Court Opinion

ID: 9770586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:11:08.467651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:23.560293
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Griffin
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The relators, alleging that they are severally duly elected delegates from the counties of Dallas, Tarrant, Harris, Nueces, Galveston and Travis to the Republican State Convention to be held in Mineral Wells, May 27, 1952, for the purpose of selecting delegates to the National Convention of the Republican Party, seek by their petition filed directly in this court to have issued to respondent, Ross, Secretary of State, writs of mandamus and injunction.
Relators allege that they were severally the permanent chairmen of the County Conventions of the Republican Party duly and legally called and held in the six named counties pursuant to the provisions and requirements of Art. 235 of the Election Code of the State of Texas (being Election Code, Article 13.58, Vernon’s Texas Statutes, 1952 Supplement) ; that as such chairmen they signed and filed with the respondent, Ross, returns of such conventions and lists of delegates to the State Convention there selected, and that accordingly they and those whose names appear as delegates on the lists filed by them “have a legal right” to exercise their functions and perform their duties as “legally elected” delegates to the State Convention “free from any impairment of or challenge to such right by any other person claiming to be a delegate” by virtue of election at any other convention.
*270Relators further allege that the respondent Ross has received and filed another set of returns and list of delegates from each of the six named counties, which returns and lists are illegal for various reasons, and that “unless restrained and enjoined by this court, the defendant (respondent) will transmit one copy of the aforementioned illegal returns to the Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee, and the delegates named in said illegal returns will then be placed upon the roll of the Republican State Convention.” Relators allege further that a majority of the members of the Republican State Executive Committee have openly avowed that they will not recognize relators but will, on the contrary, recognize and place on the convention roll as delegates those who were selected at the competing conventions.
Relators pray in their petition that the respondent “be ordered and commanded not to transmit to the Chairman of the Republican Executive Committee” the competing minutes and returns of election of delegates “and that the respondent be ordered to transmit the original of the minutes and returns” signed by relators.
The respondent has not answered the petition but the Chairman and Secretary of the Republican State Executive Committee have filed a sworn intervention in which they deny the allegations in the petition and specifically assert that the Committee will decide the contests between competing delegations “in accordance with law and the rules and the customs and usages of the Republican Party in Texas” and that each contest will “have to be adjudged on its individual merits.” The intervenors, by special exception and otherwise, offer several reasons why relators’ petition should not be granted, only two of which we will notice and both of which we must sustain. They are as follows: (1) That the relief sought by relators is essentially injunctive and this court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief; and (2) That the duties of the Secretary of State in the premises are purely ministerial and that it is his duty to forward to the Chairman of the State Executive Committee all returns filed with him, leaving to the State Executive Committee the duty of determining which of the competing groups of delegates shall be placed on the Convention temporary roll of delegates.
1 (1) It was admitted in argument before the court that unless restrained therefrom the Secretary of State proposed to and would forward to the Chairman of the Republican State Executive Committee the returns and lists of delegates filed *271by relators and those filed by the competing groups. It thus appears that there is no need for a writ of mandamus to compel the forwarding of relators’ lists; the lists will be forwarded anyway. A writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an officer to do that which he is willing to do and intends to do. Ferguson v. Huggins, et al, 122 Texas 95, 52 S.W. 2d 904; State ex rel. Candler v. Court of Civil Appeals, Fourth Supreme Judicial District, et al, 123 Texas 549, 75 S.W. 2d 253.
2 Since no writ of mandamus will issue to compel the forwarding of relators’ lists of delegates, the only remaining relief sought by relators is purely injunctive. According to their prayer it is that the respondent “be ordered and commanded not to transmit * * * minutes and returns of election of delegates * * * other than the minutes and returns signed” by relators. It is well settled that this court has no original jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction. Article V, Section 3, Constitution of Texas; Love v. Wilcox, 119 Texas 256, 28 S.W. 2d 515, 519, 70 A. L. R. 1484; Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n. v. Kirby, et al, 137 Texas 106, 152 S.W. 2d 1073, and eases therein cited. Nor can the Legislature, in violation of the constitutional provision, confer such power upon this court as relators claim Art 1735, V.A.C.S. confers. Love v. Wilcox, supra. In cases in which this court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus has attached the court necessarily has the correlative authority to issue a writ of injunction to make the writ of mandamus effective. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Texas 1, 285 S.W. 1063,1068. Writs of injunction were issued in the cases of Love vs. Wilcox, supra, and Seay et al v. Latham, 143 Texas 1, 182 S.W. 2d 251, 155 A. L. R. 180, but only after the parties had shown themselves to be entitled to a writ of mandamus and only to make effective the judgment awarding the writ of mandamus.
3 (2) We have concluded that the filing with the Secretary of State of competing sets of returns and lists of delegates from the six counties created contests between such competing delegates for the right to be placed upon the State Convention’s temporary roll of delegates with the ensuing right of participating in the temporary organization of the convention. But it is relators’ position that under Art. 235 of the Election Code the duty devolves upon the Secretary of State to decide the contests, and, if necessary to that end, to take testimony for the purpose of determining which of the competing lists of delegates is entitled to be transmitted to the Chairman of the State Executive Committee. With this contention we cannot agree. Art. 235 does not grant to the Secretary of State any such power by ex*272press provision. Neither does it imply such power. On the contrary, Art. 220 of the Election Code directs that “Except for a place on party tickets for public elective offices, all contests within a political party shall be decided by the State, district, or county executive committee, as the nature of the office may require, each such committee to retain all such powers and authority now conferred by law.”
Article 220 of the Election Code was formerly Art. 3146 of our statutes. Under that article it was settled by decisions of this court that delegates to the state convention of a political party are not “public elective officers” and that contests for such places were to be decided by the appropriate executive committee. Wall et al v. Currie, 147 Texas 127, 213 S.W. 2d 816; Carter v. Tomlinson, 149 Texas 7, 227 S.W. 2d 795. It certainly cannot be contended that such delegates are candidates “for a place on parity tickets for public elective offices” within the meaning of Art. 220 of the Election Code. (Emphasis ours).
4 It is a well settled and fundamental rule of law that when the Legislature re-enacts a statute in identical wording after it has been construed by the courts, the court’s construction of the statute is also adopted and confirmed. Hart v. Winsett, 141 Texas 312, 171 S.W. 2d 853; Cunningham v. Cunningham, 120 Texas 491, 40 S.W. 2d 46, 75 A.L.R. 1305. It follows that there can be no escape from the holding that by the enactment of Article 220 of the Election Code in the exact language of Article 3146 the Legislature intended to leave jurisdiction to settle contests for party office, in the first instance, to the parties’ executive committees.
5 The provisions of the Dicker bill (Arts. 3154a — 3158a, V.A.C.S.) do not supersede Arts. 220 and 235 of the Election Code. In practical effect these articles of the statutes apply to the Republican Party only but they must be interpreted in the light of the Election Code and harmonized therewith so as to resolve apparent conflicts and so as to give effect to all provisions of each. Martin v. Sheppard et al, 129 Texas 110, 102 S.W. 2d 1036; Marfa Ind. School Dist. v. Davis, Tex. Civ. App., 102 S.W. 2d 283 (writ ref.). If Art. 3154a which makes the Republican Party “subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State for non-compliance with, or violation of relevant Civil and Penal statutes governing general, special and primary elections and conventions” is constitutional, which point we do not decide, but for the purpose of this case only assume, its provisions may be harmonized with those of Art. 220 of the Elec*273tion Code by holding that all party contests shall be tried in the first instance by the appropriate party executive committee with the right to appeal to an appropriate court for redress against unlawful acts on the part of such committee.
This opinion is handed down as of May 21, 1952 to carry into effect the order of the Court entered on said date denying relators the relief sought by them, and on account of the fact that at such time the date for holding the Republican State Convention was near at hand, the relators were denied the right to file a motion for rehearing, Rule 515, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Opinion delivered May 28, 1952.