Court Opinion

ID: 9477982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:36:15.852311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:09.259380
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Chief Judge,
with whom OAKES and KEARSE, Circuit Judges, join, concurring:
I concur in the holding of the court because I believe that the post-indictment restraint and post-conviction “relation back” provisions of the CFA conflict with the right of criminal defendants to select their own counsel. To the extent these provisions prevent an indicted defendant who would otherwise be able to retain counsel of choice from doing so, they are unconstitutional. I do not believe that the hearing envisioned in the panel opinion, 836 F.2d 74, is sufficient to overcome the constitutional infirmities.
The sixth amendment right to counsel of choice is a fundamental right that serves to protect other constitutional rights. It is a key element in our system of criminal justice and distinguishes that system from others that do not allow individuals the chance to resist in a meaningful way the imposition of government power upon them. Therefore, the right to counsel of choice cannot be infringed unless a compelling governmental purpose outweighs it. Many of the cases that allow limitations on the right to counsel of choice deal only with partial limitations or infringements, such as preventing a defendant from substituting counsel once the trial has begun, see, e.g., United States v. Paone, 782 F.2d 386, 392 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882, 107 S.Ct. 269, 93 L.Ed.2d 246 (1986), or disqualifying a particular lawyer, see, e.g., United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 219-20 (2d Cir.1987). In contrast, the right in this case is destroyed almost completely by depriving the defendant of the means to retain counsel of choice prior to the commencement of trial. Therefore, one would suppose that the governmental justification for such drastic action is overwhelmingly persuasive.
The fact is just to the contrary. The suggested governmental interests that are served by restraining, and permitting the ultimate forfeiture of, assets that are needed to pay attorney’s fees are not all that compelling. The government’s interests are that assets it seeks to obtain not be dissipated in the relatively brief period from indictment to possible conviction and that an alleged criminal not be able to use his economic power obtained from illegal activities. As to the former, the government’s claim to the disputed assets at the time of restraint is only conditional, since under the CFA the government’s owner*1403ship interest in the assets is not determined until the outcome of the criminal prosecution. This is not to say that the government has no claim to these assets at all, but only that the claim is not sufficiently strong to prevent those assets from being spent on an accused’s defense when the accused has no other funds available. Moreover, it must be remembered that in this sixth amendment context, the government is not prevented from freezing an indicted defendant’s other assets — those not necessary for payment of counsel — so that there will be no dissipation or concealment of those.
To the extent that the government seeks to strip an accused of the economic power he obtained from alleged illegal activities, this interest is weak in the context before us. As I have just indicated, defendants’ assets generally are a fair target for the government. We are concerned here with only one aspect of economic power, the power to hire an attorney in relation to the criminal prosecution. Of course, weakening the ability of an accused to defend himself at trial is an advantage for the government. But it is not a legitimate government interest that can be used to justify invasion of a constitutional right. Our holding does not allow a criminal to retain his illgotten economic power after conviction. It frees assets only when they are used to pay legitimate attorney’s fees and when no other assets are available. It does not allow defendants to shelter untainted assets by paying a lawyer with tainted property first. Thus, if the accused is ultimately convicted, the only assets our holding will have saved from forfeiture are assets that have been spent on defense. Admittedly, the government does have some interest in preventing criminals from using ill-gotten economic power to hire attorneys, but that interest simply does not outweigh an accused’s constitutional right to counsel of choice.
The government argues that since United States v. Salerno, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987), held that a defendant may be detained pending trial, the restraint on a defendant’s property here (as opposed to his liberty) must be permissible. The argument seems persuasive at first blush, but on further analysis it is not. Salerno stands for the proposition that an accused’s liberty interest may sometimes be overcome by the compelling government interest in coping with an immediate threat to public safety. Here there is no government interest anywhere near as compelling as that. Nor is the restraint here on property alone. The restraint affects the right to counsel of choice, which in turn affects important liberty interests.
Therefore, the statute as applied below is unconstitutional. The sixth amendment mandates that the district court, in evaluating a restraining order, permit a defendant access to sufficient funds to pay the legitimate costs of his defense. On remand, the court must permit invasion of the restrained assets to the extent necessary to provide Monsanto with sufficient funds to retain counsel of choice. The government must also be prohibited from later seeking forfeiture of fees paid to Monsanto’s counsel of choice. On the facts before us, the “relation back” provision of 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) has the same effect as a restraining order when applied to attorney’s fees, since practical considerations will keep an attorney from accepting fees based upon the contingency of success at the criminal trial.
Our holding does permit some who have engaged in criminal activity to obtain a particular attorney solely because they have gained economic power through crime. And, it may be true (although unfortunate) that greater financial power frequently buys the ability to present a stronger and more thorough defense. The small societal cost of allowing criminals to use their illegally obtained wealth to hire an attorney, however, is the price we must pay for protecting the rights of the innocent, who might otherwise be deprived of legitimate economic power in waging a full defense. It is a cost of our adversarial system, which places great value on protecting the rights of the accused. The trouble with the statute, as applied in this case, is that it deprives defendants of their *1404economic power to hire an attorney before they are proven to be criminals.
It is true, as the dissenting opinion of Judge Mahoney points out, that other circuits, although not without disagreement within the circuit, have held the statute as applied here constitutional. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully disagree with the reasoning of those opinions.
The government must prove that an accused is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It must do this by obtaining convincing evidence of the defendant’s guilt, not by preventing the defendant from retaining counsel of choice. As Judge Rubin said concurring in United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1477 (5th Cir.1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (1987):
The Government should not be permitted to cripple the defendant at the outset of the [trial] by depriving him of the funds he needs to retain counsel....
I agree.