Court Opinion

ID: 9412801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 17:09:16.888227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:30.395108
License: Public Domain

J-S20002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: J.W., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.W., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 97 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-DP-0000697-2017

  IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.W., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.W., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 98 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered December 8, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-AP-0000670-2021

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                               FILED AUGUST 1, 2023

       J.W. (“Father”) appeals from the December 8, 2022 decree of the trial

court, which terminated Father’s parental rights to his son, J.L.W. (“Child”),

born in January 2011. Father also appeals from a December 8, 2022 trial

court order that changed the permanent placement goal for Child from

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20002-23

reunification to adoption. After careful review, we affirm the termination of

Father’s parental rights and dismiss Father’s appeal of the goal change order

as moot.

     Child initially came to the attention of DHS in March 2017 when he was

removed from the home of his mother, E.W. (“Mother”), and declared

dependent based upon reports concerning Mother’s mental health. Father did

not live with Mother or Child at the time of the 2017 removal or in any other

period relevant to this appeal. Child was reunified with Mother in July 2018,

and DHS supervision terminated the following month.

     DHS again received reports in the spring of 2019 related to the mental

health of Mother and Child. Child was removed from the home in May 2019,

and placed in a medical facility. On June 11, 2019, Child was adjudicated

dependent based upon lack of proper parental care or control and placed in

treatment foster care, having been discharged from the medical facility. In

mid-2020, Child was placed in kinship foster care with a maternal great-aunt.

Permanency review hearings were held on August 14, 2019, November 6,

2019, January 29, 2020, September 11, 2020, February 4, 2021, August 17,

2021, November 17, 2021, July 13, 2022, and October 26, 2022. Father only

attended the January 29, 2020 hearing.

     On November 5, 2021, DHS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate

the parental rights of Father and Mother and a petition to change Child’s

permanency goal to adoption.      A hearing was held on the petitions on

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December 8, 2022.1 At the hearing, Unique Dutton-Bass, the current case

manager from the assigned Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), testified

that DHS removed Child in 2019 following receipt of a general protective

services report that Mother had held a gun to Child’s older sibling’s head and

other erratic behavior.        N.T., 12/8/22, at 17-19.   The agency also had

concerns regarding Mother’s ability to address Child’s mental health needs.

Id. at 19.

       Dutton-Bass testified that, after DHS took custody of Child in May 2019,

case plan objectives were established for Mother and Father. Id. at 20, 25.

With respect to Father, these objectives included parenting classes, mental

health treatment, enrollment in an anger management program, providing

proof of housing and employment, and supervised visits with Child. Id. at 20,

25, 43, 46. Dutton-Bass explained that since she was assigned the case in

June 2022, she has had no communication with Father, that none of the

certified letters that were sent to Father once or twice per month were

returned to CUA, and that he had never expressed interest in visits with Child.

____________________________________________

1 Child was represented by a guardian ad litem and separate legal counsel at

the hearing. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1235 (Pa. 2020)
(holding that “appellate courts should engage in sua sponte review to
determine if orphans’ courts have appointed counsel to represent the legal
interests of children in contested termination proceedings, in compliance with”
23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)). The guardian ad litem has filed a brief in this appeal
advocating for the affirmance of the termination decree and goal change
order.

                                           -3-
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Id. at 26, 36-37. When asked to describe Father’s level of compliance with

his case objectives, Dutton-Bass described it as “[n]one.” Id. at 26.

      When asked whether termination of Father’s parental rights would cause

Child irreparable harm, Dutton-Bass answered in the negative. Id. at 29-30.

She explained that Child had not seen Father “in some time” and that Child

does not ask to visit with Father. Id. As a result of the fact that she had not

observed any visits between Father and Child, Dutton-Bass had not detected

a bond between the two. Id. at 30. Dutton-Bass also stated that reunification

of Child with Father was not appropriate and adoption was in Child’s best

interests because Father had not completed any of his case objectives. Id.

      Dutton-Bass stated that Child was doing well in foster care with his

great-aunt, that his behaviors had evened out and he was no longer in mental

health treatment, he was on the honor roll in school, and he was up to date

on all of his medical treatment with no current prescribed medication. Id. at

28-29, 31-32. Dutton-Bass also testified that Child understands the concept

of adoption and wished to be adopted. Id. at 31.

      Ronara Jones, the CUA case manager from 2018 until Dutton-Bass took

over in June 2022, testified that she visited Father’s residence, a rented

bedroom at a rooming house, and it was not appropriate for Child. Id. at 39,

46. Jones stated that Father started but did not complete anger management

classes. Id. at 46, 56, 60. Father was not able to attend the required mental

health treatment based upon an issue with his insurance. Id. at 46, 55-56,

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60-61. Father also never completed the required parenting classes. Id. at

61.

      Father initially had once-per-week supervised visits with Child that were

increased to twice-weekly visits based upon his compliance with the agency’s

directives. Id. at 47, 58. Jones stated that the visits were “somewhat good”

but that Child was not always comfortable with the interactions with Father

because on occasion Father yelled at Child if he did not know a word when

reading a book aloud. Id. at 47. Jones observed Child crying on one occasion

because of these interactions. Id. at 47. Jones also described Child as being

“bored” during the visits. Id. at 59. Jones testified that Father kept in good

touch with her while the visits were ongoing. Id. at 60.

      Jones explained that the supervised visits ceased at the outset of the

Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020 as Father did not want to engage in virtual

visits, even though he had the capability to do so. Id. at 48, 51, 55-56. Jones

recalled that Father stated at the time that “he didn’t want to see his son

through a phone.” Id. at 57. Jones spoke with Father on one occasion after

in-person visits resumed and Father indicated that he wished to resume

visitation, but Child refused at that time. Id. at 59-60, 62. Jones testified

that Child did not exhibit any negative behavior as a result of the cessation of

visits or ask to see Father after that point even though Jones regularly asked

Child about whether he would like to resume visits with Father. Id. at 51-52,

60.

                                     -5-
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       Jones stated that Father’s compliance with case objectives during her

time as case manager was “[m]inimal.” Id. at 48. Jones opined that Child

would not suffer irreparable harm if the Father’s parental rights were

terminated. Id. She stated that, although there had been a bond in the past,

Father did not have a parent-child bond with Child at the time of the hearing.

Id. at 57, 59, 61-62. Jones further opined that adoption was in Child’s best

interest. Id. at 48. Jones testified that, after his placement with his great-

aunt, he had made a “huge turnaround,” was achieving honor roll grades in

school, and his behavioral issues had dissipated. Id. at 50-51.

       Child’s legal interests counsel stated at the hearing that she spoke with

Child, who was nearly 12 at that time; Child stated to counsel that he fully

understood what adoption meant and that he desired to be adopted by his

great-aunt. Id. at 62. Child indicated that he did not want to have any more

of a “connection” or “contact” with Mother and Father going forward. Id. at

62-63. Child also recognized that his great-aunt is who is providing for him

and supports him, and he was proud of how well he was doing in school and

emotionally compared to his condition when removed from Mother’s home.

Id.

       Father also testified at the hearing.2 When asked about his bond with

Child, Father stated that he had not seen his son since March 2020 but that

____________________________________________

2 Mother, who arrived late to the hearing and left early after causing several

disruptions, did not testify. See N.T., 12/8/22, at 43-49.

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“[w]hen we had a bond together[,] I missed him, and he missed me.” Id. at

63-64. Father testified that he was working hard to reunite with Child but that

he had to stop his mental health treatment, which he was attending until

October 2020, “because [he] was going through a whole lot.” Id. at 64-65.

Father stated that he was also attending anger management but he “just

stopped.” Id. at 65. Father also indicated that he was still living in the same

rooming house and had not made attempts to find new housing because he

“like[s] where [he’s] at.” Id. at 69.

      Father attributed his inability to fulfill his case objectives to three

reasons. Id. at 64-66. First, he stated that he had to be with his father, who

is “old and [] sick,” every day. Id. at 64. Second, he stated he was “going

through a lot of stuff with [his other] son and [that] son’s mother [that kept

him] going back and forth to court.” Id. at 65. And, finally, he stated that

the Covid-19 pandemic “slowed everything down.” Id. at 66.

      Father stated that he had a very good relationship with Jones, the case

manager from 2018 to June 2022. Id. at 66. He testified that he did not

refuse virtual visits because he did not want to talk to his son through a phone,

as reported by Jones. Id. at 70. Instead, Father stated that he attempted to

stay in touch with Jones and the other case workers but that no one would

answer or return his calls. Id. at 70.

      Father testified that he appeared at court hearings up until the beginning

of the pandemic but ceased going at that point as he stopped receiving

subpoenas directing him to attend. Id. at 73-74. He testified that he was

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nevertheless aware that hearings were taking place at three-month intervals,

but he was not sure of the exact date and time of the hearings. Id. at 72-73.

While Father stated that he attended a hearing that occurred in September

2021,3 he did not request visitation at that hearing. Id. at 66, 74. Father

testified that since that September 2021 hearing, he did not “hear [any]thing

about [his] son from 2021 until now,” he had not received any subpoenas until

shortly before the December 8, 2022 hearing, and he was unaware that Child

was living with his great-aunt until one month prior to the hearing. Id. at 64,

66.

       At the conclusion of the December 8, 2022 hearing, the trial court

announced its ruling that the involuntary termination petitions and goal

change petition would be granted. Id. at 75-78. On that same date, the trial

court issued separate decrees terminating the parental rights of Father and

Mother and entered an order changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

With respect to Father, the termination decree provided that termination was

proper under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) of the Adoption Act, as well

as under subsection (b) of that same provision. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2),

(5), (8), (b). Father filed timely notices of appeal from the decree terminating

his parental rights and the goal change order,4 along with contemporaneous

____________________________________________

3 Notably, no hearing took place in September 2021.

4 Mother did not appeal the goal change order or the termination decree as to

her.

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concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.               See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i).5

       Father presents the following issues on appeal:

       1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse[] its discretion
       where it determined that the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.[ §]
       2511(a) to terminate [Father]’s parental rights were met.

       2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse[] its discretion
       where it determined that the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.[ §]
       2511(b) were met.

       3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law or abuse[] its discretion
       where it determined that the permanency goal for [Child] should
       be changed to adoption.

Father’s Brief at 3 (suggested answers omitted).

       Father’s first two issues concern the trial court’s involuntary termination

of his parental rights to Child.        In addressing these issues, we apply the

following precepts:

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
       by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
       courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
       or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
       of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
       unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
       court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
       the record would support a different result. We have previously
       emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
       observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

____________________________________________

5 On February 6, 2023, the trial court informed this Court by letter that, due

to the retirement of the trial court judge who had presided over these
proceedings, no Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion would be prepared.

                                           -9-
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In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

      The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.

2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts

in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act.      “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds

describing particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary

termination[.]” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).        If the trial court determines the petitioner

established grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and

convincing evidence, the court then must proceed to assess the petition under

subsection (b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267.

      Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and subsection (b).        However, this

Court may affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its

determination concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as

Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)

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(en banc).    We focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which

provide as follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         *     *      *

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

         *     *      *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. . . .

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

      Under Section 2511(a)(2), “the moving party must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that there is (1) repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal

caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence;

and (3) that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or

will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 600 (Pa.

2021). The grounds for termination under Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited

to affirmative misconduct, but also include refusal and parental incapacity that

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cannot be remedied. In re K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(en banc).    “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re Adoption of

A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also In re Adoption of

K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), affirmed, 240 A.3d

1218 (Pa. 2020) (noting that a parent has an “affirmative duty” to work

towards the return of his children, which requires, at a minimum, that he

“cooperate with the [local agency] and complete the rehabilitative services

necessary so that the parent can perform his parental duties and

responsibilities”). “[W]hen a parent has demonstrated a continued inability

to conduct his life . . . in a fashion that would provide a safe environment for

a child, whether that child is living with the parent or not, and the behavior of

the parent is irremediable as supported by clear and competent evidence, the

termination of parental rights is justified.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118

(Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      The trial court found that grounds for termination existed under Section

2511(a)(2) based upon Father’s failure to maintain a relationship with Child

over the more-than-two-year period since the beginning of the Covid-19

pandemic and the cessation of his visits with Child. N.T., 12/8/22, at 75-76.

The court found Father’s testimony to be non-credible, specifically finding

Father’s claim that he did not see Child over this extended period because

“somebody else didn’t do what they were supposed to do” as being

unsupported by the record. Id. The court found that the testimony presented

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by DHS contradicted Father’s explanations as to why he could not comply with

his case objectives, showing that “he never did anything to try and maintain

a relationship” with Child. Id. at 76. The court further emphasized the three-

and-one-half-year period in which Child had spent in DHS’s care without

essential care from either of his parents. Id. at 76-77.

      Father argues that “it was DHS’s burden to prove that Father lacked the

capacity to parent” Child, and that “there was no evidence at all in the record

to support a finding that Father had any incapacity at all.” Father’s Brief at

13-14. In light of this absence of any evidence of Father’s incapacity, Father

contends that we should vacate the termination decree. Id. at 14.

      Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the finding that

termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(2). We first find no merit

to Father’s argument that the trial court was required to prove his incapacity

to parent Child.    Rather, the language of Section 2511(a)(2) is in the

disjunctive and requires a showing of “repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent [that] has caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence.”       23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(a)(2) (emphasis added). Therefore, the agency is required to prove any

one of the parent’s incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal and not incapacity

specifically.   See id.; see also K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 474 (stating that

termination under Section 2511(a)(2) can be based on either affirmative

misconduct, refusal, or neglect).

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       Here, the evidence related to Father may be more properly deemed as

showing his repeated and continued refusal to provide Child with essential

parental care.     The CUA established case objectives for Father—including

parenting and anger management classes, seeking mental health treatment,

obtaining employment and adequate housing, and participating in supervised

visits with Child—yet Father was only deemed to be minimally compliant with

these objectives during the early stages of Child’s dependency and not at all

compliant by the time of the termination hearing. N.T., 12/8/22, at 20, 25,

43, 46, 48.     Father did not complete the parenting or anger management

classes, he has not fulfilled the requirement that he obtain mental health

treatment,6 and he has made no efforts to obtain adequate housing. Id. at

39, 46, 55-56, 60-61, 64-65, 69.7

       While Father was initially compliant in attending supervised visits and

his visitation schedule even being increased to twice per week, his visits

ceased in March 2020 when they went virtual, which Father found to be

unsatisfactory.     Id. at 47-48, 51, 55-58.       While Father requested on one

occasion to resume visitation after in-person visits restarted, which Child

____________________________________________

6 While the testimony from the CUA witnesses indicated that Father’s inability

to fulfill the mental health objective related to an insurance issue, N.T.,
12/8/22, at 46, 55-56, 60-61, Father testified that he voluntarily ceased
attending mental health appointments in October 2020 “because [he] was
going through a whole lot.” Id. at 64-65.
7 The record contains no evidence regarding whether Father complied with the

case objective to obtain adequate employment.

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refused, Father admitted that he never made such a request in court, nor did

he even attend any hearings after the date that in-person visits resumed. Id.

at 59-60, 62, 66, 74.

      Father also refused to reestablish parental care to Child by failing to

remain in contact with CUA as the period of Child’s dependency progressed.

While Jones stated that she was regularly in contact with Father while he was

still visiting with Child, she only spoke to him on one occasion after in-person

visits resumed despite the CUA’s numerous attempts to reach out to Father

via cellphone and letters.   Id. at 58-60.    Furthermore, Dutton-Bass, who

managed the case during the six months preceding the hearing, stated that

she had never heard from Father despite the fact that letters were sent to him

once or twice per month that were never returned as undeliverable. Id. at

26, 36-37. As discussed above, Father also failed to attend eight of the nine

permanency review hearings, and he was completely unaware of Child’s living

situation at the hearing, with no knowledge that Child was residing with his

maternal great-aunt for more than two years after Child’s placement in kinship

care. Id. at 64.

      Turning to the second element under Section 2511(a)(2), Father’s

refusal to parent Child caused Child “to be without essential parental care,

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.” 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); see also L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600. Child was declared

dependent on June 11, 2019 after his removal from Mother’s home, and he

remained either in medical treatment, foster homes, or in kinship care with

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his great-aunt for approximately three-and-one-half years until the date of

issuance of the termination decrees and goal change order.

      Finally, the evidence showed that the causes of Father’s refusal to

provide essential parental care to Child “cannot or will not be remedied by”

Father. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 600. Although Father

started off with good attendance at his supervised visits and was otherwise

minimally compliant with his case objectives, after the onset of the Covid-19

pandemic he did not attend any more visits or court hearings, almost entirely

ceased communication with the CUA case managers, and made no efforts to

complete the anger management, parenting, or mental health objectives.

Father’s inability to remedy the issues that prevent him from providing care

to Child is exemplified by Father’s statement that he has not sought to move

out of his inadequate housing, a rented room at a boarding house, because

he “like[s] where [he’s] at.” N.T., 12/8/22, at 39, 46, 69. We additionally

note that the excuses Father offered at the hearing for why he could not

comply with his case objectives, his own father’s infirmed state, the legal

issues with the mother of another one of his children, and the “slow[] down”

associated with the pandemic, id. at 64-66, provides no cause to believe that

Father would prioritize his relationship with Child in the future. See Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1118 (“[A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of

uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.”) (citation omitted); see

also K.M.G., 219 A.3d at 672 (Section 2511 does not provide a parent with

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an “unlimited period [of] time” to overcome their deficiencies in parenting that

led to the adjudication of the child as dependent). We therefore conclude that

DHS met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to show sufficient

grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2).

      We next consider Father’s second issue, which corresponds with the

second prong of the termination analysis under Section 2511(b) of the

Adoption Act.    This provision requires that the trial court “give primary

consideration to the development, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The emotional needs and welfare of the

child have been properly interpreted to include intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.”    T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation and

quotation marks omitted); see also In the Interest of K.T., ___ A.3d ___,

2023 WL 4092986, *14 (Pa. June 21, 2023). “Notably, courts should consider

the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 2023

WL   4092986,    *13.     “[T]he   determination   of   the   child’s   particular

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare must be made on

a case-by-case basis.” Id. at *14; see also L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593.

      Our Supreme Court has mandated that any Section 2511(b) analysis

“requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.”

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Specifically, “[c]ourts must determine whether the

trauma caused by breaking [the parent-child] bond is outweighed by the

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benefit of moving the child toward a permanent home.”         Id. at 253. The

recognized threshold for this required bond inquiry is whether termination will

sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” such that the child could suffer

“extreme emotional consequences” or “significant, irreparable harm.” K.T.,

2023 WL 4092986, *16 (citation omitted). The court is not required to use

expert testimony concerning the existence of a bond and may instead rely on

the evaluations of case workers and social workers. In the Matter of M.P.,

204 A.3d 976, 983 (Pa. Super. 2019); Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121.

      Our Supreme Court has instructed that a court engaging in a Subsection

2511(b) inquiry must also consider, as appropriate, the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care, the child’s placement in a pre-

adoptive home and whether there is a bond with the foster parents, and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs. K.T., 2023 WL 4092986, *18. Nonetheless, there is no

“exhaustive list” of factors that must be considered by a trial court in this

context.   Id. at *18 n.28.    As under Section 2511(a), “the party seeking

termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination best

serves the child’s needs and welfare.” Id. at *19 (citing C.M., 255 A.3d at

358-59).

      The trial court found that, while Father had a bond with Child during the

period he was engaged in visitation more than two-and-one-half years prior

to the termination hearing, that bond no longer existed at the time of the

hearing. N.T., 12/8/22, at 75-76. The court noted that Child was currently

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placed in a pre-adoptive home with a family that provided for his emotional

and physical needs and that sought to care for him going forward. Id. at 76,

78. The court additionally placed great emphasis on Child’s own expressed

preference that he wanted no relationship with either of his birth parents in

the future. Id. at 77.

      Citing Jones’ testimony that Father had a bond with Child when engaged

in in-person visits in 2019 and 2020, id. at 59, 61-62, Father argues that the

trial court erred by not “giv[ing] him more time to redevelop that bond once

again and tak[ing] into account how well Father was doing before his in person

visits were taken away due to” the Covid-19 pandemic. Father’s Brief at 17.

      We find no merit to Father’s argument as it is not responsive to our

analysis under Section 2511(b).     Section 2511 provides for a bifurcated

analysis, with subsection (a) centering on the conduct of the parent, “whereas

the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child.” In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 349

(Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted); see also K.T., 2023 WL 4092986, *13,

*19; K.M.W., 238 A.3d at 473. Father’s argument addresses only his own

concerns as a parent and cites to his efforts to maintain contact with Child

before the pandemic, with no attention paid to whether termination of Father’s

parental rights serves Child’s needs and welfare. K.T., 2023 WL 4092986,

*13 (“Notably, [under Section 2511(b),] courts should consider the matter

from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.”).

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      Moreover, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s needs

and welfare analysis, including the court’s determination that there was no

bond between Father and Child. It is well-established under Pennsylvania law

that “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re K.Z.S., 946

A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also A.H., 247 A.3d at 445. Jones,

the CUA case manager through June 2022, testified that although Father and

Child were bonded when visits were ongoing in 2019 and early 2020, no bond

existed at the time of the December 8, 2022 hearing. N.T., 12/8/22, at 57,

59, 61-62. Jones explained that Child refused Father’s request to resume in-

person visits and never said he wanted to meet with Father when asked. Id.

at 51-52, 59-60, 62. Dutton-Bass, who replaced Jones as case manager, also

opined that there was no bond between Father and Child, and she stated that

Child did not ask to have visits with Father. Id. at 29-30. Father also spoke

about his bond in the past tense at the hearing, stating that “[w]hen [Child

and I] had a bond together . . .” Id. at 64. Therefore, the evidence supports

the trial court’s conclusion that Child did not have a bond with Father.

      In addition, the evidence shows that Child’s emotional needs and welfare

will be best served by termination of Father’s parental rights to allow his

adoption by his kinship foster family. Both Jones and Dutton-Bass opined that

Child would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were

terminated and that adoption was in Child’s best interests. Id. at 29-30, 48.

The record reflects that Child’s mental health had dramatically improved as

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compared to his state when he was declared dependent and placed in in-

patient treatment and then treatment foster care to address violent and

disruptive behavior; after he began living with his great-aunt, Child had a

“huge turnaround” with his behavior, he no longer required medication, and

he was not in mental health treatment as of the date of the termination

hearing. Id. at 28-29, 31-32, 50-51. Child’s educational performance had

also undergone a significant improvement as he had gone from receiving Cs

and Ds to being on the honor roll. Id. at 29, 31, 51. Child also articulated

his desire to be adopted to his case manager and counsel, he expressed pride

in how well he was doing in his pre-adoptive kinship home, and he stated that

he did not want to have any future contact with either of his biological parents.

Id. at 31, 62-63.

      In light of the above evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding that termination of parental rights was

appropriate under Section 2511(b). Father’s second issue therefore affords

no basis for relief.

      We now turn to Father’s final claim on appeal, in which he challenges

the change of Child’s permanent placement goal from reunification to

adoption. Given our decision to affirm the trial court’s termination decrees,

any challenge to the goal change order is moot. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 446

(“[T]he effect of our decision to affirm the orphans’ court’s termination decree

necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change Child’s

goal to adoption.”); see also Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa.

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Super. 2020). We therefore dismiss Father’s appeal of the goal change order

as moot.

        Based on the foregoing analysis, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law in the trial court’s involuntary termination of Father’s parental

rights to Child, and we affirm the lower court’s December 8, 2022 decree.

Because any challenge to the change of Child’s permanent placement goals is

moot given our decision to affirm the termination decree, we dismiss the

appeal from the December 8, 2022 goal change order.

        Decree terminating Father’s parental rights affirmed. Appeal from goal

change order dismissed.

        Judge Kunselman joins the Memorandum.

        Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/1/2023

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