Court Opinion

ID: 9947946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 22:03:09.789619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:47.976932
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/8/24; certified for publication 3/5/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                     SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION ONE

 In re F.V., a Person Coming                        B329192
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.                      (Los Angeles County
                                                    Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04342)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

 RENE S.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders
of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Tamara E. Hall,
Judge. Reversed.
       Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ____________________

       Rene S. (father) appeals from the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders removing his daughter F.V. from father and
mother Fa.V. (mother).
       Father and F.V. traveled to the United States from
Honduras when F.V. was nine years old. When they were unable
to cross the border together, F.V. entered the United States
alone. Immigration authorities placed F.V. with E.V., a maternal
uncle then living in California (maternal uncle) after obtaining
mother’s consent to that placement. The juvenile court sustained
jurisdictional allegations that maternal uncle then sexually
abused F.V. Although the juvenile court found mother and father
had no reason to know maternal uncle would sexually abuse F.V.,
the court asserted jurisdiction based on parents allowing F.V. to
enter the United States unaccompanied with no plan in place for
her care.
       As for disposition, the juvenile court indicated it was
inclined to return F.V. to mother in Honduras, which could not
happen immediately because, inter alia, F.V. had no passport.
The court declined to place F.V. with father, finding his housing
situation was “not stable” and F.V. did not want to relocate to
Texas, where father now lived. Consequently, F.V. remained in
foster care.
       We hold there was insufficient evidence of future risk to
F.V. to support jurisdiction. At the time of the jurisdiction
hearing, F.V. was no longer in maternal uncle’s custody, and

                                  2
there was no indication mother and father would allow maternal
uncle access to her. Assuming arguendo F.V.’s entering the
United States alone demonstrated a failure to supervise and
protect her, that circumstance was unlikely to recur given father
was now in the United States and able to care for her, and
mother wanted her back in Honduras. To the extent mother and
father disagree as to who should care for F.V., that is not a basis
for the juvenile court’s involvement.
      Accordingly, we reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders.

                        BACKGROUND

1.    Referral and initial investigation
       On November 1, 2022, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
alleging maternal uncle, with whom F.V. resided, had sexually
abused F.V. F.V. was 10 years old at the time. DCFS removed
F.V. and maternal uncle’s daughter, M.V., and placed them in
foster care.1
       DCFS’s investigation revealed the following. F.V. had
traveled to the United States from Honduras with father
approximately 11 months earlier. F.V.’s family lived in poverty,
and “had heard younger children were being allowed into the
United States.” Their first attempt to cross the border was
unsuccessful. F.V. then crossed without father and was detained

      1  At various times in these proceedings, F.V. and M.V.
gave detailed accounts of the sexual abuse they suffered. Those
details are not relevant to our resolution of this appeal, and we
do not summarize them.

                                    3
by immigration authorities. Mother, still in Honduras, consented
to the immigration authorities placing F.V. with maternal uncle.
Father arrived in the United States later and was living in Texas.
      F.V. told mother during a videochat that maternal uncle
had sexually abused her. Mother called another relative in
California, D.R., and asked her to call the police, which D.R. did,
thus leading to the referral. When a social worker spoke with
D.R., D.R. reported that she knew maternal uncle because they
were from the same town in Honduras. She said when she was
14 years old, maternal uncle “would try to touch her body and she
would get rocks to defend herself from him.”
      Maternal uncle had prior child welfare history. DCFS
found “Inconclusive” a March 1, 2022 referral stating maternal
uncle hit his daughter, M.V., with a belt on numerous occasions.
DCFS also found inconclusive a December 18, 2021 referral
alleging maternal uncle, then living in a shelter with M.V. and an
unidentified second child, had left the children unsupervised. On
October 5, 2021, M.V. reported that years earlier, one of maternal
uncle’s friends had raped her, although she had never told her
father. DCFS found “no allegation reported or concerns of risk.”
      F.V. told DCFS she wished to return to mother in
Honduras. Mother’s preference was for F.V. to live with father
and hoped DCFS could help father get custody; otherwise, mother
wanted F.V. to return to Honduras. Mother stated she was
“residing in . . . poverty.”
      Father also stated he would like DCFS’s assistance in
obtaining custody of F.V. He said he was having trouble getting
money because he had no fixed employment and was
undocumented. He also was “not living in the best place and

                                   4
understands the USA requires for the child to be [in] a safe
environment.”

2.    Detention
       On November 3, 2022, DCFS filed a Welfare and
Institutions Code2 section 300 petition seeking to detain F.V.
The petition asserted identical allegations under section 300,
subdivisions (b)(1) and (d). The allegations stated that mother
and father had “placed the child in a detrimental and
endangering situation by allowing the child to come to the United
States from Honduras unaccompanied resulting in the child
residing with the maternal uncle . . . .” The allegations then set
forth in some detail the sexual abuse suffered by F.V.
       At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found father to
be F.V.’s presumed father. Father requested a prerelease
investigation and return of F.V. to father or placement with
father’s relatives. Mother requested the child be released to both
parents and to stay with father in the United States. Minor’s
counsel stated minor wished to be released to mother or father,
but because of the impracticality of doing so at that time, minor’s
counsel submitted, requesting a prerelease investigation of
father, paternal relatives, and mother.
       The juvenile court ordered F.V. removed and detained from
parents.

3.    Proceedings leading to adjudication and disposition
       In a prerelease investigation report filed less than a month
after the detention hearing, mother stated she now believed it

      2  Unspecified statutory citations are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                    5
was in F.V.’s best interests to return to mother in Honduras.
Mother stated she was not employed, and lived with her three
other children, ages 19, 16, and 12. Father and mother’s adult
son supported her financially. DCFS conducted a virtual
assessment of mother’s two-bedroom home via WhatsApp and
reported no concerns.
       Father stated he would like F.V. to be in his care. He was
working in construction and lived by himself in a one-bedroom
trailer with a sofa bed in the living room. DCFS conducted a
virtual home assessment of the trailer and reported no concerns.
Father informed DCFS of the school and medical and dental
providers he had located for F.V. should she be placed with him.
He also gave DCFS the name of someone he had found to look
after F.V. while father was at work.
       DCFS found no criminal history for mother or father.
       The juvenile court held a pretrial release hearing on
December 1, 2022. Father asked F.V. be released to him. Mother
asked that DCFS facilitate her fingerprinting, which DCFS had
cited as a reason for not releasing F.V. to her. F.V.’s counsel
stated F.V. “would like to be released to one of her parents,” but
submitted on the prerelease investigation because “there are
logistical issues to work out in terms of the practicality of getting
her, physically, either to Texas or Honduras.” F.V.’s counsel
asked that at disposition DCFS consider release to parents, and
“outline in the report the logistics of return or plans for that.”
       DCFS objected to releasing F.V. to parents because DCFS
would be unable to monitor the case if the child were in
Honduras or Texas, father had said someone else would watch
F.V. while he was at work, and father’s residence “may be
temporary because of relocation services being offered through

                                     6
that state.” The court denied release to parents, citing the
reasons stated by DCFS and F.V.’s counsel.
       In the jurisdiction and disposition report, mother stated she
did not know maternal uncle was sexually abusing F.V. until F.V.
told her. Father stated he first heard of the sexual abuse
allegations when a DCFS social worker informed him.
       Mother and father both reported that although they had
been in a relationship with each other until recently, they no
longer were on speaking terms. They did not provide further
details.
       Mother continued to assert her belief that F.V. would be
best off in her care. Father stated he wanted F.V. in his care but
believed she would also be safe in mother’s care. F.V. stated she
did not want to reside with father, and mother had told her “only
[mother] will take care of her and keep her safe.”
       Both parents had telephonic visits with F.V. two to three
times a week. At their request, DCFS allowed longer and more
frequent visits. F.V.’s caregiver reported parents called at their
scheduled times and were always respectful.
       A last minute information filed December 30, 2022 stated a
Texas social worker had visited father’s trailer to conduct a home
assessment and reported no concerns. Father reported to the
social worker that he earned $400 a week and paid $350 a month
in rent.
       At a January 5, 2023 hearing, DCFS again opposed release
to parents, stating there had been no recent contact with mother,
and although father had been assessed and “[e]verything looks
fine,” F.V. did not want to relocate to Texas. F.V.’s counsel stated
F.V. wished to return to mother and counsel was working with
immigration authorities to resolve the logistical issues in

                                    7
returning F.V. to Honduras. Father contended F.V. should be
released to him because he was employed and had proper
housing. The juvenile court again denied release to either
parent.
       In a last minute information filed January 26, 2023, father
reported he was unemployed and could not provide financial
support for his children in Honduras. An attorney provided
notarized confirmation that mother had no criminal history in
Honduras.
       At a February 1, 2023 hearing, F.V.’s counsel requested
that DCFS assist in obtaining a passport for F.V. to travel to
Honduras and arrange for her to attend immigration hearings.
DCFS did not object to the request and the juvenile court granted
it. Father reasserted he wanted F.V. placed with him.
       In a last minute information filed February 24, 2023, father
stated he was still residing in the same place and did not intend
to relocate. The last minute information further indicated the
DCFS social worker had communicated with DCFS’s immigration
unit about options for securing F.V. legal status in the United
States, and also what would be required to obtain an emergency
travel passport from the Honduran consulate. The immigration
unit stated it could contact the consulate about the passport if the
juvenile court issued an order to assess mother’s home for
placement.

4.    Adjudication and disposition
      The adjudication and disposition hearing took place on
March 6, 2023. DCFS argued the juvenile court should sustain
the petition in full because parents knew or should have known
maternal uncle was a sexual abuser yet placed F.V. in his care.
As evidence of parents’ knowledge, DCFS pointed to maternal

                                    8
relative D.R.’s statement that maternal uncle had tried to
sexually abuse her when she was 14.
       Mother argued she did not know or have reason to know
maternal uncle was a sexual abuser, and when she found out, she
acted appropriately by calling D.R. and asking her to intervene.
Mother argued F.V. no longer was in danger so none of the
allegations in the petition should be sustained. Mother wanted
F.V. returned to her but acknowledged she needed DCFS’s
involvement for that to happen.
       Father similarly argued he had no reason to know
maternal uncle was a sexual abuser. He disputed the assertion
that parents had allowed F.V. to come to the U.S. alone, noting
he had accompanied her, but they were separated at the border.
       F.V.’s counsel asked the juvenile court to sustain the
petition under section 300, subdivision (b), but to dismiss the
allegation under subdivision (d), which would require parents to
have known or reasonably known F.V. was in danger of sexual
abuse. F.V.’s counsel argued sending F.V. to live in a foreign
country alone at the age of nine placed her in an inherently
dangerous situation. F.V.’s counsel contended, however, there
was no evidence parents should have anticipated the sexual
abuse, and both reacted appropriately when they found out.
       The juvenile court dismissed the subdivision (d) count,
finding no evidence D.R. told either parent that maternal uncle
had tried to sexually abuse her, and therefore no evidence
parents knew F.V. would be sexually abused. The court
sustained the subdivision (b) count, because maternal uncle did
sexually abuse F.V., as alleged, and parents “did place their child
in a detrimental environment . . . by sending a nine-year-old to
this country by herself to reside with family members.”

                                    9
       As for disposition, DCFS asked F.V. not be placed with
either parent. DCFS argued it had no “information at this time
that mother would be appropriate today if the child were
returned to her care. She had reason to send the child to the
United States. There’s no information that those reasons have
abated or have changed.” DCFS contended father was living in a
shelter in Texas, and there was no evidence F.V. would be
adequately supervised if placed with him. Also, DCFS noted F.V.
had stated she did not want to relocate to Texas.
       Mother requested placement with her with the
understanding there were immigration issues preventing F.V.’s
return to Mother. Mother argued there was no clear and
convincing evidence that F.V. would be at risk if placed with her.
       Father requested placement with him, arguing he lived in a
trailer, not a shelter, and there was no evidence of risk of harm.
He noted that Texas has its own child welfare agency. If the
court would not place F.V. with him, father “would be in
agreement with returning the minor to mother.”
       F.V.’s counsel stated F.V. wished to return to Honduras.
F.V.’s counsel contended father had been “transient” in Texas,
and although he may be settled for the moment, at bottom F.V.
did not want to live with him. Because of passport and
immigration issues, F.V.’s counsel requested suitable placement
with the court revisiting the issue of release to mother later.
F.V.’s counsel stated the Honduran consulate would require both
parents to participate before F.V. could receive a passport, so
counsel requested the court order the parents to cooperate in
accomplishing that. F.V.’s counsel further stated F.V. had an
immigration hearing scheduled on May 30, “at which time her

                                  10
attorneys will be asking the court to authorize [F.V.’s] voluntary
departure to Honduras.”
       The juvenile court found, “The best place for this child, so
that she can heal mentally, emotionally, psychologically is with
her mother.” The court cited evidence that F.V. had tried to tell
her mother about the abuse but maternal uncle had prevented it,
and noted that mother had taken immediate action when she
finally learned of the abuse.
       The court denied placement with father, finding “[f]ather’s
housing is not stable for this child. It is not in the child’s best
interest to be bounced yet to another environment, in another
jurisdiction where the father’s housing is not stable only for this
child to be subjected to more instability.”
       The court ordered “suitable placement with the
understanding that there’s a possibility that will change to home-
of-parent to mother after the immigration hearing because the
child does need a passport to travel back to Honduras.” The court
ordered parents to facilitate the passport process. The court
further ordered both parents to complete parenting and sexual
abuse awareness courses and engage in individual counseling.
       Father timely appealed from the jurisdictional and
dispositional orders.

                          DISCUSSION
       Father argues the evidence was insufficient for the juvenile
court to assert jurisdiction over F.V. We agree.
       “ ‘In reviewing the jurisdictional findings . . . , we look to
see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we
draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the
findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record

                                    11
in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we
note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.’ [Citations.]” (In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622, 633.)
       The juvenile court asserted jurisdiction under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), which permits a court to take jurisdiction if,
inter alia, “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk
that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a
result of any of the following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of
the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect
the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent failure of the child’s
parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child
from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been
left.”
       The juvenile court expressly found no evidence that mother
or father had reason to know maternal uncle would sexually
abuse F.V. Accordingly, maternal uncle’s sexually abusive acts
could not, by themselves, justify assertion of jurisdiction. The
juvenile court instead asserted jurisdiction based on parents’
sending F.V. into the United States alone without a plan for her
care.
       Father disputes that the circumstances of F.V.’s entry into
the United States demonstrated a failure to adequately supervise
or protect F.V. Father argues, “The record does not address how
F.V. specifically crossed the border, at what point [father]
separated from her, and, prior to her entry, whether the parents
made arrangements with [maternal uncle] to provide for F.V.’s
care once in the United States.”
       We need not decide whether parents failed adequately to
supervise or protect F.V. at the time she crossed the border.
Even if they did fail in this regard, “ ‘previous acts of neglect,

                                     12
standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there
must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will
reoccur. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Savannah M. (2005)
131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394 (Savannah M.), italics omitted,
abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at
p. 628.)
       Here, there was no evidence that the harm F.V. suffered
following her entering alone into the United States would recur.
At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, F.V. was no longer in
maternal uncle’s custody. There was no indication mother or
father would allow maternal uncle access to F.V.—as the juvenile
court found, neither had a reason to know maternal uncle was a
sexual abuser, and mother took appropriate action to protect F.V.
once she found out. Thus, there was no evidence at the time of
the jurisdiction hearing that maternal uncle remained a danger
to F.V.
       Nor was there reason to think that the circumstances
leading to parents’ allegedly negligent decision to send F.V. into
the United States alone would recur. Father took F.V. to the
United States because the family lived in poverty and had heard
the United States was allowing younger children to enter. F.V.
crossed the border by herself because father could not cross with
her, and mother was still in Honduras with their other children.
       These circumstances had changed significantly by the time
of the jurisdiction hearing. Father was now in the United States
himself and could care for F.V. There was nothing in the record
to suggest he could not do so—he had a residence, was working in
construction, and had found a school, medical and dental care,
and a caregiver for F.V. while he was at work. Both DCFS and a
Texas social worker had evaluated his home and identified no

                                  13
problems. Indeed, at the January 5, 2023 hearing DCFS stated,
“Everything looks fine,” and objected to placement with father
only because F.V. stated she did not want to relocate to Texas.
The juvenile court’s finding at the disposition hearing that
father’s housing was “unstable” is not supported by the record—
there is no indication father was transient or that his housing
situation was tenuous. Although father reported in the
January 26, 2023 last minute information he was “currently
unemployed,” we are aware of no authority that a parent’s
unemployment by itself is a basis to assert dependency
jurisdiction.
      Mother made clear she no longer had interest in F.V. being
in the United States, and wanted her back in Honduras. Any
concern that mother might again send F.V. into the United
States unaccompanied is not supported by the record.
      We acknowledge that mother and father during the
jurisdiction hearing did not agree as to which of them should care
for F.V., and reported they were no longer on speaking terms.
Parental disagreement as to custody, however, is a family law
matter, and not a reason for the juvenile court to get involved.
      In defense of the jurisdictional order, DCFS argues that
during the 11 months F.V. lived with maternal uncle, father
did not attempt to take custody of her. Also, when mother first
spoke to a social worker, she stated she “d[id] not believe [F.V.]
could be with father as he is not doing well financially.” Father
explained early in the proceedings that at that time, he was
having difficulty finding work and housing, which presumably is
why he did not come for F.V. As noted, the record indicates that
since that time, father has obtained housing and work.

                                  14
      DCFS argues that because father needs to arrange a
caregiver for F.V. while he works, he is “plac[ing] her in yet
another unstable situation where she would be under the
supervision of a stranger.” Parents are free to arrange for
babysitters, and that decision is not, in and of itself, evidence of
risk supporting jurisdiction.
      DCFS argues Savannah M. is distinguishable because in
that case, the parents left their children with an inappropriate
caregiver for a single night (Savannah M., supra,
131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1390–1391), whereas mother and father
sent F.V. into the United States alone, and were far from her for
many months, “unable to assist her in any way after [F.V.]
disclosed” the sexual abuse.
      The significance of Savannah M. for our purposes is the
proposition that, whatever a parent’s past mistakes, jurisdiction
is proper only upon a showing of substantial risk of future harm.
(See Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.) In
reversing the jurisdictional order in Savannah M., the Court of
Appeal reasoned there was insufficient evidence the parents
reasonably should have foreseen that the caregiver, a family
friend, would sexually abuse their daughter, and even if the
parents were “somewhat negligent,” they had taken appropriate
action once they learned of the sexual abuse. (Id. at pp. 1396–
1397.) Under those circumstances, the notion that they might in
the future allow a sexual abuser “to manipulate them into caring
for their daughters” was “mere speculation.” (Id. at p. 1397.)
      In the instant case, similarly, the juvenile court found
mother and father had no reason to know maternal uncle was a
sexual abuser, and mother took appropriate and immediate
action when she found out. There is nothing in the record to

                                    15
suggest mother and father would make that mistake again.
Further, discussed above, there was no evidence that the
circumstances that led to F.V. being alone in the United States
are likely to recur, now that father is in the United States and
mother wants F.V. back in Honduras.
       Our reversal of the jurisdictional order also necessitates
reversal of the dispositional order. (In re Roger S. (2018)
31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583.)

                         DISPOSITION
      The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are reversed.

                                           BENDIX, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

                                   16
Filed 3/5/24
                CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION ONE

 In re F.V., a Person Coming          B329192
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.        (Los Angeles County
                                      Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP04342)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                   CERTIFICATION AND
 DEPARTMENT OF                        ORDER FOR PUBLICATION
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,                            [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

 RENE S.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed
February 8, 2024, was not certified for publication in the
Official Reports. For good cause it now appears that the opinion
should be published in the Official Reports and it is so ordered.
      There is no change in the judgment.
      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

____________________________________________________________
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.           BENDIX, J.        WEINGART, J.