Court Opinion

ID: 9837062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:11.721348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.145589
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
Once again the majority, without explanation or justification, fails to follow Supreme Court precedent concerning the effective assistance of counsel when the sentence is death. See United States v. Curtis, 46 MJ 129, 131 (1997) (Crawford, J., dissenting). In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a capital case, the Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test for ineffective assistance of counsel, which this Court adopted in United States v. Scott, 24 MJ 186 (CMA 1987). Our opinions consistently have applied that two-pronged test, until Curtis and, now, Murphy.
By concluding that appellant’s counsel were ineffective, the majority attempts to fit a square peg in a round hole. It relies upon the absence of information in the record regarding trial defense counsels’ courts-martial experience to support its contention that appellant’s defense counsel were ineffective at trial. It also fails to recognize the presumption of competence of counsel, and the high hurdle an appellant must overcome in order to establish prejudice.
FACTS
I find it telling that the majority gives short shrift to a discussion of the evidence in this case. Determining whether an attorney’s conduct falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and whether an appellant was prejudiced by that attorney’s conduct, requires an analysis of the factual evidence introduced at trial.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the first prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test has been met, one must still consider the prejudice prong. A prejudice analysis should encompass a review of all the evidence presented at trial. For this reason, I shall begin with a discussion of the facts.
Prior to the murders, appellant was involved in a lengthy, acrimonious divorce proceeding in which his ex-wife, Petra Murphy, was demanding more financial support. Appellant told fellow soldiers “that if he had to pay alimony he was going to kill her.”
Appellant admitted that, approximately 10 or 11 days prior to the murders, he took a taxi to Petra’s apartment complex because he *30did not know its exact location. When he arrived, he did not exit the cab, but had the cab driver return him to his own car. Then he drove his own car back to the apartment complex and circled around it a couple of times to see if Petra and the children were there. Although appellant claimed to have an innocent intent in doing so, it is a reasonable inference that his actions were a prelude to the murders.
On the night of the murders, appellant drove to Petra’s apartment and parked 100 yards from the apartment complex so that no one would associate his car with the complex. He arrived at 11:15 p.m. In his car he had both the hammer and gloves (the murders occurred in August) that he would use for the murder.
The victims in this ease were appellant’s former wife, Petra Murphy, Petra’s five-year-old son by a former marriage, Tim Herkstroeter, and appellant’s twenty-one-month-old son, James Murphy. The bodies of the victims were found in the bathroom several days after their murders. The bodies of the children lay in a partially filled bathtub; Tim was lying face up, James face down. The forensic pathologist testified at trial that the children were alive and conscious at the time of drowning. Petra was found kneeling beside the tub, her head draped into the water. The forensic pathologist testified at trial that Petra died by drowning but had also suffered at least four severe blows to her head prior to death, one of which fractured her skull, and had injuries on her neck indicative of choking. Petra may have been unconscious when she was drowned.
Murphy, 36 MJ 8 (Crawford, J., dissenting).
After committing the murders, appellant wiped off all the fingerprints in the house, arranged the crime scene to make it look like someone else had committed the crime, and then removed and disposed of all the incriminating evidence, including the towel he used to wipe away his fingerprints, Petra’s key, and Petra’s military dependent identification card. He locked the door and threw the key away, knowing that no one could get into the apartment and that he was scheduled to leave Germany in a few days. The bodies were discovered several days after appellant returned to the United States.
Appellant provided the police with four separate versions of events. Each version is progressively more incriminating and more consistent with the physical evidence in the case. Appellant initially denied any involvement in the murders. He then claimed that he killed Petra because she killed the children. Appellant’s third claim was that he killed Petra and his step-son because Petra killed his son. Finally, appellant admitted that he murdered all three of them. Appellant confessed not only to police, but to three others as well.
Appellant demonstrated that he was intimately familiar with the crimes by providing numerous diagrams of Petra’s apartment before and after the murders. These diagrams accurately reflected the crime scene. Police also located the gloves and hammer appellant stated that he used during the murders.
DEFENSE COUNSELS’ EXPERIENCE
An attorney’s lack of experience is not a per se bar to trying capital cases. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See also Wisehart v. State, 693 N.E.2d 23 (Ind.1998). Admittedly, it is preferable for a defense attorney to have extensive experience in felony cases and jury trials. The majority concludes that, because trial defense counsel, Captains (CPT) Vitaris and Schneller, lacked experience trying capital cases, and did not request the use of experts in sentencing, they must have been ineffective. 50 MJ at 9. Case law does not support such a holding.
The Supreme Court in Cronic rejected the idea that the experience of counsel determines effectiveness. In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision which found an appointed defense counsel ineffective because he was a young real estate lawyer and had never participated in a jury trial. 466 U.S. at 649, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The Court held that “[t]he character of a particular lawyer’s experience may shed light in an evaluation of his actual performance, but it does not justify a presumption of inef*31fectiveness in the absence of such an evaluation.” The Court noted that “[e]very experienced criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case.” Id. at 665, 104 S.Ct. 2039.
The majority emphasizes that trial defense counsel did not list their qualifications and experience on the record. 50 MJ at 8-9. However, there is no requirement that defense counsel do so. This Court should not imply that defense counsels’ failure to reveal their experience and qualifications in any way strengthens appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume counsel is competent. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Further, the lead defense counsel in appellant’s trial was the Senior Defense Counsel of the Hanau Field Office, Trial Defense Service. A military attorney does not ascend to this position without extensive court-martial experience and strong qualifications.
Appellant was represented by two military lawyers who were not associated with appellant’s command, but were part of a separate defense counsel organization with its own training, supervision, and headquarters in Washington, D.C. Both attorneys were members of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps selected in a highly competitive atmosphere. Upon being selected and commissioned, they received training at the Army Judge Advocate General’s School, an American Bar Association approved law school which Congress approved to award a Master of Laws degree (LL.M.). At that school, they received specialized training in litigation, trial practice, and criminal law. Additionally, they were members of a separate public defender organization that conducts periodic training.
Given the common experience of all judge advocates, and what we know of the experience of the lead defense counsel in this case, there is no reason to infer a lack of experience or qualifications absent some showing by appellant. Even if appellant were to present evidence of his trial defense counsels’ inexperience or lack of training, this would not be a per se showing of ineffectiveness. Rather, under Cronic, such evidence would be only a factor to consider in determining the defense counsels’ effectiveness.
CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL
RCM 901(d)(4), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, based on Fed. R.Crim.P. 44(c) and United States v. Breese, 11 MJ 17 (CMA1981), provides:
The military judge shall, in open session:
* * *
(D) Promptly inquire, whenever two or more accused in a joint or common trial are represented by the same detailed or individual military or civilian counsel, or by civilian counsel who are associated in the practice of law, with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each accused of the right to effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation. Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the military judge shall take appropriate measures to protect each accused’s right to counsel[.]
The Discussion to RCM 910 states: Whenever it appears that any defense counsel may face a conflict of interest, the military judge should inquire into the matter, advise the accused of the right to effective assistance of counsel, and ascertain the accused’s choice of counsel. When defense counsel is aware of a potential conflict of interest, counsel should discuss the matter with the accused. If the accused elects to waive such conflict, counsel should inform the military judge of the matter at an Article 39(a) session so that an appropriate record can be made.
When a conflict appears on the record, the judge should conduct an inquiry.
In his affidavit, appellant denies that his lawyers discussed representation of Private (PVT) French or advised him of any potential conflict. Now he indicates that, had he been so advised, he would not have consented to representation by CPT Vitaris or CPT Schneller.
The military judge stated in his affidavit that PVT French’s case was one of a number *32of trials that he presided over between July and December of 1987. He indicated that he did not remember, during appellant’s trial, that CPT Schneller had represented PVT French. There was no indication on the record of the prior representation of PVT French.
CPT Schneller states in his affidavit that the representation of PVT French was discussed with appellant. He asserts that appellant agreed that he would continue to represent appellant and would seek release from representing PVT French.
In his affidavit, CPT Schneller states:
Due to [appellant’s] irresistible impulse to confess his alleged crimes to anyone who would listen, CPT Vitaris and I, on our own, developed the theory that “Beata [sic] might have done it” and [appellant] was protecting her.... [PVT] French’s testimony fit the theory of our case.
CPT Vitaris was in charge of the trial of the case in chief. That is, I handled the opening statement and CPT Vitaris handled all matters thereafter through a verdict by the panel. It was our decision that should the panel not believe our theory that “Beata [sic] might have done it,” they would not be in any mood to listen to CPT Vitaris plea for [appellant’s] life. Therefore it was felt that it would be better if we separated the case and I presented the sentencing, as I might have more credibility than CPT Vitaris, at that time, with the panel. I can say ... that CPT Vitaris and I were totally devoted to [appellant] and were determined to obtain an acquittal. There was no thought given to a possible conflict of interest with [PVT] French after I was relieved from his case. The decision not to cross-examine [PVT] French had nothing to do with my prior representation and to the best of my knowledge was due solely to the fact that the information to be obtained from cross-examination would have been detrimental to [appellant’s] case.
CPT Vitaris corroborates CPT Schneller’s affidavit and remembers admonishing appellant to remain silent because PVT French’s testimony was consistent with their trial strategy. There was no need or advantage to be gained by cross-examination.
No inquiry was required by the judge under RCM 901(d)(4), because there was not a joint or common trial involving the accused. Nor was the judge unreasonable in failing to remember one of many trials, in fact, a snapshot of one of many trials he presided over while “riding” a trial circuit in Europe during a 6-month period of time. Defense counsel, after they obtained appellant’s consent for CPT Schneller to continue his representation, should have informed the judge pursuant to the non-binding discussion to RCM 901(d)(4). However, contrary to the majority’s holding, this conflict had no impact on appellant’s trial.
As the majority acknowledges, PVT French primarily reiterated information contained in appellant’s confessions. 50 MJ at 11. Defense counsel are not required to cross-examine a witness. Indeed, they are only ineffective if their failure to cross-examine falls below the standards set forth under Strickland. See Brown, v. United States, 625 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.1979); Sallie v. State, 587 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.1978). As the majority notes, some of PVT French’s testimony was helpful to appellant, which may be why PVT French was not impeached on the stand. 50 MJ at 11.
On findings, the theory of the case was that appellant confessed repeatedly, to all who would listen, because he was protecting the real perpetrator, his wife Beate. In this context, PVT French’s testimony supported the defense theory.
An attorney’s conflict of interest does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless an appellant was prejudiced by the conflict of interest. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987). The majority determines that appellant may have been prejudiced by the witness’ testimony that appellant stated he murdered his son because he did not want to leave any witnesses to the murder. 50 MJ at 11. I disagree.
Similar evidence was presented at trial by a different source and, thus, the challenged testimony could not have prejudiced appel*33lant, During a police interrogation, appellant informed Special Agent Woodall that he killed James, his 2-year-old son, because “the authorities would ‘automatically assume’ that he was the perpetrator if James survived.” See 36 MJ at 1141 (quoting R. 425).
Further, a reasonable member could reach this conclusion from the mere fact that appellant murdered everyone in the home. Appellant’s reason for murdering his son did not tip the scales toward the death penalty in this case. Rather, the fact that appellant murdered a toddler, a 5-year-old, and his ex-wife, in a clearly premeditated act, convinced the members to sentence appellant to death. Further, PVT French’s testimony did not undercut appellant’s contention that he felt remorse for his crime afterwards.
INVESTIGATION AND EXPLORATION OF APPELLANT’S MENTAL HEALTH AND ABUSE AS A CHILD
An appellant may not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on actions taken as part of a reasonable trial strategy. United States v. Curtis, 44 MJ 106, 119 (1996), rev’d as to sentence on recon., 46 MJ 129 (1997). A defense counsel’s selection of witnesses and introduction of evidence are generally issues of trial strategy and “virtually unchallengeable.” Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Mo.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 343, 121 L.Ed.2d 259 (1992).
“In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. “[T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citation omitted). “A criminal attorney has the duty to investigate, but the scope of investigation is governed by a reasonableness standard.” Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir.1985). “[Cjounsel’s duty to investigate depends critically on the information furnished by the defendant and his family.” Curtis, 44 MJ at 121.
If there is compelling evidence of mitigation that, for no valid reason, an attorney failed to investigate, an 8th Amendment or a 6th Amendment claim may lie. See May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.1990); Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir.1986); and Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.1985). However, a tactical decision to forgo introducing mitigating evidence will not support a claim. May v. Collins, supra (8th Amendment); Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 493-4 (11th Cir.1988) (6th Amendment).
The Supreme Court in Strickland warned that it is “tempting to second-guess” a lawyer’s performance, but that a court’s assessment of an ineffectiveness claim should try to “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. As the Supreme Court stated in Burger:
[Defense counsel] could well have made a more thorough investigation than he did. Nevertheless, in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, “[w]e address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.” We have decided that “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”
483 U.S. at 794, 107 S.Ct. 3114, quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 665 n. 38, 104 S.Ct. 2039, and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Strickland was a capital case involving some of the same allegations as here, that is, ineffectiveness in failure to investigate and produce mitigating evidence at the penalty stage. Strickland’s defense counsel did not produce presentencing evidence because “his conversations with his client gave no indication that [Strickland] had psychological problems.” 466 U.S. at 673, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court found that there was not a violation of the Strickland two-pronged test. Id. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court did not, as the majority would, impose a more rigorous standard on the conduct of defense counsel in death penalty cases.
*34The majority opinion criticizes defense counsel for not meeting face-to-face with appellant’s character witnesses. 50 MJ at 12-13. There is no requirement that defense counsel interview witnesses in such a manner. Indeed, such a requirement would place an unreasonable burden upon defense attorneys. It is entirely possible to acquire necessary and relevant information from witnesses over the telephone. I know of no case law suggesting that telephonic interviews are unacceptable methods of communication, and the majority has not cited any.
Defense counsel in this case obtained the names of potential witnesses from appellant, contacted those witnesses, and asked those witnesses for information and names of other witnesses that might be helpful. He then contacted those potential witnesses. During the sentencing stage, seven witnesses from North Carolina testified for appellant. Additionally, there was a stipulation of expected testimony of seven others who were relatives and friends of appellant. These stipulations addressed appellant’s hometown, his childhood, and his background. Numerous exhibits were introduced into evidence which favorably showed appellant’s childhood background and good character.
Counsel is not ineffective simply because he or she relied on a less than complete psychiatric evaluation. State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221, 1223 (Fla.1987). Further, the fact that an accused recently has secured a more favorable expert opinion is an insufficient basis for relief. Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 546 (Fla.1990). “Disagreements among professionals do not per se show incompetence.” United States v. Loving, 41 MJ 213, 241 (1994). “[Djefense counsel is not obligated to shop for an expert witness who might provide more favorable testimony.” State v. Kenley, 952 S.W.2d 250, 268 (Mo.1997) (holding that, in light of aggravating evidence, there was no reasonable probability the sentence would be different).
In Riley v. State, 110 Nev. 638, 878 P.2d 272 (1994), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a defense attorney was not ineffective for failing to hire an expert to examine the appellant’s mental and physical health, where a pretrial evaluation report gave no indication that the appellant had a mental or physical illness, but only noted the appellant’s extensive drug use. The court said, “As a result, we hold that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel, without stronger indications, for [defense counsel] to have failed to order a psychiatric evaluation of [the appellant] based on the information contained in the pretrial evaluation.” Id. at 280.
Appellant underwent a pretrial RCM 706 sanity board hearing. The sanity board found that he was competent to stand trial and was sane when he murdered his son, stepson, and ex-wife. The sanity board consisted of a psychiatrist and a psychologist, who concluded that appellant was able to “appreciate the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his conduct” and did not have “a severe mental disease or defect” at the time of the murders.
Neither appellant nor any of his character witnesses informed defense counsel that appellant or his mother had been victims of abuse. Thus, appellant’s defense attorneys had no reason to investigate further appellant’s childhood background or his mental health for either the findings or sentencing portion of the trial. Their failure to investigate further these claims was reasonable, based upon the information provided to them by appellant and his witnesses.
Even if defense counsel were ineffective during findings or sentencing for failing to investigate appellant’s recently discovered childhood abuse and mental health evidence, there was no prejudice. In Buenoano v. Dugger, 559 So.2d 1116, 1119 (1990), the Florida Supreme Court held that appellant’s mental health and childhood abuse “in no way would be sufficient to overcome the overwhelming evidence presented against her at trial.” See also People v. Lear, 175 Ill.2d 262, 222 Ill.Dec. 361, 677 N.E.2d 895, 902 (1997) (appellant not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present evidence of psychological and physiological defects because aggravating evidence was overwhelming and mitigation evidence was weak); Johnston v. Dugger, 583 So.2d 657 (Fla.1991) (defense at*35torney was not ineffective for failing to pursue insanity defense where the court found the pretrial competency examination of appellant was adequate).
Given the strong evidence of appellant’s sanity, it is unlikely that the post-trial psychiatric report would have convinced the members to acquit him, even if it had been presented to them. See Coogan v. McCaughtry, 958 F.2d 793, 795 (7th Cir.1992) (appellant did not demonstrate that new psychiatric evidence “would probably result in an acquittal”); United States v. Massa, 804 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir.1986) (jury was unlikely to acquit appellant based on new psychiatric report). Thus, even if defense counsel were ineffective in failing to investigate further appellant’s mental health, there was no prejudice on findings. Evidence of appellant’s guilt for these atrocious crimes was overwhelming. Even if he had presented evidence that he was abused as a child and suffers from a mental illness, it is hard to find any prejudice to appellant.
CONCLUSION
The majority’s decision lowers an appellant’s burden in ineffective assistance of counsel cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. Regardless of whether trial defense counsels’ conduct was below an objective standard of reasonableness during some phase of appellant’s trial, there was no prejudice to appellant given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt. Even absent these alleged errors, the members would have found appellant guilty of the capital offenses and sentenced him to death. I would affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence.
For the above reasons, I dissent.