Court Opinion

ID: 9856039
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:36:55.245032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:55.994913
License: Public Domain

Baker, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the prevailing opinion i'n this case.
If under the facts of this case as disclosed by the record, this Court is going to circumvent the law of this State that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will not be applied, by holding that there is some circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer negligence on the part of the defendants-respondents, then I think it best that we overrule the long line of decisions heretofore holding said doctrine inapplicable and frankly adopt it.
*69Whether the trial Judge had before him only the testimony offered by appellant and no part of the testimony offered by the defendants-respondents, does not appear in the record, but does appear in the brief of counsel for appellant. Even so, I can see nothing in the testimony offered on behalf of defendants-respondents, or even isolated excerpts therefrom, which in anywise strengthens the case of the appellant, and have no idea that said last-mentioned testimony would have affected the action of the learned trial Judge.
In connection herewith, and as a portion of this dissenting opinion, I adopt the Order of the trial Judge setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting judgment in favor of the defendants-respondents notwithstanding the verdict; and direct that his said Order be published herewith.
The following is the order of Judge E. H. Henderson:
The plaintiff was assisting in the loading of pieces of 6x8 timber upon a truck, when a piece fell from the nearby stack or pile, striking him on the leg and causing serious injury. The defendants moved for a directed verdict in their favor, one of the grounds being that there was no evidence of negligence on their part. The motion was refused. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $3,000.00.
The present motion by the defendants for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was heard by me while presiding in the Third Circuit, and was taken under advisement.
The law is clear that a master has the duty to provide for his servants a reasonably safe place in which to work, but he is not an insurer of their safety, and is liable only for negligence.
The decision of this motion depends upon whether the . case falls within the'principle laid down in Tucker v. Holly Hill Lumber Co., 200 S. C. 259, 20 S. E. (2d) 704, and like cases, that evidence of the failure of the master to provide a reasonably safe place in which to work makes out a *70prima facie case of negligence, or whether the action is governed by Weston v. Hillyer, 160 S. C. 541, 159 S. E. 390, and similar cases.
After a careful study of these cases, aided by a transcript of a portion of the testimony, I feel convinced that a verdict should have been directed in favor of the defendants, and that consequently it is now my duty to grant the pending motion.
Analysis of the two lines of cases will show that while of course a prima facie case of negligence may be made by evidence that the master failed to provide a reasonably safe place for work, nevertheless there must be some evidence that he did fail to provide such reasonably safe place.
In the Tucker case five men were placed in a boat which was built to accommodate only three, at a time when the river was at flood stage, although on a previous trip with five men the water came within three inches of the top of the boat.
In Grainger v. Greenville, S. & A. R. Co., 101 S. C. 73, 85 S. E. 231, there was evidence that the injured man was put to work digging under an overhanging bank of earth, which was likely to fall upon the workmen. The overseer was present, and his attention was called to the danger.
In the case of Rikard v. Middleburg Mills, 113 S. C. 137, 101 S. E. 643, there wras evidence that when the plaintiff pushed open the door to the warehouse, as he was ordered to do, a bale of cotton, which had been insecurely and carelessly stacked in front of the door, fell and struck him.
There was evidence, in Bunch v. American Cigar Co., 126 S. C. 324, 119 S. E. 828, that the day was dark and cloudy, there was no light at the door leading to the staircase and none on the staircase, there was a splotch of oil upon the floor into which the plaintiff stepped, and some of it stuck to her shoe. On the staircase she slipped and fell, due to the oil on her shoe.
*71It appears in the case of Trimmier v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry. Co., 81 S. C. 203, 62 S. E. 209, that the railroad switch was defective or wrongly placed.
There was some testimony, in Bailey v. Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 151 S. C. 83, 148 S. E. 703, that there was a defect in the floor.
In the present case I do not think that there is any evidence that the defendants had provided an unsafe place. There is no evidence that the timber was unevenly piled, or that any piece of it projected from the stack, or that the pile was too high, or that it was placed on uneven ground, or any other defect in the pile or its surroundings. All we have is that the piece fell.
That is precisely what appeared in Weston v. Hillyer, above, and in Holmes v. Davis, Director General, 126 S. C. 231, 119 S. E. 249; something fell and injured the servant.
In the Weston case the plaintiff was working on the Cooper River bridge, where a walkway was to be constructed. Suspended along the handrails, and attached thereto by wire at both ends, were steel bars about 30 feet long and about six inches wide. One of these bars, suspended above the place where the plaintiff was at work, fell upon him and injured his leg. The Court affirmed an order of nonsuit pf the trial Judge, and said that there was not a particle of evidence that the weight of the bar of steel was too great for the strength of the wires; there was no proof that the wires broke, or that they slipped; there was proof that there were hundreds of other bars of like size and weight so suspended, and that this was the only one that fell. “It is possible that other laborers may have leaned or sat upon the beam, and brought about its fall. It is possible that work being done elsewhere on the bridge might have jarred the beam and loosened the wires which held it and caused it to slip and fall. There is no proof of what caused the fall; the whole thing is left to conjecture. And that matter may not be left to conjecture,” [160 S. C. 541, 159 S. E. 392.]
*72In the Holmes case [126 S. C. 231, 119 S. E. 250], above, the evidence was that the plaintiff was filling a cotton waste press and leveling the top of the waste with his hand, when the plunger fell on his arm. Such a fall had never occurred before. The Court held that this was insufficient for submission to the jury on the question of the defendant’s negligence in failing to furnish a safe place. The Court said that there was not a particle of evidence to sustain the allegation that the machine was defective, other than the inference that it must have been defective or it would not have fallen as it did. It added that “this, under the authorities cited, is not sufficient to carry the case to the jury.” And it was said “So the cause of the unexpected dropping of the plunger * * * is left to ‘conjecture, surmise, speculation, or supposition,’ and whether the injury was or not due to the negligence of the master.”
To the same effect is Watson v. Charleston Stevedoring Co., 141 S. C. 355, 139 S. E. 778. There the plaintiff was helping unload a ship. He was standing on the deck, when suddenly a rope or guy line, attached to a swinging boom, broke and swung loose, wrapped itself around the neck of the plaintiff and hurled him to the wharf. The Court approved an order of nonsuit, which held that there was no evidence of any defect in the rope. “The bare proof shows only that the rope broke and as to what caused it to break is left wholly to conjecture. There is not a scintilla of evidence of any failure to inspect, of the rope being too small or subjected to too heavy a strain, or that it was worn, or rotten, or otherwise defective, or that it was subjected to any sudden jerk or of any other facts or circumstances tending to show negligence on the part of the defendant.”
In the instant case to say that the mere fact that the timber fell is evidence of an unsafe place provided by the master would be to apply the rule of res ipsa loquitur, to indulge in surmise and conjecture, and to try the case as if under the workmen’s act instead of under the rules of the common law.
*73In view of this holding it will not be necessary for me to dwell at length on the other grounds of the motion, as to assumption of risk and contributory negligence, but as I believe that it ordinarily is the duty of the trial Judge to rule on all the grounds, I will simply say that such grounds are overruled.
For the reasons stated it is ordered that the verdict of the jury be, and the same hereby is, set aside, and judgment is granted in favor of the defendants notwithstanding the verdict.