Court Opinion

ID: 9685706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:57:48.438197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:09.697604
License: Public Domain

*328EICH, C.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully record my dissent from the majority opinion in this case because I believe sec. 970.03(4), Stats., was complied with and, further, that the trial court exercised its discretion to exclude the two spectators in conformity with the requirements of Stevens v. Manitowoc Cir. Ct., 141 Wis. 2d 239, 414 N.W.2d 832 (1987), and related cases. I would affirm the conviction.
The majority concludes that the trial court erred in excluding the general public and Webb's "support people" — his mother and his niece — from the preliminary examination under the authority of sec. 970.03(4), Stats. That section provides as follows:
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 . . . the judge shall, at the request of the complaining witness, exclude from the hearing all persons not officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed by the court to be supportive of them . . .. The judge may exclude all such persons from the hearing in any case where the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225 . . .. [Emphasis added.]
Webb and the majority read the phrase "all such persons" as applying only to persons who are not "officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others deemed . . . to be supportive of them." In my view, having "all such persons" apply only to persons who are not court officers, family members or supporters of the principal parties reads an irreconcilable conflict into the statute. If the trial court can never exclude officers, family members or supporters under any circumstances, and if the last sentence applies only to those persons not in those categories, the first sentence would mandate exclusion of all those who are not officers, friends or supporters ("the judge shall . . . *329exclude"); while the second sentence makes the same decision discretionary: "The judge may exclude all such persons . .
Recognizing the rule that statutes should be construed to avoid irreconcilable conflicts or absurd results, Thelen v. DHSS, 143 Wis. 2d 574, 579, 422 N.W.2d 146, 148 (Ct. App. 1988), I read "all such persons" in sec. 970.03(4), Stats., as referring to those affirmatively, rather than negatively, named immediately before; that is, "officers of the court, members of the witness's or defendant's families or others . . . supportive of them . . .." Thus, in my view, the statute's first sentence requires the court, on proper request, to exclude all those who are "not" in those named categories; and the second sentence gives the court discretion to exclude those who are. Any such discretionary exclusion, of course, must meet a constitutional test as well.
In Stevens, the court, overruling past cases, held for the first time that "a qualified sixth amendment public trial right" applies to preliminary hearings and "must adhere when closure is sought by the complainant under sec. 970.03(4), Stats." Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 248-49, 414 N.W.2d at 836. The court outlined the procedure which must be followed before a hearing may be closed. It is a balancing test similar to that discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984), and Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II). First, the state must advance a compelling interest which would be prejudiced absent closure, such as the need to protect a sexual assault victim from undue embarrassment and emotional trauma. Second, the court must narrowly tailor its order and consider reasonable alternatives to full closure. Third, the court must articulate specific findings adequate to support closure, such as the "victim's age, *330psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, and the desires of the victim and the victim's family . . Finally, the court should give great but not exclusive weight to the desires of the victim since that is "clearly shown to be proper public policy as evidenced by the enactment of sec. 970.03(4)." Stevens, 141 Wis. 2d at 254, 414 N.W.2d at 838-39.
I believe the trial court properly exercised its discretion in this case. First, the charged crime was of a most sensitive nature — sexual assault by a stepfather on his stepchild. It is difficult to conceive of a crime more likely to cause emotional stress and possible trauma to a child witness than sexual assault by a parent. Second, the court articulated on the record why it excluded the defendant's relatives from the hearing. The court asked the defendant's attorney "[w]hat is the relationship, if any, that exists between the two people who are present and the victim in this case?" Upon learning that they were the defendant's mother and niece — and thus also relatives of the victim — the court stated that given the "fact that these people are people who she [the victim] is familiar with as being associated with the defendant in this case, I will grant the motion and will ask that these two individuals will be excluded from the courtroom as well."
The court made additional findings in support of its order. The court asked the prosecutor how old the complainant was and found that " [u]pon the representation of [the prosecutor] that the request is being made at the request of the alleged victim, and given the age of the victim [twelve] ... I will grant the motion . . .." The court emphasized that, "If we were dealing here with an adult victim, then my determination would be other than it has."
*331It thus appears that the court grounded its closure order on: (1) the victim's age and the nature of the crime; (2) the fact that the request for closure came from the prosecution on the victim's behalf; and (3) the fact that the persons excluded were relatives of the defendant, the victim's stepfather, and were thus familiar to her — which, implicitly, at least, amounts to a finding that their presence in court would be embarrassing or traumatic to the victim.
Finally, I believe the order was sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the state's (and the victim's) desire to avoid the embarrassment and trauma attendant upon a hearing of this nature, without unduly burdening Webb's right to a public trial. First, I note that the hearing transcript remained part of the public record; it was neither sealed nor otherwise restricted. Second, it appears that Webb's objection to the order was not that it closed the proceedings to the public, but only that it did not permit his mother and niece to remain in the courtroom. After the district attorney's initial request "to clear and close the courtroom," defense counsel stated: "That's fine with me, your Honor. If they're not going to have any support people in here, that's fine." Then, when the prosecutor stated he wished to have the victim's mother and the rape counselor present, defense counsel took the position that, under the statute, "[e]ither [the court] excludes all or he excludes none, except for . . . the support people" for both the victim and the defendant.
Under the statute, exclusion of spectators — including "support persons" — is discretionary with the trial court. In light of the circumstances discussed above, including the familial relationships between the defendant, the victim and the defendant's relatives, I believe the trial court's explanation of its *332decision, while unfortunately sketchy, is minimally adequate under Stevens.