Court Opinion

ID: 9915764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:06:13.082513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:22.584856
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2634-21

A.E.R.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

R.J.R.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted December 19, 2023 – Decided January 8, 2024

                   Before Judges Haas and Natali.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
                   Docket No. FV-14-0497-22.

                   John V. Saykanic, attorney for appellant.

                   Weinberger Divorce & Family Law Group, LLC,
                   attorneys for respondent (Francine M. Aster and Wayne
                   G. Perry, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
     We use initials to protect the privacy of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10).
      The parties were married in June 2016 and have two children. In June

2021, the parties had an argument and discussed filing for divorce. They later

separated with plaintiff residing in the marital residence and defendant living in

an apartment in a neighboring town.

      Plaintiff commenced this action pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, by filing a Temporary

Restraining Order ("TRO") against defendant in June 2021 based on allegations

defendant was physically and verbally abusive toward her. On July 12, 2021,

the parties entered into a Civil Restraining and Custody Agreement

("Agreement") which dismissed the TRO in favor of the Agreement and set forth

various restraints and conditions.

      Specifically, the Agreement expressly prohibited defendant from stalking

plaintiff, granted her exclusive use of the marital home, and stated the parties

intended the restraints to survive any divorce as the Agreement was "to be

incorporated into [the] FM docket as a Consent Order if and when a matrimonial

complaint is filed by any party."       Additionally, under the terms of the

Agreement, defendant agreed to attend a gambling addiction course, undergo a

"risk assessment and psychological evaluation," and submit to a drug test.

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      On December 24, 2021, shortly after the Agreement was entered, plaintiff

filed for and obtained a second TRO ("December 2021 TRO") after she observed

defendant inexplicably driving by her home multiple times, in violation of the

Agreement. She specifically alleged she had not seen her husband recently and,

when she last saw him, she "never knew which version" of defendant "was

coming home any given night" as he was either "manic" or in a "state of rage."

Plaintiff testified defendant had a gambling problem, was suicidal, and used

steroids.    Plaintiff submitted into evidence documentation of twenty-four

independent incidents of defendant driving by her home, testified to seven, and

stated defendant had no reason to drive by the house as he lived in a neighboring

town. Plaintiff stated each time defendant drove by her home, she was "scared"

and "concerned."

       At the conclusion of a two-day trial, Judge James M. DeMarzo found

defendant had stalked plaintiff and he entered a final restraining order (FRO) in

her favor.    He also awarded plaintiff exclusive use of the marital home.

Defendant appeals the FRO arguing 2:

2
   We have reorganized certain of defendant's point headings to facilitate our
discussion of the issues.
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POINT I

THE FRO SHOULD BE VACATED AS THERE WAS
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
FINDING OF STALKING (THE PREDICATE ACT)
AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDING THAT THE FRO WAS NEEDED TO
ENSURE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S FUTURE
PROTECTION

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF
LAW IN DISQUALIFYING [DEFENDANT'S]
FORMER ATTORNEY DUE TO AN INCORRECTLY
PERCEIVED CONFLICT

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY RELYING ON THE [] AGREEMENT
THAT WAS: A) TAINTED IF [DEFENDANT'S]
COUNSEL, AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT,
HAD A CONFLICT; ALTERNATIVELY B) NOT IN
EVIDENCE MAKING INVALID THE TRIAL
COURT'S RELIANCE ON THE AGREMEENT AS
TO THE PREDICATE ACT OF STALKING

  [A.]

  THE [] AGREEMENT WAS INADMISSIBLE
  IF [DEFENDANT'S PRIOR COUNSEL] HAD A
  DISQUALIFYING CONFLICT

  [B.]

  THE [] AGREEMENT WAS NOT PROPERLY
  IN EVIDENCE IN THE COURT BELOW

                                          A-2634-21
                   4
            POINT IV
            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
            MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

      We find insufficient merit in these arguments to warrant extensive

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E).

      To briefly amplify our disposition of defendant's arguments, we start by

observing we reject his contention in Point I as there was sufficient evidence to

support all Judge DeMarzo's findings, which are deserving of appellate

deference. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). We are also satisfied

the judge properly interpreted and applied the stalking statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–

10, in finding an act of domestic violence to support plaintiff's domestic violence

claim, N.J.S.A. 2C:25–19(a)(14) (including "stalking" within the definition of

"domestic violence").

      The evidence adduced by plaintiff demonstrated that defendant drove by

plaintiff's house dozens of times, in violation of the parties' Agreement, and

disregarded various other provisions of the Agreement as well. The judge found

defendant's conduct to be a legitimate concern of plaintiff's, as stalking was

specifically prohibited by the Agreement. The judge concluded defendant's true

intent when repeatedly driving by plaintiff's residence, absent any other

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explanation offered, was to stalk her. There was ample credible evidence from

which the judge could draw such a conclusion.

        Substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge DeMarzo in his thorough

and well-reasoned oral opinion, we agree that defendant's conduct violated the

stalking statute: defendant's actions constituted a course of conduct within the

meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:12–10(a)(1); were directed at plaintiff; and would

"cause a reasonable person to fear for [her] safety . . . or suffer other emotional

distress," N.J.S.A. 2C:12–10(b).

        We also reject defendant's contention the judge failed to make adequate

Silver3 findings. Upon finding a predicate act of domestic violence occurred, as

Judge DeMarzo did in this case, the judge next considers if "a restraining order

is necessary, upon an evaluation of the [factors] set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to

prevent further abuse." J.D. v M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 475-76 (2011) (quoting

Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126-27 (App. Div. 2006)). The factors

which the judge should consider include, but are not limited to:

              (1) The previous history of domestic violence between
              the plaintiff and defendant, including threats,
              harassment and physical abuse;

3
    Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006).
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                                         6
             (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or
             property;

             (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and
             defendant;

             (4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

             (5) In determining custody and parenting time the
             protection of the victim's safety; and

             (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection
             from another jurisdiction.

             [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).]

      The court is not mandated to incorporate all factors into its findings when

determining whether an act of domestic violence has occurred. Cesare, 154 N.J.

at 401-02. Additionally, the Act requires courts to evaluate claims of domestic

violence in light of the history of the parties. Ibid. (quoting Peranio v. Peranio,

280 N.J. Super 47, 54 (App. Div. 1995)). As such, "a court may . . . determine

that an ambiguous incident qualifies as prohibited conduct, based on a finding

of violence in the parties' past." Ibid.

      Contrary to defendant's argument, Judge DeMarzo properly found

plaintiff met the second prong of Silver because the civil restraint set forth in

the Agreement that prohibited defendant from stalking plaintiff was clearly

insufficient to prevent defendant's conduct and his actions placed her in fear for

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                                           7
her safety as she credibly testified. Indeed, defendant drove by plaintiff's home

on numerous occasions after the parties entered into the Agreement and before

plaintiff filed the second TRO. The December 2021 TRO, rather than the

Agreement, caused defendant to cease his conduct. As such, the court properly

concluded the civil restraint was insufficient to prevent defendant's conduct and

properly entered the FRO after considering plaintiff's reasonable fears for her

safety.

      Defendant's arguments in Point II are similarly without merit. Evidence

presented to Judge DeMarzo demonstrated an attorney-client relationship

existed between plaintiff and defendant's former attorney. Indeed, an attorney-

client relationship is formed when "the prospective client requests the lawyer to

undertake the representation, the lawyer agrees to do so and preliminary

conversations are held between the attorney and client regarding the case."

Herbert v. Haytaian, 292 N.J. Super. 426, 436 (App. Div. 1996). Further, an

attorney-client relationship may be inferred "when (1) a person seeks advice or

assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to

matters within the attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney

expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or

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                                       8
assistance." Ibid. (quoting Bays v. Theran, 418 Mass. 685, 639 (1994) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

      Here, the judge correctly found an attorney-client relationship existed

between former counsel and plaintiff because, prior to counsel's representation,

he consulted with both parties about their divorce and the Agreement. Judge

DeMarzo noted counsel acted within his professional competence as a

matrimonial attorney when he "sat down and started to talk about settling the

divorce like a mediator," and provided counsel or advice to plaintiff concerning

her divorce when they discussed the Agreement. As such, the judge correctly

found an attorney-client relationship existed and properly disqualified counsel

from subsequently representing defendant in the matter. See RPC 1.9(a).

      With respect to defendant's contention in Point III, and specifically his

claim Judge DeMarzo erred in relying on the Agreement, we similarly find that

argument unpersuasive. Indeed, the parties entered into the Agreement and

attested they were doing so "of their own volition without any duress, undue

influence or coercion of any kind," and the judge specifically found nothing

before him established it "wasn’t voluntarily entered into." Because defendant

did not show fraud, duress, or other compelling circumstances, and as the parties

stated they entered the Agreement freely, we reject defendant's contention his

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                                       9
prior counsel's disqualification nullified the Agreement or prevented the judge

from relying on it, particularly as it was clearly relevant to discern defendant's

intent related to the predicate act of stalking. None of the authority cited by

defendant compels a contrary result.

      We similarly reject defendant's contention Judge DeMarzo erred in

considering the Agreement because it was not offered into evidence. As the

judge noted, the Agreement was part of the record in the parties' concurrent FM

case, and he therefore properly took judicial notice of and considered it in the

FRO proceeding. See N.J.R.E. 201(b)(4).

      Finally, as plaintiff's testimony fully supported the entry of the FRO, we

conclude defendant's challenge to Judge DeMarzo's ruling denying his

application for a directed verdict is also without merit. See R. 4:40-1; see also

Edwards v. Walsh, 397 N.J. Super. 567, 571 (App. Div. 2007) (stating a motion

for a directed verdict will be granted "only if, accepting as true all evidence

supporting the party opposing the motion and according that party the benefit of

all favorable inferences, reasonable minds could not differ." (citing Dolson v.

Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 5 (1969))).

      Affirmed.

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