Court Opinion

ID: 9384953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 17:07:30.325776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:57.944762
License: Public Domain

J-A03011-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER             :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2373 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0003393-2017

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M.C., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER             :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2374 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Decree Entered August 18, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000600-2019

 IN THE INTEREST OF: G.C., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER             :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :
                                       :   No. 2375 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered August 18, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-DP-0000848-2021
J-A03011-23

    IN THE INTEREST OF: G.A.C., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: J.L.C., MOTHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2376 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Decree Entered August 18, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-AP-0000450-2022

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                             FILED APRIL 5, 2023

        J.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the August 18, 2022 decrees involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her sons, S.C., a/k/a S.M.C. (born in

December 2017), and G.C., a/k/a G.A.C. (born in August 2021) (collectively,

“Children”).1 Mother also appeals from the August 18, 2022 orders changing

Children’s permanency goals from reunification to adoption.            In addition,

Mother’s appointed counsel, James W. Martin, Esquire (“Counsel”), has filed a

petition to withdraw and accompanying brief, pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 By separate decrees the same date, the trial court terminated the parental
rights to the putative father of S.C., D.C., the putative father of G.C., A.Y.,
and any unknown fathers to both Children. Neither D.C., A.Y., nor any
unknown father filed notices of appeal, and none have participated in this
appeal.

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A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).        After careful review, we grant Counsel’s petition to

withdraw, affirm the termination decrees, and dismiss the appeals from the

goal change orders as moot.

       The following relevant facts and procedural history are undisputed.2 The

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) first became involved

with this family in 2008 and then again in 2013 and 2014, with respect to her

four children, none of whom are subjects of these appeals.        DHS Petition,

8/5/2021, at ¶ a, e, m. On March 17, 2017, the trial court terminated Mother’s

parental rights to three of those children.3 Id. at ¶ ff.

       Thereafter, in December 2017, DHS received a general protective

services (“GPS”) report alleging that Mother gave birth to S.C. Id. at ¶ gg.

The report further alleged that Mother did not appear prepared to care for

S.C., and she had a history of using phencyclidine (PCP) and marijuana. Id.

On December 27, 2017, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (“OPC”)

____________________________________________

2  During the August 18, 2022 termination hearing, counsel for Mother
stipulated to the facts as alleged in the petitions filed by DHS. Notes of
testimony, 8/18/22 at 30-35.

3In July 2016, one of Mother’s children died of natural causes. DHS Petition,
8/5/2021, at ¶ dd.

On June 25, 2018, this Court affirmed the decrees involuntarily terminating
Mother’s parental rights to two of the children. In the Interest of A.M.,
2018 WL 1979123 (Pa.Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). This Court
vacated the order involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the
third child. Id.

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for S.C. and placed him in the kinship care of his maternal great-cousin, J.S.,

where he currently remains.

      At a shelter care hearing on December 28, 2017, the trial court lifted

the OPC, ordered legal custody to DHS, and ordered the temporary

commitment to stand. Subsequently, on January 10, 2018, after a hearing,

the trial court adjudicated S.C. dependent. On April 4, 2018, the trial court

issued an order finding that aggravated circumstances exist as to Mother due

to the termination of her parental rights to other children.

      Nevertheless, the court maintained a permanency plan of reunification.

In furtherance of this goal, Mother was required to comply with the following

objectives: (1) comply with mental health services, sign releases, and comply

with all recommendations; (2) attend visitation; (3) report for random drug

screens; (4) attend family school; (5) maintain stable employment; (6) obtain

appropriate housing; (7) complete a parenting capacity evaluation and comply

with the recommendations; and (8) attend Achieving Reunification Center

(“ARC”) for anger management, housing, and employment services.           DHS

petition, 8/5/2021, at ¶ pp; DHS petition, 7/25/2022, at ¶ q; Notes of

testimony, 8/18/22 at 26-27.

      In August 2021, DHS received another GPS report alleging that Mother

gave birth to G.C.; she was homeless; she did not have infant supplies; and

S.C. and one other child were in placement.        On August 16, 2021, DHS

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obtained an OPC for G.C., and placed him in the kinship care of a family friend,

S.M., where he currently remains.

      At a shelter care hearing on August 18, 2021, the trial court lifted the

OPC, ordered legal custody to DHS, and ordered the temporary commitment

to stand. On September 21, 2021, after a hearing, the trial court adjudicated

G.C. dependent. On the same date, the trial court issued an order finding that

aggravated circumstances exist as to Mother due to the termination of her

parental rights to other children. The trial court established a permanency

plan of reunification and provided Mother with largely the same objectives.

      The record does not contain significant detail, but provides that over the

course of the dependencies, Mother failed to consistently attend mental health

services. In February 2022, JFK Behavioral Health discharged Mother due to

lack of attendance. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 20. Mother has also failed

to consistently visit with and care for Children. DHS petition, 8/5/2021, ¶ nnn;

DHS petition, 7/25/2022 ¶ u; Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 38-40, 44-47.

Mother also failed to obtain suitable housing and maintain stable employment.

8/5/2021, ¶ nnn; DHS petition, 7/25/2022 ¶ u. Furthermore, as best we can

discern from the record, Mother did not complete her ARC objective. DHS

petition, 8/5/2021, ¶ uu.

      On August 5, 2021, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination

of Mother’s parental rights to S.C. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), and (b), along with a petition to change S.C.’s permanency goal from

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reunification to adoption.4 Thereafter, on July 25, 2022, DHS filed a petition

for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to G.C., then almost

a year old, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), along

with a petition to change G.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to

adoption.

       The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 18, 2022, at

which time Children were ages four and one, respectively.         Children were

represented by Faryl Bernstein, Esquire, as guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and

legal counsel.5

____________________________________________

4  S.C.’s case was continued numerous times for various reasons
including (1) the assigned judge was not available, (2) to obtain a contested
time slot, (3) Mother’s counsel was recently appointed, and (4) for reasons
undisclosed in the record.

5 Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to verify sua sponte that the
court appointed counsel to represent a child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2313(a), and if counsel served in a dual role, that the court determined
before appointment that there was no conflict between a child’s best and legal
interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020). If a
child is “too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of
the proceedings,” there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests,
and a child’s subsection 2313(a) right to counsel is satisfied by an attorney-
GAL who represents the attorney-GAL’s view of the child’s best interests. See
In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-1093 (Pa. 2018).

Regarding S.C., the trial court confirmed on the record that there was no
conflict between his best and legal interests. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at
8-10. Concerning G.C., inasmuch as he was merely one year old at the time
of the hearing, he was unable to express a preference. Accordingly, we
conclude that Children’s statutory right to counsel was satisfied by Attorney
Bernstein.

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     DHS presented the testimony of Michaela Finley, outpatient therapist at

JFK Behavioral Health, and Jacqueline Tillman, Community Umbrella Agency

(“CUA”) case manager.     Mother was represented by Counsel and did not

appear. Counsel stated on the record to the trial court that Mother texted him

immediately prior to the hearing that “her health is more important than this

hearing.” Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 11-12.

     By decrees dated and entered August 18, 2022, the trial court

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In addition, by orders dated

and entered the same date, the court changed Children’s permanency goals

to adoption.   Mother, through Counsel, filed timely notices of appeal and

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The trial

court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 25, 2022.

     Counsel filed his petition to withdraw and Anders brief in this Court on

December 1, 2022, which we address first. This Court has explained:

           When counsel files an Anders brief, this Court may
           not review the merits without first addressing
           counsel’s request to withdraw. [T]his Court [has]
           extended the Anders principles to appeals involving
           the termination of parental rights. . . .

In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

     To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

           1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
           after making a conscientious examination of the

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           record, counsel has determined that the appeal would
           be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief
           to the [appellant]; and 3) advise the [appellant] that
           he or she has the right to retain private counsel or
           raise additional arguments that the [appellant] deems
           worthy of the court’s attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en

banc) (citation omitted).

     In Santiago, our Supreme Court held:

           [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-
           appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel
           must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural
           history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
           to anything in the record that counsel believes
           arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s
           conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
           counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
           frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts
           of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on
           point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal
           is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.3d at 361.

     Additionally, this Court has stated that,

           [P]ursuant to Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873
           A.2d 748 (Pa.Super. 2005) and its progeny, [c]ounsel
           also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his
           client[, along with] a letter that advises the client of
           his right to: (1) retain new counsel to pursue the
           appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
           points that the appellant deems worthy of the
           court[‘]s attention in addition to the points raised by
           counsel in the Anders brief.

In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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      With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform

the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court

has held counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the letter

sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.” Millisock, 873 A.2d

at 752. Finally, “[o]nce counsel has satisfied the above requirements, it is

then this Court’s duty to conduct its own review of the court’s proceedings and

render an independent judgment as to whether the appeal is, in fact, wholly

frivolous.” In re X.J., 105 A.3d at 4 (citation omitted).

      Instantly, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw. Counsel also filed an

Anders brief which includes a summary of the procedural history and facts of

the case with citations to the record, issues that could arguably support

Mother’s appeal, and Counsel’s assessment regarding why the appeal is

frivolous with citations to relevant legal authority. Finally, Counsel attached

to his petition the letter that he sent to Mother advising of her right to retain

new counsel or proceed pro se to pursue her appeal. Accordingly, Counsel

complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.

      We next “conduct a review of the record to ascertain if on its face, there

are non-frivolous issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or

misstated.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1197 (Pa.Super.

2018) (en banc).

      We note the standard of review in termination of parental rights cases:

            [A]ppellate courts . . . accept the findings of fact and
            credibility determinations of the trial court if they are

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           supported by the record. If the factual findings are
           supported, appellate courts review to determine if the
           trial court made an error of law or abused its
           discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse of
           discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
           unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
           will. The trial court's decision, however, should not be
           reversed merely because the record would support a
           different result. We have previously emphasized our
           deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
           observations of the parties spanning multiple
           hearings.

In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 941-942 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

     Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of

parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.

           Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
           party seeking termination must prove by clear and
           convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
           satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
           delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
           determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
           termination of his or her parental rights does the court
           engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
           Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and
           welfare of the child under the standard of best
           interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs
           and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status
           of the emotional bond between parent and child, with
           close attention paid to the effect on the child of
           permanently severing any such bond.

In re J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 942 (citation omitted).        In order to affirm a

termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the trial court as to

any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

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      In the matter at bar, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Here, we analyze

the court’s termination decrees pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which

provide as follows:

            (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard
            to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on
            any of the following grounds:

            ....

            (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
            neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
            to be without essential parental care, control or
            subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
            being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
            abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
            remedied by the parent.

            ....

            (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating
            the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration
            to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
            and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall
            not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental
            factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
            income, clothing and medical care if found to be
            beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any
            petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
            the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent
            to remedy the conditions described therein which are
            first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
            filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2), we have indicated:

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             In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23
             Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three elements
             must be met: (1) repeated and continued incapacity,
             abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse,
             neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without
             essential parental care, control or subsistence
             necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and
             (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
             refusal cannot or will not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental

duties.” In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting In re

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)) (internal

citation omitted). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.” Matter of

Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

As   such,   “A   parent’s   vow   to    cooperate,   after   a   long   period   of

uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re S.C., supra at 1105

(citation omitted).

      A careful review of the record supports termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2). Primarily, Children have never resided with Mother and she has

never provided for their needs. Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 24-26, 42-46.

Ms. Tillman, CUA case manager, testified that Mother actually delayed various,

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unspecified services and assessments for S.C. because she refused to sign

consents. Id. at 42.

      In 2018, during S.C.’s first year of life, Ms. Tillman testified that Mother

regularly attended supervised visits with S.C. Id. at 39. In December 2018,

the trial court granted Mother twice weekly unsupervised community visits

with him. Id. at 40-42; Order, 12/5/2018. Mother continued to visit S.C.

regularly during 2019.    Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. However, Ms.

Tillman testified that “[Mother’s] visits [] became an issue because [she]

started not attending or being late to visits.” Id. at 42. On January 6, 2020,

the trial court returned Mother to supervised visits.        Id. at 43; Order,

1/6/2020.

      Thereafter, Mother gave birth to G.C. in August 2021.          Ms. Tillman

testified that “[d]uring the visits, [Mother] just has him in his stroller, and

she’s just sitting there looking at him.      She’s not holding him.”   Notes of

testimony, 8/18/22 at 46. According to DHS’s petition, Mother last saw G.C.

in March 2022. DHS Petition, 7/25/2022, at ¶ s. In addition, with respect to

Mother’s visits with S.C., Ms. Tillman stated that “[h]e plays with [Mother].

[Mother] does not have -- [Mother] is not nurturing.        She sits there. She

argues with him. She yells at him.” Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. It is

unclear from the record when Mother last saw S.C.             After returning to

supervised visits, Mother never again achieved unsupervised community

visits. Id. at 43.

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      Ms. Finley, outpatient therapist at JFK Behavioral Health, testified that

Mother participated in therapy from December 2019 to December 10, 2021,

for a total of twenty-six sessions over two years.    Id. at 20. She further

testified that Mother was discharged on February 4, 2022, due to Mother’s

lack of attendance. Id.

      Finally, despite notice, Mother did not appear for the termination of

parental rights hearing. Id. at 10-12. Mother contacted her counsel right

before the hearing to tell him that she was not attending, stating her “health

is more important than this hearing.”    Id. at 11-12. Accordingly, Counsel

could not state Mother’s position on the record. Id. at 30.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial

court in concluding that Mother’s conduct warrants termination pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(2).     The record demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and

continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to comply with her permanency goals,

resolve her mental health issues, and provide any type of love or care to

Children, has caused Children to be without essential parental care, control,

or subsistence necessary for their physical and mental well-being. Further,

the conditions and cause of Mother’s incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.

      We turn now to Section 2511(b), which requires the court to “give

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and

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welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such

as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d

251, 267 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our Supreme Court

has made clear that Section 2511(b) requires the trial court to consider the

nature and status of bond between a parent and child. In re E.M., 620 A.2d

481, 484-485 (Pa. 1993). It is reasonable to infer that no bond exists when

there is no evidence suggesting the existence of one. See In re K.Z.S., 946

A.2d 753, 762–763 (Pa.Super. 2008). To the extent there is a bond, the trial

court must examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a

“necessary and beneficial relationship,” thereby causing a child to suffer

“extreme emotional consequences.” In re E.M., 620 A.2d at 484-485.

      “While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major aspect

of the [s]ubsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one

of many factors to be considered by the court when determining what is in the

best interest of the child.” In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa.Super. 2014).

“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally emphasize the

safety needs of the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as

the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the foster

parent.”   Id.   In determining needs and welfare, the court may properly

consider the effect of the parent’s conduct upon the child and consider

“whether a parent is capable of providing for a child’s safety and security or

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whether such needs can be better met by terminating a parent’s parental

rights.” L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2021).

      Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates

that courts considering termination must also consider whether the children

are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster

parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing the

bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.”     Id. at 269.    The T.S.M. Court

observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have an

obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . .

the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      As related supra, Mother has never cared for Children. Ms. Tillman

testified that Mother does not have a parental bond with Children. Regarding

S.C., she testified that Mother merely “argues with him” and “yells at him.”

Notes of testimony, 8/18/22 at 39. Ms. Tillman further testified that when

Mother visited G.C., she did not hold him and merely looked at him as he sat

in the stroller. Id. at 46. Ms. Tillman testified that Children would not suffer

irreparable harm if Mother’s rights are terminated, and it is in their best

interest to terminate her rights. Id. at 39-41, 46.

      Ms. Tillman also stated that Children are bonded to their respective

kinship foster parents, with whom Children have resided from the outset of

their cases and are pre-adoptive resources. Id. at 37-48. Ms. Tillman testified

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that S.C.’s kinship foster parent, J.S., provides for his daily needs and attends

his doctors’ appointments. Id. at 40. Ms. Tillman further testified that S.C.

requires unspecified services because he “has some delays.” Id. She stated

that J.S. ensures that S.C. gets the services he needs and has been teaching

him sign language. Id. at 40-41. Regarding G.C., Ms. Tillman testified that

G.C. considers his kinship foster parent, S.M., to be his “mom.” Id. at 45.

Ms. Tillman stated that S.M. provides for G.C.’s daily needs, attends his

doctors’ appointments, and brings him to play dates. Id. Finally, Ms. Tillman

testified that the kinship foster parents know each other, and CUA can

organize sibling visits in the community to encourage a sibling relationship

between Children.     Id. at 48.   Accordingly, the trial court did not err in

terminating Mother’s parental rights because termination was consistent with

Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant

to Section 2511(b).

      Our independent review of the certified record reveals no preserved

non-frivolous issue that would arguably support these appeals from the

decrees.

      We decline to review Mother’s appeals from the orders changing

Children’s permanency goals in light of our disposition with respect to Mother’s

appeals from the termination decrees. By affirming the termination decrees,

Mother’s appeals from the goal change orders are moot. See In the Interest

of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is

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moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any

legal force or effect.”) (citation omitted).

      Therefore, we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw from representation,

affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and dismiss as moot the appeals from the

orders changing Children’s permanency goals to adoption.

      Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Decrees affirmed. Appeals from

goal change orders dismissed as moot.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/05/2023

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