Court Opinion

ID: 9899876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:05.240168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.351595
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23
                    CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                     SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                            DIVISION TWO

 In re                                   B319925

         CHRISTOPHER T. HICKS, JR.,      (Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. KA114437)
         on

         Habeas Corpus.

      ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Petition denied.
      Marilee Marshall, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Petitioner.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda J. Murray, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
and Charles Chung, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
                    _________________________________
       Petitioner Christopher T. Hicks, Jr. is currently serving a
sentence on two counts of burglary and one count of robbery. He
seeks early parole consideration under article I, section 32,
subdivision (a)(1) of the California Constitution (hereafter section
32(a)(1)). The issues presented by this petition for writ of habeas
corpus are: (1) whether an inmate with convictions for violent as
well as nonviolent felonies is eligible for early parole
consideration under section 32(a)(1); and (2) whether the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the
Department) abused its rulemaking authority in adopting in
2022 the current version of the regulations that exclude from
nonviolent offender early parole consideration an inmate who
also stands convicted of a violent felony. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15,
§ 3490, subd. (a)(5) (hereafter 15 CCR § 3490).)1 We conclude the
Department’s regulation constitutes a valid exercise of the
Department’s rulemaking authority consistent with section 32,
subdivisions (a)(1) and (b), and the Department properly
determined that petitioner does not qualify for early parole
consideration under section 32(a)(1) based on his violent felony
conviction. We therefore deny the petition for writ of habeas
corpus.
                    PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced on one count of
first degree burglary, one count of second degree burglary, one
count of second degree robbery, and two counts of receiving stolen
property. Petitioner was originally sentenced on August 7, 2017.

      1 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “15 CCR
section 3490” are to the current version of the regulation, as
amended in 2022.

                                 2
Following a recall of his sentence on the convictions for receiving
stolen property, petitioner was resentenced on September 10,
2020, to a term of 10 years 8 months in state prison. The
sentence consisted of four years for the first degree burglary
conviction plus a five-year gang enhancement under Penal Code
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(B), and consecutive terms of
eight months for the second degree burglary and one year for the
robbery conviction. According to respondent, petitioner’s
anticipated release date is in July 2025.
       On April 27, 2022, petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in this court in which he sought early parole
consideration under section 32(a)(1). We summarily denied the
petition.
       Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the California Supreme Court. On June 14, 2023, the California
Supreme Court issued the following order: “The Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is ordered to show
cause, returnable before the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Two, why petitioner is not entitled to relief
based on his claim that he is unconstitutionally being excluded
from early parole consideration under section 32, subdivision
(a)(1) of article 1 of the California Constitution.” We issued an
order to show cause, directed the Department to file a return, and
granted petitioner’s counsel leave to file a traverse.

                                 3
                            DISCUSSION
      The Current Regulation Barring Inmates
      Convicted and Sentenced for Both Violent and
      Nonviolent Felonies from Early Parole
      Consideration Represents a Reasonable
      Interpretation of Section 32(a)(1) and a Proper
      Exercise of the Department’s Rulemaking
      Authority Under California Constitution,
      Article I, Section 32, Subdivision (b)
   A. Section 32(a)(1) and the definition of a violent felony
      Proposition 57, approved by the voters in November 2016,
added (among other provisions) section 32 to article I of the
California Constitution. (In re Gadlin (2020) 10 Cal.5th 915, 923;
In re Mohammad (2022) 12 Cal.5th 518, 527 (Mohammad).)
Subdivision (a)(1) of section 32 provides that “ ‘[a]ny person
convicted of a nonviolent felony offense and sentenced to state
prison shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing
the full term for his or her primary offense.’ ” (Mohammad, at
p. 527.) “Primary offense” is defined as the “longest term of
imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense, excluding the
imposition of an enhancement, consecutive sentence, or
alternative sentence.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (a)(1)(A);
Mohammad, at p. 527; see also 15 CCR § 3490.)
      “Violent felony” is a crime or enhancement listed in Penal
Code section 667.5, subdivision (c). (15 CCR § 3490, subd. (c);
Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 528.) Penal Code section
667.5, subdivision (c)(9) defines “[a]ny robbery” as a violent

                                 4
felony.2 Petitioner thus stands convicted and sentenced for a
violent felony⎯robbery—and for two nonviolent felonies⎯the two
convictions for burglary. The Department refers to such inmates
as “mixed offense inmates,” a convention we adopt here.
   B. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3490
       Proposition 57 also directed the Department to adopt
regulations to implement early parole consideration for inmates
convicted of nonviolent offenses pursuant to section 32. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 32, subd. (b); Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at
pp. 523, 527.) In accordance with that mandate, the Department
promulgated as an emergency regulation section 3490 of the
California Code of Regulations, title 15 (operative Apr. 13, 2017
(Register 2017, No. 15)). Thereafter, the Department amended
the regulation in 2018, 2019, and 2022. The immediate
predecessor to the current regulation adopted by the Department
“exclude[d] from nonviolent offender early parole consideration
any inmate who ‘is currently serving a term of incarceration for a
“violent felony.” ’ ” (Mohammad, at p. 524; see 15 CCR (2019)
§ 3490, subd. (a)(5).) In Mohammad our Supreme Court upheld
this regulation, “conclud[ing] that the Department acted within
the authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted
[15 CCR (2019) section 3490, subdivision (a)(5)].” (Mohammad,
at p. 524; id. at p. 537.)

      2 Section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21) also defines first degree
burglary as a violent felony if another person (other than an
accomplice) was present in the residence during the commission
of the burglary. However, the Department concedes that
petitioner’s first degree burglary conviction does not qualify as a
violent felony.

                                 5
    B. The California Supreme Court’s Decision in
Mohammad
        The issue in Mohammad was “whether Proposition 57 . . .
requires [the Department] to provide early parole consideration
to individuals currently serving a term of incarceration for a
violent felony.” (Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 523.)
        In Mohammad, the inmate had completed the full term of
his sentence for the primary offense, a nonviolent felony, and was
then serving the term for a violent felony. (Mohammad, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 525.) The Court of Appeal had found the
language of section 32(a)(1) to be clear and unambiguous. (Id. at
p. 531.) Based on the provision “establishing parole consideration
for ‘ “[a]ny person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense” upon
completion of “the full term for his or her primary offense,” ’ ” the
Court of Appeal held that the sole requirement for early parole
consideration under section 32(a)(1) was conviction of a
nonviolent felony. (Id. at pp. 525–526.) The Court of Appeal thus
concluded that the Department’s regulation (15 CCR (2019)
§ 3490) was incompatible with section 32(a)(1), and that
Mohammad was entitled to parole consideration under section
32(a)(1). (Ibid.)
        Our Supreme Court reversed. Noting “language that seems
plain when considered in isolation may be ambiguous when
examined within the context of the scheme it implements”
(Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 531), the Mohammad court
found section 32(a)(1) to be ambiguous because it “does not
directly state whether an inmate like [Mohammad]—who has
nonviolent felony convictions but is currently serving a term of
incarceration for a violent felony—would be eligible for early
parole consideration” (id. at p. 532).

                                 6
       To resolve this ambiguity, the court turned to the
Proposition 57 ballot materials presented to the voters.
(Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 534.) Based on its
“consideration of the constitutional text, the ballot materials, the
stated purposes of the initiative, and the Department’s discretion
to promulgate regulations under the Constitution,” the
Mohammad court concluded that the Department was authorized
to promulgate 15 CCR (2019) section 3490, subdivision (a)(5) (id.
at p. 537), and had reasonably interpreted section 32(a)(1) in
determining that inmates currently “serving a term of
incarceration for a violent felony should be excluded from early
parole consideration” (id. at pp. 541–542).
   C. In resolving the questions left open by the Mohammad
decision, the current version of 15 CCR section 3490 is a
reasonable interpretation of the constitutional language
and ballot materials and constitutes a valid exercise of the
Department’s rulemaking authority
       1. Unresolved questions following Mohammad
       Although Mohammad resolved the ambiguity in section
32(a)(1)’s application to the eligibility for early parole
consideration of mixed offense inmates who are currently
incarcerated for a violent felony, it left other questions
unanswered. Specifically, as noted in the concurring opinion of
Justice Liu, Mohammad did not decide the issue presented in
this case⎯whether a mixed offense inmate who is not currently
serving the sentence on his or her violent felony is entitled to
parole consideration under section 32(a)(1). “Consider, for
example, an inmate serving a consecutive sentence for a robbery
offense with a six-year term and a receiving stolen property
offense with a three-year term. The robbery offense is the

                                 7
‘primary offense’ because it carries ‘the longest term of
imprisonment imposed by the court for any offense.’ (Art. I,
§ 32(a)(1)(A).) Once the inmate has completed the six-year term
for his primary offense of robbery, is he then—for purposes of
article I, section 32(a)(1)—currently serving a term for the
nonviolent offense of receiving stolen property and thus eligible
for early parole consideration, as Justice Robie’s view[3] suggests?
Or does article I, section 32(a)(1) allow the Department to treat
him as currently serving a term for the violent offense
throughout the entire nine-year aggregate sentence and find him
ineligible for early parole consideration on that basis? [¶]
Today’s decision does not answer these questions, nor does it
address at what point, if any, during Mohammad’s consecutive
sentence he may become eligible for early parole consideration.
These issues await resolution in future cases.” (Mohammad, at
p. 543 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).)
       2. The 2022 amendment to 15 CCR (2019) section 3490,
subdivision (a)(5)
       Effective February 28, 2022, the Department amended 15
CCR (2019) section 3490, subdivision (a)(5) to explicitly exclude
mixed offense inmates such as petitioner from early parole
consideration.4 The principal change produced by the

      3 In re Douglas (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 726, 738 (conc. opn.
of Robie, Acting P. J.), review granted June 16, 2021, S268570.
      4 The current regulation provides that an inmate who “is
currently convicted of and is sentenced to a term of incarceration
for a ‘violent felony,’ including a term for which a violent felony
sentence was stayed under Penal Code section 654” does not
qualify as a nonviolent offender, thus making him or her

                                 8
regulation’s amendment was to make the mixed offense inmate’s
violent felony conviction a disqualifying factor in determining
eligibility for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1).
Thus, under the current regulation, the dispositive fact in
deciding eligibility for early parole is that the mixed offense
inmate currently stands convicted of and sentenced for a violent
felony. The inmate does not qualify for early parole under section
32(a)(1) regardless of whether the violent or nonviolent felony
conviction is deemed the “primary offense” or whether the inmate
is serving a sentence on the violent or nonviolent conviction when
applying for parole.5
       The amended regulation thus addresses the questions
raised by Justice Liu that Mohammad left unanswered. The only
remaining issues are whether the current regulation “is
consistent with a reasonable interpretation of [section 32(a)(1)]
and the [Proposition 57] ballot materials,” and constitutes “a

ineligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1).
(15 CCR § 3490, subd. (a)(5).)
      5 As illustrated by petitioner’s case, one advantage of the
current regulation is that it avoids the arbitrariness and
guesswork involved in determining which sentence a mixed
offense inmate is “currently serving.” Originally sentenced on
August 7, 2017, with an anticipated release date in July 2025,
petitioner has already served the four-year term for his primary
offense of first degree burglary. As of November 2023, he may be
serving the term for the five-year gang enhancement (which
would put him past the release date of July 2025) or he may have
already commenced serving the robbery term in light of his
anticipated release in July 2025. And neither of these scenarios
takes account of the consecutive eight-month term imposed for
the second degree burglary.

                                 9
valid exercise of the Department’s rulemaking authority under
article I, section 32(b).” (Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 542;
id. at p. 541.) Accepting, as we must, our Supreme Court’s
holding in Mohammad that section 32(a)(1) is ambiguous as
applied to mixed offense inmates, we follow the Mohammad
court’s lead and refer to the ballot materials that were before the
voters to resolve these issues. (See Mohammad, supra, 12
Cal.5th at p. 534 [“Because the constitutional text provides ‘ “no
definitive answer” ’ to the question before us [citations], we
consider the materials that were before the voters”].)
       3. The Proposition 57 ballot materials
       The ballot materials for the November 8, 2016 election
clearly conveyed to the voters that Proposition 57 would establish
“Parole Consideration for Nonviolent Offenders” (Voter
Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of Prop. 57 by
Legis. Analyst, p. 56) and would not authorize early parole
consideration for “violent offenders” (Voter Information Guide,
Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59).
       The official title and summary stated that the relevant
provisions of Proposition 57 would “Allow[] parole consideration
for persons convicted of nonviolent felonies.” (Voter Information
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, Official Title and Summary of Prop. 57,
p. 54.) The Legislative Analyst explained that the initiative
“changes the State Constitution to make individuals who are
convicted of ‘nonviolent felony’ offenses eligible for parole
consideration after serving the full prison term for their primary
offense.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, analysis of
Prop. 57 by Legis. Analyst, p. 56.)
       In their argument in favor of the initiative, supporters
declared, “parole eligibility in Prop. 57 applies ‘only to prisoners

                                10
convicted of non-violent felonies.’ ” (Voter Information Guide,
Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58, quoting
Brown v. Superior Court (2016) 63 Cal.4th 335, 352.) Supporters
also stressed that the initiative “[k]eeps the most dangerous
offenders locked up.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.,
supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.) In their rebuttal
arguments, the proponents asserted that “violent offenders” and
“[v]iolent criminals as defined in Penal Code 667.5(c)” would not
be eligible for early parole. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.,
supra, rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.) Rather, the
rebuttal again emphasized, “parole eligibility under Prop. 57
applies ‘only to prisoners convicted of non-violent felonies.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting Brown v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 352.)
       In Mohammad, the court considered and upheld a
regulation that specifically barred inmates currently serving
terms for a violent felony from section 32(a)(1) early parole.
(Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 541–542.) But the
regulation before us is different: It excludes from early parole
consideration an inmate who “is currently convicted of and is
sentenced to a term of incarceration for a ‘violent felony,’ ” even if
the sentence on the violent felony conviction was stayed. (15
CCR § 3490, subd. (a)(5), italics added.)
       The disagreement between supporters and opponents of
Proposition 57 had nothing to do with whether the “primary
offense” qualified as a violent or nonviolent felony, or whether a
prisoner was currently serving a sentence for a violent or
nonviolent felony offense. Instead, as Mohammad observed, “the
ballot materials focus[ed] on the distinction between inmates
convicted of violent felonies and inmates convicted of nonviolent

                                  11
felonies. For this reason, the opponents and proponents sparred
over the scope of the term nonviolent felony.” (Mohammad,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 537.) Thus, while the initiative’s
supporters asserted violent felons as defined by Penal Code
section 667.5, subdivision (c) would be “excluded from parole”
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to
argument against Prop. 57, p. 59), opponents took issue with the
scope of the term “violent felony,” which they suggested was too
narrow. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, rebuttal to
argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58 & argument against Prop. 57,
p. 59 [the initiative “applies to violent criminals” because it “will
allow criminals convicted of rape, lewd acts against a child, gang
gun crimes and human trafficking to be released early from
prison”], capitalization omitted.)
       4. The current regulation is a reasonable interpretation of
section 32(a)(1), and thus constitutes a valid exercise of the
Department’s rulemaking authority
       “Whenever by the express or implied terms of any statute a
state agency has authority to adopt regulations to implement,
interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out the provisions of
the statute, no regulation adopted is valid or effective unless
consistent and not in conflict with the statute and reasonably
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” (Gov. Code,
§ 11342.2; Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 529.) “Although
we are obligated to strike down regulations that alter or amend
the constitutional provision or its scope [citations], our role is not
to examine the wisdom of the regulations but their legality
[citations].” (Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 530.)
       We find the current version of section 3490, subdivision
(a)(5) of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations to be

                                 12
consistent with, and reasonably necessary to effectuate the
purpose of Proposition 57 and section 32(a)(1).
       As set forth above, the ballot materials explicitly stated
that early parole consideration would be available only to
prisoners convicted of nonviolent felonies, and the initiative
would exclude from parole “[v]iolent criminals as defined in Penal
Code 667.5(c).” (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra,
rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.) The ballot
materials thus make abundantly clear the intent of Proposition
57 to exclude from early parole consideration inmates with
violent felony convictions.
       Mohammad upheld a regulation that, on its face, only
barred from early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1) a
mixed offense inmate who “is currently serving a term of
incarceration for a violent felony.” (15 CCR (2019) § 3490, subd.
(a)(5); Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 528.) But there is no
principled distinction between inmates serving a sentence for a
violent felony and inmates who have been convicted of a violent
felony but who are not currently serving that sentence. Whether
the inmate with a violent felony conviction has served, is serving,
or will serve the sentence for that offense is simply irrelevant to
the determination of whether that person has committed a
violent offense. By focusing on the fact of the violent felony
conviction rather than the sentence the inmate happens to be
serving, the current regulation closely adheres to the supporters’,
opponents’, and voters’ clearly expressed intent to keep “the most
dangerous offenders locked up.” (Voter Information Guide, Gen.
Elec., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)
       Moreover, it makes no sense to grant early parole to
inmates with convictions for both nonviolent and violent felonies

                                13
based on the nonviolent felony conviction, while inmates with
only a violent felony conviction are barred from early parole. The
nonviolent felony conviction does not alter the character of a
concurrent violent felony conviction. The current regulation sees
to it that the mixed offense inmate is not inoculated from the
consequences of his or her violent felony conviction by
consideration for early parole.
       In stating the necessity for revision to 15 CCR (2019)
section 3490, subdivision (a)(5), the Department recognized the
failure of that regulation to address early parole eligibility for
inmates with convictions for violent felonies who happened to be
serving sentences for nonviolent felonies.6 But as Proposition
57’s ballot materials made clear, the initiative’s declared intent
was to create a path to early parole only for inmates convicted of
nonviolent offenses—violent offenders were expressly precluded
from obtaining early release by virtue of their violent felony
convictions. (See Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec., supra,
argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58 & rebuttal to argument
against Prop. 57, p. 59.)

      6 “Because [mixed offense] inmates have sustained
convictions for committing violent offenses, they are violent
offenders and are currently excluded from [nonviolent offender
parole review process (NVPP)] eligibility. However, existing
regulations do not clearly state that these individuals are
excluded from NVPP eligibility. Therefore, it is necessary to
change existing regulations to clarify that such individuals are
not eligible for NVPP consideration.” (Cal. Dept. of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, Notice of Change to Regulations, NCR
No. 21-07, Initial Statement of Reasons & Problem Statement,
p. 2, Aug. 6, 2021.)

                                14
       Our Supreme Court observed, “Proposition 57 directed the
Department to ‘adopt regulations in furtherance of [the
constitutional] provisions,’ and to ‘certify that these regulations
protect and enhance public safety.’ (Art. I, § 32(b).)”
(Mohammad, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 538.) As in Mohammad, we
conclude that in promulgating the current regulation, “[t]he
Department’s approach is consistent with a reasonable
interpretation of the constitutional language and the ballot
materials. We cannot say that the Department abused its
rulemaking authority in coming to this conclusion.” (Id. at
p. 542.)
       5. Petitioner’s claim that Proposition 57 and
section 32(a)(1) require early parole consideration for any inmate
whose primary offense was a nonviolent felony finds no support in
the ballot materials or the expressed intent of the electorate
       Petitioner contends that it was the clear intent of the
electorate in approving Proposition 57 (and with it
section 32(a)(1)) to “extend early parole consideration to every
offender whose primary offense is a nonviolent felony, regardless
of his secondary offense/s.” We disagree and reject petitioner’s
unsupported and distorted characterization of the ballot
materials and voters’ intent.
       We first note that petitioner’s interpretation of section
32(a)(1) is squarely at odds with our Supreme Court’s decision in
Mohammad, which reversed the Court of Appeal’s holding that
the only requirement for early parole consideration under
Proposition 57 is conviction of a nonviolent felony. (Mohammad,
supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 526–527, citing In re Mohammad (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 719, 726.)

                                15
       Further, nothing in the ballot materials—not the analysis
by the Legislative Analyst, not the arguments in support of
Proposition 57, and not even the arguments in opposition to the
initiative—suggests that Proposition 57 was intended to operate
as a “get-out-of-jail-free card” as long as the primary offense was
a nonviolent felony. Indeed, the only statement in the ballot
materials about the primary offense is that “the full prison term”
for that offense must be completed before any inmate may be
considered for parole. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec.,
supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58.)
       Nowhere do the ballot materials specify that as long as the
primary offense is a nonviolent felony, parole is available to any
inmate upon completion of the prison term for the primary
offense. To the contrary, as set forth above, the ballot materials
repeatedly stress that Proposition 57 “keeps the most dangerous
criminals”⎯that is, violent felons⎯“behind bars,” Proposition 57
does “not authorize parole for violent offenders,” “[v]iolent
criminals as defined in Penal Code 667.5(c) are excluded from
parole,” and “parole eligibility under Prop. 57 applies ‘only to
prisoners convicted of non-violent felonies.’ ” (Voter Information
Guide, Gen. Elec., supra, argument in favor of Prop. 57, p. 58 &
rebuttal to argument against Prop. 57, p. 59.)
       Petitioner further asserts that there is “nothing ambiguous
about what section 32, subdivision (a)(1) means in this case, and
there is accordingly no cause to look beyond the text to ballot
materials or other extrinsic evidence of the voters’ intent.”
Again, we disagree. In considering the validity of 15 CCR (2019)
section 3490, the immediate predecessor to the current regulation
at issue here, Mohammad expressly found section 32(1)(a) to be
ambiguous as applied to mixed offense inmates. (Mohammad,

                                16
supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 533 [“That there are several plausible
interpretations of the constitutional language indicates the
meaning of the text is ambiguous”].)
       6. Conclusion
       As in Mohammad, the language of the constitutional
provision does not speak directly to the question here whether an
inmate with convictions for violent as well as nonviolent felonies
is eligible for early parole consideration under section 32(a)(1),
requiring us to review the Proposition 57 ballot materials
presented to the voters. Our examination of those materials
reveals an intent on the part of the voters to authorize early
parole consideration for nonviolent offenders while ensuring that
inmates convicted of violent felonies do not receive such
consideration. In fulfilling its duty to promulgate regulations
pursuant to California Constitution, article I, section 32,
subdivision (b), the Department determined that inmates
convicted of and sentenced for a violent felony are not eligible for
early parole consideration. (15 CCR § 3490, subd. (a)(5).) We
find the Department’s regulation is consistent with and
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional
language and the ballot materials. Accordingly, we find no abuse
of the Department’s rulemaking authority in promulgating 15
CCR (2022) section 3490, subdivision (a)(5).

                                 17
                         DISPOSITION
     The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                          LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     ASHMANN-GERST, J.

     CHAVEZ, J.

                               18