Court Opinion

ID: 9411561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-27 00:01:55.058995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:07.159632
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30647        Document: 00516835319             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/26/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-30647
                                    Summary Calendar                                 FILED
                                    ____________                                 July 26, 2023
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
   Oscar Turner, Jr.,                                                                Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Wal-Mart Louisiana, L.L.C.; Wal-Mart, Incorporated,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 5:21-CV-3417
                     ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         A customer sued Wal-Mart for injuries he suffered after being allowed
   to use a wrench on an automobile he brought in for servicing. The district
   court struck portions of the plaintiff’s affidavit and granted Wal-Mart
   summary judgment. We conclude that the district court erred when striking

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                   No. 22-30647

   certain portions of the affidavit. Nevertheless, summary judgment was
   proper. AFFIRMED.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In January 2020, Oscar Turner visited a Wal-Mart in Shreveport,
   Louisiana, to get new tires. While he was in the waiting area, a Wal-Mart
   employee told him that the mechanics were having trouble removing the lug
   nuts from his tires. The employee offered to let Turner remove the lug nuts,
   and Turner entered the service bay area to help. Turner accepted a wrench
   from the employee, attempted to use it to remove the lug nuts, and fell
   backward and injured himself when the wrench slipped. Turner had worked
   on cars before and had removed lug nuts from tires many times.
         Turned sued Wal-Mart in state court. Wal-Mart removed the case to
   federal court in the Western District of Louisiana, based on diversity
   jurisdiction. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing that any
   hazard had been open and obvious. Turner attached an affidavit to his
   opposition to the motion. Wal-Mart moved to strike the affidavit.
          The district court granted the motion to strike after finding that
   portions of the affidavit contradicted Turner’s prior testimony. The court
   also granted Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion. It relied on a Louisiana
   Supreme Court opinion that also denied liability on quite similar facts. See
   Caserta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 90 So. 3d 1042 (La. 2012). Turner timely
   appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
          Turner makes two arguments. First, he argues the district court erred
   by striking certain portions of his affidavit. Second, he argues that summary
   judgment was improper. We address the arguments in that order.

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          I.     Affidavit
          We review a motion to strike for an abuse of discretion. Cambridge
   Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Exnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir. 2007). A party
   may not “defeat a motion for summary judgment using an affidavit that
   impeaches, without explanation, sworn testimony.” Seigler v. Wal-Mart
   Stores Tex., L.L.C., 30 F.4th 472, 477 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks and
   citation omitted). “However, not every discrepancy in an affidavit justifies
   disregarding it when evaluating summary judgment evidence. Instead, the
   bar for applying the [sham affidavit] doctrine is a high one, typically
   requiring affidavit testimony that is inherently inconsistent with prior
   testimony.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).
          The district court identified three discrepancies between Turner’s
   deposition testimony and his later affidavit.
          First, Turner testified that a Wal-Mart employee “asked [him] to take
   [the lug nut] off” and then Turner “tr[ied] [to] take it off.” In his affidavit,
   Turner asserts “he did not request or agree with defendant, Wal-Mart, to
   attempt to remove the lug nuts.” Despite saying he had not agreed, the
   affidavit also swears that a Wal-Mart employee “persuaded him to attempt
   to remove the lug nuts.” Turner’s initial testimony implies that he agreed to
   take the lug nuts off, while part of the affidavit explicitly states he did not
   agree. Because these statements are inconsistent, the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in striking the relevant portion of the affidavit.
          Second, when asked whether the wrench was “defective,” Turner
   testified “I don’t know.” In his affidavit, Turner avers that the wrench was
   “defective.” Turner provides no explanation for the inconsistency, such as
   acquiring additional information that allowed him to form an opinion.
   Moreover, whether the wrench was defective is central to Turner’s
   negligence claim. A panel of this court reasonably declined to find an abuse

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   of discretion where an excluded inconsistency relates to a key element of the
   plaintiff’s claim. Free v. Wal-Mart La., L.L.C., 815 F. App’x 765, 766–67 (5th
   Cir. 2020). We decline to do so here, too.
            Finally, Turner testified that he had taken lug nuts off tires
   “[p]robably a thousand times.” In his affidavit, Turner avers that he had
   been “figuratively speaking” and that he “ha[d] taken lug nuts off many
   times,     but   nowhere    near     a   thousand      times.”       A     “summary
   judgment affidavit may supplement deposition testimony by clarifying or
   amplifying the facts with greater detail but may not simply ‘tell[] the same
   story differently.’” Bouvier v. Northrup Grumman Ship Sys., Inc., 350 F.
   App’x 917, 920–21 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax,
   Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original)). “[T]he sham-
   affidavit doctrine    is   not     applicable       when   discrepancies    between
   an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements
   are not inherently inconsistent.” Seigler, 30 F.4th at 477. Turner’s affidavit
   clarifies his earlier hyperbolic testimony and is reconcilable. As a result, the
   district court abused its discretion when excluding this third statement.
            As we will explain, the error was harmless.
            II.     Summary judgment
            We review a district court’s grant of summary judgement de novo.
   Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baptist, 762 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2014).
   Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
   material fact.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A party cannot defeat summary
   judgment with “conclus[ory] allegations, unsupported assertions, or
   presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d
   564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012). Instead, “the nonmovant must go beyond the
   pleadings and designate specific facts” that prove a genuine issue of material
   fact exists. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

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            Under Louisiana’s duty-risk formulation for negligence liability, a
   plaintiff must prove: “(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct
   to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) the defendant’s conduct failed
   to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) the
   defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injuries
   (the cause-in-fact element); (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a
   legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries (the scope of liability or scope of
   protection element); and (5) the actual damages (the damages
   element).” Lemann v. Essen Lane Daiquiris, Inc., 923 So. 2d 627, 633 (La.
   2006).
            We now examine the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion on which the
   district court relied. It held this: “If the facts of a particular case show that
   the complained-of condition should be obvious to all, the condition may not
   be unreasonably dangerous, and the defendant may owe no duty to the
   plaintiff.” Caserta, 90 So. 3d at 1043. The plaintiff in Caserta also suffered
   injury while attempting to remove a lug nut in a Wal-Mart service area. Id.
   The plaintiff was “a machinist who regularly uses a lug wrench, and typically
   services his own truck.” Id. Further, the plaintiff “admitted he was using
   his body weight to put pressure on the lug” and that the “wrench was not
   defective.” Id. The court concluded that “any risk from attempting to
   remove the frozen lug nut should have been obvious to plaintiff, and could
   have been avoided through the use of ordinary care. Therefore, defendants
   owe no duty to plaintiff.” Id. (citation omitted).
            Caserta’s import, however, changed on March 17, 2023, when the
   Louisiana Supreme Court decided Farrell v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 359 So. 3d
   467 (La. 2023). The court “clarif[ied] [] that whether a condition is open and
   obvious is embraced within the breach of the duty element of the duty/risk
   analysis.” Id. at 478. Thus, whether a condition is open and obvious is “not
   a consideration for determining the legal question of the existence of a duty.”

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   Id. (emphasis added). Obviously, open and obvious defects are still part of
   the analysis, but its consideration occurs at a different point.
          Because Farrell was published after briefing in this case was complete,
   we requested supplemental briefing from the parties. With that briefing in
   hand, we review the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
          We begin with duty. “The existence of a duty is a question of law.
   The inquiry is whether the plaintiff has any law (statutory, jurisprudential, or
   arising from general principles of fault) to support the claim that the
   defendant owed him a duty.” Id. at 473 (citation omitted). Here, Louisiana
   Civil Code articles 2315 and 2316 supply a duty.               See id. Article
   2315(A) provides: “Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
   obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.” Article 2316 states:
   “Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his
   act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.” Here, Wal-
   Mart had a duty to keep its premises in a “reasonably safe condition” for
   patrons. See Farrell, 359 So. 3d at 473–74.
          With respect to breach, Louisiana courts apply the risk/utility
   balancing test, which considers four factors: “(1) the utility of the
   complained-of condition; (2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm,
   including the obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of
   preventing the harm; and, (4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms
   of social utility or whether the activities were dangerous by nature.” Id. at
   474. The second factor includes analysis of “open and obvious” conditions.
   Id. at 478. We analyze each factor.
          “If [the complained-of condition] was meant to be there, it often will
   have social utility.” Id. at 474. Wal-Mart contends that “the utility of
   allowing customers the choice of removing their own over-tightened lug nuts
   is high.” Allowing customers the option to remove their own lug nuts when

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   employees cannot do so saves customers the trouble of having to go
   elsewhere. Certainly, customer involvement in such activities may pose
   safety risks. We find this factor to be neutral.
           Turning to the second factor, “[t]he likelihood of the harm factor asks
   the degree to which the condition will likely cause harm.” Id. at 474. If a
   condition “is likely to cause harm, that weighs in favor of finding it
   unreasonably dangerous. If it is unlikely to cause harm, that weighs in favor
   of it not being unreasonably dangerous.” Id. “The more obvious the risk, the
   less likely it is to cause injury because it will be avoided.” Id. To that end,
   the “open and obvious concept asks whether the complained of condition
   would be apparent to any reasonable person who might encounter it.” Id. at
   478. Finally, the “magnitude of the harm factor asks whether the condition
   presents a risk of great or small injury and the likelihood of each.” Id. at 474.
           Turner argues that Wal-Mart, by purportedly restricting the service
   bay to employees, had already determined the likelihood and magnitude of
   harm to be high. Turner asserts that when customers enter the service bay,
   they are at risk of being “struck and killed by falling objects” or “vehicle[s].”
           The correct focus is on Turner’s use of the wrench. Here, as in
   Caserta, 1 voluntarily opting to remove lug nuts and then applying one’s
   weight to do so, as Turner did, presents an “obvious” risk. See Caserta, 90
   So. 3d at 1043. Individuals can likely “avoid[] any harm through the exercise
   of ordinary care,” which weighs against finding there was an “unreasonable
   risk of harm.” Rodriguez v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 152 So. 3d 871, 872 (La. 2014).
   Further, we conclude that voluntarily removing a lug nut with a wrench does

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           1
             Farrell clarified that the “open and obvious” inquiry relates to breach, not duty.
   Farrell, 359 So. 3d at 478. We still, however, read the substance of Caserta’s “open and
   obvious” analysis — not its placement — as valid guidance.

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   not present a high magnitude of harm. Consequently, the likelihood and
   magnitude of harm here is “minimal.” See Farrell, 359 So. 3d at 479.
          Next, we evaluate the cost of prevention. Turner argues it would not
   cost Wal-Mart any money to prevent harm by not allowing customers into
   the service bay. Wal-Mart argues that the record does not contain evidence
   on the cost of prevention. We agree that “the record is void of any []
   evidence” regarding the cost of prevention. Id. at 479. As a result, we do not
   consider this factor.
          Finally, we consider the social utility of Turner’s activities. Turner
   argues that there was no social utility to his conduct. In any event, there may
   be some social utility to customers removing their own lug nuts when
   employees cannot do so.       Further, removing lug nuts does not seem
   particularly dangerous by nature. As a result, this factor weighs in favor of
   breach, though it does not necessarily “weigh heavily as a consideration in
   determining an unreasonably dangerous condition.” Id.
          After applying the risk/utility balancing test, we conclude that
   “reasonable minds could only agree that the condition”— the risk of injury
   from applying one’s weight to remove lug nuts from a tire — was not
   unreasonably dangerous. See id. at 478. Thus, Wal-Mart met its initial
   burden of identifying the absence of factual support for the breach element of
   Turner’s claims. Turner has failed to produce factual support sufficient to
   establish a genuine issue of material fact. See id. at 479. Consequently, Wal-
   Mart did not breach any duty owed.
          The district court’s erroneous exclusion of a portion of Turner’s
   affidavit does not affect this conclusion. The district court properly granted
   summary judgment. AFFIRMED.

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