Court Opinion

ID: 9473377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:28:24.463261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:29.856204
License: Public Domain

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view the temporary injunction is not supported by an adequate showing of irreparable injury, the recognized sine qua non of such relief in this character of case.
The underlying controversy, and the interim relief, relates solely to the amount of money to be charged by United Gas Pipe Line Company (“United”) to Mississippi Power & Light Company (“MP&L”) pursuant to the unregulated contract to which those two investor-owned concerns are the only contracting or beneficiary parties. The merits of the suit are to no extent based on any assertion that the price charged by United is illegal or otherwise one that MP&L could not lawfully agree or have agreed to pay. Rather, the sole question on the merits is that posed by MP&L’s assertion that it did not so agree and that United and it agreed to a specified lower price.1 In short, this is a suit for breach of the pricing provisions of a private unregulated contract, and its disposition on the merits presents no questions of public or regulatory law. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 434, 83 L.Ed.2d 360 (1984). I do not dispute the power of an administrative agency to suspend rates it has preliminarily determined are excessive, rather than allowing them to go into effect and later utilizing a refund procedure. See Federal Power Comm’n v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 371 U.S. 145, 83 S.Ct. 211, 9 L.Ed.2d 199 (1962).2 But we are not enforcing a regulatory order or public statute here. Rather, the legislative bodies concerned have expressly exempted the prices in question from regulation and have left them to private sellers and purchasers. The Natural Gas Act does not regulate the price at which gas is sold in “direct” or not-for-resale sales, whether interstate or intrastate.3 Mississippi initially elected not *628to regulate “direct” interstate gas sales,4 such as the sales from United to MP&L. More recently, it apparently has also elected to deregulate intrastate natural gas pipeline company sales to industrial or public utility purchasers.5 What the district court has done here, with the sanction of the majority, is in essence to employ the federal judicial equity power incident to this diversity breach of private contract suit as if it were a vehicle to fill the public law-regulatory hiatus established by Congress and the Mississippi Legislature. In my view, this is not an appropriate judicial function, particularly not for the federal judiciary.
*627“[T]here is 'no question’ as to the Commission’s authority to issue interim rate orders. a
. Faced with the finding that the rate of return was excessive, the Commission acted properly within its statutory power in issuing the interim order of reduction and refund, since the purpose of the Act is 'to afford consumers a complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from excessive rates and charges' [citation omitted]. To do otherwise would have permitted Tennessee Gas to collect the illegal rate for an additional 18 months____” 83 S.Ct. at 214-16.
*628This, of course, is not to imply that preliminary injunctions have no place in contract actions. But the normal standards must be met. The majority recognizes our oft-repeated admonition “that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy which should not be granted unless the movant clearly carries the burden of persuasion,” Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir.1974), “as to all of the four prerequisites” for such relief, id. at 576, including “(2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted.” Id. at 572.6 The indispensability of proof of “irreparable injury” would seem to clearly appear from its listing as one of “the four prerequisites.” And indeed we have frequently reiterated Canal Authority’s admonition that the requirement that the four prerequisites be established means “all of the four.”7 Moreover, it is evident that among the four prerequisites, one is central and preeminent, namely, the “irreparable harm” prerequisite. This is made clear from Canal Authority:
“A preliminary injunction may be issued to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury and to preserve the district court’s power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the merits____
"... The primary justification for applying this remedy is to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits____ Thus only those injuries that cannot be redressed by the application of a judicial remedy after a hearing on the merits can properly justify a preliminary injunction.” 489 F.2d at 572-73.
Many other decisions by this Court are to like effect. See, e.g., Parks v. Dunlop, 517 F.2d 785, 787 (5th Cir.1975) (“[T]he central purpose of a preliminary injunction ... is to prevent irreparable harm. It is the threat of harm that cannot be undone which authorizes exercise of this equitable *629power to enjoin before the merits are fully determined.”); Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir.1976) (“The finding prior to issuance, most essential to a preliminary injunction, is that the failure to grant it will result in irreparable injury ____”); Van Arsdel v. Texas A & M University, 628 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir.1980) (“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which the district court should grant only when necessary to protect the plaintiff from irreparable injury ____”).8 These decisions echo the Supreme Court’s admonition in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 94 S.Ct. 937, 952, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974), “that ‘[t]he basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies,’ Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-507, 79 S.Ct. 948, 954, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) ....” That language was reiterated in Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 95 S.Ct. 2069, 2075, 45 L.Ed.2d 12 (1975).
Making the same point, 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2948, states that “[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is a demonstration that if it is not granted the applicant is likely to suffer irreparable harm before a decision on the merits can be rendered.” Id. at 431.9
Consequently, although the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, it is nevertheless settled that, with possible exceptions for certain statutory actions, there is no discretion to grant such relief absent an adequate showing of likely irreparable harm. Relief granted contrary to this requirement will be reversed on appeal. Our decisions clearly follow this path. See Parks v. Dunlop, supra; Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir.1975); Lewis v. S.S. Baune, supra; Van Arsdel v. Texas A & M University, supra. Other Circuits are in accord.10
Finally, and crucially here, while in many contexts what constitutes irreparable injury may be difficult to determine, it is nevertheless settled that “ ‘[a]n injury is “irreparable” only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies’ [citation omitted].” City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (quoting Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328, 338 (5th Cir.1981)). It necessarily follows that the hardship and inconvenience attendant on interim loss of monies which will be paid, with interest, on final judgment does not constitute irreparable harm. In Sampson v. Murray, the Court held that a mere temporary loss of income would fall “far *630short of the type of irreparable injury which is a necessary predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction.” 94 S.Ct. at 953. The Sampson Court, in its discussion of the irreparable injury requirement, quoted with approval the following passage, inter alia, from Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958):
“ ‘The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.’ ” 94 S.Ct. at 953 (emphasis in original).
Following Sampson, we have held that loss of salary representing forty-five percent of family income, which the district court found would probably lead to foreclosure of the mortgage on plaintiff’s home, did not constitute irreparable injury, as the salary loss would be fully compensated by an award of back pay should plaintiff prevail on the merits. Morgan v. Fletcher, supra. We accordingly set aside the temporary injunction issued by the district court. Id. In Van Arsdel v. Texas A & M University, we made a similar holding, stating, “Since reinstatement after trial, coupled with back pay, would suffice to redress appellee’s alleged wrong, we find that the preliminary injunction must be vacated.” 628 F.2d at 346. See also Parks v. Dunlop, supra; Lewis v. S.S. Baune, supra.
Other Circuits clearly follow this rule. For example, in Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179 (3d Cir.1977), it was held that tenants of a large subsidized housing project were not entitled to a preliminary injunction against increased rents because “the claimed injury was financial, a loss of money, a loss capable of recoupment,” and should the tenants eventually “prove victorious, the path would be clear for refunds of improper rent increases.” Id. at 182 (footnote omitted). Glasco was reaffirmed in In re Arthur Treacher’s Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir.1982), where the Court also stated, “[W]e have never upheld an injunction where the claimed injury constituted a loss of money.” See also Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass’n, 725 F.2d 564, 569-70 (10th Cir.1984) (neither growers’ loss of revenue from sales of sugar beet crops nor manufacturer’s inability to obtain adequate supply for operation of its plant constituted irreparable harm sufficient to justify preliminary injunction); Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir.1980) (“loss of wages, employee benefits, and opportunities for promotion” did not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction)11; Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1980) (lost revenue due to failure to acquire football team tenant not sufficiently irreparable to warrant preliminary injunction).12
*631The majority asserts that the irreparable injury is to MP&L’s customers, who would have to pay more in the interim for electricity. Reference is made to the fact that Mississippi has the nation’s lowest per capita income and that in forty-four of the forty-five counties served by MP&L the per capita income is somewhat below the statewide average. There was no evidence, however, that the disputed charges, which had been in effect for a year prior to the hearing below, had worked any irreparable hardship on any MP&L customers.13 MP &L estimated United’s future annual “overcharge” at approximately $21 million. Taking the figures from MP&L’s own records introduced in evidence below, it appears that this claimed overcharge would amount to slightly less than four percent of MP&L’s total 1982 revenues from the sale of electricity. Allocating the overcharge in the same proportions that MP&L’s 1982 electric sales revenues are allocated, approximately $7,050,000 would be charged to residential customers, of whom there were 268,556 at the end of 1982, for an average annual charge of about $26.26 or $2.19 per month.14 Again, this would amount to just less than four percent of the average residential bill. If it be assumed that temporarily decreasing home electric use by four percent, or paying an additional $2.19 per month, amounts to irreparable harm, nevertheless there was plainly no necessity that MP&L pass these disputed charges through prior to final judgment.15 If there is a difficulty with refunds — which for the most part could be minimized by credits on customers’ bills — it is obviously with the residential customers, who comprised about eighty-six percent of the total as of the end of 1982. The $7,050,000 of the claimed annual overcharge attributable to these customers, amounting to approximately twenty percent of MP&L’s net income, could be temporarily absorbed by MP&L and, if its suit has merit, collected by it from United with appropriate interest on final judgment. Moreover, the residential and commercial customers together *632amount to over ninety-eight percent of the total number of MP&L’s electric customers, but account for only fifty-seven percent of its electricity revenues.16 There is no suggestion of difficulty with refunds as to the relatively few remaining, obviously large institutional customers, nor any indication that MP&L would be in any sense irreparably harmed by the interim foregoing of the some $12 million of annual revenue representing the portion of the claimed annual overcharge attributable to residential and commercial customers. Indeed, there is no showing that MP&L would be irreparably harmed by postponement of collection of all the $21 million, amounting to about sixty percent of its 1982 net income, until final judgment. Certainly we are presented with nothing remotely approaching a need for preliminary relief to forestall any threatened “virtual disappearance” of MP&L “as a functional entity.” See Henry v. First Nat. Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 305 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980).17
In these circumstances, reliance on the public interest to sustain the award of preliminary relief is surely misplaced. Moreover, such employment of the “public interest” factor misconceives its role in this kind of case. To begin with, at least absent some contrary statutory mandate, see United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.1969), prevention of irreparable harm is, of itself, an indispensable element for granting a preliminary injunction. The satisfaction of another necessary element — the public interest— is not sufficient. That necessarily follows from our above-referenced holdings that each and all of the four Canal Authority elements must be established. This is, of course, particularly true as to the prevention of irreparable harm element, for, as previously indicated, it is the ultimate touchstone for preliminary injunctive relief. See, e.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Payer Corp., 95 S.Ct. at 2079 (“[T]he fact that respondent is pursuing a cause of action which has been generally recognized to serve the public interest provides no basis for concluding that it is relieved of showing irreparable harm and other usual prerequisites for injunctive relief.”); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass’n, 725 F.2d at 570 (Absent adequate showing of irreparable injury to plaintiffs, a “finding of irreparable injury to the community” does not suffice to sustain a preliminary injunction.).18 Further, the “public interest” prerequisite is “that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” See supra note 6. See also, e.g., Morgan v. Fletcher, 518 F.2d at 239; Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir.), cert. *633denied, 444 U.S. 1016, 100 S.Ct. 668, 62 L.Ed.2d 646 (1980); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 568 (5th Cir. 1981) ; Southern Monorail Co. v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 666 F.2d 185, 186 (5th Cir. 1982) . Obviously, what this says is that a court should not use its extraordinary interim equity powers to bring about a public harm which would not arise if the court stayed its hand pending resolution of the merits. It does not say that the court should grant preliminary injunctive relief whenever that is sufficiently beneficial to the public. The public interest standard is a hurdle which must be overcome before employing the drastic remedy of interim injunctive relief, not a clarion call for action before reaching final judgment.19
The district court made no finding of irreparable harm to MP & L if the preliminary injunction were not granted, and the evidence does not demonstrate any such harm, whether or not all or any of the claimed excessive charges are passed through pending final judgment. The merits of this lawsuit do not involve anything other than the application of private contract law or any claim as to which anyone other than MP & L and United has a legally protectable interest. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., supra. In these circumstances, the Court’s conception of the public interest does not justify the preliminary injunction. The public interest factors are to be considered by the Mississippi Public Service Commission, in its own proceedings, to determine what, if any, interim pass through is appropriate.
Affirmance of this temporary injunction is hence contrary to our well-established requirements for such relief. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. I pretermit any discussion of the merits of this question.

. As the Court said in Tennessee Gas:

. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(b); Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 252 U.S. 23, 40 S.Ct. 279, 64 L.Ed. 434 (1920); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 190, 92 L.Ed. 128 (1947); Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 448, 205 Ct.Cl. 16 (1974). The Natural Gas Act does require that all furnishing of gas in interstate commerce must be pursuant to a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC”) certificate of public convenience and necessity and that no portion of such service may be abandoned without prior FERC approval. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717f(b) & (c). See Federal Power Comm’n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 92 S.Ct. 1827, 32 L.Ed.2d 369 (1972). However, there is no claim of abandonment or threatened abandonment here.

. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 241 Miss. 762, 133 So.2d 521 (1961); Texas Gas Transmission Corp. v. Mississippi Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 241 Miss. 826, 133 So.2d 526 (1961).

. See Laws 1977, ch. 455; Miss.Code Ann. § 77-11-301 et seq.

. The other three prerequisites are:
"(1) [A] substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits, (2) [above quoted], (3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant, and (4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest." 489 F.2d at 572.
This formulation has been repeated almost innumerable times by this Court. Relatively recent cases include Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir.1984), and City of Meridian, Miss. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir.1983). That the moving party has the burden of proof on each of these "prerequisites" has likewise been frequently reiterated. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc., 730 F.2d at 389; Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir.1982).

. See, e.g., Apple Barrel Prods., Inc., 730 F.2d at 389 ("In order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the movant must carry the burden of persuasion on each of the elements of the four prong test.”); Southern Monorail Co. v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 666 F.2d 185, 186 (5th Cir.1982) ("A preliminary injunction may not issue unless the movant carries the burden of persuasion as to all four prerequisites.”); Spiegel v. City of Houston, 636 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir.1981) ("In order to prevail plaintiff must carry the burden on all four elements.”); Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016, 100 S.Ct. 668, 62 L.Ed.2d 646 (1980) ("The remedy should not be granted unless the movant carries the burden of persuasion concerning all four of these criteria.”).

. See also Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 568 (5th Cir.1981) ("[T]he essential question determining the propriety of a preliminary injunction" is "whether the injunction is necessary to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.’’).

. See also 11 Wright & Miller, supra, § 2942 at 368-69 (”[T]he main prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief is a finding that plaintiff is being threatened by some injury for which he has no adequate legal remedy.").
Other scholars take a similar view. See Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 525, 565 (1978) (”[T]he heart of the matter" is "the need to prevent irreparable injury to legal rights.’’).
As the Sixth Circuit said in Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102-03 (6th Cir.1982);
"Although these four factors [similar to those of Canal Authority ] guide the discretion of the district court, they do not establish a rigid and comprehensive test for determining the appropriateness of preliminary injunctive relief____ Nevertheless, this court has never held that a preliminary injunction may be granted without any showing that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury without such relief. Despite the overall flexibility of the test for preliminary injunctive relief, and the discretion vested in the district court, equity has traditionally required such irreparable harm before an interlocutory injunction may be issued.”

. See, e.g., In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litig., 689 F.2d 1137, 1145-47 (3d Cir.1982); Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (7th Cir.1980); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1980); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass’n, 725 F.2d 564, 569-70 (10th Cir.1984).

. And, in American Hosp. Ass’n v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1328, 1331 (7th Cir.1980), the Seventh Circuit approvingly cited this Court’s opinion in Morgan v. Fletcher, supra, for the proposition that '"[m]ere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.’ ”

. There are a few narrow exceptions to the rule that the possibility of an award of damages precludes a finding of irreparable harm sufficient to authorize a preliminary injunction. All are clearly inapplicable here. One is where a statute or regulation is thought to require the preliminary relief. See United States v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 415 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir.1969). Another may apply where the rights at issue are noneconomic, particularly constitutional rights such as those secured by the First Amendment. See Henry v. First Nat. Bank of Clarksdale, 595 F.2d 291, 304 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. Henry, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S.Ct. 1020, 62 L.Ed.2d 756 (1980). A similar exception exists where the rights are economic, but because of their nature or the circumstances of the case establishment of the dollar value of the loss is especially difficult or speculative. State of Texas v. Seatrain Int’l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1975). An exception has also been recognized where withholding relief “would have entailed the virtual disappearance of” the plaintiff “as a functional entity." Henry, 595 F.2d at 305. Finally, exception may be made where the defendant is unable to respond in damages; there was no sufficient evidence or finding on this exception, and the majority does not rely on it. See generally *631Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 359(1), 360 (1981).

. Nor was there any evidence about the cost of living in Mississippi as compared to other parts of the nation, or whether domestic electricity costs represented a higher or lower portion of the typical family budget. We should not simply assume that there is one standard for preliminary injunctions in these forty-five Mississippi counties and another in, say, forty-five counties in Southern California.

. In 1982, MP&L’s total revenues from the sale of electricity were $546,421,000, of which $183,045,000, or approximately one third, was residential, and $128,099,000 was commercial. At the end of 1982, there were a total of 312,717 MP&L electricity customers, of whom 268,556 were residential and 38,651 were commercial. The balance of the customers were industrial, governmental and municipal, and other utilities. MP&L’s 1982 net income was $35,120,000.

. Commissioner Havens, Chairman of the Mississippi Public Service Commission ("the Commission"), testified that it was the intent of the Mississippi Legislature "that a charge will [not] flow [through] to a consumer before it is determined lawful or unlawful.” Nevertheless, he also testified later in his direct examination that "I can't cite you that section, but I believe the statute dictates to the Public Service Commission ... that all gas, whether it be an overage or an underage, will be flowed through in a fuel adjustment clause to its rate payer." However, no such statute (nor any court decision or attorney general’s opinion or similar authority) has been cited to us by the Commission or MP&L and we have been unable to find any. To the contrary, the Mississippi statutes clearly appear to authorize the Commission to "define specific costs which may be included” in fuel adjustment retail billing, Miss.Code Ann. § 77-3-45(e), and to require exclusion, inter alia, of any costs determined by the Commission to be "unjust or unreasonable.” See id. at § 77-3-42. Nothing requires the utility to include disputed costs. Chairman Havens admitted as much during his cross-examination.
It seems plain that the Commission has the authority to require that these disputed costs not be passed through, at least pending resolution of the dispute, and, equally, that MP&L is not legally obliged to pass them through while they are disputed.
I also observe that the Mississippi statute specifically provides for the refund of excessive charges, with interest, by credit on the utility bill if the overcharged party is then a customer of the utility. § 77-3-42. The only evidence as to the turnover of customers was Chairman Havens’ testimony, "You would probably experience from a 6 to 7 percent turnover, maybe, annually. That’s purely a guesstimate.”

. Using the 1982 figures.

. See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975) (Threatened "bankruptcy” is an injury which "meets the standards for granting interim relief, for otherwise a favorable final judgment might well be useless.”).

. Cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 9, at 543 n. 101 ("That a tentative weighing indicates the defendant’s activities are socially harmful does not warrant preliminary relief if, for example, the harm can be compensated by damages."), & 549 ("An interlocutory decision about specific performance of a contract to make parts for a power plant should turn on the applicable contract law, not the plant’s environmental impact____ Those whom the law excludes from protection at the final hearing have no greater claim to be taken into account earlier.”). We have held that consumers have no legally protectable interest in a contract price dispute between a utility and its fuel supplier where resolution of the dispute is wholly governed by private contract law and rights are not asserted under public law statutes or regulations. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., supra. The grant of permissive intervention to the Commission does not change the applicable substantive law by which the instant controversy is to be resolved, which remains the applicable private contract law of Mississippi, as all parties recognize. The public "interest in the enforcement of contractual obligations” obviously is not the variety of public interest comprehended by the fourth Canal Authority prerequisite. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 358 (3d Cir.1980).

. See Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614 F.2d at 358 ("In all of these cases, the effect on the public interest considered by this Court was not that justice be done, but that specific acts presumptively benefiting the public not be halted until the merits could be reached and a determination made as to what justice required."). Cf. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 365 (1981) (Specific performance or an injunction will not be granted if what is required thereby is contrary to public policy.).