Court Opinion

ID: 9845368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:20:07.0846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:03.583403
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
“When the right point of view is discovered, the problem is more than half solved.” Ellison v. Ga. R. &c. Co., 87 Ga. 691, 706-707 (13 SE 809) (1891). Because I believe that the majority opinion has discovered the wrong point of view and thereby has more than half compounded the problem, I must respectfully dissent.
Initially, I note that Duncan v. State, 185 Ga. App. 854 (366 SE2d 154) (1988), concerned the jurisdiction of county recorder’s courts. The instant case concerns the jurisdiction of municipal courts. Although I share the majority opinion’s observation that this court in Duncan evidently overlooked Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. X, Par. I (5), the fact remains that Duncan is inapposite here. The majority opinion inappropriately attempts to use the instant case as a vehicle to overrule Duncan.
More importantly, I believe the majority opinion has taken the wrong view concerning this court’s own jurisdiction. Ga. Const., Art. *309VI, Sec. I, Par. I, following the assignment of judicial power of the State, provides that “[mjunicipal courts shall have jurisdiction over ordinance violations and such other jurisdiction as provided by law.” OCGA § 40-13-21 (a) expressly empowers municipal courts to handle cases involving “all criminal laws of this state relating to traffic upon the public roads, streets, and highways of this state where the penalty for the offense does not exceed that of the grade of misdemeanor.” Under these constitutional and statutory provisions, municipal courts such as the Recorder’s Court of the City of Chamblee clearly have jurisdiction over misdemeanor DUI offenses.
Decided October 26, 1989.
Lenzer & Lenzer, Thomas P. Lenzer, Robert W. Lenzer, for appellant.
Gerald N. Blaney, Solicitor, George L. Kimel, David M. Fuller, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.
The instant case involves application, not construction, of precise and unambiguous provisions of the state constitution. In this situation, the majority opinion thus errs in transferring the appeal to the Supreme Court. Oswell v. State, 181 Ga. App. 35 (351 SE2d 221) (1986).
Considering the merits of this appeal, OCGA § 40-6-391.1 (a) provides that acceptance of a nolo contendere plea is within the trial court’s discretion. The record demonstrates no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s refusal to accept the appellant’s nolo contendere plea in this case, and I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this dissent.