Court Opinion

ID: 9492075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:31:27.850765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:05.688864
License: Public Domain

WEXLER, District Judge,
dissenting:
While I agree with the majority’s statement of the relevant factual and procedural background, I believe that the alleged sentencing disparity cannot be used as a basis for downward departure because it is not “sufficient to take this case out of the Guideline’s heartland,” as required under Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and vote to affirm Banuelos-Rodriguez’s sentence.
Although sentencing disparity among federal districts resulting from different plea-bargaining practices of U.S. Attorneys is not mentioned as a forbidden, encouraged, or discouraged factor for departure, I believe that the sentencing disparity, as it allegedly occurs in the circumstances here, is not sufficient to take Banuelos-Rodriguez’s case out of the heartland of § 2L1.2. In my view, when analyzed under Koon, the alleged sentencing disparity between the Central District of California and California’s other districts, resulting from the “fast track” program adopted in the Southern District and similar programs adopted in the other districts, does not make Banue-los-Rodriguez’s case “special” or “unusual.” While the heartland of § 2L1.2 may vary depending on an offender’s conduct, Banuelos-Rodriguez’s offense conduct falls squarely within the heartland of § 2L1.2. Banuelos-Rodriguez received the sentence prescribed by § 2L1.2 for a defendant with his criminal history committing the offense conduct in which he engaged and for which he was convicted.
Significantly, the Koon Court emphasized that departures based on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be “highly infrequent.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 96, 116 S.Ct. at 2045. By downwardly departing for § 1326 defendants who could have benefitted from the “fast track” program, the district court would, in effect, be adopting the “fast track” program in the Central District, making downward departures in the Central District for such defendants not infrequent. I believe that the district court should not substitute its discretion for the prosecutorial discretion exercised by the Central District’s U.S. Attorney, who allegedly has not adopted the “fast track” program in that district.
The overriding goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is the elimination of national sentencing disparity. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B); U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, p.s. *7483; see also United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993). In formulating the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission took into account that sentencing disparity among federal districts might occur because of different plea-bargaining practices of U.S. Attorneys. Indeed, as the Sentencing Commission indicated, the Sentencing Guidelines “are intended to ensure that plea negotiation practices ... do not perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparity.” U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B, intro, comment. To avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity due to the exercise of prosecuto-rial discretion, the Sentencing Commission incorporated in the Guidelines various checks on plea-bargaining practices through policy statements to be used by federal courts in deciding whether to accept plea agreements. Id. To this end, as the majority notes, a court may accept a plea agreement “if the court determines ... that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a).
Although downward departure presumably would lessen any sentencing disparity between a § 1326 defendant in the Central District and § 1326 defendants in California’s other districts, allowing departure ignores any sentencing disparity between § 1326 defendants in California’s districts and § 1326 defendants in other districts in the country. If the goal of eliminating national sentencing disparity is to be achieved, the district court would be required to consider the plea-bargaining practices for § 1326 defendants in every district in the country, not just California’s districts. In other words, the elimination of sentencing disparity in California’s districts ignores the Guidelines’ goal of eliminating national sentencing disparity. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, downward departure under the circumstances may very well sacrifice the greater uniformity for the lesser uniformity. Unless every district in the country has adopted a “fast track” program — and Ban-uelos-Rodriguez neither alleged nor provided evidence of such fact — the district court would have to choose between national uniformity and local uniformity, something I believe the district court should not be required to do.
Ironically, if allegedly similarly situated defendants in California’s other three districts are given sentences significantly below Banuelos-Rodriguez’s sentence and, arguably, below that contemplated by the Guidelines, then, under the majority’s ruling, those defendants should be subject to upward departure to fulfill the goal of § 2L1.2. However, the Guidelines already provide the appropriate remedy where a plea agreement results in charges that do not “adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior,” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a), namely, rejection of the plea agreement.
Moreover, I do not agree that United States v. Ray, 930 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1990), as amended Apr. 23, 1991, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1124, 111 S.Ct. 1084, 112 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1991), and United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101 (9th Cir.1991), support the majority’s ruling. Banuelos-Rod-riguez is not being sentenced under a different “legal regime” or “sentencing scheme” from the allegedly similarly situated defendants in California’s other three districts.
In sum, I believe that in considering the “structure and theory” of § 2L1.2 and the Guidelines as a whole, as instructed under Koon, the alleged sentencing disparity, as it occurs in the circumstances here, is not sufficient to take this case out of the heartland of § 2L1.2. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm Banuelos-Rodri-guez’s sentence.