Court Opinion

ID: 9892275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 07:09:02.494866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:22.019907
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued October 17, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-23-00171-CV
                            ———————————
                      IN RE ARMANDO LOPEZ, Relator

            Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      On March 8, 2023, relator Armando Lopez, proceeding pro se, filed a petition

for a writ of mandamus challenging two trial court orders: (1) an October 13, 2022

order denying Lopez’s “Motion to Disqualify Attorney” Keith Gross, counsel for

real party in interest, David Wilson; and (2) a February 1, 2023 order denying

Lopez’s “Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party,” in which Lopez

sought to designate Gross as a responsible third party.
      In his mandamus petition, Lopez argued that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to disqualify Gross because Gross, “by his conduct

and advice, . . . convinced Wilson to settle his case without first exhausting all

available remedies and, in the process, . . . bec[a]me a material witness.” Lopez

further argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to

designate Gross as a responsible third party because he “sufficiently pleaded facts”

that showed that Gross engaged in conduct that “caused or contributed to Wilson’s

alleged harm” because the trial court “did not provide Lopez an opportunity to

replead, if necessary” and “nothing in Texas law prevent[ed] attorneys from being

designated as responsible third parties under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code.”

      Lopez therefore requested that the Court “conditionally grant his petition for

writ of mandamus” and “direct the trial court to vacate its orders” and “instead issue

an [o]rder designating . . . Gross as a responsible third party” and an order “granting

the motion to disqualify . . . Gross as counsel” for Wilson.

      After reviewing the petition, response, and the mandamus record, we conclude

that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Lopez’s motion to designate

Gross as a responsible third party without granting him an opportunity to replead,

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and we conditionally grant, in part, Lopez’s petition for writ of mandamus.1 We

further conclude that Lopez failed to establish that he is entitled to mandamus relief

regarding the trial court’s October 13, 2022 order denying his motion to disqualify

Gross, and thus, we deny his request for mandamus relief related to the trial court’s

October 13, 2022 order.

                                    Background

      The underlying lawsuit at issue in this original proceeding was initiated by

Wilson, who asserted a cause of action for negligence against Lopez. Wilson alleged

that Lopez, who was hired by Wilson to act as his attorney in an earlier defamation

lawsuit, was negligent in investigating and prosecuting the defamation lawsuit.

Wilson is represented by Gross in the underlying lawsuit.

      The defamation lawsuit arose out of an incident that purportedly occurred

during a ribbon cutting ceremony at the Houston Community College North Forest

Campus in August 2019. Wilson, who was a Trustee of Houston Community

College, attended the ribbon cutting ceremony. According to Wilson’s original

petition, at the ribbon cutting ceremony, Diana C. Barrero Burgos “approached

Wilson and greeted him . . . by putting her hand on his forearm.” Wilson then

“removed her hand from his forearm as the two had always had an adversar[ial]

1
      The underlying case is David Wilson v. Armando Lopez, Cause No. 2022-27346, in
      the 164th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable C. Elliott Thornton
      presiding.

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relationship.” After the ribbon cutting ceremony, Burgos “attempted to press

criminal charges” against Wilson, alleging that “Wilson removing her hand

constituted an assault.”

      In connection with the alleged incident, Burgos filed a “written document with

Houston Community College–Office of Institutional Equity,” alleging “various

accusations against Wilson.” Two other individuals, Monica Flores Richart and

Zaphaniah David Capo, thereafter “published[] or republished” the statements made

by Burgos. Wilson hired Lopez to represent him in a potential defamation cause of

action against these three individuals. According to Wilson, Lopez “represented to

Wilson that the actions of Burgos, Richart, and Capo were in fact defamatory” and

Lopez initiated a lawsuit against the three individuals on behalf of Wilson, asserting

a cause of action for defamation.

      Thereafter, on September 21, 2020, the three individuals filed a motion to

dismiss Wilson’s defamation claim pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act

(TCPA), arguing that their purported statements were protected speech. See TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 27.003. A hearing was set for the trial court to

consider the motion to dismiss on October 12, 2020. See id. § 27.004(a) (trial court

must set hearing on TCPA motion to dismiss “not later than the 60th day after the

date of service of the motion”). Prior to the hearing, Lopez, on behalf of Wilson,

“filed three pleadings asking the trial court to allow limited discovery” in connection

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with the motion to dismiss. See id. § 27.006(b) (“On a motion by a party . . . and on

a showing of good cause, the [trial] court may allow specified and limited discovery

relevant to the motion.”). According to Lopez, to his “surprise, the [trial] court

denied” his requests for limited discovery. Lopez did not file a response to the TCPA

motion to dismiss.

      Subsequently, the trial court granted the TCPA motion to dismiss. After the

trial court’s ruling on the TCPA motion to dismiss, Wilson, apparently disappointed

with the outcome and the counsel he was provided by Lopez, obtained new counsel

to represent him in the defamation lawsuit. Wilson hired attorney Gross to assist

him in resolving the defamation lawsuit. Gross negotiated a settlement of the

defamation lawsuit without seeking further intervention from the trial court or

appellate review of the trial court’s ruling.

      Then, on May 6, 2022, Wilson initiated the underlying litigation against

Lopez, alleging that Lopez was negligent in his representation of Wilson in the

defamation lawsuit. Wilson alleged that Lopez pressed forward with filing the

defamation lawsuit without fully “investigat[ing] whether Burgos, Richart[,] and

Capo’s conduct was protected under the First Amendment and advis[ing] Wilson on

the matter.” Further, Wilson alleged Lopez was negligent in “failing to file a

substantive response to” the TCPA motion to dismiss. As a result of Lopez’s

negligent conduct, Wilson alleged that he “suffered damages” and sought

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“approximately $35,000.00.” The underlying lawsuit against Lopez was filed by

Gross on behalf of Wilson.

      On September 15, 2022, Lopez filed a “Motion to Disqualify Attorney,”

requesting that the trial court disqualify Gross from representing Wilson in the

underlying litigation. In his motion, Lopez argued that Gross should be disqualified

because “[a]n attorney is disqualified from acting as an attorney in the case if she

becomes a witness.” Lopez asserted that Gross “ha[d] personal knowledge of the

fact that he was hired by Wilson without consultation or notice to Lopez, that he

entered the case after the court granted [the TCPA] motion[] to dismiss, and that he

did not file any motion intended to protect Wilson’s interest” in the defamation

lawsuit, such as a motion for reconsideration, mandamus petition, . . . motion for

new trial[,] or notice of appeal.

      Instead of taking these potential steps, Lopez alleged that Wilson and Gross

“embarked on a course of conduct intended to end the [defamation lawsuit] by

immediately entering into settlement discussions.” Therefore, Gross must “be called

as a witness to provide testimony regarding the foregoing decisions and conduct in

concluding the” defamation lawsuit, and his testimony will be “genuinely needed

and . . . material to th[e] [underlying] lawsuit.” On October 13, 2022, the trial court

denied Lopez’s motion to disqualify Gross, without explanation. To the extent that

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there was a hearing on the motion to disqualify, the mandamus record does not

provide a transcript of such hearing.

      Separately, on October 19, 2022, Lopez filed a “Motion for Leave to

Designate Responsible Third Party.” In that motion, Lopez sought to designate

Gross as a responsible third party in the underlying lawsuit, alleging that “Wilson’s

hiring of Gross [in the defamation lawsuit] was a new and independent cause which

broke the chain of causation . . . denying Lopez the opportunity to file a motion for

reconsideration, a writ of mandamus, a substantive motion for new trial or an

appeal.”

      On February 1, 2023, the trial court denied Lopez’s motion for leave to

designate Gross as a responsible third party, without explanation. Again, to the

extent that there was a hearing on the motion for leave to designate a responsible

third party, the mandamus record does not provide a transcript of the hearing.

      Thereafter, Lopez filed his petition for writ of mandamus challenging the trial

court’s orders. A response was requested, and on March 24, 2023, Wilson filed a

response to the petition for writ of mandamus.

                               Standard of Review

      Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is only available in limited

circumstances. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992). To be

entitled to mandamus relief, Lopez bears the burden to establish that the trial court

                                          7
committed a clear abuse of discretion and that there is no adequate remedy by appeal.

See In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005).

      A trial court abuses its discretion where “it reaches a decision so arbitrary and

unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law” or if it clearly fails

“to analyze or apply the law correctly.”           Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40.

Accordingly, “[m]andamus relief is only appropriate when the relator[] ha[s]

established that only one outcome in the trial court was permissible under the law.”

In re Murrin Brothers 1885, Ltd., 603 S.W.3d 53, 56 (Tex. 2019).

      To the extent that Lopez is able to establish an abuse of discretion with respect

to the trial court’s ruling on his request for leave to designate Gross as a responsible

third party, mandamus relief may be appropriate. See In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500

S.W.3d 67, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding) (“Courts of

appeals that have addressed the adequacy of the remedy by appeal in Chapter 33

cases have reached different conclusions, but they repeatedly refer to the . . . maxim

that the decision depends heavily upon the circumstances presented.” (internal

quotations omitted)). Similarly, “[m]andamus is available where a motion to

disqualify is inappropriately denied as there is no adequate remedy on appeal.” In

re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819, 823 n.2 (Tex. 2010).

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                          Motion to Disqualify Attorney

      In his mandamus petition, Lopez argued that the “trial court abused its

discretion by denying [his] motion to disqualify [Gross] because, by his conduct and

advice to Wilson, Gross convinced Wilson to settle [the defamation lawsuit] without

first exhausting available remedies and, in the process, . . . bec[a]me a material

witness.”

      The Texas Supreme Court has concluded that “[d]isqualification is a severe

remedy.” Spears v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 797 S.W.2d 654, 656 (Tex.

1990). Given that, a trial court must “strictly adhere to an exacting standard to

discourage a party from using the motion as a dilatory tactic.” See In re Villasanta,

No. 01-11-00474-CV, 2011 WL 4398557, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Sept. 22, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

      Here, Lopez argued that Gross should be disqualified because he had “become

a material witness.” However, “[t]he fact that a lawyer serves as both an advocate

and a witness does not in itself compel disqualification.” In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d

54, 57 (Tex. 2004). Instead, “[d]isqualification is only appropriate if the lawyer’s

testimony is necessary to establish an essential fact.” Id. Importantly, “the party

requesting disqualification must demonstrate that the opposing lawyer’s dual roles

as attorney and witness will cause the party actual prejudice.” Id.

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      In his motion to the trial court, Lopez argued that Gross should be disqualified

because he “ha[d] personal knowledge of the fact that he was hired by Wilson

without consultation or notice to Lopez, that he entered the case after the [trial] court

granted [the TCPA] motion[] to dismiss [in the defamation lawsuit], and that he did

not file any” pleading to challenge that ruling. Instead of challenging the trial court’s

TCPA order in the defamation lawsuit, “Wilson and [Gross] embarked on a course

of conduct intended to end the litigation by immediately entering into settlement

discussions.” Accordingly, Lopez stated that Gross would “be called as a witness to

provide testimony regarding” those “decisions and conduct in concluding the

underlying litigation.”    Lopez further suggested that Gross’s testimony was

“genuinely needed and [was] material to his suit, relate[d] to contested issues in th[e]

[underlying lawsuit], and [was] not merely a formality.”

      In response to Lopez’s motion to disqualify, Wilson and Gross asserted that

Lopez failed to meet his burden to establish (1) that Lopez could not obtain

testimony on the identified subjects from another source, therefore making Gross’s

testimony unnecessary; and (2) Lopez failed to establish the “actual prejudice” he

would suffer if Gross was permitted to continue his representation of Wilson.

      We conclude that Lopez has failed to establish that Gross’s testimony would

be “necessary to establish an essential fact” and that such information could not be

obtained from an alternative source, namely Wilson. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.

                                           10
PROF’L CONDUCT 3.08(a); see also In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d at 57; In re Villasanta,

2011 WL 4398557, at *2. Further, we conclude that Lopez failed to establish the

prejudice he would be subjected to if Gross was allowed to continue his

representation of Wilson.

      Accordingly, we hold that Lopez has not meet his burden of establishing that

the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to disqualify attorney

Gross. We therefore deny Lopez’s request for mandamus relief to the extent that

Lopez seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its October 13,

2022 order denying Lopez’s motion to disqualify attorney Gross.

            Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party

      In his mandamus petition, Lopez next argued that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his motion for leave to designate Gross as a responsible third

party in the underlying lawsuit because the trial court denied his motion without

“provid[ing] [him] an opportunity to replead, if necessary.”

      In his motion to the trial court, Lopez argued that Texas Civil Practice and

Remedies Code section 33.004(a) provides that “a defendant can move for leave to

designate a person as a responsible third party.” He further stated that a “responsible

third party [was] a person who [was] alleged to have caused or contributed to causing

in any way the harm for which recovery of damages [were] sought, whether by

negligent act or omission, or by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable

                                          11
legal standard.” Lopez then concluded that “[i]n th[e] [underlying lawsuit], Keith

Gross [was] a responsible third party because he caused or contributed to the alleged

harm for which recovery of damages [were] sought by Wilson.”

      Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004(a) states that a

defendant “may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing a

motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party.” TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(a). Notably, “the pleading requirements for

designating a responsible third party at the outset of a case are not stringent.” In re

Cook, 629 S.W.3d 591, 596 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021, orig. proceeding). A party

meets his pleading requirement by satisfying a “fair notice” standard. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 47(a) (requiring “a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give

fair notice of the claim involved”). “So long as a party can ascertain from the

pleading the nature, basic issues, and type of evidence that might be relevant to the

controversy, a pleading satisfies the [Texas] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 47(a)

standard.” In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d 805, 809–10 (Tex. 2022).

      To this end, there are few limitations for designating responsible third parties.

First, the statute requires that any motion for leave to designate “be filed on or before

the [sixtieth] day before the trial date.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §

33.004(a). Here, Lopez filed his motion for leave before the trial court set a trial

date, satisfying this requirement. The statute further states that a party “may not

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designate a person as a responsible third party with respect to [the] claimant’s cause

of action after the applicable limitations period on the cause of action has expired.”

Id. § 33.004(d). Here, there are no limitations concerns at issue.

       The statute then states that the trial court “shall grant leave to designate the

named person as a responsible third party unless another party files an objection to

the motion for leave.” Id. § 33.004(f). Wilson filed a “Response to Motion for

Leave,” opposing Lopez’s request for leave to designate Gross as a responsible third

party. Assuming Wilson’s response constituted an “objection” to the motion for

leave, the statute provides the next steps for the trial court. Specifically, the statute

states that that if:

       [A]n objection to the motion for leave is timely filed, the [trial] court
       shall grant leave to designate the person as a responsible third party
       unless the objecting party establishes: (1) the defendant did not plead
       sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to
       satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;
       and (2) after having been granted leave to replead, the defendant failed
       to plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the
       person to satisfy the pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil
       Procedure.”

Id. § 33.004(g).

       The trial court’s order does not state the basis for its denial of Lopez’s “Motion

for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party,” and the mandamus record does not

provide a transcript of any hearing on Lopez’s motion. However, the basis for the

denial is of no consequence at this point in these proceedings. As noted above, the

                                           13
statute provides that the trial court “shall grant leave” to designate a responsible third

party unless the objecting party established that the moving party failed to meet the

notice pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and “after

having been granted leave to replead,” the moving party was unable to meet the

notice pleading requirements. Id.

      There is no evidence in the mandamus record that the trial court afforded

Lopez an opportunity to replead prior to denying his motion for leave to designate

Gross as a responsible third party, as is required by the statute. Id.

      A trial court “does not have the discretion to deny a motion for leave to

designate a responsible third party without first giving the movant an opportunity to

replead.” See In re Smith, 366 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, orig.

proceeding); see also In re YRC Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 810 (“Moreover, even if the

motion [for leave to designate responsible third party] had failed to satisfy the[]

pleading requirements, [Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section

33.004(g)(2)] required the trial court to provide [relator] an opportunity to replead.

The trial court lacked the discretion to deny the motion without first affording

[relator] that opportunity.”); Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty. v. Smith, 656

S.W.3d 867, 882–83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, orig. proceeding)

(concluding trial court abused its discretion by failing to afford moving party

opportunity to replead prior to denying motion for leave to designate responsible

                                           14
third party). This is true regardless of the merits of a moving party’s motion. See In

re Smith, 366 S.W.3d at 286 (noting section “33.004 does not contain a futility

exception to its rule that the movant must be given an opportunity to replead”).

      Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

Lopez’s motion for leave to designate a responsible third party without affording

him an opportunity to replead. Because Lopez also lacks and adequate remedy by

appeal, we hold that Lopez is entitled to mandamus relief from the trial court’s

February 1, 2023 order.

                                      Conclusion

      We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Lopez’s

“Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party” without affording Lopez

the opportunity to replead. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Lopez’s petition for

writ of mandamus, in part, and direct the trial court to vacate its February 1, 2023

order denying Lopez’s “Motion for Leave to Designate Responsible Third Party,”

and render a new order affording Lopez an opportunity to replead facts supporting

the designation. We are confident that the trial court will comply with this Court’s

ruling, and the writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within thirty days

of the date of this opinion.

      We further conclude that the trial court’s October 13, 2022 order denying

Lopez’s “Motion to Disqualify Attorney” does not amount to an abuse of discretion

                                           15
and we deny Lopez’s request for mandamus relief with respect to this order. All

pending motions are dismissed as moot.

                                              Amparo Guerra
                                              Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Rivas-Molloy, and Guerra.

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