Court Opinion

ID: 9543843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:49:43.839363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:18.963550
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I am aware of the exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit in an action when the acts complained of are unconstitutional or unauthorized by statute. See Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 624, 376 A.2d 359 (1977); Simmons v. Parizek, 158 Conn. 304, 307, 259 A.2d 642 (1969); see also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corporation, 337 U.S. 682, 690, 691, 69 S. Ct. 1457, 93 L. Ed. 1628 (1949). In Horton v. Meskill, supra, we quoted with approval language that “the government cannot *349justifiably claim interference with its functions when the acts complained of are unconstitutional or unauthorized by statute.” Horton v. Meskill, supra, quoting Block, “Suits against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine,” 59 Harv. L. Rev. 1060, 1081 (1946).
In recognizing the distinction between sovereign immunity from suit and sovereign immunity from liability; see Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 285-87, 130 A.2d 293 (1957); we have often in the past considered the merits of appeals from judgments in declaratory judgment actions when state officials have been parties. See Horton v. Meskill, supra, 625-26, and the eleven Connecticut Supreme Court cases so cited as the occasion for such review by us. In Horton, we specifically said: “The declaratory judgment procedure in Connecticut as provided by § 52-29 of the General Statutes and 307-313 of the Practice Book [now §§ 388-394 of the 1978 Practice Book] is peculiarly well adapted to the judicial determination of controversies concerning constitutional rights and . . . the constitutionality of state legislative or executive action.” Horton v. Meshill, supra, 626. In that case, we also said: “The [declaratory judgment] procedure has the distinct advantage of affording to the court in granting any relief consequential to its determination of rights the opportunity of tailoring that relief to the particular circumstances.” Id., 627. See Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334, 340-42, 355 A.2d 307 (1974).
After Horton, this court handed down its decision in Rogan v. Board of Trustees for the State Colleges, 178 Conn. 579, 424 A.2d 274 (1979). In Rogan, the plaintiffs sought mandatory injunctive relief *350against the defendants; the plaintiff does the same here. In Bogan, the plaintiffs did not seek declaratory relief, nor does the plaintiff here.1 The plaintiffs in Bogan disputed the termination of their employment at a “laboratory school” at a state college in part on due process grounds.2 In Rogan, we held that that action for prospective injunctive relief against alleged constitutional violations would not lie against the state because the plaiütiffs had not sought it in the context of declaratory judgment relief. See Rogan v. Board of Trustees for the State Colleges, supra. In so holding, we reaffirmed the principles of Horton (and Textron, Inc. v. Wood, supra) set out above.
While the majority does not decide the issue of back pay, it sustains the trial court’s order reinstating the plaintiff with tenure. This decision, by overruling not only the holding of Bogan, but also portions of Horton and Textron, has the effect of declaring the rights of the parties, and also of controlling the activities of the defendant board, and thus the state, in its administration of the educational system at Manchester Community College. *351See Rogan v. Board of Trustees for the State Colleges, snpra. This relief is “coercive” and has been awarded unattended by the proper vehicle, i.e., declaratory judgment relief, whose vitality and adaptability to matters concerning the operations of government, such as those presented on this appeal, has been given our strong approbation twice in the very recent past.3 I submit that no compelling reason has been presented by the majority for in effect rejecting such approval in this case.4
Therefore, I dissent, would find error, and would direct judgment for the defendant.

 la this case, the plaintiff seeks temporary and permanent injunctive relief reinstating him with full back pay and benefits, an order directing the defendant to continue his employment with tenure at Manchester Community College, and such “other and further relief as to equity may pertain.”
In his brief the plaintiff states that he “has requested certain affirmative relief. However, [the] plaintiff’s suit could also be characterized as a request for a declaratory judgment.” There appears to be no question that he has not complied with any of our requisites for seeking a declaratory judgment, which is a special proceeding. General Statutes § 52-29; see Practice Book §§ 389-391. See Atwood v. Regional School District No. 15, 169 Conn. 613, 616, 363 A.2d 1038 (1975).

 In Rogan v. Board of Trustees for the State Colleges, 178 Conn. 579, 424 A.2d 274 (1979), the plaintiffs also sought damages by way of any lost wages, costs and counsel fees.

 The majority observes that “[t]o afford the state an opportunity both to minimize disruption to government and to comply voluntarily, a court may suspend the effective date of an injunction which it grants.” The defendant was given no time or opportunity in this case to comply voluntarily. There was no suspension of the effective date of the injunction which was clearly mandatory. The degree of disruption occasioned by this mandatory relief cannot be evaluated, but whatever this degree, because of the immediacy of the mandatory relief ordered, we do know that the defendant is left with no alternative but to comply forthwith.

 In a footnote, the majority cites to Weaver v. Ives, 152 Conn. 586, 210 A.2d 661 (1965), and Stock v. Cox, 125 Conn. 405, 6 A.2d 346 (1939), for the proposition that prior to rogan v. Board of Trustees for the State Colleges, 178 Conn. 579, 424 A.2d 274 (1979), this court “approved injunctive relief against state officials although the plaintiff had made no prior or contemporaneous requests for declaratory relief.” I do not think that those cases stand for the claimed proposition. In Weaver v. Ives, supra, this court held that the defense of sovereign immunity was inapplicable because the plaintiffs claimed that the highway commissioner was exceeding his statutory authority. In Weaver, we reasoned that “[pjrevious decisions of this court have carefully distinguished situations in which the official acted within the limitations of his authority from those in which official duty was transcended. Newton v. Hamden, 79 Conn. 237, 241, 64 A. 229 [1906]; Stock v. Cox, 125 Conn. 405, 417, 6 A.2d 346 [1939]; Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 82, 60 A.2d 767, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 859, 69 S. Ct. 132, 93 L. Ed. 405 [1948] ; Winchester v. Cox, [129 Conn. 106, 114, 26 A.2d 592 (1942)]. The principle that the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent does not prohibit a suit for injunctive relief against one of its officers who is acting without authority. Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250, *352254, 46 S. Ct. 92, 70 L. Ed. 259 [1925]; Colorado v. Toll, 268 U.S. 228, 230, 45 S. Ct. 505, 69 L. Ed. 927 [1925]; Payne v. Central P. My. Co., 255 U.S. 228, 238, 41 S. Ct. 314, 65 L. Ed. 598 [1921]; Yale College v. Sanger, 62 Fed. 177, 186 (D. Conn. [1894]); 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions § 177; 49 Am. Jur., States, Territories, and Dependencies § 94. Since the gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that the defendant is acting illegally and in excess of his statutory authority, the action is not to be treated as one against the state requiring the consent of the state before it can be maintained.” Weaver v. Ives, supra, 590-91.
Stock v. Cox, supra, which is cited with approval in Weaver, involves a similar claim that the highway commissioner was exceeding his statutory authority. The issue of sovereign immunity is neither mentioned nor discussed in Stoelc.