Court Opinion

ID: 9584208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:45:31.234235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:04.078872
License: Public Domain

Caporale, L,
dissenting.
While I agree that the evidence supports Arnold’s convictions, I must nonetheless dissent, for the district court abused its discretion in not investigating the jury conduct Arnold described, and thus clearly erred.
Quoting State v. Washington, 182 Conn. 419, 438 A.2d 1144 (1980), we acknowledged in Hunt v. Methodist Hosp., 240 Neb. 838, 846, 485 N.W.2d 737, 743 (1992), the seriousness of predeliberation discussions by noting:
Derived from the constitutional concept of a right to a jury trial is the principle that “it is improper for jurors to discuss a case among themselves until all the evidence has been presented, counsel have made final arguments, and the case has been submitted to them after final instructions by the trial court.”
“As confirmed by case law, the constitutional right in both civil and criminal cases protects parties from juror discussions prior to deliberations. Anything short of silence is juror misconduct, and at some point, nondeliberation dialogue prejudices a *798party and voids the trial.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 848, 485 N.W.2d at 744.
The situation described by Arnold is not one in which a juror, without engaging anyone else in conversation, shakes or nods the head, rolls the eyes, smiles, laughs, yawns, or demonstrates any other individual response to what has been heard, seen, or otherwise sensed. Rather, it is a situation in which a juror spoke words to another juror under circumstances which at least suggest that the conversation related to something that had transpired in the courtroom, and which further suggest that displeasure was being directed at the defense team. Indeed, the district court acknowledged as much by observing that “[cjlearly, they want to see something right now . . . [b]ut, anyway, I am not going to explore it any further . ...” I therefore submit that Arnold met his burden of making a showing tending to prove that serious misconduct had occurred.
Surely, if one juror said to another that it was obvious that Arnold’s team was trying to hide something and for that reason could never vote to acquit Arnold, we would hold that serious jury misconduct had taken place and that Arnold had been prejudiced. However, since the majority chooses to approve the district court’s election to remain ignorant, we will never know what was said or whether Arnold was prejudiced.
I would remand the cause to the district court with the direction that it conduct a hearing to determine what was said and whether what was said prejudiced Arnold.
Gerrard, J., joins in this dissent.