Court Opinion

ID: 9745938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:43:20.111477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:06.533275
License: Public Domain

SHARPNACK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with my colleagues that the trial court failed to follow the procedures outlined in Lindsey v. State, 260 Ind. 351, 295 N.E.2d 819 (1973). However, I believe on balance, the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not reversible error.
First, while Lindsey outlines the appropriate procedure that a trial court should follow if its jurors become exposed to prejudicial, extraneous information, it is important to recognize that in Lindsey there was no admonishment for our supreme court to consider. There, after the State concluded its presentation of the evidence, the defendant filed a motion for mistrial because of an article that had appeared in a local newspaper the evening before. Id. at 354, 295 N.E.2d at 821. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for mistrial, and the jury found the defendant guilty. Id. at 355, 295 N.E.2d at 822. After the guilty verdict, the trial court conducted an examination of the jury regarding the article. Id. As a result of the examination, the trial court discovered that four of the jurors had no exposure to the article, but that eight had been exposed; however, their exposure varied from mere awareness of the article to specific knowledge derived from having read the entire article. Id. The trial court only questioned the two jurors who had read the entire article as to whether their exposure had influenced their decisions. Id. They stated, under oath, that the article did not influence them, and the verdict was permitted to stand. Id. Our supreme court reversed the trial court, stating in part, that:
Upon a suggestion of improper and prejudicial publicity, the trial court should make a determination as to the likelihood of resulting prejudice, both upon the basis of the content of the publication and the likelihood of its having come to the attention of any juror. If the risk of prejudice appears substantial, as opposed to imaginary or remote only, the court should interrogate the jury *438collectively to determine who, if any, has been exposed. If there has been no exposure, the court should instruct upon the hazards of such exposure and the necessity for avoiding exposure to out-of-court comment concerning the case. If any of the jurors have been exposed, he must be individually interrogated by the court outside the presence of the other jurors, to determine the degree of exposure and the likely effect thereof. After each juror is so interrogated, he should be individually admonished. ... If the jury has been interrogated and admonished, as set forth above, the continuance of the trial, over the imperiled party's motion for a mistrial, will be reversible error only if it can be said, after giving the decision of the trial judge the benefit of all reasonable doubt, that the peril was such as to be uncura-ble by instruction.
Id. at 358-359, 295 N.E.2d at 824.
Here, as the majority indicates, the trial court did not follow the procedure outlined in Lindsey. Specifically, the trial court did not separately and individually interrogate the jurors.4 Rather, it questioned the four jurors who had been directly exposed to the newspaper article in the presence of the other jurors. Because the trial court did not separately interrogate the four exposed jurors, the remaining eight jurors became indirectly exposed to the prejudicial information contained within the newspaper article. The trial court did not then interrogate the eight indirectly exposed jurors to determine whether they subsequently had formed an opinion regarding Stroud's guilt or innocence as a result of their exposure.
The majority also contends that the trial court violated the dictates of Lindsey, because "the trial court did not specifically admonish any of the jurors, either collectively or individually, to disregard what they had read or heard with respect to that particular article." Majority Opinion at 484. I disagree. Specifically, the trial *439court admonished the jury on two separate occasions.5 First, the trial court admonished the entire jury after its interrogation of the four exposed jurors. Specifically, the trial court stated that it was the jury's sworn duty to "consider only evidence that is admitted in this courtroom through testimony of witnesses and any exhibits that may be submitted to [them] for examination." Transcript at 264-265. Moreover, before opening statements, the trial court admonished the jury a second time, stating in part, that:
There may be publicity in newspapers, on radio, or television concerning this trial. You should not read or listen to these accounts, but should confine your attention to the court proceedings, listen attentively to the evidence as it comes from the witnesses, and reach a verdict solely upon what you hear and see in this court.
Id. at 268-269. As previously mentioned, in Lindsey there was no admonishment to the jury for the supreme court to specifically consider. However, our supreme court did note that where an appropriate admonishment had been given, proceeding in spite of a defendant's motion for a mistrial would "be reversible error only if it can be said, ... that the peril was such as to be uncurable by instruction." Id. at 359, 295 N.E.2d at 824.
Our supreme court has held on several occasions that an admonishment is considered sufficient to cure an alleged error and, thereby, protect a defendant's rights. Dixon v. State, 524 N.E.2d 2, 4 (Ind.1988). For example, in Dizon, the defendant moved for a mistrial because after the first day of trial, a juror saw a local newspaper article stating that the defendant was on trial for burglary. Id. Specifically, the article stated that the defendant faced an enhanced fifty-year sentence and designation as an habitual offender. Id. The trial court questioned the juror individually and found that any prejudice that might have arisen in the mind of the juror who had a minimal exposure to the news story about the defendant was insufficient to warrant a mistrial. Id. The judge then admonished the entire jury to disregard the independent interrogation of the juror and avoid contact with outside sources. Id. The admonishment was presumed to cure any error unless the contrary was shown. Id. Our supreme court ultimately held that the trial judge properly denied the defendant's motion for mistrial. Id.; see also Bradley v. State, 649 N.E.2d 100, 107 (Ind.1995) (affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's request for a mistrial and stating that reversible error is seldom found when the trial court has admonished the jury to disregard a statement made during the proceedings), reh'g denied; Schlomer v. State, 580 N.E.2d 950, 956 (Ind.1991) (stating that "usually an admonishment to the jury is considered adequately curative and will support the trial judge in his denial of a motion for a mistrial").
Whether peril is of enough substance to be uncurable by instruction is determined by the probable persuasive effect of the prejudicial information. See Schlomer, 580 N.E.2d at 955. Here, although the information contained within the newspaper article was prejudicial, there was overwhelming clear evidence of Stroud's guilt, making it improbable that his conviction resulted from any of the publicity to which the jury had been exposed and which it *440had been instructed to ignore. Officer Cornelis's testimony clearly described the details of the drug purchase operation that took place on September 1, 1998. Officer Cornelis testified that Stroud was the individual who sold him cocaine that night. The State admitted into evidence a recorded conversation between Officer Cornelis and Stroud, wherein they discussed when and where the drug transaction would take place. The State also admitted into evidence a recording of the actual drug purchase transaction. Other surveillance officers who were present the night of September 1, 1998, also testified at trial and corroborated Officer Cornelis's testimony regarding the events surrounding the drug purchase operation. Further, the substance that Stroud sold to Officer Cornelis tested positive for cocaine. Seq, e.g., Schlomer, 580 N.E.2d at 956 (diseuss-ing the "overwhelming evidence" against the defendant).
Thus, the trial court did admonish the jury to ignore the media information and base their decision upon the evidence, which in this case is overwhelming. Stroud has not shown that the peril to which he was exposed by the juror's exposure to the media information was "such as to be uncurable by instruction." Lindsey, 260 Ind. at 359, 295 N.E.2d at 824. I, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err by denying a mistrial and would affirm Stroud's conviction for dealing in cocaine as a class B felony.

. In Dupree v. State, we addressed the issue of whether it was reversible error for the trial court not to examine jurors individually and outside the presence of other jurors, when one juror reported hearing an inappropriate, out of court comment. 712 N.E.2d 1076, 1078-1080 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). We held that although the judge did not individually interrogate the jurors, the "[the defendant] failed to present substantial evidence of prejudice by the trial court's decision not to interrogate the jurors outside of the presence of the other jurors." Id. at 1080. However, the facts in this matter are distinguishable from the facts in Dupree. Particularly, in Dupree, a courthouse coffee shop employee stated that, "well, they'll never pick me for jury duty because I know everybody in the courthouse. And besides, I figure if he's charged with something and brought-if he's coming to trial, that probably means he did something." Id. at 1078. Here, the extraneous information contained in the newspaper article is significantly more prejudicial than the employee's comment in Dupree. In particular, the newspaper article contained a great deal of prejudicial information regarding Stroud's previous criminal history as well as his alleged involvement in another crime. On the other hand the employee's comment in Dupree was "merely the employee's opinion that if a person is charged with a crime, he must be guilty. The employee did not mention specific evidence or facts surrounding the case." Id. at 1079. Moreover, in Dupree all of the jurors were initially exposed to the extraneous information; therefore, the trial court's failure to individually interrogate the jurors was not critical. Conversely, here the trial court's failure to separately interrogate the jurors was significant, because only four of the twelve jurors had been initially exposed. Hence, while in Dupree we held that there was no indication thai the defendant presented substantial evidence of prejudice by the trial court's action, we should not reach the same conclusion here. See, eg., Matthews v. State, 476 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Ind.1985) (holding that it was proper for the trial court to individually examine a juror who was concerned about an extraneous racial issue).

. The majority considers the preliminary instruction given by the court as having "no bearing" on the analysis of the case because it "was not given as an admonition." Majority Opinion at 435 n. 3. In the context of this case, I believe the preliminary instruction must be considered as an "admonition;" or, perhaps rather, it cannot be ignored in assessing the overall impact of what the trial court did.