Court Opinion

ID: 9388245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 15:00:34.05126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:19.123266
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-14861   Document: 83-1      Date Filed: 04/20/2023    Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                                No. 20-14861
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       DIMITAR PETLECHKOV,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                         ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A216-634-377
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-14861     Document: 83-1     Date Filed: 04/20/2023    Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court               20-14861

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Dimitar Petlechkov, proceeding pro se, seeks review of an
       order issued by the Department of Homeland Security for his ex-
       pedited removal from the United States as an alien convicted of an
       aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1228; 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petle-
       chkov contends that the Department violated his Fifth Amend-
       ment due process rights by failing to provide notice of the charge
       of removability and an opportunity to respond. Specifically, he al-
       leges that the “Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Re-
       moval Order” contained in the administrative record was never
       served on him, contrary to the signed (but unsworn) certificate of
       service on the document. He argues that even if the Notice had
       been served on him, he would not have been able to respond be-
       cause it did not provide a return address. And he argues that if he
       had been given the opportunity to respond, he would have shown
       (among other things) that the restitution order relied on by the De-
       partment was “insufficient as a matter of law” to establish that his
       mail-fraud conviction involved the amount of loss necessary to
       qualify as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C.
       § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Obasohan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 479 F.3d 785, 791
       (11th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Nijhawan v.
       Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009). He asks this Court to (1) vacate the
       order of removal and (2) direct the Department to compensate him
USCA11 Case: 20-14861     Document: 83-1      Date Filed: 04/20/2023    Page: 3 of 4

       20-14861               Opinion of the Court                        3

       in various ways for the time he spent in Department custody before
       his removal.
              We lack jurisdiction to review “any final order of removal
       against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed”
       an aggravated felony, except to the extent that the petitioner raises
       constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)–
       (D). Our jurisdiction is further limited to those claims for which
       the petitioner “has exhausted all administrative remedies available
       to the alien as of right.” Id. § 1252(d)(1); see Amaya-Artunduaga v.
       U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006).
                Our jurisdiction to review the claims raised in Petlechkov’s
       petition turns in part on whether he was, in fact, served with the
       Notice of Intent and given a reasonable opportunity to respond to
       it. If so, we lack jurisdiction to review Petlechkov’s claims because
       he failed to raise any of them before the agency during his expe-
       dited removal proceedings. See Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d
       1282, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2014). If not, agency review arguably was
       not an “available” administrative remedy for Petlechkov. The
       question would then become whether the evidence that Petle-
       chkov now seeks to present from his criminal proceedings would
       have been sufficient to rebut the agency’s allegation that his mail-
       fraud offense involved “fraud or deceit in which the loss to the vic-
       tim or victims exceeds $10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M) (defin-
       ing the term “aggravated felony”).
             We decline to decide either question in the first instance.
       Petlechkov claims that he informed the Department in writing—
USCA11 Case: 20-14861     Document: 83-1     Date Filed: 04/20/2023    Page: 4 of 4

       4                      Opinion of the Court                20-14861

       by mail and by service in a related habeas corpus proceeding—that
       he had not been served with notice before the Department issued
       its final order of removal. But those documents are not contained
       in the administrative record. Nor does the record contain any find-
       ings by the Department as to whether Petlechkov was served with
       the Notice of Intent in compliance with agency regulations. See 8
       C.F.R. § 238.1(b). As a court of review, we are not in a position to
       make such findings ourselves. See Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S.
       183, 185–86 (2006). “Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare cir-
       cumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation
       or explanation.’” Id. at 186 (quoting I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537
       U.S. 12, 16 (2002)).
              We therefore remand to the Department for a determina-
       tion as to whether the Notice of Intent was personally served on
       Petlechkov, and if so, whether the Notice afforded him a reasona-
       ble opportunity to respond and contest the charge of removability.
       If the Department concludes on remand that Petlechkov did not
       receive notice or have a meaningful opportunity to respond, it
       should then consider his arguments concerning his removability.
              We DENY Petlechkov’s motion for the Court to take judi-
       cial notice of docket entries in his federal criminal proceeding be-
       cause we do not reach the argument to which those entries are rel-
       evant. We also DENY his motion to supplement the record be-
       cause we are limited by statute to consideration of the administra-
       tive record. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
             PETITION REMANDED.