Court Opinion

ID: 9654404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:19:14.239505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:07.235982
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) lab report is testimonial, I believe that Caulfield’s failure *318to request the BCA analyst’s testimony constitutes a valid waiver of his . Sixth Amendment right to confront that analyst in court. Minnesota Statutes § 634.15 (2004) adequately guards a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation. The majority argues that a defendant must receive notice of the likely consequences of failing to request the preparer’s testimony before confrontation rights may be waived.1 This additional safeguard, however desirable, is not required by either the statute or the United States Constitution.
I begin with the observation that this question has had relatively little attention, and there are few decisions on point, with none from our court. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has provided some guidance with respect to this issue.
“[T]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver.” New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114, 120 S.Ct. 659, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991)). “What suffices for waiver depends on the nature of the right at issue.” Id. In order for a defendant to waive his right to confront witnesses against him, there must be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968).
The issue, then, is whether Caulfield’s failure to request the BCA analyst’s testimony under section 634.15 can be characterized as an “intentional relinquishment” of a “known right.” Under Supreme Court precedent, I would answer that question in the affirmative.
Caulfield’s failure to request the BCA analyst’s testimony can be construed as an “intentional relinquishment” of his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court has held that a waiver of a constitutional right need not be explicit. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345-46, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970).2 There is no constitutional requirement, then, that every waiver of a constitutional right must be affirmatively conceded by the defendant on the record. Since we presume that members of society are acquainted with the law, State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 615 (2005), when defendants choose not to exercise their right to confront the BCA analyst under section 634.15, I believe that right is relinquished.
The Supreme Court has also held that a constitutional right may not be waived unless it is a “known right or privilege.” Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318. But the Court has not required defendants to have complete knowledge of their rights *319in order to effectuate a valid waiver. For example, in Taylor v. United States, the defendant failed to return to his trial after a lunch recess. 414 U.S. at 17, 94 S.Ct. 194. The district court continued with the defendant’s trial, despite his inability to testify and confront witnesses against him. The Supreme Court held that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights, noting that, “[i]t is wholly incredible to suggest that petitioner * * * entertained any doubts about his right to be present at every stage of his trial.” Id. at 20, 94 S.Ct. 194. The Court did not require that the defendant demonstrate knowledge of, let alone affirmatively state, the precise constitutional right he was waiving.3
Similar reasoning can be applied to MinmStat. § 634.15. The statute clearly states that the results of a laboratory analysis authorized by the BCA are admissible into evidence. Minn.Stat. § 634.15, subd. 1(a) (2004). The statute provides that the defendant may cross-examine the analyst at trial “by notifying the prosecuting attorney at least ten days before the trial” of the defendant’s intention. Id. subd. 2(a). The clear and necessary consequence of failing to give the statutory notice to the prosecution is that the analyst will not be available for cross-examination. It is “wholly incredible” that Caulfield “entertained any doubts” that the analyst would not be a prosecution witness at trial, after Caulfield failed to give notice under the statute. Minnesota Statutes § 634.15, as written, provides a defendant with adequate notice under the Constitution, to voluntarily relinquish his right to confront the analyst.
As a matter of policy and court rule, I would not disagree that a more detailed waiver of the confrontation right is desirable, and there are procedures available that may lead to the adoption of just such a rule. But I conclude that by failing to request the analyst’s testimony as provided by Minn.Stat. § 634.15, Caulfield waived his constitutional right to confront the analyst, and, therefore his conviction should be upheld.

. The majority also states that defendants must be advised of the actual contents of a BCA report in order for waiver to be valid. Because the appellant has not argued that he did not receive a copy of the report, this requirement is not before us and I therefore address only the notice issue in this dissent.

. The Supreme Court has found nonexplicit waivers of confrontation rights in several contexts. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (finding waiver where defendant voluntarily absented himself from courtroom); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (finding waiver where defendant's conduct caused his expulsion from courtroom); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878) (finding waiver where defendant procured witness’s unavailability). While these examples involve defendant misconduct and are not directly comparable with the facts before us, section 634.15 provides a mechanism through which the defendant may choose or not choose to confront the witness; this is greater protection than that granted to defendants in misconduct circumstances, where the defendants were almost certainly not considering their trial rights.

. While the defendant’s misconduct in Taylor makes the case distinguishable, the broader proposition is that waivers may be effectuated in many different ways, depending on the right and the context in which that right arises. I do not suggest, for example, that in the guilty plea context, a silent record might be sufficient to waive all trial rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). A BCA analyst's testimony, while important, arises in an evidentiary context, which lacks the same finality as a guilty plea. Section 634.15 adequately safeguards defendants’ rights in those circumstances.