Court Opinion

ID: 9494287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:34:10.349252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:19.911198
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all but part III of the majority opinion; I disagree, however, that *334there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that Buculei obtained “custody or control” over Megan C. as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2251A(b). The “custody or control” requirement of § 2251A means that a defendant must exert a significant degree of authority over the minor. In all events, § 2251A must be interpreted as outlawing conduct that is more serious than the lesser-included offense of § 2251(a), which makes it unlawful to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. While Buculei certainly persuaded, induced, and enticed Megan, he never possessed authority over her that amounted to “custody or control.” Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affir-mance of Buculei’s conviction on the one count brought under § 2251A(b).
There are two primary offenses dealing with the use of minors in producing child pornography. The baseline offense is § 2251(a), which prohibits the “employ[ment], use[ ], persua[sion], inducement], entice[ment], or coercion]” of a minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. Section 2251A, on the other hand, deals with more serious conduct (and carries substantially stiffer penalties) than does § 2251(a).* Titled the “Selling or buying of children,” § 2251A has two parts. Section 2251A(a) prohibits a parent, legal guardian, or other person having “custody or control” of a minor from selling or transferring custody or control of the minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. Section 2251A(b), in turn, prohibits any person from buying or obtaining “custody or control” of a minor for the purpose of producing child pornography.
To have “custody or control,” the defendant must exert a significant degree of authority over the minor. The plain meaning of the words “custody” and “control” compels this conclusion. The word “control” is defined in the dictionary as the “power or authority to guide or manage.” Webster’s New International Dictionary 496 (3d ed.1993) (emphasis added). Likewise, “custody” is defined as the “act or duty of guarding and preserving.” Id. at 559 (emphasis added). The statutory definition likewise confirms that the minor must be under the defendant’s authority: “custody or control” includes “temporary supervision over or responsibility for a minor whether legally or illegally obtained.” Id. § 2256(7).
In addition to the plain language of § 2251A and the statutory definition, other factors confirm that it takes a significant degree of authority to have “custody or control” of a minor. First, § 2251A must be interpreted in light of the lesser-included offense of § 2251(a). Again, § 2251(a) prohibits the “employfment], use[ ], persuasion], induce[ment], entice[ment], or coercion]” of a minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. To avoid making § 2251A redundant, “custody or control” must be interpreted to involve something more authoritative than employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion. See, e.g., Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (stating that courts should avoid interpreting one statute in a way that makes another statute redundant). If “custody or control” is equated with a significant degree of authority, § 2251A and § 2251(a) stand apart from each other and cover separate crimes. Otherwise, they do not. Second, the words surrounding “custody or control” in § 2251A(a) suggest that a significant degree of authority is required. See, e.g., *335Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 695, 115 S.Ct. 2407, 132 L.Ed.2d 597 (1995) (“[A] word is known by the company it keeps”). The section prohibits a “parent,” “legal guardian,” or “other person having custody or control” of a minor from selling or handing over the minor for use in child pornography. By placing a person with “custody or control” in the same class as a “parent” and “legal guardian,” Congress surely meant that a person with custody or control will have significant authority and power over the minor. Third, the statute’s title sheds light on the meaning of “custody or control.” See, e.g., Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 125, 120 S.Ct. 2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000) (using the statute’s title as part of the Court’s statutory interpretation analysis). Section 2251A is titled the “Selling or buying of children.” This suggests that the section targets defendants who have significant power over their victims, specifically, the power to sell or buy them. Fourth, the structure of section 2251A reveals what is required for custody or control. Here, I repeat that section 2251A(a) prohibits a parent, legal guardian, or any other person having “custody or control” of a minor from selling or transferring custody or control of the minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. This means that a person with “custody or control” of a minor will have enough power and authority over the minor to sell her or transfer custody or control of her to a third person. Section 2251A(b), the basis for the third count against Buculei, prohibits a person from buying or otherwise obtaining custody or control of a minor for the purpose of producing child pornography. Once a person, like Buculei, buys or obtains custody or control of a minor, he would surely be obtaining power and authority equal to that necessary for custody or control under § 2251A(a), that is, sufficient power and authority over the minor to resell her or re-transfer custody or control. As I will explain, the evidence does not establish that Buculei had that sort of power and authority over Megan. This is the case, notwithstanding the strict standard of review: “The verdict of [the] jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942).
The majority concludes that the effect of the “clear” drink gave Buculei custody or control over Megan. I disagree. At the motel Megan drank less than one-half cup of a clear drink which made her feel “dizzy and tired.” Megan’s testimony, however, reveals that the drink did not significantly impair her judgment or her ability to function. She remained quite lucid, even reminding Buculei several times that it was getting late and that she had to be home by 6:00 a.m. Megan was able to recount the entire night’s experience with Buculei in vivid detail. She remembered many particulars that were incidental. For example, she recalled that she was wearing two shirts, but not a belt; that Buculei got undressed all at once; that the motel room had two beds, a table and chair, and paper cups; that the room had a sink area that was separate from the bathroom; and that the television was turned on. Megan did not testify that the drink had any effect on her other than making her dizzy and tired. For example, she did not say that the drink made her act differently, that it was in any way a factor in bringing about the events that unfolded, or that it impaired her ability to reason. In short, Megan’s testimony reveals that the drink had the limited effect of making her somewhat dizzy and tired. Because the drink had such a limited effect, it did not give Buculei custody or control over Megan.
*336The evidence strongly supports a finding that Buculei persuaded, induced, and enticed Megan to have sex with him for the purpose of producing child pornography in violation of § 2251(a), as charged in count two. The evidence, however, does not show that Buculei had “custody or control” of Megan. I would therefore vacate Bucu-lei’s conviction on count three and remand for resentencing on the remaining four counts.

 Absent special circumstances, § 2251(a) carries a minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum of 20. Section 2251A carries a minimum of 20 years and a maximum of life.