Court Opinion

ID: 9688954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:14:20.308888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:43.230183
License: Public Domain

Mackenzie, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that plaintiff’s claim against defendant Indianapolis Life Insurance Company (ilic) is not barred by res judicata.
As noted by the majority, Michigan recognizes a broad application of the res judicata doctrine which bars not only claims actually litigated in a prior action, but also those claims arising out of the same transaction which the plaintiff could have brought but did not. Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich 147; 294 NW2d 165 (1980). The majority concludes that the facts before us present two distinct transactions: first, the cancellation of Vutci’s old policy and Adams’ persuading him to apply for a new policy and, second, Vutci’s application to ilic for the new policy. The majority then holds that because the only subject matter of plaintiff’s first suit was the second of these "transactions,” plaintiff is not barred from raising claims relating to the first "transaction” in the instant suit.
In my opinion, this analysis places an overly narrow gloss on the concept of "same transaction.” The problem lies in the premise that the test as to whether two claims arise out of the same transaction is whether the same facts or evidence are essential to both actions. See Mazzola v Vineyard *447Homes, Inc, 54 Mich App 608, 613-614; 221 NW2d 406 (1974), cited by the majority. This is a test for determining identity of claims, i.e., whether the plaintiff is simply giving one cause of action two denominations in two different lawsuits. Mazzola, supra, p 613.
Application of the Mazzola test in this case is fine as far as it goes. I would agree that plaintiff stated distinct causes of action in his two lawsuits. Nevertheless, the fact that plaintiff has stated distinct claims does not end the inquiry. This determination, without more, does not address the broad view of res judicata, i.e., whether the plaintiff is raising in a second suit an issue which could have been raised in a prior suit.
Stripped to their essentials, the two "transactions” isolated by the majority are (1) a plan to defraud the insurer and (2) completing the paperwork necessary to effectuate the plan. In my view, these are not discrete "transactions” at all, but instead are separate claims based on different phases of a single transaction. Since all claims against ilic based on this transaction could have been raised by plaintiff in his first suit, the claims against ilic in this suit are barred by principles of res judicata. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of accelerated judgment as to defendant ILIC.