Court Opinion

ID: 9695779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:29:18.37546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.443203
License: Public Domain

Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I don’t see anything ambiguous about the provision of MCL 570.1109(1); MSA 26.326(109)(1) which was quoted with emphasis in the majority opinion and provides that notice shall be given "... within 20 days after furnishing the first labor or material . . . .” The majority says a notice given one hundred days before the furnishing of supplies is substantial compliance with the statute. That is not a "liberal construction,” it is a complete departure from the statute.
We do not know the context in which disbursements from financing were made in this endeavor. Often escrow accounts are established with title companies, mortgage companies, banks, insurance companies or other fiduciaries which rely heavily on recording mechanisms. If an examiner of recorded documents were to assume freedom of encumbrance due to his reliance on statutory dates for insurance of title, the majority’s decision would pose problems. This statute is clear and needs no judicial interpretation. Smith v Ruberg, 167 Mich App 13; 421 NW2d 557 (1988). Action Auto, Inc v Anderson, 165 Mich App 620; 419 NW2d 36 (1988), lv den 430 Mich 873 (1988). To say that providing the notice prior to furnishing the first material complies with the statute is to render the word "after” surplusage or nugatory, contrary to the rules of statutory construction. Plaintiffs act in providing the notice of furnishing over ninety days prior to furnishing the first material is not in compliance with the statute, nor can it be considered in substantial compliance with the statute. Saying it "isn’t so” under the rubic of "liberal construction” amounts to literal destruction here.
*615The trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(0(10), and I would therefore affirm.