Court Opinion

ID: 9485890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:33:11.269834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:25.630594
License: Public Domain

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with my colleagues that the injunction against the United States Trade Representative must be set aside. The National Environmental Policy Act requires “all agencies of the Federal Government” to include an impact' statement in “every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. ...” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). Private parties may sue to redress alleged violations of this provision only after there has been “final agency action” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 918 (D.C.Cir.1992), citing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3185, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). The majority holds that with respect to the North American Free Trade Agreement, there has been no “final” action because the President has not even transmitted NAFTA to Congress for its approval; and that if and when the President does submit the agreement and its implementing legislation, this would not qualify because, as Franklin v. Massachusetts, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 120 L.Ed.2d 636 (1992), decided, the President is not an “agency.”
I do not quarrel with either one of these rationales. But I get a bit concerned when the opinion announces that it is too early to toll the bell for judicial review in a “legislative EIS” case and then starts trying to limit Franklin (maj. op. at 552-53). The idea behind this is that proposing, legislation to Congress can constitute “final ... action,” and that when an “agency” rather than the President does the proposing, § 704 of the APA will be satisfied (maj. op. at 552-53). I am not so sure. Franklin held not only that the President is outside the APA’s definition of “agency,” but also that “action” cannot be considered “final” under the APA unless it “will directly affect the parties.” — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2773. When the alleged “action” consists of a proposal for legislation, how can this condition for judicial review be satisfied? In Franklin, the President’s submission to Congress directly affected the parties because, under the “automatic reapportionment statute,” congressional action was not required. — U.S. at —, 112 S.Ct. at 2771. In general, however, it is difficult to see how the act of proposing legislation could generate direct effects on parties, or anyone else for that matter. The head of an independent agency, a member of the President’s Cabinet, or the President himself may send a letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. Such “executive communications” are commonplace. See How OuR Laws Abe Made, H.R.Doc. No. 139, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1989). Yet only a Member of Congress may introduce a bill embodying the proposal, and even then no one will be affected, directly or *554otherwise, unless and until Congress passes the bill and the President signs it into law. If one takes Franklin at its word, a legislative proposal’s lack of any direct effects would seem to mean that there can be no final action sufficient to permit judicial review under the APA. Of course, there is a big difference between saying that APA review is unavailable and saying that officials do not have to comply with NEPA when they suggest legislation. If Congress believed an agency had not lived up to its obligation to prepare an impact statement, it could always refuse to consider the agency’s proposal. Or, if Congress wanted to evaluate environmental impacts before putting the measure to a vote, congressional committees could hold hearings on the subject. This is how a large proportion of legislative proposals already must be treated. NEPA’s impact statement requirement applies only to federal agencies. Members of Congress, who alone introduce bills and offer amendments, are not covered. Neither are private individuals, corporations, labor unions, citizen groups or- other organizations, all of which frequently avail themselves of their First Amendment right to petition the government.
I am therefore not prepared to say whether in NEPA cases, the act of proposing legislation constitutes final action under § 704 of the APA, as Franklin has interpreted that provision. This is a troublesome question, bound to arise in future cases, and we should not stake out a position on it here. The nub of the problem is that judicial review under the APA demands “final agency action” whereas the duty to prepare an impact statement arises earlier. The main objective of an impact statement is -to ensure that the decisionmaker considers environmental effects prior to taking action. This is why in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2728 n. 15, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976), the Court — without mentioning § 704 of the APA — identified the “time at which a court enters the process” to be “when the report or recommendation on the proposal is made, and someone protests either the absence or the adequacy .of the final impact statement.” Franklin’s direct-effects-on-the-parties test, as applied to NEPA suits, may have to be reconciled with, the portion of Kleppe v. Sierra Club just quoted. But there is no need to make the attempt in this case. It is enough to hold that regardless of whether the President’s submission of NAFTA to Congress would be final action, there is no “final” action that can be attributed to an “agency.”