Court Opinion

ID: 9742603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:16:42.330412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:43.917225
License: Public Domain

DARDEN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I would respectfully disagree with the majority's interpretation of the statute. I believe that without bifurcation, the statute is unconstitutional as applied in this case. Because the accused is clothed with a presumption of innocence, it is antithetical to our system of jurisprudence to label one accused of a crime as a "serious violent felon"9 during proceedings to determine guilt. By labeling the accused a "serious violent felon"" from the outset and for the duration of the proceedings, it is a likelihood-almost a certainty-that the jury will lose sight of the statute's foundational elements: whether the accused knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm. See Ind.Code § 85-47-4-5.
The statute, as construed by the majority, lessens the State's burden at trial by labeling the accused a "serious violent felon," thereby vitiating the presumption of innocence. By labeling Spearman from the outset, the jury was invited to engage *551in forbidden inferences that Spearman was not credible and had a propensity to commit crimes, in particular serious violent crimes. A statute that strips an accused of the presumption of innocence is unconstitutional. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 8398-99, 113 S.Ct. 858, 122 LEd.2d 208 (1998) (constitutional provisions for, inter alia, right to confront witnesses, right to compulsory process, right to effective assistance of counsel, right to jury trial, and requirement that prosecution prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt all in place to "make it more difficult for the State to rebut and finally overturn the presumption of innocence which attaches to every eriminal defendant.").
That the legislature could not intend such a result is obvious to me. "[Where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 1911, 146 LEd.2d 902 (2000) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Deloware & Hudson Co., 218 U.S. 866, 29 S.Ct. 527, 58 L.Ed. 836 (1909)). Through bifurcation we can avoid the grave constitution, al questions that arise under the statute. As .C. § 85-47-4-5 was applied to Spear-man, he lost the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 898, 118 S.Ct. 853 (person first charged with a crime entitled to presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
In my view, evidence of the predicate elements must be presented to the jury before it is informed of the accused's status as a serious violent felon. If the jury determines that the evidence is sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm,10 then, as in the case of habitual offender enhancement, the jury would be informed of the second portion of the proceedings. In that manner, the accused's right to the presumption of innocence will not be trammeled by references to 'a previous serious violent felony conviction, as occurred here.
The majority reasons that possessing a firearm would not be a crime absent the "serious violent felon" element. However, it is also true that absent the predicate elements of knowingly or intentionally possessing a firearm, it is not a separate offense to be a "serious violent felon." The majority's decision alters the focus of our system of justice. The majority focuses on the State's right to present, and the jury's right to hear, evidence as to all elements. One need not look beyond the Indiana Rules of Evidence to observe the firmly entrenched proposition that many forms of evidence are withheld from a jury's consideration simply because the evidence is too prejudicial or irrelevant to the ultimate issue. The constitutional rights of the accused are paramount in proceedings to determine guilt.
While it is true that as to the "serious violent felon" status would be necessary to prove the crime, there is no reasonable justification for tainting the entire proceedings with references to and evidence of that element prior to a determination on the predicate elements. To do so robs the accused of the presumption of innocence and, contrary to our system of justice, impermissibly shifts the burden to the accused to present evidence to overcome the label.
*552Spearman's contention with regard to bifurcation rests, in part, upon Ind. Trial Rule 42. Subsections (B) and (C) of the rule are particularly relevant:
(B) Separate trials. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury.
(C) Submission to Jury in Stages. The Court upon its own motion or the motion of any party for good cause shown may allow the case to be tried and submitted to the jury in stages or segments including, but not limited to, bifurcation of claims or issues of compensatory and punitive damages.
TR. 42. To avoid damage to the presumption of innocence, the jury should not have been exposed to information that Spear-man was a convicted serious violent felon before it deliberated on the predicate elements of knowingly or intentionally possessing a firearm. Thus, Spearman demonstrated good cause for bifurcation.
In the context of explaining the rationale for the bifurcation requirement when a defendant is charged as an habitual offender, our supreme court stated:
Evidence of prior convictions "is generally inadmissible in a criminal case, because it has no tendency to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused but, if effective at all, could serve only to prejudice or mislead or excite the minds and inflame the passions of the jury." In Lawrence [v. State, 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 8830 (1972)] we concluded that any state interest in having the prior conviction evidence heard in the same phase as evidence of the felony is outweighed by the injustice to a defendant from a jury determining his guilt or innocence with knowledge of his prior conviction.
In Shepler [v. State, 274 Ind. 8381, 412 N.E.2d 62, 69 (1980) ], we explained the rationale underlying the bifurcation requirement: "The purpose of ... bifurcated proceeding[s] is to prevent the jury from being tainted by knowledge of the defendant's prior felony convictions, in determining his guilt or innocence of the charge before them." By separating the consideration of prior convictions from the jury's initial guilt/innocence determination, the defendant is provided a fair and impartial jury to determine his guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge.
Shelton v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (Ind.1992) (some citations omitted). The court explained that the rationale has been extended beyond habitual offender statutes and applied to statutes that require charge elevation based upon a prior con-viection. Id. at 1019-20.
The rationale should apply with equal force to crimes wherein a prior conviction is an element of the offense. The serious violent felon statute is rife with the potential for jurors to focus on the defendant's status as someone who has committed other crimes. Endemic in the statute, and specifically as applied in this case, is the fact that the defendant already has been convicted of at least one other crime, that the crime was a felony, and that the crime was both serious and violent.
In Spearman's case, the jury was told numerous times throughout the proceedings that he previously had been convicted of a serious violent felony. The record discloses that information with regard to the previous conviction permeated the proceedings from the charging information and preliminary instructions to final instructions.11 Cf. Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 286-87 (Ind.1997) (determin*553ing that defendant did not receive a fair trial when extensive inadmissible evidence of a prior crime was presented to the jury); but see Leach v. State, 699 N.E.2d 641, 648 (Ind.1998) (determining that reference to habitual offender charge during voir dire was improper and prejudicial; but evidence of guilt was overwhelming so reference did not deny defendant a fair trial).12
It is inconceivable that under the circumstances of this case the jury was able to keep discrete the knowledge of Spear-man's prior conviction for a serious violent felony from its determination of whether he possessed a firearm. Conflicting evidence was presented as to Spearman's knowledge and possession of the gun, as well as his ability to control the gun found in the trunk of a car he did not own. CJ Sanders v. State, 724 N.E.2d 1127, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (because credibility of witnesses was only issue, attempt to bolster State's witnesses by portraying prosecutor as pursuer of justice was impermissible). Absent bifurcation, the accused is doubly damaged. By bombarding the jury with information that Spearman was a convicted serious violent felon, the jury was invited to engage in forbidden inferences that Spearman was not credible and had a propensity to commit serious violent crimes, thereby denying Spearman any real ability to present a defense, and lessening the State's burden to present evidence beyond a reasonable doubt on the current offense.
Additionally, absent bifurcation, a defendant may be forced to choose to forgo the right to a jury trial in an effort to minimize the damage to the presumption of innocence incurred by informing a jury of prior convictions for serious violent felonies. See People v. District Court, Denver, 953 P.2d 184 (Colo.1998) (holding prosecution's unqualified right to oppose jury waiver abrogated where defendant sought waiver of jury trial so that his prior convictions for felony menacing and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon would not be presented to jury).
The majority suggests ways to lessen the impact of the evidence of a prior conviction for a serious violent felony. I believe that in order to preserve the accused's presumption of innocence and ability to present a defense, bifurcation is the answer. Even if precautions are taken to lessen the impact of the evidence, any evidence of a previous conviction that does not bear upon the accused's guilt in the new proceeding is unnecessary and may taint the proceeding.
As noted by the majority, the tactical considerations for presentation of evidence of prior convictions were explored in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174, 117 S.Ct. 644, 186 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). There, the Court concluded that a district court abused its discretion by rejecting the defendant's offer to stipulate as to the matter of a prior conviction "when the name or nature of the prior offense raises the risk of a verdict tainted by improper considerations, and when the purpose of the evidence is solely to prove the element of prior conviction." Id. Relying upon Old Chief, this court in Sams v. State, 688 *554N.E.2d 1323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), and in Herrera v. State, 710 N.E.2d 981, 986 (Ind. Ct.App.1999), explored the same considerations. In Herrera, we stated:
._ It is generally true that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice, and a criminal defendant may not stipulate his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case to be presented against him. Sams [v. State, 688 N.E.2d at 1325] (based on Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 186 L Ed.2d 574). However, this general rule has virtually no applicability where the point at issue is a defendant's legal status independent of the criminal conduct charged. Sams, 688 N.E.2d at 1325. Thus, when a defendant objects to the admission of evidence of the collateral misconduct which resulted in the legal status and offers to concede the legal status at issue, the risk of unfair prejudice flowing from the admission of the uncharged misconduct will necessarily outweigh its probative value. Id. at 1326. The Old Chief court held that, where defendant had offered to concede his status as a felon in a prosecution for being a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial court abused its discretion under Evid. R. 408 by permitting the prosecution to introduce the full record of Old Chief's prior felony conviction. 519 U.S. at 190-94, 117 S.Ct. at 655-56. Similarly, in Sams, we held that, where defendant offered to stipulate that his operator's license had been suspended for life in a prosecution for driving while suspended for life, the trial court abused its discretion under Evid.R. 403 by permitting the State to introduce defendant's entire driving record. 688 N.E.2d at 1325-26.
Herrera, 710 N.E.2d at 9836.
Although Spearman stipulated to the evidence of his prior conviction for a serious violent felony, any tactical advantage was obliterated by the repetitive and pervasive use of the label "serious violent felon" throughout the proceedings. Under the cireumstances, he was denied the ability to present a defense or maintain his innocence. Cf. Lloyd v. State, 448 N.E.2d 1062, 1068 (Ind.1983) (introduction of evidence, even if error, was harmless in that it did not constrict his counsel in his choice of defense tactics). The conundrum can be avoided through bifurcation.
In short, bifurcation is practical and should be required when a defendant is charged with knowingly or intentionally possessing a firearm as a serious violent felon, even though the previous conviction for a serious violent felony is an element of the charge. I acknowledge that in the federal setting, bifurcation has been rejected in the context of the federal statute proscribing possession of a firearm by a felon.13 See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1993) (bifurcation of possession of firearm and the evidence of prior convictions not allowed when prior convictions constitute element of offense), opinion modified on denial of reh'g 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir.1994); but see United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1994), appeal after remand, 98 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (limiting decision in Umited States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24 (1st Cir.1989), the Tavares court noted that it is generally inappropriate to give information beyond the existence of a previous conviction even though the conviction is an element of the new offense). However, Indiana is free to provide protections under Indiana's Constitution in addition to those prescribed by the federal constitution. See Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 832, 48-50 (Ind.1999) (Indiana Constitution provides double jeopardy protections in addition to those under United States Constitution).
Although the evidence here was conflicting, the State presented testimony that Spearman brandished a gun and placed *555the gun in the trunk of the car. Accordingly, double jeopardy principles would not be offended by a retrial of Spearman for the instant offense. I would reverse Spearman's conviction and order a new trial,14

. The majority acknowledges the potential for prejudice and urges that trial courts exercise discretion by crafting instructions that refer to the prior felony conviction as one listed within the statute; however, that was not done in the present case. Repeatedly exposing the jury to information and evidence of the prior conviction denied Spearman the presumption of innocence.

. In Hatchett v. State, 740 N.E.2d 920 (Ind. Ct.App.2000), the court noted that the prohibition against carrying a handgun is more specific than a prohibition for possession of a firearm. The Hatchett court explained that handgun and firearm are not coterminous. We note that the instruction Spearman tendered with his argument for bifurcation was patterned after the statute proscribing carrying a handgun, Ind.Code § 35-47-2-1. The carrying a handgun statute lists excepted cir-cumsiances that would be inapplicable to the unlawful possession of a firearm component of the present charge. However, the instruction can be transformed to require the jury to deliberate on the unlawful possession compo-neni before it is informed of the serious violent felony conviction.

. The record of proceedings does not contain voir dire; thus, we cannot determine whether the jury was informed of the previous conviction even before being impaneled.

. Citing Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at 233-34, the court in Leach stated that the defendant's "prior habitual criminal history should not have been referenced unless directly relevant to an issue in the guilt phase of the case." Leach, 699 N.E.2d at 643. In Thompson, the evidence of the other crime was relevant but inadmissible under the trial rules. There is no issue here that Spearman's criminal confinement conviction would have been otherwise relevant or admissible in the guilt phase of a trial for unlawful possession of a firearm. Furthermore, Spearman presented a plausible defense in that he denied possession of the gun. The gun was discovered in a car driven to the scene by Spearman's friend. Spear-man did not own the car in which the gun was discovered. Spearman's guilt became an issue of credibility for the jurors to determine. The State was necessarily relieved of much of its burden to produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that Spearman knowingly or intentionally possessed a firearm by the information that Spearman already had been convicted as a serious violent felon.

. As noted, our statute refers to the prior conviction as "serious" and "violent." The additional emphasis on the accused's prior bad behavior provides a more compelling reason to bifurcate the proceeding.

. I also note that the deputy prosecutor's closing argument mentioned that Spearman did not present as a witness the owner of the car in which the gun was found. The deputy prosecutor suggested that the owner could have bolstered Spearman's contention that the gun did not belong to him, and that he did not know of its presence in the borrowed car. It is error to suggest that a defendant has a burden to present evidence in his defense. See Wright v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1098, 1112 (Ind.1997) (holding defendant was not placed in position of grave peril based upon de min-imis nature of impropriety, weight of evidence of guilt, and instructions on presumption of innocence). I believe this error contributes to the denial of Spearman's presumption of innocence.