Court Opinion

ID: 9930116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 14:02:14.321481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:36.897200
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 6, 2024

                        S23A1018. REDDING v. THE STATE.

        LAGRUA, Justice.

        Following a 2018 jury trial, Appellant Merrick Redding was

found guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection

with the death of Joseph Davis. 1 In his first appeal to this Court, we

        1 The crimes occurred on September 5, 2016. Redding was arrested for

Davis’s killing on September 12, 2016. On September 28, 2017, Redding filed
a “Motion to Dismiss Charge Based on Violation of Constitutional Right to
Speedy Trial.” On April 24, 2018, a Muscogee County grand jury indicted
Redding for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault with a
“closed fist.” He was reindicted on the same charges on May 22, 2018. At a trial
from October 24 to November 5, 2018, the jury found Redding not guilty of
malice murder but guilty of the remaining counts. The trial court orally denied
the speedy-trial motion at the pretrial conference and ultimately sentenced
Redding to life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder and
a concurrent term of 20 years to serve in prison for aggravated assault.
Redding filed a timely motion for new trial, which the trial court denied on
June 4, 2019. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and in Redding v. State,
309 Ga. 124 (844 SE2d 725) (2020), this Court vacated the trial court judgment
and remanded with direction. On remand, the trial court merged the
aggravated assault count into felony murder, resentenced Redding to serve life
in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder, and entered its
first written order denying Redding’s speedy-trial motion. Redding filed a
held that the evidence presented at Redding’s trial was legally

sufficient to support his murder conviction, but we otherwise

vacated the judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to

make factual findings and legal conclusions regarding Redding’s

allegation of a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy

trial.2 See Redding v. State, 309 Ga. 124, 129-130 (2) (844 SE2d 725)

(2020) (“Redding I”).

      On remand, the trial court issued a written order denying the

speedy-trial motion. Redding filed a second appeal, again contending

his speedy-trial rights were violated along with other claims of error.

This Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case a second

time “because the trial court misstated and misapplied the law

regarding the prejudice factor, failed to weigh each Barker factor,

and conflated its consideration of some factors. . . .” Redding v. State,

timely notice of appeal, and in Redding v. State, 313 Ga. 730 (873 SE2d 158)
(2022), this Court again vacated the judgment and remanded with direction.
On remand, the trial court entered a second written order denying the speedy-
trial motion on March 6, 2023. Redding filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed to this Court’s August 2023 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
       2 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial,” U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
                                      2
313 Ga. 730, 736 (873 SE2d 158) (2022) (“Redding II”).

     On remand, the trial court entered a second written order

denying the speedy-trial motion. Redding filed his third appeal,

presently before the Court, again raising his speedy-trial claim

along with other previously unaddressed claims. For a third time,

we vacate the trial court’s order and remand this case for the trial

court to resolve the speedy-trial claim. We will not address the

remaining claims of error.

     1. A constitutional speedy-trial claim is evaluated under the

two-part framework set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(92 SCt 2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972) and Doggett v. United States, 505

U.S. 647, 652 (112 SCt 2686, 120 LE2d 520) (1992). As we explained

in Redding II,

     [f]irst, the trial court must consider whether the length of
     time between the defendant’s arrest and trial is
     sufficiently long to be considered presumptively
     prejudicial. If not, the speedy-trial claim fails at the
     threshold. A delay of one year or more is typically
     presumed to be prejudicial. In Redding I, we concluded
     that the presumptive-prejudice threshold was crossed in
     this case.

                                  3
     When that threshold is crossed, the trial court proceeds to
     the second part of the framework, applying a context-
     focused, four-factor balancing test to determine whether
     the defendant was denied the right to a speedy trial.
     These four factors are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
     reasons for it; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to
     a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.

Redding II, 313 Ga. at 731-732 (citation and punctuation omitted).

Consideration of the Barker-Doggett factors “requires courts to

engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process,” and the four

factors have no “talismanic qualities and must be considered

together.” Leonard v. State, 316 Ga. 827, 839 (6) (889 SE2d 837)

(2023).

     When reviewing the trial court’s weighing and balancing of the

factors, this Court

     must accept the factual findings of the trial court unless
     they are clearly erroneous, and we must accept the
     ultimate conclusion of the trial court unless it amounts to
     an abuse of discretion, even though we might have
     reached a different conclusion were the issue committed
     to our discretion.

Henderson v. State, 310 Ga. 231, 235 (2) (850 SE2d 152) (2020)

(citation and punctuation omitted). But in the context of a

                                  4
constitutional speedy-trial analysis, if the trial court’s factual

findings are clearly erroneous or the trial court “significantly

misapplies the law,” then “the trial court’s exercise of discretion can

be affirmed only if the appellate court can conclude that, had the

trial court used the correct fact[ual] and legal analysis, it would have

had no discretion to reach a different judgment.” State v. Pickett, 288

Ga. 674, 679 (2) (d) (706 SE2d 561) (2011). If the trial court would

still have discretion to reach a different judgment, we remand for

the trial court to reweigh the factors and exercise its discretion using

the correct factual and legal analysis. See State v. Johnson, 291 Ga.

863, 868 (3) (734 SE2d 12) (2012).

     2. Redding was arrested on September 12, 2016, indicted 19

months later on April 24, 2018, reindicted on the same charges on

May 22, 2018, and tried 5 months later on October 24, 2018. The

trial court properly found this cumulative 25-month period was

presumptively prejudicial—as we also concluded in Redding I—and

proceeded to consider the Barker-Doggett factors. See Redding I, 309

Ga. at 129 (2) (holding the presumptive-prejudice threshold was

                                   5
crossed in this case).

     (a)     The length of the delay.

     The trial court erred by weighing the length-of-delay factor

neutrally.

     The length of the pretrial delay in absolute terms plays a role
     in the threshold determination of presumptive prejudice.
     However, it also wears another hat as one of the four
     interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the
     second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.

Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56 (2) (b) (i) (663 SE2d 189) (2008)

(emphasis supplied). While similar, the presumptive prejudice

threshold and length-of-delay factor are separate inquiries. Ruffin,

284 Ga. at 57 (2) (b) (i). In considering the length of the delay, a court

must consider “whether delay before trial was uncommonly long.”

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 (II). “[T]he delay that can be tolerated in a

particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and

seriousness of the charges in that case,” and a delay may be

uncommonly long when the case is “not prosecuted with the

promptness customary in such cases . . . .” State v. Buckner, 292 Ga.

390, 393 (3) (a) (738 SE2d 65) (2013). Uncommonly long delays

                                    6
should generally weigh against the State, at least lightly. 3

      Here, the trial court found the delay was uncommonly long.

However, instead of weighing the length-of-delay factor against the

State, the trial court examined the reasons for the delay and

weighed it neutrally. Specifically, the trial court referenced a

backlog at the State Crime Lab and found that the State did not

intentionally delay trial, noting that “both sides requested delays.”

But the reasons for the delay is its own factor. The length-of-delay

factor should consider only the length of the delay itself, not the

reasons for it. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 56 (2) (b) (i) (explaining the

length of pretrial delay “in absolute terms” plays a role as one of the

four Barker-Doggett factors). Because the trial court based the

weight of the length-of-delay factor on the reasons for the delay

      3 Indeed, should the length of the delay cross the presumptive prejudice

threshold, a review of our prior decisions shows the length-of-delay factor is
generally weighed against the State—even if the delay is not uncommonly
long. See Williams v. State, 314 Ga. 671, 678 (4) (a) (878 SE2d 553) (2022)
(identifying no error when trial court held 25-month delay was not
uncommonly long but nonetheless weighed against State); Phan v. State, 290
Ga. 588, 593 (1) (a) (723 SE2d 876) (2012) (“There is no dispute that the . . .
delay . . . has crossed the threshold of presumptive prejudice . . . . [f]urther, as
the trial court found and the State does not dispute, the length of the delay
should be weighed against the State.”).
                                         7
(which is a separate factor), it misapplied the law. The trial court

should have weighed the length-of-delay factor against the State.

     (b)    The reasons for the delay.

     The trial court also erred by weighing the reasons-for-delay

factor neutrally. In considering the reasons-for-delay factor, we have

explained

     the trial court must consider which party was responsible
     for the delay, whether the delay was intentional, and, if it
     was intentional, what the motive was for seeking or
     causing the delay. As to the amount of weight assigned to
     this factor, different weights should be assigned to
     different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial
     in order to hamper the defense should be weighted
     heavily against the government, and an unintentional
     delay, such as that caused by the prosecuting attorney’s
     mere negligence or the trial court’s overcrowded docket,
     should be weighted less heavily.

Leonard, 316 Ga. at 849-850 (6) (b) (citations and punctuation

omitted). “Of course, delay caused by the defense weighs against the

defendant.” Burney v. State, 309 Ga. 273, 287 (4) (b) (845 SE2d 625)

(2020).

     The trial court found the 25-month delay “between [Redding’s]

arrest and the date of his trial can . . . be attributed to the need for

                                   8
the State to collect evidence” and “for the court to provide timely

trials to other cases. . . .” The trial court also found the State did not

deliberately delay indictment or trial. However, the trial court also

found “both sides requested delays,” citing March and November

2017 hearings where the trial court claimed defense counsel

requested more time to obtain a witness and was not ready for trial.

Because the trial court believed the delay was attributed to “both

sides,” the trial court weighed the reasons-for-delay factor neutrally.

     The trial court’s factual finding was clearly erroneous. While

Redding did request more time to prepare for his probation

revocation at those hearings, he never requested a delay of trial at

either hearing or anywhere else in the record. Thus, the trial court’s

reason for weighing this factor neutrally is unsupported by the

record. The record shows the reasons for the delay of the trial were

solely attributable to the State, so this factor should be weighed

against the State. See Leonard, 316 Ga. at 849-850 (6) (b).

     (c)   The assertion of the right to a speedy trial.

     The trial court weighed the assertion-of-right factor neutrally

                                    9
and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. We have explained that

this factor

      asks whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy
      trial in due course. This factor focuses on the timing, form,
      and vigor of the accused’s demands to be tried
      immediately. Although an accused need not demand a
      trial at the first available opportunity, his failure to assert
      his right with reasonable promptness will ordinarily
      weigh heavily against him.

Davis, 315 Ga. at 257 (2) (d) (iii) (citation and punctuation omitted).

      The trial court correctly found that Redding first asserted his

right to a speedy trial almost exactly one year after arrest. Prior to

that, Redding did not raise any speedy-trial concerns. The trial court

also cited a June 2017 letter where defense counsel asked to

reschedule a calendar call for unindicted cases because he was on

vacation and was not expecting a hearing on an unindicted case,4

and the trial court again cited the November 2017 hearing in

support of its finding that Redding requested trial delays.

Ultimately, the trial court weighed the assertion-of-right factor

      4 The trial court did not mention the June 2017 letter when examining

the reasons-for-delay factor.
                                    10
neutrally because the assertion-of-right delay “w[as] not intentional

from either side other than a vacation of [Redding’s] attorney.”

     Although the trial court again made an erroneous factual

finding that Redding requested trial delays, the trial court correctly

laid out the other facts and reasons behind the one-year delay in

filing the speedy-trial motion and based its analysis in large part on

those findings. It is undisputed that Redding first raised the speedy-

trial issue one year after his arrest. Redding argues that was the

earliest he could have raised a constitutional speedy-trial claim

because a delay is generally not presumptively prejudicial until at

least a year after arrest, and he speculates that a motion to dismiss

filed before September 2017 would likely have been denied outright.

We disagree. First, while a motion to dismiss may not have been

successful prior to the one-year mark, “[i]n order to invoke the right,

the accused need not file a formal motion[.]” Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 62

(2) (b) (ii). Second, we have rejected the argument that a defendant

should wait until the presumptively prejudicial threshold has

passed to first assert the speedy-trial right.

                                  11
     Although we have said that a defendant has the
     responsibility to assert his speedy trial right once it
     accrues, we have not equated accrual of the right with the
     one-year, presumptively prejudicial period of delay that
     satisfies the threshold inquiry; rather, a defendant may
     assert his constitutional right to a speedy trial at any time
     after he is arrested and need not wait until indictment.
     Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the
     notion that the right must be asserted or waived by a
     precise point in the process.

Cash v. State, 307 Ga. 510, 517 (b) (iii) (837 SE2d 280) (2019)

(citations and punctuation omitted).5 Ultimately, the trial court

considered Redding’s arguments and circumstances and opted to

weigh the factor neutrally, and we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by doing so. See Henderson, 310 Ga. at 237-238

(2) (c) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it considered the timing, form, and vigor of the assertion and

weighed the assertion-of-right factor neutrally when defendant

     5 We note that both Redding and the defendant in Cash had counsel at

the earlier points during which they may have asserted their speedy-trial
rights. Compare Cash, 307 Ga. at 518 (b) (iii) (weighing assertion-of-right
factor against defendant who failed to assert speedy-trial right sooner “even
though he had the benefit of counsel”) with State v. Alexander, 295 Ga. 154,
159 (2) (c) (758 SE2d 289) (2014) (agreeing defendant’s failure to promptly
assert speedy-trial right was partially mitigated by lack of counsel).
                                     12
demanded a speedy trial for the first time 10 months after

indictment). Cf. Cash, 307 Ga. at 518 (b) (iii) (concluding that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by weighing against

defendant his one-year wait to file a speedy trial demand).

     (d)   Prejudice.

     The trial court also did not abuse its discretion by weighing the

prejudice factor heavily against Redding. As we have explained,

     [t]he prejudice associated with unreasonable delay before
     trial includes oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety
     and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the
     accused’s defense will be impaired by dimming memories
     and loss of exculpatory evidence. Of these forms of
     prejudice, the most serious is the last, because the
     inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his case
     skews the fairness of the entire system.

Id. at 239 (2) (d) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Redding claims potential witness Jerry Ferrell died prior to

trial, making the pretrial delay prejudicial to Redding’s defense.

However, the trial court found defense counsel did not know and

could not show how Ferrell’s testimony would have assisted

                                  13
Redding’s defense.6 Further, the trial court found, and Redding does

not dispute, that defense counsel met with Ferrell and declined the

opportunity to read Ferrell’s statement to police into evidence at

trial when the trial court so offered. We see no abuse of discretion;

Redding failed to show prejudice from Ferrell’s death. See Dillard v.

State, 297 Ga. 756, 761-762 (4) (778 SE2d 184) (2015) (weighing

prejudice factor against defendant who “did not demonstrate what

that [dead] witness’s testimony would have been.”); Fallen v. State,

289 Ga. 247, 249 (4) (710 SE2d 559) (2011) (concluding witness’s

death did not prejudice defendant when witness was interviewed on

video prior to death, the State stipulated to the video’s admissibility,

and the interview was largely cumulative of other testimony).7

      6  Redding was convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault for punching Davis at a Labor Day cookout, which resulted in Davis’s
death by blunt force head trauma. Ferrell was at the cookout but did not
witness the incident; at that moment, he was in a washroom next to the patio
where it happened. Redding argued he acted in self-defense, but witnesses
testified that Davis did not provoke Redding.
       7 Further, the record is unclear when Ferrell died. The trial court found

Ferrell was “still alive one year after the murder” because defense counsel said
during an October 2020 hearing that Ferrell died in January 2018. But defense
counsel also said at a November 2017 hearing that Ferrell had been dead for
over a year, putting Ferrell’s death close in time to Redding’s September 2016

                                      14
     The trial court concluded its prejudice analysis by noting that

Redding did not even raise prejudice based on allegations of

oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety and concern of the

accused. Redding nonetheless argues he was prejudiced by both but

presents no specific showing of either. See Ruffin, 284 Ga. at 65 (2)

(b) (iv) (weighing prejudice factor against defendant who “failed to

establish oppressive pretrial incarceration or anxiety and concern

beyond that which necessarily attends confinement in a penal

institution”). Accordingly, the trial court weighed the prejudice

factor heavily against Redding, and we conclude the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in doing so.

     (e)   Weighing the factors.

     In summary, the trial court weighed factors one, two, and three

neutrally, but factor four heavily against Redding. The trial court

erred factually and legally and should have weighed factors one and

two against the State. We may only affirm the trial court’s

arrest, which would mean the inability to obtain Ferrell’s testimony was not
attributable to pretrial delay.

                                    15
conclusion if the trial court would have had no discretion to reach a

different judgment other than denying the speedy-trial motion.

Pickett, 288 Ga. at 679 (2) (d).

      While the trial court may be authorized to deny Redding’s

speedy-trial motion after assigning weight and balancing anew the

four factors in accordance with the applicable law and directions

outlined in this opinion, 8 we cannot say the trial court is necessarily

compelled to do so. This is especially so as the trial court only

weighed the prejudice factor against Redding and committed two

errors in the State’s favor. While “under the circumstances of a

particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the

balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d)

(705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or

sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been

violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579)

      8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court

acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and
committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the
speedy-trial right after weighing factor one against the State, factors two and
three neutrally, and factor four against the defendant).
                                       16
(2010); Buckner, 292 Ga. at 393 (3) (“Of these factors, no one is

dispositive.”).9

      Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order denying

Redding’s speedy-trial motion, and we remand this case again for

the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and

conclusions of law on the speedy-trial claim. See Redding II, 313 Ga.

at 736 (2); Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3).10

     Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.

      9 This is in contrast to the right to a speedy appeal, where, “unlike a

speedy trial claim, the failure to show actual prejudice from the delay is fatal
to the claim, even when the other three factors weigh in the appellant’s favor.”
Harper v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (1) (___ SE2d ___) (Case No. S23A0810)
(February 6, 2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
       10 As we explained in his last appeal, “[i]f the trial court denies

Appellant’s speedy-trial motion, Appellant may file a notice of appeal, and in
his new appeal, he may raise again the issues raised in his current appeal that
we do not address today, as well as any issue arising from the proceedings on
remand.” Redding II, 313 Ga. at 736 n.11.
                                      17