Court Opinion

ID: 9941678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 18:02:08.017304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:51.738552
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11149    Document: 24-1      Date Filed: 02/16/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11149
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        LARRY DEWAYNE GOLDSMITH,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00020-LAG-TQL-1
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11149

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Larry Goldsmith appeals his 180-month above-guidelines
        sentence for attempting to entice and coerce a minor to engage in
        sexual activity. On appeal, he argues that the district court issued
        a substantively unreasonable sentence by imposing the upward
        variance without affording appropriate weight to his neuropsycho-
        logical deficits, lack of criminal history, and the need to avoid un-
        necessary sentencing disparities. After review, we affirm.
            I.    FACTUAL        BACKGROUND            &    PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
               In 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Goldsmith with one
        count of attempting to entice and coerce a minor to engage in sex-
        ual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (“Count 1”), and one
        count of traveling with intent to engage in illegal sexual contact, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) and (f) (“Count 2”). Pursuant to a
        plea agreement, Goldsmith pled guilty to Count 1.
               In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared
        Goldsmith’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which out-
        lined the offense conduct as follows. In June 2021, the grand-
        mother of thirteen-year-old “M.P.” contacted law enforcement to
        report M.P. missing. The grandmother reported that M.P. had
        stepped outside onto the porch and then disappeared, and she sus-
        pected that M.P. had left with someone she had been contacting on
        the phone. An hour later, M.P. was found on the side of the road,
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        23-11149              Opinion of the Court                       3

        appearing dazed and confused, and she reported that a male had
        forced her to do things, but she could not remember much. In a
        forensic interview, M.P. stated that she left home to meet “Ron,”
        who she had been contacting on the phone applications Spotaf-
        riend and Snapchat, for sexual intercourse. She stated that Ron ar-
        rived, took M.P. to a wooded area, and made her drink something
        in which he had dissolved a white pill. She began going in and out
        of consciousness, but recalled being carried to the car, waking up
        in a hotel room, and later waking up in the grass. A toxicology
        report revealed the presence of Rohypnol, the “date rape” drug, in
        M.P.’s system.
               The PSI further stated that M.P.’s telephone records con-
        tained 130 text messages from “Ron” between May 21, 2021, and
        June 3, 2021. The texts included Ron questioning M.P. about the
        geographical surroundings of her house and discussing M.P. taking
        a Lyft to meet Ron in Tennessee and plans for him to pick her up.
        Texts revealed discussions of M.P. joining Ron in Indiana or Chi-
        cago before Ron realized that M.P. would be unable to prove that
        she was eighteen years old for a plane ticket and Ron stating that
        M.P. should not bring her phone so that people could not track her.
        M.P. asked about school, and Ron stated that he would home-
        school her until she could take the GED and that he could make
        money for them. Ron asked for pictures of M.P. on Snapchat and
        discussed the sexual activities he wished to do with her. Ron told
        M.P. that he had picked up his “ex” in the same way he planned
        with M.P., that his “ex” was fourteen years’ old, and that he had
        accidentally impregnated her.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11149

               The PSI explained that investigators were able to link texts
        in M.P.’s phone to a number belonging to Goldsmith. Following
        his arrest, Goldsmith gave a statement in which he admitted to
        traveling to Georgia for the purpose of having sexual intercourse
        with M.P., communicating with her as “Ron,” and believing her to
        be fourteen years old.
                The PSI then calculated Goldsmith’s total offense level by
        first determining that Goldsmith had a base offense level of 28, pur-
        suant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(a)(3). The PSI added two levels because
        the offense involved the use of an interactive computer service to
        entice or coerce a minor to engage in the prohibited sexual con-
        duct. The PSI then applied a three-level reduction because Gold-
        smith demonstrated acceptance of responsibility and timely noti-
        fied the government of his intention to enter a guilty plea. Thus,
        Goldsmith’s total offense level was set at 27.
               Goldsmith did not have any prior convictions, placing him
        in criminal history category I. However, the PSI noted that he had
        pending cases with active warrants for two instances of driving
        with a suspended license. The PSI also noted that Goldsmith had
        an active warrant out of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
        District of Indiana for transporting a minor with the intent of en-
        gaging in sexual activity. The PSI detailed that Goldsmith began
        communicating with a minor via Snapchat and Spotafriend, picked
        her up in Michigan, drove her to Indiana, and impregnated her.
        The PSI also explained that the indictment in that case was filed in
        August 2021, but because he was in custody for the instant case, he
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        23-11149               Opinion of the Court                        5

        had not made his initial appearance for the Southern Indiana indict-
        ment, and the warrant remained active.
              The PSI also noted the following regarding Goldsmith’s his-
        tory and characteristics. Goldsmith’s grandparents initially raised
        him because his parents were abusing illegal drugs when Gold-
        smith was born. Then, Goldsmith’s father regained custody when
        Goldsmith was eleven years old. Goldsmith was diagnosed with
        ADHD, depression, anxiety, and insomnia at twelve years old, and
        he began using illicit substances at age thirteen.
               Based on a total offense level of 27 and a criminal history
        category of I, the PSI set the guideline imprisonment range at 70 to
        87 months’ imprisonment. However, the statutory minimum
        term of imprisonment was ten years, and the maximum term was
        life. Thus, because the statutorily required minimum sentence was
        greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the
        statutorily required minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprison-
        ment became the guideline sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
        § 5G1.1(b).
               In his sentencing memorandum, Goldsmith asked for the
        mandatory-minimum guideline sentence of 120 months’ imprison-
        ment. In support of his request, he submitted a psychological eval-
        uation that he underwent that explained his deficits that resulted in
        his inability to appreciate the social consequences of his actions.
        The evaluation detailed that Goldsmith reported that his mother
        may have been intoxicated during her pregnancy with him, and
        that he had a difficult and unstable upbringing. The evaluation
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        6                     Opinion of the Court                23-11149

        indicated that Goldsmith suffered significant developmental issues
        early in his life based on his early separation from his mother, his
        dependency on frail and ailing grandparents, and his need to learn
        functional independence as a child.
               The evaluation further explained that a neuropsychological
        assessment indicated Goldsmith had impairment of the frontal and
        temporal lobe brain functions, cognitive distortion and uncer-
        tainty, affective disturbance, hypomania with paranoid ideation,
        and substantial anxiety. The evaluation concluded that his impair-
        ments may be the result of prenatal toxicity and that Goldsmith
        lacked an internal emotional foundation which impaired his cogni-
        tive and social development. The evaluation concluded that these
        impairments affected Goldsmith’s ability to appreciate the conse-
        quences of his actions and impaired his judgment.
               At sentencing, the district court stated that it had reviewed
        the PSI, Goldsmith’s sentencing memorandum, and the psycholog-
        ical evaluation, and the court confirmed that neither party had ob-
        jections to the PSI. The court acknowledged Goldsmith’s offense
        level and criminal history category, and that the advisory sentenc-
        ing range was 120 months based on the statutorily required mini-
        mum term of imprisonment, to which neither party objected.
              The government stated that it did not have a recommended
        sentence but acknowledged the 120-month mandatory-minimum.
        The government asked that the sentence reflect the seriousness of
        the defendant’s conduct and the danger he posed based on his
        online coercion and enticement and his willingness to travel from
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        23-11149               Opinion of the Court                        7

        Indiana to Georgia to have sex with a child whom he gave Rohyp-
        nol. The government argued that the psychological report pro-
        vided more concern about, rather than support for, a lower sen-
        tence because it showed that Goldsmith’s judgment was compro-
        mised and that he may continue to engage in this conduct, high-
        lighting the pending charges Goldsmith had for similar conduct in
        Indiana. The government contended that Goldsmith posed a great
        danger to the children of the community.
                Goldsmith then read a letter to the court that he prepared,
        stating that he was sorry for the crimes he committed and that he
        was not aware of the impact he had on his victims at the time of
        his illegal conduct. He stated that he now understood the foolish-
        ness of his actions and would never do anything similar again.
        Next, Goldsmith’s counsel explained that he sought out the psy-
        chological evaluation because of concerns about Goldsmith’s defi-
        cits based on his reports of his mother’s use of controlled sub-
        stances while pregnant with him. His attorney then asked for the
        court to impose the guideline sentence of 120 months. He noted
        that Goldsmith may receive additional time in the Indiana case, so
        120 months in this case would reflect the seriousness of the offense.
                The district court stated that it considered the advisory
        range and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and
        circumstances of the offense, Goldsmith’s history and characteris-
        tics, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the
        need to protect the public. The court stated that “this case [was]
        above and beyond” the average case of this kind under this
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11149

        guideline and highlighted that Goldsmith traveled to engage in the
        illegal conduct with a thirteen-year-old and then actually did en-
        gage in that conduct by drugging her. The court stated that it could
        accept and understand that Goldsmith suffered cognitive and psy-
        chological difficulties as outlined in the psychological report, but
        noted its disbelief that Goldsmith did not understand what he was
        doing was wrong because he took countermeasures to avoid being
        caught by police. Accordingly, the court believed an upward vari-
        ance was appropriate based on the § 3553(a) factors, and it sen-
        tenced Goldsmith to 180 months’ imprisonment and 10 years’ su-
        pervised release. Goldsmith objected to the procedural and sub-
        stantive reasonableness of the sentence. His appeal followed.
            II.    ANALYSIS
                We review for an abuse of discretion the substantive reason-
        ableness of a sentence. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th
        Cir. 2020). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of
        showing it “is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a)
        factors.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir.
        2008). A district court abuses its discretion in this context when it
        (1) fails to consider “relevant factors that were due signiﬁcant
        weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
        tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment” by balancing the
        proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
        1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).
              Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “shall im-
        pose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to
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        23-11149               Opinion of the Court                          9

        “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
        law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;” “afford ade-
        quate deterrence to criminal conduct;” “protect the public from
        further crimes of the defendant;” and “provide the defendant with
        needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
        correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). In addition, the court must consider “the na-
        ture and circumstances of the offense and the history and charac-
        teristics of the defendant;” “the kinds of sentences available;” the
        guideline sentencing range; any applicable policy statements; and
        the need to provide restitution to offense victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1),
        (3)-(5), & (7).
               Finally, the court should also consider “the need to avoid
        unwarranted sentence disparities.” Id. § 3553(a)(6). When consid-
        ering a claim of disparity, we first consider “whether the defendant
        is similarly situated to the defendants to whom he compares him-
        self.” United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 2015).
        One of the purposes of the Guidelines is to provide certainty and
        fairness in sentencing and “avoid[] unwarranted sentencing dispar-
        ities among defendants with similar records who have been found
        guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Docampo, 573
        F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
               Our review “involves examining the totality of the circum-
        stances” and whether the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence.
        United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). We
        will only vacate a sentence as unreasonable if “we are left with a
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11149

        deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court committed a
        clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriv-
        ing at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences
        dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal
        quotation marks omitted).
                District courts have “discretion to decide how much weight
        to give each § 3553(a) factor.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1323. While
        the district court must consider all § 3553(a) factors, it “is permitted
        to attach ‘great weight’ to one factor over others.” United States v.
        Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United
        States, 552 U.S. 38, 57 (2007)). Moreover, district courts may con-
        sider a wide array of information related to a defendant’s back-
        ground and character in imposing an upward variance. United
        States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he district
        court, in imposing a variance, may consider conduct that a proba-
        tion oﬃcer already had considered in calculating the defendant’s
        advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983
        (11th Cir. 2015). Further, “variances from the advisory guidelines
        range can sometimes be based on the sentencing judge’s disagree-
        ment with whether a guideline properly reﬂects the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.
        2015).
              A sentence outside of the guideline range is not presumably
        unreasonable, but we may consider the extent of a variance in our
        review of the reasonableness of a sentence. Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1237.
        A court selecting a sentence outside the guideline range must have
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        23-11149               Opinion of the Court                         11

        a justiﬁcation “suﬃciently compelling to support the degree of the
        variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We give weight to a district court’s
        decision to vary because the district court has substantial discretion
        “in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the
        extent of one that is appropriate.” Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238. A sen-
        tence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an in-
        dicator of a reasonable sentence. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d
        1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
               On appeal, Goldsmith contends that the district court im-
        posed a substantively unreasonable sentence when it varied up-
        ward in crafting his sentence. He argues that the district court
        failed to properly consider his psychological deficits, his lack of
        criminal history, and the need to avoid sentencing disparities.
                Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in impos-
        ing the upward variance. The district court outlined the proper
        factors it considered, and acknowledged the mitigating evidence
        Goldsmith submitted, including his psychological evaluation. The
        district court accepted that Goldsmith suffered some cognitive def-
        icits, but noted the steps Goldsmith took to evade detection. It was
        within the district court’s discretion to give greater weight to the
        seriousness of Goldsmith’s offense conduct, and the district court
        did not abuse its discretion in not giving greater weight to Gold-
        smith’s psychological deficits or lack of criminal history. Shaw, 560
        F.3d at 1237.
              While Goldsmith argues that the district court’s imposition
        of the above-guideline sentence ignores the need to avoid
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11149

        sentencing disparities, his argument does not show a disparity ex-
        ists between his sentence and those with similar records who were
        found guilty of similar conduct, and he instead points to more gen-
        eralized statistics. Docampo, 573 F.3d at 1102. Additionally, the dis-
        trict court explicitly noted that it had considered the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors, and that Goldsmith’s case went “above and beyond” the typi-
        cal case it had seen under that guideline. Finally, Goldsmith’s
        above-guideline sentence is well below the statutory maximum
        penalty he did face—life imprisonment—thus further supporting
        the conclusion that his sentence is substantively reasonable. Riley,
        995 F.3d at 1278. In this case, we are simply not “left with a definite
        and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error
        of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sen-
        tence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
        by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
             III.   CONCLUSION
              For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM Goldsmith’s
        sentence.