Court Opinion

ID: 9897772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:24:54.699636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.454711
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED

              RICHARD EARL MARTIN
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0681-23-3                                         PER CURIAM
                                                                               SEPTEMBER 26, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GRAYSON COUNTY
                                                H. Lee Harrell, Judge

                              (William B. Vaughan; William B. Vaughan, PLLC, on brief), for
                              appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Susan Hallie Hovey-Murray,
                              Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee
                              submitting on brief.

                     Richard Earl Martin was arrested upon a capias for violating the conditions of his probation.

              By order entered on February 23, 2023, the trial court denied Martin’s motion for release on bail

              pending his revocation hearing. Martin appeals this decision. See Code § 19.2-124. Finding no

              abuse of the trial court’s discretion, we affirm. The parties waived oral argument in this case. See

              Code § 17.1-403(ii).

                                                       BACKGROUND

                     On October 27, 2006, upon guilty pleas, the trial court convicted Martin for two counts of

              statutory burglary, petit larceny as a third offense, and grand larceny. For each of the burglary

              convictions the trial court sentenced Martin to eight years of imprisonment with six years and six

              months suspended. For the third-offense larceny and grand larceny convictions, the trial court

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
sentenced Martin to six years of incarceration, all suspended. The trial court ordered Martin’s

sentences to run concurrently and that he complete eight years and six months of probation upon

his release from incarceration. The trial court also ordered Martin to pay $936 in restitution to

the victims.

       On October 26, 2012, upon his guilty pleas, the trial court convicted Martin of two counts

of grand larceny, two counts of possessing stolen property with the intent to sell it, and larceny

by fraud as a third offense. The trial court sentenced Martin to 19 years of imprisonment with 17

years and 8 months suspended. The trial court ordered Martin to complete ten years of

supervised probation. The trial court also ordered Martin to pay restitution to the victims.

       By major violation reports dated August 11, 2022, Martin’s probation officer alleged that

he violated his probation for both the 2006 and the 2012 convictions by absconding from

supervision since March 2022. Martin’s probation supervision had been transferred to

Chesterfield County. Martin was enrolled in the “Shadow Track/Voice Recognition Monitoring

System” in 2016. Although initially compliant, Martin had no contact with his probation officer

since March 2022. Concerning the 2012 convictions, the probation officer also asserted that

Martin violated his probation by failing to pay court-ordered restitution.

       Following Martin’s arrest upon a capias for the probation violations, the trial court held a

hearing on February 23, 2023, upon his request for release on bail. Martin stated that, if granted

bail, he would live in Chesterfield County, where he had resided for 14 years, and he provided

his address and current phone number. Martin had full-time employment as a painter and

welder. Concerning the recent charge of absconding, Martin explained that he lost his phone

number after the death of his wife, who had maintained the phone plan. He said that he was

placed on the “ShadowTrack” program for supervision and was advised that he would “be okay”

with a new phone number. Martin admitted that he recently was charged with driving while

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intoxicated (DWI). He also had three felony charges involving possessing controlled substances.

He requested bail so that he could keep working, pay his expenses, and retain his residence. He

admitted that he had outstanding restitution obligations.

       The Commonwealth opposed the motion for bail, arguing that Martin had a lengthy

criminal history beginning in 1990 involving numerous larcenies, defrauding an innkeeper,

trespassing, assault and battery, possessing drugs, breaking and entering, and violating the

conditions of his probation. He also had convictions from jurisdictions in North Carolina and

Georgia. Martin had made no payment toward his restitution obligation since November 2014.

       The trial court denied Martin’s motion for bail, finding that his release would constitute a

danger to others, especially considering the pending DWI and felony offenses. Martin appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       Martin argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for bail by

giving too much weight to his criminal history, “most of which preceded the bond hearing by

over ten years.” This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny bail for an abuse of

discretion. See Commonwealth v. Duse, 295 Va. 1, 7 (2018); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 73

Va. App. 121, 127 (2021); Rule 5A:2(b). When reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of

discretion, this Court defers to the trial court’s judgment and will “not reverse merely because it

would have come to a different result in the first instance.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va.

187, 212 (2013). Nonetheless, “a trial court ‘by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an

error of law.’” Auer v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 637, 643 (2005) (quoting Shooltz v. Shooltz,

27 Va. App. 264, 271 (1998)). Thus, the trial court abuses its discretion

               when a relevant factor that should have been given significant
               weight is not considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is
               considered and given significant weight; and when all proper
               factors, and no improper ones are considered, but the court, in
               weighing those factors, commits a clear error of judgment.

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Lawlor, 285 Va. at 213 (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282

Va. 346, 352 (2011)). When considering a motion for bail, a trial court must explain its

reasoning sufficiently for this Court “to make an objective determination that the court below has

not abused its discretion.” Shannon v. Commonwealth, 289 Va. 203, 206 (2015).

        “Code § 19.2-120 governs pre-trial bail.” Duse, 295 Va. at 1. Under Code § 19.2-120, a

person held in custody pending trial for a criminal offense “shall be admitted to bail by a judicial

officer, unless there is probable cause to believe that . . . [h]e will not appear for trial or hearing

or at such other time and place as may be directed” or “[h]is liberty will constitute an

unreasonable danger to himself, family or household members . . . , or the public.” Code

§ 19.2-120(A)(1), (2). “[F]or the court to deny bond it only need[s] to find ‘probable cause’ that

appellant’s liberty would pose a danger to himself or others; it [i]s not required to make a

determination based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even a preponderance of the

evidence.” Keene v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 547, 555 (2022) (holding that evidence of

defendant’s accrual of increasingly serious charges pending trial for other crimes against the

same victim established probable cause to conclude that his pretrial release posed an

unreasonable risk of danger to the community). “Probable cause has been described as ‘a fluid

concept,’ that ‘deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances.’” Id.

(first quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); and then quoting Maryland v. Pringle,

540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003)).

        In making the determination of whether a defendant should be admitted to bail, the

judicial officer

                   shall consider all relevant information, including (i) the nature and
                   circumstances of the offense; (ii) whether a firearm is alleged to
                   have been used in the commission of the offense; (iii) the weight of
                   the evidence; (iv) the history of the accused or juvenile, including
                   his family ties or involvement in employment, education, or
                   medical, mental health, or substance abuse treatment; (v) his length
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               of residence in, or other ties to, the community; (vi) his record of
               convictions; (vii) his appearance at court proceedings or flight to
               avoid prosecution or convictions for failure to appear at court
               proceedings; and (viii) whether the person is likely to obstruct or
               attempt to obstruct justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate, or
               attempt to threaten, injure, or intimidate, a prospective witness,
               juror, victim, or family or household member as defined in
               § 16.1-228.

Code § 19.2-120(B).1

        The trial court found probable cause that Martin’s release on bail would constitute an

unreasonable risk of harm to the public. The record supports this finding. While acknowledging

that Martin had longstanding employment and had resided in Chesterfield County for a

significant period of time, the trial court also considered, as it was entitled to do, Martin’s

lengthy history of criminal convictions in Virginia and two other states. Not only was Martin

charged in Grayson County with probation violations of criminal convictions from 2006 and

2012, but he had also incurred new criminal charges for felonies and for DWI. Considering all

the facts and circumstances, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in finding

probable cause that Martin’s release would pose a danger to the public and in denying his request

for bail pending his revocation hearing.

                                           CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision denying Martin’s motion

for bail.

                                                                                       Affirmed.

        1
         Code § 19.2-120(B) previously imposed a presumption against bail for certain
enumerated offenses. Effective July 1, 2021, Code § 19.2-120 no longer contains any
presumption against bail. See 2021 Va. Acts Spec. Sess. I ch. 337. However, according to Code
§ 19.2-120(A), the trial court was nonetheless obligated to consider whether there was “probable
cause to believe that” Martin’s release pending his revocation hearing would “constitute an
unreasonable danger to . . . the public.”
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