Court Opinion

ID: 9778334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:00:50.269633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.623556
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for rape of a child. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 21.09. Punishment was assessed by the jury at 10 years.
Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We will review the evidence only as necessary to the disposition of appellant’s grounds of error.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the issue of mistaken identity. Appellant timely requested such a charge in writing.
Evidence was offered by the appellant that appellant and two other persons were displayed before the complaining witness for possible identification as one of the three persons who had raped her and that she said neither appellant nor either of the others had committed the rape. This evidence was contradicted by testimony offered by the State. The opinion by the panel in this cause held that a defensive issue of mistaken identification was raised and that the trial court erred in failing “to submit an affirmative jury charge on this defensive issue” in light of appellant’s request for such an issue.
On the same day that the opinion in this cause was handed down, another panel handed down an opinion in Waller v. State, 581 S.W.2d 483 (1979), in which the defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in refusing to give his requested instruction on misidentification was rejected. After noting that the issue of misidentification was not raised by the evidence, it was stated:
“Even assuming an issue had been raised, it would have been error for the trial court to single out the fact concerning Anderson’s identification of appellant and magnify them before the jury. This *665would constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence. See Laws v. State, 549 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), Art. 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., and the cases there cited under Note 743. Moreover, mis-identification is not an affirmative defense, and the appellant was adequately protected by the requirement that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense.”
In the recent cases of Jones v. State, 566 S.W.2d 628, and Guzman v. State, 567 S.W.2d 188, we find holdings of this Court which appear to be contrary to the holding in the instant case. A complaint that the trial court erred in failing to charge on mistaken identity was rejected in Jones. There it was held:
“The court’s charge to the jury on the burden and standard of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the law of alibi, substantially incorporated his requested instructions. Sheppard v. State, 545 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). The charge, when considered as a whole, adequately protected his rights. Article 36.-19, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Pittman v. State, 554 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).”
In Guzman, a like contention was rejected, the Court finding no error in light of the court’s instruction to the jury that it must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense before finding him guilty.
In Laws v. State, 549 S.W.2d 738, this Court, in rejecting the defendant’s complaint that the court refused to charge on mistaken identification, found that, the court had instructed the jurors that they had to believe defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In Laws, it was further noted that it would have been improper for the court to submit such an instruction “because it would have been singling out particular parts of the testimony.”
In the somewhat earlier case of Ward v. State, 505 S.W.2d 832, this Court, after finding that there was no evidence to raise the issue of mistaken identity, went on to say:
“The court’s charge affirmatively required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense before he could be convicted. The jury was further instructed that if it had a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt it should acquit. The court did not err in failing to instruct the jury as requested by appellant.”
In the instant case the court instructed the jury on the presumption of innocence, the requirement that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed the offense, and “Unless you so find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant.” In addition, the court in the instant case charged on the law of alibi. We find that the charge adequately protected appellant’s rights and the court did not err in refusing the requested charge on mistaken identity.
Further, the fact that the complaining witness failed to identify appellant on one occasion goes only to the weight to be given the identification evidence. It does not give rise to an affirmative defense which would require that the appellant be acquitted.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his right of confrontation by admitting expert testimony based on the conclusion of another medical expert. The testimony complained of was that of Dr. Anton Broms.
Dr. Broms testified that he conducted an examination of the victim on the night of the offense. Dr. Broms was unable to recall any specifics of the examination until he refreshed his memory from medical records made at the time of the examination.
The records reflected that Dr. Broms, a specialist in gynecology, had been called in to examine the victim by another treating physician. Broms stated that he had examined the victim in conjunction with this other physician. Although the report contained information in the handwriting of other persons, the witness stated that his signature would indicate that his examina*666tion of the victim had confirmed the existence of those conditions.
Appellant has failed to show that Dr. Broms testified to any fact that he did not actually observe. The record does not lend factual support to appellant’s contention. No error is shown.
Appellant contends that the prosecutor failed to timely disclose material evidence favorable to the appellant. Under this ground of error, appellant urges error in that:
“the prosecutor failed and refused to subpoena Robert Gonzalez and gave no account as to his whereabouts. This witness would have shed light on whether or not the complainant was raped by three young Blacks and whether the defendant was the rapist. The prosecutor refused to produce that part of the offense report written by officer Coleman in which officer Martin stated that the complainant told him that M_J_ was the boy that raped her. The prosecutor further failed to subpoena officer MeCafferty, officer Martin, and officer Coleman. The prosecutor, further, failed to subpoena the [sic] Dr. Walker, who made the medical examination as to the wet mount sperm.
“The state failed to subpoena officer Martin and failed to subpoena the officer that wrote down officer Martin’s report. When Defendant subpoenaed officer Martin, the state intentionally suppressed that part of the offense report in which officer Martin held a lineup on the 26th of December, 1975, with the defendant and three other Blacks, and the complainant was unable to make any identification. In failing to produce this portion of the offense report, the prosecutor presented the false picture that when the complainant went to the lineup on December 26, 1975 the Defendant and M_J_were not there.”
A ground of error complaining of numerous alleged errors is multifarious and does not comply with Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, Y.A.C.C.P. See, Morgan v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 545 S.W.2d 811; Rodriguez v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 530 S.W.2d 944.
Moreover, we note that Martin and McCafferty testified at trial and that the State introduced evidence that it was unable to locate Robert Gonzalez despite efforts to do so. We further find that the record reflects no factual basis to support appellant’s contention that the State withheld any information favorable to him.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to argue facts not in evidence and to refer to the demands of the community for a particular punishment. These arguments occurred during the punishment stage of the trial.
Although appellant objected to the prosecutor's argument that he maintains was outside the record, no ruling on that objection was secured. No error is preserved for review, Moffett v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 555 S.W.2d 437; Cain v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 549 S.W.2d 707.
The second argument complained of was as follows:
“Is that what our probation laws were meant for? That a person who would rape a child, would come down here— forcibly rape, where her vagina is lacerated—and get probation? Surely that’s not the case. I mean, it can’t be. It can’t be as long as I stand here in front of people like yourselves. It just can’t be the case. I’m sure that I don’t live in a community where people feel like that either.”
A jury argument that refers to the expectations or demands of the community for a particular result is error. Bothwell v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 128; Crawford v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 14. The jury argument in the present case does not set forth what result the community demands or expects in this case. See Crawford v. State, supra. No error is shown.
Appellant finally contends that the “trial court’s actions throughout the trial constituted reversible error. . . . ” Appellant points to the trial court’s rulings on four of his objections as follows:
*667‘Q. Now, when I saw Clayton Homes, it’s not really a subdivision; that’s an apartment project, isn’t it?
“MR. PINK [defense counsel]: I would object to the Prosecutor leading his witness, getting her to say yes.
“MR. MOEN [prosecutor]: Judge, may I have the legal objection from the man rather than making a Jury argument?
“There’s a proper time for it and now is not the time.
“THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead. * * * * * *
‘Q. Okay, and I think I told you, did I not, yesterday to describe—
“MR. PINK: Your Honor, I would object to any testimony or anything that he told her yesterday. It’s not proper as to what he told her yesterday. It’s not a proper question.
“MR. MOEN: I don’t believe that’s a legal objection, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: Sustained — I mean, overruled. But, don’t repeat the testimony.
‘Q. (By Mr. Moen) And did I not tell you that when you started talking about the male sex organs to refer to that as the penis?
‘A. Yes, sir.
‘Q. Okay.
“MR. PINK: Your Honor, again, I would like to object to the State continuously testifying and leading the witness.
“THE COURT: All right, overruled.
“MR. PINK: Note my exception. * * * * * *
‘Q. Now, I think I told you yesterday I was going to have to ask you some foolish questions, did I not?
‘A. Yes, sir.
‘Q. Okay, listen to what I have to say. “MR. PINK: Again, I would object to this kind of leading question as to the way the D.A. is phrasing this.
It’s not proper. He’s testifying again.
“MR. MOEN: If I may, could we have Mr. Pink make a legal objection rather than a Jury argument? “THE COURT: Overruled. * * * * * *
“Q. Did anyone ever try to stuff anything in your mouth?
“A. Yes.
“MR. PINK: That’s leading. We object to leading questions.
“THE COURT: Overruled. ******
“Q. Did he stick around a little bit while the smallest one was raping you?
“A. Yes, just a little while.
“MR. PINK: Your Honor, if it please the Court, State is continuing to lead the witness, and we would ask the Court to ask the State—
“THE COURT: Just make an objection, if you will, and give a legal reason that’s sufficient. You object to the question?
“MR. PINK: Because it’s leading.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
“MR. PINK: Note my exception.”
Appellant maintains that the trial court’s actions in ruling on these objections were “prejudicial responses.”
This ground of error is multifarious and fails to comply with Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, supra. See Love v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 533 S.W.2d 6.
Further, we decline to hold that the manner of the court’s ruling on appellant’s objections constituted reversible error. The instances cited do not reflect an opinion of guilt on the part of the court. See Zima v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 553 S.W.2d 378. While an accused may complain of an erroneous ruling made as the result of prejudice, it would be the error in the ruling rather than the prejudice that would give him the right to complain. Bolding v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 493 S.W.2d 181; Vera v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 547 S.W.2d 283. No error is shown.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is affirmed.