Court Opinion

ID: 9897383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:53.40419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.494822
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      May 31 2023, 9:06 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark K. Leeman                                             Theodore E. Rokita
Leeman Law Office                                          Attorney General
Logansport, Indiana                                        Robert J. Henke
                                                           Director, Child Services Appeal
                                                           Unit
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the                               May 31, 2023
Parent-Child Relationship of                               Court of Appeals Case No.
T.M. (Minor Child)                                         22A-JT-2628
and M.M. (Mother)                                          Appeal from the
M.M. (Mother),                                             Cass Circuit Court
                                                           The Honorable
Appellant-Respondent,
                                                           Stephen R. Kitts, II, Judge
        v.                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           09C01-2206-JT-7
Indiana Department of Child
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

                                  Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                               Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023                                Page 1 of 9
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   M.M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her

      daughter, T.M. (“Child”). She identifies an obvious error in the trial court’s

      order, but under the particular circumstances of this case, the error does not

      require reversal. We therefore affirm the termination of Mother’s rights.

      However, we remand for correction of the order and remind the trial court of

      the importance of accurate findings and conclusions in termination orders.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Child was born in 2018 to Mother and S.M. (“Father”). In July 2021, the

      Department of Child Services (DCS) removed Child from Mother and Father

      and filed a petition claiming she was a child in need of services (CHINS). DCS

      alleged, in part, that the family had been evicted from their home, the home

      was unsanitary due in part to bugs and dog feces, Child was dirty and had a

      “repulsive odor,” and Father had been charged with molesting one of the other

      children in the home. Ex. O.

[3]   Father admitted Child was a CHINS and voluntarily relinquished his parental

      rights. A fact-finding hearing was held regarding Mother in January 2022, and

      the trial court found Child was a CHINS. In February, the court issued a

      dispositional decree that ordered Mother to engage in various services. Three

      days later, however, DCS asked the court to make a finding under Indiana
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023             Page 2 of 9
      Code section 31-34-21-5.6 that DCS was not required to make reasonable

      efforts to reunify Mother and Child, based on the fact that Mother’s parental

      rights to Child’s siblings had recently been terminated. See Ind. Code § 31-34-

      21-5.6(b)(4) (providing that reasonable efforts to reunify are not required if

      “[t]he parental rights of a parent with respect to a biological or adoptive sibling

      of a child who is a child in need of services have been involuntarily terminated

      by a court”). In March, the court issued an order making the reasonable-efforts-

      not-required finding.

[4]   In June 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The

      trial court held a termination hearing in September 2022 and issued its

      termination order in October 2022.

[5]   Mother now appeals.

      Discussion and Decision
[6]   A petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a child in need of

      services must allege the four elements listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

      4(b)(2)(A)-(D):

              (A) that one (1) of the following is true:

                       (i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
                       six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

                       (ii) A court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
                       that reasonable efforts for family preservation or

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023                Page 3 of 9
                 reunification are not required, including a description of
                 the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
                 in which the finding was made.

                 (iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
                 been under the supervision of a local office or probation
                 department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
                 recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
                 the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
                 being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
                 delinquent child;

        (B) that one (1) of the following is true:

                 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
                 that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
                 placement outside the home of the parents will not be
                 remedied.

                 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
                 of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
                 being of the child.

                 (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
                 adjudicated a child in need of services;

        (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

        (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
        the child.

“[I]f the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of

this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.”

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023                 Page 4 of 9
      I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a). “If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition

      are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.” Id. at (b).

[7]   Here, the trial court entered the following conclusions of law addressing the

      four elements, under the heading “CONCLUSIONS”:

              1. The child has been removed from her parent(s) for at least six
              (6) months under a disposition decree.

              2. There is a reasonable probability that:

                       a. the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
                       continued placement outside the home will not be
                       remedied by Mother;

                       b. continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
                       threat to the Child’s wellbeing;

              3. Termination of parental rights is in the Child’s best interests;

              4. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the
              Child, that being Adoption.

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 46. Mother doesn’t challenge the second, third, or

      fourth conclusions. She argues only that the first conclusion is erroneous. We

      agree, but for the reasons that follow, the error does not require reversal.

[8]   Again, under the first element, the petitioner must allege, and ultimately prove,

      that one of the following is true at the time of the termination petition: (1) the

      child has been removed for at least six months under the CHINS dispositional

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023                  Page 5 of 9
       decree, (2) a reasonable-efforts-not-required finding has been entered, or (3) the

       child has been removed for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. I.C. §

       31-35-2-4(b)(2)(A). Together, these provisions ensure that neither too little time

       nor too much time passes before a termination petition is filed. See In re Bi.B., 69

       N.E.3d 464 (Ind. 2017) (describing the provisions as “waiting periods”); M.H.C.

       v. Hill, 750 N.E.2d 872, 875-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that provisions

       (ii) and (iii) were added to the statute in 1999 to comply with federal law that

       seeks “to ensure that children did not spend long periods of their childhoods in

       foster care or other settings designed to be temporary”).

[9]    In this case, DCS’s termination petition alleged that the second provision was

       true. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11. And it was. During the underlying CHINS

       case, the trial court entered a reasonable-efforts-not-required finding under

       Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.6. DCS did not allege, and could not have

       alleged, that the other provisions were true. When DCS filed the termination

       petition in June 2022, the first provision wasn’t true because the CHINS

       dispositional decree had been issued just four months earlier (in February

       2022), and the third provision wasn’t true because Child had only been

       removed for a total of eleven months (since July 2021). At the termination

       hearing in September 2022, DCS—consistent with its allegation—introduced as

       an exhibit a copy of the reasonable-efforts-not-required finding from the CHINS

       case. See Ex. V.

[10]   It was two weeks later, in the termination order, that things went awry. In its

       findings of fact, the trial court correctly found that “[a] finding of No

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023             Page 6 of 9
       Reasonable Efforts Required was found, and order signed 3/22/2022.”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 43. But then, as noted above, the court didn’t

       mention the reasonable-efforts-not-required finding in its legal conclusions at

       the end of the order. Id. at 46. Rather, the court stated that “[Child] has been

       removed from her parent(s) for at least six (6) months under a disposition

       decree.” Id. This is a mistaken reference to the first provision of Section 31-35-2-

       4(b)(2)(A), which DCS hadn’t alleged in its termination petition and which

       hadn’t been satisfied when the petition was filed.

[11]   Mother seizes on that error. She argues that the erroneous six-month-removal

       conclusion requires reversal of the termination order even though there was

       “evidence adduced at trial” that would have been sufficient to sustain the

       decision on a different legal theory, i.e., the existence of the reasonable-efforts-

       not-required finding. Appellant’s Br. pp. 4, 9, 10. If all that happened regarding

       the reasonable-efforts-not-required finding was the presentation of evidence, we

       would agree with Mother that reversal is appropriate. In a termination case, the

       allegations in the petition and the trial court’s findings and conclusions as to

       those allegations are just as important as the evidence presented at the final

       hearing. See I.C. § 31-35-2-8; In re Bi.B., 69 N.E.3d 464.

[12]   But as we already noted, presentation of evidence wasn’t the only thing that

       happened regarding the reasonable-efforts-not-required finding. DCS, in its

       termination petition, expressly and correctly alleged that such a finding had

       been entered during the CHINS case. And the trial court, in its findings of fact,

       expressly and correctly found that “[a] finding of No Reasonable Efforts

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023              Page 7 of 9
       Required was found, and order signed 3/22/2022.” Again, under Indiana Code

       section 31-35-2-8(a), the court must terminate the parent-child relationship if it

       “finds” that the allegations in a termination petition are true. Here, the court

       did “find” DCS’s reasonable-efforts-not-required allegation to be true, albeit

       only in the findings of fact.

[13]   Mother would have us reverse because that finding was not repeated under the

       “CONCLUSIONS” heading, along with the court’s other legal conclusions.

       While the finding certainly should have been repeated as a conclusion, to

       reverse on that basis would be to elevate form over substance, which we seek to

       avoid. See Moryl v. Ransone, 4 N.E.3d 1133, 1139 (Ind. 2014). Moreover, at the

       end of its findings of fact, just before the “CONCLUSIONS,” the court stated,

       “Any matter enumerated above as a Finding of Fact which may be found as a

       Conclusion of Law is hereby deemed a Conclusion of Law.” Appellant’s App.

       Vol. II p. 46. Viewed in that light, the court’s finding of fact regarding the

       reasonable-efforts-not-required finding was also a conclusion of law.

[14]   For these reasons, we affirm the termination of Mother’s parental rights to

       Child. However, we remand this matter to the trial court for the entry of a

       corrected order. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(C)(7) (allowing appellate court to

       “order correction of a judgment or order”).

[15]   To be clear, our affirmance of the termination does not mean we are

       comfortable with the mishandling of the termination order by both DCS and

       the trial court. The docket indicates that DCS included the erroneous six-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023             Page 8 of 9
       month-removal conclusion in the proposed termination order it submitted to

       the trial court. The court then signed the proposed order without making any

       changes. Both DCS and the court bear responsibility for this unfortunate

       situation. With the stakes in termination cases being so high, the findings of fact

       and conclusions of law must be precise so that the reasons for termination are

       clear to everyone involved. Under the specific circumstances of this case,

       however, reversal is not required.

[16]   Affirmed and remanded.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-JT-2628| May 31, 2023           Page 9 of 9