Court Opinion

ID: 9896102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 16:04:34.871035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:59.959970
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                            )
                                              )
         v.                                   )      ID # 1507018423A & B
                                              )
GARY PERKINS,                                 )
                                              )
                 Defendant.                   )

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                 Submitted: August 15, 20231
                                 Decided: November 8, 2023

      Upon Consideration of the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation on
                   Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                                   ADOPTED

          Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                                     DENIED

              Upon Consideration of Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw,
                                     GRANTED

       Upon Consideration of Defendant’s Motion to Substitute Rule 61 Counsel,
                               DENIED AS MOOT

Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, and Kimberly A. Price, Esquire, Collins & Associates,
Wilmington, Delaware, Postconviction Counsel for Defendant Gary Perkins

Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire, Greto Law, 715 N. Tatnall St., Wilmington,
Delaware, Trial Counsel for Defendant Gary Perkins

JURDEN, P.J.

1
    The matter was reassigned by the President Judge to herself on August 15, 2023.
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.     INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................1
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................2
   A. The Evidence Presented at Trial ......................................................................3
       i.      The 911 call ................................................................................................3
       ii.     Video evidence ............................................................................................4
       iii.    Corporal Vice’s observations .....................................................................5
       iv.     DNA, forensic, and blood spatter evidence ................................................6
       v.      Perkins’ statements to police ......................................................................7
       vi.     Underwood’s interview testimony ..............................................................8
       vii. Underwood’s trial testimony ......................................................................9
     B. Postconviction Relief Procedural History .......................................................9
     C. Perkins’ Rule 61 Claims ................................................................................13
     D. Commissioner’s Characterization of Perkins’ Rule 61 Claims .....................15
     E. Perkins’ Objections to the Commissioner’s Report ......................................16
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW ............................................................................18
     A. Rule 61: Procedural Bars to Relief ................................................................18
     B. Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel...................................................20
     C. Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw ........................................................22
IV. DISCUSSION ...................................................................................................22
  B. Perkins’ Objections to the Commissioner’s “Relevant Facts” are Without
  Merit .....................................................................................................................23
    i.    The green grocery bag..............................................................................24
       ii.     Underwood’s testimony ............................................................................24
       iii.    Arresting officer’s knowledge ..................................................................26
       iv.     Perkins’ DNA on the McDonald’s cup straw ...........................................27
     C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims .....................................................27
       i.      Ground One: Trial Counsel provided Perkins with his chosen defense ..28
       ii.     Ground Two: Trial Counsel’s communications were not deficient .........31

                                                              ii
     iii. Ground Three: Perjury First Degree; and Ground Four: “Prosecutorial
     Misconduct” ......................................................................................................32
     iv.     Ground Five: “The Use of False Evidence” ............................................36
        1. Trial Counsel was not unreasonable when deciding not to test some of
        Perkins’ clothing for DNA ............................................................................36
        2.     Trial Counsel was not deficient by failing to obtain a voice expert .....38
     3. There was no suppression issue at the time of the arrest ......................40
  D. Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw ........................................................41
  E. Perkins’ Motion to Substitute Rule 61 Counsel ............................................42
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................43

                                                          iii
                                 I.   INTRODUCTION

       On October 26, 2017, Defendant Gary Perkins (“Perkins”) was found guilty

by a jury of Murder First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the

Commission of a Felony for the fatal stabbing of his girlfriend, Jamie Murphy

(“Murphy”).2     He now moves for Postconviction Relief under Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 Motion”).3 This Memorandum Opinion addresses his

Rule 61 Motion, Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdrawal,4 and Defendant’s Motion

for Substitute Rule 61 Counsel,5 encompassing all outstanding motions. For the

reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation

(“Commissioner’s Report”) is ADOPTED, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction

Relief is DENIED, Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is GRANTED, and

Defendant’s Motion for Substitute Rule 61 Counsel is DENIED as MOOT.

2
  D.I. 73(A). Docket numbers followed by the letter (A) refer to the A Case docket and docket
numbers followed by the letter (B) refer to the B Case docket.
3
  D.I. 95(A).
4
  D.I. 116(A).
5
  D.I. 150-53(A).
                                             1
            II.   BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY6

       On the morning of July 23, 2015, Murphy’s body was discovered in the

playground area of Canby Park,7 located between the City of Wilmington and

Elsmere.8 Murphy was found partially clothed on top of the slide platform9 with

thirty to forty stab wounds on her face, neck, and chest.10 The wounds produced

such heavy bleeding that blood flowed down the slide and puddled beneath it.11 The

surrounding playground equipment was smeared and spattered with her blood.12 The

cause of death was multiple stab wounds to the neck.13 Perkins was Murphy’s

boyfriend at the time of her death.14 The same day Murphy’s body was found,

Perkins was arrested in connection with her murder.15

       On October 26, 2016, Perkins was indicted for Murder First Degree,

Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (“PDWDCF”),

Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (“PDWBPP”), and Criminal

Contempt.16 On January 19, 2017, he filed a motion to sever the PDWBPP and

6
   All references to Rule 61 Counsel’s Appendix to the Motion to Withdraw are referred to as
“C___” and all references to the State’s Appendix are referred to as “D___”.
7
  C230-33, C236-38, C248-49, C289.
8
  C206.
9
  C248.
10
   C237, C268-7, C438, C448-49.
11
   C237.
12
   C268-71, C278-84, C530-34, C540-41.
13
   C449.
14
   C218.
15
   D.I. 1(A).
16
   D.I. 3(A).
                                             2
Criminal Contempt charges from the Murder First Degree and PDWDCF charges.17

The Court granted the motion on May 11, 2017.18 On October 20, 2017 following a

jury trial on the Murder First Degree and PDWDCF charges (the “A Case”), Perkins

was found guilty of both charges.19 After a bench trial conducted the same day, the

Court found Perkins guilty of PDWDCF and Criminal Contempt (the “B Case”).20

           A.     The Evidence Presented at Trial

                 i.   The 911 call

       The State presented overwhelming evidence against Perkins at trial. Most

significant was the 911 recording that captured Murphy’s murder.21 This 911 call

was made from Murphy’s cell phone at 4:01 a.m. on July 23, 2015.22 As the 911

operator attempted to communicate with the caller, the jury could hear gasping,

moaning, and wheezing.23 The audio captures a male voice stating, among other

things; “Die bitch,” . . . “I told Jim I was gonna kill your motherfucking ass,” and

what could be interpreted as, “don’t fuck with G.”24 Perkins’ Probation Officer

17
   D.I. 32(A).
18
   D.I. 47(A).
19
   D.I. 66(A).
20
   D.I. 13(B). These convictions were affirmed by the Supreme Court. Perkins v. State, 2019 WL
327959, at *1 (Del. Jan. 23, 2019). Counsel raised only one issue on direct appeal, claiming that
an outburst from the gallery during opening statements was so prejudicial that it should have
resulted in a mistrial. C786-796.
21
   C173-75.
22
   Id., C366-69, C372-73, C717; D108.
23
   Id.
24
   Id.
                                               3
testified at trial that it was Perkins’ voice on the 911 call.25 He testified he was

familiar with Perkins’ voice as a result of his weekly in-person meetings and phone

calls with Perkins over the course of eighteen months.26

               ii.   Video evidence

       At the scene, law enforcement officers found a purse containing Murphy’s

photo ID, a green grocery bag,27 and two McDonald’s cups next to her body.28 The

State presented video footage from the McDonald’s located in Elsmere near Canby

Park that depicted Murphy and Perkins purchasing two drinks on the evening of July

22, 2015 around 7:30 p.m.29 In the video, Perkins can be seen carrying a green

grocery bag similar to the bag found at the scene.30 Video footage from a second

McDonald’s on 4th Street in the early morning hours of July 23, 2015 showed

Perkins wearing orange sweatpants and speaking to another individual by the name

of Thomas Underwood (“Underwood”).31 When Perkins was arrested around 5:30

p.m. on July 23, 2015, he was wearing orange sweatpants.32

25
   C392-96. The Probation Officer was not identified to the jury as Perkins’ Probation Officer.
26
   Id.
27
   C267-68, C287-89.
28
   C275-78, C291-92, C573.
29
   C298-03, C573-75.
30
   C298-301; D5.
31
   C314, C577; D7. Because there are two McDonald’s, the McDonald’s near Elsmere will be
referred to as “Elsmere McDonald’s” and the McDonald’s on 4th Street will be referred to as the
“4th Street McDonald’s.”
32
   C206-07, C351-54.
                                              4
               iii.   Corporal Vice’s observations

       Corporal Vice testified he saw Perkins wearing bright orange sweatpants on

the morning of July 23, 2015.33 Corporal Vice knew Perkins from prior encounters

and was familiar with Murphy’s and Perkins’ relationship.34 Corporal Vice testified

that on the morning of Perkins’ arrest he saw Perkins on Walnut Street between 8th

Street and 9th Street but made no contact.35 Later that day, following a police call

notifying him that Perkins was a suspect in Murphy’s death, Corporal Vice located

and approached Perkins at a local bus shelter.36 While patting Perkins down,

Corporal Vice noticed that Perkins wore a pair of blue sweatpants underneath his

orange sweatpants.37 After pulling the orange sweatpants partially down, Corporal

Vice noticed Perkins’ blue sweatpants were covered in blood.38 Inside the pocket of

the blue sweatpants, Corporal Vice found a pen knife and fresh blood.39 Corporal

Vice testified that law enforcement collected Perkins’ clothing.40 The inventory

taken included a surfboard keychain attached to a small knife with a two-inch

33
   C350. Corporal Vice’s full title is Corporal Damian Vice of the Wilmington Police Department.
C346-47.
34
   C347-48, C355.
35
   C350, C355.
36
   C350-52, C356-57.
37
   C352-53.
38
   C353. At trial, the State’s DNA expert testified it was Murphy’s blood.
39
   Id.
40
   C361.
                                               5
blade.41 Both the keychain and knife appeared to have dried blood on them.42 Blood

was also found on the Perkins’ gray long-sleeved shirt, blue short-sleeved shirt, and

Timberland boots.43

                iv.     DNA, forensic, and blood spatter evidence

      The State introduced DNA evidence through its DNA expert, Sarah Lindauer

(“Lindauer”).         Lindauer explained that Perkins’ clothing and knife, and the

McDonald’s cups, among other items, were collected from the crime scene and

tested for DNA.44 The tests revealed that one of the McDonald’s cups had Murphy’s

fingerprints and DNA on it.45 The other cup had Murphy’s DNA on the cup stain

and Perkins’ DNA on the straw.46 Blood from Perkins’ gray long-sleeved shirt

produced a mixed DNA profile of at least two individuals which included Murphy.47

Blood from Perkins’ blue sweatpants and left boot also produced mixed DNA

profiles of at least two individuals with Murphy being the major contributor.48 Blood

on the blade of the knife taken from Perkins’ pocket at the time of his arrest and

blood found on one of his boots produced a single source profile that was consistent

41
   Id.
42
   C361-62, C401, C414-15, C577.
43
   C405-11.
44
   C474-75.
45
   C482.
46
   C482-83.
47
   C485-89.
48
   Id.
                                             6
with Murphy’s DNA.49 The knife handle swab produced a mixed DNA profile with

Perkins as a possible contributor.50

      The State’s forensics expert, Dr. Gary Collins, testified that the cause of

Murphy’s death was multiple stab wounds to her neck caused by a sharp object

consistent with the knife found on Perkins at the time of his arrest.51

      The State’s bloodstain pattern expert, Paul Kish (“Kish”), who performed a

pattern analysis on the physical evidence and looked for blood-like stains,52 testified

that the blood spatter observed on the playground equipment and Perkins’ clothing

correlated with the DNA report.53 He also testified that the blood spatter patterns on

Perkins’ sweatpants indicated he was near Murphy when the stabbing occurred.54

               v.   Perkins’ statements to police

      Detective Bucksner testified that, after being read his Miranda rights, Perkins

agreed to speak with the police.55 Initially, Perkins denied seeing or speaking with

Murphy for several weeks, but when confronted with information regarding the

McDonald’s video footage of him with Murphy, he admitted to seeing her the

49
   C478-81.
50
   C484.
51
   C437, C449-54.
52
   C523-24.
53
   C528-47.
54
   C556-57.
55
   C133-C581. Detective Bucksner’s full title is Detective Corporal Joseph Bucksner of the
Wilmington Police Department. C34-35.
                                            7
evening of her murder.56 Perkins claimed that he and Murphy parted ways after

leaving McDonald’s, and he spent the night in the 10th Street Park.57 He told the

police that he developed a rash after having sex with Murphy one week prior to her

death and presented to Christiana Hospital to be tested for a venereal disease.58

Medical records confirmed that Perkins was examined on July 21, 2015 for a

sexually transmitted disease.59

              vi.   Underwood’s interview testimony

      Prior to trial, police interviewed Underwood, and Underwood provided

incriminating information about Perkins. Underwood testified in his interview that

Perkins was angry with Murphy because he believed she had given him a venereal

disease.60 In his interview, Underwood claimed Perkins said he was going to “beat

her up” for giving him a venereal disease.61 During cross-examination, defense

counsel, Anthony Figliola, Esq. (“Figliola”), vigorously attacked Underwood’s

credibility, using his prior statement to impeach him before the jury.62

56
   C139-45, C158, C160.
57
   C146, C161.
58
   C136, C150-54, C160.
59
   C583-84.
60
   C311-14.
61
   C312-13, C317, C320-23.
62
   Id.
                                          8
                vii.   Underwood’s trial testimony

       At trial, Underwood testified that he spoke to Perkins (who he referred to as

“G”) the day before Murphy was killed.63 Underwood testified he saw Perkins again

on the morning of July 23, 2015 at the 4th Street McDonald’s.64 At the 4th Street

McDonald’s, Perkins admitted to Underwood that he had seen Murphy the night

before on the bus.65 During that conversation, Underwood observed blood stains

between Perkins’ finger and thumb. Underwood testified that Perkins always carried

a pocketknife.66

           B.      Postconviction Relief Procedural History67

       On March 12, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief and

the Appointment of Counsel.68 His Motion was referred to a Superior Court

63
   C311-14.
64
   C311-13, C576. Underwood met Perkins through a mutual friend named Ellis Whiteman, who
is known as “Jimmy.” C310.
65
   C312.
66
   C311-12, C331-32, C576.
67
   This case has a long, drawn out, post-conviction procedural history. This is attributable, in part,
to the deluge of letters filed by Perkins. Since filing his Motion for Postconviction Relief in March
2019, Perkins has filed 35 letters. D.I. 97(A), D.I. 103-04(A), D.I. 106-08(A), D.I. 110-13(A),
D.I. 119-20(A), D.I. 131(A), D.I. 133(A), D.I. 135-37(A), D.I. 146(A), D.I. 148(A), D.I. 152-
53(A), D.I. 155-56(A), D.I. 163(A), D.I. 165(A), D.I. 170-73(A), D.I. 176(A), D.I. 179(A), D.I.
182(A), D.I. 184(A), D.I. 185(A), D.I. 187(A).
68
   D.I. 90-91(A). The State in its Response concisely framed Perkins’ initial Rule 61 claims as
follows:
        (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failing to prepare a defense at trial, (b)
        mailing him discovery 18 days before the trial started, (c) refusing to communicate;
        (2) “perjury in the first degree” by an unnamed State witness; (3) prosecutorial
        misconduct for “misleading the jury with untruthfulness”; (4) “the use of false
        evidence”; (5) failure of the police to inform him of his right to remain silent; (6)
        Trial Counsel violated Delaware Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a)(4) by failing
        to promptly comply with reasonable requests for legal information he needed.
                                                  9
Commissioner for proposed findings of fact and recommendations pursuant to 10

Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Procedure Rule 62(a)(5).69

       Two months later, on May 6, 2019, Perkins filed a second pro se Motion for

Postconviction Relief, raising nearly identical claims as those in his first Motion,

and again requesting the appointment of counsel.70               On June 20, 2019, the

Commissioner granted his appointment of counsel request and Patrick J. Collins,

Esq. and Kimberly A. Price, Esq. became Perkins’ Rule 61 Counsel (“Rule 61

Counsel”).71

       On February 19, 2021, Perkins’ Rule 61 Counsel found no meritorious

grounds for relief and moved to withdraw.72 Perkins requested a continuance on

March 3, 2021 to respond to his Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion, and the Commissioner

granted his request.73

       On April 21, 2021, Perkins filed a Motion for Substitute Rule 61 Counsel and

an extension of time to respond to Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw.74 The

 State’s Resp. at 3.
69
   D.I. 94(A).
70
   D.I. 95-96(A). The Court considers Perkins’ second pro se motion as a supplement to his
original Rule 61 Motion.
71
   D.I. 98(A).
72
   Id.
73
   D.I. 119-121(A).
74
   D.I. 126-127(A). Although Perkins does not describe his request for substitute counsel as a
Motion, the Court will review it, and his corresponding supplemental letters, as such.
                                             10
Commissioner granted a 30-day extension,75 and on June 15, 2021, Perkins filed

pro se his responses to Rule 61’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw.76

       On July 27, 2021, Perkins’ Trial and Appellate Counsel, Anthony Figliola, Jr.,

responded to Perkins’ claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”).77

       In August 2021, Perkins filed a series of supplemental letters and

documentation to support his previously filed responses to his Rule 61 Counsel’s

Motion to Withdraw.78

       On August 27, 2021, the State filed its response to Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion

to Withdraw and Perkins’ Rule 61 Motion.79

       On December 10, 2021, the record was further expanded to allow his original

Trial Counsel, who withdrew prior to the case going to trial, Eugene Maurer, Jr.,

Esq., to file an affidavit in response to Perkins’ Rule 61 Motion.80

       Throughout early 2022, Perkins continued to file various submissions with the

Court, including letter requests for extensions of time to file his reply, a stay of all

75
   D.I. 127(A).
76
   D.I. 128(A). In Perkins’ responses, he further clarifies that the witnesses he asserts submitted
false claims were both Detective Bucksner and Underwood.
77
   D.I. 130(A).
78
   D.I. 131(A), 133(A), 135-37(A).
79
   D.I. 138-39(A).
80
   D.I. 143-44(A). Maurer served as counsel for Perkins until the Court granted his motion to
withdraw on January 23, 2017. See D.I. 36(A). The State was permitted to supplement its response
to Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw and Perkins’ IAC claims after Mauer filed his affidavit
responding to the IAC claims. However, Maurer’s affidavit did not prompt any further briefing
by the State. By letter dated January 5, 2022, the State indicated it was relying on its Response to
Perkins’ Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief filed on August 27, 2021. D.I. 145(A).
                                                11
proceedings, an evidentiary hearing request, and additional requests for the

appointment of substitute Rule 61 counsel.81 In response to Perkins’ request to stay

the proceedings, the Commissioner granted his request and stayed the matter until

November 30, 2022, to give him time to retain substitute Rule 61 counsel.82 He was

unsuccessful in retaining substitute counsel and, on November 23, 2022, he filed his

pro se brief in support of his Motion for Postconviction Relief.83

       On March 24, 2023, the Commissioner issued her Report and

Recommendation to the Court to deny Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief

and grant Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw.84 The Commissioner also denied

“all other motions related to the Rule 61 motion filed by [Perkins] not previously

ruled upon by the Court.”85

       On April 5, 2023, Perkins filed his “Appeal from the Commissioner’s

Findings of Fact and Recommendation” (“Objections”).86

81
   D.I. 148-50(A), 152-57(A).
82
   D.I. 161(A).
83
   D.I. 169(A). Perkins then filed requests for a decision on December 16, 2022 and December
19, 2022, respectively. D.I. 170-173(A). There are errors in the docket. First, D.I. 169 is filed as
Perkins’ “Motion for Postconviction Relief.” This is not a second motion, but rather is his “Brief
in Support of his Motion for Postconviction Relief.” The Commissioner’s Report refers to a D.I.
168(A) but there is no D.I. 168(A) in the docket.
84
   Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, ID No. 1507018423 A&B, D.I.174(A) (Del.
Super. Mar. 23, 2023) (herein “Comm. Rep.”).
85
   D.I. 177(A). See Comm. Rep. at 21 n.102.
86
   D.I. 177(A). Although Perkins refers to his response as an “appeal,” the Court will refer to them
as objections consistent with 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)d.
                                                12
       On May 24, 2023, the Court granted the State’s request for an extension of

time to respond to Perkins’ Objections.87

       On June 2, 2023, Perkins filed a letter objecting to his Rule 61 Counsel’s

“decision not to oppose the State’s [request for an] extension” because he “was not

in agreement with that decision . . . .” 88

       On June 16, 2023, the State filed its Response to Defendant’s Objections

(“State’s Response”).89

       On July 17, 2023 and July 27, 2023, Perkins filed requests seeking a decision

on his Objections.90

       On August 24, 2023, Perkins filed a letter asking whether a decision had been

made, again requesting to substitute Rule 61 Counsel, and requesting “docket

sheets.”91 The Court provided Perkins with a copy of the case docket on September

15, 2023 and considers his Rule 61 Motion and Motion for Substitute Rule 61

Counsel below.92

           C.     Perkins’ Rule 61 Claims

       Consolidating all of Perkins’ Rule 61 filings, Perkins asserts the following

Rule 61 claims:

87
   D.I. 181(A).
88
   D.I. 182(A).
89
   D.I. 183(A).
90
   D.I. 184(A).
91
   D.I. 187(A).
92
   D.I. 188(A).
                                              13
(1) “Trial Counsel failed to present a defense, failed to provide him with
    discovery until 18 days before trial, and failed to communicate with him[;]

(2) ‘Perjury in the First Degree,’ namely that State witnesses provided false
   testimony in the court proceedings[;]

(3) Prosecutorial misconduct that the State mislead the jury and was untruthful
    during trial[;]

(4) ‘Use of False Evidence,’ that because some of his clothing was never
   tested for DNA that the use of that clothing by the forensic consultant in
   his testimony was tantamount to providing false evidence[;]

(5) Violation of his Miranda Rights in that law enforcement essentially failed
   to fully explain either his right to remain silent or his right to counsel[;]

(6) A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and that his Trial
   Counsel violated Section 1.4(a)(4) of the Delaware Rules of Professional
   Responsibility for failing to promptly respond to his requests for legal
   information before trial and during his direct appeal.

(7) failing to impeach or otherwise object to the testimony of certain police
   officers at trial;

(8) failing to file a motion to suppress the clothing he was wearing that was
    not tested for DNA and/or failing to present evidence that some of the
    clothing he was wearing was not tested for DNA;

(9) failing to call a voice authentication expert to testify that the voice on the
    911 call was not Perkins’ voice;

(10) failing to cross-examine the officer who testified regarding the 911 call
   with a transcript of the call ‘allowing the jury to see that there was
   inconsistency with his statement;’

(11) failing to object to the testimony of Thomas Underwood;

(12) failing to refute the statements about the Perkins having a venereal
   disease; and
                                    14
         (13) failing to move to suppress evidence taken from Perkins at the time of
            his arrest because Perkins was taken into custody [and searched] without a
            warrant in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”93

             D.     Commissioner’s Characterization of Perkins’ Rule 61 Claims

         As the Commissioner notes, in Perkins’ November 15, 2022 pro se Brief in

Support of Motion for Postconviction Relief he seems to abandon certain claims and

attempts to whittle down the foregoing list into five claims:

         Claim One – Petitioner’s rights under the United States and Delaware
         Constitutions were violated by Trial Counsel’s failure to investigate,
         failure to move to suppress and present evidence of Detective
         Bucksner[‘s] false statements made during Petitioner’s August 26,
         2015 preliminary hearing;

         Claim Two – Petitioner was deprived of a fair trial because the State
         knowing[ly] presented and/or failed to correct false testimony at his
         trial; to the extent Trial Counsel could have objected and presented
         evidence of prosecutorial misconduct an[d] perjury in the first degree;

         Claim Three – Petitioner’s rights under the United States and Delaware
         Constitutions were violated by Trial Counsel’s failure to investigate
         and arrange for a voice expert to attend Petitioner’s trial allowing the
         use of false evidence to be presented;

         Claim Four – Petitioner’s rights under the United States and Delaware
         Constitutions were violated by Trial Counsel’s failure to object to
         Thomas Underwood[‘s] testimony and failure to request a self-serving
         instruction where State’s witness had offenses that were never
         explored; and

         Claim Five – The cumulative effect of two or more of the above-
         described violations of Petitioner’s rights deprived Petitioner of a fair

93
     D.I. 167(A), 169(A).
                                            15
        trial and, thus, due process of law under the United States and Delaware
        Constitutions.94

            E.       Perkins’ Objections to the Commissioner’s Report

        Perkins objects to the following:

     (1) Commissioner’s finding that the green bag carried by Perkins in the
         surveillance footage from the McDonald’s near Canby Park was consistent
         with the green bag found near Murphy’s body at the scene.95

     (2) Commissioner’s classification that Underwood testified on stand that if
         Murphy gave Perkins a venereal disease that he would beat up or kill her.96

     (3) Commissioner’s finding, “when the officer learned that Perkins was a suspect
         in the death of Ms. Murphy, he located Perkins at a bus shelter at the
         intersection of 10th and King Streets.”97

     (4) Commissioner’s finding, “[o]ne of the McDonald’s cups found on the
         playground had Ms. Murphy’s fingerprints and DNA on it and the other cup
         had Ms. Murphy’s and the Defendant’s DNA on it.”98

     (5) Commissioner’s organizing of Perkins’ postconviction relief request, placing
         prosecutorial misconduct and perjury in the first degree under an ineffective
         assistance of counsel claim.99

     (6) Commissioner’s categorization that Perkins chose the defense that Trial
         Counsel presented at trial.100

94
   D.I. 169(A) (i), (ii).
95
   Comm. Rep.
96
   Id. at 6-7.
97
   Id. at 7.
98
   Id. at 9.
99
   Id. at 21.
100
    Comm. Rep. at 24.
                                            16
      (7) Commissioner’s determination that Trial Counsel was not ineffective for not
          producing Perkins’ laboratory tests to refute statements of him having a
          venereal disease.101

      (8) Commissioner’s contention that Trial Counsel communicated with Perkins
          through in-person meetings to review the evidence on numerous occasions.

      (9) Commissioner’s statement that “[n]othing in the record indicates Detective
          Bucksner intentionally lied at any stage of the proceedings.”102

      (10) Commissioner’s explanation that the inconsistencies in Underwood and
         Detective Bucksner’s comments “do not establish perjury but are rather
         credibility questions for the jury.”103

      (11) Commissioner’s conclusion, “Perkins’ ‘use of false evidence’ assertion is
         procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) because he failed to raise it in the
         proceedings leading to his conviction and, as such, should be summarily
         denied.”104

      (12) Commissioner’s finding that Trial Counsel was not deficient because they
         failed “to present evidence that some of his clothing was not tested for
         DNA.”105

      (13) Commissioner’s finding that Trial Counsel was not deficient in failing to
         obtain a voice expert to refute Perkins’ Probation Officer’s testimony.106

      (14) Commissioner’s finding that the police had probable cause to arrest and
         search Perkins without a warrant.107

101
    Comm. Rep. at 43-44.
102
    Id. at 30.
103
    Id. at 31.
104
    Id. at 33.
105
    Id. at 36.
106
    Id. at 38-39.
107
    Id. at 47.
                                          17
                           III.    STANDARDS OF REVIEW

       Pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1), the Court may designate a commissioner

to review a motion for postconviction relief and provide a report and corresponding

recommendation to the Court.108              Following the issuance of a report and

recommendation, any party may file timely objections to the Commissioner’s

findings.109 In reviewing a party’s objections, the Court “shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified findings of fact or

recommendations to which an objection is made.”110 The Court may then “accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

Commissioner.”111

           A.     Rule 61: Procedural Bars to Relief

       Rule 61 governs postconviction relief.112 Under Rule 61, an incarcerated

individual may seek abrogation of his conviction by establishing a lack of

jurisdiction or alternative ground that sufficiently establishes a factual and legal

basis for a collateral attack upon the conviction.113 The rule is designed as a

safeguard to allow the Court to correct constitutional infirmities in a conviction or

108
    10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)b.
109
    10 Del. C. § 512(b)(1)d.
110
    Id.; State v. Bartell, 2020 WL 6480845, at *1 (Del. Super. Nov. 4, 2020).
111
    Id.
112
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1).
113
    Id.
                                               18
sentence.114 However, while “Rule 61 is intended to correct errors in the trial

process, [it does] not allow defendants unlimited opportunities to relitigate their

convictions.”115

       Before considering the merits of any claims for postconviction relief, the

Court must first consider whether any procedural bars exist.116 Rule 61(i) establishes

four procedural bars to postconviction relief.117 Rule 61(i)(1) requires a motion for

postconviction relief must be filed within one year of a final judgement or

conviction.118 Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive motions for postconviction relief unless

certain conditions are met.119 Pursuant to Rule 61(i)(3) and (4), any ground for relief

not previously raised is deemed waived and any claims formerly adjudicated are

thereafter barred.120

       There is an exception to the Rule 61(i)(3) procedural bar to relief. Procedural

default may be overcome if the movant shows “(A) cause for relief from the

114
    Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500 (Del. 1970).
115
    Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013).
116
    Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
117
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1)-(4).
118
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
119
    Rule 61(i)(2) bars successive or subsequent motions for postconviction relief unless the movant
is able to “pled with particularity” that (i) “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that
the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was
convicted” or (ii) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the movant’s case
and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.” Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
120
     This includes proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a
postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Super. Ct. Crim. R.
61(i)(5), (d)(2)(i), (ii).
                                                  19
procedural default and (B) prejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.”121 A

“cause” for procedural default can be shown through IAC.122 However, “[a]ttorney

error short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute ‘cause’ for a

procedural default even when that default occurs on appeal rather than trial.” 123

Because IAC claims cannot be raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings and are

properly presented by way of a motion for postconviction relief.124

           B.     Rule 61: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       To succeed on IAC claims, a defendant must meet the test set out in Strickland

v. Washington.125 That is, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) trial counsel’s

performance was objectively unreasonable,126 and (2) if counsel was deficient, there

was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.”127

       Although not insurmountable, the Strickland standard is highly demanding

and leads to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of

reasonably professional assistance.128 Mere allegations of ineffectiveness are not

121
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3)A, B.
122
    Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 556 (Del. 1990).
123
    Id.
124
    Sabb v. State, 2021 WL 2229631, at *1 (Del. May 28, 2021); Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160,
187-188 (Del. 2020); Whittle v. State, 2016 WL 2585904, at *3 (Del. Apr. 28, 2016); State v. Evan-
Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016).
125
    Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).
126
    Sykes v. State, 147 A.3d 201, 211 (Del. 2015) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
127
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
128
    Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988); Salih v. State, 2008 WL 4762323, at *1 (Del.
2008).
                                               20
enough.129 Counsel “may not be faulted for reasonable miscalculation or lack of

foresight or for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote possibilities.”130

There is a strong presumption that a defense counsel’s conduct constituted sound

trial strategy,131 and a defendant must make and substantiate concrete allegations

that overcome this presumption.132 When reviewing a defendant’s allegations of

deficient counsel, the reviewing court must “avoid peering through the lens of

hindsight.”133 The “[b]enchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”134

      The Court also utilizes the Strickland test when reviewing the performance of

appellate counsel.135 Importantly, appellate counsel has wide discretion to decide

which issues to appeal and is not constitutionally required to raise all possible

issues.136 “A defendant can only show that his appellate counsel ineffectively

represented him where the attorney omits issues that are clearly stronger than those

the attorney presented” on appeal.137 Even where a defendant is successful in

129
    Younger, 580 A.2d at 556.
130
    State v. Finn, 2012 WL 1980566, at *4 (Del. Super. May 23, 2012) (citing Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-110 (2011)).
131
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
132
    See Salih, 962 A.2d at 257; see also Albury, 551 A.2d at 59.
133
    State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288, 295 (Del. Super. 1994).
134
    Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 840 (Del. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
135
    Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 753 (Del. 1990).
136
    Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 938, 946 (Del. 2013).
137
    Ploof, 75 A.3d at 832.
                                           21
demonstrating the foregoing, he must then establish a reasonable probability that,

but for appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue, the defendant would have

prevailed on appeal.138

           C.     Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

       Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is governed by Superior Court

Criminal Rule 61(e)(7). Under Rule 61, counsel may move to withdraw if they find

the movant’s claim to be “so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate

it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to the

movant.”139 When evaluating a motion to withdraw, the Court must determine if its

satisfied that moving counsel made conscientious examinations of the record and the

law for any claims that could arguably support the Rule 61 motion.140 The Court

should also undertake its own review of the relevant claims to determine whether

the Rule 61 motion would be devoid of “any, at least, arguable postconviction

claims.”141

                                   IV.    DISCUSSION

       In her forty-nine-page Report and Recommendation detailing why Perkins

fails to establish he is entitled to postconviction relief, the Commissioner concludes:

138
    Neal, 80 A.3d. at 947.
139
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
140
    State v. Coston, 2017 WL 6054944, at *2 (Del. Super. Dec. 7, 2017).
141
    Id.
                                              22
         [t]he evidence presented at trial implicating Perkins in the death of
         Jaime Murphy was overwhelming. It included, among other things, (i)
         an audiotape of the 911 call made from the victim’s phone during the
         attack. . . in which her killer’s voice is heard and then identified as being
         Perkins’ voice at trial, (ii) surveillance video of the victim and the
         Defendant together the evening before she was killed, (iii) DNA
         evidence of the victim found on the murder weapon and Perkins’
         clothes and (iv) witness testimony implicating Perkins in the crime and
         establishing motive. The Court finds no professional errors on the part
         of trial or appellate counsel much less any errors that would meet the
         exacting standards set forth in Strickland or otherwise convince the
         Court that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.
         . . Perkins has failed to establish that either his appellate counsel or Trial
         Counsel was deficient in any regard or that he suffered actual prejudice
         as a result thereof. The Court has reviewed the record carefully and has
         concluded that Defendant’s Rule 61 motion is without merit and devoid
         of any other substantial claims for relief. The Court is also satisfied
         that appointed Rule 61 counsel made a conscientious effort to examine
         the record and the law and has properly determined that Perkins does
         not have a meritorious claim to be raised in his Rule 61 motion.142

         The Court now addresses each of Perkins’ Objections to the Commissioner’s

Report.

             B.     Perkins’ Objections to the Commissioner’s “Relevant Facts” are
                    Without Merit
         Perkins first objects to the following factual findings made by the

Commissioner: (1) the green grocery bag found at the murder scene was consistent

with the grocery bag Perkins carried in the McDonald’s video; (2) Perkins told

Underwood that if Murphy had given him a venereal disease that he was going to

kill her; (3) the arresting officer knew he was a suspect in Murphy’s death before he

142
      Comm. Rep. at 48-49.
                                              23
took Perkins into custody; and (4) Perkins’ DNA was on one of the McDonald’s

cups.143

                i.   The green grocery bag

      Perkins’ objection to the Commissioner’s finding that the green bag at the

scene was “consistent” with the bag he was carrying as depicted in the video

evidence is based on Detective Bucksner’s 2015 preliminary hearing testimony that

“there were no fingerprints found at the scene that belong to Perkins.”144 This

objection is without merit. The Commissioner’s Report relies on the undisputed

evidence presented at trial. Investigators found a green grocery bag and a black

purse at the top of the sliding board where Murphy’s body was found. 145 The

surveillance video from the Elsmere McDonald’s shows Perkins and Murphy on the

evening before the murder and Perkins is carrying a green grocery bag.146 This is

ample evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding.

               ii.   Underwood’s testimony

      Perkins next argues that Underwood lied in his trial testimony. He contends

that, in Underwood’s interview with Detective Bucksner, Detective Bucksner asked

whether Perkins said he was going to beat up Murphy and Underwood responded,

143
    C482-83.
144
    Objections at 1.
145
    C267-68, C287-89.
146
    C298-303; D5.
                                        24
“No.”147 Perkins overlooks the fact that Detective Bucksner asked Underwood two

questions: “Did he say he was going to beat her up? Did he say anything else?” to

which Underwood answered, “No.”148 Underwood’s “No” was in response to

Detective Bucksner’s second question, not his first. Underwood had already told

Detective Bucksner earlier in the interview that “[Perkins], like he, you know, he

say to get to her, he’d beat her up.”149      When Detective Bucksner asked for

clarification as to why Perkins said he would beat up Murphy, Underwood replied,

“because he thought she gave him a venereal disease.”150 The inconsistency between

Underwood’s trial testimony—that Perkins said he was going to “kill” Murphy and

Underwood’s police interview—that Perkins said he was going to “beat her up”—

was highlighted and explored by Perkins’ Trial Counsel in front of the jury.151 On

cross-examination, pursuant to 11 Del. C. §3507, Perkins’ Trial Counsel introduced

Underwood’s prior inconsistent statement made to police to impeach Underwood’s

credibility.152 When Trial Counsel pointed out to Underwood that there was no

mention of Perkins saying he was going to kill Murphy in the Underwood’s

interview with police, Underwood testified:

      [n]o, that’s not true. You only reading two pages of a statement, man.
      I told [Detective Bucksner] that. He said that day I remember telling
147
    Objections at 3-4.
148
    D44.
149
    D43.
150
    Id.
151
    C312-13, C317, C322.
152
    C324-325.
                                        25
       him because he said he was going to kill her. . . Why it ain’t in the
       transcript, I don’t know. I know I told him that because that man said
       that.153

Trial Counsel then called Detective Bucksner as an adverse witness in the defense’s

case.154 During the State’s cross-examination questioning when the State asked

whether Detective Bucksner remembered Underwood talking about whether Perkins

would injure Murphy, Detective Bucksner replied “Yes.”155 This objection is

without merit.

               iii.   Arresting officer’s knowledge

       Perkins objects to the Commissioner’s factual finding that Perkins’ arresting

officer had knowledge that Perkins was a suspect in Murphy’s murder at the time of

his arrest because the officer’s report does not state that Perkins was “wanted for the

death of [Murphy] before he made the stop.”156 Corporal Vice testified that, after he

saw Perkins, he learned of the murder and received a communication asking if he

recognized Perkins.157 He responded, “Yes…[w]hat did he do now?”158 It was after

this call that he looked for Perkins, found him, and took him into custody.159

153
    C322.
154
    D84-85, D.I. 167(A) at (i), 3-5. Detective Bucksner testified at Perkins’ preliminary hearing
held on August 26, 2015 as follows: “The witness also stated that on July 22nd they had a
conversation with Perkins in which Mr. Perkins stated he was going to kill Murphy.” C41.
155
    C329-31.
156
    Objections at 2.
157
    C349-52.
158
    Id.
159
    C352-53.
                                               26
Whether this was memorialized in a police report is of no consequence. This

objection is without merit.

               iv.   Perkins’ DNA on the McDonald’s cup straw

       Perkins objects to the Commissioner’s factual determination regarding DNA

found on the straw of one of the McDonald’s cups. He argues that because his DNA

was only found on the straw of one of those cups, it proves he did not place the cup

in that location.160 While Perkins’ DNA was not found on the cup stains, this does

not vitiate the fact that Perkins’ DNA was found on the straw of the cup, nor does it

“prove” that Perkins did not leave the cup at the murder scene. This objection is

without merit.

       On de novo review, the Court adopts all of the Commissioner’s factual

findings, and now turns to Perkins’ six grounds for relief based on IAC.

          C.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims161

       Perkins objects to the Commissioner’s characterization of his six claims for

relief as “IAC claims” because he does not believe they are properly characterized

as such.162 His objection on this point is difficult to understand given that Perkins’

only avenue to relief is through IAC claims. To prevail under Rule 61, Perkins must

160
    Objections at 2.
161
    The Court condenses a few of the headings and sections in the Commissioner’s Report for
brevity and clarity.
162
    Objections at 3.
                                            27
show there was cause for relief and prejudice from the violation of his rights.163

Because Perkins’ claims would otherwise be procedurally barred under Rule 61,

Perkins must show an IAC claim amounts to showing of cause for relief. 164 The

Commissioner’s characterization of the claims as IAC claims benefits Perkins.165

       While the Commissioner identified six claims for relief, on de novo review

the Court condenses Perkins’ claims into five grounds.166

                 i.   Ground One: Trial Counsel provided Perkins with his chosen
                      defense

       Perkins claims that Trial Counsel was deficient in not allowing him to pick

his chosen defense. The Commissioner concluded that Perkins’ claim is merely

conclusory and fails to prove an IAC claim.167                The Court agrees.         As the

Commissioner correctly notes:

       [t]rial counsel pursued an identity defense as Perkins asserted that he
       was not the individual who killed Murphy. Trial Counsel hired a
       private investigator to attempt to substantiate Perkins’ claim that
       another person at Canby Park killed Ms. Murphy and he merely came
       upon her after the attack, but the private investigator found no evidence
       to support his allegations.

       Despite the lack of evidence to support these assertions, Trial Counsel
       nevertheless argued in opening statements and closing arguments that

163
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
164
    Id.
165
    Comm. Rep. at 21, n.102.
166
    The Court combines the Commissioner’s Ground Six: Trial and Appellate Counsels’
violations of the Professional Rules of Conduct into her Ground One IAC claims.
167
    Comm. Rep. at 22 (citing Jordan v. State, 1994 WL 466142, at *1 (Del. Aug. 25, 1994) (holding
that conclusory allegations are legally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance of counsel)
(citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 556).
                                               28
       Perkins was not the killer, and introduced the possibility that Perkins
       may have tried to help Murphy to explain why Perkins was covered in
       her blood.

       Trial Counsel also questioned witnesses about other people who were
       seen in Canby Park that day as well as the other 911 calls that were
       placed around the park area in the early morning hours of July 23, 2015,
       including that another 911 call had been placed seconds after Murphy’s
       call, to raise reasonable doubt and suggest that perhaps that caller was
       the killer.

       The record reflects that Trial Counsel prepared and presented Perkins’
       chosen defense, despite the overwhelming evidence against him. . . The
       fact that the chosen strategy did not yield an acquittal does not make
       the Trial Counsel’s performance legally ineffective under Strickland.168

       Perkins claims his Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to refute

statements that he had a venereal disease. He relies on evidence from laboratory

tests conducted while he was in custody of the Department of Correction that yielded

results “basically within normal limits.”169 Because Trial Counsel did not present

his “negative test” results, Perkins claims that the Commissioner’s finding that he

chose his defense is incorrect. In support of this argument, Perkins focuses on his

July and September 2016 letters to Trial Counsel regarding “errors” in the

preliminary hearing transcripts. Those “errors” pertained to the laboratory tests

“showing he did not have a disease” and “false statements and mistakes made at his

168
   Comm. Rep. at 23-24.
169
   D99-102, D152-55. The laboratory tests to which Perkins referred to were taken at DOC in
August 2015 and May 2016, but the exact nature of what he was tested for is unclear, except that
the results were deemed “basically within normal limits.” Id.
                                              29
preliminary hearing.”170 The Commissioner determined that Trial Counsel was not

deficient because he would have had no logical basis upon which to introduce the

results of the laboratory tests taken while Perkins was incarcerated.171 Additionally,

the Commissioner found that the failure to introduce the results was neither

objectively unreasonable nor was Perkins prejudiced by that failure.172 The Court

agrees.

      The State’s theory regarding Perkins’ motive for the murder was that Perkins

believed Murphy had given him a venereal disease.           Underwood’s testimony

established that in the days leading up to Murphy’s murder Perkins was angry with

Murphy because Perkins believed she had given him a venereal disease,173 and

Perkins told Underwood if she had, he was going to kill her.174 Perkins told the

police in his interview that two days before Murphy was murdered, he went to

Christiana Hospital because a rash had developed after having sex with Murphy the

week prior to her death.175 Perkins’ medical records from Christiana Hospital were

admitted into evidence at trial and confirmed he was treated for exposure to a

sexually transmitted disease.176

170
    Objections at 3.
171
    Comm. Rep. at 23-24.
172
    Comm. Rep. at 42-43.
173
    C312-13, C317, C321.
174
    C312-13, C317.
175
    C136, C150-54, C157-58.
176
    C583-84; D75.
                                         30
         Despite all this evidence, Perkins argues that his “normal” test results would

have disproved the State’s motive theory. He is incorrect and misses the point. The

fact that Perkins did not actually have a venereal disease does not undermine the

State’s motive theory. Perkins’ belief that Murphy had given him a venereal disease

was the reason he wanted to kill her. The Court agrees with the Commissioner’s

determination that “the fact that Perkins may have tested ‘normal’ after the date of

the murder has no bearing on his belief or state of mind at the time of [the]

murder.”177

         It is clear from the record, Trial Counsel prepared and presented Perkins’

chosen defense.        On de novo review, the Court agrees with and adopts the

Commissioner’s finding and determination on Ground One that Perkins fails to

establish IAC under either prong of Strickland.

                 ii.   Ground Two: Trial Counsel’s communications were not deficient

         Perkins contends that Trial Counsel failed to communicate with him and did

not promptly comply with his requests for legal information.178 Like his claim for

failure to choose a defense, the Commissioner rejected it as conclusory and for

177
      Comm. Rep. at 26.
178
      C802-03, C807-08.
                                           31
failing to meet either prong under Strickland.179 She also concluded that the record

reflects Perkins’ contention is factually untrue.180 The Court agrees.

      On de novo review, the Court finds ample support in the record that Trial

Counsel communicated with Perkins through letters, at court proceedings, and at in-

person meetings.181 Trial Counsel reviewed the evidence with Perkins on numerous

occasions182 and had multiple discussions regarding trial strategy.183 Additionally,

immediately prior to trial, Trial Counsel communicated with Perkins regarding

witness statements that implicated him in the killing as well as all the evidence the

State intended to present at trial.184 The notion that Trial Counsel failed to “respond

promptly” is unfounded.

      The Court adopts the Commissioner’s finding and determination on Ground

Two that mere allegations of failing to communicate are insufficient to demonstrate

that counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial under Strickland.

              iii.   Ground Three: Perjury First Degree; and Ground Four:
                     “Prosecutorial Misconduct”

      In Ground Three, Perkins argues that his Trial Counsel should not have

allowed the State’s witnesses to swear falsely and give false statements during their

179
    Comm. Rep. at 26.
180
    Id.
181
    See e.g. C82, C86-87, C101-04, C108, C120-22, C123-25, D89-91, D97-98, D103, D150-51,
D156.
182
    C102-04.
183
    D89-91, C82, C86-86, C101-05, C108, C120-25.
184
    D90-91.
                                           32
testimony.185 In Ground Four, he makes a similar conclusory statement that the

prosecution allowed the “false” statements to be presented to the jury and therefore

misled the jury with “untruthfulness” during trial.186 Since both grounds (perjury

and prosecutorial misconduct) stem from the same factual findings, the Court

consolidates the review below.

       The Commissioner correctly determined that the claims asserting false

statements, perjury, and prosecutorial misconduct are procedurally barred under

Rule 61(i)(3) for failing to raise them on direct appeal.187 Because these claims were

not raised on direct appeal, the Commissioner recast them as IAC claims and

conducted a Strickland analysis.

       With regard to Perkins’ argument that his Counsel should be “punished” for

allowing the State’s prosecutors to perpetuate “perjury,” the Court reviews Trial

Counsel’s decision not to object to the alleged perjury and prosecutorial misconduct

and Appellate Counsel’s decision to not object on appeal under a Strickland. Thus,

Perkins must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was (1) objectively

185
    C802, C807. By objecting to the Commissioner’s characterization of Perkins’ claims as IAC
claims, Perkins is essentially arguing in favor of a procedural bar.
186
    Id.
187
    Id. at 29 (citing Ruffin v. State, 2019 WL 719038, at *2 (Del. Feb 19, 2019) (holding that claims
of prosecutorial misconduct not raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred under Rule
61(i)(3)); see also Reeder v. State, 2006 WL 1210986, at *2 (Del. May 3, 2006) (holding that
perjury claims raised for the first time on a motion for postconviction relief are procedurally barred
under Rule 61(i)(3)).
                                                 33
unreasonable and (2) there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”188

       Rule 61 Counsel in their Motion to Withdraw conducted a thorough review of

both Trial Counsel’s and Appellate Counsel’s responsibility to raise the perjury and

prosecutorial misconduct claims during trial and on appeal and found the claims

were meritless.189 The Commissioner found the same.190

       In support of his argument, Perkins again points to Underwood’s prior

inconsistent statement. But, the Court has already addressed this inconsistency and

finds that on de novo review Trial Counsel was not ineffective and Perkins was not

prejudiced because he used Underwood’s inconsistent statement to impeach

Underwood at trial.191

       Perkins also objects to the Commissioner’s finding that “Detective Bucksner

did not intentionally lie at Perkins’ preliminary hearing.”192 Perkins asserts (for the

first time) that during his preliminary hearing when Detective Bucksner was asked

by Trial Counsel about Underwood’s statements to investigators, Detective

Bucksner testified that Underwood told him Perkins made a statement saying “you

188
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
189
    D.I. 116-118. Anthony Figliola served as Perkins’ Trial and Appellate Counsel. However,
because he operated in a different capacity for each of his roles, the Court will review his conduct
as Trial and Appellate Counsel separately.
190
    Comm. Rep. at 32.
191
    Supra pp 25-26.
192
    Objections at 5.
                                                34
know, I got her.”193 Perkins claims this testimony is false because the transcript from

Underwood’s police interview never referenced any statements by Perkins that he

“got her.”194 This is of no consequence. It is correct that Detective Bucksner

testified at Perkins’ preliminary hearing that Underwood told him Perkins said, “I

got her” when Underwood saw Perkins at the 4th Street McDonald’s the day

following the murder.195 But, at trial, neither Detective Bucksner nor Underwood

testified that Perkins said, “I got her.” Luckily for Perkins, the jury never heard this

evidence.196

       As Rule 61 Counsel correctly notes:

       Any inconsistencies in prior statements and the testimony at trial do not
       give rise to a postconviction claim. Upon a review of the record, the
       prosecution did not mislead the jury or engage in misconduct. The
       prosecutor asked the witnesses questions, to which they responded.
       Trial counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses regarding
       any inconsistencies in their testimony from prior statements.197

       The Court agrees with Rule 61 Counsel and adopts the Commissioner’s

determination that Perkins’ IAC claims regarding perjury and prosecutorial

misconduct are without merit and fail Strickland.198

193
    Id.
194
    Id.
195
    C61-62.
196
    See generally, C309-327, C328-331.
197
    Id.
198
    Comm. Rep. at 32.
                                          35
                iv.    Ground Five: “The Use of False Evidence”

                       1. Trial Counsel was not unreasonable when deciding not to test
                          some of Perkins’ clothing for DNA

       Perkins argues that Trial Counsel should have presented evidence that some

of his clothing was not tested for DNA, and the use of such evidence at trial was

“false evidence.”199       The Commissioner found that, as a free-standing claim,

Perkins’ “use of false evidence” assertion “is procedurally barred under Rule

61(i)(3) because he failed to raise it in the proceedings leading to his conviction, and

as such, should be summarily dismissed.”200                     The Court agrees. But the

Commissioner gave Perkins the benefit of the doubt and reviewed this claim on its

merits.201

       While it is true the State did not test all of Perkins’ clothing for DNA, as the

Commissioner correctly notes, “Delaware law does not require that the State perform

any specific testing on the physical evidence it gathers.”202 Trial Counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise an objection because such an objection would have

199
    C803, C808; D80-88.
200
    Comm. Report. at 33.
201
    Comm. Rep. at 34 (“In his subsequent pro se filings, however, Perkins attempts to couch the
same ‘use of false evidence’ argument into one of ineffective assistance of counsel by claiming
that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to (i) present evidence that some of his clothing was
not tested for DNA; (ii) object to police testimony that his blue shirt and keychain had blood stains
on them; (iii) object to police testimony that he was wearing orange sweatpants over his blood-
stained blue sweatpants; and (iv) file a motion to suppress with respect to certain evidence.”).
202
    Dennis v. State, 2013 WL 1749807, at *3 (Del. Apr. 23, 2013) (citing Anderson v. State, 1999
WL 504332, at *3 (Del. Mar. 18, 1999); Comm. Rep. at 36.
                                                 36
been meritless. Lindauer testified with specificity regarding which items were tested

for DNA, and the DNA tests were performed to determine whether the blood on the

items tested was Murphy’s.203

         The State did not elicit “false evidence” by admitting into evidence Corporal

Vice’s observations regarding the physical evidence. Perkins’ argument is that the

photos of the clothing presented to the jury showed “no visible blood,” and if his

Trial Counsel raised this, it would “prove” the State introduced false evidence.204

Perkins’ claim is without merit. The testimony of the police officer who collected

Perkins’ clothing at the time of his arrest testified about what he observed: what

appeared to be dried blood on the keychain, knife blade, long-sleeve thermal t-shirt,

blue t-shirt, blue sweatpants, and boots.205 Although the blue t-shirt Perkins wore

under the gray long-sleeve thermal t-shirt was not tested for blood or DNA, this does

not make it “false.” Witnesses are not precluded from testifying about what they

observed simply because the photographs of the clothing do not show signs of visible

blood.

         Although the orange sweatpants were not tested for blood or DNA, Kish’s

testimony as to what he observed on the sweatpants was properly admitted. The

same is true of Corporal Vice’s testimony—that Perkins was wearing orange

203
    C473-97.
204
    Objections at 9.
205
    C400-10.
                                           37
sweatpants over his blue sweatpants at the time of his arrest, he observed “blood all

over the blue sweatpants,” and when he pulled the orange sweatpants down slightly,

he saw “a bunch of blood, fresh blood, [not] dried up blood,” in Perkins’ pocket.206

This is not “false evidence,” and Trial Counsel would have had no good faith basis

to file a motion to suppress as to any of this testimony.

          The Commissioner determined that Trial Counsel was not ineffective because

he failed to object to the introduction of Perkins’ clothing when there was not a basis

for the objection.207 The Court agrees.

                       2. Trial Counsel was not deficient by failing to obtain a voice
                          expert

          Perkins claims the 911 call was a “use of false evidence” because he disputes

that the male voice on the call was his and takes issue with the testimony of his

probation officer who identified his voice.208 Perkins contends his Trial Counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate and arrange for a voice expert to refute that

evidence and testify that the voice on the 911 call was not his.209 The Commissioner

deemed this claim procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(4),210 the Commissioner

states:

206
    C353.
207
    Id. at 37.
208
    D83-88.
209
    Id.; D.I. 169(A).
210
    Comm. Rep. at 38 (“The issue regarding the admissibility of the testimony of Perkins’ probation
officer regarding his identification of Perkins’ voice on the 911 call was previously adjudicated by
this Court and is therefore barred by Rule 61(i)(4). No Rule 61 exceptions apply.”).
                                                38
       [t]he issue regarding the admissibility of the testimony of Perkins’
       probation officer regarding his identification of Perkins’ voice on the
       911 call was previously adjudicated by this Court and is therefore
       barred by Rule 61(i)(4). No Rule 61 exceptions apply.211

       Perkins perseverates, objecting now to the Commissioner’s explanation that

the decision to call a voice expert was well within Trial Counsel’s discretion and his

decision not to do so was not ineffective.212 Perkins maintains that expert testimony

would have “prove[d] the use of false evidence, since John French is the only witness

claiming it’s my voice who isn’t a voice expert and I claim it is not my voice.”213

       The Commissioner correctly determined that Trial Counsel’s decision not to

call a voice identification witness fails under Strickland because it is unlikely that

such a witness would have changed the result of the trial.214 The jury heard on the

audiotape of the 911 call the speaker refer to himself as “G,” and Underwood

testified Perkins went by this nickname.”215 The jury heard Underwood say he met

Perkins through a friend named “Jimmy,” and the male speaker makes reference to

a “Jim” on that 911 call.216 Finally, the jury heard Perkins’ voice when portions of

211
    Comm. Rep. at 38 (internal citations omitted).
212
    Comm. Rep. at 39.
213
    C803-08.
214
    Comm. Rep. at 39.
215
    C310-12, C576.
216
    Id.
                                                39
his interview were played during the trial.217 The Court finds this objection without

merit and agrees with the Commissioner’s Report.

                       3. There was no suppression issue at the time of the arrest

       Perkins claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion

to suppress his warrantless arrest in violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights.218 He argues Appellate Counsel was likewise ineffective for

failing to raise this issue on direct appeal.219 The Commissioner determined that this

claim is without merit because there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Perkins

and the search was incident to his arrest.220 Murphy’s body was found on the

morning of July 23, 2015, at approximately 8:00 a.m., and Perkins was arrested at

approximately 5:30 p.m.221 A search warrant was executed at 7:57 p.m.222 During

that timeframe, enough evidence was gathered to establish probable cause.

Detective Bucksner did not testify that Perkins was not a suspect at the time of his

arrest; to the contrary he stated that at the time the investigators first found Murphy’s

217
    C581.
218
    D83-88. Perkins contends all evidence seized was illegally obtained because it was not pursuant
to a warrant. D87-88, D.I. 167(A). This contention is without merit.
219
    Id., D.I. 169(A).
220
    Comm. Rep. at 47. U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“[a] custodial arrest of a
suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification . . . it is
the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.”).
221
    C29-30.
222
    Id.
                                                  40
body, Perkins was not yet a suspect.223 Once the police identified the victim as

Murphy, Perkins became a suspect.224 Although on the video footage, Perkins and

Murphy do not appear to be fighting at the McDonald’s eight hours prior to her

murder, that does not, as Perkins argues, establish a lack of probable cause.225 The

video establishes they were together eight hours before the murder, shows them with

the McDonald’s cups, and shows Perkins with a green grocery bag.

      There was no good faith basis for Trial Counsel to file a suppression motion

given the facts here. Trial Counsel recognized this and advised Perkins that there

was no colorable basis for filing a motion.226 Likewise, Appellate Counsel was not

deficient for failing to raise a meritless issue on appeal. For the foregoing reasons,

the Commissioner’s Report is ADOPTED and Perkins’ Motion for Postconviction

Relief is DENIED.

          D.     Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

      On February 19, 2021, Rule 61 Counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as

Postconviction Counsel pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(6). Rule

61(e)(6) provides that:

      [i]f counsel considers the movant’s claim to be so lacking in merit that
      counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any
      other substantial ground for relief available to the movant, counsel may
223
    C54-55.
224
    Id.
225
    Objections at 10-11.
226
    D.I. 115-118. See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel along with the accompanying Memorandum
in Support of Motion to Withdraw and Appendix.
                                           41
       move to withdraw. The motion shall explain the factual and legal basis
       for counsel’s opinion and shall give notice that the movant may file a
       response to the motion within 30 days of service of the motion upon the
       movant.227

Rule 61 Counsel represents that, after undertaking a thorough examination of the

record to evaluate Perkins’ claims, they determined the claims to be so lacking in

merit that Counsel cannot ethically advocate them.228 They are not aware of any

other substantial claims for relief available to Perkins.229 Because they find no

potential meritorious grounds on which to base a Rule 61 motion, they seek to

withdraw as counsel.230 The Court is satisfied that Rule 61 Counsel has made a

conscientious and thorough examination of the record and upon de novo review of

the record, the Court finds that Perkins’ Rule 61 Motion is devoid of any meritorious

postconviction claims. Consequently, Rule 61 Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is

GRANTED.231

           E.     Perkins’ Motion to Substitute Rule 61 Counsel

       Because Perkins’ Rule 61 Motion is denied, Perkins’ Motion for Substitute

Rule 61 Counsel is DENIED AS MOOT.

227
    Super. Ct. Civ. R. 61(e)(6).
228
    Id.
229
    Id.
230
    Id.
231
    Matos v. State, 2015 WL 5719694, at *2 (Del. Sept. 29, 2015).
                                              42
                                   V.    CONCLUSION

       After careful and de novo review, the Court accepts and ADOPTS, in whole,

the Commissioner’s Report.232 Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is

DENIED, Rule 61 Counsel’s Postconviction Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw is

GRANTED, and Perkins’ Motion for Substitute Rule 61 Counsel is DENIED AS

MOOT.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                   /s Jan R. Jurden
                                                   Jan R. Jurden, President Judge

oc:    Prothonotary
cc:    Carolyn S. Hake, Esquire
       Patrick J. Collins, Esquire
       Kimberly A. Price, Esquire
       Anthony A. Figliola, Jr., Esquire
       Gary Perkins (SBI #285925)

232
   See Super. Ct. Crim. R. 62(a)(5)(iv) (“A judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings of fact or recommendations made by the Commissioner.”).
                                              43