Court Opinion

ID: 9794295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:03:23.699127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:41.002622
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion disposes of this case upon a ground which was neither presented in the court below nor argued on appeal. The defendant’s demurrer was interposed to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not on the ground that it failed to allege the falsity of the alleged defamatory statement, but on the ground that the statement was not libelous. In fact, in the oral argument defendant’s counsel conceded that “by demurring we admit that it [the alleged defamatory statement] was false.” Plaintiff’s counsel now learns for the first time that in an action of libel a complaint is fatally defective even when not attacked by defendant, if it fails to allege the falsity of the statement. This should come as a surprise to him as well as other members of the bar because this court has previously stated in a strong dictum that falsity is not an essential element in pleading defamation. In Thomas v. Bowen, 29 Or 258, 266-267, 45 P 768 (1896) we said:
“* * * ‘The falsity of defamatory words,’ * * * ‘is presumed, because the law will not presume misconduct in a person. If libelous per se, malice is also presumed; and if the defendant pleads their truth, he must prove it, or, in the absence of any *297other defense, respond in damages, at least to some extent * * *.’ The rule is ancient and also well established that where the law presumes a fact it need not be stated in the pleading * * *. The publication being presumed false, scandalous, and defamatory, the allegation of these facts was unnecessary and immaterial; and this being so, the legal presumption, until disputed, supplies the necessary evidence, and the plaintiff was under no obligation, in the first instance, to offer any evidence in support thereof * * *. ‘Where a party * * * grounds his right of action upon a negative allegation he must prove it. It is then material, and a denial raises a material issue. But it is otherwise if he inserts in his complaint a negative allegation which he need not prove in order to make out a prima facie case.’ The plaintiff did not base her right of action on the negative allegations contained in the complaint * *
The majority now proposes to depart from the view we have previously expressed without giving any convincing reasons why we should do so. It is conceded by the majority that it is defendant’s burden to plead and prove truth as an affirmative defense. What purpose is served, then, by requiring plaintiff to allege falsity? It would obviously be a mere formality if, as Thomas v. Bowen, supra, advises us, falsity will be presumed. To insist upon such surplusage is to make a fetish out of technical procedure. It should not be necessary to allege in the complaint anything more than is necessary to apprise the defendant of the theory of plaintiff’s cause of action. Can it be seriously contended that defendant is not so apprised by a complaint which sets out the alleged defamatory words and charges that he wrote and published them “wilfully and maliciously intending to defame plaintiff; thereby holding plaintiff up to public scorn, contempt and *298ridicule all to plaintiff’s general damage in the sum of $25,000”? In what way would the addition of the word “falsity” to the above allegation aid the defendant in the preparation or prosecution of his defense ?
Other states have held in accordance with the view of Thomas v. Bowen, supra, that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege falsity. Atwater v. Morning News Co., 67 Conn 504, 34 A 865, 869 (1896) (“[I]t has never been deemed necessary to allege it [falsity] in the declaration”). Rodger v. American Kennel Club, 131 Misc 312, 226 NYS 451, 453 (1928) (“The failure to allege that the contents of the publication were false does not impair the sufficiency of the pleading, since truth is a matter of affirmative defense by way of justification”).
The Restatement of Torts, § 613① sets forth the parties’ respective burdens of proof in an action for defamation. In a recent case, the Pennsylvania court, in applying a statute identical in terms with § 613, said: “Defendant * * * alleges that the falsity of the statement must be pleaded in the complaint. Such a position is not tenable [by reason of the Pennsylvania statute identical with § 613].” Redeker v. Baltz, 7 D & C2d 605, 608 (Pa 1956). In my opinion this is a sound application of the provisions of § 613.
*299Where plaintiff may recover for a truthful but malicious defamatory statement as well as for a false defamatory statement there is reason for the requirement that plaintiff allege falsity if that is the basis of his charge, because defendant is entitled to know upon which of two available theories plaintiff is relying. See, Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 288 Ill App 79, 5 NE2d 610 (1937); Comerford v. Meier, 302 Mass 398, 19 NE2d 711 (1939).
And there maybe reason for requiring an allegation of falsity where the complaint does not set forth the alleged libelous words. See, Fritschle v. Kettle River Co., 346 Mo 196, 139 SW2d 948 (1940); Hand v. Hand, 23 NJ Misc 118, 41 A2d 270 (1945). Or where a statute is interpreted as requiring it. Glenn v. Gibson, 75 Cal App2d 649, 171 P2d 118 (1946). But cf., Atwater v. Morning News Co., supra. Where these or similar reasons do not exist an allegation of falsity should not be required. And even if we should adopt the rule that falsity must be alleged, the defendant and not this court should raise the issue.
It is my conclusion, therefore, that the complaint was not subject to attack on appeal for failure to allege falsity. I am further of the opinion that the words published by the defendant were libelous per se.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings below.
Sloan, J., joins in this dissent.

 § 613. Burden of Proof.
(1) In an action for defamation the plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised,
(a) the defamatory character of the communication,
(b) its publication by the defendant,
(c) its application to the plaintiff,
(d) the recipient’s understanding of its defamatory meaning,
(e) the recipient’s understanding of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff,
(f) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication,
(g) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
(2) In an action for defamation the defendant has the burden of proving, when the issue is properly raised,
(a) the truth of the defamatory communication,
(b) the privileged character of the occasion on which it was published,
(c) the character of the subject matter of defamatory comment as of public concern.