Court Opinion

ID: 9608476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:13:32.274104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:13.398667
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that, under the circumstances, Officer McDermott reasonably believed that a true emergency existed. Nevertheless, because I do not agree that the evidence that McDermott observed when he entered defendant’s home to render emergency aid is admissible in this criminal prosecution, I dissent.
Oregon Supreme Court precedents establish that a search or seizure is invalid, and any evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed, unless the state actor’s conduct *658was authorized by Article I, section 9, in the sense that that constitutional provision does not prohibit the search or seizure. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or 97, 101-06, 743 P2d 692 (1987) ; State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 239, 759 P2d 1054 (1988) . That authority exists when a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid warrant or when an exception to the warrant requirement applies. In State v. Follett, 115 Or App 672, 680, 840 P2d 1298 (1992), we concluded that “the Emergency Aid Doctrine provides an exception to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9[.]” 115 Or App at 680. However, that should not necessarily mean that the evidence observed by the state actor who invades a privacy interest pursuant to that exception may be used to prosecute the person whose privacy is invaded.
The basis of every decision under section 9 permitting the use of seized evidence is that if the officer has a right to be where the evidence of a crime is discovered, the state can use that evidence in a criminal prosecution. The warrant requirement, and the judicially crafted exceptions to that requirement, serve only to authorize the state actor to invade protected privacy interests in various situations. After we approve the invasion, the evidence is per se admissible. However, that consequence does not necessarily, or even logically, follow.
Although section 9 protects against invasions of privacy interests by precluding unauthorized searches or seizures, nothing in the constitution defines what constitutes a search or a seizure. Under our current view, a search or seizure is an event that does or does not occur at a particular point' in time based on particular conduct. However, an invasion of privacy is not necessarily a discreet event. A person’s privacy can be invaded when another person discovers private information and again when that person discloses the private information to others. That is why, under the civil law, intrusion into a person’s seclusion and publication of private facts are distinct invasion of privacy based torts. Compare McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or 549, 533 P2d 343 (1975), with Flowers v. Bank of America, 67 Or App 791, 679 P2d 1385, rev den 297 Or 601 (1984).
Because an invasion of privacy can escalate, depending on the extent of any subsequent disclosure of the private *659information obtained from the initial invasion, our current perspective of what constitutes a search or seizure cannot shield all of the privacy interest that the government may invade or that section 9 was designed to protect. To say that the government may seize information discovered in an entry to save a person’s life does not necessarily mean that the government can further invade that, or some other, person’s privacy by using the information it obtains from a rescue to prosecute. Instead, the use of the information obtained from an invasion of privacy should be limited to fulfilling the purpose that justified that invasion. If the use of the information does not further the authorized purpose for the invasion, it should not be permitted under section 9, i.e., the subsequent use of information constitutes an unauthorized search or seizure. This rationale is consistent with the court’s conclusion in Bridewell, that the police may invade a person’s privacy in a nonlaw enforcement context to render aid, but the evidence obtained from that intrusion must be suppressed. See State v. Bridewell, supra, 306 Or at 240.
Here, the authorized purpose for McDermott’s entry into defendant’s house was to render aid. That purpose would not be furthered by allowing the state to use the evidence McDermott obtained to convict defendant. Consequently, although the initial entry into defendant’s home did not violate section 9, because there was a true emergency, the subsequent use of the evidence obtained from that entry would violate section 9 so it should be suppressed.1
I dissent.
Durham, J., joins in this dissent.

 The state is, however, authorized to confiscate and destroy that evidence. That is what occurs even if a motion to suppress is allowed and the seized evidence is contraband. See State v. Davis, 295 Or 227, 666 P2d 802 (1983).