Court Opinion

ID: 9794163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:00:39.514072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:35.737951
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, J.*
(dissenting) — Appellants claim they presented genuine issues of material fact as to the existence of a design defect and as to causation. The majority opinion agrees and reverses the summary judgment granted PAC-CAR by the trial court. I dissent on the ground that the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs (Drivers) is insufficient to sustain a finding of a design defect.
As reflected in the majority opinion, air quality consultants were employed by PACCAR and the Drivers. Those consultants could not identify any chemical or group of chemicals or any other source as the probable cause of the Drivers’ physical complaints. The consultants theorized about various possibilities, including low humidity, but none could identify a cause on a more probable than not basis. Despite this failure to identify a cause of the Drivers’ physical problems, the majority opinion holds that the Drivers’ evidence is sufficient to raise substantial issues of material fact on the issues of a product defect and causation.
The experts seem to recognize some degree of a temporal relationship between the physical problems experienced by the Drivers and driving the trucks over long distances, particularly under conditions when the cab is closed and the air heaters are in operation. It is my view that proving no more than some degree of temporal relationship is insufficient to support a finding that a product is defective under the products liability laws of this state.
Dr. Patricia Sparks found no indication of systemic toxicity and, as accurately reported in the majority opinion at page 205, she believed that the exposures detected "were unlikely to produce direct irritant effects or systemic toxicity”. The deposition testimony of Dr. William Daniell, an occupational *219medical specialist in chemical exposure, noted the temporal relationship between the symptoms and work activities and was of the view that the symptoms appeared consistent with irritation by some unidentified airborne chemical substance. In this respect, however, he stated that the temporal association was "suggestive of some possible causative relationship, but the nature of this relationship remains completely unclear.” Dr. Daniell went on to say in respect to the yet-unidentified workplace factor that "I can make no determination as to whether that factor is single or multiple, involves a specific chemical or chemicals, involves nonspecific chemical irritation, involves nonchemical irritation, involves group or individual factors or whatever.”
In the report of Charles McCammon, Ph.D., submitted by the Drivers, he found two known skin irritants in measurable quantities, but stated that "the levels were so low that it was unlikely that they were responsible for the widespread skin problems”. As noted in the majority opinion, he was also of the view that the symptoms experienced by the Drivers appeared to be related to the driving of new Ken-worth trucks. He suggested that accelerating offgassing by baking out the trucks before delivery to the drivers was a possible solution to the problem.
The doctrine of strict liability does not impose legal responsibility simply because a product causes harm. Such a result would embody absolute liability which is not the import of strict liability.
Seattle-First Nat’l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 150, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
Thus, we hold that liability is imposed under section 402A if a product is not reasonably safe. This means that it must be unsafe to an extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer. This evaluation of the product in terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer allows the trier of the fact to take into account the intrinsic nature of the product. The purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably expect the same degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expensive Cadillac. It must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a relative, not an absolute concept.
*220In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In other instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed defect may make other factors relevant to the issue.
Tabert, at 154.
The instruction recommended in WPI 110.02 involving a manufacturer’s duty of safe design includes the elements referred to in Tabert, including "the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk”. It is the requirement that the product be shown to be not reasonably safe for reasons attributable to the design of the product which distinguishes strict liability under our products liability laws from absolute liability. The evidence presented to the trial court by the Drivers in this case went no further than to show a possible relationship between the design of the truck and symptoms experienced by the Drivers. Presenting evidence of a likely temporal relationship, without more, is insufficient.
The majority opinion acknowledges that Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wn. App. 558, 643 P.2d 906, review denied, 97 Wn.2d 1037 (1982) requires reliable and specific expert testimony to establish the nature of the alleged dangerous condition in a products liability case. The majority opinion’s suggestion that Dr. Knights’ testimony met this requirement is unpersuasive. Dr. Knights went no further than to identify airborne chemicals in the truck cabs, each of which registered at levels lower than those identified in regulatory standards as dangerous. Dr. Knights acknowledged that he had no background in medicine or toxicology and was not qualified to offer an opinion as to the cause of the Drivers’ medical conditions. He acknowledged that he had no opinion on a more probable than not basis as to the likely source or cause of the Drivers’ ailments. This testimony falls far short of testimony that could provide reliable guidance to a jury in resolving issues of causation and the reasonable safety of the *221product. None of the experts referred to in the majority opinion were willing to speculate on the identity of the cause of the Drivers’ ailments. Where the experts are unwilling to speculate on the critical issues, a jury should not be allowed to speculate either.
The flaw in the majority’s reasoning in this case is demonstrated by its reliance on Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 66 Wn. App. 644, 833 P.2d 390 (1992), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1031 (1993). Intalco involved claims under the workers’ compensation statutes. It is not a product liability case. The goal of the Industrial Insurance Act is to provide compensation to all covered workers injured in the course of their employment. The act is liberally construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the worker. As Intalco demonstrates, the proof need go no further than to demonstrate a causal relationship between the worker’s illness and conditions encountered in his workplace. If proof sufficient to justify compensation under the Industrial Insurance Act is deemed sufficient to prove a defective product in a products liability case, then proof that the product is defective will have been eliminated. The proof submitted by the Drivers in this case could very well be adequate to support an award of compensation under the Industrial Insurance Act because to show the causal relationship under that act does not require precise identification of air pollutants causing the injury.
The majority opinion does not explain how a jury could assess the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk when there is no evidence before the jury identifying the risk, its source, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating it.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.
Review denied at 126 Wn.2d 1025 (1995).

This opinion was filed after the retirement of Judge Jack P. Scholfield, but it was written by Judge Scholfield prior to his retirement.