Court Opinion

ID: 9710636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:13:50.906234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:58.657250
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Lybrook, J.
Having examined the record of the proceedings below at length, I must respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues. In my opinion, the essential evidence is without conflict and leads but to one reasonable conclusion, that being that Seufert Construction and Supply Co. is responsible to Glick on the theory of quasi-contract.
The undisputed evidence reveals that Patoka Valley Plumbing and Heating Co. was, for reasons not disclosed, experiencing considerable difficulty in its attempt to fulfill its obligations under its contract with Seufert. For that reason, Patoka Valley contacted Glick sometime in January, 1973, and apparently made arrangements for Glick to finish the plumbing work. There is, however, no evidence that an express written contract existed between Patoka Valley and Glick. Moreover, subsequent to the apparent agreement between Patoka Valley and Glick and upon learning that Patoka Valley had completely ceased any and all work on the Hope Convalescent Center, Glick also ceased all work on the plumbing. It was at this time that Glick approached Leinenbach, the general superintendent of Seufert, and in the presence of Chandler, notified Leinenbach that all plumbing work on Glick’s part had ceased “until I find out who is going to pay me . . At this point, Glick was told by Leinenbach to go back to work and that he would see to it that Glick was paid. As appellee points out there is somewhat of a dispute in the evidence as to Leinenbach’s exact statement. There were three persons at this meeting, Glick, Leinenbach and Chandler. Glick’s testimony was:
*361“And so Jim [Leinenbach] told me that, to go to work, and that they [Seufert] would see that I got paid.”
Leinenbach testified that his statement was:
“. . . he [Glick] agreed that he would go ahead and do the work, and I told Mr. Glick that I would try to help him get his money . . .”
Chandler’s testimony concerning the incident was:
“When he [Glick] asked if he would get paid, and who was going to pay him, and I was standing there, and Mr. Leinenbach said ‘we will see that you get paid.’ ”
In my opinion, the only reasonable conclusion that may be drawn from Leinenbach’s statement to Glick, considering the circumstances under which the conversation occurred, is that Leinenbach on behalf of Seufert agreed to pay the reasonable value of Glick’s services in exchange for Glick’s return to work. It is entirely unreasonable to assume that either Glick or Seufert expected that the plumbing work done by Glick was to be done on a gratuitous basis. Clearly from Glick’s action in refusing to continue work after Patoka Valley’s departure, Seufert was put on notice that Glick would be looking to Seufert for payment. By telling Glick to return to work under assurances, of payment, Seufert became bound on a theory of quasi-contract to compensate Glick for the reasonable value of his services.
Additional undisputed evidence which requires the conclusion that a quasi-contractual relationship existed between Glick and Seufert concerns certain materials which were necessary to complete the plumbing work. When approached by Glick concerning these materials, Leinenbach stated:
“. . . buy them, pay for them and send a paid receipt to Seufert Construction Company.”
Moreover, upon completion of the nursing home, Glick in a conversation with Mr. Seufert, inquired as to when he [Glick] could expect payment. Seufert replied “in two weeks.” Additionally upon completion of the nursing home, Glick was *362handed the plumbing “scratch sheet” and requested to correct the defects or deficiencies therein noted. Also, upon completion of the nursing home, Mr. Seufert approached Glick and asked Glick to “take care of his [Seufert’s] yearly guarantee” on the home, explaining that Seufert had furnished the purchaser [Chandler] a one year guarantee.
In light of the above evidence, none of which is conflicting or disputed, there is but one reasonable conclusion, that being that a quasi-contractual relationship existed between Seufert and Glick. The majority rejects the quasi-contract theory on the basis that no unjust enrichment was shown for the reason that Seufert allegedly paid Patoka Valley. However, the record does not disclose that Seufert paid Patoka Valley for the work performed by Glick. Rather, the testimony was that Patoka Valley was paid by Seufert for the work they performed. Moreover, if Seufert made any payments to Patoka Valley after Patoka Valley had left the job site and after Glick had notified Seufert that he would look to Seufert for payment, those payments were improperly paid and cannot be used by Seufert as a bar to Glick’s claim. For that reason the question of unjust enrichment in this case must be determined as between Glick and Seufert alone without regard to the question of whether Seufert paid a third party for the work Glick performed. For these reasons I would hold Seufert liable to Glick on a theory of quasi-contract. A contrary ruling in my opinion cannot be supported on any reasonable basis in light of the uncontradicted evidence.
While it is true that Seufert and Glick made no specific agreement as to the amount of compensation due Glick, the undisputed evidence is that Glick’s statement for $5,528.14 is a fair and reasonable amount for the services rendered. I therefore would reverse the judgment below and remand the case-with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Glick in the amount of $5,528.14.
Note. — Reported at 342 N.E.2d 874.