Court Opinion

ID: 9401336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 20:00:53.470807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:52.248462
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           ______________

                       Nos. 22-2176, 22-2178, 22-2195
                              ______________

                      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                      v.

           ANTOINE ALICEA, a/k/a Twan, a/k/a Twiz, a/k/a Twizzy
                                    Appellant
                         ______________

                      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                      v.

KAREEM SMITH, a/k/a Wink, a/k/a Lucky, a/k/a Lamar Jones, a/k/a Ronald Parker
                                     Appellant
                           ______________

                      UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                      v.

                   JAMAL TURNQUEST, a/k/a Pop; a/k/a P.
                                    Appellant
                           ______________

        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
            FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
     (D.C. Nos. 2-07-cr-00737-015, 2-07-cr-00737-001 & 2-07-cr-00737-002)

               District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                                ______________

                            Argued May 18, 2023
                              ______________
                Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, GREENAWAY, JR.,
                           and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges.

                              (Opinion Filed: June 12, 2023)

Samantha K. Drake [Argued]
Brett G. Sweitzer
Federal Community Defender Office
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106,
              Counsel for Appellants

Bernadette A. McKeon
Elizabeth M. Ray [Argued]
Robert A. Zauzmer
Office of the United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
              Counsel for Appellee
                                    ______________

                                        OPINION*
                                     ______________

GREENAWAY, JR. Circuit Judge.

       The District Court did not properly consider Appellants’ First Step Act § 404

motions. The Supreme Court and many circuits, including ours, have made clear that

“when deciding a First Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to

explain decisions and demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.”

Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). A district court must provide

more than a mere recitation of the factors. Because the District Court did not address all of

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

                                             2
Appellants’ nonfrivolous arguments, we will vacate and remand the District Court’s denial

of Appellants’ motions.1

    I.     BACKGROUND

         Appellants Kareem Smith, Jamal Turnquest, and Antoine Alicea (together,

“Appellants”) were convicted of various offenses, most of which fall under the category of

crimes eligible for discretionary relief under the First Step Act. All three filed First Step

Act § 404(c) motions seeking reduction of their sentences with respect to the eligible

crimes. Alicea presented evidence and arguments about his rehabilitation and overall

positive prison record, a strong support system and release plan, his limited role as a

nonviolent outside supplier, letters in support of his release, and his lack of any criminal

history before this offense and conviction. Smith presented evidence and arguments about

his sentencing scheme had he been sentenced post the passage of the First Step Act, his

efforts at rehabilitation, and family support to aid his reintegration into society. Turnquest

presented evidence and arguments about his reduced Guidelines range, a time credit issue

1
  Chief Judge Chagares concurs in the judgment, reasoning as follows. In a First Step Act
resentencing proceeding, like other sentencing proceedings, a district court has “an
obligation to explain [its] decision[] and demonstrate that [it] considered the parties’
arguments.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404. But the precise scope of this obligation
depends upon the circumstances of each case, and “[t]he law leaves much, in this respect
to the judge’s own professional judgment.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2405 (noting that the First Step Act does not “require a
district court to make a point-by-point rebuttal of the parties’ arguments.”). To permit
effective review, however, the district court “should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
court that he has considered the parties arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising
his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. The District Court’s orders,
in this case, do not meet this modest threshold, in Chief Judge Chagares’s view.

                                              3
that none of the parties nor the District Court could foresee at sentencing, his overall

satisfactory prison record, and his efforts at rehabilitation, including serving as a

community outreach worker and securing employment with a moving company when he

was temporarily released by the BOP under the CARES Act.

       The District Court denied relief under the First Step Act to all three defendants. As

for Alicea, the District Court wrote, in relevant part:

       After considering the relevant section 3553(a) factors, the Court, in exercising its
       discretion, finds that the factors do not weigh in favor of granting Alicea’s motion.
       Because the Guidelines range remains the same, and given the nature of the offense,
       Alicea’s history and role in the conspiracy as a principal supplier, and the need to
       avoid unnecessary sentencing disparities, the Court concludes, inter alia, that
       Alicea’s current sentence adequately reflects the seriousness of his crime and
       provides just punishment for the offense, affords adequate deterrence to others, and
       protects the public from further crimes by Alicea.

App. 8.

       As for Smith, the District Court wrote, in relevant part:

       After considering the section 3553(a) factors, the Court, in exercising its discretion,
       finds that the factors do not weigh in favor of granting Smith’s motion. Given the
       nature of the offense, Smith’s history and role in the conspiracy as the organizer of
       the drug ring, the need to avoid unnecessary sentencing disparities, and given that
       the Court previously granted the motion for a downward departure, the Court
       concludes, inter alia, that Smith’s current sentence adequately reflects the
       seriousness of his crime and provides just punishment for the offense, affords
       adequate deterrence to others, and protects the public from further crimes by Smith.

App. 10.

       As for Turnquest, the District Court wrote, in relevant part:

       After considering the relevant section 3553(a) factors, the Court, in exercising its
       discretion, finds that the factors do not weigh in favor of granting Turnquest’s
       motion. Given the nature of the offense, Turnquest’s history and significant role in
       the conspiracy, the need to avoid unnecessary sentencing disparities, and given that
       the Court previously granted the motion for a downward variance, the Court

                                              4
         concludes, inter alia, that Turnquest’s current sentence adequately reflects the
         seriousness of his crime and provides just punishment for the offense, affords
         adequate deterrence to others, and protects the public from further crimes by
         Turnquest.

App. 12.

   II.      JURISDICTION

         District courts have original jurisdiction over such prosecutions pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3231. The instant appeals challenge the District Court’s orders, entered on June

21, 2022, denying Appellants’ motions for reduced sentences under Section 404 of the First

Step Act. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over appeals from a final

decision of a district court. Timely notices of appeal were filed.

   III.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

         On appeal of a decision under § 404 of the First Step Act, this Court reviews the

record to ensure that a district court has “made no legal errors and ‘has demonstrate[d] that

it has considered the arguments before it.’” United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 194 (3rd

Cir. 2022) (quoting Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404-05). When a district court finds a

defendant eligible for relief under the First Step Act, but either declines to reduce the

sentence or imposes a reduced sentence with which the movant is unsatisfied, we review

for abuse of discretion. See id. at 189.

   IV.      DISCUSSION

         The District Court erred in denying Appellants’ First Step Act § 404 motions

without providing its rationale in assessing each Appellant’s nonfrivolous arguments.

                                              5
       The Supreme Court recently announced in Concepcion that “when deciding a First

Step Act motion, district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and

demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404;

see also United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2020) (requiring district courts

to show their consideration of the parties’ arguments), abrogated on other grounds by

Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. 2404. In holding so, the Supreme Court explained that there is a

long and durable tradition that sentencing judges enjoy discretion in the sort of information

they may consider at initial sentencing proceedings that carry over to sentencing

modification proceedings and that the same principles at initial sentencing proceedings also

apply to sentencing modification proceedings. Id. at 2398-99. In exercising that discretion

in the context of the First Step Act motion and against the backdrop of these long-held

principles, “district courts bear the standard obligation to explain their decisions and

demonstrate they considered the parties’ arguments.” Id. at 2404.

       Shortly after Concepcion was decided, we decided Shields, 48 F.4th at 184. In

Shields, we reiterated the principles announced in Concepcion—i.e., the district court’s

statement of reasons may be brief, but it must make clear that it considered the parties’

arguments.2 Id. We also recognized that Easter’s requirement that a district court

2
  The dissent imports into the plurality opinion words that are not there. There is no edict
stated here requiring a point-by-point rebuttal. None of the cases in the troika referenced
here, that relate to the First Step Act, set forth a notion of “conceptually simple arguments”
as an exception. Post, at 1. Further, far from requiring an onerous level of detail, as my
dissenting colleague suggests, only the modest threshold, that my colleague concurring in
the judgment suggests, is necessary.

                                              6
demonstrate their consideration of parties’ arguments remained good law post-Concepcion.

See id. at 190-193.

       Easter, Concepcion, and Shields make clear that while a district court’s order may

be brief and need not be a point-by-point rebuttal, it must make clear that it considered the

movant’s nonfrivolous arguments and do so in a way that allows our Court to effectively

review its order. See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404-05 (The First Step Act does not require

“courts to expressly rebut each argument,” but district courts must “demonstrate that it has

considered the arguments before it”) United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir.

2007) (stating that the reasoning needs to be “sufficiently detailed,” so “that [it] lends itself

to effective review); Shields, 48 F.4th at 194 (approvingly quoting and citing Grier); see

also Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (stating that a sentencing judge must

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to

promote the perception of fair sentencing”).

       Here, the District Court’s orders explaining why it rejected Appellants’ motions are

undeniably brief, almost identical except for several words in the analysis section, and do

not make clear that it reasoned through the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments.3 See

Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404 (“[A] district court must ‘make clear that it reasoned

through [the parties’] arguments.’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v.

Maxwell, 991 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir. 2021)). Although the District Court need not respond

3
 The threshold question is whether arguments presented for consideration for relief under
§ 404(c) are nonfrivolous. Appellants’ arguments are nonfrivolous and the Government
agrees that they are nonfrivolous.

                                               7
to every argument raised, id., the District Court did not address Alicea’s arguments about

his post-sentence rehabilitation, strong support system and release plan, and lack of

criminal history before the instant offense, see United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897,

912 (3d Cir. 2022) (affirming where the district court considered, “with extraordinary

care,” letters and character testimony submitted on defendant’s behalf). Nor did the District

Court consider Alicea’s good behavior while incarcerated. See United States v. Newbern,

51 4th 230, 233 (7th Cir. 2022). (stating that the district court inadequately reasoned

through the defendant’s arguments based on his good behavior in prison); see also United

States v. Carter, 44 F.4th 1227, 1129 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding that “the district court

erred” because it did not, among other things, address the defendant’s arguments and

evidence about his “prison good behavior and consequent lack of prison discipline, and his

‘post-conviction rehabilitation’”). In sum, the error is that the District Court clearly did not

enunciate specifically or by general reference that it had grappled with Appellants’

nonfrivolous arguments. Maxwell, 991 F.3d at 693-94 (affirming the district court’s denial

for relief under the First Step Act where it was “clear that the court reasoned through

[Appellant’s] arguments”).

       Smith requested that the District Court consider the different sentencing scheme he

would have faced if he was sentenced today, his rehabilitation, and family support to

reenter and reintegrate into society. The District Court rejected his motion but made no

mention that Smith was subject to life imprisonment at the time of sentencing and that

following the First Step Act, he would not have faced an enhanced, mandatory, or statutory

range of life imprisonment. At least one of his prior convictions may not have qualified as

                                               8
an enhancement following the First Step Act.4 Nor did the District Court discuss evidence

of rehabilitation and family support. These were nonfrivolous arguments that the District

Court had to consider.

       Turnquest sought a reduction based on his reduced Guidelines range, a substantial

time credit issue that neither the parties nor the District Court could foresee at sentencing

and his efforts at rehabilitation. The District Court briefly referenced an argument in

support of a sentence reduction, see App. 12 (“[T]he Court previously granted the motion

for a downward variance”). This brief discussion is enough for this issue because it is

sufficiently detailed for us to review. See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404 (stating that a

district court’s reasons may be brief so long as it demonstrates that it considered the

defendant’s arguments); Shields, 48 F.4th at 194 (same).

       That said, the District Court did not address Turnquest’s rehabilitation and

accomplishments since being temporarily released under the CARES Act. See Pepper v.

United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing

rehabilitation is “[h]ighly relevant—if not essential—to [the] selection of an appropriate

sentence” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).

4
  Section 401 of the FSA eliminated the statutory life range under which Smith was
sentenced and reduced it to 25 years. See First Step Act of 2018, S. 3747, 115th Cong.
§ 401 (2018). More importantly, it narrowed the class of enhancement predicates in
§ 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) to what is now called “serious drug felonies,” offenses punishable
by 10 years or more and for which a defendant served more than one-year imprisonment.
See id. § 401. The District Court’s Order does not make clear that it considered any of this.

                                              9
        The District Court’s discussion does not allow us to conclude that it met its

obligation to consider Appellants’ nonfrivolous arguments. Hence, we cannot effectively

review its order, as required by Concepcion, Easter, and Shields.

   V.      CONCLUSION

        Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s orders and remand with instructions

to reconsider its orders consistent with this opinion.

                                             10
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
       The Lead Opinion treats as mandatory a process that statute and Supreme Court
precedent make discretionary. In response to a motion for a sentence reduction, a district
court must show that it considered the parties’ non-frivolous arguments, but the law does
not require a district court to respond to those contentions point by point. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c) (authorizing district courts to reduce a previously imposed sentence under
certain circumstances “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the
extent that they are applicable” (emphasis added)); Concepcion v. United States,
142 S. Ct. 2389, 2405 (2022) (“All that is required is for a district court to demonstrate

that it has considered the arguments before it.” (emphasis added)); Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007) (holding that even at an original sentencing, when a case is
“conceptually simple . . . and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered

the evidence and arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to write more
extensively”); see also United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 191–94 (3d Cir. 2022)
(requiring consideration of a movant’s non-frivolous arguments); United States v. Easter,
975 F.3d 318, 323–27 (3d Cir. 2020) (requiring consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors). Yet here, the Majority vacates and remands these consolidated appeals because,
although the record shows that the District Court considered the movants’ myriad post-

sentencing mitigation arguments, the District Court did not explain in detail why it was
rejecting each of those arguments or identify specifically each argument that it
considered. But all the law requires for conceptually simple arguments is demonstrated

consideration – not a point-by-point explanation or recital – and consequently, the orders
denying the sentence-reduction motions should be affirmed. See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct.
at 2405 (explaining that a district court need not “make a point-by-point rebuttal of the
parties’ arguments”); United States v. McMaryion, 64 F.4th 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2023)
(“The question . . . is not whether the district court could offer a lengthy explanation after
considering myriad factors – it’s whether the district court must. Nothing in Concepcion

. . . requires the second proposition.”).
       Far from the level of detail demanded by the Lead Opinion, the Supreme Court
has approved a check-the-box approach to resolving motions for a sentence reduction. In

Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959 (2018), a district judge denied the
requested reduction by checking a box on a Form AO-247 issued by the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, which certified that he had “considered” the motion
and “tak[en] into account” the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. Chavez-Meza,
138 S. Ct. at 1965 (assuming that “district courts have equivalent duties when initially
sentencing a defendant and when later modifying the sentence”). Although the movant
had raised non-frivolous post-sentencing rehabilitation arguments in his motion –
emphasizing the courses he completed while in prison, his efforts to obtain a GED, and
the appropriateness of a proportional reduction – the Supreme Court did not require the

district court to explain further, respond to, or even mention those arguments due to their
conceptual simplicity. See id. at 1965–68; United States v. Chavez-Meza, 1:12-cr-00701,
ECF No. 169 (D.N.M. Aug. 10, 2015).
       Here, the District Court exceeded that check-the-box approach. Much like
Chavez-Meza, the movants in these cases raised conceptually simple mitigation
arguments, highlighting, for instance, their positive records while incarcerated and
community support. In each of its responsive orders, the District Court recognized that
the movants raised those post-sentencing § 3553(a) arguments, acknowledged its
obligation to consider them, and indicated expressly that it had considered the sentencing

factors. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568–69 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(holding that, in imposing the original sentence, the district court “meaningfully
consider[ed]” the government’s general-deterrence arguments by referencing “the

sentencing goals of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis removed)); see also Easter, 975 F.3d at 326 (“[A] district court need
simply acknowledge it has considered the § 3553(a) factors ‘to the extent that they are

applicable.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a))). The District Judge also acknowledged
several other movant-specific issues in its orders, such as Jamal Turnquest’s argument
that his Guidelines range would be lower if he were sentenced today, his request for a
proportional variance, and the fact that the First Step Act lowered the mandatory
minimum sentence for Kareem Smith’s offense.1 Lastly, the District Judge provided
individualized reasons for denying each motion.2
       While that explanation alone surpasses the standard set by the Supreme Court for
demonstrating the requisite consideration, “the record as a whole” further confirms that
the District Judge “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for

1
  The Lead Opinion asserts that the District Court “made no mention that Smith was
subject to life imprisonment at the time of sentencing and that following the First Step
Act, he would not have faced an enhanced, mandatory, or statutory range of life
imprisonment.” Lead Op. at 7–8. But the District Court did acknowledge that originally
“Smith was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of life under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)” and that “the First Step Act reduces Smith’s mandatory minimum
sentence . . . to 10 years’ imprisonment under section 841(b)(1)(B).” App. 9–10.
Although it did not detail the First Step Act’s effect on Smith’s prior convictions, these
statements suggest the District Court’s awareness of the different sentencing scheme that
he might face today.
2
  As to Antoine Alicea, the District Court explained that his Guidelines range remains the
same as at his original sentencing, emphasized his role in the conspiracy as one of its
suppliers of cocaine, and reiterated its previous finding that Alicea was responsible for
59.1 kilograms of crack. Regarding Smith, the District Court stressed his role as the
leader of the drug gang and noted that it already granted him a significant downward
departure. Finally, the District Court observed that Turnquest played a substantial role in
the conspiracy (he was one of the gang’s managers) and noted that it already granted him
a downward variance at his original sentencing.
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Chavez-Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1967
(quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356). As in Chavez-Meza, the District Judge had before him

full briefing from the parties regarding each movant’s mitigation arguments, and there is
no doubt that he reviewed those submissions. See id. Further, as “the same judge who
had sentenced [the movants] originally,” id., the District Judge had already explained his

reasons for their sentences, and many of the arguments made in the instant motions
echoed those already presented, considered, and addressed at sentencing. The District
Court, for example, already considered that Antoine Alicea “[spends] his time fruitfully
while he is in prison,” “has a supportive family,” and “has friends and supporters in the
community.” United States v. Smith, 2:07-cr-00737, ECF No. 840, at 40 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
31, 2011). And it explained at length why it found those types of arguments
unpersuasive in this case, pondering that “it’s as if there are two Antoine Aliceas.” Id.
With that context, “there was not much else for the judge to say.” Chavez-Meza,
138 S. Ct. at 1967.

       In the end, the Lead Opinion seems to fault the District Court for not reciting each
of the movants’ arguments at a greater level of specificity, such as by stating, “I have
considered Smith’s family-support arguments.” But gauging the appropriate level of
specificity is not only an invitation for arbitrary appellate review (as these cases
themselves demonstrate),3 it also affronts the broad discretion the Supreme Court has

3
  Compare Lead Op. at 8 (statement that the District Court “previously granted
[Turnquest’s] motion for a downward variance,” App. 12, was sufficient to show
consideration of his post-sentencing time-credit argument), with, e.g., Lead Op. at 7
(District Court’s statement that Alicea’s Guidelines range was “based on . . . a criminal
history category of I” and “remains the same,” App. 8, was not enough to show that it
considered his lack of criminal history), and Lead Op. at 7–9 (District Court’s statements
that each movant “primarily argues that the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors weigh in
favor of a reduction” and that it “should consider post-sentencing developments, such as
. . . rehabilitation arguments,” App. 8, 10, 12 (internal quotation marks omitted), was not
afforded to district courts in deciding how much explanation to provide when ruling on
sentence-reduction motions. See Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404 (emphasizing that

appellate review in this area “should not be overly searching” and that the degree of
explanation is left to “the [district] judge’s own professional judgment” (quoting Chavez-
Meza, 138 S. Ct. at 1961)). And even if a precise incantation of each argument

considered and rejected served some compelling function, it is not legally required. See
Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2404–05; Rita, 551 U.S. at 359. By reaching a contrary
conclusion, the Lead Opinion treats as mandatory what statute and binding precedent
treat as discretionary.
       For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

enough to show that it considered the movants’ post-sentencing rehabilitation
arguments).