Court Opinion

ID: 9785220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:10:43.682784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:12.302308
License: Public Domain

Pigott, J.
(dissenting). As efficacious as many remedial programs are, particularly those involving drug and alcohol rehabilitation, in my view, they do not relieve the People nor the *290court from keeping promises made as part of a bargained-for plea. It is for that reason that I respectfully dissent.
We have long recognized that “[p]lea bargaining is a practice vital to the efficient administration of the criminal justice system, and ‘an integral part of the plea bargaining process is the negotiated sentence’ ” (People v Avery, 85 NY2d 503, 506 [1995] [citations omitted]). “Plea and sentence negotiation further important policy considerations, conserving law enforcement, judicial and penal resources, and permitting the parties to avoid the uncertainties inherent in the lengthy process of charge, trial, sentence and appeals, thereby ‘starting the offender on the road to possible rehabilitation’ as soon as practicable” (id., quoting People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d 227, 233 [1974], cert denied 419 US 1122 [1975]). In short, it’s good for both sides.
It has always been true that if a defendant violates a valid condition of the plea agreement, the court is not bound by the agreed-upon sentence (People v Figgins, 87 NY2d 840, 841 [1995]). But it is equally true that the sentencing court must conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine if defendant has indeed violated any condition of the plea (see People v Outley, 80 NY2d 702 [1993]); and it is the People who bear the burden of proving that a violation has occurred (see People v Milligan, 40 AD3d 1217 [3d Dept 2007]; see also Torres v Berbary, 340 F3d 63 [2d Cir 2003]). In the absence of a violation, the failure or inability to fulfill a promise by either the People or the court requires either that the plea of guilty be vacated or the promise fulfilled (People v Selikoff, 35 NY2d at 239).
Equally relevant here, a court does not have discretion to unilaterally impose conditions that were not originally agreed upon by the parties or reasonably understood to be part of the agreement (see Avery, 85 NY2d at 508; People v Spina, 186 AD2d 9, 9-10 [1st Dept 1992]). We have said before that “inasmuch as the State may hold the defendant to the precise terms of the plea agreement as stated on the record, as a matter of fairness, defendant should be entitled to no less” (People v Danny G., 61 NY2d 169, 174 [1984]).
In this case, defendant’s plea agreement required him to participate in a residential drug treatment program at Veritas Therapeutic Community (Veritas), a residential 12-to-18-month program devoted to the treatment and prevention of drug abuse and addiction. If defendant successfully completed the program, the Office of Special Narcotics Prosecutor (OSN) would join *291defendant’s application to dismiss the indictment in the interest of justice. “Successful completion” of the program was defined under the agreement as “completing vocational educational training, obtaining a General Equivalency Diploma, securing full-time employment, and finding suitable housing approved by the Enforcement Team of the Office of Special Narcotics Prosecutor (OSN).” If defendant left the program or otherwise failed to successfully complete the program as determined by the program, the court would impose a sentence of SVa to 7 years. The agreement further required defendant to execute a consent form for the release of confidential information so that the court, his attorney and OSN could be apprised on a monthly basis of his progress in the treatment program. Whether defendant violated the terms and conditions of the agreement was “at the sole discretion of OSN and the Court.”
Defendant entered Veritas in January 2000, and on a monthly basis thereafter, Veritas sent to OSN, which then forwarded to the court, a progress report on defendant. For instance, after 13V2 months of treatment, in February 2001, a letter was sent to OSN from Veritas indicating that defendant was making “immense progress” and had negative toxicology reports. Further, defendant had maintained employment, opened a savings account, and demonstrated “responsibility and determination.” On June 13, 2001, a progress report indicated that defendant “completed the residential phase of treatment and began the Live-Out Phase of treatment on March 30, 2001.” He completed a “12-week cycle of Relapse Prevention on April 27, 2001,” had negative drug tests and attended all scheduled groups. The letter further stated that defendant resided with his family, was employed full time, and continued his vocational training. For over a year and a half, progress reports like these were sent to OSN and the court. Thus, defendant’s case was calendared and adjourned in excess of 50 times, evidencing close supervision by OSN and the court and apparent satisfaction with his progress.
On October 4, 2001, following completion of the program, defendant moved to dismiss his case in the interest of justice pursuant to the plea agreement. Neither OSN nor the People opposed defendant’s motion, although they did not join in it as required by the plea agreement. A letter to the court, dated October 11, 2001, from a Veritas case manager announced defendant’s success and confirmed that he “has completed all phases of drug treatment at Veritas.” It further indicated that defendant had regularly attended group and individual sessions and had tested negative for drug use.
*292The case manager noted one wrinkle, unrelated to the original plea agreement, i.e. that defendant “has unresolved family issues” with his girlfriend “that have created and will eventually create further problems ... if not addressed.” According to the case manager, Veritas had attempted to provide not just defendant but “the couple” with “family services,” but defendant’s girlfriend had refused to participate. Despite these family problems, defendant still “ha[d] made strides in his recovery and with [the Veritas] program. As of [October 11, 2001] defendant ha[d] completed all phases of drug treatment at Veritas.”
Upon the return date of the motion, October 12, 2001, Supreme Court conducted no inquiry and, presumably, made no determination as to whether defendant had, in fact, met all of the conditions of the plea agreement. Significantly, the People made no claim that defendant had not successfully completed the program. Rather, the People requested two to three weeks to respond and sought defendant’s cooperation in providing certain documents. The court held an off-the-record discussion at the bench. What exactly was said during this discussion is unknown, but it caused defense counsel to withdraw the motion. What is known is that the parties talked about the “unresolved family issues” identified in the October 11th Veritas letter and that the court adjourned the matter to look into getting defendant “some other support services.” Defendant voiced his objection stating, among other things, that he “completed everything there is to complete in this program.”
A majority of the Appellate Division and this Court reason that Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion when it postponed the matter to permit defendant to submit proof of his compliance with some of the conditions of the plea agreement. However, my reading of the record, as just indicated, reveals that Supreme Court adjourned the matter for another reason—to investigate the “family issues” separate and apart from any agreement between the court and defendant.
Moreover, it is readily apparent that the People did not contest defendant’s claim that he was entitled to have the charges dismissed, let alone establish that he was not, nor did the court make such a finding. Indeed, the People never even argued in Supreme Court, the Appellate Division or to this Court that, as of October 2001, defendant had not complied with the terms and conditions of the plea agreement. Rather, the People have consistently argued that Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in requiring defendant to participate in further services.
*293Clearly, it was Supreme Court’s duty to make sufficient inquiry, at the time of the motion, as to whether defendant had complied with the terms of the plea agreement. I disagree with the majority that defendant’s failure to provide documentation regarding the successful completion of the program excused such inquiry by the court; to so hold improperly shifts the burden of proof from the People to the defendant to prove his compliance with the plea agreement—something we have never done. But even assuming the burden was on the defendant, the facts found in this record seem to support his claim. The court had in its possession monthly progress reports from Veritas, as well as the October 11th letter, indicating that defendant had successfully completed the program: a determination that Veritas was to make under the plea agreement. What remained for the court to determine was whether OSN had approved of his housing and whether defendant had committed any new crimes. The October 11th Veritas letter confirmed that defendant had been residing with his family. OSN never objected to defendant’s housing nor his compliance with any of the other terms of the plea agreement during his treatment. Indeed, OSN only objected to his housing on October 23, 2001, two weeks after the return date, and the objection was conditional, i.e. defendant had to find another residence if his girlfriend did not attend treatment meetings.
Further, in my view, while well intentioned, Supreme Court erred in adjourning the matter to determine whether family counseling was needed for defendant, and also erred in imposing family counseling as a condition.
Accordingly, I would reverse and remit the matter to Supreme Court to conduct the appropriate inquiry into whether defendant complied with the terms and conditions of his plea agreement as of October 11, 2001.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Graffeo, Read, Smith and Jones concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Pigott dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion.
Order affirmed.