Court Opinion

ID: 9745398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:53:46.439118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:00.064995
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
This appeal began as a challenge to a purported final judgment of conviction out of Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division Three. However, when the appeal was fully briefed and was submitted to the Second District of the Court of Appeals for decision, there was no final appealable judgment.
*472In the case before us, it clearly appears that Master Commissioner Craig Wellnitz purported to enter the judgment. Record at 118. The sentencing was not approved by the Honorable John Barney, Jr., the regular judge of the court. The record shows that Mr. Wellnitz continued to preside after trial. Although the court reporter indicated that the matter was before the Honorable John Barney, the order appointing pauper appellate counsel was clearly issued by Craig Wellnitz as Commissioner.
Various panels of the Court of Appeals have attempted, in numerous memorandum decisions, as well as in published opinions, to remain consistent and, by dismissing purported appeals, to honor the clear and unmistakable dictate of our Supreme Court in State ex rel. Smith v. Starke Circuit Court (1981) 275 Ind. 483, 417 N.E.2d 1115. See Landers v. State (1991) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 577 N.E.2d 990. Under the cireum-stances as they existed in this cause prior to February 21, 1992, a dismissal of the purported appeal was mandated.
On the latter date, however, an order signed by Chief Judge Ratliff? was improvidently issued. It reads as follows:
"It becoming apparent to the Court after an examination of the record of the proceedings in this appeal that judgment was purportedly entered by a Master Commissioner of the trial court, the Court now finds that this Court should suspend consideration of this appeal and this cause should be remanded to the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 3, for the purpose of the entry of sentence by a proper judicial officer.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED as follows:
1. This Court now suspends consideration of this appeal and remands this cause to the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 8, with instruction to the Honorable John R. Barney, Jr., Judge thereof, to cause sentence to be entered by a proper judicial officer, either by himself or by a duly qualified pro tem judge;
2. The Clerk of this Court is ordered to send copies of this Order to:
The Honorable John R. Barney, Jr.
Judge, Marion Superior Court
Criminal Division, Room 8
W-242, City-County Building
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
The Honorable Faye I. Mowery
Clerk of Marion County
W-122, City-County Building
Indianapolis, Indiana 46204
in addition to sending copies hereof to all counsel of record;
3. The Clerk of Marion County is ordered and directed to file a copy of this Order and thereafter to cause the same to be spread of record in cause number 49G08-9009-CF-105804 of the Marion Superior Court, Criminal Division, Room 8;
4. The Honorable John R. Barney, Jr. is ordered and directed to cause sentence to be entered by a proper judicial officer and thereafter to cause a certified copy of that action to be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of Indiana no later than thirty (80) days from the date of this Order.
ORDERED this 21st day of February, 1992."
Subsequently, on March 19, 1992, a corrected "Order Entering Judgment of Convietion" was filed with the Clerk of the trial court. That course of action was contemplated by the February 21 order of this court. For this reason I am compelled to conclude that appellant should not be penalized by action which this court has authorized, albeit in error.1
Notwithstanding the cases cited by the majority in its footnote 8 at page 470, we are left with a peculiar procedural chronology in the case. The filing of the praecipe, *473the filing of the record as certified on January 29, 1991 by Craig Wellnitz as Master Commissioner, and the filing of the briefs all antedate the entry of judgment. One might question whether the cart has been placed before the horse in such a manner as to destroy both the vehicle and its source of locomotion.
In any event, because of the February 21, 1992 order, I have considered the merits of the "appeal" and I concur in the affirmance of Woodfork's three convictions.

. - An order directing the regular judge "to cause sentence to be entered" presupposes that the regular judge or a duly appointed pro tem will in fact approve the recommendations made by the Master Commissioner. It is, I believe, presumptuous for us to assume that a proper judicial officer is a mere rubber stamp. The proper judicial officer must and does retain the discretion and the prerogative to accept or reject the recommendations of the Commissioner.