Court Opinion

ID: 9753190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:03:03.072553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:10.040014
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
I dissent on the ground that the trial court improperly excluded appellant’s offer of evidence seeking to establish that the killing of the police officer was not committed in the perpetration of the felony but resulted from his cofelon, Seeley’s hatred of policemen generally. Appellant offered to prove this by the testimony of Seeley’s wife and other evidence that Seeley had recently killed another policeman.
It is well established that for an accused to be criminally responsible for the acts of his cofelons under the felony-murder rule, “the hilling must have been done by the defendant or by an accomplice or confederate or by one acting in furtherance of the feloni*524ous undertalcing.” Commonwealth v. Redime, 391 Pa. 486, 496, 137 A. 2d 472, 476 (1958); accord Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 228, 261 A. 2d 550, 555 (1970). The excluded evidence was material to appellant’s defense seeldng to establish that his cofelon killed, not “in furtherance of the felonious undertaking,” but only to satisfy his inveterate hatred of policemen. In fact, the trial court charged the jury that if the killing was committed for reasons unrelated to the burglary, appellant would not be within the reach of the felony-murder rule. The court erroneously excluded appellant’s evidence offered to demonstrate that the killing was not “in the furtherance of the felonious undertaking.”
The majority nevertheless holds that the evidence was properly excluded because it was not “logically probable that Seeley would shoot a policeman at every opportunity or that his actions in the instant case grew out of or were caused by his action in the earlier crime. ??
The standard for relevancy is not “logically probable” but whether the evidence offered is “tending to prove or to disprove the matters in issue.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 597, 50 A. 2d 342, 344 (1947); McCormick, Evidence §152 at 318-19 (1954); 1 Wigmore, supra, §§9-10 at 289-95 (3d ed. 1940). The trial court excluded appellant’s evidence on a material issue which if admitted may have created a “reasonable doubt” in the minds of the jury that Seeley killed the policeman in the “furtherance of the felonious undertaking.”
The majority sustains the exclusion of this evidence on the theory that the evidence of Seeley’s prior crime did not “indicate sufficient regularity to make it probable that the same actions would be carried out in every instance or in most instances. ...” I fail to see how *525the rule, barring evidence of other crimes for which the accused is not presently being tried unless the other crimes are clearly relevant for reasons other than to show the accused’s bad character, applies at all in this case. That rule is designed to prevent convictions on the basis of “bad character.” McCormick, supra, §157 at 327; Wharton, Criminal Evidence §232 (1955). The only person who could be possibly prejudiced by this evidence, appellant’s cofelon, was deceased at the time of trial. The rule was clearly inapplicable in this situation.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and grant appellant a new trial.