Court Opinion

ID: 9746433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:15:26.416564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:57.393444
License: Public Domain

*954BELSON, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I submit that the majority opinion plainly misapplies this jurisdiction’s law on the issue of notice of a cause of action for purposes of commencement of the period of limitations. Judge Braman applied the law correctly. Before discussing the majority opinion, I will quote briefly from our controlling precedents and then set forth the most salient facts.
I.
Recently, we summarized the relevant principles of law regarding limitations of actions in Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, 785 A.2d 296, 298-99 (D.C.2001), as follows:
As a general rule, “where the fact of an injury can be readily determined," a claim accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations at the time the injury actually occurs.” Colbert v. Georgetown University, 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C.1994) (en banc). But when “the relationship between the fact of injury and the alleged tortious conduct [is] obscure,” this court determines when the claim accrues through application of the discovery rule, i.e., the statute of limitations will not run until plaintiffs know or reasonably should have known that they suffered injury due to the defendants’ wrongdoing. Id. at 472-73. [Footnote omitted.]
We have made it clear that “for a cause of action to accrue where the discovery rule is applicable, one must know or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know (1) of the injury, (2) its cause in fact, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing.” East v. Graphic Arts Industry Joint Pension Trust, 718 A.2d 153, 157 (D.C.1998) (quoting Bussineau v. President & Dirs. of Georgetown College, 518 A.2d 423, 435 (D.C.1986)).
In Hendel v. World Plan Executive Council, 705 A.2d 656, 661 (D.C.1997), we explained that the discovery rule does not allow the plaintiff to “defer legal action indefinitely if she knows or should know that she may have suffered injury and that the defendant may have caused her harm,” stating:
[A] right of action may accrue before the plaintiff becomes aware of all of the relevant facts. “It is not necessary that all or even the greater part of the damages ... occur before the [right] of action arises.” Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). Any “appreciable and actual harm flowing from the [defendant’s] conduct” is sufficient. Id. “[T]he law of limitations requires only that [the plaintiff] have inquiry notice of the existence of a cause of action....” Colbert, supra, 641 A.2d at 473 (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. A.H. Robins Co., 613 F.Supp. 994, 996 (D.D.C.1985)).
Hendel held that, as a matter of law, the court had to ascertain whether “Ms. Hen-del was placed on inquiry notice prior to September 1, 1986, of the possibility that she had suffered appreciable harm as a result of the wrongful conduct of the defendants.” Id. (emphasis added). Hendel also pointed out that a plaintiffs actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant facts must be assessed under an objective “reasonable person” standard. Id.
II.
Since the majority opinion sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history extensively, I will summarize only the facts that bear on the question whether appellee Medlantic Healthcare Group (the hospital) was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ■ The hospital established that Doe should have reasonably inferred on April 25, 1996, that he had suffered an injury *955inflicted by Tijuana Goldring’s dissemination of confidential information contained in and taken from Doe’s hospital record and — even assuming arguendo that there was not such actual notice — that he had inquiry notice before the end of April 1990. Appellant filed this action on May 20,1997. Thus, we examine what occurred on or before May 20,1996.
• In April of 1996, appellant Doe and witness Tijuana Goldring were part-time evening employees of a company that provided cleaning services at the United States Department of State (State).
• Appellant, who had not disclosed to his coworkers at State that he was HIV positive, was hospitalized at the Washington Hospital Center (operated by Medlantic) on April 13-16, 1996, and returned there for an outpatient follow-up on April 23,1996.
• While at the hospital on April 23, he paid a “courtesy call” on Tijuana Goldring, who was a part-time receptionist there during the day. During their conversation, Goldring asked Doe to spell his unusual last name, ostensibly so that she could send him a card. Doe never received such a card from Goldring.
• Doe received the customary card and cash gift given to all ill employees from his coworkers at State. Since he had informed a supervisor at State on April 13 that he was entering the hospital and would be on sick leave, his coworkers knew he was ill. He did not disclose the nature of his illness to his supervisor.
• On April 26, Doe returned to State while still on sick leave to pick up his paycheck. Before entering the building, he encountered two coworkers, Derek Nelson and Gordon Bannister, who were laughing. When Nelson “stunned” Doe by stating, “Hey motherfucker, I hear you’re dying of AIDS,” Bannister had a smile on his face.
• After Doe entered the building, he encountered coworker Donnell Fuell, who greeted him with “Hey, Tom, Tijuana [Goldring is] going around here telling everyone you got AIDS.” Fuell did not tell Doe at that time that Goldring had also informed him that she obtained the information from the hospital. According to Doe, “When Donnell told me that Tijuana was spreading rumors, he wasn’t joking with me, he was serious.... ”
• Over the ensuing weekend, Doe called a coworker and friend, Ms. Willie Jones, to inquire whether she had heard the rumor that Doe had AIDS. When Jones acknowledged that she had, Doe failed to ask her how she learned of the rumor and whether the source was Goldring, as Fuell had told him.
• On April 29, 1996, Doe’s first day back at work, he approached Goldring “one on one and asked her if she was spreading the rumors .... ” She denied it but, Doe acknowledged, did not appear surprised when he told her Fuell had informed him that she was spreading the rumors.
• Later that day, Doe approached Fuell and Goldring while they were together and told Fuell that “Tijuana said she did not say that.” Notwithstanding his statement to Doe four days before, Fuell looked at Goldring and asked ‘What’s he talking about?” She replied, despite having spoken about the matter earlier in the day with Doe, “I don’t know what he talking about.” Fuell and Goldring immediately left and went about their work.
*956• Doe testified that after April 25, 1996, his experience at his job was a “living hell” because he was teased, scorned, and made fun of in numerous ways. Some coworkers became nicer to him and treated him with pity, but he did not “want their pity.”
• Between April 29 and May 20, 1996, Doe failed to ask Fuell to explain why on April 29 in front of Goldring he feigned ignorance as to what Doe was talking about, in light of what he had told Doe on April 25.
• Between April 29 and May 20, 1996, Doe also neglected to ask Goldring further about the matter, and also failed to ask Nelson, Bannister, or any of his other taunters the source of their information. Prior to May 20, Bannister had learned from Donnell that Goldring’s source was the hospital. Finally, Doe also neglected to ask Ms. Willie Jones before May 20, 1996, whether she was aware of the source of the rumor.
• In April of 1996, Doe telephoned a friend, Edward Coles, who knew of his condition. When asked by Doe’s counsel whether Doe had described the “problems he had with the Washington Hospital Center and Tijuana Goldr-ing,” Co'le responded “[y]es, he did,” and that Doe was “angry about what happened ... he told me he was angry about what happened .... ”
• On May 20, Fuell questioned Doe about his health in the presence of a group of coworkers gathered at the time clock. Doe answered “I’m fíne.” Fuell asked Goldring ‘What’s up with that, T (Goldring’s nickname)”? Doe testified that Goldring’s silence together with a hand motion she made “confirmed to [him] in [his] mind that [Goldring] actually [looked at his file . and spread the rumor].”
• Doe testified that once he concluded that Goldring had spread the rumor, he inferred that she had obtained the information from the hospital records.
• The next day, May 21, Doe telephoned the hospital and spoke with a vice-president who informed him that the type of dissemination of information that Doe said had occurred was against hospital policy and the laws of the District of Columbia.
Hi.
Following the jury’s verdict, which included inter alia a finding against the hospital on the one-year statute of limitations issue that was framed in terms of the discovery rule, the hospital filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a new trial. One of the hospital’s bases for its motions was that the statute of limitations barred appellant’s action as a matter of law. Several weeks later, the court issued a twenty-four page opinion, the first nine pages of which set forth the trial judge’s reasons for granting judgment as a matter of law on the limitations issue.
In rejecting Judge Braman’s reasoning and reversing, the majority states that “the trial court erred in several respects. First, the court’s findings indicate that it found what it considered reasonable under the circumstances without deferring to the jury’s reasonable conclusions on the issue of accrual.” (Majority Opinion at 947).
To the contrary, I submit, the trial judge demonstrated that he was well aware of the respective roles of judge and jury, and correctly stated that it is true “that in most cases involving a discovery rule, the issue of when the statute begins to run is a jury question. But there are cases, like Hendel, supra, 705 A.2d 656, and Colbert, supra, 641 A.2d 469, where reasonable *957minds cannot differ based on the evidence of record.”1 I agree with the trial judge that this is such a case.2
Further, with respect to the asserted trial court error, the majority states that in making his findings, Judge Braman “mischaracterized or ignored the testimony of Fuell, Coles and Doe, and failed to draw reasonable inferences favorable to Doe.” (Majority Opinion at 947). This appraisal of the trial court’s opinion is not warranted. The majority gives several reasons for this assessment, but only one of them has any substance, and that aspect did not compromise the trial court’s analysis.
One criticism is that the trial judge “seems to have drawn his own inferences,- — contrary to those of the jury — in concluding that Coles testified” that in April of 1996 Doe told him he was angry with Goldring and the hospital. (Majority Opinion at 947). Attempting to explain how the trial judge somehow erred in accurately recounting Coles’ testimony, the majority says that the transcript “reveals [ ] that Doe’s counsel incorporated the mention of Goldring and the hospital into his questions, while Coles himself did not testify directly that Doe was ‘angry1 in April 1996.” It is unsound, I suggest, to disconnect questions from answers to blunt the effect of Coles’ response that in April of 1996 Doe said he was angry at Goldring and the hospital. The majority opinion speculates that perhaps the jury thought the witness incorrectly recalled details of the conversation, including its date. The testimony of Coles speaks for itself.3
*958The majority opinion offers that even if Coles’ testimony was as Judge Braman interpreted it, the judge ignored the testimony of Doe who stated that he did not come to believe that Goldring- and Washington Hospital Center were responsible until May 20, 1996. (Majority Opinion at 948). But this criticism ignores the principle that the standards by which the discovery rule is applied are objective. Doe had the obligation under the discovery rule to interpret reasonably what was being said to him and done to him, and to inquire diligently into the matters involving the words and actions of his coworkers on and after April 25, 1996. See Hendel, supra, 705 A.2d at 661.
The majority also states that the trial judge “found that Doe knew Goldring had access to the hospital’s medical records of non-employees” (Majority Opinion at 948) despite the absence of any testimony to that effect. This criticism, however, ignores Doe’s own testimony that as soon as he concluded that Goldring was the wrongdoer, he inferred that she obtained the information from the hospital and that, indeed, is what the trial court indicated when it quoted plaintiffs testimony.4 Within one day, Doe contacted the hospital and learned enough to conclude that it was quite likely that the hospital had not adequately safeguarded the confidentiality of its medical records.
The majority also faults the trial court for characterizing Goldring’s request for Doe’s last name as a “transparent ploy” (Majority Opinion at 948) when Doe in fact received a get well card at a later date from other coworkers at the State Department. But Goldring did not in fact send Doe a card, and was not one of the employees who took part in organizing the sending of such cards. Doe’s hospitalization and absence on sick leave were known among his co-employees, who sent him the customary card on the week he returned to work. Once Doe became aware through the direct statement of Fuell on April 25 that Goldring was spreading the rumor that he had AIDS, he like anybody else could reasonably have viewed Goldring’s request for the spelling of his unusual name as a transparent ploy.
The only factual reference by the trial judge cited by the majority that is not fully consistent with the transcript was to the effect that on April 25, Fuell not only told Doe of the rumor that Goldring was spreading, but also stated the hospital was the source of her information. Significantly, however, the trial judge did not repeat that misstatement in the two subsequent passages of his opinion in which he stated his reasons for concluding, that Doe, had ample notice on April 25 to trigger the statute and that Doe did not diligently pursue inquiry notice. In the first such subsequent passage, the trial judge referred only to Goldring’s being the one who started the rumor (not to where Fuell said she got the information); in the second, the trial judge correctly noted that Doe based his lack of knowledge argument *959in part on Fuell’s not telling him until after May 20 that Goldring obtained the information from the hospital records. Thus, the trial court’s initial misstatement, later restated correctly, does not undercut the trial court’s result. Of greater importance, even without any statement to Doe on April 25 that Goldring said she obtained the information from the hospital, the proposition that the statute began to run before May 20, 1996, is correct as a matter of law.
The majority’s essential conclusion is that Doe exercised reasonable diligence by engaging in the two conversations with Goldring and Fuell on April 29, and then being satisfied by them that Fuell was just joking on April 25 and that Goldring’s denials could reasonably be accepted. Due diligence, the majority concludes, required no more, and was satisfied despite Doe’s remaining passive until the fortuitous events of May 20.
To the contrary, I submit, Doe could not reasonably have been satisfied with Fuell’s response on April 29 when in Goldring’s presence Doe told Fuell of Goldring’s denial, i.e., his saying, “What’s he talking about” to Goldring and then returning to his duties with no further explanation. Clearly, due diligence required that Doe ask Fuell further about the matter outside the presence of Goldring as soon as his daily work at State permitted, and that he ask Fuell about the inconsistency between Fuell’s April 25 statement and his evasive answer of April 29. A reasonable inquiry of Fuell could have been expected 'to bring out the fact that Goldring had already informed Fuell that she obtained the information from the hospital.
Likewise, Goldring’s answer that she didn’t know what Doe was talking about could not have been reasonably satisfactory to Doe, not only because Goldring clearly knew what he was talking about, but also because Doe had had his conversation with Goldring at the hospital just before the damaging leak of medical information was spread among his coworkers. Doe also failed to inquire further of his friend Ms. Willie Jones, to ask her what she could tell him about the source of the rumors once life became a “living hell” for him at his job. Likewise, he could have inquired of other coworkers — Bannister, for example, who testified that he knew before May 20 that Goldring was the source of the rumor and that she had told Fuell that she obtained the information from the hospital.
A reading of Judge Braman’s opinion also refutes the majority’s statement that he “disregarded Doe’s efforts to investigate the source of the rumors and the effect of Goldring’s subsequent denial of responsibility, contrary to our holding in Diamond” (citation omitted) (Majority Opinion at 948). As just explained, Doe’s efforts to investigate those matters were feeble and short-lived and, despite the harsh atmosphere created by his coworkers, the unfortunate Doe took no further steps to pursue the matter until the fortuitous occurrence of May 20.
The majority’s statement that “summary judgment is improper where there is a disputed question about plaintiffs diligence in investigating a possible cause of action” (Majority Opinion at 945-46) is far too sweeping. The mere fact that the parties dispute whether a plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence does not preclude the granting of summary judgment (or of a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law) in circumstances in which, as in this case, on the undisputed facts, the plaintiff did not act with reasonable diligence. The majority’s reliance on Ezra Company v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, DC, 687 A.2d 587, 593 (D.C.1996), is misplaced. Ezra held that a plaintiff, who argued fraudulent conceal*960ment, could not be held as a matter of law to have acted with less than reasonable diligence when he accepted the assurances of two principles of the corporate defendant that they and the corporation had not violated the corporation’s agreement giving plaintiff exclusive rights to serve as its real estate broker.
The majority suggests that Doé was entitled to presume that the hospital would honor its confidential relationship with him before assuming that actions of Goldring were evidence of the hospital’s negligence. (Majority Opinion at 948). Doe himself convincingly refuted that position by stating that as soon as he decided that Goldr-ing was the wrongdoer, he inferred that she got the information from the hospital. A telephone call to the hospital was all that Doe needed to ascertain that the hospital had failed to enforce its policy (and, Doe was told by a hospital vice-president, the laws of the District of Columbia) forbid: ding this type of dissemination of confidential medical information.
The essential weakness in Doe’s case is that under the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to him, he simply failed to pursue the matter with reasonable diligence after he was first informed that Goldring was indeed the culprit. The trial judge’s ruling was correct and the judgment as a matter of law for the hospital should be affirmed.5

. The majority states, "Although what constitutes the accrual of a cause of action is a question of law, when accrual actually occurred in a particular case is a question of fact for the fact finder." (Majority Opinion at 945) ( citing Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 770-71 (D.C.1998)). As Heridel, supra, and Colbert, supra, hold, however, there are cases where the controlling facts are uncontested and when accrual occurred becomes a matter of law.

. In discussing Doe’s argument that the trial judge erred in substituting his credibility determinations for those of the jury and failing to give Doe the benefit of reasonable inferences, the majority understates Medlantic’s position as being "that the rumors at work of Doe’s medical condition were enough to put Doe on inquiry notice...” (Majority Opinion at 946).
Similarly, in beginning its discussion of the application of the discovery rule, the majority writes that "Doe no doubt began to experience injury on April 25 when he returned to work and a co-worker harassed him about having AIDS ...,” (Majority Opinion at 947.) and goes on to recite Doe’s testimony that his time at work then became "a living hell" to acknowledge that Doe must have become aware that in some way his medical privacy had been violated. (Id.) The majority concludes, "That is not enough, however, to put him on inquiry notice.” The glaring omission in both of the two majority formulations of the hospital’s position is the majority’s failure to acknowledge that on Doe’s first return to his workplace on April 25, 1996, Fuell told him point blank that hospital employee Tijuana Goldring was telling everybody that he had AIDS. That salient fact, while noted in other parts of the majority opinion, deserves inclusion in any summary of appellee's position regarding inquiry notice.

.The following is an excerpt from appellant’s counsel’s direct examination of witness Coles, who had been a social acquaintance of appellant for over twenty-five years:
Q. Did you learn about — did there come a time when you learned about his problem with Tijuana Goldring and Washington Hospital Center?
A. He told me about the incident. When it first occurred, in the sense of after having come back to work from the illness and being approached by different innuendoes and people approaching him.
Q. You don't have to tell us sort of a blow-by-blow what he told you, but did he describe to you the problems he had with the Washington Hospital Center and Tijuana Goldring?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And when he told you those problems, were you aware -
*958THE COURT: When did he do that, sir?
THE WITNESS: When did he? The exact date, I’m thinking, is right after he got out the hospital.
So I think it was in '96 sometime.
THE COURT: Pardon me.
THE WITNESS: In April of '96, I believe.
Q. So it's your testimony he did not convey his feelings to you?
A. Well, his feelings — He was angry about what happened. I could detect that and, you know, he told me he was angry about what happened, but that's basically—
(Emphasis added).

. The trial court did not find that Doe knew that Goldring “had access” to such records, which has a different connotation.

. In light of my view of the merits of Doe's appeal, I would not reach the hospital's cross-appeal. I do not disagree with the majority's treatment of the cross-appeal.