Court Opinion

ID: 9771447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:43:49.441518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:31.558780
License: Public Domain

George Rose Smith, J., concurring. I cannot join in the majority’s conclusion that Mary Salmon was shown to be an accomplice as a matter of law. This witness did not admit her complicity in the crime, as by turning state’s evidence. On the witness stand she sought to maintain her innocence and to convince the jury that it was not until the money was being counted in her home that she was certain a crime had been committed. She explained her failure to report the offense by saying she was afraid to go to the police. Although her avowals of innocence were greatly weakened upon cross examination I cannot say that the jury were bound to disbelieve her. Hence I think we should follow the rule adhered to in Jackson v. State, 193 Ark. 776, 102 S. W. 2d 546: “ In any view of the situation, appellant was entitled to have the question as to whether she was an accomplice submitted to the jury, as it was one of mixed law and fact,... unless the testimony or subsequent events show conclusively she was an accomplice.” In my opinion the court below properly submitted this issue to the jury. I agree, however, that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, as the court erred in giving its instruction No. 10. By that instruction the jury were permitted to convict the accused even though Mary Salmon was found to be an accomplice. This instruction should not have been given, for as the majority correctly point out there is no evidence whatever, apart from Mary Salmon’s testimony, that connects these appellants with the crime. Hence the jury should not have been given an opportunity to base a conviction upon nonexistent proof. Ward, J., joins in this opinion.