Court Opinion

ID: 9948775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 21:10:39.37081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:50.038322
License: Public Domain

[Cite as C.L.A. v. D.P.M., 2024-Ohio-836.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

C.L.A.,                                            :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 112831
                 v.                                :

D.P.M.,                                            :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: DISMISSED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
                           AND REMANDED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 7, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County, Court of Common Pleas
                              Domestic Relations Division
                                Case No. DR-15-358274

                                             Appearances:

                 Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, Nicole A.
                 Cruz, and Kelley R. Tauring, for appellee.

                 Costanzo & Lazzaro, PPL and Raymond J. Costanzo, for
                 appellant.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant D.P.M. (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s

May 11, 2023 and May 25, 2023 judgment entries that granted plaintiff-appellee

C.L.A.’s (“Wife”) motion to dismiss Husband’s postdecree motions for lack of
service. For the following reasons, we dismiss in part, reverse in part, and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural History

               On April 18, 1997, Wife and Husband married and during the

marriage had one child, A.M. (d.o.b. 10/23/2006). On July 18, 2017, the trial court

executed a divorce decree that dissolved the parties’ marriage and addressed child

and spousal support. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Husband was ordered to pay

$1,000 per month for child support and $104 per month for cash medical support

as well as $4,500 for 78 months in payment of spousal support.

               On February 19, 2020, the Office of Child Support Services (“OCSS”)

issued    an      Administrative     Adjustment         Recommendation       (“OCSS

Recommendation”) as to Husband’s monthly child support and cash medical

support obligations for A.M. The OCSS Recommendation indicated that Husband

should pay $817.88 and $20.07 for child support and cash medical support,

respectively. The OCSS Recommendation also stated that the trial court had granted

a deviation under the existing order, but OCSS could not determine the monetary or

percentage of the deviation.

               On March 4, 2020, Husband filed a motion for court hearing or

judicial review (“motion for judicial review”), pursuant to R.C. 3119.60, so that the

trial court could determine whether the revised child support calculated by the OCSS

was an appropriate amount and whether the child support order should be revised.
Husband served the March 4, 2020 motion by regular mail on the OCSS. Husband

did not serve the motion on Wife.

              On May 18, 2020, Wife’s counsel filed a notice of appearance, and on

May 19, 2020, Wife’s counsel issued a subpoena duces tecum on Husband’s

employer seeking wage and employee benefits information.

              On December 23, 2020, Husband filed three postdecree motions: a

motion to determine arrearages (“arrearages motion”), a motion to modify child and

spousal support (“support modification motion”), and a motion to show cause and

demand attorney fees (“show cause motion”) (collectively “December 23, 2020

motions”). The arrearages motion stated the OCSS miscalculated the spousal and

child support arrearages that had accrued since the trial court’s July 18, 2017 order,

including a miscalculation of temporary support. The support modification motion

sought to decrease Husband’s obligations for child and spousal support pursuant to

the July 18, 2017 court order. The show cause motion requested that Husband have

visitation with A.M. and that Wife refinance her residence to remove Husband’s

name from the mortgage.

              On January 6, 2021, Wife filed briefs in opposition to Husband’s

December 23, 2020 motions, arguing the merits of the motions. Wife did not argue

that Husband failed to properly serve her with copies of the December 23, 2020

motions. Wife filed numerous motions between January and November 2021.

              On November 29, 2021, Wife filed a motion to dismiss alleging that

Husband’s motion for judicial review filed on March 4, 2020, and his December 23,
2020 motions were not properly served upon Wife. Within the motion to dismiss,

Wife stated the issue of lack of service relative to the March 4, 2024 motion was

raised at a hearing on or about November 15, 2020.

               On November 29, 2021, Husband filed a brief in opposition to Wife’s

motion to dismiss. In his brief, Husband conceded he did not perfect service of the

motions. Husband argued that from March 4, 2020, through October 28, 2021, the

parties had conducted discovery on the pending motions; defended the motions on

their merits; obtained continuances with the court; participated in more than 15

pretrial hearings and settlement conferences; and set at least two trial dates.

Husband argued that Wife waived her claim of lack of service of process by

voluntarily submitting to the court’s jurisdiction.

               On December 1, 2021, Husband requested service of process on three

motions — the motion for judicial review, the arrearages motion, and the support

modification motion — by certified mail at Wife’s home address. The U.S. Postal

Service assigned receipt number 46149786 to Husband’s request for service of

process.

               On December 1, 2021, under a separate request for service, Husband’s

show cause motion was sent by certified mail to Wife’s home address and assigned

U.S. Postal Service receipt number 46125837. On December 2, 2021, the U.S. Postal

Service delivered Husband’s show cause motion, referenced as receipt number

46125837, to the wrong address. The motion was delivered to the correct street but

the incorrect street number.
              The record also indicates that Husband’s three motions — the motion

for judicial review, the arrearages motion, and the support modification motion —

served under receipt number 46149786 were delivered by certified mail on

December 8, 2021, to Wife’s correct address.

              Almost one year later on the date of trial — November 22, 2022 —

Wife orally renewed her motion to dismiss for failure of proper service. Wife argued

that Husband’s postdecree motions were required to be served pursuant to Civ.R. 4

through 4.6 to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, Wife argued that the

motions did not contain proofs of service and were never served on her personally.

Wife conceded that service may have been attempted in December 2021, but the

motions were delivered to an incorrect address. Husband argued that Wife waived

service, and the docket reflects service of his motions was perfected on Wife, via

certified mail, on December 8, 2021.

              The magistrate acknowledged there was an attempt at service, but her

review of the docket indicated that all of Husband’s postdecree motions were

delivered to an incorrect address. The magistrate granted Wife’s motion to dismiss

on the basis that service of the motions was not perfected, and Wife withdrew her

pending motions.

              On November 25, 2022, Husband filed four proofs of service with the

trial court. Attached to each proof of service was a copy of Husband’s four motions

that allegedly lacked service. Each proof of service identified the date the attached

motion was originally filed electronically with the clerk of courts and stated that at
the time of the original filing, the motion was sent to all counsel of record by

operation of the court’s electronic filing system.

               On December 21, 2022, a magistrate’s decision was filed, and it

granted Wife’s oral motion to dismiss Husband’s postdecree motions. The decision

also ordered the adoption of the OCSS recommendation in a separate order and

denied all other procedural motions filed by Wife as moot. On January 3, 2023,

Husband filed objections to the magistrate’s decision as well as supplemental

objections on February 2, 2023. Husband’s objections disputed the magistrate’s

decision to grant Wife’s motion to dismiss due to lack of service.

               On May 11, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry that

overruled Husband’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopted the

magistrate’s decision. On May 25, 2023, the trial court issued a judgment entry that

adopted the magistrate’s December 21, 2022 decision in its entirety; granted Wife’s

motion to dismiss; dismissed Husband’s motions because of the failure of service

upon Wife; ordered the OCSS Recommendation be adopted by separate order; and

ordered Wife’s pending motions either withdrawn or denied as moot.

               On June 7, 2023, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal presenting

three assignments of error:

      Assignment of Error I: The trial court committed reversible error in
      failing to find [Wife] voluntarily submitted herself to the court’s
      jurisdiction and waived the Civ.R. 75(J) requirement of issuance and
      service of process.

      Assignment of Error II: The trial court committed reversible error in
      dismissing [Husband’s] motions under Civ.R. 4(E).
      Assignment of Error III: The trial court committed reversible error in
      finding that a motion for court hearing emanating from an
      administrative child support review recommendation is subject to
      Civ.R. 75(J) service of process requirement.

On November 3, 2023, this court, sua sponte, directed the parties to submit

supplemental briefs addressing whether the trial court’s orders constituted final,

appealable orders. The parties provided supplemental briefing and this issue is now

ripe for review.

Legal Analysis

I. Final, Appealable Order

               Before reviewing the merits of this case, we must first consider

whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. An appellate court’s review is

limited to final judgments and orders. Cooney v. Radostitz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110009, 2021-Ohio-2521, ¶ 12. “If an order is not final and appealable, then an

appellate court has no jurisdiction to review the matter and the appeal must be

dismissed.” Assn. of Cleveland Firefighters, #93 v. Campbell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 84148, 2005-Ohio-1841, ¶ 6. “[T]his court has a duty to examine, sua sponte,

potential deficiencies in jurisdiction.” Cooney at ¶ 12.

               We have two issues to address with regard to our jurisdiction over this

case: (1) did the trial court’s failure to adopt the OCSS Recommendation prevent

the May 25, 2023 order from constituting a final, appealable order, and (2) did the

trial court’s dismissal of Husband’s postdecree motions constitute a final,

appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.
OCSS Recommendation

              The trial court’s May 25, 2023 order (1) adopted the magistrate’s

December 21, 2022 decision in its entirety; (2) granted Wife’s motion to dismiss

thereby dismissing Husband’s postdecree motions; (3) ordered the adoption of the

OCSS Recommendation by separate order; (4) recognized several of Wife’s motions

were withdrawn; and (5) denied as moot several of Wife’s motions.

              On June 7, 2023, Husband filed his notice of appeal from the court’s

judgment. At that time, the trial court had not issued a separate order adopting the

OCSS Recommendation even though the May 25, 2023 order stated the court would

do so. Additionally, the OCSS Recommendation was not filed on the trial court’s

docket but was attached to Husband’s motion for judicial review. For these reasons,

this court sua sponte requested supplemental briefing on whether the absence of a

court order adopting the OCSS Recommendation resulted in an unresolved matter

that required further action and, therefore, rendered the May 25, 2023 order not a

final, appealable order.

              Husband analogizes the OCSS Recommendation to a qualified

domestic relations order (“QDRO”) and argues neither vehicle requires further

adjudication on the merits of the case but are simply ministerial tools used in

furtherance of an order. A “QDRO implements a trial court’s decision of how a

pension is to be divided incident to divorce or dissolution.” Wilson v. Wilson, 116

Ohio St.3d 268, 2007-Ohio-6056, 878 N.E.2d 16, ¶ 7.          Wife argues that any

judgment that leaves issues unresolved is not a final, appealable order. Wife also
argues that consistent with the holding in M.E.D. v. P.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

112070, 2023-Ohio-3471, the current appeal should be dismissed for a lack of a final,

appealable order.

               This court has found that

      a QDRO is not an independent judgment entry but rather an
      enforcement mechanism pertaining to the trial court’s previous
      judgment entry of divorce.

E.O.W. v. L.M.W., 2021-Ohio-2040, 174 N.E.3d 414, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.), citing

Ballinger v. Ballinger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105180, 2017-Ohio-7077, ¶ 6. A

QDRO is “merely a tool used to execute the divorce decree.” Wilson at ¶ 19.

               Similarly, we find here that the trial court intended to adopt the OCSS

Recommendation as proposed without any modifications, and the trial court’s

failure to adopt the OCSS Recommendation under a separate order did not prevent

the issuance of a final, appealable order.

R.C. 2505.02

               The types of orders that qualify as final, appealable orders are

delineated in R.C. 2505.02(B):

      An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or
      reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
      (1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect
      determines the action and prevents a judgment;
      (2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special
      proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;
      (3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
      (4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which
      both of the following apply:
      (a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the
      provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of
      the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
      (b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective
      remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings,
      issues, claims, and parties in the action.
      (5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be
      maintained as a class action;
      (6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the
      Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly,
      * * * or any changes made by Sub. S.B. 80 of the 125th general assembly,
      ***;
      (7) An order in an appropriation proceeding that may be appealed
      pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 163.09 of the Revised Code.

R.C. 2505.02(B).

              A “substantial right” is “a right that the United States Constitution,

the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a

person to enforce or protect.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(1). A “special proceeding” is “an

action or proceeding that is specially created by statute and that prior to 1853 was

not denoted as an action at law or a suit in equity.” R.C. 2505.02(A)(2).

              A divorce action is a special proceeding. Thomasson v. Thomasson,

153 Ohio St.3d 398, 2018-Ohio-2417, 106 N.E.3d 1239, ¶ 12, citing Wilhelm-

Kissinger v. Kissinger, 129 Ohio St.3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 6. A

motion to modify child support may qualify as a special proceeding pursuant to R.C.

2505.02(B)(2). Cooney, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110009, 2021-Ohio-2521, at ¶ 22;

In re K.A.V., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26312, 2014-Ohio-5575, ¶ 13; Worch v.

Worch, 2d Dist. Darke No. 98 CA 1477, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2589, 8-9 (June 11,

1999), citing Koroshazi v. Koroshazi, 110 Ohio App.3d 637, 640, 674 N.E.2d 1266
(9th Dist.1996) (“Motions to modify child support are special proceedings.”); see

Jennings v. Hall, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-12-259, 2013-Ohio-1731, ¶ 6

(“Matters within the juvenile court setting child support are special proceedings”).

We also find a motion for judicial review filed pursuant to R.C. 3119.60, such as

Husband’s March 4, 2020 motion, is a proceeding created by statute and qualifies

as a special proceeding.

               In addition to showing the motions were made in a special

proceeding, Husband must demonstrate that the trial court’s May 11, 2023 and May

25, 2023 orders affected Husband’s substantial rights. This court has found that

      [a]n order affects a substantial right if, in the absence of an immediate
      appeal, one of the parties would be foreclosed from appropriate relief
      in the future. See, e.g., Crown Servs. v. Miami Valley Paper Tube Co.,
      162 Ohio St. 3d 564, 2020-Ohio-4409, 166 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 16 (“An order
      affects a substantial right ‘only if an immediate appeal is necessary to
      protect the right effectively.’”), quoting Wilhelm-Kissinger v.
      Kissinger, 129 Ohio St. 3d 90, 2011-Ohio-2317, 950 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 7,
      citing Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181
      (1993).

Cooney at ¶ 23.

               We will evaluate Husband’s postdecree motions separately to address

whether the trial court’s dismissal of each created a final, appealable order. In his

appeal, Husband argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his motion for

judicial review, arrearages motion, and support modification motion. Husband’s

appeal does not address his show cause motion, and thus, we will not analyze the

dismissal of this motion for a final, appealable order.

A. Motion for Judicial Review
              Husband sought judicial review of an OCSS Recommendation to

modify the parties’ child support order. OCSS Recommendations are governed by

R.C. 3119.60. According to R.C. 3119.63, after Husband received a copy of the OCSS

Recommendation, he could request a court hearing or administrative hearing on the

issue, but either request was required to be filed within 14 days after Husband

received the OCSS Recommendation. The OCSS issued its recommendation on

February 19, 2020, and Husband filed his motion for judicial hearing on March 3,

2020, within the 14-day time requirement. No hearing was held on the motion

because the trial court dismissed Husband’s motion for judicial hearing for lack of

service. If Husband is unable to appeal the dismissal of his motion for judicial

review at this time, the trial court will adopt the OCSS Recommendation in its

entirety and the modification will relate back to the date the OCSS Recommendation

was sent. R.C. 3119.772. Husband will be prevented from arguing to the court his

objections to the OCSS Recommendation. R.C. 3119.60 offers no method by which

Husband can request a subsequent hearing. Thus, Husband, in the absence of the

current appeal, would be denied a substantial right because he would be foreclosed

from presenting his arguments against the OCSS Recommendation.

              We find that the facts here are unique where Husband filed a motion

for a judicial hearing under R.C. 3119.60; the trial court did not conduct a hearing

as requested by Husband; and Husband is now outside the time parameters of the

statute to request another hearing on this issue. The instant matter is a case where

the trial court’s dismissal otherwise than on the merits will prevent Husband from
refiling his motion for judicial review. Thus, we find that the trial court’s May 11,

2023 and May 25, 2023 orders resulted in a final, appealable order on Husband’s

motion for judicial review.

B. Arrearages Motion

               Husband filed an arrearages motion requesting that the trial court

determine his arrearages in child and spousal support following the July 18, 2017

court order.

               Orders affect a substantial right only if they have “immediate

consequences” or “if not immediately appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief

in the future.” Ossai-Charles v. Charles, 188 Ohio App.3d 503, 2010-Ohio-3558,

935 N.E.2d 944, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.), quoting Walburn v. Dunlap, 121 Ohio St.3d 373,

2009-Ohio-1221, ¶ 24, 904 N.E.2d 863, and Southside Community Dev. Corp. v.

Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 1209, 2007-Ohio-6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 7.

               Here, the trial court’s order on the arrearages motion did not have

immediate consequences for Husband. The trial court made no determination

whether arrearages exist. The dismissal of this motion did not foreclose Husband

from refiling this motion so that he can attempt to obtain appropriate relief in the

future. The trial court’s dismissal of Husband’s arrearages motion did not affect a

substantial right and, therefore, does not amount to a final, appealable order.

C. Support Modification Motion

               In his support modification motion, Husband seeks a decrease in his

child and spousal support obligations that were issued on July 18, 2017. Husband
argues on appeal that a dismissal of this motion will foreclose his substantial right

to have his spousal and child support reduced retroactively to the initial filing date

of December 23, 2020.

              “As a general rule, because of the time it takes to modify child support

orders, an order modifying child support order may be made retroactive to the date

the motion to modify child support was filed unless special circumstances dictate

otherwise.” In re J.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 109747 and 109748, 2021-Ohio-

2451, ¶ 12, quoting Phelps v. Saffian, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106475, 2018-Ohio-

4329, ¶ 37.

              Wife cites to M.E.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112070, 2023-Ohio-

3471, in support of her position that Husband’s modified support modification

motion is not a final, appealable order. In M.E.D., Father filed a postdecree motion

to modify a parenting order and perfected service of the motion. Father then filed a

second postdecree motion to modify child support (“child support motion”) without

serving Wife under Loc.R. 19 of the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County,

Domestic Relations Division (“Loc.R. 19”) and Civ.R. 75(J) (collectively “service

rules”). At issue in M.E.D. was whether Father was required to follow the service

rules for the child support motion where the court’s continuing jurisdiction had

already been triggered by the initial motion to modify a parenting order. Father in

M.E.D. served the child support motion on Wife’s counsel rather than Wife, which

was not in compliance with the service rules. This court found in M.E.D. that where

Father did not invoke the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction through compliance
with the service rules and Father had the opportunity to refile his motion upon

dismissal of the case, there was no final, appealable order.

              M.E.D. is distinguishable from the instant case. Father in M.E.D.

failed to serve Mother properly with the motion to modify support and, therefore,

did not invoke the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction. Mother timely raised the

issue of failed service within three months of Father filing his motion to modify

support. There is also the matter of whether Father’s compliance with the service

rules on his first postdecree motion impacted the service necessary on his second

postdecree motion.

              Here, as is demonstrated by the record and discussed below in our

analysis of Husband’s second assignment of error, Husband’s support modification

motion was properly served on Wife thereby invoking the trial court’s continuing

jurisdiction. Further, Wife’s motion to dismiss for lack of service was filed in

response to Husband’s postdecree motions originally filed on March 4, 2020, and

December 23, 2020. Wife did not file her motion to dismiss until November 29,

2021. From January 2021 through November 2021, Wife actively participated in

litigation of the postdecree motions. Wife states in her motion to dismiss that the

issue of service relative to the March 4. 2020 motion was previously raised in

November 2020, but there is no record of such a discussion nor any filing by Wife

prior to November 2021. Thus, we find the facts and holding of M.E.D. are

distinguishable from the instant matter.
               While Husband has the ability to refile his support modification

motion, any award will relate back to the new filing date rather than the original

filing date of December 23, 2020. Husband would be prevented from benefitting

from a potential modification between the period of December 23, 2020, and the

new filing date. For this reason, we find that the dismissal of Husband’s support

modification motion would impact a significant right of Husband, and the dismissal

of this motion was a final, appealable order. See In re K.A.V., 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 26312, 2014-Ohio-5575 at ¶ 11 (Although court’s dismissal of Father’s motion to

modify child support did not prevent him from refiling the motion, Father would be

entitled to a support reduction retroactive only to the date of the new filing; the loss

of the reduction retroactively to the date of his initial filing qualified as a substantial

right under R.C. 2505.02.); Smith v. Smith, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2008 CA 00030,

2009-Ohio-3978, ¶ 41 (Trial court’s judgment entry involuntarily dismissing a

motion to modify child support is a final, appealable order because the “order

modifying child support cannot be retroactive beyond the date that a motion for

modification of child support is made.”).

               In summary, we find that the trial court’s May 11 and May 25, 2020

orders resulted in final, appealable orders on Husband’s motion for judicial review

and support modification motion. We find further that the trial court orders were

not final, appealable orders on Husband’s arrearages motion. We will address the

merits of Husband’s appeal as it relates to his motion for judicial review and support

modification motion.
II. Assignments of Error

               For ease of discussion, we will address Husband’s assignments of

error out of order.

A. Third Assignment of Error

               In his third assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court

committed reversible error when it determined his motion for judicial review filed

pursuant to R.C. 3119.63 was subject to Civ.R. 75(J) service requirements and

dismissed the motion for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wife argues Husband was

required to follow the service requirements of Loc.R. 19 and Civ.R. 75.

               A trial court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is a question

of law subject to a de novo review. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126

Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 27.

               Generally, after the resolution of divorce proceedings that include

child and spousal support, the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction must be invoked

for postdecree motions through service of process. “When a party fails to invoke the

continuing jurisdiction of the trial court by not meeting the requirements for service

of process, the court lacks personal jurisdiction to enter judgment upon the motion.”

Sweeney v. Sweeney, 2016-Ohio-1384, 63 N.E.3d 542, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).

               One manner to invoke a trial court’s continuing jurisdiction on a

postdecree motion for modification of custody, support, or alimony is through

service of process under Civ.R. 75(J). Hansen v. Hansen, 21 Ohio App.3d 216, 217,

486 N.E.2d 1252 (3d Dist.1985). But that is not the only way to invoke the court’s
jurisdiction. R.C. 3119.60 also independently imparts jurisdiction on the trial court

to resolve motions such as Husband’s motion for judicial review. See Dragon v.

Dragon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104019, 2016-Ohio-7304, ¶ 7 (where the statutory

framework delineated by R.C. 3119.96, rather than Civ.R. 75(J), invoked the trial

court’s continuing jurisdiction).     R.C. 3119.60 has no service requirement.

Jurisdiction is predicated on a party filing a motion for a court hearing no later than

14 days after the party received an OCSS Recommendation. Once a request for a

court hearing is filed, the court is required to conduct a hearing in compliance with

R.C. 3119.66. Further, the court must provide notice of the hearing to the parties

and the child support enforcement agency (“CSEA”) at least 30 days prior to the

hearing. R.C. 3119.67. Thus, any reference to a trial court’s continuing jurisdiction

under Civ.R. 75(J) in relation to an OCSS Recommendation generated under R.C.

3119.60 is misplaced.

               Accordingly, Husband invoked          the   trial   court’s   continuing

jurisdiction when he filed his motion for judicial review in accordance with R.C.

3119.63. The trial court’s determination that the motion for judicial review was

subject to Civ.R. 75(J) and the subsequent dismissal of Husband’s motion for

judicial review was erroneous. For these reasons, we sustain Husband’s third

assignment of error.

B. Second Assignment of Error

               In his second assignment of error, Husband argues that the trial court

committed reversible error when it dismissed his support modification motion
pursuant to Civ.R. 4(E).1 Specifically, Husband argues that service of his support

modification motion was perfected within the time required under Civ.R. 3(A) and

prior to the court’s ruling on Wife’s motion to dismiss. Husband also argues that a

dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 4(E) will foreclose his substantial right to have his

spousal and child support reduced retroactively to the initial filing date of December

23, 2020.

               We review a trial court’s dismissal due to lack of proper service for an

abuse of discretion. Troxel v. Mabe, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2008-02-018,

2008-Ohio-5420, ¶ 8. The term abuse of discretion “implies that the court’s attitude

is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). An abuse of discretion occurs when a court

exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has

discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304,

187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

               To invoke the domestic relations court’s continuing jurisdiction,

Husband needed to file his support modification motion pursuant to Civ.R. 75(J).

Civ.R. 75(J) reads:

      1 In regard to Husband’s first assignment of error, appellant’s and appellee’s briefs

address the filing of Husband’s motion for judicial review, arrearages motion, and support
modification motion. Husband’s second assignment of error discusses Husband’s
arrearages motion and support modification motion. Since we find that there is no final,
appealable order on Husband’s arrearages motion, and our discussion on Husband’s third
assignment of error is dispositive on Husband’s motion for judicial review, we will address
only the support modification motion during our analysis of the first and second
assignments of error.
      Continuing jurisdiction. The continuing jurisdiction of the court
      shall be invoked by motion filed in the original action, notice of which
      shall be served in the manner provided for the service of process under
      Civ.R. 4 to 4.6. When the continuing jurisdiction of the court is invoked
      pursuant to this division, the discovery procedures set forth in Civ.R.
      26 to 37 shall apply.

Civ.R. 75(J). Pursuant to Civ.R. 4(A), upon the filing of a complaint — or Husband’s

support modification motion — the clerk shall issue a summons for service upon

each defendant. The document shall be served by either certified or express mail,

unless otherwise permitted in the civil rules, as evidenced by “return receipt signed

by any person.” Civ.R. 4(A)(1)(a).

               On December 23, 2020, Husband filed his support modification

motion with the trial court but failed to serve the motion in accordance with Civ.R.

75 and Civ. R. 4 through 4.6. Instead, Husband simply filed the motion through the

court’s electronic filing system.

               On November 29, 2021, almost one year after Husband filed his

support modification motion, Wife filed a motion to dismiss Husband’s motion due

to its failure to comply with the service rules. Wife conceded during oral argument

that she did not recognize a potential service issue until that later date. On the same

day Wife filed her motion to dismiss, Husband filed a brief in opposition to Wife’s

motion to dismiss, arguing that Wife waived service of process by conducting

discovery, receiving continuances, and defending the merits of Husband’s motions.

Husband further argued that from March 4, 2020 — when his first postdecree

motion was filed — through October 28, 2021, the parties had conducted discovery
on motions filed by both Husband and Wife, participated in more than 15 pretrials

and settlement conferences, and set two trial dates.

               Two days later, on December 1, 2021, Husband filed with the court a

request for service that instructed the clerk of courts to serve the support

modification motion on Wife, by certified mail, at her home address. The U.S. Postal

Service assigned receipt number 46149786 to the service of the motion.

               The record indicates that on December 15, 2021, Husband’s motion

served under receipt number 46149786 was delivered by certified mail on December

8, 2021, to Wife’s correct address. The receipt information provided by the U.S.

Postal Service and included in the record shows the signature of the recipient and

the address of the recipient. The signature of the recipient is illegible, and we are

not able to ascertain the name of the signatory. The address of the recipient is

difficult to decipher, but the street numbers are legible — which reflect Wife’s correct

address — and the receipt states the item was delivered in the Wife’s correct city and

state. Husband’s support modification motion was not delivered to an incorrect

address.2

      2 The trial court erred when it found that Husband served the support modification

motion to the incorrect address. It appears that the trial court confused service of
Husband’s support modification motion with service of his show cause motion; the show
cause motion is not subject to this appeal. A thorough review of the record indicates that
on November 22, 2021, Husband requested service of his show cause motion on Wife. On
December 1, 2021, Husband’s show cause motion was sent by certified mail to Wife’s
correct address, and that mailing was assigned U.S. Postal Service receipt number
46125837. U.S. Postal Service receipt number 46125837 was delivered on December 2,
2021, to the wrong street address rather than Wife’s address. The show cause motion was
delivered to the incorrect address.
              According to Civ.R. 4.1(A), “service of process may be made by

certified mail ‘evidenced by return receipt signed by any person * * *.’” Belovich v.

Crowley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109523, 2021-Ohio-2039, ¶ 31, quoting Matteo v.

Principe, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92894, 2010-Ohio-1204, ¶ 10, quoting Civ.R.

4.1(A). Certified mail must be sent to an address “reasonably calculated to cause

service to reach the defendant.” Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. First Am. Properties,

113 Ohio App.3d 233, 237, 680 N.E.2d 725 (2d Dist.1996). “‘There is a rebuttable

presumption of proper service when the civil rules governing service are followed.’”

Belovich at ¶ 31, quoting Roscoe v. Delfraino, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 19 MA 0038,

2019-Ohio-5253, ¶ 25, citing Draghin v. Issa, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98890, 2013-

Ohio-1898, ¶ 10. This presumption of proper service is rebuttable by sufficient

evidence. Rafalski v. Oates, 17 Ohio App.3d 65, 66, 477 N.E.2d 1212 (8th Dist.1984).

              Here, the return receipt shows that certified mail service of Husband’s

support modification motion was sent to Wife’s home address, signed, and returned.

Under Civ.R. 4.1(A), service was presumptively completed.         See Castellano v.

Kosydar, 42 Ohio St.2d 107, 110, 326 N.E.2d 686 (1975) (“[C]ertified mail, under

the Rules of Civil Procedure, no longer requires actual service upon the party

receiving the notice but is effective upon certified delivery.”). Wife introduced no

evidence to rebut proper service, but argued erroneously that the motion was served

to the wrong address.

              As to his support modification motion, Husband satisfied the service

rules. However, Husband did not serve the motion within six months of its filing
and, therefore, the support modification motion could be subject to dismissal

pursuant to Civ.R. 4(E) that reads:

      Summons; Time limit for service. If a service of the summons and
      complaint [support modification motion] is not made upon a
      defendant within six months after the filing of the complaint and the
      party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good
      cause why such service was not made within that period, the action
      shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the
      court’s own initiative with notice to such party or upon motion. This
      division shall not apply to out-of-state service pursuant to Rule 4.3 or
      to service in a foreign country pursuant to Rule 4.5.

Civ.R. 4(E).

               Civ.R. 4(E) states a trial court will dismiss an action if service of the

summons and complaint is not made upon the defendant within six months of filing

the complaint and the party filing the complaint does not show good cause as to why

service was not perfected in that time frame. In his supplemental objections filed

on February 2, 2023, Husband argued service of the motion was delayed for good

cause. Husband argued that upon Wife’s responding to the motion on January 6,

2021, he believed Wife had subjected herself to the court’s jurisdiction. Husband

also noted that Wife’s January 2021 motions argued the merits of the case but did

not question service of the motion. The parties actively litigated the case from

January 2021 through November 2023, when the trial court dismissed the case for

lack of proper service. Husband also argued that service was perfected on December

8, 2021, and the delay in obtaining service did not interfere with the progression of

the case. Husband argued dismissal of the matter for lack of service would be unjust.
              The record reflects that the first written claim of lack of jurisdiction

was made on November 29, 2021, when Wife filed her motion to dismiss due to lack

of service. On that same day, Husband filed a brief in opposition and argued that

Wife waived service by her continued participation in litigation of his motions. Just

a few days later, on December 1, 2021, Husband filed a request for service in an

attempt to perfect service of the support modification motion on Wife.           And

Husband successfully perfected service of the motion on December 8, 2021. The

trial court granted Wife’s motion to dismiss due to lack of service, and thereby

dismissed Husband’s support modification motion in May 2023, over a year after

Husband perfected service.

              As this court stated previously,

      [w]e do not believe that Civ.R. 4(E) is meant to be used as a vehicle to
      dismiss cases once service has been properly perfected, but rather is
      intended to apply to those situations where there is no service and
      where the plaintiff has been dilatory in attempting to obtain service on
      a defendant.

Briggs v. Glenbeigh Health Servs., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 77395 and 77665, 2000

Ohio App. LEXIS 5587, 11 (Nov. 30, 2000). “Like all procedural rules, Civ.R. 4(E)

must be ‘construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating delay,

unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration

of justice.’” Carter v. Univ. Park Dev. Corp., 2017-Ohio-5795, 94 N.E.3d 1019, ¶ 22

(9th Dist.), quoting Civ.R. 1(B); see Gibson v. Williams, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2023-A-0026, 2023-Ohio-3760, ¶ 16 (The trial court found “there was little

justification for dismissal inasmuch as Gibson had shown cause for not obtaining
service within six months of filing the Complaint and had shown diligence in

obtaining service.”).

               By the time the trial court ruled on Wife’s motion to dismiss, Husband

had perfected service of the support modification motion. We find Husband’s timely

response to Wife’s motion to dismiss and his reasoning for good cause, coupled with

Husband’s successful service of his support modification motion just days after Wife

filed her motion to dismiss, demonstrate just cause for Husband’s delay in

perfecting service. Additionally, adopting the reasoning behind Civ.R. 4(E) and this

court’s reluctance to dismiss an action where service has been perfected, we

determine that the trial court abused its discretion when it found Husband did not

perfect service of the support modification motion and dismissed that motion.

Therefore, we sustain Husband’s second assignment of error. Further, our finding

on the second assignment of error renders Husband’s first assignment of error moot.

               Judgment is dismissed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. As to Husband’s second and third

assignments of error, the dismissals of Husband’s support modification motion and

motion for judicial review, respectively, are reversed and remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. As to Husband’s arrearages motion, we

conclude that the trial court’s May 11, 2023 and May 25, 2023 orders dismissing the

motion for lack of service were not final, appealable orders and, therefore, dismiss

that portion of Husband’s appeal relative to that motion.

      It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR