Court Opinion

ID: 9637529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:09:14.062037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:57.254754
License: Public Domain

*283BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached by the majority, but wish to comment further upon appellee’s claim that she was entitled to delay damages under Pa.R.C.P. 238. Although I agree with the majority that Rule 238 does not apply to an action for malicious prosecution, I believe that conclusion requires some explanation. As noted by the majority, damages for malicious prosecution “may include compensation for mental anguish, humiliation, and injury to feelings.” Shelton v. Evans, 292 Pa.Super. 228, 233, 437 A.2d 18, 21 (1981). Instantly, appellant sought damages for such injuries. Certainly a broad construction of the terms “bodily injury” could encompass these types of injuries. The question, however, is whether we should construe the term so broadly. For the reasons that follow, I conclude that we should not do so.
The primary purpose of Rule 238 is to encourage pre-trial settlement of civil actions for bodily injury, death or property damages in order to alleviate the judicial congestion and delay caused by these types of actions. Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 436 A.2d 147 (1981). I believe that the number of malicious prosecution actions is so small relative to the number of actions for bodily injury (of a less broadly defined type), death, or property damage that I do not believe they contribute significantly to judicial congestion and delay. Also, I believe the difficulty in computing the proper amount of compensation for the type of injuries involved instantly tends to make pre-trial settlement so difficult that it would make the encouragement of Rule 238 of little value. Therefore, I would decline to construe the term “bodily injury” to encompass those injuries for which recovery is sought in a malicious prosecution action and agree with the majority that the trial court properly held that Rule 238 was inapplicable.1

. Cf. Miller v. Carnation Co., 39 Colo.App. 1, 564 P.2d 127 (1977). In that case, the court construed the term "personal injuries" in the Colorado statute providing for delay damages, Col.Stat.Ann.1973 *284§ 13-21-101, as meaning those injuries which impair well-being or the mental or physical health of the victim.