Court Opinion

ID: 9701153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:07:50.675384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:20.062115
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that evidence of the use of an extraordinary amount of force during the commission of a violent felony is not required to satisfy aggravating circumstance (9), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). However, contrary to the assertion of the majority, appellant also raises the issue of whether the evidence of his convictions of rape and sodomy arising from a single criminal episode is sufficient to establish a “significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” Id. *342I would hold that under the reasoning of the majority in Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270, 495 A.2d 527 (1985), the aggravating circumstance in question was invalid.
In interpreting the statutory language it is essential that the underlying purposes of the death penalty statute be appreciated. “[T]he decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (plurality opinion). However the death penalty must be administered in a way that can rationally distinguish between those cases in which death is an appropriate sanction and those in which it is not. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, _, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3163, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 352 (1984); see also Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). Thus to prevent the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty the discretion of the sentencing jury must be carefully limited and channelled. Gregg v. Georgia, supra at 189, 96 S.Ct. at 2932.
Our legislature has provided guidance to juries in capital cases by identifying a limited number of factors relating to the nature of the crime or the character of the defendant which, in the legislature’s judgment, not only engender extreme moral outrage but also strike at the very fabric of an ordered society. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d). Only where one of these specific factors is established beyond a reasonable doubt may a sentence of death even be considered.
One of the factors the legislature has deemed to be such an aggravating circumstance is a “significant history” of violent felony convictions. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9). In Commonwealth v. Goins, supra, this Court concluded that the legislature intended the significance of the defendant’s history of such convictions, rather than the serious nature *343of a prior offense, to be the basis for a finding of that aggravating factor. Accordingly we interpreted the legislature’s use of the plural “convictions” as deliberate and held that more than one conviction must be proven to establish a “significant history.”
It is implicit in our holding in Goins that the sentencing jury or judge must determine whether the number of the defendant’s prior convictions of crimes of violence is “significant.” The plain meaning of the term “significant” is “having or expressing a meaning.” Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language (2d Coll. ed. 1982). Clearly the number of prior convictions must be sufficient for the sentencer to draw a conclusion as to the defendant’s character.
Since only felonies involving the use or threat of physical violence may be considered, the prior convictions proven by the Commonwealth will share two characteristics in common. First, they are serious offenses; second, they are violent in nature. In my view the legislature has determined that a prior criminal record which reveals a pattern of repeated violent crimes of a serious nature should be an aggravating factor in the sentencing determination. Multiple convictions of such crimes would establish not only the defendant’s contempt for society’s laws, but also his propensity for violent behavior and callous disregard for the sanctity of human life. Such individuals present a clear danger to society and are beyond remorse or rehabilitation.
The Commonwealth’s evidence in support of a “significant history” in this matter was patently inadequate. The only evidence offered was that appellant had been convicted of a rape-sodomy in Virginia in 1974. Appellant countered with evidence that he had successfully fulfilled the conditions of his parole following a period of imprisonment. I reject the notion that proof of one prior remote and isolated incident involving a single victim could support the finding of a “significant history” of violent felony convictions as that term is contemplated by the General Assembly.
*344In the instant case, however, the evidence in support of aggravating circumstance (10), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(10), was so overwhelming and the evidence offered in mitigation of the multiple homicides was so vague and unconvincing that I am satisfied that the jury’s balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances would not have been significantly affected by the exclusion of a finding of aggravating circumstance (9) from the weighing process. Moreover, its erroneous inclusion was in my judgment under these circumstances harmless. I, therefore, concur in the result reached by the majority.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.