Court Opinion

ID: 9571348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:59.783601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:34.910998
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that the provisions of the ordinance in question which require the removal of existing signs without compensation is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in State Hwy. Dept. v. Branch, 222 Ga. 770 (152 SE2d 372) (1966), I cannot join in the majority’s disposition of the entire case with that single holding.
In addition to providing for the removal of existing signs, the ordinance places numerous restrictions on the construction of signs in the future. Indeed, this case had its genesis in appellee’s effort to have appellants enjoined from constructing certain signs for which they held permits. Where, as here, the portions of the ordinance which are declared unconstitutional are not so vital and connected with the general scheme of the ordinance that its whole purpose must fail, the portion which is invalid can be stricken and the remainder of the ordinance upheld as valid. City of Newnan v. Atlanta Laundries, 174 Ga. 99 (162 SE 497) (8) (1931). This court is, therefore, directly confronted with the issue of whether the trial court erred in enjoining the construction of two signs for which appellants held permits predating the ordinance, and whether the trial court erred in rejecting what the majority characterizes as a “flurry of constitutional claims,” and in holding that the ordinance is constitutional. Being unable to join in an opinion which does not address those issues, I must dissent.
*49Landau, Davis & Farkas, James V. Davis, Leonard Farkas, for appellee.
Rubin, Winston & Diercks, Eric M. Rubin, Steven J. Stone, Hull, Towill, Norman & Barrett, David E. Hudson, amici curiae.