Court Opinion

ID: 9578154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:42:13.309506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:55.833095
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I am in agreement with the general principle set out in the majority opinion — i. e., that, “[ajbsent an express provision in the lease establishing the tenant’s liability for loss from negligently started fires, the trend has been to find that the insurance obtained was for the mutual benefit of both parties, and that the tenant ‘stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited purpose of defeating a subrogation claim.’ ”
However, here the parties chose to include an express provision establishing the tenant’s liability for fires caused by the tenant’s own negligence. The majority cites no opinions in which the court has held that the general principle overrules such an express provision, and I would not allow it to do so here. In my opinion, the public policy considerations involved here are not so overwhelming that the parties ought not to be allowed to contract for a different result according to their own preferences; but the majority’s treatment of the language here makes this well-nigh impossible.1
My view might be different were this lease a product of a disparity of bargaining power, or similar to a contract of adhesion; but no such claim is made here, and properly so, as neither party can be characterized as unsophisticated in such matters.
I do not read the provisions of the lease as being inconsistent. However, even if they were, I agree with the Rizzuto court in its statement that “[o]ur review of the cases in this area leads us to conclude that the intent of the parties is the primary factor considered by the courts in construing exemption clauses.” Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d 688, 691 (1979). Rizzuto was decided after trial id. 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d at 689, based upon “the undisputed testimony of all the parties.” Id., 22 Wash.App. 951, 592 P.2d at 691. The instant case is on appeal from a summary judgment, and I think there are still genuine issues of material fact regarding the intent of the parties.

. “The question whether the desired result (that the lessee be given the benefit of the lessor’s insurance) should be reached by judicial imposition of such a rule in the absence of statutory or administrative sanctions is debatable. Probably the courts should not so rule if the lease and insurance provisions together clearly express an agreement that the lessor’s insurer shall have the right of subrogation.” R. Keeton, Insurance Law § 4.4(b), at 210 (1971).
I think that there are two clear provisions establishing the tenant’s liability for loss from fires started by its own negligence: Paragraph 11(c), which states “[ljessee agrees to indemnify and hold lessor harmless from and against loss, damage and liability arising from the negligent act of lessee, its agents, employees or clients;” and Paragraph 11(b), which requires the lessee to “leave said premises at the expiration of this lease in as good a condition as received, excepting fair wear and tear and/or loss or damage caused by fire, explosion, earthquake or other casualty; provided that such casualty was not caused by the negligent act of the Lessee, its employees or agents .... ” In my opinion, the lessee by these provisions clearly and unambiguously covenanted to be responsible for fire damage caused by its own negligence.