Court Opinion

ID: 9940644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 21:01:24.193493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:12.601590
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4042

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        KEITH LAMONT THOMPSON, JR.,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00223-D-1)

        Submitted: November 7, 2023                                   Decided: February 13, 2024

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, and HARRIS and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Harris wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge
        Diaz and Judge Heytens joined.

        ON BRIEF: Kearns Davis, Tanisha Palvia, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON,
        HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael
        F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Lucy Partain Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PAMELA HARRIS, Circuit Judge:

               A jury convicted Keith Lamont Thompson, Jr., of possession of cocaine with intent

        to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and two related firearms offenses. At

        sentencing, the district court determined that Thompson had a prior conviction for a

        “controlled substance offense” within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines, and

        accordingly adopted an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months’ to life

        imprisonment. The court ultimately sentenced Thompson to 30 years’ imprisonment, the

        bottom of the advisory range.

               On appeal, Thompson challenges both his conviction and his sentence, in both

        instances raising arguments he did not preserve before the district court. His principal

        contention is that the district court erred in finding that his prior North Carolina conviction

        for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver qualified as a “controlled substance

        offense” under the Guidelines. He also contends that the district court erred in admitting

        certain testimony at trial and that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for or “bolstered”

        an informant’s credibility. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the

        district court.

                                                      I.

               Because it is his primary argument on appeal, we begin with Thompson’s claim

        regarding his sentence. It is not disputed that Thompson was previously convicted of

        possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver under North Carolina’s drug distribution

        statute. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1). The district court found that this conviction

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        was for a “controlled substance offense” under the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G.

        § 4B1.2(b). That determination, in turn, led to an advisory sentencing range substantially

        higher than it otherwise would be.

               For the first time on appeal, Thompson argues that North Carolina’s drug

        distribution statute sweeps more broadly than the Guidelines definition of a “controlled

        substance offense,” and therefore should not have been used to enhance his Guidelines

        sentencing range. According to Thompson, North Carolina’s statute – which prohibits

        delivery and possession with intent to deliver controlled substances – reaches “attempted”

        as well as completed transfers of drugs. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) (general

        prohibition on selling or delivering a controlled substance); id. at § 90-87(7) (defining

        “deliver” as “the actual[,] constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another of

        a controlled substance”). And because we held in United States v. Campbell, 22 F.4th 438,

        440 (4th Cir. 2022), that the Guidelines definition of a “controlled substance offense” does

        not reach attempt crimes, Thompson finishes, his North Carolina conviction cannot qualify

        as a “controlled substance offense” for Guidelines purposes.

               Because Thompson did not raise this argument before the district court, our review

        is for plain error only. See United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th 215, 223 (4th Cir. 2023);

        United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-35 (1993) (outlining plain-error standard of

        review). Here, we find no error, plain or otherwise. After briefing in this case was

        completed, Thompson’s view of the North Carolina statute was foreclosed by our decision

        in United States v. Miller, 75 F.4th at 228-31. In that case, we examined the same North

        Carolina drug distribution statute at issue here, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1), in light of

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        the same argument raised by Thompson, and held that § 90-95(a)(1) is indeed a categorical

        match with the Guidelines’ definition of “controlled substance offense.” See Miller, 75

        F.4th at 230-31. North Carolina’s statute, we concluded, does not in fact criminalize

        attempted deliveries – a reading that would render North Carolina’s separate attempt

        statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-98, superfluous, and lead to the “remarkable” result that many

        state controlled-substance-trafficking laws would not qualify as “controlled substance

        offenses.” Miller, 75 F.4th at 230 (“This cannot be what the Sentencing Commission

        intended.”). Under Miller, Thompson’s prior conviction under North Carolina’s drug

        distribution statute was properly treated as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes

        of calculating his Sentencing Guidelines range.

                                                     II.

               Thompson also challenges his conviction, raising for the first time on appeal an

        evidentiary objection to the admission of a police officer’s trial testimony and a claim that

        the prosecutor improperly vouched for or bolstered out-of-court statements by an

        informant. Finding no plain error, we affirm Thompson’s conviction.

               We begin with the officer testimony. Asked what prompted the investigation into

        Thompson, a police officer testified that he was told by a confidential informant that the

        informant had seen contraband in Thompson’s apartment.             J.A. 36-37.    On cross-

        examination, the officer explained that the informant gave him Thompson’s phone number,

        identified a photograph of Thompson, and advised that he “had viewed an ankle monitor

        on Mr. Thompson.”        J.A. 53-54.    Thompson now claims that this testimony was

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        inadmissible hearsay, violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights, was

        unduly prejudicial, and constituted impermissible propensity evidence.

               Thompson did not object to this testimony at trial and so again, we are limited to

        plain-error review. We find no reversible error here. Because the officer recounted the

        informant’s statements not for the underlying truth of those statements but to “explain[]

        why a government investigation was undertaken,” the officer’s testimony was not hearsay.

        United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Davis,

        918 F.3d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 2019). Thompson’s Confrontation Clause claim therefore fails

        as well, because that provision “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes

        other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d

        233, 248 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ayala, 601 F.3d 256, 272 (4th Cir.

        2010)). And we reject Thompson’s passing suggestion that it was plain error to admit the

        evidence due to its unduly prejudicial effect or as forbidden propensity evidence.

               Thompson also argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for or bolstered the

        same informant’s credibility by mentioning in his opening statement that officers obtained

        a search warrant for Thompson’s premises based on the informant’s tip and then

        elaborating that this “means [the officers] went to a judge [and] the judge found probable

        cause.” J.A. 28. Again, we disagree.

               “Vouching occurs when a prosecutor indicates a personal belief in the credibility or

        honesty of a witness,” while bolstering occurs when a prosecutor implies “that the

        testimony of a witness is corroborated by evidence known to the government but not known

        to the jury.” United States v. Sanchez, 118 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1997). Only if such

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        vouching or bolstering “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

        conviction a denial of due process” is a new trial warranted. Id. (quoting United States v.

        Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1993)). Here, the prosecutor’s one-sentence remark,

        objectively describing the search warrant process, falls well short of that mark. “[T]he

        government has a right to explain its procedures,” United States v. Lewis, 10 F.3d 1086,

        1089 (4th Cir. 1993), and that is all the prosecutor did here. ∗

                                                     III.

               For the reasons given above, we affirm Thompson’s conviction and sentence.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

               ∗
                  Thompson also raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim predicated on his
        trial counsel’s failure to raise the issues Thompson now brings on appeal. Given our
        disposition of those claims, we do not find that ineffectiveness of counsel conclusively
        appears on the face of the record. Accordingly, Thompson’s “claim should be raised, if at
        all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir.
        2016).

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