Court Opinion

ID: 9655425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:09:53.733437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:09.314711
License: Public Domain

Hendry, C.J.,
concurring in the result.
I concur with the result reached by the majority. However, I write separately as I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that it need not decide whether the appellants substantially complied with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 1998). In my view, the district court appropriately considered substantial compliance and correctly determined that substantial compliance with § 32-1405(1) was shown.
Relying on State, ex rel. Winter, v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 294 N.W. 200 (1940), the majority holds that the sworn statement provision of § 32-1405(1) is mandatory rather than directory. However, given the factual distinctions and our recognition that “the right of initiative . . . should not be circumscribed by . . . narrow and strict interpretation of the statutes pertaining to i[t]s exercise,” State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 531, 162 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1968), I do not believe that State, ex rel. Winter, precludes substantial compliance.
In Marsh, supra, a case in which we applied substantial compliance, we determined that the petitioners had substantially complied with the statutory requirements of the predecessor to § 32-1405(1) and affirmed the district court’s decision to require the State to place the petition on the ballot. Although substantial compliance was not invoked in Marsh to specifically address the absence of a verified statement, we nonetheless distinguished State, ex rel. Winter, by noting that State, ex rel. Winter, “involved a complete failure to file both the copy of the form of petition to be used and the preliminary sworn statement.” Marsh, 183 Neb. at 534, 162 N.W.2d at 270. In noting such distinction in Marsh, I believe State, ex rel. Winter, should be read as simply recognizing the impossibility of applying substantial compliance in a situation where the record clearly demonstrated a “complete failure” to comply.
*913It is axiomatic that without some level of compliance, there can never be substantial compliance. The case before us is not one in which there was a “complete failure” to comply with § 32-1405(1). Rather, the record shows that the final draft of the proposed initiative petition, together with a cover letter signed by the appellants, which included either a street address or post office box for each appellant, was filed with the Secretary of State. Moreover, preliminary drafts and cover letters had previously been submitted to the Secretary of State, which ultimately culminated in the initiative petition at issue. Given the importance of the initiative process in our governmental structure and recognizing that “the right of initiative ... should not be circumscribed by restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the statutes pertaining to i[t]s exercise,” Marsh, 183 Neb. at 531, 162 N.W.2d at 269,1 would reach the issue of substantial compliance. In reaching that issue, I agree with the district court that substantial compliance with § 32-1405(1) has been shown.
Section 32-1405(1) is part of the legislative procedure through which citizens of Nebraska exercise their power of initiative. This court has emphasized the importance of this process, stating: “The decisions almost universally hold that the power of initiative must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process and that the right of initiative constitutionally provided should not be circumscribed by restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the statutes pertaining to its exercise.” State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 531, 162 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1968). We have further stated that “ ‘[t]he right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter.’ ” State ex rel. Brant v. Beermann, 217 Neb. 632, 636, 350 N.W.2d 18, 21 (1984) (quoting McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948)).
Substantial compliance, in the context of a statute, has been defined as
“actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. It means that a court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which it *914was adopted. Substantial compliance with a statute is not shown unless it is made to appear that the purpose of the statute is shown to have been served. What constitutes substantial compliance with a statute is a matter depending on the facts of each particular case.”
Larson v. Hazeltine, 552 N.W.2d 830, 835 (S.D. 1996). The key determination, therefore, is identifying the purpose of the statute and whether that purpose has been served.
In State, ex rel. Winter, v. Swanson, 138 Neb. 597, 599, 294 N.W. 200, 201 (1940), this court discussed the purpose of the statutory predecessor to § 32-1405(1) as follows:
The requirement that the form of the petition be filed with the secretary of state before the petitions were circulated is calculated to advise the electorate in advance as to the exact provisions of the proposal through publicity resulting from its filing. By this means the proposal is rendered intelligible and the possibilities of fraud greatly reduced. The requirement that the name of every person, corporation or association sponsoring the petition or contributing or pledging contributions to defray the cost of preparation, printing and circulation of petitions be filed is likewise a safeguard against fraud and deception.
Thus, according to State, ex rel. Winter, the purpose to be served by what is now § 32-1405(1) is to safeguard against fraud by informing the public of the exact provisions of the proposal, as well as identifying the sponsors of such proposal.
I believe that given the record before us, the filings with the Secretary of State met the purpose of § 32-1405(1); thus the appellants substantially complied with the statute.
Pat Loontjer contends that the appellants’ filings fail to substantially comply with § 32-1405(1) for essentially three reasons. First, Loontjer argues that the purpose of a sworn statement is to prevent fraud and deception. Loontjer contends that under Nebraska’s election laws, the making of a false statement under oath is a crime and the ability to hold a signer liable for criminal penalties acts to safeguard against possible fraud and deception. A fortiori, Loontjer reasons the purpose of § 32-1405(1) has not been met and, therefore, substantial compliance has not been shown.
*915However, I concur with the district court’s determination that the primary purpose of § 32-1405(1) is not to “facilitate criminal prosecution.” In addition, as the district court observed, although State, ex rel. Winter, “required] the name of every person sponsoring an initiative petition [a]s a ‘safeguard against fraud and deception,’ ” State, ex rel. Winter, “did not state that the filing of a sworn statement provided such a safeguard.” In the district court’s order, it reasoned, and I agree, that
[although having a statement made under oath or verified may facilitate criminal prosecution, it does not seem realistic to believe that a person who is intent on engaging in a deception is going to be deterred by whatever ramifications there may be of falsifying a statement under oath to the Secretary of State.
Furthermore, as stated earlier, the purpose of § 32-1405(1) is to safeguard against fraud and deception by requiring those who are sponsoring the initiative petition to identify themselves in a sworn statement filed with the Secretary of State. The district court found that the individuals who signed the cover letter that was filed with the Secretary of State were in fact the actual initiative sponsors. In my de novo review of the record, giving weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another, see Reichert v. Rubloff Hammond, L.L.C., 264 Neb. 16, 645 N.W.2d 519 (2002), I reach the same conclusion. As such, the purpose of § 32-1405(1) has been served, notwithstanding the absence of a sworn statement.
Second, Loontjer contends that the requirement of “street addresses” for each sponsor safeguards against fraud and deception. Loontjer argues that post office boxes are not “street addresses” and that the failure to provide “street addresses” for all sponsors does not substantially comply with the statute. However, I fail to see how, in this instance, the failure to include all “street addresses” is a safeguard against fraud and deception. Loontjer simply argues that “the street addresses for the sponsors were needed for summons and subpoenas, and most were not available.” Brief for appellee Loontjer at 30. However, as the district court observed, “[i]t is clear . . . that, with the information provided by the individual defendants and a little work, [Loontjer] *916was able to secure the information necessary to perfect service on the individuals [sic] defendants.”
Finally, Loontjer asserts that Paul Schumacher, the Nebraska Cooperative Government Commission (NCGC), and the Committee for Local Option Gaming (the Committee) are sponsors and that the failure to list them in the documents filed with the Secretary of State violates § 32-1405(1).
The term “sponsor,” as used in § 32-1405(1), is not defined in the statutes setting forth the procedure by which the initiative process is to be exercised. “Sponsor” is defined as “one who assumes responsibility for some other person or thing.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 2204 (1993).
In adopting a definition of the term “sponsor” in this circumstance, we must keep in mind that “the right of initiative . . . should not be circumscribed by restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the statutes pertaining to i[t]s exercise.” State, ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 183 Neb. 521, 531, 162 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1968). Within that framework, it seems reasonable to define sponsor as simply one who identifies himself or herself as willing to assume statutory responsibilities once the initiative process has commenced. See, e.g., § 32-1405(2) (requiring Secretary of State to provide sponsor(s) with suggested changes made to initial proposal by Revisor of Statutes); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1409(3) (Reissue 1998) (requiring Secretary of State to notify “the person filing the initiative” whether, in opinion of Secretary of State, sufficient valid signatures have been collected to meet constitutional and statutory requirements); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1412(2) (Reissue 1998) (notifying sponsors) that in any suit commenced to enjoin Secretary of State from placing measure on official ballot, sponsor(s) of record will be party defendant(s) in such suit). In my view, those individuals agreeing to accept such responsibilities were identified in the documents filed with the Secretary of State.
In her brief, Loontjer specifically contends that “Schumacher sought to hide his involvement [with the petition] by creating a sham committee to advance the Petition. Hence, the Committee ... was formed.” Brief for appellee Loontjer at 28. Loontjer further alleges that Schumacher, together with Bill Kurtenbach, legal counsel for the NCGC, “recruited the same seven people *917who serve on the [NCGC] to serve on the Committee.” Id. Thus, Loontjer’s concern appears to be that Schumacher’s backing, financial or otherwise, was such that he must be identified as a sponsor of the petition and further, that Kurtenbach’s involvement similarly involved the NCGC. However, in this instance, I do not believe such support equates to sponsorship.
The predecessor to § 32-1405(1) required the filing of a statement containing “the name or names of every person, corporation or association sponsoring said petition or contributing or pledging contribution of money or other things of value” with the Secretary of State. (Emphasis supplied.) See 1939 Neb. Laws, ch. 34, § 13, p. 184. Thus, even the predecessor of § 32-1405(1) recognized a possible distinction between one who sponsors a petition initiative and one who financially contributes to that effort.
Section 32-1405(1), as currently codified, goes even further by eliminating any filing requirement with the Secretary of State for those financially contributing to such petition effort. Such involvement must now be disclosed by filing with the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 49-1454 and 49-1455 (Reissue 1998 & Cum. Supp. 2002). The record shows that Schumacher’s financial contributions, made through Community Lottery Systems, Inc., were disclosed by the Committee in its filings with the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission.
In summary, I agree with the Secretary of State who persuasively argues that “the main purpose of § 32-1405(1) is to prevent fraud by requiring that petition sponsors advise the electorate in advance as to the exact provisions of their initiative proposal and as to precisely who sponsored their initiative. Clearly, the materials filed with the Secretary of State ... do that.” Reply brief for appellee Secretary of State at 13-14.
Although concluding that the appellants have substantially complied with § 32-1405(1), I nevertheless concur in the result.
In Justice Wright’s concurrence, he determines, inter alia, that the appropriate standard in evaluating whether an initiative petition seeking a constitutional amendment contains more than one subject is the “natural and necessary connection” test set out in Munch v. Tusa, 140 Neb. 457, 300 N.W.2d 385 (1941). I agree with Justice Wright’s reasoning and believe such result is further *918supported by the applicable rules for determining the intent and understanding of a constitutional amendment.
The appellants contend that the standard articulated in Anderson v. Tiemann, 182 Neb. 393, 155 N.W.2d 322 (1967), should apply to the amendment. I disagree. In my view, the application of such standard cannot be justified when construing Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 2, as a whole. See State ex rel. Spire v. Beermann, 235 Neb. 384, 455 N.W.2d 749 (1990) (stating that with respect to determining intent and understanding of constitutional amendment, it is to be construed as whole, and no part is to be rejected as meaningless or surplusage if such can be avoided). The sentence in article III, § 2, immediately preceding the amended language at issue reads: “The constitutional limitations as to the scope and subject matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall apply to those enacted by the initiative.” This sentence clearly applies to statutes enacted by initiative and “incorporates” the “one subject” requirement for legislative bills and resolutions found in Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 14. With respect to applying the “one subject” requirement to legislative bills and resolutions, it is true that in such circumstance this court has applied the broader standard set forth in Tiemann, supra. The problem with the appellants’ argument, however, is I do not believe that construing article III, § 2, as a whole leads one back to article III, § 14.
Given my belief that the sentence quoted above from article III, § 2, refers only to statutes proposed by initiative, the amendment to article III, § 2, at issue, “[initiative measures shall contain only one subject,” must be a reference to the only remaining initiative power, that being the initiative whereby constitutional amendments may be adopted by the people. To read it otherwise would, in my view, fail to consider article HI, § 2, as a whole. As such, the appropriate standard would not be that as applied to statutes (article ID, § 14), but that as applied to a proposed constitutional amendment. That standard is found in Munch, supra.
Although Munch, was a proceeding to enjoin the placement upon the ballot of amendments to the city of Omaha’s home rule charter, we have observed that “[t]he power to form a charter may be likened to the power of a people to form a constitution. The charter of a home rule city is its constitution.” Mollner v. *919City of Omaha, 169 Neb. 44, 50, 98 N.W.2d 33, 37 (1959). In Munch, supra, we reviewed cases involving constitutional amendments embracing several subjects and enunciated the standard applicable when constitutional amendments are at issue. That such standard is narrower than that applied to statutes is a recognition of the “seriousness of the business in which we are engaged. A legislative act may be amended or repealed at any succeeding session of the legislature. A constitutional provision is intended to be a much more fixed and permanent thing.” State, ex rel. Hall, v. Cline, 118 Neb. 150, 154-55, 224 N.W. 6, 8 (1929). See, also, Omaha Nat. Bank v. Spire, 223 Neb. 209, 389 N.W.2d 269 (1986) (noting that differences between law and constitutional amendment enacted by initiative are obvious and great in that any law may later be repealed by Legislature but constitutional amendment (assuming it does not violate federal Constitution) can only be repealed by people in subsequent amendment to constitution).
The initiative process is a precious right reserved to the people. The people, however, through their constitution and elected representatives, determine the manner in which this right is to be exercised. In this instance, the people, in an election conducted in May 1998, approved an amendment to their constitution requiring that any “[initiative measures shall contain only one subject.”
Prior to this amendment, the state Constitution contained no language specifically addressing the issue of whether an initiative petition seeking to amend the constitution could contain more than one subject. By amending their constitution in May 1998, the people of Nebraska considered that specific question and determined that in such instance, a multiplicity of subjects shall not be permitted. The function of this court is not to question that decision, but to ensure that the initiative process reserved to the people is implemented in the manner the people have chosen. The determination that Munch v. Tusa, 140 Neb. 457, 300 N.W.2d 385 (1941), sets forth the appropriate standard does not thwart the will of the people. To the contrary, it upholds it. To permit the proposed measure to be submitted to the people through the initiative process would be to effectively ignore the determination of the people as expressed in their amendment to article HI, § 2, and this *920court’s standard, enunciated 57 years prior to the amendment’s passage, for determining when a proposed constitutional amendment contains more than one subject. The district court determined the initiative petition violated the single subject requirement of the constitution in that a “myriad of the provisions of the Initiative Petition for Local Option Gaming have no natural or necessary connection with each other and/or with the general subject of gambling.” After my de novo review of the initiative petition, I agree. I therefore concur in the result.