Court Opinion

ID: 9379574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 19:08:00.797431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:36.183583
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-681.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       GALLIA COUNTY

State of Ohio,                             :     Case No. 22CA3
                                                          22CA4
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                :
                                                 DECISION AND
        v.                                 :     JUDGMENT ENTRY

Stavonte D. Smith,                         :

        Defendant-Appellant.               :     RELEASED 3/02/2023

______________________________________________________________________
                            APPEARANCES:

L. Scott Petroff, Athens, Ohio, for appellant.

Jason Holdren, Gallia County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jeremy Fisher, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Gallipolis, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Hess, J.

        {¶1}     In consolidated appeals, Stavonte D. Smith appeals judgments of

conviction for aggravated possession of drugs and possession of a fentanyl-related

compound entered by the Gallia County Court of Common Pleas in two criminal cases.

In his sole assignment of error, Smith contends that the trial court erred when it imposed

the maximum sentence for each offense. He asserts that his sentences are contrary to

law because the trial court ignored sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and

considered factors not permitted by those statutes. But the record reflects that the trial

court considered the statutory factors, and Smith has not shown by clear and convincing

evidence that the trial court acted contrary to law by considering any extraneous factors.

Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                            2

                       I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶2}   On September 10, 2020, Smith was indicted in Case No. 20 CR 202 on one

count each of aggravated possession of drugs, aggravated trafficking in drugs,

possession of a fentanyl-related compound, trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound,

and tampering with evidence. He pleaded not guilty and was released on bond. He failed

to appear at a February 1, 2021 plea change hearing conducted via Zoom, and the court

ordered that a warrant be issued for failure to appear. On February 9, 2021, defense

counsel filed a motion to recall the warrant asserting that the defendant contacted counsel

on the hearing date “and apparently there was a miscommunication regarding Zoom.”

Defense counsel asked the court to schedule the matter for a plea change hearing. The

trial court granted the motion to recall and scheduled a plea change hearing for February

18, 2021, to be conducted via Zoom. However, Smith again failed to appear, and the court

again ordered that a warrant be issued for failure to appear.

      {¶3}   Smith was arrested on November 30, 2021. Subsequently, he was indicted

in Case No. 22 CR 25 on five counts alleged to have occurred on or about the day of his

arrest—possession of a fentanyl-related compound, trafficking in a fentanyl-related

compound, aggravated possession of drugs, aggravated trafficking in drugs, and

tampering with evidence. Smith initially pleaded not guilty.

      {¶4}   However, Smith later entered a guilty plea in Case No. 20 CR 202 to

aggravated possession of drugs, a second-degree felony, and a guilty plea in Case No.

22 CR 25 to possession of a fentanyl-related compound, a second-degree felony. In

exchange, the state agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, recommend concurrent

sentences, and “not seek to enhance [post-release control] for the new conviction.”
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                             3

During the change of plea hearing, Smith told the court that he suffers from “bipolar

depression and PTSD” and was taking Zoloft, an anti-depressant.

       {¶5}   At the sentencing hearing, the state asked the court to impose the maximum

prison sentence for each offense, defense counsel asked the court to impose the

minimum prison sentence for each offense, and the parties asked the court to run the

sentences concurrent. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a) (if a court imposing a sentence for a

felony elects or is required to impose a prison term, the term for a second-degree felony

committed on or after March 22, 2019, “shall be an indefinite prison term with a stated

minimum term selected by the court of two, three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and

a maximum term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the Revised Code”).

Defense counsel asked the court to consider, among other things, that Smith had only

one prior felony conviction for an offense which was not drug-related and that he had

certificates of completion from November 2020 related to his time at Alvis House and a

certificate of completion of the Recovery Choices IOP program from January 2021, which

showed that he could “be successful * * at drug treatment.” Smith and his mother also

made statements to the court.

       {¶6}   The trial court told the parties it had considered everything presented at the

hearing, “considered the presentence investigation report,” “considered the underlying

agreement,” “considered the record and all relevant information,” and “considered” and

was “guided by the purposes and principles of sentencing under 2929.11 and the

seriousness and recidivism factors relevant to the offense and the offender in 2929.12(B)

through (F).” The court found that Smith was on post-release control when he committed

both offenses, was out on bond in Case No. 20 CR 202 when he committed the offense
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                               4

in Case No. 22 CR 25, had a history of criminal convictions with prior prison time served

for a felonious assault, and that six months after his release, he committed the offense in

Case No. 20 CR 202. The court also found “a pattern of substance use and a refusal or

inability to remain in treatment.” The court found “a prison sentence is consistent with the

purposes and principles of sentencing,” and stated that it was going to sentence Smith to

a mandatory minimum term of 8 years and a maximum term of 12 years for each offense.

The court then explained that it believed the sentences should be served consecutively

but would impose concurrent sentences as the parties recommended.

       {¶7}   In the sentencing entry in Case No. 20 CR 202, the trial court made the

following statements and findings, which are nearly identical to those in the sentencing

entry in Case No. 22 CR 25. The court stated that it had “considered the record, Defense

counsel’s oral statements, Defendant’s oral statements, Defendant’s record, Defendant’s

mother’s statement, the certificates of completion from Alvis House showing Defendant’s

AOD participation, the presentence investigation report, and other relevant information.”

The court stated that it “also considered and is guided by the principles and purposes of

sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11.” In addition, the court “considered

and is guided by the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code

Section 2929.12(B)-(F), and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and

restitution.” The court stated that it found that none of the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C),

(E), or (F) were relevant to Smith. However, citing R.C. 2929.12(D)(1), the court found

that Smith “was on Post Release Control when he committed these offenses” and

“committed a new felony offense while on bond” in Case No. 20 CR 202. Citing R.C.

2929.12(D)(2), the court found that Smith had “a history of criminal convictions, having
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                                           5

served a prior prison term.” Citing R.C. 2929.12(D)(4), the court found that Smith “exhibits

a pattern of drug abuse related to the offense and a refusal to engage in treatment.” And

after considering “all of the above,” the court found that “a prison term is consistent with

the purposes and principles of sentencing” in R.C. 2929.11.

        {¶8}    In both cases, the trial court sentenced Smith to a mandatory minimum

prison term of 8 years and a maximum term of 12 years, and the court ordered that the

sentences be served concurrently. The court dismissed the remaining counts in both

cases on the state’s motion. In Gallia App. No. 22CA3, Smith filed a notice of appeal with

respect to Case No. 22 CR 25, and in Gallia App. No. 22CA4, Smith filed a notice of

appeal with respect to Case No. 20 CR 202. We sua sponte consolidated the appeals.

                                  II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        {¶9}    Smith presents one assignment of error:               “The trial court erred to the

prejudice of Mr. Smith by improperly imposing the maximum prison sentence.”1

                                     III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

        {¶10} In his sole assignment of error, Smith contends the trial court erred when it

imposed the maximum sentence for each offense. Smith maintains his sentences are

contrary to law because the trial court “ignored certain factors” and considered

“extraneous factors outside of those laid out in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Smith asserts

that the sentencing transcript indicates the court considered only that he “was on post-

release control, has a previous conviction of felonious assault in which he properly served

his time, and has a pattern of substance abuse.” “Yet the court previously heard that [he]

was in drug treatment during the pendency of these cases,” “was on medication and had

1We have taken the assignment of error from page 1 of Smith’s appellate brief; the assignment of error is
worded slightly differently on page 4 of his brief.
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                             6

mental health issues he was dealing with.” Smith claims the court’s findings show it “did

not carefully consider the relevant factors” and claims the court “failed to address many

of the other factors that would suggest a proper imposition of the maximum sentence.”

He also asserts that the court’s findings show it “considered factors outside of the felony

sentencing statutes.” He claims that the court “only considered three factors when it

imposed the maximum sentence suggesting that it used other outside factors when

sentencing [him].” He also asserts that only explicitly considering three factors “does not

‘use minimum sanctions’ to ‘protect the public from future crime and punish the offender’

as the felony sentencing statute is set out to do.” And he claims the record “does not

reflect the trial court using the minimum sanctions to protect the public from future crime”

and punish him.

       {¶11} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.

2953.08(G)(2), which states:

       The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
       that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand
       the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court’s
       standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its
       discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this
       division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

       (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under
       division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
       2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever,
       if any, is relevant;

       (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

       {¶12} “A defendant bears the burden to establish, by clear and convincing

evidence, that a sentence is either contrary to law or that the record does not support the

specified findings.” State v. Helterbridle, 4th Dist. Adams Nos. 21CA1149, 21CA1150,
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                               7

2022-Ohio-2756, ¶ 9. “ ‘[O]therwise contrary to law’ means ‘ “in violation of statute or

legal regulations at a given time.” ’ ” State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-

1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729,

169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990). “Clear and

convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere

‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required

‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the

trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶13} R.C. 2929.11 states:

       (A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided by the
       overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding purposes of felony
       sentencing are to protect the public from future crime by the offender and
       others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of
       the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines
       accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on
       state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes, the
       sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender,
       deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the
       offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or
       both.

       (B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated to
       achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in
       division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the
       seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact upon the victim, and
       consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
       offenders.

                                         ***

       {¶14} R.C. 2929.12(A) states:

       Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of the Revised
       Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender
       for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                             8

       with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11
       of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider
       the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this section relating to the
       seriousness of the conduct, the factors provided in divisions (D) and (E) of
       this section relating to the likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, and the
       factors set forth in division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender’s
       service in the armed forces of the United States and, in addition, may
       consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and
       principles of sentencing.

       {¶15} R.C. 2929.12(B)-(E) provide nonexhaustive lists of seriousness and

recidivism factors the court must consider. The factors the trial court found relevant in

this case were the recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12(D)(1), (2), and (4), which state:

       (1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under release
       from confinement before trial or sentencing * * * [or] was under post-release
       control pursuant to section 2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised
       Code for an earlier offense * * * .

       (2) The offender * * * has a history of criminal convictions.

       ***

       (4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse that
       is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to acknowledge that the
       offender has demonstrated that pattern, or the offender refuses treatment
       for the drug or alcohol abuse.

       {¶16} “Although a court imposing a felony sentence must consider the purposes

of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12,

‘neither R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires [the] court to make any specific factual

findings on the record.’ ” (Bracketed material sic.) Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-

Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, at ¶ 20, quoting Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729,

169 N.E.3d 649, at ¶ 20. Moreover, “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits a record-does-not-

support-the-sentence review only for sentences that are imposed pursuant to certain

enumerated statutes, which do not include R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                              9

Jones at ¶ 35-39. “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an appellate court to conduct an

independent review of a trial court’s sentencing findings under R.C. 2929.12 or its

adherence to the purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11.” Id., citing Jones at

¶ 41-42. “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not allow an appellate court to modify or vacate a

sentence based on its view that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. at ¶ 22, citing Jones at ¶ 31, 39.

       {¶17} However, “[b]ecause both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require the trial

court to consider the factors outlined in those two statutory provisions, * * * a trial

court’s failure to consider the factors would render the sentence ‘in violation of statute’

and thus ‘contrary to law.’ ” State v. Poole, 4th Dist. Adams No. 21CA1151, 2022-Ohio-

2391, ¶ 17. In addition, “when a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or

considerations that are extraneous to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12, that sentence is contrary to law.” Bryant at ¶ 22. Claims that raise these issues

are therefore reviewable under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

       {¶18} Smith has failed in his burden to show that his sentences are contrary to

law. The record reflects that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. At the

sentencing hearing, the court stated that it “considered” and was “guided by the purposes

and principles of sentencing under 2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors

relevant to the offense and the offender in 2929.12(B) through (F).” And in the sentencing

entries, the court stated that it “considered and is guided by the principles and purposes

of sentencing under Ohio Revised Code Section 2929.11” and that it “considered and is

guided by the seriousness and recidivism factors under Ohio Revised Code Section

2929.12(B)-(F), and the need for deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and restitution.”
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                                  10

It is true that at the sentencing hearing, the court explicitly made findings related to some

R.C. 2929.12 factors—R.C. 2929.12(D)(1), (D)(2), and (D)(4)—but not others. However,

that does not warrant a conclusion that the court did not consider the unmentioned factors,

particularly when the sentencing entries stated that the court considered the factors in

R.C. 2929.12(B)-(F) and found none of the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (E), or (F)

were relevant. See generally State v. Branch, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110050, 2022-

Ohio-132, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Phillips, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110148, 2021-Ohio-

2772, at ¶ 8 (“The mere fact that the trial court emphasized certain factors and did not

mention others, does not lead us to conclude that the trial court failed to consider all

relevant factors. It is generally accepted that ‘a trial court’s statement in its sentencing

journal entry that it considered the required statutory factors is alone sufficient to fulfill its

obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12’ ”).

       {¶19} In addition, the suggestion that the sentences are contrary to law because

the trial court ignored Smith’s mental health issues, the fact that he was on medication,

and his prior drug treatment is not well-taken. The sentencing entries state that the court

“considered the record,” which includes Smith’s statements at the plea change hearing

about his mental health issues and medication. The entries also state that the court

considered defense counsel’s oral statements at sentencing, which included statements

about Smith’s drug treatment, and considered Smith’s certificates of completion from Alvis

House. Thus, the record reflects that the court did consider Smith’s mental health issues,

medication, and prior drug treatment. The fact that it did not give greater weight to those

circumstances does not make the sentences contrary to law. And to the extent Smith

may be suggesting his prior treatment precluded the trial court from finding that he refused
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                            11

treatment for purposes of R.C. 2929.12(D)(4), he failed to develop an argument on that

point.

         {¶20} Smith has also not shown that the trial court improperly considered any

extraneous factors. Smith has not identified any factor the trial court considered which

falls outside the bounds of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. He appears to ask this court to

find that the factors the trial court explicitly relied upon do not support maximum

sentences, so the trial court must have improperly considered unidentified, extraneous

factors to reach its decision. We will not make such an inference. “Trial court proceedings

generally enjoy a presumption of correctness and an appellant has the burden to

affirmatively demonstrate error.” State v. Pettygrove, 4th Dist. Adams No. 12CA941,

2013-Ohio-1062, ¶ 7. And if this court were to infer a sentence was contrary to law and

vacate it merely because we did not believe the factors the trial court identified supported

it, we would in effect be vacating a sentence based on our view that it is not supported by

the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which is not permitted under R.C.

2953.08(G)(2). Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, at ¶ 22.

         {¶21} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err when it

imposed maximum sentences. Accordingly, we overrule the sole assignment of error and

affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                               JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.
Gallia App. Nos. 22CA3, 22CA4                                                            12

                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENTS ARE AFFIRMED and that appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Gallia
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

       IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted.
The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of
Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay
is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day
period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of
Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of
the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the
appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

                                          For the Court

                                          BY: ________________________
                                              Michael D. Hess, Judge

                                 NOTICE TO COUNSEL

       Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
the clerk.