Court Opinion

ID: 9493926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:31.087943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:06.438639
License: Public Domain

ALSOP, District Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s recitation of the facts and with their conclusion that Detective Kriteman reasonably could have searched Mr. Gillette’s vehicle based on the Crofts’ third-party consent. However, the search in question was not conducted *1035by Detective Kriteman but instead by Deputy Smithson. I cannot agree that the “collective knowledge” theory may be stretched so far as to impute knowledge of the third-party consent to Deputy Smithson. Because I see no other ground on which to affirm the conviction, I respectfully dissent.
This Court has recognized for some time that all the facts necessary to establish probable cause for a warrantless search need not be within the personal knowledge of the officer performing the search. See, e.g., White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, 254 (8th Cir.1971) (holding that probable cause is evaluated based on the information collectively available to officers involved in an investigation). The purpose of this rule is to allow law enforcement officers to work as a team without requiring each member of the team to know every fact pertinent to the team’s actions. United States v. Stratton, 453 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir.1972). Although our cases applying this rule often refer to the “collective knowledge” of the officers, the term “collective knowledge” is misleading because as a practical matter individual officers cannot know anything collectively. Individual officers, on the other hand, can act collectively, and the real issue in our collective knowledge cases is whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in light of any collective action in which two or more officers were engaging.
Collective action involves the exchange of information and instructions, and in most instances the collective knowledge theory simply allows one officer to accept facts or directives communicated by another officer at face value and to take appropriate action based on that communication. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 220 F.3d 922, 924-25 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that probable cause for an investigatory stop and warrantless arrest may be based in part on information communicated to the investigating officer); United States v. Twiss, 127 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir.1997) (holding that an officer may order a war-rantless search based only on information communicated from another officer). In order to ensure that the officers are acting collectively and not independently, “some degree of communication” regarding the pertinent subject matter must exist between the officers. United States v. Horne, 4 F.3d 579, 585 (8th Cir.1993).
A small number of cases have relaxed the communication requirement when the officers involved were “working closely together” during the execution of a search warrant. United States v. O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1419 (8th Cir.1988). In such cases, “we presume the officers have shared relevant knowledge which informs the decision to seize evidence or to detain a particular person, even if the acting officer is unable to completely and correctly articulate the grounds for his suspicion at the time of the search.” Id.See also United States v. Wright, 641 F.2d 602, 606 (8th Cir.1981) (upholding a seizure by one officer outside the scope of a search warrant because another officer involved in the search was aware of facts establishing probable cause). The rationale underlying this application of the collective knowledge theory is difficult to discern, although this Court recently emphasized that such an application is justified only if the evidence at issue was seized “in the presence of’ the officer with knowledge of facts sufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 808-09 (8th Cir.2001). The emphasis on physical presence during the search suggests that shared knowledge should be presumed only when two or more officers are working collectively in close proximity and it is reasonable to assume that the officers could have communicated the pertinent information during the course of their collective action.
*1036The search of Mr. Gillette’s vehicle cannot be squared with either of these lines of authority. The record shows, and the majority acknowledges, that Deputy Smithson came to the Croft residence without having-previous knowledge of the investigation, merely in response to a request for backup. He began to search vehicles without receiving any instructions or information from any officer with knowledge of facts sufficient to justify a search. In addition, Detective Kriteman, who was in charge of the search, testified that he only “vaguely remembered” Deputy Smithson being on the scene and that Deputy Smithson’s actions were not in accord with the search plan other officers were implementing. Another officer testified that Deputy Smithson “had taken it upon himself’ to begin the search. Deputy Smithson was not called to testify. The mere fact that Deputy Smithson responded to a request for backup does not establish that he was engaging in collective action in any meaningful sense. The evidence instead compels the conclusion that Deputy Smithson acted entirely on his own and made an unreasonable warrantless search. The obvious drug-related activity of the defendant does not justify excusing this patent violation of the Fourth Amendment.
For those reasons, I would hold that the evidence seized from Mr. Gillette’s vehicle was inadmissible as illegally obtained and that the inculpatory statements Mr. Gillette made immediately after the search also were tainted by the Fourth Amendment violation and therefore inadmissible under the rule of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The government offered no other evidence in support of the conspiracy charge, and I accordingly would reverse the conviction.