Court Opinion

ID: 9727405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:34:42.230482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:17.097131
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOODWARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. As the majority states, the trial court’s determination on a motion to suppress will not be overturned unless it is manifestly erroneous (People v. Galvin (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 153). Officer Nicholas testified that he was standing about 20 feet away from the Cadillac as it was parked on Emery Lane. From his unobstructed vantage point, he was able to see the defendants within the car. The vehicle’s dome light was on. Nicholas described in detail the physical actions of defendants Laspisa, Scott and Kalteux. Each of them engaged in typical cocaine-taking behavior. For example, defendant sat with his head down toward his lap. Within seconds, he pulled his head up and then tilted his head backward. When the officers approached the Cadillac, the dome light was turned off, and defendants drove off to a local nightclub. The officers reentered their unmarked vehicle and followed the Cadillac, having determined, based on their experience, that the vehicle’s occupants had been ingesting cocaine. While following the Cadillac, Nicholas and Pánico attempted to get a squad car in the area to make a traffic stop. After the Cadillac pulled into the Hurricane’s lot, the officers turned into the parking lot directly east. They approached the car as defendant and Kalteux were getting out of it. Officer Nicholas displayed his badge and identified himself to Kalteux, and Officer Pánico approached defendant and showed him his badge. Nicholas pointedly asked Kalteux if the car’s occupants had been snorting cocaine. Pánico asked defendant what they had been doing on Emery Lane. At the initial hearing on defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, the trial court stated: “[T]he motor vehicle was properly stopped and a search of the motor vehicle was permissible under the circumstances. There was a sufficient basis in fact for probable cause that there was a controlled substance in the motor vehicle. Therefore, the motion to suppress the arrest and evidence seized is denied. As to statements made, there being an admonishment that was required and not given, the statements are suppressed.” There is little question that the trial court surmised from the facts that defendants were going to be arrested for cocaine possession in the Hurricane’s parking lot. This was not an investigatory situation in which the police had a suspicion that the defendants had committed a crime. From close range, Officer Nicholas had watched defendants ingest a substance which, based upon his extensive experience, he believed was cocaine. Nicholas unsuccessfully attempted to have a squad car pull the Cadillac over prior to its stopping in Hurricane’s parking lot. When the subject questions were posed to defendants, there is little doubt that their arrest was either imminent or had already commenced. Defendants were obviously not free to leave. The fact that the police had not drawn their weapons and had not told the four people they were under arrest is of little import here. A reasonable person in these circumstances would not have believed he was free to leave. It is disingenuous of the State to argue that the subject questions were merely a part of an on-the-scene investigation. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officers should have given the Miranda warnings to defendant. The cases cited by the majority are factually distinguishable. The police officer in Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 U.S. 420, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 104 S. Ct. 3138, had merely observed defendant driving erratically. Upon making a routine traffic stop, his questions to defendant were part of an on-the-scene investigation. The instant appeal does not involve a routine traffic stop; it resulted from police officers observing probable criminal acts. In People v. Parks (1971), 48 Ill. 2d 232, unlike this case, the police did not observe the alleged criminal behavior. People v. Pullum (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 15, is similar to Berkemer in that it dealt with a routine traffic stop. Finally, People v. Acebo (1989), 182 Ill. App. 3d 403, dealt with a valid Terry stop, which involved some on-the-scene questioning. The appeal at bar did not involve a Terry stop, as the circumstances here had progressed far beyond those meriting a Terry stop. The facts support the trial court’s conclusion that Miranda warnings should have been given to defendant prior to his questioning in the Hurricane’s parking lot. Moreover, as the trial court found, because there is primary illegality, there is derivative illegality regarding defendant’s statements in the police station. Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court’s order suppressing defendant’s statements.