Court Opinion

ID: 9840267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 17:10:51.990058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:11:38.992580
License: Public Domain

J-S29023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  TERRANCE L. BROWN                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 303 MDA 2023

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 6, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002913-2020

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2023
    Appellant, Terrance L. Brown, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment

of sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following

his jury trial conviction for persons not to possess firearms and his open guilty

plea to receiving stolen property, carrying a firearm without a license, resisting

arrest, and possession of drug paraphernalia.1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

          Nicholas Ishman, who has been employed by the Harrisburg
          City Police Department since 2008 and is part of the Vice
          Control and Organized Crime Unit, testified that on May 22,
          2020, he received information from a confidential informant
          (hereinafter “CI”) regarding Appellant. Detective Ishman
          was familiar with Appellant and knew him by the nickname
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105, 3925, 6106, 5104, and 35 P.S. §         780-113(a)(32),
respectively.
J-S29023-23

       of “Duke.” This particular CI had been providing information
       since 2012, and Detective Ishman would sometimes speak
       with the CI multiple times a day. This CI led to the
       apprehension of several dozen fugitives in the past. On May
       22, 202[0], the CI informed Detective Ishman that an
       individual by the nickname of “Zay,” who Detective Ishman
       knew as Jose Andujar was driving a light gray Toyota
       4Runner with the license plate of KRX-4401 and was picking
       up “Duke” aka … Appellant.

       Officer Ishman provided this information to Agent (Allen)
       Shipley, a state parole agent on the Marshals Fugitive Task
       Force because he was aware that Appellant had warrants
       out for his arrest. It was Detective Ishman’s understanding
       that “Zay” was picking “Duke” up during the time he
       received the tip, so the information was specific to that
       particular day.

       Allen Shipley testified that he is a state parole agent
       assigned to the U.S. Marshals Task Force. In the course of
       his duties, Agent Shipley works regularly with Detective
       Ishman and has worked with him since 2010. The two men
       regularly share information regarding individuals who have
       active warrants. Agent Shipley was familiar with Appellant
       and the fact he was wanted, and several weeks prior to that
       date, the task force began looking for Appellant.

       On May 22, 2020, Agent Shipley received information from
       Detective Ishman that Appellant was going to be picked up
       by an individual nicknamed “Zay” driving a gray Toyota
       4Runner with the license plate number KRX-4401. Agent
       Shipley passed this information along to other members of
       the task force, and personally went to the area it was
       believed Appellant was staying, on Thomas Street, to see if
       the vehicle was in that vicinity.

       At the time, Agent Shipley was in his uniform and driving an
       unmarked, civilian type vehicle. Agent Shipley identified the
       vehicle in question in the parking lot of Choice Cigarette
       Outlet. … After Agent Shipley followed the car out of the
       parking lot, he was able to determine that Appellant was not
       the driver of the vehicle. He was unable to identify the
       passenger of the vehicle, initially. Harrisburg Detective
       Ryan Neal used his vehicle to pull in front of the suspect

                                   -2-
J-S29023-23

             vehicle, and Agent Shipley pulled directly behind the suspect
             vehicle, effectively pinning the vehicle between the two
             police cars. It was then that a passenger in the car, who
             was suspected to be Appellant bailed out of the passenger
             seat and threw items in the air, and ran towards another
             detective and Deputy U.S. Marshal, where a struggle
             ensued, and the individual resisted arrest. Agent Shipley
             deployed his taser and the individual was apprehended.
             Agent Shipley had two state parole agents in his vehicle,
             and Deputy Mark Golob.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/24/23, at 3-5) (internal record citations omitted).

          Appellant filed a suppression motion on February 16, 2021, arguing that

officers “did not possess reasonable suspicion or probable cause when they

seized [Appellant], as the reliability of the informant had not been confirmed.”

(Suppression Motion, filed 2/16/21, at 5). The court conducted a suppression

hearing on April 2, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied

relief.     On May 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion for a bifurcated trial.

Specifically, Appellant sought to sever a single count of persons not to possess

firearms      from   the   remaining   charges   contained   within   the    criminal

information. The court subsequently granted Appellant’s motion to bifurcate.

          Appellant proceeded to trial on May 18, 2021. At the conclusion of trial,

the jury found Appellant guilty of persons not to possess firearms, and the

court deferred sentencing. On August 6, 2021, Appellant entered an open

guilty plea to the remaining charges.          Immediately thereafter, the court

accepted the plea and sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of eight and

one-half (8½) to seventeen (17) years’ incarceration. On August 8, 2021,

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion challenging the discretionary

                                         -3-
J-S29023-23

aspects of his sentence. The court denied the post-sentence motion on August

19, 2021. Appellant did not file a notice of appeal.

       On August 10, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se petition seeking

reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc.          The court reinstated

Appellant’s direct appeal rights on February 8, 2023. On February 21, 2023,

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc. On March 8, 2023,

the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal.            Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b)

statement on March 19, 2023.

       Appellant now raises one issue for our review:

          Whether the suppression court erred in denying the motion
          to suppress the evidence seized as violative of unreasonable
          searches and seizures by law enforcement officials because
          they did not possess the required reasonable suspicion?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

       Appellant contends that Detective Ishman sent a text message to Agent

Shipley notifying him about the information from the CI.2 Appellant complains

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, Appellant’s argument references a portion of Agent Shipley’s
cross-examination from the suppression hearing. At that time, defense
counsel questioned Agent Shipley about his report for this case, which
Appellant offered into evidence as an exhibit. (See N.T. Suppression Hearing,
4/2/21, at 44). The report referenced a text message that Agent Shipley
received from Detective Ishman. (Id. at 46). The text message included the
information that Appellant “was going to be picked up by another individual …
by the name of Zay.” (Id. at 47). Agent Shipley added, “I believe we had
phone conversations thereafter, … but what really got our attention was the
text message that came through for the specific incident itself.” (Id.)

                                           -4-
J-S29023-23

that the Commonwealth’s case relied upon the information in the text

message, but the Commonwealth did not actually produce the text message

at the suppression hearing. Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth’s

failure to produce the text message “puts into serious question that the level

of detailed facts possessed by [Agent] Shipley was [able] to reach the

threshold of reasonable suspicion.” (Id. at 14). “While it may have been the

case that [Detective] Ishman possessed somewhat more reliable information

than [Agent] Shipley,” Appellant argues that Agent Shipley did not have a

relationship with the CI; therefore, Agent Shipley lacked enough information

to conduct an investigative detention.           (Id. at 15).     Under these

circumstances, Appellant concludes that this Court must reverse the order

denying Appellant’s suppression motion.3 We disagree.

       The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion

to suppress:

          An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a
____________________________________________

3 In the alternative, Appellant suggests that the suppression court made no

findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See Appellant’s Brief at 20-22). The
record belies this claim. The court provided an on-the-record statement of
conclusions of law at the end of the suppression hearing. (See N.T.
Suppression Hearing at 66-67). Regarding findings of fact, the court provided
a detailed analysis of the interaction between Appellant and the officers in its
Rule 1925(a) opinion.       (See Trial Court Opinion at 3-5).        See also
Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(explaining that Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I) requires suppression court to enter on
record findings of fact and conclusions of law at end of suppression hearing;
where suppression court fails to abide by Rule 581(I), however, Superior Court
may look at suppression court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion to garner findings of fact
and conclusions of law).

                                           -5-
J-S29023-23

         challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
         determining whether the suppression court’s factual
         findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
         conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
         the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court,
         we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth
         and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
         uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
         whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
         supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by
         those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
         conclusions are erroneous.       Where the appeal of the
         determination of the suppression court turns on allegations
         of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are
         not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
         determine if the suppression court properly applied the law
         to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below
         are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018).

      Contacts between the police and citizenry fall within three general

classifications:

         The first [level of interaction] is a “mere encounter” (or
         request for information) which need not be supported by
         any level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
         stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative detention”
         must be supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a
         suspect to a stop and a period of detention, but does not
         involve such coercive conditions as to constitute the
         functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest or
         “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Bryant, 866 A.2d 1143, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal

denied, 583 Pa. 668, 876 A.2d 392 (2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Phinn, 761 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa.Super. 2000)).

      An “investigative detention” is interchangeably labeled as a “stop and

                                     -6-
J-S29023-23

frisk” or a “Terry stop.”4         Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119

(Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 251 A.3d 771 (2021).

          An investigative detention, unlike a mere encounter,
          constitutes a seizure of a person and thus activates the
          protections of Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
          Constitution. To institute an investigative detention, an
          officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that
          criminal activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion requires a
          finding that based on the available facts, a person of
          reasonable caution would believe the intrusion was
          appropriate.

                                       *       *   *

          Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able to
          articulate specific observations which, in conjunction with
          reasonable inferences derived from those observations, led
          him reasonably to conclude, in light of his experience, that
          criminal activity was afoot and that the person he stopped
          was involved in that activity.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa.Super. 2005) (internal

citations omitted).

       “Information provided by informants may supply the police with

reasonable suspicion to make [an investigative detention].” Commonwealth

v. Griffin, 954 A.2d 648, 651 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 760,

967 A.2d 958 (2009).

          When determining whether such information is enough to
          meet the standard, the court should use a totality of the
          circumstances test. Three factors relevant to the analysis
          are: the veracity of the informant, the reliability of the
          information, and the informant’s basis of knowledge.
          Though not strict requirements, these factors help
____________________________________________

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

                                           -7-
J-S29023-23

        determine how much faith law enforcement can place in the
        information they are given.

        First, the veracity of the informant may be partly assessed
        by whether the identity of the informant is known to the
        police or whether the tip is anonymous. An anonymous tip
        is to be treated with particular suspicion, and may not
        provide a basis for [an investigative detention] in situations
        in which information from a known informant would. A
        person whose identity is known to the police is far less likely
        to provide false information out of fear of reprisal. Our
        Supreme Court has explained the distinction, saying: a
        known informant places himself or herself at risk of
        prosecution for filing a false claim if the tip is untrue,
        whereas an unknown informant faces no such risk.

        Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also provided
        guidance on assessing the reliability of the information. If
        an informant is able to provide details about the future
        actions not ordinarily easily predicted, then the information
        is considered to have a higher degree of reliability. This
        ability to predict future events is relevant because only a
        small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s
        itinerary, [and] it is reasonable for police to believe that a
        person with access to such information is likely to also have
        access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal
        activities.

        Basis of knowledge, the third factor, refers to how the
        informant obtained the information. The more intimate the
        basis of knowledge, the more likely the information is to be
        trustworthy.

        These factors serve as a starting point for our analysis.
        However, in a totality of the circumstances test, other
        factors may also be taken into account to form the basis of
        [an investigative detention]. Innocent facts, when taken
        together, may combine to give a police officer reasonable
        suspicion. Moreover, we must give due weight … to the
        specific reasonable inferences [the police officer] is entitled
        to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Id. at 651-52 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

                                     -8-
J-S29023-23

      Instantly, the suppression court made the following conclusions before

it denied Appellant’s suppression motion:

          I think the Commonwealth has established reliability of the
          CI. The CI information was not—in some respects was
          general but in others [was] extremely specific, like the plate
          number. The general description of the vehicle, 4Runner,
          you missed that it was gray, and, in fact, it was.

                                   *    *    *

          The fact that [Appellant] was definitely not the driver
          actually substantiates corroboration of the testimony
          because [Appellant] was to be picked up, not that he was
          going to be driving the vehicle. It was that he would be a
          passenger.

          Now, we do not have the corroboration that it was, in fact,
          [Appellant], but the testimony was that [Appellant] was
          going to be picked up right now. And that’s what, in fact,
          they found, was that someone was being picked up right
          now by a gray 4Runner, Toyota, with a plate number as it
          was, and was substantiated for a period of time. And a
          decision was made to stop the vehicle to actually find out if,
          in fact, the final aspect of the stop, was that [Appellant].

(N.T. Suppression Hearing at 66-67). Based on our review of the record, we

cannot say that the suppression court erred in reaching these legal

conclusions. We also note that Agent Shipley engaged in his own investigation

of Appellant, prior to receiving information from Detective Ishman. (See id.

at 33).    From this prior investigation, Agent Shipley already knew that

Appellant utilized the 4Runner on a previous occasion, and the 4Runner was

one of at least three vehicles linked to Appellant. (Id. at 32, 46).

      Here, the officers knew about an active warrant for Appellant’s arrest.

A known, reliable informant subsequently provided police with information

                                       -9-
J-S29023-23

about Appellant’s itinerary, which the officers corroborated in part. Under the

totality of the circumstances, the officers possessed reasonable suspicion at

the time of the investigative detention. See Griffin, supra; Jones, supra.

See also Commonwealth v. Yong, 644 Pa. 613, 636, 177 A.3d 876, 889

(2018), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 3774, 202 L.Ed.2d 286 (2018)

(holding that Pennsylvania adheres to vertical approach of “collective

knowledge doctrine,” which instructs that officer with requisite level of

suspicion may direct another officer to act in his stead). Thus, the suppression

court properly denied Appellant’s pretrial suppression motion.      See Ford,

supra. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/15/2023

                                     - 10 -