Court Opinion

ID: 9718215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:18:57.817391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:08.455472
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s February 8, 1991, order to leave the child in the custody of her mother. I believe that the trial court’s ruling was amply supported by the evidence adduced at the February hearing. I consider the majority’s conclusion that a remand is necessary to be wholly unwarranted, indeed pointless.1
I have carefully reviewed the record and find no support for the majority’s conclusion that the trial court failed to provide counsel for the minor child and counsel for Children and Youth Services (CYS) the opportunity to develop a full record in the instant case. In fact, it is clear to me that at the February hearing the trial court fully and fairly determined that the petitioners had not met their burden in attempting to remove the child from the custody of her mother.
In the first place I note that appellant has failed to include in her brief a statement of questions involved. Pa.R.A.P. 2116 mandates the inclusion of such a statement and indicates that it is considered “in the highest degree mandatory”. Ordinarily this court will not consider any *214point which is not set forth in a statement of questions involved. In this case, the majority bases its reversal on an argument which not only is not set forth in the omitted Rule 2116 statement, but is also only vaguely alluded to in the body of appellant’s brief. Indeed, these indirect allusions to the argument that a full hearing was not permitted in the argument portion of appellant’s brief is the first time such an argument was made by any party.
For instance, in its statement of matters complained of on appeal filed with the trial court, counsel for the child only alleged that the trial court erred in failing to find that mother’s ongoing alcoholism amounted to clear and convincing evidence of the necessity to remove Donna from her care, along with a claim that hearsay was improperly admitted. Nowhere did appellant allege, however, prior to filing its brief with this court, that the trial court prevented counsel from presenting Donna’s case, interrupted counsel, or failed to provide counsel with an opportunity for cross-examination. Other than objecting to the admission of alleged hearsay, appellant gave no indication at the time of the hearing that it was dissatisfied with the manner in which the hearing was conducted. The record simply does not support appellant’s vague claim that the opportunity for a full hearing was somehow impeded by the trial court.
Nothing which occurred at the February hearing substantiates the belated argument, which the majority accepts and upon which it bases its remand decision, that counsel was afforded no opportunity to present its case. There is not the slightest indication that counsel for Donna or for CYS had any evidence or argument to offer which the trial court was unwilling to hear. Even now, counsel does not suggest what evidence, if any, it was prevented from presenting to the trial judge.
Moreover, it is my view that whatever error may have occurred at the February hearing has been rendered moot by the findings and conclusions occasioned by a later hearing on May 10, 1991. At the May 10, 1991, hearing CYS testified that the mother continued to make progress in her *215therapy. In addition, the CYS worker testified several unannounced home visits revealed that the family was doing “very well.”
Appellant’s true challenge in the case is not a failure to award appellant a full hearing but is a challenge to the trial judge’s interpretation of the significance of the January 29th episode. On January 29 the mother who had been drinking was driving her car. The child was in the back seat and was not buckled into a harness. The trial judge weighed this isolated episode against the steady progress mother had made towards rehabilitating herself, the salutary goal of family reunification and the cessation of the constant shift of custodians for Donna. Apparently, appellants conclude that the trial judge did not give appropriate weight to the relapse even in light of the significant progress mother had made and the fact that, otherwise, Donna was well cared for. In my view, the argument that the judge did not assign the incident determinative weight is not a proper basis upon which to premise reversal. This is particularly so in light of the trial court’s intimate and thorough familiarity with the case. The trial judge has overseen this dependency proceeding for almost two years.
A review of the February hearing which is the subject of this appeal reveals sufficient testimony to support the court’s determination not to remove Donna from her mother’s custody. Background of the case reveals that Donna was first adjudicated delinquent in December, 1988, when she was only about seven months old and was placed in the foster care of neighbors and close family friends, the Ed-gars. Henceforth commenced a series of frequent, closely monitored reviews and hearings, all of which occurred before the same trial judge. In general, the parties, particularly mother and child, have been represented by the same counsel throughout.
Reviews were held before the trial court on: February 24, 1989; June 7,1989; September 6, 1989. Finally, on December 6,1989, after being satisfied that mother had made both substantial efforts and progress in conquering her alcohol *216abuse problem and had demonstrated her ability to care for her child, the trial judge returned Donna to her mother’s custody. The court also ordered that the foster family be permitted regular visits. At the December 6, 1989, hearing the trial court found that the progress mother had made was “as good a report as [he] had gotten for reunification”.
Oversight continued, however, and in February, 1990, Donna was again removed from the mother’s care and replaced with the foster family. This occurred as a result of a domestic dispute at mother’s home which was precipitated by alcohol abuse. Another review took place on May 9, 1990, which indicated that mother was participating in an alcohol rehabilitation program, receiving counseling and attending regular AA meetings. Further review was scheduled for August 10, 1990.
On August 10, 1990, the trial court once again returned Donna to her mother's custody. The trial court found that mother had steadily progressed “in dealing with her alcoholism, parenting skills, and personal and domestic problems”. Mother’s therapist reported that she was doing well, there was no evidence of a relapse into former problems and as a result CYS recommended that Donna be returned to her mother. The Edgars were permitted continued access to Donna and a review was scheduled for February 8, 1991.
At the February hearing it came to the court’s attention, through the testimony of the CYS caseworker, that on January 29, 1991, mother had been stopped for drunk driving and that Donna was with her in the car, unrestrained by a carseat. The CYS caseworker indicated that, aside from this incident, the gravity of which no one diminished, mother was “doing well ... attending therapy and ____[that] Donna is doing well with her mother”.
In fact, the caseworker reiterated later in the hearing that “[t]here has never been a concern about how [the child] has been cared for.” The seriousness of this episode prompted extensive questioning of the mother by the trial judge regarding the circumstances which led up to this dangerous breach of parental responsibility. Apparently, *217the mother’s sincerity and credibility convinced the trial court “that she has learned a lesson from this serious, but isolated, failure on her part and that it will not be repeated.” Therefore, the trial court continued Donna’s custody with her mother.
Between August 10, 1990, when the trial court returned Donna to her mother’s custody for the second time, and February 8, 1991, the record reveals consistent headway on mother’s part towards conquering her alcohol problems. It is clear from the record that the trial court took very seriously the lapse in judgment and responsibility which was represented by the January 29th incident. It is without any foundation, in my view, to conclude as the majority did that the trial court “did not seem to take into account the past behavioral and domestic problems of the mother.” The trial court was exceedingly aware of and sensitive to mother’s past problems and had in fact removed the child from her custody twice before. However, on February 8, the evidence overwhelmingly substantiated the trial judge’s conclusion that mother’s significant overall progress and ability to provide proper parental care outweighed the isolated incident relied upon by CYS to recommend removal.
The majority seems to think that the trial judge lacked sufficient information to make a decision at the February hearing. Even counsel for Donna concedes in its brief to this court that it would have been absurd to demand or expect that CYS or Donna’s counsel be required to recount the history of the case to the trial judge who had presided over this proceeding from the start. Appellants presumed, rightly, that the judge knew the case extremely well, having conducted periodic hearings every three months for two years. The nature of the “full and complete record” which the majority now remands to establish is unclear. In my view, despite its protestations, the majority is doing precisely what this court must not do in reviewing custody decisions such as this one, and that is, substituting its judgment for that of the trial court which has conscientiously and painstakingly followed the case from its inception. I be*218lieve that the trial court, with its unique opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and place the case in proper context, is in a far better position than is this court to appreciate and decide the best interests of Donna and the ability of her mother to properly care for her. I would affirm the trial court’s considered order.