Court Opinion

ID: 9474764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:08:16.724391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:19.426302
License: Public Domain

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent and vote to remand this case to the district court for it to make a finding as to whether Jimenez made a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. The district court failed to recognize Jimenez’ statement as being obtained in derogation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Instead, it viewed the failure promptly to object to the officer’s testimony as part of defense counsel’s trial strategy. The district court said: “Having knowledge of the grounds upon which an objection to the evidence could have been made, counsel delayed raising an objection until the close of the government’s case, over a full day and three witnesses later, [sic] constitutes waiver.”
Ordinarily, admission of testimony without objection may constitute a waiver, even of a Miranda violation. If that were the case here, I would join the majority in affirming. But Jimenez’ statement cannot be characterized simply as an unwarned but voluntary admission obtained in violation of Miranda. Rather, it was a coerced and unwarned statement that was obtained in violation of Jimenez’ Fifth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has recently noted that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally mandated, but serve instead as a prophylactic measure designed to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984).
The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda.
Oregon v. Elstad, — U.S.-, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1292, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). In El-stad, the Supreme Court observed that while an unwarned admission taken in violation of Miranda would be suppressed, the fruits of that confession, including sub*172sequent confessions, witnesses, or physical evidence, would not be similarly suppressed unless the initial confession was coerced and involuntarily made in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
Here, Jimenez’ Miranda-less statement was coerced under circumstances calculated to undermine his ability to exercise his free will. Jimenez was rear-handcuffed and held at gunpoint by four or more government agents when he was asked where he had been. Such circumstances so clearly indicate a lack of voluntariness and free will that they are sufficient to satisfy the compulsion element of a Fifth Amendment violation as a matter of law.
Having established a constitutional deprivation the next question is what standard governs its waiver. The district court apparently thought such right could be waived as a matter of trial tactics. The majority affirms contenting itself simply by observing that the finding of a trial tactic was not clearly erroneous. This conclusion fails to deal with the legal proposition before us — which is, did the failure by Jimenez’ counsel to object to the introduction into evidence of Jimenez’ coerced statement constitute a voluntary and intelligent waiver of a right to object to evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right.
The law is clear that Jimenez’ rights to assert this constitutional violation could only have been waived by him or his counsel; and then only if done voluntarily and intelligently. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Defense counsel may have erred by not recognizing the Miranda violation after Casey’s testimony, or by waiting to raise an objection until a later point in the trial. Yet, even assuming this to be a trial tactic, it defies logic to leap from that presumption to the conclusion that Jimenez’ rights therefore were knowingly and voluntarily waived.
When a constitutional right is not at stake — for example, in the case of a voluntary but unwarned Miranda-less statement — the proof necessary to establish a waiver is less, because the underlying right is less important. But a constitutional right may not be held to have been waived without a finding first having been made that defendant knew such right was being sacrificed and voluntarily consented. Inasmuch as the district court made no findings on this issue, such failure was a plain error of law that requires a remand for that purpose.