Court Opinion

ID: 9469623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:45:21.386883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:28.924702
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING EN BANC
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY, McWilliams, barrett, doyle, McKAY, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
A three-judge panel of this Court filed its opinion in these two appeals on June 15, 1981. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1976). The three-judge panel affirmed the judgment of the district court in No. 79-2180 and dismissed the appeal in No. 79-1004. On June 29, 1981, Siviglia, the appellant in both cases, *837filed a petition for rehearing, with the suggestion that both appeals be reheard en banc. On August 19, 1981, this Court granted Siviglia’s petition for rehearing en banc. The opinion of the panel, filed on June 15, 1981, has not been withdrawn. Thereafter, the parties were permitted to file supplemental briefs, and the cases were reargued to the Court, sitting en banc, on May 6, 1982.
No. 79-2180
Although a rehearing en banc was granted in each of these two appeals, the supplemental briefs and the oral argument of counsel related only to No. 79-1004. As indicated, in No. 79-2180, the panel affirmed the order of the district court denying Siviglia’s motion for dismissal or a new trial. On rehearing en banc, the Court adheres to the judgment of the panel in No. 79-2180, and affirms the order of the district court.
No. 79-1004
The supplemental briefs and the oral argument were concerned exclusively with No. 79-1004. In No. 79-1004, the panel dismissed the appeal on the ground that an earlier remand order divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. On rehearing en banc of No. 79-1004, the Court adheres to the order of the panel dismissing the appeal.
For background material, the reader of this opinion is directed to the opinion of the panel. United States v. Siviglia, 686 F.2d 832 (10th Cir. 1981). It is sufficient for our present purposes simply to note that on August 27, 1979, Siviglia, through counsel, filed a motion to remand his case to the district court. As of that date, the appeal had been fully briefed, and the case was set for oral argument in the September, 1979, term of court. On August 31, 1979, the government filed a response to the motion to remand, in which the government objected to a remand on the ground that it was a delaying tactic. On September 7,1979, the Court granted Siviglia’s motion for remand. Our remand order was an unqualified remand, i.e., not a partial remand, and contained no conditions or limiting language.
The panel, in dismissing No. 79-1004, held that the unqualified remand order terminated our jurisdiction of that appeal. The Court, on rehearing en banc, adheres to the panel’s order of dismissal in No. 79-1004.
The Court notes that Siviglia’s motion to remand was itself “unqualified” in nature in that he did not request a partial remand for a limited purpose. In his motion to remand, Siviglia stated that he intended to file with the district court a motion for dismissal, or, alternatively, for a new trial, and that a remand was necessary in order to permit the district court to consider, and to grant such motion. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33. In the motion for remand, Siviglia declared that if the district court were to grant his motion for dismissal, or new trial, further prosecution of the direct appeal, No. 79-1004, would be unnecessary. Significantly, Siviglia further declared that should the district court deny his motion for dismissal or new trial, he would then appeal “such denial.” After remand, Siviglia in fact did file a motion for dismissal, or for a new trial, which the district court, after hearing, denied. As above indicated, we have affirmed such denial in No. 79-2180.
We find nothing in Siviglia’s motion to remand to indicate that he sought only a partial or limited remand in order to preserve the direct appeal of his conviction should the district court deny his motion for dismissal or new trial. On the contrary, Siviglia advised the Court in his motion to remand that should the district court deny his motion for dismissal or new trial, he intended to appeal “such denial,” which he did. Accordingly, the motion for remand, in practical effect, constituted an abandonment of any appeal going to the merits of his conviction. In this connection, our examination of Siviglia’s brief addressing the merits of his second conviction indicate quite clearly that his grounds for reversal are unsubstantial. So, the motion for remand indicates, to us, that Siviglia was staking all on his ability to convince the district court that the charges against him should either be dismissed, or that he should be granted a new trial thereon, or, absent *838that, a reversal on appeal of any such denial order.
By supplemental brief, current counsel for Siviglia, who did not prepare the motion for remand or otherwise actively represent Siviglia until the rehearing en banc, suggests that Siviglia has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. That particular issue cannot be injected into the present proceeding in such offhand manner. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to support the suggestion.
In sum, this Court had jurisdiction over Siviglia’s direct appeal of his criminal conviction in No. 79-1004 until September 7, 1979, on which date we granted defendant’s unqualified motion to remand to the district court. Our unqualified remand of the case operated to divest us of jurisdiction. See Dist. 17 and 28, U.M.W. v. N.L.R.B., 468 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C.Cir.1972). Having lost jurisdiction, we could not regain it until a proper appeal had been perfected. Siviglia’s attempt to revive No. 79-1004 was untimely and, as such, cannot constitute a proper appeal. Accordingly, No. 79-1004 must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
HOLLOWAY and LOGAN, JJ., dissent, and a dissenting opinion, or dissenting opinions, will be filed.
Holloway, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion in which Logan, J., joined.