Court Opinion

ID: 9738815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:03:34.13893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.644397
License: Public Domain

Rogosheske, Justice
(concurringspecially).
I agree with the result. However, I do not believe this state is constitutionally divested of jurisdiction to provide a means whereby a candidate for Congress could contest an election in the courts of this state. This seems to be implied in the opinion. While there is language in our prior decisions, especially in Williams v. Maas, 198 Minn. 516, 270 N. W. 586,1 which supports this implication, in my opinion such a holding neither is, nor should be regarded as, the basis for this decision. Moreover, I believe it is an inaccurate declaration *447of the constitutional limitation on the state’s power and duty to prescribe the time, place, and manner of electing members of Congress.
It is true that U. S. Const, art. I, § 5, vests final power in each house to determine who shall be seated as a member of Congress. However, U. S. Const, art. I, § 4, by express language not only grants power but imposes a duty on the legislatures of the several states to enact laws governing the election process. This process surely includes laws by which it can be determined who received the highest number of votes legally cast. An election contest which permits a recanvass of the votes cast, under court supervision designed to insure accuracy and fairness, is as much a part of the election process as the initial counting of the votes by the election judges. That it is so regarded by the legislature for all save the congressional office is demonstrated by the provisions of oúr Election Law. In fact, our courts are given jurisdiction to entertain an election contest over a state legislative office even though Minn. Const, art. 4, § 3, contains language of identical import with that contained in U. S. Const, art. I, § 5. With respect to an election contest to determine who received the highest number of legal votes, these constitutional provisions should not be regarded as a limitation on legislative power but only as an overriding constitutional prerogative vesting in each house of Congress, as well as in each branch of the state legislature, the final judgment as to who shall be seated as a member. It does not logically follow that, because each house of Congress has plenary power to disregard a judicial determination, providing statutory machinery for such a contest would be “officious and nugatory.” Whether followed or not, the primary objective of such election-contest machinery is to ascertain the true expression of the will of the voters. The primary objective sought by the exercise of a final judgment by either Congress or the state legislature is identical. Practical considerations alone could demonstrate that any results from an intermediate court review would be of inestimable aid to Congress in arriving at a final judgment no less than such reviews have aided the state legislature. In the broad sense, state laws granting authority to courts to review the election process would not interfere with or encroach upon either the constitutional *448power of the legislature or of Congress because such constitutional powers are plenary and, when exercised, final.2
Our construction of Minn. St. 204.32, subd. 2, should be based only upon the absence of any statutory authorization to judicially determine who received the most legal votes for the congressional office and not upon the proposition that this state and its courts are constitutionally divested of jurisdiction to provide for proceedings to contest an election.

See, also, State ex rel. 25 Voters v. Selvig, 170 Minn. 406, 212 N. W: 604; Youngdale v. Eastvold, 232 Minn. 134, 44 N. W. (2d) 459..

See, Wickersham v. State Election Bd. (Okla.) 357 P. (2d) 421.