Court Opinion

ID: 9940275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 20:02:34.857445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:42.147425
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/24 In re D.H. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re D.H., a Person Coming Under                                   B325184
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                                  Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                              Super. Ct. No. CK84291C
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
           v.
 DAMIEN H.,
           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Jennifer W. Baronoff, Commissioner.
Affirmed.
      David M. Thompson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        ____________________
       Father, Damien H., appeals the juvenile court’s order
appointing a legal guardian for his daughter D.H. without
ordering visitation for father and, in the alternative, the court’s
denial of his request for a continuance of the matter. We affirm.
       Substantial evidence—substantiated allegations that father
sexually abused D.H.—supports the court’s conclusion that
visitation with father would be detrimental to D.H. As such, the
court was not required to order visitation for father under
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(4)(C).
       The court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s
request for a continuance to allow father, who was absent from
the hearing, to challenge the sexual abuse allegations against
him. Father’s counsel provided no explanation as to why father
was absent from the hearing where visitation was at issue.
Father failed to establish good cause for a continuance.
                          BACKGROUND
       This appeal raises narrow questions in the context of long-
running dependency proceedings. We limit our recitation of the
facts to those pertinent to the issues before us.
       The underlying proceedings are older than D.H. Her
brother was born in 2010 and became the subject of a dependency
case 18 days after birth. Her sister was born in 2012 and became
the subject of a dependency case seven days after birth. They
were detained on various substantiated allegations that included
neglect, emotional abuse, physical abuse, and drug and alcohol
use by one or more of the parents, and domestic violence between
the parents.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                2
       D.H. was born in May 2013. The Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
detained her when she was two months old based on concerns
about father’s violence toward mother, failure to comply with
juvenile court orders, and history of substance abuse, as well as
mother’s failure to protect. By that time, both parents had
already had their reunification services terminated as to D.H.’s
brother (though mother had successfully petitioned to have hers
reinstated), and their services for her sister were in jeopardy.
D.H. was declared a dependent in August 2013.
       D.H. was first placed with mother. But a few months later,
she was removed and placed, together with her siblings, in foster
care. Father lost his ability to visit with them sometime in 2014
when he was arrested and sentenced to more than two years in
jail for possession of a controlled substance.
       The children thereafter moved from foster placement to
foster placement, not always together.
       The juvenile court terminated parents’ reunification
services in March 2016. Father was released from jail but then
reincarcerated for about six months and released again in late
2016. Upon his release, he was admitted to an inpatient
substance abuse treatment center and resumed visitation with
the children.
       In October 2017, the juvenile court granted father’s petition
for reinstatement of services.
       In May 2018, the court ordered D.H. and her siblings
returned to father’s custody. Though father admitted to
struggling with caring for three young children, they were
observed to be happy and fairly stable in his care as of November
2018. All three children remained with father until March 2019,

                                 3
when they were again removed, this time based on allegations
that father was abusing amphetamine, methamphetamine, and
alcohol and not participating in court-mandated treatment
programs and other services. D.H.’s brother was placed with a
previous foster caregiver. D.H. and her sister were placed with a
new foster caregiver.
       D.H. and her sister’s caregiver reported the girls were
“extremely sexualized” and she believed they had seen people in
father’s home having sex. The girls—and especially D.H.—were
fixated on sex, which they called “ ‘Shake Butt,’ ” bringing it up
often, and acting it out. On one occasion, the caregiver found
D.H. in her sister’s bed and “both of the girls’ underwear were
down and [her sister] reported that [D.H.] was trying to ‘Shake
Butt’ with [her].” When, in spring 2019, the Department asked
the girls about anyone touching their private areas, D.H.’s sister
denied it but responded, “ ‘[d]id [D.H.] say I touched her[?]’ ”
D.H. said, “[my sister] touched my vagina and I touch hers,” then
stared at the social worker for a few seconds before saying, “no I
trick you.” D.H. described in detail watching people having sex
at father’s house. She did not then claim father or any other
adults touched her private areas.
       In July 2019, the court terminated services for father and
set a section 366.26 hearing for November 2019. Father
continued to visit with the children over the next several weeks
until he was incarcerated again in mid-September 2019. D.H.
and her sister continued to move from foster placement to foster
placement. Father continued to have contact with the children
from jail by telephone.
       In 2021, both D.H. and her sister, who were then
separately placed, refused telephone visits with father. They said

                                4
they did this because he touched them inappropriately when they
lived with him. D.H.’s report of being touched in her vaginal area
by both father and his friend generated a referral to the
Department. The Department closed the referral as inconclusive,
noting it was “historical” and father did not then have access to
D.H. because of his incarceration.
       Father was released from jail in early April 2022 and
resumed in-person visitation with the children shortly thereafter.
Within the month, he filed another petition for further
reunification services. The juvenile court commenced an
evidentiary hearing on father’s petition in early May 2022, at
which father testified. The court was impressed by the
self-improvement father had undertaken while incarcerated. The
hearing was continued to permit more visitation between father
and D.H. and her sister. The court entered an order expanding
father’s visitation rights.
       A few weeks later, D.H.’s sister refused to attend a
scheduled visit with father. She explained she did not feel safe
visiting with him because, when she and her siblings were living
with father in 2018 and 2019, father would “rub her private parts
with his hand” and would “ask her to take all her clothes off and
go to bed, [and] father would take all his clothes [off] too and
would get in bed with her.” Father reportedly “told her not to tell
anyone and that it would be their secret.” The person reporting
this information relayed that all the children feared father and
that his recent petition for custody could result in them being
returned to his care.
       The Department responded with an investigation. Its
interview with D.H.’s sister confirmed the initial report. D.H.
stated father rubbed her vaginal area and buttocks while she was

                                5
naked in bed with him and that she had seen him do the same to
her sister. She also stated some of father’s friends, while at the
home consuming drugs and drinking alcohol, had touched her
vaginal area. A caregiver for the children reported that each of
them engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors after being in
father’s care. D.H.’s brother, who told the caregiver he watched
pornographic videos in father’s home, had become “an entirely . . .
different child”—“sexualized, jumpy, and disrespectful towards
people”—after living with father. Further, the siblings “[could
not] be left alone with one another because they d[id] not know
how to interact appropriately and attempt[ed] to touch each
other’s private parts.”
       Based on its investigation, on June 10, 2022, the
Department filed an ex parte application to terminate father’s
visitation rights under the order the juvenile court entered the
preceding month. The court granted the Department’s
application on an interim basis on June 15, 2022 and, following a
hearing on June 21, 2022, ordered “no visitation for Father
pending the next court date.” The record does not include a
transcript of that hearing.
       On June 29, 2022, the Department determined D.H.’s and
her sister’s allegations of sexual abuse by father were
substantiated. Upon notifying father of this determination, he
responded “ ‘I want the children to be adopted and stay with their
caregivers.’ ”
       Different relatives agreed to adopt D.H.’s siblings. D.H.’s
caregiver was unwilling to adopt her but agreed to serve as her
legal guardian. On July 20, 2022, father withdrew his April 2022
petition for further reunification services and submitted to
termination of his parental rights to D.H.’s siblings so they could

                                6
be adopted. D.H.’s case was continued to October 18, 2022. At
the conclusion of the July 20, 2022 hearing, mother’s counsel
stated: “[a]s to [D.H.], I am asking for the Department to
continue working with the mother and [D.H.], to have contact
and visit. And in one of the latest [last minute information
filings with the court], [D.H.] did say that she would like contact
with her mother.” The court responded, “Department is ordered
to continue working on visitation for both parents.” Children’s
counsel then “remind[ed] the court the court made a finding as
for father, had an objection”—an apparent reference to the court’s
June 2022 no-visitation order. The court responded, “Right.
Right. Mother not to monitor.”
       At the continued section 366.26 hearing on October 18,
2022, father was not present. His absence is not explained in the
record. The juvenile court ordered legal guardianship as D.H.’s
permanent plan, without any provision for visitation by father.
       Father did not contest the legal guardianship but his
counsel objected to the lack of visitation. According to father’s
counsel, the Department had to file a section 388 petition to
terminate father’s visitation rights and, alternatively, the matter
should be continued to allow father to make an evidentiary
presentation.
       The juvenile court determined it could consider visitation
as part of the section 366.26 hearing without a section 388
petition and declined to continue it. The court found visitation
with father would be detrimental to D.H. In support, the court
read from the Department’s report of D.H.’s allegations of
inappropriate touching by father, as well as a last minute
information from July 2022 noting that visitation with Father led
to regressive acting out by D.H.

                                7
      Father timely appealed.
                        DISCUSSION
1.    There was no error in the juvenile court’s detriment
      finding.
       We do not address the Department’s argument that father
waived his challenge to the juvenile court’s detriment finding
because the finding was manifestly supported by substantial
evidence.
       When ordering legal guardianship, a juvenile court “shall
also make an order for visitation with the parents or guardians
unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
visitation would be detrimental to the physical or emotional well
being of the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(C).) “ ‘Detriment is a
familiar standard in child welfare determinations; but . . . the
notion of detriment is at best a nebulous standard that depends
on the context of the inquiry. . . . It cannot mean merely that the
parent in question is less than ideal . . . . Rather, the risk of
detriment must be substantial, such that [the proposed action]
represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-
being.’ ” (In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154, 160.)
       We review the juvenile court’s finding that visitation would
be detrimental for purposes of section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(4)(C), under the substantial evidence standard.
(In re A.J., supra, 239 Cal.App.4th at p. 160.) We examine the
whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and
conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on
issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re Tania S.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733-734.) Evidence is “[s]ubstantial”
only if it is “ ‘reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must

                                 8
actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law
requires in a particular case.’ ” (In re A.J., at p. 160.)
       Father argues the girls’ reports of sexual abuse are not
substantial evidence because they were “belied by various
factors”: the time elapsed between the alleged abuse and the
reporting; the absence of sexual abuse allegations
contemporaneous with the alleged abuse or at the time of the
girls’ detention; positive reports about the girls’ wellbeing during
the period of alleged abuse; and that some of the allegations came
after father disclosed his intention to regain custody of the girls.
As to this last point, father argues “[i]t is quite reasonable to
assume that the girls raised the issue of the alleged sexual abuse,
not because of any such abuse, but other unpleasantries involved
in living with father. . . . In other words, there was incentive to
manufacture sexual abuse allegations in order to insure not being
removed from their successful, nurturing placements.”
       None of these facts compels a conclusion that father did not
sexually abuse his daughters. The record, including the
Department’s determination that the girls’ claims of abuse were
substantiated, amply supports the conclusion that father sexually
abused them. Put simply, father asks us to discount evidence the
juvenile court found credible to reach a contrary conclusion. This
we cannot do. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.)
       Father denies he is asking us to reweigh the evidence. He
contends his complaint is that the juvenile court “failed to
consider its decision in light of the whole record and not simply
the recent accusations of years-old sexual abuse.” His support for
this claim is just another attack on the evidence—that “[i]t defies
logic that [father] would go completely out of character and

                                 9
sexually abuse his young daughters after working so hard to
complete the services required to gain custody.”
       We presume the juvenile court performed its duty and
considered all necessary matters. (Evid. Code, § 664; cf. In re
Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 498-499.) Father fails to defeat
this presumption with the inference he asks us to draw. Father
does not dispute that, after working hard to regain custody, he
allowed friends into his home who drank alcohol, consumed
drugs, and had sexual intercourse in front of his young
daughters. Whatever value might otherwise lie in the
implication that father prioritized maintaining custody above all
else, the facts simply do not support that inference.
2.     The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
       denying father’s request for a continuance.
      A juvenile court may not continue a hearing beyond the
statutory outside date to conduct it if doing so would be “contrary
to the interest of the minor. In considering the minor’s interests,
the court shall give substantial weight to a minor’s need for
prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to
provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a
minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (§ 352, subd. (a)(1).)
A continuance may be granted “only upon a showing of good
cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by
the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the
continuance.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “Courts have interpreted this
policy to be an express discouragement of continuances.” (In re
Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 179.)
      The parties agree the limitations of section 352 apply to
father’s request to continue the section 366.26 hearing. We

                                10
review the juvenile court’s denial of the request for abuse of
discretion. (In re Karla C., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
       The juvenile court denied father’s continuance request for
his failure to show good cause. The only cause father offered was
in the form of a proffer from his attorney, who stated “[f]ather
would like to challenge the contents of the reports that he
essentially sexually abused the minor and would like to show the
court that visits can occur safely in a monitored setting.” The
court responded, “Thank you. The court is not finding that
sufficient. The court is denying that request.”
       Father was aware since not later than June 2022 that his
daughters alleged he sexually abused them; that the juvenile
court credited these allegations (it suspended his visits with his
daughters); and that the Department had substantiated the
allegations through interviews with the girls and others. He also
had notice that his right to future visitation with D.H. would be
at issue at the October 2022 hearing. Indeed, the court had
expressly ordered “no visitation for Father pending next court
date.” That order was continued in effect until the October 2022
hearing. As father concedes in his reply brief, the record shows
“the juvenile court on July 20, 2022, fully expected to decide the
visitation issue at [the October 2022 hearing].”
       Given this, it was incumbent upon father to address his
visitation and why he believed he was entitled to resume it at the
October 2022 hearing. That he was absent from the hearing and
therefore unable to mount the challenge he wanted to make is not
grounds for a continuance without some valid justification for his
absence. (Nahas v. Nahhas (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 440, 442 [“The
mere absence of a party standing alone is insufficient to compel
the court to grant a continuance”].) As father notes in his

                               11
opening brief, the record does not show why father was absent.
This demonstrates a lack of good cause for continuance, not an
abuse of discretion by the juvenile court in proceeding.
      Finally, father implies the juvenile court’s July 2022 order
that the Department “continue working on visitation for both
parents” took the question of a detriment finding off the table for
the October 2022 hearing. We disagree. Counsel for the
Department and for children both immediately took issue with
this directive. The children’s counsel said, “I was just going to
remind the court the court made a finding as for father, had an
objection.” The court responded, “Right. Right.” If anything,
this exchange served to underscore the Department’s and the
children’s opposition to future visitation with father and that
such visitation would be a contested issue at the October 2022
hearing.
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order of legal guardianship is affirmed.

                              GRIMES, J.

WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

                                12