Court Opinion

ID: 9594564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:10.789672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:37.362287
License: Public Domain

BURNETT, Judge,
specially concurring.
I join the Court in holding that the district judge abused his discretion by failing to set aside a verdict which was against the clear weight of the evidence. Our holding rests, as it must, upon the evidence itself, not upon the juror affidavits presented in contravention of I.R.E. 606(b). However, those affidavits point to a separate problem that could arise again on remand. They show how the language of IDJI 101, the pattern instruction on insurance, may be misinterpreted by a jury.
As noted in the Court’s opinion, the first paragraph of IDJI 101 reads as follows: “No insurance company is a party to this action. You must refrain from any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance.” The policy embodied in IDJI 101 is that a jury should not find the facts or apply the law differently in cases where insurance exists than in cases where it does not exist.1 Unfortunately, the instruction expresses this policy poorly. It does not explain why the possibility of insurance should be disregarded. Rather, it attempts to “hide the ball” from the jury by making the literally correct but wholly misleading statement that “[n]o insurance company is a party to this action.” At best, this language may amuse those modern jurors who know that insurance companies need not be named as parties in order to have a stake in litigation. At worst, the language may cause impressionable jurors to do what the jury allegedly did here — interpret the instruction as a warning that the defendant is uninsured.
If a jury tailors its findings to avoid imposing liability upon a supposedly uninsured defendant, the reviewing court faces an insoluble enigma. Has the jury deviated from a “true” verdict in order to protect the vulnerable defendant? Or has the jury rendered a “true” verdict because there appeared to be no opportunity to tap a “deep pocket?”
Such ambiguity can be prevented, and the policy underlying IDJI 101 can be implemented more effectively, if we candidly tell jurors why they should not speculate about insurance. Jurors should be informed that insurance does not always exist and that their function is the same regardless of insurance. The following language is offered as an illustration:
You must not speculate as to whether any party to this lawsuit has insurance. In some cases there is insurance; in other cases there is not. In either event, your job is the same. It is to reach a verdict solely upon the evidence and upon the principles of law contained in these instructions.
*512This language is consistent with pattern instructions found in other jurisdictions.2 The trial judge in the present case may wish to consider giving such an instruction on remand. Rule 51(a)(2), I.R.C.P., allows a judge to depart from an IDJI instruction whenever he or she finds that “a different instruction would more adequately, accurately or clearly state the law.” I submit that the goals of accuracy and clarity will be better achieved when we discontinue our efforts to “hide the ball” from Idaho juries.

. This policy does not prohibit all mention of insurance in the courtroom. IDJI 101 contains optional paragraphs explaining that insurance may be mentioned during voir dire for the limited purpose of probing for juror bias. Rule 411, I.R.E., further allows evidence of liability insurance to be admitted during trial for purposes other than to prove negligence or wrongful conduct. Moreover, in some types of litigation, the scope of recoverable damages may be affected by the existence of insurance. None of these exceptions, however, alters the fundamental objective of keeping jury verdicts insurance-neutral.

. Washington and Illinois employ the following standard instruction: “Whether a party is or is not insured has no bearing whatever on any issue that you must decide. You must refrain from any inference, speculation or discussion about insurance." See Washington Pattern Instruction No. 2.13 and Illinois Pattern Instruction No. 2.13 (same number). California uses the following language, focusing specifically upon a defendant’s liability insurance:
There is no evidence before you that the defendant has or does not have insurance against the plaintiffs claim. Whether or not such insurance exists has no bearing upon any issue in this case and you must refrain from any inference, speculation or discussion upon that subject.
See California Book of Approved Jury Instructions (BAJI) No. 1.04.