Court Opinion

ID: 9678338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:17:10.16592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:03.680167
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(for remand to the magistrate). This case reviews a magistrate’s action in a preliminary examination. Two questions are involved: first, the proper extent of a magistrate’s examination; second, whether the magistrate erred by abuse of discretion.
As to the proper extent of a magistrate’s examination, I agree with the per curiam opinion that the magistrate’s duty is not only to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence established a prima facie case but also whether the defendant’s evidence destroyed the prosecution’s prima facie case by either contrary evidence as to the primary case or by establishing an affirmative defense. Of course, if the prosecution establishes a prima facie case by its evidence, and if defendant’s evidence merely raises a question of fact as to that case or his defense, the case must be bound over to the trial court.
As to whether the magistrate erred by abuse of discretion, I agree with Justice Moody that in the instant case the magistrate invaded the province of the trial judge and trier of fact as to whether an affirmative defense existed.
*164In People v Doss, 406 Mich 90, 101-103; 276 NW2d 9 (1979), in a unanimous decision, this Court considered whether the magistrate had abused "his discretion in finding that defendant was not justified as a matter of law in taking the life of the decedent”. In holding that the magistrate had not abused his discretion, this Court did two things in the Doss case of concern in this case. First, it recognized implicitly that the magistrate had the duty to consider the defendant’s right to try to prove self-defense in a preliminary examination. Second, it recognized explicitly that if the case of self-defense was based on conflicting evidence, the case was subject to jury trial since the prosecution had otherwise made a prima facie case.
Doss therefore supports the instant per curiam opinion’s holding that the magistrate must consider the defendant’s affirmative defense as well as the prosecution’s case.
Doss, on the other hand, makes clear what both the per curiam opinion and my brother Moody agree on, and that is that the magistrate has no authority to dismiss a defendant where the prosecution had made a prima facie case but where the defendant’s defense is subject to conflicting evidence. In my opinion Justice Moody has correctly analyzed the testimony and found that defendant’s defense was subject to factual conflict.
As a consequence, I would hold that the examining magistrate abused his discretion in dismissing the charges as to first- and second-degree murder. I would further hold that the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in ruling that a magistrate is limited to determining whether the prosecutor had established a prima facie affirmative case without considering the defendant’s testimony and defen*165ses. I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals opinion on the law but concur in the reversal of the circuit court’s and the magistrate’s action. As a consequence, I would remand the matter to the magistrate for arraignment upon the charge of first-degree murder not inconsistent with this opinion.