Court Opinion

ID: 9881724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 18:18:26.605332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:14:23.167586
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                   JENNIFER STUCKY, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                         v.

              TJC TRAINING, LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 22-0540
                                FILED 10-3-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. CV2018-007718
                  The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Jennifer Stucky, Fairfield, OH
Plaintiff/Appellant

Michael C. Van, Las Vegas, NV
By VC2 Law
Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
                       STUCKY v. TJC TRAINING
                         Decision of the Court

                     MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1           Jennifer Stucky challenges the superior court’s ruling
enforcing a settlement agreement between herself, TJC Training, LLC
(“TJC”), and Gerald and Maryann Acuff. Because that agreement is
binding, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2             Stucky sued TJC, the Acuffs, and Anthony Capullo in 2018
seeking either damages or a declaration that she owned 15 percent of TJC.
Capullo was dismissed from the case after a bankruptcy discharge. The
claims against TJC and the Acuffs (collectively “Defendants”) proceeded to
a jury trial, where Stucky represented herself.

¶3           On day three of the trial, the parties told the court they
wanted to settle the case. The court responded that the settlement terms
must be certain, stressing, “I won’t agree for you guys to have a tentative
settlement here with the understanding that if it breaks down, you’re
coming to come back for a second jury trial.” After excusing the jury, the
court encouraged the parties to “continue to talk,” advising:

      If you reach some sort of a resolution and you want to put it
      on the record to make what’s called a Rule 80(a) settlement
      agreement, let me know. What I would do in that situation is
      I would have one of you state for the record what the
      agreement is and then I would ask the other one, do you agree
      with that agreement, and then I make a formal record and we
      have at least the—the FTR recording of what that settlement
      would be.

¶4            Representing herself, Stucky asked the court to repeat the
rule. The court answered that the rule says ”in the event the parties reach
a resolution, it’s final and binding if placed on the court record or in
writing.”

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                        STUCKY v. TJC TRAINING
                          Decision of the Court

¶5             After lunch, defense counsel announced that “the parties
have come to a tentative resolution.” The attorney read 13 terms of the
settlement agreement aloud. Stucky occasionally chimed in to add or
clarify the terms. The court then turned to Stucky and asked, “Ms. Stucky,
have you heard what’s been said and are you in agreement with that?”
Stucky replied, “Reluctantly, but yes.” The court then asked Stucky a
second time, “But, Ms. Stucky, just so we’re clear on the record, you agree;
is that correct?” Stucky said, “Yes.” Defense counsel told the court he
would prepare a draft TJC operating agreement that conformed to the terms
of settlement by June 1, 2021.

¶6            The court declared a Rule 80(a) settlement, finding “the
parties have knowingly, voluntarily entered into that agreement,” which
the court confirmed in a minute entry, “approving and adopting the
settlement terms recited on the record as a binding agreement pursuant to
Rule 80(a).” Given the settlement, the superior court vacated the remainder
of trial. The parties agreed the superior court would retain jurisdiction to
resolve any “disputes over reaching the agreement.”

¶7            When the dust settled, Stucky refused to sign the written
operating agreement. She filed several motions, which the superior court
described as “lengthy” and “increasingly denigrating,” seeking relief from
the settlement agreement. The court heard oral argument on Stucky’s
motions and denied each, granting the defendants’ motion to enforce the
settlement agreement.

¶8           Stucky moved unsuccessfully for relief from the judgment
and now appeals. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and
12-2101(A)(1).

                              DISCUSSION

¶9            Stucky disavows the settlement agreement on appeal,
arguing it was only “tentative” and never binding under Rule 80. We
review de novo the enforceability of a settlement agreement, Robertson v.
Alling, 237 Ariz. 345, 347, ¶ 8 (2015), using general principles of contract
interpretation, Emmons v. Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 509, 512, ¶ 14 (App.
1998). We review de novo the application of court rules. Haroutunian v.
ValueOptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541, 549, ¶ 22 (App. 2008).

¶10           Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(a) directs that a settlement
agreement is binding and enforceable if either (1) in writing or (2) made
orally in open court and entered in the minutes. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 80(a).

                                     3
                         STUCKY v. TJC TRAINING
                           Decision of the Court

¶11           Here, the parties reached an agreement on the third day of
trial, which they memorialized on the record in open court. The court
explained the meaning of Rule 80(a) to Stucky, and twice asked Stucky to
confirm her agreement. Stucky did so. The court then “declare[d] a Rule
80(a) settlement,” which the court enshrined in a minute entry. That
agreement is binding.

¶12            Stucky cleaves to the adjective “tentative,” but the “tentative”
agreement was no longer tentative after Stucky accepted its terms. See Ariz.
R. Civ. P. 80(a). Nor does Stucky’s subjective perception of finality defeat
her objective manifestation of assent. See Hill-Shafer P’ship v. Chilson Fam.
Tr., 165 Ariz. 469, 474 (1990); see also Althaus v. Cornelio, 203 Ariz. 597, 601,
¶ 15 (App. 2002) (oral agreements still binding if they anticipate a written
document memorializing the terms).

¶13           We also reject Stucky’s subordinate arguments, including
discovery violations, fraud, lack of mutual assent, attorney misconduct,
“violence” to the agreement’s terms, and attorney fee awards. Having
settled the case, Stucky cannot relitigate it here, see Emmons, 192 Ariz. 509
at ¶ 18, and she has not offered clear and convincing evidence of mutual
mistake or fraud, see Nelson v. Rice, 198 Ariz. 563, 566, ¶ 7 (App. 2000). The
record also reflects the amended operating agreement complied with the
settlement terms. The court did not err in enforcing the settlement
agreement.

                                Attorney Fees

¶14            Stucky challenges the superior court’s attorney fee award,
citing the Rule 80(a) settlement provision that “with regard to this litigation,
each side will bear its own costs and attorney’s fees.” She cites caselaw
stating that a contractual fee provision can preclude an award under A.R.S.
§ 12-341.01(A). See, e.g., Geller v. Lesk, 230 Ariz. 624, 627, ¶ 9 (App. 2012)
(citing Connor v. Cal-Az Props, Inc., 137 Ariz. 53, 55 (App. 1983)).1 But the
superior court also based its award on A.R.S. § 12-349(A), and Stucky cites
no authority suggesting a contractual fee provision can preclude the court
from awarding fees under that statute. She also does not challenge the

1      Our supreme court later held that § 12-341.01(A) applies unless it
“effectively conflicts with an express contractual provision governing
recovery of attorney’s fees.” American Power Products, Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc.,
242 Ariz. 364, 368, ¶¶ 13–14 (2017) (quoting Jordan v. Burgbacher, 180 Ariz.
221, 229 (App. 1994)).

                                       4
                        STUCKY v. TJC TRAINING
                          Decision of the Court

court’s findings that she unreasonably delayed and expanded the
proceedings. See A.R.S. § 12-349(A)(3).

¶15          Stucky also contends the superior court erred by not holding
an evidentiary hearing on the attorney fee award, but she cites no authority
in support and § 12-349 does not require an evidentiary hearing.

¶16             Stucky next contends the fee award was excessive because the
court did not consider the “extensive evidence” of “contradictory,
fraudulent, and inflated documentation.” We review the amount of the
award for an abuse of discretion. Larkin v. State ex rel. Rottas, 175 Ariz. 417,
426 (App. 1992). We discern no error here. See Takieh v. O’Meara, 252 Ariz.
51, 62, ¶ 39 (App. 2021) (“We may affirm the superior court’s [§ 12-349]
ruling ‘if it is correct for any reason apparent in the record.’”) (quoting
Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212 Ariz. 263, 265, ¶ 9 (App. 2006)).

¶17           Because she has not prevailed, we deny Stucky’s request for
her costs. Defendants request their attorney fees on appeal under ARCAP
13(a)(8) and 21, but they offer no statutory basis in support. See Assyia v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Ariz. 216, 224, ¶ 34 (App. 2012)
(discussing ARCAP 21). We therefore deny their fee request, but
Defendants may recover their taxable costs incurred in this appeal upon
compliance with ARCAP 21.

                               CONCLUSION

¶18           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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