Court Opinion

ID: 9690777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:42:15.151113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:04.242374
License: Public Domain

Terry Crabtree, Judge. The White County Circuit Court revoked the probation of Dana Whitener and sentenced her to five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The court ordered that three years of the sentence be suspended, and that she be transferred to the Regional Correction Facility for twenty-four months to participate in the drug program there. On appeal appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding that she inexcusably violated the terms of her probation, because the terms and conditions of her probation were not introduced into evidence. The State responds that because the argument was not raised below, it is not preserved for appeal. We agree and affirm. In August 2002, appellant entered into a plea bargain with the prosecution in the White County Circuit Court. As part of the negotiated plea, she pled guilty to a violation of the Arkansas Hot Check Law. She was placed on supervised probation for three years and ordered to pay a fine of $1000, restitution of $1056.29, and court costs of $150. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-303 (Repl. 2006), if a court suspends imposition of sentence on a defendant or places him or her on probation, the court shall attach such conditions as are reasonably necessary to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life. The statute further provides that every suspension or probation will contain the express condition that the defendant not commit an offense punishable by imprisonment during the period of suspension or probation. As required by statute, appellant was given a written copy of the terms and conditions of her probation which contained, among other requirements, the provision that she not commit a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment. She signed the acknowledgment of the terms and conditions on August 28, 2002, and a copy of the terms and conditions was made part of the court’s file. A petition to revoke was filed on March 15, 2005, alleging that appellant violated the terms of her probation by her failure to report, delinquency on court ordered payments, failure to refrain from the use of illegal controlled substances, being out of state without permission, and being found guilty of driving under the influence and negligent minor care in the state of Nebraska and not reporting the offense to her probation officer. A hearing on the petition was held April 28, 2005. At the hearing Mary Rudisill, a probation officer for White County, testified that she received a call from an officer in Nebraska informing her that appellant’s transfer to that state was being denied due to new charges appellant received in Nebraska. Appellant was charged in Nebraska with driving under the influence and negligent minor care, and she was sentenced to ten days in jail, six months driver’s license suspension and a $400 fine. Ms. Rudisill testified that appellant had completed her sentence in the state of Nebraska. Appellant testified that she did receive a DUI in Nebraska, and that her daughter was riding in the car with her when she was arrested. The court documents from Nebraska were admitted into evidence without objection. Ms. Rudisill also testified that she performed a home visit at appellant’s home, and appellant gave her permission to come inside. Appellant indicated to Ms. Rudisill the bedroom in which she was staying, and on the nightstand in plain view was drug paraphernalia. A field test of a light bulb and plate revealed a positive result for methamphetamine. There was also a glass pipe, marijuana seeds in a plastic bag, three yellow tablets in a plastic bag, scrub pads, and a torch lighter. Ms. Rudisill testified that appellant tested positive for drugs on many occasions. During appellant’s testimony she denied that the drug paraphernalia belonged to her, and she denied being on drugs; however, when escorted from the courtroom to take a drug test, she admitted that she would test positive for methamphetamine. Appellant’s confession was admitted without objection. The trial court revoked appellant’s probation, finding that there had been a violation of the terms of probation. Appellant does not dispute the fact that she was on probation, rather she asserts that because the terms and conditions of her probation were not entered into evidence at the revocation hearing, the trial court had no legal basis for finding a violation. Although appellant raises this argument for the first time on appeal, she contends her argument is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence of the State’s proof regarding violation of a condition of probation may be challenged on appeal of a revocation in the absence of a motion for directed-verdict. Barbee v. State, 346 Ark. 185, 56 S.W.3d 370 (2001). This court dealt with a similar issue in Nelson v. State, 84 Ark. App. 373, 141 S.W.3d 900 (2004). In Nelson, the appellant argued for the first time on appeal that the State failed to produce proof at the hearing that a written list of probationary conditions was given to him, so no revocation could be had. He asserted that his argument was one about the sufficiency of the proof, so the issue was open for review despite being raised for the first time on appeal. We reasoned that “the rule requiring one to make procedural and evidentiary objections known to the trial court is still a viable rule of law. At no time did appellant raise this issue by pointing out to the trial court that he had not been furnished a written statement of his conditions or by objecting to the revocation hearing on that ground.” Id. at 379, 141 S.W.3d at 904. We held that this was a procedural matter and appellant did not timely object; therefore, he waived the issue on appeal.  In the case at bar, appellant does not argue that the State failed to prove that she had knowledge of the terms and conditions of her probation; instead, she asserts that the State failed to prove that the court had knowledge of the terms and conditions of her probation. Appellant’s argument ignores the long-recognized presumption that every person is presumed to know the law, whether civil or criminal. Owens v. State, 354 Ark. 644, 128 S.W.3d 445 (2003). Indeed, a higher duty of compliance rests on those whose responsibility it is to enforce the law than on the general populace. Harris v. State, 264 Ark. 391, 572 S.W.2d 389 (1978). Because our statutory law requires that every probationary sentence contain the condition that the probationer not violate the law, and because everyone is presumed to know the law, it was not necessary for the State to introduce into evidence the probationary condition that appellant not violate the law. There was testimony from appellant’s probation officer and from appellant herself that she was convicted and served jail time in Nebraska for driving under the influence. There was also testimony that appellant was in possession of drug paraphernalia during the probation officer’s home visit, and appellant admitted at the hearing that she would test positive for methamphetamine. Appellant’s argument that the terms and conditions of probation were not introduced into evidence amounts to a procedural objection, and appellant did not raise this issue at the revocation hearing. This court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Brown v. State, 5 Ark. App. 181, 636 S.W.2d 286 (1982).  Appellant also argues that the court’s findings supporting the revocation of her probation are against the preponderance of the evidence because there was no proof that the violation was “inexcusable” as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Repl. 2006). Appellant testified that she was convicted in Nebraska of DUI, and she also confessed to using methamphetamine. She offered no excuse for her behavior. The preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant violated the terms and conditions of her probation. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. Robbins, Bird, Baker, and Roaf, JJ., agree. Griffen, J., dissents.