Court Opinion

ID: 9896918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:03:55.284441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:52.937398
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/14/23 P. v. Odell CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B324487

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                      BA436727)

 FLOYD ODELL,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed.
      Karyn H. Bucur, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, and Michael C. Keller and Charles
S. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Defendant and appellant Floyd Odell (defendant) appeals
from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1172.6
(former section 1170.95) petition seeking resentencing on prior
convictions for murder (one count) and attempted murder (two
counts).1 We consider whether the trial court correctly found
defendant did not make a prima facie case for relief because his
trial jury was not instructed on felony murder, aiding and
abetting liability pursuant to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any theory that would permit imputing
malice to defendant.

                        I. BACKGROUND
       A.    The Offense Conduct, as Established by the Evidence
             at Trial
       James Freeman (James) testified he and his wife were
about to enter their car on May 12, 2015, when he turned to see
the flash of a gun. He was shot once in the groin. He did not see
who shot him and he did not recognize defendant at trial. His
wife, Pamela Freeman (Pamela), testified she knew defendant
from previous encounters. She saw defendant approach her
husband, shoot him once, and fire multiple shots at her—with
one bullet hitting her hand.
       Elisha Bables (Bables) testified regarding a separate
incident that occurred on May 18, 2015. According to Bables,
Charles Wilson (Wilson), defendant, and friends gathered in
Wilson’s home for “dominoes, cards, [and] drinking.” Defendant
and Wilson argued sporadically over “[m]iscellaneous, frivolous

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                2
things.” Defendant left, but returned a short time later “banging
on the door.” Bables and Wilson went outside to talk to him.
Bables was walking in front of Wilson and defendant when she
heard shots, turned around, and saw defendant “grabbing”
Wilson. She saw Wilson “sliding down the side of the house” and
“it looked like [defendant] was shooting him.” Bables begged
defendant not to hurt her and he left.
       At trial, defendant testified he accidentally shot Pamela
and James. As for Wilson, defendant testified someone else shot
him. Defendant claimed Wilson approached defendant with a
gun, defendant hit him, and around the same time, an unknown
third party fired shots in their direction and defendant reacted by
using Wilson “like a shield.” Defendant claimed he tried to revive
Wilson, who had been shot, by “pumping his chest” but left the
scene when defendant was unsuccessful.

      B.     Charges, Jury Instructions, and Judgment
      Defendant was charged with the murder of Wilson,
attempted murder of Pamela and James, assault with a firearm
on Pamela and James, and possession of a firearm by a felon.
      The jury instructions relevant to the murder and attempted
murder charges included CALJIC No. 8.10 (defining murder),
CALJIC No. 8.11 (malice aforethought), CALJIC No. 8.20
(deliberate and premeditated murder), CALJIC No. 8.30
(unpremeditated murder of the second degree), CALJIC No. 8.31
(second degree murder—killing resulting from unlawful act
dangerous to human life), CALJIC No. 8.66 (attempted murder),
CALJIC No. 8.67 (attempted murder—willful, deliberate, and
premeditated), CALJIC No. 8.70 (duty of jury as to degree of
murder), CALJIC No. 8.71 (doubt whether first or second degree

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murder), and CALJIC No. 8.74 (unanimous agreement as to
offense—first or second degree murder).2
       The jury found defendant guilty of the second degree
murder of Wilson and found various firearm enhancements to be
true, including that defendant “personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, to wit: handgun, which caused death to
Charles Wilson, within the meaning of . . . section 12022.53[,
subdivision] (d) . . . .” The jury also found defendant guilty of the
willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder of
Pamela. It again found various firearm enhancements to be true,
including that defendant “personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm, to wit: handgun, which caused great bodily
injury to Pamela . . . , within the meaning of . . . section
12022.53[, subdivision] (d). The jury further found defendant
guilty on both counts of assault with a firearm (again finding
various firearm enhancements to be true) and possession of a
firearm by a felon. The jury was not able to reach a verdict on
the charge of attempting to murder James.
       With the associated firearm enhancements, the trial court
sentenced defendant to an indeterminate Three Strikes law
sentence of 50 years to life in prison for the murder of Wilson, 25
years to life in prison for the attempted murder of Pamela, and
life in prison for one of the assault with a firearm convictions.
Sentences on other counts and for other enhancements were
stayed.

2
      This court granted the Attorney General’s request that we
take judicial notice of the jury instructions. (Evid. Code, §§ 452,
subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).)

                                  4
       C.     Section 1172.6 Petition
       Defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing in
April 2022. After appointing counsel for defendant and receiving
briefing, the trial court held a hearing and denied defendant’s
petition based on his failure to make a prima facie case for relief.
       At the hearing, defendant’s attorney argued the court
should issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary
hearing because “[his] feeling [was] . . . that the—the continuing
ar[c] of jurisprudence published about this statute continually
bends toward more and not less in terms of allowing a petitioner
to have to in court litigate the petition on the merits not [sic] an
evidentiary hearing. [¶] And it’s an extremely rare case that
someone is simply barred as a matter of law from being able to
have an O.S.C. [Defendant’s attorney] was remembering a
discussion that . . . [Senate Bill No.] 775 specified that the court
can look at an appellate opinion in a matter for the limited
purpose of determining case procedural history. And [defendant’s
attorney] suddenly remembered an 1170.95 case that [he] had
maybe a year and a half ago, somewhere in the—where the
appellate opinion actually misstated the procedural history. And
had . . . an O.S.C. not been granted and had an evidentiary
hearing not been held, that never would have emerged because
we wouldn’t have had access to all the documents, to the original
certified court documents, the trial transcript and the clerk’s
transcript. [¶] . . . [T]hat’s why the court should err on the side of
caution and err on the side of the spirit of the statute and grant
an evidentiary hearing and hold one. Whatever the result,
whatever the issues that might be present at an evidentiary
hearing . . . the . . . predominant tone of all the case law that’s

                                  5
published on this matter is for conducting a hearing and being
able to litigate it.”
      The trial court declined to issue an order to show cause.
Citing People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, the court
observed the jury instructions and the verdicts conclusively
established, with no fact finding or weighing of the evidence
necessary, that defendant was convicted as the actual killer and
therefore ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The trial court
emphasized that, in this case, “[t]he only theory of murder and
attempted murder was malice which would be express for the
attempted murder.”3 The trial court also cited the jury’s true
findings as to the various firearm enhancements.

                         II. DISCUSSION
       Defendant’s only challenge to the trial court’s finding that
he failed to make a prima facie case for relief under section
1172.6 is an invocation of his trial attorney’s feeling that courts
ought to err on the side of issuing an order to show cause and
holding an evidentiary hearing. This is not the law. If, after
briefing and argument, “the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If, on the
other hand, “the petition and record in the case establish

3
       The reporter’s transcript indicates the trial court also said
“[t]he only instruction of felony murder natural and probable
consequences were given in the verdicts.” It is not clear what the
trial court might have meant by this. There were no written
instructions as to felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine and no references to these theories in the
verdict forms.

                                 6
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial
court may dismiss the petition.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708; accord People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
971 [“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry . . . , allowing the court to distinguish
petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly
meritless”].)
       Here, the trial court correctly determined the record of
conviction conclusively establishes defendant was not “convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime” or “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The jury
instructions (and the true findings on the firearm enhancements)
establish defendant was convicted as the actual (attempted)
killer, not on any theory of criminal liability that did not involve
his own mens rea. (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 52 [“if the
record shows that the jury was not instructed on either the
natural and probable consequences or felony-murder doctrines,
then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law”].)
       In addition to challenging the denial of his section 1172.6
petition, defendant contends the case should be remanded to the
trial court so that court can exercise discretion conferred by
Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike or dismiss
certain firearm enhancements. If the argument is advanced
independent of the aforementioned argument for reversal that we
have rejected, it is still wrong. “[T]he authority to strike or
dismiss a firearm enhancement applies only to nonfinal
judgments or to final judgments where the defendant is being

                                  7
resentenced under some other law.” (People v. Baltazar (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 334, 341.) Defendant will not be resentenced under
section 1172.6 and his criminal judgment is final.

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           BAKER, J.

We concur:

      RUBIN, P. J.

      KIM, J.

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