Court Opinion

ID: 9376994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 17:02:06.252414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.997994
License: Public Domain

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                   2023 CO 11

                      Supreme Court Case No. 21SC885
                    Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
                     Court of Appeals Case No. 20CA641

                                   Petitioners:

  Colorado State Board of Education and Douglas County School District RE-1,

                                        v.

                                 Respondents:

               Judy A. Brannberg and John Dewey Institute, Inc.

                              Judgment Reversed
                                   en banc
                                 March 6, 2023

Attorneys for Petitioner Colorado State Board of Education:
Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Michelle Berge, First Assistant Attorney General
Joseph A. Peters, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Jenna Zerylnick, Assistant Attorney General
       Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Petitioner Douglas County School District RE-1:
Caplan and Earnest LLC
Elliot V. Hood
       Boulder, Colorado

Respondent Judy A. Brannberg, pro se
     Littleton, Colorado
Respondent John Dewey Institute, Inc., pro se
     Littleton, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Charter School Institute:
Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Davin Dahl, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Noah Patterson, Assistant Solicitor General
       Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE
HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

                                       2
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1       This case requires us to determine whether the last sentence of section

22-30.5-108(3)(d), C.R.S. (2022), of the Charter Schools Act (the “Act”), which

provides that “[t]he decision of the state board [of education] shall be final and not

subject to appeal,” applies to all decisions of the Colorado State Board of Education

(“State Board”) under section 22-30.5-108(3), thereby precluding judicial review of

all such decisions.1

¶2       Section 22-30.5-108 (“section 108”) of the Act creates a four-step procedure

in which a charter school applicant may potentially twice appeal an adverse

decision of a local board of education to the State Board. The parties agree that

section 108 precludes judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a

second appeal under section 108(3)(d). They disagree, however, as to whether this

appeal-preclusion language also bars judicial review of final decisions of the State

Board rendered after a first appeal under section 108(3)(a)—a scenario in which

the State Board has affirmed the local board’s decision to deny a charter school

application, thus rendering a second appeal unnecessary.

1   Specifically, we granted certiorari to review the following issue:
         Whether the last sentence of section 22-30.5-108(3)(d)—“The decision
         of the state board shall be final and not subject to appeal”—applies to
         all state board decisions under section 108(3).

                                            3
¶3    Applying the plain language of section 108 and the statutory scheme as a

whole, we now conclude that section 108(3)(d)’s appeal-preclusion language

applies to all final decisions of the State Board rendered under section 108,

including when, as here, the State Board affirms the local board’s denial of a

charter school application during an initial appeal, thereby ending the matter and

rendering a second appeal unnecessary.

¶4    Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals division’s ruling below

declaring that final decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal are

subject to judicial review, and we remand this case with instructions that the case

be returned to the district court for the dismissal of plaintiff John Dewey Institute,

Inc.’s (“JDI’s”) claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

                         I. Facts and Procedural History

¶5    In 2019, JDI submitted a charter school application to the Douglas County

School Board. That local board denied JDI’s application, and pursuant to the

appeals procedure outlined in section 108, JDI appealed to the State Board. In the

course of this initial appeal, the State Board affirmed the Douglas County School

Board’s denial of JDI’s application, thus effectively ending the matter and

eliminating any need for a second appeal under section 108(3)(c).

¶6    Pursuant to the State Administrative Procedure Act, § 24-4-106, C.R.S.

(2022), JDI then filed a complaint for judicial review against defendants Douglas

                                           4
County School Board and the State Board (collectively, “defendants”). In its

complaint, JDI alleged that, in denying its application, defendants had failed to

comply with a number of the Act’s procedural requirements.

¶7    Defendants jointly moved, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), to dismiss JDI’s

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In this motion, defendants

argued, as pertinent here, that the appeal-preclusion clause in section 108(3)(d)

barred judicial review of the State Board’s final decision.

¶8    The district court ultimately agreed and thus granted defendants’ motion to

dismiss. In so ruling, the court discerned “some ambiguity” in section 108(3)(d)’s

finality and appeal-preclusion language, particularly given that that language

appears only in the section of the statute concerning second appeals. In the court’s

view, the placement of this language in section 108(3)(d) raised a question as to

whether the finality and appeal-preclusion language applied only to final

decisions rendered by the State Board after a second appeal, or whether it applied

to any final decision of the State Board, including final decisions made after a first

appeal. The court ultimately “construe[d] this finality language to apply to all

charter application decisions by the State Board, whether those are decisions in

initial appeal or in second appeal.” In support of this conclusion, the court

explained that it would make no sense to read section 108 to permit judicial review

when both the local board and the State Board denied an application but to

                                          5
preclude such review when the State Board remands to the local board for

reconsideration, the local board adheres to its position, and after a second appeal,

the State Board relents and accepts the local board’s denial. The court found

further support for its position in the fact that article IX, section 1 of the Colorado

Constitution vests in the State Board “general supervision” of public schools, and

the Act gives the State Board the ultimate power to decide whether the local

board’s decision regarding a charter school application was “‘contrary to the best

interests of the pupils, school district, or community’ as required by

section 22-30.5-108(3)(d).”

¶9    JDI appealed, contending, as pertinent here, that the district court had erred

in concluding that section 108(3)(d) precludes judicial review of State Board

decisions rendered after a first appeal. Brannberg v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 2021

COA 132, ¶ 14, 503 P.3d 893, 897. A division of the court of appeals agreed and

concluded that the appeal-preclusion language in section 108(3)(d) was clear—“it

does not explicitly or by necessary implication limit Colorado courts’ jurisdiction

to review first-appeal state board decisions.” Id. at ¶ 25, 503 P.3d at 898.

¶10   The division found support for its conclusion in the facts that (1) the

appeal-preclusion clause appears only in section 22-30.5-108(3)(d) (the provision

detailing the State Board’s second-appeal review); and (2) that section references

                                          6
a “singular and definite ‘decision’ in a process containing two possible state board

decisions.” Id. at ¶¶ 25, 28–31, 503 P.3d at 898–99.

¶11   The division also relied on a comparison of the language and structure of

section 108 with the language and structure of the appeal-preclusion language in

section 22-30.5-107.5, C.R.S. (2022) (“section 107.5”). Id. at ¶¶ 25, 34–38, 503 P.3d

at 898, 900. The division observed that section 107.5 details the appeals process for

certain charter contract disputes. Id. at ¶ 34, 503 P.3d at 900. The division noted

that, like section 108, section 107.5 allows parties to appeal to the State Board for

review. Id. Unlike section 108, however, section 107.5 provides only for a single

appeal. Id. And section 107.5 “concludes with a provision, set off in its own

subsection, stating as follows: ‘Any decision by the state board pursuant to this

section shall be final and not subject to appeal.’” Id. (quoting § 22-30.5-107.5(6)).

In the division’s view, this statutory structure, in contrast with the structure of

section 108, made it “abundantly clear” that section 107.5’s appeal-preclusion

language applies to any State Board decision under that section. Id. at ¶ 36,

503 P.3d at 900. And the division believed that its construction was reinforced by

the facts that (1) section 107.5 adds “pursuant to this section” in its

appeal-preclusion provision (language that does not appear in section 108(3)(d));

and (2) section 107.5(6)’s appeal-preclusion language refers to “[a]ny decision,”

rather than merely “the decision,” which is the language in section 108(6)(d) (and

                                         7
which the division believed concerns only a decision after a second appeal). Id. at

¶¶ 37–38, 503 P.3d at 900.

¶12   Finally, the division rejected defendants’ suggestion that its interpretation

of section 108 was absurd, noting that the division could “envision at least one

plausible justification” for the General Assembly’s according first and second

appeals different degrees of finality. Id. at ¶ 44, 503 P.3d at 901. Specifically, in

the division’s view, barring judicial review of second appeals “affords the process

a level of conclusiveness to what may be contentious conflicts between the state

board and local boards,” and “[n]o such justification undergirds a bar to review of

first-appeal state board decisions.” Id. at ¶¶ 45–46, 503 P.3d at 901. The division

thus reversed the district court’s order dismissing JDI’s complaint and remanded

the case for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 48, 503 P.3d at 902.

¶13   Defendants petitioned this court for certiorari review, and we granted their

petition.

                                   II. Analysis

¶14   We begin with the applicable standard of review and principles of statutory

interpretation. We then consider the plain language of section 108(3) and the

statutory scheme as a whole, and we conclude that when the State Board makes a

final decision concerning the denial of a charter school application, that decision

                                          8
is not subject to appeal, regardless of whether the State Board makes this

determination after a first or second appeal.

           A. Standard of Review and Principles of Construction

¶15   We review questions of statutory construction de novo.            Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2021 CO 43, ¶ 17, 488 P.3d 1065, 1069.

When interpreting statutes, we seek to discern and give effect to the General

Assembly’s intent. Id. In doing so, we apply words and phrases in accordance

with their plain and ordinary meanings, and we consider the entire statutory

scheme to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. In

addition, we will avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases

superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results. Id. And in construing

a statute, we must respect the General Assembly’s choice of language. UMB Bank,

N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840. We therefore

do not add words to the statute or subtract words from it. Id.

¶16   If the statutory language is unambiguous, then we must apply it as written,

and we need not resort to other rules of statutory construction. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, ¶ 17, 488 P.3d at 1069.

                        B. The State Board and the Act

¶17   Article IX, section 1(1) of the Colorado Constitution provides, “The general

supervision of the public schools of the state shall be vested in a board of education

                                          9
whose powers and duties shall be as now or hereafter prescribed by law.”

Construing this provision, we have observed that the framers of our constitution

      contemplated general supervision to include direction, inspection,
      and critical evaluation of Colorado’s public education system from a
      statewide perspective, that they intended the State Board to serve as
      both a conduit of and a source for educational information and policy,
      and that they intended the General Assembly to have broad but not
      unlimited authority to delegate to the State Board “powers and
      duties” consistent with this intent.

Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Booth, 984 P.2d 639, 648 (Colo. 1999).

¶18   Article IX, section 15 of our constitution, in turn, sets forth the role of local

school boards:

      The general assembly shall, by law, provide for organization of school
      districts of convenient size, in each of which shall be established a
      board of education, to consist of three or more directors to be elected
      by the qualified electors of the district. Said directors shall have
      control of instruction in the public schools of their respective districts.

¶19   We have construed “control of instruction” to require “power or authority

to guide and manage both the action and practice of instruction as well as the

quality and state of instruction.” Booth, 984 P.2d at 648.

¶20   Against this background, the General Assembly adopted the Act to create a

form of direct citizen participation in government through which members of a

community can come together to build and operate a public school. § 22-30.5-102,

C.R.S. (2022). The schools remain subject to the oversight and indirect control of

                                           10
the local school board through a charter contract. See § 22-30.5-104, C.R.S. (2022).

They are therefore known as charter schools. § 22-30.5-103(2), C.R.S. (2022).

¶21   Individuals or groups that want to create a charter school must first submit

a charter school application to a local school board. §§ 22-30.5-106(1), -107, C.R.S.

(2022). This application is a proposed agreement that details the proposed school’s

mission statement, goals, objectives, and pupil performance standards; provides

evidence that an adequate number of parents, teachers, and pupils support the

formation of the proposed school; and includes descriptions of the proposed

school’s educational program, governance, and operation. § 22-30.5-106(1).

¶22   Upon receipt of such an application, the local board reviews the application,

holds public hearings, and evaluates the merits of the proposed charter school. See

§ 22-30.5-107(2). If the local board approves the proposal, then the charter school

application “serve[s] as the basis for a contract between” the charter school and

local board. § 20-30.5-105(1)(a), C.R.S. (2022). If, however, the local board denies

the application, then an applicant has the right to obtain review of that adverse

decision pursuant to the appeal and review process outlined in section 108. See

§ 22-30.5-107(3).

¶23   Because the resolution of the question before us turns on the proper

construction of section 108, we quote the pertinent portions of that section at some

length:

                                         11
(1) Acting pursuant to its supervisory power as provided in section 1
of article IX of the state constitution, the state board, upon receipt of
a notice of appeal or upon its own motion, may review decisions of
any local board of education concerning the denial of a charter school
application . . . , in accordance with the provisions of this section.

....

(3) If the notice of appeal, or the motion to review by the state board,
relates to a local board’s decision to deny a charter application . . . ,
the appeal and review process shall be as follows:

(a) Within sixty days after receipt of the notice of appeal or the
making of a motion to review by the state board and after reasonable
public notice, the state board shall review the decision of the local
board of education and make its findings. If the state board finds that
the local board’s decision was contrary to the best interests of the
pupils, school district, or community, the state board shall remand
such decision to the local board of education with written instructions
for reconsideration thereof. Said instructions shall include specific
recommendations concerning the matters requiring reconsideration.

(b) Within thirty days following the remand of a decision to the local
board of education and after reasonable public notice, the local board
of education, at a public hearing, shall reconsider its decision and
make a final decision. . . .

(c) Following the remand, if the local board of education’s final
decision is still to deny a charter application . . . , a second notice of
appeal may be filed with the state board within thirty days following
such final decision.

(d) Within thirty days following receipt of the second notice of appeal
or the making of a motion for a second review by the state board and
after reasonable public notice, the state board, at a public hearing,
shall determine whether the final decision of the local board of
education was contrary to the best interests of the pupils, school
district, or community. If such a finding is made, the state board shall
remand such final decision to the local board with instructions to

                                   12
      approve the charter application . . . . The decision of the state board shall
      be final and not subject to appeal.

§ 22-30.5-108 (emphasis added).

¶24   As the foregoing makes clear, section 108(3)(a) details the State Board’s

initial review of the local board’s decision. During this initial review, the State

Board decides whether the local board’s decision “was contrary to the best

interests of the pupils, school district, or community.” § 22-30.5-108(3)(a). If the

State Board finds that it was, then the State Board must remand the decision to the

local board with written instructions (including specific recommendations) for

reconsideration thereof. Id.

¶25   Sections 108(3)(b) and (c), in turn, describe the processes by which the local

board reconsiders the application on remand and reaches its “final decision.”

§§ 22-30.5-108(3)(b)–(c).   If, after reconsideration, the local board decides to

approve the application, then the local board and the charter applicant complete

the charter contract, rendering a second appeal to the State Board unnecessary. See

§ 22-30.5-108(3)(b). If, however, the local board’s final decision is again to deny

the application, then the applicant may file a second notice of appeal with the State

Board. § 22-30.5-108(3)(c).

¶26   Thereafter, the State Board, at a public hearing, must determine whether the

local board’s “final decision” was “contrary to the best interests of the pupils,

school district, or community.” § 22-30.5-108(3)(d). If the State Board decides that

                                           13
it was, then the Board again remands the matter, this time with instructions to the

local board to approve the application. Id. The State Board’s decision “shall be

final and not subject to appeal.” Id.

¶27   The parties agree that the appeal-preclusion clause in section 108(3)(d) bars

judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a second appeal. They

disagree, however, as to whether that section also bars judicial review of final State

Board decisions rendered after a first appeal. JDI contends that section 108(3)(d)

applies only to State Board decisions concerning charter school applications that

are made after a second appeal under section 108. Thus, in its view, State Board

decisions made after a first appeal are properly subject to judicial review.

Defendants, in contrast, assert that section 108(3)(d) precludes judicial review of

all State Board decisions concerning charter school applications, including final

decisions rendered after a first appeal. For the following reasons, we agree with

defendants.

¶28   First and foremost, section 108’s plain language makes clear that the statute

precludes judicial review of all final decisions of the State Board concerning

charter school applications, whether rendered after a first or second appeal. As

we have previously recognized, section 108 establishes “a scheme of review in

which the State Board has final, unappealable, authority.” Acad. of Charter Schs. v.

Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 32 P.3d 456, 462 (Colo. 2001). Specifically, when read

                                         14
as a whole, section 108 plainly gives to the State Board the final word on matters

concerning the approval of charter school applications, and when the State Board’s

work is complete, section 108(3)(d) makes clear that the Board’s decision “shall be

final and not subject to appeal.” § 22-30.5-108(3)(d); see also Booth, 984 P.2d at 648

(noting “the Charter Schools Act’s designation of the State Board as final arbiter of

disputes involving local boards”).

¶29   We are not persuaded otherwise by the fact that section 108(3)(a) is silent as

to the effect of a State Board decision, after a first appeal, agreeing with the local

board’s decision to deny a charter school application. In such a scenario, it is

unnecessary for the State Board to remand that decision to the local board for

reconsideration or to conduct a second appeal before making a final decision.

Rather, as the division below recognized, “[A] first-appeal affirmation would

constitute the state board’s ultimate decision on the matter.” Brannberg, ¶ 10,

503 P.3d at 897. Accordingly, a final decision of the State Board rendered after a

first appeal becomes “[t]he decision” of the State Board on the matter, and

section 108(3)(d) plainly states, “The decision of the state board shall be final and

not subject to appeal.” § 22-30.5-108(3)(d). Such a conclusion is fully consistent

with our prior statements recognizing that section 108 establishes a statutory

scheme under which the State Board “has final, unappealable, authority,” Acad. of

                                         15
Charter Schs., 32 P.3d at 462, and is the “final arbiter” of disputes in this area, Booth,

984 P.2d at 648.

¶30   Moreover, section 108 nowhere gives a charter school applicant standing to

file a lawsuit or the right to seek judicial review when the State Board renders a

final decision after a first appeal. This is significant because when the legislature

intended to confer such standing or rights of judicial review, it has done so

expressly. See, e.g., § 22-30.5-104(7)(b) (“The charter school shall have standing to

sue and be sued in its own name for the enforcement of any contract created

pursuant to this paragraph (b)” (concerning agreements between a charter school

and others for the use of a school building and grounds, the operation and

maintenance thereof, and the provision of certain services, activities, or

undertakings).); §§ 22-63-302(10)(a)–(d), C.R.S. (2022) (allowing a teacher who was

dismissed by a local school board to seek review in the court of appeals and

providing that the court of appeals must review the record “to determine whether

the action of the board was arbitrary or capricious or was legally impermissible”).

¶31   Here, to the extent that section 108 says anything about judicial review, it

provides that the State Board’s decision is final and not subject to appeal. See

§ 22-30.5-108(3)(d). As noted above, we may not add words to the statute to create

a right of judicial review that the statute nowhere affords. See UMB Bank, N.A.,

¶ 22, 408 P.3d at 840. And interpreting the statute to allow judicial review in

                                           16
circumstances like those before us would mean that the judiciary has the final say

in such circumstances, directly contrary to the statutory scheme, which gives the

final word to the State Board. See Acad. of Charter Schs., 32 P.3d at 462; Booth,

984 P.2d at 648.

¶32   Second, we deem it significant that the State Board’s analysis is the same

during both a first and second appeal. Specifically, in both contexts, the State

Board determines whether the local board’s decision “was contrary to the best

interests of the pupils, school district, or community.” §§ 22-30.5-108(3)(a), (d).

And in both scenarios, the State Board effectively “substitute[s] its judgment for

that of the local board.” Booth, 984 P.2d at 651. Accordingly, unlike the division

below, we perceive no textual basis in the statute for creating a right of judicial

review in connection with (and imposing a lesser degree of finality on) final

decisions of the State Board rendered after a first appeal. To the contrary, like the

district court, we can discern no basis for affording an applicant a right of judicial

review after the local board and the State Board agree at the outset to deny a

charter school application, when, as all parties here agree, the statute precludes

judicial review if the State Board remands to the local board to reconsider, the local

board persists in its denial, and the State Board ultimately agrees with the local

board’s decision to deny the application. In both cases, the local board has voted

to deny an application, and the State Board has affirmed that decision. In our view,

                                         17
under the plain language of section 108, the State Board’s decision should be

afforded the same level of finality in both scenarios.

¶33   Third, interpreting section 108 to authorize judicial review of State Board

decisions concerning charter school applications after a first appeal is inconsistent

with the General Assembly’s intent to expedite consideration of charter school

applications. See §§ 22-30.5-107 to -108 (setting forth the timelines for the filing of

an application, the local board’s consideration at each stage, and the initial and, if

necessary, second appeals to the State Board); Booth, 984 P.2d at 652 (noting that

“the entire application process indicates legislative intent for efficiency and

decisiveness”). Specifically, the Act envisions a process by which a charter school

application can be filed early in one school year so that the charter school, if

approved, can begin operating in the next school year. See §§ 22-30.5-107 to -108.

Allowing judicial review in a scenario like that present here would undermine the

expeditious process that the legislature has created.

¶34   Finally, although we have not directly addressed the precise issue now

before us, our case law regarding the State Board’s authority is fully consistent

with the decision that we reach today.

¶35   In Booth, 984 P.2d at 642, for example, the Denver School Board challenged

the constitutionality of the second-appeal provision of section 108. The question

presented was whether the General Assembly could constitutionally “authorize

                                          18
the State Board of Education to order a local school board to approve a charter

school application that the local board ha[d] rejected when the State Board finds

approval to be in the best interests of the pupils, school district, or community.”

Id. We concluded that the second-appeal provision was constitutional. Id.

¶36   In reaching this conclusion, we first discussed the State Board’s “general

supervision” power under article IX, section 1(1) of the Colorado Constitution and

determined that the framers of our constitution contemplated “general

supervision” to include the State Board’s “direction, inspection, and critical

evaluation of Colorado’s public education system from a statewide perspective.”

Id. at 648. We then examined the derivation of the State Board’s powers, noting

how, in 1877, the legislature had established a procedure by which a person

aggrieved by a local school board’s decision could appeal that decision first to the

county superintendent and then to the State Board, with the State Board’s decision

being final. Id. at 648 (citing ch. 92, sec. 81, 87, 1877 Colo. Gen. Laws §§ 2527, 2533,

at 836–37). We explained that this statutory assignment of authority to the State

Board is analogous to the role of the State Board in section 108 and provided

“legislative precedent for the Charter Schools Act’s designation of the State Board

as final arbiter of disputes involving local boards.” Id. In light of the foregoing,

and the respective roles of the State Board and local boards of education, we

concluded that the State Board did not unconstitutionally infringe on the Denver

                                          19
School Board’s control of instruction when it ordered the approval of the charter

school application at issue. Id. at 655.

¶37   Our interpretation today similarly recognizes and gives life to the General

Assembly’s designation of the State Board as the final arbiter of disputes involving

local boards in this area.

¶38   In Academy, 32 P.3d at 458–59, we considered whether a charter school may

seek judicial enforcement of the charter contract with its local school district, and

we concluded, as pertinent here, that disputes between a charter school and a

district arising out of the statutorily required portions of a charter contract are not

justiciable but are reserved for determination by the State Board.

¶39   Specifically, in Academy, a charter school sued its authorizing district to

enforce both the “service provisions” of the contract and the statutorily mandated

“governing policy provisions.” Id. at 467–68. We concluded that the “service

provisions” of the contract, which related to the “use of a school building and

grounds” and the “operation and maintenance” thereof, were judicially

enforceable    under    express    statutory    language.      Id.   at   468   (citing

§ 22-30.5-104(7)(b)).    In contrast, we concluded that disputes over the

implementation of the “governing policy provisions,” which consisted of the

“charter school application and all agreements and requests releasing the charter

school from school district policies[,]” are “funneled into the administrative

                                           20
system embodied by section 22-30.5-108.” Id. at 462. Turning then to section 108,

we explained:

      The processes outlined in section 22-30.5-108 set forth a scheme of
      review in which the State Board has final, unappealable, authority.
      § 22-30.5-108(3)(d). Because the governing policy provisions of a
      charter contract are formed subject to the State Board’s final authority,
      see § 22-30.5-107, the State Board has complete statutory authority to
      settle any disputes arising from implementation of those governing
      policy provisions of that contract. In essence, the governing policy
      provisions of the charter contract are not subject to judicial review.

Id. We thus concluded, “[A]ny decision rendered by the State Board under section

22-30.5-108 is final and not subject to appeal.” Id. at 468.

¶40   In our view, the same principles relating to the force and effect of

section 108’s statutory language apply here.

¶41   We are not persuaded otherwise by any of JDI’s arguments. In its answer

brief, JDI raised many merits-based contentions and policy claims. JDI did not,

however, address the narrow issue of statutory interpretation on which we

granted certiorari. Nor did JDI respond in any way to the points made by

defendants in their joint opening brief, which did address the issue before us. JDI’s

merits-based arguments are simply not before us.

                                  III. Conclusion

¶42   Because the State Board in this case affirmed the Douglas County School

Board’s decision to deny JDI’s charter school application after JDI’s first appeal,

and because that determination was the State Board’s final decision on the matter,

                                          21
we conclude that under the plain and unambiguous language of section 108(3)(d)

and the statutory scheme as a whole, the State Board’s decision is not subject to

judicial review.

¶43   Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below, and we

remand this case with instructions that the case be returned to the district court for

the dismissal of JDI’s claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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