Court Opinion

ID: 9749937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:06:38.790247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:03.602215
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-447

                                 PARKER HAYDEN

                                       vs.

                               BRIAN P. MCKEON.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The plaintiff, Parker Hayden, appeals from a judgment of

 the Superior Court dismissing his complaint for intentional

 misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and breach of

 fiduciary duty against the defendant, Dr. Brian P. McKeon. 1               The

 plaintiff also appeals the denial of his motion for

 reconsideration.      Agreeing with the Superior Court judge that

 the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res

 judicata, we affirm.

       "The term 'res judicata' includes both claim preclusion and

 issue preclusion."       Santos v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 89 Mass.

 App. Ct. 687, 692 (2016), quoting Kobrin v. Board of

 1 The count alleging breach of fiduciary duty simply reiterated
 the allegations set forth under the intentional
 misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment counts.
Registration in Med., 444 Mass. 837, 843 (2005).    "[C]laim

preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the

parties and their privies, and bars further litigation of all

matters that were or should have been adjudicated in the

action."    Duross v. Scudder Bay Capital, LLC, 96 Mass. App. Ct.

833, 836 (2020), quoting Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 23

(1988).    Claim preclusion "requires three elements:   (1) the

identity or privity of the parties to the present and prior

actions, (2) identity of the cause of action, and (3) prior

final judgment on the merits."    LaRace v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 99 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 324 (2021), quoting Santos, supra.

"Causes of action are the same for the purposes of res judicata

when they 'grow[ ] out of the same transaction, act, or

agreement, and seek[ ] redress for the same wrong.'"     LaRace,

supra at 325, quoting Fassas v. First Bank & Trust Co. of

Chelmsford, 353 Mass. 628, 629 (1968).    "We review the allowance

of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all well-

pleaded facts alleged in the complaint."    Osborne-Trussell v.

Children's Hosp. Corp., 488 Mass. 248, 253 (2021), quoting Ryan

v. Mary Ann Morse Healthcare Corp., 483 Mass. 612, 614 (2019).

     Here, the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of

res judicata because they arise from a "common nucleus of

                                  2
operative facts." 2   Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass.

399, 411 (2021), quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24

comment b (1982).     See Howard v. Boston Water & Sewer Comm'n, 96

Mass. App. Ct. 119, 124 (2019) (claims precluded where "the

complaint in the Boston Municipal Court [was] based on the same

series of transactions as the complaint dismissed in the Housing

Court").   In October 2019, the plaintiff commenced the first of

two lawsuits against the defendant, his orthopedic surgeon.      In

the first complaint, the plaintiff alleged that on June 19,

2012, during an elective surgical procedure on his right knee,

the defendant also "performed an unauthorized surgical procedure

known as a 'Lateral Release.'"    The plaintiff alleged negligence

based on the defendant's concealment and failure to explain the

lateral release "after identification of patellar tilt and right

before the 'Tibial Tubercle Osteotomy.[']"    In addition, the

plaintiff alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress

based on the defendant's refusal to speak with the plaintiff and

the defendant's failure to offer a "protocol for potential

reversal."

     After a Superior Court judge allowed the defendant's motion

to dismiss, pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass.

2 There is no dispute that the first and third elements of res
judicata are satisfied. See Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844 ("there is
no question that there was a final order of the board on the
merits . . . and the parties in both actions are identical").

                                   3
754 (1974), on the ground that the claims were barred by the

statute of repose, G. L. c. 260, § 4, the plaintiff filed a

second complaint. 3   In his second complaint the plaintiff alleged

that the defendant "intentionally omitted the lateral release

procedure" in his operative notes, "fraudulently concealed the

medical malpractice cause of action including the 'lateral

release' surgery," and failed to inform the plaintiff that he

had performed the lateral release surgery. 4

     Both complaints arose out of the surgical procedure and its

aftermath, and both complaints sought redress for the

defendant's alleged concealment and failure to inform the

plaintiff of the nature of the procedure.      The first complaint

raised "[t]he concealment and lack of explanation to the

plaintiff" of the surgical procedure and complication and the

defendant's refusal to provide the plaintiff with information

after the procedure.    The second complaint similarly raised the

defendant's "not disclosing to or informing the plaintiff" of

3 The plaintiff appealed from the judgment dismissing his first
complaint. On April 26, 2021, a panel of this court affirmed.
Hayden v. McKeon, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 1121 (2021).
4 Given that the plaintiff allegedly became aware of the

defendant's misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment of the
lateral release surgery "[a]fter reviewing the medical records
in July 2019," there is no reason why the plaintiff could not
have pursued these claims when he filed his first complaint in
October 2019. Cf. Kobrin, 444 Mass. at 844 (disciplinary action
not barred by claim preclusion where "the board could not
previously have litigated this issue or disciplined the
petitioner as the convictions had not yet occurred").

                                  4
the procedure.   That the plaintiff packaged this concealment as

negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress in the

first complaint and as fraud and breach of fiduciary duty in the

second complaint does not take this case outside the reach of

res judicata, as a claim brought under a different legal theory

"is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of

the same transaction, act, or agreement, and seeks redress for

the same wrong."   Laramie, 488 Mass. at 411, quoting Mackintosh

v. Chambers, 285 Mass. 594, 596 (1934).

     The plaintiff's reliance on Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App.

Ct. 258 (2008), is misplaced.   We held there that claims for

fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation were

"not a recasting of their original claims for medical

malpractice," and thus not subject to the medical malpractice

statute of repose.   Id. at 264.   Putting aside the fact that our

opinion in Chace did not discuss res judicata or the standard

for identity of causes of actions for claim preclusion purposes, 5

5 In Chace, 71 Mass. App. Ct. at 259, the original complaint
against Dr. Arlene Curran and the nurse included counts for
fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepresentation, and
thus the dismissal of the malpractice count did not bar the
continuation of those counts. Although it is questionable
whether the plaintiff's claim in his first complaint for
negligent infliction of emotional distress should have been
dismissed under the statute of repose, the plaintiff raised no
issue regarding that count in his previous appeal. Once final
judgment entered on that count, claim preclusion prohibited its
resurrection under a new legal theory.

                                   5
nothing in Chace suggests that claims for concealment, which the

plaintiff raised in the first complaint, are different than

claims for fraudulent concealment and intentional

misrepresentation based on the same concealment.      Accordingly,

the plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata.

                                      Judgment of dismissal, and
                                        order denying motion for
                                        reconsideration, affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.
                                        Ditkoff & Hodgens, JJ. 6),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    August 28, 2023.

6   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  6