Court Opinion

ID: 9380795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 14:07:24.248179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.567326
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                               No. 04-22-00718-CV

                         IN THE INTEREST OF J.C.M. AND R.M., Children

                       From the 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                    Trial Court No. 2021-PA-00503
                          Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 15, 2023

AFFIRMED

           M.G. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her children J.C.M.

(born 2013) and R.M. (born 2015). 1 M.G. argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interests of her children. We affirm.

                                                   BACKGROUND

           On March 24, 2021, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed

J.C.M. and R.M. from M.G.’s care due to allegations of domestic violence and drug use by both

parents. The Department obtained temporary managing conservatorship over the children, placed

them in a foster home, and filed a petition to terminate M.G.’s parental rights. The Department

1
 To protect the privacy of the minor children, we use initials to refer to the children and their biological parents. TEX.
FAM. CODE § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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also created a family service plan requiring M.G. to, inter alia, attend individual therapy, undergo

a drug assessment and treatment evaluation, refrain from illegal drug use and alcohol abuse, submit

to random drug testing, and participate in a parenting class as a condition of reunification. The

Department ultimately pursued termination of M.G.’s parental rights.

       On September 9, 2022, and October 6, 2022, the trial court held a two-day bench trial. The

trial court heard testimony from three witnesses: (1) the Department’s caseworker, Demetrius

Knighton; (2) M.G.; and (3) the children’s father, S.M. After the conclusion of trial, the court

signed an order terminating M.G.’s parental rights pursuant to section 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O) and

(P) and its finding that termination of M.G.’s parental rights was in the best interests of the

children. M.G. appealed.

                                             ANALYSIS

       M.G. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence on which the trial court

relied to conclude that termination was in the best interests of the children.

                                        Standard of Review

       The involuntary termination of a natural parent’s rights implicates fundamental

constitutional rights and “divests the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and

powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit from the parent.” In

re S.J.R.-Z., 537 S.W.3d 677, 683 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “As a result, appellate courts must strictly scrutinize involuntary termination

proceedings in favor of the parent.” Id. The Department had the burden to prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, both that a statutory ground existed to terminate M.G.’s parental rights and

that termination was in the best interests of the children. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.206; In re A.V.,

113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth

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of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007; In re S.J.R.-Z., 537

S.W.3d at 683.

       When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court’s order of

termination, we apply well-established standards of review. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263

(Tex. 2002). To determine whether the Department presented clear and convincing evidence, a

legal sufficiency review requires us to “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that its finding was true.” Id. at 266. We “assume that the factfinder resolved disputed

facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92,

98 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). “A corollary to this requirement is that a court should

disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been

incredible.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Nevertheless, “we may not simply disregard

undisputed facts that do not support the finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened

burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.L.M., 513 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). If a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the matter that must be proven is true, then the evidence is legally sufficient. Id. at 747.

       In contrast, in conducting a factual sufficiency review, we must review and weigh all the

evidence, including the evidence that is contrary to the trial court’s findings. In re J.O.A., 283

S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009). We consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable

factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the challenged finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at

266. The evidence is factually insufficient only if “in light of the entire record, the disputed

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction.” Id.

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         In both legal and factual sufficiency review, the trial court, as factfinder, is the sole judge

of the weight and credibility of the evidence. In re M.G., No. 04-20-00216-CV, 2020 WL 6928390,

at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 25, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). We must defer to the

factfinder’s resolution of disputed evidentiary issues and cannot substitute our judgment for that

of the factfinder. See, e.g., In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (factual

sufficiency); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (legal sufficiency).

                                                    Best Interests

                                                   Applicable Law

         M.G. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s order that termination

of her parental rights was in the best interests of J.C.M. and R.M. There is a strong presumption

that a child’s best interest is served by maintaining the relationship between a child and the natural

parent, and the Department has the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. See, e.g., In re R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d at 97. To determine whether the Department satisfied

this burden, the Texas Legislature has provided several factors 2 for courts to consider regarding a

parent’s willingness and ability to provide a child with a safe environment, and the Texas Supreme

2
 These factors include, inter alia: “(1) the child’s age and physical and mental vulnerabilities; (2) the frequency and
nature of out-of-home placements; (3) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the child; (4)
whether the child has been the victim of repeated harm after the initial report and intervention by the department; (5)
whether the child is fearful of living in or returning to the child’s home; (6) the results of psychiatric, psychological,
or developmental evaluations of the child, the child’s parents, other family members, or others who have access to the
child’s home; (7) whether there is a history of abusive or assaultive conduct by the child’s family or others who have
access to the child’s home; (8) whether there is a history of substance abuse by the child’s family or others who have
access to the child’s home; (9) whether the perpetrator of the harm to the child is identified; (10) the willingness and
ability of the child’s family to seek out, accept, and complete counseling services and to cooperate with and facilitate
an appropriate agency’s close supervision; (11) the willingness and ability of the child’s family to effect positive
environmental and personal changes within a reasonable period of time; (12) whether the child’s family demonstrates
adequate parenting skills [. . .]; and (13) whether an adequate social support system consisting of an extended family
and friends is available to the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 263.307(b).

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Court has provided a similar list of factors 3 to determine a child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE

§ 263.307(b); Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).

         A best interest finding, however, does not require proof of any particular factors. See In re

G.C.D., No. 04-14-00769-CV, 2015 WL 1938435, at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 29, 2015,

no pet.) (mem. op.). Neither the statutory factors nor the Holley factors are exhaustive, and

“[e]vidence of a single factor may be sufficient for a factfinder to form a reasonable belief or

conviction that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re J.B.-F., No. 04-18-00181-CV, 2018

WL 3551208, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 25, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “A trier of

fact may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct [in] determin[ing] whether

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.” In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). Finally, drug use can destabilize the home and expose

children to physical and emotional harm if not resolved. See, e.g., In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278,

at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2019, pet denied). Evidence that proves a statutory

ground for termination is also probative on the issue of best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28

(Tex. 2002).

                                                    Application

         The Department initiated this case due to concerns about allegations of domestic violence

and both parents’ alleged drug use. On appeal, M.G. argues this is not a case involving extreme

family violence or out of control drug use, and she simply needs to re-establish a relationship with

3
  Those factors include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the
future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the
individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those individuals to promote the best interest of the
child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is
not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–
72 (Tex. 1976).

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her children. She contends the Department failed to provide sufficient evidence to justify

termination of her parental rights based on the best interests of the children.

         The Department’s caseworker, Knighton, testified M.G. was largely in compliance with

her service plan; however, hair follicle tests administered during the proceeding resulted in positive

results for methamphetamines in all but one instance. M.G.’s only clean hair follicle test occurred

shortly after her discharge from inpatient drug rehabilitation (on June 22, 2022). However, M.G.

tested positive for methamphetamines on August 18, 2021; January 11, 2022; March 24, 2022;

August 31, 2022; and September 12, 2022. M.G. also refused testing on February 11, 2022. See In

re K.C.B., 280 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, pet. denied) (“The trial court may

infer from a refusal to take a drug test that appellant was using drugs.”). The trial court could have

disbelieved M.G.’s testimony that she was sober and did not know how she continued to test

positive for methamphetamines as well as her suggestion that her hair follicle tests were returning

positive because she was around people who use them. Because drug use can destabilize the home

and expose children to physical and emotional harm if not resolved, its use weighs in favor of

termination. See, e.g., In re K.J.G., 2019 WL 3937278, at *8 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21,

2019, pet denied).

         Because M.G.’s service plan required drug testing and abstinence from drug use and

alcohol abuse, her continued use of methamphetamines (and abuse of alcohol) violated the terms

of her service plan. The trial court terminated on subsection (O) and (P) grounds. See TEX. FAMILY

CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O) (failure to comply with court-ordered service plan), (b)(1)(P)(ii)

(continued use of controlled substances). M.G.’s failure to comply with her service plan and

continued methamphetamine use further supports a finding that termination was in the best

interests of the children. See In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no

pet.).

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       The trial court also considered evidence that M.G. could not provide for the children’s

physical and emotional well-being. At the time of trial, appellant was living with her aunt; had

difficulty securing housing for herself; and, by her own testimony, was “on again off again” with

respect to her employment. See In re M.L.C., No. 04-17-00459-CV, 2017 WL 6597828, at *6 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Dec. 27, 2017, pet. denied) (lack of stable employment and housing supports

finding that parent cannot provide for child’s physical and emotional well-being).

       Moreover, when the children came into the custody of the Department, their developmental

delays were significant. Knighton testified that the children were reading at a “Pre-K” level.

Although at the time of trial they remained developmentally delayed, the children’s foster parents

have accessed special education services through the school to close the gap. The caseworker

testified that he expected the children would be developmentally on track within a year if they

remained with their foster parents.

       The children’s foster parents have offered a stable and nurturing environment, and the

children have bonded with their foster parents. At the time of trial, the foster parents had raised

the children for over one-and-a-half years, and they expressed a desire to adopt the children. That

the children are thriving in their current placement in a stable and nurturing environment with a

planned adoption further supports the trial court’s finding that termination is in the children’s best

interests. See In re A.M.M., No. 04-19-00806-CV, 2020 WL 2139308, at *4 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio May 6, 2020, pet. denied).

       After reviewing the evidence under the appropriate standards of review, we conclude a

reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of M.G.’s

parental rights was in the best interests of J.C.M. and R.M. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We

therefore hold legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best interest

finding, and we overrule M.G.’s arguments to the contrary.

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                                   CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

                                          Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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