Court Opinion

ID: 9840967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 20:04:56.994545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:08.836685
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/20/23 In re L.V. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re L.V., Jr., a Person Coming                                B319841
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                              (Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                          Super. Ct. No. 21LJJP00507A)
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 L.V.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Susan Ser, Judge. Affirmed.
      Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
               _________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       L.V. (Father), the father of a dependent child, appeals from
juvenile court’s restraining order, enjoining him from contacting
a social worker assigned to the case. Father also appeals from
the court’s dispositional order, removing the child from parental
custody and denying Father’s request to have the child placed
with him. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the
restraining order because Father engaged in conduct toward the
social worker that is prohibited under Welfare and Institutions
Code1 section 213.5. We further conclude the evidence was
sufficient to support the dispositional order because the juvenile
court reasonably could find that placing the child with Father
would be detrimental to his physical safety and well-being, and
that removal from Father was the only reasonable means to
protect the child from harm. We accordingly affirm.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     Dependency petition
       Father and M.M. (Mother) are the parents of L.V., Jr.,
(L.V.), a boy born in October 2021. At the time of L.V.’s birth,
Father and Mother were in a dating relationship, but did not
reside together. Mother had no prior criminal or dependency
history. Father had a number of prior convictions for offenses
that included assault, criminal threats, and marijuana
possession. He had been identified as the father of another child
in an open family maintenance case, but none of the allegations
in that case involved him.

1     Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references
are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                 2
       On October 10, 2021, the Los Angeles County Department
of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral
alleging that Mother and L.V. had both tested positive for
methamphetamines at the child’s birth. In an interview with
DCFS at the hospital, Mother stated she was shocked by the test
results. According to Mother, she was not currently using any
drugs. She last experimented with methamphetamines in 2018,
and Father helped her to stop using the drug at that time. She
believed the positive drug test was likely caused by eating tainted
food from a food truck a few days before she gave birth. Mother
planned to reside with L.V. in the maternal grandparents’ home
upon their release from the hospital. She reported Father had
not visited L.V. in the hospital because he was a military veteran
who suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.
       On October 11, 2021, DCFS attempted to meet with Father,
but he refused to make himself available for an interview.
He also had been uncooperative with DCFS in the other open
dependency case. In a telephone call with DCFS, Father stated
he wanted custody of L.V. He denied any history of drug use, and
expressed shock that Mother and the baby had tested positive for
methamphetamines.
       Following L.V.’s discharge from the hospital, DCFS took
the child into protective custody. On October 15, 2021, DCFS
filed a dependency petition for L.V. under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). The petition alleged that Mother had a history
of substance abuse and abused methamphetamines during her
pregnancy, which caused L.V. to have a positive toxicology screen
for the drug following his birth. The petition further alleged that
Father knew or reasonably should have known of Mother’s
substance abuse, and failed to protect L.V. from the risk of harm.

                                3
       At the October 21, 2021 detention hearing, Mother
appeared via Webex and was appointed counsel. Father did not
appear. The juvenile court detained L.V. from both parents at
that time. On November 5, 2021, Father appeared for
arraignment via Webex and was appointed counsel. At least
10 to 15 times during the hearing, Father attempted to unmute
himself and to interrupt the court. When Father refused to
cooperate despite the court’s repeated admonishments, the court
ejected him from the hearing. Father’s counsel requested that
L.V. be released to Father, or alternatively, the paternal
grandmother. The court denied the request, and ordered DCFS
to investigate potential relative placements with discretion to
release L.V. to any appropriate relative pending adjudication of
the petition. The court granted both parents monitored
visitation.
II.    Jurisdictional and dispositional report
       As of the November 18, 2021 jurisdictional/dispositional
report, L.V. was residing in a foster home. DCFS reported that
the child was doing well in the care of his foster parents, and had
begun monitored visits with Mother. In a November 2021
interview with DCFS, Mother denied using drugs during her
pregnancy. She maintained that the positive drug test following
L.V.’s birth was caused by tainted food purchased from a food
truck. She stated that she and Father were good parents, and
that the safest place for her child was at home with her.
       DCFS made multiple attempts to interview Father for its
report, but was unable to reach him. In a lengthy e-mail sent to
the children’s social worker Angela Stantorf (CSW Stantorf) on
November 16, 2021, Father questioned why DCFS was trying to
contact him, and stated that he did not have a case. He also

                                 4
accused DCFS of unlawfully detaining L.V., asserting in part:
“ ‘None of you people at DCFS has done the job properly! It’s
pretty sad that my child was taken from my baby’s mother at
6 day’s [sic] old when he was in no danger! The child must be in
imminent danger to be removed the way he was! Your
organization placed my child in more danger then [sic] we would
ever do! Had anyone done their job you would know that
[Mother] is the victim of a crime and all you people have done is
victimized her even more! She doesn’t know her rights or the law
but guess what? I DO! . . . I’m coming for every last person on
this case! If you knew anything about me you people would know
that I know the law because I worked with them and the
government for over 15yrs [sic] all I hear is that I’m this and I’m
that, but only thin[g] I am is a pissed off father who [sic] child
was taken illegally.’ ”
       In the e-mail, Father denied Mother had any prior drug
use, and claimed the positive drug test was caused by either the
meal she ate from the food truck or the medication given to her at
the hospital. He further stated: “I demand my child back and
I’m not going to be treated like we’re guilty of something when
we’re not! [L.V.] should have never been taken so all of this is
voided! I will not conform nor perform for your little dog and
pony show! I am not a criminal, molester, or druggie! Beyond
being judged in a court of law you will be judged by the highest
authority of them all . . . GOD! Everyone will have their day and
when that day comes may he have mercy on your soul’s [sic]
because to put someone through this is pure EVIL!’ ”
       In a series of supplemental reports filed prior to the
adjudication hearing, DCFS noted that L.V. remained placed
with his foster parents. Between December 2021 and

                                 5
January 2022, Mother had four positive tests for
methamphetamines, and failed to appear for a number of other
drug tests. In a January 2022 meeting with DCFS, Mother
admitted to using drugs, and indicated that she planned to
participate in a drug treatment program. As of February 2022,
Mother was attending an outpatient drug program. She had
tested negative for drugs in three consecutive tests, but was not
consistently attending her individual program sessions.
She continued to have monitored visitation with L.V., and was
attentive to the child during the visits.
       Between December 2021 and March 2022, CSW Stantorf e-
mailed Father on several occasions in an effort to set up his visits
with L.V. and to provide referrals for services. Father did not
respond to any of these e-mails. CSW Stantorf also tried to
contact Father via text message. On March 2, 2022, Father
responded to CSW Stantorf in a lengthy text message, which
began: “I don’t have a case with you! Never have never will!
It’s such a shame that you’re just now messaging me after almost
5 month’s [sic] of illegally having my child! I don’t live with
[Mother] nor was I at the hospital! Per the law and your own
guidelines, my child should have never been taken!” He denied
any involvement in the other dependency case in which he had
been identified as a father. He also accused DCFS of kidnapping
L.V. when it detained the child from Mother.
       Father then asserted: “You people fuked [sic] up bad!
I coming [sic] for everyone’s job! This is a level of incompetence
that can’t be measured! No offense but I don’t care who you are
or how nice you’ve pretended to be to [Mother] or my child!
This is criminal what’s been done! There’s a certain line that’s
established and once you cross it there’s no ‘I made a mistake’ or

                                 6
‘I’m so sorry, I didn’t know’ fuk [sic] that! People will be held
accountable even this judge! . . . You all can think I’ve been
blowing smoke and I’m a nobody all you want! But you shall see
1st hand how much I love my child and how fuked [sic] up this
has been and the pain and torment you’ve caused my family!
I know it’s not you exactly but you’re collateral damage at this
point because you did nothing to try and really help my child be
where he should have been all along! I’m sure [Mother] has given
you the packet of evidence we comprised [sic] of all the infractions
and violations of rights! You should look through it! Maybe
you’ll learn something about me! Instead of following the rest of
the sheep.”
       Father’s text message continued: “This is the only time I’m
texting you! So you can take your classes and whatever else
you’re trying to pull and stick it . . . I think you get the rest!
I know the Law i [sic] worked in it for 10yrs [sic] of my life! I’m
not doing shit for you people to make me look like I actually have
a case hahahah you’re crazy! Go ahead and run to the judge with
this message just like you did with the email! This doesn’t make
me need a psychiatric evaluation! This means I’m fuking [sic]
mad because my son was taken and I’m being violated and
slandered left and right! But never given the full paperwork to
know what’s really going on nor the opportunity to speak on [sic]
court to show I’m not who you all are saying I am! Really does
suck it had to come this far! But God always has a plan! And
everything happens when it’s supposed to! God Bless and
GOODLUCK! [sic] You’re going to need it!”
       Father also sent photos to CSW Stantorf with his text
message. In one image, which appeared to be a self-photo taken
in front of a mirror, Father was wearing a law enforcement badge

                                 7
around his neck and a gun holstered at his waist. In another
image, Father was wearing a skeleton-type mask over his face.
III. Adjudication hearing
       On March 8, 2022, the juvenile court held the adjudication
hearing on the section 300 petition. The court sustained the
allegations in the petition made against Mother based on her
substance abuse, and dismissed the allegations made against
Father. With respect to Father, the court stated that “[t]he
father has not been entirely cooperative with the Department,
but the court does not find that there is a preponderance of the
evidence regarding his failure to protect.”
       Both parents requested that L.V. be immediately released
to Father as a nonoffending parent. The court denied the
request, finding that it would be detrimental for the child to be
placed with Father at that time. The court continued the matter
for a dispositional hearing, and ordered DCFS to assess releasing
L.V. to the parents or the paternal grandmother.
IV. Request for a restraining order
       On March 8, 2022, the date of the adjudication hearing,
DCFS filed a request for a restraining order against Father on
behalf of CSW Stantorf under section 213.5. DCFS alleged that
Father sent CSW Stantorf e-mail and text messages along with a
photo, which caused her to feel threatened and to fear for her
safety. DCFS further alleged that, during a call with CSW
Stantorf, Father said “he had become numb to killing children as
a result of his war experience overseas and PTSD,” which also
caused her to fear for her safety. At the adjudication hearing, the
court granted a temporary restraining order against Father.
       The hearing on DCFS’s request for a permanent
restraining order was held on March 29, 2022. Prior to the start

                                 8
of the hearing, Father refused to comply with the court’s request
that he remove his hat while inside the courtroom. When the
court ordered Father to either remove his hat or exit the
courtroom, Father became angry at the court and the bailiff.
The bailiff and a second deputy had to address Father outside the
courtroom due to his disruptive behavior.
       CSW Stantorf testified at the hearing. According to her
testimony, she had been working as a children’s social worker for
DCFS for about two years. Her first contact with Father was in a
November 2021 telephone call. During the call, Father said that
he had been deployed multiple times and had become numb to
having to kill children to protect the men in his unit. He did not
make any specific threat at that time.
       When CSW Stantorf later reached out to Father to discuss
the case, he responded in the November 16, 2021 e-mail.
Although Father did not make any direct threats of harm in the
e-mail, CSW Stantorf feared for her safety based on his
statement about God having mercy on their souls. It was her
understanding that this statement typically was made when a
person had died or was dying.
       CSW Stantorf next had contact with Father in March 2022
when he replied to her text message. In his reply, Father did not
threaten CSW Stantorf with physical harm. She feared for her
safety, however, based on Father’s statement calling her
collateral damage. As a military veteran herself, CSW Stantorf
understood this term to refer to an innocent civilian being injured
or killed. She also felt threatened by the accompanying photo of
Father with a holstered gun, although she acknowledged that
Father also wore a badge and was not holding the weapon in the

                                 9
photo. Father’s text message was CSW Stantorf’s last contact
with him.
       As a DCFS social worker, CSW Stantorf had prior
encounters with parents who were angry about their children
being detained. This was the first time that she sought a
restraining order against a parent. She testified that Father’s
statements and behavior had caused her substantial emotional
distress.
       Following this testimony, counsel for DCFS asked the court
to grant a permanent restraining order against Father. Citing
sections 213.5 and 340.5, DCFS’s counsel argued that Father
made a threat of physical harm against CSW Stantorf and had
the apparent ability to carry out that threat. Father’s counsel
opposed the request, arguing that CSW Stantorf’s testimony
showed that Father never made a direct threat of harm.
His counsel also argued that Father’s statements about coming
after the people involved in the case referred to pursuing
available legal remedies, and not acts of violence.
       The court granted the request for a restraining order.
The court stated that, while Father may not have made a direct
threat against CSW Stantorf, a reasonable person would consider
his statements to her to be threats of physical violence. The court
also noted that Father’s statements and behavior had caused
CSW Stantorf to experience substantial emotional distress.
In addition, the court found that Father’s conduct toward CSW
Stantorf constituted harassment, which as defined in Code of
Civil Procedure section 527.6, includes a willful course of conduct
directed at a specific person that alarms, annoys, or harasses the
person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.

                                10
       In issuing the restraining order, the court also considered
Father’s behavior at the hearing. The court stated: “Our bailiff
made a simple request for the father to remove his hat. Father
got very angry, at one point pointed to the court, and stated
something to the court in an angry tone. I didn’t catch what the
father stated, but then he started approaching the bailiff very
closely, I believe [in] a threatening manner. This was all in
reaction to the bailiff asking the father to follow court rules.”
       The restraining order prohibited Father from having any
contact with CSW Stantorf, and required him to stay at least
100 yards from her person, residence, and workplace for a period
of three years.
V.     Dispositional hearing
       Prior to the dispositional hearing, DCFS reported that it
had attempted to assess the paternal grandmother and both
parents for L.V.’s possible placement, and was recommending
that the child not be released to them at that time. As to the
paternal grandmother, she told DCFS she wanted to know the
rules before having the child placed with her and did not want to
make any changes to her home. While she indicated she was
willing to have Mother and Father reside in her home, she asked
that DCFS communicate with her directly because “[Mother]
lies.” She also stated Father was not currently living with her
because she “can only take so much of [him].” Although the
paternal grandmother agreed to a home assessment, no one
answered the door when DCFS arrived at the scheduled time.
       As to Mother, she informed DCFS that she again tested
positive for methamphetamines in April 2022. Her counselor
advised DCFS that Mother would be discharged from her drug
treatment program if she had another positive or missed drug

                                11
test. As to Father, DCFS reported that it had been unable to
assess him for placement because he had not responded to any of
the repeated attempts to reach him. DCFS stated it was
concerned that if Father refused to make himself available for an
interview, he would not make L.V. available for monthly visits
from the agency to assess the child’s safety and well-being.
DCFS also expressed concern about Father’s mental health given
that he reportedly suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder,
appeared to have unresolved anger issues, and had engaged in
threatening and harassing conduct toward CSW Stantorf.
In addition, DCFS noted Father had not participated in any
services, and had not visited L.V. since the child was detained.
       On April 11, 2022, the juvenile court held the dispositional
hearing. Counsel for DCFS and counsel for L.V. joined in
requesting the child be removed from both parents. Mother’s
counsel asked the court to release L.V. to Mother on the condition
that she reside with the paternal grandmother, or alternatively,
to Father. Father’s counsel requested that the court release L.V.
to Father as a nonoffending, noncustodial parent.
       After hearing argument from counsel, the court declared
L.V. a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b).
The court removed L.V. from both parents, finding that the child
would be in substantial danger if returned to parental custody,
and that there were no other reasonable means of protecting L.V.
from harm. The court also denied Father’s request that L.V. be
released to him, finding that such placement would be
detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or well-being.
       In making its ruling, the court noted that it had made a
prior finding of detriment at the March 8, 2022 adjudication
hearing based on Father’s conduct toward CSW Stantorf.

                                12
The court also noted that Father had to be removed from the
courtroom at the March 29, 2022 restraining order hearing based
on his hostile behavior toward the court and bailiff. The court
then stated: “So the father, if he can’t comply with a simple
request by the court and our bailiff, the court has little confidence
that [he] will cooperate with the department and comply with
court orders. . . . [C]ompliance with the court and the
department is essential for a release of a child to the father, since
the department and the court [have] to ensure that the child will
be safe. [¶] . . . So the . . . finding that the court made on March 8,
2022, that does remain. And the court has additional evidence to
support that finding.”
      The court ordered monitored visitation and reunification
services for both parents. Mother’s case plan included a full drug
and alcohol treatment program with aftercare and weekly drug
testing, parenting education, and individual counseling. Father’s
case plan consisted of parenting education, individual counseling,
and a psychiatric evaluation with follow-up treatment as
recommended.
      Father filed a timely appeal.
                                DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Father challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the restraining order issued against him.
Father also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
dispositional orders removing L.V. from his custody and denying
his request that the child be placed with him.
I.    Restraining order
      At the March 29, 2022 hearing, the juvenile court granted
DCFS’s request for a restraining order that enjoined Father from
having any contact with CSW Stantorf for a three-year period.

                                  13
On appeal, Father argues the juvenile court erred in issuing the
restraining order because there was no evidence that he made
any threats of physical harm to CSW Stantorf. We conclude
Father’s argument lacks merit.
       A.    Governing law
       Section 213.5 authorizes the issuance of a restraining order
to protect a social worker in a pending dependency proceeding.
It provides, in relevant part, that the juvenile court may “issue
an ex parte order enjoining a person from molesting, attacking,
striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
harassing, telephoning, . . . destroying the personal property,
contacting, . . . coming within a specified distance of, or
disturbing the peace of the child’s current or former social
worker.” (§ 213.5, subd. (a).) “Issuance of a restraining order
under section 213.5 does not require ‘evidence that the restrained
person has previously molested, attacked, struck, sexually
assaulted, stalked, or battered’ ” the person to be protected.
(In re S.G. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 654, 671.) “Nor does it require
evidence of a reasonable apprehension of future abuse.” (In re
C.Q. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 355, 363.) Rather, “[t]here need only
be evidence that the restrained person ‘disturbed the peace’ ” of
the protected person. (In re Bruno M. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 990,
997.) In this context, one person “ ‘disturb[s] the peace’ ” of
another by engaging in “ ‘ “conduct that destroys the mental or
emotional calm of the other party.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       Section 340.5 also permits the juvenile court to issue a
restraining order to protect a social worker from the parents of a
dependent child. It states that the juvenile court “may, for good
cause shown and after an ex parte hearing, issue its order
restraining the parents of the dependent child from threatening

                                14
the social worker, or any member of the social worker’s family,
with physical harm.” (Id., subd. (a).) Under the statute, “ ‘good
cause’ means at least one threat of physical harm to the social
worker, or any member of the social worker’s family, made by the
person who is to be the subject of the restraining order, with the
apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (Id., subd. (b).) To be
entitled to relief under section 340.5, either the child welfare
agency or the social worker “must show a threat arising from the
social worker’s performance of his or her assigned duties in
providing services to a dependent child of the juvenile court.”
(In re Matthew F. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 883, 888.)
       “[A]ppellate courts apply the substantial evidence standard
to determine whether sufficient facts supported the factual
findings in support of a restraining order and the abuse of
discretion standard to determine whether the court properly
issued the order.” (In re Carlos H. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 861, 866;
accord, In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 670; In re A.M.
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 614, 619.) When the appellant challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
factual findings, “ ‘we view the evidence in a light most favorable
to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable
inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there
is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance
of the restraining order may not be disturbed.’ ” (In re Bruno M.,
supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996–997.)
       B.    Substantial evidence supported the restraining
             order against Father
       Viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
order, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Father engaged in conduct prohibited under section 213.5.

                                15
The record reflects that, during the course of the dependency
case, Father sent CSW Stantorf two lengthy, vitriolic writings
along with some concerning self-photos, which she perceived as
threatening and caused her to fear for her physical safety.
       In his first writing sent via e-mail, Father told CSW
Stantorf, “ ‘I’m coming for every last person on this case!’ ”
He also warned her, “ ‘Beyond being judged in a court of law you
will be judged by the highest authority of them all . . . GOD!
Everyone will have their day and when that day comes may he
have mercy on your soul’s [sic] because to put someone through
this is pure EVIL!’ ” CSW Stantorf testified that, even though
Father did not make any explicit threats of violence in his e-mail,
she feared for her safety based on his statement about God
having mercy on her soul because “[t]hat’s usually a statement
made when someone is dying or has died.”
       In his second writing sent via text, Father wrote, “[Y]ou
shall see 1st hand how much I love my child and how fuked [sic]
up this has been and the pain and torment you’ve caused my
family! I know it’s not you exactly but you’re collateral damage
at this point because you did nothing to try and really help my
child be where he should have been all along.” He also stated,
“Really does suck it had to come this far! But God always has a
plan! And everything happens when it’s supposed to! God Bless
and GOODLUCK [sic]! You’re going to need it!” CSW Stantorf
testified that Father’s description of her as “collateral damage”
also caused her to fear for her safety because, as a fellow military
veteran, she understood the term to refer to a “civilian, an
innocent party being injured or killed.” In addition, Father chose
to attach to this text message photos of himself wearing a gun
holstered at his waist and a skeleton-type mask over his face.

                                 16
       Given this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could
find that Father “ ‘disturbed the peace’ ” under section 213.5 by
engaging in “ ‘ “conduct that destroy[ed] the mental or emotional
calm” ’ ” of CSW Stantorf. (In re Bruno M., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th
at p. 997.) The court also reasonably could find that Father’s
conduct was “harassing” within the meaning of section 213.5.
While section 213.5 does not define harassment, Code of Civil
Procedure section 527.6, which authorizes civil restraining orders
prohibiting harassment, provides a definition of the term. (See
In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510 [courts may
refer to other statutes “for purposes of obtaining a ‘reasonable
and practical’ statutory construction” of terms used in section
213.5].) It defines “harassment” to include “a knowing and willful
course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously
alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)
The conduct “must be that which would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually
cause substantial emotional distress.” (Ibid.) CSW Stantorf
testified that Father’s conduct did in fact cause her “substantial
emotional distress.” She further testified that she had prior
experience with parents who were angry about their children
being detained, but this was the first time that a parent’s conduct
caused her to seek a restraining order. CSW Stantorf’s testimony
therefore provided substantial evidence to support the issuance of
a restraining order under section 213.5.
       Citing section 340.5, Father contends the evidence was
insufficient to support a restraining order because CSW Stantorf
admitted in her testimony that Father never made any direct
threats of physical harm to her. Unlike section 340.5, however,

                                17
section 213.5 does not require a showing that the person to be
restrained made a prior threat of physical harm. Instead,
“[i]t may be sufficient to show that the person to be restrained
‘disturb[ed] the peace’ of the petitioner (§ 213.5, subd. (a)).”
(In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 671.) Although counsel
for DCFS relied on section 340.5 in arguing that a restraining
order was warranted, she also noted that section “213.5 does
allow the court to enjoin such conduct” to “protect the social
worker in this case.” Moreover, both DCFS’s request and the
juvenile court’s order were made on Judicial Council forms that
specifically referenced section 213.5. In any event, the juvenile
court reasonably could have inferred that Father’s statements to
CSW Stantorf, along with the photos he sent of himself wearing a
holstered gun and a mask, constituted an implied threat of
physical harm under section 340.5.
       In deciding to grant the restraining order, the juvenile
court also could have drawn a reasonable inference that Father’s
conduct toward CSW Stantorf was likely to continue given the
hostility and lack of impulse control that he displayed at the
hearing on the restraining order. (See In re Bruno M., supra,
28 Cal.App.5th at p. 998 [restraining order proper where juvenile
court reasonably could infer from parent’s “ ‘tendency to resort to
violence as well as from his evident lack of impulse control, that
he might be a threat to [the protected person’s] safety’ ”].)
As described by the court, Father refused to comply with a simple
decorum request that he remove his hat inside the courtroom.
Instead, Father responded to the court in an “angry tone” and
approached the bailiff in a “threatening manner,” ultimately
resulting in his removal from the hearing.

                                18
       Father argues that his conduct was that of a parent who
was angry about his child being detained. He also asserts that
his statements to CSW Stantorf showed he was taking certain
measures to contact her superiors, but was not threatening acts
of violence. At the hearing on the restraining order, the juvenile
court was able to review the entirety of Father’s e-mail and text
messages to CSW Stantorf and to hear her testimony about the
extent of her contact with Father. Based on such evidence, the
court found that a reasonable person would consider Father’s
statements to CSW Stantorf to be threats of physical harm, and
that his statements and conduct actually caused CSW Stantorf
substantial emotional distress. It is not the role of the appellate
court to reweigh the evidence or second-guess the juvenile court’s
credibility determinations. (In re S.G., supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 672.) Rather, “ ‘we must indulge all reasonable inferences to
support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its
findings where there is substantial evidence to support them.’ ”
(In re Carlos H., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 866.) Because there
was substantial evidence supporting the restraining order, the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in issuing it.
II.    Dispositional order
       At the April 11, 2022 dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court removed L.V. from the custody of both Mother and Father,
denied Father’s request to have the child placed with him, and
ordered the parents to participate in reunification services.
On appeal, Father asserts the evidence was insufficient to
support these orders because there was no evidence that L.V.
ever suffered or was at risk of suffering serious physical harm in
Father’s custody. We conclude this claim also fails.

                                19
       A.     Governing law
       Section 361, subdivision (d), governs the removal of a child
from a noncustodial parent. It provides that “[a] dependent child
shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her
parents . . . with whom the child did not reside at the time the
petition was initiated, unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence that there would be a substantial danger to
the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child for the parent . . . to live with the child or
otherwise exercise the parent’s . . . right to physical custody, and
there are no reasonable means by which the child’s physical and
emotional health can be protected without removing the child
from the child’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (d).)
       In determining whether to remove a child from parental
custody, “the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past
conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to
the conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.”
(In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) The court “must also
consider whether there are any reasonable protective measures
and services that can be implemented to prevent the child’s
removal from the parent’s physical custody.” (Ibid.) “A removal
order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to
provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to
the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.]
The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have
been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the
statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.W. (2013)
214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163; accord, In re D.B., at p. 328.)
       Section 361.2 governs the placement of a child following
removal from parental custody. It states, in relevant part, that

                                  20
“[i]f a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the
court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child,
with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events
or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that
parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the
parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be
detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).)
        Section 361.2 “evinces the legislative preference for
placement with the noncustodial parent when safe for the child.”
(In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1262.) Thus, “[i]t
requires placement with a noncustodial, nonoffending parent who
requests custody ‘unless the placement would be detrimental to
the child.’ ” (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
In making a finding of detriment, the juvenile court “weighs all
relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net harm.”
(In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43.) The burden is on the
party opposing placement with a nonoffending parent “to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the child will be harmed if the
nonoffending parent is given custody.” (In re C.M., at p. 1402.)
        Although the language of section 361, subdivision (d), is not
identical to section 361.2, it is substantively similar. (Compare
§ 361, subd. (d) [placement with noncustodial parent would create
“substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or
physical or emotional well-being of the child”] with § 361.2,
subd. (a) [placement with noncustodial parent would be
“detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child”].) Moreover, under both statutes, the
standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence. (In re S.F.

                                 21
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696, 720 [applying § 361, subd. (d)]; In re
C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401 [applying § 361.2].)
Accordingly, in most cases in which a court finds a “substantial
danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being of the child” (§ 361, subd. (d)) in a parent’s
custody, it will also find “that placement with that parent would
be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being of the child” (§ 361.2, subd. (a)). (See In re S.F., at
p. 720, fn. 14 [any error in applying § 361.2 instead of § 361,
subd. (d), would have been harmless given the statutes’ similar
standards]; In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 610 [“[i]t is
illogical to require a court to consider placing a child with a
noncustodial parent who has already been determined to pose a
substantial danger”].)
       An appellate court reviews challenges to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting dispositional orders for substantial
evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘ “In making
this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency
court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and
credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do
not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but
merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the
findings of the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When reviewing a finding
that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.)

                                22
“The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of
a sufficiently substantial nature to support the findings or
orders.” (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
       B.    Substantial evidence supported the juvenile
             court’s dispositional order
       Based on the totality of the record in this case, the evidence
was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings that placing
L.V. with Father would pose a substantial danger to the child,
and would be detrimental to his physical safety and well-being.
The evidence was also sufficient to support the court’s finding
that there were no reasonable means to protect L.V. from the risk
of harm without removing him from Father’s custody.
       While the juvenile court dismissed the failure-to-protect
allegations made against Father in the section 300 petition, the
court reasonably could have found that, as of the dispositional
hearing, Father did not appreciate the substantial risk of harm
that Mother’s ongoing substance abuse posed to L.V. In her
initial interview with DCFS, Mother admitted that she used
methamphetamines in 2018, and that Father helped her to stop
using the drug at that time. However, in an October 11, 2021
telephone call with DCFS, Father expressed shock that Mother
had tested positive for methamphetamines. Then, in his
November 16, 2021 e-mail to CSW Stantorf, Father denied that
Mother had any prior drug use. He also repeated Mother’s
implausible claim that her positive drug test at the time of L.V.’s
birth had been caused by tainted food that she bought from a food
truck. Further, on the two occasions that Father responded to
CSW Stantorf’s multiple attempts to reach him, he questioned
why she was attempting to contact him at all and insisted that he
did not have a case with DCFS. Thus, despite being a

                                 23
nonoffending parent as of the dispositional hearing, Father
continued to display a serious lack of insight into the issues that
led to L.V. becoming a dependent of the court.
       The juvenile court also reasonably could have found that
placing L.V. with Father at the time of the dispositional hearing
would be detrimental to the child’s safety and well-being because
Father had no relationship with L.V. An “ ‘alleged lack of a
relationship between [a] father and [a child] is not, by itself,
sufficient to support a finding of detriment.’ ” (In re Adam H.
(2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 27, 33.) It is, however, a permissible factor
that may be considered in assessing whether placement with a
noncustodial parent would be detrimental to a child. (In re A.C.,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 43; In re C.M., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1402.) In this case, L.V. was detained by DCFS shortly after
his discharge from the hospital, and the dispositional hearing
was held six months later. Father did not visit L.V. in the
hospital. Nor did Father make any effort to visit the child at any
time over the course of the dependency proceedings. Rather,
when CSW Stantorf repeatedly tried to contact Father to set up a
visitation schedule, his only response was to send her the
messages and photos that would form the basis for the
restraining order against him. Given L.V.’s young age, Father’s
complete lack of contact with the child, and Father’s denial of
Mother’s clear substance abuse issues, there was sufficient
evidence to support a finding that L.V. would be at risk of harm if
placed in Father’s custody.
       An order removing a child from parental custody also
requires a showing that removal is the only reasonable means of
protecting the child from the risk of harm. (§ 361, subds. (c)(1),
(d).) Here, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that

                                24
there were no reasonable means of protecting L.V. absent
removal from Father. Prior to the dispositional hearing, Father
requested that L.V. either be released to his custody, or placed
with him on the condition that he reside in the paternal
grandmother’s home. The court accordingly ordered DCFS to
assess both Father and the paternal grandmother for L.V.’s
possible placement. Father refused, however, to make himself
available for an in-person or telephone interview despite DCFS’s
repeated attempts to reach him. Due to Father’s refusal to
cooperate, DCFS also did not know where L.V. would be residing
if the child were released to Father under in-home supervision.
Although Father previously had identified his home address as
the paternal grandmother’s residence, she told DCFS that Father
was not currently living in her home because she “can only take
so much of [him].” In addition, when DCFS attempted to conduct
a scheduled safety assessment of the paternal grandmother’s
home, no one answered the door. The juvenile court therefore
reasonably could infer that placing L.V. with Father subject to
DCFS supervision was not a sufficient alternative means of
protecting the child from the risk of harm.
       In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the removal order, Father contends the juvenile court improperly
based its detriment finding on his lack of cooperation with DCFS,
his statements to CSW Stantorf which caused her to seek the
restraining order, and his reaction in the courtroom when he was
ordered to remove his hat. Although the court mentioned these
specific facts in making the detriment finding, it also stated it
had “additional evidence to support that finding.” Moreover,
the court could consider these facts in issuing the removal order
because they supported a reasonable inference that Father would

                               25
not cooperate with DCFS if L.V. were placed in his care, and
thus, there were no reasonable means of protecting the child
short of removal. (See In re E.E., supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 217
[removal order supported by substantial evidence where, among
other facts, parents “did not cooperate with the social worker or
engage meaningfully in services when [social services agency]
became involved with their family,” and instead “were
emphatically resistant to the agency’s investigation”].)
       It is true, as Father asserts, that “[t]he inability of a parent
to get along with a social worker is not evidence to support a
removal order.” (In re Emily L. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 1, 16.)
This is not a case, however, where the only evidence offered in
support of removal was the parent’s lack of cooperation with
DCFS. Rather, as discussed, the evidence supporting the court’s
findings in this case included Father’s denial of Mother’s drug
abuse and the risk of harm it posed to their infant child, and his
lack of any relationship with L.V. and failure to visit the child at
any time during the dependency proceedings. On this record,
the juvenile court’s order removing L.V. from Father’s custody
and denying Father’s request to have the child placed with him
was supported by substantial evidence.
       Lastly, Father argues that the portion of the dispositional
order requiring him to participate in reunification services must
be reversed because he was a nonoffending parent and there was
no evidence supporting the order removing L.V. from his custody.
As discussed, however, the evidence was sufficient to support the
removal order. Moreover, when fashioning a dispositional order,
the juvenile court may make “all reasonable orders for the care,
supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the
child.” (§ 362, subd. (a).) The court is not limited to the content

                                  26
of the sustained petition, and may consider the evidence as a
whole to determine what orders would be in the child’s best
interests. (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 311.)
The court’s determination will not be reversed “ ‘absent a clear
abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522,
532.)
       Here, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that
ordering Father to participate in parenting education, individual
counseling, and a psychiatric evaluation would best serve L.V.’s
interests. At the time of the dispositional hearing, Father had
never visited L.V., or had any contact with his child. Father also
displayed a lack of insight into the issues that had led to DCFS’s
involvement with the family and filing of the section 300 petition.
In addition, Father engaged in harassing conduct toward
CSW Stantorf, and acted in a hostile manner toward the court
and its bailiff when asked to follow courtroom decorum.
Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering Father to participate in reunification services.
                           DISPOSITION
       The juvenile court’s restraining order and dispositional
order are affirmed.

                                          VIRAMONTES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        WILEY, J.

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