Court Opinion

ID: 9526716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:22:32.797129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:12.533927
License: Public Domain

CROTHERS, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 39] I respectfully dissent.
*78[¶ 40] A primary stricture of appellate law is that we decide cases based on issues raised by the parties at the district court and, subsequently, on appeal. See Rutherford v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2009 ND 88, ¶ 13, 765 N.W.2d 705 (“ ‘It is axiomatic that an issue or contention not raised or considered in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal from judgment.’ John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 2003 ND 109, ¶ 18, 665 N.W.2d 698 (quoting Bard v. Bard, 380 N.W.2d 342, 344 (N.D.1986)).”). A narrow exception not applicable here exists to recognize certain errors “seriously affectfing] the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of criminal jury trials.” State v. Borner, 2013 ND 141, ¶ 25, 836 N.W.2d 383.
[¶ 41] Here, I believe the majority strays from our civil case scope of appeal rule by deciding the release clauses are ambiguous. Ambiguity of those clauses was not an issue advanced by Hillerson on appeal or in the district court. Rather, in the district court Hillerson argued that YMCA’s releases were void as against public policy, that the YMCA was not a proper charity to receive immunity under N.D.C.C. § 32-03.1-02 and that the YMCA’s liability was not limited under that same Century Code section. Hiller-son never used the word “ambiguous” or “ambiguity” in her brief resisting summary judgment before the district court. In a citation in her district court brief she acknowledged our prior decision in Kon-drad v. Bismarck Park District held that “the parties are bound by clear and unambiguous language evidencing an intent to extinguish liability, even though exculpatory clauses are construed against the bene-fitted party.” 2003 ND 4, ¶ 6, 655 N.W.2d 411. Yet she did not argue the release clauses here were ambiguous. The transcript of oral argument before the district court also shows Hillerson’s attorney did not use the word “ambiguous” or “ambiguity,” although counsel for the YMCA makes several references to the terms.
[¶ 42] Hillerson’s articulated issue on appeal was that “the trial court err[ed] when it decided that the release signed by T.D.’s mother, Kristina Dickerson exonerated the YMCA from all liability for their negligence and granted the YMCA Summary Judgment.” However, her brief essentially repeats the argument at the district court, claiming the releases were contrary to public policy. She cited the North Dakota Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) allowing for a more definite statement where a pleading is vague or ambiguous; otherwise the words “ambiguous” and “ambiguity” do not appear in Hiller-son’s appellate brief. I therefore dissent because the issue upon which the majority decides this case was not advanced in the district court or on appeal.
[¶ 43] DANIEL J. CROTHERS