Court Opinion

ID: 9374345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 20:03:12.116157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:46.734431
License: Public Domain

Electronically Filed
                                                        Supreme Court
                                                        SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                        22-FEB-2023
                                                        09:33 AM
                                                        Dkt. 25 ORD

                          SCEC-XX-XXXXXXX

          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
________________________________________________________________

                 GARY ARTHUR CORDERY, Plaintiff,

                                vs.

              DAVID YUTAKA IGE; JOSHUA BOOTH GREEN;
           SYLVIA JUNG LUKE; and MARK E. RECKTENWALD,
   individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
________________________________________________________________

                        ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

                               ORDER
  (By: Nakayama, Acting C.J., McKenna, Wilson, and Eddins, JJ., and
    Circuit Judge DeWeese, in place of Recktenwald, C.J., recused)

     Upon consideration of Plaintiff Gary Arthur Cordery’s

“Request for Declaratory Judgement” filed on December 15, 2022

(complaint), the motion to dismiss filed by Defendants (Dkt.

15), and the record, the court grants the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss and the complaint is dismissed as to all claims and

parties.
                               I. BACKGROUND

      On December 15, 2022, Cordery, pro se, submitted by

electronic filing a document entitled “request for declaratory

judgement without relief pursuant to HRCP Rule 57 . . .”

(complaint) which was docketed as an “election contest” in the

Hawaiʻi Supreme Court. 1     Dkt. 1; see also Dkt. 2 (notice of

electronic filing).      The complaint’s caption and allegations

identify the plaintiffs as “Gary Arthur Cordery pro se, along

with more than Thirty Voters pro se”.         Dkt. 1:1.     The complaint

asserts this court has jurisdiction under Hawaiʻi Revised

Statutes (HRS) § 11-172 (Supp. 2021), which is the election

contest statute, and HRS § 602-5 (2016).          Dkt. 1:2.

      The complaint’s allegations take issue with the timing of

the inaugurations, 2 and do not challenge any election results.

See Dkt. 1.    The prayer for relief requests a declaratory

judgment related to the timing of the inaugurations.            See Dkt.

1:14-18.

1     The complaint refers to the parties as petitioner/respondent, but this
is incorrect. In an election contest the parties are referred to as
plaintiff/defendant. See Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule
81(b)(10) (establishing that the HRCP apply to election contests); see also
HRCP Rule 17 (“Parties plaintiffs and defendant”).

2     C.f., Haw. Const. art. V, § 1 (providing that “[t]he term of office of
the governor shall begin at noon on the first Monday in December next
following the governor’s election and end at noon on the first Monday
in December, four years thereafter.”).

                                      2
     The complaint was only signed by Cordery and included

Cordery’s address and phone number.    Dkt. 1:1, 16.   The

complaint does not include the signature, address or phone

number for any of the other thirty plaintiffs.    See Dkt. 1; see

also HRCP Rule 11(a) (requiring a pro se party to sign a

pleading and to include the pro se party’s “address and

telephone number, if any”).

     On December 16, 2022 - the day after the complaint was

filed - Cordery submitted an electronic filing of a document

titled “Exhibit 3 Request for Declaratory Judgement” that

appears to identify the purported signatures of thirty voters.

Dkt. 7; see Dkt. 8 (notice of electronic filing).

     On December 16, 2022, Cordery filed a motion to correct the

record to identify a defendant (Motion #1).    Dkt. 9.   Motion #1

is only signed by Cordery.    Dkt. 9:2.   There is no signature of

the other thirty plaintiffs.    Id.

     On December 22, 2022, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint.   Dkt. 15.   Defendants’ arguments for dismissal

are addressed below.

     On December 26, 2022, Cordery filed a memorandum in

opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss.    Dkt. 17.     The

memorandum in opposition is only signed by Cordery.      Dkt. 17:8.

There is no signature of any of the other thirty plaintiffs.

                                  3
Id.   The arguments asserted by Cordery in opposition to the

Defendants’ motion to dismiss are addressed below.       Dkt. 17.

      On January 6, 2023, Cordery filed a motion for

interrogatories.   Dkt. 19.    The document states, “I, Gary Arthur

Cordery pro se, lead Petitioner, hereby bring this Motion for

Interrogatories” (Motion #2).     Dkt. 19:1.    Motion #2 is only

signed by Cordery.   Id.

      On January 12, 2023, Defendants filed a memorandum in

opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion #2.     Dkt. 21.

      On January 16, 2023, Cordery filed a motion for additional

interrogatories (Motion #3).     Dkt. 23.   Motion #3 is only signed

by Cordery.   Dkt. 23:5.

                           II. LEGAL STANDARD

      Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to HRCP

Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.     Dkt. 15:6.    “Our review

of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

is based on the contents of the complaint, the allegations of

which we accept as true and construe in the light most

favorable” to the plaintiff.     Yamane v. Pohlson, 111 Hawaiʻi 74,

81, 137 P.3d 980, 987 (2006) (cleaned up).       Dismissal of the

complaint is appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.”     Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-

                                   4
Toledo, 143 Hawaiʻi 249, 258, 428 P.3d 761, 770 (2018) (citation

omitted); see Yamane, 111 Hawaiʻi at 81, 428 P.3d at 987 (same).

                           III. DISCUSSION

A.   Non-attorney Cordery is the only Plaintiff

     While Defendants’ motion to dismiss did not raise any issue

with Cordery, who is not an attorney, appearing to represent

other natural persons in this case, the Court will sua sponte

address the issue.

     Under HRS § 605–2 (2016) and HRS § 605–14 (2016), persons

who are not licensed to practice law in Hawaiʻi “are not

permitted to act as ‘attorneys’ and represent other natural

persons” in a lawsuit.    Oahu Plumbing and Sheet Metal, Ltd. v.

Kona Construction, Inc., 60 Haw. 372, 377, 590 P.2d 570, 573

(1979) (citing HRS § 605-14 (“Unauthorized practice of law

prohibited”)); see also HRS § 605-2 (providing, in pertinent

part, that “no person shall be allowed to practice in any court

of the State unless that person has been duly licensed . . . by

the supreme court[.]”).

     This court’s decision in Alexander & Baldwin, LLC v.

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi 37, 48-54, 508 P.3d 832, 843-849 (2022), is

instructive.   In Armitage the circuit court had allowed non-

attorneys to represent an unincorporated association known as

the “Reinstated Hawaiian Nation” in court to defend on an

ejectment claim.   Id., 151 Hawaiʻi at 42, 48, 508 P.3d at 837,

                                  5
843.    The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the

plaintiff Alexander & Baldwin, LLC and against the defendant

Reinstated Hawaiian Nation.       Id. at 45, 508 P.3d at 840.        On

appeal, this court held:

                  Because Noa and Armitage, as non-lawyers, were not
            authorized to represent the Reinstated Hawaiian Nation in
            court, the circuit court should have exercised its inherent
            power to prevent their unauthorized practice of law. “Our
            courts have inherent and statutory powers to deal with the
            unauthorized practice of law. . . . Under those powers,
            our courts, sua sponte, may prevent an unauthorized person
            from practicing law in a case pending before [them].” . . .
            Courts have an active role in enforcing HRS §§ 605-2 and
            605-14. Thus, they not only may but should act sua
            sponte to prevent non-attorneys from practicing law before
            them.

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 49, 508 P.3d at 844 (first citation

omitted) (emphasis added).

       In so holding this court rejected a blanket “nullity rule”

whereby actions of a non-attorney would “automatically result in

a nullity.”    Id. at 50, 508 P.3d at 845; see id., at 51, 508

P.3d at 846 (“[W]e do not view the nullity rule as necessary in

every case to promote the policies behind the ban on the

unauthorized practice of law.”).          Instead, the court explained:

            [B]ecause the consequences of applying the nullity rule to
            a case can be harsh, it should be invoked only where it
            fulfills the purposes of protecting both the public and the
            integrity of the court system from the actions of the
            unlicensed, and where no other alternative remedy is
            possible.

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at 847 (citation omitted).

This court then went on to establish that “courts should address

the effects of non-attorney representation on a case-by-case

                                      6
basis” and that the remedy imposed by the court should vindicate

the “policy aims of HRS §§ 605-2 and 605-14, namely protecting

the courts and the public, including the litigants, from the

conduct of non-attorneys.”     Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52-53, 508

P.3d at 847-48.    The court held that in conducting this analysis

the courts should consider the following factors:

          1. Whether the non-attorney’s conduct is done without
             knowledge that the action was improper;
          2. Whether the party acted diligently in correcting the
             mistake by obtaining counsel;
          3. Whether the non-attorney’s participation is minimal;
          4. Whether the participation results in prejudice to the
             opposing party; and
          5. Any other relevant circumstances.

See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.          The

court in Armitage then went on to apply these factors and

vacated the summary judgment that had been entered by the

circuit court.    Id. at 51-54, 508 P.3d at 846-49.

     Turning to the case before the court, the complaint asserts

that the plaintiffs include “more than thirty voters pro se”

(Dkt. 1:1) and that the signatures of these voters are attached

at Exhibit 3.    Dkt. 1:16.   Yet there is no Exhibit 3 attached to

the complaint, and the complaint itself does not include the

names, signature, and phone numbers for any plaintiffs except

for Cordery.    See Dkt. 1.   Even the caption of the complaint is

silent as to the names of these other thirty voters.          Id.

     The day after the complaint was filed, on December 16,

2022, Cordery submitted an electronic filing of the signatures

                                    7
of the thirty voters on a document that is marked “Exhibit 3”.

See Dkt. 7; see also Dkt. 8 (indicating on the notice of

electronic filing that Cordery filed Docket No. 7).

     The issue before the court, therefore, is whether the

Exhibit 3 document filed by non-attorney Cordery the day after

the complaint was filed joins these other natural persons to

this action.

     Applying the Armitage factors, we hold that the Exhibit 3

filing (Dkt. 7) does not have the legal effect of joining other

natural persons to this action and, therefore, the only

plaintiff to this action is Cordery.

     As to the first factor - whether Cordery’s conduct was done

without knowledge that the action was improper - this factor is

neutral as the record is silent as to whether Cordery knows he

is not authorized to represent other natural persons in this

action.   See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.

     As to the second factor - whether these thirty voters acted

diligently in correcting the mistake - the record indicates that

none of these voters have filed a document in this case or have

otherwise appeared on their own behalf in this action.    Id.

Thus, as to the second factor it weighs in favor of finding the

Exhibit 3 filing (Dkt. 7) has no legal effect.

     As to the third factor - whether non-attorney Cordery’s

participation is minimal - this factor weighs in favor of a

                                 8
finding that the Exhibit 3 filing has no legal effect.    See

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.

      Cordery has submitted numerous filings on behalf of other

natural persons.    Specifically, the complaint (Dkt. 1) and other

documents were filed by Cordery on behalf of other natural

persons.   See Dkts. 1, 9, 17, 19, 23.   In these filings Cordery

purports to act as the “lead Petitioner” (see Dkts. 17:1, 19:1)

and requests relief on behalf of “Petitioners” or “Plaintiffs.”

See Dkt. 9:2 (stating “Petitioners reserve all rights[.]”); Dkt.

17:5 (arguing jurisdiction and asserting that “Plaintiffs

maintain”).    Yet none of these documents were signed by the

other plaintiffs.    See Dkts. 1, 9, 17, 19, 23.

      As to the fourth factor - whether the participation results

in prejudice to the opposing party - this factor is neutral as

the record is silent as to any prejudice to the Defendants.     See

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.

      As to the fifth factor - other relevant circumstances -

this factor also weighs in favor of finding the Exhibit 3 filing

(Dkt. 7) has no legal effect and that Cordery is the only

plaintiff.    See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at 847–

48.   This is because Cordery did not include any contact

information for any of the other “thirty voters” and, thus,

there is no way for the court to contact them without going

directly through Cordery.    See HRCP Rule 11(a) (requiring a

                                  9
self-represented natural person to sign every pleading, written

motion, or other paper filed with the court).

     In sum, three of the five Armitage factors weigh in favor

of a finding that Cordery is the only plaintiff before the court

and Cordery’s Exhibit 3 filing (see Dkt. 7) did not join the

other purported plaintiffs to this action.        As set forth in

Armitage, before the court applies the nullity rule it must also

consider policy considerations and alternative remedies:

          [B]ecause the consequences of applying the nullity rule to
          a case can be harsh, it should be invoked only where it
          fulfills the purposes of protecting both the public and the
          integrity of the court system from the actions of the
          unlicensed, and where no other alternative remedy is
          possible.

Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at 847 (citation omitted).

     Here, to apply the nullity rule to Cordery’s Exhibit 3

filing (Dkt. 7) serves to protect the public from the

unauthorized practice of law.      See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–

53, 508 P.3d at 847–48.     This is because Cordery, as a non-

attorney, is not authorized to represent the thirty voters and

Cordery’s filing on December 16, 2022 of a document on behalf of

the voters is a document filed in violation of HRS §§ 605-2 and

605-14.

     The application of the nullity rule to the Exhibit 3 filing

also protects the “integrity of the court system from the

actions of the unlicensed” because it is consistent with other

                                   10
court rules.    See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52–53, 508 P.3d at

847–48.

       In this case for other natural persons to join this lawsuit

they were required to sign the complaint.     See HRCP Rule 11(a)

(“Every pleading, written motion, and other paper . . . if the

party is unrepresented, shall be signed by the party.”).     But

only Cordery signed the complaint.     Dkt. 1:16.

       After the complaint was filed, in order for other self-

represented natural persons to join this lawsuit, these natural

persons would need to file a motion and obtain leave of court.

See HRCP Rule 24(c).     And to comply with HRCP Rule 11(a), any

motion filed by a natural person would need to be signed by the

party that seeks to join the case.     But no such motion was

filed.

       Given the failure of Cordery to follow the court rules, the

application of the nullity rule to Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7) also

protects the “integrity of the court system from the actions of

the unlicensed”.    See Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi at 52, 508 P.3d at

847.

       The final consideration is whether an “alternative remedy

is possible.”    Id.   Here, one alternative remedy would be to

construe the complaint liberally to include the next-day filed

Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7), and thereby allow Cordery to join thirty

additional plaintiffs to this action.     The court finds this

                                  11
alternative is inappropriate because it would countenance

Cordery representing the other natural persons in this case in

violation of HRS §§ 605-2 and 605-14.

     In addition, this alternative remedy is inconsistent with

the policy considerations behind the fundamental tenant of

Hawaiʻi law that a pleading prepared by a pro se litigant “should

be interpreted liberally.”   See Waltrip v. TS Enterprises, Inc.,

140 Hawaiʻi 226, 239, 398 P.3d 815, 828 (2016) (citation

omitted).   “The underpinnings of this tenet rest on the

promotion of equal access to justice — a pro se litigant should

not be prevented from proceeding on a pleading or letter to an

agency if a reasonable, liberal construction of the document

would permit [them] to do so.”   Id.   But here the complaint will

be dismissed as untimely and for lack of jurisdiction regardless

of whether additional parties are joined.   Therefore, a liberal

construction of the complaint to include the Exhibit 3 filing

(Dkt. 7) would not serve to promote equal access to justice, and

the court declines to construe the complaint liberally to

include the Exhibit 3 filing.

     A second alternative remedy would be to notify the thirty

voters of their failure to sign the complaint.   In the usual

situation, the clerk would bring a party’s failure to sign a

document to the attention of the party before the document is

stricken.   See HRCP Rule 11(a) (providing that “[a]n unsigned

                                 12
paper shall be stricken by the clerk unless omission of the

signature is corrected promptly after being called to the

attention of the attorney or party.”).

     But in this case, there is no way to notify the voters set

forth on Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 7) of their failure to sign the

original complaint without going through their purported

representative, Cordery.   This is because the complaint and all

subsequent documents filed by Cordery did not include the

addresses and phone numbers for any of the other pro se voters.

In this circumstance there is no reasonable alternative remedy

available for this court to bring the omission of the failure to

sign the complaint to the attention of the thirty pro se voters.

     Accordingly, we find Cordery is the only plaintiff in this

case.

B.   The Election Contest is Time Barred

     The complaint cites to HRS § 11-172 as the basis for this

court’s jurisdiction.   Dkt. 1:2.    And Cordery has maintained

throughout his filings that this court has jurisdiction to

consider this action as a contested election under article II,

                                13
section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, 3 HRS § 11-171 (2009), 4

and HRS § 11-172.     See Dkt. 17:5-7.

      Defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the basis that

Cordery failed to meet the statutory deadline to file an

election contest as set forth in HRS § 11-174.5 (Supp. 2021).

Dkt. 15:10.

      In response, Cordery argues that HRS § 11-174.5 is

“irrelevant to this action” because Cordery made “no reference

to this statute anywhere in this election complaint.”             See Dkt.

17:3.   Cordery also cites to Watland v. Lingle, 104 Hawaiʻi 128,

133 n.8, 85 P.3d 1079, 1084 n.8 (2004), for the general

proposition that this court “has jurisdiction to consider the

election challenge[.]”      Dkt. 17:7.     Essentially Cordery argues

there is no time limitation on an election contest under HRS

§ 11-172 when the party asserting the election contest does not

rely on HRS § 11-174.5.       See Dkt. 17:3-7.

      Cordery’s reliance on Watland is misplaced.           Watland does

not stand for the broad proposition that an election contest

under HRS § 11-172 has no deadline.         To the contrary, in Watland

the election contest challenging the ratification of the

3     Article II, section 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution provides, “Contested
elections shall be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in such
manner as shall be provided by law.”

4     HRS § 11-171 provides, “This part shall apply whenever a contested
election is subject to determination by a court of competent jurisdiction in
the manner provided by law.”

                                     14
constitutional amendment by the electorate in the November 5,

2002 general election was filed on November 22, 2002, seventeen

days after the general election.        See Watland, 104 Hawaiʻi at

132-33, 85 P.3d at 1083-84.     In 2002, HRS § 11-174.5(a) was

identical to the current version of the statute, which provides:

          (a) In general, special general, special, or runoff
          elections, the complaint shall be filed in the office of
          the clerk of the supreme court not later than 4:30 p.m. on
          the twentieth day following the general, special general,
          special, or runoff election and shall be accompanied by a
          deposit for costs of court as established by rules of the
          supreme court. The clerk shall issue to the defendants
          named in the complaint a summons to appear before the
          supreme court not later than 4:30 p.m. on the tenth day
          after service thereof.

HRS § 11-174.5 (emphasis added).        Cordery is incorrect that

Watland allows for an exception to the statutory deadlines to

file an election contest under HRS § 11-172.         To the extent

Watland has any application to the instant case it would be the

exact opposite of the proposition argued by Cordery because the

election contest in Watland was filed within the 20-day deadline

to file an election contest challenging a general election

result as established by HRS § 11-174.5.        See Watland, 104

Hawaiʻi at 132-33, 85 P.3d at 1083-84.

     Notably, the complaint’s core allegations - viewed in a

light most favorable to Cordery and deemed to be true - are not

a direct challenge to any election result, and rather they

complain about the timing of certain inaugurations.          See Dkt. 1.

Yet Cordery maintains throughout his pleading and filings that

                                   15
this court has jurisdiction to consider the complaint as a

contested election under HRS § 11-172.        To this end, we agree

with Defendants that any election contest claim made in the

complaint under HRS § 11-172 is time barred.

     HRS § 11-172 provides:

          With respect to any election, any candidate, or qualified
          political party directly interested, or any thirty voters
          of any election district, may file a complaint in the
          supreme court. The complaint shall set forth any cause or
          causes, such as but not limited to, provable fraud,
          overages, or underages, that could cause a difference in
          the election results. The complaint shall also set forth
          any reasons for reversing, correcting, or changing the
          decisions of the voter service center officials or the
          officials at a counting center in an election using the
          electronic voting system. A copy of the complaint shall be
          delivered to the chief election officer or the clerk in the
          case of county elections.

See HRS § 11-172.   Under HRS § 11-174.5(a), the deadline to file

a contest for cause of the general election pursuant to HRS

§ 11-172 is “not later than 4:30 p.m. on the twentieth day”

following the general election.      Id.; see also Tataii v. Cronin,

119 Hawaiʻi 337, 339, 198 P.3d 124, 126 (2008) (holding in an

election contest challenging the result of a general election

“pursuant to HRS § 11-172” that the “twenty-day provision of HRS

§ 11–174.5(a) is mandatory”).

     While the complaint does not allege the date of the general

election, the Constitution of the State of Hawaiʻi sets forth the

date of the general election:

          General elections shall be held on the first Tuesday after
          the first Monday in November in all even-numbered
          years. Special and primary elections may be held as
          provided by law; provided that in no case shall any primary

                                   16
            election precede a general election by less than forty-five
            days.

Haw. Const. art. II, § 8 (emphasis added).          And in 2022 the date

fell on Tuesday, November 8, 2022.         See Hawaiʻi Rules of

Evidence, Rule 201(c) (allowing the court to take judicial

notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute because it is

“capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”); A.

Bowman, Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence Manual, § 201-5[2] (2020)

(“Calendars can be used to ascertain the day on which a

particular date fell” and collecting cases). 5

      Here, the deadline for Cordery to file an election

challenge based on HRS § 11-172 was on November 28, 2022.             See

HRS § 11-174.5(a).      But the complaint was filed after this

deadline on December 15, 2022.        See Dkt. 1.

      Accordingly, to the extent Cordery’s complaint asserts an

election contest claim based on HRS § 11-172, we hold the claim

is time barred by HRS § 11-174.5(a).

C.    The Declaratory Judgment Claim is Dismissed

      Defendants also move to dismiss the complaint on the basis

that this court lacks original jurisdiction to resolve the

complaint’s claim for declaratory judgment.           See Dkt. 15:14.     In

5     When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to HRCP Rule 12(b)(1) the
trial court is “not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review
any evidence . . . to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of
jurisdiction.” Yamane, 111 Hawaiʻi at 81, 137 P.3d at 987.

                                     17
response, Cordery argues this court has jurisdiction to consider

the claim for declaratory judgment pursuant to HRS § 602-5.

Dkt. 17:6-7.

     We agree with Defendants.

     Cordery’s claim for declaratory judgment is not a direct

challenge to the election results, and instead takes issue with

the timing of the inauguration of the certain elected officials.

See Dkt. 1.    The particular relief requested by Cordery is akin

to the relief available under Chapter 632, titled “Declaratory

Judgments.”    Specifically, HRS § 632-1 (2016) provides that

declaratory relief, including on the interpretation of a

statute, may be granted in the specific circumstances enumerated

therein.   HRS § 632-1(a), (b).

     Outside of a challenge to a constitutional amendment, this

court is without original jurisdiction to consider a claim for

declaratory judgment.    See HRS § 602-5; see also Blaisdell v.

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 30342, 2010 WL 708623, at *1 (Haw.

Feb. 25, 2010) (dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus on

the basis “that issuance of a declaratory judgment . . . is not

within the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” (citing

HRS §§ 602–5 and 632–1); Blaisdell v. Trader, No. 29895, 2009 WL

1944467, at *1 (Haw. July 7, 2009) (same); Blaisdell v. Dep’t of

Pub. Safety, No. 29920, 2009 WL 2387371, at *1 (Haw. Aug. 3,

2009) (same).    The only narrow exception to this jurisdictional

                                  18
bar, is that this court has original jurisdiction to consider a

claim for declaratory relief on the validity of a constitutional

amendment.   See Taomae v. Lingle, 108 Hawaiʻi 245, 250, 118 P.3d

1188, 1193 (2005) (granting in an original proceeding before the

court the plaintiffs’ requested relief for declaratory judgment

that the bill proposing a constitutional amendment “was not

validly passed”); see also Watland, 104 Hawaiʻi at 134–35, 85

P.3d at 1085–86 (considering in an original proceeding before

the court the plaintiffs’ requested relief to invalidate the

ratification of a constitutional amendment); Kahalekai v. Doi,

60 Haw. 324, 331, 590 P.2d 543, 549 (1979) (similar).

     Here, the narrow exception clearly does not apply because

Cordery’s claim for declaratory judgment is not related to the

passage of a constitutional amendment.    See Dkt. 1.    Rather, the

jurisdiction to consider the merits of a claim for declaratory

relief is with the circuit court.    See HRS § 632-1(b) (providing

relief by declaratory judgment “may be granted in civil cases”);

HRS § 603-21.5(a)(3) (2016 & Supp. 2021) (establishing the

circuit court with jurisdiction of civil actions).      See e.g.,

Tax Found. of Hawaii v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 189, 439 P.3d

127, 141 (2019) (discussing the nature of standing requirements

in declaratory judgment actions under HRS § 632-1).

Accordingly, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

                                19
D.   Pending Motions

     Cordery’s complaint requests the court take judicial notice

of the Hawaiʻi laws cited therein.    Dkt. 1:3.   Defendants did not

file any opposition to Cordery’s request.    Pursuant to Hawaiʻi

Rules of Evidence Rule 202(b) (2016), the request for judicial

notice of the Hawaiʻi laws cited in the complaint is granted.

     Cordery’s motions are all denied as moot.

                           IV. CONCLUSION

     Accordingly, it is ordered that the Defendants’ motion to

dismiss is granted.    The complaint is dismissed as to all claims

and parties.

          DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, February 22, 2023.

                                      /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

                                      /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

                                      /s/ Michael D. Wilson

                                      /s/ Todd W. Eddins

                                      /s/ Wendy M. DeWeese

                                 20