Court Opinion

ID: 9930786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 18:00:58.994147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:31.423582
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 _______________

                                      No. 23-1167
                                    _______________

                            IN RE:JONATHAN ANDREWS,
                                               Petitioner
                                   _______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                 on February 1, 2024

               Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                                 (Filed: February 7, 2024)
                                    _______________

                                       OPINION*
                                    _______________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

       Jonathan Andrews applies for authorization to file a second or successive petition

for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because he cannot show that his second

§ 2255 petition would be based on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to

cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” to

him, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2), we will deny Andrews’ application.

I.     DISCUSSION1

       Federal prisoners may not file a second or successive petition for habeas corpus

relief unless they first receive authorization from this Court to do so. In re Sampson, 954

F.3d 159, 160 (3d Cir. 2020); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). To obtain our authorization,

the petitioner must make a prima facie showing that the petition will be based on either:

       (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the
       evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
       convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
       movant guilty of the offense; or

       (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
       review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

       1
        We have jurisdiction to consider Andrews’ application for leave to file a second
or successive habeas petition in the first instance under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) and 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).

                                             2
       Andrews invokes the second ground, claiming that he is entitled to habeas relief

under either United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) or United States v. Taylor,

596 U.S. 845 (2022). He is mistaken.

       In Davis, the Supreme Court announced a new, retroactively applicable rule of

constitutional law by invalidating the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally

vague, leaving only the elements clause of the provision’s definition of “crime of

violence.” See Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336. But Andrews’ second habeas petition cannot be

based on Davis because the rule established in Davis was not “previously unavailable.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). Davis was decided in 2019, while Andrews’ first § 2255 petition

was still pending,2 and Andrews has offered no reason why he could not have amended

that petition to include the Davis claim. See, e.g., Munoz v. United States, 28 F.4th 973,

977–78 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that the rule announced in Davis was available during

Petitioner’s initial habeas petition because “the record does not establish that he would

have been prohibited from amending his initial habeas motion to assert a Davis argument

related to his § 924(c) conviction”).

2
 After he was arrested for his participation in two armed robberies, Andrews pleaded
guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), one count
of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and one count of using and carrying a firearm during a
crime of violence (in connection with the attempted Hobbs Act robbery), in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to a total of 180 months in prison, a significant
downward departure from his guidelines range. Andrews then filed his first § 2255
petition on May 22, 2017. The District Court denied the petition, and we summarily
affirmed.

                                             3
       Even if Davis was unavailable at the time of Andrews’ first petition, the petition

he now seeks to pursue based on that “new rule” would be time-barred because it had to

be filed by no later than June 24, 2020, a year after Davis was decided. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(f)(3) (requiring that a second or successive habeas petition based on a new rule of

constitutional law be filed within one year of “the date on which the right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court . . .”). Instead, Andrews filed this application

for leave to file a second or successive habeas petition more than three and a half years

after the Davis decision, on January 31, 2023.

       To the extent that Andrews’ petition would rest on Taylor, it would fail under

§ 2255(h) for a different reason: Taylor addressed a question of statutory interpretation,

not a new rule of constitutional law. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir.

1997) (distinguishing “substantive statutory holding[s]” from “new rule[s] of

constitutional law”), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465

(2023). In Taylor, the Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1951(a), did not constitute a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of 18

U.S.C. § 924(c).3 596 U.S. at 860. But it did so merely by applying the reasoning in

Davis and interpreting the term “crime of violence” under § 924(c), see id. at 850–59, not

3
 Because the Court had already determined two years earlier in Davis that the residual
clause of § 924(c) was unconstitutionally vague, Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2336, the Taylor
Court’s holding meant that a defendant who has been convicted of attempted Hobbs Act
robbery could no longer be subject to the enhanced penalties of § 924(c), see Taylor, 596
U.S. at 860.

                                             4
by announcing a new constitutional rule, and Andrews points to no court of appeals that

has held otherwise.

       In short, Andrews cannot satisfy the requirements of § 2255(h)(2) based on either

Davis or Taylor, and his application for leave to file a second or successive petition for

habeas corpus relief under § 2255 must therefore be denied.

II.    CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we will deny Andrews’ § 2255(h) application.

                                             5