Court Opinion

ID: 9714886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:48:04.340614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:29.236997
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
The facts of this case are set out in the majority opinion. Only two questions are presented, namely: (1) Once a defendant has indicated he wants a lawyer and one is retained, can he waive his lawyer’s presence and give a valid statement? (2) Under such circumstances, can law enforcement officers lawfully ask a defendant if he is willing to make such a waiver?
The answer to these propositions must be determined on the basis of rules laid down by the United States *598Supreme Court in certain key decisions. The interpretation of these decisions in the federal courts must be accorded primary consideration. The state courts are in conflict on the propositions here presented with a majority answering the two questions mentioned above in the affirmative. This is a case of first impression in Nebraska. Decisions of other states are merely advisory and are not binding in Nebraska, but the federal decisions are of primary importance in arriving at a correct interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions.
Prior to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10 A. L. R. 3d 974, decided in 1966, there were many decisions handed down by the United States Supreme Court regarding various privileges incorporated in the Bill of Rights. Among these earlier decisions are Massiah v. United States, 377 U. S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977. It appears to have been the intent of the court in Miranda to clarify some of these earlier decisions as it is therein stated: “We granted certiorari in these cases, * * * m order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.” It must be recognized that this is not a case involving a denial of counsel. Defendant was permitted to contact his lawyer and his lawyer was not denied access to defendant. In fact, counsel made no effort to contact his client.
Although Miranda appears to be controlling in the present situation, it seems advisable to consider the Massiah and Escobedo decisions. In Massiah, the defendant was tricked into making a confession by having an accomplice, acting as an agent for law enforcement personnel, elicit statements from defendant which were listened to over a concealed microphone. Although sometimes interpreted as completely barring a confes*599sion made after indictment and retention or request for counsel, the court stated: “We do not question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we hold is that the defendant’s own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial.” Escobedo lays down the rule that once a defendant requests a lawyer’s presence, questioning must cease until the lawyer is present. The case was aggravated by a deliberate refusal by the police to permit counsel to see his client. The court stated: “We hold only that when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory — when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession — our adversary system begins to operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.” Neither Massiah nor Escobedo go so far as to deny the right of a defendant to waive his constitutional right to counsel.
The constitutional rights discussed in Miranda and other decisions are personal in nature. They are intended to protect individual defendants from coercion and trickery. They can be waived or asserted only by the defendant or his authorized representative. Counsel cannot ordinarily assert or waive them against the will of his client, but the client may do either with or without the consent of counsel. In this regard, so long as he acts knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, he is the master of his own fate and may determine the course to be pursued. It is conceded that the right to remain silent may be waived. Is the right to consult counsel any more sacred or important? If a defendant determines it is best to proceed and to give information in the absence of his lawyer, should he not be free to do so? Miranda answers these questions clearly. The court stated: *600“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. * * * the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires. * * * An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. * * * In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. * * * He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity *601afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement(Emphasis supplied.)
Miranda repeatedly makes it clear that the right to consult counsel may be waived. This is the interpretation placed upon United States Supreme Court decisions governing situations such as the one now before us by the federal courts. In Goughian v. United States, 391 F. 2d 371 (9th C'ir., 1968), the court said: “At the time the confession was obtained, the appellant was represented by court-appointed counsel. This fact was well known to the officers who interrogated the accused. No notice was given by the officers to defendant’s counsel of the intended interviews and he was not present when the statement was taken. * * * Under this state of the facts, appellant contends that his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel was effectively denied. We are asked to rule that any statement, admission or confession secured by peace officers from a defendant represented by an attorney, where the attorney was not timely advised of the proposed interview or interrogation, be rejected as violative of the right to counsel. Appellant recognizes that this Sixth Amendment right may be voluntarily waived, but, at oral argument, it was contended that such a waiver would never be knowing and truly voluntary unless counsel was present to advise the client. * * * It may well be that the day is approaching when the right to counsel may be expanded to the point where an accused may only be interrogated by the police in the presence of his lawyer. However, no persuasive precedent for the holding here sought has come to our attention. Appellant relies heavily on the teaching of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Miranda specifically recognizes prior cases holding that the right to counsel may be waived. Here a clear and. knowing waiver was shown. We are unwilling to attempt to ex*602pand the Miranda ruling to the extent sought by appellant.”
In United States v. Fellabaum, 408 F. 2d 220 (7th Cir., 1969), it is said: “The issue comes down to this: May a defendant, who has an identified counsel, be questioned when, after adequate constitutional warnings, he has fully, repeatedly, and affirmatively declined the presence of counsel? We conclude, under the circumstances appearing in this case, that such questioning is fully consistent with all constitutional safeguards.” To the same effect are the following cases: Arrington v. Maxwell, 409 F. 2d 849 (6th Cir., 1969); Reinke v. United States, 405 F. 2d 228 (9th Cir., 1968); Wilson v. United States, 398 F. 2d 331 (5th Cir., 1968); State v. Lopez, 80 N. M. 130, 452 P. 2d 199 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 352 F. 2d 30 (3d Cir., 1965); Conway v. State, 7 Md. App. 400, 256 A. 2d 178 (1969); People v. Smith, 42 Ill. 2d 479, 248 N. E. 2d 68 (1969); State v. Blanchey, 454 P. 2d 841 (Wash., 1969); Mathies v.United States, 374 F. 2d 312 (D. C. Cir., 1967); Beatty v. United States, 377 F. 2d 181 (5th Cir., 1967). See, also, Shultz v. United States, 351 F. 2d 287 (10th Cir., 1965). In three of these cases, Arrington, Reinke, and Beatty, the defendant solicited the opportunity to speak. In the others he did not.
. Can it be truthfully maintained that coercion exists or is present when a law enforcement officer repeats the Miranda warnings and simply inquires of the defendant if he is then willing to waive his constitutional rights? In what manner is the defendant wronged by a simple inquiry as to whether or not he will waive these rights? He is under no compulsion, has a full understanding of the situation, and the decision is his to make.' Under the circumstances, it appears that the majority opinion goes far beyond any federal rules now in force and represents a material and unwarranted expansion of the law governing the admissibility of confessions. The opinion holds, in effect, that once a defendant has de*603manded or obtained a lawyer, he cannot thereafter be questioned under any circumstances in the absence of his lawyer and cannot waive the right to have his lawyer present, at least unless such waiver is made in the presence of his lawyer. It is contrary to our holding in State v. Godfrey, 182 Neb. 451, 155 N. W. 2d 438 (1968), wherein in speaking for the court, McCown, J., said: “The fact that a defendant, as a part of the initial procedures at a police station, after full Miranda warnings, is asked whether he desires to make a statement at that time, and answers negatively, does not automatically invoke his right to counsel and render inadmissible any subsequent statement obtained in the absence of counsel. Such a factual- circumstance, coupled with other facts present, does not prohibit or invalidate a later waiver voluntarily, knowingly; and intelligently made.” It is also contrary to our ruling in State v. Woods, 182 Neb. 668, 156 N. W. 2d 786 (1968), wherein this court held that although the accused had previously requested an attorney, he could thereafter change his mind, waive the right to an attorney, and make a valid statement.
I believe our decision in this case is illogical and incorrect and consequently, I must respectfully dissent.
White, C. J., and Carter, J., join in this dissent.