Court Opinion

ID: 9659565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:49:31.911513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:09.430691
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the decision and I write specially only to suggest that there are some limitations on the “other just causes” referred to in the preamble to A.R.S.D. 55:01:12:05. Under this rule, the Career Service Commission has defined just causes for disciplinary action by the commissioner of the appointing authority. Grievant claims, on one hand, that all of the “just causes” delineated in A.R.S.D. 55:01:12:05 are duty related. The majority points, on the other hand, to two enumerated causes that may not be job related and thus refutes grievant’s claim that under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the “other just causes” mentioned generally in the preamble must likewise be job related. Even though an appointing authority could deem spitting on the sidewalk to be a “just cause” for termination, there may be protections built into other terminology in the rule.
First, A.R.S.D. 55:01:12:05 requires that “[t]he commissioner shall assure that the foregoing actions shall be uniformly administered.” (Emphasis added.) This appears to place a considerably greater burden upon commissioners who preside over grievance hearings involving termination where the cause is not one of those enumerated in the rule.
Second, and perhaps more important in the context of this case, I would point out that where the Commission specifically enumerated under A.R.S.D. 55:01:12:05(1) that “... convicted of a felony which renders [employee] unfit to perform the duties of his position” (emphasis added) is cause for termination, any attempt to extend this to lesser offenses would clearly violate the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio al-terius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of a different thing. If the Commission wants to extend the grounds to other offenses, even those involving moral turpitude, it has the prerogative to do so under the rulemaking procedures. It is not for the appointing authority, nor the commissioner, nor certainly for this court to extend that provision any further than as specifically enumerated.