Court Opinion

ID: 9494923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:50:10.655383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:42.429520
License: Public Domain

STAFFORD, District Judge,
dissenting.
DISSENT
Because I cannot agree that the district judge erred in dismissing the petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus on limitations grounds, I must respectfully dissent. The district court determined-I believe correctly-that AEDPA provides district courts with the authority to sua sponte consider the timeliness of a habeas petition even when a state fails to preserve the issue. Here, the district court (1) determined that the respondent’s failure to raise the defense was inadvertent and not the result of a purposeful or deliberate decision to forego the defense; (2) gave the petitioner an opportunity to present his arguments against dismissal on limitations grounds; *932(3) found that the petition was untimely under the provisions of AEDPA; and (4) concluded that dismissing the petition as untimely was appropriate given the goals of AEDPA. I would affirm the district court.
A.
Initially, I question whether the waiver/ sua sponte dismissal issue addressed by this court is within the scope of the certificate of appealability (“COA”). In its order dismissing the petition, the district court considered four issues: (1) whether the petition is barred as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); (2) whether the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations; (3) whether the district court has the discretion to raise the statute of limitations issue sua sponte; and (4) whether applying the statute of limitations to the petitioner’s case amounts to an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The district court certified only the first issue for review on appeal. Specifically, the district judge wrote:
In light of the evolving case-law interpreting and applying the recently-enacted one-year statute of limitations governing habeas corpus cases set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a certificate of ap-pealability will issue solely with respect to the issue addressed in this Order as to whether the instant habeas corpus petition is barred from review under § 2244(d).
When we remanded the case to the district court for it to reconsider its COA in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000), the district court said that it “stands by its original order for issuance of certificate of appealability on the statute of limitations question addressed in the Order being appealed.”
The petitioner did not ask this court to broaden the scope of the district court’s COA. The petitioner nonetheless specified four issues on appeal, none of which was expressly certified by the district court. Specifically, the petitioner raised the following issues: (1) whether the respondent waived the statute of limitations defense; (2) whether the district court violated its due process obligation to be fair and impartial when it sua sponte asserted a waivable defense on behalf of the respondent; (3) whether the district court erred in determining that the petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling; and (4) whether enforcement of the statute of limitations in the petitioner’s case constituted an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
AEDPA limits the scope of review in a habeas appeal to issues specified in the COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Issues not certified for appeal, either by the district court or by this court on motion under Sixth Circuit Rule 22(a), cannot be heard on appeal. Savage v. United States, 25 Fed.Appx. 280, 2001 WL 1587326 (6th Cir. Dec.11, 2001); Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250 (11th Cir.1998). Because the operative COA in this case mentions only the issue of timeliness under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), I believe that we exceed the scope of the COA when we address the issues articulated by the petitioner.
B.
Should we nevertheless generously construe the COA as permitting the petitioner to argue on appeal his waiver and sua sponte dismissal issues, we should then reject the petitioner’s arguments on the merits. In my judgment, the district court acted in conformity not only with AEDPA but also with the caselaw construing AED-PA.
Congress intended AEDPA to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, *933436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (stating that “there is no doubt Congress intended AEDPA to advance these doctrines [comity, finality, and federalism]”). Consistent with such purpose, Congress created a one-year limitations period that was meant to streamline the habeas review process and to lend finality to state court convictions. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2128, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (recognizing that “the 1 year limitation period of § 2244(d)(1) quite plainly serves the well-recognized interest in the finality of state court judgments”); see also H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 518, 104th Cong., at 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 944 (1996) (explaining that, in enacting AEDPA, Congress wanted “to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus” by adding, among other things, a one-year period of limitation to the time a state prisoner has to seek habeas relief from a state conviction). Indeed, as recognized by the Second Circuit in Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir.2000), AEDPA’s one-year limitations period implicates values beyond the interests of the parties and, in particular, “promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time.”
Since enactment of AEDPA, many courts have concluded that the one-year limitation period contained in section 2244(d)(1) is an affirmative defense that may be waived by the respondent. See, e.g., Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir.1999). Nonetheless, courts have unanimously held that a district court may sua sponte raise and decide a limitations defense, waivable though it may be, before the respondent is even ordered to file an answer to the petition. See, e.g., Acosta, 221 F.3d at 121-122; Kiser, 163 F.3d at 329. These courts have found such a result to be consistent not only with the purposes of AEDPA but also with Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, which rule gives district courts the power to review and summarily dismiss habeas petitions, before the respondent files an answer, “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 4. Rooted in “the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer,” Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 4, the district court’s authority to summarily dismiss habeas petitions under Rule 4 reflects AEDPA’s policy considerations of comity, finality, and federalism and clearly “differentiates ha-beas cases from other civil cases with respect to sua sponte consideration of affirmative defenses.” Kiser, 163 F.3d at 328.
To be sure, this case is distinguishable from the many cases upholding summary dismissal on limitations grounds where respondents have never been ordered to file a response to the petition. Here, the district court ordered the respondent to file a return of writ responding to the allegations of the petition. In its order, the court stated that the return of writ “should” include a number of allegations, including an allegation as to whether AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations barred the petitioner’s claims. The respondent in fact filed a return of writ without raising or addressing in any way the limitations issue. The court today decides that, when the respondent failed to mention a limitations defense in its return of writ, the district court lost its authority to consider the issue sua sponte. I disagree.
*934In Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134-35, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), the Supreme Court considered the question of how an appellate court ought to handle a nonexhausted habeas petition when a respondent fails to raise the defense in the district court. The Court decided that an appellate court is not required to treat the respondent’s failure to raise the defense as an absolute waiver of the defense. The Court instead held that, based on the interests of comity and federalism, an appellate court has the discretion to decide “whether the administration of justice would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or by reaching the merits of the petition forthwith.” Granberry, 481 U.S. at 131, 107 S.Ct. 1671.
In the wake of Granberry, it is now well-recognized that a federal court-either district or circuit-may raise sua sponte a petitioner’s failure to exhaust state law remedies and may apply that doctrine to dismiss the petitioner’s federal case even when the respondent fails to assert the defense. See, e.g., Graham v. Johnson, 94 F.3d 958, 970 (5th Cir.1996) (rejecting the state’s explicit waiver of the exhaustion requirement and remanding for dismissal based on the petitioner’s failure to exhaust). Furthermore, at least nine circuits have relied on the reasoning of Granberry to find that, in the interests of comity, federalism and judicial economy, habeas courts also have the discretion to deny relief on the basis of a petitioner’s procedural default despite the failure of the respondent to preserve or properly raise the defense. See, e.g., Yeatts v. Angelone, 166 F.3d 255, 261 262 (4th Cir.1999) (collecting cases); Magouirk v. Phillips, 144 F.3d 348, 357-358 (5th Cir.1998). Courts are thus permitted to sua sponte raise failure to exhaust and procedural default-both affirmative defenses which may be waived by the respondent-before as well as after the respondent files an answer. There is no reason why the statute of limitations-also an affirmative defense which may be waived by the respondent-should be treated differently.
Advancing concerns no less important than those advanced by the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default, AED-PA’s statute of limitations must be treated by the federal courts just as the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default are treated. In the interests of comity and federalism, a district court has the discretion to dismiss a habeas case for procedural default and/or nonexhaustion whether or not the respondent has filed an answer or exercised a waiver. In the interests of finality, not to mention judicial economy, a federal court likewise should have the discretion to dismiss an untimely habeas case whether or not the respondent has filed an answer or exercised a waiver. That is what Congress intended when it enacted AEDPA, what the Supreme Court has authorized in analogous situations, and what the district court did in this case. Finding no error, I would affirm.