Court Opinion

ID: 9607560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:56.83835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:25.782773
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
Does the scope of judicial review of a civil service commission’s approval of the dismissal of a city *817employee encompass a review on the merits? Specifically, the real issue before the court is not “What is right”? but rather, “Who decides what is right”?
Respondent, a Seattle policeman, was dismissed by the chief of police “for conduct unbecoming an officer, for violation of state laws, for conduct likely to bring discredit upon the Seattle Police Department and for the good of the service.” The chief of police filed with the civil service commission a Report of Separation which included a statement of reasons.
Respondent requested the commission to conduct an investigation pursuant to Art. 16, § 12 of the Seattle City Charter.1 Four 'hearings were held; respondent was represented by counsel; numerous witnesses testified. The commission sustained the dismissal.
Upon review, the superior court reversed the commission and reinstated respondent because, in the court’s opinion, the commission was arbitrary and capricious. In State ex rel. Perry v. Seattle, 62 Wn.2d 891, 384 P.2d 874 (1963), this court abrogated the reinstatement order and remanded the case for further consideration by the civil service commission “because its proceedings were conducted upon an inherently wrong basis.” The commission’s formal findings stated:
*818We can upset the action of the department head in cases of this kind only when such action is arbitrary and capricious.
The commission used the wrong standard in reaching its decision. It did not consider the merits of the issues of fact raised by respondent’s discharge; hence, our remand for a new hearing.
Upon receipt of the remittitur the parties stipulated that in the new hearing no further testimony would be taken before the commission; that the new hearing would consist of submission to the commission of a transcript of the evidence of the original hearings, with oral argument thereon; and that the civil service commission should make its decision upon such new hearing.
The commission considered the record and heard argument of counsel. Its minutes, which were transmitted to the chief of police, disclose:
The Commission further finds and concludes as its independent judgment on the matter that the dismissal of . . . [respondent] was for just cause. The action of Chief of Police Ramon is therefore sustained. (Italics ours.)
Our former opinion (62 Wn.2d 891 at 893) sets forth the evidence presented to the commission for its consideration. It is not necessary to repeat it. It is sufficient to state that the reason assigned for respondent’s dismissal is not “so frivolous that all minds must necessarily agree that it is not a legitimate cause.” State ex rel. Wolcott v. Boyington, 110 Wash. 622, 627, 188 Pac. 777 (1920). The charges were considerably more serious than simply “erratic driving” while off duty. As we pointed out in our former opinion, there was evidence presented to the commission, if believed, to warrant the conclusion that, on two occasions, respondent was affected by intoxicating liquors and it was not safe for him to drive an automobile.
Again, the superior court held that the action of the civil service commission was arbitrary and capricious. The decree entered by the trial court reversed the findings and decision of the commission and remanded the cause for rein*819statement of respondent to the police force as an active police officer.
The city and the commission again present the case for our review.
In the last analysis respondent’s contention before the superior court and in this court amounts to little else than that the civil service commission wrongly decided the charges against him upon the merits. The superior court agreed. We conclude that neither the superior court nor this court can consider the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Appellate review is not a trial de novo. That is the province of the civil service commission.
We cannot distinguish the instant case from State ex rel. Littau v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 64, 63 P.2d 515 (1937). Littau, a Seattle policeman for 19 years, was discharged. After a full hearing at which he appeared in person and by counsel, the civil service commission sustained the action of the chief of police. The superior court sustained a demurrer to Littau’s application for a writ of mandamus to compel his reinstatement to the position of patrolman. This court affirmed dismissal of the action, saying:
The principle of law governing the situation is this: When, in a case of removal from office or position within the classified civil service, it appears that the appointing power has filed with the civil service commission a written statement of the reasons for the removal, upon charges that cannot be said to be utterly frivolous, and when it further appears that the commission -has awarded the party charged a full opportunity to be heard, and that competent evidence has been produced tending, in some measure at least, to prove the charges made, the court may not inquire into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Its power is confined to the inquiry whether the officers entrusted with the authority to effect removals and discharges have acted within the prescribed rules.
Other decisions announcing the same doctrine are set forth in the margin.2
*820In State ex rel. Schussler v. Matthiesen, 24 Wn.2d 590, 166 P.2d 839, t'he court pointed out that, in the absence of a charter provision establishing a merit system or system of civil service, the appointing power of a municipality has the right to discharge an employee with or without reason. When, however, the employee has the protection of a civil service system, the rules of the system must be followed.
Respondent’s protection is twofold: that which springs from a hearing before the civil service commission, and that which springs from review by the courts. The first is executive and administrative in nature; the second is judicial. The latter is not a trial de novo on the merits.
When the appointing power has filed a Report of Separation and a “statement in writing of the reasons therefor”1 it then becomes the function of the civil service commission, upon request, to investigate, to hold a hearing, and to reach a conclusion upon the merits of the dismissal. The commission is not only the final fact-finding body, it is the final arbiter of policy. This was recognized in State ex rel. Wolcott v. Boyington, 110 Wash. 622, 188 Pac. 777 (1920), wherein the court said:
It [city charter] has not only given to the civil service commission the power to decide questions of fact, that is, as to what acts have been committed by an employee which are sought to be shown as grounds for his dismissal, but also the question as to whether or not the particular acts drawn in question constitute sufficient cause for the dismissal of an employee.
Upon review by certiorari the function of the court is equally important, but of a different nature. The court is neither a fact-finding agency, a policy-making body, nor a hiring hall. Its function is limited to testing the legality of the administrative procedure. Was a written statement filed setting forth reasons for the discharge? Were the *821charges so frivolous that all minds must necessarily agree that a legitimate cause for discharge was not stated? State ex rel. Wolcott v. Boyington, supra. Was respondent advised of the charges preferred against him? Was he afforded the right of a full and complete hearing with the aid of counsel? Luellen v. Aberdeen, 20 Wn.2d 594, 148 P.2d 849 (1944). Did the commission disregard the facts? Was the commission’s decision made upon “an inherently wrong basis” as illustrated by the prior appeal in this case? Was the action of the commission arbitrary and capricious?
None of these questions requires discussion — except the last — for the record amply supports the conclusion that respondent was not deprived of administrative due process.
A decision by an administrative commission is not arbitrary and capricious simply because a trial court and this court conclude, after reading the record, that they would have decided otherwise had they been the administrative commission. Where a tribunal has been established to hold inquiries and make decisions as to whether an employee shall be dismissed, review by the judiciary is limited to determining whether an opportunity was given to be heard and whether competent evidence supported the charge. State ex rel. Schussler v. Matthiesen, 24 Wn.2d 590,166 P.2d 839 (1946), and cases cited therein. The crucial question is whether or not there is evidence to support the commission’s conclusion. A finding or a conclusion made without evidence to support it, is, of course, arbitrary. State ex rel. Tidewater-Shaver Barge Lines v. Kuykendall, 42 Wn.2d 885, 891, 259 P.2d 838 (1953); but it is not arbitrary or capricious if made with due consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing. See Miller v. Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 390, 378 P.2d 464 (1963), and cases cited. The instant case meets this test. Neither the trial court nor this court can substitute its judgment for the independent judgment of the civil service commission. State ex rel. Wolcott v. Boyington, supra.
The scope of judicial review requires that this cause be reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss it.
It is so ordered.
*822Hill, Don worth, Finley, Ott, and Hamilton, JJ., concur.

City of Seattle Charter, Art. 16, § 12, provides:
“Sec. 12. Tenure In Classified Service; Removal For Cause; Investigation; Reinstatement; Suspension; Oaths and Evidence: Every officer or employee in the classified civil service shall hold office until removed or retired. Any officer or employee whose appointment is complete may be removed by the appointing power only upon the filing with the commission of a statement in writing of the reasons therefor. Any officer or employee so removed may within ten days after his removal demand an investigation. The commission shall forthwith make such investigation and its finding and decision shall be certified to the appointing officer, and if the removal is not sustained thereby, the officer or employee so removed shall at once be re-instated. Nothing in this article shall limit the power of any officer to suspend without pay a subordinate for a period not exceeding thirty days. In the course of any investigation each member of the commission or their designated agents shall have power to administer oaths, and shall have the power to require the attendance of any officer or employee or other person and the production of books and papers relevant to such investigation.” (Italics ours.)

Price v. Seattle, 39 Wash. 376, 81 Pac. 847 (1905); King v. Listman, 63 Wash. 271,115 Pac. 93 (1911); State ex rel. Wolcott v. Boyington, 110 Wash. 622, 188 Pac. 777 (1920); Ford v. Seattle, 117 Wash. 55, 200 Pac. 568 (1921); Ryan v. Everett, 121 Wash. 342, 209 Pac. 532 (1922); *820State ex rel. Boltin v. Cotterill, 125 Wash. 533, 216 Pac. 851 (1923); Bridges v. Patterson, 135 Wash. 436, 237 Pac. 998 (1925); State ex rel. Beebe v. Seattle, 159 Wash. 392, 293 Pac. 459 (1930); State ex rel. Tate v. Seattle, 180 Wash. 635, 41 P.2d 784 (1935); State ex rel. Ashing v. Davis, 4 Wn.2d 454,104 P.2d 335 (1940); State ex rel. Price v. Seattle, 20 Wn.2d 17, 145 P.2d 286 (1944); State ex rel. Schussler v. Matthiesen, 24 Wn.2d 590, 166 P.2d 839 (1946).