Court Opinion

ID: 9883657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:06:18.392823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:28.225446
License: Public Domain

Justices Smith,
joined by Justices Griffin and Calvert, dissenting.
We respectfully dissent. The rule announced by the majority should not be and, in our opinion, is not the law. The court’s judgment in this case is void for the reason that there is no evidence to sustain it. Moreover, even in the absence of supporting evidence, the judgment itself does not contain recitations of facts necessary to its validity.
In the case of Ex Parte Fisher, 146 Texas 328, 206 S.W. 2d 1000, this Court said in part: “Whether he committed the act charged is conclusively determined by the order or judgment of the trial court in the proceeding wherein he is adjudged in contempt, provided that court possessed jurisdiction1. We may consider the facts only for the purpose of determining whether they constituted acts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court to make the particular order.”
This court, no doubt, had a reason for using the phrase “provided that court possessed jurisdiction.” We think it was because no man should be adjudged in contempt of court unless the judgment is based on facts in evidence, or, in the absence of evidence, unless the judgment recites the facts on which it is based.
*261The case out of which the contempt judgment grew was vigorously contested in the trial court. Counsel opposing the relator questioned Frank Stephenson at great length- The record shows that many times he would break into an answer to propound another question. The relator in many instances did not object. When he made objections he frequently addressed the court: “Your Honor, please,” and if the court overruled the objection he would state: “Note our exception.”
Many times during the hearing the court would interrupt a question or an answer or even break in the middle of an objection. Relator was under a sworn duty as an attorney and in the exercise of that duty he had the right to make objections and to request, if the objections were overruled, that his exception be noted.
We have carefully examined the statement of facts in this case and we fail to find any evidence to justify the conclusions reached in the trial court’s judgment. The majority opinion admits, in effect, that if we look only to the record, the relator might be entitled to a discharge under holdings in cases like Ex Parte Crenshaw, 96 Texas Crim. Rep. 654, 259 S.W. 587, 31 A.L.R. 1181. But, because of recitations contained in the order (which we say are not supported by the record and are not in themselves sufficient to sustain the order), the majority resolves the matter in favor of its validity.
The majority opinion divides the case into two episodes.
The first episode relates to the incident when the court held relator in contempt and assessed a fine of $100.00 as punishment. The majority opinion admits that relator was right in the controversy that provoked the judge to assess the fine. However that may be, the order of the judge does not order relator to be confined until the fine is paid and relator’s application for writ of habeas corpus seeks only release from the restraint imposed by the order. Moreover, at the time the fine was imposed relator was clearly guilty of no conduct which could be regarded as contemptuous under Ex Parte Crenshaw and other decisions of the courts of this State to be hereafter noted. Assuming that when the judge thereafter ordered the fine paid by one o’clock, the judge correctly interpreted the remark made by relator— which was unintelligible to the court reporter — as “we will see about that,” and that such remark in itself was contemptuous, it will not support any part of the judgment because it was made after the fine was imposed and the subsequent order of confine*262ment does not purport to be in punishment for that remark. It follows that unless the second episode and the order entered thereon furnish a sufficient basis for relator’s continued confinement the writ applied for should issue.
The facts constituting the second episode as recorded by the official reporter are set out in the majority opinion. As heretofore stated, the majority opinion indicates that if that was all we had before us and we were to follow cases like Ex Parte Crenshaw, relator would likely be entitled to a discharge. Quoted also in the majority opinion are pertinent parts of the court’s order on which the majority opinion rests. They need hot be repeated. They do need to be analyzed in the light of the official record.
The second episode arose out of a colloquy between the court and relator regarding the right of relator to object to a question by opposing counsel before it had been completely phrased. The court had the unfinished question read by the reporter. The court’s order then recites “* * * and that the court then and there admonished the said Frank Sentell to go slow and take things easy and let the counsel ask and propound the question in full and give the witness time to answer and he, the said Frank Sentell, the proper time to make objection, and if this rule was followed that the matter could be straightened out very easily and that he could have and protect his rights * * This recitation, though perhaps not accurately reflecting the record, finds substantial support in the Court Reporter’s record, as follows: “THE COURT: It wasn’t no question. You interrupted the man and didn’t give him a chance to finish. Now, go slow and I will try to separate this stuff and give you both your full rights.” The order then continues: “* * * and that in defiance of the court’s suggestions and admonitions the said Frank Sentell continued to argue and harangue said court and insist that the witness be permitted to answer the unfinished question.” This recitation not only has no support in the record, it is directly contrary to the record. In the first place, relator was trying, by objection, to prevent the witness from answering the question rather than insisting that he be permitted to answer it as recited by the court. Furthermore, the record clearly reflects that the only thing said by relator following the aforementioned admonition was “Note our exception.” This can hardly be said to support the recitation that relator “continued to argue and harangue” the court. Thereupon rather than let relator have his exception for whatever it was worth as customary decorum on the part of the court required, the court said: “You don’t have any exception.” Relator then stated: “We ask the record to show it.” Relator could have *263said no less if he thought his client’s rights were being transgressed. Surely it cannot be thought that there was anything of a contemptuous nature in the words spoken by relator, and the court’s recitation that by saying them relator “continued to argue and harangue” the court is without any basis in fact.
The recitations in the court’s order continue: “That this court then and there again admonished the said Frank Sentell that if he continued to argue this point with the court after the court had ruled, that this court would have to hold him, the said Frank Sentell, in contempt and confine him to jail * * This recitation seems to be supported by the Court Reporter’s record as follows: “THE COURT: Well, I am going to put you in jail if you keep on.” It may be noted, however, that this admonition was not made in response to any effort on the part of relator to continue “to argue the point after the court had ruled,” but was made in response to relator’s request that the record show his exception. The order continues : “* * * at which time the court did not catch the side-bar remark made, but it was evident to this court from the expression and attitude, of the said Frank Sentell that he then and there, as he had in the past, defied the court to hold him in contempt.” The only basis for this recitation is found in the official record as follows: “MR. SENTELL: (Sounds unintelligible to the reporter).”
From the foregoing analysis, it is quite obvious that the court did not rest its judgment upon the nature of words spoken by relator, nor upon his interruption of a question of opposing counsel by objection, nor upon frivolous or unfounded objections made with the view of harassing the court and impeding justice, nor upon arguing with and haranguing the court. Rather, it was rested upon “the expression and attitude” of relator. It is upon this recitation also — a “contemptuous attitude” — that the majority has denied the writ.
There seems to be a division of authority as to whether the intonations of voice, the vehemence of objections or the physical attitude of counsel will render contemptuous words which are otherwise proper. 17 C.J.S., Contempt, Sec. 8, p. 11. But accepting the view that an order of contempt may be founded alone upon the connection in which the words are used and the look, manner and emphasis of the speaker, there is yet strong, and, we think, sound authority that before the order may be sustained as valid it must recite the facts which constitute the contempt as distinguished from simple conclusions. Crites v. State, 74 Neb. 687,105 N.W. 469; People v. Sherwin, 354 Ill. 371, 188 N.E. 484; Ex Parte Pugh, 30 Ariz. 129, 245 Pac. 273.
*264The reasons for the rule are stated in Grites, v. State. In that case counsel continued a certain line of interrogation despite several warnings by the court and finally advised the court that he was going to ask another question in spite of the court’s admonition. After reciting the facts the court’s contempt order continued : “and the court being fully advised in the premises finds that said Albert W. Grites is guilty of contemptuous and insolvent behavior towards the court and is in contempt of court.” The Supreme Court of Nebraska struck down the order, saying: “In such a case it is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the liberties of the citizen that in recording the conviction the court shall state the facts showing the contempt charged. It is not sufficient to state in a general way the conclusions of fact on which the conviction is based. The facts themselves must be stated, from which the reviewing court can see that the ultimate fact of guilt is properly and justly found. * * * No intendments or presumptions can be indulged in to sustain the judgment of the trial court in a contempt proceeding. Such a proceeding is criminal in its nature and the rules governing criminal proceedings are applicable thereto.”
There is contrary authority, but we believe the reasoning underlying the cases illustrated by those above cited is sound.
To obviate the type of proceeding illustrated by the case at bar some states have enacted statutes, requiring the court’s order to set out the facts on which it is based. Illustrative of the strict compliance required under such statutes is the case of State ex rel Breen v. District Court of Silver Bow County, 34 Mont. 107, 85 Pac. 870. In that case the contempt order recited that the contemnor “Knowingly and wilfully addressed the court in a contemptuous, insolent, and disrespectful manner, and in an insolent, contemptuous and sneering manner called, and attempted to call, the said Honorable Michael Donlan, judge as aforesaid, to prove and attempted to prove by said judge certain scandalous matters * * In striking down the order the Montana court said: “It states conclusions and inferences only, drawn by the judge from the facts as they transpired; thus leaving this court no alternative but to accept these conclusions or to hold the order invalid.” Our limited investigation shows that at least California and Oklahoma have statutes making similar requirements.
Most of the outstanding cases in this State on direct contempt have been decided by our Court of Criminal Appeals. While we are not bound to follow the decisions of that court, *265the respect which it commands from this court dictates that we give great weight to its decisions and that we harmonize our decisions therewith whenever possible.
In Ex Parte Kearly, 35 Texas Cr. Rep. 634, 34 S.W. 962, the trial judge demanded that relator apologize before proceeding in the trial of a case and stated that relator was being spoken to in all kindness, whereupon relator said: “I don’t want you to treat me kindly. You can talk me out of court. I want you to treat me as mean as you know how. I want to say that nothing you can do will ever make me look upon you with regard again-” While relator was discharged on other grounds, the court noted that relator had not been guilty of contempt, owed no duty to purge himself, and wholly discounted the boisterous manner in which he addressed the court.
In Ex Parte Snodgrass, 43 Texas Cr. Rep. 359, 65 S.W. 1061, relator charged in his argument to the jury that one of two witnesses giving diametrically opposite testimony was either mistaken or had lied. This precipitated a physical encounter between relator and one of the witnesses and the trial judge held relator in contempt. He was discharged by the Court of Criminal Appeals, that court holding that what relator said was correct, and continuing: “Courts will look with much allowance upon the zeal and partisanship of counsel representing their clients in the courts- Without zeal and without an honest and fervent desire to have everything done and to do everything that can be done within his power that is honorable to promote the interests of his client, and secure him a fair and impartial trial, the object of counsel would be destroyed, and the bar would soon fall into disrepute.”
In Ex Parte Miller, 92 Texas Cr. Rep. 489, 244 S.W. 612, it appears that in the trial of a criminal case the defense of former jeopardy was interposed, based on the contention - that a jury in a former trial had been discharged too soon. The contempt order grew out of the jury argument of relator, counsel for defendant-The contempt order contained recitations showing relator had used strong language which was highly critical of the court’s action in discharging the jury on the former trial. The relator was discharged by the Court of Criminal Appeals, it being said that there was some factual basis for relator’s comments, and the court said: “The right or wrong of the court’s former discharge of the jury had become an issue before this jury, and we are forced to conclude that relator might urge the ivrong of it even in a loud, vehement, and arrogant manner, provided his language *266and manner be decent and such as he might fairly use in discussing the acts or testimony of any other citizen in a court of justice.”
With these pronouncements before us, what were the facts surrounding the unintelligible remark of relator that formed the basis of the trial judge’s conclusion that he had a “contemptuous attitude?” The order does not tell us. Therefore, this Court has no way of reviewing his conclusion. Did those acts come within the classification of mere excessive zeal and partisanship? We cannot know, but if so they were not contemptuous. Did he protest against what he deemed to be a wrong inflicted by the court in a loud, vehement and arrogant manner? We cannot know, but if so it was not contemptuous. Did he sneer at the court? The court does not so find. Did he make meaningful signs at the court? We do not know. All we know is that the court found that he exhibited a “contemptuous attitude” — a pure conclusion which we are unable to review because of the failure of the order to recite the facts. Because of this failure the order should be held to be void.
If a contempt order may rest upon pure conclusions, the great writ of habeas corpus has lost its value to one illegally deprived of his liberty because the court from which it is sought will have no power to review the facts upon which the commitment is based.
Relator acted within his rights when he took his bill of exceptions. We cannot escape the conclusion that the unjudicial conduct of the court climaxed by the remark “You don’t have any exception” precipitated whatever attitude relator thereafter displayed, although his only intelligible reply was: “We ask the record to show it.” What was said by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex Parte Duncan, 42 Texas Cr. Rep. 674, 62 S.W. 762, seems not inappropriate here:
“We wish to say that the power of the Court is official — judicial, and not personal — and the relations of Court and attorney are correlative. Courts may, will and should enforce judicial power and functions when necessary; yet this must be done in a manner sanctioned by law, and in consonance with judicial dignity, and with due regard to the rights of parties to be affected. Attorneys are bound and will be held to obey legal orders of courts, yet the court should invoke its judicial authority under the law and in obedience thereto. The relationship of court and attorneys, bench and bar, are reciprocal, and each, in their pro*267per sphere, is clothed with powers, rights and privileges, which are to be recognized and respected by the other. These relations should be recognized and respected alike by the bench and bar, and being carefully kept in view and followed as rules of action and conduct, will avoid friction.”
We conclude that there are no facts in the record supporting the contempt order and there are not recitations of facts in the order itself supporting it. The order should therefore be held void and relator discharged.
Delivered February 24, 1954.
Rehearing overruled April 21, 1954.

. — Emphases added throughout this opinion.