Court Opinion

ID: 9794845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:12:48.532412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:14.990186
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion, this case should be reversed With directions to proceed to trial upon the plaintiffs’ petition for damages.
There was no statutory authority by which the defendant could acquire any right of eminent domain to construct an underground conduit. The court correctly observes the statute (K. S. A. 17-618) is ambiguous, but its language authorizes an electric company to exercise the power of eminent domain only to the extent that its “wires may be laid, carried or stretched on, through or over any land or lot .. . as may be needed . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The court construes the statute and virtually, in one short sentence disposes of the case. In construing the statute, it states “[t]he term ‘through’ in our opinion, is used in the sense of and equivalent to ‘under,’ ” and, therefore, holds the defendant acquired the right to construct a conduit “under” the surface of the plaintiffs’ land. No authority is cited in support of that sweeping conclusion. My research discloses there is no authority to support the statement and the decided cases on the point are contrary to the court’s holding.
The power of eminent domain can be exerted only by virtue of legislation expressly authorizing its exercise, and there is nothing in the statute which indicates an intention to authorize an electric company to condemn a right of way to “lay, carry or stretch” its wires in an underground conduit. The words “on” and “over,” as used in the statute, clearly do not authorize the acquiring of any such right. The word “on” can only refer to the surface of land. The word “over” was used in its ordinary sense to mean above the surface of the land. Thus, the only other empowering word remaining in the statute for consideration is the word “through.” The *541word “through” is defined in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, as:
“Extending or passing from one end or surface to another . . . admitting free or continuous passage . . . not interrupted or obstructed . . . affording right of way . . .”
Like many words in the English language, the word “through” has various meanings and its significance in a particular case is dependent on the thought with which it is used and the context in which it is employed. (86 C. J. S., Through, p. 813.) The word is a very common preposition and its primary and ordinary meaning is from end to end; from side to side; from one surface or limit to the other surface or limit, and as meaning onward from point to point, or into or out of at the opposite, or at another point. As employed as an adjective and when used with respect to transportation, it means extending or going from point of departure to destination, and has been held to merely describe the line or direction of the route. When used as an adverb, it may be employed as meaning throughout; from beginning to end; to the ultimate purpose. (62 C. J., Through, p. 949.) As used in 17-618, the word “through” should be construed to be synonymous with “in,” “over” and “across” as merely describing the line or direction by which an easement passes “through” land or lots. The phrase “over and through” has been held not to include “under,” “below” or “beneath.” In Commonwealth v. Warwick, 185 Pa. 623, 40 A. 93, a telephone company contended it had the right to lay its lines in underground conduits pursuant to an ordinance by which it was “authorized to run and maintain its wires over and through the streets of the city of Philadelphia for the purpose of establishing telephonic communication between its patrons and between its exchange office and the subscribers thereto . . .” It was held the company acquired no such right, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
“The grant however of authority to run and maintain wires ‘over and through’ the streets, did not include permission to lay them under, below or beneath. Over and through are equivalent to across and along, not only by the natural meaning of the words in this connection, but by the practical construction given to them at the time of the acts of the parties. The claims of the realtor in this respect are too broad and cannot be sustained.” (1. c. 637.) (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing construction of the statute is sustained in Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P. 2d 124. There, the gas company sought to take by condemnation subterranean sands *542of the plaintiffs’ land for a gas storage reservoir. This court said no statutory authority existed to condemn subterranean earth to store natural gas. The words of the statute empowering the exercise of eminent domain of “on, through or over any land” were expressly considered in the opinion, and in denying the right, the court said:
“. . . If the rights contended for by appellant are to be given to gas pipeline companies, it is a matter for the consideration of the legislature. To stretch the statute to cover the case here presented would be little short of judicial legislation.” (1. c. 397.)
It is well settled that an easement taken by condemnation cannot be extended by implication or intendiment. Any ambiguity in the scope of the easement taken by the defendant in 1956 must be resolved against it. To permit the construction of 161,000 volt electric transmission line or lines by the use of a “Berlin Wall” under the plaintiffs’ land by which they were compelled to pay the sum of $18,000 to have the construction company lower the “wall” so they might use their land to construct sewage lines without interference, is to grant a right the legislature never contemplated. I would reverse the judgment.