Court Opinion

ID: 9639499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:20:38.75365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:19.253524
License: Public Domain

WILBUR, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The Alaska Packers Association authorized its employee and agent Ernest Califro to ascertain the cubic capacity of one of its schooners, the Metha Nelson, and for that purpose to procure the assistance of John' Lyons, if he could be found, and, if not, the services of Capt. Klotz, or of Capt. Frank E. Weidemann, to remove the hatches of the Metha Nelson. Ernest Califro could not find John Lyons or Capt. Weidemann, so he procured the services of Capt. Klotz, and proceeded to measure the capacity of the schooner. While they were in the hold of the vessel,' so engaged, Capt. Weidemann appeared on deck, and, unsolicited, attempted to descend into the hold, and in doing so fell from the ladder and suffered the injuries for which he was awarded compensation by the deputy commissioner.
The association, believing that Capt. Weidemann had been employed by Califro, as authorized, and during the latter’s absence, notified the deputy commissioner of the accident and requested him to make the appropriate order. This was done.
After the second award was made on September 16, 1931, the association ascertained from Califro that he had not employed Capt. Weidemann, and within 30 days after the order the association brought the newly discovered evidence and situation to the attention of the deputy commissioner by a motion to set aside the order of September 16, 1931, on the ground of fraud and mistake in the procurement of the second order. This application was denied upon the ground that the fact of employment had been determined at the time of the first award and could not be reconsidered on the application for a new award based on new conditions.
This decision of the deputy commissioner, be it observed, was rendered before the decision of the Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598, decided February 23, 1932, and was in accordance with the views of the compensation commissioner, as embodied in its rules (see dissenting opinion of Judge Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S. 22, at pages 67, 68, 89, note 25, 52 S. Ct. 285, 307, 76 L.Ed. 598). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional finding of the deputy commissioner was not binding on the District Court or on the parties in an action brought within the time limited in the act, but that the question was to be tried de novo in the court, upon the evidence there introduced.
Until that decision of the Supreme Court, it was a matter of doubt whether there could be a trial de novo on the jurisdictional question. It was this uncertainty, no doubt, that impelled the association to present its newly discovered evidence as to employment to the deputy commissioner, in the form of an application to vacate the award of September 16. Upon the denial, by the deputy commissioner, of its petition for a rehearing on October 16, 1931, the association on November 16, 1931, filed the present action alleging the foregoing facts and praying for an injunction against the enforcement of the supplemental order awarding Capt. Weidemann the additional sum of about $2,850 for his injuries which were found to be permanent. The trial court found the facts alleged by the association to be true and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the order. The fact ascertained by the court that Capt. Weidemann was not an employee of the association at the time of the injury was jurisdictional, and one to be determined by the court, by a trial de novo, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598, if the question is seasonably brought to the attention of the court. The question.then *762is this: Was the association bound by the finding of employment, upon which the first award was made when, the deputy commissioner made the second and ten times greater award for the same injury?
My associates, as I understand, hold that the failure to seek a judicial review of the jurisdictional question within 30 days after the first award foreclosed that question at the time of the second, additional and greater award. This is in accord with the view of the dissenting members of the Supreme Court, as expressed by Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, supra, but is, I believe, opposed to the views of the majority of the court as stated by Chief Justice Hughes. The Supreme Court held, in effect, that the finding of the deputy commissioner as to the fact of employment had no effect, probative or otherwise, upon the trial of that question in court. The validity of the deputy commissioner’s order the Supreme Court held depended upon the existence of a contract of employment, and his decision upon that jurisdictional question was in no way binding upon the court, which was required to determine that question upon evidence presented to it by the parties. If the deputy commissioner were a court rather than an administrative officer, his finding of jurisdiction in the first proceeding would no doubt be conclusive upon the second and supplementary application for increased compensation due to the development of conditions not foreseen or compensated for in the first instance. But the jurisdiction of the administrative officer to take any action at all is dependent upon the fact of employment, and this factual question is one which Congress had no power to take away from the court. Crowell v. Benson, supra. That the first order is effective and enforceable is conceded, because not attacked within 30 days. It does not follow that the second order, which the deputy commissioner had no authority or jurisdiction to make, is sustainable because the previous erroneous finding of jurisdiction was consented to by the association, and because the order was complied with in the mistaken belief that the fact was as found by the deputy commissioner. The deputy commissioner could not acquire jurisdiction to make a further and supplementary order of relief merely by reason of his erroneous finding of the jurisdictional fact in the first instance. The law under which he acted expressly provided that the second award, like the first, was subject to attack in the courts by an application for injunctive relief, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 (b), and section 22 of the act (44 Stat. 1437), wherein the jurisdiction of the deputy commissioner to make the order is -a sufficient reason for granting relief. Crowell v. Benson, supra. Such an application, however, must be made within the period of 30 days after the award is filed in the office of the deputy commissioner. The new compensation order was made and filed September 16, 1931. This order by the terms of the act became final and conclusive upon the expiration of 30 days after it was filed. 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 (a). The application to the court was made November 16, 1931, upon the theory that action of the deputy commissioner upon the motion for a rehearing, and for a vacation of the order of September 16, was a final order awarding compensation, as to which an application for an injunction might be made to the court within 30 days. The order of September 1-6 was the order-making the award, and the application for a rehearing or a reconsideration, or a vacating of the order, did not extend the time for the commencement of an action in the District Court for an injunction. That time ran from the filing of the new compensation award.
I am therefore of opinion that the application to the District Court was too late, and that the proceedings should have been dismissed for that reason. Consequently I concur in the order of reversal, but am of opinion that the trial court should be directed to dismiss the action because - filed too Tate.