Court Opinion

ID: 9408120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 17:01:28.981882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.915440
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NANUBHAI M. PATEL;                              No. 22-55294
LALITABEN N. PATEL; VIMAL
NANU PATEL; VIMAL, INC., a                        D.C. No.
California corporation,                        8:21-cv-01707-
                                                 DOC-KES
                Plaintiffs-Appellants,

    v.                                            OPINION

CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a
municipal corporation; LOS
ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT; DOES, 1 through
10, inclusive,

                Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
            for the Central District of California
          David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

                   Submitted June 8, 2023 *
                    Pasadena, California

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2                  PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

                        Filed July 11, 2023

     Before: Susan P. Graber and John B. Owens, Circuit
       Judges, and John R. Tunheim,** District Judge.

                       Per Curiam Opinion

                          SUMMARY ***

            42 U.S.C. § 1983 / Pre-Seizure Notice

    The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment
dismissing for failure to state a claim a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action in which plaintiffs alleged that the Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department violated their constitutional
rights by failing to provide pre-seizure notice.
   The Sheriff’s Department seized $98,000 from Plaintiffs
pursuant to a state court judgment.
    The panel concluded that the district court correctly held
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of
procedural due process. The panel considered the Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), factors: the competing
interests at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation under
existing procedures, and the value of substitute
procedures. First, the competing interests strongly weighed

 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the
**

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.
***
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES                 3

against a conclusion that plaintiffs’ procedural due process
rights were violated. The City as creditor had a clear interest
in collecting the money judgment because it prevailed before
the California trial court and on appeal, and plaintiffs did not
allege that the funds were exempt or were needed for
subsistence. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation under
California’s procedures was small because the procedures
required the clerk of the court only to transcribe the amount
of the money judgment and take account of statutory
defenses like the exemptions asserted by a judgment
debtor. Finally, given the small risk of erroneous
deprivation, the value of the substitute procedure proposed
by plaintiffs did not outweigh the strong interests of the
City. The judgment put plaintiffs on notice to apply for
exemptions, which plaintiffs did not do. In addition, courts
have largely rejected the suggestion that pre-deprivation
notice is constitutionally required.
4                PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

                        COUNSEL

Frank A. Weiser, Law Offices of Frank A. Weiser, Los
Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Amber A. Logan, Logan Mathevosian & Hur LLP, Los
Angeles, California; Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City
Attorney; Scott Marcus, Chief Assistant City Attorney;
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney; Office of the Los
Angeles City Attorney; Los Angeles, California; Henry P.
Nelson, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.

                         OPINION

PER CURIAM:

    Plaintiffs Nanubhai M. Patel, Lalitaben N. Patel, Vimal
Nanu Patel, and Vimal, Inc., timely appeal from the district
court’s dismissal of their first amended complaint for failure
to state a claim. After the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (the “Sheriff’s Department”) seized $98,000
from Plaintiffs pursuant to a state court judgment, Plaintiffs
brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the failure
to provide pre-seizure notice violated their constitutional
rights. Reviewing de novo the dismissal, Bolden-Hardge v.
Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1220 (9th Cir.
2023), we affirm.
I. Background
   In May 2018, the City of Los Angeles (the “City”)
brought an action against Plaintiffs for abatement, unfair
                   PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES                       5

competition, and public nuisance regarding their ownership
of a motel. After contested proceedings, the state court
entered judgment in the City’s favor in November 2019,
issued injunctive relief, and required Plaintiffs to pay the
City $98,318.71. The California Court of Appeal dismissed
Plaintiffs’ appeal, and the California Supreme Court denied
review in March 2021. At no time did Plaintiffs file for an
exemption. 1
   On September 22, 2021, at the request of the City, a state
court issued a writ of execution in the amount of the
judgment. About six days later, the Sheriff’s Department
executed the writ against Plaintiffs’ personal and business
bank accounts at Bank of America and seized approximately
$98,000.
    Plaintiffs filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the
City, the Sheriff’s Department, and the County of Los
Angeles (the “County”) on October 14, 2021. A month later,
Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, the operative
complaint. Plaintiffs allege that the seizure of funds without
notice violated their procedural due process and other
constitutional rights. The district court granted Defendants’
motion to dismiss, holding in relevant part that Defendants’
execution of the writ in compliance with California’s post-
judgment collection procedures did not violate Plaintiffs’
due process rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 to review this timely appeal.

1
  Under California law, judgment debtors may file to exempt certain
essential funds from execution of a judgment. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 703.030(a).
6                   PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

II. Due Process Analysis
    The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs failed to
state a claim for a violation of procedural due process. 2 To
determine whether there has been a due process violation,
we consider the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
factors, which “include the competing interests at stake, the
risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures, and
the value of substitute procedures.” Duranceau v. Wallace,
743 F.2d 709, 711 (9th Cir. 1984).
    The competing interests strongly weigh against a
conclusion that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights
were violated. “The fact that the creditor has obtained a
judgment establishing the monetary liability of the debtor
gives it a strong interest in a prompt and inexpensive
satisfaction of the debt.” Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50,
58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc); see also Duranceau, 743 F.2d
at 711 (reasoning that states have a general interest in “the
effective enforcement of judgments”). In this case, the City
as creditor has a clear interest in collecting the money
judgment because it prevailed before the California trial
court and on appeal. Although a judgment debtor has a
strong interest in protecting statutorily exempt funds,
especially those needed for subsistence, e.g., Betts v. Tom,
431 F. Supp. 1369, 1375–77 (D. Haw. 1977), Plaintiffs have
not alleged—in either the original complaint or the first
amended complaint—that the funds are exempt or are

2
  We reject the City’s argument that we should dismiss the appeal as
defective because Plaintiffs copied and pasted sections of their district
court brief. Although Plaintiffs repeat verbatim some of the arguments
that they made to the district court, those arguments are relevant to our
court as well. Neither the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure nor any
other binding legal authorities require that we dismiss the appeal.
                 PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES               7

needed for subsistence. In these circumstances, the City’s
interest in retaining the funds outweighs Plaintiffs’. See,
e.g., McCahey v. L.P. Invs., 774 F.2d 543, 549 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“The debtor’s interest in preserving non-exempt property
for his or her own use is of course subservient to the
creditor’s judgment.”).
    The risk of erroneous deprivation under California’s
procedures is small because the procedures require the clerk
of the court only to transcribe the amount of the money
judgment and “take account of statutory defenses like the
earnings exemptions asserted by [a judgment debtor].”
Duranceau, 743 F.2d at 712 (noting, in similar
circumstances, that “the sources of error are few”); Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 699.510(a) (outlining the procedure for the
issuance of a writ of execution); Civ. Proc. § 699.520(f)–(g).
Further, under California procedures, certain property is
exempt automatically, without action by the debtor. See,
e.g., Civ. Proc. § 704.080 (deposit accounts that receive
public benefit or social security payments); Civ. Proc.
§ 704.120 (unemployment benefits); Civ. Proc. § 704.170
(aid payments from charitable organizations); Civ. Proc.
§ 704.220 (money in a deposit account equal to a minimum
standard of living).
    Given the small risk of erroneous deprivation, the value
of the substitute procedure proposed by Plaintiffs does not
outweigh the strong interests of the City. Plaintiffs contend
that no safeguards prior to seizure exist in California and
suggest that they must receive notice before execution of the
writ to protect exempt property. But the value of pre-
deprivation notice—the substitute procedure—is de minimis
because Plaintiffs already had a contested court proceeding
that resulted in entry of the judgment. The judgment put
Plaintiffs on notice to apply for exemptions. See Civ. Proc.
8                PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES

§§ 703.020(b)(1), 703.030(a) (indicating that the judgment
debtor may claim exemptions and the time and manner to do
so); see also Phillips v. Bartolomie, 121 Cal. Rptr. 56, 62
(Ct. App. 1975) (noting that a judgment debtor could file an
exemption “immediately after the judgment is entered”).
Moreover, as mentioned above, California has several
automatic exemptions that apply without action by the
debtor. Plaintiffs did not invoke these statutory safeguards,
assert that their funds are exempt, or state that the funds are
necessary for subsistence. Additional notice prior to
execution of the writ would therefore not reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation.
    In addition, courts have largely rejected the suggestion
that pre-deprivation notice is constitutionally required. E.g.,
McCahey, 774 F.2d at 550; Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of
Duval, 539 F.2d 1355, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976); but see Betts,
431 F. Supp. at 1377–78 (holding a Hawaii statute
unconstitutional because it permitted garnishment of a bank
account containing funds from an aid grant without pre-
deprivation notice). Because the City’s interests outweigh
Plaintiffs’, the risk of erroneous deprivation is small, and the
value of the substitute procedure is minimal, we join those
courts in holding that the lack of pre-deprivation notice did
not violate Plaintiffs’ due process rights in this particular
situation. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (“[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” (cleaned up)).
                    PATEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES                         9

   Finally, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’
Fourth and Fifth Amendment 3 and Equal Protection claims. 4
We need not reach the remaining issues. 5
    AFFIRMED.

3
  Plaintiffs briefly challenge the dismissal of their Fourth and Fifth
Amendment claims on the basis of a due process violation, but those
claims fail because there was no due process violation.
4
  Plaintiffs rest their equal protection claim on a comparison between
pre- and post-judgment debtors. However, this comparison is misplaced:
post-judgment debtors clearly differ from pre-judgment debtors because
post-judgment debtors already have had a judicial proceeding. See
Brown, 539 F.2d at 1366; Wyshak v. Wyshak, 138 Cal. Rptr. 811, 812–
13 (Ct. App. 1977) (emphasizing the different due process concerns of
pre-judgement and post-judgment debtors). Because the distinction is
rational, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim cannot succeed on this ground.
5
  Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief does not mention the First Amendment, so
they have forfeited any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of that
claim. See Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874, 880 n.7 (9th Cir.
2021). They also do not argue “specifically and distinctly” that the
district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend, so we do
not review that issue. Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir.
1994). Nor do we reach whether the Sheriff’s Department and the
County have immunity.