Court Opinion

ID: 9622638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:21:23.098392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:50.759535
License: Public Domain

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge,
Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:
I agree with and applaud the majority’s adoption of the “substantial or motivating factor” test to determine challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In recent Batson cases, the Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt the “but for” causation requirement. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008) (declining to require “but for” causation and explicitly noting that the Court had never previously applied such a requirement); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005) (“Miller-El II”); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 346, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (“Miller-El I”) (“Even though the practice of jury shuffling might not be denominated as a Batson claim because it does not involve a peremptory challenge, the use of the practice here tends to erode the credibility of the prosecution’s assertion that race was not a motivating factor in the jury selection.”) (emphasis added).
Moreover, although the initial three-step framework of Batson does derive from Title VII jurisprudence, the “but for” causation requirement that has been applied in those contexts, see, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), is not appropriate in the distinct Batson context. The difficult task of “ferreting out discrimination” would be made nearly impossible by a “but for” causation requirement, which would require a court to engage in counterfactual reasoning, often with only a sparse record to guide it. See Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 376-77 (9th Cir.2006) (en banc) (Berzon, J. concurring).
Jury selection is a brief process in which peremptory challenges are based on a prosecutor’s judgments or feelings alone,1 with little, if any, recorded discussion. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 239, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (noting the “practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature, and choices subject to myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on the panel from which jurors are selected”). Permitting blatant instances of discrimination to go undeterred in such circumstances, however, would be contrary to Batson’s purpose, eviscerate its protections in many cases, and erode public confidence in the neutrality of the criminal justice system. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 238, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (stating that “the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor’s discrimination invites cynicism respecting the jury’s neutrality, and under*829mines public confidence in adjudication”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411, 111 S.Ct. 1364,113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) (“[Rjacial discrimination in the selection of jurors ‘casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.’ ”) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979)); see also Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928, 110 S.Ct. 292, 107 L.Ed.2d 272 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (stating that racial discrimination in jury selection is “perhaps the greatest embarrassment in the administration of our criminal justice system”).
Where I part company with the majority is in its application of the “substantial or motivating factor” standard to the challenge Matthew Cook (“Cook”) makes here. For me, the proper application of that test would, as the district court stated, lead to a grant of Cook’s habeas petition. I reach this conclusion because the prosecutor’s treatment of African-Americans contrasts starkly with his far different treatment of non-African-Americans. Any fair comparison of the seven strikes he exercised and those he declined to strike demonstrates that his conduct violated Cook’s rights under Batson and its progeny.
"When the dust settled from jury selection, the prosecutor had struck seven out of nine African-American venirepersons (77%) while striking only twenty-three out of ninety non-African-American venirepersons (26%), using 23% of his challenges against African-Americans even though they comprised only approximately 11% of the jury pool.
Finding that the defense had established a prima facie case, the trial court required the prosecutor to state his reasons for exercising the seven peremptory challenges. Although there was a general analysis of the credibility of these explanations, the trial court did not consider each strike individually. It found that the prosecutor had “used reasonable, acceptable criteria” that were not pretextual or a “systematic ... effort to exclude black persons from this jury.” The case went to trial before a fifteen-person jury with one African-American,2 and Cook was convicted on all counts.
Prior to voir dire, prospective jurors completed a questionnaire,3 which the *830prosecutor claims to have heavily relied upon in deciding to exercise strikes.4 In response to the defendants’ BatsonfWheeler motion, the prosecutor explained his strikes against each of the seven venirepersons.
On direct appeal, the California Court of Appeal concluded the reasons given for each peremptory challenge were reasonable and race neutral. However, in affirming the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion, the court gave no indication why it credited the prosecutor’s justifications. Faced with a Batson challenge, a court has a “duty to determine whether the defendant ... established purposeful discrimination.” Lewis v. Lewis, 321 F.3d 824, 834 (9th Cir.2003). The Court of Appeal instead erroneously required only one of the prosecutor’s stated reasons to appear valid on its face in order to sustain each peremptory challenge.
Noting an absence of binding Ninth Circuit authority on the appropriate standard for adjudicating pretext in Batson claims, the district court relied on precedent from other circuits and reluctantly adopted the “but for” approach borrowed from employment discrimination “mixed-motives” cases. Cook v. La Marque, No. CIV S-02-2240 LKK GGH P, 2008 WL 1701690, at *1 (E.D.Cal. Apr.9, 2008) (“[T]he court adopts mixed motives analysis based on the weight of existing federal precedent ... If the court were to decide the matter in the first instance, however, it would likely come to a different conclusion ... Whatever the merits of mixed motives analysis at the trial court level, it is ill-suited for collateral and direct review.”) (citations omitted).
The district court noted that if it had not applied the “but for” standard, it would have concluded that “the discriminatory reason tainted the peremptory strike [of Watkins] and grant[ed] habeas relief on that basis” because “legitimate and illegitimate reasons both independently motivated the strike.” The court further found that the prosecution’s surmise that Watkins “believe[d] that African-Americans were treated differently in the criminal justice system, even though Ms. Watkins had never expressed such a belief,” was a “discriminatory reason that also motivated the strike.” The court nevertheless denied the petition because it concluded that the discriminatory reason, while a substantial motivation for the strike, was not necessarily its “but for” cause.
Denials of habeas petitions are reviewed de novo. Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). Factual findings by the district court are reviewed for clear error. Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 714 (9th Cir.2004).
Our review of the state appellate court’s finding that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), dictated by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Where, as here, our review of a state court’s factual determination is based entirely on information that was contained in the state court record, we would ordinarily defer to the last reasoned state court opinion’s factual findings unless they were “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the *831evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Ali v. Hickman, 584 F.3d 1174, 1181 (9th Cir.2009); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358 n. 1 (citing Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 (9th Cir.2004)). The AEDPA standard of review is “demanding but not insatiable” and “deference does not by definition preclude relief.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 240, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
However, where a state court fails to apply comparative juror analysis in making its factual determination regarding pretext, no AEDPA deference is due because its failure to compare seated jurors with excused jurors in conducting its analysis is contrary to federal law. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358. Here, the state court failed to determine whether the prosecutor’s non-racial motives were pretextual by employing comparative juror analysis and evaluating “the persuasiveness of the justification” and “whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Id. at 358-61 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also People v. Lenix, 44 Cal.4th 602, 622, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 187 P.3d 946 (2008) (“[EJvidence of comparative juror analysis must be considered in the trial court and even for the first time on appeal if relied upon by defendant and the record is adequate to permit the urged comparisons.”). Because the California Court of Appeal employed the incorrect legal standard, this court may examine petitioner’s Batson claim de novo. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007) (when a state court’s adjudication of a claim “is dependent on an antecedent unreasonable application of federal law,” a federal court must “resolve the claim without the deference AEDPA otherwise requires”).
As the majority notes, Cook having established a prima facie case of discrimination and the prosecution having stated reasons for its strikes, the only remaining issue concerns the third step in the Batson analysis: purposeful discrimination. At this stage, the court must “determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination” by evaluating the prosecutor’s proffered reasons. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. “While subjective factors may play a legitimate role in the exercise of challenges, reliance on such factors alone cannot overcome strong objective indicia of discrimination.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (quoting Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir.1994)); see also Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317. As the Supreme Court noted in Miller-El II, while the exercise of peremptory challenges are often a matter of instinct and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is, when illegitimate grounds like race are at issue, a prosecutor must state the reasons for each challenge, which will stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons given. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in “thinking up any rational basis.” 545 U.S. at 252,125 S.Ct. 2317.
To determine whether a defendant has shown “purposeful discrimination,” the trier of fact must evaluate “the persuasiveness of the justifications” offered by the prosecutor to determine whether race was a substantial or motivating factor. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359 (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)). As the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he critical question in determining whether a prisoner has proved purposeful discrimination ... is the persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s justification for his peremptory strike. At this stage, “implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be *832pretexts for purposeful discrimination.” In that instance the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor’s demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy ... Deference [to the trial court] is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations.
Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338-39, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768,115 S.Ct. 1769). Here, however, the state trial court failed to evaluate the “totality of the relevant facts” to decide “whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359.
While determining motive in this area is difficult, side-by-side comparisons (potential jurors who were struck versus those who were not) can be critical in establishing purposeful discrimination. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (“More powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.”); id. at 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (“The whole of the voir dire testimony subject to consideration casts the prosecution’s reasons for striking [the struck venireperson] in an implausible light. Comparing his strike with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views supports a conclusion that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.”).5
Once an inference of race-based strikes has been established, the court need not blindly accept just any non-racial excuse. Kesser, 465 F.3d at 358 (citing Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1331 (9th Cir.1993)). The court must evaluate the record and consider each explanation within the context of the trial as a whole because “[a]n invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 363, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)); Kesser, 465 F.3d at 359. “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317. “The fact that [a proffered] reason also applied to these other panel members, most of them white, none of them struck, is evidence of pretext.” Id. at 248,125 S.Ct. 2317.
As in Kesser, where the state court failed to consider any “evidence outside of the prosecutor’s own self-serving Batson testimony,” 465 F.3d at 358-61, this case is well-suited for appellate application of comparative juror analysis because of the prosecutor’s contemporaneous, recorded *833justifications for the strikes and the timing of the BatsonfWheeler hearing, which was conducted before the original trial was completed and soon after voir dire and the allegation of misconduct.
Finally, if impermissible biases are shown to be a “motivating factor” in the peremptory challenges, the Batson motion should be granted. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1212.
Potential Juror Watkins
The prosecutor gave a litany of reasons for striking Watkins,6 a 37-year-old married African-American woman, who was a college graduate working as an accounting clerk at a law firm. Although some of the proffered explanations may appear plausible at first blush, when read in context and in comparison with seated jurors, they appear pretextual. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (side-by-side comparisons serve as “evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination”). Without evaluating each of these justifications individually or performing comparative juror analysis, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s determination as long as one legitimate race-neutral explanation existed for the strike. The Court of Appeal stopped at the second step of the Batson analysis, where the facial validity of the prosecutor’s reasons were determined, and failed to consider whether any of the proffered reasons were pretextual.
As in another recent Ninth Circuit Bat-son case, the record pertaining to venireperson Watkins convinces me “that each of the prosecutor’s justifications is logically implausible, undermined by a comparative juror analysis, and otherwise unsupported by the record.” Ali, 584 F.3d at 1182. Because “an evaluation of the voir dire transcript and juror questionnaires clearly and convincingly refutes each of the prosecutor’s nonracial grounds,” I conclude that his “actual and only reason for striking [the venireperson] was her race.” Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360.
First, the prosecutor claimed that Watkins “believes her brother was unjustly prosecuted” and “was wrongly convicted,” which could affect her perception of the criminal justice system. See supra note 6. On her questionnaire, Watkins reported that twenty years earlier her brother was convicted of a shooting that her parents had told her was “in self defense.” In response to questions during voir dire, Watkins stated that her brother’s conviction, which occurred when she was only seventeen years old and lived in Alabama, would not affect her at trial and did not *834engender any ill feeling toward the police or prosecutors in Sacramento County.
Despite Watkins’s statements that her brother’s conviction would not affect her judgment in this case, the prosecutor provided the first reason for striking Watkins:
She may ... perceive that ... the government is treating an African-American person differently. She may see, there may be an inward bias. I’m not saying there is, that might be the driving force. That’s a concern, just not that fact, but the whole scenario excludes her, from our point of view.
The district court found, “the prosecutor’s inferential presumption that because Watkins thought her brother wrongly convicted, it might mean that she would be race conscious in her deliberations if chosen to be a juror.” Such a presumption is highly problematic and suggests that the “prosecutor exercised challenges in part with a discriminatory mindset.” Indeed, because the prosecutor never asked her, it is not even certain that Watkins thought her brother was wrongly convicted.7 In response to the court’s questions, she testified that her brother’s trial occurred when she was a minor, that all of her information about it came from her parents, and that her brother was convicted and served seven years in prison for the shooting. Watkins told the court, as she had stated on the questionnaire, that the incident would not affect her judgment in the case or her feelings toward police.
Additionally, Watkins never stated, or even implied, that she believed the government “treats African-Americans differently.” The prosecutor’s attribution was based solely on Watkins’s lack of reply to the question whether she had experienced prejudice. On the questionnaire, Watkins did not mark either ‘Yes” or “No” in response to the question, “Would you say you were raised in an atmosphere free of prejudice?” Instead, she commented, “There are many forms of prejudice, so I can’t accurately answer that.” With respect to both of these alleged statements by Watkins, as in Miller-El II, “[pjerhaps [the prosecutor] misunderstood, but unless he had an ulterior reason for keeping [the struck venireperson] off the jury we think he would have proceeded differently.” 545 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317. Similarly, “we expect the prosecutor would have cleared up any misunderstanding by asking further questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike.” Id. “The failure to ask undermines the persuasiveness of the claimed concern.” Id. at 250 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 2317. As the voir dire transcript shows, Watkins testified that she had no reservations about her brother’s conviction influencing her in the trial, and the prosecutor never challenged her on that assertion.
Moreover, the prosecutor’s explanation is undermined by his treatment of three non-African-American jurors, two of whom also had relatives who had been charged with homicides, and one of whom was unsure of a family member’s past problems with the law. Juror l’s cousin shot and killed his brother-in-law and Juror 14’s father was arrested for murder, but the prosecutor allowed both to be seated. Additionally, the prosecutor also did not strike Juror 5, who only vaguely related information about his brother’s arrest or charge regarding “[s]omething about cocaine” around 1977, about which he “[n]ever did find out the details.”
*835Although no seated juror was precisely identical to Watkins in every respect, the law does not require such a finding. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 247 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (“A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable.”); see also Kesser, 465 F.3d at 366. The prosecutor’s unquestioning acceptance of similar non-African-American jurors, and rejection of Watkins based on his concern about the conviction of her brother creating bias against the criminal system, smacks of pretext. The Supreme Court has found that a prosecutor’s reliance on crime in an African-American juror’s family to justify a strike where the relative’s “criminal history was comparable to those of relatives of other panel members not struck by prosecutors” suggests pretext. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 250 n. 8, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
Second, the prosecutor’s assertion that he excused Watkins because “she might not believe our officers here, or that they start off not with equal standing as some of the other witnesses, including defendants’ witnesses, we suspect, in this case,” is unpersuasive in light of comparative juror analysis.
Although the prosecutor claims he struck Watkins because she stated she did not think “police officers are always truthful, but [did not] think the civilian would be either,” he failed to strike several non-African-American seated jurors who expressed equal or greater skepticism about police officers’ credibility.8 The “distrust of law enforcement” rationale for the strike is “severely undercut by the prosecution’s failure to object to other panel members who expressed views much like [the dismissed venireperson].” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 248, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
Furthermore, contrary to the prosecutor’s contention that Watkins might be more likely to credit testimony by defense witnesses, her statement clearly indicates equal skepticism of civilian witnesses: “I don’t [think] police officers are always truthful, but I don’t think the civilian would be either.” There is simply no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor’s suspicions of bias. As the magistrate correctly noted, “because Watkins thought both law enforcement and non-law enforcement could be untruthful, the [prosecutor’s assertion that] she therefore disfavored law enforcement is a non-sequitur and strained.”
Third, the prosecutor’s alleged concern that Watkins might have had a “hidden agenda” to act against the prosecution through a nullification vote is equally implausible. On her questionnaire, Watkins indicated that she saw problems with the criminal justice system, but did not identify any specifics, stating “I’m not sure.” A comparison of Watkins to two empaneled non-African-American jurors, who the prosecutor failed to strike, is instructive. Juror 6 stated she was “Not sure” about what the problems were with the criminal justice system. Juror 5 indicated there were problems with the criminal justice system, generally stating that “Nothing is perfect,” but did not elaborate. The prosecutor’s failure to strike either non-African-American juror also suggests that the “hidden agenda” rationale was pretextual.
The prosecutor also failed to ask Watkins any clarifying questions on voir dire *836that might confirm or refute his inference. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 2317. During the Batson hearing, he stated that Watkins’s answer that she was “not sure” about problems with the criminal justice system “[left] a void somewhere. Not sure in what sense? Not sure because of the O.J. Simpson case? What sense?” However, Watkins’s questionnaire bears no indication that she closely followed the Simpson trial; she stated she watched “[j]ust enough to see how it was going” and that “it did not affect[her] view [of the courts and the criminal justice system] at all.” Contrary to the requirements of Batson, the prosecutor’s justification provided no “clear and reasonably specific explanation of [the] legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the prosecutor allowed several jurors to be seated who expressed an interest in the O.J. Simpson case to a far greater degree than Watkins. Juror 1 stated he “watched whenever [he] could on CourtT.V.” Juror 3 stated he followed the Simpson case “fairly closely” and found the trial “disappointing.” Indeed, most of the seated jurors followed news of the Simpson case to some degree,9 and none stated in their questionnaire that they did not follow it at all. The prosecutor’s claimed concern with Watkins’s interest in the Simpson trial is simply not credible.
Fourth, the prosecutor’s proffered justification that he struck Watkins because “she would not like to sit as a juror” and “indicate[d] she would not be able to give her full attention to the trial because of work pressures” is again undermined by comparative juror analysis. In response to the questionnaire’s inquiry of whether there would be “any adverse effects from your service on this jury, such as loss of money, work pressures, or health that might prevent you from giving your full attention to this trial,” Watkins marked “Yes” and wrote ‘Work pressures.” Although the prosecutor claimed that this statement contributed to his decision to strike Watkins, he failed to strike seated Jurors 3, 6, 10, and 12, who responded to the question in stronger or more concrete terms. Juror 3 stated that he would “prefer not to be a juror”; Juror 6 expressed her desire not to serve, stating “loss of wage” and “the length of time” as potential problems; Juror 10 noted “[t]ime w/o pay” as an adverse effect of serving on the jury; and Juror 12 indicated that it was not convenient because of the “long drive and ... traffic.” The prosecutor’s differential treatment of these non-African-American jurors again suggests pretext. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1211 (finding it particularly problematic that the prosecutor “attempted to elicit assurances that [the non-African-American juror] would be able to serve despite his work and family obligations,” while choosing not to question the African-American juror more deeply about the matter).
Fifth, the prosecutor stated that, although not controlling, he was also concerned with Watkins’s employment as an account clerk at a law firm: “We find people that work in the legal field somewhat have a difficult time with issues. I’m not sure what comments she may have expressed about lawyers in that firm.” This rationale falls short of Batson’s mandate for a “clear and reasonably specific explanation of [the] legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (internal *837quotation marks omitted). The prosecutor also failed to explore Watkins’s opinion of attorneys.
Sixth, one of the issues with which the prosecutor specifically noted a concern was Watkins’s initial uncertainty in her questionnaire responses about the deliberative process. The prosecutor stated, “I can’t take a chance with a juror ... who will not change her vote, is inflexible even if the others, even if she is persuaded [by the other jurors]. This is not someone that either party would want as a juror.” Contrary to this characterization, Watkins initially appeared to suggest a great degree of flexibility, prompting the court to clarify whether she would too easily relinquish her views in the interests of unanimity.
A comparative analysis of Watkins with Jurors 6 and 7 again reveals that the prosecutor allowed several jurors to sit with questionnaire responses more troubling than Watkins’s. When asked if she would change her vote after discussion if she still thought she was right, Juror 6 handwrote “Unsure” on her questionnaire. Juror 7 stated that he would not change his initial view, even if he was persuaded that he was wrong.10 The prosecutor struck neither, undermining his alleged concern with Watkins’s inflexibility as a juror.
Finally, on her questionnaire, Watkins stated that neither she nor anyone close to her used illegal drugs, but commented that she has “friends that use [them].” The prosecutor claimed that this answer supported his strike:
One can draw an inference from that, that she condones the use of marijuana, thus, that would be violating the law.
She may find certain laws of such a nature that she personally feels she can disregard them, or is morally disinclined to follow them. She may reach such a conclusion during the consideration of this trial. She may not like a particular law, may not feel she has a requirement to follow it.
I’m not saying that’s what her position is. One could draw that inference from this response.
It’s another issue that leaves me uncomfortable that would support a challenge for cause.
Although the prosecutor cited Watkins’s condoning of drugs as a basis for his strike, he offered no explanation for why Watkins’s personal views on marijuana would bear on the case. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712. He also declined to strike six non-African-American jurors who had close friends or relatives who used drugs in the past, four of whom described the relatives’ drug use as problematic. Additionally, the prosecutor allowed two jurors to sit who admitted to using drugs themselves when they were younger,11 behavior that is certainly more indicative of a “disregard” for the law than Watkins’s association with individuals who use drugs.
The majority explains the prosecutor’s justification, which it concedes is “weak,” as a distinction between present and past attitudes regarding drug use. In the prosecutor’s words, however, the issue of drug use was relevant due to his concern that a juror might reach a conclusion because “she personally feels she can disregard” particular laws or be “morally disinclined *838to follow them.” This concern applies more, or certainly just as much, to individuals who have themselves used drugs, even if in the past, than with those potential jurors who have made the decision to personally abstain from drug use but happen to know other people who have not. Comparative juror analysis thus leads to only one reasonable conclusion: the prosecutor’s asserted concern about condoning drug use was not his actual reason for striking Watkins.
The analysis of the “totality of relevant facts,” including comparative juror analysis, refutes the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking Watkins. “The fact that[a given] reason also applied to these other panel members, most of them white, none of them struck, is evidence of pretext.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 248, 125 S.Ct. 2317. The evidence on the record “is open to judgment calls, but when this evidence on the issues raised is viewed cumulatively its direction is too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination.” Id. at 265, 125 S.Ct. 2317. It leads me to conclude that the prosecutor’s actual and only reason for striking Watkins was her race. See Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. Moreover, “the California courts, by failing to consider comparative evidence in the record before it that undeniably contradicted the prosecutor’s purported motivations, unreasonably accepted his nonracial motives as genuine.” Id. at 358. In so doing, the California appellate court reached a conclusion regarding the prosecutor’s intent that was not only incorrect, but unreasonable. See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 266, 125 S.Ct. 2317.
Other Challenged Venirepersons
Because a single racial peremptory challenge calls for a retrial, we need not determine whether there was any genuine nonracial reason for striking each of the other potential African-American jurors. See Snyder, 128 S. Ct at 1208; see also United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir.1988) (“Striking a single black juror could constitute a prima facie case even when blacks ultimately sit on the panel and even when valid reasons exist for striking other blacks.”); United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir.1994) (“[T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.”). Although the strikes exercised against African-American venirepersons Isaac Tillman (“Tillman”), Norman Reynolds (“Reynolds”), James Singleton (“Singleton”), Ruby Parker (“Parker”), Chandra Livingston-Blanks (“Livingston-Blanks”), and Barbara Maxey (“Maxey”) are not as clear cut as that of Watkins, an examination of the explanations for these strikes further undermines the prosecutor’s credibility and lends additional support to the conclusion that the strike of Watkins was racially motivated. See Ali, 584 F.3d at 1193; Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902 (The prosecutor’s “willingness to make up nonracial reasons ... make[s] it even harder to believe his reasons for striking [the minority juror in question] were race-neutral.”).
First, the prosecutor’s professed concern with a venireperson’s disregard for the law as measured by their alleged “condoning” of marijuana use appeared to wax or wane depending on whether the venireperson under consideration was African-American. The prosecutor characterized Livingston-Blanks and Maxey, both African-American, as “condoning” the use of the illegal substances during the Bat-son/Wheeler hearing and argued on that basis that he believed they possessed a more general “disregard for the law.” However, the prosecutor expressed no such concerns about the non-African-American jurors with similar or stronger *839ties to drug use and allowed them to be seated.
The prosecutor expressed concern with Maxey’s ex-husband’s marijuana use and Livingston-Blanks’s admission that “casual Mends at social functions” used illegal drugs, and her ex-boyMend “was a drug and alcohol abuser.” The prosecutor claimed that these associations clearly reflected “a mental state that is very suspect to us as a juror,” and indicated “some social acceptance of this type of activity” that could lead to an unwillingness to follow the law as jurors, or “some negative feelings towards the government because of the fact that it’s illegal to use that product.” This professed concern with drug use by Mends of potential jurors is undermined by his willingness to seat six jurors who had close friends or relatives who used drugs in the past. Moreover, two jurors were allowed to sit who admitted to using drugs themselves when they were younger.12 The prosecutor’s failure to strike these non African-American jurors—or to even inquire at voir dire as to their willingness to follow the law—strongly suggests that these concerns were merely pretextual and makes drug use a dubious basis for the prosecutor’s strikes against Livingston-Blanks and Maxey.
Second, the prosecutor’s supposed concern with venireperson Watkins’s reluctance to serve, see supra p. 14706-07, was duplicated with respect to two other African-American venirepersons—Singleton and Maxey—but again failed to manifest itself with respect to non-AMcan-American members of the venire. Venireperson Maxey, a 41-year-old, college-educated, married African-American woman who was employed as an Associate Personnel Analyst, made a hardship request because she was due to transfer to another state agency and was unsure if she would be able to complete her work if asked to serve on the jury. The court denied her request after questioning, and the record does not reflect that Maxey protested the denial. Venireperson Singleton, an African-American college graduate and U.S. Air Force veteran, did express concern about his high blood pressure and medication, which might require frequent bathroom visits; however, the court made arrangements to ensure Singleton could sit on the jury, allowing him a corner seat and the opportunity to take breaks when needed.
The prosecutor claimed to take all hardship requests “seriously in terms of looking at whether a juror wants to sit, or not, whether or not a juror is going to give us their attention,” and to factor in the requests when “considering whether or not to peremptorily challenge a juror.” This was based on a belief that a juror with a hardship request “would not make a good juror for [the prosecution and] might be inclined to hurry through the process.” However, hardship requests were only used as justification for the prosecutor’s decision to strike African-American venirepersons; similar hardship requests did not prompt him to strike Jurors 8, 6, 10, and 12.
The prosecutor’s alleged concern about unwillingness to serve is further discredited by his strike of venireperson Reynolds for being “too overly eager to serve.” In justifying this strike, the prosecutor focused on a racial aspect of Reynolds’s comments about jury duty:
He appeared to be focused on a race issue by making a comment in reference to a statement he made in the questionnaire that, you know, black people have died for this opportunity, for me to sit therein the jury].
*840That concerned me. I have never heard anybody quite put it that way before, in terms of wanting to be a juror, and it concerned me that he may be overly focused on the issue of race.
That immediately raised my senses that he might be sympathetic to and relate to two of the defendants that are African-American here.
The prosecutor inferred from Reynolds’s statement that Reynolds would be sympathetic to African-American defendants because they were of the same race. There is simply no basis for an inference that African-Americans who appreciate the progress in civil rights of the past century are, on that basis, unable to participate in trials involving other African-Americans. This rationale is so broad that it could exclude nearly all African-Americans from the jury and cannot form a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005).
The prosecutor’s strike for both alleged reluctance and overeagerness to serve on the jury, and his failure to strike similar non-African-American venirepersons, cast doubt on the legitimacy of this proffered reason for striking venirepersons Maxey, Singleton, and Reynolds. A prosecutor truly concerned that Maxey and Singleton would “be inclined to hurry through the process” would also have struck other potential jurors who expressed similar concerns. A prosecutor unmotivated by race would not have considered Reynolds’s positive attitude about serving on a jury a troubling factor weighing in favor of a strike. The inconsistent application of the proffered rationale and the lax treatment of seated jurors on the issue, as with the others discussed above, reinforces the impression that race was a substantial or motivating factor in jury selection. See Miller El II, 545 U.S. at 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (“The whole of the voir dire testimony subject to consideration casts the prosecution’s reasons for striking [the struck venireperson] in an implausible light. Comparing his strike with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views supports a conclusion that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.”).
Third, as the district court found in the case of Watkins, “the prosecutor’s inferential presumption that ... [African-American venirepersons] would be race conscious in [their] deliberations if chosen to be a juror” is highly problematic and suggests that the “prosecutor exercised challenges in part with a discriminatory mindset.” The prosecutor struck Livingston-Blanks, a 36-year-old, divorced African-American woman, because her employment in “human services” might indicate “a liberal viewpoint, or [that she would be] more inclined to be sympathetic, especially given the age of these defendants.” He based this on her temporary employment in clerical roles with the Sacramento County Department of Human Services and Child Protective Services. However, the prosecutor did not strike Juror 15, a registered clinical social worker and nurse.
If Livingston-Blanks’s clerical position truly indicated a “liberal” viewpoint sufficient to support a strike, Juror 15’s direct experience as a social worker should also have supported a strike. The prosecutor’s failure to treat Juror 15 similarly substantially undermines his proffered reason and raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of his strike. “If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar non-black who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317; see also McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) *841(noting that the “prosecutor’s motives may be revealed as pretextual where a given explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different race who was not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge”).
Overall, the validity of the prosecutor’s decision to strike Tillman, Reynolds, Singleton, Parker, Livingston-Blanks, and Maxey is a close question. However, in light of the strike of Watkins, the prosecutor’s proffer of these questionable explanations for the strikes of the African-American venirepersons, as in Ali, “take on a significance that they otherwise might lack.” 584 F.3d at 1195; see also Lewis, 321 F.3d at 831 (“The proffer of various faulty reasons and only one or two otherwise adequate reasons, may undermine the prosecutor’s credibility to such an extent that the court should sustain a Batson challenge.”). At a minimum, these dubious explanations reaffirm our conclusion that impermissible biases were a “substantial or motivating factor” in the peremptory challenges and, therefore, the Batson motion should have been granted. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1212. Even if considered under AEDPA’s deferential standard, the California courts erred by failing to consider comparative evidence in the record that contradicted the prosecutor’s purported motivations, leading them to render “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
The district court believed that the Bat-son issue turned on whether a “substantial or motivating factor” test or a “but for” causation requirement is applied. Although the district court found the prosecutor’s “discriminatory reason tainted the peremptory strike” of venireperson Watkins and would therefore satisfy the “substantial or motivating factor” test, it nevertheless denied petitioner’s habeas petition, feeling bound to apply the “but for” causation requirement as well. Cook, No. CIV S-02-2240 LKK GGH P, 2008 WL 1701690, at *1.13 What we should be doing here is remanding to the district court to apply the proper standard. Instead, the majority substitutes its own judgment for that of the district court.
CONCLUSION
Following Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the proper inquiry in Batson cases is whether the race of at least one potential juror was a “substantial or motivating factor” contributing to a prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges. Id.; Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 346, 123 S.Ct. 1029; Kesser, 465 F.3d at 360. Applying that standard, I would reverse the denial of habeas relief.

. The attempt of the prosecutor in the present case to explain his rationale for one strike as "one of those feelings” is illustrative.

. The jurors self-identified their “ethnic background[s]” as follows: seven "white” or "Caucasian,” one "Asian,” one “black,” one "Croatian,” one "Irish,” one "Italian American,” one "Mexican American,” and one “Pacific Islander” (Juror ll's background is unclear from the record). "[T]he presence of one African-American on the jury does not preclude a Batson challenge,” United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 558 (6th Cir. 2008), because the "more powerful” comparison is between "black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve.” Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317; see also Turner v. Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 814 (9th Cir.1995) ("In denying a Batson motion ... a trial court may not rely solely on the fact that some African-Americans remain on the jury.”), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir.1999).

. The questionnaire included the following questions, among others:
• "How would you describe your ethnic background?”;
• "How closely did you follow the O.J. Simpson trial?”;
• "How, if at all, did the O.J. Simpson trial affect your view of the courts and the criminal justice system?”;
• "Some people think that everyone is biased to some degree. What do you think of that statement?”;
• “Would you say that you were raised in an atmosphere free of prejudice?”
Additionally, the questionnaire asked venirepersons to indicate their level of concurrence with statements regarding minority stereotypes and difficulties faced by minorities as well as questions regarding legal concepts, including the credibility of witnesses, expert *830opinions, circumstantial evidence, and accomplice liability.

. During the BatsonfWheeler proceeding, the prosecutor stated: "I have found that jurors are more frank within their responses in the questionnaire, and I believe that they are easily influenced in rehabilitation ... so I put a lot of deference to the questionnaire.... I don’t ask a lot of followup questions in voir dire, because I believe the questions are more specific than I could restate them in court.”

. See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (courts should consider “such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available”); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830-33 (employing a comparative analysis of the struck juror with empaneled jurors); McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that the “prosecutor's motives may be revealed as pretextual where a given explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different race who was not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge”); Turner v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248 1251-52 (9th Cir.1997) ("A comparative analysis of jurors struck and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring the possibility that facially race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination.”).

. He explained his decision to strike Watkins as follows: (1) she “believes her brother was unjustly prosecuted ... and he went to prison for 7 years, she believes it was in self-defense, the inference being he was wrongly convicted” which could affect her perception of the criminal justice system; (2) she may think "the government is treating an African-American person differently" and thus might have "an inward bias”; (3) "she doesn’t believe police officers are always truthful”; (4) she might have “a hidden agenda, whether or not she would be a nullification vote”; (5) she stated she "saw problems with the criminal justice system” but was “not sure” what those problems were, which "[left] a void somewhere” for the prosecutor; (6) she indicated “she would not be able to give her full attention to the trial because of work pressures”; (7) she "works as an accounting clerk in a law firm ... people that work in the legal field somewhat have a difficult time with issues”; (8) her answer that she was "not sure” whether she would change her vote "if she was persuaded her initial view was right” indicated to the prosecutor that she "is inflexible”; (9) "she indicated that she has friends that use marijuana. One can draw an inference from that, that she condones the use of marijuana, thus, that would be violating the law. She may find certain laws of such a nature that she personally feels she can disregard them, or is morally disinclined to follow them.”

. Although she described her brother as having acted in "self-defense,” she may have been using the term colloquially rather than in its legal sense; she never indicated whether she herself believed he was innocent.

. Juror 1 (on his questionnaire): “[p]olice officers are human and can make mistakes like anyone.” Juror 5: “[t]ruthfulness is a personal issue with very little relevance to profession.” Juror 6: “[e]ither party would have to be proven not credible or dishonest.” Juror 10: police officers “are humans w/ feelings, & their own agendas.” Juror 14: a police officer “is just as human as a civilian and is capable of lieing[sic] just as easy.”

. Juror 13 "saw what was on news on television and [she] listened for the verdict.” Jurors 4, 8, and 15 "occasionally” followed the trial. Juror 7 followed it “every now and then.” Juror 11 followed it for "maybe 2 or 3 weeks.”

. Juror 7 marked "No” in response to the question, “If after discussion with your fellow jurors you became persuaded that your initial view had been wrong, would you change your vote?”

. Juror 5: "Many, many years ago I tried marijuana a few times.” Juror 7: "I have [used illegal drugs] in high school 16 years ago.”

. See supra note 11.

. Had the district court not stated its view that relief would have been granted if a less stringent standard applied, I would have remanded for the application of the "substantial or motivating factor” test.