Court Opinion

ID: 9909332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 01:00:32.229015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:06.106207
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10860        Document: 00516999252             Page: 1      Date Filed: 12/12/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-10860
                                     ____________                                     FILED
                                                                              December 12, 2023
   United States of America,                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk
                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Oren Javentay Pichon,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:22-CR-79-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Southwick, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Defendant Oren Javentay Pichon pleaded guilty to one count of
   possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court upwardly
   departed from the guidelines imprisonment range and imposed the maximum
   sentence of 120 months. On appeal, Pichon argues that the district court
   erroneously imposed an above-guidelines sentence and erred in accepting
   Pichon’s guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10860      Document: 00516999252          Page: 2   Date Filed: 12/12/2023

                                    No. 22-10860

          We conclude that the district court’s sentence was both procedurally
   and substantively reasonable, and that the district court’s acceptance of
   Pichon’s guilty plea under § 922(g)(1) was not plain error.
          We accordingly affirm.
                                        I.
          On January 3, 2022, Pichon was subject to a traffic stop, during which
   police officers found him in possession of a firearm. Because Pichon had
   prior felony convictions, as well as multiple outstanding warrants, he was
   arrested.    On March 9, 2022, Pichon was indicted with one count of
   possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pichon pled guilty without a plea
   agreement.     In his factual resume, Pichon stipulated that the firearm
   “traveled at some time from one state to another or from one country into
   the United States.”
          The presentence report noted that the offense involved a
   semiautomatic firearm with a high-capacity magazine, that the firearm was
   used in connection with another felony offense, and that Pichon possessed a
   total of three firearms—two of which were stolen property. Furthermore,
   the PSR stated that Pichon had five prior adult criminal convictions, as well
   as six pending charges in Texas state court. Some relevant offenses include
   Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon—arising from allegations that
   Pichon fired into an apartment containing a woman and two children—and
   Discharge of Firearm in Certain Municipalities—arising from allegations
   that Pichon fired a weapon into the ceiling of his mother’s apartment. The
   record notes that Pichon allegedly “stole, possessed, and used multiple
   firearms within a five-month period.”
          Accordingly, the advisory guidelines range was 84 to 105 months of
   imprisonment, and the statutory maximum sentence was 120 months of
   imprisonment. The district court ultimately concluded that based on its

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   consideration of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and the Sentencing
   Guidelines, it upwardly departed from the advisory guidelines range. The
   court found its decision permissible under § 4A.1.3(a)(1) because Pichon’s
   criminal history category “substantially underrepresent[ed] the seriousness
   of his criminal history and the likelihood that he [would] commit other
   crimes.” Pichon timely appealed.
                                         II.
                                         A.
          Pichon argues that the district court erroneously departed from the
   advisory guidelines range because it considered information that was
   insufficiently reliable and did not properly balance the § 3553(a) sentencing
   factors.
          We employ a two-step process to assess the reasonableness of a
   sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007) (procedural
   and substantive error test). First, our court must evaluate whether the
   sentencing court committed “significant procedural error, such as failing to
   consider the applicable factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
   erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
   United States v. Winding, 817 F.3d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted)
   (cleaned up). If the decision is procedurally sound, we evaluate “the
   substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id.
          To determine whether a sentence was procedurally reasonable, we
   review the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing
   Guidelines de novo and its findings of facts for clear error. See United States
   v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2017). “A district court’s reliance on
   a PSR is based on a finding of fact that the PSR’s information contains indicia
   of reliability.” United States v. Peterson, 977 F.3d 381, 396 (5th Cir. 2020).

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          On appeal, Pichon argues that the district court heavily relied on
   information related to the unadjudicated state court charges (all of which
   relate to incidents that occurred prior to the arrest) to make its above-
   guidelines sentence determination. He notes that the information regarding
   Pichon’s pending charges in the PSR consists of mere “allegations that a[re]
   not supported by sufficient indicia of reliability.” The Government argues
   that the PSR was sufficiently reliable and that Pichon had presented no
   rebuttal evidence to prove otherwise.
          A district court may consider any information—including information
   derived from police reports concerning unadjudicated charges—so long as it
   “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.”
   United States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
   (holding facts obtained from police reports and from the PSR regarding
   unadjudicated crimes as sufficiently reliable). This court has consistently
   held that a PSR “generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability to be
   considered as evidence by the sentencing judge in making factual
   determinations.” United States. v. Nava, 624 F.3d 226, 230−31 (5th Cir.
   2010); Peterson, 977 F.3d at 396−97 (holding that factual recitations from a
   PSR bear sufficient indicia of reliability). And if such indicia exist, and if the
   defendant fails to otherwise refute the PSR’s reliability, the district court may
   then “adopt the facts contained in a [PSR] without further inquiry.” United
   States v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2007).
          Here, the PSR’s “Offense Conduct” section contains a detailed fact-
   intensive recitation of the law enforcement reports and investigations
   underlying Pichon’s unadjudicated state court charges. And Pichon has not
   shown that the information is “materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable.”
   Peterson, 977 F.3d at 396−97 (quoting United States v. Angulo, 927 F.2d 202,
   205 (5th Cir. 2010)). Thus, we find that the district court committed no

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   significant procedural error by considering Pichon’s pending state court
   charges.
            Next, we consider the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under
   an abuse of discretion standard. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “When conducting
   this review, the court . . . take[s] into account the totality of the
   circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines
   range.” Id. To determine whether an upward departure from the guidelines
   range was reasonable, the court may “consider the extent of the deviation,
   but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
   factors . . . justify the extent of the variance.” Id. An upward departure is
   unreasonable when the court “(1) does not account for a factor that should
   have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an
   irrelevant . . . factor, or represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the
   sentencing factors.” United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 708 (5th Cir.
   2006).
            Pichon fails to demonstrate that his sentence was substantively
   unreasonable. He cites the sentencing transcript to show that his sentence
   was greater than necessary and that the district court appeared to have given
   undue weight to the pending state charges, but the sentencing transcript does
   not suggest this. The district court noted that it considered all the relevant
   balancing factors (including the Sentencing Guidelines and Pichon’s factual
   resume), the facts and criminal history set forth in the PSR, and arguments
   from both sides in making the sentencing determination. There is no further
   indication that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the above-
   guidelines sentence. “The fact that the appellate court might reasonably
   have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to
   justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

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          For these reasons, we find the district court’s above-guidelines
   sentence to be both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
                                          B.
          Next, Pichon claims that the district court erroneously accepted his
   guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He presents three arguments to
   support his claim. First, Pichon argues that the court committed a Rule 11
   error because § 922(g)(1) requires more than the firearm’s past movement in
   interstate commerce. Second, he argues that § 922(g) exceeds Congress’s
   enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause.                And third, Pichon
   challenges the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under the Second
   Amendment, given the Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle &
   Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). As Pichon concedes precedent
   forecloses the first two arguments and that the arguments were strictly made
   to preserve for further appeal, we need only address the last one.
          We review the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) de novo. See United
   States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997). Since Pichon raises this
   constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error.
   See United States v. Williams, 847 F.3d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 2017) (when an
   objection is “admittedly unpreserved, we review for plain error”).
   Therefore, Pichon must demonstrate a clear or obvious error that affected his
   substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). And
   if this showing is made, the court may only correct the error if it “seriously
   affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
   United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
          Error is plain when it is “clear under current law.” Id. at 734. “Even
   where the argument requires only extending authoritative precedent, the
   failure of the district court [to do so] cannot be plain error.” Wallace v.
   Mississippi, 43 F.4th 482, 500 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks

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   omitted). Accordingly, we have repeatedly held that the lack of binding
   precedent on § 922(g)(1) after Bruen precludes a finding of plain error. See
   e.g., United States v. Avila, No. 22-50088, 2022 WL 17832287 (5th Cir. Dec.
   21, 2022) (unpublished), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 2512 (2023); United States v.
   Hickcox, No. 22-50365, 2023 WL 3075054 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2023)
   (unpublished); United States v. Garza, No. 22-51021, 2023 WL 4044442 (5th
   Cir. June 15, 2023) (unpublished); United States v. Smith, No. 22-10795, 2023
   WL 5814936 (5th Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (unpublished).
          For these reasons, we affirm.

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