Court Opinion

ID: 9352342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 20:00:31.948314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:09.677420
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-11528    Document: 32-1      Date Filed: 01/05/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-11528
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        YOVANNY HERNANDEZ SEVERINO,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00465-SCB-AEP-3
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                  21-11528

        Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Yovanny Hernandez Severino, a federal prisoner proceeding
        pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate release
        and subsequent post-judgment motion for reconsideration. The
        government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance and to stay
        the briefing schedule.
                                              I.
               In 2018, a Coast Guard cutter detected a “go-fast vessel” ap-
        proximately 200 nautical miles south of the Dominican Republic
        and interdicted the vessel. After a boarding team approached the
        vessel, the operator refused to step away from the helm and tried
        to escape. During the attempted escape, the crew jettisoned bales
        of contraband and barrels of fuel. The Coast Guard cutter disabled
        the vessel, and the boarding team captured Severino and two other
        crewmembers. The Coast Guard recovered approximately 570 kil-
        ograms of cocaine from approximately 19 jettisoned bales.
                A grand jury charged Severino with one count of conspiracy
        to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms
        or more of cocaine while on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of
        the United States, 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a),
        70506(a)–(b), and one count of possession with intent to distribute
        five or more kilograms of cocaine while on a vessel subject to the
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        21-11528                Opinion of the Court                         3

        jurisdiction of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2, 21 U.S.C.
        § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a).
                Severino later agreed to plead guilty to both counts without
        the benefit of a written plea agreement. A magistrate judge held a
        change of plea hearing and issued a report recommending the dis-
        trict court accept the plea. The district court adopted the report,
        accepted his plea, and ultimately sentenced Severino to 210
        months’ imprisonment based on a total offense level of 35 and a
        criminal history category of III. Severino did not appeal.
               In February 2021, Severino, proceeding pro se, filed the pre-
        sent motion for compassionate release. Procedurally, he argued he
        had exhausted his administrative remedies and that, even if he had
        not, the district court could still consider his motion as it was not a
        jurisdictional requirement. For his extraordinary and compelling
        reasons, he asserted that he suffered from health conditions that
        increased his risk of serious infection or death if he contracted
        COVID-19, the spread of which was particularly severe in a prison
        environment. He also contended that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
        tors weighed in favor of releasing him because he was a nonviolent
        offender, he was not a danger to the community, and other inmates
        with similar health conditions had been released due to the risk of
        a serious infection.
               The district court denied Severino’s motion before the gov-
        ernment could respond, finding that he had not waived his exhaus-
        tion requirement and that, even though the requirement was not
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-11528

        jurisdictional, it still represented a mandatory claims processing
        rule that should not be waived.
                Next, the district court found that, even if Severino had ex-
        hausted his remedies or that requirement was waived, he had failed
        to identify an extraordinary and compelling reason that would war-
        rant his release, finding that his medical circumstances, as well as
        the possibly of COVID-19 exposure, did not rise to the level of an
        extraordinary or compelling reason. As to the § 3553(a) factors, the
        district court weighed the factors and found that they weighed
        against granting Severino relief based on his offense conduct and
        the length of time he had served of his sentence.
               Rather than immediately appealing, Severino moved for re-
        consideration, arguing he had not received notice about briefing or
        opposition to his motion. The district court denied the motion as
        the government had not responded and Severino did not have a
        right of reply.
               On appeal, Severino argues that the district court erred by
        considering the exhaustion requirement to be mandatory when it
        is a non-jurisdictional claims processing rule that could have been
        waived. Substantively, Severino argues that his medical conditions
        combined with the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an extraordi-
        nary and compelling reason meriting relief and that the district
        court was no longer bound by the U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 policy state-
        ment. He does not argue against the district court’s finding that
        the § 3553(a) factors did not weigh in favor of release.
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        21-11528                 Opinion of the Court                           5

               The government, in response, moved for summary affir-
        mance and to stay the briefing schedule, arguing that Severino
        failed to establish he had exhausted his administrative remedies.
        Substantively, the government argues that Severino failed to estab-
        lish that he suffered from a qualifying medical extraordinary and
        compelling reason and the district court could not consider other
        reasons outside the policy statement. The government also con-
        tends that Severino failed to argue against the district court’s find-
        ing that the § 3553(a) factors weighed in favor of release. Finally,
        the government argues that the district court correctly denied Sev-
        erino’s motion for reconsideration, as he did not raise a cognizable
        argument in that respect.
                                               II.
                Summary disposition is appropriate, in part, where “the po-
        sition of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that
        there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.”
        Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.
        1969). A motion for summary affirmance or summary reversal
        shall postpone the due date for the filing of any remaining brief un-
        til we rule on such motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
               We review de novo whether a district court had the author-
        ity to modify a term of imprisonment. United States v. Phillips,
        597 F.3d 1190, 1194 & n.9 (11th Cir. 2020). When appropriate, we
        review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) mo-
        tion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908,
        911 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court abuses its discretion if it applies
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-11528

        an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making
        the determination, or makes findings that are clearly erroneous.
        United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
        We “may affirm ‘for any reason supported by the record, even if
        not relied upon by the district court.’” United States v. Al-Arian,
        514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Williams v. Bd. of
        Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2007)).
              Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v.
        United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). "When an ap-
        pellant fails to challenge properly on appeal one of the grounds on
        which the district court based its judgment,” however, “he is
        deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it
        follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed. Sapuppo v. All-
        state Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). A party
        also abandons a claim when he fails to raise it plainly and promi-
        nently in his brief. Id. at 681.
               Under our prior panel precedent rule, a prior panel’s holding
        is binding unless it has been overruled or abrogated by the Su-
        preme Court or by us sitting en banc. See United States v. Steele,
        147 F.3d 1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998).
                                            III.
               A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de-
        fendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a stat-
        ute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th
        Cir. 2015). The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194
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        21-11528                  Opinion of the Court                         7

        (Dec. 21, 2018), expressly permits district courts to reduce a previ-
        ously imposed term of imprisonment. United States v. Stevens,
        997 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 2021).
              The First Step Act, in part, provides that a “court may not
        modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except
        under certain circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In the context of
        compassionate release, the statute provides that:
               [T]he court, upon . . . motion of the defendant after
               the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
               rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to
               bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse
               of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
               warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is ear-
               lier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after
               considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section
               3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
               that—extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
               such a reduction.

        Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
               The exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, but it is a
        claim-processing rule. Harris, 989 F.3d at 910–11. The exhaustion
        requirement is mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce
        the rule if a party properly raises it. Id. at 911. If a party does not
        raise an objection based on a mandatory claims processing rule,
        that claim may be forfeited. See id.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11528

               Section 3582(c)(1)(A) also requires that any reduction be
        consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentenc-
        ing Commission. Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines pro-
        vides the applicable policy statement for § 3582(c)(1)(A). U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.13. The application notes to § 1B1.13 list four categories of
        extraordinary and compelling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical
        condition, (B) his age, (C) his family circumstances, including the
        death of a caregiver of a minor child, and (D) “other reasons.” Id.
        cmt. n.1. Subsection D serves as a catch-all provision, providing
        that a prisoner may be eligible for relief if, “[a]s determined by the
        Director of the [BOP], there exists in the defendant’s case an ex-
        traordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination
        with, the reasons described in subdivisions (A) through (C).” Id.
        cmt. n.1(D). Section 1B1.13 also states that extraordinary and com-
        pelling reasons exist if the defendant is suffering from, among other
        things, a terminal illness or a serious physical or medical condition
        that substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within
        the environment of a correctional facility and from which he is not
        expected to recover. Id. cmt. (n.1(A)(i)).
               We have noted that the fact that a prisoner has a common
        ailment that could “possibly” make his risk of a serious illness
        “more likely” if he contracts COVID-19 is not the kind of debilitat-
        ing condition that meets the policy-statement definition of an “ex-
        traordinary and compelling reason” for early release from prison.
        See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912. Moreover, a district court does not err
        in finding a defendant ineligible for compassionate release where
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        21-11528                Opinion of the Court                         9

        certain health conditions are manageable in prison. United States
        v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021).
                In United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021), we
        concluded that § 1B1.13 was applicable to all motions filed under
        that statute, including those filed by prisoners, and, thus, a district
        court may not reduce a sentence unless a reduction would be con-
        sistent with § 1B1.13’s definition of extraordinary and compelling
        reasons. Id. at 1252–62. Next, we concluded that the catch-all pro-
        vision in the commentary to § 1B1.13 did not grant to district courts
        the discretion to develop other reasons outside those listed in
        § 1B1.13 that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence.
        Id. at 1248, 1263–65.
               The § 3553(a) factors include, among other things, the na-
        ture and circumstances of the defendant’s offense, his history and
        characteristics, and the need to protect the public from further
        crimes of the defendant. It is the defendant’s burden to show that
        his circumstances warrant a reduction. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The
        weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the
        sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Croteau, 819
        F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). Generally, when a district court
        considers the § 3553(a) factors, it need not state on the record that
        it has explicitly considered each of them or discuss each of them.
        See United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013).
               The district court need not conduct the compassionate re-
        lease analysis in any particular order. United States v. Tinker,
        14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). A district court may reduce a
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                21-11528

        term of imprisonment if the § 3553(a) factors favor doing so, there
        are extraordinary and compelling reasons for doing so, and the re-
        duction would not endanger any person or the community. Id. All
        of these necessary conditions must be satisfied before the court can
        grant a reduction. Id. Therefore, the absence of even one condi-
        tion will foreclose a sentence reduction. Id. at 1238.
               “[A] motion for reconsideration of a district court order in a
        criminal action is not expressly authorized by the Federal Rules of
        Criminal Procedure.” United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413
        (11th Cir. 1992). In civil cases, a party cannot use a motion for re-
        consideration “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
        evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judg-
        ment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757,
        763 (11th Cir. 2005).
                                            IV.
               Turning to the issues raised on appeal, even if we assume
        arguendo that Severino had exhausted his administrative remedies,
        or such exhaustion was not required, we conclude that the district
        court properly denied his motion on the merits, and we can affirm
        on those grounds alone.
               First, Severino did not identify an extraordinary and compel-
        ling reason for releasing him. For his medical conditions, he did
        not show how he is unable to provide self-care while in the prison
        environment. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Common ailments
        that may make side effects from COVID-19 worse do not rise to
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        21-11528               Opinion of the Court                        11

        the level of an extraordinary and compelling circumstance contem-
        plated by the policy statement. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912. Fur-
        ther, we are bound by Bryant to apply the policy note to claims
        filed by defendants and to consider that district courts lacked dis-
        cretion to go beyond the definitions provided using the catch-all
        provision as Bryant has not been overruled or abrogated by the Su-
        preme Court or by us sitting en banc. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248,
        1252–63, 1265; Steele, 147 F.3d at 1317–18. As this is one of the
        necessary grounds for granting compassionate release, we can af-
        firm on this ground alone. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38.
               Second, we conclude that because Severino failed to ex-
        pressly challenge on appeal the district court’s finding that the
        § 3553(a) factors weighed against release, that argument is aban-
        doned. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. As the district court relied on
        this ground, in part, for its judgment, the decision of the district
        court is due to be affirmed. Id. at 680. Even if implicitly preserved,
        any such challenge fails because the district court considered Sev-
        erino’s offense conduct and criminal history and had the discretion
        to put weight on those factors. Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1309. Sev-
        erino also had the burden to show that the factors weighed in his
        favor, and he did not do so. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As this is
        one of the necessary conditions for compassionate release, we can
        also affirm on this ground. Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38.
              Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly
        correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion
        for summary affirmance and DENY its motion to stay the briefing
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        12                   Opinion of the Court              21-11528

        schedule as moot. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162; see
        also 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).