Court Opinion

ID: 9787498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:18:10.213258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:56.626920
License: Public Domain

COATS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
In reviewing whether a magistrate properly issued a search warrant, this court is to give the magistrate’s findings great deference. This court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the warrant and will only invalidate the warrant if the magistrate abused her discretion.”1 We are *99to uphold the decision to issue the search warrant in doubtful or marginal cases.2. When I apply this standard, I conclude that the information contained in the warrant established a fair probability that Crocker possessed an unlawful amount of marijuana. I would therefore uphold the warrant.
In several prior decisions, this court has upheld search warrants that were based primarily on testimony from police officers that they smelled the strong odor of growing marijuana coming from a particular source.3 In its decision today, the court overrules all these prior cases and adds a further requirement for the State to obtain a warrant: the State must prove that the growing marijuana was not a small quantity being grown for personal use, protected by Ravin v. State.4, I would adhere to our precedent.
Our former cases, going back many years, accepted the conclusion that where the police could establish that there was a strong odor of growing marijuana, there was probable cause that there was criminal activity and that a search warrant could properly be issued. Without any notice to the State, the court has suddenly reversed ground. The court now assumes that a marijuana growing operation is protected by Ravin and that the State has the duty to disprove this presumption before obtaining a search warrant. I do not see any basis for the majority’s presumption,5 and therefore, I would follow our former precedent.6
The majority states that our prior cases are questionable authority because they were decided “in the context of a state law that forbade any and all possession of marijuana.” But Ravin has been the law in Alaska since 1975. So in our prior cases the parties and the court had to be aware of Ravin. Furthermore, the state statute which was based on the initiative that “forbade any and all possession of marijuana” was in effect at the time the warrant was issued in this case. Noy v. State, striking down that law, was decided long after the magistrate issued the search warrant in Crocker’s case.7
*100I certainly believe, as does the majority, that it is this court’s duty to follow the supreme court’s decision in Ravin. My concern, however, is that the majority’s decision actually threatens the viability of Ravin by departing from our former precedent and operating on the assumption that a marijuana growing operation is legal unless the State shows otherwise. The majority’s decision makes it difficult for the State to enforce legitimate laws prohibiting the possession and sale of marijuana.

. Van Buren v. State, 823 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Alaska App.1992) (citing State v. Chapman, 783 P.2d 771, 772 (Alaska App.1989)).

. McClelland v. State, 928 P.2d 1224, 1225 (Alaska App.1996); State v. Conway, 711 P.2d 555, 557 (Alaska App.1985).

. See, e.g., Lustig v. State, 36 P.3d 731, 732-33 (Alaska App.2001); Wallace v. State, 933 P.2d 1157, 1163 (Alaska App.1997); McClelland, 928 P.2d at 1226-27; Landers v. State, 809 P.2d 424, 424-25, 426-27 (Alaska App.1991).

. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).

. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2335 n. 13, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (stating that “innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause”); Van Sandt v. Brown, 944 P.2d 449, 452 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1995)) (stating that probable cause "requires only a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing that such activity occurred”); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 130 (Alaska 1971) (holding that probable cause existed despite possible innocent explanation for conduct); Badoino v. State, 785 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska App.1990) (quoting Harrelson v. State, 516 P.2d 390, 396 (Alaska 1973)) ("Probable cause to issue a search warrant exists when 'reliable information is set forth in sufficient detail to warrant a reasonably prudent [person] in believing that a crime has been or was being committed.’ "); State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 632 n. 3 (Alaska App.1990) ("probable cause is established even though the facts known to the officer could also be reconciled with innocence.”); Dunn v. State, 653 P.2d 1071, 1079 (Alaska App.1982) (holding that probable cause existed even though “various factors, if taken individually, are as readily consistent with innocence as guilt, ... the main point to be made is that the factors did not occur individually, and in isolation from each other”); People v. Atley, 727 P.2d 376, 377-78 (Colo.1986) (holding that the state established probable cause when the suspect's apartment did not appear to be lived in and the apartment contained a mushroom growing operation even though the informant's observations were as consistent with growing lawful mushroom plants, as they were with growing psychedelic mushrooms containing psilocybin, a controlled substance).

. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn, v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (explaining that courts have a duty and obligation to follow precedent); State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999) (quoting State v. Fremgen, 914 P.2d 1244, 1245 (Alaska 1996)) (stating that courts should reverse prior decisions only when they are “clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more harm than good would result from a departure from precedent”).

. Noy v. State, 83 P.3d 538 (Alaska App.2003) was issued in 2003, while the warrant in this case was issued in 2001.