Court Opinion

ID: 9905989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 18:01:13.029055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.029007
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3209     Document: 010110961034         Date Filed: 11/30/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           November 30, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,
                                                                 No. 22-3209
  v.                                                  (D.C. No. 6:20-CR-10066-JWB-2)
                                                                  (D. Kan.)
  GARY A. LOWE, JR.,

        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Gary A. Lowe, Jr., pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to

 distribute heroin and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Before

 sentencing, Mr. Lowe moved to recuse the judge, who denied the motion and

 imposed a 210-month prison sentence. Mr. Lowe appeals the calculation of his

 sentence and the denial of his recusal motion.

        *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
 be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-3209       Document: 010110961034         Date Filed: 11/30/2023   Page: 2

       The Government argues we should dismiss based on the appeal waiver in

 Mr. Lowe’s plea agreement. It also argues Mr. Lowe’s appeal fails on the merits.

       Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we dismiss Mr. Lowe’s appeal

 of his sentence by enforcing the appeal waiver. We affirm the denial of his recusal

 motion.

                                     I. BACKGROUND

                                         A. Indictment

       A grand jury indicted Mr. Lowe on five drug- and gun-related charges. He pled

 guilty to possession with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing a

 detectable amount of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Count 2), and to

 being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

 (Count 5). The Government dismissed the remaining counts.

                                    B. Changes of Counsel

       A succession of five attorneys represented Mr. Lowe. Even while represented,

 he routinely attempted to proceed pro se.

       His second attorney moved to withdraw. At a hearing on that motion, the district

 court 1 permitted Mr. Lowe to speak for himself. He argued the indictment was unfair

 and flawed. The judge told him twice not to argue and denied the motion to

 withdraw.

       1
           We refer to the district court and the district judge interchangeably.

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       Several weeks later, a third attorney entered an appearance. Within a few

 months, the third attorney moved to withdraw. At a hearing on that withdrawal

 motion, Mr. Lowe repeatedly interrupted the judge, who told him to stop and to sit

 down. The judge then granted the motion to withdraw. The court later granted a

 motion for the second attorney to withdraw and appointed a fourth attorney.

       Five months after appointment of the fourth attorney, Mr. Lowe filed a motion

 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The fourth attorney moved to withdraw.

 At the hearing on these motions, the judge noted, “Mr. Lowe, you and I have had a

 couple of hearings together,” and after Mr. Lowe attempted to interrupt, the judge

 continued, “I’m going to start this one off by making sure you understand the ground

 rules . . . . You and I are going to address one another respectfully,” and “[a]t the

 appropriate times I’m going to give you an opportunity to speak and explain your

 position,” but “we’re not going to talk over one another.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 128. The

 judge added, “Ultimately, however, this is my courtroom and so when I talk,

 everyone else stops talking. Somebody’s got to be in charge and around here, that’s

 me; just one of the perks of the job.” Id.

       Later at the hearing, when Mr. Lowe spoke out of turn, the judge told him to

 stop until after his counsel had been heard. The judge let Mr. Lowe present his

 argument and then denied both Mr. Lowe’s motion for a new attorney and the fourth

 attorney’s motion to withdraw.

       A few months later at another hearing, Mr. Lowe “made an oral motion to

 appear pro se,” and his fourth attorney “made a[] [renewed] oral motion to

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 withdraw.” Id. at 12-13. Mr. Lowe later withdrew his motion, and the court denied

 the attorney’s motion. Mr. Lowe then “informed the court he would like an

 opportunity to retain a[] [fifth] attorney and requested a continuance of the [] trial

 date.” Id. at 13. The judge then contacted Mr. Lowe’s proposed fifth attorney, who

 confirmed he was willing to represent Mr. Lowe. The judge appointed the fifth

 attorney to the Criminal Justice Act panel and substituted him for the fourth attorney.

 The judge also permitted the fifth attorney to refile several stricken motions that

 Mr. Lowe had filed pro se.

                          C. Guilty Plea and Motion to Withdraw

       While represented by the fifth attorney, Mr. Lowe pled guilty to Counts 2 and

 5 under a written plea agreement. The agreement included an appeal waiver that

 prevented Mr. Lowe from challenging “any matter in connection with th[e]

 prosecution, his conviction, or the components of the sentence.” Id. at 345-46.

       Before sentencing, Mr. Lowe moved pro se to withdraw his plea based on

 ineffective assistance of counsel. At a September 15, 2022 hearing to consider the

 matter, Mr. Lowe’s fifth attorney told the court that “Mr. Lowe ha[d] not authorized

 [him] to do anything at this stage.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 34. The court permitted

 Mr. Lowe to present his motion. When Mr. Lowe challenged the judge’s “failure to

 [] advise” him about the plea, the judge read “a rough transcript of the plea hearing.”

 Id. at 38. During this reading, Mr. Lowe repeatedly interrupted the judge, who told

 him, “Don’t interrupt me,” id., and, “Will you quit interrupting me? When I talk you

 stop talking,” id. at 39. The judge and Mr. Lowe then had the following exchange:

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              THE COURT: Don’t talk to [the prosecutor].
              THE DEFENDANT: Well, I’m talking to the Court.
              THE COURT: Well, then don’t look at [the prosecutor].
              THE DEFENDANT: I can’t look around?
              THE COURT: Don’t you get smart with me. I haven’t
              finished sentencing you yet. I will be the one who will be
              sentencing you. You want to sit here and poke me in the
              eye, see what happens.
              THE DEFENDANT: I already know what’s going to
              happen.
              THE COURT: You don’t know anything that is going to
              happen, Mr. -- listen to me. I have no desire to grind you
              up. I’m not going to give you 30 years. I know that right
              here and now. I am going to give you a reasonable and
              just sentence once I review the presentence report and go
              through the sentencing process. I have got nothing against
              you, but I’m telling you you’re quite foolish to come in
              here antagonizing the person who is going to sentence you.
              That’s not a very wise litigation strategy. Now, what else
              do you have to say?

 Id. at 45. Later in the hearing, the colloquy escalated:

              THE DEFENDANT: It doesn’t matter what you
              explained, once this man told me that --
              THE COURT: Quit interrupting me.
              THE DEFENDANT: -- it didn’t --
              THE COURT: This hearing is over.
              THE DEFENDANT: All right, this man does this, I told
              you, I knew this.
              THE COURT: Get this man out of here.
              THE DEFENDANT: I told you --
              THE COURT: You’ll get a written order; we’re done.
              This hearing is over.

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              THE DEFENDANT: . . . You didn’t do nothing but be
              bias [sic] to [sic] me through this whole proceeding.

 Id. at 58.

        The court denied Mr. Lowe’s motion to withdraw his plea.

                                   D. Motion to Recuse

        After the district court denied Mr. Lowe’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea,

 he filed a pro se motion to recuse the judge. In the motion, Mr. Lowe argued he was

 not receiving “fair and impartial hearings,” ROA, Vol. 1 at 399, and that the judge

 was biased against him and was “hostile and harbor[ed] an aversion” toward him, id.

 at 406. Mr. Lowe cited 28 U.S.C. § 455 and Tenth Circuit case law regarding

 judicial recusal. Id. at 398-99; id. at 408 (citing United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d

 1243 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2005)). He

 also filed a pro se affidavit in support of his motion to recuse.

        At a hearing on the motion, Mr. Lowe’s counsel said he could not argue on

 Mr. Lowe’s behalf because he was not authorized to do so. ROA, Vol. 3 at 67 (“I

 don’t feel like I can argue this motion, Your Honor. But I think Mr. Lowe . . . would

 like to argue [it] . . . .”). The judge did not permit Mr. Lowe to argue the motion

 himself. Without hearing argument, the judge rejected Mr. Lowe’s motion, stating:

              I went through that process [hearing the pro se guilty plea
              withdrawal motion] until Mr. Lowe he became so
              disruptive that I had him remove[d] from the Court and
              ultimately issued a written ruling on that matter [the guilty
              plea withdrawal]. . . . I think overall any objective person
              looking at that record would conclude that I have bent over
              backwards to accommodate this defendant who has been
              undoubtedly the most obstructive and difficult defendant to

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              deal with in any criminal case that I have had since coming
              on the bench. . . . There is just no basis whatsoever for any
              objective person to believe that I am biased, prejudiced, or
              have any sort of favoritism toward the Government. I
              reject that and I have made my record on it. So that
              motion is denied.

 Id. at 77.
                                      E. Sentencing

        The district court proceeded to sentencing. When Mr. Lowe was arrested,

 police had found drugs and currency at his home. The Presentence Investigation

 Report (“PSR”) had converted the amount of currency found at Mr. Lowe’s residence

 to drug weight based on a dollars per pound ratio and added that calculated drug

 weight to the weight of actual drugs found at his residence. Mr. Lowe objected,

 arguing the drug quantity in the report differed from the “factual basis in the plea

 agreement.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 418. The court rejected Mr. Lowe’s argument, noting

 that calculating drug weight based on the factual basis in the plea is “not what is

 contemplated under the [U.S. Sentencing] [G]uidelines and the plea specifically

 contemplates relevant conduct” like related currency. ROA, Vol. 3 at 125.

        The court sentenced Mr. Lowe to 210 months in prison on Count 2 and

 120 months on Count 5, to run concurrently. He also received three years of

 supervised release for each count, to run concurrently.

                    F. Appeal and Motion to Enforce Appeal Waiver

        Mr. Lowe timely appealed. The Government moved to enforce Mr. Lowe’s

 appeal waiver and to dismiss the appeal. Following briefing on the issue, we denied

 the motion without prejudice to the Government’s raising the issue in its brief.

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          Although Mr. Lowe’s docketing statement expressed his intent to raise four

 issues on appeal, he has only raised two in his opening brief: (1) whether the district

 judge abused his discretion in declining to recuse, and (2) whether the district court

 erred in determining the converted drug quantity based on the PSR. Aplt. Br.

 at 14, 25.

          The Government raised the appeal waiver issue in its response brief, arguing

 we should enforce the waiver as to both issues and dismiss the appeal. Aplee. Br.

 at 20. It alternatively argued we should affirm on the merits. Mr. Lowe did not file a

 reply.

                                     II. DISCUSSION

          We enforce the appeal waiver on Mr. Lowe’s sentencing claim but exercise

 our discretion to address the recusal issue on the merits.

                                   A. Legal Background

          “We review de novo the enforceability of a defendant’s appeal waiver in a plea

 agreement.” United States v. Gross, 44 F.4th 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 2022).

          In deciding whether to enforce the waiver, we ask: “(1) whether the disputed

 appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the

 defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether

 enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Hahn,

 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).

          We determine whether the appeal waiver bars each argument presented on

 appeal. See, e.g., Gross, 44 F.4th at 1302-03 (holding two issues fell within appeal

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 waiver and “dismiss[ing] [the defendant’s] appeal insofar as [his] arguments” bore on

 those issues); United States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2007)

 (analyzing separately whether the appeal waiver covered ineffective assistance of

 counsel and factual basis for guilty plea).

       Because appeal waivers do not affect our jurisdiction, Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1324,

 we may “bypass resolution” of an appeal waiver issue and reach the merits, United

 States v. Garcia-Ramirez, 778 F.3d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 2015). We do so here on the

 recusal issue because: “(1) the waiver issue [i]s relatively complex, (2) the

 government ha[s] briefed the merits, and (3) [Mr. Lowe’s] appellate argument clearly

 fail[s].” Id. (citing United States v. Black, 773 F.3d 1113, 1115 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014)).

                                      B. Application

    Sentencing

       Mr. Lowe alleges procedural error in the district court’s drug-quantity

 calculation used for sentencing. See United States v. Williams, 48 F.4th 1125, 1128

 (10th Cir. 2022) (explaining that a challenge to a drug-quantity calculation is

 procedural). Analyzing the three Hahn factors, we enforce Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver

 on his sentencing challenge.

       a. Scope

       Even “strictly constru[ing]” the language of Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver, United

 States v. Anderson, 374 F.3d 955, 957 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted), his

 procedural reasonableness challenge falls within the waiver’s scope. His appeal

 waiver reads:

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               The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives any right
               to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection
               with this prosecution, his conviction, or the components of
               the sentence . . . . The defendant also waives any right to
               challenge his sentence, or the manner in which it was
               determined, or otherwise attempt to modify or change his
               sentence, in any collateral attack, including, but not limited
               to, a motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (except as
               limited by United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179,
               1187 (10th Cir. 2001)), or a motion brought under Federal
               Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). In other words, the
               defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed
               in this case, except to the extent, if any, the Court departs
               or varies upwards from the sentencing Guideline range that
               the Court determines to be applicable. . . .
               Notwithstanding the forgoing [sic] waivers, the parties
               understand that the defendant in no way waives any
               subsequent claims with regards to ineffective assistance of
               counsel or prosecutorial misconduct.

  ROA, Vol. 1 at 345-46. Mr. Lowe thus waived the “right to appeal . . . the

  components of his sentence,” “any right to challenge his sentence, or the manner in

  which it was determined,” and “the right to appeal the sentence imposed,” except in a

  situation not relevant here (upward departure or variance from the Guidelines range).

  Id. In Gross, we enforced an appeal waiver under nearly identical language: the

  defendant “waived the right to appeal his ‘sentence as imposed by the Court,

  including . . . the manner in which the sentence is determined.’” 44 F.4th at 1301

  (alterations in original). Mr. Lowe’s sentence challenge falls within the scope of his

  appeal waiver.

        b. Knowing and voluntary

        Mr. Lowe has not argued his appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary.

  In his response to the Government’s motion to enforce the plea waiver, he argued

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  only that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his “constitutional right to an

  unbiased judge” or “his right to assert ineffective assistance of counsel.” See

  Doc. 10977154 at 13-14. As noted, Mr. Lowe has not replied to the Government’s

  renewed motion to enforce the appeal waiver. He thus has not shown the appeal

  waiver was not knowing and voluntary. See Anderson, 374 F.3d at 958-59.

        c. Miscarriage of justice

        Enforcement of the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. A

  defendant may show a miscarriage of justice “[1] where the district court relied on an

  impermissible factor such as race, [2] where ineffective assistance of counsel in

  connection with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid, [3] where

  the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum, or [4] where the waiver is otherwise

  unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (alterations in original) (quotations omitted).

  Mr. Lowe has not done so.

        First, no evidence shows that Mr. Lowe’s race or a similar impermissible

  factor affected his sentence.

        Second, Mr. Lowe argued in his response to the motion to enforce the appeal

  waiver that he could claim ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the

  negotiation of his plea agreement. See Doc. 10977154 at 15-17. But the record

  shows otherwise.

        In one of his pro se motions in district court, Mr. Lowe argued ineffective

  assistance because he entered into the plea agreement “pur[e]ly based on the stern

  advice of [his] attorney.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 349. He claimed that “[t]he plea was given

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  to [him] the morning of [his] trial, and in the course of 10 minutes [his] attorn[e]y

  briefly tried to explain it to [him],” and that “[n]ever, not once did [the attorney] tell

  [Mr. Lowe] . . . about the maximum sentence that [he] could receive.” Id. at 349-50.

  But the district court found Mr. Lowe’s claims to be “contradicted by the record.”

  Id. at 390.

         The Government offered the plea to Mr. Lowe more than six months before his

  trial date, amended it once, and then re-extended it to him four months before the

  trial. Id. at 292-93. The Government also told the court that Mr. Lowe’s fourth and

  fifth attorneys had both reviewed the plea agreement with him. Id. at 293. Mr. Lowe

  admitted to the court that he understood the appeal waiver would “generally giv[e] up

  [his] right to challenge th[e] prosecution, [his] conviction, or [his] sentence in this

  case.” Id. at 314-15. And he admitted that the plea agreement was “read by [him] or

  at least read to [him] word for word” and that he and his fifth attorney “had time to

  review and discuss all the documents or other evidence produced by the

  Government.” Id. at 307.

         In this court, Mr. Lowe argued in his response to the Government’s motion to

  enforce the appeal waiver that “a full record was not developed” on this issue.

  Doc. 10977154 at 16. But given the record before us, nothing indicates Mr. Lowe

  received ineffective assistance in the negotiation of the waiver.

         Third, Mr. Lowe’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. The

  statutory maximum for his drug offense alone without enhancements for prior

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  offenses was 20 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Mr. Lowe was sentenced to

  210 months (17.5 years) in prison. ROA, Vol. 1 at 442.

        Fourth, we see no reason, and Mr. Lowe has not provided one, why the waiver

  would be otherwise unlawful.

                                      *   *        *   *

        We enforce Mr. Lowe’s appeal waiver and dismiss his appeal on the

  sentencing issue.

     Recusal

        Rather than address whether Mr. Lowe’s motion to recuse is within the scope

  of his appeal waiver, we exercise our discretion to address it on the merits. See

  Garcia-Ramirez, 778 F.3d at 857.

        Mr. Lowe contends the district court judge erred in denying his motion to

  recuse because (1) based on the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, “a

  reasonable person would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality,” requiring

  recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455; and (2) the judge was required to ask another judge to

  decide the motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Aplt. Br. at 16.

        a. Partiality

        We review the “denial of a motion to disqualify a judge for abuse of

  discretion.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1052 (10th Cir. 2019). “Under this

  standard, we will not reverse unless the [judge] has made an arbitrary, capricious,

  whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Id. (quotations omitted).

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        “Section 455(a) requires disqualification for the appearance of impartiality,

  § 455(b)(1) for actual partiality.” Id. at 1053; see also Liteky v. United States, 510

  U.S. 540, 552-53 & n.2 (1994). Section 455(a) provides that “[a]ny justice, judge, or

  magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in

  which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” And § 455(b) lists specific

  grounds for disqualification, including “[w]here [the judge] has a personal bias or

  prejudice concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Mr. Lowe invokes both

  § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1). Aplt. Br. at 13. 2

        Both arguments fail. Mr. Lowe has not shown any judicial bias or partiality.

  The Supreme Court has held that “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,

  annoyance, and even anger,” do “[n]ot establish[] bias or partiality.” Liteky, 510 U.S.

  at 555-56. “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and

  short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—remain

  immune” from challenge under § 455. Id. at 556.

        At the September 15 hearing, the judge employed “ordinary efforts at

  courtroom administration,” id., particularly in light of Mr. Lowe’s lack of decorum

  throughout the proceedings and his self-described “impulsive[ness],” ROA, Vol. 3 at

        2
          The Government appears to assert that Mr. Lowe made only a § 455(a)
  argument and not one under § 455(b)(1). See Aplee. Br. at 39-40. We think
  arguments under both are preserved. Although Mr. Lowe’s motion concerned a
  “violation of 28 U.S.C. [§] 455(a),” ROA, Vol. 1 at 398, the judge also addressed
  whether he should recuse under (b)(1), ROA, Vol. 3 at 68. We may “reach issues
  that were either pressed by the appellant before, or passed upon by, the lower court.”
  Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies, 942 F.3d 979, 992 (10th Cir. 2019) (quotations
  omitted).
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  43. Mr. Lowe argues the statement “Don’t you get smart with me. I haven’t finished

  sentencing you yet,” is “objectively, [] a threat.” Aplt. Br. at 21. We disagree,

  especially in light of the judge’s immediate statement to the contrary: “I have no

  desire to grind you up. I’m not going to give you 30 years. I know that right here

  and now. I am going to give you a reasonable and just sentence once I review the

  presentence report and go through the sentencing process.” ROA, Vol. 3 at 45.

        Mr. Lowe also takes issue with the district judge’s statements at earlier

  hearings. See Aplt. Br. at 16-18. Those statements—such as, “Somebody’s got to be

  in charge and around here, that’s me; just one of the perks of the job,” ROA Vol. 1 at

  128, and, “Quit interrupting me,” ROA, Vol. 3 at 58—are at most “expressions of

  impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” made while attempting to

  maintain decorum in the courtroom, Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56. Even though the

  judge said Mr. Lowe was “undoubtedly the most obstructive and difficult defendant

  to deal with in any criminal case that [he] ha[d] had since coming on the bench,”

  ROA, Vol. 3 at 77, the judge showed no bias against Mr. Lowe nor partiality toward

  the Government.

        We see no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial of Mr. Lowe’s motion.

        b. Decision by another judge

        Mr. Lowe argues on appeal that another judge should have decided his recusal

  motion. Aplt. Br. at 15, 16. But he did not raise this issue in district court, nor did

  the judge address it. Mr. Lowe thus forfeited this argument, and he has not argued

  plain error on appeal. “When an appellant fails to preserve an issue and also fails to

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  make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the issue waived (rather

  than merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all . . . .” United States v.

  Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019). We will not review the issue in these

  circumstances.

                                    III. CONCLUSION

         We dismiss the appeal as to Mr. Lowe’s sentencing issue and affirm the

  district court’s denial of his motion to recuse the district judge.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                               Circuit Judge

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