Court Opinion

ID: 9868636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:46:13.368814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:49.722967
License: Public Domain

On Motion Fob Rehearing
The Church of Christ Home for the Aged, and other beneficiaries, have filed their petition to rehear, complaining that the Court committed error in holding that their suit was barred by the statute of limitations; that it was also error to hold that Mrs. Hughes ’ dissent from her husband’s will and receipt of a year’s support “was notice that she would treat her agreement with her husband to *643endow the complainants with the remainder of her estate at her death and their mutual wills ‘as a nullity’, and that complainant’s right to sue for such breach accrued' the moment Mrs. Hughes dissented.” Counsel for petitioners argue that the effect of the opinion “will affect radical changes in the laws governing the duties and liabilities of executors, administrators and trustees, and in many instances will destroy the title of beneficiaries of trust estates, especially remaindermen, ’ ’ etc.
This is an erroneous view. The duties and obligations of executors and administrators are not involved in the instant case. Counsel argue the foregoing question as if Mrs. Hughes acquired an interest in her husband’s estate by virtue of the execution of the mutual wills, and that she held it in trust for the remaindermen. As a matter of fact, she took nothing under his will. Mr. Hughes had deeded her his real estate sometime before his death; his entire personal estate was exhausted in paying his funeral expenses and a year’s support to the widow. Since she took nothing under the will, she held nothing in trust for anybody. If it is contended she was a trustee of all . the property by virtue of the contract to make the reciprocal wills, the reply is, she repudiated the contract by dissenting from her husband’s will. When she renounced*all property rights which may have accrued to her by virtue of the mutual agreement, she thereby repudiated the trust. ■ '■! ¡
We have held that the contract between Mr. and Mrs. Hughes was valid. Having survived her husband, she had the right to all the property for her own use for life, and whatever she did not consume she held in trust for the remaindermen. But when she repudiated the trust, she thereby gave notice to the petitioners, remain-dermen, that she was holding all the property in her own *644right and adversely to them. Now by all the authorities, where a person holds property for himself and others, either as joint tenants, tenants in common, or holds it in trust, the statute of limitations commences to run as of the time such holder gives notice of his repudiation of such relationship and claims ownership of the property adversely to all others. In 33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, etc., sec. 188, p. 661, it is said, “Repudiation of a trust for the remaindermen will set the statute of limitations in motion.” Commonwealth v. Clark, 119 Ky. 85, 83 S. W. 100, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 750.
The case of Earp v. Edgington, 107 Tenn. 23, 64 S. W. 40, which involved the question of the revocation of a will, has no application to the instant case and the same may he said of Robinson v. Harrison, 2 Tenn. Ch. 11.
It is furthermore insisted on the brief that, where the widow dissents from the will and receives property to which remaindermen are entitled, she holds the same as trustee, and that “such remaindermen may sue the executor or administrator for such trust property. ’ ’ This is wholly foreign to the issue before us since Mrs Hughes received nothing from the executor but only that which she was entitled to under the law. Moreover, the petitioners did not seek a writ of injunction to restrain Mrs. Hughes from defeating the provisions of the will, as was done in Seat v. Seat, 172 Tenn. 618, 113 S. W. (2d) 751; nor seek any recovery against the executor-trustee in any amount.
The case of Hamilton v. Mound City Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 124, cited by petitioners, does not involve the time as of which the statute commences to run. There the parents were given the use of the property with the right to encroach upon the corpti-s “for their support” and also *645“the power of disposition”. No such situation exists in the instant case.
The contention here made that we have announced a rule which radically affects the administration of estates is unfounded. We have dealt only with the statute of limitations as it affects the rights of beneficiaries under a contract to execute mutual wills where one of the parties repudiates it and claims an interest that is adverse to them.
Petition denied.
All Justices concur.