Court Opinion

ID: 9399917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 18:00:53.451688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.879296
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-30090         Document: 00516776129             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                      June 6, 2023
                                       No. 21-30090                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                         Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Larry Moore Alston, Jr.

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 1:19-CV-650
                      ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Stewart and Douglas, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Larry Moore Alston, Jr. filed this appeal challenging the district
   court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion alleging that he was denied
   effective assistance of counsel in submitting his guilty plea. Because Alston
   has failed to show that his counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial
   under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-30090        Document: 00516776129             Page: 2      Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                        No. 21-30090

                 I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
           Alston, federal prisoner # 19658-035, and a dozen co-defendants were
   indicted for conspiring to distribute and to possess a mixture and substance
   containing a detectable amount of cocaine and a mixture and substance
   containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine. 1 Relevant to this
   appeal, Alston pleaded guilty with the benefit of a plea agreement to the
   conspiracy count involving only the methamphetamine mixture.
           At Alston’s rearraignment hearing, a state trooper testified that he
   believed that the plea agreement offered to one of the co-defendants involved
   between 1.5 and 5 kilograms of a mixture containing methamphetamine. 2
   Subsequent to the rearraignment hearing, however, the probation officer who
   prepared Alston’s presentence report (“PSR”) explained that “[t]he U.S.
   Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicated that the
   methamphetamine associated with . . . this case was of a high purity level and
   should be considered ‘actual’ methamphetamine for guideline purposes.”
   The probation officer continued that, according to laboratory reports, the
   methamphetamine involved in the conspiracy ranged in purity “from 99.6%
   (+/- 3.7%) to 92.3% (+/- 3.6%).” Consequently, applying the 2016 edition of
   the Guidelines, the probation officer determined that Alston was accountable
   for 49 ounces of actual methamphetamine, 10 ounces of heroin, and 24
   ounces of cocaine, which, taken together, were equivalent to 28,202.58
   kilograms of marijuana. That drug quantity resulted in a base offense level of
   34. Alston received no adjustment for acceptance of responsibility due to a
   post-guilty-plea arrest. Thus, his total offense level remained at 34. He
           _____________________
           1
               Alston was also charged in the same indictment with use of a communication
   facility to facilitate a drug offense.
           2
             The district court conducted Alston’s rearraignment hearing simultaneously with
   the rearraignment hearings of two of his co-defendants.

                                              2
Case: 21-30090       Document: 00516776129          Page: 3   Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 21-30090

   received a total of 13 criminal history points which placed him in criminal
   history category VI.
            Defense counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum, disputing the
   finding that Alston’s offense involved actual methamphetamine instead of a
   methamphetamine mixture. He argued that the parties understood that
   Alston was pleading guilty to a conspiracy involving a “mixture” of
   methamphetamine rather than “actual” methamphetamine based on the
   state trooper’s testimony at rearraignment. He explained that the laboratory
   reports cited in the PSR had not been presented or referred to at
   rearraignment and noted that Alston “would not have accepted, and [he]
   would not have advised [Alston] to enter into a plea agreement for actual
   methamphetamine.” He also submitted written objections to the PSR raising
   a substantially similar argument.
            At sentencing, defense counsel re-urged his objection and the district
   court overruled it, emphasizing that: (1) Alston denied at rearraignment that
   there was any side agreement apart from the plea agreement, (2) there was
   nothing in the record suggesting that there was an agreement as to the purity
   of the drugs, and (3) Alston had been sufficiently admonished and
   acknowledged at rearraignment that the ultimate sentence was up to the
   court.
            The parties ultimately agreed that Alston was entitled to a two-point
   reduction in his criminal history score, but the district court mistakenly
   reduced his offense level, rather than his criminal history score, resulting in
   a total offense level of 32 and a criminal history category of VI, yielding a
   guidelines imprisonment range of 210 to 240 months. The district court then
   sentenced him within guidelines to 225 months of imprisonment, to be
   followed by five years of supervised release.

                                           3
Case: 21-30090      Document: 00516776129          Page: 4     Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

          Alston appealed his sentence, arguing that his offense level should
   have been calculated based on a finding that the offense involved a mixture
   containing methamphetamine rather than actual methamphetamine. United
   States v. Alston, 720 F. App’x 219, 219 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
   (unpublished). A panel of this court rejected his argument and affirmed his
   sentence. Id. at 219–20.
          Alston subsequently filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion with the
   district court, asserting that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
   because in advising him to plead guilty, counsel incorrectly informed him of
   a guidelines range that was based on a mixture containing methamphetamine
   instead of actual methamphetamine. According to Alston, counsel told him
   that if he accepted the Government’s plea offer, he would be facing a
   guidelines range of 120 to 150 months’ imprisonment. He claimed that but
   for counsel’s incorrect estimation of his guidelines range, he would not have
   pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
          The magistrate judge (“MJ”) issued a report recommending that the
   § 2255 motion be denied. Relying primarily on Thomas v. United States, 27
   F.3d 321, 326 (8th Cir. 1994) and various district court cases, the MJ
   concluded that the district court’s admonishments were sufficient and that
   counsel’s failure to advise Alston of the correct guidelines range did not
   establish that his performance was deficient.
          Through newly retained counsel, Alston objected to the MJ’s report,
   attacking its reliance on Thomas and the district court cases, arguing that they
   were not controlling and were distinguishable. The district court determined
   that the MJ’s findings and recommendations were correct and denied the §
   2255 motion. It then denied Alston a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
   With the assistance of counsel, Alston moved this court for a COA. A judge

                                          4
Case: 21-30090      Document: 00516776129           Page: 5    Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 21-30090

   of this court subsequently granted a COA with respect to his ineffective
   assistance of counsel claim.
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
          In an appeal from the denial of a § 2255 motion, this court reviews the
   district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear
   error. United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 2008). Claims of
   ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. See United States v.
   Scott, 11 F.4th 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 827 (2022).
                                  III. DISCUSSION
          “[A] prisoner who claims that his sentence violates federal law ‘may
   move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside[,] or correct
   the sentence’” under § 2255. United States v. Kelley, 40 F.4th 250, 251 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). “Relief under [§ 2255] is reserved
   for transgressions of constitutional rights and for a narrow range of injuries
   that could not have been raised on direct appeal and would, if condoned,
   result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Vaughn, 955 F.2d
   367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (citation omitted). A federal prisoner
   may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence on four distinct
   grounds: “(1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or
   laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose
   the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence; or
   (4) the sentence is ‘otherwise subject to collateral attack.’” United States v.
   Placente, 81 F.3d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “The scope of
   relief under § 2255 is consistent with that of the writ of habeas corpus.” Id.
   (citation omitted). “[A] § 2255 motion is the preferred method for raising a
   claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Green, 47 F.4th
   279, 296 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted).

                                          5
Case: 21-30090      Document: 00516776129          Page: 6    Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

          A defendant has a constitutional right to “be advised and understand
   the consequences of a guilty plea.” United States v. Rivera, 898 F.2d 442, 447
   (5th Cir. 1990). “The consequences of a guilty plea, with respect to
   sentencing, mean only that the defendant must know the maximum prison
   term and fine for the offense charged.” Id. In other words, as long as a
   defendant understands “the length of time he might possibly receive, he was
   fully aware of his plea’s consequences.” Id. (citations omitted).
          To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
   demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was deficient, and that this
   substandard performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
   A failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice defeats an
   ineffective assistance claim. Id. at 697. A claim that a plea was involuntary
   due to counsel’s deficient performance encompasses the issue of whether
   counsel rendered ineffective assistance under Strickland. See Hill v. Lockhart,
   474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). “[A] guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on
   inadequate legal advice unless counsel was not a reasonably competent
   attorney and the advice was not within the range of competence demanded
   of attorneys in criminal cases.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant can show Strickland
   prejudice by establishing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
   counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
   on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. “[I]t is not enough, under Strickland,
   ‘that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the
   proceeding.’” Motley v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). “[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a
   petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
   would have been rational under the circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
   U.S. 356, 372 (2010).

                                          6
Case: 21-30090      Document: 00516776129           Page: 7   Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 21-30090

          A. Deficient Performance
          Alston contends that his attorney’s performance was deficient
   because he misstated the potential exposure that he faced under the
   Guidelines if he accepted the guilty plea. He further takes issue with the fact
   that his attorney mistakenly believed he was pleading guilty to a “mixture”
   involving methamphetamine, rather than “actual” methamphetamine. He
   complains that if he was aware he would get nearly a maximum sentence by
   pleading guilty, he would not have pleaded guilty. His assertions, however,
   are belied by the record.
          As an initial matter, Alston’s written plea agreement provided in
   express terms that he understood and agreed that the maximum punishment
   on the count to which he pleaded guilty was “a term of imprisonment of not
   more than twenty (20) years.” The written agreement further provided that
   “the sentencing judge alone [would] decide what sentence to impose” and
   that “[n]o other agreement, understanding, promise, or condition exist[ed]”
   or would be considered binding “unless it [was] committed to writing in an
   amendment attached to the [the plea agreement] and signed by [Alston].”
   Finally, the plea agreement provided just above Alston’s signature that he
   affirmed that “absolutely no promises, agreements, understandings, or
   conditions [had] been made or entered into in connection with [his] decision
   to plead guilty except those set forth in [the] plea agreement.”
          Likewise, during Alston’s rearraignment, the district court directly
   addressed him numerous times with regard to his maximum sentencing
   exposure. The court first asked “Mr. Alston, do you understand that the
   maximum possible penalty under Count 1 is a maximum of 20 years in prison,
   plus a fine of up to $1 million?” Alston replied, “Yes, sir.” The court
   confirmed, “You understand that?” and Alston responded, “Zero to 20?”
   and the court answered, “Maximum 20.” Alston replied again, “Oh, yes,

                                          7
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129           Page: 8    Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

   sir.” The court repeated once again, “Maximum,” and Alston answered,
   “Yes, sir.” The court then explained that a PSR would be put together prior
   to sentencing that would be prepared by Probation and Pretrial Services and
   that counsel for both sides would be able to make recommendations as to
   Alston’s sentence. The court then emphasized “Do you understand any
   recommendation of sentence by any attorney in the case, whether they agree
   or not, is not binding on the court, and you could receive a sentence more
   severe than that recommended by any attorney? Mr. Alston, do you
   understand?” and Alston confirmed “Yes, sir.” The court went on to discuss
   the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors before stating “[a]ll of this is to
   say to you that your sentence is entirely up to me. It’s not up to any lawyer,
   either from your side of the case or on the [G]overnment’s side of the case.
   Do each of you understand what I’ve just told you? Mr. Alston?” Alston
   replied again, “Yes, sir.”
          Finally, at Alston’s sentencing hearing, when counsel re-urged the
   argument    regarding    the   methamphetamine        mixture     versus   pure
   methamphetamine, the district court again clarified:
              While we’re there, you know, let’s go back to the time
              of the guilty plea. I make it a point during my colloquies
              to ask if there are any side agreements at all other than
              what’s contained in the written plea agreement. And
              you said and the [G]overnment also said that there
              were no side agreements. Now, I understand that you
              maybe interpreted the word “mixture” to mean
              something amorphous other than, you know, high
              purity, but if there was an agreement about that, it
              should have been brought up then if you say there was
              an actual agreement. I haven’t seen anything put in the
              record other than your suggestions that there was an
              agreement to anything. I also am very careful to ask,
              and did ask this defendant, if he was aware that the

                                          8
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129           Page: 9    Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

              sentencing was entirely up to me. And I asked it a
              bunch of different ways, and everyone seemed to
              understand that that’s the way that was . . . I wanted to
              make it clear for this proceeding that what was
              represented to the court previously was that there
              were no side agreements of any kind.
   Alston’s counsel agreed after the district court’s statements above that there
   was no side agreement and Alston verbally confirmed the same. The district
   court then rendered Alston’s sentence of 225 months with a 5-year term of
   supervised release.
          As previously mentioned herein, a panel of this court affirmed
   Alston’s sentence on direct appeal, rejecting his argument that his offense
   level should have been calculated based on a finding that the offense involved
   a mixture rather than actual methamphetamine. Alston, 720 F. App’x at 219–
   20. In so doing, the panel reasoned:
              Where a defendant pleads guilty to an offense
              involving a mixture or substance containing
              methamphetamine, the offense level [is] determined
              by the weight of the pure methamphetamine in the
              mixture or substance if doing so would result in a
              higher offense level. The presentence report’s
              reliable, unrebutted findings as to the purity of the
              methamphetamine attributable to Alston, which were
              based on laboratory reports provided by the
              Government, were sufficient to support the court’s
              offense level determination.
   Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United
   States v. Koss, 812 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[I]nformation in the PSR
   [regarding drug composition] is presumed reliable, and [the defendant] bore
   the burden ‘to demonstrate by competent rebuttal evidence that the
   information [was] materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable.’” (citation

                                          9
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129            Page: 10   Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 21-30090

   omitted)); see also United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 619 (5th Cir. 2013)
   (“Generally, a PSR bears sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the
   sentencing court to rely on it at sentencing . . . . [I]n the absence of rebuttal
   evidence, the sentencing court may properly rely on the PSR and adopt it.”
   (citation omitted)).
          Having been denied relief on direct appeal, Alston attempts to obtain
   relief through these collateral proceedings. Nevertheless, the applicable case
   law in this circuit does not favor his position. In United States v. Valdez, 973
   F.3d 396, 401–02 (5th Cir. 2020), the defendant, Lauro Valdez, pleaded
   guilty after counsel allegedly advised him that his guidelines range was
   between 24 and 33 months’ imprisonment. However, Valdez claimed that
   counsel failed to tell him about a cross reference provision of the Guidelines.
   Id. at 402. Following the application of the cross reference, the district court
   determined that Valdez’s guidelines range was 324 to 405 months of
   imprisonment, although his ultimate sentence was capped at the statutory
   maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment. See id. at 401–02, 404.
          Valdez filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to set aside his
   conviction on grounds “that his trial counsel was ineffective in substantially
   underestimating [his] Guidelines range and therefore failing to advise [him]
   that he faced a significant risk of receiving the statutory maximum term of
   imprisonment.” Id. at 402. In his motion, he alleged “that his attorney did
   not tell him about the cross-reference provision of the Guidelines and instead
   advised that his Guidelines range was [between 24 and 33 months].” Id.
          This court rejected Valdez’s argument concluding that he had
   “fall[en] short of demonstrating an unreasonable deficiency” under
   Strickland. Id. at 403. Although counsel had underestimated the applicable
   guidelines range, we noted that counsel had nonetheless “properly apprised
   [the defendant], prior to his pleading guilty, of the maximum penalty the

                                          10
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129           Page: 11    Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

   court could impose” and had “made abundantly clear to [the defendant] that
   no estimation he offered was a guarantee or a promise.” Id. at 404. In
   addition, we noted that post-Booker, “it is axiomatic” that “the court is
   entitled to impose a variance outside the Guidelines range.” Id. (citing Gall
   v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–51 (2007)).
          Here, similar to Valdez, Alston was aware that his statutory maximum
   was 20 years and that any estimated sentence by his attorney or the
   Government was not a promise. In his written plea agreement and at
   rearraignment, he was advised that he faced a maximum 20-year sentence,
   and he expressly confirmed that he received no promises beyond those in the
   plea agreement. Moreover, his plea agreement also advised him “that a final
   determination of the applicable guidelines range [could not] be made until
   the completion of the presentence investigation.” Alston’s attorney’s
   inaccurate estimation of his potential sentence under the Guidelines was not
   based on a misunderstanding of the Guidelines, but rather on an apparent
   belief that the information received from the Government regarding the
   methamphetamine’s purity prior to rearraignment was not subject to change.
   Additionally, counsel argued vehemently by objecting to the PSR and by
   renewing that objection at sentencing that Alston should be sentenced in
   accordance with an offense level based off of a methamphetamine mixture,
   rather than actual methamphetamine. But the district court rejected
   counsel’s arguments for a lower sentence as it was entitled to do. Alston
   cannot now feign surprise at his higher sentence because he was directly
   informed numerous times by the sentencing judge that his sentence was “up
   to” the court and that he could be sentenced up to a maximum of 20 years.
          In light of these considerations, we hold that the record does not
   support Alston’s argument that his attorney’s performance was deficient
   under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Rather, the record clearly indicates that his
   attorney fought hard for a lower sentence but simply could not prevail given

                                          11
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129            Page: 12   Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                     No. 21-30090

   the exceedingly high purity level of the methamphetamine that Alston and
   his co-conspirators chose to utilize in their illegal drug operations. Given that
   “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply
   reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” Alston’s counsel has
   met that standard on this record. Id. at 688; see also Thomas, 27 F.3d at 326
   (“As we have shown, the district court correctly concluded, on the basis of
   the prior proceedings and the allegations of the § 2255 motion, that the failure
   of [the defendant’s] lawyer to inform him that he could be sentenced as a
   career offender did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
          B. Prejudice
          In addition to failing to show that his counsel performed deficiently,
   Alston has likewise failed to show prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
   As previously stated herein, in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant can
   only show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable probability that, but for
   counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
   on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The focus of this inquiry is on what
   motivated the individual defendant’s decision-making. See Lee v. United
   States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2017). The Supreme Court has emphasized,
   however, that “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc
   assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his
   attorney’s deficiencies.” Id. at 1967. Instead, courts should “look to
   contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s expressed
   preferences.” Id. Factors relevant to the inquiry include “the risks [the
   defendant] would have faced at trial, his representations about his desire to
   retract his plea, and the district court’s admonishments.” Valdez, 973 F.3d
   at 403 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          In Valdez, this court recounted the sequence of events leading to
   Valdez’s plea, which suggested that he was motivated to plead guilty not by

                                          12
Case: 21-30090     Document: 00516776129           Page: 13   Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                    No. 21-30090

   his attorney’s prediction regarding his sentence, but by the “exposure of
   evidence which proved fatal to his affirmative defense, all but guaranteeing a
   conviction at trial.” Id. at 404, 406 (quote at 406). There, we held that
   Valdez’s argument failed under the prejudice prong of Strickland for the
   additional reason that he was “clearly advised—multiple times” of the
   statutory maximum by both the district court and his attorney and was “fully
   aware of his plea’s consequences.” Id. at 405 (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). As we explained, Valdez’s statements during his plea
   colloquy, wherein he confirmed his understanding of the consequences of
   pleading guilty, “serve[d] as evidence relevant to understanding his decision-
   making at the time.” Id. at 405–06.
          Alston’s circumstances in this appeal largely mirror those of the
   defendant in Valdez. As the Government aptly points out, the record contains
   substantial evidence in support of Alston’s conviction. Additionally,
   numerous other co-defendants from the conspiracy who had already pleaded
   guilty would have been motivated to testify against him to reduce their own
   sentences. Finally, as was the case in Valdez, Alston was clearly admonished
   by the sentencing court during his plea colloquy that he faced a maximum of
   20 years regardless of his counsel’s advice, and he indicated at that hearing
   that he understood. His awareness is further supported by his signature on
   the plea agreement expressly providing that his maximum sentencing

                                         13
Case: 21-30090       Document: 00516776129              Page: 14       Date Filed: 06/06/2023

                                         No. 21-30090

   exposure was 20 years. For these reasons, we hold that Alston has failed to
   show prejudice under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 3
                                   IV. CONCLUSION
           For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s order
   denying Alston’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion on grounds that he has failed to
   show that his counsel’s performance was deficient or prejudicial under
   Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

           _____________________
           3
             Alston urges in his § 2255 motion that he “inform[ed] [his] attorney of the fact
   that [he] wished/desired to withdraw [his] plea” but his counsel stated, “listen, you don’t
   want to go in there pissing the judge off or making him see you any worse than he probably
   already does, so just chill out and let me handle this.” Even if Alston is correct, these
   statements do not establish deficient performance or prejudice under Strickland, 466 U.S.
   at 687. At most, counsel’s advice against Alston withdrawing his plea was a strategic
   decision that ultimately had no bearing on Alston’s ultimate sentence given the substantial
   evidence submitted by the Government in support of his conviction. See Dunn v. Reeves,
   141 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2021) (“As to counsel, we have often explained
   that strategic decisions . . . are entitled to a ‘strong presumption’ of reasonableness.”
   (citation omitted)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“In any ineffectiveness case, a
   particular decision . . . must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the
   circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”).

                                               14