Court Opinion

ID: 9483272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:15:45.295419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:31.511760
License: Public Domain

LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in Part IV of the court’s opinion, affirming appellant Ford’s conviction, and in Part III to the extent that it reverses the district court and orders it to enter a judgment of acquittal on count 7 of Peay’s indictment. I dissent, however, from the remainder of the court’s opinion in which it vacates Peay’s conviction on counts 1 through 6 of the indictment and remands for a new trial. Though I agree that the district court erred in allowing the government to reopen its case while denying Peay the opportunity to impeach Seagers by calling Rainer, I would hold that that error was harmless.*
Harmless error analysis is necessarily fact-specific. The standard for harmlessness of nonconstitutional error is “whether we, in appellate review, can say ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’ ” United States v. Urbanik, 801 F.2d 692, 698 (4th Cir.1986) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). It must be “ ‘highly probable that the error did not affect the judgment.’ ” Id. at 699 (quoting United States v. Nyman, 649 F.2d 208, 212 (4th Cir.1980), in turn quoting Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 34-35 (1970)); accord United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1193 (4th Cir.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 955, 112 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1991). Similarly, in United States v. Davis, 657 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.1981), we explained that “[t]he test for harmlessness for nonconstitutional error is whether it is probable that the error could have affected the verdict reached by the particular jury in the particular circumstances of the trial.” Id. at 640 (citing Nyman and Kotteakos).
Three factors guide the inquiry into harmlessness, the “closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error.” Nyman, 649 F.2d at 212; see also Urbanik, 801 F.2d at 699 (quoting Nyman)] Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1969). The closeness of the case is “the single most important factor, because it provides the central safeguard against reversals for purely ‘technical’ error.” Urbanik, 801 F.2d at 699. Here, the issue affected by the error was central to the case, and few, if any, steps were taken to mitigate the effect of the error. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this case be considered a close one, given the overwhelming evidence of Peay’s guilt. In my view, it is not at all “probable that the error could have affected the verdict reached by the particular jury in the particular circum*77stances of the trial.” Davis, 657 F.2d at 640.
At least three witnesses — not including Patterson or Seagers — testified that Peay was the leader of a sophisticated and widespread drug organization. These witnesses included Cassandra Williams, Robert Williams, and Cathy Harris Torry. Cassandra Williams testified that Peay sometimes paid her personally for her activities in the drug ring, J.A. at 68; that Peay provided her with the headsets and walkie-talkies used in the drug activities, id. at 69; that she, as one of Peay’s “lieutenants,” would receive from him drugs to sell, id. at 72; and that she would phone Peay when she had run out of drugs to sell, id. at 81. Similarly, Robert Williams, another of Peay’s “lieutenants,” testified that Peay gave him a job selling cocaine, id. at 89; that Peay paid him for his activities, id. at 92; that he had retrieved and prepared cocaine with Peay on numerous occasions, id. at 95-97; and that he had seen Peay preparing cocaine in his house surrounded by various firearms, id. at 98. A sample of testimony of Cathy Harris Torry, yet another of Peay’s “lieutenants,” is typical of the powerful evidence of Peay’s guilt that was heard by the jury:
Q. After he [Peay] asked you to become lieutenant, what did you do?
A. I held the money and gave the guys the drugs to sell.
Q. Who did you receive the drugs from that you gave out?
A. Ben Peay.
Q. How often did you see Mr. Peay?
A. Every day.
Q. Would it be on one or more occasion during the day?
A. Two or three times a day.
Q. What size packages would you receive on those occasions?
A. A thousand-dollars package, which is a hundred dime bags.
Id. at 102-03. In addition to the testimony from Cassandra Williams, Robert Williams and Cathy Torry, the fruit of a search of Peay’s residence, which was introduced into evidence, included the standbys of the drug dealer: cash, guns, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Id. at 145-67. None of this testimony was impeached by Seagers; nor would any of it have been impeached by Rainer.
Based upon this evidence, I am convinced that the district court’s error was harmless. Even assuming that Rainer’s testimony would have negated Seagers’ (second) testimony and that Seagers’ (first) testimony negated Patterson’s testimony, there was still overwhelming evidence of Peay’s guilt of the drug and drug-related offenses charged. Accordingly, I would affirm Peay’s conviction on these charges in all respects.

 The government did not argue harmless error in its submissions to this court. At argument, however, counsel for the government took the position that any error was harmless. In any event, we may raise this issue on our own initiative. See, e.g., United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343 (D.C.Cir.1991); United States v. Giovannetti, 928 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.1991).