Court Opinion

ID: 9895658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 14:07:37.346735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.661679
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Warman v. LivaNova Deutschland, 2023-Ohio-4045.]

                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                     HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 DARREN WARMAN,                                 :           APPEAL NOS. C-230149
                                                                        C-230150
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      :           TRIAL NOS. A-2200202
                                                                        A-2203770
    vs.                                         :
                                                              O P I N I O N.
 LIVANOVA DEUTSCHLAND, GMBH, :
 f.k.a. SORIN GROUP DEUTSCHLAND,
 GMBH,                           :

 LIVANOVA USA, INC.,                            :

 LIVANOVA HOLDING USA, INC.,                    :

 TRIHEALTH, INC.,                               :

    and                                         :

 GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL OF :
 CINCINNATI, OHIO,

      Defendants-Appellees.                     :

Civil Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: November 8, 2023

Thomas Law Offices, PLLC, and Louis C. Schneider, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Rendigs, Fry, Kiely & Dennis, LLP, and Brian Goldwasser, for Defendants-Appellees
TriHealth, Inc., and Good Samaritan Hospital of Cincinnati, Ohio,
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath, LLP, M. Joseph Winebrenner, Nelson Mullins Riley
& Scarborough, LLP, Zachary C. Maciaszek and Dustin B. Rawlin, for Defendants-
Appellees LivaNova Deutschland GMBH, LivaNova USA, Inc., and LivaNova
Holding USA, Inc.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}    The overarching goal of Ohio’s discovery rules is to prevent unfair

surprise and concealment by facilitating the free flow of relevant information between

parties. However, courts have broad discretion to manage the scope of discovery to

ensure it remains “proportional to the needs of the case.”               Civ.R. 26(B)(1).

Accordingly, when plaintiff-appellant Darren Warman proved unable to point to

anything in his own medical records to substantiate his claim of injury (allegedly

caused by defendant-appellee LivaNova’s medical device), the trial court acted within

its discretion to suspend discovery unless and until he could do so. The trial court

afforded him ample time and opportunity to procure relevant expert evidence, but he

mustered neither an opinion indicating that he actually suffered from the relevant

condition nor any indication that some missing discovery would enable his expert to

reach a diagnosis that would justify the lawsuit. On the limited facts in this record, the

trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing his claims for failure to comply with

its discovery order. We therefore affirm its judgment.

                                            I.

       {¶2}    Mr. Warman underwent heart surgery in July 2015 at defendant-

appellee Good Samaritan Hospital in Cincinnati. In January 2020, he received a letter

from defendant-appellee TriHealth, Inc., notifying him that he may have been exposed

to harmful bacteria emitted from LivaNova’s Sorin Stockert 3T Heater-Cooler Device

(“3T System”), which regulates the patient’s blood temperature during heart surgeries.

The 3T System is the subject of a federal multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) centralized

in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. There,

plaintiffs typically allege that, due to design defects, the 3T System emits
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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Nontuberculous Mycobacteria (“NTM”), a group of bacteria that includes

Mycobacterium (M.) chimaera, M. abscessus, and M. fortiuitum, among others. They

contend that they contract infections, sometimes years later, resulting from exposure

to aerosolized NTM emitted from the 3T System during heart surgeries. In total,

plaintiffs have brought more than 200 cases relating to NTM exposure from 3T

Systems in federal and state courts.

       {¶3}   Here, in multiple complaints, Mr. Warman claims he developed an

infection after exposure to M. chimaera emitted by the 3T System during his 2015

surgery. He first sued Good Samaritan Hospital and TriHealth, Inc., (collectively,

“hospital defendants”) in July 2021, claiming common law negligence.            After

voluntarily dismissing that case without prejudice, he brought a separate complaint

against the hospital defendants (as “suppliers”) and multiple LivaNova entities

(together, “LivaNova”) (as the designer and manufacturer) for product liability claims

under R.C. 2307.71. LivaNova immediately removed the latter case to a federal court,

which then transferred it to the MDL court. The MDL court remanded the matter back

to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Warman refiled his negligence case against the hospital

defendants. After the bouncing procedural ball finally came to a rest, the trial court

consolidated the actions and issued a case management order (“CMO”) in September

2022, setting deadlines for discovery, expert reports, and summary judgment motions.

       {¶4}   That same month, after the remand, Mr. Warman asked defendants for

discovery. They balked, citing their pending motion to dismiss, and demanded some

proof that he had actually developed a post-operative infection and that it had some

causal connection to NTM emitted by the 3T System, as he claimed. Defendants

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

turned to the trial court later that month, moving it to modify its CMO to include a

“tiered approach to discovery” under which the court would stay all discovery until Mr.

Warman could support his claims with an expert opinion. The record does not show

any initial discovery requests from either side, and we presume that none was served.

         {¶5}   In essence, defendants asked the court to impose a “Lone Pine” order.

Under such an order, the trial court typically requires plaintiffs, under penalty of

dismissal, to produce prima facie evidence of injury, exposure to the harmful

substance or device in question, and causation.        See generally Nora Freeman

Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 Yale L.J. 2 (2019). Though Lone Pine orders

are somewhat common in mass toxic-tort litigation and MDL cases, trial courts rarely

impose them in single-plaintiff cases (for a host of reasons that we need not explore

here).

         {¶6}   The trial court considered defendants’ motion at an October 2022

hearing. After first rejecting their motion to dismiss, the trial court entertained

argument from Mr. Warman and defendants regarding the status of discovery, Mr.

Warman’s medical records, and what, if any, information he needed in discovery from

defendants to establish the basis for his claims. Mr. Warman’s counsel objected to

defendants’ motion, arguing he was entitled to complete discovery, but assured the

court: “I’ve got all kinds of medical records that he’s got an infection. Do you want me

to have a doctor produce a report that my client got an infection as a result of the

surgery? I can do that.” Consistent with that admission, defendants argued that he

would have everything he needed—namely, his own medical records—to both establish

that he had some type of post-operative infection and that he had or has NTM in his

system. The trial court agreed with defendants and instructed Mr. Warman “to show

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

me something that shows your client had this or currently has it” within 60 days,

referring either to the presence of NTM in Mr. Warman’s system or other evidence of

an NTM-related infection. It added, “You got to show he’s got it or you’re out.”

However, it held defendants’ motion in abeyance and made no definitive ruling

regarding a stay of discovery.

       {¶7}   Mr. Warman’s initial time ran out at a hearing in December 2022. By

the time of the hearing, he had not produced an expert statement or other evidence of

any post-operative infection (let alone one possibly linked to M. chimaera) despite his

promises at the October hearing. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’

motion to modify its CMO and issued an order that read, “Plaintiff shall produce an

expert report substantiating the infection claimed in the Complaint on or before March

3, 2023. Discovery is hereby STAYED until Plaintiff produces said expert report.”

During the hearing, the court further stated “on March 3rd, at 1:30, you will all be here

for report [sic]. It will be produced on that day or the cases will be dismissed.”

Notably, as Mr. Warman’s counsel acknowledged, the court’s March 3 deadline

mirrored the court’s original CMO deadline for his expert disclosure and report.

       {¶8}   The court dismissed Mr. Warman’s claims on March 3, 2023 at 3:41

p.m. pursuant to its discovery order. Mr. Warman’s counsel failed to appear at the

status conference held that afternoon and had not yet filed an expert disclosure or

report. A couple of hours after the dismissal, Mr. Warman filed an expert disclosure

identifying an expert who would testify about “the risk of post-operative infection to

Darren Warman as the result of Defendants’ product(s).” In a letter attached to the

filing, the expert states that Mr. Warman was exposed to the 3T System and “was at

risk for [an NTM infection],” noting that NTM emitted by the system can incubate for

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

as long as five to seven years. (Emphasis added.) The expert did not comment on the

fact that his report was being filed nearly eight years after the surgery. Nor did the

expert discuss whether Mr. Warman developed any infection or unexplained negative

symptoms after his surgery. Regarding discovery, the expert suggested:

       “Additional discovery and information would be beneficial as I develop

       my opinions in this case. This would include, but not be limited to, the

       information that [hospital defendants] has and had about NTM

       infections from the [3T Systems] they were using during their cardiac

       surgery procedures.”

       {¶9}   Although their expert disclosure and reports were not due until April

2023, hospital defendants submitted an expert assessment in December 2022. After

reviewing Mr. Warman’s medical records and his complaints, their expert concluded

“there is no objective evidence that Darren Warman developed any infection as a result

of being exposed to [M. chimaera]” from the 3T System used in his July 2015 surgery.

Further, the expert describes Mr. Warman’s course of treatment after the surgery,

including multiple blood cultures negative for M. chimaera.            He identifies a

pacemaker pocket infection that left him hospitalized for six days in April 2018, but

notes that a culture from that infection site was positive only for Pseudomonas, a

bacterium not connected to the 3T System. Mr. Warman’s expert neither responded

to hospital defendants’ expert report nor contested its findings.

       {¶10} Mr. Warman filed this appeal, arguing that the trial court unfairly

truncated discovery. He cites no case law in his appellate brief, only raising arguments

under Ohio’s discovery rule, Civ.R. 26. In a single assignment of error, he challenges

the dismissal resulting from his failure to comply with the court’s discovery order.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                                  II.

        {¶11} Few Ohio appellate courts have had occasion to address the prudence of

a Lone Pine order or a similar discovery order, and just one court has considered the

issue in any depth. See Simeone v. Girard City Bd. of Edn., 171 Ohio App.3d 633,

2007-Ohio-1775, 872 N.E.2d 344 (11th Dist.). Because the issue is insubstantially

briefed in the appeal before us, and because the circumstances of this case do not

facilitate a robust analysis of the potential benefits and drawbacks of Lone Pine

orders,1 we decline to discuss the overall legality and wisdom of such orders under

Ohio law. Rather, for the narrow reasons stated below, we hold that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in staying discovery while requiring Mr. Warman to

substantiate his injury. Nor did the court err in ordering dismissal of Mr. Warman’s

claims after he failed to provide even basic proof that he suffered an injury, an essential

element of any tort claim.

        {¶12} The trial court’s order staying discovery while requiring Mr. Warman to

produce evidence of an NTM-related infection is best characterized as a discovery

order. See, e.g., Simeone at ¶ 23-24. In general, a trial court has broad discretion to

regulate discovery, and orders concerning discovery matters will not be reversed

absent an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts, 133 Ohio St.3d 339,

2012-Ohio-4699, 978 N.E.2d 188, ¶ 19. Abuse of discretion occurs when “a court

exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it

has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-

1 It is also unclear that this order even constitutes a “Lone Pine” order because it only required proof

of injury, rather than injury and causation.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Further, appellate courts reverse discovery orders “ ‘when

the trial court has erroneously denied or limited discovery.’ ” Mauzy v. Kelly Servs.,

75 Ohio St.3d 578, 592, 664 N.E.2d 1272 (1996), quoting 8 Wright, Miller & Marcus,

Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 2006 (2d Ed.1994). “Thus, ‘an appellate

court will reverse the decision of a trial court that extinguishes a party’s right to

discovery if the trial court’s decision is improvident and affects the discovering party’s

substantial rights.’ ” Mauzy at 592, quoting Rossman v. Rossman, 47 Ohio App.2d

103, 110, 352 N.E.2d 149 (8th Dist.1975).

       {¶13} Civ.R. 26 governs discovery matters. “Unless otherwise limited by court

order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any

nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional

to the needs of the case.” Civ.R. 26(B)(1). In determining proportionality, courts

consider “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources,

the importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense

of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. According to a staff note

regarding the July 2020 amendment to Civ.R. 26, which added the proportionality

language, “[a] party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should

be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as

that party understands them.” 2020 Staff Note, Civ.R. 26. Further, “[t]he purpose of

discovery under the civil rules is to prevent unfair surprise and the secreting of

evidence by ensuring the free flow of information between the parties upon request.”

Weckel v. Cole + Russell Architects, 2013-Ohio-2718, 994 N.E.2d 885, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.).

“[A] trial court's exercise of its discretion to end discovery ‘must be justified by a

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

weightier interest than expediency,’ particularly when * * * the party opposing

discovery alone possessed the facts substantiating or disproving the matter in

dispute.” Id. at ¶ 33, quoting Rossman at 110. Compare Dansberry v. Mercy Health-

West Park, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210304, 2022-Ohio-260, ¶ 12-13, 17 (reversing

trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s request for additional discovery when defendants

obfuscated critical facts necessary to plaintiff’s case).

       {¶14} In Ohio’s only significant case on Lone Pine orders, the Eleventh District

held that “the trial court abused its discretion in prematurely issuing [a] ‘Lone Pine’

order” and that it further abused its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under

Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for noncompliance with the order. Simeone, 171 Ohio App.3d 633,

2007-Ohio-1775, 872 N.E.2d 344, at ¶ 65.          In Simeone, a group of students and

teachers who attended and worked in an intermediate school building and suffered

health problems sued defendants involved in constructing the building for various

torts, including product liability claims.        After plaintiffs requested discovery,

defendants moved for a Lone Pine order. Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery,

but the court denied it and granted defendants’ motion for a Lone Pine order six

months later. They filed for reconsideration to compel discovery and submitted expert

affidavits stating they could not meet the order’s requirements without discovery from

defendants, but the court kept its order in place. It required plaintiffs to identify their

specific injuries, the contaminant they were exposed to, testing relied upon to show

exposure, and expert opinions on causation. The court eventually dismissed the case

for failure to comply over one year later.

       {¶15} The Simeone court noted that the circumstances typically preceding a

Lone Pine order—either a plaintiff’s attempt to thwart discovery or their failure to set

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

forth a prima facie claim—were not present in that case. Id. at ¶ 43, 46. Because “there

had yet to be any meaningful discovery” prior to the trial court’s Lone Pine order, and

because “the timing of the issuance of the ‘Lone Pine’ order * * * effectively and

inappropriately supplanted the summary judgment procedure provided in Civ.R. 56,”

the court held that the trial court “put the cart before the horse” and denied plaintiffs

“the procedural protections of Civ.R. 56.” Id. at ¶ 42, 49, 53, 59.

       {¶16} This case differs from Simeone in several important ways. First, in

Simeone, plaintiffs “requested various tests and other documents that are in the privy

of the appellees,” and plaintiffs’ experts claimed they could not comply with the trial

court’s “Lone Pine” order without reviewing those documents. Id. at ¶ 61. Here,

however, Mr. Warman did not argue that he was denied access to any specific tests,

documents, or other information from defendants that would have enabled his expert

to substantiate whether he had an infection. Additionally, unlike the plaintiffs in

Simeone, Mr. Warman never filed a motion to compel discovery (nor, as best we can

tell, ever served discovery). In response to questions on this point at oral argument,

Mr. Warman’s counsel pointed to the court’s blanket stay of all discovery, implying a

motion to compel would have been a fool’s errand. But even so, Mr. Warman had

ample opportunity at both the October and December hearings to explain to the trial

court what specific information in defendants’ possession he needed to supplement

his own medical records for the purpose of identifying an injury and connecting it to

defendants’ device (and actual, served discovery prior to the court’s stay could have

bolstered the point). His inability to do so suggests that the problem with filing a

motion to compel was not just that it may have been met with skepticism or hostility;

it was that the motion would have lacked specificity and substance.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶17} Furthermore, in the letter submitted in the evening after the case was

dismissed, his expert merely indicated that he was in the process of reviewing Mr.

Warman’s medical records and that additional discovery from defendants would help

him form an opinion. This letter contains no specifics in terms of what information is

actually needed and why (beyond a suggestion that more evidence might be

“beneficial”), nor does it even hint that Mr. Warman has or had any condition

attributable to the 3T System. As the trial court concluded in issuing its discovery

order, his medical records should contain sufficient information for his expert to at

least conclude whether he even had an infection caused by M. chimaera.             Mr.

Warman’s own counsel claimed as much—that he had “all kinds of medical records

that he’s got an infection”—at the October 2022 hearing, but by March 3, he could offer

the court nothing to validate the point.

       {¶18} Additionally, Mr. Warman’s expert’s assertion that M. chimaera

infections are hard to diagnose and can incubate for five to seven years fails to

reconcile that he wrote the letter more than seven years after Mr. Warman’s July 2015

heart surgery. Finally, the expert never claimed that Mr. Warman’s own medical

records were lacking or deficient in any way.

       {¶19} Contrast plaintiff’s expert’s letter with the report tendered by the

defense expert in December. He describes the nature and purpose of Mr. Warman’s

July 2015 surgery (an aortic valve replacement) and subsequent course of care, which

included placement of a permanent pacemaker and an April 2016 pacemaker pocket

revision.   Some complications arose from the revision, but Mr. Warman was

consistently negative for fever, chills, or unexplained weight loss, symptoms common

in M. chimaera infection cases. Following a February 2018 pacemaker malfunction

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

and subsequent replacement, Mr. Warman contracted a pacemaker pocket infection

leading to a six-day hospital stay in April 2018. The defense expert discerns that

multiple blood cultures were taken and were negative for M. chimaera, but a pocket

site culture was positive for Pseudomonas, an unrelated bacterium. He further notes

that throughout Mr. Warman’s course of care from 2015 to 2021, his medical records

indicate no suspicion for an NTM-related infection. He concluded, accordingly, that

“it is not medically plausible that Mr. Warman would have infection due to [M.

chimaera] for several years and not have significant systemic manifestations such as

weight loss or anemia, or focal clinical manifestations, and positive cultures.”

Therefore, there was “no objective evidence that Darren Warman developed any

infection as result of being exposed to [M. chimaera].” Mr. Warman’s expert does not

refute (or mention) these conclusions at all, even though the defense expert’s report

was filed more than two months prior to the plaintiff’s report deadline.

       {¶20} The vagueness of plaintiff’s expert’s letter dovetails with the lack of any

discovery served (or at least filed) in this case. Generally, to show that a party has been

denied a reasonable opportunity to obtain discovery, a party must show specifically

what was needed and why, rather than just speculating that a smoking gun might

emerge from a pile of documents. See Dansberry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210304,

2022-Ohio-260, at ¶ 12-14 (describing plaintiff’s diligence in the litigation and her

motion for additional discovery time to depose a key witness and criticizing defendant

for “hiding critical facts,” including the witness’s identity). Of course, everyone might

like more information, but Mr. Warman’s expert never explains how that information

would illuminate a diagnosis that could not be reached from the medical records alone.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

         {¶21} Ultimately, the trial court acted reasonably in concluding that, absent

an explanation or a motion to compel to the contrary, Mr. Warman had all the evidence

he needed to at least identify an injury potentially linked to the 3T System. And we

also underscore that the trial court afforded Mr. Warman ample time here—in

addition to the nine months between filing the claims in January 2022 and the October

2022 motions hearing, the trial court gave Mr. Warman nearly five additional months

to procure an expert report. Furthermore, the final deadline the court provided for

the expert report, March 3, 2023, matches the original due date for his expert

disclosure and report established in the court’s initial case management order from

September 2022—the timeline could not have caught Mr. Warman or his expert off

guard.

         {¶22} Thus, the court’s decision to stay discovery pending corroboration of

Mr. Warman’s injury is “ ‘justified by a weightier interest than efficiency.’ ” Weckel,

2013-Ohio-2718, 994 N.E.2d 885, at ¶ 33, quoting Rossman, 47 Ohio App.2d at 110,

352 N.E.2d 149. Rather than rushing Mr. Warman out the door, the court’s order

guarded against a potentially frivolous claim that, although sufficiently pleaded to

survive a motion to dismiss, apparently lacked basic evidentiary support. Moreover,

because Mr. Warman did not show that defendants were “secreting” information that

they “alone possessed,” and because the stay did not threaten to inflict “unfair

surprise,” the court’s order does not undermine the purpose of Ohio’s discovery rules.

Id. at ¶ 24, 33. Instead, the court acted within the scope of its discretion in managing

the scope of discovery under Civ.R. 26, ensuring discovery remained tailored to the

needs of the case. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing the discovery order.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           III.

       {¶23} The trial court’s ultimate decision to dismiss the case for noncompliance

with its discovery order is best characterized as an involuntary dismissal under Civ.R.

41(B)(1). “We review a decision to dismiss a case pursuant to Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for an

abuse of discretion, and dismissals with prejudice are subject to heightened scrutiny.”

Williams v. Metro, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190321, 2020-Ohio-3515, ¶ 23. “Despite

the heightened scrutiny to which dismissals with prejudice are subject, this court will

not hesitate to affirm the dismissal of an action when ‘the conduct of a party is so

negligent, irresponsible, contumacious or dilatory as to provide substantial grounds

for a dismissal with prejudice for a failure to prosecute or obey a court order.’ ”

Quonset Hut, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 684 N.E.2d 319 (1997),

quoting Tokles & Son v. Midwestern Indemn. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 632, 605 N.E.2d

936 (1992).

       {¶24} The trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case under

Civ.R. 41(B)(1) for Mr. Warman’s failure to comply with the court’s order. From the

trial court’s admonishments at the October and December hearings, he had adequate

notice of the trial court’s intent to dismiss if he could not substantiate his claims. Even

if it had considered the substance of Mr. Warman’s expert disclosure and letter,

tendered later in the evening following the court’s dismissal, the disclosure and letter

would not have changed the outcome—Mr. Warman failed to substantiate that he

actually had an infection, rendering dismissal appropriate.

       {¶25} Arguably, as the court explained in Simeone, a summary judgment

motion might have been the more appropriate procedural avenue to dispose of these

claims rather than an involuntary dismissal due to failure to comply with the court’s
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

discovery order (particularly since the defense had already filed their expert report).

But the interference with the summary judgment process motivating the court’s

decision in Simeone is not present here. In Simeone, the court explained that allowing

a case to proceed through the normal summary judgment stage empowers the plaintiff

to file a Civ.R. 56(F) motion to extend their time to respond when more discovery is

needed. Simeone, 171 Ohio App.3d 633, 2007-Ohio-1775, 872 N.E.2d 344, at ¶ 56. The

court further stated that a Civ.R. 56(F) motion could give plaintiff more time to “obtain

affidavits from expert witnesses to successfully oppose” the summary judgment

motion. Id. at ¶ 57. But here, in addition to the nine months between filing and the

October 2022 hearing, the court gave Mr. Warman nearly five months to substantiate

his claim with an expert opinion before dismissing the case. Additionally, in contrast

to the plaintiffs in Simeone, Mr. Warman never identified what specific tests,

documents, records, or other information he needed that would fill in the gaps for his

expert. The trial court asked only for information that Mr. Warman’s own medical

records would have included, if it existed at all, and he asserts no deficiency or errors

in his medical records, let alone any that could be resolved by defendants in discovery.

Given Mr. Warman’s inability to point to an injury in his medical history possibly

attributable to defendants’ medical device, we are satisfied that the court’s discovery

order and subsequent dismissal did not violate his substantial rights.

       {¶26} Therefore, we conclude that the court acted within its discretion in

dismissing Mr. Warman’s cases with prejudice following his failure to satisfy the

court’s discovery order. Accordingly, we overrule his sole assignment of error and

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                    *      *      *

       {¶27} In sum, although we decline to assess the overall legality and wisdom of

Lone Pine orders under Ohio law, we hold that the trial court, in this instance, acted

within its discretion in staying discovery until Mr. Warman could provide a basic

evidentiary basis for an essential element of his claims. Upon his failure to do so, the

court acted within its discretion in dismissing his cases with prejudice. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court and overrule Mr. Warman’s sole assignment of error.

                                                                   Judgment affirmed.

WINKLER and BOCK, JJ., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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