Court Opinion

ID: 9393001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-08 21:02:17.654698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:50.356141
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/8/23 P. v. Thompson CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                      A163964
    v.
    ROMONDIS TYRON THOMPSON,                                            (Lake County Super. Ct. Nos.
    JR.,                                                                CR958995, CR959006)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Romondis Tyron Thompson, Jr., was found guilty of felony
evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count one) and
two counts of resisting, delaying, or obstructing peace officers in the
discharge of their duties (Pen. Code § 148, subd. (a)(1); counts four and five).1
He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of four years, comprised of the
middle term of two years on count one (doubled for a prior strike), and two
180-day terms on counts four and five (both concurrent to count one).
         On appeal, defendant contends the sentences were in violation of
section 654 because he was given multiple punishments for an indivisible
course of conduct of evading apprehension by the police. We conclude

1        Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that section
654 was inapplicable because defendant’s sentences were based on separate
and divisible acts. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In October 2020, the Clearlake Police Department investigated
defendant on several matters, including the reported theft of a 1997 Dodge
pickup truck. Clearlake Police Officers Nathan Williams and Chris Kelleher
were dispatched to a residential address where defendant was believed to be
when they saw the Dodge truck driving by. The officers pursued the truck as
it drove on Sonoma Avenue, a partially paved and dirt road in a residential
neighborhood. Williams turned on the emergency lights of his vehicle and
commenced a traffic stop of the Dodge truck as another police vehicle drove in
front of the Dodge. As Williams and Kelleher exited their vehicle and
approached, the Dodge truck pulled to the right and drove away.
      Officers Williams and Kelleher ran back to their vehicle and pursued
the Dodge, which was driving “in the middle of the roadway” at
approximately 45 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. The truck was
not driving at a safe speed as it drove on the dirt portion of Sonoma Avenue,
and it was “creat[ing] dust that [made] it very difficult for other vehicles to be
seen.” The pursuit ended when defendant tried to make a left turn and
crashed against a dirt hillside. Williams’ vehicle lost traction and rear-ended
the Dodge truck.
      Defendant then exited the truck and fled on foot. He went to “the top of
an incline that led to heavy brush and continued . . . through the brush.”
Officers Kelleher and Williams pursued defendant and fired their
department-issued tasers at him but missed. They eventually caught
defendant and placed him in handcuffs.

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      Defendant was transported to a hospital, where he somehow managed
to get free of his handcuffs. He ran out of the hospital room, saying, “bye,
Kelleher” as he left. Defendant fled to the ambulance bay but collided with a
wall and was soon apprehended.
      A petition for revocation of post release community supervision (PRCS)
was filed in Lake County Superior Court alleging that defendant committed
several new crimes while on release, including felony vehicle theft (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and possession of stolen property (§ 496).2
      In April 2021, defendant was charged by information with felony
evasion of a peace officer while driving in willful or wanton disregard for the
safety of persons or property (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count one);
felony vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count two); felony receipt
of a stolen vehicle (§ 496d, subd. (a); count three); misdemeanor resisting
arrest as to Officer Kelleher (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count four); misdemeanor
resisting arrest as to Officer Williams (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count five); and
battery on a hospital security guard (§ 243, subd. (b); count six). As to counts
one, two, and three, the information alleged that defendant previously
suffered a prior felony strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12).
      Before trial, the prosecution dismissed counts two, three, and six.
      Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and a single bench trial was
held on both the PRCS petition and the criminal information. The trial court
heard testimony from several witnesses, including defendant and Officers

2     The petition further alleged that defendant committed rape by force
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2)), oral copulation by force (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)), false
imprisonment (§ 236), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)),
sexual penetration by force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A)), misdemeanor flight from a
peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.1), violation of PRCS (§ 3452), and
misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)).

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Williams and Kelleher. In finding defendant guilty on counts one, four, and
five, the court observed, defendant “knew they were police officers, he knew
they were doing their job, and he . . . resisted, he delayed, he obstructed
multiple times. He ran on foot, he tried to escape at the hospital.” The court
also found true the prior strike allegation.
       At the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a
total of four years in prison, as follows: the middle term of two years on count
one, doubled for the prior strike; a term of 180 days on count four, concurrent
to count one; a second term of 180 days on count five, concurrent to count one;
and a third term of 180 days as to the PRCS petition, concurrent to count
one.
       Defendant timely appealed.
                                   DISCUSSION
       “Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or
indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294;
§ 654, subd. (a) [in no case shall act or omission be punished under more than
one provision of law].) “Although section 654 literally applies only where
multiple statutory violations arise out of a single ‘act or omission,’ it has also
long been applied to cases where a ‘course of conduct’ violates several
statutes. [Citations.] A ‘course of conduct’ may be considered a single act
within the meaning of section 654 and therefore be punishable only once, or it
may constitute a ‘divisible transaction’ which may be punished under more
than one statute.” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252 (Kwok).)
       “ ‘Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives
rise to more than one act within the meaning of section 654 depends on the
intent and objective of the actor. If all the offenses were incident to one
objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of such offenses but not

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for more than one.’ ” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 637, italics
omitted (Beamon).) However, “a course of conduct divisible in time, although
directed to one objective, may give rise to multiple violations and
punishment.” (Id. at p. 639, fn. 11.) “This is particularly so where the
offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant
opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the
next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy
already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935 (Gaio).)
“Thus, a finding that multiple offenses were aimed at one intent and objective
does not necessarily mean that they constituted ‘one indivisible course of
conduct’ for purposes of section 654.” (Kwok, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1253.)
      “The question whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given
series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad
latitude in making this determination. Its findings on this question must be
upheld on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support them.”
(People v. Hutchins (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1312 (Hutchins).) In
reviewing for substantial evidence, we view the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment and presume in support of the judgment
every fact that can reasonably be deduced from the record, and we do not
reweigh conflicting evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. (People v. Skiff
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 571, 579.) “In the absence of an explicit ruling by the
trial court at sentencing, we infer that the court made the finding appropriate
to the sentence it imposed, i.e., either applying section 654 or not applying it.”
(People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1045.)
      Viewing the record before us in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied

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finding that defendant’s sentences were based on separate and divisible acts.
That is, one could reasonably conclude from the record that defendant’s first
act of reckless driving to evade the police began with the vehicle pursuit on
Sonoma Avenue and ended when defendant crashed the Dodge truck into a
dirt hill. He then engaged in a separate and distinct act of fleeing the officers
on foot through the nearby brush. Then, after a further elapse of time,
defendant again attempted to flee law enforcement when he broke free of his
handcuffs and ran from his hospital room. Although the three acts shared
the same objective of evading apprehension, they were sufficiently divisible in
time and conduct to support multiple sentences. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at
p. 639, fn. 11.)
      Defendant maintains there was too little time between the vehicle and
foot chases for them to constitute divisible acts. But the evidence was in
conflict on this question, and we defer to the trial court’s implied finding that
defendant had a sufficient opportunity after the vehicle crash to reflect and to
renew his intent to flee, this time on foot. (Gaio, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at
p. 935; see People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335 [temporal proximity
of events does not mean they were part of one indivisible course of conduct].)
As Williams testified, the Dodge truck came to a complete stop after crashing
into the dirt hill. At that point in time, the vehicle chase had ended, and
defendant could have remained inside the truck for the police to approach.
Instead, he decided to exit the vehicle and flee on foot through a residential
neighborhood, “thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy
already undertaken” by his reckless driving. (Gaio, at p. 935.)
      Moreover, the trial court could reasonably credit defendant’s own
testimony that he decided to stop driving and instead run away on foot
because he had “been to the [penitentiary] for felony evasions before” and he

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“[knew] the seriousness of it.” That is, the court could reasonably have
concluded that defendant committed a new and separate crime after
reflecting on the seriousness of his reckless driving and renewing his resolve
to escape despite the setback of the car crash. (See People v. Louie (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 388, 399 [“[i]f the separation in time afforded [a] defendant[] an
opportunity to reflect and to renew [his or her] intent before committing the
next crime, a new and separate crime is committed”].) Given the “broad
latitude” vested in the trial court to determine the applicability of section 654
(Hutchins, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 1312), we conclude the court
reasonably found that the vehicle and foot chases were separate and divisible
acts, each subject to punishment.
      Defendant next contends that separate punishments on counts four and
five violated section 654 because “the hospital incident involved the same
officers and was an indivisible course of conduct.” To the extent this
argument assumes that the sentences on counts four and five were both
based on defendant’s flight attempt at the hospital, we are unpersuaded.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude
the trial court appears to have attributed one of these counts to defendant’s
conduct of fleeing on foot after the vehicle chase, and the other to his
attempted escape from the hospital. Because the two acts of resisting arrest
were separate and divisible acts, section 654 does not prohibit sentences for
both. (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639, fn. 11.)
      Finally, defendant argues the case should be remanded for
resentencing in light of Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 441), which recently amended section 654 to no longer require that
trial courts impose the longest possible term of imprisonment when multiple
offenses are based on the same act or omission. (People v. White (2022) 86

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Cal.App.5th 1229, 1236.) As the Attorney General points out, however, this
argument presumes that section 654 applies to the facts of the instant case.
Because we have concluded that the trial court did not impose multiple
punishments for the same act or indivisible course of conduct, section 654 is
inapplicable and there is no basis for remanding in light of Assembly Bill
No. 518.
                                   DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                      _________________________
                                      Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Petrou, J.

People v. Thompson (A163964)

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