Court Opinion

ID: 9853720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:53:04.366199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:02.747209
License: Public Domain

*1269McCLINTOCK, Justice,
dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, joins.
I would concede with the majority that the allowance of alimony is a subject peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court. Under our practice of “notice pleading” and particularly in view of the fact that the subject of defendant’s income seems to have been gone into in the evidence, I am not greatly concerned that issues concerning alimony were not alleged, thereby delineating the issues upon which the case would be tried. I do not believe that great harm is done to a plaintiff-husband, suing for termination of a marriage that has lasted for a period of years (in this case four), by requiring him to litigate the question as to the amount of alimony which will be allowed to the defendant-wife.
Perhaps unimportantly, it is my personal view that alimony imposed in a marriage of short duration should not be a weight around the husband’s neck pressing him deeper and deeper into an inescapable morass as he seeks to reestablish his own life. It is a form of assistance to enable the wife as well to find that new life and temporarily to assist her in regaining the presumably self-supporting and independent status she enjoyed before the marriage; she should have help in resuming her former position.1 If the wife has been gainfully employed during the marriage, it is less difficult for her to assume an independent status. If she has not, but is possessed of training and skills, she may be able with a refresher course again to find gainful employment. I do not say that the trial judge has not attempted to make provision for this. I say that he has done so without evidence.
I concede that how property will be divided, or what alimony is required, is a difficult question, depending upon the circumstances of the parties. If both are rich, should the husband be required to furnish his wealthy wife with all the amenities which he has theretofore provided, or should the wife be required in some measure to provide her own support? If the parties are of modest means, the question of what provision shall be made may be even more difficult, but the needs of the wife and the sources of revenue to satisfy those needs can never be an irrelevant question. Liberality of pleading does not obviate the need of evidence on the question.
In Anderson v. Anderson, 72 Wis.2d 631, 242 N.W.2d 165, 171 (1976) it is said:
“Both alimony and support payments are fixed on the basis of the needs of the wife and children and the ability of the husband to pay. These needs are ordinarily established by a consideration of the wife’s assets and income, her special needs, the age and health of both the wife and children and their customary station in life. * * * ”
In 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 620, p. 741,
“The question whether permanent alimony shall be allowed is determined by the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of the husband.”
I would say in this case then that while the court properly permitted consideration of many of the elements weighing upon the amount of alimony that should be allowed (and I would not be understood as saying that he has grossly abused his discretion or has seriously erred in the allowance that he has made), the record is seriously bare of any real evidence to use as the basis for any award. I think that what the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said in Hillery v. Hillery, 342 Mass. 371, 173 N.E.2d 269, 272 (1961), while pertinent to the question of the husband’s income and ability to pay, is pertinent in this case:
“The trial of a case is not to be converted into a game of hide and seek and the judge very properly expressed his disapproval of the evidence given by the libel-lee and his witnesses. But this evasive*1270ness or untruthfulness cannot itself be the basis of a finding that the libellee’s income was substantially in excess of what was actually shown. * * *
“The libellant had the burden of showing what the libellee could afford to pay. A decree ordering alimony or support must rest on something more than disbelief of the libellee and his witnesses. In Klar v. Klar, 322 Mass. 59, 76 N.E.2d 5, relied on by the libellant, there was a more solid foundation for the order than here.”
Quoting from 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 248b, p. 31:
“An award of alimony must be based on some evidence, and except where otherwise provided by statute and except in some jurisdictions in the case of a suit for separation from bed and board, the burden of making a prima facie case for granting an allowance to the wife for alimony or for counsel fees and expenses is cast upon the wife. The decree or order cannot rest on mere presumption or conjecture; all the facts on which the decree or order is founded must be proved.”
And it was said in Bowes v. Bowes, 287 N.C. 163, 214 S.E.2d 40, 47 (1975):
“The burden of proof was on the plaintiff [wife] throughout the case. Defendant was under no legal duty to offer any explanation as to any of plaintiff’s evidence (although we note he elected to do so). In fact, based on our examination of the evidence in this record, we are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for the award of alimony based on earning capacity.”
I have been unable to find any Wyoming ease specifically on the point, but it has always been my assumption that the burden of proof, as indicated in First National Bank of Morrill v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 118, 216 P. 691, 693 (1923),
“ * * * is upon the party asserting the affirmative of an issue, using the latter term in the larger sense and as including any negative proposition which such party might have to show. If he alleges a fact that is denied, he must establish it. He is the actor and as such remains so throughout the case as to the allegations which he makes, or rather must make. Having alleged the truth of a matter in issue, he must prove it.”
Admitting that in this ease we have recognized the provisions of the statute as being a substitute for allegations in the complaint, I do not think that we can go so far as to permit that statute, which is certainly not evidentiary in any way, to supply the evidence. Mrs. Hendrickson, in this court at least, contends that she needs certain amounts for her support which the husband is able to provide. Admittedly the husband’s income appears substantial, but we have no real knowledge as to what his legitimate expenses are. The needs of the wife and the ability of the husband to pay are both material issues in the case, and I believe the trial judge has been put on the spot of having to require further evidence or make his own best guess. I cannot accept this latter course, and while I can agree with the majority in their view that “[a] failure of proof by a party upon whom the burden of proof rests must accrue to the benefit of the party who negatives the issue,” I simply cannot accept their statement that “[t]he burden rested upon plaintiff to establish that the wife was capable of taking care of herself, in whole or in part,” 583 P.2d at 1268, as being good law and would submit that it ignores the realistic requirement set forth in Ford, supra.
I would also take exception to the majority’s reference to Biggerstaff and Young as Wyoming cases consistent with the position they take. Biggerstaff holds only that “generally speaking the allowance or disal-lowance of alimony lies within the discretion of * * * [the trial] court” and says nothing about the burden or measure of proof necessary to support an alimony award, 443 P.2d at 528. In Young it is expressly said that “appellee’s need for alimony was shown in the evidence.” 472 P.2d at 787. I do not argue about the right and discretion of the trial court to make alimony allowances. I only claim that the burden of proof rests with the wife to allege and prove such need.
*1271I would also say that the statement in Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 39, 22 P.2d 199, 204 (1933) that allowance of alimony depends on the
“ * * * station in life of the parties, the manner in which they have lived, and the income of the husband are all very properly to be taken into consideration in determining the amount of alimony which should be paid * * *,”
and the further statement therein that “the controlling element naturally [is] the ability of the husband to pay” are to be applied with circumspection and should not leave out of consideration the questions whether the wife is working or has worked, how long she was so employed, her earning ability, what income she could expect and what are her needs commensurate with the life which she has been leading with her husband.
Section 20-2-116, W.S.1977 specifically provides that
“After a decree for alimony or other allowance for a party or children * * *, the court may from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties, revise and alter the decree respecting the amount of the alimony or allowance * * * and may make any decree respecting any of the matters which the court might have made in the original action.”
Notwithstanding the broad purport of this language, it has consistently been held by this court that it is changed circumstances which make possible such changes. In Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283, 284 (1965), it is stated categorically:
“ * * * [W]e are compelled to answer that proof of change of circumstances is required in a support-modification proceeding, even though it is proved that the support requirements are, for practical purposes, impossible of attainment by the father.”
And in Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244, 1252 (1976) this court, speaking more specifically to an alimony situation than in the previous case, summarizes the law in this fashion:
“Any modification of the judgment nisi by a court of this state must be consistent with our previous decisions declaring that a modification hearing is not a time to reconsider the evidence and premises upon which the original judgment was entered but only to consider whether there has been such change of circumstances as to warrant a different decree. [Citations omitted]”
The point I wish to make is that in the original trial of this case an alimony payment has been entered without what I consider to be proper evidence. Circumstances may arise which would make it desirable to change that decree but which are difficult to prove. We would then have a situation where a decree of alimony, not really based on evidence that is factually probative, may not be changed because it cannot be shown that there has been a change of circumstances. I therefore do not consider that I am being captious when I insist that this case of little financial moment be tried under the same rules that should be applied if the amount involved were multiplied many times. I think that the majority would agree with me that both parties have in this case done a pretty poor job of presenting the facts as to the financial condition of the parties, and to my way of thinking the wife is no more excused from making out the necessary requirements for a judgment in her favor than is any other party upon whom the burden of proof rests. I consider the record in this case wholly inadequate for any meaningful disposition of the financial rights of the parties and would therefore reverse the judgment, except as to the granting of the divorce and the award of child support, as to which there is no dispute, and remand the cause for further proceedings upon the question of alimony to the wife.

. Compare this statement with that of Mr. Justice McIntyre in Young v. Young, Wyo., 472 P.2d 784, 786 (1970) that
“We think there has been a tendency in recent years for the trial courts to get pretty much away from alimony. And that is probably good.”