Court Opinion

ID: 9930816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 19:03:41.518249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:27.164612
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/7/24 P. v. Meza CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      (Yolo)
                                       ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096776

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. CR20203140)

           v.

 JOSE TRINIDAD PEREZ MEZA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         The prosecution charged defendant Jose Trinidad Perez Meza with two counts of
assault with intent to commit a sex offense, among other charges. The trial court used
CALCRIM No. 890 to instruct the jury on these counts, saying the jury was required to
find defendant acted with intent to commit “rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or penetration
by a foreign object.” Based on this instruction, the prosecutor told the jurors in closing
argument that they did not need to agree which of the specific offenses best captured
defendant’s intent, so long as they all agreed “he intended to commit one of those”

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offenses. The jury found defendant guilty on both counts of assault with intent to commit
a sex offense.
       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred because it was required to
identify the specific sex offense at issue, rather than provide a list of multiple offenses,
and the prosecutor was incorrect when he told the jurors they did not need to have
unanimity as to the specific sex offense intended by defendant. Defendant further argues
trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the jury instruction at issue.
We find no merit in defendant’s contentions and will affirm the judgment.
                                      BACKGROUND
       Defendant assaulted the two victims, L.C. and X.Z., in separate incidents. The
prosecution charged defendant with two counts of assault with intent to commit a sex
offense (Pen. Code1, § 220, subd. (a); counts 1 & 4), one count each of forcible sexual
penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 2), sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a); count 3),
attempted rape by force (§§ 664, subd. (a), 261, subd. (a)(2); count 5), assault likely to
cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 6), second degree robbery (§§ 211,
212.5, subd. (c); count 7), and misdemeanor dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1);
count 8).
       As relevant here, L.C. testified at trial that defendant attacked her while she was
walking to her car at her apartment complex. L.C. was on crutches, fell over when
defendant pushed her, and hit her head on the pavement. As she was lying on the ground,
defendant reached under her dress with a “claw like motion” and groped her buttocks and
vagina. It felt as if he was trying to push his fingers or part of his hand into her vagina.
L.C. cried out for help; some neighbors called the police and chased defendant away.
       X.Z. testified she was finishing work one night and decided to walk along a nearby
bike path when defendant came up behind her and placed her in a chokehold. Defendant

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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held her on the ground, told her not to scream, and took her phone. He also claimed he
had a gun. He told her, “I just want to fuck,” and X.Z. closed her legs tightly together.
Defendant tried to force her legs apart while touching X.Z. X.Z. tried to convince him to
stop and defendant pulled her up to her feet. Defendant apologized, asking her not to call
the police. Defendant insisted on walking X.Z. home and grabbed her hand.
       X.Z. walked defendant back to her apartment. Once in the apartment, X.Z. offered
defendant tea, hoping to buy time until her roommate woke up. Once the roommate
woke up, she called to him in Chinese, telling him to call the police, but the roommate
did not understand. Defendant asked X.Z. whether she would have sex with him and if
she wanted to have sex in her room. X.Z.’s roommate came downstairs, and defendant
ran away.
       The prosecution also introduced evidence of defendant’s prior conduct, including
two separate incidents where defendant was riding a bicycle, came up behind women,
and sexually assaulted them.
       The prosecution asked the trial court to instruct the jury using CALCRIM No. 890
(Assault with Intent to Commit Specified Crimes), along with the instructions for several
enumerated crimes included in section 220, subdivision (a). The prosecutor explained, “I
think the reason I did this is I believe the CALCRIM -- the 890, the assault with the intent
to commit a specified crime, I believe that jury instruction calls for a definition of the
theor[ie]s of what specific offense he was intending to commit. So because of that, I -- I
included the 1,000 before the attempted rape.”
       He clarified his theory of the offense, saying, “I just included all of the offenses
within the 220 series just because they don’t need to all agree on which of the offenses he
intended to commit, as long as they all agree that he intended to commit one of those. So
I simply include that one as well as the sodomy one. I was just leaving it up for the jury
so they could make their own independent decision as to what they thought [defendant’s]

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intent were -- was.” The trial court asked defense counsel if he had any objection;
counsel responded, “No. That’s fine.”
       The trial court ultimately instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 890, saying, in
relevant part, “The defendant is charged in Counts 1 and 4 with assault to commit rape,
sodomy, oral copulate, or penetration by a foreign object in violation of Penal Code
section 220(a). . . [¶] To prove that the Defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that. . . when Defendant acted, he intended to commit rape, sodomy, oral
copulation, or penetration by a foreign object.” The instruction then referred jurors to
CALCRIM Nos. 1000, 1015, 1030, and 1045 for the definitions of rape, sodomy, oral
copulation, and penetration by a foreign object.
       During closing argument, the prosecutor discussed defendant’s intent in the
context of the jury instruction, saying, “Now, there are a number of other offenses here.
And the reason those are included is because you folks may think, Hey. Well, despite
that, maybe he just wanted to digitally penetrate her like he did with L.C. Maybe he
wanted to orally copulate her. Maybe he wanted to sodomize her. You don’t all need to
agree on which of these five he intended to commit, as long as you all agree he intended
to commit one of those. You could literally split into teams.” Defense counsel argued
there was no evidence defendant intended to rape either victim.
       The jury found defendant guilty of both counts of assault with intent to commit a
sex offense, along with the sexual battery, attempted rape by force, assault likely to cause
great bodily injury, robbery, and dissuading a witness counts. The jury found defendant
not guilty of forcible sexual penetration, but guilty of the lesser included offense of
attempted forcible sexual penetration.
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the trial court erred when it instructed the jury using CALCRIM
No. 890 and provided the jury a list of offenses that could be used to fulfill the intent

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requirement of the assault with intent to commit a sex offense counts, rather than
specifying the offense defendant intended to commit. Defendant claims this failure to
identify a specific offense runs afoul of the bench notes in the instruction and case law
construing the instruction.
       The People respond defendant forfeited the issue because trial counsel did not
object to the use of the instruction or the prosecutor’s argument. Because defendant also
asserts he received ineffective assistance of counsel, we will proceed to the merits of
defendant’s claim, but conclude there was no error.2
       “A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335,
1345.) Under section 220, subdivision (a)(1), “any person who assaults another with
intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or any violation of Section
264.1, 288, or 289 shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or
six years.” Section 289 forbids forcible sexual penetration by a foreign object. Thus, an
essential element of the offense is the intent to commit one of the offenses specified in
the statute. (People v. Meichtry (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 388-389; People v. Dillon (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1379.)
       According to the bench notes for CALCRIM No. 890, the trial court must “specify
the sex offense or offenses that the defendant is charged with intending to commit” where
required in the instruction. (Italics added.) The notes further require the trial court to
“[g]ive the appropriate instructions on the offense or offenses alleged.” Although jury
instruction bench notes are not binding authority (People v. McDonald (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 16, 26), we see no reason why the jury instruction would need to specify
only one specific offense, particularly when the statute enumerates multiple offenses.

2 Although defendant’s briefing divides the ineffective assistance of counsel argument
from his substantive argument as to the jury instruction, we will address both arguments
in the same section because they are intertwined.

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Nor do we find persuasive defendant’s reliance on People v. May (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d
118, 129, which stands only for the proposition that a trial court must also instruct on the
elements of the underlying intended sex offense, and does not require that there be only
one such offense. Here, the trial court did instruct on the specified sex offenses and thus
complied with May.
       Defendant further claims the prosecutor misstated the law when he told jurors they
could “independently select the offense [they] believed the defendant intended to
commit,” and that the statement “violated the constitutional unanimity requirement.” We
disagree any unanimity principles were violated.
       “In a criminal case, ‘the jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a
specific crime. [Citation.] Therefore, cases have long held that when the evidence
suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.’ [Citation.]
Yet ‘where the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for
disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed or what the defendant’s precise
role was, the jury need not unanimously agree on the basis or, as the cases often put it,
the “theory” whereby the defendant is guilty.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 877-878.)
       “The crime of burglary provides a good illustration of the difference between
discrete crimes, which require a unanimity instruction, and theories of the case, which do
not. Burglary requires an entry with a specified intent. (Pen. Code, § 459.) If the
evidence showed two different entries with burglarious intent, for example, one of a
house on Elm Street on Tuesday and another of a house on Maple Street on Wednesday,
the jury would have to unanimously find the defendant guilty of at least one of those acts.
If, however, the evidence showed a single entry, but possible uncertainty as to the exact
burglarious intent, that uncertainty would involve only the theory of the case and not
require the unanimity instruction. [Citation.] Other typical examples include the rule

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that, to convict a defendant of first degree murder, the jury must unanimously agree on
guilt of a specific murder but need not agree on a theory of premeditation or felony
murder [citation], and the rule that the jury need not agree on whether the defendant was
guilty as the direct perpetrator or as an aider and abettor as long as it agreed on a specific
crime [citation].” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132-1133.)
       Here, CALCRIM No. 890 was used to instruct on two discrete crimes -- the
assault on L.C. and the assault on X.Z. -- and the list of specific sex offenses within the
instruction was used to describe the specific intent requirement of those crimes. (People
v. Cook (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 309, 313.) To the extent there was any uncertainty about
which sex offense defendant intended to commit, that uncertainty was thus connected to
the theory of each assault. Consistent with the prosecutor’s statement, the jurors were not
required to unanimously agree which sex offense defendant intended to commit when he
assaulted the two victims. We thus reject defendant’s claims that the jury instruction, or
the prosecutor’s argument discussing that instruction, were erroneous.
       Because the jury instruction was correct, there is no basis for defendant’s
argument that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to object to the instruction or
the prosecutor’s argument. Defendant must show counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. (People v.
Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) Defendant’s objection has no merit, and trial counsel
is not required to make unmeritorious objections. (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th
543, 587.) We see no ineffective assistance of counsel.

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                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  WISEMAN, J.

We concur:

 /s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

 /s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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