Court Opinion

ID: 9926228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 15:02:08.700261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:13.248629
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 47
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION III
                                        No. E-22-404

 STACY BRIDGES                                  Opinion Delivered January 24, 2024

                                APPELLANT
                                                APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
                                                BOARD OF REVIEW
 V.                                             [NO. 2022-BR-00048]

 DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF                          AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED IN
 WORKFORCE SERVICES                             PART
                                  APPELLEE

                             CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

        Appellant Stacy Bridges appeals from an order issued by the Arkansas Board of

Review (Board) affirming the determination of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) requiring her

to repay $6,096 in unemployment-compensation benefits. We affirm in part and remand in

part.

                             I. Background and Procedural History

        The record indicates that Bridges received $81 in weekly state unemployment benefits

for the weeks ending January 23 through May 8, 2021, for a total of $1,296. In addition,

Bridges received $300 in weekly Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation

(“FPUC”) during that same time period for a total of $4,800 in FPUC benefits. The record

also contains a notice of agency determination dated September 29, 2021, that disqualified

Bridges from receiving benefits beginning January 8, 2021. The decision disqualifying
Bridges from unemployment benefits was ultimately upheld by the Board in case No. 2022-

BR-00047 after Bridges was found, after a Paulino1 hearing, to have filed an untimely appeal

of a decision by the Division of Workforce Services (Division) to the Tribunal.2 That

underlying disqualification is therefore not before us. In this separate appeal, we address

only the issue of repayment.

       On November 4, 2021, the Division issued a notice of nonfraud overpayment to

Bridges based on the Division’s determination that she had been disqualified from receiving

benefits. Bridges timely filed an appeal of the overpayment determination to the Tribunal.

A hearing was held on the overpayment issue on November 30, 2021, after which the

Tribunal found that the overpayment was not due to Division error and that Bridges was,

therefore, liable for repayment.

       Bridges appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board. After reviewing the record, the

Board affirmed and adopted the decision of the Tribunal. Bridges has appealed the

overpayment determination.

                                      II. Standard of Review

       Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.

Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence

       1
           Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676, 559 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980).
       2
         We previously remanded for additional findings or to supplement the record,
because the order affirming the disqualification of benefits was not included in our record.
Bridges v. Dir., 2023 Ark. App. 498.

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that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of

unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences

deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is

evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board

could have reasonably reached its decision on the basis of the evidence presented. Id.

However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the

Board. Thomas v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 468, 587 S.W.3d 612; Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App.

171, 517 S.W.3d 427.

                                         III. Analysis

       This court’s recent decision in Carman v. Director, 2023 Ark. App. 51, 660 S.W.3d

852, confirmed that, for purposes of overpayment of state unemployment benefits, the

repayment may be waived “if the director finds that the overpayment was received as a direct

result of an error by the Division of Workforce Services and that its recovery would be against

equity and good conscience.” Carman, 2023 Ark. App. 51, at 7, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (quoting

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021)). Carman also holds that FPUC

repayment may be waived if the State determines that the payment of the FPUC was without

fault on the part of the individual and that such repayment would be contrary to equity and

good conscience. Id. at 8, 660 S.W.3d at 857 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2)).

       In the present case, the Board affirmed and adopted the decision of the Tribunal,

which found that the overpayment of benefits was a result of a final disqualifying Board

determination and not due to an error by the Division. As stated above, to avoid repayment

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of state unemployment benefits, the overpayment must have been caused as a direct result

of the Division’s error, and it must be against principles of equity and good conscience to

require repayment. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-532(b)(2). Because Bridges failed to satisfy

the first prong of her state unemployment-waiver analysis that overpayment was received as

a result of an error by the Division, we affirm the Board’s decision requiring Bridges to repay

$1,296 in state unemployment benefits.

       However, Bridges also received FPUC benefits. For the repayment of federal benefits

to be waived, the Division must find that the federal payments were made without fault on

the part of the claimant and that repayment would be contrary to equity and good

conscience. See 15 U.S.C. § 9023(f)(2). Here, neither the Tribunal nor the Board performed

the required federal-waiver analysis to determine whether the $4,800 in FPUC benefits must

be repaid, and no findings were made with regard to that analysis. Whether sufficient

findings of fact have been made is a threshold question in an appeal from an administrative

board. Id. If adequate findings of fact are not made on the issue presented, we remand to the

Board for it to provide findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which to perform proper

appellate review. Id. Therefore, we must remand for further findings as to, first, whether

Bridges was at fault and, second, whether repayment would be contrary to equity and good

conscience before requiring her to repay the $4,800 in FPUC benefits.

       In sum, we affirm the decision requiring Bridges to repay the $1,296 in state benefits

and remand for further findings regarding whether Bridges is required to repay the $4,800

in FPUC benefits for the reasons set forth above.

                                              4
Affirmed in part; remanded in part.

GRUBER and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Stacy Bridges, pro se appellant.

Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for appellee.

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