Court Opinion

ID: 9444742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:10:33.766622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:59.296583
License: Public Domain

HUXMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
While the question is not free from doubt and is somewhat shrouded in uncertainty, I find myself unable to agree with my Associates.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b)1 governs the venue of patent infringement suits. Under this section as it was prior to the 1948 Judicial Code revision it was held without exception that the phrase “the judicial district where the defendant resides” had reference to the state of incorporation of a corporate defendant charged with patent infringement. The question is whether the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c) of the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code, which in substance provides that the place of incorporation, the place in which a corporation is licensed to do business or the place in which it is doing business, shall be regarded as the place of residence of a corporation for venue purposes has application to corporations charged with patent infringement. One line of cases holds that revised Section 1391(c) has no impact on Section 1400(b) and that it stands unimpaired as before with respect to patent infringement suits, while another line of cases holds that the term “resides” in Section 1400(b) is for the first time legislatively defined by Section 1391(c).
Judicial construction should be employed only when there is ambiguity or vagueness in language used. It has no place in the law with respect to language which is clear, unambiguous and logically leads to only one result. Section 1391(c) is general in its application. It applies to corporations without exception. It seems clear to me that it states in clear language that action against corporations without exception may be brought in districts in which they are licensed to do business. The defendant corporation in this case was licensed to do business in the district in which it was sued in this action. But, argues the majority and the cases holding with them, since under the decisions of the courts it had been held that a suit could be brought only in a state of incorporation, the conclusion must be that had Congress intended to change this interpretation it would have so provided in specific language. It is just as logical and more convincing to me that had Congress intended to exempt patent infringement corporate defendants from the effect of the clear language of Section 1391(c), it would, as pointed out by Judge Hall in his opinion in Farr Co. v. Gratiot, D.C.S.D.Cal.1950, 92 F.Supp. 320, 322, have provided “ ‘except in patent litigation.’ ”
When we seek support for our views in the legislative history of an act, it is not too difficult to find what we seek. It is pointed out that the revisor’s notes are keyed to sections of the revision and point out each substantive change in the various sections. Reliance is placed on the fact that no reference is made to any substantive changes in Section 1400(b). But not all important changes were noted in the revisor’s notes. Clearly an important change was made *579in Section 1391(c), yet the revisor’s notes do not call attention to this change.
I can add nothing new to Judge Lind-ley’s able dissenting opinion in C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co. v. Barnes, 7 Cir., 1952, 194 F.2d 410, 415, or to the logic of Judge Hall’s opinion in Farr Co. v. Grat-iot, D.C.S.D.Cal.1950, 92 F.Supp. 320, or to the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Dalton v. Shakespeare Co., 196 F.2d 469. Until the question is finally settled by the Supreme Court, I adhere to the views expressed in these cases and, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. This section is set out in the majority opinion and need not be repeated herein.