Court Opinion

ID: 9840237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 16:06:21.650685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:14.362390
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                               COURT OF APPEAL

                                 FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 2023 CA 0298

CARL ALEXANDER, JENNY FONTENOT, VICTORIA ERICKSON
                            AND WESLEY DYSON

                                     VERSUS

  PNK (BATON ROUGE) PARTNERSHIP D/ B/ A L' AUBERGE
   BATON ROUGE AND PENN NATIONAL GAMING, INC.

                                         JUDGvtF,NT RENDERED:       SEP 15 223

                                    E3E3E3EMMM3

              Appealed from The Nineteenth Judicial District Court
                  Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
                        Docket Number C- 686593 • Section 23

                  The Honorable Kelly Balfour, Presiding Judge

   Gregory John Miller                             COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
   Baton Rouge, Louisiana                          PLAINT[ FFs--   Carl Alexander, Jenny
                                                   Fontenot, Victoria Erickson, and
                                                   Wesley Dyson

   John Thomas Andrishok                           COUNSEL FOR APPELLLES
   Vicki M. Crochet                                DEFENDANTs— PNK (Baton
   Gillian B. Griffin                              Rouge) Partnership d/b/ a L' Auberge
   Baton Rouge, Louisiana                          Baton Rouge and Penn National
                                                   Gaming, Inc.

            BEFORE: WELCH, HOLDRIDGE, AND WOLFE, JJ.
WELCH, J.

       Former employees filed suit against their former employer, seeking unpaid

wages for accrued paid time off ("PTO").           Employer filed a motion for summary

judgment, arguing that it had a clear policy that unused PTO would not be paid upon

termination. The trial court granted employer' s motion and dismissed employees'

claims against employer, with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Plaintiffs— Carl Alexander, Jenny Fontenot, Victoria Erickson, and Wesley

Dyson— are former employees of PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership d/ b/a/ L' Auberge

Casino and Hotel in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (collectively, " PNK"). 1 PNK employed

plaintiffs beginning in August 2012, and discharged or terminated all plaintiffs from
                                     2
their employment by July 2018. During plaintiffs' employment, PNK modified its

PTO policy. On October 18, 2016, PNK issued a PTO policy change memorandum

to all its employees, including plaintiffs, informing them of the change. The new

PTO policy stated, in pertinent part:

              PTO is a gratuitous benefit of employment granted solely
              at the Company' s discretion. PTO is not earned and is not
              to be considered an amount due or a wage for any purpose
              and effective October 1, 2016[,] team members will not be
              compensated upon separation of employment for unused
              PTO.

The new PTO policy further provided that PTO could be used by employees " when

they need time away from work for any reason[,]" including but not limited to

 vacations, holidays[,] or other personal time." Plaintiffs all acknowledged receipt

1 PNK ( Baton Rouge) Partnership is the owner and operator of the L' Auberge Casino and Hotel
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Penn National Gaming, Inc. acquired ownership of PNK in December
2018. Penn has never served as plaintiffs' employer.

2 Mr. Alexander began his employment with PNK on August 20, 2012, and was terminated on
May 19, 2017. Ms. Fontenot began her employment with PNK on August 13, 2012, and was
terminated on April 7, 2017. Ms. Erickson began her employment with PNK on November 12,
2014, and was terminated on July 24, 2018. Mr. Dyson began his employment with PNK on August
6, 2012, and was terminated on February 14, 2018.

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of the October 18, 2016 PTO policy change memorandum. PNK issued a new team

member handbook in March 2018,                which incorporated the new PTO policy as

modified in October 2010

          Upon each plaintiff"s termination from employment by PNK, plaintiffs were

not paid for unused PTO pursuant to PNK' s October 2016 PTO policy. Plaintiffs

filed suit against PNK and Penn National Gaming, Inc. ( collectively, " defendants")

in August 2019, seeking compensation for unused accrued PTO, statutory penalties

equal to up to ninety days of wages, with interest from date ofjudicial demand, until

paid, all costs of the proceedings, and reasonable attorney' s fees.

          Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that no genuine

issues of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiffs were entitled to

reimbursement for unused, accrued PTO upon termination. Defendants argued that

in accordance with the applicable jurisprudence, PNK had a clear, written policy

establishing that PTO was a gratuity and not an amount due under the terms of

employment;         therefore,    upon    discharge,     plaintiffs   were    not   entitled    to

reimbursement for unused, accrued PTO. Defendants contended that plaintiffs'

claims should be dismissed.

         Following a hearing, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary

judgment and signed a judgment in accordance with its ruling on October 6, 2022.

Plaintiffs now appeal.'

3
    By March 2018, Mr. Alexander, Ms. Fontenot, and Mr. Dyson had all been terminated from their
employment with PNK. Ms.       Erickson, who was still employed by PNK in March 2018,
acknowledged receipt of the new team member handbook.

    Plaintiffs filed a motion for devolutive appeal on November 1, 2022. The trial court signed an
order of appeal on November 4, 2022, notice of which was transmitted by the clerk of court to the
parties on January 13, 2023.

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                                     SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

        Appellate courts review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment

de novo using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether

summary judgment is appropriate. Georgia-Pacific Consumer Operations, LLC

v. City of Baton Rouge, 2017- 1553, 2017- 1554 ( La. App. 1St Cir. 7/ 18/ 18), 255
So. 3d 16, 22, writ denied, 2018- 1397 ( La. 1213118),              257 So. 3d 194. After an

opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted

if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show there is no genuine

issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

La. C. C. P. art. 966( A)(3);       Campbell v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 2019- 0036 ( La. App.
                                                                                                lst

Cir. 1/ 9/20), 294 So. 3d 522, 526.

        The burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment rests with the mover.

La. C. C. P. art. 966( D)( 1);      Lucas v. Maison Insurance Co., 2021- 1401 ( La. App.

I" Cir. 12122122), 358 So. 3d 76, 84. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the

burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court on the motion for

summary judgment, the mover' s burden on the motion does not require him to negate

all essential elements of the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense. Instead, after

meeting his initial burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material

fact, that mover may point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support

for one or more elements essential to the adverse party' s claim, action, or defense.

Thereafter, summary judgment shall be granted unless the adverse party can produce

factual evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material

fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See La. C. C. P.

art. 966( D)( 1);    Lucas, 358 So. 3d at 84.

5 Although the Legislature recently amended La. C. C. P. art. 966, those amendments are not
applicable to the instant appeal. See 2023 La. Acts No. 317, § 1 ( eff. Aug. 1, 2023), and 2023 La.
Acts No. 368, §     1 ( eff. Aug. 1, 2023).

                                                 4
         Summary judgment is appropriate for determining issues relating to earned

and unpaid wages, vacation time, or PTO. See, e.g., Newton v. St. Tammany Fire

District No. 12, 2022- 1119 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 5/ 18/ 23), 2023 WL 3556319, * 2 -* 3

 unpublished).

                                       LAW AND DISCUSSION

         The issue before this Court is whether PNK' s employees are entitled to

reimbursement for unused, accrued paid time off (" PTO")                          upon discharge or

resignation. The Louisiana Wage Payment Act, La. R.S. 23: 631, et seq. (" LWPA"),

provides for payment of wages due after termination of employment. The main

purpose of the LWPA is to compel an employer to pay the earned wages of an

employee promptly after his dismissal or resignation and to protect discharged

Louisiana employees from unfair and dilatory wage practices by employers. Newton

v. St. Tammany Fire District No. 12, 2020- 0797 ( La. App. 1st Cir. 2119121), 318

So. 3d 206, 211. The cornerstone of the LWPA is La. R.S. 23: 631, 6 which is titled

 Discharge or resignation of employees; payment after termination of employment"

and provides, in pertinent part:

                  A. ( 1)(    a)   Upon the discharge of any laborer or other
                  employee of any kind whatever, it shall be the duty of the
                  person employing such laborer or other employee to pay
                  the amount then due under the terms of employment,
                  whether the employment is by the hour, day, week, or
                  month, on or before the next regular payday or no later
                  than       fifteen   days   following    the   date   of   discharge,
                  whichever occurs first.

                  D. ( 1)For purposes of this Section, vacation pay will be
                  considered an amount then due only if, in accordance with
                  the stated vacation policy of the person employing such
                  laborer or other employee, both of the following apply:

G We recognize that in Kidder v. Statewide Transport, Inc., 2013- 594 ( La. App. Yd Cir.
12/ 18/ 13),   129 So. 3d 875, 880- 81, the Third Circuit held that the Federal Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U. S. C. A. § 207, preempts the LWPA with regard to overtime provisions for employees
engaged in interstate commerce, an issue that is not at play in the instant case. We also note that
the opinions of other circuit courts are not authoritative or binding on this court. Derbonne v.
State Police Commission, 2019- 1455 ( La. App.            I" Cir. 10/ 14/ 20), 314 So. 3d 861,   871, writ
denied, 2020- 01323 ( La. 2/ 17/ 21), 310 So. 3d 1152.

                                                    5
                 a) The laborer or other employee is deemed eligible for
                and has accrued the right to take vacation time with pay.
                b) The laborer or other employee has not taken or been
                compensated for the vacation time as of the date of the
                discharge or resignation.

                2)     The      provisions   of this    Subsection   shall   not be
                interpreted to allow the forfeiture of any vacation pay
                actually earned by an employee pursuant to the employer' s
                policy.

      Upon termination, an employer is required under La. R. S. 23: 63 1 ( A)( 1)(           a) to

pay their employees " the amount then due under the terms of employment[.]"

Pursuant   to    La.    R. S.    23: 631( D),   which    specifically addresses payment for

accumulated vacation time, vacation pay will be considered an amount due only if,

in accordance with the stated vacation policy, the employee is eligible and has

accrued the right to take vacation time and has not been otherwise compensated for

the vacation time. Hess v. Magnolia Behavioral Healthcare, L.L.C., 2015- 1312

La. App. 1st Cir. 2124116),           189 So. 3d 1183, 1186, writ denied, 2016- 0576 ( La.

5113116), 191 So. 3d 1056. Likewise, unused PTO that an employee has accrued

under the terms of their employment constitutes wages due under the L WPA. Davis

v. St. Francisville Country Manor, L.L.C., 2013- 0190 ( La. App, 1st Cir. 11/ l/ 13),

136 So. 3d 20, 24. Accordingly, as a general rule, vacation pay and PTO are " amounts

then due" under the terms of employment and constitute wages, which are due upon

discharge or resignation by the employee. Hess, 189 So.3d at 1186.

      However, where an employer has a clearly established policy that vacation

time or PTO is not considered wages actually earned by an employee, the employee

is not entitled to reimbursement for unused, accrued vacation time or PTO upon

discharge or resignation. Wyatt v. Avoyelles Parish School Board, 2001- 3180 (La.

1214/ 02), 831 So. 2d 906, 913. See also Hess, 189 So. 3d at 1186; Chapman v.

Ebeling, 41, 710 ( La. App. 2"          Cir. 12113/ 06), 945 So. 2d 222, 226.         Only in the

absence of a clear written policy establishing that vacation time or PTO granted by

                                                  6
an employer to an employee is nothing more than a mere gratuity and not a wage, is

accrued but unused vacation time or PTO considered a vested right for which an

employee must be paid upon discharge or resignation. Hess, 189 So. 3d at 1186.

      We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and evidence submitted in

support of and in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, as well

as the applicable jurisprudence. The evidence shows that PNK had a clear, written

policy establishing that PTO is a " mere gratuity." A gratuity is something " acquired

or otherwise received without bargain or inducement," " given          freely or without

recompense,"   or a " gift."
                               Hess, 189 So. 3d at 1189 ( citing Black' s Law Dictionary,

631 ( 5th Edition)). In the case before us, PNK' s employee PTO policy expressly

stated that PTO, for vacation or otherwise, was a gift. Accordingly, the employees'

unused PTO was not an amount then due under the terms of employment, or a wage

for which they should have been paid under La. R.S. 23: 631 upon the termination of

their employment with PNK. See Hess, 189 So. 3d at 1189; Wyatt, 831 So. 2d at 913.

Therefore,    the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of

defendants.

                                         DECREE

      We affirm the trial court' s October 6,        2022 judgment granting summary

judgment in favor of defendants, PNK (Baton Rouge) Partnership d/ b/ a L' Auberge

Casino and Hotel in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Penn National Gaming, Inc., and

against plaintiffs, Carl Alexander, Jenny Fontenot, Victoria Erickson, and Wesley

Dyson, and dismissing all of plaintiffs' claims against defendants with prejudice. All

costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiffs,      Carl Alexander, Jenny Fontenot,

Victoria Erickson, and Wesley Dyson.

      AFFIRMED.

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