Court Opinion

ID: 9664019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:59:50.994273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:01.224478
License: Public Domain

LAWSON, Justice (dissenting).
I am in accord with the conclusions reached in the majority opinion in every respect except that I am of the opinion that the judgment should be reversed because of the improper argument of State’s counsel.
The first statement made by the county solicitor with which we are concerned here ■was palpably improper. It was in part at least a statement of fact not in evidence, and as to which no evidence could have been introduced. It was a direct appeal to passion and not to reason. Its only tenden*423cy was to inflame the minds of the jury. Bridges v. State, 225 Ala. 81, 142 So. 56.
Likewise, the second statement of the county solicitor which is here under consideration was highly improper. It was a remark concerning which the solicitor could not possibly have any knowledge and in no event would that be a matter which could concern the jury. Johnson v. State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632; Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Drennen, 175 Ala. 338, 57 So. 876.
This court has frequently condemned argument of counsel similar to that made by the circuit solicitor in the State’s closing argument. Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 19 So.2d 11; Johnson v. State, 246 Ala. 630, 22 So.2d 105, and cases cited.
It is apparent that the learned trial court in excluding these statements and in admonishing the jury to disregard them sought, as he did throughout the trial, to protect the rights of the defendant. And it is clear from the remarks of the trial court included in his judgment overruling the motion for new trial that he entertained the view that the prejudicial effect of the remarks was eradicated by his instructions to the jury.
In Johnson v. State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632, 636, this court did not reverse the judgment of conviction when the solicitor stated to the jury in argument that counsel for defendant “though doing all they could to acquit the defendant, yet down in their hearts they knew he deserved the death penalty”, for the reason that the effect of such improper remarks was sufficiently removed by the trial court’s rebuke to the solicitor and his admonishment to the jury to disregard the remarks. To like effect is the case of Norris v. State, 236 Ala. 281, 182 So. 69.
But here we have three statements made by counsel for the State in the course of argument to the jury, all of which, as we have shown, were improper.
In the first, reference is made to lynching, a practice which the solicitor indicated had been resorted to “in cases of this character,” that is, in cases where a Negro is charged with raping a white woman.
In the next statement counsel, who had been appointed by the court to perform the solemn duty of representing a comparatively ignorant man who is without funds with which to employ counsel, are directly charged with the knowledge of the guilt of their client, who had just taken the stancí and who, upon examination by his counsel, had professed his innocence in no uncertain terms.
In the other statement counsel for the State in effect calls to the attention of the jury the fully packed courtroom and asks them not to let down the persons present in the courtroom, as well as those in the community.
All of this in a case where a Negro man is on trial for his life before a jury of white men, charged with the commission of a crime of this character.
I am unwilling to say that the admonitions of the trial court to the jury, though clear and forceful, could eradicate from the minds of the jury the cumulative effect of the improper arguments of State’s counsel.
This court has recognized the cumulative effect of improper arguments and reversed the judgment of conviction though the trial court had instructed the jury to disregard such improper statements. In Blue v. State, 246 Ala. 73, 19 So.2d 11, where the charge was not rape and the difference in races was not present, we said:
“In determining the question before the court, we do not think that each of the above statements must be analyzed separately to see whether or not, if standing alone, it would create an ineradicable bias or prejudice. We think, on the contrary, that these various statements should be considered together to determine whether or not, in their cumulative effect, they created a prejudicial atmosphere. It may be that some of the statements of the solicitor were replies in kind to statements made by counsel for the defendant, and we fully recognize, as said in Arant v. State, 232 Ala. 275, 167 So. 540, 544, ‘a trial is a legal battle, a combat in a sense, and not a parlor social *424affair.’ The record shows that the presiding judge exercised great patience and in most of these incidents did what he could to disabuse as far as possible the minds of the jury of any prejudicial impression; but it is our duty to see to it that trials are free from prejudice and passion and that the courthouse means that where a conviction is obtained, it is obtained in an impartial atmosphere. The foregoing remarks were made in the presence of the jury. Considering them in their cumulative effect, we think that they were calculated to inject the poison of bias and prejudice into the minds of the jury. They created an atmosphere of bias and prejudice which no remarks by the court could eradicate. This is not justice and prejudicial error has been shown. Kabase v. State, 244 Ala. 182, 12 So.2d 766.” 246 Ala. 79-80, 19 So.2d 16.
With full appreciation of the excellent manner in which the learned trial court conducted the course of the trial below and his efforts to protect the rights of the defendant, I am constrained to the conclusion that because of the improper and prejudicial arguments of counsel for the State, the judgment of conviction should be reversed.