Court Opinion

ID: 9869516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:31:03.857304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:02.384017
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
concurring specially.
[¶ 38] I reluctantly concur in the result because our precedent, and post Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015), judicial decisions elsewhere, require that I do so. See State v. Deviley, 2011 ND 182, 803 N.W.2d 561; United States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 680 (8th Cir.2016) (reasonable suspicion justified extending of a traffic stop for 40 minutes until arrival of drug dog); United States v. Walton, 827 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir.2016) (reasonable suspicion justified detaining two occupants for 22 minutes to perform a dog sniff); United States v. Davis, 620 Fed.Appx. 295, 300 (5th Cir.2015) (reasonable suspicion supported extending traffic stop for a canine unit located 30 miles away to arrive 51 minutes after the initial stop).
[¶ 39] Regarding reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, I agree with the dissent that out of state license plates, a rental car, a GPS device, no visi.ble luggage, an air freshener, one energy drink container and eye drops provide little to no evidence of criminal activity. Kapsner dissent, ¶ 58. Standing alone, grounding suspicion of criminality on possession of these common things simply exposes too many people to prolonged detention to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. I also have come to agree with Justice Kapsner’s warning in Deviley that we must be cautious of reasonable articulable suspicion built on “officer training and experience.” Deviley, 2011 ND 182, ¶ 27, 803 N.W.2d 561 (J. Kapsner, dissenting). (“However, the phrase ‘officer’s training and experience’ should not be used to mask what was operating in this case—the officer simply had a strong hunch that these individuals, driving a vehicle with an out-of-state license, were engaged in criminal activity. We have to be mindful not to let ‘officer’s training and experience’ become a substitute for a showing of a true reasonable and articula-ble suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal activity.”)
[ÍI40] However, as the majority and Justice McEvers correctly point out, courts do not look at isolated facts in determining whether an officer possessed reasonable articulable suspicion. In Fields, this Court explained:
“Whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. This Court considers the totality of. the circumstances when deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists. Although we have recognized that the concept of reasonable suspicion is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules, it does require more than a ‘mere hunch.’ To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, we apply an objective standard, .taking into account the inferences-and . deductions that an investigating officer would make that may elude a layperson. *850The question is whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity.”
State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 13, 662 N.W.2d 242 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[¶41] Here, the driver and passenger ostensibly disagreed on their destination. Tesfaye had no identification, did not know the name of the passenger they dropped off in North Dakota and was on probation for possession of methamphetamine. The district court apparently found credibility in the officers’ testimony that, based on training and experience, Adan showed unusual nervousness by quivering, shaking, constaptly licking his lips and touching his face. These facts, considered together with the otherwise innocent conduct and items, provided reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity allowing the defendants to be detained beyond completion of the traffic stop.
[¶ 42] ■ Whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists to prolong defendants’ detention is only part of the question, however. The remaining inquiry is whether the duration of the post-traffic offense detention was reasonable.
[¶ 43] I am troubled by the defendants’ 46 minute roadside detention while awaiting arrival of a drug-sniffing dog, especially given the thin suspicion to detain. However, neither party has argued the •length of. permissible detention is regulated by the depth of suspicion and, other than my own calculus from which I have been unable to craft a rule of law, I have found no case • advancing the notion. Therefore, once reasonable articulable suspicion exists, focus must remain on the length of detention alone.
[¶ 44] “An officer ... may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But ... he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Rodriguez, 135 S.Ct. at 1615. Upon completion of a traffic stop, the continued detention of automobile occupants is a Terry stop requiring its own reasonable articula-ble suspicion. The Terry stop has limits:
“The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time. It is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an ■ investigative seizure.”
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 45] At some point, the duration of a driver’s detention awaiting arrival of a drug dog will violate the Fourth Amendment. See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Séizure: A Treatise of the Fourth Amendment, 4 Search and Seizure § 9.2(f), n. 234 (5th ed.2016). (“The Supreme Court has recognized a ‘liberty interest in proceeding with [an] itinerary,’ United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d *851110 (1983), and thus the length of a detention is more likely to pass muster if ‘the detention did not interfere with defendant’s travel plans.’) United States v. Tavolacci 895 F.2d 1423 (D.C.Cir.1990).” Where that point lies is unclear. Post-Rodriguez judicial decisions suggest a 45 minute seizure while waiting for a drug dog is permissible. But I am skeptical whether that length of detention would be tolerated for other Terry stop situations, and if it was an issue before the court I would question whether the duration of seizure is permissible for travelers on the interstate highway system.
[¶ 46] Daniel J. Crothers