Court Opinion

ID: 9704555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:39:45.278168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.373797
License: Public Domain

FERREN, Associate Judge,
with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and MACK, Associate Judge, join, concurring:
Judge KELLY’S opinion for the majority holds that if a lawyer commits a criminal offense involving “moral turpitude” (as determined by specified procedures), then D.C.Code 1973, § ll-2503(a), mandates disbarment, despite the more flexible provisions of disciplinary Rule XI (1979). Thus, to the extent that Rule XI conflicts with § ll-2503(a), the rule must yield to the statute.
Our dissenting colleagues question the very premise of the majority opinion. They suggest that this court, at the time it created a disciplinary system under Rule XI of the Rules Governing the Bar, implicitly decided that § ll-2503(a) need not be taken literally — that under the broad authority of •D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502, this court properly adopted, by court rule, the full range of disciplinary sanctions for a lawyer convicted of a crime, whether it involved moral turpitude or not. Thus, Rule XI is the exclusive guide for lawyer discipline; § ll-2503(a) must be ignored in favor of a lawful, preemptive court rule.
The dissenters argue, second, that Rule XI and § ll-2503(a) are manifestly incompatible. They suggest that this reflects, in an objective way, not only that the court originally intended to discard the statute but also that the majority, in applying it now to Colson, has “wreak[ed] considerable havoc upon the orderly functioning” of the disciplinary system. (Dissent at 1178.)
Finally, the dissenters maintain that disbarment of Colson under § 11 — 2503(a) presents, in any event, “a serious question as to whether due process requirements have been met,” since this court has never applied that statute in a previous disciplinary proceeding, and no party has relied on it in this one. (Dissent at 1177.)
In view of this broadside against the majority’s analysis, I believe a further explanation should be offered to demonstrate why, in my judgment, the dissent altogether lacks force.
I.
First, for reference, I set forth those portions of the dissent which appear to bear most directly on the first issue, the relationship between the statute and Rule XI.
In considering what rules to adopt in 1971, this court (of which, like Chief Judge NEWMAN and Judges MACK and FERREN, I was not then a member) was faced with the inconsistencies between the broad grants of power contained in §§ ll-2501(a) and 11-2502 on the one hand, and the restrictive provisions set forth in § 11-2503 on the other. [Dissent at 1163.]
* * * * * *
When the point of decision was reached as to the adoption of disciplinary rules, the court chose the ABA’s model rules (with certain modifications thereof), which have provided both thorough guidance and a desired flexibility. The court did not specifically discuss § 11-2503; that statute’s objectives readily could be considered to be subsumed by (1) the broad authority specifically granted by Congress in §§ ll-2501(a) and 11-2502 (including § 11-2502’s provision for us to “censure, suspend from, or expel a member of [our] bar for crime . . . .”), and (2) the inherent power possessed by the highest court of any jurisdiction to exercise disciplinary authority over attorneys admitted to practice within that jurisdiction. See D.C.Code 1973, § 11-102. [Dissent at 1172.]
******
*1180While I recognize that at least one of the court’s newest judges may not have been aware of the existence of § 11-2503 prior to this case, I can state flatly that this court as an institution, Bar Counsel, and the Board as an institution long have been well aware of the problems present-. ed by the inconsistencies between § 15 of our Rule XI and § 11-2503 of the Code— and, as would be expected, there has been careful dialogue on the subject between the court, Bar Counsel, and the Board. [Dissent at 1172.]
These assertions suggest several questions: (1) Do §§ ll-2501(á) and 11-2502 provide authority for rejecting § ll-2503(a)? (2) Whatever the majority view on that question is today, did this court, in adopting Rule XI in 1971, reject § ll-2503(a)? (3) If not, did this court reject § ll-2503(a) sometime later, in a disciplinary proceeding or otherwise?
A. As to the first question, the dissenters assert that § ll-2503(a) can be “subordinated” to or “subsumed” by §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502. Thus, they say, by authority of these other, more general statutory provisions, Rule XI is paramount to § 11-2503(a). I disagree. There is no doctrine of “subordination” or “subsumption” which would authorize this court to ignore the clear, specific words of § ll-2503(a) in favor of the more general regulatory authority over membership in the bar set forth in §§ 11-2501 and 11 — 2502. The very specificity of § 11-2503 implies a limitation on this court’s general authority under the two preceding sections of the Code.
Basically, what divides the court here is that the majority finds no legitimate basis for ignoring § ll-2503(a) whereas the dissenters conclude that the general powers granted under §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502 are sufficient to justify the court’s blinking at the next section of the statute in favor of the nicely symmetrical, Rule XI disciplinary procedure recommended by the ABA. I do not believe this court can so easily ignore an express act of Congress.1
In holding that Rule XI is limited by § ll-2503(a), the majority acknowledges that when a lawyer is charged with committing a serious criminal offense, there will be a more complex relationship between court and Board than there would be under Rule XI alone. See, e. g., 412 A.2d at 1165 n. 10. But, short of an amendment to the statute or a rewriting of the rule, the procedure spelled out by Judge KELLY for the majority is the one which must be followed.
This legal confirmation of the vitality of § ll-2503(a) is enough to sustain the majority position. The dissent, however, makes factual assertions which suggest that this court is reversing a previously-announced view. If we were doing so, I would be concerned about applying a statute which Colson had legitimate reason to believe the court had officially rejected. We would have to consider seriously whether the better course would be to confirm the authority of § ll-2503(a) prospectively and apply Rule XI to Colson.2 Accordingly, I feel *1181obliged to deal with the dissenters’ statement that there has been “institutional” communication about this subject among the court, Bar Counsel, and the Board, and that the court is therefore “disingenuous” in applying § ll-2503(a) to Colson.
B. When one carefully reads the dissent, especially the passages quoted above, it is apparent that the dissenters never state that this court actually focused on § 11-2503(a) in 1971, at the time Rule XI was adopted. All their assertions are compatible with the view that the court simply overlooked § ll-2503(a) while focusing on the comprehensive draft model rules of the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Professional Discipline. But whatever the truth may be — whether the court was aware of § ll-2503(a) at the time of adopting Rule XI, or learned about the inconsistency sometime later — that fact is legally irrelevant unless this court, in adopting Rule XI or otherwise, can be said to have officially rejected § ll-2503(a). This brings us, then, to the dissenters’ statement that this court “as an institution” took up the matter at some point with Bar Counsel and the Board “as an institution.”
As I can best determine, there was no formal exchange of views between court and Board, for I can find no record of correspondence, memoranda, or minutes which could be considered an official pronouncement of this court, equivalent to an advisory opinion. Nor can I find any tangible evidence of even an informal pronouncement of some sort. Furthermore, even if one or more members of the court had discussions amounting to a “careful dialogue on the subject between the court, Bar Counsel, and the Board” (dissent at 1172), such an informal, private colloquy cannot serve as a proper basis for asserting that a provision of the District of Columbia Code has been officially scrapped.3 I therefore conclude that any attitude of forbearance toward enforcement of § ll-2503(a) which this court may have communicated to the Board can have no legal consequence. An informal policy of forbearance is not tantamount to repeal of a statute.
C. There remains the question whether this court has acted in some other, official way which manifests a rejection of § 11-2503(a). The answer is no. This court has not formally confronted and officially rejected § ll-2503(a) at any time after adoption of Rule XI in 1971.
As the disciplinary system has evolved, the Board, initially through its committees, has considered all “serious crime” cases and made recommendations to this court. See Rule XI, § 15. In some, the Board has concluded that there were ethical violations on grounds other than a finding of moral turpitude. It has based its recommendations accordingly. In others, the Board has found moral turpitude and recommended disbarment. In only one instance prior to the present case has this court considered a “serious crime” involving moral turpitude without an accompanying recommendation of disbarment — an instance in which § 11-2503(a) was not suggested to the court, and in which a three-judge division issued an unpublished three-month suspension order lacking precedential significance.4 Simply *1182put, there is no other basis for saying that this court has rejected § ll-2503(a) at any time after adoption of Rule XI.
Clearly, therefore, the dissenters’ first argument has no force. The provisions of D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-2501(2), 11-2502 do not authorize rejection of § ll-2503(a); but in any event, it is incorrect to suggest that the court, prior to this case, has officially addressed that issue.
II.
The dissenters’ second charge is that Rule XI and § 11 — 2503(a) are manifestly incompatible, and that the majority accordingly has “wreak[ed] considerable havoc” upon the disciplinary system.5
It is important to note first, for perspective, that this court adopted a more pervasive interim suspension rule than § 11-2503(a) expressly requires. Rule XI, § 15 provides for immediate suspension by the court upon conviction of any “serious crime” — a term including all felonies and other specified crimes reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law. See Rule XI, § 15(2). As a result, the “serious crime” category includes all crimes potentially calling for a finding of moral turpitude — and others. Thus, Rule XI, § 15 is broader than § ll-2503(a); it provides as well for immediate suspension for some crimes cognizable under § ll-2503(b).6 The dissenters accept this.
Next, Rule XI, § 15(4) provides that upon a lawyer’s initial suspension for a serious crime, the certificate of conviction shall be forwarded to the Board for institution of formal disciplinary proceedings. If the conviction becomes final, those proceedings shall be confined to one issue: “the nature of the final discipline to be imposed.” Id. Under this system, therefore, if the Board concludes that the crime involved moral turpitude, we hold in Colson that the Board must call for disbarment. D.C.Code 1973, § ll-2503(a). Otherwise, the Board has the full range of sanctions to recommend. D.C. Code 1973, § ll-2503(b); see Rule XI, § 3.7
*1183Inherent in implementing § 11-2503, of course, is the need to establish a procedure for making the “moral turpitude” inquiry in a given case. As indicated by the broader, “serious crime” category in Rule XI, § 15(2), this court does not limit immediate suspension to lawyers convicted of offenses involving moral turpitude; but, of equal importance, the court does not label any offense as one of “moral turpitude,” even tentatively, until that question can be explored on a case-by-case basis, beginning with hearings before a Board committee and then the Board itself. The dissenters acknowledge, in fact, that “[a]n attorney’s right to practice his profession obviously is a valued one, which may not be taken away without proper notice and a fair hearing.” (Dissent at 1171.) Accordingly, Rule XI, § 15 provides a mechanism which can be used to accomplish the purposes of § ll-2503(a), consistent with due process: (1) immediate, interim suspension for “serious crimes” (including all those likely to involve moral turpitude), coupled with (2) disbarment upon final conviction of an offense involving “moral turpitude,” determined to be such after proper hearings before a Board committee, the Board itself, and then this court.
The dissenters, nonetheless, fault this analysis because of two alleged inconsistencies between § ll-2503(a) and Rule XI. First, they reject the majority’s position that Rule XI, § 15 can be used to provide due process elaboration on § ll-2503(a). They assert that “if the statute is to be applied, then it is we [the court] who must make a determination of moral turpitude prior to suspension, which would leave nothing (other than confirming the fact of conviction) to be determined by the Board.” (Dissent at 1177.) I do not understand that statement. As long as this court makes the ultimate determination, there is no reason why we cannot, consistent with the statute, invite the Board, as an arm of the court, to develop the record at a fair hearing and make a recommendation with respect to moral turpitude. Especially for crimes which, on their facts, may involve moral turpitude but are not such per se,8 there is no way that this court can conduct hearings on moral turpitude before suspension; indeed, the dissenters acknowledge as much when stating, with reference to disciplinary hearings generally, that “[unquestionably the caseload of this court would preclude such a role for us.” (Dissent at 1171.) Therefore, unless we limit offenses involving moral turpitude to per se categories, which would unduly narrow the statute, the Board’s role is indispensable, not merely desirable. If Rule XI did not exist, we would have to adopt such provisions to implement § ll-2503(a).
Second, the dissenters claim that § 11-2503(a) is inconsistent with Rule XI because it “connotes permanence” (dissent at 1172), contrary to Rule XI, § 21(2) permitting application for reinstatement five years after disbarment. This point is unpersuasive, however, for several reasons. The § 11-2503(a) requirement that a lawyer convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude “shall be struck from the roll of the members of *1184the bar and . . . thereafter cease to be a member” does not necessarily imply that such expulsion must be permanent.9 Even if it does, the constitutionality of such a result would have to be considered. Finally, if permanent disbarment were constitutional, we obviously would have to reconsider our reinstatement rule in light of the statute. In any event, the question of reinstatement is not before us in this case. See note 2 supra. I see no legitimate reason to ignore the statute simply because of speculation about a related but analytically sev-erable issue.
In summary, recognizing that any disciplinary system should be designed in a way that assures due process, this court has initiated a system which hopefully guarantees a lawyer’s constitutional rights in all situations. I do not understand how the court’s desire to protect constitutional rights can properly lead the dissenters to conclude that Rule XI, § 15 is wholly inconsistent with § ll-2503(a), with the result that the court must choose between the rule and the statute. The statute is there, necessarily to be implemented by procedurally fair rules.10 Judge KELLY’s opinion so provides. Accordingly, there is no manifest incompatibility between § ll-2503(a) and Rule XI.
ill.
A few words should be added, finally, about the dissenters’ argument that the court should not consider § ll-2503(a) in Colson’s case because the proponents of disbarment have not relied on it — presenting a “serious question” of due process.
Rather than accept the majority’s good faith, the dissenters accuse us of revitalizing § ll-2503(a) solely to circumvent the recent amendment of the disciplinary rules providing that the court shall adopt the disposition recommended by the Board (in Colson’s case a five-year suspension), “unless to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable conduct or otherwise would be unwarranted.” Rule XI, § 7(3), as amended. This accusation is not well-founded.
While not premising his advocacy on the statute, Mr. Douglas, as amicus curiae, called the statute to the court’s attention in his brief. If, as the dissenters claim, there is a prevailing assumption that this court, in adopting Rule XI, discarded the mandatory disbarment aspect of § ll-2503(a), then we are duty-bound, in supervising the disciplinary system, to face up to that assumption by deciding forthrightly whether the statute applies or not. We cannot ingenuously ignore it.11
*1185As indicated earlier, if I could perceive a sound basis for believing that this court at any time had officially rejected § 11-2508(a), such that the court now had to reverse itself, I would consider clarifying the applicability of § ll-2503(a) prospectively and judging this case instead under Rule XI, including the standard of review in § 7(3), as amended. I conclude, however, that the court, until now, has not so addressed the question. Nor is there evidence that anyone from the court, Bar Counsel’s office, or the Board gave Colson reason to assume that Rule XI comprised the entire disciplinary universe. At most, the court has diverted attention from the statute by adopting a comprehensive Rule XI which ostensibly covers all bases, although an inconsistency becomes apparent when the rule is compared with the enabling statute.
Under these circumstances, I find the court, in Colson’s case, merely resolving a fundamental legal question which must be settled before there can be a proper disposition. Lawyers and judges routinely have to compare governing statutes and related court rules for consistency. There is nothing inherently unfair — no violation of due process — in doing so here, especially when Colson received full and fair hearings before the Board’s hearing committee, the Board itself, and this court.12
IV.
In summary, the general provisions of D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502 do not provide a basis for rejecting the specific language of § ll-2503(a); the dissenters’ legal argument for ignoring that provision is an all-too-thin bootstrap. Furthermore, I can find no evidence to support the view that this court has openly, let alone officially, rejected D.C.Code 1973, § ll-2503(a) at any time prior to this case. Finally, there is no basis for judging Colson only under Rule XI and announcing prospective application of § ll-2503(a); to do so would elevate a legal question to a legal excuse.
Colson, accordingly, must be disbarred under the statute.

. As the dissenting opinion points out, this court was created under Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Thus, the question whether Congress, rather than this court, has ultimate authority over the practice of law in the District of Columbia arguably raises less of a “separation of powers” problem than there might be were this court created under Article III — or under a separate judicial article of a state constitution. For this reason, I am satisfied not to consider sua sponte the question whether § ll-2503(a), to the extent of requiring mandatory disbarment, is “constitutional.” As indicated later in Part II, a different constitutional question is raised if § ll-2503(a) were construed to require permanent disbarment, i. e., expulsion without prospect for reinstatement, upon conviction of a moral turpitude crime.

. The significance of applying the statute instead of the rule at this point in time is potentially twofold. First, Rule XI does not necessarily require disbarment for a crime involving moral turpitude. See id., §§ 3, 15(4). Second, Rule XI, § 21(2) permits application for reinstatement five years after disbarment, whereas there is an open question whether disbarment under § 11-2503(a) permits reinstatement — an issue to be considered by the en banc court this fall in the case of In re Elaine Kerr, No. D-18-77. Thus, if Rule XI, not the statute, were to be applied in Colson’s case, the question would remain open as to whether he would be entitled to apply for reinstatement under the rule, irrespective of our eventual disposition of the reinstatement question under the statute.

. I was a member of the Disciplinary Board (now Board on Professional Responsibility) during its first four years, 1972-76. I do not recall participating in or learning about any such discussion, but because memory fades I am willing to assume that one or more took place.

. To reinforce their point that § ll-2503(a) should not be applied, our dissenting colleagues stress that three disciplinary cases decided by this court did not mention the statute. The first two cases, however, In the Matter of Wild, D.C.App., 361 A.2d 182 (1976) and In the Matter of Kleindienst, D.C.App., 345 A.2d 146 (1975) (en banc) (per curiam) did not involve “moral turpitude” crimes. Thus, there was no reason for the court to discuss § ll-2503(a).
In the third case, in the Matter of Foshee, No. S-48-77 (unpublished), this court did find violations of DR 1-102(A)(3), proscribing “illegal conduct involving moral turpitude,” as well as DR 1-102(A)(4), prohibiting “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” The court accepted the Board’s recommendation of a three-month suspension without reference to § 1 l-2503(a). The three-judge division of this court issuing the Foshee order was comprised of former Chief Judge Reilly and Associate Judges Nebeker and Harris.
*1182In an effort to enhance the significance of Foshee, supra, the dissenters assert, at their note 7, that “[t]he Foshee case received the careful attention of the full court,” having “voted sua sponte to consider the case en banc” after the division had circulated to the full court “a draft opinion for intended publication.” Subsequently, according to the dissenters, the en banc court returned the case to the division for disposition without publication. The dissenters suggest that these events manifest the full court’s affirmative approval of Foshee, supra. That may. — or may not — be the case. Sometimes, a vote sua sponte to go en banc prior to issuance of a division opinion about to be published signals that a majority of the full court tentatively disagrees with the division in one or more significant respects. See, e. g., Gorham v. United States, D.C.App., 339 A.2d 401 (1975). Thus, by interdicting the intended publication of Foshee, supra and permitting its issuance only as an unpublished Memorandum Opinion and Judgment, with diminished precedential significance, the en banc court cannot, in fairness, be said to have manifested unquestioned approval of that opinion, let alone given forthright consideration to § 1 l-2503(a), which was not cited by the division.

. This argument apparently is advanced for two purposes: to supply objective evidence that the court rejected § 1 1-2503(a) in adopting Rule XI, and to show that the majority’s use of the rule to implement the statute is unworkable. Because the legal irrelevance of the first point is discussed in Part I, supra, I will deal here only with the functional relationship between the statute and the rule.

. This broader immediate suspension provision is justified under D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-2501 and 11-2502 granting this court overall authority to regulate the practice of law, for it does not derogate from any express requirement of § 11-2503.

. Rule XI, § 3, “Types of Discipline,” provides in part as follows:
Misconduct shall be grounds for:
(1) Disbarment by the Court; or
(2) Suspension by the Court [not] in excess of five years; or
(3) Temporary Suspension by the Court . . . ; or
(4) Censure by the Court; or
(5) Reprimand by the Board on Professional Responsibility; or
(6) Informal admonition by Bar Counsel; or
(7) Probation by the Court in conjunction with or in lieu of other discipline.
Without doubt, the legal situation would be clearer if mandatory disbarment for moral turpitude crimes had been specifically incorporated into the disciplinary rules, tracking § 11-2503(a). In creating a “serious crimes” catego*1183ry broader than moral turpitude crimes, and thereby requiring immediate suspension for a broader range of offenses than required by § ll-2503(a), the court failed to deal expressly with the narrower range of offenses mandating eventual disbarment under § ll-2503(a). As indicated earlier, however, this failure may have been caused by the court’s overlooking § 1 l-2503(a) when it adopted Rule XI, not by a conscious rejection of that statute.

. As stated in the majority opinion, we perceive two categories of crimes involving moral turpitude: those which are such per se and those which are such, in a given case, only because of the underlying facts. As to the former, we hold in this case that once this court has made such a determination, after considering the Board recommendation, the Board’s hearing role will be limited in future cases of the same crime to confirming whether the record establishes the conviction. As indicated in the majority opinion at 1165 n.8, we believe that due process is satisfied by this evolutionary process toward a determination of per se moral turpitude crimes. All the more so, due process is preserved through the case-by-case approach, with the Board’s help, to all other determinations that a respondent’s criminal conviction reflects moral turpitude.

. The cases cited by the dissenters, In re Quimby, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 273, 359 F.2d 257 (1966) (per curiam), and In the Matter of Williams, 158 F.Supp. 279 (D.D.C.1957) (per curiam), aff’d per curiam, D.C.Cir., 256 F.2d 888 (1958), do not hold that § ll-2503(a) or its predecessor statute make disbarment permanent. Quimby affirmed appellant’s disbarment for embezzlement, while Williams merely denied a “Motion to Mitigate Punishment” brought by a lawyer who had been disbarred while his appeal of a forgery conviction was pending.
While the Quimby court characterized a suspension, in contrast with disbarment, as a “lesser disciplinary action” which “implies the likelihood that at some future time the court may again be willing to hold out the embezzler as an officer of the court worthy of a client’s trust,” id., 123 U.S.App.D.C. at 274, 359 F.2d at 258, the court did not go on to say that disbarment, to the contrary, would forever preclude reinstatement.

. In stressing that Rule XI, § 15 is designed to assure due process, I do not intend to suggest that this particular procedure is constitutionally required. I simply am saying that this court, in trying to assure fairness, issued rules which can be construed to operate in furtherance of— not inconsistent with — § 1 l-2503(a).

. Although we do not reach the question of the proper disposition of this case under Rule XI, it is not true that we would have confronted a problem with our new standard of review in § 7(3), as amended. This is a case of first impression, with the Board voting five to four in favor of a five-year suspension over disbarment. Given our responsibility to begin setting standards for “moral turpitude” crimes, it would not necessarily be a breach of faith with our new standard if the court were to find a five-year suspension “unwarranted” for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1970) and hold that disbarment was the proper remedy. On the other hand, assuming that the record supports the Board’s recommendation, I have confidence that the seven members of the court in the majority would remain faithful to our oath of office and adopt that disposition.

. The only procedural problem I can think of would be the question whether it is appropriate to disbar under the statute when the Board, after reviewing the majority opinion, conceivably might want to reconsider whether Colson did, after all, commit a crime involving moral turpitude — in which case a remand might be the appropriate disposition. I reject the remand approach, however, for the record is assuredly complete for purposes of our making a moral turpitude determination.