Court Opinion

ID: 9830019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:49:19.996955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:10.985116
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
This suit was instituted under title 70, articles 4694 to 4704a, commonly known as the death statute. On May 27, 1925, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Thereafter, and for the first time at any stage of the proceedings in the case, appellant filed a motion suggesting fundamental error apparent of record, in that, at the time of the death of appellee’s husband, which was alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act of appellant, and at the time of the trial of the case, the deceased’s father was living and was not made a party to the suit, nor was the suit brought for his use and benefit. ■
Although the matter was raised for the first time as stated, appellee filed no reply or contest of the motion, and made no suggestion why the statutory provision should not prevail, requiring a father to be made a party to a suit of this character. We sustained the motion July 1, 1925, and reversed and remanded the cause.
Appellee now files a motion for a rehea'ring, ' suggesting that she alleged and proved that the father had no interest in the suit, and was therefore not a necessary party to it A careful examination of the record convinces us that this motion should be sustained. The Supremp Court and the several Courts of Civil Appeals have by numerous decisions held that a parent is a beneficiary of the damages claimed under the provisions of the death statute, and a necessary party to a suit to recover them, and that, where it appears from the record that a parent is not made a party, the judgment cannot stand; the error going to the very foundation of the action. Railway Co. v. Culberson, 68 Tex. 664, 5 S. W. 820; Railway Co. v. Moore, 49 Tex. 31, 30 Am. Rep. 98; Railway Co. v. LeGierse, 51 Tex. 189; Railway Co. v. Mertink, 101 Tex. 165, 105 S. W. 485.
An equally well established rule to the one requiring that a father, having a statutory interest by reason of the wrongful act, be made a party to the suit for damages, is one holding that where the petition for such damages alleges, and the proof shows, that he has no interest in the suit, no useful purpose can be subserved by making him a party. Tex. Central Ry. Co. v. Frazier (Tex. Civ. App.) 34 S. W. 664; Industrial Cotton Oil Co. v. Lial (Tex. Civ. App.) 164 S. W. 40; Railway Co. v. Henry, 75 Tex. 220, 12 S. W. 828; Railway Co. v. Taylor, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 668, 24 S. W. 975; Railway Co. v. Younger, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 141, 29 S. W. 948.
In this case appellee sued for damages for her sole, exclusive, and personal benefit. The record discloses that the father of her deceased husband was present at the trial ‘and testified in the case. Appellee did not sue in her name, for hjs use and benefit. Her petition alleged the following:
“That prior to and at the time of his death he was for a long time engaged in business, and did thereby earn and receive therefrom the sum of $200 per month, and that he was in line for promotion, and could and would have continued to earn the same and more during the period of his natural life; that he has since his marriage cared for and supported his family, consisting of this plaintiff, and has contributed to her support all of his above earnings, with the exception of his bare necessities of life, and would have continued to contribute to the support of this plaintiff the same or more during his natural life.”
Her testimony in support of this allegation is:
“Outside of his own personal expenses and what he contributed to me in the conduct of our home, that was all of his expense. He was not an extravagant man. He was industrious. He worked all the time we were married. In his contributions to me Mr. Lindsay was kind. He bought my clothing. He did not spend a good deal of his salary on his own personal needs. He did not contribute to anybody’s support, except my own. I was entirely dependent on him for support. I am living with my father in Dallas. I was not working while I was married to Mr. Lindsay, but have gone back to work since his death.”
M. M. Lindsay, a witness for appellee, testified:
“He cared for his wife out of his earnings and supported her. He was a good provider, within his means, for his wife. After he married, he put most of his earnings into conducting his home.”
Tlie record discloses that the deceased’s father was a witness for'the appellant. Appellant made no inquiry concerning his interest, if- any, in the suit, or whether the deceased contributed anything to his support. The widow testified that the deceased “did not contribute to anybody’s support except my *1113own.” The record further discloses that the cause was tried in the court helow at the November term, A. D. 1922; that it had been tried once before this, at probably the May term, A. D. 1922, of the same court; and that the father was a witness at the first trial of the case.
Appellant filed no plea or motion, requesting the joinder of the father to the suit, nor did it offer any evidence that he was' claiming an interest. In no way did appellant suggest a nonjoinder of parties, either by a plea to that effect, or by motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial, or by any bill of exception or assignment of error, but raised the question for the first time as above stated. Under these facts, we are of the opinion that appellant is in no position to now complain that the father was not made a party to the suit. The case comes clearly within the rule announced in the ease last above cited; also within the rule announced in Railway Co. v. Spiker, 59 Tex. 435, and Railway Co. v. Wilson, 85 Tex. 516, 22 S. W. 578, in which latter case the Supreme Court said:
“In the case at bar the fact that the. widow and children of deceased "were not parties was directly called ,to defendant’s attention, for it is therein shown that they have no interest in the suit. How, then, can it be said that the verdict of the jury was affected by the idea that it was to be brought for the benefit of all those provided for by statute? If the defendant desired them made parties, it became its -duty to plead it in some way. The Spiker Case, supra, says that, if the mother had settled her claim, that should have been shown, and the judgment could then stand. The assignment is overruled.”
The motion of appellee wiU be granted. The opinion on appellant’s motion filed July 1, 1925, is hereby withdrawn. Our opinions affirming the case, May '27, 1925, ánd on this motion, shaR constitute the judgment of this court.