Court Opinion

ID: 9390317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:38.207012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.636826
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                          TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0139-DG

JOE WIELAND; AND HOT RODS & BBQ,                                    APPELLANTS
LLC

                    ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                          NO. 2021-CA-0534
                   HENRY CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CI-00171

DANA FREEMAN; FREEMAN’S KOUNTRY                                      APPELLEES
KORNER KAFE, LLC; AND BEN FREEMAN

               OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER

                                  AFFIRMING

      Joe Wieland (Wieland) and Hot Rods & BBQ, LLC (Hot Rods) appealed

from a Henry Circuit Court order that failed to rule upon their contract claim.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding in part that

Wieland and Hot Rods waived their unadjudicated claim under Kentucky Rule

of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.04. Wieland and Hot Rods moved for discretionary

review of the Court of Appeals Opinion. This Court granted discretionary review

“solely with respect to the issue of whether the Movants waived their breach of

contract claim.” For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the

Court of Appeals on the limited issue of waiver.
                                 I. BACKGROUND

      The underlying facts of this appeal are largely irrelevant for our limited

review. Wieland and Hot Rods signed a lease for a property owned by Dana

Freeman, Ben Freeman, and their company, Kountry Korner Kafe (collectively,

“the Kafe”). In the spring and summer of 2018, however, the relationship

between the parties regarding the tenancy began to deteriorate. Wieland and

Hot Rods filed suit against the Kafe, alleging wrongful eviction, breach of

contract, and defamation. Our review is limited to the alleged waiver of Wieland

and Hot Rods’ breach of contract claim.

      Wieland and Hot Rods’ circuit court complaint alleges, in part, “The

wrongful eviction, contract breach and tortuous [sic] conduct herein described

were reckless, wanton, intended to cause damage to Plaintiffs and did in fact

cause damage to Plaintiffs.” Subsequently, in granting summary judgment to

the Kafe on the wrongful eviction claim, the trial court wrote, “The Court agrees

with Defendants that if this were a claim made for a breach of lease, there

would be genuine issues of material fact.” That Order was entered on

September 14, 2020. It appears that the trial court was under the impression

that Wieland and Hot Rods did not make a breach of contract claim. Wieland

and Hot Rods then filed a motion to reconsider, alleging in part that the trial

court had overlooked their contract claim. The motion points out that the trial

court, in a previous order, stated, “Plaintiff [sic] argues that there was a breach

of contract by Defendant.”

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      Although the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ requested relief, it

acknowledged confusion regarding issues raised by Plaintiffs in their

Complaint. In a subsequent order entered December 11, 2020, the trial court

gave the parties thirty days to alert the trial court to matters, if any, that were

still outstanding. Wieland and Hot Rods filed their response to the trial court’s

order on January 11, 2021. In their response, Wieland and Hot Rods asserted

that their claim for breach of contract “is undeniable,” while expressing

confusion over whether the claim had been ruled upon by the trial court.

Wieland and Hot Rods ultimately asked the trial court to make it clear whether

their breach of contract claim remained pending before the trial court.

      In April of 2021, the trial court entered an order dismissing Wieland and

Hot Rods’ defamation claims. In the order, the trial court erroneously noted

that Wieland and Hot Rods did not respond to the court’s previous Order

requesting clarification of remaining issues.1 The Order stated:

      It is of note that the Court entered an Order on December 10,
      2020, in response to Plaintiffs’ contention that more issues than
      defamation per se were pending before the Court. As the Court
      acknowledged some confusion as to issues raised by Plaintiffs in
      their Complaint, the Court requested both parties to tender to the
      Court within thirty days what matters were still considered
      outstanding. Plaintiffs never responded to said order. As the
      Court considers all issues resolved by this Order and the previous
      Order granting Defendants’ Summary Judgment, this Order is final
      and appealable there being no just cause for delay.

      1 Between the entry of the December 11, 2020 order and this April, 2021 order,

Judge Conrad retired and Judge Crosby took the bench.

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(Emphasis added). Wieland and Hot Rods, without making any motion to

correct or inform the trial court of its aforementioned error, appealed the trial

court’s order. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on this issue,

initially stating that “Wieland and Hot Rods did not inform the court that it had

a pending breach of contract claim,” and therefore holding that they waived the

claim. In so doing, this initial Opinion perpetuated the trial court’s error

regarding the fact that Wieland and Hot Rods had not responded.

      Wieland and Hot Rods petitioned the Court of Appeals for a rehearing,

arguing that the appellate court was incorrect to assert that Wieland and Hot

Rods did not respond to the trial court’s December 11, 2020 Order. The Court

of Appeals denied the petition for rehearing, withdrew its initial Opinion, and

substituted that Opinion with a modified version. In the second Opinion, the

Court of Appeals acknowledged the trial court’s error, but came to the same

conclusion regarding waiver. The court held,

      Appellants’ argument is waived because Appellants failed to bring
      to the circuit court’s attention the error contained in its April 22,
      2021 order. As Appellees correctly point out Appellants waived this
      claim because pursuant to CR 52.04, Appellants could have
      requested the circuit court to make a finding of fact on the breach
      of contract claim, or to deny they failed to respond to the circuit
      court’s April 22, 2021 order.

Wieland v. Freeman, No. 2021-CA-0534-MR, 2022 WL 816964, at *6 (Ky. App.

Mar. 18, 2022), review granted (Aug. 10, 2022) (footnote omitted). This Court

subsequently granted discretionary review.

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                                    II. ANALYSIS

      The only determination required on our review is whether Wieland and

Hot Rods waived their contract claim by failing to bring the trial court’s error to

its attention. Thus, this Court’s review is solely regarding an issue of law. “We

review these questions of law de novo, respectfully owing no deference to the

legal determinations of the courts below.” Phillips v. Rosquist, 628 S.W.3d 41,

45 (Ky. 2021) (citing S. Fin. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs, 413 S.W.3d 921, 926 (Ky.

2013)).

      The Court of Appeals held that CR 52.04 was dispositive on this issue.

We agree. The procedural history we are called to review is this: The trial court

erroneously believed that Wieland and Hot Rods had failed to respond to its

order requesting a listing of outstanding claims. Because of this, the trial court

believed there were no outstanding claims and therefore failed to adjudicate the

contract claim. Then, Wieland and Hot Rods failed to either move to correct the

trial court’s erroneous beliefs or move for a ruling on their remaining claim. As

the Court of Appeals has correctly opined in Oldham Farms Development, LLC

v. Oldham County Planning & Zoning Commission, regarding the requirement of

CR 52.04, “the failure of [a party] to insist upon a ruling by the circuit court on

. . . issues means that they are not properly preserved for our review.” 233

S.W.3d 195, 197 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Dillard v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d

366, 371 (Ky. 1999)). That court further correctly explained that “under CR

52.04, on appeal a party may not be heard to complain about the absence of a

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trial-court ruling unless the failure to rule was brought to the attention of the

trial court in writing.” Id. (citations omitted).

      CR 52.04 states,

      A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded because of the
      failure of the trial court to make a finding of fact on an issue
      essential to the judgment unless such failure is brought to the
      attention of the trial court by a written request for a finding on that
      issue or by a motion pursuant to Rule 52.02.

Wieland and Hot Rods argue that CR 52.04 is inapplicable because first, the

matter was not tried by the court; second, the issue on review does not concern

an “essential fact;” and third, the case was decided on summary judgment,

which does not require factual findings. We address each argument in turn.

      First, Wieland and Hot Rods argue that CR 52.04 is inapplicable because

the matter was not tried by the trial court. This issue was also addressed by

the Court of Appeals in Oldham Farms Dev., LLC. That court explained, “[T]he

question here is not whether CR 52.01 applies, but rather whether CR

52.04 does. And by its own terms, CR 52.04 categorically governs ‘judgments’

of a trial court without qualification.” Oldham Farms Development, LLC, 233

S.W.3d at 197. Because the order at issue in this case was a final judgment,

CR 52.04 clearly applies.

      Second, Wieland and Hot Rods’ issue does concern an essential fact;

namely, whether their contract claim exists and has yet to be ruled upon. In

addition, the trial court order purports to resolve all issues, but makes no

factual findings regarding the issue of a contract claim aside from those

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findings it makes on defamation. On either theory, factual findings on an

essential issue were absent from the trial court’s order. CR 52.04.

      Third, while CR 52.01 does exempt a trial court from the requirement of

factual findings on summary judgments, it does not then render moot the

requirements on litigants imposed by CR 52.04. We discussed the interplay

between the two rules in Anderson v. Johnson, 350 S.W.3d 453 (Ky. 2011).

There, this Court clarified that the two statutes impose different burdens on

the trial court (through CR 52.01) and the litigant (CR 52.04):

      CR 52.04 requires a litigant to make a written request of the court
      or file a motion requesting a finding of fact essential to the
      judgment when the court has omitted it. Read as a whole, the rule
      clearly states that requests for findings are not necessary unless
      the court fails to include an essential fact that would make a
      judgment complete. In that limited instance, it is reasonable to
      require a litigant to request that finding if he wishes to have an
      appeal of that judgment, because the judgment is not whole
      without it. CR 52 embodies a burden on both the court (CR 52.01)
      and the litigant (CR 52.04). . . . And such a reading is in keeping
      with the intent of CR 52: a judge must make findings of fact and
      not address the matter in a perfunctory manner, but if he misses
      only some key fact in his findings, the litigant must assist the
      court in its good faith efforts to comply with the rule by requesting
      that specific finding.

Id. at 458. Here, as described in Anderson, we have a judgment that was not

“complete.” See id. Accordingly, the litigant—here, Wieland and Hot Rods—was

required under our rules to “assist the court in its good faith efforts to comply”

with our Civil Rules. Id. CR 52.01 does not exempt litigants from their duty

under CR 52.04. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that

Wieland and Hot Rods waived their contract claim—a claim that remains

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unadjudicated and available to the parties below so long as their claim is not

barred by any statute of limitations.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      Wieland and Hot Rods could have brought this error to the trial court’s

attention under numerous Rules. See, e.g., CR 52.02, 52.04, 59.05, 60.01,

60.02, etc. They did not. Their failure to correct an error of the trial court

acting in good faith does not then require reversal or remand from an appellate

court. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:

William Kirk Hoskins
Law Office of William Kirk Hoskins

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:

Ruth Helen Baxter
Crawford & Baxter, P.S.C.

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