Court Opinion

ID: 9740902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:44:27.957999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:20.946671
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
Royse, C. J.
(Dissenting opinion) — I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority in this case. I- am in general agreement with their views on the question of pleas in abatement and, under other circumstances, believe their conclusion would be correct. However, for the reasons hereinafter stated, I believe the appeal should be dismissed because the action which appellant commenced is moot.
The complaint herein was filed in the Superior Court of Marion County March 30, 1948. On June 10, 1941, congress enacted a statute authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, when requested by the Federal Loan Administrator, with the approval of the President, to create a corporation, inter alia, to take such action as the President and the Federal Loan Administrator may deem necessary to expedite the national-defense program (55 Stat. 248, 249). Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation created appellee on December 13, 1941, to insure property against war damage, and defendant’s charter was made a part of thepermanent federal regulations (Code of Federal Regulations, Cum. Supp., pp. 3819-20 (1st ed.) ; see also, 7 Federal Register 2531). On March 27, 1942, Congress enacted a statute directing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to continue to supply funds to defendant but in an amount not to exceed one billion dollars (56 Stat. 174, 175).
Both the Act of June, 1941 (55 Stat. 248, 250), au-' thorizing appellee’s creation, and its charter expressly *606provide that it “shall (not) have succession beyond January 22, 1947, except for purposes of liquidation, unless . . . (appellee) is extended beyond such date pursuant to an Act of Congress.” Congress has passed no act extending the life of appellee beyond January 22, 1947. In fact, on June 30, 1947, Congress repealed the Act of March 27, 1942, authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to supply funds to appellee (61 Stat. 202, 209).
Finally, on July 30, 1947, Congress enacted the following law in reference to appellee:
“War Damage Corporation: The Board of Directors of the Corporation shall pay or cause to be paid to the Treasury of the United States $210,751,618.-65 of the amount realized by the Corporation from its operations, such sum to be covered into the Treasury immediately upon the approval of this Act . and applied to reduction of the national debt.” 61 ' Stat. 574,' 579.
Appellee in its brief in this court correctly asserts that we must take judicial knowledge of these Acts of Congress and the Code of Federal Regulations. It then asserts they show when this action was commenced (1) appellee was not doing business in Indiana, (2) it owned no property here, and (3) in fact had completely ceased to exist.
Appellant in its reply brief concedes that if appellee has ceased to exist its. action against it should be dismissed. But appellant contends that the above referred-to statutes do not show appellee has ceased to exist because the statute creating it and its charter provided it shall not have succession beyond January 22, 1947, except for purposes of liquidation, unless it is extended beyond such date pursuant to an Act of Congress. : In support of this contention it cites the fact that appellee' *607appeared through the United States District Attorney in litigation of the same character after it had allegedly ceased to exist and there was no reference to that fact in those cases. They are: Matlaw Corporation v. War Damage Corporation (May, 1947), (D. C. S. D. of Ind.) 7 F. R. D. 349; (7th Cir.) (Oct. 1947) 164 F. 2d 281 (Certiorari Denied), 333 U. S. 863; Knowles v. War Damage Corporation (Oct. 1948), (C. A. D. C.) 171 Fed. 2d 15 (Certiorari Denied) (1949) 336 U. S. 914. From the reported opinions it is not possible to determine when these actions were commenced. It is apparent from reading these opinions the question here under consideration was not presented to the Federal Courts in those cases. I do not believe the appearance of a United States District Attorney or of the Attorney General of the United States on behalf of a Federal agency whose existence had expired by operation of law could recreate life in such agency, nor could the failure to present such a question to the court have such effect.
It is to be assumed that a government agency or corporation will obey the law. Congress did not extend the life of appellee beyond January 22, 1947. Therefore-, it must be presumed that appellee proceeded on that date to liquidate its affairs. Congress determined it needed no more funds after June 30, 1947 and repealed the Act authorizing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to supply it funds — this was more than six months after its existence ended except for liquidation. By the Act of Congress of July 30, 1947, supra, appellee was directed to pay to the Treasury of the United States $210,751,618.65. The minute particularity of this sum is significant. It indicates to me that Congress by this Act completed the liquidation of appellee.
It is well settled by the authorities in this jurisdiction that to give appellate jurisdiction there must be. a *608real controversy which can give to one of the parties some valuable or tangible relief. Flanagan, Wiltrout & Hamilton, Indiana Trial and Appellate Practice, Vol. II, pp. 13-, 14, §2129, Subdivisions C, H and I; State ex rel. Murchie v. Bath, Secretary of State et al. (1949), 227 Ind. 481, 86 N. E. 2d . 680; Bell v. Buescher Band Instrument Company et al. (1930), 202 Ind. 12, 171 N. E. 377; State ex rel. Bryant v. Jackson, Secretary of State (1922), 192 Ind. 497, 137 N. E. 51; Levsey et al. v. City of Evansville, et al. (1951), 121 Ind. App. 666, 101 N. E. 2d 196.
I am of the opinion appellee had ceased to exist as an entity by operation of law long before this litigation’ was commenced. Therefore the appeal should be dismissed and an end put to this litigation. It does not necessarily follow that if there be any merit in appellant’s complaint it might not, in a proper action, pursue the fund. However, it is significant that logical and persuasive dicta in the case of Knowles v. War Damage Corporation, supra, pp. 19, 20, has apparently ended actions of this kind against appellee in the Federal Courts.