Court Opinion

ID: 9912546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 18:03:46.260966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:06.673326
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                2023 IL App (4th) 230689-U
 This Order was filed under
                                                                                   FILED
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is              NO. 4-23-0689                      December 22, 2023
 not precedent except in the                                                     Carla Bender
 limited circumstances allowed                                               4th District Appellate
 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                  IN THE APPELLATE COURT                           Court, IL

                                            OF ILLINOIS

                                        FOURTH DISTRICT

In re J.M., a Minor                                           )      Appeal from the
                                                              )      Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois,                         )      Tazewell County
              Petitioner-Appellee,                            )      No. 22JA15
              v.                                              )
                                                              )      Honorable
Jovanni M.,                                                   )      David A. Brown,
                  Respondent-Appellant).                      )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
                Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Zenoff concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1      Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating
              respondent’s parental rights because the court’s best interests finding was not
              against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶2              Respondent, Jovanni M., appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental

rights to his minor child, J.M. (born in 2022). J.M.’s mother is not a party to this appeal.

However, J.M.’s mother appealed the termination of her parental rights in appellate court case

No. 4-23-0688. Respondent argues the court’s best interests determination was against the

manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4                                         A. Case Opening

¶5              On January 28, 2022, the State filed a petition seeking to adjudicate J.M.

neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
(West 2022)). The State alleged J.M. was neglected due to being in an environment injurious to

his welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). Specifically, the State alleged (1) J.M.’s

mother was found unfit in a prior case involving his sibling and had not completed services to

restore her to fitness, (2) J.M.’s mother did not have custody of J.M.’s sibling, (3) J.M.’s mother

tested positive for cocaine when she gave birth to J.M., (4) J.M.’s sibling’s umbilical cord tested

positive for cocaine at birth, (5) J.M.’s mother admitted to an investigator from the Illinois

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in January 2022 that she was using

cocaine, (6) respondent would not submit to a drug test after being informed J.M. was placed

under a safety plan due to his mother’s issues, and (7) respondent had a criminal record in

connection with his service in the United States Marine Corps.

¶6             On April 5, 2022, the trial court adjudicated J.M. neglected (705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022)). In a dispositional order entered the same day, the court found

respondent unfit and unwilling for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for

J.M., made J.M. a ward of the court, and placed his guardianship and custody with DCFS.

¶7             On February 8, 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. The State alleged respondent was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the

return of J.M. to his care within nine months after the adjudication of neglect, specifically April

5, 2022, to January 5, 2023 (705 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)). At a May 20, 2023, fitness

hearing, and pursuant to respondent’s stipulation to the allegation, the trial court found the State

proved he was unfit by clear and convincing evidence.

¶8                                   B. Best Interests Hearing

¶9             On August 1, 2023, the trial court held a best interests hearing. FamilyCore

caseworker Justin Sangalli testified J.M. was added at birth to a preexisting family case. J.M. had

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been in the care of his foster parents (his maternal aunt and her husband) since he was born. The

foster parents moved to a different home during the time J.M. was in their care, so he had lived

with them in two homes—the first in Peoria and the second in East Peoria. Sangalli had visited

both homes and found they were clean and appropriate. J.M. had his own bedroom in both

homes and Sangalli found both rooms were appropriate for him. The home in East Peoria was

approximately 10 minutes from J.M.’s maternal grandmother’s home. This proximity facilitated

J.M.’s contact with extended family members. Sangalli characterized the relationship between

J.M. and his foster parents as “[v]ery bonded.” J.M.’s foster parents had “raised him as their own

*** from the time that he came home.” J.M.’s foster parents provided love, affection, food,

shelter, and clothing and ensured his medical needs were met. Sangalli opined that the foster

parent placement was the least disruptive placement alternative for J.M. Sangalli did not feel

respondent demonstrated sufficient stability for him to “even think” about returning J.M. to his

care. Sangalli believed J.M.’s senses of security, familiarity, and continuity of affection were

with his foster parents. J.M.’s foster parents also indicated their willingness to adopt him. On

cross-examination, Sangalli acknowledged respondent demonstrated a “greater level of

cooperation” between August 2022 and January 2023.

¶ 10           Emma M., J.M.’s maternal aunt and foster mother, testified J.M. resided with her

and her husband since they picked him up from the hospital a few days after his birth. Emma

provided food, shelter, and clothing for J.M. and ensured his medical needs were met. Emma

believed J.M. was thriving in her care. Emma described the morning routine with J.M. and her

husband; they wake up between 6 and 6:30 a.m. and eat breakfast together, and Emma takes J.M.

to school at about 7:30 a.m. before going to work. When everyone is back home in the evening,

they eat dinner and either visit Emma’s parents or play at home together with their dog. Emma

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described the visitation between J.M. and his biological parents as sporadic at the beginning but

acknowledged it had improved within the preceding six months. However, Emma observed only

a “minimal bond” between J.M. and his parents, and this bond did not increase over time. During

these visits, J.M. would become upset when he would see his foster parents walk away; he would

enjoy his time with his biological parents “for a little bit,” and then, after about 30 minutes to an

hour, he is “done” and is “ready to just lay down or do something.” Emma described J.M. as

being part of a “big family support system,” which included his siblings and Emma’s parents,

great-grandmother, and husband and his family. Emma and her husband have wanted to adopt

J.M. since he came into their home. On cross-examination, Emma acknowledged J.M.’s

biological parents had brought clothes, food, and bottles for him when they came over for visits.

¶ 11           Respondent testified he had been seeing a counselor through the Department of

Veterans Affairs since 2015 for anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder.

Respondent attended J.M.’s mother’s Cocaine Anonymous meetings to learn more and gain

insight into her addiction issues. Respondent was employed and financially able to provide for

J.M. Respondent was concerned J.M. would not be exposed to his Mexican heritage if he was

adopted. Respondent hoped J.M. would come back home so they could “be a stronger family

together.”

¶ 12           During closing arguments, the State emphasized how the testimony established

(1) J.M. was thriving in his foster parents’ home, (2) the foster home was clean and appropriate,

(3) he had a sense of familiarity, security, and continuity of affection with his foster parents, and

(4) he and his foster parents were bonded with each other. The State also emphasized how J.M.

was bonded with extended family members and his foster parents wanted to adopt him.

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¶ 13           Respondent’s counsel pointed out he was voluntarily attending J.M.’s mother’s

meetings and was “learning how to be a better dad.” Respondent was concerned J.M. would not

be exposed to his Mexican heritage if he was adopted. Counsel noted that over the preceding six

months, there was “amazing efforts and progress” being made by the parents and “they’ve really

illustrated that they’re there to provide a safe, stable *** environment for their child.”

¶ 14           The guardian ad litem (GAL) argued J.M.’s physical safety and welfare rested

with his foster parents. While both biological parents had provided to some extent, “the vast

majority of shelter, clothing and food comes from the foster parents.” The development of J.M.’s

identity, his sense of familiarity, his continuity of affection, and his least disruptive placement all

were with the foster parents. According to the GAL, (1) the foster placement was “the only home

that [J.M.] knows,” (2) J.M. was “extremely bonded to the foster parents,” and (3) the foster

parents were willing to provide permanency through adoption.

¶ 15           The trial court acknowledged that both biological parents “doubled down starting

sometime in February of this year,” but only in response to the State’s petition to terminate their

parental rights. The court also acknowledged that while both the foster parents and biological

parents “have contributed to [J.M.’s] general welfare during the course of the case,” his

“physical safety has been provided for by the foster parents.” The court stated J.M.’s senses of

attachment, security, and familiarity were with his foster parents but recognized his continuity of

affection “comes from a lot of different directions.” The court then stated, “[T]he risk of

substitute care is this notion that substitute family or parents won’t have the same bond, concern,

or responsibility for a child somehow that the natural parents would have, and I don’t think that’s

the case in this situation.” Regarding the need for permanency, the least disruptive placement,

the senses of security and familiarity, and J.M.’s bond with his foster parents, the court found it

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would be in his best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court named DCFS

as guardian and changed the permanency goal to adoption.

¶ 16           This appeal followed.

¶ 17                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18           On appeal, respondent challenges only the trial court’s best interests finding,

arguing it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.

¶ 19           Following a finding of parental unfitness, the trial court’s focus shifts away from

the parents, and the court gives full and serious consideration to the minor’s best interests. In re

T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961 (2005). At the best interests stage of termination proceedings, the

State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the minor’s best

interests. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 366 (2004). “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s

interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable,

loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. In making the best interests determination, the court

must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). These factors include:

               “(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the

               child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,

               cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love,

               security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive

               placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community

               ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability

               and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the

               uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute

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               care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the

               child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS

               405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).

“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these

factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in

affirming its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.

¶ 20           A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s best interests finding

because the trial court is in a superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.

In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court “will not disturb the trial court’s

decision regarding a child’s best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the

evidence.” C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 68. A best interests determination is against the

manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result.

C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 68.

¶ 21           At the time of the best interests hearing, J.M. had been in the care of his foster

parents since he was born. J.M. had lived with his foster parents in two clean and appropriate

homes in the Peoria area and had his own appropriate bedroom in both homes. J.M.’s foster

parents raised him as if he was their own child and they were bonded to one another. J.M.’s

foster parents were facilitating his relationships with an extensive family support system, which

included both foster parents’ families. J.M.’s foster parents provided love, affection, food,

shelter, and clothing for him and ensured his medical needs were met. While respondent was

visiting J.M. with an increased frequency, the evidence demonstrated there was only a minimal

bond that did not improve during this period. Sangalli testified J.M.’s foster parents were the

least disruptive placement alternative. According to Sangalli, respondent’s circumstances were

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such that he could not “even think” about returning J.M. to his care. Sangalli testified J.M.’s

security, familiarity, and continuity of affection were all with his foster parents, who provided

him the only home he ever had and were willing to adopt him.

¶ 22           Based on the evidence presented and in light of the statutory factors carefully

considered by the trial court, the court’s decision that it was in J.M.’s best interests to terminate

respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 23                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 24           For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 25           Affirmed.

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