Court Opinion

ID: 9710188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:04:03.834635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.964889
License: Public Domain

Judge, RILEY,
concurring in result.
The majority’s decision is based upon a conclusion that the trial court was obligated, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-35 — 1—2(a)(3), to advise the petitioner that prior convictions may preclude the suspension of any or all of his sentence. However, based on my reading, I.C. § 35-35-1-2(a)(3) requires:
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime without first determining that the defendant:
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(3) has been informed of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
The statute is clear and unambiguous and is therefore not subject to judicial interpretation. Stratton v. State, 791 N.E.2d 220, 223 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied. Relevant to Cozart’s claim, the trial court was required to determine that Cozart understood the minimum sentence for the crime charged. As our supreme court explained in White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 899 (Ind.1986), I.C. § 35-35-1-2 removed the previous requirement that trial courts directly advise defendants and “instructed the trial judge to ‘determine’ whether the defendant! ] understood.” Further, the statute focuses on the “minimum sentence for the crime charged” and does not ask the trial court to calculate the least amount of time a defendant could possibly spend in jail, because of criminal history or other reason. I.C. § 35-35-l-2(a)(3). The trial court accomplished this by eliciting from Cozart a statement that he understood the minimum sentence for the crime charged to be twenty years. Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court failed to adequately advise Cozart; the trial court had no duty to advise, and actually determined what is required by statute, i.e., that Cozart understood the minimum sentence for the crime charged.
However, before the plea was accepted, Cozart and his counsel informed the trial court that Cozart had been erroneously advised by his counsel that the minimum sentence for the crime charged could be suspended. “Defendants who can prove that they were actually misled by the judge, prosecutor, or defense counsel about the choices before them will present color-able claims [that their plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently].” White, 497 N.E.2d at 905-06 (emphasis added). The erroneous advice from Cozart’s counsel was a form of coercion, which requires us to set aside Cozart’s guilty plea. See id. *400Therefore, I agree with the majority that Cozart’s guilty plea was not made voluntarily or intelligently and should be set aside.