Court Opinion

ID: 9513222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:33:01.498996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:46.898406
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
[¶25] I concur in nearly all of the well-developed majority opinion by Justice Mar-ing, but I do not believe this case is “significantly distinguishable” from State v. Rodriguez, 454 N.W.2d 726 (N.D.1990) or Geiger v. Backes, 444 N.W.2d 692 (N.D.1989). Here, similar to Geiger, an officer identified De-seth’s car, but was not sure who was driving:
I can’t say for sure that that’s him driving that car, but I would say that it’s his car— probably him.
Officer Rainesalo quickly confirmed Deseth’s license suspension by radio and communicated his reasonable suspicion to the second officer for an investigative stop.
Whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is a fully reviewable question of law.
State v. Gahner, 554 N.W.2d 818, 820 (N.D.1996) (citing State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D.1995)). Only a suspicion is needed, not a probability, to investigate further.
[¶26] The trial court only found, “there wasn’t any license check on the vehicle to positively identify the vehicle as” Deseth’s. But “positively” is more than the suspicion required. As we have often explained, “[w]hile there may be other explanations for the officer’s observations, the reasonable and articulable suspicion standard is less stringent than probable cause.” City of Grand Forks v. Zejdlik, 551 N.W.2d 772, 775 (N.D.1996). It is unclear to me what further findings would do. Therefore, I would reverse . both the suppression order and the dismissal of these prosecutions and remand for trial.