Court Opinion

ID: 9960513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 15:01:33.382979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:32.813315
License: Public Domain

(Slip Opinion)              OCTOBER TERM, 2023                                       1

                                       Syllabus

         NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
       being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
       The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
       prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
       See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                       Syllabus

        RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF
                  VETERANS AFFAIRS

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
                THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

    No. 22–888.      Argued November 8, 2023—Decided April 16, 2024
Since World War II, the Federal Government has provided educational
  assistance to servicemembers with qualifying service through various
  GI bills. Typically, GI bills provide 36 months of educational benefits
  each up to a cap of 48 months in cases where servicemembers become
  eligible for benefits under more than one GI bill. See 38 U. S. C.
  §3695(a). This case concerns two GI bills with overlapping service pe-
  riods—the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984 (covering service between
  1985 and 2030) and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act
  of 2008 (covering service on or after September 11, 2001).
     Petitioner James Rudisill enlisted in the United States Army in
  2000 and served a total of eight years over three separate periods of
  military service. He became entitled to Montgomery Bill benefits as a
  result of his first period of service. Rudisill earned an undergraduate
  degree and used 25 months and 14 days of Montgomery benefits to
  finance his education. Through his subsequent periods of service,
  Rudisill also became entitled to more generous educational benefits
  under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Rudisill sought to use his Post-9/11 bene-
  fits to finance a graduate degree. Rudisill understood that such bene-
  fits would be limited to 22 months and 16 days under §3695’s 48-month
  aggregate-benefits cap. But the Government informed Rudisill that
  he was only eligible for 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits
  (the length of his unused Montgomery benefits) due to §3327, a provi-
  sion in the Post-9/11 Bill designed to coordinate benefits for those ser-
  vicemembers meeting the criteria for both Montgomery benefits and
  Post-9/11 benefits. Section 3327 provides that a servicemember meet-
  ing the criteria for both GI bills can elect to swap Montgomery benefits
  for the more generous Post-9/11 benefits, up to a total of 36 months of
2                     RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                                 Syllabus

    benefits. §3327(d)(2)(A). Ultimately, the Federal Circuit, sitting en
    banc, sided with the Government, explaining that when Rudisill
    sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “election” under
    §3327(a)(1) to swap his Montgomery benefits for Post 9/11 benefits,
    making his benefits subject to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month limit.
Held: Servicemembers who, through separate periods of service, accrue
 educational benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI
 Bills may use either one, in any order, up to §3695(a)’s 48-month ag-
 gregate-benefits cap. Pp. 8–18.
    (a) The Government claims that someone in Rudisill’s position is
 subject to §3322(d)’s mandatory coordination clause, so, to receive any
 Post-9/11 benefits, he must make an election under §3327(a), which in
 turn subjects him to §3327(d)(2)’s 36-month benefit limit. Rudisill
 counters that §3322(d) does not apply to him because he has earned
 two separate entitlements to benefits. Rudisill further maintains that
 §3327(a)’s election mechanism is optional in any event, and that he
 does not forfeit any entitlement by declining to make a §3327(a) elec-
 tion.
    The statutory text resolves this case in Rudisill’s favor. Rudisill
 earned two separate entitlements to educational benefits, one per the
 Montgomery GI Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving
 in the military for nearly eight years over three separate periods. Fo-
 cusing on these two separate benefits entitlements—rather than on
 his periods of service—leads to two relevant observations about the
 statute. First, the statute establishes a baseline rule that, absent
 some other limitation, the VA “shall pay” a veteran’s benefits.
 §§3014(a), 3313(a). Second, Congress has plainly delineated certain
 durational limits on these benefits entitlements; i.e., each program en-
 titles the recipient to up to 36 months of benefits, and both are subject
 to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-benefits cap. §§3013(a)(1), 3312(a).
 Rudisill is thus separately entitled to each of two educational benefits,
 and absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily obligated to pay him
 48 months of benefits. Pp. 8–10.
    (b) Section 3322(d), which creates a mechanism for certain service-
 members to “coordinate” their benefits, does not limit Rudisill’s enti-
 tlement. First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any veteran
 to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive benefits. Section
 3322(d) does not mention the receipt of benefits but addresses instead
 the “coordination of entitlement.” Because Rudisill is already entitled
 to two separate benefits, he has no need to coordinate any entitlement
 under §3327. As used in the statute, the word “coordination” denotes
 a swap. Section 3327, to which §3322(d) points, describes coordination
 as making an election that permits the individual to get Post-9/11 ben-
 efits “instead of” Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1).
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                         3

                                Syllabus

   There are two additional clues that §3322(d) does not address a vet-
eran who just wants to use one of his two separate entitlements. First,
§3322—titled “Bar to duplication” of benefits—does not speak to some-
one who has earned each benefit separately and is asking to receive
each benefit separately. Second, §3322(d) applies to individuals with
Montgomery entitlements “as of August 1, 2009,” the effective date of
the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Before that date, individuals could have been
accruing Post-9/11 benefits (ever since September 11, 2001) but would
have had no way to opt into a benefits program that was not enacted
until 2008. The swap Congress devised in §3327 gives such individuals
a mechanism for accessing these benefits. Pp. 10–13.
   (c) The contention that Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits
by invoking §3327 is contradicted by that provision’s text. Pp. 13–18.
      (1) To start, an election under §3327(a) is optional, i.e., an individ-
ual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefits. And a decision not to
make a §3327(a) election does not purport to alter one’s entitlement.
To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefits only by making
a §3327(a) election is to misread §3322(a) as imposing a substantive
requirement to elect benefits via §3327(a). The two elections are dif-
ferent. While §3322(a) requires Rudisill to elect which benefit to re-
ceive at any particular time, it does not follow that he must also make
an election under §3327(a) to swap out his benefits. And it is notewor-
thy that §3322(a) does not mention, much less cross-reference, either
§3322(d) or §3327. Other parts of the statute confirm that not all elec-
tions are the same. Compare §3322(a) with §3322(h); §3327(a) with
§3327(c)(1). In the context of a statute that establishes multiple dis-
tinct elections, attempts to equate a §3322(a) election with a §3327(a)
election are unpersuasive. Pp. 13–15.
      (2) The plain text of §3327(d) makes clear that §3327(d)—which
details the consequences of making an election under §3327(a)—does
not limit a servicemember in Rudisill’s situation. One such conse-
quence is that a §3327 election entitles an individual to Post-9/11 ben-
efits instead of basic Montgomery benefits. But Rudisill was entitled
to both benefits, and he had no need to swap one set of benefits for
another. A second consequence of a §3327 election is that “the number
of months of [Post-9/11 benefits] shall be . . . the number of months of
unused [Montgomery benefits], as of the date of the election.”
§3327(d)(2)(A). Like subsection (d)(1), this provision only relates to an
individual making a §3327(a) election. This makes perfect sense under
Rudisill’s reading of the statute, but would be nonsensical under the
Government’s view, as it would impose an exhaust-or-forfeit require-
ment for veterans with two separate entitlements. The more sensible
view is that §3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one’s entitlement
through the swapping mechanism §3327 creates. Pp. 16–18.
4                     RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                                Syllabus

55 F. 4th 879, reversed and remanded.

   JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ.,
joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which BARRETT, J.,
joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.
                        Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                              1

                             Opinion of the Court

     NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
     United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
     Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543,
     pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                                   _________________

                                   No. 22–888
                                   _________________

    JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENIS R.
     MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
                    AFFAIRS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
                                 [April 16, 2024]

  JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Petitioner James Rudisill first enlisted in the United
States Army in the year 2000. Over the next decade, he
reenlisted twice, serving a total of eight years on active
duty. As a result of his first period of military service,
Rudisill was entitled to 36 months of educational benefits
under the Montgomery GI Bill, to be paid by the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs (VA). Rudisill’s subsequent peri-
ods of service separately entitled him to 36 months of edu-
cational benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. Both of
Rudisill’s entitlements were subject to a 48-month aggre-
gate-benefits cap.
  Rudisill used 25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery
benefits to help fund his undergraduate degree. Then, after
serving his third tour of duty, Rudisill sought to use his
Post-9/11 benefits to attend divinity school.
  The VA informed Rudisill that his Post-9/11 benefits were
limited to the duration of his unused Montgomery benefits,
pursuant to a provision of the Post-9/11 GI Bill, 38 U. S. C.
§3327(d)(2). In other words, according to the VA, by re-
questing Post-9/11 benefits before exhausting all of his
2                    RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                         Opinion of the Court

Montgomery benefits, Rudisill could receive only 36 months
of benefits in total, not the 48 months to which he would
otherwise be entitled.
   The question before us is whether Rudisill can access his
Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without being subject to
§3327(d)(2)’s durational limit. We hold that he can. Be-
cause he simply seeks to use one of his two separate enti-
tlements, §3327(d)(2) does not apply.
                               I
                               A
   “The United States has a proud history of offering educa-
tional assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated
by the many ‘G. I. Bills’ enacted since World War II.” Post-
9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, §5002(3),
122 Stat. 2358, 38 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. GI bills honor the
sacrifices of those who have served in the military, and as
such, “ha[ve] a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed
Forces.” Ibid. These education benefits have also helped to
“reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to
civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United
States economy.” Ibid.
   In the more than 75 years since Congress passed the first
GI Bill in response to World War II, it has enacted addi-
tional GI bills, most of which share two relevant features.
First, an individual with the requisite period of military
service becomes “entitled to” educational benefits, typically
in the form of a stipend or tuition payments, which the VA
is then required to provide once the veteran enrolls in an
eligible education program. Servicemen’s Readjustment
Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 288, 289; see also, e.g., Veterans’ Re-
adjustment Assistance Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 664–666; Vet-
erans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 13, 15.
Second, with one brief exception,1 GI bills from the Korean

——————
 1 Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 14.
                    Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                  3

                        Opinion of the Court

War onward have provided education benefits to fully qual-
ified servicemembers for a fixed duration: 36 months of ben-
efits per GI bill, up to a total of 48 months of benefits for
those servicemembers who become eligible for educational
benefits under multiple GI bills. See 66 Stat. 665; 82 Stat.
1331; 90 Stat. 2396.2
   This case relates to the overlap between two recent GI
bills. The first is the Montgomery GI Bill Act of 1984, 38
U. S. C. §3001 et seq. The Montgomery GI Bill provides
“[b]asic educational assistance” to servicemembers who
first enter active duty between 1985 and 2030. §3011(a).
Montgomery benefits give veterans a “basic educational as-
sistance allowance” that “help[s] meet, in part, the expenses
of such individual’s subsistence, tuition, fees, supplies,
books, equipment, and other educational costs.” §3014(a);
see also §3015 (setting forth amount of assistance). This
limited stipend ordinarily does not pay the full costs of a
veteran’s education.
   As with other GI bills, the Montgomery GI Bill consists of
a detailed series of statutory provisions that include an en-
titlement and also durational limits. To be “entitled to basic
educational assistance” under the Montgomery benefits
program, a servicemember must satisfy certain military
service requirements—typically two or three years of con-
tinuous active duty. §3011(a). The servicemember is then
“entitled to 36 months” of Montgomery benefits.
§§3013(a)(1), (c)(1). An eligible servicemember “may make
an election not to receive [Montgomery benefits],”
§3011(c)(1) (emphasis added), but unless he opts out, he
contributes $1,200 into the program, usually through a se-
ries of pay reductions. §§3011(b)(1)–(2). The Montgomery
Bill’s 36-month entitlement is also “[s]ubject to section

——————
  2 Congress has amended this provision over the years, but the statu-

tory language has remained largely the same, and the 48-month aggre-
gate cap has not varied. 38 U. S. C. §3695(a).
4                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

3695,” §3013(a)(1), a provision that predates Montgomery
and limits “[t]he aggregate period for which any person may
receive assistance under two or more [GI bills]” to 48
months, §3695(a).
   The second GI bill at issue in this case is the Post-9/11
Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008, 122 Stat.
2357, 38 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. When it enacted this bill,
Congress expressly recognized that “[s]ervice on active duty
in the Armed Forces has been especially arduous . . . since
September 11, 2001,” and that the Montgomery GI Bill’s
modest educational benefits, which were “designed for
peacetime service,” had become “outmoded.” §§5002(2), (4),
122 Stat. 2358. Therefore, the Post-9/11 GI Bill gives ser-
vicemembers “enhanced educational assistance benefits”
that “are commensurate with the educational assistance
benefits provided by a grateful Nation to veterans of World
War II.” §5002(6), ibid. A servicemember entitled to Post-
9/11 benefits ordinarily receives the actual net cost of in-
state tuition, additional public-private cost sharing to cover
the cost at private institutions, a monthly housing stipend,
a lump sum for books and supplies, and additional amounts
for other specified expenses. 38 U. S. C. §§3313(c), 3315–
3318.
   As with the Montgomery GI Bill, the Post-9/11 GI Bill es-
tablishes an entitlement and also prescribes durational lim-
its. To be entitled to Post-9/11 benefits, servicemembers
must typically serve on active duty in the Armed Forces for
at least three years starting on or after September 11, 2001.
§3311(b). “[A]n individual entitled to educational assis-
tance under [the Post-9/11 GI Bill] is entitled to . . . 36
months” of enhanced educational benefits. §3312(a). And
as with Montgomery benefits, this entitlement is “[s]ubject
to section 3695,” ibid., meaning that a servicemember’s ag-
gregate benefits from the Post-9/11 GI Bill and other GI
bills are capped at 48 months, see §3695(a).
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)              5

                      Opinion of the Court

   Because the Montgomery and Post-9/11 bills cover over-
lapping service periods, eligibility for benefits under these
two bills overlaps as well. Consequently, the Post-9/11 GI
Bill contains a provision titled “[b]ar to duplication of edu-
cational assistance benefits.” §3322. This bar clarifies that
an individual with entitlements to both Montgomery and
Post-9/11 benefits “may not receive assistance under two or
more such programs concurrently, but shall elect . . . under
which chapter or provisions to receive educational assis-
tance.” §3322(a). A later enacted provision further ensures
that an individual may not receive double credit for a single
period of service; rather, he “shall elect . . . under which au-
thority such service is to be credited.” §3322(h)(1).
   Thus, to summarize: Per §3322, servicemembers who are
eligible for educational benefits under either the Montgom-
ery GI Bill or the Post-9/11 GI Bill—from a period of service
that could qualify for either program—can opt to credit that
service toward one educational benefits program or the
other. If servicemembers serve for long enough, they may
be entitled to both. But such servicemembers cannot re-
ceive disbursements from both entitlement programs at the
same time, nor may they receive any combination of bene-
fits for longer than 48 months. Outside of those limitations,
their service “entitle[s]” them to the benefits that they have
earned, and the VA “shall pay” them these benefits.
§§3011(a), 3014(a), 3311(a), 3313(a).
                               B
  When it enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill, Congress ad-
dressed one immediate problem that arose due to the lag
time between the start of the Post-9/11 GI Bill’s entitlement
period and the bill’s effective date. The case before us con-
cerns the scope of that solution.
  As we have explained, the Post-9/11 GI Bill created an
educational benefits entitlement for veterans who serve on
or after September 11, 2001. But the legislation granting
6                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

that entitlement was not passed until 2008 and did not take
effect until August 1, 2009. See 122 Stat. 2378. Thus, ser-
vicemembers who were entitled to Post-9/11 benefits but
had been funneled through the Montgomery program until
the Post-9/11 GI Bill went into effect needed a way to access
the more generous Post-9/11 benefits program.
   Section 3322(d) informs these servicemembers that “coor-
dination of entitlement to educational assistance under [the
Post-9/11 GI Bill], on the one hand, and [the Montgomery
GI Bill] on the other, shall be governed by [§3327].” Then,
under §3327, an individual who meets the criteria for Mont-
gomery benefits and Post-9/11 benefits based on the same
(overlapping) period of service can elect to exchange the
Montgomery benefits he has received for the Post-9/11 ben-
efits that he wants. Section 3327(a) states that “[a]n indi-
vidual may elect to receive educational assistance under
[the Post-9/11 GI Bill]” if they meet two criteria. First, they
must fall into one of six categories “as of August 1, 2009,”
including, as relevant here, individuals who are “entitled to
[Montgomery benefits].” §§3327(a)(1)(A), (C). Second, they
must “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to [Post-9/11
benefits]” “as of the date of the” §3327(a) election.
§3327(a)(2).
   Making a §3327(a) election effects a swap by operation of
§3327(d): “[A]n individual making an election under
[§3327(a)] shall be entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits], instead
of [Montgomery benefits].” §3327(d)(1). And, notably, the
statute further clarifies that, if the individual has already
used some Montgomery benefits when he makes that swap,
the new entitlement is not a full 36 months of Post-9/11 ben-
efits. Instead, his new entitlement capped at “the number
of months of unused entitlement . . . under [the Montgom-
ery GI Bill], as of the date of the election.” §3327(d)(2)(A).
Once a servicemember elects to swap his Montgomery ben-
efits entitlement for a Post-9/11 benefits entitlement, that
“election . . . is irrevocable.” §3327(i).
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                     7

                          Opinion of the Court

                               II
   Petitioner James Rudisill spent nearly eight years on ac-
tive duty in the U. S. Army, providing three distinct periods
of military service.3 He was deployed to Iraq and Afghani-
stan, experienced combat, and sustained multiple injuries.
He reached the rank of captain and earned several medals
and commendations, including a Bronze Star. After each
period of service, Rudisill received an honorable discharge.
   In between his second and third periods of military ser-
vice, Rudisill earned an undergraduate degree. To help fi-
nance this education, he used 25 months and 14 days of the
Montgomery benefits he was entitled to receive due to his
first period of service. After graduating in 2007, he reen-
rolled in the Army for a third period. By 2015, Rudisill suc-
cessfully sought admission to Yale Divinity School; he in-
tended to earn and use that degree to become a chaplain in
the Army.
   To fund his graduate school education, Rudisill applied to
the VA for Post-9/11 benefits, relying on the entitlement
that he had earned with respect to his second and third pe-
riods of service. But the VA issued a certificate of eligibility
stating that Rudisill was only eligible for 10 months and 16
days of Post-9/11 benefits—the length of his unused Mont-
gomery benefits. This response did not accord with
Rudisill’s understanding of the scope of his entitlement: In
his view, he had earned an entitlement to 36 months of
Post-9/11 benefits based on his second and third periods of
service, and he could use 22 months and 16 days of that
Post-9/11 entitlement due to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-
benefits cap. Rudisill filed a notice of disagreement with
the VA, which eventually denied his claim for the additional
entitlement.
——————
  3 Rudisill’s first period of service was from January 2000 to June 2002;

his second and third periods of service were from June 2004 to December
2005, and November 2007 to August 2011, respectively.
8                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

   The Board of Veterans’ Appeals affirmed the VA’s deci-
sion, but the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims re-
versed. It reasoned that although the statutory scheme was
ambiguous, the statutory structure, regulatory framework,
congressional purpose, and pro-veteran canon supported
Rudisill’s interpretation of the statute. BO v. Wilkie, 31
Vet. App. 321 (2019).
   Over a dissent, a panel of the Federal Circuit agreed,
holding that veterans with multiple periods of qualifying
service are not subject to §3327(d)(2). 4 F. 4th 1297 (2021).
The en banc Federal Circuit then considered the matter,
and, overruling the panel in a 10-to-2 decision, it reversed.
55 F. 4th 879 (2022). It explained that, when Rudisill
sought to use his Post-9/11 benefits, he had made an “elec-
tion” under §3327(a)(1), making his benefits subject to
§3327(d)(2)’s limit.
   We granted certiorari and now reverse the judgment of
the Federal Circuit. 599 U. S. ___ (2023).
                              III
  The question before us is this: When servicemembers
have separate entitlements to both Montgomery and Post-
9/11 benefits, can they use their benefits, in any order, up
to §3695’s aggregate 48-month cap? In the Government’s
telling, a veteran in this position is subject to §3322(d)’s
mandatory coordination clause; to receive any Post-9/11
benefits, he must make an election under §3327(a), which
subjects him to §3327(d)(2). By contrast, Rudisill argues
that he already has two separate entitlements to benefits—
36 months under each program—so §3322(d) does not apply
to him. And, even if it did, Rudisill says, §3327(a)’s election
mechanism is optional, and he does not forfeit any entitle-
ment by declining to make a §3327(a) election.
  As explained below, the pertinent statutory text resolves
this dispute in Rudisill’s favor. Section 3327(d)(2)’s limit
applies only to an individual who makes a §3327(a) election.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            9

                      Opinion of the Court

But Rudisill never made an election under §3327(a), nor
must he have done so, because §3327 is triggered only if a
servicemember is “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement per
§3322(d). Someone in Rudisill’s situation—who just uses
one of his two entitlements—is not coordinating anything.
This view is further reinforced by our reading of §3327(a).
That provision’s election mechanism is optional, and
Rudisill does not forfeit his entitlements by declining to
make a §3327(a) election.
                              A
   We start by examining Rudisill’s benefits entitlements
generally. It is undisputed that Rudisill earned two sepa-
rate entitlements to educational benefits due to the length
of his military service. Based on his first period of service,
he became “entitled to” Montgomery benefits, as the statute
clearly states. §3011(a). Equally clear is that his second
and third periods of service “entitled” him to Post-9/11 ben-
efits. §3311(a).
   So, from the outset, we know that Rudisill earned two
separate benefits entitlements, one per the Montgomery GI
Bill and the other per the Post-9/11 GI Bill, by serving in
the military for nearly eight years over three separate peri-
ods. Notably, our analysis does not focus on his periods of
service. Contra, post, at 7–8 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Ra-
ther, what matters is that his lengthy service conferred two
separate entitlements.
   Recognizing Rudisill’s separate entitlements leads us to
two observations. First, the statute establishes a baseline
rule that, absent some other limitation, the VA must pay a
veteran’s benefits. The Montgomery GI Bill requires that
“[t]he Secretary shall pay to each individual entitled to
[Montgomery benefits] who is pursuing an approved pro-
gram of education a basic educational assistance allow-
ance.” §3014(a) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Post-9/11
10                RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

GI Bill states that “[t]he Secretary shall pay to each indi-
vidual entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits] who is pursuing an
approved program of education . . . the amounts specified.”
§3313(a) (emphasis added).
   Second, Congress has clearly and plainly delineated cer-
tain durational limits on these benefits entitlements.
Montgomery and Post-9/11 entitlements have specified
outer limits: Each program entitles the recipient to up to 36
months of benefits, and both are “[s]ubject to section 3695,”
which imposes a 48-month aggregate-benefits cap.
§§3013(a)(1), 3312(a). The benefits entitlements are like-
wise qualified by certain enumerated exceptions. Ibid.
   Thus, even before turning to the statutory provisions that
are most directly implicated here, it is clear that (1) Rudisill
is separately entitled to each of two educational benefits;
and (2) absent specified limits, the VA is statutorily obli-
gated to pay him 48 months of benefits. As explained below,
no statutory constraint prevents Rudisill from accessing his
benefits, up to 48 months, in whichever order he chooses.
                               B
  Section 3322(d) is the first of two statutory provisions
that are at the heart of this dispute. That subsection, titled
“Additional coordination matters,” states:
     “In the case of an individual entitled to educa-
     tional assistance under [the Montgomery GI Bill
     or other specified programs], or making contribu-
     tions toward [the Montgomery Program], as of
     August 1, 2009, coordination of entitlement to ed-
     ucational assistance under [the Post-9/11 GI
     Bill], on the one hand, and such chapters or pro-
     visions, on the other, shall be governed by [38
     U. S. C. §3327].”
  There is no dispute that subsection (d) applies to a ser-
vicemember who is entitled to Montgomery benefits but has
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)           11

                      Opinion of the Court

become eligible for Post-9/11 benefits for his period of qual-
ifying service as of August 1, 2009, given the overlap of
those two entitlement programs. See Part I–B, supra. But
in the context of the instant dispute, the Government ar-
gues, and the dissent echoes, that an individual who has
two separate benefits entitlements under the Montgomery
and Post-9/11 bills must also “coordinate” those two entitle-
ments under §3322(d) in order to access his Post-9/11 bene-
fits. We conclude that the plain text of §3322(d) does not
support that assertion.
    First, nothing in the statute imposes a duty for any vet-
eran to “coordinate” entitlements in order to receive bene-
fits. Sections 3011 through 3014, which outline the Mont-
gomery entitlement, do not refer to coordination. Nor do
§§3311 through 3313, which establish the Post-9/11 bene-
fits entitlement. And §3695—the provision that specifically
addresses veterans with more than one entitlement—does
not require, or even mention, coordination.
    For the person covered by §3322(d)’s coordination re-
quirement, the provision does discuss “coordination of enti-
tlement” to benefits. But the statute distinguishes between
“entitlement to” and “receipt of ” benefits. For example,
§§3322(e), (f ), and (g) bar duplicative receipt of benefits.
Similarly, §3322(a) says that a servicemember “may not re-
ceive” two benefits at the same time. But §3322(d) does not
concern the receipt of benefits—that term appears nowhere
in that subsection. Instead, subsection (d) addresses “coor-
dination of entitlement.” Rudisill has no need to coordinate
any entitlement: He is already entitled to two separate ben-
efits. Section 3322(d) says that “coordination of entitlement
. . . shall be governed by” §3327, but, as Rudisill correctly
observes, with nothing to coordinate, §3327 does not gov-
ern.
    Both the Government and the dissent argue that this
view misconstrues the meaning of the term “coordination.”
12                RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

In their view, “coordinat[ing]” an entitlement is not convert-
ing or exchanging entitlements. But what, then, does it
mean to coordinate an entitlement under this statutory
scheme? They contend that coordination “refers to a vet-
eran choosing which ‘entitlement’ . . . he would like to use.”
Post, at 5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). But choosing an entitle-
ment is an election, not coordination. And the statute uses
the word “elect” repeatedly to say that veterans should
choose between two different entitlements. Here, §3322(d)
speaks of “coordination,” not “election,” and we generally
“presume differences in language like this convey differ-
ences in meaning.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA
Inc., 582 U. S. 79, 86 (2017).
   Nor does the reference to “coordination” in subsection (d)
exist in isolation. Rather, subsection (d) points to §3327,
which—as we explain below, see Part III–C–2, infra—tells
us what coordination means: making an election that per-
mits the individual to get Post-9/11 benefits “instead of ”
Montgomery benefits. §3327(d)(1). In ordinary parlance,
if a person who is directed to “coordinate,” receives one
thing “instead of ” another, that “coordination” is under-
stood to effect a swap.
   If we were left with any doubt that §3322(d) simply does
not speak to a veteran who just wants to use one of his two
separate entitlements, two additional clues would tip the
balance. First, §3322 is titled “Bar to duplication” of bene-
fits. There is no duplication for someone in Rudisill’s situ-
ation. He earned each benefit separately, and he is asking
to receive each benefit separately. “[S]ection headings . . .
‘supply cues’ as to what Congress intended,” Merit Manage-
ment Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 583 U. S. 366, 380
(2018), and §3322’s heading tells us that its provisions pre-
vent double dipping, something that Rudisill is not doing.
   Second, §3322(d) applies to individuals with Montgomery
entitlements “as of August 1, 2009.” The Government says
that this language just references the bill’s effective date.
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                    13

                          Opinion of the Court

See Brief for Respondent 16, and n. But, in the entire Post-
9/11 GI Bill, only two statutory provisions—§3322(d) and
§3327(a)(1)—specifically reference this date. Why would
Congress refer to the effective date of the Post-9/11 GI Bill
in only these two places and nowhere else?
   The most logical inference is that this date is material to
the work of those particular provisions. And under the in-
terpretation we adopt today, August 1, 2009, is highly rele-
vant, because before then, individuals could have been ac-
cruing Post-9/11 benefits (ever since September 11, 2001)
but would have had no way to opt into that benefits pro-
gram. The swap Congress devised in §3327 gives such in-
dividuals a mechanism for accessing these benefits. The in-
vocation of the bill’s effective date in §3322(d) thus provides
another clue that these provisions are not relevant to some-
one, like Rudisill, who has no need to make a swap.4
   Adding all this up, we come to the conclusion that
§3322(d) serves a specific function: to allow individuals with
Montgomery benefits who would prefer to swap them for
Post-9/11 benefits to “coordinate” these entitlements via
§3327. But when a person already has two separate enti-
tlements and simply uses one after the other, he is not co-
ordinating anything. Because that is Rudisill’s situation,
§3322(d) does not speak to him.
                             C
  Based on the analysis we have already laid out, Rudisill
never reaches §3327 when using his benefits because he is
not coordinating his entitlements. And the contention that
Rudisill can only use his Post-9/11 benefits by invoking
§3327 is contradicted by the text of §3327 itself.

——————
  4 To be clear, as both parties agree, the August 1, 2009, effective date

does not limit servicemembers’ ability to use §3327’s election mechanism
to swap benefits earned after this date.
14                RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      Opinion of the Court

                                1
   We cannot agree that, to receive Post-9/11 benefits, a ser-
vicemember in Rudisill’s situation must elect them via
§3327. The statute simply does not say that a servicemem-
ber with more than one entitlement receives Post-9/11 ben-
efits only by making a §3327(a) election.
   To start, a §3327(a) election is optional: An eligible indi-
vidual “may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefits. “ ‘[T]he
“word ‘may’ clearly connotes discretion.” ’ ” Opati v. Repub-
lic of Sudan, 590 U. S. 418, 428 (2020). So a veteran can
opt for a §3327(a) election, but he does not have to.
   If he decides not to opt for a §3327(a) election, nothing in
§3327, §3322, or anywhere else purports to alter his entitle-
ment. Instead, the veteran remains in the exact same posi-
tion as before. A veteran who had only Montgomery bene-
fits is left with only Montgomery benefits. Likewise, for the
veteran (like Rudisill) who started out with both Montgom-
ery and Post-9/11 benefits, both sets of benefits remain.
   To argue that Rudisill may receive Post-9/11 benefits only
by making a §3327(a) election, the dissent invokes—and
misreads—§3322(a). See post, at 5 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).
To repeat, as relevant here, §3322(a) provides: “An individ-
ual entitled to [Post-9/11 benefits] who is also eligible for
[Montgomery benefits] may not receive assistance under
[both] programs concurrently, but shall elect . . . under
which chapter or provisions to receive educational assis-
tance.” As is clear from its text, §3322(a) just says, and
means, that a veteran cannot use Montgomery and Post-
9/11 benefits at the same time to fund his education. Sec-
tion 3322(a) bars double dipping—it does not impose a sub-
stantive requirement to elect benefits via §3327(a).
   So, while Rudisill must make an election per §3322(a)
when he wants to have a particular aspect of his education
funded, it does not follow that he must also make an elec-
tion under §3327(a). The two elections are completely dif-
ferent, and making one is not the same as making the other.
                      Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                      15

                           Opinion of the Court

By blurring all elections into one, instead of recognizing
that the statute contemplates multiple distinct elections,
the Government—and the dissent—make a crucial misstep.
   In this regard, it is noteworthy that §3322(a) does not
mention, much less cross-reference, either §3322(d) or
§3327. Even though §3322(a) and §3327(a) both use the
word “elect,” nothing in the text of either provision suggests
that these two elections are one and the same. Rather, to
“elect” just means to choose. See New Oxford American Dic-
tionary 545 (2d ed. 2005) (“elect” means to “opt for or choose
to do something”). And that says nothing about the sub-
stance of any option.
   Other parts of the statute confirm that not all elections
are the same. For example, §3322(a) requires a person with
two or more entitlements to “elect” which to receive at any
given time, while §3322(h) bars “duplication of eligibility
based on a single event or period of service,” and thus re-
quires certain individuals to “elect” under which benefits
programs their service is to be credited.5 Turning to §3327,
subsection (a) similarly allows a person who is entitled to
Montgomery benefits to “elect” to receive Post-9/11 benefits
under certain circumstances, and subsection (c)(1) lets a
person “elect” to revoke an entitlement that he previously
transferred. Furthermore and importantly, subsection (i)
refers to these two elections separately. See §3327(i) (“An
election under subsection (a) or (c)(1) is irrevocable”). In the
context of a statute that establishes multiple distinct elec-
tions, attempts to equate a §3322(a) election with a
§3327(a) election are unpersuasive.

——————
  5 In all, 38 U. S. C. §3322 has six separate subsections that require dif-

ferent elections. See §§3322(a), (c), (e), (g), (h)(1), (2). Neither the Gov-
ernment nor the dissent offers a compelling reason as to why, out of all
six provisions, §3322(a) requires “coordination” under §3322(d) and an
“election” under §3327(a).
16                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                       Opinion of the Court

                                2
   Undeterred, the Government turns to §3327(d), which de-
tails the consequences of making an election under
§3327(a). But the plain text of §3327(d) makes clear that
the provision does not limit a servicemember in Rudisill’s
situation.
   From its start, §3327(d) contradicts the Government’s
reading of the statute. Section 3327(d)(1) tells us that “an
individual making an election under [§3327(a)] shall be en-
titled to [Post-9/11 benefits] instead of basic [Montgomery
benefits].” §3327(d)(1) (emphasis added). In other words,
he swaps out his entitlement to Montgomery benefits for an
entitlement to Post-9/11 benefits. Rudisill had no need to
get Post-9/11 benefits “instead of ” Montgomery benefits,
because he was already entitled to both benefits.
   For veterans who have used some but not all of their
Montgomery benefits, §3327(d)(2)(A) lays out one further
consequence of making a §3327 election: When these veter-
ans “mak[e] an election under [§3327(a)], the number of
months of [Post-9/11 benefits] shall be . . . the number of
months of unused [Montgomery benefits], as of the date of
the election.” Two aspects of this provision stand out.
   First, like subsection (d)(1), this limitation only applies to
“an individual making an election under subsection (a).”
So, if a person does not make a §3327(a) election,
§3327(d)(2) does not limit his entitlement.
   Second, this provision makes perfect sense under
Rudisill’s interpretation of the statute. If a veteran served
for three years, he earned 36 months of benefits. If he re-
ceived Montgomery benefits for this service but should have
been able to get Post-9/11 benefits, due to the overlap in the
eligibility for these programs, §3327 lets him opt for Post-
9/11 benefits instead. But if he has already used some ben-
efits at the time he elects the swap, a §3327(a) election does
not entitle him to a full 36-month period of Post-9/11 bene-
fits in addition to the Montgomery benefits he has already
                     Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                   17

                          Opinion of the Court

used. Instead, §3327(d)(2) ensures that his one period of
service entitles him to 36 months of educational benefits in
total—no more, and no less.
  By contrast, §3327(d)(2) is nonsensical under the Govern-
ment’s view of the statute. It would impose an exhaust-or-
forfeit requirement for veterans with two separate entitle-
ments: Either use up all of your Montgomery benefits (so
that you can get your full 48 months of benefits), or lose any
entitlement in excess of 36 months.6 At the very least, this
would be an odd way to create an exhaustion requirement,
and the Government has not pointed us to any comparable
one in this statutory scheme or elsewhere. Again, the more
sensible view—and the view that the statutory text best
supports—is that §3327(d)(2) is a limit on exceeding one’s
entitlement through the swapping mechanism §3327 cre-
ates, and is thus not an exhaustion requirement at all.
  In sum, §3327(a)’s election mechanism is an optional
means of trading an existing benefits entitlement for Post-
9/11 benefits. Although §3327 details the consequences of
making that election, those consequences—by their own
terms—apply only to an individual who makes a §3327(a)
election. On the other hand, the entitlements of a person
who does not make a §3327(a) election are not altered. In
Rudisill’s case, that leaves him with two different entitle-
ments (one under the Montgomery GI Bill and the other un-
der the Post-9/11 GI Bill) that the VA “shall pay” to him,
subject only to §3695’s 48-month cap. §§3014(a), 3313(a).

——————
  6 Consider, for example, a veteran who has used 24 months of Mont-

gomery benefits and also has an entitlement to 36 months of Post-9/11
benefits. Under the Government’s reading, if she uses up her last 12
months of Montgomery benefits, she could then get 12 months of Post-
9/11 benefits (48 months in total benefits). But if she wants to immedi-
ately start using her Post-9/11 benefits entitlement without using up all
the Montgomery entitlement, she could get only 12 months of Post-9/11
benefits, and nothing more (adding up to 36 months in total).
18                RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                     Opinion of the Court

                         *    *    *
   The bottom line is this: Veterans who separately accrue
benefits under both the Montgomery and Post-9/11 GI Bills
are entitled to both benefits. Neither §3322(d) nor §3327
restrict veterans with two separate entitlements who
simply seek to use either one. Thus, Rudisill may use his
benefits, in any order, up to §3695’s 48-month aggregate-
benefits cap. If the statute were ambiguous, the pro-
veteran canon would favor Rudisill, but the statute is clear,
so we resolve this case based on statutory text alone. Be-
cause the Federal Circuit incorrectly limited Rudisill’s ben-
efits, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                             It is so ordered.
                 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            1

                   KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                          No. 22–888
                         _________________

    JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENIS R.
     MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
                    AFFAIRS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
                        [April 16, 2024]

   JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, with whom JUSTICE BARRETT
joins, concurring.
   I agree with the Court that the post-9/11 education-
benefits law entitles James Rudisill, a military veteran, to
additional benefits for graduate school. The Court goes on
to say that the clarity of the benefits law at issue here
means that we need not rely on the veterans canon of
statutory interpretation. I again agree. I write separately,
however, to note some practical and constitutional
questions about the justifications for a benefits-related
canon (such as the veterans canon) that favors one
particular group over others.
   Under the veterans canon, statutes that provide benefits
to veterans are to be construed “in the veteran’s favor.”
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). The veterans
canon is a substantive canon of statutory interpretation. A
substantive canon is a judicial presumption in favor of or
against a particular substantive outcome. Some classic
examples include the presumption against retroactivity,
the presumption against extraterritoriality, and the
presumption of mens rea.
   Applying a substantive canon, a court may depart from
what the court, absent the canon, would have concluded is
the best reading of the statutory text. Otherwise, of course,
2                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                   KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

the substantive canon would not be necessary or relevant.
See J. Manning & M. Stephenson, Legislation and
Regulation 383 (4th ed. 2021) (In “order for a substantive
canon” to “do any work, it must be the case that in the
absence of the canon the court would have reached a
different conclusion”).
  Substantive canons are typically based on background
constitutional    principles    or    long-settled   judicial
understandings of congressional practice. See id., at 382–
384. Because a substantive canon by definition has
important decision-altering effects, any substantive canon
must be sufficiently rooted in constitutional principles or
congressional practices.
  Here, no one suggests that the veterans canon rests on
background constitutional principles. Rather, the canon
seems to stem from a loose judicial assumption about
congressional intent—in particular, an assumption that
Congress intends for courts to read ambiguous veterans-
benefits statutes more broadly than the courts otherwise
would read such statutes. See Boone v. Lightner, 319 U. S.
561, 575 (1943).
  But what is that assumption based on? The Court has
never explained.
  The first glimmerings of the veterans canon appeared in
the 1940s. See ibid. But the early cases did not purport to
establish a canon. They seem to have simply engaged in
broadly purposive interpretation of the particular statutes
at issue. Since those early cases, the Court has occasionally
referred to a general pro-veterans interpretive principle,
but without further explanation. See, e.g., Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 441 (2011); King v. St. Vincent’s
Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 220–221, n. 9 (1991). The canon
appears to have developed almost by accident.
  Moreover, the veterans canon has apparently not
mattered—in other words, has not affected the result—in
any of this Court’s past decisions in veterans cases, or in
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            3

                   KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

this case for that matter. See, e.g., Henderson, 562 U. S., at
441; Brown, 513 U. S., at 117–118; King, 502 U. S., at 220–
221, n. 9; see also Kisor v. McDonough, 995 F. 3d 1347, 1350
(CA Fed. 2021) (Prost, C. J., concurring in denial of
rehearing en banc). The Court has “rarely” applied the
veterans canon. Id., at 1350. And even when mentioned,
the canon has seemingly served only as the proverbial icing
on a cake already frosted—that is, an extra citation after
the Court has already concluded that the veteran prevails
anyway under the statutory text and traditional tools of
statutory interpretation.
  Despite the canon’s seemingly nonexistent impact on this
Court’s decisions, the Court’s reflexive repetition of the
canon over the years has created the appearance of deeper
rooting, leading lower courts—particularly the Federal
Circuit where veterans benefits cases are channeled—to
rely on the canon in a way that this Court has not. Compare
id., at 1350–1358 with id., at 1366–1374 (O’Malley, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). But this
Court’s repetition of the canon has not yielded any greater
justification or explanation by the Court for applying such
a canon in the first place.
  In considering whether a sufficient justification exists,
we must confront some fundamental problems with
benefits-related canons like this one.
  To begin with, the notion that benefits statutes should be
interpreted to favor a particular group creates significant
tension with the actual operation of the process by which
Congress and the President enact spending laws. To be
sure, if someone asked a Member of Congress or the
President (or this judge, for that matter) in the abstract,
“Should veterans get more benefits?” the answer would be
yes. But that question is not (and cannot be) answered in
the abstract. The spending process is a zero-sum game,
where money spent on one group means less money for
other groups and other national priorities.
4                  RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                     KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

   Would Congress prefer to pay for another semester of
veterans’ graduate-school educations, or instead for more
Pell Grants for lower-income college students? Would
Congress want to spend more on healthcare benefits for the
disabled, or instead on prescription-drug benefits for senior
citizens? Would Congress choose to increase the pension
benefits of retired CIA agents, or instead the wages of
soldiers who are serving in harm’s way today? The list of
difficult choices goes on and on.               National security,
assistance to the poor, law enforcement, energy production,
environmental protection, border security, cancer research,
housing aid, highway construction, airplane safety, school
lunches, disaster relief, drug treatment, prisons, and a
plethora of other national priorities all compete for funding
in the legislative process. And the U. S. Treasury is not a
bottomless well of free money—rather, the money comes
primarily from the taxes paid by the American people.
   The spending process in Congress requires hard choices
with painful tradeoffs. Judges have no principled way to
make those choices or weigh those tradeoffs. Nor do judges
have a principled way, other than reading the statutory text
as written, to conclude that Congress and the President
would prefer to favor one group over another—or stated
another way in this zero-sum process, to disfavor one group
over another.
   In addition to that practical problem, judges have no
constitutional authority to favor or disfavor one group over
another in the spending process. Rather, under the
Constitution’s separation of powers, Congress and the
President make those policy judgments. See U. S. Const.,
Art. I, §7, cl. 2; §8, cl. 1; §9, cl. 7. Courts must then neutrally
interpret and apply the spending laws enacted by Congress
and the President. Courts do so by heeding the statutory
text and employing the traditional tools of statutory
interpretation—not by singling out particular groups for
favored or disfavored treatment. See A. Scalia & B. Garner,
                 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)           5

                  KAVANAUGH, J., concurring

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 352–354
(2012).
  For those reasons, courts interpreting spending laws
usually do not apply canons to favor or disfavor particular
groups. Courts, for example, do not apply a low-income-
families canon, a healthcare-for-seniors canon, or a local-
law-enforcement canon to favor those groups. (Nor, from
the other direction, do courts apply a general fiscal-
responsibility canon to narrowly construe spending
statutes.)
  In short, any canon that construes benefits statutes in
favor of a particular group—rather than just construing the
statutes as written—appears to be inconsistent both with
actual congressional practice on spending laws and with the
Judiciary’s proper constitutional role in the federal
spending process.
  To be clear, Congress’s commitment to assisting veterans
through the many federal veterans-benefits programs is
entirely appropriate given the sacrifices made by those who
have served in the Armed Forces. The statutes that provide
significant veterans benefits—including healthcare,
education, disability, and retirement benefits—properly
assist those who have defended America. And when
statutes afford broad benefits for veterans or others, as is
often the case, courts should apply the statutes as written.
  But providing federal benefits—and determining their
scope—is Congress’s prerogative. The Judiciary’s role is to
neutrally interpret those statutes, not to put a thumb on
the scale in favor of or against any particular group. For
that reason, it may be important in a future case for this
Court to address the justification for any benefits-related
canon that favors one group over others.
                 Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)            1

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
                         _________________

                          No. 22–888
                         _________________

    JAMES R. RUDISILL, PETITIONER v. DENIS R.
     MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF VETERANS
                    AFFAIRS
 ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
           APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
                        [April 16, 2024]

   JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE ALITO joins, dis-
senting.
   Our country rewards those who serve in the Armed
Forces with educational benefits. This case involves the ed-
ucational benefits available under the Montgomery GI Bill
and the more recent Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Post-9/11 bene-
fits are more generous than the Montgomery benefits, and
veterans are sometimes entitled to benefits under both pro-
grams. By statute, however, veterans cannot receive bene-
fits under both programs at the same time. Congress there-
fore created an election mechanism that allows veterans to
switch from Montgomery benefits to Post-9/11 benefits.
Under that mechanism, when a veteran switches to Post-
9/11 benefits after using some, but not all, of his Montgom-
ery benefits, the amount of his Post-9/11 benefits is limited
to the number of months he had remaining for Montgomery
benefits. 38 U. S. C. §3327(d). The question here is
whether this limitation applies to James Rudisill, a retired
captain in the U. S. Army.
   The Court agrees that Rudisill could not use his two sets
of benefits concurrently, and that he switched to Post-9/11
benefits when he had some remaining Montgomery bene-
fits. Ante, at 7, 14. But, it declines to apply the statute’s
corresponding limitation on his benefits because Rudisill
2                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

was separately entitled to Montgomery and Post-9/11 ben-
efits due to his multiple periods of service. Ante, at 2. Be-
cause this approach conflicts with the statute’s plain text, I
respectfully dissent.
                               I
   Since World War II, Congress has enacted numerous
statutes that provide veterans with a range of educational
benefits, commonly called GI bills. Two of these statutes
are at issue here: the Veterans’ Educational Assistance Pro-
gram Act of 1984 (Montgomery GI Bill), 38 U. S. C. §3001
et seq., and the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance
Act (Post-9/11 GI Bill), 38 U. S. C. §3301 et seq. As the ma-
jority explains, the Montgomery GI Bill had been the pri-
mary source of educational benefits since 1985, but, in di-
rect response to the September 11, 2001, attacks and the
ensuing conflict, Congress enacted the Post-9/11 GI Bill and
made its benefits retroactively available. Ante, at 3–4. The
Montgomery and Post-9/11 programs differ in meaningful
ways. Montgomery benefits provide a modest, fixed
monthly stipend, whereas Post-9/11 benefits are more gen-
erous and can cover the actual net cost of in-state tuition,
along with other expenses such as tutorial assistance and
licensing test fees. Compare, e.g., §3015 with §§3313–3315,
3317–3318.
   Both programs impose a durational cap on the benefits
that an individual may receive. Regardless of how long a
veteran has served or how many periods of service he has,
a qualifying veteran is generally eligible for a maximum of
36 months of benefits under each program. §§3013, 3312.
In addition, there is an aggregate cap on benefits that ap-
plies across programs. No veteran may receive more than
48 months of educational benefits total. §3695.
   The two educational-benefit programs cover overlapping
time periods. And, several statutory provisions address
this overlap. No veteran can use the two sets of benefits
                      Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                      3

                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

concurrently. §3322(a). Veterans accordingly must “elect”
which benefits to receive at a specific time. Ibid. As rele-
vant here, there is a condition attached to one particular
election. Under §3327, if a veteran elects to switch to Post-
9/11 benefits when he “has used, but retains unused,” Mont-
gomery benefits, he is subject to a statutory “[l]imitation on
entitlement.” Under this limitation, the amount of his Post-
9/11 benefits will be limited to “the number of months of
unused entitlement of the individual under” the Montgom-
ery program. §3327(d)(2)(A).1
   The question before us is whether that statutory limita-
tion applies to Rudisill’s benefits. Rudisill served during
three separate periods, spanning roughly eight years. He
first enlisted in the Army in 2000 and served until 2002.
During this period of service, Rudisill became eligible for
Montgomery benefits. He used some of these benefits to
start and, after a second period of service spanning about a
year and a half, complete an undergraduate degree.
Rudisill then rejoined the Army as a commissioned officer,
serving from 2007 to 2011. Rudisill’s second and third pe-
riods of service made him eligible for Post-9/11 benefits. Af-
ter he completed his third period of military service, he was
admitted to Yale Divinity School.
   Rudisill sought to use his remaining benefits to fund his
graduate education at Yale. At that time, Rudisill had used
25 months and 14 days of his Montgomery benefits for his
undergraduate education. This left him with 10 months
and 16 days of remaining Montgomery benefits. Rather
than use these remaining benefits, however, Rudisill de-
cided to switch to his Post-9/11 benefits. As part of that
switch, Rudisill filled out a Department of Veterans Affairs
——————
   1 There is another part of the limitation’s formula that is of no concern

in this case. Title 38 U. S. C. §3327(d)(2)(B) encompasses “the number
of months, if any, of entitlement revoked by the individual under subsec-
tion (c)(1).” This provision concerns a veteran’s transfer of benefits to
family members, which Rudisill has not done.
4                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

(VA) form electing to receive Post-9/11 benefits “in lieu of ”
Montgomery benefits. App. 1a. He expressly acknowledged
that his “months of entitlement under chapter 33”—i.e.,
Post-9/11 benefits—would be “limited to the number of
months of entitlement remaining under chapter 30”—i.e.,
Montgomery benefits. Ibid.
   Applying the limitation on entitlement in §3327, the VA
awarded Rudisill Post-9/11 benefits for 10 months and 16
days—the amount he had remaining for his Montgomery
benefits. Rudisill appealed, arguing that the §3327 limita-
tion did not apply to him because he had separate entitle-
ments to Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits due to his
multiple periods of service. Sitting en banc, the Federal
Circuit held that the VA had correctly applied the statutory
limitation to Rudisill’s benefits. I would affirm.
                               II
   Rudisill’s Post-9/11 benefits are limited to the amount of
Montgomery benefits he had not used. Because he could
not use his sets of benefits concurrently, the statute re-
quired that Rudisill coordinate his entitlements, and that
such coordination would be governed by §3327. Rudisill
then used the election mechanism in §3327 to switch to
Post-9/11 benefits after he had used some, but not all, of his
Montgomery benefits. By making that election, the statute
limited his benefits to the amount of Montgomery benefits
he had left. Because the statutory scheme directs how a
veteran in Rudisill’s position can switch to Post-9/11 bene-
fits, I would apply that mechanism to Rudisill’s election—
and the cost that comes with it.
   As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Rudisill can-
not use his Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits concur-
rently. See Brief for Petitioner 39–40; ante, at 14. Under
§3322(a), a veteran “entitled to” Post-9/11 benefits “who is
also eligible” for Montgomery benefits “may not receive as-
sistance under two or more such programs concurrently,
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)             5

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

but shall elect (in such form and manner as the Secretary
may prescribe) under which chapter or provisions to receive
educational assistance.” Because Rudisill is entitled to
Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits, he cannot receive both
benefits at the same time. Instead, he “shall elect” which
benefits to receive.
   How does Rudisill “elect” which benefits to receive? That
is the core of the dispute in this case. In my view, the stat-
ute answers that question by requiring Rudisill to coordi-
nate his entitlements and creating an election mechanism
for him to do so. After barring the concurrent use of bene-
fits in §3322(a), Congress included a provision titled “[a]ddi-
tional coordination matters” in subsection (d). This coordi-
nation provision states that “[i]n the case of ” a veteran
“entitled” to benefits under certain other chapters—includ-
ing the Montgomery chapter—“coordination of entitlement
to educational assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter, on
the one hand, and such chapters or provisions, on the other,
shall be governed by [38 U. S. C. §3327].”
   The “coordination” here refers to a veteran choosing
which “entitlement”—i.e., set of benefits—he would like to
use. The ordinary meaning of “coordination” is “[t]he action
of arranging or placing in the same order, rank, or degree.”
3 Oxford English Dictionary 898 (2d ed. 1989); see also Ran-
dom House Dictionary of the English Language 447 (2d ed.
1987) (defining “coordinate” as “to place or arrange in
proper order or position” and “to assume proper order or re-
lation”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
501–502 (1981) (defining “coordination” as “arrangement in
the same order, class, rank, or dignity” and “coordinate” as
“to make coordinate; put in the same order or rank”). In
this context, coordination refers to a veteran ordering his
sets of benefits. A veteran’s entitlement to both Montgom-
ery and Post-9/11 benefits necessarily requires “coordina-
tion” because he cannot use them concurrently, as subsec-
tion (a) prohibits such use. And, subsection (d) explains
6                    RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                         THOMAS, J., dissenting

that such coordination “shall be governed” by §3327.2
   Unsurprisingly, the coordination provision points to an
election mechanism. As relevant, under §3327(a)(1), a vet-
eran “may elect to receive educational assistance under this
[Post-9/11] chapter” if he meets certain criteria. “[A]s of Au-
gust 1, 2009,” the veteran must be “entitled” to Montgomery
benefits and “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement” to
Post-9/11 benefits. §§3327(a)(1), (2). Next, a veteran may
make this election to switch to Post-9/11 benefits if he “has
used, but retains unused, entitlement under [the Montgom-
ery] chapter.” §3327(a)(1). Put more simply, this election
mechanism applies to a veteran who is entitled to both
Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits and has used some, but
not all, of his Montgomery benefits.
   There is a consequence, however, for using this election
mechanism. By making a §3327(a)(1) election, a veteran
triggers a “[l]imitation on entitlement.” §3327(d)(2). Under
that limitation, the veteran’s Post-9/11 benefits are limited
to “the number of months of unused entitlement of the in-
dividual under [the Montgomery] chapter . . . as of the date
of the election.” §3327(d)(2)(A). That is, a veteran with re-
maining Montgomery benefits who elects to switch to his
Post-9/11 benefits is limited to the amount of Montgomery
benefits he has remaining.
   Rudisill is covered by the election mechanism and its ac-
companying limitation. He is entitled to both Montgomery
and Post-9/11 benefits. And, as of August 1, 2009, he had
used, but retained unused, Montgomery benefits. Section
3327(a) therefore provided him a mechanism by which he
could elect to switch to Post-9/11 benefits. And, Rudisill
made that election. App. 1a (“By electing Chapter 33, I

——————
  2 Contrary to the Court’s assertion, coordination and election are dis-

tinct acts. See ante, at 12. Coordination requires a veteran to choose
which entitlement to use at any given time; an election is the mechanism
by which he switches from one set of benefits to another.
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)             7

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

acknowledge that I understand . . . my months of entitle-
ment under chapter 33 will be limited to the number of
months of entitlement remaining under chapter 30”). Be-
cause Rudisill elected to switch to his Post-9/11 benefits be-
fore exhausting his Montgomery benefits, he was subject to
the corresponding limitation on his entitlement: He could
receive Post-9/11 benefits for only the months remaining on
his Montgomery benefits. Indeed, the VA informed him of
this consequence before he made his election, and Rudisill
acknowledged it. See ibid. Applying this limitation, the en
banc Federal Circuit correctly found that Rudisill was lim-
ited to 10 months and 16 days of Post-9/11 benefits for his
graduate education. That straightforward conclusion fol-
lows from the statutory scheme that Congress created. I
would simply apply that statutory limit to Rudisill.
                              III
   Rudisill and the majority make various attempts at
avoiding the statute’s inevitable conclusion, but none hits
the mark. That is in large part because the statute’s text,
though complicated, is ultimately unambiguous. Accord-
ingly, they do not dispute that Rudisill earned entitlements
to both Montgomery and Post-9/11 benefits and that he can-
not use these entitlements concurrently. Ante, at 9, 14;
Brief for Petitioner 25–26, 39–40. They do not dispute that
he made an election to switch to Post-9/11 benefits. Ante,
at 14; Brief for Petitioner 26–27; App. 1a. And, they do not
dispute that, when he made that election, he had used, but
retained unused, Montgomery benefits. Ante, at 7; Brief for
Petitioner 26.
   Instead, Rudisill’s primary argument is that the specific
provisions in the statute governing coordination and elec-
tion do not apply to veterans who have multiple periods of
service. But, Rudisill acknowledges that the text of
§3327(a) “does not state that its election mechanism is lim-
ited to veterans with only a single period of service.” Id., at
8                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

46. There is likewise no language in the coordination pro-
vision of §3322(d) that plainly cabins its application based
upon periods of service. Because the plain text contains no
carveout based on periods of service, that should be the end
of the debate.
   Rudisill’s contrary argument is especially unconvincing
given that Congress included other period-of-service limita-
tions in the very subchapter at issue. See Rotkiske v.
Klemm, 589 U. S. 8, 14 (2019) (“Atextual judicial supple-
mentation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Con-
gress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted
language or provision”). Congress provided that a “period
of service counted for purposes . . . of an education loan un-
der [a different program] may not be counted as a period of
service for entitlement to educational assistance under this
[Post-9/11] chapter.” §3322(b) (emphasis added); see also
§3322(h) (creating a “[b]ar to duplication of eligibility based
on a single event or period of service” (emphasis added)).
Congress could have chosen to similarly limit the scope of
§3322’s coordination provision or §3327’s election mecha-
nism based upon periods of service or separate entitle-
ments, but it did not. We cannot do so of our own accord.
   Next, Rudisill contends that the election mechanism in
§3327 is merely meant to provide veterans with a single pe-
riod of service a way to convert lesser Montgomery benefits
into more generous Post-9/11 benefits on a one-to-one basis.
The text of §3327 makes clear, however, that it is a mecha-
nism for making an election to switch from Montgomery
benefits to Post-9/11 benefits—not merely a way to convert
one into the other. Section 3327 provides how a veteran
“may elect to receive” Post-9/11 benefits instead of his
Montgomery benefits. And, it echoes §3322(a)’s require-
ment that a veteran entitled to multiple sets of benefits
“shall elect” which benefits to receive because he cannot use
them concurrently. Moreover, the election mechanism ap-
                  Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)             9

                     THOMAS, J., dissenting

plies only to veterans who are already eligible for both pro-
grams. See §3327(a) (requiring a veteran to be “entitled to
basic educational assistance under [the Montgomery] chap-
ter” and “mee[t] the requirements for entitlement to educa-
tional assistance under this [Post-9/11] chapter”). Because
a veteran must already qualify for Post-9/11 benefits, this
mechanism cannot provide a way for veterans who lack
Post-9/11 benefits to “convert” their Montgomery benefits.
Indeed, the entire point of the election mechanism is to “co-
ordinat[e]” Montgomery and Post-9/11 “entitlement[s]”—
i.e., to manage two existing entitlements. §3322(d) (cross-
referencing §3327). More importantly, §3327(a) does not
cabin its application based upon period of service or sepa-
rate entitlements. See supra, at 7–8. Rudisill’s interpreta-
tion ultimately does not overcome the application of §3327’s
plain text to his circumstance—he is entitled to both sets of
benefits and switched to Post-9/11 benefits when he “ha[d]
used, but retain[ed] unused,” Montgomery benefits.
   The majority, for its part, takes a different tack. Its rea-
soning seems to rest on the theory that because Rudisill was
“entitled” to Montgomery benefits and “entitled” to Post-
9/11 benefits, those multiple entitlements cannot be limited
when switching between benefits. Ante, at 9–10. But, the
majority’s own reasoning undermines that theory. It agrees
that Rudisill cannot receive the full 72 months of benefits
he earned because a separate statutory provision limits him
to 48 months total. See ante, at 10; §3695. And, it agrees
that Rudisill cannot use his two separate entitlements con-
currently. Ante, at 5; §3322(a). This is true even though
Rudisill is “entitled” to 36 months of Montgomery benefits
and “entitled” to 36 months of Post-9/11 benefits. See
§§3011(a), 3311(a). In other words, the majority itself ad-
mits that Rudisill’s entitlements are not absolute. But,
while the majority accepts certain statutory limitations on
Rudisill’s multiple “entitlements,” it rejects others—even
ones listed in the same subsection. Indeed, even though the
10                 RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                      THOMAS, J., dissenting

Court agrees that some election must be made, it rejects the
election process spelled out in the statute to address
Rudisill’s circumstance. My focus on this election does not
“blu[r ] all elections into one,” ante, at 15, but rather, applies
specific statutory text that plainly covers Rudisill.
   The majority tries to justify its selective reading of the
statute by suggesting that the coordination provision in
§3322(d) “simply does not speak to a veteran who just wants
to use one of his two separate entitlements.” Ante, at 12.
But that provision specifically governs the “coordination of
entitlement” to Post-9/11 benefits “on the one hand” and
Montgomery benefits “on the other.” §3322(d) (emphasis
added). It is unclear how a statute could more explicitly
cover the interaction between two separate entitlements.
The majority also provides no satisfactory answer for why
the concurrent-use bar in §3322(a) applies to Rudisill, but
the coordination provision in §3322(d) does not. Both pro-
visions cover veterans who qualify for both sets of benefits,
yet the majority applies one but not the other to Rudisill.
More fundamentally, the Court agrees that some election
must be made. See ante, at 14. Rather than leave Rudisill
to make some uncodified election to switch to Post-9/11 ben-
efits, I would apply the election mechanism that Congress
created to cover his circumstance.
   The majority’s remaining arguments are simply critiques
of Congress’s policy judgments. The Court calls the Gov-
ernment’s reading of the statute’s election mechanism “non-
sensical” because it requires a veteran to exhaust or forfeit
his Montgomery benefits before switching to Post-9/11 ben-
efits. Ante, at 17. But, in reality, the election mechanism
offers a veteran in Rudisill’s circumstance two paths. He
may use 48 months of benefits by first using all 36 months
of his Montgomery benefits, followed by 12 months of Post-
                      Cite as: 601 U. S. ____ (2024)                     11

                          THOMAS, J., dissenting

9/11 benefits.3 Or, he could use 36 months of benefits, with
his choice of when to switch from Montgomery to Post-9/11
benefits. It is not “remarkable” for Congress to “include a
rule allowing individuals to make a wholly voluntary elec-
tion to receive a more generous benefit earlier, at a cost.”
BO v. Wilkie, 31 Vet. App. 321, 352 (Ct. App. Vet. Cl. 2019)
(Bartley, J., dissenting).
   In any event, the wisdom of this limitation is not up to
this Court. It was for Congress to decide what Post-9/11
benefits a veteran should receive retroactively. As Rudisill
acknowledges, the Post-9/11 program is “far more gener-
ous” and, accordingly, costs much more than the Montgom-
ery program. Brief for Petitioner 15. Perhaps the limita-
tion on entitlement reflects a measure to manage this
growing cost, given that “[p]assing a law often requires com-
promise.” NLRB v. SW General, Inc., 580 U. S. 288, 306
(2017). Or, perhaps not. Either way, the limitation is what
Congress enacted—whether the majority agrees with its
fairness or not—and the text that Congress enacted must
dictate the result in this case.
   Moving even further away from the text, the majority
hints that the veteran’s canon could apply if the statute
were ambiguous. Ante, at 18. The veteran’s canon directs
that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s
favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994). Yet,
as the majority recognizes, this canon cannot apply when
the statutory text is plain, so it has no role to play here.
More importantly, substantive canons such as the veteran’s
canon rest on uncertain foundations. See Arizona v. Navajo
Nation, 599 U. S. 555, 572 (2023) (THOMAS, J., concurring).
I share JUSTICE KAVANAUGH’s concern that the veteran’s
——————
  3 This option arises because once a veteran has used all his Montgom-

ery benefits, he is no longer entitled to multiple sets of benefits, render-
ing the coordination provision and election mechanism inapplicable.
Both of those provisions apply only to a veteran entitled to more than
one set of benefits. See §§3322(d), 3327(a).
12                RUDISILL v. MCDONOUGH

                    THOMAS, J., dissenting

canon “appears to have developed almost by accident,” and
no explanation has been provided for its foundation. Ante,
at 2 (concurring opinion). I question whether this pur-
ported canon should ever have a role in our interpretation.
                              IV
   The Court holds that, although Rudisill must make some
election to switch from his Montgomery to Post-9/11 bene-
fits, the statute’s corresponding limits do not apply because
it would reduce the amount of available benefits. In my
view, the Court ignores the statutory mechanism that Con-
gress created in favor of an interpretation that reaches a
desired outcome. I respectfully dissent.