Court Opinion

ID: 9700576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:36:15.350494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:11.664725
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
Irene Gerken and Timothy Gerken alleged that Hawkins Construction Company, by its contract with the city of Omaha, had expressly agreed to “provide all safeguards, safety devices and protective equipment and make any other needed actions . . . reasonably and necessary to protect. . . the safety of the public.” Notwithstanding that contractual obligation, Hawkins supplied no personnel to look after the construction site at the completion of a workday. Also, Hawkins failed to fence the area of the construction site where the bulldozer was kept, although the site was located within a residential area where children lived and had been subject to vandalism before the incident in question. Hawkins’ bulldozer was left unattended at the unsecured construction site and had no locking device to prevent operation by unauthorized personnel. Moreover, the bulldozer’s operating key was left in its ignition switch or otherwise easily accessible for starting the bulldozer. Some unknown person or persons started the bulldozer which, in turn, damaged Gerkens.
Based on the preceding factual setting, the majority concludes that unauthorized use of the bulldozer was unforeseeable and, therefore, was an intervening act which Hawkins could not have anticipated; hence, the unforeseeable operation of the bulldozer was a superseding cause that precludes Hawkins’ liability.
“ ‘Foreseeability is a factor in establishing a defendant’s duty ....’” Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., 229 Neb. 160, 173, 425 N.W.2d 872, 881 (1988) (quoting Holden v. Urban, 224 Neb. 472, 398 N.W.2d 699 (1987)). Accord, Dowis *163v. Continental Elev. Co., 241 Neb. 207, 486 N.W.2d 916 (1992); Ditloff v. Otto, 239 Neb. 377, 476 N.W.2d 675 (1991). An intervening act, reasonably foreseeable by a defendant, does not preclude the defendant’s liability. See Mundt v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 230 Neb. 192, 430 N.W.2d 530 (1988). “Determination of causation is, ordinarily, a matter for the trier of fact.” Mendoza v. Omaha Meat Processors, 225 Neb. 771, 778, 408 N.W.2d 280, 285 (1987). Accord, Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., supra; Zeller v. County of Howard, 227 Neb. 667, 419 N.W.2d 654 (1988). Consequently, foreseeability, as a factor in causation, is usually a question for the fact finder and ordinarily is not a subject for judicial determination as a matter of law raised by a demurrer.
Although the majority of this court invoices a rule regarding car theft to deny Gerkens their day in court, a more realistic and cogent analysis that distinguishes car theft from unauthorized use of a construction company’s bulldozer was expressed by Justice Roger Traynor in Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955), a case involving liability for damages when a construction company’s bulldozer was set in operation by vandals at a construction site. As Justice Traynor pointed out, “[a]utomobiles do not arouse curiosity, and ordinarily the only appreciable risk that they will be set in motion if they are left unattended arises from the possibility of their being stolen,” and “it could reasonably be inferred that [the bulldozers] were attractive to children when left unattended at the end of the working day.” 44 Cal. 2d at 776, 285 P.2d at 271. Hence, there was a justifiable “conclusion that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk that defendants’ bulldozers might be tampered with when left unattended.” Id.
Justice Traynor continued the analysis:
Given this foreseeable risk of intermeddling, the question is presented whether defendants were under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent intermeddlers from putting their bulldozers in operation. . . . The risks arising from intermeddling with bulldozers, however, are entirely different from those arising from the driving of an automobile by a thief. Bulldozers are relatively uncommon, and curious children or others attracted by *164them ordinarily will not know how to operate them. An intermeddler who starts a bulldozer accidentally or otherwise may not be able to stop it, and the potentialities of harm from a 26-ton bulldozer in uncontrolled motion are enormous .... The extreme danger created by a bulldozer in uncontrolled motion and the foreseeable risk of intermeddling fully justify imposing a duty on the owner to exercise reasonable care to protect third parties from injuries arising from its operation by inter meddlers.
In the absence of an effective lock the bulldozer engine could be started by pushing in a lever and stepping on the starter. Moreover, the engine could be started with the bulldozer in gear, and if so started, the bulldozer would commence to move immediately. Although this risk could be avoided by the use of a simple but effective lock, there is evidence that no such lock was used. Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that defendants did not exercise reasonable care to prevent intermeddlers from setting their bulldozer in motion.
... It is settled, however, that “If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious or criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.” (Rest. Torts, § 449 . . . .) The possibility of the intentional, wrongful misconduct that occurred in this case was not so remote as not to constitute “one of the hazards” that would justify the conclusion that defendants’ failure to lock the bulldozer was negligent. Accordingly, defendants’ duty to protect plaintiffs from injuries caused by the uncontrolled and unauthorized operation of their bulldozer included a duty to protect plaintiffs from the intentional misconduct of the young men, and such misconduct did not therefore constitute a superseding cause of plaintiffs’ harm.
44 Cal. 2d at 776-77, 285 P.2d at 271-72. Other courts have concurred in the Traynor analysis and distinction between *165automobile theft cases and unauthorized use of a construction company’s bulldozer. See, Foreign Auto Prep. Serv. Inc. v. Vicon Constr. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 420, 474 A.2d 1088 (1984) (whether owner of a bulldozer could foresee that vandals would operate the bulldozer was a question of fact); Batiste v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., Inc., 404 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 1981) (a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant, as the owner of a bulldozer at a construction site, could foresee that the bulldozer would be operated by vandals with relative ease, especially in view of prior acts of vandalism at the construction site); Bronk v. Davenny, 25 Wash. 2d 443, 171 P.2d 237 (1946) (owner of a tractor was liable for damage caused by a young boy who easily started the unattended and unsecured tractor).
The facts alleged by Gerkens show, or provide a basis for a reasonable inference, that the unsecured bulldozer was accessible to anyone and could easily be started, since the operating key was left readily available or actually in the bulldozer’s ignition switch. Previous vandalism at the unfenced construction site indicated that trespassers, including neighborhood children, could enter the area, tamper with Hawkins’ heavy equipment, and start the bulldozer without any degree of difficulty or expertise. Under those circumstances, a recognizable and realizable likelihood existed that an unauthorized person or unauthorized persons would enter the construction site. After starting the bulldozer, an untrained inter meddler or joyrider would discover that the heavy equipment was difficult to control. At that point, the bulldozer would be released on its course of destruction rather than construction.
Disregarding the foregoing implications and reasonable inferences drawn from Gerkens’ petitions, the majority has completely ignored the fact that Gerkens’ appeals involve rulings on demurrers. By applying a rule of law regarding an owner’s liability for a stolen automobile, the majority has mechanically extended the car-theft rule and, in so doing, has bulldozed foreseeability as the cornerstone of duty in the foundation of a negligence cause of action. On the facts pleaded by Gerkens, a cause of action was stated against Hawkins, and for that reason, Hawkins’ demurrers should *166have been overruled so that the proceedings could continue against Hawkins. Since the majority has reached the opposite conclusion, I dissent.
White and Lanphier, J J., join in this dissent.