Court Opinion

ID: 9641011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:20:52.90307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:34.449675
License: Public Domain

MeDOWELL, District Judge
(concurring). I was not able to concur in the conclusion reached in the majority opinion until I had solved a question which gave me considerable difficulty, and which is not dis-. cussed in the foregoing opinion. As the subject is novel, and probably of interest to all federal trial judges, it may be worth while to state the cause of my perplexity and tiie reason for concurring. At the outset it should be said that I have never thought that any right given the probationer in this ease by the' federal Constitution has by possibility been infringed. The question with me has never been as to the power of Congress, but as to the intent shown by the Probation Act (43 Stat. 1259).
From the record in the habeas corpus ease (2471) it appears that one of the conditions of probation was that the probationer should during probation observe all state and federal criminal laws. It also appears that the reason which induced the trial court to revoke the probation was a belief that the probationer had, after probation was granted, violated some one or more of the state and federal prohibition laws. The petition for habeas corpus.asserts, and the return by the marshal admits, that the probationer has never admitted that he had committed any new offense, that he has never waived trial by jury of such charges, and that he has never had a jury trial thereof.
Even if not always the fact, at least in an overwhelming majority of instances, probation is to the probationer a highly esteemed privilege. It is at least a postponement of 'execution, a stay, which in many eases may become perpetual. A probationer is during probation at liberty, even if under a more or less mild surveillance, and to a probationer who is objecting thereto a revocation of probation is certainly a deprivation and a loss of ,& privilege. Too plainly to require discussion, the power to revoke probation, when it exists, like the power to grant probation, is intended to be exercised without the assistance of a jury.
The fact that the conditions of probation are expressly required by the statute to be put in writing, and a copy thereof furnished to each probationer, most clearly implies that probation may not be revoked unless a condition of probation has been broken.- The fact that power to revoke probation is expressly given, and the fact that the foregoing restriction on the power is implied, does not seem to me of importance. That which .is certainly implied in a statute is as binding as that which is expressed. That the probation statute was not intended to give the courts an arbitrary power of revocation seems a necessary conclusion. Treating as a whole the express power to revoke and the implied restriction, the result is that the statute contains a grant of power to revoke because of a breach of a condition of probation, and does not grant power to revoke merely because a charge has been made-that the probationer has broken a condition. If I am right in the belief that the statute does not give power to revoke probation in any ease, unless and until there has been a breach of a condition of probation, it was of necessity intended by the lawmakers that some person or some tribunal should have the power to determine the truth of every charge of breach of condition of probation.
Many conditions of probation may properly be prescribed, and every possible condition may properly be put in one or the other of two classes. Obedience to the federal and state criminal laws falls properly into one class of conditions of probation, and all other possible conditions fall into the other class. In respect to this second class, it seems . clear enough that the court which granted probation is impliedly given power to decide whether or not the probationer has violated a condition of probation. That such power should be given to such courts, even *11if not absolutely necessary, is useful and in accordance with usage. In faet, in respect to the breaches of condition in the second class, the very failure of the statute to indicate some other person or tribunal as having the power is a sufficient reason for holding that the statute impliedly gives the power to the court which had previously granted probation.
However, where the breach of condition charged is the commission of a crime by a probationer who does not confess, and who has not been regularly convicted, the conclusion that the Probation Act gives power to the judge holding the court which granted probation to decide the question is not quite so easily reached. If the charge of crime is justified, such charge usually at least should be, and in regular course will be, tried by the tribunal which has jurisdiction of such charges independent of the probation statute. If the eharge is too trivial, or too ill-supported, to justify prosecution in such court, it might properly be ignored by the court which granted probation. In other words, every charge of crime, if of sufficient gravity and if supported by evidence, can be prosecuted in the regularly constituted tribunal, and there can therefore be no absolute necessity that the court which granted probation shall determine for itself the truth of the eharge. After conviction in such tribunal the judge holding the court which granted probation can of course revoke the probation or refuse to revoke it, as he thinks proper.
If the judge of the court which granted probation has the power to decide that a probationer has committed a crime, he can so deeide in advance of the regular jury trial of such eharge; and it is certainly possible that the judge’s decision may not correspond with the subsequent verdict. If by the pro.bation statute Congress has given the judge of the court which granted probation power to decide that a crime has been committed, Congress has provided for at least an occasional duplication of effort and of expense. Revoking probation does not excuse the new crime, and a regular trial by jury may and usually will follow.
Again, a decision by the judge of the court which granted probation, made in advance of the regular trial of the criminal charge, might prejudice either the prosecution or the defense on the regular trial of the criminal charge. The faet that probation had been revoked, because of a belief on the part of the judge that the probationer had committed a crime, might, if known, be highly prejudicial to the probationer on his trial on such eharge in the criminal court. Likewise a refusal to revoke might prejudice the prosecution.
If the crime charged against the probationer be a federal offense, committed in the district in which he was granted probation, the judge who, in advance of the .regular criminal trial, undertakes to determine the guilt or innocence of the probationer could disqualify himself. A judge who has formed, expressed, and acted upon an opinion that the accused is either guilty or. innocent of a charge of crime may no longer be qualified to preside at the regular trial before a jury of the same eharge. If the charge made against the probationer is a crime against a state law, there is at least danger of a breach of propriety in deciding in advance of a trial in the state court that the probationer either has or has not violated the state law. I do not here refer to the prejudice to the prosecution or to the defendant that might result, but to the seeming want of respect for the state court, shown by what may be an unnecessary decision by a federal court of a eharge which is yet to be tried in the state court.
While the question is to me close and difficult of solution, it seems more satisfactory to hold that the above-mentioned dangers and possibilities afford strong reasons for caution in exercising the power of revocation, rather than reasons for denying the existence of the power in any case. Any grant of judicial pówer, and especially the grant of a new power, is liable to be abused. But such faet affords no sufficient reason for denying that the power has been granted. In many cases it may be judicious for the court which granted probation to refuse to act on any charge of crime against a probationer, unless the probationer admits the charge, or unless he has been regularly and finally convicted after trial by the duly constituted criminal authorities. But at least occasionally the possession by the court which granted probation of the power to speedily and certainly revoke the probation, when the judge holding such court has become satisfied that the probationer has broken a condition of probation by committing a crime, will be of very high value. The majority of probationers are and will be youthful, or at least of less than normal adult intelligence; and to such persons a power that can be very promptly exercised is much more respected and efficacious than a power that can be exercised only after the *12(frequently slow) processes of the criminal law have been finally completed.
The purpose of the Probation Act is to put a selected part of those who, lacking self-control, have violated the law, under the strongest inducement to long-continued good behavior. The most serious breach of good behavior would he the commission of crimes; and the inducement to good behavior, furnished by probation and the power to revoke probation, would be much weakened if in such cases revocation must always be delayed and subjected to all the chances of the usual criminal prosecution. As a deterrent of crime and as an incentive to good behavior, power to punish promptly is of very great value. This consideration gives no little support to the belief that Congress intended that the judge holding the court which granted probation should have a discretionary power to revoke probation, without necessarily waiting for action by the criminal courts.
The possibility of an acquittal at the criminal trial of a probationer whose probation has already been revoked may exist in any case. But juries are so frequently influenced by sympathy, or by other improper reasons, that a subsequent acquittal does not necessarily show that the revocation of probation was erroneous; and the power to finally revoke in advance of and independent of the result of a trial of the criminal charge will of itself add greatly to the effectiveness of' probation. I purposely do not discuss the effect of an acquittal at the criminal trial on the power to subsequently revoke probation. This question is not here involved, and there .may be reasons for holding that the power does not exist in such cases, even though it does exist in the- ease at bar.
The delicacy of the question I have discussed is shown by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Renew, 132 S. E. 613, April 7, 1926, reversing State v. Sullivan, 127 S. C. 186, 121 S. E. 47, 52. The South Carolina statute involved in these cases (1 Code Cr. Proc. S. C. 1922 [128] § 5) reads as follows:
“The circuit judges of this state shall have the power and authority, in their discretion, to suspend sentences imposed by them, upon such terms and upon such conditions as in their judgment may be fit and proper: Provided, said power and authority shall not extend to eases of felony.”
In the Sullivan Case, Judge Cothran, dissenting, expressed the belief that in all such cases action on a proceeding to revoke probation should be held in abeyance until after the conclusion of the criminal trial. In the Renew Case this position seems to have been concurred in by the four judges who participated.