Court Opinion

ID: 9565632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:24:50.631294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.366625
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s opinion. As we stated in Blalock v. Blalock, 250 Ga. 862 (301 SE2d 876) (1983),
*78Decided June 30, 2008.
Gannam, Gnann & Steinmetz, J. Hamrick Gnann, Jr., for appellant.
Brannen, Searcy & Smith, William N. Searcy, Robert C. Hughes III, for appellee.
[i]t is true that the parties do each hold a one-half undivided interest in the subject property. However, the parties’ divorce decree, which was rendered approximately [36] years before the filing of the complaint in this case, gives the defendant the right to [permanent possession of] the property. The plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that the defendant has been, or should be, divested of this right.
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I would recognize that Harvey implicitly agreed to relinquish his right to partition the property when he failed to appeal the 1970 divorce decree in order to challenge its provision granting Sessoms “permanent possession” of the property. I thus cannot agree with the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Sessoms or its disapproval of White v. White, 253 Ga. 388 (320 SE2d 757) (1984) and Blalock, supra.