Court Opinion

ID: 9680031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:17:22.681267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:24.760785
License: Public Domain

*173BLOODWORTH, Justice.
This case, originally assigned to another justice on this court, has been reassigned to the writer.
The State petitioned for, and has been granted, a writ of certiorari to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition prays that we reverse the decision of that court. We grant that prayer and reverse and remand this cause.
The Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision reversing the trial court is based on three propositions :
VI. “ * * * that error is made to appear in overruling objection to asking Mrs. Wilbanks as to whether or not she and her husband had stayed away from Barbara King’s funeral”;
IX. that it was error to refuse the following charge requested by defendant, viz:
“Defendant’s Charge No. 17
“The Court charges the Jury that if a conviction in this case depends on the testimony of a single witness; and if the Jury have a reasonable doubt as to the correctness of the testimony of such witness, they cannot convict the Defendant.”
X. That it was error to refuse the following charge requested by defendant, viz:
“Defendant’s Charge No. 20
“The Court charges the Jury that if, from the testimony, there is a probability of Defendant’s innocence, that is a just ground for a reasonable doubt; and, if such probability exists in this case, you cannot convict the Defendant.”
Upon a consideration of these three propositions, it is our conclusion that none of them constitutes reversible error.
For convenience sake, we discuss our reasons for reversal of the Court of Criminal Appeals under the same headings as used by that court in its opinion.
VI.
The record shows this question was asked of Mrs. Wilbanks, viz:
“Q. All right now, I will ask you this, did you go to the funeral of this child?”
This question was never answered by the witness. We have held:
“ * * * Where there is no answer to a question, any error in asking the question is harmless. * * * ” State v. Hodge, 280 Ala. 422, 425, 194 So.2d 827, 829 (1967); 2A Ala.Dig., Appeal & Error, «=1048(5) ; 7 Ala.Dig., Criminal Law, «=117014(3).
Moreover, the court never ruled on the objection. An extensive colloquy ensued, after the objection was made, between the court and both counsel, and undoubtedly all parties lost sight of the court’s never having ruled. Since no ruling was made by the trial court, there is, of course, an absence of reversible error.
Perhaps, the Court of Criminal Appeals was led to believe that the objection to the question was overruled because appellant’s brief so states. As we have already indicated, upon an inspection of the full record ourselves, we have found this to be an erroneous assumption.
In a very recent decision, this court reaffirmed a long established principle (which the court has followed for at least forty years) to the effect that, “There being no dispute about the facts, we may go to the [full] record for a more complete understanding of those features treated in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals.” Johnson v. State, 287 Ala. 576, 253 So.2d 344, 345 (1971). Both the justices, who joined in the majority opinion, and those who concurred specially, fully concurred in this principle.
Clearly, the full record speaks for itself in this instance, and what it reveals with *174respect to the point in issue cannot be made the subject of dispute.
Mr. Justice Lawson’s most scholarly special concurrence in Johnson v. State, supra, points out other instances in which this court has approved going to the record : to examine pleadings, the oral charge, written requested charges, and contracts, which the Courts of Appeals have interpreted in their opinions. See Johnson v. State, supra, 253 So.2d at pages 348-349.
It seems to us it would create an absurdity, as well as perpetuate a grave miscarriage of justice, were we to affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision, as the dissent suggests we do, when we know, as a matter of fact, that court’s opinion is based upon a misconception as to what actually transpired in the trial court with resjpect to the error charged.
IX.
Defendant’s charge No. 17 is misleading, if not positively erroneous, in using the word “correctness” in alluding to the single witness’ testimony, of which, when the jury have a reasonable doubt, they cannot convict the defendant.
None of the cases cited by the Court of Criminal Appeals to reverse supports that conclusion. Each of the charges in those cases uses the word “truth” or “truthfulness.”
 We have been unable to find any case in Alabama holding that refusal to give such a charge constitutes reversible error. We are unwilling to hold such to be error here, in view of our conclusion, already stated, that we think the charge is misleading, if not positively erroneous. It is not error to refuse a misleading charge. Herring v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 203 Ala. 136, 82 So. 166 (1919); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 276 Ala. 99, 159 So.2d 458 (1963); see also Jones v. Berney, 288 Ala. 423, 261 So.2d 745 (1972).
Moreover, we have read the court’s oral charge, as well as the other charges given for the defendant, and we are convinced that the charge in question was amply “covered.” It would serve no useful purpose, and would unduly prolong this opinion, to repeat the court’s oral charge, or to set out the given charge to which we refer. Suffice it to say, the court has examined and thoroughly considered each in consultation.
X.
There was no error to reverse in refusing defendant’s charge No. 20.
In one of our more recent decisions, Stokley v. State, 254 Ala. 534, 545, 49 So. 2d 284, 294 (1950), this court expressed itself thusly with respect to an almost identical charge:
“The trial court also refused to give defendant’s written requested Charge No. 3, which is as follows: T charge you, Gentlemen of the Jury, that if the evidence in this case convinces you that there is a probability of the Defendant’s innocence, then your verdict should be not guilty.’
“This charge has had a rather checkered career in our cases. In the early cases it was held that the refusal of such a charge constituted reversible error. Croft v. State, 95 Ala. 3, 10 So. 517; Whitaker v. State, 106 Ala. 30, 17 So. 456; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274. However, the more recent decisions of this court and of the Court of Appeals hold that the refusal of such a charge is not reversible error, particularly where, as here, the trial court adequately instructed the jury that the defendant must be acquitted unless shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Edwards v. State, 205 Ala. 160, 87 So. 179; Russo v. State, 236 Ala. 155, 181 So. 502; Wilson v. State, 243 Ala. 1, 8 So.2d 422; Napier v. State, 26 Ala.App. 597, 164 So. 307; Reeves v. State, 28 Ala.App. 222, 182 So. 90; Duncan v. State, 31 Ala.App. 186, 13 So.2d 695. To like effect see Odom v. State, 253 Ala. 571, 46 So.2d 1.”
*175We do not think the trial court erred in refusing this charge particularly where, as here, the trial court adequately instructed the jury in its oral charge, that the defendant must be acquitted unless shown to be guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Stokley v. State, supra.
Reversed and remanded.
MERRILL. HARWOOD, MADDOX and McCALL, J J., concur.
HEFLIN, C. J., dissents.
COLEMAN, J., dissents.