Court Opinion

ID: 9855239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:21:28.811554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:15.590358
License: Public Domain

Danhof, J.
Plaintiff1 sued defendant, city of East Tawas, for damages arising from the loss of an eye resulting from an explosion while he was at the East Tawas municipal dump on December 4, 1965. The claim was originally based upon negligence, but additional counts of gross negligence and nuisance were later added. The defendant filed a motion for an accelerated judgment asserting that PA 1964, No 170, § 7 (MCLA § 691.1407 [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 3.996(107)]), relative to governmental immunity, bars the cause of action. The circuit judge denied the defendant’s motion stating that the aforesaid § 7 was unconstitutional as it did not fall within the object embraced in the title of the act and, therefore, defendant was not immune from such suit. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on the theory of nuisance, after plaintiff voluntarily struck his allegations of negligence and gross negligence from the complaint, and a verdict was rendered in favor of plaintiff in the amount *114of $12,500, plus costs. From this judgment defendant appealed, alleging the trial court erred in ruling that defendant was not immune from suit. In addition, the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial alleging the verdict was grossly inadequate and from the denial of his motion, the plaintiff appealed. Subsequently, the two appeals were consolidated.
On appeal, the first question to he answered is whether plaintiff’s nuisance suit was well-founded. The city argues that plaintiff’s cause of action was founded upon nothing more than negligence in the operation of its dump, and that such cause of action was barred by PA 1964, No 170, § 7.
In support of this position defendant points out that plaintiff initially claimed ordinary negligence in his complaint, then by amendment added gross negligence and nuisance, later voluntarily abandoning- the negligence theories and proceeding to trial on a nuisance theory only — all without change in the allegations.
As authority the defendant cites Royston v. City of Charlotte (1936), 278 Mich 255, 260, where the court enunciates the following legal proposition:
“Acts in the discharge of governmental functions which create a nuisance per se do not come within the immunity otherwise accorded. Want of care in maintenance, however, presents the question of negligence only, and not that of a public nuisance, which must rest on inherent danger even under the best of care.”
Since the Royston Case, supra, we have the case of Denny v. Garavaglia (1952), 333 Mich 317, which clearly recognizes three categories of nuisance, the last one based on negligence. At p 331 the Court quoted from Beckwith v. Town of Stratford (1942), 129 Conn 506 (29 A2d 775), wherein the court had *115occasion to discuss the elements constituting nuisances. The quotation follows:
“ ‘Apart from nuisances which have their origin in accident, nuisances resulting in personal injury fall into three general classes. Beven, Negligence (4th ed), p 426, note. One class includes nuisances which result from conduct which is in itself a violation of law, and as to them it has been held on high authority that contributory negligence is not a defense, Delaney v. Philhern Realty Holding Corporation (1939), 280 NY 461, 465 (21 NE2d 507); but with such nuisances we have no concern in this case. A second includes nuisances which are intentional, using that word as meaning not that a wrong or the existence of a nuisance was intended but that the creator of them intended to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. The other class includes nuisances which have their origin in negligence, which in its essence is an absence of care. Nuisances falling in the second class are those which we characterize as absolute and against which contributory negligence is not a defense. To hold that contributory negligence should not be a defense as regards them and should be as to the last class of nuisances rests upon the essential difference in the nature of the wrong committed. Negligence consists in a failure to exercise due care, and to a nuisance grounded on negligence, contributory negligence is for that reason an appropriate defense. Winfield, Torts, p 501. Where, however, the essence of the wrong is conduct which is intentional, in the sense in which we have used that word, that conduct goes beyond a mere lack of proper care, and there is not the same balance of obligation between the duty of one person to guard another from an injury from such a lack and the duty of the other not to fail to exercise a like care in his own protection. See Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts, p 527. The fact that contributory negligence is not a defense as against reckless mis*116conduct presents a somewhat analogous situation.’ ” (Citations omitted.)
The Court in the Denny Case then held:
“The record supports the finding of the trial court that the nuisance was created through acts of negligence on the part of Garavaglia.”
Again in the case of Dahl v. Glover (1956), 344 Mich 639, 644, 645, the Court recognized that a nuisance might have its origin in negligence for the Court said:
“We are not in accord with appellant’s claim that the court erred in charging the jury that they might find the maintaining of a nuisance created by negligence; or that the court ‘improperly injected [the question of negligence] into the case.’ The court charged the jury that a nuisance might have its origin in negligence, and charged that if the jury so found, contributory negligence would be a good defense which the jury must consider.
“The charge as a whole was proper. Denny v. Garavaglia (1952), 333 Mich 317; Brown v. Nichols (1953), 337 Mich 684.”
Also, in the case Young v. Groenendal (1968) 10 Mich App 112, the general rule that contributory negligence is available as a defense to an action based on a nuisance where the nuisance is caused by negligent conduct was recognized. The Court said:
“The Supreme Court of Michigan has stated that as a general rule contributory negligence is available as a defense to an action based on a nuisance where the nuisance is caused by negligent conduct. Denny v. Garavaglia (1952), 333 Mich 317. The rule is contra by the established weight of authority when there is a ‘classic’ or ‘standard’ or ‘absolute’ nuisance involved. See 73 ALR2d 1381. The latter *117type nuisance arises when one so uses his land as to cause unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land of another. The classic nuisance is not in question here because there are no conflicting real property interests being asserted.
“Whether the source of a nuisance action is really negligence requires attentiveness to all the facts of the action. In Dahl v. Glover (1956), 344 Mich 639, the Supreme Court, relying on Denny v. Garavaglia, supra, held that a jury charge on contributory negligence as a defense to be considered by the jury was proper although plaintiff, at the close of her evidence, withdrew her count in negligence and relied solely on her count in nuisance. In the instant case, with no change in the facts alleged to support the cause of action, plaintiff amended his complaint to read nuisance instead of negligence. As in Dahl v. Glover, supra, the trial court may and should penetrate the formal label to discover the actualities of the case.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The brief amicus curiae of the Michigan Association of Municipal Attorneys which argues in support of the defendant city’s position that nuisance cannot be based on negligence alone cites the case of Awad v. McGolgan (1959), 357 Mich 386. However, this case is distinguishable from the preceding cases because the action sounded in contract rather than in tort. The Court specifically recognized the negligence-nuisance type of action at p 390 where it said:
“We do not hold that the negligence-nuisance type of action referred to above may never be brought. In a proper case it may be, and, if so, it partakes of the essentials of a negligence action, including such defenses as that of contributory negligence. (See annotation, 57 ALR 7.) The name (negligence or nuisance) does not control the result. The point is, however, that the gravamen of the *118action must sound in tort and a landlord’s breach of promise to repair does not so sound.”
Thus, this Court concludes that the 1loyston Case, supra, insofar as it holds that want of care in maintenance presents a question of negligence only, and not that of a public nuisance, has been overruled indirectly by subsequent cases, Denny, Dahl, Young, supra, and that the plaintiff has stated a cause of action in nuisance even though the allegations relate solely to negligence.
Further, we hold that contributory negligence is available as a defense in such a case; to wit, where the nuisance giving rise to the cause of action is based on negligent conduct. Young v. Groenendal, supra, Denny v. Garavaglia, supra, and Dahl v. Glover, supra.
Plaintiff vigorously contends that the instant case is within the first or second categories as quoted in the Denny Case, supra. We cannot agree that it is in the first category — namely, nuisances which result from conduct which is a violation of law even though the act referred to, PA 1965, No 87 (MCLA § 325.291 el seq. [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 14.435(1) el seq.]) was given immediate effect June 28, 1965, and the injury in question occurred December 4, 1965, because the statute did not prohibit open dumps, but rather it required licensing. Further, the rules and regulations promulgated to implement this licensing and regulating act had not been published at the time of the injury, as required by PA 1943, No 88, § 4, as amended by PA 1964, No 161, (MCLA § 24.74 [Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 3.560 (10)]) which is a condition precedent to their being effective, nor had they been given immediate effect by the governor as authorized by § 5 of the fore*119going act (MCLA § 24.75 [Stat Ann 1961 Rev § 3.560(H)]).2
With regard to the second category, nuisances which are intentional, we think the trial judge properly left this question to the jury which held unanimously on a special finding that there was no intentional nuisance, but held by a vote of ten to two that there was a nuisance arising out of the manner of operation, in other words negligence. Dahl v. Glover, supra.
We come now to the constitutional question. Is recovery barred by PA 1964, No 170, § 7, or, in the alternative, is § 7 unconstitutional?
Section 7 states:
“Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein said government agency is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is hereby affirmed.”
There is no question but what the legislature has the authority to adopt this type of legislation, Williams v. City of Detroit (1961), 364 Mich 231. Nevertheless, the legislature cannot exercise this authority in a manner which violates the prohibitions expressed in Const 1963, art 4, § 24. That section provides:
“No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. No bill shall *120be altered or amended on its passage through either house so as to change its original purpose as determined by its total content and not alone by its title.”
Therefore, this Court must decide whether PA 1964, No 170, § 7, embraces an object not expressed in its title.
The title to the act reads:
“An act to make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and the state, its agencies and departments, when engaged in a governmental function, for injuries to property and persons caused by negligence; to define and limit such liability; to define and limit the liability of the state when engaged in a proprietary function; to authorize the purchase of liability insurance to protect against loss arising out of such liability; to provide for defending certain claims made against public officers and paying damages sought or awarded against them; and to repeal certain acts and parts of acts.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Specifically, since the title refers to “negligence” whereas § 7 refers to “tort liability,” is § 7 unconstitutional because broader in scope than the title? There is no doubt that negligence is a kind of tort, but there are also intentional torts not based on negligence. Thus, on its face the section is not included in the title.
However, the variety of the Michigan judicial decisions of the past decade dealing with governmental immunity resulted in the legislature deciding to adopt this act to make uniform the liability of governmental agencies. If at all possible, such obvious legislative intent should not be thwarted by a ruling that § 7 is unconstitutional.
The history of governmental immunity in Michigan is now divided into pre-Williams and post-Williams law. In the landmark case, Williams v. *121City of Detroit, supra, our Supreme Court wrote three fascinating but differing opinions, the ultimate effect of which was to overrule prospectively the common-law rule that cities while performing a governmental function are immune from liability for negligence. The trial judge in that case, Victor J. Baum, later wrote an article entitled “Governmental Immunity in Michigan — Some Recent Developments” which was printed in the Michigan State Bar Journal, May 1965, pp 37-48, wherein he summarized the pre-Williams law as follows:
“To put the pre-Williams law in a nutshell, the picture was one of near-total immunity for all levels and agencies of government while engaged in a governmental function. By legislation there were small areas of exposure for injuries resulting from defective maintenance of public roads and from negligent operation of autos and airplanes.
“With respect to road maintenance, only the lesser levels of government had exposure. The state continued to be immune.
“Also there were the tiny judge-made islands of exposure for direct trespassory act and nuisance.
“There was another rather large judge-made area of exposure arising out of proprietary activity and this exposure extended to all levels of government, including the state.”
The Williams Case, supra, was followed the same year by McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner (1961), 365 Mich 268, in which the Supreme Court held that insofar as the state is concerned, the doctrine of immunity of state government, as it presently exists in Michigan, is a creature of the legislature, based on a pattern of deliberate legislative choices, which cannot be altered by the Court.
Additionally, the Supreme Court held in Sayers v. School District No. 1, Fractional (1962), 366 Mich 217, that school districts have immunity as *122agencies of state government, and in Myers v. Genesee County Auditor (1965), 375 Mich 1 the Supreme Court said that counties, townships and villages do not have governmental immunity when engaged in a governmental function. Along the way, there were the holdings in Lewis v. Genesee County (1963), 370 Mich 110, Munson v. County of Menominee (1963), 371 Mich 504, and Sherbutte v. City of Marine City (1964), 374 Mich 48, which further defined the application of the law of governmental immunity.
It is against this now historic judicial setting that the legislature adopted PA 1964, No 170, in an attempt to make uniform the liability of governmental agencies when engaged in governmental functions.
Attorneys amicus curiae have vigorously argued the position that PA 1964, No 170, § 7, grants all governmental agencies immunity from all tort liability when engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function and does not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 24, despite the fact that the title of that act is limited to negligence.
First, it is contended that the last part of art 4, § 24,3 namely, “as determined by its total content and not alone by its title,” which language was not in the 1908 Constitution, provides a strong rationale for the position that PA 1964, No 170, § 7, is a valid includable part of the original legislative intent and purpose.
The answer to that contention is that two distinct prohibitions are stated in § 24. The new language modifies the subject, “bill,” in the second sentence and does not affect the meaning of the first sentence where the subject is “law.”
*123Further, arguing that if one can find the object of a statute by reading the title and the act, then the object is fairly reflected therein and so no one is misled by a title which does not state the object accurately, is circular reasoning.
Amici curiae seek to find additional comfort in the opinion of Justice Brennan in Smith v. Ginther (1967), 379 Mich 208. It is sufficient answer for this Court to point out that Justice Brennan’s opinion was the dissenting opinion, and, furthermore, was not directed to the question of constitutionality.
Additionally, it is questionable whether the legislature meant to grant immunity from all tort liability in § 7. As pointed out previously4 some exceptions to governmental immunity existed even in pre-Williams times, two of them being in the areas of direct trespassory acts and nuisance.
We think that the constitutionality of § 7 cannot be sustained if it is construed as applying to all tort liability when the title is limited to negligence. We agree with the point made in the brief on behalf of the intervenor that legislators mig'ht have been misled by the title into voting affirmatively, thinking that immunity from liability for negligence desirable, yet not wishing to go so far as to grant immunity from assault and battery, false arrest, invasion of privacy, direct trespass, nuisance, and other torts. Vernor v. Secretary of State (1914), 179 Mich 157, 160; Leininger v. Secretary of State (1947), 316 Mich 644, 649; Continental Motors Corporation v. Township of Mushegon (1965), 376 Mich 170, 179.
There remains the possibility of limiting § 7 to tort liability “based on negligence.” By statutory construction this Court might conceivably read in *124the words “based on negligence,” thereby limiting § 7 so that it is not broader in scope than the title.
If this Court were to read into § 7 the words “based on negligence” this might bar plaintiff’s recovery as his cause of action in nuisance is actually based on allegations of negligence. None of the cases relative to nuisance cited at p 38 in Judge Baum’s article, supra, involve a nuisance based on negligence nor a governmental body, so the courts were not presented with the governmental immunity question. Since the Supreme Court has definitely made a distinction between nuisance based on negligence and other kinds of nuisance when the defense of contributory negligence was involved (Denny, Dahl, Young, supra), it is reasonable and consistent to make such a distinction between nuisance arising out of negligence and other types of nuisance when making exceptions to the rule of governmental immunity. To hold otherwise would be illogical, since the same facts may support a cause of action in nuisance created by negligence as support a cause of action in negligence.
The trial judge considered and rejected this possibility as “a strained construction” and “extreme judicial legislation.” With this view, this Court agrees.
The trial judge concluded that § 7 was severable from the remainder of the act and struck it as unconstitutional. While we affirm his opinion, we do not imply that none of the other sections might not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 24. For the purposes of this case, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of each of the sections of PA 1964, No 170.
We turn now to the question of adequacy of the verdict which plaintiff raised in his appeal. The trial judge in ruling on plaintiff’s motion for new trial and additur found that the plaintiff was a *125married man without minor children, 59 years of age, who lost less than 30 days of work as a result of the accident and at the time of the trial was on the same job that he had previously held. Plaintiff’s foreman testified that he was a good worker and that he intended to continue him in his employ. The testimony indicated that his take home pay was $78 per week before the accident and was slightly higher at the time of trial. The out-of-pocket medical and hospital expense was $784.44. This together with the wage loss totaled $1,096.44. There was in addition, earning capacity damage, pain and suffering, and permanent injury to be considered.
The trial court then held that the verdict of $12,500 was within the jury’s discretion, citing from 11 ALR3d 461 as follows:
“‘[d] Adequate
— $18,677 to man assaulted with pitchfork; loss of one eye; fractured nose; dental bridgework destroyed; laceration of face; no showing of permanent loss of earning capacity. Doivd v. Webb (CA3 1964), 337 F2d 93.
£££[e] Inadequate
— $6,000, increased to $12,000; 30-year-old, semiskilled workman earning about $250 per month; loss of left eye. Tyler v. United States Casualty Company (La App, 1961), 127 So 2d 804.’”
The court further stated that the verdict could not be said to shock the judicial conscience, nor to be erroneous as a matter of law.
Under these circumstances, this Court will not say that the jury and trial judge were in error. See Teller v. George (1960), 361 Mich 118; Osberry v. Watters (1967), 7 Mich App 258.
Affirmed with no costs, a public question being involved.
Holbrook, J., concurred.

 During the pendency of these causes plaintiff Leo V. Maki died and by order of this Court Virginia Maki, administratrix of the estate of Leo V. Maki, deceased, was substituted as party plaintiff. When plaintiff is mentioned in this opinion, reference is to the original plaintiff, Leo V. Maki.

 Buie numbers 325.1101-325.1110, promulgated pursuant to PA 1965, No 87, were filed with the Secretary of State November 23, 1965 at 4:15 p.m. They were published in the Michigan Administrative Code Quarterly Supplement 45 on February 14, 1966.

 Tlie comparable prohibitions in the Michigan Constitution of 1908 aro in art 5, §§ 21, 22.

 See Judge Baum’s article, supra.