Court Opinion

ID: 9832084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:36:22.582515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.916990
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.-
Appellants and appellee each file motions for rehearing; appellee files motion to certify.
Replying to appellant Interurban’s motion, in stating briefly the finding of the jury on the is^ue of unavoidable accident, while we later quote the verbiage of the finding, we should have said the jury found that plaintiff had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the collision was not due to an unavoidable accident.
In the original opinion we held that the tendered but excluded evidence of the witness Miss Kline, being merely cumulative of the evidence of several other witnesses on the exact point, its exclusion did not present reversible error, whether it was res gestie or not. Appellants insist that, in view of another trial, we‘ express our view as to the admissibility of the excluded evidence. The circumstances are sufficiently stated in the original opinion. We think the tendered evidence of Miss Kline, as presented in the record, was part of the res gestae, and was admissible on the issue of the negligence of’the Interurban. We hardly think it admissible on the issue of contributory negligence of the driver of the automobile unless it could also be said from the other evidence in the case that L. B. Hughes was so situated at the time of the collision that he could see, or would be charged with seeing, the standing car, and was himself negligent in not warning the driver of the car in which he was riding of the presence of the • standing car and the danger of going upon the track as indicated by the standing car. We still think that the contributory negligence of the driver of the automobile, if she was negligent, would not of itself be attributed to appellee unless he was also negligent as above indicated. If the evidence Of Miss Kline, on another trial, is admitted, and the record on another trial is similar to the present, the evidence should be limited to the issue of negligence of the In- . terurbsan.
We have said that the evidence of Miss Kline was res gestee, and, being so, was admissible as evidence, but by so holding we do not mean to say that its exclusion was reversible error. We thought in writing the original opinion that its exclusion was not reversible error, as it was cumulative.
Appellants refer us to Lamar v. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 248 S. W. 34, 39. It will be noted in that ease that Judge Powell says; “It is also true that no other witness gave this testimony. It was not cumulative of other evidence in the case.” Here it was cumulative of other evidence in the case on the exact point sought to be proved. If we understood the Lamar opinion, it is based on the fact that the evidence was not cumulative of other evidence on the fact sought to be proved; otherwise it would seem useless to say that the evidence was not cumulative.
We make no reply to other matters presented in the Interurban’s motion on rehearing.
Appellee filed a lengthy motion for rehearing based on this court’s holding on appellant’s propositions 10 and 11, assigning error in entering judgment on the finding of the jury on issue 54, to the effect that appellee had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the collision in this case was not due to an unavoidable accident.
We have quoted the issue submitted and finding on the issue in the original opinion and need not repeat it here.
No objection was made by appellee, or question raised in the trial court, on the submission of the issue, or in the form submitted, so that wé assume the issue of unavoidable accident was, under the evidence, properly in the case. To avoid the effect on the judgment of an unavoidable accident, it would seem that the preponderance of the evidence, as submitted in the charge, should show that the collision was not the result of an unavoidable accident, and, where the preponderance of the evidence does not so show, as found by the jury, we fail to see how a judgment could be entered on the negligence found. The charge submits the issue negatively. The legal effect of the finding, as we view it, is that the appellee has not discharged that burden.
*1110The issue is always a difficult one. The trial court submitted the issue, evidently under the impression that the pleading and the evidence justified its submission. We reviewed with much interest all that appellee had to say on the question in his brief, and have done so on his motion, but do not concur in appellee’s contention that the issue is immaterial or merely an evidentiary issue. Appellee must have concurred in its submission as an ultimate issue, and in the form in which it was submitted, as he made no objection to its submission or the form in which it was submitted.
As said by Judge Speer in Rosenthal Dry Goods Co. v. Hillebrand (Tex. Com. App.) 7 S.W.(2d) 521, 523: “It was indispensable to the plaintiff’s case, and the burden was upon her to that extent, to prove that her injuries resulted from the alleged negligence of the defendant. It was not necessary that the defendant plead specially that the injuries were the result of an unavoidable accident. This was put in issue by the general denial and imposed upon the plaintiff the necessity of proving that the 'happening was not an unavoidable accident. This necessarily was a part of her case. While this requires the proving of a negative, nevertheless it is in keeping with sound reasoning.”
Since the burden was upon appellee, under the above authority, and the court having submitted the issue to the jury without objection of appellee, it was necessary that the preponderance of the evidence show that the collision causing the injury was not due to. or the result of, an unavoidable accident. The effect of the jury’s finding evidently is that the evidence does not so show. If not, appel-lee has not discharged the burden, and judgment for appellee could not properly be entered.
'To the extent above indicated, our original opinion is modified, and both motions for rehearing are overruled.
Appellee’s motion to certify is overruled.