Court Opinion

ID: 9942028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:10:28.367585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:35.951854
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Penny Gustafson,                       :
                   Appellant           :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :
American Federation of State, County, :
and Municipal Employees, Council 13; :
American Federation of State, County, :
and Municipal Employees, District      :
Council 83; and American Federation of :
State, County, and Municipal           :   No. 1298 C.D. 2022
Employees, Local 2047                  :   Argued: December 6, 2023

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
            HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
            HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
            HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                      FILED: February 20, 2024

            Penny Gustafson (Appellant) appeals from the Cambria County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) February 10, 2022 order: (1) sustaining the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME),
Council 13’s, AFSCME, District Council 83’s, and AFSCME, Local 2047’s
(collectively, AFSCME) first, second, and third preliminary objections to
Appellant’s Complaint, and dismissing as moot AFSCME’s fourth, fifth, and sixth
preliminary objections to Appellant’s Complaint (collectively, Preliminary
Objections); (2) denying AFSCME’s Motion for Leave to File Brief Nunc Pro Tunc;
and (3) dismissing Appellant’s Complaint with prejudice. Appellant presents one
issue for this Court’s review: whether the trial court erred by sustaining AFSCME’s
first Preliminary Objection in the nature of a demurrer, and dismissing Appellant’s
Complaint where she set forth a legally cognizable cause of action for damages
arising out of AFSCME’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation. After
argument, and upon careful review, this Court reverses and remands to the trial court.
                 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth), Department of
Human Services (DHS), employs Appellant as a residential services aide at
Ebensburg Center. Appellant is in a bargaining unit represented by AFSCME.1
DHS removed Appellant from direct resident care for a period of three weeks while
it investigated her for alleged workplace misconduct. Appellant was not eligible to
work overtime during the period of investigation. Appellant asked AFSCME, Local
2047 to file a grievance on her behalf because of ostensible lost overtime
opportunities during the three-week investigation. AFSCME, Local 2047 filed a
grievance on her behalf; however, without notifying Appellant, AFSCME, Local
2047 settled the grievance, rather than proceeding to arbitration.
                 On September 22, 2021, Appellant filed the Complaint in the trial court,
therein alleging AFSCME’s failure to fairly represent her during a workplace
investigation and subsequent grievance proceeding. Appellant requested that the
trial court: (1) enter judgment against AFSCME; (2) award compensatory and
punitive damages; (3) award costs and fees, including reasonable attorneys’ fees;
and (4) award such other relief as the trial court deems appropriate. Appellant also
demanded a jury trial pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1007.1. On
October 28, 2021, AFSCME filed its Preliminary Objections averring: (I)
demurrer/insufficient specificity and legal insufficiency - claim for damages on duty
of fair representation claim; (II) demurrer/legal insufficiency - claim for punitive

        1
            Appellant was previously a member of AFSCME, but resigned her membership in June
2019.
                                               2
damages improper in a duty of fair representation case; (III) demurrer/legal
insufficiency - claim for attorneys’ fees and costs improper in a duty of fair
representation case; (IV) demurrer/legal insufficiency - request for jury trial
improper in a duty of fair representation case; (V) nonjoinder of a necessary party
(the Commonwealth); and (VI) lack of jurisdiction.2
              On February 10, 2022, the trial court: (1) sustained AFSCME’s first,
second, and third Preliminary Objections, and dismissed as moot AFSCME’s fourth,
fifth, and sixth Preliminary Objections; and (2) dismissed Appellant’s Complaint
with prejudice. Appellant appealed to this Court.3
              Appellant argues that, because the Public Employe Relations Act
(PERA)4 does not govern or limit the relief Appellant may seek for AFSCME’s
breach of its duty of fair representation, she is not constrained to seek arbitration of
a claim that only the union is responsible for mishandling. Appellant contends that
the duty of fair representation in this Commonwealth is based in common law and
does not implicate PERA when only a union’s misconduct is at issue. Specifically,
Appellant asserts that, where, as alleged herein, a union intentionally,

       2
        On November 9, 2021, AFSCME filed an untimely brief. On November 12, 2021,
AFSCME filed a Motion for Leave to File Brief in Support of Preliminary Objections (Motion).
On February 10, 2022, the trial court denied the Motion.
       3
              [This Court’s] review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary
              objections and dismissing a complaint is limited to determining
              whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of
              law. In reviewing preliminary objections, all well[-]pleaded
              relevant and material facts are to be considered as true, and
              preliminary objections shall only be sustained when they are free
              and clear from doubt. Such review raises a question of law; thus,
              our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
Podolak v. Tobyhanna Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 37 A.3d 1283, 1286-87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012)
(citations omitted).
        4
          Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301.

                                                3
discriminatorily, and in bad faith “botches” an employee’s grievance, established
precedent and justice dictate that the union alone must answer for its misconduct in
damages. Appellant Br. at 10. Appellant maintains that to hold otherwise would
allow unions to “run roughshod” over public employees’ rights and prevent those
affected by union wrongdoing from ever obtaining meaningful relief. Id. Further,
Appellant declares that limiting an aggrieved employee’s relief to arbitrating a claim
that her union already mishandled would abrogate the essence of the fiduciary duty
of fair representation the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pronounced in Falsetti v.
Local Union No. 2026, United Mine Workers of America, 161 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1960).
                  AFSCME rejoins that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in
Martino v. Transport Workers’ Union of Philadelphia, Local 234, 480 A.2d 242 (Pa.
1984), is binding precedent that limits Appellant’s remedy to an equitable one
because she has not, by specific facts, pled collusion and/or conspiracy between the
Commonwealth and AFSCME to deprive her of rights under the applicable
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Specifically, AFSCME retorts that, in
Martino, our Supreme Court expressly considered whether the remedy available in
duty of fair representation cases arising under federal labor law should govern for
Commonwealth public-sector workers, and the Martino Court expressly declined to
adopt the private-sector remedial scheme that Appellant has asked this Court to
apply.
                  Initially, in Falsetti,5 our Supreme Court explained:

                  The aggrieved member-employee, limited to seeking
                  relief against the [u]nion, is not without effective remedy.
                  In entering into [a CBA], the [u]nion has assumed the role
                  of trustee for the rights of its members and other
                  employees in the bargaining unit. The employees, on the
                  other hand, have become beneficiaries of fiduciary
                  obligations owed by the [u]nion. As a result, the [u]nion

         5
             Falsetti was decided before PERA was enacted.
                                                 4
               bears a heavy duty of fair representation to all those within
               the shelter of its protection. If the [u]nion, in processing
               an employee’s grievance, does not act in good faith, in
               a reasonable manner[,] and without fraud, it becomes
               liable in damages for breach of duty. In this way, the
               employee is recompensed for the harm [s]he had suffered,
               and yet the process of collective bargaining, in the industry
               is meaningfully preserved.

Id. at 895-96 (emphasis added; citations and footnote omitted).
               The United States (U.S.) Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
an employee who files a duty of fair representation claim against a union is limited
to a remedy of arbitration in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), explicating:

               [The p]etitioners urge that an employee be restricted in
               such circumstances to a decree compelling the employer
               and the union to arbitrate the underlying grievance. It is
               true that the employee’s action is based on the employer’s
               alleged breach of contract plus the union’s alleged
               wrongful failure to afford him his contractual remedy of
               arbitration. For this reason, an order compelling
               arbitration should be viewed as one of the available
               remedies when a breach of the union’s duty is proved.
               But we see no reason inflexibly to require arbitration in
               all cases. In some cases, for example, at least part of the
               employee’s damages may be attributable to the union’s
               breach of duty, and an arbitrator may have no power
               under the bargaining agreement to award such damages
               against the union. In other cases, the arbitrable issues
               may be substantially resolved in the course of trying the
               fair representation controversy. In such situations, the
               court should be free to decide the contractual claim
               and to award the employee appropriate damages or
               equitable relief.
Id. at 196 (bold and italic emphasis added; footnote omitted).6

      6
          The Vaca Court further explained:
               A more difficult question is, what portion of the employee’s
               damages may be charged to the union[;] in particular, may an award
               against a union include . . . damages attributable solely to the

                                               5
               Our Supreme Court reaffirmed Falssetti in Ziccardi v. Department of
General Services, 456 A.2d 979 (Pa. 1982), therein expounding:

               The Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that an employee
               may file an unfair labor practice against its bargaining
               agent is erroneous. The union’s refusal to submit a
               grievance to arbitration does not fall under any of the
               categories of unfair labor practices enumerated in
               Section 1201(b) of PERA[, 43 P.S. § 1101.1201(b)]. See
               also Falsetti. . . . In Falsetti[,] th[e Pennsylvania
               Supreme] Court held that a public employee’s remedy for
               his bargaining agent’s refusal to submit a grievance to
               arbitration is an action against the union for damages for
               breach of its duty of fair representation.
               Under Falsetti, a member of a bargaining unit has a
               right to sue his union for failure to proceed to
               arbitration when the complaint alleges bad faith. Of
               course, the union, like any fiduciary, must be given broad
               discretion in determining whether to pursue the remedy.

               employer’s breach of contract? We think not. Though the union
               has violated a statutory duty in failing to press the grievance, it
               is the employer’s unrelated breach of contract which triggered
               the controversy and which caused this portion of the employee’s
               damages. The employee should have no difficulty recovering these
               damages from the employer, who cannot, as we have explained, hide
               behind the union’s wrongful failure to act; in fact, the employer may
               be (and probably should be) joined as a defendant in the fair
               representation suit[.] . . . It could be a real hardship on the union to
               pay these damages, even if the union [was] given a right of
               indemnification against the employer. With the employee assured
               of direct recovery from the employer, we see no merit in requiring
               the union to pay the employer’s share of the damages.
               The governing principle, then, is to apportion liability between the
               employer and the union according to the damage caused by the fault
               of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the employer’s breach
               of contract should not be charged to the union, but increases if any
               in those damages caused by the union’s refusal to process the
               grievance should not be charged to the employer.
Id. at 196-98 (emphasis added; citation and footnote omitted).

                                                  6
              Falsetti . . . . Furthermore, the issue of just cause does not
              determine liability for this breach. Whether there was just
              cause becomes relevant on the issue of damages, only after
              bad faith has been shown. For these reasons, the
              Commonwealth Court’s [O]rder sustaining preliminary
              objections as to the action against the union must be
              vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings
              consistent with this [O]pinion.

Ziccardi, 456 A.2d at 980-81 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
              Notwithstanding the above, AFSCME maintains that Martino supports
its position that the only permitted remedy herein is arbitration. While at first blush
Martino may appear to support AFSCME’s position, a thorough reading of that
Opinion instructs otherwise. Specifically, in Martino,

              [t]he sole question for our [Supreme Court’s]
              consideration [wa]s whether a public employee is totally
              precluded from obtaining any relief directly or indirectly,
              involving his public employer, for discharge in arguable
              breach of a [CBA] when the union has violated its duty of
              fair representation by failing in bad faith to pursue his
              grievance to impartial arbitration.
Id. at 243 (emphasis added). The Martino Court held:
              [B]efore a court in equity may entertain a complaint
              seeking to order arbitration, the complainant must prove
              that the union acted in bad faith towards its member. Once
              it has been determined that the union breached its duty of
              fair representation, the [c]ourt of [c]ommon [p]leas sitting
              in equity ma[]y order the completion of the arbitration
              procedure and, in cases governed by state labor law[,]
              its power is limited to that remedy.[7]

Id. at 252 (emphasis added).

       7
         This Court acknowledges that, although the Martino Court disapproved of Falsetti, it did
not overrule Falsetti, and it left Ziccardi intact.

                                               7
However, the Martino Court explained:

Our legislature mandates []:
   In all cases where a remedy is provided or a duty
   is enjoined or anything is directed to be done by
   any statute, the directions of the statute shall be
   strictly pursued, and no penalty shall be inflicted,
   or anything done agreeably to the common law, in
   such cases, further than shall be necessary for
   carrying such statute into effect.
[Section 1504 of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972,]
1 Pa.C.S. § 1504. Our holding that the chancellor lacks
authority to resolve the underlying grievance is consistent
with that statutory provision and the strong policy favoring
arbitration of public sector grievances embodied in
Section 903 of PERA[, 43 P.S. § 1101.903]. Moreover,
our holding that the chancellor may, if the employee
establishes the union’s breach of its duty of fair
representation, order arbitration of the underlying
grievance nunc pro tunc provides the employee with a
complete and adequate legal remedy.[FN]14 See D. Feller,
A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 61 Cal.L.Rev. 663, 813 (1976).[FN]15
   [FN]14
        Unlike Ziccardi, Martino’s complaint against
   the union and [Southeastern Pennsylvania
   Transportation Authority] seeks an order directing
   the union to undertake its duty to represent him
   and to initiate arbitration proceedings nunc pro
   tunc.
   [FN]15
         The [U.S. Supreme C]ourt in Vaca assigned
   two reasons for the proposition that the court could
   reach the underlying grievance in actions based on
   the union’s breach of its duty of fair
   representation. First, the [Vaca] Court stated that
   “[i]n some cases at least part of the employee’s
   damages may be attributable to the union’s breach
   of duty, and an arbitrator may have no power
   under the bargaining agreement to award such
   damages against the union.” 386 U.S. at
   196 . . . . However, “it is perfectly possible, and
   indeed desirable, to couple an order directing the

                               8
                 union to process the grievance with an order
                 imposing liability on the union for any additional
                 damages suffered by the employee if it should be
                 found in arbitration that the grievance was
                 justified, without jumping to the conclusion that,
                 in order to do so, the court must itself decide the
                 merits of the grievance.” Feller, supra, 61
                 Cal.L.Rev. at 814.
                 The Vaca [C]ourt’s second reason for not limiting
                 the remedy to an order to process the grievance
                 was that “the arbitrable issues may be substantially
                 resolved in the course of trying the fair
                 representation controversy . . . .” 386 U.S. at
                 196[.] . . . It does not follow, however, that the
                 court should proceed to decide the merits.
                    [T]here are differences in the quality of
                    judgment and the standards to be applied in
                    arbitration as compared with the judicial
                    forum . . . and considerable differences . . . in
                    the remedies available . . . .
                 Feller, supra, at 815.

Martino, 480 A.2d at 251-52 (emphasis added).
             Here, Appellant avers that AFSCME discriminated against her for not
being a union member. Appellant is not seeking an order directing the union to
undertake its duty to represent her and/or to initiate arbitration proceedings nunc pro
tunc on her behalf. Further, Appellant is not asking the court to decide the merits of
her grievance. Moreover, Appellant is not alleging wrongdoing on her employer’s
part. Rather, Appellant’s sole claim is that AFSCME failed to fairly represent her
during a workplace investigation and subsequent grievance proceeding.
             In her Complaint, wherein “all well[-]pleaded relevant and material
facts are to be considered as true,” Podolak v. Tobyhanna Twp. Bd. of Supervisors,
37 A.3d 1283, 1287 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), Appellant alleged:

             47. [Appellant] asked [AFSCME, Local 2047 shop
             steward Doug Myers (]Myers[)] to explain the resolution
                                           9
             of [her] grievance and the reason for the delay in
             delivering it to her. She asked Myers, “How can this be?”
             In response, Myers grinned and said, “You’re right, it
             can’t be,” and walked away.
             48. On information and belief, Myers purposely delayed
             delivering [Appellant] the grievance resolution letter.
             49. On or about July 7, 2020, [Appellant] called to discuss
             the handling of her grievance with Dominic Sgro, Director
             of [AFSCME,] District Council 83 [(Sgro)].
             50. Sgro told [Appellant] that he was not familiar with her
             situation because he “deals with hundreds of people,” but
             stated that he would look into it.
             51. On the July 7, 2020 phone call, Sgro called
             [Appellant] a “free rider” when he learned that she was
             not a member of AFSCME.
             52. Over three months later, on or about October 15, 2020,
             [Appellant] finally reached Sgro again by phone via
             conference call, within hearing of witnesses.
             53. In the October 15, 2020 phone call, Sgro told
             [Appellant] that she is “sponging” off the union and its
             members and that he “knows what happened” and that
             [Appellant] got “minimal” or “limited” representation
             because she is a “freeloader.”

Reproduced Record at 12a (emphasis added). Clearly, Appellant is seeking damages
for AFSCME’s breach of its fair representation duty because she was not a union
member. Such a claim is not an unfair labor practice under PERA. See Ziccardi.
Accordingly, because it is not “free and clear from doubt[,]” that Appellant cannot
proceed on a claim for damages on her duty of fair representation claim, the trial
court erred by sustaining AFSCME’s first Preliminary Objection and dismissing the
Complaint. Podolak, 37 A.3d at 1287.
             For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order sustaining the first
Preliminary Objection is reversed, the Complaint is reinstated, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including reconsideration of the
                                         10
second and third Preliminary Objections, and consideration of the remaining
Preliminary Objections consistent with this Opinion.

                                       _________________________________
                                       ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this matter.

                                         11
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Penny Gustafson,                       :
                   Appellant           :
                                       :
            v.                         :
                                       :
American Federation of State, County, :
and Municipal Employees, Council 13; :
American Federation of State, County, :
and Municipal Employees, District      :
Council 83; and American Federation of :
State, County, and Municipal           :      No. 1298 C.D. 2022
Employees, Local 2047                  :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 20th day of February, 2024, the Cambria County
Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) February 10, 2022 order sustaining the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees’ (AFSCME), Council 13’s,
AFSCME, District Council 83’s, and AFSCME, Local 2047’s first Preliminary
Objection is REVERSED. The Complaint is REINSTATED, and the matter is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this
Opinion.
            Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                         _________________________________
                                         ANNE E. COVEY, Judge