Court Opinion

ID: 9640186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:00:24.825487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:28.024542
License: Public Domain

Schettino, J.
(concurring). I join in the majority opinion but I express additional views herein.
Respondents concede that they were municipal attorneys while also attorneys for the land and building developers in that municipality. The issue is whether such dual representation per se violates Canon 6.
We note that Canon 6 forbids the representation of conflicting interests “except by express consent of all concerned given [by each client] after a full disclosure of the facts.” This proviso does not sanction dual representation; it forbids it except in certain cases. See Drinker, Legal Ethics, 120 (1953). But this escape hatch is not available to an attorney representing a municipality and a private client. See Ahto v. Weaver, 39 N. J. 418, 431 (1963). Mr. Chief Justice Weintraub in a “Notice To The Bar,” 86 N. J. L. J. 713 (1963), referred to the duty of such municipal attorney “fully to disclose his conflict of interest, to withdraw completely from representing both the municipality or agency and the private client with respect to such matter, and to recommend to the municipality or agency that it retain independent counsel.” (Emphasis added)
*336I emphasize the prohibition of any representation “with respect to such matter.” There is no intent to prohibit general representation of private clients in their private dealings or dealings with other municipalities. Municipal attorneys may in their private capacities represent clients who live in the same municipality. It is readily conceivable that any one of the private clients would, over the years, have one or more contacts with the municipality. It would be unfair to bar the general representation of such a private client (except in any case involving his municipality) just because the attorney happened to be the municipal attorney.
But should such general representation be permitted in cases where the private client is a land or building developer in that municipality P Because of political fears or because of a desire for favored treatment—real or fanciful—some developers seek out the municipal attorney. Perhaps experience in other municipalities has made a developer “practical” as well as conscious of human failings. He knows that if he is represented by the municipal attorney, he will get expeditious if not favored treatment on his numerous requests for municipal actions. The developer’s fears or desires are not justifiable bases for selecting a municipal attorney as the developer’s attorney.
A land and building development has widespread ramifications in a municipality, not the least of which are the required dealings with the various municipal agencies and departments. Even though the municipal attorney may not actively represent the developer in matters affecting the municipality (as respondents here claim), other municipal officials and employees will of necessity know of the representation. Such a situation probably results in a Pandora’s box of psychological and legal entanglements involving other public officials as well as the municipal attorney.
' I agree with the majority that the Court cannot countenance such dual representation for it violates Canon 6.
Compare Virginia Construction Corp. v. Fairman, 39 N. J. 61, 64-5 (1962), wherein we referred to the employment by *337a real estate developer of a part-time township engineer as not “uncommon in the past” but added that “it gives rise to highly offensive conflicts of interest and should not be tolerated hereafter by municipalities.” I find the mixed relationship of attorney-municipality-developer no less obnoxious and abhorrent.
Moreover, as pointed out in New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 69, 88 N. J. L. J. 97, 103 (1965) :
“The relationship between the municipality and the developer where the interpretation and enforcement of so many statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations are brought into play, is indeed a fertile field for conflicting interests, and when the public is involved the municipal attorney must avoid any semblance of divided loyalty. The public image of the legal profession as a whole would be detrimentally affected if such a practice, as here proposed, were permitted. And this is so although the lawyer may be guided by the purest of altruistic intentions because it is the suspicion engendered in the mind of the public by such conduct that creates the mischief. See N. J. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 8, 86 N. J. L. J. 718 (1963), and Opinion 54, 87 N. J. L. J. 689 (1964).”
I agree. No attorney can, with propriety, extricate himself in such situations. Public officials are obligated to perform their duties not only with honesty, faithfulness and ability but also with exclusive fidelity. By so doing, an attorney not only will avoid all impropriety, but will avoid appearance of impropriety. Nor should such an attorney even inferentially create a public image that he is utilizing his public position to advance his professional success or personal interests at the expense of the public.
I agree with the majority that as this is the first time the Court has dealt with this relationship, it should withhold any form of discipline. But, in the future any attorney found guilty of entering into such an arrangement should be disciplined. Moreover, as the Court’s opinion here is in the nature of an advisory one, I would, as to any attorney presently in such a situation, require him, within a reasonable time hereafter, to free himself of such entanglements.
Jacobs, J., concurs in result.
*338For discharge of order — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Erancis, Proctor, Sohettino and HaneMAN-6.
Opposed—-Justice Hall—1.