Court Opinion

ID: 9781308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:29:53.945013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:23.963061
License: Public Domain

BENEFIELD, Judge,
dissenting.
The courts have virtually ignored the summary judgment standard in church property disputes thereby giving little credence to the opportunity for the parties to have a jury, as opposed to a judge, decide the issues. Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30 (222 SE2d 322) (1976); Rector of Christ Church v. Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 305 Ga. App. 87 (699 SE2d 45) (2010), aff'd 290 Ga. 95 (718 SE2d 237) (2011), as well as this case. “[The] civil courts use ‘neutral principles of law,’ i.e., statutes, charters, relevant deeds of conveyance, and the organizational constitutions and bylaws of the denomination, to resolve hierarchical church property disputes.” Kemp v. Neal, 288 Ga. 324, 326 (704 SE2d 175) (2010) (plurality). Therefore, the only forms of evidence to be considered in these cases are deeds, statutes, and local and national church documents leaving little to no room for parol evidence as to the uniquely factual issue of intent.9
There are church property cases decided solely on the national church’s documents demonstrating the grantor’s intent by looking at the beneficiary’s impression of a trust, apparently due to the alleged grantor’s “affiliation” with the national church and the purported “benefits” enjoyed by the grantor thereby. Kemp, supra at 328-329; Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 344-345 (254 SE2d 330) (1979); Carnes, supra. Affiliation with the national church, and purported benefits of it, have not been articulated as a neutral principle of law. Inasmuch as this “affiliation” is not a deed, statute or church document and it is being relied on to demonstrate intent, *295perhaps it creates a genuine issue of material fact assuming opposing affidavits to the contrary as in this case. (See affidavits of Dan Patterson, a trustee of TPC, Inc., and Michael L. West, the CEO of TPC, Inc.) Conversely, it is perhaps a judicial acknowledgment that it is insufficient to decide these critical cases on deeds, statutes and church documents alone.
Often the deeds (or land grant) do not establish a trust holding the property for the greater church. See Carnes; Christ Church-, Kemp and Crumbley, supra. In determining intent, this is viewed as irrelevant, “neutral” or in some roundabout way proof of the grantor’s intent. As the majority opinion notes, “[i]t is true that [the deeds do not] show an intent by the grantors to create a trust.” Maj. Op. at 277. When in truth, it was either created or it was not and a review of the deed would quickly demonstrate which was true. The majority continues “[b]ut [the deeds] also do not expressly preclude the creation of one. Given [the provision in the national church’s constitution] Timberridge would have no reason to believe that its deeds needed to recite a trust in favor of the general church... .’’Id.; see also Christ Church, supra at 89-90. It would seem just as easily to follow that Timberridge had no intention of creating a trust since it did not provide one in the deeds as it easily could have. What would be the purpose of including language “this instrument does not create a trust” in a deed?
The statutes are also generally found to be inapplicable, Kemp, supra, or as the majority states, unnecessary or inappropriate in the resolution of this case. In reversing the Court of Appeals, the majority concludes that “the fact that a trust was not created under our state’s generic express . . . trust statute[ ] does not preclude the implication of a trust on church property under the neutral principles of law doctrine.” Maj. Op. at 281. Presumably, it would also not compel the implication of a trust. The majority minimizes reliance on OCGA § 53-12-20, Georgia’s express trust statute, even as persuasive authority, and strongly criticizes the Court of Appeals for incorrectly relying on it.
Even the majority takes issue with the applicability of OCGA § 14-5-46. As the majority concedes,
[although the Court of Appeals’ reason for not applying [the Code section] was erroneous, we note that this Court and the Court of Appeals have failed to analyze another component of the statutory text in our modern cases, namely, whether the property was conveyed “for the purpose of erecting churches or meeting houses.”
(Emphasis in original.) Maj. Op. at 278-279.
*296Nonetheless, the majority looks to OCGA § 14-5-46 as an expression of “this State’s policy of looking to ‘the mode of church government or rules of discipline’ in resolving church property disputes, even when the statutory text does not squarely apply.” Id. at 279. This argument begs the question why OCGA § 53-12-20 cannot likewise be used, at a minimum, as an expression of the State’s policy.
Despite its apparent inapplicability, the majority asserts that OCGA § 14-5-46 “weights] in favor of the trial court’s judgments under our precedents . . .,” id. at 279, yet does not concede that OCGA § 53-12-20 weighs against those judgments demonstrating the bias of “neutral principles of law” as it has evolved in favor of the national church.
The majority relies on Timberridge’s Articles of Incorporation to demonstrate its intent to establish a trust in favor of PCUSA. Without deeds and statutes to resolve the dispute all that is left to the majority are the respective church’s documents. Since the majority interprets Timberridge’s Articles of Incorporation to “unequivocally submit Timberridge and its property to the PCUSA as its governing authority,” (emphasis supplied), id. at 282, it is necessary to review them.
In Division 1 the majority quotes a portion of Article 4 of the Articles of Incorporation of Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc., which states the corporation is “to be a church institution which is a member of the Presbytery of Atlanta of the [PCUSA], or any successor Presbytery thereof.” Further examination of the Article shows that use of the quoted sentence violates the neutral principles of law doctrine and should not have been relied upon by the majority in finding the intent of Timberridge as it began by stating the “purposes for which the Corporation is organized are the proclamation of the Gospel for the salvation of humankind...” which deviates from the role of civil courts to decide these disputes without reference to ecclesiastical matters.10
The majority then quotes the requirement found in the Articles of Incorporation, that “the corporation’s members must be ‘active members’ of Timberridge ‘as defined in the Book of Order of the (PCUSA),’ which defines an ‘active member of a particular church’ *297to be a person who has ‘voluntarily submitted to the government of this (general) church.’ ” Citing § G-5.0202. Maj. Op. at 282. The quote relied on by the majority has a footnote defining the term “government” by citing two biblical passages.11 Therefore, it is artful for the majority to say they are not quoting the biblical portions of the PCUSA’s Constitution. Furthermore, as Presiding Justice Carley points out in his dissent, this definition of “active member” is outside of the property section of the Book of Order and again sounds in spiritual terms.
The majority’s contention that Timberridge’s articles “unequivocally submit Timberridge and its property to PCUSA as its governing authority,” Maj. Op. at 282, is tempered by the majority’s admission that Timberridge may not have rendered itself subject to the authority of PCUSA “in all temporal matters.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 283. A review of the Book of Order demonstrates there is not an area of church governance, including temporal matters, that is not addressed. Nonetheless it is “clear” to the majority that “[b]y adopting these Articles of Incorporation, TPC Inc., with unmistakable clarity, agreed to bind itself to,” id., the Book of Order’s explicit property trust provision. This conclusion is particularly troublesome since they rely heavily on the national church’s constitution, as opposed to simply relying on the articles, to reach this conclusion.
The majority maintains that “[o]ur decision derives from the specific language of the governing documents adopted by the local and national churches, supported by the policy reflected in OCGA § 14-5-46 and not contradicted by the deeds at issue.” Id. at 288. Could the majority not as easily declare that “[o]ur decision derives from the specific language of the governing documents . . . supported by the policy of OCGA § 53-12-20 and not contradicted by the deeds at issue?”
In finding intent neither the trial court, the Court of Appeals nor the majority-have cited the summary judgment standard.12 It is also true that neither of the parties have argued that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case. This may be because the “neutral *298principles of law” construct, as it has evolved in this state, virtually eliminates any genuine and material issues of fact by foreclosing parol evidence as to intent despite the “affiliation” argument.13 As a result, we have institutionalized “trial by judges” in the area of church property cases.
The majority argues that the application of the neutral principles of law doctrine does not create a bias for the national church and it allows this Court to be “even handed” in resolving church property disputes. This argument is a paternalistic assurance to the parties that the courts have developed a system to resolve church property disputes without the bothersome need of a jury. After all, juries may tread on the church’s first amendment rights. Trust us. We know best.
As quoted in Justice Carley’s dissent in Kemp, supra, 288 Ga. at 332, “[t]he majority’s determination that a hierarchical church can unilaterally impress a trust in its favor of local congregational property depends on dicta from Jones v. Wolf, ... but effectively ignores”
the important qualification in the Jones v. Wolf dicta that the obligation of civil courts is to honor “the result indicated by the parties.” [Cit.] In simpler language, civil courts must give effect to bilateral agreements, and a unilateral declaration of trust by the putative beneficiary is not a bilateral agreement. . . . [The majority’s] decision to grant hierarchical churches a unique authority to impress a trust upon property they do not own merely by declaring that the church is the trust beneficiary of that property is [a] ... startling cession of governmental power to a religious organization. Calvin Massey, Church Schisms, Church Property, and Civil Authority, 84 St. John’s L. Rev. 23, 46-49 (III) (2010).
Despite this, the majority in the case sub judice states their decision is “based ... on the sort of legal materials ‘familiar to lawyers and judges,’ embodied in a ‘legally cognizable form,’ and having nothing to do with the church’s religious doctrine,” quoting Jones v. Wolf. Maj. Op. at 288. In what non-church property case is the grantor’s intent found solely in a self-serving document created by the grantee determined to be a “legally cognizable form”?
*299Calvin Massey’s quote in the Kemp dissent goes on to provide:
This is . . . the . . . extraordinary power to seize property by divesting others of their beneficial interests in the property. . . . Donors of property to local churches are not necessarily members of the hierarchical church. Such donors have no assurance that their intent to transfer property in trust for the exclusive benefit of the local church, and not the hierarchical church, will be honored. All the general church would need to do is alter its own internal governing instruments to nullify the explicit intentions of donors.
Granted, the Court in Kemp decided the case solely on one page of the national church’s constitution and though it may be argued that there is more evidence of intent in this case, the point is that the church’s property is being taken as a matter of law and not by the consideration of intent by a jury.
Perhaps it is time to acknowledge that the “neutral principles of law” approach as it has evolved creates a bias for the national church and it is time to correct its application so that we can truly look for, as well as fairly determine, the real intent of the parties. There is no clearer example of the need for this correction than the per curiam decision in the Kemp case. In Kemp, the real property of a local church was awarded to the national church based upon one page of its Book of Discipline and the “affiliation” of the local church with the greater one. Presiding Justice Carley’s dissent pointed out that “the local church obtained title long before adoption of the trust provision on which the majority relies.” Kemp, supra at 332. There were no deeds of conveyance, the statutes were inapplicable and there were no local church documents. Affidavits of two long-time church members averring that there was no question concerning the local church’s right of ownership of the property, given to a bank to obtain a loan upon which the bank relied in accepting a deed to secure the promissory note, Kemp, supra, n. 2, were presumably not considered because they were not relevant to the application of the neutral principles of law doctrine. “When a local church has a relationship with a national church and accepts the benefits afforded to it as a result of that relationship, the local church cannot deny the existence of a trust for the national church as recited in the constitution of the national church.”14 (Citations omitted.) Kemp, *300supra at 329. Based on one page of the Book of Discipline15 and the local church’s “affiliation” with the national church, the local church lost its property to the national church. Is this the even-handedness of which the majority speaks?
Decided November 21, 2011
Reconsideration denied December 8, 2011.
Wilson, Morton & Downs, Robert E. Wilson, Debra A. Golym-bieski, for appellant.
Talley, French & Kendall, Michael C. Kendall, Maureen E. Murphy, for appellee.
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, David H. Gambrell, Linda A. Klein, John Hinton TV, Gallagher Sharp, Forrest *301A. Norman, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, Christopher J. Cox, Alexandra Fellowes, Bell & Brigham, John C. Bell, Jr., Hull Barrett, David E. Hudson, Patrick J. Rice, McNatt, Greene & Peterson, Hugh B. McNatt, Tucker, Everitt, Long, Brewton & Lanier, Thomas W. Tucker, John B. Long, A. Montague Miller, amici curiae.
*300This Court, as the highest court in Georgia, is, and has been, appropriately concerned with protecting the church’s first amendment rights to freedom of religion and the establishment of churches. However, it appears by applying the neutral principles of law construct as it is currently employed, the parties are being denied the right to a jury trial. Churches should not be required to give up one right to protect another.16
By implementing the neutral principles of law in this way, we have not earnestly looked for the intent of both parties. And if we have not, then we have failed not only the pew sitters in the particular churches, but also the overriding directive of Jones v. Wolf to resolve church property disputes by ascertaining “ ‘the intention of the parties’.. . regarding beneficial ownership of the property at issue as expressed ... in a ‘legally cognizable form.’ ”
The majority opines that “Judge Benefield’s dissent cites no precedent that supports her position,” Maj. Op. at 286, and by doing so ignores the point of this dissent. This Court can change, or evolve, the neutral principles of law construct and I am suggesting that it should and, for that, Jones v. Wolf provides the precedent: “a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters.” (Emphasis added.) Jones v. Wolf, supra at 602. For the reasons stated in this dissent, it is time to reform the standard employed.

 Apparently, the courts recognize an unacknowledged fifth form of evidence and that is the local church’s alleged acceptance of benefits from the greater church. “Because [the local congregation] remained a member of the [greater church] and accepted the benefits flowing from that relationship, it cannot now deny the existence of a trust for the benefit of the general church.” Crumbley v. Solomon, 243 Ga. 343, 345 (254 SE2d 330) (1979). Also see Maj. Op. at 275. Local churches sometimes deny the value of the purported benefits received. Carnes, supra (the local church separated from the general church because they were not granted a full-time pastor).

 The majority reproaches the dissenters for quoting ecclesiastical portions of the church documents, however, the quotes are an effort to demonstrate it is the majority that is delving into, and relying on, ecclesiastical matters in their decision and not the dissenters. As noted by the dissent in Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595, 612 (99 SC 3020, 61 LE2d 775) (1979), church documents “tend to be drawn in terms of religious precepts. Attempting to read them ‘in purely secular terms’ is more likely to promote confusion than understanding.” By parsing out the secular terms from the scriptural references in the national church’s Book of Order, the majority has purportedly found the local church’s intent thereby creating bias for the national church, rather than a true understanding of the intent of both parties.

 “They serve at a sanctuary that is a copy and shadow of what is in heaven. This is why Moses was warned when he was about to build the tabernacle: ‘See to it that you make everything according to the pattern shown you on the mountain.’ ” Heb. 8:5. (NIV) “Peace and mercy to all who follow this rule, even to the Israel of God.” Gal. 6:16. (NIV)

 Where this dissenter stands alone, as characterized by the majority, is not whether summary judgment should he granted under the current application of the neutral principles of law doctrine, rather it is whether the law should he changed to permit additional types of evidence to show the intent of both parties. As noted by the dissent in Jones v. Wolf, “ ‘the neutral principles of law’ approach operates as a restrictive rule of evidence,” at least in its current incarnation. See Jones, 443 U. S. at 611.

 In the majority’s response to this dissent, no mention was made as to how evidence of the local church’s “affiliation” with the national church fits into the tight construct of the neutral principles of law doctrine and how they can rely on it as a matter of law when it is a fact that is in dispute in this case.

 The local church denied receiving such benefits and, ironically, when the local church argued that as a result the “trust was breached,” the Kemp Court stated: “We know of no neutral principle of law that embodies appellants’ position, and civil courts may not rely on doctrinal concerns or ecclesiastical principles when deciding disputes between churches.” *300Kemp, supra at 329-330.

 It was the only portion of the Book of Discipline placed in the record by the parties.

 See Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733 (209 SE2d 18) (1974) (a defendant’s testimony at a motion to suppress could not be used against him in the State’s case at trial because that would force him to forfeit a valid Fourth Amendment claim or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).