Court Opinion

ID: 9900352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:28.91759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.636764
License: Public Domain

No. 491            September 20, 2023                207

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

              SCOTT ANTHONY WOODS,
                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
                             v.
                Kimberly HENDRICKS,
                    Superintendent,
            Santiam Correctional Institution,
                 Defendant-Respondent.
              Marion County Circuit Court
                  21CV26750; A178703

  Courtland Geyer, Judge.
  Submitted April 10, 2023.
   Jedediah Peterson and O’Connor Weber, LLC, filed the
brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant
Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  POWERS, J.
  Reversed and remanded.
208   Woods v. Hendricks
Cite as 328 Or App 207 (2023)                                         209

          POWERS, J.
          Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s judgment
granting the superintendent’s motion to dismiss his petition
for habeas corpus relief. He challenges the authority for his
confinement by asserting that he was held past the expiration
date of his term of incarceration due to an improper calcula-
tion by the Department of Corrections (DOC) of his eligibil-
ity for earned-time credit under ORS 421.121. Defendant, the
superintendent of the institution where plaintiff was incarcer-
ated, moved to deny the petition under ORS 34.680(1), assert-
ing that DOC correctly calculated plaintiff’s sentence. The
trial court granted defendant’s motion, and plaintiff appeals.
As explained below, because plaintiff’s sentence was eligible
for earned time, the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s
habeas petition. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
         ORS 34.680(1) provides that a habeas “defendant
may, before the writ issues, move to deny the petition on the
grounds that the petition fails to state a claim for habeas
corpus relief.” We review the denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus under ORS 34.680(1) for legal error. Barrett v.
Williams, 247 Or App 309, 311, 270 P3d 285 (2011), rev den,
352 Or 25 (2012). A motion to deny a habeas corpus petition
under ORS 34.680(1) is analogous to a motion to dismiss
under ORCP 21A(1)(h). Barrett, 247 Or App at 311.1 In our
review of the denial of the habeas petition, we view the alle-
gations and related inferences in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff to determine whether the petition alleges a
legally sufficient claim. Rankin v. Landers, 317 Or App 493,
494, 505 P3d 497 (2022).
         The relevant facts are few and undisputed. Plaintiff
was convicted of first-degree burglary, ORS 164.225 (Count
1); two counts of second-degree robbery, ORS 164.405
(Counts 6 and 7); and attempted second-degree robbery, ORS
161.405(2)(c) (Count 5). Three of plaintiff’s convictions were
subject to statutes that restricted eligibility for any reduc-
tion in the term of incarceration; however, his conviction for
Count 5 was not. Specifically, for Count 1, the court imposed
a 60-month sentence that was subject to ORS 137.635 and
    1
      Barrett refers to former ORCP 21 A(8), which was renumbered as ORCP 21
A(1)(h), effective January 1, 2022.
210                                                     Woods v. Hendricks

not eligible for any reduction in term.2 For Counts 6 and
7, the court imposed a 70-month sentence, concurrent with
Count 1, that was subject to ORS 137.700 and not eligible
for any reduction in term.3 For Count 5, the court imposed
a 60-month sentence that was eligible for reduction. That
is, the judgment specifically provides that plaintiff “may be
considered by the executing or releasing authority for any
form of reduction in sentence, temporary leave from cus-
tody, work release, or program of conditional or supervised
release authorized by law for which [plaintiff] is otherwise
eligible at the time of sentencing.”
        The issue in this case centers around the sentence
for Count 5 and plaintiff’s eligibility to accumulate earned-
time credit during the service of that sentence.4 The sentenc-
ing court split or spliced the 60-month sentence for Count
5 into two parts: a 42-month term served concurrent to
    2
      ORS 137.635 provides, in part:
         “(1) When, in the case of a felony described in subsection (2) of this sec-
    tion, a court sentences a convicted defendant who has previously been con-
    victed of any felony designated in subsection (2) of this section, the sentence
    shall not be an indeterminate sentence to which the defendant otherwise
    would be subject under ORS 137.120, but, unless it imposes a death pen-
    alty under ORS 163.105, the court shall impose a determinate sentence, the
    length of which the court shall determine, to the custody of the Department
    of Corrections. * * * The convicted defendant shall serve the entire sentence
    imposed by the court and shall not, during the service of such a sentence, be
    eligible for parole or any form of temporary leave from custody. The person
    shall not be eligible for any reduction in sentence pursuant to ORS 421.120
    or for any reduction in term of incarceration pursuant to ORS 421.121.
            “(2) Felonies to which subsection (1) of this section applies include and
are limited to:
    “* * * * *
            “(h) Burglary in the first degree, as defined in ORS 164.225.”
    3
      ORS 137.700(2)(a)(S) provides that the mandatory minimum sentence
for second-degree robbery is a 70-month term of incarceration. Further, ORS
137.700(1) provides, in part:
         “The person is not, during the service of the term of imprisonment, eli-
    gible for release on post-prison supervision or any form of temporary leave
    from custody. The person is not eligible for any reduction in, or based on,
    the minimum sentence for any reason whatsoever under ORS 421.121 or any
    other statute.”
    4
      For certain convictions, an incarcerated person may be eligible for “Earned
Time Credits,” which reduce the term of their incarceration. OAR 291-097-
0210(4); see also ORS 421.121 (setting forth the conditions under which an adult
in the custody of the Department of Corrections may be eligible for a reduction in
term).
Cite as 328 Or App 207 (2023)                              211

Count 6 (and also concurrent to a federal sentence), and an
18-month term served consecutive to Count 6. Importantly,
as noted earlier, the judgment for Count 5 provides that
plaintiff is eligible for any reduction in sentence, including
under ORS 421.121. In calculating his total incarceration
term, DOC determined that plaintiff was entitled to receive
earned-time credit during only the second portion of Count
5, viz., DOC calculated earned time for only the 18-month
portion of Count 5 and denied plaintiff earned time during
the concurrent 42-month portion.
         Plaintiff’s habeas corpus petition challenged that
calculation. He argued that Count 5 was eligible for reduc-
tion under ORS 421.121 and that he was entitled to accumu-
late earned-time credit during the entirety of that 60-month
sentence. The superintendent moved to dismiss plaintiff’s
habeas petition, contending that plaintiff had been credited
with the appropriate earned time based on the structure of
his sentence. In the superintendent’s view, because the sen-
tencing court split Count 5 into two parts, with one portion
concurrent and the other consecutive to Count 6 (which was
subject to ORS 137.700 and not eligible for earned time) any
credits earned during the concurrent 42-month term had no
impact on his release date.
         The parties’ different interpretations of how to cal-
culate the appropriate earned-time credit result in a sig-
nificant difference to plaintiff’s total incarceration time.
Under plaintiff’s interpretation, he would be considered
for a 20-percent reduction of the entire 60-month sentence,
reducing his sentence on Count 5 by 12 months. Whereas,
under the superintendent’s interpretation, plaintiff
would be considered for a 20-percent reduction of only the
18-month term, reducing his sentence by about 3.5 months.
Ultimately, the trial court agreed with the superintendent’s
position, concluding that DOC had appropriately calculated
plaintiff’s sentence such that he was entitled to earned time
during only the consecutive 18-month portion of Count 5.
Accordingly, the court granted the superintendent’s motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
         Plaintiff appeals, assigning error to the court’s deci-
sion to grant the motion to dismiss. On appeal, he argues
212                                          Woods v. Hendricks

that our decision in Samson v. Brown, 310 Or App 319, 486
P3d 59 (2021), and a plain reading of the term-reduction
statute, ORS 421.121, entitles him to earned time for the
entire term of Count 5. Thus, because our task involves
interpreting the applicable sentencing statutes, we turn to
the familiar framework to do so. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or
160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (explaining that we exam-
ine the text, context, and any pertinent legislative history
to discern the legislature’s intended meaning). We begin our
analysis with ORS 421.121, which provides, in part:
                 “(1) Except as provided in ORS 137.635,
   137.700, 137.707, 163.105, 163.107 and 163.115, each adult
   in custody sentenced to the custody of the Department of
   Corrections for felonies committed on or after November 1,
   1989, is eligible for a reduction in the term of incarceration
   for:
               “(a) Appropriate institutional behavior, as
   defined by rule of the Department of Corrections; and
              “(b) Participation in the adult basic skills
   development program described in ORS 421.084.”
          The sentencing judgment for Count 5 did not make
plaintiff’s sentence subject to any of the exceptions in ORS
421.121(1). Thus, under the terms of ORS 421.121(1), his sen-
tence for Count 5 “is eligible for a reduction in the term of
incarceration.” The superintendent’s view would impose an
additional restriction not listed in the text of the statute,
viz., it would require that eligibility for earned time further
depend upon whether the sentence was run concurrent with
an ineligible sentence. That approach runs contrary to the
framework for statutory interpretation. See ORS 174.010
(providing that the court’s role in statutory interpretation
“is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in
substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”); see also State v.
Baca, 325 Or App 503, 508-09, 529 P3d 242 (2023) (applying
ORS 174.010 and noting that, although the state’s interpre-
tation was logical, it required us to add words to the statute
that did not exist).
       Moreover, nothing in the statute’s text or context
persuades us that the legislature intended eligibility for
Cite as 328 Or App 207 (2023)                                                     213

earned time to depend on the nature of any concurrent
sentence. That is, we are not persuaded that eligibility for
earned-time credit under ORS 421.121 is driven by whether
a trial court structures the sentence to run consecutive or
concurrent to a non-eligible sentence.5 When the trial court
made Count 5 eligible for earned-time credits, it did not limit
that eligibility to only the portion of time that was consec-
utive to an ineligible sentence. Thus, because the sentence
for Count 5 is not subject to one of the exceptions listed in
ORS 421.121(1), if plaintiff meets the requirements of ORS
421.121(1)(a) and (b), the entire sentence for Count 5 is eligi-
ble for earned-time credits.
         The superintendent also argues that, despite its eli-
gibility under ORS 421.121, the sentence for Count 5 is inel-
igible under ORS 137.700. That statute provides, in part:
        “Notwithstanding ORS 161.605, when a person is con-
    victed of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(a) of this
    section and the offense was committed on or after April 1,
    1995, or of one of the offenses listed in subsection (2)(b)
    of this section and the offense was committed on or after
    October 4, 1997, or of the offense described in subsection
    (2)(c) of this section and the offense was committed on or
    after January 1, 2008, the court shall impose, and the per-
    son shall serve, at least the entire term of imprisonment
    listed in subsection (2) of this section. The person is not,
    during the service of the term of imprisonment, eligible for
    release on post-prison supervision or any form of tempo-
    rary leave from custody. The person is not eligible for any
    reduction in, or based on, the minimum sentence for any
    reason whatsoever under ORS 421.121 or any other stat-
    ute. The court may impose a greater sentence if otherwise

     5
       Implicit in the superintendent’s argument appears to be the assumption
that the trial court is authorized to split or splice earned-time eligibility just as it
can order only a portion of a sentence to be served concurrently or consecutively
to another sentence. Compare ORS 137.750 (requiring a sentencing court to order
that a defendant may be considered for release, leave, and certain sentencing
programs for which the defendant is otherwise eligible unless the court makes
a finding on the record that substantial and compelling reasons exist that war-
rant a contrary result) with ORS 137.123 (providing that a “sentence imposed by
the court may be made concurrent or consecutive to any other sentence which
has been previously imposed or is simultaneously imposed upon the same defen-
dant”). Because we understand the sentencing judgment in this case to have
made Count 5 eligible for earned time for the entire sentence, we do not address
the underlying premise of the superintendent’s argument.
214                                        Woods v. Hendricks

   permitted by law, but may not impose a lower sentence than
   the sentence specified in subsection (2) of this section.”
ORS 137.700(1).
         Because second-degree robbery (Count 6) is one of the
felonies described in subsection (2) of ORS 137.700(2)(a)(S),
the superintendent asserts that the limitations of that stat-
ute apply with equal force to the concurrent portion of the
sentence for Count 5. In the superintendent’s view, ORS
137.700 imposes restrictions from eligibility for earned time
on the person, rather than the sentence, and because Count
5 must be served concurrent to Count 6, plaintiff is ineli-
gible to accumulate any earned-time credit until the ORS
137.700 sentence is completed.
          As plaintiff argues, and the superintendent recog-
nizes, those same arguments were made in Samson about
ORS 137.635. 310 Or App at 321-22. In that case, after con-
ducting an analysis of ORS 137.635, we concluded that,
although that statute precludes the possibility of a person
receiving any kind of reduction in term of incarceration for
the sentence that is subject to that statute, it had no effect on
a concurrent sentence that is not subject to that statute. Id.
at 325-26. That is, when a person is serving two sentences
simultaneously, “one of which is subject to ORS 137.635 and
one of which is not, then the earned-time prohibition in ORS
137.635 applies at all times to the sentence that is subject
to ORS 137.635, but it never applies to the sentence that is
not subject to ORS 137.635.” Id. at 327-28. That same logic
applies here. Although we recognize that ORS 137.635 and
ORS 137.700 are not identical, we are not persuaded that
any distinction between the two statutes leads to a different
conclusion in this case than that of Samson. Both statutes
prohibit eligibility for term reductions on sentences that are
subject to them; however, neither operates to prohibit eli-
gibility for sentences that are not subject to them. Indeed,
ORS 137.700 provides that a person is not eligible for any
reduction in, or based on, “the minimum sentence,” which
is different from making a person ineligible because the
sentence is served simultaneously or consecutively to a sen-
tence that is ineligible.
Cite as 328 Or App 207 (2023)                           215

         Accordingly, because we conclude that the sentenc-
ing judgment for Count 5 provides that plaintiff is eligible
for earned-time credit under ORS 421.121 for the entire
sentence for that count, the trial court erred in dismissing
plaintiff’s habeas petition.
        Reversed and remanded.