Court Opinion

ID: 9926632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 16:01:30.744314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.753847
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7050        Document: 010110989811      Date Filed: 01/25/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                    FILED
                                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                                FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         January 25, 2024
                            _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  RALPH RICHARD HILBURN, II,

           Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-7050
                                                   (D.C. No. 6:22-CV-00181-JFH-DES)
  WILLIAM RANKINS, Warden,                                     (E.D. Okla.)

           Respondent - Appellee.
                          _________________________________

                ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                       _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Petitioner Ralph Richard Hilburn, II, a state inmate appearing pro se, brings

 this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking review of a dismissal of his petition

 seeking federal habeas relief. In his petition, Hilburn argues that the state district

 court erred when it denied his petition as time-barred.

       We conclude that the district court properly denied the petition. Accordingly,

 we deny his request for a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) and dismiss this

 matter.

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-7050    Document: 010110989811        Date Filed: 01/25/2024      Page: 2

                                   I.     Background

       On October 10, 2017, Hilburn entered a guilty plea to one count of child

 sexual abuse in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 843.5(E). His guilty plea was

 accepted and Hilburn was sentenced to twenty-seven years of imprisonment with

 seventeen years suspended. Under Okla. Crim. App. R. 4.2(A), Hilburn then had ten

 days to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in order to seek direct review of his

 conviction by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. He did not do so and his

 conviction therefore became final on October 20, 2017. On April 12, 2021, Hilburn

 filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court which was

 denied. He did not appeal that denial to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

 until March 31, 2022.

       On May 27, 2022, Hilburn filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the

 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma alleging that the

 state court lacked jurisdiction and that the statute under which Hilburn was convicted

 was unconstitutionally vague. The federal district court dismissed Hilburn’s habeas

 petition on the grounds that Hilburn’s claim was time-barred under 28 U.S.C.

 § 2244(d)(1) and denied him a COA. Hilburn filed a notice of appeal and request for

 a COA. Hilburn raises two claims: (1) the untimeliness of his habeas petition was

 caused by a state-created impediment and (2) his actual innocence is a gateway to

 overcome the time limitation issue.

                                             2
Appellate Case: 23-7050     Document: 010110989811         Date Filed: 01/25/2024     Page: 3

                                II.    Standard of Review

        In a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition, we review the federal district

 court’s conclusions of law de novo. Davis v. Exec. Dir. of Dep’t. of Corr., 100 F.3d

 750, 756 (10th Cir. 1996). “When a denial of the habeas petition is based on 28

 U.S.C. § 2244(d), we generally exercise de novo review.” Fleming v. Evans, 481

 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2007).

                                      III.   Analysis

        Hilburn claims that the state court, where he pleaded guilty, did not have

 jurisdiction over him because he is a member of the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma

 and the crime was committed in Indian Country. Hilburn claims that the state court’s

 denial of an evidentiary hearing impeded his timely filing of a habeas petition

 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).

        Hilburn’s habeas petition sets forth claims of a state-created impediment

 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) but on different grounds. In his habeas

 petition, Hilburn claimed that the state created an impediment because the charging

 statute under which he was convicted, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 843.5(E), was

 unconstitutionally written. R. at 356. While Hilburn did raise jurisdictional issues in his

 habeas petition, it was based on a different ground—that is, it was by implicit invocation

 of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Id. at 361. Because we construe a pro se litigant’s

 pleadings liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991), we will

 address Hilburn’s claim regarding the alleged jurisdictional issue despite this

 discrepancy.

                                              3
Appellate Case: 23-7050     Document: 010110989811          Date Filed: 01/25/2024         Page: 4

        A. Jurisdictional claims as state-created impediment

        Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), an

 appeal starts when a COA is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Therefore, without a COA,

 an appeal may not be taken. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). A COA

 can be issued if there is a substantial showing that a constitutional right was denied.

 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If the habeas petition was dismissed by the district court on

 procedural grounds and the constitutional claim was never reached, this Court should

 issue a COA if the petitioner shows that a “jurist[] of reason would find it debatable

 whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and . . .

 whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at

 474. However, no appeal is warranted if the district court was correct to invoke a

 “plain procedural bar” because no reasonable jurist would conclude either that there

 was an error in dismissing the habeas petition or that the proceeding should continue.

 Id. at 484.

        The federal district court identified a plain procedural bar when it determined

 that Hilburn’s habeas petition was time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),

 which provides that a state inmate must file a federal habeas petition within a one-

 year deadline. The one-year deadline starts to run from the latest of four events

 specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In his appellate brief, Hilburn invokes

 § 2244(d)(1)(B), which states that the limitation period runs from:

        the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State
        action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed,
        if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action.

                                               4
Appellate Case: 23-7050      Document: 010110989811         Date Filed: 01/25/2024      Page: 5

        Hilburn is correct that if there is a state-created impediment that actually prevents

 the petitioner from filing the habeas petition in a timely manner, the one-year time limit

 does not start to run until the impediment has been removed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).

 In this case, the federal district court determined that the time limit began to run “on the

 date on which his conviction became final by the expiration of his time to seek direct

 review.” R. at 321. Because his judgment was rendered on October 10, 2017, and

 Hilburn then had ten days to initiate a direct appeal by requesting to withdraw his guilty

 plea, his conviction became final on October 20, 2017. Therefore, his one-year time limit

 to file a habeas petition began the next day on October 21, 2017, and expired one year

 and one day later (because October 21, 2018 fell on a Sunday) on October 22, 2018.

        As the federal district court correctly found, the impediment in 28 U.S.C.

 § 2244(d)(1)(B) “must have actually prevented” the filing of a habeas petition. Aragon v.

 Williams, 819 F. App’x 610, 613 (10th Cir. 2020). We have previously identified certain

 situations where this occurred. For example, an inmate may be “actually prevented”

 from filing a habeas petition when his access to the courts is functionally blocked because

 he is denied access to the prison library or other legal materials. Id. But in the instant

 case, Hilburn does not show that there was anything that would have prevented him from

 filing his habeas petition in a timely manner.

        A lack of jurisdiction is a cognizable due process claim and lack of jurisdiction

 can be the basis for relief in a habeas petition. Yellowbear v. Wy. Att’y. Gen., 525

 F.3d 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. ex rel. Herrington v. Mancusi, 415 F.2d

                                               5
Appellate Case: 23-7050      Document: 010110989811          Date Filed: 01/25/2024   Page: 6

 205, 208–09 (2d Cir. 1969)). But, as we have said before in a non-precedential

 opinion, “as with any other habeas claims, [a petitioner’s] due-process claim is

 subject to dismissal for untimeliness.” Murrell v. Crow, 793 F. App’x 675, 679 (10th

 Cir. 2019). Because Hilburn’s jurisdictional claim was subject to the time limitation

 imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)’s “plain procedural bar . . . [the] Petitioner’s due

 process claim [is] subject to dismissal for untimeliness.” Allen v. Crow, No. 22-

 6141, 2023 WL 5319809, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 18, 2023). We agree with the federal

 district court that Hilburn’s claim “is barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.”

 Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000).

        B. Actual innocence

        Hilburn’s habeas petition does not assert any claims of actual innocence. He

 raises claims of actual innocence for the first time in his appellate brief.

        It is true that the statutory one-year time limitation can be overcome if the

 petitioner shows actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013)

 (“[A]ctual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may

 pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or expiration of the statute of

 limitations.”).

        As stated above, Hilburn pleaded guilty in open court to the offense of child

 sexual abuse. R. at 379–90. Because he pleaded guilty, his claim of actual

 innocence is precluded by that guilty plea. United States v. Rising, 631 F. App’x

 610, 617 (10th Cir. 2015). Once a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea and admits

 that he is guilty in open court, “he may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

                                                6
Appellate Case: 23-7050     Document: 010110989811          Date Filed: 01/25/2024         Page: 7

 character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was

 not within the standards set forth in” governing Supreme Court precedent. Tollett v.

 Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). When the issue is raised about reliance on

 counsel’s advice to accept a plea deal, we have previously held that these decisions

 are strategic. In order for those decisions to fall below the objective standard of

 reasonableness, a defendant must show that if it was not for counsel’s errors “he

 would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Rising,

 631 F. App’x at 615 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).

       Finally, “[a]n issue is waived if it was not raised below in the district court.”

 Wilburn v. Mid-South Health Dev., Inc., 343 F.3d 1274, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003). Because

 Hilburn’s claim of actual innocence is precluded by his guilty plea, and he did not

 raise any claims concerning voluntariness or the intelligent character of his guilty

 plea, his claim of actual innocence is barred.

                                     IV.    Conclusion

       For these reasons, we DENY the COA and DISMISS this matter.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Allison H. Eid
                                               Circuit Judge

                                              7