Court Opinion

ID: 9710519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:11:12.258122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.322133
License: Public Domain

J. P. Swallow, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the statutory scheme as contained in the ticket scalping statute, MCL 750.465; MSA 28.720, allows an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private individuals.
In Senate of the Happy Home Clubs of America v Alpena Co Bd of Supervisors, 99 Mich 117; 57 NW 1101 (1894), the statutory scheme outlawed public drunkenness and provided for criminal punishment unless the offending drunkard successfully completed a "cure” pursuant to rules and regulations promulgated by certain designated facilities, i.e., the Senate of the Happy Homes Clubs.
Similarly, in the present case, the statutory scheme provides that ticket scalping is unlawful and shall be punished as a crime unless the offending ticket scalper secures from the promoter written permission to resell tickets. Under this statutory scheme, the grant of permission to resell tickets may be conditioned upon the promoter’s own personal dictates. Thus, in this case, as in Senate of the Happy Home Clubs, the Legislature has delegated to private individuals the power to prescribe a procedure by which conduct that is otherwise criminal can be excused and the resultant criminal sanctions avoided.
While language in People v Turmon, 417 Mich 638, 649-653; 340 NW2d 620 (1983), suggests that the legislation considered in Senate of the Happy Home Clubs may have been constitutional were sufficient standards prescribed, in the present case the statute must likewise fail for the same reason.
For in the present case, as in Senate of the *805Happy Home Clubs, the relevant statute delegates legislative authority without sufficient standards to numerous private parties to establish varying rules and policies as stringent or lenient as they individually choose. For example, the statute fails to set forth standards as to how, who or when a promoter may grant or deny to another party the privilege of reselling their tickets. Further, it fails to provide any standards or guidelines regarding the resale charge for tickets. Thus, promoters are free to make arbitrary decisions under whatever rules they may elect in determining or setting the resale price of tickets.
Finally, it is clear that because of the absence of standards the statute fails to prevent those abuses normally attendant with ticket resale, i.e., denial of equal access to the best seats, resale fraud, the predatory practices of resellers charging exorbitant prices for tickets otherwise available at box office prices, and the dangers and annoyances of loiterers surrounding the place of an event in their attempt to obtain and resell tickets. Absent a purpose to cause abatement of those abuses, the statute cannot be supported as a legitimate exercise of police power by the Legislature. See Gold v DiCarlo, 235 F Supp 817 (SD NY, 1964), aff'd 380 US 520; 85 S Ct 1332; 14 L Ed 2d 266 (1965).
I would affirm the circuit court and district court on the grounds that the ticket scalping statute allows for an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to private individuals.