Court Opinion

ID: 9382420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 17:07:26.608811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.313719
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Kubala v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-991.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

KENNETH J. KUBALA,                               CASE NO. 2022-T-0094

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                 Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                   Court of Common Pleas

RANDY SMITH, et al.,
                                                 Trial Court No. 2021 CV 00651
                 Defendant-Appellant.

                                            OPINION

                                      Decided: March 27, 2023
                                        Judgment: Affirmed

David L. Engler, Engler Law Firm, 181 Elm Road, N.E., Warren, OH 44483 (For Plaintiff-
Appellee).

Jeffrey Stankunas and Molly R. Gwin, Isaac Wiles & Burkholder, LLC, Two Miranova
Place, Suite 700, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Randy Smith, appeals the trial court’s denial of summary

judgment on the issue of his immunity in his individual capacity. We affirm.

        {¶2}     From October 2011 until May 2018, appellee, Kenneth J. Kubala, worked

as a safety manager for the Trumbull County Engineer’s Office, where Smith served as

the Trumbull County Engineer. Kubala resigned effective May 11, 2018.

        {¶3}     In 2021, Kubala filed a complaint pursuant to R.C. 4112.01 et seq. against

Smith and Trumbull County alleging that Smith created a sexually hostile work
environment.1 Kubala specifically maintained that Smith “willfully, wantonly, maliciously,

and in reckless disregard for Kubala’s rights” engaged in sexually hostile conduct. The

county and Smith answered the complaint, denying that Smith created a sexually hostile

work environment. As an affirmative defense, the county and Smith asserted that they

were entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744.

        {¶4}     Thereafter, the county and Smith moved for summary judgment, claiming

that they were entitled to judgment because (1) Kubala could not demonstrate that the

alleged harassment was based on sex; (2) Kubala could not demonstrate that the alleged

conduct was severe or pervasive; and (3) Smith in his individual capacity was immune

from Kubala’s claim pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).2 Kubala responded in opposition

to the motion, and the county and Smith filed a reply.

        {¶5}     Thereafter, the trial court issued an entry denying summary judgment on

the first and second bases set forth above, granting summary judgment to the county and

Smith in his official capacity, and denying summary judgment to Smith in his individual

1. Kubala originally filed a complaint in 2018, alleging that Smith created a sexually hostile work
environment and violated Kubala’s First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. Kubala
v. Smith, N.D.Ohio No. 4:18CV1988, 2019 WL 7282096, *1-2 (Dec. 27, 2019), aff'd in part, vacated in part,
984 F.3d 1132. The case was removed to federal court. Id. at *2. The federal district court granted
summary judgment to the county and Smith, and Kubala appealed. Id. at *9; Kubala v. Smith, 984 F.3d
1132, 1135 (6th Cir.2021) (“Kubala II”). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment with
respect to Kubala’s First Amendment claim but determined that the sexual harassment claim shared no
common nucleus of fact with the First Amendment claim, depriving the district court of subject matter
jurisdiction over the sexual harassment claim. Kubala II at 1135. The Sixth District therefore vacated the
district court’s judgment on the sexual harassment claim and directed the district court to dismiss that claim
without prejudice. Id. at 1142.

2. Any potential issues regarding the propriety, finality, and appealability of the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment on the issue of immunity to the county and Smith, in his official capacity, are beyond the scope
of this appeal. See Zoldan v. Lordstown, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0002, 2014-Ohio-3007, ¶ 10
(cross-appeal of the grant of summary judgment to village on its claim of immunity not final order where
claims against individual named in the complaint were pending, and the judgment entry ruling on summary
judgment did not contain Civ.R. 54(B) language).
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Case No. 2022-T-0094
capacity. The trial court determined that questions of fact existed as to whether immunity

pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) was available to Smith.

      {¶6}   In his two assigned errors, Smith contends:

             [1.] The trial Court erred as a matter of law by denying
             Defendant-Appellant Randy Smith immunity in his individual
             capacity under R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6) by determining that a
             genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he was
             acting manifestly outside the scope of his employment.

             [2.] The Trial Court erred as a matter of law by denying
             Defendant-Appellant Randy Smith immunity in his individual
             capacity under R.C. § 2744.03(A)(6) by determining that a
             genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether he was
             acting with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or
             reckless manner.

      {¶7}   In Smith’s assigned errors, he argues that the trial court erred in denying

him summary judgment on the issue of immunity in his individual capacity.

      {¶8}   Initially, we note that “[g]enerally, the denial of summary judgment is not a

final, appealable order.” Ruckman v. Smith, 2022-Ohio-1813, 190 N.E.3d 707, ¶ 9 (11th

Dist.), citing Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, 873 N.E.2d 878, ¶ 9.

“However, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that ‘[w]hen a trial court denies a motion

in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744,

that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and is therefore a final, appealable

order pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).’” Ruckman at ¶ 9, quoting Hubbell at syllabus.

“Appellate review under R.C. 2744.02(C) is limited to the review of alleged errors that

involve the denial of the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability.” Ruckman at ¶ 9,

citing Doe 1 v. Licate, 11th Dist. Ashtabula Nos. 2018-A-0019, 2018-A-0020, 2019-Ohio-

412, ¶ 28.

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
       {¶9}   We review decisions denying summary judgment on the issue of immunity

de novo, “i.e., independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Hedrick

v. Szep, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2020-G-0272, 2021-Ohio-1851, ¶ 13, citing Grafton v.

Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996); Ruckman at ¶ 10.

              Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary
              judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No
              genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
              (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
              and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
              can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence
              most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
              for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to
              that party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); Allen v.

5125 Peno, LLC, 2017-Ohio-8941, 101 N.E.3d 484, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Holliman v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 86 Ohio St.3d 414, 415, 715 N.E.2d 532 (1999). “The initial burden is

on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue of material fact

exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing

Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). “If the movant

meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine

issue of material fact exists for trial.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher at 293. “[T]he purpose

of summary judgment is ‘not to try issues of fact, but rather to determine whether triable

issues of fact exist.’” Smathers v. Glass, --- Ohio St.3d ----, 2022-Ohio-4595, --- N.E.3d -

---, ¶ 3 (Dec. 22, 2022), quoting Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 15,

467 N.E.2d 1378 (6th Dist.1983). Therefore, a court making an immunity determination

at the summary judgment stage of proceedings ”must look at the evidence and determine

whether it is so one-sided that the party claiming immunity should prevail as a matter of

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
law.” Smathers at ¶ 3, citing Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340, 617 N.E.2d 1123

(1993).

        {¶10} With respect to Smith’s claim of immunity, Smith holds the office of the

Trumbull County Engineer. “[O]fficeholders are employees of political subdivisions” when

sued in their individual, as opposed to their official, capacities. Lambert v. Clancy, 125

Ohio St.3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483, 927 N.E.2d 585, ¶ 21, quoting R.C. 2744.01(B) (“the

term ‘employee’ ‘includes any elected or appointed official of a political subdivision’”);

Kravetz v. Streetsboro Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Portage No. 2011-P-0025, 2012-Ohio-1455,

¶ 22.3 Because the trial court denied summary judgment to Smith on the issue of

immunity in his individual capacity, the issues on appeal pertain to political-subdivision-

employee immunity. Pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), in a civil action, an employee of a

political subdivision is immune from liability unless one of the following applies:

                 (a) The employee’s acts or omissions were manifestly outside
                 the scope of the employee’s employment or official
                 responsibilities;

                 (b) The employee’s acts or omissions were with malicious
                 purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;

                 (c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by
                 a section of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be
                 construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code
                 merely because that section imposes a responsibility or
                 mandatory duty upon an employee, because that section
                 provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general
                 authorization in that section that an employee may sue and
                 be sued, or because the section uses the term “shall” in a
                 provision pertaining to an employee.

3. Where “allegations are directed against the holder of an office in his official capacity, it is the equivalent
of suing the political subdivision itself[,]” and immunity is reviewed through the three-tier analysis applicable
to political subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744.02. (Emphasis added.) Thompson v. Buckeye Joint
Vocational Sch. Dist., 2016-Ohio-2804, 55 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.), citing Lambert.
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Case No. 2022-T-0094
       {¶11} Here, the court denied summary judgment on the issue of Smith’s immunity

in his individual capacity, finding that genuine questions of fact remained relative to the

first two of these exemptions to immunity. With respect to the first exemption, “R.C.

Chapter 2744 does not define what conduct is ‘manifestly outside the scope of the

employee’s employment or official responsibilities.’” Thomas v. Bauschlinger, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 27240, 2015-Ohio-281, ¶ 25, quoting R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a). “However, Ohio

courts have generally held that ‘“‘conduct is within the scope of employment if it is initiated,

in part, to further or promote the master’s business.’”’” Thomas at ¶ 25, quoting Curry v.

Blanchester, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2009-08-010, CA2009-08-012, 2010-Ohio-3368,

¶ 30, quoting Jackson v. McDonald, 144 Ohio App.3d 301, 307, 760 N.E.2d 24 (5th

Dist.2001). “‘For an act to fall within the scope of employment, it must be “calculated to

facilitate or promote the business for which the [employee or agent] was employed.”’”

Thomas at ¶ 25, quoting Johnson v. Godsey, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012 CA 80, 2013-Ohio-

3277, ¶ 32, quoting Osborne v. Lyles, 63 Ohio St.3d 326, 329, 587 N.E.2d 825 (1992).

“‘In general, if an act is committed within the scope of employment, it will be authorized,

either expressly or impliedly, by the employer.’” Thomas at ¶ 25, quoting Johnson at ¶

32. “‘“It is only where the acts of [public] employees are motivated by actual malice or

other [situations] giving rise to punitive damages that their conduct may be outside the

scope of their * * * employment.”’” Thomas at ¶ 25, quoting Curry at ¶ 30, quoting Jackson

at 307. “‘The act must be so divergent that it severs the employer-employee relationship.’”

Thomas at ¶ 25, quoting Wee Care Child Ctr., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-1004, 2014-Ohio-2913, ¶ 28.

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
       {¶12} In the similar context of immunity for state employees, R.C. 9.86 provides

exemptions from immunity akin to those contained in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a) and (b), which

are applicable to political-subdivision employees. See R.C. 9.86 (“* * * no officer or

employee shall be liable in any civil action that arises under the law of this state for

damage or injury caused in the performance of his duties, unless the officer’s or

employee’s actions were manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official

responsibilities, or unless the officer or employee acted with malicious purpose, in bad

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” (Emphasis added.)). With respect to R.C. 9.86,

in addressing whether an employee acted manifestly outside the scope of his

employment, the Tenth District has indicated that “‘an employer is not liable for

independent self-serving acts of his employees which in no way facilitate or promote his

business.’” Oye v. Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1362, 2003-Ohio-5944,

¶ 7, quoting Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 59, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991). “Implicit in this

statement is that such self-serving acts are not within an employee’s scope of

employment.” Oye at ¶ 7. “Given this framework of analysis, [the Tenth District] [has]

interpret[ed] actions ‘manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official

responsibilities,’ as used in R.C. 9.86, to include actions that bear no relationship to the

conduct of the state’s business.” Oye at ¶ 7, citing Hidey v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 10th

Dist. Franklin No. 97API12-1587, 1998 WL 655277, *1 (Sept. 22, 1998). We likewise

conclude that a political-subdivision employee acts “manifestly outside the scope of his

employment or official responsibilities” when his actions bear no relationship to the

conduct of the political subdivision’s business for purposes of the first exemption to

immunity contained in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a).

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
       {¶13} With respect to the second exemption to immunity contained in R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(b), regarding acts committed with “malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a

wanton or reckless manner,” these terms describe the following distinct types of conduct.

       {¶14} “‘“Malicious” means “indulging or exercising malice; harboring ill will or

enmity.”’” Cook v. Hubbard Exempted Village Bd. of Edn., 116 Ohio App.3d 564, 569,

688 N.E.2d 1058 (11th Dist.1996), quoting Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs.,

76 Ohio App.3d 448, 453, 602 N.E.2d 363 (12th Dist.1991), abrogated on other grounds

as stated in Anderson v. Massillon, 134 Ohio St.3d 380, 2012-Ohio-5711, 983 N.E.2d

266. “Furthermore, ‘malice’ can be defined as the willful and intentional design to do

injury, or the intention or desire to harm another, usually seriously, through conduct which

is unlawful or unjustified.” Cook at 1061, quoting Jackson at 453-454.

       {¶15} “‘“[B]ad faith, although not susceptible of concrete definition, embraces

more than bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity,

conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will

partaking of the nature of fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive

another.”’” Cook at 1061-1062, quoting Jackson at 453-454, quoting Slater v. Motorists

Mut. Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962), paragraph two of syllabus.

       {¶16} “Wanton misconduct is ‘the failure to exercise any care toward those to

whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm

will result.’” Smathers, 2022-Ohio-4595, at ¶ 33, quoting Anderson at ¶ 33.

       {¶17} “Reckless conduct” connotes the “‘conscious disregard of or indifference to

a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances

and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.’” Smathers at ¶ 33, quoting Anderson

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
at ¶ 34, and citing O'Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 2008-Ohio-2574, 889 N.E.2d

505, ¶ 73 (referring to recklessness as a “perverse disregard of a known risk”).

       {¶18} Here, Kubala alleged in his complaint that Smith engaged in sexually hostile

acts toward Kubala “that occurred continuously from in or about 2015 through May 11,

2018[,]” which included, but were not limited to:

              a. Smith asked Kubala whether Kubala was a homosexual;

              b. On multiple occasions, Smith asked Kubala to remove his
              shirt in his office in the presence of others including Herb
              Leukart, who was present for the majority of Smith’s sexually
              hostile comments and interactions with Kubala;

              c. Smith encouraged Kubala to come and visit Smith’s renter,
              “Richard,” who Smith told Kubala was waiting for Kubala while
              lying on a bear skin rug;

              d. Smith, in a “creepy” way, without letting Kubala know if
              Smith was or was not joking or being serious, told Kubala that
              Smith’s wife, Angela, was away at a union conference, and
              asked Kubala to come over to keep him from being “scared;”

              e. Smith asked if Kubala had ever seen a male elected
              Trumbull official nude;

              f. Smith, at a meeting, encouraged Kubala to place his
              “wiener” in the ear of another high-ranking employee of the
              Office of the Trumbull County Engineer who appeared to be
              sleeping;

              g. Smith, on hundreds of occasions throughout the period that
              began in or about 2015 and extended until May 11, 2018
              would lick the top of his Diet Pepsi can in a sexually
              suggestive way while looking directly at Kubala;

              h. Smith suggested that Kubala ride in a truck with the road
              superintendent while Kubala was holding the road
              superintendent’s “wiener;”

              i. Smith asked to see Kubala’s hands and said “You have nice,
              soft hands.” Smith made the same request three months
              later, and when Kubala refused, Smith grabbed Kubala’s
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Case No. 2022-T-0094
             hands. Smith’s comments about Kubala’s hands had a
             distinct sexual connotation;

             j. While at lunch at the Buena Vista Café with Kubala, the
             hostess asked Smith and Kubala how they were doing and
             Smith replied “We’re trying to find Kubala a boyfriend or
             girlfriend; anyone will do.”;

             k. On multiple occasions at other dining establishments with
             Kubala present, Smith made gratuitous comments to
             restaurant employees which comments demonstrated Smith’s
             presumption regarding Kubala’s sexual orientation and
             Kubala’s sexual preference; and

             l. On one occasion, Smith saw Kubala sitting outside the
             Starbucks at the Eastwood Mall with a female friend and said
             “Good to see you with a girl.”

      {¶19} In his deposition, Kubala testified as to the above incidents, and he

maintained that, although the complaint alleged that Smith suggestively licked a soda can

in front of Kubala “on hundreds of occasions,” this conduct had occurred about 10-20

times. Kubala further testified as to other of Smith’s actions/comments including: Smith

referring to Kubala as a “delicate flower” at restaurants approximately 6-8 times; Smith

telling Kubala that having boyfriends does not make someone homosexual; Smith

describing certain individuals involved in previous litigation as people who “want to pull

your pants down, stick it in your ass, and break it off” and “cut your balls off[,]”; Smith

stating to another employee of the Engineer’s Office that he had ”caught” Kubala, which

Kubala interpreted as a claim to have caught Kubala masturbating; Smith asking Kubala

if he was homosexual; Smith commenting to Kubala that they should go to the drive-in to

drink wine and eat a food basket that they had won at a raffle. Kubala maintained several

times that he told Smith that he did not “want to hear” these comments.

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
      {¶20} In the motion for summary judgment, Smith maintained that, in his individual

capacity, he was immune from Kubala’s claims under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). In support,

Smith contended that Kubala had no evidence that Smith’s comments/conduct were

made with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Smith

relied on Kubala’s deposition testimony wherein he admitted to never complaining about

Smith’s actions and never requested Smith to stop making the alleged remarks, but

instead only stated, “I don’t like to hear that kind of stuff.” Smith did not address R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(a), exempting from immunity an “employee’s acts or omissions [that] were

manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official responsibilities[.]”

      {¶21} Kubala responded to the motion for summary judgment with regard to

immunity by first addressing the exemption from immunity pursuant to R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(a), which he referenced that Smith had failed to address.            Kubala

maintained that a reasonable juror could conclude that Smith’s actions were manifestly

outside the scope of employment because Smith’s actions did not further or promote the

interest of the county.      With regard to the immunity exemptions under R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(b), Kubala maintained that material questions of fact existed as to whether:

(1) Smith’s comments where willful, in that they deviated from the clear legal duty that

prohibits sexually harassing employees or engaging in conduct that creates a sexually

hostile work environment and knew, or should have known, that his conduct would injure

Kubala; (2) Smith acted in bad faith, in that he engaged in the conscious wrongdoing of

making sexually-related comments to Kubala in violation of Ohio’s anti-discrimination

laws; and (3) Smith acted with malice by continuing this conduct despite Kubala’s

repeated requests that he stop.

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
        {¶22} Kubala further maintained that the county’s and Smith’s motion for summary

judgment did not present the evidence in the light most favorable to Kubala. Nonetheless,

Kubala argued that even if the record were read as supporting Smith’s assertions that

Kubala failed to request Smith to stop his behavior and failed to lodge a formal complaint

against Smith, such actions were irrelevant in the context of the immunity exceptions

contained in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a) and (b).

        {¶23} In their reply, the county and Smith maintained that Kubala did not allege in

his complaint that Smith acted manifestly outside the scope of employment so as to be

exempt from immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a).4 However, the county and Smith

argued that, if Smith’s conduct was manifestly outside the scope of his employment, then

the claim of a hostile work environment against Smith in his individual capacity and the

county under R.C. 4112.02 necessarily fails.

        {¶24} As set forth above, the trial court determined that questions of fact existed

as to whether Smith acted manifestly outside the scope of employment and whether he

acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.

Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to Smith in his individual capacity.

        {¶25} On appeal, Smith initially maintains that the trial court mischaracterized the

standard applicable to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a), necessitating reversal, by stating in its

decision that “[w]hether the Defendant, Randy Smith, was acting within the scope of his

employment is a question of fact to be decided by a jury.” (Emphasis added.) However,

4. The county and Smith did not advance an argument in the trial court, nor does Smith advance an
argument on appeal, that the issue of whether Smith was exempted from immunity under R.C.
2744.03(A)(6)(a) was not before the court for failure of the complaint to specifically allege that Smith acted
manifestly outside the scope of his employment. Our opinion should not be read to express any position
on this issue.
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Case No. 2022-T-0094
the trial court’s statement is an accurate statement of the law in general as applied here.

See Townsend v. Kettering, 2022-Ohio-2710, 194 N.E.3d 457, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.) (“Whether

an employee acted within the scope of employment generally is a question of fact to be

decided by the jury.” (Citation omitted.)). Further, the court reasoned that “[i]t is difficult

to imagine how the conduct alleged by the Plaintiff could further or promote any interest

of the Engineer or of Trumbull County.” See Thomas, 2015-Ohio-281, at ¶ 25. These

are appropriate considerations in determining whether triable questions exist on the issue

of an employee acting manifestly outside the scope of employment for purposes of R.C.

2744.03(A)(6)(a).      Accordingly, we do not read the trial court’s decision as

misunderstanding the applicable standards.

       {¶26} Smith next argues that his alleged actions do not rise to the level of acting

“manifestly outside the scope” of his employment or official duties. In support, Smith

maintains that only two of Kubala’s allegations were purportedly made outside of the

workday, and “[t]he remaining allegations, however crude, are specifically related to

workplace discussion at the Engineer’s Office.”

       {¶27} Implicit in Smith’s argument on appeal is an apparent concession that

certain specific instances of alleged conduct were not made as part of workplace

discussion. Regardless, although the place and time of the conduct may be relevant in

determining whether the conduct was manifestly outside the scope of employment, such

factors are not themselves determinative of whether the conduct promoted any interest

of the employer. See Thomas, 2015-Ohio-281, at ¶ 25 (conduct is manifestly outside

scope of employment if it is “so divergent that it severs the employer-employee

relationship”); see also Oye, 2003-Ohio-5944, at ¶ 7 (actions that bear no relationship to

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
the conduct of the employer’s business are manifestly outside the scope of employment).

Unlike the allegations involved in cases cited by Smith, here there is no indication in the

record that Smith’s comments and conduct pertained to county business. See Curry v.

Blanchester, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2009-08-010, CA2009-08-012, 2010-Ohio-3368,

¶ 31 (where mayor made a derogatory and crude comment regarding employee’s

appearance and dress during discussion of employee’s pay raise, “it was not ‘manifestly’

outside the scope of [mayor’s] employment.”), Afjeh v. Ottawa Hills, 6th Dist. Lucas No.

L-14-1267, 2015-Ohio-3483, ¶ 5, 14 (village solicitor acted within scope of her

employment when, while attempting to clear building following completion of a village

meeting, she moved a resident in her wheelchair out of the only doorway to the meeting

room after resident refused to move); Cline v. Tecumseh Local Bd. of Edn., 2d Dist. Clark

No. 2020-CA-36, 2021-Ohio-1329, ¶ 2, 16 (where mother arranged for early release of

children from school into her care, but children were mistakenly released from school to

board bus, bus driver who returned children to school and then engaged in verbal

altercation with mother was acting within the scope of employment).

       {¶28} Based on the foregoing, a material question of fact remains as to whether

Smith was acting manifestly outside the scope of his employment or official

responsibilities when engaging in the conduct and making the comments alleged by

Kubala. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Smith’s motion for summary

judgment on the basis.

       {¶29} Smith next argues that his alleged conduct and comments amount to

“simple teasing” and “offhand comments” occurring in isolated incidents over

approximately three years, which did not rise to the level of recklessness. Smith further

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
argues that if a question exists as to whether he created a “risk of harm,” there is “at a

minimum, a close enough question that the knowledge of risk cannot safely be imputed

to Smith without some accompanying evidentiary basis.”

       {¶30} However, “[i]n a summary judgment review, the court may not weigh the

proof or choose among reasonable inferences[.]” Coterel v. Reed, 2016-Ohio-7411, 72

N.E.3d 1159, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). Further, our review does not pertain to whether there is

factual support for the underlying claim, as the “appeal is limited in scope to a

determination whether there are genuine issues of fact material to the defense for

statutory immunity.”   Id. “‘Consequently, in order to sustain a motion for summary

judgment predicated upon immunity bestowed by R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b), a court must

conclude that the record is devoid of evidence tending to show that the political

subdivision employee acted wantonly or recklessly.’” Coterel at ¶ 15, quoting Irving v.

Austin, 138 Ohio App.3d 552, 556, 741 N.E.2d 931 (6th Dist.2000).

       {¶31} Here, there exists summary judgment evidence from which it may be

reasonably inferred that Smith acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless

manner.   Kubala maintained that Smith directed numerous comments and engaged in

behavior toward Kubala that was either inferentially or explicitly sexual in nature. Kubala

further maintained that he informed Smith that he did not want to hear these comments.

The record is not devoid of evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Kubala,

that Smith’s conduct and comments were made to intentionally cause harm, or, at

minimum, with “conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm

to another that is unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than

negligent conduct.”

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Case No. 2022-T-0094
      {¶32} Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying summary judgment on the

issue of employee immunity on this basis.

      {¶33} The judgment is affirmed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2022-T-0094