Court Opinion

ID: 9662084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:59:09.500325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:36.779939
License: Public Domain

CLIFFORD H. AHRENS,
Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I believe that the evidence of defendant’s prior conviction was relevant and admissible to prove defendant’s intent and absence of mistake or accident in the present case.
The majority correctly notes that evidence of a prior conviction is not automatically admissible when knowledge or intent is an element of the crime. State v. Dudley, 912 S.W.2d 525, 529 (Mo.App.1995). For intent, mistake or accident to serve as the basis for admission of evidence of an uncharged crime, those must be legitimate issues in the case. State v. Conley, 873 S.W.2d 233, 237 (Mo. banc 1994).
The majority concludes that defendant’s intent to commit the act was not an issue in controversy in the present case. I disagree. The majority relies upon Conley for the proposition that where there is *645direct evidence, as there was in the present case, that defendant committed the charged act, it will give rise to an inference of the necessary intent, and no other evidence is required to establish that element of the crime. 873 S.W.2d at 237. However, the court in Conley continued to find that where the state has some reason to believe the defendant will make intent, mistake or accident an issue, other evidence may be required. Id.
In the present case, defendant’s written statement was admitted, without objection, at trial. Defendant stated that while he was playing with the dog with J.B., he “unknowingly and unintentionally” touched her on the “rear end” while hugging her, and his hand “slipped a little bit below her belt line” while they were playing. He apologized for any misunderstanding.
Defendant argues that his position was not that he accidentally touched J.B.’s breast, the conduct for which he was on trial, but that he did not have any contact with her breast. Based upon defendant’s statement, the State could reasonably believe that he would make intent an issue in the case. Defendant stated that he unknowingly and unintentionally had physical contact with J.B.’s “rear end.” He acknowledged that while they were playing his hand also “slipped a little bit below her belt line.” Defendant apologized for “any misunderstanding” that arose from the incident. His statement regarding his physical contact with J.B. was made in the context of accidental contact while playing with the dog with J.B. It is a reasonable inference from this statement that if the jury found he had contact with J.B.’s breast, it was accidental. Therefore, defendant’s intent was at issue in the case, and the admission of his prior conviction for statutory sodomy was relevant and admissible to prove his intent in the present case.
The majority notes that even assuming evidence of defendant’s prior conviction was relevant, the evident prejudice outweighed any probative value. While I recognize the prejudicial nature of the evidence presented of defendant’s prior conviction, I also believe this evidence was relevant to prove defendant’s intent in the present case. The trial court is in a superior position to weigh any prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative value. State v. Kaiser, 139 S.W.3d 545, 558 (Mo.App.2004). The ruling of the trial court in this respect must be so clearly against the logic of the circumstances and so arbitrary or unreasonable as to shock our sense of justice and indicated a lack of careful consideration. Id. I do not believe the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of defendant’s prior conviction constituted such an abuse of discretion.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.