Court Opinion

ID: 9862053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:58:55.05472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:58.531434
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing concurrent 23-year sentences for defendant’s armed-violence and home-invasion convictions. However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant has forfeited consideration of his contention that his aggravated-battery conviction violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine. I would reach the merits of this contention under the plain-error rule of Rule 615(a) despite defendant’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A close examination of the plea agreement accepted by the trial court reveals that the State did not make any concessions in return for defendant’s guilty plea. Although the State dismissed three charges, the State could not have gained convictions on these charges, as they were alleged in the alternative to the three charges to which defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant also did not receive any sentencing concessions as a result of the State’s agreement to allow him to plead guilty but mentally ill. Therefore, I believe that defendant’s guilty plea was essentially an open plea and that he was not required pursuant to Evans to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea to avoid forfeiture of the issue on appeal. An examination of the charging instrument is necessary to properly understand the nature of the plea agreement accepted by the trial court. A review of the six-count indictment filed in this case reveals that the State alleged three different theories of criminal culpability: armed violence (counts I and II), home invasion (counts III and IV), and aggravated battery (counts V and VI). As the State acknowledged during oral argument, the State pleaded two alternative counts as to each theory, alleging slightly different facts. In the counts alleging armed violence, count I alleged that defendant stabbed the victim repeatedly while armed with “a knife with a blade at least 3 inches long”; count II alleged that defendant stabbed the victim repeatedly while armed with “a switchblade knife.” In the counts alleging home invasion, count III alleged that defendant entered the victim’s dwelling and remained there until he “knew” the victim was present and stabbed her repeatedly with a knife; count IV alleged that defendant entered the victim’s dwelling and remained there until he “had reason to know” the victim was present and stabbed her repeatedly with a knife. In the counts alleging aggravated battery, count V alleged that defendant caused the victim “great bodily harm” by. stabbing her repeatedly with a knife; count VI alleged that defendant stabbed the victim repeatedly using “a deadly weapon.” Although the State alleged two alternative counts as to each theory of criminal culpability, each of the alternative counts was predicated upon the same physical act and could support only one criminal conviction as to each theory. See People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (1977) (noting that a criminal defendant may not be convicted of more than one offense carved from the same physical act). Both counts I and II were predicated upon defendant’s physical act of stabbing the victim while armed with a dangerous weapon; counts III and IV were predicated upon defendant’s physical act of entering the victim’s dwelling when he knew or had reason to know that the victim was present and intentionally causing injury to her; counts V and VI were predicated upon defendant’s physical act of stabbing the victim. Putting aside for the moment defendant’s contention that the armed-violence and the aggravated-battery counts were carved from the same physical act, it is evident from the charging instrument that the State could maintain only one conviction each with respect to the offenses of armed violence, home invasion, and aggravated battery. Indeed, at oral argument, the State acknowledged that three of the counts had been pleaded in the alternative. Thus, in the event that the State secured convictions on all six counts contained in the indictment, the trial court would have been required to merge the three convictions of the alternative counts to avoid a violation of King. The State was never in a position to secure six convictions in this case; the best-case scenario for the State was that it would secure three convictions, one each for armed violence, home invasion, and aggravated battery. This was precisely what the State achieved when defendant pleaded guilty to one count of armed violence (count I), one count of home invasion (count III), and one count of aggravated battery (count VI). I do not take issue with the majority’s summary of Evans or its general statement that a defendant who has received charging concessions from the State must move to withdraw his or her plea in order to avoid relinquishment of the right to challenge nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities. See Townsell, 209 Ill. 2d at 547-48. However, applying these principles to this case, I reject the majority’s conclusion that defendant received a benefit or a concession as a result of the State’s dismissal of counts II, iy and V. As the State could not have secured convictions upon these three alternative charges, it did not give up anything in dismissing them in exchange for defendant’s guilty plea. Thus, what appeared on the surface to be a plea agreement consisting of a bargained-for exchange between the State and defendant, in essence amounted to an open plea by defendant in which he pleaded guilty to each of the three criminal theories charged by the State. Although defendant may have believed that he was receiving a benefit as a result of State’s dismissal of counts II, IY and V, such a benefit was illusory because the State would have been unable to maintain convictions upon these alternative charges. See King, 66 Ill. 2d at 566. Defendant also did not gain a benefit as a result of the State’s agreement to allow him to plead guilty but mentally ill. Such an agreement did not guarantee that defendant would receive a shorter sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—6(a) (West 2002). The trial court certainly could have considered defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor even if defendant had entered a straight guilty plea. See People v. Robinson, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1052 (1991). Pleading guilty but mentally ill also did not necessarily guarantee that defendant would receive specific treatment for his mental illness while incarcerated. See 730 ILCS 5/5 — 2—6(b) (West 2002) (requiring the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide such treatment for a defendant found guilty but mentally ill “as it determines necessary”). As defendant did not receive any benefit in return for his guilty plea, I believe that the circumstances in this case are comparable to those in Moshier. Here, as in Moshier, the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the possible charges upon which the State could maintain criminal convictions. See Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 880. As was the case in Moshier, there was no exchange of benefits between defendant and the State in the plea agreement entered in this case. Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Accordingly, because the State relinquished nothing in the plea agreement, I do not believe that the instant appeal can be seen as an attempt by defendant to hold the State to its bargain while avoiding his own obligation. Under the reasoning applied by the majority in this case, a defendant will always receive a legally recognizable benefit in pleading guilty that will necessitate the filing of a motion to withdraw guilty plea to preserve errors on appeal. Such a result is at odds with the jurisprudence of our supreme court and I decline to join such a holding. See Lumzy, 191 Ill. 2d at 185-87 (identifying various types of guilty pleas). The record in this case plainly indicates that defendant did not receive any benefit, real or intangible, in return for his guilty plea. Lacking any indication in the record that defendant received a legally recognizable benefit in return for his guilty plea, I believe that the appropriate conclusion in this case was that reached by the reviewing court in Moshier: that consideration of the surplus-conviction issue is appropriate under the plain-error doctrine despite defendant’s failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See Moshier, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 881. I would address the merits of defendant’s surplus-conviction contention as follows. It is well established in Illinois that aggravated battery is a lesser-included offense of armed violence. See People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill. 2d 164, 170 (1982) (holding that multiple convictions of both armed violence and the underlying felony cannot stand where a single physical act is the basis for both charges). As detailed above, all of the armed-violence and the aggravated-battery counts filed in this case were predicated upon defendant’s physical act of stabbing the victim. Because the State did not attempt to differentiate between the separate stab wounds in the indictment, it is evident that the State was charging defendant with a single physical act. See People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 342-43 (2001). Under these circumstances, multiple convictions of armed violence and aggravated battery cannot stand. See Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d at 342-46. Accordingly, I believe the appropriate disposition in this case would be to vacate defendant’s conviction of the lesser-included offense of aggravated battery (count VI). For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.