Court Opinion

ID: 9797777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:29:06.716779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:48.192205
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
concurring in the judgment only.
I too would reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal; however, unlike the majority, I do not consider it to be within the discretion of any court to dismiss a person’s lawsuit for refusing to incriminate himself, no matter how significant his testimony may have been to the proceeding. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is not a qualified privilege, the exercise of which may be limited or burdened on the basis of its impact on an adverse party. Furthermore, I strongly disagree with the suggestion that a majority of courts considering the matter hold otherwise. The extreme minority of courts approving the dismissal of an invoking party’s claims in order to protect the interests of another have, in my view, simply failed to consider or correctly apply the controlling precedents of the Supreme Court, much like the majority does today.
It is beyond dispute that the privilege against self-incrimination, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, applies to civil as well as criminal proceedings. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S.Ct. 16, 69 L.Ed. 158 (1924). Unlike the criminal context, in which the defendant’s criminality and a state-imposed sanction are the ultimate matters at issue, however, in the civil context the constitutional privilege does not extend so far as to protect .an invoking party from inferences that may logically be drawn from its exercise. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). It has long been recognized that standing silent in certain circumstances, including in the face of an accusation of criminal conduct, may give rise to an inference of guilt. See Id.; S.E.C. v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir.1994). In a civil proceeding, such an inference is permissible, where appropriate, not as a sanction or remedy for any unfairness created by exercise of the privilege but simply because it is relevant and outside the scope of the privilege. See Baxter, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551.
Exercise of the privilege in the civil context is not without other disadvantages as well. Without giving testimony that effectively waives the privilege, a civil plaintiff may well find himself unable to carry his burden of proof. Because exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination in no way limits the court’s authority (or obligation) to manage the case fairly and efficiently, a number of courts have held that any attempt to waive the privilege, as it becomes advantageous or even necessary to maintain a *144claim — either at trial or in order to defend against pre-trial motions — must be considered in light of the unfairness created by such a belated waiver. See United States v. 4003-4005 5th Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y., 55 F.3d 78 (2d Cir.1995); Graystone Nash Inc., 25 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.1994); F.T.C. v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., 612 F.Supp. 1282 (D.Minn.1985). Because the privilege is constitutionally based, detriment to the pax-ty asserting it should be no more than is necessary to prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other side, but a party asserting the privilege has no absolute right to subsequently waive it, and trial courts must carefully balance his interests against an adversary’s entitlement to equitable treatment. See Graystone Nash Inc., 25 F.3d at 192.
Because C.R.C.P 26 does not require disclosure of privileged material, it is at least clear that proper exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination cannot amount to a discovery violation in the first instance and therefore cannot implicate either an order to compel or sanctions permitted by C.R.C.P. 37. Graystone Nash Inc., 25 F.3d at 191; Welding v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir.1980); Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir.1979). Whether burdens imposed on the exercise of the pi'ivilege are referred to as “sanctions” or merely as “remedies” to prevent inherent unfairness, the view that having selected the litigation process, a plaintiff may not use the privilege to advance his cause — to use it as a sword rather than a shield — is an “approach ... that has not cai'ried the day.” McMullen v. Bay Ship Mgmt, 335 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir.2003).
By my count, the “modern ti'end,” maj. op. at 140, or “more recent approach,” maj. op. at 141, referred to by the majority, consists of only one case from the First Circuit Court of Appeals, see Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc., 82 F.3d 515 (1st Cir.1996), which relies on the now largely discredited approach of the Fifth Circuit, see Wehling, 608 F.2d 1084, and a misi'eading of other modern cases. In contradistinction to this “approach,” it is clear, at least to me, that both the Second and Third Circuit cases relied upon by the majority, see McMullen, 335 F.3d 215; 4003-4005 5th Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y., 55 F.3d 78; Graystone Nash Inc., 25 F.3d 187, merely stand for the proposition that a balance is required before a pai'ty may be permitted to change his mind and belatedly waive the pi'ivilege. The Third Circuit in McMullen expressly distinguishes Serafino, which had been relied on by the distinct court being reviewed, and holds that the case is controlled by Gray-stone instead. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Campbell, 592 F.2d 1054, see maj. op. at 141, explains Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir.1969), see maj. op. at 140, as a case in which the privilege was not properly invoked in the first place and therefore refusal to answer was appropriately subject to Rule 37 sanctions, Campbell, 592 F.2d at 1057, and it expressly holds it to be “obvious that dismissal of an action is costly and therefore would not survive the Griffin test,” id. at 1058, prohibiting any penalty for exercising the privilege against self-incrimination.
The privilege against self-incrimination is no more relative to an opponent’s need for the undisclosed information than is any statutorily created privilege, see Clark v. Dist. Ct., Second Judicial Dist., City and County of Denver, 668 P.2d 3, 9 (1983), and courts have no more authority to penalize its exercise than the exercise of any other absolute privilege. Courts must determine whether the privilege against self-incrimination has been properly invoked, whether it has been (or may even permissibly be) waived, and what inferences may logically be drawn from its exercise. While logical inferences arising from the exercise of the privilege are not barred in civil proceedings, and a court must exercise its discretion to insure that an invoking pai'ty may not acquire an unfair advantage by belated waiver, an opposing party has no right to a properly invoking party’s testimony, no matter how advantageous it might be for the defense. The disadvantage to another party resulting from the privilege against self-incrimination is among the inherent costs associated with any such policy choice and is not a matter to be “remedied” by imposing a penalty — like dismissal of a party’s lawsuit — upon exercise of that right.
Because I believe the majority, in much the same way as the First Circuit upon which *145it relies, fundamentally misperceives the nature of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, I do not join its opinion. Because I agree, however, that it correctly reverses the court of appeals opinion upholding the trial court’s dismissal, I concur in the judgment of the court.