Court Opinion

ID: 9778479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:07:16.383468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:17.021638
License: Public Domain

SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice,
concurring.
I agree the jury’s negligence findings must be reinstated and judgment should be rendered in Rocor’s favor on this theory of liability.1 But I do not believe Rocor *816has a cause of action for breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.2 Nor do I believe either that National Union waived its cross-points3 or that Rocor is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.4

. Cf., e.g., American Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Tex.1994) (ex*816plaining that Stowers duty arises out of contractual obligations to defend and indemnify insured and its control over insured’s defense); id. at 847 n. 11 (declining to address “the difference between the requirement of 'good faith’ in ‘attempting’ settlement under Tex. Ins.Code Ann. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b)(4), and the common law standard of ordinary care concerning a third-party liablity insurer's attempts to settle a covered lawsuit”); id. at 849 (explaining that Stowers liability may extend beyond liability for excess judgment after negligent failure to settle within policy limits); American Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480 (Tex.1992) (Stowers duty owed by primary carrier in charge of settlement negotiations to excess carrier); Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983) ("One who voluntarily enters an affirmative course of action affecting the interests of another is regarded as assuming a duty to act and must do so with reasonable care.”); Ecotech Int’l., Inc. v. Griggs & Harrison, 928 S.W.2d 644, 648 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (“We agree with the defendants that the Stowers doctrine covers a broad scope which includes investigation, preparation of defense, the trial, and certain matters within the agency relationship between the insurer and insured, such as negligence, gross negligence, failure to advise, acting without authority, breach of contract, and others.”); Emscor Mfg., Inc. v. Alliance Ins. Group, 879 S.W.2d 894, 909 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (Stow-ers duty “extends to the full range of the agency relationship as expressed in the policy,” but does not apply when insurer has “no duty to investigate, negotiate or defend [insured] under the terms of the excess policy or at law, and never undertook those responsibilities on its own.”).

. Maryland Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coating & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex.1996) ("[W]e now hold that Texas law recognizes only one tort duty in [the third-party insurance claim] context, that being the duly stated in Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.Comm’n App.1929, holding- approved).”) (citing Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex.1994) (Cornyn, J., joined by Hecht, J., concurring)) (emphasis added).

. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.2(b)(1)(A); Oak Park Townhouses v. Brazosport Bank, 851 S.W.2d 189, 190-91 (Tex.1993); Commonwealth Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Downs, 853 S.W.2d 104, 109 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993, writ denied).

. See Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818-19 (Tex.1997); Blair v. Fletcher, 849 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex.1993) ("[w]hen the applicable law changes during the pendency of the appeal, the court of appeals must render its decision in light of the change in the law.”)