Court Opinion

ID: 9494218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:32:19.655402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:16.976884
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
What distinguishes this case from Dane Sheet Metal, W.D. George Construction, and all other reported cases is the Letter of Assent. In other cases, the employer had either signed the collective bargaining agreement itself or belonged to the contractor’s association that had. Courts and the NLRB have provided little guidance on the legal effect of executing a letter of assent rather than a collective bargaining agreement. As a matter of logic, a party can only be bound by that to which it agrees according to the terms of the document it actually signs. Because the Letter of Assent Architectural executed neither contains an interest arbitration clause nor incorporates the one found in the collective bargaining agreement, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s disposition of this case.
Generally, a letter of assent is “a typical short-form agreement by which an employer agrees to be bound by a collective bargaining agreement already negotiated, or about to be negotiated, between a local union and the employer’s collective bargaining representative.” National Elec. Benefit Fund v. Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co., 931 F.Supp. 169, 177 (W.D.N.Y.1995).1 A letter of assent and a collective bargaining agreement “are separate agreements, which are intended to perform different functions.” Carpenters Local 1471 v. Bar-Con, Inc., 668 F.Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.Miss.1987) (construing a letter of assent based upon the same standard form as the Letter of Assent executed in this case). Accordingly, the terms of a letter of assent determine the obligations of a party. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 357 v. Greyhound Exposition Servs., Inc., No. 94-16814, 1995 WL 430244, at *6 (9th Cir. July 20, 1995) (mem.) (holding that the terms of a letter of assent only bind an employer to the contract in effect at signing, not subsequent amendments). Therefore, the question becomes what this Letter of Assent means.
The majority accepts the Union’s reliance on the Letter of Assent’s second sentence, which makes the Letter of Assent “as binding on the undersigned firm as though it had signed the above referred agreement and any Amendments thereto.” For two reasons, this sentence does not end the inquiry. First, the sentence references what comes before it in defining what binds Architectural. Second, it only outlines the effect of signing the Letter of Assent, not the terms thereby incorporated. In other words, this sentence precludes Architectural from defending against a grievance by maintaining that the Letter of Assent did not constitute a valid, legally binding promise to comply with the agreement’s terms and conditions of employment, but says nothing about Architectural’s legal rights and obligations as an employer.
Embodying the substantive agreement between the parties, the Letter of Assent’s first sentence provides that Architectural *433“has examined and does agree to comply with the terns and conditions of employment contained in the collective bargaining agreement.” (Emphasis added.) Use of the phrase “terms and conditions of employment,” a specialized term of art in federal labor law, demonstrates that in signing the Letter of Assent Architectural did not agree to interest arbitration. For purposes of an employer’s duty to bargain under section 8(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), interest arbitration clauses constitute a nonmandatory subject of bargaining because of their “remote or incidental relationship to terms or conditions of employment.” Latrobe Steel Co. v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 171, 177 (3d Cir.1980). “[A]n interest arbitration clause is a nonmanda-tory subject of bargaining since it relates to the relationship between the parties rather than to wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment.” Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 867, 869 (1997). See also Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, Local 14 v. Aldrich Air Conditioning, Inc., 717 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir.1983); Milwaukee Newspaper & Graphic Communications Local No. 23 v. Newspapers, Inc., 586 F.2d 19, 21 (7th Cir.1978); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local Union No. 38, 575 F.2d 394, 398 (2d Cir.1978); NLRB v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass’n, 557 F.2d 894, 897-98 (1st Cir.1977); NLRB v. Greensboro Printing Pressmen & Assistants’ Union No. 319, 549 F.2d 308, 308-09 (4th Cir.1977) (per curiam); NLRB v. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistants’ Union No. 252, 543 F.2d 1161, 1164-66 (5th Cir.1976). That interest arbitration clauses are non-mandatory subjects of bargaining demonstrates that courts and the NLRB in interpreting federal labor law regard interest arbitration as fundamentally distinct from “the terms and conditions of employment.” Against this background the parties could not have understood Architectural’s promise to comply with the Agreement’s “terms and conditions of employment” as extending to the interest arbitration clause.
Additionally, I think that only Architectural’s reading rationalizes every term and provision of the documents at the center of this case. By signing the Letter of Assent rather than the collective bargaining agreement, Architectural specifically opted not to agree to interest arbitration.2 Had it wanted to do so, Architectural could have signed the Agreement itself or designated the Association as its bargaining representative. A conclusion to the contrary renders either the Article XII signature block or the Letter of Assent wholly superfluous. A contractor signing the agreement or belonging to the Association would have no reason to execute a letter of assent. Alternatively, if a letter of assent bound a party to the same terms contained in the agreement itself, the provisions of the letter of assent would be of no consequence. Moreover, accepting the Union’s position provides for interest arbitration in a one-sided manner: under the terms of Article X, Section 8(a) only Local 24 or “the Local Contractor’s Association” can invoke the jurisdiction of the NJAB. A contractor in Architectural’s position cannot. In practical effect, the Union asks us to construe the Agreement as allowing it to invoke the interest arbitration clause in its sole discretion. The majority acknowledges this problem and rewrites the agreement to allow Architectural to invoke the agreement’s interest arbitration procedures by “stepping into the shoes” of the Association. A more natural interpretation of the agreement, however, compels either enforcement of an inequitable inter*434est arbitration clause against contractors in Architectural’s position or acceptance of Architectural’s argument that in signing the Letter of Assent it did not agree to the interest arbitration clause at all.
Most importantly, I think that the Union’s construction of the Letter of Assent and the collective bargaining agreement violates a fundamental policy of federal labor law by requiring Architectural to submit to arbitration a matter it had not agreed so to submit. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). I respectfully dissent.

. Standardized versions of such agreements come in two varieties. A “Letter of Assent A” creates an ongoing relationship between an employer and a union and has no specific lermination date. McDonald v. Hamilton Elec., Inc. of Fla., 666 F.2d 509, 511 n. 2 (11th Cir.1982); Heary Bros., 931 F.Supp. at 177. Like the Letter of Assent in this case, a “Letter of Assent B“ binds an employer for a specific period of limited duration. Id.

. Architectural may also have sought to avoid designating the Association as its bargaining representative pursuant to Article XII, Section 4.