Court Opinion

ID: 9479361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:15:43.934337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:58.753116
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Judge Hill’s opinion makes good points, but I want to add a little. In this case, our job is to interpret Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. As I understand it, Rule 9(b) is simple and provides federal courts with an objective standard to apply in dealing with second petitions for habeas corpus by state prisoners.
If a state prisoner files a petition raising a claim that was available but not raised in his earlier petition, the prisoner has abused the writ.1 See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2622 n. 6, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (plurality opinion). A claim is available whenever an arguable basis in fact and in law exists for it. Cf. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); Neitzke v. Williams, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). That some or even all courts might ultimately resolve the argument against the petitioner’s contention does not mean that the claim is unavailable.2
When a court faces an abuse of the writ, the court’s discretion comes into play; and the court may decline to dismiss the petition. In general, petitions abusing the writ should be dismissed: Rule 9(b) was intended to lead to substantially more finality in the disposition of habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners in federal courts. Still, a colorable showing by a petitioner that he was in fact innocent would justify a court’s refusal to dismiss in even the worst case of abuse of the writ; and — apart from factual innocence — a showing that some objective factor external to the petitioner and his agents blocked his effort to present an available claim earlier might justify a court’s decision not to dismiss. That the first petition was filed pro se is an unsound basis for declining to dismiss, however.
Neither the Constitution nor statutes require that habeas petitioners have the assistance of legal counsel. Because the presence of legal expertise has not been made essential to participating fully in federal habeas proceedings, a petitioner’s thinking and acting like a lawyer is inessential to his being bound by earlier habeas proceedings. In addition, a claim’s availability — that is, whether an arguable legal basis exists for it — does not hinge on the qualities of the person looking for the claim. The claim is available or it is not. Whether a legal point is arguable or inarguable is a question of law.
The effect of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), on jury instructions about intent in criminal cases was a live issue in the law when petitioner filed his first petition for federal habeas corpus. Petitioner left out of his first petition a claim that was then available as a matter of law. By omitting an available claim and later filing a second *970petition, he abused the writ. He asserted no ground that warranted the district court’s decision to decline to dismiss the second petition for habeas relief. In the light of Rule 9(b), I would reverse the judgment of the district court.

. Deliberately withholding a known claim or filing a second habeas petition only to vex, harass and delay are examples of abuse of the writ, but neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court has said that these are the exclusive ways of abusing the writ. Instead, these acts seem to be only the most obvious ways.

. Judicial decisions rejecting a claim can show that the issue was alive at the time. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131 n. 41, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1574 n. 41, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982). Incidentally, Engle also sets out a good discussion of some costs of the Great Writ; in my view, recognition of these and other costs, especially those related to federalism, led to 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b) and Rule 9(b).