Court Opinion

ID: 9710263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:05:25.911065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.473290
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
Applicant, Byron C.1 Wells, admitted making unwanted sexual advances to between ten and twenty young male clients in the mid-1980s. In 1987, he was arrested and charged with five counts of battery. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wells admitted committing one count of misdemeanor battery, and the prosecution dismissed four of the counts and agreed to withhold prosecution with respect to the remaining count, subject to Wells’ participation in a pretrial diversion program. Wells successfully completed the diversion program, and the remaining count was dismissed.1
As a result of his misconduct, the Supreme Court of Indiana suspended Wells from the practice of law for three years with a fitness requirement. In re Wells, 572 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind.1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 864, 118 S.Ct. 169, 139 L.Ed.2d 112 (1997). Wells has twice sought and been denied reinstatement in Indiana. He now seeks admission to the bar of the District of Columbia. A three-member majority of the Committee on Admissions (“the Committee”) recommends that we grant Wells admission to the bar. Two members dissented in an opinion written by the Committee’s Chairman, Richard B. Nettler, Esquire. The Committee’s majority and dissenting opinions are attached hereto.
When evaluating applications for admission to the bar, we afford some deference to the Committee’s recommendations, making “due allowance for the Committee’s opportunity to observe and evaluate the demeanor of the applicant where relevant, e.g., with regard to such attitudes as sincerity or remorse.” In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1293 (D.C.1985). In this case, however, the Committee members are sharply divided in their assessments of Wells’ understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct and his acceptance of responsibility for his actions. We consider that disparity when assessing the Committee’s recommendation, keeping in mind that “the ultimate decision regarding admission or denial of admission remains for this court to make.” Id. Moreover, we find it persuasive that the Supreme Court of Indiana has twice denied reinstatement, and has unanimously concluded with respect to Wells’ most recent petition that
[t]he misconduct leading to the petitioner’s suspension was grave. He used his advantage, power and control to attempt to inappropriately incite sexual relations with young men, some of whom had come to the respondent to seek his professional assistance. We have stated that the more serious the attorney misconduct, the greater its negative impact on future rehabilitation and eventual reinstatement and, accordingly, the greater the petitioner’s burden of proof to overcome the implication of unfitness which is conjured by the misconduct. In the present case, our concerns about the sincerity of the petitioner’s remorse and the integrity of his attitude towards and understanding of the standards imposed upon members of the bar, coupled with the severity of his misconduct, outweigh the evidence he presented concerning his rehabilitation and present fitness to practice law.
*773In re Wells, 572 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind.1991) (citation omitted). As in reciprocal discipline cases, we give great deference to the Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions, for Indiana is Wells’ jurisdiction of original admission.2
Substantially for the reasons stated in Mr. Nettler’s persuasive dissent, we conclude that Wells has failed to meet the burden imposed on him by D.C. Ct.App. R. 46(e) of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he presently possesses the good moral character required in order to practice law in this jurisdiction. Accordingly, we deny Wells’ application for admission to the bar of the District of Columbia.

So ordered.

. Wells was arrested in 1990 on two additional charges of battery, but was acquitted of those charges by a jury.

. Because the ultimate decision rests with this court, and the question of sufficiency of evidence of good moral character under the clear and convincing standard is ultimately one of law, we cannot agree with our dissenting colleague’s conclusion in this case.