Court Opinion

ID: 9941795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 22:02:00.1988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:03.067720
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24 P. v. Redden CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,                                                 B328856

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                          Los Angeles County
                                                            Super. Ct. No. VA150716
         v.

AUSTIN HUNTER REDDEN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lee W. Tsao, Judge. Affirmed; remanded
with instructions.

      Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Jonathan M. Krauss,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       Austin Hunter Redden drove under the influence of
nitrous oxide and crashed his SUV. One of his passengers was
killed and the other two were seriously injured. Charged with
murder and driving under the influence causing injury with
a prior, Redden entered into a plea agreement with the People.
Redden then retained a new attorney and moved to withdraw
his plea. The trial court denied the motion. We find no abuse
of discretion and therefore affirm Redden’s conviction. We
remand for the trial court to address one error in sentencing
and to correct the abstract of judgment.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.     Redden runs a red light, loses control of his Chevrolet
       Suburban SUV, and rolls it1
       On the morning of May 13, 2019, Diego Castillo was
hanging out with his best friend Jacob Scianni, smoking
marijuana. Redden came and picked them up in his Chevy
Suburban. Redden’s girlfriend Andrea Sandoval was with him.
She was in the front passenger seat, Castillo sat in the left rear
passenger seat, and Scianni sat in the right rear passenger seat.
       Castillo saw a tank of nitrous oxide—also known as “noz”—
in the third row seat of the Suburban. The plan was “[j]ust to
go eat and hang out.” While they were driving, Castillo heard
a “loud” noise coming from the noz tank, “like air getting out.”
He heard the sound “[p]robably like three or four times.” Castillo
wasn’t paying that much attention; he was on his phone “paying
attention to the bluetooth.”
       Five or ten minutes after he heard the sounds, Castillo
“felt the car jolt and ride up on the center divider.” The

1     As the parties resolved the case before trial, we take our
statement of facts from the testimony at Redden’s preliminary
hearing.

                                 2
Suburban “start[ed] to go from all the way to the left-hand side to
the right-hand side.” Castillo shut his eyes and “everything went
in slow motion.” He “woke up after.” Someone “pulled [him] out
from the car.” At the preliminary hearing, Castillo testified he
was “suffering from . . . memory loss problems” so he “[didn’t]
remember anything.”
       On that afternoon of May 13, Hugo Ramirez Gonzalez was
driving eastbound on Rosecrans in Norwalk. He was stopped at
a red light at Pioneer. Ramirez Gonzalez saw a black Suburban
accelerate through the intersection and then run a red light.
The driver of the Suburban lost control. It hit the center median
and then hit a tow truck. The Suburban flipped over.
       Deputy Trevor Ctibor arrived at the scene. Ctibor saw
a Chevrolet Suburban “turned upside down in eastbound lanes
facing westbound.” A man—later identified as Castillo—was
sitting on the curb. A woman—presumably Sandoval—was lying
on the sidewalk on Rosecrans, unconscious but breathing. A man
later identified as Redden was “pacing.” “[H]is eyes were red
and glossy [sic].”2 “His speech pattern was a little slow.”
His responses to Ctibor’s questions seemed delayed.
       Inside the Suburban Ctibor found “a canister resembling
nitrous oxide” and “balloons scattered about.” Video from a
nearby business showed the black Suburban going eastbound
at “what appear[ed] to be a high rate of speed.” It “went up on
the center divider” “and lost control,” going “across the eastbound
lanes.” No brake lights appeared. In the opinion of the
investigating officer, the driver “[a]ppeared to have no control
of the vehicle.”

2     It’s likely the deputy meant “glassy.”

                                 3
       Anaheim police officer Matt Ellis, a drug recognition
expert, was asked to go to the hospital on May 13, 2019. He
arrived around 6:20 p.m. Redden was lying in a hospital bed
and appeared to be sleeping. Officers woke him up “easily.”
Ellis gave Redden a breath alcohol test that “came back zero
or no alcohol.”
       According to Ellis, “[r]ecreational[ ]” users of nitrous oxide
typically ingest it by inhaling it out of a balloon or “directly into
the mouth” from a pressurized canister. Nitrous oxide can cause
a person to be “drowsy”; if the person is “in an excited state, it
can cause [him] to have time and distance perception problems.”
It can cause “euphoria.” It also “ultimately [can] lead to
unconsciousness and death.”
       A person under the influence of nitrous oxide may be
“unconscious,” “almost unable to care for themselves.” “They
may be barely able to stand up or sit up without falling over.”
Nitrous oxide can cause body numbness, lack of coordination,
blurred vision, confusion, dizziness, and lightheadedness.
It’s “very short lasting.”
       When Ellis examined Redden’s eyes, he “saw horizontal
gaze nystagmus maximum deviation”3 and “lack of smooth
pursuit as his eyes traveled across the horizontal [plane].” Ellis
also saw “lack of convergence.”4 Horizontal gaze nystagmus
and lack of convergence can be caused by certain depressants,
“dissociative anesthetics,” and inhalants. Lack of convergence

3     Horizontal gaze nystagmus is an “involuntary jerking of the
eyes as they travel across the horizontal [plane].”
4     Lack of convergence is “[w]hen the eyes are unable to . . .
change their focus from far to close. And as the eyes try to cross,
one or both eyes will come from the point of convergence in the
middle back out.”

                                  4
also can be caused by these “drug categories” as well as by
cannabis. Ellis noticed Redden’s eyes were red and watery.
      Redden told Ellis he had used nitrous oxide in the past
and that day he had inhaled four balloons before the collision.
In Ellis’s opinion, Redden “displayed symptomology of being
under the influence of a central nervous system depressant
and cannabis.”
      Scianni died “as a result of the injuries he sustained during
the collision.” Sandoval suffered two neck fractures and a broken
arm. She had “bleeding in the brain and brain injury.” She was
unconscious for three days and “they put staples in [her] head.”
She has “a big scar” and still feels numbness, “like tingling,” in
her hand and arm. Sandoval testified she also had “a little bit
of a memory problem.”
      Castillo’s “whole eyelid” of his left eye was “cut open” and
he had 24 stitches on it. He had “a severe concussion” and was in
a neck brace for about 10 weeks. Castillo’s neck was “shattered”
and he was unable to go back to work.
2.    The charges and plea agreement
      The People charged Redden with the murder of Scianni
(count 1) and with driving under the influence (DUI) of a drug
causing injury within 10 years of another DUI offense (count 2).
The People alleged Redden personally inflicted great bodily
injury on Castillo and Sandoval under Penal Code section
12022.7, subdivisions (a) and (b), respectively. The People also
alleged Redden had caused death or bodily injury to more than
one victim and thus was subject to additional punishment under
Vehicle Code section 23558. Finally, the People alleged Redden
had suffered a prior DUI conviction in March 2017.
      Redden was arraigned on November 7, 2019. He was
represented by private counsel, Carlo A. Spiga. The case was
continued a number of times over the next two years, due in part

                                 5
to the pandemic. On January 27, 2022, counsel advised the court
the parties had reached a plea disposition. Spiga told the court,
“The defendant is going to be entering a plea today to count 1
and count 2. The sentence on count 1 that is being recommended
by the D.A.’s office is the 15 to life. The count 2 sentence that’s
being recommended is eight years to run concurrent. That’s
the term of this deal.”
       Counsel continued, “That eight years is broken down
as follows: He will be pleading to Vehicle Code section 23153(f)
for a total of three years; he will be admitting the bodily injury
enhancement that’s also alleged under that count as Penal Code
section 12022.7(b) for an additional five years, that eight years
to run concurrent to count 1. [¶] He will be admitting his prior
conviction under Vehicle Code section 23560 . . . .”
       The court stated, “So that’s a total term of 15 years to life.
And you’ll calculate credits, Mr. Spiga?” Spiga replied he’d
already calculated them. The court asked Redden, “Mr. Redden,
is that your understanding of the agreement?” Redden answered,
“Yes, Your Honor.”
       The court then explained to Redden the charges and
allegations. The court stated both of the counts to which Redden
was pleading were strikes. Redden had initialed and signed
a Tahl waiver form.5 Handwritten entries on the form stated
Redden would be pleading to second degree murder with a
term of “15–L” and a violation of Vehicle Code section 23153,
subdivision (f), with an enhancement of five years under Penal
Code section 12022.7, subdivision (b).6 Redden confirmed he

5     In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
6     Handwritten on the form under “aggregate term of
imprisonment” is “23–L.” Had a jury convicted Redden of both

                                 6
understood the charges against him. The court asked, “Did you
read and understand everything on the form with the assistance
of your lawyer Mr. Spiga?” Redden replied, “Yes, Your Honor.”
       The court then detailed all the rights Redden had that he’d
be giving up by entering his pleas as well as the consequences
of those pleas. Redden confirmed he understood those rights
and consequences. The court asked, “Have you had enough time
with Mr. Spiga to discuss this case and the terms of the offer?”
Redden replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” The court asked Redden,
“Do you have any questions before I take your pleas?” Redden
answered, “No, Your Honor.”
       Redden then pled guilty to the charges and admitted
the great bodily injury and prior conviction allegations. The
court found Redden had knowingly and intelligently given up
his rights, he had freely and voluntarily entered his plea and
admitted the enhancements, and there was a factual basis for
the plea. Spiga asked to put over sentencing until early March
so he could prepare “Franklin materials.”7
3.     Redden’s motion to withdraw his plea, the evidentiary
       hearing, and the court’s ruling
       On March 3, 2022, Redden appeared before the court.
Spiga was present as well. The prosecutor told the court she’d

counts and found the allegations true—or had Redden pleaded
to the information as filed—his maximum exposure would
have been 24 years to life: 15 years to life for the second degree
murder, the upper term of three years for the DUI causing injury
with a prior, plus five years for the infliction of great bodily
injury on Sandoval, plus one year for the multiple victim
enhancement.
7     See People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. Redden was
21 years old when he committed the crimes.

                                7
been “notified by a new attorney” for Redden that he wished
to substitute in. Because Scianni’s family members had come
to court, and new counsel—Andrew Stein—had not filed a
substitution of attorney or a motion to continue the sentencing
(nor did he appear that day), the court proceeded with
victim impact statements (without any objection by Redden).
Spiga then asked the court, on Stein’s behalf, to continue
the sentencing. The court put the matter over to early April.
      Stein appeared on April 6 and made an oral motion to
substitute in as counsel for Redden. At Stein’s request, the court
continued the case to mid-June. The case later was continued
four more times. On September 29, 2022, Stein filed, on Redden’s
behalf, a motion to withdraw his plea. Redden asserted Spiga
had “rendered ineffective assistance” and “thus deprived” him of
his Sixth Amendment rights. Stein stated a defendant convicted
of murder does not qualify for good conduct credits. In an
attached declaration, Redden declared Spiga had told him he
“would serve between five and eight years and then [he] would
be paroled.” Redden stated, “I have since been informed that I
will not be eligible for parole for fifteen years, and that contrary
to what Mr. Spiga told me, the chances of my release at my first
hearing are nowhere near certain.” Redden declared, “Had I been
aware that there was a substantial likelihood that I would not
be released from prison for twenty [sic] years, and that I could
potentially remain in prison for the rest of my life, I would
have insisted that Mr. Spiga continue to negotiate for a better
disposition, or proceed to trial.”
      Redden also attached declarations by two family members
and two other individuals: his sister Makenna; his mother
Graciela; Joshua Loebl, who stated he was “a friend and
coworker” of Makenna; and Tulia Mora, who stated she was

                                 8
“a close personal friend of Grace [sic] Redden” (perhaps referring
to Redden’s mother Graciela).
       Makenna declared Spiga told her in January 2022 that,
if her brother “took advantage of the programming and
opportunities in prison, [he] would be out in five to eight years.”
Graciela declared she also spoke with Spiga in January 2022.
Graciela stated,
              “He indicated to me that this was his best
              option, and that he would be out of prison in
              five to eight years. This was his only choice.
              He told me that he had no defense. He would
              be sentenced to fifteen years to life in state
              prison, but he assured me that he would
              be released while he was still a young man.”
       Loebl declared he was in a car with Makenna when she
had a conversation with Spiga. Loebl stated, “Mr. Spiga informed
Makenna that [Redden] was going to plead no contest and be
sentenced to fifteen years to life. He indicated that if [Redden]
did not get in trouble in custody, and if he participated in
programming and educational opportunities, he would do about
half that, and serve between five and eight years.”
       Mora declared she spoke with Spiga in September 2021.
She stated Spiga told her that, “[I]f [Redden was] sentenced
to fifteen to life, he would only do about seven years based on
programming in state prison. [¶] He explained that he would
get fifteen percent credit[s] for his time in custody. Additionally,
once he is transferred to state prison, his credits could increase to

                                 9
as great as thirty percent.” Mora declared she “took handwritten
notes regarding [their] conversation.”8
        The prosecution filed an opposition to Redden’s motion.
The prosecution asserted, “[B]ased on current CDCR credits,
defendant could be eligible for a parole hearing in as little as
5 to 8 years.” The prosecution explained that, after Proposition
57 was passed, inmates such as Redden could earn 33.3 percent
good conduct credits. The prosecution also contended Spiga’s
assessment of Redden’s chances of parole at his first hearing,
as well as his assessment of the strength of any defense, were
“not unreasonable.” The prosecution stated, “[T]he offer for
which defendant pled was the best possible deal the People
were willing to offer.”
        The prosecution attached a declaration from Spiga.
Spiga declared he never told Redden “or anyone else he would be
paroled in 5–8 years.” Spiga had given Makenna a memorandum
from the Prison Law Office (also attached to his declaration)
that “detail[ed] a current breakdown of CDCR’s credits and
prison programming.” Spiga told Redden he’d be eligible for
a youth offender parole hearing in 15, 20, or 25 years if he was
still in custody. Spiga declared he told Redden he “stood a good
chance at early parole as long as he rehabilitated and did not
pick up any disciplinary violations in prison.” Spiga never told
Redden “or anyone else his early parole was a certainty.”
        The court conducted an evidentiary hearing over the course
of four days. The court heard from seven witnesses, including
Redden. The court admitted exhibits submitted by both Redden
and the prosecution.

8     Of the four declarations, the only one that mentioned
credits was Mora’s. Redden did not declare Spiga misadvised
him about credits.

                                10
        At the hearing, Makenna Redden testified Spiga called her
in January 2022 and told her “he’d be pleading [Redden] to 15
to life.” Makenna otherwise essentially repeated the contents
of her declaration. Makenna never was a party to any
conversations between Redden and Spiga.
        Loebl testified he was with Makenna during her January
2022 conversation with Spiga. Spiga told Makenna that Redden
“would be eligible for early release in half the time, which, you
know, was eight years and possibly less if he had followed the
programs and stayed out of trouble.” When Stein asked Loebl
if he remembered Spiga using the word “five,” Loebl said, “Yes.”
Stein asked if “there [was] any mention of youth offender status.”
Loebl answered, “Yes.” Contrary to Makenna’s testimony that
Spiga expressly said Redden would be out in five to eight years,
Loebl testified Spiga said Redden could be out in that time.
        Graciela essentially repeated what was in her declaration.
She also testified Spiga had given them “a piece of paper from
C.D.[C.R.],” which she confirmed was the Prison Law Office
document attached to the prosecution’s brief. Graciela didn’t
recall if Spiga spoke with her about “33 percent credit.” She
denied Spiga told her Redden could be eligible for parole in nine
years. Graciela admitted Spiga had told her the black box data
from Redden’s SUV showed he’d been going 82 miles per hour.
        Mora testified Spiga told her Redden “would be released
in five to seven years.” She admitted she’d written in her notes
six to seven years depending on programming. Mora said Spiga
told her Redden “would probably not get paroled the first time
but probably the second time.” Mora denied Spiga had told her
Redden could be paroled after nine years but then admitted
she’d written in her notes, “ ‘He can parole in nine years.’ ”
        Spiga testified he tried his best to get the prosecution to
make an offer of a determinate sentence. The lowest offer the

                                11
prosecution would make was 15 years to life. Spiga denied telling
Redden, Makenna, or Graciela that Redden would be out in five
to eight years. Nor did he tell Mora that Redden would “be out
in about seven years.”
       Spiga noted video showed Redden’s SUV going down
Rosecrans “at a very, very high rate of speed while swerving.”
One video also showed Redden—at the moment he lost control of
the SUV—with “a balloon of nitrous oxide directly in front of his
face.” As Redden hit the center divider, “the event data recorder”
showed he was “almost flooring it.” Another “extremely graphic
video” from a nearby restaurant showed the SUV “barrel rolling
several times” and “ejecting the . . . unfortunately eviscerated
body of the victim.”
       In Spiga’s view, Redden’s case was “not a good case to
go to trial on” given that video showed his “stunningly reckless
act” of “driving a vehicle down a city street, running red lights,
swerving while imbibing nitrous oxide.” In addition, Redden
was on probation for a DUI when he committed the crimes
in this case, and he had a pending DUI in Orange County,
where he’d been driving more than 100 miles per hour while
under the influence of cannabis.
       Stein called Mark Rafferty as a witness. Raffety is an
attorney specializing in “alcohol-related offenses dealing with the
motor vehicle.” He has “handl[ed]” more than 4,000 DUI cases.
Graciela Redden came to see him and he spoke with her for two
to three hours. Rafferty also spoke with Austin Redden, and he
read the preliminary hearing transcript, the arrest report, and
other documents in the case.
       Rafferty testified he “could not understand why any
defense counsel would plead [his client] in this scenario.”
Rafferty also was “concern[ed]” about “the information that
the defendant had in regard to the consequences of a plea

                                12
of guilty to the second degree murder and his understanding
of the consequences.” In Rafferty’s opinion, Spiga should have
retained an accident reconstruction expert9 as well as a forensic
toxicologist.10 While admitting he didn’t “do parole work much”
and didn’t “have experience in the parole board,” Rafferty opined
Redden’s prior DUI conviction “would have a devastating effect”
on his chances of release on parole.
        On cross-examination, Rafferty said he had handled
“[p]robably one or two” cases involving nitrous oxide, adding,
“[i]t’s rare.” Rafferty had not seen any of the videos in the case.
        The last witness to testify was Austin Redden. Redden said
Spiga told him that, “without a doubt,” he “was going to be able to
parole in five to seven years if [he] programmed and just stayed
straight line.” That five to seven years was “[o]n top of the time
[Redden] had been in.”11 Redden first claimed Spiga never told
him he “could do a life sentence”; then he testified Spiga did tell
him “[t]hat it could be life.” Redden continued, “But he told me
that he didn’t see me doing that many years.” Redden said Spiga
told him he’d “likely” be released at his first parole hearing.

9     Stein asked Rafferty about an accident reconstruction
report apparently prepared in a related civil lawsuit arising from
the crash.
10    Stein asked Spiga during his testimony if he’d hired “a
human factors expert.” Stein didn’t explain what he meant by
that term.
11    Redden was arrested on May 13, 2019, and entered his
guilty pleas on January 27, 2022. As of that date he had credit
for 991 actual days. Redden’s sentencing—and therefore his
transfer to state prison—was delayed for more than a year
because of his motion to withdraw his plea.

                                13
      Redden admitted Spiga told him about the 15 years to life
exposure, but he “wasn’t thinking [he] was going to get that.”
The prosecutor asked, “You knew that was a possibility, but you
hoped to get out sooner?” Redden replied, “Yeah.” In response
to the prosecutor’s question whether, when he entered his plea,
he would have preferred a sentence of 15 years to life “[a]s
opposed to 23 years to life,” Redden answered, “Yeah.”
      On the fourth day of the hearing, February 10, 2023,
the court—together with counsel—watched “six incident videos”
taken from three businesses near the crash. After hearing
oral argument, at length, from counsel, the court denied
Redden’s motion to withdraw his plea.
      The court found that, while Spiga did tell Redden “he could
be paroled within five to seven years if he programmed and
stayed out of trouble,” he “did not promise [Redden] that he
would be paroled within five to seven years.” The court noted
“the basis for the motion to withdraw” was that Spiga was
incorrect about credits. However, after the passage of
Proposition 57, the court continued, inmates are “eligible to
earn 33 percent credits in prison.” The defense—the court said—
had not disputed this and instead “ha[d] pivoted” to “put forth
other arguments why the plea should be withdrawn.”
      While noting Redden “fault[ed]” Spiga for failing to retain
experts or file certain motions,12 the court found Redden had not

12    Stein contended Spiga should have filed a motion to
suppress—under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436—the
statements Redden made to the officer who came to the hospital.
Stein also asserted Spiga should have filed a motion under
Penal Code section 995 challenging the magistrate’s order
holding Spiga to answer, apparently on the issue of whether
Redden was “under the influence” at the time of the crash.

                               14
been prejudiced by any of those failures. The court stated,
“I think Mr. Spiga was correct in his analysis of the case, and
that is that even if the People were unable to prove impairment,
the defendant’s driving was so reckless that he could still be
liable for implied malice murder.” There are “a number of factors
that can be considered” in determining if conduct “qualifies for
second degree murder,” the court said, “among them, speed, the
manner of driving, the ingestion of the narcotics, [and] whether
or not the defendant was under the influence of that narcotic
at the time of the incident.” The court continued,
             “[B]ut the fact that there were nitrous oxide
             balloons passed around the vehicle is certainly
             evidence of conscious disregard for human life.
             Mr. Spiga was entitled—not only entitled but
             right to consider that in advising Mr. Redden
             about his options and about whether or not to
             plead in this case. In fact, had he not done so,
             that, in this court’s view, would be a greater

Stein did not mention either of these alleged failures in his
motion to withdraw the plea, but he raised them at the hearing.
       Spiga testified at the hearing that he didn’t file a
suppression motion because “[t]he statement was not in violation
of Miranda.” Spiga said he had “looked at the case law on
this issue” and there was “not one single case in the state of
California that shows that a hospital interrogation is a violation
of Miranda.” (See, e.g., People v. Mosley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
1081, 1090–1091 [defendant not “in custody” for Miranda
purposes when questioned while being treated in ambulance
by paramedics].) As for a section 995 motion, Spiga testified
Redden’s “admissions were sufficient to get him past the
preliminary hearing stage.” In Spiga’s view, Redden’s “chances
of winning a 995 were very slim as were his chances of winning
a suppression motion under Miranda.”

                                15
              dereliction of duty. I find that the defense
              has not demonstrated good cause to withdraw
              the plea.”
       The court then sentenced Redden in accordance with
his plea agreement to 15 years to life for the murder and eight
years for the DUI, consisting of the high term of three years plus
five years for the great bodily injury enhancement, to be served
concurrently with the murder count. The court stayed the
multiple victim enhancement.
       Redden filed a notice of appeal and the trial court granted
his request for a certificate of probable cause.
                             DISCUSSION
1.     Governing law
       Penal Code section 1018 provides a court, on application
by a defendant, may, “for a good cause shown, permit the plea
of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”13
To establish good cause to withdraw a guilty plea, the defendant
must show by clear and convincing evidence that he was
operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor
overcoming the exercise of his free judgment, including
inadvertence, fraud, or duress. (People v. Archer (2014) 230
Cal.App.4th 693, 702 (Archer); People v. Breslin (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 1409, 1416 (Breslin).) “[I]t is settled that good cause
does not include mere ‘buyer’s remorse’ regarding a plea deal.”
(People v. Simmons (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1466.)
       The Legislature has stated section 1018 “shall be
liberally construed to effect these objects and to promote justice.”
(§ 1018.) However, “leave to withdraw a plea with its resulting
inconvenience and expense should not be lightly granted.”

13    References to statutes are to the Penal Code.

                                 16
(People v. Waters (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 323, 331; Archer, supra,
230 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 [guilty pleas resulting from a bargain
should not be set aside lightly and finality of proceedings should
be encouraged]. See also 4 Witkin and Epstein, Cal. Criminal
Law (4th ed. 2023) Withdrawal of Guilty Plea, § 326 [the
“ ‘good cause shown’ ” language in section 1018 “recognizes
the long-established rule that leave to withdraw a plea, with its
resulting inconvenience and waste of time and effort of courts
and prosecuting officers, should not be lightly granted”].)
Moreover, the promotion of justice “require[s] a consideration
of the rights of the respondent, The People of the State of
California, as well as those of the appellant.” (Waters, at p. 331.)
       “The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”
(Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416; People v. Fairbank
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254 [a decision to deny a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is final unless the defendant can show
a clear abuse of the trial court’s discretion].) “We are required to
accept all factual findings of the trial court that are supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
914, 917.) That we review a trial court’s ruling on a section 1018
motion under the “ ‘abuse of discretion’ ” standard appropriately
results in our paying considerable deference to the trial court’s
factual findings. (Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)
All questions of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence are
addressed in the first instance to the trier of fact—here, the
trial judge. (Ibid.)
2.     Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
       findings and it did not abuse its discretion in denying
       Redden’s motion to withdraw his pleas
       When Redden entered his guilty pleas on January 27, 2022,
Spiga first told the court the terms of Redden’s agreement with

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the People. Spiga said the prosecution was “recommend[ing]”
“15 to life” on the murder count. Spiga explained the
agreed-upon sentence on the DUI count and that it would
be served concurrently with the murder count.
         The court then stated, “So that’s a total term of 15 years to
life.” The court addressed Redden directly: “Mr. Redden, is that
your understanding of the agreement?” Redden replied, “Yes,
Your Honor.” After stating the maximum possible sentence, the
court told Redden, “I’ll be sentencing you to 15 years to life in
state prison . . . .” In response to more questioning by the court,
Redden confirmed he understood the “potential consequences”
of his pleas, he had had enough time to discuss the case “and
the terms of the offer” with Spiga, and he was entering his pleas
“freely and voluntarily and because [it was] in [his] best interests
to do so.” The court asked Redden, “Do you have any questions
before I take your pleas?” Redden answered, “No, Your Honor.”
Redden never asked the court about credits, nor told the court
it was his understanding he’d serve only five to eight years.
         On appeal, Redden does not dispute any of this exchange or
claim he didn’t understand he was pleading to an indeterminate
life sentence. Instead, he contends Spiga was constitutionally
ineffective. Redden asserts he “only accepted” the 15 years to life
offer because Spiga advised him he’d be eligible for parole in five
to eight years. Redden also argues Spiga “advis[ed] him to plead
. . . at a point in the proceedings where counsel had not yet filed
any pre-trial motions; hired any experts; or done any meaningful
investigation.”
         A defendant “is entitled to effective assistance of counsel
in determining whether to accept or reject a plea bargain.”
(Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.5th at p. 707.) To establish a claim
for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

                                 18
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and he
suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–692;
People v. Codinha (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1064 (Codinha);
Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.)
       While the trial court found Spiga told Redden “he could be
paroled within five to seven years if he programmed and stayed
out of trouble,” the court also found Spiga “did not promise him
that he would be paroled within five to seven years.” On cross-
examination Redden conceded he knew 15 years to life was a
possibility but he hoped to be released sooner.
       Even if Spiga acted unreasonably in incorrectly estimating
a likely release date, Redden has not carried his burden of
showing a reasonable probability that—but for counsel’s
incompetence—he would not have pleaded guilty. (Codinha,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1069; see People v. Patterson (2017)
2 Cal.5th 885, 901.) While Redden’s declaration stated he
would have “insisted” Spiga “continue to negotiate for a better
disposition, or proceed to trial” had he “been aware” there was
“a substantial likelihood” he’d serve 20 years, or perhaps life,
he never testified to that at the hearing. When asked on direct
examination why he pleaded guilty, Redden replied, “Because
he told me it was of [sic] my best interest; that if I didn’t, I would
get 24 to life.” When asked if “one of the reasons [he] took the
deal” was Spiga told him he’d be “out in five to seven years,”
Redden answered, “Yeah.”
       Redden made no showing in the trial court, or here on
appeal, that he has “a potentially meritorious defense.” (See
Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1416.) For example, he has
not cited any case in which a suspect’s statements to an officer—
made not “in custody” but rather in a hospital—were suppressed
under Miranda. Moreover, even if a motion to suppress Redden’s

                                 19
statements were successful, his passenger Castillo heard the
sound of the compressor three or four times minutes before
the crash, and a first responder found a canister of nitrous oxide
in Redden’s SUV. A video showed Redden with a balloon just in
front of his lips as he lost control of the SUV. As for “continu[ing]
to negotiate for a better disposition,” the prosecutor made clear
the People would not have agreed to anything less than a murder
conviction with a life sentence.
        In sum, after evaluating the totality of the circumstances,
the trial court acted well within its discretion in ruling Redden
had failed to meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence
to show he entered his guilty pleas under mistake, ignorance,
or any other factor overcoming his exercise of free judgment.
(See Breslin, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1412, 1418, 1421
[affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea; counsel’s failure
to discover before defendant’s plea that victim had attempted
to recant his statement to police did not constitute ineffective
assistance; defendant’s “ ‘self-serving statement’ ” that she would
not have “ ‘accepted a proffered plea bargain[ ] is insufficient
in and of itself to sustain the defendant’s burden of proof as to
prejudice’ ”]; Codinha, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp.1054, 1063–
1064, 1069–1070 [affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea;
counsel was not ineffective in failing to tell defendant a possible
consequence of his plea was an indeterminate commitment as
a sexually violent predator]; Archer, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 707–708 [affirming denial of motion to withdraw plea; counsel
was not ineffective in failing to take into account section 654
issue in advising defendant of maximum possible sentence].)
3.      The sentence and the abstract must be corrected
        At sentencing, the court stated, “The court stays the
multiple victim enhancement under Vehicle Code section 23558
. . . with respect to count 2 of the information.” However,

                                 20
the multiple victim enhancement should have been stricken,
as Redden did not admit it in entering his plea. The minute
order dated February 10, 2023, states, “The court stayed the
enhancement pursuant to Vehicle Code section 23558 (multiple
victims), but this should be stricken because defendant did
not admit to it.” The abstract of judgment says the same thing.
However, the record on appeal contains no minute order actually
striking the enhancement, and the abstract of judgment shows
the enhancement imposed and stayed. On remand, the court
is to strike the enhancement and prepare an amended and
corrected minute order.
       In addition, with respect to restitution, the court stated,
“Defendant . . . is ordered to pay a $300 restitution—well,
actually, given the nature of the offense here, defendant is
to pay $1000 in victim restitution, $30 criminal conviction fee,
$40 security fee, a $300 victim restitution fund fine. A $1000
parole revocation fine is stayed.” The minute order states,
“The defendant is to pay a restitution fine pursuant to section
1202.4(b) Penal Code in the amount of $1000.” While ordinarily
the court’s oral pronouncement controls in the case of a
discrepancy, it appears here the minute order is correct and
the court merely misspoke when it referred to both “$1000 in
victim restitution” and “a $300 victim restitution fund fine.”
       One final problem: The abstract of judgment incorrectly
lists $2000 as the amounts of both the restitution fund fine and
the parole revocation fine. The court is to prepare a corrected
abstract of judgment—listing the $1000 amounts—and to
forward it to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

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                        DISPOSITION
      We affirm Austin Hunter Redden’s conviction. We
remand the matter for the trial court to strike the multiple
victim enhancement and to prepare a corrected minute order and
abstract of judgment. The trial court is to forward the corrected
minute order and abstract to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                    EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P. J.

             LAVIN, J.

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