Court Opinion

ID: 9468094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:04:32.962888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:40.922436
License: Public Domain

REED, District Judge,
dissenting.
I feel impelled to dissent from the holding of the majority in this case.
I have no particular disagreement with most of the abstract principles of law elucidated in the well written majority opinion. My difficulty is in applying those principles to the peculiar facts of this case.
As is so often the case, we are dealing with clashing policy considerations. There are strong reasons to support the finality of judgments and to oppose the post trial interrogation of jurors and analysis of their motives. On the other side of the scale is the desire to provide a fair trial to every litigant. Misrepresentations during the voir dire cannot be countenanced.
The majority notes that a district court’s determination on a motion for either a new trial or relief from judgment because a juror failed to fully disclose information during voir dire is reversible only for either an abuse of discretion by the trial judge or a clear error of law in the exercise of that discretion. Having stated this principle, the majority points out that the trial judge evinced a proper sensitivity to the litigants’ rights, “by permitting plaintiffs’ counsel to interview jurors, by holding oral argument on plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial, and by writing a thoughtful memorandum opinion.” (Majority opinion at 657, n.5)
The reason for not establishing a per se rule is that the law, as repeatedly interpreted, delegates the disposition of this issue to the reasonable discretion of the trial judge. An exercise of discretion is required where the operative factual patterns are so shaded and varied that a value judgment must be made in each case. Per se rules have little or no place in the post trial consideration of voir dire responses.
In my view the district judge demonstrated great sensitivity to the fundamental rights of the litigants and the counterbalancing policies involved in this case.
Having considered all of the circumstances in this case, I cannot agree that the trial judge abused his discretion. The trial judge determined that the juror’s answer was at most “an inadvertent concealment of less than prejudicial impact.” (Majority opinion at 657) I would affirm the judgment and therefore respectfully dissent.