Court Opinion

ID: 9705770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:20:07.845638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:53.147108
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Montgomery, J.:
The majority decision is based on two reasons which I do not believe to be sound, viz., the untimeliness of appellant’s objection to the evidence in question and the reasonableness of the search and seizure by which it was procured.
I am in accord with the law as declared in the cases cited by the majority, that objection to evidence based on the unreasonableness of its seizure must be made timely and before trial, if reasonable opportunity before trial is afforded. However, in the present case, such reasonable opportunity was lacking. This crime was committed on May 15, 1961; appellant was not arrested until July 11, 1961; his trial started October 9, 1961. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, which completely changed the law relating to evidence in criminal cases, first appeared in the United States Supreme Court Reporter on July 3, 1961, but it was many months before its application in Pennsylvania was considered and declared by this Court; in fact, its full significance is still undetermined. Our earliest cases were not decided until June of 1962, and *132others are still before us. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 51, 182 A. 2d 541; Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 47, 182 A. 2d 295; Commonwealth v. Richards, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 39, 182 A. 2d 291. Therefore, to rule that this appellant is prejudiced because he did not raise the question before his trial is unfair and unreasonable, particularly since no question as to procedure is raised on this appeal. His counsel’s strenuous objection made to the admission of the evidence at his trial should be sufficient to support his appeal.
As to the second reason, a finding of reasonableness in the manner the evidence was secured is contrary to established law on the subject.
Although searches of arrested persons and seizures of contraband from their person, homes or automobiles have been held reasonable as incidental to their arrest, Draper v. United States, 358 U. S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327; Commonwealth v. Richards, supra, there was no arrest in the present case; and we find no cases approving such action prior to the arrest of a suspect, except when a crime is presently being committed.1 In fact, in Commonwealth v. Czajkowski, 198 Pa. Superior Ct. 511, 182 A. 2d 298, a considerable part of our opinion is devoted to a discussion of the justification for the apprehension of the defendant therein, and our conclusion that the search and seizure of the evidence was reasonable is based on the fact that “Under the circumstances . . . the officers clearly had probable cause and reasonable grounds to arrest appellant without a warrant.” (Emphasis supplied)
*1331 have no quarrel with the majority in its reference to Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543, and Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick Sedan, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 12, 184 A. 2d 365, to support its statement of the law that a valid search of an automobile may be made when the seizing officer has a valid belief that its contents offend against the law. However, that is not the present case. Herein, the search was made two months after the burglary had been committed, and the only information of which the seizing officer had knowledge was that this car had been seen in the vicinity of the burglary on the morning it had been committed. He knew nothing about any tools being used in the burglary or about the fruits of same; and there was nothing to indicate that this car contained anything that offended against the laws of Pennsylvania or New York.2 Therefore, there was no probable cause for such an action. Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145.
The permission granted by the appellant’s wife to the officer to enter and search their home did not include permission to search the automobile. Such waivers or consents to waivers of constitutional rights are to be strictly interpreted. Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A. 2d 780; 16 C. J.S. Constitutional Law §89b; 7 P.L.E., Constitutional Law, §19.
There was no urgency in the present situation. The automobile was not being used and there was no indication that it would suddenly be moved. Therefore, its immediate search was not necessary. See State v. *134Fahy, 149 Conn. 577, 183 A. 2d 256. A delay in order to procure a search warrant would not have made the search impossible or impracticable. The New York officer had these premises under surveillance for two days, without indicating his presence to anyone; and he purposely delayed executing his warrant until he saw the presence of the station wagon at appellant’s home. During this period of surveillance he secured no more information than he had originally secured, viz., that a station wagon bearing a license issued to appellant had been seen near the scene of a burglary in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, on May 15, 1961, which could not be apprehended by local police. Had the New York officer desired to search the car when discovered, he had ample opportunity to secure a warrant to do so. However, admittedly by him, he had no intentions of making such a search; his sole purpose being to arrest appellant on the fugitive warrant he was carrying. Failing to find appellant in the house, the officer made a general exploratory examination of the ear. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 62, 70 S. Ct. 430, 433, 94 L. Ed. 653, 658, Mr. Justice Minton3 said, “We do not understand the Marron case to have been drained of contemporary vitality by Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452. Those cases condemned general exploratory searches, which cannot be undertaken by officers with or without a warrant.” Pennsylvania was in accord, even before Mapp v. Ohio, supra. Commonwealth v. Rehmeyer, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 393.
I would sustain this appeal, suppress the evidence obtained by what, in my opinion, was an unreasonable search and seizure, and grant a new trial.
*135Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Watkins, J., joins in this dissent.

 However: See State v. Michaels, 60 Wn. 638, 374 P. 2d 989, decided September 28, 1962, wbieb holds a search of an automobile and the seizure of contraband could not be sustained as reasonable on the basis of being incidental to an arrest, when the arrest on a traffic violation was made for the purpose of searching the vehicle.

 There was nothing in plain view to attract the officer’s attention as discussed in Commonwealth v. Calvarese, 199 Pa. Superior Ct. 319, 185 A. 2d 6572 (1962). The officer not only entered the car, but also opened a bag which was behind the front seat before he found the tools in the present case.

 Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48 S. Ct. 74, 72 L. Ed. 231.