Court Opinion

ID: 9747022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:53:04.928997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.121726
License: Public Domain

NEWSOM, Acting P. J.
— I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment for misconduct by Juror Adams in his concealment of a felony conviction which rendered him ineligible to serve on the jury.
The defendant in a criminal trial has the constitutional right to have the charges against him or her tried by a fair and impartial jury. (In re Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 110 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 860 P.2d 466]; People v. Hord (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 711, 724 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 55]; People v. Blackwell (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 925, 929 [236 Cal.Rptr. 803].) ‘““The right of unbiased and unprejudiced jurors is an inseparable and inalienable part of the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 933 [200 Cal.Rptr. 77]; see also People v. Ryner (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 1075, 1081 [211 Cal.Rptr. 140].) Concealment or false answers by a juror during voir dire, whether inadvertent or intentional, interferes with the right of a criminal defendant to conduct voir dire for the purpose of discovering bias or impartiality, and constitutes serious misconduct. In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 112; People v. Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at pp. 929-930; People v. Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 935.)
The trial court found, and the majority has affirmed, that Juror Adams committed obvious misconduct by concealing the fact of his 1965 felony *1021conviction, which deprived appellant of the right to properly conduct voir dire and exercise his peremptory challenges to obtain an impartial and unbiased jury. (Cf. In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 112; People v. Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 929.) The majority also acknowledges, and again I agree, that due to the misconduct appellant remained unaware of the resulting lack of capacity of Adams to sit upon the jury, which would have required his dismissal and replacement with another juror without the necessity of a peremptory challenge. (Cal. Const., art. VII, § 8; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 633 [250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Where I part company with the majority is in its conclusion, unsubstantiated in my view, that the misconduct was not prejudicial to appellant.
Juror misconduct, while not reversible error per se, raises a presumption of prejudice. (People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327]; People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 16, 34 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 258]; People v. Ryner, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 1082.) The burden is on the prosecution, not the defendant, to rebut that presumption. (People v. Underwood (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1239 [226 Cal.Rptr. 840].) The presumption created by juror misconduct “ ‘may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court’s examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party’ ” resulting from the misconduct. (People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 117 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; see also In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 119; People v. Ryner, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 1082.) “Some of the factors to be considered when determining whether the presumption has been rebutted are as follows: the strength of the evidence that misconduct occurred; the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; whether the prosecutor’s burden was lightened by the misconduct; the effect of the misconduct upon the defense case; and the probability that actual prejudice may have ensued.” (People v. Ryner, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 1082; see also People v. Harper (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1420, 1427 [231 Cal.Rptr. 414]; People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 820 [184 Cal.Rptr. 829].) An “objective evaluation of the misconduct” must be made “in light of the entire record. [Citations.]” People v. Ryner, supra, 164 Cal.App.3d at p. 1083; see also People v. Hill, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 35.)
Here, the prosecution presented no affirmative evidence to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and I find no such evidence in my review of the record. The misconduct was not discovered until after the verdict was rendered, and the impact of the concealment by Juror Adams of his ineligibility to serve is essentially impossible to assess. The prosecution’s burden of rebuttal hence must be considered “almost insurmountable.” (People v. *1022Harper, supra, 186 Cal.App.3d 1427.) “[Cjoncealment by veniremen during voir dire uncovered before jury deliberations inherently involves prejudicial misconduct which perhaps cannot be rebutted by either the People or a review of the entire record because of its subjective, intangible and subliminal nature. [Citation.]” (People v. Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 937, fn. 5.) The suppression of material information by juror Adams during voir dire also “constitutes implied bias” and “creates an inference” that he “prejudged the case.” In re Hitchings, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 120; see also People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 401 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610].) I think the record reaffirms rather than rebuts the inference of bias on the part of Adams and the presumption of prejudice which arose from his misconduct. His comments upon appellant’s guilt before deliberations commenced and his activities as an apparent neighborhood vigilante, when taken together with his concealment of his status as a convicted felon, convince me that his impartiality was at best highly debatable.1
In addition to Adams’s concealment of critical information which raised unresolved doubts as to his impartiality, it must be remembered that he was incompetent as a convicted felon to perform the duties of a juror. Our high court has declared that a verdict rendered with the participation of a juror unfit or incompetent to serve “must be reversed. [Citations.]” (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520 [224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251].)2 We know, at least, that Adams was unquestionably ineligible to act as a juror, and had he not concealed his felony conviction during voir dire would not have served on the jury. Of course, with disclosure of his ineligibility coming only after the verdict was reached, we cannot easily resolve the issue of prejudice by reference to the record. But in my view, the concealment of information by Adams which, I believe, demonstrates his bias, coupled with his incompetence and a record which fails to establish that appellant was afforded the right to a fair and impartial jury, compels reversal of the judgment. (Cf. People v. Blackwell, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at p. 931.)
A petition for a rehearing was denied February 21, 1995, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied April 13, 1995. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

I do not challenge the trial court’s findings, which we have upheld on appeal, that Adams did not commit misconduct by pronouncing his belief in appellant’s guilt or in exhibiting his “Sidewinder Investigations” card, but merely consider such evidence in reviewing the record as it relates to the issue of rebuttal of the presumption of prejudice.

In Burgener, the lack of fitness stemmed from claimed intoxication rather than conviction of a felony, but I consider the distinction inconsequential to the principle that a verdict obtained with the participation of an incompetent juror must be subject to reversal absent compelling evidence of lack of prejudice.