Court Opinion

ID: 9691610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:43:24.20627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:23.409609
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, P.J.
(concurring in the result only). The trial court concluded that this Court’s opinion in Allstate Ins Co v Keillor (On Remand), 203 Mich App 36; 511 NW2d 702 (1993), aff’d in part (After Remand), 450 Mich 412; 537 NW2d 589 (1995), is dis-positive of plaintiff’s declaratory judgment actions.1 I respectfully disagree.
In Allstate, supra, a panel of this Court considered an exclusionary clause in the insurance contract that excluded liability for “intentional or criminal acts of an insured person . . . .” 203 Mich App at 39-40. This Court held that the act of serving alcohol to a minor constitutes a criminal act causing the exclusion to apply. Id. at 40. The Court then concluded that *67because the defendant served alcohol to a minor, i.e., committed a criminal act, the exclusion precluded coverage.2 Id. at 41. On appeal after remand, the Supreme Court declined to consider the criminal acts exclusion, instead basing its opinion on a motor vehicle exclusion in the contract. 450 Mich 420-421. The Court specifically noted that it was affirming the opinions of this Court and the trial court “only insofar as they hold that coverage is precluded by the motor vehicle exclusion.” Id.
When the Michigan Supreme Court reviews a decision of this Court, it occasionally decides to address less than all the issues presented to this Court. This was the case in Allstate, supra. With regard to the issues the Supreme Court decides to address, the Court reviews the matter in the first instance, not merely considering the correctness of this Court’s decision. Once the Supreme Court announces its decision, that opinion is determinative of the legal question or questions involved and becomes binding precedent on intermediate appellate and trial courts. Riley v Northland Geriatric Center, 425 Mich 668, 680; 391 NW2d 331 (1986). Points of law not discussed in the Supreme Court’s opinion or ruled upon by that Court are not authoritative and are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents. See Dist of Columbia v Sierra Club, 670 *68A2d 354, 360 (DC App, 1996). See also Bostrom v Jennings, 326 Mich 146, 156-157; 40 NW2d 97 (1949), not followed on other grounds by Sexton v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc, 413 Mich 406; 320 NW2d 843 (1982) (noting that where “a question necessarily involved in a case and answered by our holding was neither considered by the Court nor discussed in our opinion, the answer thus arrived at is not binding as a precedent”).3
When, after reviewing the issues in any particular case on appeal from this Court, the Supreme Court enters an order affirming or reversing a final order issued by a panel of this Court, that order becomes the law of the case. While this Court’s opinion may provide guidance to those attempting to interpret the Supreme Court’s holding, the intermediate opinion no longer has precedential value and may not be relied upon unless the Supreme Court has specifically approved or adopted the Court’s opinion or holding. Similarly, when a case is appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court does not accept the reasoning or analysis of the lower court, or limits its acceptance of the lower court’s opinion, the rejected analysis cannot be relied on.
A contrary conclusion would inevitably leave us with the uncertainty of two tiers of jurisprudence in Michigan. The first would be that part of a decision of this Court that has been appealed to the Supreme Court but does not constitute part of that Court’s opinion. The second would be the decision of the *69Supreme Court insofar as the decision resolves the issues presented to that Court on appeal. Such a situation would inevitably create difficulties in Michigan law. In some cases, for example, it may be difficult to determine the extent of the Supreme Court’s opinion —i.e., whether the Court approved of specific language in an opinion or merely a specific holding or rationale. In other cases, the Supreme Court may, in fact, have implicitly adopted the rationale of this Court, but declined to expressly state its intentions. By determining that the decision of the Court of Appeals has limited precedential value, my conclusion avoids such difficulties.
In any event, with respect to Allstate, supra, the Supreme Court noted that it was affirming the opinions of this Court and the trial court “only insofar as they hold that coverage is precluded by the motor vehicle exclusion.” 450 Mich 420-421. Such an express statement of the Court’s intentions should not be read as an implicit acceptance of the remainder of this Court’s opinion. To the contrary, the Court appears to have specifically rejected those parts of the opinion not relating to the motor vehicle exclusion. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Justice Riley wrote a separate concurring opinion in Allstate simply to “signal” her “concerns with the result of the Court of Appeals regarding the intentional/criminal acts exclusion.” Id. at 421 (Riley, J., concurring). Justice Riley agreed, however, that the Court did not need to consider that exclusion because its decision was based on the automobile exception. Id. Were we to read the majority’s opinion in Allstate as an approval of this Court’s analysis regarding the intentional/criminal acts exclusion, Justice Riley’s opinion *70should be read as a dissent rather than a concurrence.
Insofar as I believe that the portion of this Court’s opinion in Allstate, supra, that relates to the intentional/criminal acts exclusion is not good law in Michigan, I disagree with the majority’s apparent approval of Allstate. Therefore, because I conclude that the trial court erred in relying on Allstate, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 The trial court found this Court’s opinion in Allstate, supra, to be dis-positive of this case. However, the majority opinion, ante at 62, concludes that it need not “consider this issue to resolve the present matter.”

 I am troubled by a determination that the criminal acts exclusion applies to preclude insurance coverage. Consider the following hypothetical situations: (1) the insured is charged with drunk driving, a criminal act that would preclude coverage; (2) the insured violates a city ordinance by failing to shovel the snow from his sidewalk, a criminal act that would preclude coverage. Such an interpretation could greatly restrict the insured’s ability to get insurance coverage in situations where coverage becomes vitally important.

 This is an issue of first impression in Michigan. Because neither party has briefed this issue on appeal, I would remand this case to the trial court to allow the parties to file briefs and to present this matter to the trial court before an appellate decision.