Court Opinion

ID: 9756561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:38:11.698185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:25.784003
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.,
Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Though some change in the law is warranted in sexual assault cases where the victim’s credibility is at issue, I would hold that extrinsic evidence of a victim’s prior false accusations should be admissible only if 1) the accusations are similar to the charged offense, and 2) the victim denies making the false accusations after being confronted on cross-examination. In this case, it need not be determined whether the first condition was met because certainly the second condition was not met, and in any event, the defendant was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the evidence.
I first take issue with the majority’s expansive and unprecedented holding that the prior false allegations sought to be introduced need not be similar to the charged offense. Instead, as the majority explains, “[t]he relevance of prior false allegations is not premised upon the subject matter of the prior false allegation ... [and] ... the fundamental requirement for admitting extrinsic evidence of a prior false allegation is essentially a showing of legal relevance by balancing the probative value of the knowingly made prior false allegation with the potential prejudice.” As the majority acknowledges, however, “[i]n cases involving rape or sexual assault, most states require trial courts to make a preliminary determination ... that (1) the prosecuting witness made another allegation of rape or sexual assault [that was false].” In fact, every state that has allowed extrinsic evidence of false allegations in sexual assault cases requires that the prior false allegation be the same as or at least similar to the charged offense. See, e. g., Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 831 A.2d 432, 447 (2003); Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 333 (Alaska App.2002); State v. West, 95 Hawaii 452, 24 P.3d 648, 654 (2001); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (refusing to adopt per se rule but looking at each case individually); State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind.1999); State v. Smith, 743 So.2d 199, 202-03 (La.1999); State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d 869, 878 (1997); People v. Grano, 286 Ill.App.3d 278, 221 Ill.Dec. 727, 676 N.E.2d 248, 257-58 (1996); State v. McCarroll, 336 N.C. 559, 445 S.E.2d 18, 20 (1994); State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis.2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600, 606 (1990); Roundtree v. U.S., 581 A.2d 315, 322 (D.C.1990); Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158, 160 (1989); Miller v. State, 105 Nev. 497, 779 P.2d 87, 89-90 (1989); State v. Barber, 13 Kan.App.2d 224, 766 P.2d 1288, 1289-90 (1989); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978); State v. Izzi, 115 R.I. 487, 348 A.2d 371, 372-73 (1975); State v. Nab, 245 Or. 454, 421 P.2d 388, 391 (1966).
*34In effect, these states already have undertaken the majority’s legal relevance/balancing approach by determining, categorically, and as a matter of law, that in cases of sexual assault, the probative value of knowingly made false allegations outweighs the potential prejudice only where the false allegations are the same or similar to the charged offense. Conversely, where the false allegations are not the same or similar to the charged offense, the probative value of the false allegations never outweighs the potential prejudice. This is the better rule. It is a bright line that is easier to apply, and it is more in keeping with the general rule, as cited by the majority, that bars extrinsic evidence of prior, specific acts of misconduct so to conserve judicial resources by avoiding mini-trials on collateral issues. Theoretically, under the majority rule, even the false report of a property loss to collect insurance proceeds or the willful failure to pay a tax is admissible in a sexual assault case. This is the unfortunate result of painting with too broad a brush.1
Assuming that the false allegations here were sufficiently similar under the different rule I would adopt, defendant did not follow the proper procedure for their admission. The majority ignores defendant’s clear violation of the longstanding eviden-tiary rule that precludes the introduction of extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness with specific acts of misconduct without first affording the witness the opportunity to affirm or deny the matter on cross-examination. See State v. Fredericks, 136 Mo. 51, 87 S.W. 832, 833 (1896); Strahl v. Turner, 310 S.W.2d 833, 844 (Mo.1958). The rule is designed, of course, to promote efficiency and preserve judicial resources. It is also to ensure “that the sideshow does not take over the circus.” State v. Johnson, 700 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Mo. banc 1985); John W. Strong, McCoRmick on Evidence sec. 39 (5th ed.1999). Here, for instance, had counsel for defendant inquired of the victim on cross-examination whether she had made false allegations in the past, and the trial court determined that the questioning was relevant on the issue of her credibility, she may have admitted doing so, thus obviating the need for the introduction of extrinsic evidence and the attendant waste of time. See, e. g., Hoover v. Denton, 335 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Mo.1960) (holding that extrinsic evidence should not be admitted once a person admits to a criminal conviction on cross-examination because the further impeachment becomes “surplusage”). See also McCoRmick on Evidence sec. 39 (“If the witness fully admits the facts, the impeacher should not be allowed to prolong the attack by calling other witnesses”). However, the majority, in a footnote, dismisses defendant’s failure to cross-examine as unnecessary, stating that “[i]t likely would have been futile for counsel to attempt to cross-examine the victim regarding subject matter that the trial court had already ruled irrelevant.” That likelihood, though, should not excuse a litigant from making a proper record. The rule for false allegations in sexual assault cases, up to now, was that the cross-examiner was bound by the answers of the witness, and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to impeach the witness. But the fact that the new rule now allows the introduction of extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness’ answers is no reason to discard the requirement that the matter must first be brought up on cross-examination. In fact, all the other appellate courts that have addressed the introduction of extrinsic evidence of a witness’ false alle*35gations in sexual assault cases have done so only in the context of a foundational cross-examination. See generally, State v. Baker, 679 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 2004); Pantazes v. State, 376 Md. 661, 831 A.2d 432 (2003); State v. Bray, 356 N.J.Super. 485, 813 A.2d 571 (2003); Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332 (Alaska App.2002); State v. Gordon, 146 N.H. 258, 770 A.2d 702 (2001); State v. West, 95 Hawaii 452, 24 P.3d 648 (2001); Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Bryant v. State, 734 A.2d 157, 1999 WL 507300 (Del.1999); State v. Walton, 715 N.E.2d 824 (Ind.1999); State v. Smith, 743 S.2d 199 (La.1999); State v. Harris, 97 Wash.App. 865, 989 P.2d 553 (1999); Booker v. State, 334 Ark. 434, 976 S.W.2d 918 (1998); State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d 869 (1997); State v. Chamley, 568 N.W.2d 607 (S.D.1997); State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34 (1997); State ex rel. Mazurek v. District Court of the Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist., 277 Mont. 349, 922 P.2d 474 (1996); People v. Grano, 286 Ill.App.3d 278, 221 Ill.Dec. 727, 676 N.E.2d 248 (1996); State v. Kelley, 229 Conn. 557, 643 A.2d 854 (1994); State v. McCarroll, 336 N.C. 559, 445 S.E.2d 18 (1994); State v. Goodnow, 162 Vt. 527, 649 A.2d 752 (1994); State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813 (1992); Commonwealth v. Boyles, 407 Pa.Super. 343, 595 A.2d 1180 (1991); State v. Boiter, 302 S.C. 381, 396 S.E.2d 364 (1990); State v. DeSantis, 155 Wis.2d 774, 456 N.W.2d 600 (1990); Roundtree v. U.S., 581 A.2d 315 (D.C.1990); Phillips v. State, 545 So.2d 221 (Ala.Crim.App.1989); Smith v. State, 259 Ga. 135, 377 S.E.2d 158 (1989); Miller v. Nevada, 105 Nev. 497, 779 P.2d 87 (1989); State v. Barber, 13 Kan.App.2d 224, 766 P.2d 1288 (1989); Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 235 Va. 319, 368 S.E.2d 263 (1988); State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 685 P.2d 830 (1984); People v. Hackett, 421 Mich. 338, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984); State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302 (N.D.1984); State v. Hutchinson, 141 Ariz. 583, 688 P.2d 209 (1984); State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417 (Minn.1982); People v. Mandel, 48 N.Y.2d 952, 425 N.Y.S.2d 63, 401 N.E.2d 185 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 378 N.E.2d 987 (1978); State v. Simbolo, 188 Colo. 49, 532 P.2d 962 (1975); State v. Izzi, 115 R.I. 487, 348 A.2d 371 (1975); State v. Nab, 245 Or. 454, 421 P.2d 388 (1966); People v. Hurlburt, 166 Cal.App.2d 334, 333 P.2d 82 (1958). I cannot fathom why Missouri should stand apart.
Finally, even if the evidence of false allegations should have been admitted, I would hold that the failure to do so was not prejudicial. First, the defendant did indeed introduce testimony that the victim’s reputation for truth and veracity was very poor, and defense counsel’s focus on closing argument was the victim’s inconsistent stories and behaviors. The additional evidence of specific false allegations — allegations that were not nearly so serious and that involved dissimilar incidents with a different individual — would have added little. Second, and more important, this was not merely a “he said-she said” case as the majority characterizes — a case that turned solely on the victim’s credibility. Instead, there was ample independent support for the victim’s claim that the incident was not consensual and the wounds were not self-inflicted, which was the sole defense. At trial, Long admitted to consensual sexual activity with the victim, but testified that her injuries were self-inflicted and that it was “not surprising that she had bruises or a bump on her head ... she was so violent and hysterical.... ” However, as noted, and contrary to Long’s defense of consent, the victim exhibited much more than “bruises or a bump on her head,” she suffered significant injuries to her vaginal and anal areas and was beaten severely over her entire body. The particulars of *36the uncontroverted evidence press the point: She finally went to the hospital two days after the attack because she still was “bleeding from [her] rectum.” An external body exam conducted by a “sexual assault nurse examiner” revealed “multiple bruises throughout her arms and legs ... head '... shoulders ... jaw ... [and] fingers ... consistent with the way [the victim described] being held [by her assailants].” She also suffered “abrasions” to her labia and “inflammation” in her vaginal area, “indicative of forced penetration.” Additionally there was “a lot of bruising, swelling, [and] abrasions” inside and around the rectum, causing so much pain that the victim “could barely sit down.” In my view, and that of a reasonable juror, no person would consent to such mistreatment.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.

. Not at issue in this case is whether the false reports occurred "recently” before trial, or were too remote in time to be relevant. See State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 258 (Mo. banc 2000); State v. Williams, 492 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo.App.1973).