Court Opinion

ID: 9659290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:38:04.752878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.860459
License: Public Domain

*755SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 64. (dissenting). I disagree with the majority opinion on two grounds:
¶ 65. First, the majority opinion errs in refusing to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers in the defendant's home. I conclude there is no nexus in the warrant application in this case between the defendant's home and the defendant's drug-dealing activities to establish probable cause to search the home.1
¶ 66. Second, the majority opinion errs in refusing to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers who failed to comply with the constitutionally based rule of announcement. I would not adopt the majority opinion’s exception to the exclusionary rule.
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¶ 67. I approach the question of probable cause to issue a search warrant for a drug dealer's home with the following basic principles in mind.
¶ 68. A moving force behind the enactment of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was to prohibit the government from conducting indiscriminate general searches.2 Accordingly, a crucial element *756in evaluating a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment is whether it is reasonable to believe that the item to be seized will be found in the place to be searched, here a home.3 "Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed."4
¶ 69. Before issuing a warrant a magistrate must be "apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the place to be searched." State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 980, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). Our duty as a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, giving deference to the magistrate's conclusion and accepting reasonable inferences to sustain the issuance of a warrant. Id. " '[T]he fact that there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime does not automatically give the police probable cause to search his house for evidence of that crime' "5
¶ 70. Applying these principles to the majority opinion, I conclude that, for big drug dealers, the majority has abandoned the rule that a magistrate must be apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought would be found in the place to be searched. The majority opinion has, instead, adopted a blanket general rule, a per se rule, that if a magistrate determines *757probable cause to believe that a person is a dealer in significant quantities of drugs6 then it automatically follows there is probable cause to issue a warrant to search that person's home. Majority op. at ¶ 36.7
¶ 71. The State does not claim that the affidavit in support of the application for a search warrant in this case contained any direct evidence that the defendant had sold drugs out of his home or that any illegal items had been spotted there. The majority's decision upholding the issuance of the warrant apparently rests on two pieces of evidence. The first piece of evidence is that the defendant supplied drugs to other dealers. From this fact, the majority opinion states that the magistrate could conclude that the defendant was probably a "big" drug dealer.
¶ 72. The second piece of evidence is that an informant drug dealer referred to the defendant as "Lance on Royce." The city tax records, examined by a law enforcement officer, confirmed that Lance Ward owned a house at 1663 Royce Street. Neither the informant's reference to the street where the defendant *758lived or the city tax records giving the defendant's exact home address suggest that drugs were sold from the defendant's home.
¶ 73. Thus the majority's holding that there was probable cause to believe the drugs were in the defendant's home does not rest on any specific evidence in the record tying the drugs to the home. Rather the majority's holding rests on the supposition that a magistrate may reasonably conclude, unless there is evidence to the contrary, that every drug dealer suspected of dealing in significant quantities of drugs keeps the drugs at home.
¶ 74. I conclude that the majority's holding is once again creating a drug exception to the Fourth Amendment "based on the 'culture' surrounding a general category of criminal behavior," contrary to Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 392 (1997). The U.S. Supreme Court in Richards overturned this court's blanket per se rule that all drug dealers may be presumed armed and that therefore no-knock entries to the home are justified in felony drug searches.
¶ 75. The general per se drug exception the majority creates today, allowing searches of the homes of "big" drug dealers, is subject to the same two criticisms that the U.S. Supreme Court leveled against the generalization about drug dealers that this court adopted in Richards. First, the majority opinion's new rule that "big" drug dealers keep drugs in their homes contains considerable overgeneralization. The Richards case, 520 U.S. at 393, condemned a similar generalization about drug dealers and arms. While "big" drug dealers may frequently keep drugs (or arms) in their homes, not every "big" drug dealer does so.
¶ 76. Second, the majority opinion's categorical rule that "big" drug dealers keep drugs in their homes *759"can, relatively easily, be applied to others." In Richards, 520 U.S. 394, the Supreme Court condemned this court's categorical rule on drug dealers and arms on the grounds that the generalization could be applied to many crimes and thus undercut the Fourth Amendment requirement that individualized grounds to search a place be demonstrated.
¶ 77. If we follow the majority opinion's reasoning to its "common sense" conclusion, one can assume that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, every drug dealer (big, medium or small) and further everyone engaged in criminal activity (drugs or otherwise), keeps evidence of the criminal activity at home. This "common sense” reasoning swallows the Fourth Amendment requirement that applications for warrants must demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the item to be seized will be found in the place specified to be searched. "If a per se exception were allowed for each category," the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant application must demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that the item to be seized will be found in the place to be searched "would be meaningless." Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.
¶ 78. I do not join the majority opinion because it substitutes a generalization, a per se rule, for the constitutional requirement that a nexus must appear in the warrant application between the place to be searched and the drug-dealing activities to establish probable cause to search the place specified. In sum, the majority opinion does not give adequate consideration to the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home against indiscriminate general searches.
*760II
¶ 79. The majority opinion errs m adopting an exception to the exclusionary rule to refuse to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers who failed to comply with the constitutionally based rule of announcement.
¶ 80. The exclusionary rule prevents evidence that has been seized in violation of an accused's statutory or constitutional rights from being admitted into evidence. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 347 (1987). The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Leon case held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by law enforcement officers acting on objectively reasonable reliance upon a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate when the warrant was ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. 468 U.S. at 926.
¶ 81. The majority opinion does not adopt the Leon "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. The Leon good faith exception has been strongly criticized by state courts and commentators.8 Indeed the *761majority opinion studiously avoids citing Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the leading good faith case, and even steers clear of using the words "good faith." The majority opinion uses the words "good faith" only nine times, in six instances referring to other writers' use of the words (twice referring to the State's argument, twice referring to a U.S. Supreme Court holding,9 and twice quoting from a case from the Vermont Supreme Court).10
¶ 82. Instead of relying on Leon, the majority opinion relies on Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), a *762"Leon-based decision."11 In Krull, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule would not apply to evidence seized by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches; after the search and seizure in that case the statute was held unconstitutional as violating the Fourth Amendment.
¶ 83. Krull sweeps broadly and authorizes the use of evidence seized in a whole class of unconstitutional searches, that is, those conducted pursuant to a statutory enactment which is later declared unconstitutional. The Krull rule means that an appellate court need not review each case falling within the class. In contrast, the Leon case deals with a single unconstitutional judicial authorization of a particular search under particular circumstances; an appellate court reviews each warrant to determine whether that case falls within the Leon "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Because of the sweeping reach of Krull, commentators and courts have found the Krull rule more problematic than the Leon rule.
¶ 84. Professor LaFave, for example, views the Krull rule as even more objectionable than Leon.12
¶ 85. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who agreed with Leon, dissented along with three of her colleagues in Krull (a 5-4 decision). The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected the Krull rule. That court reasoned that the Krull rule provides a grace period in which constitutional rights may be violated with impunity; the grace period can last for several years and can affect large numbers of people. The Illinois Supreme Court *763concluded that "this is simply too high a price for our citizens to pay."13
¶ 86. Neither Krull nor Leon confronts the fact situation presented in this case: an officer seizes evidence; an unconstitutional decision of a court authorizes the search. The majority opinion thus extends an exception to the exclusionary rule beyond Krull and Leon. I would not do so.
¶ 87. This court should be more cautious in adopting exceptions to the exclusionary rule in light of the history of the exclusionary rule in this state. The Wisconsin Supreme Court was one of the first in the nation to adopt the exclusionary rule.14 State v. Hoyer, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1923), was decided almost 40 years before Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), obliged this court to adopt the exclusionary rule. This early adoption of the exclusionary rule demonstrates this state's commitment to protecting the privacy of its citizens which this court should not rush to diminish.15
¶ 88. Although the majority opinion asserts that its "decision will affect only a narrow band of cases arising between State v. Richards and Richards [v. Wisconsin]," majority op. at ¶ 45, I fear that the major*764ity opinion has broader implications. The majority opinion applies to any published decision of the court of appeals or this court authorizing a search when the decision is later declared unconstitutional. The majority opinion rendered today also removes much of the incentive for an accused to challenge a search or seizure that is authorized by a published decision of this court or the court of appeals. The accused would not get an effective remedy in the very case in which he or she successfully challenged a decision, because the evidence seized would be admissible under the exception adopted by the majority opinion today.
¶ 89. What does this majority opinion mean for the future of the exclusionary rule in Wisconsin? What is the status of the good faith exception in Wisconsin? Who knows? The majority isn't telling.16
¶ 90. For the reasons stated, I do not join the majority opinion's extension of the Krull rule to the present case. The majority opinion errs in refusing to suppress evidence seized by law enforcement officers who failed to comply with the constitutionally based rule of announcement.
¶ 91. I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this dissent and JUSTICE DAVID T. PROSSER joins Part I of this dissent.

 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 and n.21 (1980) (describing historical circumstances leading to the enactment of the Fourth Amendment).

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 n.6 (1978).

 State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 195-96, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998).

State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 995, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991) (quoting United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982)).

 The majority does not describe how to distinguish between "significant" and "insignificant" quantities of drugs.

 The majority appears to deny this holding. It states at ¶ 36 that it is "not suggesting that when there is sufficient evidence to identify an individual as a drug dealer. . .that there is sufficient evidence to search the suspect's house." It goes on to state: "In this case, the affidavit identifies one address in Beloit and two individuals who both deal drugs in volume." I do not understand how this cryptic sentence provides law enforcement officers, magistrates, circuit courts or the court of appeals with any guidance in deciding when an application to search the home of a drug dealer of significant quantities of drugs sufficiently connects the illegal activities to the home to be searched when the only information is that the person is a big drug dealer and lives on a specified street.

 In the fifteen years since the Leon case was decided, at least twelve states have rejected the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule as incompatible with their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992); People v. Sellars, 394 N.W.2d 133 (Mich. App. 1986), appeal denied, 441 Mich. 867, 494 N.W.2d 495 (1986); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d 1097 (N.H. 1995); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991); State v. Taylor, 1987 WL 25417 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State *761v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt. 1991); State v. Crawley, 808 P.2d 773 (Wash. App. 1991).
The majority opinion discusses and relies on State v. Oakes and State v. Guzman (majority op. at ¶ 58), but does not acknowledge that both these cases reject the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Another two states have rejected the good faith exception as impermissible under state statutory grounds. Gary v. State, 422 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. 1992); Imo v. State, 826 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Several states have expressed reservations about the good faith exception, although their highest courts have not specifically rejected it. See, e.g., State v. Rothman, 779 P.2d 1, 8 (Haw. 1989) (Hawaii has not yet adopted good faith exception); State v. Martinez, 411 N.W.2d 209, 149 (Ct. App. Minn. 1998) (Minnesota has not yet adopted good faith exception).
Several state courts have adopted the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under their own state constitutions. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 641 So. 2d 840 (Ala. 1994); Jackson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1987); State v. Brown, 708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).

See majority op. at ¶¶ 50-51 (referring to Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. at 346).

 See majority op. at ¶ 58, quoting State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119, 122 (Vt. 1991).

 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(h) at 97 (3d ed. 1996).

 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 1.3(h) at 98 (3d ed. 1996).

People v. Wright, 697 N.E.24 693, 697 (Ill. 1998), quoting People v. Krueger 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996).

See State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 523, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973)(noting the court's early adoption of the exclusionary rule).

 For a more developed discussion of State v. Hoyer and its implication for this court's adoption of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see Justice Prosser's concurring opinion in State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 604 N.W.2d 543, of even date. I join that part of Justice Prosser's concurrence in Orta relating to Hoyer and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

I raise the issue of what constitutes reliance in objective good faith on a pronouncement of this court in my dissent in State v. Orta, 2000 WI 4, 231 Wis. 2d 782, 604 N.W.2d 543, of even date.