Court Opinion

ID: 9776510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:38:13.258401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.338681
License: Public Domain

*402DUNN, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority as to all points of error, with one exception. As to point of error one, I respectfully dissent.
The appellant complains, in its first point of error, that there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to support the court’s finding that the vehicle had no value at the time of purchase. The majority excerpts testimony of the appellee and her husband, pertaining to the intrinsic value (value to her) of the vehicle in question, ignoring her previous testimony that supports the Court’s finding that the value of the vehicle at the time of purchase was “0.”
The following is the testimony excerpted by the majority in their attempt to support their conclusion that “... there is no evidence to support a finding that the vehicle was worthless, ...” but placed in context. On cross-examination the appellee was asked the date she met with the General Motors representative:
Q. I just want to know if you can tell us when you learned of it — when you learned of the repair work that you say you would not have bought the vehicle had you known about it....
[[Image here]]
A. You ask me would I have bought that — or the value of the vehicle was. And my assessment is zero in light of the fact that prior ownership and prior damage to the vehicle. And the repairs, had I known that, no, I would not have bought the vehicle. It would not have been worth a cent to me.
(The portion quoted by the majority is underlined.)
Further, the appellee’s husband’s testimony, quoted by the majority, was in answer to a question about the value of the vehicle in its present state. Her husband answered as follows:
Q. Okay. As the owner of the vehicle, more especially as an attorney, do you have an opinion as to what the value of that vehicle is in its present state having to disclose all of the known defects?
A. Mr. Bradt, as the owner of that vehicle, I would believe it has no value.
(Emphasis added.)
The majority ignores testimony of the appellee in support of the court’s finding pertaining to the value of the vehicle, considering its mechanical condition, at the time it was sold, which is as follows:
Q. As the owner of the vehicle, do you have an opinion as to what that vehicle was worth at the time that it was sold to you in the condition that it was sold to you?
A. It wouldn’t have been worth anything.
Q. Okay. Why not?
A. Because it was a defective vehicle. An unsafe vehicle.
On cross examination, Rhea Elliott testified:
Q. Okay. As I understood your testimony earlier, the car was worthless in your opinion because of the condition at the time that you were sold it. Is that right?
A. That is correct.
Q. Zero was the value?
A. That’s correct.
In addition to the above testimony, the appellee testified that she paid $17,320.00 for the automobile. I would find that there is sufficient probative evidence to support the court’s finding and the test for the measure of damages, i.e. “(1) The out of pocket measure, which is the difference between the value of that which was parted with (i.e. $17,320.00) and the value of that which was received (i.e. “0”)”.
Under Tex.R.Evid. 701, a lay witness is qualified to render an opinion so long as it is “rationally based” on her perception, and is “helpful” to a clear understanding of a fact in issue.
An owner of property can prove market value by her opinion testimony, even though she may not be qualified to testify about the value of like property belonging to another. Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 504. She is prima facie qualified to state her opinion if she declares she knows the market value. Bavarian Autohaus, Inc. v. *403Holland, 570 S.W.2d 110, 115 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ). However, if, as in this case, the owner is not asked specifically if she knows the market value, we look to her testimony to determine if the opinion expressed by the owner as to value refers to market value, as distinguished from its intrinsic value or its personal value to her. Powell-Buick-Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bowers, 718 S.W.2d 12, 15 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). If the owner’s articulated basis for her opinion does not affirmatively demonstrate that the value is personal to her, she has prima facie established her qualification to testify about market value. Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 505; see also Bowers, 718 S.W.2d at 15.
The only testimony tending to establish the market value of the vehicle sold to the appellee, based on its actual condition at the time it was delivered, came from the appellee. Although she testified to the value of the vehicle to her, this testimony is unnecessary to the determination of the issue and can be ignored by the court. There is no testimony in this record that questions, or diminishes, her testimony of market value of the vehicle in its condition at the time of delivery. Neither Dot-tie Allred, nor John Gilbert testified concerning the value of this vehicle in its defective condition, at the time of its delivery. The majority indicates that they testified as to “this vehicle.” Their testimony referred to the value of any vehicle of this type, the only criteria being that it was a used vehicle without giving any consideration to the mechanical condition of the car involved herein.
Appellee’s attorney, in posing the question to the appellee, used the term “worth” in attempting to establish the market value of the vehicle at the time of purchase. There was no personal application of the term “worth” to the appellee herself. The appellee’s answer established the basis of her opinion, i.e., the defective and unsafe condition of the vehicle. There were no “personal” reasons given, as in Porras and Vista, quoted by the majority, and she did not engage in speculation, or equivocation, about the vehicle’s value as in Walters. I would find that her testimony sufficiently refers to market value and not personal value. Therefore, she made a prima facie demonstration of her qualification to state her opinion. It was left for the appellant to impeach her testimony through cross-examination, or to rebut it through the testimony of witnesses. Hillin v. Hagler, 286 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1956, no writ).
Further, there was no objection by the appellant to the appellee’s testimony as there was in Vista and Porras. She was not taken on voir dire examination by the appellant as to her competency. In the absence of such a request, the competence of the witness is established. Cortez v. Mascarro, 412 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, no writ). The strength or weakness of the qualifications of the witness is merely a factor to be considered by the court in weighing the testimony. Johnson v. Egert, 233 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.Civ. App.—Galveston 1950, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Considering the foregoing, I would overrule the appellant’s no evidence and insufficiency points of error, and hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the court’s finding of $17,820.00 in actual damages.