Court Opinion

ID: 9654267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:12:10.257451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:07.449647
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Both Appellee, Royal Indemnity, and Appellant, Charles E. Miles, have filed motions for rehearing.
Royal Indemnity complains in essence that this Court avoided the stipulated facts and exceeded its authority by finding facts contrary to “the facts which were dealt with in the District Court and upon which the parties had agreed in the District Court.” Related to this complaint, Royal Indemnity contends that this Court erred by failing to hold that the boat “Alyson” was unseaworthy as a matter of law.
Contrary to Royal Indemnity’s assertion, this Court did not ignore the stipulated facts. Neither party stipulated to the effect that the starboard seacock had not been closed and remained entirely unobstructed by any other material, such as a shop rag. Appellant Miles’ theory of recovery against Hoke, the repairman, was that Hoke failed to turn off the seacock, which *734failure was negligence and the proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel. As stated in our original opinion, there is testimony in the record that Hoke, although he did not turn off the starboard seacock, did stuff a rag into the opening. Appellant Miles, in support of his contention that there was sufficient evidence to support the proximate cause issue and the negligence cluster, argued to the judge that:
“We have alleged that his failure to turn off the [seacock] was the proximate cause of the sinking of the vessel.
Stuffing the rag — that was an additional thing that he did. But we have alleged that the failure to close the valve was the cause of the sinking of the vessel. And thus far in the case, that’s the only thing that’s been shown as a cause of the sinking of the vessel.”
In response to special issues, the jury found that Hoke failed to close the through-hole fitting on the occasion in question, but that such failure was not negligence. As previously stated, other expert boat repairmen stuffed rags into through-hull openings as a common and acceptable practice.
We fail to see how statements made by appellant’s attorney, such as the one above quoted, require us to ignore the evidence in the record concerning the shop rag which had been stuffed into the seacock. Appellant’s cause of action as against Royal Indemnity was that he was entitled to recover under the “all risks” policy. The evidence that the shop rag had been stuffed into the seacock was not necessarily the controlling factual determination, but is rather eviden-tiary of the ultimate fact issue which is whether or not the Alyson was seaworthy immediately prior to the time she sank. As stated in our original opinion, the jury found the vessel seaworthy. This issue was submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions which neither party challenged on appeal.
Royal Indemnity also complains that this Court erred in not holding that the testimony of Lamar Fuller concerning the amount of money necessary to restore the Alyson to a condition she was in prior to her sinking was hearsay, because his testimony shows on its face that the only thing he knew about the condition of the vessel before the sinking was what he had been told by someone else. Royal Indemnity contends that Fuller could not testify that the repairs which were made were necessary as a result of the sinking because he had no personal knowledge of the condition of the vessel before she sank. Accordingly, Royal Indemnity contends that all of his testimony concerning the condition of the vessel before she sank was hearsay and, since his testimony was the only testimony in the record relating to the cost of repairs, the damage award is based exclusively upon hearsay, and therefor there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
The distinction Royal Indemnity is attempting to point out on motion for rehearing is not clear. We are still of the opinion that Fuller’s testimony as an expert witness had probative value in determining the reasonable and necessary cost of repairs to the Alyson as a result of the vessel’s sinking.
Finally, Royal Indemnity presents the final complaint that this Court erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment (non ob-stante veredicto) and in awarding damages for storage of the Alyson. There is nothing in the record showing that Royal Indemnity objected to the special issue concerning storage costs on the ground that the special issue inquired into an amount which was not covered by the policy nor did Royal Indemnity’s motion for judgment non ob-stante veredicto state that the jury’s answer to that special issue should be disre-gardéd on the basis that such damages were not covered under the policy in question. There is nothing in appellee’s appellate brief by way of cross-point or any other statement stating that this is not an amount covered by the policy. While we note that the trial record does contain a special exception by Royal Indemnity challenging Miles’ pleadings on the basis that storage was not covered under the policy, there is absolutely nothing in the record to indicate that such special exception was ■brought to the trial court’s attention to be acted upon.
*735In addition, Miles’ motion for judgment on the jury’s verdict states as a grounds therefor that the costs of storage should be recovered pursuant to paragraph eight of the general provisions pertaining to the “all risks” policy in question. This assertion was not contradicted in any way by Royal Indemnity. It is too late for Royal Indemnity to bring this complaint to our attention on motion for rehearing. See: Wright v. Gernandt, 559 S.W.2d 864 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ). Royal Indemnity’s motion for rehearing is hereby overruled.
Miles, in his motion for “correction of judgment or for rehearing,” complains that this Court failed to award pre-judgment interest at the rate of 6% per annum, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The pre-judgment interest request on motion for rehearing is a troublesome question in this case. Miles contends that he is entitled to receive pre-judgment interest from the date Royal Indemnity denied insurance coverage for the loss in question, October 8,1976, until the date of judgment. Miles’ pleadings prayed for recovery under the policy of insurance issued by Royal Indemnity for the cost of repairs to the Alyson plus storage, “plus costs of Court, and such other and further relief, both general and special, at law and in equity, to which he may be justly entitled.” Miles contends that this general prayer is a sufficient basis upon which to award both pre- and post-judgment interest.
Royal Indemnity, on the other hand, complains that there is no evidence in the record as to the date Royal Indemnity denied liability pursuant to the terms of the policy because the letter (cross-plaintiff’s exhibit number 8) upon which Miles relies was never introduced into evidence. In addition, Royal Indemnity complains that the damages Miles sought to recover cannot be considered unliquidated within the general rule which allows pre-judgment interest on damages for unliquidated demands when the principal damages are determinable and established at a definite time, either by the rules of evidence or known standards of value because such damages were not “determinable and established at a definite time.” (See McDaniel v. Tucker, 520 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, no writ).
Justice McGee writing on behalf of our Supreme Court in Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Northwest National Bank of Fort Worth, 578 S.W.2d 109, 116 (Tex.1979), stated the following general rule concerning pre-judgment interest:
“Prejudgment interest is that interest calculated on the sum payable to the plaintiff from the time of his loss or injury to the time of judgment. It is recoverable as a matter of right where an ascertainable sum of money is determined to have been due and payable at a date certain prior to judgment.” (Citations omitted.)
Pre-judgment interest can be allowed eo nominee only where it is so provided for by contract or statute. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex.1978). Pre-judgment interest can also be awarded as damages in certain instances under equitable principles as compensation for the use or detention of money. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480, 485-88 (Tex.1978). Where pre-judgment interest is sought at common law as an element of damages, the plaintiff must plead for it. Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex.1979). An award for pre-judgment interest eo nominee, pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.-03 (1971) may be based upon a prayer for general relief if the plaintiff pleads and proves a written contract ascertaining a sum payable on date certain. Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 117 (Tex.1979).
In this case, Miles’ motion for rehearing fails to disclose whether prejudgment interest is being sought eo nominee pursuant to art. 5069-1.03 or as damages, because rules pertaining to each are cited by him without distinction. It is clear, however, that pursuant to the general rules, Miles cannot recover pre-judgment interest as damages because his claim for *736such interest is supported only in his trial pleadings with a prayer for general relief. We further note that, although Miles filed a motion for judgment on the jury’s verdict supported by an exhibit containing his proposed judgment, neither the motion nor the proposed judgment mention pre-judgment interest. In addition, although Miles’ original appellate brief and reply brief contain specific prayers which, in' substance, request our Court to reverse the trial court’s judgment non obstante veredicto and to render judgment in accordance with the jury’s answers to special issues, neither of his appellate briefs mention pre-judgment interest nor do they contain a prayer for general relief to support such award.
We move to the critical question: Is Miles entitled to recover pre-judgment interest eo nominee pursuant to Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5069-1.03 (1971). This statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“When no specified rate of interest is agreed upon by the parties, interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be allowed on all written contracts ascertaining the sum payable, from and after the time when the sum is due and payable . . . ”
In order for Miles to be entitled to recover pre-judgment interest eo nominee within the meaning of article 5069-1.03, it was incumbent upon him to plead and prove “a written contract ascertaining a sum payable at a date certain prior to judgment.” Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 116-17 (Tex.1979). The Texas Supreme Court has long construed the requirement that a contract “ascertaining a sum payable” is satisfied when the following general conditions are met:
“[T]he words, ‘ascertaining the sum payable’ have reference to the sum or amount the party executing the obligation may be reasonably expected or required to pay, in view of all the circumstances incident to the matter or business he is contracting about, if by reason of the provision of the contract he becomes at any time liable to pay thereunder; and it is not necessary . . . that the contract shall itself establish a fixed liability in a definite amount as of a date certain. It is sufficient ... if the contract provides the conditions upon which liability depends and fixes a measure by which the sum payable can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, in the light of the attending circumstances. We think the statute should be construed as applying to contracts where, in case of liability arising from contingencies occurring after its execution, the obligor is furnished the means or opportunity of ascertaining with reasonable certainty the extent of liability or the sum he may be expected to pay.” Federal Life Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Kriton, 249 S.W. 193 (Tex.Comm’n App.—1923, opinion adopted). (Emphasis added).
The' insurance policy upon which Miles relied was introduced into evidence and is sufficient to constitute a contract ascertaining a sum payable within the meaning of article 5069-1.03.
The question of whether Miles proved that such sums were due and payable at a date certain prior to judgment is the next question to be answered. It has been generally stated that where an insurer denies liability under the terms of an insurance policy where no payment date is stated in the policy, and thereafter the insured establishes the insurer’s liability pursuant to the policy, pre-judgment interest will commence from the date the insurer denied liability. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. General Insurance Corp., 517 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Fort Worth Lloyds v. Hale, 405 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1966, writ ref’d n. r. e.); compare Fisch v. Transcontinental Insurance Company, 356 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1962 writ ref’d n. r. e.). Although the express terms of the insurance policy required Miles to give Royal Indemnity “immediate written notice with full particulars” in the event of a loss which could give rise to a claim under the policy provisions, the policy itself does not state a date or time limit for Royal Indemnity to pay such claim. In order to establish the date certain for payment, Miles relies upon the letter of October 8, 1976, wherein Royal Indemnity denied insurance *737coverage for the damage caused by the sinking of the Alyson. This letter, however, was not introduced into evidence. Arguably then, Miles cannot recover pre-judgment interest eo nominee because he failed to prove a date certain prior to the entry of judgment when an ascertainable sum became payable.'
A different result, however, was reached in New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Coffman, 540 S.W.2d 445, 457-58 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ ref’d n. r. e.), where the Court held in effect that prejudgment interest was recoverable and would commence on the date the insurance company first denied liability under the policy which, in that case, was the date the company filed its original answer denying liability. Since Miles had prayed for general relief, we enter the judgment the trial court should have entered. Rule 434, T.R. C.P.
We therefore grant Appellant Miles’ motion for rehearing and grant pre-judgment interest from October 7, 1977, when the record shows Royal Indemnity denied liability (original answer to third party complaint filed October 7, 1977) until date of judgment, January 18,1978, at 6% and post-judgment interest at the rate of 9% from the date of judgment until paid.