Court Opinion

ID: 9954346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 22:02:10.860715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:04.669651
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION EIGHT

 ELINTON GRAMAJO,                         B322697, B323024

         Plaintiff and Appellant,         (Los Angeles County
                                          Super. Ct. No. BC694779)
         v.

 JOE’S PIZZA ON SUNSET, INC.,
 et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Jon R. Takasugi, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
      Law Office of Alfredo Nava Jr. and Alfredo Nava for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      The Linde Law Firm and Douglas A. Linde for Defendants
and Respondents.
               _________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       Plaintiff and Appellant Elinton Gramajo sued Defendants
and Respondents Joe’s Pizza on Sunset, Inc.; Joe’s Pizza on
Sunset, LLC; and Giuseppe Vitale (together, Joe’s Pizza) for
Labor Code violations in connection with Gramajo’s work as a
pizza delivery driver. Gramajo recovered $7,659.93 after a jury
trial. Gramajo requested attorney fees in the amount of $296,920
and costs in the amount of $26,932.84 under Labor Code section
1194, subdivision (a), which entitles prevailing employees to their
reasonable litigation costs, including attorney fees. The trial
court denied Gramajo’s requests for fees and costs in their
entirety, finding Gramajo’s counsel severely over-litigated the
case, and the requested fees and costs were grossly
disproportional to Gramajo’s limited trial success. The trial court
relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a),
which gives trial courts discretion to deny prevailing plaintiffs
their litigation costs when plaintiffs file their case as an
unlimited civil proceeding but only recover an amount available
in a limited civil case.
       On appeal, Gramajo argues the trial court should have
awarded him reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code
section 1194, subdivision (a), and abused its discretion by
applying Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), to
deny those costs in their entirety.
       We agree with Gramajo. We hold employees who prevail in
actions to recover unpaid minimum and overtime wages are
entitled to their reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code
section 1194, subdivision (a), irrespective of the amount
recovered. We express no opinion on the reasonableness of
Gramajo’s requests for litigation costs. Accordingly, we reverse

                                 2
and remand the matter for the trial court to determine a
reasonable fee and cost award.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Gramajo worked as a delivery driver for Joe’s Pizza from
February 2014 to June 2015.
      In February 2018, Gramajo sued Joe’s Pizza for failure to
pay minimum and overtime wages (Lab. Code, §§ 510, 558, 1194),
failure to provide rest and meal periods (Lab. Code, §§ 512,
226.7), failure to pay wages due at time of termination (Lab.
Code, §§ 201, 202, 203), failure to reimburse for business
expenses (Lab. Code, § 2802), and unfair business practices
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). Gramajo also sought declaratory
and injunctive relief.
      After nearly four years of litigation and extensive
discovery, the matter was set for trial in October 2021. Gramajo
sought $26,159.33 in unpaid minimum and overtime wages,
missed meal and rest breaks, waiting time penalties, and
unreimbursed expenses. After a seven-day trial, the jury found
in favor of Gramajo on his minimum wage and overtime causes of
action. The jury awarded Gramajo $2.17 in unpaid minimum
wages and $3,340 in unpaid overtime wages. In total, Gramajo
recovered $7,659.63, consisting of the unpaid minimum and
overtime wages; $2,115.59 in statutory interest; $2,100 in waiting
time penalties calculated at the daily wage rate of $70 per day for
thirty days per Labor Code section 203; $2.17 in liquidated
damages; and $100 in statutory penalties.
      Gramajo moved for attorney fees totaling $296,920 for
228.4 hours billed at $650 per hour and applying a multiplier of
two. Gramajo also requested $26,932.84 in costs. Joe’s Pizza

                                3
opposed the fee request and moved to tax Gramajo’s costs in their
entirety.
       The trial court denied Gramajo’s fee request and granted
Joe’s Pizza’s motion to tax costs, ultimately awarding Gramajo
nothing. The trial court found Gramajo acted in bad faith by
artificially inflating his damages figure and including equity
claims he never intended to pursue to justify filing the case as an
unlimited civil proceeding. The trial court noted Gramajo sought
$26,159.33 at trial, just over the jurisdictional amount, which
included $10,822.16 in unreimbursed expenses. In trial,
however, Gramajo never introduced any evidence to support his
expense claim. Similarly, Gramajo never pursued injunctive or
declaratory relief at trial despite requesting that relief in his
complaint. The trial court also found the case was severely over
litigated, noting Gramajo had propounded 15 sets of written
discovery requests and noticed 14 depositions despite only
admitting 12 exhibits at trial. In denying Gramajo’s request for
litigation costs, the trial court stated: “Plaintiff’s case clearly
should have been brought in limited jurisdiction, was extremely
straightforward, and demanded very little skill. Despite this,
Plaintiff’s counsel repeatedly engaged in conduct which evinced a
prioritization of gamesmanship over professionalism and which
bore no proportional relationship to the work actually required to
litigate the underlying claims. . . . [¶] . . . In light of the fact that
this case should never have been filed in this jurisdiction, the
gross disproportionality in the hours billed-for and the success
obtained, and Plaintiff’s counsel bad faith tactics, the [c]ourt
finds the fee request to be so unreasonably inflated as to justify
zero attorney fees recovered.” The trial court denied Gramajo’s
costs on the same grounds.

                                    4
       Gramajo separately appealed the trial court’s orders
denying his fees and granting Joe’s Pizza’s motion to tax costs.
We consolidated the appeals for purposes of opinion and oral
argument.
                            DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Gramajo argues he is entitled to his reasonable
litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a),
and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on Code
of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), to deny his
litigation costs in their entirety.
       Without expressing any opinion on the reasonableness of
Gramajo’s requests or whether the case should have been filed in
limited jurisdiction, we hold Gramajo was entitled to an award of
his reasonable litigation costs under Labor Code section 1194,
subdivision (a), and the trial court erred when it relied on Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), to deny those costs
in their entirety.
I.     Standard of review and rules of statutory
       interpretation
       Generally, we review a trial court’s award of fees and costs
for abuse of discretion. (Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th
1506, 1512.) However, when the determination of whether a
party was entitled to its attorney fees and costs is a matter of
statutory construction and presents a question of law, our review
is de novo. (Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
132, 142.)
       “Where, as here, we are called upon to interpret two
seemingly inconsistent statutes to determine which applies under
a particular set of facts, our goal is to harmonize the law
[citation] and avoid an interpretation that requires one statute to

                                 5
be ignored.” (Chatsky & Associates v. Superior Court (2004)
117 Cal.App.4th 873, 876.) “Moreover, in looking at the
relationship between two statutes, ‘[l]iteral construction should
not prevail if it is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in
the statute. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter
will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.
[Citations.] An interpretation that renders related provisions
nugatory must be avoided. [Citation.] . . . [E]ach sentence must
be read not in isolation but in the light of the statutory scheme
[citation]; and if a statute is amenable to two alternative
interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result
will be followed.’ ” (McLaughlin v. State Bd. of Educ. (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 196, 211.)
        “ ‘The courts assume that in enacting a statute the
Legislature was aware of existing, related laws and intended to
maintain a consistent body of statutes. [Citations.] Thus there is
a presumption against repeals by implication; they will occur
only where the two acts are so inconsistent that there is no
possibility of concurrent operation, or where the later provision
gives undebatable evidence of an intent to supersede the earlier;
the courts are bound to maintain the integrity of both statutes if
they may stand together.’ ” (Hays v. Wood (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772,
784.) “ ‘To overcome the presumption the two acts must be
irreconcilable, clearly repugnant, and so inconsistent that the two
cannot have concurrent operation. The courts are bound, if
possible, to maintain the integrity of both statutes if the two may
stand together.’ ” (Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 419–420
(Western Oil).)

                                 6
II.    Labor Code section 1194 and Code of Civil Procedure
       section 1033
       Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) provides: “[A]ny
employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the
legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is
entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full
amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation,
including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit.” The statute is a one-way fee shifting provision, whose
purpose is to disincentivize violations of our minimum and
overtime wage laws. (Eicher v. Advanced Business Integrators,
Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1380.)
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a)
provides: “Costs or any portion of claimed costs shall be as
determined by the court in its discretion in a case other than a
limited civil case in accordance with Section 1034 where the
prevailing party recovers a judgment that could have been
rendered in a limited civil case.” Our Supreme Court has
explained Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a)
“applies when a plaintiff has obtained a judgment for money
damages in an amount (now $25,000 or less) that could have been
recovered in a limited civil case, but the plaintiff did not bring the
action as a limited civil case and thus did not take advantage of
the cost- and time-saving advantages of limited civil case
procedures.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th
970, 982–983 (Chavez).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
subdivision (a), gives the trial court discretion to deny litigation
costs to a plaintiff, who would otherwise be entitled to those costs
as a matter of right. (Chavez, at p. 983.) The purpose of the
statute “is to encourage plaintiffs to bring their actions as limited

                                  7
civil actions whenever it is reasonably practicable to do so.” (Id.
at p. 988.)
III. The trial court did not have discretion to deny
       Gramajo’s fees and costs in their entirety under
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a)
       As an initial matter, we must determine whether Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), and Labor Code
section 1194, subdivision (a), are irreconcilable such that
concurrent operation is impossible. (Western Oil, supra,
49 Cal.3d at p. 420.) We conclude they are.
       On the one hand, Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
subdivision (a), gives the trial court discretion to deny litigation
costs altogether when it finds the plaintiff failed to take
advantage of the efficiency of a limited civil proceeding as
evidenced by the plaintiff’s recovery of less than the jurisdictional
threshold. (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 983.)
       On the other hand, Labor Code section 1194, subdivision
(a), provides for a mandatory award of reasonable litigation costs
where an employee prevails on unpaid minimum and overtime
wage claims irrespective of the amount recovered. (Harrington v.
Payroll Entertainment Services, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 589,
593–594 (Harrington).)
       Thus, one statute gives the trial court discretion to deny
litigation costs based on the amount recovered while the other
provides for a mandatory cost award regardless of that amount.
Nor does either statute address the question of which one should
control in this area of overlap, for example, by including
qualifying language such as “ ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute’ or ‘[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.’ ”
(Moreno v. Bassi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 244, 257 (Moreno).)

                                  8
Therefore, there is a discrepancy between the two statutes with
respect to the trial court’s discretion to award or deny litigation
costs where an employee recovers unpaid minimum and overtime
wages, but where his or her counsel seemingly overstates the
value of the case and files in the incorrect jurisdiction. We find
this discrepancy is an irreconcilable conflict that prevents the
concurrent operation of the two statutes in the circumstances
before us.
      Given our conclusion that the statutes conflict, we must
decide which one controls. (Western Oil, supra, 49 Cal.3d at
p. 420.) We hold Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a),
controls given the legislative intent behind Labor Code section
1194, subdivision (a), and because that statute is more recently
enacted and more specific relative to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1033.
      Generally, when two statutes conflict, a specific statute will
take precedence over a general one, and a more recently enacted
statute will take precedence over an earlier one. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1859; Stoetzl v. Department of Human Resources (2019)
7 Cal.5th 718, 749.) It is also “ ‘the general rule that where the
general statute standing alone would include the same matter as
the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be
considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was
passed before or after such general enactment.’ ” (People v.
Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 479.)
      Here, there is no question that Labor Code section 1194,
subdivision (a), is the more recently enacted statute. The
amendment to Labor Code section 1194 mandating the recovery
of reasonable attorney fees was enacted in 1991 (Moreno, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 258, citing Stats. 1991, ch. 825, § 2, p. 3666)

                                 9
while the relevant portion of Code of Civil Procedure section
1033, subdivision (a), was enacted in 1953 (Chavez, supra,
47 Cal.4th at p. 983, citing Stats. 1953, ch. 910, § 1, p. 2266).
       We also find that Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a),
is the more specific statute relative to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1033, subdivision (a). We find Moreno, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th 244 instructive on this point.
       In Moreno, the court decided whether Code of Civil
Procedure section 1031 controls over Labor Code section 1194,
subdivision (a), when a prevailing employee recovers wages in an
amount less than $300. (Moreno, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at
p. 249.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1031 provides: “In
actions for the recovery of wages for labor performed, where the
amount of the demand, exclusive of interest, does not exceed
three hundred dollars ($300), the court shall add, as part of the
cost, in any judgment recovered by the plaintiff or cross-
complainant, an attorney’s fee not exceeding 20 percent of the
amount recovered.” In Moreno, the employee recovered $16 in
unpaid minimum wages and $16 in liquidated damages.
(Moreno, at p. 248.) Relying on Code of Civil Procedure
section 1031, the trial court awarded the employee $3.20 in fees.
(Moreno, at p. 249.) The employee appealed, arguing she was
entitled to her reasonable attorney fees under Labor Code
section 1194, subdivision (a). (Ibid.)
       The Moreno court agreed with the employee, finding Labor
Code section 1194, subdivision (a), controlled over Code of Civil
Procedure section 1031 because the Labor Code provision was the
more specific and more recently enacted statute. (Moreno, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 257–258.) The court found Code of Civil
Procedure section 1031 could be classified as either the general or

                                10
specific statute relative to Labor Code section 1194, subdivision
(a). However, the court reasoned that the latter should be
regarded as the more specific statute because “the type of wages
in question was more important to the Legislature than the
amount demanded” and gave “the specificity as to the type of
wages precedence over the specificity as to the amount of
recovery.” (Moreno, at p. 258.) The court inferred “the
Legislature intended all actions to recover minimum wages or
overtime compensation to be subject to the reasonable attorney
fees provision in Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a)” to
conclude Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a) was “properly
regarded as the more specific provision and it should control
where it overlaps with section 1031.” (Moreno, at p. 258.)
The court also noted that, even if the specificity question was
“regarded as a tossup, Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a)
would take precedence over section 1031 under the principle that
the later enacted statute should prevail.” (Ibid.)
      In a similar fashion to the Moreno court, we conclude Labor
Code section 1194, subdivision (a), is the more specific statute
relative to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a).
Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), applies only to certain
wage and hour actions whereas Code of Civil Procedure section
1033, subdivision (a), can apply to any case in which a plaintiff
recovers less than the jurisdictional amount regardless of subject
matter.
      Our holding is consistent with our Supreme Court’s and
other appellate courts’ interpretations of the scope of Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a).
      For example, in Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th 970, our
Supreme Court decided the issue of the interaction between Code

                               11
of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), and Government
Code section 12965, subdivision (b)— the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act’s (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et
seq.) fee provision. (Chavez, at p. 982.) There, the plaintiff
recovered $11,500 for a FEHA retaliation claim. (Chavez, at
p. 980.) The plaintiff’s attorney requested $870,935.50 in fees
and $13,144.26 in costs. (Id. at p. 981.) The trial court denied the
motion for fees, relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
finding the plaintiff should have brought his case as a limited
jurisdiction civil proceeding. (Chavez, at p. 981.) The court of
appeal reversed, reasoning while Code of Civil Procedure section
1033, subdivision (a), and FEHA both served laudable but
conflicting purposes, applying Code of Civil Procedure section
1033, subdivision (a), to a FEHA plaintiff would discourage
attorneys from taking meritorious cases. (Chavez, at pp. 981–
982.)
       Our Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the Court of
Appeal. (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 982.) The court
discussed the history of Code of Civil Procedure section 1033,
subdivision (a), and explained that it generally applied when a
plaintiff recovers an amount that could have been recovered in a
court of lesser jurisdiction. (Chavez, at pp. 982–983.) “In this
situation, even though a plaintiff who obtains a money judgment
would otherwise be entitled to recover litigation costs as a matter
of right, section 1033(a) gives the trial court discretion to deny, in
whole or in part, the plaintiff’s recovery of litigation costs.”
(Ibid.) With respect to Government Code section 12965,
subdivision (b), the court found that, while a prevailing plaintiff
is generally entitled to attorney fees, a trial court may deny a

                                 12
FEHA plaintiff’s fee request when “special circumstances would
render the award unjust.” (Chavez, at p. 985.)
       In interpreting the two statutes, the court ruled there was
“no irreconcilable conflict between section 1033(a) and the
FEHA’s attorney fee provision.” (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 986.) The court explained, the discretion afforded to trial
courts under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision
(a), to deny prevailing parties their fees fell into FEHA’s special
circumstances exception that would render an award unjust.
(Chavez, at p. 986.)
       Relying on Chavez, Joe’s Pizza argues since there is no
Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a) “ ‘carve out’ ”
for FEHA cases, we should likewise conclude there is no similar
exemption for unpaid minimum and overtime wage cases.
       We disagree. The Chavez court’s holding hinged on its
conclusion that FEHA’s fee provision allowed for the denial of
fees in special circumstances, which could include the over-filing
of a case under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision
(a). (Chavez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 986.) We find no similar
exception to Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a)’s mandatory
one-way fee provision. Therefore, unlike FEHA’s discretionary
fee provision, which provides for instances where a total denial of
fees and costs are appropriate, there is no analogous standard in
a case governed by Labor Code 1194, subdivision (a). It follows
then that Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a)’s mandatory
fee provision cannot be harmonized with a trial court’s discretion
under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a) to
deny litigation costs altogether.
       Two other Courts of Appeal have found Chavez and Code of
Civil Procedure section 1033, subdivision (a), are of limited

                                 13
applicability in the context of a mandatory fee statute like Labor
Code section 1194, subdivision (a).
       In Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 761 (Alamanor), a homeowners association
sought to impose fines against two property owners for violating
the property’s covenants, conditions and restrictions. (Id. at
p. 765.) Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled against the
property owners but also rejected as unreasonable many of the
fines that the association had sought to impose. (Ibid.) On the
parties’ competing motions for attorney fees, the trial court
determined the association to be the prevailing party and
awarded it over $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. (Ibid.)
The property owners appealed the attorney fees award,
challenging the amount of the attorney fees award in light of the
association’s limited success at trial. (Ibid.) The property owners
asserted that the fees were “ ‘grossly disproportionate’ ” to the
monetary award and relied on Code of Civil Procedure section
1033, subdivision (a), and Chavez for the proposition that the
trial court should have disallowed attorney fees and costs since
the association recovered less than the statutory minimum to be
classified as an unlimited civil matter. (Alamanor, at p. 777.)
       The Alamanor court rejected the property owner’s
argument. “The reasoning of Chavez is of limited applicability
here. Unlike the fee provision under FEHA, which is
discretionary and therefore not irreconcilable with section 1033,
subdivision (a), the fee-shifting provision of the Davis-Stirling Act
is mandatory. [Citations.] The circumstances in which a court
might deny or reduce a fee award under a permissive statutory
provision, like FEHA, such as because special circumstances
‘ “ ‘would render an award unjust,’ ” ’ do not apply equally where

                                 14
a statute mandates attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.”
(Alamanor, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 778–779.)
       Similarly, in Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, P.C. (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 883 (Nishiki), an employee prevailed against her
employer on her claim for waiting time penalties, and was
awarded $4,250. (Id. at pp. 887–888.) The trial court awarded
the employee $86,160 in attorney fees. (Id. at p. 888.) The
employer appealed. Citing Chavez, the employer argued the trial
court abused its discretion in not reducing the fee award given
the employee’s limited success. (Nishiki, at pp. 895–896.) The
Court of Appeal rejected that argument, finding the reasoning of
Chavez and other discretionary fee cases did not apply because
the statute before it was a “one-way” attorney fees provision
meant to ensure even employees who achieve minimal success
are still entitled to an award of fees. (Nishiki, at p. 896.)
       Like Alamanor and Nishiki, we find Chavez’s reasoning is
of limited value where a mandatory fee statute controls.
       As a note of caution, our holding should not be read as a
license for attorneys litigating minimum and overtime wage cases
to over-file their cases or request unreasonable and excessive cost
awards free of consequence. Under Labor Code section 1194,
subdivision (a), a prevailing employee is still only entitled to a
reasonable fee and cost award. (See Harrington, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) In assessing requests for litigation
costs, trial courts must always be guided by what is reasonable
and exercise their discretion to strike costs or reduce fees they
find unreasonable. (See PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000)
22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1133.)

                                15
       On this last point, we find Harrington illustrative. There,
an employee filed a class action for unpaid overtime wages.
(Harrington, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 591.) After class
certification was denied, the employee’s remaining individual
claim was for $44.63 in unpaid wages. (Ibid.) The employer
ultimately settled the case for $10,500 and agreed that for
purposes of attorney fees, the employee would be deemed the
prevailing party. (Id. at pp. 591–592.) The employee then
requested more than $46,000 in attorney fees and more than
$2,200 in costs. (Id. at p. 592.) The trial court denied the
employee’s request, finding it unreasonable and excessive, and
that the employee had already been paid a windfall of $10,500 for
a $44 overtime claim. (Id. at p. 593.)
       After the employee appealed, the Court of Appeal reversed
the denial but fixed the fee award at $500. (Harrington, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 593–594.) Although the Harrington court
found the employee was entitled to an award of fees under
various provisions of the Labor Code, including Labor Code
section 1194, subdivision (a), “there [was] no way on earth this
case justified the hours purportedly billed by Harrington’s
lawyers.” (Harrington, at pp. 593–594.) Given the nature of the
dispute, the amount of the settlement, and the record on appeal,
the court was “satisfied that the trial court could not reasonably
award an amount in excess of $500.” (Id. at p. 594.)
       Thus, as Harrington demonstrates, there are still sufficient
consequences for attorneys who make unreasonable and
excessive requests to recover fees and costs even in the face of a
mandatory fee statute like Labor Code section 1194, subdivision
(a).

                                16
IV.    Gramajo is entitled to a reasonable fees and costs
       Since we conclude Gramajo was entitled to his reasonable
fees and costs, we remand the matter back to the trial court,
which is in the best position to assess the value of the services
rendered by Gramajo’s attorney. (Harman v. City and County of
San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 427.) We reiterate,
under Labor Code section 1194, subdivision (a), Gramajo is only
entitled to his reasonable fees and costs, nothing more. (See
Harrington, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 594; Karton v. Ari
Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 743–750
[reviewing factors a trial court may weigh when determining a
reasonable fee].)
                          DISPOSITION
       The orders denying Appellant’s motion for attorney fees
and granting Respondents’ motion to tax costs are reversed, and
the cause is remanded to the trial court to exercise its discretion
to determine a “reasonable” fee for Appellant’s attorney, as well
as Appellant’s costs under Labor Code section 1194, subdivision
(a). The parties are to pay their own costs on appeal, including
their own attorney fees.

                                           VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                  GRIMES, Acting P. J.

                  WILEY, J.

                                 17