Court Opinion

ID: 9928900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 15:07:57.21862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:53:49.163831
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0107-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

MICHAEL BAILEY, a/k/a
BIG RED,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted January 22, 2024 – Decided February 1, 2024

                   Before Judges Chase and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos.
                   13-01-0157 and 13-01-0161.

                   Bailey & Toraya, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Adam
                   W. Toraya, on the brief).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Deborah Cronin Bartolomey, Deputy
                   Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Michael Bailey appeals from the trial court's August 1, 2022

order denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an

evidentiary hearing. Upon careful review of the record and applicable legal

standards, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Andrea G.

Carter's thorough and well-reasoned written opinion.

      We summarize the facts developed in the record. On September 27, 2012,

defendant entered a residence in New Brunswick, New Jersey, possessing a

handgun and intending to rob a nineteen-year-old college student. Defendant

attempted to rob the victim, who resisted. Defendant shot the victim multiple

times, fatally.

      Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder while engaged in the

commission of a robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a)(1)(2); first-degree conspiracy to commit armed robbery, N.J.S.A.

2C:15-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; two

counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b); and two counts of second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). He was indicted separately for second-degree

possession of a handgun by certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-7(b).

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      Defendant entered into a written plea agreement and pleaded guilty to

second-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C11-4; first-degree armed

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and second-degree certain persons not to have

weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State agreed

to recommend concurrent sentences not to exceed twenty-five years subject to

the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), meaning defendant would be required to

serve 85% of his sentence, twenty-one years and three months, without the

possibility of parole.

      Paragraph thirteen of the plea form provided the State would recommend

a sentence "[n]ot to exceed [twenty-five] years NERA (85% without

parole) . . . ." Plaintiff also executed the supplemental plea form for NERA

cases and responded "yes" to the question, "Do you understand that because of

your plea of guilty to [aggravated manslaughter] you will be required to serve

85% of the sentence imposed for that offense[] before you will be eligible for

parole on that offense[]?" Paragraph seven of the plea form, however, stated

incorrectly ". . . the minimum period of parole ineligibility is [twenty] years and

[ten] months . . . ."

      During the plea hearing, the plea judge advised defendant correctly his

period of parole ineligibility "boils down to a minimum of 85[%], or about

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[twenty-one] years give or take . . . [twenty-five] times .85 equals [twenty-one]

and a quarter." Defendant agreed he was satisfied with the sentence as described

by the court.   Defendant testified he understood every aspect of the plea

agreement and was satisfied with the services of defense counsel.

      On December 18, 2014, defendant was sentenced in accordance with the

plea agreement to twenty-five years NERA for second-degree manslaughter.

The court imposed shorter concurrent sentences for the other offenses.

Defendant filed a direct appeal, which was dismissed voluntarily.

      On December 11, 2020, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR.

Defendant subsequently retained counsel who filed a supplemental brief in

support of the petition. Defendant argued trial counsel was ineffective because

he was advised incorrectly by counsel and in the plea form that he faced a

minimum period of parole eligibility of twenty years and ten months instead of

twenty-one years and three months. As a result, he did not understand the nature

and consequences of his plea. Defendant sought an evidentiary hearing to

determine what he was told by counsel at the time of the plea. Defendant also

argued his initial pro se petition was not time-barred because the law library in

the prison was often closed in December 2019, and January 2020, when he was

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attempting to file his petition and was thereafter inaccessible because of the

COVID-19 pandemic.

      Judge Carter heard oral argument on the petition for PCR and, on August

1, 2022, entered an order denying defendant's petition supported by a written

decision. The court found defendant failed to set forth a prima facie ineffective

assistance claim because the plea form clearly stated defendant would be

required to serve 85% of his twenty-five-year sentence without parole and the

plea judge correctly explained the minimum period of parole eligibility would

be twenty-one years and three months. The court also found defendant failed to

demonstrate the result of the proceedings would have been different absent the

alleged error. Finally, the court found defendant's petition was time-barred

because it was filed more than five years after entry of the judgment of

conviction, and defendant failed to demonstrate excusable neglect. This appeal

followed.

      On appeal, defendant presents the following contentions:

      POINT ONE

                 THE [PCR] COURT ERRED IN DENYING
            THE   DEFENDANT'S    PETITION  WITHOUT
            AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
            TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
            FAILED     TO     RECEIVE     ADEQUATE
            REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL

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                                       5
                 DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE    OF  COUNSEL     WHEN HIS
            ATTORNEY PROVIDED FALSE INFORMATION
            ABOUT THE TIME PERIOD DEFENDANT WOULD
            BE SUBJECT TO PAROLE INELIGIBILITY

      POINT TWO

                  THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING [RULE]
            3:22-12 [] AS A PROCEDURAL BAR AGAINST THE
            DEFENDANT'S FILING FOR [PCR]

      "Where, as here, the PCR court has not conducted an evidentiary hearing,

we review its legal and factual determinations de novo." State v. Aburoumi, 464

N.J. Super. 326, 338 (App. Div. 2020) (citing State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super.

284, 291 (App. Div. 2018)).

      "Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of

habeas corpus." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "It is a safeguard to ensure that a defendant

was not unjustly convicted." Ibid. (citing State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482

(1997)). It provides a final opportunity for a defendant to raise a legal error or

constitutional issue, including a violation of the right to effective assistance of

counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. "Ordinarily, PCR

enables a defendant to challenge the legality of a sentence or final judgment of

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conviction by presenting contentions that could not have been raised on direct

appeal." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 (citing McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482-83).

      In addressing an ineffective assistance claim, we follow the two-pronged

standard formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). "First, the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The test is whether "counsel's representation fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

"Second, the defendant must have been prejudiced by counsel's deficient

performance." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To

prove this element, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Failure to meet either prong of the

Strickland/Fritz test results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker,

212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).

      The defendant must establish, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, that he is entitled to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518,

541 (2013); Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459. To sustain that burden, the defendant

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must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate

basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

Defendants must do more than make "bald assertions" of ineffective assistance.

State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999).

      There is a strong presumption that counsel "rendered adequate assistance

and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional

judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Further, because prejudice is not

presumed, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of counsel

undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.

648, 659 n.26 (1984); see also Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 ("[P]rejudice must be

proved; it is not presumed."). "The test is not whether defense counsel could

have done better, but whether [they] met the constitutional threshold for

effectiveness." Nash, 212 N.J. at 543. The court should review counsel's

performance in the context of the evidence against defendant at the time of the

plea or trial. State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314-15 (2006).

      To demonstrate "prejudice after having entered a guilty plea, a defendant

must prove 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,

[he or she] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'"

State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (alteration in original) (quoting State

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                                        8
v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). A defendant must show, "had he

been properly advised, it would have been rational for him to decline the plea

offer and insist on going to trial and, in fact, that he probably would have done

so[.]" State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011).

      A court reviewing a PCR petition based on claims of ineffective assistance

has the discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing only if defendant establishes a

prima facie showing in support of the requested relief. Preciose, 129 N.J. at

462-63.     "To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b). The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle a defendant to an

evidentiary hearing. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170.

      A petition for PCR must be filed no "more than [five] years after the date

of entry . . . of the judgment of conviction that is being challenged." R. 3:22-

12(a)(1).    An untimely petition may be considered if the petition shows

excusable neglect for the late filing and that a fundamental injustice will result

if defendant's claims are not considered on their merits. State v. Brewster, 429

N.J. Super. 387, 400 (App. Div. 2013); R. 3:22-12(a)(1)(A).               "Absent

compelling, extenuating circumstances, the burden to justify filing a petition

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                                        9
after the five-year period will increase with the extent of the delay." State v.

Afanador, 151 N.J. at 52. "[A] court should relax Rule 3:22-12's bar only under

exceptional circumstances. The court should consider the extent and cause of

the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the petitioner's claim

in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time

limits." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 580. To meet his burden, defendant must do "more

than simply provid[e] a plausible explanation for [his] failure to file a timely

PCR petition." State v. Norman, 405 N.J. Super. 149, 159 (App. Div. 2009).

      We affirm largely for the reasons set forth in Judge Carter's written

opinion.   We add that to establish prejudice having entered a guilty plea,

defendant was required to show "had he been properly advised, it would have

been rational for him to decline the plea offer and insist on going to trial and, in

fact, that he probably would have done so." Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. at 486.

Defendant does not assert he would have declined the plea offer and insisted on

going to trial absent counsel's alleged error. Nor does defendant show it would

have been rational for him to do so. Defendant faced the very real possibility of

a significantly longer sentence had he rejected the plea offer and insisted on

going to trial. Defendant, therefore, failed to establish prejudice as required by

the second prong of Strickland.

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                                        10
      We are satisfied defendant did not establish a prima facie case of

ineffective assistance and his petition was time-barred. The court did not abuse

its discretion by denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing and

correctly denied his petition for PCR.

      Affirmed.

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