Court Opinion

ID: 9684115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:47:03.022113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.928398
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court was not clearly wrong in finding that an average person, apply*571ing contemporary community standards, would find exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9,11,12, and 13 did not appeal to the prurient interest. The trial court found the above exhibits involved the visual depiction of heterosexual and homosexual cunnilingus, fellatio, masturbation, and anal and vaginal intercourse, “[a]ll, or nearly all, of [which] culminate with the male(s) involved ejaculating, usually on the pubic or facial area of the female(s) involved.”
I recognize that when reviewing a finding concerning “prurient interest,” an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or rewéigh the evidence; an appellate court will substitute its findings for that of the trier of fact only if the appellate court concludes that the trier of fact’s determination is clearly wrong. State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. 829, 593 N.W.2d 299 (1999). However, there are no conflicts in the evidence or any doubt as to the credibility of the essential witnesses in the instant case. The exhibits themselves are the best “witnesses” of their content. See Paris Adult Theatre I. v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 37 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1973). Thus, in determining whether the trier of fact was clearly wrong, the only question is whether an average person applying contemporary community standards could find that these exhibits, taken as a whole, do not appeal to the prurient interest. To decide this question, the trier of fact must look at each exhibit as a whole and determine whether its dominant theme is one which goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in appealing to a shameful or morbid interest in sex. State v. Harrold, supra.
Having reviewed the exhibits at issue, it is my opinion that the trier of facts’ finding in the instant case was clearly wrong. I do not think the clearly wrong standard of review means that “ ‘juries have unbridled discretion in determining’ ” whether certain speech appeals to the prurient interest. State v. Harrold, 256 Neb. at 840, 593 N.W.2d at 310, quoting Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S. Ct. 2750, 41 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1974). As we stated in State v. Harrold, supra, an appellate court must make an independent review of the finder of facts’ determination concerning prurient interest, the issue being whether the materials create an issue of fact as to obscenity. As in any other context, the trier of fact must make a finding that is supported by the evidence.
*572In State v. Harrold, supra, this court held that the trier of facts’ finding that the visual depiction of a man masturbating appealed to the prurient interest was not clearly wrong. In the instant case, the majority again concludes that the findings of “fact” were not clearly wrong, even though the visual depictions of sex at issue herein are, without a doubt, more shameful and morbid than that in Harrold. I think the majority’s holding in the instant case sets the standard so low as to make this court’s appellate review of findings of “fact” in this context meaningless. If the exhibits in the instant case do not go substantially beyond customary limits of candor in appealing to a shameful or morbid interest in sex (prurient interest), I have difficulty imagining what does. It is difficult, in the instant case, to accept a result that renders the graphic depiction of men ejaculating on the faces of women, among other things, as being protected by the First Amendment; and yet State v. Harrold, supra, renders a depiction of male masturbation without ejaculation obscene and not protected by the First Amendment. Finders of “fact” are not given this type of latitude in any other context, and I see no reason to give them such latitude in this one.
I conclude that exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 46 can be found only to appeal to the prurient interest and that the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary was clearly wrong. However, because the trial court made no findings as to whether the above exhibits were patently offensive or, with the exception of exhibits 9 and 46, whether the above exhibits have some serious value, I would remand with directions for the trial court to make such findings.
McCormack, J., joins in this dissent.