Court Opinion

ID: 9855280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:22:15.216261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:30.864886
License: Public Domain

TAYLOR, Justice, with whom KNUDSON, J., concurs
(dissenting).
I disagree with the construction adopted in the majority opinion of the phrase, “stoppage of work” as used in our statute, I.C. § 72 — 1366(j). The language of that subsection is clear and unambiguous. It needs no construction. It provides:
“(j) A benefit claimant shall not be eligible to receive benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute; * *
In this case the record will not support any other conclusion than that claimant’s unemployment was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute. The majority opinion imports from the statutes of other states the phrase, “at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed”, and in effect amends our statute by including such language therein. The great similarity of the unemployment compensation laws of the various states indicates a common source. The fact that our legislature refused to adopt the language last above quoted should not be regarded as accidental. Its omission should be accorded some significance, and the omission should not be supplied by construction. The statutes in the jurisdictions cited by the majority contain the language omitted by our legislature. It will suffice to call attention here to the specific terms of the statutes in two jurisdictions highly regarded in the majority opinion. The statute of Arizona, under which the decision in Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528, 173 A.L.R. 480 (1947) was written is as follows:
“(d) For any week with respect to which the commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute, strike or lock-out at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed * * Arizona Employment Security Act, § 56-1005 (d).
*545The provision of the Hawaiian statute construed in Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd. v. Akahane, 46 Haw. 140, 377 P.2d 715 (1962) is as follows:
“(d) Labor dispute. For any week with respect to which it is found that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed; * * R.L.H.1955, § 93-29 (d). (Not set out in the opinion).
We observed the same distinction between the Utah statute and our own in Ankrum v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 274, 361 P.2d 795 (1961).
In addition “stoppage of work” has another important connotation. It was used in contradistinction to “unemployment” to preserve the employer-employee relationship in cases where the work was interrupted by a strike or lock-out.
In this case the record shows that claimant was an employee of the employer Western Equipment Co. from October 2, 1963, when the strike commenced, until October 24, 1963, when his union was notified by the employer that his job had been filled by a permanent replacement. During that time his “unemployment” was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute, and he was not eligible for benefits. The record further shows that the strike and labor dispute continued until November 22, 1963. In my opinion, claimant did not become eligible for benefits until October 24th, when the relationship of employer and employee was terminated by the action of the employer in permanently replacing him.
The majority opinion is also in error in concluding that the words of limitation found in the statutes of other states “has reference to and limits the place where the ‘labor dispute’ occurs, and not to the phrase, ‘stoppage of work’.” In other states where the qualifying phrase is added to the statute, the courts hold that the “stoppage of work” refers to the “factory, establishment, or employer’s premises.” Actually a labor dispute, by its very nature, can have no particular situs, unless it be the community where the business of the employer is carried on. Such a dispute could no more exist at the factory or establishment of the employer, than it could at the headquarters of the union or at the homes of the employees or the homes of the management.
The order appealed from should be reversed as to the construction of the statute adopted therein, and modified so as to limit claimant’s unemployment benefits to the period following October 24, 1963.