Court Opinion

ID: 9954021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 15:10:49.255692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:03.808897
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robin Dulin,                          :
                   Petitioner         :
                                      :
      v.                              : No. 368 C.D. 2023
                                      :
Unemployment Compensation             :
Board of Review,                      :
                 Respondent           : Submitted: March 8, 2024

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                          FILED: March 25, 2024

      Robin Dulin (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the March 2, 2023
Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), which
affirmed the decision of a Referee dismissing her appeal as untimely. We affirm.

                                   Background
      Claimant filed an application for unemployment compensation (UC) benefits
effective January 16, 2022, based on her separation from employment with Veterans
Administration (Employer). Bd.’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1, 3. Claimant
selected “internal message with email notification” as her preferred method of
receiving notifications about her UC application. Id. No. 2; Record (R.) Item No. 1.
      On May 11, 2022, the Department of Labor and Industry (Department)
emailed a Disqualifying Separation Determination (Determination) to Claimant,
notifying her that she was disqualified from receiving UC benefits under Section
402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 because the Department
determined that Claimant “left [her] employment to retire” and that “[c]ontinuing
work was available to [her].” Bd.’s F.F. No. 3; R. Item No. 3.2 The Determination
included appeal instructions, which stated that the last day to file a timely appeal
was June 1, 2022. Bd.’s F.F. No. 4.3 The Determination also stated:

       Pursuant to [S]ection 401(f) of the Law [43 P.S. § 801(f)], this
       disqualification remains in effect until [C]laimant has earned,
       subsequent to the disqualifying separation identified in this
       determination, remuneration for services in an amount equal to or in
       excess of six (6) times his or her weekly benefit rate in “employment”
       as defined in [the Law].

Id. No. 5; R. Item No. 3.

       1
         Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §
802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee is ineligible for UC benefits for any
week “[i]n which [her] unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a
necessitous and compelling nature.” 43 P.S. § 802(b).

       2
          In Finding of Fact Number 3, the Board found that the Department “mailed” the
Determination to Claimant’s “last known post office address.” Bd.’s F.F. No. 3. This appears to
be an error, because the Board also found that Claimant selected “internal message with email
notification” as her preferred method of receiving notifications about her UC application, id. No.
2, and that the Department sent the Determination to Claimant “via [her] preferred notification
method,” Ref.’s Order, 10/14/22, at 5; Bd.’s Order, 3/2/23, at 1. In any event, whichever method
the Department used to issue the Determination to Claimant, Claimant does not dispute that she
received it or that she received it in a timely fashion.

       3
           The Determination stated:

       You have the right to appeal this [D]etermination.
       You have 21 days from the [D]etermination date on this letter to file an appeal.
       This means your appeal must be received or postmarked by 06/01/2022.

R. Item No. 3 (bold in original). It also stated at the top of the page: “Final Date to Appeal:
6/1/2022.” Id. (bold in original).

                                                2
       Previously, Claimant underwent surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation
treatment for cancer; her treatment ended in April 2022. Bd.’s F.F. No. 6. At the
time she received the Determination, Claimant was still under a physician’s care,
undergoing routine testing, taking various medications, and attending follow-up
medical appointments. Id. Nos. 7-8. Claimant was initially confused by the
Determination and took note of the language stating that she could work and earn
six times her weekly benefit rate and purge the disqualification. Id. No. 9.
       Sometime between June and July 2022, Claimant spoke with a UC
representative by telephone regarding the purge provision referenced in the
Determination. Id. No. 10. The UC representative did not discuss an appeal with
Claimant at that time. Id. No. 11. Thereafter, Claimant had difficulty reaching a UC
representative by telephone due to high call volume. Id. No. 12.
       On September 18, 2022, Claimant spoke with a different UC representative
by telephone,4 who informed Claimant that her intervening employment could not
be used to purge the disqualification and suggested that Claimant file an appeal. Id.
No. 13. Claimant filed her appeal that day. Id. No. 14. The Department received
her appeal on September 18, 2022. Id. No. 15.
       The Referee held a telephone hearing on October 13, 2022.                        Claimant
appeared and testified on her own behalf. Employer did not appear.
       Following the hearing, the Referee concluded, in pertinent part, as follows:

       [W]hile the Referee notes and credits the Claimant’s testimony
       regarding the serious health condition [she] was dealing with at the time
       of the issuance of the Determination and her confusion regarding the

       4
         At the hearing, Claimant testified that this phone call took place on September 2, 2022.
Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/13/22, at 6-7. However, Claimant also testified that she filed her
appeal the day she spoke with the UC representative, id. at 6, and the record shows that her appeal
was filed on September 18, 2022, R. Item No. 4.

                                                3
      [D]etermination and inability to timely reach a UC representative to
      discuss the matter, the Referee unfortunately cannot conclude that these
      issues prevented [her] from filing a timely appeal and notes the
      substantial delay in the Claimant submitting her appeal, in excess of
      three months.

      While the UC . . . representative who spoke with the Claimant in
      June/July 2022[] discussed the purge provisions of the Law and may
      not have advised the Claimant of her right or need to file an appeal, the
      record does not indicate that the UC representative misled the
      Claimant in . . . regard to the need for or timing of an appeal should
      the Claimant disagree with the disqualifying determination.

      . . . [T]here is no competent evidence in the hearing record to establish
      that the Claimant was prevented from filing a timely appeal due to
      fraud, a breakdown in the administrative process, or . . . non-negligent
      conduct on [her] part.

Ref.’s Order, 10/14/22, at 4 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Referee dismissed
Claimant’s appeal as untimely.
      Claimant appealed to the Board, which adopted and incorporated the
Referee’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Board also made the
following additional findings and conclusions:

      [C]laimant was not misled or misinformed regarding her appeal rights
      or the need to file a timely appeal.

      The Board concludes that based on [C]laimant’s testimony, she
      confused the purge provisions of the Law with the appeal deadline.
      While the Board is sympathetic to [C]laimant’s health situation, the
      Board cannot conclude that [her] confusion over the appeal deadline
      shows that she is entitled to nunc pro tunc relief. Indeed, in her appeal
      to the Board, [C]laimant indicates, “I am now able to clearly read and
      understand the timeliness of this appeal. Due to the information in the
      [Referee’s] decision ‘finding[s] of fact,’ my understanding of the date
      and process wasn’t clear at that time.” This reinforces the Referee’s
      conclusion that [C]laimant was confused about the appeal process, but

                                         4
       her misunderstanding or confusion over the process does not rise to the
       level of fraud, administrative breakdown, or non-negligent conduct.

Bd.’s Order, 3/2/23, at 2 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Board affirmed the
Referee’s decision. Claimant now petitions this Court for review.5
                                           Analysis
       The sole issue before this Court is whether Claimant’s untimely appeal was
caused by an administrative breakdown justifying an appeal nunc pro tunc. Section
501(e) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 821(e), provides that an aggrieved party has 21 days to
appeal from a Department determination.6 This Court has held that if an aggrieved
party does not file an appeal within 21 days (formerly 15 days) of the mailing date
of the determination, the decision becomes final, and the Referee lacks jurisdiction
to consider the merits of the appeal. See Hessou v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Rev., 942 A.2d 194, 197-98 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). An appeal filed even one day after
the appeal deadline is untimely. Id. at 198; see DiBello v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 197 A.3d 819, 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
       The Referee may consider an untimely appeal only in extraordinary
circumstances. Roman-Hutchinson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 972 A.2d
1286, 1288 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). An appeal nunc pro tunc may be allowed where
the delay in filing the appeal was caused by fraud, a breakdown in the administrative
process, or non-negligent circumstances related to the claimant, his attorney, or a

       5
         Where, as here, the party with the burden of proof was the only party to present evidence
and did not prevail below, our review is limited to determining whether the Board capriciously
disregarded competent evidence and whether there was a constitutional violation or an error of
law. Constantini v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 173 A.3d 838, 842 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

       6
         The General Assembly recently amended Section 501 of the Law to extend the appeal
period from 15 days to 21 days; the amendment became effective on July 24, 2021, ten months
before the Department issued its Determination in this case.

                                                5
third party. Cook v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 671 A.2d 1130, 1131 (Pa.
1996). However, “the [claimant] bears a heavy burden to justify an untimely
appeal.” Roman-Hutchinson, 972 A.2d at 1288 n.1.
      Here, it is undisputed that Claimant’s appeal from the Department’s
Determination was untimely. The Determination clearly stated, in bold typeface,
that the last day to file an appeal was June 1, 2022. R. Item No. 3. At the hearing,
Claimant admitted that she did not file an appeal by the June 1, 2022 deadline. N.T.,
10/13/22, at 4. Rather, Claimant filed her appeal more than three months later, on
September 18, 2022. Bd.’s F.F. No. 15.
      Before this Court, Claimant contends that her late appeal was caused by an
administrative breakdown.      Specifically, she asserts: “I have followed all the
instructions after speaking to the UC representatives.      I have timely filed all
requested information to the [Board] and to this Court. My intent was to get
direction from the [UC] representatives to process my claim and to be provided with
my options.” Claimant’s Br. at 7. She further asserts that “filing an appeal was not
an option when [she] called for direction after receiving the disqualifying
determination,” referencing her initial telephone call in June or July 2022 with a UC
representative. Pet. for Rev. at 2.
      To establish an administrative breakdown justifying a nunc pro tunc appeal,
the claimant must show that the Department provided misinformation regarding the
availability of, timing of, or need for an appeal. Greene v. Unemployment Comp.
Bd. of Rev., 157 A.3d 983, 992 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). As to this issue, our Court has
explained: “Necessity-of-appeal type cases involve statements or actions suggesting
that an appeal is not allowed, an appeal could wait, or further corrective action is
unnecessary.” Id. at 991. Further, “not every misstatement by an apparently

                                         6
authoritative person will justify a nunc pro tunc appeal; rather, the misinformation
must relate to the availability, timing or need for an appeal.” Id. at 992 (emphasis
added).
       Here, the record establishes that, during Claimant’s first conversation with a
UC representative in June or July 2022, they did not discuss an appeal. Bd.’s F.F.
Nos. 10-11. Claimant testified, and the Board found, that she called the UC
representative to inquire about the purge provision of the Law referenced in the
Determination. N.T., 10/13/22, at 4; Bd.’s F.F. No. 10. There is no evidence that
Claimant asked the UC representative during that conversation about an appeal or
that the UC representative provided her any information about the appeal process.7
       Moreover, Claimant’s deadline to file a timely appeal, as explicitly stated on
the Determination, was June 1, 2022. Bd.’s F.F. No. 4; R. Item No. 3. The Board
found that Claimant spoke with the first UC representative “sometime between June
and July 2022.” Bd.’s F.F. No. 4. Unless Claimant spoke with the UC representative
on June 1, 2022, which the record does not establish, then we can reasonably
presume that Claimant likely called the UC representative after the appeal deadline
had already passed. See Greene, 157 A.3d at 992 (recognizing that “almost all the
cases where a nunc pro tunc appeal was allowed involve statements attributed to
compensation authorities after the issuance of a notice of determination and during
the period when an appeal is allowed) (emphasis in original).
       In support of her administrative breakdown claim, Claimant asserts that her
“intent was to get direction from the [UC] representatives to process [her] claim and

       7
        In her appellate brief, Claimant asserts, for the first time, that her initial telephone call
with a UC representative occurred “in May 2022.” Claimant’s Br. at 6. However, based on
Claimant’s own testimony, the Board found that this call occurred “sometime between June and
July 2022.” Bd.’s F.F. No. 10; see N.T., 10/13/22, at 7.

                                                 7
to be provided with [her] options,” suggesting that the first UC representative failed
to inform her about her appeal rights.         Claimant’s Br. at 7.    However, the
Department’s Determination provided Claimant with the relevant information
regarding her right to appeal, the deadline to appeal, and how to appeal. See R. Item
No. 3. Although Claimant credibly testified that she was confused about the
Determination, there is no evidence that she inquired about the appeal language in
the Determination when she spoke with the first UC representative in June or July
2022. More importantly, for purposes of satisfying her burden of proof, Claimant
failed to establish that the first UC representative misled her or provided
misinformation about the availability of, timing of, or need for an appeal. See
Greene, 157 A.3d at 992 (denying nunc pro tunc relief to a claimant who filed a late
appeal where “there [we]re simply no statements attributable to [UC] authorities
that address[ed] the availability, timing or need for an appeal”) (emphasis added).
The Board found, based on the credible evidence of record, that Claimant’s late filing
was caused by her misunderstanding or confusion over the process, which does not
amount to an administrative breakdown. Bd.’s Order, 3/2/23, at 2; cf. Hessou, 942
A.2d at 198 (stating that our Court has held that nunc pro tunc relief may be granted
“when[] a referee’s decision is mailed to an incorrect address; adequate assistance is
not provided to a claimant with cognitive impairment; or[] an official misleads a
litigant as to the proper procedure for filing an appeal”).
      We conclude that Claimant failed to satisfy her heavy burden of proving that
her late appeal was caused by an administrative breakdown because: (1) Claimant’s
initial telephone call with the UC representative likely occurred after the appeal
deadline; (2) there is no evidence that, during the June or July 2022 telephone
conversation, the UC representative provided any misinformation to Claimant about

                                           8
her right or need to appeal; and (3) the Determination provided Claimant with all of
the relevant information regarding the appeal process. While we sympathize with
Claimant’s ongoing health struggles, we cannot conclude that her late appeal was
caused by an administrative breakdown.8 See Carney v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 181 A.3d 1286, 1288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“The pressure of life events is . .
. insufficient to excuse an untimely [UC] appeal.”); see also Rabe v. Unemployment
Comp. Bd. of Rev. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1785 C.D. 2013, filed Feb. 24, 2014) (denying
nunc pro tunc relief to a claimant who was dealing with financial stress and multiple
pending court cases during the appeal period); Menges v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 2230 C.D. 2009, filed Apr. 22, 2010) (holding that a
claimant dealing with a death in the family and the lingering effects of a medical
condition failed to justify a nunc pro tunc appeal).9
                                          Conclusion
       We conclude, based on the evidence of record, that Claimant filed her appeal
with the Referee beyond the 21-day appeal deadline and failed to establish that her

       8
          In the proceedings before the Referee and the Board, Claimant also asserted – in addition
to claiming an administrative breakdown – that her appeal was untimely because of her health
issues. See R. Item Nos. 4, 10; N.T., 10/13/22, at 4. To the extent Claimant attempts to invoke
the timeliness exception for non-negligent circumstances, we reject that claim. Our Supreme Court
has held: “The exception for allowance of an appeal nunc pro tunc in non-negligent circumstances
is meant to apply only in unique and compelling cases in which the [claimant] has clearly
established that she attempted to file an appeal, but unforeseeable and unavoidable events
precluded her from actually doing so.” Criss v. Wise, 781 A.2d 1156, 1160 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis
added). Here, the record contains no evidence that Claimant attempted to file an appeal prior to
September 18, 2022 but was precluded from doing so.

       9
         We may cite unreported panel decisions as persuasive authority pursuant to Section
414(a) of our Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

                                                9
late appeal was caused by an administrative breakdown. Accordingly, we affirm the
Board’s Order.

                                     ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

                                       10
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Robin Dulin,                     :
                Petitioner       :
                                 :
     v.                          : No. 368 C.D. 2023
                                 :
Unemployment Compensation        :
Board of Review,                 :
                 Respondent      :

                               ORDER

     AND NOW, this 25th day of March, 2024, the March 2, 2023 Order of the
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review is hereby AFFIRMED.

                                 ELLEN CEISLER, Judge