Court Opinion

ID: 9915757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 15:05:28.83086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:19.635208
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-871

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                              DAVID F. PACKARD.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       On September 15, 2003, the defendant, who was represented

 by counsel, pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle under

 the influence of alcohol, in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1)

 (a) (1).    He was sentenced to a period of probation, he was

 ordered to attend an alcohol education program, and his license

 was suspended for forty-five days.           In addition, the defendant

 asserts that he lost his commercial driver's license (CDL) as a

 consequence of the plea.        In 2004, the defendant admitted to

 violating the terms of his probation, and he was sentenced to

 serve thirty days in the house of correction.             Approximately

 eighteen years later, in 2022, the defendant moved to vacate his

 guilty plea, seeking a new trial.           It is the denial of that

 motion that is before us now.
     The defendant moved to vacate his plea on two grounds.

First, he argued that he was not advised of his right to a jury

or of his right to confront witnesses.   Second, he argued that

he was not advised by plea counsel that his plea would affect

his CDL, and therefore did not receive effective assistance of

counsel.   These two arguments were based on the factual

assertions contained in the defendant's affidavit.   Notably, the

defendant did not supply a transcript of the plea colloquy or

the "tender of plea or admission waiver of rights" form (green

sheet) that he, defense counsel, and the judge signed at the

time of the plea.

     On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge abused his

discretion by denying his motion to vacate plea, essentially

repeating the arguments he pressed below.    "A motion to withdraw

a guilty plea is treated as a motion for a new trial [pursuant

to] Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501

(2001)."   Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009).

"When, as here, the motion judge did not preside [at the plea

hearing], . . . we regard ourselves in as good a position as the

motion judge to assess the [plea] record."   Commonwealth v.

Petetabella, 459 Mass. 177, 181 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v.

Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).

     As an initial matter, we note that the presumption of

regularity applies; the transcript of the defendant's plea

                                 2
hearing is apparently unavailable given the passage of time, 1 and

the unexplained delay in bringing the appeal is directly

attributable to the defendant.   See Commonwealth v. Cartagena,

466 Mass. 1021, 1022 (2013); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 426 Mass.

657, 661-662 (1998).   In these circumstances, "if the challenge

is to advance at all, [it] must be accompanied by sufficient

credible and reliable evidence to rebut a presumption that the

prior conviction was valid."   Lopez, supra at 665.   Overcoming

the presumption requires proof "above and beyond . . . reliance

upon the mere nonexistence of a transcript of the plea

proceedings."   Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 50

(1997).

     The judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that

the defendant failed to meet that burden here.   To begin with,

the defendant does not deny that he signed the following

acknowledgement of waiver of rights at the time of the plea:

          "I, the undersigned defendant, understand and
     acknowledge that I am voluntarily giving up the right to be
     tried by a jury or a judge without a jury on these charges.

          I have discussed my constitutional and other rights
     with my attorney. I understand that the jury would consist
     of six jurors chosen at random from the community, and that
     I could participate in selecting those jurors, who would
     determine unanimously whether I was guilty or not guilty.
     I understand that by entering my plea of guilty or
     admission, I will also be giving up my right to confront,
     cross-examine, and compel attendance of witnesses . . . ."

1 The defendant states that the transcript is unavailable, an
assertion we accept for purposes of this appeal.

                                 3
Nor does the defendant challenge plea counsel's attestation

(also contained in the green sheet) that he explained "the

defendant's waiver of jury trial and other rights so as to

enable the defendant to tender his [] plea of guilty or

admission knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily."    Likewise,

the green sheet contained a signed certification by the plea

judge that the defendant was advised of his rights during the

plea colloquy, and knowingly and voluntarily waived them.

Moreover, the defendant offers no explanation for the

inconsistencies between the assertions in his 2022 affidavit and

those in the green sheet executed contemporaneously with the

plea.   The failure to explain those discrepancies, combined with

the natural inference to be drawn from the fact that the

defendant waited many years before seeking to withdraw his plea

even though he had long known about the plea's consequences for

his CDL, certainly undercut the credibility of the defendant's

affidavit.    In short, we see no error in the judge's conclusion

that the defendant failed to overcome the presumption of

regularity.   Cf. Commonwealth v. Tokarev, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 819,

821-822 (2015).

     What remains is the defendant's argument that plea counsel

was ineffective for failing to advise him that the plea would

affect his CDL.   But, except for the obligation to advise about

                                  4
potential immigration consequences, there is no general duty to

advise a client of all possible collateral consequences flowing

from a plea.    See Commonwealth v. Henry, 488 Mass. 484, 497

(2021).    As a result, even accepting the defendant's assertion

that plea counsel did not advise him that the plea would affect

his CDL, he failed to establish that counsel's performance fell

"measurably below that which might be expected from an

ordinarily fallible lawyer" and "likely deprived the defendant

of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defence."

Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).

                                      Order dated July 15, 2022,
                                        denying motion to vacate
                                        guilty plea affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                        Neyman & Shin, JJ. 2),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    January 8, 2024.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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