Court Opinion

ID: 9897900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:54.511686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:04.552672
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Dependency of                            No. 84852-6-I
                                                  (consolidated with Nos.
C.M.L. and C.S.S.,                                  84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-
                                                                             6-I)

                        Minor children.           ORDER GRANTING MOTION
                                                 TO PUBLISH

      Respondent the Department of Children, Youth, and Families filed a

motion to publish the opinion filed on August 28, 2023 in this case, and appellant

filed an answer to the motion. A majority of the panel has determined that the

motion should be granted. Now, therefore, it is hereby

     ORDERED that respondent’s motion to publish the opinion is granted.

                               FOR THE COURT:

                                      Judge
       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

In the Matter of the Dependency of                No. 84852-6-I
                                                  (consolidated with Nos.
C.M.L. and C.S.S.,                                84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)

                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                         Minor children.

      BOWMAN, J. — D.L. appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate

a default order terminating her parental rights to C.M.L. and C.S.S. D.L. argues

we should set aside the default order because (1) the Department of Children,

Youth, and Families (Department) failed to notify her of the motion for default

under CR 55(a)(3), (2) the Department deprived her of due process because the

termination summons did not adequately advise her of her right to an attorney,

and (3) the factors under CR 60(b)(1) supported vacating the default judgment.

We affirm.

                                      FACTS

      D.L. is the biological mother of C.M.L. and C.S.S. The children’s biological

father is deceased. In May 2021, the Department filed dependency petitions and

removed both children from D.L.’s care, citing D.L.’s issues with mental health,

substance use, and parenting skills. The court appointed D.L. an attorney, and
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/2

the Department assigned her a caseworker to assist D.L. with reunification

services.

      In June 2021, the Department referred D.L. for a drug and alcohol

evaluation, but she did not follow through with the assessment. And between

May and August 2021, the Department referred D.L. for drug testing, but she

failed to appear to submit samples.

      On September 16, 2021, the court issued an order finding the children

dependent. Then, in November 2021, D.L. completed detox and a drug and

alcohol evaluation. In December 2021, she completed a 28-day inpatient

treatment program. After inpatient treatment, D.L. began an intensive outpatient

treatment program. But in January 2022, she relapsed and stopped participating

in treatment.1 In June 2022, D.L. started another 28-day inpatient program, but

she again stopped outpatient treatment after discharge.

      The Department also referred D.L. for mental health and family

preservation services throughout 2021, but she did not participate in any of the

services. And she did not regularly visit her children or maintain regular contact

with her caseworker.

      On August 24, 2022, the Department filed petitions to terminate D.L.’s

parental rights to C.M.L. and C.S.S. The petitions noted that the father may have

been a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians. So, the

Department sent notice to the tribe as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act of

1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901, and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare

      1
          When D.L. stopped outpatient treatment, she lost her housing.

                                            2
Act (WICWA), chapter 13.38 RCW. The tribe responded that neither the children
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/4

nor the father were members and that the children were not eligible for

membership.

       On October 28, 2022, D.L.’s Department caseworker Stacie Naweli

personally served D.L. with the termination petitions and a “Notice and

Summons/Order [re] Termination of Parent-Child Relationship.” The summons

informed D.L. that the Department was seeking to terminate her parental rights to

C.M.L. and C.S.S. It said that the court scheduled a preliminary hearing on

termination for December 5, 2022 at 9:00 a.m.2 The notice informed D.L. that

she “should be present at this hearing.” And it warned her that if she did not

appear, “the court may enter an order in [her] absence . . . [p]ermanently

terminating [her] parental rights.”34 The notice also informed D.L. that she had

the right to an attorney and instructed her how to request one.

       When Naweli gave D.L. the summons, she “pointed out the date of the

hearing.” Naweli also told D.L. that “she could appear at the hearing via Zoom [5]

and then asked [D.L.] for a good e[-]mail address,” which D.L. provided.

       On November 1, 2022, Naweli e-mailed D.L. a service letter that included

the preliminary termination hearing date and time and information on how to

access the hearing. And on November 30, 2022, Naweli e-mailed D.L. the

       2
         Under Snohomish County Superior Court Local Juvenile Court Rule (SCLJuCR)
3
 .6A(a), “[i]n every matter set for a dependency, guardianship, or termination fact-finding
hearing, a preliminary hearing shall first be had to resolve all undisputed facts and to
consider matters of law.”
       4
         “Any party not appearing at the preliminary hearing in person or by counsel,
after proper notice, may be adjudged in default.” SCLJuCR 3.6A(c).
       5
           Zoom is an online platform that provides audio and video conferencing.

                                             4
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/5

preliminary hearing date and time, the Zoom link to appear at the hearing, and

the call-in information.6 She also called D.L.’s last known phone number7 and left

a voice mail asking for a return call. Naweli then texted D.L. that she had

emailed her the Zoom link to appear at the hearing.

       D.L. did not appear at the preliminary hearing on December 5, 2022.8 So,

the Department requested to proceed by default, which the court allowed. The

Department first asked the court to find that ICWA and WICWA do not apply

based on the tribe’s determination that neither child is a member or eligible for

membership. The trial court found that ICWA and WICWA do not apply.

       The Department then presented testimony from caseworker Naweli.

Naweli described the services the Department offered D.L. and D.L.’s lack of

compliance with those services. Naweli opined that there is “little likelihood that

the children can be returned to [D.L.] in the near future” because she “has not

engaged in services necessary to remedy her parental deficiencies” or

“maintained contact” with the children or the Department. She also stated that

D.L. was unfit to parent the children because of her ongoing substance use,

       6
         Naweli sent both the November 1 and November 30 e-mails to the address that
D.L. provided on October 28, 2022, to another e-mail address that D.L. had “personally
provided” on December 16, 2021, and to two other addresses “that had been provided
from parent locator searches.”
       7
         Naweli called the phone number “that she had been using to communicate with”
D.L. since October 2022 and “had no reason to believe . . . was not a good number to
reach [D.L.].”
       8
         D.L.’s dependency attorney appeared at the preliminary hearing. But she
informed the court that she “represent[s] [D.L.] in the underlying dependency matter
only” and that D.L. “has not reached out to me to request counsel for the termination.”

                                            5
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/6

mental health issues, lack of safe and stable housing, and failure to engage in

any parenting skills classes.

       Based on Naweli’s testimony, the court found that the Department met its

burden to show that it offered D.L. all necessary services and that she did not

follow through or maintain consistent engagement with the services. The court

specifically found that D.L. “continues to have untreated mental health issues

[and] substance use issues,” never “addressed any parenting skills or parenting

deficiencies,” and “has not maintained consistent visitation with the children.”

The court concluded that D.L. is unfit to parent the children and that there was

little likelihood that her parental deficiencies would allow the children to be

returned to her in the near future. The court issued a “Hearing, Findings, and

Order Regarding Termination of Parent-Child Relationship” as to each child and

a default order terminating D.L.’s parental rights to C.M.L. and C.S.S.

       A couple of hours after the hearing, D.L. texted Naweli.9 D.L. said that

she was “having issues with her phone” and “wanted to check in about court.”

Naweli asked if she could call D.L. later and D.L. responded, “Yes what time is

court.” Naweli replied that court was at 9:00 a.m. D.L. told Naweli that “she

thought the hearing was at 2 [p.m.] but realized that she was thinking of her

doctor appointment.” Naweli then arranged to meet with D.L. two days later at a

location D.L. chose.

       9
         The record shows that the hearing began at 9:00 a.m. on December 5, 2022.
D.L. texted Naweli at 11:24 a.m.

                                          6
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/7

       On December 7, 2022, Naweli arrived at D.L.’s suggested location for the

meeting, but D.L. did not show up. Naweli called D.L., who answered and said

she would like to meet at a different location. Naweli drove to the new location,

but again, D.L. did not appear. Over the next 45 minutes, Naweli called and

texted D.L. several times, but D.L. never responded. Eventually, Naweli texted

D.L. that she had to leave but could meet the next week on December 12. D.L.

responded that she could meet at that later date. On December 12, 2022,

Naweli called D.L. to confirm their meeting, but D.L. did not respond.

       More than a week later on December 21, D.L. texted Naweli, “apologizing

for not staying in touch.” Naweli then called D.L. and explained that the court

terminated her parental rights. D.L. asked Naweli for her dependency attorney’s

contact information, which Naweli provided.

       On December 29, 2022, D.L.’s dependency attorney filed a notice of

appearance in the termination matter. And on January 10, 2023, D.L. moved to

vacate the default termination order for mistake and excusable neglect. D.L.

argued that CR 60(b)(1) required the court to vacate the default termination order

because her dyslexia prevented her from meaningfully processing the notice of

hearing and summons. She also asserted that the default proceedings violated

her due process right to a meaningful opportunity to participate at the hearing.

       D.L. summitted a declaration with her motion, admitting that Naweli

personally served her with the petitions and summons but that she has

“disabilities that interfered with [her] ability to understand the Notice of Hearing,

when the hearing was, and what [she] needed to do.” She said she suffers from

                                           7
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/8

dyslexia and was on an individual education plan in school because of that

disability. And D.L. said she missed the December 5 hearing because “I got my

dates mixed up.”

       The Department responded, arguing that D.L. was not entitled to relief

under CR 60(b)(1) because she failed to show excusable neglect or mistake and

failed to present a prima facie defense to the termination action. The Department

also argued that the court’s default judgment proceedings satisfied due process.

       On January 25, 2023, the court heard the motion to vacate. At the

beginning of the hearing, D.L.’s attorney argued that ICWA mandated reopening

the case. She argued that the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians

concluded that the children were not eligible by “blood quantum,” but under their

bylaws, the children are eligible for membership in the tribe by “linear descent of

enrolled members.” The court rejected that argument as speculation. D.L. then

argued that the State “cannot prove that she relapsed” and that her disability

warranted relief from the default.

       The court denied the motion to vacate, concluding that D.L. failed to show

substantial evidence of a prima facie defense and showed insufficient evidence

of excusable neglect. The court found that D.L. acted with due diligence in

moving to vacate the default order but concluded that “it doesn’t negate the

weight to be given to the other factors.” Finally, the court concluded that “it is

really clear . . . there will be a substantial hardship, in terms of permanency, to

the children,” and that “when the rights of the children and the rights of the

                                          8
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/9

parents are in conflict, the rights of the parents must give way to the best

interests of [the] child.”

       D.L. appeals.10

                                       ANALYSIS

       D.L. argues (1) the Department should have notified her of the default

hearing under CR 55(a)(3), (2) due process required her termination summons to

explain that her dependency attorney did not also represent her in the

termination proceedings, and (3) the CR 60(b)(1) factors compelled the trial court

to vacate the default order. We address each issue in turn.

       1. CR 55(a)(3)

       D.L. argues we should reverse the default termination order because she

received no notice of the default proceeding as required under CR 55(a)(3). We

disagree.

       Whether a party has a right to notice of a motion for default is a question

of law that we review de novo. In re Welfare of S.I., 184 Wn. App. 531, 539, 337

P.3d 1114 (2014). “CR 55(a) controls entry of an order of default and default

judgment.” Id. A party may move for default when the opposing party “has failed

to appear, plead, or otherwise defend as provided by these rules.” CR 55(a)(1).

Under CR 55(a)(3),

       [a]ny party who has appeared in the action for any purpose shall be
       served with a written notice of motion for default and the supporting
       affidavit at least [five] days before the hearing on the motion. Any

       10
          D.L. filed four separate appeals of the termination orders, default order, and
the order denying her motion to vacate the default termination order. We consolidated
the appeals under No. 84852-6-I.

                                            9
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/10

       party who has not appeared before the motion for default and
       supporting affidavit are filed is not entitled to a notice of the motion.

One “appears in an action when he or she answers, demurs, makes any

application for an order therein, or gives the plaintiff written notice of his or her

appearance.” RCW 4.28.210.

       D.L. did not appear in the termination action. Still, she argues that

because she appeared in the dependency proceeding, she was entitled to five

days’ notice of the motion for default in the termination proceeding under CR

55(a)(3).

       Division Three of our court rejected that same argument in S.I. There, the

mother appeared in a dependency action and sporadically participated in

services that DSHS11 offered. S.I., 184 Wn. App. at 535-36. DSHS filed for

termination of the mother’s parental rights. Id. at 536. The assigned caseworker

personally served the mother with the termination petition and a notice and

summons to appear at a hearing on the petition. Id. The mother did not file a

notice of appearance in the termination matter or appear at the hearing. Id. at

536-37. A week later, DHSH moved for default, and the trial court entered a

default termination order the same day. Id.

       On appeal, the mother argued that entry of the order of default without five

days’ notice violated CR 55(a)(3). S.I., 184 Wn. App. at 539. Division Three held

that the mother had no right to notice under CR 55 because her appearance in

the dependency matter did not amount to an appearance in the termination

       11
            Department of Social and Health Services.

                                            10
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/11

proceeding. Id. at 540-41. The court explained that “an action to permanently

terminate parental rights is a new proceeding and not an extension of the

dependency action.” Id. at 540. This is so because

        the purpose of a dependency proceeding and a termination
        proceeding are diametric: A dependency proceeding seeks to
        provide services to a parent to correct parental deficiencies so as to
        reunify the parent-child relationship; whereas a termination
        proceeding seeks to permanently terminate the parent-child
        relationship.

Id.12

        D.L. urges us to reject S.I. She argues that S.I. improperly relied on In re

Dependency of Hiebert, 28 Wn. App. 905, 627 P.2d 551 (1981), to conclude that

a dependency and a termination are separate proceedings. See S.I., 184 Wn.

App. at 540-41.

        The court in Hiebert held that a party may file a timely affidavit of prejudice

to disqualify the judge in a termination proceeding when the same judge presided

over the dependency because the termination proceeding is a separate action.

28 Wn. App. at 910-11, 908. According to D.L., S.I. “inverted” Hiebert’s logic

because Hiebert focused “largely on the fact that termination constitutes so

profound a deprivation that due process entitles the parent to ‘new notice’ of the

proceedings.” But the relevant conclusion in Hiebert—that a termination action is

a separate proceeding from the dependency action—is well settled law. See In

        12
         We adopted the reasoning of S.I. in an unpublished opinion, In re Dependency
of W.L.S., No. 80010-8-I, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.courts.
wa.gov/opinions/pdf/800108.pdf.

                                           11
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/12

re Welfare of Martin, 3 Wn. App. 405, 410-11, 476 P.2d 134 (1970); In re Welfare

of Gibson, 4 Wn. App. 372, 379, 485 P.2d 131 (1971).

       D.L. offers no compelling reason for us to depart from S.I. Because D.L.

did not appear in the termination action, she was not entitled to five days’ notice

of the default proceeding under CR 55(a)(3).

       2. Due Process

       D.L. argues that the Department violated her due process rights by failing

to adequately advise her of her right to an attorney. We disagree.

       “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” W ASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. Due process in the termination context

“requires that parents have notice, an opportunity to be heard and defend, and

the right to be represented by counsel.”13 In re Welfare of L.R., 180 Wn. App.

717, 723, 324 P.3d 737 (2014). In determining whether a parent has received

due process, we must balance (1) the parent’s interests, (2) the risk of error

created by the procedures used and the likely value of additional safeguards,

and

(3) the state’s interests. In re Dependency of C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. 608, 614-15,

814 P.2d 1197 (1991) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct.

893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976)). We review whether a proceeding violates due

process de novo. In re Welfare of J.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 920, 125 P.3d 245

(2005).

       13
         Terminations are civil proceedings, so the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply. In re Welfare of
S.E., 63 Wn. App, 244, 249, 820 P.2d 47 (1991).

                                          12
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/13

       Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of their

children, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution. In re

Dependency of V.R.R., 134 Wn. App. 573, 581, 141 P.3d 85 (2006). As a result,

state law guarantees a parent the right to counsel in termination proceedings.

Id.; RCW 13.34.070(3), .180(6). On the other hand, the Department “has a

strong interest in protecting the rights of the children, which includes a speedy

resolution of the termination proceeding.” L.R., 180 Wn. App. at 727. That

interest is “ ‘not only in establishing a stable and permanent home for the child,

but also in doing it as soon as possible.’ ” Id. (quoting C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. at

615). Given D.L.’s and the Department’s competing interests here, the second

factor (whether adequate safeguards exist to protect a parent’s liberty interests)

is dispositive.

       A parent’s right to counsel in dependency and termination proceedings

arises under RCW 13.34.090. In re Dependency of E.P., 136 Wn. App. 401,

404-05, 149 P.3d 440 (2006). That statute provides:

       At all stages of a proceeding in which a child is alleged to be
       dependent, the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian has the
       right to be represented by counsel, and if indigent, to have counsel
       appointed for him or her by the court. Unless waived in court,
       counsel shall be provided to the child’s parent, guardian, or legal
       custodian, if such person (a) has appeared in the proceeding or
       requested the court to appoint counsel and (b) is financially unable
       to obtain counsel because of indigency.

RCW 13.34.090(2). The statute creates both a right to be represented by

counsel and an obligation to appoint counsel should a parent appear in a

proceeding unrepresented. See In re Welfare of G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326, 333,

                                         13
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/14

65 P.3d 1219 (2003) (appearance triggers the court’s duty to provide counsel; a

parent need not request appointment of counsel). Our Supreme Court has held

that RCW 13.34.090 “fulfills all of the requirements of due process” in the

dependency context. In re Welfare of Key, 119 Wn.2d 600, 611, 836 P.2d 200

(1992).

        Parents are advised of their right to counsel in termination proceedings by

way of a summons. RCW 13.34.070. Under RCW 13.34.070(2) and (3), the

Department must serve the parent with the termination petition and a summons,

which “shall advise the parties of the right to counsel.” The summons “shall also

inform the child’s parent, guardian, or legal custodian of his or her right to

appointed counsel, if indigent, and of the procedure to use to secure appointed

counsel.” RCW 13.34.070(3). Under RCW 13.34.180(6), the petition must

include, “in substantially the following form,” notice that the parents

        “have the right to have a lawyer represent you at the hearing. A
        lawyer can look at the files in your case, talk to the [D]epartment . .
        . or other agencies, tell you about the law, help you understand
        your rights, and help you at hearings. If you cannot afford a
        lawyer, the court will appoint one to represent you. To get a
        courtappointed lawyer you must contact: (explain local
        procedure) .”

        Here, D.L.’s caseworker served her with the termination petitions and a

summons that contained the required statutory language. The summons advised

D.L.:

        •   You have the right to be represented by a lawyer. If you cannot
            afford a lawyer, you have the right to request that the court
            appoint a lawyer to represent you at public expense. If you
            qualify, a lawyer will be appointed by the court to represent you.

                                          14
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/15

       •   Your lawyer can look at the social and legal files in your case, talk
           to the supervising agency or other agencies, tell you about the
           law, help you understand your rights and help you at hearings.

       •   If you wish to have a lawyer appointed, contact the Snohomish
           County Office of Public Defense by telephone at 425-388-
           3500, or at 3000 Rockefeller First floor, Room #C-103, Everett, WA
           98201.

       Still, D.L. argues that the language in her summons does not satisfy due

process. According to D.L., the language is a “vague advisement” that

“overestimated [her] legal sophistication.” She complains that the summons

“said nothing about dependency counsel” and that there was “no reason for [her]

to infer, without specific direction, a need to formally retain the attorney who had

already represented her.” But D.L.’s summons clearly advised her that she had

the right to a lawyer and explained the steps she must take to obtain one. And

as much as she may have been confused about the process, the statute

provides a safeguard. Had D.L. appeared at the preliminary hearing, the court

was statutorily required to appoint her a lawyer. Indeed, D.L.’s dependency

attorney was present at the hearing and stood ready to represent D.L. if she

appeared and requested appointment.

       D.L. fails to show that current safeguards do not adequately protect a

parent’s due process right to counsel in termination proceedings.

      3. CR 60(b)(1)

       D.L. argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion to

vacate under CR 60(b)(1) for mistake or excusable neglect. We disagree.

                                         15
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/16

       Default judgments are not favored in the law. Gage v. Boeing Co., 55 Wn.

App. 157, 159, 776 P.2d 991 (1989). Still, the Department may obtain a

judgment terminating a parent’s right to the custody of their child if the parent

fails to respond to notices and summons of the proceeding to terminate their

rights. C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. at 616. This is because “a child’s right to a stable

home cannot be put on hold interminably because a parent is absent from the

courtroom and has failed to contact his or her attorney.” Id. But before the court

can enter a default judgment terminating parental rights, it must have a

meaningful hearing on the merits of the case in accordance with the statutory

requirements for termination. Id.

       Under CR 60(b)(1), “the court may relieve a party or the party’s legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . [m]istakes,

inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining a judgment

or order.” We will not disturb a trial court’s decision on a motion to vacate a

default judgment absent an abuse of discretion. White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348,

351, 438 P.2d 581 (1968). A trial court abuses its discretion “when its decision is

manifestly unreasonable, based on untenable grounds, or made for untenable

reasons.” Fowler v. Johnson, 167 Wn. App. 596, 604, 273 P.3d 1042 (2012). If

the decision to deny a motion to vacate is based on tenable grounds and is

within the bounds of reasonableness, we must affirm. In re Est. of Stevens, 94

Wn.

App. 20, 30, 971 P.2d 58 (1999).

                                         16
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/17

       A party seeking to vacate a default judgment must show (1) that there is

substantial evidence supporting a prima facie defense, (2) that the failure to

timely appear and answer was due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect, (3) that the defendant acted with due diligence after notice of

the default judgment, and (4) that the plaintiff will not suffer a substantial hardship

if the court vacates the default judgment. TMT Bear Creek Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.

PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 191, 212, 165 P.3d 1271 (2007).
The first two factors are primary and the other two are secondary. Id. at 200-01.

The “factors are interdependent,” so the proof that a moving party must show “on

any one factor depends on the degree of proof made on each of the other

factors.” Norton v. Brown, 99 Wn. App. 118, 124, 992 P.2d 1019 (1999).

       If the moving party shows a “ ‘strong or virtually conclusive defense,’ ” the

court will spend little time inquiring into the reasons for the failure to appear and

answer, provided the party timely moved to vacate and the failure to appear was

not willful. TMT, 140 Wn. App. at 20514 (quoting Johnson v. Cash Store, 116 Wn.

App. 833, 841, 68 P.3d 1099 (2003)). Relieving a party from a default judgment

that has a strong or virtually conclusive defense serves equitable principles that

ensure “ ‘substantial rights are preserved and justice is done.’ ” Id. at 204-05

(quoting Johnson, 116 Wn. App. at 841). But when the moving party’s evidence

supports no more than a prima facie defense, the court will scrutinize the reasons

for the failure to timely appear with greater care. Id.

       14
            Internal quotation marks omitted.

                                                17
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/18

             A. Prima Facie Defense

      D.L. argues that the trial court erred by finding she failed to show a prima

facie defense. We disagree.

      The party seeking to vacate a default judgment must show “that there is

substantial evidence supporting a prima facie defense.” Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d

696, 703-04, 161 P.3d 345 (2007). To determine whether evidence supports a

prima facie defense, “the trial court must take the evidence, and reasonable

inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the movant.” Pfaff v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 Wn. App. 829, 835, 14 P.3d 837 (2000). A CR 60

movant shows a prima facie defense when they produce evidence that, if

believed by the trier of fact, would amount to a defense to the claims presented.

Id. at 835-36. So, a parent may show a prima facie defense by challenging the

State’s ability to meet its burden of proof under the termination statute, RCW

13.34.180.

      A trial court may terminate parental rights when the Department

establishes the statutory elements of RCW 13.34.180(1)(a) to (f) by clear,

cogent, and convincing evidence. In re Parental Rights to K.M.M., 186 Wn.2d

466, 478, 379 P.3d 75 (2016); RCW 13.34.190(1)(a)(i). Those elements are:

             (a)     That the child has been found to be a dependent child;
             (b)     That the court has entered a dispositional order
      pursuant to RCW 13.34.130;
             (c)     That the child has been removed or will, at the time of
      the hearing, have been removed from the custody of the parent for a
      period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;
             (d)     That the services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have
      been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all
      necessary services, reasonably available, capable of correcting the

                                        18
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/19

       parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been
       expressly and understandably offered or provided;
               (e)     That there is little likelihood that conditions will be
       remedied so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near
       future. . . .
               . . . and
               (f)     That continuation of the parent and child relationship
       clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a
       stable and permanent home.

RCW 13.34.180(1). The Department must also prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best

interests. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010);

RCW 13.34.190(1)(b).
     On appeal, D.L. argues she showed a prima facie defense against

termination by explaining that she “had disabilities including, at least, dyslexia,”

and that the Department did not properly investigate and tailor services to her

disabilities. But D.L. offered no evidence of this defense at the hearing on the

motion to vacate. D.L. did not allege in her declaration that the Department’s

investigation into her disabilities was inadequate, that the Department did not

offer sufficient services, or that her dyslexia prevented her from meaningfully

participating in those services. Instead, her declaration in support of vacating the

termination order addressed only the reasons she failed to appear at the

December 5 preliminary hearing. It said:

       I have disabilities that interfered with my ability to understand the
       Notice of Hearing, when the hearing was, and what I needed to do.
       . . . I suffer from dyslexia. . . . When I was a student in school, I was
       on an IEP (Individual Education Plan) because of this disability.

Nothing in D.L.’s declaration amounts to a prima facie defense to the petitions to

terminate her parental rights.

                                          19
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/20

       D.L. also argues she “raised a prima facie defense related to ICWA and

WICWA” by arguing that the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians erred in

determining her children were not eligible for membership by blood quantum

because the tribe’s bylaws state that the test for eligibility is by lineage. But it is

solely for the tribe to determine tribal membership eligibility. In re Dependency of

Z.J.G., 196 Wn.2d 152, 175, 471 P.3d 853 (2020); In re Dependency of A.L.W.,

108 Wn. App. 664, 671-72, 32 P.3d 297 (2001). And the record shows the tribe

determined that the children were not members or eligible to become members.

              B. Excusable Neglect

       Even if D.L. had set out a prima facie defense to the termination petitions,

she did not show that her failure to appear at the December 5 hearing resulted

from excusable neglect.

       D.L. says she struggled to understand the summons because of dyslexia.

But her caseworker personally served her with the termination petitions and a

summons to appear at the termination hearing. The summons informed D.L. that

the Department was seeking termination of her parental rights to C.M.L. and

C.S.S., and that the court scheduled a preliminary hearing on termination for

December 5, 2022 at 9:00 a.m. It warned her several times to appear—“You

should appear at this hearing,” “You are summoned and required to appear at

the hearing,” “A termination Petition, if granted, will result in permanent loss of

your parental rights,” “If you do not appear the court may enter an order in

your absence . . . [p]ermanently terminating your parental rights.” When giving

                                           20
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/21

D.L. the summons, Naweli “pointed out the date of the hearing.” Naweli told D.L.

that “she could appear at the hearing via Zoom and asked [her] for a good e[-

]mail address.” D.L. gave Naweli an e-mail address and never expressed

confusion about the date of the hearing.

       On November 1, 2022, Naweli sent D.L. a service letter via e-mail that

included the hearing date and time and “information on how to access the

hearing.” And on November 30, 2022, Naweli sent D.L. an e-mail with the date

and time of the preliminary hearing, the Zoom link, and the call-in information for

the hearing. Naweli also called D.L.’s last known phone number and left a voice

mail, asking for a return call. She then texted D.L. that she had e-mailed her the

hearing link.

       Finally, when D.L. called Naweli and asked about court, she did not tell the

caseworker that she did not understand the summons because of dyslexia.

Instead, she texted Naweli “to check in about court” because she was “having

issues with her phone.” And she told Naweli that she mixed up the time with her

doctor’s appointment that afternoon. D.L.’s declaration attached to her motion to

vacate also explains that she “got [her] dates mixed up.” Forgetting the time of a

termination hearing after formal notice and several reminders does not amount to

excusable neglect. See S.I., 184 Wn. App. at 544 (mother’s failure to read the

termination petition and summons after her caseworker personally served her

was not excusable neglect).

       D.L. argues that this case is like In re Parental Rights to C.E.C.L., No.

                                         21
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/22

84156-4-I (Wash Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2023) (unpublished), https://www.courts.

wa.gov/opinions/pdf/841564.pdf. In that case, the Department petitioned to

terminate the father’s parental rights. Id., slip op. at 1. Though the father was “in

regular contact with his dependency attorney,” the Department failed in its

attempts to serve him. Id., slip op. at 7, 1. So, the Department moved to serve

him by publication, which the court granted. Id., slip op. at 1-2. The Department

then served notice by publication in the Daily Journal of Commerce.15 Id., slip

op. at 7.

       When the father failed to appear at the termination hearing, the

Department moved for an order of default. C.E.C.L., No. 84156-4-I, slip op. at 2.

The court then held a default termination hearing, heard testimony from the

father’s caseworker, and granted the termination petition. Id. Shortly after the

hearing, the father appeared and moved to vacate under CR 60. Id. The trial

court denied his motion. Id. We reversed, concluding that the father showed

evidence of a prima facie defense. Id., slip op. at 1, 6. And we concluded that

the trial court “failed to consider mistake or excusable neglect” despite an error in

proper service and service by publication, a method of service unlikely to reach

the father. Id., slip op. at 7.

       15
           The Department also mailed the summons and termination petition to the
father’s last known address, but “it previously had declared his whereabouts were
unknown.” C.E.C.L., No. 84156-4-I, slip op. at 1-2. And under a local court rule, the
Department e-mailed the documents to the father’s dependency attorney, but the
attorney “had ‘missed’ and not opened or read the e[-]mail.” Id., slip op. at 2.

                                           22
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/23

       D.L.’s case is different. D.L. presents no evidence in support of a prima

facie defense. Further, the Department properly served her with a summons.

Indeed, D.L. received personal service of the termination petitions and summons,

received several reminders about the hearing, and never indicated confusion

about how to access the hearing. D.L. cannot show her absence resulted from

excusable neglect.

              C. Due Diligence

       D.L. argues that she acted with due diligence. The State agrees. The

record shows that D.L. contacted her dependency attorney on December 22,

2022, less than a month after the termination. The attorney then promptly

entered an appearance in the termination and moved to vacate the default order.

This secondary factor supports granting D.L.’s motion to vacate.
            D. Substantial Hardship

       D.L. argues that the State would not suffer substantial hardship if we

vacated the default judgment. If we did so, the matter would proceed to a

termination trial. See Pfaff, 103 Wn. App. at 836. But that alone is not a

substantial hardship for purposes of CR 60(b)(1). Id. This secondary factor also

supports D.L.’s motion to vacate.

              E. Equity

       Finally, D.L. argues that equity demands we set aside the default

termination order. A CR 60(b)(1) determination to set aside a default judgment

“is not a mechanical test,” but “a matter of equity.” Little, 160 Wn.2d at 703-04.

Our overarching concern when reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to

vacate “is whether that decision is just and equitable.” TMT, 140 Wn. App. at

                                         23
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/24

200. That is because “ ‘[j]ustice is not done if hurried defaults are allowed, but

neither is it done if continuing delays are permitted.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 116

Wn. App. at 841). So, we employ an equitable analysis to determine what is

proper “ ‘by the facts of each case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all

situations.’ ” Id.16 (quoting Little, 160 Wn.2d at 703).

       Here, the equities support the trial court’s decision denying D.L.’s motion

to vacate. At termination, the State and the children share an interest “ ‘not only

in establishing a stable and permanent home for the child, but also in doing it as

soon as possible.’ ” L.R., 180 Wn. App. at 727 (quoting C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. at

615). The Department removed D.L.’s children from her custody in May 2021,

more than a year and a half before the termination proceeding. Vacating the

termination order would cause more delay and disruption to the children’s

interest in a stable and permanent home. Starting the termination process anew

would be a hardship for the children and a barrier to permanency.

       The primary factors under CR 60(b)(1) and equitable consideration of all

the factors weigh against vacating the default termination. The trial court did not

abuse its discretion by denying D.L.’s motion to vacate.

       We affirm the order denying D.L.’s motion to vacate the default order

terminating her parental rights to C.M.L. and C.S.S.

       16
            Internal quotation marks omitted.

                                                24
No. 84852-6-I (consol. with Nos. 84853-4-I, 85000-8-I, 85001-6-I)/25

WE CONCUR:

                                       25