Court Opinion

ID: 9957022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:05:40.241517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:02.935341
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                     ROBERT JOSEPH GOLDSMITH,
                             Appellant,

                                      v.

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,
                                Appellee.

                  Nos. 4D2022-1632 and 4D2022-2863

                               [April 3, 2024]

   Consolidated appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial
Circuit, Broward County; John J. Murphy, III, Judge; L.T. Case Nos. 17-
000368CF10A and 07-013734CF10A.

   Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Robert Porter, Assistant Public
Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

   Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sorraya M. Solages-
Jones, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GERBER, J.

    The defendant appeals from his convictions and sentences after a jury
found him guilty of one count of delivery of cocaine and two counts of
third-degree felony murder. The defendant also appeals from those
offenses having been used as the primary basis for the revocation of his
community control probation and ensuing sentence on prior convictions.

   The defendant argues the circuit court reversibly erred in three
respects, by: (1) denying the defendant’s motion for mistrial after the state,
over defense objection, used a testifying police officer to improperly bolster
the state’s confidential informant’s credibility, by vouching for the
informant’s past credibility; (2) trying the defendant to a six-member,
rather than a twelve-member, jury; and (3) imposing certain investigative
costs and supplemental prosecution costs on his new convictions, where
competent substantial evidence did not support these costs and/or the
appropriate agency did not request the costs.
   The first argument constitutes harmless error under the facts here, as
we will explain below. The defendant’s second argument has been rejected
in Guzman v. State, 350 So. 3d 72, 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), review denied,
No. SC22-1597, 2023 WL 3830251 (Fla. June 6, 2023). The defendant’s
third argument regarding the costs has merit, as we will explain below.
Thus, we affirm the defendant’s new convictions and ensuing sentences,
and affirm the revocation of the defendant’s community control probation
and ensuing sentences on his prior convictions. However, we reverse that
portion of the defendant’s sentences regarding the costs on his new
convictions. We remand for the circuit court to assess the proper
prosecution costs and to determine whether to assess the subject
investigation costs.

      Harmless Error in Allowing a Testifying Police Officer to
      Vouch for the Confidential Informant’s Past Credibility

   The defendant and the state commendably have agreed on a brief
recitation of the record facts leading to the issue on appeal regarding a
testifying officer vouching for the confidential informant’s past credibility.

   The police used the informant to arrange a $100 crack cocaine
purchase from the defendant. The informant made several phone calls
and sent several text messages to the defendant in which they discussed
the deal and where they would meet to conduct the transaction. The
informant and the defendant eventually settled on conducting the
transaction behind an apartment complex.

   Immediately before the transaction was to occur, the police searched
the informant, and he did not already possess any drugs or money. The
police outfitted the informant with a recording device, and provided him
$100 for the transaction. The police told the informant to say “good deal”
after the transaction was complete to signal the police waiting nearby to
descend upon the scene and arrest the defendant.

   After the transaction occurred, the informant gave the “good deal”
signal. The informant immediately met with the police waiting nearby and
gave them a bag containing crack cocaine. The police searched the
informant, who no longer had the $100 provided to make the purchase.

   Meanwhile, other officers on the scene closed in on the defendant, who
was in his vehicle. The defendant drove his vehicle away at a high rate of
speed, but quickly crashed the vehicle into a nearby canal, where the
vehicle became submerged. The defendant was able to get out of the
vehicle and swim to shore. When the police asked the defendant if

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anybody else was inside the vehicle, the defendant initially was evasive.
But the defendant then told police that two friends were inside the vehicle.
At that point, several officers jumped into the canal and tried to rescue the
two people inside the vehicle, but they could not get inside the vehicle.
Fire rescue divers arrived on scene soon afterwards, but also could not get
inside the vehicle. Eventually, a tow truck pulled the vehicle out of the
water, and the two victims’ deceased bodies were discovered inside. The
medical examiner’s autopsy determined both victims had drowned.

   The state charged the defendant with one count of delivery of cocaine
and two counts of third degree felony murder. Those charges also served
as the state’s basis to charge the defendant with violating his community
control probation on prior convictions.

   Having presented that factual background, we now turn to the trial
testimony which led to the issue on appeal, when one of the police officers
vouched for the informant’s past credibility for purposes of this case.

   The officer testified the informant had worked for the police for three
years, and the officer had served as the informant’s handler. The state
asked the officer: “If an informant is later determined to not be reliable,
what happens to that informant?” The officer testified: “He is no longer
going to be used.” The state then asked: “[D]uring the time that [the
informant] had been a[n] … informant while you were in the [u]nit, was he
determined to be credible and reliable with the information he would bring
to you?” The officer testified: “Absolutely.”

   Defense counsel objected to this testimony as bolstering and moved for
a mistrial. At sidebar, defense counsel argued: “That is solely the [j]ury’s
job, to determine the reliability of a[n] [informant], not the [officer] to testify
about that.” The circuit court overruled defense counsel’s objection and
denied the mistrial motion.

    During the state’s rebuttal closing argument, the state asked the jury
to “trust what [the informant] did that day.” However, the state then also
noted: “[I]t’s on video, so you don’t have to take [the informant] at his
word, it also comes from the [d]efendant’s own mouth, his admissions.”
The state then remarked: “[The officer] testified that, … if they get bad
information from a[n] … informant, they don’t use that informant
anymore. They don’t try to cover it up by charging someone with a crime.”
The state then again noted: “The crime happened, it’s on video.”

   As indicated above, the defendant’s appeal argues the circuit court
erred in denying the mistrial motion after the state, over defense objection,

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had used the officer to improperly bolster the informant’s credibility by
vouching for the informant’s past credibility. The defendant adds the state
compounded the error by improperly bolstering the informant’s credibility
again during its rebuttal closing argument. Anticipating the state’s answer
brief might argue that any error was harmless, the defendant’s initial brief
argues the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
did not contribute to the verdict.

    The state’s answer brief indeed responds: “In the event such evidence
crossed the line, the error was harmless since, in addition to the video and
audio evidence of the transaction, [the defendant] admitted to selling
cocaine to the informant and driving the vehicle into the canal, which led
to the victims’ deaths.”

   Our standard of review is abuse of discretion, limited by the rules of
evidence. Shermer v. State, 16 So. 3d 261, 265 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
Applying that standard of review, we conclude the circuit court erred in
overruling defense counsel’s bolstering objection. However, we conclude
the error was indeed harmless, and therefore affirm the circuit court’s
denial of the mistrial motion.

   “[I]mproper vouching or bolstering [of witness testimony] occurs when
the State places the prestige of the government behind the witness or
indicates that information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s
testimony.” Jackson v. State, 147 So. 3d 469, 486 (Fla. 2014) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “It is elemental in our system of jurisprudence
that the jury is the sole arbiter of the credibility of witnesses. Thus, it is
an invasion of the jury’s exclusive province for one witness to offer his
personal view on the credibility of a fellow witness.” Boatwright v. State,
452 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (internal citations omitted).

    Jennings v. State, 294 So. 3d 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020), on which the
defendant relies, is instructive. We held a circuit court presiding over a
delivery of cocaine trial had erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection
to a detective’s testimony that the detective had “found the informant to
be reliable in the past.” Id. at 380. In concluding the error was harmful,
we reasoned: “The jury may have dismissed any potential misgivings
about the informant’s credibility based on the lead detective’s opinion that
the informant has been reliable in the past.” Id. at 382. We further
reasoned the “improper vouching was especially harmful because it came
from a police officer,” and “the harm was enhanced when the informant
whose credibility was bolstered was the only person within close proximity
to the seller in the transaction.” Id.

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    Similarly, in Page v. State, 733 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), on
which the defendant also relies, a police officer testified he had worked
with an informant for a year-and-a-half before the drug buy at issue and
“[e]verything he did for us was very trustworthy and reliable.” Id. at 1081.
Defense counsel objected, arguing this testimony improperly bolstered the
informant’s credibility. Id. The circuit court overruled the objection. Id.
In concluding harmful error had occurred, we reasoned: “It is especially
harmful for a police witness to give [an] opinion of a witness[’s] credibility
because of the great weight afforded an officer’s testimony. This is all the
more significant when the witness whose credibility is bolstered is the only
eye witness to testify about the transaction.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

   Turning to the instant case, however, as we had noted in Jennings:
“Improper bolstering is subject to harmless error analysis.” 294 So. 3d at
382. And unlike the facts in Jennings and Page, the facts here indeed
render the circuit court’s error in overruling the bolstering objection as
harmless. As the state’s answer brief responds:

         Admittedly, [the officer’s] isolated response that the
      informant was credible and reliable in the past appears
      improper in light of … Jennings … and Page … upon which
      [the defendant] relies.       However, those cases are
      distinguishable because any error that may have occurred in
      this case was harmless in the face of … [the defendant’s]
      admissions as well as video and audio evidence.

         … [I]n Page, the error was reversible because the informant
      was the sole witness to testify about the drug transaction
      since audio to law enforcement was lost when defendant drove
      informant to a different location. 733 So. 2d at 1080-81.
      Likewise, in Jennings, the witness informant was the only
      [person] in close proximity to the transaction. 294 So. 3d at
      382.

         In stark contrast, [the instant defendant] admitted to
      [police] selling the crack cocaine to the informant. He likewise
      admitted to driving the vehicle with the victims into the canal.
      Officers witnessed [the defendant] drive the vehicle into the
      canal. Audio and video recordings of the entire transaction,
      including [the defendant’s] attempt to flee which led to the
      victims’ deaths were also in evidence. Additionally, the
      informant did not return with the money [which law
      enforcement had] provided [him] for the transaction but did
      return with crack cocaine. The cocaine in question was

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      admitted into evidence. Moreover, it was undisputed that the
      victims died from drowning due to [the defendant’s] actions.

         … [F]aced with the above evidence, there was no possibility
      that the [officer’s brief and isolated] comment contributed to
      the verdicts in this case. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d
      1129, 1138 (Fla. 1986). … Cf. Lopez v. State, 711 So. 2d 563,
      564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“[T]he informant’s credibility vel non
      played no role in the conviction. The State based its case on
      evidence of Lopez’s constructive possession of the cocaine
      found in the vehicle and the bedroom closet; it did not rely on
      testimony by the informant or on any information furnished
      by him.      Further, the detective’s testimony about the
      informant was not a feature of the trial and was not again
      brought to the jury’s attention. Any error in this regard was
      harmless.”) (citation omitted)).

(internal record citations omitted).

    Further, contrary to the defendant’s assertion here, the state did not
“improperly bolster the informant’s credibility again during its rebuttal
closing argument.” As the state’s answer brief responds, its rebuttal
closing reference to the officer’s testimony “that, … if they get bad
information from a[n] … informant, they don’t use that informant
anymore,” spoke directly to the evidence, i.e., the officer’s testimony. As
for the state’s directive to the jury to “trust what [the informant] did that
day,” as the state’s answer brief further responds:

         The jury did not have to consider the non-testifying
      informant’s credibility because it had [the defendant’s] own
      admission as well as the video and audio evidence. See, e.g.,
      U.S. v. Granville, 716 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1983) (“When
      the prosecutor voices a personal opinion but indicates this
      belief is based on evidence in the record, the comment does
      not require a new trial.”)[.]

   Based on the foregoing conclusion of harmless error, we affirm the
circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s mistrial motion.

     Reversible Error in Imposing Certain Investigative Costs and
                  Supplemental Prosecution Costs

   Section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2021), pertinently provides:

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      (1) In all criminal and violation-of-probation or community-
      control cases, convicted persons are liable for payment of the
      costs of prosecution, including investigative costs incurred
      by law enforcement agencies, … if requested by such
      agencies. …

      ….

      (4) Any dispute as to the proper amount or type of costs shall
      be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.
      The burden of demonstrating the amount of costs
      incurred is on the state attorney.            The burden of
      demonstrating the financial resources of the defendant and
      the financial needs of the defendant is on the defendant.

      ….

      (8) Costs for the state attorney must be set in all cases at no
      less than $50 per case when a misdemeanor or criminal traffic
      offense is charged and no less than $100 per case when a
      felony offense is charged, including a proceeding in which the
      underlying offense is a violation of probation or community
      control. The court may set a higher amount upon a
      showing of sufficient proof of higher costs incurred. …

§ 938.27(1), (4), (8), Fla. Stat. (2021) (emphases added).

   Regarding prosecution costs, as we stated in Taylor v. State, 352 So.
3d 346 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022):

         To set a higher amount [than the minimum amount for
      which section 938.27 provides], the state attorney must
      demonstrate the amount spent on prosecuting the defendant
      and the trial court must consider the defendant’s financial
      resources.

          When a trial court imposes a prosecution cost above the
      statutory minimum, but sufficient proof is not shown, the cost
      is stricken.

Id. at 349 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

  Applying that holding to Taylor’s facts, where “no record evidence
support[ed]” the above-the-statutory-minimum prosecution cost imposed

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by the trial court, we “reverse[d] the trial court’s denial of the [Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure] 3.800(b) motion on this issue and remand[ed] the
case to the trial court to assess the proper prosecution cost.” Id. (citing
Desrosiers v. State, 286 So. 3d 297, 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (reversing
trial court’s denial of motion to correct sentencing error and remanding for
factual findings to support the imposition of costs above the statutory
minimums)).

   Here, as the defendant’s initial brief submits:

         [T]he State requested $820.95 in supplemental
      [prosecution] costs … but[—as the defendant asserted in his
      unsuccessful Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 3.800(b)
      motion—the record does not reflect the State] present[ed] any
      evidence at the sentencing hearing or at any other time to
      justify any amount of cost of prosecution above the statutory
      minimum. Therefore, it was error for th[e] [trial] [c]ourt to
      grant the State’s request and impose the supplement[al
      [prosecution] costs ….

(internal citation omitted).

   Accordingly, as in Taylor, we reverse on this argument and remand for
the circuit court to assess the proper prosecution cost. 352 So. 3d at 349.

   Regarding investigative costs, as we also stated in Taylor:

         “The burden of demonstrating the amount of [investigation]
      costs incurred is on the state attorney.” § 938.27(4), Fla. Stat.
      (2021). Where the State does not introduce competent
      substantial evidence to meet its burden, Florida courts have
      routinely struck the cost of investigation. See, e.g., Negron v.
      State, 266 So. 3d 1266, 1267 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019).

         Furthermore, section 938.27(1), Florida Statutes (2021),
      provides a defendant must pay investigation costs only if the
      agency [which] incurs that cost requests it. Prosecutors are
      not authorized to request costs on behalf of an agency without
      that agency’s request. See Lippwe v. State, 152 So. 3d 782,
      783 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (“We also point out that ‘investigative
      fees’ that are not ‘costs for the state attorney’ ... must be
      requested on the record by the appropriate agency.”). But
      investigation costs “need not be supported by evidence if the

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      defendant affirmatively agrees to pay the requested amount.”
      Icon v. State, 322 So. 3d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

352 So. 3d at 349.

   Here, both sets of investigative costs were erroneously imposed for two
reasons: (1) the record does not reflect that the appropriate agency or
agencies requested the investigative costs; and (2) competent substantial
evidence does not support the investigative costs.

   The state’s answer brief argues competent substantial evidence existed
to support these costs, because the circuit court’s costs orders stated:
“[D]ocumentation was either shown or there was agreement.” However, as
the defendant’s reply brief submits, given the absence of any record
documentation supporting the costs or the defendant’s agreement to the
costs, the orders’ language is clearly erroneous.

   Thus, as in Taylor, we reverse on this argument and remand for the
circuit court to determine whether to assess the subject investigation
costs. See id.

                               Conclusion

   Based on the foregoing, we affirm the defendant’s new convictions and
ensuing sentences, and affirm the revocation of the defendant’s
community control probation and ensuing sentences on his prior
convictions. However, we reverse that portion of the defendant’s sentences
regarding the costs on his new convictions. We remand for the circuit
court to assess the proper prosecution costs and to determine whether to
assess the subject investigation costs.

   Convictions and revocation of community control probation affirmed;
sentences affirmed in part and reversed in part; remanded with
instructions.

GROSS and CONNER, JJ., concur.

                           *        *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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