Court Opinion

ID: 9707703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:19:13.465546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:45.606121
License: Public Domain

KONENKAMP, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent on Issue One. This case should be remanded for a voluntariness hearing. If the trial judge determines the statements admitted in the first trial were involuntary, then the statements should be excluded and a new trial ordered. If the judge determines the statements were voluntary, then the judgment should be affirmed. This Court adopted the same procedure in State v. Stumes, 90 S.D. 382, 241 N.W.2d 587 (1976).
Even under the majority’s holding, the trial court must now proceed to conduct a voluntariness hearing before the new trial. If the court determines the statements were voluntary then the new jury will presumably hear the same evidence offered in the first trial. For what purpose then is the majority ordering a new trial? The jury will not be determining the statements’ voluntariness. We adopted the so-called orthodox rule in State v. Thundershield, 83 S.D. 414, 160 N.W.2d 408 (1968), sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Under this rule the “judge solely and finally determines the voluntariness of the confession.... ” Thundershield, 160 N.W.2d at 411. If and only if the trial court on remand determines that the statements were not voluntary, will a new trial be necessary, •because only then will the new jury not be hearing essentially the same evidence the first jury heard.
The United States Supreme Court approved this very procedure thirty years ago:
But if at the conclusion of such an eviden-tiary hearing in the state court on the coercion issue, it is determined that [the defendant’s] confession was voluntarily given, admissible in evidence, and properly to be considered by the jury, we see no constitutional necessity at that point for proceeding with a new trial, for [the defendant] has already been tried by a jury with the confession placed before it and has been found guilty.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. at 394, 84 S.Ct. at 1790; see also Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43, 85 S.Ct. 174,13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964). The Court in Lufkins v. Solem, 716 F.2d 532 (8th Cir.1983), relied upon by the majority, rejected the Supreme Court’s recommendation in Jackson v. Denno, supra, but for two clearly distinguishable reasons not present in this case. First, in Lufkins a new trial was ordered because original trial counsel failed to sequester three “unreliable eyewitnesses” and a new voluntariness hearing could not cure the prejudice to the original jury. Id. at 542. Second, the Lufkins court reasoned:
[E]ven if a full and fair voluntariness hearing determines that Lufkins’ statement was properly admitted during Lufkins’ trial, this would not cure the prejudice caused by the jury’s presence when the trial court took testimony on the voluntariness of Lufkins’ statement and ruled that *713the statement was voluntary for purposes of admissibility.
Id. Here the trial court made no such ruling in the jury’s presence, So unlike in Lufkins, the trial judge did not infringe on the jury’s right to accept or reject Erickson’s statements. Defense counsel’s general objection fails to preserve for appellate review any other purported error. State v. Kaiser, 504 N.W.2d 96 (S.D.1993); State v. Rufener, 392 N.W.2d 424 (S.D.1986), modified in part, 401 N.W.2d 740 (S.D.1987).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice MILLER joins this dissent.