Court Opinion

ID: 9689922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:37.308824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.767883
License: Public Domain

BLOODWORTH, Justice
(dissenting) :
While I concur in part of the majority opinion authored by Mr. Justice Somerville, I most respectfully dissent from that portion dealing with the judgment against Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc.
As to defendant Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc., I would hold the complaint does state a cause of action against this defendant. If the pleading is in some respect defective, such as is suggested in the majority opinion, it appears to me the harmless error rule would govern (Rule 45, Revised Rules of the Supreme Court, 279 Ala. XXI, XLI).
This court has long held, viz:
“ * * * Even if the court erred in overruling the demurrer, however, we must review the ruling in light of the rule that overruling a demurrer to a count is not always reversible error. The rule is that if there is some defect of averment in the complaint and the court has erred in holding such pleading good, nevertheless, if there is evidence of the matter so omitted and both parties try the issue as though such allegation were made, and the court instructs the jury that such matters must be proven, and both parties have full opportunity to offer and do offer all the evidence they wish on that issue, we will not reverse the judgment for the error in such ruling on the pleading. Turner v. Blanton, 277 Ala. 536, 540, 173 So.2d 80, and authorities there cited. The error in overruling the demurrer must be held as cured by the clear instructions requiring proof of the omitted allegation. Southern Ry. Co. v. Dickson, 211 Ala. 481, 485, 100 So. 665. There are circumstances, however, when the rule will not apply, as, for example, when the complaint does not state a cause of action without the matter which was omitted. Thompson-Hayward Chemical Co. v. Childress, 277 Ala. 285, 291, 169 So.2d 305; City of Mobile v. McClure, 221 Ala. 51, 53, 127 So. 832.” Western Railway of Alabama v. Brown, 280 Ala. 543, 555, 196 So.2d 392, 402.
In the Western Railway case, the appellant insisted that neither count stated a cause of action, viz:
“ * * * Defendant says that, instead of averring negligence in general terms, plaintiff attempts to state the acts or *541omissions of defendant which constitute the breach of duty charged, and that the complaint is demurrable under the .rule that, where a complaint avers negligence in general terms and then avers the particular act or acts constituting the alleged negligence without more, unless such act or acts in themselves amount to negligence, the complaint is demurrable. (Citing cases)
“Defendant says that, in Count One, plaintiff does not allege the breach of any duty owed by defendant to plaintiff in that plaintiff alleged merely that she suffered injury as the proximate result of the ‘negligence of the defendant in negligently failing to provide the Plaintiff with a stool or box on which to alight from its said train when such was necessary by reason of the unreasonably high distance from said train to the ground,’ without alleging facts which show a duty on defendant to furnish a stool or box.
The court, in that case, rejected the contention that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. However, it was pointed out, viz:
“We do not hold that the complaint is not defective on some or all of the grounds urged by defendant. * * * ”
The court then proceeded to hold, as I have hereinbefore indicated I would hold, that even if there was error in overruling the demurrer, it was not reversible error.
Neither would I reverse for failure of the complaint to sufficiently allege proximate cause nor for failure of the trial court to give the affirmative charge on proximate cause, as to defendant Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc.
As the majority opinion suggests, our rule is that when the facts presented are such that reasonable men must draw the same conclusion, the question of proximate cause is one of law for the court to determine. Giles v. Gardner, 287 Ala. 166, 169, 249 So.2d 824 (1971). I cannot agree that reasonable men must draw the same-conclusion from the facts as to proximate cause here. It is apparent the trial judge reached the same conclusion as I espouse. The dissenting justices are each of the. opinion the issue was for the jury. Thus, it is self-evident that a number of judges do not agree that the issue of proximate cause is a matter of law. Generally, it is held to be a jury question. Giles v. Gardner, supra.
I do not disagree with the principles of law enunciated in the majority opinion as to proximate cause, but I do disagree with their application to the facts in the case at bar.
I also consider the following principles from our decisions to be applicable on the issue of proximate cause, and I would follow them in deciding this issue in this case, viz:
“ ‘The particular principle of proximate cause here pertinent to defendant’s liability is: That a person guilty of negligence should be held responsible for all the consequences which a prudent and experienced man, fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact existed, whether they could have been ascertained by reasonable diligence or not, would at the time of the negligent act, have thought reasonably possible to follow, if they had occurred to his mind.
“ ‘It is not necessary that the defendant should anticipate the injury in the precise form as resulted. Nor need the particular consequences have been within the contemplation of the parties. * * *
“ ‘In line with our decisions on this subject is the statement: “As regards proximate cause * * * the courts look more for the possibility of a hazard of *542some form to some person than for the expectation of the particular chance that happened. * * * ” ’
“ ‘Wien a person by his negligence produces a dangerous condition of things, which does not become active for mischief until another person has operated upon it by the commission of another negligent act, which might not unreasonably be anticipated to occur, the original act of negligence is then regarded as the proximate cause of the injury which finally results. (Citing cases) * * * ” Alabama Power Company v. Guy, 281 Ala. 583, 206 So.2d 594 (1968).
“In Chambers v. Cox, 222 Ala. 1, 3, 130 So. 416, 418, we said:
“ ‘ * * * “As a general rule, it may be said that negligence, to render a person liable, need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes, other than plaintiff’s fault, is the proximate cause of the injury.” * * * ’
“So also in this case, negligence may have existed on the part of others which concurred with the alleged negligence of the appellee to proximately cause the appellant’s injury. To recover, the negligence, causing the appellant’s injury in this case, need not be the sole proximate cause of her injury, but only its proximate cause, if she was free from negligence contributing thereto. The charge misstates the law and giving it requires a reversal of the case.” Shepherd v. Gardner Wholesale, Inc., 288 Ala. 43, 256 So.2d 877.
In conclusion, I would most respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the court and would hold that the case ought to be affirmed as to defendant Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc.
HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, J., con■cur.