Court Opinion

ID: 9941226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 08:14:08.24819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:22.886267
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                              __________________

                              NO. 09-22-00393-CV
                              __________________

            MOBIL OIL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION, Appellant

                                       V.

                           CRAIG SMITH, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

                On Appeal from the 60th District Court
                       Jefferson County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. B-210,066
__________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Mobil Oil Federal Credit Union (MFCU) appeals the trial court’s

order denying MFCU’s motion to compel arbitration. Appellee Craig Smith (Smith),

a member and account holder at MFCU, sued MFCU for personal injuries he

allegedly sustained when a chair he was sitting in at MFCU broke and collapsed. We

reverse the trial court’s order denying MFCU’s motion to compel arbitration.

                                        1
                                    Background

      In Smith’s Original Petition, he alleged that on February 16, 2022, while he

was at the MFCU facility transacting business, a chair he was sitting in broke and

collapsed. Smith named MFCU as a defendant and alleged that the injuries,

damages, and losses he suffered from the incident were proximately caused by

MFCU’s negligence.1 MFCU filed its First Amended Answer, generally denying

Smith’s claims and asserting numerous affirmative defenses, including invoking its

right to compel arbitration under the terms of an arbitration agreement.

      MFCU filed a motion to compel arbitration, arguing that at the time of the

incident, Smith maintained an account with MFCU and thereby “accepted certain

terms and conditions as well as periodic modifications thereto.” MFCU attached a

business records affidavit with exhibits attached thereto. MFCU argued in the

motion that the three Statements of Account (each attached to the affidavit)2 were

sent to Smith’s address, that the Statements of Account included a notification about

changes in the terms and conditions of the accounts adding an arbitration provision,

      1
         After MFCU filed the motion to compel arbitration, Smith amended his
petition to add the distributor and manufacturer of the chair as defendants, but those
defendants are not parties to this appeal.
       2
         All three Statements of Account are addressed to the same address, but each
Statement of Account has different account holder names, one for “Craig L Smith[,]”
one for “Centersect Enterprises LLC[,]” and one for “Susan P Smith[.]” On the
Statement of Account in the name of “Susan P Smith[,]” “Craig L Smith” is listed
as a “Joint Owner[,]” and on the Statement of Account in the name of “Craig L
Smith[,]” “Susan P Smith” is listed as a “Joint Owner[.]”
                                           2
and that attached to each Statement of Account was an arbitration provision that

provided the account owner an opportunity to opt out of arbitration without any loss

of the rights or benefits of the account. According to MFCU, Smith did not opt out.

In its motion to compel arbitration, MFCU alleged that the parties were bound by a

valid arbitration agreement because Smith accepted the arbitration provision, he did

not timely opt out of the provision, and he accepted the benefits associated with

having obtained his account at MFCU. MFCU argued the arbitration agreement is

enforceable, covers “any dispute” between the parties, and states that claims shall be

resolved through binding arbitration by the AAA. MFCU also claimed that Smith

had alleged over $1,000,000 in damages in the suit that he filed in district court, and

he wasn’t entitled to sue MFCU because MFCU had not waived its right to

arbitration.

      To support its motion to compel arbitration, MFCU filed an affidavit signed

by Karrie Harris. Harris states she is a custodian of records and Assistant Vice

President, and includes the following, in relevant part:

      “My name is Karrie Harris. I am of sound mind, capable of making this
      affidavit, and personally acquainted with the facts herein stated. I am a
      custodian of the records of Mobiloil Credit Uni[]on (“Mobiloil”) and
      am familiar with the manner in which the Mobiloil records are created
      and maintained by virtue of my duties and responsibilities. I currently
      hold the position/title known as AVP of Risk/Compliance. Attached to
      and incorporated into this affidavit are records from Mobiloil. These
      referenced records are kept by Mobiloil in the regular course of
      business, and it was the regular course of business of Mobiloil for an
      employee or representative of Mobiloil, with knowledge of the act,
                                          3
      event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, recorded to make the record or
      to transmit information thereof to be included in such record; and the
      record was made at or near the time or reasonably soon thereafter.
      These referenced records are the original or exact duplicates of the
      original. These records were made by, or from information transmitted
      by, one or more persons with knowledge of the matters set forth, or it
      is the regular practice of Mobiloil for this type of record to be made by,
      or from information transmitted by, persons with knowledge of the
      matters set forth in them. These records were kept in the course of
      regularly conducted business activity, or it is the regular practice of
      Mobiloil to keep this type of record in the course of regularly conducted
      business activity. The records attached hereto are trustworthy
      recordings of Mobiloil’s activities and records based on the routine
      practices of Mobiloil stated or otherwise reflected in this affidavit and
      the referenced records.”

             These records are numbered and described as noted below:

                    1. Statement of Account for 12/1/21—12/31/21 of Craig
                       L. Smith;
                    2. Statement of Account for 12/1/21—12/31/21 of
                       Centersect Enterprises, LLC;
                    3. Statement of Account for 12/1/21—12/31/21 of Susan
                       P. Smith.

The account statements are attached to the affidavit as exhibits A1, A2, and A3. The

first three pages of A1 and A2 and the first two pages of A3 contain the December

account statements for each account described in Harris’s affidavit, and each

statement shows what MFCU states is Smith’s address at the top of the first page.

The following statement appears at the top of the first page on each of the statements

attached to Harris’s affidavit:

      PLEASE NOTE: Your monthly statement contains an important
      change in terms with an arbitration provision and right to opt out. Please
      read it carefully.
                                          4
Behind each monthly statement is a document that provides the following, in

relevant part:

                       IMPORTANT CHANGE IN TERMS
                        Please Read This Notice Carefully

      1. The following Arbitration provision is added as a new section at the
      end of the Mobiloil Federal Credit Union Membership and Account
      Agreement, which shall thereafter be known as the Membership,
      Account and Arbitration Agreement (“Member Agreement”). You can
      opt out of the Arbitration and Class Action Waiver provision as
      provided below and you will not lose any of the rights and benefits of
      your accounts.

      ARBITRATION

      You and we agree to attempt to informally settle any disputes arising
      out of, affecting, or relating to your accounts, any products or services
      we have provided or offered to you, or any aspect of your relationship
      with us. If that cannot be done, you and we agree that any claim or
      dispute between us (“Claim”) that is filed or initiated after the Effective
      Date (as defined below) of this Arbitration provision, even if the Claim
      arose prior to the Effective Date, shall, at the election of either you or
      us, be resolved by binding arbitration administered by the American
      Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in accordance with its applicable
      rules and procedures for consumer disputes (“Rules”), whether such
      Claim is in contract, tort, statute, or otherwise. . . .

      AS A RESULT, IF EITHER YOU OR WE ELECT TO RESOLVE A
      PARTICULAR CLAIM THROUGH ARBITRATION, YOU WILL
      GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT TO ASSERT OR
      DEFEND YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THIS AGREEMENT (EXCEPT
      FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT INDIVIDUALLY WITHIN SMALL
      CLAIMS COURT JURISDICTION, SO LONG AS THE CLAIM
      REMAINS IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT). This Arbitration provision
      shall be interpreted and enforced in accordance with the Federal
      Arbitration Act as set forth in Title 9 of the U[.]S. Code to the fullest
      extent possible, notwithstanding any state law to the contrary and
      regardless of the origin or nature of the Claim. . . .
                                          5
     SELECTION OF ARBITRATOR. The neutral arbitrator shall be
     selected in accordance with the Rules, and shall have experience and
     knowledge in financial transactions. If AAA is unavailable to resolve
     the Claim, and if you and we do not agree on a substitute, then you can
     select the appropriate forum for the Claim.

     EFFECTIVE DATE. For members of the credit union as of 11:59 p.m.
     (central standard time), January 2, 2022, this Arbitration Agreement is
     effective upon the 31st day after we provide it to you (“Effective
     Date”), unless you opt-out within the 31-day period in accordance with
     the requirements of the RIGHT TO OPT-OUT provision below. If you
     receive your statements by mail, then the Arbitration Agreement was
     provided to you when it was mailed. If you receive your statements
     electronically, then it was provided to you when you were sent notice
     electronically. For all other members of the credit union, this
     Arbitration Agreement is effective immediately and there is no right to
     opt-out.

     ....

     RIGHT TO OPT-OUT. For members of the credit union as of 11:59
     p.m. (central standard time), January 2, 2022, you have the right to opt-
     out of this Arbitration provision and it will not affect any other terms
     and conditions of your relationship with the credit union. To opt out,
     you must notify us in writing of your intent to do so before the Effective
     Date. Your opt-out will not be effective and you will be deemed to have
     consented and agreed to the Arbitration Agreement unless your notice
     of intent to opt out is received by us in writing (via mail) at: Mobiloil
     Federal Credit Union; ATTN: Arbitration Opt-Out (TPB); 3535 Calder
     Ave., Suite 200; Beaumont, Texas 77706; (via email) at:
     MOFCUarboptout@mofcu.org. Your notice of intent to opt out can be
     a letter that is signed by you or an email sent by you that states “I elect
     to opt out of the Arbitration Agreement” or any words to that effect.
     For all other members of the credit union, this Arbitration Agreement
     is effective immediately and there is no right to opt-out.

     Smith filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (the

Response), and he included an objection to Exhibit A “to the extent it is
                                         6
unauthenticated, inadmissible hearsay, and speculative.” Specifically, in the

Response he argued as follows:

             As an initial matter, Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s Exhibit A to
      the extent it is unauthenticated, inadmissible hearsay, and speculative.
      The evidentiary standards for a motion to compel arbitration are the
      same as for a motion for summary judgment.[] Under the summary
      judgment standard, copies of documents must be authenticated to
      constitute competent summary judgment evidence.
             Here, Defendant attached a Business Record Affidavit signed by
      Ms. Karrie Harris, the purported custodian of records for Mobiloil. Ms.
      Harris claims Exhibit A contains “exact duplicates” of Mobiloil
      business records.[] Plaintiff objects to the authenticity and admissibility
      of Defendant’s Exhibit A. Mobiloil failed to authenticate a signed copy
      of any “agreement”.

      Smith did not obtain a ruling from the trial court on his evidentiary objections.

Smith also argued in his response that MFCU could not prove that an enforceable

arbitration agreement exists because MFCU could not establish that the contract was

properly executed under Texas law, as required by Section 2 of the Federal

Arbitration Act (FAA).3 According to Smith, MFCU could not produce a document

signed by Smith either agreeing to the arbitration agreement or evidencing that he

reviewed the arbitration agreement, MFCU could not prove that Smith received the

Notice of the Arbitration Agreement or that it was actually attached to the account

      3
        Under the summary judgment standard applicable here, copies of documents
may be authenticated by a business records affidavit. See Tex. R. Evid. 803(6),
902(10); Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 270 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (relying on summary judgment precedent to hold that the trial and
appellate courts must accept as true the clear, direct, and positive evidence of an
undisputed affidavit supporting a motion to compel arbitration).
                                         7
summaries, and there is no evidence that Smith received or read the Notices attached

to Harris’s affidavit that were allegedly sent to Smith’s address with the Statements

of Account. Smith argued that MFCU could not prove a meeting of the minds

between MFCU and Smith because there is no evidence that Smith consented to,

agreed to, or signed in person or electronically, MFCU’s arbitration addendum.

Smith argued that the opt out provision renders the contract invalid for lack of

mutuality.4 Citing to section 171.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies

Code, Smith also argued that the arbitration agreement was invalid under Texas law

because Texas prohibits arbitration of personal injury claims. Smith also alleged the

premises liability dispute does not fall within the arbitration provision because,

according to Smith, “[t]he arbitration provision applies to ‘members and account

holders’ for disputes affecting their accounts or services provided by [MFCU].” In

support of this argument, Smith relied on the fact that “the arbitration provision

provides for a “‘neutral arbitrator’ that ‘shall have knowledge in financial

transactions[,]’” and not personal injury.

      4
         Smith abandons this argument in his Appellee’s brief, and he did not present
any evidence to the trial court in support of this defense. We note that “when an
arbitration clause is part of a larger, underlying contract, the remainder of the
contract may suffice as consideration for the arbitration clause.” In re Palm Harbor
Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. 2006). “[A]rbitration clauses generally do
not require mutuality of obligation so long as adequate consideration supports the
underlying contract.” In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. 2008).
                                          8
      MFCU filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration and argued

because Smith contractually agreed to be bound by the FAA, the Texas Arbitration

Act’s provision exempting personal injury claims from arbitration does not apply to

this case. MFCU argued that a valid arbitration agreement exists because MFCU

properly authenticated the documents, and the documents show MFCU mailed the

notices of arbitration to Smith’s address with the Statements of Account, and Smith

never opted out of the arbitration provision. MFCU further argued that when the

agreement is a written agreement and it is agreed to by the parties as it was here, the

Texas Supreme Court has concluded a signature is not required by the FAA or the

TAA.5 MFCU asserted that notice of the arbitration provision was mailed to Smith,

he did not opt out of the provision as provided for in the agreement, and his continued

use of his MFCU account constituted acceptance of the terms of the arbitration.

MFCU alleged that the dispute falls within the arbitration provision because the

provision applies to “any dispute” between the parties. According to MFCU,

Harris’s business records affidavit meets the requirements of Rule 902(10) of the

      5
        MFCU cited to In re Polymerica, LLC, 296 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); In re Macy’s Tex., Inc., 291 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Tex. 2009)
(per curiam); In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 606 n.5 (Tex. 2005)
(per curiam); Wright v. Hernandez, 469 S.W.3d 744, 760 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015,
no pet.); In re Brown & Root, Inc., No. 05-98-00689-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS
3676, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 18, 1998, orig. proceeding); Hearthshire
Braeswood Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Bill Kelly Co., 849 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied).
                                         9
Texas Rules of Evidence, and Smith offered no affidavits or documents as evidence

to support his argument that the dispute should not be submitted to arbitration.

      After a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied MFCU’s motion.

MFCU appeals from the trial court’s denial of MFCU’s motion to compel

arbitration.

                     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to compel arbitration for an abuse

of discretion. See Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Tex. 2021); In re

Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 642-43 (Tex. 2009). “A trial court abuses

its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to

any guiding rules or principles.” Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52

(Tex. 2002) (per curiam). We defer to a trial court’s factual findings and review the

trial court’s legal determinations de novo, including questions of contract

interpretation, and we should not reverse because we might have decided the issue

differently. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex.

1985); Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 283; In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d at

642-43; see also Barrow-Shaver Res. Co. v. Carrizo Oil & Gas, Inc., 590 S.W.3d

471, 479 (Tex. 2019) (“We construe contracts under a de novo standard of review.”).

Whether a valid arbitration agreement exists and whether the claims in dispute fall

within the scope of the arbitration agreement are legal questions subject to de novo

                                         10
review. See Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018); In re Labatt

Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d at 643. When, as here, the trial court did not issue

written findings of fact or conclusions of law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

“‘if it can be upheld on any legal theory that finds support in the evidence.’” Sam

Houston Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Berry, 582 S.W.3d 282, 288 (Tex. App.—Beaumont

2017, no pet.) (quoting Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990)).

      A party seeking to compel arbitration has the initial burden of proof to

establish that a valid arbitration agreement exists and that the claims are within the

agreement’s scope. See Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 282; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220,

223 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d

732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d

223, 227 (Tex. 2003). While there is a strong presumption favoring arbitration, the

presumption only arises after the party seeking to compel arbitration proves that a

valid arbitration agreement exits. J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 227. Ordinary

principles of state contract law determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate

exists. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 738. After the proponent of

arbitration has made the required showings, the burden then shifts to the party

opposing arbitration to raise an affirmative defense to enforcing arbitration. Henry,

551 S.W.3d at 115; Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex.

2014).

                                         11
      The evidentiary standards for a motion to compel arbitration are the same as

for a motion for summary judgment. In re Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d 693, 699-

700 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). The trial court may

summarily decide whether to compel arbitration on the basis of affidavits, pleadings,

discovery, and stipulations if the material facts are not controverted. Id. at 700; see

also Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992) (orig.

proceeding). Thus, the party alleging an arbitration agreement exists must present

summary judgment proof that an agreement to arbitrate requires arbitration of the

dispute. Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 269; In re Jebbia, 26 S.W.3d 753, 757

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding). The party resisting a

motion for summary judgment may contest the opponent’s proof or present evidence

supporting the elements of a defense to enforcement. Jebbia, 26 S.W.3d at 757. If a

material issue of fact is raised, an evidentiary hearing is required. Jack B. Anglin

Co., 842 S.W.2d at 269.

      Whether an issue falls within the scope of an arbitration agreement generally

depends upon the wording of the arbitration agreement, and any doubts as to whether

an issue falls in the scope of the arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration.

Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115-16. To determine whether a party’s claims fall within an

arbitration agreement’s scope, we focus on the complaint’s factual allegations rather

                                           12
than the legal causes of action asserted. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749,

754 (Tex. 2001).

                                      Analysis

      In one appellate issue, MFCU argues that the trial court erred when it denied

MFCU’s motion to compel arbitration because MFCU presented undisputed

evidence establishing that Smith and MFCU agreed to arbitrate “any claim or dispute

between us.” According to MFCU, it proved the existence of an arbitration

agreement by presenting a business records affidavit which proved up and

authenticated Smith’s December 2021 Statement of Account for his MFCU account,

and his Statement of Account included a copy of the arbitration provision. According

to MFCU, the Statement of Account and the arbitration provision apprised Smith of

his right to opt out of arbitration, and Smith did not allege or present evidence that

he opted out. MFCU argues that, although Smith argued in opposition to the motion

to compel that MFCU provided no evidence that Smith read or received (or had the

opportunity to even read) the notices regarding the arbitration clause, Smith failed

to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the arbitration

agreement because he did not deny agreeing to the arbitration provision and he did

not provide evidence by contrary affidavit showing that he did not agree to the

arbitration agreement. MFCU also contends that the arbitration agreement applies to

                                         13
Smith’s claim because Smith and MFCU agreed to arbitrate “any claim or dispute

between us . . . whether such claim is in contract, tort, statute or otherwise.”

      Smith argues MFCU failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the existence of

a valid arbitration agreement, and he argues that his claims are outside the scope of

the alleged arbitration agreement. Smith contends that as to the alleged arbitration

agreement, MFCU had the burden to provide evidence of the following elements

required to form a valid and binding contract in Texas: (1) an offer; (2) acceptance

in strict compliance with the offer’s terms; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) consent

by both parties; (5) execution and delivery; and (6) consideration. According to

Smith, MFCU presented no evidence that Smith signed the arbitration agreement,

there is no evidence in the record to memorialize Smith’s assent to or the awareness

of the alleged arbitration agreement, and no evidence that Smith read, received, or

had an opportunity to read the alleged arbitration agreement or its notice. Smith

contends that MFCU provided no evidence of when Smith received the arbitration

provision, and Smith did not have to produce any evidence in response to MFCU’s

motion to compel arbitration. Smith also argues that his personal injury claims

against MFCU are outside the scope of the alleged arbitration agreement because

they “have nothing to do with his credit union account, or the products or services

[MFCU] offers [Smith] as part of its credit union[,]” and that language in the

agreement requiring this matter to be arbitrated by someone with “knowledge in

                                          14
financial transactions[]” demonstrates “the absurdity of [MFCU]’s incongruous

position.”

      Our first inquiry is to determine if MFCU met its initial burden of proof to

establish that a valid arbitration agreement exists. See Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 282;

In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d at 737; J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128

S.W.3d at 227. MFCU relies upon Harris’s affidavit and the attachments to the

affidavit for proof that a valid arbitration agreement exists. In that affidavit, Harris

states the account statements and arbitration provision notices that were attached as

exhibits to Harris’s affidavit are originals or exact duplicates of originals and that

the documents were kept by MFCU in its regular course of business. MFCU

contends the statements attached bore Smith’s address, the statements referenced the

inclusion of the arbitration clause that followed each statement in a separate

document, and the separate document informed Smith of his opportunity to opt out

of arbitration and notified Smith that the arbitration clause would take effect on

January 2, 2022, if he did not opt out. According to MFCU, the arbitration agreement

which was attached to each statement was authenticated as a business record by

Harris’s affidavit. MFCU argues that it met its burden and established a binding

arbitration agreement, and Smith presented no evidence showing that he opted out.

MFCU argues that the business records affidavit and attachments thereto presented

                                          15
“all the evidence MFCU was required to present to establish existence of the

arbitration agreement.”

      “Evidence of mutual assent in written contracts generally consists of

signatures of the parties and delivery with the intent to bind.” Baylor Univ. v.

Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2007). That said, under the Federal

Arbitration Act and Texas law, an arbitration agreement may still be enforced even

if it is not signed by the parties if the agreement is written and its terms are agreed

to by the parties. See In re Polymerica, LLC, 296 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2009) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam); In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 606 &

n.5 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.

§ 171.001(a) and noting that the Texas Arbitration Act requires signature for

contracts of less than $50,000 or personal injury claims); see also In re Macy’s Tex.,

Inc., 291 S.W.3d 418, 419 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (observing that “[t]he FAA

contains no requirements for the form or specificity of arbitration agreements except

that they be in writing; it does not even require that they be signed.”); In re

Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2002) (holding arbitration clause was

accepted by continued employment). When an arbitration agreement is governed by

the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA), the Act does not allow for the arbitration of

personal injury claims unless the arbitration provision is in writing, and the

agreement is signed by each party and each party’s attorney. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

                                          16
Code Ann. § 171.002(a)(3), (c)(1-2). It is undisputed that the parties here did not

comply with section 171.002(c)(1-2). That said, the FAA does not exclude the

arbitration of personal injury claims. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16; see also In re Jim Walter

Homes, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 888, 896 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig.

proceeding). So, if the arbitration agreement is governed by the FAA, the personal

injury section of 171.002 does not control. See In re Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 207

S.W.3d at 896.

      Here, MFCU argues that it authenticated Smith’s December 2021 account

statement and accompanying arbitration provision with a business record affidavit

under Rule 902(10) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. In the trial court, Smith

challenged Exhibit A attached to Harris’s affidavit, but Smith failed to obtain a

ruling on his objections from the trial court.

      A party can satisfy its evidentiary burden to prove an arbitration agreement’s

existence by submitting authenticated copies of an agreement containing an

arbitration clause. DISH Network L.L.C. v. Alexander, No. 13-20-00240-CV, 2021

Tex. App. LEXIS 5823, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh July 22, 2021,

pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc. v. Stiel, No.

05-16-00299-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 13424, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 16,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Before documents may be used as evidence, they must

be authenticated as genuine.”). To satisfy the authentication requirement, the

                                          17
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what

the proponent claims it is. Tex. R. Evid. 901(a). In a summary proceeding, a properly

sworn affidavit stating that the attached documents are true and correct copies of the

original authenticates the copies so that they may be considered as evidence. See In

re Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d at 704; see also Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d

at 270 (relying on summary judgment precedent to hold that the trial and appellate

courts must accept as true the clear, direct, and positive evidence of an undisputed

affidavit supporting a motion to compel arbitration). An arbitration agreement may

be self-authenticated through a business record affidavit that complies with Rule

902(10) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., Northpointe LTC, Ltd. v. Durant,

No. 01-22-00215-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 9326, at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (defendant met its burden by presenting

a copy of an arbitration agreement authenticated by a business records declaration);

Toyota of Richardson v. Kouros, No. 05-22-00019-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS

7222, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (same).

      Harris’s affidavit establishes the authenticity of the documents attached to her

affidavit. Harris’s affidavit establishes that the attached documents are originals or

exact duplicates of originals, and that the documents were maintained by MFCU in

its regular course of business. The authenticated documents attached to the affidavit

include three December 2021 Statements of Account, each bearing the address

                                         18
MFCU alleges is Smith’s address and notifying the account holder that the “monthly

statement contains an important change in terms with an arbitration provision and

right to opt out[,]” and a notice and arbitration provision is attached to each

statement. The authenticated arbitration agreement attached to the three Statements

of Account states that “[i]f you receive your statements by mail, then the Arbitration

Agreement was provided to you when it was mailed[,]” and “[i]f you receive your

statements electronically, then it was provided to you when you were sent notice

electronically.” If a party’s uncontroverted affidavit is clear, direct, and positive, the

court must accept it. Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 270. MFCU bore the burden

to prove that Smith received notice of the arbitration provision only if MFCU’s

motion to compel arbitration and Smith’s response presented conflicting evidence

as to whether Smith received notice of the arbitration agreement. See Stagg Rests.,

LLC v. Serra, No. 04-18-00527-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 1013, at *7 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Feb. 13, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Jack B. Anglin Co.,

842 S.W.2d at 269; In re MP Ventures of S. Tex., Ltd., 276 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2008, orig. proceeding)). On this record, Smith has not disputed

that he received the arbitration agreement, and he has not disputed that the address

on the monthly statements is his address. The trial court was required to accept

MFCU’s uncontroverted evidence that Smith received the arbitration agreement

when he received his monthly statement. See Jack B. Anglin Co., 842 S.W.2d at 270.

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Accordingly, MFCU carried its initial burden to prove the existence of a valid

arbitration agreement. See Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 282; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d

at 223.

      Having concluded a valid agreement between MFCU and Smith to arbitrate

under the FAA exists, our next inquiry must be to determine whether the claims

asserted by Smith fall within the arbitration provision. See Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at

282-83; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 223; In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166

S.W.3d at 737; J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227. We resolve any doubts about

the arbitration provision’s factual scope in favor of arbitration. See Henry, 551

S.W.3d at 115-16; In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 754. Under the

arbitration provision here, MFCU and Smith “agree to attempt to informally settle

any disputes arising out of, affecting, or relating to [Smith’s] accounts, any products

or services [MFCU has] provided or offered to [Smith], or any aspect of [Smith’s]

relationship with [MFCU,]” and that if that cannot be done, MFCU and Smith agreed

that “any claim or dispute” between them filed or initiated after the effective date of

the arbitration provision must be submitted to binding arbitration upon election by

either MFCU or Smith “whether such Claim is in contract, tort, statute, or

otherwise.” Smith’s factual allegations in the Original Petition are that “[o]n

February 16, 2022, Plaintiff went to a Mobil Oil Federal Credit Union facility to

transact business[,] . . . was offered a chair in which to sit, and while doing so, the

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chair broke and collapsed, causing injury, damage, and loss to Plaintiff.”

Considering the arbitration provision’s broad language stating that any claim or

dispute between MFCU and Smith “whether such Claim is in contract, tort, statute,

or otherwise[]” must be submitted to binding arbitration upon election by either

MFCU or Smith, and because Texas courts resolve any doubts about an arbitration

agreement’s scope in favor of arbitration, we conclude that Smith’s factual

allegations fall within the scope of the claims the parties agreed to arbitrate. See

Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115 (noting that any doubts about an arbitration agreement’s

scope are resolved in favor of arbitration); In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at

754-55 (arbitration agreement covered claims because it stated it covers “‘all

disputes, claims, or other matters in question arising out of or relating to this Loan,

its interpretation, validity, performance, or the breach thereof’” and that “‘the scope

of arbitrability is broad and includes, without limitation, contractual, tort, statutory,

and case law claims.’”). Although the arbitration agreement here provides in a

different section titled “Selection of Arbitrator” that the arbitrator selected “shall

have experience and knowledge in financial transactions[,]” this language does not

limit the broad language in the “Arbitration” section which defines the type of and

scope of the disputes that are governed by the arbitration agreement.

      To summarize, based on the evidence in the record, we conclude MFCU met

its evidentiary burden to establish the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration

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agreement and that the disputed claim falls within the scope of that agreement. See

Wagner, 627 S.W.3d at 282-83; In re Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d at 223. The burden then

shifted to Smith to raise an affirmative defense to enforcing arbitration. Henry, 551

S.W.3d at 115; Venture Cotton Coop., 435 S.W.3d at 227. Smith failed to present

evidence supporting any defense to arbitration, and therefore the trial court had no

discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings. See In re

FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753-55.

      We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying MFCU’s

motion to compel arbitration, and we sustain MFCU’s issue. We reverse the trial

court’s order denying MFCU’s motion to compel arbitration, and we remand the

cause to the trial court with instructions to render an order compelling arbitration.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                                                          LEANNE JOHNSON
                                                               Justice

Submitted on September 13, 2023
Opinion Delivered February 15, 2024

Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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