Court Opinion

ID: 9838357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:10:14.975155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:52.203358
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 29, 2023

                                              In The
                                Court of Appeals
                         Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                     No. 05-19-00092-CR

                           SYED SARTAJ NAWAZ, Appellant
                                       V.
                           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court
                               Collin County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 199-81120-2017

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REMAND
                  Before Justices Pedersen, III, Garcia,1 and Breedlove2
                            Opinion by Justice Pedersen, III
       This case is on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for our

determination of whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant’s

conviction for violation of section 22.04(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code. See Nawaz

1
  The Honorable Dennise Garcia succeeded the Honorable Bill Whitehill, a member of the original panel.
Justice Garcia has reviewed the briefs and the record before the Court.
2
  The Honorable Justice Maricela Moore Breedlove succeeded the Honorable Lana Myers, a member of
the original panel. Justice Breedlove has reviewed the briefs and the record before the Court.
v. State, 663 S.W.3d 739, 742 n.3, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). We affirm the trial

court’s judgment.3

                                         Standard of Review

        In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court adopts a perspective

that favors the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable

inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);

Whatley v. State, 445 S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The duty of weighing the evidence,

drawing reasonable inferences, and resolving conflicts in testimony lies with the fact

finder. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The

reviewing court accords deference to the fact finders’ credibility determinations and

the weight assigned to the witnesses' testimony since they hold the exclusive

authority in making such determinations. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. The

reviewing court considers all evidence presented in the record, regardless of its

admissibility. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

Additionally, the cumulative impact of the entire body of evidence is taken into

3
  As this case is on remand and the parties are familiar with the facts of the underlying cause, we will not
fully recite them in this opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. Instead we will incorporate the background
information detailed in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion, see Nawaz, 663 S.W.3d 739,
and in our original opinion. See Nawaz v. State, No. 05-19-00092-CR, 2021 WL 1884551 (Tex. App.—
Dallas May 11, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication), rev’d in part, 663 S.W.3d 739, 748 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022). We will, however, provide supplemental facts pertinent to the issue in this appeal.

                                                   –2–
account during the review process. See Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018).

      When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, a reviewing court does

not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact

finder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Isassi v. State,

330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Additionally, the jury may use

common sense, common knowledge, personal experience, and observations from

life when drawing inferences. See Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2014).

                                      Discussion

      Appellant contends the evidence that he caused “serious mental deficiency,

impairment, or injury” is insufficient as a matter of law. See PENAL § 22.04(a)(2).

Appellant also contends the State’s evidence of developmental delay is simply

additional proof of injury to a child under section 22.04(a)(1) of the penal code.

      In its entirety, section 22.04(a) of the penal code provides:

      (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,
         recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally,
         knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes a child, elderly
         individual, or disabled individual:

              (1) serious bodily injury

              (2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or

              (3) bodily injury.

                                          –3–
PENAL § 22.04(a).

      Specifically, appellant complains Dr. Kristine Reeder’s testimony that A.R.’s

cognitive and developmental deficiencies are from A.R.'s traumatic brain injury and

only supports a finding of serious bodily injury under section 22.04(a)(1). We reject

appellant’s contention and find the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction

for knowingly causing serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury under

section 22.04(a)(2).

      The burden fell upon the State to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that

appellant knowingly caused “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” to

A.R., a child below the age of fourteen, as required by Section 22.04(a)(2). See PENAL

§ 22.04(a)(2). Appellant correctly contends that the definition of “serious bodily

injury” includes protracted impairment of any bodily organ but that the statute does

not explicitly state a legal definition of “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or

injury.” PENAL § 22.04(a)(2); see Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 575 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2023). When there is no definition or technical meaning provided for a word

or phrase, the terms are typically given their plain and ordinary meaning. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.011(a) (“Words and phrases shall be read in context and

construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”); see also State v.

Bolles, 541 S.W.3d 128, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (in context of sufficiency

review, stating “jurors may ‘freely read [undefined] statutory language to have any

meaning which is acceptable in common parlance’” and quoting Kirsch v. State, 357

                                         –4–
S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 20120)). “‘In determining [the] plain meaning’

of an undefined statutory term, ‘we can consult dictionary definitions ... read words

in context, [and] apply[ ] rules of grammar[.]’” State v. Bolles, 541 S.W.3d at 138

(quoting Ex parte Ingram, 533 S.W.3d 887, 893-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).

      The statutory phrase at issue here, “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or

injury,” uses terms with common meanings that are readily understandable by jurors.

The term “deficiency” by itself means “the quality or state of being deficient,” which

in turn means “lacking in some necessary quality or element,” or “not up to a normal

standard   or   complement.”      Deficiency,    MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020). “Impairment” means “diminishment or loss of function

or ability.” Impairment, id. “Mental deficiency” is defined as “a deficiency in

cognitive functioning, specifically, intellectual disability.” Mental deficiency, id.

      With the foregoing statutory terms and their ordinary meanings in mind, we

now turn to consider the evidence at hand to evaluate whether any rational juror

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory element of “serious

mental deficiency, impairment, or injury” was satisfied here.

      The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently provided an example of what

constitutes insufficient evidence of “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or

injury.” Edwards, 666 S.W.3d. 571. In that case, the State presented evidence a child

had ingested “a large amount of cocaine.” Id. at 576. The only additional testimony,

however, described “possible” or “potential” side effects from the child’s cocaine

                                          –5–
ingestion that “could” occur in the future, but without any definite testimony that the

child had in fact suffered from a “serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury.”

Id. at 576-77. The testimony in the trial below was materially different.

       Testimony provided by A.R.'s pediatrician revealed that prior to the inflicted

injury, the child exhibited typical growth patterns and developmental milestones,

indicating good health. However, following the incident, A.R. required frequent

therapy sessions to aid her in reaching an appropriate developmental level for her

age.

       To establish serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury, the State

offered testimony from Dr. Reeder that the abusive head trauma caused the holes in

A.R.'s brain that delayed her development, and may have caused cognitive

impairment. Dr. Reeder opined that it was too soon to say what the extent of A.R.'s

mental injury or deficiency would be. She explained that A.R. would never be

completely normal and would always be at risk for seizure. A.R. was unable to track

objects and never focused on anything. Dr. Reeder also determined that A.R. was

developmentally delayed. A.R. had been receiving therapy multiple times a week to

help her achieve age-appropriate development. According to Dr. Reeder's expert

testimony, A.R. exhibited delays in meeting milestones and lagged behind

developmentally, falling short of expectations for a six-month-old infant. At the time

of assessment, the full extent of the consequences stemming from A.R.’s injuries

could not be definitively determined, as stated by Dr. Reeder. The potential

                                         –6–
outcomes regarding A.R.'s physical capabilities, such as walking, running, climbing,

as well as her cognitive abilities within an educational setting, including the

possibility of normal speech, remained uncertain. These uncertainties were explicitly

acknowledged during Dr. Reeder's testimony, where she expressed concerns

regarding behavioral issues, learning difficulties, and hearing impairments.

      The record contains legally sufficient evidence that appellant caused A.R. to

experience serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury. See PEN. § 22.04(a)(2).

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

190092f.u05                                /Bill Pedersen, III//
Do not publish                             BILL PEDERSEN, III
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)                    JUSTICE

                                        –7–
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

SYED SARTAJ NAWAZ, Appellant                 On Appeal from the 199th Judicial
                                             District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-19-00092-CR         V.                Trial Court Cause No. 199-81120-
                                             2017.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Opinion delivered by Justice
                                             Pedersen, III. Justices Garcia and
                                             Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 29th day of August, 2023.

                                       –8–