility determinations are binding on this

Court. See Mitchell, 105 A.3d at 1265. Therefore, because Appellant has

failed to demonstrate that trial counsel made a specific promise that

invalidated Appellant’s waiver colloquy, Appellant’s claim fails for lack of

arguable merit. See Bishop, 645 A.2d at 277; Carey, 340 A.2d at 511. For

these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

               Failure to Challenge Identification Evidence

      In his remaining claim, Appellant argues that both trial counsel and

direct appeal counsel were ineffective for failing to properly challenge the

sufficiency of the identification evidence supporting his conviction for first-

degree murder. Appellant’s Brief at 31. Specifically, Appellant claims that

although trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, trial counsel

challenged the evidence proving specific intent, rather than the evidence

establishing that Appellant was the shooter.          Id. at 42.   Appellant baldly

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asserts that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to raise this

argument and that, had trial counsel done so, Appellant would have been

acquitted of the first-degree murder charge. Id. at 42-43. Appellant also

claims that direct appeal counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to raise

this claim on appeal and that direct appeal counsel’s “omission of this claim

on direct appeal had an adverse effect on the outcome of the appellate

proceedings.” Id. at 44-45.

       “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is

required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, each of the

three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of representation.”

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1004 n.11 (Pa. 2022) (citation

omitted). Further, it is well settled that

       if the petitioner cannot prove the underlying claim of trial counsel
       ineffectiveness, then [the] petitioner’s derivative claim of
       [subsequent] counsel ineffectiveness of necessity must fail, and it
       is not necessary for the court to address the other two prongs of
       the Pierce[3] test [i.e., the reasonable basis and prejudice prongs]
       as applied to [subsequent] counsel.

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (Pa. 2011) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

       Here, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

____________________________________________

3Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (Pa. 1987); see also
Turetsky, 925 A.2d at 880 (same).

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       It is true that in [Appellant’s] statement to police, he denied that
       he was the shooter. Following Miranda[4] warnings, [Appellant]
       gave a statement in which he admitted to participating in the
       robbery and murder of Mr. Jones with two other accomplices. N.T.
       Trial, 7/22/09, at 153-56. However, [Appellant] told police that
       he was merely a getaway driver, and that prior to the robbery, he
       gave his gun to one of the other accomplices. Id. at 153-54.

       However, the Commonwealth offered compelling evidence that
       [Appellant] admitted to being the shooter, and not merely the
       getaway driver, in a statement that he made to Commonwealth
       witness Ebony Sawyer. Ms. Sawyer, who was one of [Appellant’s]
       girlfriends, testified that following the murder of Mr. Jones, she
       was with [Appellant] when he began playing with a gun and
       proceeded to point the gun at Ms. Sawyer. N.T. [Trial,] 7/20/09,
       at 161-62. After Ms. Sawyer said to [Appellant], “you wouldn’t
       shoot me[,]” [Appellant] stated, “you crazy, ask my goonies[.]”
       Id. at 162. According to Ms. Sawyer, [Appellant] said that
       “somebody got their back blew out the frame[,]” in reference to
       the Saturday shooting. N.T. Trial, 7/20/09, at 163.

       More importantly, the Commonwealth also introduced Ms.
       Sawyer’s statement to police. In that statement, Ms. Sawyer
       stated that [Appellant] told her the following, while pointing a gun
       at her:

          He said I should have been there on Saturday. Jerone
          walked up to the guy and said something to the guy to make
          him stop. [Appellant] was playing with the gun and was
          showing me how he shot the guy on Saturday,
          demonstrating that he shot the gun three times. [Appellant]
          said that “I tore his back out the frame.”

       N.T. Trial, 7/22/09, at 97-99. This admission, without more, was
       sufficient to establish that [Appellant] was the shooter.

       Moreover, there was additional compelling evidence that
       corroborated [Appellant’s] admissions.        In particular, the
       Commonwealth presented evidence that three days after the
       murder, the police traced the signal from the stolen cell phone of
       the decedent, Mr. Jones, to a residence at the intersection of
       Germantown Avenue and Washington Lane. N.T. Trial, 7/22/09,
       at 139-40.    After the police witnessed [Appellant] exit the
____________________________________________

4 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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      residence with a cell phone in his hand, they stopped [Appellant]
      and patted him down. Id. at 140-42. During the pat-down, police
      found a .40 caliber handgun on [Appellant], which was the same
      type of gun used to shoot Mr. Jones. Id. at 142. Moreover, a
      ballistics analysis demonstrated that the two fired cartridge cases
      recovered from the scene of the murder had been fired from the
      gun recovered from [Appellant]. Id. at 83-87. The police then
      verified that the cell phone [Appellant] was holding was Mr. Jones’
      missing cell phone. Id. at 142-43.

      Accordingly, there was ample evidence to support the [c]ourt’s
      finding that [Appellant] robbed and personally shot and killed Mr.
      Jones. As a result, neither trial nor appellate counsel was
      ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims based on the
      sufficiency of the evidence.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 12-13 (footnote omitted and some formatting altered).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no error of law in the

PCRA court’s conclusions, which are supported by the record.    See Lawson,

90 A.3d at 4.   As noted by the PCRA court, the Commonwealth presented

ample evidence demonstrating that Appellant was the shooter. See PCRA Ct.

Op. at 12-13.    Therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to

challenge the sufficiency of the identification evidence. See Commonwealth

v. Rivera, 816 A.2d 282, 292 (Pa. Super. 2003) (reiterating that “trial counsel

will not be considered ineffective for failing to pursue meritless claims”

(citation omitted and formatting altered)). Likewise, because Appellant has

failed to prove that trial counsel was ineffective, his ineffectiveness claim

against direct appeal counsel also fails. See id; see also Parrish, 273 A.3d

at 1004 n.11; Chmiel, 30 A.3d at 1128. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled

to relief. For these reasons, we affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 12/19/2023

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