Court Opinion

ID: 9463283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:02:23.320089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:00.943612
License: Public Domain

McENTEE, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the result reached by the court and in its reasoning to the extent that it applies the criteria described in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 97 S.Ct. 246, 50 L.Ed.2d 172 (1976).1 That opinion suggested that claims under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention are not to be resolved in terms of a simple location test (where the injury occurred), but rather by application of “a tripartite test based on activity (what the plaintiffs were doing), control (at whose direction) and location.” Id. at 33. I believe that this tripartite test represents a reasonable and flexible basis for analyzing Article 17 cases, because it is consistent both with the terms of the Convention and with the realities of modern air travel. In my opinion, the Second Circuit’s holding concerning the embarkation provision of Article 17 is equally applicable to disembarkation cases:
“We are of the view that the words ‘in the course of any of the operations of embarking’ do not exclude events transpiring within a terminal building. Nor, do these words set forth any strictures on location. Rather, the drafters of the Convention looked to whether the passenger’s actions were a part of the operation or process of embarkation . . .” Id. at 33 (footnote omitted).
Examining the instant claim in the light of this tripartite test, I am persuaded that Air France was no longer in real control of the passengers’ activity when the terroristic attack took place.2 Although, when viewed in terms of the other two factors, this case presents a close question, I believe that the airline’s control was so exiguous or even non-existent that I do not think that Article 17 applies. For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court.

. See also Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 75-1990 (3d Cir., May 4, 1976), petition for rehearing en banc granted, June 3, 1976.

. In my opinion, a terroristic attack should be subjected to the same analysis for Article 17 purposes as any other tortious act. Such an attack is one of the risks of modem air travel, and the airlines would be liable should the attack occur “in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.”