Court Opinion

ID: 9527826
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:34:39.788625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:14.534392
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority except for its determinations that judgment was properly entered against George Cline, individually, and that punitive damages were properly awarded.
Concerning the first of these issues I quite agree that the evidence was ample to establish personal liability on the part of Cline. The majority appears to me, however, to confuse this basis for liability with the basis for jurisdiction to enter a judgment. Jurisdiction to enter a personal judgment depends upon the court having personal jurisdiction over the person in question, and George Cline was never made a party to this lawsuit. He was not sued individually and served summons, and no motion was ever made to add him or substitute him as a party.
Pursuant to Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 4(A):
"The court acquires jurisdiction over a party or person who under these rules commences or joins in the action, is served with summons or enters an appearance, or who is subjected to the power of the court under any other law."
See State ex rel. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Madison Sup. Ct. (1976), 265 Ind. 287, 354 N.E.2d 188; see also Idlewine v. Madison Co. Bank & Trust Co. (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 1198.
The majority seeks to avoid the consequences of this basic flaw by pointing out that Cline accepted service of the complaint and was present throughout the trial It also asserts that the question of piercing the corporate veil was actually litigated without objection.
Both assertions are subject to the very defect that concerns me: Cline was never put on legal notice that he might be held personally liable. The complaint and summons were addressed to A.B.C. and Cline's acceptance of them and presence at trial as an officer of A.B.C. were appropriate without regard to any claim of personal liability. Similarly, as a non-party he had no personal standing to object to the evidence offered at trial or any particular motivation to do so.
I wholeheartedly agree that his conduct concerning the Plummers was reprehensible. But the court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment against him personally as a non-party.
Concerning the award of punitive damages the trial court's special findings are simply inadequate to justify the award under the restrictions imposed by Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Traina (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1019 and Travelers Indemmity Co. v. Armstrong (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 349.
I therefore dissent.