Court Opinion

ID: 9671148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:56.241378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.327151
License: Public Domain

*969FOUK.NET, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion properly points out that we were influenced in granting a rehearing by the urgent appeal of counsel to reconsider the testimony relating to the excessive speed of the car, which caused the accident, and, tob, the fact that in all three opinions — that of the district court, the Court of Appeal, and the original opinion in this court — the provisions of the state law-applicable to the speed of automobiles driven through unincorporated villages was ignored.
In the majority opinion it is said that “There is nothing in the record to indicate that the locus of the accident was in a village or in an unincorporated village”, and the conclusion is reached that we would not, therefore, “be justified in holding that the accident occurred within the limits of an unincorporated village where the twenty-five mile speed limit prevails”. Section 32 :~ 227 of the 1950 revision is cited.
The author of the majority opinion obviously overlooks that these facts were specifically pleaded and admitted by the defendant.1
. Under the express provisions of the law in effect at the time this accident occurred in 1949, it was “unlawful for any person to operate or drive any passenger motor or other vehicle upon the public roads, highways and bridges of this State * * * at a greater speed than twenty-five (25) miles per hour within or through any town or village not incorporated”, Act 502 of 1948, and any person “so driving * * * shall be held and deemed to be prima facie at fault in and responsible for any accident or damage proximately flowing therefrom or connected therewith * * Act 286 of 1938, LSA-R.S. 32:1 et seq.
This law was obviously adopted to protect people living in small villages that are usually without proper police protection and traffic control from the excessive and unwarranted speed of motorists using their highways, and the plaintiffs are entitled to have their day in court with due consideration given to these admitted facts in the light of this lavy.. ....
*971In any event, it is my opinion that the proximate cause of the accident was the excessive and heedless speed of the motorist who drove recklessly through this thickly ■populated unincorporated village, just at dusk, when it was impossible for the decedent to determine at what speed the car 'was approaching, and this decedent was well within his right in crossing this roadway to rely on the state speed law adopted for his protection.
According to my mathematical calculations, based on the physical facts as disclosed in the record, the driver of the defendant car was travelling nearly 70 miles an hour, as alleged in the petition, and that speed is in violation of all of the state laws governing the speed on any and all highways throughout the state.
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. The petition contains the allegation “That on or about 6:30 p. m., on the 4th day of March, 1949, a 1949 Mercury automobile was being driven by the defendant, Clarence J. Kimble, in a northerly direction on the west side of Bayou Lafourche, along Louisiana State Highway Number 78, in Gut Off, Parish of Lafourche, Louisiana,” (Paragraph 3), and “That Cut Off, Louisiana, is unincorporated and that under the laws of the State of Louisiana the legal speed limits for vehicles travelling in or through said Gut Oif, Louisiana, was, and is no greater than twenty-five (25) miles per hour.” Paragraph 15. In his answer the defendant specifically admits the allegations of Paragraph 3, while those of Paragraph 15 are denied for lack of sufficient information to establish their belief. (Emphasis supplied.)