Court Opinion

ID: 2964744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:26.056501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:57.174305
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2209

                                 MARK R. MERRIFIELD,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                   JOHN DEMELLO, BARNSTABLE COUNTY SHERIFF, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________
                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________
                                 ____________________

            Mark R. Merrifield on brief pro se.
            __________________
            Joan M. LeGraw, Robert  S. Troy and Robert S. Troy and Associates,
            ______________  _______________     _____________________________
        on  brief for  appellees,  John DeMello,  Barnstable County  Sheriff's
        Dept.,  Robert  A. O'Leary,  John W.  Doane,  Victoria H.  Lowell, and
        Barnstable County.
            John  J. O'Brien, Jr. and Kirby, O'Brien & von Rosenvinge on brief
            _____________________     _______________________________
        for appellees,  Nancy Blanchard,  Neil Nightingale and  The Barnstable
        Police Department.
            Scott  Harshbarger,  Attorney  General,   and  William  J.  Meade,
            __________________                             __________________
        Assistant Attorney General, on Motion to Dismiss Appeal or for Summary
        Affirmance  and Memorandum  of Law  in Support  for appellees,  Philip
        Rollins and J. Thomas Kirkman.

                                 ____________________

                                    June 18, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      Per  Curiam.    Pro  se appellant  Mark  Merrifield
                      ___________

            appeals from  the district court's grant  of summary judgment

            against  him in  his 42  U.S.C.    1983 suit  against various

            local  government defendants.   After  careful review  of the

            record, we conclude that  most of Merrifield's contentions on

            appeal  lack  merit.    Accordingly, we  affirm  judgment  in

            defendants' favor  essentially for  the reasons given  in the

            district court's orders issued on  December 19, 1995, and  on

            July 2, 1996.   However, we affirm dismissal of  Merrifield's

            claims against Barnstable town police officer Nancy Blanchard

            for the reasons given below.  

                      We note that  the record gives rise  to an isolated

            issue of fact  as to whether  sworn statements or  affidavits
                                          _____

            were  submitted.   The  Fourth  Amendment  warrant clause  is

            directed to sworn statements and it is not certain that sworn

            statements, either written or oral, were submitted in support

            of the  arrest warrant  which Officer Blanchard  obtained and

            relied  on in  arresting  Merrifield on  September 17,  1992.

            But, for reasons  that follow,  we do not  think any  purpose

            would be served by a remand to explore  this factual issue in

            further detail or to determine whether on the facts so found,

            a constitutional  violation might exist (and,  if so, whether

            any damages could be established).

                 The reason why this is unnecessary is that the thrust of

            Merrifield's   1983 action  is for malicious prosecution, not

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            merely for wrongful arrest.   Merrifield asserts not  just an

            absence of  sworn affidavits  to support the  arrest warrant,

            but  that the  charges  against him  were  "bogus", that  the

            warrant  was maliciously  obtained, and  that, in  effect, it

            lacked any factual  basis.  A judgment  in Merrifield's favor

            would  consequently imply  the invalidity  of his  subsequent

            conviction  of  the  charges   for  which  he  was  arrested.

            Accordingly,  since  Merrifield   has  not  shown  that   his

            conviction  has already  been invalidated,  his suit  must be

            dismissed.   See  Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.  477, 486 (1994)
                         ___  ____    ________

            (if  judgment in a   1983 plaintiff's favor would necessarily

            imply the invalidity of his conviction, the complaint must be

            dismissed  unless  the  plaintiff can  demonstrate  that  the

            conviction has  already been  invalidated).   We note  that a

            dismissal under Heck is without prejudice.  See Guzman-Rivera
                            ____    _______ _________   ___ _____________

            v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1994).
               ___________

                      During  the course  of  this action,  the  district

            court dismissed  two  defendants  --  Clerk  Magistrate  Omer

            Chartrand and defense counsel John Biega -- without prejudice

            since they had never been served with process.  We modify the

            judgment in their favor to be with prejudice since Merrifield
                                          ____

            could  not bring  suit  against them  at  all under     1983.

            Chartrand was absolutely immune for his decision to issue the

            arrest  warrant.   See Scott  v. Dixon,  720 F.2d  1542, 1546
                               ___ _____     _____

            (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); see also
                              ____________                       ___ ____

                                         -3-

            Boyer  v. City  of Washington,  971 F.2d  100, 102  (8th Cir.
            _____     ___________________

            1992)  (per  curiam)  (dictum);  Torres  Ramirez v.  Bermudez
                                             _______________     ________

            Garcia, 898 F.2d  224, 228 (1st Cir.  1990) (by implication).
            ______

            Since defendant  John Biega was appointed by  the state court

            to  defend Merrifield  against the  criminal  charges against

            him, his actions did not constitute state action under   1983

            and he could  not be sued.   See Polk  County v. Dodson,  454
                                         ___ ____________    ______

            U.S. 312, 325 (1981).

                      Affirmed.   We  modify the  judgment  of  dismissal
                      ___________________________________________________

            against defendant Nancy Blanchard to be without prejudice and
            _____________________________________________________________

            the judgment of  dismissal against defendants  Omer Chartrand
            _____________________________________________________________

            and John Biega to be with prejudice.   
            ____________________________________

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