Court Opinion

ID: 9853823
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:55:39.08652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:09.021593
License: Public Domain

*525Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority has failed to apply the correct standard of review by determining whether the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous, the majority today has itself rendered a “clearly erroneous” decision on appeal. In my opinion, application of the correct standard of appellate review mandates an affirmance of the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Sanchezes and against the City. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
“[T]he majority rule is that the unreasonableness of an ordinance need not appear on the face of the ordinance, but may be shown by evidence. ...” 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 18.24 (rev. 3d ed. 1996). See also 5 McQuillin, supra, § 18.26. Although we owe no deference to the trial court regarding the law, “we are bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. . . . [Cits.]” Cannon v. Coweta County, 260 Ga. 56, 58 (2) (389 SE2d 329) (1990). Here, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the portion of the ordinance which requires a minimum one-acre lot size to keep a Vietnamese pot-bellied pig is not substantially related to the public health, safety, or general welfare. This finding is in accordance with the “substantive due process” test. Cannon v. Coweta County, supra at 57 (2). Under that test, the means adopted by the ordinance must have a real and substantial relation to the result sought to be obtained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 525 (54 SC 505, 78 LE 940) (1934); Hayward v. Ramick, 248 Ga. 841, 843 (1) (285 SE2d 697) (1982); Eubanks v. Ferrier, 245 Ga. 763, 766 (4) (267 SE2d 230) (1980).
The trial court heard evidence that, as the lot size increases, Vietnamese pot-bellied pigs which are kept outdoors may, in fact, grow even larger, and the quantity of the resulting fecal matter thus becomes greater. Construed most favorably for the Sanchezes, the evidence also demonstrated that the potential negative impact of the pigs was no greater than that of other household pets, and that the one-acre requirement, which did not apply to owners of other household pets, would not reduce the negative impact of any individual pig. Furthermore, the trial court was able to construe this evidence in the light of its own visit to the present home of the Sanchezes’ pig. This “view” was made upon request of one party and with consent of both parties, as reflected by the record. After the view, the trial court commented that actually seeing the size of the pigs and the extent of runoff, odor, and rooting problems was much better than merely seeing photographs. As to the existence of any benefit from the one-acre requirement, the City’s evidence indicated only that an overall larger area per pig, as with any household pet, may result in less negative impact overall. The trial court also relied on the absence in the ordinance of any set-back requirements for confining the pigs. Where, as *526here, a municipal ordinance imposes a minimum acreage for the keeping of a certain household pet and further limits the number of those household pets per lot to only one, but the evidence shows that the minimum acreage requirement will not be effective in reducing the negative impact produced by each of the household pets, I believe that the trial court was authorized to find that the ordinance is unconstitutionally unreasonable and irrational in imposing the minimum acreage requirement, especially where set-back requirements would suffice to alleviate the negative impact. See Avant v. Douglas County, 253 Ga. 225, 226 (319 SE2d 442) (1984). Accordingly, in my opinion, the trial court was authorized to find by clear and convincing evidence that the one-acre requirement is not substantially related to the public health, safety, or general welfare.
However, I point out that affirmance of the trial court in this case would not mean that such a finding would be demanded as to all minimum acreage requirements for Vietnamese pot-bellied pigs in other jurisdictions in this state. Consequently, I express no opinion regarding the differing local circumstances which may arise in such other jurisdictions and I would hold only that, under the circumstances in this case, the trial court was authorized to find that the one-acre requirement imposed by the City was unconstitutionally unreasonable.
The majority, however, apparently would approve any such minimum acreage requirement so long as the enacting jurisdiction can provide some evidence that the minimum acreage requirement is substantially related to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Thus, the majority has severely limited the role of the trial court in a case of this type. From now on, whenever a trial court fulfils its role as factfinder by weighing the evidence in a constitutional challenge to a local ordinance based on substantive due process, any decision in favor of the challenger will inevitably result in an appeal and almost automatic reversal. Even though the trial court’s findings of fact relate to a constitutional challenge, “[s]uch findings cannot be set aside by the appellate court unless found to be clearly erroneous.” City of Atlanta v. McLennan, 240 Ga. 407, 409 (2) (240 SE2d 881) (1977). See also Cannon v. Coweta County, supra at 58 (2). Similarly, even where, as here, the standard of proof is the “clear and convincing evidence” test, the factfinding and weighing of evidence is to be done in the trial court and the appellate court’s role is to defer to the lower court in the area of factfinding. In the Interest of E.C., 225 Ga. App. 12, 19 (482 SE2d 522) (1997). “It is not our role on appeal to substitute our view of the evidence for that of the trial court. [Cit.]” Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, 248 Ga. 383, 384 (2) (283 SE2d 452) (1981). The trial court, having viewed the premises where the Sanchezes’ pig is now kept, was in a better position to form an opin*527ion as to the one-acre requirement than is this Court from the reported evidence alone. Rogers v. Western & Atlantic R., 209 Ga. 450 (4) (74 SE2d 87) (1953). Although I may or may not have reached the same conclusion as the majority had I been the trial judge, it is clear that this Court should not disturb the trial court’s detailed findings of fact which were based upon hearing and observing the sworn witnesses, reviewing the documentary evidence and attending the view. These findings are not clearly erroneous. See Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Sibley, supra. “ ‘ “On appeal, this court must not substitute its judgment for that exercised by the trial court when there is some support for the trial court’s conclusion.” ’ ” Leventhal v. Seiter, 208 Ga. App. 158, 164 (8) (430 SE2d 378) (1993). I think it ironic that, while accusing the trial court of substituting its judgment for the legislative decision of the City, the majority itself has acted in place of the trial court and has substituted its judgment for that of the trial court. Rather than properly affirming the judgment on the basis that the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, the majority effectively reweighs the facts for itself in order to conclude that the one-acre requirement is substantially related to the public health, safety, or general welfare. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
Decided October 6, 1997 —
Reconsideration denied October 31, 1997.
Jenkins & Nelson, Kirk R. Fjelstul, Judd T Drake, for appellant.
Arnold S. Kaye, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.