Court Opinion

ID: 9838179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 16:08:41.052804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:01.484231
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Matter of:

                  JESSICA SIQUEIROS, Petitioner/Appellee,

                                        v.

             GABRIEL VALENZUELA, Respondent/Appellant.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 22-0370 FC
                               FILED 9-5-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FC2021-050947
                 The Honorable Scott A. Blaney, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Law Office of Katherine Kraus, PLLC, Peoria
By Kimberly A. Staley
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Rose & Associates, PLLC, Chandler
By Timothy J. Rose
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
                       SIQUEIROS v. VALENZUELA
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1           Gabriel Valenzuela (“Husband”) appeals the superior court’s
judgment accepting a consent decree lodged by Jessica Siqueiros (“Wife”).
We find no error and affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            On April 1, 2021, Wife petitioned for the dissolution of her
marriage. The same day, Husband and Wife submitted a consent decree to
the superior court. The court explained to the parties that it could not accept
the decree for 60 days, citing A.R.S. § 25-329.

¶3           On June 1, Wife again lodged the parties’ consent decree. It
included a worksheet showing that Husband owed Wife $ 43 per month
under the guidelines. But the parties represented that neither party should
pay child support to the other parent. Husband objected to the lodged
decree. He argued there was no “meeting of the minds” between the parties
when they submitted the decree because they were unrepresented and did
not clearly understand the law. Wife responded, arguing that the parties
had properly negotiated and agreed to all terms. The court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether the parties had validly entered a
consent decree.

¶4            In his prehearing statement, Husband contested the
agreement’s requirement that each party pay their separate and community
debts by challenging bank-account transactions after the community
terminated. He also argued that the parties did not mutually assent to
provisions about the distribution of retirement benefits because Wife
allegedly did not disclose her pension and 401(k). Husband also argued that
the parties lacked mutual assent over the equity in the marital residence
because, although the agreement awards Wife the property, it is silent
about how to proceed if Wife cannot refinance the home in her name.
Finally, Husband alleged that the agreement deviates from the child
support guidelines without properly explaining the deviation.

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                      SIQUEIROS v. VALENZUELA
                          Decision of the Court

¶5             The superior court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the consent decree was a valid agreement under A.R.S. § 25-317(B)
(The property terms of a separation agreement “are binding on the court
unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties
and any other relevant evidence produced by the parties, on their own
motion or on request of the court, that the separation agreement is unfair.”).
As for the retirement benefits, Husband testified that Wife did not disclose
any accounts. But Wife testified that Husband was aware of her retirement
benefits. In the consent decree, the parties checked the box reflecting that
each party waived any interest in the other party’s retirement benefits, not
the box that the parties had no retirement benefits.

¶6            As for the marital residence, Wife testified that the parties
agreed she would keep the property in exchange for Husband not having
to pay any student loans she took out while married. Husband did not
dispute this arrangement but asked the court to award him 50% of the
equity in the marital residence. The consent decree showed that the parties
would evenly split the down payment, and Wife would receive the marital
home as her sole and separate property.

¶7            Husband also testified that he was not involved in preparing
a child support worksheet, and it would not be in the children’s best
interests to waive child support. Wife testified that they agreed not to pay
child support. The consent decree reflected that neither party required child
support. Yet the worksheet showed that Husband would have owed Wife
$ 43 per month under the guidelines.

¶8            The court found Wife’s testimony credible, Husband’s
testimony not credible, and Husband’s arguments without merit. The court
also found no duress, power imbalance, or concealment of material
information. The court then found the consent decree’s terms fair and
equitable and accepted the agreement. It also noted that the parties might
negotiate a resolution or seek post-decree enforcement on any issues arising
out of terms left out of the agreement, such as what should happen if Wife
cannot refinance the home in her name. The court also awarded Wife her
attorney’s fees.

¶9           Husband appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§§ 12-2101(A)(1) and (2).

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                       SIQUEIROS v. VALENZUELA
                           Decision of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

A.   The Superior Court Did Not Err by Concluding that the Property
Terms Were Not Unfair.

¶10          Husband argues that the superior court erred by accepting the
consent decree. Husband contends that the court erred by not awarding
him 50% of the equity in the marital residence and 50% of Wife’s retirement
accounts.

¶11           “A marital separation agreement is a contract, and when a
property settlement agreement is incorporated into a decree, contract law
governs the agreement.” Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 129, ¶ 10
(App. 2019) (citations omitted). “The validity and enforceability of a
contract is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo.” Id.
“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the trial
court’s findings and determine whether there was evidence that reasonably
supports the court’s findings.” Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5
(App. 1998).

¶12           Under Rule 69, an agreement is valid and binding if it “is in
writing and signed by the parties.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. (“ARFLP”)
69(a)(1). Such an agreement “is presumed valid, and a party who challenges
the validity of an agreement has the burden to prove any defect in the
agreement.” ARFLP 69(c). The consent decree was in writing and signed by
Husband and Wife. It is presumed valid, and Husband had the burden of
proof to show otherwise. And in reviewing the consent decree, the court
was bound by it unless it found the terms were unfair. A.R.S. § 25-317(B).

¶13           Husband first argues that the court erred by awarding Wife
the marital residence because Wife allegedly did not disclose the student
loan debt she agreed to take on in exchange for the property. But Husband
does not explain how this would invalidate the agreement, and the court
found credible Wife’s testimony that Husband knew about the loans.
Husband also did not dispute the arrangement. The court did not err by
finding this agreement provision valid.

¶14           Husband also argues that the court erred because it was
inequitable not to award him 50% of Wife’s retirement account. He
contends that Wife disclosed her retirement benefits only after the parties
signed the agreement, and she “did not include the retirement accounts in
the lodged decree.” But, the court found Husband’s testimony not credible,
especially because he did not signify in the agreement that Wife had no
retirement benefits. As the court stated, “the parties confirmed the existence

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                      SIQUEIROS v. VALENZUELA
                          Decision of the Court

of retirement accounts and affirmatively waived any interest in those
accounts.” The court did not err by finding this provision valid.

¶15           The court ultimately found that the parties negotiated and
signed the agreement with no imbalance of power, duress, or other reason
that the agreement would be invalid. The court did not err by accepting the
agreement.

B.     The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Concluding
that the Consent Decree Did Not Unfairly Divide Community and
Separate Debt.

¶16           Husband argues that the court erred by not equitably
dividing separate and community debts. “[W]hen a marital separation
agreement is presented to the superior court under [A.R.S. § 25-317(B)], the
superior court must determine whether the agreement is enforceable, and
if the agreement is enforceable, determine whether it is ‘unfair.’” Buckholtz,
246 Ariz. at 128, ¶ 1.

¶17           Husband identifies debt from bank-account transactions that
occurred after the community terminated and argues that the superior
court either should have concluded that the debt was separate or equitably
divided the debt. He contends that the court abused its discretion by not
requiring Wife to reimburse Husband. The court, however, did not have to
do so because the question before the court was only whether the
agreement was enforceable or unfair. The superior court noted that a party
might file a post-decree enforcement action on the decree’s terms.

¶18         As Husband notes, the decree did not explicitly include the
bank accounts. But the decree provided that each party would pay their
community and separate debts. If Wife fails to abide by the agreement,
Husband can bring an enforcement action under Rule 91.

C.     The Superior Court Did Not Err by Ordering No Child Support.

¶19           Husband next argues that the court erred by “deviat[ing]
from the child support guidelines” without explanation. The court must
abide by the child support guidelines unless doing so would be
“inappropriate or unjust.” Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 424, ¶¶ 19–20 (App.
2017); A.R.S. § 25-320 app. (“Guidelines”) § IX.B.1. If the court deviates, it
must make written findings explaining its decision. Guidelines § IX.B.3.

¶20          Husband contends the court deviated from the guidelines,
but he does not identify what would be an appropriate amount of child

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                      SIQUEIROS v. VALENZUELA
                          Decision of the Court

support. In its order, the court found the terms of the parties’ agreement
“fair and equitable . . . and in the best interest of the minor children.” The
agreement incorporated a child support worksheet. That worksheet
demonstrated that Husband should pay Wife $ 43 per month. But the
parties agreed that neither party owed child support. Given the parties’
representations and the minor nature of the support Wife waived, the court
did not err by ordering zero child support.

D.    The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Awarding
Wife Attorney’s Fees.

¶21            The superior court awarded Wife her attorney’s fees under
Rule 69(c), which permits a court to award fees under A.R.S. § 25-324. We
review a fee award under A.R.S. § 25-324 for an abuse of discretion. Hefner
v. Hefner, 248 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 6 (App. 2019).

¶22           Husband argues the court erred by awarding Wife fees
because the “court’s entire finding was based on the false premise that the
parties actually discussed the issues Husband objected to.” But, the court
found Husband’s testimony not credible and found that the parties had
discussed the terms of their agreement. As a result, the court did not abuse
its discretion by awarding Wife the fees she incurred defending the
agreement’s validity.

                    ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶23           Both parties request their fees and costs on appeal under
A.R.S. § 25-324. Per our discretion, we award Wife her reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

                                 CONCLUSION

¶24           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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