Court Opinion

ID: 9948971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:16:58.961456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:32.858384
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1827-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JERGERE E. MINAYA-ACOSTA,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

                   Argued January 23, 2024 – Decided March 8, 2024

                   Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 19-07-0823.

                   Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
                   argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
                   Public Defender, attorney; Alison Gifford, of counsel
                   and on the brief).

                   Edward F. Ray, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Mark Musella, Bergen County
                   Prosecutor, attorney; Edward F. Ray, of counsel and on
                   the brief).

PER CURIAM
        Tried to a jury, defendant Jergere E. Minaya-Acosta, appeals from the

October 13, 2021 judgment of conviction for attempted manslaughter,

endangering an injured victim, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose

and unlawful possession of a weapon, and sentencing him to an aggregate prison

term of fourteen years and eight months. Because clear errors in the jury

instructions were not harmless, we reverse the conviction and remand for further

proceedings.

                                         I.

        The following facts were adduced at trial. In 2019, defendant and R.C.1

were having marital difficulties and she moved out of their apartment into her

brother's apartment, which he had vacated. A short time later, she agreed to

attempt reconciliation and defendant moved into the apartment with her. On

April 19, 2019, which was Good Friday, R.C. left work early in the afternoon

and stopped by church before going home to the apartment. At approximately

3:00 p.m., defendant arrived at the apartment and an argument ensued because

he wanted her to attend church with him and she declined. Defendant gathered

R.C.'s religious items and said he was going to drop them off at church, telling

her, "I think . . . you're possessed, you have the devil on you." He left the

1
    We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. See Rule 1:38-3(c)(12).
                                                                            A-1827-21
                                         2
apartment with her belongings but returned with them a short time later. He told

R.C. he was leaving her and was going to look for a room when he returned, and

then left the apartment again.

      At approximately 8:00 p.m., defendant returned and began playing music,

which R.C. asked him to turn down. They continued to argue, and R.C. went

into her bedroom and locked the door. Defendant then "popped" the door lock

and entered the bedroom. From this point, the testimony diverged as to what

occurred.

R.C.'s Testimony

      R.C. testified defendant "snatched" her cell phone, called her names, and

mocked her. He accused her of having an affair with a woman. While in the

kitchen, he poured bottles of water on her, telling her to calm down. R.C. then

returned to the bedroom, changed her clothes, packed a bag, and attempted to

leave the apartment but defendant prevented her from doing so. He "tossed [her]

around" and when she fell to the floor, he dragged her by her t-shirt and her

"necklace ripped."

      Over the next few hours, R.C. pleaded with defendant to let her leave the

apartment but he prevented her from doing so. He barricaded the top of the

stairs with several chairs and sat on one of them. R.C. tried to go over the railing

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                                         3
of the stairs but defendant kept pushing her back. She grabbed a wooden mortar

and threatened to hit defendant with it if he did not let her leave. Defendant

laughed at her and said, "oh yeah, that's great . . . something for me to tell the

judge." Defendant then took the mortar away from R.C. by twisting her hand .

      R.C. then picked up a paring knife.2 Defendant took the knife from her,

threw it on the floor, took the knife rack, and put "everything near him by the

stairs." R.C. removed defendant's belongings from a closet, threw them in the

living room, and told him if he was not happy he should leave. While going

through his clothes on the floor, defendant picked up a "hook knife" with a

yellow handle and put it in his rear pocket. R.C. took the knife out of defendant's

pocket and threw it down the stairs, but defendant retrieved it.

      R.C. then attempted to run down the stairs but defendant dragged her back

up and she fell to the floor in the living room. Defendant straddled her and

pinned her down with his knee and elbow. She begged him to let her go and he

laughed. In trying to get away from him, R.C. flipped over onto her stomach.

Defendant grabbed R.C. by her hair, pulled her head back, and sliced her neck

2
  R.C. denied she threatened defendant with a knife. During cross-examination,
defense counsel confronted R.C. with her prior statement, wherein she said, "I
had a knife and threatened him with it, but I didn't do anything with it ."
However, R.C. said she did not recall her prior statement.
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with the knife. R.C. felt heat coming from her neck, and defendant pulled her

head back again and sliced her neck a second time.

      Defendant then put a pillow over R.C.'s head and pushed her head into it

with his knee. She said to him, "Just let me die," and told him to cut off her St.

Michael's ankle bracelet so she could "die in peace." Defendant cut the anklet

off and while she lay on the floor, R.C. heard him step over her and the sound

of plastic bags opening and closing.

      Defendant then took a shower, turned off the lights and fan, closed the

windows and shades, and left the apartment. Still bleeding, R.C. got up and

knocked on the neighbors' doors for help, but no one answered. She went around

the corner to a residence where a man answered the door and called 911.

Defendant's Testimony

      Defendant testified R.C. started the physical altercation by picking up a

piece of dental equipment and trying to stab him with it. She accidentally cut

her hand on it and told defendant she was going to call the police and have him

sent to jail because of the injury. Defendant said he took R.C.'s cell phone and

tried to persuade her from leaving the apartment. On cross-examination, he

admitted he did not allow her to leave the apartment but said he did so because

it was 3:00 a.m., raining, and he was "scared about her threat to call the police"

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                                        5
about the cut on her hand. R.C. threatened him with a knife, which he knocked

out of her hand and put in his back pocket.

      R.C. then came at defendant with a knife in one hand and a screwdriver in

the other, swinging at his face. In response, defendant swung at her with his

knife and cut her neck. She lay on the floor and he put a pillow underneath her

head to prop it up. She asked him to remove her ankle bracelet and he slipped

it off, and she said to him, "Minaya, you killed me." He did not intend to kill

R.C. and denied cutting her more than once. Although defendant did not believe

she was dead, he was scared.

      Defendant took off his bloodied jeans and shoes and put them in a garbage

bag with the knife, showered, packed his belongings in the car, and threw out

the bag. While packing his belongings, defendant observed R.C. moving and

breathing, and he put a cell phone close to her so she could call for help.

Defendant left the apartment without calling for help "because he panicked" and

"[his] mind just got blocked." While driving to New York, defendant called the

apartment property manager and asked him to check on R.C., telling him they

had gotten into a fight and he had "unintentionally stabbed" her.       At the

manager's insistence, defendant left his car in New York, called the police and

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                                       6
took a bus back to New Jersey. He ended up on the wrong bus route and reported

to the police department in Englewood instead of Hackensack.

       Defendant conceded that during the subsequent interview with police he

told them that he had killed R.C.; however, at trial he testified he only made that

statement because R.C. said he had "killed" her.

Other Witnesses' Testimony

       A responding police officer testified he observed R.C. "holding her hands

against her neck, bleeding everywhere, and she had a scarf wrapped around her

neck trying to keep the . . . blood in as much as she could." Another officer

observed R.C. covered in blood, describing it as "when you jump in a pool and

you come out and you're totally soaked with water, but instead it was blood " on

her. Inside the apartment, the officer observed bloody prints on the windowsill

and door frame, R.C.'s ankle bracelet lying a pool of blood on the floor and

blood on a pillow and clothing.

       A Hackensack detective was dispatched to the Englewood Police

Department to take defendant into custody. Defendant was read Miranda3 rights

in Spanish, placed under arrest and taken to the Hackensack Police Department.

A search of a dumpster near the apartment uncovered a garbage bag that

3
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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                                        7
contained a knife with a two-inch hooked blade, and bloodied jeans and work

boots.

         Dr. Stephen Cohn, the trauma surgeon who treated R.C., testified she

sustained a neck wound four to five inches long and one centimeter deep, which

had sliced open her trachea and required surgery to close. She also had injuries

to her arms, scrapes on her elbow, a cut on her hand and bruising to her chest

area. She spent a week recovering in the hospital.

                                         II.

         On July 16, 2019, a Bergen County grand jury indicted defendant on

charges of first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3, :5-1 (count one);

third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (count two);

third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -

4(d) (count three); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-5(d) (count four); third-degree stalking for violating a court order,

N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(c) (count five); fourth-degree contempt for violating a court

order, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) (count six); and fourth-degree contempt for violating

an order entered under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-9(b)(1) (count seven). 4

4
    Counts five, six and seven were dismissed prior to trial.
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                                         8
     On July 29, 2021, the court held a hearing pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104 on the

State's motion to admit the statements made by defendant during his police

interview on April 20, 2019. Defendant had been interviewed by Officer Ionnis

Papanikolaou, with Officer Felix Katasaroans interpreting from English to

Spanish and vice versa. On August 3, 2021, the court issued an opinion and

order finding issues with the Miranda warnings given to defendant:

                 Papanikolaou read the words "I have read the
           above statement of my rights and they have been read
           aloud to me. I understand what my rights are, I am
           willing to answer questions without an attorney present.
           No promises or threats have been made to me and no
           pressure or coercion has been used against me."

                  Katasaroans did not translate said statement,
           instead Katasaroans replaced that statement with an
           explanation of his understanding of what Papanikolaou
           had said.     Katasaroans stated[,] "Right now he
           (Papanikolaou) is telling you that you now have read all
           of this and you understand that you are going to speak
           to us and we are not giving you anything, meaning there
           is nothing bad talking to us."

                  This dialogue suggests that the defendant might
           have understood that nothing bad would happen to him
           if he were to speak with the officers. That is completely
           contrary to the message that a defendant be given when
           receiving Miranda warnings.

                  At another moment the defendant asked[,] "Like
           here, like it says up here, this is to sign away the rights,
           like my right that I am giving up[,]" at which point
           Katasaroans interrupted the defendant. The officers did

                                                                          A-1827-21
                                        9
             not make sure that the defendant finished his question.
             The defendant never received an answer yet the officers
             had him sign the Miranda form.

      Although the court found defendant did not knowingly waive his Miranda

rights, it ruled the statement could be used for impeachment:

             A statement acquired contrary to a defendant's Miranda
             rights may still be admissible for impeachment
             purposes if made voluntarily. The jurisprudence is
             based upon the equally compelling goals of fairness at
             trial and a result based upon truth. State v. Burris, 145
             N.J. 509, 533-34 (1996).

      The court found there were significant interpretation issues throughout the

interview.     The interpreter "paraphrased" questions instead of directly

interpreting and, when defendant asked for clarification, the interpreter

"instructed [defendant] as to what Katasaroans thought Papanikolaou had

asked." The court deemed inadmissible those portions of the interview it found

"confusing and misleading," and left further determinations of admissibility to

the time of trial.

      Trial before a judge and jury was conducted from August 16 to 23, 2021.

Defendant invoked self-defense, contending that if the State proved he used or

threatened to use force against R.C. he only did so to protect himself. During

the charge conference, both counsel agreed the court would read the jury charge

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                                       10
on self-defense. The judge charged the jury consistent with the model jury

charges, including the following pertinent provisions:

                   Even if you find that the use of deadly force was
            reasonable, there are limitations on the use of deadly
            force. If you find that the defendant with the purpose
            of causing death or serious bodily harm to another
            person provoked or incited the use of deadly force
            against himself in the same encounter, then the defense
            is not available to him. If you find that the defendant
            knew that he could avoid the necessity of using deadly
            force by retreating, provided that the defendant knew
            he could do so with complete safety, then the defense
            is not available to him.

                   A dwelling includes a porch or other similar
            structure. In your inquiry as to whether a defendant
            who resorted to deadly force knew that an opportunity
            to retreat with complete safety was available, the total
            circumstances, including the attendant excitement
            accompanying the situation, must be considered.

                  The burden of proof on this subject. The Stat[e]
            has the burden to prove to you beyond a reasonable
            doubt that the defense of self-defense is untrue. This
            defense only applies if all the conditions or elements
            previously described exist. The defense must be
            rejected if the State disproves any of the conditions
            beyond a reasonable doubt.

                   The same theory applies to the issue of retreat.
            Remember, that the obligation of the defendant to
            retreat only arises if you find that the defendant resorted
            to the use of deadly force. The burden of proof is upon
            the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
            defendant knew he could've retreated with complete
            safety.

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                                       11
                     If the State carries its burden, then you must
              disallow the defense. If the State does not satisfy this
              burden and you have—and you do have a reasonable
              doubt, then it must be resolved in favor of the defendant
              and you must allow the claim of self- defense and acquit
              the defendant.

        The model jury charge also includes the following passage, which appears

in between the first two paragraphs above: "[CHARGE WHERE APPLICABLE:

An exception to the rule of retreat, however, is that a person need not retreat

from his or her own dwelling, including the porch, unless he/she was the initial

aggressor. A dwelling includes a porch or other similar structure.]." Model Jury

Charges (Criminal), "Justification – Self Defense (In Self Protection), N.J.S.A.

2C:3-4," at 3 (rev. Nov. 13, 2023) 5 (footnotes omitted).          Although it was

applicable here, this provision was not discussed during the charge conference

nor did the court read this additional instruction to the jury.6

5
    This revision did not alter the section on self-defense.
6
  During the charge conference, the court referenced a provision of the proposed
jury instructions regarding duty to retreat: "It says: 'If the defendant does not
resort to the use of deadly force, one who is unlawfully attacked may hold his
position and not retreat.' That’s not really applicable anymore. I think that
should come out." Both counsel agreed to remove that portion of the instruction,
presumably because deadly force had been used.
                                                                             A-1827-21
                                         12
      The judge also charged the jury regarding R.C.'s prior inconsistent

statements. On cross-examination, defendant denied he thought he killed R.C.,

and at sidebar, the State informed the court of its intention to impeach defendant

with the prior statement he made to police that he had killed R.C.

      The following exchange occurred on cross-examination:

                   [PROSECUTOR]: In [the April 20, 2019
            statement to Hackensack police], you told police
            multiple times, that you thought you killed [R.C.],
            didn't you?

                  [DEFENDANT]: Because of what she herself
            told me. She said, Minaya, you killed me.

                 [PROSECUTOR]: You told the police you
            thought she was dead, didn’t you?

                  [DEFENDANT]: Yes, I’m saying, again, I said,
            wow, I killed [R.C.], because I was guided—led by
            what she was saying.

      Defendant made another inconsistent statement about whether R.C. asked

to leave the apartment. He testified on direct examination he was not blocking

the stairs because R.C. never asked to leave. At sidebar, the State informed the

court it intended to impeach defendant with the statement he made to police

wherein he admitted not allowing her to leave. The court instructed the State to

provide the statement it intended to use, and the State pointed to several portions

of the statement where defendant admitted he prevented R.C. from leaving the

                                                                             A-1827-21
                                       13
apartment. Despite having this discussion at sidebar, the State did not impeach

defendant on this issue.

      Contrary to its order on the Miranda hearing, the court did not instruct the

jury that it was only permitted to use defendant's prior inconsistent statements

to evaluate his credibility. Instead, the court instructed the jury it was permitted

to consider defendant's prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.

      The court instructed:

                   Evidence, including statements by a witness,
            prior to the trial showing that at a prior time a witness
            had said something, which is inconsistent with the
            witness' testimony at trial, may be considered by you
            for the purpose of judging the credibility of a witness.
            It may also be considered by you as substantive
            evidence; that is, proof of the truth of what was stated
            in the prior contradictory statement.

                  Evidence has been presented showing that at a
            prior time two people who testified before you said
            something which is inconsistent with the testimony that
            you heard at the trial. This evidence may be considered
            by you as substantive evidence or proof of the truth of
            the prior contradictory statement or omitted statement.

      The court further provided the jury an example of a prior inconsistent

statement, referencing the statement defendant made to the police:

                  [I]n regard to the testimony of [defendant] on
            direct examination he testified that he never . . .
            prevented [R.C.] from leaving the apartment.

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                                        14
            However, on cross-examination inconsistencies were
            shown between his prior statement and that testimony.

      The State, however, had not impeached defendant as to this issue.

      On August 23, 2021, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree

attempted passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser included offense of

attempted murder, third-degree endangering an injured victim, third-degree

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and fourth-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon. On October 8, 2021, he was sentenced to an aggregate

prison term of fourteen years and eight months.

      This appeal follows, in which defendant presents the following issues for

our consideration:

            POINT I
            REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE COURT
            IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE
            DUTY TO RETREAT; A PERSON ATTACKED
            INSIDE THAT PERSON’S OWN DWELLING HAS
            NO SUCH DUTY.

            POINT II
            THE COURT FAILED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE
            PRIOR STATEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT
            COULD BE USED ONLY TO IMPEACH HIS
            CREDIBILITY.

            POINT III
            THE REPEATED DESCRIPTION OF R.C. AS THE
            "VICTIM" BY THE STATE’S WITNESSES
            DIMINISHED   THE    PRESUMPTION      OF

                                                                          A-1827-21
                                     15
            DEFENDANT'S INNOCENCE AND DEPRIVED HIM
            OF A FAIR TRIAL.

            POINT IV
            THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE ERRORS
            DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.

      Because we agree the jury was incorrectly charged on the duty to retreat

and the use of prior inconsistent statements, and these errors were clearly

capable of producing an unjust result, we are constrained to reverse the

conviction. In light of this disposition, we need not reach the other points raised

by defendant.

                                        III.

      It is well settled that "[a]ppropriate and proper charges are essential for a

fair trial." State v. Baum, 224 N.J. 147, 158-59 (2016) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613 (2004)). Jury instructions must

give "a comprehensible explanation of the questions that the jury must

determine, including the law of the case applicable to the facts that the jury may

find." Id. at 159 (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)). The

charge must also be read as a whole and not just the challenged portion, to

determine its overall effect. State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 201 (2017).

      If, like here, defense counsel did not object to the jury charge at trial, the

plain error standard applies. State v. Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182-83 (2012).

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                                       16
Plain error is error that is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Id. at

182; see also R. 2:10-2. In terms of its effect in a jury trial, the error must be

"sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a

result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336

(1971).

      N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a) provides "the use of force upon or toward another

person is justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is

immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of

unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion." This justification

is not without limit. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(2), states in relevant part:

            The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this
            section unless the actor reasonably believes that such
            force is necessary to protect himself against death or
            serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:

            (a) The actor, with the purpose of causing death or
            serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against
            himself in the same encounter; or

            (b) The actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of
            using such force with complete safety by retreating or
            by surrendering possession of a thing to a person
            asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with
            a demand that he abstain from any action which he has
            no duty to take, except that:

                                                                              A-1827-21
                                        17
            (i) The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling,
            unless he was the initial aggressor. 7

      Defendant contends, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to him and consistent with his testimony, R.C. attacked him with a

screwdriver and knife, and he responded by defending himself with a knife.

      The State concedes the jury charge was incorrect but argues the duty to

retreat was immaterial to any issue at trial and not plain error because defendant

was the initial aggressor. The State also contends it "disproved self-defense

because it was not conceivable that defendant, who did not have a scratch on

him, dodged R.C.'s attack and simultaneously caused a five-inch laceration on

her neck with a knife that only had a two-inch blade."

      Here, the jury heard two different versions of the incident and was charged

with deciding those issues of fact. According to defendant, R.C. escalated the

argument into a physical altercation by threatening him with first a mortar and

then a knife, both of which he wrested from her. She then "came at" him again

7
  Prior to 1999, a resident of a dwelling had a duty to retreat when attacked by
a cohabitant. See State v. Gartland, 149 N.J. 456 (1997). Because of the
concerns this duty caused in the context of domestic violence, the Legislature
abolished it, except where the actor was the initial aggressor. See L. 1999, c.
73, § 271.
                                                                            A-1827-21
                                       18
with a knife in one hand and a screwdriver in the other, swinging at his face, and

he slashed at her with a knife in defense of himself.

      We are unpersuaded by the State's arguments because they are premised

on factual determinations within the province of the jury, to be made after it has

been properly charged. If the jury believed even part of defendant's version, it

could have found R.C. escalated the verbal argument to a physical altercation,

to which he responded in self-defense. But because the charge imposed on

defendant a duty to retreat, the jury was foreclosed from considering self-

defense based on the facts presented. This critical error raises reasonable doubt

on whether the jury reached a result it otherwise might not have reached.

      We next turn to the jury charge regarding prior inconsistent statements.

Defendant contends the incorrect charge warrants reversal because the jury was

permitted to consider defendant's statements that he killed R.C. as substantive

evidence, which was clearly capable of impacting the jury's deliberations.

      The State concedes the jury instruction was incorrect but submits the error

is not of reversible proportion because defendant’s belief after the fact was

immaterial to the determination of whether he purposely attempted to cause her

death. The State also argues defendant's statement to police was not wholly

inconsistent with his testimony, which lessens the prejudice of the error.

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                                       19
      After finding the Miranda warnings were insufficient, the court

determined the statements could nevertheless be used to impeach defendant if

he were to testify at trial. Our Supreme Court cautioned in those instances "the

jury should be instructed as to the limited consideration it may give to the

statement and its contents." State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 233 (1975). We

recognize the State did not use this information in presenting its case -in-chief

and did not reference the statement in its closing argument. However, the court's

instruction nevertheless told the jury it was permitted to use the statement as

proof of guilt, and we presume it followed the court's instruction.

      Although defendant's statement that he killed R.C. did not directly prove

an element of manslaughter, we have little doubt it had the capability of

impacting the jury's determination whether defendant purposely attempted to

cause her death. Because this highly prejudicial statement to police impacted

the jury's consideration of whether he was guilty of the charged offenses, the

improper jury instruction was clearly capable of producing an unjust result.

      Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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                                      20