Court Opinion

ID: 9891613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 07:10:00.311276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:22.534558
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                     EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                          EL PASO, TEXAS

    JD AUTO CORP.,                                         §                  No. 08-22-00187-CV

                                     Appellant,            §                     Appeal from the

    v.                                                     §              384th Judicial District Court

    MICHAEL H. BELL,                                       §               of El Paso County, Texas

                                     Appellee.             §                 (TC# 2021DCV0743)

                                        CONCURRING OPINION

         I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court never acquired personal

jurisdiction over JD Auto prior to issuing the default judgment, and the default judgment is

therefore void as a matter of law. However, I write separately because, in the collateral attack

analysis, my opinion would begin where the majority opinion could have ended—in concluding

Bell failed to exercise reasonable diligence so as to justify substituted service. 1 That is, even

assuming without deciding that: (1) Bell exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to personally

serve JD Auto’s authorized agent so as to justify substituted service; and (2) Bell posted notice at

the courthouse in compliance with the trial court’s substituted service order, JD Auto’s collateral

1
 See In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. 2012) (“If personal service can be effected by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, substitute service is not to be resorted to.”) (quoting Sgitcovich v. Sgitcovich, 241 S.W.2d 142, 147
(Tex. 1951)).
attack succeeds because, even though approved by the trial court, 2 the form of substituted service

effected in this case was constitutionally infirm.

         Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106(b)(2) does a fine job of encapsulating the bedrock due

process principle articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mullane. See Retzlaff v. GoAmerica

Commc’ns Corp., 356 S.W.3d 689, 695 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (recognizing that even

when substituted service is appropriate, due process requires notice to “be reasonably calculated,

under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford

them an opportunity to present their objections”) (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314). To meet that

standard, Bell would have had to produce evidence showing that the chosen option of posting at

the courthouse was reasonably calculated to apprise JD Auto of the suit. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at

314. Bell presented no such evidence.

         Accordingly, even if we were to determine that Bell exercised reasonable diligence in

attempting to serve Dick and substituted service could “be resorted to,” the choice to singularly

post at the courthouse constituted constitutionally deficient substitute service. See In re

Miramontes, 648 S.W.3d 590, 601 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“While the sufficiency of

notice is fact-specific to each case, if notice is not meaningful, constitutional due process

requirements are not satisfied.”). 3 Additionally, there is nothing on the record to indicate that

2
  Bell points to our opinion in Singh to urge that service by posting was sufficient because it complied with the trial
court’s substituted service order. See Singh v. Trinity Marketing & Distributing Co., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 257, 263–64
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). However, in Singh, the court-authorized substituted service method effected was
first-class mail, a method not determined to be constitutionally infirm in that case. Id. at 260. In this case, the court-
authorized substituted service method effected was itself constitutionally infirm, making compliance with the trial
court’s substituted service order immaterial in terms of the notice-by-posting choice.
3
  In its supplemental briefing, Bell continues to urge us to interpret “consideration of all the circumstances” in the
“reasonably calculated” test to include extrinsic evidence presented at the bill-of-review proceeding, which Bell
indicates included “the defendant’s own acts that prevent[ed] service” and “Bell’s posting of notice at J.D. Auto
headquarters in addition to the courthouse posting.” But we do not consider extrinsic evidence in the collateral attack,
except as specified in Mitchell with respect to public records. Here, Holt-Shirley’s return of service indicated only that
Bell served JD Auto by posting at the courthouse; it was not amended prior to the default judgment and no proof of
service through another method was presented prior to the trial court issuing the default judgment. And as to the

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posting at the courthouse alone was not “substantially less likely to bring home notice than other

of the feasible and customary substitutes.” 4 Mitchell v. MAP Res., Inc., 649 S.W.3d 180, 189

(Tex. 2022) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950)).

         In light of Texas law, and with modern society offering myriad ways to effectively reach a

known defendant with an operating business at a known address through a named registered

agent, 5 trial courts should be wary of approving any proposed order for substituted service under

Rule 106(b) that includes the singular choice of effecting service solely by posting at the

courthouse in similar situations. 6

         Because JD Auto has conclusively established it was not served in accordance with

constitutional due process requirements in the underlying case, I join the majority in reversing the

trial court’s grant of summary judgment in Bell’s favor and rendering summary judgment in

JD Auto’s favor based on its collateral attack.

defendant’s authorized agent’s acts, the only evidence before the trial court at the relevant time was Holt-Shirley’s
affidavit detailing his attempts to personally serve Dick.
4
  Bell argues that the Mullane dicta upon which the Texas Supreme Court relies in Mitchell has been abrogated by
Dusenbery v. U.S., 534 U.S. 161, 163 (2002) in so far as there is no hierarchy or comparison of service methods and
instead the reasonableness of “any chosen method . . . on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform
those affected” may be defended. Even if that were the case and we were to disregard the Texas Supreme Court
precedent by which we are bound, regardless of whether posting was “substantially less likely to bring home notice
than other of the feasible and customary substitutes,” service by posting at the courthouse on its own in this case fails
to meet due process requirements, as required by Rule 106(b)(2) and the holding in Mullane and its Texas progeny.
5
  Although not applicable to the present case, Rule 106(b)(2)’s 2020 revisions reflect some of these modern channels
by expressly naming potential electronic service methods such as “social media, email, or other technology, that the
statement or other evidence shows will be reasonably effective to give the defendant notice of the suit.” See
TEX. R. CIV. P. § 106 comment to 2020 change (“Rule 106 is revised in response to section 17.033 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, which calls for rules to provide for substituted service of citation by social media. Amended
Rule 106(b)(2) clarifies that a court may, in proper circumstances, permit service of citation electronically by social
media, email, or other technology. In determining whether to permit electronic service of process, a court should
consider whether the technology actually belongs to the defendant and whether the defendant regularly uses or recently
used the technology.”).
6
  It is noteworthy that even in the federal cases the dissent cites where the defendants, through their actions, made
personal service effectively impossible and alternative service was deemed constitutionally sufficient, service was
effected by mail or email in addition to posting or publication.

                                                           3
                                             LISA J. SOTO, Justice

October 13, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

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