Court Opinion

ID: 9764652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:34:32.220871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:59.599602
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice (concurring). Under our statutes and holdings, this Court should affirm the Commission in the case at bar, since the Commission’s findings have the same force and effect as a jury verdict. But the purpose of this concurring opinion is to attempt to clarify some confusion which I think has slipped into some of our Workmen’s Compensation cases, involving the collapse of a worker. There seems to be an impression that the Workmen’s Compensation Commission can allow a recovery in the case of a collapsed worker only when there is a strain or burden on the worker, more than the usual work for which he is employed. That impression is entirely erroneous, as I see the cases. The confusion seems to result from the failure to distinguish between two groups of cases: (1) In the first group are those cases in which the Commission allowed recovery for a collapsed worker, and we affirmed the Commission; and (2) in the second group are those cases in which the Commission has refused recovery for a collapsed worker, and we reversed the Commission. In the first group are such cases as McGregor v. Arrington, 206 Ark. 921, 175 S. W. 2d 210; Harding Glass Co. v. Albertson, 208 Ark. 866, 187 S. W. 2d 961; Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, 208 Ark. 1017, 188 S. W. 2d 629; Frank Lyon Co. v. Scott, 215 Ark. 274, 220 S. W. 2d 128; and Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Maestri, 215 Ark. 501, 221 S. W. 2d 38. In the second group are such cases as Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S. W. 2d 26; and Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., 218 Ark. 671, 238 S. W. 2d 640, 243 S. W. 2d 754. (1) Now as to the first group of cases: i. e., where the Commission allowed recovery and we affirmed, — a study shows that the Commission allowed recovery in several of these cases, in which the evidence disclosed that the collapsed worker did not have any extra work load or strain greater than the normal work load. It was not work unusual to the vocation that was the key to the recovery; rather it was work greater than the individual workman could stand, which was the key to the recovery. For example: in Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, supra, the Commission allowed a recovery "because of the collapse of A1 Mays, who died of a heart attack, yet the Commission carefully stated: ‘ ‘. . . that the lifting of the pole required no more than usual exertion.” The Commission furthermore said of the testimony of the doctor: ‘ ‘ It was his opinion that he (A1 Mays) died of heart failure, which is not uncommon in a person over 50 years of age; and those attacks may come on without warning and sometime without unusual exertion. . . . He further testified that in his opinion, lifting the pole was not the cause of death, but in bending over, sawing the log, which was on the ground, when he (A1 Mays) raised up suddenly, the heart failed to compensate, and he died; . . .” Thus in Sturgis Bros. v. Mays, there was nothing other than the usual course of work being done by the man; and recovery was allowed, and we affirmed. Another case to the same effect is Quality Excelsior Coal Co. v. Maestri, supra. There the evidence disclosed that the worker was doing his usual work, but that his place of work was in a cramped and confined position. The Commission recited: ‘ ‘. . . we are of the opinion . . . that labor snch as was performed by the deceased, . . . pnt a greater strain upon his already diseased and weakened heart than it conld stand, thereby ag’gravating the pre-existing diseased condition of his heart and hastening death.” The Commission allowed a recovery, and we affirmed. The rule stated in those two cases is sound law. It is not necessary, in order for the Commission to allow a recovery for the collapse of a worker, that there be shown that the worker was subjected to a burden greater than the usual course of the work. Recovery is not gauged by the average of work, but by the ability of the collapsed worker to discharge the burden. I frankly admit that there is language in some of our cases that could have caused the Commission to believe that it could allow recovery only when there was proof that the work load at the time of the collapse was greater than the usual work load; but I insist that to reach such conclusion, the language must be lifted o.ut of its context. As an illustration, in McGregor v. Arrington, supra, there is a statement that the worker, immediately prior to his collapse, was tugging at one end of a board, and the opinion has this language: “It is suggested, and appears highly probable, that more strength and effort was required to slide the plank into place, than would have been required to lift or carry it.” But that quoted language was not intended to mean that it must be shown that the work load was greater than the usual work load; because in McGregor v. Arrington, we quoted, with approval, this language from the Commission’s allowance of the claim: “In our opinion the evidence shows that the decedent, while performing his duties as an employee for respondent employer, put forth an effort that was greater than his heart, already weakened by disease and no doubt fatigued by long hours of labor, could bear. Thus, the decedent suffered an exertion, the accidental and unexpected result of which was an injury to his heart, causing his death. We, therefore, hold that decedent’s death resulted from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” In short, there are cases which allowed recovery in the absence of any evidence of a work load more than the usual work load in that employment. The point I am making is that there need be no proof of any such additional work load before recovery can be allowed. The test for the Commission to apply in allowing a recovery is exactly that last quoted from McGregor v. Arrington. In some cases, it has been intimated that if the testimony shows that the worker would have died anyway, then there was no “accident arising out of and in the course of employment. ’ ’ But on this question of accident, I' call attention to what we said in Batesville White Lime Co. v. Bell, 212 Ark. 23, 205 S. W. 2d 31; and what we said in Murch-Jarvis Co. v. Townsend, 209 Ark. 956, 193 S. W. 2d 310. (2) Now, coming to the second group of cases— i. e., those in which the Commission refused recovery and we reversed, — attention need only be called to the case of Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., supra, and Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co., supra. In each of those cases there was proof of an additional strain or work load; and we reversed the Commission because it had refused a recovery even in cases of additional strain. In the Triebsch case, we said: “These facts are: a pre-existing ailment, an increased and overtaxing effort to accomplish the work load under the conditions existing, and a collapsed worker resulting therefrom. These make a case of accidental injury within the purview of the Workmen’s Compensation Law. ’ ’ In the Scobey v. Southern Lumber Co. case, we said: ‘ ‘ The conditions under which Scobey worked, . . . all considered together, are substantial evidence to the effect that the constant inhalation of the emery dust and sawdust caused an irritation in the lung which accidentally aggravated a cancerous condition, within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, and caused the death of Scobey. ’ ’ The point I am trying to emphasize is, that when there was an extra work load, we reversed the Commission and allowed a recovery because there had been an extra work load, but those cases do not mean that recovery can be allowed only when there is an additional work load. To summarize: From our own cases, and from the authorities generally,1 I understand that when the Commission allows a recovery in a case like this one, then this Court will not reverse unless there is an entire absence of substantial evidence /that would indicate that the collapse arose out of and in the course of the work; but when the Commission refuses a recovery, then this Court will not reverse the Commission unless the evidence shows an extra or additional strain, burden, or working condition but for which the collapse of the worker would not have occurred. In other words, the Commission may find that the collapse of the worker (brought about by aggravation of a previous condition) arose out of and in the course of the work, without any extra or additional strain, burden, or worldng condition; but when the Commission finds against recovery in such a state of facts, then there must be evidence of some extra or additional strain, burden, or working condition before this Court will reverse the Commission. In the ease at bar, the Commission has found that the collapse of the worker came about in such a way that there can be no recovery. Since the Commission’s findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict, I cannot vote to reverse the Commission, although if I had been a finder of the facts, in the case at bar, I would have reached a conclusion different from that of the Commission. I think the Workmen’s Compensation Law should be construed to .allow recovery for the collapse of a worker in a case such as the one at bar, rather than to deny recovery. But I cannot say that there are no substantial facts to support the Commission’s conclusion in the case at bar; therefore, I concur in this case.   In Synder’s Permanent Edition on Workmen’s Compensation, Vol. 5, § 1387, cases are reviewed from many jurisdictions on heart disease and injuries as accidents. See, also, 71 C. J. 607, et seq. Also, there are Annotations on this point in 19 A. L. R. 101, 28 A. L. R. 209, and 60 A. L. R. 1314.