Court Opinion

ID: 999667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:29:21.237135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:58.393339
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

THOMAS THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LAMBERT ECHOLS, Jail Administrator,
Marion County Jail/Correctional
                                                               No. 99-6304
Center; CHUCK STEVENS; DALLIS
SICKLES, Correctional Officers,
Marion County Jail/Correctional
Center, in their individual and
official capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg.
Irene M. Keeley, District Judge.
(CA-98-168-1)

Submitted: July 27, 1999

Decided: September 15, 1999

Before ERVIN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Thomas Thompson, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Thompson appeals the district court's orders dismissing
his 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 1999) complaint alleging defen-
dants failed to protect him from four other inmates while he was
incarcerated at the Marion County Jail and seeking damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief.* Along with his complaint, Thomp-
son submitted an affidavit sworn to by a former fellow prisoner
asserting that Defendant Sickles encouraged the inmates to attack
Thompson and that Defendant Stevens declined to move him to pro-
tective custody until after he suffered a second beating. The district
court dismissed the claims for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(b) (West
1999) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Unaware of
the dismissal order, Thompson submitted a second affidavit received
by the clerk three days following entry of the court's final order.
Sworn to by one of the prisoners who admits to attacking Thompson,
the prisoner asserts that he and the other assailants beat Thompson at
the request of all three Defendants who promised them a transfer from
the overcrowded jail in exchange for their cooperation. The district
court ordered the affidavit filed and, presumably pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e), reconsidered its decision in light of the new informa-
tion. Upon reconsideration, the court reaffirmed that Thompson failed
to state a claim because his injuries were de minimis. We find that
Thompson has timely appealed both orders.

We review dismissals for failure to state a claim de novo. See
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Dis-
missal for failure to state a claim is inappropriate unless it appears
_________________________________________________________________
*We note that Thompson's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
are now moot because he has been transferred to another correctional
facility.

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beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his
allegations. See Revene v. Charles County Commrs , 882 F.2d 870,
872 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, when considering dismissal, a court
accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and affords the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn
from the allegations. See Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1134.

However inartfully pleaded by a pro se plaintiff, allegations are
sufficient to call for an opportunity to offer supporting evidence
unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
entitling him to relief. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). While
a court is not expected to develop tangential claims from scant asser-
tions in a complaint, if a pro se complaint contains potentially cogni-
zable claims, a plaintiff should be allowed to particularize these
claims. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274 (4th Cir.
1985); Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir. 1965).
Because the extent of Thompson's injuries are unclear from the com-
plaint and attachments and because the complaint contains potentially
cognizable claims, we conclude the district court should have pro-
vided Thompson with an opportunity to particularize his claims.

Accordingly, we vacate both district court orders and remand the
matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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