Court Opinion

ID: 9918385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 20:00:43.223405+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:27.611453
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10819    Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024   Page: 1 of 22

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10819
                           ____________________

        In re: DONALD H. BAILEY
                                                                  Debtor.
        ________________________________________
        KAI HANSJURGENS,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        DONALD H. BAILEY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00105-RSB-CLR,
USCA11 Case: 22-10819         Document: 62-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2024         Page: 2 of 22

        2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-10819

                               Bkcy No. 4:07-bk-41381-EJC
                                ____________________

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM and ABUDU,
        Circuit Judges.
        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
               Baseball Hall of Famer Frank Robinson famously said that
        “[c]lose only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.” 1 To that
        list we add one more thing: close—as long as it’s close enough to
        qualify as “substantial compliance”—also counts when it comes to
        following a state’s rules for reviving a judgment in federal court un-
        der Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a).
               More than a decade ago, Appellee Donald Bailey obtained a
        bankruptcy judgment against Appellant Kai Hansjurgens for tor-
        tious interference with contract. That judgment included punitive
        damages based on Hansjurgens’s “malice and intent to injure” and
        “cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[].” Bailey v. Hako-
        Med USA, Inc., No. 09-4002, at 8–9 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Apr. 7, 2011).
        Hansjurgens has not paid Bailey a cent.
               Georgia state law gave Bailey ten years to collect. But before
        Bailey’s judgment expired irretrievably, Bailey ﬁled—and the bank-
        ruptcy court granted—a motion to revive that judgment. Hansjur-
        gens does not dispute that the underlying judgment is valid, but he

        1 Nick Acocella, More Info on Frank Robinson, ESPN CLASSIC (last visited Jan. 12,

        2024), https://www.espn.com/classic/000728frankrobinsonadd.html
        [https://perma.cc/5ATF-87HL].
USCA11 Case: 22-10819     Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 3 of 22

        22-10819              Opinion of the Court                          3

        still seeks to keep his streak of dodging payment intact. This time,
        Hansjurgens claims that Bailey didn’t strictly comply with Georgia
        state-law procedures to revive his judgment. But the district court
        found—and Bailey argues on appeal—that Bailey did enough to sat-
        isfy the Georgia judgment-revival procedure under Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 69(a). We agree. So after careful consideration,
        and with the beneﬁt of oral argument, we aﬃrm.
                             I.     BACKGROUND

             A.     Original Bankruptcy Proceedings and Related Appeals

                Bailey and Hansjurgens’s dispute originated with a business
        arrangement. Bailey leased medical equipment to physicians. To
        obtain some of his leasing inventory, Bailey entered into a distrib-
        utorship agreement with Hansjurgens and his medical device com-
        pany Hako-Med USA, Inc. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bai-
        ley), 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 6300, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2010). Under
        this agreement, Bailey bought several Hako-Med PRO Elec DT
        2000 and VasoPulse 2000 devices. Healthcare professionals use
        these machines to non-invasively treat lower back pain. Id. Unfor-
        tunately for Bailey, though, he had trouble selling the devices. In
        Bailey’s view, his sales problem arose because Hansjurgens and
        Hako-Med recommended billing codes that resulted in lower reim-
        bursement rates than they had touted. Id. at *3–4.

              After the distributorship agreement expired, a medical-
        equipment rental company, New River, oﬀered to pay Bailey $1,000
        each month per device to lease the devices to physicians’ oﬃces.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1     Date Filed: 01/12/2024     Page: 4 of 22

        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10819

        Id. at *5. But Hansjurgens and Hako-Med threatened (unfounded)
        legal action against physicians who were negotiating with Bailey
        and New River. Id. at *6. So Bailey stopped marketing the devices,
        and New River shut down its operations. Id. at *9.
               Bailey filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. In bankruptcy court,
        Bailey brought an adversary proceeding against Hansjurgens and
        Hako-Med for tortious interference with contract.
               The bankruptcy court held a trial and entered an interlocu-
        tory order in favor of Bailey. Id. at *27. It concluded that Hansjur-
        gens had indeed tortiously interfered “to bully the Potential Pur-
        chasers out of negotiations” and “to advance his own pecuniary in-
        terest.” Id. at *18–19.
               After finding that Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “acted with
        malice and intent to injure,” the bankruptcy court ordered post-
        judgment discovery on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. Id.
        at *21, *27. Bailey’s post-judgment discovery requests went
        “largely unanswered,” so Bailey moved to compel. Bailey, No. 09-
        4002, at 2. The bankruptcy court ordered Hansjurgens and Hako-
        Med to submit discovery responses for the court’s inspection, but
        they did not do so. Id. at 2–3.
                In the meantime, the bankruptcy court proceeded with its
        trial on punitive damages and attorney’s fees. In April 2011, the
        bankruptcy court entered judgment for Bailey and awarded
        $893,973.64 total: $277,336.13 in compensatory damages,
        $554,672.26 in punitive damages, and $61,965.25 in attorney’s fees.
        Id. at 12. In support of its ruling, the court characterized
USCA11 Case: 22-10819       Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 5 of 22

        22-10819                Opinion of the Court                          5

        Hansjurgens’s trial testimony as “evasive and uncooperative” and
        noted his “cavalier attitude toward [his] duties as [a] litigant[]”
        throughout the discovery process. Id. at 3, 9. And it found that
        Hansjurgens’s failure to produce post-judgment discovery was “in-
        tentional” and “possibly motivated by a desire to perpetrate a fraud
        on the Court.” Id. at 10.
               Hansjurgens repeatedly and unsuccessfully appealed.
               First, before the bankruptcy court entered ﬁnal judgment,
        Hansjurgens sought to appeal the partial-liability determination to
        the district court. But the district court dismissed the appeal for
        lack of jurisdiction because Hansjurgens never obtained leave to
        appeal the interlocutory order. Hansjurgens v. Bailey (In re Bailey),
        489 F. App’x 425, 425 (11th Cir. 2012). We aﬃrmed. Id.
               Hansjurgens then moved to reopen his appeal. The district
        court denied the motion. Because the bankruptcy court later is-
        sued a ﬁnal judgment, we dismissed as moot Hansjurgens’s appeal
        of that denial. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. 12-12465, at 4 (11th Cir.
        2013).
               In his third eﬀort on appeal, Hansjurgens appealed the ﬁnal
        judgment to the district court. But the district court found that
        Hansjurgens’s notice of appeal was untimely ﬁled, and he failed to
        show excusable neglect as Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
        8002(c)(2) requires. Hansjurgens v. Bailey, No. CV411-202, 2012 WL
        3289001, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2012). We aﬃrmed the dismissal
        for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, 521 F. App’x 920, 922 (11th Cir.
        2013).
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 6 of 22

        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10819

               Around the same time, Bailey moved the bankruptcy court
        to hold Hansjurgens in contempt based on his and Hako-Med’s
        continued failure to produce post-judgment discovery. Hansjur-
        gens did not appear at the contempt hearing. So the bankruptcy
        court submitted a proposed contempt order to the district court.
        Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc. (In re Bailey), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 5424
        (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). The proposed order directed that Hansjur-
        gens “be placed under arrest and imprisoned for his continuing
        noncompliance” and that Hansjurgens reimburse Bailey’s reasona-
        ble expenses incurred. Id. at *19.
               The district court eventually adopted the bankruptcy court’s
        proposed order in its entirety, specifying that an arrest warrant
        would issue after 30 days if Hansjurgens did not comply with the
        discovery order. Bailey v. Hako-Med USA, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
        119697, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 2014). The court also ordered Hansjurgens
        to pay Bailey’s reasonable expenses arising from the contemptible
        conduct, including attorney’s fees, but it left calculation of those
        expenses to the bankruptcy court. Id. at *3–4. Once again,
        Hansjurgens did not comply. But the district court never issued an
        arrest warrant.
               Hansjurgens again appealed to this Court, and we dismissed
        the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re Bailey, No. 14-14905 (11th
        Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 820 (2016). In our opinion, we noted
        that both we and the U.S. Marshals “tried and failed to contact”
        Hansjurgens about his own appeal. Id. at 5.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819         Document: 62-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2024        Page: 7 of 22

        22-10819                  Opinion of the Court                               7

                                B.      Revival Proceedings

               Under Georgia state law, the judgment against Hansjurgens
        became dormant on April 7, 2018, and was due to become unen-
        forceable on April 7, 2021. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-61 (2020). 2
        Before that could happen, though, in November 2020, Bailey re-
        quested a status conference with the bankruptcy court. The bank-
        ruptcy court set the conference for March 18, 2021. To inform
        Hansjurgens of the status conference, the Bankruptcy Noticing
        Center sent notice of the telephonic status conference to Hansjur-
        gens’s Hawaii address and to Hako-Med’s registered agent
               On March 12, 2021, Bailey ﬁled an “Emergency Motion to
        Revive Dormant Judgment” in the same adversarial proceeding as
        the original judgment. In his motion, Bailey alleged that the judg-
        ment “remains unsatisﬁed,” as Hansjurgens and Hako-Med “have
        refused to pay any of the award.”
               The bankruptcy court conducted its status conference, set a
        telephonic hearing on the motion for March 30, and determined
        that process would be served by mail. Bailey and the Bankruptcy
        Noticing Center mailed notice of the hearing to Hansjurgens,
        Hako-Med, and Hako-Med’s registered agent at their Nevada and
        Hawaii addresses. At the court’s direction, Bailey ﬁled an amended
        certiﬁcate of service attesting that he had mailed the motion and

        2 Throughout this opinion, we cite the 2020 statute, the version in effect when

        the judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant and Bailey filed the mo-
        tion to revive.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819         Document: 62-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2024        Page: 8 of 22

        8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10819

        notice of hearing to Hansjurgens, Hako-Med, registered agents
        (EastBiz.com, Inc. and Alive, Inc.), and Hansjurgens’s attorney,
        Craig Marc Rappel, at additional addresses in Nevada, Hawaii, and
        Florida. Bailey’s counsel also called Rappel the day before the hear-
        ing. But Hansjurgens failed to appear at the hearing or otherwise
        contact the court.
               On April 1, 2021, the bankruptcy court granted Bailey’s mo-
        tion. It found that the judgment remained unpaid and that Bailey
        timely moved to revive within the limitations period. As a result,
        the bankruptcy court concluded, Bailey had satisﬁed Georgia’s pro-
        cedural requirements and was entitled to revival of the judgment
        against Hansjurgens.
                Hansjurgens, proceeding pro se, appealed to the district
        court. He raised four objections: (1) the bankruptcy court lacked
        personal jurisdiction over him; (2) Bailey failed to comply with
        Georgia procedures for revival of judgments; 3 (3) Bailey did not
        state good cause to warrant issuance of an “emergency” order; and
        (4) Bailey failed to properly notify him of the proceedings and serve
        him with a summons, violating his due-process rights.

        3 Hansjurgens contends that Bailey did not strictly comply with Georgia’s scire

        facias procedures. We discuss Georgia’s scire facias procedures in more detail
        later in this opinion, but for now, we note simply that scire facias “resembles
        a summons and directs the” judgment debtor “to appear in the issuing court
        on a certain date and to show cause why the identified judgment should not
        be revived and an execution be issued.” Popham v. Jordan, 628 S.E.2d 660, 662
        (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 9 of 22

        22-10819               Opinion of the Court                          9

              The district court aﬃrmed the bankruptcy court’s order.
        Hansjurgens now appeals to this Court.
                              II.    JURISDICTION

               The district court exercised bankruptcy appellate jurisdic-
        tion under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). We have appellate jurisdiction under
        28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291 because the revival judgment is a
        ﬁnal order.
               To be ﬁnal, an order “must end the litigation on the merits,
        leaving nothing to be done but execute the judgment.” Barben v.
        Donovan (In re Donovan), 532 F.3d 1134, 1136 (11th Cir. 2008). We
        take a functional approach to the ﬁnality inquiry, “looking not to
        the form of the” order “but to its actual eﬀect.” Thomas v. Blue Cross
        & Blue Shield Ass’n, 594 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and
        quotation marks omitted). And we treat ﬁnality more ﬂexibly in
        the bankruptcy context. Donovan, 532 F.3d at 1136. To that end, a
        ﬁnal order generally must resolve the adversary proceeding or con-
        troversy in question but need not resolve the bankruptcy proceed-
        ings in their entirety. Id.
               For postjudgment proceedings, we determine ﬁnality
        through a two-step inquiry. First, we “‘treat the postjudgment pro-
        ceeding as a free-standing litigation, in eﬀect treating the ﬁnal judg-
        ment as the ﬁrst rather than the last order in the case.’” Mayer v.
        Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 672 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (quot-
        ing Thomas, 594 F.3d at 829). Second, we ask whether the order
        “disposes of all the issues raised in the motion that initially sparked
        the postjudgment proceedings” and whether the order is
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2024       Page: 10 of 22

        10                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10819

        “apparently the last order to be entered in the action.” Id. (citations
        and quotation marks omitted).
               Under this framework, the revival judgment is a ﬁnal order
        over which we have appellate jurisdiction. Bailey’s emergency mo-
        tion to revive the judgment “initially sparked the postjudgment
        proceedings,” and the bankruptcy court’s order granting that mo-
        tion “dispose[d] of all the issues raised” therein. See id. At the same
        time, the district court’s order “dispose[d] of all the issues” in the
        revival proceedings and was “the last order to be entered in the ac-
        tion.” See id. And there is no further merits determination to be
        made, since scire facias proceedings do not permit review on the
        merits. See Heslen v. Heslen, 404 S.E.2d 592, 592 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)
        (“A grant of a writ of scire facias does not authorize the examina-
        tion of the original judgment’s validity.” (citation omitted)). In
        short, the revival judgment qualiﬁes as a ﬁnal order over which we
        have appellate jurisdiction.
                         III.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

               In bankruptcy cases, we sit as a “‘second court of review.’”
        Ga. Dep’t of Revenue v. Mouzon Enters., Inc. (In re Mouzon Enters., Inc.),
        610 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Finova Cap. Corp. v. Lar-
        son Pharm. Inc. (In re Optical Techs., Inc.), 425 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th
        Cir. 2005)). In this capacity, we “‘examine[] independently the fac-
        tual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy court and em-
        ploy[] the same standards of review as the district court.’” Id. We
        review the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and
USCA11 Case: 22-10819       Document: 62-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2024       Page: 11 of 22

        22-10819                 Opinion of the Court                           11

        factual ﬁndings for clear error. Carrier Corp. v. Buckley (In re Globe
        Mfg. Corp.), 567 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009).
                                 IV.     DISCUSSION

        A.     The district court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens
                               for the revival proceedings.

                First, Hansjurgens claims that the bankruptcy court lacked
        personal jurisdiction over him for the revival proceedings. 4 The
        threshold question we must address in considering this issue is
        whether the bankruptcy court needed to re-establish personal ju-
        risdiction. We conclude that it did not.
               Bailey did not ﬁle a new action against Hansjurgens. Rather,
        he ﬁled, with the same bankruptcy court and under the same case
        caption as the adversary proceeding, an emergency motion for re-
        vival that the bankruptcy court and district court construed as a
        motion seeking revival in the form of scire facias. “Scire facias to
        revive a judgment is not an original action but is the continuation
        of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA. CODE
        ANN. § 9-12-62; see also Mitchell v. Chastain Fin. Co., 233 S.E.2d 829,
        832 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977) (scire facias to revive a judgment “is merely
        a supplementary step in the original action”). So if the bankruptcy
        court had personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens for the adversary
        proceeding—and neither party contests that it did—the

        4 Bailey moved to dismiss based on the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine. We
        carried that motion with the case. But because the merits require aﬃrmance
        in any case, we DENY AS MOOT Bailey’s motion to dismiss.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819     Document: 62-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2024         Page: 12 of 22

        12                     Opinion of the Court                    22-10819

        bankruptcy court did not need to re-establish that jurisdiction for
        the continuation of that proceeding. In other words, the bank-
        ruptcy court retained personal jurisdiction over Hansjurgens from
        the original bankruptcy adversary proceeding for the purposes of
        the revival judgment.
             B.    The district court properly revived the judgment against
                                     Hansjurgens.

               Hansjurgens raises two objections to how Bailey revived the
        judgment against him: (1) the procedure failed to strictly comply
        with Georgia law governing scire facias proceedings; and (2) it vio-
        lated due process. We ﬁnd neither availing.
                  1. Rule 69 does not require strict compliance with
                           Georgia scire facias procedures.

               We begin by identifying the relevant rules of procedure in a
        judgment-revival proceeding in federal bankruptcy court. Rule
        81(a)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P., makes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
        applicable to bankruptcy proceedings “to the extent provided by
        the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.” And Federal Rule of
        Bankruptcy Procedure 7069, in turn, provides that Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 69 “applies in adversary proceedings.” Fed. R.
        Bankr. P. 7069.
              So we turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Rule 69
        provides that the execution of judgments in adversary proceedings
        “and in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment or
        execution . . . must accord with the procedure of the state where
USCA11 Case: 22-10819         Document: 62-1         Date Filed: 01/12/2024         Page: 13 of 22

        22-10819                   Opinion of the Court                                13

        the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it
        applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (incorporated into bankruptcy ad-
        versary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7069). 5 That requires us to
        reconsider the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. But no
        Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure “governs” revival of judg-
        ments. So under Rule 69, the creation, dormancy, and execution
        of the judgment against Hansjurgens must “accord with” Georgia
        state procedures.
               We begin, as always, with the Rule’s text. See United States v.
        Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). Rule 69’s key phrase
        is “accord with.”
                In its original form, Rule 69 provided,

        5 The bankruptcy and district courts concluded that Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

        cedure 81(b) abolishes scire facias in federal court, and under that rule, Bailey
        could obtain relief previously available through scire facias by “appropriate
        action or motion.” So the courts determined that Bailey needed to substan-
        tially comply with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and filing the motion to
        revive sufficed. On appeal, for the first time, Hansjurgens objects to the appli-
        cation of Rule 81(b), relying on our decision in Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV,
        LLC, 818 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2016). Rosenberg held that the Federal Rules of
        Civil Procedure “only apply” in bankruptcy cases “to the extent they have
        been explicitly incorporated by the Federal Bankruptcy Rules,” id. at 1288, and
        Hansjurgens asserts that Rule 81 has not been explicitly incorporated. We
        need not decide this issue regardless of whether Hansjurgens preserved it.
        Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court should have issued an adversar-
        ial summons after Bailey initiated the revival proceeding by motion. Although
        bankruptcy courts may issue adversarial summonses, see Fed. R. Bankr.
        P. 7004, we reject the argument that the failure of the bankruptcy court to
        issue one here violated Rule 69(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 14 of 22

        14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10819

               The procedure on execution, in proceedings supple-
               mentary to and in aid of a judgment, and in proceed-
               ings on and in aid of execution shall be in accordance
               with the practice and procedure of the state in which
               the district court is held, existing at the time the rem-
               edy is sought, except that any statute of the United
               States governs to the extent that it is applicable.
        Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) (1938) (emphasis added). In 2007, Rule 69(a)
        was amended as part of a broader eﬀort to simplify the language
        of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without changing their sub-
        stance. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 advisory committee’s note to 2007 Amend-
        ment; see also Mills v. Foremost Ins., 511 F.3d 1300, 1308 n.11 (11th
        Cir. 2008). The phrase “accord with” replaced the phrase “in ac-
        cordance with.” Because these phrases are substantially the same,
        we look to dictionary deﬁnitions from the time of initial adoption
        of the “accordance” language, 1938. See Bostock v. Clayton County,
        140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738–39 (2020); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
        Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 40, at 257 (2012) (ex-
        plaining that “new language” in a “legislative restyling exercise[]”
        like the revised Rule 69(a) “does not amend prior enactments un-
        less it does so clearly”).
               At that time, “accord” meant “to agree or concur,” Accord,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1933), or “to agree, be in harmony,
        be consistent,” Accord, Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1933). See
        also Accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1938)
        (“To bring into agreement; to reconcile; to . . . harmonize”). Those
USCA11 Case: 22-10819        Document: 62-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2024        Page: 15 of 22

        22-10819                  Opinion of the Court                              15

        deﬁnitions do not require revival proceedings in federal court to
        strictly follow state-law procedures, however impractical or arcane.
        Rather, they suggest that revival proceedings in federal court must
        only “agree” or “be in harmony”—in other words, substantially
        comply—with state-law procedures. And “when the meaning of
        the [Rule’s] terms is plain, our job is at an end.” Bostock, 140 S. Ct.
        at 1749. 6
               Still, though, as we explain after we describe Georgia’s scire
        facias procedures, practicalities reinforce the natural meaning of
        “accord.” Under Georgia law, a “judgment shall become dormant
        and shall not be enforced . . . [w]hen seven years shall elapse after
        the rendition of the judgment before execution is issued
        thereon[.]” GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-60. The judgment creditor may
        “renew[] or revive[]” the dormant judgment “by an action or by
        scire facias, at the option of the holder of the judgment, within
        three years from the time it becomes dormant.” Id. § 9-12-61.
        These two statutory provisions “operate in tandem as a ten-year
        statute of limitation for the enforcement of Georgia judgments.”
        Corzo Trucking Corp. v. West, 636 S.E.2d 39, 40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
        The 2011 judgment against Hansjurgens became dormant on April
        7, 2018, and would have expired on April 7, 2021.

        6 Even if we look to dictionary definitions from 2007, when the current version

        of the Rule was adopted, our interpretation does not change. See, e.g., Accord,
        Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (“To agree”); Accord, Merriam-Web-
        ster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007) (“to be consistent or in harmony:
        AGREE”); Accord, American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2006) (“To be in
        agreement, unity, or harmony”).
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 16 of 22

        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10819

                Scire facias “resembles a summons and directs the” judg-
        ment debtor “to appear in the issuing court on a certain date and
        to show cause why the identiﬁed judgment should not be revived
        and an execution be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. “Scire fa-
        cias to revive a judgment is not an original action but is the contin-
        uation of the action in which the judgment was obtained.” GA.
        CODE ANN. § 9-12-62. To that end, “[i]n no case and under no cir-
        cumstances can the merits of the original judgment be inquired
        into” in scire facias proceedings. Mitchell, 233 S.E.2d at 833.
               If the judgment debtor resides outside the state, the “judg-
        ment may be revived . . . by such process as is issued in cases in
        which the defendant resides in this state, provided that” he “shall
        be served with scire facias by publication in the newspaper in which
        the oﬃcial advertisements of the county are published[.]” GA.
        CODE ANN. § 9-12-67. Neither “record[ing] the judgment on the
        general execution docket” nor “mak[ing] any eﬀorts to collect the
        judgment” is a “prerequisite to reviving a dormant judgment.”
        Bowers v. Jim Rainwater Builder & Props., Inc., 416 S.E.2d 832, 832
        (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
               Hansjurgens asserts that Bailey and the bankruptcy court
        did not strictly comply with these state-law procedures. He is right
        about that. It is undisputed that Bailey did not ﬁle a new judgment
        to seek revival. It is also undisputed that Bailey did not strictly fol-
        low traditional scire facias procedures. These traditional proce-
        dures include issuance from “the court of the county in which the
        judgment was obtained” and service “by the sheriﬀ of the county
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024     Page: 17 of 22

        22-10819               Opinion of the Court                         17

        in which [the judgment debtor] resides” twenty days prior to the
        hearing, or service by publication for two months before the hear-
        ing. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-12-63, 9-12-67.
                But, again, we do not interpret Rule 69(a) to require strict
        compliance—only that federal revival proceedings “accord,” or
        substantially comply, with state procedures. See Chambers v. Blickle
        Ford Sales, Inc., 313 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that an en-
        forcement hearing in lieu of a state scire facias action “accords with
        the spirit of the Rules and seems to be a suﬃciently close adherence
        to state procedures”); Thomas, Head & Greisen Emps. Tr. v. Buster, 95
        F.3d 1449, 1452 (9th Cir. 1996); 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
        Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Civil § 3012 (3d ed. 2023); 13
        Moore’s Federal Practice Civil § 69.03[3]. As the Seventh Circuit has
        opined, “[w]e do not think the draftsmen of Rule 69 meant to put
        the judge into a procedural straitjacket, whether of state or federal
        origin.” Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Ruiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1226 (7th Cir.
        1993) (citation omitted). And as we’ve explained, the Rule’s plain
        text does not compel a “procedural straitjacket” in the form of a
        strict-compliance requirement. We will not impose one here.
               What’s more, Georgia scire facias procedures do not
        squarely ﬁt within the federal court system. Under Georgia state
        law, the clerk of the state court in which the judgment was ob-
        tained must issue scire facias, and that county’s sheriﬀ must serve
        it. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-12-63. But Georgia federal courts do not
        control county sheriﬀs. Requiring strict compliance with scire fa-
        cias procedures in a federal forum that cannot order the state-
USCA11 Case: 22-10819      Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024      Page: 18 of 22

        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10819

        mandated relief makes little sense. And insisting on county-speciﬁc
        procedures in federal court, especially in a state with 159 counties,
        is impractical. Rather, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
        apply uniformly in federal court, require one procedure for obtain-
        ing relief: ﬁling a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) (incorporated
        into bankruptcy adversary proceedings by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007).
        That is exactly what Bailey did here.
                We conclude that Bailey substantially complied with Geor-
        gia’s scire facias statute, so revival was proper. Scire facias provides
        notice of court proceedings and the opportunity “to show cause
        why the identiﬁed judgment should not be revived and an execu-
        tion be issued.” Popham, 628 S.E.2d at 662. Service here accom-
        plished the same goal. Hansjurgens received at least twelve notices
        of the revival hearing, and his participation in these proceedings
        has provided him an opportunity to object to the revival judgment.
        In other words, the purposes of scire facias have been served. Cf.
        Sanderford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 902 F.2d 897, 900 (11th Cir.
        1990) (upholding a default judgment when the summons omitted
        a return date but substantially complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b)
        and the defendant was not prejudiced by the defect); Chambers, 313
        F.2d at 256.
               Indeed, as a purely practical matter, there is nothing more
        that can be accomplished by remanding for strict compliance. Re-
        manding would not change the ultimate result of the revival pro-
        ceedings. To be sure, the district court could require personal ser-
        vice on Hansjurgens. But a revival motion may be timely even if
USCA11 Case: 22-10819     Document: 62-1       Date Filed: 01/12/2024     Page: 19 of 22

        22-10819               Opinion of the Court                        19

        service is not perfected during the dormancy period, so long as the
        motion is ﬁled before the judgment expires. Stahle v. Jones, 3 S.E.2d
        861, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939). And here, Bailey timely ﬁled his re-
        vival motion. So even if the district court ordered Bailey to person-
        ally serve it on Hansjurgens, the revival proceedings would still go
        forward.
                Personal service could not accomplish more than what this
        record demonstrates has already occurred: Hansjurgens’s actual
        notice of the proceedings. Plus, under Georgia law, parties may
        not challenge “the merits of the original judgment” in scire facias
        proceedings to revive it. Bowers, 416 S.E.2d at 832–33. So since Bai-
        ley’s revival motion was timely, and since we dispose of Hansjur-
        gens’s procedural objections in this appeal, Hansjurgens has no
        other basis for a challenge to the revival proceedings.
              Put simply, the only outcome on remand would be to reach
        the same result: the entry of a valid revival judgment, though after
        even more time and expense. Because service here was in “accord”
        with Georgia’s scire facias procedures, and because remanding for
        personal service would not change the outcome of the revival pro-
        ceedings, we hold that the bankruptcy court properly revived the
        dormant judgment.
                2. The revival proceedings did not violate due process.

               Finally, Hansjurgens argues that the bankruptcy court vio-
        lated his due-process rights when it did not require personal service
        through an adversarial summons, contrary to Georgia state law.
        Hansjurgens does not claim that Bailey mailed the revival motion
USCA11 Case: 22-10819     Document: 62-1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024    Page: 20 of 22

        20                     Opinion of the Court                22-10819

        and notice of hearing to the wrong addresses—addresses that
        Hansjurgens had provided to the court. Instead, Hansjurgens com-
        plains that, despite delivery to the addresses he provided and a call
        to his former (and later) attorney advising him of the proceeding,
        Hansjurgens was unaware of the proceeding until after the judg-
        ment was revived.
                Our precedent does not require service in one particular
        form to satisfy due process—rather, “[d]ue process is a ﬂexible con-
        cept that varies with the particular circumstances of each case, and
        myriad forms of notice may satisfy” its requirements. Arrington v.
        Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006). Under this “ﬂexible”
        framework, “notice must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the
        circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
        action and aﬀord them an opportunity to present their objections.’”
        Id. at 1349–50 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339
        U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
               Both the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Fed-
        eral Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service by mail. First, Fed-
        eral Rule of Civil Procedure 5 applies in bankruptcy adversary pro-
        ceedings. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7005. Under that rule, “mailing” the
        motion and notice of hearing “to the person’s last known address—
        in which event service is complete upon mailing”—accomplishes
        service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C). Separately, the Federal Rules of
        Bankruptcy Procedure authorize service by mail “to the individ-
        ual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode or to the place where
        the individual regularly conducts a business or profession” or to “an
USCA11 Case: 22-10819       Document: 62-1        Date Filed: 01/12/2024       Page: 21 of 22

        22-10819                 Opinion of the Court                            21

        agent of such defendant authorized by appointment or by law to
        receive service of process.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7004(b)(1), (8).
                Bailey certiﬁed that he mailed the motion to revive and no-
        tice of hearing to Hansjurgens at three Hawaii and Nevada ad-
        dresses, including the address that Hansjurgens has since used in
        his appellate ﬁlings. Bailey also mailed the motion and hearing no-
        tice to two registered agents of Hako-Med (EastBiz.com, Inc. and
        Alive, Inc.) and Hansjurgens’s attorney, Craig Marc Rappel. 7 The
        Bankruptcy Noticing Center certiﬁed that it too mailed notice to
        of the hearing to three Nevada addresses. Not only that, but Bai-
        ley’s counsel called Rappel in yet another attempt to inform
        Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings. And as Hansjurgens’s par-
        ticipation in the appellate process reﬂects, Hansjurgens had actual
        notice of the revival proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.
                To be sure, Bailey could have attempted service personally
        or by publication, but due process did not require him to do so. See
        Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1350 (due process does not require notice that
        is “ideal under all the circumstances, but rather” notice that “is rea-
        sonable under all the circumstances”). We conclude that service by
        mail to the six addresses here was “reasonably calculated . . . to ap-
        prise” Hansjurgens of the revival proceedings and to allow him to
        present objections. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

        7 At the time, Hansjurgens was proceeding pro se, but Rappel had represented

        him in prior proceedings. Rappel resumed representing Hansjurgens for his
        appeal in this Court until Rappel passed away in January 2023 and current
        counsel took over.
USCA11 Case: 22-10819   Document: 62-1    Date Filed: 01/12/2024   Page: 22 of 22

        22                  Opinion of the Court              22-10819

                            V.    CONCLUSION

               For the reasons we have explained, we aﬃrm the district
        court’s revival order.
              AFFIRMED.