Court Opinion

ID: 9373830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:07:41.772127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.694891
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KENNETH L. MOORE,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          DE-0752-15-0552-C-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                    DATE: March 18, 2022
                   Agency.

               THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kenneth L. Moore, Colorado Springs, Colorado, pro se.

           Alex Rivera, Esquire, Denver, Colorado, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                                Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                  Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                            ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the compliance initial
     decision, which denied his petition for enforcement for failing to show
     noncompliance with the administrative judge’s order to cancel the appellant’s
     removal, retroactively restore him to his position, pay him appropriate back pay,
     and adjust his benefits.     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administr ative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     appellant’s compliance petition for review. We AFFIRM the compliance initial
     decision as to the finding that the appellant is not entitled to back pay or the
     restoration of additional annual leave, as MODIFIED to clarify the basis for the
     agency’s annual leave calculations.       However, we REVERSE the finding of
     compliance as to the appellant’s Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS)
     retirement account and ORDER the agency to file evidence of compliance within
     45 days.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant filed an appeal challenging his removal.           Moore v. U.S.
     Postal Service, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-15-0552-I-1, Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1.    The administrative judge reversed the appellant’s removal and
     ordered the agency to retroactively restore him to his position, effective August 7,
     2015, to pay him appropriate back pay, and to adjust his benefits. 2 IAF, Tab 19,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 3-4, 13-14.      The initial decision became final on
     December 30, 2015, after neither party filed a petition for review. ID at 16.
¶3         On December 3 and 14, 2015, the agency mailed the appellant letters
     ordering him to return to duty.      Moore v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket
     No. DE-0752-15-0552-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 5 at 11-15. Throughout
     December 2015, the appellant’s supervisor also left him voicemail messages
     ordering him to return to duty. Id. at 10. The appellant, however, did not report
     and told the agency that he was not ready, willing, and able to work during the
     back pay period due to his medical conditions. CF, Tab 5 at 137, Tab 10 at 16.
     The agency notified him that if he was not ready, willing, and able to work, he
     would not be entitled to back pay and that he would not receive any compensation
     during that period, unless he used earned annual or sick leave.               Id.   He
     nonetheless declined to buy back the annual leave that the agency had paid him

     2
      The Back Pay Act applies to the appellant because he is a preference-eligible veteran.
     IAF, Tab 7 at 11; Moore v. U.S. Postal Service, 83 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 10 (1999).
                                                                                        3

     upon his August 7, 2015 removal, or to use his sick leave.        CF, Tab 1 at 33,
     Tab 10 at 16.
¶4         On April 8, 2016, the appellant filed a petition for enforcement, alle ging
     that the agency “took 152 hours of [his] annual leave,” rather than pay him back
     pay, as ordered; did not reinstate him in December 2015; and failed to restore his
     retirement account. CF, Tab 1 at 28-29, 33. The administrative judge issued an
     initial decision denying the appellant’s petition for enforcement, finding that the
     agency was in compliance with the reinstatement and back pay orders.
     CF, Tab 13, Compliance Initial Decision (CID) at 1, 6.          He found that the
     appellant was not entitled to back pay because, upon his own admission, he was
     not ready, willing, and able to work, and that the agency fulfilled its obligation to
     reinstate him by instructing him to return to duty in December 2015. CID at 2-5.
     He further found that the appellant did not have any annual leave to restore
     because the agency had properly paid him for all of it upon his removal and he
     declined to repay the money. CID at 5. Neither the administrative judge nor the
     agency directly addressed the appellant’s claims concerning his retirement
     benefits.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, to which the agency has
     submitted a response. Compliance Petition for Review (CPFR) File, Tabs 1, 5.
     The Clerk of the Board issued an order seeking evidence regarding the agency’s
     recrediting of the appellant’s annual leave. CPFR File, Tab 6. The agency has
     filed a response. CPFR File, Tab 7.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         The Board has jurisdiction to consider an appellant’s claim of agency
     noncompliance with a Board order. Kerr v. National Endowment for the Arts,
     726 F.2d 730, 733 (Fed. Cir. 1984). An agency bears the burden of proving its
     compliance with a Board order.        Pernell v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     118 M.S.P.R. 15, ¶ 7 (2012).     The agency’s assertions of compliance must be
                                                                                       4

     supported by relevant, material, and credible evidence in the form of
     documentation or affidavits. Id.

     The appellant has shown no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the
     agency fulfilled its back pay and reinstatement obligations.
¶7        The appellant continues to argue that the agency denied him back pay in
     accordance with the administrative judge’s order. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 13. As
     stated by the administrative judge, an appellant’s back pay award is predicated
     upon him being ready, willing, and able to work during the back pay period. CID
     at 4-5; see 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(c)(1) (specifying that a back pay award may not
     include any period during which an employee was not ready, willing, and able to
     perform his duties because of an incapacitating illness or injury). The agency
     provided documentation, wherein the appellant admitted that he was not ready,
     willing, and able to work during the period for which back pay was claimed. IAF,
     Tab 10 at 16. The appellant’s own admissions and medical documentation further
     substantiate the agency’s claim. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4, 10; CF, Tab 1 at 9-13.
     Although the appellant alleges that the agency improperly instructed him to sign a
     back pay worksheet that he did not complete, he has not explained how this
     affected his relief. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 7, 13. Therefore, this alleged error is not
     a basis to grant review. See Forte v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 124,
     ¶ 9 (2016) (explaining that an appellant seeking reversal of an adverse action
     based on a procedural error must prove that the error was likely to have caused
     the agency to reach a different conclusion than if there wer e no such error).
     Thus, as the administrative judge correctly found, the appellant was not entitled
     to back pay because he was not ready, willing, and able to work. CID at 5.
¶8        Moreover, the appellant’s challenge to the administrative judge’s finding
     that the agency reinstated him in December 2015 does not provide a basis for
     finding otherwise. CID at 2-4; CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant claims that
     he was not reinstated in December 2015, as he did not resume receiving pay stubs
     until January 9, 2016. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. But, he does not rebut the agency’s
                                                                                            5

     argument and evidence that it cancelled the removal action; contacted him
     multiple times, by letter and telephone in December 2015, ordering him to return
     to duty in his position of record; and returned him to pay status in January 2016. 3
     CF, Tab 1 at 42, Tab 5 at 10-15, 135. Thus, we agree with the administrative
     judge that the agency reinstated the appellant. CID at 2-3; see Mann v. Veterans
     Administration, 29 M.S.P.R. 271, 274-75 (1985) (finding that to be in compliance
     with a Board order to reinstate an employee, an agency generally must return him
     to his former position).      Even if the appellant were not reinstated until he
     received his January 9, 2016 pay stub, he has failed to show that he suffered any
     loss of pay or benefits because he declined to return to work throughout January
     2016. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4, 10; CF, Tab 1 at 9-13.

     The appellant has shown no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the
     agency complied with its obligations as to his leave balances.
¶9         The appellant also continues to assert that the agency wrongfully took
     “152 hours of annual leave,” and that he should not have to buy it back because
     he never used or was paid for that leave. 4 CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2. In response to
     the Clerk’s order, the agency clarified that the terminal leave payment issued to
     the appellant on September 25, 2015, covered the entirety of the annual leave that
     he had earned as of his August 7, 2015 removal, or 368.01 hours. CPFR File,

     3
       On January 28, 2016, the agency issued the appellant a new proposed removal related
     to his failure to return to work in December 2015, as instructed. CF, Tab 1 at 4-8. The
     appellant attached to his compliance petition for review the agency’s June 3, 2016
     decision to rescind this subsequent proposed removal. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 6. He also
     appears to dispute the merits of the subsequent removal. Id. at 7. We need not address
     that matter here. As the administrative judge correctly stated, if the agency effects the
     proposed removal or takes any other chapter 75 adverse action against the appellant, he
     may wish to file a separate Board appeal challenging such action. CID at 4.
     4
       The appellant also alleges that the agency improperly placed him in leave without pay
     status, instead of granting him sick leave, prior to the August 7, 2015 effective date of
     his removal. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2-4. We need not address this claim because the
     Board’s authority to make an aggrieved employee whole under the Back Pay Act
     extends only to the effective date of the reversed adverse action.            Rittgers v.
     Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 8 (2015).
                                                                                        6

      Tab 7 at 6-7.      The appellant was not entitled to the additional 152 hours he
      references because those hours appear to represent advanced annual leave that he
      had not yet earned as of his removal. Id.
¶10            Given that the appellant had been paid out for all 368.01 hours of earned
      annual leave, he was required to reimburse the agency for that leave to have it
      restored. Id. at 7; see O’Connell v. Department of the Navy, 73 M.S.P.R. 235,
      237-40 (1997) (observing that an agency properly offset from an appellant’s back
      pay award the cash value of the leave the agency paid out to him upon separation
      and then recredited on his reinstatement); 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(e)(iv), (g)
      (instructing an agency to deduct lump sum annual leave payments from a back
      pay award and restore the leave to the employee). But, the appellant declined to
      do so. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 2; CID at 5. As such, he had no earned annual leave
      at the time of his separation, and he accrued no additional leave during the back
      pay period because he was not ready, willing, and able to work, as explained
      above. Accordingly, there was no annual leave with which to recredit him.
¶11            In addition, the agency advanced the appellant the correct number of leave
      hours upon his reinstatement, although that balance has decreased as the appellant
      has failed to earn this advanced leave. CPFR File, Tab 7 at 8; CF, Tab 1 at 39,
      41-42. Therefore, we discern no error in the administrative judge’s finding that
      the agency fulfilled its obligations regarding the appellant’s l eave balances.

      The agency has not fully complied with the administrative judge’s order as to the
      appellant’s FERS retirement contributions.
¶12            As argued below, the appellant contends on review that the agency has not
      recredited him with his FERS retirement contributions because his leave and
      earning statements show a balance of zero. CPFR File, Tab 1 at 13-15; CF, Tab 1
      at 33.     In support, he provided the final pay stub that he received before his
      removal, from pay period 20 of 2015, which reflected a FERS retirement
      contribution balance of $3,715.17. CF, Tab 1 at 39. He also submitted pay stubs
      from after his reinstatement, which reflect a FERS retirement contribution
                                                                                        7

      balance of “.00.” Id. at 41-42. The appellant informed the agency that he did not
      receive an annuity payment or voluntarily withdraw his retirement contributions
      during the agency’s processing of his back pay. CF, Tab 10 at 18.
¶13         The agency has not disputed, or otherwise addressed, the appellant’s claims
      as to the restoration of his FERS retirement contributions. CPFR File, Tabs 5, 7;
      CF, Tabs 5, 10-11.      Similarly, the administrative judge did not address this
      allegation in the compliance initial decision. Thus, we find that the agency has
      not complied with the administrative judge’s order. See Gallagher v. Department
      of the Army, 59 M.S.P.R. 379, 384-85 (1993) (finding that the agency’s failure to
      ensure that an appellant’s leave and earning stat ement accurately reflected his
      retirement contributions constituted noncompliance with the back pay award
      provision in a settlement agreement, even though the agency assured the appellant
      and the Board that he had not lost his retirement contributions).
¶14         Because we have found the agency in noncompliance, the agency is being
      directed to file evidence of compliance with the Clerk of the Board , and the
      appellant will be afforded the opportunity to respond to that evidence.        The
      appellant’s petition for enforcement will be referred to the Board’s Office of
      General Counsel, and depending on the nature of the submissions, an attorney
      with the Office of General Counsel may contact the parties to further discuss the
      compliance process. The parties are required to cooperate with that individual in
      good faith. Because the purpose of the proceeding is to obtain compliance, when
      appropriate, an Office of General Counsel attorney or paralegal may engage in ex
      parte communications to, among other things, better understa nd the evidence of
      compliance and/or any objections to that evidence. Thereafter, the Board will
      issue a final decision fully addressing the appellant’s petition for review of the
      compliance initial decision and setting forth the appellant’s further appea l rights
      and the right to attorney fees, if applicable.
                                                                                         8

                                           ORDER
¶15        We ORDER the agency to submit to the Clerk of the Board within 45 days
      of the date of this decision satisfactory evidence of compliance with this decision.
      This evidence shall adhere to the requirements set forth in 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.183(a)(6)(i), including submission of evidence and a narrative statement
      of compliance. The agency’s submission must include proof of the amount of
      FERS retirement contributions it restored to the appellant and how it arrived at
      that figure, including an accounting of any credits or deductions following the
      August 7, 2015 removal action. The agency must also provide evidence that the
      appellant’s leave and earning statements accurately reflect his FERS retirement
      contributions.
¶16        We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s efforts
      to determine the cumulative amount of his FERS retirement contributions and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. The agency must serve all parties with copies of its submission.
¶17        The Board will assign a new docket number to this matter, DE -0752-15-
      0552-X-1. All subsequent filings should refer to the new docket number set forth
      above and should be faxed to (202) 653-7130 or mailed to the following address:
                                     Clerk of the Board
                             U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board
                                    1615 M Street, N.W.
                                  Washington, D.C. 20419

      Submissions may also be made by electronic filing at the MSPB’s e-Appeal site
      (https://e-appeal.mspb.gov) in accordance with the Board’s regulation at 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.14.
¶18        The appellant may respond to the agency’s evidence of com pliance within
      20 days of the date of service of the agency’s submission.                5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.183(a)(8). If the appellant does not respond to the agency’s evidence of
      compliance, the Board may assume that he is satisfied with the agency’s action
      and dismiss the petition for enforcement.
                                                                                        9

¶19        The agency is reminded that, if it fails to provide adequate evidence of
      compliance, the responsible agency official and the agency’s representative may
      be required to appear before the General Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection
      Board to show cause why the Board should not impose sanctions for the agency’s
      noncompliance in this case. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c). The Board’s authority to
      impose sanctions includes the authority to order that the responsible agency
      official “shall not be entitled to receive payment for service as an employee
      during any period that the order has not been complied with.”             5 U.S.C.
      § 1204(e)(2)(A).
¶20        This Order does not constitute a final order and is therefore not subject to
      judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).           Upon final resolution of the
      remaining issues in this petition for enforcement by the Board, a final order shall
      be issued which shall be subject to judicial review.

      FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.