Court Opinion

ID: 9633659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:56:08.272784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:39.457449
License: Public Domain

CARSON, J.,
dissenting.
For nearly a decade, the appellate courts of this state have sought to bring clarity to this remote area of criminal jurisprudence—jury instructions on lesser-included crimes. In this quest for clarity, I am convinced that we have become overly-precise in an imprecise field. .
After years of dormancy, the Oregon appellate courts reconsidered the appropriate instruction on the deliberation procedure to be used by the jury when considering lesser-*647included offenses. First, the Court of Appeals decided State v. Ogden, 35 Or App 91, 580 P2d 1049 (1978). That court held the following instruction to be reversible error:
“You have to start with the charge contained in the indictment * * * and you consider the [lesser included] charge * * * only if you should find the Defendant not guilty of the * * * [original charge].” 35 Or App at 94.
Subsequently, this court noted in State v. Allen, 301 Or 35, 38, 717 P2d 1178 (1986) that the following instruction was to be viewed as reversible error:
“* * * If you determine that the defendant is not guilty of the crime of_you may consider the lesser included crime of----State v. Bird, * * * 59 Or App at 79; State v. Martin, 64 Or App 469, 471-472, 668 P2d 479 (1983).,1
On the other hand, this court, in Allen, approved the following instruction adopted by the Oregon State Bar Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions Committee:
«* * * pjf you cannot agree on a verdict on the charged offense, you should then consider the lesser included offense.” 301 Or at 37.
The operative part of each of the questioned jury instructions here is as follows:
“* * * [Although the defendant is charged in that Count with the crime of Rape in the First Degree [charged offense], you have the right to determine in that Count that the defendant has committed a crime of lesser degree, provided that you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he has committed the crime as charged, but you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he has committed a crime of lesser degree. * * *” (Emphasis supplied.)
The heart of the Ogden decision in the Court of Appeals was that the jury was required to reach a verdict before proceeding with consideration of a lesser-included offense. The court stated: “The import of the supplemental instruction was that before the jury could consider the lesser *648included offense, it had to reach a verdict with respect to the burglary charge [charged offense], and that if the jury was deadlocked as to the burglary charge, the court must order a mistrial.” State v. Ogden, supra, 35 Or App at 94-95. See also State v. Allen, supra, 301 Or at 39. The nub of the rationale behind the “bad” instruction is its coercive effect upon a juror. That is, by proceeding in this manner from the most serious to a less serious offense, verdict by verdict, the juror is compelled to find the defendant guilty, find the defendant not guilty, or allow a mistrial to be suffered. This reversible instruction format, as noted by the majority, has been dubbed “acquittal first.”
What the majority fails to note, or to find significant, is that the instruction in this case does not first require an acquittal before lesser-included offenses may be considered. What is required merely is the inability to reach a guilty verdict. There is a difference. For example, a 9-3 vote for a guilty verdict under the instruction considered in Ogden would require (coerce) movement by at least one juror to avoid a hung jury. Under the instruction in this case, a 9-3 vote for a guilty verdict (sufficient number of jury not satisfied of guilt) would permit the jury to examine lesser-included offenses.
In my opinion, the jury instruction in this case does not suffer the coercive effect that lies at the heart of the appellate courts’ objection to the Ogden instruction.
Simply stated, I see a substantial difference between the requirement to find a verdict for acquittal before proceeding and a direction to proceed if there is no finding of guilt. The post-conviction court was right: Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render inadequate assistance in proposing the jury instructions.
Peterson, C. J., and Jones, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

 This instruction appears in comments to Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1009, adopted by the Oregon State Bar Uniform Criminal Jury Instructions Committee in June 1984. But see revised Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction No. 1009, December 1986.