Court Opinion

ID: 9952766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 18:02:42.647594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:25.481383
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/20/24 P. v. Isais CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062109

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 22CF0425)

 JESSE GARCIA ISAIS,                                                   OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard
M. King and Cheri T. Pham, Judges. Affirmed.
                   Michaela Dalton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and
Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in a
warrantless search, Jesse Garcia Isais pled guilty to possession of fentanyl for sale,
sale/transportation of fentanyl for sale, possession of methamphetamine for sale, and
sale/transportation of methamphetamine for sale. He now appeals from the judgment of
conviction, claiming the court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. Given the
totality of the circumstances of Isais’s encounter with the police, we find the court did not
err in denying the motion to suppress and affirm the judgment.
                          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
               On February 17, 2022, at approximately 10:35 a.m., Santa Ana Police
Officer Duarte and Deputy Probation Officer Rollon entered a parking lot in Santa Ana in
a marked police car.1 A gray Nissan was parked in the west side of the lot. There were
no other vehicles near the Nissan, but a man was standing outside the driver’s window.
When the man saw the police car enter the parking lot, he began to walk away. Based on
his experience, Officer Duarte recognized the man’s “distancing of himself” from the
Nissan upon seeing the officers as behavior consistent with a potential narcotics sale.
Officer Duarte had 10 years of experience as a police officer and had made over a dozen
narcotics arrests and participated in more than a hundred investigations involving
narcotics sales. He had patrolled the area before and understood it was adjacent to a high
narcotics traffic area.
               Officer Duarte believed the Nissan was occupied, and he confirmed that
belief by circling the police car around the Nissan. He then parked the police car a short
distance behind the Nissan. Officer Duarte did not block the Nissan with the patrol car or
in any way impede the Nissan’s ability to pull away simply by moving forward.

1 The description of the facts of Isais’s encounter with the officers is taken from the
reporter’s transcript of the suppression hearing and a videotape of the encounter, which
was captured on Officer Duarte’s body camera and introduced into evidence at the
hearing on the suppression motion.

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Throughout the encounter, the Nissan had an unobstructed exit path. Officer Duarte did
not activate his patrol car’s lights or sirens or shine either a flashlight or a search light
into or on the Nissan.
               Officer Duarte got out of his car and approached the Nissan, which was
occupied by three passengers, two in the front seat and one in the back seat behind the
driver. He stood outside the window of the passenger seat behind the driver. Without
having been asked to do so, the driver’s side passenger rolled the window down part way.
Officer Duarte said, “What’s up man? You alright?” and then asked the passenger if he
was still on probation. The passenger said he was not. After asking, “You sure?” Officer
Duarte asked the passenger to roll the window a little further down and said, “What are
you guys up to?” After making a lighthearted remark about “just eating cocoa puffs,”
Officer Duarte again asked the passenger if he had cleared his probation. When the
passenger responded in the affirmative, Officer Duarte then asked Isais, the driver, “What
about you, bud?” Isais responded he was on a “109” probation. After asking Isais for the
name of his probation officer, Officer Duarte, who was still standing outside the driver’s
side passenger door, told the passenger to “stop moving around” and instructed Isais to
put his hands on the steering wheel. Isais complied, and Officer Duarte responded,
“thanks buddy.” At this point, over a minute had elapsed since Officer Duarte exited his
vehicle. A subsequent warrantless search of the Nissan revealed fentanyl,
methamphetamine, and a cell phone with text exchanges regarding drugs.
               During Officer Duarte’s verbal exchanges with Isais and the other
passenger, Officer Rollon was standing to the back right side of the Nissan. He did not
direct any comments or questions to the passengers. Throughout the exchange with the
occupants of the Nissan, Officer Duarte’s tone and demeanor were calm. He did not raise
his voice or speak harshly. Neither Officer Duarte nor Officer Rollon unholstered their

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service weapons or brandished them at any time. Neither officer threatened to draw their
weapons.
              Isais was charged with violating Health and Safety Code sections 11351
(possession of a controlled substance [fentanyl] for sale; count 1), 11352, subdivision (a)
(sale/transportation for sale of a controlled substance [fentanyl]; count 2), 11378
(possession of a controlled substance [methamphetamine] for sale; count 3), and 11379,
subdivision (a) (sale/transportation for sale of a controlled substance [methamphetamine];
count 4).
       Following a preliminary hearing, Isais filed a motion to suppress the evidence
seized from the Nissan, claiming he was unlawfully detained and the search of the car
violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the
California Constitution, article I, sections 1 and 13. The trial court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the motion, at which only Officer Duarte testified. At the hearing,
the People acknowledged that once Officer Duarte instructed Isais to put his hands on the
steering wheel, a detention occurred because at that juncture “[Isais’s] freedom had been
limited in some way.” Thus, the parties agreed the question presented by the motion was
whether a detention occurred prior to that instruction. Following the hearing, the court
denied the motion to suppress.
              Isais then pleaded guilty to all counts and was sentenced to two years on
count 1, two years on count 3, and two years on count 4, all to be served concurrently.
He now appeals the ruling on the motion to suppress.
                                       DISCUSSION
              “‘In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we
defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by
substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining

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whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’” (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.)
              Isais argues the search of his car and seizure of evidence from it violated
the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.
Isais contends that, from the very beginning of the encounter, “the officers’ shows of
authority would cause a reasonable person under these circumstances to not feel free to
leave” and, accordingly, by the time Isais told Officer Duarte of his probation status, he
already had been detained within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
              “[E]vidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used
in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” (United
States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 347.) “For purposes of Fourth Amendment
analysis, ‘police “contacts” or “interactions” with individuals’ include consensual
encounters, detentions, and arrests, with consensual encounters being the least intrusive,
and arrests the most intrusive, of these contacts.” (People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21
Cal.App.5th 1146, 1152–1153.) An encounter is consensual when an officer approaches
a person in a public place and asks questions, and the person voluntarily answers those
questions. Consensual encounters do not violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v.
Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974 [“consensual encounters present no constitutional
concerns and do not require justification”].) If, however, an officer uses authority or
physical force to restrain someone, that is a seizure and must be justified under the Fourth
Amendment. (Ibid.) A person is restrained “‘if “in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave,”’ or ‘“otherwise terminate the encounter”’ [citation], and if the person actually
submits to the show of authority [citation].” (Ibid.)
              A recent California Supreme Court case, People v. Tacardon (2022) 14
Cal.5th 235 (Tacardon), is instructive on the difference between a consensual encounter

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and a detention. In Tacardon, the officer noticed three individuals sitting in a car legally
parked on the street, saw smoke coming from the windows, made eye contact with the
occupants of the car as he drove past, then made a U-turn and parked 15-20 feet behind
the car. The officer turned on his spotlight and directed it at the car, and then walked
toward the car. Using a flashlight to illuminate the car’s interior, the officer asked the
occupants to identify themselves and asked the driver (Tacardon) if he was on probation
or parole. The Supreme Court held these facts and circumstances did not amount to a
detention of Tacardon. (Id. at p. 248 [“under the totality of the circumstances here,
Tacardon was not detained”].)2
              The facts of Officer Duarte’s encounter with Isais are strikingly similar to
those found not to be a detention in Tacardon. Here, the officers saw at least one
individual sitting in a legally parked car and observed something that suggested a
potential narcotics sale. They circled the car, parked behind it, and walked toward the
car. One of the officers asked two of the passengers if they were on probation. The other
officer said nothing. As in Tacardon, this does not amount to a detention.
              Citing People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100 (Garry) and People v.
Kasrawi (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 751 (Kasrawi), Isais argues he was detained because the
officers “immediately and hurriedly” approached the Nissan from two sides once they
had parked and immediately asked about the occupants’ probationary status. (Garry, at
pp. 1111–1112.) In Garry, the officer “all but ran directly at [the defendant], covering 35
feet in just two and one-half to three seconds, asking defendant about his legal status as

2 The California Supreme Court nevertheless remanded the case for a determination of
whether Tacardon was aware the officer had, while walking toward the car, directed a
female passenger, who had exited the car, to stand in a certain location. The Supreme
Court concluded the officer’s show of authority toward the female passenger could have
communicated to Tacardon that he was not free to leave. (Id. at pp. 253–255.)

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he did so.” (Id. at p. 1112.) In Kasrawi, the defendant was handcuffed only 15 seconds
after the officer got out of his car. (Kasrawi, at p. 755.)
              The facts here—particularly as shown on the video of the encounter—do
not support Isais’s arguments. Unlike the officers in Garry and Kasrawi, Officer Duarte
did not run toward the Nissan or even move rapidly. Like the officer in Tacardon
(Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 239), Officer Duarte walked from his police car to the
Nissan. It took him approximately 12 seconds from the time he stepped out of the police
car to reach the Nissan and another approximately 8 seconds to begin speaking to the
passengers. He then spent about 22 seconds speaking with the passenger in the back seat
and generally to the passengers in the car before speaking directly to Isais. About 6
seconds later, Isais acknowledged he was on “109” probation. Once Isais said he was on
a “109” probation, Officer Duarte was entitled, by law, to detain him and conduct a
search without a warrant.3 Officer Duarte waited more than 18 seconds after learning
Isais was on PRCS before detaining him by directing him to place his hands on the
steering wheel.
              From the time Officer Duarte stepped out of his patrol car to the time he
asked Isais to put his hands on the steering wheel, more than a minute elapsed. Neither
officer stood in front of the Nissan or tried to block it. Until Isais acknowledged his

3 Assembly Bill 109 (Stats. 2011, Ch. 15, § 479), enacted as Penal Code section 3450 et
seq., creates an alternative to traditional probation and parole, known as Postrelease
Community Supervision or PRCS. By statute, all individuals placed on PRCS are subject
to warrantless search. (Pen. Code, § 3465 [individuals placed on PRCS and their
residences and possessions “shall be subject to search and seizure at any time of the day
or night, with or without a warrant”].) “[A]n officer’s knowledge that [an] individual is
on PRCS is equivalent to knowledge that he or she is subject to a search condition.”
(People v. Douglas (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 865.)

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probation status, neither Officer Duarte nor Officer Rollon made any attempt to limit his
movement or that of his vehicle.
              Isais also argues he was detained as soon as the officers exited their patrol
car because the second officer, Officer Rollon, was “handling his gun,” “display[ing] his
firearm,” and “exhibiting his weapon in an intimidating way” during the encounter.
Neither the testimony at the suppression hearing nor the videotape of the encounter
supports these assertions. At most, the video shows that at times Officer Rollon rested
his hand on his weapon, but there is no evidence he drew it, brandished it, or handled it at
all, much less in an “intimidating” manner.
              Isais’s reliance on United States v. Chan-Jimenez (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d
1324 (Chan-Jimenez) is unavailing. In Chan-Jimenez, a police officer in an unmarked
vehicle followed the defendant’s truck for a mile and a half and, when the truck pulled
over and the driver raised the hood, the officer pulled behind the truck and activated his
emergency light. After getting out of his car, the officer identified himself and asked for
the driver’s license and registration. The driver complied and the officer confirmed they
were in order. The officer did not, however, return the license and registration. Instead,
while retaining the driver’s documents and with his hand on his revolver, the officer
asked the driver if he could search the truck. The officer did not administer any warnings
under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) or inform the driver of his
right to refuse to consent to the search. The driver did not respond verbally to the
officer’s request for permission to search the truck. Instead, he walked to the back of the
truck and lifted the tarp covering the truck bed.
              The Chan-Jimenez court considered two issues: First, whether the
encounter between the driver and the officer was a seizure, and second, whether the
driver voluntarily consented to the search of his truck. The court found the driver was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer “obtained and
failed to return his driver’s license and registration, and proceeded with an investigation.”

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(Chan-Jimenez, supra, 125 F.3d at p. 1326.) The court noted the driver could not
lawfully have driven away without the documents. The court separately found the driver
did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search under the totality of the
circumstances. (Ibid. [the driver had been seized, no Miranda warning was given, the
driver was not informed of his right to refuse to consent, and the officer kept his hand on
his revolver at all times].)
               The totality of the circumstances here is very different from that in Chan-
Jimenez. Officer Duarte did not ask for, take, or retain anyone’s documentation. Officer
Duarte did not have his hand on his gun at any time. Officer Rollon did not have his
hand on his gun at all times. There is no issue of consent to search because once Isais
admitted he was on probation with a search condition, the search was lawful.
               We conclude the officers’ initial encounter with Isais was consensual. It
became a detention only after Isais advised Officer Duarte he was on a PRCS probation
and Officer Duarte then lawfully detained Isais pursuant to his PRCS search condition.
Accordingly, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court did not
err in denying Isais’s motion to suppress.4

4 Because we determine the initial encounter was consensual, we need not address the
issue of reasonable suspicion raised by Isais.

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                                  DISPOSITION

            The judgment is affirmed.

                                             GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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