Court Opinion

ID: 2964917
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:56.953316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:26.286234
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
       No. 96-1831
                            WILLIAM MORRILL GILDAY, JR.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                                LARRY DUBOIS, ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                                    
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
                                                    
                                       Before
                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                           Stearns,  U.S. District Judge,
                         and Gertner,  U.S. District Judge.
                                                    
            Mark M. Owen, with whom Edward S. Rooney, Jr., Andrea C. Dow and
       Lyne, Woodworth & Evarts LLP were on brief for appellant.
            Philip W. Silva, Department of Correction, with whom Nancy Ankers
       White, Special Assistant Attorney General, was on brief for appellees
       Dubois and Matesanz.
            Thomas R. Teehan for appellee New England Telephone and Telegraph
       Company.
            Susan E. Stenger, with whom Lawrence G. Green and Perkins, Smith
       & Cohen, LLP were on brief for appellee AT&T Corp.
                                                    
                                   August 29, 1997
                                                    
                           
            Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
             Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

                    CYR, Circuit 
                                 Judge.  Plaintiff William Morrill Gilday,
          Jr. challenges a summary judgment ruling dismissing his civil
          rights claims and related claims for civil contempt against
          appellees Larry Dubois and James Matesanz, of the Massachusetts
          Department of Correction ("DOC"), and appellees American Telephone
          and Telegraph Corporation ("AT&T") and New England Telephone and
          Telegraph Company ("NET"). As Gilday failed to generate a
          trialworthy issue with respect to any claim, we affirm the district
          court judgment.
                                          I
                                     BACKGROUND
                    After killing a Boston police officer during a 1970 bank
          robbery in Brighton, Massachusetts, Gilday was convicted of first
          degree murder and armed robbery, for which he is now serving
          concurrent life sentences at the Bay State Correctional Center in
          Norfolk, Massachusetts. In 1974, Gilday commenced a civil rights
          action in federal district court against various FBI and DOC offi-
          cials, 
                see 
                    Gilday v. 
                              Webster, No. 74-4169-C, alleging interference
          with attorney-client communications in violation of the Sixth and
          Fourteenth Amendments, and violations of the federal and state
          wiretap statutes, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510 
                                             et 
                                                seq., and Mass. Gen. L. ch.
                              
               The relevant facts are related in the light most favorable to
          Gilday, against whom summary judgment entered. 
                                                        Hegarty v. 
                                                                   Somerset
          County, 53 F.3d 1367, 1370, n.1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
          Ct. 675 (1995). 
                                          2

          272, SS 99 
                    et 
                       seq. Gilday alleged that federal and state officials
          were opening his prison mail and intercepting his telephone
          communications in a coordinated effort to gather information
          regarding others involved in the Brighton bank robbery.
                    Approximately ten years later, Gilday and four DOC
          officials entered into a stipulation ("settlement stipulation")
          which led to the following permanent injunction against the DOC and
          the defendant DOC officials on September 12, 1984 ("the    Gilday
          injunction"):
                                PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
                    Having reviewed and approved the Settle-
                    ment Stipulation dated September 10,
                    1984, and after hearing, it is hereby
                    ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
                         1.   All officers, agents, ser-
                         vants, employees and attorneys
                         of the Department of Correction
                         are enjoined permanently, under
                         both 18 U.S.C. S 2510 et  seq.
                         and M.G.L. c. 272, S 99     et
                         seq., from intercepting, en-
                         deavoring to intercept, or pro-
                         curing any other person to in-
                         tercept or endeavor to inter-
                         cept, any wire communication by
                         or to plaintiff William Gilday
                         without a specific court order
                         or legislative authorization to
                         do so, except as  specifically
                         permitted by  these  statutes,
                         taken together, as they have
                         been amended or may be amended
                              
               Around the same time, Gilday brought a 
                                                      pro se action against
          four supervisory DOC officials alleging due process violations,
          denial of access to the courts, and theft of personal belongings.
          See Gilday v. Boone, 657 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981). 
               Gilday proceeded with the action against the nonsettling DOC
          officials. 
                                       3

                         and 
                            as 
                               they 
                                    have 
                                         been 
                                              construed
                         or 
                           may 
                               be 
                                  construed 
                                            in 
                                               reported
                         decisions that are binding  in
                         this Court  or  in  the  state
                         courts of Massachusetts.
                         2.   [mail restrictions]
                         3.   This 
                                  Permanent 
                                            Injunction,
                         entered pursuant to the settle-
                         ment stipulation dated Septem-
                         ber 10, 1984, shall operate
                         prospectively only; it   shall
                         not prejudice  the  rights  of
                         nonsettling defendants or,  of
                         its  own  force,  affect   the
                         rights of  inmates other  than
                         William Gilday.
          (Emphasis added.)
                    Over the next ten years, however, developments in
          electronic technology, as well as inmate ingenuity, prompted
          increased prison-telephone abuses, such as acquiring merchandise
          by fraud, promoting drug violations, soliciting murder, harassing
          crime victims, witnesses, and public officials, facilitating escape
          plots, violating court restraining orders, and threatening domestic
          violence. The DOC responded in 1993 by inviting telephone-system
          vendors to furnish, install, and maintain an advanced prison
          telephone system designed to deter inmate abuses by monitoring,
          recording, and "detailing" their calls. 
                    Ultimately, NET contracted to produce, install, and
                              
               For example, one DOC inmate alone managed to mischarge 271 so-
          called "third-party" calls to a single business firm in one month.
          See infra note 19.
               Call "detailing" involves recording such billing-related
          matters as the number called and the duration of the call.
                                          4

          maintain an inmate telephone system for all DOC facilities, which
          became known as the Massachusetts Inmate Telephone System ("MITS"),
          to supply both local and long distance service and remit to the DOC
          forty percent of the gross revenues from inmate calls. NET in turn
          subcontracted with AT&T to furnish long distance MITS service. A
          third company, Telematic Corporation, contracted with AT&T and NET
          to provide the electronic equipment and software needed to
          provision the system.
                    On April 8, 1994, the DOC promulgated new inmate
          telephone regulations, see 103 C.M.R. SS 482.00   et seq. ("MITS
          Regulations"), "establish[ing] Department procedures regarding
          access to, use of and the monitoring and/or recording of inmate
          telephones." Id. S 482.01. Under the MITS Regulations, a personal
          identification number ("PIN") is randomly assigned to each inmate.
          The inmate must dial the assigned PIN immediately before dialing
          the telephone number, whereupon an automatic operator completes the
          connection. No more than fifteen designated parties are accessible
          with any PIN: ten friends and family members and five attorneys.
          See id. S 482.07(3)(c); Bender Aff. q 8. The right to call
          designated attorneys may not be suspended or curtailed except
          during an institutional emergency,   see  id. SS 482.08-482.09,
          whereas the right to call other designated parties is subject to
          disciplinary restriction, see  id. SS 482.07(3)(h), 482.09. In
          addition, all inmates are allowed to call three prison legal-
          service organizations. 
                    Stickers on all MITS telephones alert inmates to the
                                          5

          monitoring/recording regime. All inmate calls, except pre-
          authorized attorney calls and legal-service organization calls, are
          automatically recorded. Certain "detailing" information is
          recorded on all calls either attempted or completed. Finally, all
          except attorney and legal-service organization calls may be
          subjected to concurrent monitoring (
                                             i.e., listened in on) by autho-
          rized DOC personnel, either at random or for investigative
          purposes.  See id. S 482.07(3)(d). 
                    In order to obtain an individual PIN, the inmate must
          complete and sign a "Number Request Form," designating the attorney
          and nonattorney telephone numbers which may be called. The form
          advises inmates that their "acceptance and use of a PIN and use of
          inmate telephones shall be deemed as consent to the conditions and
          restrictions placed upon inmate telephone calls, including call
          monitoring, recording, and call detail." All inmate calls must be
          placed "collect."  Id. S 482.07(3)(a). Each call begins with a
          recorded message    audible by both parties    that the call has
          been placed "collect" by a DOC inmate and is subject to recordation
          and "detailing." See 
                               id. S 482.07(3)(g); Kennedy Aff. q 10. Both
          parties hear the entire message, but there can be no communication
          until the collect call has been accepted by the person called. 
                                                                        See
          103 C.M.R. S 482.07(3)(f); Bender Aff. q 11. 
                    Gilday declined to submit a PIN request form, on the
          ground that the MITS contravenes the federal and state wiretap
                                          6

          statutes and therefore violates the Gilday injunction. At about
          the same time, Gilday mailed AT&T and NET copies of the    Gilday
          injunction entered September 12, 1984, 
                                                see 
                                                    supra pp. 3-4, advising
          that their provision of MITS services would violate the injunction.
                    Shortly thereafter Gilday petitioned the federal district
          court for a contempt citation against AT&T, NET, and various DOC
          officials, claiming that the defendants were "endeavoring to
          intercept" his telephone communications. Although neither AT&T nor
          NET was privy to the Gilday injunction, Gilday asserted that both
          received actual notice by mail,   supra pp. 6-7, and therefore
          knowingly aided and abetted the alleged violations by the DOC
          defendants. Finally, Gilday alleged, the defendants were depriving
          him of his "federal right to be free of any interception of his
          wire communications," as well as his Sixth Amendment right to
          counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts,
          by restricting consultation with counsel regarding six pending
          judicial proceedings. 
                    The district court entered summary judgment for the
          defendants, on the ground that the Gilday injunction bans neither
          monitoring nor recording, but only "interceptions." It noted that
          no secretive, nonconsensual monitoring or recording     hence no
                              
               Consequently, for the most part Gilday has been without
          telephone access since the MITS went into operation. Under a
          stipulation among the parties, however, he has been allowed limited
          telephone use in order to communicate with counsel regarding his
          unrelated appeal in Gilday v. Callahan, 866 F.Supp. 611 (D. Mass.
          1994), 
                aff'd, 59 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 1995), 
                                                   cert. 
                                                         denied, 116 S. Ct.
          1269 (1996).
                                          7

          "interception" 
                           had occurred under either wiretap statute, since
          all recording and monitoring is well advertised as required by the
          MITS Regulations.  See supra p. 6. The district court reasoned
          that inmates render the MITS monitoring/recording regime consensual
          by executing the request form and utilizing the MITS. And since it
          found the term "interception" ambiguous at best, the district court
          determined to resolve any interpretive doubts favorably to the
          defendants. Finally, it dismissed the Gilday claims relating to
          call "detailing," on the ground that 
                                              Langton v. 
                                                         Hogan, 71 F.3d 930
          (1st Cir. 1995), had already endorsed the MITS practice in this
          regard. Accordingly, it concluded that the attendant recording and
          monitoring did not constitute an "interception" under either the
          federal or state wiretap statute, thus did not contravene the
          Gilday injunction.
                    Thereafter, the district court dismissed the section 1983
          claims as well, on the ground that Gilday retained all mail
          privileges, access to a prison law library, the right to meet with
          counsel and, under the MITS regulations, the right to conduct
          unmonitored telephone communications with five attorneys and three
          legal-service organizations. 
                              
               The district court likewise determined that the defendant DOC
          officials came within the "law enforcement" exceptions to the
          respective wiretap statutes.    See 18 U.S.C. S 2510(5)(a)(ii)
          (excluding interceptions by an "investigative or law enforcement
          officer in the ordinary course of his duties"); Mass. Gen. L. ch.
          272, S 99(D)(1)(c) (exempting federal law enforcement officials);
          see also, e.g., United 
                                 States v.  Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308, 1328-29
          (7th Cir. 1989) (concluding that a prison monitoring regime,
          conducted as part of an "institutionalized, ongoing policy[,]" does
          not constitute "interception").
                                          8

                                         II
                                     DISCUSSION
          A.   Standard of Review
                    A summary judgment ruling is reviewed 
                                                        de 
                                                           novo and must be
          affirmed if the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
          nonmoving party, "reveals no trialworthy issue of material fact and
          the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
          Velez-Gomez v. SMA 
                             Life 
                                  Assur. 
                                         Co., 8 F.3d 873, 874-75 (1st Cir.
          1993). Moreover, we may affirm "on any independently sufficient
          ground."  Polyplastics, 
                                  Inc. v.  Transconex, 
                                                       Inc., 827 F.2d 859,
          860-61 (1st Cir. 1987). 
          B.  The Contempt Claims 
                    Gilday mounts several challenges to the district court
          rulings on the contempt claims. We address these arguments in
          turn, mindful that it was for Gilday to establish by "'clear and
          convincing evidence[,]'" Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11,
          16 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting  Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206,
          1220 (1st Cir. 1991)), that the particular defendant violated an
          unambiguous consent decree "that left no reasonable doubt as to
          what behavior was to be expected," 
                                            id. at 17.  See 
                                                            also 
                                                                 Porrata v.
          Gonzalez-Rivera, 958 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating that
          complainant must clearly establish that "a lucid and unambiguous
          consent order has been violated");  NBA Properties, Inc. v. Gold,
          895 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1990) (similar). Moreover, "'the party
          enjoined must be able to ascertain from the four corners of the
          order precisely what acts are forbidden.'"  Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17
                                          9

          (quoting Drywall Tapers & Painters of Greater N.Y., Local 1974 v.
          Local 530 of Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons Int'l Ass'n
                                                                      , 889
          F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)); 
                                                           see 
                                                               also 
                                                                    Reed v.
          Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
                               , 607 F.2d 749, 752 (6th Cir. 1979) (stating
          that judicial order must "clearly tell a reasonable person what he
          is required to do or abstain from doing"). From these requirements
          flows the important corollary that courts are to construe ambigu-
          ities and omissions in consent decrees as "'redound[ing] to the
          benefit of the person charged with contempt.'" 
                                                        NBA Properties
                                                                      , 895
          F.2d at 32 (quoting Ford v. Kammerer, 450 F.2d 279, 280 (3d Cir.
          1971) (per curiam));  see also Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16 (same).
               1.   Issue Preclusion 
                    As a threshold matter, Gilday insists that the DOC
          defendants are collaterally estopped from contending that the MITS
          does not violate the  Gilday injunction, because this issue was
          resolved in Langton v.  Hogan, No. 79-2167-Z, 1995 WL 96948 (D.
          Mass. Feb. 21, 1995), which culminated in a permanent injunction
          ("the Langton injunction") almost identical to the Gilday injunc-
          tion.
                    Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars
          relitigation of any issue "
                                    actually decided in previous litigation
          'between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.'"
          Grella v. 
                   Salem Five Cent Sav. Bank
                                            , 42 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1994)
          (quoting 
                  Dennis v. 
                            Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
                                                   , 744 F.2d 893, 899 (1st
          Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
                                                    Restatement (Second) of
          Judgments, S 27 (1982)). Although "[a]n issue may be 'actually'
                                         10

          decided even if it is not   explicitly decided, for it may have
          constituted, logically or practically, a necessary component of the
          decision reached in the prior litigation," 
                                                   Grella, 42 F.3d at 30-31
          (emphasis in original), the narrow, fact-based district court
          decision in 
                     Langton had simply declined to 
                                                   modify the injunction in
          that case, to permit monitoring and recording, 
                                                       because 
                                                               there 
                                                                     was 
                                                                         no
          evidence of  inmate-telephone  abuse  by Langton  or  his  fellow
          plaintiff. Thus, as the district court ruling on the petition for
          modification in  Langton neither addressed nor implicated the
          question whether the MITS violates either the state or federal
          wiretap statute, see  Langton, No. 79-2167-Z, 1995 WL 96948, it
          neither "actually" nor "necessarily" determined that the MITS
          regime violated the  Langton injunction, let alone the     Gilday
          injunction. See 
                          Grella, 42 F.3d at 30 (stating that "the determi-
          nation of the issue must have been essential to the judgment");
          see also NLRB v. Donna-Lee 
                                     Sportswear 
                                                Co., 
                                                     Inc., 836 F.2d 31, 34
          (1st Cir. 1987) (same).
               2.   Claim Preclusion
                    Gilday next contends that the 1984 consent decree
          precludes the DOC defendants from claiming that the MITS does not
          violate the Gilday injunction, because our decision in Langton v.
          Hogan, 71 F.3d 930, 933-35 (1st Cir. 1995), involving a similar
                              
               Furthermore, a determination that the MITS violated the
          Langton injunction    with its materially different language and
          discrete purpose, see infra, pp. 12-25    could not constitute a
          determination that the 
                                Gilday injunction, with its less restrictive
          language and scope, see infra p. 25, had been violated.
                                         11

          injunction, held that the DOC was precluded from contesting the
          meaning of the same state and federal wiretap statutes there
          involved without first obtaining a court order modifying the
          injunction. Once again we are unable to agree, as the     Langton
          panel decision is inapposite for several reasons. 
                    First, although the parties to a consent decree are bound
          by traditional preclusion principles and may not litigate claims
          necessarily resolved by the decree, see id. at 933-34, the Gilday
          injunction    unlike the Langton injunction    expressly provided
          that reported decisions authoritatively construing the relevant
          state and federal wiretap statutes (hereinafter: "authoritative
          decisions") were to control their future construction for all
          purposes material to the  Gilday injunction.   See supra pp. 3-4
          ("All [DOC agents] are enjoined permanently . . . from . . .
          endeavoring to intercept . . . any wire communication by or to
          [Gilday] . . . except as specifically permitted by these statutes
          . . . 
               as 
                  they have been construed or 
                                              may 
                                                  be 
                                                     construed 
                                                               in [authori-
          tative decisions]."). (Emphasis added.) Thus, the construction
          suggested by Gilday would ignore language expressly limiting the
          scope of the 
                      Gilday injunction.  See 
                                              Mackin v. 
                                                        City of Boston
                                                                      , 969
          F.2d 1273, 1277 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to construe consent
          decree so as to "overlook[] the language of the decree itself").
          See 
             also 
                  United States
                                v. 
                                   ITT Continental Baking Co.
                                                            , 420 U.S. 223,
          236-37 (1975) (construing consent decrees as contracts);  System-
          ized 
               of 
                  New 
                      England, 
                               Inc. v. SCM, 
                                            Inc., 732 F.2d 1030, 1034 (1st
          Cir. 1984) (noting that courts are to adopt constructions that
                                         12

          "give meaning and effect to every part of a contract and reject
          those which reduce words to mere surplusage"). Accordingly, the
          Gilday injunction did not preclude reliance on intervening authori-
          tative decisions construing the state and federal wiretap statutes.
          Instead, "construed as it is written," United 
                                                        States v. Armour 
                                                                          &
          Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971), the Gilday injunction, unlike the
          Langton injunction, plainly envisioned their consideration.
                    Second, although the  Langton panel majority concluded
          that the DOC had relinquished any right to litigate the meaning of
          these wiretap statutes as against the 
                                              Langton inmates, 
                                                               see 
                                                                   Langton,
          71 F.3d at 933-34, it did so because it believed those inmates
          otherwise would have 
                              gained 
                                     nothing 
                                                beyond a mere promise by the
          DOC to obey the law: 
                    The usually understood meaning of a Settlement
                    Stipulation is that each party is agreeing to
                    give up something    to yield on one or more
                    reasonably plausible contentions of law, or
                    fact, or mixed-law-fact issues. "[T]he agree-
                    ment reached normally embodies a compromise;
                    in exchange for the saving of cost and elimi-
                    nation of risk, the parties each give up
                    something they might have won had they pro-
                    ceeded with the litigation." When making an
                    agreement for a consent decree, the parties to
                    a case are agreeing not to press any of their
                    disputes to decision in court. The parties
                    forego "their right to litigate issues in-
                    volved in the case and thus save themselves
                    the time, expense and inevitable risk of liti-
                    gation."
                              
               The Langton injunction prohibited the DOC defendants from
          intercepting inmate wire communications except as specifically
          permitted by the federal and state wiretap statutes "as they have
          been 
              construed in reported decisions that 
                                                  are binding on this court
          or in the state courts of Massachusetts." Langton, 71 F.3d at 931
          (emphasis added).
                                         13

           
          Id. (quoting Armour 
                              & 
                                 Co., 402 U.S. at 681) (internal citation
          omitted).
                    On the other hand, in the present case the consent decree
          secured Gilday a substantial independent benefit unavailable to the
          Langton plaintiffs. As the district court recognized, Gilday had
          alleged in his 1974 action against the DOC that he was the target
          of two secret federal and state law enforcement efforts, directed
          by the FBI and code-named "STOP" and "GILROB," aimed at gathering
          information about his as-yet unapprehended accomplices in the
          Brighton bank robbery.   See supra p. 3. In securing the 1984
          consent decree, therefore, Gilday obtained permanent injunctive
          relief from any  DOC  participation in current or future wire-
          communication interceptions unlawfully directed against him by
          these state and federal law enforcement agencies    consideration
          unavailable to the 
                            Langton litigants. Accordingly, notwithstanding
          that the 
                  Gilday consent decree permitted the DOC to litigate future
          unresolved issues relating to the meaning of the applicable wiretap
          statutes, Gilday obtained substantial consideration for entering
          into the settlement with the DOC. Thus, the        Langton panel
          majority's concerns over a lack of meaningful consideration for the
          Langton plaintiffs' consent are not implicated to the same degree
          in the present context. 
                    Finally, the   Langton and    Gilday cases presented
          themselves in materially different ways on appeal. The    Langton
          panel was asked to review,  inter alia, a district court ruling
          denying a DOC petition to modify the Langton injunction.  See id.
                                         14

          at 931. On appeal, the DOC claimed that the district court had
          broadened the injunction impermissibly in favor of the    Langton
          inmates.  Id. at 933. The   Langton panel majority first decided
          that the parties had relinquished their respective rights to
          litigate the meaning of the wiretap statutes underlying the
          injunction, and then determined that no authoritative decision,
          existing at the time the Langton injunction issued, specifically
          supported the challenged MITS monitoring and recording practices.
                    Finally, the   Langton majority went on to survey
          subsequent decisional law, simply noting    without resolving the
          merits    that "reasonable [competing] arguments can be advanced"
          as to whether the challenged MITS monitoring and recording regime
          violated the federal wiretap statute. Id. at 935-37; see 
                                                                   also 
                                                                        id.
          at 940 ("Nor does the panel majority hold that the present regime
          is unlawful under the federal and state statutes but only that
          reasonable arguments can be made on both sides.") (Boudin, J.,
          dissenting) (emphasis in original). Thus, the   Langton majority
          simply decided that the DOC had failed to carry its burden of
          demonstrating any change in the law, or the facts, which would
          warrant modification of the injunction.      See  id. at 937-38
          (sustaining modification ruling as "appropriately tailored to the
          only changes in law or in fact disclosed on the record before the
          district court"). 
                    In the present case, on the other hand, Gilday alleges
          DOC violations of an injunction which expressly contemplates that
          authoritative decisions subsequent to the  Gilday injunction may
                                         15

          determine whether a violation has occurred.  See supra pp. 12-13.
          Moreover, since the 
                             Langton panel majority never reached the merits
          regarding the lawfulness of the MITS regime under either wiretap
          statute, see  supra p. 15, we may consider afresh whether the
          challenged MITS practices violate the 
                                               Gilday injunction. Finally,
          we are required to review the district court's summary judgment
          ruling against Gilday 
                               de 
                                  novo.  See 
                                            Velez-Gomez, 8 F.3d at 874-75. 
                    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the DOC is
          entitled to litigate the meaning of the applicable wiretap
          statutes. 
               3.   The Gilday Injunction
                    Gilday argues that the DOC defendants violated the 
                                                                     Gilday
          injunction by endeavoring to monitor and record his wire communica-
          tions in violation of the state and federal wiretap statutes. The
          linchpin in this argument is that no authoritative decision
          "specifically" construes either the federal or state wiretap
          statute to "permit" the inmate-telephone system established under
          the MITS. In other words, Gilday argues that the injunction is
          violated absent an authoritative decision validating either the
          MITS regime itself or substantially similar practices in a
          comparable prison context. At its most particular level, this
          contention would necessitate an authoritative decision declaring
          the challenged MITS practices compatible with the applicable
          wiretap statutes.
                    We test this contention against the language employed in
          the Gilday injunction, viewed in its unique litigation context,
                                         16

          including the particular circumstances surrounding its formation
          and the basic purposes it was designed to serve.         See  ITT
          Continental  
                      Baking  
                              Co., 420 U.S. at 238 (construing ambiguous
          language in consent decree in light of "the circumstances surround-
          ing [its] . . . formation");   see also  Massachusetts 
                                                                 Ass'n 
                                                                        for
          Retarded 
                   Citizens, 
                             Inc. v. King, 668 F.2d 602, 607-08 (1st Cir.
          1981) (construing consent decree in light of its language, the
          circumstances surrounding its formation, and its basic purposes);
          Cornelius v. 
                      Hogan, 663 F.2d 330, 333 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting that
          court construing ambiguous consent decree may "inquire into the
          parties' intent and the circumstances surrounding the decree in
          order to select the most reasonable interpretation"). 
                    As a preliminary matter it is necessary to note, however,
          that no violation of the injunction can be found unless Gilday
          first established an "interception," as defined under either the
          federal or Massachusetts wiretap statute, based on "clear and
          convincing evidence," 
                               Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16 (citation and quotation
          marks omitted).  See infra pp. 25-27, 29-30. Therefore, Gilday's
          insistent contention on appeal 
                                           that 
                                               no MITS practice can ever be
          allowed under the     Gilday injunction unless it has been
          "specifically permitted" beforehand by an authoritative decision 
                                                                           
          cannot succeed.
                    Moreover, even assuming Gilday were to demonstrate an
          "interception," the injunction expressly excepts from its reach any
          practice "specifically permitted" under the wiretap statutes as
          construed in authoritative decisions, see supra pp. 3-4, and the
                                         17

          term "specifically permitted" is susceptible to various reasonable
          interpretations.  On the one hand, "specifically permitted" may be
          read to require an authoritative decision that the MITS regime, 
                                                                         as
          applied directly to Gilday, comports with the applicable wiretap
          statutes.  See Webster's 
                                   Third 
                                         New 
                                             International 
                                                           Dictionary 2187
          (1986) (noting that term "specific" may connote restriction "to a
          particular individual"); see also Barnett 
                                                    Bank 
                                                         of 
                                                            Marion 
                                                                    County,
          N.A. v. Nelson,    
                              U.S.    
                                       ,    
                                            , 116 S. Ct. 1103, 1111 (1996)
          (noting that "'[s]pecifically' 
                                        can mean 'explicitly, particularly,
          [or] definitively'") (quoting 
                                       Black's Law Dictionary
                                                              1398 (6th ed.
          1990) (emphasis added)). Under such a reading, an authoritative
          decision would be unavailing to the DOC defendants unless it
          explicitly addressed the MITS monitoring and recording of wire
          communications involving Gilday. On the other hand, "specifically
          permitted" may contemplate simply an authoritative decision
          upholding interceptions involving some other DOC inmate or DOC
          inmates in general. See 
                                  Webster's Third New International Dictio-
          nary at 2187 (noting that "specific" may merely restrict to a
          particular situation). Under these interpretations, therefore,
          Gilday would need to demonstrate simply an absence of authoritative
          decisions specifically permitting the challenged MITS practices as
          applied directly to him or to similarly situated inmates.     See
                              
                Ambiguity is the "condition of being understood in more than
          one way."   Webster's  
                                 Third  
                                        New  
                                            International  
                                                           Dictionary 2187
          (1966); 
                 see 
                     also William Empson, 
                                          Seven Types of Ambiguity
                                                                  1 (2d ed.
          1966) (defining ambiguity as "any verbal nuance, however slight,
          which gives room for alternative reactions to the same piece of
          language"). 
                                         18

          Langton, 71 F.3d at 935-37 (noting no reported decision "holding
          that this type of prison telephone monitoring system" meets
          "consent" exception to federal wiretap statute).
                    Alternatively, at a more universal level, "specifically
          permitted" may simply contemplate an authoritative decision
          upholding the general types or kinds of monitoring and recording
          practices prescribed by the MITS, without regard to whether the
          practices were employed in a prison context.    See 2 
                                                                The 
                                                                     Oxford
          English Dictionary
                            2949 (Compact Ed. 1987) (defining "specifically"
          as "[i]n something of the same kind");  see also Webster's 
                                                                      Third
          New  
              International  
                             Dictionary at 2187 (defining "specific" as
          "constituting or falling into the category specified"); Webster's
          New  
              World  
                     Dictionary  
                                 of  
                                    American  
                                              English 1287 (3d ed. 1988)
          (defining "specific" as being "of a special, or particular, sort or
          kind"); Webster's  
                             Ninth  
                                   New  
                                        Collegiate  
                                                   Dictionary 1132 (1989)
          (defining "specific" as "sharing or being those properties of
          something that allow it to be referred to a particular category").
          Under the latter interpretation, of course, Gilday would need to
          demonstrate an absence of authoritative decisions vindicating the
          kinds of practices utilized under the MITS, without necessary
          regard to the exact context in which the practices were applied,
          thereby implicating any relevant authoritative decision addressing
          the applicable wiretap statutes. Thus, under the latter
          interpretation only 
                             unlawful MITS practices would be barred by the
                                         19

          Gilday injunction.  
                    Ambiguities in an injunctive decree are construed in the
          light most favorable to the alleged contemnor. See 
                                                             Kemp, 947 F.2d
          at 16; NBA 
                     Properties, 895 F.2d at 32; see also United 
                                                                 States v.
          O'Quinn, 913 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1990);  In re Baldwin-United
          Corp., 770 F.2d 328, 339 (2d Cir. 1985);    New 
                                                          York 
                                                               Tel. 
                                                                    Co. v.
          Communication Workers of America, 445 F.2d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 1971);
          Ford, 450 F.2d at 280; 11 C. Wright and A. Miller,        Federal
          Practice 
                   & 
                     Procedure:  
                                 Civil S 2955, at 310 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
          (same). For present purposes, therefore, the   Gilday injunction
          would be construed as banning only unlawful interceptions. 
                    The litigation context underlying the   Gilday consent
          decree likewise commends the latter construction.        See  ITT
          Continental  
                      Baking  
                              Co., 420 U.S. at 238 (construing ambiguous
          consent-decree language in light of "circumstances surrounding
          [its] formation . . ."); 
                                  see 
                                      also 
                                           King, 668 F.2d at 607 (similar).
          Throughout the district court action terminated by the consent
          decree, the DOC defendants steadfastly denied "monitoring,"
                              
                The latter construction is strongly suggested by other
          language in the  Gilday consent decree itself, which explicitly
          links its injunctive ban to the relevant federal and state wiretap
          statutes, thereby indicating that the ban was not meant to prohibit
          conduct lawful under the wiretap statutes themselves       either
          because the practice in question did not constitute an
          "interception" or it constituted a lawful "interception"      as
          construed in authoritative decisions, extant or forthcoming.  See
          Armour & Co.
                     , 
                       402 U.S. at 678-80 (construing particular provisions
          in light of other language in decree);  Brewster v. Dukakis, 687
          F.2d 495, 499 (1st Cir. 1982) (construing consent decree provision
          in relation to other language in decree);
                                                   
                                                   
                                                   United 
                                                          States 
                                                                 v. 
                                                                    City of
          Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1507-08 (11th Cir. 1993) (construing "consent
          decree as a whole"). 
                                         20

          "recording," or "intercepting" any wire communication involving
          Gilday. Thus, implicit in the stance taken by Gilday now is the
          suggestion that the DOC defendants impliedly conceded prior
          violations of the relevant wiretap statutes simply by entering into
          the stipulation of dismissal, whereas the record flatly contradicts
          any such concession. Instead, the stipulation of dismissal
          substantiates the view that the DOC defendants simply agreed to an
          injunction which required their compliance with the applicable
          federal and state law governing "interceptions."
                    Viewed in context, therefore, the Gilday consent decree
             entailing no resolution of the central dispute as to whether the
          DOC defendants ever "monitored" or "recorded," let alone "inter-
          cepted," any Gilday wire communication     is most harmoniously
          construed as an agreement that the DOC defendants were to refrain
          from any "interception" violative of either wiretap statute, as
                              
                The stipulation of dismissal stated: 
                    By entering into this stipulation, these
                    [signatory] defendants do not admit, but rath-
                    er, generally deny that they have ever violat-
                    ed the plaintiff's rights under . . . the
                    federal wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. S 2150
                    et seq., [and] the state wiretapping statute,
                    M.G.L. c. 272, SS 99 et seq. . . . as alleged
                    by the plaintiff. The 
                                          defendants 
                                                     specifically
                    deny that any  of them, or anyone acting in
                    concert with any of them, ever intercepted or
                    monitored 
                             any 
                                 of 
                                    the 
                                        plaintiff's 
                                                    wire 
                                                         communi-
                    cations 
                           by 
                              any 
                                  means, 
                                         lawful 
                                                or 
                                                   unlawful . . .
                    .
          See Settlement Stipulation: Claims Against Defendants Fair, Vose,
          Hall and Callahan, Gilday v. Fair, et al., Civ. A. No. 74-4169-C
          (emphasis added).
                                         21

          determined under 
                          either 
                                 existing 
                                         or 
                                            future authoritative decisions.
          That is to say, the Gilday consent decree bans only unlawful DOC
          monitoring and recording practices.  See Settlement Stipulation:
          Claims Against Defendants Fair, Vose, Hall and Callahan, 
                                                                  Gilday v.
          Fair, et al., Civ. A. No. 74-4169-C, discussed supra pp. 20-21 &
          n.12; see also supra pp. 3-4.
                    The suggested construction comports with the    Langton
          panel majority opinion as well, which held that the 
                                                            Langton injunc-
          tion banned any "interception" absent "a specific court order or
          legislative authorization to do so, except as specifically
          permitted by these statutes, . . . as they have been construed in
          reported decisions that are binding in this Court or in the state
          courts of Massachusetts."    Langton, 71 F.3d at 931 (emphasis
          added). Thus, the Langton panel majority reasoned that the consent
          decree was to be construed as requiring the DOC defendants to
          refrain, 
                  in 
                     perpetuity, 
                                 from 
                                      contesting 
                                                the 
                                                    meaning 
                                                            of 
                                                               the 
                                                                   relevant
          state and  federal wiretap  statutes "as construed in reported
          decisions that [were] binding in [the federal district court] or in
          the state courts of Massachusetts"    at  the  time  the  Langton
          injunction was entered, see id. at 931, 933-35, as distinguished
          from merely requiring the DOC defendants to refrain from unlawful
          interceptions. As the  Langton panel majority viewed the matter,
          any other approach threatened to render the terms of the  Langton
          injunction "illusory    stating nothing beyond what was already
          forbidden by law 
                          before 
                                 the 
                                     Permanent 
                                              Injunction 
                                                         was 
                                                             entered."  Id.
          at 933 (emphasis added); but see id. at 940 (Boudin, J., dissent-
                                         22

          ing); see also supra pp. 13-14.
                    The panel majority relied as well on the final section in
          the 
             Langton injunction, which stated in terms similar to the 
                                                                     Gilday
          injunction, see supra p. 4, that the injunction "shall not of its
          own force affect the rights of inmates of the Department other than
          William Langton and David LeBlanc."  See Langton, 71 F.3d at 933.
          It reasoned that had the DOC promised merely to obey the law, no
          purpose would have been served by the quoted provision.  See id.
                    Once again, however, the two cases presented themselves
          on appeal in materially different postures. First, as discussed
          supra pp. 14-16, the repeated observation by the   Langton panel
          majority, see Langton, 71 F.3d at 933-37    that no then-existing
          authoritative decision specifically permitted the challenged MITS
          practices and that the 
                                Langton decree would be rendered meaningless
          were it to be construed as a mere promise to obey the law     is
          inapposite to the instant context. That is, central to the present
          analysis is the explicit language in the 
                                                 Gilday injunction ("or 
                                                                        may
          be construed in reported decisions"),  see  supra p. 4 (emphasis
          added)    nowhere to be found in the  Langton injunction, see 71
          F.3d at 931    which in no sense purports to prohibit either (i)
          these parties from litigating open questions as to the meaning of
          the applicable wiretap statutes, or (ii) our consideration of later
          authoritative decisions upholding monitoring and recording
          practices of the kind prescribed by the MITS, 
                                                       see 
                                                           infra pp. 45-48.
          Second, since the settlement stipulation and the consent decree in
          Gilday were entered into while the parties in Langton were still
                                         23

          litigating the initial action which led to the 
                                                        Langton injunction,
          paragraph 3 in the   Gilday injunction ( viz., "[t]his Permanent
          Injunction . . . shall not . . . affect the rights of inmates other
          than William Gilday[,]") served the discrete purpose of not
          disturbing the rights of the Langton inmates whose initial action
          against the DOC was to remain in litigation for two months after
          the consent decree was entered in Gilday.
                    Accordingly, unlike the corresponding provision in the
          Langton injunction, paragraph 3 in the     Gilday injunction is
          entirely consistent with the view that the 
                                                   Gilday injunction simply
          contemplates that the DOC not violate the applicable wiretap
          statutes. For these reasons we conclude, notwithstanding their
          similarities, that the  Gilday injunction is substantially less
          restrictive in scope than the   Langton injunction, in that it
          unambiguously enjoins only   unlawful recording and monitoring
          practices by the DOC.
                              
                The 
                   Gilday injunction was entered on September 12, 1984; the
          Langton injunction, on November 16, 1984.
                It is noteworthy as well that the complaint in the action
          which gave rise to the Gilday injunction alleged that Gilday "has
          never consented, nor upon information and belief has any person
          with whom he communicated consented, that wire communications to or
          from him be intercepted or monitored in any way." Second Amended
          Complaint, Gilday v. Webster, 
                                        et 
                                           al., No. 74-4169-C. The Gilday
          complaint in the present action indicates that his concern in the
          former action was not with   all interceptions of his telephone
          calls, however, but only with interceptions unlawful under the
          applicable wiretap statutes because allegedly conducted without the
          requisite consent. Thus, the more narrow concern reflected in the
          present complaint comports with the view that the Gilday settlement
          stipulation and consent decree were meant to ban only    unlawful
          interceptions. 
                                         24

                    A.   The Massachusetts Wiretap Act
                    We must now consider whether Gilday demonstrated by
          "clear and convincing evidence," Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16, that the
          challenged MITS practices constitute unlawful interceptions under
          the applicable wiretap statutes, beginning with the Massachusetts
          Wiretap Act, bearing in mind that it was for Gilday to show that
          the DOC defendants "violated a clear and unambiguous order that
          left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was to be expected"
          and that the defendants were "'able to ascertain from the four
          corners of the order precisely what acts are forbidden.'"  Id. at
          17 (quoting Drywall 
                              Tapers, 889 F.2d at 395). First, we inquire
          whether the monitoring, recording, and call "detailing" practices
          prescribed by the MITS Regulations are "interceptions" under the
          Massachusetts Wiretap Act, Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(4).
          Second, should Gilday successfully surmount the first hurdle, we
          determine whether any such interpretation is nevertheless permitted
          under any authoritative decision binding on the federal district
          court. Finally, we conclude that Gilday failed to prove either
          that the monitoring and recording practices conducted pursuant to
          the MITS constitute "interceptions" under the Massachusetts Wiretap
          Act, or that the MITS call "detailing" practices were clearly
          prohibited under the Gilday injunction.
                    1.   Monitoring and Recording
                    We begin by noting that the Gilday injunction prohibits
          only "interceptions" under the applicable statutes and not call
          monitoring, recording, or "detailing" 
                                               per 
                                                   se. The term "intercep-
                                         25

          tion," as used in the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, "means to 
                                                                   secretly
          hear, 
               secretly record, or aid another to 
                                                  secretly hear or 
                                                                   secretly
          record, the contents of any wire or oral communication through the
          use of any intercepting device . . . ." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S
          99(B)(4) (emphasis added).
                    The Massachusetts courts have interpreted this "secrecy"
          requirement literally.  See  Commonwealth v. Jackson, 349 N.E.2d
          337, 339-40 (Mass. 1976) (holding that secrecy is essential to
          establishing a violation of Massachusetts Wiretap Act); see  also
          District Attorney v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 399 N.E.2d 866,
          869 (Mass. 1980) (stating that 
                                       secret recordation of incoming calls
          violates Massachusetts Wiretap Act). A secretive interception
          occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act unless both parties to
          a wire "communication" had "actual knowledge" of the
          "interception," 
                         see, 
                              e.g., 
                                    Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340, which may be
          established by evidence that the parties were informed that their
          conversation was being intercepted, or by "clear and unequivocal
          objective manifestations of knowledge . . . sufficiently probative
          of a person's state of mind as to allow an inference of knowledge."
          Id.
                    As the district court correctly concluded, the recording
          and monitoring practices at issue here were in no sense
          surreptitious. Inmates are informed in advance, both by the MITS
          Regulations 
                        a matter of public record 
                                                     and the individualized
          PIN Request Form advisory as well, that their MITS calls will be
          monitored and recorded. Moreover, inmates are reminded by stickers
                                         26

          affixed to each phone that all non-attorney calls are subject to
          the monitoring and recording practices prescribed by the MITS
          Regulations. Finally, a prerecorded message informs  both parties
             before the parties can communicate    that all call "contents"
          will be recorded.
                    Against this backdrop, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
          Court ("SJC") has decided that even inmates who "have not consented
          to the [MITS] monitoring and recording"       such as Gilday     
          nonetheless have been "made aware of the procedure and its require-
          ments."  Cacicio v. Secretary of Public Safety, 665 N.E.2d 85, 91
          (Mass. 1996) (rejecting constitutional challenge to MITS
          Regulations). Therefore, the SJC held, "[t]he [MITS] monitoring
          and recording is not surreptitious in any sense."  Id.
                    Accordingly, we now hold that whatever recording and
          monitoring of oral communications takes place under the MITS regime
          does not constitute an "interception" under the Massachusetts
          Wiretap Act, as it is not secretly conducted.   See Jackson, 349
          N.E.2d at 339 (non-secret recordings not "interceptions" under
          Massachusetts Wiretap Act). 
                    2.   Call "Detailing"
                    The Massachusetts Wiretap Act defines the term
          "interception" as a secret acquisition of "the contents of any wire
                              
                The SJC did not differentiate between recording of contents
          and recording of billing-related features (  i.e., "detailing").
          Instead, 
                  Cacicio simply described the prerecorded message as notice
          to the inmate and the person called that the call would be recorded
          in its entirety.  See Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 88.
                                         27

          or oral communication 
                               through 
                                       the 
                                           use 
                                               of 
                                                  any 
                                                      intercepting 
                                                                   device .
          . . ." Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(4) (emphasis added).
          Elsewhere the statute explicitly excepts certain telephone
          equipment from its definition of "intercepting device":
                    The term "intercepting device" means any
                    device or apparatus which is capable of . . .
                    recording a wire or oral communication . . .
                    other than any telephone or telegraph
                    instrument, equipment, facility, or a
                    component thereof . . . being used by a
                    communications common carrier in the ordinary
                    course of its business.
            
          Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(3)(b). Thus, no "interception"
          occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act if the device used to
          acquire the contents of a wire communication comes within the ambit
          of the "telephone equipment" exception.  
                    The MITS employs a sophisticated network of computers and
          associated telephone equipment, including "controller boards"    
          electronic call processing devices attached to each prison
          telephone 
                      supplied, installed, and maintained by NET.  The NET
          equipment automatically screens approved outside telephone numbers
          from unapproved numbers, routes inmate calls to approved telephone
          numbers outside the prison, plays the prerecorded message to both
          parties, and identifies calls placed to listed attorneys so as to
                              
                The SJC has held that a device which records information
          relating to the identity of the parties to a call or the existence
          of a wire communication, records the "contents of [a] wire . . .
          communication."   District  
                                     Attorney  
                                               for  
                                                    Plymouth  
                                                             Dist. v.   New
          England 
                  Tel. 
                       & 
                         Tel. 
                              Co., 399 N.E.2d 866 (Mass. 1980), discussed
          infra pp. 33-35.
                NET procures the telephone equipment from AT&T and Telematic
          Corporation under various subcontracts.
                                         28

          preclude their monitoring and recordation. All call "detail" is
          recorded automatically by the NET telephone equipment in order to
          generate billing reports and safeguard the NET equipment against
          fraudulent use by inmates (  i.e.,  inter alia, unapproved long
          distance and collect calls).
                    The monthly revenue statements NET provides under its
          contract with the DOC reflect "detail" on all inmate calls placed,
          including the number dialed, the length of the call, and other
          billing-related and revenue-related information. In addition, the
          NET site administrator at each prison facility regularly generates
          a so-called "Fraud Report," listing all outside telephone numbers
          to which the total number of calls placed by inmates within the
          reporting period exceeded a specified level. The Fraud Report is
          forwarded to NET and the DOC for use in investigating fraudulent
          telephone usage.
                              
                The MITS is similar to the telephone systems utilized by the
          Bureau of Prisons, as well as in certain state prisons such as New
          York and Tennessee.   See Bender Aff. q 6. However, the MITS
          utilizes devices far more sophisticated than the "in-house" devices
          generally considered by this court or the Massachusetts courts.
          See, 
              e.g., 
                    Williams v. 
                                Poulos, 11 F.3d 271, 275-76 (1st Cir. 1993)
          (involving "custom made" system consisting of "small alligator
          clips" and a VCR attached to a microphone cable);  Griggs-Ryan v.
          Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 114 (1st Cir. 1990) (involving recording
          device attached by landlady to extension telephone); Jackson, 349
          N.E.2d at 338 (involving cassette recorder microphone attached to
          earpiece in telephone receiver).
                Among the abuses the MITS is designed to stop are so-called
          "third-party" calls placed by inmates to large outside
          establishments through which the inmate can request another 
                                                                    outside
          line, then place a long-distance call at the expense of the
          establishment whose number the inmate called in the first instance.
          See, e.g., supra note 4.
                                         29

                    Within the above-described evidentiary framework, we now
          inquire whether the MITS call "detailing" conducted by NET is
          excepted from the Massachusetts Wiretap Act definition of
          "intercepting device" in S 99(B)(3)(b).    See  supra pp. 28-29.
          First, we note that NET is a "communication common carrier" within
          the contemplation of S 99(B)(3).      See District  
                                                              Attorney  
                                                                        For
          Plymouth 
                   Dist. v.  Coffey, 434 N.E.2d 1276, 1280 (Mass. 1982).
          Second, Gilday does not contend that the processor computers and
          controller boards used by NET for billing-related purposes are not
          "equipment . . . being used in the ordinary course of [NET's]
          business."  See Reply Brief for the Plaintiff, Appellant at 6 n.8
          ("Gilday does not argue that NET is precluded from using call
          detail for billing purposes."). Nor does any authoritative
          decision suggest that a communication common carrier which
          "details" calls in order to generate billing reports or protect its
          equipment from fraudulent abuse, does not do so in the ordinary
          course of its business.  Thus, Gilday has not demonstrated by
          "clear and convincing" evidence, 
                                          see 
                                              Kemp, 947 F.2d at 16, that any
                              
                We have construed the Federal Wiretap Act, which the
          Massachusetts statute tracked, see  Commonwealth v. Vitello, 327
          N.E.2d 819, 836 (1975), as conferring a "statutory right" upon a
          communication common carrier to intercept wire communications in
          order to protect its rights and property interests. United States
          v. 
            Pervaz, --- F.3d ---, ---, 1997 WL 336208, *5 (1st Cir.) (R.I.)
          (construing 18 U.S.C. S 2511(2)(a)(i), which permits an employee of
          a wire communication services provider whose facilities are used in
          transmission of wire or electronic communication, "to intercept,
          disclose, or use that communication in the normal course of his
          employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary
          incident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of
          the rights or property of the provider of that service").
                                         30

          call "detailing" conducted by NET for its own billing-related
          purposes falls outside the S 99(B)(3)(b) exception for equipment
          used by it "in the ordinary course of its business." Accordingly,
          no "interception" occurs under the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, at
          least by reason of the billing-related "detailing" conducted by
          NET.  
                    Gilday nonetheless insists, however, that the injunction
          precludes the DOC  defendants from acquiring access to any call
          "detail" information and that NET therefore may not aid and abet
          the DOC by affording access.     See Reply Brief for Plaintiff,
          Appellant at 6 n.8. Under the Regulations and the MITS "Procedural
          Statement" 
                       a DOC operations guideline which supplements the MITS
          Regulations 
                        authorized DOC officers may request both "standard"
          and "custom" call "detail" reports from NET personnel         for
          investigative  
                        purposes, or, after receiving training from NET
          personnel, print out such call "detail" reports themselves.
          Moreover, these "standard" reports may, at the DOC's option, be
          configured to provide call "detail" relating to an individual
          inmate's PIN, a particular group of inmate PINs, specific prison
          telephones used to place calls, or particular telephone numbers
          dialed. Finally, since the record discloses no limitation on the
          domain reserved for the so-called "custom" reports, we assume, at
                              
                Although the record is unclear as to what, if any, role AT&T
             as NET's subcontractor     performs in call "detailing," our
          analysis of the NET role in call "detailing,"   supra pp. 27-30,
          appears equally applicable to AT&T, which is a communication common
          carrier as well.  See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(3)(b).
                                         31

          the summary judgment stage, 
                                     see 
                                         Velez-Gomez, 8 F.3d at 874-75, that
          NET is obligated to provide the DOC with any and all call "detail"
          requested. Notwithstanding its advantageous summary judgment
          posture, however, the Gilday call "detailing" claim fails in
          relation to the DOC defendants as well. 
                    Gilday claims that the DOC violates the injunctive ban
          against "intercepting" or "endeavoring to intercept" his wire
          communications, see supra pp. 3-4, simply by applying the MITS
          requirements to him; in particular, by making     his consent a
          prerequisite to utilizing the MITS. The claim is premised on
          several rationales: first, the MITS requirements cannot be applied
          to 
            him, since the 
                           Gilday injunction bans all "interceptions" of his
          calls, absent a relevant court order, legislative authorization, or
          authoritative decision specifically permitting the challenged MITS
          practices in their prison context; second, since    he has never
          consented to the MITS regime, DOC call "detailing" cannot meet the
          "two party consent exception" under Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S
          99(B)(4), even assuming consent by the party called;  and third,
          even assuming he were found to have given implicit consent by
          utilizing the MITS, the injunctive ban on "interceptions" is
          infringed by DOC call "detailing," because it secretly records the
          outside number dialed by the inmate before the other party can
                              
                Section 99(B)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that the "term
          interception means to secretly hear, secretly record, or aid
          another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any
          wire or oral communication . . . by any person other than a person
          given prior authority by all parties to such communication." Mass.
          Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(4).
                                         32

          consent; for example, should the outside phone not be answered.
          All these contentions likewise fail.
                    As with monitoring and recording, see supra pp. 25-27,
          virtually all call "detailing" conducted under the MITS regime is
          thoroughly advertised. In addition to the MITS Regulations, the
          "Number Request Form" itself discloses that all inmate calls are
          subject to call "detailing." Moreover, the recorded message heard
          both by the inmate and the call recipient advises that their entire
          conversation and all "call detail" will be recorded. Thus,
          whatever "detailing" occurs 
                                     after the call recipient is so advised
          by the recorded message comports with the Massachusetts Wiretap
          Act, as both parties have been fully informed in advance that their
          entire oral communication, as well as all "call detail," will be
          recorded.  See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 339 (non-secret recordings
          not "interceptions" under Massachusetts Wiretap Act). 
                    At summary judgment, however, Gilday proffered unrebutted
          evidence that the outside number dialed by the inmate is recorded
          before the call is answered; in other words, before the prerecorded
          message announcing the MITS monitoring/recording regime has been
          heard by the party who answers the call. Thus, the number called
          by the inmate will have been subjected to call "detailing," whether
          or not the party called answers the phone or withholds "consent" to
          the MITS recording and call "detailing" procedure subsequently
          announced in the prerecorded message.  Gilday therefore contends
                              
                On appeal, AT&T vigorously disputes that any such "secret"
          call detailing occurs in these circumstances. Nevertheless, none
                                         33

          that defendants violate the injunction by "endeavoring" to record
          call "detail" during the 
                                  interim between the dialing of the outside
          number by the inmate and before the call can be answered and
          accepted    what we shall refer to as "interim call detailing."
                    Gilday relies heavily on a line of SJC decisions,  see,
          e.g., District 
                         Attorney 
                                  for 
                                      Plymouth 
                                               Dist. v. New 
                                                            England 
                                                                    Tel. 
                                                                          &
          Tel.  
               Co., 399 N.E.2d 866 (Mass. 1980), treating with "pen
          registers" and "call traps," telephone equipment consisting of
          electronic devices which surreptitiously record, respectively, the
          number called or the number from which an incoming call was placed.
          These authoritative decisions hold that such electronic devices do
          record call "contents," within the meaning of the Massachusetts
          Wiretap Act, since they acquire "'information concerning the
          identity of the parties to such communication or the existence . .
          . of that communication.'"  Id. at 869 (quoting Mass. Gen. L. ch.
          272, S 99(B)(5)). Thus, "[e]ven if the call is not completed, the
          caller has initiated a wire communication . . . which is intended
          to cause . . . [the call recipient's] telephone to ring and the
          existence of that communication is recorded by an intercepting
                              
          of the defendants challenged Gilday's proffer in their opposition
          to summary judgment, as required by Mass. D. Ct. Local Rule 56: 
                    Material facts of record set forth in the
                    statement required to be served by the moving
                    party will be deemed for purposes of the
                    motion to be admitted by opposing parties
                    unless controverted by the statement required
                    to be served by opposing parties.
          Consequently, we credit Gilday's assertion for summary judgment
          purposes.  See Carreiro v. Rhodes Gill & Co., Ltd., 68 F.3d 1443,
          1446 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1995).
                                         34

          device." Id. Be this as it may, however, it gains Gilday nothing.
                    First of all, it is important to note that the SJC's
          definition of "wire communication," 
                                             see 
                                                id., would not encompass an
          attempt by an inmate to call a number not on the preapproved MITS
          list, since the MITS regime automatically prevents such calls from
          getting past its "host processors," the computers which control the
          outflow of inmate calls from the prison. Consequently, inmate
          attempts to dial numbers not approved under the MITS regime cannot
          cause an outside telephone to ring, because the call cannot be
          connected to the point of reception. Accordingly, there can have
          been no "wire communication," which is defined as "any
          communication . . . by the aid of wire, cable or other like
          connection 
                    between 
                            the 
                                point 
                                      of 
                                         origin 
                                               and 
                                                   the 
                                                       point 
                                                             of 
                                                                reception."
          Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(1). (Emphasis added.) Second,
          should an inmate initiate a call through the MITS regime, he will
          already have completed the "Number Request Form," thereby 
                                                                  divulging
          in advance to the DOC        the very entity which previously
          advertised its intention to monitor and record all outgoing inmate
          calls to nonattorneys 
                                  both 
                                       the 
                                          telephone 
                                                    number 
                                                           and 
                                                               the 
                                                                   name 
                                                                        and
          relationship of the family member or  friend to whom the call  is
          directed.   See supra p. 6. Third, no reported Massachusetts
          decision has ever involved sufficiently similar circumstances so as
          to constitute an authoritative decision that call "detailing" in
          the present context is unlawful. 
                                          Cf., 
                                               e.g., 
                                                     Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at
          338-40 (discussing residential telephone subscriber's interceptions
          of incoming calls to ascertain calling number and identity of
                                         35

          unknown caller); District Attorney For Plymouth Dist., 399 N.E.2d
          at 867, 869-70 (discussing judicial power to compel telephone
          company, pursuant to warrant, to assist installation of cross-
          frame-unit trap on particular telephone line in order to record
          telephone numbers from which incoming calls were made in
          circumstances where callers' numbers and identities had 
                                                                not already
          been divulged by callers in advance); New England Tel. & Tel. Co.
          v. 
            District Attorney For Norfolk Dist.
                                               , 373 N.E.2d 960, 962 (Mass.
          1978) (discussing judicial power to order telephone company to
          assist installation of pen register to determine telephone numbers
          dialed from particular phone); 
                                        District Attorney For Plymouth Dist.
          v.  Coffey, 434 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Mass. 1982) (discussing
          warrantless interception by telephone company of calls to
          residential line to ascertain previously unknown telephone numbers
          from which incoming, harassing telephone calls were being made). 
                    Furthermore, Gilday has never alleged an  intention to
          call a telephone number or party not listed by him on the required
          MITS "Number Request Form," see supra p. 6, even assuming he were
          to elect to utilize the MITS. Instead, since there can be no
          secretive acquisition of information already provided to the DOC,
          see 
             supra pp. 25-27 (noting that "secretive" interceptions presume
          lack of knowledge), Gilday simply assumes, sub silentio, that any
          putative number(s) and person(s) he might call would not already
                              
                In another case, the SJC declined to address a claim that the
          MITS violates the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, as it had not been
          raised below.  See Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 89 n.9. 
                                         36

          have been known to the DOC before the call was placed. Absent
          evidence on this critical point, however, there can have been no
          prima  facie showing that any surreptitious or secretive
          "interception" would occur, let alone did occur, within the meaning
          of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act.  See Jackson, 349 N.E.2d at 340
          (holding that a secretive "interception" has occurred unless both
          parties to the call had "actual knowledge" of the intrusion). In
          all events, as noted above, see  supra pp. 34-35, were Gilday to
          continue to withhold consent but attempt to place a call      or
          consent, yet attempt to call a number not previously approved by
          the DOC 
                    the MITS computers would screen out the attempted call.
          Thus, under Massachusetts law, no "wire communication" could occur.
          See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 272, S 99(B)(1) (defining "wire
          communication" as any "connection between the point of origin and
          the point  of reception") (emphasis added);   see  also  District
          Attorney 
                   for 
                       Plymouth 
                                Dist. v. New 
                                              England 
                                                      Tel. 
                                                           & 
                                                             Tel. 
                                                                  Co., 399
          N.E.2d 866, 869 (Mass. 1980).
                              
                Although Gilday argues on appeal that interim call
          "detailing" would violate the Massachusetts Wiretap Act because it
          would record inmate attempts to call telephone numbers not listed
          on their respective Number Request Forms    i.e., that MITS call
          "detailing" takes place even though the inmate calls a party not on
          the Number Request Form, hence not already known to the DOC    he
          has never alleged an intention to make such calls       i.e., to
          circumvent the requirements of the MITS 
                                                   even assuming he were to
          participate in it. Thus, the present attempt to hypothesize an
          abstract interim call "detailing" violation raises no justiciable
          case or controversy, as the injunction simply prohibits the DOC
          from intercepting or endeavoring to intercept any wire
          communication by Gilday.   See Pacific 
                                                 Gas 
                                                     & 
                                                        Elec. 
                                                              Co. v.  State
          Energy 
                 Resources 
                           Conservation 
                                        and 
                                            Dev. 
                                                 Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203
          (1983) (declining on Article III ripeness grounds to consider
          constitutionality of California law allowing State to block
                                         37

                    In conclusion, any attempt to dial a number not
          previously disclosed by an inmate on the Number Request Form: (i)
          results in no "wire communication" to the person called, as it
          cannot proceed beyond the prison,  see supra p. 34-35; and (ii)
          voluntarily discloses to the DOC the number called, without any
          "wire communication" having taken place. Thus, interim call
          "detailing" under the MITS regime is neither "secretive" within the
          meaning of the Massachusetts Wiretap Act, nor an "interception"
          within the scope of the   Gilday injunction. Accordingly, the
          district court supportably determined that the challenged MITS
          practices did not violate the Massachusetts-law component in the
          Gilday injunction.
                    Moreover, there is no basis for the conclusory contention
          that the  Gilday injunction is violated simply by the MITS
          regulatory requirement that he, like any other inmate, consent to
          the MITS regime, including call "detailing," as a prerequisite to
          utilizing the MITS       hence, that the consent requirement
          constitutes a coercive    endeavor to intercept Gilday's wire
          communications in violation of the injunction.  See supra pp. 31-
          32. First, its unstated premise that Gilday is entitled to utilize
          prison phones even though he withholds consent is groundless. As
          a prison inmate, Gilday can identify no federal or state right   
                              
          construction of nuclear power plants lacking adequate storage
          capacity for spent nuclear fuel, because the Court "cannot know" if
          State "will ever find a nuclear plant's storage capacity to be
          inadequate");  Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, 903 F.2d 845, 847-48
          (1st Cir. 1990) (refusing on Article III ripeness grounds to
          address claim based on abstract injury "that may not occur as
          anticipated or may not occur at all").
                                         38

          constitutional or otherwise 
                                        to utilize a prison phone on his own
          terms. See, 
                      e.g., 
                            Washington v. 
                                          Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1100 (6th Cir.
          1994) (stating that "a prisoner's right to telephone access is
          'subject to rational limitations in the face of legitimate security
          interests of the penal institution'") (quoting Strandberg v. City
          of Helena, 791 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1986))); see also Feely v.
          Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 374 (1st Cir. 1978) (stating that the right
          of pretrial detainees to make telephone calls, while "not free from
          doubt[,]" is subject to reasonable restrictions);   Cacicio, 665
          N.E.2d at 92 (upholding MITS limitations on inmate telephone access
          as constitutional, and citing  Bellamy v. McMickens, 692 F.Supp.
          205, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), for the proposition that prisoners have
          no right to unrestricted telephone use). Second, the       Gilday
          injunction does not purport to ban call "detailing" lawfully
          conducted under federal and state law. See 
                                                     supra pps. 3-4, 20-25.
          And since MITS call "detailing" cannot occur absent inmate consent
             a prerequisite to access to the MITS, see supra pp. 6-7    the
          very least that can be said is that there is no  clearly-defined,
          see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17, "interception" under either federal or
          state law, see supra pp. 34-37; infra pp. 45-48. Third, the verb
          "endeavor," meaning "to work with set purpose," or "make an effort"
          to accomplish a particular purpose,    see  Webster's  
                                                                 Third  
                                                                        New
          International Dictionary
                                  748 (1986) 
                                                here, allegedly, to conduct
          unlawful interceptions of Gilday's wire communications    cannot
          bear the weight he places on it. Given the uncontroverted evidence
          that extensive inmate fraud and criminal activity necessitated the
                                         39

          MITS,  see  supra p. 4, Gilday cannot demonstrate that the
          establishment of the MITS    universally available exclusively to
          inmates 
                 who 
                     consent 
                             to 
                                its 
                                    terms (
                                          including 
                                                    Gilday, should he elect
          to participate)    constituted an "endeavor" to "detail" Gilday's
          telephone calls unlawfully, and thus constituted a clear violation
          of the Gilday injunction, see Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17.
                    Once again we emphasize the obvious simply because it is
          so consistently elided by Gilday, both below and on appeal: The
          Gilday injunction grants Gilday 
                                         no 
                                            right 
                                                  or 
                                                     privilege 
                                                               to 
                                                                  place 
                                                                        any
          telephone call, nor has Gilday cited any authoritative decision
          indicating that conditioning prison-telephone utilization on
          informed prisoner consent to reasonable prison-security safeguards
          violates a federal or state right.   See Langton, 71 F.3d at 936
          (stating: "at the least, grounds exist for genuine dispute" about
          whether DOC "defendants are authorized by law" to require prisoner
          consent to MITS regime) (citing 
                                         Griggs-Ryan v. 
                                                        Smith, 904 F.2d 112
          (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that "implied consent" is inferred from
          circumstances indicating that party knowingly agreed to
          surveillance)); see also Washington, 35 F.3d at 1100 (prison may
          impose rational limits on inmate telephone access, including
          subjecting inmates to MITS-type system);  Strandberg, 791 F.2d at
          747 (prisoner's right to telephone access subject to reasonable
          restrictions); 
                        Feely, 570 F.2d at 374 (right of pretrial detainees
          to place telephone calls is subject to reasonable restrictions);
          Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at 90 (upholding MITS as reasonable security
          measure). But 
                        cf. 
                            United States
                                          v. 
                                            Cheely, 814 F.Supp. 1430, 1443-
                                         40

          44 (D. Alaska 1992) (rejecting argument that prison may deem
          consent implied in situations where inmate must consent to terms in
          order to place calls, but finding surveillance of prison phones "a
          necessary price for prison security"),  aff'd, 36 F.3d 1439 (9th
          Cir. 1994).
                    In sum, the 
                               Gilday injunction does not purport to entitle
          Gilday to utilize the MITS without acceding to lawful restrictions
          founded upon reasonable prison-security measures. Furthermore,
          inmates who voluntarily withhold their consent retain their
          constitutional right to communicate with their attorneys (and with
          family and friends) through prison visitations and the mail. Thus,
          it is unfounded supposition to suggest that the DOC has
          "endeavored" to do anything other than afford inmates the
          opportunity to utilize the MITS, subject to reasonable restrictions
          designed to preclude fraud, crime, and misuse of the prison
          telephone system. Accordingly, the claim that the DOC is
          "endeavoring" to "detail" Gilday's telephone calls in violation of
          the Gilday injunction fails.
                              
                We note that the Gilday call "detailing" contention is
          problematic in another important respect, since Mass. Gen. L. ch.
          272, S 99(B)(3)(a), excepts from its definition of the term
          "intercepting device" any device or apparatus "furnished to a
          subscriber or user by a communications common carrier in the
          ordinary course of its business under its tariff and being used by
          the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business."
          The SJC has indicated that institutional efforts to ensure security
          constitute activities in the "ordinary course of business" for S
          99(B)(3)(a) purposes. See 
                                    Crosland v. 
                                                Horgan, 516 N.E.2d 147, 150
          (Mass. 1987) (stating that preservation of security may be viewed
          as within hospital's "ordinary course of business"). Similarly,
          the SJC has stated that maintenance of security is "an essential
          incident to the business of a prison."   Id. (dicta) (describing
                                         41

                     Finally, even assuming, arguendo, that Gilday were to
          overcome all other hurdles,  in fine his call "detailing" claim
          engenders substantial justiciability concerns not addressed by the
          parties. Article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution
          confines federal court jurisdiction to actual "cases" and
          "controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, S 2. Article III was
          designed to ensure that federal courts decide only disputes of "a
          Judiciary nature," M. Farrand, 2 Records of the Federal Convention
          of 
             1787, at 430 (1911), thereby prohibiting advisory opinions,
          Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968). In order to satisfy the
          "case or controversy" requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate
          "'a personal stake in the outcome[,]'"   City 
                                                         of 
                                                            Los 
                                                                Angeles v.
          Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (quoting  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
          186, 204 (1962)), and the complaint must present a controversy
          neither "conjectural [n]or hypothetical," but both "real and
          immediate," see id. at 102, without regard to the type of relief
                              
          purport of 
                    Campiti v. 
                               Walonis, 453 F.Supp. 819, 822 (D.Mass. 1978),
          aff'd, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979)). Perhaps most significantly,
          in response to a constitutional challenge the SJC has held that the
          MITS serves "the legitimate purpose of improving the security of
          the Massachusetts correctional system" by acting as a "deterrent
          against improper use" of prison telephones. 
                                                     Cacicio, 665 N.E.2d at
          90.
               Thus, it can be concluded, with considerable confidence in our
          judgment, that the issue as to whether corrections officials may
          intercept MITS calls in the "ordinary course of [prison] business,"
          under the protection of S 99(B)(3)(a), is     at the  very  least
          reasonably debatable, and, therefore, that Gilday's contention
          comes a cropper. See 
                               Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17 (stating that injunction
          must leave "no reasonable doubt" what conduct is prohibited); see
          also Langton, 71 F.3d at 936 (finding "reasonably debatable" the
          issue as to whether MITS monitoring comes within the "ordinary
          course of business of a law enforcement officer" as defined by
          Federal Wiretap Act).
                                         42

          sought, 
                 see 
                     Skelly Oil
                                v. 
                                   Phillips Petroleum Co.
                                                        , 339 U.S. 667, 671
          (1950). 
                    Among the showings required under the "case or
          controversy" requirement is "ripeness," which governs 
                                                              when a proper
          party may bring a justiciable action consistent with Article III.
          See Thomas v. Union 
                              Carbide 
                                      Agric. 
                                             Prods. 
                                                    Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580
          (1985) ("'[R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing.'")
          (quoting 
                  Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases
                                                        , 419 U.S. 102, 140
          (1974)). The basic rationale underlying the ripeness doctrine is
          "to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature
          adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements
          over administrative policies and also to protect the agencies from
          judicial interference until an administrative decision has been
          formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the
          challenging parties."  Abbott 
                                         Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
          136, 148-49 (1967);  Pacific  
                                        Gas  
                                             &  
                                               Elec.  
                                                      Co. v.  State  
                                                                     Energy
          Resources 
                    Conservation 
                                 and 
                                     Dev. 
                                          Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200 (1983)
          (same). The ripeness determination thus turns on "'the fitness of
          the issues for judicial decision' and 'the hardship to the parties
          of withholding court consideration.'"  Id. at 201 (quoting Abbott
          Lab., 387 U.S. at 149); 
                                 Lincoln House, Inc.
                                                    v. 
                                                       Dupre, 903 F.2d 845,
          847 (1st Cir. 1990) (same). As we have explained, "[p]erhaps the
          most important consideration in determining whether a claim is ripe
          for adjudication is the extent to which 'the claim involves
          uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated,
          or indeed may not occur at all.'"    Id. (quoting 13A Wright and
                                         43

          Miller, Federal 
                          Practice 
                                   and 
                                       Procedure S 3532.2, at 141 (1984)).
          See also Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d
          1282, 1289-90 (D.C. Cir. 1982);  A/S 
                                               Ludwig 
                                                      Mowinckles 
                                                                 Rederi v.
          Tidewater Construction Corp., 559 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1977).
                    As Gilday has never utilized the MITS regime, there can
          have been no call "detailing" of any Gilday "wire communication."
          Accordingly, no Gilday wire communication could have been subjected
          to "interception" by NET, ATT or the DOC; consequently, there can
          have been no "endeavoring to intercept." Moreover, as Gilday gives
          no indication that he intends to consent, any DOC "detailing" of a
          potential wire communication remains entirely hypothetical. Nor
          can it simply be 
                          presumed that the DOC will "detail" unlawfully any
          call to which Gilday might be a party in the future, nor even that
          he would dial a number which might prompt a call "detail" report.
          See Pacific 
                      Gas 
                          & 
                             Elec. 
                                   Co., 461 U.S. at 200. Thus, the call
          "detailing" claim, in fine, "'involves uncertain and contingent
          events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur
          at all.'"  Lincoln House, 903 F.2d at 847 (quoting 13A Wright and
          Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure S 3532.2, at 141 (1984)). 
                    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the claims
          premised on the Massachusetts Wiretap Act are unavailing. 
                    B.   Title III
                    Although the Federal Wiretap Act (Title III, Omnibus
          Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510    et  seq.
          ("Title III")) generally forbids "interceptions" of wire communica-
          tions absent prior judicial authorization, it expressly provides
                                         44

          that "[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person acting  under
          color 
               of 
                  law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication
          where . . . 
                     one 
                         of 
                            the 
                               parties 
                                       to 
                                          the 
                                              communication 
                                                            has 
                                                                given 
                                                                      prior
          consent 
                 to 
                    such 
                         interception." 18 U.S.C. S 2511(2)(c). (Emphasis
          added.) The "consent" exemption under Title III is "'construed
          broadly'" as encompassing implied consent.  Griggs-Ryan v. Smith,
          904 F.2d 112, 116 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Amen,
          831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987));    see also  United  
                                                                 States v.
          Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 693-94 (2d Cir.) (same), 
                                                       cert. 
                                                             denied, 117 S.
          Ct. 319 (1996); S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,  reprinted
          in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2182 (same).
                    Under the MITS regime, the following prerecorded message
          is heard by both parties immediately after the recipient responds
          to an inmate call and before the parties can communicate:
                         NYNEX [or AT&T for long distance
                         calls] has a collect call from [name
                         of inmate], an inmate at the [name
                         of correctional facility]. To re-
                         fuse this call, hang up. If you use
                         three-way calling or call waiting,
                         you will be disconnected.  All call
                         detail and conversation, excluding
                         approved attorney calls,   will  be
                         recorded. To 
                                      accept 
                                             this 
                                                  call, 
                                                        dial
                         "1" now.
          (Emphasis added.) Thus, upon dialing "1" the party reached at the
          number dialed by the inmate consents to the MITS regime prior to
          any communication with the inmate.
                    Although Gilday points out that 
                                                  he has never consented 
                                                                           
          either explicitly or implicitly 
                                            to the MITS regime, the federal
          wiretap statute as well as relevant authoritative decisions
                                         45

          indicate that the requisite consent under the Federal Wiretap Act
          may be provided by either party.  See 18 U.S.C. S 2511(2)(c) (no
          impermissible "interception" where "one of the parties to the
          communication has given prior consent to such interception"); see
          also 
              United States
                            v. 
                               McDowell, 918 F.2d 1004, 1006 (1st Cir. 1990)
          (finding no Title III bar to telephone interceptions based on
          unilateral consent); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 986-87
          (1st Cir. 1990) (finding unilateral consent adequate to permit
          interception under federal law). Thus, MITS call "detailing" and
          recording does not offend Title III.
                    Moreover, it is settled law in the First Circuit and
          elsewhere that "Title III affords safe harbor not only for persons
                              
                Call "detailing," moreover, is not within the ambit of the
          Federal Wiretap Act, as it simply captures electronic signals
          relating to the PIN of the caller, the number called, and the date,
          time and length of the call.   See 103 C.M.R. S 482.06(1). The
          Federal Wiretap Act defines "interception" as an "aural or other
          acquisition of the  contents of any wire, electronic, or oral
          communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or
          other device." 18 U.S.C. S 2510(4) (emphasis added). Subsection
          2510(8) in turn defines "contents" as "any information concerning
          the substance, purport, or meaning of [the] . . . communication."
          Id. S 2510(8).
               The United States Supreme Court, in an analogous context, has
          held that "pen registers"    devices which can record any number
          dialed from a particular telephone    do not violate the Federal
          Wiretap Act "because they do not acquire the contents of communica-
          tions as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. S 2510(8)."     United
          States v. 
                   New York Tel. Co.
                                    , 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977). Similarly,
          the SJC has held that pen registers "are not governed by Title III,
          since there is no 'aural acquisition' of anything."      District
          Attorney For Norfolk District, 373 N.E.2d at 962. The legislative
          history of the 1986 Amendments to the Federal Wiretap Act likewise
          indicates that Congress intended to exclude call "detailing"
          devices.  See S.Rep. No. 99-541, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted
          in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (stating that devices which record
          electronic data "capture no part" of the contents of "an actual
          telephone conversation"). 
                                         46

          who intercept calls with the explicit consent of a conversant but
          also for those who do so after receiving implied consent." 
                                                                    Griggs-
          Ryan, 904 F.2d at 116;  see also Williams v. Poulos, 11 F.3d 271,
          281 (1st Cir. 1993) (same). Accord 
                                             United States
                                                           v. 
                                                              Van Poyck
                                                                       , 77
          F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir.),  cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 276 (1996);
          United States
                       v. 
                          Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir. 1992); 
                                                                     United
          States v. 
                   Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing 
                                                                      Amen,
          831 F.2d at 378); Watkins v. L.M. 
                                            Berry 
                                                  & 
                                                    Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581
          (11th Cir. 1983). Implied consent may be "inferred from . . .
          language or acts which tend to prove . . . that a party knows of,
          or assents to, encroachments on the routine expectation that
          conversations are private."    Griggs-Ryan, 904 F.2d at 116-17
          (internal citations and quotations omitted). Thus, "a reviewing
          court must inquire into the  dimensions of  the consent and then
          ascertain whether the interception exceeded those boundaries." 
                                                                        Id.
          at 119 (emphasis added).
                    The prerecorded MITS message explicitly advises that
          "[a]ll call detail and conversation, excluding approved attorney
          calls, 
                will 
                     be 
                        recorded," 
                                   see 
                                       supra p. 45 (emphasis added), thereby
          informing the call recipient that the entire "contents" will be
          intercepted. Consequently, notwithstanding the absence of explicit
          notice of the lesser intrusion represented by possible monitoring
          of call content,  the recipient is fully informed of the greater
                              
                The MITS regime permits random monitoring, as well as
          particularized investigative monitoring     the latter based on
          suspected criminal activity.
                                         47

          intrusion; 
                    viz., that the 
                                   entire 
                                          conversation, as well as all call
          "detail," will be intercepted  and recorded.   See id.; see  also
          Williams, 11 F.3d at 281-82 (discussing elements of implied
          consent). Thus, since the MITS records the entire conversation,
          any concurrent aural monitoring by authorized DOC officials in no
          sense exceeds the dimensions of the broad implied consent given to
          record all call "content," including call "detail."  See  Griggs-
          Ryan, 904 F.2d at 114, 116-19 (finding implied consent to
          interceptions, consisting of concurrent aural monitoring and
          recording of telephone conversations, after plaintiff had been
          informed of the recording only and no restrictions had been placed
          on the scope of the interceptions); see also Williams, 11 F.3d at
          282 (stating that implied consent obtains where party to conversa-
          tion was provided with at least "minimal knowledge" of scope of
          interception). Therefore, based on the relevant authoritative
          decisions, it is at the very  least an open question whether the
          express prior consent provided by MITS-call recipients to the
          recordation of all call "content" constitutes implied consent to
          monitoring.  
                    Finally, as this is a civil contempt proceeding it was
          for Gilday to prove that the DOC defendants "violated a clear and
          unambiguous order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior
                              
                Although it has been held    outside the prison context    
          that mere "knowledge of the capability of monitoring alone cannot
          be considered implied consent," 
                                         Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581 (emphasis
          in original), under the MITS the recipient of the call is informed
          that the entire call will be recorded. 
                                         48

          was to be expected" and that the DOC was "'able to ascertain from
          the four corners of the order precisely what acts . . . [were]
          forbidden.'"  Kemp, 947 F.2d at 17 (quoting  Drywall 
                                                               Tapers, 889
          F.2d at 395). Since the    Gilday injunction bans only unlawful
          practices by the DOC defendants,      see  supra pp. 20-22 and
          authoritative decisions supportably indicate    at the very least
             that the challenged MITS practices constitute lawful monitoring,
          Gilday has not demonstrated a "clear and unambiguous" violation of
          Title III.  Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded
          that Gilday failed to establish a violation of the         Gilday
          injunction, either by the DOC or by its putative aiders and
          abettors, NET and AT&T. 
          C.   The Section 1983 Claims
                    In a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, the
                              
                Various federal decisions have upheld similar prison
          monitoring and recording practices under the Federal Wiretap Act.
          See, e.g., Horr, 963 F.2d at 1126;  United 
                                                     States v. Sababu, 891
          F.2d 1308, 1326-30 (7th Cir. 1989); 
                                             Willoughby, 860 F.2d at 19-21;
          Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1458 (7th Cir. 1988);  Amen, 831
          F.2d at 378-80; 
                         United States
                                       v. 
                                          Paul, 614 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir.
          1980);  United 
                         States 
                                v. 
                                    Green, 842 F.Supp. 68, 71-72 (W.D.N.Y.
          1994), aff'd, 80 F.3d 688, cert. 
                                            denied, 117 S. Ct. 319 (1996);
          United States v. Valencia, 711 F.Supp. 608, 611 (S.D. Fla. 1989);
          Lee v. Carlson, 645 F.Supp. 1430, 1438-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
               Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a personal
          call may be intercepted by a business under S 2510(5)(a)(i) "to the
          extent necessary to guard against unauthorized use of the telephone
          or to determine whether a call is personal or not."  Watkins, 704
          F.2d at 583. Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has suggested that in
          circumstances where an employee is believed to be committing a
          crime or making excessive personal calls, employer monitoring of
          employee phone calls may not be an unlawful "interception" under
          the "ordinary use" exception applicable to extension phones in S
          2510(5)(a)(i). See  Deal v. 
                                      Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir.
          1992). 
                                         49

          plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a
          person acting under color of state law deprived him of a right
          guaranteed by the United States Constitution or the laws of the
          United States.  Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 984 (1st Cir.),
          cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 515 (1995);  Tatro v. Kervin, 41 F.3d 9,
          14 (1st Cir. 1994). Gilday argues that the terms of the    Gilday
          injunction grant him a "federal right to be free of any intercep-
          tion of his wire communications not specifically permitted under
          the terms of the Permanent Injunction." From this mistaken premise
          he maintains that the DOC defendants violated section 1983 by
          implementing the MITS under color of Massachusetts law in violation
          of the Gilday injunction, thereby depriving him of a "federal
          right." Likewise, he claims that AT&T and NET are state actors,
          liable for aiding and abetting the alleged violations by the DOC
          defendants. As the Gilday injunction was never violated, however,
          these civil rights claims collapse as well.
                                         III
                                     CONCLUSION
                    Appellant having failed to show as a matter of law that
          appellees violated the permanent injunction or caused a deprivation
          of any federal or constitutional rights, the judgment of the
          district court is affirmed.
                              
                On appeal, Gilday has abandoned the claim that defendants
          deprived him of "meaningful access to the courts," as well as his
          Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We therefore deem any such
          section 1983 claim waived. See 
                                        Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
                                                                  v. 
                                                                     Public
          Service Commission of Puerto Rico
                                          , 906 F.2d 25, 40 (1st Cir. 1990).
                                         50