Court Opinion

ID: 9652844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:33:28.243812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:54.560784
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
This court granted a rehearing in this case to consider a contention of the defendants that in the opinion filed February 4,1946 this court gave to § 6(f) of the interlocutory decree of the District Court of March 5, 1940 an interpretation more strict and onerous than the District Judge intended. By § 6(f) of the decree the defendants were enjoined:
“From giving to any part of their merchandise not sold by defendants, their agents or distributors, in bottles to consumers, a color imitating or resembling the color of plaintiff’s product, if or when defendants know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the purchaser thereof intends to dispense such merchandise to the consumer other than in bottles, or intends to bottle the beverage made from such product and to use on the bottles, labels or caps some extrinsic, deceiving element that in conjunction with the color imitating plaintiff’s color enables such purchaser to pass off his, her or their product for plaintiff’s product.”
We quoted this section in our opinion on the first appeal from the interlocutory decree, and approved it as an appropriate method of protecting the Coca-Cola Company from the defendants’ practice of encouraging dealers in the fountain trade to pass off defendants’ product for Coca-Cola. We held, in view of the evidence of such practice, that the District Judge was justified in enjoining the defendants, in the manner set out in the quoted section, from giving to their merchandise not sold in bottles to customers the distinctive Coca-Cola color. See 117 F.2d 352, 353, 361. There was no apparent ambiguity in the language in the section of the decree and no one questioned its meaning at the time.
The interval between the interlocutory decree and the final decree of the District Court of March 19, 1945, was consumed in the talcing of evidence on damages and profits, and in hearings before the Special Master and the District Judge. At the last hearing before the District Judge the defendants made the contention that the color injunction does not apply or should not apply unless the defendants know or in the exercise of reasonable care should know that the purchaser intends to dispense the merchandise to consumers other than in bottle in response to orders for Coca-Cola. This emendation of the text of § 6(f) of the injunction was approved by the District Judge who held that he was without authority to modify the express language of the decree but nevertheless declared that § 6(f) should be interpreted to read as follows :
“From giving to any part of their merchandise not sold by defendants, their agents or distributors, in bottles to consumers, a color imitating or resembling the color of plaintiff’s product, if or when defendants know, or in the exercise of reasonable care should know, that the purchaser thereof intends to dispense such merchandise to the consumer other than in bottles, including dispensing to customers of soda fountains, taverns, restaurants, or bar rooms, in response to filling orders from any such customers for plaintiff’s product1including orders for use of same as one of the ingredients of a mixed beverage; or intends to bottle the beverage made from defendants’ product, and to use on the bottles, labels or caps some extrinsic deceiving element that in conjunction with the color imitating plaintiff’s color enables such purchaser to pass off his, her or their product for plaintiff’s product”.
*69Obviously this interpretation lessened the protection afforded the plaintiff by the injunction as originally understood. The change may have been influenced by certain evidence presented by the defendants at the special master’s hearing tending to show that since the entry of the interlocutory decree the defendants have ceased to sell their product for distribution at soda fountains and have taken steps in connection with the distribution of their product in bars and taverns to eliminate the passing off of their product for “Coca-Cola”. We think, however, that § 6(f) of the decree of March 5, 1940, should have been enforced by the District Court in the proceeding to fix the plaintiff’s damages and should have been given the original and obvious meaning attributed to it in the first opinion of this court. Accordingly, we hold that upon the remand of the case in accordance with our last opinion the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to present evidence of violations of the decree as so interpreted. This evidence may be presented in conformity with the ruling that the plaintiff should be given permission to present evidence of illegal acts by the defendants either in the present proceeding or under a supplemental bill as the District Judge in his discretion may determine; but it is not intended that the plaintiff shall be given leave to reopen the case in any respect as to which the opportunity to present evidence has been heretofore accorded in the District Court.
It should, however, be borne in mind that we are dealing in this case with a continuing decree of injunction which, under the established rule, the District Court has power to modify when changed conditions justify such action. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999. We do not intend by anything said herein to restrict the District Court in the exercise of the power to reconsider the terms of the injunction in this case. It is conceivable that some change should be made with respect to the future conduct of the defendants’ business; but the rights of the parties prior to such modification should be determined in accordance with the terms of the original decree as approved by this court and no modification of the decree should be made until the parties have been given an opportunity to present evidence and to be heard with respect to the propriety of the modification.

 Italics inserted.