Court Opinion

ID: 6786836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-21 01:04:14.787622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:02:57.487432
License: Public Domain

Francis E. Sweeney, Sr., J.,
dissenting.
{¶ 75} Today the majority considers extraneous arguments to reach a result more palatable to them than the existing law. In so doing, they ignore our rules of practice and well-established precedents and unnecessarily modify stare decisis, a long-standing principle of American jurisprudence. For these reasons, I dissent.
{¶ 76} First, this case comes before us as a certified question. The Supreme Court Rule of Practice governing this procedure, S.CtPrac.R. IY(3)(B), provides: “In their merit briefs, the parties shall brief the issues identified in the order of the Supreme Court as issues to be considered on appeal.” The case was certified to settle a disagreement among the appellate districts on the effects of the broadened-coverage endorsement in a UIM/UM insurance provision. While Aetna gives lip service to the certified issue, the main thrust of its brief is to convince the court to overrule and limit established case law on different issues. These issues are not properly before the court, and, therefore, the majority should not decide them.
{¶ 77} Not only were these issues not properly certified, none of the arguments on them was raised by Aetna during summary judgment proceedings or during its appeal to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Aetna did not challenge the viability of Scott-Pontzer v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 660, 710 N.E.2d 1116; or Ezawa v. Yasuda Fire & Marine Ins. Co. of Am. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 557, 715 N.E.2d 1142, until after the case was certified and after it appeared that the composition of this court would change. We have always held that issues not raised below are waived. Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121, 679 N.E.2d 1099. The majority ignores this well-established principle.
*236{¶ 78} Moreover, in deciding to reexamine ScotL-Pontzer, the majority fails to abide by the long-standing rule of stare decisis. Stare decisis is the policy that a court will follow its past decisions. The significance of this rule cannot be overstated. Without it, litigants may try to challenge precedent every time there is a change in the composition of the court. If this is allowed, issues will never be resolved as long as one side believes that a new court will save the day in another case.
{¶ 79} In State ex rel. Allison v. Jones (1960), 170 Ohio St. 323, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417, a new justice was faced with the chance to overrule a recent decision by the old court. In refusing to do so, he had this to say:
{¶ 80} “On another occasion, each of my six colleagues was privileged to consider a situation identical to that here presented and to arrive at his individual conclusion unfettered by established and existing law. Alone of the seven members of this court, I have not had the opportunity of passing upon the issue * * * without the restriction of a controlling decision of this court directly in point. Exercising judgment in the enviable aura of unrestricted choice, three of my colleagues chose each of the two divergent courses * * *, and each now adheres to his position so adopted. I enjoy no such freedom of choice and consider myself bound to follow what has now been established as the law of this state. Whether I find the result to be palatable is of concern only to myself.” Id. at 324, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417 (Peck, J., concurring).
{¶ 81} Justice Peck further recognized:
{¶ 82} “Such a change in the pronounced law can only result from an abandonment of a doctrine which may well be considered the heart and core of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. That doctrine is referred to as stare decisis, a phrase which is an abbreviation of a maxim adjuring the courts ‘to stand by precedent, and not to disturb settled points.’ ” Id. at 325, 10 O.O.2d 417, 164 N.E.2d 417, quoting Ballard Cty. v. Kentucky Cty. Debt Comm. (1942), 290 Ky. 770, 772-773, 162 S.W.2d 771.
{¶ 83} I quote Justice Peck because he was faced with precisely the same situation that faces this new court, but he chose a different outcome because he felt duty-bound to follow established case law. His guidance, in the name of stare decisis, should be heeded.
{¶ 84} Adherence to precedent has several laudatory goals, including certainty, equality, efficiency, and the appearance of justice. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision’s Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee (1994), 82 Geo.L.J. 1689. The goal of certainty is promoted “by allowing individuals to arrange their affairs with confidence, assured in the knowledge that the law that will be applied to them in the future will be the same as currently applied.” Id. at 1691. Equality is accomplished “by treating like cases alike.” Id. at 1692. *237Efficiency is promoted because “[o]nce a previous court has addressed difficult policy questions, subsequent courts need not expend time and resources to readdress those issues, but can rely on the wisdom of the previous court.” Id. The last reason is the appearance of justice. This goal “conforms to the public’s notion that Supreme Court Justices should be making impartial rules of law and not * * * law based on personal biases.” Id. at 1693.
{¶ 85} Traditionally, courts have accepted three circumstances under which it is proper to overrule precedent: “when there has been an intervening development of law, when the rule it promulgated has proved unworkable, or when its underlying reasoning is outdated or inconsistent with contemporary values.” Id. at 1694. Although these reasons have withstood the test of time, the majority feels compelled to craft new rationale in syllabus law. This is done despite the long-held view that any discussion of stare decisis is dicta. Id. at 1690, fn. 6. “Dicta” is defined as “[ejxpressions in court’s opinions which go beyond the facts before court and therefore are * * * not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990) 454.
{¶ 86} I am especially troubled by the first and third reasons espoused by the majority in the syllabus. As to the first reason (that the prior decision was wrongly decided), I ask, Who decides whether a decision was wrongly decided? In Scott-Pontzer, we were examining specific UIM policy language that had not previously been examined by the court. In reaching our decision, we did not overrule any prior decision. In fact, we followed the established law that when ambiguous policies permit more than one reasonable interpretation, the one that favors the insured must prevail. This time-tested principle encourages precise policy language, protects insureds who rely upon their reasonable understanding of the policies, and precludes insurers from profiting from their sloppy draftsmanship. If our interpretations in these cases contravened the intent of the insurance companies, it was the obligation of the insurance companies to rewrite their policies. Indeed, this is what happened after Scott>-Pontzer. In response to the ambiguities, insurance companies rewrote their contracts to better describe the scope of coverage provided. See majority opinion, fn. 10.
{¶ 87} Perhaps even more troubling is the third new ground for overruling precedent (that overruling will not impose an undue hardship for those who have relied upon the decision). How can this factor be met here? Even the majority concedes that many pending cases raise Scottr-Pontzer issues. These cases involve individual litigants who have devoted much time and money in pursuing their claims. Therefore, how can the majority even suggest that no undue hardship is created by this decision?
{¶ 88} Thus, even though recent cases are not immune to being overruled, a change in court composition is not a sufficient reason for abandoning precedent. *238Padden, Overruling Decisions, supra, 82 Geo.L.J. at 1719. Instead, I believe that the majority should recognize that prior rulings of this court are still valid and binding even after a member of the majority has left the bench.
{¶ 89} Moreover, I believe that the majority commits error in adopting new rationale for overruling precedent. There is no reason to abandon the time-tested principles for applying stare decisis.
{¶ 90} For all these reasons, I dissent.
Resnick, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.