Court Opinion

ID: 9543045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:38.740199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:36.643709
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting:
The trial court found that the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and those of which they had reasonably trustworthy knowledge, were not sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that Gary Dennis had committed or was committing an offense. I find no error of law or abuse of discretion by the trial court. As did the Honorable Mark I. Bernstein, I would conclude that probable cause to search or arrest was lacking at the time the officers pursued Dennis into his dwelling. The objects recovered as the result of the pursuit and seizure of Dennis were properly suppressed. I must therefore dissent.
Our Supreme Court has recently restated the rule to be followed when reviewing the grant of a suppression motion, as follows:
[W]here a motion to suppress has been filed, the burden is on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h). In reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, our task is to determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. If so, *433we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted.
Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 530 Pa. 299, -, 608 A.2d 1030, 1031 (1992), (citations omitted).
We are limited to the evidence on the record of the suppression hearing and the findings of the trial court. In reviewing the suppression court’s determination, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Compare Commonwealth v. Edwards, 528 Pa. 103, 105, 595 A.2d 52, 53 (1991); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 518 Pa. 156, 159, 541 A.2d 1387, 1388-89 (1988).
Moreover, the facts and circumstances establishing probable cause must be known to the police at the time of the arrest. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103, 80 S.Ct. 168, 171, 4 L.Ed.2d 134, 139 (1959); Commonwealth v. Rush, 459 Pa. 23, 26, 326 A.2d 340, 341 (1974). In this case, the Commonwealth contends, as it must, that the facts known to the officers at the time they pursued Dennis into the house were sufficient to permit a conclusion that a felony had already been committed, thereby establishing the exigent circumstances necessary to support their pursuit and entry. I must disagree.
When the suppression hearing testimony is reviewed in a light most favorable to Dennis, the prevailing party, it reveals the following facts. On March 9, 1989, uniformed police officers Edward Bier and Officer Marynowitz began an area patrol in the vicinity of the 1600 block of Sparks Street, at approximately 2:10 P.M. They were in a marked police car, patrolling the area, traveling up and down the streets, at times, stopping the vehicle.
Prior to leaving their District police station and arriving in their patrol area, the officers had received District complaints from their Captain that drugs were being sold from 1618 Sparks Street. The Captain had received these com*434plaints “from the community.” Officer Bier, who was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing, admitted that there were no radio calls or anything regarding drug sales on Sparks Street other than the Captain’s statement made to the officers at the station. There is nothing in the suppression hearing transcript to suggest that the description of persons, the time of drug activity, or other specifics were provided to the officers, by their Captain, by another police official, or by any other source.
At approximately 3:20 P.M., more than one hour after the area patrol had commenced, Officer Bier observed an unidentified white male talking to an unidentified black male, while both were standing outside the doorway of 1618 Sparks Street. Bier observed the unidentified white male hand the black male, who was later arrested and identified as Gary Dennis, money which Dennis then placed in his right pocket. Dennis was then observed taking something out of his left pocket, an object which Bier could not see. There is no direct testimony in the suppression hearing transcript as to what Dennis did with the unidentified object. Officer Bier testified as follows:
The defendant then went into his left pocket and took out an object, an object which I could not see but believed, based on what had transpired, to be a narcotics sale.
Motion to Suppress Transcript, April 16, 1991, page 6.
At this point, Officer Bier alighted from his patrol car and approached the two men. As Bier approached, both men on the porch looked in Bier’s direction and ran into the dwelling. Both Bier and Marynowitz chased the men into the house.
Í agree with my colleagues that the pursuing police officers must have probable cause to believe that the individual they are pursuing has committed a crime, in order to support the entry into the dwelling. I also agree that in determining whether probable cause existed, our task is not to look at one or two factors individually but to consider the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Commonwealth *435v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 272, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 354 Pa.Super. 11, 17, 510 A.2d 1253, 1256 (1986).
The standard which our court en banc repeated in Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, as quoted from Commonwealth v. Simmons, 295 Pa.Super. 72, 83, 440 A.2d 1228, 1234 (1982), further quoting Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa.Super. 175, 178, 289 A.2d 237, 239 (1972), is fully applicable on this appeal:
[w]hen we examine a particular situation to determine if probable cause exists, we consider all the factors and their total effect, and do not concentrate on each individual element____ We also focus on the circumstances as seen through the eyes of the trained officer, and do not view the situation as an average citizen might____ Finally, we must remember that in dealing with questions of probable cause, we are not dealing with certainties. We are dealing with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act. This is not the same ‘beyond-a-reasonable-doubt’ standard which we apply in determining guilt or innocence at trial.
Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra, 354 Pa.Superior Ct. at 17-18, 510 A.2d at 1256 (emphasis in original).
In the case now before us on appeal, the trial court aptly noted that there are really only three factors that could possibly coalesce in order to constitute probable cause: (1) the statement made by the Captain to the officers that drug sales were taking place at 1618 Sparks Street, without attribution of that information to any specific person or persons in the community; (2) two unidentified persons,— one white, one black — standing on a doorstep, while one man hands some money to the other man and the latter takes something out of his pocket; and (3) both men hurrying into the house after looking in Officer Bier’s direction.
My colleagues in their majority opinion adopt the Commonwealth’s characterization of the “District complaints” as “neighbors’ complaints”. This might make the subse*436quent pursuit, arrest and seizure more appealing, however, there is no direct testimony by Officer Bier that these were in fact “neighbors’ complaints.” Bier testified only as to “District complaints.” Motion to Suppress Transcript, supra, page 4. On cross-examination, the following exchange between defense counsel and Officer Bier occurred:
Q. The police report I referred to earlier says that you were patrolling from 2:10 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.; that you made a constant patrol in the 1600 block of Sparks Street due to Captain and neighbors’ complaints of drugs being sold in the area. Is that accurate?
A. Being sold from 1618 Sparks Street.
Q. From specifically 1618?
A. That’s correct.
Q. There was no radio call, or anything like that that would substantiate that claim, is there?
A. That’s correct. We received the District complaints from the Captain. The Captain receives it from the community, and we act on that.
THE COURT: Okay.
BY THE COURT:
Q. But, in fact, you received information only from the Captain?
A. That’s right, Your Honor.
Q. He told you whatever he told you?
A. Yes.
Q. He got his information from wherever he got it? A. Correct.
THE COURT: Next question.
Motion to Suppress Transcript, supra, pages 21-22. Defense counsel referred to a statement in a police report that characterized the reports as “Captain and neighbors’ complaints” but that police report was not introduced into evidence and Officer Bier did not expressly adopt that characterization in his testimony.
I also am unable to accept the majority’s assertion that “Officer Bier ... observed defendant ... accept money in *437exchange for the transfer of a small item, and then bolt when he saw the police approaching.” Majority at 434. The only possible testimony that could support a conclusion that an exchange had taken place was not what Bier observed, but rather what he supposed. Bier testified:
A. I observed a white male talking to this defendant here; at which time I observed the white male hand the defendant an amount of U.S. currency, at which time the defendant accepted that U.S. currency and placed it in his right pocket. The defendant then went into his left pocket and took out an object, an object which I could not see but believed, based on what had transpired, to be a narcotics sale.
Id., at page 6 (emphasis added). After an objection, based upon defense counsel’s contention that the conclusion as to a sale was purely speculative, and after argument and a ruling on that objection, Bier continued to testify as follows:
Q. After you made that observation and came to that conclusion, what action did you take?
A. I exited the vehicle and approached that property. As I was approaching the steps, both males looked in my direction and fled inside that property.
Q. What did you mean by the word “fled”?
A. Ran.
Id., at page 8.
Officer Bier never testified as to what Dennis may have done with the object which Bier could not see. From the record, we cannot conclude whether Dennis put the object back in his pocket, handed the object to another person, or threw it onto the ground. I fail to find sufficient articulable facts to support Officer Bier’s conclusion that a narcotics sale had transpired.
A police officer may arrest without a warrant where there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the arrestee is the felon. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 484, 467 A.2d 288, 292 *438(1983), cert. denied sub nom. Travaglia v. Pennsylvania, 467 U.S. 1256, 104 S.Ct. 3547, 82 L.Ed.2d 850. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officer are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that the arrestee has committed the offense. Id.
The majority finds “particularly compelling ... the fact that residents of the area, individuals living on the 1600 block, made multiple reports to police of drug dealing at 1618 Sparks.” Majority at 1019. I am at a complete loss to understand how these assertions became “facts” for purposes of our review. As discussed above, there is absolutely nothing in Officer Bier’s direct testimony to support the majority’s claim that the District complaints came from “residents of the area.” The transcript is devoid of any testimony which would permit a reasonable conclusion that the complaints mentioned by the District Captain came from “individuals living on the 1600 block.” Nor did Officer Bier testify concerning “multiple complaints.”
I am unable to agree with my colleagues that Judge Bernstein, in granting the suppression- motion, made two basic errors of approach. When I view the totality of the facts available to the suppression court, they still are nothing more than anonymous complaints passed through the Captain to the beat patrolmen, a possible exchange where the officer could not see what had been exchanged and did not testify that the unseen object had, in fact, been passed between the unidentified men, and the movement of the two, then-unidentified men into a house after looking in the direction of the officers. When these facts are taken together, they fall far short of permitting a reasonable belief that a felony had been committed. Judge Bernstein was well aware of the appropriate test and, in my view, properly and conscientiously applied it.
Judge Bernstein did not “discount” the facts, as suggested by the majority. He did set forth the law. The majority seemingly relies on cases involving the validity of search warrants in reversing the order of the suppression court, *439e.g., Commonwealth v. Kendrick, 340 Pa.Super. 563, 490 A.2d 923 (1985); Commonwealth v. Jones, 506 Pa. 262, 484 A.2d 1383 (1984); Commonwealth v. Price, 318 Pa.Super. 240, 464 A.2d 1320 (1983). I have found the warrantless seizure cases cited and relied upon by the suppression court to be both appropriate and controlling. Commonwealth v. Greber, 478 Pa. 63, 385 A.2d 1313 (1978); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 391, 394 (1973); Commonwealth v. Vassiljev, 218 Pa.Super. 215, 275 A.2d 852 (1971); Commonwealth v. Hunt, 280 Pa.Super. 205, 421 A.2d 684 (1980). See and compare Commonwealth v. Martinez, 403 Pa.Super. 125, 588 A.2d 513 (1991) petition for allow. denied 608 A.2d 29 (1992).
Unless Officer Bier had probable cause to believe that a drug sale had been consummated and that Gary Dennis had participated in that felony, Bier had no authority for chasing Dennis and the other unidentified male into the house. When I consider all of the factors which can be gleaned from Bier’s testimony and their total effect, I am not convinced that it was reasonable to believe that a crime had been committed at the moment Bier exited his vehicle and approached the unidentified suspects.
Judge Bernstein reached the following conclusions: Although Officer Bier stated that the defendant “ran”, the testimony is clear that the defendant could only have traveled a few feet before he was into his house. No probable cause existed to justify Officer Bier’s chasing the defendant through his house. At the time Officer Bier chased Gary Dennis into his house, he and another man were acting in a normal manner on a front porch. There was nothing so unusual about their persons or in their conduct to indicate that they were engaging in criminal activity.
Opinion, Bernstein, J., December 2, 1991, page 6. Judge Bernstein’s factual findings are supported by the record. While this court may not be bound by the conclusions reached by the suppression court, I find them to be fully *440supported by the facts of record and consistent with Pennsylvania law.
I would affirm the order of the trial court which granted the motion to suppress physical evidence. I must, therefore, dissent.