Court Opinion

ID: 9569969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:18:59.691401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:28.370408
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
HEEN, J.
I concur in the result only of this opinion, for the reasons stated in my concurrence in Bennett v. Bennett, 8 Haw. App. 415, 807 P.2d 597 (1991).
Additionally, I am compelled to comment further on the majority opinion in this case. In this case, the majority has attempted to establish a further foundation for the Uniform Starting Points (USP) established by prior opinions. In doing so, they have only served to emphasize what I consider an invalid deviation *14from Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 580-47(a) (Supp. 1990). I suggest we revisit the statute.
HRS § 580-47(a) provides in pertinent part that
[i]n making such further orders [regarding, inter alia, division and distribution of the marital property], the court shall take into consideration: the respective merits of the parties, the relative abilities of the parties, the condition in which each party will be left by the divorce, the burdens imposed upon either party for the benefit of the children of the parties, and all other circumstances of the case.
Our appellate courts have consistently construed HRS § 580-47 to confer wide discretion on the trial courts and have held that each case must be decided upon its own facts and circumstances. See, e.g., Carson v. Carson, 50 Haw. 182, 436 P.2d 7 (1967).
In footnote 2 of the majority opinion here, the majority states:
In the absence of a USP, each family court judge will have the discretion to start at a different Category 5 starting point in each divorce case. The family court judge will have the discretion to apply a Category 5 starting point of 100% to the husband and 0% to the wife in one case and a Category 5 starting point of 100% to the wife and 0% to the husband in another case. On appeal, only the family court judge’s ending point will be reviewed and it will be reviewed only under the abuse of discretion standard of review.
The statement is entirely correct and is in complete consonance with the statute. It is our function to review the trial court’s decision to determine whether it leaves the parties in a position that satisfies the factors outlined in the statute. It is not our function to determine if the court started from a point which is not mandated by the statute.
*15I note that in order to provide some uniformity in the award of child support, the legislature has adopted uniform guidelines for the courts’assistance. See HRS Chapter 576(D) (Supp. 1990). If uniform starting points are as important as the majority considers them to be, the issue should be presented to the legislature for its consideration.