Court Opinion

ID: 9735143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:03:38.490357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.353117
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice
(concurring specially).
In spite of the statutory authority of SDCL ch. 19-10, which statutes have allowed judicial notice in a wide range of circumstances, this court has held that, “There is no authority allowing a circuit court to take judicial notice of an ordinance. An ordinance therefore must be admitted into evidence prior to instructing the jury on its language.” Nose v. Christensen, 409 N.W.2d 131, 132 (S.D.1987).* However, the court in Nase *748also suggested that, “Perhaps for this reason our legislature has enacted a provision simplifying their admission.” Nose, 409 N.W.2d at 132 (citing SDCL 9-19-18). SDCL 9-19-18 provides:
An original ordinance or resolution, the record or a certified copy thereof, or any compilation or revision of ordinances purporting to be printed under the authority of the municipality are admissible in evidence without further proof.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, under this statute, calling of the “custodian” of a city ordinance as a witness would be unnecessary. In the present case, plaintiff Albers produced a certified copy of the ordinance on dogs “running at large” in the City of Lennox. This could easily have been placed into evidence; however, Judge Bogue refused to reopen so that this could be accomplished. His rationale was that this would cause delay, and also that there was no evidence on the record to show that the Kuper’s dog was running at large. The “delay” rationale is without merit, as the record shows that the proceedings were well ahead of schedule. See Northwestern Nat’l Bank of Sioux Falls v. Brandon, 88 S.D. 453, 459, 221 N.W.2d 12, 16 (1974) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs motion to reopen to allow additional testimony). Thus, the refusal to reopen to permit the introduction into evidence of the certified copy of the city ordinance was an abuse of discretion. Further, there appears to have been sufficient evidence-in the record that a jury could have concluded that the Kuper’s dog was running at large, in violation of the ordinance. Whether there was a violation of the ordinance was a question for the jury, which would have had obvious bearing on the negligence question. See Stevens v. Wood Sawmill, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 13, 14 (S.D.1988); Lovell v. Oahe Elec. Coop., 382 N.W.2d 396, 397-98 (S.D.1986).
Finally, whether Albers owned a dog had no bearing on the issues presented at this trial. Albers properly objected to this line of questioning; however, the court made clear that it would allow such testimony. This was improper, and prejudicial to Albers’ case. Such testimony should not be permitted on remand.

 This is an exception to the general rule on judicial notice, as stated in Nauman v. Nauman, 336 N.W.2d 662 (S.D.1983), wherein this court cited SDCL 19-10-2(3) and 19-10-3 for the proposition that, “[Ejven though it be a fact of which the court does not possess actual present knowledge, judicial notice may be taken of public or official records.” Nauman, 336 N.W.2d at 664 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (holding that judicial notice can be taken of a marriage license). Certainly, a municipal ordinance is a "public or official” record. Other examples of judicial notice include, e.g., Byre v. City of Chamberlain, 362 N.W.2d 69, 74 (S.D.1985) (noting that the circuit court, "properly took judicial notice of the fact that a health hazard arises when garbage is not properly collected and disposed of"); Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120, 122 n. 3 (S.D.1982) (taking judicial notice of a Memorandum of the South Dakota Department of Public Safety citing statistics on alcohol-related traffic fatalities); State v. Larson, 81 S.D. 540, 547, 138 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (1965) (stating that judicial notice may be taken of "public or official records of general public interest”); Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458, 464, 285 N.W. 443, 446 (1939) (taking judicial notice of legislative journals); Home Owners’ Loan Corp. v. Oleson, 68 S.D. 435, 438-39, 3 N.W.2d 880, 881 (1942) (taking judicial notice of the existence and content of reports of the South Dakota Department of Agriculture and the Superintendent of Banks). The rationale for the rule that judicial notice may not be taken of *748municipal ordinances at the appellate level appears to have been stated in McDonnel v. Laktings, 78 S.D. 195, 201, 99 N.W.2d 799, 802 (1960) wherein it was noted that, " 'This court cannot undertake to notice the ordinances of all the municipalities within its jurisdiction, nor to search the records for evidence of their passage, amendment, or repeal. A party relying upon such matters must ... in some manner present them as a part of the record.' ” Id. (quoting Steiner v. Nebraska, 78 Neb. 147, 110 N.W. 723, 724 (1907). Members of this court have criticized the rule. See Anderson v. Adamson, 79 S.D. 429, 436-42, 112 N.W.2d 612, 615-18 (Hanson and Biegelmeier, J.J., dissenting). In Anderson, one of the dissenters stated that, "The only plausible explanation for the existence of the above evidentiary rule is court convenience. It serves no other purpose and, as in the present action, it often results in the disposition of cases without decision on the merits. Accordingly, I believe this technical rule of procedure should be reconsidered and re-examined in light of modem authority.” 79 S.D. at 438, 112 N.W.2d at 616 (Hanson, J., dissenting). The questionable justification for refusing to allow a trial court to take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance, which is a public or official record, should cause this court to reconsider the rule.