Court Opinion

ID: 9755085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:24:24.666782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:02.427647
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by Justice
KELLER.
Although I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, I write separately as to Part IX, in which the majority addresses Appellant’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error when it prevented Appellant from introducing, as “mitigating evidence” in his KRS 532.025 capital sentencing phase, written copies of two (2) previous plea offers extended by the Commonwealth. While I agree with the majority’s bottom-line conclusion that the trial court properly excluded this evidence, I observe that the majority: (1) for the second time — the first being Haight v. Commonwealth1 declines to address squarely whether KRE 408 or KRE 410 excludes such evidence; (2) appears to leave the door open to the possibility that KRE 408 excludes such evidence — a view with which I have previously expressed my disagreement2 — by quoting language from Haight describing the KRE 408 argument as “not without merit or support”;3 (3) strays from this *855Appellant’s allegation of error by addressing whether the failure to admit this evidence violated Appellant’s constitutional rights; and (4) erroneously characterizes the Court’s holding in Clark v. Commonwealth.4, Accordingly, I write separately to explain the reason why I conclude that the trial court properly excluded evidence of the Commonwealth’s plea offers.
The Kentucky General Assembly has designed a constitutionally-adequate capital sentencing procedure that individualizes the capital punishment decision in part by permitting the introduction of “additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment”5 after a defendant is found guilty of a capital offense. In his brief on appeal, Appellant does not cite us to either the federal or state constitution, and instead argues only that he was permitted to introduce the Commonwealth’s plea offer under the procedure set forth in Kentucky’s capital sentencing statute. Previously, I outlined an argument as to the relevance of such evidence6 in the hopes of nudging the Court into addressing this relevancy question. However, now that we have actually reached the issue, I conclude that such evidence is inadmissible in this context because the Commonwealth’s plea offer does not constitute “additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment” under KRS 532.025(l)(a) nor does it relate to any of the statutory mitigating circumstances. Kentucky’s capital sentencing statute contemplates the introduction of evidence concerning the defendant’s character or criminal record and the circumstances surrounding the offense.7 Because the evidence that Appellant wished to introduce pertains to none of those subjects, it is not, in my view, “evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment,” and the trial court thus properly excluded it.

. See Haight v. Commonwealth, Ky., 41 S.W.3d 436 (2001).

. Id. at 449-451 (Keller, J., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing and modifying opinion).

. Majority Opinion, 95 S.W.3d 843, 852 (2003), quoting Haight v. Commonwealth, supra note 1 at 447-8.

. Ky., 833 S.W.2d 793 (1991). Contrary to the majority’s suggestion that, in Clark, "we held that no party may present evidence which would lead the jury to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriate sentence rests elsewhere," Majority Opinion, supra note 3 at 853, the Court actually found reversible error when a prosecutor’s comments during opening and closing statements left the jury with the impression that "the awesome responsibility of determining the appropriateness of death rests elsewhere.” Clark v. Commonwealth, supra at 796 (emphasis added).

. KRS 532.025(l)(a).

. Haight v. Commonwealth, supra note 1 at 451 n. 11 (Keller, J., dissenting from order denying petition for rehearing and modifying opinion).

. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 870 S.W.2d 412, 419 (1994) ("This provision [KRS 532.025] would permit the trial court to submit redeeming evidence to the jury. However, we believe the evidence must contain facts or a qualified opinion bearing on the defendant’s character, prior record or circumstances of the offense, or relative to one of the specified statutory mitigating circumstances.”).