Court Opinion

ID: 9374927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 17:04:24.618907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.302172
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                COURT OF APPEAL

                                   FIRST CIRCUIT

                                   2022 CA 0823

2-r                          MIDLAND FUNDING LLC

                                      VERSUS

                                STACIA M WELCH

                                           JUDGMENT RENDERED:         FEB 2 4 2013

                                   Appealed from the
                               City Court of Baton Rouge
                   Parish of East Baton Rouge • State of Louisiana
                               Docket Number 09- 07316- E

               The Honorable Judy Moore Vendetto, Presiding Judge

      Garth Jonathan Ridge                             COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
      Baton Rouge, Louisiana                           DEFENDANT— Stacia Wetch

      Adam R. Deniger                                  COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
      Baton Rouge, Louisiana                           PLAINTIFF—   Midland Funding, LLC
       and

      Mary Grace Pollet
      Baton Rouge, Louisiana

                BEFORE: WELCH, PENZATO, AND LANIER, JJ.
WELCH, J.

        In this suit on an open account, the City Court of Baton Rouge sustained an

exception of no cause of action, dismissing debtor' s "   Petition to Annul Judgment,

for Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction to Arrest Garnishment of

Wages"    with prejudice.   For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment and

remand for further proceedings.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        Midland Funding, LLC (" Midland") filed a suit on an open account against

Defendant, Stacia M. Welch (" Ms. Welch"),     on August 10, 2009, in the City Court

of Baton Rouge. The sheriff was unable to serve Ms. Welch with the petition after

a diligent search and inquiry, so Midland filed a motion and order for appointment

of a private process server, which the trial court granted.    According to a service

return filed in the record, Ms. Welch was finally served on January 9, 2010, at

 2104 S.    Sherwood Forest Blvd.     parking lot."     Ms.   Welch did not file any

responsive pleadings, and a default judgment was rendered on March 11, 2010

  the default judgment").     The clerk of court mailed the notice of signing of

judgment to Ms. Welch at the following address:

       2104 S. SHERWOOD FOREST BLVD.
       PARKING LOT
       BATON ROUGE, LA

       In 2019, Midland filed a petition for garnishment, and the trial court ordered

that a writ of fieri facias be issued on August 7, 2019.       Shortly thereafter, Ms.

Welch filed a " Petition to Annul Judgment,           for Preliminary Injunction and

Permanent Injunction to Arrest Garnishment of Wages" (" petition to annul"), in

which she "   explicitly" denied that she was ever served with Midland' s petition or

any other documents associated with this lawsuit in the Sherwood Forest parking

lot.   She further denied that she was ever served with any document associated

with this lawsuit prior to 2019.   Ms. Welch also alleged that notice of the default

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judgment was deficient since the " address to which the notice was sent is not an

actual address"    and that she does not "      have any connection with the address for

any building at 2104 S. Sherwood Forest Blvd." Accordingly, Ms. Welch argued

that garnishment of her wages is premature because notice of the default judgment

was never provided, and therefore, new trial and appeal delays never began to run.

Ms.   Welch prayed        for ( 1)   a judgment annulling the default judgment; (               2)

preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Midland from seizing her

property via garnishment of her wages; and ( 3) attorney' s fees and costs.                 In the

meantime, Midland filed a motion and order to revive the default judgment before

it prescribed and a notice to hold the garnishment in abeyance pending resolution

of Ms. Welch' s concerns regarding the default judgment. Midland also filed an

answer to the petition to annul, in which it asserted failure to state a cause of action

as an affirmative defense,' and a separate opposition to Ms. Welch' s request for

preliminary injunction. Ms. Welch also filed a motion in support of her request for

preliminary injunction.

       The preliminary injunction hearing was held on December 11, 2019.                   At the

conclusion of the trial,       the trial court denied the preliminary injunction and

 determined that Service was proper."          The trial court signed a judgment reflecting

that ruling on or about January 22, 2020.2
       In April 2021,      Midland filed a motion to set its objection raising the

peremptory exception of no cause of action for hearing.             The motion also set forth

the basis for Midland' s exception— that the petition to annul consists primarily of

legal conclusions, which if unsupported by facts, do not establish a cause of action.

 If a party has mistakenly designated a peremptory exception as an affirmative defense, the court
shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1005.
2 Ms. Welch filed a notice of intent to seek supervisory review of this ruling on February 7,
2020. The trial court signed Ms. Welch' s motion, set a return date, and stayed the proceedings
pending resolution of the writ application.    However, Ms. Welch did not file a timely writ
application, and Midland moved to lift the stay. The trial court lifted the stay on April 14, 2021.

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Midland further argued that the private process server reported service on Ms.

Welch, and notice of default judgment was properly mailed in accordance with La.

Code Civ. P. art. 1913( C). 3 Ms. Welch opposed the exception. She argued that the

petition to annul clearly states that she was not served with the original petition

filed by Midland, and the court is required to accept that well -pleaded fact as true

for purposes of the exception of no cause of action. Ms. Welch also asserted that

the petition to annul sought to enjoin garnishment on the basis that it was

premature since service by mail of the notice of judgment was to a parking lot,

which does not constitute " an address" under Article 1913.

       The parties appeared for trial on the exception on December 15, 2021,

during which counsel for Midland argued that "[ t]he suit record reflects that ...

 Ms. Welch]       was served personally with the citation petition . . .           via   private

process server[,]   and she has not alleged any facts that would rebut that prima facie

evidence."    The trial court specifically stated on the record that it considered the

service return.     At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court sustained Midland' s

exception and denied Ms. Welch' s request for an opportunity to amend her petition

per La. Code Civ. P. art. 934.

       The trial court later provided written reasons for judgment at Ms. Welch' s

request.   In its written reasons, the trial court stated,

               Based on the prior Preliminary Injunction ruling in which this
       court determined that service upon Defendant was proper, this court
       again rules that service was proper on the Defendant.

               Plaintiff notes that the Sheriff' s office coordinated with the
       Defendant and met at an agreed upon location that was not her
       domicile or place of employment in order for her to accept service, yet
       the Defendant does not provide any proof of insufficiency of service
       other than her own testimony that she did not receive service.

3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1913( 0) states, " Except when service is required
under Paragraph B of this Article, notice of the signing of a default judgment shall be mailed by
the clerk of court to the defendant at the address where personal service was obtained or to the
last known address of the defendant."

                                               M
                For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff' s Exception of No Cause of
        Action is granted, dismissing the Defendant' s petition to annul and
        Defendant' s alternative fraud and ill practices claim with prejudice. l41

The trial court signed a judgment memorializing its ruling and dismissing the

petition to annul with prejudice on February 24, 2022, from which Ms. Welch now

appeals.

                                   LAW AND DISCUSSION

        The peremptory exception of no cause of action questions whether the law

affords the plaintiff any remedy under the allegations of the petition.                   Cheniere

Construction, Inc.        v.   State through Department of Revenue and Taxation,

2019- 1471 (   La. App.        1st Cir. 9118/ 20), 313 So. 3d 992, 994, writ denied, 2020-

01194 ( La. 1218120), 306 So. 3d 431.             The exception of no cause of action is triable

only on the face of the petition and any attached documentation, and no evidence

may be introduced to support or controvert the objection.                         Tracer Security

Services, Inc. v. Ledet, 2018- 0269 (             La. App.       1st Cir. 9124118), 259 So. 3d 353,

355, citing La. Code Civ. P.             art.   931.       The trial court must presume all well -

pleaded facts are true, must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving       party,   and      must   resolve       any doubts in favor of the petition' s

sufficiency.    See Cheniere Constr., 313 So. 3d at 995.                 An exception of no cause

of action should be granted "        only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of any claim that would entitle him to relief."

Tracer Sec. Servs., 259 So. 3d at 355, quoting State of Louisiana, by and

through Caldwell v. Astra Zeneca AB, 2.016- 1073 (                     La. App.   1st Cir. 4111118),

249 So. 3d 38, 42 ( en bane), writs denied, 2018- 00766 & 2018- 0758 ( La. 9/ 21/ 18),

252 So. 3d 899 & 904.          The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a

4 In her appellate brief, Ms. Welch specifically states that she is not appealing her " alternative
fraud and ill practices claim."

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cause of action is on the exceptor, and an appellate court reviews a denial of an

exception of no cause of action de novo. Cheniere Constr., 313 So. 3d at 995.

      A final judgment may be annulled under three circumstances. Those limited

circumstances include judgments rendered:

         1) Against an incompetent person not represented as required by law.

         2) Against a defendant who has not been served with process as

      required by law and who has not waived objection to jurisdiction, or
      against whom a valid default judgment has not been taken.

         3) By a court which does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
      of the suit.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 2002( A). In order to state a cause of action for annulment of

the default judgment, Ms. Welch needed only to allege facts sufficient to support

grounds for which the default judgment could be annulled..                See Alderdice v.

Board of Sup' rs of Louisiana State University and Agr.                    and Mechanical

College, 2012- 0148 ( La. App. 4th Cir. 7125112),        107 So. 3d 7, 11.       Ms. Welch

explicitly denied she was served with Midland' s petition.                In the absence of

evidence of proper citation and service of process informing the defendant of the

claim against him, in strict compliance of the law, all subsequent proceedings are

absolutely null.     Brown v. Stratis Construction, LLC, 2021- 0964 ( La. App.             1st

Cir. 317122), 341 So. 3d 640, 646. Therefore, if Ms. Welch is able to prove at trial

that she was not served with Midland' s petition, there would be grounds for

annulling the default judgment pursuant to Article 2002( A)( 2),             which in turn

would be grounds for a permanent injunction on the garnishment of Ms. Welch' s

wages.

      We acknowledge that the trial court made a prior factual finding during the

preliminary injunction hearing that service was made on Ms. Welch.                   However,

consideration   of anything     beyond the       allegations   of   the   petition   and   any

                                          reel
attachments thereto is improper on an exception of no cause of action.'                     See

Tracer Sec. Servs., 259 So. 3d at 355.         The court' s inquiry on an exception of no

cause of action is limited to determining whether the law provides a remedy to

anyone if the facts alleged in the petition are proved at trial. See Farmco, Inc. v.

West Baton Rouge Parish Governing Council, 2001- 1086 (                     La. 6115101),   789

So. 2d 568, 569 (   per curium).      Further, a court exceeds its limited scope on an

exception of no cause of action by reaching the merits.                   See Id.   Ms. Welch

asserted that she was not served, and assuming that fact is true ( as one must on an

exception of no cause of action),        we are constrained to conclude the trial court

exceeded its limited scope on an exception of no cause of action.             Accordingly, we

reverse the trial court' s judgment that granted the exception of no cause of action

and dismissed Ms. Welch' s petition to annul.

                                          DECREE

       For the above and foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court' s February

24, 2022 judgment granting the exception of no cause of action filed by Midland

Funding, LLC and dismissing Stacia M. Welch' s "           Petition to Annul Judgment, for

Preliminary Injunction and Permanent Injunction to Arrest Garnishment of Wages"

with prejudice.    This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

All costs of this appeal are assessed to Appellee, Midland Funding, LLC.

       REVERSED AND REMANDED.

 Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes an exception to the rule against the admission of evidence
to support or controvert an exception of no cause of action— when evidence is admitted without

objection, it may be considered by the court as enlarging the pleadings.   Beem v. Beem, 2020-
0897 ( La. App. lst Cir. 4120121),324 So. 3d 682, 686. However, the transcript from the hearing
on Midland' s exception does not reflect the admission of any evidence.

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