Court Opinion

ID: 9858389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:21:22.560435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:05.679358
License: Public Domain

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from division II of the majority opinion for the same reasons expressed in division II of Justice Larson’s dissent in Montgomery v. Polk County, 278 N.W.2d 911, 920 (Iowa 1979).
I dissent from division III for all of the reasons assigned in my dissent in Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1973). Although the majority indicates Iowa’s Lunday decision is supported by the greater weight of authority, a number of recent decisions have rejected the rationale relied on in that opinion. Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 623-24, 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972); Kossak v. Stalling, 277 N.W.2d 30, 34-35 (Minn.1979) (statutory requirement that suit against city be commenced within one year after notice denied equal protection where the city had actual notice); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 235, 510 P.2d 879, 882-83, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079, 94 S.Ct. 598, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 818-19, 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975); O’Neil v. City of Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504, 508-09 (W.Va.1977).
I would hold section 613A.5 deprived these plaintiffs of equal protection, and affirm.
LARSON, J., joins this dissent.