Court Opinion

ID: 9401185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 09:09:48.177672+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.500128
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-22-00266-CR
      ___________________________

 KENNETH DWAYNE AUGUST, Appellant

                      V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

 On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 3
            Tarrant County, Texas
        Trial Court No. 0947650AR

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Kenneth August appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for

postconviction DNA testing under Chapter 64 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01, .05. He claims that the trial court erred by

denying his request to have various pieces of evidence tested, that he was entitled to

but deprived of counsel in the Chapter 64 proceeding, and that he was erroneously

excluded from the unrecorded Chapter 64 hearing.1 Because August failed to present

a viable argument that the results from his requested DNA tests would have probably

prevented his conviction, the trial court did not err by denying his motion for DNA

testing, nor did it err by declining to appoint counsel. And as for the hearing, August

was not excluded from anything because no hearing occurred.

      We will affirm.

                                   I. Background

      August is currently serving a life sentence for capital murder based on his

participation in the robbery and murder of a drug dealer.

      1
       August’s three issues are reordered for organizational purposes.

                                           2
A.    Underlying Conviction2

      In 2002, August, his relative Marcus August, 3 and two other men—Allan

Powell and Derrick Price—decided to rob a drug dealer. Marcus commented that he

would kill the dealer if the dealer saw his face, and August had a shotgun in his car, so

the group retrieved shotgun shells before they went to the drug dealer’s apartment.

      Upon arrival, August went into the apartment to purchase drugs and reported

back that the dealer was alone. Marcus and Allan then knocked on the dealer’s door,

and when he answered, Marcus shot him with the shotgun. August joined the group

in stealing drugs and guns from the apartment, and he had a stolen gun in his

possession when he was arrested. See August, 2006 WL 1174213, at *2.

      Two of the dealer’s customers spoke with August on the day of the shooting.

See id. at *1–2. The first—Jodie Williams—saw August before the shooting, and he

told her that he was going to “jack” (i.e., rob) the dealer. Id. at *1. She heard

gunshots about five minutes later. Id. Then, after the police responded to the

shooting, another drug user—LaWanda Moore—was walking in the vicinity of the

      2
       The facts recited herein are based on the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law as well as our discussion of the case in August’s direct appeal. See
August v. State, No. 2-04-484-CR, 2006 WL 1174213, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
May 4, 2006, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op, not designated for publication).
      3
        The trial court’s findings describe Marcus as August’s brother, but our prior
opinion described him as August’s cousin. See id. at *2. And August’s mother and
grandmother, in affidavits attached to August’s Chapter 64 motion, described Marcus
as August’s cousin. The specific familial link between the two men is immaterial to
this appeal.

                                           3
dealer’s apartment, and she saw August and Marcus.               Id. at *2.   August asked

LaWanda to take him to see Jodie, and Jodie later testified that August told her he had

“jacked” the dealer. Id. August gave Jodie and LaWanda cocaine, and according to

LaWanda, August had dealer quantities of the drug. Id.

       August was indicted for capital murder, and one of the State’s theories of

liability was that he was a party to the offense. Id. at *1–2.

       Before trial, the State sent several items for DNA testing. The results either

excluded August or were inconclusive:

•      Blood samples from the dealer’s apartment were matched to the dealer.

•      A toboggan hat found on the sidewalk near the dealer’s apartment had an
       insufficient amount of quality DNA so the test was inconclusive.

•      A baseball cap found in the dealer’s living room (1) returned no DNA profile
       from the cap’s back band and (2) returned a two-person DNA mixture from
       the cap’s front band, with the dealer, August, and all three accomplices
       excluded as sources.

       These DNA results were admitted into evidence at trial. As for witnesses,

accomplices Allan and Derrick both testified at August’s trial, as did Jodie, LaWanda,

and another woman who saw the group of four together that day and saw blood spots

on Marcus’s shirt after the shooting. See id.

       August was convicted and received an automatic life sentence, and we affirmed

that conviction on direct appeal. Id. at *1–3.

                                             4
B.     Post-Conviction Motion for DNA Testing

       More than a decade later, August filed a motion for postconviction DNA

testing.     See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01.      The motion identified 13

categories of evidence that he sought to have tested, although for many of those

categories, his explanations revealed that he did not seek DNA testing but rather a

general reexamination of that part of his case—a new autopsy, a new psychological

exam, a new ballistics analysis, a new inspection of his vehicle, a new fingerprint

analysis, new drug testing for the substances found in the dealer’s home, and

verification of the chain of custody for various items. Even liberally reading his

motion, the items for which he appeared to seek DNA testing were limited to three

categories of evidence from August’s apartment or person:

       (1)      the drugs, clothes, and items found in August’s home;

       (2)      August’s car; and

       (3)      the hair, blood, and similar samples collected from August after his
                arrest;

and five items from in or around the dealer’s apartment:

       (1)      a skullcap;

       (2)      cigarette butts;

       (3)      the money found on the dealer and in his home;4

     It is unclear if August sought to have the money tested for fingerprints, for
       4

DNA, or both. Since Chapter 64 relates to DNA testing, for purposes of our Chapter

                                            5
      (4)    the drugs in the dealer’s home; and

      (5)    the gun stolen from the dealer’s apartment and later found in August’s
             possession.

      Although August admitted that he had purchased drugs from the dealer just

before the murder and that he, Marcus, Allan, and Derrick had discussed robbing the

dealer, August insisted that he “was just following those guys” and had not known

that they would shoot the dealer.5 He claimed that DNA testing would establish his

innocence by debunking specific details of Allan’s and Derrick’s stories and by

showing that he had not possessed the stolen gun, worn the skullcap, or been in the

dealer’s apartment during or after the murder.

      The State filed lists of the items in its possession that contained “potential

biological evidence related to this case,”6 and it argued that August was not entitled to

DNA testing in part because any results would probably not have prevented his

conviction. Cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.02(a)(2), .03(a)(2)(A).

64 analysis, we assume that he sought to have the money tested for DNA. See generally
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01(a-1), .03.
      5
        August places great weight on his assertion that he was not the gunman. That
fact was not dispositive. The group went to the scene of the offense with a shotgun.
Cf. Gittens v. State, 560 S.W.3d 725, 736 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet. ref’d)
(stating that factfinder “could have . . . reasonably determined [the defendant] should
have anticipated that by using firearms during the commission of the robbery,
someone at the residence could be killed”).
      6
       The lists were very broad; even copies of the indictments, photospreads, and
crime-scene photos were included.

                                           6
      After considering August’s Chapter 64 motion and the State’s response, the

trial court adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, 7 and

it denied August’s Chapter 64 motion without a hearing.8

      7
        One of the State’s proposed findings does not apply to this case. The State
asked the trial court to find that “[s]ignificant evidence unrelated to any swabs
collected during V.P.’s sexual assault examination establishes that the defendant
sexually assaulted V.P.” The State has not cited any evidence of sexual assault in this
case, and the dealer’s initials were not V.P. The proposed finding appears to have
been inadvertently imported from another case. But when the trial court adopted the
State’s proposed findings and conclusions as its own, it adopted the erroneous finding
as well. And the State did not identify the error when it recited the findings of fact
and conclusions of law in its brief.

        Regardless, although this erroneous statement is labeled a finding of fact, it is
an application of law to fact, and because it does not turn on credibility or demeanor,
it does not bind us. Cf. Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(listing findings entitled to deference, noting that “whether a reasonable probability
exists that exculpatory DNA tests would prove innocence is an application-of-law-to-
fact question that . . . is . . . reviewed de novo,” and concluding that exculpatory test
results would not outweigh other evidence of appellant’s guilt).
      8
        Although the trial court was not required to certify the defendant’s right to
appeal, it did so anyway. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2); cf. Order Amending Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2, Misc. Docket No. 18-9149 (Tex. Nov. 5, 2018)
(amending rule such that certification is not required for order appealable under
Chapter 64); Order Amending Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2, Misc. Docket
No. 18-021, (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 30, 2018) (same). But the certification states that
the defendant has no right of appeal, which is incorrect. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 64.05. Because this error is in a superfluous certification, though, it does not
require dismissal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

                                            7
                                II. Standard of Review 9

       When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a Chapter 64 motion, we apply a

bifurcated standard of review, giving “almost total deference to the judge’s resolution

of historical fact issues supported by the record and applications-of-law-to-fact issues

turning on witness credibility and demeanor” while reviewing de novo legal questions

and all other application-of-law-to-fact questions. Reed v. State, 541 S.W.3d 759, 768–

69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Coleman v. State, No. 02-22-00089-CR, 2023 WL 2430027,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 9, 2023, pet. ref’d) (quoting Reed); see Ex parte

Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

                                    III. Discussion

       August raises three issues on appeal: 10 (1) that he was entitled to DNA testing;

(2) that he was entitled to but denied counsel; and (3) that the trial court erroneously

       9
         Citing federal authorities, August contends that, because he “is a lay man of
the law, unskilled and without training in the drafting of legal papers . . . he is entitled
to a less stringent standard than those filed by lawyers.” State case law holds
otherwise: “A pro se appellant is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney.”
Carte v. State, No. 2-03-324-CR, 2004 WL 1636010, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July
22, 2004, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Bender v.
State, No. 02-17-00342-CR, 2018 WL 4401745, at *7 n.9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 23, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (similar).
       10
         In his brief, August characterizes this proceeding as an appeal from his trial
court conviction and from our 2006 opinion affirming that conviction. A good deal
of his brief is devoted to disputing the merits of his conviction.

                                             8
excluded him from the Chapter 64 hearing and the court reporter erroneously failed

to record that hearing. 11

A.     August was not entitled to DNA testing.

       First, August argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for DNA

testing. He claims that if the evidence listed in his Chapter 64 motion had been

tested, the test results would have demonstrated that he had no part in the crime. We

disagree—results from the requested DNA tests were unlikely to have prevented

August’s conviction.

       Chapter 64 authorizes a convicting court to order postconviction DNA testing

only if it finds, among other things, that it is more likely than not that “the person

would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through

DNA testing.”12 Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). The convicted

       11
         August also attempts to collaterally attack his conviction, arguing that his Due
Process rights were violated by the State’s reliance on “snitch” testimony and that the
nonaccomplice evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We addressed
and rejected the latter argument in August’s direct appeal. See August, 2006 WL
1174213, at *1–2. Plus, “Chapter 64 does ‘not confer jurisdiction upon this court to
entertain collateral attacks on the trial court’s judgment or to review, under the guise
of a DNA testing appeal, anything beyond the scope of those articles.’” Gowan v.
State, No. 02-18-00032-CR, 2020 WL 1949015, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr.
23, 2020, pet. ref’d) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (quoting
Reger v. State, 222 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d)).

       We review this application-of-law-to-fact question de novo. Gutierrez, 337
       12

S.W.3d at 895 n.36; Wright v. State, No. 02-06-152-CR, 2007 WL 174920, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Jan. 25, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

                                           9
person bears the burden to prove this by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. art.

64.03(a)(2).

       “[I]f DNA testing would not determine the identity of the person who

committed the offense or would not exculpate the accused, then the requirement of

Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) [that exculpatory results would probably have prevented the

conviction] has not been met.” Prible v. State, 245 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008) (noting that this requirement is related to another Chapter 64 requirement—the

requirement that identity be an issue). Here, none of the eight categories of evidence

that August sought to have tested would have determined the identity of the person

who committed the offense, proved August’s noninvolvement, or probably have

prevented August’s conviction. See id.

       For the three categories of evidence from August’s home or person—(1) the

drugs, clothes, and items in his home; (2) his car; and (3) his hair, blood, and similar

samples—it is difficult to understand why August contends that these tests would

produce “exculpatory results” that “exclud[e] the convicted person as the donor of

the DNA.” Hall v. State, 569 S.W.3d 646, 655–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (reciting

meaning of exculpatory results).      August’s hair and blood in particular would

undoubtedly contain his own DNA. Cf. Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 900 (noting that if

victim’s blood sample were tested, “[t]he DNA from [the victim] will undoubtedly be

her own”). August fails to explain how such test results could be exculpatory. See

Reed, 541 S.W.3d at 774 (noting that courts assume without deciding that DNA test

                                          10
results would be favorable to the incarcerated person). We also fail to see how such

results could be exculpatory as they would not determine the identity of the person

who murdered the dealer or make it less likely that August committed the crime as a

party.

         As for the other five categories of evidence that August sought to have

tested—the skullcap, 13 gun, cigarette butts, drugs, and money that were in or from the

dealer’s apartment—August has not explained why the DNA found on these items

would necessarily identify the murderer or cast doubt on his conviction.            It is

undisputed that the dealer sold drugs out of his apartment, see August, 2006 WL

1174213, at *1, so any number of people could have left DNA on the items in or

around his residence. See Hernandez v. State, No. 13-20-00216-CR, 2022 WL 324069, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 3, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (noting that “DNA analysis is more probative when the

number of potential DNA contributors to an item of evidence is reasonably limited,”

and holding appellant failed to show that exculpatory results would probably have

prevented conviction when golf club used in assault at store could have DNA from

“any number of shop-goers”). In fact, August conceded that he himself had been

         It is unclear if the “skullcap” August references is the same as the toboggan
         13

hat that was DNA tested before his trial. To the extent that it is, the trial court could
have denied retesting the hat because August offered no evidence that, “although
previously subjected to DNA testing,” the hat “c[ould] be subjected to testing with
newer testing techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of results that are more
accurate and probative than the results of the previous test.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 64.01(b)(2).

                                           11
“present at [the dealer’s] home to briefly purchase drugs” just before the murder, so

he was among those who could have deposited DNA on the items in or around that

apartment. Cf. id.

      Moreover, “[i]n cases involving accomplices, the burden is more difficult

because there is not a lone offender whose DNA must have been left at the scene.”

Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 900. August was convicted as an accomplice under the law of

parties—he was found to have been a member of the four-person group that robbed

and killed the dealer. See August, 2006 WL 1174213, at *1–2. To be entitled to DNA

testing, then, August was required to show that exculpatory results would establish

that he did not commit the crime as either a principal or a party. See Gutierrez, 337

S.W.3d at 900.

      And August’s requested DNA tests would not do that. Although he denies his

own involvement in the murder, he does not dispute the identities of the other three

members of the group—Marcus, Allan, and Derrick—nor does he dispute that they

robbed and murdered the dealer. So even if the items from the dealer’s apartment

were tested, and even if the DNA results excluded August and identified one of the

other three perpetrators—Marcus, Allan, or Derrick—such results would say nothing

about August’s participation in the plot as a party. Cf. Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 900–

01.

      The Court of Criminal Appeals held as much in a similar robbery–murder case

tried under the law of parties. See id. at 894, 899–902. There, as here, the appellant’s

                                          12
two accomplices had confessed, and although the appellant admitted to participating

in the robbery, he claimed that he was not the one who killed the victim. Id. at 887–

88, 899. He sought postconviction DNA testing of several items from the victim’s

home and person, claiming that the items would prove he did not commit the murder

and was not in the home when it happened. Id. at 888, 899–900. The Court of

Criminal Appeals concluded that exculpatory results were unlikely to have prevented

the conviction. Id. at 899–902.

      Even if the appellant’s DNA were not on the items inside the victim’s home,

the court explained, there was no reason to think that those items necessarily had the

DNA of the murderer. Id. at 900–01. Plus, the case had been tried under the law of

parties, so even if the DNA tests excluded the appellant, “[i]t would not establish that

[the] appellant, who admittedly masterminded ‘the rip-off,’ was not a party to [the

victim]’s murder.” Id. at 901; see Wilson v. State, 185 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006) (affirming denial of DNA testing and explaining that even if “DNA testing

showed that another perpetrator was involved, that finding would not exonerate

appellant because it would show nothing more than there was another party to the

crime”).

      Similarly here, even if August’s DNA were not found on any of the eight

categories of evidence listed in his motion, there is no reason to think that the DNA

on those items would establish that August was not a party to the offense, so any

results would probably not have prevented August’s conviction. See Tex. Code Crim.

                                          13
Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). Consequently, he was not entitled to DNA testing

under Chapter 64. See id.

      We overrule this issue.

B.    August was not entitled to counsel.

      August also argues that he was entitled to but erroneously denied court-

appointed counsel in the Chapter 64 proceeding. Again we disagree.14

      An indigent convicted person who files a postconviction motion for DNA

testing has a limited right to appointed counsel, and that right is “conditioned on the

trial judge’s finding ‘that reasonable grounds exist for the filing of a motion.”’

Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 889; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c); Gowans v.

State, No. 01-19-00902-CR, 2020 WL 7391712, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Dec. 17, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“A motion

requesting court-appointed counsel and a motion requesting post-conviction DNA

testing are intertwined.”). Reasonable grounds for testing are not present unless the

convicted person presents “a valid or viable argument” that, among other things, test

results “could plausibly show that [he] would not have been convicted.” Gutierrez, 337

S.W.3d at 891–92 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that if a result “would

      14
          August asserts that he filed a motion for appointed counsel in our court and
that we did not rule on the motion. Our records contain no such motion. But
August asked the trial court to appoint appellate counsel when he filed his notice of
appeal in that court, and his statements in a subsequent appellate motion imply that
the trial court denied his request.

                                          14
not change the probability that the inmate would still have been convicted, then there

are no reasonable grounds to appoint an attorney”).

      For the reasons already discussed, August’s motion did not present a viable

argument that DNA test results would probably have prevented his conviction. Even

if August’s proposed DNA tests returned negative results—despite some of those

tests being performed on his own hair, blood, and personal possessions—August did

not plausibly show that the DNA on those items would identify the murderer or

disprove his involvement as a party to the offense. Because August did not establish

reasonable grounds for the filing of the motion, he was not entitled to an appointed

attorney. See Gowans, 2020 WL 7391712, at *5 (holding trial court did not err by

denying counsel when appellant failed to show, among other things, that there was a

reasonable probability that exculpatory DNA results would have prevented his

conviction).

      We overrule this issue.

C.    No hearing occurred, and none was required.

      August further argues that he was erroneously excluded from the Chapter 64

hearing at which the trial court ruled on his motion for DNA testing. He complains

that he was not informed of the hearing, that he was not provided the opportunity to

participate, and that the court reporter did not record the hearing. But this is because

no hearing occurred.

                                          15
      Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court held a hearing on August’s

Chapter 64 motion, and the State confirms that it did not.15 Nor was the trial court

required to hold such a hearing. See Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 893 (reiterating that

Chapter 64 “does not require any evidentiary hearing before the trial judge decides

whether a convicted person is entitled to DNA testing” and noting that even “if a

hearing is held, the convicted person has no right to be present”); Rivera, 89 S.W.3d at

58–59 (holding that Chapter 64 does not require a pre-test hearing and that “any

evidentiary issues arising under Article 64.03 could be resolved by affidavits, which

could be submitted by the convicted person along with his motion”). Thus, August

was not excluded from any Chapter 64 hearing.

      August also asserts that he is entitled to an automatic reversal because the court

reporter failed to make a record of the hearing. As explained above, however, there

was no hearing, so there was nothing for the court reporter to transcribe.

      We overrule August’s final issue.

      15
        In August’s brief, he too asserts there was no hearing.

                                          16
                                  IV. Conclusion

      Having overruled all three of August’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s denial

of August’s Chapter 64 motion for postconviction DNA testing. 16

                                                     /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                     Bonnie Sudderth
                                                     Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: June 8, 2023

      16
        August’s pending motions and objections are denied as moot.

                                         17