Court Opinion

ID: 9882921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:21:57.035204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:20.478361
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Hale, 2023-Ohio-3199.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           BUTLER COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO,                                  :

        Appellee,                                :         CASE NO. CA2023-03-019
                                                                    CA2023-03-021
                                                 :
     - vs -                                                     OPINION
                                                 :               9/11/2023

 JOSHUA E. HALE,                                 :

        Appellant.                               :

       CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                          Case No. CR 2000 05 0701

Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael Greer, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Joshua E. Hale, pro se.

        S. POWELL, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Joshua E. Hale, appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of

Common Pleas dismissing his second, successive petition for postconviction relief as

untimely. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.

        {¶ 2} On July 17, 2000, the Butler County Grand Jury returned an indictment
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charging the then 17-year-old Hale with one count of first-degree felony rape with a

specification of force in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). The charge arose after it was

alleged Hale used an object to penetrate the vagina of his girlfriend's two-year-old daughter,

M.D., on the morning of June 4, 1999. Hale was found guilty following a jury trial and

thereafter sentenced to a mandatory, indefinite sentence of 10-years-to-life in prison. Hale's

sentence was imposed by the trial court pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) and 2929.13(F). Hale

appealed his conviction to this court, raising four assignments of error for review. This

included Hale arguing his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence and was

against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court disagreed and affirmed Hale's

conviction in its entirety. State v. Hale, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2002-02-037, 2003-Ohio-

4448.

        {¶ 3} On November 18, 2004, Hale filed his first petition for postconviction relief.

The trial court denied Hale's petition on February 10, 2005. Hale did not appeal that

decision. Nearly 17 years later, on December 17, 2021, Hale filed his second, successive

petition for postconviction relief. To support this petition, Hale argued that the rule espoused

by the Ohio State Supreme Court in State v. Patrick, 164 Ohio St.3d 309, 2020-Ohio-6803,

that a trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating

factor before imposing a life sentence for aggravated murder under R.C. 2929.03, even if

that sentence includes eligibility for parole, should be applied retroactively to his case,

thereby rendering unconstitutional the mandatory, indefinite 10-years-to-life prison

sentence that he received for raping the two-year old victim in this case.

        {¶ 4} On February 6, 2023, the trial court issued a decision dismissing Hale's

second, successive postconviction relief petition as untimely. In so doing, the trial court

determined that:

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             Hale has failed to establish that he was unavoidably prevented
             from challenging the constitutionality of his conviction and
             sentence.     He has failed to demonstrate that he was
             unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which
             he now relies in his petition. There is no citation to any decision
             of the United States Supreme Court recognizing a new right that
             could be applied retroactively to Hale's conviction and sentence.

             Hale relies solely on the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State
             v. Patrick, 164 Ohio St.3d 309, 2020-Ohio-6803. That decision
             was very narrowly tailored to apply to situations where a juvenile
             offender is being sentenced for aggravated murder pursuant to
             R.C. §2929.03. Hale was sentenced for the offense of rape
             pursuant to R.C. §2907.02(A)(1)(b).

             ***

             That being the case, Hale has wholly failed to demonstrate why
             any of the exceptions in R.C. §2953.23(A)(1) apply. A
             postconviction petition for relief that is not filed within the time
             period set forth in R.C. §2953.23, and which only raises issues
             relating to sentencing errors does not vest a trial court with
             jurisdiction to consider the same.

      {¶ 5} Hale now appeals the trial court's decision, raising the following single

assignment of error for review.

      {¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED THE

STATE OF OHIO'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE DEFENDANT'S SECOND OR

SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF FILED DECEMBER 17, 2021.

      {¶ 7} Hale argues the trial court erred by dismissing his second, successive petition

for postconviction relief as untimely. To support this claim, Hale reiterates the same

argument that he advanced previously in his postconviction relief petition he filed with the

trial court on December 17, 2021. That is to say, Hale argues the rule espoused by the

Ohio State Supreme Court in Patrick, that a trial court must separately consider the youth

of a juvenile offender as a mitigating factor before imposing a life sentence for aggravated

murder under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence includes eligibility for parole, applies

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retroactively to his case, thereby rendering unconstitutional the mandatory, indefinite 10-

years-to-life prison sentence he received for raping the two-year-old victim in this case. We

disagree.

        {¶ 8} Hale's petition for postconviction relief was filed well beyond any applicable

time period for filing such a petition set forth by either the current or former R.C. 2953.21,

thus rendering it an untimely petition for postconviction relief. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a)-(b)

provides certain narrow exceptions authorizing the trial court to allow for an untimely,

successive postconviction relief petition.1 Hale's situation in this case, where he sought to

have the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Patrick applied retroactively to him, does not fit

into any of those exceptions. This is because, "[w]hile R.C. 2953.23(A)[1][a] vests a

common pleas court with authority to grant relief on an untimely petition when the petitioner

asserts a claim based on a new state or federal right recognized by the United States

Supreme Court, the statute provides no exception allowing an untimely petition to be

granted based on a new decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio." (Emphasis deleted.)

State v. Jarrett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111659, 2023-Ohio-811, ¶ 19, discretionary appeal

not allowed, 06/20/2023 Case Announcements, 2023-Ohio-1979, citing State v. Parker, 157

Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 2.

        {¶ 9} This is also because, while R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) permits a common pleas

court to grant relief on an untimely petition where, but for constitutional error at trial, no

reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty, or where, but for constitutional error at

the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder would have found him eligible for the death

sentence, there must first be constitutional error under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). As noted

1. A second, alternative exception is set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A)(2), which applies in certain circumstances
where DNA testing was performed. However, as there is no indication that DNA testing was involved in this
case, R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) has no application to this case.
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above, Hale has failed to demonstrate any constitutional error in this case. There is also

no dispute that Hale was not sentenced to death, but was instead sentenced to a

mandatory, indefinite sentence of 10-years-to-life in prison pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(B) and

2929.13(F).     This is in addition to the undisputed fact that nowhere within Hale's

postconviction relief petition does Hale argue his actual innocence of the first-degree felony

rape charge for which he was tried and ultimately convicted.             It is only under those

circumstances that the exception set forth under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) applies. See State

v. Carter, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2006-03-010, 2006-Ohio-4205, ¶ 16 ("the plain language

of R.C. 2953.23[A][1][b] extends only to trial error [where, but for constitutional error at trial,

no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the

petitioner was convicted,] and does not extend to sentencing errors, except those occurring

within the capital punishment context").

       {¶ 10} In so holding, we note that when faced with a similar issue to the case at bar,

the Second District Court of Appeals concluded in State v. Wiesenborn, 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29388, 2022-Ohio-3762, that the rule announced by the Ohio Supreme

Court in Patrick was a procedural rule that does not apply retroactively, and that the offender

had no legal right to have Patrick applied to his case because he had no appeal pending

when the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Patrick. Id. at ¶ 26, citing Ali v. State,

104 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-Ohio-6592, ¶ 6 ("[a] new judicial ruling may be applied only to

cases that are pending on the announcement date"). The Eighth District Court of Appeals

concluded the same in Jarrett, thus agreeing "with the Second District that the rule

announced in Patrick is a procedural rule and does not apply retroactively." Id. at ¶ 24. In

reaching this decision, the Eighth District expressly noted that, "as the law currently stands,

Patrick does not apply retroactively." Id. at ¶ 17.

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       {¶ 11} Just like the Eighth District before us, we also agree with the Second District

that the rule announced in Patrick is a procedural rule and does not apply retroactively.

Therefore, similar to the holdings expressed in Wiesenborn and Jarrett, because Hale had

no direct appeal pending when the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Patrick was decided,

Hale had no legal right to the application of Patrick to his case. That is assuming, of course,

that Patrick had any application to Hale's case at all.        This is because, rather than

aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2929.03, Hale was found guilty of first-degree felony

rape with specification of force in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). See generally State v.

Fuell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-02-008, 2021-Ohio-1627, ¶ 67-76 (setting forth

several reasons why the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Patrick may not extend beyond

those cases where a juvenile offender is receiving a life sentence for aggravated murder

under R.C. 2929.03), dismissing appeal as having been improvidently accepted, 168 Ohio

St.3d 631, 2022-Ohio-1607.      Accordingly, finding no error in the trial court's decision

dismissing Hale's second, successive petition for postconviction relief as untimely, Hale's

single assignment of error lacks merit and is overruled.

       {¶ 12} Judgment affirmed.

       HENDRICKSON and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.

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