Court Opinion

ID: 9639558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:23:09.621241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:19.847686
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Chief Justice,
dissents.
I respectfully dissent.
I would hold that the insurer’s share of the settlement under section 287.150, RSMo, should be determined without reference to the verdict in the trial and the component finding of comparative fault. Obviously, the effect of the post-trial settlement was to annul the judgment and the *783verdict on which the judgment was based. Brickner v. Normandy Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 910 (Mo.App.1985). In fact, according to the docket sheet of the United States District Court in which the trial was conducted — a matter appropriate for judicial notice — while post-trial motions were pending, the trial court expressly-vacated the judgment in light of the parties’ post-trial settlement. Thus, the finding of comparative fault is a nullity, and the final judgment, which was entered as a “Consent Judgment,” has no finding of comparative fault. The General Assembly, in basing the apportionment between employer and employee on a “finding of comparative fault,” could only have meant a finding that was final and valid. Ultimately, the section 287.150 alternative formula that is based on a finding of comparative fault cannot be invoked where the finding of comparative fault no longer exists.
For this reason, I would reverse the judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment for the insurers in the amount of $66,600.