Court Opinion

ID: 9793423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:47:21.419935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:54.394940
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
specially concurring:
I believe in the rightness of the opinion of Mr. Justice Moore, and further believe that some aspects of his opinion can bear amplification.
Justification of this zoning ordinance in the name of progress, and on the theory that the Constitutions, Federal and state, are flexible enough to sustain it, is not in my opinion warranted. All too frequently acceptance of legislation is urged because it represents progress, and because the flexibility of both Constitutions allegedly has come to mean documents of boundless accommodation, Protean in their adjustments. Beguiling indeed are these notions, and hence their advancement as arguments for a proposition should be scrutinized and analyzed with care.
*141Let us examine and evaluate aspects of the ordinance in question. Is there sanction in the law for the provision regarding off-street parking? — for the provision placing technical demands upon one who desires to keep alive a nonconforming use? — for the provision giving the ordinance a retrospective operation?
Answers to these questions begin with certain fundamental, immemorial rules of property law. In ignoring or overlooking these basic tenets the law has been reduced to a state of contrarieties, where ownership envisions rights in the law of property, but only privileges in the law of zoning and city planning. It is imperative that we return to basic concepts, for then we can get direction and proceed correctly toward our goal — the amelioration of municipál ills.
What derives from the ownership of property? The ordinance under attack here is typical of one answer to the question. In so far as zoning applies, the owner has an inchoate, limited right to put his property to a use; he must go to an agency for a permit to develop his property in a certain way. The zoners and city planners have devised laws by which the owner must seek and obtain a license to do some particular thing with his property. Through these laws certain rights in property are placed under lock and key, and in their place arises a privilege to improve one’s property, granted only after application and then only as the law permits.
Today a zoning board issues a permit to the owner to put his property to a certain use. This board exercises a legislatively imposed discretion in passing upon the application for the permit. And this permit bestows a privilege upon the owner. Such permit “partakes of a personal privilege and grant which attaches to the land. The right in so far as it is a personal privilege is not assignable, and it must be exercised within a reasonable time after its issuance.” Hanley v. Cook, 245 Mass. 563, 139 N.E. 654. See Rhyne, Municipal Law, page 893.
There is another answer to the question of what de*142rives from ownership. It has been tested in the crucible of time, and by reason of its merit constitutional provisions were conceived and cast in its mold. By it an owner has more than a confer able privilege to use his property. He has a legal right, subject to certain restraints, to enjoy and use his property; his ownership, and his enjoyment and use springing therefrom, are not privileges, but are rights which this government was instituted to protect.
If this be not true, of what avail is it that “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right * * * of acquiring, possessing and protecting property . . .,” covenanted in Article II, Section 3, of our Constitution? Of what avail that “Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use without just compensation,” assured in Article II, Section 15? Of what avail that “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” solemnly pledged in Article II, Section 25? Of what avail that a state may not “deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law,” guaranteed in Amendment XIV, Section 1, of the Federal Constitution?
Property had a well-defined meaning at the time these Constitutions were adopted. “The natural right one may have to use his own property as he wills is subject always to the limitation that in its use others shall not be injured. That which is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society may always be prohibited under the inherent or plenary power of the state, notwithstanding the incidental inconvenience or loss individuals may suffer thereby. This power is the law of necessity, and is founded upon the maxim, ‘Salus populi suprema lex.’ The exercise of the power is essential to the maintenance of society, and the establishment of government itself presupposes the surrender to it by the individual citizen of the right to regulate, and even forbid, such use of his private property as would prove injurious to the *143citizens generally. City of Chicago v. Rogers Park Water Co., 214 Ill. 312 [73 N.E. 375]; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 665 [8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205]. It is equally true, however, that the owner of property has the right to put it to any use he desires, provided in so doing he does not imperil or threaten harm to others. Legislative restrictions of the use of property are imposed only upon the theory of necessity; that is, they are necessary for the safety, health, comfort, or general welfare of the public.” Curran Bill Posting & Distributing Co. v. Denver, 47 Colo. 221, 107 Pac. 261, 27 L.R.A.N.S. 544. (Emphasis supplied.) Cf. Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W. (2d) 308; O’Connor v. Moscow, 69 Ida. 37, 202 P. (2d) 401, 9 A.L.R. (2d) 1031 (both zoning cases). See Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443.
It has been said that “[i]f the right of use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right.” Spann v. Dallas, 111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513, 19 A.L.R. 1387; O’Connor v. Moscow, supra. Unless the contemplated use of property imperils the safety, health, comfort or general welfare of the community, it appears that a denial of such use would be invalid. And a zoning restriction must have a reasonable and substantial relation to the safety, health, morals or general welfare; the connection may not be tenuous, vague or remote. 101 C.J.S. §7, page 683 et seq. See Hedgcock v. People, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P. (2d) 264.
Is there such a relation to safety, health, morals or general welfare as warrants the provision in the ordinance for off-street parking? As in the numerous zoning ordinances of other cities requiring the installation of off-street parking facilities in order to make use of property, justification for the provision in question is urged on the ground that Denver has a traffic problem: certain streets in the industrial, commercial and business areas of the city are choked with moving and parked cars, and further uses of property will magnify the con*144dition. To the extent that contemplated uses magnify the condition, the ordinance is said to be proper and effectual in that it will constitute a holding-of-the-line against intensifying the problem.
Although courts generally cannot question the wisdom and policy of a zoning law, they have the duty to determine “that the power must not be exercised so arbitrarily or unreasonably as to make the [zoning] ordinance unconstitutional in its operation and effect,” Colby v. Board of Adjustment, supra. If the effect of off-street parking facilities is to intensify the traffic condition, is ineffectual on examination, and putting it into operation would destroy the thing it purports to protect, clearly it would be unconstitutional. Property would then be taken in violation of cited constitutional provisions.
And that would be the very effect of the operation of the off-street parking provision. Parking space in these areas has reached flood-tide; moving and parked vehicles are jamming the streets; therefore, make possible more parking areas by requiring owners of buildings to provide off-street facilities, and thereby concentrate more moving traffic in the areas. Alleviate the lesser of two evils, the parked car, so that the greater, the moving vehicle, can be put in increased mass movement. A self-defeating condition inevitably follows such a development, for with more parking facilities available, more vehicles are attracted to the area, and traffic becomes denser.
If an owner builds a large structure on his land (and let us assume it is a useful building presenting no aspects of being a nuisance), does it imperil safety, health, morals or general welfare because no provision is made for parking facilities? It may be a building requiring, because of the nature of the business conducted therein, very few employees, and very few persons may be attracted to it for trade. On the other hand, it may house businesses having many employees and bringing to it many people. The building may be located on very busy *145streets, heavily burdened with moving and parked vehicles. In either case, automotive traffic attracted to the building may be a minute part of one per cent or it may be one per cent of the total traffic on the streets around the structure on any or every day.
Continuing with our illustration: the total traffic represents 100%, and the problem of how to handle this total traffic is one of municipal concern. It is primarily a street problem; it involves movement of vehicles with dispatch, convenience and safety. Even the total parking may be an inconsequential percentage of the total traffic using the streets around the building. Other streets in the area may have substantially less traffic and less parking. In all these illustrations we are dealing with variants, all of which go to the question of the reasonableness of the provision requiring the installation of parking facilities.
Is there a reasonable connection between traffic congestion and a large building to which may be attracted considerably less than one per cent of the parked and moving cars on the street? In most instances the street, its width, its accessibility to other important streets, the directness with which persons using it can reach points of interest or of business, and probably other factors create the problem of traffic congestion. As can be seen, in essence the problem begins in the street and ends there.
In fact, there is authority for the proposition that mounting traffic burdens or hazards are matters which constitute police problems and are not within the province of the zoning authorities. Greenberg v. City of New Rochelle, 129 N.Y.S. (2d) 691, affirmed 134 N.Y.S. (2d) 593, appeal dis. 308 N.Y. 736, 124 N.E. (2d) 716; Property Owners Ass’n, etc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 123 N.Y.S. (2d) 716.
Adelphi College, located in the village of Garden City, N. Y., made application to the Zoning Board for permission to erect stands which would accommodate 3,958 per*146sons, and the Board approved stands for only 2,000 persons, subject to certain conditions. As stated by the Supreme Court of New York in Property Owners Ass'n, etc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals, supra: “The principal question raised upon the hearing related to a possible increase in traffic and parking upon the village streets which allegedly would be detrimental to the residents but the evidence does not justify a conclusion that the presence or absence of permanent seats would have that effect.” In the syllabus is a succinct statement of the holding of the court, viz.: “Great increase in traffic and parking on village streets, if a college were granted permission to erect seating stands adjacent to its athletic field in village, were problems for police, not. village zoning authorities.”
This total traffic condition represents a municipal and public problem to be solved. Property dedicated to its solution is property devoted to a public use. Involuntary dedication of such property to such use is a taking of the property. Only a resort to sophistry may sustain the ordinance as not constituting the taking of property for a public use.
Indeed, there is argument that only persons going to a building will be permitted to use the parking facility provided for the building. It is argued that parking is furnished for their convenience, and therefore it is not requiring an owner to put his property to a public use. If that be true, then it is a taking for private use, a taking of more doubtful validity.
How far can a city go in requiring accessory uses? Could a city require an apartment house builder who intends to accept families with children to furnish classrooms for such children in order to ameliorate traffic congestion and related problems on the streets on which his building will be located? In order to keep children off the streets, whether such children are tenants or visitors of tenants, could the city require such builder to furnish playgrounds and a gymnasium — yes, and super*147visors to maintain safety and order while these facilities are being used? Could the city require the builder of an office building to construct over- or underpasses for tenants and their patrons where the building would be located on heavily traveled streets? Instances could be multiplied, but these questions test the measure of the proposed power of a city.
As a matter of fact, the illustrations suggested by the foregoing questions have a better basis for being held valid than the reality with which we are dealing, for in each of the illustrations the problem of safety has a closer relevance to the use of the property than the off-street parking provision has to the uses of property described in the instant ordinance.
The zoning ordinance in question details action that must be taken by an owner in order for him to preserve a nonconforming use. If through inadvertence, oversight, misunderstanding or other mishap the owner should fail to take some step in the process required, the nonconforming use is placed in automatic jeopardy. Thus, a very valuable property on which is conducted a very profitable business, all of which is inoffensive per se except that it does not conform to the uses permitted by the ordinance in the district, may, by reason of the failure to perform some condition required to save a nonconforming use, become subject to the drastic provisions of the zoning law.
The conditions of the ordinance for keeping alive nonconforming uses have no reasonable basis in the exercise of the police power, for they represent nothing more than artificial quicksands for the owner. They make it a facile task for the city to eliminate nonconforming uses. These conditions have for their aim the expectation that the owner housing a nonconforming use will be guilty of an omission which will place the city in a position to assume the offensive in bringing about the speedy and effective liquidation of the nonconforming use.
As has been pointed out previously in this opinion, *148our constitutional provisions were drawn to protect the rights of ownership, use and enjoyment of property. That which the Constitution secures, the ordinance seeks to render insecure. Constitutional protection extends to the nonconforming use and to the property quartering such use under a zoning law.
It should not be the objective of a zoning ordinance to bring about the extinction of a nonconforming use through unreasonable and arbitrary law; rather it should be “the purpose and intent of the ordinance to protect the owner’s right to a non-conforming use * * * ” State v. Hunt, 235 Wis. 358, 291 N.W. 745. “The right to a non-conforming use is a property right and any provision of a statute or ordinance which takes away that right in an unreasonable manner, or in a manner not grounded on public welfare, is invalid.” Schneider v. Board of Appeals, 402 Ill. 536, 84 N.E. (2d) 428.
Perhaps the leading case on the reasonableness of an ordinance devising a way to bring about the cessation of a nonconforming use is O’Connor v. Moscow, supra. The law for accomplishing the purpose cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable, and this rule and its application is well depicted in this decision. The ordinance in that case ordained it would be unlawful to open and operate a new or additional business in a certain area, and then provided that “Any change of ownership of an existing business of the type herein defined shall be deemed a new or additional business.” In a well-reasoned opinion this provision was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, and to have no relation to the purposes of zoning. See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14.
May a city by an ordinance given retrospective operation wipe out a vested right to put property to a lawful use? To put the question makes obvious the answer. See Calton Court v. Switzer, 223 N.Y.S. 856. Zoning ordinances should have a prospective operation; they look to the future, and to development within the confines of the law to the days ahead. O’Connor v. Moscow, *149supra. It has been said “that a statute cannot be given a retroactive effect, and be made operative to affect rights and interests vested prior to its enactment.” Gardner v. Resumption M. & S. Co., 4 Colo. App. 271, 35 Pac. 674. See U. S. v. McPhee, 51 Colo. 425, 118 Pac. 996.