Court Opinion

ID: 9860852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:34:40.216192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:47.064625
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I respectfully submit this separate writing to clarify two points. First, I generally agree that the rationale in Storto, adopted as controlling by the majority (214 Ill. 2d at 387), is sound. I believe, however, that Storto and the majority fall short of a complete explanation of the application of Rule 721. Second, I question the majority’s statement that “it is only individuals — and not corporations — who are granted the privilege to practice law.” 214 Ill. 2d at 387. Taking this second point first, the majority’s statement is belied by the plain language of Rule 721(c), providing as follows: “No corporation or association or limited liability company shall engage in the practice of law in Illinois, or open or maintain an establishment for that purpose in Illinois, without a certificate of registration issued by this court.” (Emphasis added.) 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(c). There is no doubt that only qualified individual attorneys may be licensed and “granted the privilege to practice law” (214 Ill. 2d at 387). 188 Ill. 2d R. 701. In fact, the registration of various corporate entities under Rule 721 is based upon the license of individual shareholders, officers, directors, members, or partners. 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(a). Rule 721 is, thus, merely a registration vehicle to permit licensed attorneys to engage in the practice of law through a registered corporate entity. Upon qualification, this court issues a certificate of registration entitling a registered entity to “engage in the practice of law in Illinois.” 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(a). A plain reading of Rule 721 establishes that a registered corporate entity may engage in the practice of law. I acknowledge, however, that in a practical sense, the registered corporate entity does not and cannot practice law on its own. Rule 721 may need to be amended to clarify its precise intent. Despite the registration requirements of Rule 721, that rule carries no civil or criminal penalties for noncompliance (see Storto, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 337), nor does it provide a remedy for private parties. Nevertheless, an entity’s noncompliance with Rule 721 can be the basis for discipline by this court, including termination or suspension of the entity’s right to practice law or some other discipline. Rule 721(b) provides in pertinent part: “Any violation of this rule by the corporation or association or limited liability company is a ground for the court to terminate or suspend the right of the corporation or association or limited liability company to practice law or otherwise to discipline it.” (Emphases added.) 166 Ill. 2d R. 721(b). In the event of a violation, Rule 721(b) further provides for the potential termination or suspension of the entity’s registration rights or other discipline by this court. This court’s imposition of discipline does not follow automatically from noncompliance with Rule 721, and may be inappropriate in some cases. In my opinion, this is such a case. Even if some discipline were appropriate, Rule 721 should not be interpreted to void a judgment under the circumstances presented in this record. A Rule 721 violation does not include any retroactive or collateral relief. The only consequence of a Rule 721 violation is the potential for discipline by this court. Furthermore, the majority correctly determined that the public was not subjected to risk of harm from the entity’s unregistered practice of law in this case. 214 Ill. 2d at 391. Simply stated, the defendant cannot complain of any prejudice. Moreover, Rule 721 provides no legal basis for the relief sought by defendant. I therefore agree with the majority that the lower courts erred in applying the nullity rule to void the judgment.