Court Opinion

ID: 9788250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:33:20.03176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:06.464396
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
24 I concur in Parts I(A) and II of the court's opinion. I dissent from Part I(B), not so much because I disagree with all that is said there, but because I think it is premature to reach that issue. We have asked the trial court to revisit the alimony question, make more complete findings, and make a determination that properly results therefrom. It may be that that exercise will lead to no alimony, more alimony, alimony of longer duration, or alimony of a different character. We do not have the clear picture of the alimony award that we would have if more detailed findings and a fuller explanation were made by the trial court. I therefore believe it is best to reserve judgment on the propriety of rehabilitative alimony until we have that clear picture.
125 I dissent from Part I(C) because, in my view, my colleagues fail to give the Legislature its due, while at the same time inviting further legislative incursion into the management of divorce cases. In my opinion, the Legislature's clear statement that fault may be considered in alimony determinations, see Utah Code Ann. § 80-3-5(8)(b) (2007), represents a policy judgment that courts should take to heart and endeavor to follow. The fact that this legislative mandate is made in a broad and generalized way strongly suggests that the Legislature appreciates the multitude of factual seenarios that arise in divorce cases, recognizes the broad equitable powers traditionally enjoyed by the courts in doing justice in divorce proceedings on a case-by-case basis, and trusts the courts to flesh out the alimony/fault concept in the course of adjudication of cases over time.
126 I fear that we betray that trust and shirk that responsibility in telling the Legislature we cannot follow that policy mandate until it is spelled out more precisely. Indeed, in declining to consider fault, we are in fact "substitut[ing} our judgment for that of the Legislature," because it is plain that in using the term "fault" without a great deal of specificity, the judgment of the Legislature is precisely that the courts should develop the concept in the context of real disputes, rather than having the Legislature do so in a factual vacuum.
{27 All of that said, I acknowledge the insightful points made in the lead opinion that will, indeed, make the exercise a difficult one. The majority is right that fault concepts are already reflected in several aspects of alimony analysis and that finding a role for fault in alimony analysis that will neither punish nor reward is intellectually perplexing and will no doubt prove challenging in practice. Still, it is appropriate to take the Legislature's mandate to heart and employ the fault concept in appropriate cases in making alimony awards.
28 Procedurally, to ensure that the role of fault can be understood by the parties and *484appropriately reviewed on appeal, the trial court in a given case should first come to an alimony award based just on the usual criteria. See id. § 30-8-5(8)(a@)@-(vil). If it determines that one party's fault should lower or increase the amount of the award, it should identify the precise character of the fault in question, the relevance of that fault to the matter of alimony, and the amount by which alimony should be increased or decreased by reason thereof. Cf. Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946-47 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (affirming award of alimony where trial court considered the statutorily-required criteria and the recipient's " 'fault in engaging in an extra-marital affair ") (quoting trial court's findings), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999).
29 I would do nothing more in this case than give the trial court this guidance, for its use in reassessing its alimony determination on remand, and would reserve judgment, for now, on the propriety of considering the proper role of fault in calculating alimony in this case.