Court Opinion

ID: 9706153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:33:01.927774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:19.713990
License: Public Domain

*474MACK, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
The majority and I agree that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), become applicable as soon as a suspect’s freedom of action is curtailed to a “degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983)); the question to be asked is whether the stop “exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.” Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 437, 104 S.Ct. at 3148.
I emphatically part company with the majority, however, when it concludes that Miranda is not applicable here because appellant’s seizure amounted to no more than a Terry stop.1 In my view the situation in this case is one in which Mr. Mcll-wain’s freedom was significantly curtailed and where he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes. By my calculation appellant had been detained in his bedroom for a period of at least forty-five minutes with a police officer posted outside the door and another uniformed officer within the house. The residents of the house had called the police to specifically report that appellant had committed the offense and this fact was confirmed when arriving detectives interviewed these residents and the victim. When the police continued to detain appellant after an initial investigation and after their suspicions hardened, the officers were required to give appellant Miranda warnings prior to further questioning. Indeed, the interrogating detective appeared to realize this in that he attempted to recite the warnings to appellant. The fact that he failed to recite them correctly (as the government concedes) should not give rise to this post-hoc holding that appellant was not “in custody” at the time.
I respectfully dissent.

. The majority, in quoting a passage from the Berkemer opinion to sustain its position, omits a significant beginning sentence:
In both of these respects [z'.e., whether a seizure is made in public view and whether the scene is "police dominated”] the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,” see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), than to a formal arrest.
Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 3149. Indeed Mr. Justice Marshall, in stressing the difference between a Terry stop and a formal arrest, was careful to point out that “most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief determination authorized in Terry. Id. at 439 n. 29, 104 S.Ct. at n. 29 (emphasis added). These factual situations were contrasted with those in which Miranda is brought into play. See Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 439 & n. 28, 104 S.Ct. at 3150 & n. 28 (footnote citing Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 1096, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969)) (suspect questioned in his bedroom by four officers) and Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2-3, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 1504, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968) (defendant questioned in jail by government agent).