Court Opinion

ID: 6550492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-19 22:24:45.7055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:05.772761
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Judge. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether or not appellant, Terry Dean Dodson, had justifiable cause not to pay child support or communicate with his minor child for a period of one year. The trial judge found no justifiable cause existed and ruled that appellant’s consent to the adoption was not required pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 56-207 (a) (1) and (2) (Supp. 1983), which provides: (a) Consent to adoption is not required of: (1) a parent who has deserted a child without affording means of identification, or who has abandoned a child; (2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the parent for a period of at least one [1] year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree; We find no error and affirm. Appellant Terry Dodson and appellee Debra Kay Donaldson were married and are the natural parents of a daughter born on January 19, 1979. By an Oklahoma decree of divorce entered on October 26, 1979, appellee Debra Kay Donaldson was awarded custody of the minor child and appellee was ordered to make support payments in the amount of $35.00 per week through the office of the clerk of that court and was awarded visitation rights. Stipulated exhibit number 1 made part of the record of the proceedings below reveals that appellant’s support payments were paid to the clerk and forwarded to the parents of appellee who resided in Alma, Arkansas. Appellee remarried in June, 1980, and shortly thereafter both she, her daughter and appellee Melvin Gale Donaldson moved to Kansas City, Kansas. They resided there until April, 1981, when another move was made to Mountainburg, Arkansas. They subsequently moved to Fort Smith in February, 1982. Appellees filed a petition for adoption in the probate court of Sebastian County in May, 1982, to which appellant answered object-, ing to the adotion of his minor child by appellees. It was stipulated at trial that appellant did not support or communicate with his child from January 13, 1981, until the day of the trial, September 8, 1982. This was a period of approximately one year and eight months. The failure of appellant to pay child support or communicate with his minor child was found by the probate judge to constitute abandonment, thus dispensing with the necessity of obtaining appellant’s consent to the adoption of his minor child by appellees. Statutory provisions involving the adoption of minors are strictly construed and applied. Roberts v. Swim, 268 Ark. 917, 597 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. App. 1980). The holding of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Harper v. Caskin, 265 Ark. 558, 580 S.W.2d 176 (1979), places a heavy burden upon the party seeking to adopt a child without the consent of a natural parent of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed significantly or without justifiable cause to communicate with the child or to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree. In Kelly v. Kelly, 264 Ark. 865, 575 S.W.2d 672 (1979), the Supreme Court defined clear and convincing evidence as being: Evidence by a credible witness whose memory of the facts about which he testifies is distinct and whose narration of the details thereof is exact and in due order and whose testimony is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the facts related is clear and convincing, (cites omitted). This measure of proof lies somewhere between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, (cites omitted). It is simply that degree of proof which will produce in the trier of fact a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established, (cites omitted). While we review probate proceedings de novo on the record, it is well-settled that the decision of a probate judge will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous (clearly against the preponderance of the evidence), giving due regard to the opportunity and superior position of the trial judge to judge the credibility of the witnesses. A.R.C.P. Rule 52 (a); Henson v. Money, 1 Ark. App. 97, 613 S.W.2d 123 (1981). Judge Kimbrough thoroughly covered the evidentiary issues in his findings of fact. In summary, the court found from the facts and evidence that appellant and his family knew at all times where appellee’s mother’s family lived and made no inquiry or effort through them to learn of appellee’s whereabouts and that of the minor child except for one brief contact with appellee’s brother; that appellant was aware at all times that the child support payments went to appellee from the Clerk’s office to her mother’s home in Alma; that appellant knew appellee and the minor child went to Kansas City to live as appellee’s husband had a job there and this information was disclosed by word of mouth, by correspondence and by phone call to appellant’s sister to verify the address and phone number which appellee supplied to appellant; that there was no effort or intention on the part of appellee, her husband, family or otherwise to not make her whereabouts and that of the minor child known at any time to appellant; and that appellant had frequent contact by reason of his employment and union affiliation with the maternal grandfather. In addition, there was a specific finding by the trial court that the adoption was in the best interest and welfare of the minor child. Appellant’s contention that he had justifiable cause not to pay child support or communicate with the minor child for more than twelve months is without merit. The thrust of his argument is that his justifiable cause came about as a direct result of appellee keeping the location of the child a secret. The record reveals that appellant made one attempt to inquire of his former in-laws as to his daughter’s whereabouts following the move to Kansas. Appellant was employed by the Whirlpool Corporation in Fort Smith and his former father-in-law was his union representative. The testimony was in conflict as to what occurred on that date between appellant and his former in-laws. Appellant testified that he went to their home at approximately 9:00 a.m. and was not allowed to speak to them. Appellant stated that he made no further efforts to contact appellee’s parents as he felt that “it would do no good”. Appellee’s mother testified that she was aware of her daughter’s whereabouts at all times following her remarriage. She further testified that appellant came to their home on one occasion at 6:30 a.m. to inquire about his daughter and they were still in bed. She stated she had no hostility toward appellant and that appellant had always known that he could telephone them at any time to inquire about his daughter. Appellee wrote a letter to appellant shortly before their move to Kansas informing him of her new address, phone number, and assuring him that he could visit with his daughter either in Kansas or Alma. Shortly thereafter, appellant and his attorney wrote to appellee in Kansas City and the letter was returned as “not deliverable”. Appellee testified that she never changed her address in Kansas City. Appellant testified that he then attempted to telephone appellee at the number she had provided and was unable to reach her as he either got a recording or static on the line. Appellee testified that she maintained the same phone number the entire time she resided in Kansas and that it was never disconnected. Appellant continued to pay child support to the clerk of the court for another month and a half. Appellant testified that he then consulted with his attorney in Oklahoma and made the decision to discontinue child support payments based upon his perception that he was being denied his visitation rights. It is important to note that the above events occurred during a two-month period commencing with appellees’ move to Kansas in November 1980, and ending in January 1981, when appellant made his last child support payment. Appellees both testified that at no time did they seek to keep appellant from seeing his child or keep her whereabouts a secret. The asserted j ustifiable cause of appellant in his failure to support or communicate with the minor child is not supported by the evidence. In this regard, the probate judge found and stated the following in his decree: That the Respondent contends that he had justifiable cause in ceasing to make the payments of child support, and was prevented from having contact with the minor child, for the reason that he did not know where the Petitioner mother and child lived; that his efforts for help from his attorney in the divorce case, or an opportunity to talk with the Court in that case, were not productive; and that he was reluctant to talk to the natural mother’s parents as they had said previously that they didn’t want to be involved; so he therefore unilaterally terminated the child support payments and waited for reasons known to himself until he learned where the child was, which knowledge he contends first came to him as a result of this adoption proceeding being filed and processed and notice being issued therein. That the facts, testimony, and circumstances of this case demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent natural father made no genuine or diligent effort to contact, locate, communicate with, support or assist his minor child herein concerned, from and since January, 1981. That his actions were voluntary and constituted abandonment, and a failure to communicate with or provide care and support for the minor child as required by law and j udicial Decree, so that his consent to this adoption is not required. Giving due regard and deference to the superior position of the probate judge to determine the weight of evidence and the credibility of the testimony, we cannot conclude that his ruling that appellant did not have justifiable cause to not support or communicate with the minor child was error. Recognizing that the father’s duty to support his minor child cannot be excused on the basis of the conduct of others, unless that conduct prevents him from performing his duty, Green v. Green, 232 Ark. 868, 341 S.W.2d 41 (1960), we cannot say that the probate judge’s finding to the contrary is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. We believe the probate judge correctly found appellees met their heavy burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that appellant had failed significantly and without justifiable cause to communicate with or to provide for the care and support of the minor child, so that the appellant’s consent to the adoption was not required. Affirmed. Glaze, J., dissents.