Court Opinion

ID: 9558797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:17:04.284042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:36.110083
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: I concur in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Six. The traditional classifications relative to premises liability constitute a cornerstone of tort law in Kansas which has been reaffirmed on multiple occasions in recent years. For no legally supportable reason, the majority abandons our prior decisions. This result is wholly contrary to the important doctrine of stare decisis.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1406 (6th ed. 1990) states the following relative to the doctrine of stare decisis, in pertinent part:
“Policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb settled point. Neff v. George, 364 Ill. 306, 4 N.E.2d 388, 390, 391. Doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties and property are the same. Horne v. Moody, Tex. Civ. App., 146 S.W.2d 505, 509, 510. Under doctrine a deliberate or solemn decision of court made after argument on question of law fairly arising in the case, and necessary to its determination, is an authority, or binding precedent in the same court, or in other courts of equal or lower rank in subsequent cases where the very point is again in controversy. State v. Mellenberger, 163 Or. 233, 95 P.2d 709, 719, 720.”
An excellent summary of Kansas case law relative to the doctrine of stare decisis is contained in Chief Justice Schroeder’s dissent in Bowers v. Ottenad, 240 Kan. 208, 226-27, 729 P.2d 1103 (1986), wherein he stated:
“Few decisions have been written elaborating on the doctrine of stare decisis because it has been so basic in the teaching of the law throughout the centuries. Students of tire law are thoroughly indoctrinated by the proposition that an appellate court’s decision is binding authority upon itself as well as upon inferior courts. The binding effect concerning the law enunciated by our Supreme Court decisions upon the district courts of Kansas was emphatically discussed by Justice Harold Herd in a concurring opinion *513in State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 174-75, 689 P.2d 822 (1984). The doctrine must also be given respect by the jurists on the appellate court of last resort in the state.
“Addressing the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Alex Fromme, writing for the court in Guffy v. Guffy, 230 Kan. 89, 96-97, 631 P.2d 646 (1981), said:
‘It is not always easy to determine the proper ambit of the court’s authority on an issue of the present kind. We must not discard the time-tested advantages of consistency and uniformity in the fabric of the law to do that which we might conceive to be justice in a particular instance. . . . We as judges may have the power, though not the right, to ignore the ultimate effects of legislative pronouncements. History teaches us that departures from clear principles of law lead to more and more departures, many of which for the moment may seem in the highest public interest; but, when that happens, the day will soon come when personal preferences of judges overcome long established principles, and the law instead of being rules governing action becomes vacillating judgments dependent upon the particular membership of the court at any given time.
‘ “The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield a spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity of order in the social life.’ ” Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, at 141 (1921).’
". . . . That doctrine [stare decisis], its literal Latin meaning being ‘let the decision stand,’ is essential to maintaining certainty and stability in the legal community. By this doctrine, attorneys are able to advise their clients and their clients, in turn, are able to behave accordingly.
“In the early case of Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H.L. Cas. *274, *338 (1861), it was said that an appellate court’s decision is binding authority upon itself as well as upon inferior courts. The function of the judiciary is not to make the law, but to ascertain and apply existing law to the facts before it. The fact the composition of the court may have changed since an earlier decision is not sufficient reason to overrule established precedent set by that earlier decision. This court has stated the doctrine of stare decisis is not inflexible, and that if an earlier decision is clearly erroneous or conditions have changed materially, the earlier rule should be set aside. Hillhouse v. City of Kansas City, 221 Kan. 369, 372, 559 P.2d 1148 (1977); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 332-33, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); In re Estate of Preston, 193 Kan. 145, 148, 392 P.2d 922 (1964); Warburton v. Warkentin, 185 Kan. 468, 476, 345 P.2d 992 (1959).”
In the case before us, the rationale for departure from the rule of stare decisis is stated as follows:
*514“A majority of this court believes that a partial change in our premises liability law is warranted as more reflective of modern social mores and as a more reasonable method of fault 'determination in our society.”
This is obviously not a determination that our prior decisions were erroneous. The majority finds it is adopting “a more reasonable method.” Inherent in this statement is that the existing method is reasonable. If we were deciding a case of first impression, and choosing between two alternatives, such a rationale could be asserted. That is not the situation herein. This leaves us with the determination that the change is “warranted as more reflective of modern social mores.” Presumably, this is intended to be the equivalent of the alternative justification for not following the doctrine of stare decisis — conditions having changed materially. To test this justification, let us first examine our prior decisions.
In 1978, the same challenge made herein to the traditional classifications was made in Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978), and rejected. We stated:
"The traditional classification of trespassers, licensees and invitees and the distinctions as to the duty of care owed to each came to this countiy with the common law and has been applied generally in this country. This system of classification which began in England was first discarded by that country in 1957 by way of a statute which imposed the same duty of care to licensees and invitees. The statute declared that the possessor of premises owes the same ‘common duty of care’ to both, with reasonable care modified according to the circumstances of the entry. (Occupiers’ Liability Act, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31. Discussed in Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed., Ch. 10, § 62, p. 398.)
“In considering the question of whether this state should discard all classifications and distinctions two things should be noted concerning the change in England. First, the. change to a common duty of reasonable care did not extend to trespassers and second, the use of a jury in negligence actions had virtually disappeared in England and these actions were being tried to the court.
“In the nine or ten states in this country which have discarded the traditional classifications it was concluded that their courts were confused by the classifications and would be better able to instruct their juries in premises cases if the standard of reasonable care were required under all circumstances. It was generally agreed in those states that a jury should determine the circumstances which would relieve a possessor of premises from liability to a trespasser, an invitee and a licensee. We doubt the validity of those conclusions. It should be kept in mind that in England negligence *515eases are tried to the court without a jury. This is not so in the United States.
“It has been argued that additional instructions to the jury to the effect that it should consider the foreseeability of plaintiff's presence on the premises, the foreseeability of possible harm, the likelihood that others would not appreciate or be aware of the danger, and the extent of the burden on the possessor to remove the danger or notify of the risk would sufficiently protect the possessor of the premises. These general admonitions to a lay jury may or may not suffice.
“If the traditional classifications are discarded the legal distinctions which have heretofore governed the courts in imposing a particular standard of care are also discarded. In such case the standard, reasonable care under all the circumstances, would have to be applied by the jury to the specific facts of each case. Can a lay jury reasonably be expected to consider the proper relative effect of natural and artificial conditions on the premises which are or may be dangerous, the degree of danger inherent in such conditions, the extent of the burden which should be placed on the possessor of premises to alleviate the danger, the nature, use and location of the condition or force involved, the foreseeability of the presence of the plaintiff on the premises, the obviousness of such dangerous condition or the plaintiff’s actual knowledge of the condition or force which resulted in injury? It would appear these considerations should be imparted to the jury if it is to be placed in a position to decide whether reasonable care was exercised by the possessor of the premises. Otherwise the jury will have a free hand to impose or withhold liability.
“A majority of the members of this court do not feel that the traditional classifications of trespassers, licensees and invitees should be jettisoned. The traditional classifications were worked out and the exceptions were spelled out with much thought, sweat and even tears by generations of Kansas legal scholars who have gone before us. Should this body of law be discarded completely in favor of a free hand by a lay jury? We feel at this time there is too much of value in our premises law with respect to rights of possessors of premises to warrant its abandonment.
“It should be noted that the adoption of one standard of care not only will have the effect of lowering the standard of care owed to trespassers and licensees but also would lower the standard of care presently owed to invitees. Under our present law the duty owed to an invitee is active and positive. It includes a duty to protect and warn an invitee against any danger that may be reasonably anticipated. Not only does it extend to dangerous conditions known to the possessor but also to dangerous conditions discoverable in the exercise of a duty to inspect and keep the premises free of unreasonable risk of harm.
“It has been suggested that the jury need not be left without guidance even though the traditional classifications are discarded. It is further suggested that after a jury is advised of the single standard of care the court can further instruct the jury by setting out the applicable rules found in *516the Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, §§ 333 through 343B. The Restatement classifies these rules as follows: Title B. Liability of Possessors of Land to Trespassers; Title C. General Liability of Possessors of Land to Licensees and Invitees; Title D. Special Liability of Possessors of Land to Licensees; and Title E. Special Liability of Possessors of Land to Invitees. If such a suggestion is followed in advising the jury what if anything is gained by discarding the traditional rules? The traditional classifications (trespassers, licensees and inviteés) are still to be considered by the court. If, as the appellant suggests, the traditional classifications are confusing, unreasonable and arbitrary any change which embraces the Restatement rules will be subject to similar charges. In such case we would be merely changing the extent of the duty owed by a possessor of premises. The extent of that duty would still be dictated by the circumstances surrounding entry on the premises, the danger involved and the burden to be placed on the possessor to make the premises reasonably safe. The traditional classifications would remain but the traditional rules worked out over so many years would be discarded and new rules governing a possessor’s liability would have to be relearned.
“A majority of this court feel if the mores and values of present society dictate changes such changes should be worked out individually as the circumstances of a particular case may warrant. Such changes will result in less general confusion and better understanding of each particular change.
“In conclusion we wish to acknowledge what has been referred to as a trend in this country toward abolition of the traditional classifications. Apparently the bellwether case in the United States was handed down in 1968, Rowland, v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 [1968]. Our research indicates that in the ten years which have elapsed since Rowland only nine states have followed the lead. During this same period of time several states have elevated licensees to a common class with invitees, and five states have placed social guests in the category of invitees. During this same period of time a large majority of states have continued to follow the traditional common law classifications. At least six states have considered the advisability of following Rowland v. Christian, supra, and have declined to do so. The jurisdictions which have abolished all classifications are not sufficient in number to constitute a clear trend.” 223 Kan. at 449-54.
In Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. 528, 581 P.2d 385 (1978), we again rejected the proposed discarding of the traditional classifications.
In 1982 the challenge was made again in Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502, 638 P.2d 914 (1982). In the opinion we discussed the results of the research done by Professor Carl S. Hawkins as to what the effect of modification *517of the traditional classifications was in those states which had made the change. Justice Fromme, writing for the majority, concluded:
“It seems apparent from the findings resulting from the above survey of cases, that courts still find it necessary to fix tire limits of premises liability even after they have repudiated the status categories of entrants on land. The professor, agreeing with the conclusion expressed in Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 Ind. L.J. 467 (1976), states ‘that in the absence of some structure for fixing the limits of premises liability, the law would be reduced to “a conceptual conduit through which all cases are funneled into the jury room.” ’ Utah L. Rev. at 61.
“Again, after reconsideration, a majority of the members of this court do not feel that the landowner’s duty to licensees in the traditional premises law of this state should be changed. The possessor of premises on which a licensee enters owes the licensee a limited duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly injuring the entrant. Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. at 529.” 230 Kan. at 507.
In Bowers v. Ottenad, 240 Kan. 208, 729 P.2d 1103 (1986), the challenge was again made. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, stated:
“Appellant raises several issues, only two of which require consideration here. First, appellant contends that this court should abandon the common-law premises doctrine which establishes liability of a landowner or occupier of real property based upon the status of the injured party and adopt the traditional negligence standard of reasonable care under all the existing circumstances, at least to the extent of adopting such standard for licensees. Second, it is asserted that if this court does not consider it appropriate to abandon the existing premises doctrine we should follow the active negligence exception recognized by this court in Montague v. Burgerhoff 150 Kan. 217, 92 P.2d 98 (1939).
“As to the first issue, whether we should abandon the common-law doctrine of premises liability based upon the status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee, much has been written in recent years. This court has been asked on at least four occasions to abandon the premises liability or status classification doctrine of landowner or occupier liability and on each occasion a majority of the court has declined to do so. Britt v. Allen County Community Jr. College, 230 Kan. 502, 638 P.2d 914 (1982); Zuther v. Schild, 224 Kan. 528, 581 P.2d 385 (1978); Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 576 P.2d 593 (1978); Frazee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Rly. Co., 219 Kan. 661, 549 P.2d 561 (1976). We see nothing to be gained by rehashing the pros and cons of the argument as they are adequately covered in our existing cases. Suffice it to say, a majority of the members of this court remains of the opinion that there are compelling reasons not to depart *518from the existing doctrine. The traditional common-law doctrine of premises liability based upon the status of the party injui-ed or damaged as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee is approved and confirmed as the law of this state. We therefore decline to overrule the cases cited.” 240 Kan. at 210-11.
The active negligénce exception was recognized and clarified in Bowers.
The majority opinion cites Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 118, 443 P.2d 561 (1968), the bellwether case on abrogation of the traditional classifications, emphasizing the language thereof that application of such classifications “is contrary to our modern social mores and humanitarian values.”
This court rejected that rationale in Gerchberg in 1978. Nor has Kansas been alone in so doing.
Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 62, pp. 432-34 (5th ed. 1984) makes the following highly pertinent observations:
“The traditional distinctions in the duties of care owed to persons entering land — based upon the entrant’s status as a trespasser, licensee or invitee— have been criticized for some time as being harshly mechanical, unduly complex, and overly protective of property interests at the expense of human safety. In 1957, England by statute abolished the distinction between licensees and invitees, and imposed upon the occupier a ‘common duty of care’ toward all persons who lawfully enter the premises. This was followed in the United States in 1958 by a Supreme Court decision refusing to engraft the traditional distinctions onto the law of admiralty. Ten years thereafter, in 1968, the Supreme Court of California in Rowland v. Christian abolished the traditional duty classification scheme for trespassers, licensees and invitees, and replaced it with the ordinary negligence principles of foreseeable risk and reasonable care. Over the next ten or twelve years, eight other jurisdictions followed suit, abolishing all distinctions between entrants on land, and another five jurisdictions discarded the distinctions between licensees and invitees but retained the traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults.
“Although the abolition movement gathered impressive momentum through the mid-1970s, it thereafter quite abruptly lost its steam, and in 1979 it came to a screeching halt. All six courts passing on the issue from then until 1982 have reaffirmed their commitment to the traditional trespasser-licensee-invitee classification scheme. It is still too early to determine whether this most recent shift in attitude toward the entrant categories will prove to be only a momentary rest stop on the long march toward a general overthrow of this entire system of legal doctrine. Instead, it may reflect a more fundamental dissatisfaction with certain developments in accident law that accelerated during the 1960s — the reduction of whole systems of legal *519principles to a single, perhaps simplistic, standard of reasonable care, the sometimes blind subordination of other legitimate social objectives to the goals of accident prevention and compensation, and the commensurate shifting of the decisional balance of power' to the jury from the judge. At least it appears that the courts are gaining a renewed appreciation for the considerations behind the traditional duty limitations toward trespassing adults, and that they are acquiring more generally a healthy skepticism toward invitations to jettison years of developed jurisprudence in favor of a beguiling legal panacea.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority herein has opted to jettison years of developed jurisprudence in favor of this “beguiling legal panacea.” In 1978 in Gerchberg, 223 Kan. 446, we recognized Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, for what it was — the seductive Siren’s song — and likewise rejected it in 1978, 1982, and 1986.
What has happened since the Prosser and Keeton cut-off date of 1982? An extensive pertinent annotation appears in 22 A.L.R.4th 294. The September 1993 Supplement thereto, at page 47, lists the following states as having expressly considered and rejected abrogation of the traditional classifications (case cites omitted herein):
Alabama (federal court applying Alabama law) (1984)
Arkansas (1988)
Connecticut (1992)
Florida (1982)
Idaho (1987)
Indiana (1982)
Kansas (1986)
Kentucky (1988)
Maryland (1984)
Montana (federal court applying Montana law) (1985)
Ohio (1988)
Oklahoma (1985)
Pennsylvania (1989)
Texas (1985)
Washington (1986).
On page 46 of the 1993 supplement, Colorado, Illinois, Montana, and New York are listed as having recognized the ordinary care standard to licensees and invitees alike in decisions filed between 1984 and 1986.
*520The majority opinion herein is clearly not following any modern trend. It is, in fact, not only turning its back on our well-established law but also is , swiijrming against the stream of current opinion in other states on this issue.
As previously noted, under the doctrine of stare decisis this court is bound by its own prior decisions. Exceptions thereto are if the prior decisions aré clearly erroneous or there are materially changed conditions. The majority opinion justification is that the change “is warranted as more reflective of modern social mores,” which ostensibly equates to materially changed conditions. To justify departure from our prior cases, there must be materially changed conditions. What are the changed conditions which warrant the departure from our prior decisions?
The majority opinion does not state what social mores have changed that justify the abrogation of Kansas law. Surely, if changed mores are to justify the decisions reached by the majority, they should be discussed in some detail or at least named with sufficient particularity that they can be identified.
Further, a time frame is needed in which to judge the validity of the changes, circumstances, or mores the majority is relying upon. Have social mores changed since 1978 (Gerchberg and Zuther); 1982 (Britt);, or 1986 (Bowers)? Or does the majority ignore our prior decisions in deciding to reject their rationale and go clear back to the Old English common law when the landed gentry were presumably being protected from claims of landless peasants? There is no way of determining the time frame in which the majority is operating.
Stare decisis would have little meaning if, no matter how frequently the same issue arises, the court compares historical English social conditions with those of the current year. The issue is whether to change the existing law of Kansas. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, only significant material changes occurring since 1986 should be considered, or, at the earliest, the date should be 1978. The majority identifies no such changes as none exist. The rationale of our decision in the 1970s and 1980s is just as valid now as then and, arguably, more so.
The classifications have been developed over many years and are grounded in reality. In the real world there are enormous differences between businesses and residences. Businesses extend *521invitations to prospective customers, clients, etc., to come to their places of business for commercial purposes. Persons so coming are, for the most part, personally unknown to those extending the invitation. It is anticipated these invitees will roam freely about the public areas of businesses, and a 'part of the cost of doing business is providing reasonably safe premises. These establishments are, ordinarily, professionally designed, built, and equipped. Safety and convenience account for much of their sterile uniformity.
Residences are designed to please the homeowners and meet their needs and wants. A residence reflects the homeowners’ individuality and is equipped and operated by the homeowners according to how they want to live. We live in the age of the do-it-yourselfer. Few homes would meet OSHA’s standards, and few individuals would desire to live in such a home. Modern businesses do not have polished hardwood floors, throw rugs, extension cords, rough flagstone paths, stairways without handrails, unsupervised small children, toys on the floor, pets, and all the clutter of living — homes do-. There are good reasons behind the old adage that most accidents occur in the home.
Here, we are specifically concerned with the business invitee and social guest in the home. The argument is made: Why should liability rest on the injured party’s status as a business invitee or social guest (licensee)? As any homeowner knows, the business invitee is in the residence on a much different basis than is the social guest. The invitee is there for a limited specific purpose. For example, when the Maytag man is called to repair the washing machine, he is shown where the machine is and advised of the machine’s problem. The repairperson will be in the laundry room or wherever the machine is located. If he or she wants to go to the basement to check the plumbing, or use the bathroom or the telephone, permission and location are asked. The homeowner shows the repairperson where the basement, phone, bathroom, etc. is. The repairperson does not have free run of the premises. The homeowner knows just where the repairperson is. If there is a known hazard with which the repairperson will be in contact, such as a frayed electrical cord on the washing machine, it is logical to require that a warning be given. Likewise, if an insurance agent comes in to discuss insurance, he or she *522will be escorted to a particular place and seated. If the homeowner goes to the kitchen to get coffee, he or she has every reason to expect the agent to be exactly where the agent was seated. The social guest, on the other hand, is there on a much more informal basis and can be anywhere in the residence. Commonly, guests are told to leave their coats on the bed upstairs while the homeowner returns to the kitchen to finish meal preparations. Relatives and close friends wander at will, making themselves at home, as the saying goes. The homeowner simply does not have the awareness of all guests’ locations in mind at all times or even know where they might be. Social guests and hosts take each other as they are, in a relaxed informal situation.
The idea that one's home is one’s castle has even greater meaning today. The increasing crime rate makes many people afraid to be away from home at night. Their safe sanctuary is their home. The cares, concerns, and pressures of their lives make the home this sanctuary. Over and over again, one hears victims of residential burglaries describe their feelings as being those of violation or of psychological rape. Their one safe place is not safe any more. This is an area where people have an expectation of privacy — a carefully guarded term in criminal law. Our times produce high frustration levels — not only from crime but also from increasing job and economic pressures, governmental restrictions on activities, etc.
One’s home is where one can be oneself. Neighbors, relatives, and friends stop by to visit. Our highly mobile society makes social visits more common than ever. To place the same standard on an individual in his or her home relative to a social guest as in a business relationship entails an unreasonable intrusion.
How can a homeowner protect himself or herself from liability? Must the homeower close out the world, padlock off-limit areas, make the home a safe sterile place devoid of individuality, post warning signs, lock up children and pets, regiment all guests, forbid the children to invite friends over, or eliminate all elderly or handicapped persons as persons who may enter the home socially?
Even if the homeowner is not negligent, it will take a jury trial, in most instances, to determine that fact. Interestingly, the jury, in determining whether or not the defendant homeowner *523has exercised reasonable care, will be considering, inter alia, the status of the injured guest. The circumstances of the visit are an integral part of a foreseeability determination.
There is another serious effect from the majority’s decision. Present day homeowners and renters insurance rates in Kansas reflect our present law on premises liability. The potential for increased liability and defense costs, whether in real or exaggerated terms, will be used to justify increased premiums for such insurance.
Kansas has, in the past, created exceptions to the present standards where justified and can continue to do so in the future (active negligence, attractive nuisance, etc.). In this manner, undue hardship can be ameliorated while adhering to the basic principles.
As used in this dissent, “homeowner” includes individuals who rent or lease the premises in which they reside. The majority decision is not just adding a burden to the landed estate owner; the homeowner of even the most modest residence or apartment will be subject to far greater liability than exists at present.
The case before us is a sleeper in every sense of the word. It raises an issue that has been put to rest. No new argument is made in support of the proposed change. There is a serious question whether the issue is even properly before us. Yet, one of the basic tenets of well-established Kansas law is being dramatically altered with no sound or sufficient reason being stated in the majority opinion to justify such a change. Stare decisis is grounded on very important principles. A body of law is established on precedent in order that people will know what the law is and can depend on it. Lawyers can hardly advise their clients as to the law if precedent means nothing.
Our established law is neither clearly erroneous, nor has there been a material change in circumstances justifying a change. This court is, accordingly, bound by our prior decisions. If a change is to be considered on a public policy basis, it should be addressed to the legislature, where the public policy may be determined after the receipt of input from all parties potentially affected thereby.
I would adhere to our existing law and affirm the district court.