Court Opinion

ID: 9963852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:05:32.881302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.320107
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2022-CA-1175-MR

ESTATE OF CHARLES MILDRED
HARDIN, BY KATHY PEARLENE
GOODWIN, ADMINISTRATRIX;
AND JAMES LEON HARDIN                                            APPELLANTS

                APPEAL FROM SPENCER CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 18-CI-00106

JOHN RILEY; CHRIS LIMPP;
AND NATHAN NATION                                                  APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                                 AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: The Estate of Charles Mildred Hardin, by Kathy Pearlene

Goodwin, Administratrix, and James Leon Hardin (the Estate) bring this appeal

from a September 7, 2022, Opinion and Order of the Spencer Circuit Court
granting summary judgment in favor of John Riley, Chris Limpp, and Nathan

Nation upon the basis of qualified official immunity. We affirm.

              On June 13, 2017, Charles Mildred Hardin suffered an apparent heart

attack at her home in Taylorsville, Kentucky. Her family initiated several calls to

911 for emergency assistance. The exact events that followed are disputed;

however, several witnesses described those events as chaotic. While Hardin lay

unconscious on her kitchen floor without a discernable pulse, her daughter exited

the home and yelled at members of the Taylorsville-Spencer County Fire

Protection District (TSFPD)1 to bring a shocker (defibrillator). For some unknown

reason, one member of TSFPD thought the daughter said “shot her” or “shooter,”

so TSFPD members refused to enter the home. Instead, the police were contacted.

Thereupon, a dispute arose between Hardin’s son and a member of TSFPD that led

to a verbal altercation. Hardin was eventually taken by ambulance to the hospital,

where she died a few days later.

              Ultimately, the Estate filed a complaint in the Spencer Circuit Court

against Spencer County Emergency Medical Services (SEMS);2 Spencer County

Fiscal Court; TSFPD; Limpp, in his individual capacity; Nation, in his individual

1
 Throughout this Opinion, Spencer County Fire Protection District is referred to as TSFPD or
SCFD.
2
 Throughout this Opinion, Spencer County Emergency Medical Services is referred to as SEMS
or SCEMS.

                                             -2-
capacity; and Riley, in his individual capacity. Relevant to this appeal, it was

alleged:

             (3) Defendant Chris Limpp is a citizen of the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Director of
             Defendant Spencer County Emergency Medical Services
             (“SEMS”), which provides ambulance and other medical
             emergency services for Spencer County in the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky.

             (4) Defendant Nathan Nation is a citizen of the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Fire Chief of
             Defendant Taylorsville-Spencer County Fire Protection
             District (“TSFPD”), which provides emergency fire and
             rescue services for Spencer County in the
             Commonwealth of Kentucky.

             ....

             (6) Defendant John Riley was at the time of the
             incident complained of herein the Spencer County Judge
             Executive charged with oversight of the Spencer County
             Fiscal Court and all agents, employees, servants and
             entities subject to the control of the Spencer County
             Fiscal Court.

             (7) The true names and capacities of the Defendants
             identified as John Doe(s) are currently unknown to the
             Plaintiffs. At all times relevant, these individuals were
             agents, employees, or servants of Defendants SEMS,
             TSFPD, and Spencer County Fiscal Court who
             participated in the acts alleged in this Complaint that
             resulted in the untimely death of Decedent. The
             Plaintiffs will seek leave to amend this Complaint as the
             names and capacities of these John Doe Defendants
             become known through discovery.

             ....

                                         -3-
(9) Realizing that she was in distress, James Leon
Hardin called their daughter, who in turn called for an
ambulance and for assistance from SEMS [Spencer
County Emergency Medical Services] and TSFPD
[Taylorsville-Spencer County Fire Protection District].

(10) After an initial call was made at 7:23 p.m., several
additional calls were made to dispatchers to inquire as to
when assistance would arrive.

(11) Upon information and belief, at the time the
emergency calls were placed, both SEMS ambulances
and John Doe SEMS personnel were not at their station;
rather, they were at a local park watching their children
play soccer.

(12) Upon information and belief, before dispatchers
could send an ambulance to Decedent’s rescue, they were
required to contact a member of Defendant Spencer
County Fiscal Court, seeking permission.

(13) As a result of these delays, emergency personnel
did not finally arrive on scene until sometime after 8 p.m.

(14) A John Doe Defendant from the TSFPD arrived
first on the scene but made no effort to assist Decedent
and, instead, created a disturbance, further delaying any
help Decedent hoped to receive.

(15) The John Doe Defendants who arrived on scene
failed to act with any urgency.

(16) The John Doe Defendants took no steps to assist
with Decedent’s breathing. The Defendants did not
intubate the Decedent, nor did they utilize a
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) machine.

(17) Even though Decedent had been diagnosed with
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, an affliction that

                            -4-
blocks airflow and makes it difficult to breathe, she was
not provided with oxygen.

(18) When she was removed from the scene, Decedent
was placed on a stretcher and wheeled out of her home
with her naked body exposed to the public eye.

(19) Decedent was transported to Jewish Hospital in
Shelbyville Kentucky, arriving at 8:47 p.m.

(20) Once at Jewish Hospital, Decedent was placed on
life support. She remained on life support until June 16,
2017, when life support was removed and Decedent
passed away.

(21) Doctors determined that as a result of her ordeal,
Decedent had suffered a global anoxic injury, with her
brain deprived of oxygen for far too long.

     COUNT I: NEGLIGENCE/GROSS
NEGLIGENCE/FAILURE TO PROVIDE TIMELY
        AND ADEQUATE CARE

(22) At all times relevant to this action, all Defendants
had a duty to exercise reasonable care for the health and
safety of Decedent.

(23) Notwithstanding this duty, the Defendant entities,
and their John Doe agents, servants, and employees,
committed a gross and wanton breach of this duty in one
or more of the following ways:

      a.     Carelessly and negligently delayed their
             response to Decedent;
      b.     Carelessly and negligently attended to
             Decedent;
      c.     Carelessly and negligently failed to
             provide adequate life support measures;

                            -5-
      d.     Carelessly and negligently failed to
             request further assistance within an
             appropriate time;
      e.     Carelessly and negligently delayed
             obtaining further assistance;
      f.     Carelessly and negligently allowed
             Decedent to be transferred from the scene
             without provision of adequate life
             support; and
      g.     Carelessly and negligently failed to
             request advanced life support assistance
             in moving a patient who needed
             additional on-scene resuscitation efforts.

(24) The Defendants committed these acts with wanton
and reckless disregard for the life and safety of Decedent.

(25) As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful
acts and omissions of the Defendants, Decedent suffered
extensive and severe injuries, including pain, suffering,
mental and physical anguish, injuries, damages, and other
pecuniary losses.

(26) These damages are in an amount in excess of the
minimum dollar amount necessary to establish the
jurisdiction of this Court.

COUNT II: NEGLIGENCE/GROSS NEGLIGENCE,
       TRAINING AND SUPERVISION

(27) The Plaintiffs repeat all of the preceding
allegations of this Complaint and in addition allege the
following.

(28) The Defendant entities and supervisors failed to
provide the John Doe Defendants with the training,
supervision, and equipment necessary to fulfill the duty
of reasonable care for the health and safety owed to
Decedent.

                            -6-
           (29) The Defendant entities and supervisors knew, from
           past experiences, that the lack of training and supervision
           provided to the John Doe Defendants and other
           employees created a risk of harm such as that suffered by
           Decedent.

           (30) In light of this prior knowledge, the Defendant
           entities and supervisors acted with wanton and reckless
           disregard for the life and safety of Decedent.

           (31) As a direct and proximate result of the negligent
           training and supervision committed by the Defendants,
           Decedent suffered extensive and severe injuries,
           including pain, suffering, mental and physical anguish,
           injuries, damages, and other pecuniary losses.

           (32) These damages are in an amount in excess of the
           minimum dollar amount necessary to establish the
           jurisdiction of this Court.

                    COUNT III: WRONGFUL DEATH

           (33) The Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all of the
           preceding allegations of this Complaint and in addition
           allege the following.

           (34) As a direct and proximate result of the negligent
           and wrongful acts and omissions of the Defendants,
           Decedent suffered extensive and severe injuries that
           resulted in her death.

           (35) The damages suffered include physical and mental
           injuries suffered due to the Defendants’ negligent acts
           and omissions, as well as the medical and other final
           expenses incurred as a result of Decedent’s passing.

August 16, 2018, Second Amended Complaint at 3-7.

                                       -7-
             Eventually, Riley, Limpp, and Nation filed motions for summary

judgment claiming entitlement to qualified official immunity. Riley, Limpp, and

Nation argued that the Estate’s claims were based upon their alleged failure to

properly train, supervise, and equip SEMS and/or TSFPD personnel. Riley,

Limpp, and Nation maintained that their actions related thereto were not

ministerial but fundamentally discretionary. Assertions that these actions were

performed in good faith and within the scope of their employment, Riley, Limpp,

and Nation argued that the Estate’s claims were barred by qualified official

immunity.

             The Estate responded to the motions for summary judgment.

According to the Estate, Riley, Limpp, and Nation disregarded and failed to

comply with various provisions of the Spencer County Administrative Code and

Spencer County Emergency Medical Services Standard Operating Guidelines,

which imposed ministerial duties upon each of them. As to such ministerial duties,

the Estate argued that Riley, Limpp, and Nation were not entitled to qualified

official immunity.

             By order entered September 7, 2022, the circuit court rendered

summary judgment in favor of Riley, Limpp, and Nation and reasoned:

                    The Second Amended Complaint alleges that
             Limpp, Riley, and Nation failed to provide the
             responding volunteer firefighters and SCEMS employees
             with the training, supervision, and equipment for them to

                                        -8-
              fulfill the duty of reasonable care owed to Hardin. The
              911 call from Hardin’s family was placed at 7:49 p.m. on
              June 13, 2017[,] and the ambulance arrived on the scene
              at 8:03 p.m. At 7:54 p.m., dispatch requested that the
              Taylorsville-Spencer County Fire Protection District
              should respond to the Hardin medical run. Five
              volunteer firefighters, three in their personal vehicles and
              two arrived in an official vehicle, arrived at varying times
              before the ambulance arrived. None of the volunteer
              firefighters were equipped with [an] AED (Automated
              External Defibrillator). An AED is included in the
              equipment kept on an “apparatus truck,” but no apparatus
              truck attended the scene of the Hardin medical run. The
              first arriving volunteer firefighter, Doug Herndon,[3] who
              lived approximately 1,000 feet from the Hardin
              residence, found Charles Mildred Hardin unconscious on
              the kitchen floor. Herndon searched for a pulse, found
              no pulse, and began to perform CPR on Hardin until
              SCEMS arrived. Additional volunteer firefighters
              arrived on scene, as they approached the residence, one
              of the volunteers heard a female yelling “shot her.”
              (Later it was determined that the yelling female (Hardin’s
              daughter) was not yelling “shot her,” rather she was
              yelling about the need for a “shocker,” referencing a
              defibrillator.) The volunteer firefighters radioed in this
              information to dispatch and halted entering the residence
              until law enforcement could arrive. Hardin’s son became
              upset at the volunteer firefighters refusing to enter the
              house to help his mother, and a verbal argument broke
              out between the son and one of the volunteer firefighters.
              This verbal argument prompted another radio call for law
              enforcement to get to the residence. Law enforcement
              arrived and settled tempers. There were also a number of
              additional family members and neighbors who had
              gathered in the front yard of the Hardin residence during
              this time frame, creating what was described as a chaotic
              atmosphere. When the ambulance arrived, it had to park

3
 Doug Herndon lived within 1,000 feet of Charles Mildred Hardin’s home and was a volunteer
emergency medical technician for Mount Eden, Kentucky.

                                            -9-
50 feet to 100 feet away from the driveway because of
the number of vehicles and people that had gathered at
the Hardin residence. Once the ambulance arrived,
Charles Mildred Hardin was put on a stretcher, placed in
the ambulance, and taken to Jewish Hospital Shelbyville.
She was placed on life support, but died three days later
on June 16, 2017.

       Nation, as Chief of the Fire District, is appointed
by the Board of Trustees of the Fire District to oversee
the day-to-day business of the Fire District. Nation, as
Chief, does not have the authority to hire, fire, or
discipline Fire District employees or any of the 50
volunteer firefighters of the Fire Department, with the
Board of Trustees retaining such authority. Nation is
responsible for the training and certification of the
employees and volunteers for the Fire District. The Fire
District provides supplemental medical services to
SCEMS. Volunteer firefighters are expected to provide
supplemental basic medical care and operate on the scene
under the direction of SCEMS direction and supervision.
The Kentucky Fire Commission sets the minimum
requirements as to training and certifications for
volunteer firefighters. See [Kentucky Revised Statutes]
KRS 95A.040. All of the volunteer firefighters that
participated in the Hardin medical run were up to date on
their mandatory training and were properly certified.
None of the volunteer firefighters were equipped with an
AED. There is no policy or rule that volunteer
firefighters are required to have medical equipment in
private vehicles (3 or the 5 volunteers arrived in their
personal vehicles) and there is no policy/rule that
volunteer firefighters be equipped with a defibrillator,
cardiac monitor or mechanical CRP device. Plaintiffs
point to a rule in the Fire District’s EMS Assist Program
which states that “Any EMTs responding directly to the
scene shall provide their own trauma kit.” Not all
volunteer firefighters are EMTs for application of the
rule. Plaintiffs provide no evidence or proof that an AED
would be included in a trauma kit. Nation indicates that

                           -10-
a trauma kit contains supplies to treat physical injuries
resulting from trauma, typically to treat blood loss, and
such kit would include gloves, sponges, bandages,
dressings, and a tourniquet.

       Plaintiffs are critical of Riley and Limpp for the
fourteen minutes it took for an ambulance to arrive at the
Hardin residence after the 911 call was made for
assistance and that Spencer County was only operating
two code-complaint EMS vehicles on the date of the
Hardin medical run. There is no support or context for
Plaintiffs’ conclusory argument that a fourteen minute[ ]
response time for an ambulance is excessive. The
ambulance came from Waterford Park, Taylorsville,
Kentucky[,] to 102 Evelyn Drive, Taylorsville,
Kentucky[,] a distance of eleven miles, in fourteen
minutes. SCEMS and its ambulance serve Taylorsville
and the whole Spencer County, there is no reasonable
expectation that an ambulance will be present in close
proximity to the location of a medical emergency. The
responding ambulance was sufficient to handle the
medical emergency call at the Hardin residence.
Plaintiffs also argue that EMTs are to be provisioned
with a trauma kit, which the Court addressed above, as
there is no indication that an AED would be included in
such trauma kit.

       Plaintiffs are critical of Nation, Riley, and Limpp
as to the personnel that responded to the Hardin medical
run. All the responding personnel were up-to-date on
their mandatory training and certifications. The
requirement of any additional training beyond the
mandatory training required for volunteer firefighters and
EMS personnel, such as scene management training,
would be a decision left to the discretion of Nation,
Riley, or Limpp. Such a decision would be a
discretionary act. There is no evidence that Nation,
Riley, or Limpp had previously received any complaints
regarding the competence or conduct of the various
responding volunteer firefighters or EMS personnel prior

                           -11-
             to the Hardin medical run. Nation, Riley, and Limpp
             were not personally involved in providing medical
             services for the Hardin medical run. (Limpp was present
             on scene, arriving after the ambulance got to the Hardin
             residence.) Their liability would extend from their
             failure to train, supervise, or equip their personnel.
             Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Nation, Riley or
             Limpp failed as to any ministerial duties as it relates to
             the training, supervision, or equipping of the personnel
             involved with the Hardin medical run. Nation, Riley, and
             Limpp are public officers or employees that are cloaked
             with qualified official immunity for discretionary acts.
             Nation, Riley, and Limpp were conducting themselves
             within the scope of their employment to train, supervise,
             and equip their personnel with SCEMS and the Fire
             District and there is no evidence to support a finding of
             bad faith in the circumstances before the Court by any of
             these gentlemen. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
             Nation, Riley or Limpp violated any ministerial duties
             and they are cloaked with qualified official immunity as
             to their discretionary acts.

September 7, 2022, Opinion and Order at 3-7. The circuit court included complete

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 54.02 language in the order. This appeal

follows.

             To begin, summary judgment is proper where there exists no material

issue of fact, and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest, Inc.

v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). All facts and

inferences therefrom are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Id. And, our review of a summary judgment is always de novo. Seiller Waterman,

                                         -12-
LLC v. Bardstown Cap. Corp., 643 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Ky. 2022); Cunningham v.

Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 651 S.W.3d 199, 202 (Ky. App. 2022).

             The Estate argues that the circuit court erroneously rendered summary

judgment concluding that Riley, Limpp, and Nation were entitled to qualified

official immunity. In particular, the Estate contends that Riley, Limpp, and Nation

breached ministerial duties and thus, were not entitled to the protection of qualified

official immunity.

             Public officials and employees may be shielded from negligence

actions when sued in their individual capacities by qualified official immunity.

Qualified official immunity is applicable to a discretionary act when performed by

the official in good faith and within the official’s scope of authority or

employment. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001). To be entitled to

qualified official immunity, the public official must be performing a discretionary

act as opposed to a ministerial act. Id. So, the distinction between a discretionary

act and a ministerial act is pivotal in determining entitlement to qualified official

immunity.

             A discretionary act involves “the exercise of discretion and judgment,

or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment[.]” Id. at 522. On the other hand,

a ministerial act generally “requires only obedience to the orders of others, or when

                                         -13-
the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution

of a specific act arising from fixed and designated facts.” Id.

             The Estate’s claims against Riley, Limpp, and Nation are not

premised upon their personal care of the decedent but rather center upon their

alleged failures to properly train, supervise, and/or equip members of SEMS, of

TSFPD, and/or these organizations. In particular, the Estate alleges that the

following ministerial duties were breached:

             [1] [T]he SCEMS personnel who responded to the
             incident were inexcusably late – it took 14 minutes to
             arrive at the scene where Ms. Hardin was already in full
             cardiac arrest – because all SCEMS personnel and
             vehicles were located at a softball game on the other side
             of the county[.] . . .

             [2] (4) code-compliant EMS vehicles were available for
             use for SCEMS personnel in 2016 and [2017], but only
             (2) such vehicles were in use on June 13, 2017. . . .

             [3] Limpp nor Judge Riley had abided by their duties to
             execute and administer clear policies relating to the
             provision of emergency medical services in Spencer
             County. For example, the SCEMS personnel had no
             direction as to where or how they were to maintain the
             SCEMS vehicles while on duty, thus they incorrectly
             concluded that having all personnel attend a softball
             game at the same time would not impede their ability to
             promptly respond to calls for help. . . .

             [4] Judge Riley and Mr. Limpp also failed to execute
             administrative policies regarding the mutual-aid
             agreement between SCEMS and SCFD. . . .

             ....

                                        -14-
             [5] Chief Nation failed to execute administrative policies
             regarding the mutual-aid agreement between SCEMS and
             SCFD. Again, under the Taylorsville-Spencer County
             Fire Department EMS Assist Program, the “Minimum
             Requirements for Responders” include that they be
             “AED Certified;” that “Any EMT’s responding directly
             to the scene shall provide their own trauma kit” . . . .
             Here, the mutual-aid SCFD responders who showed up at
             Ms. Hardin’s house did not have their own trauma kits,
             and appear not to have understood that Ms. Hardin was in
             a state where equipment including and AED would have
             been appropriate. . . .

Appellants’ Brief at 12-14. The Estate believes that the above duties were

ministerial because they involved only the execution and enforcement of fixed

policies or rules. However, the Estate fails to cite this Court to any specific policy

or rule that requires SEMS to arrive at the scene in less than fourteen minutes, to

have SEMS ambulances positioned at certain locations, or to require TSFPD

personnel to carry AED devices.

             In its brief, the Estate relies upon general policies or rules which do

not create ministerial duties. The Estate also references some specific

policies/rules that were either fully complied with or are otherwise not relevant to

the facts of this case. For instance, the Estate points out that Riley, as judge

executive, was required to properly execute Spencer County policies, such as

providing emergency services to the citizens of Spencer County. It is

uncontroverted that Spencer County provides such emergency services; thus, any

                                         -15-
ministerial duty created thereby was not violated. In another example, the Estate

points out that Limpp, as director of SEMS, was required to maintain SEMS’s

mutual aid agreements and operate one ALS ambulance and one BLS ambulance.

It was clearly established that such mutual aid agreements existed and that two

ambulances were maintained by SEMS. The Estate also cites to a provision in the

TSFPD Assist Program that specifically mandates responders be AED certified,

and it is undisputed that the responders on the day in question were so certified.

             As the Estate has failed to establish a specific policy, procedure,

regulation, statutory duty, or common-law duty binding Riley, Limpp, and Nation,

we believe that their general actions of supervising individuals are discretionary to

which qualified official immunity is applicable. Hanely v. Monsky, 311 S.W.3d

235, 244-46 (Ky. 2010); Marson v. Thomason, 438 S.W.3d 292, 299-300 (Ky.

2014). Likewise, as the Estate has failed to establish a specific policy, procedure,

regulation, statutory duty, or common-law duty obligating Riley, Limpp, and

Nation, we conclude that their decisions of how to equip TSFPD or SCEMS are

also discretionary. These decisions clearly involve the consideration of a myriad

of factors including the financial resources of the county and public entities

operating thereunder. And, as to training of personnel, KRS 95A.040 clearly

provides that the “[m]inimum standards and education of fire protection personnel”

are to be recommend by the Kentucky Fire Commission to the Governor, General

                                         -16-
Assembly and the Kentucky Community and Technical College System.

Moreover, under KRS 95A.040, the Kentucky Fire Commission has the authority

to “[c]ertify fire protection training and education programs as having attained the

minimum required standards[.]” Here, it is uncontroverted that the TSFPD

personnel, who responded to the emergency at the Hardin’s residence, met the

minimum training requirements. The Estate has not cited to this Court any more

stringent requirements that may have been applicable and not met by TSFPD

personnel.

             As the Estate has advanced no allegations that Riley, Limpp, or

Nation failed to act in good faith or outside the scope of their employment as

concerns their discretionary decisions implicated in this action, we hold that Riley,

Limpp, and Nation were entitled to the shield of qualified official immunity in this

case.

             We view any remaining contentions of error to be moot or without

merit.

             For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Spencer

Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -17-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE NATHAN
                           NATION:
Mark D. Dean
Shelbyville, Kentucky      John L. Tate
                           J. Brittany Cross Carlson
                           Bethany A. Breetz
                           Louisville, Kentucky

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEES CHRIS
                           LIMPP AND JOHN RILEY:

                           Carol Schureck Petitt
                           Pewee Valley, Kentucky

                         -18-