Court Opinion

ID: 9396222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-19 20:04:40.624564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.293045
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U
                                       No. 2-22-0015
                                  Order filed May 19, 2023

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                           IN THE

                            APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTIN M. HUBLY,                              ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
                                              ) of McHenry County.
        Plaintiff-Appellant,                  )
                                              )
v.                                            ) No. 20-MR-1296
                                              )
CARMEN I. AYALA, in Her Official Capacity )
as State Superintendent of Education, EMILY )
FOX, in Her Official Capacity as Secretary of )
the State Educator Preparation and Licensure )
Board, ELIZABETH SIMON, in Her Official )
Capacity as Hearing Officer for the State     )
Educator Preparation and Licensure Board,     )
ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF                       )
EDUCATION, and STATE EDUCATOR                 )
PREPARATION AND LICENSURE BOARD, ) Honorable
                                              ) Thomas A. Meyer,
        Defendants-Appellees.                 ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

      JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court.
      Justices Hutchinson and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

¶1    Held: The State Educator Preparation and Licensure Board’s decision to revoke plaintiff’s
            professional educator license was neither an abuse of discretion nor contrary to law.
            Further, the State Educator Preparation and Licensure Board did not exceed its legal
            authority in revoking plaintiff’s professional educator license.
2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

¶2     Plaintiff, Justin M. Hubly, appeals pro se from an order of the circuit court of McHenry

County affirming a decision of the State Educator Preparation and Licensure Board (Board). In its

decision, the Board revoked Hubly’s professional educator license. On appeal, Hubly argues that

the Board’s decision to revoke his license was unduly harsh and contrary to law. Hubly also asserts

that the Board exceeded its legal authority in revoking his license. We affirm.

¶3                                     I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Hubly worked as a music teacher at Crystal Lake Central High School. In October 2016,

the school’s administration received information that Hubly, who was 34 years old at the time,

may have engaged in inappropriate conduct with several former students after their graduation.

Prior to contacting the police, the administration investigated the allegations internally. The

administration eventually turned the matter over to the Crystal Lake Police Department, which

conducted its own investigation.

¶5     The administration and the police received information that Hubly kissed and/or groped

two former students and that he provided alcohol to five underage former students. Hubly was

ultimately charged with: (1) battery for touching Rebecca Polk’s breast sometime between June 1

and July 31, 2016 (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2016)); (2) unlawful delivery of alcohol to a

minor for giving Polk alcohol during the same time period (235 ILCS 5/6-16(a)(iii) (West 2016));

(3) battery for touching Nicole Dombrowski’s thigh, kissing her neck, and kissing her mouth on

October 7, 2016 (720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2016)); and (4) four additional counts of unlawful

delivery of alcohol to a minor for giving Dombrowski alcohol on October 7, 2016, and for giving

Trevor Bryan, Katie Murphy, and Jennifer Anderson alcohol on December 30, 2015 (235 ILCS

5/6-16(a)(iii) (West 2016)). All charges against Hubly were misdemeanors. 735 ILCS 5/12-3(b)

(West 2016) (battery); 235 ILCS 5/6-16(a) (West 2016) (unlawful delivery of alcohol to a minor).

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Following a bench trial, the circuit court of McHenry County found Hubly guilty of battery with

respect to both Polk and Dombrowski. The court also found Hubly guilty of unlawful delivery of

alcohol to a minor with respect to Polk, Dombrowski, Bryan, and Murphy. The court found Hubly

not guilty of unlawful delivery of alcohol to a minor with respect to Anderson. The court sentenced

Hubly to conditional discharge on the battery convictions and to supervision on the unlawful-

delivery-of-alcohol-to-a-minor convictions. Hubly appealed. On September 16, 2019, this court

affirmed Hubly’s convictions and sentences. People v. Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U.

¶6     On or about December 31, 2019, the State Superintendent of Education (Superintendent)

issued to Hubly a notice of opportunity for hearing. The notice advised Hubly that his professional

educator license was subject to revocation pursuant to section 21B-75 of the Illinois School Code

(School Code) (105 ILCS 5/21B-75 (West 2018)) based on conduct alleged in the attached

statement of charges. The Superintendent amended the statement of charges in May 2020. As

amended, the statement of charges alleged as follows. Hubly was a music teacher at Crystal Lake

Central High School from April 15, 2004, until November 7, 2016, when he resigned. During

Hubly’s employment at the school, he engaged in unprofessional behavior with some of his former

students. Specifically, on or about December 30, 2015, Hubly provided alcoholic beverages to two

former students—Bryan and Murphy—even though they were both under 21 years of age. Further,

in or about June or July 2016, Hubly invited Polk, a former student, to his residence, placed his

hand on Polk’s breast without her consent, and served Polk alcohol even though she was under 21

years of age. Additionally, on or about October 7, 2016, Hubly invited Dombrowski, a former

student, to his residence where he kissed her, rubbed his hands on her thighs, attempted to touch

her breast, and served her alcohol even though she was under 21 years of age. The Superintendent

asserted that respondent’s behavior established “unprofessional conduct, immorality, or other just

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cause that preclude [sic] him from continuing to hold a Professional Educator License.” The

Superintendent recommended that Hubly’s professional educator license be revoked pursuant to

section 21B-75 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21B-75 (West 2018)). In response to the

Superintendent’s notice, Hubly filed a written request for hearing.

¶7     A hearing on the amended statement of charges was held virtually before hearing officer

Elizabeth Simon on June 19, 2020. Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation which

provided, among other things, that, in lieu of calling witnesses, the parties would stipulate to the

entry of the transcript from Hubly’s criminal trial and that the testimony of the witnesses at the

criminal matter would be the same as if they had been called to testify at the revocation hearing.

The hearing officer admitted the parties’ stipulation as well as numerous joint exhibits and other

exhibits. The transcript of Hubly’s criminal trial provided in relevant part as follows.

¶8     Polk testified that she graduated from Crystal Lake Central High School in 2014 and that

Hubly was her musical director at the school. For the first two years after she graduated, Polk

worked at the school as the assistant choreographer for productions. As part of that experience,

Polk developed a relationship with Hubly that turned into a close friendship. Polk further testified

that she met with Hubly around 10 times during the summer of 2016. Polk recalled one particular

occasion in late June or early July 2016 when she went to Hubly’s house around 9 or 10 p.m. to

drink and talk. Polk stated that at the time, she was 19 years of age but would turn 20 at the end of

July. Polk testified that upon her arrival, Hubly had a shot of tequila waiting for her, which she

drank. Polk also testified that they were discussing “random stuff” when Hubly “started talking

about boobs, and he had said that [she] had nice boobs, and then he grabbed [her breast].”

Specifically, Polk stated that Hubly quickly grabbed her breast under her clothing, squeezed, let

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

go, and then removed his hand. Polk stated that she felt “shocked,” “grossed out,” and “taken

aback” by Hubly’s actions and became “uncomfortable,” leaving shortly thereafter.

¶9        Dombrowski testified that she graduated from Crystal Lake Central High School in 2015

and that Hubly was her choir and musical director. Dombrowski maintained a relationship with

Hubly after she graduated. Dombrowski stated that she and Hubly were friends and that he would

give her advice and guidance as she struggled with being homesick during the transition from high

school to college. In October 2016, Dombrowski made plans via text to go to Hubly’s house on

October 7 to hang out, talk, and catch up. Dombrowski was 19 years of age at that time.

Dombrowski knew that she was going to be drinking, so she asked her sister to be her designated

driver.

¶ 10      Dombrowski testified that her sister dropped her off at Hubly’s house between 10:30 and

11 p.m. Dombrowski asked her sister to pick her up at 1 a.m. Dombrowski testified that when she

arrived at Hubly’s home, he was the only person there. Dombrowski said that Hubly gave her two

mixed drinks and a shot of tequila, which she drank. Hubly was also drinking alcohol. Although

Dombrowski brought a bottle of wine with her, she did not bring the alcohol used to make the

mixed drinks. Dombrowski testified that as she and Hubly were talking, Hubly “leaned forward,

kind of got up on his knee, and began kissing [her] on [her] mouth and then stuck his tongue down

[her] throat and began kissing [her] neck as well.” Asked what she meant when she said that Hubly

stuck his tongue down her throat, Dombrowski responded, “Like in a very aggressive way he kind

of forced his tongue into [her] mouth.” Dombrowski said that as Hubly kissed her, his hands were

“rubbing on [her] thighs and on [her] stomach” and that Hubly “put his hand up [her] shirt and

attempted to grab [her] breast.” Dombrowski said Hubly was not successful in grabbing her breast

because she “squirmed away.” Asked what, if anything, she was doing while this was happening,

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

Dombrowski responded that she was not doing anything and “was not reciprocating the action.”

Dombrowski testified that she felt “uncomfortable” and “very scared” while Hubly kissed her and

rubbed her thighs. She also felt “uncomfortable” and “violated” when Hubly tried to grab her

breast. Dombrowski explained that she stayed on the couch because she did not have anywhere

else to go. Dombrowski and Hubly then talked for 30 to 45 minutes. According to Dombrowski,

Hubly’s demeanor was “very flirtatious and very forward, and he was sitting close to [her].” Hubly

then kissed her a second time. Dombrowski stated that she felt “uncomfortable and scared” the

second time he kissed her. After the second kiss, Dombrowski texted her sister to come pick her

up. As Dombrowski was leaving, Hubly hugged her and attempted to kiss her a third time, but she

backed away when he leaned in.

¶ 11   Anderson testified that she graduated from Crystal Lake Central High School in 2014 and

that Hubly was her high school choir director. After graduation, Anderson maintained a

relationship with Hubly, which she described as an “[a]uthoritative friendship.” Anderson further

testified that she went to Hubly’s home three or four times after she graduated. Anderson recalled

one occasion around New Year’s in 2015 or 2016 when she and some friends went to Hubly’s

house and she consumed alcohol there. Anderson testified that Hubly made the drinks for her and

“[m]ost of the people that were there.” At the time, Anderson was 19 years of age. Anderson denied

bringing any alcohol to Hubly’s house.

¶ 12   Bryan testified that he graduated from Crystal Lake Central High School in 2014 and that

Hubly was a former teacher of his. After graduation, Bryan maintained a relationship with Hubly.

Bryan testified that in December 2015, he was at Hubly’s home with several former students and

Hubly served him alcohol. Bryan testified that he was 19 years of age at the time. Bryan said that

he consumed several mixed drinks, a shot of tequila, and a shot of gin. Bryan testified that Hubly

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

“poured all the drinks,” adding “we’ve been drinking at Hubly’s so many times.” Hubly also

consumed alcohol that night. Bryan further testified that Hubly specifically instructed the former

students not to take photos or videos in his home. Bryan denied bringing any alcohol with him to

Hubly’s house. In addition, Bryan stated that Anderson did not drink alcohol on the night in

question because she was the designated driver.

¶ 13   Murphy testified that she graduated from Crystal Lake Central High School in 2014 and

that although Hubly was a teacher at the school, he was never her teacher. Murphy said that she

met Hubly after graduation through friends. Murphy testified that during winter break of 2015, she

was at Hubly’s home with several of her former high school classmates. At that time, Hubly served

her alcohol. Murphy stated she was 20 years of age at that time. Murphy said that she consumed

several mixed drinks and several shots and that Hubly made the mixed drinks. Murphy denied

bringing any alcohol with her to Hubly’s home.

¶ 14   Hubly testified on his own behalf. He denied many of the above actions attributed to him.

With respect to Polk, Hubly denied that she had been inside his home during the summer of 2016,

denied serving her alcohol, and denied talking about or touching her breasts. Regarding

Dombrowski, Hubly admitted giving her two mixed drinks and a shot of tequila. Hubly testified

that he and Dombrowski “kissed mutually.” Hubly admitted touching Dombrowski’s thighs, but

denied putting his tongue in her mouth, putting his hand up her shirt, or kissing her a second time.

Hubly said that in October 2016, he was 34 years of age, which was 15 years older than

Dombrowski. Hubly characterized their kiss as “misconstrued,” but believed that Dombrowski had

otherwise testified truthfully. Regarding Bryan, Murphy, and Anderson, Hubly denied serving

them alcohol in December 2015. He said that the only alcohol that was consumed that night was

what the group had brought with them. He added that “[t]hey were drunk when they got [to his

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

home].” Hubly opined that other than Dombrowski, the students had “walked into this courtroom

like they walked into District 155, and they lied.” Hubly further remarked that Bryan “got kids to

lie.”

¶ 15    The trial court found Hubly guilty of two counts of battery regarding his conduct with Polk

and Dombrowski, and four counts of unlawful delivery of alcohol to a minor regarding his conduct

with Polk, Dombrowski, Bryan, and Murphy. The court found that “the testimony of the students

was essentially credible, and that the testimony of [Hubly] was less so.” The court stated that

although Hubly “suggested a type of ‘conspiracy’ against him, [it] was presented with no credible

evidence of any concerted effort to fabricate or tell untruths.” In finding that Hubly had committed

battery, the court noted that Polk and Dombrowski had “a type of mentor relationship” with Hubly

while they attended college, and that they “did not believe that the nature of their relationship with

[Hubly] had changed to a romantic or even potentially romantic one, nor did they give their consent

to such a change.” Although the court found the State’s evidence sufficient to prove unlawful

delivery of alcohol to a minor regarding Hubly’s conduct with Polk, Dombrowski, Bryan, and

Murphy, the court found “problems” with the State’s presentation of evidence concerning

Anderson, and therefore acquitted him of that charge.

¶ 16    Following Hubly’s convictions, the court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Crystal

Lake Police Department Detective David Eitel, who investigated the allegations against Hubly,

testified regarding the investigation and what numerous students had told him. According to Eitel,

Dombrowski said that when Hubly was her teacher, he made comments about students becoming

friends with him on social media after graduation. Dombrowski said it was “the cool thing” to be

friends with Hubly and go to his home after graduation. Dombrowski also said that after she

developed a personal relationship with Hubly, they would talk to each other about their sexual

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

experiences. Bryan told Eitel that he and his friends were uncomfortable when Hubly tried to be

more of a counselor than their teacher. Bryan said that when he was in high school, Hubly wanted

him to stay after school to talk about issues relating to Bryan’s family and girlfriend. Bryan also

said that Hubly had told Bryan that Bryan was gay and “needed to be who he was,” but Bryan

denied being gay and said he felt “exploited.” Anderson told Eitel that she had been to Hubly’s

home with friends after she had graduated, that the gatherings were “mostly harmless,” and that

Hubly had provided alcohol. Anderson said that she sometimes felt uncomfortable around Hubly,

and described an incident in which Hubly was intoxicated and went “around asking girls including

[Anderson] if he could take a shot out [sic] of their tits.” Anderson also said that Hubly

“constantly” asked her about her sex life and would share details with her about his own sex life

including the different people with whom he had had sex and the places it had occurred. Another

former student of Crystal Lake Central High School, identified in the record only as M.D., told

Eitel that she thought Hubly “took advantage of his position of power and preyed on the vulnerable

students at school.” M.D. added that Hubly was “drawn to kids with a bad home life.” M.D. also

told Eitel that Hubly asked her about her brother being gay.

¶ 17   At the sentencing hearing, Hubly spoke in allocution. He apologized to his students for his

abrupt resignation, to his colleagues, and to Dombrowski and her family. He also apologized “to

the community for [his] poor decision-making,” and expressed “hope that everyone can accept

[his] apology and [his] commitment to do better.” He submitted 18 letters in support of his

character and teaching career, primarily from former students and current and former teachers.

¶ 18   The trial court sentenced Hubly to conditional discharge on the battery convictions and to

court supervision on the unlawful-delivery-of-alcohol-to-a-minor convictions. The court also

ordered Hubly to undergo a sex evaluation as part of his sentence on the battery convictions. The

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court explained that Hubly appeared to be “a great music teacher and a great theater director,” and

the court believed he deserved a second chance, but that “school boards and others who may hire

him in the future should be aware that he is getting a second chance.” The court found that Hubly

was not entitled to a sentence of supervision on the battery counts because it could not find “that

it would be in the public’s best interest or in a school board’s best interest or school district’s best

interest to be unaware that [Hubly] is being given a second chance.”

¶ 19    Hubly filed a motion to reconsider sentence. At the hearing on that motion, Hubly argued

that the court should have imposed a sentence of supervision on the battery convictions. The court

denied the motion. The court explained that, under the supervision statute (730 ILCS 5/5-6-1(c)

(West 2016)), it had to consider whether the public would be best served by Hubly receiving only

supervision, such that he would not have a criminal record. The court concluded that not having a

record of the crimes would not be in the public’s best interest and that “the public [would be] best

served if whatever [school] district hires him in the future knows that [he is getting] a second

chance.”

¶ 20    Hubly appealed to this court, challenging, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his two battery convictions and his conviction of providing alcohol to Polk. We

affirmed his convictions. People v. Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U. In our disposition, we

noted that the evidence against Hubly with respect to Polk presented “a classic ‘he said, she said’

case.” Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U, ¶ 62. We concluded that the trial court, which was

charged with evaluating the credibility of the witnesses and assessing any flaws in their testimony,

reasonably credited Polk’s testimony over that of Hubly. Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U,

¶¶ 62-64. We further noted that “[t]he evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that [Hubly]

was a mentor and a close friend to [Dombrowski] rather than a prospective romantic partner,” and

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2023 IL App (2d) 220015-U

that “[e]ven if [Hubly] could have reasonably construed their get-together as a date, the evidence

*** did not support [Hubly’s] argument that he merely made ‘[a] reasonable romantic physical

advance.’ ” Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U, ¶ 76. We explained that Hubly “did not simply

go in for a first kiss,” but “ ‘forced his tongue’ ” into Dombrowski’s mouth in “ ‘a very aggressive

way,’ ” “rubbed her thighs and stomach, and put his hand up her shirt and attempted to grab her

breast.” Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U, ¶ 76. Additionally, we commented that Hubly had

kissed Dombrowski a second time after she had “rebuffed” him by “squirm[ing] away,” and then

attempted a third kiss as she left his home. Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U, ¶ 77.

¶ 21   After the stipulation of facts, joint exhibits, and other exhibits had been admitted into

evidence, the hearing officer heard opening statements. The Superintendent requested the

revocation of Hubly’s professional educator license on the basis that Hubly “exhibited a lack of

professional judgment by inviting underage former students to his home on multiple occasions[,]

*** provid[ing] alcohol to [them], *** [and] inappropriately touch[ing] two former female

students without their consent.” The Superintendent acknowledged Hubly’s lengthy career as a

teacher, but argued that Hubly’s conduct “outweighed the years of service he provided to the

School District.” Hubly requested a one-year suspension of his professional educator license.

Hubly stated that although his behavior “was indeed inappropriate, especially with

[Dombrowski],” he disagreed with many of the trial and appellate courts’ decisions, including that

his actions rose to the level of battery. He also emphasized that none of the victims had been

current students, and while they were under 21 years of age, they were all adults. In closing

argument, Hubly reiterated that “[e]veryone was an adult in this case.” He stated that “nobody was

lured by [him]” and nobody was “prodded along.” He denied providing alcohol to the former

students. He stated that he hoped the hearing officer would “take the time to read [the trial court’s]

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statements regarding the case,” because of the court’s specific finding that he “should receive a

second chance.” Hubly concluded by acknowledging again that he had committed “inappropriate

behavior” and offering a “commitment to do better.”

¶ 22   After closing arguments, the hearing officer admitted the Superintendent’s rebuttal

exhibits. 1 Hubly objected to the admission of the Superintendent’s rebuttal exhibit No. 1, which

was a letter of reprimand he received in 2006 regarding inappropriate communications with a 17-

year-old student (2006 Reprimand Letter). Hubly argued that the 2006 Reprimand Letter was not

relevant to the proceedings because it was not included in the statement of charges. The hearing

officer noted Hubly’s objection, but admitted the exhibit. The parties subsequently filed post-

hearing briefs in the matter. The Superintendent argued that Hubly’s “unprofessional and immoral

conduct” warranted revocation of his professional educator license. Hubly argued that revocation

would be inappropriate because the students were adults at the time of the events at issue. He also

argued that he should be given a second chance as the trial court had indicated and that any sanction

should be comparable to the sanctions imposed in other educator misconduct cases.

¶ 23   The hearing officer issued her recommended decision on August 18, 2020. She determined

that the Superintendent had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Hubly’s conduct

on three different occasions over a 10-month period in 2015 and 2016 was unprofessional and

inappropriate, violating section 21B-75(b) of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21B-75(b) (West

2018)) and the Code of Ethics for Illinois Educators (Ethics Code) (23 Ill. Admin. Code

§§ 22.20(b)(4), (d)(3), (e)(3) (2014)). Noting the trial court’s efforts to balance the competing

       1
           Although the rebuttal exhibits were admitted into evidence, they have not been included

in the record submitted on appeal.

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considerations of a community’s right to be informed of Hubly’s lapses in professional judgment

with Hubly’s history of positive achievements as a teacher and mentor, the hearing officer

determined that a sanction of suspension would be consistent with the court’s ruling while a

sanction of revocation would not be. Therefore, the hearing officer recommended that Hubly

receive a four-year suspension. She further indicated that because two years had passed since

Hubly had been found guilty in 2018, that Hubly should receive credit for those two years, and a

four-year suspension should end in July 2022.

¶ 24   The Superintendent filed an exception to the hearing officer’s decision, disagreeing with

the hearing officer that Hubly deserved a second chance, and requesting that the Board revoke his

license. The Superintendent further argued that the hearing officer did not have authority under the

School Code to reduce a suspension for “time served,” pointing out that the criminal proceedings

were separate and apart from the proceeding brought by the Superintendent. Hubly filed a

response, arguing that the hearing officer’s recommendation of suspension was appropriate and

should be affirmed by the Board.

¶ 25   The Board held a meeting on December 4, 2020, in which the hearing officer presented her

recommended decision. When asked about the 2006 Reprimand Letter, the hearing officer stated

that she found the letter to be admissible and relevant to the Board’s case, but discounted the letter

because it did not indicate the nature of the inappropriate conduct and the conduct had occurred

10 years prior to the events at issue.

¶ 26   During the public participation segment of the meeting and pursuant to Section 475.120(d)

of Title 23 of the Illinois Administrative Code (Administrative Code) (23 Ill. Admin. Code

§ 475.120(d) (2013)), the parties addressed the Board. The Superintendent referenced the 2006

Reprimand Letter, stating that Hubly had already “been put on notice that he had to watch ***

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how he interacted with people, and he failed to do so because he continued in this conduct.” For

his part, Hubly admitted that his conduct was both “unprofessional” and “inappropriate” and that

“most certainly *** some kind of sanction on [his] license is appropriate.” He remarked that the

“odds of [him] teaching are slim,” but believed the hearing officer’s recommendation of

suspension was an appropriate sanction and encouraged the Board to adopt that recommendation.

Hubly then indicated that he would be “happy to answer any questions that [the Board] might

have.” One Board member noted that Hubly had let his license lapse and asked Hubly why he did

not renew his license. Hubly responded that he thought it was “inappropriate” for him to renew his

license during the pendency of these proceedings. Hubly also stated, “quite frankly *** if I were

sitting here today and you asked me do I want to teach again, the short answer is no, I don’t think

I do even though I had a good teaching career and really enjoined [sic] the work that I did.” Hubly

added, however, that at a later time, he might reconsider whether to return to teaching. Hubly was

also questioned as to whether he had apologized to the students involved in the events at issue.

Hubly stated that he had apologized to Dombrowski, but “never will” apologize to Polk because

“she [was] lying.”

¶ 27   The Board’s discussion of the matter followed. The Board considered whether Hubly’s

conduct was unprofessional, Hubly’s future teaching plans, and the issue of “grooming.” The

Board also discussed the circumstances under which a teacher’s license may be suspended during

the pendency of an administrative proceeding. In addition, during the discussion, some members

of the Board referenced the 2006 Reprimand Letter and whether Hubly had apologized for his

conduct. Following the discussion, a majority of the Board voted to revoke Hubly’s professional

educator license. Of 16 total members who voted, 12 voted for revocation, two abstained, and two

voted against revocation. The Board issued a final order on December 10, 2020, in which it adopted

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the hearing officer’s statement of facts, legal analysis, and conclusions of law. However, the Board

rejected the hearing officer’s recommendation of a suspension and instead revoked Hubly’s

professional educator license.

¶ 28   On December 22, 2020, Hubly filed pro se in the circuit court of McHenry County a

complaint for administrative review of the Board’s final order. On December 10, 2021, the circuit

court entered an order affirming the Board’s decision. Thereafter, Hubly filed a pro se notice of

appeal to this court.

¶ 29                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 30   On appeal, Hubly challenges the Board’s decision to revoke his professional educator

license on various grounds. Prior to discussing Hubly’s claims, we observe that Hubly does not

challenge the Board’s finding that the Superintendent had established by a preponderance of the

evidence that his conduct violated section 21B-75(b) of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21B-75

(West 2018)) or sections 22.20(b)(4), (d)(3), and (e)(3) of the Ethics Code (23 Ill. Admin. Code

§§ 22.20(b)(4), (d)(3), (e)(3) (2014)). See 105 ILCS 5/21B-75 (West 2018) (providing that the

standard of proof for any administrative hearing held pursuant to section 21B-75 of the School

Code shall be by the preponderance of the evidence); see also 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.110(c)

(2013) (same). As such, Hubly has forfeited any such challenge on appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in

oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”); In re R.S., 382 Ill. App. 3d 453, 464 (2008).

Furthermore, Hubly acknowledges in his brief on appeal that he should be subject to some

sanction. He asserts, however, that revocation of his professional educator license was improper

for various reasons. Consequently, we limit our discussion on appeal to addressing the propriety

of the Board’s sanction of revocation.

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¶ 31                                  A. Abuse of Discretion

¶ 32   Initially, Hubly argues that the Board’s decision to revoke his professional educator license

was an abuse of discretion and unduly harsh. Hubly further posits that it was “incongruent” for the

Board to accept the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but reject her

recommendation of a suspension.

¶ 33   The Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018)) and the rules

adopted thereto govern all proceedings instituted for the judicial review of a final administrative

decision of the Board. 105 ILCS 5/21B-90 (West 2018). In administrative review cases, the role

of the appellate court is to review the decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the

circuit court. Brogan v. Colatori, 2022 IL App (2d) 220160, ¶ 26. A reviewing court defers to the

administrative agency’s expertise and experience in determining what sanction is appropriate to

protect the public interest. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill.

2d 76, 99 (1992). As such, the sanction imposed by an administrative agency is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. Sonntag v. Stewart, 2015 IL App (2d) 140445, ¶ 19. Abuse of discretion is the

most deferential standard of review. Control Solutions, LLC v. Elecsys, 2014 IL App (2d) 120251,

¶ 38. A sanction will be found to be an abuse of discretion if it is: (1) arbitrary or capricious; (2)

overly harsh in view of the mitigating circumstances; or (3) unrelated to the purpose of the statute.

Sonntag, 2015 IL App (2d) 140445, ¶ 15; Kazmi v. Department of Financial & Professional

Regulation, 2014 IL App (1st) 130959, ¶ 21. An administrative agency’s imposition of a sanction

“ ‘commands respect and substantial deference and will stand even if the reviewing court considers

another sanction to be more appropriate.’ ” Sonntag, 2015 IL App (2d) 140445, ¶ 19 (quoting

County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 682, 692 (1998)). The

mere fact that a reviewing court would consider a different sanction to be more appropriate does

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not render an administrative agency’s decision an abuse of discretion. See Sonntag, 2015 IL App

(2d) 140445, ¶ 20.

¶ 34    Article 21B of the School Code sets forth the licensing requirements for educators in

Illinois. 105 ILCS 5/21B-5 et seq. (West 2018). Those licensing provisions recognize that the

education of Illinois citizens “is the single most important influence on the prosperity and success

of this State.” 105 ILCS 5/21B-5(a) (West 2018). To this end, the School Code grants the

Superintendent, in consultation with the Board, the exclusive authority “to initiate the suspension

of up to 5 calendar years or revocation of any license *** for *** immorality, *** unprofessional

conduct ***, or other just cause.” 105 ILCS 5/21B-75 (West 2018). Thus, revocation is clearly an

available sanction. In addition, Illinois educators are governed by the Ethics Code, the purpose of

which is “to set expectation for educators; guide educational practice; and inspire professional

excellence in relation to federal, State, and local policies and rules, and local established collective

bargaining agreements.” 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 22.10(a) (2014). In accordance with these

purposes, the Ethics Code establishes the core principles, values, and responsibilities that apply to

all Illinois educators. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 22.10 et seq (2014). Among other things, the Ethics

Code charges educators with the responsibility to: (1) “[d]emonstrate a high level of professional

judgment” (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 22.20(b)(4) (2014)); (2) “[d]evelop and maintain professional

relationships with parents, families and communities” (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 22.20(d)(3) (2014));

and (3) “[c]omply with State and federal laws and regulations” (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 22.20(e)(3)

(2014)).

¶ 35    Given the deferential standard of review applicable to our analysis and in light of the

foregoing statutory and administrative provisions, we cannot say that the Board’s decision to

revoke Hubly’s professional educator license constituted an abuse of discretion. Here, Hubly’s

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conduct consisted not of just a single, isolated incident of poor judgment. Rather, the evidence

presented at the revocation hearing showed that, over a 10-month period in 2015 and 2016, Hubly

engaged in unprofessional conduct on at least three separate occasions. During get-togethers with

two former students—Polk and Dombrowski—Hubly attempted to engage in sexual activities

without their consent even though he had been their teacher just a year or two prior and he was 14

or 15 years older than them. Notably, Hubly grabbed and squeezed Polk’s breast under her

clothing. In addition, Hubly forcefully kissed Dombrowski multiple times, forced his tongue in

her mouth in an aggressive manner, rubbed her thighs and stomach, and attempted to grab her

breast. Additionally, Hubly knowingly served alcohol to several former students at his house, even

though they were under 21 years of age. Indeed, Bryan remarked that former students had gone to

Hubly’s home to drink “so many times.” Moreover, Hubly took steps to hide his actions by

requesting attendees at the gatherings not take pictures or videos of his home. The evidence

presented at the revocation hearing also suggested that Hubly fostered relationships with the

students while they were still in high school, setting the expectation that they could be friends with

him following graduation. As a result of this conduct, Hubly was charged with and ultimately

found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of two counts of battery and four counts of unlawful

delivery of alcohol to a minor. This court affirmed the convictions that Hubly challenged on direct

appeal. People v. Hubly, 2019 IL App (2d) 180619-U. Although the offenses of which Hubly was

convicted are classified as misdemeanors (see 720 ILCS 5/12-3(b) (West 2016) (battery); (235

ILCS 5/6-16(a) (West 2016) (unlawful delivery of alcohol to a minor)), they are violations of

Illinois criminal law nonetheless and Hubly’s actions constituted serious lapses in professional

judgment. See 23 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 22.20(b)(4) (2014) (requiring Illinois educators to

demonstrate a high level of professional judgment); 23 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 22.20(d)(3) (2014)

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(requiring Illinois educators to develop and maintain professional relationships with parents,

families and communities); 23 Ill. Admin. Code §§ 22.20(e)(3) (2014) (requiring Illinois educators

to comply with State and federal laws and regulations).

¶ 36   We recognize that the trial court, at the sentencing hearing in the underlying criminal

proceeding, stated that Hubly appeared to be “a great music teacher and a great theater director”

and that he deserved a “second chance.” We do not discount Hubly’s achievements in the

educational field. That being said, the Board could have reasonably concluded that, despite

Hubly’s achievements as a teacher, his lapses in professional judgment were so egregious that it

would not be in the public’s best interest to allow him to continue educating Illinois citizens.

Moreover, given the importance of education in Illinois, as reflected by the legislature’s statement

in the licensing provisions of the School Code, the Board could have reasonably concluded that a

sanction of revocation was necessary to deter others who are professionally licensed in the field.

In short, given the deferential standard of review and the Board’s experience and expertise in

determining what sanction is appropriate to protect the public interest, we cannot say that the

Board’s determination was arbitrary or capricious, overly harsh, or unrelated to the purposes of

the School Code.

¶ 37   In arguing that the sanction imposed by the Board was unduly harsh, Hubly points out that

under the School Code, a professional educator license is required to be revoked when an

individual’s conviction of certain specified felonies is finalized. See 105 ILCS 5/21B-80 (West

2016). Hubly argues that the sanction imposed by the Board was unduly harsh because “he was

convicted of two misdemeanor counts of battery that did not involve students or minors.” Hubly,

however, cites no authority for the proposition that revocation is not an available sanction for

misdemeanor convictions. Therefore, we consider it forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,

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2020) (requiring the appellant’s brief to include argument “which shall contain the contentions of

the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record

relied on.”); Crull v. Sriratana, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1045 (2009) (“A contention that is supported

by some argument but no authority does not meet the requirements of Rule 341 and is considered

forfeited.”). Forfeiture aside, we reject this argument for several reasons. First, Hubly seems to

ignore that, in addition to the battery convictions, he was also found guilty of four counts of

unlawful delivery of alcohol to a minor. Second, the School Code provides for the revocation of a

professional educator license for unprofessional conduct. 105 ILCS 5/21B-75 (West 2016). As

noted above, there was ample evidence for the Board to conclude that revocation was an

appropriate sanction under the circumstances present here. Third, the fact that Dombrowski and

Polk were not minors and were no longer students is irrelevant. The fact remains that Hubly

attempted to engage in sexual activities without their permission, they had recently graduated from

high school, they looked to Hubly—their former teacher—for advice and counsel, and he was 14

or 15 years older than them. Based on this record, the Board could reasonably conclude that

Hubly’s conduct demonstrated a serious lack of professional judgment and warranted revocation.

¶ 38   Hubly also argues that the Board’s sanction was unduly harsh because the Board failed to

consider his “long history of excellence” when it decided to revoke his professional educator

license. We disagree. The Board had before it all the evidence presented to the hearing officer at

the revocation hearing. The Board reviewed the record as well as the hearing officer’s findings of

fact and conclusions of law, all of which reference Hubly’s accomplishments as a teacher. See 23

Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013). In addition, during its discussion at the December 4, 2020,

meeting, the Board expressly referenced the trial court’s remarks that it believed that Hubly

deserved a “second chance.” Nevertheless, as noted above, the Board could have reasonably

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concluded that despite Hubly’s achievements as a teacher, his lapses in professional judgment were

so egregious that they outweighed the years of service he provided as a teacher. We find no error

on this basis.

¶ 39    In arguing that the sanction imposed by the Board was unduly harsh, Hubly also directs us

to three cases involving the revocation of liquor licenses. See Hanson v. Illinois Liquor Control

Comm’n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 974 (1990); Soldano v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 131 Ill. App.

3d 10 (1985); Byrne v. Stern, 103 Ill. App. 3d 601 (1981). In each of those three cases, the courts

held that the revocation of the operator’s liquor license was too severe where the operators of the

establishments had never previously been charged with a license violation. Hanson, 201 Ill. App.

3d at 983-84; Soldano, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 16; Byrne, 103 Ill. App. 3d at 606-607. Although a court

may consider sanctions imposed in similar cases, “each case must be considered on its merits ***,

and it is for the [administrative agency] to determine the appropriate sanction in each case.”

Siddiqui v. Department of Professional Regulation, 307 Ill. App. 3d 753, 763 (1999). Here, the

cases cited by Hubly are not similar to the facts of his case. Liquor licenses are governed by the

Liquor Control Act (235 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2020)) whereas professional educator licenses are

governed by the School Code (105 ILCS 5/21B-5 et seq. (West 2020)). More significantly, the

cases cited by Hubly involve operators of establishments who did not have a prior history of liquor

license violations. In this case, Hubly was convicted of multiple offenses involving his former

students for conduct that occurred over a course of approximately 10 months. Stated differently,

Hubly’s convictions were not the result of a single, isolated instance of poor judgment. Rather,

they arose from a pattern of poor professional judgment. As such, we conclude that the cases cited

by Hubly are simply not apposite.

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¶ 40   As noted above, Hubly also contends that it was “incongruent” for the Board to accept the

hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, but reject her recommendation of a

suspension. According to Hubly, because the Board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions

of law of the hearing officer, it was required to also adopt the hearing officer’s recommendation

that his professional educator license be suspended rather than revoked. Hubly posits that only if

the Board had “modified or rejected” the hearing officer’s findings would the Board “have been

free to make its own decisions based on its own findings.” Hubly, however, cites no authority for

this proposition. Therefore, we consider it forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)

(requiring the appellant’s brief to include argument “which shall contain the contentions of the

appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied

on); Crull, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1045 (“A contention that is supported by some argument but no

authority does not meet the requirements of Rule 341 and is considered forfeited.”). Forfeiture

aside, where, as here, reasonable minds may differ on the merits of the arguments presented, we

will defer to the decision of the administrative agency. See Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 99; Salvator

v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp., 2017 IL App (4th) 170173, ¶ 66; McNeil v. Ketchens, 397 Ill. App.

3d 375, 397-98 (2010). The Board’s decision to revoke Hubly’s professional educator license

rather than suspend it was a product of its expertise and experience in determining what sanction

is appropriate to protect the public interest. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 99. Under these

circumstances, we defer to the Board’s decision.

¶ 41                                     B. Contrary to Law

¶ 42   Next, Hubly argues that the Board’s decision to revoke his professional educator license

failed to comply with the rules applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s jurisdiction

(see 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.10 et seq. (2013)) and was therefore contrary to law. Specifically,

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Hubly complains that: (1) the Board considered the 2006 Reprimand Letter even though it was not

included in the statement of charges as a reason to revoke his professional educator license; (2) the

Board speculated that he had “groomed” his former students despite no evidence of such an offense

in the record; and (3) members of the Board did not review the entire record of proceedings before

voting to revoke his professional educator license. We address these claims seriatim. Prior to doing

so, we review the relevant provisions of the Administrative Code.

¶ 43      All actions conducted under the jurisdiction of the Board are initiated when the

Superintendent issues a written notice of opportunity for hearing which is served upon the licensee.

23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.40(a) (2013). The written notice of opportunity for hearing must include

a statement of charges alleged against the licensee. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.40(b)(1) (2013).

The statement of charges shall consist of “a short and plain statement of the material allegations

asserted,” “the citations of the statutes and rules that the licensee allegedly violated,” and “the

sanction recommended by the *** Superintendent.” 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.40(b)(1) (2013). If

a licensee receiving a notice of opportunity for hearing wishes to request a hearing, then he or she

must file a written request for hearing within 10 days after receipt. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.40(e)

(2013).

¶ 44      If a request for hearing is received, the Superintendent notifies the secretary of the Board

and requests the designation of a hearing officer. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.40(f) (2013). The

assigned hearing officer possesses “all powers necessary and appropriate to conduct a fair, full and

impartial hearing,” including the power to rule upon motions, objections, and evidentiary

questions. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.50(c)(9) (2013). Further, the parties “shall exchange, and

provide a copy to the hearing officer of, the documents or exhibits to be used at the hearing and

list of witnesses to be called at the hearing no later than 14 days prior to the hearing, or by a

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deadline otherwise set by the hearing officer.” 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.90(a) (2013). The

Administrative Code also sets forth the procedures governing proceedings before the hearing

officer, including the order of proceedings, matters of evidence, and the submission of written

briefs. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.110 (2013). Finally, Section 475.120(c) of Title 23 of the

Administrative Code governs the procedures that culminate in a final order of the Board. 23 Ill.

Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013). That provision requires that: (1) the hearing officer present his

or her proposed order in person to the Board; (2) the Board review the record and the hearing

officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations, together with any exceptions

thereto and briefs in support thereof; and (3) the Board issue a final order accepting, rejecting, or

modifying the hearing officer’s recommendation within 30 days from the hearing officer’s

presentation. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2014). In addition, parties to the hearing are

permitted to be present at the hearing officer’s presentation to the Board and may address the Board

during any public participation segment of the Board meeting for a period of up to five minutes.

23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(d) (2013).

¶ 45   The interpretation of agency rules and regulations is a question of law subject to de novo

review. Campbell v. Department of Children & Family Services, 2016 IL App (2d) 150747, ¶ 17.

In contrast, we review an administrative agency’s decision regarding the admission of evidence

for an abuse of discretion. Danigeles v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional

Regulation, 2015 IL App (1st) 142622, ¶ 89. Under this standard of review, the decision of an

administrative agency will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary or capricious or unless no

reasonable person would agree with the agency’s position. Sonntag, 2015 IL App (2d) 140445,

¶ 22. With these principles in mind, we turn to Hubly’s assignments of error.

¶ 46                                 1. 2006 Reprimand Letter

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¶ 47   Hubly contends that the Board should not have considered the 2006 Reprimand Letter

because it was not referenced as a reason to revoke his professional educator license in the original

or amended statement of charges filed by the Superintendent. Hubly further contends that by not

including the 2006 Reprimand Letter in the original or amended statement of charges, he did not

receive proper due process.

¶ 48   Initially, we conclude that the admission of the 2006 Reprimand Letter did not constitute

an abuse of discretion. The rules applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s jurisdiction

permit a party to submit rebuttal evidence. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.110(e)(1) (2013). A hearing

officer may exclude such evidence if it is “irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious.” 23 Ill.

Admin. Code § 475.110(e)(1) (2013); see also 5 ILCS 100/10-40(a) (West 2020) (providing that

“[i]rrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence shall be excluded” under the

Administrative Procedure Act). In this case, the 2006 Reprimand Letter was introduced as rebuttal

evidence at the revocation hearing in response to Hubly’s promise of a “commitment to do better.”

The Superintendent offered the 2006 reprimand letter to show that Hubly had already been put on

notice to watch how he interacted with students, yet he continued to exercise poor professional

judgment. At the Board meeting, the hearing officer explained that although she discounted the

2006 Reprimand Letter because it did not specify the nature of the inappropriate conduct and the

conduct had occurred 10 years prior to the events at issue, she admitted the document into evidence

because it had some relevancy to the Board’s case. Given that the 2006 Reprimand Letter was

offered in rebuttal and considering the hearing officer’s rationale for admitting the document, we

cannot say that the decision to admit the 2006 Reprimand Letter was arbitrary or capricious or that

no reasonable person would agree with the decision. Sonntag, 2015 IL App (2d) 140445, ¶ 22.

Accordingly, we find no error in its admission.

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¶ 49   The Superintendent notes that the 2006 Reprimand Letter is not contained in the record

filed on appeal. Generally, it is the appellant’s burden to present a sufficiently complete record of

the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error. Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391 (1984);

Burns v. Department of Insurance, 2013 IL App (1st) 122449, ¶ 15. In the absence of such a record

on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the administrative agency was in

conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392; Burns, 2013 IL

App (1st) 122449, ¶ 15. Moreover, any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the

record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392; Burns, 2013 IL App (1st)

122449, ¶ 15. However, since Hubly’s contention presents a legal question, i.e., whether the

Illinois Administrative Code allows the Board to consider a document that is included in the record

but not in the statement of charges, the absence of the 2006 Reprimand Letter in the appellate

record does not necessarily preclude meaningful review of the issue and we will address it.

¶ 50   Hubly correctly observes that the 2006 Reprimand Letter was not referenced in the original

or amended statement of charges. However, there is a logical reason for this. As noted above, the

2006 Reprimand Letter was admitted as rebuttal evidence. As such, it was not included in either

the original or amended statement of charges, which only referenced events that occurred in 2015

and 2016. Indeed, as the Superintendent cogently observes (and Hubly agrees), the event

referenced in the 2006 Reprimand Letter was neither the catalyst for the revocation proceedings

nor the subject of the revocation hearing. However, once the 2006 Reprimand Letter was admitted

into evidence at the revocation hearing and became part of the record, the Board was obligated to

review the entire record in its entirety before reaching its decision. See 23 Ill. Admin. Code

§ 475.120(c) (2014) (providing that upon the hearing officer’s presentation of his or her proposed

order to the Board, “the [Board] shall review the record and the hearing officer’s findings of fact,

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conclusions of law, and recommendations, together with any exceptions thereto and briefs in

support thereof, and shall *** issue a final order *** accepting, rejecting or modifying the hearing

officer’s recommendation”). In short, the Board’s action of reviewing the record, which included

the 2006 Reprimand Letter, was permitted by Section 475.120(c) of Title 23 of the Administrative

Code (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2014)), and therefore was not contrary to law.

¶ 51   Additionally, contrary to Hubly’s assertion, the Board’s consideration of the 2006

Reprimand Letter did not constitute a violation of due process. Administrative proceedings are

governed by the fundamental principles and requirements of due process of law. Abrahamson, 153

Ill. 2d at 92. Our supreme court has stated that due process is a flexible concept and requires only

such procedural protections as fundamental principles of justice and the particular situation

demand. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 92. Our supreme court has also commented that procedural

due process in an administrative proceeding does not require a proceeding in the nature of a judicial

proceeding. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 93. A fair hearing before an administrative agency includes

the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and impartiality in ruling

upon the evidence. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 95. A court will find a due process violation only if

prejudice is shown. Gonzalez v. Pollution Control Board, 2011 IL App (1st) 093021, ¶ 42. A claim

that an administrative proceeding violated an individual’s right to due process presents a question

of law and, therefore, is subject to de novo review. MIFAB, Inc. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n,

2020 IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 81.

¶ 52   In this case, Hubly had notice of the charges against him as provided in section 475.40 of

the rules applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s jurisdiction. 23 Ill. Admin. Code

§ 475.40 (2013). Those charges included his conduct with respect to Polk, Dombrowski, Bryan,

and Murphy in 2015 and 2016. Those events were the focus of the revocation hearing. Moreover,

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Hubly made an opening statement and a closing argument. He stipulated to the entry of the

transcript from his criminal trial in lieu of calling witnesses at the revocation hearing. Further, he

had the right to cross-examine the witnesses at the criminal proceeding and did so. Additionally,

Hubly had an opportunity to make comments before the Board at the December 4, 2020, meeting,

and he advocated for suspension of his professional educator license instead of revocation. In light

of the foregoing, we concluded that Hubly received all the process that he was due.

¶ 53   Nevertheless, Hubly claims that he was prejudiced by the Board’s references to the 2006

Reprimand Letter because he was unable to refute the allegation of misconduct in the letter.

Hubly’s argument fails to recognize that the 2006 Reprimand Letter was not introduced as

substantive evidence, but rather as rebuttal evidence following his “commitment to do better”

during closing argument at the revocation hearing. Whatever conduct led to the issuance of the

2006 Reprimand Letter, it was not part of the charges at issue. Furthermore, the fact that the 2006

Reprimand Letter reflected negatively upon Hubly is different from establishing prejudice to

substantiate a due process violation. Again, the record establishes that Hubly received all the

process that was due where he received notice of the charges against him, stipulated to the

admission of the testimony from the criminal trial, made an opening statement and closing

argument at the revocation hearing, and spoke at the Board’s December 4, 2020, meeting.

¶ 54   Hubly also directs us to Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264

(2004), in support of his due process argument, but his reliance on that case is misplaced. In Lyon,

the supreme court was concerned with the reasonableness of delays in the administrative appeals

process given the burden of proof required to sustain an indicated report of child abuse. The court

ultimately concluded that when the lower standard of proof of credible evidence was used for an

indicated report rather than the higher standard of preponderance of the evidence, the Department

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of Children and Family Services would have to comply with the statutory and regulatory deadlines

to afford procedural due process. Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 283-84. In this case, there was no delay in

the administrative appeals process and no question as to any burden of proof. Lyon, therefore, does

not provide persuasive authority for Hubly’s due process argument.

¶ 55                                        2. Grooming

¶ 56   Next, Hubly argues that the Board’s decision to revoke his professional educator license

was contrary to law because the Board speculated that he had “groomed” his former students when

they were in school, despite no evidence of such an offense in the record. In support of his position,

Hubly asserts that the offense of “grooming” as defined in section 11-25 of the Criminal Code of

2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/11-25 (West 2020)) means “a crime in which a person uses an

electronic device or other technology to lure a child under the age of 17 and to commit a sex crime

against the child.” Hubly then highlights the testimony of two Board members who remarked that

there was “some evidence of grooming” and that “some type of grooming” had occurred based on

the fact that students, having graduated only a year prior, were getting together with a former

teacher at his home and being served alcohol. Hubly asserts, however, that he was never accused

or criminally charged with the offence of “grooming” (see 720 ILCS 5/11-25 (West 2020)

(defining the offense of “grooming”)), he was not alleged to have committed the offense of

“grooming” in the statement of charges issued by the Superintendent, and there was no evidence

in the record of any unprofessional behavior or misconduct with any person under the age of 17.

According to Hubly, the Board only had the authority to “accept, reject or modify” the hearing

officer’s decision (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013)) and was without authority to

speculate or otherwise add to the record. As such, Hubly contends that the Board “considered ***

baseless speculation” of grooming as a reason to revoke his professional educator license.

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¶ 57   Hubly’s argument is based on a misinterpretation of the record. Section 11-25(a) of the

Criminal Code defines the offense of “grooming” in pertinent part as follows:

       “A person commits grooming when he or she knowingly uses a computer on-line service,

       Internet service, local bulletin board service, or any other device capable of electronic data

       storage or transmission, performs an act in person or by conduct through a third party, or

       uses written communication to seduce, solicit, lure, or entice, or attempt to seduce, solicit,

       lure, or entice, a child, a child’s guardian, or another person believed by the person to be a

       child or a child’s guardian, to commit any sex offense as defined in Section 2 of the Sex

       Offender Registration Act [(730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2020))], to distribute photographs

       depicting the sex organs of the child, or to otherwise engage in any unlawful sexual conduct

       with a child or another person believed by the person to be a child.” 720 ILCS 5/11-25(a)

       (West 2020).

For purposes of the “grooming” statute, a “child” means a person under 17 years of age. 720 ILCS

5/11-25(a) (West 2020). Contrary to Hubly’s argument, none of the Board members accused him

of “grooming” as that offense is defined in section 11-25(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/11-

25(a) (West 2020)). Rather, the Board members to whom Hubly refers were merely expressing

their concern that Hubly had set the expectations with his students, while they were still students,

that after graduation they could spend time with him at his home and consume alcohol. The Board

members’ statements and concerns are supported by the record.

¶ 58   In this regard, we note that Detective Eitel testified at the sentencing hearing that according

to Dombrowski, Hubly had made comments about students becoming friends with him on social

media after graduation and that it was the “cool thing” to be friends with Hubly and go to his home

after graduation. At Hubly’s criminal trial, several students testified that they went to Hubly’s

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home and were served alcohol by him. Eitel’s testimony and the testimony of the students were

part of the record submitted to the Board. As noted above, the Board is required to review the

record. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013). This necessarily entails discussing the evidence.

Indeed, there is nothing in the rules applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s

jurisdiction that precludes members of the Board from engaging in discussions and sharing their

viewpoints before reaching a decision. The fact that the Board has the authority to “accept, reject

or modify” the hearing officer’s recommendation in no way implies that the Board members are

without authority to discuss the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s discussion

of the evidence and its members’ comments about “grooming” were not contrary to law.

¶ 59                                    3. Record Review

¶ 60   Next, Hubly argues that the Board’s decision to revoke his professional educator license

violated the rules applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s jurisdiction because Spencer

Saal, one of the Board members who voted to revoke his professional educator license, “admitted

he did not review the record as required.” See 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013) (requiring

the Board to review the record). Hubly further argues that there is evidence that other members of

the Board did not review the record. In this regard, Hubly posits that “[i]t can only be assumed”

that two other Board members, Jacob Carlson and Sophia Gehlhausen-Anderson, did not review

the record because they “speculated that Hubly committed the offense of [g]rooming without any

evidence on the record supporting such a claim.”

¶ 61   The record shows that prior to the December 4, 2020, Board meeting, members were sent

various documents from Hubly’s case, including, but not limited to, the statement of charges, the

transcript of the underlying hearing, evidence provided at the hearing, the parties’ briefs, the

findings and recommendations of the hearing officer, and any exceptions filed by the parties. The

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Board members were also sent a memorandum informing them that the documents from Hubly’s

case “should be reviewed by [Board] members prior to the December 4 meeting at which [they]

will be asked to make a final decision on the recommendations of the hearing officer.” The

memorandum further advised that “there are a considerable number of pages of documents to

review on this legal case prior to the hearing (609 total pages). This number is not typical for most

educator misconduct cases.” During the Board’s December 4, 2020, meeting, Saal stated, “I didn’t

read all 600 pages. I was not able to.” Hubly argues that because Saal did not “review the record,”

the revocation of his professional educator license was contrary to law and must be reversed. We

disagree.

¶ 62   The rule which Hubly references provides in relevant part that “the [Board] shall review

the record and the hearing officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations,

together with any exceptions thereto and briefs in support thereof.” 23 Ill. Admin. Code

§ 475.120(c) (2013). As noted above, Saal stated that he “didn’t read all 600 pages [of the record].

I was not able to.” (Emphasis added.) Saal’s comments do not establish that the revocation of

Hubly’s professional educator license was contrary to law. Notably, section 475.120(c) does not

require the members of the Board to read every single page of the record. It simply requires the

Board to “review the record.” 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013). While Saal’s statement

indicates that he did not “read” all 600 pages of the record, it in no way indicated that he had not

“review[ed]” the record, including those parts of the record that were of relevance to Hubly’s case.

In any event, the comment of a single Board member is not significant where the overwhelming

majority of the members were in support of revocation.

¶ 63   Regarding Carlson and Gehlhausen-Anderson, Hubly cites no evidence that they did not

review the record. Instead, his argument is premised on an assumption that they did not review the

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record because they “speculated” that he had engaged in the criminal offense of “grooming.” We

previously rejected Hubly’s claim that the Board speculated that he had “groomed” his former

students despite no evidence of such an offense in the record. Moreover, conjecture is not proof

and is insufficient to demonstrate error. See People v. Saunders, 220 Ill. App. 3d 647, 670 (1991)

(noting that “probability and speculation *** do not support a claim of reversible error”). As such,

this argument is wholly insufficient to establish that the Board’s actions were contrary to law.

Lastly, we observe that Gehlhausen-Anderson did not vote, so whether she reviewed the record

has no bearing on the outcome of the Board’s decision.

¶ 64   In short, we are unpersuaded by Hubly’s claim that the Board’s decision to revoke his

professional educator license failed to comply with provisions of the rules and regulations

applicable to administrative cases under the Board’s jurisdiction (see 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.10

et seq. (2013)) and was therefore contrary to law.

¶ 65                                    C. Legal Authority

¶ 66   Next, Hubly argues that the Board exceeded its legal authority when it revoked his

professional educator license because it considered information regarding his future teaching

plans, whether he apologized to the Board for his actions, whether the Illinois educator system

adequately protects students from unprofessional educators, and whether a school district would

hire him based on his criminal convictions. Hubly maintains that consideration of this additional

information was improper because the Board only had the authority to “accept, reject or modify”

the hearing officer’s recommendation and could not consider information outside of the hearing

officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Having done so, Hubly insists that the Board’s

decision to revoke his professional educator license must be revoked. We review the question

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whether the Board exceeded its authority de novo. Emerald Performance Materials, LLC v. Illinois

Pollution Control Board, 2016 IL App (3d) 150526, ¶ 25.

¶ 67   At the outset, we observe that the only support Hubly cites in support of his argument is a

provision of the Administrative Code (23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013)) and three cases.

One of the cases Hubly cites (Southern Illinois Asphalt Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 60 Ill. 2d

204 (1975)) is simply for the applicable standard of review. Another case (Dorfman v. Gerber, 29

Ill. 2d 191 (1963)) is for the proposition that courts have reversed the decision of an administrative

agency where the action of the agency “was arbitrary and capricious in revoking a license.” The

third case (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 505-06 (1988)) is for

the proposition that an administrative decision is arbitrary and capricious where the agency “relies

on factors which the legislature did not intend for the agency to consider.” Conspicuously absent

from Hubly’s discussion, however, is any statute, administrative rule, case law, or other authority

that supports his argument that the Board’s alleged consideration of the information he references

was contrary to law, constitutes factors the legislature did not intend the Board to consider, or

otherwise requires reversal of the Board’s decision. The rules of our supreme court require the

appellant’s brief to include argument “which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the

reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct.

R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). A contention that is supported by some argument, but no relevant

authority, does not comply with the form and content requirements of the rule pertaining to briefs

and is considered forfeited. See Crull, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1045. Consequently, we find this

argument forfeited.

¶ 68   Forfeiture aside, we find Hubly’s claims without merit. As noted above, the rules

applicable to administrative cases under the jurisdiction of the Board require the hearing officer to

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present his or her proposed order in person to the Board. 23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013).

Upon the hearing officer’s presentation of his or her proposed order to the Board, the Board “shall

review the record and the hearing officer’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendations, together with any exceptions thereto and briefs in support thereof, and shall ***

issue a final order *** accepting, rejecting or modifying the hearing officer’s recommendation.”

23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(c) (2013). The rules further provide that parties to the hearing “are

permitted to be present at the hearing officer’s presentation to the [Board] and may address the

[Board] during any public participation segment of the [Board] for a period of up to five minutes.”

23 Ill. Admin. Code § 475.120(d) (2013). Notably, the rules do not contain any language limiting

the Board’s discussion of the record prior to reaching a final decision. To the contrary, the fact that

the rules require the Board to review the record is at odds with Hubly’s suggestion that the Board

is without authority to discuss the evidence prior to rendering a final decision. Moreover, it is

counterintuitive to allow the hearing officer to present his or her proposed order to the Board and

a party to address the Board, but then prohibit the Board from discussing the hearing officer’s or

the parties’ remarks. See Perez v. Illinois Department of Children & Family Services, 384 Ill. App.

3d 770, 775 (2008) (recognizing that administrative rules should not be interpreted so as to produce

absurd results); Modine Manufacturing, Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 40 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502

(1976) (noting that an administrative agency has the power to construe its rules and regulation to

avoid absurd or unfair results). Quite simply, there is no support in the rules applicable to

administrative cases under the jurisdiction of the Board to support the notion that the Board is

limited to considering only the hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Consequently, we conclude that Hubly’s future teaching plans, whether he apologized to the Board

for his actions, whether the Illinois educator system adequately protects students from

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unprofessional educators, and whether a school district would hire him based on his criminal

convictions were relevant and appropriate for the Board to discuss in rendering its sanction

decision. Because the Board complied with section 475.120 and did not exceed its legal authority

in discussing this additional information, we find no error.

¶ 69                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 70   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County,

which affirmed the final administrative order of the Board.

¶ 71   Affirmed.

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