Court Opinion

ID: 9733855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:18:57.094319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:36.339167
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
dissenting.
In one fell swoop, without analysis or citation, the majority has effectively held that section 302 of the Crimes Code,1 18 Pa.C.S. § 302, defines the general requirements of culpability for all offenses in Pennsylvania. While this may be a laudable result it is accomplished by usurping the legislative power to define crimes.
The crime in this case has been legislatively defined as follows:
§ 3732. Homicide by vehicle.
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law *202of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, Act of June 17, P.L. 162, No. 81 § l.2
The culpability requirement in this statute is contained in the word “unintentionally”; for that is the only reference to the actor’s mental state. In Commonwealth v. Hicks, 502 Pa. 344, 466 A.2d 613 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1015, 104 S.Ct. 1260, 79 L.Ed.2d 668 (1984), this Court left no question that the legislative intent in enacting this statute was to “borrow from concepts of tort law” and that such a “borrowing” was constitutional, to wit:
By focusing on drivers who know or should know that they are engaging in conduct constituting a Vehicle Code violation, of which death is a probable consequence, section 3732 seeks only to sanction those persons who should reasonably anticipate that their conduct is likely to produce death, in much the same manner as the law of tort imposes liability against only those wrongdoers who should reasonably have anticipated the harm resulting from their conduct. It has long been perceived that the imposition of liability for negligent conduct tends to improve the quality of social conduct. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts 14-16 (4th ed. 1971). As the judgment by the Legislature to borrow from concepts of tort law in imposing liability under section 3732 bears a rational relationship to the Legislature’s goal, it must be con-*203eluded, that the Legislature’s enactment of section 3732 was a constitutional exercise of its lawmaking authority.
Id., 502 Pa. at 348, 466 A.2d at 615. (emphasis added).
To suggest, as the majority does, that the above quoted language only “implies” the acceptance of the tort standard of ordinary negligence is disingenuous. Furthermore, to imply that although this Court has examined this statute on numerous occasions it never properly identified the culpability requirement is impercipient, at the least.
It is our duty to determine whether legislatively defined crimes pass constitutional muster, not to define the crimes ourselves; and this Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of the present statute. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, id. Commonwealth v. Field, 490 Pa. 519, 417 A.2d 160 (1980).
Consequently, I would reverse the order of the Superior Court.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1.

. This is the form of the statute when the accident culminating in this prosecution occurred.
The statute in its present form is as follows:
§ 3732. Homicide by vehicle.
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death. [Our emphasis notes the 1982 Amendment.]
Act of December 15, 1982, P.L. 1268, No. 289, § 10.