Court Opinion

ID: 9394427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 14:02:34.809701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.181874
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1220    Document: 43     Page: 1   Filed: 05/15/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                   CHARLES FLYNN,
                      Petitioner

                             v.

                DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
                        Respondent
                  ______________________

                        2022-1220
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. DC-4324-21-0367-I-1.
                 ______________________

                  Decided: May 15, 2023
                  ______________________

     BRIAN J. LAWLER, Pilot Law, PC, San Diego, CA, argued
 for petitioner.

     MARGARET JANTZEN, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, argued for respondent. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, CLAUDIA BURKE, PATRICIA M.
 MCCARTHY.
                   ______________________

    Before LOURIE, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1220    Document: 43      Page: 2    Filed: 05/15/2023

 2                             FLYNN   v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 HUGHES, Circuit Judge.
      Charles Flynn appeals the final decision of the Merit
 Systems Protection Board denying his request for differen-
 tial pay for his military service in the Army Reserve. Be-
 cause our holdings in Adams v. Department of Homeland
 Security, 3 F.4th 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2021) and Nordby v. Social
 Security Administration, No. 21-2280 (Fed. Cir. May 11,
 2023) dictate that the entitlement to differential pay under
 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a) and 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)(B) requires
 the employee to serve in a contingency operation, we af-
 firm.
                               I
      The facts and procedural history of this appeal largely
 mirror those laid out in Nordby. In Nordby, the federal em-
 ployee was activated under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to serve in
 the military. Upon conclusion of his service, he requested
 differential pay to make up the difference between the mil-
 itary and civilian compensation. The agency denied the re-
 quest, determining that military service under 10 U.S.C.
 § 12301(d) does not qualify for differential pay under 5
 U.S.C. § 5538. The Board affirmed.
     Similarly, Mr. Flynn was employed by the United
 States Department of State as a Special Agent in the Bu-
 reau of Diplomatic Security. He also served as Lieutenant
 Colonel in the United States Army Reserve. From March
 2020 to March 2022, he performed active duty under 10
 U.S.C. § 12301 (d) at the Office of Military Commissions at
 the Pentagon, providing support on a variety of legal is-
 sues. For this duty period, he requested differential pay
 from the agency. The agency denied his request, determin-
 ing that those called to voluntary active duty pursuant to
 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) are not entitled to differential pay un-
 der 5 U.S.C. § 5538(a). He appealed the decision to the
 Merit Systems Protection Board. The Board affirmed, hold-
 ing that he was not entitled to differential pay as a matter
Case: 22-1220     Document: 43      Page: 3   Filed: 05/15/2023

 FLYNN   v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE                              3

 of law because his activation orders under 10 U.S.C.
 § 12301(d) did not qualify as a contingency operation, for
 which differential pay could be awarded under 5 U.S.C
 §5538.
     Mr. Flynn now appeals.
                               II
     We set aside the Board’s decision only if it is “(1) arbi-
 trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). Legal conclusions by the Board are reviewed de
 novo. Wrocklage v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 769 F.3d 1363,
 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
                              III
     Mr. Flynn concedes that our holding in Adams affects
 the outcome of this case. Pet. Br. vi, 4–5. He dedicates all
 of his argument to challenging Adams and does not purport
 to show how his activation under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) war-
 rants a different outcome from that of Adams. He also con-
 cedes that the petitioners in Nordby raise the same
 question: whether federal employees activated under 10
 U.S.C. § 12301(d) are entitled to differential pay under 5
 U.S.C. § 5538(a). Pet. Br. vi, 5.
     The factual and procedural similarities between
 Nordby and this case compel us to reach the same outcome
 here. To receive differential pay, an employee “must have
 served pursuant to a call to active duty that meets the stat-
 utory definition of contingency operation.” Adams, 3 F.4th
 at 1378; Nordby, No. 21-2280. slip op. at 4. And for volun-
 tary activation under 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d) to qualify as a
 contingency operation, “there must be a connection be-
 tween the voluntary military service and the declared na-
 tional emergency.” Nordby, No. 21-2280. slip op. at 5. But
 Mr. Flynn has not alleged any connection between his
Case: 22-1220    Document: 43      Page: 4   Filed: 05/15/2023

 4                            FLYNN   v. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

 service and an ongoing national emergency, and thus failed
 to demonstrate that his voluntary, active service under 10
 U.S.C. § 12301(d) met the statutory definition of a contin-
 gency operation. Accordingly, we hold that the Board
 properly denied differential pay and affirm the decision of
 the Board.
                       AFFIRMED
                           COSTS
 No costs.