Court Opinion

ID: 9907441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:00:58.456583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:51.777154
License: Public Domain

23-702-cv
     Irazu v. Sainz De Aja

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1              At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the
 2   Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse,
 3   40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of December, two
 4   thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7              DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
 8                    Chief Judge,
 9              DENNY CHIN,
10              MICHAEL H. PARK,
11                    Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13   Fernando G. Irazu,
14
15                            Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17                      v.                                       23-702-cv
18
19   Margarita Oliva Sainz De Aja, Kevin F.
20   Collins, Jeffrey A. Diamond,

21                    Defendants-Appellees.
22   _____________________________________

                                                     1
 1   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                  Fernando G. Irazu, Esq.,
 2                                                             pro se, Buenos Aires,
 3                                                             Argentina.
 4
 5   FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                 No appearance.
 6
 7

 8         Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District

 9   of Connecticut (Victor A. Bolden, Judge; Robert M. Spector, Magistrate Judge).

10         UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,          IT   IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

11   ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

12   AFFIRMED.

13                                         * * *

14         Appellant Fernando Irazu, an attorney proceeding pro se and in forma

15   pauperis, sued his ex-wife, her attorney, and Connecticut Superior Court “Caseflow

16   Coordinator” Jeffrey Diamond for allegedly violating his constitutional rights by

17   abusing the litigation process during several proceedings related to his divorce.

18   The district court adopted a report and recommendation and dismissed his

19   complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because (1) the Caseflow Coordinator is

20   immune from suit based on the Eleventh Amendment, quasi-judicial immunity,

21   and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) the other defendants are not state actors. The court

                                              2
1   also denied Irazu’s motion to disqualify the magistrate judge and district court.

2   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

3   history, and the issues on appeal.

4         We review a sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) de novo.

5   Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018). A screening

6   dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis is appropriate if the action “(i) is

7   frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

8   (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

9   28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 1

    1
     To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B) “a complaint
    must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
    Hardaway, 879 F.3d at 489 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
    570 (2007)). Because Irazu is an attorney, we agree with the district court that,
    although he is proceeding pro se, he is not entitled to the special solicitude
    normally afforded to pro se litigants. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 101–02 (2d
    Cir. 2010).

                                              3
 1       I.   Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Quasi-Judicial Immunity, and § 1983

 2            Irazu’s claims for money damages and injunctive relief against Diamond in

 3   both his official and individual capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment,

 4   quasi-judicial immunity, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2

 5               a. Eleventh Amendment

 6            The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity from suits for money

 7   damages in federal court to states, state entities, and state officials acting in their

 8   official capacities. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret.

 9   Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2013); Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d

10   522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993). The immunity “extends beyond the states themselves to

11   state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.”

12   Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and

13   citation omitted). As we have noted before:

14            Six factors determine whether an entity is an arm of the state: (1) how
15            the entity is referred to in its documents of origin; (2) how the
16            governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is
17            funded; (4) whether the entity’s function is traditionally one of local
18            or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the

     2 Irazu argues the district court erred by solely considering his claims to be based
     on § 1983. He does not, however, explain what other claims providing federal
     jurisdiction he asserted. Accordingly, he has abandoned any such argument. See
     LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that issues not
     raised in an appellate brief are abandoned).
                                                4
 1         entity’s actions; and (6) whether the entity’s financial obligations are
 2         binding upon the state.
 3
 4   Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation

 5   omitted). We have applied these factors to conclude that New York’s Unified

 6   Court System is an arm of the state protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity,

 7   because (among other reasons) New York’s courts were established by the New

 8   York Constitution and their function is traditionally associated with state

 9   government. Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 366–68.

10         The Gorton factors yield the same result with respect to the Connecticut

11   Judicial Branch and thus Diamond in his official capacity.          The Connecticut

12   Constitution calls for the creation of a judiciary, including superior courts like the

13   one by which Diamond was allegedly employed. See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 1. It

14   also dictates that lower court judges will be appointed by the General Assembly

15   in a manner prescribed by law. Id. § 3. The state legislature funds, at least

16   partially, the judiciary. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-12(a) (Compensation plan).

17   Finally, the “function [of the court system] is traditionally one of . . . state

18   government.” Gollomp, 568 F.3d at 368. Accordingly, the Connecticut Judicial

19   Branch is a state entity protected by the Eleventh Amendment and that shield

20   extends to protect its employees from suits for damages for actions taken in their

                                               5
 1   official capacity. As a judicial employee, Diamond is protected in his official

 2   capacity by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

 3             b. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

 4         As for Irazu’s individual capacity claims for money damages against

 5   Diamond, we agree with the district court that Diamond is also shielded by quasi-

 6   judicial immunity, which extends to people, other than judges, “who perform

 7   functions closely associated with the judicial process.” Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37,

 8   39 (2d Cir. 1988) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). This immunity

 9   extends to “all persons—governmental or otherwise—who [are] integral parts of

10   the judicial process.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983).

11         We have previously extended absolute immunity to court clerks who were,

12   like Diamond, alleged to have violated a plaintiff’s due process rights based on

13   impermissible handling of a case docket. Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66–67

14   (2d Cir. 1997). “A court’s inherent power to control its docket is part of its function

15   of resolving disputes between parties” and therefore a “function for which judges

16   and their supporting staff are afforded absolute immunity.” Id. at 66.

17         Like the clerk in Rodriguez, Diamond is protected from suit by the judicial

18   nature of docket-management. Accordingly, Irazu’s claim for money damages

                                               6
 1   against Diamond in his individual capacity was also correctly dismissed.

 2             c. Section 1983

 3         To the extent that Irazu seeks prospective injunctive relief against Diamond,

 4   § 1983 itself bars suits for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officers for

 5   acts taken in their judicial capacity “unless a declaratory decree was violated or

 6   declaratory relief was unavailable.” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir.

 7   1999) (per curiam) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For the same reasons that Diamond

 8   was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, he qualifies as a judicial officer for

 9   purposes of § 1983. See id. at 761 (concluding that because a parole board

10   commissioner had absolute judicial immunity in his official capacity, he was also

11   protected by § 1983’s limitation on injunctive relief); cf. Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d

12   157, 174 (2d Cir. 2004) (the lack of entitlement to quasi-judicial immunity led “by

13   the same token” to the inapplicability of § 1983’s limitation on injunctive relief).

14   Accordingly, Irazu’s claim for injunctive relief against Diamond is also barred, as

15   Irazu did not allege the violation of a declaratory decree or the unavailability of

16   declaratory relief.

                                                 7
 1   II.   State Action

 2         We also agree with the district court that Irazu’s amended complaint fails to

 3   adequately allege that either Oliva Sainz de Aja or Collins, neither of whom is a

 4   state actor, was acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Meadows v.

 5   United Servs., Inc., 963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). While a private

 6   entity can act under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when “(1) the State

 7   compelled the conduct [the ‘compulsion test’], (2) there is a sufficiently close nexus

 8   between the State and the private conduct [the ‘close nexus test’ or ‘joint action

 9   test’], or (3) the private conduct consisted of activity that has traditionally been the

10   exclusive prerogative of the State [the ‘public function test’],” Irazu’s allegations

11   fail to satisfy any of these tests. McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d

12   Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original).

13   Non-governmental lawyers, without more, are not state actors, Szymonik v.

14   Connecticut, 807 F. App’x 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order), and “the mere

15   invocation by defendants of [state] legal procedures” does not transform them into

16   state actors, Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 1984). Further, Irazu failed

17   to provide any non-conclusory allegations that Diamond and the other defendants

18   were involved in a § 1983 conspiracy. Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307,

                                                8
 1   325 (2d Cir. 2002) (dismissing § 1983 conspiracy claim because the “allegations are

 2   strictly conclusory.”).

 3          Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Irazu’s claims against

 4   Oliva Sainz de Aja and Collins for failure to allege state action.

 5   III.   Recusal

 6          The district court’s decisions to decide the recusal motion and to deny the

 7   recusal motion were not only proper but required. LoCascio v. United States, 473

 8   F.3d 493, 498 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“[A] judge has an affirmative duty to

 9   inquire into the legal sufficiency of [an affidavit of prejudice] and not to disqualify

10   himself unnecessarily”); In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]here

11   the standards governing disqualification have not been met, disqualification is not

12   optional; rather, it is prohibited.”). Irazu’s argument that the district court and

13   magistrate judge were biased against him fails because his argument is based on

14   his disagreement with the judges’ decisions, which is not grounds for a bias claim.

15   Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost

16   never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”).

17                                           * * *

18

                                               9
1        We have considered Irazu’s remaining arguments and find them to be

2   without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and

3   DENY Irazu’s motion to supplement the record.

4
5                                      FOR THE COURT:
6                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

7

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