Court Opinion

ID: 9717969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:13:45.836715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:56.494545
License: Public Domain

KELLEY, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the remand of the court of appeals for a new trial for the reason the defendant was denied an appropriate “hearing” on the admissibility of child testimony, and, that as a result the record is devoid of sufficient indicia of reliability of such statements to justify their admission in evidence at the trial.
In enacting Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 (1986), I think the legislature, with remarkable clarity, has provided that as a condition precedent to admissibility of a child’s out-of-court hearsay statement in a prosecution charging intrafamilial sexual abuse, there must be a “hearing.” An elementary precept of statutory construction commands that words in a statute are to be construed according to common and approved usage, and if a word in a statute is deemed to have a technical connotation, it is to be construed with reference to its technical meaning. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. § 645.08(1) (1986). Whether one considers the word “hearing” as used in Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3(a) (1986) as a word in common usage or as one used in a technical sense, the result remains the same. In both vernacular and legal parlance the word “hearing” connotes the existence of an opportunity to be heard and to present one’s side of a controversy, or, in other words a procedure in the nature of a trial, or, in the case of preliminary matters, of a “mini-trial.” See, e.g., Websters 3rd International Dictionary (Unabridged p. 1044), Black’s Law Dictionary 649 (5th ed. 1979). Here the record clearly demonstrates that what occurred before the trial judge could not be considered a “hearing” under any usage of the word. Though he properly and promptly requested, the defendant’s attorney was denied his right to challenge either the content of this statement or credibility of the statement or person reporting by cross-examination, or otherwise.
Though suggesting so only obliquely, the court’s opinion, in effect, says the hearing requirement of the statute is meaningless because, in the court’s opinion, the trial court comported with Minn.R.Evid. 103 and 104. I respectfully disagree. Even Rule of Evidence 104(c) requires “hearings on— preliminary matters.” I take it the ruling on admission of this out-of-court child hearsay testimony would be deemed a preliminary matter. While I have no quarrel with the court’s opinion that the ultimate decision on admissibility rests with the trial court, I fail to see why the “hearing” requirement of the statute and rule are incompatible, and why the requirements traditionally in our law associated with “hearings” need be disregarded as clearly as they were here. We simply do not know whether there were factual disputes surrounding the minor victims’ statements or the reliability of the persons reporting those statements. Because the trial judge personally knows and has confidence generally in the work of a social worker does not necessarily foreclose the possibility that in a particular instance the worker’s report, by a mistake or otherwise, might be unreliable. The trial court’s denial of a hearing to defendant’s counsel foreclosed him from making any preliminary probe into the extent of that reliability.
The court’s opinion seems to recognize as much, but concludes that defendant has now no cause of complaint if, following trial, it is clear the evidence was properly admitted. Again, I must conclude, as did the court of appeals, that Minn.Stat. § 595.02, subd. 3 prohibits substantive use of out-of-court hearsay statements of one alleged child victim about alleged abuse of another child. I don’t think that application of plain statutory language results in “artificially limiting the statutory scope.” Presumably the statute means what it says, and as the court of appeals noted, the testimony from Dr. Hewitt in this case could well provide the explanation of why the wording in the statute limiting the ability of the child to testify to abuse of himself was selected by the legislature.
*252Without question there exist facts in this record, as well as facts which occurred after the conviction, that suggest that defendant’s conviction might well have been justified. Nonetheless, that is irrelevant to the issue before us. The question here is whether the accused was afforded the trial protections the law affords all persons accused of this type of crime. I agree with the court of appeals that he was not. Therefore, I would concur in its remand.