Court Opinion

ID: 9777190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:01:47.716998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:49.879561
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result reached by the principal opinion; however, I disagree with the reasoning by which the opinion reaches that result.
The property for which the variance is sought in the present case is improved with two single-family dwellings. The house nearest the street is the original dwelling on the parcel. The other house is a renovation of, and addition to, the former garage, located on the back of the parcel. The zoning ordinance in question defines “lot” as follows:
A parcel of land occupied by, or intended for occupancy by, one principal building, unified groups [sic] of buildings for principal use, and having access to a public street. A lot may be one or more platted lots, or tracts as conveyed, or parts thereof.
North Kansas City Code, Appendix A § 3(7), p. 477.
In the applicable zone, the “permitted uses” are defined to include “dwellings, one-family.” Id. §§ 7, 8, pp. 489-91. The zoning ordinance defines the pertinent “[l]ot area per family” as follows:
Every dwelling hereafter constructed, reconstructed, moved or altered shall provide a lot area of not less than three thousand eight hundred fifty square feet per family.
Id. § 8, pp. 491-92. The property on which the two houses are situated apparently contains approximately one and one-half times the number of square feet required for a single one-family residence.1
The back house was built several decades prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. However, there is some question whether occupancy of both houses as single-family dwellings would be acceptable under the ordinance as a pre-existing nonconforming use, since there may have been a lapse in occupancy terminating that status. The property owner therefore requested and obtained a variance to excuse strict compliance with the requirements of the zoning ordinance.
In its analysis prefatory to concluding that the judgment must be reversed, the principal opinion proceeds on the assumption that the variance requested here would be characterized under the “New York model” as a “use” variance, rather than a “non-use” or “area” variance. In distinguishing between the two, the discussion quoted by the principal opinion from Rath-kopf s Law of Zoning and Planning is apropos, with the addition of the sentence which follows the quoted language.
*420The two types of variances with which cases are customarily concerned are “use” variances and “nonuse variances.” The latter consist mostly of variances of bulk restrictions, of area, height, density, setback, side line restrictions, and restrictions covering miscellaneous subjects, including the right to enlarge nonconforming uses or to alter nonconforming structures.
As the name indicates, a use variance is one which permits a use other than the one of those prescribed by the zoning ordinance in the particular district; it permits a use which the ordinance prohibits. A nonuse variance authorizes deviations from restrictions which relate to a permitted use, rather than limitations on the use itself, that is, restrictions on the bulk of buildings, or relating to their height, size, and extent of lot coverage, or minimum habitable area therein, or on the placement of buildings and structures on the lot with respect to required yards. Variance made necessary by the physical characteristics of the lot itself are nonuse variances of a kind commonly termed “area variances.” These may consist of a variance of the minimum required area of lot for a permitted use, (the most common “area” variance) or a variance of the required width of the lot or its frontage on a street.
Rathkopf, 3, The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 38.01, pp. 38-1, -2 (1979) [emphasis added].
That part of the variance which alters the requirement imposed by § 3 that each lot on which principal residences are located have “access to a public street” is equivalent to a requirement that a lot have “frontage on a street.” Such a variance is therefore an “area” variance. Id. That part of the variance which alters the requirement that principal residences in the zone occupy a minimum of 3,850 square feet is also clearly an area variance. Hoffman v. Harris, 17 N.Y.2d 138, 216 N.E.2d 326, 269 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1966).
The North Kansas City Zoning Ordinance defines “use” as
The purpose or activity for which the land or building thereon is designed, arranged or intended, or for which it is occupied or maintained.
North Kansas City Code, Appendix A § 3(7), p. 481. In the context of multiple-family dwellings, the New York Court of Appeals stated that
... in an area zoned for apartment houses, to seek a variance of height, floor area, and density is to seek an area variance because the essential use of a land is not being changed. In such a situation, the essential use remains the same (apartments), although the particulars (height, lot area, floor area ratio) of said use may be different.
Wilcox v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 17 N.Y.2d 249, 217 N.E.2d 633, 270 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (1966).
In Hoffman, two residences were situated on one parcel of land comprising just over two acres. The land was zoned for single-family residences, with a lot area requirement of two acres per residence. One of the residences had been the main house of a larger estate, and the other had been the “gatehouse.” At the time the zoning ordinance came into effect, the gatehouse had been occupied by the gardener for the main house, a permitted “accessory” use in the zoning district. Subsequently, however, the gatehouse was rented to a family who were not employed in the main house. Such a use was not a pre-existing nonconforming use, and a variance was therefore requested to excuse compliance with the zoning ordinance. The Board of Zoning Appeals granted the variance and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the variance sought was an “area” variance rather than a “use” variance, and that proof of “practical difficulties” alone was therefore sufficient. Id., 216 N.E.2d at 330, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 124; see also Rathkopf, supra at p. 38-47 (citing Hoffman as a case to be “looked to for guidance” on the question of establishing “practical difficulties”). Hoffman is indistinguishable *421from the present case, and clearly establishes that the variance involved here is an “area” variance under the New York model.2
Because the present case does not involve a “use” variance, it is not necessary to address, as the principal opinion does, whether Missouri has historically rejected variances of that type. This Court has never held that “use” variances are prohibited, notwithstanding proof of “unnecessary hardship,” although two Court of Appeals cases have arguably so held. State ex rel. Meyer v. Kinealy, 402 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.App.1966); State ex rel. Sheridan v. Hudson, 400 S.W.2d 425 (Mo.App.1966); contra, Beckmeyer v. Beuc, 367 S.W.2d 9 (Mo.App.1963).
Both the Meyer and Sheridan cases attribute their holdings to this Court’s opinion in State ex rel. Nigro v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 95, 27 S.W.2d 1030 (Mo. banc 1930). In that case, a variance was sought to construct and use for retail business purposes a new building, to be situated on one corner of an intersection, on property zoned for residential purposes. The basis for the owner’s request was that the other three corners of the intersection were zoned for businesses, that new residential development in the area would create more need for retail businesses, and that denial of the variance would deprive him of potential profits. The circuit court reversed the zoning board’s denial of the variance, and this Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the evidence did not demonstrate “practical difficulties” or “unnecessary hardship” within the meaning of both the zoning ordinance and the relevant statute, so as to authorize a variance. This Court also commented that
if in a specific case the enforcement of a regulation according to its strict letter would cause unnecessary hardship and the board can by varying or modifying the application of the regulation obviate the hardship and at the same time fully effectuate the spirit and purpose of the ordinance, they are authorized to so vary or modify the application. But the board can in no case relieve from a substantial compliance with the ordinance; their administrative discretion is limited to the narrow compass of the statute; they cannot merely pick and choose as the individuals of whom they will or will not require a strict compliance with the ordinance.
Id. 27 S.W.2d at 1032. This Court also stated that, rather than seeking to establish the statutory standards for a variance, the landowner was in fact asking the board of zoning appeals to “rezone” property, which the board was not empowered to do. Id. Nothing in the Nigro opinion requires the conclusion that “use” variances are categorically prohibited under the statutory standard.3
Notwithstanding that the variance involved here is an “area” variance rather than a “use” variance, the ordinance itself requires proof which is similar to the “unnecessary hardship” standard as it is described by the principal opinion. Under the ordinance, the board is authorized to grant a variance only if it is demonstrated “[t]hat *422the property in question cannot yield a reasonable return if permitted to be used only under the conditions allowed by the regulations governing the district in which it is located_” North Kansas City Ordinance, Appendix A, § 27(B)(1)(a). It is the application of this standard that requires that the judgment in the present case be reversed and remanded.
As the principal opinion notes, proof under the “reasonable return” standard cannot be made by mere lay opinion, without a showing of the facts upon which such an opinion could be based. Such evidence was not before the board in the present case, and was in fact rejected when offered. In light of this deficiency, the board’s decision was unlawful, and the judgment affirming that decision must be reversed. Remand is “ advisable, however, to permit the landowners to submit proof under this standard if available.
I therefore concur in the principal opinion only to the extent of the result reached.

. The testimony and the parties refer to the property as constituting one and one-half "lots.” The ordinance contains a provision that, in single-family zoning districts, dwellings are to be "located on a lot,” and that "there shall be no more than one principal building on one lot except as may be approved in the planned zoning process." Id. § 4(C), p. 483. Since the definition of “lot” applicable under the zoning ordinance has no relation to platted lots, and pertains only to parcels occupied by "one principal building,” this provision is superfluous and adds nothing to the pertinent zoning restrictions. Furthermore, since the term “lot" refers to no other particular standard, it may be presumed that the "lot" referred to is the "lot area” required for a single-family dwelling.

. Were the variance involved here actually a "use" variance, the ordinance would appear to prohibit it under any circumstance. The ordinance conditions the authority of the board to grant a variance on proof “[t]hat the variance, if granted, will not alter the essential character of the locality.” North Kansas City Code, Appendix A § 27(B)(1)(c). This language is presumably derived from Wilcox, supra, which described an “area” variance as one involving "no change in the essential character of the zoned district." Id. 217 N.E.2d at 634, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 571. However, since the variance here is not a "use” variance, this problem is not before us.

. The remaining cases cited by the principal opinion in footnote 2 do not address the prohibition of "use” variances. Two of them concern “area” variances. Rosedale-Skinker Improvement Assn., Inc. v. Bd. of Adj. of St. Louis, 425 S.W.2d 929 (Mo. banc 1968); Brown v. Beuc, 384 S.W.2d 845 (Mo.App.1964). The third held that a board of zoning adjustment was not authorized to grant a "use" variance on the ground of financial hardship. Bartholomew v. Bd. of Adj. of Kansas City, 307 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Mo.App.1957).