Court Opinion

ID: 9884522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:00:30.812292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:38.726077
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s ruling that this appeal should not be dismissed as moot because there clearly remains a controverted issue between the parties. Assuming the case is moot, I believe the court should nevertheless address the legal questions raised because they present a question of substantial public interest (Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 170 (1997); Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 395 (1994)). The circuit court erred in narrowly interpreting section 17 not to include the Village’s zoning decision approving Advocate’s planned development (PD) or the Board’s decision to issue a certificate of need for the Wellness Center. The Village had an obligation to consult with the IDNR under section 17. Because the Village’s zoning decision authorized Advocate to proceed with construction likely to have an adverse impact on a natural area (525 ILCS 30/17 (West 1996)), the Village was required to engage in consultation with the IDNR. As the Village’s zoning decision “authorized” the construction of the Wellness Center and the Board’s decision to issue the certificate of need “authorized” the building’s use as a health facility, these were unquestionably “actions *** authorized *** by” state or local government under section 17 of the Act. Section 17 is clear on its face. That section applies to “the actions, including capital projects, that are authorized, funded, or carried out by [an] agency of State or local government.” 525 ILCS 30/17 (West 1996). Illinois courts have held the word “authorized” to mean “given or endowed with authority” or “legally or duly sanctioned.” In re Disconnection of Certain Territory from the Sanitary District, 111 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344 (1982); see also People v. Shinn, 5 Ill. App. 3d 468, 472 (1972). These meanings are similar to the definition of “authorized,” i.e., “endowed with *** [or] sanctioned by authority,” provided in the standard dictionary regularly relied upon by this court (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 147 (1986)). Based on the meanings associated with the term “authorized” and on the explanation given in Black’s Law Dictionary that “ ‘ [authorized’ ” may be construed as meaning “ ‘permitted’ ” or “ ‘directed’ ” (Black’s Law Dictionary 133 (6th ed. 1990)), I would find that section 17 encompasses the decisions of the Village and the Board in this case. Here, the Village “authorized” the construction of the Wellness Center because the Village gave permission for the construction by approving the amendment to Advocate’s planned development. No construction could have occurred without that approval. Because the Wellness Center was a “health facility,” it was necessary for the Board to grant a certificate of need. See 20 ILCS 3960/5 (West 1996). Therefore, the construction of the building and its use as a health facility were “actions *** authorized *** by” (525 ILCS 30/17 (West 1996)) these agencies because the actions were “legally or duly sanctioned” by them (In re Disconnection, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 344). The majority relies on its definition of the term “planning” in the first paragraph of section 17 to conclude that the legislature’s use of that term precludes this court from adopting the broad dictionary definition of the term “authorized” advocated by plaintiffs and the IDNR. The majority, however, has not gleaned its definition of planning from the dictionary normally employed by this court but, instead, looks to another source. Based upon this court’s past reliance on Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, the majority should have used the definition of planning set out in that dictionary, i.e., “the act or process of making or carrying out plans,” specifically, “the establishment of goals, policies, and procedures for a social or economic unit.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1731 (1986). In light of this definition, I believe the language “planning of any action” in section 17 refers, in particular, to those actions undertaken by a governmental agency, whereas the language “the actions *** authorized” by a governmental agency, as set forth in the second paragraph of section 17, refers to the actions of not only public agencies but also other parties. Moreover, the use of “shall” in that paragraph indicates the mandatory nature of the consultation process. See Village of Winfield v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 176 Ill. 2d 54, 64 (1997) (use of the word “shall” in a statute generally indicates a mandatory obligation). By not engaging in a consultation with the IDNR concerning the environmental impact of Advocate’s project prior to authorizing the action, the Village did not comply with the legislature’s intent in enacting section 17. Based upon my interpretation of the terms “planning” and “au- ■' thorized,” I believe the language of section 17 is clear. Therefore, under the rules of statutory construction, no further analysis is required. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The best indicator of that intent is the language used in the statute itself (In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 195 (1997)), which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. Because the language is clear, no construction is necessary as permitted. The statute must be given effect as written without resort to legislative history if the meaning of the provision can be determined from its text (Nevitt v. Langfelder, 157 Ill. 2d 116, 134 (1993)) and without reading into the statute “exceptions, conditions, or limitations that the legislature did not express” (Moon v. Smith, 276 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962 (1995)). As the plain language of section 17 is clear, we need not resort to other interpretive aids to ascertain legislative intent. To support its decision, the majority cites a comment by Senator Severas from the legislative debate about projects “funded with public dollars” and another exchange in the Senate about private properties. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 298. However, where a statute is clear on its face, a basic rule of statutory construction “forbids a court to canvass legislative history for evidence of legislative intent.” Nevitt, 157 Ill. 2d at 134. Because section 17 is clear (and the majority nowhere describes how it is ambiguous), no examination of the legislative history is proper. Additionally, Senator Severas’ remark regarding section 17 reflected the view of a single legislator. Isolated statements from floor debates standing alone are insufficient to establish legislative intent. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 150 Ill. App. 3d 304, 307 (1986). Most important, the reference by Senator Severas to “projects funded with public dollars” (302 Ill. App. 3d at 298) is inconsistent with the language of section 17 itself, which also mentions actions “authorized” or “carried out” by the government. Comments by legislators are an aid to construction only when consistent with the statutory language. 2A N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 48.13, at 356 (5th ed. 1992). Even assuming section 17 is ambiguous in some respect, I would, contrary to the majority’s position, rely on the decisions of the federal courts that have interpreted the meaning of “actions *** authorized, funded, or carried out by” agencies of state or local government. That phrase, as well as the consultation procedure of section 17 itself, was drawn from identical provisions providing for consultation under section 11(b) of the Illinois Endangered Species Protection Act (520 ILCS 10/11(b) (West 1996)). Section 11(b) requires consultation relating to “actions authorized, funded or carried out by” agencies of local government. 520 ILCS 10/11(b) (West 1996). This provision of the Illinois Endangered Species Protection Act was based on section 7(a)(2) of the federal Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)). That section applies to every agency and to “any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency” (hereinafter referred to as agency action) (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994)). The federal courts have repeatedly been called upon to interpret the statutory language of section 7(a)(2) of the federal Endangered Species Act. Their decisions confirm that the language is both clear and broad. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978). The Supreme Court observed that “[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act” and declared that “[t]his language admits of no exception.” Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 173, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 133, 98 S. Ct. at 2291. Lower federal courts “have also construed ‘agency action’ broadly.” Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1994); Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992). They have required consultation under section 7 not only for projects “carried out” by the government but also for private activity “authorized” by the government. See, e.g., Pacific Rivers Council, 30 F.3d at 1054-55; Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. United States Department of the Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990). When an Illinois statute is modeled after a federal statute, federal decisions construing the federal statute should be used in interpreting our statute. County of Kane v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 165 Ill. App. 3d 614, 620 (1988). Consequently, assuming ambiguity, I would also rely on the interpretation given by the federal courts to section 7 of the federal Endangered Species Act as an aid in interpreting the language in question in section 17 and conclude that, under section 17, the Village was required to engage in consultation with the IDNR concerning the environmental impact Advocate’s construction of the Wellness Center would have on adjacent Lyman Woods. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.