Court Opinion

ID: 9672361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:53:34.250191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:15.602040
License: Public Domain

McCown, J.,
dissenting.
' L.B. 381, Laws 1975, does not create any new offense nor does it materially change the nature of any existing offense. It is not complete in itself, nor is it original and independent legislation. Instead, it attempts to" reduce the penalties for any speed limit violation which occurs on any part of “the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways” if the speed limit is violated by hot .more than 10 miles per hour. The bill *755reduced penalties by limiting the finé to not more than $10, omitting court costs, and by providing that no points shall be assessed against the operator under the point system, but it also completely revamped the point system.
The designation of Interstate highway system is a new addition to statutory language involving speed limits, which is now introduced into a group of statutes which have used and still use the term “freeway” in imposing various speed limits, and define that word in section 39-602(29), R. S. Supp., 1975. That freeway definition has continuously applied to a divided arterial highway designed primarily for through traffic with full control of- access and with grade separations, and the definition of freeway has not and does not contain any limitations' or -references to the Interstate system.
In attempting to change the point system to provide for the omission of penalty points for a speed limit violation on any part of the Interstate system, instead of simply omitting any points for a speeding violation of not more than 10 miles an hour on the Interstate, L.B. 381 completely revised the point system. Prior to L.B. 381, any speeding violation, no matter where or on what highway it occurred, was subject to the same point assessment. Not more than 5 miles per hour over the speed limit was 1 point; 5 to 10 miles over the speed limit was 2 points; and more than 10 miles per hour over the speed limit was 3 points. L.B. 381 continues that same identical point assessment for speeding on most highways but now makes new and different assessment for speeding violations on freeways, the state highway system, or any dustless surfaced highways. As to those highways, 1 point is assessed for speeding not more than 10 miles per hour over the speed limit; 2 points for 10 to 15 miles per hour over the limit; and 3 points for more than 15 miles per hour over the limit. L.B. 381 then provides that no points shall be assessed upon conviction of exceeding by not more than 10 miles *756per hour the speed limit on any part of the Interstate system. Speed limits referred to and specifically included in L.B. 381 are all general statutory speed limits under sections 39-662 and 39-666, R. S. Supp., 1975, and 39-663, R. R. S. 1943. It should be noted that those speed limits include maximum speed limits established by the Department of Roads or local authorities for a particular place or part of any highway, and include maximum speed limits effective at different times of day or night.
Regardless of the intent of the Legislature in adopting L.B. 381, the result is constitutionally unsupportable. Although the issue of equal protection was not directly raised in this case, the requirements of reasonable classification were raised and must be met. The Legislature may make a reasonable classification of persons, corporations, and property for the purpose of legislation concerning them, but the classification must rest upon real differences in situation and circumstances surrounding the members of the class relative to the subject of the legislation which render appropriate its enactment; and to be valid, the law must operate uniformly and alike upon every member of the class so designated. See Creigh v. Larsen, 171 Neb. 317, 106 N. W. 2d 187.
Although L.B. 381 attempted to reduce the penalties for certain violators of the speed laws, it nevertheless imposed new and different penalties upon others and it must therefore still comply with constitutional provisions requiring uniformity, the inhibitions as to the enactment of special laws, and must also be nondiscriminatory under the equal protection clause.
Thorough analysis of L.B. 381 establishes the fact that there are literally no real differences in situation and circumstances in many, if not most, of the circumstances upon which it purports to operate. There is no logical nor rational justification for any distinction between speeding on a freeway which is a part of the Interstate system and speeding on a freeway which is *757not. Neither is there any possible justification for imposing different penalties for an identical violation of the same speed limit law simply because it occurred at one place rather than another. The arbitrary nature of the distinctions L.B. 381 attempts to make are perhaps best illustrated by an example involving a 45-mile per hour speed limit established at a particular place or part of different highways by the Department of Roads or local authorities under section 39-663, R. R. S. 1943. Such speed limits are established upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation to determine what is reasonable and safe for that particular location and highway. Obviously in each case the maximum speed limit has been set with respect to the conditions on that particular highway. Under L.B. 381, if that 45-mile per hour speed limit is violated by 7 miles per hour, the result would be as follows: On the Interstate system, a fine of not more than $10, no court costs, and no points; on a freeway other than the Interstate, a fine of not more than $100 plus costs, and 1 point; on any part of the state highway system or on any dustless surfaced highway, the result would be the same as on a freeway; on a county road, the penalty would be a fine of not more than $100 plus costs, and the assessment of 2 points. In the event the same 45-mile per hour speed limit were violated by more than 10 miles per hour but less than 15, all violators would be assessed under the same fine and cost limitations. The drivers on the Interstate, freeway, and state highway systems would be assessed 2 points, while the driver on the county road would be assessed 3 points. It is only when the violation of that 45-mile per hour speed limit exceeds the limit by more than 15 miles per hour that all drivers are again subject to the same penalties.
While the power of classification rests with the Legislature, such classification must rest upon real and substantial differences which afford a rational basis for the classification. Those real and substantial differences *758do not exist here, nor is there a rational basis which can logically justify the classifications made. The purposes and provisions of L.B. 381 are so intertwined and interconnected that it is impossible to separate those portions which are constitutionally permissible and those which are not. Therefore, the entire act should fall.