Court Opinion

ID: 9707744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:20:24.923051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:37.532455
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Judge,
dissenting.
The trial court properly dismissed the Bagnalls’ writ petitions. I disagree with the majority’s contrary view. Concerning petitions 1 and 3 the majority finds dispositive the case of Board of Zoning Appeals v. Elkins, 659 N.E.2d 681 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. I cannot agree because El-kins stands for the proposition that notice need not be perfected within thirty days. In fact our supreme court opinion upon which Elkins relies specifically holds “[t]o require the actual service of notice within thirty (30) days after the decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals would read into the statute something which is not present.” Porter v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals, 146 Ind.App. 272, 277, 254 N.E.2d 882, 884-85 (1970) (emphasis added). The case before us has nothing to do with when notice is perfected or served. Hence Elkins provides little guidance. Rather this case involves the question of when must notice be filed. The distinction is subtle but important because: (a) the notice requirement is jurisdictional, and (b) as a result only by a party’s strict compliance with the notice requirement doe's the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the parties or the case. Shipshewana Convenience Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of LaGrange County, 656 N.E.2d 812, 813 (Ind.1995).
Here, the relevant statute provides in pertinent part “on filing” of a writ petition, the petitioner “shall have a notice served by the sheriff....” Ind.Code § 36-7-4-1005. I agree with the trial court that a plain reading of the statute requires that notice must be filed contemporaneously with the filing of the writ petition. The sheriff may then serve notice upon the necessary parties. If notice is thereafter actually served or perfected outside of the thirty (30) day time limit, then as Elkins and Porter dictate, there is no jurisdictional defect because the statutory requirement would have been met. In this case it is clear that the Bagnalls did not file their notices at the time their petitions for writ of certiorari were filed. As a result they failed to comply strictly with the statutory mandate. Accordingly the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the parties or this case and properly dismissed the Bagnalls’ petitions. I therefore dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court on this point.