Court Opinion

ID: 9900392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:05.590116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.779032
License: Public Domain

256                      July 26, 2023                  No. 385

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

               STATE OF OREGON,
                Plaintiff-Respondent,
                          v.
      DYLANA CONSTANCE SERENITY HORTON,
                Defendant-Appellant.
           Josephine County Circuit Court
         20CR68459, 20CR68461, 21CR03129;
         A177021 (Control), A177022, A177023

   Robert S. Bain, Judge.
   Submitted May 25, 2023.
   Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Zachary Lovett Mazer, Deputy Public Defender,
Office of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
   Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, and Joyce, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
   AOYAGI, P. J.
   Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                                               257

           AOYAGI, P. J.
         Defendant was charged in three separate cases,
leading to three separate jury trials and a single sentenc-
ing proceeding. As relevant to this consolidated appeal, in
Case Number 20CR68459, defendant was convicted of first-
degree criminal mischief, ORS 164.365 (Count 3), and, in
Case Number 20CR68461, defendant was convicted of fail-
ure to perform the duties of a driver to injured persons, ORS
811.705 (Count 2), and second-degree criminal mischief,
ORS 164.354 (Count 6).1 On appeal, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by failing to instruct the juries on the
mental-state requirement for the value element of criminal
mischief. She also challenges the court’s imposition of 36
months of post-prison supervision (PPS) for Count 2 in Case
Number 20CR68461.
         As described below, regarding the jury instructions
on criminal mischief, we reject defendant’s contention that
preservation was excused, so we are limited to plain-error
review. On plain-error review, we conclude that the instruc-
tional error is plain under current law, but we are unper-
suaded to exercise our discretion to correct it in this case. As
for the sentencing issue, the state concedes, and we agree,
that the court erred in its PPS calculation and that we should
exercise our discretion to correct that error. Accordingly, we
remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm.
          I. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF CONVICTIONS
        Defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal
mischief based on an incident in which she stole her friend’s
car and tore apart the dashboard electronics, causing over
$2,100 in damage to the car. First-degree criminal mis-
chief requires property damage in excess of $1,000. ORS
164.365(1)(a)(A). Defendant was convicted of second-degree
criminal mischief based on a separate incident in which she
    1
      In Case Number 20CR68459, defendant also was convicted of unauthorized
use of a vehicle, ORS 164.135 (Count 1); she was acquitted of a robbery charge. In
Case Number 20CR68461, defendant also was convicted of unauthorized use of
a vehicle, ORS 164.135 (Count 1); fourth-degree assault, ORS 163.160 (Counts 3
and 4); and reckless driving, ORS 811.140 (Count 5). In Case Number 21CR03129,
defendant was convicted of assault on a public safety officer (Count 1); another
charge was dismissed before trial.
258                                          State v. Horton

stole a stranger’s truck and drove it in a manner that caused
a multi-vehicle accident and, as relevant here, approximately
$4,800 in damage to a concrete barrier. Second-degree crim-
inal mischief requires property damage in excess of $500.
ORS 164.354(1). The charges were tried to different juries.
Neither jury was instructed on a mental-state requirement
for the value element.

         In her first assignment of error, defendant argues
that it was error not to instruct the jury in Case Number
20CR68459 on the mental-state requirement for the value
element of first-degree criminal mischief. In her sec-
ond assignment of error, she argues that it was error not
to instruct the jury in Case Number 20CR68461 on the
mental-state requirement for the value element of second-
degree criminal mischief.

A.    Preservation

         We begin with preservation. Defendant did not
request in either case a jury instruction on the mental-state
requirement for the value element of criminal mischief.
“Generally, an issue not preserved in the trial court will not
be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341,
15 P3d 22 (2000). We have discretion, however, to correct a
“plain” error. ORAP 5.45(1). An error is “plain” when it is an
error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably
in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record with-
out our having to choose among competing inferences. State
v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013). It is a
matter of discretion whether we will correct a “plain” error.
State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 166, 130 P3d 780 (2006).

        Defendant contends that preservation is excused—
such that we should conduct regular review, instead of
plain-error review—because, at the time of her trials, there
was controlling law that the state did not need to prove
any culpable mental state for the value element of crimi-
nal mischief. See State v. Morales, 309 Or App 777, 779,
482 P3d 819 (2021), vac’d, 370 Or 471, 520 P3d 882 (2022)
(holding that, for first-degree criminal mischief, “no culpa-
ble mental state is required with respect to the amount of
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                                               259

damages”).2 In defendant’s view, given the controlling law,
preservation was excused under State v. Merrill, 303 Or App
107, 112, 463 P3d 540 (2020), adh’d to as modified on recons,
309 Or App 68, 481 P3d 441, rev den, 368 Or 402 (2021). In
the alternative, defendant requests plain-error review.

         We disagree with defendant’s reading of Merrill.
Merrill does not stand for the proposition that a party is
excused from preserving an issue if there is unfavorable
controlling authority at the time of trial. Such an approach
would be inconsistent with the many cases in which we and
the Supreme Court have conducted plain-error review as
to an issue on which the law changed after trial. See, e.g.,
State v. McKinney/Shiffer, 369 Or 325, 505 P3d 946 (2022)
(conducting plain-error review of the lack of an instruction
on the culpable mental state for the physical-injury element
of assault, where the controlling law at the time of trial was
State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999), which was
overruled on that issue by State v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 505
P3d 953 (2022), during the pendency of the appeal); State v.
Ulery, 366 Or 500, 464 P3d 1123 (2020) (conducting plain-
error review of jury instruction allowing nonunanimous
guilty verdicts, where the controlling law at the time of trial
was Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 US 404, 92 S Ct 1628, 32 L Ed
2d 184 (1972), which was overruled by Ramos v. Louisiana,
___ US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020), during
the pendency of the appeal); State v. Dippre, 320 Or App 317,
512 P3d 835 (2022) (conducting plain-error review of entry
of conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance,
where the controlling law at the time of trial was State v.
Boyd, 92 Or App 51, 756 P2d 1276, rev den, 307 Or 77 (1988),
which was overruled by State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844,
500 P3d 728 (2021), rev allowed, 369 Or 504 (2022), during
the pendency of the appeal).

    2
      As discussed later, the law has since changed. That change in the law led
the Supreme Court to vacate and remand Morales for reconsideration in light of
State v. Shedrick, 370 Or 255, 518 P3d 559 (2022), and, on remand, we held that
a culpable mental state is required for the value element of first-degree criminal
mischief. State v. Morales, 326 Or App 177, 181, 530 P3d 932 (2023). Morales
involved a motion for a judgment of acquittal, rather than a jury instruction, but
the legal issue is the same, i.e., whether a culpable mental statement requirement
exists for the value element. Id. at 180.
260                                           State v. Horton

          Merrill simply applies traditional preservation prin-
ciples to one particular situation that is different from the
situation here. In Merrill, the defendant moved for judgment
of acquittal in the trial court, arguing that the evidence
was insufficient to prove the state’s strangulation theory of
assault, which relied on State v. Hendricks, 273 Or App 1,
359 P3d 294 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 794 (2016). Merrill, 303
Or App at 110-11. On appeal, the defendant renewed the
argument that he had made in the trial court, as well as
arguing for the first time that Hendricks is plainly wrong
and should be disavowed. Id. at 111. We concluded that the
latter argument was properly before us and did not have
to be raised in the trial court, because it would have been
futile to raise it there (given that the trial court was bound
by Hendricks), and because waiting to raise it on appeal
had not caused any “unfair disadvantage or surprise” to the
other party. Id. at 113.
         This situation is different. In Merrill, the relevant
legal issue—whether the evidence was legally sufficient
to prove the physical-injury element of assault—had been
raised in the trial court. It was only the specific argument
challenging Hendricks as wrong that had not been made to
the trial court. Under the circumstances, the purposes of
preservation were adequately served. Compare id. at 112
(describing the purposes of preservation), with id. at 113
(describing when we will consider a litigant’s request that
we disavow existing precedent when it is made for the first
time on appeal). By contrast, in State v. Mailman, 303 Or
App 101, 103-06, 463 P3d 20 (2020), adh’d to as modified,
309 Or App 158, 480 P3d 339, rev den, 368 Or 561 (2021)—
decided the same day as Merrill—we refused to consider
the defendant’s argument that Hendricks is plainly wrong
and should be disavowed, where the defendant’s motion
for judgment of acquittal on the physical-injury element of
assault had been narrowly focused on the victim’s recanta-
tion (which had nothing to do with the Hendricks issue), and
where allowing him to challenge Hendricks for the first time
on appeal would have been unfair to the other party.
        Here, defendant never raised any issue regarding a
mental-state requirement for the value element of criminal
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                               261

mischief. The purposes of preservation were not met, nor is
preservation excused. We therefore proceed with plain-error
review.
B.   Plain-Error Review
         “Whether a plain error occurred does not turn on
the law at the time of trial, but rather depends on the law
at the time of the appellate decision.” McKinney/Shiffer, 369
Or at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree
with defendant that, under current law, not instructing the
jury on a mental-state requirement for the value element of
criminal mischief is plain error. See State v. Morales, 326
Or App 177, 181, 530 P3d 932 (2023) (holding, on remand for
reconsideration in light of State v. Shedrick, 370 Or 255, 518
P3d 559 (2022), that a culpable mental state is required for
the amount-of-damage element of first-degree criminal mis-
chief); State v. Waterman, 319 Or App 695, 702, 511 P3d 78
(2022) (holding, “[i]n light of recent cases on the law of culpa-
ble mental states,” that it was plain error not to instruct the
jury that a culpable mental state was required “with respect
to the value of the property damaged on the first-degree
criminal mischief charge”); see generally Shedrick, 370 Or
at 260, 269 (explaining that, under Owen, the state ordi-
narily must prove a culpable mental state for any material
element of a criminal offense, except those relating to when
and where a crime can be prosecuted, and holding that the
state needed to prove a culpable mental state for the value
element of first-degree theft). That is, it is an error of law,
the legal point is obvious and not reasonably in dispute, and
it is apparent on the record. Vanornum, 354 Or at 629.
         As for the specific mental state at issue, defendant
argues that recklessness is the required culpable mental
state for the value element of both first- and second-degree
criminal mischief. It would be improper for us to decide that
issue, however, in a plain-error posture. As to both degrees
of criminal mischief, it is an open question in Oregon law
which mental-state requirement actually applies to the
value element—cf. Shedrick, 370 Or at 270 (leaving open
what the applicable culpable mental state is for the value
element of first-degree theft, but assuming without decid-
ing that it is criminal negligence)—and, as the detailed
262                                            State v. Horton

arguments in defendant’s opening brief demonstrate, the
answer to that question is far from “obvious.” Because it is
an open question which specific mental state is required, the
only error that qualifies as “plain” is the error in failing to
instruct the juries on any mental-state requirement for the
value element.
         In other words, it was plain error not to instruct the
juries that at least criminal negligence had to be proved as
to the value element, because it is now obvious and beyond
reasonable dispute that some culpable mental state applies
to the value element, and criminal negligence is the low-
est one. See ORS 161.085(6) (“ ‘Culpable mental state’ means
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negli-
gence as these terms are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9)
and (10) of this section.”). However, it is not obvious, and
is reasonably disputed, that recklessness had to be proved,
so it cannot be said to be plain error to have failed to give
a recklessness instruction. We therefore decline to address
defendant’s argument that recklessness is the required
mental state. Further, for purposes of deciding whether to
exercise our discretion to correct plain error, we view the
error as being the lack of an instruction that a guilty ver-
dict on criminal mischief required at least a finding that
defendant was criminally negligent as to causing more than
$1,000 of damage to her friend’s car (for first-degree crimi-
nal mischief) or more than $500 of damage to the concrete
barrier (for second-degree criminal mischief).
           We now turn to whether the error was harmless
and, if not, whether we should exercise our discretion to cor-
rect it. We cannot reverse a judgment based on a harmless
error, so if the error was truly “harmless,” then we have no
discretion and must affirm. See Montara Owners Assn. v.
La Noue Development, LLC, 357 Or 333, 350-51, 353 P3d
563 (2015) (under ORS 19.415(2), an appellate court may
reverse a judgment based on an erroneous jury instruction
only if the error substantially affected the party’s rights,
i.e., if there is more than little likelihood that it influenced
the result); State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 29 n 7, 77 P3d 1111
(2003) (the analysis for determining whether an appellate
court must affirm a judgment despite trial error under
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                                                263

ORS 19.415(2) is similar to the analysis under Article VII
(Amended), section 3); State v. Garcia, 284 Or App 357, 363,
392 P3d 815, rev den, 361 Or 645 (2017) (“If error is harm-
less, this court is required to affirm a defendant’s conviction
even when a trial court commits error; and error is harm-
less if there is little likelihood that the error affected the
verdict or substantially affected the defendant’s rights.”).
          Whether an error was “harmless” is a binary ques-
tion. “[A]pplication of the harmless-error test permits only
one legally correct outcome—an error is either harmless,
or it is not.” State v. Ramoz, 367 Or 670, 703, 483 P3d 615
(2021). A determination that there is little likelihood that
an error affected the verdict “is not a finding about how
the [appellate] court views the weight of the evidence,” but
rather “a legal conclusion about the likely effect of the error
on the verdict.” Davis, 336 Or at 32. In the mental-state con-
text in particular, the pertinent inquiry “is not whether a
jury could have found defendant to have the requisite men-
tal state on this record; rather, it is whether there is some
likelihood that the jury might not have been persuaded that
he had the requisite mental state, had it considered that
issue.” State v. Stone, 324 Or App 688, 695, 527 P3d 800
(2023) (emphases in original).
         When a jury was not instructed at all on one element
of an offense—a situation that is normally rare but with
which we are currently regularly faced due to the change
in the law under Owen and Shedrick—an appellate court is
in a difficult position in trying to assess whether the jury
might have found that element to be unproved, had it been
instructed on it. Although harmlessness is often a difficult
analysis, it is especially difficult in that procedural posture,
as we must be extremely wary of usurping the jury’s func-
tion. We should therefore be appropriately cautious about
concluding that the failure to instruct a jury on a required
element of an offense was legally “harmless.”
         Here, as to each of defendant’s criminal-mischief
convictions, we conclude that the error does not meet the
legal standard for harmlessness.3 There is at least some
   3
     Recently, in State v. Perkins, 325 Or App 624, 630-31, 529 P3d 999 (2023),
which involved a preserved error, we called attention to the fact that “the failure
264                                                         State v. Horton

possibility that the jury might not have been persuaded
that defendant had the requisite mental state for criminal
mischief. Stone, 324 Or App at 695. Moreover, if the claim
of error was preserved—i.e., if defendant had requested an
instruction on the mental-state element for criminal mis-
chief, and the trial court had refused to give it—we would
conclude that reversal was necessary. Given that reality,
it would be inconsistent to conclude in the present posture
that the error was legally “harmless.”
         Having concluded that failure to instruct the jury on
a required element of the offense was not legally “harmless,”
it follows that we have discretion to correct the error, if we
choose, so we proceed to our discretionary analysis. “[T]he
harmless-error analysis does not govern our discretionary
decision about whether to address unpreserved claims of
error. Instead, we must balance the gravity of any error,
in the context of the nature of the case, against the other
factors set forth in Ailes, Vanornum, Fults, and other plain-
error cases.” State v. Inman, 275 Or App 920, 936, 366 P3d
721 (2015), rev den, 359 Or 525 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or
376, 823 P2d 956 (1991); Vanornum, 354 Or at 614; State v.
Fults, 343 Or 515, 173 P3d 822 (2007).
         Even if an error does not qualify as “harmless,” our
assessment of where it falls on the spectrum of “likelihood”
of having affected the verdict can be an important consid-
eration to the exercise of discretion. The likelihood that the
error affected the outcome goes to its “gravity” and to “the
ends of justice.” Inman, 275 Or App at 936 (“[T]he error in

to submit a required element of an offense to the jury is a federal constitutional
error” and that the federal harmlessness standard requires that “the error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant in the present case has not
claimed a federal constitutional violation, instead arguing only under the state
constitutional harmlessness standard. We therefore apply the state standard. We
note that the burden of persuasion as to harmlessness is on defendant under the
state standard, State v. Torres, 206 Or App 436, 445, 136 P3d 1132 (2006) (“The
burden is on a defendant who appeals his conviction to show that a court’s error
affected a substantial right.”), and, because the error is unpreserved, also would
be on defendant under the federal standard, United States v. Olano, 507 US 725,
734, 113 S Ct 1770, 123 L Ed 2d 508 (1993) (explaining that, under Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 52, the burden of persuasion regarding harmlessness is
borne by the state as to preserved errors, whereas it is borne by the defendant as
to unpreserved errors).
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                                265

this case was not particularly grave, in terms of its likeli-
hood of affecting the verdict.”); State v. Pergande, 270 Or
App 280, 285-86, 348 P3d 245 (2015) (citing “the ends of jus-
tice and the gravity of the error” in exercising discretion to
correct a plain error that was “likely” harmful and carried
a “significant risk” that it affected the verdict).
         Some plain errors are so grave, due to either their
nature or their likelihood of having affected the outcome,
that we or the Supreme Court will exercise our discretion
to correct them based on that consideration alone—or at
least without feeling the need to expressly discuss any other
considerations. See, e.g., State v. Flores Ramos, 367 Or 292,
295, 478 P3d 515 (2020) (“[T]he receipt of a nonunanimous
verdict is an error sufficiently grave that appellate courts
should exercise their discretion to correct the error on
appeal, despite the state’s interest in avoiding the expense
and difficulty associated with a retrial.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)); Pergande, 270 Or App at 285-86 (exercis-
ing discretion to correct plain error in allowing vouching
testimony, where there was a “significant risk” that the
error affected the jury’s credibility assessments in a case
that came down to a credibility contest).
          In many cases, however, other considerations also
come into play, such as “the competing interests of the par-
ties; the nature of the case; * * * how the error came to the
court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the gen-
eral rule requiring preservation of error have been served in
the case in another way.” Ailes, 312 Or at 382 n 6 (nonexclu-
sive list); see, e.g., State v. Roelle, 259 Or App 44, 45, 50, 312
P3d 555 (2013) (exercising discretion to correct plain error
in admitting prior-bad-acts evidence, based on the gravity
of the error and the nature of the case, where the defen-
dant was convicted of strangling both his ex-girlfriend and
their four-year-old son, and “the admission of that evidence
likely affected the jury’s verdict”); State v. Reynolds, 250 Or
App 516, 521-23, 280 P3d 1046, rev den, 352 Or 666 (2012)
(exercising discretion to correct plain error in convicting
the defendant of third-degree assault, because entry of a
criminal conviction without sufficient proof is a grave error
of constitutional magnitude, and because correcting the
error would not undermine the important considerations
266                                                         State v. Horton

behind the preservation requirement in the particular
circumstances).
         Here, we ultimately are not persuaded to exercise
our discretion to correct the instructional error. There is no
question that the evidence in each case was legally sufficient
to prove that defendant was criminally negligent as to the
value element—but that alone, of course, is minimally rel-
evant to whether the error was grave. What is relevant is
that, viewing the records as a whole and in the context of the
juries’ other findings, even though there is some likelihood
that the verdict would have been different (such that the
error was not legally harmless), it is an extremely low like-
lihood. We have not treated failure to instruct on a mental-
state element as the type of plain error that is so grave as
to merit the exercise of discretion in every case.4 Each case
therefore must necessarily be decided on its own particular
facts. Here, we are ultimately unpersuaded that the gravity
of the error, the ends of justice, or the other relevant con-
siderations warrant exercising our discretion to reverse and
remand for new trials based on the failure to give a mental-
state instruction on the value element. We therefore affirm
defendant’s convictions for first- and second-degree criminal
mischief.
                   II. PPS TERM ON COUNT 2
        In her third assignment of error, defendant con-
tends that the court plainly erred by imposing 36 months of
PPS for Count 2, failure to perform the duties of a driver, in
Case Number 20CR68461, because the offense has a crime
seriousness rating of Level 6, which carries a maximum
PPS term of 24 months. OAR 213-018-0038; OAR 213-005-
0002(2)(a). The state concedes that the trial court plainly
erred in its PPS calculation on that count for that reason
and that we should exercise our discretion to correct the

    4
      The Supreme Court recently reminded us to use “utmost caution” in decid-
ing whether to exercise discretion to correct a plain error. McKinney/Shiffer, 369
Or at 333; see also Ailes, 312 Or at 382 (“A court’s decision to recognize unpre-
served or unraised error in this manner should be made with utmost caution.”).
Automatically correcting every plain error that does not meet the constitutional
harmlessness standard would not seem to be a cautious exercise of our discretion.
As with most discretionary decisions, a more nuanced approach is required.
Cite as 327 Or App 256 (2023)                                          267

error. We agree.5 Accordingly, we remand for resentencing
in all three cases, as they were sentenced together.
          Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.

    5
      We do not address defendant’s additional argument that the court must
reduce the presumptive 24 months of PPS to 23 months under OAR 213-005-
0002(4). That argument may be raised on remand and decided by the sentencing
court in the first instance.