Court Opinion

ID: 9957915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 17:00:58.414401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:41.706783
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 5 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RYAN GALAL VANDYCK,                             No.    23-15198

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. Nos.    4:21-cv-00399-CKJ
                                                             4:15-cr-00742-CKJ-
 v.                                             MSA-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                MEMORANDUM*
                Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

                       Argued and Submitted April 1, 2024
                               Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, BADE, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

      Ryan VanDyck appeals the district court’s denial of his motion under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. VanDyck was convicted on one count of conspiracy to produce

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and (e), and one count of

possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and

(b)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2255(d). We review de

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
novo a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, and we review factual findings

for clear error. See United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1996);

Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 167 (9th Cir. 1990).

      In March 2014, America Online, Inc (AOL) identified an email attachment

as appearing to contain child pornography. AOL sent a report to the National

Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which traced the email to Tucson,

Arizona, and forwarded it to local police. The police opened the attachment

without a warrant, determined that the email’s IP address was associated with

VanDyck’s residence, and then executed a search warrant on that address.

Hundreds of videos and images of child pornography were discovered on

VanDyck’s electronic devices. After VanDyck was indicted, his trial counsel

moved to suppress the attachment on multiple grounds, including that the affidavit

and request for extension contained material misrepresentations. The district court

denied these motions to suppress, VanDyck was convicted on both counts

following a bench trial, and this court affirmed on direct appeal. United States v.

VanDyck, 776 F. App’x 495 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished memorandum).

      VanDyck moved for relief from his sentence under § 2255, arguing that his

trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise a Fourth Amendment

challenge to the police opening the jpeg attachment to the AOL email without a

warrant, and that appellate counsel on direct appeal was ineffective because she

                                          2
failed to challenge the extension of a search warrant deadline that was allegedly

based on knowingly false statements. The district court denied the motion. We

affirm the district court’s denial of VanDyck’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective, and deny a certificate of appealability on VanDyck’s claim that

appellate counsel was ineffective.

      1. The district court correctly denied VanDyck’s ineffective assistance of

trial counsel claim because counsel could have reasonably concluded that the

motion to suppress would fail. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s performance “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that “the deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).

Trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that VanDyck lacked a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the email attachment and therefore decided not to move

to suppress the attachment on the basis VanDyck asserts now, and instead decided

to assert several other arguments.

      Specifically, trial counsel could have reasonably concluded that AOL’s

Terms of Service (TOS) and Privacy Policy eliminated VanDyck’s reasonable

expectation of privacy in the attachment because the TOS and Privacy Policy

included express terms notifying users that AOL monitored their accounts and

would disclose suspected illegal activity. See United States v. Ganoe, 538 F.3d

                                          3
1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir.

2010). Trial counsel also could have reasonably concluded that the district court

would find that opening the attachment was permissible under exceptions to the

warrant requirement, including the private-search doctrine and the third-party

doctrine. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (private-search

doctrine); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (third-party

doctrine).

      Therefore, because trial counsel could have reasonably decided not to move

to suppress the attachment for any of these reasons, or a combination of these

reasons, the district court did not err in concluding that VanDyck did not receive

ineffective assistance of counsel and denying the first claim in VanDyck’s § 2255

motion. See Sexton v. Cozner, 679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining

that “[c]ounsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise even a nonfrivolous

claim”); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that counsel

“cannot be required to anticipate” a later judicial decision).

      2. We decline to issue a certificate of appealability as to the ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel claim. “A certificate of appealability may issue . . .

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Reasonable jurists would not find

debatable the district court’s conclusion that VanDyck’s ineffective assistance of

                                           4
appellate counsel claim was frivolous. The district court correctly denied the

motion to suppress based on the warrant extension after holding an evidentiary

hearing in which officers testified they needed an extension because they learned

VanDyck would not be in town the day they intended to execute the search

warrant. Therefore, any reasonable jurist would conclude that appellate counsel

was not ineffective for failing to challenge the extension. See Wildman v. Johnson,

261 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise issues on

direct appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance when appeal would not have

provided grounds for reversal.”).

      We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of VanDyck’s § 2255 motion as to his

claim that trial counsel was ineffective, and DENY the certificate of appealability

on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

                                          5