Court Opinion

ID: 9671234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:12.468742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.668335
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(concurring in affirmance). As noted by Division 2 (Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Company [1969], 18 Mich App 87, 88, 89), plaintiffs have raised a number of additional questions for review. All however proceed on assumption that errors were committed during the trial of a submissible case, warranting a new trial. In view of the foregoing, however, there is no need for treatment of any of those questions beyond brief reference to the thoroughly briefed proposal that this *80Court employ the case at bar as a vehicle for overrulement of contributory negligence, and that the Court should substitute in the place thereof some judicially selected form of comparative negligence.1
The most prominent reason assigned for this latest proposal of judicial legislation was presented brilliantly during oral argument of plaintiffs’ appeal. It was that contributory negligence is most unfair to plaintiffs in negligence in that it authorizes jury argument and jury instruction that, if any contributory negligence, “however slight”, be found, the verdict must be against the slightly negligent plaintiff regardless of the extent or nature of the defendant’s causal negligence.
I could agree with the stated “however slight” criticism if it were not for Clark v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co. (1962), 367 Mich 396, 402, and Mack v. Precast Industries, Inc. (1963), 369 Mich 439, 448-454.2 But the point is now academic in view of Mack. It is not likely that this Court will undertake to reverse Mack’s holding that these “however slight” jury arguments and instructions are quite out of order.
As for the motion for legislation proper, I agree with the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the Vincent case (p 130):
“Without passing judgment upon the merits of pure comparative negligence as opposed to comparative negligence as it is presently applied in this jurisdiction, we think that the legislature is the body best *83equipped to adopt the change advocated by the appellant. Such was also the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Maid v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill 2d 193 (239 NE2d 445) when it was asked to adopt for general application the doctrine of comparative negligence.”
*81Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 1

*82PLAINTIFFs' EXHiBIT No. 2

*83Adams, J., concurred with Black, J.

 Last year a near similar proposal by the American Trial Lawyers Association, that “pure” comparative negligence be installed in Wisconsin by judicial action, was submitted to and rejected by the Supreme Court of that State. See Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis 2d 120 (177 NW2d 513).

 For similar sentiments, see recent O’Brien v. Bethlehem Steel Corp (1971), 59 NJ 114; 279 A2d 827.