Court Opinion

ID: 9941197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 01:01:31.696615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:19.921771
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40619        Document: 00517065938             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/15/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                      No. 22-40619                      February 15, 2024
                                     ____________                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jesse Paul Blankenship; William Glenn Chunn,

                                             Defendants—Appellants.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:20-CR-83-5
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Primarily at issue are whether the district court: abused its discretion
   in denying Jesse Paul Blankenship and William Glenn Chunn’s continuance
   motions; and erred in sentencing each to life imprisonment. They were

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                   No. 22-40619

   among 12 persons charged in an original four-count indictment, for which
   there is a superseding indictment. Blankenship and Chunn were charged for
   racketeering conspiracy, with Blankenship’s being also charged for (1)
   violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR)-kidnapping, and (2) conspiring
   to commit such kidnapping. In their consolidated 14-day trial with more than
   30 witnesses, a jury found them guilty of all charges. AFFIRMED.
                                        I.
         Blankenship and Chunn were members of the “Aryan Circle” (AC),
   a “whites only” prison-based gang. Chunn served as vice president of AC’s
   “federal system” and as a member of its “task force”—a confidential and
   select group of members “capable of certain acts of violence” that served as
   AC’s “hit squad”. Blankenship served as an AC “major”, exercising
   authority over AC members in the Missouri Department of Corrections and
   AC’s federal-prisons branch.
         AC generally operated according to a “constitution”. To join, a
   “prospect” was required to, inter alia, “put in work” by committing violence
   at the direction of an AC member. Full members earned the right to wear the
   AC “patch”—generally a tattoo of a diamond with a swastika on the inside
   containing a circle with lightning bolts or “AC”. Prospects were also
   required to undergo a background check, by which AC obtained and reviewed
   the prospect’s “paperwork”—usually court documents, presentence
   investigation reports, or criminal-history checks—to ensure he had not
   previously cooperated with law enforcement or engaged in other conduct
   prohibited by AC. AC did not limit its membership to prisoners.
         Following the 14-day jury trial, Blankenship and Chunn were each
   convicted of conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Blankenship was also convicted of: violent
   crimes in aid of racketeering (VICAR)-kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

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   § 1959(a)(1); and conspiracy to commit VICAR-kidnapping, in violation of
   18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5). The court in 2022 sentenced each to life
   imprisonment.
                                          II.
          Blankenship challenges venue. Appellants challenge the denial of
   their continuance motions, the sufficiency of evidence, and numerous
   sentencing rulings.
                                          A.
          Blankenship contends the evidence was insufficient to establish venue
   in the Eastern District of Texas for his two VICAR offenses. Because he did
   not preserve this issue in district court, review is only for plain error. E.g.,
   United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 546 (5th Cir. 2012). Under that
   standard, he must show a forfeited plain error (clear-or-obvious error, rather
   than one subject to reasonable dispute) that affected his substantial rights.
   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes that showing,
   we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain error, but generally
   should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
   reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. (citation omitted).
          Blankenship has not shown the claimed venue error affected his
   substantial rights. “As a general rule, an error affects a defendant’s
   substantial rights only if the error was prejudicial.” United States v. Reed, 974
   F.3d 560, 562 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Specifically, “defendant
   must show a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would
   have been different but for the error”. Id. at 562–63 (citation omitted).
   Blankenship does not contend he suffered the requisite prejudice, only that
   venue was erroneous.

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                                         B.
          Regarding Appellants’ challenges to the denial of their September
   2021 continuance motions, they were indicted originally in October 2020 and
   trial was set for February 2021. After four unopposed continuance motions
   were granted, trial was reset for that August. In early July, Chunn’s opposed
   continuance motion was granted, resetting trial for October 2021, a year after
   their initial indictment. That September, Appellants filed the opposed
   continuance motions at issue.
          Their challenges to the denial of these motions are reviewed for abuse
   of discretion. E.g., United States v. Capistrano, 74 F.4th 756, 777 (5th Cir.),
   cert. denied, No. 23-5975, 2023 WL 8532046 (U.S. 11 Dec. 2023). The court’s
   discretion in ruling on continuance motions is understandably broad. E.g.,
   United States v. Mesquiti, 854 F.3d 267, 275 (5th Cir. 2017). To show such
   abuse, Appellants “must show that the denial resulted in specific and
   compelling or serious prejudice”. Id. (citation omitted). For our review, we
   “look[] to the totality of the circumstances”, including: (1) “the amount of
   time available”; (2) “defendant’s role in shortening the time needed”; (3)
   “the likelihood of prejudice from denial”; (4) “the availability of discovery
   from the prosecution”; (5) “the complexity of the case”; (6) “the adequacy
   of the defense actually provided at trial”; and (7) “the experience of the
   attorney with the accused”. United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 439 (5th
   Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
                                         1.
          Appellants have not shown “specific and compelling or serious
   prejudice” in the denial of a sixth motion to continue. Mesquiti, 854 F.3d at
   275 (citation omitted). Blankenship asserts he was prejudiced because he
   presented no witnesses at trial and counsel proceeded to trial without
   reviewing all discovery. Chunn contends he had insufficient time to review

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   discovery or prepare a defense with his attorney, and could not have properly
   made a decision to testify with such insufficient time. Neither Appellant,
   however, identifies any evidence he would have presented, witnesses he
   would have called, or specific defensive strategies he would have employed if
   given more time. See id. at 275–76 (requiring specifics in contentions of
   prejudice); Capistrano, 74 F.4th at 777 (same).
                                          2.
          Instead, Appellants claim other prejudice related to the denial of their
   continuance motions. Blankenship contends the claimed error in denying his
   motion was compounded when the court erroneously allowed an unlisted
   Government witness to testify. Chunn maintains: the court reversibly erred
   in not granting his alternative discovery motion after denying his continuance
   motion; and the denial of those motions had the cumulative effect of violating
   his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
                                          a.
          Regarding Blankenship’s contention that the harm in denying his
   continuance motion was exacerbated when the court admitted testimony by
   a Government witness not included on the Government’s witness list, a
   “district court’s order instructing the government to provide a list of
   witnesses is a discovery order”. United States v. Aguilar, 503 F.3d 431, 434
   (5th Cir. 2007). Our court “review[s] the admission of evidence that violates
   a discovery order”, as here, “for abuse of discretion”. Id.
          The Supreme Court has explained there is no general constitutional
   right to pretrial discovery of witnesses in non-capital cases. E.g., Weatherford
   v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559–60 (1977). “The district court has great latitude
   in fashioning the appropriate remedy for alleged discovery errors.” United
   States v. Dvorin, 817 F.3d 438, 454 (5th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Our

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   court “will order a new trial only where a defendant demonstrates prejudice
   to his substantial rights”. Aguilar, 503 F.3d at 434 (citation omitted).
          The court did not abuse its discretion. When determining whether to
   sanction a party for violating a discovery order, the court “should consider
   the following factors: (1) the reasons why disclosure was not made; (2) the
   amount of prejudice to the opposing party; (3) the feasibility of curing such
   prejudice with a continuance of the trial; and (4) any other relevant
   circumstances”. Dvorin, 817 F.3d at 454 (citation omitted). First, the
   disclosure was not made because the Government decided to call the witness
   only when a gap—the result of a severance and a codefendant’s plea—
   occurred in the trial schedule. Second, any prejudice to Blankenship was
   minimal. The Government announced on a Friday its intention to call the
   witness the following Monday, allowing defense counsel the weekend to
   prepare. See id. (upholding admittance of testimony when Government
   identified witness on morning of testimony). Additionally, the witness
   testified about an incident disclosed during discovery. Third, Blankenship
   does not assert the untimely disclosure of the witness was in bad faith. See
   id. (noting no claim late disclosure was in bad faith); United States v. Garrett,
   238 F.3d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 2000) (vacating district court’s exclusion of late-
   noticed Government witnesses where that court found no bad faith).
          Neither has Blankenship demonstrated prejudice to his substantial
   rights. See, e.g., Aguilar, 503 F.3d at 434. He has not shown “there was any
   way in which []he would have been better prepared to subject [the witness’]
   testimony to adversarial testing if his name had been disclosed on a witness
   list”. Id. In fact, counsel extensively cross-examined the witness; and, as
   noted, the incident addressed by the witness had been disclosed in discovery.
   See id. (finding no prejudice).

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                                          b.
          Regarding Chunn’s two claims for other prejudice, we first turn to the
   denial of his discovery motion.
                                          i.
          In response to the denial of his continuance motion, Chunn filed a
   discovery motion requesting access within his prison facility to a computer
   containing discovery materials. Chunn asserts the court reversibly erred in
   denying that motion.
          Early in the proceedings, the court entered an agreed protective order
   stating discovery would “not be provided to defendant as originals or
   duplicated, or otherwise disseminated, without further order of th[e] Court”.
   The order further explained defendants would be “allowed to access and
   review these materials; however, [they would] not be allowed to possess the
   originals or a copy of these documents outside of the courtroom and/or in the
   presence of defense counsel, absent prior permission from th[e] Court”. One
   month before trial, Chunn filed his motion, essentially asking the court to
   revise the protective order.
          The court had compelling reasons for imposing the protective limits
   on discovery. The Government asserted Chunn was actively attempting to
   obtain discovery to disseminate it for retaliatory purposes. It pointed to an
   instance in which one of its witnesses received a letter from an AC
   communications hub that the witness believed to be a threat.
          “We review the district court’s denial of a motion to modify a criminal
   protective order for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Morales, 807 F.3d
   717, 720 (5th Cir. 2015). “There is no general constitutional right to
   discovery in a criminal case”. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 559. “[T]he trial
   court can and should, where appropriate, place a defendant and his counsel

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   under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the materials
   which they may be entitled to inspect”. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
   165, 185 (1969). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the court
   “may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or
   grant other appropriate relief”. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(1).
          In deciding whether to modify a protective order, courts consider: (1)
   “the nature of the protective order”; (2) “the foreseeability, at the time of
   issuance of the order, of the modification requested”; (3) “the parties’
   reliance on the order; and most significantly (4) whether good cause exists
   for the modification”. Morales, 807 F.3d at 723 (citation omitted). “Good
   cause is the most important of these factors in the criminal context, given that
   phrase’s inclusion in Rule 16(d)(1).” Id.
          Both the second and fourth factors weigh against modification. On
   the second factor, Chunn sought to change only how he was permitted to
   view the discovery material. The alleged need to view the material outside
   the presence of counsel to aid in preparation would have been foreseeable at
   the time of the agreed protective order’s issuance. For the fourth factor,
   Chunn has not shown good cause. In this context, “good cause” includes
   “changed circumstances or new situations” and it “factors in the other
   party’s need for protection”. Id. at 723–24 (citation omitted). Again, Chunn
   points to no legitimate changed circumstances and, even if he could, the
   Government’s need for protection was legitimate. There was no abuse of
   discretion. See id. at 720 (outlining standard of review).
                                         ii.
          Chunn asserts the ultimate effect of the denial of his continuance
   motion was to violate his Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth
   Amendment right to assistance of counsel.           “[O]nly an arbitrary or
   unreasonable denial of a requested continuance will constitute a violation of

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   the defendant’s Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights”. United States v. Hughey,
   147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1998). As discussed, the district court did not
   abuse its discretion in denying Chunn’s motion, and neither was the denial
   “arbitrary or unreasonable”. Id.
                                          C.
          Appellants contend the evidence was not sufficient to support their
   convictions.    Our court reviews timely sufficiency challenges de novo,
   construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. E.g., United
   States v. Sanders, 952 F.3d 263, 273 (5th Cir. 2020). “The jury’s verdict will
   be affirmed unless no rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the
   offense to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.”           United States v.
   Roetcisoender, 792 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). That
   standard “leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw
   from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors draw
   reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts”. Coleman v. Johnson,
   566 U.S. 650, 655 (2012) (citation omitted). Our court “resolve[s] any
   conflict in the evidence in favor of” the verdict. Sanders, 952 F.3d at 273.
   Additionally, “we defer to the credibility determinations of the jury, and we
   reject the challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence based solely upon such
   credibility determinations”. United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 317 (5th
   Cir.), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 463 (2022).
          The Government presented its case-in-chief through more than 30
   witnesses and approximately 450 exhibits over the course of the 14-day trial.
   Following the Government’s case-in-chief, Appellants rested without
   presenting any evidence.

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                                          1.
          Blankenship does not contest the sufficiency of evidence for his
   conviction for conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). He does contest sufficiency for his
   convictions for VICAR-kidnapping and conspiracy to commit VICAR-
   kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), (5).
          To convict Blankenship of his VICAR offenses, the Government was
   required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, inter alia: “(1) an enterprise
   existed; (2) the enterprise engaged in, or its activities affected, interstate
   commerce; (3) it was engaged in racketeering activity; (4) the defendant
   committed violent crimes; and (5) the defendant committed the violent
   crimes to gain entrance to, or maintain or increase his position in, the
   enterprise”. United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th 357, 377 (5th Cir.)
   (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Iglesias-Villegas v. United States, 144
   S. Ct. 268 (2023); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). Blankenship contests only
   elements four and five.
                                          a.
          For VICAR element four’s requisite violent crime, the Government
   charged Blankenship with kidnapping a former AC member (FAC), in
   violation of Missouri state law. A person violates that kidnapping statute
   when he, inter alia, “removes another person without his or her consent from
   the place where he or she is found”. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.110.
          Blankenship asserts there is insufficient evidence he removed FAC
   without his consent from his girlfriend’s house. He contends FAC left the
   house willingly. Testimony established that, after Blankenship and another
   man entered the house unannounced and without knocking, Blankenship
   explained to FAC’s girlfriend that he would take FAC with them, and it
   appeared to FAC’s girlfriend that FAC had no choice but to leave with the

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   pair. FAC testified: he was not willing to go with the group; thought he
   would be “beat up or something” if he did not leave with them; believed
   leaving with the group was a life-or-death choice; and was confined to a
   vehicle with Blankenship, who held a gun on his lap.
          FAC testified on cross-examination, however, that, before leaving
   with Blankenship, he stated: “Hell, yeah. Let’s go. Okay. I’m ready”. He
   also testified on cross that he left the house willingly.
          Resolving “conflict[s] in the evidence in favor of” the verdict and
   recognizing the jury “retains the sole authority to weigh conflicting evidence
   and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses”, the evidence was sufficient to
   show Blankenship removed FAC from the house without his consent.
   Sanders, 952 F.3d at 273; United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 351 (5th Cir.
   2005) (citation omitted).
                                           b.
          For VICAR element five’s above-described requisite reason for
   committing a violent crime, Blankenship contends the evidence did not
   establish the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of maintaining or
   increasing his position within AC.
          Blankenship asserts the kidnapping occurred because of a personal
   issue between FAC and another AC member, not as a matter of AC
   punishment. Evidence, however, supports the contrary conclusion:
   Blankenship kidnapped FAC because he did not provide his “paperwork”
   proving he was not cooperating with a Government investigation. Also,
   Blankenship explained in emails that he completed the kidnapping for the
   benefit of AC and in hopes of earning membership on its “task force”.
   Viewing the evidence in the requisite light most favorable to the verdict, a
   jury could have reasonably concluded the kidnapping was done for the

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   purpose of maintaining or increasing Blankenship’s position within AC. See
   Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th at 377 (listing element five).
                                          2.
          Chunn contends the evidence was insufficient to support his sole
   conviction: conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation
   of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). To establish a racketeering-conspiracy violation
   under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), the Government must prove beyond a reasonable
   doubt: “(1) the existence of an enterprise that affects interstate or foreign
   commerce, (2) that the defendant was ‘employed by’ or ‘associated with’ the
   enterprise, (3) that the defendant participated in the conduct of the
   enterprise’s affairs, and (4) that the participation was through ‘a pattern of
   racketeering activity’”. United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 855 (5th
   Cir. 1998) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
          Chunn contests elements one and three. He also contends the
   evidence was insufficient because the trial testimony was primarily by former
   AC members seeking sentence reductions.
                                          a.
          For element one, Chunn asserts AC is neither sufficiently cohesive
   nor organized to be an “enterprise”. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). An “enterprise”
   is “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,
   and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
   entity”. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). This definition “reaches a group of persons
   associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
   conduct” and “is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or
   informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing
   unit”. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 944–45 (2009) (citation omitted).
   “A jury may infer the existence of a RICO enterprise by considering largely

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   or wholly circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Velasquez, 881 F.3d 314,
   329 (5th Cir. 2018).
          AC’s “constitution” outlined the history, purpose, “ethics”, beliefs,
   and bylaws of AC. The document included a description of AC’s rigid
   ranking system, a system witnesses repeatedly referenced and affirmed. To
   join AC, prospective members underwent a period of “prospecting”
   outlined in the “constitution”, typically lasting one year. The process
   involved learning about AC, handwriting copies of its “constitution”, and
   following every order. In addition to monthly dues, AC required members
   attend district meetings once a month and ranking members attend a national
   meeting annually. AC also tracked members through rosters identifying
   members’ names, institutional affiliations, patch numbers, and release dates.
   Substantial evidence supports the finding that AC was an ongoing, formal
   organization, and its associates functioned as a continuing unit. See Boyle,
   556 U.S. at 944–45.
                                        b.
          For element three, Chunn disputes his involvement in AC’s affairs.
   “[T]o have participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs, the
   defendant must have participated in the operation or management of the
   enterprise itself”. Velasquez, 881 F.3d at 330 (citation omitted). “An
   enterprise can be operated by upper management and by lower rung
   participants under the direction of upper management.” Id. Chunn held a
   high rank in AC; made decisions about when to go to “war” with other prison
   gangs; ordered attacks on a Zerbinos gang member, an AC member, an Aryan
   Brotherhood member, and a homosexual inmate; and sold drugs in prison.
   There was substantial evidence Chunn participated in, at least, the operation
   of AC. See id. (explaining element three is met when defendant participated
   in enterprise’s operation or management).

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                                           c.
          Likewise, Chunn fails to establish his conviction lacked sufficient
   evidence by asserting many witnesses were former AC members cooperating
   with the Government. “This Court has long held that a defendant may be
   convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a coconspirator who has
   accepted a plea bargain, so long as the coconspirator’s testimony is not
   ‘incredible.’” Perry, 35 F.4th at 317 (citation omitted). “Testimony is
   incredible as a matter of law only if it relates to facts that the witness could
   not possibly have observed or to events which could not have occurred under
   the laws of nature.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, our court has
   “allowed convictions supported only by one witness’ testimony to stand,
   [w]hatever the problems with that witness’ credibility, if the account was
   neither physically impossible nor outside his powers of observation”. Id.
   (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
          Chunn has not pointed to any trial testimony that was physically
   impossible or outside the power of a witness’ observation. And, as discussed
   supra, our court will reject sufficiency challenges based only on credibility
   determinations. Id.
                                          D.
          Appellants’ numerous remaining challenges are to their sentences.
   Although post-Booker, the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, the
   district court must avoid significant procedural error, such as improperly
   calculating the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
   38, 46, 51 (2007). If no such procedural error exists, a properly preserved
   objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for substantive reasonableness
   under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 51; United States v. Delgado-
   Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 751–53 (5th Cir. 2009). In that respect, for issues
   preserved in district court, its application of the Guidelines is reviewed de

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   novo; its factual findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States v. Cisneros-
   Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
          “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of
   the record as a whole.” United States v. Zuniga, 720 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir.
   2013). Re-stated, our court will find clear error in a factual finding “only if a
   review of the record results in a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
   has been committed”. Id. (citation omitted). “When making factual findings
   for sentencing purposes, district courts may consider any information which
   bears sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy”. United
   States v. Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
   “Generally, a [presentence investigation report (PSR)] bears sufficient
   indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the sentencing judge in
   making factual determinations.” Id. (citation omitted). The PSR does not
   convert bald, conclusory statements into sufficiently reliable facts. See id. at
   230 n.2. If the PSR’s facts “are supported by an adequate evidentiary basis
   with sufficient indicia of reliability”, however, “a defendant must offer
   rebuttal evidence demonstrating that those facts are materially untrue,
   inaccurate or unreliable”. Id. at 230 (citation omitted). Appellants presented
   no evidence at sentencing disputing the PSR’s factual allegations.
          For the Guidelines’ offense-level and criminal-history matrix, which
   determines the Guidelines sentencing range, the primarily contested item by
   each Appellant is his offense level. Along that line, Guideline § 1B1.1 outlines
   the application of the Guidelines.
          To calculate a Guidelines sentence, a court begins by first determining
   the Chapter Two Guidelines section applicable to the offense based on the
   Guidelines’ Statutory Index. Guideline § 1B1.1(a)(1). The Statutory Index
   identifies Section 2E1.1 (“Unlawful Conduct Relating to Racketeer

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   Influenced and Corrupt Organizations”) as the section applicable to
   violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1963. Guideline app. A.
          Second, the court must “[d]etermine the base offense level and apply
   any appropriate specific offense characteristics, cross references, and special
   instructions”. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(2). Section 2E1.1 applies a base offense level of
   19, or “the offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity”.
   Id. § 2E1.1(a). In determining the base offense level, the court is to consider
   all relevant conduct. Id. § 1B1.3(a). Relevant conduct includes: “all acts and
   omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
   procured, or willfully caused by the defendant”; and, in joint-criminal
   activity, “all acts and omissions of others that were—(i) within the scope of
   the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal
   activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
   activity”. Id. The relevant conduct does not need to be charged or an
   element of the offense. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. background. In racketeering cases,
   however, the relevant conduct must qualify as “racketeering activity”. See
   id. § 2E1.1(a)(2); United States v. Flores, 912 F.3d 613, 621–23 (D.C. Cir.
   2019); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (defining “racketeering activity”).
          Third, the court must “[a]pply the adjustments as appropriate related
   to victim, role, and obstruction of justice from Parts A, B, and C of Chapter
   Three”. Guideline § 1B1.1(a)(3). The court repeats these first three steps
   for each count when there are separate counts of a conviction. Id.
   § 1B1.1(a)(4). For racketeering cases where, as here, “there is more than one
   underlying offense”, the court must “treat each underlying offense as if
   contained in a separate count of conviction”. Id. § 2E1.1 cmt. n.1. The court
   will determine the offense level applicable to each underlying offense and
   combine the points according to Guideline § 3D1.4. Id. § 3D1.1(a); see also
   id. § 3D1.4(a).

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          Finally, the court applies any adjustment for acceptance of
   responsibility, determines defendant’s criminal-history category, and
   calculates the resulting Guidelines sentencing range. Id. § 1B1.1(a)(5)–(8).
                                         1.
          Blankenship claims eight procedural errors. As discussed supra,
   “[w]here there is more than one underlying offense”, the court must “treat
   each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of conviction”.
   Id. § 2E1.1 cmt. n.1.       The PSR identified four offenses underlying
   Blankenship’s conviction for conspiracy to participate in a racketeering
   enterprise: 2016 kidnapping of FAC (Count 1A); 2016 attempted murder of
   FAC (Count 1B); 2016 drug-trafficking conduct (Count 1C); and 2020
   attempted murder of a rival gang-member (Count 1D). The district court
   calculated the offense level for each underlying offense and combined the
   units. See id. § 3D1.1(a) (outlining calculation process).
          Blankenship contends the court reversibly erred in: applying a two-
   level “serious bodily injury” enhancement and two-level dangerous-weapon
   enhancement to Count 1A; applying the wrong base offense level to Count
   1B; incorporating an unproved drug quantity, and including his 2016 drug-
   trafficking conduct as both underlying racketeering activity and criminal
   history in Count 1C; employing the wrong burden of proof in finding Count
   1D to be an underlying offense, and applying the incorrect base offense level
   to that count; and applying a four-level organizer/leader enhancement.
          All of Blankenship’s contentions, except for the two concerning
   Count 1D, are reviewed for clear error. See Zuniga, 720 F.3d at 590 (finding
   clear error “only if a review of the record results in a definite and firm
   conviction that a mistake has been committed” (citation omitted)). For the
   first of the two exceptions, his claim that the court evaluated Count 1D under
   the incorrect Guideline section is reviewed de novo. E.g., Cisneros-Gutierrez,

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   517 F.3d at 764 (explaining application of Guidelines is reviewed de novo).
   Regarding the second exception, because he did not preserve the issue in
   district court, his challenge to the offense level of Count 1D is subject to
   plain-error review. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (outlining plain-error
   standard).
                                          a.
          For the underlying racketeering activity of Count 1A—kidnapping
   FAC in 2016—the offense level began at 32 according to Guideline
   § 2A4.1(a). The court increased the offense level by four points because it
   found FAC suffered “serious bodily injury” and “a dangerous weapon was
   used”. See Guideline § 2A4.1(b)(2)(B), (b)(3). Blankenship challenges both
   enhancements.
                                          i.
          The court applied a two-level enhancement because it found FAC
   sustained “serious bodily injury” during removal of his patch. See id.
   § 2A4.1(b)(2)(B) (“[I]f the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase
   by 2 levels”.). Blankenship contends FAC sustained only “bodily”, not
   “serious bodily”, injury. The Guidelines’ commentary defines “[s]erious
   bodily injury” as, inter alia, an “injury involving extreme physical pain or the
   protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental
   faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or
   physical rehabilitation”. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M). By comparison, the
   commentary defines the lesser “[b]odily injury” as “any significant injury;
   e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for which medical
   attention ordinarily would be sought”. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(B). Therefore, at
   issue is whether FAC suffered an “injury involving extreme physical pain”.
   Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(M) (defining “[s]erious bodily injury”).

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          After removing him from his girlfriend’s house, FAC’s kidnappers
   drove him to an AC-member’s home and directed him to the basement where
   several members were heating a metal rod with a blow torch. The AC
   members allowed FAC to smoke from marihuana and meth pipes before
   twice placing the heated rod against his torso in an attempt to remove his AC
   patch. Afterward, Blankenship tattooed over FAC’s patch and explained
   that, if it were up to him, he would have just killed him.
          FAC testified at trial that Blankenship and the other AC members
   “took it easy” on him and told him he “took that like a G[angster]”. He did
   not seek medical aid.
          Blankenship asserts: FAC never testified that he suffered extreme
   physical pain; and the enhancement requires the victim subjectively
   experience such pain. The Government counters the court could infer FAC
   experienced extreme physical pain based on the testimony and circumstances
   of the tattoo-removal.
          Although FAC did not testify he felt the requisite “extreme physical
   pain” during the patch removal, our court has never held a victim’s
   testimony is the exclusive means of proving such pain. Rather, the district
   court is permitted to reasonably infer such pain from the evidence. See
   United States v. Garza-Robles, 627 F.3d 161, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The
   [PSR] indicates that [the victim] had been assaulted repeatedly resulting in a
   broken rib, bruised buttocks, and cuts behind the ears. It was plausible for
   the district court to find these injuries involved ‘extreme pain’ and therefore
   qualified as serious bodily injuries.”); United States v. Davis, 19 F.3d 166,
   168–69, 171 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding no clear error where district court,
   without reference to victim’s testimony, found “serious bodily injury” when
   victim was bound, beaten, poked, gagged, and confined to vehicle trunk as
   defendants drove across state lines); see also United States v. Shi Yong Wei,

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   373 F. App’x 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Where a victim has been beaten
   bloody and unconscious, requiring emergency hospitalization (even briefly)
   and stitches, any reasonable person would conclude that the injury caused
   ‘extreme physical pain.’” (emphasis added)). Therefore, the court did not
   clearly err in finding FAC suffered “serious bodily injury” when evidence
   showed AC members restrained him, twice placed a heated metal rod on his
   AC tattoo, and then tattooed over it. See Zuniga, 720 F.3d at 590 (“A factual
   finding is not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a
   whole.”).
                                           ii.
          The two-level dangerous-weapon enhancement is applicable “[i]f a
   dangerous weapon was used” during a kidnapping. Guideline § 2A4.1(b)(3).
   A “dangerous weapon was used” if the firearm was “discharged” or
   “otherwise used”. Id. § 2A4.1 cmt. n.2. Because there was no evidence
   Blankenship “discharged” his firearm, the enhancement applies only if he
   “otherwise used” it. See id.
          A firearm is “[o]therwise used” if “the conduct did not amount to the
   discharge of a firearm but was more than brandishing, displaying, or
   possessing a firearm or other dangerous weapon”. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(J).
   The Guidelines define “[b]randished” as “all or part of the weapon was
   displayed, or the presence of the weapon was otherwise made known to
   another person, in order to intimidate that person, regardless of whether the
   weapon was directly visible to that person”. Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(C).

          Therefore, at issue is whether Blankenship “more than brandish[ed],
   display[ed], or possess[ed] a firearm” while kidnapping FAC. Id. § 1B1.1
   cmt. n.1(J). Our court has explained:

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          The threat to the victim must be specific rather than general.
          Displaying a weapon without pointing or targeting should be
          classified as “brandished,” but pointing the weapon at any
          individual or group of individuals in a specific manner should
          be “otherwise used.”
   United States v. Dunigan, 555 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted);
   see also United States v. Sanchez, 603 F. App’x 259, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (rejecting Government’s request to expand definition of “otherwise used”
   “to activity beyond . . . a direct physical threat caused by pointing or
   otherwise targeting the weapon at the victims”).
          There is no evidence Blankenship displayed a firearm as he entered
   FAC’s home; there is evidence he placed one on his lap as the AC members
   drove FAC to the patch-removal location. As they drove, FAC requested the
   group drop him off at a tattoo shop so he could cover his patch there. The
   AC members refused.
          And, there is no evidence Blankenship pointed the gun at FAC; but,
   its placement on Blankenship’s lap, in full view of FAC, and in a vehicle
   containing only two other AC members, all while preventing him from
   leaving the vehicle, could be threatening only to FAC. The threat to him was
   therefore “specific” and “target[ed]” him. Dunigan, 555 F.3d at 505. The
   court did not clearly err.
                                         b.
          For the underlying racketeering activity of Count 1B—attempted
   murder of FAC in 2016—the court applied a base offense level of 33.
   Guideline § 2A1.5(c)(2) (“If the offense resulted in an attempted murder or
   assault with intent to commit murder, apply §2A2.1”.); id. § 2A2.1(a)(1)
   (applying base level of 33 “if the object of the offense would have constituted

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                                     No. 22-40619

   first degree murder”). Blankenship contends the court applied the incorrect
   base offense level.
          The incident occurred several weeks after FAC’s patch removal. In
   the middle of the night, Blankenship donned a mask and, with two other AC
   members, entered FAC’s house. They kicked down the bedroom door and
   found FAC in bed asleep with his girlfriend. Blankenship fired one shot at
   FAC, striking the bedframe, before retreating from the house.
          Blankenship contends that, even if he did shoot at FAC, he at most
   committed aggravated assault, not attempted murder. See id. § 2A2.2 cmt.
   n.1 (defining “[a]ggravated assault” as, inter alia, “a felonious assault that
   involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury . . . with
   that weapon”). It was plausible in the light of the record as a whole for the
   court to find that, when Blankenship broke into FAC’s house and shot at him
   as he slept, the object of the attack was first-degree murder. The court did
   not clearly err.
                                          c.
          Blankenship likewise challenges the 2016 drug-trafficking conduct
   (Count 1C) the PSR included as underlying racketeering activity in his
   offense-level computation. He asserts the court reversibly erred by:
   sentencing based on an unproved drug quantity; and including the drug-
   trafficking conduct as both underlying racketeering activity and criminal
   history, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
                                          i.
          The PSR recommended the court find Blankenship responsible for
   535.714 grams of methamphetamine. The calculated quantity was based on
   case material provided by the Government that police apprehended
   Blankenship’s       vehicle   containing    $30,000     in    proceeds    from

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                                     No. 22-40619

   methamphetamine sales. The PSR applied the 2017 price for 93-percent,
   pure methamphetamine and reached the approximate 535.714 grams. The
   court therefore applied Guideline § 2D1.1(c)(5) (explaining base offense
   level is 30 for offenses involving at least 500 grams but less than 1.5 kilograms
   of methamphetamine). Blankenship contends the Government did not meet
   its burden of establishing the relevant drug quantity by the requisite
   preponderance of the evidence.
          “[A] district court may consider estimates of the quantity of drugs for
   sentencing purposes.” United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 246 (5th
   Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). In making its fact
   finding, the court “may consider any information that has sufficient indicia
   of reliability to support its probable accuracy, including a probation officer’s
   testimony, a policeman’s approximation of unrecovered drugs, and even
   hearsay”. Id. at 247 (citation omitted).
          There was trial evidence in addition to the $30,000 discussed by the
   case material. A witness testified she observed Blankenship paying the
   witness’ methamphetamine dealer a substantial amount of money and, based
   on her observation, Blankenship was dealing more than a pound of
   methamphetamine at a time. Another witness likewise testified Blankenship
   was dealing large quantities of methamphetamine. The court also found that,
   even if Blankenship did not directly engage in drug trafficking, he was
   responsible for the amount based on trafficking of other members of the
   conspiracy. See United States v. Fierro, 38 F.3d 761, 773 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (observing district court may consider any reasonably foreseeable amounts
   part of common plan or scheme); United States v. Castillo, 732 F. App’x 267,
   268 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[Defendant] could be held accountable for all drug
   quantities involved in the conspiracy”.).

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          Additionally, a “[PSR] generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability
   to be considered as evidence by the trial judge in making the factual
   determinations required by the sentencing guidelines”. United States v.
   Alford, 142 F.3d 825, 831–32 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Again, when,
   as here, the PSR’s factual allegations “are supported by an adequate
   evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability, a defendant must offer
   rebuttal evidence demonstrating that those facts are materially untrue,
   inaccurate or unreliable”.     Harris, 702 F.3d at 230 (citation omitted).
   Blankenship presented no rebuttal evidence. There was no clear error.
                                            ii.
          In contesting, on double-jeopardy grounds, the inclusion of this 2016
   drug-trafficking conduct, Blankenship notes his PSR’s criminal-history
   section includes a 2018 conviction for, inter alia, possession with intent to
   distribute methamphetamine. Accordingly, he contests the PSR’s listing the
   conviction as both criminal history and an underlying racketeering offense,
   assigning points for both. Guideline § 2E1.1 cmt. n.4 (explaining conduct
   considered part of “pattern of racketeering activity” should be treated as
   prior sentence if it resulted in conviction prior to last overt act of instant
   offense).
          The listed conviction in Blankenship’s criminal history, however,
   concerned     a    discrete   incident     regarding   only   4.65   grams   of
   methamphetamine, and the PSR listed as an underlying racketeering offense
   only the 2016 incident involving the $30,000 in methamphetamine
   proceeds—an evidently different episode than the conviction for possession
   of the 4.65 grams of methamphetamine. Blankenship offered no rebuttal
   evidence demonstrating the conviction and the seizure of proceeds are the
   same event. See Harris, 702 F.3d at 230. (Moreover, even if the court
   improperly included the incident, Blankenship can show no harm because the

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                                    No. 22-40619

   evidence discussed supra showed he otherwise trafficked more than 500
   grams of methamphetamine. See Guideline § 2D1.1(c)(5) (applying base
   offense level of 30 if offense involved “at least 500 G[rams] . . . of
   Methamphetamine”).)
                                         d.
          Blankenship also challenges the PSR’s inclusion of the attempted
   murder of a rival gang-member (Count 1D) as underlying racketeering
   activity in his offense-level computation. He contends the court used the
   incorrect burden of proof in considering the underlying offense and applied
   the wrong base offense level.
                                         i.
          He maintains the court erred by treating the attempted murder as an
   underlying offense for the purposes of Guideline § 2E1.1 (explaining in
   commentary that “[w]here there is more than one underlying offense, treat
   each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of conviction”)
   because the attempted murder was not alleged in the superseding indictment.
   He insists the alleged attempted murder falls under Guideline § 1B1.2(d) (“A
   conviction on a count charging a conspiracy to commit more than one offense
   shall be treated as if the defendant had been convicted on a separate count of
   conspiracy for each offense that the defendant conspired to commit.”). In
   applying Guideline § 1B1.2(d), our court has explained: “in the absence of a
   verdict or plea on those underlying ‘pseudo’ offenses”, the court can
   consider underlying offenses only if “a reasonable trier of fact would find the
   defendant guilty of those underlying offenses beyond a reasonable doubt”.
   United States v. Jones, 699 F. App’x 325, 326 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Guideline
   § 1B1.2(d) & cmt. n.4).
          Because the jury did not make a finding on the underlying offense,
   Blankenship asserts the court erred in employing a preponderance-of-the-

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                                      No. 22-40619

   evidence, rather than a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, standard to find him
   guilty of the attempted murder.         See id.    As noted supra, the court’s
   application of the Guidelines is reviewed de novo. E.g., Cisneros-Gutierrez,
   517 F.3d at 764.
          Blankenship’s reliance on Guideline § 1B1.2(d) is misplaced. That
   provision applies to multi-object conspiracies. A racketeering conspiracy,
   however, is a single-object conspiracy. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“It shall be
   unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
   subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”); see also United States v. Carrozza,
   4 F.3d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 1993) (“In enacting RICO, Congress intended that a
   series of agreements that under pre-RICO law would constitute multiple
   conspiracies could under RICO be tried as a single enterprise conspiracy if
   the defendants have agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense.” (citation
   omitted)); United States v. Massino, 546 F.3d 123, 135 (2d Cir. 2008)
   (explaining RICO is single-object conspiracy); United States v. Corrado, 227
   F.3d 528, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Garcia, 754 F.3d
   460, 482–83 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Barragan, 871 F.3d 689,
   717 (9th Cir. 2017) (same); but see United States v. Nguyen, 255 F.3d 1335,
   1340–42 (11th Cir. 2001) (clarifying beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
   applies to racketeering predicate acts in sentencing by analogy to multi-object
   conspiracies).
          The proper provision is, instead, Guideline § 2E1.1 (“Unlawful
   Conduct Relating to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations”). As
   discussed supra, Guideline § 2E1.1 applies a base offense level of 19, or “the
   offense level applicable to the underlying racketeering activity”. Guideline
   § 2E1.1(a) & cmt. n.1 (“Where there is more than one underlying offense,
   treat each underlying offense as if contained in a separate count of
   conviction”.).

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                                     No. 22-40619

          As also noted supra, the Guidelines explain that relevant conduct
   includes “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
   commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant”. Id.
   § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).    The sentencing court may find such conduct by a
   preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval,
   6 F.4th 63, 104 (1st Cir. 2021); Massino, 546 F.3d at 135. Therefore, the
   district court appropriately considered the attempted murder in
   Blankenship’s offense-level computation and correctly reviewed the
   underlying offense under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See
   Sealed Appellee 1 v. Sealed Appellant 1, 767 F.3d 418, 424 n.26 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (explaining preponderance means “[the fact being proved] is more likely than
   not” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
                                           ii.
          In asserting the court erred in assigning a base level of 33 to the
   attempted murder, Blankenship contends there was no evidence the offense
   would have constituted first-degree murder; therefore, the base level should
   be 27. See Guideline § 2A2.1(a) (applying base level of 27 if object of offense
   was not first-degree murder). As pointed out earlier, because Blankenship
   did not preserve this issue in district court, review is only for plain error.
          Accordingly, also noted earlier, he must, inter alia, show a forfeited
   plain error, i.e., a clear or obvious error. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Guideline
   § 2A2.1 defines “[f]irst degree murder” as conduct that “would constitute
   first degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111”. Guideline § 2A2.1 cmt. n.1.
   Section 1111(a) provides: “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
   with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a).
          In that regard, there was: evidence Blankenship sent an AC member
   to attack the rival gang-member; evidence of premeditation; two shanks
   present at the scene on the body of the victim; and a puncture wound

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   consistent with stabbing in the back of the victim’s skull. The court did not
   commit the requisite clear or obvious error.
                                         e.

          Blankenship’s final sentencing challenge is that the court should have
   applied Guideline § 3B1.1’s three-level manager/supervisor enhancement
   instead of its four-level organizer/leader enhancement. See Guideline § 3B1.1
   (“(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity . . .
   increase by 4 levels. (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but
   not an organizer or leader) . . . increase by 3 levels”.). When deciding
   whether a person was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity, as opposed
   to a manager or supervisor, a court is to consider

          the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of
          participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment
          of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits
          of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or
          organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal
          activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over
          others.
   Id. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4.
          Evidence showed Blankenship: held the AC rank of “major” within
   both the Missouri Department of Corrections and the AC federal-prisons
   branch; ordered lower-ranking members to perform attacks; collected dues;
   was recognized by prison officials as an AC leader; and recruited new AC
   members.      In the light of the record as a whole, the court’s finding
   Blankenship was a leader within the AC is not clearly erroneous.
                                         2.
          Chunn challenges six aspects of his sentencing, five of which are
   procedural: the factual allegations in the PSR; the characterization of

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                                      No. 22-40619

   ordered stabbings as attempted murder instead of aggravated assault; the
   four-level organizer/leader enhancement; the two-level obstruction-of-
   justice enhancement; and the date found by the court for the beginning of his
   racketeering activities. His sixth and final challenge is that his sentence is
   substantively unreasonable. We first address the five claimed procedural
   errors.
                                            a.
             As discussed supra, the district court must avoid significant
   procedural error in applying the Guidelines, such as improperly calculating
   the Guidelines sentencing range. E.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Each of Chunn’s
   procedural claims is reviewed for clear error.
                                            i.
             For the PSR’s factual allegations of his involvement with the
   conspiracy, Chunn denies participating in any acts that included murder,
   kidnapping, or robbery. His appellate brief, however, almost exclusively
   reiterates, including without citation to authority, his filed objections in
   district court to the PSR. A party cannot incorporate by reference district-
   court assertions. See, e.g., E. R. ex rel. E. R. v. Spring Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,
   909 F.3d 754, 763 (5th Cir. 2018). And the brief must contain “appellant’s
   contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and
   parts of the record on which the appellant relies”. Fed. R. App. P.
   28(a)(8)(A). Accordingly, Chunn’s first claim is forfeited. See Spring Branch
   Indep. Sch. Dist., 909 F.3d at 763.
                                           ii.
             Chunn contends the offense levels for the stabbings listed in the PSR
   should have been calculated under Guideline § 2A2.2 (aggravated assault),
   not Guideline § 2A1.5(a) (conspiracy or solicitation to commit murder).

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   Chunn, however, identifies only one item of evidence relating to one
   stabbing. He points to trial testimony stating he was upset after the brutal
   attack on a homosexual inmate because the stabbing he ordered was not
   supposed to be a murder. Other evidence, however, included trial testimony
   that Chunn ordered an AC prospect to stab the inmate so severely that he
   would be life-flighted to a hospital. One witness testified at trial that, after
   the prospect had stabbed the inmate at least 13 times, Chunn made him go
   back and “finish him out”. The prospect returned to the cell and struck the
   bleeding inmate’s head and upper body multiple times.
          The court accepted the PSR’s detailing of the stabbings and overruled
   the objection based on, inter alia, the PSR and trial testimony. Chunn has not
   demonstrated the facts stated in the PSR are materially untrue and, therefore,
   has not definitely and firmly convinced our court the district court made a
   mistake regarding the one stabbing he addresses. As for the other stabbings,
   he forfeits his contentions because they are not adequately briefed. See Fed.
   R. App. P. 28(a)(8).
                                         iii.
          Chunn challenges the court’s application of the four-level leadership
   enhancement under Guideline § 3B1.1(a) (“If the defendant was an organizer
   or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
   otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.”). As discussed supra, when
   deciding whether defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity,
   as opposed to a manager or supervisor, our court considers the factors listed
   in Guideline § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4 (listing factors court should consider when
   determining leadership enhancement).
          The unrebutted facts in the PSR and trial evidence show Chunn
   exercised decision-making authority, participated extensively in planning

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   and organizing the offenses, and exercised a high degree of authority over
   others. See id. Again, Chunn has not met his burden.
                                          iv.
            In contesting his two-level obstruction-of-justice enhancement under
   Guideline § 3C1.1, Chunn contends the district court reversibly erred by not
   addressing his contention that no evidence showed he possessed a firearm
   when he attempted to intimidate an AC member who was cooperating with
   law enforcement. The enhancement does not require the use or threatened
   use of a firearm. Guideline § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4 (“The following is a non-
   exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which this adjustment
   applies: (A) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a
   co-defendant, witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do
   so”.).
            The court found Chunn had obstructed justice based on, inter alia: the
   PSR; the trial testimony of three individuals; and letters from Chunn. Chunn
   did not present rebuttal evidence demonstrating the PSR is materially untrue,
   and we are not definitely and firmly convinced the court’s finding was
   mistaken.
                                           v.
            For this final procedural claim, Chunn contends his arrests for robbery
   in 2001, gun and drug possession in 2004, and drug possession again in 2004
   were related to his racketeering charge, and, therefore, the district court
   should have listed them as relevant conduct, not criminal history. Guideline
   §§ 1B1.3 (outlining relevant conduct), 4A1.2(a)(1) (defining “prior
   sentence”). The court, noting the PSR was supported by sufficient indicia
   of reliability, found Chunn joined the AC on or about the date he admitted
   his AC affiliation to law enforcement: 18 March 2009. As rebuttal evidence,

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                                     No. 22-40619

   Chunn points to trial testimony in which a witness stated Chunn was just a
   regular member of the AC and held no rank in 2004.
          Even if we concluded the district court committed clear error by not
   crediting this trial testimony, removal of the relevant arrests would not
   change Chunn’s Guidelines sentencing range. He contends his proper
   criminal-history category was IV, not VI as applied by the court. With his
   offense level of 43, however, Chunn’s Guidelines sentence would be life even
   with a criminal-history category of I. See id. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).
   In short, any error was harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d
   812, 822 n.7 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding Guidelines error is harmless if it does
   not affect Guidelines sentencing range).
                                          vi.
          In addition, any procedural error by the district court was harmless
   because “the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence
   imposed”. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d at 753 (citation omitted). An error is
   harmless “if the proponent of the sentence convincingly demonstrates both
   (1) that the district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not
   made the error, and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it
   gave at the prior sentencing”. United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 714
   (5th Cir. 2010). After the court had extensively commented on the reasons
   for imposing the sentence, it stated that, even if it had erred in calculating the
   Guidelines sentencing range, it would have imposed the same sentence
   because it met the “sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and
   protection of the public”. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (sentencing factors);
   United States v. Leontaritis, 977 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 2020) (finding any
   potential error was harmless under similar circumstances).

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                                          b.
          For Chunn’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his
   sentence, and as addressed supra, review is for abuse of discretion. E.g., Gall,
   552 U.S. at 51. A within-Guidelines sentence is presumptively reasonable.
   See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 712 F.3d 209, 214 (5th Cir. 2013).
          “The presumption is rebutted only upon a showing that the sentence
   does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it gives
   significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear
   error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” Id. (citation omitted).
   Because Chunn does not identify any 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factor
   the court omitted, overweighed, or erred in balancing, he does not show his
   sentence is substantively unreasonable.
                                         III.
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgments are AFFIRMED.

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