Court Opinion

ID: 9548791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:44.605972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:25.730478
License: Public Domain

WARDEN, P. J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority that the issue of the admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes must be decided under the amended rule. However, because I would hold that the trial court did not err in suppressing the prior crime evidence, I respectfully dissent.
*123The state contends, and the majority holds, that the evidence of the assault on Galassini and the murder of Remington is admissible under OEC 404(3) to prove defendant’s identity.1 Under OEC 404(3), other crimes evidence is inadmissible if it is offered solely to prove that a defendant has a bad character and acted in conformity with that character. State v. Johns, 301 Or 535, 548, 725 P2d 312 (1986). Evidence of other crimes offered to prove the identity of a defendant is “strictly limited to crimes committed ‘by the use of a novel means or in a particular manner’ so as to earmark the acts as the handiwork of the accused.” State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 551; see State v. Manrique, 271 Or 201, 207, 531 P2d 239 (1975). Proof of “a novel means” or “a particular manner” of committing the crimes is a rigid requirement when admitting prior crimes to prove identity. State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 551. Whether evidence is admissible under OEC 404(3) to prove an issue other than character or criminal propensity is a legal conclusion as to its relevance, which we review for adverse discretion. See State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 559.
After a pretrial hearing, the trial court made these oral findings:
“The motion in limine, as I indicated, is allowed as to prior crimes. The criteria the Court must follow is set forth in State v. [Hookings, 29 Or App 139, 562 P2d 587, rev den 279 Or 301 (1977), cert den 434 US 1049 (1978)] and State v. Collins[, supra].[2]
“First, the need for the evidence in this case. There is an apparent need because the case against [defendant] is circumstantial.
“The second factor is the certainty of the commission of the crime by [defendant. I’m referring to the Remington and Gallasini incidents. He was convicted so there is certainty there.
“The third factor has to do with the evidence, its strength and weakness, and fourth, its prejudicial effect.
*124“What we have here is an offer of proof and the Court is left to speculate, first, whether some of that evidence is admissible and second, whether the witnesses would testify as represented by the District Attorney.[3]
“I find there [are] inferences upon inferences as was argued by [defense counsel]. One example being the alleged similarity that the victims were not to tell [about their job interviews with defendant]. The note left by Diann Remington, ‘I’ll be back —’ to me is nothing more than inference that she was told not to tell.
“The fact that the victims were taken to remote areas is not unusual in sexual situations. People don’t usually conduct those activities in public.
“Alibi is another [example]. It’s not an issue in this case and indeed it is not an unusual thing for the accused to claim to have been somewhere else at the time, nor do I find the fact that [defendant] was perhaps acquainted with these ladies of any significance.
“Statistically we are informed that most victims of sexual assault are acquainted with their assailant and finally as a further example, the cause of death was an assault which I notice varies in each case.
“If we take [defendant’s] statement as true regarding Weber [the victim in this case], he hit her over the head with a two-by-four and then stabbed her in the chest, I believe with a knife. A bullet hole was found.
“Assuming for the sake of argument he did it, that shows a bludgeoning with a knife and bullet.
“In Remington, only a knife was used and there the stabbing was in the back. A dissimilarity with Weber.
“And in Gallasini, although a knife was displayed, it was apparently not used in any similar fashion as in the other two cases.
“So it’s my conclusion, although there are some similarities, there are an equal number of, if not more, dissimilarities and that those similarities are not so unique as to constitute his signature on the crimes.
“And in any event, I feel that their admission into evidence is outweighed by the prejudice and will be excluded *125under [OEC] 403 due to unfair prejudice and undue delay in the proceedings.”
The majority devotes only four sentences to discussing the sufficiency of the evidence to invoke defendant’s signature on the crimes, listing as “substantial similarities” the fact that the three victims were from the same general area, were acquainted with defendant and were enticed by similar job offers. 93 Or App at 120. I agree that the job offers are substantially similar. In my view, however, that similarity, even coupled with the other two similarities noted by the majority, is not sufficient to imprint defendant’s signature on the crimes.
Assuming that the state could present admissible evidence to establish the similarities, see n 3, supra, they do not provide sufficient proof of “a novel means” or “a particular manner” of committing the crimes to render the prior crime evidence admissible. In its offer of proof, the state relied on several alleged points of similarity between the Galassini and Remington crimes and the Weber crime. First, the crimes were committed within a two-month period in 1978-79. That does little to put defendant’s signature on the Weber murder. Second, the three women were single and white with similar facial and physical features. Third, defendant met and became acquainted with all three women through his job. Fourth, he found all three women attractive. Those facts cannot be characterized as unique features of these crimes. Fifth, the women were not to tell anyone about their job offers with defendant. The trial court observed that that inference cannot be drawn in the Remington case, and the state’s offer of proof did not allege that Weber was instructed by defendant not to tell anyone. Sixth, the crimes allegedly occurred in remote, rural areas. That similarity is again not so unique as to put defendant’s signature on the crimes. Seventh, defendant used a work-related alibi in the Galassini and Remington cases. That has no significance, because defendant did not file an alibi defense in this case. Eighth, Remington and Weber were buried in shallow graves. That similarity is again not a feature that is unique to these crimes. Ninth, defendant asked about Remington’s and Weber’s whereabouts after each had disappeared. That similarity does nothing to point to defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The state points out that defendant was acquainted with the women. It therefore would not *126be unusual that he would inquire as to their whereabouts after they had disappeared. Tenth, defendant later visited the crime scenes. That similarity, at best, permits a weak inference that defendant was familiar with the crimes, but again it does not make the crimes unique. Eleventh, defendant attempted to or did have sexual relations with the victims before assaulting or killing them. Defendant sexually assaulted Galassini. The state’s offer of proof does not clearly state whether defendant’s alleged sexual relations with Remington and Weber were consensual, and we therefore must speculate whether that evidence has any probative value as to identity. In sum, the similarities are not so unique, considered either individually or together, as to earmark the Weber crime as the handiwork of defendant.
Furthermore, there are distinguishing dissimilarities between the crimes that weigh heavily against categorizing them as signature crimes. First, the manner in which each victim was assaulted was different. Weber allegedly was hit by a two-by-four, stabbed in the chest and shot.4 Remington was stabbed in the back. Galassini was assaulted with a knife in a manner completely dissimilar to Weber and Remington, suffering a cut on her hand and breast during a sexual assault. Additionally, Remington’s body was found in Benton County, Washington, and the Galassini assault also occurred there. Weber’s remains were found in Umatilla County, Oregon.
For the reasons stated, the state has not demonstrated sufficient similarity between the prior crimes and Weber’s murder to require admission of the prior crime evidence under OEC 404(3). Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence and would affirm. If the majority agreed with me, it would not have to consider OEC 403 and the issue of whether the probative value of the evidence exceeds its prejudicial nature. However, were it necessary to reach that issue, I again would disagree with the majority’s resolution of it. I therefore address it here.
Under OEC 404(3), evidence that is relevant for some *127purpose other than to prove a defendant’s propensity to commit certain crimes may nonetheless be excluded under OEC 403 if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 549-50. Whether evidence is admissible under OEC 403 is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 558-59.
The majority concedes, as it must, that the trial court considered the factors set forth in Johns, see n 2, supra, and discussed them at length on the record. Having considered those factors, the trial court exercised its discretion under OEC 403 and excluded the prior crime evidence. The majority’s discussion of this issue also is limited to only a few sentences. It holds that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence, because, “[g]iven the certainty that defendant committed the other crimes and their many significant similarities to the crime charged here, the proffered evidence cannot fairly be characterized as weak.” 93 Or App at 122. The majority thus relies on the similarities, again without any great detail as to what they are, between the prior crimes and the charged crime; but, as I have demonstrated at some length, the similarities presented by the state are not logically relevant to show that Weber’s murder is imprinted with defendant’s signature. The weakness of the prior crime evidence therefore weighs heavily against its admissibility, despite the state’s alleged need for the evidence and the certainty that defendant committed the prior crimes. Because the prior crime evidence has little, if any, probative value, the very nature of the evidence would make its admission unduly prejudicial. I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under OEC 403.

 I agree with the majority that the record does not support the state’s contention that the evidence was also offered to prove defendant’s motive, intent and preparation. We need not consider those grounds.

 In State v. Johns, supra, 301 Or at 557-58, the Supreme Court expressly approved the factors set forth in Collins. Johns was decided on August 26,1986, and the trial court’s oral decision was rendered on September 10, ten days before Johns appeared in the Advance Sheets.

 The offer of proof made by the state consisted only of a lengthy narrative statement. I agree with the trial court that we are left to speculate as to the admissibility of some of the evidence contained in the offer.

 The only evidence concerning Weber’s death apparently comes from a confession made by defendant. A forensic anthropologist, after examining Weber’s remains, apparently concluded that a definite cause of death could not be determined.