Court Opinion

ID: 9897242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:08.945198+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.353762
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Oct 30 2023, 9:03 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Donald R. Shuler                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Barkes, Kolbus, Rife & Shuler, LLP                        Attorney General of Indiana
Goshen, Indiana                                           Alexandria Sons
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

James A. Cassity,                                         October 30, 2023
Appellant-Defendant                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-209
        v.                                                Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Gretchen S. Lund,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          The Honorable Eric S. Ditton,
                                                          Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          20D04-2001-F6-92

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                             Judges Vaidik and Mathias concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023                              Page 1 of 12
      Statement of the Case
[1]   James A. Cassity (“Cassity”) appeals his convictions, following a bench trial,

      for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine1 and Class A misdemeanor

      possession of paraphernalia.2 Cassity argues that the trial court abused its

      discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine and paraphernalia into

      evidence because the arresting officer was not wearing a distinctive uniform as

      required by INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2 (“the Police Uniform Statute”).

      Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we reverse the trial court’s

      judgment.

[2]   We reverse.

      Issue
                      Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted
                      evidence.

      Facts
[3]   In January 2020, Elkhart City Police Department Officer Justin Gage (“Officer

      Gage”) was working as a member of the community relations unit. Officer

      Gage, who was driving an unmarked police car, was parked across the street

      from hotels that were being watched for drug activity. Cassity was the driver of

      a white Buick (“Cassity’s car”). While watching the hotel, Officer Gage saw,

      1
          IND. CODE § 35-48-4-6.1.
      2
          I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023           Page 2 of 12
      on two separate occasions, Cassity fail to signal while turning. Officer Gage

      then initiated a traffic stop on Cassity’s car. At the time of the traffic stop,

      Officer Gage was wearing a sweatshirt and jeans, and he wore a vest over his

      clothing. The vest contained the word “POLICE” written on it and had a

      badge on the shoulder area of the vest. On his vest, Officer Gage also carried

      his firearm, a taser, a bodycam, a radio, a notepad, and a pen.

[4]   Officer Gage approached Cassity’s car from the passenger side. When Officer

      Gage was walking up to the vehicle, he observed a woman later identified as

      Nicole Doty (“Doty”) making furtive movements and frantically placing

      something behind the center console. Additionally, when Officer Gage began

      talking with Doty and Cassity, he noticed that both Cassity and Doty were

      “visibly nervous[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202). Officer Gage also noticed that Doty

      was “shaking” and was reaching underneath her left thigh. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 202).

      Officer Gage asked both Cassity and Doty to exit Cassity’s car. At the same

      time, Elkhart City Police Officer Gruber (“Officer Gruber”), arrived on the

      scene wearing clothing similar to Officer Gage’s. This clothing included a

      sweatshirt, jeans, and a vest with the word “POLICE” written across it. Officer

      Gage saw a baggy containing what he believed to be methamphetamine in the

      front passenger seat when Doty exited the car, and he watched Cassity glance

      behind the center console as he exited the car.

[5]   After Cassity and Doty had both exited Cassity’s car, Officer Gage and Officer

      Gruber handcuffed them. Around this point in time, two officers driving

      marked police cars arrived at the scene. Officer Gage searched Cassity’s car for

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023          Page 3 of 12
      drugs and found a zipped bag behind the center console. The zipped bag

      contained methamphetamine. Officer Gage also searched Cassity and found on

      his person a baggy of methamphetamine along with a pipe containing burnt

      residue.

[6]   The State charged Cassity with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine

      and Class A misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia for the

      methamphetamine and pipe that Officer Gage found on his person. Thereafter,

      Cassity filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine and paraphernalia

      found on his person during the traffic stop. In September 2022, the trial court

      held a suppression hearing. At this hearing, Cassity argued that Officer Gage

      did not have the authority to stop him under the Police Uniform Statute.

      Officer Gage testified at the hearing and specifically testified that he had been

      wearing a “modified police uniform” with the word police across the vest and

      his badge affixed to the outer vest area. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 111). Officer Gage also

      testified that, at the time of the stop, he had been driving an unmarked police

      car. Officer Gage further testified that Cassity and Doty were not free to leave

      after he had initiated the traffic stop. During closing arguments, Cassity argued

      that Officer Gage did not have the authority under the Police Uniform Statute

      to make the traffic stop because he was in an unmarked police car and was not

      dressed in a distinctive police uniform. In support of this argument, Cassity

      cited to Davis v. State, 858 N.E.2d 168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

[7]   The trial court denied Cassity’s motion to suppress. The trial court stated that

      “Officer Gage was wearing police attire that was sufficiently distinctive enough

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023        Page 4 of 12
      that did clearly show to casual observations that he was a police officer[.]”

      (App. Vol. 2 at 88). The trial court specifically noted that “the word POLICE

      [was] largely displayed in bright white, capital, shiny letters in the center of the

      vest[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 88) (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court

      also explained that “there [were] various accoutrements common to police

      uniforms, e.g. a taser, a firearm, a flashlight, a pen, a notepad, a handheld radio

      transponder with spiral cord . . ., and a camera lens for the body cam” affixed

      to the vest. (App. Vol. 2 at 88) (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the

      trial court noted that Officer Gage had an Elkhart Police badge on his shoulder.

[8]   The trial court held a jury trial in October 2022. The jury heard the facts as set

      forth above. Additionally, at the start of Officer Gage’s testimony, Cassity

      lodged a continuing objection to Officer Gage’s authority to effectuate the

      traffic stop and to the admission of the evidence found during the stop.

      Specifically, Cassity stated that “the officer . . . didn’t have the authority under

      Indiana Code 9-30-2-2, to (indiscernible) stop.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 199). The trial

      court noted Cassity’s ongoing objection.

[9]   At the conclusion of the jury trial, the jury found Cassity guilty of Level 6

      felony possession of methamphetamine and Class A misdemeanor possession

      of paraphernalia. At his sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that Cassity

      serve two (2) years for his Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine

      conviction and one (1) year for his Class A misdemeanor possession of

      paraphernalia conviction. The trial court ordered Cassity’s sentences to be

      served concurrently at the county jail.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023          Page 5 of 12
[10]   Cassity now appeals.

       Decision
[11]   Cassity argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the

       methamphetamine and paraphernalia into evidence. Although Cassity

       originally challenged the admission of the evidence through a motion to

       suppress, he now challenges the admission of the evidence at trial. Thus, the

       issue is appropriately framed as whether the trial court abused its discretion by

       admitting the evidence. See Jefferson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2008), trans. denied. We will reverse a ruling on the admission of evidence for

       an abuse of discretion, which occurs only when the ruling is clearly against the

       logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s

       substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).

[12]   Specifically, Cassity argues that the traffic stop initiated by Officer Gage did not

       satisfy the requirements of INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2 because Officer Gage was

       not wearing a distinctive uniform and badge. INDIANA CODE § 9-30-2-2(a)

       provides that:

               a law enforcement officer may not arrest or issue a traffic
               information and summons to a person for a violation of an
               Indiana law regulating the use and operation of a motor vehicle
               on a highway or an ordinance of a city or town regulating the use
               and operation of a motor vehicle on a highway unless at the time
               of the arrest the officer is:

                        (1) wearing a distinctive uniform and a badge of authority;
                        or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023         Page 6 of 12
                        (2) operating a motor vehicle that is clearly marked as a
                        police vehicle;

               that will clearly show the officer or the officer’s vehicle to casual
               observations to be an officer or a police vehicle.

       A law enforcement officer’s compliance with this statute is not optional, it is

       required. “‘The purpose of this statute is to protect drivers from police

       impersonators and to protect officers from resistance should they not be

       recognized as officers.’” Porter v. State, 985 N.E.2d 348, 355 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2013) (quoting Ervin v. State, 968 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). “The

       statute seeks to help distinguish law enforcement officers from those on our

       highways who, for illicit purposes, impersonate law enforcement officers.” Id.

       (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Evidence obtained in an

       unlawful arrest may be excluded upon proper motion by the defendant. Id.

[13]   We first turn our attention to whether the Police Uniform Statute applies to

       Officer Gage’s traffic stop. In Bovie v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1195 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2002), this Court recognized, for purposes of the Police Uniform Statute, that

       the risks inherent with an investigatory stop are identical to those inherent to an

       arrest. We further explained that the purpose of the Police Uniform Statute –

       “to protect drivers from police impersonators and to protect officers from

       resistance should they not be recognized as officers” – was “implicit in the

       language” of the statute. Bovie, 760 N.E.2d at 1199. Thus, we held that, for

       purposes of the Police Uniform Statute, “there is no difference between an

       actual arrest or an investigatory stop.” Id. Thus, as soon as Officer Gage

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023              Page 7 of 12
       initiated the traffic stop on Cassity’s car, the Police Uniform Statute applied.

       See id. (holding that an officer neither wearing a uniform nor driving a marked

       car could not properly conduct a stop based on a traffic violation); see also Davis

       v. State, 858 N.E.2d 168, 172 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the officer “was

       precluded from conducting a traffic stop and effectuating either an arrest or

       simply an investigatory stop based on his lack of uniform and marked police

       vehicle”).

[14]   We recognize that our legislature did not define the term “distinctive uniform”

       in the Police Uniform Statute. “If the legislature has not defined a word, we

       give the word its plain, ordinary and usual meaning, consulting English

       language dictionaries when helpful in determining that meaning.” Moriarity v.

       Ind. Dept. of Nat. Res., 113 N.E.3d 614, 621 (Ind. 2019). From its earliest uses

       from Old French and Latin, the word “distinctive” has been used as an

       adjective describing a noun as being in a different division or class. OXFORD

       DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 277 (1966). Originating from Middle

       French and Latin, the noun “uniform” means “distinctive clothes worn by

       members of [a] group . . . .” THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF

       ETYMOLOGY 213 (1995). In addition, we consider how the word “uniform”

       has been used in statutes regulating police uniforms. See INDIANA CODE § 10-

       11-2-18 (Indiana State Police required to file description or picture of the

       design, color, insignia, and hat relating to its uniform); I.C. § 10-11-2-17

       (uniforms and equipment provided to Indiana State Police officers remain the

       property of the state); I.C. § 21-17-5-2 (trustees of educational institutions may

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023         Page 8 of 12
       prescribe distinctive police uniforms to be worn on campuses); I.C. § 36-8-10-

       10.6 (special deputies shall wear a uniform the design and color of which is

       easily distinguishable from the uniforms of the Indiana State Police, the regular

       county police force, and all municipal police and fire forces located in the

       county); I.C. § 36-8-10-20.1 (a uniform commission is created and directed to

       establish a police uniform of standard design and color for sheriffs and their

       deputies); I.C. § 36-8-4-4 (uniforms provided by a city remain the property of

       the city); I.C. § 36-8-10-4 (a county police force is established in each county

       and the county is to provide officers with uniforms).

[15]   These statutes direct the State Police, county sheriff, municipalities, and police

       forces of educational institutions to design distinctive uniforms that set their

       respective officers apart from each other by color and design. Furthermore,

       these uniforms remain the property of the respective departments. It is not the

       accoutrements that make the uniform. Instead, a “distinctive uniform” is the

       specific design, color, and patches officially adopted by the governmental

       authority employing the police officer so as to inform the public that the person

       stopping them is, in fact, a police officer employed by that respective

       department.

[16]   Our holding in this case is bolstered by our decision in Davis. In Davis, an

       officer who was a member of a Neighborhood Resource Officer Unit was

       monitoring a gas station that was in a high drug activity area. The officer was

       sitting in an unmarked police car across the street from the gas station and

       initiated a traffic stop on a car for failing to use his turn signal. The officer was

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023          Page 9 of 12
       wearing a sweatshirt and jeans underneath a vest with the word “POLICE”

       written across it and a badge on his shoulder area. We held that an officer

       wearing a “dark hooded sweatshirt, jeans, and a vest that said POLICE in plain

       white letters” along with a badge on his shoulder was not a uniform that

       satisfies the requirements of the Police Uniform Statute, precluding the officer

       from conducting a traffic stop or effectuating an arrest. Davis, 858 N.E.2d at

       172.

[17]   Here, the facts of this case are similar to Davis. Our review of the record reveals

       that Officer Gage, a member of the community relations unit, was parked in an

       unmarked car across the street from a hotel known for drug activity. Officer

       Gage initiated a traffic stop on Cassity’s car for failing to use his turn signal.

       During this evening traffic stop, Officer Gage was wearing a black sweatshirt

       and jeans. Over his civilian clothes, Officer Gage wore a black vest with the

       word “POLICE” written in white letters on his chest. Officer Gage also had a

       taser, a firearm, a flashlight, a pen, a notepad, a handheld radio transponder,

       and a body cam affixed to his vest. Additionally, Officer Gage had an Elkhart

       Police badge affixed to his shoulder. However, the officer wore the vest over

       his civilian clothes and not over a police uniform. As we did in Davis, we again

       hold that a black vest with the word police written across it, worn over civilian

       clothes, does not satisfy the distinctive uniform requirement of the Police

       Uniform Statute. See Davis, 858 N.E.2d at 172 (holding that a vest merely

       stating police, but not bearing the officer’s name, police department, or any

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023         Page 10 of 12
       other logo or distinguishing feature is not a uniform under the Police Uniform

       Statute).

[18]   The State argues that Officer Gage’s clothing satisfied the Police Uniform

       Statute because he was wearing a vest that contained “all of the various

       accoutrements common to police uniforms[.]” (State’s Br. 10). The State

       argues that these accoutrements make the vest a “distinctive uniform” as

       required by the Police Uniform Statute. However, the State cites to no

       authority supporting this argument, and we are not convinced by such an

       argument. None of the accoutrements cited by the State are items that are

       exclusively purchased or possessed by police officers. An individual in

       possession of a taser, a firearm, a flashlight, a pen, a notepad, a handheld radio

       transponder, and a body cam worn on a plain vest with the word “POLICE”

       written on it is not dressed in a “distinctive uniform,” as required by the Police

       Uniform Statute. In addition, the presence of the accoutrements on Officer

       Gage’s vest did not transform his civilian clothes into a “distinctive uniform.”

       This is certainly true in the context of an officer driving an unmarked car at

       night and wearing civilian clothing, including a sweatshirt and jeans, beneath

       the vest. Further, none of the accoutrements affixed to Officer Gage’s vest

       clearly identified him as an Elkhart police officer except his badge, which is a

       separate requirement of the Police Uniform Statute. See I.C. § 9-30-2-2(a)(1)

       (requiring officers to be wearing a distinctive uniform and a badge of authority).

[19]   Accordingly, we hold that the vest worn by Officer Gage does not satisfy the

       “distinctive uniform” requirement in the Police Uniform Statute. As a result,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023       Page 11 of 12
       the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the methamphetamine and

       paraphernalia obtained as a result of this invalid traffic stop.

[20]   Reversed.

       Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-209| October 30, 2023   Page 12 of 12