Court Opinion

ID: 9671617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:40:33.73267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.020219
License: Public Domain

Roberds, J.,
dissenting.
I agree the judgment should be affirmed against Par-tee and Cox, but I do not think any negligence has been shown on the part of the Bus Lines. The declaration *837grounded negligence against the Bus Lines on the fact of stopping the bus at the time and place and under the circumstances hereinafter shown. It did not, when tested by rules properly applicable to pleading, charge any negligence in the manner of bringing the bus to a stop. Counsel for plaintiffs clearly recognized and admitted that by asking permission of the court to amend the declaration and charge that the Bus Lines “suddenly decreased” its speed, without giving a “warning” signal. That was made after the testimony was all in, both sides had rested and the court had overruled a motion for a peremptory instruction on liability of the Bus Lines. The trial court admitted the testimony under his conception that the allegations of the declaration charged “general” negligence. However, in this dissent, in considering the question of negligence of the Bus Lines, I will discuss the testimony applicable both to the manner of stopping, and the fact that the bus was stopped, at the time and place in question. And it is of the utmost importance to clarity and justice to recognize, at the outset, that the Bus Lines had the right, and, indeed, it was its duty, to stop the bus and pick up the passengers at this time and place. This was a straight road for over a mile in distance. The pavement was twenty feet wide, with good, safe shoulders of five to sis feet in width on either side of the pavement where the bus stopped. In other words, the road was thirty to thirty-two feet wide. The bus had stopped at this place and discharged and picked up passengers for years. The specific question of the right to stop the bus for boarding and departing passengers was involved in Teche Lines, Inc. v. Dan-forth, et al., 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784. In that case the pavement was twenty feet wide and the shoulders on each side were three and one-half feet wide, “making a total width of twenty-seven feet. ’ ’ The stop was about half way down an incline. The bus was about eight feet wide, as here, “so that when some room was left to the passenger to alight on the shoulder, and not in the ditch, *838it was impossible to leave twenty feet clearance opposite the bns. ’ ’ An instruction told the jury that ‘ ‘ if less than twenty feet clearance was left by the bus, this was negligence.” In denying that contention this Court, construing Section 90, Chapter 200, Laws 1938, said:
“The central principle, which runs through all the cases dealing with statutes regulatory of highway traffic is that such statutes must have a practical or workable interpretation, not an arbitrary or unreasonable construction, and never that which would require an impossibility; and this has been the rule from the earliest enactments of such statutes down to this day. We do not prolong this opinion by going into a review of pertinent cases from other states. Hundreds of them are cited and annotated in the elaborate note found in 131 A. L. R., pp. 562 to 607, among which we might mention Kelly v. Locke, 186 Ga. 620, 198 S. E. 754, as particularly persuasive. No case has been cited by appellee, nor have we found any, which under its particular facts would sustain the quoted instruction under facts such as are presented by the record here before us. * * *
“While admitting, as must be admitted, that impossibilities are not required by any statute whatever its subject, it has been argued that when impossible to stop so as to leave as much as 20 feet clearance, the vehicle must keep going until a place may be found where the required clearance can be left, and that argument has proceeded so far as to say that if this require a going-forward of ten miles or even farther, this must be done or else the statute would be violated.
“This Court may, and it is its duty to, take judicial knowledge of what everyone knows who has been beyond his own door sill, that at least 85% of the public highways of this state are of such width that it is only occasionally possible, and this often at distant intervals, to stop a vehicle so as to leave as much as twenty feet of unobstructed highway to the side of the vehicle. To give the statute in question the literal or hard and fast con*839struction for which appellees contend would lead to un-thought of and absurd consequences, which every experienced member of the legislature would be bound to disclaim as ever having been in his mind as a deliberate conclusion. It is enough to say of this that if such a construction could be sustained and enforced, it would dislocate and put out of business the rural mail delivery service on not less than 75% of the rural routes in the state, and a husband could not pick up his wife trudging homeward from the rural grocery store in the rain, or even to attend to a wounded or sick person found on the roadside. * * *
“Aside from absurdity or unthought of consequences, we may advance a step, and a very vital step, further, and to the following inescapable consideration: ‘ The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. ’ Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579, 583, 71 A. L. R. 604, 610. There seems to be no dissent among the authorities on this proposition. See 11 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law, Sec. 329, p. 1135, and the language of the Court in Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N. W. 579, 7 L. R. A. 507, 18 Am. St. Rep. 473.
“The right to travel means, of course, the right to go from one place to another. It includes the right (1) to start, (2) to go forward on the way, and (3) to stop when the traveler’s destination has been reached. To speak of the first two of these as fundamental rights without including the third would be to descend again to the absurd, *840and so far as the instant case is concerned that is what we have here. Bnt we do not so limit the right. We affirm that it includes the right to stop on the way, temporarily, for a legitimate or necessary purpose when that purpose is an immediate incident to travel. So it is that the texts and authorities declare that the right to stop when the occasion demands is an incident to the right to travel, a proposition so completely self-evident that no authority is necessary to sustain it, and which we would pronounce irrefutable, had it never heretofore been mentioned. But here are some of the authorities which do declare and sustain it. 2 Blashfield Automobile Law, Perm. Ed., Sec. 1191, p. 321; Fulton v. Chouteau County Farmers’ Co., 98 Mont. 48, 37 P. 2d 1025; Morton v. Mooney, 97 Mont. 1, 33 P. 2d 262, 263; Albrecht v. Waterloo Const. Co., 218 Iowa 1205, 257 N. W. 183. When, then, the right to stop is arbitrarily or unreasonably restricted, or cut off by statutory enactment, the statute is as objectionable from a constitutional standpoint as had the enactment prevented going forward.
“The rights aforesaid, being fundamental, are constitutional rights, and while the exercise thereof may be reasonably regulated by legislative act in pursuance of the police power of the State, and although those powers are broad, they do not rise above those privileges which are imbedded in the constitutional structure. The police power cannot justify the enactment of any law which amounts to an arbitrary and unwarranted interference with, or unreasonable restriction on, those rights of the citizen which are fundamental. State v. Armstead, 103 Miss. 790, 799, 60 So. 778, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 495.
“Since, as already mentioned, this Court must take judicial knowledge of what everybody knows, namely, that at least 85% of the public highways in this State are of such width that it is only occasionally possible, and this at distant intervals, to stop a vehicle so as to leave as much as twenty feet of unobstructed highway, which *841would mean that over long stretches of our public roads no vehicle could stop without violating the law, if. that clause in the statute which requires that in any event twenty-foot clearance shall be left is to be enforced according to its literal terms, detached from the remainder of the statute, the result would be an unreasonable and arbitrary abridgment of the right to travel, thus, rendering the statute unconstitutional when so interpreted, and to the extent so interpreted. ’ ’
And what is the testimony as to the manner of bringing the bus to a stop, in the case at bar ? The accident happened about 11:30 on Saturday morning. It was a clear day. The bus was making its usual trip from Columbus, Mississippi, to Jackson, Mississippi. It stopped at Larson’s store, a half mile north of the scene of the accident. It started up and pulled back into the highway. Smithson said he was then about a quarter of a mile north of the bus, and the cattle truck was three-tenths of a mile north of the Smithson truck. The bus continued south, gaining some momentum until he was running some forty to forty-five miles. No one claims the bus, in covering that distance, ever ran over forty-five miles an hour. Indeed, the great preponderance of the testimony, including that of many of the passengers on the bus, was that it never got over forty miles. But within that distance of one-half mile Smithson had caught up with the bus and Partee had caught up with Smithson. Now, all of the testimony is to the effect that some three hundred feet before reaching the passengers who were flagging the bus to stop, the bus began to gradually slow down. Smithson and the bus driver said that; a number of the passengers testified to that effect, as did Hardy, one of the prospective passengers and the one who was flagging the bus. Indeed, not a witness said otherwise. The testimony of all these and several other passengers said the slow down was gradual. Some described the slowing down as “real slow”; some as “very normal”: *842most of them as “smooth.” So we have some eight or ten witnesses testifying that the method of stopping was in a proper manner and evidenced skill, care and caution. Not a witness testified otherwise. These witnesses, other than Welch, the driver of the bus, had not. the slightest interest in the outcome of this lawsuit, except that it is conceivable that Smithson, to exculpate himself, might have had an interest in showing that the bus was negligent, yet he never testified to one fact showing that. All of these witnesses were in position to know the facts. Again Smithson said the bus gave the proper signal it was going to stop. The rear stop-lights came on. He saw that; he knew the bus was slowing down to pick up passengers. Smithson said when the bus began to slow •down three hundred feet before the stop that he, Smithson, then put on his brakes. The bus began to gradually ease onto the right shoulder some 200 feet before reaching the awaiting passengers. None of this is contradicted. Partee could not contradict it, because he said he never saw the bus. He didn’t know it was in front of Smithson. The only possible contradiction of the proper manner of stopping this bus, mentioned in the majority opinion, is the statement that Smithson said that at one time he pushed down hard on his brakes. He did say that, but he explained when and why that happened. He said it happened when he was attempting to pass the bus, as it was slowing down and going onto the shoulders, and he saw the Klaas car approaching from the south and he then put on his brakes to get back behind the bus, which he did. Here is what Smithson said about that: “Q. * * * as you gained on the bus, when you get to within 300 feet back of the bus, then you saw the red stop light of the bus come on for the first time, didn’t you? A. Yes. Q. Then I believe you said that you did not apply your brakes immediately, did you? A. Almost immediately. Q. Was not the first thing that you did was to pull to the left a little to see.if you could pass the bus ? A. After *843I applied brakes. Q. You did not apply them very hard at that time, you said a moment ago you did not put on your brakes right at first? A. Not hardest. Q. Because your first impulse and your intention was to pass that bus, was it? A. Yes. Q. Then it was that you saw the Studebaker car going north? A. Yes. Q. Then yon pulled back to your right to get behind the bus, didn’t you? A. Yes. Q. If you had not pulled around in an attempt to get by the bus and then saw the Studebaker car, you could have stopped behind the bus any time you wanted to. In other words, as the bus came to a stop you came to a stop? A. Yes. Q. Is that right? A. Yes. Q. You had your truck fully under control at all times? A. Yes. Q. And you could have stopped, could you? A. Yes. Q. And you finally did stop, didn’t you? A. Yes.” Smithson repeatedly said he had his truck under control and could have stopped at any time. There was no jury issue as to the manner of stopping this bus. No witness found fault with that.
But it is argued that the position of the bus after it stopped established negligence contributing to the injury. This is the charge in the declaration: * * the driver of said passenger bus nevertheless negligently brought the same to a stop partly on the main traveled portion of said highway and without leaving sufficient space open on said highway for the safe passage of other vehicles thereon, and thereby created a condition of great, immediate and imminent danger to the occupants of all of said vehicles * * *” which resulted in said injuries. There are two answers to that contention — one is, that the proof shows without substantial contradiction that the bus got as far off the highway as it possibly could, and the other is that the position of the bus after it stopped had not the slightest causal connection with the accident.
The contention of appellees, on the stated issue of fact, and the basis of the majority holding, as I understand it, is that there was a dispute in the testimony as to whether *844the bus got as far off the paved part of the highway as it safely could do, and that the jury resolved that question against the Bus Lines.
As stated, the pavement' was twenty feet wide and the shoulders on either side were from five to six feet, the exact width not being shown. The bus was exactly eight feet one and a quarter inches in width. On the west side, where the bus stopped, a ditch ran north and south, .parallel with the road. This ditch was some two and a half to three feet deep and was approximately three to five feet across at the top. Considerable grass was upon this shoulder extending from the pavement to, and into, the ditch. Of course, the bus could not get down into this ditch, and prudence warned against getting too close to it, having due regard for the safety of the passengers on the bus. Seven witnesses testified directly as to the position of the bus, after it stopped, as related to the ditch.
Miss Ashley was a passenger on the bus. She lived in Jackson, Miss. She was a student at Holmes Junior College. . She got off the bus after the accident and after the bus stopped. She said “We had to step into the ditch to get out of the bus.” Asked the position of the bus as to the ditch, she said, “It pulled as far to the right as it could get.’’ In another place she said: “It pulled over just as far as it could possibly get. ’ ’
Miss Bolling was a passenger going from Ethel to Canton, Miss. She was sitting on the seat just behind the driver. She got off the bus. She was asked, “You got off. Where was the bus then with reference to the shoulder and pavement? A. Off as far as it could get; when I got off the bus I had to step down in the ditch.” Again she said “ * * * I had to go down in the ditch to get off the bus.’’ She was asked “When you got back in the bus how did you get in it?” and she replied “Caught ahold of the door and pulled up.” She said the ditch was about three feet deep, and getting back into the bus was rather difficult for her. She also said the bus *845was leaning towards the west because of its closeness to the edge of the ditch.
Mike Erickson was a passenger. He said in his opinion the bns conld not have gotten any closer to the ditch.
. Leonard Hardy was the man who flagged the hns to stop. He said when the bns pulled to the west he and his wife and children, who were going to hoard the bns, had to get into the ditch to avoid the bns striking them. He said “* * * When he pulled on the shoulder, when he began to crowd me I got in the ditch, where mother and children were.” The bus stopped even with him.
Mrs. Trudy Trantham lived in Jackson, Miss. She was a student at Holmes Junior College, Goodman, Miss. She was a passenger on the bus. She was asked if it was possible for the bus to go further to the right, and she replied “No, there was a ditch. I don’t believe — I don’t believe it would have been possible without his going over in the ditch. ’ ’
Welch, the driver, was asked: “Mr. Welch, would it have been possible for you to have gotten any further over with safety?” He replied “No.” He further said there was a “drop” in the shoulder of the ditch — “my bus was tilted just a little, leaning towards the field. ’ ’
Charles W. Smith, driving another passenger bus of the Bus Lines, arrived from the north at the scene of the accident within a few moments after it happened. He stopped his bus behind where the Welch bus was standing. He paid particular attention to the location of the Welch bus. Here is his examination on that: “ Q. Where were the right wheels situated, if you know, with relation to the edge of the shoulders. A. They were far over, over to the right. Q. How much, if any, shoulder was there remaining from the west side — on the west side of the bus? A. West side of the bus? Q. Yes. A. Was not any there. ’ ’
Every witness said the bus was parallel to the paved part of the highway.
*846It will be noted that these witnesses were in position to note and state the facts. Most of them got down into the ditch as they got onto and alighted from the bus. Not a witness contradicted the facts stated by them, unless, by inference, there is some slight contradiction in the testimony I now set out.
All of the witnesses, except Stringer and Stovall, placed the left wheels of the bus about two or two and a half feet upon the west edge of the pavement — some less than two feet. Stringer said he thought the bus was about half on and half off the highway. That would place the bus about four feet on the pavement. Of course, that was a mere estimate. Here was Stringer’s situation: He says he was driving south. He was behind the cattle truck. He did not see the accident. He thinks he was about the first man to arrive at the scene after the accident. He said the cattle were out of the cattle truck and running about some three hundred feet north of the scene of the accident. He was asked, “Approximately how far north of the accident did you meet these cattle? A. Oh, I met them, I judge, about 300 feet. ’ ’ He stopped and parked his car on the west side of the highway north of the passenger bus and the Smithson truck and rushed immediately across the road to aid those injured in the wreck. Now, it is just a matter of human reaction and common sense that he did not, under such- circumstances, pay attention to the position of the passenger bus.- He does not claim that he did that. He admits he was simply expressing an opinion and giving, as he said, an “approximate” estimate of the position of the passenger bus on the paved part of the highway.
Stovall was driving north some distance behind the Klaas car. He said he saw the Partee truck pull into the east traffic lane and collide with the Klaas car. He explained the movements of the colliding cars — how they came together, etc. He was, of course, meeting and passing the bus, and could not possibly have been paying *847much attention to it while noting the movements of the Partee truck and the Klaas car as they collided. But as to the position of the bus, he was asked: “Where did this bus stop with reference to pavement of the highway?” He replied “As well as I remember the bus was just about the shoulder, the right edge of the pavement, the rest of the bus was just about in line with the pavement, with the edge of the pavement. Q. That would make half of the bus on the west shoulder and half of the bus on the pavement? A. Yes.” In another place he said he thought that was about the position of the bus.
Neither witness claims to have seen the ditch nor does either undertake to say how close the right side of the bus was to the ditch. And any conclusion that their guess, or estimate, of the position of the bus on the pavement and shoulder, made under the above circumstances, should prevail over the positive, direct testimony of the several other witnesses, who were right at the bus and in position to note, with accuracy, its position, would be against the great weight of the testimony. However, we may concede that Stringer and Stovall were accurate in their estimates, yet there was no negligence on the part of the passenger bus. Their testimony places the right side, or steps, of the bus within two feet of the top of the ditch, even giving plaintiffs the benefit of as much as six-foot shoulder, and the estimate of the width of the shoulder is five to six feet. Surely it cannot be said to be negligence on the part of the bus not to drive closer than two feet of this ditch. Two feet, even according to the estimates of Stringer and Stovall, was the space afforded passengers in boarding and alighting from the bus. I cannot conceive that negligence can be based upon that situation. Indeed, had some passenger been injured by falling into the ditch, when only two feet had been provided for entering and leaving the bus, the injured person, with plausible reason, might have claimed it was negligence not to leave more space than the two feet. The testimony of *848Stringer and Stovall, accepted in its broadest implications favorable to plaintiff, and disregarding all other testimony on the question, could not possibly establish negligence on the part of the Bus Lines.
But, under the testimony in this record, the position of the bus, after it had stopped, had no causal connection, whatever with the accident. The bus had not come to a stop when the Klaas car met and passed it. The entire east paved lane, in which the Klaas car was traveling, and at least five feet of the west paved lane, were clear. Smithson had attempted to pull out and pass the bus; saw the Klaas car coming, put on his brakes and pulled back behind the bus — all before the Klaas car ever met the bus. By actual measurements, and by undisputed testimony, the collision between the Partee truck and the Klaas automobile occurred 225 feet north of the place where the bus stopped. So far as the bus was concerned there was not the slightest interference with the travel of the Klaas car. That is true also of the attempt of Smithson to pass the bus. He was back behind the bus and in full control of his truck, with the ability, he said, to stop it at any time, before the Klaas car ever met the bus. So far as Smithson and the bus were concerned the road was clear for the Klaas car, and, as to the bus, Klaas had more room for travel when the bus stopped to the right of the road than would have been the case had the bus proceeded in the west paved lane of the road, as it had a right to do.
Neither under the theory of the manner of stopping the bus nor its position after it did stop has any negligence been shown on the part of the Continental Southern Lines, Inc.
The cause of this wreck was the action of Partee in operating his truck too close behind Smithson,' so that when the latter stopped Partee had to turn onto the wrong side of the highway to avoid hitting him. If he had been driving at a proper distance behind the vehicle ahead and *849had kept his track under proper control, as Smithson did, he would have been able to stop in a normal manner without swerving into the east lane, and colliding with the Klaas car. The unfortunate accident was not attributable to the position in which the bus stopped nor to the manner of stopping, for if either of those factors had been the negligent cause of the'wreck, it would have been the Smithson truck rather than Partee’s truck that would have gone into the wrong lane and caused the death of Mr. Klaas.
McGehee, G. J., and Holmes and Lotterhos, JJ., join in this dissent.
ON MOTION PRIOR TO DECISION FOR ADDITIONAL ORAL ARGUMENT
McGehee, 0. J.
The appellants in the two above-styled cases have filed a motion to be allowed to reargue both of the cases on the ground that when the same were originally argued and submitted, Justice Julian P. Alexander, now deceased, was a member of this Court, and that since the argument and submission of the cases, and before the decision thereof, the personnel of the Court has changed in that Justice Fred J. Lotterhos has succeeded Justice Alexander as a member of the Court.
It appears that the cases were originally scheduled to be argued and submitted before Justices Koberds, Alexander, Hall, Kyle, and Holmes, a quorum of the Court under the constitutional amendment inserted by the Legislature at its 1952 session. It further appears from the minutes of the Court that Justice Arrington sat and heard the original arguments in the place and stead of Justice Alexander, who was temporarily absent from the bench when these cases were argued. The five members of the Court who heard the original arguments are still members *850of the Court and are participating in the decision of the cases, which are now being considered by the entire membership of the Court, including Justice Lotterhos as successor of Justice Alexander, deceased, and no original opinion has been written or decision rendered in either of the cases.
The appellees have filed an objection to the granting of the motion for additional oral argument and have pointed out that Justice Alexander, deceased, did not hear the original arguments and that there is no precedent or need for the same to be argued before Justice Lotterhos as successor of Justice Alexander, deceased.
In the case of McKay, et al. v. Lemly, et al., decided en banc by the Court April 25, 1949, and reported in 206 Miss. 456, 40 So. 2d 281, there was a change in the personnel of the Court after the cause had been argued and submitted, in that Justice Hall had succeeded Justice Griffith upon the expiration of the latter’s term of office, and before a decision had been rendered in the cause. The Court sustained a motion in favor of the appellants for reargument before the Court as thus newly constituted on the ground that the case had been argued before a six-member court while Justice Griffith was a member thereof, and that the appellants were entitled to reargue the case before the six judges who were to render the decision therein, including Justice Hall. No opinion was written in deciding the motion for reargument.
We have concluded that neither our action in granting reargument in McKay, et al. v. Lemly, et al., supra, nor in any other case which the Court has heretofore decided, is a precedent for sustaining the motion in the instant case, and that  since under the constitutional amendment of 1952, whereby the Court was increased from six to nine members, it is provided that five out of the nine members of the Court shall constitute a quorum, we should not sustain the motion now before us in view of the fact that all five of the justices who sat and heard the original argu*851ments are now present and participating in the decision to he rendered in each of said canses. The motion for additional oral argument is therefore overruled.
Motion overruled.
All Judges concur.
ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR AND MOTIONS
Ethridge, J.
This cause was affirmed on June 8, 1953, by a decision of four judges with four judges dissenting. The suggestion of error by Continental Southern Lines, Inc., attacks the decision on the merits.  The case has now been thoroughly reconsidered on the merits by all nine members of the Court, and five of us are of the opinion that the original decision on the merits is correct and that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Appellant Continental Southern Lines, Inc., has also filed a motion that this case be remanded to the docket for consideration by a full panel of nine judges, and a motion for oral argument on the precedent motion. Since all nine judges are now participating in the decision, those motions have become moot and are hereby dismissed.
Suggestion of error overruled and motions dismissed.
Hall, Lee, Kyle and Arrington, JJ., concur.
McGehee, G. J., and Roberds, Holmes and Lotterhos, JJ., dissent on suggestion of error. All Justices concur on motions. _
ON SECOND SUGGESTION OF ERROR AND MOTIONS
Ethridge, J.
Appellant, Continental Southern Lines, Inc., has filed (1) a motion requesting this Court to set aside the opinions, orders and judgments rendered in these cases and to remand them to the docket for consideration and adjudication by all nine of the Judges, on the argued *852ground that the original decisions, 65 So. 2d 575, 596, were void, since the affirmance was by a four to four vote, and four judges cannot affirm a case, and hence it is argued the affirmance on suggestion of error by five judges, 65 So. 2d 833, 834, is not a valid ratification of the original judgment; (2) a motion to argue orally the preceding motion; (3) a suggestion of error directed both to the dismissal of similar motions in 65 So. 2d 833, 834, and to the merits of these cases. In the opinions of July 3, 1953, all nine of the judges participated in the decision on the merits and overruled the suggestions of error, by a five to four vote, and all nine of the judges concurred in a dismissal of substantially similar motions there made because they had become moot. 65 So. 2d 833, 834. Hence the Court on suggestion of error pretermitted'the question of whether a case may be affirmed by four judges, since five joined in the final decision.
The stated motions and the suggestion of error directed to the opinions of July 3, 1953, and the orders thereon, dismissing the motions there before the Court, and the briefs thereon, deal with the same constitutional issue which the Court finally disposed of on that date. It was there decided that the decision on suggestion of error by a majority of five judges constituted a valid and final judgment, and that the question raised by Continental Southern Lines in its motions as to the effect of the original four to four decision was moot, and was therefore pretermitted, since a majority of five judges rendered the final judgment. To the same effect is Joe Ready’s Shell Service. Station & Cafe, et al. v. Mrs. Mary L. Ready, 65 So. 2d 268, on suggestion of error, Miss. Advance Sheet No. 35, page 12; see also Carney v. Anderson, 214 Miss. 504, 517, 58 So. 2d 13, 59 So. 2d 262 (1952).  Accordingly the two motions, and suggestion of error directed to the dismissal of the motions described in 65 So. 2d 833, 834, are overruled.
The balance of the suggestion of error attempts to deal with questions submitted on the merits of the case and *853finally decided in the opinion and judgment on suggestion of error in July 1953. Rule 14 (3) of this Court provides:  “After a suggestion of error has been sustained, or overruled, by the Court, no further suggestion of error shall be filed by any party. ’ ’ Hence that part of the suggestion of error by Continental is dismissed.
Motions to set aside prior judgments herein, and for oral argument thereon, and suggestion of error to dismissal of motions on July 3, 1953, are overruled, and suggestion of error on the merits is dismissed.
All Justices concur.