Court Opinion

ID: 9763994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:06:17.259517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:52.147728
License: Public Domain

Robert L.Brown, Justice, dissenting. I disagree that Swanigan's Swanigan’s counsel waived his argument that the cocaine should be excluded as the product of an illegal search. I would reach the merits of this case. The majority states that on appeal Swanigan asserts that the trial court erred in admitting the cocaine into evidence. Not true. What Swanigan argues is that because all of the proof presented by the prosecution showed the arrest was illegal, the cocaine should have been excluded from consideration. Here, it is clear that Swanigan’s counsel did not raise an objection to the admission of the cocaine into evidence because he did not contest the fact that cocaine was found on Swanigan at the Blytheville Police Department. What he did contest was the propriety of arresting Swanigan in the first place and then searching him incident to what he contends was an illegal arrest. Under his theory, it is the illegal arrest that warrants the exclusion of the cocaine. The majority describes Swanigan’s motion as a motion for directed verdict. The trial court and defense counsel referred to it as a motion to dismiss because the revocation hearing was held before the judge and not a jury. Whatever the case, it was appropriate to make the motion after the prosecution had presented its proof about the arrest because it was necessary for all of the facts concerning the arrest to be presented before the motion was ripe and appropriate. To have made the motion in the middle of the prosecution’s case would have been premature. Our criminal rules describe when a motion for directed verdict for jury trials should be made. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1. It is at the end of the prosecution’s case and at the close of all of the evidence. Nothing is said about requiring objections to physical evidence as a prerequisite to making the motion. Indeed, I am unaware of any caselaw making that requirement. The majority opinion certainly cites us to none. This opinion unnecessarily muddies the water and confuses the law concerning motions for directed verdict and motions to dismiss as opposed, to objections to specific physical evidence. I would refrain from finding a waiver in this case and address the merits. For that reason, I dissent. Imber, J., joins.