Court Opinion

ID: 9914077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 16:01:10.641724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:02.536141
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1074    Document: 28    Page: 1   Filed: 12/29/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                LORI D. MCLAUGHLIN,
                      Petitioner

                            v.

      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                        2023-1074
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-1221-19-0114-M-1.
                 ______________________

                Decided: December 29, 2023
                  ______________________

    LORI D. MCLAUGHLIN, Whitsett, NC, pro se.

     JEFFREY GAUGER, Office of General Counsel, United
 States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,
 for respondent. Also represented by ALLISON JANE BOYLE,
 KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH.
                  ______________________
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 2                                        MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

         Before DYK, PROST, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Lori McLaughlin appeals a decision from the Merit
 Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dismissing her whistle-
 blower Individual Right of Action appeal for lack of juris-
 diction. We affirm because Ms. McLaughlin’s disclosures
 either (1) fall within the purview of her Title VII claims and
 thus are not within the MSPB’s jurisdiction, or (2) were not
 exhausted before the Office of Special Counsel as required
 by the Whistleblower Protection Act.
                               I
     Ms. McLaughlin was employed as a Criminal Investi-
 gator by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Ex-
 plosives (the Agency), a law enforcement component of the
 Department of Justice (DOJ). Throughout her employment
 with the Agency, Ms. McLaughlin has filed numerous Title
 VII complaints alleging Equal Employment Opportunity
 (EEO) violations. 1
                               A
     On or about March 29, 2018, Ms. McLaughlin filed a
 whistleblower complaint with the Office of Special Counsel
 (OSC). In that complaint, Ms. McLaughlin identified dis-
 closures she had made to District Court Judge Catherine
 Eagles between August 2017 and January 24, 2018, during
 a Title VII proceeding in the Middle District of North

     1   See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Mukasey, No. 1:08-cv-1256
 (D.D.C.) (filed July 22, 2008); McLaughlin v. Holder, No.
 1:11-cv-1868 (D.D.C.) (filed Oct. 21, 2011); McLaughlin v.
 Holder, No. 6:12-cv-1168 (M.D. Fla.) (filed July 30, 2012);
 McLaughlin v. Sessions, No. 1:17-cv-759 (M.D.N.C.) (filed
 Aug. 16, 2017); McLaughlin v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-318
 (M.D.N.C.) (filed Mar. 21, 2019); McLaughlin v. Barr, No.
 20-cv-230 (M.D.N.C.) (filed Mar. 11, 2020).
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                         3

 Carolina. Ms. McLaughlin alleged she informed Judge Ea-
 gles during this time period that: (1) a DOJ attorney did
 not report Privacy Act violations; (2) a DOJ attorney tried
 to coerce a deceptive settlement agreement; (3) Agency of-
 ficials did not investigate misconduct allegations commit-
 ted by DOJ attorneys; (4) Agency officials did not
 investigate misconduct allegations committed by Agency
 management officials; (5) a DOJ attorney engaged in im-
 proper ex parte communications in her Title VII case in the
 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia; (6) a DOJ
 attorney denied her an opportunity to respond to a court
 motion in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
 in bad faith; (7) Agency officials committed several ethics
 violations during the administrative processing of her Title
 VII complaints and attempted to cover up allegations of
 sexual harassment inside the Agency; and (8) an Agency
 management official obstructed justice by submitting a
 false statement about non-mandatory training. On Sep-
 tember 19, 2018, the OSC informed Ms. McLaughlin that
 it was closing her file but that she had the right to file an
 appeal with the MSPB.
                              B
      On November 3, 2018, Ms. McLaughlin filed the pre-
 sent Individual Right of Action (IRA) appeal with the
 MSPB. On November 13, 2018, the administrative judge
 issued a jurisdictional show cause order. In response to the
 show cause order, Ms. McLaughlin filed several declara-
 tions in which she alleged that the MSPB had jurisdiction
 because of (1) the disclosures she made to Judge Eagles
 during her Title VII case (discussed supra in Section I.A),
 and (2) statements Ms. McLaughlin made to staff in Sena-
 tor Charles Grassley’s office and in the Government Ac-
 countability Office (GAO) on July 10, 2018, alleging that an
 Agency official improperly suspended another Investiga-
 tive Analyst at the Agency. Ms. McLaughlin alleged that,
 because of these disclosures, she was removed from her po-
 sition as a field criminal investigator, she was reassigned
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 4                                      MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 to less favorable positions and locations, and her security
 clearance investigation was improperly terminated.
                              C
      On April 1, 2019, the administrative judge issued an
 initial decision dismissing Ms. McLaughlin’s MSPB ap-
 peal for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, this court vacated
 that decision and remanded for the administrative judge to
 consider Ms. McLaughlin’s January 28, 2019 submission,
 which it had improperly failed to consider the first time.
 McLaughlin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 853 F. App’x 648, 650
 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (non-precedential). We did not take a posi-
 tion on the jurisdictional issue at that time, and only gen-
 erally noted that the administrative judge’s “legal analysis
 was admittedly flawed in at least certain respects.” Id.
     On remand, the administrative judge notified the par-
 ties that they could file additional evidence and argument
 to support their jurisdictional positions. On June 15, 2021,
 Ms. McLaughlin timely filed a supplemental jurisdictional
 statement. She later filed a reply to the Agency’s supple-
 mental jurisdictional statement, but the administrative
 judge did not consider it because the post stamp on the en-
 velope was July 13, 2021, one day after the deadline for
 supplemental submissions.
     While this appeal was pending before the MSPB,
 Ms. McLaughlin filed another IRA appeal with the MSPB
 on September 26, 2021. That appeal involved similar dis-
 closures to the ones at issue here. The parties agreed to
 stay this appeal until after a jurisdictional determination
 in the other case. On January 21, 2022, the administrative
 judge dismissed the September 26, 2021 appeal for lack of
 jurisdiction. Ms. McLaughlin appealed that MSPB deci-
 sion, and this court has since affirmed the decision.
 McLaughlin v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 2022-1589, 2023
 WL 2820085 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 7, 2023) (non-precedential).
      While the September 26, 2021 appeal was pending be-
 fore us, the administrative judge issued a decision in the
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                           5

 present case dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. The admin-
 istrative judge concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over
 the disclosure to Senator Grassley’s office because that dis-
 closure was not exhausted before the OSC. For the rest of
 the disclosures, the administrative judge concluded that it
 lacked jurisdiction—not necessarily because those disclo-
 sures were related to her Title VII case—but because
 Ms. McLaughlin had not established a reasonable belief
 that the Agency violated a law and thus did not make any
 protected disclosures. The administrative judge also con-
 cluded that, even had she made protected disclosures, she
 did not show how the disclosures resulted in an adverse ac-
 tion.
     Ms. McLaughlin appeals this decision, arguing that
 the MSPB has jurisdiction over her appeal and that the ad-
 ministrative judge procedurally erred by disregarding cer-
 tain of her MSPB submissions. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                               II
     We review MSPB decisions for whether they are “(1)
 arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
 not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without proce-
 dures required by law, rule, or regulation having been fol-
 lowed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). Whether the MSPB has jurisdiction
 over an appeal is a question of law we review de novo.
 Coradeschi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 439 F.3d 1329, 1331
 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Although pro se pleadings are generally
 held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by
 counsel, pro se litigants still bear the burden of establish-
 ing jurisdiction over their claims. Prewitt v. Merit Sys. Prot.
 Bd., 133 F.3d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As to the relevant
 procedural arguments, we review the Board’s decision not
 to consider a submission deemed untimely under an abuse
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 6                                        MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 of discretion standard. See, e.g., Zamot v. Merit Sys. Prot.
 Bd., 332 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
                               III
     Reviewing the jurisdictional issue de novo, we conclude
 that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction over Ms. McLaughlin’s
 appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). We are also unpersuaded
 by Ms. McLaughlin’s procedural arguments and see no
 abuse of discretion. Thus, the MSPB properly dismissed
 the appeal, and we affirm.
                               A
     There are two categories of statements that
 Ms. McLaughlin argues give rise to jurisdiction. The first
 category includes statements she made during the context
 of a Title VII complaint, and the second category includes
 statements made to staff in Senator Grassley’s office and
 the GAO. We begin with the first category and conclude
 that those statements do not give rise to MSPB jurisdic-
 tion.
      The MSPB’s jurisdiction over IRA actions stems from
 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). This jurisdictional provision allows a
 federal employee to seek corrective action from the MSPB
 for any personnel action taken “as a result of a prohibited
 personnel practice described in § 2302(b)(8) or
 § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).” 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a). This
 provision does not give the MSPB jurisdiction over any of
 the other prohibited personnel actions described in
 § 2302(b), such as employment discrimination ((b)(1)) or re-
 taliation for filing an employment discrimination action
 ((b)(9)(A)(ii)). Id.; see also Spruill v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
 978 F.2d 679, 690–91 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Thus, whether the
 MSPB has jurisdiction to hear Ms. McLaughlin’s appeal
 depends on whether she seeks corrective action for person-
 nel actions taken because of a prohibited practice under
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                           7

 subsections (b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i), 2 or whether she seeks cor-
 rective action for personnel actions taken because of a pro-
 hibited practice under some other subsection.
     Section 2302(b)(8) prohibits an agency from retaliating
 against an employee for whistleblowing, which is defined
 as:
     [A]ny disclosure of information by an employee or
     applicant which the employee or applicant reason-
     ably believes evidences—

     (i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or

     (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds,
     an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
     danger to public health or safety,

     if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by
     law and if such information is not specifically re-
     quired by Executive order to be kept secret in the
     interest of national defense or the conduct of for-
     eign affairs.
 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Separately, § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) pro-
 hibits an agency from retaliating against that employee for
 pursuing a whistleblower complaint under (b)(8). Young v.
 Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 961 F.3d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
 Both types of actions are within the MSPB’s jurisdiction.

     2   The prohibited practices of (b)(9)(B), (C), and (D)
 protect an employee’s rights to give testimony in an inves-
 tigation, cooperate with the Inspector General, or refuse to
 obey an order that would require them to break a law.
 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). These categories are not relevant to
 the statements here, and thus we do not address them in
 detail.
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 8                                       MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

      In contrast, § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) makes clear that the
 MSPB’s jurisdiction under § 1221(a) does not cover “retali-
 ation for exercising any appeal, complaint, or grievance
 right other than one seeking to remedy a violation of section
 2302(b)(8).” Young, 961 F.3d at 1329 (emphasis added). For
 example, as we noted in our recent decision dismissing Ms.
 McLaughlin’s similar appeal, “the MSPB does not have ju-
 risdiction over alleged retaliation for filing Equal Employ-
 ment      Opportunity     (“EEO”)      and     discrimination
 complaints.” McLaughlin, 2023 WL 2820085, at *4. Nor
 does the MSPB have jurisdiction over alleged retaliation
 for statements that “were made during [appellant’s] Title
 VII lawsuit and were directly related to her attempt to rem-
 edy alleged Title VII violations.” Id. This does not mean
 that there is no remedy for parties who claim retaliation
 for actions taken in a Title VII lawsuit. The proper avenue
 for such cases may be through the Title VII process before
 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or in dis-
 trict court, but not through the IRA process before the
 MSPB. 3 See Young, 961 F.3d at 1329.
     Here, most of Ms. McLaughlin’s alleged disclosures
 were not only made during her Title VII case, but they were
 also directly related to her allegations of employment dis-
 crimination in that case. We go through each in turn, ex-
 plaining why all the relevant statements either fall within
 the purview of subsections (b)(1) or (b)(9)(A)(ii), and thus

     3   We do not decide here if the Equal Employment
 Opportunity Commission can review and provide a remedy
 for actions taken by a defendant in response to litigation
 statements and arguments made by the plaintiff during a
 Title VII litigation. In any event, Ms. McLaughlin could po-
 tentially seek redress before the district court for such re-
 taliation. See McLaughlin, 2023 WL 2820085, at *5 (noting
 Ms. McLaughlin “could seek redress for retaliation based
 on the alleged FRCP violation before the district court”).
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                          9

 are not (b)(8) or (b)(9)(A)(i) statements that would give rise
 to MSPB jurisdiction.
      The first alleged disclosure was a statement to the dis-
 trict court that a DOJ attorney did not report Privacy Act
 Violations. This statement was made directly in support of
 Ms. McLaughlin’s Title VII complaint, which alleged as
 part of her discrimination case that a DOJ attorney “failed
 to report Privacy Act Violations against the EEO Office
 that were submitted by [Ms. McLaughlin],” while at the
 same time, “allowing DOJ Attorneys to file a Privacy Act
 Violation against [Ms. McLaughlin].” McLaughlin, No.
 1:17-cv-00759       (M.D.N.C.),     ECF     No.    1    (Com-
 plaint) ¶ 174 (filed Aug. 16, 2017). Because she was mak-
 ing this statement to prove employment discrimination
 ((b)(1)) and/or retaliation for pursuing an employment dis-
 crimination claim ((b)(9)(A)(ii)), this statement is an exam-
 ple of Ms. McLaughlin “exercis[ing] any appeal, complaint,
 or grievance” right other than one seeking to remedy a
 § 2302(b)(8) violation. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii). Thus,
 the statement does not fall within the MSPB’s jurisdiction.
     Similarly, Ms. McLaughlin’s second alleged disclo-
 sure—that a DOJ attorney tried to coerce a deceptive set-
 tlement agreement—was a supporting allegation in Ms.
 McLaughlin’s Title VII complaint. She alleged in her Title
 VII complaint that the Agency committed employment dis-
 crimination against her because it “attempted to ‘coerce’ a
 deceptive settlement agreement regarding [her] Federal
 EEO lawsuit.” McLaughlin, No. 1:17-cv-00759 (M.D.N.C.),
 Complaint ¶ 173. Like the first statement, this second
 statement falls within (b)(9)(A)(ii) and is not within the
 MSPB’s jurisdiction.
     Ms. McLaughlin’s third and fourth alleged disclosures
 are, respectively, that Agency officials did not investigate
 misconduct allegations committed by DOJ attorneys or
 Agency management officials. But the misconduct the
 Agency allegedly failed to address in both instances was
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 10                                        MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 sexual harassment, which is a form of employment discrim-
 ination based on sex. To the extent these allegations were
 made as part of Ms. McLaughlin’s Title VII case for retali-
 ation, they would fall within (b)(9)(A)(ii). And even if not
 made solely during the Title VII case, but also made out-
 side the context of her Title VII complaint, these are alle-
 gations of sex discrimination and would fall squarely
 within (b)(1). Either way, such statements are not within
 the MSPB’s jurisdiction.
     Ms. McLaughlin’s fifth and sixth alleged disclosures
 are, respectively, that a DOJ attorney engaged in improper
 ex parte communications in her Title VII case before the
 U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and a DOJ
 attorney denied her an opportunity to respond to a court
 motion in violation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
 in bad faith. Both of these statements are allegations that
 the Agency intentionally took actions designed to interfere
 with Ms. McLaughlin’s ability to exercise her Title VII com-
 plaint rights. Like the first and second disclosures dis-
 cussed above, such allegations fall squarely within
 § (b)(9)(A)(ii).
     So, too, does Ms. McLaughlin’s seventh alleged disclo-
 sure fall within § (b)(9)(A)(ii). This disclosure includes as-
 sertions that Agency officials committed several ethics
 violations during the administrative processing of her Title
 VII complaints and attempted to cover up allegations of
 sexual harassment inside the Agency. But complaints
 about the administrative processing of Title VII complaints
 are, again, related to Ms. McLaughlin’s ability to exercise
 her Title VII rights. As such, they fall within § (b)(9)(A)(ii).
     Finally, Ms. McLaughlin’s eighth alleged disclosure is
 that an Agency management official obstructed justice by
 submitting a false statement about non-mandatory train-
 ing. This disclosure was also made in the context of her Ti-
 tle VII litigation, in which Ms. McLaughlin alleged that the
 Agency’s actions with respect to the non-mandatory
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                         11

 training were an attempt to “manipulate the litigation pro-
 cess by interfering with the Plaintiff[’s] (pro se) ability to
 draft a response to the Defendant’s motions.” McLaughlin,
 No. 1:17-cv-00759 (M.D.N.C.), ECF No. 19 (Response to
 Motion to Dismiss) at 6 (filed Jan. 24, 2018). Once again,
 this relates directly to Ms. McLaughlin’s ability to exercise
 her Title VII rights, and thus falls within § (b)(9)(A)(ii).
      Ms. McLaughlin seems to argue that the statements
 she made during the Title VII proceedings do not fall under
 § (b)(9)(A)(ii) because those statements are more properly
 characterized as § 2302(b)(8) disclosures. For at least some
 of the disclosures, 4 the administrative judge agreed with
 Ms. McLaughlin on this point, noting that “[Section]
 2302(b)(9)(A) involves a claim of retaliation for exercising
 the right to engage in a protected activity and not a claim
 of retaliation for making a (b)(8) disclosure in the context
 of that activity.” S.A. 15–16 n.14. The administrative judge
 concluded that (b)(9) did not apply here because Ms.
 McLaughlin “has alleged that agency officials retaliated
 against her for her (b)(8) disclosures and not her (b)(9) ac-
 tivity” S.A. 16 n.14. The administrative judge appears to
 have either (1) identified some overlap between (b)(9)(A)(ii)
 and (b)(8) that allows disclosures to fall within both cate-
 gories and give rise to the MSPB’s jurisdiction under (b)(8),
 or (2) too narrowly defined what falls under (b)(9)(A)(ii)
 such that Ms. McLaughlin’s statements in support of her
 Title VII complaint fall outside of § (b)(9)(A)(ii).
     We disagree under either interpretation of the admin-
 istrative judge’s reasoning. We have held that “[t]o read the
 scope of § 2302(b)(8) as including activities squarely within
 § 2302(b)(9)(A)[(ii)] would have the effect of reversing [the]
 carefully considered Congressional decision” to treat these

     4   We note that the administrative judge did conclude
 that four of the disclosures related to Title VII and were
 not protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act.
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 12                                       MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 activities differently. Spruill, 978 F.2d at 690–91. We un-
 derstand Spruill to mean that there cannot be a statement
 that both falls squarely within (b)(9)(A)(ii) and is also a
 (b)(8) disclosure that gives rise to MSPB jurisdiction. It is
 either one or the other.
     And as to whether Ms. McLaughlin’s statements fall
 squarely within (b)(9)(A)(ii) or whether they are more
 properly considered (b)(8) disclosures, we have already ex-
 plained above why these statements are within
 (b)(9)(A)(ii)—they are directly related to Ms. McLaughlin’s
 exercise of her Title VII rights. Section 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii) re-
 lates to “exercising any appeal, complaint, or grievance
 right other than one seeking to remedy a violation of sec-
 tion 2302(b)(8).” Young, 961 F.3d at 1329 (emphasis
 added). So, exercising one’s employment discrimination
 rights under (b)(1) by engaging in the Title VII process falls
 within (b)(9)(A)(ii). What it means to “exercise” one’s rights
 to pursue an employment discrimination action includes
 more than just bringing the action in the first place. Part
 of exercising those rights necessarily requires plaintiffs to
 make statements throughout Title VII proceedings to sup-
 port their employment discrimination claims under (b)(1)
 or (b)(9)(A)(ii). Such statements, made for the purpose of
 supporting a plaintiff’s EEO complaint, cannot logically be
 separated from “exercising any appeal, complaint, or griev-
 ance right” seeking to remedy a (b)(1) or (b)(9)(A)(ii) viola-
 tion. Id.; see also McLaughlin, 2023 WL 2820085, at *4. As
 discussed above, the alleged disclosures in this case were
 directly related to Ms. McLaughlin’s Title VII claims be-
 cause they were inextricably linked to her Title VII com-
 plaint. Thus, these statements are best characterized as
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                        13

 (b)(1) or (b)(9)(A)(ii) disclosures, over which the MSPB does
 not have jurisdiction. 5
                              B
     We next address whether the MSPB lacked jurisdiction
 over the second category of statements: those made to staff
 in Senator Grassley’s office and the GAO. For a different
 reason than with the first category, we also conclude that
 the MSPB lacked jurisdiction over this second category of
 statements.
     To file an IRA appeal, an appellant must first exhaust
 their administrative remedies by filing a complaint with
 OSC prior to filing their appeal with the Board. 5 U.S.C.
 § 1214(a)(3); Yunus v. Dep’t of Vets. Affs., 242 F.3d 1367,
 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To satisfy this exhaustion require-
 ment, the appellant must have informed OSC of “the pre-
 cise ground of [their] charge of whistleblowing” so that OSC
 has a “sufficient basis to pursue an investigation which
 might have led to corrective action.” Ward v. Merit Sys.
 Prot. Bd., 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting
 Knollenberg v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 953 F.2d 623, 626 (Fed.
 Cir. 1992)).
      Ms. McLaughlin’s ninth, and final, 6 alleged disclosure
 fails to meet this exhaustion requirement. Here, Ms.

     5   Because Ms. McLaughlin’s alleged disclosures
 were so intertwined with her Title VII claims, we need “not
 resolve whether there are other situations where disclo-
 sures made in a Title VII lawsuit may give rise to MSPB
 jurisdiction—for instance, where a disclosure was made in
 a Title VII lawsuit but is unrelated to the alleged discrimi-
 nation.” McLaughlin, 2023 WL 2820085, at *4 n.2 (empha-
 sis added).
     6   In some places in her briefing to this court, Ms.
 McLaughlin references statements other than these nine
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 14                                      MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 McLaughlin alleges that she disclosed to Katherine Nikas
 in Senator Grassley’s office and Diana Maurer in the GAO
 that an Agency official indefinitely suspended another in-
 vestigative analyst without the benefit of any misconduct
 investigation. This was not identified as a disclosure in Ms.
 McLaughlin’s OSC complaint. At most, Ms. McLaughlin
 copied an OSC employee on an email mentioning the name
 of this other investigative analyst, but those emails do not
 appear to inform the OSC employee that Ms. McLaughlin
 contacted Senator Grassley’s office about this investigative
 analyst or that Ms. McLaughlin suffered whistleblower re-
 taliation for doing so. We agree with the administrative
 judge that “the fact that [Ms. McLaughlin] provided this
 email to an OSC employee without any apparent follow-up
 explanation to describe the purpose or significance of the
 document is insufficient to prove exhaustion.” S.A. 15 (cit-
 ing Delgado v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 880 F.3d 913, 927 (7th
 Cir. 2018)). Thus, because this ninth alleged disclosure was
 not exhausted before the OSC, it also does not give rise to
 MSPB jurisdiction here.
                              C
    In addition to the jurisdictional arguments discussed
 above, Ms. McLaughlin identifies procedural grounds for
 vacating or reversing the Board’s decision. We are not per-
 suaded by these arguments.

 disclosures that she believes are protected disclosures.
 E.g., Informal Reply Br. 2 (alleging Ms. McLaughlin “be-
 came a ‘whistleblower’” in February 2011 when she corrob-
 orated testimony in a congressional investigation of the
 Agency); see also, e.g., id. at 8. But the operative OSC com-
 plaint for this appeal does not include those allegations,
 and she has not shown how any of those statements were
 exhausted with the OSC. Thus, we need not consider these
 statements in detail here.
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 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                       15

     First, Ms. McLaughlin argues the administrative judge
 erred by ignoring our guidance and failing to consider her
 January 28, 2019 submission, which we previously re-
 manded for the Board to consider. McLaughlin, 853 F.
 App’x at 650. But we see no indication in the final decision
 that the administrative judge did not account for the Jan-
 uary 28, 2019 submission when drawing his conclusions on
 remand. To the contrary, the administrative judge noted
 our remand order and “apologize[d]” for not considering the
 January 28, 2019 submission in the first instance. S.A. 9
 n.8. The administrative judge also gave the parties an op-
 portunity to file “additional evidence and/or argument” to
 support their jurisdictional positions. S.A. 9. The adminis-
 trative judge said nothing about not considering the sub-
 missions that had already been filed, including the
 January 28, 2019 reply submission, in addition to any
 newly filed evidence. Based on our review of the opinion,
 we see no reason to believe the administrative judge ig-
 nored our mandate to consider the January 28, 2019 sub-
 mission on remand.
     Ms. McLaughlin relies on footnote 8 in the opinion for
 her argument that the administrative judge did not con-
 sider her January 28, 2019 submission. This footnote fol-
 lows a sentence in the opinion explaining the procedural
 history of the case and that Ms. McLaughlin filed a petition
 for review of the Board’s first decision with this court on
 May 31, 2019. Footnote 8 simply mentions, as an apparent
 aside, that “[i]n her petition, the appellant did not allege
 that I improperly denied her January 28, 2019 submis-
 sion.” S.A. 9 n.8. Ms. McLaughlin appears to read this foot-
 note as improperly requiring her to re-make that allegation
 before the MSPB on remand. But in this footnote, the ad-
 ministrative judge is not faulting Ms. McLaughlin for not
 re-raising her January 28, 2019 submission after we re-
 manded her case; rather, the administrative judge is just
 characterizing her arguments in the petition she filed with
 this court in May 2019. After the footnote, the
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 16                                      MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB

 administrative judge goes on to acknowledge that—regard-
 less of what Ms. McLaughlin did or did not argue in her
 petition to this court—we held that it was an error for the
 administrative judge to not have considered the January
 28, 2019 submission. We do not see this footnote as an in-
 dication that the administrative judge ignored our order to
 consider the January 28, 2019 submission on remand and
 find no abuse of discretion.
     Second, Ms. McLaughlin argues that the administra-
 tive judge erred by failing to consider her July 13, 2021 re-
 ply to the Agency’s supplemental brief. After this case was
 remanded, the administrative judge gave the parties an op-
 portunity to submit additional evidence and arguments
 and set a July 12, 2021 deadline for Ms. McLaughlin to file
 a reply to the Agency’s submission. MSPB regulations pro-
 vide that a document filed by commercial delivery is
 deemed filed as of the date it was delivered to the commer-
 cial delivery service. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(l). The evidence
 available to the administrative judge to determine when
 the reply had been delivered to the commercial delivery
 service was a FedEx envelope indicating the date the sub-
 mission was shipped: July 13, 2021. Thus, the administra-
 tive judge properly exercised his discretion in not
 considering Ms. McLaughlin’s reply submission. See Za-
 mot, 332 F.3d at 1379 (“We have repeatedly stated that the
 waiver of a regulatory time limit based on a showing of
 good cause is a matter committed to the Board’s discretion
 and that this court will not substitute its own judgment for
 that of the Board.” (citation and quotations marks omit-
 ted)).
     On appeal, Ms. McLaughlin has submitted a receipt
 that shows she actually delivered the reply submission to
 FedEx on the evening of July 12, 2021, even though it was
 not shipped until July 13, 2021. But Ms. McLaughlin does
 not refute the Agency’s representation that this receipt was
 not part of the record before the administrative judge, and
 we cannot fault the administrative judge for deciding the
Case: 23-1074    Document: 28      Page: 17   Filed: 12/29/2023

 MCLAUGHLIN v. MSPB                                        17

 submission was untimely based on the evidence available
 to him at that time. Moreover, even if it was an error not to
 review the reply submission, Ms. McLaughlin has not
 shown that the administrative judge’s failure to review her
 reply submission resulted in any substantial harm, and we
 do not vacate under an abuse of discretion standard for
 harmless errors. See Curtin v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d
 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also Rockwell v. Dep’t
 of Transp., 789 F.2d 908, 913 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Thus, we
 find no abuse of discretion, and we affirm.
                              IV
    We have considered the remainder of Ms. McLaughlin’s
 arguments and find them unpersuasive. Thus, we affirm
 the administrative judge’s decision dismissing Ms.
 McLaughlin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                        AFFIRMED
                            COSTS
 No costs.