Court Opinion

ID: 9840813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 15:00:47.606702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:55.852906
License: Public Domain

21-6460
     Sanchez-Juarez v. Garland
                                                                                              BIA
                                                                                        Douchy, IJ
                                                                                      A208 157 972

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of September, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              REENA RAGGI,
 8              JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 9              SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   OSCAR SANCHEZ-JUAREZ, 1
14           Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                                    21-6460
17                                                                          NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22

     1   The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Anne Pilsbury, Esq., Central American Legal
 2                                       Assistance, Brooklyn, NY.
 3
 4   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
 5                                       Attorney General, Civil Division; Erica B.
 6                                       Miles, Acting Assistant Director, Office of
 7                                       Immigration Litigation; Erik R. Quick, Trial
 8                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 9                                       United States Department of Justice,
10                                       Washington, DC.

11         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

12   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

13   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

14         Petitioner Oscar Sanchez-Juarez, a native and citizen of El Salvador, seeks

15   review of a July 21, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming a November 27, 2018

16   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his application for asylum,

17   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

18   (“CAT”). In re Oscar Sanchez-Juarez, No. A 208 157 972 (B.I.A. July 21, 2021), aff’g

19   No. A 208 157 972 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y. City, Nov. 27, 2018). We assume the parties’

20   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

21         We have reviewed both the IJ’s and BIA’s opinions “for the sake of

22   completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigr. & Customs Enf't, 448

23   F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). We review factual findings for substantial evidence
                                              2
 1   and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo. Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

 2   562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).       “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 3   conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

 4   the contrary.”    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).     We find no error in the agency’s

 5   determination that Sanchez-Juarez failed to establish past persecution or a well-

 6   founded fear of persecution on the basis of an imputed anti-gang political opinion

 7   or as an immediate family member of a Salvadoran police officer.

 8         To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, an applicant

 9   must establish past persecution or a well-founded fear (asylum) or likelihood

10   (withholding of removal) of persecution and that “race, religion, nationality,

11   membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least

12   one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see

13   also id. § 1231(b)(3)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b), 1208.16(b); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52

14   F.4th 103, 114 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the “one central reason” standard applies

15   to both asylum and withholding of removal).

16         I.     Past Persecution

17         The agency did not err in concluding that Sanchez-Juarez did not establish

18   past persecution. Generally, “applicants can become candidates for asylum relief

                                               3
 1   only based on persecution that they themselves have suffered or must suffer.”

 2   Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 494 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2007). “[P]ersecution

 3   is an extreme concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society

 4   regards as offensive.” Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011)

 5   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 6         Sanchez-Juarez testified that his father was murdered by gang members

 7   because he was a police officer, and afterwards his family received three unsigned

 8   letters threatening to kill them if they did not leave. They believed the letters

 9   were from gang members.          After receiving the third letter, Sanchez-Juarez

10   relocated a four-hour drive away to live with his grandmother.           The threats

11   stopped, but his cousin was murdered at some later time—gang members pulled

12   him off a bus, which Sanchez-Juarez also usually rode, and his body was found

13   months later.    While tragic, these murders do not constitute persecution of

14   Sanchez-Juarez. See Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 308; Tao Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d

15   137, 143 (2d Cir. 2007) (denying petition where applicant personally suffered no

16   abuse and did not share the characteristic that triggered his parent’s persecution).

17         The agency did not err in concluding that the threatening letters did not rise

18   to the level of persecution. The letters were unsigned and thrown at the house

                                               4
 1   rather than delivered to the family, and Sanchez-Jaurez did not provide details

 2   that would link the letters to his father’s murder. Absent evidence that the threats

 3   were imminent or against him personally, the agency reasonably concluded that

 4   they did not rise to the level of persecution. See Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449

 5   F.3d 408, 412–13 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (collecting cases rejecting claim that

 6   threats were sufficient to show past persecution); see also Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d

 7   316, 328 (2d Cir. 2020) (requiring evidence that threats were “imminent or

 8   concrete” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

 9         II.    Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution

10         Absent past persecution, a noncitizen may establish eligibility for asylum by

11   demonstrating a “well-founded fear” of future persecution.                  8 C.F.R.

12   § 1208.13(b)(2).   To establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an applicant

13   must “present credible testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and

14   establish that his fear is objectively reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357

15   F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective reasonableness entails a showing that a

16   reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances would fear persecution if

17   returned to his native country.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d

18   Cir. 2005) (per curiam). A “fear may be well-founded even if there is only a slight,

                                               5
 1   though discernible, chance of persecution.” Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d

 2   Cir. 2000). But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support” in the

 3   record and is merely “speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. In

 4   addition to being well founded, the fear must be on account of “race, religion,

 5   nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”         8

 6   U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).     The agency did not err in concluding that Sanchez-

 7   Juarez failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of actual

8    or imputed political opinion or his membership in a particular social group of

 9   families of police officers.

10         As the government argues, Sanchez-Juarez abandoned his challenge to the

11   denial of his political opinion claim by failing to adequately raise it in his opening

12   brief. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming

13   applicant’s “claim abandoned” where he raised an issue in “only a single

14   conclusory sentence”); Norton v. Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998)

15   (holding that an issue is not adequately raised when it is argued “for the first time

16   in a reply brief”). Even if we were to consider the issue, we would find no error

17   in the agency’s conclusion. Sanchez-Juarez did not provide “solid support” for

18   his claim that he would be targeted on account of his anti-gang political opinion.

                                                6
 1   Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129. “The applicant must . . . show, through direct or

 2   circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from the

 3   applicant’s political belief,” Yueqing Zhang, 426 F.3d at 545, either “actual or

 4   imputed,” Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010). Although Sanchez-

 5   Juarez was credible as to his belief that MS-13 sent the letters and that it did so

 6   because gang members were arrested for his father’s murder, neither that belief

 7   nor alleged retaliation for the arrests establishes that the gang members perceived

 8   him as having a political opinion. “Whether the requisite nexus exists depends

 9   on the views and motives of the persecutor.” Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 196–

10   97 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).         “Fears of

11   retribution over purely personal matters or general conditions of upheaval and

12   unrest do not constitute cognizable bases for granting asylum.” Zelaya-Moreno v.

13   Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 190, 199 (2d Cir. 2021) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation

14   marks and citation omitted).

15         As to the social group claim, the agency reasonably concluded that Sanchez-

16   Juarez failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his

17   membership in the particular social group of families of police officers. He had

18   the burden to establish that this fear was well-founded, “that the group itself was

                                              7
 1   cognizable, and that the alleged persecutors targeted the applicant on account of

 2   [his] membership in that group.”      Paloka, 762 F.3d at 195 (internal quotation

 3   marks and citation omitted). Even assuming this proposed social group was

 4   cognizable, Sanchez-Juarez failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear that

 5   he would be harmed because of his membership in that group. His fear of harm

 6   as the immediate family member of a police officer was undercut by his own

 7   testimony that none of his father’s immediate family members have been

 8   approached, threatened, or harmed by gang members in El Salvador since his

 9   murder. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding an

10   applicant’s fear diminished when similarly situated family members remain

11   unharmed in applicant’s native country). And there was no evidence that he was

12   the intended target in his cousin’s murder. The fact that gang members singled

13   out Sanchez-Juarez’s cousin is not evidence of mistaken identity, particularly

14   given the absence of prior or future attempts to harm Sanchez-Juarez or more

15   immediate members of his father’s family. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 128–

16   29 (finding no well-founded fear when applicant supported his claim with “sparse

17   and uncorroborated” testimony, and failed “to offer credible, specific, and detailed

18   evidence”).   While Sanchez-Juarez argues that country conditions evidence

                                              8
 1   shows that police officers’ families are targeted for violence, that evidence does

 2   not compel a conclusion that he had a well-founded fear given the absence of harm

 3   or attempted harm of other members of his father’s immediate family.            See

 4   Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 592 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that when the

 5   “agency’s conclusion finds support in record evidence,” a noncitizen “cannot

 6   secure . . . relief by pointing to conflicting evidence that might support–but not

 7   compel–a different conclusion”).

 8         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

 9   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

10                                         FOR THE COURT:
11                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12                                         Clerk of Court

                                              9