Court Opinion

ID: 9950107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 14:09:21.665792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:40.075382
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13428

                COMMONWEALTH   vs.   KHALID KALILA.

         Suffolk.     November 6, 2023. – March 13, 2024.

   Present:   Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.1

Practice, Criminal, Execution of sentence, Stay of proceedings,
     Affidavit. Appeals Court, Appeal from order of single
     justice.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on June 28, 2018.

     A motion for a stay of execution of sentence, filed on May
24, 2021, was heard by Michael D. Ricciuti, J., and a second
motion for a stay of execution of sentence was heard in the
Appeals Court by Kenneth V. Desmond, Jr., J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     J.W. Carney, Jr., for the defendant.
     Darcy Jordan, Assistant District Attorney (Lynn Feigenbaum,
Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

     1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
prior to his retirement.
                                                                    2

     GAZIANO, J.    In this case, we review the decision of a

single justice of the Appeals Court denying the defendant's

motion to stay execution of his sentence pending the appeal from

his convictions.    The single justice upheld the decision of the

trial judge (trial judge or judge), and concluded that although

the defendant demonstrated a likelihood of success on his

appeal, he was nonetheless a flight risk and a danger to others.

In support of this conclusion, the single justice cited the

defendant's connections and frequent travel to a foreign country

as evidence that he was a flight risk.    The single justice also

cited the impulsive, racially motivated, and violent acts for

which the defendant was convicted as evidence that he was a

danger to others.

     There is no dispute that the defendant established a

reasonable likelihood of success on appeal.   In fact, the

defendant's direct appeal was successful, and his convictions

have now been vacated.   See Commonwealth v. Kalila, 103 Mass.

App. Ct. 582, 583 (2023).   Notwithstanding this determination,

we discern no abuse of discretion in the single justice's denial

of the defendant's motion to stay execution of his sentence.

Applying the relevant factors, see Commonwealth v. Hodge (No.

1), 380 Mass. 851, 855-857 (1980), and Commonwealth v. Nash, 486

Mass. 394, 403 (2020), the single justice had an adequate basis

to determine that the defendant posed an unacceptable security
                                                                     3

risk.   Accordingly, we affirm the single justice's order denying

the defendant's motion to stay his sentence pending appeal.

     Background.   We set forth the facts as presented to the

trial judge and single justice in connection with the motion to

stay the defendant's sentence pending appeal.

     The defendant was born in Morocco and lived there with his

family until the age of fourteen.    He and his family then

emigrated to the United States in 2003, where he since has

resided.    The defendant routinely visits Morocco with his family

and maintains dual citizenship with the United States and

Morocco.    Indeed, the defendant's father resides in Morocco.

     On January 30, 2018, the defendant and his brother were

drinking to celebrate their spouses' just-announced pregnancies.

The celebration ended at a restaurant and lounge in Boston,

where the defendant had an altercation with another patron.

Security personnel attempted to remove the defendant from the

premises.   The defendant responded by striking one of the

security personnel, who was Black, with a glass at least twice

and yelling racial epithets.   The victim was taken to a

hospital, where he required plastic surgery and more than

seventy stiches.   As a result of his injuries, the victim

continues to suffer from loss of vision, nerve damage, and

permanent scarring.   The defendant subsequently was arrested by

Boston police.
                                                                   4

     After his arrest, the defendant was released on $10,000

cash bail from the South Boston Division of the Boston Municipal

Court Department.   As a condition of his release, the defendant

was ordered to have no contact with the victim and to refrain

from visiting the restaurant where the altercation occurred.

The defendant followed these conditions for the next three

years.   During this time, the defendant also remained gainfully

employed and attended every court date.

     In June 2018, a grand jury indicted the defendant for

mayhem, G. L. c. 265, § 14; assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); assault and battery

by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious bodily injury,

G. L. c. 265, § 15A (c) (i); and violation of constitutional

rights with bodily injury, G. L. c. 265, § 37.

     On May 10, 2021, empanelment for the defendant's trial

commenced in the Superior Court.   After four jurors had been

seated, including a Black woman, two white women, and one white

man, juror no. 32, a Black man, was called.   During voir dire

examination, juror no. 32 stated he would not weigh the

testimony of a police officer differently from that of a

civilian.   The juror also stated that his mother worked as a

civilian in internal affairs at Boston police department

headquarters.
                                                                       5

     On completion of individual voir dire, the defendant

exercised a peremptory challenge to remove juror no. 32 due to

the juror's familial connection with the Boston police

department.    The defendant did not challenge another juror who

had a familial connection to the police.2    Nonetheless, the

defendant argued that juror no. 32 should be dismissed because

the defendant planned to challenge the testimony of two Boston

police officers during trial.     The judge overruled the

challenge, stating that while the defendant's reason was

genuine, the defendant's proffered race-neutral explanation was

inadequate.3

     At trial, the defendant denied using racial epithets and

claimed he acted in self-defense against the victim.        The jury

rejected the defendant's testimony and returned verdicts of

guilty on all four charged offenses.    The conviction of assault

and battery by means of a dangerous weapon causing serious

bodily injury ultimately was dismissed and vacated at the

defendant's sentencing hearing.    The defendant was sentenced to

     2 In particular, juror no. 17, a white woman, had a father
who was a former police officer.

     3 The judge further explained that he was overruling the
defendant's objection because there was no reason why a Black
juror should be challenged on the proffered grounds, where the
juror credibly testified that he would not value a police
officer's testimony differently from the testimony of another
witness.
                                                                     6

from three to four years in State prison for the mayhem

conviction; one year in a house of correction for his conviction

of violating constitutional rights with bodily injury, to be

served from and after his State prison sentence; and two years

of probation for his conviction of assault and battery by means

of a dangerous weapon.

     On May 24, 2021, the defendant filed a motion for a stay of

execution of his sentence pending appeal pursuant to Mass. R.

Crim. P. 31 (a), as appearing in 454 Mass. 1501 (2009).    In his

motion, the defendant argued that the judge's erroneous denial

of his peremptory challenge against juror no. 32 created a

strong likelihood that the defendant's conviction would be

overturned and further argued that the defendant did not pose a

security risk.

     On June 14, 2021, the judge denied the defendant's motion

in a written opinion.    The judge found that even if an appellate

court considered the denial of the defendant's peremptory strike

"as based on genuineness rather than adequacy grounds, the

defendant nonetheless has shown a likelihood of success of

appeal."   However, the judge also found that the defendant

"present[ed] a profound risk of flight."    The judge first noted

the serious crimes for which the defendant had been convicted,

which arose "from an extraordinarily violent and sudden attack

in which [the defendant] seriously slashed the face of a [B]lack
                                                                     7

bar employee with a shard of heavy glass while repeatedly

threatening and hurling ugly racial epithets at the employee."

The judge then found that the defendant's significant sentence

created a compelling motive for the defendant to escape.

Further, given that the jury rejected the defendant's

exculpatory testimony as "incredible," the judge concluded that

it was "impossible to rely on [the defendant's] representations

that he will not seek to flee."   Last, the judge found that the

defendant was an "extreme risk of flight" due to his status as a

dual citizen of the United States and Morocco, the time he had

spent in Morocco, the presence of his father in Morocco, and the

defendant's ability to access a foreign passport.4

     The judge also inferred that the defendant was stockpiling

funds that would provide him the financial ability to flee.     In

making this inference, the judge cited the defendant's payment

of bail on the night of his arrest, regular employment, history

of expensive foreign trips, and representation by private

counsel.

     Following the judge's denial, on July 30, 2021, the

defendant filed a motion to stay with a single justice of the

Appeals Court pursuant to Mass R. A. P. 6 (b), as appearing in

     4 Although the judge noted that the defendant's Moroccan
passport currently was expired, he asserted that the defendant
could replace the expired passport.
                                                                   8

481 Mass. 1608 (2019).   The single justice examined the judge's

denial utilizing the test articulated in Nash, 486 Mass. at 403.

Finding no abuse of discretion or error of law, the single

justice denied the defendant's motion.

     Specifically, the single justice concluded that, under the

first Nash factor, the defendant presented "an issue which is

worthy of presentation to an appellate court, one which offers

some reasonable possibility of a successful decision in the

appeal."   Under the second Nash factor, the single justice held

that the judge's finding that the defendant was a security risk

was reasonable due to his extreme risk of flight and the danger

he posed to others.   The single justice reasoned that the

defendant's flight risk was demonstrated by his dual citizenship

and associated recurring travel to Morocco, the sentence that

the defendant faced, the jury's rejection of the defendant's

testimony at trial, and the seriousness of the crimes of which

he was convicted.   The single justice further reasoned that the

defendant was a danger to others, as shown through his

"convictions for impulsive, racially motivated, and violent

acts."   Last, after exercising his independent review and

discretion, the single justice reached the same conclusions as

the judge.5

     5 The single justice also addressed the third Nash factor
sua sponte. He "conclude[d] that the health risks to the
                                                                      9

        The defendant appealed from the single justice's order to a

full panel of the Appeals Court.     The Appeals Court affirmed the

single justice's order denying the defendant's motion for a

stay.     See Commonwealth v. Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 108, 120

(2023).    After concluding that the first Nash factor was not at

issue, the Appeals Court focused on the second Nash factor --

whether the defendant posed a security risk.     See id. at 112-

113.    While acknowledging that the judge may have "placed undue

reliance on the fact that the defendant retained private

counsel" to infer that the defendant had the financial ability

to flee the country, the Appeals Court held that the single

justice did not abuse his discretion.     Id. at 116.   The Appeals

Court, in upholding the single justice's decision, cited the

defendant's frequent travel to Morocco, his visits abroad to see

his brother in Germany, his stable employment, and the judge's

opportunity to assess the defendant's credibility firsthand.

Id. at 115-116.    The Appeals Court also held that, insofar as

the single justice made an independent determination that the

defendant posed a security risk, there likewise was no abuse of

discretion.    See id. at 120.

        Meanwhile, the defendant had filed a direct appeal from his

convictions to the Appeals Court.     In his direct appeal, the

defendant do not outweigh the significant security risk the
defendant would pose if released."
                                                                      10

defendant argued that the judge's refusal to strike juror no. 32

constituted structural error.     See Kalila, 103 Mass. App. Ct. at

583.    As the defendant's direct appeal was pending, in May 2023,

this court granted the defendant's application for further

appellate review of the single justice's denial of the

defendant's motion to stay.      See 492 Mass. 1101 (2023).   After

oral arguments in the case before us, the Appeals Court, on

November 30, 2023, issued a decision on the defendant's direct

appeal, holding that the judge had erred in denying the

defendant's peremptory challenge and vacating the defendant's

convictions.     See Kalila, supra.

       Discussion.   1.   Standard of review.   We review the single

justice's denial of the defendant's motion to stay for error of

law or abuse of discretion.      See Nash, 486 Mass. at 412, citing

Hodge, 380 Mass. at 853.     An abuse of discretion occurs when a

judge makes a clear error in weighing the relevant factors such

that the decision "falls outside the range of reasonable

alternatives."    L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27

(2014).    The role of an appellate court in this context is not

to exercise our independent discretion but merely to review the

correctness of the single justice's ruling.      See Nash, supra at

412.    We do not substitute our judgment for that of the single

justice simply because we would have reached a different result.

See Commonwealth v. Dilworth, 485 Mass. 1001, 1002 (2020).      See
                                                                    11

also L.L., supra, citing Bucchiere v. New England Tel. & Tel.

Co., 396 Mass. 639, 641 (1986) ("it is plainly not an abuse of

discretion simply because a reviewing court would have reached a

different result").6

     2.   The single justice's review of the trial judge's denial

of the stay.   A judge evaluates two factors in deciding a

defendant's request for a stay:   (1) the defendant's likelihood

of success on appeal and (2) certain security concerns.      See

Nash, 486 Mass. at 406.7   The defendant has the burden to prove

both factors by a preponderance of the evidence.   See id.    See

     6 In addition to challenging the single justice's decision
on his motion to stay, the defendant asserts in passing that the
single justice's decision amounts to impermissible
discrimination based on the defendant's national origin. A
conclusory two sentences in the defendant's brief, not
accompanied by either legal argument or factual detail, is
insufficient to rise to the level of appellate argument, and
thus is deemed waived. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019) (appellate issue must include
rationale and legal authority). See also Atwater v.
Commissioner of Educ., 460 Mass. 844, 853 n.8 (2011) (mere
citation to article of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights
without further development did not rise to level of acceptable
appellate argument).

     7 Due to the "extraordinary" nature of the COVID-19 pandemic
and the "fundamental change in circumstances" that it brought,
including "the particular danger of transmission of the [COVID-
19] virus to persons in custody who cannot realistically engage
in social distancing," we adjusted the test to incorporate a
third factor. Christie v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401-402
(2020). See Nash, 486 Mass. at 405. Under this third factor,
judges consider pandemic-related health and safety risks to a
defendant. See id. at 406. Here, the third Christie factor is
not at issue.
                                                                    12

also Care & Protection of Laura, 414 Mass. 788, 791 (1993),

citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-176 (1987)

(preliminary questions of fact established by preponderance of

evidence).

     To meet the first factor, a defendant needs to show that he

has presented an appealable issue "which is worthy of

presentation to an appellate court [and] offers some reasonable

possibility of a successful decision in the appeal."       Nash, 486

Mass. at 403, quoting Commonwealth v. Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct.

501, 503-504 (1979).   As the first factor involves a "pure

question of law or legal judgment," the single justice's

decision on this factor receives no deference from a reviewing

court.   See Commonwealth v. Allen, 378 Mass. 489, 498 (1979),

citing Levin, supra at 505.    To establish a reasonable

possibility of success, a defendant need not prove that his

success on appeal is certain or "even more likely than not."

Nash, supra at 404.    The appeal, however, may not be frivolous.

See Hodge, 380 Mass. at 587.    Instead, the question to be

answered on this first factor is whether the defendant has

proved the existence of at least one appellate issue with

"sufficient heft" that would provide an appellate court "pause."

Nash, supra.   The issue presented by the defendant must require

legitimate evaluation, where both parties can find meaningful

support for their position, and where the defendant would
                                                                   13

receive a favorable outcome if he were successful.      See id.   In

this case, as stated, there is no dispute that the defendant has

presented an appellate issue of "sufficient heft."      See id.

     Under the second factor, to determine whether a defendant

poses a security risk, a judge must weigh considerations such as

"the possibility of flight to avoid punishment; potential danger

to any other person or to the community; and the likelihood of

further criminal acts during the pendency of the appeal."      Nash,

486 Mass. at 405, quoting Hodge, 380 Mass. at 855.      See Christie

v. Commonwealth, 484 Mass. 397, 401 (2020) (judges should

consider "the danger to other persons and the community arising

from the defendant's risk of reoffense"); Levin, 7 Mass. App. Ct

at 505 (weighing considerations such as possibility of flight

and further criminal acts, familial status, roots in community,

employment, prior criminal record, and demeanor).    While the

first factor is a question of law, the second factor presents a

question of fact.   Nash, supra, citing Levin, supra.    Judges

have "considerable leeway" in determining this second factor.

Nash, supra.

     Here, the single justice detailed various considerations

that supported the judge's conclusion that the defendant was a

flight risk, including the defendant's dual citizenship and

frequent travel to his country of origin, the serious crimes of

which the defendant was convicted, the significant sentence that
                                                                   14

the defendant had begun to serve, and the jury's rejection of

the defendant's testimony at trial and its effect on his

credibility.    The single justice also emphasized that the

defendant's convictions were based on "impulsive, racially

motivated, and violent acts," demonstrating a potential danger

to others.     At the same time, the single justice also noted

considerations that weighed in the defendant's favor, such as

the defendant's minimal criminal history, community support, and

compliance with conditions of pretrial release.     Ultimately, the

single justice held that, even accounting for mitigating

factors, it was not "outside the range of reasonable

alternatives" for the judge to find that the defendant

constituted a security risk.    See L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.

     On appeal, the defendant argues that the single justice

abused his discretion when he endorsed the judge's "speculation"

that the defendant has the means, both financially and through

his support network, to flee the country.     Specifically, the

defendant claims that the considerations on which the judge

relied in reaching these inferences, including the defendant's

steady employment, his strong family support, his posting of

$10,000 bail on the night of his arrest, and his hiring of

private counsel, were improper.8

     8 The defendant also asserts that the judge and the single
justice appear to have presumed, in error, that the defendant
                                                                  15

     A judge properly may consider a defendant's financial

resources in evaluating whether he is a flight risk.   See

Brangan v. Commonwealth, 477 Mass. 691, 693 (2017) (judge "must

consider a defendant's financial resources" in setting amount of

bail under G. L. c. 276, § 58); Allen, 378 Mass. at 498 (factors

used to govern bail before trial "may properly be considered" in

deciding motion to stay).   Here, the judge referenced financial

resources in rejecting the defendant's motion for a stay.

Specifically, the judge wrote:

     "At argument, the court expressed to Kalila's counsel that
     the release terms the defense proposed -- [global
     positioning system monitoring], a curfew[,] and $10,000
     bail (the amount Kalila originally posted) -- were
     inadequate, but counsel offered nothing to supplement them.
     That was troubling; Kalila posted $10,000 bail on the night
     of his arrest, has been regularly employed in a management
     job . . . , has a history of regularly taking expensive
     foreign trips, and is represented by private counsel, all
     of which suggests that Kalila has access to significant
     financial resources to make good on flight, but offered
     none to further secure his release. That he may be
     conserving funds to flee is thus a serious risk."

     In doing so, the judge did not consider merely the

defendant's actual financial resources as permitted by law.

Instead, he found "troubling" that the defendant posted bail on

could not be extradited from Morocco to the United States.
However, this rationale does not feature in either the judge's
or the single justice's written decisions. In any event,
whether the defendant could be extradited after he already fled
bears little, if any, weight in the determination whether the
defendant may flee in the first place.
                                                                   16

the night of his arrest, maintained regular employment, had a

history of foreign trips, and retained private counsel yet

offered no additional funds in seeking his motion for a stay.

It was error for the judge to use all of this information to

speculate that the defendant was stockpiling funds to flee.

     However, the single justice did not endorse these

considerations.   In fact, these considerations do not appear in

the single justice's written opinion.    The single justice's

stated reasons -- including the defendant's dual citizenship,

recurring trips abroad, "impulsive, racially motivated, and

violent acts," and lack of credibility at trial -- were all

proper and, when taken together, sufficient to find that the

defendant constituted a security risk.   We thus conclude that

the single justice did not abuse his discretion.   See L.L., 470

Mass. at 158 n.27.

     The defendant also argues that his strong likelihood of

success on appeal should be considered in assessing whether he

constitutes a security risk.   Specifically, the defendant

asserts that "[t]he single justice abused his discretion here by

failing to weigh the strength of the defendant's appeal under

factor 1 and its bearing on the defendant's flight risk under

factor 2."   This is not the proper analysis for these two

factors.
                                                                    17

     As recognized by the Appeals Court, Nash did not "signal[]

a new approach to the traditional two-factor test."     Kalila, 102

Mass. App. Ct. at 113.     In Nash, 486 Mass. at 407 n.17, we noted

that judges may consider the totality of the circumstances in

weighing a third factor against the other two factors if it

serves the ultimate objective underlying that third factor -- to

"safely and responsibly manag[e] confinements pending appeal for

the duration of the pandemic."     The creation of a third factor,

however, was not intended to modify the way judges should assess

the first two factors in all cases going forward.     The third

factor is unique from the other factors in both its purpose and

application.   It was created in response to the "extraordinary

times" of the COVID-19 pandemic.     See note 7, supra; Christie,

484 Mass. at 401.   See also Nash, supra at 396 ("we held that

the pandemic is a factor for judges to consider when ruling on

requests for stay").     Our approval of a totality of the

circumstances test was likewise an extraordinary measure for

extraordinary times.

     A judge evaluating a motion to stay thus has two distinct

factors to consider, as stated supra:     (1) the likelihood of

success on appeal, and (2) certain security concerns, such as

possibility of flight and potential danger to the community.

See Nash, 486 Mass. at 406 ("Under the traditional, pre-pandemic

standard for determining motions to stay, . . . a defendant
                                                                   18

bears the burden of proving two factors -- likelihood of success

on appeal and security -- in order to prevail").     If, after

examining the first factor, the answer to that threshold

question is yes, then the judge should proceed to an examination

of the second factor; if the answer is no, the motion to stay is

denied.

     Nonetheless, the defendant here asserts that the type of

error involved in his underlying appeal -- structural error --

makes the defendant less of a security concern because it

requires reversal without a need to demonstrate prejudice.       See

Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 545 (2017).    We are not

convinced for two reasons.   To begin with, the defendant's best

outcome from his appeal is a new trial.   The possibility of a

conviction after the defendant's new trial certainly is not

remote.   A prior jury, in convicting the defendant of all

charges, rejected the defendant's claims that he did not use

racial epithets and acted in self-defense.   We therefore agree

with the Appeals Court that "the nature of the error gives [the

defendant] no reasonable expectation of an acquittal -- or any

less incentive to flee."   Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 118.9

     9 This reasoning, of course, is not applicable to appeals
challenging the sufficiency of evidence or other issues
resulting in acquittal. See Kalila, 102 Mass. App. Ct. at 117.
That issue is not raised in this case, and we need not reach it.
                                                                     19

Next, the second Nash factor requires judges to consider the

danger a defendant poses to the community.     See Nash, 486 Mass.

at 405.     The nature of the error underlying the appeal here does

not make the defendant any less dangerous.

       Based on the foregoing, the single justice did not abuse

his discretion in concluding that the judge likewise did not

abuse his discretion.

       3.   The single justice's independent determination.   A

single justice has the option to review a judge's denial of a

motion to stay in two ways.     Nash, 486 Mass. at 410.   Either the

single justice may review the matter for an error of law or

abuse of discretion, or the single justice may review it anew.

See id. (reviewing motion anew provides defendant with "a second

bite at the apple").     It is not uncommon for a single justice to

review a judge's decision under both methods.    See id. at 410-

411.   Here, the single justice stated, at the end of his

decision, that, "after exercising [his] independent review and

discretion, [he] reach[ed] the same conclusion [as the judge]."

Having analyzed the single justice's appellate review of the

judge's decision, we now analyze the single justice's decision

as if he made it anew.

       For purposes of our analysis, there is only one noteworthy

difference between the single justice's review of the judge's

decision and the single justice's independent determination.
                                                                   20

The single justice had two additional pieces of evidence before

him that the judge did not:   an affidavit of the defendant's

wife in which she asserts that the financial resources of the

defendant's family are limited and an affidavit of the

defendant's brother in which he states that their father did not

live in Morocco full time.    Neither affidavit is sufficient to

render the single justice's decision denying the motion to stay

unreasonable, given the single justice's stated reasons for

finding that the defendant constituted a security risk -- the

defendant's dual citizenship status and associated travel, the

jury's determination that the defendant was not credible, and

the serious and impulsive nature of the crime of which the

defendant was convicted.   See Nash, 486 Mass. at 405 (judge has

"considerable leeway" in determining second factor).     We thus

conclude that the single justice did not abuse his discretion

insofar as he engaged in any independent review of the

defendant's motion.

     Conclusion.   For the reasons discussed, we conclude that

the single justice did not commit an abuse of discretion by

denying the defendant's motion to stay the execution of his

sentence pending appeal.   Accordingly, we affirm the single

justice's order denying that motion.

                                    So ordered.