Court Opinion

ID: 9929811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 14:02:15.668291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:51:40.134528
License: Public Domain

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               JAMIE LOVE v. COMMISSIONER
                     OF CORRECTION
                        (AC 45738)
                        Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

                                   Syllabus

The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes
   of assault in the first degree and carrying a pistol without a permit,
   sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel, T, had
   rendered ineffective assistance because she failed to consult with and
   retain an eyewitness identification expert to testify at a pretrial hearing
   to suppress evidence and at his criminal trial. The habeas court rejected
   the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding
   that the petitioner had failed to establish that T’s decision not to consult
   with or use an eyewitness identification expert constituted deficient
   performance. The court determined that, although T was aware that the
   petitioner’s prior trial counsel, B, had intended to use an eyewitness
   identification expert at the criminal trial, there was no evidence that
   established what B’s basis was for believing it necessary to retain such
   an expert. The court further determined that T had a reasonable strategic
   basis for concluding that there was nothing an identification expert
   would have contributed to the petitioner’s defense. The court rendered
   judgment denying the petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of
   certification, appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court properly
   determined that the petitioner failed to show that T’s performance was
   deficient, the petitioner having failed to present sufficient evidence to
   overcome the presumption that T’s decision not to consult with or
   present the testimony of an identification witness expert was sound
   trial strategy: the habeas court credited the testimony of T, an experi-
   enced public defender who was familiar with eyewitness identification
   experts, that her review of the state’s case, B’s file and the identification
   evidence had led her to conclude that an eyewitness identification expert
   was unnecessary and that there was nothing such an expert would have
   contributed to the defense, as T’s own investigation led her to conclude
   that the state’s identification witnesses were sure that the petitioner
   was the gunman in the underlying shooting incident and that enhanced
   video evidence showed that the petitioner and the shooter had similar
   characteristics; moreover, T pursued other reasonable avenues of dis-
   crediting the state’s case, including seeking an alibi for the petitioner,
   filing a motion to suppress the witnesses’ identifications of the petitioner,
   and cross-examining the witnesses about weaknesses or discrepancies
   in their identifications; furthermore, this court found unavailing the
   petitioner’s assertion that the fact that B, whom the petitioner had
   retained privately, had withdrawn specifically so that the defense would
   be able to afford an eyewitness identification expert should have
   prompted T to consult such an expert once she was appointed to repre-
   sent the petitioner, as that was not the standard to determine whether
   counsel performed deficiently, and, although B may have believed that
   an eyewitness identification expert was necessary, the fact that one
   attorney may have opted for an expert did not signify that another
   attorney’s decision not to consult an expert constituted deficient perfor-
   mance.
     Argued September 18, 2023—officially released February 6, 2024

                             Procedural History

   Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland, where the petition was withdrawn in part;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, M. Murphy,
J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the peti-
tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
  J. Christopher Llinas, for the appellant (petitioner).
   Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state’s
attorney, and Marc G. Ramia, senior assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                          Opinion

   SEELEY, J. Following the granting of his petition
for certification to appeal, the petitioner, Jamie Love,
appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying
his amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in
which he alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the
habeas court improperly concluded that his trial coun-
sel’s failure to consult with and retain an eyewitness
identification expert for assistance and testimony at
the petitioner’s pretrial suppression hearing and at his
criminal trial did not constitute deficient performance
that prejudiced the petitioner. We disagree with the
petitioner and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the
habeas court.
   The following facts, as found in the record and set
forth by the habeas court in its memorandum of deci-
sion, and procedural history are relevant to this appeal.
‘‘On September 4, 2015, Waterbury police [were] dis-
patched to 262 Hill Street regarding a shooting. Police
officers . . . respond[ed] to that location and identi-
fied one or two witnesses [who] had been involved or
had witnessed a shooting. Police officers simultane-
ously also went to St. Mary’s Hospital where they [met
with] the [victim] in this case . . . William Compress
[victim]. He . . . indicate[d] [that] he was shot in the
leg by a Black male, approximately [five feet, ten inches
tall], wearing a white T-shirt. [The shooter] was also
with another individual later identified as Aaron Velez,
who is a codefendant. . . .
   ‘‘When police officers [met] with . . . [the victim],
he . . . indicate[d] that there was a verbal altercation
between himself and . . . Velez. . . . Velez . . .
instruct[ed] the [shooter], later identified as [the peti-
tioner], to shoot [the victim], which he did, in fact, do
at the time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
   On the basis of information obtained from witnesses
at the scene, as well as information from a confidential
informant, the officers ‘‘were able to develop a name,
specifically, Jamie Love. They . . . compare[d] an in-
house booking photo[graph] to the surveillance video
[that] was recovered at the scene and, based upon that
information . . . present[ed] a photo[graphic] lineup
to two separate witnesses, one being the victim in this
case . . . and also Placido Rivera, who was present
during the altercation. Both [the victim] and . . .
Rivera identified [the petitioner] as the [man] who [shot]
the victim in this case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)
   The petitioner subsequently was charged with assault
in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
59, conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree
in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-59,
unlawful discharge of a firearm in violation of General
Statutes § 53-203, criminal use of a firearm in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-216, and carrying a pistol with-
out a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to
2015) § 29-35. The petitioner initially had obtained pri-
vate counsel, Peter G. Billings, to represent him. On
October 21, 2016, Billings submitted a motion to with-
draw on the ground that, ‘‘[i]n order to provide the
effective assistance of counsel, undersigned counsel
believes it is absolutely necessary to retain an eyewit-
ness identification expert to act as a consultant and
testify at the upcoming trial. . . . [T]he [petitioner]
does not have sufficient funds to retain the necessary
expert. . . . Consequently, undersigned counsel does
not believe he can provide the effective assistance of
counsel as required by the state and federal constitu-
tions or uphold his ethical obligations to the [petitioner]
under these circumstances.’’ The trial court, Fasano,
J., granted Billings’ motion to withdraw on December
21, 2016, and appointed the Office of the Public Defender
to represent the petitioner. Subsequently, TaShun Bowden-
Lewis, a senior assistant public defender (trial counsel),
filed an appearance on behalf of the petitioner.
   According to the habeas court, trial counsel ‘‘received
. . . Billings’ case materials and received discovery
from the state, which included . . . [surveillance] vid-
eos. [Trial counsel] noted that . . . Billings had used
an investigator and that the videos had been enhanced
to allow for [a] side-by-side comparison of the shooter
and the petitioner. [Trial counsel] explained that the
. . . description [of the shooter] . . . and the petition-
er’s appearance were quite similar, including several
distinct facial features. [Trial counsel] additionally con-
ducted her own research but did not consult with an
eyewitness identification expert. [Trial counsel] explain-
ed to the petitioner her reasons for not consulting with
such an expert.
   ‘‘The petitioner discussed with [trial counsel] the
efforts by . . . Billings directed toward obtaining an
expert [on] eyewitness identification. The petitioner,
who is Black, described the eyewitness to the shooting
(i.e., Rivera) as being Hispanic and the victim (i.e., Com-
press) as being white. The petitioner stated that [trial
counsel] discredited anything . . . Billings had said
about an eyewitness identification expert; instead, [trial
counsel] said that the eyewitnesses had identified him.’’
  Before trial began, trial counsel ‘‘challenged the pho-
to[graphic] identification procedures with a motion to
suppress.1 [Trial] [c]ounsel considered using an expert
on eyewitness identification but concluded that an
expert would not assist her arguments. The motion to
suppress was argued after the jury had been selected
and the matter was ready to proceed to trial. [At the
suppression hearing], [a]fter both [Rivera] and the vic-
tim testified2 and identified the petitioner as the shooter,
which was consistent with [their identifications of] the
petitioner from their respective photo[graphic] arrays,
the court took a recess before issuing its ruling.’’ (Foot-
notes added.) During the recess, the petitioner asked
his trial counsel if a plea offer that previously had been
made by the state was still available. Trial counsel then
approached the prosecutor, who was amenable to the
plea offer.
   After the recess, the court, Crawford, J., ruled on
the petitioner’s motion to suppress the identifications
and denied the motion to suppress. Later that same
day, trial counsel informed the court, Fasano, J., that
the petitioner wanted to accept the state’s plea offer.
The petitioner then pleaded guilty, pursuant to the
Alford doctrine,3 to assault in the first degree and car-
rying a pistol without a permit. The state recommended
a sentence of eight years to serve, five years of which
was a mandatory minimum, with ten years of special
parole, for a total effective sentence of eight years to
serve and ten years of special parole. The court can-
vassed the petitioner and found that his guilty plea was
‘‘voluntary and understandingly made with the assis-
tance of competent counsel.’’ The court found that there
was a factual basis for the plea and accepted it. The
court scheduled the sentencing hearing for January
31, 2018.
   The petitioner subsequently regretted his decision
to plead guilty. Prior to his sentencing hearing, the
petitioner wrote letters to his trial counsel, the prosecu-
tor, and the court asking for help in revoking his plea
because he did not believe he had been provided with
effective assistance of counsel. In the letters, he com-
plained that his trial counsel had not sufficiently com-
municated with him and had not provided him with
materials obtained during discovery. At sentencing, the
petitioner addressed the court and requested that he be
permitted to vacate his plea on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The court informed the petitioner
that, although ineffective assistance of counsel could
be the basis of a habeas petition, it was not a basis for
withdrawing his guilty plea. Before the court imposed
the agreed upon sentence, the petitioner stated, ‘‘I defi-
nitely want to take my plea back. I was wrongly accused.
She did nothing to represent me.’’ The court then, having
previously accepted the petitioner’s plea, imposed the
agreed upon sentence.
   Subsequently, the petitioner filed the operative
amended habeas petition on June 16, 2021. The peti-
tioner alleged, inter alia, that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because she failed to procure an
eyewitness identification expert to aid in the petition-
er’s defense. Specifically, he alleged that trial counsel’s
representation was ineffective ‘‘in that she failed to
consult with and engage an expert in the field of eyewit-
ness identification regarding the strengths and weak-
nesses of the state’s alleged eyewitnesses, and to offer
expert testimony regarding the same at the hearing on
the motion to suppress . . . as well as at trial . . . .’’
The petitioner also claimed that, but for trial counsel’s
deficient performance, he ‘‘would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on continuing with the
trial for which the jury already had been selected
. . . .’’
  On March 16, 2022, the habeas court, M. Murphy, J.,
held a one day trial on the amended habeas petition, at
which the petitioner testified and presented testimony
from his trial counsel; Dr. John Bulevich, an expert in
human memory and psychology; and Attorney Christo-
pher Duby, an expert in criminal law.
   The habeas court summarized the testimony pre-
sented by the petitioner and trial counsel as follows.
The petitioner testified that ‘‘he felt pressured by [trial
counsel] to accept the plea and not proceed to trial.
The petitioner testified that, after the discussion with
[trial counsel] during the recess following the motion
to suppress hearing, he contacted . . . Billings and
consulted with his former attorney. The petitioner testi-
fied at the habeas trial that he felt that he had no option,
after it became clear that there would be no eyewitness
identification expert at trial, but to plead guilty.’’
   Trial counsel testified that ‘‘she has encountered iden-
tification issues in other cases during her twenty-four
years as a public defender. She has conducted research
in this area on an ongoing basis. Based on her review
of the state’s case and the identification issues, [trial
counsel] concluded that an expert on eyewitness identi-
fication was unnecessary, both in general and regarding
cross-racial identification purposes in this case, and
informed the petitioner accordingly.’’
   In a memorandum of decision dated June 30, 2022,
the habeas court rejected the petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. The habeas court con-
cluded that the petitioner failed to establish that trial
counsel’s failure to call an eyewitness identification
expert constituted deficient performance. The court
noted that, although trial counsel ‘‘did not consult with
or use an eyewitness identification expert . . . counsel
did review the materials in Billings’ file, which included
his investigation and assessment of the eyewitness iden-
tifications based on the enhanced videos that allowed
for [a] side-by-side comparison of the shooter and the
petitioner. It has not been established by any evidence
what . . . Billings’ basis was for believing it necessary
to retain an eyewitness identification expert to act as
a consultant and testify at the criminal trial. Thus,
although [trial counsel] was aware that Billings
intended to use an eyewitness identification expert at
trial, she concluded after her review of the state’s file,
the video recording, [her] predecessor counsel’s file,
and her own investigation, that there was nothing an
eyewitness expert would contribute to the defense.
[Trial counsel’s] decision not to have an identification
expert was corroborated by the transcripts of the
motion to exclude the video and the motion to suppress
the photo[graphic] arrays. The court finds [trial coun-
sel’s] testimony to be both credible and persuasive, and
that her representation was not deficient.’’4 Accord-
ingly, the court denied the amended habeas petition.
Thereafter, the court granted the petition for certifica-
tion to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court.
   Before we address the substance of the petitioner’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we first set forth
our standard of review and general principles governing
such a claim. ‘‘Our standard of review of a habeas
court’s judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel
claims is well settled. In a habeas appeal, this court
cannot disturb the underlying facts found by the habeas
court unless they are clearly erroneous, but our review
of whether the facts as found by the habeas court consti-
tuted a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel is plenary.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Humble v. Commissioner of
Correction, 180 Conn. App. 697, 703–704, 184 A.3d 804,
cert. denied, 330 Conn. 939, 195 A.3d 692 (2018); see
also Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn.
449, 460, 298 A.3d 588 (2023). ‘‘To succeed on a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner
must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strick-
land v. Washington, [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)]. Strickland requires that a
petitioner satisfy both a performance prong and a preju-
dice prong. . . . It is well settled that [a] reviewing
court can find against a petitioner on either ground,
whichever is easier.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, 342 Conn.
771, 780, 272 A.3d 189 (2022). To establish prejudice in
cases involving guilty pleas, ‘‘the petitioner must show
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) O’Reagan v. Commissioner of Correction,
211 Conn. App. 845, 862, 274 A.3d 189, cert. denied,
343 Conn. 926, 275 A.3d 1213 (2022); see also Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d
203 (1985).
   With respect to the first prong of Strickland, ‘‘[i]n
order for a petitioner to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance on the basis of deficient performance, he
must show that, considering all of the circumstances,
counsel’s representation fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness as measured by prevailing pro-
fessional norms. . . . In any case presenting an ineffec-
tiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be
whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable consider-
ing all the circumstances.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Mercer v. Commissioner of Correction, 222
Conn. App. 713, 729,        A.3d       (2023), petition for
cert. filed (Conn. January 24, 2024) (No. 230287). Fur-
thermore, ‘‘we are mindful that judicial scrutiny of coun-
sel’s performance must be highly deferential. It is all
too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it
is all too easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense
after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.
. . . A fair assessment of attorney performance
requires that every effort be made to eliminate the dis-
torting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circum-
stances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evalu-
ate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evalu-
ation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
[the] conduct [of trial counsel] falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
[petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under
the circumstances, the challenged action might be con-
sidered sound trial strategy.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Doan v. Commissioner of Correction, 193
Conn. App. 263, 274–75, 219 A.3d 462, cert. denied, 333
Conn. 944, 219 A.3d 374 (2019). ‘‘Indeed, our Supreme
Court has recognized that [t]here are countless ways
to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even
the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend
a particular client in the same way. . . . [A] reviewing
court is required not simply to give [the trial attorney]
the benefit of the doubt . . . but to affirmatively enter-
tain the range of possible reasons . . . counsel may
have had for proceeding as [he] did . . . .’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 730.
   ‘‘[S]trategic choices made after thorough investiga-
tion of law and facts relevant to plausible options are
virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made
after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 142 Conn. App. 744, 753, 68
A.3d 111 (2013). The decision of whether to call a wit-
ness ‘‘is a tactical decision for defense counsel, and to
the extent that the decision might be considered sound
trial strategy, it cannot be the basis of a finding of
deficient performance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Jordan v. Commissioner of Correction, 197 Conn.
App. 822, 855, 234 A.3d 78 (2020), aff’d, 341 Conn. 279,
267 A.3d 120 (2021).
  As this court has consistently recognized, ‘‘there is
no per se rule that requires a trial attorney to call an
expert in a criminal case.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 222
Conn. App. 278, 294, 304 A.3d 862 (2023), cert. denied,
348 Conn. 940,      A.3d      (2024); Doan v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 193 Conn. App. 276 (same);
see also Michael T. v. Commissioner of Correction, 307
Conn. 84, 100–101, 52 A.3d 655 (2012) (noting that our
Supreme Court ‘‘has never adopted a bright line rule
that an expert witness for the defense is necessary in
every sexual assault case’’); Antonio A. v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 148 Conn. App. 825, 833, 87 A.3d
600 (‘‘there is no per se rule that requires a trial attorney
to seek out an expert witness’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 312 Conn. 901, 91 A.3d 907
(2014). Instead, ‘‘[o]ur appellate courts repeatedly have
rejected a petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel ren-
dered deficient performance by failing to call an expert
witness at trial on the ground that trial counsel’s deci-
sion was supported by a legitimate strategic reason.’’
Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 295; see
also Bryant v. Commissioner of Correction, 290 Conn.
502, 521, 964 A.2d 1186 (‘‘the decision whether to call
a particular witness falls into the realm of trial strategy,
which is typically left to the discretion of trial counsel
. . . [however] it does not follow necessarily that, in
every instance, trial counsel’s strategy concerning these
decisions is sound’’ (citation omitted)), cert. denied sub
nom. Murphy v. Bryant, 558 U.S. 938, 130 S. Ct. 259,
175 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2009).
   As this court observed in Brown, ‘‘[f]ailing to retain
or utilize an expert witness is not deficient when part
of a legitimate and reasonable defense strategy. . . .
[T]he selection of an expert witness is a paradigmatic
example of the type of strategic choic[e] that, when
made after thorough investigation of [the] law and facts,
is virtually unchallengeable.’’ (Citation omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 222
Conn. App. 295. Even in cases in which ‘‘an expert may
have been helpful to the defense, there is always the
possibility that an expert called by one party, upon
cross-examination, may actually be more helpful to the
other party. . . . [T]he right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance, and not the right to perfect repre-
sentation.’’ (Citation omitted.) Michael T. v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 307 Conn. 101.
   Applying the foregoing principles, we agree with the
habeas court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s decision
not to consult with an expert on eyewitness identifica-
tion to evaluate potential weaknesses in the state’s eye-
witness testimony, and to offer expert testimony at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, was supported by
a reasonable strategic basis. Trial counsel, an experi-
enced senior assistant public defender, testified during
the habeas trial that she was familiar with eyewitness
identification experts and had considered the petition-
er’s request for an eyewitness identification expert, but
opted not to pursue one because it would not have
done ‘‘anything to enhance what was already there. The
case dealt with . . . the identification . . . from the
witness[es], [one of whom] indicated that he was pretty
sure that [the petitioner] was the person who shot him,
as well as a witness . . . [who] said the same thing
. . . . The videos that we saw, my own investigation,
as well as the previous investigation from . . . Billings,
where [they] indicated that they did an enhancement
of the videos [and a] side-by-side comparison, and
[there are] characteristics of the shooter and [the peti-
tioner that] were quite similar, including the very promi-
nent crease that [the petitioner] has in his forehead.’’
After considering these factors, trial counsel opted not
to call an eyewitness identification expert. Trial counsel
also pursued other avenues of discrediting the state’s
case. In addition to the motion to suppress the identifi-
cations, she sought an alibi for the petitioner and had
continued to investigate the petitioner’s case and
planned to cross-examine the witnesses about potential
weaknesses or discrepancies in their identifications of
the petitioner, including varying descriptions given to
the police regarding the petitioner’s hairstyle.
   ‘‘The habeas judge, as the trier of facts, is the sole
arbiter of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be given to their testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Corbett v. Commissioner of Correction, 133
Conn. App. 310, 316, 34 A.3d 1046 (2012). The habeas
judge found credible trial counsel’s testimony that
‘‘there was nothing an eyewitness expert would contrib-
ute to the defense.’’ This court is obligated under Strick-
land to indulge the presumption that trial counsel’s
tactical decision not to call an expert witness falls
within the broad range of reasonable trial strategy. See,
e.g., Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 222
Conn. App. 296–97 (trial counsel’s decision not to call
eyewitness identification expert ‘‘was supported by a
legitimate strategic basis . . . [where trial counsel]
was aware of the benefits that an eyewitness identifica-
tion expert could provide . . . [but] nevertheless
determined, on the basis of his investigation of the
facts, that the testimony of an eyewitness identification
expert . . . would not have been helpful at trial primar-
ily because of the compelling nature of the victim’s
identification of the petitioner’’). Given the facts in the
present case, we conclude that trial counsel’s strategy
to undermine the impact of the eyewitness identifica-
tions through cross-examination and other means,
rather than to call an expert on eyewitness identifica-
tion, was reasonable.
  The petitioner claims that, under the circumstances
of this case, the holdings in State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn.
218, 49 A.3d 705 (2012), and United States v. Nolan,
956 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2020), necessitated the hiring of
an eyewitness identification expert on the petitioner’s
behalf. We are not persuaded.
  As this court recently noted, ‘‘Guilbert was not a
habeas case but, instead, was a direct appeal in which
our Supreme Court reversed its precedent to conclude
that testimony by a qualified expert on the fallibility
of eyewitness identification is admissible when that
testimony would aid the jury in evaluating the state’s
identification evidence.’’ Brown v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 222 Conn. App. 300. In reaching that
holding in Guilbert, our Supreme Court enumerated
eight factors relevant to the unreliability of eyewitness
identifications, and thus, the admissibility of expert tes-
timony concerning such identifications. Those factors
are ‘‘that (1) there is at best a weak correlation between
a witness’ confidence in his or her identification and
its accuracy, (2) the reliability of an identification can
be diminished by a witness’ focus on a weapon, (3)
high stress at the time of observation may render a
witness less able to retain an accurate perception and
memory of the observed events, (4) cross-racial identifi-
cations are considerably less accurate than same race
identifications, (5) a person’s memory diminishes rap-
idly over a period of hours rather than days or weeks,
(6) identifications are likely to be less reliable in the
absence of a double-blind, sequential identification pro-
cedure, (7) witnesses are prone to develop unwarranted
confidence in their identifications if they are privy to
postevent or postidentification information about the
event or the identification, and (8) the accuracy of an
eyewitness identification may be undermined by uncon-
scious transference, which occurs when a person seen
in one context is confused with a person seen in
another.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) State v. Guilbert, supra,
306 Conn. 237–39.
   In Nolan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the issue of whether, in that
case, the failure to call an eyewitness identification
expert could constitute deficient performance for pur-
poses of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
See United States v. Nolan, supra, 956 F.3d 76. In Nolan,
the defendant’s trial counsel ‘‘did virtually nothing to
contest the admissibility of [eyewitness] identifications’’;
id.; that ‘‘bore significant indicia of unreliability’’ and
were central to the prosecution’s case. Id., 75. The court
in Nolan noted the following important factors that
were relevant to the eyewitness identifications, namely,
the perpetrators were wearing disguises; the victims
were Black and Hispanic, whereas the defendant was
white; there was a weapon present; many weeks had
elapsed between the instigating incident and the vic-
tims’ identifications of the defendant in a photographic
array; and, finally, ‘‘the police employed highly irregular
procedures in pursuing the witnesses’ identification[s]
of [the defendant].’’ Id., 80, 81. In light of those factors,
the court concluded that ‘‘counsel could not render
effective assistance without input from an expert. Coun-
sel therefore had a duty at least to consult an expert
and consider whether to call her to the stand.’’ Id., 82.
  The petitioner argues that, because some of the fac-
tors concerning the unreliability of an eyewitness identi-
fication considered by the courts in Guilbert and Nolan
exist in the present case, and because the petitioner’s
prior counsel had withdrawn specifically so that the
petitioner might be able to have an expert on eyewitness
testimony testify on his behalf, ‘‘even the most mini-
mally competent attorney would at least consult an
expert suggested to her by a credible source where
the expert’s testimony might raise reasonable doubt,
at trial, regarding a defendant’s guilt.’’ We conclude,
however, that the petitioner’s reliance on Guilbert and
Nolan is misguided.
   First, Guilbert addresses only the issue of the admis-
sibility of testimony from an eyewitness identification
expert; it does not address whether the decision to call
or not to call an expert constitutes deficient perfor-
mance. Second, although the petitioner is correct that
some of the factors from Nolan and Guilbert exist in
the present case, including a cross-racial identification
and the presence of a weapon, there are crucial differ-
ences that could lead a reasonable attorney to make a
different choice regarding the decision to call an expert
witness. Unlike in Guilbert or Nolan, in the present
case there was a face-to-face confrontation of some
length between the victim and the petitioner immedi-
ately prior to the shooting, but before a weapon was
introduced into the confrontation. During that confron-
tation, the petitioner and the victim had an exchange
of sufficient length that they moved from inside the
convenience store to the area outside the store, and an
onlooker had time to attempt to intervene. Additionally,
the petitioner in the present case was not wearing a
disguise during the confrontation,5 as the perpetrators
did in Nolan, and, unlike in Nolan or Guilbert, the
confrontation in the present case was caught on surveil-
lance video, which the state intended to offer at trial
to corroborate the testimony of the eyewitnesses.
Although a jury did not have a chance to review the
surveillance video footage in this case, the state’s posi-
tion was that the video showed the events leading up
to the shooting and depicted the shooter. Had the case
proceeded to trial, as recognized by trial counsel, the
jury would have had a chance to compare the surveil-
lance video footage to the testimony of the eyewitnesses
and draw its own conclusions. Furthermore, unlike in
Nolan, the court in the present case already had found
that there was nothing unnecessarily suggestive or
irregular about the procedure used in administering the
photographic array to the victim and other testifying
eyewitnesses. We conclude that, as a result of the signif-
icant factual distinctions between the present case and
Guilbert or Nolan, neither of those decisions required
trial counsel to retain an eyewitness identification
expert.
  Finally, the petitioner argues that the fact that his
previous counsel had withdrawn specifically so that the
petitioner’s defense would be able to afford an eyewit-
ness identification expert should have prompted trial
counsel to do the same once she was appointed to the
petitioner’s case. That, however, is not the standard for
deficient performance. Although the petitioner’s previ-
ous counsel may have believed that an eyewitness iden-
tification expert was necessary, a competent attorney
also reasonably could have reached the opposite con-
clusion. As discussed previously in this opinion, as a
reviewing court, we must extend significant latitude in
determining what constitutes legitimate trial strategy.
The fact that one attorney may have opted for an expert
does not signify as to whether the choice by an attorney
not to consult an expert constitutes deficient perfor-
mance.
   Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court prop-
erly determined that the petitioner failed to show that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient, as the peti-
tioner failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome
the presumption that trial counsel’s choice not to con-
sult with, or to present the testimony of, an expert
witness was sound trial strategy. Therefore, the peti-
tioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
      The judgment is affirmed.
      In this opinion the other judges concurred.
  1
     Specifically, in the motion to suppress, filed October 24, 2017, and
amended October 26, 2017, the petitioner argued that the identification
procedures were unnecessarily suggestive such that they violated his due
process rights. During the arguments on the motion, the petitioner argued,
inter alia, that the procedures were unnecessarily suggestive because one
of the detectives remarked to Rivera that they had a suspect before he
looked at the photographs, and also told the victim before showing him the
photographs ‘‘to try to pick out the person who shot him . . . .’’ The peti-
tioner further argued that Rivera and the victim, in their identifications,
were not ‘‘[100] percent positive that this was the person who actually did
the shooting.’’ In ruling on the motion, the court noted that ‘‘[t]he detectives
did not inform [Rivera] or [the] victim that the [petitioner’s] photo[graph]
was included . . . . Informing [Rivera] or [the] victim that they would be
looking [to] see if the suspect was there is not the same as telling them
that the suspect was included. The detectives did not do anything to influence
the identification of the [petitioner]. Although neither [Rivera] [n]or the
victim [stated that either one had] 100 percent certainty, [the victim] wrote
that he was ‘quite sure’ [in his identification], and . . . Rivera wrote, ‘it
looks like the guy. I’m pretty sure it is him.’ ’’ The court concluded that
‘‘the procedure used, viewed in light of the factual circumstances, is not
unnecessarily suggestive,’’ and denied the motion to suppress.
   2
     At the suppression hearing, in addition to presenting the testimony of
the victim and Rivera, the petitioner called four police officers to testify
regarding the statements taken from the victim and Rivera, including their
descriptions of the shooter, and concerning the administration of the photo-
graphic lineup and the identification procedures used in conducting that
lineup.
   3
     A defendant who pleads guilty under the Alford doctrine does not admit
guilt but acknowledges that the state’s evidence against him is so strong
that he is prepared to accept entry of a guilty plea. See generally North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
   4
     The habeas court rested its decision on its conclusion that trial counsel’s
performance was not deficient and did not address the issue of prejudice.
In light of our determination that the habeas court did not err in its finding
that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we need not address the
prejudice prong. See Foster v. Commissioner of Correction, 217 Conn. App.
658, 667, 289 A.3d 1206 (failure of petitioner to demonstrate either deficient
performance or prejudice is fatal to habeas petition), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
917, 303 A.3d 1193 (2023).
   5
     The petitioner likens the fact that he was wearing a hoodie at the time
of the shooting to wearing a disguise. The petitioner fails to explain how
the hoodie would constitute a ‘‘[disguise] . . . that partially obscured [his]
features’’ as was the case in Nolan, in which the defendants wore a ‘‘half
ski mask’’ and a ‘‘skully.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States
v. Nolan, supra, 956 F.3d 80.