Court Opinion

ID: 9949449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 18:00:54.147199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:13.589761
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50287          Document: 44-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/11/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                                FILED
                                                                       March 11, 2024
                                  No. 23-50287
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                Clerk

Denise H.; Mark H.; John H., by next friend Denise H. and
Mark H.,

                                                              Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                        versus

Texas Education Agency; Keith Swink, in his official capacity as
Manager of Dispute Resolution, Texas Education Agency; Mike Morath,
in his Official Capacity, Commissioner of the Texas Education Agency; Jodi
Duron, in her official capacity as Superintendent of Elgin ISD,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 1:20-CV-816
                 ______________________________

Before Stewart, Clement, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
      John H., a young man with disabilities in the Elgin Independent
School District, appeals the denial of relief under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. Because we

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-50287          Document: 44-1         Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/11/2024

                                      No. 23-50287

agree that John H. has already received or is not entitled to the relief he seeks,
we affirm the district court’s judgment that the claim is moot.
        The facts of the case are as follows. The Texas Education Agency
(TEA) found that the District did not provide John H. with a Free
Appropriate Public Education (FAPE) under the IDEA. TEA ordered the
District to comply with the statute. The District nevertheless failed to
comply. When TEA found that no corrective action was needed, John H.
requested an administrative hearing, which TEA denied. John H.’s parents,
acting as next of friend, sued the District in federal court, seeking compliance
with the IDEA, compensatory education for the time John H. was denied a
FAPE, and attorney’s fees. They also sued TEA for denying John H. a FAPE
and appealed the denial of the administrative hearing. In addition to the
above remedies, the plaintiffs requested “[a]ll such and further relief” to
which they may be entitled.1
        The plaintiffs settled with the District, which offered compensatory
education and attorneys’ fees. TEA moved for summary judgment on the
claim against it, arguing that it was nonjusticiable because John H. had
received the relief sought. The district court agreed and granted judgment in
favor of TEA. The plaintiffs timely appealed.
        We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standards used by the district court. Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co., 332
F.3d 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the

        _____________________
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          The plaintiffs’ complaint also requested compensatory damages. The plaintiffs
do not argue an entitlement to these damages on appeal, and we note that they are
unavailable under the IDEA in any event. See Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Sch., 598 U.S. 142,
148 (2023) (“compensatory damages” are “a form of relief everyone agrees IDEA does
not provide.”).

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                                  No. 23-50287

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
        Federal courts lose jurisdiction to decide a case once that case
becomes moot. See United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381, 385–86
(2018) (“A case that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is
‘no longer a “Case” or “Controversy” for purposes of Article III,’ and is
outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”) (quoting Already, LLC v.
Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)). “Mootness applies when intervening
circumstances render the court no longer capable of providing meaningful
relief to the plaintiff.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co.,
704 F.3d 413, 425 (5th Cir. 2013).
        The district court correctly concluded that it was no longer capable of
providing meaningful relief to John H on the claim against TEA. John H.
asked for educational services to compensate for the period he was denied a
FAPE.     His request was granted.          Insofar as the plaintiffs now seek
compensatory education from TEA, they have not shown that the services
provided by the District are inadequate or that any requested services have
yet to be provided. And insofar as they seek a declaratory judgment that TEA
denied John H. a FAPE, they have not indicated that such a ruling would
affect John H’s rights. See St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41, 42 (1943)
(“A federal court is without power to decide moot questions or to give
advisory opinions which cannot affect the rights of the litigants in the case
before it.”).
        Nor, under our precedents, does the possibility of attorney’s fees keep
the controversy justiciable. The plaintiffs claim they could be entitled to an
award of attorney’s fees, either via a declaratory judgment or reversal of the
hearing denial. But attorney’s fees are available when relief on a plaintiff’s
claim “materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by

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                                  No. 23-50287

modifying the defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1992). The plaintiffs have
not alleged that the requested relief would modify TEA’s behavior in a way
that would benefit John H. Indeed, they have not pointed to any part of
TEA’s behavior toward John H. that needs modification. See Salley v. St.
Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., 57 F.3d 458, 468 (5th Cir. 1995) (refusing award of
attorney’s fees where IDEA plaintiff’s “sole victory” was finding of a
statutory violation).
       Finally, the plaintiffs claim, for the first time on appeal, a potential
entitlement to nominal damages. Because the plaintiffs have failed to
preserve the issue, we need not address it. See, e.g., Hawse v. Page, 7 F.4th
685, 691 n.8 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The complaint, however, did not seek nominal
damages, and a boilerplate request for ‘such other and further relief as the
Court deems just and proper’ is insufficient to preserve a claim for nominal
damages.”).
       In short, the plaintiffs have failed to set forth any requested relief that
John H. could be granted. Short of this showing, they have presented no
justiciable controversy. We therefore affirm the district court.

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