Court Opinion

ID: 9870963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 20:13:08.081995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:44.890828
License: Public Domain

Kapsner, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent from Part C of the majority opinion.
[¶28] Section 25-03.3-18, N.D.C.C., subsection 4, provides: “At any healing held pursuant to a petition for discharge, the burden of proof is on the state to show by clear and convincing evidence that the committed individual remains a sexually dangerous individual.” The statute requires- evidence that at the time of the hearing the individual is currently dangerous, not that the individual has been dangerous-in the past. In addition, the district court must make findings which support the conclusion that the individual is currently dangerous. Matter of R.A.S., 2008 ND 185, ¶¶ 8-9, 756 N.W.2d 771.
[¶ 29] In this order, the district court acknowledged adopting a great deal of language from a prior order of the court dated January 29, 2014. This is not sufficient to comply with the statutory language which requires the court to determine whether Voisine “remains” a sexually dangerous individual, not review whether he was in the past. In what the district court described as “Prong IV: Can Mr. Voisine Control His Behavior?” the district court relied specifically on prior findings by another judge at an earlier hearing. And on this issue, the district court stated, “Finally, the Court finds that Mr. Voisine has not made any progress in his treatment and that he has not demonstrated that he would be able or willing to control his behavior if he were to be released into the community. The Court, finds that the State has met the burden of proof on Prong IV as well.”
[¶ 30] The district court rather ambiguously seems to place the burden on the *789committed individual to show that he has changed from the evidence heard at that last hearing. The statute places, the burden on the State to establish current dangerousness. Because the court has not articulated findings that comply with the statute or with Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002), I would reverse and remand for findings. Matter of Johnson, 2015 ND 71, ¶ 9, 861 N.W.2d 484. Therefore, I dissent.
[¶ 31] Carol Ronning Kapsner