Court Opinion

ID: 9962067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 16:12:26.863043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:47.360705
License: Public Domain

J-S08043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  RASHAWN DAVID WILLIAMS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1377 MDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 28, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-41-CR-0001442-2017

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                          FILED: APRIL 22, 2024

       Appellant, Rashawn David Williams, appeals from the order entered in

the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County dismissing his first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. After careful consideration, we affirm.

       This Court has previously set forth the relevant facts and procedural

history of Appellant’s underlying homicide case as follows:

       On June 22, 2017, at approximately 1:10 a.m., Williamsport City
       Police responded to an emergency call regarding a stabbing at the
       corner of Locust Street and Center Place in Lycoming County,
       Pennsylvania. N.T., 10/15/2018, at 23-24. Police discovered “a
       white male, mid-30s laying on the sidewalk ... bleeding heavily.”
       Id. at 24. The investigating officer performed CPR after not
       finding the victim's pulse. Id. at 29. Emergency medical
       personnel also responded, but the victim died later at the hospital.
       Id. at 33.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S08043-24

     Three unrelated eyewitnesses on the scene told police that just
     prior to the stabbing they heard someone repeatedly yelling, “Stop
     it. You're killing me.” Id. at 47-83. Each of the eyewitnesses ran
     toward the screams until they came upon the bleeding victim who
     was lying on the street. Id. One of the eyewitnesses, John Miller,
     who was approximately 50 feet away from the incident, described
     a “scuffle” wherein the victim was on the ground, with another
     man standing over him. Id. at 47-51. Another witness, Travis
     McCarthy, who was in his apartment on Locust Street watching a
     movie, ran outside and toward the screams. Id. at 54-56.
     Although he did not see a weapon, McCarthy saw a “person [ ] on
     top of another” swinging both arms. Id. at 57. McCarthy could
     not identify the alleged attacker, but saw him run into a residence,
     later identified as 321 Locust Street, where Appellant lived. Id.
     at 57-58. McCarthy saw the victim lying in a pool of blood and
     yelled at the purported attacker to come back outside. Id. Beth
     Luckner who was outside gardening nearby also responded to the
     screams and saw the victim lying in a pool of blood. Id. at 72-
     73. She witnessed McCarthy yelling at the alleged attacker and
     pointing at the residence where he retreated. Id. at 73. Luckner
     called the police, waited for their arrival, and assisted with
     rendering aid to the victim. Id. at 74-75.

     When police arrived, they surrounded the residence at 321 Locust
     Street. Id. at 81. Police apprehended Appellant on the back
     porch. Id. at 84. Appellant was visibly sweaty and dropped a
     cellular telephone when police arrested him. Id. at 85. When
     later told he was to be charged with homicide and related
     offenses, Appellant claimed the victim came into his home and
     that he had the right to defend himself and his family. Id. at 113.

     In a subsequent search of Appellant's residence, police recovered
     a damaged knife from the kitchen sink. Id. at 163. The tip of the
     knife's blade was missing. Id. Police also testified that they
     smelled the strong odor of bleach and found a bucket of bleach
     water on the floor in the kitchen. Id. at 32 and 105. From the
     second floor, police recovered a man's slipper and white towels
     that appeared to be stained with blood. Id. at 158-163. Police
     additionally observed and collected samples of drops of blood on
     the living room television, inside and outside of the exterior front
     door threshold, and from the front porch. Id. at 164-165. There
     were broken spindles and traces of blood on the railing around the
     front porch. Id. at 123. In addition, police observed a plastic
     outdoor chair with bloodstains overturned in the yard. Id. at 124.

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     Police also documented bloodstains on a wall leading to Locust
     Street where the victim was found. Id. at 127-129. The
     bloodstains were located approximately seven to eight feet from
     the ground, which police later described at trial as “cast off.” Id.

     In a subsequent autopsy, a forensic pathologist confirmed that the
     victim died as a result of 35 stab wounds to the face, neck, back,
     chest, arms, and hands. N.T., 10/17/2018, at 104-135. The
     pathologist recovered a knife tip lodged in the victim's cheekbone.
     Id. at 116. A microscopic comparison of that knife tip with the
     knife blade recovered from Appellant's sink revealed “one entity
     before being fractured.” N.T., 10/16/2018, at 93. Subsequent
     testing revealed the presence of the victim's DNA on the recovered
     bloody slipper, a bloody white towel found in a second floor
     bathroom, the blood found on the living room television, as well
     as inside and outside the threshold to the front door. Id. at 62-
     83. There was no blood found on the knife recovered from the
     sink. Id. at 39.

     A six-day jury trial commenced on October 15, 2018, wherein the
     Commonwealth presented the aforementioned evidence.
     Appellant testified in his own defense. In his [brief on direct
     appeal], he summarize[d] his testimony as follows:

           The defense asserted that [Appellant] suffers from
           Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder [(PTSD)] and had
           been the victim of sexual assaults as a minor. He
           testified that [the victim] entered his home without
           his permission, grabbed [Appellant's] groin, and
           attempted to sexually assault him. [Appellant]
           grabbed a knife to scare him, but [the victim] kept
           coming at him. Then [Appellant] said he blacked out
           or went into a rage and did not recall stabbing [the
           victim] but acknowledged doing so.

           ...

           With respect to the events of the evening, Appellant
           testified that the decedent came through an unlocked
           door into his apartment [and] touched his thigh and
           [buttocks] without his permission.        [Appellant]
           repeatedly asked the decedent to leave the residence,
           but he refused to do so, saying, “Pussy, I'm not
           leaving here until I get what I want.” After saying

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          this, the decedent touched [Appellant's] groin and
          when [Appellant] tried to swat his hand away, [the
          victim] sprayed mace at [Appellant], while repeatedly
          saying, “I'm not leaving until I get what I want.” A
          struggle ensued with the decedent touching
          [Appellant] in his “private area.” When [Appellant]
          went to the kitchen, the decedent threw a chair at
          [Appellant], and in response, [Appellant] picked up a
          knife to scare the decedent, but it didn't work and
          [Appellant] kept trying to push him away. They
          continued to struggle when the decedent maced
          [Appellant] in the neck and chest, and a third time in
          the face. It was at this point that [Appellant] stabbed
          the decedent for the first time.

          Eventually, they ended up outside, because
          [Appellant] wanted the decedent out of the house, but
          when [Appellant] attempted to get back into the
          apartment, the decedent pulled on [Appellant's] shirt
          and he fell to the bottom of the steps, where the
          decedent threw a chair at him. [Appellant] tried to
          ascend the stairs to get back into the apartment. At
          that point, the decedent was grabbing [Appellant] by
          his lower half and had hold of his groin, and
          [Appellant] blacked out, and stabbed the decedent to
          get him away from him. By this time, the two had
          fallen over the banister of [Appellant's] front porch,
          and the decedent got up and walked across the street
          and collapsed, with [Appellant] following to make sure
          he didn't get up and come back after him.

     Brief of Appellant on Direct Appeal, at 9-10 (record citations
     omitted).

     To rebut Appellant's defense, at trial, the Commonwealth also
     presented evidence of a secret romantic relationship between
     Appellant and the victim. The victim's mother testified that her
     son was openly gay. N.T., 10/15/2018, at 38. The victim often
     wore women's capris pants, lipstick, and women's perfume and he
     regularly carried a purse. Id. at 38-39. Police recovered two
     cellular telephones from the victim—one on the street in a pool of
     the victim's blood and the other from inside the victim's purse.
     N.T., 10/16/2018, at 122-123. The victim's mother confirmed one
     of the victim's cellular telephone numbers. N.T., 10/15/2018, at

                                   -4-
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     38. As previously mentioned, police also recovered a cellular
     telephone that Appellant dropped on the back porch when he was
     apprehended. N.T., 10/16/2018, at 123. In an interview with
     police, Appellant confirmed his cellular telephone number. N.T.,
     10/17/2018, at 30-31. Police served search warrants on the
     cellular telephone service providers and obtained the records for
     all three cellular telephone numbers for the month prior to the
     stabbing. N.T., 10/16/2018, at 28-34.              At trial, the
     Commonwealth presented evidence of specific text messages
     between Appellant and the victim. Id. at 47-55. During the
     month leading up to the incident, Appellant and the victim
     contacted each other 363 times.              Id. at 44-45. The
     Commonwealth also presented records indicating that Appellant
     initiated lengthy, late-night conversations with the victim almost
     daily.    N.T., 10/18/2018, at 58-60.         The Commonwealth
     confronted Appellant with evidence of the internet browsing
     history from the cellular telephone associated with him, which
     showed searches for “shemale porn videos,” “transvestite porn,”
     “free gay porn,” and “hermaphrodite porn.”          Id. at 80-82.
     Appellant denied conducting those internet searches and claimed
     that another roommate staying with him at the time had access
     to his cellular telephone. Id. at 67-68 and 80-82. Appellant,
     however, confirmed that audio call records showed that there
     were telephone calls from Appellant's cellular telephone to the
     victim immediately after the aforementioned internet searches.
     Id. at 80-82. Appellant denied having photographs depicting
     partially naked men stored on his cellular telephone. Id. at 68.
     Upon cross-examining Appellant, the Commonwealth presented
     evidence of a photograph of a man in a jock strap retrieved from
     the images section of Appellant's cellular telephone. N.T.,
     10/19/2018, at 72-73. Appellant claimed that he was unaware
     that the photograph was stored on his cellular telephone. Id.

     Additionally, two experts testified at trial—Dr. Scott Scotilla and
     Dr. William Anthony Cox. Dr. Scotilla, an expert in forensic
     psychology, evaluated Appellant, diagnosed Appellant with Post-
     Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and testified about Appellant's
     history of physical and sexual abuse and neglect. N.T.,
     10/18/2018, at 147-218. Dr. Cox, a forensic pathologist and
     neuropathologist, testified regarding the toxicology report that
     was prepared as part of the victim's autopsy. N.T., 10/19/2018,
     at 34-60. The toxicology report indicated the presence of alcohol,
     Alprazolam (an antidepressant), Clonazepam (an anticonvulsant),
     amphetamines, methadone, cocaine, and tetrahydrocannabinol

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      (THC, a metabolite of marijuana) in the victim's blood. Id. Dr.
      Cox explained the general effects of each of these substances. Id.
      At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Appellant of the
      aforementioned crimes. On December 17, 2018, the trial court
      sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of
      parole for first-degree murder. The trial court imposed sentences
      of five to ten years of incarceration for aggravated assault,3 one
      to two years of imprisonment for tampering with physical
      evidence, and one to two years of incarceration for obstruction of
      the administration of law. The trial court imposed these sentences
      consecutively to the sentence for first-degree murder and to each
      other. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking a
      new trial and reconsideration of his sentence. The trial court
      denied relief by order entered on May 22, 2019. On June 3, 2019,
      the trial court issued an accompanying opinion for the reasons it
      denied relief.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 241 A.3d 1094, 1097–100 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      On June 4, 2019, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. In his direct appeal,

he raised various issues of trial court error, one of which challenged the trial

court’s ruling that limited the scope of testimony offered by defense experts

Dr. Scotilla and Dr. Cox regarding the content of their respective written

expert reports. On October 8, 2020, this Court rejected all appellate issues

and affirmed judgment of sentence. Appellant filed no petition for allowance

of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      On April 19, 2021, Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition. Through

court appointed counsel, he filed an amended petition asserting that his

defense team ineffectively failed to ensure that each expert report contained

the factual account upon which each doctor based his opinion. At the PCRA

evidentiary hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that the trial court had issued

a pretrial directive that an expert report must include the factual account of

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the conflict upon which any expert opinion was based if the defense wished to

present at trial expert testimony based upon either Appellant’s or the victim’s

behavior during their encounter. N.T., 8/22/22, at 12, 14, 17.     Trial counsel

also confirmed that neither expert report submitted prior to trial contained

such a factual report. N.T. at 18-22.

      The trial court thus precluded the defense from eliciting expert

testimony from clinical psychologist Dr. Scotilla that Appellant’s violent

conduct forming the basis for the charge of homicide was a manifestation of

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), which produced a hypervigilant act

of self-defense. In other words, he could not state directly that in his opinion

Appellant acted in the heat of passion.     N.T. at 22-23.    Dr. Scotilla was

permitted to testify, however, that a person diagnosed with PTSD placed in

the scenario in which Appellant allegedly found himself would be far more

vulnerable to an emotional overreaction than would a person without PTSD.

      Similarly, the failure of expert toxicologist Dr. Cox to indicate in his

written report that he based his opinion on Appellant’s factual allegations

precluded him from offering at trial the opinion that the victim would have

exhibited aggressive behavior attributed to him by Appellant based on the

toxicology report indicating significant levels of narcotics were present in the

victim’s blood at the time of his death. Dr. Cox, however, was permitted to

testify that the victim’s aggressive behaviors as alleged by Appellant could be

consistent with what one could reasonably expect from a person with a

toxicology screen like the victim’s. N.T. at 24-25.

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      At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied

Appellant’s petition as meritless. This timely appeal followed.

      Appellant’s counseled brief presents the following questions for this

Court’s review:

      1. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
         properly preserve Dr. Scott Scotilla’s testimony through the
         submission of a complete expert report despite receiving
         pretrial notice that the report needed amended [sic] and this
         failure resulted in Mr. Williams being prohibited by the trial
         court from presenting his defense to the jury which denied him
         a fair trial.

      2. Trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to
         properly preserve Dr. William Anthony Cox’s testimony through
         the submission of a complete expert report despite receiving
         pretrial notice that the report needed amended [sic] and this
         failure resulted in Mr. Williams being prohibited by the trial
         court from presenting his defense to the jury which denied him
         a fair trial.

      3. Even if this Court holds the individual failures set forth above
         are insufficient to merit Mr. Williams’ receipt of a new trial, the
         cumulative prejudice from being denied the opportunity to
         utilize the above expert testimony explaining what occurred on
         June 22, 2017 resulted in Mr. Williams being prohibited by the
         trial court from presenting his defense to the jury which denied
         him a fair trial.

Brief of Appellant, at 4.

       “We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is

supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of

a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar,

154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). However, we afford “great

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deference” to the PCRA court's credibility determinations. Commonwealth

v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021). As our Supreme Court has

explained:

      We will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court if they are
      supported by the record, even where the record could support a
      contrary holding. [An appellate court's] scope of review is limited
      to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record
      of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to
      the prevailing party.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

resulted from “one or more” of the seven, specifically enumerated

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in

the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d

1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead

and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

      (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular
      course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some
      reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests; and, (3) but
      for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that

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      the outcome of the challenged proceedings would have been
      different.

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court has

explained:

      A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
      accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth v.
      Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) (“if a petitioner raises
      allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do not establish the
      underlying claim ..., he or she will have failed to establish the
      arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether the facts rise
      to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.

      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel's decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

      In Appellant’s first two issues, he contends that trial counsel ineffectively

failed to heed the trial court’s pretrial admonition to ensure that the defense

expert reports of clinical psychologist Dr. Scotilla and toxicologist Dr. Cox,

respectively, contained Appellant’s factual account of the victim’s alleged

attack against him that purportedly triggered Appellant’s hypervigilant self-

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defense response. Because the expert reports failed to incorporate Appellant’s

factual account upon which Appellant’s mental infirmity-based self-defense

defense was based, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to

preclude   defense   expert   testimony   that   Appellant’s   response   was a

manifestation of his PTSD and that the victim’s act of aggression was a

manifestation of his drug use as reflected in post-mortem toxicology blood

test results.

      At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, PCRA counsel admitted that Dr. Scotilla

was allowed to testify Appellant suffers from PTSD and people who suffer from

PTSD often overreact in emotional ways where people without PTSD would not

react that way. N.T., 8/22/22, at 3-4. She conceded, however, that “what

[Dr. Scotilla] was not permitted to testify to was that, based on his interview

of the defendant and the defendant’s recitation of what occurred on June 22 nd

of 2017, his – my client’s behavior was consistent with someone who had

PTSD.” N.T. at 4.

      Trial counsel testified that she believed the crux of the opinion rendered

in Dr. Scotilla’s expert report was nevertheless reflected in the doctor’s trial

testimony acknowledging that Appellant has PTSD and that a person with

PTSD confronted with the same incursion described by Appellant would be far

more vulnerable than a person without PTSD to counter with an emotionally

driven “overreaction.” N.T. at 55-57.

      The trial record supports trial counsel’s PCRA testimony. At trial, the

court permitted Dr. Scotilla to testify that a person with a diagnosis of PTSD

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stemming from a long history of sexual abuse victimization could be expected

to overreact emotionally under the factual scenario offered by Appellant at

trial:

         DEFENSE COUNSEL: I guess, finally, turning away from Mr.
         Williams and back to a person suffering from Post-Traumatic
         Stress Disorder, how would a person with Post-Traumatic Stress
         Disorder react to someone entering a home in the middle of the
         night, putting their hands on them while they were sleeping,
         grabbing at their genitals and refusing to leave when they were
         told to leave?

               DR. SCOTILLA: Especially if that harkens back to prior
         trauma, they could be much more vulnerable than you or I in the
         exact same situation to emotionally acting out or an over – an
         overreaction.

N.T. at 186.       On redirect, Defense counsel was permitted to explore

Appellant’s proclivity towards overreaction as a mode of avoidance common

among PTSD sufferers/patients:

         DEFENSE COUNSEL: Would the fact that he avoids – one of the
         characteristics of PTSD and that you found with an elevated scale
         with Mr. Williams was the avoidance. Would that impact whether
         he has sexual relations with male or female?

         DR. SCOTILLA: It could but it wouldn’t necessarily impact it, no.

         Q:   Would it change your opinion as far as how a person with
         PTSD would react to unwanted sexual advances?

         A:   [After asking counsel to repeat the question] No.

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       Q:    Those elevated scales[1] wouldn’t change your opinion
       either?
       A:    As how one would react to unwanted sexual advances?

       Q:     Yes.

       A:     Not the scales of avoidance. It’s – it’s a different – that’s a
       different thing. I can explain if you want.

       ...

             [After explaining his work with survivors of Battered Women
       Syndrome, who would act as if they were instinctively drawn to
       abusive relationships but would seek relief from the specific
       abusive acts] What we’re talking about in the avoidance piece of
       a PTSD diagnosis, the avoidance is avoiding a specific stimuli
       associated with the traumatic event [which] is different than
       saying they wouldn’t actually avoid any relationships that
       smacked of anything that had to do with this trauma. It just
       doesn’t work that way in the real word [sic]. They are different
       things when we are talking about avoidance and then we are
       talking about relationships.

N.T. at 206-08.

       The trial court then permitted the Defense, over Commonwealth

objection, to develop further the discussion initiated during cross-examination

about reports filed during Appellant’s childhood diagnosing him with ADHD

____________________________________________

1  On cross-examination of Dr. Scotilla, the Commonwealth addressed
Appellant’s evaluation for posttraumatic stress and psychological sequelae of
traumatic events under the Trauma Symptom Inventory-2 (“TSI-2”) test,
which placed Appellant on an “elevated scale” in several categories of inquiry,
including: “Insecure Attachment-Relational Avoidance,” indicating a
preoccupation with and fears about rejection and abandonment in
interpersonal relationships; “Defensive Avoidance”, indicating a tendency to
attempt to suppress painful thoughts or memories from awareness and
attempt to avoid events or stimuli in their environment that might restimulate
such thoughts and memories; and “Anger”, indicating the patient often
describes their angry thoughts and behaviors as intrusive, unwanted, and not
entirely within their control. N.T., 10/18/18, at 192-94.

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and Oppositional Defiant Disorder. N.T. at 208-209. On this point, Dr. Scotilla

opined that Appellant’s experience was representative of many childhood

cases where the truly causative, underlying illness, PTSD, was not identified

and diagnosed.

      DR. SCOTILLA: They are diagnosed with things like ODD and
      ADHD and sometimes they are just mistakenly labeled as being
      just bad kids and they are reacting to the trauma that they have
      lived through at home.

      DEFENSE COUNSEL: And that was consistent with what you
      found in your interview and your testing with Mr. Williams?

      A:    That’s correct.

      Q:    And those old reports?

      A:     Correct, especially the fact that in the 9[-]year[-]old ones
      you see very specific comments that are not talking about abuse
      history or you’ll see the young 9[-] year[-]old Mr. Williams
      specifically deny abuse history with the stepfather along with him
      that later[,] in later reports we read that he was being abused in
      that very house. It’s not until you get to 11[-]year[-]old, 13[-
      ]year[-]old that you see professionals seeing it coming in about
      abuse, diagnosing PTSD consistently.

N.T. at 208-09.

      The PCRA court agreed with defense counsel’s assessment of the

latitude afforded the defense during trial, and it thus concluded that Appellant

failed to establish the prejudice prong of his ineffectiveness claim:

      While there may be arguable merit to Williams’ claim that his
      attorneys should have sought an amended or supplemental record
      from Dr. Scotilla, the failure did not prohibit Williams from
      presenting his defense to the jury. To the contrary, Williams was
      able to present his heat of passion/voluntary manslaughter
      defense to the jury, but it failed because it was dependent on the
      credibility of Williams with respect to what happened that evening.

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     ...

     The trial court permitted Dr. Scotilla to testify about Williams’
     PTSD and how a person with PTSD would react to certain stimuli.
     However, the trial court precluded Dr. Scotilla from testifying that
     to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty this defendant
     is one who would meet the legal criteria of heat of passion in his
     reactions of stabbing his alleged attacker because [the doctor] did
     not include any factual basis for that opinion in his report.

     Dr. Scotilla . . . testified about Williams’ history of abuse [dating
     back to his childhood], including sexual abuse, and how that abuse
     caused Williams to suffer from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
     (PTSD). He discussed his history of mental health issues and
     placements and how that supported the PTSD diagnosis. That
     history also showed that Williams was not making up a mental
     health problem just to create a defense in this case. Dr. Scotilla
     also talked about conducting testing on Williams and how that
     testing supported his conclusion that Williams suffered from PTSD,
     as well as other disorders.

     ...

     [Defense Counsel] specifically asked Dr. Scotilla how a person
     suffering from PTSD would react to someone entering a home in
     the middle of the night, putting their hands on them while they
     are sleeping, grabbing their genitals and refusing to leave when
     they were told to leave. [ ] Dr. Scotilla answered, “Especially if
     that harkens back to prior trauma, they could be much more
     vulnerable than would you or I in the exact same situation to
     emotionally acting out or an over – an overreaction.” [N.T. trial
     transcript, 10/18/18,] at 186-87.

     In closing arguments, [Defense Counsel] argued that Williams
     acted in the heat of passion[] and that conclusion was supported
     by Dr. Scotilla’s testimony. Trial Transcript, 10/22/2018, at 35-
     40. He noted how Williams had been sexually abused as a child
     and how sexual abuse affects people. He noted that Williams
     suffered from PTSD, how a situation or smell [similar to one from
     a past traumatic episode] can trigger the person with PTSD, and
     how the person will overreact as a result of the PTSD. He argued
     that situation and the overkill of the stabbing incident showed
     provocation and heat of passion.

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      The heat of passion/voluntary manslaughter defense was
      presented to the jury; the jury just didn’t buy it because it was
      dependent on Williams’ statements and testimony about his
      relationship with the victim and what happened that night, which
      was not consistent and not credible.

      Dr. Scotilla acknowledged at trial that his conclusions to some
      extent were dependent on Williams’ honesty. Trial Transcript,
      10/18/18, at 189-90.

      In [the Commonwealth’s] closing arguments, the prosecutor
      extensively and persuasively argued Williams’ lack of credibility
      [with particular emphasis] on his denial of being in a sexual
      relationship with the victim based on the number and length of
      phone calls and the content and number of text messages
      between them. He also note[d] how Williams’ version of what
      happened [was] inconsistent with physical evidence and the
      testimony of disinterested witnesses. Trial Transcript, 10/22/18,
      at 81, 87-89, 92-95, 98, 100-122.

      ...

      Dr. Scotilla was able to testify about PTSD and heat of passion.
      [The Defense] was not able to present the final statement of
      Scotilla, but it was argued to the jury.

PCRA Opinion, 11/29/23, at 11-14.

      Furthermore, on the importance of Appellant’s credibility at trial, the

PCRA court observed that evidence introduced at the PCRA hearing showed

significant   discrepancies   between   Appellant’s   trial   testimony   and   his

statement to police on the night of his arrest, the many times Appellant

changed his story on the events of the evening causing defense counsel to

doubt his trial testimony, and the contradictions between Appellant’s trial

testimony about his childhood experiences and what he told Dr. Scotilla about

those experiences.      PCRA Opinion at 15. Accordingly, the PCRA court

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concluded that Appellant was not prejudiced from the limitations placed on

Dr. Scotilla’s expert testimony.   Instead, it reasoned, “[h]is trial attorneys

presented a heat of passion/voluntary manslaughter defense, but the jury did

not accept them due to Williams’ lack of credibility.” Id.

      We discern no error with the PCRA court’s determination. Here, despite

the pretrial ruling, the defense was able to present to the jury Appellant’s

alleged factual scenario that an uninvited, menacing acquaintance unlawfully

entered Appellant’s home and bedroom at night as Appellant slept and

attempted to force himself sexually on Appellant. Doctor Scotilla, moreover,

told the jury that, compared to a person without PTSD, a person with PTSD

could be prone to an emotionally driven “overreaction” to such an incursion.

As it is reasonable to conclude that even one without PTSD would employ a

vigilant physical defense of person and home under this scenario, it follows

that an “overreaction” by comparison could entail significant violence.

      Taken as a whole, therefore, Dr. Scotilla’s testimony conveyed to the

jury that a person with PTSD, like Appellant, placed in Appellant’s alleged

scenario could be far more prone to offer a hypervigilant, excessively violent

response than would one without PTSD. As such, though Dr. Scotilla could

not, by pretrial ruling, state directly that Appellant’s conduct manifested PTSD

consistent with a heat of passion defense, the inference drawn from his

collective testimony is clear; if one finds Appellant’s factual allegations

regarding the victim’s incursion credible, then Appellant’s response could be

understood as a hypervigilant act of self-defense manifesting PTSD.

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J-S08043-24

      As such, the doctor’s proffer, taken in its entirety, all but provided the

functional equivalent of the direct expert testimony Appellant denied him

through the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Accordingly, we

conclude that the prejudice, if any, incurred from the loss of such direct

testimony was de minimis and, thus, insufficient to satisfy Appellant’s burden

to prove that but for counsel’s challenged conduct he would have obtained a

better result at trial.

      Turning to the limitations placed on Dr. Cox’s expert testimony with

respect to the victim’s post-mortem toxicology report, we have noted supra

that the PCRA court determined Appellant failed to prove any prong of the

three-pronged ineffective assistance of counsel claim.        Because Dr. Cox

admitted at trial that one could not determine from a toxicology report a

person’s corresponding behavior without also knowing that person’s drug use

history, he could not opine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that

the victim was hyperactive and aggressive as Appellant alleged.

      From the values obtained in the toxicology screening alone, Dr. Cox

explained at trial that he could not tell if the victim would have been

unconscious or in an aggressive state.        N.T., 10/19/18, at 58-59.   Either

manifestation could have taken place given the test results. As such, the trial

court ruled that the most Dr. Cox was permitted to testify was that any

bizarre, aggressive, and threatening behaviors that Appellant attributed to the

victim during their interaction could be consistent with the levels of substances

found in the victim’s system post-mortem. N.T., 10/19/18, at 50, 53-54, 57.

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      The PCRA court found that the defense team was unable to provide

additional information to Dr. Cox regarding the victim’s use history because

they did not have that information and the victim was deceased. The PCRA

court noted, further, that Appellant did not testify at either his trial or PCRA

hearing as to the victim’s drug use history.       Therefore, the PCRA court

determined that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim failed under each prong of

the ineffectiveness inquiry. After careful review of the record, we concur with

the PCRA court’s reasoning that Appellant demonstrated no arguable merit to

his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pertaining to their

presentation of Dr. Cox’s testimony, and that the jury’s finding of fact with

respect to the victim’s conduct was largely dependent upon its assessment of

Appellant’s credibility as a witness.

      Finally, because we base our denial of Appellant’s second ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on its lack of arguable merit, Appellant may not

prevail on his claim of cumulative prejudice.       See Commonwealth v.

Hutchinson, 25 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Wright,

961 A.2d 119, 158 (Pa. 2008)) (holding a claimant may not prevail on a

cumulative prejudicial effect claim without having demonstrated a particular

cumulation).

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     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA order entered below.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/22/2024

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