Court Opinion

ID: 9375502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 22:02:29.087898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.571114
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 Lachtman v. Ocean Terrace Condominium Assn. CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

SHANE A. LACHTMAN                                               B314580

        Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No.
        v.                                                      19STCV14215)

OCEAN TERRACE CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gary Y. Tanaka, Judge. Affirmed.
     Gusdorff Law and Janet Gusdorff for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
     Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, Claudia Borsutzki, and
Nicholas M. Gedo for Defendants and Respondents.
      Plaintiff Shane Lachtman (plaintiff) was injured in an
attack by one of his condominium complex neighbors and sued,
among others, the complex’s homeowners’ association, Ocean
Terrace Condominium Association (the HOA), and management
company, M. Roy Nelson, Inc., doing business as Horizon
Management (Management). The HOA and Management
prevailed on summary judgment based partly on the trial court’s
determination that they had no prior knowledge that the attacker
was violent. Within days of the summary judgment ruling,
plaintiff claimed he happened upon documents not produced in
discovery that suggest the HOA and Management did have such
prior knowledge. Plaintiff moved for a new trial in light of this
claimed discovery, and in this appeal from the trial court’s denial
of that motion, we consider whether the new evidence was
admissible and whether plaintiff met his burden to establish
irregularity in the proceedings.

                         I. BACKGROUND
      A.     The Complaint’s Allegations and Summary Judgment
      Plaintiff and his girlfriend own a unit in Ocean Terrace
Condominiums in Ranchos Palos Verdes. His neighbors, Timothy
Plant (Plant) and Stephanie Ross, rented a condominium from
Jennifer Maria Andersen (Andersen).
      Residents of the condominium complex have access to a
shared hot tub. In August 2017, plaintiff was in the hot tub with
a few other people when Plant arrived with a larger group. After
plaintiff asked one of the members of Plant’s party not to enter
the hot tub nude, Plant and another man in the group, Erik
Bachelder (Bachelder), physically attacked him.

                                2
       Plaintiff’s operative second amended complaint asserted
claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against Plant and Bachelder and negligence and
premises liability against Andersen, the HOA, and Management.
The HOA and Management moved for summary judgment,
arguing, among other things, that the attack was not foreseeable
because there was no history of violence at the condominium
complex by Plant, Bachelder, or anyone else. They emphasized
that “[t]he only complaints ever made about Plant involved a
noise complaint and concern over the safety of a fire pit on his
deck.” The HOA and Management alternatively argued that
plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by any act or omission on their
part.
       The trial court granted summary judgment for the HOA
and Management based on plaintiff’s failure to raise a triable
issue of fact as to either duty or causation.1 The trial court
reasoned “no duty of care can be imposed upon [the moving
defendants] because the alleged unprovoked criminal attack of
[p]laintiff by Plant and Bachelder was not foreseeable.” The
evidence that Plant “had loud and raucous parties” prior to the
attack on plaintiff did not “make it foreseeable that Plant or
Bachelder would criminally assault and/or batter an individual,”
and plaintiff’s contention that issuing warnings to Plant
regarding these incidents would have prevented the attack was
“speculation and conjecture.”

1
      The trial court granted a similar motion by Andersen. We
dismissed plaintiff’s appeal of the judgment in favor of Andersen
on plaintiff’s request.

                                 3
       B.    Motion for New Trial
       Shortly after the trial court issued its order granting the
HOA and Management’s summary judgment motion, plaintiff
moved for a new trial. Plaintiff sought a new trial on grounds
including newly discovered evidence and irregularity in the
proceedings, i.e., the HOA and Management’s destruction or
withholding of material evidence.
       Plaintiff submitted a declaration with his new trial motion
stating that, “[i]n the days following” the hearing at which the
trial court granted the summary judgment motion, he “noticed”
that, due to construction in the condominium complex, “many
HOA documents” were stored on top of furniture in a common
area and in a closet to which the door had been left “propped
open.” Plaintiff did not estimate the number of documents he
encountered, but referred to “boxes” of documents. He claimed
that he reviewed “all” of these materials and submitted two one-
page documents for the trial court’s review.
       One of the documents was a printout of an email
purportedly written by the complex’s former on-site manager,
Janet Garcia (Garcia), a few weeks before the attack on plaintiff.
The only header information included in the printout is as
follows: “On August 2, 2017, at 10:50 AM, Janet Garcia
 wrote[.]” There is no information
regarding the recipient. Each line of the document begins with
an angle bracket, but there is no other indication that the email
was part of a longer chain. The body text reads, in full:
“Resident complained that the Unit 109 male renter struck
another pool user. Resident offered to be contacted. Please call
me or let me know if you want to contact them. [¶] Thank you,

                                4
[¶] Janet Garcia.” (Plant lived in Unit 109.) A signature block
includes Garcia’s contact information.
      The second document is a one-page printout with the
heading “MAY 2017 [¶] OT MEETING.” The document includes
notes regarding various complaints, ranging from the
temperature of the pool to “[f]ence hurdlers” roaming the
complex. One item is pertinent here: “Party yelling, glass
bottles, loud music, smoking, pushing and kicking in pool and
jacuzzee [sic]. Tim-Stef again. Enough!”
      Neither of these documents was produced in discovery.
Plaintiff suggested, however, that they were alluded to in an
email chain including the HOA president and Garcia following
the attack. In a discussion regarding records of “previous
incidents” involving Plant, Garcia said “I have these two.” No
attachments were produced with this email, and there was no
discussion of the content of the items to which Garcia referred.
      Plaintiff also declared he was approached by Anthony
Corcoran (Corcoran), Garcia’s successor as on-site manager,
weeks after the summary judgment hearing. According to
plaintiff, Corcoran told him Garcia “had deleted numerous
emails” and “important documents.”
      In opposition to plaintiff’s new trial motion, the HOA and
Management argued, among other things, that none of the new
evidence was admissible. They contended the statements
attributed to Corcoran were inadmissible hearsay and submitted
a declaration in which Corcoran denied having made them.2

2
      Corcoran acknowledged speaking with plaintiff around the
date plaintiff claimed, but “what [he] actually said to [plaintiff]
was that [he] assumed that historical emails must have been

                                 5
They further contended the Garcia email and meeting notes were
not properly authenticated, lacked foundation, and included
hearsay statements not subject to any exception. Indeed, they
suggested the documents were fabricated.
      Garcia stated in a declaration that she “did not create or
write” the August 2, 2017, email, she had no knowledge of the
incident referred to in the email, and she “would never have used
the word ‘renter’ to refer to a resident of Ocean Terrace.”
Another Management employee, Martha Olvera, stated in a
declaration that she “took all minutes for any [HOA] meeting in
2017” and she did not draft the “OT MEETING” document. She
had no knowledge of the incident referred to in the document and
would not have misspelled “Jacuzzi.” Corcoran also stated that
he never saw boxes of documents left on furniture in common
areas and that the closet in which they were kept was never
propped open. In reply, plaintiff submitted another declaration
and attached photographs purporting to show boxes in a closet,
on a pool table, and on the floor in a common area.
      The trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s new trial
motion on May 6, 2021. The court issued a minute order the
same day indicating it had taken the matter under submission.
On July 19, 2021, the court amended its previous order nunc pro
tunc to deny plaintiff’s motion.
      The trial court sustained the HOA and Management’s
objections to the portion of plaintiff’s declaration recounting
statements by Corcoran as well as the Garcia email and meeting
notes. The court ruled that a new trial was not warranted based

deleted[ ] because [he] ha[dn’t] seen any and because of lack of
space in the Google account.”

                                 6
on the new evidence because none of it was admissible. The court
further determined that a new trial was not warranted based on
irregularity in the proceedings because the evidence allegedly
withheld was inadmissible.
      The trial court entered judgment in favor of the HOA and
Management, and plaintiff appeals.

                          II. DISCUSSION
       Preliminarily, plaintiff contends that because the trial
court did not rule on his new trial motion within the time set
forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 660, subdivision (c),3 it
was denied by operation of law. As a result, plaintiff contends
the trial court’s subsequent nunc pro tunc amendment of a
minute order issued within the statutory deadline was
unauthorized and its evidentiary rulings are not entitled to any
deference. We do not decide this issue because it does not affect
our analysis. Even if plaintiff is correct that the rationale stated
in the amended minute order does not merit any deference, the
denial of a new trial motion by operation of law is still reviewed
for abuse of discretion.
       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
plaintiff’s new evidence was inadmissible and therefore did not
warrant a new trial. Plaintiff not only failed to authenticate the
Garcia email and meeting notes, he presented no evidence
indicating he even attempted to authenticate the materials.
Assuming he discovered these documents as described in his
declaration, these circumstances do not support plaintiff’s

3
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

                                  7
assumptions as to their provenance. The statements plaintiff
attributes to Corcoran are hearsay, and plaintiff’s reliance on the
exceptions applicable to admissions by a party and authorized
admissions lacks merit.
      The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in
determining plaintiff did not establish procedural irregularities
warranting a new trial. Although the analyses are separate, the
new evidence was inadmissible to demonstrate procedural
irregularities for the same reasons that it was inadmissible to
demonstrate the HOA and Management’s substantive liability.

       A.    Legal Framework and Standard of Review
       “An order granting summary judgment is properly
challenged by a motion for a new trial.” (Doe v. United Airlines,
Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504.) A new trial may be
granted based on various statutorily enumerated grounds
“materially affecting the substantial rights of [the moving]
party,” including newly discovered material evidence “which [the
moving party] could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial” and “[i]rregularity in the
proceedings of the . . . adverse party . . . by which either party
was prevented from having a fair trial.” (§ 657, subds. (1), (4).)
       An order denying a motion for new trial will not be set
aside unless there was an abuse of discretion that resulted in
prejudicial error. (City of Los Angeles v. Decker (1977) 18 Cal.3d
860, 871-872.) “[I]n the case of an order denying a new trial
following summary judgment, the determinations underlying the
denial dictate our standard of review. [Citation.]” (Wall Street
Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
1171, 1176.) As pertinent here, we review the trial court’s

                                 8
evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 852 [“According to the
weight of authority, appellate courts ‘review the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings on summary judgment for abuse of
discretion’”].)

      B.       The Timing of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order Does Not
               Impact Our Analysis
       Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “the power of the
court to rule on a motion for a new trial shall expire 75 days after
the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the
court . . . or 75 days after service on the moving party by any
party of written notice of entry of judgment, whichever is earlier,
or if that notice has not been given, 75 days after the filing of the
first notice of intention to move for a new trial.” (§ 660, subd. (c).)
If the trial court does not rule on the motion within the statutory
deadline, “the effect shall be a denial of the motion without
further order of the court.” (§ 660, subd. (c).)
       Here, plaintiff filed his notice of intention to move for a new
trial on March 25, 2021, the trial court issued a minute order
taking the matter under submission on May 6, 2021, and the trial
court amended the May 2021 minute order to deny the motion on
July 19, 2021—well over 75 days from March 25, 2021. Relying
on cases in which courts belatedly purported to grant a new trial
motion (see, e.g., Siegal v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (1968)
68 Cal.2d 97, 99; Dodge v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th
513, 516), plaintiff contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
amend the May 2021 minute order more than 75 days after it
filed its notice of intention to move for a new trial. According to
plaintiff, “[t]he practical effect” of the 75-day deadline for

                                  9
purposes of this appeal is that the July 2021 nunc pro tunc order
is void and the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are not entitled to
any deference.
       Assuming without deciding plaintiff is correct that section
660, subdivision (c) precludes the trial court from stating its
reasons for denying a new trial motion after 75 days, his
suggestion that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are therefore
subject to de novo review lacks merit. Plaintiff’s characterization
of the denial of a new trial motion by operation of section 660,
subdivision (c) as a failure to exercise any discretion is contrary
to settled law. (Strauch v. Bieloh (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 278, 281
[“The discretion of the trial judge must be deemed to have been
exercised in permitting the motion to be denied by lapse of time
exactly the same as though that discretion were used in
affirmatively passing on the motion”]; In re Shepard’s Estate
(1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 70, 75 [courts reviewing automatic denial
of new trial motion consider “whether the fictious exercise of the
trial court’s discretion [in causing the new trial to be denied by
operation of law] amounted to an abuse of that discretion”]; see
also Meskell v. Culver City Unified School Dist. (1970) 12
Cal.App.3d 815, 823 [trial court has “discretion to permit the
[new trial] motion to be denied by operation of law by expiration
of the [statutory] period”].)

      C.   A New Trial Is Not Warranted Based on New
           Evidence
     To warrant a new trial under section 657, subdivision (4),
newly discovered evidence must be admissible. (Plancarte v.
Guardsmark (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 640, 647 [affirming denial of
new trial motion in part because newly discovered evidence was

                                 10
inadmissible hearsay].) Inadmissible evidence necessarily fails to
satisfy section 657, subdivision (4)’s materiality requirement.
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
new trial motion because the one page document purporting to
reflect an email from Garcia and the asserted meeting notes were
not properly authenticated and the statements attributed to
Corcoran were hearsay not subject to an exception.

             1.     The ostensible email and meeting notes
       A writing must be authenticated before it is received in
evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1401, subd. (a).) “Authentication of a
writing means (a) the introduction of evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the
evidence claims it is or (b) the establishment of such facts by any
other means provided by law.” (Evid. Code, § 1400.)
       The Evidence Code sets forth various means of
authenticating a writing, including testimony by a person who
saw the writing made (Evid. Code, § 1413); admission of
authenticity by the opposing party (Evid. Code, § 1414);
handwriting evidence (Evid. Code, §§ 1415-1419); evidence that
the writing was received in response to a communication sent to
the purported author (Evid. Code, § 1420); and evidence that the
writing “refers to or states matters that are unlikely to be known
to anyone other than” the purported author (Evid. Code, § 1421).
These means of authenticating a writing are not exhaustive.
(Evid. Code, § 1410.) The proponent’s burden is “[e]ssentially” to
make a “prima facie case” that the writing is what they claim it
is: “‘The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding
authenticity goes to the document’s weight as evidence, not its

                                11
admissibility.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59
Cal.4th 258, 267 (Goldsmith).)
      Plaintiff contends his declarations concerning the
circumstances in which he found the email and meeting notes
along with the photographs of boxes were sufficient to support a
finding that they are records of the HOA and/or Management.
Although the required foundation may be supplied by evidence of
the location in which a writing is discovered (Goldsmith, supra,
59 Cal.4th at 268), the evidence offered here raises more
questions than it answers. Despite a purportedly comprehensive
review of multiple boxes of documents just days after the trial
court’s summary judgment ruling, plaintiff does not indicate
which box(es) contained the email and meeting notes, he does not
state whether or how their contents were organized, and he says
nothing about the other documents he reviewed—in particular,
plaintiff does not discuss whether he reviewed any similar or
related documents.4 Moreover, the fact that Garcia referred to
two documents concerning incidents involving Plant in another
email is not probative of the authenticity of these documents
where it is undisputed there were other complaints regarding
Plant. The two documents themselves also bear no indicia of
authenticity—they appear to be documents anyone with a word
processing program could create. Under these circumstances, the

4
      Plaintiff emphasizes that other emails produced in
discovery included the same limited header information seen in
the email. But these were parts of longer chains. Plaintiff does
not indicate whether the box in which he allegedly discovered the
email included other pages which could belong to the same email
chain.

                               12
trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding plaintiff’s
account of his fortuitous discovery was insufficient to
authenticate the documents.
       Plaintiff’s insistence that we must view conflicting evidence
in the light most favorable to him in the context of a new trial
motion following a summary judgment motion has no merit. This
principle applies only to admissible evidence. (Bozzi v.
Nordstrom (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761 [“Only admissible
evidence is liberally construed in deciding whether there is a
triable issue”].) Moreover, we do not rely—and the trial court did
not rely—on the HOA or Management’s evidence suggesting
plaintiff fabricated the email and meeting notes in concluding
plaintiff failed to meet his burden as the propounding party.
       Plaintiff’s further contention that he “could not possibly
have come forward with more evidence of authenticity” without
an opportunity for further discovery is also unsupported by the
record. As we have already mentioned, his description of the
boxes he discovered was short on detail. Moreover, there is no
indication that he made informal attempts to confirm, for
example, whether the HOA and Management reviewed these
boxes in preparing their discovery responses. And despite
suggesting in his reply brief that the meeting notes were not
official minutes but rather “the notes and statements of a
resident at Ocean Terrace,” plaintiff did not describe any efforts
to identify the person who prepared them. In any case, even if
plaintiff were correct that it was not possible to authenticate the
email or meeting notes after summary judgment, this fact would
not warrant a new trial. (Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties,
LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 481, 501 [“‘The right to a new trial is
purely statutory, and a motion for a new trial can be granted only

                                13
on one of the grounds enumerated in the statute’”].) Plaintiff’s
inability to meet his burden is not a reason to relax that burden.

             2.     The conversation with Corcoran
       Plaintiff contends the statements he attributed to Corcoran
in his declaration were admissible as admissions by a party
opponent. Evidence Code section 1220 provides that “[e]vidence
of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when
offered against the declarant in an action to which he is a party
in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of
whether the statement was made in his individual or
representative capacity.” Corcoran was not a party to this action
in either an individual or representative capacity, so that
exception does not apply.
       Plaintiff takes an alternative approach in his reply brief,
arguing for the first time that Corcoran’s statements were
admissible as authorized admissions. (Bowser v. Ford Motor Co.
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 587, 611 [statements attributed to an
entity party “are not usually analyzed as party admissions under
Evidence Code section 1220, but rather as authorized admissions
under Evidence Code section 1222”].) Evidence Code section
1222 provides that “[e]vidence of a statement offered against a
party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if: [¶] (a) The
statement was made by a person authorized by the party to make
a statement or statements for him concerning the subject matter
of the statement; and [¶] (b) The evidence is offered either after
admission of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of such
authority or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof,
subject to the admission of such evidence.” Plaintiff’s position
that Corcoran’s authority to discuss the HOA and Management’s

                                14
document preservation practices during the litigation is somehow
self-evident is meritless. Plaintiff had the burden to submit
evidence regarding “the nature of [Corcoran’s] usual and
customary authority, the nature of the statement in relation to
that authority, and the particular relevance or purpose of the
statement” (O’Mary v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 563, 570), and he did not do so. Corcoran’s role as
“on-site manager” is not alone sufficient to establish that he is a
“high-ranking organizational agent[ ] who ha[s] actual authority
to speak on behalf of” either the HOA or Management.5 (Snider
v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1203.)

      D.    A New Trial Is Not Warranted Based on Irregularity
            in the Proceedings
      A party’s improper withholding of evidence may constitute
an irregularity in the proceedings warranting a new trial.
(Sherman v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1152,
1155.) Regardless of whether the withheld evidence must itself
be admissible at trial—an issue we need not decide—there must
be competent evidence of irregularity in the proceedings. (Bell v.
Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1108, 1124-1126 [reversing new trial order based in
part on inadmissible evidence]; Weathers v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospitals (1971) 5 Cal.3d 98, 105 [“We recognize, as we have in
the past, that evidence presented by affidavit in connection with

5
      Corcoran’s declaration suggests he has no relationship
whatsoever to Management. He is employed by a company called
“Associa, the current management company for [the HOA].”

                                15
a motion for new trial, like oral testimony at trial, must be given
from personal knowledge and cannot contain hearsay”].)
       Plaintiff contends the trial court conflated the issues of
admissibility at trial and admissibility for purposes of
demonstrating the need for a new trial. Although these are
indeed separate inquiries, the analyses overlap in this case to the
extent that the showing required to authenticate the email and
meeting notes as evidence of the HOA and Management’s
substantive liability was the same as that required to show that
they withheld material documents. For either purpose, plaintiff
had the burden to show these documents were records of
complaints against Plant that were created or controlled by HOA
or Management. As we have already discussed, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining plaintiff did not meet
his burden. Because the statements attributed to Corcoran were
also inadmissible to establish discovery misconduct, there was no
competent evidence of procedural irregularities.

                                16
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The HOA and Management
shall recover their costs on appeal.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                        BAKER, J.

I concur:

      MOOR, J.

                            17
 Lachtman v. Ocean Terrace Condominium Association et
                               al.
                            B314580

DISSENT – RUBIN, P. J.

      I respectfully dissent. In my view, the August 2, 2017
email was sufficiently authenticated for the purpose of ruling on
the new trial motion because of where it was located when found
by plaintiff – on furniture in a common area of the condominium
– with a number of other documents that were apparently placed
there during construction. Nor were the documents hearsay, for
two reasons. One, they were offered not for the truth of the
matter but instead for where they were found on the HOA
premises and that they had not been produced during discovery.
Two, they were also offered for the nonhearsay purpose of notice
to the HOA of alleged dangerous propensities of the neighbor.
      Accordingly, I would reverse the order denying the motion
for new trial and direct the trial court to permit additional
discovery pending a renewed for motion for summary judgment
or other proceedings.

RUBIN, P. J.