Court Opinion

ID: 9942405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 22:16:57.736541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:03.767787
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 DANIELLE LABOUNTY, a single
 individual,                                        No. 84610-8-I

                      Appellant,                    DIVISION ONE

               v.                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 MOUNT BAKER SCHOOL DISTRICT
 NO. 507, a municipal corporation,

                      Respondent.

       CHUNG, J. — Danielle LaBounty sued the Mount Baker School District

(District) for discrimination, retaliation, wrongful discharge, and other claims

arising from her employment at Mount Baker High School. The District failed to

appear, and LaBounty obtained a default judgment against it. The District then

filed a CR 60(b)(1) motion to vacate the default judgment. LaBounty appeals the

court’s order granting the District’s motion to vacate. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                       FACTS

       LaBounty was employed as a paraeducator and softball coach at Mount

Baker High School beginning in 2014 until January 2020. In December 2021, she

filed a Washington State tort claim form alleging claims against the District. The

form was stamped “received” by the District on December 20, 2021.

       In March 2022, LaBounty filed a lawsuit against the District on the same

grounds stated in her tort claim form. She alleged disability discrimination in
No. 84610-8-I/2

violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), 1 retaliation in

violation of the WLAD, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, negligent

supervision, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

        LaBounty’s complaint alleges, in summary, as follows. In 2019, during the

second half of the 2018-19 school year, she was bullied by fellow paraeducator

Cheryl Kirkley and assaulted by a student. Despite her reporting these events to

her supervisor, Roger Goodwin, and a teacher, Emily Shpak, no safety plan was

created for her. Her 2018-19 performance evaluation conducted by Mount Baker

High School principal Matt Durand included what LaBounty called “retaliatory low

ratings,” and she refused to sign it. 2

        LaBounty’s complaint further alleges that she suffered a nonwork-related

ankle injury in August that kept her out of work in August and September 2019,

for which she sent the District a doctor’s note. In October, in response to a

request for a status update on her ankle, LaBounty said she could return to work

but did not have a release from her doctor. After several communications from

the District seeking a doctor’s note and discussing scheduling meetings with

District Superintendent Mary Sewright and the union, LaBounty e-mailed a letter

from a different doctor who was treating her for ADHD, anxiety, and depression,

        1 Ch. 49.60 RCW
        2 Durand’s evaluation concludes that “Ms. LaBounty is an asset to our campus and I look

forward to having her back next year.” Across 12 categories, Durand rated LaBounty “Meets
Expectations” 33 times, “Area for Growth” zero times, and “Does Not Meet Expectations” four
times. Under “Goal Areas for Next Year,” there is a note that “Ms. LaBounty is working on her
communication with her colleagues and timeliness to her job assignments, there ha[ve] been
improvements in this area.”

                                                2
No. 84610-8-I/3

recommending that she take additional time off. LaBounty alleges that the District

failed to begin a Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) or interactive accommodation

process. According to LaBounty, the District demanded meetings, sent her letters

documenting her absence from work, suspended her, put her on a plan of

improvement, retroactively terminated her benefits, and ultimately terminated her.

        On March 28, 2022, LaBounty served her summons and complaint on

Sewright, who sent it to the District’s counsel that same day. In June 2022,

LaBounty moved for default because the District had not appeared and

answered. A court commissioner granted LaBounty an order of default, and ten

days later LaBounty moved for an order of default judgment. Her motion was

supported by her declaration, her tort claim form, annual performance reviews,

her doctor’s note, and other exhibits. The court granted the motion on June 13.

The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and awarded LaBounty

$853,855.74, plus statutory fees and costs.

        In July 2022, LaBounty’s counsel delivered the court’s default judgment,

findings of fact, and judgment summary to Sewright. 3 After Sewright received the

court’s default judgment from LaBounty, the District filed its appearance on July

15, and on July 25, moved to vacate the court’s orders of default, default

judgment, and its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Its motion included a

declaration from its counsel explaining counsel “misunderstood” her legal

       3 The parties dispute whether this occurred on Tuesday, July 12, or Thursday, July 14.

The document is dated July 12, but it is stamped “received” July 14.

                                               3
No. 84610-8-I/4

assistant’s email that stated “NOA is done” to mean counsel’s notice of

appearance had been filed, when in fact the legal assistant meant the notice of

appearance was ready to be signed by counsel and filed. In her declaration, the

District’s counsel “accept[ed] full responsibility for the mistake.” The District’s

motion also included a declaration from Superintendent Sewright attaching 23

exhibits supporting its defense against LaBounty’s claims.

        On September 14, 2022, the court granted the District’s motion to vacate

the default judgment. It found the District “has presented substantial evidence of,

at a minimum, a prima facie defense to the claims alleged by Plaintiff Danielle

LaBounty.” 4 It also found the District’s failure to timely appear or answer “was

occasioned by a mistake of Defendant’s legal counsel.” It found the District

“acted diligently to address” the default judgment, and it found that any hardship

to LaBounty “can be addressed by authorizing the imposition of fees and costs

as sanctions” against the District. At the beginning of the next week, on

September 19, the District filed an answer to LaBounty’s complaint.

        LaBounty appeals the court’s order granting the District’s motion to vacate

the default judgment.

                                          DISCUSSION

        CR 60(b)(1) allows a court “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just”

to grant a moving party relief from an order due to a party’s “[m]istakes,

         4 The order states that it is entering “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” but does not

distinguish or label these categories separately.

                                                   4
No. 84610-8-I/5

inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining a judgment

or order.” A motion to vacate “shall” be “supported by the affidavit of the

applicant . . . setting forth a concise statement of the facts . . . upon which the

motion is based, and if the moving party be a defendant, the facts constituting a

defense to the action or proceeding.” CR 60(e)(1).

       Default judgments are “not favor[ed]” because we “prefer to give parties

their day in court and have controversies determined on their merits.” Morin v.

Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 754, 161 P.3d 956 (2007). “Balanced against that

principle is the necessity of having a responsive and responsible system which

mandates compliance with judicial summons.” Griggs v. Averbeck Realty, Inc.,

92 Wn.2d 576, 581, 599 P.2d 1289 (1979). Proceedings to vacate a default

judgment are equitable in character, and relief should be “afforded in accordance

with equitable principles.” Id. “The trial court should exercise its authority

‘liberally, as well as equitably, to the end that substantial rights be preserved and

justice between the parties be fairly and judiciously done.’ ” Id. at 582 (quoting

White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 351, 438 P.2d 584 (1968)).

       Courts take into consideration four factors in determining whether to

vacate a default judgment:

       (1) That there is substantial evidence extant to support, at least
       prima facie, a defense to the claim asserted by the opposing party;
       (2) that the moving party’s failure to timely appear in the action, and
       answer the opponent’s claim, was occasioned by mistake,
       inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
       (3) that the moving party acted with due diligence after notice of
       entry of the default judgment; and
       (4) that no substantial hardship will result to the opposing party.

                                           5
No. 84610-8-I/6

White, 73 Wn.2d at 352. The four White factors are “not equally weighted.”

Shepard Ambulance, Inc. v. Helsell, Fetterman, Martin, Todd & Hokanson, 95

Wn. App. 231, 238, 974 P.2d 1275 (1999). Where the moving party is able to

demonstrate a “strong or virtually conclusive defense” to a claim, “scant time” will

be spent inquiring into the reasons for the entry of default. White, 73 Wn.2d at

352. On the other hand, where the moving party is able to properly demonstrate

at least a prima facie defense, the reasons for failing to timely appear in the

action before the default “will be scrutinized with greater care.” Id. at 353.

       We review a court’s decision regarding a motion to vacate for abuse of

discretion. Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 582. “A trial court abuses its discretion if its

decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable

reasons.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362

(1997). “Our primary concern in reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to

vacate is whether that decision is just and equitable.” TMT Bear Creek Shopping

Ctr., Inc. v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 191, 200, 165 P.3d 1271

(2007). “ ‘Justice is not done if hurried defaults are allowed, but neither is it done

if continuing delays are permitted.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Cash Store, 116 Wn.

App. 833, 841, 68 P.3d 1099 (2003)).

                                          6
No. 84610-8-I/7

       I.     Evidence of a defense

       As an initial matter, LaBounty contends “the trial court found that only a

minimum prima facie defense was presented” by the District. This is a

mischaracterization of the court’s order, which states the District “has presented

substantial evidence of, at a minimum a prima facie defense to the claims alleged

by . . . LaBounty.” Clerk’s Papers 371 (emphasis added). The distinction matters

because where a party’s defenses are “ ‘strong or virtually conclusive . . . scant

time will be spent inquiring into the reasons which occasioned entry of the

default.’ ” Shepard Ambulance, 95 Wn. App. at 239 (quoting White, 73 Wn.2d at

352). But the District does not claim its defenses are so “strong or virtually

conclusive” that we should pay only “scant time” or attention to the reason for its

failure to appear. We need review only whether the court properly granted the

CR 60 motion based on consideration of each of the White factors, including

whether the District established the existence of, “at least prima facie, a defense”

to LaBounty’s claims. White, 73 Wn.2d at 352.

       LaBounty also suggests that because the District “provides nearly no

response or opposition” to the trial court’s findings of fact numbers 1-13, those

findings “should be deemed as admitted” on appeal. In her reply brief, LaBounty

similarly argues the District did not “counter” her declaration, “challenge[ ]” the

court’s findings of fact, or “answer” her complaint. But the trial court’s findings of

fact and conclusions of law support its order of default judgment—the same

default judgment that the court subsequently vacated by granting the District’s

                                           7
No. 84610-8-I/8

CR 60 motion. LaBounty’s suggestion that these factual findings from a vacated

order should be admitted is unavailing. 5

        To the extent LaBounty suggests the District cannot satisfy its burden

under CR 60 because she has provided contradicting evidence, this

misconstrues the relevant standard. 6 The court “does not act as a trier of fact

when considering a CR 60 motion,” and it “must take the evidence and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the CR 60 movant when

deciding whether the movant has presented ‘substantial evidence’ of a ‘prima

facie’ defense.” Pfaff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 Wn. App. 829, 834,

14 P.3d 837 (2000). 7 A defendant moving to vacate a default judgment against it

“satisfies its burden of demonstrating the existence of a prima facie defense if it

is able to produce evidence which, if later believed by the trier of fact, would

constitute a defense to the claims presented.” TMT, 140 Wn. App. at 202 (citing

Pfaff, 103 Wn. App. at 835-36) (emphasis added).

        5 Moreover, in support of its CR 60 motion, the District was not required to file an answer

to the complaint with denials of its allegations. Rather, CR 60 required it, as the defendant, to set
forth “the facts constituting a defense” to LaBounty’s claims. Pfaff v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 103 Wn. App. 829, 834, 14 P.3d 837 (2000).
          6 The court in Pfaff addressed a similar argument that the trial court erred by not finding

that her “facts and inferences were stronger than [the CR 60 movant], and by not concluding from
such a finding that [the movant] did not have a ‘defense.’ ” 103 Wn. App. at 835. Pfaff argued that
the facts favorable to her, rather those favorable to the defendant, were “material” facts that the
court should have considered because the court was the trier of fact who weighs and balances
the evidence. The court “reject[ed] this view of the trial court’s function on a CR 60 motion.” Id.
          7 In contrast, “neither Pfaff nor any subsequent decision holds that the trial court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when determining whether the
defendant is able to demonstrate the existence of a strong or virtually conclusive defense to the
plaintiff’s claims.” TMT, 140 Wn. App. at 203. In the present case, the trial court did not make a
specific determination that the District’s evidence was “strong or virtually conclusive.”

                                                 8
No. 84610-8-I/9

       Likewise, LaBounty’s hearsay challenges to certain evidence provided by

the District are unavailing. CR 60(e)(1) requires only that a motion be “supported

by the affidavit of the applicant or the applicant’s attorney setting forth a concise

statement of the facts or errors upon which the motion is based, and if the

moving party be a defendant, the facts constituting a defense to the action or

proceeding.” Thus, a CR 60(b) movant may rely on an affidavit “to proffer

evidence which, if proved, would entitle that defendant to relief,” as “the purpose

of requiring the defendant to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie defense

is simply to avoid a useless subsequent trial.” TMT, 140 Wn. App. at 204 (citing

Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 583). The defendant must set out concrete facts and cannot

merely state allegations. Ha v. Signal Elec., Inc., 182 Wn. App. 436, 449, 332

P.3d 991 (2014). Here, the District supported its motion with the affidavits of its

attorney and Superintendent Sewright, along with attachments, and the trial court

could consider these documents in determining whether to exercise its discretion

to grant the CR 60(b) motion.

       With these standards in mind, we review the trial court’s order and the

District’s affidavits supporting its defense to each of LaBounty’s claims in turn.

              A. Failure to accommodate

       LaBounty’s complaint alleges the District refused to participate in an

interactive accommodation process. The WLAD, RCW 49.60.180(3), requires an

employer to “ ‘take steps reasonably necessary to accommodate an employee’s

disability.’ ” Gamble v. City of Seattle, 6 Wn. App. 2d 883, 888, 431 P.3d 1091

                                          9
No. 84610-8-I/10

(2018) (quoting Johnson v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 18, 27, 244 P.3d

438 (2010)).

       “The WLAD envisions an exchange between the employer and the

employee to ensure that the employee’s needs are properly addressed.” Gamble,

6 Wn. App. 2d at 892 (citing Goodman v. Boeing Co., 127 Wn.2d 401, 408, 899

P.2d 1265 (1995) (“Reasonable accommodation thus envisions an exchange

between employer and employee where each seeks and shares information”)).

“The employee therefore has a duty to communicate to the employer whether the

accommodation was effective.” Gamble, 6 Wn. App. 2d at 891 (quoting Frisino v.

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 160 Wn. App. 765, 783, 249 P.3d 1044 (2011)).

       The District argues in defense to her accommodation claim that LaBounty

“refused to be candid” about her condition, “refused to engage in the interactive

process,” never had her doctor complete a medical questionnaire it requested,

and denied it the opportunity to talk with her doctor. In support, the District

presented evidence that LaBounty was not at work when the 2019-20 school

year started on August 29. The next week, LaBounty told the District that she

broke her ankle over the weekend and would be out at least two weeks. While

LaBounty’s accident on August 31 did not explain why she missed work on

August 29, after LaBounty informed the District of her injury, Sewright emailed

LaBounty to ask her for a doctor’s note for the absence and a doctor’s release for

her to come back to work.

                                          10
No. 84610-8-I/11

       The District presented evidence that on September 20, 2019, Sewright

sent LaBounty a letter asking to “establish clear understanding,” “with

documentation from your physician,” about her “ability to return to work without

limitations or your need for further time off to recover.” After a meeting on

September 30, Sewright sent LaBounty a letter on October 7 suspending her for

two days because at the meeting LaBounty “admitted that [she] chose not to

show up for work.”

       On the same day, October 7, Sewright sent LaBounty another letter

placing her on a “Plan of Improvement” regarding “Attendance and Punctuality,”

“Time Management,” and “Human Relations and Work Attitude.” Sewright’s email

that attached these letters communicated to LaBounty that she was to “start work

on Monday, October 14.”

       On Sunday, October 13, LaBounty told the District that she was “free to

take my boot off now and return to work,” but that she “forgot to get my release

for work,” so she would need “to put in for a sub in the morning.” On Wednesday,

October 16, LaBounty told the District she was “not released for full duty from my

doctor.” The District asked LaBounty for “a current doctor’s note stating your

status as your last letter is now expired.” Sewright invited LaBounty to a meeting

that day, October 16, but LaBounty answered that “[s]ince I’m not released for full

duty from my doctor, the meeting will have to be rescheduled.”

       On October 21, Sewright sent LaBounty a letter noting LaBounty had

“failed to abide by the directives in my October 7 letter,” directing her to “attend a

                                          11
No. 84610-8-I/12

meeting with me this week to explain your actions and to discuss the Plan of

Improvement,” and to “provide the appropriate documentation from your doctor

as soon as possible.” Sewright warned LaBounty that “[i]f you fail to abide by

these directives, you will be subject to further discipline, up to and including

discharge from employment.”

       On November 12, Sewright sent LaBounty an email asking if she was

requesting more unpaid leave or if she was “requesting a reasonable

accommodation for a disability under the ADA.” If the latter, Sewright attached a

questionnaire to be completed by LaBounty’s doctor in order to “begin the

interactive process.” LaBounty did not reply. On November 21, Sewright sent

LaBounty a letter explaining that she “will be recommending the termination of

your employment” because “[y]ou have missed all of the 2019-2020 school year

to date.” On November 26, Sewright asked LaBounty’s counsel whether “Ms.

LaBounty is seeking a reasonable accommodation.”

       Thus, the District presented evidence that it attempted to determine

whether LaBounty was seeking an accommodation, but she did not request any

specific accommodation other than time off, nor did she communicate with the

District about her medical status to advance the interactive process. We

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the District

satisfied its burden to establish the existence of a prima facie defense to

LaBounty’s claim of failure to accommodate.

                                         12
No. 84610-8-I/13

              B. Retaliation

       LaBounty’s complaint alleges the District retaliated against her for

engaging in protected activity. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under RCW 49.60.210(1), a plaintiff must show that (1) he or she engaged in

statutorily protected activity, (2) he or she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) there was a causal link between his or her activity and the other

person’s adverse action.” Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 182 Wn. App. 733,

742, 332 P.3d 1006 (2014). The first element describes opposition to “any

practices forbidden by” chapter 49.60 RCW. Id. at 742-43 (quoting RCW

49.60.210(1)). When a person reasonably believes she is opposing

discriminatory practices, RCW 49.60.210(1) protects that person whether or not

the practice is actually discriminatory. Id. at 743 (citing Ellis v. City of Seattle, 142

Wn.2d 450, 461, 13 P.3d 1065 (2000)).

       LaBounty argued that her concern for her safety, her attempts to involve

her union representative, and her attempts to request an accommodation for her

medical conditions were all protected activities. She argues that her poor

performance review, the District’s increased scrutiny, or “bird-dogging,” and her

termination were all adverse employment actions. And she argues causation can

be proved by the close proximity in time of the District’s adverse actions to her

protected activities.

       In defense, the District argues that LaBounty did not identify any

opposition to activity forbidden by RCW 49.60—in other words, that she did not

                                           13
No. 84610-8-I/14

engage in any protected activity. The District points out that while LaBounty

complained about coworkers and about feeling disrespected by a student, she

never alleged she was subjected to a hostile workplace based on her disability or

otherwise, and that these complaints are not activities that could form the basis

for a retaliation claim. Additionally, the District contends that LaBounty

“disengaged from the interactive accommodation process” by failing to

communicate with the District about her condition or possible reasonable

accommodations.

       The District also argued in defense that LaBounty did not suffer an

adverse employment action because she “never showed up for a single day of

work in the 2019-2020 school year” and she “abandoned her job altogether.” If

LaBounty abandoned her job, then Sewright’s recommending her termination

could not be an adverse employment action.

       Finally, the District argues in defense that to the extent the alleged

protected activity was her retention of counsel regarding her claims, LaBounty

cannot prove the element of causation. On November 21, 2019, Sewright sent

LaBounty a letter advising that Sewright was recommending LaBounty’s

termination to the District’s board. The next day, November 22, Sewright

received an email from the office of LaBounty’s counsel. Attached to the email

was a letter LaBounty’s counsel wrote to Sewright informing her that LaBounty

had retained counsel to represent her regarding harassment, bullying, and

retaliation claims arising out of her employment. That attached letter is dated

                                         14
No. 84610-8-I/15

November 14, before Sewright recommended terminating LaBounty. However,

the District presented evidence that this letter was sent to the wrong email

address, so Sewright did not receive it until after she recommended termination. 8

        LaBounty’s overarching argument is that her evidence is stronger:

“LaBounty put forth detailed facts based on firsthand knowledge – the District did

not.” But this is not, as discussed above, the standard when the court is deciding

a motion to vacate. The court acted within its discretion in determining that the

District met its burden to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie defense to

LaBounty’s retaliation claim.

                C. Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy

        LaBounty’s complaint alleges her termination by the District was in

violation of public policy. Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy is a

narrow exception to the doctrine of employment at will. Martin v. Gonzaga Univ.,

191 Wn.2d 712, 723, 425 P.3d 837 (2018). To prevail, “a plaintiff employee must

demonstrate that . . . her ‘discharge may have been motivated by reasons that

contravene a clear mandate of public policy.’ ” Id. (quoting Thompson v. St.

Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984)). “[T]he public-

policy-linked conduct” must have been “a significant factor in the decision to

discharge the worker.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 12 Wn. App. 2d 557,

        8 LaBounty’s counsel’s letter dated November 14 says it was delivered “VIA EMAIL

ONLY” to “msewright@mtbaker.wed.net.edu.” On November 26, Sewright replied to LaBounty’s
counsel, asking, “What report of ‘harassing conduct and safety issues’ do you believe to be the
basis for such claims?” Her letter also states: “My email address is
msewright@mtbaker.wednet.edu, not msewright@mtbaker.wed.net.edu (emphasis added).”

                                               15
No. 84610-8-I/16

578, 459 P.3d 371 (2020) (citing Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 723). If so, “ ‘the burden

shifts to the employer to prove that the dismissal was for reasons other than

those alleged by the employee.’ ” Martin, 191 Wn.2d at 723 (quoting Thompson,

102 Wn.2d at 232-33).

       In defense, the District’s motion to vacate argued that LaBounty’s wrongful

termination claim failed for the same reasons given above regarding failure to

accommodate and retaliation. On appeal, the District argues specifically that

“LaBounty abandoned her job,” pointing to a letter from Sewright to LaBounty

purporting to show that LaBounty failed to attend staff development days and

“the first day of school,” and “never showed up for a single day of work in the

2019-2020 school year.”

       In her opening brief, LaBounty acknowledges that on appeal and below,

her briefing’s “focus is on retaliation.” As to the other issues, the “lack of

reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration.” Palmer v.

Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413 (1996). Consequently, we conclude

that the court did not abuse its discretion when it found the District met its burden

to demonstrate the existence of a prima facie defense to LaBounty’s wrongful

discharge claim.

              D. Negligent supervision, defamation, and outrage

       LaBounty’s complaint raises additional claims, including that the District

negligently supervised her colleague Kirkley, her supervisor Goodwin, Principal

Durand, and Superintendent Sewright. She also alleges that the District’s annual

                                          16
No. 84610-8-I/17

review of her constituted defamation, and that the District engaged in intentional

infliction of emotional distress. In defense, the District argued that LaBounty’s

complaint does not contain sufficiently specific allegations regarding any of these

claims.

       First, LaBounty’s complaint does not allege that any of its employees

acted outside the scope of their employment, as is required for a negligent

supervision claim, but only that the District “knew or should have known [its

employees] acted in a discriminatory and/or retaliatory manner towards

[LaBounty] when addressing allegations” she made. Clerk’s Papers 16

(emphasis added). 9

       Second, regarding LaBounty’s defamation claim, the District notes that

she does not identify with specificity any particular statement, and it points to

evidence the performance evaluation was not false, including Sewright’s

declaration and attached exhibits that establish LaBounty was not present at her

assigned class during the 2018-19 school year on numerous occasions. 10

       Finally, in defense to LaBounty’s claim of outrage, the District argues that

an employer does not owe a duty to provide its employees with a stress-free

work environment, citing Bishop v. State, 77 Wn. App. 228, 234-35, 889 P.2d 959

       9 “In Washington, a cause of action for negligent supervision requires a plaintiff to show

that an employee acted outside the scope of his or her employment.” LaPlant v. Snohomish
County, 162 Wn. App. 476, 479, 271 P.3d 254 (2011).
         10 Proof of defamation requires a showing of (1) falsity, (2) an unprivileged

communication, (3) fault, and (4) damages. Clardy v. Cowles Pub. Co., 81 Wn. App. 53, 57, 912
P.2d 1078 (1996) (citing LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 197, 770 P.2d 1027, cert. denied, 493
U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 61, 107 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1989)) (other citation omitted).

                                               17
No. 84610-8-I/18

(1995). The District argues the evidence “belie[s]” any allegation of outrageous

behavior on its part because it shows Sewright believed LaBounty had resolved

the issue with her colleague Kirkley, gave the student at issue a new supervision

plan, and attempted to learn LaBounty’s medical condition and needs for an

accommodation. 11

        LaBounty did not provide specific argument addressing the District’s

defenses to these claims, instead stating that her briefing’s “focus is on

retaliation.” Therefore, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined the District satisfied its burden of showing the existence of a

prima facie defense to these claims.

        II.     Mistake or excusable neglect

        The trial court ruled the District’s failure to timely appear or file an answer

“was occasioned by a mistake of Defendant’s legal counsel for failing to promptly

file a notice of appearance.” LaBounty argues that the District’s counsel’s

“internal office failure” is not excusable neglect. The District argues the court did

not abuse its discretion by finding its counsel’s mistake caused its failure to

timely appear or answer. We agree with the District.

        11 The claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, or outrage, requires emotional

distress that is inflicted “intentionally or recklessly; mere negligence is not enough,” and the
conduct “must be outrageous and extreme.” Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wn.2d 52, 59, 530 P.2d 291
(1975). “Liability exists ‘only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).

                                                 18
No. 84610-8-I/19

       “[I]f a company’s failure to respond to a properly served summons and

complaint was due to a breakdown of internal office procedure, the failure was

not excusable.” TMT, 140 Wn. App. at 212. For example, in TMT, the plaintiff

served process on a legal assistant in the company’s general counsel’s office,

but the legal assistant failed to calendar the information or notify the general

counsel. Id. at 213. Then, the legal assistant was away from work for several

weeks due to vacation and an injury; temporary workers also failed to calendar

the information. Id. We reasoned that the legal assistant’s failure to calendar the

deadline, the subsequent failure to ensure the temporary workers were trained to

do so, and the failure to institute other procedures to inform the general counsel

of the lawsuit constituted “a breakdown in internal office management and

procedure” and was, therefore, inexcusable neglect. Id. See also Johnson, 116

Wn. App. at 848 (inexcusable neglect where summons and complaint served on

store manager, who thought documents were irrelevant to store’s business and

provided no explanation for failing to inform company’s administration or legal

counsel that she received them); Prest v. Am. Bankers Life Assur. Co., 79 Wn.

App. 93, 100, 900 P.2d 595 (1995) (finding inexcusable neglect when summons

and complaint were forwarded to person designated to receive process, but that

person had been reassigned and was out of town, and the file was “mislaid” and

not forwarded to the proper person in time). In these examples of inexcusable

neglect, the party was served properly, but the party’s internal office procedures

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No. 84610-8-I/20

broke down, resulting in the proper person not receiving notice of the lawsuit,

which then caused the party’s failure to appear and respond to the complaint.

        By contrast, a mistake is different from inexcusable neglect; a mistake

“results from a misunderstanding.” Ha, 182 Wn. App. at 451. For example, where

an insured party was properly served and tendered a defense of claim to its

insurer, but the claims manager sent the wrong case file to the law firm, the

reason for failing to appear was held to be a mistake. Berger v. Dishman Dodge,

Inc., 50 Wn. App. 309, 311, 748 P.2d 241 (1987). The court held the defendant

“had no reason to believe that [its] interests were not being protected after

promptly forwarding the documents to the insurer.” Id. at 312. 12

        Likewise, in Ha, the failure to appear was due to a mistake. 182 Wn. App.

at 454. 13 There, the plaintiff sued a company that was in bankruptcy and asked

the independent bankruptcy attorney to accept service of process. Id. at 443. The

company’s bankruptcy attorney accepted process, then forwarded the

documents to the company’s financial advisor, who forwarded them to the wrong

insurance company. Id. at 444. Because the company’s bankruptcy attorney was

not the company’s general counsel and neither he nor the company’s financial

         12 The Berger court’s analysis accounted for the principle that, in the insurance context,

the acts or omissions of an insurer can be imputed to its insured. 50 Wn. App. at 312.
Nonetheless, because the dealership had no reason to believe its interests were not being
protected, because it quickly moved to vacate, and because it explained the mistake at issue, the
court affirmed the vacation of the default judgment. See Akhavuz v. Moody, 178 Wn. App. 526,
537, 315 P.3d 572 (2013) (discussing Berger).
         13 The trial court had not specified whether it vacated for lack of personal jurisdiction, for

mistake or excusable neglect under CR 60(b)(1), or for manifest injustice under CR 60(b)(11), all
of which were claimed by the company’s motion. Id. at 441.

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advisor were office employees, “their mistakes were not a breakdown of internal

procedure, and so the rule of TMT does not apply here.” Id. at 451. The court

also noted that “[t]hese facts demonstrate that [the company]’s failure to respond

was not deliberate or even neglectful.” Id. at 452. 14

        Showalter v. Wild Oats likewise illustrates a mistake, rather than neglect.

124 Wn. App. 506, 101 P.3d 867 (2004). There, after the defendant company

was properly served, a paralegal asked a safety and risk manager to give the

summons and complaint to the company’s internal claims administrator, who

would then notify the outside claims administrator, who would then hire defense

counsel. Id. at 514. The safety and risk manager misunderstood the paralegal’s

request, as it was contrary to customary business practice, and did not forward

the notice; as a result, the company did not timely answer. Id. We reasoned that

the company “did not intentionally fail to respond,” and that “the circumstances

surrounding the misunderstanding between [the company’s] staff are more akin

to a mistake than inexcusable neglect.” Id. at 514-15.

        The present case does not involve a breakdown of the defendant party’s

office procedure, but instead is more like the cases involving mistakes. After

         14 The Ha court addressed the concept that an attorney’s acts are binding on the client,

distinguishing the case of Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wn.2d 539, 547, 573 P.2d 1302 (1978), which
involved a consent judgment. See Ha, 182 Wn. App. at 452-53. There are different “equities at
play in consent judgments . . . versus default judgments.” Id. at 453. “[C]onsent judgments may
not be set aside for excusable neglect—only for fraud or mutual mistake.” Id. With respect to
default judgments, “ ‘[w]hat is just and proper must be determined by the facts of each case, not
by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situations regardless of the outcome.’ ” Id. (quoting
Akhavuz, 178 Wn. App. at 534-35). Thus, the fact that in the present case it was the District’s
counsel rather than the District whose mistake caused the failure to appear is not dispositive.

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No. 84610-8-I/22

Superintendent Sewright received LaBounty’s summons and complaint on behalf

of the District, she promptly forwarded it to the District’s counsel that same day.

Like the defendant in Berger, the District had no reason to believe its interests

were not being protected after it promptly forwarded the documents to its

attorney. The failure to appear was not due to the party’s failure to inform counsel

of the lawsuit, but because counsel “misunderstood” her legal assistant’s email

stating “NOA is done” to mean counsel’s notice of appearance had been filed.

Thus, the District’s failure to appear was based on counsel’s mistaken belief that

her assistant had completed the filing, not any intention by the defendant to fail to

respond, similar to Showalter. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

determining the cause of the failure to appear was a mistake by District’s

counsel.

       III.   Due diligence

       What constitutes a “reasonable time” to move to vacate a default judgment

that satisfies the due diligence requirement depends on the facts and

circumstances of each case. Luckett v. Boeing Co., 98 Wn. App. 307, 312, 989

P.2d 1144 (1999). “The critical period is between when the moving party became

aware of the judgment and when it filed the motion to vacate.” Ha, 182 Wn. App.

at 454. Three months has been held not to be a reasonable time to respond. Id.

(citing Gutz v. Johnson, 128 Wn. App. 901, 919, 117 P.3d 390 (2005), aff’d by

Morin, 160 Wn.2d at 758). But entering an appearance just over a month after

receiving notice of default judgment and moving to vacate within two and a half

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months of receiving notice has been held sufficient to demonstrate diligence. Id.

at 454-55.

        Here, the trial court found that the District, through its counsel, “acted

diligently to address the June 13 default judgment.” After LaBounty obtained

default judgment on June 13, she hand-delivered it to Sewright on either July 12

or 14. Counsel for the District filed a notice of appearance that same week, on

July 15. Then, the District moved to vacate the court’s orders of default, default

judgment, and findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 25, at most 13 days

after it learned about the court’s order of default judgment.

        LaBounty contends that “the District did not act with due diligence with

regard to pursuing its motion to vacate” and by failing to file an answer. As for its

answer, the District had no obligation to file an answer before the court vacated

LaBounty’s default judgment. 15

        At oral argument below, LaBounty argued that under CR 60, the District

was supposed to move the court for an order to show cause. Not doing so does

not show a material lack of diligence on the District’s part, because the District

         15 LaBounty seizes on the words “and answer” in the second White factor to argue the

District did not act with due diligence because it did not answer her complaint when it moved to
vacate. LaBounty misunderstands the White factors and CR 60. The second White factor pertains
to whether “the moving party’s failure to timely appear in the action, and answer the opponent’s
claim, was occasioned by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” 73 Wn.2d at
352. It does not pertain to due diligence, which is the third White factor: “that the moving party
acted with due diligence after notice of entry of the default judgment.” Id. Nor does CR 60 require
an answer. See CR 60. Regardless, once the court granted the District’s motion to vacate on
September 14, reinstating the action, the District answered LaBounty’s complaint five days later
on September 19.

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served its motion on LaBounty and re-noted the motion hearing for a week later

to ensure she had notice. And LaBounty waived any resulting procedural error.

       We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by deciding the District

acted diligently in filing a notice of appearance the same week it learned the

court had entered default judgment against it and by filing a motion to vacate at

most 13 days after it learned about the default judgment.

       IV.    Deprivation of finality as prejudice

       LaBounty argues the court’s order granting the District’s motion to vacate

is a hardship that “deprive[d her] of finality,” and that the hardship “should be

borne by the District and their counsel due to their admitted negligence in saying

‘I accept full responsibility.’ ” However, “the prospect of trial cannot constitute,

without more, ‘substantial hardship’ within the meaning of White’s fourth factor.”

Pfaff, 103 Wn. App. at 836. Here, the court imposed costs and fees against the

District for “[a]ny hardship” LaBounty suffered from the District’s failure to timely

appear and answer. The court did not abuse its discretion in its consideration of

the fourth White factor.

       White “is not a mechanical test [and] whether or not a default judgment

should be set aside is a matter of equity.” Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 704, 161

P.3d 345 (2007). But “ ‘whether or not justice is being done’ ” is the “fundamental

principle” when balancing finality against determining disputes “ ‘on the merits

rather than by default.’ ” Id. at 703 (quoting Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 581-82). It is for

this reason that “we will liberally set aside default judgments . . . for equitable

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reasons in the interests of fairness and justice.” Morin, 160 Wn.2d at 749.

Particularly when, as here, the party seeking to vacate the default has presented

a thorough defense on the merits, “[w]e prefer to give parties their day in court

and have controversies determined on their merits.” Id. at 754.

        We affirm the court’s order granting the District’s motion to vacate the

default judgment.

        V.      Costs and fees

        An appellant who substantially prevails on review is entitled to costs. RAP

14.2; RAP 14.1(d). An appellant may recover reasonable attorney fees if

applicable law grants that right and they devote a section of their opening brief to

the request. RAP 18.1(a), (b). 16

        LaBounty does not prevail on appeal, and whether she will prevail below

on any claims providing a right to fees remains to be determined. Accordingly, we

deny her request for costs and fees.

        Affirmed.

        16 In her opening brief, LaBounty requested costs and fees if she prevailed on appeal

because she was awarded costs and fees by the court’s default judgment and its order vacating
default judgment. The District contends LaBounty did not satisfy RAP 18.1(a). In her reply brief,
LaBounty added “RCW 49.60 et seq[.]” as an additional basis for costs and fees.

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No. 84610-8-I/26

WE CONCUR:

                   26