Court Opinion

ID: 9655713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:19:56.619339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:19.478379
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(dissenting). The defendant in this case presents an issue of first impression for this state. We are asked to determine whether the defendant can be prosecuted under MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 for equipping his motor vehicle with a radar detector or "Fuzzbuster”. A pertinent part of the statute provides:
"Any person who shall equip a vehicle with a radio receiving set that will receive signals sent on frequencies assigned by the federal communications commission of the United States of America for police purposes, or use the same in this state * * * without first securing a permit * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”.
Under the challenged statute, we would hold that a radar detector falls within the definition of a radio receiving set. Secondly, the frequencies upon which the radar detector operates have been assigned for police purposes. Thus, the detection of such radio waves on assigned frequencies brings the device within the prohibition of the statute.
We also would hold that such enforcement is not pre-empted by the federal Communications Act of *2151934. Furthermore, we would hold that the enforcement of the statute is a valid exercise of this state’s police power, and that there is no equal protection violation. Finally, despite the logical clarity of the statute, we would affirm the dismissal of charges against the defendant, because a reasonable layperson might not heretofore have understood that radar was within the proscription of the act. However, we also agree with the Court of Appeals that because of our "judicial gloss” persons in the future could be prosecuted under the statute. We would affirm.
I. Facts
On December 3, 1976, defendant motorist was stopped by a Troy police officer. The officer observed that defendant’s car was equipped with a radar detector. He charged the defendant with equipping or using a motor vehicle with a radio receiving set capable of receiving police signals in violation of MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776.
The charges were dismissed by the Troy Municipal Court, which found that, although a radar detector is a radio receiving set, it is not within the proscription of the statute. The Oakland Circuit Court, however, reversed the lower court and remanded the case for trial. The Court of Appeals dismissed the charges against the defendant, but held that persons in the future could be prosecuted under the statute. 88 Mich App 764; 279 NW2d 546 (1979); 93 Mich App 321; 287 NW2d 220 (1979) (On Rehearing).
We granted leave on June 20, 1980. 408 Mich 960 (1980).
*216II. Statutory Interpretation

A. Radio Receiving Set

The first issue which must be resolved is whether a radar detector is a "radio receiving set” under MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776.1 The defendant asserts that the phrase "radio receiving set” should be interpreted in such a way that radar detectors are excluded because such devices do not receive voice communications.2 We would hold that a radar detector is included in the statute.
The relevant statutory language provides:
"Any person who shall equip a vehicle with a radio receiving set that will receive signals”. (Emphasis added.)
The trial record indicates that a radar detector, even though it receives signals at a different fre*217quency, receives the same radio waves or signals as does a conventional radio. The insignificant difference between the two is that the radar detector does not transform the received signals into the same type of output.
The commonality of radar and radio receiving sets is apparent from the fact that the term radar is a convenient acronym for "RAdio Detection And Ranging”. State v Tomanelli, 153 Conn 365, 369; 216 A2d 625 (1966). Furthermore, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1966) Edition, p 1871, has defined "radar” as "a radio device or system for locating an object by means of emitting radio signals”. Consequently, when comparing the terms "radio” and "radar”, it is immediately apparent that radio is a broad designation given to devices that receive wireless signals or radio waves and that radar is simply one type of radio device that also receives such signals. Therefore, construing MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 narrowly, as we must, we conclude that the term radio receiving set encompasses the term radar detector within the plain meaning of the statute. In People v Hall, 391 Mich 175, 189-190; 215 NW2d 166 (1974), we stated that "the fact that these types of statutes [penal] are narrowly construed does not require rejection of that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the overall context of the statutes”.

B. Assigned for Police Purposes

The issue is whether, on the record, the radar frequency in question was assigned for police use. The operative language of the statute reads:
"Any person who shall equip a vehicle with a radio receiving set * * * on frequencies assigned by the fed*218eral communications commission * * * for police purposes”. (Emphasis added.)
The record indicates that the frequency of 10,-525 megahertz has been assigned for police purposes. The record specifically shows that the Michigan State Police department was granted a license to operate its radar device on the frequency of 10,525 MHz.
Defendant contends that the assignment must be exclusively for police use. Plaintiff’s witness testified that, except for low-power burglar alarm systems, this frequency is exclusively assigned for police use. There was no contrary testimony. However, there is no statutory requirement of exclusivity in the frequencies assigned for police purposes. The plain and unambiguous language of the statute only requires that the relevant frequencies be assigned by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for police purposes. Accordingly, we would hold that the frequency utilized by police radar has been assigned by the FCC "for police purposes”.
III. Pre-emption by Federal Communications Act
The defendant also asserts that the Communications Act of 1934,3 which provides for a comprehensive regulatory scheme, reflects a Congressional intent to pre-empt the field of radio reception. Therefore, he argues that MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 must yield to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. US Const, art VI, cl 2. In advocating this claim, the defendant looks to the legislative history of the Communications Act, the pervasiveness of its regulatory scheme and to *219§6054 as being the exclusive limitation on radio reception. The plaintiff, however, asserts that the Michigan statute and the policy reasons for its adoption do not unsettle the federal scheme and that it represents a valid exercise of this state’s police power.
The exercise of state powers must yield to an act of Congress with which it conflicts. But the United States Supreme Court, in assessing the proper interface between state and federal schemes, has indicated that the challenged state action will be pre-empted only when it becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment of a national objective. In Pennsylvania v Nelson, 350 US 497, 502-506; 76 S Ct 477; 100 L Ed 640 (1956), that Court fashioned a three-pronged analysis to lie used in establishing the pre-emption parameters: (1) the pervasiveness of the federal scheme; (2) federal occupation of a field dictated by the need for national uniformity; and (3) danger of conflict between state laws and the administration of the federal program.
However, the Court has applied a narrow definition to the term "conflict”. In Rice v Santa Fe Elevator Corp, 331 US 218, 230; 67 S Ct 1146; 91 L Ed 1447 (1947), the Court stated that when a state exercise of its police power is challenged under the Supremacy Clause, "we start with the assumption that the historic powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the federal scheme of allocating frequencies for radio transmission may be pervasive as the legislative history indicates. The need for uniformity, how*220ever, is not so strong that the federal interest should dominate over an important state interest. The United States Supreme Court mandated no less a principle in Head v New Mexico Board of Examiners in Optometry, 374 US 424, 431; 83 S Ct 1759; 10 L Ed 2d 983 (1963). In that case, the Court held that the federal regulatory scheme created by the Communications Act was not so pervasive or the need for uniformity so strong that the states were foreclosed from regulating the content of advertising messages over the airwaves. The exercise of a state’s police power in regulating highway safety is an equally strong interest. Cases where state regulation of radar was held not preempted by the Communications Act include: Smith v Dist of Columbia, 436 A2d 53 (1981); Bryant Radio Supply, Inc v Slane, 507 F Supp 1325 (WD Va, 1981), aff'd 669 F2d 921 (CA 4, 1982) (state regulation of radar not pre-empted); State v Anonymous (1980-8), 36 Conn Supp 551; 421 A2d 867 (1980); Crenshaw v Commonwealth, 219 Va 38; 245 SE2d 243 (1978).
The Michigan statute was adopted to facilitate effective law enforcement activity and to protect police frequencies from being used by people who wish to circumvent the laws. "Radar detectors have no utility other than aiding an illicit effort to drive in an irresponsible manner, evading society’s punishment for such conduct.” Smith, supra, 59. The connection between the prohibition of radar detectors and law enforcement and highway safety is quite obvious, and the recognition of an important state interest also supports the rationality of the federal scheme.
Finally, there is no direct conflict between MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 and the Communications Act. *221Under 47 CFR 90.103(a), the FCC has established the requirements for eligibility for authorization to employ radiolocation devices. This fact reinforces the notion that the proscription of radar detectors complements rather than conflicts with the federal scheme. The defendant gets no relief by arguing that § 605 of the act is an exclusive enforcement device which may not be extended by state legislation. This provision exists to deal with the rights of senders and recipients of communications. Section 605 was not legislatively intended to regulate the detection of radio transmissions. Accord, Bryant Radio Supply, supra, 1328.
Therefore, defendant has failed to persuade us that Congress has clearly manifested an intent to pre-empt state activity in the regulation of radar detectors. By following the mandate of the United States Supreme Court that the presumption is against pre-emption when there is a strong state interest, we would hold that the prohibition against equipping or using radar detectors under MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 is not pre-empted by the Communications Act of 1934.
IV. Equal Protection
Defendant argues that MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 denies him equal protection under the Michigan and federal constitutions. Const 1963, art 1, § 2; US Const, Am XIV.
In Alexander v Detroit, 392 Mich 30, 35-36; 219 NW2d 41 (1974), this Court, after recognizing the various tests employed by the United States Supreme Court in equal protection analysis, found two tests to guide the Court in its scrutiny of challenged legislation:
*222"(1) Are the enactment’s classifications based on natural distinguishing characteristics and do they bear a reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation?”
"(2) Are all persons of the same class included and affected alike or are immunities or privileges extended to an arbitrary or unreasonable class while denied to others of like kind?” (Citations omitted.)
Moreover, in Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, 394 Mich 655, 668; 232 NW2d 636 (1975), we discussed the two-tiered approach to equal protection and its shifting burden of proof. If an interest is fundamental or a classification suspect, a reviewing court will apply a strict scrutiny test, requiring the state to justify by showing a compelling state interest.
Other legislative classifications are reviewed under the traditional equal protection test. The burden is then on the party challenging the legislation to show that it is without reasonable justification:
"It has been said that '[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it’. A classification will stand unless it is shown to be 'essentially arbitrary’. Few statutes have been found so wanting in 'rationality’ as to fail to satisfy the 'essentially arbitrary’ test.” Manistee Bank, supra, 668 (footnotes omitted).
Defendant cites Reed v Reed, 404 US 71; 92 S Ct 251; 30 L Ed 2d 225 (1971), which involved an Idaho statute giving preference to men over women in the administration of decedents’ estates, for the proper test.5 In the case at bar, it becomes *223immediately apparent that the challenged legislation does not involve such a class or even a fundamental interest. Therefore, the burden is on the defendant to show that the classification is arbitrary and does not bear a rational relationship to the object of the legislation.
The defendant seeks to sustain his burden by saying that the Legislature reasonably made the exemption of peace officers and FCC-licensed amateur radio operators in the context of voice radio, because the purpose of the statute was to avoid tipping off burglars to the approach of police. He insists that this rationale does not apply in the case of radar and the Court of Appeals interpretation as to the purpose of the statute, viz., the promotion of highway safety. We are not impressed by defendant’s argument, because the essential statutory purpose under his and the Court of Appeals interpretation is that the prohibition of use of a radio device on police frequencies is to prevent the police from being impeded in the carrying out of their duties. So if the classification is reasonable under the defendant’s interpretation, it is reasonable under the Court of Appeals interpretation. In short, the defendant has failed in his burden to show the classification is arbitrary.
We find that the statute was enacted to facilitate law enforcement activity by restricting the use of radio receiving sets in motor vehicles because individuals using such sets could detrimentally monitor police frequencies. Furthermore, the exemptions are rationally related to the statutory objective because the Legislature found that such *224individuals are more accountable when using their sets.
V. Due Process
For reasons similar to those discussed with respect to equal protection, we would hold that there is no denial of due process under the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 1, § 17. As we stated in Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 612-614; 267 NW2d 72 (1978):
"The test to determine whether legislation enacted pursuant to the police power comports with due process is whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. * * *
"The test to determine whether a statute enacted pursuant to the police power comports with equal protection is, essentially the same. * * *
"In the application of these tests, it is axiomatic that the challenged legislative judgment is accorded a presumption of constitutionality. * * * What this 'presumption of constitutionality’ means, in terms of challenged police power legislation, is that in the face of a due process or equal protection challenge, 'where the legislative judgment is drawn in question’, a court’s inquiry 'must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it’.” (Footnotes and citations omitted.)
As we have already indicated, we would hold that the statutory objective of proscribing the equipping or use of vehicles with radar detectors is reasonably related to promotion of public health, welfare, and safety, a legitimate use of the state police power.
It is unquestionably true that the ultimate vice sought to be proscribed is the monitoring of police activity by private motorists. The prevention of *225such monitoring is the apparent statutory objective. It is difficult to conclude, however, that proscribing the equipping of a vehicle with a radar detector tuned to a police frequency is not a means of rationally achieving that lawful objective.
Our question, therefore, is whether there is such separation between the means chosen by the Legislature and its legitimate objective as to render the statute invalid because of a lack of due process. Although there may be a logical and semantic difference between equipping a vehicle to monitor and the actual monitoring of police frequencies, it is difficult for us to conclude that there is no reasonable nexus between the means chosen and the public safety objective to be achieved, particularly since the "challenged legislative judgment is accorded a presumption of constitutionality”. Shavers, supra, 613.
The Legislature has, without successful constitutional objections, enacted other legislation with a similar nexus. For example, the mere carrying of a concealed dangerous weapon is unlawful because the Legislature, in its wisdom, believed that such a provision would be in the public interest.6
In short, the Michigan Legislature has exercised, without disapproval, broad discretion in creating reasonable means which are needed in protecting the public to achieve legitimate police power objective.7
*226As we have stated in section IV, we find that the statute was enacted to facilitate law enforcement activity by protecting police frequencies. Furthermore, the proscriptions are rationally related to the statutory objective to protect public safety. In short, we find no lack of due process under the Michigan Constitution.
VI. The Dempster Rule
Nevertheless, we agree with the defendant that there was the practical possibility of such ambiguity that a person of ordinary intelligence might not have been put on notice that the use of radar detectors is forbidden under the statute. This Court, however, in People v Dempster, 396 Mich 700, 715-716; 242 NW2d 381 (1976), quoting Bouie v City of Columbia, 378 US 347, 353, 355; 84 S Ct 1697; 12 L Ed 2d 894 (1964), noted that a "clarifying gloss” could eliminate such a problem in the future:
"It is. true that interpretations of statutory provisions by a court may add a clarifying gloss to otherwise unclear words, and thereby provide constructive notice to future defendants, but
" 'an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law * * *’ and '* * * the effect is to deprive [the defendant] of due process of law in the sense of fair warning that his contemplated conduct constitutes a crime.’ ”
Therefore, we agree with the Court of Appeals8 both that the charges lodged against this particular defendant should be dismissed and that all persons shall be on notice that equipping one’s *227vehicle with a radar detector is unlawful in Michigan.
VII. Conclusion
It was proper for the Court of Appeals to have dismissed the charges against the defendant. We would hold, however, that persons in the future can be prosecuted under MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 because a radar detector is a radio receiving set which receives signals on frequencies that have been assigned for police purposes.
In addition, we find no conflict between the statute and the Communications Act of 1934. By enforcing the statute, the state is exercising its valid police powers which complement the regulatory scheme of the act. Furthermore, the challenged exemptions of the statute do not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions. Accordingly, we would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

 MCL 750.508; MSA 28.776 provides:
"Any person who shall equip a vehicle with a radio receiving set that will receive signals sent on frequencies assigned by the federal communications commission of the United States of America for police purposes, or use the same in this state unless such vehicle is used or owned by a peace officer or a bona fide amateur radio operator holding a conditional, general, advanced or extra class amateur license issued by the federal communications commission, without Srst securing a permit so to do from the commissioner of the Michigan state police upon such application as he may prescribe, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not more than 1 year or by a fine of not more than $500.00 or by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.” (Emphasis added.)

 The defendant relies heavily on two New York cases. People v Moore, 92 Misc 2d 807; 401 NYS2d 440 (1978); People v Faude, 88 Misc 2d 434; 388 NYS2d 562 (1976). In both cases, the court did not find radar detectors to be radio devices because they are not capable of receiving voice transmissions. These cases are easily distinguished from the instant case because § 140.40 of the New York Penal Law, which governs the use of certain radio devices, specifically defines radio device as "any device capable of receiving a wireless voice transmission on any frequency allocated for police use”.

 47 USC 151 et seq.

 47 USC 605.

 The test requested by the defendant is the substantial-relation-to-the-object test which is a middle-tier review. In Manistee Bank & Trust Co v McGowan, supra, 394 Mich 668-671, this Court indicated that the substantial relation test should be applied where a challenged statute carves out a discrete exception to the general and the *223exception is no longer experimental. It has no application in the instant case. For an excellent review of middle-tier scrutiny, see Roberts, Gender-Based Draff Registration, Congressional Policy and Equal Protection: A Proposal for Deferential Middle-Tier Review, 27 Wayne L Rev 35 (1980).

 MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424 states that:
"A person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto, or other dangerous weapon * * * concealed on or about his person * * * shall be guilty of a felony”.

 Under the felony-firearm statute, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), for example, the mere possession of a firearm during the course of a felony is punishable. The purpose of the statute is to deter the use of handguns during the course of a felony. The bare fact that a felon has a firearm at his disposal should he need it creates a sufficient risk to others that it is within the state’s power to punish its possession. See People v Elowe, 85 Mich App 744; 272 NW2d 596 (1978).

 88 Mich App 764, 774; 279 NW2d 546 (1979).