Court Opinion

ID: 9759453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:16:57.634458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.803849
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial court’s instruction on voluntary manslaughter erroneously precluded the jury from even considering evidence of appellant’s intoxication. The majority holds that this instruction misstated the law but nevertheless denies relief on the spurious theory that because appellant was convicted of murder of the third degree the trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I dissent.
The trial court instructed the jury that as to the charge of involuntary manslaughter evidence of appellant’s intoxication “would be no party [sic] whatever of your reasoning, and you must as to that determination dismiss all evidence of his intoxication from your consideration.” This erroneous instruction incorrectly and improperly circumscribed the *221jury’s consideration. That the jury returned a verdict of murder of the third degree in no way lessens the possibility that the court’s error diverted the jury from a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. But for the trial court’s error, the jury might have found that the intoxication evidence justified a compromise verdict, of voluntary manslaughter even if the jury believed that evidence insufficient to justify acquittal.
Appellant clearly was entitled to a charge on voluntary manslaughter which correctly and completely expressed the law. E. g., Commonwealth v. Musselman, 483 Pa. 245, 396 A.2d 625 (1979). Having found the trial court’s instructions on voluntary manslaughter to be defective, this Court may not overlook a recognized possibility of harm which could arise from that error. The trial court’s acknowledged error in this case was far from harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.