Court Opinion

ID: 9832967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:20:32.630353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:56.732323
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We must decline to make the requested additional finding as facts of a sentence or more from the lengthy testimony of Witwer. Whether we would have made the same finding the district court did is another question, but there is ample testimony to support it. The finding of the court is that appellant was not the procuring cause. We have already said, if appellant were the procuring cause of sale, he would be- entitled to his commission on his contract. We cited the case of McDonald v. Cabiness, 98 S. W. 945, to express fully the idea without further elaboration.
It is true that that opinion was in a suit based upon the quantum meruit, while this is 'on an express contract, as we designated it, and so it is. Having sued upon the contract and no recovery sought upon an implied contract for services performed, our discussion has been confined to that theory.
[4] If the sale had been consummated on the terms of appellant’s alleged contract, because he had procured the purchaser willing, ready, and able to pay the authorized price, the agent would then have performed his duty. He would have still been entitled to his commission, if the purchaser was procured by him and the sale made on his procurement, even though the terms and price changed.
But we said in our opinion it made no difference whether the seller knew or not that the purchaser was procured by him to fix his liability in certain cases, if the sale was closed by a purchaser sent by him on terms given the agent. The word “very” added nothing to its force or logic.
Again, he would not be entitled in such a case to commissions on a contract when the purchaser was procured, without the seller’s knowledge, if the sale was closed on different terms from that given the agent to sell, for that would not entitle him to that particular compensation for services in procuring a purchaser.
This case is disposed of upon the alleged contractual relations of the parties as discussed, because the district court has determined for us the facts, finding that the purchaser was not procured by appellant; in other words, did not procure Lindsley as the purchaser.
The motion for a rehearing is therefore denied.