Court Opinion

ID: 9754335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:55:34.938309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:52.320033
License: Public Domain

PORFILIO, Senior Circuit Judge
concurring in the result.
I believe the court has correctly concluded to dismiss this action, but because I also believe the Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue the merits of their claim, I cannot join in all the court’s reasoning. I neither need nor desire to prolong the disposition, so I shall briefly explain my premise.
The “merits” of the case presented by the Plaintiffs consist only of a claim that a constitutionally protected individual right to vote has been violated by the Colorado Supreme Court in People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo.2003). They limit this claim, however, to rights established in Art. I, § 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Yet, as we pointed out in Lance I and reiterated in this order, section 4 creates no individual right to vote, “independent and distinct from any ‘institutional’ right.” Order, p. 5. Indeed, Plaintiffs have provided no precedential support for their assumption of such an individual right.
Yet, the law of this Circuit requires that we take care not to conflate the merits of a ease with a plaintiffs standing. In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th Cir.2006) and Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1092-97 (10th Cir.2006) (en banc). Indeed, this court relies upon those cases in reaching the conclusion that the Plaintiffs have standing here.
Nonetheless, neither case is apposite because the conclusion reached in both was based upon an unquestionable individual constitutional right asserted by the plaintiffs: the right of free speech, and the right to propose initiated legislation, respectively. Here, however, Plaintiffs’ legally protected interest stands upon a right *1163that is not merely contested, it simply does not exist. See Initiative and Referendum, 450 F.3d at 1093.
Moreover, neither Special Grand Jury nor Initiative and Referendum suggests standing must be automatically conferred upon every plaintiff who asserts the violation of a First Amendment right. We may test the premise of any First Amendment claim, albeit carefully. See Initiative and Referendum, 450 F.3d at 1089. Remembering how the merits of this case are circumscribed, I believe predicating dismissal on lack of standing does not cross a boundary into improper conflation. Plaintiffs must first establish they have a right protected by section 4 before they may argue that right was aggrieved by the Colorado Supreme Court. Because they have not, even though presented with the opportunity to do so, their action must be dismissed for lack of standing.