Court Opinion

ID: 9890856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 17:04:43.091688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:30.256337
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/16/23 P. v. Jones CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081333

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD293518)

 TYRICE LAVELL JONES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Rachel Cano, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
         Belinda Escobosa, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Maxine Hart, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

         Tyrice Lavell Jones appeals the order granting probation after he pled
guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon. He challenges conditions
requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of electronic devices, to stay
away from known members of a certain criminal street gang, and not to use
marijuana if so directed by his probation officer. The People concede the
electronics search condition is invalid. We strike that condition, reject
Jones’s other challenges, and affirm the order as modified.
                                BACKGROUND
      Jones was one of several passengers in a sedan stopped by police for
Vehicle Code violations. Because the driver did not have a license, the sedan
was impounded. During an inventory search, a loaded handgun was found in
the pocket of the seat behind which Jones had been sitting. When
interviewed at the police station, Jones admitted his fingerprints would be
found on the handgun but denied he owned it. At the time, Jones was on
probation for a prior felony conviction involving firearm possession.
      The People charged Jones with unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm in
a public place (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (c); subsequent section references
are to this code) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)).
He pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, and the other charge was
dismissed. The parties agreed Jones would serve 365 days in local custody
and be put on probation.
      At the sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended imposition of
sentence for two years, ordered Jones to serve 365 days in jail, and granted
formal probation. The conditions of probation included:
• No. 6.n.: “Submit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects,
   computers, and recordable media . . . to search at any time with or without
   a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by
   [probation officer] or law enforcement officer.”

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• No. 12.b.: “Do not associate with any person who you know, or who a
   [probation officer] or other law enforcement officer informs you, is a
   Skyline gang member. ‘Gang’ means a ‘criminal street gang’ as defined in
   Pen. Code 186.22(e) and (f).”
• No. 14.a.: “Participate in a substance use level of care assessment within
   7 business days if directed by [probation officer].”
• No. 14.b.: “Enroll in & adhere to substance use treatment & recovery
   services, as clinically indicated if directed by [probation officer].”
• No. 14.c. “No marijuana use at all ‘if’ directed by [probation officer].”
      Jones objected to the inclusion of computers and recordable media in
condition No. 6.n. and to the entirety of condition Nos. 12.b. and 14.c. as
having no nexus to the crime to which he pled guilty. He objected to
condition No. 12.b. on the additional grounds that although he “has had
associations with Skyline in his past[,] . . . he is personally moving away from
or has moved away from gang involvement”; and that because of where and
with whom he grew up, the condition “could interfere with his constitutional
rights to associate with family members and friends for noncriminal reasons.”
Jones declined to serve his custody time on work furlough based on the
assignment location because he did not “feel safe in that area,” did not “want
to be in a position where he would be faced with people who associate him
with a group that he used to belong to,” and did not want to be in a
neighborhood that was “likely going to cause him problems.” As to the
current offense, Jones told the probation officer: “ ‘I wish I listened to my
conscience and not gone out with my friends. I had to separate myself from
people like that.’ ”
      The trial court overruled Jones’s objections. As to the search condition,
the court stated: “[P]robation can look up whether he’s taking pictures of

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guns, possession of guns. So I think that’s appropriate given it’s not his first
gun offense.” The court found the condition prohibiting association with
Skyline gang members appropriate because Jones could not “even do work
furlough from being around these people.” As to the marijuana use condition,
the court stated: “[I]t is an ‘if directed’ condition. If there’s an assessment
done and there’s no issue, then it shouldn’t be an issue with the smoking of
marijuana legally.”
      Jones appealed the order granting probation. (See § 1237, subd. (a)
[appeal lies from order granting probation]; People v. Patton (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 934, 943 [defendant who pleads guilty may attack probation
conditions on appeal without obtaining certificate of probable cause].)
                                 DISCUSSION
      Jones renews his challenge to the three probation conditions to which
he objected in the trial court. He contends the court abused its discretion by
imposing them, because the conditions have no relationship to his current
conviction, concern conduct that is not itself criminal, and have no reasonable
relationship to preventing future criminality. Jones asks us to modify the
order granting probation by striking the challenged conditions. The People
concede the condition requiring Jones to submit his computers and recordable
media to searches without a warrant or reasonable cause is invalid and must
be stricken, but they ask us to uphold the other two conditions. As we shall
explain, we agree with the parties as to the search condition but reject
Jones’s other challenges.
      We begin with the general rules regarding imposition of terms or
conditions of probation. When a trial court grants probation, “[t]he court may
impose and require any or all of the terms of imprisonment, fine, and
conditions specified in this section, and other reasonable conditions, as it may

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determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that
amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done
to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for
the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .” (§ 1203.1, subd.
(j).) This statute gives courts “broad discretion to impose conditions to foster
rehabilitation and to protect public safety.” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) A reviewing court may not invalidate a probation
condition “unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality . . . .’ ” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486 (Lent).) “The
Lent test ‘is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a
reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ” (In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).) “[A] reviewing court will disturb the trial
court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all
the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly
unreasonable.” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403 (Moran).)
      The parties are correct that the trial court abused its discretion by
requiring as a condition of probation that Jones submit to searches of
computers and recordable media without a warrant or reasonable cause. Our
Supreme Court held a similar condition failed the Lent test when there was
no evidence the defendant had used computers or other electronic devices in
the burglaries he admitted committing or in any other crimes, and the
burden of the condition on the defendant’s privacy was substantially
disproportionate to the goal of deterring future criminality. (Ricardo P.,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1119-1120.) Following Ricardo P., this court struck a
search condition like the one imposed on Jones in a case where the defendant

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pled guilty to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger and there was no evidence
the defendant had ever used a computer, other electronic device, or
recordable media in committing a crime. (People v. Cota (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 786, 790-791.) As was true of the defendants in those cases,
nothing in the record in this case indicates Jones used a computer, recordable
media, or other electronic device in committing the firearm possession offense
to which he pled guilty; his use of such devices would not be inherently
criminal; and the burden of the search condition on his right to privacy is
substantially disproportionate to the goal of preventing future criminality.
The portion of condition No. 6.n. to which Jones objects is therefore
unreasonable under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, and must be stricken.
      We reach a different conclusion on the probation condition prohibiting
Jones from associating with known Skyline gang members. Although the
record does not show the current crime was in any way gang related and
although associating with known gang members is not in itself criminal,
prohibiting such association is reasonably related to preventing future
criminality. (See Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The probation report
documented Jones’s criminal history, which started in 2004 with infliction of
corporal injury on a spouse and child endangerment; continued over the years
with resisting a peace officer, battery of a peace officer, public intoxication,
vandalism, trespass, and firearm offenses; and ended in 2022 with the
current firearm offense. Jones told the probation officer he was a
documented member of the Skyline gang, but had moved from the gang’s
neighborhood and stopped affiliating with the gang. At the sentencing
hearing, Jones advised the court through counsel that the prohibition on
associating with gang members could interfere with his constitutional right
to associate with family and friends, and he had declined work furlough and

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instead agreed to serve time in jail because the work was in a neighborhood
where he feared people would associate him with the gang and “cause him
problems.” The regret Jones expressed to the probation officer about his
failure to heed his conscience and separate himself from the other passengers
in the sedan in which he committed the current crime indicate susceptibility
to influence by bad actors. Thus, Jones’s susceptibility to bad influences,
“gang affiliation, and consistent and increasing pattern of criminal behavior
warranted a conclusion by the trial court that [his] disassociation from gang-
connected activities was an essential element of any probationary effort at
rehabilitation because it would insulate him from a source of temptation to
continue to pursue a criminal lifestyle.” (People v. Lopez (1998) 66
Cal.App.4th 615, 626; see In re Laylah K. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1496, 1501
[“probation conditions designed to curb dangerous associations with gangs
[are] not unreasonable” since “[a]ssociation with gang members is the first
step to involvement in gang activity”].) Because the court’s imposition of
condition No. 12.b was not “arbitrary and capricious” and “wholly
unreasonable,” we must uphold it. (Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 403.)
      People v. Brandão (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 568, on which Jones relies,
does not support his argument that we must strike the condition prohibiting
association with known gang members. In Brandão, the Court of Appeal held
“a no-gang-contact probation condition cannot be imposed on defendant here,
given that the record divulges (1) no ties between defendant and any criminal
street gang, (2) no such ties involving any member of defendant’s family, and
(3) no criminal history showing or strongly suggesting a gang tie.” (Id. at p.
576.) The first two elements of this holding are absent from this case,
because Jones was a member of the Skyline gang and has family and friends
who still are. Brandão is therefore not on point.

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      Finally, we reject as unripe Jones’s challenge to the probation condition
concerning marijuana use. The ripeness requirement “ ‘prevents courts from
issuing purely advisory opinions, or considering a hypothetical state of facts
in order to give general guidance rather than to resolve a specific legal
dispute.’ ” (People v. Garcia (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 316, 328.) “It is rooted in
the fundamental concept that the proper role of the judiciary does not extend
to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion.” (Pacific Legal
Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170.) The
condition prohibiting Jones from using marijuana would take effect only upon
the occurrence of three antecedent events: (1) a direction from the probation
officer that Jones participate in a substance abuse level of care assessment;
(2) an assessment that reveals a problem with marijuana use; and (3) a
direction from the probation officer that he not use marijuana. Nothing in
the record shows any of those three events has happened. If and when they
do, Jones may petition the trial court to remove the condition prohibiting
marijuana use and develop a record on the issue. (§§ 1203.2, subd. (b)(1),
1203.3, subd. (a); see People v. Cookson (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1091, 1095 [trial

court may modify probation conditions when circumstances change].)1
“[M]atters which are not ripe for adjudication should ordinarily be left to a
future forum.” (People v. Ybarra (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 546, 550.)

1     We note the present record contains some indications Jones may have a
substance use problem related to criminality. The probation report states he
was convicted of disorderly conduct for being intoxicated in a public place
(§ 647, subd. (f)) and was later arrested for the same offense. Jones told the
probation officer he started using alcohol and marijuana when he was 14
years old. Another passenger in the sedan told police that before the stop he
“was having a good time and drinking alcohol with Jones at Jones’ residence.”
The record, however, is not sufficiently developed to allow a definitive
determination on whether any such problem would justify a prohibition on
marijuana use.
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                               DISPOSITION
      The order granting probation is modified by striking “computers, and
recordable media” from condition No. 6.n. As so modified, the order is
affirmed.

                                                                    IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

     O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

                 KELETY, J.

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