Court Opinion

ID: 9913353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 19:05:43.112249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:42.086299
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

               NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NO. A-1673-22

ANTONIO FUSTER and
BRIANNA DEVINE,

     Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.                                        December 27, 2023

TOWNSHIP OF CHATHAM                     APPELLATE DIVISION

and GREGORY LACONTE,
in his official capacity as
Records Custodian,

     Defendants-Respondents.
__________________________

           Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023

           Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.

           On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
           Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-1814-22.

           CJ Griffin argued the cause for appellants (Pashman
           Stein Walder Hayden, PC, attorneys; CJ Griffin, on the
           briefs).

           Peter Joseph King argued the cause for respondents
           (King Moench & Collins, LLP, attorneys; Peter Joseph
           King, on the brief).

     The opinion of the court was delivered by

PEREZ FRISCIA, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned).
      Plaintiffs Antonio Fuster and Brianna Devine appeal from a January 17,

2023 Law Division order which entered judgment in favor of defendants

Township of Chatham and its custodian of records Gregory LaConte. Plaintiffs

had requested, under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1

to -13, and the common law right of access, the release of a body worn camera

(BWC) video-recorded statement that Fuster had provided to a Chatham Police

Department (Department) officer regarding allegations of sexual misconduct

against plaintiffs' special needs son. The statement was recorded pursuant to the

Body Worn Camera Law (BWCL), N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.3 to -118.5.

Defendants denied release of the recording, claiming that the video was

confidential.   After hearing argument on the order to show cause seeking

disclosure, the motion judge found the BWC recording was exempt under OPRA

and not subject to release under the common law right of access. As a result,

the judge denied plaintiffs' OPRA fee application.

      Plaintiffs' argument that the BWCL's exemption provision, N.J.S.A.

40A:14-118.5(l), abrogates OPRA's exemptions is without merit. We conclude

OPRA's exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), applies to preclude disclosure of the

BWC recording because our case law has long-established that information

received by law enforcement regarding an individual who was not arrested or

charged is confidential and not subject to disclosure. See N. Jersey Media Grp.,

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                                       2
Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447 N.J. Super. 182, 204 (App. Div.

2016). A review of the plain language of the BWCL's inspection provision,

N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k), which provides that a review of a BWC recording is

subject to OPRA, demonstrates the four exemptions listed in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-

118.5(l) are in addition to OPRA's exemptions. Further, reading OPRA in pari

materia with the BWCL demonstrates the Legislature did not intend to preclude

the application of OPRA's exemptions to BWC recordings.

      We further reject plaintiffs' argument they are entitled to the BWC

recording under the common law right of access. We conclude the common law

right of access does not compel release of the BWC recording because under the

balancing of interests factors established by our Supreme Court in Loigman v.

Kimmelman, 102 N.J. 98, 113 (1986), law enforcement's and the individual's

interests in confidentiality outweigh the public's and plaintiffs' interests in

disclosure.

      Therefore, we affirm the judge's order that plaintiffs were not entitled to

disclosure of the BWC recording under either OPRA or the common law right

of access.

                                       I.

      We discern the following pertinent facts from the record. On May 25,

2022, Fuster went to the Department to report alleged sexual mis conduct

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perpetrated against his son by a male relative. An investigatory interview

occurred at the police station, which was recorded by an officer using a BWC.

Fuster did not witness the alleged misconduct he reported.

      The Department, along with other agencies, investigated the allegations

and determined there was insufficient probable cause to file charges. The

Department notified plaintiffs of the decision not to prosecute.     Plaintiffs

strongly disagreed with this determination.

      Fuster emailed a request for copies of police reports and his video-

recorded statement pursuant to OPRA. Ten days later, the Department's records

clerk responded by email, providing copies of the police reports but denying

disclosure of the video recording. The Department explained that the request

for the BWC video was denied because it related to a juvenile case, which

resulted in no charges.

      Thereafter, plaintiffs made several requests, all of which were denied.

The next day, Fuster sought the BWC video "under the [c]ommon [l]aw right of

access." Fuster next requested preservation of the "recordings indefinitely in

their original unaltered form." Devine also requested to review "the BWC

video." On behalf of the Department, LaConte denied her request, stating

"[a]fter reviewing the [video] footage, disclosure would not advance the public

interest to warrant disclosure. Any disclosure could potentially impede agency

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investigative functions by providing info[rm]ation potentially involving third

parties, who also have a privacy right."       A list of OPRA exemptions was

attached.

      Plaintiffs filed an order to show cause and a two-count verified complaint,

seeking release of the video. Plaintiffs alleged the Department erred in denying

disclosure of the BWC video because: OPRA required "readily accessible"

review of the "government record" since the BWCL abrogated the application

of OPRA's exemptions; and under the common law right of access plaintiffs

established a "significant interest" and "need."        Plaintiffs also requested

attorney's fees under OPRA. Defendants filed an answer and opposition.

      After argument, the judge entered an order, accompanied by a cogent

written statement of reasons, granting judgment in favor of defendants and

denying plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees.

      On appeal, plaintiffs argue the judge's order was erroneous because: the

clear language of the BWCL provisions, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(j)(2) to (3), (k),

mandates disclosure of the video recording as no exemption exists under

N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l) and OPRA's exemptions are abrogated; a common law

right of access to the video exists; and they are entitled to attorney's fees under

OPRA. In opposition, defendants maintain disclosure is precluded under OPRA

because the BWCL does not preempt OPRA's exemptions, plaintiffs do not

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prevail under the common law balancing of interests, and there is no entitlement

to attorney's fees.

                                        II.

      "[D]eterminations about the applicability of OPRA and its exemptions are

legal conclusions" reviewable de novo. ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors

Ass'n of N.J., 474 N.J. Super. 243, 256 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Carter v. Doe

(In re N.J. Firemen's Ass'n Obligation), 230 N.J. 258, 273-74 (2017)), certif.

granted, 253 N.J. 396 (2023). Our review of "the determination regarding the

common law right of access is de novo as well." Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off.,

447 N.J. Super. at 194.

      To effectuate the Legislature's intent when interpreting a statute, a court

must first examine the plain language and ascribe to its words their ordinary

meaning. Conforti v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 163 (2023). "Where

statutory language is clear, courts should give it effect unless it is evident that

the Legislature did not intend such meaning." Bubis v. Kassin, 184 N.J. 612,

626 (2005) (quoting Rumson Ests., Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338,

354 (2003)). We "ascribe[] to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and

significance and read[] them in context with related provisions so as to give

sense to the legislation as a whole." W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023)

(quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). "If the language [of a

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                                        6
statute] is clear, the court's job is complete." In re DiGuglielmo, 252 N.J. 350,

360 (2022) (quoting In re Expungement Application of D.J.B., 216 N.J. 433,

440 (2014)). On appeal, the interpretation of a statute is reviewed de novo. In

re Registrant H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020).

      "When 'a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result,

contrary to public policy,' or 'would lead to results inconsistent with the overall

purpose of the statute,' such interpretations should be rejected in favor of the

spirit of the law." Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447 N.J. Super. at 199

(quoting Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 392-93 (2001)). A court may examine

"legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction" to

determine legislative intent. DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492-93 (quoting Cherry

Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)). "When considering the

meaning of legislation, we assume the Legislature is 'thoroughly conversant with

its own legislation and the judicial construction of its statutes.'" Est. of Burns,

ex rel. Burns v. Care One at Stanwick, LLC, 468 N.J. Super. 306, 319 (App.

Div. 2021) (quoting Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174 (1969)).

      "When two or more statutory schemes are analyzed, they 'should be read

in pari materia and construed together as a unitary and harmonious whole.'"

Liberty Ins. Corp. v. Techdan, LLC, 253 N.J. 87, 103-04 (2023) (quoting State

v. Nance, 228 N.J. 378, 395 (2017)). "OPRA requires government agencies to

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                                        7
balance the public's strong interest in disclosure of government records 'with the

need to safeguard from public access personal information that would violate a

reasonable expectation of privacy.'" Scheeler v. Off. of the Governor, 448 N.J.

Super. 333, 348 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198

N.J. 408, 427 (2009)).

                                        A.

                                BWCL and OPRA

      The Legislature enacted the BWCL, which became operative on June 1,

2021, mandating that officers utilize "a [BWC] that electronically records audio

and video" to capture their activities, with limited exceptions. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-

118.3(a). The BWCL provides that a BWC "shall be activated whenever [an]

officer is responding to a call for service or at the initiation of any other law

enforcement or investigative encounter between an officer and a member of the

public." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(c)(1). The recording must "be retained for not

less than 180 days from the date it was recorded . . . and shall be subject to . . .

additional retention periods" such as a minimum three-year period. N.J.S.A.

40A:14-118.5(j).

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                                         8
      The BWCL specifically clarifies that BWC video recordings are not

considered "criminal investigatory record[s]" 1 exempt from disclosure under

OPRA and provides four exemptions from "public inspection" of BWC video

under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l).2 The exemptions apply to recordings that: are

"not subject to a minimum three-year retention"; "capture[] images involving an

encounter about which a complaint has been registered" and the complainant

requests non-disclosure; are subject to a minimum three-year retention period

and law enforcement determines they are of "evidentiary or exculpatory" value

or for training purposes; and a member of the public, a parent or legal guardian,

or next of kin for a decedent who is the subject of the video recording requested

non-disclosure. N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l), (j). However, separate from the

exemption provision, under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k), the BWCL specifies that

a "member of the public, parent [,]or legal guardian . . . shall be permitted to

1
  Under OPRA, a "'[c]riminal investigatory record' means a record which is not
required by law to be made, maintained or kept on file that is held by a law
enforcement agency which pertains to any criminal investigation or related civil
enforcement proceeding." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.
2
  We observe that the BWCL legislative history contemplates exemptions under
OPRA and provides the criminal investigation exemption of public records does
not apply. "The bill also specifies when video footage from a [BWC] is exempt
from the State['s] open public records act. Recent case law has held that police
video recordings are exempt from public disclosure under the State['s] open
public records act because they pertain to criminal investigations." N.J. Assemb.
Comm. Statement to A. 4312 (Jan. 1, 2021).

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                                       9
review the [BWC] recording in accordance with the provisions of [OPRA]."

(Emphasis added).

      Thus, in determining OPRA's application to the BWCL, we "must begin

with the recognition that the Legislature created OPRA intending to make

governmental records 'readily accessible' to the state's citizens 'with certain

exceptions[] for the protection of the public interest.'" Gilleran v. Township of

Bloomfield, 227 N.J. 159, 170 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1). To effectuate that purpose, OPRA establishes "a comprehensive

framework for access to public records." Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J.

51, 57 (2008).

      "The public's right to disclosure, while broad, is not unlimited." Bozzi v.

City of Jersey City, 248 N.J. 274, 284 (2021). "OPRA . . . exempts more than

twenty categories of records" from disclosure.         Rivera v. Union Cnty.

Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 141 (2022) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1). "[I]f a

document falls within one of these categories, it is not a government record and

not subject to disclosure pursuant to OPRA." Commc'ns Workers of Am. v.

Rousseau, 417 N.J. Super. 341, 355 (App. Div. 2010).

      Accordingly, OPRA directs that "all government records shall be subject

to public access unless exempt," and "a public agency has a responsibility and

an obligation to safeguard from public access a citizen's personal information

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with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate the

citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. In assessing the

sufficiency of an agency's reasons for nondisclosure, "a court must be guided by

the overarching public policy in favor of a citizen's right of access." Courier

News v. Hunterdon Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 358 N.J. Super. 373, 383 (App. Div.

2003) (citing N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1). The government agency has "the burden of

proving that the denial of access is authorized by law. . . . A requestor who

prevails in any proceeding shall be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee."

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6.

      Relevant here is OPRA's disclosure exemption for government records

deemed privileged or confidential. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-

9(b) provides:

                  The provisions of [OPRA] . . . shall not abrogate
            or erode any executive or legislative privilege or grant
            of confidentiality heretofore established or recognized
            by the Constitution of this State, statute, court rule or
            judicial case law, which privilege or grant of
            confidentiality may duly be claimed to restrict public
            access to a public record or government record.

      Government records involving "a person who has not been arrested or

charged with an offense are entitled to confidentiality based upon long -

established judicial precedent." Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447 N.J. Super.

at 189. "Therefore, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), an exemption exists under

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                                       11
OPRA that precludes a custodian of records from disclosing whether such

records exist in response to an OPRA request." Ibid. Disclosure of records

concerning a person who was ultimately not charged implicates "the integrity

and effectiveness of law enforcement efforts for the benefit of the public at

large." Id. at 204. Additionally, "the grant of confidentiality protects the

privacy interest of the individual who, lacking an opportunity to challenge

allegations in court, would face irremediable public condemnation." Ibid.

      Although plaintiffs acknowledge OPRA generally applies to the release

of law enforcement government records, they argue the BWCL, N.J.S.A.

40A:14-118.5(l), precludes law enforcement's non-disclosure under an OPRA

exemption. Plaintiffs maintain OPRA's exemptions are inapplicable because the

BWCL disclosure provision exclusively provides only four enumerated

exemptions. Essentially, plaintiffs seek a statutory interpretation of the BWCL

that abrogates OPRA's exemptions.

      Plaintiffs specifically argue the BWCL prohibits the application of

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b)—OPRA's exemption of government records deemed

confidential under "judicial case law." Plaintiffs argue the judicial precedent

established in Bergen County Prosecutor's Office, 447 N.J. Super. at 189, which

provides records of a person who is not arrested or charged are confidential and

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not subject to disclosure, "cannot apply to a record[ing]" under the BWCL. We

disagree.

      It is undisputed that BWC recordings are government records. Under the

BWCL, police officers are required, with limited exceptions, to initiate video

recordings at a "law enforcement or investigative encounter" with "a member of

the public." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(c)(1). Additionally, Fuster had standing to

request review of the video as a member of the public who was the "[s]ubject of

the [BWC] footage."       See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(a), (k).       Further, it is

undisputed the four enumerated exemptions under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l) are

inapplicable to plaintiffs' disclosure requests. Thus, we turn to the applic ation

of OPRA's exemptions to the BWCL.

      The plain language of the BWCL's inspection provision, N.J.S.A. 40A:14-

118.5(k), provides that a review of a video is subject to OPRA. Thus, we

conclude the exemptions listed in N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l) are in addition to

OPRA's exemptions. To interpret the BWCL otherwise would ignore the fact

that the inspection provision under subsection (k), which provides for review

subject to OPRA, precedes the four exemptions enumerated in subsection (l).

See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k), (l).        Subsection (l), as discussed above,

specifically states that BWC recordings are not criminal investigatory records

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under OPRA, and the enumerated exemptions relate to the BWC recordings

created. See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(l).

      We next turn to the specific OPRA exemption at issue here. N.J.S.A.

47:1A-9(b) precludes disclosure of government documents that "judicial case

law" has "established or recognized" as "privilege[d]" or "confidential[]." It is

well-established that disclosure of government records may be precluded

because "confidentiality [exists] to protect innocent persons whose names have

been mentioned but have not been charged." Daily Journal v. Police Dep't of

Vineland, 351 N.J. Super. 110, 124 (App. Div. 2002). Thus, not all exemptions

are "those enumerated as protected categories within the four corners of OPRA."

Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447 N.J. Super. at 201. Nor, we discern, are the

exceptions contained within the purview of the BWCL. We conclude that the

video was exempt from disclosure under judicial case law.

      Nonetheless, a review of the plain language of these two statutes, read as

a harmonious whole, demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to preclude

the application of OPRA's recognized exemptions. Rather, under the BWCL,

the Legislature: recognized and mandated recordings would not be exempt as

criminal investigation records under OPRA; provided specific exemptions for

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ongoing investigations; 3 and provided confidentiality for qualifying BWC

recorded subjects requesting nondisclosure. The BWCL did not abolish the

long-recognized confidentiality exemption afforded to uncharged individuals by

judicial case law but preserved the application of existing OPRA exemptions.

      Again, we note that subsection (l) of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5, which

provides the exemptions, is preceded by subsection (k), which requires even a

member of the public who is the subject of a recording or a subject's parent or

legal guardian to "review the [BWC] recording in accordance with the

provisions of [OPRA]."      N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(k).     Had the Legislature

intended to preclude the application of OPRA's confidentiality exemption or the

judicially recognized confidentiality exemption, it would have provided for such

an exclusion. See Est. of Burns, 468 N.J. Super. at 319 (quoting Brewer, 53 N.J.

at 174). We also observe the Legislature did not amend OPRA to limit its

application to the BWCL.

      We conclude the exemption applies here because information received by

law enforcement regarding "a person who has not been arrested or charged" is

confidential and not subject to disclosure. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447

N.J. Super. at 204. Defendants met their burden of establishing the exempti on

3
   An ongoing investigations exemption under OPRA, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-3(a),
provides that "records which are sought to be inspected, copied, or examined
[that] pertain to an investigation in progress" are exempt.

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applied because of the potential harm to the uncharged third party if the BWC

footage were released.

      We note that Fuster seeks release of his own statement, which he

undoubtedly recollects. Conversely, the accused has not had an opportunity to

object or challenge the recorded allegations in court. The accused here, as in

many uncharged investigations, may not know the video exists. Fuster can

waive his privacy interest and consent to disclosure; the accused does not have

the same opportunity. Under OPRA, the Department has the "responsibility and

an obligation to safeguard from public access" the BWC video which contains

confidential information "with which it has been entrusted [as] disclosure

thereof would violate the citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy." N.J.S.A.

47:1A-1.

      We recognize plaintiffs' compelling argument that they are highly

concerned parents "advocating for their child" as they believe Fuster's video

statement of alleged sexual misconduct against their son demonstrates the

Department wrongfully declined to prosecute. However, these reasons do not

negate the well-established confidentiality exemption protecting an uncharged

person's law enforcement records from disclosure. A review of the BWCL's

plain meaning provides no reason to depart from this bedrock principle.

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      Although we conclude the confidentiality exemption is appropriate here,

we briefly address plaintiffs' argument that the "AG Directive 2022-1," Off. of

the Att'y Gen., L. Enf't Directive No. 2022-1, Update to Body Worn Camera

Policy 1 (Jan. 19, 2022), does not control the disclosure of the video recording.

Cf. In re Att'y Gen. L. Enf't Directive Nos. 2020-5 & 2020-6, 246 N.J. 462, 487-

88 (2021) (explaining that Attorney General directives "relating to the

administration of law enforcement have the 'force of law'" for police entities

(quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541,

565 (2017))). The BWCL provides that a "[BWC] shall be activated . . . in

accordance with applicable guidelines or directives promulgated by the Attorney

General." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(c)(1). Further, "The Attorney General is

authorized to promulgate or revise guidelines or directives, as appropriate, to

implement and enforce the provisions of [the BWCL]." N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.4.

The BWCL does not provide the Attorney General the authority to modify its

video disclosure requirements; rather, it states the Attorney General may

promulgate "applicable guidelines or directives" to effectuate the statutory

provisions. See N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(c)(1); State v. Jones, 475 N.J. Super.

520, 532 n.1 (App. Div. 2023). Because the legislative intent is clear, we need

not address this argument further.

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      In summary, the plain language of the BWCL's exemption provision does

not abrogate the application of OPRA, but rather supplements OPRA's

exemptions. Here, the OPRA exemption, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), which excludes

from disclosure a public record deemed privileged or confidential pursuant to

established judicial case law, precludes release of the BWC video recording of

Fuster's accusations against an uncharged relative.

                                       B.

                                 Common Law

      A common law right of access to public records exists independently of

OPRA. See Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC v. Township of Neptune, 254

N.J. 242, 256 (2023); see also N.J.S.A. 47:1A-8 (stating that "[n]othing" in

OPRA "shall be construed as limiting the common law right of access to a

government record"). At common law, a citizen has "an enforceable right to

require custodians of public records to make them available for reasonable

inspection and examination." ACLU, 474 N.J. Super. at 268 (quoting Irval

Realty Inc. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 61 N.J. 366, 372 (1972)). "Indeed,

historically, '[t]he common law makes a much broader class of documents

available than [OPRA], but on a qualified basis.'" O'Shea v. Township of W.

Milford, 410 N.J. Super. 371, 386 (App. Div. 2009) (alterations in original)

(quoting Daily Journal, 351 N.J. Super. at 122). However, "[t]o obtain records

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under 'this broader class of materials, [a] requestor must make a greater showing

than OPRA requires.'" Rivera, 250 N.J. at 144 (second alteration in original)

(quoting Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 578).

      "[T]he common[]law right of access . . . is not absolute." Keddie v.

Rutgers, 148 N.J. 36, 50 (1997). The threshold question under the common law

right to access is whether the requested records are "public records." See

O'Shea, 410 N.J. Super. at 386-87. Under common law, to constitute a public

record, three elements must be met: (1) the document "be a written memorial";

(2) the document "be made by a public officer"; and (3) "the officer be

authorized by law to make it." Bergen Cnty. Imp. Auth. v. N. Jersey Media

Grp., Inc., 370 N.J. Super. 504, 518 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Nero v. Hyland,

76 N.J. 213, 221-22 (1978)). Our Supreme Court has recognized if an exemption

exists under OPRA to a request for a videotape, it may be "better analyzed under

the common law right of access where the asserted need for access can be

weighed against the needs of governmental confidentiality." See Gilleran, 227

N.J. at 176-77.

      Once the requested information is established as a public record: "(1) the

person seeking access must establish an interest in the subject matter of the

material; and (2) the [person's] right to access must be balanced against the

State's interest in preventing disclosure." Rivera, 250 N.J. at 144 (alteration in

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                                        19
original) (quoting Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. at 578) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Our Supreme Court has determined that "the trial court [is] 'the best

forum to elicit facts about the parties' interests under the common law and to

balance those interests.'" Gannett Satellite Info. Network, LLC, 254 N.J. at 258

(quoting Rivera, 250 N.J. at 146).

      Here, the requested video is undisputedly a public record. Plaintiffs have

demonstrated a recognized interest in the disclosure of the video under the

BWCL. We are unpersuaded by defendants' argument that plaintiffs have no

personal interest in the video. Fuster was a "[s]ubject of the video footage"

under N.J.S.A. 40A:14-118.5(a) as a "conversant . . . or other similarly situated

person who appears on the [BWC] recording."

      The point of contention here is whether plaintiffs' right to access the video

compels disclosure when balanced against the interests in non-disclosure. In

determining whether the balancing of interests mandates disclosure of a public

document under the common law, it is necessary to review the factors identified

by the Supreme Court in Loigman, 102 N.J. at 113. The factors to consider are:

            (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency
            functions by discouraging citizens from providing
            information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure
            may have upon persons who have given such
            information, and whether they did so in reliance that
            their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to
            which agency self-evaluation, program improvement,
            or other decisionmaking will be chilled by disclosure;

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            (4) the degree to which the information sought includes
            factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of
            policymakers; (5) whether any findings of public
            misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by
            remedial measures instituted by the investigative
            agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or
            investigatory proceedings have arisen that may
            circumscribe the individual's asserted need for the
            materials.

            [Ibid.]

      In balancing the factors, plaintiffs argue the common law right of access

requires disclosure because:    under factor one, citizens "would not [be]

discourage[d] . . . from providing information"; under factor two, Fuster "gave

the statement," so no harm would occur; and under factor three, "decision-

making w[ould] not be chilled by disclosure" and no confidentiality policy

reasons precluded disclosure of the accusations known to plaintiffs. Defendants

argue under factor one that investigations would be negatively impacted.

Defendants argue if statements regarding alleged familial sexual abuse against

a special needs minor were made public, then the investigative decisions "might

be postponed or referred to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency . .

. where such documents [we]re . . . exempt." Under factor two, defendants argue

that "good Samaritans [would] second guess getting involved," if their BWC

recorded   statements    were    readily   released,   detrimentally   affecting

investigations. Lastly, defendants argue the custodian was correctly "protecting

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the privacy rights of an accused where no probable cause was found . . . and that

of a special needs" minor.

      When balancing the interests in disclosure of plaintiffs and the public

against law enforcement and the uncharged party, we conclude the balance of

factors weighs toward non-disclosure of the video footage. Release of BWC

video investigation information of an uncharged individual will impede law

enforcement's investigative function because witnesses may choose not to come

forward. Also, as we have addressed, under the BWCL, an uncharged party has

no opportunity to be informed of the potential disclosure by law enforcement

and thus has no ability to object and be heard. Law enforcement efforts should

not be stinted by the potential release of BWC recorded information regarding

an uncharged party. We concur with the judge's finding that while plaintiffs

here would remain cooperative, there exists a "risk of discouraging [others from]

reporting . . . crimes when a third party is able to obtain BWC footage of the

reporting party's police interview." In weighing the compelling interests under

the common law, the interests militate against disclosure.

      Again, we recognize plaintiffs have a strong personal interest in disclosure

and accept their desire to advocate for their son. However, mandating disclosure

of a witness's recorded statement of an alleged crime against an uncharged

individual presents a substantial risk of "imped[ing] agency functions by

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discouraging citizens from providing information to the government."            See

Loigman, 102 N.J. at 113.

      We note, unlike the compelling public interest in Rivera, 250 N.J. at 149-

50, which involved disclosure of redacted documents after an investigation

"substantiated" claims of "[r]acist and sexist conduct by the civilian head of a

police department [that] violate[d] the public's trust in law enforcement," here

there was insufficient probable cause to file charges. The interest of the accused

cannot be ignored as we have determined "confidentiality protects the privacy

interest of the individual who . . . would face irremediable public condemnation"

from disclosure of uncharged accusations. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 447

N.J. Super. at 204. Based on the specific facts presented in the record, the

interest in disclosure is outweighed by the government's and individual's interest

in confidentiality; therefore, plaintiffs are not entitled to disclosure of the BWC

video pursuant to the common law right of access.

      We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude they

lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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