Court Opinion

ID: 9774423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:19:56.6554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:08.263560
License: Public Domain

JONES, Justice,
dissenting.
With due respect for the opinion of the majority of this Court, I feel constrained to dissent from the views expressed therein concerning the trial court’s granting Reserve’s motion for summary judgment.
The procedure for summary judgment under CR 56.01 is a handy tool for the bench and bar alike, but it is a drastic remedy because it deprives a party of a trial and results in a final judgment against him. The procedure should not be invoked where a genuine issue of a material fact is involved. CR 56.01; Conley v. Hall, Ky., 395 S.W.2d 575 (1965); Mooser v. Mason, Ky., 416 S.W.2d 355 (1967). Here, the issue of timely notice is a question of fact and should have been submitted to a jury.
The affidavit of Richards’ attorney filed in response to Reserve’s motion for summary judgment stated that the Kentucky School Board had knowledge of the action filed in the United States District Court on July 1, 1970.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and respectfully register my dissent for reasons set out herein.
I am authorized to say that CLAYTON, J., joins in the dissent.