Court Opinion

ID: 9611152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:52:46.465968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:10.470901
License: Public Domain

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that the timeliness of Parmley’s habeas petition hinges on whether the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ denial of Parmley’s petition for rehearing. Answering this question “requires an examination of the particular state court procedures.” Riddle v. Kemna, 523 F.3d 850, 853 (8th Cir.2008) (en banc). Here, this examination requires us to interpret arguably conflicting rules of Arkansas procedure. After interpreting these rules, we then must apply them to Parmley’s case to identify “the highest court ... in which a decision could be had,” 28 U.S.C. § 1257, since the U.S. Supreme Court only has jurisdiction to review a decision from that court. The Court today errs in both its interpretation of Arkansas procedure and its application of § 1257. First, the Court effectively reads Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-4(c) to be a nullity, when an alternative *1074reading would continue to give force to that rule. Second, the Court incorrectly focuses on the jurisdiction of the Arkansas Supreme Court, rather than on whether a decision from that court was available to Parmley.
Instead of compelling defendants to file, and the Arkansas Supreme Court to entertain, petitions for review that do not comply with Arkansas’s procedural rules, I would continue to apply Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-4(c) as written. In my view, the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ ruling was the final state court decision available to Parmley, and it therefore triggered the U.S. Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. Thus, the statute of limitations for Parmley’s federal habeas petition did not begin to run until the 90-day period for petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court expired. See Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 348 (8th Cir.1998). Because I would hold that Parmley was entitled to this 90-day period and that consequently his habeas petition was timely filed, I respectfully dissent.
A.
Two state court procedural rules are the focus of this case. Under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule l-2(e), the Arkansas Supreme Court has unbounded discretion to grant a petition for review for any reason. However, Rule 2-4(c) provides that petitions for review must allege one of eight grounds for review: a tie vote in the Court of Appeals, a decision that conflicts with an Arkansas Supreme Court decision or another Court of Appeals decision, or one of the six grounds enumerated in Rule 1 — 2(b).5 See ante at 1070-1071 (listing the grounds enumerated in Rule 1 — 2(b)). In short, Rule l-2(e) allows the Arkansas Supreme Court to grant petitions for reasons (hereinafter “discretionary factors”) that, on their own, would be insufficient for a defendant to even file a petition under Rule 2-4(c).
The interpretive question before the Court is the proper way to address the gap between the set of petitions which could be granted and the smaller set of petitions which could be filed. The Court chooses to eliminate this gap, holding that notwithstanding the limitations of Rule 2-4(c), any petition which could be granted can be filed.6 This overlooks the possibility that the gap was created intentionally; that is, in my view the Arkansas Supreme Court has deliberately restricted its discretion to grant petitions to encompass only the subset of petitions it permits defendants to file. As explained below, I find the Court’s reading problematic in two respects. Initially, it ignores Rule 2-4(c)’s clear text, which states that a “petition for review must allege one of’ the eight enumerated grounds. Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 2 — 4(c) (emphasis added). Also, the Court’s holding runs counter to the Arkansas Supreme Court’s actual treatment of petitions for review and its statements concerning the role of the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Reading Rules l-2(e) and 2-4(c) in the manner I propose avoids these problems.
*1075First, the Court’s holding effectively nullifies Rule 2 — 4(c). The rule states that a petition “must allege” one of eight specifically enumerated grounds. According to the Court, however, a petition to the Arkansas Supreme Court no longer needs to allege one of those eight grounds, but may instead assert any other reason that the Arkansas Supreme Court might find, in its discretion, to be a persuasive ground for granting the petition. Ante at 1070-1072. This result ignores Rule 2-4(c)’s text and eliminates any force the words “must allege” previously had.
Second, by permitting every defendant to petition the Arkansas Supreme Court for review on any ground, the Court undermines the Arkansas Supreme Court’s goal of assigning the Arkansas Court of Appeals “its own field of primary jurisdiction.” Moose v. Gregory, 267 Ark. 86, 590 S.W.2d 662, 664 (1979); see also id. (“Ideally [the Court of Appeals] will in effect be a court of last resort, with its decisions having a desirable finality.”). Under the Court’s reading, any Arkansas defendant may petition for review for any reason, making the Arkansas Court of Appeals into “a purely intermediate court, ... ‘merely an expensive and time-consuming level in the appellate structure.’ ” Daniels v. Bennett, 272 Ark. 275, 613 S.W.2d 591, 592 (1981) (quoting Moose, 590 S.W.2d at 663). While the Court suggests that these statements reflect an intent merely to establish a discretionary review system, they are more consistent with an intent of the Arkansas Supreme Court to take a limited role in’ the appellate process, leaving particular classes of cases and issues to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. In any event, the Court reaches its conclusion without identifying any rulings on petitions for review that did not comply with Rule 2-4(c) where the Arkansas Supreme Court nonetheless considered discretionary factors in granting or denying the petition.7 But see Wilson v. Cain, 564 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir.2009) (ignoring Louisiana state procedural rule for habeas filings only after finding that “Louisiana courts do not invariably apply [the rule]”); Emerson v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 931, 935 (5th Cir.2001) (same with respect to Texas, “deferring] to Texas courts’ application of state law”).
I read Rule 2-4(c) to bar petitions which cannot allege one of the eight grounds, but once such a ground is found and alleged with respect to at least one issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court may consider other factors in deciding whether to grant review of that issue and others. While Rule l-2(e) allows the Arkansas Supreme Court potentially to review issues that do not satisfy one of the eight enumerated grounds, under this reading the court will do so only when (1) one of the eight grounds is otherwise present and (2) discretionary considerations support also reviewing the issue normally within the “primary jurisdiction” of the Arkansas Court of Appeals, Moose, 590 S.W.2d at 664 (discussing such a “primary jurisdiction” for the Court of Appeals). The structure of *1076the Arkansas appellate system, in this respect, would be analogous to a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. While a federal court could not hear a state law claim alone under § 1367, it will do so when (1) a federal claim is present and (2) discretionary considerations support also hearing the state law claim. In both instances, an issue within the court’s “primary jurisdiction” is the necessary “ticket” into that court. Once there, though, other issues may be considered.
This interpretation of Arkansas’s procedural rules continues to give force to Rule 2-4(e)’s “must” language while also giving effect to the statement of unbounded discretion in Rule l-2(e), thereby avoiding the first problem with the Court’s reading. Furthermore, unlike the Court’s reading, this interpretation is fully consistent both with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s treatment of petitions for review, see supra note 7, and with the Arkansas Supreme Court’s intent for the Arkansas Court of Appeals to develop “its own field of primary jurisdiction.” Moose, 590 S.W.2d at 664.
The Court relies on Maxey v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 341 Ark. 306, 18 S.W.3d 328 (2000), to support its flawed reading of Arkansas’s procedural rules. In fact, the procedural path of Maxey is more consistent with the interpretation that I propose. In Maxey, the petition for review alleged that the case presented an issue of first impression, one of the six Rule l-2(b) grounds that permits the filing of a petition for review under Rule 2-4(c). Only after granting review to examine that question did the Arkansas Supreme Court decide also to review certain factual findings, relying on its discretion under Rule l-2(e). Thus, Maxey does not support the Court’s conclusion that Rule 2-4(c) is a nullity. Maxey merely stands for the proposition that Rule l-2(e) gives the Arkansas Supreme Court discretion to review an issue when a petition could be filed under Rule 2-4(e), not that a losing party can file a petition based on any issue. Consistent with Maxey, the interpretation I propose shows that Rules l-2(e) and 2-4(c) are not necessarily irreconcilable and that therefore the Court errs in reading Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 2-4(c) as a nullity.
B.
In addition to its flawed reading of the Arkansas Supreme Court Rules, the Court’s analysis also incorrectly focuses on “the Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority and jurisdiction to review a case,” ante at 1072, rather than on whether a “decision could be had” from a “higher court” for the particular defendant in this case, as 28 U.S.C. § 1257 requires.8 Simply put, we may not be able to identify a single “highest court” for all cases from a particular state, since the review available to a losing party can vary from case to case due to peculiarities in that state’s procedural rules.9 Moreover, unpacking the meaning of the word “decision” in § 1257 shows that the Court’s interpretation, if correct, *1077places a significant additional burden on the Arkansas Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that in order to identify the “highest court ... in which a decision could be had,” it is necessary to look to what review, if any, is available to a particular losing party. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari directly to a Kentucky police court in Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960). There, the police court fined Thompson ten dollars for loitering. Because this fine was less than twenty dollars, it was “not appealable or otherwise renewable in any other Kentucky court.” Id. at 202, 80 S.Ct. 624 (citing Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 26.080). Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Thompson’s petition for writ of certiorari despite the lack of any decision beyond the ruling of the police court. Id. While the police court was obviously not the “state court of last resort” for all or even most Kentucky defendants, in Thompson’s case it was the “highest court ... in which a decision could be had.” See also Nash v. Fl. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 237, 88 S.Ct. 362, 19 L.Ed.2d 438 (1967) (finding jurisdiction because a per curiam “denial by the Florida District Court of Appeal apparently precludes further state review”); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517, 518, 66 S.Ct. 274, 90 L.Ed. 274 (1946) (“Since he could not appeal to a higher state court [than the county court] this appeal ... is properly before us.”).
Thompson, Nash, and Tucker further show that while § 1257 requires a decision from the highest state court in which a decision can be had, the U.S. Supreme Court does not define “decision” to include a confirmation from a higher court that a procedural bar does, in fact, prevent a defendant’s appeal. To be sure, the U.S. Supreme Court will not “indulg[e] in conjecture” over discretionary decisions of state supreme courts. Stratton v. Stratton, 239 U.S. 55, 56, 36 S.Ct. 26, 60 L.Ed. 142 (1915). However, none of the defendants in Thompson, Nash, or Tucker were required to attempt a proeedurally-barred appeal in a higher state court simply to obtain a rejection, in order to satisfy § 1257. The absence of these procedural denials did not prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from exercising jurisdiction. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court plainly does not consider the denial of a petition for failure to comply with procedural rules to be a “decision” of a higher court.10 Cf. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 847-48, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (“[T]here is nothing in the [habeas] exhaustion doctrine requiring federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s case-specific approach to identifying the highest court in which a decision could be had shows that the Court’s focus on the “Arkansas Supreme Court’s authority and jurisdiction,” ante at 1072, is misplaced. Rather, the Court should have identified a “decision” that a particular defendant — Parmley in this case — could have received. In nullifying Rule 2-4(c) and permitting defendants like Parmley who cannot satisfy Rule 2-4(c) to file a petition, the Court may have inadvertently made such a decision available to these defendants. However, to remain consistent with the definition of “decision” in cases like Thompson, the Court must further hold that, regardless of Rule 2-4(c)’s limitations, the Arkansas Supreme Court will examine the mer*1078its of such a petition and decide whether to grant review in its discretion. But see supra note 7. These decisions, unlike procedural denials, fall within Stratton’s requirement that a defendant allow a state supreme court the opportunity to exercise its discretion to review, before petitioning for a writ of certiorari. 239 U.S. at 56-57, 36 S.Ct. 26. Only if the Arkansas Supreme Court would issue such a discretionary decision would the Court’s interpretation of Arkansas procedure make available to every defendant, including Parmley, a “decision” from the Arkansas Supreme Court.11
Under the Court’s interpretation, the Arkansas Supreme Court would be required to render a “decision” on every petition for review.12 Evaluating the discretionary factors discussed in a non-compliant petition, rather than simply denying the petition for failure to comply with Rule 2-4(c), would necessarily require significantly more time and effort. Should the Arkansas Supreme Court continue to enforce Rule 2 — 4(c) strictly by not considering discretionary factors, the issue presented in this case could return to us because such procedural denials are not “decisions” of a higher court. Only if, as the Court reads the rules, the Arkansas Supreme Court discretionarity denies petitions filed contrary to Rule 2-4(c)’s “must allege” provision would the Arkansas Supreme Court remain the “highest court ... in which a decision could be had” for defendants such as Parmley.
Under the interpretation I propose, a decision from the Arkansas Supreme Court was unavailable to Parmley, for there is no dispute that he could not file a petition for review that complied with the text of Rule 2 — 4(e).13 Most Arkansas criminal defendants likely will be able to comply with Rule 2 — 4(c) and therefore receive a decision from the Arkansas Supreme Court. However, Parmley is like the defendant in Thompson: state rules rendered a lower court the “highest court ... in which a decision could be had.” Since there was no further decision that Parmley could receive from a higher court, he had 90 days from the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ denial of his petition for rehearing to petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. I would hold that because Rule 2 — 4(c) prohibited Parmley from petitioning the Arkansas Supreme Court, his judgment did not become final for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 until after *1079that 90-day period expired. His petition is therefore timely, and should be remanded for consideration on its merits.14 I respectfully dissent.

. There is no dispute that Parmley could not satisfy Rule 2-4(c). The state has never denied Parmley's claim that Rule 2-4(c) barred his petition. Indeed, Parmley's only potentially qualifying claim was an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, ineffective assistance claims that were not raised in the trial court may only be brought under Arkansas Criminal Procedure Rule 37, not on direct appeal. Whitney v. State, 326 Ark. 206, 930 S.W.2d 343, 345 (1996).

. The Court appears to make this choice based solely on the fact that the unusual gap exists. The logical result of the Court’s analysis is that no state supreme court with unconstrained discretion could constrain that discretion by adopting a procedural rule such as Rule 2-4(c).

. Indeed, I could locate no cases where the Arkansas Supreme Court denied a petition for failure to comply with Rule 2-4(c) and at the same time discussed the discretionary factors the Court now holds can also provide grounds for granting a petition. See, e.g., Munn v. State, No. CR 05-985, 2005 WL 2462251, at * 1 (Ark. Oct.6, 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (“We find no ground pursuant to Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 2-4(c) to grant the petition for review.”); Kelly v. State, No. CR 04-1388, 2005 WL 256565 (Ark. Feb.3, 2005) (unpublished per curiam); Abshure v. State, No. CR 02-1213, 2002 WL 31845911 (Ark. Dec. 19, 2002) (unpublished per curiam); Murphy v. State, No. CR 99-1388, 1999 WL 1212876 (Ark. Dec. 16, 1999) (unpublished per curiam); Brown v. State, No. CR 99-194, 1999 WL 223495 (Ark. Apr.15, 1999) (unpublished per curiam); Dodson v. State, No. CR 99-75, 1999 WL 54932 (Ark. Feb.4, 1999) (unpublished per curiam).

. There is also reason to doubt the Court's conclusion that Rule 2-4(c) is not jurisdictional, ante at 1072. See Casey v. State, No. CR 07-171, 2009 WL 223888 (Ark. Jan.30, 2009) (unpublished per curiam) (noting a defendant "would not be able to demonstrate that the jurisdiction of this court would be properly invoked” without alleging one of Rule 2-4(c)’s grounds); see also supra note 7 (collecting additional cases in which petitions were dismissed solely for non-compliance with Rule 2-4).

. Thus, this case does not present the question of "which appellate court in Arkansas is the 'state court of last resort.’ ” Ante at 1067 (emphasis added). The relevant question is which court was the "state court of last resort” for Parmley.

. The parties apparently understand that a procedural denial is not a "decision," since it is undisputed that the Arkansas Supreme Court’s order on May 20, 2004, refusing to direct the clerk to file Parmley’s belated petition for review, did not trigger the U.S. Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

. In declining to use a case-by-case method to identify the highest court in Arkansas for each defendant, the Court is not "merely clarifying when the statute of limitations began running for some prisoners,” ante at 1073, but rather it is defining the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review cases from all Arkansas courts. The Court effectively holds that the U.S. Supreme Court may never review an Arkansas Court of Appeals decision.

. The Court’s two choices for a habeas petitioner, ante at 1072-1073, amount to a red herring. When a defendant who lacks any Rule 2-4(c) grounds is considering whether to petition the Arkansas Supreme Court for review, his salient concern is continuing his direct appeal and avoiding a final judgment, not the potential statute of limitations for filing his habeas petition. As a result, his only real choices are to (1) "petition the Arkansas Supreme Court for discretionary review based on other factors,” ante at 1073, or (2) abandon all direct appeals and allow the judgment to become final.

. In this respect, Parmley’s case is distinguishable from O’Sullivan, which held that “the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable.” 526 U.S. at 848. While the parties in O’Sullivan disputed whether the petitioner could file a procedurally proper petition, here there is no dispute. Ante at 1070-1071. Additionally, Arkansas does not have "a discretionary review system ... without more," Rule 2-4(c) provides additional restrictions on filings, restrictions not present in Illinois.

. Though I find that Parmley’s petition was timely, I too would hold that he was not entitled to the stay-and-abeyance procedures defined in Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 125 S.Ct. 1528, 161 L.Ed.2d 440 (2005). Stay and abeyance applies only to "mixed” petitions, where "a state prisoner presents a federal court with a single petition containing some claims that have been exhausted in the state courts and some that have not.” Id. at 271, 125 S.Ct. 1528. However, Parmley’s petition is not a mixed petition; it contains only exhausted claims, and neither Norris nor the district court suggested otherwise. Indeed, Parmley can only point to minor semantic differences between the claims he raised in state court and the claims in his petition. See Appellant Br. at 21 (distinguishing between failure "to seek a suppression hearing” and to "file a motion to suppress,” and between "crime lab technician” and “chemist”). Since Parmley’s petition does not contain unexhausted claims, stay and abeyance was not appropriate.