Court Opinion

ID: 9666672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:24:29.096891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:31.813367
License: Public Domain

JONES, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. See my dissenting opinion in Hubbard v. Halstead, 294 Ala. 688, 321 So.2d 169.
When, as here, the new trial order is based on the assigned ground that the verdict is contrary to the great preponderance of the evidence, the common law standard applicable to the presiding judge is that the verdict must be sustained if there is “evidence on both sides or some evidence to support the verdict.” 1 Cobb v. Malone & Collins, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738 (1891).
In this case, the $9,000 verdict was substantially lower than the relief demanded by the appellee, but this fact alone is not a sufficient basis for granting a motion for new trial. The evidence introduced on the desirability of implementing module makers and the evidence that an unusually large amount of rain delayed the crop three weeks were facets which the jury could properly consider in determining what proportion of damage to Davis-Hunt was attributable to Hargrave’s unreasonable delay.
Admittedly, the record reveals that no single witness’s testimony supports a $9,000 verdict. Indeed, the tendencies of the evidence adduced by Davis-Hunt support a $52,810.50 verdict for the plaintiff, while the tendencies of the evidence adduced by Hargrave support a verdict for the defendant — no recovery. The trial Court’s order granting a new trial has the effect of holding that the jury was bound to accept the whole of the contention of one side or the other. I cannot agree.
The jury was free — to be sure, it was obligated — to sift from the whole of the evidence the truth; and, in its effort to find the truth, the jury may accept any *702part and reject any part of any witness’s testimony. This fact finding prerogative was clearly defined in the Court’s oral instructions to the jury. •
Here, the jury found that the truth lay somewhere between the all or nothing contentions of the parties; and, in my opinion, the evidence supports its right to so find.
It is important to remember that it is not the role of the presiding judge to re-examine the facts of each case and decide whether the jury has returned the best of all possible verdicts; his role is only to make sure that the jury has based its verdict on some evidence properly before it.
I would reverse and remand.
FAULKNER, J., concurs.

. The trial Judge did not base his order on the ground discussed in Hubbard v. Halstead, supra, that the verdict was manifestly unjust, and I agree that that ground is not applicable.