Court Opinion

ID: 9517816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:34:01.479174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:12.219707
License: Public Domain

SHEA, Justice,
with whom KELLEHER, Justice, joins,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical-malpractice actions should apply to this case.
The plaintiffs, Marion and Philip Vigue, have brought a claim against an unnamed nurse and the hospital where the nurse is employed and where Marion Vigue was a patient. Mrs. Vigue alleges that she fell and injured herself because the nurse allowed her to walk to the bathroom unattended. The plaintiffs filed their complaint within the three-year statute-of-limitations period applicable to personal-injury claims (G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-1-14 as amended by P.L.1976, ch. 188, § 1) but not within the two-year statutory period applicable to claims for medical malpractice at the time this claim arose. Section 9-1-14.1. The plaintiffs contend that their complaint, which alleges negligence against a nurse, states a claim in ordinary common-law negligence, not in the specialized area of negligence known as medical malpractice. Since the statute of limitations applicable to ordinary negligence would not bar a claim against the nurse, plaintiffs contend that it should not bar their claim, under a theory of respondeat superior, against the nurse’s hospital-employer.
The outcome of this appeal and the ability of the Vigues to obtain their day in court turns on the meaning and application of the statutory term “medical malpractice.” The ultimate question is whether lack of due care by a nurse falls within the limited area of negligence known as medical malpractice. The Legislature has not defined the term; therefore, we must use the rules of statutory construction to determine its meaning. The majority’s reliance on the definition of the term “malpractice” contained in G.L.1956 (1976 Reenactment) chapter 37.1 of title 5 is not correct. Chapter 37.1 deals with the Board of Medical Review established by the Legislature in 1976 to investigate and adjudicate independently claims of unprofessional conduct alleged against licensed physicians. It in no way establishes a claim available to plaintiffs in court. This section was intended to establish an independent forum to adjudicate charges of unprofessional conduct against licensed physicians. The Board of Medical Review has the power to reprimand, suspend, or revoke the license of physicians that it finds guilty of unprofessional conduct. Section 5-37.1-13. This section, in our opinion, establishes a review of physicians’ conduct, totally independent of the courts and these plaintiffs’ common-law action. And even if chapter 37.1 were applicable, it is explicitly limited to licensed physicians and does not include complaints *6against nurses. Section 5-37.1-3(2). In defining the statute, therefore, we must assume that the Legislature intended to give the words their ordinary meaning. Mount Pleasant Cab Co. v. Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Board, 73 R.I. 7, 15, 53 A.2d 485, 489 (1947).
It appears to be the unanimous holding in states with similar statutes of limitations for medical-malpractice claims that the negligence of a nurse constitutes ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. Kambas v. St. Joseph’s Mercy Hospital, 389 Mich. 249, 205 N.W.2d 431 (1973); Wolff v. Jamaica Hospital, 11 A.D.2d 801, 205 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1960); Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. 370, 199 N.E.2d 878 (1964); see Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions, 47 Cornell L.Q. 339, 340 (1962); Note, When is Malpractice by a Physician Actionable?, 21 St. John’s L.Rev. 77, 78 (1946); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1336 (1966).
The legislation that enacted the lower period in which to bring a claim for medical malpractice was passed by the Legislature in 1976 in response to the alleged “mid-1970s medical malpractice crisis.” Boucher v. Sayeed, R.I., 459 A.2d 87, 88 (1983). The Legislature apparently sought a response to a threatened “doctors’ strike” because “physicians * * * were resentful of ‘steep increases in premium rates.’ ” Id., 459 A.2d at 89. (Emphasis added.) Nowhere does it appear that the Legislature intended the shorter two-year statute of limitations to extend beyond claims against physicians.6 The term “malpractice” has been consistently used at common law to apply only to the negligence of physicians and surgeons. Blastos v. Elliot Community Hospital, 105 N.H. 391, 392, 200 A.2d 854, 856 (1964).7 We should not imply that the Legislature intended a broader meaning for this term than that established at common law absent a specific indication otherwise. Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. at 372-73, 199 N.E.2d at 880.
We should not extend the meaning of the term “medical malpractice” beyond claims against physicians and surgeons merely because a hospital is named as a defendant. To extend the term as the majority has done invites inclusion under the term “medical malpractice” of alleged negligent actions by orderlies, administrative staff, and maintenance workers. I do not believe that the Legislature intended such a broad meaning.
There does not appear to be any compelling reason to include nurses within the term “medical malpractice”. Physicians are required to exercise their independent judgment on matters that may mean the difference between life and death. The duty they owe to plaintiffs is generally based on the physician-patient relationship. A nurse, although highly skilled, well trained, and essential to the delivery of health care, is not in the same category as a physician. A nurse is not authorized to practice medicine. See generally G.L.1956 (1976 Reenactment) chapter 34, title 5. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
“[A nurse’s] primary function is to observe and record the symptoms and reactions of patients. A nurse is not permitted to exercise judgment in diagnosing or treating any symptoms which the patient develops. Her duty is to report them to the physician. * * * It is in the areas of diagnosis and prescription that there is the greatest danger of unwarranted *7claims. A nurse by the very nature of her occupation is prohibited from exercising an independent judgment in these areas and thus is not subject to such claims.” Richardson v. Doe, 176 Ohio St. at 373, 199 N.E.2d at 880.
Medical malpractice is nothing more than a specialized subsection of the theory of negligence applicable to physicians and surgeons because of the special knowledge, training, and skill they possess.
In the present case, Mrs. Vigue alleges that the nurse negligently allowed her to walk to the bathroom unattended when she knew or should have known that Mrs. Vi-gue was not able to walk without assistance. The failure to assist her adequately, if proved, would simply represent a claim based on ordinary negligence. No negligence is alleged against any physician or surgeon but only against a nurse employed by the defendant hospital. In view of this fact, I conclude that the plaintiffs’ action should not be deemed one for medical malpractice. The hospital, being liable in the present case solely on the basis of respon-deat superior, can be in no different position from that of the agent through whom it acts. Because I conclude that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury claims should apply, I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with their claim.

. The Legislature has indicated its intention to treat medical-malpractice claims in the same manner as claims for personal injury. The Legislature in 1981 amended G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-1-14.1 to extend the statute-of-limitations period for medical-malpractice claims to three years.

. This also appears to be true in the medical profession. A review of various articles from the Journal of the American Medical Association shows the use of the term “medical malpractice” is limited to the actions of physicians. See Hassard, Professional Liability Claims Prevention, 163 J.A.M.A. 1267 (1957); Morris, “Res Ipsa Loquitur" — Liability Without Fault, 163 J.A.M.A. 1055 (1957).