Court Opinion

ID: 9576780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:28:25.740787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:47.510994
License: Public Domain

Gordon, J.,
dissenting:
The majority recognizes that the policy makes reasonable notice of an accident a condition precedent to coverage. But, in my opinion,, the holding in this case makes the condition meaningless.
Although the majority opinion does not expressly say so, I believe we are agreed that prejudice is implicit in the insurance company’s ignorance of the accident and that proof of prejudice is unnecessary. Yet, the trial judge based his finding (that Timmons had satisfied the condition of written notice as soon as practicable) in large measure upon his conclusion that the insurance company’s proof of prejudice was “not strong enough” to warrant a contrary finding.
Clearly, Graninger’s knowledge of the accident was not the insurance company’s knowledge. Nor could the insurance company have been affected by Graninger’s failure to advise Timmons to give the insurance company prompt written notice of the accident, with such details as were already in Timmons’ possession. As stated in the majority opinion, Graninger was not the insurance company’s agent. If he was agent for anyone, he was agent for Timmons.
Timmons’ only explanation for his 65-day delay in reporting the accident was the weak excuse that he could not find cousin Floyd or obtain Floyd’s prompt cooperation after he was found. Under *270such circumstances, I do not believe the evidence supports the finding that written notice was given as soon as practicable or within a reasonable time. I would reverse and enter final judgment for the insurance company.
Carrico, J., concurs in this dissent.