Court Opinion

ID: 9890825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 16:09:25.561056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:22.544997
License: Public Domain

J-S29017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: L.T., A MINOR            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: M.H., MOTHER                      :       No. 682 MDA 2023

                  Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2023
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000108-2022

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: OCTOBER 16, 2023

       Appellant, M.H. (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered in the York

County Court of Common Pleas, which changed the permanency goal for L.T.

(“Child”) from reunification to adoption, following the motion of the York

County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) for a combined

placement review and dispositional review hearing. We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follow.

On March 17, 2022, six-week-old Child was admitted to the emergency room

at Hershey Medical Center, where doctors discovered “a broken femur and rib

fractures on both the right and left sides that were in various stages of

healing.”    (Dependency Petition, filed 5/17/22, at 2).       Mother and C.T.

(“Father”) reported that they were the only caregivers for Child since his birth,

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S29017-23

they denied dropping Child, and they could not explain how Child sustained

the injuries. The responding caseworker noted, however, that Mother “was

holding the child in an odd, non-comforting manner, i.e., away from her body

with both hands out in front of her.” (Id. at 3). CYF subsequently received a

child protective services referral alleging physical abuse.

       CYF filed an application for emergency protective custody on May 13,

2022, which the court granted that same day. On May 17, 2022, CYF filed a

dependency petition.        Later, CYF filed a motion for finding of aggravated

circumstances, arguing that Child suffered physical abuse resulting in serious

bodily injury. The court adjudicated Child dependent on June 1, 2022. On

October 20, 2022, the court found clear and convincing evidence to establish

that aggravated circumstances existed as to Mother and Father.

       Thereafter, the court received a parenting capacity assessment of

Mother from Dr. Robert Gordon, M.Ed., a licensed psychologist.1 Dr. Gordon

expressed concerns over Mother’s difficulties with “setting and enforcing

boundaries in her relationship with [Father].”       (CYF Exhibit 1, submitted

11/30/22, at 15).       Dr. Gordon also stated that “the caseworker strongly

suspects that [Father] had engaged in domestic violence toward [Mother], yet

[Mother] remained in the relationship.” (Id.) Dr. Gordon observed: “If the

child’s father caused the injuries to the child, as suspected, there are some

____________________________________________

1 Dr. Gordon conducted this assessment on September 8, 2022, and the court

received the report at a status review hearing on November 30, 2022.

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concerns that [Mother] was not able to protect the child and not able to ensure

his safety.” (Id. at 14). Dr. Gordon concluded that Mother’s “weaknesses in

her parenting skills are in her ability to provide guidance and boundaries and

in her ability to ensure the safety of the child.” (Id. at 16).

       On March 9, 2023, Dr. Lisa Jannetta, Psy.D., a licensed psychologist,

conducted a protective capacity assessment of Mother.             Based upon this

assessment, Dr. Jannetta expressed concerns with Mother’s “history of

protecting her son and taking action when there were threats to his safety.”

(CYF Exhibit 2, submitted 4/6/23, at 12). Dr. Jannetta also opined that Mother

may not “comprehend the physical harm to her child and the dangers to his

safety in her home.”          (Id. at 13).       Dr. Jannetta concluded that it is

“questionable whether [Mother] is capable of effectively protecting [Child]

without supervision.” (Id. at 14).2

____________________________________________

2 The trial court provided the following analysis of Dr. Jannetta’s conclusions:

          The evaluator found that some of Mother’s decisions
          appeared to have been based upon her own needs, related
          to her own complicated childhood, [rather] than the needs
          of [Child]. … [Dr. Jannetta] found that Mother does not
          seem to comprehend what secure and healthy relationships
          are or to have a strong sense of self, which affects
          [Mother’s] comprehension of what is required of her as a
          protector of [Child]. [Dr. Jannetta] was encouraged by
          Mother’s Family Advocate David Kasberg’s representations
          of an improved bond between Mother and [Child]; however,
          [Dr. Jannetta] noted how troubling Mother’s prior inability
          to act on [Child]’s behalf was. Though Mother was able to
          recognize by the time of her evaluation, that Father “did
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       On April 4, 2023, CYF filed a motion for a combined placement review

and dispositional review hearing. The court conducted the hearing on April 6,

2023, and it summarized the witnesses’ testimony as follows:

          Brittany Sunday testified that she is the family therapist
          working with Mother and Father in this case. The current
          goals for Mother were “stabilization of mental health,
          increasing healthy coping skills for stress management with
          a focus on anxiety, improving self-esteem and productive
          communication skills.”        Mother’s progress towards
          stabilizing her mental health was rated as moderate. The
          psychiatrist Mother saw diagnosed her with social anxiety
          disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed emotion
          disturbance. The psychiatrist recommended that Mother
          continue working with Catholic Charities, including her
          therapist through them, Leanne Meyers, and the
          psychiatrist prescribed Mother medication. The medication
          Mother was prescribed was fifty milligrams of Zoloft, which
          the psychiatrist, Dr. Heinly, hoped would help Mother feel
          less socially uncomfortable, which would enable her to “be
          more appropriately assertive and confident in her
          presentation and manner.” Mother’s progress towards her
          other goals was also rated, by Ms. Sunday, as moderate.

          Ms. Sunday described Mother as fidgeting a lot and having
          social anxiety, which Ms. Sunday was working to teach her
          coping skills for.   Regarding Mother’s medication, Ms.
____________________________________________

          something” to [Child], [Dr. Jannetta] noted that it was
          unknown how Mother, who is overly dependent on others,
          would act in an unsupervised situation. At the time of
          preparation of the report, Mother had demonstrated an
          “improved capacity for protectiveness with supervision.”
          Considering the necessity of certainty in [Child’s] young life,
          [the trial court] found it compelling that the evaluator wrote
          “if [Mother] continues to improve on her trajectory, she may
          eventually be able to function independently regarding
          protective capacity.”

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/6/23, at 14-15) (internal footnotes and record
citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

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        Sunday testified that, in her opinion, Mother had not been
        taking it long enough, at the time of the hearing, for Ms.
        Sunday to notice any effect. Regarding visitation progress,
        Ms. Sunday testified that the next step would be partially
        supervised visits and that, at that point, Ms. Sunday had no
        concerns about moving forward with partial visitation[;]
        however and importantly, Ms. Sunday admitted that she had
        not reviewed [the] protective capacity assessment on
        Mother, dated March 9, 2023, and therefore accepted [the
        trial court’s] decree that there would be no progression
        towards partially supervised visitation.         Ms. Sunday
        acknowledged that Mother was approved to have contact
        with [Child] in the kinship home, supervised by the kinship
        parents, for approximately three hours on weekends.

                                *    *    *

        David Kasberg testified that he is a family advocate with
        Catholic Charities and that he had been working with Mother
        and Father. Mr. Kasberg supervised Mother’s visitation once
        per week and Ms. Sunday covered the other weekly
        visitations. These visitations occurred at Mother’s residence
        and were fully supervised. Mr. Kasberg felt that Mother was
        fully prepared and generally parented from a nurturing and
        appropriate standpoint.       Although Mr. Kasberg rated
        Mother’s progress as moderate[,] he thereafter testified that
        “I can’t say mom has done very well with our agency’s
        services, so I can’t speak to that.”

                                *    *    *

        Sarah White testified that she had written a report to the
        court and that there were no updates in the interim. Ms.
        White testified that [CYF] recommended that [Child] be
        placed in the custody of [a maternal cousin], and that legal
        custody be retained through [CYF]. Ms. White testified that
        the [maternal cousin] only lived about ten to fifteen minutes
        from the then current resource family; though the [maternal
        cousin lives] across the state line in Maryland. [CYF]
        continued to recommend that the goal be changed to
        adoption due to the updated protective capacity assessment
        that was completed by Dr. Janetta.

(Trial Court Opinion at 3-6) (internal record citations omitted).       At the

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conclusion of the hearing, the court changed Child’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption. On Monday, May 8, 2023, Mother timely filed notice

of appeal and a concise statement of errors.

      Mother now raises two issues for our review:

         Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and [err] as a
         matter of law when it unreasonably changed the goal from
         reunification to adoption despite consistent positive
         progress by Mother.

         Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion and [err] as a
         matter of law when it changed the goal to adoption from
         reunification when in less than twelve (12) months Mother
         made moderate progress in [alleviating] the circumstances
         which necessitated the original placement, and it was
         contrary to the best interest of the child.

(Mother’s Brief at 4).

      Mother’s issues are related, and we address them together.         Mother

argues that she has demonstrated moderate progress in alleviating the

circumstances that necessitated the original placement, and she continues her

attempts to achieve all goals outlined in her family service plan.       Mother

emphasizes that she has implemented the recommendations provided by the

parenting and protective capacity assessments. Mother complains that the

parenting capacity assessment did not indicate that she lacks the protective

capacity to ever take care of Child. Mother insists that she meets all of Child’s

needs during visits, and she has a very strong bond with Child. Under these

circumstances, Mother concludes that the court’s decision “to change the goal

from reunification to adoption is not in the best interest of [Child],” and the

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court’s decision “is not supported by competent evidence.” (Id. at 20-21).

We disagree.

      On appeal, goal change decisions are subject to an abuse of discretion

standard of review. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa.Super. 2006).

         In order to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion,
         we must determine that the court’s judgment was
         manifestly unreasonable, that the court did not apply the
         law, or that the court’s action was a result of partiality,
         prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record. We are
         bound by the trial court’s findings of fact that have support
         in the record. The trial court, not the appellate court, is
         charged with the responsibilities of evaluating credibility of
         the witness and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. In
         carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free to
         believe all, part, or none of the evidence. When the trial
         court’s findings are supported by competent evidence of
         record, we will affirm, even if the record could also support
         an opposite result.

Id. at 822-23 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      The Juvenile Act controls the disposition of dependent children. In re

R.P., 957 A.2d 1205, 1217 (Pa.Super. 2008).           Section 6351 provides in

relevant part:

         § 6351. Disposition of dependent child

                                   *    *    *

         (f)     Matters to be determined at permanency
         hearing.—At each permanency hearing, a court shall
         determine all of the following:

            (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness
            of the placement.

            (2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of
            compliance with the permanency plan developed for the

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          child.

          (3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
          circumstances  which    necessitated   the    original
          placement.

          (4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current
          placement goal for the child.

          (5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the
          child might be achieved.

          (5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize
          the permanency plan in effect.

          (6)      Whether the child is safe.

                                  *    *    *

          (9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of
          the last 22 months or the court has determined that
          aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable
          efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the
          child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to
          preserve and reunify the family need not be made or
          continue to be made, whether the county agency has
          filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental
          rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a
          qualified family to adopt the child unless:

          (i)   the child is being cared for by a relative best
          suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of
          the child;

          (ii)  the    county     agency   has    documented        a
          compelling reason for determining that filing a petition to
          terminate parental rights would not serve the needs and
          welfare of the child; or

          (iii) the child’s family has not been provided with
          necessary services to achieve the safe return to the
          child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time
          frames set forth in the permanency plan.

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                                  *    *    *

         (f.1)    Additional determination.—Based upon the
         determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant
         evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine
         one of the following:

            (1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s
            parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return
            of the child is best suited to the safety, protection and
            physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

            (2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption,
            and the county agency will file for termination of parental
            rights in cases where return to the child’s parent,
            guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety,
            protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
            child.

            (3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal
            custodian in cases where the return to the child’s parent,
            guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not
            best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental
            and moral welfare of the child.

            (4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and
            willing relative in cases where return to the child’s
            parent, guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption
            or being placed with a legal custodian is not best suited
            to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral
            welfare of the child.

                                  *    *    *

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), (f.1).

      “When the child welfare agency has made reasonable efforts to return a

[dependent] child to his or her biological parent, but those efforts have failed,

then the agency must redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an

adoptive home.” In re N.C., supra at 823.

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        [T]he fifteen-to-twenty-two-month timeframe set forth in
        the Juvenile Act is not prerequisite to a goal change, but
        rather is “an aspirational target in which to attain
        permanency.” In the Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266,
        1279 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(9)).
        While trial courts should not rush to change a child’s
        permanency goal to adoption in circumstances where a
        parent is making progress toward reunification, neither
        should courts persist in attempting to reunite a family when
        further reunification efforts would be futile and/or contrary
        to a child’s best interest.

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 909 (Pa.Super. 2017).

        Although the agency has the burden to show a goal change
        would serve the child’s best interests, “[s]afety,
        permanency, and well-being of the child must take
        precedence over all other considerations” under Section
        6351. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009),
        appeal denied, 601 Pa. 702, 973 A.2d 1007 (2009)
        (emphasis in original); In re S.B., … 943 A.2d 973, 978
        [(Pa.Super. 2008)], appeal denied, 598 Pa. 782, 959 A.2d
        320 (2008). “[T]he parent’s rights are secondary” in a goal
        change proceeding. In re D.P., supra.

        Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal
        change to adoption might be appropriate, even when a
        parent substantially complies with a reunification plan. In
        re N.C., supra at 826-27.         Where a parent’s “skills,
        including her judgment with regard to the emotional well-
        being of her children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change
        to adoption might be appropriate, regardless of the parent’s
        compliance with a permanency plan. Id. at 825. The
        agency is not required to offer services indefinitely, where a
        parent is unable to properly apply the instruction provided.
        … Thus, even where the parent makes earnest efforts, the
        “court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
        need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
        progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of
        R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006).

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa.

648, 12 A.3d 372 (2010) (emphasis in original).

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     Instantly, the trial court found that a goal change to adoption is

appropriate:

        We do not deny that Ms. Sunday and Mr. Kasberg testified
        that the parents had made “moderate progress.” However,
        … even substantial progress, which is not present here, does
        not necessarily dictate reunification. The plain fact of the
        matter was that Mother’s protective capacity assessment
        established that it was unknown whether Mother could
        appropriately protect [Child] absent supervision.        The
        evaluator left it to the involved agencies and case manager
        to determine at what point Mother might demonstrate
        effective protective capacity and could parent absent
        supervision and support.            The involved agency
        recommended the change of goal. Mother’s history of a lack
        of protective capacity in regard to both herself and to
        [Child], her shifting stories as to the cause of [Child’s]
        injuries, her late recognition of Father’s role in [Child’s]
        injuries, her delayed willingness to terminate her
        relationship with Father, and the evaluator’s repeated
        expressions of concern despite at least one report of
        progress, as far as the parent-child bond, [were] all
        concerning. … Mother might eventually be able to parent
        [Child] unsupervised and without support, but [Child] needs
        stability as soon as possible and the change of goal allows
        for that.

                                *     *      *

        Additionally, Mother’s moderate progress under supervision
        has not obviated Mother’s clear susceptibility to mental
        health issues, which, unfortunately, are a shorthand for
        Mother’s inability to prioritize [Child’s] needs above her
        own—especially as it regards [Child’s] physical safety. The
        evaluator noted the progress reported on the parent-child
        bond; however, the evaluator expressed enough concern
        about Mother’s ability to prioritize [Child] that [the trial
        court] felt compelled to provide [Child] permanency by way
        of a change of goals. Reunification efforts would be futile
        when Mother’s demonstrated inability to stand up for and
        protect [Child], absent supervision, is unlikely to resolve
        within an acceptable window of time. The best interests of
        [Child] are served by providing him permanency. Further,

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         it was clear to the [trial court] that Mother faces a long, long
         road ahead in learning how to protect herself and stand on
         her own two feet, let alone protecting [Child].

(Trial Court Opinion at 17-18, 20) (internal record citations omitted)

(emphasis in original).

      Our review of the record confirms that sufficient evidence supported the

court’s findings.   See In re N.C., supra.      The court considered Mother’s

moderate progress in alleviating the circumstances that necessitated Child’s

placement. Nevertheless, the court also weighed the testimony and various

expert reports, including Dr. Jannetta’s protective capacity report that

questioned whether Mother would ever be able to protect and parent Child.

Based upon this evidence, the court determined that prioritizing permanency

in Child’s life best served his interests.    See In re J.D.H., supra; In re

R.M.G., supra. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in this

regard. See In re R.M.G., supra; In re N.C., supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/16/2023

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