Court Opinion

ID: 9909380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 14:06:01.448925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.480908
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. White, 2023-Ohio-4499.]

                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                   FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                             HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                      :   APPEAL NO. C-230093
                                                         TRIAL NO. B-9308662B
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                         :

   vs.                                               :       O P I N I O N.

 CHRISTOPHER WHITE,                                  :

     Defendant-Appellant.                            :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed As Modified

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 13, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Christopher White, pro se.
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Christopher White appeals the Hamilton County

Common Pleas Court’s judgment denying his “Motion to Vacate or Set Aside

Conviction.” Because the lower court did not have jurisdiction to consider White’s

motion, we modify the court’s judgment to reflect a dismissal of the motion and affirm

the common pleas court’s judgment as modified.

                            Procedural and Factual History

       {¶2}   In May 1994, White was convicted of aggravated murder with a gun

specification, tampering with evidence, and unlawful possession of a dangerous

ordnance, all crimes he had committed as a juvenile. The trial court imposed the

agreed sentence of 25 years to life in prison. This court affirmed White’s convictions

on direct appeal. State v. White, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-940427, 1995 Ohio App.

LEXIS 2018 (May 17, 1995).

       {¶3}   In July 2021, White moved to vacate his conviction for aggravated

murder, arguing that his parole hearing was conducted improperly. The common pleas

court denied the motion. White did not appeal.

       {¶4}   Then, in October 2022, White filed another motion to vacate his

conviction for aggravated murder and his accompanying sentence. White, citing to

State v. Patrick, 164 Ohio St.3d 309, 2020-Ohio-6803, 172 N.E.3d 952, asserted that

his sentence was constitutionally invalid. In Patrick, the Ohio Supreme Court held that

to prevent a sentence from running afoul of the federal and state constitutions’

protections against cruel and unusual punishment, a trial court must expressly

consider a juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor before sentencing a juvenile

offender convicted of aggravated murder to a life term, even if the term includes parole

eligibility. White argued that the sentencing court did not consider his youth as a

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

mitigating factor and therefore, his sentence was unconstitutional. White also

contended that Am.Sub.S.B. No. 256 (“S.B. 256”), which became effective April 12,

2021, supports his argument that his sentence was unconstitutional. R.C.

2967.132(C)(2) was enacted by S.B. 256 and provides that certain juvenile homicide

offenders are eligible for parole after serving 25 years in prison, regardless of the actual

sentence imposed or when the offender was sentenced.

       {¶5}    In response, the state argued that the motion should be denied because

Patrick does not apply retroactively and White’s argument with respect to S.B. 256 is

barred by res judicata because he could have raised this issue in his July 2021 motion

to vacate his conviction and did not do so.

       {¶6}    The common pleas court denied the motion to vacate for the reasons

cited by the state. White appeals that judgment, arguing in a single assignment of error

that the court erroneously denied his motion to vacate.

                      Untimely Petition for Postconviction Relief

       {¶7}    White did not cite to the postconviction statutes, R.C. 2953.21 et seq.,

when he filed his motion to vacate and/or set aside his conviction for aggravated

murder and, by implication, his accompanying sentence of 25 years to life in prison.

But the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a “motion to vacate a conviction” and/or “a

motion to correct or vacate a sentence” is a petition for postconviction relief under R.C.

2953.21 et seq., when the motion is (1) filed after a defendant’s direct appeal; (2) claims

a denial of constitutional rights; (3) seeks to render the judgment void; and (4) asks

the court to vacate the judgment and sentence. State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158,

679 N.E.2d 1131 (1999); State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882

N.E.2d 431.

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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶8}   White filed his motion to vacate his conviction and sentence after his

direct appeal and claimed that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and therefore, that his conviction

and sentence should be vacated. Accordingly, the common pleas court should have

recast White’s motion as one for a petition for postconviction relief.

       {¶9}   Reviewing the denial of White’s motion to vacate under the

postconviction statutes, we note that White’s motion, filed well after the one-year time

period, is an untimely petition for postconviction relief. Although R.C. 2953.23

provides certain narrow exceptions allowing a common pleas court to grant untimely

petitions, White’s situation, where he is seeking to have a new Ohio Supreme Court

decision applied to him, does not fit into any exceptions. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a) and

(b). While R.C. 2953.23(A) vests a common pleas court with jurisdiction to grant relief

on an untimely petition when the petitioner asserts a claim based on a new state or

federal right recognized by the United States Supreme Court, the statute provides no

exception allowing an untimely petition to be granted based on a new Ohio Supreme

Court decision. State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 137 N.E.3d 1151,

¶ 2. Because White cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements under R.C.

2953.23(A), the common pleas court should have dismissed his petition. See R.C.

2953.21(D) and (F).

                      Patrick Does Not Apply Retroactively

       {¶10} Although we have already determined that the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to consider White’s motion to vacate, we address White’s argument that

the common pleas court could revisit his sentence in light of Patrick.

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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶11} “A new judicial ruling may be applied only to cases that are pending on

the announcement date. The new judicial ruling may not be applied retroactively to a

conviction that has become final, i.e., where the accused has exhausted all of his

appellate remedies.” Ali v. State, 104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6502, 819 N.E.2d

687, ¶ 6, citing State v. Evans, 32 Ohio St.2d 185, 186, 291 N.E.2d 466 (1972).

       {¶12} White’s appellate remedies were exhausted in 1994 after this court

affirmed his convictions on direct appeal and he did not appeal that decision to the

Ohio Supreme Court. Accordingly, Patrick cannot be applied to White’s case as he had

no appeal pending when Patrick was released. We agree with other appellate districts

that have considered this same issue and have concluded that the rule announced in

Patrick is a procedural rule, and thus, cannot be applied retroactively. See State v.

Wiesenborn, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29388, 2022-Ohio-3762, ¶ 26; State v. Jarrett,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111659, 2023-Ohio-811, ¶ 24; State v. Hale, 12th Dist. Butler

Nos. CA2023-03-019 and CA2023-03-021, 2023-Ohio-3199, ¶ 11. As the Eighth

District noted, this holding “comports with the principle that ‘[a]bsent statutory

authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by

reconsidering its own final judgment.’ ” Jarrett at ¶ 24, citing State v. Carlisle, 131

Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-6553, 961 N.E.2d 671, ¶ 1.

                                        Conclusion

       {¶13} Because White’s motion to vacate was an untimely petition for

postconviction relief, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the

petition and should have dismissed it. We modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect

a dismissal of White’s motion and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

                                                       Judgment affirmed as modified.

BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Please note:

       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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