Court Opinion

ID: 9670258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:17:37.159561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.396516
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with Chief Justice Riley’s result, but write separately to state that as the debate between the majority and minority indicates, the *172rule of People v Weston, 413 Mich 371; 319 NW2d 537 (1982), was ill conceived. Rather than seek to distinguish that holding, Weston should be overruled and its potential for mischief put to rest.
For one to clearly understand the issue here, it must be first stated: no justice of this Court is of the opinion that any defendant involved in these cases was given a trial in which any error occurred. We posit convictions of defendants at error-free trials where the prosecution proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority recognizes that it is "disproportionate to dismiss the charge and discharge the defendant after trial and conviction . . . .” Ante, p 156. The majority seems to feel that this situation can be avoided and the statute can be enforced by imposing the new procedural requirements. If it is desirable to avoid the disproportionate effect of the Weston remedy, the majority proposal is seriously flawed.
The majority fails to explain what the result will be if the defendant takes all the procedural steps necessary to preserve the issue and relief is denied. The Chief Justice assumes that the denial of interlocutory appeal "will effectively result in a decision of the issue on its merits.” Ante, p 171. I disagree. I assume that the majority opinion means that an interlocutory denial would not be a decision on the merits and that a defendant who had preserved the issue by complying with the interlocutory procedure will be allowed to secure Weston relief on appeal after conviction.
The majority states, "If the defendant fails to raise these issues before the commencement of the preliminary examination, the Weston remedy of dismissal without prejudice may not be invoked.” Ante, p 157. The negative pregnant of this statement is that if the defendant does raise these *173issues before the commencement of the preliminary examination, the Weston remedy, that is, dismissal of a conviction without prejudice, may be invoked.
As the Chief Justice notes, the interlocutory appellate procedure will take many times the twelve-day period in which the statute requires the preliminary examination. If the Chief Justice is correct in assuming that interlocutory denial is a decision on the merits, a defendant who takes all pretrial steps will secure either a dismissal of the information or a denial which is a decision on the merits. In the case of a dismissal of the information, the entire process has been delayed for the appeals period. In the case of a denial which is treated as a decision on the merits, the trial has been delayed for the appeals period.
Assuming, as I do, that the majority opinion intends that interlocutory denial implies nothing regarding the Court’s view of the merits, Great Lakes Realty Corp v Peters, 336 Mich 325; 57 NW2d 901 (1953), the interlocutory procedures here set forth have an even more mischievous result. If this assumption is correct, a defendant will have preserved the Weston remedy by invoking the interlocutory procedure with consequent delay and will then, after trial and conviction, be able to secure the Weston remedy on appeal, and the process will start again.
Under either approach, the majority has compounded the Weston problem by adding further delay. Either approach makes the purported solution to Weston worse than the problem Weston created.1
Weston erred first in assuming that the remedy for a pretrial violation of MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925 *174should be reversal of a conviction. Both the state and the accused are entitled to a prompt examination under the statute. While a remedy for delay might be dismissal of the information if prejudice were shown,2 the most obvious remedy for a delay in examination is the holding of an examination. This is the logical inference to be drawn from the purpose of the statute, and it is supported by the provision of the statute which states: "An action on the part of the magistrate in adjourning or continuing any case, shall not cause the magistrate to lose jurisdiction of the case.” MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925. Despite these words, Weston and the majority treat the statute as if the failure to timely hold the examination or to support the delay with adequate reasons is a jurisdictional defect requiring pretrial discharge of a defendant.
Secondly, Weston’s assumption that the Legislature intended that its directive was to be enforced by reversal, despite the absence of prejudice, flies in the face of the Legislative directive that "[n]o judgment or verdict shall be set aside or reversed ... for error as to any matter of . . . procedure, unless ... it shall affirmatively appear that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096.
Since the Weston remedy of discharge without prejudice adds more delay to the process by permitting renewal of the prosecution, the Weston remedy is simply a waste of time and resources which can benefit a defendant only if the retrial falters for lack of witnesses, evidence, or prosecution interest. No legitimate interest is served by *175the Weston result. As the Chief Justice observes, the majority remedy not only suffers from the same fault, but actually builds even further delay into the process.
Other remedies for a violation of the statute exist. Where a probable cause determination has not been made, the Fourth Amendment requires a state to provide a prompt determination of probable cause by a judicial officer "as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty,” Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 125; 95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975).
Moreover, whether defendants are incarcerated or not, this Court has recognized that prolonged delay in concluding examination will justify the pretrial issuance of process mandating the conclusion of the examination or the discharge of the defendant, People v Den Uyl, 320 Mich 477; 31 NW2d 699 (1948). The unexcused failure of the magistrate to perform a clear legal duty would also be an appropriate subject for a writ of superintending control, People v Flint Municipal Judge, 383 Mich 429, 432; 175 NW2d 750 (1970). Such a situation would of course be correctable through use of our administrative powers of superintending control. Jett v Recorder’s Court Judge, 366 Mich 281; 114 NW2d 504 (1962). MCR 3.302.
Finally, the majority seems most troubled by the prospect that a magistrate might fail to fulfill the oath of office to uphold the laws of this state and that such a failure would not be corrected. Weston and the majority proceed from the incorrect assumption that all error must not only be capable of correction, but actually be corrected on appeal. In fact, even if it be posited that the magistrate erred in continuing an examination and that the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court all erroneously denied leave to appeal and *176affirmed the magistrate, the delay would warrant reversal, if delay had impaired the right to a fair trial, United States v Marion, 404 US 307; 92 S Ct 455; 30 L Ed 2d 468 (1971). If, however, the delay did not impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial, it would not warrant reversal, even though the magistrate erred and the appeals courts failed to correct the error.
The Code of Criminal Procedure contains a number of provisions urging magistrates to certain forms of conduct: A magistrate shall not issue warrants for other than minor offenses without security for costs or initiation by the prosecution or other significant officials, MCL 764.1; MSA 28.860, a warrant shall be directed to a peace officer, MCL 764.16; MSA 28.875, the magistrate shall certify the recognizance for appearance, MCL 764.6; MSA 28.865, and the magistrate shall inform an alleged felon of his rights and give him an opportunity to speak, MCL 764.26, 765.6; MSA 28.885, 28.893. A violation of these statutory duties might be correctable prior to trial by one or more of the remedies suggested above, but it could not be legitimately posited that such a violation must be corrected by vacation of a trial verdict untainted by the error. If, for example, a magistrate failed to advise a defendant of his rights and the prosecution did not use evidence procured by reason of the statutory violation at the trial, an otherwise valid conviction would not be reversible, even if the defendant had sought pretrial relief and it had erroneously been denied.
I cannot accept the premise that the Legislature intended that the appropriate response to a delay in examination that does not cause prejudice to an accused should be the reversal and retrial of an error-free conviction. Nor can I accept the conclusion that where there is no miscarriage of justice, *177justice requires reversal of a conviction. I cannot accept such premises and conclusions because, apart from this Court’s ill-conceived opinion in Weston, there is nothing in law to support them and much which refutes them. Nor is there wisdom in such a rule. The majority would impose the most severe systemic penalty, reversal of a conviction, for a one-day violation of a time requirement, despite the assumption that the judgment was validly obtained and error free. The Legislature did not intend that result, and nothing in the sound administration of justice supports it.
I would overrule Weston and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Crawford. In Harris and Williams, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of those issues not reached by the Court of Appeals.
Griffin, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 I would respectfully suggest that a solution to the Weston problem must speak to this ambiguity for the benefit of the bench and bar.

 This Court’s Committee on the Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure has proposed that "[a] violation of this subrule is to be deemed harmless error unless the defendant demonstrates actual prejudice.” Proposed Rule 6.107(B).
*186Further significant refinements were made in 1986 PA 176. They include a notice requirement for all potential defendants in a dram-shop action, § 22(5); a rebuttable presumption that only the last retail licensee is liable under the act, § 22(9); denial of recovery under the act to members of the alleged intoxicated person’s family, § 22(10); and a requirement that liquor licensees file proof of financial responsibility to satisfy obligations under the act, § 22a(2).