Court Opinion

ID: 9819265
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:24.434539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:32.255553
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent and would affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing the petition. When the State files a petition for adjudication of wardship on the basis that a child has been abused, the death of the child does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to proceed. If other children are involved, the court may continue with the case, and proof that the deceased child was abused, neglected, or dependent may be the basis for a finding that the other children are abused, neglected, or dependent. See In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728 (1997). However, where the court will no longer be called upon to order any relief under the Act, I disagree that the case may continue solely for the entry of a declaratory judgment that the parents are child abusers. The majority opinion suggests (291 Ill. App. 3d at 623) that the case may continue for the protection of "those who potentially may be subject to neglect or abuse because they reside, or may in the future reside, with a person who has been found to have neglected or abused another child.” If one examines, however, each of the potential adjudicatory or dispositional orders that a juvenile court is empowered to enter, they all make reference to or implicitly require the existence of a living child. See 705 ILCS 405/2—20, 2—21, 2—23 (West 1994). Even in cases that may be filed under the declaratory judgment provision of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2—701 (West 1994)), there must be a showing that the underlying facts and issues of the case are not moot or premature so as to require the court to pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events. Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375, 362 N.E.2d 298, 300 (1977). Among the reasons why courts do not rule on moot questions are (1) the courts are already too busy with real cases, and (2) the decision of a moot question is suspect because the parties do not have the incentive to litigate it that they have to litigate actual controversies. Respondents’ lack of incentive is shown by their failure to appear in this court. The State argued in the trial court that this case was not moot because of the public interest involved in the ongoing case. There is a "public interest exception” to the mootness doctrine, but much more is required for its application than that the public is interested in the case. See Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 170, 676 N.E.2d 637, 639 (1997). The State offers no reason why this case should not be dismissed except to say that "the State may stand in the place of the deceased child to vindicate his interest in seeing that his abuser is brought to justice.” In particular, there is no suggestion that other children are involved, either in this petition or similar petitions. Continuing with this proceeding as a substitute for a criminal proceeding, or in order to obtain discovery in connection with a criminal proceeding, would be improper. I agree with the trial court there is no jurisdiction for the entry of a purely declaratory judgment in a juvenile case. I do not read the trial court’s decision to say that an abuse case must terminate on the death of the child even when there is some purpose for further proceedings. We should accept the trial court’s determination that there is no further purpose for proceeding with this case. Even if we assume the trial court did not make that determination, we may affirm for any reason supported by the record, even one rejected by the trial court. Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 347-48, 662 N.E.2d 397, 409 (1996). The record shows no reason why this litigation should continue, and in the absence of such a showing the case should be dismissed.