Court Opinion

ID: 9386777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 16:07:52.789349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:08.393405
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 ELIEZAR LAZU CARRASQUILLO                  :
                                            :
                    Appellant               :     No. 621 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 29, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003522-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                FILED: APRIL 13, 2023

      Eliezar Lazu Carrasquillo appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions of two counts each of aggravated assault

and   aggravated    assault   with   a   deadly    weapon.   See   18   Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 2702(a)(1), (4). Carrasquillo argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support his convictions; the verdict was against the weight of the evidence;

the trial court erred in clearing the courtroom when a witness testified; and

the trial court erred in providing the jury instructions. We affirm.

      For purposes of this appeal, the essential facts of this case are

undisputed. The central dispute at trial involved Carrasquillo’s state of mind.

On June 10, 2014, Carrasquillo’s brother, Xavier a/k/a “Sapo,” got into a

verbal altercation with Breeze Johnson in a bar in Reading. Sapo and Johnson
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separated and left the bar with their respective groups. Once outside the bar,

Sapo contacted Carrasquillo, who arrived shortly thereafter armed with a gun.

      Carrasquillo confronted Johnson and suggested that both groups go to

11th and Chestnut Streets to allow Johnson and Sapo to have a fair fistfight.

When Johnson’s group arrived at the intersection, they observed Armando

Ortega in a nearby alley, while Carrasquillo and Sapo approached from the

opposite direction. After words were exchanged, Carrasquillo fired three

rounds into the ground.

      More shots rang out from an unidentified source. Johnson and several

of his compatriots began running towards Chestnut Street. Carrasquillo

started shooting in their direction until his gun ran out of bullets. One of

Johnson’s compatriots, Brock Neely, was struck twice by bullets, and

ultimately died from his wounds. Another of Johnson’s associates, Jordan

Almodovar, was shot in the leg but survived.

      The Commonwealth charged Carrasquillo with first-degree murder,

third-degree murder, and multiple counts of aggravated assault. Carrasquillo

was tried jointly with Ortega before a jury. Ultimately, the jury found

Carrasquillo guilty of two counts each of aggravated assault and aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon, but acquitted Ortega on all charges. The trial

court sentenced Carrasquillo to 99 to 210 months in prison. This timely appeal

followed.

      On appeal, Carrasquillo raises the following questions for our review:

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      A. Whether the evidence present at trial was insufficient as a
         matter of law wherein the Commonwealth’s evidence
         presented at trial failed to establish that [Carrasquillo] caused
         serious bodily injury [to] another?

      B. Whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence
         wherein the verdict is so contrary to the evidence and shocks
         one’s sense of justice where the Commonwealth’s evidence
         presented at trial failed to establish that [Carrasquillo]
         intended to and did cause serious bodily injury to another in
         that the verdict does not make logical sense in the fact that
         one of the victims is deceased and there was no cause
         attributable to [Carrasquillo]?

      C. Whether the court erred in allowing the courtroom to be
         cleared to allow the testimony of Alberto Dunn, after he
         claimed to be intimidated by individuals in the defendants’
         families, thereby giving the jury the ability to see that the
         persons in the courtroom had changed and thus permitting the
         improper impression that the defendants were intimidating?

      D. Whether the court erred in failing to read all of the jury
         instructions at once and then read in an order which would
         have caused jury confusion especially in regard to the claim of
         self-defense and how that would weigh into the verdict; such
         being evidenced, by way of example, by the jury coming back
         with an aggravated assault conviction even though there is a
         deceased victim?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some capitalization omitted).

      In his first claim, Carrasquillo contends that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions because the Commonwealth failed to

prove he caused serious bodily injury to another person. See id. at 16, 17-

18. Carrasquillo argues he acted in self-defense by returning fire in response

to a gun fired at him from the alleyway. See id. To that end, Carrasquillo

asserts the Commonwealth failed to prove that the gunman in the alley was

associated with him, as Ortega was acquitted. See id. at 17. According to

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Carrasquillo, the evidence established he fired his gun into the ground and

there was no evidence that his bullets were found in the bodies of Neely or

Almodovar. See id. Carrasquillo highlights that he was carrying a .45-caliber

firearm, while a .40-caliber bullet was found in Neely. See id. Carrasquillo

claims there was no reason for him to shoot Neely or Almodovar, and if he

wanted to aid his brother, he would have shot Johnson. See id. at 17-18.

      Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is as follows:

      The standard we apply is whether viewing all the evidence
      admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
      there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
      element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
      above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
      judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts
      and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
      evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier
      of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 229 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted).

      “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he … attempts to cause

serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly

or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the

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value of human life[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). A person is also guilty of

aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly

causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2702(a)(4). Deadly weapon is defined as “[a]ny firearm, whether loaded or

unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death

or serious bodily injury, or any other device or instrumentality which, in the

manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to

produce death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

      “For aggravated assault purposes, an ‘attempt’ is found where the

accused, with the required specific intent, acts in a manner which constitutes

a substantial step toward perpetrating a serious bodily injury upon another.”

Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 670 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation

omitted). The Commonwealth may establish the defendant’s intent solely from

“circumstantial evidence and inferred from acts, conduct or attendant

circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d 980, 984 (Pa. Super.

2013) (citation omitted). Further, for aggravated assault, the intended harm

need not be directed at a specific person. See Commonwealth v. Palmer,

192 A.3d 85, 95 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      “Pursuant to Section 505 of the Crimes Code, self-defense is established

and the use of force is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is

immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use

of unlawful force    by such other     person on the      present occasion.”

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Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 51 (Pa. 2012) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

            While there is no burden on a defendant to prove the self-
      defense] claim, before that defense is properly at issue at trial,
      there must be some evidence, from whatever source to justify a
      finding of self-defense. If there is any evidence that will support
      the claim, then the issue is properly before the fact finder.

           If the defendant properly raises self-defense under Section
      505 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, the burden is on the
      Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
      defendant’s act was not justifiable self-defense.

            The Commonwealth sustains this burden if it establishes at
      least one of the following: 1) the accused did not reasonably
      believe that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or
      2) the accused provoked or continued the use of force; or 3) the
      accused had a duty to retreat and the retreat was possible with
      complete safety. The Commonwealth must establish only one of
      these three elements beyond a reasonable doubt to insulate its
      case from a self-defense challenge to the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations,

brackets, formatting, and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, in June 2014, Jordan Almodovar, Brock Neely, Gilbert Concepcion,

Breeze Johnson, and Joshua Rivera were at a bar in Reading. See N.T.,

2/16/22, at 266, 268, 326, 405; see also N.T., 2/17/22, at 720-21 (Criminal

Investigator Eric Sweitzer testifying that the contents of a surveillance video

outside the bar showed the group entering and leaving the bar). At the bar,

Johnson and Sapo engaged in a brief altercation. See N.T., 2/16/22, at 275,

277-78, 327-29, 412-14.

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      The parties later left the bar and Sapo contacted Carrasquillo, who

arrived outside the bar. See N.T., 2/18/22, at 1074-75; N.T., 2/16/22, at 284-

86, 329. At that time, Carrasquillo confronted Johnson while carrying a

firearm. See N.T., 2/16/22, at 331-33, 416-18, 424. At Carrasquillo’s

suggestion, the parties attempted to fix the situation and go to a different

area – 11th and Chestnut – to have a fair fistfight between just Sapo and

Johnson. See id. at 331, 334-36, 338, 419, 422, 424; see also N.T., 2/18/22,

at 1077 (Carrasquillo testifying that he suggested the new location because

he had been in the area earlier in the night).

      Almodovar, Neely, Concepcion, Johnson, and Rivera arrived at the

location, and observed Ortega in the alley across the street. See N.T.,

2/16/22, at 430-32. The group then observed Sapo and Carrasquillo approach

from the opposite direction and the parties had a verbal altercation, during

which Sapo yelled somebody has a gun. See id. at 341-42, 368, 434; see

also N.T., 2/18/22, at 1087. Carrasquillo then fired three rounds into the

ground and told people to get back. See N.T., 2/18/22, at 1088-89, 1091;

N.T., 2/16/22, at 342, 368, 437-38, 442.

      Subsequently, shots were fired from an area where Ortega had been

standing. See N.T., 2/18/22, at 1090; N.T., 2/16/22, at 343, 345, 438. As

Neely, Almodovar, and Johnson ran from the scene toward Chestnut Street,

Carrasquillo fired his gun at them until he was out of bullets. See N.T.,

2/18/22, at 1090-91; N.T., 2/16/22, at 345, 438-39, 441. Almodovar was

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struck in his leg and Neely died after being struck two times in the hip and

lower back, which exited through his upper chest. See N.T., 2/17/22, at 792-

98; N.T., 2/16/22, at 346-48.

      At the scene, police found .40 caliber casings on the eastside alley on

11th Street and .45 caliber casings on the westside alley on 11th Street, where

Carrasquillo had been standing. See N.T., 2/15/22, at 195, 199, 203. Based

upon the damage found at the scene and the casings, the police determined

that the bullets were fired from the east and west alleys on 11th Street toward

Chestnut Street. See id. at 224-26. Further, John Brad Hoy, an expert in

firearm and tool mark examination with the Berks County District Attorney’s

Office Crime Laboratory, testified that each of the .40 caliber casings were

discharged from the same gun and eight of the ten .45 caliber casings were

fired from the same gun. See N.T., 2/17/22, at 680, 682-83. Hoy also

indicated the bullet found in Neely’s hip was a .40 caliber bullet. See id. at

685; see also Lab Report, 11/23/21, at 2.

      This evidence, taken as a whole, was capable of establishing Carrasquillo

facilitated the confrontation at 11th and Chestnut Streets by convincing

Johnson’s group to go to that location for a fair fistfight; Carrasquillo brought

a gun to the fistfight confrontation; when the groups convened in the area,

Sapo yelled something about a gun and Carrasquillo fired gunshots at the

ground; in conjunction with another shooter, Carrasquillo then fired multiple

gunshots toward Chestnut Street as Neely and Almodovar attempted to flee

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the scene; and Neely was killed from gunshot wounds and Almodovar was

shot in the leg. As such, a reasonable jury could conclude Carrasquillo

interjected a firearm into the dispute with Johnson’s group and he could have

avoided the use of deadly force by retreating to safety from the unarmed

victims. See Commonwealth v. Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super.

2012) (en banc) (stating that Commonwealth may negate self-defense claim

by proving defendant “used greater force than was reasonably necessary to

protect   against   death    or   serious       bodily    injury.”).    Therefore,   the

Commonwealth        disproved     Carrasquillo’s         self-defense     claim.     See

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 180 A.3d 1217, 1231 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(concluding that the Commonwealth disproved appellant’s self-defense claim,

where after an argument and physical altercation, appellant shot the victim

despite his ability to safely retreat).

      Further, the totality of the evidence supports a conclusion that

Carrasquillo acted recklessly with an extreme indifference to the value of

human life by firing his gun. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, the evidence was sufficient to support the aggravated

assault and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon convictions, as

Carrasquillo attempted to cause serious bodily injury to the victims and did so

while he possessed a deadly weapon. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/22, at 5;

see also Commonwealth v. Holley, 945 A.2d 241, 249 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(concluding that evidence that the defendant attacked the victim, pointed a

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gun at her, and missed the shot was sufficient to support defendant’s

aggravated assault conviction because it established that the defendant

intended to cause serious bodily injury).

      In his second claim, Carrasquillo contends that the verdicts were against

the weight of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 18-19. Carrasquillo argues

that the verdict is shocking because he was found guilty of aggravated assault,

while Ortega was found not guilty of any crimes. See id. at 19. Further,

Carrasquillo maintains that the verdict was absurd where the jury found him

guilty of aggravated assault as to two victims, when one victim was killed.

See id.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A) requires a challenge to

the weight of the evidence to be raised with the trial court in a motion for a

new trial that is presented “(1) orally, on the record, at any time before

sentencing; (2) by written motion at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a

post-sentence motion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). “Failure to properly preserve the

claim will result in waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its

opinion.” Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

      Here, in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court rejected

Carrasquillo’s weight challenge. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/22, at 6-8.

However, a review of the record reveals Carrasquillo did not properly preserve

his weight challenge before the trial court. Therefore, we conclude the weight

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of the evidence claim is waived. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); Lofton, 57 A.3d at

1273.

        In his third claim, Carrasquillo argues that the trial court erred in

clearing the courtroom prior to Albert Dunn’s testimony. See Appellant’s Brief

at 19-20. Carrasquillo contends Dunn’s statements that Carrasquillo’s family

was intimidating him permitted the improper impression to the jury that

Carrasquillo himself was intimidating. See id. at 20. Carrasquillo highlights

there were no articulated specific instances of any intimidation or threats, and

that Dunn was an informant who testified in multiple cases and had no

overriding interest in clearing the courtroom. See id. at 20-21. According to

Carrasquillo, the trial court should have instead instructed the observers of

the trial to recognize courtroom decorum. See id. at 21. Further, Carrasquillo

claims the trial court’s placement of courtroom staff in place of the regular

audience could have confused the jury or permitted inferences that

Carrasquillo was intimidating the witness, such that the verdict was affected.

See id.

        “A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to a trial that is open to

members of the public.” Commonwealth v. Jordan, 212 A.3d 91, 101 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted); see also Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 9. However,

the United States Supreme Court has held that although a defendant has the

right to a public trial, a court may close the courtroom if the following factors

are met: “(1) there is ‘an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced,’ (2)

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the closure is ‘no broader than necessary to protect that interest,’ (3) the trial

court considers ‘reasonable alternatives’ to closure, and (4) the trial court

makes ‘findings adequate to support the closure.’” Jordan, 212 A.3d at

101 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984)). “The violation of

the right to a public trial constitutes a structural defect, a specific type of

constitutional    error   warranting     a     new   trial   without   any   showing   of

prejudice.” Id. at 103 (citation omitted).

       Here, Dunn was called as a witness by Ortega, Carrasquillo’s co-

defendant. See N.T., 2/18/22, at 1031.1 Dunn refused to testify in open court

due to potential retaliation, noting prior threats to him and his family, and his

worry about his girlfriend, who was acquainted with Carrasquillo’s brother.

See id. at 1032, 1038, 1046. A detective, who was testifying in the case,

noted that a group of people in the back of the courtroom took an extreme

interest in Dunn and were staring him down when he was on the stand. See

id. at 1043-44. Thereafter, the trial court, the detective, the district attorney,

Ortega’s counsel, and Carrasquillo’s counsel all acknowledged that Dunn was

shaking and credibly scared. See id. at 1044-45.

____________________________________________

1 At trial, Dunn testified that he was in prison with Carrasquillo, who claimed
to not have been involved in the shooting but did not identify the other
shooter. See N.T., 2/18/22, at 1057-58. Dunn further testified that Ortega
told him that a person named “Boobah” was involved in the shooting. See id.
at 1059.

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      The trial court and Ortega’s counsel then indicated that the courtroom

be closed and filled with courtroom staff, to which Carrasquillo’s counsel

objected. See id. at 1050-51. Thereafter, the district attorney pointed out

that Dunn was Ortega’s witness and that if he could not testify, Ortega could

be prejudiced. See id. at 1054. Ultimately, the trial court, finding threats to

Dunn’s safety, decided to close the courtroom and repopulate it with court

staff so that approximately the same amount of people were in the courtroom.

See id. at 1051-53, 1055.

      The trial court addressed Carrasquillo’s claim as follows:

      The witness in question[, Dunn,] claimed that he feared retaliation
      against himself and his family if his testimony was observed by
      certain people present in the courtroom at that time. Those
      concerns were reinforced by the witness’s attorney and one of the
      detectives involved in the case who observed the spectators in the
      courtroom, specifically, their responses and facial expressions
      directed to [Dunn]. Additionally, the [trial c]ourt observed the
      profound shaking and anxiety of [Dunn] during his questioning in
      chambers. [Dunn’s] physical manifestations of the fears he
      expressed were acknowledged on the record by counsel for all
      Defendants and the Commonwealth. Indeed, prior to the instant
      trial, the witness’s fears were determined to be of sufficient
      credibility so as to be the basis for him to be moved to another
      county jail when he began cooperating with the Commonwealth,
      his fears of reprisal were also the basis for an agreement of
      counsel prior to trial that discovery would be produced to defense
      counsel only and not disclosed to her client or any other persons.
      To balance the interests of preserving the testimony of [Dunn]
      and avoid any perception of change or bias by the jury, the [trial
      c]ourt decided to clear the courtroom and replace as many of the
      spectators as possible with court personnel. It is worthy of note
      that the entire trial was conducted in an open courtroom with
      different people moving freely in and out and different people
      present in the courtroom at various times throughout trial.
      Additionally, the sealed portion of the transcript is rife with
      acknowledgements by [Carrasquillo’s] counsel that various people

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      freely entered and exited the courtroom throughout the trial,
      many of them different people, including court personnel, wishing
      to observe the proceedings. [Carrasquillo’s] counsel likewise
      acknowledged that during the very brief period of [] Dunn’s
      testimony, less than 15 minutes, although the courtroom door was
      locked, the number of spectators was roughly the same volume of
      people that had been present over the course of the trial. The
      assertion that this action “gave the jury the ability to see that the
      persons in the courtroom had changed and thus permitted the
      improper impression that the Defendants were intimidating,” is
      factually specious and entirely unsupported by any evidence.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/14/22, at 9-10.

      We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court and conclude that

it did not abuse its discretion in closing the courtroom due to Dunn’s fear of

the spectators in the courtroom and placing courtroom staff as spectators

during Dunn’s testimony. Here, the trial court met the Waller factors: (1)

there was an overriding interest, as co-defendant Ortega would be prejudiced

if he was not able to present his witness, Dunn, at trial if the courtroom had

not been closed; (2) the closure was only for this sole witness and the gallery

was filled with court staff during Dunn’s testimony; (3) the trial court

implemented a reasonable alternative by having staff in the courtroom, so

that the jury saw about the same number of people in the gallery and did not

see an empty courtroom; and (4) the trial court put its findings supporting its

decision on the record. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 48. Notably, having members

of the court staff in the courtroom assured the trial was public. See Jordan,

212 A.3d at 102 (stating that “[w]here trial courts perceive a threat to the

orderly administration of justice in their courtrooms by an unmanageable

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public, they may always place reasonable restrictions on access to the

courtroom, so long as the basic guarantees of fairness are preserved[.]”).

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s decision was sound and that

Carrasquillo’s third claim is without merit. See generally Commonwealth

v. Conde, 822 A.2d 45, 50 (Pa. Super. 2003) (concluding that the trial court’s

order excluding spectators from the courtroom due to their behavior was

designed to maintain the dignity and decorum of the courtroom and did not

deny appellant’s right to a public trial, as the trial remained open to members

of the public who acted appropriately).

      In his final claim, Carrasquillo argues the trial court’s jury instruction

confused the jury. See Appellant’s Brief at 21. Carrasquillo’s entire argument

is as follows:

      Upon a review of the full transcript, there are multiple points
      within the trial that the [trial c]ourt conferences with Defense
      counsel and the District Attorney regarding the jury instructions.
      In addition, the Court first reads only six (6) of the instructions,
      and then recesses to again review the instructions which were
      missed. The Court then reconvenes with the jury, after they were
      left in the courtroom for approximately an hour, through
      lunchtime, and reads additional instructions. The jury was then
      dismissed after 2 pm to deliberate. This could have only been
      confusing to the jury. Their confusion was further evidence by the
      multiple jury questions, which including a request to be provided
      the instructions. The Superior Court has held that a “charge which
      is correct in the abstract but misleading because of the manner in
      which the ideas are couched may be [reversible] error.”
      Commonwealth v. [Prosdocimo], 525 Pa. 147, 152 (1990),
      citing Commonwealth v. Cain, 484 Pa. 240, 249 (1979). Thus,
      even though the Court may have eventually gotten the correct
      instructions read into the record, the long and arduous way they
      were presented is reversible error in this case.

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Appellant’s Brief at 22.

      Initially, despite the voluminous transcripts in this case, Carrasquillo

fails to cite any place in the record where he preserved this issue for appellate

review through objection or an exception. See Commonwealth v. Parker,

104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating to preserve an appellate claim

regarding a jury instruction, an appellant must have either taken an exception

or made a specific objection); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“No portions of

the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless

specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.”). In

fact, neither Carrasquillo’s statement of the case nor the argument section of

his brief contain a specific “[s]tatement of place of raising or preservation of

issues.” Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c).

      Moreover,    Carrasquillo’s   argument    merely    makes    unsupported

conclusory statements that the jury was confused by the trial court’s

instructions, without providing any citation to the record or pertinent case law.

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d

1231, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“The failure to develop an adequate argument

in an appellate brief may result in waiver of the claim under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.”).

Therefore, this claim is waived. In any event, Carrasquillo appears to concede

that trial court’s instructions were a proper reading of the law. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa. Super. 2018) (stating

that “[t]he trial court has broad discretion in its phrasing of jury instructions

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so long as the issue is adequately, accurately, and clearly presented to the

jury for its consideration.” (citation and quotations omitted)).

      In light of the foregoing, Carrasquillo’s claims are without merit and we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/13/2023

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