Court Opinion

ID: 9781303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:29:12.673926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:23.683746
License: Public Domain

NAHMIAS, Justice,
concurring specially.
For the reasons given in my special concurrence in Collier v. State, 288 Ga. 756, 759 (707 SE2d 102) (2011), I believe that OCGA § 17-8-58 (b) mandates that appellate courts apply plain error review to enumerated errors regarding jury charges that were not objected to at trial as required by OCGA § 17-8-58 (a). Thus, I do not agree with the statement in Division 3 of the majority opinion that Cawthon’s failure to object at trial to the denial of his requested jury instruction “ ‘ “waived his right to urge error on appeal.” ’ ” Maj. Op. at 510 (quoting Madrigal v. State, 287 Ga. 121, 122-123 (694 SE2d 652) (2010)). Instead, as the majority correctly says just after quoting Madrigal, Cawthon may still receive plain error review of his jury charge issue on appeal. The majority then correctly concludes that he has not shown plain error, citing another case from this Court — decided on the very same day as Madrigal — that holds that we will review for plain error in this situation. See id. at 510 (citing Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 264 (695 SE2d 195) (2010)).
As I have now repeated seven times since Collier, this Court needs to resolve the clear conflict in our case law on the meaning of OCGA § 17-8-58. We should do so by overruling Madrigal and similar cases without further delay. Accordingly, I do not join the portion of Division 3 that quotes and relies on Madrigal, although I join the remainder of the majority opinion and the judgment.