Court Opinion

ID: 9738882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:50.905729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.942466
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
In my opinion the judgments of the trial courts below should be affirmed. In State *588v. Baysinger and others, No. 1978 S 202, appellees were charged with appearing in the state of nudity by showing the female breasts and buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering of the nipples and buttocks at a night club, The Scorpion, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-45-4 — 1 (Burns 1978). Ap-pellees filed a motion to dismiss and discharge contending that the statute was unconstitutional and the trial court sustained the motion. The judgments in the other two cases arose in different postures, but are to the same effect, i. e., that Ind. Code § 35 — 45-4-1 is unconstitutional on its face for reasons of overbreadth insofar as it proscribes public nudity in public places. That part of the statute dealing with public nudity applicable here provides:
“(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
♦ * * * * *
(3) Appears in a state of nudity; ******
commits public indecency, a class A misdemeanor.
(b) ‘Nudity’ means the showing of the human male or female . . buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple . .
In Grody v. State, (1972) 257 Ind. 651, 278 N.E.2d 280, this Court invalidated a state criminal statute because of unconstitutional overbreadth and there described the doctrine as follows:
“A penal statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if its sanctions are applicable to activities that are protected by the First Amendment. Coates v. Cincinnati (1971), 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 . . . . The invalidity of such a statute rests on the fact that it constitutes a substantial deterrent to the free exercise of important First Amendment rights.” 257 Ind. at 653, 278 N.E.2d at 281-282.
The issue presented here then is whether a person could be criminally liable under Ind. Code § 35 — 45—4-1, for engaging in conduct protected by the First Amendment. The crime defined by this statute occurs when a female person appears at any time, in any manner, in any public place, for any purpose, with naked breast. The statute is indifferent to verbal or other conduct in which the person may be engaged at the time or the presence and rights of others who may be in the same place at the same time. This statute would empower law enforcement officials to arrest and prosecute a nude woman dancer or actress in a professional stage production or a nude woman engaged in a public meeting the purpose of which is to educate about and encourage infant breast feeding or self-examination for breast cancer. It would permit the arrest and prosecution of models who may pose in the nude for art classes at our state universities. Activities of these sorts involving live performances, the dance, and educational activities are afforded the broadest First Amendment protection. Schacht v. United States, (1970) 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44; California v. LaRue, (1972) 409 U.S. 109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342; Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., (1975) 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648. This statute is clearly unconstitutionally overbroad. Furthermore, the statute is so grossly overbroad that no court could construe it so as to render it free from this constitutional defect as to do so would require the court to exercise a legislative authority, a role we cannot assume. Grody v. State, supra.