Court Opinion

ID: 9762487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:27.181132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:34.979302
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
Because I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the statement of G.W. was inadmissible under Commonwealth v. Lively, 530 Pa. 464, 610 A.2d 7 (1992), I concur in the reasoning on that issue. However, because the statement is nonetheless admissible as substantive evidence under the Ten*330der Years Hearsay Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1,1 must respectfully dissent.
The Tender Years Hearsay Act provides:
(a) General rule. — An out of court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was twelve years of age or younger, describing indecent contact, sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal proceeding if:
(1) The court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.
(2) The child either:
(i) testifies at the proceeding; or
(ii) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborating evidence of the act.
(b) Notice required. — A statement otherwise admissible under subsection (a) shall not be received into evidence unless the proponent of the statement notifies the adverse party of the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceeding at which the proponent intends to offer the statement into evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet the statement.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1.
With respect to subsection (a)(1), the trial court properly found that this prong had been met. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove a material fact. Commonwealth v. Chism, 480 Pa. 233, 246, 389 A.2d 1041, 1048 (1978). Clearly statements by the victim of sexual abuse describing the acts of which petitioner was accused and identifying the accused as the perpetrator were relevant to prove material facts in issue: whether petitioner had committed the acts charged. The trial court conducted the required in camera hearing and determined that the prior statement made by the victim to Trooper *331Danko was highly reliable because the trooper had written down G.W.’s statements verbatim at the time they were made, six and a half years closer in time to the incidents which were the subject of the statement. The trial court found the Trooper’s testimony concerning the circumstances under which the statement was made to be credible and that finding will not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. McCracken, 540 Pa. 541, 551, 659 A.2d 541, 546 (1995) (appellate courts will not disturb credibility determinations of the trial court, which observed the witness’ demeanor first hand). The reliability of the prior inconsistent statement is further strengthened by both the testimony of B.M. and appellant’s statement in which he confessed to performing oral sex on B.M. and his grandson. B.M. testified, consistent with his prior statement, that G.W. was present at the time appellant performed oral sex on him. This corroborates the portion of G.W.’s statement in which he said he stood guard while his grandfather performed oral sex on G.W. Moreover, appellant’s own signed statement corroborates the prior statement of G.W. Therefore, G.W.’s prior statement had sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission under the Tender Years Hearsay Act. Because the trial court found the statements to be reliable and relevant following an in camera hearing, the statement satisfies subsection (a)(1) of the act. The requirement of subsection (a)(2) is satisfied because G.W. testified at trial.
Finally, appellant contends that he was not notified of the Commonwealth’s intention to admit the prior statement of G.W., as required by subsection (b), and that, therefore, he was not able to “meet the statement.” 1 The record demonstrates that the Commonwealth advised the defense in advance of trial of the existence and particulars of the statement and that the Commonwealth provided the defense with a copy of such a statement. Thus, not only did the defense know prior to trial that there was a written statement that was highly adverse to the defendant, but it also had a copy of the statement. Defense counsel was also put on notice by the *332statement that the declarant was twelve years old or younger. In fact, on September 6, 1990, appellant filed a motion in limine to prevent the Commonwealth from introducing the statement into evidence in the event that the victim denied having made the statement. In that motion, appellant stated that the victim was eight years old at the time the statement was made and stated that the defense believed that the Commonwealth intended to introduce the statement at trial. Thus, his own actions to exclude use of the statement as substantive evidence demonstrate that he had sufficient notice that the statement could be admitted as a hearsay exception under the Tender Years Hearsay Act. Hence, appellant cannot claim that he was ambushed by the use of the statement after the witness’ memory failed. Further, even were the notice inadequate,2 had the defense been genuinely unprepared to meet the statement due to the alleged lack of notice, a continuance could have been requested; however, here one was not. Appellant only complains of the notice (or alleged lack thereof) now that the verdict against him has been rendered. Under these facts, I would find that appellant was apprised of the existence and substance of the statement so as to have been put on adequate notice of its potential use at trial.3 Therefore, the statement is not barred by subsection (b) of the act.
The trial court, which was in the best position to assess the credibility of Trooper Danko, determined that the written report of G.W.’s statements was reliable. The circumstances under which the statements were made combined with the corroboration from the statements of both B.M. and appellant *333provide sufficient indicia of reliability to make the statement admissible under the Tender Years Hearsay Act. As with all exceptions to the rule forbidding the admission of hearsay evidence, once the statement or other evidence is accepted as an exception to the hearsay rule, then that statement or evidence becomes substantive evidence and, if relevant, is admissible in the trial of one accused of criminal conduct. The Tender Years Hearsay Act provides a hearsay exception in Pennsylvania and G.W.’s statement is admissible as substantive evidence in the trial of appellant, notwithstanding the rule espoused by this Court in Lively, supra.
Accordingly, I would hold that the statement was admissible as substantive evidence and affirm the order of the Superior Court affirming the judgment of sentence, albeit on different grounds.

. Appellant does not explain how he would otherwise have been able to “meet the statement” had additional notice been given.

. In view of the fact that the child’s statement was provided and the child’s age at the time the statement was known, defense counsel, who is charged with knowing the law of this Commonwealth as an attorney admitted to practice in the Commonwealth, should have been on notice that such statement could be used under the Tender Years Hearsay Act at the time such information was first provided by the prosecution.

. There is no indication that the Commonwealth knew that the witness would change the testimony prior to the time the child took the witness stand. Because the Commonwealth was surprised by the testimony, they could not have given additional advance notice of their intention to introduce the statement.