Court Opinion

ID: 9858991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 17:58:38.944503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:15:13.870831
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
Resolution of the issue here does not rest on federal or state constitutional grounds; rather, it depends upon whether a police officer’s inquiry whether a suspect will submit to a blood test is interrogation triggering the application of Miranda. Because I would answer that question in the negative, I dissent.
In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 922-23, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Supreme Court held “that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.” The Court also noted,
“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), police words or actions ‘normally attendant to arrest and custody’ do not constitute interrogation. The police inquiry here is highly regulated by state law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects. It is similar to a police request to submit to fingerprinting or photography. Respondent’s choice of refusal thus enjoys no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection.” Id. at 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15.
In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990), the Court addressed directly the issue of whether a defendant’s statements, made when asked to submit to a breathalyzer test, must be suppressed in the absence of Miranda warnings. The Court stated:
“We believe that Muniz’s statements were not prompted by an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, and therefore the absence of Miranda warnings does not require suppression of these statements at trial.... Officer Deyo carefully limited her role to providing Muniz with relevant information about the breathalyzer test and the Implied Consent *651Law. She questioned Muniz only as to whether he understood her instructions and wished to submit to the test. These limited and focused inquiries were necessarily ‘attendant to’ the legitimate police procedure, see Neville, supra [459 U.S.], at 564, n. 15 [103 S.Ct. at 923 n. 15], and were not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response.” Id. 496 U.S. at 605, 110 S.Ct. at 2652 (footnotes and citation omitted).
I see no difference between this case and Pennsylvania v. Muniz. The testimonial or communicative nature of Beaton’s statements is irrelevant, for purposes of Miranda, if the statements were not elicited in response to custodial interrogation. While there may be no doubt that Beaton was in custody, see ante at 649, the trooper’s inquiry whether Beaton would submit to a blood-alcohol test is not interrogation under Neville and Mun-iz.
For these reasons, I would not hold Bea-ton’s statements of refusal inadmissible.