Court Opinion

ID: 9737317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:21:46.873816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:58.042577
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge
(concurring specially)
1.
I concur in the result and in the analysis of an exclusion in the National Union policy for “any claim arising out of bodily injury.” This exclusion is unique because it deals with claims arising out of a certain harm suffered, namely, bodily injury. It contrasts with the more common exclusion for claims “arising out of’ a certain act or course of action that leads to the suffering of some harm.
As the majority concludes, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court did not employ this ground for its summary judgment, appellants’ claims are for bodily injuries inflicted in the course of sexual misconduct and for emotional harm flowing from those injuries.
2.
This conclusion may involve legal consequences for the insurer beyond the holding of the case. The unique type-of-injury exclusion has had remarkably little judicial scrutiny, in this state or others. An exclusion regarding a whole category of damages resulting from wrongful acts may severely limit the value of the coverage, a matter of some concern for legislative and executive policymakers and for court determinations based on the reasonable expectations of the insured.
In this case, we have set aside appellants’ reasonable-expectations argument largely because the exclusion appears prominently in the policy. Appellants’ limited briefing on the topic is directed against broadly excluding causative acts; appellants contend that the exclusion should not extend to hiring-decisions because of representations, attributable to the insurer, that its liability coverage under this policy extended to claims “arising out of’ hiring, firing, promotion, or demotion. We are not dealing here with arguments or a supporting record regarding the purchaser’s understanding of a type-of-damages exclusion, representations related to that topic, or the cause for or against a broad reading of the exclusion in light of the premium cost of the policy.
3.
This case shows cause for a more cautious analysis of causative-act exclusions like the National Union policy clause on claims arising out of “assault or battery.” It should not encompass misconduct of school staff that results from negligent hiring, supervision, or retention conduct — serious errors of school officials that represent a lapse in their fundamental mission to provide a day-long learning environment for children that is, among other things, reasonably safe.
Heretofore, we have reported imprecisely on the doctrine that emerges from cases dealing with exclusions on claims “arising out of’ certain conduct. Thus, for example, in explanatory dicta, written by the author of this concurring opinion, we have observed that these exclusions applied when the conduct stated in the exclusion was the “immediate” cause of injuries. Mork Clinic v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 575 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. App.1998). In that discussion, we had no occasion to enunciate whether the immediacy of a cause was examined with respect to the sequence of events, the physical proximity of acts and injuries, or the nature of the causes and effect. See National Hydro Sys. v. M.A. Mortenson Co., 529 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn. 1995) (calling for examination of the “temporal, geographical, or causal” nexus between the injury and each of its multiple causes).
The supreme court’s thorough exploration of this kind of exclusion is found in Rausch v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 277 N.W.2d 645 (Minn. 1979), where the court determined that an airplane owner’s liability defense costs arose out of the crash of the plane rather than from the plane-lessee’s dishonor of a contract to pay the costs. The holding prevented recovery under the lessee’s insurance policy, which excluded “liability arising out of’ use of the aircraft.
*271The nexus between the act and the injury, the Rausch court explained, must be examined as a matter of fact in each case. Id. at 647. The court preferred the “fundamental” cause, distinguishing causes that were “incidental” or less “significant.” The ruling, as the court saw it, placed causation, for purposes of the exclusion, in “the original activity out of which this entire matter arose.” The contract breach, the court noted, was not an intervening cause but was “inextricably interwoven with the use of the aircraft.” Id.
The Rausch analysis says, in my opinion, that the fact-specific analysis should look carefully at the weight or importance of the scrutinized cause in producing the injury. In the language of Mortenson, the “causal nexus” is vitally important. The temporal- nexus, Rausch demonstrates, may require primary attention to the earliest cause, the one that begins the course of events causing injuries.
Using the more considered approach the supreme court has employed, it is a mistake, in my opinion, to find the closest nexus between the teacher and the abused student. The responsibility of district officials to the students is an overwhelming, “fundamental” consideration in determining whether or not children will be safe while in school.
The factual circumstances of the case contrast with the more incidental negligence, for example, of those who stage recreational events. See Roloff v. Taste of Minn., 488 N.W.2d 325 (Minn.App.1992), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 1992); Ross v. City of Minneapolis, 408 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.App.1987), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 1987). The selection and monitoring of staff is a responsibility that is greater than other supervisory roles. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 881 (8th Cir.1996) (parent supervision). And the duty of school officials to students is more direct and personal than the duties of many employers toward those who are in occasional contact with their staff.