Court Opinion

ID: 9760594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:02:22.148663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:14.045292
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, J.,
dissenting. I agree with the majority that the defendant’s argument regarding the ten-year construction prohibition was not preserved for appeal. I write separately, however, because I disagree that RSA chapter 651 (2007 & Supp. 2008) imposes no limit on the length of time the trial court may suspend a sentence.
“The constitution assigns to the legislature the power ... to fix the degree, extent and method for punishment.” Doe v. State, 114 N.H. 714, 718 (1974) (citing N.H. Const. pt. II, art. 5). “The statutory development of provisions for criminal sentences has confirmed the common-law power of the courts to suspend either the imposition or the execution of a sentence.” State v. Valrand, 103 N.H. 518, 520 (1961). RSA 651:20 (2007) (amended 2008) provides the trial court with statutory authority to suspend a sentence.
RSA 651:20 is silent, however, as to a time limit for suspension of a sentence. This silence does not mean that no time limit exists. For example, we have previously held that, based on the defendant’s due process right, the trial court cannot suspend a sentence indefinitely. State v. Ingerson, 130 N.H. 112, 114 (1987). In Ingerson, the defendant pleaded no contest to two misdemeanor charges and received a sixty-day suspended sentence conditioned upon good behavior. Id. at 113. The State moved to impose the suspended sentence two and a half years later. Id. We held that “fundamental fairness, a basis for the defendant’s due process right, as provided by part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, entitles [the *325defendant] to be informed about the time period in which the trial court may exercise its authority to call forward either her conviction or her sentence.” Id. at 114.
Due process requires advance notice of the outer limits of a defendant’s sentence. See Stapleford v. Perrin, 122 N.H. 1083, 1087 (1982) (“At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, a defendant and the society which brought him to court must know in plain and certain terms what punishment has been exacted by the court . . . .” ). In Valrand, we addressed whether the trial court could require the defendant to serve an intermittent sentence. Valrand, 103 N.H. at 520. We stated that: “It is conceivable that such a power would be praiseworthy penology but it should be exercised under a comprehensive statute or rule of court which would give some advance notice to the defendant that the power exists.” Id.
Here, the defendant did not have advance notice as to the upper temporal limit of his sentence. On his misdemeanor conviction, the trial court imposed a twelve-month sentence suspended for four years. In the final year, the State called forward the suspended sentence and the trial court imposed nine months and suspended the remaining three months for ten years. At the time of the original sentencing, the defendant could not have known that the twelve-month sentence could be hanging over him for fourteen years. In fact, until the defendant has served the entire twelve months, the trial court may continue to suspend a portion of the sentence for additional periods of time. See State v. Sideris, 157 N.H. 258, 264 (2008). Thus, the defendant still does not know the upper limit of his sentence.
We have only addressed the limits of RSA 651:20 within the context of a due process analysis. Ingerson did not address suspended sentences of a determinate length. Instead we stated: “For us to make a determination on review as to a reasonable temporal limit to be applied in such circumstances as this case under our constitutional supervisory authority would in our view be an invasion of a policy area better decided by the legislature.” Ingerson, 130 N.H. at 117 (emphasis added). The issue in Ingerson, however, was the trial court’s authority to bring forward a suspended sentence indefinitely. That issue required a due process analysis and not statutory interpretation. Thus, we did not interpret the sentencing statutes to determine if the legislature included a time limitation. Here, unlike Ingerson, the trial court suspended the defendant’s sentence for a specific time — four years. To determine whether this was a legal sentence, we must consider the sentencing statutes as a whole, see RSA eh. 651, instead of interpreting RSA 651:20 in isolation. See Appeal of Pinetree Power, 152 N.H. 92, 96 (2005) (‘We interpret statutes not in isolation, but in the context of the overall statutory scheme.”).
*326Both RSA 651:20 and RSA 651:21 (2007) pertain to suspended sentences. RSA 651:20,1, provides, in pertinent part, “[T]he sentence to imprisonment of any person may be suspended by the sentencing court at the time of imposition of the sentence or at any time thereafter in response to a petition to suspend sentence ...” RSA 651:21 provides: “Upon revocation of any suspended sentence the court may order that the defendant serve such sentence in full or in such parts and at such times as is deemed best, may further suspend any part not ordered to be served upon such terms and conditions as the court may order and may place the defendant on probation during the time any portion of the sentence remains suspended.” (Emphasis added.)
Reading RSA 651:20 and RSA 651:21 together provides for a limit on suspended sentences. RSA 651:2, V(a) (2007) limits the period of probation: “The period of probation shall be for a period to be fixed by the court not to exceed 5 years for a felony and 2 years for a class A misdemeanor.” If the trial court is permitted to place the defendant on probation during the time the sentence is suspended and probation can only be for a period of two years for a misdemeanor, it logically follows that the suspended sentence can only be for a period of time not to exceed two years. Otherwise, RSA 651:20 and RSA 651:21 are inconsistent. See State v. Wheeler, 127 N.H. 337, 339 (1985) (“It is well established that where several statutes deal with the same subject matter . . . they should be construed, so far as reasonably possible, not to contradict each other”). Thus, suspending the sentence for four years in this case was impermissible.
This reading of RSA 651:20 and RSA 651:21 finds support in Jackson v. State, 541 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1975), where the Alaska Supreme Court held that the five-year statutory restriction on probation also applies to suspended sentences. Jackson, 541 P.2d at 26. Jackson interpreted the Alaska statute, which provides: “[A] court... may suspend the imposition or execution or balance of the sentence or a portion thereof, and place the defendant on probation for a period and upon the terms and conditions as the court considers best.” Id. at 25. The provision did not contain a time limit for suspended sentences. Id. A separate provision, however, provided that probation “shall not exceed five years.” Id. Jackson looked to the federal probation provision, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651, which used similar language, to hold that the probation restriction also applies to suspended sentences. Jackson, 541 P.2d at 26 (federal cases construing the analogous federal statute held that sentencing court only had authority to suspend sentence when imposing a term of probation). Jackson also compared probation and suspended sentences, stating “a suspended sentence carries with it the mental burdens of a period of probation.” Id.
*327Similarly, here, although RSA 651:20 does not specifically state a time restriction, RSA chapter 651 must be read as a whole and when doing so, there is a temporal limitation on suspended sentences. See People v. Schwartz, 823 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 823 P.2d 1386 (Colo. 1992) (statute authorizes trial court to suspend misdemeanor sentences even though relevant provision did not specify misdemeanors and was included within the felony sentencing scheme).
Although I agree with the majority that this is an area where the legislature can act, given the legislature’s failure to do so for over twenty years since Ingerson, I am doubtful it will. The majority relies upon the legislature’s inaction in support of its analysis that no statutory limitation exists. The legislature, however, is aware of another sentencing statute with language expressly giving the trial court unlimited discretion, see RSA 632-A.TO-a, V(a) (2007) (judge may include a sentence of lifetime supervision), and, thus, if the legislature intended this, it could have amended RSA 651:20 to include it.
The majority also relies upon the history of RSA 651:20 in support of its reasoning that no limitation exists. RSA 607:12 (1955) (repealed 1973) included a three-year time limitation on bringing forward a suspended sentence. The legislature repealed RSA 607:12 with the enactment of the Criminal Code. RSA 651:21, however, was also enacted at the same time as the legislature repealed RSA 607:12. Thus, the legislature’s enactment of RSA 651:21 addressed the time limitation.
The majority’s decision not to adopt a clear rule and instead to read RSA 651:20 in isolation may introduce inconsistency and unpredictability into the sentencing process. Although the trial court has discretion in sentencing, that discretion is not without limitation. “Both the legislature and this court have recognized and accepted the trial court’s need for discretion in sentencing decisions.” Ingerson, 130 N.H. at 115. “It does not necessarily follow, however, that this discretion should be left unbridled.” Id.
Time limitations create consistency within sentencing. See RSA 651:2 (specific time limits). The majority’s holding permits one trial court to suspend a misdemeanor sentence, carrying a maximum one-year sentence, for one year, where another court may suspend the sentence for ten years despite similarly situated defendants. In addition, a defendant who elects to have a trial expecting the maximum punishment to be one year in jail, a fine and two years probation, see RSA 651:2, will be surprised to learn that his one-year sentence may be suspended for ten years. Moreover, presumably defendants pleading guilty will also have to be advised that their potential exposure is not limited to the alternatives specifically identified in RSA 651:2, but that the trial court also has the authority to suspend the sentence well beyond two years for a misdemeanor and five years for a felony.
*328The majority notes that the sentencing discretion “is bounded on a case-by-case basis only by constitutional limitations.” Indeed, at oral argument the State seemed to recognize such when asked the limits of a suspended sentence in this case. The State opined that it would have been appropriate for the defendant’s sentence here to be suspended for ten years at the original hearing. The State acknowledged, however, that based upon the facts of this case, “a defendant could argue that fifteen years on a misdemeanor may be a little excessive,” which the State said would amount to a constitutional challenge. Until we have developed a body of case law in this new area, trial courts will have little guidance. In the meantime, trial courts must anticipate our interpretation of the constitutional limitations on suspended sentences. Rather than waiting for us to develop this area of sentencing law through constitutional challenges, I would adopt a bright line rule now that, in my view, is harmonious with the sentencing statutes.
For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent.