Court Opinion

ID: 9862924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:29:08.455371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:38:12.024053
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing
At a former day of this term this court held that the temporary injunction restraining the taking of trustee Dishman’s deposition was improvidently granted and ordered it dissolved. Thereafter appellee Dishman filed his plea to the jurisdiction of this court urging for the first time that the trial court had not granted a temporary injunction, and that because thereof this court had no jurisdiction of the appeal. On October 10, 1962, we sustained appellee’s plea, set aside our original judgment and ordered that the appeal be dismissed.
Appellant has timely filed her motion for rehearing, complaining of this court’s action in dismissing the appeal. Since the question was one that had not been presented in the original submission before us, we have heard oral argument thereon.
We conclude that we were wrong in sustaining appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal. As stated in the original opinion, the trustee filed a sworn application with the trial court, praying that a temporary restraining order be issued forbidding the taking of the deposition, and upon a hearing to be set by the court, that a temporary injunction be granted against the taking of the deposition, and upon final hearing that the injunction be made permanent. The application made no reference to or *377mention of Rules 186a or 186b, T.R.C.P. After granting the temporary restraining order the court set a hearing on the application for temporary injunction for May 10, 1962, but later changed the hearing to May 3rd, 1962. The Statement of Facts on this hearing are before us. At the opening of the hearing the court stated:
“THE COURT: Now, the court set this down for a hearing to determine whether I should — of course, I granted this temporary restraining order and quashed that subpoena. But this was set down by me to have all of you here to determine if those two, either or both of those writs should issue — what you have prayed for.”
After statement by one of counsel for appellant the court further stated:
“THE COURT: All right. I will hear all matters together as to whether he is entitled to his relief and whether you are entitled to yours. We will hear it all together.”
After the evidence was heard, counsel for the trustee stated:
“MR. BOWERS: If the court please, unless the plaintiff here can show an authorized purpose of these records in this divorce suit, the temporary injunction should be granted. The Plaintiff or the defendant only has a contingent interest in the property belonging to the trust estate.”
In the argument which followed Mr. Bowers again stated:
“MR. BOWERS: As far as injunctions to restrain taking depositions is concerned, your Honor, Lowe and Archer, Texas Practice, says that an injunction may issue to prevent the taking of deposition where there is no authority for the taking thereof or where the taking of such deposition is for an unauthorized purpose.”
After further argument before the court between counsel, the court státed: “He (trustee) is asking in his application that this subpoena duces tecum be quashed” whereupon the following comment of counsel was made:
“MR. BROWNE: Yes, asking that it be quashed and that this injunction be made permanent.”
“MR. BOWERS: That’s right.”
“MR. ROBICHAU: We are here under Rule 186b, a and b too, your Honor, in that application.”
“MR. BROWNE: No, they are not here under ‘A’. All they are here for is motion to quash and injunction and restraining order restraining us from taking a deposition. That was all that was served on us. Is the court under the impression that there is something else here?
“THE COURT: The court is under the impression he is stating here that you do not have the right to take this— do not have a right to look into these records because of these trusts instruments but he has plead here because of the provisions of them—
“MR. BROWNE: Well, in the order of the court he had listed an injunction ■ — that the court issue a temporary restraining order, it is accordingly ordered that the clerk of this court issue a temporary restraining order and then down to the — next to last — it is further ordered that said application for a temporary injunction effective until final hearing hereon. That is all that has been issued by this Court is an injunction. And, we ask, your Honor, specifically, that it be dissolved.”
It has been made known to us by affidavit that counsel for appellee, after the conclusion of the hearing, submitted a proposed order for the court to sign which would have dissolved the temporary restraining order and quashed the subpoena duces tecum as was done in the court’s order. Following this the proposed order read:
“ * * * And it is the further ORDER and DECREE of the Court that *378under and by virtue of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Nos. 186a and 186b the books and records of the Lucas trusts mentioned in said subpoena duces tecum shall not be inquired into by the plaintiff, Carolyn Lucas and that the said H. E. Dishman shall not be required to produce said books and records and he shall not be required to give any evidence in regard to the assets, income and records of said Lucas trusts.”
In the order executed by him the court did not use the phrase, “under and by virtue of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Nos. 186a and 186b” as will be reflected in the pertinent parts of the order which we now set out as the one entered by him and the one appealed from:
“Be it remembered that on this the 3rd day of May, 1962, came on to he heard the motion to quash subpoena and application for injunction filed herein by H. E. Dishman on April 30, 1962, and also the motion to dissolve injunction filed herein by Plaintiff, Carolyn Lucas on May 3, 1962, and appeared the Plaintiff and Defendant by their attorneys, and all parties announced ready for trial, and the Court after reading the pleadings and hearing the evidence and argument is of the opinion and finds that The Philip Bland Lucas Trust, The Lucas Louisiana ‘B’ Trust and The Lucas Texas ‘B’ Trust have not been terminated and that the Defendant, Philip B. Lucas has no right to any of the assets or income of these trusts nor will he have any such right until July 15, 1964; and the Court further finds that in the trial of a divorce between these two parties it could not by Judgment award either party any of the assets or income of the above described trusts.
“THEREFORE, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by the Court on his own motion that the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on April 30, 1962, be and it is hereby dissolved.
“And it is also ORDERED that the subpoena duces tecum issued and served on H. E. Dishman to appear and produce the books and records of the above mentioned Lucas trusts on May 4, 1962, at 2:00 o’clock P.M. at 1012-1018 Good-hue Building, Beaumont, Texas, be quashed and the same are hereby quashed.
“And it is the further ORDER and DECREE of the Court that the books and records of the Lucas trusts mentioned in said subpoenas duces tecum shall not be inquired into by the Plaintiff, Carolyn Lucas and that the said H. E. Dishman shall not be required to produce said books and records and he shall not be required to give any evidence in regard to the assets, income and records of said Lucas trusts.”
Was the order one granting a temporary injunction? An injunction was defined in Railroad Commission v. A. E. McDonald Motor Freight Lines, Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 932 (935), as follows:
“ * * * According to Standard Dictionary, an injunction is defined as ‘a judicial order or process, operating upon the person, requiring the person to whom it is directed to do or (usually) refrain from doing some designated thing,’ * *
High on Injunctions (4th Ed.), Vol. 1, Sec. 1, p. 2, states: “A writ of injunction may be defined as a judicial process, operating in personam, and requiring the person to whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.” The order providing that the books and records of the Lucas Trusts * * * “shall not be inquired into by the Plaintiff Carolyn Lucas, and that the said H. E. Dishman will not be required to produce said books,” etc., acts upon these parties and restrains appellant from making inquiry by deposition. This is, in effect, a temporary injunction against appellant. *379Roosth v. Roosth, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 974. No bond was required under Rule 684 in the present case; but neither was it required in the Roosth case.
As further supporting our view that the order appealed from was one granting a temporary injunction, it must be borne in mind that the issues upon which the parties go to trial are determined by the pleadings. 33 Tex.Jur. 653. The nature of a suit is determined from the allegations of the petition. Collins v. Griffith, Tex.Civ.App., 105 S.W.2d 895. The application involved was purely one for injunction. The prayer of the application was, first, for temporary restraining order, second, temporary injunction, and third, on final hearing that the injunction be made permanent. From the quoted excerpts of the statement of facts reflecting argument before the court, it is further clear that the parties considered the hearing to be one upon whether a temporary injunction should be issued. This construction having been placed by the parties upon the pleadings in the trial court, this court will adhere thereto. 3 Tex.Tur.2d 633.
We do not agree with appellee that the trial court’s order was under or by virtue of Rules 186a and 186b. The court struck out of the proposed order tendered him by appellee’s counsel any reference to the rules. Also, we think it fair to presume that the trial court followed the law and acted within the scope of the parties’ pleadings. Wood v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Civ.App., 86 S.W.2d 871. It will be noted that Rule 186b provides that after notice is served for the taking of a deposition it is provided “upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown,” the court may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken. No such motion was made nor notice given. In addition to the presumption that the court intended to stay within the scope of the pleadings, the recitation in the trial court’s order “came on to be heard the motion to quash subpoena and application for injunction — and also the motion to dissolve injunction” and the record of the hearing1 as set out above convince us that he actually did so. He dissolved the temporary restraining order on his own motion, evidently since it was originally granted to exist until May 10th, 1962, and he did not want the two orders to overlap in time. No recitation appears in the order that he on his own motion, was granting relief to the trustee under Rule 186b, if such could be so done.
The former order of this court setting aside our original judgment and withdrawing our opinion thereon, as well as the order dismissing the appeal, are hereby set aside and the original order reversing the judgment of the trial court and dissolving the temporary injunction granted is reinstated.
We have considered appellee’s motion for rehearing, filed with the plea to the jurisdiction of this court, and it is overruled.