Court Opinion

ID: 9753386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:12:21.661575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:35.732638
License: Public Domain

ADKINS, J.,
dissenting, in which BATTAGLIA, J., joins.
Although I deeply value the importance of the ADA and similar statutes, I am more cautious than my colleagues in interpreting and applying this County law because I fear that the Majority’s open-ended, uncritical approach to disability claims creates worrisome precedent, without giving citizens, organizations, lawyers, or judges the guidance they need. The majority relies on the doctrine advising liberal interpretation of remedial legislation, without assessing the boundaries of that interpretative tool.
In its analysis section (II), the majority rejects Federal court interpretation of the ADA, making the dubious distinction that the County Code uses the term “handicap,” whereas the ADA uses the word “disability.” Maj. Op. at 486-88, 36 A.3d at 489-90. Yet it fails to explain the meaningful difference between “handicap” and “disability.” More importantly, the debate here is not about a possible difference between “handicap” and “disability,” but rather, over how to interpret “substantial limitation” and “major life activities,” terms appearing in both the ADA and the County law.
We are certainly free to apply a more liberal reading to the County law than to the ADA, and our cases are legion with the principle that we interpret remedial statutes “liberally in favor of claimants seeking ... protection.” Maj. Op. at 489, 36 A.3d at 491. But there are limits to this doctrine. See, e.g., In re Roger S., 338 Md. 385, 393, 658 A.2d 696, 700 (1995) (“Even a remedial statute should not be construed so broadly as to create the possibility of results that are unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). The majority offers no standard lor determining which claimants will qualify for relief and which will not, except by relying on the “ordinary, popular understanding” of the general words in the County law. I submit that *496these words, “physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of the individual’s major life activities,” are very general terms that call for interpretation by the Court. In particular, the statutory requirement that a limitation be “substantial” should not be entirely up to the discretion of the jury, as the Majority impliedly holds. In so doing, the Majority declines to subject Meade’s claim to a rigorous legal standard.
The impact and implications of the Majority’s decision should not be underestimated.12 It is far-reaching, I submit, because a large segment of the population has some health condition that impairs their ability to function fully in all the activities that they may deem highly desirable. And yet, surely not all of these people should be encouraged to file disability discrimination claims. For example, many people suffer serious allergies to airborne particles of weeds, trees, flowers, etc., and may not be able to watch their children’s soccer or baseball games in the fall or spring. Yet, these people are not disabled such that they qualify for accommodations — such as moving indoors or constructing a special air-controlled viewing booth beside each playing field. A person with claustrophobia may not be able to fly on crowded airplanes, despite traveling well by other means. Surely that person is not disabled, such that he is entitled to disability benefits, because there are no separate, spacious cabins for only him and a few others to occupy. A person may have a serious allergy to perfumes; yet this is not a disability that would require a department store to make accommodations, such as to halt sale of those products or to build a special room in order to allow the allergic person to shop there. The same can be said about a person with food allergies and restaurants who sell those foods. Other, and perhaps better, examples can be identified.
As a Court, we need to be more careful in analyzing what is a substantial impairment of a major life activity. We should *497consider the extensive litigation spawned by the almost identical ADA, much of it based on non-qualifying claims. Although we need not be in lockstep with Federal courts’ interpretation of the ADA, we should at least take heed from their attempts to flesh out the legislative meaning of the general terms “substantially limits” and “major life activity.”13 Given the generality of the statutory terms in question, the meaning of “substantial limitation” and “major life activity” should not be decided on a jury-by-jury basis.
This case requires deciding (1) whether parenting is a “major life activity”; and (2) whether Meade’s allergy to latex creates a “substantial limitation” on her parenting activity. As to the first issue, I lean towards the view that parenting is a “major life activity.” See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 942 (1st Cir.1997), aff’d, 524 U.S. 624, 655, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2213, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998) (“Ms. Abbott faces the unfortunate reality that even if she gives birth to a healthy child, she probably will not live long enough to complete the task of raising the child to adulthood. We thus hold that HIV-positive status is a physical impairment that substantially limits a fecund woman’s major life activity of reproduction. Ms. Abbott therefore is disabled within the purview of the ADA.”); see also Emory v. AstraZeneca Pharm LP, 401 F.3d 174, 180-81 (3d Cir.2005) (relying in part on the plaintiffs inability to raise his children to conclude that a rational factfinder could find him disabled under the ADA); MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 337 (6th Cir.2002) (listing “parenting” as a major life activity under the ADA); Cain v. Hyatt, 734 F.Supp. 671, 679 (E.D.Pa.1990) (“[A] significant injury to the reproductive system impedes a major life activity. The interests in conceiving and raising *498one’s own children have been deemed essential, basic civil liberties of man, and rights far more precious ... than property rights.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).14
Nevertheless, assuming that parenting is a “major life activity,” we must determine what counts as a “substantial limitation” on parenting. The Majority just ignores the word “substantial.” Whether a claimant has met this qualifier is not simply for the jury to decide as a matter of fact. If it were, both claimants, and the businesses and organizations they sue, would have virtually no standard for differentiating acceptable and unacceptable conduct in terms of dealing with people’s differences in health status. Certainly, to meet the “substantial limitation” test, the alleged disability must do more than infringe on one aspect of parenting, or cause a parent to suffer inconvenience or expense, when the claimant still enjoys the majority of the parenting experience. Cf. Sherrod v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120 (5th Cir.1998) (“Evidence of disqualification from a single position or a narrow range of jobs will not support a finding that an individual is substantially limited from the major life activity of working.”); Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1392 (5th Cir.1993) (“[I]n determining whether a given impairment *499substantially limits an individual’s employment potential [a court should consider] the number and type of jobs from which the individual was disqualified, the geographic area to which he has reasonable access, and the individual’s employment qualifications____ An impairment that affects only a narrow range of jobs can be regarded either as not reaching a major life activity or as not substantially limiting one.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
The only proof offered by Meade is that she cannot enter this preschool program to observe her young child participate in some unspecified activity. I say unspecified because, if the child is in diapers, he is unable to participate in the gymnastics program she cited as an example of what she would miss. See Maj. Op. at 484-85, 36 A.3d at 488. In order to show that her allergy is a disability that impairs parenting, she must offer proof that by not being able to come inside the school she has lost out on a substantial part of parenting. Observing one’s child interact with other children at school, at any age, is an enjoyable part of parenting, but Meade has failed to show what activities a nursery-aged child would engage in, which she could not see elsewhere, that would amount to a substantial limitation on her parenting.
Moreover, Meade failed to show that other nursery schools not using latex, were unavailable to her and her child. Like the claimant in Sherrod who showed disqualification from a narrow range of jobs, Meade has made no showing that most nursery schools use latex gloves with powder, as Children’s Manor Montessori School does. Additionally, as her child leaves the age of nursery school, and will no longer wear diapers, the latex allergy will no longer interfere with her parenting at all, and thus lacks permanence.
The Court of Special Appeals succinctly summarized and commented on her testimony about her latex allergy:
Meade testified that she can control her latex allergy by avoiding certain products. For example, she testified that she stopped using latex gloves at work, and her employer stopped using powdered latex gloves. When asked if she *500changed any other aspects of [her] life as a result of the diagnosis, Ms. Meade said:
Yes; ... latex is in many areas of our environment. Balloons are latex; I cannot touch or have balloons in my home. Erasers on pencils are latex; I have to use special — or, my children have to use special erasers for their schoolwork. Rubber bands are latex; I can’t have rubber bands or touch a rubber band. I use another kind of product called a plastic band as a substitute. Cleaning gloves for doing routine housework cannot be — the typical yellow latex gloves, because those are latex. Those are a few examples.
Ms. Meade also described the few times she had accidentally been exposed to latex after she learned of her allergy. These incidents occurred as a result of: eating at a restaurant in which the employees use latex gloves to handle the food, visiting her mother at a hospital, taking her son to the dentist, hugging her husband after he came home from the dentist, and having her blood drawn. But these instances of accidental exposure were relatively infrequent, and on none of those occasions was her reaction serious enough that she had to go to the hospital. Instead, she simply treated the allergic reaction with an inhaler. There was no evidence that Meade’s breathing was at all limited when she was not exposed to latex. Meade admitted that she never experienced any allergic reactions to latex while actually at the Children’s Manor school.
Shangri-La Ltd. P’ship v. Meade, 181 Md.App. 127, 140-41, 955 A.2d 834, 841-42 (2008). This evidence is not sufficient to show a substantial limitation on her parenting.
The Majority justifies its decision that Meade’s allergy can be considered a substantial limitation on her parenting ability by comparison to the decision of the intermediate appellate court in Univ. of Md. at Balt. v. Boyd, 93 Md.App. 303, 612 A.2d 305 (1992). Maj. Op at 493-94, 36 A.3d at 493-94. Notably, the Majority offers no analysis explaining why the two cases are comparable or what Boyd teaches us. Boyd had a disfigurement caused by shaving, so that the conditions of *501his employment — namely, that he shave — meant he carried this disfigurement around with him at all times. Id. at 316-17, 612 A.2d 305. This condition embarrassed him so much that he would not go out in public. Id. This likely meant that he did not mingle with friends, play sports, attend sporting events, walk in the park, go to the movies, theater, or concerts, or occupy himself with the myriad of activities that people enjoy. Unlike Boyd, Meade’s allergy to latex occurs only when she is directly exposed and would have no impact on her socialization. Indeed, as the Court of Special Appeals pointed out, Meade admitted that she never experienced any allergic reactions to latex while at the Children’s Manor school. Shangri-La, 181 Md.App. at 141, 955 A.2d at 841-42.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent, on grounds that Meade failed to prove that she suffered a substantial limitation of a major life activity. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
Judge BATTAGLIA authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed here.

. As written, the Majority opinion suggests a state-wide standard, with implications for any disability claim.

. Norman J. Singer, in the treatise Statutes and Statutory Construction, explains: “It is the role of the judiciary to construe legislation not solely for the purpose of resolving a particular controversy but also to demonstrate the operation and effect of certain statutory language so that the citizenry can better comply with the law and the legislature can better construct the law.” 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 45:3 (7th ed.2007).

. But see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.1996) ("We hold that the District Court properly concluded that reproduction and caring for others are not cognizable major life activities under the ADA.”); Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.La.1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1143 (5th Cir.1996) ("[Fjinding 'reproduction' to be a 'major life activity’ would be inconsistent with the illustrative list of major life activities provided in the ADA regulations.").
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that parenting is a "major life activity” in a cause of action pursuant to the Howard County Code. The latter defines "major life activities” to be "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working[,j” and does not include procreation or parenting, or even socialization. Howard County Code § 12.400(c). Yet, regulations issued under the state law, Md.Code (2003), Article 49B, include both socialization and procreation. See COMAR 14.03.02.02(B)(7) (" 'Major life activities’ includes, but is not limited to, functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working, driving a vehicle, socializing, and engaging in procreation and recreation.”).