Court Opinion

ID: 9409551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 17:04:18.352631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:51.338040
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/18/23 P. v. Merli CA2/5

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B319579

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. YA102143-01)
           v.

 ERIC GRAYSON MERLI,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.
      Katja Grosch, under the appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                             ___________________________
       Eric Merli appeals from a judgment that imposes
restitution in the amount of $3,500 for attorney fees incurred by
one of his victims. He contends the attorney fees were
unauthorized under Penal Code section 1202.4 because they were
unrelated to the victim’s economic loss.1 He also contends the
trial court erred when it imposed additional fines and fees
totaling $481 without determining his ability to pay. We reverse
the $3,500 restitution award but otherwise affirm the judgment.
                               FACTS
       On June 15, 2020, Merli took a taxi to Palos Verdes
Estates, where he attempted to rob and carjack his driver. The
cab driver got out of his car, kept the keys and called the police.
Merli fled to the home of victim Allen Lee and threatened him
with a large kitchen knife. He demanded Lee give him cash and
the keys to Lee’s car. Lee complied, and Merli drove away in
Lee’s car, taking a power drill from the garage on his way out.
He was quickly apprehended and arrested.
       On December 15, 2021, Merli pleaded no contest to one
count of carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)) and one count of residential
robbery (§ 211). The trial court sentenced him to six years and
four months in state prison, comprised of the midterm of five
years for the carjacking count plus a consecutive term of sixteen

1     “[A] victim of crime who incurs any economic loss as a
result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution
directly from any defendant convicted of that crime,” including
but not limited to, certain prescribed actual and reasonable
attorney fees. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subds. (a) & (f)(3)(H).) We
discuss the statute in greater detail in the Part 1(a) of the
Discussion section of our opinion.
      All further section references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.

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months (one-third the midterm) on the robbery count.2 The court
also imposed various fines and assessments which we discuss
below.
       At the subsequent victim restitution hearing, the
prosecutor sought a restitution award of $90 to have Lee’s car
cleaned plus $5,000 for fees Lee had paid to attorneys Bruce
McGregor and Mark Velez. The parties stipulated to the
admission of McGregor’s declaration in support of the fee request.
Velez did not submit a declaration.
       In his declaration, McGregor stated he was retained by Lee
the day after the robbery to act as “Victim’s Rights counsel.”
McGregor affirmed Lee paid flat fees of $3,500 to McGregor and
$1,500 to Velez. Neither attorney kept detailed records of time
spent on the matter. During the 18 months he represented Lee,
McGregor provided “legal work associated with visiting the scene
of the crime, undertaking both telephonic and email
correspondence with the Palos Verdes Estate Police Department
and the Torrance Branch of the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s Office. [He] acted as an intermediary between Mr. Lee
and those professional agencies. . . . There were also
approximately 15 criminal court appearances in the course of
handling this case. [He] personally attended most of these
appearances.”
       McGregor explained Lee hired Velez because Velez had
“intimate knowledge of the systems and procedures of the Palos
Verdes Estates Police Department.” McGregor believed Velez
also made court appearances on Lee’s behalf.
       At a restitution hearing, Merli agreed Lee was entitled to
recover the $90 cleaning fee but objected to the $5,000 attorney

2     Merli was on probation at the time and stipulated to a
consecutive eight-month term as to the previously imposed but
suspended sentence.

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fees request, arguing it was an unreasonable amount and was not
recoverable because the fees were not incurred to recover Lee’s
economic damages.
       The court ordered Merli to make restitution to Lee in the
reduced amount of $3,590 ($90 cleaning fee plus $3,500 for
McGregor’s fees), finding McGregor’s fees to be reasonable and
allowable under section 1202.4.3 Although Lee’s actual direct
loss from the crime totaled only $90, the court found it was
reasonable for Lee to have retained McGregor to investigate the
extent of his losses, including the determination of whether any
psychological damage resulted from the robbery at knifepoint.
Merli timely appealed.4
                              DISCUSSION
1.     Restitution Order
       Merli challenges the court’s restitution order of $3,500 for
McGregor’s fees, asserting they were not incurred to recover Lee’s
economic damages as required under section 1202.4, subdivision
(f)(3)(H). Merli also contends the fees were unreasonable,
amounting to nearly 40 times Lee’s $90 economic damages.
       The People acknowledge Lee’s attorney fees were not
incurred to recover his economic loss. Relying on People v. Kelly
(2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 1172 (Kelly), the People instead contend
restitution was authorized because the attorney fees were
themselves economic damages resulting from Merli’s criminal
conduct under section 1202.4.
       Because the parties agree Lee did not incur $3,500 in
attorney fees to recover an economic loss of $90, we address the

3    The court declined to credit McGregor’s statements
regarding Velez’s fees. Those fees are not at issue in this appeal.

4   There was no evidence that Lee suffered psychological
damage or sought related professional help.

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People’s argument the attorney fees themselves constituted
recoverable economic loss under section 1202.4 and Kelly. We
begin with the standard of review and the applicable legal
principles.
        a.     Applicable Law on Victim Restitution
         Section 1202.4, subdivision (a) requires “that a victim of
crime who incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission
of a crime shall receive restitution directly from any defendant
convicted of that crime.” Under subdivision (f)(3)(H), “To the
extent possible, the restitution order shall be prepared by the
sentencing court, shall identify each victim and each loss to
which it pertains, and shall be of a dollar amount that is
sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for every
determined economic loss incurred as the result of the
defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, . . . [¶]
[¶] . . . Actual and reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs of
collection accrued by a private entity on behalf of the victim.”
        “ ‘[B]ecause [section 1202.4] uses the language “including,
but not limited to” these enumerated losses, a trial court may
compensate a victim for any economic loss which is proved to be
the direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior, even if not
specifically enumerated in the statute.’ ” (People v. Henderson
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 467, 472–473.)
        The economic loss must be “proper, necessary and a logical
result of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct.” (People v. Lyon
(1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1525 (Lyon).) A trial court “may only
impose restitution for economic losses incurred ‘as a result of’ the
defendant’s criminal conduct. [Citation.] Put differently,
restitution may be imposed in such cases only to the extent the
defendant’s criminal conduct played a ‘substantial factor’ in
causing the victim’s economic loss. [Citation.] To be a
substantial factor, the defendant's criminal conduct must be more

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than a ‘trivial or remote’ factor contributing to the victim’s loss,
but it need not be the ‘sole’ cause of the loss.” (In re S.O. (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1101.)
       “At a victim restitution hearing, a prima facie case for
restitution is made by the People based in part on a victim's
testimony on, or other claim or statement of, the amount of his or
her economic loss. [Citations.] ‘Once the victim has [i.e., the
People have] made a prima facie showing of his or her loss, the
burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the amount of
the loss is other than that claimed by the victim.” (People v.
Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 26 (Millard).)
       “ ‘The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse of
discretion. “A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly and
liberally construed.” [Citation.] “ ‘Where there is a factual and
rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial
court, no abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing
court.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] However, a restitution order
‘resting upon a “‘ “demonstrable error of law” ’ constitutes an
abuse of the court’s discretion. [Citations.]” [Citations.] ‘In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence [to support a factual
finding], the “ ‘power of the appellate court begins and ends with
a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence,
contradicted or uncontradicted,’ to support the trial court’s
findings.” [Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a
restitution hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] “If the
circumstances reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,’ the
judgment may not be overturned when the circumstances might
also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do not
reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the inference

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drawn by the trier of fact.” (Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at
p. 26.)
       b.    The People Failed to Make a Prima Facie
             Showing that Recovery of Lee’s Attorney Fees
             Were Proper, Necessary, and a Logical Result of
             Merli’s Crime
       We conclude the People (on behalf of Lee) have failed to
make a prima facie showing the attorney fees incurred were
“proper, necessary and a logical result of [the defendant’s]
criminal conduct.” (Lyon, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525.)
       Kelly is instructive regarding when attorney fees may be
recovered as economic damages. In Kelly, Charles Schwab Co.,
Inc. obtained a restraining order against the defendant, who had
been terminated and was threatening Schwab employees. (Kelly,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1176.) Posing as someone else, the
defendant violated the restraining order by contacting Schwab
employees and obtaining information he was not authorized to
receive. Schwab’s lawyer, who had previously obtained the
restraining order, investigated and provided law enforcement
with evidence of the defendant’s false personation of another,
unauthorized use of personal information, and violation of the
restraining order. The defendant was convicted of those crimes.
(Id. at p. 1177.)
       At the restitution hearing, Schwab sought reimbursement
for attorney fees and costs to obtain the restraining order, to
investigate and prove the violation of the restraining order, and
to assist the prosecution of the case. Schwab’s request for
restitution was supported by the declaration of its lawyer with
billing records, a prosecutor’s written statement, two letters
containing statements of Schwab’s loss submitted to the
probation department, and a probation memorandum. (Kelly,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1178.) The trial court awarded

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Schwab $221,140.40 in restitution, representing the attorney fees
paid to its counsel for investigating the restraining order
violations and assisting the prosecutor. The court declined to
award any fees Schwab incurred to obtain the restraining order.
(Ibid.)
       The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding expenses incurred to
protect the victim from the defendant’s ongoing criminal conduct
and to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the
defendant were “ ‘ “a logical result of appellant’s criminal
conduct.” ’ ” (Kelly, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 1180.)
       Unlike Kelly, McGregor’s declaration does not demonstrate
he performed specific legal work to protect his client’s rights, or
to aid in investigating or prosecuting the crime.5 McGregor
generically described the objectives of a “Victim’s Rights counsel”
as “legal work to obtain restitution recovery, representation
during victim interview obligations, representation to obtain
protective orders, and providing impact statements and case
resolution input to government prosecutors during the
appropriate stages of criminal court proceedings.” Yet, McGregor
did not state he actually did any of these things. Indeed, nothing
in the record shows he sought to recover victim restitution for
Lee, attended victim interviews, obtained a protective order,
submitted a victim impact statement, or provided case resolution
input.
       Instead, McGregor stated he visited the crime scene,
attended nearly 15 court hearings, and communicated with the
prosecutor and law enforcement without attesting to the purpose
or outcome of this work. McGregor failed to link the objectives of

5     Nor are we persuaded by People v. Moore (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 1229, also cited by the People. In Moore, the
victim recovered lost wages for his attendance at court hearings,
not attorney fees. (Id. at p. 1231.)

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a Victim’s Rights counsel to his actual work on the case. Without
this link, it is equally likely Lee could have hired McGregor
merely to keep him updated on the progress of the case, to
investigate the circumstances of the crime, or to influence how
law enforcement and the prosecution proceeded against Merli.
We do not know because McGregor provides no explanation for
his work.
       The facts of this case are straightforward: On June 15,
2020, Merli entered Lee’s home and unlawfully took his car,
money, and a power drill. The police apprehended and arrested
Merli shortly thereafter. A felony complaint was filed less than
48 hours later, charging Merli with first degree robbery and
carjacking of Lee.6 McGregor does not explain how his work
furthered Lee’s rights as a victim or aided law enforcement in
investigating or gathering evidence in this relatively
straightforward crime.
       We recognize Lee would not have hired McGregor if not for
Merli’s crime. But the People have failed to present evidence
that McGregor’s work was a necessary or logical result of Merli’s
conduct.
2.     Fines and Fees
       Merli next contends the trial court violated his due process
rights when it imposed assessments and fines totaling $481
without determining his ability to pay.7 (People v. Dueñas (2019)

6     We need not set out the charges relating to the taxi driver.

7      This issue is currently before the California Supreme
Court. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted
Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 [the high court will determine whether a
trial court must “consider a defendant’s ability to pay before
imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments,” and if so,
“which party bears the burden of proof regarding defendant’s
inability to pay.”].)

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30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1168 (Dueñas).) Merli has forfeited this
contention.
       At sentencing, the court ordered Merli to pay: a $300
restitution fine pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subd. (b);
a $300 parole revocation restitution fine, which was suspended
unless parole is revoked, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45;
a $40 court operations assessment for each count, totaling $80,
pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8; a $30 criminal conviction
assessment for each count, totaling $60, pursuant to Government
Code section 70373; and a $10 crime prevention fine pursuant to
Penal Code section 1202.5 plus a $29 penalty assessment and a
20 percent criminal surcharge, amounting to $2.
       Merli raised no objections regarding the fines and fees
imposed. Nor does the record show he expressed any concern
about an inability to pay, much less submit evidence of it to the
trial court. His argument is therefore forfeited. (People v.
Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 864 [a defendant’s failure to
challenge the fees and fines imposed at sentencing precludes him
from doing so on appeal]; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680,
729; People v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 687.)
       We reject Merli’s contention that this raises a pure
question of law and an objection was not necessary at the trial
level. His ability to pay is a factual question. (People v.
Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153; see People v. Scott
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [claims of error in the trial court’s
exercise of its sentencing discretion are “essentially factual,” and
thus distinct from ‘ “clear and correctable” ’ legal errors that
appellate courts can redress on appeal ‘independent of any
factual issues presented by the record at sentencing.’ ”].)

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                          DISPOSITION
      That part of the restitution order awarding $3,500 for
attorney’s fees is reversed. The trial court is directed to prepare
a corrected abstract of judgment reflecting restitution in the
amount of $90. The trial court is directed to forward a certified
copy of the amended abstract to the Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

                                           RUBIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:

                         BAKER, J.

                         MOOR, J.

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