Court Opinion

ID: 9400781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:21.154517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.848440
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2020-CA-1049-MR

BENJAMIN W. ROSS                                                    APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE BRIAN PRIVETT, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 17-CR-00162

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ECKERLE, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Benjamin W. Ross brings this appeal from a November 21,

2019, judgment of the Scott Circuit Court sentencing Ross to five-years’

imprisonment. We affirm.

            On the night of February 20, 2017, Ross was driving a motor vehicle

that struck and killed Donald Savage. At the time of the incident, Ross was

seventeen years old. Two days later, on February 22, 2017, a juvenile petition was
filed that charged Ross with tampering with physical evidence and leaving the

scene of an accident/failure to render assistance (17-J-00030-001).

               Ross subsequently turned eighteen on April 4, 2017, and on April 28,

2017, an assistant county attorney filed a Motion to Transfer Ross to the circuit

court to be prosecuted as a youthful offender per Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)

635.020(7).1

               The district court conducted a preliminary hearing. KRS

640.010(2)(a).2 At the hearing, the Lieutenant Josh Hutchinson testified that Ross

admitted to driving the motor vehicle that struck Savage and to fleeing the scene.

Hutchinson also stated that visibility that night was limited to around 20 or 25 feet

due to foggy conditions. Hutchinson further testified that Ross removed stickers

from the vehicle to prevent it from being identified.

               By order entered May 8, 2017, the district court determined that

probable cause existed to believe that Ross was charged with a felony prior to

turning eighteen years old and that Ross was currently eighteen years old at the

time of the hearing. KRS 635.020(7); KRS 640.010(2). The court then considered

1
 A youthful offender is a child who is “prosecuted and sentenced as if” he was an adult.
Chipman v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 95, 97 (Ky. 2010); see also Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 600.020(69) (currently KRS 600.020(72)).
2
 KRS 640.010 was amended effective June 29, 2021. We, however, shall utilize the version of
KRS 640.010 that was in effect in 2017.

                                            -2-
the factors for transfer as set forth in KRS 640.010(2)(b) and concluded that Ross

should be transferred to circuit court as a youthful offender.

              Thereafter, Ross was indicted by the Scott County Grand Jury upon

the offenses of reckless homicide (KRS 507.050), leaving the scene of an

accident/failed to render assistance (KRS 189.580(1)(a)), and tampering with

physical evidence (KRS 524.100).

              A jury trial ensued. The jury found Ross not guilty of reckless

homicide and tampering with physical evidence. However, the jury did find Ross

guilty of leaving the scene of an accident/failure to render assistance. By judgment

entered November 21, 2019, the circuit court sentenced Ross to five-years’

imprisonment. This appeal follows.3

              Ross contends that the district court’s decision to transfer him to

circuit court to be tried as a youthful offender was erroneous. Ross alleges that the

district court failed to appropriately consider a statutory factor before ordering the

transfer – the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of Ross by utilizing the

resources available in the juvenile justice system (KRS 640.010(2)(b)7.). In

particular, Ross believes that the district court was improperly swayed by the

3
 Benjamin W. Ross filed a Motion for Belated Appeal on August 27, 2020, in the Court of
Appeals. By Order entered August 6, 2021, the Court of Appeals granted the motion for belated
appeal.

                                             -3-
inaccurate testimony of Stacy Williams, who was employed by the Department of

Juvenile Justice, as to the resources available to Ross in the juvenile justice system:

                    Here, Ben had never been in trouble with the law.
             He was never [in] the juvenile court for any reason in his
             seventeen [17] years of life. . . . The Commonwealth
             presented incorrect testimony during one of the key
             factors: “The likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of
             the child by the use of procedures, services, and facilities
             currently available to the juvenile justice system.” KRS
             640.010(2)(b)(7). This is arguably the most important
             factor given that the fundamental question is whether the
             juvenile system is appropriate to handle the case and
             rehabilitate the child. . . .

             Williams erroneously described how SB 200 limited
             resources to children. Williams wrongly suggested that
             SB 200 would only allow Ben to be probated if he were
             adjudicated in juvenile court. Williams gave the court
             the distinct impression that “only probation” did not
             equate to treatment. Williams failed to detail ANY
             program or procedure that DJJ would employ to monitor
             and rehabilitate Ben. Williams failed to describe any
             specific screening procedure DJJ used to determine
             resources necessary to counsel clients, routinely over
             eighteen (18) years old, within their system. To
             complicate matters, Williams’s disobliging testimony
             coupled with the wrong information, persuaded the court
             that there was nothing that could be done for Ben within
             the juvenile system, which is patently false. The Justice
             and Public Safety Cabinet of Juvenile Justice Policy and
             Procedures has promulgated specific procedures dealing
             with clients within the community that are subject to
             community supervision under DJJ Policy number 605.
             Ben was never considered or his circumstances reviewed
             based on the juvenile services worker’s belief that he
             could not be served based on his age. Community
             services may include: 1. Intensive supervision caseloads,
             which may include the Juvenile Intensive Supervision

                                          -4-
Team (JIST) Program; 2. In-home services; 3.
Monitoring Device; 4. Drug Screening; 5. Community
Service projects; 6. Vocational and educational services;
7. Extended hours day treatment programs; 8. Day
treatment programs; 9. Day or evening reporting centers;
10. Utilization of Outpatient or Inpatient treatment
services; 11. Cooperation with law enforcement agencies
when youth are known, or suspected of being involved
in, criminal activities; or 12. Any other appropriate
community resource to the identified treatment needs.
505 [Kentucky Administrative Regulations] 1:130; KRS
15A.0652; KRS 15A.068; KRS 605.090. Williams
minimized the resources available to Ben and thwarted
the court’s ability to feel confident that his needs of
rehabilitation and community protection would be met
within the community.

      ....

       After SB 200, there was an express limitation on
the juvenile court’s ability to remove children from their
home and place them in the custody of the Department of
Juvenile Justice when their only offenses consisted of
misdemeanors and/or D felonies. SB 200 made the goal
of keeping children in the community “except when
absolutely necessary” more of a reality by limiting
commitment to when the child either has a serious felony
offense or when the child has a low-level offense, and
the court has made several prior attempts at community
interventions. Clearly, this factual description of SB 200
strengthens the notion that any person adjudicated within
the juvenile system could be guaranteed treatment and
services related to rehabilitation within the community.
Ben Ross could and should have received various types
of treatment from DJJ for an entire year. KRS
635.060(2)(c)(3). Williams failed to share the length of
time a child can be probated to DJJ thereby misleading
the court to believe that there was nothing available to an
eighteen (18) year-old.

                            -5-
Ross’s Brief at 8-12 (citations omitted). Ross requests this Court to review the

above contention of error under the palpable error rule found in Kentucky Rules of

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26, as it was unpreserved.4

                The prosecution and sentencing of a child as an adult are controlled by

statutory law. Relevant herein, KRS 635.020 provides:

                (7) If a person who is eighteen (18) or older and before
                the court is charged with a felony that occurred prior to
                his eighteenth birthday, the court shall, upon motion of
                the county attorney made prior to adjudication, and after
                the county attorney has consulted with the
                Commonwealth’s attorney, that the child be proceeded
                against as a youthful offender, proceed in accordance
                with the provisions of KRS 640.010.

And, KRS 640.010 reads, in pertinent part:

                (2) In the case of a child alleged to be a youthful offender
                by falling within the purview of KRS 635.020(2), (3),
                (5), (6), (7), or (8), the District Court shall, upon motion
                by the county attorney to proceed under this chapter, and
                after the county attorney has consulted with the
                Commonwealth’s attorney, conduct a preliminary
                hearing to determine if the child should be transferred to
                Circuit Court as a youthful offender. The preliminary
                hearing shall be conducted in accordance with the Rules
                of Criminal Procedure.

4
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26 provide:

                A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may
                be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an
                appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or
                preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a
                determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.

                                                -6-
(a) At the preliminary hearing, the court shall
determine if there is probable cause to believe that
an offense was committed, that the child
committed the offense, and that the child is of
sufficient age and has the requisite number of prior
adjudications, if any, necessary to fall within the
purview of KRS 635.020.

(b) If the District Court determines probable cause
exists, the court shall consider the following
factors before determining whether the child’s case
shall be transferred to the Circuit Court:

      1. The seriousness of the alleged offense;

      2. Whether the offense was against persons
      or property, with greater weight being given
      to offenses against persons;

      3. The maturity of the child as determined
      by his environment;

      4. The child’s prior record;

      5. The best interest of the child and
      community;

      6. The prospects of adequate protection of
      the public;

      7. The likelihood of reasonable
      rehabilitation of the child by the use of
      procedures, services, and facilities currently
      available to the juvenile justice system; and

      8. Evidence of a child’s participation in a
      gang.

(c) If, following the completion of the preliminary
hearing, the District Court finds, after considering

                     -7-
                   the factors enumerated in paragraph (b) of this
                   subsection, that two (2) or more of the factors
                   specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection are
                   determined to favor transfer, the child may be
                   transferred to Circuit Court, and if the child is
                   transferred the District Court shall issue an order
                   transferring the child as a youthful offender and
                   shall state on the record the reasons for the
                   transfer. The child shall then be proceeded against
                   in the Circuit Court as an adult, except as
                   otherwise provided in this chapter.

                (d) If, following completion of the preliminary
                hearing, the District Court is of the opinion, after
                considering the factors enumerated in paragraph (b) of
                this subsection, that the child shall not be transferred
                to the Circuit Court, the case shall be dealt with as
                provided in KRS Chapter 635.

             Per KRS 635.020(7), a child may be deemed a youthful offender if he

was under eighteen years old when he committed the felony, and he subsequently

attained the age of eighteen years at the time of the hearing. To be deemed a

youthful offender, the requirements of KRS 640.010 must be satisfied. Notably,

the district court must conduct a preliminary hearing. At the hearing, the district

court must initially determine whether the child committed an offense and comes

within the purview of KRS 635.020. If so, the district court then proceeds to

consider the factors set forth in KRS 640.010(2)(b) and decides whether the child

should be transferred to circuit court as a youthful offender. It must be emphasized

that the district court shall consider every factor enumerated in KRS 640.010(2)(b)

and set forth its findings as to each factor. Harden v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d

                                         -8-
323, 325 (Ky. App. 1994). If the district court ultimately concludes that two or

more factors favor transfer, the court may order the child transferred as a youthful

offender to circuit court. Id.

             In this case, there is no dispute that probable cause existed; therefore,

our analysis is focused upon the district court’s consideration of the factors set

forth in KRS 640.010(2)(b). At the preliminary hearing, the district court

considered the offense to be very serious and to be against a person. The district

court also noted that Ross did not have a prior criminal record. However, the

district court believed that Ross was mature as he was seventeen at the time of the

offenses. The court further concluded that it would be in the best interest of Ross

to not be transferred, but it would be in the best interest of the community to

transfer Ross to circuit court as a youthful offender. The district court did not view

Ross as a danger to the public; nonetheless, given that Ross was an adult, the court

did not believe that the juvenile justice system could rehabilitate Ross. The district

court further noted that Ross was not involved in a gang. Ultimately, the district

court concluded that the factors weighed in favor of transfer to the circuit court.

             Upon review of the district court’s decision to transfer, it is clear that

the district court considered all the factors set forth in KRS 640.010(2)(b) and

detailed its findings as to each factor. Additionally, the district court concluded

that two or more factors favored transfer. Although Ross argues that the district

                                          -9-
court received incorrect information upon the factor of Ross’s reasonable

rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system, the district court plainly found at least

two other factors that did favor transfer under KRS 640.010(2)(b). Accordingly,

we conclude that the district court did not commit error that resulted in manifest

injustice by transferring Ross as a youthful offender to circuit court. See RCr

10.26; Commonwealth v. M.G., 75 S.W.3d 714, 719 (Ky. App. 2002).

             Ross also asserts that he should have been sentenced as a juvenile

upon conviction of leaving the scene of an accident/failure to render aid in circuit

court. Ross specifically argues:

                    The Kentucky Juvenile Code states that when a
             juvenile is transferred to circuit court as a youthful
             offender but is later convicted of an offense that is not
             transferrable had that been the original charge (the charge
             is “exempt” from the transfer statute), the child shall be
             sentenced as a juvenile as provided for in KRS 635.060.
             KRS 640.040(4). . . .

                    ....

             While Ben was initially charged with 3 Class D Felonies,
             . . . [he] was transferred under KRS 635.020(7) because
             he was 18 years of age at the time he was “before the
             court” but was under the age of majority when the
             incident occurred which qualified for a charge as a D
             felony. Under the statute and case law, Ben cannot be
             sentenced as a youthful offender unless the charge that he
             pled guilty to was a transferrable offense. Here, Ben was
             convicted of a class D felony, other than having turned
             eighteen (18) years old, would not have been transfer
             eligible. Since Ben had no prior juvenile felony

                                          -10-
             adjudications, the charge was not transferrable and he
             was only eligible to be sentenced as a juvenile.

Ross’s Brief at 14-16. Ross again requests this Court to review this assertion under

the palpable error rule of RCr 10.26.

             To be sentenced as a youthful offender, the child must qualify for

transfer to circuit court as a youthful offender per KRS 635.020 and “continue to

qualify him as a youthful offender under one of the provisions in KRS 635.020(2)-

(7)” upon conviction in circuit court. Chipman v. Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 95,

97 (Ky. 2010). Simply stated, “to be properly sentenced as an adult, a child must

qualify as a youthful offender both for prosecution and for sentencing” under KRS

635.020(2)-(7). Chipman, 313 S.W.3d at 97.

             In this case, Ross was initially charged with the offenses of tampering

with physical evidence and leaving the scene of an accident/failure to render aid.

Both of these offenses were Class D felonies. KRS 524.100(2); KRS

189.580(1)(a); KRS 189.990(1). The district court ultimately transferred Ross to

circuit court as a youthful offender pursuant to KRS 635.020(7). Under KRS

635.020(7), a person may be transferred to circuit court as a youthful offender if he

is at least eighteen years old at the time of the hearing and committed a felony

before turning eighteen years of age.

             In the circuit court, the jury convicted Ross upon the offense of

leaving the scene of an accident/failure to render aid, with serious physical injury

                                         -11-
or death of the victim. This offense is a Class D felony and would qualify Ross as

a youthful offender under KRS 635.020(7). As a result, Ross was properly

sentenced as an adult in circuit court.

             For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Scott Circuit Court is

affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Londa J. Adkins                            Daniel J. Cameron
 Department of Public Advocacy              Attorney General of Kentucky
 Frankfort, Kentucky
                                            Kristin L. Conder
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

                                          -12-