Court Opinion

ID: 9492474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:41:59.008024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:19.364340
License: Public Domain

COLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion, except section III, which addresses Ward’s Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) claim. Because I believe that the admission of Ward’s prior *493judgment and commitment order was unfairly prejudicial, I respectfully dissent with regard to that issue.
As an initial matter, I do not believe that the majority opinion fully captures the unfairness to which Ward was subjected in this case. Indeed, reading the majority opinion, one might conclude that the only inflammatory material contained in Ward’s prior judgment and commitment order was the court’s “big-time drug dealer” comment. Certainly, there is no question that it was highly and manifestly prejudicial to allow the government to alert the jury to the fact that the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky had labeled Ward a big-time drug dealer.1 As Ward points out, however, even more inflammatory was the order’s relevant-conduct section, which concluded that Ward was responsible for the very acts at issue in this case. Thus, the district court permitted the government to introduce a document that contained another federal district judge’s conclusion that, for all intents and purposes, Ward was guilty as charged.2 I need not elaborate on the effect this must have had on the jury.
Given the prejudicial nature of the comments contained' in the judgment and commitment order, as well as the prejudicial nature of the order itself, I would be inclined to reverse even if I agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Ward waived her objection to the admission of this evidence. I do not agree with that conclusion, however. The majority’s opinion places much emphasis on Ward’s failure to specifically ask for a redaction of the judgment and commitment order at trial. Indeed, the majority writes that “Ward does not argue that the commitment order should have been excluded.” This is not my understanding of either Ward’s argument below or her argument before this court. Before trial, as the majority notes, Ward objected under Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) to the introduction of any evidence of her prior crime. Furthermore, she again objected under Rule 404(b) to the introduction of her prior judgment and commitment order.3 As Ward notes, the redaction of the judgment and commitment order was merely one option available to the district court under Rule 404(b), as was excluding the order all together. Cf. United States v. Mernweather, 78 F.3d 1070, 1077 (6th Cir.1996) (stating that a court’s exclusion of a tape recording under 404(b) could have either allowed proof on matter in question by other means or by playing less offending portions of the tape).
The majority is correct that Ward did not identify the specific inflammatory portions of the judgment and commitment order before it was admitted. Nevertheless, because Ward sought to invoke the court’s discretion to exclude the judgment and commitment order in its entirety because it was more prejudicial than probative, her objections were sufficient to preserve the matter for review. See Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 5036, at *494176 (1982) (“Counsel has done all that the Rule requires to preserve the point if he ‘objects’ on the ground of ‘prejudice’ under 403.”).4 There is no question that the district judge would have been more likely to exclude the evidence in question had Ward’s attorney detailed the factors that the judge was to balance in this case, see id., but I cannot conclude that this lack of detail constitutes a waiver.
In any event, it is clear that the district court failed to follow this court’s instructions for the proper application of Rule 404(b).
Upon objection by the defendant, the proponent of the evidence, usually the government, should be required to identify the specific purpose or purposes for which the government offers the evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts.” ... After requiring the proponent to identify the specific purpose for which the evidence is offered, the district court must determine whether the identified purpose, whether to prove motive or intent or identity [or] some other purpose, is “material”; that is, whether it is “in issue” in the case. If the court finds it is, the court must then determine, before admitting the other acts evidence, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. If the evidence satisfies Rule 403, then, after receiving the evidence, the district court must “clearly, simply, and correctly” instruct the jury as to the specific purpose for which they may consider the evidence.
Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1076-77. As the majority notes, the district court erroneously instructed the jury — both when the order was introduced and again in the court’s final jury instructions — that it might consider the judgment and commitment order for any one of a number of purposes, rather than instructing the jury that it could consider the order only on the question of intent. In other words, “the district court plainly erred by instructing the jury that the [evidence was] admissible to prove ‘opportunity,’ ‘preparation,’ ‘plan,’ ‘knowledge,’ or ‘absence of mistake.’ ” Id. at 1077 (emphasis added). Furthermore, there is absolutely no indication in the record that, prior to giving this erroneous instruction, the court conducted any sort of balancing under Rule 403. “Given the potential for confusion, misuse, and unfair prejudice from other act evidence, it is preferable that the district court make an explicit finding regarding the Rule 403 balancing.” United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 363 (6th Cir.1997). Such balancing would have necessarily led to the conclusion that, although the government may have been entitled to introduce some evidence regarding the prior acts of the defendant, the judgment and commitment order was substantially more prejudicial than probative. A factor in balancing probative value and unfair prejudice is the availability of other means of proof. See United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 329 (6th Cir.1997). The government, in fact, informed the court that it had witnesses who could testify as to Ward’s prior possession of drugs, in the event that the court disallowed the judgment and commitment order.
Because I believe that the admission of the judgment and commitment order was error5 under Fed.R.Evid. 403 and 404(b) and our case law, I dissent from the majority’s opinion in this regard. I would reverse Ward’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

. The statement, which describes the reason why the court imposed a 240-month sentence on Ward for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute in 1994, reads as follows: "To promote respect for the law & provide just punishment, and act as a deterrent to future criminal activity. Deft, is a big-time drug dealer, but the sentence is just for the crime; A sentence of 240 mos. is sufficient and justified.”

. In this case, Ward stood accused of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine on or about April 10, 1995. In Ward's prior judgment and conviction order, the court counted as relevant conduct "11.90 Keys and 38 Keys in April 1995.”

.Ward’s attorney stated simply that "[tjhere is an objection, Your Honor.” The court noted the objection, and it is clear from the record that the court understood the nature of the objection. Indeed, the court shortly thereafter granted "[a]ll defendants ... a continuing objection to 404(b) evidence.” See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1) (requiring litigants to specifically state the grounds for objections "if the specific ground was not apparent from the context”).

. In this circuit, district courts are required to conduct Fed.R.Evid. 403 balancing in evaluating a Rule 404(b) objection. See United States v. Myers, 123 F.3d 350, 363-64 (6th Cir.1997); Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1076-77.

. Additionally, I would not conclude that the error was harmless. See Merriweather, 78 F.3d at 1079.