Court Opinion

ID: 9852911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:38:52.025844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:37.170195
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent to Division 5 (c) of the majority opinion because trial counsel was deficient in failing to object during closing argument to the prosecution’s repeated references to Patterson’s invocation of his right to counsel and right to silence, see *603Division 5 (b), and this deficient performance was sufficiently prejudicial to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
The fact that a defendant exercised the right to remain silent may not be used against the defendant at trial. [Cit.] However, if the testimony concerning remaining silent is made “during a narrative on the part of the authorities of a course of events” and “apparently was not intended to, nor did it have the effect of, being probative on the guilt or innocence of the defendant,” it is not prejudicial. [Cit.]
Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 559, 561 (2) (d) (532 SE2d 395) (2000). Here, there was testimony from both a detective and from Patterson that after he was arrested and made some initial statements he invoked his right to counsel and declined to talk further. Although this testimony was not improper because it was made during a narrative regarding a course of events, the prosecution’s use of the testimony as the basis of its closing argument, as set forth in Division 5 (b), was clearly intended to be probative on the issue of Patterson’s guilt or innocence. See id. The prosecutor deliberately used against Patterson his exercise of his right to remain silent: “[i]f he didn’t want to talk, if he hadn’t done anything, why does he not want to tell something, you know, because the only thing that can hurt him is admitting to the crime.” Compounding the comment on the right to remain silent, the prosecutor deliberately used against Patterson his right to be represented by counsel: “[i]f he hadn’t done anything, what did he want a lawyer for?” It is unquestionable that trial counsel’s failure to object to the argument and seek curative instructions was deficient performance. See, e.g., Cheney v. State, 233 Ga. App. 66 (1) (a) (503 SE2d 327) (1998) (reference in opening statement to defendant’s silence upon arrest cured by trial court admonishing prosecutor, instructing jury that remarks of counsel are not evidence, and ultimately excluding related evidence).
The majority, however, found no reasonable probability that Patterson was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. As we have recently reiterated, the State is not permitted in criminal cases to comment upon a defendant’s silence. “[I]n the situation of a criminal defendant, this failure to speak or act will most often be judged as evidence of the admission of criminal responsibility. Thus, the element of prejudice is indisputable.” (Emphasis supplied.) Reynolds v. State, 285 Ga. 70, 71 (673 SE2d 854) (2009). The closing argument by the prosecutor in this case specifically and deliberately posited that Patterson’s failure to speak should “be judged as evidence of the admission of criminal responsibility.” Id. There is thus more than a reasonable probability that the prejudice created *604by the prosecution’s protracted improper argument, left to stand without objection, altered the outcome of the trial. I would recognize that the prosecutor’s use against Patterson of the exercise of his constitutional rights involved such egregious misconduct as to deny Patterson a fundamentally fair trial in violation of his right to due process of law under the Georgia Constitution, which uncontrovert-edly predates appellant’s trial in 1987. See generally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U. S. 610, 618-619 (96 SC 2240, 49 LE2d 91) (1976) (fundamentally unfair and deprivation of due process to afford suspect constitutional right and yet allow implications of exercise of that right to be used against him).
Decided June 29, 2009.
James D. Lamb, for appellant.
J. Gray Conger, District Attorney, Wesley A. Lambertus, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Sara K. Sahni, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears joins this dissent.