Court Opinion

ID: 9363830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 19:04:28.742779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.132507
License: Public Domain

NOTICE
                                                                                             NOTICE
 Decision filed 01/17/23. The         2023 IL App (5th) 220588-U
                                                                                  This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be
                                                                                  Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to               NO. 5-22-0588                        not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for
 Rehearing or the disposition of                                                  limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                       IN THE                           under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

In re H.C., a Minor                       )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois,     )     Vermilion County.
                                          )
       Petitioner-Appellee,               )
                                          )
v.                                        )     No. 20-JA-70
                                          )
Jakob C.,                                 )     Honorable
                                          )     Thomas M. O’Shaughnessy,
       Respondent-Appellant).             )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the trial court’s orders finding that Jakob C. was an unfit parent and that the
               best interest of the minor child warranted termination of his parental rights were
               not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, we affirm the orders.

¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3       H.C. is a female child born on October 31, 2013. H.C.’s mother is Rhiannon W., and her

father is Jakob C. 1 This case began with a report on April 14, 2020, that involved the care that

         1
          This case only involves H.C. and her father, Jakob. Jakob and Rhiannon surrendered their parental
rights to another child prior to this case.

                                                    1
H.C. was receiving from her paternal grandparents. 2 The Department of Children and Family

Services (DCFS) investigated and determined that there was insufficient evidence of neglect or

abuse. 3 However, by interviewing the grandparents, DCFS learned that Rhiannon refused to

provide the grandparents with guardianship. Without guardianship, the grandparents had no ability

to obtain medical care for H.C. The grandparents reported that Rhiannon periodically picked up

H.C. and would keep her for two to three days at a time.

¶4      DCFS’s investigation revealed that Rhiannon was homeless and living in random “drug

houses,” and that she had been arrested on March 30, 2020, for possession of methamphetamine.

H.C.’s father, Jakob, was in California and was reportedly in a drug rehabilitation facility.

¶5      On May 8, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship. The petition alleged

that that H.C. was neglected in that she was in an environment injurious to her health (705 ILCS

405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and that she was neglected in that she was under the age of 18, and

was not receiving the proper or necessary support or education as required by law, and also was

not receiving medical or remedial care mandated by State law and required for her well-being (id.

§ 2-3(1)(a)). The court held the shelter care hearing on the same date. The court granted DCFS

temporary custody of H.C. As Jakob and Rhiannon could not be located, the State served both by

publication notifying the parents of the upcoming adjudicatory hearing date.

¶6      Jakob appeared at the court hearing on February 3, 2021. The court entered a denial of the

allegations of the adjudicatory petition on Jakob’s behalf, appointed an attorney to represent him,

entered an order requiring Jakob to submit to a DNA test to establish his paternity of H.C., and

        2
           From a dispositional report DCFS filed later in this case, it appears that H.C. was initially residing
with Rhiannon’s father and his wife—not with her paternal grandparents.
         3
           DCFS contracted with an agency, the Center for Youth and Family Solutions, to provide services
to the parents in this case. The caseworker and supervisor were employed by this agency. For continuity in
this order, we refer to the entity in charge of the case involving H.C. as DCFS.
                                                       2
continued the adjudicatory hearing to April 7, 2021. The trial court directed Jakob to work with

his appointed attorney, who was in the courtroom at the time of his appointment, and to speak with

DCFS workers who were also present in the courtroom.

¶7     At the adjudicatory hearing on April 7, 2021, Jakob stipulated to the second count of the

State’s petition for adjudication. He informed the court that he was 26 years old, lived in Tilton,

Illinois, and had obtained his GED after dropping out of high school after the tenth grade. In

exchange for his admission of neglect, DCFS agreed not to file a petition to terminate his parental

rights for at least nine months after entry of the court’s adjudicatory order so long as Jakob

maintained regular contact with DCFS. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the

allegations of the State’s adjudicatory petition had been proven by a preponderance of the

evidence.

¶8     DCFS filed its dispositional report on June 3, 2021. In this report, DCFS provided the

information it received from an unnamed reporter at the beginning of H.C.’s case. The reporter

stated that H.C. was living with Rhiannon’s father and the father’s girlfriend. The reporter stated

that H.C., who was then six years old, was not potty-trained. The reporter stated that the girlfriend

said that they could no longer care for H.C. H.C. had not yet been enrolled in school. DCFS

indicated that Jakob was the purported biological father of H.C. and requested that he complete

the following tasks: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow recommendations,

(2) participate in random drug testing, (3) obtain a stable living arrangement, (4) complete a

parenting assessment and follow recommendations, and (5) engage in visitation with H.C.

¶9     DCFS filed another dispositional report on August 18, 2021. H.C. was in a relative

placement and was doing well. Jakob was working for his mother in her at-home daycare. He was

scheduled for a substance abuse assessment later in August 2021. He had thus far tested negative

                                                 3
on drug tests. Jakob had missed his parenting assessment. He had engaged in visits with H.C. but

had also missed several visitation opportunities. DCFS reported that Jakob’s visits with H.C. went

well. DCFS maintained its service recommendations for Jakob and asked the court to keep H.C.

in foster care for 12 months.

¶ 10   The next dispositional report prepared by DCFS was filed on September 7, 2021. As of

that date, Jakob was employed with Mervis, a recycling business. He was living in a two-bedroom

apartment with his mother. His August 9, 2021, random drug test was negative. Jakob continued

to struggle with consistency with visitation. Jakob’s service plan included securing and

maintaining employment and housing, attending a substance abuse assessment and any

recommended treatment, attending a parenting assessment and engaging in parenting classes,

random substance abuse testing, and continued engagement in visitation with H.C. Jakob missed

his scheduled substance abuse and parenting assessment appointments. DCFS advised him to call

“New Directions” to reschedule the appointments.

¶ 11   On September 10, 2021, the trial court held the dispositional hearing and entered its order.

Jakob was present with his attorney. The court ordered Jakob to submit to a drug test on that date,

and the results were negative. At the hearing, Jakob’s attorney informed the court that “New

Directions” could not work Jakob in for appointments until November 2021, and that he also

intended to contact “Rosecrance” to see if he could obtain earlier appointments. At the conclusion

of the hearing, the trial court found that Jakob was unfit and unable to care for, protect, train,

educate, supervise, or discipline H.C., and that placement with Jakob was contrary to H.C.’s health,

safety, and best interest because “of his need to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow

all recommendations, engage and complete parenting education[,] and demonstrate sobriety and

                                                 4
stability to parent his child.” The court granted the State’s petition, adjudicated H.C. neglected,

and made her a ward of the court and placed guardianship with DCFS.

¶ 12   DCFS filed its next permanency court report on December 10, 2021. Jakob and his mother

continued to live in the two-bedroom apartment. DCFS inspected the apartment and found that it

was an appropriate home for H.C. DCFS scheduled two random drug tests since the last report.

Jakob tested negative on one test and missed the second test. Jakob was scheduled for a parenting

assessment on December 7, 2021, at “Family Advocacy Center,” but DCFS was unaware if he had

completed the assessment. Jakob was also scheduled for a substance abuse assessment on

December 23, 2021. Jakob continued to engage in visitation with H.C. showing appropriate

parenting techniques.

¶ 13   The court held its permanency review hearing on December 15, 2021. Jakob was present

for the hearing. Jakob’s attorney reminded the trial court that Jakob had never tested positive on

any court-ordered or DCFS random tests he took. However, Jakob claimed he did not know that

he was required to call the drug testing system to see if he had been selected for a test. In response,

the State stated that Jakob’s claim that he was unaware that he needed to call the drug testing

system each day was not credible. The court found that Jakob had made reasonable efforts, but not

reasonable and substantial progress toward returning the minor home, and ordered him to have the

DNA test, obtain employment, and comply with the service plan recommendations.

¶ 14   DCFS filed its next permanency report on March 30, 2022. DCFS reported that Jakob

reported recent employment with Beef House Restaurant in Covington, Indiana, that he continued

to live in the appropriate two-bedroom apartment with his mother, that he did not show for or

reschedule the December 7, 2021, parenting assessment or his December 23, 2021, substance

abuse assessment, and that he had been scheduled for six drug drops since the last court hearing,

                                                  5
but that he only showed for two of the six tests. He was negative on the two tests he took. He

continued to engage in his weekly visitation with H.C. Jakob reported to DCFS that despite missing

the random drug tests, he was living a sober lifestyle.

¶ 15   Jakob failed to appear at the March 30, 2022, permanency hearing. His attorney informed

the court that Jakob was ill and would not be able to attend. The State reported that Jakob missed

the DNA test because the testing date “slipped his mind.” The State called Stephanie Jones, a

caseworker employed by the Center for Youth and Family Solutions, an agency contracted by

DCFS. Jones was assigned to this case. She testified that Jakob engages in visitation with H.C.

about 75% of the time. Jones testified that the relative foster placement was willing to provide

permanency for H.C. through adoption. H.C. and her younger brother, O.G., 4 were both in the

same foster family—the home of their maternal great aunt and uncle. The State and the guardian

ad litem asked the trial court to change the permanency goal to substitute care pending termination

of the parents’ rights. The trial court agreed and entered its order finding that Jakob had not made

reasonable efforts or reasonable and substantial progress toward return of H.C.

¶ 16   On April 5, 2022, the State filed its petition to terminate. The petition alleged that Jakob

was an unfit parent for the following three bases: (1) he had failed to maintain a reasonable degree

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to H.C.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020));

(2) he had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for H.C.’s

removal within the specific nine-month period from July 5, 2021, to April 5, 2022, following the

adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) he had failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of H.C. during the nine-month period from July 5, 2021, to April 5, 2022,

following the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)). Jakob was served with the petition to

       4
           H.C. and O.G. had the same mother, Rhiannon, but different biological fathers.
                                                     6
terminate and the notice of hearing on April 10, 2022, by a deputy of the Vermilion County

Sheriff’s Office.

¶ 17   DCFS filed its March 23, 2022, Family Service Plan on May 12, 2022, in anticipation of

the fitness hearing. The period covered by this service plan was March 30, 2022, though October

31, 2022. Caseworker Stephanie Jones evaluated the permanency goal as not having been

achieved. As of the date of the report, Jakob continued to live in the apartment with his mother

and was then employed with Red Lobster Hospitality, LLC. Jakob had completed his integrated

assessment earlier in the case. DCFS’s requirement that Jakob live a sober lifestyle mandated that

he complete a substance abuse assessment, engage in any treatment determined necessary, and test

negative on all random drug tests. Jakob was rated unsatisfactory on this permanency plan outcome

because he did not complete the substance abuse assessment. However, DCFS noted that when he

appeared for his random drug tests, the results were consistently negative. Jakob was also required

to provide appropriate parenting for H.C. To satisfy that requirement, he needed to complete a

parenting assessment and complete any necessary parenting classes. Jakob was rated

unsatisfactory on this permanency plan outcome because he did not complete a parenting

assessment. Jakob was required to prove a safe home for H.C., which included both housing and

income. DCFS had determined that the apartment Jakob shared with his mother was adequate for

H.C.’s needs. As Jakob was currently employed, he had achieved the income aspect of this

permanency plan objective.

¶ 18   The fitness hearing was held on July 1, 2022. Jakob did not appear at the hearing but was

represented by his attorney. The State called two DCFS witnesses.

¶ 19   The first witness called by the State was Cassandra Carter, the supervisor and case manager

for DCFS. Carter testified that she handled the case from its inception until June or July of 2021,

                                                7
when the case was handed over to Stephanie Jones. Jakob completed the integrated assessment

packet sent to him by Carter. Carter testified that based upon the information he included in this

assessment, she recommended services for substance abuse and parenting. She also recommended

visits with H.C. and a DNA test to establish parentage. Carter testified that Jakob was required to

obtain and maintain adequate housing and employment. Carter stated that she referred Jakob for a

substance abuse and parenting assessments in early 2021, and that she made the initial

appointments for him. She testified that he completed the DNA test.5 During the time that Carter

managed this case, Jakob did not complete the substance abuse or parenting assessments. She

testified that his housing was appropriate, but that his employment was not consistent. Carter

testified that Jakob was allowed weekly supervised visits with H.C., but that he only attended

approximately one visit each month during her involvement with his case. Carter stated that

Jakob’s visits with H.C. went well. Jakob maintained contact with DCFS, and he tested negative

on all court-ordered drug tests. However, Carter indicated that DCFS never got close to returning

H.C. to Jakob’s care because his visitation was inconsistent and he had not completed the

mandatory assessments.

¶ 20   The second witness called by the State was Stephanie Jones, who took over as Jakob’s

caseworker in July 2021. She recommended the same services for Jakob as her predecessor. Jones

testified that Jakob failed to engage in the recommended services for substance abuse and

parenting. He participated in the random drug testing and was negative on the two tests he took.

However, he missed five of the seven tests ordered. Jones testified that his failure to show for most

of the mandated drug tests was concerning because of Jakob’s sobriety permanency goal. Jones

       5
         Although the DNA test result is not included in the record on appeal, the result presumptively
established that he was H.C.’s biological father.
                                                  8
indicated that housing was stable, but that he had worked for four to five employers, and so income

was not stable. Overall, Jones testified that Jakob failed to comply with his service plan. She

testified that Jakob participated in 27 of 50 scheduled weekly visits with H.C. and that the visits

went well. Jones indicated that she had not had contact with Jakob since March 2022, and before

that, she interacted with him approximately once per month. Since March, Jones testified that she

had phoned and texted Jakob multiple times, and she mailed him one letter. Jakob responded to

none of these contacts.

¶ 21   At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the State established by clear

and convincing evidence that Jakob was an unfit parent. The court stated that Jakob had not made

reasonable efforts or reasonable progress toward reunification with H.C. The court entered its

written order on July 18, 2022, confirming the court’s verbal findings at the conclusion of the July

1, 2022, hearing.

¶ 22   The court held the best interest hearing on August 25, 2022. Jakob did not appear but was

represented at the hearing by his attorney. The only witness to testify was caseworker Jones. Jones

testified that Jakob’s last visit with H.C. was on March 15, 2022. Since that date, Jakob had not

sent any cards, gifts, or letters to her. H.C. had been in her relative placement with her maternal

great aunt and uncle since May 18, 2020. Her younger brother, O.G., was placed in the same home

on February 9, 2021. H.C. was almost nine years old and had expressed her desire to stay in her

current placement. Jones testified that H.C. was happy in this home. H.C. received counseling

services and was seeing a psychiatrist for medication. H.C. had a history of anger outbursts, and

the services were designed to address those behavioral and emotional needs. Jones testified that

both children are loved and cared for in this placement and bonded with their foster parents. The

foster parents had indicated a willingness to provide permanence by adoption of both children. On

                                                 9
cross-examination, Jones testified that Jakob apparently ceased his communications with her

because she had informed him that the case was heading toward a potential termination of his

parental rights. She testified that he contacted her a couple of weeks prior to the best interest

hearing, and she advised him that he could still have visitation with H.C. However, he never

responded to set up a visit with H.C. Jones confirmed that H.C. occasionally asks about Jakob’s

absence.

¶ 23   At the conclusion of the best interest hearing, the trial court found that the State established

by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of Jakob’s parental rights to H.C. was the

appropriate outcome. In reaching this conclusion, the court listed the following statutory factors it

considered in the context of H.C.’s age and developmental needs:

       (1) her physical safety and welfare;

       (2) the development of her identity;

       (3) her background and ties, including familial ties;

       (4) her sense of attachment, including where she actually feels love, attachment, and a

           sense of being valued; her sense of security; her sense of familiarity; the continuity of

           affection for the child; and the least disruptive placement for the child;

       (5) her wishes;

       (6) her community ties;

       (7) her need for permanency, which included her need for stability and continuity of

           relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other relatives;

       (10) the uniqueness of her situation;

       (11) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and

       (12) the preferences of the persons available to care for her.

                                                 10
The court then ordered that H.C. shall remain a ward of the court, terminated Jakob’s parental

rights based upon the findings of unfitness, and appointed DCFS as the guardian and custodian of

H.C. with the authority to consent to her adoption without further notice to or consent by Jakob.

On September 1, 2022, the trial court entered its detailed written order finding that it was in H.C.’s

best interest to terminate Jakob’s parental rights.

¶ 24                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 25   Jakob appeals from the trial court’s orders finding that he was an unfit parent and that his

parental rights should be terminated.

¶ 26   The legal authority for the involuntary termination of parental rights in Illinois is found in

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)) and in the Adoption Act

(750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2020)). In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010) (citing In re E.B.,

231 Ill. 2d 459, 463 (2008)). The procedural basis for the involuntary termination of parental rights

is found in section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020)).

The procedure involves two steps. With step one, the State must prove, by clear and convincing

evidence, that the parent is an “unfit person” as defined by the Adoption Act. Id.; 750 ILCS

50/1(D) (West 2020); In re A.J., 269 Ill. App. 3d 824, 828 (1994). If the trial court finds that the

parent is unfit, the process moves to step two. With step two, the State must prove, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that it is in the child’s best interest that the parent’s rights be

terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at 337-38.

¶ 27   On appeal from a trial court’s findings that a parent is unfit and that terminating the parental

rights is in the child’s best interest, the reviewing court must not retry the case but, instead, must

review the trial court’s findings to determine if the findings are against the manifest weight of the

evidence. In re A.W., 231 Ill. 2d 92, 104 (2008). The trial court’s finding of unfitness is given great

                                                  11
deference because the court had the best opportunity to view and evaluate the parties and their

testimony. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1064 (2006). Accordingly, on appeal, we will

not reweigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of the witnesses. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d

387, 391 (2001). A decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite

conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the

evidence presented. In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 28 (citing In re Joseph M., 398

Ill. App. 3d 1086, 1089 (2010)); In re S.R., 326 Ill. App. 3d 356, 360-61 (2001).

¶ 28   We first review the evidence to determine if the State met its burden of proving, by clear

and convincing evidence, that Jakob was an “unfit person.” The trial court determined that the

State met its burden of proof on the following basis: (1) he had failed to maintain a reasonable

degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to H.C.’s welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)); (2) he

had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for H.C.’s

removal within the specific nine-month period from July 5, 2021, to April 5, 2022, following the

adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) he had failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of H.C. during the nine-month period from July 5, 2021, to April 5, 2022,

following the adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

¶ 29   Jakob argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was an unfit parent because he

demonstrated sobriety by engaging in substance abuse rehabilitation while he lived in California

and because he tested negative on the drug tests he took during the pendency of this case. He also

argued that he established his fitness as a parent because he completed his integrated assessment

form, maintained a stable home life, and was employed. Finally, he contends that his visits with

H.C. established his parental fitness. Jakob claims that the trial court’s conclusions—that he was

                                                12
unfit for not having a sufficient interest in H.C.’s welfare and failing to make reasonable progress

and reasonable efforts toward reunification—were erroneous.

¶ 30   “Reasonable progress” is determined by an objective standard, based upon the amount of

progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was taken from the parent.

In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17 (citing In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1067). “The

benchmark for measuring a parent’s reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption

Act encompasses the parent’s compliance with the service plans and court’s directives in light of

the condition that gave rise to the removal of the child and other conditions which later become

known that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent.” Id. (citing

In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001)). A parent makes reasonable progress when the trial

court can find that the progress “is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality” that the trial

court may soon be able to order the return of the minor to the parent’s custody. Id. (citing In re

J.H., 2014 IL App (3d) 140185, ¶ 22).

¶ 31   “Reasonable effort” is determined by a subjective standard that refers to the amount of

effort which is reasonable for that parent. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1066-67. The court

must determine whether the parent has made committed and diligent efforts toward correcting the

conditions that led to the removal of the minor from the home. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d)

180218, ¶ 24.

¶ 32   We review Jakob’s progress pursuant to the standard that includes the parent’s compliance

with the service plan objectives and the court’s orders. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17. Here,

Jakob could not be located when the case began in April 2020, and he did not make an appearance

in this case until February 2021. H.C. had been in foster care for approximately 10 months before

Jakob made his first court appearance and was directed to work with DCFS. Jakob was presented

                                                13
with an integrated assessment packet which he completed. However, the information Jakob

reported in this assessment required him to participate in both a substance abuse and a parenting

assessment. If additional services were recommended after the individualized assessment, then

Jakob was required to complete those services as well. Jakob never completed the assessments,

and thus no services were ordered. Although DCFS never reached the point of requiring Jakob to

complete specific services, that does not mean that Jakob was compliant or showed reasonable

progress or effort. Jakob was required to call into the random drug system daily to determine if he

had been selected for a drug test. Jakob’s negative results, both when ordered by the trial court

during hearings and through the random testing program, reflected that on those dates he was not

under the influence. More problematic was the number of random drug tests that Jakob missed. As

DCFS caseworker Jones testified at the fitness hearing, missing a random drug test was concerning

because he was required to demonstrate that he was maintaining a sober lifestyle. What is not

known is whether Jakob purposefully skipped the drug test because he knew he would test positive.

However, missed random drug tests, without some sort of verified excuse, could be treated as

presumptive positive tests. At the very least, missing a multitude of drug testing opportunities

reflects Jakob’s lack of commitment to the process. Additionally, Jones testified that Jakob missed

almost 50% of his weekly visits with H.C., and he never consistently maintained employment.

¶ 33    Accordingly, we find no basis in the record on appeal to conclude that the trial court’s

determination that Jakob was an unfit parent was in error. We conclude that the trial court’s finding

that Jakob was an unfit parent was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.W.,

231 Ill. 2d at 104.

¶ 34    Having determined that the trial court correctly found that Jakob was an unfit parent, we

turn to the best interest of H.C. Termination of a parent’s rights is an extreme act. In re Adoption

                                                 14
of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 274-75 (1990). A parent maintains a superior right to raise his or her own

children. Id. Once a parent has been determined to be unfit, “the parent’s rights must yield to the

child’s best interest.” In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d 165, 170 (2002); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d at

337-38. Until the court determines that a parent is unfit, the interests of both the parent and the

child are concurrent “to the extent that they both ‘share a vital interest in preventing erroneous

termination of their natural relationship.’ ” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 363 (2004) (quoting

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760-61 (1982)).

¶ 35   After finding that a parent is unfit, the State must establish proof that termination of a

parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-

29(2) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. On appeal of a best-interest determination, we

must decide whether the trial court’s decision is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

In re Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009); In re S.J., 368 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755 (2006). A

best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly

demonstrate that the court should have reached the opposite result. In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App.

3d at 1072. On appeal from an order terminating a parent’s rights, the reviewing court gives great

deference to the trial court’s decision because the trial court was in a much better position to see

the witnesses and judge their credibility. In re K.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 748 (2000).

¶ 36   “[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child

relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d

at 364. The trial court must consider several factors within “the context of the child’s age and

developmental needs” when considering if termination of parental rights serves a child’s best

interest. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020). The trial court may also consider the likelihood of

adoption. In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d at 170.

                                                  15
¶ 37   During the best interest hearing, the trial court stated that it had considered all statutory

best interest factors (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)) and found that H.C.’s security and familiarity,

continuity, and the need for permanence were paramount. The court concluded that in

consideration of all factors, H.C.’s best interest could only be met by termination of Jakob’s

parental rights. The record indicates that Jakob last saw H.C. in March 2022. Although he was

offered the right to continue his weekly visits, he declined that opportunity. H.C. was fully

integrated into her maternal relative’s home. Her younger brother, O.G., also lived in this relative

placement. The family informed DCFS of their intent to formally adopt H.C. and her brother, O.G.

Here, the record clearly reflects that termination of Jakob’s parental rights was the appropriate

outcome for H.C. She deserves the permanence and stability that termination would provide. We

conclude that the trial court’s decision to terminate Jakob’s parental rights was not contrary to the

manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002).

¶ 38                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 39   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Vermilion

County.

¶ 40   Affirmed.

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