Court Opinion

ID: 9625735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:49:59.627488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:22.339733
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
dissenting: In my judgment, the verdict in favor of Mrs. Smith was so grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience and to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. She was correctly found not guilty of contributory negligence, yet she was awarded a sum which appears to me as less than paltry in view of her grievous injuries and extensive pecuniary losses.
Summarizing briefly, Mrs. Smith incurred medical expenses which exceeded $10,300 at the time of trial, and the record indicates that additional expenses were clearly in prospect. Not only had she sustained a loss of wages amounting to some $10,000 when the case was tried but she had lost a position of employment which provided civil service status, and other valuable benefits. Ever since the accident occurred she has endured great pain and suffering, much of which can be expected to continue. She has undergone four operations, has spent a great deal of time in hospitals and has been either in traction, in braces or on crutches more or less constantly. The medical evidence indicates that she has sustained a 50% disability of her ankle, which will continue to result in pain unless the ankle is fused; she has a very definite limitation of movement of her knee; serious back problems persist with accompanying pain and discomfort; she is no longer able to work at her former occupation as a clerk; she is unable to do her housework and can no longer join her family in recreational activities. In short, the record reveals that this victim of an accident for which she was not to blame, and concerning which the defendant was patently negligent, faces a bleak future so far as her physical condition is concerned.
*121For all the pain and suffering she has endured and will continue to bear, for loss of wages in the future, for substantial permanent disability and for loss of many of the pleasures which life affords— both tangible and intangible — Mrs. Smith has been awarded the miserly sum of $2355 — the amount which remains after deducting past medical expenses and lost wages. I repeat, this amount is wholly inadequate.
Passion and prejudice is also indicated in Randy’s case. The jury awarded $44 for “personal injury and expense.” That amount, however, exactly matched his medical expenses, leaving naught for pain and suffering. It is not disputed, so far as I can ascertain, that both of Randy’s shins were skinned and bruised and required two weeks to heal, that he missed a day of school, that he was highly nervous, and even at the time of trial was having some difficulties along this line. Even though his injuries could be considered entirely minimal (which I do not concede) he would be entitled, at the very least, to nominal damages above his medical expense. (Timmerman v. Schroeder, 203 Kan. 397, 454 P. 2d 522.)
In Domann v. Pence, 183 Kan. 135, 325 P. 2d 321, this court speaking through Mr. Justice Price said: “No verdict is right which more than compensates — and none is right which fails to compensate.” This observation bespeaks a truth which is just as germane to the turbulent times of today as it was to the more placid conditions of yesterday.
Nothing would be gained by comparing the present verdicts with verdicts of the past where issues of adequacy were raised. Verdicts were set aside in some instances while others were upheld as adequate. It remains to be said, however, that this court has never deviated from its adherence to the rule that where an award of damages is so inadequate as to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted. (Henderson v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 188 Kan. 283, 362 P. 2d 60; Corman, Administrator v. WEG Dial Telephone, Inc., 194 Kan. 783, 402 P. 2d 112.)
I agree that a court should be extremely reluctant to set aside the verdict of a jury on the ground of inadequacy, for I am a firm believer in the jury system. However, a jury may occasionally fall into error, as indeed may a court, since no human institution, to my knowledge, has yet achieved perfection. Thus it is that a verdict is subject to appellate review, and where it is so grossly *122inadequate as to show passion and prejudice, it should be set aside.
The proper way to dispose of this appeal, as I see it, is to direct a new trial on the question of damages only, for there is no reason to believe that the verdict resulted from a compromise on the issue of liability.
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.