Court Opinion

ID: 9372449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 17:07:29.500304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:35.498647
License: Public Domain

J-A28045-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DEANNA M. THOMPSON                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1376 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 8, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-15-CR-0002162-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED FEBRUARY 21, 2023

       Deanna M. Thompson appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, following her entry of a

hybrid guilty plea. Thompson’s counsel, Brian L. McCarthy, Esquire, has filed

an application to withdraw as counsel and an accompanying Anders1 brief.

Upon review, we affirm Thompson’s judgment of sentence and grant Attorney

McCarthy’s application to withdraw.

       The trial court summarized the factual background as follows:

       On September 4, 2019, it was reported to the Kennett Square
       Police Department that a burglary had occurred at 424 South
       Union Street, a property owned by Charles Thompson [(victim)].
       At that time, [the victim] was incarcerated and the residence was
       vacant. Neighbors reported that [victim]’s sister, [defendant],
       had been seen at the residence shortly after the break-in was
____________________________________________

1 Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v.
McClendon, 434 A.2d 1185 (Pa. 1981); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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        discovered.    An investigation revealed that numerous items
        belonging to [the victim] were pawned by [the defendant] without
        [the victim’s] permission. A further investigation revealed that
        [the defendant] fraudulently used [the victim]’s bank account to
        pay her personal expenses.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/22, at 1 (unpaginated).

        Thompson was charged with one count each of dealing in proceeds of

unlawful activities,2 theft by unlawful taking,3 receiving stolen property,4 and

access device fraud.5       On January 26, 2021, Thompson filed a motion to

suppress, but withdrew that motion prior to a hearing on February 1, 2021.

        Subsequently, on December 17, 2021, Thompson entered into a hybrid

guilty plea wherein she agreed to plead guilty to theft by unlawful taking and

access device fraud. In exchange, the Commonwealth withdrew the remaining

charges. There was no agreement as to sentencing. On December 17, 2021,

the trial court conducted a guilty plea hearing at which it accepted Thompson’s

plea, deferred sentencing, and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence

investigation report (PSI).

        On April 8, 2022, the trial court sentenced Thompson on her conviction

for theft by unlawful taking to a period of 3 to 23 months in prison, followed

by two years of probation. At her conviction for access device fraud, the trial

court sentenced Thompson to four years of probation. Thompson’s sentences
____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5111(a)(1).

3   Id. at § 3921(a).

4   Id. at § 3925(a).

5   Id. at § 4106(a)(1)(iv).

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were imposed consecutively, resulting in an aggregate term of 3 to 23 months

in prison followed by 6 years of probation. The trial court also ordered that

Thompson pay restitution to the victim, in the amount of $28,412.00, and that

Thompson was to be paroled upon reaching her three-month minimum.

      Thompson filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court

denied on April 21, 2022. Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal, and both

Thompson and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal,

Attorney McCarthy filed an Anders Brief.          Thompson has not retained

alternative counsel, nor has she filed a pro se response.

      Before addressing Thompson’s issue on appeal, we must determine

whether Attorney McCarthy has complied with the dictates of Anders and its

progeny    in   petitioning   to   withdraw    from    representation.        See

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 986 A.2d 1241, 1244 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009)

(“When presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits

of the underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”).

Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes that an appeal is frivolous and

wishes to withdraw from representation, he or she must:

      (1) petition the court for leave to withdraw[,] stating that after
      making a conscientious examination of the record and
      interviewing the defendant, counsel has determined the appeal
      would be frivolous[;] (2) file a brief referring to any issues in the
      record of arguable merit[;] and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to
      defendant and advise [her] of [her] right to retain new counsel or
      to raise any additional points that [she] deems worthy of the
      court’s attention. The determination of whether the appeal is
      frivolous remains with the [C]ourt.

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Commonwealth v. Burwell, 42 A.3d 1077, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted).

     Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that a

proper Anders brief must:

     (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
     citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
     counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
     counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
     counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
     Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
     case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
     that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

     After determining that counsel has satisfied the technical requirements

of Anders and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of

the record to ascertain if there appears[,] on its face[,] to be arguably

meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.”

Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en

banc).

     Instantly, our review of counsel’s Anders brief and application to

withdraw reveals that Attorney McCarthy has substantially complied with the

technical requirements of Santiago. See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 934

A.2d 1287, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (counsel must substantially comply with

requirements of Anders). We note that counsel frames the issue in terms of

whether it has merit. However, in the argument section, counsel identifies

the potential issue to be raised, cites to the record where appropriate, and

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concludes that the issue is frivolous.     Additionally, counsel included the

requisite Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement for Thompson’s claim, which challenges

the discretionary aspects of her sentence. The record further reveals that

counsel has furnished a copy of the Anders brief to Thompson, advised

Thompson of her right to retain new counsel or proceed pro se, or raise any

additional points that she deems worthy of this Court’s attention.       Thus,

Attorney McCarthy has substantially complied with the requirements for

withdrawing from representation and, therefore, we will examine the record

and make an independent determination of whether Thompson’s appeal is, in

fact, wholly frivolous. See Wrecks, supra.

      In the Anders brief, Attorney McCarthy raises one claim for our review,

whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Thompson. Anders

Brief, at 15-17.   However, Attorney McCarthy contends that this claim is

ultimately frivolous because the trial court considered all mitigating factors,

including the PSI, and sentenced Thompson leniently. Id.

      Thompson’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence,

from which there is no automatic right to appeal. See Commonwealth v.

Austin, 66 A.3d 798, 807-08 (Pa. Super. 2013). Rather, when an appellant

challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence, we must consider her

brief on this issue as a petition for permission to appeal. Commonwealth v.

Yanoff, 690 A.2d 260, 267 (Pa. Super. 1997). Prior to reaching the merits of

a discretionary sentencing issue,

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      [this Court conducts] a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
      whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
      Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
      preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
      sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief
      has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
      substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
      appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quotation

marks and some citations omitted).

      Here, Thompson filed a timely notice of appeal, preserved her claim in

a timely post-sentence motion, and properly included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

statement in the Anders Brief. However, Attorney McCarthy has contended

that the bald claim of abuse of discretion cannot satisfy the substantial

question requirement to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Anders Brief, at 15-

17; see Moury, supra. We agree that Thompson has not raised a substantial

question for this Court and, thus, her appeal is wholly frivolous.

      Nevertheless, we review the merits of Thompson’s claim as part of our

independent review of the record. See Dempster, supra. Our review of the

record reveals that, at sentencing, the trial court stated that it considered

Thompson’s pre-sentencing memorandum, letters from Thompson’s and the

victim’s family, and acknowledged Thompson’s community work. N.T.

Sentencing Hearing, 4/8/22, at 23-25. The trial court also heard from the

victim, who detailed the significant financial damage Thompson’s actions

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caused to him and his children.6 See id. at 10-18. Additionally, the trial court

expressly stated that it had considered Thompson’s PSI, and that Thompson

had no prior criminal record.        See id. at 1; see also Commonwealth v.

Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (where sentencing court considered PSI,

this Court presumes that it “[is] aware of relevant information regarding the

defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating

statutory factors”). Accordingly, Thompson’s claim lacks merit.

         Finally, our independent review of the record discloses no other

“arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated.”     Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272.          As such, we grant Attorney

McCarthy’s application to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

        Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.

        Judge Sullivan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

____________________________________________

6Although the victim was incarcerated at the time Thompson committed these
offenses, Thompson nevertheless stole several thousands of dollars in family
heirlooms, other valuables, and money from the victim’s residence. Id. at
15-18. The victim indicated that all of these items and money were being
saved for the future of his children after his passing. Id. at 12-14. The victim
also detailed that Thompson illegally changed his mailing address to
Jacksonville, Florida, and stressed to the trial court the difficulties he had in
correcting that change. Id. at 10-12, 14-16.

                                           -7-
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/21/2023

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