Court Opinion

ID: 9631469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:39:22.13633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:54.508730
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
GRACI, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Appellant pleaded guilty to a crime for which there was no factual basis. In my view, the majority has improperly based its decision on an issue not raised by Appellant in the trial court or on appeal.
¶ 2 “It is of course elementary that issues not preserved for appellate review or, even if preserved at the trial level, not raised by a party to an appeal, will not be considered by an appellate court.” Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428, 383 A.2d 174, 179 (1978). See also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“[ijssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). “Implicit in this concept is another cardinal rule of appellate jurisprudence in this state, viz., an appellate court is not to raise sua sponte issues which it perceives in the record where, as here, those issues are not presented at the appeal level.” McKenna, 383 A.2d at 180. See also Commonwealth v. Clair, 458 Pa. 418, 326 A.2d 272 (1974) (abrogating “basic and fundamental error” doctrine in criminal matters).
¶ 3 Although arising in a civil proceeding, the above principles are best illustrat*798ed in Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 387 A.2d 256 (1975). In that case, this Court considered, sua sponte, the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Commonwealth’s divorce statute. In reversing our decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took the opportunity to remind this Court of the scope of its authority:
The Superior Court by sua sponte deciding the constitutional issue exceeded its proper appellate function of deciding controversies presented to it. The court thereby unnecessarily disturbed the processes of orderly judicial deeisonmaking. Sua sponte consideration of issues deprives counsel of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues and the court of the benefit of counsel’s advocacy.
Id. at 257. See also McKenna, 383 A.2d at 180 (citing Wiegand with approval); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 504 Pa. 565, 475 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1984) (finding that Superior Court exceeded its bounds by considering sua sponte whether “defense of others” charge should have been given where appellee argued only that trial court’s self-defense charge was defective).
¶ 4 Here, Appellant argues that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea for a number of reasons.11 One of these reasons, discussed more fully in the lead opinion, is Appellant’s claim that during his oral colloquy he asserted his innocence to the charge that formed the basis of his negotiated guilty plea: conspiracy to commit third-degree murder. Brief of Appellant, at 14. The majority acknowledges, based upon Appellant’s own prior testimony, that he ultimately retreated from his initial assertion of innocence and admitted culpability. Were we to adhere to this Court’s proper appellate function our inquiry would end here.
¶ 5 Instead, the majority proceeds to make the following observations based upon its own review of the record:
Under the unique facts of this case, however, we are compelled to the conclusion that it was impossible under the law to commit the crime of conspiracy to commit murder in the third degree, and that, as a result, appellant actually pleaded guilty to an offense that did not exist and, therefore, a crime that did not occur.
Majority Opinion, at 795. The majority also concludes that “it is clear that defense counsel, in convincing appellant to abandon his position, misstated the law — a misstatement that was endorsed by the prosecutor, and accepted by the presiding judge.” Id. at 795.
¶ 6 There is nothing in the record before this Court or the brief filed on Appellant’s behalf to suggest that he has ever raised the issues identified by the majority or that the trial court had occasion to address those issues. Appellant may have attempted to assert his innocence to conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, however that is vastly different from arguing that the offense was not, in fact, a crime. Nor has Appellant argued that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance by advising him to plead guilty to a non-existent crime. It is simply inappropriate for the majority to raise such a claim on Appel*799lant’s behalf and then conclude that counsel was ineffective for misstating the law.12
¶ 7 The present case illustrates why this Court should refrain from raising issues sua sponte. By doing so, and then rendering a decision on those very grounds, the majority has effectively usurped the role of the trial court in the disposition of this matter. See Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719 A.2d 306, 308 (1998) (noting importance of trial court opinion to process of appellate review). The majority has also deprived the Commonwealth, and, to a lesser extent, Appellant, of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues identified as dispositive. Having neither the benefit of counsel’s advocacy, nor a trial court opinion addressing the pertinent issues, I fail to see how the majority can offer its opinion as a fair and reasoned decision.13
¶ 8 Since I am unable to join the majority’s disposition, I am compelled to address the claims advanced by Appellant. In my view, Appellant failed to offer a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea (and the majority has exceeded the bounds of this Court’s appellate function by offering its own fair and just reason on Appellant’s behalf). The trial court committed no abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s presentence motion to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.14

. In support of his withdrawal motion, Clinger argued that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily due to: (1) the influence of medications he was taking for depression and mood swings, (2) pressure to secure favorable treatment for his brother and father, (3) a promise by the Commonwealth to incarcerate Clinger in physical proximity to his brother, (4) confusing statements by the trial court regarding the possible penalties and Clinger’s burden should he choose to withdraw his plea, and (5) the alleged assertion of innocence discussed in text.

. Assuming Appellant had raised an ineffective assistance claim, we would be precluded from reviewing such a claim on direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726, 738 (2002) ("[A]s a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.”). It is most troubling that the majority is apparently willing to circumvent the deferral rule announced only recently in Grant by sua sponte addressing prior counsel's performance.

. Though I would not presently review this issue, I recognize that failing to do so presently would not leave Appellant without recourse. In the event Appellant wished to challenge either the lawfulness of his guilty plea, or counsel's assistance with respect thereto, he could pursue such claims in a timely petition for post-conviction collateral relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(h) (pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel claims), (iii) (relating to unlawfully induced guilty pleas). See also Commonwealth ex. rel. Dadario v. Goldberg, 565 Pa. 280, 773 A.2d 126 (2001) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from plea-bargaining process are eligible for review under the PCRA).

.In his second issue on appeal, Appellant argues that his sentence was manifestly excessive and that the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs, treated the offense as if the victim had not survived, and punished Appellant for seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. It is well-settled that an appellant who challenges the discretionaiy aspects of a sentence must set forth in his brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Appellant has failed to include a Rule 2119(f) statement and the Commonwealth has noted its objection to that omission. Since " 'we may not reach the merits of [the] claims' where the Commonwealth has objected] to the omission of the [Rule 2119(f)] statement,’ ” Commonwealth v. Farmer, 758 A.2d 173, 182 (Pa.Super.2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 637, 771 A.2d 1279 (2001) (citation omitted), I would find that Appellant has waived his discretionary sentencing claims.