Court Opinion

ID: 9391750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 06:10:42.68563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.269292
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 26, 2023

                                         S
                                Court of Appeals
                                                In The

                         Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                    No. 05-21-00242-CV
                                    No. 05-21-00373-CV

            IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.M. AND M.A.M., CHILDREN

                 On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court
                              Collin County, Texas
            Trial Court Cause Nos. 366-53554-2020 and 366-50778-2021

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Pedersen, III, Goldstein, and Smith
                                Opinion by Justice Smith
        We deny Mother’s April 19, 2023 request for rehearing. On the Court’s own

motion, we withdraw our March 17, 2023 opinion and vacate the judgments of that

date. This is now the opinion of the Court.

        Mother, representing herself pro se, challenges the trial court’s temporary and

final orders in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) and a final

protective order. In five issues, she asserts that a temporary order was improper and

unconstitutional; the final SAPCR order1 and final protective order2 were

   1
       Appellate cause number 05-21-00242-CV.
   2
       Appellate cause number 05-21-00373-CV.
“structurally defective”; and, in the SAPCR, the trial court erred in failing to provide

“procedural safeguards,” including appointing counsel and a guardian ad litem. For

the following reasons, we affirm.

                                            Background

         Mother and Father began a romantic relationship in late 2005. Their daughter,

M.C.M., was born in 2013; a son, M.A.M., was born in 2015. In January 2020,

Mother and Father ended their relationship. On June 1, Father filed a SAPCR

petition.3 On June 30, Mother filed a suit for divorce. The trial court subsequently

consolidated the SAPCR into the divorce suit.4

         On August 3, Father filed a motion for temporary orders. Following a hearing,

the trial court appointed Mother and Father as temporary joint managing

conservators of M.C.M. and M.A.M. and ordered that Father would determine the

children’s primary residence and Mother would have an expanded possession

schedule. The trial court also required both Mother and Father to submit a drug test

result within a week.

         Mother did not timely submit a drug test result and, on August 25, Father filed

a motion requesting that the trial court deem Mother’s drug test positive. Mother

then filed a drug test result that was positive for methamphetamine and

    3
        Trial court cause number 366-52880-2020.
    4
       Trial court cause number 363-53554-2020 (appellate cause number 05-21-00242-CV). The trial
court’s order in the divorce suit is the subject of a separate appeal (appellate cause number 05-21-00360-
CV).

                                                   –2–
amphetamine. At a hearing on Father’s motion, there was discussion about whether

Mother could have tested positive for methamphetamine as a result of consuming

prescription Adderall. The trial court required Mother to undergo a second drug test.

      On September 16, Father requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) and

temporary injunction (TI) and moved to modify the temporary orders. He submitted

a declaration and report by a toxicologist, who opined that Mother’s positive

methamphetamine test result was only possible following consumption of some form

of methamphetamine, and not prescription Adderall. The trial court held a hearing

on Father’s motion and ordered Mother to submit a drug test result negative for

methamphetamine as a condition precedent to exercising her scheduled possession

of the children.

      Mother submitted a drug test result on September 18, but the result indicated

that she was not tested for methamphetamine. Father supplemented his TRO and TI

application and, on October 5, the trial court signed an order requiring that Mother’s

possession be supervised until she delivered a 10-panel or higher drug test result that

was negative for illicit substances other than those for which she had a valid

prescription. The order further required that Mother undergo a substance abuse

evaluation.

                                         –3–
        On January 6, 2021, Father filed an amended second emergency ex parte

application for writ of habeas corpus and writ of attachment.5 Father requested the

children’s return, alleging that Mother withdrew them from school during his

possession period and did not return them. He also moved for additional temporary

orders suspending Mother’s possession pending trial. During a January 7 hearing,

the trial court heard evidence that Mother had failed to surrender possession of the

children. The trial court granted Father’s application and also entered a temporary

order suspending Mother’s possession until further order by the court. Mother filed

a motion for reconsideration, which was denied.

        On January 26, the trial court held a bench trial on the informal marriage.

Following Mother’s case-in-chief, Father moved for judgment. The trial court

granted the motion, finding Mother and Father were not informally married, and

entered an order denying Mother’s claim of informal marriage and dismissing the

divorce action.

        The next day, January 27, the trial court held a bench trial in the SAPCR. The

trial court also heard argument on a motion for enforcement of possession and access

that Father filed before trial. At the close of evidence and arguments, the court

entered oral orders into the record that, among other things, Mother and Father would

    5
       Father previously filed an application for writ of habeas corpus and writ of attachment alleging that
Mother kept the children home from school and threatened not to return them for Father’s possession over
the Thanksgiving holiday. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion and allowed Mother to
retain possession for the weekend preceding Thanksgiving.

                                                   –4–
be appointed joint managing conservators, Father would be granted the exclusive

right to determine the children’s residence, and Mother would have a modified

standard possession order. Mother’s possession would be supervised for three

months, and she was required to do twice monthly drug testing for six months,

undergo an alcohol assessment, and take an anger management class. Mother’s

compliance was a condition to her possession of the children. On the motion for

enforcement, the trial court found Mother guilty of possession violations and

awarded Father $1,000 in attorney’s fees.

        On February 5, Mother attempted to remove the children from school during

Father’s possession period. On February 11, Mother was arrested for assault family

violence and, on February 12, Father requested an ex parte temporary protective

order and a two-year protective order against Mother.6 The trial court entered a

temporary ex parte protective order and set a hearing on Father’s application for a

two-year protective order.

        On February 22, Father moved the trial court to enter and clarify its SAPCR

rulings or, alternatively, for additional orders.             Citing the temporary ex parte

protective order7 and Mother’s continued disregard for the trial court’s orders, Father

requested modifications to the trial court’s oral SAPCR rulings. Among other

things, Father requested that he be designated sole managing conservator of the

   6
       Trial court cause number 366-50778-2021 (appellate cause number 05-21-00373-CV).
   7
     A City of Richardson municipal court also entered an order for emergency protection (case number
202100011414).
                                                –5–
children, Mother be designated possessory conservator, and Mother’s possession

periods be supervised by Hannah’s House or another similar supervision facility.

      On March 3, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Father’s motion and

his application for a two-year protective order. Thereafter, the trial court entered a

final SAPCR order. The order, as Father requested, appointed Father sole managing

conservator, appointed Mother possessory conservator, and required Mother’s

possession to be supervised at a supervision facility. The trial court also entered a

final protective order prohibiting Mother for two years from, in pertinent part,

committing family violence, communicating with or coming within 250 yards of

Father, and having unsupervised possession of the children. Mother filed a motion

for reconsideration, which the trial court denied, and a subsequent motion to set aside

judgments and for new trial, which was denied by operation of law. On April 5, the

trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. This appeal followed.

                            Temporary SAPCR Order

      In her first issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s January 7, 2021

temporary order, which suspended Mother’s possession of and access to the children

until January 27, when the trial court entered orders into the record at the conclusion

of the SAPCR bench trial.        Mother contends the temporary order, issued in

connection with Father’s application for writ of habeas corpus, was improper and an

unjustified “indefinite termination of parental rights” that was cruel and unusual

punishment. However, entry of a final order supersedes a temporary order and

                                         –6–
renders moot any complaint about the temporary order. In re B.W.S., No. 05-20-

00343-CV, 2022 WL 2712494, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 13, 2022, no pet.)

(mem. op.); In re M.L.R., No. 05-15-00647-CV, 2016 WL 5791530, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 257

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). Because the trial court’s March

3, 2021 final SAPCR order superseded the January 7 temporary order, Mother’s

complaints about the temporary order are moot and, therefore, not subject to

appellate review. See, e.g., B.W.S., 2022 WL 2712494, at *4. Accordingly, we

overrule Mother’s first issue.8

                    Final SAPCR Order and Final Protective Order

        In her second issue, Mother asserts that the final SAPCR order and final

protective order are “structurally defective and should be deemed null and void.”

According to Mother, “the dismissal of the divorce dismissed the SAPCR,” and the

“protective order should have been superseded by the SAPCR, assuming the SAPCR

had been valid.” She further complains that (1) the final SAPCR order “de facto”

terminates her parental rights, is “fundamentally defective,” is “fraught with

fraudulent intent,” and was “entered without jurisdiction and without consideration

of substantive due process rights”; and (2) the final protective order “was fraudulent,

    8
       We also note that the temporary order did not, as Mother alleges, indefinitely terminate her parental
rights. Further, a trial court is authorized to render an appropriate temporary order in a habeas corpus
proceeding “if there is a serious immediate question concerning the welfare of the child,” TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 157.374, and Father properly requested the additional temporary order as part of his amended
second emergency ex parte application for writ of habeas corpus.
                                                   –7–
and not entered in good faith or out of any clear and present need for its equitable

relief.” Mother does not provide any record citations or further analysis in support

of these complaints under the second issue.9 From our review of Mother’s brief, we

understand her complaints to be that the trial court’s final orders should be void

because (1) dismissal of the divorce action also resulted in dismissal of the SACPR;

(2) the final SAPCR order improperly modified the oral orders made by the trial

court at the conclusion of the SAPCR bench trial; and (3) the final protective order

was “superseded” by the SAPCR.

        The divorce suit and the SAPCR, although consolidated, are separate and

distinct suits. See Coleman v. Coleman, No. 02-21-00368-CV, 2022 WL 7232156,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re

Marriage of Morales, 968 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

1998, no pet.)). Further, the record provides no support for Mother’s contention that

dismissal of the divorce suit also resulted in dismissal of, or otherwise affected, the

SAPCR. At the outset of the January 26 bench trial on the informal marriage, the

trial court clearly explained that they were going to proceed in a bifurcated manner,

taking up the marriage first and then determining issues regarding custody. After

    9
      Although we construe pro se briefs liberally, a brief fails if we are required to guess about the party’s
complaints, search the record for facts that may be favorable to a party’s position, or conduct research that
might support the contentions made. Joseph v. Willis, No. 05-16-00995-CV, 2017 WL 1427713, at *1
(Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. We confine our
review accordingly.

                                                     –8–
Mother’s case-in-chief, Father moved for judgment. The trial court granted the

motion, finding that there was no marriage. The court then stated that they would

proceed to the next phase of trial to determine the parent-child relationship and

custody of the minor children. The record shows that Mother understood this, and

she appeared and presented her case in the SAPCR bench trial the following day.

Also on the following day, the trial court entered an Order Denying Claim of

Informal Marriage, which specifically, and only, dismissed “the suit for divorce

pending between [Mother] and [Father].”

      At the conclusion of the SAPCR bench trial, the trial court entered oral orders

on the record, including appointing Father and Mother as joint managing

conservators and requiring that Mother’s possession be supervised by her brother or

another individual approved by Father for at least three months. Just weeks later,

however, Father filed an application for a protective order along with a declaration

stating that, among other things, Mother had jumped on Father’s back and choked

him during a February 11 birthday dinner for M.C.M. Father also moved the trial

court to enter final SAPCR orders appointing him as sole managing conservator and

imposing additional restrictions to Mother’s possession of and access to the children.

      At a March 3 hearing, the trial court heard evidence that, while at a restaurant

celebrating M.C.M.’s birthday, Mother verbally threatened Father and subsequently

attacked him physically, choking and hitting him at the same time. The court also

observed a video recording that showed a February 5 incident involving Mother, the

                                         –9–
children, and the children’s principal as Mother attempted to take possession of the

children just after Father had dropped them off for school. Finding that family

violence occurred and was likely to occur in the future, the trial court entered the

final protective order, effective for two years. The trial court also entered the final

SAPCR order, which appointed Mother possessory conservator, instead of joint

managing conservator, and required that her possession of the children be supervised

at a facility.

       The trial court’s written judgment or order controls over the court’s oral

pronouncements. In re A.N.G., 631 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no

pet.); In re K.M.B., 148 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004,

no pet.). Here, the trial court’s March 3, 2021 final SAPCR order controls. See,

e.g., In re E.D., No. 02-20-00208-CV, 2022 WL 60781, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Jan. 6, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). And, under the circumstances presented,

the trial court was free to modify the oral orders entered following the SAPCR bench

trial. Indeed, the court was required to consider the evidence of Mother’s intentional

use of abusive physical force against Father during the pendency of the case in

determining whether to appoint Mother as a joint managing conservator. See TEX.

FAM. CODE ANN. §153.004(a); see also id. §153.004(b) (providing that a trial court

“may not appoint joint managing conservators if credible evidence is presented of a

history or pattern of past or present . . . physical . . . abuse by one parent directed

against the other parent, a spouse, or a child . . .”).

                                           –10–
         Although the evidence related to the protective order is clearly relevant to the

SAPCR, the protective order proceeding and the SAPCR are independent of one

another. See Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 633–34 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015,

pet. denied) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 82.001). The final protective order, which

contains restrictions on Mother’s possession of and access to the children

specifically permitted by the Texas Family Code, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §

85.022(b), was not “superseded” by the SAPCR.

         In sum, neither the trial court’s dismissal of the divorce suit nor the fact that

the trial court’s final SAPCR order modified some of the orders orally pronounced

at the close of the SAPCR bench trial rendered the final SAPCR order void. Nor did

the SAPCR suit supersede the protective order proceeding. Because Mother has not

shown that either the final SAPCR order or final protective order are void, we

overrule her second issue.

                                     Appointment of Counsel

         In her third issue, Mother contends that the trial court’s failure to appoint

counsel to represent her in the SAPCR proceeding and advise her of her right to

appointed counsel was a due process violation.10 She asserts the “overwhelming

complexity would have undoubtedly called for appointment of counsel” in this case

    10
       Mother states her complaint as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, but she complains about the
lack of counsel, not counsel’s performance. Mother was represented by counsel until October 15, 2020,
when the trial court entered an agreed motion to withdraw. Thereafter, she represented herself pro se except
during the March 3, 2021 hearing when her criminal defense attorney was present “to counsel and assist
[Mother] with respect to her Fifth Amendment privilege.”
                                                   –11–
involving the “unjust and permanent severance of a relationship between a child and

its natural parent.” In two motions to reconsider the trial court’s January 7, 2020

temporary order, Mother wrote that “[c]ourt-appointment of counsel should be

offered.”11 Although Mother never explicitly requested that the trial court appoint

counsel or objected to the failure to do so, we assume, without deciding, that her

statements constituted an objection sufficient to preserve this issue for appeal.

        Mother cites section 107.013, which provides a statutory right to counsel for

indigent parents in government-filed termination and conservatorship cases. TEX.

FAM. CODE § 107.013(a). There is no similar right, however, in a SAPCR where

termination is not sought or even a private termination case. In those cases, the trial

court has discretion to appoint an attorney ad litem. See id. § 107.021(a).

        The U.S. Supreme Court has declined to find that an indigent parent has a due

process right to appointed counsel in a termination proceeding. See Lassiter v. Dep’t

of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31–32 (1981). Instead, the trial court, subject to

appellate review, makes the due process determination on a case-by-case basis. See

id. In making the determination, courts may consider whether (1) the petition

contains allegations of neglect or abuse upon which criminal charges could be based;

   11
       The record also includes a November 30, 2020 Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court
Costs or an Appeal Bond in Justice Court. On that form, Mother checked the following box:
        I have asked a legal-aid provider to represent me, and the provider determined that I am
        financially eligible for representation, but the provider could not take my case. I have
        attached documentation from legal aid stating this.
No documentation was attached to the statement.
                                                  –12–
(2) expert witnesses are involved; (3) the case presents troublesome points of law,

either procedural or substantive; (4) the record indicates that the absence of counsel’s

guidance rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair; (5) the presence of counsel

would have made a determinative difference; and (6) the parent demonstrates a clear

desire to contest the proceedings. In re L.F., No. 02-19-00421-CV, 2020 WL

2201905, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33); In re R.J.C., No. 04–09–00106–CV, 2010 WL

816188, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 20, 2010, no pet.). The determination

is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. R.J.C., 2010 WL 816188, at *4.

      This case, however, is not a termination case and does not, as Mother alleges,

involve the “permanent severance” of the parent child-relationship. See, e.g., In re

J.J.R.S., 607 S.W.3d 400, 407–08 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020) (mem. op.), aff’d,

627 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2021) (rejecting mother’s argument that SAPCR order, which

appointed aunt and uncle as permanent managing conservators and mother as

possessory conservator with visitation rights conditioned on approval of aunt and

uncle, “effectively terminate[d] her parental rights”); J.A.T. v. C.S.T., 641 S.W.3d

596, 615–17 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. denied) (rejecting

argument that family violence protective order effectively terminated parent-child

relationship and, thus, entitled father to “procedures and safeguards,” including

appointment of counsel).      Mother retains her parental rights and can seek a

modification of the trial court’s final SAPCR order in the future upon a showing that

                                         –13–
her circumstances, or the circumstances of Father or the children, have materially

changed since the order’s entry and modification would be in the children’s best

interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 156.001, 156.101; Chad Lee S. v. Melinda A. S.,

No. 02-14-00135-CV, 2015 WL 7820584, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 3,

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Nor does this case present, as Mother asserts, “overwhelming complexity.”

One expert, a toxicologist, testified to the results of drug tests that Mother submitted

to the trial court. There were no troublesome points of law to address. The

allegations in Father’s petition did not indicate that Mother would be subject to

criminal charges stemming from her relationship with the children. Mother clearly

contested the proceedings, and she presented substantial evidence regarding her

close relationship with, and care and support of, the children as well as her criticisms

of Father’s ability to parent the children. However, there also was evidence to

support, among others, the following findings of fact by the trial court:

    Mother attempted to interfere with M.C.M.’s urgent oral surgery;

    In August 2020, a hair sample submitted by Mother tested positive for
     methamphetamine and amphetamine due to Mother ingesting illicit
     methamphetamine within the preceding 90-day period, she also tested
     positive for amphetamine in September 2020, and Mother failed to
     produce any credible evidence that the positive tests for
     methamphetamine and amphetamine were caused by legally prescribed
     prescription medication;

    In September 2020, the Texas Department of Family and Protective
     Services issued an “Unable to Determine” finding on allegations of
     negligent supervision of the children by Mother;

                                         –14–
    In October 2020, Mother pounded on the doors and windows at Father’s
     home during his possession period and demanded to see the children;
     Mother also told the children that she was “going to f***ing kill your
     daddy”;

    In November and December 2020, Mother failed to surrender
     possession of the children at school in violation of temporary orders;

    In January 2021, Mother removed the children from school during
     Father’s possession period one day and unsuccessfully attempted to
     remove them from school another day;

    In February 2021, Mother waited for Father to drop the children off for
     school and then grabbed them as if planning to take them; the school
     principal had to hold M.C.M. to prevent Mother from removing her
     from the premises;

    Mother committed family violence against Father during the pendency
     of this case, and it is likely that she will do so again in the future;

    Mother habitually violated court orders during the pendency of this case
     despite repeated warnings from the court; and

    Mother was not a credible witness.

Mother has not challenged these findings on appeal.

      An attorney may have more thoroughly presented Mother’s arguments at trial.

However, our review of the record does not indicate that a more thorough

presentation would have made a determinative difference in the trial court’s

conclusions that, based on Mother’s conduct, it was in the children’s best interest for

Mother to be appointed possessory conservator with restricted and supervised

possession and access. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did

                                         –15–
not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint counsel for Mother in the SAPCR.

Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third issue.

                             Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem

         In her fourth issue, Mother claims the trial court erred in failing to appoint a

guardian ad litem for the children in the SAPCR. Citing Texas Family Code section

107.021(a-1),12 Mother asserts a guardian ad litem was necessary because she was

“facing de facto/procedural/fraudulent imposition of the termination of [her]

parental rights.”

         Mother never requested that the trial court appoint a guardian ad litem or

objected to the trial court’s failure to do so. To preserve a complaint for appellate

review, a party must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion

that states the specific grounds for the desired ruling, if not apparent from the context

of the request, objection, or motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); In re L.M.I., 119

S.W.3d 707, 710–11 (Tex. 2003); In re J.C., 594 S.W.3d 466, 473 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth, 2019, no pet.). A party that fails to do so does not preserve its complaint for

appellate review.         J.C., 594 S.W.3d at 47.               This preservation rule applies to

constitutional challenges. Id. (citing Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.

1993)); In re A.E.J., No. 05-20-00340-CV, 2020 WL 5107293, at *10 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 31, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

    12
       Section 107.021(a-1) provides that, in a private termination suit, a trial court must appoint a guardian
ad litem if the court finds that the child’s interest will not be represented adequately by a party to the suit
whose interests are not in conflict with the child’s interests. TEX. FAM. CODE § 107.021(a-1).
                                                    –16–
         This Court previously determined that due process did not require review of

an unpreserved complaint regarding failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in a private

termination of parental rights case. See A.E.J., 2020 WL 5107293, at * 11–12. We

likewise conclude that we need not review Mother’s unpreserved complaint in this

private SAPCR, where termination was never at issue. See id. Mother’s fourth issue

is overruled.

                                            Equal Protection

         In a fifth issue, Mother asserts Texas Family Code sections 107.013 and

263.006113 are violations of her right to equal protection. She also asserts, without

any further explanation, that denying her right to “family service planning, providing

for records access, and expediated [sic] appellate court relief” violated her equal

protection rights. In doing so, Mother again characterizes this SAPCR as a private

termination case and asserts that she and the children were subjected to “the exact

same irreparable harm as parents and children involved in CPS termination cases.”

         Mother never raised an equal protection argument during the trial court

proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that she failed to preserve her complaints

for our review on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d at 710–

11; O.L. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 460 S.W.3d 640, 654–55 (Tex.

    13
         Section 107.013 mandates appointed counsel for indigent parents in termination/conservatorship
suits filed by a governmental entity, and section 263.0061 requires the trial court to, “[a]t the status hearing
. . . and at each permanency hearing,” inform unrepresented parents of “(1) the right to be represented by
an attorney; and (2) if a parent is indigent and appears in opposition to the suit, the right to a court-appointed
attorney.” See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 107.013(a); 263.0061(a).
                                                      –17–
App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (father’s claims that application of the Interstate

Compact on the Placement of Children violated his constitutional rights to due

process and equal protection were not preserved for appeal when he did not raise

any constitutional objections in the trial court). We overrule Mother’s fifth issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s final SAPCR order and final protective order.

                                           /Craig Smith/
                                           CRAIG SMITH
                                           JUSTICE

210242F.P05

                                        –18–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.M.                      On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
AND M.A.M., CHILDREN,                          District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 366-53554-
No. 05-21-00242-CV           V.                2020.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                               Justices Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
                                               participating.

      We VACATE the judgment of March 17, 2023. This is now the judgment of
the Court.

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s March 3,
2021 Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that Appellee recover his costs of this appeal from Appellant.

Judgment entered this 26th day of April 2023.

                                        –19–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

IN THE INTEREST OF M.C.M.                      On Appeal from the 366th Judicial
AND M.A.M., CHILDREN,                          District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. 366-50778-
No. 05-21-00373-CV           V.                2021.
                                               Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                               Justices Pedersen, III, and Goldstein
                                               participating.

      We VACATE the judgment of March 17, 2023.

      In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s March 3,
2021 Final Protective Order is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that Appellee recover his costs of this appeal from Appellant.

Judgment entered this 26th day of April 2023.

                                        –20–