Court Opinion

ID: 9430488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:50.421768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:24.571377
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom Justice Rehnquist joins,
dissenting.
The Court today adopts a per se rule applicable in capital cases, under which “a capital defendant accused of an interra*46cial crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of racial bias.” Ante, at 36-37. This rule is certain to add to the already heavy burden of habeas petitions filed by prisoners under sentence of death1 without affording any real protection beyond that provided by our decisions in Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973), and Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589 (1976).
In effect, the Court recognizes a presumption that jurors who have sworn to decide the case impartially nevertheless are racially biased. Such a presumption is flatly contrary to our decisions in Ristaino v. Ross, supra, and Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S. 182, 190 (1981).2 The facts of *47this case demonstrate why it is unnecessary and unwise for this Court to rule, as a matter of constitutional law, that a trial judge always must inquire into racial bias in a capital case involving an interracial murder, rather than leaving that decision to be made on a case-by-case basis.3 Before today the facts that a defendant is black and his victim was white were insufficient to raise “a constitutionally significant likelihood that, absent questioning about racial prejudice,” an impartial jury would not be seated. Ristaino v. Ross, supra, at 596.
I
Nothing in this record suggests that racial bias played any role in the jurors’ deliberations. The relevant circumstances merit emphasis because they demonstrate that the fact of an interracial murder, by itself, does not create a substantial likelihood that racial issues can be expected to distort capital sentencing trials. Without further evidence that race can be expected to be a factor in such trials, there is no justification for departing from the rule of Ham and Ristaino.
Petitioner committed murder in the course of an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Franklin, Virginia. The murder was brutal. Petitioner shot the store’s proprietor three *48times. The first shot did not kill, but caused the victim to fall helplessly to the floor, bleeding from a scalp wound. A police officer, who had arrived in answer to a silent alarm, pleaded with petitioner not to shoot again. But petitioner fired two more shots into his victim’s chest, causing his death. The officer then managed to subdue and arrest petitioner. At trial, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was conclusive.4 Because the local media gave the murder extensive publicity, petitioner requested and was granted a change of venue from Southampton County to Northampton County, across the Chesapeake Bay, some 80 miles away from the location of the murder. No member of the jury empaneled had read or heard about the murder.
Virginia law vests the trial judge with the responsibility to conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 519-522, 273 S. E. 2d 36, 40-42 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U. S. 1011 (1981). Ordinarily, the judge, rather than counsel, questions members of the venire to provide a basis for the exercise of challenges. In this case, in accordance with state practice, the judge permitted the parties to propose questions to be asked during voir dire. Counsel for petitioner submitted 15 questions. As the 10th question on his list, counsel requested the following:
“‘The defendant, Willie Lloyd Turner, is a member of the Negro race. The victim, W. Jack Smith, Jr., was a white Caucasian. Will those facts prejudice you against Willie Lloyd Turner or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence?”’ Id., at 522, n. 8, 273 S. E. 2d, at 42, n. 8.5
*49As support for this proposed question, petitioner’s counsel referred only to certain studies that were subsequently placed in the record. The studies purported to show that a black defendant who murders a white person is more likely to receive the death penalty than other capital defendants, but the studies included no statistics concerning administration of the death penalty in Virginia. See Turner v. Commonwealth, supra, at 523, n. 9, 273 S. E. 2d, at 42, n. 9. Counsel then discussed their proposed questions with the judge. The prosecutor pointed out that the case presented no racial issues beyond the fact that petitioner and his victim were of different races.
The trial judge declined to ask the proposed question, but he did ask general questions designed to uncover bias. For example, the prospective jurors were asked, “Do any of you know any reason whatsoever why you cannot render a fair and impartial verdict in this case, either for the defendant or for the Commonwealth of Virginia?” Each juror responded negatively.6 The jury of 12 persons ultimately empaneled included 4 black citizens, and a black juror was selected to act as foreman.
There is nothing in the record of this trial that reflects racial overtones of any kind. From voir dire through the close of trial, no circumstance suggests that the trial judge’s refusal to inquire particularly into racial bias posed “an impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by due process.” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S., at 595. The Court does not purport to identify any such circumstance, or to explain why the facts that a capital defendant is of one race and his victim of *50another now create a significant likelihood that racial issues will distort the jurors’ consideration of the issues in the trial. Id., at 597. This case illustrates that it is unnecessary for the Court to adopt a per se rule that constitutionalizes the unjustifiable presumption that jurors are racially biased.
II
Until today a trial judge committed an unconstitutional abuse of discretion by refusing to inquire into racial prejudice only when the defendant showed that racial issues “were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.”7 Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S., at 597. When a defendant makes such a showing, there is an unacceptable risk that racial prejudice will “distort the trial.” Ibid. Under such circumstances, therefore, due process requires “a voir dire that include[s] questioning specifically directed to racial prejudice.” Ibid.; Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S., at 526-527. In Ristaino, however, the Court expressly declined to adopt a per se rule requiring voir dire inquiry into racial bias in every trial for an interracial crime. Neither the Constitution nor sound policy considerations supported such a per se approach.8 But today the Court decides that the Constitution does require a per se rule in capital cases because the *51capital jury exercises discretion at the sentencing phase. The Court’s reasoning ignores the many procedural and substantive safeguards, similar to those governing the jury’s decision on guilt or innocence, that circumscribe the capital jury’s sentencing decision.
Under Virginia law, murder is a capital offense only if it is “willful, deliberate and premeditated” and is committed while the perpetrator is engaged in another crime or under specified aggravating circumstances. Va. Code § 18.2-31 (Supp. 1985). As in any criminal prosecution, of course, the State carries the burden of proving all elements of the capital offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a sentencing hearing, the death sentence may not be imposed unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt statutorily defined aggravating factors. Virginia law recognizes only two aggravating factors: whether, based on the defendant’s criminal record, there is a probability that he would commit future crimes of violence, and whether the defendant’s crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim.”9 Va. Code §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (1983). The jury also is required to consider any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.
The existence of these significant limitations on the jury’s exercise of sentencing discretion illustrates why the Court’s per se rule is wholly unfounded. Just as the trial judge’s *52charge at the guilt phase instructs the jurors that they may consider only the evidence in the case and that they must determine if the prosecution has established each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, the charge at the penalty phase directs the jurors to focus solely on considerations relevant to determination of appropriate punishment and to decide if the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt factors warranting imposition of death. Accordingly, just as there is no reason to presume racial bias on the part of jurors who determine the guilt of a defendant who has committed a violent crime against a person of another race, there is no reason to constitutionalize such a presumption with respect to the jurors who sit to recommend the penalty in a capital case.
Nor does anything in the circumstances of this jury’s recommendation of the death penalty suggest a likelihood that sentencing decisions are being made on racial grounds so as to justify adoption of a per se rule. There is no question that the State proved the existence of the first aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court of Virginia noted, since 1974 petitioner “has been convicted of malicious maiming, escape, unlawful wounding, malicious wounding, and second-degree murder. Four of these offenses occurred in the penal system.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va., at 525, n. 11, 273 S. E. 2d, at 44, n. 11. The court also expressly found that petitioner’s criminal record was “one of the most extensive” it had reviewed in a capital case. Id., at 531, 273 S. E. 2d, at 47. The court further observed that, although the first aggravating factor plainly supported the recommendation of death, the circumstances of this crime were “vile” because petitioner had committed an aggravated battery on his victim. Id., at 527, 273 S. E. 2d, at 45.
Under the foregoing circumstances, there is no basis for concluding that the jury’s sentencing decision was tainted by racial bias. The mere fact that the sentencing decision, after *53the jury had found guilt and the existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, involved an element of discretion provides no ground for this Court to presume that the decision was infected by racial prejudice. Instead, the rule that until today afforded due process required petitioner to establish that some special circumstances in his case, beyond the fact of an interracial crime, raised a constitutionally significant likelihood that racial prejudice would taint the proceedings. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S., at 596. The Court rejects that rule, and adopts a singularly unwise and unjustified presumption that capital jurors harbor latent racial bias.
Ill
The per se rule announced today may appear innocuous. But the rule is based on what amounts to a constitutional presumption that jurors in capital cases are racially biased. Such presumption unjustifiably suggests that criminal justice in our courts of law is meted out on racial grounds. It is not easy to reconcile the Court’s holding today with the principles announced and applied in Ham v. South Carolina, Ristaino v. Ross, and Rosales-Lopez v. United States.10 The manner in which petitioner was tried and sentenced, and particularly the jurors who fulfilled their civic duty to sit in his case, reflected not a trace of the racial prejudice that the Court’s new rule now presumes.
For these reasons, I dissent.

 This case has traveled through each layer of review provided to capital defendants in our state and federal systems. On July 12, 1978, petitioner committed the murder underlying this petition. Trial commenced on December 3, 1979, and the jury convicted petitioner on capital murder and other charges on December 4, 1979. Following the jury’s recommendation, the trial judge sentenced petitioner to death on February 6, 1980. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the convictions and sentences. Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 273 S. E. 2d 36 (1980). This Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. 451 U. S. 1011 (1981). Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for the County of Southampton. That court denied relief, and the Supreme Court of Virginia denied review. We denied a petition for a writ of certiorari. Turner v. Morris, 462 U. S. 1112 (1983). Then, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. By order entered May 23, 1984, the District Court denied the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Turner v. Bass, 753 F. 2d 342 (1985). This Court granted certiorari, 471 U. S. 1096 (1985), and today reverses.

 “Although Ristaino involved an alleged criminal confrontation between a black assailant and a white victim, that fact pattern alone did not create a need of ‘constitutional dimensions’ to question the jury concerning racial prejudice. 424 U. S., at 596, 597. There is no constitutional presumption of juror bias for or against members of any particular racial or ethnic groups. As Ristaino demonstrates, there is no per se constitutional rule in such circumstances requiring inquiry as to racial prejudice. Id., at 596, n. 8. Only when there are more substantial indications of the likeli*47hood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case does the trial court’s denial of a defendant’s request to examine the jurors’ ability to deal impartially with this subject amount to an unconstitutional abuse of discretion.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U. S., at 190 (plurality opinion). Although Justice White’s opinion in Rosales-Lopez was for a plurality, Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concurring in the result was entirely consistent with the foregoing language.

 “Despite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge’s function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S. 589, 595 (1976), quoting Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 733 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting). In neither instance can an appellate court easily second-guess the conclusions of the decisionmaker who heard and observed the witnesses.” Id., at 188.

 At oral argument, counsel for petitioner conceded that there was no question as to his client’s guilt. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47.

 In the event that the Court decides that this new rule is to be applied prospectively only, the result of this decision will be to require trial judges to ask prospective jurors this simplistic question on voir dire. Asking such a question in the absence of circumstances that make clear a need for *49it could well have the negative effect of suggesting to the jurors that race somehow is relevant to the ease.

 As the facts of Ristaino v. Ross demonstrate, such a general question can prompt a juror who is aware of the defendant’s race, as the jurors were in this case, to admit to racial bias. 424 U. S., at 593, and n. 5. This general inquiry into bias does not have the undesirable result of suggesting to the jurors that race is relevant to the issues in the case.

 The circumstances of Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U. S. 524 (1973), are illustrative. There, a black defendant was tried for possession of marijuana. The defendant was well known in the community where the case was tried for his civil rights activities, and the theory of his defense was that the police had framed him in retaliation for those activities. On those facts, the Court held that it was an unconstitutional abuse of discretion for the judge to refuse to inquire into racial prejudice. Not only were racial issues a central part of the trial, but also the defendant’s “reputation as a civil rights activist and the defense he interposed were likely to intensify any prejudice that individual members of the jury might harbor.” Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U. S., at 597.

 “In our heterogeneous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption — as a per se rule — that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accident of birth, or the choice of religion.” Id., at 596, n. 8.

 The Supreme Court of Virginia properly has given the “vileness” clause a limiting construction to ensure that the jury’s discretion in recommending capital punishment is channeled by appropriate standards. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 (1980). Sentence of death may be imposed on the basis of this aggravating factor only if the State makes a two-pronged showing. First, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct was “ ‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.’” Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va., at 526, 273 S. E. 2d, at 44-45. Second, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “torture of the victim, an aggravated battery of the victim, or the perpetrator’s depravity of mind.” Id., at 526, 273 S. E. 2d, at 45.

 The Court’s opinion purports to reaffirm Ristaino v. Ross, ante, at 35, n. 7, and would distinguish all three of the above-cited decisions on the ground that none of them was a capital ease. The decision today cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of Ristaino and Rosales-Lopez in which we expressly held that the Constitution does not require voir dire questioning on racial bias unless the defendant proves additional circumstances beyond the fact that the case involves an interracial crime. Moreover, those two cases rejected any constitutional presumption that jurors are racially biased.