Court Opinion

ID: 9414732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 16:12:16.323338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.302081
License: Public Domain

J-S14019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                 v.                            :
                                               :
                                               :
  FRANKLYN M. GEIGER, JOYCE MILES              :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1380 WDA 2022
  APPEAL OF: FRANKLYN M. GEIGER                :

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County Civil Division at No(s):
                                11 of 2016

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: August 2, 2023

       Appellant, Franklyn M. Geiger, appeals pro se from the trial court’s

October 25, 2022 stipulation order which, inter alia, decreed the properties of

11 Madison Avenue, 13 Madison Avenue, and 414 Laurel Street (the

“Properties”), all located in the City of Warren, to be forfeited as to Appellant.

To give a brief overview, Appellant had already consented to the forfeiture of

these Properties via a consent order entered in his criminal case, but no such

forfeiture had been entered on the related civil forfeiture docket until the trial

court’s October 25, 2022 stipulation order. Upon review, we affirm the trial

court’s order.

       The trial court provided the following background on this matter:

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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       At his criminal docket (Commonwealth v. Franklyn P. Geiger,
       Warren County Docket No. 149 of 2016), … Appellant entered into
       a plea agreement whereby … Appellant entered into a consent
       order with the Commonwealth whereby he agreed to forfeit
       certain real estate including the [Properties].[1] … Appellant later
       filed a challenge to the forfeiture[,] which was dismissed by the
       trial court. Appellant appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior
       Court[,] and … [it] held that Appellant was not entitled to relief.
       [Commonwealth v. Geiger, 222 A.3d 820 (Pa. Super. 2019)
       (unpublished memorandum).2]         No petition for allowance of
       appeal was filed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Appellant
       also executed a deed to the Commonwealth for the [P]roperties in
       question.[3]
____________________________________________

1 For chronological context, the Commonwealth filed the criminal charges
against Appellant in May of 2016. He subsequently entered a negotiated guilty
plea and was sentenced on October 28, 2016. See Commonwealth v.
Geiger, 2019 WL 5063401, at *1 (Pa. Super. Oct. 9, 2019). The consent
order was filed in that case on September 9, 2016. See Warren County
Commissioners’ Petition to Intervene and Motion to Declare Forfeiture, 5/9/22,
at Exhibit F (Consent Order).

2 Specifically, Appellant appealed from the trial court’s order granting the
Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss Appellant’s “Petition to Open Consent
Order/Forfeiture Judgment” and Motion for Return of Property. On appeal,
this Court determined that Appellant was bound by the consent order and not
entitled to any relief with respect to the Properties, which were listed in the
consent order. See Geiger, 2019 WL 5063401, at *3 (“[Appellant] is due no
relief with respect to any items explicitly listed in the consent order.”).
However, we remanded the case so that Appellant could “develop his claim
that the Commonwealth retained the property identified in his petition that is
not explicitly listed in the consent order.” Id.

3 Our review of the record shows that Appellant only executed a quitclaim
deed to the Commonwealth for the 11 Madison Avenue property. He executed
this quitclaim deed with Joyce Miles, another owner of record for that property,
in the fall of 2016. The record reflects that Ms. Miles executed quitclaim deeds
to the Commonwealth for the remaining Properties in the fall of 2016. While
Ms. Miles was the sole record owner for the properties at 13 Madison Avenue
and 414 Laurel Street, she represented in prior affidavits from 2015 that
Appellant was the true owner of those properties. See generally Warren
County Commissioners’ Petition to Intervene and Motion to Declare Forfeiture
at Exhibits A-E.

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       The Commonwealth initiated civil forfeiture proceedings at the
       civil docket (Warren County Docket No. MLD 11 of 2016)
       regarding the same [P]roperties.[4] No order was requested or
       entered at that docket for the forfeiture of the same [P]roperties.
       Following the forfeiture, a dispute arose between the Warren
       County Commissioners and the Warren County District Attorney
       regarding the [P]roperties. Municipal liens and unpaid real estate
       taxes were discovered. The [C]ounty was incurring expenses in
       maintaining the premises. After years of ongoing negotiations,
       Warren County filed a Petition to Intervene in the civil action and
       requested that the parcels be sold. As no forfeiture against …
       Appellant and [Ms.] Miles had been filed at the civil docket, the
       County included them in the action.

       A hearing was conducted on October 13, 2022, with Appellant
       participating by video from his State Correctional Institution and
       Ms. Miles in person represented by counsel. The [c]ourt advised
       Appellant and Ms. Miles at the outset that they had no interest in
       the [P]roperties as they had been forfeited and the forfeiture was
       upheld by the Superior Court. Ms. Miles, through counsel,
       indicated that she had no interest in the [P]roperties, was not
       opposed to the forfeiture, and was permitted to leave the
       hearing.[5] Appellant attempted to argue that he had been
       negotiating with the [C]ounty in the past about a return of the
       [P]roperties and, therefore, he wanted to pursue those
       negotiations. The [c]ourt informed Appellant that he had no
       interest in the [P]roperties and could bid on them at any future
       public sale. The [c]ourt then facilitated a settlement between the
       County Commissioners and the District Attorney regarding the
       [P]roperties. This settlement is embodied in the [s]tipulation
       [o]rder dated October 24, 2022.[6]

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth initiated the civil forfeiture proceedings in February of

2016, but that docket apparently sat dormant from September of 2016 until
May of 2022.

5 At the hearing, Ms. Miles expressly disclaimed her interests in the properties

at 11 and 13 Madison Avenue. N.T., 10/13/22, at 7. She did not expressly
disclaim her interest in 414 Laurel Street, but we believe this was merely an
oversight on her counsel’s part.

6 The stipulation order was dated October 24, 2022, but not filed until October

25, 2022.

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Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/9/23, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

       Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal from the stipulation

order.7, 8 The trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).          After seeking an

extension to file his statement, Appellant timely did so. The trial court then

issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.9
____________________________________________

7 In his notice of appeal, Appellant purported to appeal on behalf of Ms. Miles

as well. However, for the reasons set forth infra, Appellant may not appeal
and raise arguments on her behalf.

8 We recognize that “[t]he Commonwealth Court normally has jurisdiction over

appeals from forfeiture orders, so when, as here, a party appeals a forfeiture
order to this Court, we have the discretion to transfer the appeal to the
Commonwealth Court under Pa.R.A.P. 741(a).” Commonwealth v. Bowers,
185 A.3d 358, 362 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also Pa.R.A.P. 741(a) (“The failure
of an appellee to file an objection to the jurisdiction of an appellate court on
or prior to the last day under these rules for the filing of the record shall,
unless the appellate court shall otherwise order, operate to perfect the
appellate jurisdiction of such appellate court, notwithstanding any provision of
law vesting jurisdiction of such appeal in another appellate court.”). However,
“when neither party objects, we can elect to exercise jurisdiction over a
forfeiture appeal.” Bowers, 185 A.3d at 362 (citation omitted). Here, no
party has objected to our jurisdiction, and we decline to transfer this appeal
to the Commonwealth Court.

9 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court observed that Appellant’s concise

statement consisted of a four-page narrative that failed to comply with Rule
1925(b), and it stated that the errors that Appellant complained of were
“redundant and frivolous.” TCO at 3 (unpaginated). As a result, it declined
to address Appellant’s issues.
      While we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s concise statement is
verbose and somewhat incoherent, we do not believe he presented his issues
in bad faith, and therefore decline to dismiss his appeal on this basis. See
Creighton v. Kiddie Academy of Plumsteadville, 2020 WL 4038046, at *3
(Pa. Super. July 17, 2020) (unpublished memorandum) (declining to dismiss
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant presents eight issues for our review, which we re-produce

verbatim:
       1. DID THE COURT VIOLATE THE APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS
       RIGHTS BY NOT SERVING THE APPELLANT AN (30) DAY NOTICE
       FOR THE HEARING HELD ON OCTOBER 13, 2022 WITHOUT
       SERVING SAID NOTICE UPON THE APPELLANT WHO WAS A
       NAMED DEFENDANT IN THE MATTER/

       2. DID THE COURT VIOLATE THE RULES OF COURT BY FAILING
       TO HOLD A PROPERLY REQUESTED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE.
       BY A PARTY TO THE ACTION AS ALLOWED FOR ALL PARTIES IN A
       CIVIL DISPUTE

       3. DID THE COURT FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT
       TO SETTLE CLAIMS OF DAMAGE TO HIS PROPERTY PURPETRATED
       BY AGENTS IN THE EMPLOY OF THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER’S
       THAT HE AND THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER’S ALREADY ENTERED
       INTO SETTLEMENT NEGOATIATIONS THAT WAS TO BE PART OF
       THE PREPOSED SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE IN THIS MATTER?

       4. DID THE COURT ACT IN AN INPROPER MANOR BY BY RULING
       ALL DEBTS ESTABLISHED BY THE COMMONWEALTH DURING
       THERE OWNERSHIP BE SETTLED INFULL BEFORE SALE OF
       PROPERTIES EXCEPT TO THE APPELLANT ONCE A SETTLEMENT
       AGREEMENT WERE PREPOSED THAT INCLUDED THEM?

       5. DID THE COURT IN IT’S FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE
       PREVIOUS SUPERIOR COURT RULING UNDER GEIGER V. COM.
       NO. 645 WDA 2018. THAT RULE THERE WAS NO FORFEITURE
       ACTION IN THE MATTER THEREBY MAKE IT’S RULINGS WITH A
____________________________________________

appeal based on concise statement where it was not clear that the appellant
used the concise statement to intentionally subvert the intent of Rule
1925(b)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that an unpublished non-
precedential memorandum decision of the Superior Court filed after May 1,
2019, may be cited for its persuasive value). In addition, we determine that
the lack of a trial court opinion in this matter does not hamper our review,
and a remand for the preparation of an additional Rule 1925(a) opinion is not
necessary. See Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151, 1158 n.5 (Pa.
Super. 2020) (determining that “the lack of a Rule 1925(a) opinion does not
preclude this Court’s review of the merits of [the a]ppellant’s issues based
upon our review of the record”).

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       FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW IN THE MATTER? WHEN
       BASING ITS RULINGS OFF OF FORFEITURE LAW NOT
       CONTRACTUAL LAW?

       6. WAS THE ORIGINAL CONSENT ORDER FATALLY FLAWED UPON
       CONCEPTION WHEN IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH JURISDICTION
       OVER ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE MATTER, THEREBY MAKING
       THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE APPELLANT PARTIES TO AN
       ILLEGAL CONTRACT THERBY NULLIFING THE ORIGINAL CONSENT
       ORDER?

       7. DID THE COURT ERROR WHEN IT CHANGED THE ORIGINAL
       CONSENT ORDER WITHOUT THE CONSENT AND AGREEMENT OF
       ALL PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE ORIGINAL CONSENT

       8. DOES THE APPELLANT HAVE THE RIGHT TO RAISE
       ARGUEMENTS FOR NON-PARTY JOYCE MILES FOR NON-
       JURISDICTION ISSUES OF ORIGINAL CONSENT DECREE OF 149
       OF 2016

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

                                               I.

       In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court violated his due

process rights by not serving him with thirty-day notice of the October 13,

2022 hearing. No relief is due on this basis.

       Initially, Appellant provides no applicable support that he was entitled

to thirty-day notice of the hearing.10 Further, although our review of the

record confirms that Ms. Miles failed to serve Appellant with her August 10,

2022 motion to continue the hearing pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil

Procedure 440, and the trial court did not provide Appellant with its order
____________________________________________

10 Appellant cites to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 401, which states
that “[o]riginal process shall be served within the Commonwealth within 30
days after the issuance of the writ or the filing of the complaint.” Pa.R.Civ.P.
401(a). However, this rule applies to original process, not to a court order
scheduling a hearing.

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scheduling the hearing for October 13, 2022, in accordance with Pennsylvania

Rule of Civil Procedure 236, Appellant nevertheless appeared at the October

13, 2022 hearing.11       While he generally complains that the lack of notice

denied him the ability to prepare “a proper defense” and procure witnesses

for the October 13, 2022 hearing, he does not elaborate on any specifics nor

explain how his defense would have differed had he received proper notice.

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Importantly, Appellant had no legal interest in the at-

issue Properties at the time of the October 13, 2022 hearing, as he had

previously agreed to forfeit the Properties in his criminal proceeding, and he

and Ms. Miles executed deeds to the Commonwealth for the Properties. See

42 Pa.C.S. § 5805(l) (“A defendant in a criminal case who disclaims ownership

of property during the criminal case may not claim ownership during a

subsequent forfeiture proceeding.”). Given his lack of legal interest in the

Properties, his appearance at the hearing, and the lack of specifics he provides

about how his ‘defense’ would have changed if given proper notice, no relief

is due on Appellant’s first issue.

                                               II.

____________________________________________

11 We admonish Ms. Miles and the trial court for failing to comply with the
Rules. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(a) (“The prothonotary shall immediately give
written notice of the entry of … any other order or judgment to each party’s
attorney of record or, if unrepresented, to each party.”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 440(a)(1)
(“Copies of all legal papers other than original process filed in an action or
served upon any party to an action shall be served upon every other party to
the action.”).

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      In Appellant’s second issue, he argues that the trial court violated

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 212.3 by failing to hold a properly

requested settlement conference. Appellant’s Brief at 8-9; see Pa.R.Civ.P.

212.3(a)(5) (“In any action at any time the court, sua sponte or on motion of

any party, may direct the attorneys for the parties or any unrepresented party

to appear for a conference to consider … [s]ettlement and/or mediation of the

case[.]”) (emphasis added).

      Again, no relief is due. Rule 212.3 does not require the trial court to

hold a settlement conference; instead, it simply states that the trial court may

do so.   Thus, the trial court did not violate Rule 212.3 by not holding a

settlement conference.

                                     III.

      In Appellant’s third issue, he argues that the trial court “fail[ed] to

recognize [his] right to settle claims of damage to his property purpetrated

[sic] by agents in the employ of the County commissioner’s [sic] that he and

the County commissioner’s [sic] already entered into settlement negoatiations

[sic] that was to be part of the preposed [sic] settlement conference in this

matter[.]”    Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Problematically, Appellant provides no argument on this issue. Accordingly,

it is waived. See Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super.

2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on

behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief impede our ability

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to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely

or find certain issues to be waived.”) (citations omitted).

                                      IV.

      In Appellant’s fourth issue, he contends that the trial court “act[ed] in

an inproper [sic] manor [sic] by by [sic] ruling all debts established by the

Commonwealth during there [sic] ownership be settled infull [sic] before sale

of Properties except to … Appellant once a settlement agreement were

preposed [sic] that included them.”      Appellant’s Brief at 9 (unnecessary

capitalization omitted). While Appellant’s argument is not the model of clarity,

it appears that he is complaining that the trial court impermissibly changed

the consent order, and refused to accept a settlement agreement between

Appellant and the County.

      This claim fails. To begin, nothing in the record indicates that the trial

court changed the consent order.         The consent order stated that the

Properties, among other things, are forfeited to the Warren County District

Attorney’s Office/Warren County Drug Task Force. See Consent Order at 1.

At the October 13, 2022 hearing, the trial court fully recognized that the

Properties were forfeited. See N.T. at 3-4 (“Clearly the [C]ounty has good

title to the … three [P]roperties in question. Not only was my forfeiture order

at the criminal dockets affirmed by the Superior Court, both [Appellant] and

Ms. Miles executed quit[claim] deeds to the [C]ounty for the [P]roperties. So

the [C]ounty owns the property [sic] subject to the provisions of the Forfeiture

Act.”). Thus, it did not change the consent order.

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      Furthermore, the record does not support that Appellant and the County

had reached a settlement. See also Warren County Commissioner Office’s

Brief at 27 (refuting that the parties had reached a settlement). Therefore,

Appellant’s claim that the trial court refused to enforce their settlement

agreement is meritless.    To the extent the trial court refused to entertain

Appellant’s requests to pursue a settlement, the trial court reasonably

explained that Appellant no longer has any interest in the Properties due to

the consent order and the quitclaim deeds, and noted that he may bid on the

Properties when the County puts them up for public sale.            N.T. at 8-9.

Therefore, no relief is due on Appellant’s fourth issue.

                                       V.

      In Appellant’s fifth issue, he says that the trial court failed to recognize

the previous Superior Court ruling that there was no forfeiture action.

Appellant’s Brief at 11. He points to our decision in his appeal challenging the

consent order and asking for his property to be returned, where we stated

that “the Commonwealth never petitioned for forfeiture in this matter. Rather,

the parties reached a consensual agreement which was reduced to writing.”

Geiger, 2019 WL 5063401, at *2.

      Appellant does not make clear why this statement in our previous

decision matters now and how the trial court failed to recognize it. Thus, this

issue is waived. See Hardy, supra (“This Court will not act as counsel and

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects

in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may

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dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”).

Nevertheless, we will provide context for why we said in the earlier decision

that the Commonwealth did not petition for forfeiture.           In that appeal,

Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not voiding the consent order,

setting forth various arguments in support based upon the Rules of Civil

Procedure and the procedures to be followed when the Commonwealth

initiates a forfeiture proceeding. Geiger, 2019 WL 5063401, at *1; see also

id. at *2 (recognizing that “[a] forfeiture proceeding initiated by the

Commonwealth is civil in nature and governed by the Rules of Civil

Procedure”) (citation omitted). The crux of his argument was that he did not

know that he had a right to a civil trial and could dispute the facts asserted.

Id. at *1. In addressing this argument, we essentially explained that the

Commonwealth did not proceed under the Forfeiture Act but rather the parties

reached   an   agreement    (i.e.,   the   consent   order)   that   resolved   the

Commonwealth’s claims under the Forfeiture Act to the listed property. Id.

at *2. As such, the Commonwealth did not have to follow the Rules of Civil

Procedure and/or the procedures of the Forfeiture Act, and therefore

Appellant’s claim for why the consent order should be voided failed.

      Because Appellant does not clearly explain how the trial court failed to

recognize our previous decision, Appellant’s fifth issue warrants no relief.

Further, to the degree Appellant says our previous decision represented that

there was no forfeiture action, that statement must be read in the context of

the decision as set forth supra.

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                                        VI.

      In Appellant’s sixth issue, he contends that the consent order was fatally

flawed when it failed to establish jurisdiction over all parties involved in the

matter, thereby making the Commonwealth and Appellant parties to an illegal

contract. Appellant’s Brief at 12. While Appellant’s argument is again far from

clear, it appears that he is complaining that the consent order was entered

without jurisdiction over Ms. Miles.

      It is improper for Appellant to attack the consent order entered in his

criminal case in this separate civil forfeiture action.           Further, Ms. Miles

executed quitclaim deeds for the Properties in the fall of 2016, and asked to

be excused at the October 13, 2022 hearing after again renouncing her

property interests. N.T. at 7-8. As such, Appellant’s confusing argument calls

for no relief.

                                       VII.

      In Appellant’s seventh issue, he claims that the trial court erred when it

changed the original consent order without the consent and agreement of all

the parties.     Appellant’s Brief at 14.     No relief is due.    We have already

determined that the trial court did not change the consent order. See Issue

IV, supra.

                                       VIII.

      In Appellant’s eighth issue, he argues that he has “the right to raise

arguements [sic] for non-party [Ms.] Miles for non-jurisdiction issues of

original consent decree of 149 of 2016.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (unnecessary

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capitalization omitted). At the outset, it does not appear that he raised this

issue in his Rule 1925(b) concise statement. Accordingly, it is waived. See

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are

waived.”); see also Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque

Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[I]n

determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on

non-compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers

an appellant’s obligation[. T]herefore, we look first to the language of that

order.”) (citations omitted); Trial Court Order, 12/9/22, at 1 (directing

Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and warning that “[a]ny issue not

properly included in the statement timely filed and served shall be deemed

waived”); Trial Court Order, 11/21/22, at 1 (same).

      Even if not waived on that basis, we would not grant Appellant relief.

Though his argument is nearly indecipherable, he seems to assert that he can

raise arguments for Ms. Miles because the trial court reopened the consent

order at the October 13, 2022 hearing after Ms. Miles had already excused

herself from the hearing. We reiterate that the trial court did not reopen the

consent order, which was entered in a separate case, and repeat that Ms.

Miles was represented by counsel at the hearing and disclaimed her property

interests. See Issue IV, supra. Further, she chose not to file an appeal in

this matter. Therefore, even if preserved, Appellant’s eighth issue would fail

as well.

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     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2023

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