Court Opinion

ID: 9728860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:17:49.251454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.610808
License: Public Domain

PARAS, Acting P. J.
I offer this separate concurring opinion. (Cf. Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 593 [150 Cal.Rptr. 435, 586 P.2d 916]), to emphasize what I perceive as an obvious and serious oversight in our Penal Code. Any person who fraudulently obtains the consent of another to sexual relations escapes criminal liability (at least as a sex offender under tit. IX of the Pen. Code), unless he (or she) either masquerades as the victim’s spouse (§ 261, subd. 5), or offers marriage in exchange for sexual favors from “an unmarried female of previous chaste character.” (§ 268.) In all other situations, the general rule that fraud in the inducement does not vitiate consent (People v. Harris (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 103 [155 Cal.Rptr. 472]) bars prosecution ‘for a sex offense. A society which has condoned meretricious relationships (cf. Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 [134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106]), should give serious consideration to specific delineation and punishment of conduct as offensive and outrageous as that of the defendant here. The section 261, subdivision 5 distinction between married and unmarried victims seems no longer warranted.