Court Opinion

ID: 9720804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:41:47.507648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.401950
License: Public Domain

PUGLIA, P. J.
I concur in the result and join in the opinion of the court except insofar as it declares that the right of confrontation at preliminary hearing emanates from the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., Amend. VI).
The constitutional right of confrontation is “basically a trial right” (Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719, 725 [20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260, 88 S.Ct. 115]; Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934) 291 U.S. 97, 107 [78 L.Ed. 674, 679, 54 S.Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575]; see also In re Montgomery (1970) 2 Cal.3d 863, 867 [87 Cal.Rptr. 695, 471 P.2d 15]; People v. House (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 756, 766-767 [90 Cal.Rptr. 831]). Although the federal Constitution requires a probable cause hearing to justify significant pretrial detention of defendant, that hearing need not include traditional adversary safeguards such as the right of confrontation (Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) 420 U.S. 103, 119-125 [43 *672L.Ed.2d 54, 68-72, 95 S.Ct. 854]; cf. Gallaher v. Superior Court (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 666, 671 [162 Cal.Rptr. 389]). Moreover, the federal Constitution does not require a judicial hearing at all as a prerequisite to prosecution by information (Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 119 [43 L.Ed.2d at p. 68]). A fortiori, when state procedure nevertheless provides for such a hearing, it would logically follow that the federal Constitution does not require the entire panoply of procedural rights available at trial to be observed in the pretrial hearing (cf. Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 7-11 [26 L.Ed.2d 387, 395-398, 90 S.Ct. 1999]).
The right of confrontation at preliminary hearing historically has been conferred by statute in California (Pen. Code, § 865; see also Pen. Code, § 686). Whether it also now derives from the state Constitution (art. I, § 15) is not determinative here (see Stevenson v. Superior Court (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 925, 930 [154 Cal.Rptr. 476]). The statutory right is unquestionably a substantial right (Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 875, 879-880 [59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304]) and the dispositions of the magistrate in the conduct of the preliminary hearing deprived petitioner of the full benefits of that right.