Court Opinion

ID: 9729496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:38:05.770048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:58.933676
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting
The case before us is unlike Buell v. State (1996) Ind., 668 N.E.2d 251, reh’g denied. In that case, our Supreme Court made clear that creation of the exception to the “contemporaneous” rule of Kendrick v. State (1988) Ind., 529 N.E.2d 1311 was based upon the fact that the two offenses “were first charged in the same information and all tried in the same court [at the same time]. But for the hung jury and subsequent mistrial, the court would have sentenced Buell on all counts contemporaneously.” 668 N.E.2d at 252. Not so here. The conspiracy was charged separately from the other two offenses and there was no contemplation that they would be tried at the same time, and certainly there was no certainty that the conspiracy charge would be tried by the same judge.3
In 1994, our General Assembly amended the applicable Code provision, I.C. 35-50-1-2, and effectively overturned the “contemporaneous” rule. Weaver v. State (1996) Ind., 664 N.E.2d 1169. However, Elswick’s convictions and sentences occurred in 1990, prior to the amendment. Furthermore, as observed in Berry v. State (1997) Ind., 689 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Sullivan J., dissenting), although the 1994 statutory amendment eliminated the “same time” requirement of Kendrick, it did not alter the “same court” requirement.
Here, the conspiracy conviction was before the same judge who presided over the other two convictions and in ordering consecutive sentences, the court relied upon Hutchinson v. State (1985) Ind., 477 N.E.2d 850, 857, for the proposition that consecutive sentences may be imposed if “evidence of the facts” of *596the prior crimes is before the court in the instant case. I find it particularly instructive that the Hutchinson case specifically held that a trial court may not take judicial notice of its own records in a prior separate case, but that such record may be a proper matter for evidence.
To me, the message is clear. The mere nebulous possible awareness of the trial judge with regard to evidence which may have been adduced in a prior proceeding or proceedings will not suffice for the imposition of consecutive sentences. In order to maintain some semblance of ordered judicial process, there should be a degree of evidentiary compliance. It does not appear that the facts of the murder and attempted murder trials were made a matter of evidence in the conspiracy trial. For this reason and because the “contemporaneous” rule of Kendrick is applicable, I would reverse and order resentencing.

. In addition to the judge of the Elkhart Circuit Court, there are five Elkhart County Superior Court judges. I.C. 33-5-13.1-2 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998). Each of the five is vested with criminal jurisdiction. I.C. 33-5-13.1-3. Therefore, following Elswick’s murder and attempted murder convictions, a conspiracy charge could presumably have been filed in a court presided over by a judge other than the Elkhart Circuit Court judge.