Court Opinion

ID: 9644726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:03:01.44013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:17.136937
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S SECOND MOTION FOR REHEARING
This Court, in its original opinion, erroneously found the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment that appellant murdered Jose Garcia, Jr. The facts of this case show that the alleged “murder victim” is alive. We have no choice but to grant appellant’s second motion for rehearing, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and acquit appellant of the charge of murder.
A person who reads the opinion we issued on September 17, 1992, will not be aware of the enormity of our error, for we failed to address each argument that appellant advanced under his sufficiency point. The attorney representing Mr. Sandoval is blameless for our initial failure to acquit appellant. He raised an appropriate point of error, claiming insufficiency of the evidence to support conviction for the crime alleged in the jury charge. To further specify his complaint, appellant listed the following four elements the state failed to prove: 1) that he caused the death of Jose Garcia, Jr., 2) that he knew the intent of Juan Perez to commit the offense, 3) that he knowingly acted with intent to promote or assist the offense, and 4) that he encouraged, directed, aided, solicited, or attempted to aid Perez to commit the offense. Perhaps this opinion will convince appellate lawyers of the need to raise a separate point of error for each specific complaint and to argue each point separately to ensure that appellate courts will recognize each complaint.
Appellant was indicted for the offense of murder. The indictment states in relevant part as follows:
... that NORBERTO SANDOVAL hereinafter styled Defendant, on or about the 12th day of June A.D., 1989, and before the presentment of this indictment, in Hidalgo County, Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Jose Garcia, Jr., the victim, by shooting the said victim with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm ...
The jury was charged that it could convict appellant for murder only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that
... JUAN ALFREDO PEREZ did then and there intentionally or knowingly cause the death of an individual, JOSE GARCIA, JR., the victim, by shooting the said victim, JOSE GARCIA, JR., with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm ...
*13and additionally found beyond a reasonable doubt that
... NORBERTO SANDOVAL then and there knew of the intent, if any, of the said JUAN ALFREDO PEREZ to commit the above said offense of murder, if JUAN ALFREDO PEREZ did, and the defendant, NORBERTO SANDOVAL, knowingly or intentionally acted with intent to promote or assist the commission of that above said murder offense, if any, by JUAN ALFREDO PEREZ and that the defendant NORBERTO SANDOVAL did encourage or direct or aid or solicit or attempt to aid JUAN ALFREDO PEREZ to commit the above said murder, if any....
In his first motion for rehearing, appellant complained that we overruled his factual sufficiency point of error without making any factual findings, but he did not specify our failure to make findings regarding the vitality of Jose Garcia, Jr. In his second motion for rehearing, appellant complained that we failed to make factual findings regarding whether Jose Garcia, Jr. was dead and that the trial court heard no evidence that Jose Garcia, Jr. is dead.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict by comparing the evidence to the indictment as incorporated into the charge. Benson v. State, 661 S.W.2d 708, 715 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (opinion on rehearing). There is no such thing as surplusage in the part of the court’s instructions which authorizes a conviction. Ortega v. State, 668 S.W.2d 701, 707 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) (opinion on rehearing).
Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 21.07 (Vernon 1989) provides in pertinent part:
In alleging the name of the defendant, or any other person necessary to be stated in the indictment, it shall be sufficient to state one or more of the initials of the Christian name and the surname.
Courts interpreting this rule have held that the suffixes “Jr.” or “Sr.” form no part of the name and may be regarded as surplus-age. See Smith v. State, 435 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1969); Smith v. State, 734 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.).
These cases are distinguishable, for even if the allegation of “Jr.” in the indictment could have been disregarded as surplusage, Benson, Ortega, and their progeny teach that there is no such thing as surplusage in the part of the court’s charge which authorizes a conviction. Once the charge authorized conviction only upon a finding that Jose Garcia, Jr. was killed, the State was bound to prove that fact.
Jose Garcia, Jr. was alive at the time of trial, and as far as anyone knows, is alive today. The State produced no evidence that Jose Garcia, Jr. was killed. In fact, Jose Garcia, Jr.’s mother testified as follows:
PROSECUTOR: Please state your name.
WITNESS: My name is Chavela Franco Garcia.
PROSECUTOR: Okay, are you familiar with the individual, Jose P. Garcia?
WITNESS: Yes, sir. He was my husband.
⅜: ⅝ ⅜ ⅜ # ⅜
PROSECUTOR: I hand the witness what’s been marked State’s Exhibit # 19. Do you know what the document is?
WITNESS: This is the death certificate of my husband, Jose Garcia.
PROSECUTOR: And is your husband Jose Garcia?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
PROSECUTOR: Do you have a picture of your husband?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
* * * * * *
(State’s Exhibit #23 was marked for identification and subsequently admitted into evidence without objection.)
PROSECUTOR: Alright, let me hand you back what’s been marked State’s Exhibit # 23. There are two individuals in that picture. Would you tell the jury who those individuals are?
WITNESS: These are my husband, Jose Garcia, and my son, Jose Garcia, Jr.
*14PROSECUTOR: Jose Garcia, the man in the picture is the victim in this case, right? The murder case? Is that true?
WITNESS: Yes.
Neither the indictment nor the jury-charge alleged that Jose Garcia was the victim in this case. Since the State alleged and accepted the burden of proving the death of Jose Garcia, Jr., but produced no evidence that Jose Garcia, Jr. is dead, we have no alternative but to reverse the judgment and acquit the appellant. We grant appellant’s second motion for rehearing, reverse the judgment, and acquit appellant in Cause No. 13-91-379-CR.
We deny rehearing in Cause No. 13-91-380-CR.