Court Opinion

ID: 9388775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:02:26.179598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.621035
License: Public Domain

Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the Pacific Reporter.
   Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
   303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
   corrections@akcourts.gov.

            THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

TECK AMERICAN                                   )
INCORPORATED and STATE OF                       )   Supreme Court Nos.: S-18082/18101
ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF                           )
NATURAL RESOURCES,                              )   Superior Court No.: 3AN-19-10673 CI
                                                )
                     Appellants,                )   OPINION
                                                )
    v.                                          )   No. 7647 – April 21, 2023
                                                )
VALHALLA MINING, LLC,                           )
                                                )
                     Appellee.                  )
                                                )

           Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third
           Judicial District, Anchorage, Eric A. Aarseth, Judge.

           Appearances: James N. Leik and Elena M. Romerdahl,
           Perkins Coie LLP, Anchorage, for Appellant Teck American
           Incorporated. Brian E. Gregg, Assistant Attorney General,
           and Dana S. Burke, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
           Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau,
           for Appellant State of Alaska, Department of Natural
           Resources. Matthew Singer and Lee C. Baxter, Schwabe,
           Williamson & Wyatt, P.C., Anchorage, for Appellee.

           Before: Winfree, Chief Justice,                   Maassen,       Carney,
           Borghesan, and Henderson, Justices.

           CARNEY, Justice.
      INTRODUCTION

             After a mining company abandoned its mining claims, the claims were
located and recorded by a second mining company, which also abandoned the claims.
After the second company abandoned the claims, the first company attempted to cure
its earlier abandonment. The same year that the first company filed to cure its
abandonment, a third mining company attempted to locate and record ownership of
some of the same claims. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) refused to issue
permits to the third company, reasoning that the first one had validly cured its
abandonment of its claims before the third company located the claims.            After
exhausting its administrative remedies, the third company appealed DNR’s decision to
the superior court. The superior court reversed DNR’s decision. Because DNR’s
interpretation of the controlling statute was reasonable, we reverse the superior court
decision and affirm DNR’s decision.
      FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
      A.     Facts
             In 1994 Cominco American Inc. located and recorded ownership of a
number of mining claims called the “Smucker” claims. It later conveyed the claims to
a related company, CAI Inc., a Washington corporation authorized to do business in
Alaska under an Alaska certificate of authority issued in 1999 (67504-F). CAI Inc.
changed its corporate name three times: to Cominco American Inc. in 1999; to Teck
Cominco American Inc. in 2001; and to TCAI, Inc. in 2008. Although Cominco
American Inc. changed its name in 2001 to Teck Cominco American Inc. in
Washington, it did not amend its Alaska certificate of authority to reflect this change.
From 2001 to 2007 Affidavits of Annual Labor (AALs) listed the owner of the Smucker
claims as Teck Cominco American Inc. even though it was not authorized to do business
in Alaska at the time.

                                          -2-                                     7647
             When Teck Cominco American Inc. changed its name to TCAI Inc. in
2008, it amended its certificate of authority to reflect the name change. But TCAI filed
statements of labor that did not identify TCAI as the owner of the Smucker claims,
which constituted an abandonment of those claims by statute in 2008.1
             In 2011 American Energies Resources, Inc. (AERI) located the abandoned
Smucker claims and recorded ownership of them. AERI’s successor abandoned the
claims in 2016. In October 2017 TCAI attempted to cure its ownership of the Smucker
claims under AS 38.05.265(b) by recording corrected statements of labor and paying
the associated fees and penalties to DNR.2 Two months later a third mining company,
Valhalla, Inc., attempted to locate and record nearby claims called the “Jiffy” claims,
many of which overlapped with the Smucker claims. TCAI then quitclaimed the
Smucker claims to a related entity, Teck American Inc., the current holder.3
             In February 2018 DNR’s Division of Mining, Land and Water (the
Division) sent notice to Teck acknowledging its reinstated ownership of the Smucker
claims.4 In April the Division notified Valhalla that it would not issue a permit for some

      1
             See AS 38.05.265(a) (stating that failure to record timely statements of
labor constitutes abandonment); former 11 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC)
86.220(c), (g) (am. 8/26/98) (requiring statements of labor to contain essential facts,
such as name of current owner, and rendering void statements of labor that do not
contain them).
      2
               See AS 38.05.265(b) (describing how “a person may cure the failure to
record . . . that constituted the abandonment and cure the abandonment” by properly
recording a statement of labor and paying required fees, royalties, and penalties
“[u]nless another person has located a mining claim or leasehold location that includes
all or part of the mining claim or leasehold location abandoned”).
      3
            For clarity we refer to the current and previous holders of Cominco
American Inc.’s interest in the Smucker claims as Teck, except where a distinction is
necessary.
      4
              The letter was addressed to Teck American Incorporated although TCAI
did not quitclaim its interests to Teck until March 16, 2018.
                                           -3-                                      7647
of its Jiffy claims because they overlapped with the Smucker claims. In November the
Division granted all of Valhalla’s land use permits for the Jiffy claims except the ones
that overlapped with Teck’s Smucker claims. The Division reasoned that Teck had
cured its abandonment of the Smucker claims before Valhalla had located and recorded
its claims, and Teck was therefore the rightful owner of the claims.
      B.     Proceedings
                    Appeal to DNR
             Valhalla timely filed a formal appeal of the Division’s decision with DNR
in November 2018. Both Teck and Valhalla submitted letters to DNR in support of
their ownership of the Smucker claims. In September 2019 DNR’s Commissioner
issued a final decision in favor of Teck. The Commissioner concluded that Teck had
successfully cured its abandonment of the Smucker claims under AS 38.05.265(b). She
rejected Valhalla’s argument that Teck was not allowed to cure its abandonment once
AERI had properly located and recorded ownership of the abandoned Smucker claims.
The Commissioner reasoned that Teck was able to cure its abandonment under
AS 38.05.265(b) because AERI had abandoned the claims when Teck filed the required
documents to cure; therefore there were no active intervening claims preventing Teck
from curing. The Commissioner also rejected Valhalla’s argument that Teck was barred
from curing its abandonment because it had previously failed to record statements of
labor within the two-year period required by a different statute, AS 38.05.210(c).5 The
Commissioner concluded that AS 38.05.265(b) did not place a time limit on a party’s
ability to cure its abandonment.

      5
               See former AS 38.05.210(c) (2019) (allowing “statement of annual labor
. . . [to] be amended within two years of the date by which the annual labor statement
was required to be recorded”). A recent amendment to the statute shortened time for
entries to 90 days. Ch. 31, §8, SLA 2020.

                                          -4-                                     7647
              Valhalla appealed DNR’s final decision to the superior court.6
                     Appeal to the superior court
              Following briefing the superior court held oral argument in April 2021.
The superior court reversed DNR’s decision. The court first determined that DNR’s
interpretation of the process to cure abandonment of mining claims under
AS 38.05.265(b) did not implicate DNR’s expertise or its determination of fundamental
policy. The court applied its independent judgment in interpreting the statute rather
than the more deferential “reasonable basis” standard of review.
              The superior court interpreted the word “location” in AS 38.05.265(b) to
mean the physical staking of the claim with markers,7 and it found that once Teck’s
stakes or monuments had been replaced by AERI’s, Teck could not cure its
abandonment. The court found that the legislative history specifically contemplated
that a person could cure abandonment of a claim if “no one had staked the intervening
rights.”8 The court emphasized that the purpose behind Alaska’s mining laws was to
encourage the development of resources and that the laws were “designed for miners
out in the field . . . not lawyers.”9 It reasoned that Teck’s attempt to cure did not involve
“a small miner rushing to fix an error in filing,” which it believed was the legislature’s

       6
              See AS 22.10.020(d) (“The superior court has jurisdiction in all matters
appealed to it from a subordinate court, or administrative agency . . . .”); Alaska R. App.
P. 601(b) (“An appeal may be taken to the superior court from a . . . final decision of an
administrative agency . . . .”).
       7
             See AS 38.05.195 (describing process for locating mining claim and
requiring “location’s corners [to] be distinctly marked on the ground”).
       8
             Minutes, H. Fin. Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. at 8
(Mar. 2, 2004) (comments of Bob Loeffler, Director, Dep’t of Nat. Res. Mining, Land
& Water Div.).
       9
               Minutes, Sen. Res. Standing Comm. Hearing on S.B. 155, 31st Leg., 2d
Sess. at 5 (Feb. 5, 2020) (statement of Chad Hutchinson, Counsel, Sen. Majority Off.)
(alteration in original).
                                            -5-                                        7647
focus when passing the statute, but was an attempt to cure abandonment of claims “that
occurred a decade before.”       The court concluded that the plain language of
AS 38.05.265(b), in addition to its legislative history and purpose, supported Valhalla’s
interpretation that the statute precluded Teck’s ability to cure once AERI located the
abandoned Smucker claims and recorded ownership.
              Teck and DNR separately appealed the superior court’s decision. We
consolidated the appeals.
         STANDARD OF REVIEW
              “When the superior court acts as an intermediate court of appeal, we give
no deference to its decision. Rather, we review the merits of the administrative agency
determination directly.”10 “We review an agency’s factual findings ‘to determine
whether they are supported by substantial evidence,’ meaning ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the agency’s] conclusion.’ ”11
There are two standards of review for an agency’s interpretation of a statute: the
reasonable basis standard and the independent judgment standard.12               If “the
interpretation at issue implicates agency expertise or the determination of fundamental
policies within the scope of the agency’s statutory functions,” we apply the reasonable
basis standard, deferring to the agency’s interpretation “so long as it is reasonable.”13
“If no agency expertise is involved in the agency’s interpretation, we apply the

         10
              N. Alaska Env’t Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2 P.3d 629, 633 (Alaska
2000).
         11
             French v. Alaska Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 498 P.3d 1026, 1028
(Alaska 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Shea v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of
Ret. & Benefits, 267 P.3d 624, 630 (Alaska 2011)).
         12
            See Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1082
(Alaska 2011).
         13
              Id.

                                           -6-                                     7647
substitution of judgment standard.”14 Under the substitution of judgment standard, “we
exercise our independent judgment, substituting it ‘for that of the agency even if the
agency’s [interpretation] ha[s] a reasonable basis in law.’ ”15
       DISCUSSION
       A.      The Reasonable Basis Standard Applies.
               The parties disagree whether the superior court applied the proper
standard of review to DNR’s conclusion that AS 38.05.265(b) allows curing the
abandonment of a mining claim after that same claim has been located, recorded, and
abandoned by a subsequent party. Teck and DNR argue that DNR’s interpretation of
AS 38.05.265(b) should be reviewed under a “reasonable basis” standard because it
required the resolution of policy questions and implicated the agency’s technical
expertise.    Valhalla argues that the superior court’s “substitution of judgment/
independent judgment standard of review” was correct because interpreting
AS 38.05.265(b) “does not implicate DNR’s expertise in any way.” We analyze both
arguments to determine the correct standard of review.
               Teck argues that this case is analogous to Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
State.16     In Alyeska Pipeline a company challenged DNR’s interpretation of
AS 38.35.140(a), which governs the calculation of a lease price.17 We applied the
reasonable basis standard because DNR “has special expertise” and “is charged with
granting the[] leases and adjusting and collecting their rent.”18 Similarly in Marathon

       14
               City of Valdez v. State, 372 P.3d 240, 246 (Alaska 2016).
       15
            Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai
Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987)).
       16
               288 P.3d 736 (Alaska 2012).
       17
               Id. at 737.
       18
               Id. at 740.

                                           -7-                                     7647
Oil Co. v. State, Department of Natural Resources we reasoned that because DNR
manages the state’s resources and collects royalties from gas lessees, the question
whether to allow retroactive application of contract pricing was within DNR’s
expertise.19 We held “that the reasonable basis standard is appropriate when an
agency’s adjudication of a regulated party’s claim ‘requires resolution of policy
questions which lie within the agency’s area of expertise and are inseparable from the
facts underlying the agency’s decision.’ ”20
             DNR also manages mining in Alaska, and questions involving
abandonment and cure of mining claims are within DNR’s expertise. The legislature
delegated the authority to manage natural resources to DNR, and the process of curing
abandonment and determining ownership of mining claims is a component of that
authority.21 DNR has special expertise in granting land use permits, in administering
mining claims, and in collecting payments from holders of mining claims.22
             Valhalla counters that in AU International, Inc. v. State, Department of
Natural Resources we ruled that DNR’s application of AS 38.05.265 is subject to the
substitution of judgment standard of review.23 In AU International a mining claim

      19
             254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2011).
      20
            Id. (quoting Earth Res. Co. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 665 P.2d 960, 964
(Alaska 1983)).
      21
             See AS 44.37.020(a) (“The Department of Natural Resources shall
administer the state program for the conservation and development of natural resources,
including forests, parks, and recreational areas, land, water, agriculture, soil
conservation, and minerals including petroleum and natural gas, but excluding
commercial fisheries, sport fish, game, and fur-bearing animals in their natural state.”).
      22
            See e.g., 11 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 86.107 (2023); 11 AAC
86.110; 11 AAC 86.215.
      23
             971 P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1999).

                                           -8-                                      7647
owner recorded a statement of labor that listed only four of its 1,039 claims. 24 We were
asked to consider whether the owner had abandoned its claims under AS 38.05.265 even
if it had not intended to do so.25 Because the question before us was “a legal question
involving no agency expertise,” we applied the substitution of judgment standard of
review to consider whether the state mining claims at issue were “abandoned by action
of law.”26
             This case does not require statutory interpretation to determine whether
claims have been abandoned by action of law. Instead a determination must be made
about how broadly to apply the right to cure created by statute. That determination
implicates fundamental policies within DNR’s statutory functions. Valhalla asked
DNR to apply AS 38.05.265(b) to determine which of the competing claims prevailed.
That application, in turn, affects the development of land and DNR’s finances, as we
explain further below. Because the question is not a purely legal one, as was the case
in AU International, the reasonable basis standard is the appropriate one to review
DNR’s interpretation of AS 38.05.265(b).27

      24
             Id. at 1036.
      25
             Id. at 1035. AU International focused on a different subsection of
AS 38.05.265; the legislature did not add section .265(b), the subsection at issue here,
to AS 38.05.265 until 2004. See House Bill (H.B.) 344, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (2004).
      26
             Id. at 1037-38.
      27
             See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1990)
(applying reasonable basis standard when case involved policy questions within
agency’s area of expertise).

                                           -9-                                     7647
      B.     DNR’s Interpretation Of AS 38.05.265(b) Is Reasonable.
             When analyzing a statute, we first look to its plain language.28 We
interpret the language using a sliding scale: “the plainer the statutory language is, the
more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be.”29 We
have recognized that “an agency’s interpretation of a law within its area of jurisdiction
can help resolve lingering ambiguity.”30
                    Plain meaning
             In assessing statutory language, “unless words have acquired a peculiar
meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be
construed in accordance with their common usage.”31 “[W]e presume that no words or
provisions are superfluous and that the legislature intended ‘every word, sentence, or
provision of a statute to have some purpose, force, and effect.’ ”32
             Alaska Statute 38.05.265(b) governs the process to cure abandoned
mining claims:
             Unless another person has located a mining claim . . . that
             includes all or part of the mining claim or leasehold location
             abandoned under (a) of this section or the area is closed to
             mineral location . . . a person may cure the failure to record
             or pay rents or royalties that constituted the abandonment
             and cure the abandonment by (1) properly recording a

      28
            Res. Dev. Council for Alaska, Inc. v. Vote Yes for Alaska’s Fair Share,
494 P.3d 541, 546 (Alaska 2021).
      29
             State v. Fyfe, 370 P.3d 1092, 1095 (Alaska 2016).
      30
             Wilson v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 127 P.3d 826, 829 (Alaska 2006) (quoting
Bartley v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Teacher’s Ret. Bd., 110 P.3d 1254, 1261 (Alaska
2005)).
      31
            Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 905
(Alaska 1987).
      32
             Adamson v. Mun. of Anchorage, 333 P.3d 5, 16 (Alaska 2014) (quoting
Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting, 254 P.3d 341, 345 (Alaska 2011)).
                                           -10-                                    7647
              certificate of location or a statement of annual labor, paying
              any required annual rental, and paying any required
              production royalty; and (2) paying a penalty equal to the
              annual rent for the mining claim or leasehold location that
              was abandoned under (a) of this section.

              The specific phrase at issue is the exception to cure: “[u]nless another
person has located a mining claim . . . that includes all or part of the mining claim or
leasehold location abandoned.” DNR interprets the phrase to mean that “miners [have]
the ability to cure an abandoned claim unless there is a subsequent, existing claim ‘that
includes’ (present tense) the miner’s earlier abandoned claim.” DNR argued before the
superior court that “if the intervening locator subsequently relinquishes or abandons the
overlapping claim, or never even perfected or acquired rights to the claim, it is
reasonable to interpret the statute in a manner that permits the original claim owner to
cure, if possible, whatever deficiency led to the abandonment.” DNR’s interpretation
allows “a previous locator to cure its own abandonment so long as the land is not located
by another entity or is not closed to mineral entry at the time of the cure.” DNR argues
that “the prohibition against a prior locator’s cure last[s] only so long as the subsequent
locator’s claim is valid.”
              DNR supports its interpretation by noting that the verb “has located” is in
the present-perfect tense.     Valhalla argues that because “has located” modifies
“includes,” AS 38.05.265 “encompasses both past and present competing claims and
precludes cure in either situation.” The present-perfect tense “denotes an act, state, or
condition that is now completed or continues up to the present.”33 DNR’s interpretation
relies on the second form of a present-perfect tense verb: if a subsequent miner’s
location is not continuous and ceases due to abandonment or relinquishment, there is

       33
              THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE ¶ 5.132 (17th ed. 2017) (emphasis
added).
                                           -11-                                      7647
no longer an impediment to the prior miner’s cure. DNR’s interpretation appears to be
consistent with the plain language of the statute, but because DNR concedes that “has
located” is “both open-ended and undefined,” the plain language of the statute is
ambiguous as to whether a right to cure is permanently extinguished by a subsequent
claim. We therefore turn to the legislative history and purpose.
                    Legislative history and purpose
             Alaska’s ability to autonomously manage its mineral deposits was a
condition of its admission to the Union.34 In 1959 the legislature passed the Alaska
Land Act and delegated the responsibility of managing state-owned land to DNR.35
Alaska’s mining program relies upon a wide variety of regulations, and DNR has
significant decision-making power.36
             The legislature added the cure provision to AS 38.05.265 in 2004.37 Prior
to this amendment mining claims were deemed abandoned for the reasons stated in what

      34
              Alaska Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(a)-(b), 72 Stat. 339, 340
(1958) (granting Alaska authority to select certain public lands then administered by
the federal government for transferal to State ownership).
      35
              See Ch. 169, SLA 1959; AS 44.37.020(a) (granting DNR the specific duty
of administering “the state program for the conservation and development of natural
resources, including . . . land, water, . . . and minerals”).
      36
             See generally AS 38.05.185-.275; see also AS 38.05.020(a), (b) (granting
DNR Commissioner authority to manage mining claims and to “establish reasonable
procedures and adopt reasonable regulations necessary to carry out” this duty).
      37
             See H.B. 344, 23d Leg., 2d Sess. (2004).

                                         -12-                                    7647
is now section .265(a),38 but there was no opportunity for cure.39 Legislators wanted to
create a process to cure abandoned mining claims and establish ownership in the event
of “topfiling.”40 When asked what would happen “if a miner filed late and another
miner ‘staked’ that claim,” the then-Director of DNR’s Mining, Land and Water
Division replied that “[t]he bill could rectify the claim as long as no one had staked
intervening rights. If someone staked in the interim, the language would not cure the
problem.”41 He said that the purpose of the statute was to give the holder of an
abandoned claim the opportunity to cure, as long as the cure did not displace a
subsequent mining claim.42 A discussion during the Senate Resources Committee
illustrates this intent:

       38
              AS 38.05.265(a) (“Failure to . . . timely record a certificate of location or
statement of annual labor, timely pay any required annual rental, or timely pay any
required production royalty . . . constitutes abandonment of all rights acquired under
the mining claim . . . and the claim . . . is subject to relocation by others, unless the
failure constituting the abandonment is cured under (b) of this section.”).
       39
               See former AS 38.05.265 (2000).
       40
               “Topfiling” or “relocation” occurs when the owner of a mining claim does
not file the required AALs by the deadline, pay the required fees, or include accurate
essential facts on the AAL, and another person or entity travels to the site of the claim,
stakes and marks the claim, and then files the necessary paperwork to claim ownership.
See generally Minutes, Sen. Res. Standing Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d
Sess. at 5-6 (Mar. 24, 2004) (statements of Rep. Hugh Fate & Sen. Scott Ogan, Chair,
Sen. Res. Standing Comm.).
       41
             Minutes, H. Fin. Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. at 8
(Mar. 2, 2004) (statement of Bob Loeffler, Director, Dep’t of Nat. Res. Mining, Land
& Water Div.).
       42
             Minutes, H. Res. Standing Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d
Sess. at 20-21 (Feb. 25, 2004) (statement of Bob Loeffler, Director, Dep’t of Nat. Res.
Mining, Land & Water Div.).

                                           -13-                                      7647
             SENATOR ELTON asked if this would allow a miner to
             cure the problem of a late filing up to any period of time as
             long as nobody has filed a top claim or a claim on the claim.

             REPRESENTATIVE FATE said that is correct. [….]

             CHAIR OGAN asked, if a miner decides to abandon a claim
             and another person decides to topfile and then that first miner
             changes his mind, is there a time limit for paying the penalty
             and refiling. He pointed out that HB 344 has no time limit.

             REPRESENTATIVE FATE said the first miner couldn’t get
             his claim back if it had been topfiled by someone else.[43]

             Valhalla argues that “[t]he legislative testimony is consistent that a former
owner’s ability to cure its abandonment of a claim is only available up until the point
another person locates an overlapping claim. Then the ability to cure is extinguished.”
We agree that the legislative history and purpose reflect an intent to prevent a previous
owner from using section .265(b)’s cure provision to displace the rights acquired by
someone who located claims over all or part of the previously abandoned claims.
However we do not interpret the discussions to answer the question posed here:
whether cure is available when intervening rights are subsequently abandoned. When
Teck exercised its statutory right to cure in October 2017, the area was free of any other
claims.
             Valhalla claims that Teck’s cure should also be rejected in part because a
“former miner must return to the site to re-stake and place monuments on any open land
to re-take ownership of the claims.” In section .265(b), the legislature affirmatively
chose not to require curing parties to re-stake and erect new monuments. Instead, the

      43
              Minutes, Sen. Res. Standing Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d
Sess. at 5-6 (Mar. 24, 2004) (statements of Rep. Hugh Fate & Sen. Scott Ogan, Chair,
Sen. Res. Standing Comm.).

                                          -14-                                      7647
legislature chose to allow claim holders to cure their abandonment by recording a
certificate of location or a statement of annual labor and paying a penalty. As the
legislation’s sponsor indicated, the bill was intended to allow miners to keep their
claims “by filing the paperwork and paying a penalty equal to one year[’]s rent.”44
Stakes and monuments are required when initially establishing claims, but once a claim
is properly established by staking, erecting monuments, and recording notice, there is
no requirement to keep the stakes and monuments in place.45 Legal notice to other
potential claimants is provided by recording a certificate of location, not impermanent
physical markers.46 The cured claim is valid despite the absence of the stakes and
monuments that initially established the claim.
             As the Commissioner observed, DNR’s interpretation “allows DNR the
most flexibility in returning the land to developable status and allows DNR to collect
higher annual rents in accordance with the longevity of the claims.”          We have
previously recognized that “the overall purpose of the Alaska Land Act is to maximize
revenue for the state,”47 and DNR’s interpretation of section .265(b) does that. Higher
rents are achieved when mining claim holders are permitted to cure an abandoned claim

      44
             Minutes, H. Fin. Comm. Hearing on H.B. 344, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. at 7
(Mar. 2, 2004) (statement of Rep. Hugh Fate).
      45
            See AS 38.05.195(b)-(c); Dodge v. Wilkinson, 664 P.2d 157, 159-60
(Alaska 1983).
      46
              AS 38.05.195(c) (“Within 45 days after the date of attaching the notice of
location on the monument, the locator shall record a certificate of location . . . .”).
      47
             Marathon Oil Co. v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 254 P.3d 1078, 1085
(Alaska 2011); City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Nat. Gas Storage Alaska, LLC, 373 P.3d
473, 481 (Alaska 2016).

                                         -15-                                     7647
because mining rents increase over time.48 We conclude that DNR’s construction of
the statute is consistent with this purpose.
              Because the statute is ambiguous and does not directly answer whether a
mining claim may be cured after a subsequent claimant has claimed and abandoned the
claim,49 we conclude that DNR’s interpretation is reasonable. We therefore defer to
DNR’s interpretation of AS 38.05.265(b).
       C.     DNR’s Application Of AS 38.05.265(b) Was Reasonable.
              DNR concluded (1) that abandonment occurred in 2008 when Teck failed
to “properly fil[e] affidavits of annual labor that identified TCAI Incorporated as the
owner,” (2) that Teck was not required to meet a two-year deadline because “Alaska
Statute 38.05.265(b) specifically speaks to the ability to cure post-abandonment and
does not place any time limit on the party seeking to cure,” and (3) that Teck’s cure
overrode Valhalla’s interest in the overlapping Smucker claims. We address each of its
determinations in turn.

       48
              “[T]he amount of the annual rental payment is based on the number of
years since a mining claim or leasehold location was first located . . . .” 11 AAC
86.221(b) (2022). Rents for older claims (11 years or more) are approximately five
times higher than rents for new claims. Id. Permitting Teck to cure abandonment
enabled DNR to charge annual rent based on the first location of the Smucker claims in
1994, rather than annual rent for Valhalla’s new claims first located in 2017. This
interpretation also allows DNR to collect rent from 2008-2017, which would not be
allowed without the cure.
       49
              Valhalla cites federal mining law and McGlinchy v. State, Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 354 P.3d 1025, 1029 (Alaska 2015), and asserts that “Alaska generally applies
federal mining law.” But in McGlinchy we noted that “federal mining law applies only
‘[u]nless otherwise provided’ and ‘as supplemented by state law.’ ” Id. at 1035 n.72
(quoting AS 38.05.185(c)). When “the relevant state statute clearly addresses the
subject of abandonment of state claims, we need not construe our statute in accordance
with ‘usages and interpretations’ applicable to the federal mining laws.” AU Int’l, Inc.
v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 971 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Alaska 1999).

                                           -16-                                   7647
                      DNR’s conclusion that Teck abandoned the claims in 2008
                      rather than 2001 was reasonable.
             DNR notes that the AALs recorded in 2001 through 2007 stated the name
of the corporate entity that held the Smucker claims at that time, Teck Cominco
American Inc., but it determined that Teck abandoned its claims in 2008 by “identifying
the wrong corporate entity” as the owner of the Smucker claims. Valhalla argues that
Teck’s interest was abandoned in 2001 by Teck’s failure to record AALs with accurate
essential facts, such as “the name and current mailing address of each owner.”50
             For a company or corporation to own a mining claim, that corporation
must be organized “under the laws of the United States or of any state or territory of the
United States,” and be “qualified to do business in [Alaska].”51                  Alaska
Statute 10.06.738(a) provides that “[a] foreign corporation authorized to transact
business in this state shall obtain an amended certificate of authority if it changes its
corporate name.” 52
             Cominco American Inc. had a valid certificate of authority when it located
the Smucker claims in 1994 and quitclaimed them to CAI Inc., a Washington
corporation, in 1999. CAI Inc. then obtained a certificate of authority to do business in
Alaska, and the Alaska Division of Corporations designated CAI Inc. as Alaska
corporate entity number 67504-F. CAI Inc. changed its name to Cominco American
Inc. in 1999 and then again to Teck Cominco American Inc. in 2001. As of July 2001
Alaska entity number 67504-F — which held the claims from 1999 until their
abandonment in 2008 — was officially Teck American Inc. in Washington but
remained Cominco American Inc. in Alaska. Teck did not report nor did it obtain an
amended certificate of authority from the Alaska Division of Corporations reflecting

      50
             11 AAC 86.220(c)(3) (2021).
      51
             AS 38.05.190(a)(5).
      52
             AS 10.06.738(a).
                                          -17-                                      7647
the corporation’s name change from CAI Inc. to Teck Cominco American Inc. But
from 2001-2007 Teck satisfied AS 38.05.210(c) by filing statements of labor that
reflected the correct current owner (Teck American Inc.) and mailing address.
             A foreign corporation’s failure to amend a certificate of authority under
AS 10.06.738(a) does not constitute an abandonment according to AS 38.05.265(a).53
DNR clarified that “[t]he certificate of authority for Alaska entity #67504F was never
revoked or suspended, and remained a valid certificate, although it did not always
reflect the proper corporate name.” We conclude that DNR’s conclusion that Teck
abandoned the claims in 2008 rather than 2001 was reasonable.
                    DNR’s conclusion that there was no two-year deadline was
                    reasonable.
             DNR concluded that Teck was not required to cure its abandonment of the
Smucker claims within two years under AS 38.05.265(b). But Valhalla argues that
since Teck failed to file statements of labor within two years of the abandonment,
AS 38.05.210(c) prevented Teck from curing under AS 38.05.265(b).54 We conclude
that DNR’s interpretation is supported by the plain language of AS 38.05.265(b).
             At the time of the dispute, AS 38.05.210(c) allowed amendments to
statements of annual labor “within two years of the date by which the annual labor
statement was required to be recorded.”55 But statements that failed to set out the

      53
             See AS 38.05.265(a) (listing conditions that constitute abandonment).
      54
              Owners of mining claims are required to record a signed statement of labor
yearly that can be amended under AS 38.05.210(c). 11 AAC 86.220 (2021).
      55
             Former AS 38.05.210(c) (2019). The statute was amended in 2020 by
Ch. 31, § 8, SLA 2020 (changing time to correct or amend statements of labor to 90
days).

                                         -18-                                      7647
essential facts were void and could not be amended.56 Because Teck filed statements
of labor that identified the wrong corporate owner from 2008-2017, the statements
lacked the requisite essential facts, were void, and could not be amended. Alaska
Statute 38.05.210(c) was not relevant. The only remedy for a void AAL and consequent
abandonment of a claim was the cure provision in section .265(b), which contains no
time limit in its plain language.57
                     DNR’s decision that Teck was the rightful owner of the
                     Smucker claims was reasonable.
              Teck met all of the cure requirements in October 2017, and the Division
recognized Teck’s completion of these requirements in February 2018. When Teck
took the required steps to cure its 2008 abandonment, there were no intervening claims
that included part or all of the abandoned Smucker claims because AERI’s claim was
abandoned by its successor in 2016. Based on its experience managing mining claims
and its interpretation of AS 38.05.265(a), DNR concluded that cure was allowed. When
Valhalla attempted to claim ownership of some of the Smucker claims in December
2017 — two months after Teck’s cure — DNR denied its claim because they were no
longer available after Teck’s cure. DNR’s decision was reasonable.
       CONCLUSION
              We REVERSE the superior court’s decision and AFFIRM DNR’s
decision.

       56
             Former AS 38.05.265(a) (2019) (“A statement of annual labor that does
not accurately set out the essential facts is void and of no effect.”); former 11 AAC
86.220(g) (am. 8/26/98) (“[A]n affidavit that does not set out the essential facts is void
under AS 38.05.265 and may not be amended.”).
       57
              See AS 38.05.265(b) (containing no express time limit in order to cure).
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