Court Opinion

ID: 9375831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 22:03:20.463981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.003456
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/28/23 P. v. Allen CA3
Opinion on transfer from Supreme Court
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C093465

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 05F03498)

           v.                                                                     OPINION ON TRANSFER

    ANDRE MARCUS ALLEN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         This case returns to us on transfer with directions from our Supreme Court. A jury
found defendant Andre Marcus Allen guilty of first degree murder and second degree
robbery in 2006. The jury also found true an attempted robbery-murder special
circumstance for the murder. Defendant recently petitioned the trial court for
resentencing under what is now Penal Code section 1172.61 based on changes made to
the felony-murder rule by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437). The trial court denied defendant’s petition, finding the record established

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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defendant was ineligible for resentencing because the jury found true the special
circumstance for the murder. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in relying
on the special circumstance finding to disqualify him for relief. We disagreed in our
original opinion filed March 17, 2022, and we affirmed the order.
       Defendant petitioned our Supreme Court for review; that court has now directed us
to reconsider the matter in light of People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698. Having done
so, we accept the People’s concession that the trial court’s order denying the petition
must be reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and second
degree robbery (§ 211). As to the murder count, the jury found true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed during the commission or
attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury found not true the
allegation that defendant had intentionally and personally used a firearm in the
commission of each offense (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced defendant
to life without the possibility of parole for first degree murder and stayed his sentence on
the robbery conviction pursuant to section 654. Following a direct appeal, this court
struck an inapplicable parole revocation restitution fine but otherwise affirmed the
judgment in July 2008. (People v. Coleman (July 24, 2008, C053684) [nonpub. opn.].)
       In our opinion on direct appeal, we summarized the incident resulting in these
convictions as follows:
       “On December 12, 2004, Dwayne Harvey was shot and killed while sitting in his
parked car at Fourth Avenue Park in Sacramento. He was shot nine times by two
different weapons⸺a .40-caliber semiautomatic handgun and a .38-caliber revolver.
Shell casings or bullets from each weapon were recovered from Harvey’s body and his
car.

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“Prosecution’s case
       “One of the prosecution’s main witnesses was Sammy Anderson, a friend of both
defendants who pleaded guilty to being an accessory to murder (§ 32) in return for his
truthful testimony and a one-year jail sentence. According to Anderson, on the night of
the murder, Anderson, Coleman, and Allen went to the Fourth Avenue Park to
consummate a drug deal that Coleman had arranged with the victim Harvey. It was
Coleman’s idea to kill Harvey. While waiting for Harvey to arrive, Anderson decided to
leave and was walking away from the park when Harvey’s car pulled up. Anderson saw
Allen shoot Harvey from outside of the car, near the passenger door, and after a pause,
heard more rounds of gunfire. Anderson did not see Coleman with a gun that night, but
was with Coleman the next day in the same park when Coleman picked up a gun from the
grass and hid it in a car parked on the street.
       “Testimony from eyewitnesses revealed that one of the defendants was seen
searching Harvey’s pockets and car after the shooting, and was holding a black revolver
in his hand. The person searching Harvey was wearing a long, black coat with black
pants, which matched a description of what Coleman was wearing the night of the
shooting. The other man had on a black coat with fur trim on the hood, which matched a
description of what Allen was wearing on the night of the shooting. One witness said
that two men walked up to Harvey’s car, and then he heard two rounds of different
sounding shots. Two witnesses also testified that Allen made statements to the effect that
he shot Harvey.
“Defense case
       “Defendant Coleman testified in his own defense. He stated that on the night of
the shooting, he called Harvey to buy crack cocaine and arranged to meet him at the park
with Allen and Anderson. As they were waiting for Harvey, Coleman overheard Allen
whisper to Anderson that ‘he was going to do the dude’ but did not see Allen carrying a
gun and did not believe what Allen said. When Harvey’s car arrived, Anderson was

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walking away. Allen approached the car and Coleman followed behind him. Allen
walked to the passenger side of the car, reached into the window, and fired shots into the
car. After firing about five shots, Coleman saw Allen move to the front of the car and
begin firing again with what sounded like a different gun. Coleman insisted that at no
time did he have a gun. When Allen ran away, Coleman opened the driver’s door and
pulled Harvey out of the car. He decided to look for drugs or money in the vicinity.
Finding none, Coleman took Harvey’s cell phone.
       “Defendant Allen testified that Coleman was carrying a black revolver with him
that evening when they went to meet Harvey. When Harvey arrived at the park, Coleman
walked up to the car, while Allen stayed behind. Allen heard three gunshots, and then
heard more gunshots as he ran away from the park. He knew that Coleman intended to
rob Harvey that night.” (People v. Coleman, supra, C053684.)
       On January 9, 2019, defendant filed a petition in the trial court to vacate his first
degree murder conviction under what is now section 1172.6, alleging he could not now
be convicted of murder because of the changes made to sections 188 and 189. The
petition asserted a “complaint, information, or indictment was filed against [him] that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” Defendant also declared that “[a]t trial,
[he] was convicted of 1st or 2nd degree murder pursuant to the felony murder rule or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” He declared that he was not the actual
killer or a major participant in the felony. The trial court appointed counsel for
defendant.
       The district attorney filed a responsive pleading, moving to dismiss the petition on
the grounds that the statute is unconstitutional and for failure of defendant to make a
prima facie showing of eligibility. Defense counsel filed two replies. In a written order,
the trial court denied defendant relief on the ground he had not made a prima facie
showing of eligibility.

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       As the trial court observed, we affirmed the conviction, special circumstance
finding, and sentence in an unpublished opinion in 2008. The court found defendant was
ineligible for relief under what is now section 1172.6 because the jury had found the
robbery-murder special circumstance true. In response to appointed counsel’s argument
regarding the effect of the Supreme Court decisions in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 on the robbery-murder special-
circumstance finding, the trial court explained that it was “of the view that [section]
1170.95 is not the proper forum for determining the sufficiency of the evidence of the
special circumstance finding in light of Banks and Clark.” The court reasoned that
defendant would first need to seek collateral relief in a habeas corpus proceeding.
       The trial court then discussed the evidence, as summarized in this court’s opinion
on direct appeal, reasoning in the alternative that the evidence was still sufficient to
support the special circumstance finding under Banks/Clark. In discussing the evidence,
the court proposed a scenario in which the jury may have found the section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) firearm enhancement not true, but codefendant Coleman’s section
12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement true, to wit, that only Coleman’s shot was
the fatal shot. The court then concluded: “[T]here was sufficient evidence for a jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant . . . fired the first shots with intent to kill,
thereby satisfying the mens rea required for a robbery-murder special circumstance, and
such a conclusion is not precluded by the jury’s not true finding on [defendant’s section]
12022.53[, subdivision] (d) gun enhancement, which required a finding of proximately
causing great bodily or death by the firing of the gun. That renders Banks and Clark
irrelevant in this case.”
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
       Defendant originally argued the trial court erred in denying his petition for
resentencing. He argued then, and now contends with the benefit of Strong, that the court

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erred in relying on the jury’s special circumstance finding to establish he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life because our Supreme
Court clarified the special circumstances analysis after his conviction in People v. Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522. In supplemental
briefing, the People now agree.
       The Legislature enacted and the Governor signed Senate Bill 1437, effective
January 1, 2019 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4), determining that the change in law was
“ ‘necessary to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(People v. Superior Court (Gooden) (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 270, 275.) As pertinent here,
Senate Bill 1437 added what is now section 1172.6, which permits a person convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to petition the
sentencing court to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the person on any
remaining counts if, among other things, the petitioner could not now be convicted of
first or second degree murder due to the change in the law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       Section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that, for the purposes of those special
circumstances based on the enumerated felonies in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a),
which include robbery, an aider and abettor must have been a “major participant” and
have acted “with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 190.2, subd. (d); Tapia v.
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 298.) Thus, on its face, a special circumstance
finding satisfies the requirements for accomplice murder liability even after Senate Bill
1437. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
       Since defendant’s conviction, however, the Supreme Court has refined the analysis
for who qualifies as a major participant acting with reckless indifference to human life in
Banks and Clark and “construed section 190.2, subdivision (d) in a significantly different,

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and narrower manner than courts had previously construed the statute.” (People v.
Torres (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1168, 1179, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 963.)
       After we rejected defendant’s claims in our previous opinion, our Supreme Court
decided Strong, which concluded: “Findings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark do
not preclude a defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under Senate Bill
1437. This is true even if the trial evidence would have been sufficient to support the
findings under Banks and Clark.” (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) Here,
the trial court concluded that the jury’s pre-Banks and Clark findings precluded defendant
from making a prima facie case. Because this conclusion does not survive Strong, we
will reverse the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is reversed, and the cause is
remanded with directions to conduct further proceedings consistent with People v. Strong
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698.

                                                        KRAUSE                , J.

We concur:

   RENNER                   , Acting P. J.

   BOULWARE EURIE , J.

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