Court Opinion

ID: 9599118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:14:30.169502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:44.029655
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully with the majority. It is acceptable under the Fourth Amendment for the police to stop persons and detain them briefly in order to investigate a “reasonable suspicion” that the persons have engaged or are about to engage in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). “Reasonable suspicion” is determined from the totality of the circumstances based upon some minimal objective justification for the stop. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 (109 SC 1581, 104 LE2d 1) (1989). The Terry rationale applies to allow the police to conduct an investigatory stop of a car. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (105 SC 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985). Thereafter, under Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032 (103 SC 3469, 77 LE2d 1201) (1983), “the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 1051.
The information provided to Officer Byers from the victim’s husband that his wife had been kidnapped by the appellant; that appellant was known to carry a gun; that the victim had been gone for almost 12 hours; and that the husband had received a recent telephone call from the victim wherein she related that appellant had threatened to harm her, provided sufficient articulable, objective criteria to justify both the stop of appellant’s car in order to find out what was going on and an area search of the passenger compartment of the car for the officer’s safety prior to questioning.
It is irrelevant that the officer did not follow the alleged kidnap victim into the house and obtain more information before detaining appellant, when the information that he had was sufficient to warrant the stop. Since the evidence showed that appellant was driving away, the detention was necessary immediately in order to ascertain the situation.
It is also irrelevant that appellant was secured in the back of the police vehicle when the passenger compartment was being searched. Although Michigan v. Long speaks to an. officer’s belief that a suspect “may gain immediate control of weapons,” id. at 1049, the use of the term “immediate control” must not be taken out of the context of the opinion. The Supreme Court specifically held in Michigan v. Long, “The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it was not *844reasonable for the officers to fear that Long could injure them, because he was effectively under their control during the investigative stop and could not get access to any weapons that might have been located in the automobile. This reasoning is mistaken[.] . . . During any investigative detention, the suspect is ‘in the control’ of the officers in the sense that he may be briefly detained against his will[,] . . . [but] if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 1051-1052. Clearly, the term “immediate control” encompasses a situation wherein a suspect is released after detention and has the potential immediately thereafter to obtain control of a weapon by returning to the vehicle. “[A] Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation ‘at close range,’ when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a ‘quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger. In such circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt alternate means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter.” (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis omitted and supplied.) Id. at 1052.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Birdsong, and Judge Smith join in this special concurrence.