Court Opinion

ID: 9784585
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:48:58.418569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:56.538792
License: Public Domain

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Justice,
concurring.
Chief Justice Chew finds that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s “true” finding to one of the enhancement paragraphs and remands for a new punishment hearing. I agree that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the challenged enhancement paragraph, but I write separately to explain my reasoning.
To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a prior conviction exists, and (2) the defendant is linked to that conviction. Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). No specific document or mode of proof is required to prove these two elements. Id. There is no “best evidence” rule in Texas that requires that the fact of a prior conviction be proven with any document, much less any specific document. Id. While evidence of a certified copy of a final judgment and sentence may be a preferred and convenient means, the State may prove both of these elements in a number of different ways, including (1) the defendant’s admission or stipulation, (2) testimony by a person who was present when the person was convicted of the specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person, or (3) documentary proof, *604such as a judgment, that contains sufficient information to establish both the existence of a prior conviction and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted. Id. at 921-22. These methods of proving the final conviction are not exclusive. See Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 32 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)(overruling any case holding that there are exclusive manners of proof of a defendant’s identity as to prior felonies used for enhancement). Any type of evidence, documentary or testimonial, might suffice. Flowers, 220 S.W.Sd at 922. The trier of fact looks at the totality of the evidence admitted to determine (1) whether there was a previous conviction, and (2) whether the defendant was the person convicted. Id. at 921-22. If these two elements can be found beyond a reasonable doubt, then the evidence is legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction. Id.
In addition to the two prior DWI convictions alleged for jurisdictional purposes, the indictment contained two other enhancement paragraphs, which read as follows:
And it is further presented in and to said Court that, prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense (hereafter styled the primary offense), on the 30th day of August, 1983, in cause number 1404 in the 109th Judicial District Court of Andrews County, Texas, the defendant was convicted of the felony offense of Driving While Intoxicated;
And it is further presented in and to said Court that, prior to the commission of the primary offense, and after the conviction in cause number 1404 was final, the defendant committed the felony offense of Driving While Intoxicated and was convicted on the 24th day of October, 1990, in cause number 2523 in the 109th Judicial District Court of Andrews County, Texas....
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the prior conviction in cause number 2523. Therefore, it is unnecessary to address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of true made with respect to that paragraph.
In order to prove the challenged enhancement paragraph, the State introduced into evidence a certified copy of the judgment and sentence in cause number 1404 (State’s Exhibit 3). State’s Exhibit 3 is legally sufficient to prove that there was a previous conviction as alleged in the first enhancement paragraph. The only remaining question is whether the evidence is legally sufficient to prove that Appellant is the same person who was previously convicted in cause number 1404.
Sheriff Sam Jones testified for the State as a fingerprint expert. He explained that a booking packet is created every time a person is arrested for a criminal offense. Each booking packet contains the defendant’s information, the charge, medical information, mug shots, and fingerprints. Sheriff Jones testified he had fingerprinted Appellant but he did not specify when or where. He confirmed that the prosecutor had asked him to “match the fingerprint identification from the Judgement of its present to the defendant.”1 If the judgment did not contain a fingerprint, the prosecutor had asked him to look into the booking packet and he had done that. The following exchange then occurred between the prosecutor and Sheriff Jones:
[Prosecutor]: Sheriff Jones, I’m showing you what’s been marked for identification purposes is [sic] State’s Exhibit 3. It’s Cause No. 1404, entitled The *605State of Texas vs. Guadalupe Garza Cruz in the 109th Judicial District Court of Andrews County, Texas. Did you have an opportunity to review the booking packet associated with this charge?
[Sheriff Jones]: I did.
[Prosecutor]: And did you compare the information in the booking packet with the information that was given to you from Mr. Cruz during Court?
[Sheriff Jones]: Yes, sir.
[Prosecutor]: And did it match?
[Sheriff Jones]: Yes, it did.
[Prosecutor]: And in your opinion, is the Guadalupe Cruz in the courtroom today the same Guadalupe Cruz who was convicted in this Judgement and Sentence in Cause No. 1404?
[Sheriff Jones]: Yes, sir.
Chief Justice Chew finds the evidence insufficient because the booking packet was not offered into evidence. But the Court of Criminal Appeals made it clear in Flowers that no specific form of proof is required. Consequently, I would not find the evidence insufficient simply because the booking packet was not introduced into evidence. The problem in this case is that there is no testimony that the booking packet associated with cause number 1404 contained the arrested person’s fingerprints or that Sheriff Jones compared those fingerprints to the known prints of Appellant. Sheriff Jones testified generally about the booking procedure but he did not testify that the procedure was specifically followed in cause number 1404 or that a fingerprint card was contained in that booking packet. Further, the prosecutor asked Sheriff Jones whether he had compared “the information in the booking packet with the information that was given to [him] from Mr. Cruz during Court” but he did not specify that he compared the known fingerprints of Appellant with a fingerprint card contained in the booking packet. Thus, Sheriff Jones’ testimony that the “information matched” is legally insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant is the same person who was convicted of driving while intoxicated on the 30th day of August 1983, in cause number 1404 in the 109th Judicial District Court of Andrews County, Texas. See Zimmer v. State, 989 S.W.2d 48 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. refd). For these reasons, I concur in Chief Justice Chew’s opinion that the evidence is legally insufficient to prove the prior conviction alleged in the third enhancement paragraph, and therefore, the judgment as to punishment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on punishment only. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. 44.29(b)(Vernon Supp.2008).

. The meaning of this testimony is not entirely clear but it appears the prosecutor intended to ask Sheriff Jones to compare Appellant’s fingerprints with the fingerprint contained in the judgment. The judgment in cause number 1404 does not contain a fingerprint.