Court Opinion

ID: 9715381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:03:12.90787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.376376
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). In this case, we are called upon to decide whether a claimant is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits where: she began work knowing that her employment required Saturday work; she worked on Saturdays for a period after becoming employed, but later refused such work once she had changed her religious beliefs to a creed which did not permit Saturday work; the employer imposed no new conditions upon her; and the employer, a small bank with few employees, attempted in good faith (but without success) to accommodate her newly held religious beliefs. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the claimant’s First Amendment rights were not infringed by the denial of unemployment compensation.
In both Thomas v Review Bd of Indiana Employment Security Div, 450 US 707; 101 S Ct 1425; 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981), and Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), the employer changed the employment conditions which caused the employment to become objectionable on the basis of the employees’ religious beliefs. In Hildebrand v Unemployment Ins Appeals Bd, 19 Cal 3d 765; 140 Cal Rptr 151; 566 P2d 1297 (1977), the following language and reasoning was employed:
"Sherbert is distinguishable from the present case. In Sherbert the high court examined the circumstances under which a prospective employee refused without good cause 'to accept available suitable work.’ Although *617California imposes a similar 'suitable work’ requirement upon claimants (§ 1257), the legality of that statute is not before us. Instead, measuring the constitutionality of section 1256, we must determine whether plaintiff, having initially accepted employment, thereafter left work 'voluntarily without good cause.’ The public policy underlying section 1256 has been recognized both statutorily and judicially. By denying unemployment benefits to one who has voluntarily terminated employment without good cause, the state promotes a valid purpose in assuring that unemployment benefits are reserved 'for persons unemployed through no fault of their own, and to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimum.’
"We emphasize the critical difference in the two cases. As illustrated by, and rejected in, Sherbert the condition of work imposed upon the initial employment required an impermissible sacrifice of conscience. In the matter before us, the condition was knowingly and voluntarily accepted, work commenced, and a change of mind and heart thereafter ensued, doubtless motivated by the very deepest and most sincere of impulses.” 19 Cal 3d 770-771.
Similar results based upon similar reasoning have been reached by other jurisdictions considering facts not unlike those presently before us. See Martinez v Industrial Comm of Colorado, — Colo App —; 618 P2d 738 (1980), Levold v Employment Security Dep't 24 Wash App 472; 604 P2d 175 (1979), and Kut v Albers Super Markets, 146 Ohio St 522; 66 NE2d 643 (1946).
I recognize that Adams does not allege religious discrimination on the part of the bank, but rather, challenges this state’s statutory scheme of disqualification from unemployment compensation. The Thomas Court delineated this distinction when it said that what is impermissible is "[wjhere the state conditions receipt of an important benefit *618upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith”. 450 US 717. The instant case, however, possesses several distinguishing characteristics not present in Thomas and Sherbert.
First, unlike the employers in Thomas and Sherbert, the employer here made no changes in its terms of employment which would interfere with Adams’s exercise of her religion. She made the change. Second, the bank here clearly attempted to accommodate Adams. It asked the other tellers if they would mind working her Saturday hours, but this attempt proved fruitless. Further, the bank offered any forthcoming suitable employment to her.
Finally, the benefits conferred here are not simply state-paid benefits; they are benefits substantially funded by employers. The employment security statutes essentially establish rules and guidelines for payment of benefits largely paid by employers. The statutory scheme as a whole is designed to guarantee continuing benefits to employees who are involuntarily terminated without cause. General Motors Corp v Employment Security Comm, 20 Mich App 379, 384; 174 NW2d 5 (1969). The system is not intended to compensate those who leave their employment voluntarily without good cause or for reasons not attributable to their employers.
For the reasons stated herein, I would hold that Adams is not entitled to benefits according to MCL 421.69(2)(a); MSA 17.569(19)(2)(a). She was not penalized by her employer for exercising her religious beliefs, nor was she forced into unemployment through arbitrary, unfair, or illegal actions by her employer. The statutory scheme, designed as it is to protect employees from such actions, serves a valid state purpose and is substantially served by denying Adams benefits in the instant case. I would reverse.