Court Opinion

ID: 9554184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 23:03:25.748052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:28.900777
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/7/23 P. v. Gutierrez CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B320667

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BA202688)
          v.

 ADRIAN GUTIERREZ,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
      Nancy Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Idan Ivri and Gary Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Defendant and Respondent.
                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

      Defendant and appellant Adrian Gutierrez was convicted of
second degree murder in 2000. Gutierrez now appeals from an
order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
concluded that Gutierrez was ineligible for resentencing because
he was guilty of implied malice second degree murder as an aider
and abettor. Gutierrez argues that the trial court’s findings are
not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and affirm
the order denying Gutierrez’s petition for resentencing.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
I.    The underlying offense
      We take our statement of the evidence underlying
Gutierrez’s crime from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming his

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

       Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We therefore refer to the law formerly
codified at section 1170.95 as section 1172.6.
2     We have taken judicial notice of records from Gutierrez’s
prior appeal, People v. Gutierrez (Nov. 30, 2021, B304522)
[nonpub. opn.] (Gutierrez II); namely, the trial court’s January 17,
2020 order denying his section 1172.6 petition and the clerk’s
transcript, which includes the reporter’s transcript of the trial.

                                 2
judgment of conviction. (People v. Gutierrez (July 31, 2002,
B149815) [nonpub. opn.] (Gutierrez I).)3
       “[O]n the evening of November 25, 1999, Thanksgiving Eve,
Debra Luna went to Gina’s Bar in the City of Commerce with her
friend, Roseann Aguilar. During the evening, they went across
the street to Nin[o]’s Bar. Numerous members of the Mongols
motorcycle gang were present at Nin[o]’s Bar. [Fn. omitted.]
Gutierrez was one of the Mongols in the bar that evening.
Gutierrez told Luna his name was ‘Panhead’ and displayed a
tattoo on his left arm of the word ‘pan’ and a Mongol head in a
frying pan. [Fn. omitted.] Gutierrez asked Luna to purchase a
raffle ticket to support children and the homeless. Luna paid $5
for the ticket and Gutierrez wrote his name and address on the
back of the ticket. Shortly thereafter, Luna returned to Gina’s
Bar. Several Mongols, including Gutierrez, also went across the
street to Gina’s Bar. Gutierrez appeared to be the leader and the
other individuals wearing Mongol[s] jackets listened to him.
       “Jeremy McDonald, then a Mongol[s] ‘prospect,’ testified
under a grant of use immunity. [Fn. omitted.] Gutierrez
approached McDonald in Gina’s Bar and asked for McDonald’s
buck knife. [Fn. omitted.] There was no urgency in Gutierrez’s
request and there was no altercation in the bar at that time.

3     In reviewing a section 1172.6 petition, a trial court may
rely on “the procedural history of the case recited in any prior
appellate opinion.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see also People v.
Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292 (Clements).) However,
the role of an appellate opinion is limited, and the trial court may
not rely on factual summaries contained in prior appellate
decisions or engage in fact finding at the prima facie stage.
(Clements, at p. 292.)

                                 3
After McDonald gave Gutierrez the knife, Gutierrez told
McDonald to escort one of the Mongol[s] officers to the bathroom
and guard the door while the officer was in the bathroom.
       “At about the same time, Luna was seated near the front
door. Daniel Herrera, Luna’s common law husband and the
father of her three children, came to the door of Gina’s Bar.
Herrera angrily asked why Luna had not answered her cellular
telephone and why she was there with ‘all these fucking
[Mongols].’ Gutierrez and four of five other Mongols immediately
ran to the door of the bar and attacked Herrera. The first person
to approach Herrera was Gutierrez.[4] Luna pleaded with the
Mongols to desist but they continued to beat Herrera with their
fists and feet. Herrera ran but the Mongols chased him down the
street out of Luna’s sight.
       “Aguilar observed the fight from the front of Nin[o]’s Bar
and testified Gutierrez was one of the bikers who was hitting and
kicking Herrera.
       “McDonald heard a thump while he was guarding the
bathroom and, when McDonald returned to the bar, it was empty.
McDonald saw a group of individuals wearing Mongol[s] jackets
about half a block down the street. The group walked away from
a male on the ground. As the group walked back to the bar, the
man got up and ran toward the sidewalk.
       “Luna testified the Mongols ran back to Gina’s bar.
Gutierrez was ‘all sweaty and perspiring....’ Gutierrez and
another Mongol[s] approached Luna and demanded the raffle
ticket with Gutierrez’s telephone number on it. Gutierrez and his
associate threatened to ‘take care of’ Luna if she did not comply.

4     Luna testified that she saw Gutierrez hit Herrera.

                                4
Luna returned the ticket and asked for the return of her $5.
Gutierrez gave Luna the money. Luna drove home but, when she
found Herrera was not there, she returned to the scene.
       “At approximately 12:25 a.m., Sheriff’s Deputy Scott
Hennessey found a trail of blood that went from Washington
Boulevard around the corner onto O’Neil Street and stopped at
Herrera’s body. Luna arrived shortly thereafter. Hennessey
spoke to Luna and observed her to be hysterical and stumbling.
Hennessey opined Luna was drunk and very upset.
       “Approximately five hours later, Sheriff’s Detective Michael
Scott noticed the odor of alcohol about Luna during an interview
but testified any difficulty Luna had communicating with Scott
was due to the fact she was upset rather than intoxicated. Luna
and Aguilar selected Gutierrez’s picture from a photographic
lineup and indicated he was one of the individuals in the bar on
the night of this incident.
       “A deputy medical examiner testified Herrera died as the
result of a stab wound to the torso with contributing conditions of
blunt force trauma. The stab wound was consistent with a buck
knife, which is sharp on only one side. Had Herrera only been
stabbed, he might have survived the injury.
       “William Queen, a special agent for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), infiltrated the San Fernando
Chapter of the Mongols in an undercover operation that lasted
from March 1998 until May of 2000. Queen became the
secretary/treasurer of the chapter and, in this capacity, received a
copy of the Mongol[s] constitution. Queen testified the goal of the
Mongols was to be the ‘top dog outlaw motorcycle club in the
country, the baddest club on bikes out there.’ Outlaw motorcycle
gangs, such as the Hell’s Angels and the Mongols, refer to

                                 5
themselves as ‘one percenter[s].’ This term is meant to separate
these outlaw motorcycle gangs, who consider themselves to be
above the law, from law-abiding motorcycle organizations. The
Mongols committed crimes to establish their reputation including
narcotics trafficking, gun violations, extortion, assaults, witness
intimidation, theft and other crimes.
       “The day after Herrera’s death, the Mongols issued a ‘code
55,’ which meant members were not to wear their Mongol[s]
jackets when riding their motorcycles. The purpose of the Code
55 was to protect one of the Mongols from arrest. That same day,
McDonald, who was a member of the San Fernando Chapter of
the Mongols, told Queen that Gutierrez asked McDonald for his
knife right before the altercation at the bar. Queen saw
Gutierrez approximately two weeks after Herrera’s death and
noticed his appearance had changed significantly in that
Gutierrez no longer had any facial hair. About a month and a
half later, Gutierrez had a new skull and crossbones patch on his
Mongol[s] jacket. The Mongol[s] constitution indicated a skull
and crossbones patch would be awarded to members who provide
outstanding service to the club. However, Queen learned the
skull and crossbones patch was given to an individual who killed
for the club. During a search of Gutierrez’s home, his motorcycle
was found to have a skull and crossbones on the taillight.
       “In surreptitiously tape recorded conversations with
Gutierrez on December 21, 1999 and January 6, 2000, Queen
tried to get Gutierrez to confess to the murder of Herrera by
complimenting Gutierrez on how he had ‘upped ... the image of
the Mongols two whole fucking notches....’ Queen indicated he
wanted Gutierrez with him if there was trouble. In the course of
one of these conversations, Gutierrez said they should not be

                                 6
speaking about the incident, ‘we never did nothing,’ and ‘I was
home making ... turkey and pie with one of my mother-in-laws.
That’s where I was ... with my old lady that night.’ However,
Queen testified Gutierrez’s tone of voice during this conversation
did not sound like a denial.
       “ATF Special Agent John Ciccone was responsible for
protecting Queen, directing the investigation and maintaining
contact between Queen and ATF during Queen’s undercover
work. Ciccone testified as a gang expert that violent crime is one
of the Mongols[’s] primary reasons for acting as a gang. A
member of the Mongols who exhibited a skull and crossbones
patch without having earned the patch would be kicked out of the
club, assaulted or have his motorcycle taken.”
II.    Gutierrez’s conviction, sentence, and direct appeal
       At Gutierrez’s criminal trial for Herrera’s murder, the jury
was instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. That is, if the jury found an assault was committed,
Gutierrez aided and abetted that assault, a coprincipal
committed the crime of murder, and murder was a natural and
probable consequence of the assault, then Gutierrez could be
guilty of murder. A jury found Gutierrez guilty of second degree
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (b)) and found true a gang
allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The jury found not true the
allegation that Gutierrez personally used a knife.
       On April 13, 2001, the trial court sentenced Gutierrez to 15
years to life plus three years for the gang enhancement.
       A different panel of this Division affirmed the judgment of
conviction on direct appeal. (Gutierrez I, supra, B149815.)

                                 7
III.   Gutierrez’s petitions for resentencing and
       evidentiary hearings
       In 2019, Gutierrez petitioned for resentencing under
section 1172.6. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
denied the petition, finding there was substantial evidence to
support Gutierrez’s conviction for second degree murder as the
actual perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. On appeal,
another panel of this Division reversed the order denying
Gutierrez’s petition because the trial court “erred by applying the
substantial evidence test and not acting as an independent fact
finder or applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.”
(Gutierrez II, supra, B304522.)
       On remand and after receiving additional briefing, the trial
court held another evidentiary hearing on Gutierrez’s petition.
At the hearing, the parties did not introduce new evidence and
instead relied on the record from Gutierrez’s criminal trial,
including the reporter’s transcript of the trial.5 The prosecutor
argued that after Herrera insulted the Mongols, Gutierrez
initiated the fight. The evidence further showed that Gutierrez
obtained a knife “just moments” before the fight broke out,
Gutierrez and other gang members beat Herrera and followed
him to the street, Gutierrez made incriminating statements after
the incident, and Gutierrez had a leadership position in the gang.
Based on this evidence, the prosecutor argued that even if the
trial court did not find that Gutierrez stabbed Herrera, Gutierrez
was at least a direct aider and abettor who acted with implied
malice. Gutierrez’s counsel argued that the case was “more

5    Judge Rappe had presided over Gutierrez’s criminal trial in
2000 and said he had a good recollection of it.

                                 8
genuinely just a natural and probable consequences” one, and
there was insufficient evidence Gutierrez intended to kill or acted
with conscious disregard to human life.
      The trial court again denied the petition, finding that the
People had met their burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Gutierrez was guilty of implied malice second degree
murder as a direct aider and abettor or as “part aider and abettor
and part perpetrator.”
                              DISCUSSION
      Gutierrez contends that there was insufficient evidence he
was guilty of implied malice second degree murder as an aider
and abettor. After setting forth the relevant law and standard of
review, we explain why his contention is incorrect.6
I.    Senate Bill No. 1437 and section 1172.6
      Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences
doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and
limited the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986 (Reyes); People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843
(Gentile).) The bill amended section 188 by adding the

6     Because our review is after an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), Gutierrez’s focus in his
appellate briefs on the prosecutor’s reliance on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine at the 2000 criminal trial is
misplaced. Our review after an evidentiary hearing focuses on
whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant
under the law as amended by sections 188 and 189. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

                                 9
requirement that, except as stated in section 189, subdivision (e),
“in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime shall
act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a
person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.”
(§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if the person could no longer be convicted of
murder under amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant
commences that procedure by filing a petition containing a
declaration that, among other things, the defendant could not
presently be convicted of murder under the current law. (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If the trial court receives a petition
that establishes a prima facie case for relief, it must appoint
counsel for the petitioner, if requested. The trial court also must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing.
(Ibid.; § 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c), & (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing, it is the prosecution’s burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); Strong, at pp. 708–709; People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Vargas).) If the trial court finds
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder
notwithstanding the amendments to sections 188 and 189, the
petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. (Strong, at
pp. 708–709; Vargas, at p. 951.)
II.    Standard of review
       We review the trial court’s findings after an evidentiary
hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), for substantial
evidence. (People v. Owens (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022

                                 10
(Owens); People v. Werntz (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1109–1110
(Werntz).) Under this standard, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951; Clements, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) We do not resolve credibility issues or
evidentiary conflicts. (Owens, at p. 1022.) Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1,
57.) Before we may set aside a trial court’s order, it must be clear
that “ ‘ “upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support [it].” ’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
III. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
       finding that Gutierrez could be convicted of implied
       malice second degree murder as an aider and abettor
       Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Malice may be express or
implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “It is express when there is a
manifest intent to kill (§ 188, subd. (a)(1)); it is implied if
someone kills with ‘no considerable provocation ... or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.’ (§ 188, subd. (a)(2)).” (Gentile, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 844.) “The primary difference between express
malice and implied malice is that the former requires an intent to
kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968,
976.)

                                11
       Implied malice murder instead requires that the killing be
proximately caused by an act, “ ‘ “ ‘the natural consequences of
which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed
by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of
another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Proximate
causation thus requires the act to have been a substantial factor
contributing to the death. (Ibid.)
       The guilt of an aider and abettor to a crime, including
murder, is “based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s
acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.”
(People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1117.) “A person aids
and abets the commission of a crime when [the person], (i) with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and
with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or
encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
       Accordingly, for aiding and abetting liability on a theory of
implied malice murder to be imposed, a direct aider and abettor
must, by words or conduct, aid the perpetrator’s commission of a
life-endangering act with the “knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life,” and the aider and abettor must act “in conscious
disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, 713, italics omitted, cited with approval by
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991 [implied malice murder
requires proof of aider and abettor’s “knowledge and intent with
regard to the direct perpetrator’s life endangering act”].) In other

                                12
words, under current law, “a direct aider and abettor of the
killing who knew that his (or her) conduct endangered the life of
another and acted with conscious disregard for life, may be guilty
of second degree murder.” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972, 979.)
       While Senate Bill 1437 eliminated natural and probable
consequences liability for second degree murder based on
imputed malice, implied malice remains a valid theory of second
degree murder liability for an aider and abettor. (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 991; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850; People v.
Vizcarra (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 388; Werntz, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 1112.)
       Viewing the evidence here in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s order, the record contains substantial evidence that
Gutierrez aided and abetted the murder of Herrera with implied
malice.
       There was substantial evidence that Gutierrez engaged in
life endangering acts that proximately caused Herrera’s death.
Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981, clarified what types of acts
proximately cause death. In that case, the defendant Reyes was
at a park with fellow gang members, one of whom openly
displayed a gun. (Id. at p. 985.) After someone in Reyes’s group
called out to a passing car, the group chased the car, and
someone shot at the car, killing its driver. (Ibid.) At Reyes’s trial
for murder, the prosecutor did not contend Reyes was the shooter
but instead argued he was guilty of murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or as a direct aider and
abettor. A jury convicted Reyes of second degree murder. Years
later, a court denied his section 1172.6 petition, finding, among
other things, that Reyes’s act of traveling with an armed fellow

                                 13
gang member into rival gang territory was dangerous to human
life, Reyes knew it was so, and he acted with conscious disregard
of that danger. (Reyes, at p. 987.)
       Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 988 to 989, explained
such an act merely created a dangerous situation in which death
was possible, depending on how circumstances unfolded, and
standing alone did not satisfy the proximate causation
requirement of implied malice murder. Further, there was no
evidence Reyes’s “acts precipitated or provoked the shooting.”
(Id. at p. 989.) Nor was his act of traveling to rival gang territory
with fellow gang members, at least one of whom was armed,
dangerous to human life. (Id. at pp. 989–990.) Rather, implied
malice murder requires a high probability that death will result;
the danger to life cannot be merely vague or speculative. (Id. at
p. 989; People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 513 (Cravens)
[probability of death cannot be remote or merely possible].)
While Reyes’s act of traveling with rival gang members into rival
territory could result in a gang confrontation during which it was
possible someone could get hurt or killed, the act did not by itself
“give rise to a high degree of probability” death would result.
(Reyes, at p. 989.) And if the act of shooting was the dangerous
act, there had to be evidence Reyes knew the shooter intended to
shoot, to aid him in shooting, knew shooting was dangerous to
life, and acted in conscious disregard to life. (Id. at pp. 991–992.)
       The evidence here is substantially different than in Reyes.
Here, Gutierrez was not merely with fellow gang members when
someone else attacked and stabbed Herrera. Luna testified that

                                 14
Gutierrez was the first person to approach Herrera and hit him.7
Accordingly, unlike the defendant in Reyes, Gutierrez led or
provoked the attack on Herrera. Gutierrez also was not alone in
beating Herrera: his fellow Mongols, up to six of them, were
simultaneously beating Herrera. When Herrera tried to flee,
Gutierrez and the other Mongols pursued him. And just minutes
before Herrera arrived at the bar, McDonald had given his buck
knife to Gutierrez, who never returned it. The medical examiner
testified that a buck knife was consistent with the weapon used
to stab Herrera. Thus, substantial evidence supports a finding
that Gutierrez was the stabber or gave the buck knife to the
stabber. Stabbing someone is a life endangering act, as is the act
of participating in a group, gang-related beating of one person.
(See Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 510–511 [violent force of
defendant’s punch to victim’s head was predictably dangerous to
human life].)
       Other factors such as the “victim’s vulnerability, the
number of assailants, the ferocity and duration of the attack, and
the unusualness or unexpectedness of the victim’s death” support
the malice finding. (People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela), (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 485, 502 (Valenzuela).) Herrera was vulnerable
in that he was alone, and the attack was sudden and unexpected.
Up to six men beat the apparently defenseless Herrera. At least
one man was armed with a knife. And based on the medical
examiner’s testimony, the attack was ferocious because Herrera
died as the result of a stab wound with contributing conditions of
blunt force trauma.

7     At the evidentiary hearing, Gutierrez’s counsel conceded
that Gutierrez was the first to use force while inside the bar.

                               15
       Moreover, after Herrera was stabbed, Gutierrez engaged in
behavior evidencing a consciousness of guilt. (See generally
CALCRIM No. 371 [attempt to conceal evidence may show
defendant was aware of his guilt].) After the fight ended,
Gutierrez tried to conceal his identity by demanding that Luna
return the raffle ticket on which he had written his name and
address. Gutierrez or his companion threatened to “ ‘take care
of’ ” Luna if she did not return the ticket. In the weeks after
Herrera’s murder, Gutierrez changed his appearance by
removing his facial hair. Gutierrez also added a skull and
crossbones patch to his Mongols jacket. (See, e.g., Cravens,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 511 [bragging about crime bolstered
implied malice finding].) Queen, who had infiltrated the gang,
explained that such a patch must be earned, and, after Herrera’s
murder, Queen learned that the skull and crossbones patch was
given to an individual who had killed for the gang.
       Gutierrez also had a gang-related motive to harm or to kill
Herrera. (See generally People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 32
[“motive can illuminate intent”].) Gutierrez was a member of the
Mongols motorcycle gang, and he was with fellow gang members
at the bar that night. When Herrera arrived at the bar, he
demanded to know why Luna—a woman Gutierrez had expressed
an interest in—was with “fucking Mongols.” Herrera thus
insulted Gutierrez’s gang, which provided a motive for the
ensuing fight and stabbing. (See, e.g., People v. Samaniego
(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167–1168 [gang evidence relevant
to establish gang-related motive for crime].) Although Gutierrez
characterizes this as a mere bar fight, it was something more, a
gang-related retaliation against Herrera for insulting the
Mongols.

                               16
       The evidence also suggests that nobody, including
Gutierrez, tried to help Herrera, but instead they all fled from
the crime scene. Failing to assist a wounded victim manifests “a
callous indifference to human life.” (People v. Palomar (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 969, 978.)
       In sum, the evidence showed that Gutierrez directly aided
and abetted the implied malice murder of Herrera: Gutierrez
was at the crime scene, instigated the fight with Herrera, actively
participated in the fight, tried to conceal his identity after the
fight, and was rewarded for participating in Herrera’s murder.
(See generally People v. Glukhoy (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 576, 599
[presence at crime scene, failure to prevent crime, companionship
and conduct before and after the offense, including flight,
relevant to determine whether a defendant aided and abetted a
crime].) And, as we have said, there was substantial evidence
Gutierrez engaged in at least the life endangering act of
instigating and participating in a physically violent group attack
against a lone Herrera.
       Gutierrez’s argument that this evidence was insufficient to
show he aided and abetted an implied malice murder amounts to
little more than an improper request that we reevaluate the
evidence, something the substantial evidence standard of review
forbids. (Owens, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1022.)
       Gutierrez thus first argues that what happened is divisible
into a “first fight” at the bar’s door and a “second fight” down the
street. He then argues that he was not at “the second fight,”
which he asserts is when Herrera was stabbed. There was
substantial evidence, however, that this was merely one fight
occurring over a short period of time that began just at or outside
the bar’s door and continued down the street. Luna also testified

                                17
that the same men who attacked Herrera at the door—a group
that included Gutierrez—followed Herrera down the street.
Therefore, there was evidence that Gutierrez was involved in the
entirety of the fight.
      Second, Gutierrez highlights the prosecutor’s comment at
the section 1172.6 hearing that Gutierrez obtained the knife “just
moments” before the fight, saying that the comment is
inaccurate. However, the evidence is that McDonald gave
Gutierrez a buck knife that evening about four or five minutes
before the fight broke out. Thus, the essential point is that
Gutierrez possessed a knife consistent with the murder weapon
in the minutes leading up to the fight.
      Third, Gutierrez takes issue with the trial court’s finding
that he was in a leadership position in the gang and during this
incident so that even if he did not actually stab Herrera, he could
have stopped the fight. However, the evidence supported this
finding: Gutierrez was in a position to give other Mongols orders,
as he told McDonald to escort an officer to the bathroom;
McDonald gave his knife to Gutierrez when he asked for it; and
Aguilar testified that before the fight broke out, Mongols gang
members listened to Gutierrez, whom she described as calling the
shots. Moreover, Luna testified that Gutierrez was the first
person to approach Herrera after Herrera insulted the Mongols,
and therefore, as a leader who the Mongols followed, Gutierrez
could be viewed as instigating and encouraging the fight, which is
a key feature of an aider and abettor. (See, e.g., Valenzuela,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 502 [nonstabber defendant instigated
and encouraged actual killer’s participation in armed melee].)
      Finally, Gutierrez argues that Special Agent Queen’s
testimony about the skull and crossbones did not tend to show

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Gutierrez killed Herrera. This argument is again based on an
improper reweighing of the evidence. Queen testified that during
his time in the Mongols as an undercover agent, he learned that a
member would be awarded a skull and crossbones patch if they
killed for the gang, and a Mongols gang member told him he got a
patch for killing a Hell’s Angel gang member. Queen then saw
Gutierrez wearing such a patch about one month after Herrera’s
murder. This evidence raises the reasonable inference that
Gutierrez was awarded the patch for participating in Herrera’s
murder. However, as Gutierrez points out, Queen also testified
that the Mongols’s written constitution does not expressly state
that a skull and crossbones patch will be awarded for killing
someone and instead stated it would be awarded for
“outstanding” work for the gang. Notwithstanding that the
Mongols’s constitution did not specify members would be
rewarded for murder, the trier of fact was entitled to find to the
contrary based on Queen’s testimony.
       We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Herrera could be convicted
of implied malice second degree murder as an aider and abettor.8

8      Gutierrez also argues that the prosecutor did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the trial court’s “second murder
theory” that he was part perpetrator and part aider and abettor.
It is unclear how this argument is separate from whether the
evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for implied malice
second degree murder. In any event, because we conclude that
there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
conclusion that Gutierrez could be convicted of implied malice
second degree murder under current law, we need not reach that
argument.

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                          DISPOSITION
     The order denying Adrian Gutierrez’s Penal Code section
1172.6 petition is affirmed.
            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                       ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 EDMON, P. J.

                 LAVIN, J.

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