Court Opinion

ID: 9957903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:10:25.96407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:33.915850
License: Public Domain

J-A25043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN RE: L.A.S., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: C.L., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 726 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): OC 10A-2023

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                 FILED: April 5, 2024

       C.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 23, 2023 order of the orphans’

court terminating her parental rights to L.A.S., born in 2013 (“Child”). After

careful review, we affirm.

       Mother and T.S. (“Father,” collectively “Parents”) have a long history

with Jefferson County Children and Youth Services (“Agency”) involving

numerous incidents dating back to 2007, but the present case began in April

2022 when Indiana County Children and Youth Services (“ICCYS”) received a

report that Parents had violated a safety plan implemented by ICCYS that

Child should have no contact with her brother, T.S. (“Brother”). ICCYS had

previously found Brother, who was approximately 23 years old at the time of

the termination hearing, to be an indicated perpetrator of child abuse, based

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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upon the sexual abuse of Child,1 and reported the violation of the safety plan

to the Agency. The Agency investigated and discovered that Brother remained

living in the family home with Child.

       As a result of the investigation, Child was removed on May 28, 2022,

and placed in foster care.           In June 2022, a family service plan was

implemented requiring Parents to address mental health needs, improve

parenting skills, ensure that Child has no contact with Brother, and maintain

communication with the Agency. Parents were permitted visitation with Child

in July 2022, but that visitation was suspended in September 2022. Following

a permanency review hearing on December 5, 2022, Child’s placement goal

was changed to adoption. Parents submitted to clinical interviews with Dr.

Carolyn Menta, a clinical psychologist, in January 2023, and Dr. Menta

completed psychological assessments of Parents in March 2023.

       On March 23, 2023, the Agency filed termination petitions as to Mother

and Father’s parental rights to Child. A hearing was held before the orphans’

court on both petitions on May 9, 2023, at which Joanna Welch, an Agency

caseworker, and Dr. Menta testified.2

____________________________________________

1 Under the Child Protective Services Law, an agency may find a report of child

abuse to be “indicated,” if after an investigation, the agency determines that
there is substantial evidence of the alleged abuse. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(a).
2 Child was represented in these proceedings by a guardian ad litem and
separate legal interests counsel. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d
1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020) (appellate courts must engage in sua sponte review to
determine if orphans’ courts have appointed counsel to represent the legal
interests of a child in a contested termination proceeding).

                                           -2-
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      At the hearing, Welch testified that Parents had not been compliant with

the family service plan that was put into place when Child was removed from

the home in May 2022 and that services provided by the Agency have not

been effective in remedying the conditions that led to Child’s removal. N.T.,

5/9/23, at 6-7, 9, 14. The family service plan required Parents to address

their mental health needs, improve their parenting skills, ensure that Child

have no contact with Brother, and maintain communication with the Agency.

Id. at 6. Welch stated that Parents completed their psychological evaluations

with Dr. Menta in January 2023, six months after they were ordered to do so,

and as of the date of the hearing, they had not followed through with Dr.

Menta’s recommendations that they engage in trauma and couples therapy.

Id. at 9, 13-14, 17, 31.

      Welch stated that visitation between Parents and Child was halted in

September 2022 due to the abuse investigation, and then in October 2022,

Child’s mental health providers further recommended that no visitation occur;

the cessation in visitation continued as of the date of the termination hearing.

Id. at 8-9, 15-16. Welch indicated that Parents have failed to provide Child

with any resources, such as clothes or other support, since her removal. Id.

at 13, 21.   Welch testified that Parents had not completed their required

parenting skills course, although this was due to the fact that this service

requires observation of the parent’s interaction with the child, which was

halted in this case due to Child’s disclosure of abuse. Id. at 9, 32.

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      Welch explained that Parents had failed to comply with the family

service plan goal of maintaining regular contact with the Agency since the case

opened. Id. at 7. She stated that Parents had only sporadically contacted

the Agency or Child’s foster parents to inquire about Child. Id. at 10, 13, 37.

Similarly, while the Agency had been informed that Brother had moved out of

the family home in early May 2023, that was based upon information provided

by a service provider, rather than a firsthand report from either parent. Id.

at 18-19, 27. Therefore, neither Welch nor any other representative of the

Agency had been permitted to visit the property to verify that Brother was no

longer residing there. Id. at 8, 22-23, 37-38. Separately, the Agency has

been unable to access the family home to ensure that it was a safe and

appropriate place for Child to live even though a large crack was visible in the

roof of Parents’ current residence, leading the Agency to have “significant

concerns about [its] structural integrity.” Id. at 7-8, 14, 28.

      Notwithstanding Brother’s apparent departure from the family home,

Welch testified that the issue that led to Child’s removal—Parents’ lack of

protective capacity of Child—continued to persist as of the date of the

termination hearing. Id. at 9-10, 14, 32-33, 38-39. Welch further opined

that Parents have failed to “recognize the harm” to Child that resulted from

Brother’s contact with Child in the past. Id. at 14. Welch noted that the

issues related to Brother’s abuse of Child existed “way before the filing of” the

termination petitions or even Child’s removal and therefore, Parents have long

been on notice of the safety concerns related to Child.       Id. at 28, 38-39.

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Welch stated that, with respect to Mother, the Agency still harbored concerns

that she would permit Brother to be in Child’s presence in the future. Id. at

14.

      Welch testified that Child’s foster parents, who had been caring for Child

for approximately one year as of the date of the termination hearing, were

ensuring Child’s safety and meeting her physical, developmental, and

emotional needs. Id. at 6-7, 10-11, 13. Welch stated that Child “is very

settled and stable[]” and “doing very well” in the foster home and she has

developed relationships with other children in her new neighborhood. Id. at

10, 32. Child has also begun to refer to her foster parents as “mom and dad.”

Id. at 11.

      Welch explained that Child is attending school regularly and “doing the

best that she can do” in school since her placement. Id. at 10-11. Child has

an intellectual disability with secondary speech and language impairment,

which was only diagnosed after she was removed from Parents, and she now

has an individualized education plan at school that will ensure that her

instruction is adapted to her capabilities. Id. at 11-12. Welch stated that,

prior to Child’s removal, she had instable housing—moving multiple times—

and irregular school attendance. Id. at 12.

      Welch testified that the foster parents have also ensured that Child

attends regular counseling sessions to address her sexual assault trauma. Id.

at 12. According to Welch, the therapy has been beneficial to Child, which

has allowed her to recently step down in the frequency of her treatment. Id.

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Welch stated that Child’s “mental health has taken quite [some] time to

unpack but we are starting to begin to see [Child] . . . make some forward

progress in her trauma therapy.” Id. Welch further testified that, although

Child had expressed that she missed Parents to her mental health providers

in November 2022, Child did not ask about Parents during Welch’s more recent

meetings with Child, including on the day before the termination hearing. Id.

at 32. Welch further stated that Child had not asked about resuming visitation

with Parents and she did not indicate a preference for reunification with

Parents when asked. Id.

      Dr. Menta, who was qualified as an expert in psychological testing,

testified that she conducted a clinical interview of Mother in January 2023 and

prepared an assessment report of Mother; however, Mother left before

completing the full testing and did not schedule another appointment. Id. at

41-44, 60; CYS Exhibit 1 at 1, 8. Dr. Menta noted that Mother recounted her

own personal history of trauma and victimization in childhood and stated that

Mother acknowledged that Brother had abused Child’s older sister, and Mother

also indicated that Brother himself had been abused by extended family

members. N.T., 5/9/23, at 44-46.

      Dr. Menta’s principal concern with Mother was that “she seemed to

prioritize [Brother’s] feelings about the situation over [Child’s] feelings,”

leading Dr. Menta to opine that Mother does not have the ability to protect

Child in the future. Id. at 44-46, 48. Therefore, Dr. Menta did not recommend

reunification with Child. Id. at 48. Dr. Menta stated that Mother’s history of

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trauma caused her to “normalize[] the sexual abuse in th[e] family” and

further noted that she had difficulty setting limits for Brother. Id. at 45, 47.

Dr. Menta opined that Mother suffers from generalized anxiety disorder, post-

traumatic stress disorder, and major depressive disorder.      Id. at 47.   Dr.

Menta’s recommendations for Mother were to undergo therapy to address her

personal trauma and to also participate in couples therapy with Father. Id.

at 46.

         Following the hearing, on May 23, 2023, the orphans’ court issued an

order terminating Mother’s parental rights and a supporting opinion. On that

same date, the court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights.3

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and concurrently filed a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, as required by Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i).

         Mother raises four issues on appeal:

         1. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of
         discretion in terminating Appellant’s parental rights under 23
         Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1)?

         2. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of
         discretion in terminating Appellant’s parental rights under 23
         Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2)?

         3. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of
         discretion in terminating Appellant’s parental rights under 23
         Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5)?

____________________________________________

3 Father also filed an appeal from the order terminating his parental rights,

which is docketed at 727 WDA 2023.

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      4. Whether the Trial Court erred or committed an abuse of
      discretion in terminating Appellant’s parental rights under 23
      Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 5 (suggested answers omitted).

      In addressing these issues, we apply the following precepts:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

      The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.

2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts

in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.      “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

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termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court determines the petitioner

established grounds for termination under Section 2511(a) by clear and

convincing evidence, the court then must proceed to assess the petition under

subsection (b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267.

      Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (5), and subsection (b). However, this Court

may affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its determination

concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We focus

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         *           *           *

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         *           *           *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

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      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa.

2021).

      [S]ubsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal or
      failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
      child’s present and future need for essential parental care,
      control[,] or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
      being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
      read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home
      and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint
      in state intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
      where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is
      no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation and emphasis

omitted).

      The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited

to affirmative misconduct, but also include refusal and parental incapacity that

cannot be remedied. Id.; In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.

Super. 2021).    “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” A.H., 247 A.3d at 443;

see also In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019)

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(en banc), affirmed, 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent has an

“affirmative duty” to work towards the return of her children, which requires,

at a minimum, that she “cooperate with the Child and Youth Agencies and

complete the rehabilitative services necessary so that the parent can perform

[her] parental duties and responsibilities”).   “A parent’s vow to cooperate,

after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability

of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1118 (citation omitted).      “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a

continued inability to conduct [her] life in a fashion that would provide a safe

environment for a child, whether that child is living with the parent or not, and

the behavior of the parent is irremediable as supported by clear and

competent evidence, the termination of parental rights is justified.”        Id.

(citation omitted).

      Once a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination

pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court turns to Section 2511(b), which

requires that it “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of the child.”       23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).      “The

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to

include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023). “Notably, courts should consider

the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical,

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and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296

A.3d at 1105.

        Our Supreme Court has consistently mandated that any Section 2511(b)

analysis “requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent

and child.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citing In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa.

1993)). Specifically, “[c]ourts must determine whether the trauma caused by

breaking [the parent-child] bond is outweighed by the benefit of moving the

child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The recognized

threshold for this required bond inquiry is whether termination will sever a

“necessary and beneficial relationship,” causing the child to suffer “‘extreme

emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” K.T., 296 A.3d at

1109-10 (quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484).

        “[A] court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare analysis

must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from

severance of the parental bond.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Our Supreme Court

has explained that the court should consider, as appropriate, the child’s need

for permanency and length of time in foster care, the child’s placement in a

pre-adoptive home and whether there is a bond with the foster parents, and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs. Id. Nonetheless, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors

that must be considered by an orphans’ court in this context. Id. at 1113

n.28.

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      We first address the orphans’ court’s determination that termination was

proper under Section 2511(a)(2).     The orphans’ court found that Brother’s

presence alone did not demonstrate Mother’s parental incapacity under

Section 2511(a)(2) but that

      it was instead the mindset that prompted Mother . . . to continue
      exposing [Child] to [Brother] even after [she] knew or had reason
      to know that he had molested her. Brother’s presence was merely
      emblematic of [her] inability to recognize an imminent danger and
      protect [her] daughter from it. “Parental incapacity,” in this case,
      meant “lack of protective capacity,” and that was not alleviated
      by Brother moving to a different location [days prior to the
      termination hearing].

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 6-7. The court explained that Mother

evinced parental incapacity based upon her “continual[] prioritiz[ation of her]

adult son[, Brother,] over [her] minor daughter[, Child,] allowing him to live

in [her] home, where he would have constant access to” Child. Id. at 7. While

the court noted that Brother had recently left the home, this fact “did not

mitigate” Mother’s failure to protect Child “because [she] knew Brother’s

departure was an absolute prerequisite to [Child] returning home.” Id. at 8

(emphasis in original).

      The orphans’ court noted that although the Agency developed a family

service plan to assist Mother in developing her protective capacity and regain

custody of Child, Mother “continuously made decisions that distanced [her]

farther and farther from reunification.” Id. at 7. Mother’s failures included

cutting off communication with the Agency, “stubbornly cho[osing] silence,”

even though “sever[ing] communication with” the Agency meant “sever[ing

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her] remaining avenue of access to” Child. Id. Mother also failed to allow the

Agency access to the family home to verify that it was safe and habitable for

Child. Id. at 3.

      The orphans’ court recognized that Mother did not have a “meaningful

opportunity to seek the follow-up treatment Dr. Menta recommended” in her

March 2023 report. Id. at 3. However, the court noted that the failure to

receive recommendations from Dr. Menta was a consequence of Mother’s six-

month delay in scheduling the evaluation. Id. at 8. The court observed that

the scheduling delay, as well as her failure to fully complete the testing

required of her by Dr. Menta, called into question Mother’s “willingness to do

what was necessary to prove that [she] could and would do what was

necessary to become [a] fit parent[] and regain custody of” Child.”       Id.

(emphasis in original). The court concluded that, based upon Mother’s history

and Dr. Menta’s assessment, it was not expected that Mother “will be able to

remedy . . . her parental shortcomings any time soon.” Id. “Even if [she]

did,” the court stated, “the journey toward rectifying the causes of [her]

parental incapacity would leave [Child] without the hope of permanency for

an unconscionable length of time.” Id.

      Mother argues that the record at the termination hearing did not

demonstrate that she had a “permanent, protective incapacity” as a parent.

Mother’s Brief at 12.   She recounts Dr. Menta’s testimony at the parental

incapacity hearing that, if Mother complied with Dr. Menta’s recommendations

in the March 2023 evaluation report, “it could improve things,” that if Mother

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is “motivated for treatment” she “could establish healthier boundaries,” and

that progress could be seen in “as little as a few months.” N.T., 5/9/23, at

62-64.     Mother argues that her self-reported participation in psychological

counseling and her recent eviction of Brother from the family residence

“clearly displays her motivation for treatment and overcoming any incapacity.”

Mother’s Brief at 13. Mother contends that she “has a surmountable challenge

in rebuilding her protective capacity, but she has undoubtedly been thwarted

by the lack of disclosure of beneficial treatments.” Id. She asserts that her

“actions do not reflect that of an unmotivated parent facing a permanent

incapacity.” Id.

         We conclude that the orphans’ court’s findings are supported by clear

and convincing evidence and that the court did not err in determining that

Mother had a continuing parental incapacity to protect Child, that the

incapacity caused Child to be without essential parental care, and that the

cause of the incapacity cannot or would not be remedied.         23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(a)(2); L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600.       There was ample testimony at the

termination hearing establishing that Mother lacked protective capacity to care

for Child and that she was unable to remedy her parental incapacity.       Dr.

Menta opined, following a clinical interview and the preparation of a

psychological assessment of Mother, that Mother lacked the ability to protect

Child.     N.T., 5/9/23, at 41-46, 48; see also CYS Exhibit 1.         Mother

acknowledged during her clinical interview that Brother had abused Child, as

well as Child’s older sister, over the course of several years but continued to

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prioritize Brother’s feelings over Child, leading Dr. Menta to conclude that

Mother had normalized the abuse in the family and that there was little

prospect that Mother could ever develop the ability to protect Child. Id. at

44-47. Dr. Menta thus concluded that she could not recommend Mother’s

reunification with Child. Id. at 48.

      Moreover, as the orphans’ court stated, Mother’s interactions with the

Agency reinforced that she was incapable of remedying her parental

incapacity. While the Agency was made aware that Brother did move out of

the family home, he did not do so until after the termination petition was filed

and just days prior to the hearing, and the Agency only found this information

out through a third party.    Id. at 8, 18-19, 22-23, 27, 37-38.      This was

illustrative of Mother’s general inability to maintain regular contact with the

Agency: Mother had only sporadically contacted the Agency and Child’s foster

parents, she did not provide Child with any resources during the course of the

case, and she failed to provide the Agency with access to her home to ensure

it was safe for Child. Id. at 7-8, 10, 13-14, 28, 37. Welch’s interactions with

Mother led her to conclude that Mother’s lack of protective capacity of Child

continued to persist as of the date of the termination hearing and that Mother

still failed to appreciate the harm done to Child and would continue to allow

Brother to be in Child’s presence in the future. Id. at 9-10, 14, 32-33, 39.

      While Mother argues that her eviction of Brother demonstrated that she

had taken steps to remedy her incapacity, we find no abuse of discretion in

the orphans’ court’s assessment that this action on the eve of the termination

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hearing did not mitigate Mother’s refusal to do so when Child was removed or

up to the date that the termination petition was filed. Orphans’ Court Opinion,

5/23/23, at 7-8; see also Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1118 (noting that a parent’s vow

to cooperate after a long period of uncooperativeness may be rejected as

untimely or disingenuous). Furthermore, although Mother contends that she

could not comply with Dr. Menta’s recommendation that she engage in couples

and trauma therapy since she did not receive Dr. Menta’s report until shortly

before the termination hearing, the record supports the orphans’ court’s

finding that Mother’s inability to follow the recommendations was a result of

her six-month delay in participating in the clinical interview. Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 5/23/23, at 8; N.T., 5/9/23, at 24-25, 31.

      Moreover, we observe that, while Dr. Menta recognized that therapy

“could improve things” for Mother and allow her to develop healthier

boundaries and protective capacity for Child, Dr. Menta explained that any

advancement could take years or may never occur, which would be an

unreasonable delay in Child achieving permanence and stability. N.T., 5/9/23,

at 62-65; see also In the Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. Super.

2019) (stating that a child’s life “cannot be held in abeyance” and her “need

for permanence and stability” indefinitely subordinated to a parent’s “attempts

to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities”)

(citation omitted). Finally, we note that, while Mother argues that she has

taken steps to remedy her incapacity by beginning to attend therapy, there

was no evidence submitted at the hearing to support this claim, and Welch

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denied that the Agency was in possession of any information showing that

Mother was engaged in therapy. N.T., 5/9/23, at 24-25, 30.

       We accordingly find that the Mother’s appellate claim with respect to

Section 2511(a)(2) merits no relief. We thus shift our focus to the orphans’

court’s determination that termination was appropriate under Section

2511(b).

       Mother argues that the orphans’ court did not sufficiently analyze the

bond between her and Child.            Notwithstanding the court’s determination,

Mother notes Child’s statement to a mental health care provider in November

2022 that she missed Parents and wanted Brother to move out so that she

could return home, N.T., 5/9/23, at 26, and contends that this statement4

shows that Child “is still holding onto . . . desires” to see and speak with

Mother, “which speaks to a bond that needs more evaluation before being so

quickly severed.”      Mother’s Brief at 16.       Mother asserts that Dr. Menta or

another professional should have performed a bonding assessment in this

case, which would have shown that preserving the Mother-Child bond would

best serve Child’s needs and welfare. We disagree.

____________________________________________

4 In her brief, Mother refers to another apparent statement by Child that she

wanted to speak to her “mom” during a counseling session, Mother’s Brief at
16, but this alleged statement was not mentioned at the termination hearing
nor is there any other evidence of such a statement in the certified record.
Therefore, we may not consider this additional statement in this appeal. See
In re J.C., 5 A.3d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. 2010).

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      In addressing subsection (b), the orphans’ court concluded that

terminating Mother’s parental rights will not sever a necessary and beneficial

bond that would cause Child to suffer detrimental consequences. Orphans’

Court Opinion, 5/23/23, at 8-9. The court noted that Child’s life before her

removal was “punctuated by chaos and instability,” as a result of her

“transient housing situation” and the “constant threat of abuse” that she faced

because her caregivers did not protect her from Brother. Id. at 4. The court

observed that Child “has grown up knowing that [P]arents will not keep her

safe from Brother” and that this has “create[d] conflicting emotions and inflicts

further harm” on her. Id. at 9. The court added that “[w]hether or not it was

once her desire to return home,” the testimony at the hearing demonstrated

that the bond had diminished as Child had ceased asking the Agency

caseworker about Parents and did not express a preference for reunification

when she met with Welch the day before the termination hearing. Id. at 5,

9.

      The orphans’ court further noted that “[i]n all other respects,

termination will only benefit” Child. Id. at 9. The court stated that the foster

parents provide for Child’s physical, emotional, and developmental needs and

provide her a safe and settled home where she will not be in the presence of

her abuser. Id. at 4-5, 9. Further, the foster parents capably ensure that

Child is attending school according to an individualized plan, receiving trauma-

based mental health therapy, and developing friendships within her new

neighborhood. Id. The court noted that the fact that Child refers to foster

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parents as “mom” and “dad” demonstrates that she feels safe and loved in

their care and that they have assumed a primary place in her life. Id. at 5,

9. The court concluded that “[i]f Mother and Father’s rights are terminated,

[f]oster [p]arents can then adopt [Child], making her a permanent part of

their family and ensuring that she will continue to receive the care, love, and

comfort she has received since becoming their foster daughter.” Id. at 9.

      We find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s analysis under

Section 2511(b). While Mother contends that the Agency should have enlisted

Dr. Menta to conduct a bonding assessment, it is well-settled that a formal

bonding evaluation is not required under subsection (b). In re Adoption of

J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 944 (Pa. Super. 2018); Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. Expert

testimony is not required concerning a parent-child bond, and the court may

rely on the opinion of social workers and caseworkers. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at

945; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. The orphans’ court here relied on the testimony

of Welch, the Agency caseworker, concerning Child’s diminishing attachment

to Parents over the course of the case and her waning interest in resuming

visitation. N.T., 5/9/23, at 32.

      In any event, we note that the lower court recognized that a bond

existed between Mother and Child and that Child would suffer some negative

consequences from the severance of the parent-child relationship. However,

in this case the court gave precedence to Child’s safety over the parent-child

bond. We have recognized that, in addition to a consideration of the parent-

child bond, “the [orphans’] court can equally emphasize the safety needs of

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the child” under Section 2511(b) and may assess “whether a parent is capable

of providing for a child’s safety and security or whether such needs can be

better met by terminating a parent’s parental rights.” Interest of M.E., 283

A.3d 820, 837 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.

Super. 2014), and L.W., 267 A.3d at 524). It is within the orphans’ court’s

discretion “to prioritize the safety and security needs of” a child over the bond

with her parent, “and this Court will not interfere with the court’s assessment

when its factual findings are supported by the record.” M.E., 283 A.3d at 839;

see also L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524; J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 946. The record here

provides ample support for the orphans’ court’s findings with respect to Child’s

safety needs.

      Finally, we observe that the orphans’ court’s determination that foster

parents were attending to Child’s physical, emotional, and developmental

needs, as well as ensuring that Child was regularly attending school and

receiving trauma-based mental health therapy, is well-supported by the

testimony at the termination hearing. N.T., 5/9/23, at 6-7, 10-12, 13, 32;

see K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. We thus find no merit to Mother’s argument that

the orphans’ court abused its discretion in finding that termination of Mother’s

parental rights best served Child’s needs and welfare.         Having rejected

Mother’s challenges under both subsections of Section 2511 of the Adoption

Act, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child.

      Order affirmed.

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DATE: 04/05/2024

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