Court Opinion

ID: 9394958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 18:02:26.324734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.402594
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/16/23 P. v. Solis CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096691

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 04F07362)

           v.

    ALLAN SOLIS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2006, defendant Allan Solis was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced
to 25 years to life plus one year. In June 2022, the trial court denied defendant’s second
petition to vacate his sentence under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 On appeal, defendant
contends the trial court erred (1) in concluding this court’s opinions barred the present
petition and (2) by summarily denying the petition without giving the parties an

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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opportunity to be heard. The People agree that the trial court erred but argue that these
errors were harmless given the evidence presented at trial establishing that defendant was
the actual killer — including defendant’s testimony admitting that he killed the victim —
and therefore not eligible for relief under section 1172.6. We agree and affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Given the nature of the present appeal, a summary recitation of the underlying
facts will suffice. On August 12, 2004, Ruby P. came to defendant’s apartment, and they
got into an argument that turned physical. Defendant claimed that Ruby P. grabbed a
knife from the kitchen counter and they wrestled for it, each attempting to stab the other.
They tripped on an air mattress and defendant stabbed Ruby P. in the neck, killing her.
       After a bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)). The court also found true that defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to 25 years to life
with an additional consecutive year for the personal use enhancement. We affirmed in
People v. Solis (Dec. 14, 2007, C053493) [nonpub. opn.].
       On January 22, 2019, defendant filed a petition under former section 1170.95.2
On February 25, 2019, the trial court denied the petition. We affirmed in People v. Solis
(Jan. 16, 2020, C089326) [nonpub. opn.].
       On June 1, 2022, defendant filed a second petition under section 1172.6. He
argued that an information had been filed against him that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder or a natural and probable consequences theory,
that he was convicted of murder, and that he could not now be convicted of murder based

2      Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as section 1172.6, with
no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10) Hereafter, we refer to the statute by its
current designation.

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on the recent changes to sections 188 and 189. Defendant requested appointment of
counsel. On June 6, 2022, the court appointed a public defender to represent defendant.
       On June 22, 2022, the trial court denied the petition. The court concluded that this
court’s 2007 opinion established as law of the case that defendant’s murder conviction
was based on his being the actual killer. The court also determined that our 2020 opinion
affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s first petition for failure to state a prima
facie case of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6 bars his second petition, noting that
we made a specific finding that defendant admitted he killed Ruby P.
                                        DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                      Legal Background
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), effective
January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was
not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to
human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
       Section 188, defining malice, as amended provides in part: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her [or their] participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 2.) Section 189, subdivision (e) limits the circumstances under which a
person may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [(defining first degree
murder)] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is
proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,

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solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section
190.2.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
       Senate Bill 1437 also added former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, which
allows those convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences theory to petition the trial court to vacate the conviction and resentence the
defendant. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.) This statute allows the petitioner to request
appointment of counsel, permits the parties to submit briefing, and requires the court to
review the petition to determine if the petition makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief under the statute, and, upon a prima facie showing, to issue
an order to show cause.
       Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022) further amended
section 1172.6, which now provides in relevant part: “After the parties have had an
opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) “ ‘ “[T]he court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the
petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her [or their] factual allegations were
proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although the court may rely on the record of conviction (including a
prior appellate court opinion) in determining whether defendant has made a prima facie
showing, the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence
or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
       We review independently the trial court’s determination of whether a defendant
has made a prima facie showing. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649; People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

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                                               II
                                            Analysis
       The People concede that the trial court erred in a number of respects. First, the
trial court did not permit the parties to file briefs and failed to hold a hearing at the prima
facie stage as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (c). In short, before deciding that
defendant did not make a prima facie showing, the court “did not comply with statutory
requirements.” (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 891 (Hurtado).) Second,
the People concede that it was an error for the trial court to rely, seemingly exclusively,
on our prior opinions. (See People v. Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 50 [law of the
case doctrine does not apply at the prima facie stage of a § 1172.6 proceeding]; People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987-988 [factual summary in appellate opinion cannot
establish a defendant’s ineligibility for relief under § 1172.6 at the evidentiary hearing or
at the prima facie stage]; but see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [appellate opinions
are generally considered part of the record of conviction examined at the prima facie
stage, but might not supply all the answers].)
       The People argue, however, that these errors were harmless. We agree.
       The trial court’s errors are reviewable for prejudice under the harmless error
standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d. 818, 836 (a violation of California law is
harmless unless “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of error”). (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 973-974; People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, 864; Hurtado, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893.)
       Under this standard, we conclude the trial court’s errors were harmless, because
the record of defendant’s conviction conclusively establishes that he is ineligible for
relief. “ ‘ “[I]f the record . . . ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to the
petitioner.’ ” ’ [Citation] ‘The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial

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court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ ” (Hurtado, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893, quoting Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.)
       We granted the People’s unopposed motion to incorporate by reference the record
of conviction in People v. Solis, case No. C053493, which included defendant’s trial
testimony that he stabbed Ruby P. in the neck and killed her, the testimony of his friend
Edward J. Sabala, Jr., that defendant admitted he stabbed Ruby P., and testimony from
Dr. Elizabeth Albers that the cause of death was blood loss from two stab wounds in
Ruby P.’s neck. (See People v. Flores, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 988, fn. 8 [trial
testimony admissible in § 1172.6 proceedings, unless otherwise excluded by the
Evidence Code].) Further, as set forth in the information filed on March 24, 2005,
defendant was the sole perpetrator charged with the murder of Ruby P.
       On reply, notwithstanding defendant’s nonopposition to the People’s motion, he
argues our review of the record of conviction incorporated by reference is inappropriate.
However, a request to incorporate the records from a prior appeal is not uncommon on
appeal from a trial court’s order on a section 1172.6 petition (and often made by the
defendant). (See People v. Hampton (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1096, fn. 1 [granting
defendant’s request to incorporate the records from a prior appeal on appeal from an
order on a § 1172.6 petition].) Nothing prevents a reviewing court from independently
reviewing the record of conviction on appeal from a denial of a petition brought under
section 1172.6. (Cf. People v. Flores (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 266, 273-274.)
       Here, the record establishes that defendant was convicted as the “actual killer,” a
theory that remains valid after Senate Bill 1437. “As a matter of law[,] resentencing
relief under section 1172.6 is not available to an ‘actual killer.’ ” (People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973; People v. Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 657.) We
conclude the trial court’s errors were harmless. (Garcia, at p. 971.)

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                                    DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.

                                                    \s\                    ,
                                                McADAM, J.*

      We concur:

         \s\           ,
      MAURO, Acting P. J.

          \s\              ,
      DUARTE, J.

*       Judge of the Yolo County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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