Court Opinion

ID: 9730547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:15:14.714654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.403619
License: Public Domain

WIENER, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
I view this case in far less dramatic terms than my colleagues. I see it as a relatively routine appeal in which we are called upon to apply established precedent to the factual record before us. Burdened with this mind-set I am puzzled why the majority finds it necessary to decide this case on two independent grounds, one of which creates a confusing opaqueness in settled law.
The settled law to which I refer consists of Elrod v. Burns (1976) 427 U.S. 347, 373 [49 L.Ed.2d 547, 565, 96 S.Ct. 2673], Ebel v. City of Corona (9th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2d 390, Ketchens v. Reiner (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 470 [239 Cal.Rptr. 549], and American Booksellers Assn., Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 197 [181 Cal.Rptr. 33]. Each of these cases says that “the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even a minimal period of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” (See also Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E. Judicial Dist. (9th Cir. 1988) 838 F.2d 1031, 1045; Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, Cal. (9th Cir. 1986) 798 F.2d 353, 355; San Diego Committee v. Governing Bd. (9th Cir. 1986) 790 F.2d 1471, 1473; Goldie's Book Store v. Superior Court (9th Cir. 1984) 739 F.2d 466, 472.) Unlike my colleagues I am unable to treat this statement as a stylistic device used solely to “underscore the significance of the First Amendment” (maj. *823opn. ante, p. 814) when there is no authority, federal or state, which even hints that the United States Supreme Court did not mean exactly what it said and said exactly what it meant. In addition to my questions concerning the correctness of the majority’s view, I also question the need in the context of this case for a state intermediate appellate court to depart from precedent and treat a phrase articulating a fundamental principle of First Amendment law as essentially judicial puffing.
My disagreement with the majority on the question of irreparable harm does not mean that I think the injunction should have automatically issued. All it means is that the trial court was required to consider the second factor—Was the ordinance an invalid regulation of time, place or manner of protected speech?
Because First Amendment rights are involved, the burden on this issue rests with the city to show that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve the legitimate and substantial content-neutral governmental interests. (Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S._ [105 L.Ed.2d 661, 678-683, 109 S.Ct 2746].)
Whether the city will be able to make the required showing at trial is not before us. I suspect that if this case were fully tried, the record would be considerably different than it is now with far more information relating to the city’s reasonable efforts to curtail the alleged offensive conduct. Notwithstanding the subjective conclusions of the majority, the present record is devoid of such information. The only evidence presented by the city to the trial court is the police detective’s single hearsay declaration concerning area residents’ complaints about noise from patrons outside the bar when it was operated by previous owners. Nowhere does the city confront the question of whether the ordinance was substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest. This omission is particularly significant—and I believe determinative—when even the majority acknowledges that more narrow regulations could have accomplished the purpose of the challenged enactment (maj. opn. ante, p. 821). Lacking the requisite evidence on this issue, there is simply no legal basis on which the majority can say as a matter of law that the challenged ordinance is sufficiently narrow.
The majority cannot rectify this significant omission by merely relying on its personal views or the purpose of the ordinance as stated in its preamble. As to the first basis, the defect is self-evident. As to the latter, the city council’s recitation of the problem does not answer the essential question which we must decide—whether the ordinance has been properly tailored *824to serve the governmental interest. By treating the council’s conclusionary statement as evidence and deferring to the council’s perceptions, the majority improperly subordinates the judicial role to the executive/legislative branches of government. In so doing the majority has relinquished the role of the judiciary in protecting First Amendment rights.
Based on the narrow ground that the city has failed to carry its burden at this stage of the case I conclude the court erred in denying the preliminary injunction. I would therefore reverse the order.1

It should also be noted that Sundance Saloon, Inc. has not only lost its right to a preliminary injunction but, in light of the scope of this ruling, has also lost its right to a trial on the merits. In the circumstances of this case for the majority to have converted a preliminary injunction proceeding to a full trial is manifestly unfair.