Court Opinion

ID: 9388842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 18:03:47.639797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.249890
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 210078-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                       NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/20/23. The
                                                                            This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-21-0078
                                                                            Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                            not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                       limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                            under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     St. Clair County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 10-CF-740
                                          )
CHRISTOPHER WILLIS,                       )     Honorable
                                          )     Julie K. Katz,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Cates and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: The order of the circuit court of St. Clair County dismissing the defendant’s
               postconviction petition at the second stage is affirmed where the defendant failed
               to rebut the presumption that he received reasonable assistance of counsel where
               counsel filed a certificate of compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c)
               (eff. July 1, 2017) and where the trial court’s finding that the defendant failed to
               show that his untimely filing of his pro se postconviction petition was not due to
               his own culpable negligence was not manifestly erroneous.

¶2       This is an appeal from the circuit court of St. Clair County. The defendant, Christopher

Willis, appeals the dismissal of his postconviction petition at the second stage. The defendant

argues that remand is warranted where the record demonstrates that he was denied reasonable

assistance of counsel and where postconviction counsel failed to comply with Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

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¶3                                   I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Following a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of one count of aggravated criminal

sexual assault and two counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. He was sentenced to a

consecutive sentence of 24 years’ imprisonment on the sexual assault charge and two concurrent

sentences of 4 years’ imprisonment on each of the sexual abuse charges. On direct appeal, this

court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See People v. Willis, 2013 IL App (5th) 110535-U.

¶5     On May 14, 2018, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). The petition asserted the

following: (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective where counsel failed to object to the taking of

DNA samples from the defendant prior to the appointment of counsel, and where counsel failed to

object to testimony that the defendant’s fingerprint was found on the retrieved weapon despite

documentation to the contrary; (2) that his statement was made without counsel present, due to

officers claiming he had waived his right to counsel, in violation of the Juvenile Court Act; and

(3) that any evidence taken from him on the night of his arrest was fruit of the poisonous tree as

he was a juvenile but was not appointed counsel at the time of his statement.

¶6     On July 31, 2018, the trial court entered a written order finding that the defendant’s petition

set forth the gist of a constitutional claim in that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

The court further found that the petition appeared to be untimely pursuant to section 122-1(c) of

the Act (id. § 122-1(c)), but the defendant would be given the opportunity to establish that the

delay was not the result of his culpable negligence as the petition had not advanced to the second

stage. The court appointed counsel for the defendant, and the petition moved to second-stage

proceedings. On October 3, 2018, the court entered an order granting the defendant leave to file

an amended petition, and the State was given 30 days to respond.

                                                 2
¶7     On October 4, 2019, the defendant, through his counsel, filed an amended petition for

postconviction relief.   The amended petition alleged that the defendant’s trial counsel was

ineffective where (1) counsel failed to introduce or argue DNA/fingerprint evidence that was

favorable to the defendant’s case, (2) counsel failed to determine whether the defendant was

mentally competent to stand trial, (3) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the illegal

obtaining of evidence by investigating officers, (4) the defendant’s sentence was excessive, and

(5) there was an insufficient factual basis for the conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault

and aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Attached to the amended petition was his counsel’s

certificate of compliance pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶8     On November 8, 2019, the State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s amended petition

for postconviction relief. The State argued that the petition should be dismissed as it was untimely,

and the defendant failed to show that the delay was not the result of his culpable negligence; the

defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective under the Strickland standard as the defendant could

not establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance; the defendant’s sentence was not

excessive as the sentences on all three counts were within the statutory limits; and there was a

sufficient factual basis for the conviction of aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated

criminal sexual abuse.

¶9     On December 9, 2019, the defendant, through counsel, filed a response to the State’s

motion to dismiss the amended postconviction petition on the timeliness issue only. The response

asserted that the defendant’s delay in filing the pro se petition was not the result of his culpable

negligence because, due to mental and psychological issues, he was unable to prepare a

postconviction petition without assistance, and he was unable to obtain assistance because he was

in segregation and frequently denied access to the law library. Specifically, since the time of his

                                                 3
convictions, he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and his mental disorder caused him to act

in a manner that resulted in his being placed in segregation, which prevented him from gaining

access to the law library for purposes of seeking assistance in the investigating, researching, and

drafting of his pro se postconviction petition. On other occasions, the defendant was also denied

access by prison personnel without cause or explanation. These conditions resulted in the

defendant being unable to file his petition any sooner than May 14, 2018, and therefore the

untimely filing was not the result of his own culpable negligence.

¶ 10   On January 30, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the

defendant’s amended petition for postconviction relief. After hearing argument, the court found

that the defendant’s diagnosis of schizophrenia was in 2012, but the defendant did not file his

petition until 2018. The defendant was not specific in his filings as to when the law library was

on lockdown or for how long. Additionally, the defendant told his therapist on September 9, 2013,

that, with regard to his mental health, he was having more good days than bad days. The court, in

making its decision, found that considering the defendant reported having more good days than

bad, he should have had enough good days to file his petition sooner than May 2018. The court

further found that the defendant had not refuted the court’s finding that he was culpably negligent

in failing to timely file his pro se postconviction petition. Alternatively, the court found that the

defendant waived any argument that his trial counsel was ineffective where he failed to raise that

issue on direct appeal. The court therefore granted the State’s motion to dismiss. Following the

hearing, the court entered a written order granting the State’s motion to dismiss for the reasons

stated on the record following the hearing. The defendant appeals.

                                                 4
¶ 11                                    II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12   On appeal, the defendant argues that the dismissal of his petition at the second-stage

proceedings should be reversed where his postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable

assistance and where postconviction counsel failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule

651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 13   A defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings.

People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007). The right to counsel is wholly statutory, and a

defendant is only entitled to the level of assistance provided for in the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1

et seq. (West 2016)). Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 42.

¶ 14   The Act provides a collateral means for a defendant to challenge a conviction or sentence

for a substantial violation of a federal or state constitutional right. People v. Bailey, 2017 IL

121450, ¶ 17. The Act establishes a three-stage process for adjudicating a postconviction petition.

Id. ¶ 18. At the first stage of the postconviction proceedings, the trial court must determine,

without any input from the State, whether defendant’s petition is frivolous or patently without

merit. Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). If the petition is not dismissed at the first stage,

the petition must be docketed for further consideration. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2016).

¶ 15   At the second stage, the trial court must determine whether defendant is indigent and, if so,

whether he wishes to have counsel appointed to represent him. Id. § 122-4.

¶ 16   If counsel is appointed, and after they have made any necessary amendments to the petition,

the State may file a motion to dismiss. Id. § 122-5; People v. Kirkpatrick, 2012 IL App (2d)

100898, ¶ 13. At the second stage, the trial court determines whether defendant has made a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation, and, if a substantial showing is made, the petition

                                                   5
proceeds to the third stage for an evidentiary hearing; if no substantial showing is made, the

petition is dismissed. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).

¶ 17    Although, as stated above, the Act provides for the appointment of counsel at an indigent

petitioner’s request when a petition reaches the second stage of proceedings (725 ILCS 5/122-4

(West 2016)), defendant does not have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at a

postconviction proceeding. People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 541 (2000). Instead, the Act

provides a statutory right to “a reasonable level of assistance by appointed counsel.” Id. One

aspect of reasonable assistance is substantial compliance with Rule 651(c). People v. Mason, 2016

IL App (4th) 140517, ¶ 19. Compliance with Rule 651(c) may be shown by the filing of a

certificate of counsel. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The filing of a facially valid Rule

651(c) certificate creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel acted reasonably and complied

with the rule. People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 19. We review counsel’s compliance

with Rule 651(c) de novo. People v. Bass, 2018 IL App (1st) 152650, ¶ 13.

¶ 18    Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) imposes certain duties on

postconviction counsel to ensure that defendant receives a reasonable level of assistance under the

Act. Id. Rule 651(c) requires that postconviction counsel certify, or the record affirmatively show,

that counsel: (1) consulted with defendant either in person or by mail to ascertain his contentions

of the deprivation of constitutional rights, (2) examined the trial record, and (3) amended the

postconviction petition if necessary to adequately present defendant’s claims. People v. Johnson,

338 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1008 (2003). At issue here is whether counsel failed to examine the trial

record, failed to allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to overcome a procedural bar, or

failed to make the necessary amendments to shape the defendant’s legal arguments, as required by

the rule.

                                                  6
¶ 19   As to postconviction counsel’s compliance with Rule 651(c), the defendant cites to

counsel’s allegation in the amended petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence as proof that postconviction counsel did not

examine the trial record where trial counsel did in fact file a motion to suppress the defendant’s

confession. However, we cannot say that this fact alone rebuts the presumption that postconviction

counsel complied with Rule 651(c) as there may have been some variation in what postconviction

counsel thought should have been included in the motion to suppress and the motion actually filed

by trial counsel. Therefore, we find that the defendant has not rebutted the presumption that

postconviction counsel complied with Rule 651(c).

¶ 20   Next, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance

where counsel failed to allege that appellate counsel was ineffective, a procedural bar that had to

be overcome in order for the trial court to consider the amended postconviction petition on the

merits. In dismissing the defendant’s petition, the court stated that the claims raised in the

defendant’s postconviction petition alleging that trial counsel was ineffective were forfeited where

those claims could have been brought in the defendant’s direct appeal. The defendant cites to

People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007), in arguing that appointed counsel’s failure to amend a

defendant’s pro se petition to avoid a procedural bar is grounds for remand. However, the court’s

finding that the arguments made in the defendant’s amended postconviction petition were waived,

as they could have been brought in the direct appeal, was a finding in the alternative. As we will

discuss below, we find that the defendant’s failure to file a timely pro se petition is sufficient

grounds for us to affirm the court’s dismissal of the defendant’s amended petition. Therefore, we

refuse to address this argument further.

                                                 7
¶ 21   Similarly, the defendant argues that he was denied reasonable assistance of counsel where,

in the amended petition, counsel added an allegation not contained in the pro se petition that the

defendant’s sentence was excessive but failed to support the claim with facts or evidence. Though

the defendant claims that the allegation was too conclusory, he points to nothing in the record that

counsel omitted that would have supported a claim that the sentence was excessive. Additionally,

this was not a claim contained in the pro se petition filed by the defendant that counsel failed to

shape or amend.

¶ 22   Next, the defendant argues that he was denied reasonable assistance of counsel where

counsel failed to allege that his late filing of his postconviction petition was not due to his own

culpable negligence. In general, under the Act, “If a petition for certiorari is not filed [with the

United States Supreme Court], no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than

6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing

that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2016).

Here, it is undisputed that the defendant’s filing of his pro se petition was untimely. Therefore,

the question before us is whether the delay was due to the defendant’s culpable negligence.

¶ 23   “Culpable negligence has been defined as ‘[n]egligent conduct that, while not intentional,

involves a disregard of the consequences likely to result from one’s actions.’ [Citation.] Culpable

negligence has also been defined as ‘something more than negligence’ involving ‘an indifference

to, or disregard of, consequences.’ [Citation.]” People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 106 (2002). In

order for defendant to show a lack of culpable negligence, he must allege facts justifying the delay.

People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (1988). The decision of a trial court as to whether the delay was

due to defendant’s culpable negligence will only be reversed if the determination was manifestly

                                                 8
erroneous. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (1997). “Lack of culpable negligence is very

difficult to establish.” People v. Turner, 337 Ill. App. 3d 80, 86 (2003).

¶ 24    Here, the defendant claims that postconviction counsel failed to provide reasonable

assistance and failed to comply with Rule 651(c) where counsel failed to explain why the delay

was not due to his own culpable negligence in the amended postconviction petition and where

counsel was too general in explaining why the defendant’s delay was not due to his culpable

negligence. He relies on the court’s statements regarding the lack of specificity as to when the

prison was on lockdown and when the defendant was in solitary confinement. However, the court

also stated that:

                “Additionally, the defendant told his therapist on September 9, 2013, that with
        regard to his mental health, he was having more good days than bad days. Considering the
        petition should have been filed within three [sic] years, but the defendant took six and ½
        years to file, and considering he was having more good days than bad, he should have had
        enough good days within those 6 and ½ years to file his petition earlier.”

¶ 25    Based on our review of the record, and the statements of the court, we cannot find that its

decision was manifestly erroneous. We likewise find that the court’s statements do not rebut the

presumption that counsel complied with Rule 651(c) in filing a certificate of compliance.

Therefore, we find that the defendant was not denied reasonable assistance of counsel where

counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate of compliance, and where the defendant has failed to rebut

the presumption arising from said filing.

¶ 26                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the second-stage dismissal of the defendant’s amended

postconviction petition.

¶ 28    Affirmed.

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