Court Opinion

ID: 9577091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:37.252436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:58.032987
License: Public Domain

*250BENHAM, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion holds that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to give Fleming’s requested charge on the necessity of corroboration of an accomplice’s testimony, I must dissent to the affirmance of Fleming’s conviction.
Fleming requested in writing a charge on the principle that a conviction cannot be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. See OCGA § 24-4-8. The trial court failed to give that instruction. At the conclusion of the jury charge, Fleming’s counsel reserved objections for appeal. Fleming now contends, and I am compelled to agree, that the trial court’s failure to charge as requested requires reversal of his conviction.
The majority opinion ignores both an important and applicable principle of law and a key difference between this case and the co-indictee’s case. In so doing, the majority opinion weakens the statutory principle on which Fleming’s request to charge is based.
The principle ignored by the majority opinion is that the jury could have chosen to disbelieve the corroborating evidence, including Fleming’s confession. “ ‘The sufficiency of the corroboration of the testimony of the accomplice to produce conviction of the defendant’s guilt is peculiarly a matter for the jury to determine. [Cit.]’ ” Bush v. State, 267 Ga. 877, 878 (485 SE2d 466) (1997). Thus, the mere fact that there is other evidence which could serve as corroboration does not dispense with the need for the requested charge because the jury, as the exclusive judges of credibility, could have rejected the other evidence and convicted solely on the accomplice’s testimony.
The key difference between this case and the one chiefly relied upon by the majority opinion (Jenkins v. State, 268 Ga. 468 (9) (491 SE2d 54) (1997)), is that, although the opinion in that case does not say so, the record of that case shows that Jenkins did not request a charge on corroboration. Thus, Lanford v. State, 148 Ga. App. 377 (2) (251 SE2d 395) (1978), cited in the Jenkins opinion, was appropriate authority there, holding that when “the state does not rely wholly on the evidence of the accomplice to connect the defendant to the crime charged, it is not incumbent without request to charge on corroboration. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) That holding, and the holding in Jenkins quoted in the majority opinion, are not, however, appropriate authority in this case because Fleming’s counsel did request the charge.
The phrasing of the majority opinion’s holding, and the phrasing in Jenkins, do violence to the statutory principle in aid of which the requested charge should be given. The majority holds that there is no need for the charge “where the State relies on other evidence, including a defendant’s confession, apart from the accomplice’s testimony.” The case cited in Jenkins in support of that proposition (other than *251Lanford) was Hall v. State, 241 Ga. 252 (7) (244 SE2d 833) (1978), where this Court held that the charge was not required because “there were other witnesses to the crime . . . .” The majority opinion in this case broadens the scope of the evidence which obviates the need for the jury charge from “other witnesses to the crime” to “other evidence.”
Decided March 16, 1998
Reconsideration denied April 1,1998.
Ray C. Smith, for appellant.
Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, J. Thomas Durden, Assistant District Attorney, Thurhert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Allison B. Goldberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The proper rule applicable to this case, consistent with the holding in Hall, is that a requested charge on the principle in OCGA § 24-4-8 must be given unless there is evidence other than an accomplice’s testimony which directly connects the defendant to the crime. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 136 Ga. App. 370 (4) (221 SE2d 231) (1975), where the defendant’s own testimony and evidence that a car similar to the defendant’s was seen in town before and after the crime, were sufficient to corroborate an accomplice’s testimony, but the failure to give the requested charge on the requirement of corroboration required a new trial. Because there was no testimony in this case other than the accomplice’s which directly connected Fleming to the crime, I am convinced that the majority opinion is incorrect in finding no reversible error in the failure to charge. I must, therefore, dissent.