Court Opinion

ID: 9713891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:25:11.045568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:21.259809
License: Public Domain

FLANDERS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. After the plaintiffs, Jeanette and Vincent Calise (the Cai-ises) entered into a settlement with two of the alleged joint-tortfeasor defendants in this case, G.L.1956 § 10-6-79 of Rhode Island’s Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) — consistent with the joint tortfeasor releases that the Caiises provided to the settling defendants — reduced the Caiises’ damages claims against the defaulted joint-tortfea-sor defendants. This damage-claim reduction occurred irrespective of the fact that these nonsettling defendants previously had been defaulted for failing to answer the Caiises’ complaint against them. Indeed, the default served only to foreclose the defaulted defendants’ ability to contest their liability for the Caiises’ damages arising from their alleged negligent conduct. But “a default does not concede the amount of damages,” Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197, 1200 (R.I.1990); nor does it eviscerate § 10-6-7. That statute instructs how to calculate damages in such cases as this one in which the plaintiffs have settled with and released for consideration some but not all of the joint-tort-feasor defendants. More particularly, § 10-6-7 requires that, in cases such as this one, the Caiises’ damage claims against the defaulted joint-tortfeasor defendants “shall be” reduced by the greater of (1) the amount of money the settling defendants had paid to the Calises, or (2) by the proportionate amount that corresponded to the settling defendants’ relative degree of fault for the Caiises’ total damages. In fact, this is precisely how the Caiises promised to treat their damage claims against the defaulting defendants in the release agreements they signed with the settling defendants.
Thus, I would hold that the entry of defaults against these joint-tortfeasor defendants in no way affected the required statutory reduction in plaintiffs’ damage claim against them. This reduction occurred as a matter of law under UCATA because of plaintiffs’ settlement and release of two other joint tortfeasors, who otherwise may have been liable to the defaulting defendants for contribution. Therefore, “[ujnder the mandate of the statute as well as the terms of the release, *843it was the duty of the trial justice to give [the Downing defendants] the benefit of the pro-rata share reduction.” LaBounty v. LaBounty, 497 A.2d 302, 306 (R.I.1985) (holding trial justice erred in calculating damages against a non-settling joint tort-feasor defendant when he credited only the amount of consideration paid by the settling defendant instead of the larger amount of the settling defendant’s pro-rata share of the liability). Hence, I would reverse and remand this case to the trial justice for a redetermination of damages in accordance with § 10-6-7.
Facts and Travel
On July 3,1992, Jeanette Calise allegedly slipped and fell on a common walkway leading to her condominium entrance. Seeking compensation for her personal injuries, medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, and pain and suffering that allegedly resulted from the fall, she filed a Superior Court complaint on June 9, 1994, against the Hidden Valley Condominium Association (HVCA), a nonprofit corporation that owned and maintained the condominium complex. In addition, her husband, Vincent Calise, alleged in the same complaint that he too was entitled to compensation (pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-41) for the loss of consortium he allegedly suffered as a result of his wife’s injuries after she slipped and fell. Shortly thereafter, the Calises amended their complaint by adding the Downing Corporation (Downing) and Downing/Hidden Valley Inc. (Downing HV) (collectively, the Downing defendants). The Calises alleged that the Downing defendants were additional owners and operators of the condominium. The Calises also sued Lincoln Sealcoating Company (Lincoln), which applied sealant on the walkway, and D’Ambra Construction Company (D’Ambra), which constructed the walkway.
On February 25, 1997, the Superior Court ruled that, on the undisputed facts presented, Lincoln was not negligent and, therefore, the court granted its motion for summary judgment. Later, on April 7, 1997, and pursuant to Rule 55 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court clerk entered a default against the Downing defendants (defaulted defendants) for their failure to answer the complaint within the time required by Rule 12(a)(1)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. No default judgment, however, entered at that time.10
Almost two years later, on January 12, 1999, the Downing defendants filed motions for leave to file cross-claims against codefendants D’Ambra and HVCA for contribution and indemnification. Although the Downing defendants had been defaulted for failing to respond to plaintiffs complaint, they were not in default with respect to any claims they may have possessed against defendants D’Ambra and HVCA. Both D’Ambra and HVCA objected to the cross-claims and then, in turn, they filed their own motions for leave to file cross-claims against all the other defendants. The court held a hearing on the parties’ cross-claim motions on January 25, 1999, and the parties presented arguments in connection with these motions. Although the motion justice took *844the motions under advisement, he never rendered a decision on them.
On April 29, 1999, D’Ambra and HVCA (the settling defendants) entered into separate settlement agreements with the Calis-es whereby HVCA agreed to pay $10,000 and D’Ambra agreed to pay $7,500 to them. In return the Calises executed joint-tortfeasor releases for both settling defendants and filed a stipulation with respect to all claims dismissing both settling defendants from the case with prejudice. But the releases expressly provided that the Calises’ damage claims against the remaining joint-tortfeasor defendants would be. reduced by the amount of the settlement or by the amount of the settling defendants’ proportional responsibility for the Calises’ damages, whichever amount was greater. Thus, before the proof-of-claim hearing even began against the defaulted defendants and at the very moment when the Calises settled with these other two alleged joint tortfeasors, the existence of § 10-6-7’s damage-claim reduction was a fait accompli because the Calises already had agreed to reduce their damage claims against the defaulted defendants as provided for in the releases they signed. In short, only the amount of their total damages and the size of the claim reduction they had agreed to remained to be determined.
Thereafter, on August 30, 1999, following the hearing on oral proof of the Calis-es’ reduced damage claim, the trial justice ordered the defaulted defendants to pay the plaintiffs $65,000, plus interest and costs.11 The $65,000, however, represented the Calises’ total damages, unreduced by either the consideration received by the Calises in exchange for the releases or the proportional liability they released (if it was in fact greater than the consideration paid), when they entered into the release agreements with the settling defendants. At the proof-of-claim hearing, the trial justice allowed the defaulted defendants to present evidence concerning the nature and extent of the plaintiffs’ total damages, but he refused to allow them to introduce evidence to establish the proportional responsibility of the settling defendants — that is, their relative degree of fault for the Calises’ damages — or, for that matter, to establish the amount of money the Calises had received from the settling defendants. In fine, the trial justice refused to apply § 10-6-7’s mandate for reducing the Calises’ claim for damages in light of the earlier settlement. As a result, the court failed to reduce the total damages judgment it awarded against the defaulted defendants, as required by law, by the greater of either the amount the settling defendants had paid to the Calises in consideration for obtaining their releases or by the proportional liability attributable to the settling defendants that the Calises had released when they settled with them.
Analysis
The defaulted defendants contend that the trial justice committed reversible error by failing to reduce the Calises’ damages claim as required by § 10-6-7. They argue that the trial justice erred by excluding evidence of the proportional responsibility of the settling joint-tortfeasor defendants for the Calises’ damages. The trial justice also erred, they contend, by refusing to reduce the damages claim against them by the amount of consideration paid by the settling defendants, as provided for in § 10-6-7. In essence, defaulted defendants argue, the trial justice erred by failing to apply UCATA’s mandatory claim-reduction provision when calculating the damages against a nonsettling *845joint tortfeasor, and by failing properly to “take' an account or to determine the amount of damages,” as required by Rule 55. Because the central issue in this case is a question of law — whether § 10-6-7 caused a reduction in the Calises’ claims for damages against the defaulted defendants when the Calises released the settling defendants — this Court applies a de novo standard of review on appeal. See Canario v. Culhane, 752 A.2d 476, 479 (R.I.2000).
On appeal, even the Calises grudgingly acknowledged that the defaulted defendants “may be allowed to receive a credit for the sums paid by the [settling defendants]” under § 10-6-7. But because of their default, they say, the defaulted defendants should not have been allowed to introduce evidence to prove that that those “sums paid” to the Calises in settlement were less than “any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.” Section 10-6-7.12 Without being allowed to introduce any evidence of the settling defendants’ proportional responsibility for the Calises’ damages, the defaulted defendants were unable to prove that the proportion of liability that the Calises had released when they settled with two of the joint tortfea-sor defendants was greater than the consideration the Calises had received when they released these settling defendants. Therefore, I believe the trial justice erred when he prevented the defaulted defendants from proving that they were entitled to a foil proportional reduction of the claim against them, as provided for in § 10-6-7.
“Section 10-6-7 is a verbatim enactment of section four of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 which has been adopted by several other states. The cases that have considered statutes identical to § 10-6-7 universally hold that amounts paid by settling defendants must be credited to the verdict amount returned against nonsettling joint tortfeasors.” Augustine v. Langlais, 121 R.I. 802, 804-05, 402 A.2d 1187, 1189 (1979). (Emphasis added.)
“These decisions are predicated upon the fundamental doctrine that an injured person is entitled to only one satisfaction of the tort, even though two or more parties contributed to the loss.” Id. at 805, 402 A.2d at 1189. Moreover, we have held that the “purpose of the act is to avoid the injustice of having one joint tortfeasor pay more than his or her fair share of [the] damages.”13 Wilson v. Krasnoff, 560 A.2d 335, 339 (R.I.1989). “The statute [§ 10-6-7] clearly directs that the damage award *846must be reduced by either the amount of consideration paid for the release, or the proportion of reduction provided by the release, [wjhichever is greater.” Augustine, 121 R.I. at 805, 402 A.2d at 1189. (Emphasis added.) Thus, this mandatory reduction of the plaintiffs’ damage claim was unaffected by any previously entered default against non-settling defendants because the default only foreclosed the defaulting defendants’ ability to contest liability (including the existence of a duty owed to the Calises, the defaulted .defendants breach thereof, and the fact that the breach proximately caused the Calises’ damages); but it did not override § 10-6-7 and change the manner in which plaintiffs’ damage claim had to be calculated, nor did it bar the admission of evidence that might be relevant in establishing the proportional liability of the settling joint tortfeasors at the hearing on proof-of-claim.
If found hable as joint tortfeasors, all the defendants in this case would have been held jointly and severally hable for the damages plaintiffs suffered.14 Moreover, plaintiffs would have been entitled to recover 100 percent of their damages from any one of them, subject to the right of that paying defendant to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors according to their relative degree of fault.15 See Roberts-Robertson v. Lombardi, 598 A.2d 1380, 1381 (R.I.1991); see also W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 46 (5th ed.1984). Thus, a joint tortfeasor held hable and compelled to pay more than his, her, or its “pro rata share of the final money judgement,” still has a right to seek contribution from the other joint tortfeasors pursuant to §§ 10-6-3 and 10-6-4.16 See Nelson v. Ptaszek, 505 A.2d 1141, 1143 (R.I.1986); Markham v. Cross Transportation, Inc., 119 R.I. 213, 230, 376 A.2d 1359, 1368 (1977). Therefore, absent a settlement and release of the other joint tortfeasors, the defaulted defendants would have been entitled to seek contribution from-the other joint tort-feasors if they had been compelled to pay more than their proportionate share of the liability. Id.; see also Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132, 136, 48 A.2d 353, 355 (1946) (holding that an amount received in satisfaction of judgment from one tortfeasor will reduce the claim against the others).
Yet, in this case, because the Calises chose to release the settling defendants from all liability in/exchange for cash payments, the defaulted defendants lost their right to seek contribution against the settling defendants by operation of § 10-6-7 and § 10-6-8. See Cooney v. Molis, 640 A.2d 527, 529 (R.I.1994). The releases signed by the Calises, however, clearly provided that, in accordance with § 10-6-8, if the released defendants are jointly *847and severally liable with other nonsettling defendants, then the consideration paid for the releases “shall be received in reduction of the total damages recoverable [by the Calises] against all other tortfeasors or in the amount of the pro rata or proportionate share of liability of the released parties, whichever amount is greater.”17 (Emphasis added.) Therefore, although § 10-6-8 denied defaulted defendants their right to seek contribution from the settling defendants because of the releases, they were entitled under § 10-6-7 and by the very terms of the releases themselves to receive “in place of [contribution]” a reduction in the Calises’ claims against them equal either to the consideration paid by the settling defendants or to the “proportionate share of liability of the released parties, whichever amount is greater.” See Cooney, 640 A.2d at 529; LaBounty, 497 A.2d at 307 (holding that both UCATA and the plaintiffs release gave the nonsettling defendants “a release [from the plaintiff] in the amount of the pro rata share that [the settling defendant] would otherwise [have been] required to [contribute]”).
Nevertheless, the Calises urge that we should deprive the defaulted defendants of the very claim reduction-equal to the proportion of liability settled — that the Calises themselves had agreed to when they settled with HVCA and D’Ambra. They did so knowing perfectly well that they still had damage claims pending against the defaulted defendants. Yet, the Calises have conceded that a claim reduction in the amount of the consideration paid by the settling defendants would have been appropriate. In other words, the Calises would only partially honor the damage-reduction consequences they agreed to abide by in the release agreements. But they still would have us fully enforce the benefits of those releases by strictly applying § 10-6-8 to take away defaulted defendants’ right to seek contribution from the settling defendants, while at the same time refusing to apply § 10-6-7 to give the defaulted defendants their corresponding claim reduction — equal to the greater of the consideration paid or the proportion of liability settled.
In support of this “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” argument, the Calises argue that “if the Court were to allow a defaulted party to introduce evidence of liability of other parties, it would be contrary to the principles as enunciated in [Bashforth].” But our holding in Bashforth is completely consistent with allowing defaulted defendants to obtain the full claim-reduction protection of § 10-6-7. In Bashforth, we followed the well-established rule that “[w]hile a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established by proof unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation.” Bashforth, 576 A.2d at 1200 (quoting Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.1974)). Therefore, because § 10-6-7 clearly expresses the method prescribed by the General Assembly for calculating the amount *848of a plaintiffs damage-claim reduction when that plaintiff has settled previously with some but not all joint tortfeasors and because no statutory or common-law exception exists for ignoring this claim-reduction provision when assessing damages against defaulted defendants, I would hold that a determination during the proof-of-claim hearing of the proportional liability of the settling defendants in this case was one that was properly “limited to the question of damages.” Id. In LaBounty, this Court held that “[UCATA] was free from ambiguity and that the words stated therein should be given their plain and obvious meaning.” 497 A.2d at 306. In addition, the Court held that “[u]nder the mandate of the statute as well as the terms of the release [equivalent to the releases given by the Calises], it was the duty of the trial justice to give [the nonsettling defendant] the benefit, of the pro-rata-share reduction.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, compelling a defaulted defendant to concede all the well-pleaded liability allegations in a complaint — including duty, breach and causation — provides a harsh-enough sanction with sufficient teeth to accomplish the important policy objectives of promoting efficiency and finality in litigation, while at the same time encouraging parties to avoid defaults and to answer in a timely manner.18 But going even further and denying defaulted defendants the damage-claim redúetion that UCATA imposes upon all plaintiffs who settle via joint-tortfeasor releases, is, in my judgment, an overly punitive sanction that unnecessarily turns our joint- and-several-liability law into an unduly harsh and quixotic measure; one that unjustly allows the Calises and other injured plaintiffs to recover more from defaulted defendants than their relative degree of fault for the total damages would warrant. For example, if the settling defendants’ relative degree of fault in causing the Cal-ises’ damages would have required them to pay $60,000 but the Calises foolishly, opportunistically, or greedily released them for only $17,600, then the Calises would have us shift the consequences of their poor settlement bargain onto the less culpable defaulted defendants by reducing their remaining claim against the defaulted defendants by only $17,500 instead of by $60,000, as § 10-6-7 requires.19
*849The majority is also mistaken when it suggests that, under the theory espoused in this dissent, the Calises would bear the burden of proof concerning the proportion of liability borne by all defendants. I have advanced no such burden-of-proof theory here. Indeed, even assuming, arguendo, that the burden of proof concerning the settling defendants’ proportional responsibility for the Calises’ damages at all times rested with the Downing defendants, the trial justice erred when he barred those defendants from attempting to carry that burden by introducing evidence concerning this issue. Indeed, the majority’s burden-of-proof argument serves only to underscore the trial justice’s error in barring the defaulted defendants from introducing evidence that would, if credited, reduce the Calises’ damages claim. Such a ruling had nothing to do with misplacing the burden of proof on the Calises, but it had everything to do with a palpable misunderstanding of not only the limited consequences of a default, but also the damage-claim reduction mandate of § 10-6-7 whenever plaintiffs provide a joint-tortfeasor release to settling defendants. Unfortunately, the majority’s decision perpetuates this misunderstanding.
When a defendant is served with a complaint, he, she or it “should be able to decide on the basis of the relief requested whether * * * to expend the time, effort, and money necessary to defend the action.” 10 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2663 at 139 (1983). Thus, a joint tort-feasor who has chosen to default and to concede liability rather than to contest it, still maintains the right to contest damages, to seek contribution from fellow tort-feasors, or, in the case of a settlement and release of other joint tortfeasors, to have plaintiffs’ damages claim reduced pursuant to § 10-6-7. See Augustine, 121 R.I. at 805, 402 A.2d at 1189. Thus, whether by contribution or by damage-claim reduction, UCATA assures that joint tortfeasors are not required to pay more than their proportional liability in damages and that plaintiffs will receive no more than one whole recovery for their damages.20 See Wilson, 560 A.2d at 339. Moreover, because a “judgment by default is limited to *850the relief demanded in the complaint,” it would be fundamentally unfair to surprise defaulted defendants by compelling them not only to concede liability but also to forgo their right as joint tortfeasors either to seek contribution or to obtain the benefits of the damage-claim reduction provided for in UCATA. 10 Wright, Federal Practice, § 2663 at 140.
Such a judicial mutation of UCATA will result in inconsistent damage awards among joint tortfeasors, as the defaulting joint tortfeasors inevitably will be saddled with a disproportionate share of the liability. See Hunt v. Inter-Globe Energy, Inc., 770 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir.1985) (holding that “just as consistent verdict determinations are essential among joint tortfeasors, consistent damage awards on the same claim are essential among joint and several joint tortfeasors”). To avoid this undesirable outcome the Seventh Circuit has held that in actions “where liability is joint and several, [and there has been an] entry of default judgment against fewer than all defendants * * * a damages hearing may not be held until the liability of each defendant has been resolved.” Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete Products, Inc., 722 F.2d 1319, 1324 (7th Cir.1983); see also 10 Moore’s Federal Practice § 55.25 at 55-47 (3d ed. 1998) (“A default judgment entered against one of several defendants, each of which is jointly and severally liable for plaintiffs damages, establishes only liability and not the defaulting defendant’s relative share of fault.”). As the Calises have settled with the other joint tortfeasors in this case, UCATA’s claim-reduction mechanism assures the equitable result referenced in Dundee Cement.
The Calises argue that depriving a defaulted joint-tortfeasor of § 10-6-7’s claim reduction is justified by a need to “retain some element of a [default] sanction, which must be significant.” Although precluding defaulted defendants from contesting liability appears to me to represent a most significant sanction for a default, the Calis-es find support for their ultra-punitive position in McGarvin-Moberly Construction Co. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310 (Wyo.1995). McGarvin held that “the sanction of default prohibited a defendant from filing a cross-claim or third-party complaint and from contending it was not liable.” Olsten Staffing Services, Inc. v. D.A. Stinger Services, Inc., 921 P.2d 596, 600 (Wyo.1996). But far from supporting the type of overly harsh sanction that the Calises propose, McGarvin holds that “[i]n order to defend the question of damages, [a defaulted defendant] must be able to defend on the question of the percentage of fault attributable to each actor.” 897 P.2d at 1317. According to McGarvin, because “the question of fault is inextricably intertwined with the amount of damages that may be awarded against any defendant,” a defaulted defendant must be allowed to “participate fully in the discovery process and on issues concerning proximate cause and damages.” Id.
McGarvin addressed the application of Wyoming’s comparative negligence statute, and it allows a defaulted defendant to establish proportional fault not only with respect to other defendants but also with respect to the plaintiff.21 Id.; see also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 55; Fehlhaber v. Indian Trails, Inc., 425 F.2d 715, 717 (3d Cir.1970) (holding that because Delaware’s *851contribution statute required the court to apportion negligence among responsible parties, a defaulted party could litigate fault apportionment between the parties in a Fed.R.Civ.P. 55 damages hearing); Burge v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 123 N.M. 1, 938 P.2d 210, 217 (1996) (holding that “a defaulting party admits only to the liability of his or her portion of the damages;” thus, “[w]hat must be determined after the entry , of default is the dollar amount of the damages suffered by the injured party and the portion of those damages to be awarded against the defaulting party based upon the extent of its percentage of negligence”); Schaub v. Wilson, 969 P.2d 552, 558-60 (Wyo.1998) (holding that a defaulted defendant should be permitted to establish proportional fault with respect to the plaintiff for a comparative negligence claim even in a case where there are no codefendants).
Because the defaulted defendants in this case “concede that the default against them operates as a bar to the introduction of any evidence on liability as against Plaintiff[s],” we have no need to decide whether to go as far as the Wyoming court and allow defaulted defendants to invoke the comparative negligence statute, G.L. 1956 § 9-20-4,22 to reduce the Calises’ damage claims against them even further than the mandatory § 10-6-7 reduction. Indeed, the defaulted defendants in this case seek only to exercise their preexisting statutory right under UCATA to pay no more than their proportional responsibility for the Calises’ damage claim. See Wilson, 560 A.2d at 339 (holding that the “purpose of [UCATA] is to avoid the injustice of having one joint tortfeasor pay more than his or her fair share of [the] damages”).
An entry of a default compels a defendant to concede all the well-pleaded liability allegations raised in the complaint, but it does not entitle a plaintiff to shift the burden of a bad settlement bargain onto the defaulted defendants. A default is intended to encourage efficiency and finality in litigation, but not to insure plaintiffs against imprudent settlements. Given that, but for the releases, the defaulted defendants still could have pursued (through cross-claims, third-party impleader, or independent contribution actions) a more equitable distribution of the Calises’ damages based upon the respective proportional responsibility of the other joint tortfeasors, it is both unfair and contrary to UCATA to hold them hable for more than their fair share of the Calises’ damages.23 See Roberts-Robertson, 598 A.2d *852at 1381 (holding that a joint tortfeasor may seek contribution pursuant to statute either by a separate action or by impleading the other joint tortfeasors under third-party practice). The Downing defendants’ defaults vis-a-vis the Calises’ damage claims in no way affected their rights with respect to claims against codefendants and other joint tortfeasors, see § 10-6-6 (“[T]he recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfea-sors.”); nor did it affect their ability to contest the amount of damages that the Calises can recover under § 10-6-7. Indeed, absent the settlements’ claim-reducing effect, the defaulted defendants still could have sued any other joint tortfeasors for contribution notwithstanding their defaulted status. See § 10-6-4. Thus, the mere fact that the Calises chose to settle with two of the other joint tortfeasor defendants 24 — instead of allowing those claims to be decided on the merits — should not affect the ultimate damages to be assessed against the defaulted defendants.
Finally, denying defaulted defendants the right to the claim reduction provided for in § 10-6-7 allows plaintiffs and other joint-tortfeasor defendants the strategic and tactical opportunity to shift a disproportionate amount of the damages onto defaulted defendants, while potentially allowing plaintiffs’ to recover disproportionately more damages from these defaulted defendants than their relative degree of fault would warrant. Such a rule has the undesirable effect of shifting responsibility from the court to the plaintiffs and settling defendants to decide exactly how severe a default sanction to impose on defaulted defendants. In this case, it results in a monetary sanction that has nothing to do with the true proportional responsibility of the defaulted defendants to the plaintiffs or, for that matter, to the true amount of *853the reduced damage claim that the Calises possessed against the defaulted defendants.
Conclusion
For these reasons, I would hold that defaulted defendants’ still have the right to be treated as joint tortfeasors under UCA-TA during proof-of-claim hearings. I reach this conclusion because their right to a damage-claim reduction was not affected by their default on plaintiff's liability claim. Therefore, I would hold that the trial justice erred as a matter of law by not reducing the Calises’ damage claims according to § 10-6-7 and by not permitting the defaulted defendants to offer evidence proving that the amount of the money the Calises accepted in settlement was less than the settling defendants’ proportional responsibility for the Calises’ damages. In short, I would reverse and remand this case to the Superior Court for a hearing to determine the defaulted defendants share of the damages in accordance with UCA-TA.
Chief Justice WILLIAMS did not participate.

. General Laws 1956 § 10-6-7 provides that:
"A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfea-sors in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid." (Emphasis added.)

. Rule 55(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states:
"[I]f, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems necessary and proper and shall accord a right of trial by jury to the parties when and as required by statute.”

. The order mistakenly named HVCA as a defaulted party rather than Downing HV.

. The mere fact that the settling defendants were no longer parties to the lawsuit would not have precluded the defaulted defendants from introducing evidence of the settling defendants' proportional responsibility for the Calises' damages. The settling defendants could have been deposed, subpoenaed, and otherwise “discovered” against to establish their proportional responsibility for the Calis-es’ total damages. Moreover, the defaulted defendants themselves could introduce evidence on this point. See Cooney v. Molis, 640 A.2d 527, 529 (R.I.1994) (holding that although a settling joint tortfeasor is not a party to the lawsuit "the power of subpoena [still] remains as a tool to present * * * testimony [by the settling tortfeasor] to the jury”); see also Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197, 1200 (R.I.1990) (holding that defaulted defendants must be permitted to engage in the discovery process to effectively protect their rights at the damages-assessment hearing).

. Nevertheless, a joint tortfeasor may be compelled to pay more than his or her proportional liability if contribution cannot be collected fully from another joint tortfeasor and if the court reallocates the uncollectible portion of the damages to all the remaining joint tortfeasors. Restatement (Third) Torts, § C21 at 204 (1999).

. Section 10-6-2 defines joint tortfeasors as "two (2) or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or properly, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them; provided, however, that a master and servant or principal and agent shall be considered a single tortfeasor."

. Section 10-6-3 provides that:-
"The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors; provided however, that when there is a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors, the relative degree of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro rata shares.”

.Section 10-6-4 provides that:
"A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a final money judgment for contribution until he or she has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his or her pro rata share of the final money judgment. Actions for contribution shall be commenced not later than one year next after the first payment made by a joint tortfeasor which has discharged the common liability or is more than his or her pro rata share thereof.”

. Relevant provision from HVCA Release: "Should it appear that two (2) or more persons or entities are jointly or severally liable in tort for the alleged injuries to us, the consideration for this Release shall be received in reduction of the total damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors or in the amount of the pro rata or proportionate share of liability of the released parties, whichever amount is greater." (Emphasis added.)
Relevant provision from the D’Ambra’s Release: "It is further agreed by the undersigned that the total amount of the damages recoverable by the undersigned from all other parties in any way liable for the aforesaid occurrence, injury or damage shall be reduced in compliance with [UCATA] to the extent, if any, of that fraction or portion or percentage of such total amount of damages against all other parties." (Emphasis added.)

. Contraiy to the majority's belief, there is no contention presented in this dissent that negates the consequences of the default by the Downing defendants. Nor is there any suggestion here that "the plaintiffs would bear the burden of proving not only the liability of the Downing defendants but also the specific proportion of their liability as a percentage of the total liability borne by all defendants including those who have settled with the plaintiffs." In their headlong rush to lash the Downing defendants to the stake for failing to answer plaintiffs' complaint, the majority has mischaracterized my position on this point. Far from negating the consequences of the Downing defendants’ default, I explicitly confirm that their default bars them from contesting their liability to the Calises. But that is where the consequences of their default begin and end; their default should not bar them from showing that the amount of the Calises’ damages claim is less than they are attempting to recover because the settling defendants’ relative degree of fault for causing their damages was greater than the amount of money the Calises accepted from them in settlement.

. The majority opinion worries that the application of § 10-6-7 in such a scenario would leave the injured plaintiff with less than a whole recovery and that such a result would discourage future settlements with less than all of the joint tortfeasors. But this result would be the same regardless of whether the nonsettling defendants had defaulted or not. Thus, the majority’s concern addresses a general policy question implicit in all joint tortfeasor cases: should § 10-6-7’s damage-claim reduction be applied at all? This, however, is a question best left to and already resolved by the General Assembly. Moreover, I have no qualms about leaving the burden of *849a bad bargain, on those who enter into such arrangements in the first place.

. The majority also is concerned that if we were to apply § 10-6-7 according to its terms in this case, it could result in nonset-tling defendants paying less than they would have paid had there not been a settlement. This would in fact be the case here if, for example, the $17,500 received by the Calises was in excess of the settling defendants' proportional liability (or in excess of what they would have been compelled to contribute to the nonsettling defendants). A proper application of § 10-6-7, however, would reduce the Calises’ remaining damage claim against the nonsettling defendants by the consideration paid (because it is greater than the proportional liability released). The Calises would still get a whole recovery, the settling defendants would be stuck with the burden of their bad bargain, and the nonsettling defendants would have to pay only what remained of the claim. Apparently, this outcome bothers the majority in this type of case because it believes a defaulting defendant should be punished and not rewarded. But defaulting defendants concede only the well-pleaded liability allegations in the complaint against them; they do not concede allegations concerning the amount of damages. I believe that the liability penalty for defaulted defendants is a sufficiently serious and weighty sanction and that it needs no augmentation from us. The defaulted defendants in such a scenario are not entitled to a favorable claim reduction because they defaulted, but because their codefendants may have agreed to pay more than their fair share of the liability. Rather than rewarding defaults, such a result encourages settlements that do not overcompensate plaintiffs and that bear a close resemblance to the merits of plaintiffs’ damage claims.

. Nevertheless, a majority of courts have denied defaulted defendants the opportunity to assert comparative fault claims against plaintiffs in proof-of-claim damage hearings after the default. See Timothy M. Stubson, I may be liable but it’s not my fault!: The Wyoming Supreme Court rules that defaulting defendants can now challenge fault. McGarvin-Moberly Const. v. Welden, 897 P.2d 1310 (Wyo.1995), 31 Land & Water L.Rev. 645, 653 (1996).

. General Laws 1956 § 9-20-4 (Comparative negligence) provides:
"In all actions hereafter brought for personal injuries, or where personal injuries have resulted in death, or for injury to property, the fact that the person injured, or the owner of the property or person having control ovér the property, may not have been in the exercise of due care shall not bar a recovery, but damages shall be diminished by the finder of fact in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured, or the owner of the property or the person having control over the property.” (Emphasis added.)

. The majority’s refusal to apply § 10-6-7 is based largely on the erroneous assumption that application of § 10-6-7 is an affirmative defense that is waived by default. An affirmative defense is "[a] defendant's assertion raising new facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all allegations in the complaint are true.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 430 (7th ed.1999). I agree that, with respect to the establishment of the defaulting defendants’ liability to the Calises for negligence (i.e. duly, breach and causation), all affirmative defenses are absolutely barred. Yet, with respect to defenses relating to the amount of plaintiffs’ damages, "those allegations relating to the amount of damages suffered generally are not [taken as true].” Bashforth, 576 A.2d at 1200. In order to "determine the amount of *852damages,” as required by Rule 55, the Court must apply § 10-6-7, which the General Assembly enacted specifically for cases like this one, involving settlement with some but not all joint tortfeasors. Thus, application of § 10-6-7 is not an affirmative defense offered by the nonsettling defendants, but rather a formula provided by the General Assembly for the calculation of damages that all Rhode Island courts are required to apply in situations like this one, whether requested to do so by the parties or not.

. The Court suggests that § 10-6-7 should not be applied at all in cases involving defaulted joint tortfeasors. Yet their decision gives defaulted defendants a claim reduction equal to the consideration received by the Calises ($17,500), but only "because the plaintiffs concede that the award should be offset by the amount paid them in settlement.” Such a holding means that, in the future, UCATA will be applied fully to deny defaulted joint tortfeasor defendants their right to seek contribution against joint tortfea-sor defendants who have settled, but not at all to provide such defendants their corresponding right to a claim reduction. Under such a lopsided application of UCATA, even if plaintiffs settle with some joint tortfeasors, they can still obtain a full recovery of damages from any defaulted defendants. Although this will certainly preserve the plaintiffs' incentive to settle their claims, as the majority intends, in fact it will overcompensate such plaintiffs (as plaintiffs who settle with' some joint tort-feasors can potentially collect double compensation and, in any event, more than their fair share of damages). Although intending to encourage settlements, such a holding will create distorted and unfair outcomes that contradict common sense, common law, and existing statutory law. We held in Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305, 1311 (R.I.1998), that "[t]o encourage early settlement of claims * * * the injured party ought to be able to structure an early settlement with any willing alleged tortfeasor in a manner that enables him or her to be made whole, or as near thereto as possible, without providing him or her with a windfall or any excess recovery." (Emphasis added.) The majority’s holding subverts this purpose because it will allow plaintiffs to recover windfalls and excess recoveries.