Court Opinion

ID: 9386623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 14:00:43.210248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.842888
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10740    Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 1 of 22

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10740
                           ____________________

        ASPEN AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
        Tessco Technologies Inc.,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        LANDSTAR RANGER, INC.,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00578-BJD-LLL
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10740       Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 04/13/2023      Page: 2 of 22

        2                        Opinion of the Court                   22-10740

        Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
               In this appeal, we must decide whether the express preemp-
        tion provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authoriza-
        tion Act (“FAAAA”) bars Florida negligence claims against a trans-
        portation broker based on the broker’s selection of a motor carrier
        and, if it does, whether the Act’s “safety exception” allows those
        claims to proceed. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)–(2).
                Tessco Technologies Inc. hired Landstar Ranger, Inc. as a
        transportation broker to secure a motor carrier to transport an ex-
        pensive load of Tessco’s cargo to a purchaser across state lines. But
        Landstar mistakenly turned the shipment over to a thief posing as
        a Landstar-registered carrier, who ran off with Tessco’s shipment.
        Tessco’s insurer, Aspen American Insurance Company, sued Land-
        star, claiming Landstar was negligent under Florida law in its selec-
        tion of the carrier.
                The district court dismissed Aspen’s negligence claims
        against Landstar, concluding those claims were expressly
        preempted by the FAAAA, which bars state-law claims “related to
        a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight
        forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” Id.
        § 14501(c)(1). The court also determined that the statute’s safety
        exception—which states that the preemption provision “shall not
        restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 3 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                         3

        motor vehicles,” id. § 14501(c)(2)—was inapplicable to negligence
        claims against a broker based on stolen goods. We affirm.
                                       I.

               The domestic trucking industry consists of several players,
        including the shipper, the broker, and the motor carrier. The ship-
        per is the “person who . . . owns the goods being transported”—
        like a manufacturer, retailer, or distributor. See 49 U.S.C.
        § 13102(13) (defining “individual shipper”). The motor carrier is the
        truck driver—the person who transports the goods from the ship-
        per to the purchaser. See id. § 13102(14) (defining “motor carrier”).
        The broker is the person who connects the shipper and carrier; he
        acts as the middleman between the two to arrange for the trans-
        portation of the shipper’s goods by the carrier by, for instance, ne-
        gotiating rates and routes. See id. § 13102(2) (defining “broker”); 49
        C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (same).
                The following facts come from Aspen’s complaint. In this
        appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we accept these
        factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most fa-
        vorable to Aspen. Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934
        (11th Cir. 2022). Landstar Ranger, Inc. is a transportation broker.
        To provide motor-carrier services to Landstar’s shippers, carriers
        must register with Landstar and submit bids through its online sys-
        tem. As part of the registration process, carriers create an online
        profile, where they input company information such as the car-
        rier’s physical address, point of contact, email address, and phone
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 4 of 22

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10740

        number. Landstar’s “protocol” when dispatching a shipment to a
        carrier is to verify that the carrier’s company information matches
        the data in Landstar’s online system.
               One shipper, Tessco Technologies, Inc., hired Landstar to
        arrange the transportation of an expensive shipment of cargo (val-
        ued at over half a million dollars) from Colorado to Maryland.
        Landstar selected L&P Transportation LLC to transport Tessco’s
        shipment. L&P was a Landstar-registered carrier, and its online
        profile included detailed company information.
               But Landstar did not follow its usual carrier-verification pro-
        tocols when dispatching Tessco’s shipment. When it came time for
        Landstar to turn the shipment over to L&P for transport, Landstar
        received a call from someone named “James” claiming to represent
        L&P and attempting to collect the scheduled shipment. Despite no-
        ticing discrepancies between the company information provided
        by “James” and that listed for L&P in Landstar’s system, Landstar
        dispatched Tessco’s shipment to James. Unsurprisingly, James was
        a fraud, and he stole Tessco’s cargo.
                Tessco filed a claim with its insurance provider, Aspen
        American Insurance Company, to recover the cost of the cargo.
        Aspen paid the claim and sued Landstar in the Middle District of
        Florida, seeking damages caused by Landstar’s allegedly negligent
        selection of a motor carrier. Aspen alleges that Landstar breached
        its duty as a transportation broker “to retain a reputable motor car-
        rier” to transport Tessco’s shipment by “ignoring its own protocols
        and the information readily available in its system” and was thus
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 5 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                         5

        either “grossly negligent” or “negligent” in its selection of the car-
        rier.
              The district court dismissed Aspen’s suit as expressly
        preempted by the FAAAA, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). And it rejected
        Aspen’s argument that the statute’s so-called “safety exception,” id.
        § 14501(c)(2), shielded Aspen’s negligence claims from preemption.
              Aspen appealed.
                                       II.

               We review a district court’s dismissal on federal preemption
        grounds de novo. Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp.,
        955 F.3d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 2020).
                                       III.

                The FAAAA’s express preemption provision provides, in rel-
        evant part, that “States may not enact or enforce a law . . . related
        to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or
        freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.”
        49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). But the Act also contains certain exceptions
        to its preemptive scope. Relevant here is the statute’s safety excep-
        tion, which states that the preemption provision “shall not restrict
        the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor ve-
        hicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2). On appeal, Aspen argues that its negli-
        gence claims do not fall within the FAAAA’s preemption provision
        and that, even if they do, they may nonetheless proceed because
USCA11 Case: 22-10740         Document: 33-1          Date Filed: 04/13/2023         Page: 6 of 22

        6                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10740

        they fall within the Act’s safety exception. We address these argu-
        ments in turn.
                                            A.

               We start with the scope of the FAAAA’s preemption provi-
        sion. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution
        preempts—that is, invalidates—state laws that “interfere with, or
        are contrary to” federal law. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
        1, 211 (1824). We recognize three types of federal preemption: ex-
        press preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.1
        Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1094 (11th Cir.
        2021). Express preemption, the only category at issue here, occurs
        when Congress displaces state law “by so stating in express terms.”
        Taylor v. Polhill, 964 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hills-
        borough County v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
        (1985)). In such a case, “the task of statutory construction must in
        the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which
        necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive in-
        tent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).

        1 The district court mentioned the “complete preemption” doctrine as poten-
        tially relevant. That doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case to federal
        court on the ground that a preemption defense creates federal question juris-
        diction. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 813
        F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015). Because we have federal jurisdiction in this
        case because of the parties’ diverse citizenship, we take no position on whether
        the FAAAA satisfies the standard for complete preemption.
USCA11 Case: 22-10740        Document: 33-1        Date Filed: 04/13/2023       Page: 7 of 22

        22-10740                  Opinion of the Court                             7

                Turning to the text of the statute, the FAAAA expressly bars
        states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other
        provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route,
        or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight forwarder
        with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C.
        § 14501(c)(1). There is no dispute that Aspen’s state-law negligence
        claims seek to enforce a “provision having the force and effect of
        law” subject to FAAAA preemption. See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572
        U.S. 273, 281–84 (2014) (holding “that the phrase ‘other provision
        having the force and effect of law’ includes common-law claims”).
        The parties also agree that Landstar is a “broker” as the FAAAA
        defines it. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2); accord 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a). And
        Landstar does not suggest that Aspen’s negligence claims relate to
        the “price” or “route” of a broker, arguing only that those claims
        relate to a broker’s “service.” See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
                With those preliminaries out of the way, the relevant inter-
        pretive question becomes whether Aspen’s Florida negligence
        claims are “related to a . . . service of any . . . broker . . . with respect
        to the transportation of property.” Id. Considering the phrase “re-
        lated to,” the Supreme Court has stressed that “[t]he ordinary
        meaning of these words is a broad one . . . and the words thus ex-
        press a broad pre-emptive purpose.” Morales v. Trans World Air-
        lines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (interpreting the preemption
        provision of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. §
        1305(a)(1)); see Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364,
USCA11 Case: 22-10740         Document: 33-1        Date Filed: 04/13/2023         Page: 8 of 22

        8                          Opinion of the Court                      22-10740

        370 (2008) (following Morales in interpreting the FAAAA).2 Con-
        sistent with the statute’s breadth, the Court held that a state law is
        “related to” rates, routes, or services if the law has “a connection
        with, or reference to” them. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (quoting Mo-
        rales, 504 U.S. at 384) (emphasis omitted). Even if the connection
        “is only indirect,” preemption will follow, so long as the connec-
        tion is not “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” Id. at 370, 375
        (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 386, 390); cf. Morales, 504 U.S. at 390
        (holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts states from
        regulating how airlines advertise prices but suggesting state laws
        forbidding “gambling and prostitution” would survive because
        “the connection [to airline rates] would obviously be far more ten-
        uous”).
              To be sure, the FAAAA’s preemption provision does contain
        a caveat that “massively limits the scope of preemption”: the stat-
        ute will not bar state-law claims that relate to a broker’s services

        2 When Congress sought to preempt state trucking laws as part of its ongoing
        effort to deregulate the trucking industry, it borrowed language from the
        ADA’s preemption provision. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368. The only language
        unique to the FAAAA’s preemption clause when compared to the ADA’s is
        the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property.” Dan’s City Used
        Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). “And when judicial interpreta-
        tions have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of
        the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to
        incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
        & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (cleaned up). So, we look to cases
        interpreting similar language in the ADA to help guide our analysis of the
        FAAAA’s preemption provision here.
USCA11 Case: 22-10740       Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023      Page: 9 of 22

        22-10740                Opinion of the Court                          9

        “in any capacity”—only those services that are “with respect to the
        transportation of property.” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey,
        569 U.S. 251, 261 (2013); 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). But this limiting
        language poses no obstacle to preemption here because the text of
        the FAAAA makes plain that Aspen’s negligence claims relate to a
        broker’s services with respect to the transportation of property.
        The Act defines “transportation” to include “services related to”
        “the movement of . . . property,” “including arranging for, receipt,
        delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, . . . and interchange of . . .
        property.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23) (emphasis added). And a “broker”
        is one who “sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out
        by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing,
        or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensa-
        tion.” Id. § 13102(2) (emphasis added); accord 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a)
        (“Broker means a person who, for compensation, arranges, or of-
        fers to arrange, the transportation of property by an authorized
        motor carrier.”). The Act’s implementing regulations further de-
        fine “brokerage service” as “the arranging of transportation . . . of
        a motor vehicle or of property . . . on behalf of a motor carrier.” 49
        C.F.R. § 371.2(c) (emphasis added).
                The FAAAA and its implementing regulations thus define
        the “service” of a “broker” covered by the statute as arranging for
        the transportation of property by a motor carrier. A “core” part of
        this transportation-preparation service is, of course, selecting the
        motor carrier who will do the transporting. E.g., Miller v. C.H.
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 10 of 22

        10                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10740

        Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2020). In-
        deed, Aspen itself acknowledges that “the broker has but a single
        job – to select a reputable carrier for the transportation of the ship-
        ment. That’s all.” And this is precisely the brokerage service that
        Aspen’s negligence claims challenge—Landstar’s allegedly inade-
        quate selection of a motor carrier to transport Tessco’s shipment.
        Accordingly, these claims have “a connection with or reference to”
        the service of a broker with respect to the transportation of prop-
        erty. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384.
                We realize that some district courts have held claims like As-
        pen’s to be outside the scope of FAAAA preemption on the ground
        that such claims “are generally applicable state common law causes
        of action” that “are not targeted or directed at the trucking indus-
        try.” E.g., Nyswaner v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., 353 F.
        Supp. 3d 892, 896 (D. Ariz. 2019). But those decisions are incom-
        patible with Morales, where the Supreme Court rejected this very
        line of reasoning in interpreting the similar language of the Airline
        Deregulation Act. See 504 U.S. at 386. In holding that the ADA’s
        preemption clause barred states from using their general consumer
        protection statutes to challenge deceptive airfare advertising, the
        Court rejected the argument that the ADA preempts only “state
        laws specifically addressed to the airline industry,” not “laws of
        general applicability.” Id. Such an interpretation, the Court rea-
        soned, would read the broad phrase “relating to” out of the statute
        entirely. Id. The same reasoning applies to the FAAAA. “Had the
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 11 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                      11

        statute been designed to pre-empt state law in such a limited fash-
        ion,” Congress would have worded it differently. Id. at 385.
               To be sure, the FAAAA does not preempt “general” state
        laws (like “a prohibition on smoking in certain public places”) that
        regulate brokers “only in their capacity as members of the public.”
        Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375. But Aspen’s negligence claims do no such
        thing. They do not present us with the “general” universe of com-
        mon-law tort claims that could arise within the domestic supply
        chain. They assert specific allegations of negligence and gross neg-
        ligence against a transportation broker for its selection of a motor
        carrier to transport property in interstate commerce. This applica-
        tion of the negligence standard would regulate brokers, not “in
        their capacity as members of the public,” but in the performance of
        their core transportation-related services. Id. Consequently, the
        FAAAA expressly preempts Aspen’s claims unless they fall within
        one of the Act’s preemption exceptions.
                                      B.

                We now consider whether an exception to the preemption
        statute saves Aspen’s claims. Aspen’s backup argument for reversal
        is the FAAAA’s so-called “safety exception.” That provision pro-
        vides, in relevant part, that the FAAAA’s preemption clause “shall
        not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
        to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). According to Aspen,
        its claims against a broker based on negligent selection of a motor
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 12 of 22

        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-10740

        carrier fall within this provision and are thus exempt from preemp-
        tion. We disagree. For Aspen’s claims to fall within the safety ex-
        ception, (1) the negligence standard must constitute an exercise of
        Florida’s “safety regulatory authority,” and (2) that authority must
        have been exercised “with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. Although
        Aspen’s claims satisfy the first requirement, they do not satisfy the
        second.
                                         1.

                We agree with Aspen that the negligence standard it seeks
        to enforce is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus
        within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority.” The Supreme Court
        has explained that a law is within “the safety regulatory authority
        of a State” only if the law is “genuinely responsive to safety con-
        cerns.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc.,
        536 U.S. 424, 442 (2002). Although “[t]he Court expressed no opin-
        ion as to the scope of [state and] local regulations that are indeed
        ‘genuinely responsive’ to public safety concerns,” Galactic Towing,
        Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 341 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003),
        the Court reasoned that the exception’s “clear purpose” is to ensure
        that the preemption provision does not encroach upon “the preex-
        isting and traditional state police power over safety,” Ours Garage,
        536 U.S. at 439.
                Landstar argues that the Florida negligence standard is not
        sufficiently related to safety because Aspen’s claims seek damages
        for property loss instead of bodily injury. The district court, too,
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 13 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                        13

        distinguished cases holding the exception applicable to negligent-
        carrier-selection claims arising out of personal injuries sustained
        during transit. See, e.g., Miller, 976 F.3d at 1030–31 (holding negli-
        gent-selection claims against brokers stemming from motor vehi-
        cle accidents satisfy the safety exception); Lopez v. Amazon Logis-
        tics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 515 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (holding “that
        personal injury tort claims, including a negligent-hiring claim, are
        within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)’s exception”).
                But it makes little sense for the safety exception to turn on
        whether a plaintiff seeks damages for property loss or bodily in-
        jury—the common law negligence standard is the same no matter
        the damages a breach has caused. Aspen simply alleges that,“[a]s a
        transportation broker,” Landstar “owed a duty” to Tessco “to re-
        tain a reputable motor carrier for the transportation of the subject
        shipment”; Landstar breached this duty by “ignoring its own pro-
        tocols and the information readily available in its system” in select-
        ing the carrier; and “[a]s a direct result,” Aspen “was damaged.” It
        is Landstar’s alleged unreasonableness in selecting a carrier to
        transport Tessco’s shipment that Aspen claims violates Florida law,
        irrespective of the type of damages Aspen sustained as a result.
                Moreover, we see no basis to conclude, as Landstar seems
        to suggest, that tort actions for property damage under Florida law
        are categorically divorced from safety concerns. Take products lia-
        bility actions, “[t]he fundamental purpose” of which “is to further
        public safety in the use of consumer goods.” Porter v. Rosenberg,
        650 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). A cognizable injury in
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 14 of 22

        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10740

        such an action is not limited to personal injury; a plaintiff may also
        bring a products liability action in Florida if a defendant’s unsafe
        product damages the plaintiff’s property. West v. Caterpillar Trac-
        tor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976) (citing Restatement (Second)
        of Torts § 402A (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Safety concerns thus clearly
        animate some tort standards, even if a breach of those standards
        leads only to property loss instead of bodily injury.
               In fact, safety concerns animate the very sort of tort action
        that Aspen asserts here. The allegations in Aspen’s complaint, we
        realize, do not specify any subspecies of Florida negligence law that
        Aspen contends subjects Landstar to liability in this case. Nor was
        it required to. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011)
        (“[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need
        not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise legal theory.”). But
        Aspen’s allegations are comparable to those underlying claims like
        negligent hiring, negligent selection, and negligent entrustment of
        a dangerous instrumentality, each of which is premised on public
        safety concerns under Florida law. In a negligent-hiring claim
        against an employer based on injury caused by an employee, for
        instance, “the ultimate question of liability to be decided is whether
        it was reasonable for the employer to permit the employee to per-
        form his job in the light of information about him which the em-
        ployer should have known.” Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison,
        583 So. 2d 744, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). And Florida courts
        have described the employer’s duty in such an action as “a duty to
        exercise reasonable care in hiring and retaining safe and competent
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023     Page: 15 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                        15

        employees.” Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
        1986). Florida law also recognizes an action for “negligent selection
        of an independent contractor,” which may be brought against a
        principal who “fail[s] to exercise reasonable care to employ a com-
        petent and careful contractor.” Davies v. Com. Metals Co., 46 So.
        3d 71, 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Suarez v. Gonzalez, 820
        So. 2d 342, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). Finally, Florida’s “dan-
        gerous instrumentality doctrine” reflects a special safety concern
        with those who negligently place unfit drivers on the road. “Under
        that long-established doctrine, liability is imposed on the owner of
        an automobile who voluntarily entrusts the vehicle to an individual
        who causes damage to others through the negligent operation of
        the vehicle.” Chandler v. Geico Indem. Co., 78 So. 3d 1293, 1296
        (Fla. 2011).
               Accordingly, the relevant question for our purposes is
        whether Florida’s common law negligence standard, which allows
        claims against a broker based on negligent selection of a carrier, is
        “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus within Florida’s
        “safety regulatory authority.” Our review of Florida negligence law
        convinces us that it is. Cf. Galactic Towing, 341 F.3d at 1251–53
        (holding that a city towing ordinance declaring that “the unauthor-
        ized parking of vehicles that cannot be removed constitutes a pub-
        lic nuisance and public emergency effecting the property, public
        safety and welfare of the citizens” is within the state’s safety regu-
        latory authority). In reaching this conclusion, we express no opin-
        ion on whether the allegations in Aspen’s complaint suffice to state
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 16 of 22

        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10740

        a claim under Florida law. Nor do we suggest that all of Florida
        negligence law reflects a genuine safety concern as opposed to, for
        instance, an interest in cost-spreading. See Jews For Jesus, Inc. v.
        Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1105 (Fla. 2008) (expressing “the view that
        the primary purpose of tort law is that wronged persons should be
        compensated for their injuries and that those responsible for the
        wrong should bear the cost of their tortious conduct”) (cleaned up).
        We hold only that Aspen’s particular claims seek to enforce a stand-
        ard that is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus
        within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority” under 49 U.S.C.
        § 14501(c)(2)(A).
                                          2.

               That Aspen’s state-law claims seek to enforce a standard that
        is within “the safety regulatory authority of a state” is necessary,
        but not sufficient, to sidestep FAAAA preemption. That standard
        must also be “with respect to motor vehicles.” And, here, we agree
        with Landstar that it is not.
               Neither we nor the Supreme Court has ever squarely inter-
        preted this language in the FAAAA. The Supreme Court has previ-
        ously “interpreted ‘with respect to’ in a statute to mean ‘direct re-
        lation to, or impact on.’” In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir.
        2017) (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506
        (1992)) (emphasis added)), aff’d, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v.
        Appling, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1761 (2018) (holding “that a statement is
        ‘respecting’ a debtor’s financial condition” under 11 U.S.C.
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023      Page: 17 of 22

        22-10740                Opinion of the Court                         17

        § 523(a)(2)(B) “if it has a direct relation to or impact on the debtor’s
        overall financial status” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, such
        phrases can “ha[ve] different relevant meanings in different con-
        texts.” See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563
        U.S. 1, 7 (2011); cf. Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1632 (2022)
        (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he word [‘regarding’] can have either
        a broadening or narrowing effect depending on context.”). Accord-
        ingly, we must determine the ordinary meaning of “with respect to
        motor vehicles” in the context of the FAAAA’s safety exception.
                To determine a statute’s ordinary meaning, “we look to
        many sources,” including “canons of interpretation” and the stat-
        ute’s “context.” United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1252 (11th
        Cir. 2021). Having examined these sources, we believe that the
        phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” limits the safety excep-
        tion’s application to state laws that have a direct relationship to mo-
        tor vehicles. This is so for three reasons.
               First, as we have already explained, the Supreme Court has
        determined that the phrase “with respect to the transportation of
        property” in the statute’s immediately preceding subsection “mas-
        sively limits” the scope of that provision. Pelkey, 569 U.S. at 261.
        Given that reading, it only makes sense to read the similar phrase
        “with respect to motor vehicles” as similarly limiting the scope of
        the safety exception that follows. “It would be odd if, in two con-
        secutive subsections of the Code, . . . the same words were read to
        mean one thing in the first subsection but another in the second.”
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 04/13/2023      Page: 18 of 22

        18                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10740

        Hylton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2021). In-
        stead, “[a]ll else being equal, we prefer a reading of the second that
        coheres with binding precedent as to the first.” Id.; see Regions
        Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)
        (“[A] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning
        throughout a text . . . .” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Gar-
        ner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012))).
        Just as the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property”
        “massively limits” the preemption provision, we read the phrase
        “with respect to motor vehicles” to impose a meaningful limit on
        the exception to the preemption provision.
                Second, we can ensure that the phrase “with respect to mo-
        tor vehicles” has an operative effect only by requiring a direct con-
        nection between the state law and motor vehicles. The safety ex-
        ception comes into play only when a state law is covered by the
        preemption provision because that law is “related to a price, route,
        or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight forwarder
        with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C.
        § 14501(c)(1). Of course, every state law that relates to the prices,
        routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker who contracts with a
        motor carrier, or freight forwarder who “uses . . . a [motor] car-
        rier,” id. § 13102(8), will have at least an indirect relationship to mo-
        tor vehicles—motor vehicles are how motor carriers move prop-
        erty from one place to another. See id. § 13102(14). Accordingly, if
        an indirect connection between a state law and a motor vehicle sat-
        isfied the safety exception, then the phrase “with respect to motor
USCA11 Case: 22-10740       Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 04/13/2023       Page: 19 of 22

        22-10740                 Opinion of the Court                           19

        vehicles” would have no meaningful operative effect. That inter-
        pretation would thus violate the “basic premise of statutory con-
        struction . . . that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words
        shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere sur-
        plusage.” United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287
        (11th Cir. 1991).
               Third, this reading leaves a separate field of operation for the
        other exceptions in the statute. In addition to excluding from
        preemption “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect
        to motor vehicles,” the statute also preserves “the authority of a
        State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the
        size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the
        cargo.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). If an indirect connection to mo-
        tor vehicles made a state law “with respect to motor vehicles” for
        the purposes of the safety exception, then Congress’s inclusion of a
        separate exception to allow states to impose highway route con-
        trols and cargo limits would almost certainly be redundant because
        such controls and limits are indirectly related to motor vehicle
        safety, too.
               Accordingly, a mere indirect connection between state reg-
        ulations and motor vehicles will not invoke the FAAAA’s safety ex-
        ception. But we believe an indirect connection is all that exists be-
        tween Aspen’s broker-negligence claims and motor vehicles. Once
        again, a “broker” is “a person . . . that . . . sell[s], provid[es], or ar-
        rang[es] for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49
        U.S.C. § 13102(2). A “motor carrier,” in turn, is “a person providing
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023      Page: 20 of 22

        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10740

        motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” Id. § 13102(14).
        And a “broker,” by definition, may not provide motor vehicle
        transportation for compensation; only a “motor carrier” may per-
        form that task. See id. § 13102(2) (A “broker” is “a person, other
        than a motor carrier”) (emphasis added); 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (“Mo-
        tor carriers . . . are not brokers within the meaning of this section
        when they arrange . . . the transportation of shipments which they
        . . . have accepted . . . to transport.”). Finally, a “motor vehicle” is
        “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or
        drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transporta-
        tion.” Id. § 13102(16). In light of these definitions, a claim against a
        broker is necessarily one step removed from a “motor vehicle” be-
        cause the “definitions make clear that . . . a broker . . . and the ser-
        vices it provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles.” Mil-
        ler, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissent-
        ing in part).
               The specifics of Aspen’s complaint make us even more con-
        fident that Aspen’s claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles”
        within the meaning of the safety exception. Aspen’s complaint says
        nothing at all about motor vehicles. It explains how carriers register
        with Landstar, Landstar’s protocol for verifying a carrier’s contact
        information prior to dispatch, and how Landstar allegedly ne-
        glected this protocol when dispatching Tessco’s shipment to
        “James.” And Aspen’s negligence and gross negligence counts chal-
        lenge only Landstar’s “selection of the motor carrier.” The com-
        plaint does not purport to enforce any standard or regulation on
USCA11 Case: 22-10740     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 21 of 22

        22-10740               Opinion of the Court                       21

        the ownership, maintenance, or operation of “a vehicle, machine,
        tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical
        power and used on a highway in transportation,” 49 U.S.C.
        § 13102(16)—indeed, it doesn’t even specify whether James was
        driving such a device when he absconded with the cargo. Such an
        “attenuated connection” between Aspen’s claims and motor vehi-
        cles “is simply too remote” to fall within the safety exception. Mil-
        ler, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissent-
        ing in part); see Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp.
        3d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (“Because the negligent hiring claim
        seeks to impose a duty on the service of the broker rather than reg-
        ulate motor vehicles . . . the exception does not apply”).
                Aspen’s negligence claims are not “with respect to motor ve-
        hicles” under the FAAAA’s safety exception. They are thus barred
        by its express preemption provision.
                                        IV.

              The district court is AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 22-10740      Document: 33-1       Date Filed: 04/13/2023       Page: 22 of 22

        22-10740                JORDAN, J., Concurring                          1

        JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:
               I join Parts I, II, III.A, III.B.2, and IV of Judge Brasher’s well-
        written opinion, and concur in the judgment affirming the decision
        of the district court.
               Our determination in Part III.B.2 that the negligence claims
        at issue are “not with respect to motor vehicles” dooms Aspen’s
        reliance on 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2), the FAAAA’s safety exception.
        In my view, it is therefore unnecessary to address in Part III.B.1
        whether the negligence standard Aspen seeks to enforce is within
        Florida’s “safety regulatory authority.”