Court Opinion

ID: 9567659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:56:28.756767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:39.473310
License: Public Domain

MELTON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the evidence does not support a finding that Bell acted in the heat of passion to repel the attack. Because there is some evidence in this case that Bell could have acted out of a sudden passion, without malice aforethought, in shooting his attacker, see OCGA § 16-5-2 (a), I would hold that it was error for the trial court to refuse Bell’s request for a charge on voluntary manslaughter.
The distinguishing characteristic between voluntary manslaughter and justifiable homicide is whether the accused was so influenced and excited that he reacted passionately rather than simply to defend himself. Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117 (2) (210 SE2d 659) (1974). Passion engendered by some danger, heated arguments, and physical altercations, are all sufficient provocations for a voluntary manslaughter conviction, and all were present in this confrontation. See Miller v. State, 223 Ga. App. 311, 312 (477 SE2d 430) (1996); Mims v. State, 180 Ga. App. 3 (1) (348 SE2d 498) (1986); Woody v. State, 262 Ga. 327 (2) (418 SE2d 35) (1992). Nevertheless, the majority determines that the victim’s conduct before the shooting mandated only a justification instruction. Bell’s trial testimony of the circumstances surrounding the attack show that sufficient provocation existed to raise the jury issue of whether Bell was so aroused that he reacted with a sudden passion rather than simply to defend himself. Bell testified that the victim pulled up alongside him and motioned for Bell to come towards the truck. When Bell leaned into the open passenger door, the victim began yelling at him about being “ripped off’ for some drugs. This verbal threat together with the victim’s conduct in “reaching out and grabbing” Bell, threatening to drag Bell down the street with his truck, and then “slapping away” Bell’s hand as Bell attempted to turn off the ignition, supplied sufficient provocation to excite the passion necessary for voluntary manslaughter.
Where the evidence supports both, reliance on a justification defense does not preclude a charge on the lesser included crime of voluntary manslaughter. Woody v. State, supra. If there is the slightest doubt under the evidence as to whether voluntary manslaughter is involved, the trial judge has the duty to submit that issue to the jury. Id. The sufficiency of the provocation was an issue for the jury to *569determine based on evidence established at trial that the victim yelled at Bell, grabbed his jacket and held him in the cab of the truck while threatening to drive off. Because facts surrounding the attack established the evidence of passion and provocation needed to authorize a voluntary manslaughter charge, Reynolds v. State, 271 Ga. 174 (3) (517 SE2d 51) (1999), the trial court erred in declining to give the requested charge. Coleman v. State, 256 Ga. 306 (1) (348 SE2d 632) (1986). Compare Paul v. State, 274 Ga. 601 (3) (b) (555 SE2d 716) (2001) (words alone cannot constitute serious provocation).
Decided April 25, 2006
Reconsideration denied May 19, 2006.
Michael L. Edwards, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Melanie Higgins, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Laura DAnn Dyes, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Sears joins in this dissent.