Court Opinion

ID: 9637374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:05:28.32803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:55.765201
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order permitting the elected Mayor of Lancaster, a third class city, to sign certain financing documents in his own right as Mayor and then to sign those same documents exercising power of attorney over the elected Controller of Lancaster who refused to execute the documents after being made aware of issues raised by the County Solicitor as to the propriety of the proposed financing scheme. The Majority affirms the order of the Common Pleas Court of Lancaster County that granted *675the Mayor’s mandamus petition and required the Controller to sign specific documents related to the construction of a new hotel and convention center by Penn Square Partners. In affirming, the Majority disregards powers and authority granted to the Controller under Section 1706 of The Third Class City Code, Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. § 36706, and erroneously concludes that this matter involves the Controller’s performance of a ministerial act.
Mandamus does not lie to compel a body or a public official vested with discretionary power or authority to use it in a particular manner. See Hugie v. Horn, 730 A.2d 1042 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999). It is clear that mandamus is appropriate only to compel a government body or a public official to perform a discretionary act when such government body or public official has a legally mandated duty to perform that act and has refused to do so. Id. In Williams v. Worley, 847 A.2d 134 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004), this Court articulated the settled principle that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and one that may be issued to compel the performance of a ministerial act or a mandatory duty when a dear right exists in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty exists in the defendant and no other appropriate or adequate remedy is available. A mandamus writ cannot be used to control a public official’s exercise of his or her discretion or judgment. Id.
Under Section 1706 of The Third Class City Code, the Controller “shall have the power to administer oaths or affirmations in relation to any matter touching the authentication of any account, claim, or demand of or against the city, but shall not receive any fee therefor, and shall countersign all warrants for the payment of moneys out of the city treasury when satisfied of the legality of such payment. ” (Emphasis added.) Notwithstanding its recognition of this statutory provision, the Majority concludes that “controllers of cities of the third class have a clear duty to sign [the financing documents], just as the city council has a right to see its duly passed ordinances executed.” Op. at 673. The Majority stated in its opinion that mandamus was proper because the Controller had committed an abuse of his discretion (that he never had) by refusing to execute the financing documents even though “the answer to [the legality of the financing scheme] is neither clear nor well known.” Id.
As a threshold matter, the Majority’s decision conflicts with the recent holding in Filippi v. Kwitowski, 880 A.2d 711 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). The Court held there that the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County was correct in dismissing the mandamus complaint filed by the mayor of Erie, a third class city, to compel the city controller to authorize a salary payment when no appropriation existed for the payment. The mayor contended, among other things, that the Mayor-Council Plan A of the Optional Third Class City Charter Law1 superseded The Third Class City Code2 and, therefore, that the controller functioned in a ministerial capacity, justifying a writ of mandamus to compel his signature. Also the controller had no right to challenge the legal propriety of the matter. This Court cited the principles applicable to mandamus actions and in affirming the trial court held that because the controller had the power and authority to manage all payments, the controller was not required to sign every check placed before him that *676the mayor directed him to sign. The controller’s function as to check signing was not ministerial.
In the case sub judice, the Majority imposes a duty upon a public official to execute documents whose validity the official has properly questioned. As the city’s fiscal watchdog, the Controller has the statutory power and authority to withhold his signature to the financing documents until he is satisfied as to their legality, and nothing in the applicable statutory or case law supports a directive to the Controller to exercise his discretion in a particular way. Thus the Controller may not be forced to sign the documents and clearly should not be subject to the extreme sanction of fines and/or incarceration for failing to do so. His execution of the documents does not represent the performance of a ministerial act any more than the controller’s check signing function in Filippi. The Third Class City Code allows the Controller discretion to satisfy himself of the validity of his acts before undertaking them, but by judicial fiat the Majority has removed that discretion.
When seeking to ascertain legislative intent, the courts have to assume that the legislature did not intend absurd results or results that were impossible of execution or were unreasonable. See Section 1922(1) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1); see also Pelter v. Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 663 A.2d 844 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995). Another significant rule of statutory construction is that the courts must consider the consequences of a particular interpretation and that a statute should always be construed in a sensible and rational manner to avoid mischief as well as absurdity. See Section 1921 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. The interpretation rendered in this case violates these fundamental principles.3
First and foremost, no legal authority exists for the trial court to grant a power of attorney to the Mayor to execute documents on behalf of the Controller where the Controller has refused to do so in the lawful performance of his statutory functions. Second, the validity of a document signed by the Mayor in his official capacity and then signed by him exercising power of attorney must be questioned. Third, the Majority has readily conceded that it cannot determine the legality of the financial scheme that the Controller questioned and that the issue must be decided by the Department of Community and Economic Development (DCED).
Returning to the rules governing mandamus, I believe that the record is abundantly clear that mandamus is totally inappropriate here, particularly when the Mayor has not demonstrated that the Controller acted in an arbitrary, fanciful or capricious manner or acted under a mistaken belief of the law. In Duncan Meter Corp. v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 65 A.2d 402 (1949), which upheld a writ in mandamus against a third class city con*677troller, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Section 1706 of The Third Class City Code and observed that mandamus will lie to compel proper action if the controller refused to countersign the voucher warrant presented to him based upon an abuse of his discretion or a mistaken view of the law. The court held that Section 1706 gave the controller certain discretion to satisfy himself as to the legality of the payment to be made to the plaintiff under a parking meter leasing contract but that “such discretion must be one adhering to well known and established principles of law, rather than an arbitrary, fanciful or capricious one.” Id., 361 Pa. at 610, 65 A.2d at 403.
The Supreme Court first determined in Duncan Meter, however, that the parking meter leasing contract was not invalid, and it then concluded that the controller had no right or duty to decide if it had been breached or whether the city should act upon that breach. The court accordingly concluded that the controller’s refusal to sign the warrant was based in part upon a mistaken view of the law and in part upon an abuse of his discretion. Also in Marflak v. City of Clairton, 97 Pa.Cmwlth. 643, 510 A.2d 874 (1986), this Court cited the principles enunciated in Duncan Meter. After first determining that no intentional irregularities existed in the city’s levying a special tax and then commingling the excess revenue into the general tax revenue fund, this Court upheld issuance of a mandamus writ against the controller of Clair-ton, a third class city, requiring him to countersign checks for the excess revenue. The Court held that the controller was mistaken in his belief that it was improper to authorize expenditure of the special tax revenue for general purposes.
The Majority acknowledges that the legality of the financing scheme has not been decided, and, consequently, it errs in concluding that the Controller here abused his discretion in refusing to sign the documents, particularly when he had reviewed the opinion from the Solicitor. In Duncan Meter and in Marflak, the courts first determined the legality of actions questioned by the controllers before affirming the trial courts. That step was omitted here; rather, the Majority concluded that the legality of the financing scheme must be decided by DCED, which ultimately may result in vindication of the position taken by the Controller.
There obviously is no clear right to relief in the Mayor in this case, there clearly is no corresponding duty to act in the Controller, and there certainly is another appropriate or adequate remedy available. See Williams. The Controller’s position may or may not be vindicated by a DCED ruling, but nonetheless other remedies or options still remain available that preclude a writ in mandamus.4
Judge FRIEDMAN joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Article IV, Sections 401-421 of the Act of July 15, 1957, P.L. 901, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 41401-41421.

. Act of June 23, 1931, P.L. 932, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 35101-39701.

. The consequences of the Majority’s decision have the potential to affect adversely the operations of local governments statewide. Suppose, for example, that the Mayor of Lancaster refuses to sign future financing documents related to the project, but the city council determines that he should sign the documents. Under the Majority’s reasoning the city council would have the right to a writ of mandamus to compel the Mayor to sign the documents. In the same vein, suppose the elected Treasurer questioned the legality of an improper demand made upon him by the Mayor or city council in connection with the use of collected tax revenue. Under the Majority’s reasoning the Treasurer's right to investigate reasonable suspicions as to the legality of the demands would be extinguished. My concern is that the Majority has not considered the full consequences of its decision.

. I strongly disagree with the Majority’s decision to deny attorney’s fees to the Controller that were incurred in connection with his defense of the mandamus action arising out of the performance of his official duties. The Majority cites no authority for denying what the law allows.