Court Opinion

ID: 9640271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:02:01.193754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:28.724542
License: Public Domain

HANEY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting in part).
The National Labor Relations Act provides that petitioner' “is empowered * ■* * to prevent any person from engaging in any - unfair labor practice * * * affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. A. § 160(a).
I concur in the holding fhat there is substantial evidence supporting the finding that respondent had engaged in an unfair labor practice as defined in 29 U.S.C.A. § 158, and that therefore the Board’s order with respect to Sager and -Camy should be enforced. I likewise concur- in the holding with thát the part of the'-Board’s order requiring respondent -to cease from dominat*461ing, interfering with or contributing financial or other support to the company union, inasmuch as the practice prohibited is an unfair labor, practice as defined in 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(2).
Another unfair labor practice as defined is for an employer “To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.” Section 158(5). In the latter section, the representatives of the employees mentioned are said to he those “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.” Section 159(a). The Board ' ordered respondent to:
“(c) Withdraw all recognition from [the company union] as the representative of its operators for the purposes of dealing with the respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work; and completely disestablish [the company union] as such representative;
“(d) Immediately notify each and every one of its officers and agents in each of its divisions as well as each and every one of the representatives of [the company union], that [the company union] is so disestablished and that it will refrain from any recognition thereof;
"(e) Post notices to its operators in conspicuous places in all of its terminals on each of its divisions stating: (1) that [the company union] is disestablished as the representative of its opera-tors for the purpose of dealing with it with respect to grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work, and that it will refrain from any recognition thereof; (2) that it will cease and desist in the manner aforesaid; and (3) that such notices remain posted for a period of at least thirty (30) consecutive days from the date of posting.”
It seems clear to me that the Board has jurisdiction to- order as above recited, if some union, other than the company union, was the representative of respondent’s employees as stated in 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5). Such other union would be such representative if it was “designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). But the Board would not have jurisdiction to make the order above recited, if the company union was the chosen representative. So far as the record is concerned, it is not shown which union is the chosen representative. There certainly is no evidence that the Brotherhood is the chosen representative, nor that the company union is not the chosen representative. Therefore the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by the provisions above recited.
I dissent from that part of the opinion which requires the amount of the back pay to be included in our order. The act does not require it, and such action is a useless formality.
To summarize: In my opinion the order of the National Labor Relations Board, now before us, should be enforced in its entirety except those portions thereof designated 2(c) and 2(d) and 2(e-l).- I think the portions of the order thus excepted and designated are not supported by either law or fact and that we should not order enforcement thereof.