Court Opinion

ID: 9638926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:58:42.647831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:10.657082
License: Public Domain

O’HEEN and GARIBALDI, JJ.,
dissenting.
We dissent from the disposition of the Court primarily on the basis of the Mitigating Circumstances set forth in Part IV of the non-disbarment opinion of the equally-divided Disciplinary Eeview Board. Those mitigating circumstances (with a few sentences deleted) are published herewith. We add only these observations.
We often reiterate that protection of the public, not punishment of the attorney, is the purpose of attorney discipline. In re Goldstein, 97 N.J. 545, 548 (1984). As a recipient of a judicial pension, respondent can never represent a client in a New Jersey court. N.J.S.A. 43:6A-13(a). He may never file or add his name to a brief or pleading in a New Jersey court, nor may he ever represent a New Jersey public body, except in a limited advisory capacity. Schwartz v. Judicial Retirement System of N.J., 584 F.Supp. 711 (D.N.J.1984). He may counsel clients and he may represent clients in a federal court, but realistically that is unlikely since almost his entire life has been spent in a State courtroom.
The majority says that we favor but slight discipline for the ethical infractions. Ante at 202. For respondent, although he might protest otherwise, removal from judicial office is undoubtedly the greatest punishment — the tragic end of a promising career. Had he been convicted of public corruption, he would of course be subject to disbarment and forfeiture of pension. In re Coruzzi, 98 N.J. 77 (1984). Had he been found to have destroyed or conspired to destroy evidence of criminal conduct, he would have been subject to criminal action. But the State’s Attorney General found that there was not probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. Eespondent may have sought to withhold evidence that disclosed a breach *204of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but not evidence of a crime. See N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3a(3). Our removal decision fell short of convicting respondent of criminal conduct, concluding rather that
[b]ased upon a resolution of close credibility issues, we have determined further in the Manzo matter that respondent became aware of the existence of objective evidence of self-dealing that would tend to incriminate him, at least in terms of potential disciplinary charges. This evidence consisted of the taped recordings of his conversations in which he sought to obtain the Sea Girt property. He had a duty immediately to unburden the judiciary of this conflict. He chose a path designed to suppress and conceal this evidence. We find beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent’s conduct in this regard demonstrates a disrespect for the law, a lack of integrity, and a failure to observe the high standards of conduct required of a judge in order to promote public confidence in the judiciary. [In re Yaccarino, 101 N.J. 342, 392 (1985) (emphasis added).]
Respondent has been removed from office, not convicted of crime. Public confidence in the judiciary has been achieved. No further public interest is served by disbarring a retired judge who is no longer active at the bar.
PART IV OF THE OPINION OF FOUR MEMBERS OF THE DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD VOTING NOT TO DISBAR
IV. THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
We will now assume, arguendo, that the medical testimony should be discredited. We further assume that, even if credited, it is not sufficient ipso facto to forestall disbarment. Notwithstanding this assumption, and even accepting for the moment that respondent was fully cognizant of and responsible for his conduct, we nevertheless would not disbar for independent reasons. We do not reach this conclusion inexorably. We do not say it is a conclusion which obtains with syllogistic precision. We do not gainsay the fact that it is born of instinct and inclination. We do say that an application of all the circumstances, that a global view of all the mitigating factors, *205militates against disbarment. If there is one word which encapsulates all of these elements, it is simply this: fairness.
Turning to those circumstances, they are, inter alia:
1. First, there is his overall performance. The Court has stated:
... We are mindful that respondent over the course of his judicial career has been assigned significant and substantial judicial responsibilities and has been a productive, conscientious, and energetic judge. Many attorneys have commended respondent’s performance in office ... [Matter of Yaccarino, 101 N.J. at 388]
Again:
... In fairness we must also consider the totality of respondent’s judicial career. We are aware of the many years of service that respondent has given to the public as prosecutor and judge. That record is not only essentially blameless, but reflects dedication and skill, and official recognition in terms of the duties and responsibilities to which respondent has been assigned. Moreover, many judges and lawyers who have known respondent have sensed a profound change in him following the open-heart surgery. Significantly, some of the most damaging testimony against respondent was prefaced by expressions of personal concern for the respondent. And, as noted, there is evidence of current medical impairment.
It is always difficult to balance a lifetime of service against a congeries of transgressions. . . . at 396. [Matter of Yaccarino, 101 N.J. at 396]
2. Although respondent’s medical problem may or may not be a per se condition exculpating him, it is at least a factor to be considered. Respondent, to some degree at least, was unquestionably debilitated. Even the Office of Attorney Ethics acknowledged that “these various medical ailments could constitute mitigating circumstances in a disciplinary proceeding ...” (See Memorandum of the OAE to the DRB of April 4, 1988, at p. 7.) As the District Ethics Committee stated in its decision, “the issue presented to the committee through expert witnesses was whether or not the respondent in fact had medical conditions which should constitute mitigating circumstances.”
3. This is not a Wilson case where a client’s funds have been misappropriated, requiring automatic disbarment. And it is not a corruption case, not a disgrace of the Corruzzi-DeVita genre. It is, instead, an administration of justice matter. To be sure, administration of justice matters are serious, as this *206matter is serious. Nonetheless, the Damoclean sword should not fall automatically in such cases. The Court has not consistently imposed disbarment and, quantitatively, disbarment may even be the exception, rather than the rule.
4. We are now approaching the tenth anniversary of the genesis of this matter. Most of respondent’s problems can be placed at his doorstep. But not a delay of a decade. Decency and due process deplore such a protracted proceeding particularly if it were to end in the ultimate penalty. The Court has “taken into account the extended delay in the imposition of attorney discipline.” In re Hecker, 109 N.J. 539 (1988) (where, inter alia, “almost ten years have passed since the entry of the civil verdict,” at 553); In re Stier, 108 N.J. 455 (1987); In re Kotok, 108 N.J. 314 (1987). “We have attempted to clear from our system of attorney discipline cases such as this that, because of complex factual and legal background, were delayed in their resolution for years on end.” In re Hecker, supra, 109 N.J. at 553.
5. The Attorney General and the Division of Criminal Justice determined that criminal action should not be instituted against respondent.
6. The State House Commission concluded that the extent of respondent’s conduct justified only a seven and one-half percent reduction in his pension. If his conduct had assumed the monstrous proportions suggested by the OAE and the disbarment opinion, surely the State House Commission would have (and should have) denied him that pension. The views of another branch of government, reviewing the same transgressions in a different context, are entitled to weight in these proceedings as well.
7. Most critically, the District Ethics Panel, composed of highly respected, independent and experienced attorneys from a foreign county, who had the opportunity to hear respondent and the physicians, held that a public reprimand satisfied justice. That should mean something, particularly in light of the fact *207that the Committee also believed he should have been removed from the bench.
8. The District Committee found that he has been “conducting a limited practice of law since his removal.” He has not sought out any associations with law firms because “I didn’t want to cause anybody an embarrassment.” (Tr. 173; 6-3-87). He does not maintain an office in the traditional sense. Whether this is a de facto suspension, as argued by respondent’s counsel, is irrelevant. It has been an inactive practice.
9. The District Committee found, as did we, that respondent was remorseful.
10. The District Committee also determined that the respondent voluntarily sought out medical attention, including psychological counselling. Apposite here are the remarks of the Court in Matter of Templeton, 99 N.J. 365, 373 (1985):
In all disciplinary cases, we have felt constrained as a matter of fairness to the public, to the charged attorney, and to the justice system, to search diligently for some credible reason other than professional and personal immorality that could serve to explain, and perhaps extenuate, egregious misconduct. We have always permitted a charged attorney to show, if at all possible, that the root of the transgressions is not intractable dishonesty, venality, immorality, or incompetence. We generally acknowledge the possibility that the determinative cause of wrongdoing might be some mental, emotional, or psychological state or medical condition that is not obvious and, if present, could be corrected through treatment. An inquiry into such possible causes of ethical misconduct not only can be instructive and enlightening, it may also hold the promise of a resolution of the disciplinary charges in terms of personal rehabilitation, which will serve to protect the public interest without ruining a lawyer’s career and life.
11. The Committee concluded, as did we, that there were no other violations or complaints throughout respondent’s long legal and judicial career and that there was “no possible danger to the public.”
12. The respondent testified before the District Committee below in a “forthright, open and candid manner.” The same is true of his appearance before the DRB.
13. Finally, and most important, we return to the standard of fairness. We agree that judicial removal does not insulate the offender from attorney discipline based on the same miscon*208duct. See, e.g. Matter of Coruzzi, 98 N.J. 77 (1984). But neither is the converse true — judicial removal does not compel attorney discipline based on the same misconduct. Ad hoc, not per se, must be the rule. By definition such determinations are sui generis and must be so treated for any number of reasons: (1) the guidelines for such problems are few since there have been so blessedly few cases of judicial misconduct in this State; (2) our system of jurisprudence, particularly in ethics cases, militates against such an inflexible approach, Wilson being the notable and correct exception to the rule; (3) this is, perhaps, a “different situation,” as the then DRB Chairman noted (see pp. 3-4 supra)-, (4) in its November 6, 1986, order, the Court specifically stated that, on the issue of mitigation, the parties may present additional evidence and arguments; and (5) judges who have labored so long, at such extraordinary sacrifice, deserve not special consideration, but some measure of decency.
That said, there is one primary question, one polestar, to be used in deciding this matter. It is not res judicata or which appellate review principles obtain. It is not what the DRB, OAE or District Ethics Committee think. It is not what a doctor thinks. It is not, as noted below, what the public thinks. It is only this: what is fair, right and just to do?
This respondent has already received the ultimate punishment which may be visited upon a judge. He has been removed from his judicial office. He and his family have been subjected to embarrassment and excoriation, public scorn and humiliation, all of the most profound kind. His medical condition, already severe, has worsened. He has suffered and, harsh as it sounds, he deserved to suffer. But he has suffered enough.
We understand full well that the goal of the ethics process is preservation of the public’s confidence in our judicial and legal systems. The discussion below does not detract one whit from our regard for the public interest. That is a valid consideration, and the OAE and disbarment opinion make much of that. But it is not an absolute. The public and the public interest, *209separate concepts, have been satisfied. They have witnessed the respondent’s ignominy. They have seen the decision against him and the ultimate penalty, loss of his judgeship.
Day after day, indeed year after year, his fall from grace and the reasons for it have been reported in the press. Surely the public understands that he has been soundly punished, that he gained nothing and lost everything, that the system has been preserved, that the system does not protect its own, and that it may have confidence in the system. To say that the public needs more, that it wants to see respondent carted away in the trundle anew, is to simultaneously underestimate and overestimate that public. Those who read about these matters understand what happened and have no cause to doubt the objectivity or toughness of the process. Those who do not bother to read or understand do not care and do not know.
********
For disbarment — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK and STEIN — 5.
Dissenting — Justices O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 2.
ORDER
It is ORDERED that THOMAS YACCARINO of WAYSIDE, who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1961, be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this State, effective immediately; and it is further
ORDERED that THOMAS YACCARINO be and hereby is permanently restrained and enjoined from practicing law; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent comply with Administrative Guideline No. 23 of the Office of Attorney Ethics dealing with disbarred attorneys; and it is further
ORDERED that respondent reimburse the Ethics Financial Committee for appropriate administrative costs.