Court Opinion

ID: 9616880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:50:37.923092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:45.442570
License: Public Domain

Rees, J.:
I dissent. The majority affirms, holding the evidence supports an award of 100% temporary partial disability compensation and temporary total disability compensation is a misnomer for the trial judge’s award. I find involved in the majority decision an incorrect answer to a necessary question. The question is whether in nonscheduled injury cases the “partial disability” for which temporary partial disability compensation is payable is partial disability as defined in the statutory definition of permanent partial disability, that is, inability to engage in work of the same type and character as performed at the time of the injury. The answer is in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 et seq.; it is not in relevant Kansas appellate opinions.
The Act directly defines permanent total, temporary total and permanent partial disability. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510c(a)(2), *446-510c(b)(2), -510e(a). Total disability entitling a claimant to temporary total or permanent total disability compensation is complete incapability to engage in any type of substantial and gainful employment. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510c(b)(2), -510c(a)(2). Partial disability entitling a claimant to permanent partial disability compensation is inability to engage in work of the same type and character as performed at the time of injury. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510e(a). Compensation payable for each of these three “disabilities” is for loss of wage earning capacity.
There is no direct definition of temporary partial disability in the Act. There is only a statutory expression of the formula for computation of weekly compensation for temporary partial disability. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510e(a). The cornerstone of this formula is the “difference between the average gross weekly wage . . . and the amount [claimant] is actually earning after [the] injury in any type of employment.” The post-injury actual earnings referred to are not limited to earnings from work of the same type and character as performed at the time of injury. In contrast to the formula for computation of permanent partial disability compensation, the temporary partial disability compensation formula factors do not include a disability percentage, a number determined as a conclusion of fact which is frequently if not most often drawn from opinion evidence. Temporary partial disability compensation is keyed to the difference between pre-injury and post-injury earnings, a fact ordinarily indisputable and ascertainable without debate or the need for opinion evidence. Compensation payable for temporary partial disability is for actual wage loss.
Loss of wage earning capacity and actual wage loss are distinct, different concepts.
Acknowledging the purpose of the Act to be wage replacement, restoration to a worker of a portion of wage loss (Boyd v. Barton Transfer & Storage, 2 Kan. App. 2d 425, 426-428, 580 P.2d 1366, rev. denied 225 Kan. 843 [1978]), it remains that for whatever reason it may have come to pass, by the legislatively chosen operative language of K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510c(o)(2), -510c(b)(2), and -510e(a) only temporary partial disability compensation entitlement is afforded upon the theory of actual wage loss. Entitlement to temporary total, permanent total and permanent partial disability compensation is afforded upon the theory *447of loss of wage earning capacity. (The practical consequences of proof of actual post-injury earnings where temporary or permanent total disability is claimed are of no present moment.)
Under the pre-1974 version of the Act, temporary partial disability compensation was founded upon the difference between pre-injury wages and post-injury wages earned or able to be earned. (K.S.A. 44-510c(b); K.S.A. 44-510e.) By the 1974 revision of the Act, the post-injury “able to earn” alternative element was deleted. The deletion served to eliminate evidentiary squabbles over the claimant’s post-injury ability to earn in favor of determination of the single and ordinarily indisputable fact element, the amount of actual post-injury earnings.
Although attractive arguments may be made to the contrary, I conclude temporary partial disability compensation is not payable unless there are actual post-injury earnings. Again, computation of temporary partial disability compensation is required by the Act to include as its key factor the difference between preinjury earnings and post-injury earnings. There cannot be a difference between two earnings amounts if there is only one earnings amount. That the concept of temporary partial disability compensation is actual wage loss does not alter the fact that under the Act the key computation factor is the difference between preinjury and post-injury earnings. The key factor is not stated to be the loss of earnings experienced; the actual wage loss concept is restrictively implemented. It is not our lot to legislate.
Entitlement to temporary partial disability compensation presupposes actual post-injury earnings and entitlement to temporary partial disability compensation does not exist where, as in this case, there are no actual post-injury earnings. The authors’ comments in Herrington, Workmen’s Compensation — Major Changes in Employments Covered, Benefits, Defenses, Offsets, and Other Changes, 24 Kan. L. Rev. 611, 614 (1976), and McCullough, Workmen’s Compensation — Permanent Partial Disability Benefits — The Dilemma, 24 Kan. L. Rev. 627, 629-630 (1976), indicate the existence of this presupposition. I find no authority indicating nonexistence of this presupposition.
The Act is self-contained, complete in and of itself. Compensation cannot be afforded to a person not entitled to it under the Act.
Relying upon Grounds v. Triple J Constr. Co., 4 Kan. App. 2d *448325, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 3, 606 P.2d 484, rev. denied 227 Kan. 927 (1980), the majority concludes partial disability for which temporary partial disability compensation is payable is inability to engage in work of the same type and character as performed at the time of the injury, that is, partial disability as defined in the statutory definition of permanent partial disability. This reliance is misplaced for two reasons. First, the conclusion is the product of application of the concept of loss of wage earning capacity to a compensation entitlement afforded upon the distinct and different concept of actual wage loss. Second, the relied upon citations to Grounds are inapplicable. The nature of partial disability for which temporary partial disability compensation is payable was not at issue in Grounds; that case concerned the nature of total disability giving rise to entitlement to permanent total disability compensation vis-a-vis the nature of partial disability giving rise to entitlement to permanent partial disability compensation. 4 Kan. App. 2d at 328-330.
Harsh though it may appear to some, a claimant who is not totally disabled but who is temporarily unable to engage in work of the same type and character as performed at the time of injury, is not entitled to compensation if he has no actual post-injury earnings.
Temporary partial disability compensation is not payable to the claimant in this case — she has no post-injury earnings. Furthermore, it is my conclusion that as a matter of law, the claimant’s disability is not temporary.
As noted by the majority, the purpose of temporary total disability compensation is compensation for loss of wages during the healing period. This claimant does not dispute the medical finding of both doctors that claimant’s coccyx fracture had healed. Her medical condition has become medically stationary and stable. The probable time for continuance of claimant’s disability, her painful coccyx, is indefinite and indeterminate. By application of the principles expressed in Rose v. Thornton & Florence Electric Co., 4 Kan. App. 2d 669, 672, 609 P.2d 1180, rev. denied 228 Kan. 807 (1980), an opinion filed subsequent to entry of the judgment from which this appeal is taken, her healing period is over and her condition is permanent, not temporary, in quality.
As a part of its argument, the employer contends that under K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510c(h)(3) Dr. Murphy’s release of claimant *449suspended and terminated claimant’s right to temporary total disability compensation. The language of the statute is set forth in the majority opinion. This contention is without merit.
The order of the examiner entered following the preliminary hearing, although entitled “Order for Compensation,” is an award. Though preliminary and not final, nonetheless it is an award. See K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-534a(a). By reason of its filing in the office of the director, the award is deemed to be an award of the director. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-549. K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-510c(b)(3), providing that the right to temporary total compensation is suspended upon a physician’s release, is operative “[w]here no award has been entered by the director.” An award of the director having been entered when Dr. Murphy released claimant, the release did not serve to suspend claimant’s right to temporary total disability compensation.
The testimony of Dr. Hensley and Dr. Murphy, evidence which the majority correctly finds is uncontradicted evidence that is not improbable, unreasonable or shown to be untrustworthy, and may not be disregarded, establishes that claimant’s disability is not total, that is, she is not incapable of engaging in any type of substantial and gainful employment. She is not totally disabled.
Is claimant entitled to an award of temporary partial disability compensation? No. She has no actual earnings and her impairment resulting from the June 22, 1977, accident is no longer temporary. The case is ripe for entry of a permanent partial disability award, an award that is subject to appropriate modification as authorized by K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 44-528.
Having concluded that on the record evidence and as a matter of law the claimant’s disability is not temporary but permanent and is not total but partial in that there exists an inability to engage in work of the same type and character as performed at the time of injury, there remains the question of whether our action should be in the nature of modification of the award made by the trial judge. The majority seems to choose to do so. They affirm, stating the award should have been for 100% temporary partial disability compensation. As I have described, temporary partial disability compensation is not payable to claimant. Neither should we modify the trial judge’s award by directing entry of an award for permanent partial disability compensation because that would require that we make the factual determination of a proper *450disability percentage to be utilized in computation of compensation to be paid, a decision on a factual issue not addressed by the trial judge, and which would be action outside our scope of review.
I conclude the trial judge’s award should be reversed and the case remanded for entry of a permanent partial disability award for such percentage as may be found proper upon further consideration.