Court Opinion

ID: 9466528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:18:39.87946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:47.286947
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result of Judge Gee’s opinion. But with deference I cannot agree with the reason given for denying enforcement of the Board’s order against Haskell. In my opinion, this case cannot be decided on the statute of limitations issue. We must decide whether Haskell committed an unfair labor practice on April 30, 1976, when it refused to execute and apply collective bargaining agreements allegedly negotiated on its behalf by the Negotiating Committee of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC).
Section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in pertinent part that whenever a person is charged with engaging in an unfair labor practice, the Board must serve a complaint on that person stating the charges and containing a notice of hearing, but no complaint may be issued based on an unfair labor practice later then six months after the filing of a charge with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In this case the charge was filed by five unions on October 29, 1976, and was served on Haskell on November 1, 1976. Therefore, the unfair labor practice must have occurred sometime between April 29, 1976, and October 29, 1976, or a claim based on the alleged unfair labor practice will be barred by the six month statute of limitations.
Judge Gee relies on Bryan Manufacturing and contends that the alleged unfair labor practice occurred before April 29, 1976. I find myself unable to agree with this conclusion.
The N.L.R.B. found that Haskell violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 158(a)(5), by refusing to execute collective bargaining agreements allegedly negotiated on its behalf. Section 8(a)(5) provides that an employer commits an unfair labor practice when he refuses to bargain collectively *143with the representatives of his employees. A refusal to bargain collectively includes a refusal to execute a collective bargaining agreement that was actually negotiated on a party’s behalf. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 322 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1963); Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 442 F.Supp. 431 (N.D.Col.1977), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978). Therefore, the facts, as alleged by the N.L.R.B., indicate that if Haskell committed an unfair labor practice, it was committed on April 30, 1976, when Haskell refused to sign the contract, thus satisfying the six month statute of limitations.
Consistent with Bryan Manufacturing, the events of April 6, 1978 (the last common bargaining meeting ended in confusion) and April 8, 1976 (Haskell attempted to withdraw from negotiations) merely constituted relevant evidence of events occurring outside the six month period that “shed light on the true character of [events] occurring within the limitations period . . .” Bryan Manufacturing, 362 U.S. at 416, 80 S.Ct. at 826. Haskell’s actions constituted a separate refusal to execute a collective bargaining agreement and the claim is' therefore not barred by the statute of limitations. See J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 571 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1978).
I do, however, agree with Judge Gee that enforcement of the N.L.R.B.’s order against Haskell must be denied. I reach this conclusion, however, based on the merits of the case. The facts as stated in Judge Gee’s opinion fairly and satisfactorily present an accurate description of the events leading up to the alleged unfair labor practice. Based on an examination of these facts, I must conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support the N.L.R.B.’s conclusion.
The issue stated in this case is whether Haskell was bound by the actions of the multi-employer bargaining unit or whether it made a timely withdrawal from the negotiations with the trade unions. It is clear that if Haskell was a member of a multiemployer bargaining unit with authority to negotiate on its behalf, Haskell would be deemed to have negotiated the contract itself and would be required to execute and abide by the contract. N. L. R. B. v. Strong Roofing and Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357, 89 S.Ct. 541, 21 L.Ed.2d 546 (1969). But I find that Haskell’s withdrawal was timely.
This court stated the test necessary to determine whether a multi-employer unit has been established in N. L. R. B. v. Beckham, 564 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1977). The factors examined are:
. whether the employer members of the group have indicated from the outset an unequivocal intention to be bound by group action in collective bargaining, and whether the union, being informed of the delegation of bargaining authority to the group, has assented and entered into negotiations with the group representative.
564 F.2d at 192. The “unequivocal intention to be bound by group action in collective bargaining” may be found despite the absence of an express statement made by a group of employers that they would negotiate as a single unit. McAx Sign Company v. N. L. R. B., 576 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1978). In McAx Sign, we noted that:
a multi-employer bargaining unit may be established either by “a controlling history of collective bargaining on such basis, or an unequivocal agreement of the parties to bind themselves to a course of group bargaining in the future.” Electric Theatre, Inc. 156 NLRB 1351, 1352 (1966) (emphasis added). See also Bennett Stone Co., 139 NLRB 1422 (1962). Thus, the absence of a clear expression of intent in this case is no bar to a finding that a multi-employer bargaining unit existed.
Id. at 66, n.3. It is obvious after an examination of the facts that Haskell did not indicate directly or expressly an unequivocal agreement to be bound to a course of group bargaining in the future. The question is whether the facts reveal a “controlling history of collective bargaining on such basis.” Id. (emphasis added).
*144In McAx Sign, the employer engaged in three collective bargaining sessions, between the union and all the neon electrical sign companies of Dallas, that culminated in the execution of collective bargaining agreements. The three agreements covered the period from June 20, 1968 to June 30, 1976. The contract was to continue on a year-to-year basis unless one of the parties gave written notice of its desire to modify or terminate the agreement. Notice was given in 1976, and three of the neon electrical sign companies, including McAx, entered negotiations with the union.
McAx’s representative was unable to attend the seventh negotiating meeting and attempted to avoid the matters agreed to at that time. This court denied its claim declaring that McAx was bound by the negotiations of the multi-employer unit because of the controlling history of collective bargaining on a multi-employer unit basis and because McAx agreed to bind itself to a course of group bargaining.
This case, it seems to me, is clearly distinguishable from McAx Sign. First, the only indication of multi-employer bargaining was based on the fact that AGC had negotiated on Haskell’s behalf during the previous 1974 negotiations. This one incident cannot be said to constitute a “controlling history” of bargaining on a multi-employer basis, especially when compared to the three agreements spanning eight years found in McAx Sign. Second, the controlling history of collective bargaining must indicate a desire to bargain on “such basis.’’ If anything, the 1974 agreement might have indicated a controlling history to enter into “one-on-one” group bargaining. It certainly did not signify a controlling history for “common” group bargaining. The “common” contract negotiations were something new that were tried for the first time in 1976. Prior to this, the contractors had only agreed to “one-on-one” group bargaining. Since the AGC was in a new bargaining area, it did not possess negotiating authority for Haskell.
Therefore, the next question is whether Haskell’s withdrawal from negotiations was timely. The decision on this issue is based on the test stated by the Board in Retail Associates, Inc., 42 LRRM 1119 (1958) as follows:
the intention by a party to withdraw must be unequivocal and exercised at an appropriate time.
******
[The Board] refusefs] to permit the withdrawal of an employer or a union from a duly established multi-employer bargaining unit, except upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the multi-employer negotiations. Where actual bargaining negotiations based on the existing multi-employer unit have begun, [the Board] would not permit, except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which each side has committed itself to the other, absent unusual circumstances.
Id. at 1121. In this case, AGC had no authority to negotiate for Haskell using “common” group bargaining. Also, any authority acquired in 1974 ended on April 8, 1976, when Haskell withdrew from the negotiations. Since multi-employer negotiations using the “one-on-one” method had not yet begun, Haskell’s withdrawal was timely.
In summary, Haskell’s timely withdrawal from negotiations means that it did not commit an unfair labor practice when it refused to execute the agreement on April 30, 1976. Therefore I would deny enforcement of the N.L.R.B.’s order against Haskell, and I concur only in the result reached by Judge Gee.