Court Opinion

ID: 9517059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:02:28.956449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:12.203806
License: Public Domain

STAPLETON, District Judge
(dissenting).
I read Bullock v. Carter1 and Dunn v. Blumstein2 to call for application here of the close scrutiny test. The purpose of Delaware’s three year durational residency requirement for Members of the General Assembly is to assure a minimal level of knowledge of the needs and hopes of the State and its people.3 The state interest involved would justify some durational residency requirement.4 It will not justify a three year residence requirement since, in the context of present-day Delaware, a substantially less restrictive durational residency requirement would serve the state’s interest substantially as well.5 Accordingly, I would grant the relief sought.

. 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed 2d 92 (1972). My interpretation of the Bulloch case is set forth in Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F.Supp. 143 (D.Del.1972). In summary, “where the law in question poses an absolute barrier to the candidacy of a not insubstantial segment of the community and, to that degree, limits the voters in their choice of candidates, the more strict standard of review must be applied.” Id. at 147. The only statistics available indicate that approximately 15% of Delaware’s population in 1970 had moved here from out of state since 1965.

. 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972).
“ . . . Tennessee’s durational residence laws classify bona fide residents on the basis of recent travel, penalizing those persons, and only those persons, who have gone from one jurisdiction to another during the qualifying period. Thus, the durational residence requirement directly impinges on the exercise of a second fundamental personal right, the right to travel. * * * * *
Tennessee seeks to avoid the clear command of Shapiro by arguing that durational residence requirements for voting neither seek to nor actually do deter such travel. In essence, Tennessee argues that the right to travel is not abridged here in any constitutionally relevant sense.
This view represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the law. It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. * * il: * *
. Durational residence laws impermissibly condition and penalize the right to travel by imposing their prohibitions on only those persons who have recently exercised that right. In the present case, such laws force a person who wishes to travel and change residences to choose between travel and the basic right to vote. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-583 [88 S.Ct. 1209, 1216-1217] 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968). Absent a compelling state interest, a State may not burden the right to travel in this way.”

. Another asserted purpose is to provide the electorate with an opportunity to become acquainted with the would-be lawmaker. The electorate, however, so far as would-be representatives are concerned consists of registered voters of his Representative District. The constitutional provision here under attack requires only one year’s residence in the Representative District. In this context, I doubt that the requirement of three years’ residence in the state was designed to serve the alternative asserted purpose.

. Compare Hadnot v. Amos, 320 F.Supp. 107 (N.D.Ala.1970) (three judge court), aff’d without opinion, 401 U.S. 968, 91 S.Ct. 1189, 28 L.Ed.2d 318 (1971).

. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) ; Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F.Supp. 143 (D.Del.1972).