Court Opinion

ID: 9778015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:30:16.823398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.088597
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I find the injunction to be over-broad as to its product limitations. I find that the majority’s additional modifying language compounds the problem. In my opinion, it is an improper broadening of the injunction and constitutes an impermissible restraint of trade. I find the covenant not to compete, as interpreted by the majority here and the court below, to be unreasonable, oppressive, and injurious to the public. See Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 170-171 (Tex.1987). I would modify the injunction to prohibit the sale of film pack by appellant to any customers of appellee and prohibit appellant from selling any other products sold by appellee at the time he left their employment. This latter restriction would be limited to those customers of appellee with whom appellant had specific contact during his employment with appellee.
*657I would eliminate any reference as to “substituted products” because the essence of fair competition is grounded on the concept that if one can make or sell a different or better product than the competition, one is entitled freely to market it. Particularly this concept is applicable here where the customers are limited and their names are readily available in the market place. The ultimate beneficiary of such competition is the consumer. To inhibit such competition is, in my opinion, an impermissible restraint of trade.
In sum, I find the covenant as interpreted to be unreasonable because it restrains fair competition, provides greater protection for the appellee than is necessary, and imposes an undue hardship on the appellant. I would modify the injunction as stated.