Court Opinion

ID: 9760760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:13:21.625579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:16.954925
License: Public Domain

HUTSON-DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Although I agree with the majority that the detective’s references to appellant’s refusal to submit to the polygraph examination was error, under the circumstances of this case, the references were harmless. The majority contends that the information was unduly persuasive and could not be cured by an instruction to disregard because the complainant was the only witness who could identify appellant as her attacker. I do not feel that this is true.
Ms. Kugler identified appellant as her attacker at trial. The jury knew that Ms. Kugler had been married to appellant for several years and that the couple was going through a contested divorce. Both Officer Young, who was dispatched to the home of Ms. Kugler’s neighbor on the night of the accident, and the neighbor, Katherine Moore, testified that Ms. Kugler had consistently identified appellant as her attacker. The jury could infer that the complainant, as appellant’s spouse, could recognize him as her attacker. Therefore, despite the fact that Ms. Kugler was the only eyewitness to the assault, I do not believe that the detective’s reference to appellant’s refusal to submit to a polygraph effectively “bolstered” her identification of appellant. Under these circumstances, like the court in Williams v. State, 798 S.W.2d 368, 372 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, no pet.), I believe that the detective’s testimony was not of such a character that it could not be cured by a proper instruction to disregard.
Appellant’s attorney objected to the detective’s answers concerning appellant’s refusal to take the polygraph on the basis that polygraph testimony is not to be used as evidence in any criminal trial. The jury heard this explanation and was instructed by the trial court on both occasions to disregard the detective’s responses and not to consider it for any purpose. I believe that the trial court’s instruction to disregard the remark was sufficient to cure any persuasive effect that the information might have had in the minds of the jurors. I would, therefore, hold that the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s request for a new trial or his request for an additional instruction.