Court Opinion

ID: 9766379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:44:10.061022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.987040
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 16] I concur with the Court that the trial court erred in interpreting 22 M.R.S.A. § 4055 to require that: “The best interest factor takes precedence over the fault factors .... ” We recently addressed this exact issue in two cases: In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 8, 776 A.2d 1240, and In re Scott S., 2001 ME 114, ¶¶ 17-22, 775 A.2d 1144. However, I do not agree that the trial court’s misallocation of the order of factfinding requires that the termination decision be vacated. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 17] We are not required to vacate a judgment every time we find an error in the trial court’s rhetoric or order of fact-finding. See In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 12, 776 A.2d 1240. A preserved error is reversible and not harmless only if a “substantial right” of the objecting party is affected. Id. ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240; State v. Phillipo, 628 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1993); State v. Zinck, 457 A.2d 422, 426 (Me. 1988). See also M.R. Civ. P. 61; M.R.Crim. P. 52(a); M.R. Evid. 103(a). “Any party claiming error must demonstrate prejudice from the error.” In re Joshua B., 2001 ME 115, ¶ 10, 776 A.2d 1240; Phillips v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me.1989); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 103.5 (2000 ed.).
[¶ 18] In this case, the mother’s brief presents a generalized discourse on the law regarding the proper order of factfind-ing. However, that brief makes absolutely no reference to the specific facts of this case and no effort to demonstrate how any “substantial right” of the mother was prejudiced, in any way, by the trial court’s misallocation of the order of factfinding. The mother’s rhetorical attack on the court’s order of factfinding, and her avoidance of discussion of the facts of this case is fully understandable. Those facts are very bad from her perspective. Let there be no mistake; the trial court in this case had plenty of evidence of parental unfitness, and easily found parental unfitness established by the requisite clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. Most of the trial court findings address parental unfitness, not best interest.
[¶ 19] The record indicates that the mother has a long and continuing history of subjecting herself to sexually and physically abusive relationships. In its findings, the court referred to this history several times in support of its determinations that the mother is unable to parent or protect Michelle. Beyond this history of abusive male relationships, the court found that the mother herself had significant mental health deficits and a narcissistic focus, with her needs being given priority over those of her child. Separately, the court determined that the mother had continually failed to attend and fully participate in counseling and rehabilitation activities, de*288spite counseling and rehabilitation services having been offered to her over a number of years. In addition, the court determined that Michelle is a special needs child who needs protection, support, and services that her mother cannot give her and that the mother will not be able to provide within a time reasonably calculated to meet the daughter’s needs.
[¶20] With this history of abuse, neglect, and deprivation, it is hardly surprising that the mother’s counsel did not even try to review the facts of the case to suggest how the court’s misordering of factfinding resulted in a substantial injustice or in any way prejudiced the mother. No such claim is supportable on this record. Without the mother demonstrating that a substantial right of hers had been affected or that she has been prejudiced in some way by the error which she asserts, any error in the court’s misordering of factfinding is harmless.
[¶ 21] The Court’s opinion points to the trial court’s comments, at the close of the termination hearing — comments not repeated in its factfindings — that “[t]his is not an easy case.” That may be so. Most termination of parental rights cases are very difficult for the parties and the court. But that observation, at the close of the hearing, cannot be used to suggest that factually this case is close. Certainly, the mother, in her brief, does not try to make such a claim. Even if the trial court’s comments at the close of hearing suggested that, at that moment, the trial court thought there were close issues in the case, further reflection and the court’s findings demonstrate that the trial court did not view this as a close case.
[¶ 22] Notably, in its findings, the trial court focused heavily on State’s exhibit # 2, an extensive psychological report, painting a very negative picture of the mother. The trial court noted “the evaluation carries great weight in support of this court’s final conclusion.” Among other things, that report addressed “[the mother’s] long history of engaging in extremely abusive relationships with men and exposing her children to this abuse, despite receipt of significant professional intervention to help her cope with the problem.”
[¶ 23] This case is very unlike Scott S., where a majority of this Court ruled that a similar error in the trial court’s misorder-ing of factfinding was not harmless, because in that case, there was an available competent parent to perhaps provide some care and support for the child. Here, the findings that the mother is an unfit and incompetent parent, based on clear and convincing evidence, are not contested in the mother’s brief on this appeal. In such a circumstance, any error in the trial court’s misallocation of the order of fact-finding is certainly harmless. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.