Court Opinion

ID: 9902206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:26.954565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.505227
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1377-MR

THE GOOD HEART CORPORATION                                               APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE OSCAR G. HOUSE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 22-CI-00230

ALLEN B. ROBERTS, JUDGE, AND
AKN PROPERTIES, LLC                                                      APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: The Good Heart Corporation (GHC) appeals from the order

denying its petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition and motion for

emergency relief, entered by the Clay Circuit Court on November 18, 2022. After

a careful review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                GHC entered into a commercial lease agreement for a space for its

doctor’s office with AKN Properties, LLC (AKN) effective December 9, 2019-

2022. GHC operated at the leased premises until July 2020, when COVID-19 and

staffing issues required that GHC practice via Telemed. On January 11, 2022,

AKN notified GHC it was in default for the following lease violations: the

property was not being used as a doctor’s office, and GHC failed to pay electric

and water bills, resulting in the electricity being disconnected.

                On February 16, 2022, AKN filed a forcible detainer complaint with

the Clay County District Court against GHC, alleging that it gave GHC notice to

vacate on January 13, 2022. The complaint did not specifically list or request any

monetary damages but simply made the preprinted demand contained on form

AOC-216 for possession of the premises, as well as all other relief to which AKN

may be entitled. The summons and notice of hearing were posted by a Clay

County Sheriff’s Deputy in a conspicuous place on the premises and mailed to the

same address via regular mail, as required by KRS1 454.030. While GHC claims it

never received notice of this action, or the hearing date prior thereto, this assertion

is belied by email correspondence in the record referring to the forcible detainer

action before the hearing occurred.

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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             On March 1, 2022, a forcible detainer judgment on form AOC-217

was entered. It ordered GHC to vacate the property within seven days and

awarded AKN “costs of this action” with no mention of a specific amount. GHC

appealed to the Clay Circuit Court. On May 25, 2022, the circuit court affirmed

the district court. GHC moved the Kentucky Court of Appeals for a discretionary

appeal, but its motion was denied on October 18, 2022.

             GHC later moved the district court to vacate its judgment and dismiss

the case, which was denied. GHC then petitioned the circuit court for a writ of

mandamus and prohibition in a separate, original action and moved for emergency

relief. Those motions were also denied, and this appeal followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Whether to grant a petition for a writ is a question of discretion.

Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky. 2004), as modified on denial of reh’g

(Dec. 16, 2004). “The exercise of this authority has no limits except our judicial

discretion[.]” Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Ky. 1961). Even so,

             a writ of prohibition should be granted only upon a
             showing that: 1) the lower court is proceeding or is about
             to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no
             adequate remedy by appeal, or 2) the lower court is about
             to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and
             there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise
             and great injustice and irreparable injury would result.

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Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Writs are

extraordinary remedies ‘which should be used only under the most exceptional

circumstances.’” Anthony v. McLaughlin, 566 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Ky. App. 2018)

(quoting Seymour Charter Buslines, Inc. v. Hopper, 111 S.W.3d 387, 388 (Ky.

2003)).

                                LEGAL ANALYSIS

             On appeal, GHC argues that the district court acted outside its

jurisdiction and, therefore, its writ should have been granted. GHC’s argument

relies heavily upon Anthony v. McLaughlin, 566 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. App. 2018), in

which another panel of our Court held a similar writ should be granted. That case,

however, is distinguishable from the one herein because the amount in controversy

therein was $8,100, which exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the district court of

$5,000. KRS 24A.120(1). As a result, the panel held because “the district court

was without subject matter jurisdiction due to the excessive amount in controversy,

it improperly heard and ruled upon the monetary issue.” Anthony, 566 S.W.3d at

585-86. The concurring opinion of Judge Maze further noted that “the forcible

detainer court is a court of limited jurisdiction. As such, it only has the authority to

order restitution of the premises and payment of costs expended by the prevailing

party.” Id. at 587. That is exactly what was ordered in the case before us –

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restitution of the premises and associated costs; thus, the district court did not act

outside its jurisdiction as was the case in Anthony.

             AKN further contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction

because its forcible detainer complaint was improperly filed. This contention is

largely based upon Shinkle v. Turner, 496 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2016). In Shinkle, the

Supreme Court of Kentucky explained that:

                     “The remedy of forcible entry and detainer was
             evolved from an English criminal proceeding and is not
             strictly a common law action. It is regarded as a
             statutory action at law to recover possession of real
             property[.]” McHugh v. Knippert, 243 S.W.2d 654, 655
             (Ky. 1951). As a special statutory proceeding, KRS
             383.200-285 governs the eviction process with its own
             unique procedural requirements which “shall prevail over
             any inconsistent procedures set forth in the Rules [of
             Civil Procedure].” CR 1; See Baker v. Ryan, 967 S.W.2d
             591, 592 (Ky. App. 1997) (Holding that “the [forcible
             entry and detainer] statutes set up an exclusive procedure,
             complete unto itself, which implicitly rules out
             discovery.”)[.]

             ...

                    In Kentucky, a tenant is guilty of a forcible
             detainer when he refuses to vacate the premises after his
             right of possession has ended. KRS 383.200(a) provides:
             “A forcible detainer is . . . [t]he refusal of a tenant to give
             possession to his landlord after the expiration of his term;
             or of a tenant at will or by sufferance to give possession
             to the landlord after the determination of his will.” For
             cases which, like the instant action, are unaffected by the
             Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, KRS
             383.195 prescribes the means by which a landlord must
             communicate the “determination of his will” to end the

                                           -5-
             tenancy: a landlord may terminate “a tenancy at will or
             by sufferance [by] giving one (1) month’s notice, in
             writing, to the tenant requiring him to remove.”
             Therefore, by operation of KRS 383.195, Shinkle’s
             tenancy and right of possession did not terminate until
             one month after being notified to remove himself from
             the premises. It follows that he could not be guilty of
             forcible detainer until after his right of possession ended.

                    KRS 383.210(1) creates a statutory cause of action
             for “a person aggrieved by a forcible entry or detainer.”
             To assert a valid claim for forcible detainer, the plaintiff
             must allege a current and immediate right to possession
             of the premises; otherwise, he is not “aggrieved by a
             forcible detainer.”

Id. at 421-22 (footnotes omitted).

             In Shinkle, the landlord filed a forcible detainer action eight days after

providing notice to the tenant when 30 days’ notice was required. Consequently,

the court determined the landlord did not have the right of possession at the time

the action was filed, and the district court was without jurisdiction. In the case

herein, however, AKN gave GHC written notice to vacate on January 13, 2022,

and did not file the forcible detainer action until February 16, 2022 – more than 30

days later. Furthermore, the terms of the lease state:

             If [GHC] shall default . . . in any other covenants,
             agreements, conditions, or undertakings herein contained,
             and such default shall continue for thirty days after notice
             thereof in writing to [GHC] . . . it shall be lawful for
             [AKN] at [its] election, to declare the term hereof ended
             and to re-enter the leased property, and to repossess and
             enjoy said premises[.]

                                         -6-
Thus, the district court herein was not deprived of jurisdiction as in Shinkle.

             GHC further asserts that it was not given an opportunity to cure any

default. This is not borne out by the record which contains emails acknowledging

that GHC was aware of lease violations in September 2021 and a notice of default

letter dated September 17, 2021 (delivered by certified mail on September 21,

2021). Attempted delivery of subsequent notices of default to GHC via certified

mail and Sheriff’s service on November 17, 2021, and December 6, 2021,

respectively, were unsuccessful. Still, GHC had ample time to comply with the

terms of the lease prior to the January 2022 notice of default and notice to vacate.

             GHC also claims the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the holding in Meinshausen v. Friendship House of Louisville, Inc., 607

S.W.3d 199, 201 (Ky. App. 2020), in which a forcible detainer complaint was

signed and filed by a non-attorney representative of the landlord, and pursuant to

Emmons v. Madden, 781 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. App. 1989); Cole v. Vincent by Seabolt,

588 S.W.3d 180 (Ky. App. 2019); and Coffey v. Kehoe Rock & Stone, LLC, 270

S.W.3d 902 (Ky. App. 2008), in which there was no landlord-tenant relationship.

The case herein is distinguishable from those as it was filed by an attorney and

there was, in fact, a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties.

             In the alternative, GHC argues that, if the district court was acting

within its jurisdiction, the circuit court erred by not granting the writ because GHC

                                          -7-
“will suffer great injustice and irreparable injury in that its ability to treat patients

will be interrupted.” We reject this alternative argument as GHC admits it

operated remotely beginning in July 2020; therefore, the level of harm does not

rise to that intended for use of the extraordinary remedy of a writ.

                                    CONCLUSION

              Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order entered by the

Clay Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

              ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE AKN
                                              PROPERTIES, LLC:
 Bill Meader
 Hyden, Kentucky                              Zachary R. Smith
                                              Lexington, Kentucky

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