Court Opinion

ID: 9489809
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:24:46.323039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:43.766440
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with almost everything Judge Niemeyer has written for the majority. I disagree only with the reversal of the 56-month credit for time served on the prior conspiracy conviction. This downward departure was within the district court’s discretion, and I would affirm it.
My main concern arises from the structure of the enterprise McHan stands convicted of directing. I concurred in our holding in McHan III that a continuing criminal enterprise, which is itself a conspiracy, could be composed of discontinuous smaller conspiracies.1 Though I concede the theoretical possibility of such a conspiracy-upon-conspiracy structure — a theory proved by example here — I believe that it is far enough from “the heartland” of the guidelines as to provide enough discretion to grant the departure, especially inasmuch as conviction and punishment for CCE and the inevitable continuing lesser-included conspiracy is impermissible. Rutledge v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977).
The majority relies most heavily on U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. That guideline describes, in considerable detail, what role undischarged sentences should play in setting the total sentence, and it recognizes an uncommon degree of discretion in the district courts to fashion a reasonable sentence in complex situations. See § 5G1.3(c) & comment. (nn. 3-5). Applying the hoary maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the majority concludes that no such discretion exists as to discharged sentences.
I disagree. There are three ways the Sentencing Commission may address a potential ground for departure: (i) it may forbid the factor’s use, (ii) encourage it, or (iii) discourage it. Koon v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2045, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (citing United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.1993)). Only in the first case is the district court’s discretion entirely foreclosed. The most we can say about discharged sentences from the text of § 5G1.3, even with the help of expres-sio unius ... , is that they are not an encouraged basis for departure. To infer that the basis is forbidden is more than the old saw can bear.
Concluding that the district court had some, if limited, discretion to consider a departure here, I must address whether it abused that discretion, giving “substantial deference” to its decision. Koon, — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2046-47. I see no abuse, for two reasons.
First, as I stated above, it is an odd paradox that a continuing agreement could be composed of discrete, discontinuous sub-agreements. As Rutledge resolves once and for all, a CCE is simply a conspiracy with certain aggravating characteristics, and conviction of the same conspiracy without those characteristics is unconstitutional. The “series of violations” required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) was clearly intended to refer, in the overwhelming majority of cases, to substantive crimes.2 Moreover, conversely to Rutledge’s holding as to lesser-included conspiracy, conviction and punishment for predicate .substantive crimes, and the larger CCE is generally permissible. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985).
Within the two extremes — Rutledge and Garrett — lies this peculiar case, where we have, for § 848(c)(2)’s purposes at least, what amount to substantive conspiracies. I would hold that .this peculiarity places this case well outside the “heartland” of the guidelines, and the district court’s decision that credit for time served was appropriate was not an abuse qf discretion.
Second, McHan was convicted in July 1992, but not sentenced until June 1994. Had he *1045been- sentenced any time within sixteen months of his . conviction, his prior sentence would have been undischarged. A delay of that length was not, in my view, envisioned by the Commission when it drew its distinction between discharged and undischarged sentences, and the delay thus provides an independent basis for the departure.
To the extent stated above, I respectfully dissent. Otherwise, I join the judgment and opinion of the court.

. United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134, 139-42 (4th Cir.1992).

. In dicta in Rutledge, the Supreme Court referred to the "series of violations” as the "series of substantive violations.” - U.S. at - n. 7, 116 S.Ct. at 1246 n. 7.