Court Opinion

ID: 9908068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 18:01:22.620489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:31.906995
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE;                             No. 22-16751
CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY,                                            D.C. No.
                                                   2:19-cv-01271-
                   Plaintiffs-Appellants,             MCE-DB
    v.

UNITED STATES FOREST                                  OPINION
SERVICE; MARGIE B. DEROSE,

                   Defendants-Appellees.

           Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Eastern District of California
         Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

              Argued and Submitted October 17, 2023
                    San Francisco, California

                      Filed December 7, 2023

Before: Eugene E. Siler, * Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Ryan
              D. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

                      Opinion by Judge Siler

*
 The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
2                 EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

                          SUMMARY **

                      Environmental Law

   The panel affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service in an action
challenging the Service’s approval of the Three Creeks
Project.
   Plaintiffs alleged that the Service failed to adequately
consider alternatives to logging, failed to solicit public
comments following its 2018 Environmental Assessment,
and failed to supplement its National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) analysis following a 2020 bark-beetle outbreak
and the subsequent Inyo Craters Bark Beetle Hazard Tree
Abatement Project.
     The panel held that plaintiff had not shown that the
Service’s approval of the Three Creeks Project was arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Service considered a
reasonable range of alternatives, offered the public a
reasonable opportunity to comment, and was not required to
conduct further NEPA analysis following the bark-beetle
outbreak. The panel held that because plaintiff failed to raise
its proposed alternatives during the comment period, it failed
to exhaust its argument, and the panel need not reach the
merits of the suggested alternatives.
    Since plaintiff did not include its claim regarding the
Inyo Craters Project in its amended complaint, the panel did
not consider it. Because the Service acted in accordance

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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with its own regulations, NEPA, and the Administrative
Procedures Act, the panel affirmed the summary judgment
in the Service’s favor.

                       COUNSEL

Thomas C. Buchele (argued) and Andrew B. Baloga,
Certified Law Student, Earthrise Law Center, Lewis & Clark
Law School, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Ezekiel A. Peterson (argued), Rachel Heron, and Robert P.
Stockman, Attorneys, Environment and Natural Resources
Division; Sean C. Duffy, Trial Attorney, Natural Resources
Section; Rita Ahuja, Attorney, Office of the General
Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture; Rebecca
J. Jaffe, Attorney, Environmental Enforcement Section;
Todd Kim, Assistant Attorney General; United States
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Defendants-
Appellees.
4               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

                         OPINION

SILER, Circuit Judge:

    The Inyo National Forest (“the Forest”) looks much
different now than it did in the nineteenth century. Large,
mature trees once dotted the landscape. But decades of
logging, fire suppression, and drought rendered the forest
dense with thin, immature trees. Conditions became ripe for
catastrophic forest fires, bark-beetle infestations, and fungal
infections.
    The U.S. Forest Service (“the Service”) sought to
address this problem by approving the Three Creeks Project.
Plaintiff-Appellant Earth Island Institute and the Center for
Biological Diversity (“Earth Island”) disagrees with the
Service’s methods. It alleges that in approving the project,
the Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), the Service’s Objection Regulations, and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Broadly, Earth
Island challenges the Three Creeks Project’s logging
component. Specifically, Earth Island contends that the
Service failed to adequately consider alternatives to logging,
failed to solicit public comments following its 2018
Environmental Assessment (EA), and failed to supplement
its NEPA analysis following the 2020 bark-beetle outbreak
and subsequent Inyo Craters Project. The district court
granted the Service’s motion for summary judgment. Earth
Island appeals.
    After careful consideration, we affirm. Earth Island has
not shown that the Service’s approval of the Three Creeks
Project is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The
Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives,
offered the public a reasonable opportunity to comment, and
                  EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                       5

was not required to conduct further NEPA analysis
following the bark-beetle outbreak. And since Earth Island
failed to include its claim regarding the Inyo Craters Project
in its amended complaint, we will not consider it here.
Because the Service acted in accordance with its own
regulations, NEPA, and the APA, we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in the Service’s favor.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
     The Service initiated environmental analysis for the
Three Creeks Project in 2012 with a scoping notice. It
intended for the Three Creeks Project to return the Forest to
its resilient, pre-European settlement conditions by thinning
excess trees, removing excess fire fuel, and using prescribed
fire. Earth Island submitted scoping comments questioning
the project’s necessity, objecting to its underlying science,
and requesting its withdrawal.
   In March 2016, the Service published a draft
Environmental Assessment (“2016 EA”). 1 The 2016 EA
described the Three Creeks Project area as greatly at risk of
high-intensity fires. It explained that action is needed to
open the forest to its pre-European settlement conditions,
where the horizon was open and park-like, scattered with a
random distribution of age-diverse trees, but dominated by

1
  NEPA requires agencies to analyze a project’s environmental impacts
before approving it. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. Agencies publish EAs to
determine whether a project will significantly affect the environment. 40
C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2020); Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson,
32 F.3d 1346, 1356 (9th Cir. 1994). If an EA raises “substantial
questions” as to whether a project “may cause significant degradation of
some human environmental factor,” the agency prepares a more
complicated Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). LaFlamme v.
FERC, 852 F.2d 389, 397 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). Otherwise,
the agency issues a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI).
6               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

older, larger trees. Under such conditions, fires burned
frequently but not intensely, and rarely catastrophically. The
Service contemplated two alternatives to reach this goal:
action or no action.
    In its action alternative, the Service analyzed the
potential use of commercial thinning, prescribed fire, and
fuel treatment (removing potential fire fuel, like downed
trees) to restore the project area of the Forest to pre-
settlement conditions. The project area was to comprise
10,187 acres of the Forest’s approximately two million total
acres. Those 10,187 acres were to be divided unequally into
138 units. Some units would receive special treatment in
order to protect wildlife, plants, and other resources. For
example, three units already containing high-quality Pacific
marten habitat were to be designated as “marten units,” in
which the forest treatment would be curtailed to preserve the
marten’s preferred habitat. In its no action alternative, the
Service analyzed the potential of proceeding with current
forest management.
    Earth Island submitted extensive comments requesting
withdrawal of the 2016 EA and its larger framework. It
again questioned the project’s necessity and underlying
science. It also expressed concern for the project’s impact
on certain species. It did not, however, request consideration
of alternative action. While Earth Island criticized forest
thinning as “largely irrelevant” to combatting fire intensity
and spread, it did not distinguish between the thinning of
large or small trees. Nor did it endorse the use of prescribed
or wildland fires, which it declared largely ineffectual on
future fire behavior.
   In July 2017, the Service published a revised
Environmental Assessment (“2017 EA”). The Service
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS               7

removed eight units—around 600 total acres—from the
Three Creeks Project after they were destroyed by fires. The
project size decreased to 9,590 acres divided into 130
unequal units. Otherwise, the 2017 EA remained essentially
the same as the 2016 EA.
    During the 2017 objection process, Earth Island sent the
Service a four-page letter requesting the Three Creeks
Project be halted or, “[a]t a minimum, the [p]roject’s logging
units . . . be converted into prescribed burning units (with no
pre-fire thinning/logging)[.]” Among its objections, Earth
Island included a paragraph titled “Inadequate Range of
Alternatives”:

       The EA fails to fully analyze a reasonable
       range of action alternatives, choosing to fully
       analyze only the proposed action. As a result,
       alternatives that could potentially meet the
       project’s main goals, while mitigating
       impacts to Sensitive Species—such as
       prescribed fire, wildland fire use, and/or
       precommercial thinning of trees under 8
       inches in diameter—were not fully analyzed
       or considered, in violation of NEPA.

The Service and Earth Island participated in a resolution
meeting and a field visit to the Three Creeks Project area.
The Service then responded to Earth Island’s objections and
instructed the District Ranger to clarify and modify the EA
as to several objections.
    In January 2018, the Service published its final revised
EA (“2018 EA”) and its decision notice selecting the
proposed action alternative and stating a finding of no
significant impact (FONSI). Among other modifications,
8               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

the 2018 EA adjusted the desired mean basal area and
number of large trees per acre, clarified the size of trees to
be cut, and added to its discussion of the Three Creeks
Project’s potential effect on the black-backed woodpecker
and Pacific marten. The Service did not open an objection
or comment period.
   Earth Island initiated this action in July 2019, seeking
vacatur, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. The parties
both moved for summary judgment.
    During the summer of 2020, while the parties were
briefing their cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Forest suffered a widespread bark-beetle outbreak. Bark-
beetles wrought massive tree mortality across about 520
acres of the Forest. Of the infested acres, 220 stood within
the Three Creeks Project area. The 220 acres were limited
to two project units. The Service previously designated both
units as “marten units,” formerly home to moderate-to-high
quality marten habitat the project sought to sustain or
improve. The bark-beetle outbreak reduced the habitat to
“low to moderate quality [marten] habitat . . . rapidly
deteriorating into low quality habitat.”
    The Service issued a supplemental information report
(“SIR”) evaluating the impact of the bark-beetle outbreak on
the Three Creeks Project. It found that “treatments
authorized for the two affected units . . . [were] no longer
appropriate[.]” So the Service removed the entirety of the
two affected units (559 acres total) from the project. It also
noted that the two beetle-infested former units constituted
only a small percent of the Forest’s entire marten habitat, so
the project’s overall effect on martens would remain the
same as discussed in the 2018 EA. The Service concluded
that the bark-beetle outbreak did not warrant further NEPA
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS              9

analysis “because the effects [of decreasing the project
footprint] are within the scope and range of effects as
originally analyzed in the environmental assessment and do
not result in any new or significant impacts.”
    On June 11, 2021, Earth Island amended its complaint,
alleging that the Service failed to comply with NEPA when
it declined to conduct supplemental analysis on the bark-
beetle outbreak’s impact on the Three Creeks Project.
    Three days later, on June 14, 2021, the Service proposed
the Inyo Craters Bark Beetle Hazard Tree Abatement Project
(“Inyo Craters Project”) with a scoping notice. It proposed
to cut and remove dead, dying, and infested trees alongside
roadways and trails “where they pose the greatest risk”
across 950 acres of the Forest—including acreage formerly
included in, but since removed from, the Three Creeks
Project. The Service sought to approve the Inyo Craters
Project through categorical exclusions, per 36 C.F.R.
§ 220.6(d)(3), (4). Earth Island did not seek leave to file an
additional amended complaint.           Both parties filed
supplemental cross-motions for summary judgment.
    In September 2022, the district court granted the
Service’s motion for summary judgment as to all counts,
including nine not argued here. It found that the Service’s
consideration of two alternatives sufficed under NEPA
because 1) two alternatives can be sufficient under NEPA,
2) Earth Island did not show that its proposed alternatives
are significantly different from the Service’s action
alternative, and 3) Earth Island did not show that its
proposed alternatives would achieve the same optimal
results as the Service’s action alternative.
   The district court also found that the Service was not
required to open another comment period following its 2018
10              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

EA, as the changes between the 2017 and 2018 EAs were
only clarifications that were “not based on the type of new
information or changed circumstances that would
necessitate a new comment period.”
    Finally, the district court found that the Service was not
required to engage in further NEPA analysis in response to
the bark-beetle outbreak or the Inyo Craters Project. Since
the area affected by the outbreak was “so small” compared
to the available marten habitat, the outbreak did not
constitute a “significant new circumstance” demanding
supplemental NEPA analysis. The district court also held
that because Earth Island raised the Inyo Craters Project for
the first time in its summary judgment motion, the claim was
not properly presented. And even if the claim were properly
presented, the court found that the Service’s 2020
Supplemental Information Report “sufficiently analyzed
impacts on martens in both the Three Creeks and the Inyo
Craters areas.”
     Earth Island’s appeal followed on March 9, 2023.
 II. Standard of Review
    We will review the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment de novo. Frudden v. Pilling, 877 F.3d
821, 828 (9th Cir. 2017). Agency decisions that allegedly
violate NEPA are reviewed under the Administrative
Procedure Act. Am. Wild Horse Campaign v. Bernhardt,
963 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2020). Therefore, we will
only set those decisions aside if they are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We are also
asked to determine whether the plaintiff exhausted its
administrative remedies and will also review this question
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS              11

de novo. Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955,
961 (9th Cir. 2006).
 III. Discussion
   1. The Service’s Consideration of Alternatives
    Earth Island argues that it presented the Service with
three viable alternatives, but the Service failed to either
analyze these alternatives or explain why these alternatives
did not warrant analysis. This failure, Earth Island alleges,
violated NEPA.
    Earth Island’s argument stems from its objections to the
2017 EA, in which it criticized the Service for failing to
“fully analyze a reasonable range of action alternatives . . .
that could potentially meet the project’s main goals, while
mitigating impacts to Sensitive Species—such as prescribed
fire, wildland fire use, and/or precommercial thinning of
trees under 8 inches in diameter.” Earth Island now claims
that the Service was obligated to either evaluate these
alternatives in its 2018 EA or explain why it did not.
       a. Waiver
    The Service argues that since Earth Island did not raise
any alternatives during the 2016 EA’s public comment
period, it did not exhaust its argument regarding the
Service’s failure to analyze those alternatives. Earth Island
concedes that it “did not make an explicit request that
specific alternatives be considered” in its comments, but
claims that since its comments highlighted “the
ineffectiveness of [tree] thinning and the impacts of large
tree removal . . . the Service was then put on notice to either
incorporate [its feedback] into additional alternatives or
explain why such information should not have been
considered in additional alternatives.” Earth Island further
12                 EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

argues that it complied with the Service’s regulations by
raising general issues in its comments, then later raising
specific legal claims in its objections.
    Agencies bear the primary responsibility of complying
with NEPA. Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S.
752, 765 (2004). Still, a party challenging an agency’s
compliance with NEPA has its own responsibilities: it must
“structure [its] participation so that it . . . alerts the agency to
the [party’s] position and contentions” so that the agency
may give the issue meaningful consideration. Vt. Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 553 (1978).
    Crucially, in order to object to an agency’s failure to
address alternatives, a party must have submitted comments
identifying, or otherwise urging, alternative(s) beyond those
evaluated in the EA. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764-65. 2 If
the party fails to identify alternatives in its comments, it

2
  Earth Island denies that Public Citizen’s requirement that issues be
exhausted during the comment period applies here. 541 U.S. at 764. It
instead proposes that because the Service offers both a comment period
and an objection process, while the Department of Transportation in
Public Citizen offered only a comment period, plaintiffs may exhaust
issues entirely during the objection period without raising those issues in
the comment period. Id. But Earth Island puts aside the Service’s
regulations which require that “[i]ssues raised in objections must be
based on previously submitted specific written comments regarding the
proposed project[.]” 36 C.F.R. § 218.8(c); Project-Level Predecisional
Administrative Review Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 18481, 18483 (Mar. 27,
2013) (“Both the objection eligibility requirement and the constraint on
issues raised in objection are included in the proposed and final rule to
encourage early and active involvement by the public in project planning
and analysis . . . The earlier relevant concerns and information are
brought to the attention of the responsible official, the more effective
consideration can be ensured.”).
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                13

“forfeit[s] any objection to the EA on the ground that it failed
adequately to discuss potential alternatives to the proposed
action.” Id.; see also Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians
of Colusa Indian Cmty. v. Zinke, 889 F.3d 584, 604-05 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“During the notice and comment period, Colusa
did not tell the BIA to consider the alternatives it now
proposes. Having failed to do so, Colusa has waived any
argument that the failure to consider those alternatives
represented a violation of NEPA.”).
     Earth Island admits that it did not identify alternatives in
its comments to the 2016 EA, but claims this omission is not
fatal to its argument. Instead, it contends that, per
‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition v. Rumsfeld, a party can fail to
participate in a comment period without waiving its right to
challenge the agency’s failure to consider certain
alternatives.       464 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2006).             In
‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition, we held that where an agency has
independent knowledge of an issue, “there is no need for a
commentator to point them out specifically in order to
preserve its ability to challenge a proposed action.” Id. at
1093 (quoting Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 765). The record
in ‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition was “replete with evidence”—
such as internal comments, emails, and other
communications—“that the [agency] recognized the specific
shortfall . . . raised by Plaintiffs[.]” Id. at 1092.
    Earth Island cites no evidence to show that the Service
had independent knowledge or recognition of a need to
analyze additional alternatives. Rather, Earth Island cites its
own comments to the 2016 EA “regarding the risks of
removing medium and large trees and the ineffectiveness of
commercial thinning[.]” A third party’s comments do not
constitute the type of internal knowledge we contemplated
in ‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition. Nor do third-party complaints
14              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

about a planned agency action necessarily require the agency
to incorporate or discuss additional alternatives. Such an
interpretation of ‘Ilio‘ulaokalani Coalition would render
meaningless Public Citizen’s requirement that parties
identify alternatives in their comments.
    Earth Island alternatively argues that it complied with the
Service’s objection process by offering general criticisms in
its 2016 EA comments, and then explicitly raising viable
alternatives in its 2017 EA objections. The Service’s
objection process requires that “[i]ssues raised in objections
must be based on previously submitted specific written
comments regarding the proposed project[.]” 36 C.F.R.
§ 218.8(c). The burden is on the objector to demonstrate
the connection between issues it raises in its objections and
its previously submitted written comments. 36 C.F.R.
§ 218.8(c).
    As above, the Service was not put on notice to consider
Earth Island’s suggested alternatives because Earth Island’s
suggested alternatives were not “based on previously
submitted. . . written comments[.]” 36 C.F.R. § 218.8(c).
To contend that its 2016 comments “highlight[ed] the need
to consider an action alternative [of] not logging any large
trees” and therefore put the Service on notice, Earth Island
cites one of its comments where it disputed the effectiveness
of forest thinning and claimed “the only common
denominator that tends to substantially reduce fire intensity
and spread is fire itself, and only if it has occurred relatively
recently . . . while thinning alone can tend to increase fire
intensity[.]” It noted that “thinning is largely irrelevant, and
only fire tends to affect future fire behavior—and even then
only for a short period of time . . . . Therefore, there were
always many areas in which fires were largely unaffected by
previous fire, historically.” This comment criticizes both
                  EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                      15

tree thinning and fire as futile; it does not highlight “the need
to consider an action alternative [of] not logging any large
trees,” and certainly does not urge the consideration of fire—
whether prescribed or wildland—as an alternative. In
context, this comment makes sense: In these 2016 EA
comments, Earth Island was asking the Service to withdraw
the project entirely—not to consider additional alternatives.
The Service did not understand this comment as a request
that it consider alternatives, either. In its response to the
comment, the Service explained that the project would use
“a suite of treatments” beyond thinning, which would
encourage natural non-catastrophic fires or allow for the use
of prescribed fires. 3 Nowhere does Earth Island point to a
“specific written comment[]” urging the Service to consider
additional alternatives, because one does not exist.
Therefore, Earth Island cannot satisfy 36 C.F.R. § 218.8(c).
    Between Earth Island’s failure to suggest alternatives in
its 2016 comments and its failure to connect its 2017
objections to a specific comment referencing alternatives,
Earth Island’s argument that the Forest should have been
“put on notice” to consider alternatives is unconvincing.
Because Earth Island failed to raise its proposed alternatives
during the comment period, it failed to exhaust its argument,
and we need not reach the merits of the suggested
alternatives.

3
 Earth Island also cites Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck for the
contention that a party can exhaust its administrative remedies for a
specific issue by asserting its concerns “generally,” so as to put the
agency on notice. 304 F.3d 886, 889-900 (9th Cir. 2002). But as the
Service points out, Native Ecosystems Council concerns whether a party
exhausted its complaint about an alleged violation of the National Forest
Management Act, as a whole—not specific violations of NEPA. See id.
16              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

       b. Reasonableness of Alternatives
    Even if we were to reach Earth Island’s alternatives,
however, they would fail as unreasonable. NEPA requires
federal agencies to “study, develop, and describe appropriate
[project] alternatives” in an EA. W. Watersheds Project v.
Abbey, 719 F.3d 1035, 1050 (9th Cir. 2013). The agency
must at least consider a “preferred” alternative and a “no
action” alternative, and “give full and meaningful
consideration to all reasonable alternatives.” Id. (emphasis
added); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(d), (e). We have repeatedly held
that an agency satisfies NEPA when it considers only two
alternatives—action and no action. N. Idaho Cmty. Action
Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th
Cir. 2008).
    An alternative is reasonable if it 1) advances the project’s
purpose and need, and 2) is “significantly distinguishable
from alternatives actually considered, or which have
substantially similar consequences.” Te-Moak Tribe of W.
Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 602
(9th Cir. 2010). In order to determine whether an alternative
advances the project’s purpose and need, an agency must
consider the nature and scope of the proposed action. Idaho
Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1520 (9th
Cir. 1992).
    The “significantly distinguishable” requirement is more
complicated, as it is defined in the negative. NEPA does not
require an agency to consider “every conceivable
permutation” of its proposed alternatives. Westlands Water
Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 376 F.3d 853, 872 (9th Cir.
2004); see City of Los Angeles v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 63
F.4th 835, 847 (9th Cir. 2023) (finding that, where an agency
considered a variation of a party’s suggested alternative,
                   EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                       17

“NEPA did not require [the agency] to consider further
permutations of that alternative”); see also Vt. Yankee, 435
U.S. at 551 (“Common sense also teaches us that the
‘detailed statement of alternatives’ cannot be found wanting
simply because the agency failed to include every alternative
device and thought conceivable by the mind of man.”). Nor
does NEPA require agencies to evaluate “mid-range”
alternatives between action and no action. Mont. Wilderness
Ass’n v. Connell, 725 F.3d 988, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2013)
(finding that such alternatives are not “necessary to foster
informed decisionmaking and public participation”).
    Earth Island’s suggested alternatives are not
“significantly distinguishable” from the action alternative
the Service considered and are therefore unreasonable.
Westlands Water Dist., 376 F.3d at 869.
    Earth Island claims the Service should have “fully
analyzed or considered” additional alternatives “such as
prescribed fire, wildland fire use, and/or precommercial
thinning of trees under 8 inches in diameter[.]” 4 Earth Island
aptly describes these alternatives as “merely relying on a
subset of the actions included in the Service’s preferred
[action] alternative.” In fact, the Service’s 2018 EA explains
that, in its preferred action alternative, “the vast majority of
trees to be thinned would be less than 10 inches in diameter
at breast height (dbh)[,]” and “[s]maller trees would be
preferentially cut, with trees over 24 inches dbh only

4
  It is unclear whether Earth Island intended to present precommercial
thinning, prescribed fire, and wildland fire as three separate alternatives
to be used exclusively, or one alternative to be used in tandem. Earth
Island’s use of the phrase “such as” suggests that these alternatives are
part of a longer, more extensive list. Earth Island did not provide further
explanation or suggested alternatives.
18              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

removed when basal area goals could not be met by cutting
smaller trees.” The Service’s preferred alternative also
includes the use of prescribed fire.
    In arguing that its proposed alternatives would not result
in “substantially similar consequences,” Earth Island only
claims that its alternatives “would preserve the remaining
large trees.”     Here, Earth Island cites a goal—the
preservation of the remaining large trees—without
explaining how its suggested alternatives could reach that
goal, but the Service’s action alternative could not. It does
not describe how its suggestion of prescribed and wildland
fires could ensure large tree preservation when the Service’s
used of prescribed fire could not, or why thinning trees under
eight inches dbh but preserving those between eight and ten
dbh could ensure large tree preservation. In short, Earth
Island fails to meaningfully distinguish between the
consequences of its proposed alternatives and the Service’s.
    Earth Island claims that the Service also violated NEPA
by failing to meaningfully analyze or explain why its
proposed alternatives did not warrant meaningful analysis.
Earth Island cites Environmental Defense Center v. Bureau
of Ocean Energy Management for the contention that an
agency must give a party’s proposed alternatives meaningful
analysis or explain why the alternatives did not warrant
meaningful analysis. 36 F.4th 850 (9th Cir. 2022). Earth
Island does not define the limits of this analysis/explanation
requirement—but Environmental Defense Center does.
There, we found that the agencies “did not meet their
obligation under NEPA to give full and meaningful
consideration to all reasonable alternatives.” Id. at 877
(quotations omitted) (emphasis added). As discussed above,
Earth Island’s proposed alternatives—even if properly
                  EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                   19

exhausted—were not “reasonable,” and therefore did not
require analysis. 5
    Finally, we must consider the Service’s determination
that the Three Creeks Project would not have a significant
environmental effect. We held in Earth Island Institute v.
U.S. Forest Service that “it makes little sense to fault an
agency for failing to consider more environmentally sound
alternatives to a project which it has properly determined,
through its decision not to file an impact statement, will have
no significant environmental effects anyway.” 697 F.3d
1010, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sierra Club v. Espy, 38
F.3d 792, 803 (5th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, we cannot fault
the Service for considering only two alternatives for the
Three Creeks Project.
    Since Earth Island failed to suggest alternatives during
the comment period and failed to raise reasonable
alternatives during the objection period, and since the
Service concluded that the Three Creeks Project would not
have a significant environmental effect, Earth Island’s
argument fails.
    2. The 2018 EA
    Earth Island contends that the Service was required to
circulate its 2018 EA for public comment because the EA
contained substantial changes to the Three Creeks Project’s
desired forest conditions, the methods proposed to achieve

5
  Earth Island cites Environmental Protection Information Center
(EPIC) v. U.S. Forest Service to contend that the Service must analyze
an alternative that only uses precommercial thinning, and that the
Service’s dismissal of such an alternative with only a “cursory”
explanation violates NEPA. 234 Fed. Appx. 440, 443 (9th Cir. 2007).
But EPIC is an unpublished decision and is not precedential.
20              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

these conditions, and the project’s expected effect on the
Pacific marten and black-backed woodpecker.
    Both the Service and NEPA impose standards on public
participation in the EA preparation process. NEPA’s
standards are “amorphous.” Cal. Trout v. F.E.R.C., 572 F.3d
1003, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009). It requires agencies to offer a
“not substantial” level of public participation. Id. We held
that NEPA does not require agencies to circulate a draft EA
in every case. Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Res.
Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d 938, 952 (9th
Cir. 2008). But it does require agencies to “provide the
public with sufficient environmental information,
considered in the totality of circumstances, to permit
members of the public to weigh in with their views and thus
inform the agency decision-making process.” Id. at 953.
    The Service’s regulations, on the other hand, require it to
offer the opportunity for public comment after it prepares an
EA “based on consideration of new information or changed
circumstances[.]” 36 C.F.R. §§ 218.22(a), (d). We have not
previously interpreted this regulation, but our discussion of
public comments in California v. Block informs our analysis
here. 690 F.2d 753, 771 (9th Cir. 1982).
    Public comments are intended to help agencies assess an
action’s environmental impact, so the agency can then
modify its next draft or final EA to reflect that public input.
Id. If an agency had to file a supplemental draft EA and
repeat the public comment process every time it makes any
such modifications, the NEPA review process would never
end, and agencies would balk at modifying their EAs. Id.
An agency is therefore not required to repeat the public
comment process when the EA is only a slightly modified
version of a draft EA. Id. at 771 (holding that repeating the
               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS             21

public comment process is unnecessary “when only minor
modifications are made” to a draft EA). Conversely, an
agency is required to repeat the public comment process
when the EA includes substantial changes relevant to
environmental concerns. See Mid States Coal. for Progress
v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 548 (8th Cir. 2003).
    Earth Island dismisses the above analysis as an
“artificially elevated threshold” and instead relies almost
exclusively on the Service’s regulation requiring public
comment every time the Service publishes an EA “based on
consideration of new information or changed
circumstances[.]” 36 C.F.R. §§ 218.22(a), (d). But forcing
the Service to circulate a draft EA every time new
information or circumstances emerge, without measure of
degree or further analysis, would force the Service into the
Sisyphean loop we cautioned against in Block: circulating
draft EA after draft EA when presented with even a scintilla
of new information or circumstances. 690 F.3d at 771; see
also Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
113 F.3d 1505, 1510 (9th Cir. 1997) (cautioning against
tasking agencies “with a [S]isyphean feat of forever starting
over in their environmental evaluations, regardless of the
usefulness of such efforts”). Therefore, the Service’s
regulation on public participation must be read together with
our NEPA guidance: the Service is required to circulate a
draft EA based on consideration of new information or
changed circumstances, unless the EA has undergone only
slight modifications from its last circulated version.
    Earth Island’s claim fails because the 2018 EA was a
slightly modified version of the 2017 EA and was not based
on new information or changed circumstances, and therefore
did not require a public comment period. 36 C.F.R.
22              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

§§ 218.22(d). The 2018 EA contained two changes at issue
here.
    First, Earth Island argues that the change to desired forest
conditions and methods constitutes “new information or
changed circumstances” requiring an opportunity for public
comment. 36 C.F.R. § 218.22(d). In the 2017 EA, the
project area’s desired mean basal area was 147 square feet
per acre, the desired number of large trees was 22 per acre,
and the “vast majority” of trees to be cut were between 10-
20 inches in diameter. In the 2018 EA, the desired mean
basal area was 70-152 square feet per acre, the desired
number of large trees was 14 per acre, and the “vast
majority” of trees to be cut were below 10 inches in diameter
if nonmerchantable and 10-20 inches in diameter if
merchantable. Both the 2017 and 2018 EAs make clear that
trees between 24-30 inches dbh would be removed only if
the basal goals could not be otherwise achieved. The 2018
EA also, for the first time, included the desired number of
trees per acre (37-29) and the desired mean tree dbh (22
inches).
    Earth Island claims these modifications represent a
substantial change in course from the 2017 EA. But as the
Forest Service points out, these changes were minor
modifications that were not “based on consideration of new
information or changed circumstances” and did not “differ[]
sufficiently from the alternatives canvassed in the draft [EA]
to warrant the circulation for public comment[.]” 36 C.F.R.
§§ 218.22(d); Block, 690 F.2d at 772. The overarching plan
to thin the project area to an average basal area of 70 to 140
square feet per acre remained the same between the 2017 and
2018 EAs. The desired mean basal area changed from a
singular number (147 square feet per acre) to a range that
encompassed that number (70-152 square feet per acre). Per
               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS             23

Earth Island’s request, the Service clarified the size of
merchantable versus nonmerchantable trees to be cut, but the
sizes remained within the range discussed in the 2017 EA.
Again, per Earth Island’s request, the Service included the
desired trees per acre and desired mean tree diameter as
clarifications. As perhaps the greatest change between the
2017 and 2018 EA, the Service reduced the desired number
of large trees per acre by eight—but again, despite this
change, the overarching desired conditions remained
consistent. These minor changes and clarifications follow
Block’s encouragement of minor modifications in response
to public input, and do not require further public comment.
    Second, Earth Island claims that the discussion of the
project’s impact on the black-backed woodpecker and
Pacific marten constituted new information requiring public
comment. 36 C.F.R. § 218.22(d). In its 2017 EA, the
Service discussed the potential impact of forest treatment on
the black-backed woodpecker and concluded that “[h]abitat
for black-backed woodpecker may be enhanced through
project implementation.” The Service also discussed
collecting data on the black-backed woodpecker as a
Management Indicator Species in its response to public
comments on the 2017 EA. The 2018 EA included a
somewhat more detailed discussion of the black-backed
woodpecker’s preferred habitat, but again concluded that its
habitat “may be enhanced through project implementation.”
The Service’s conclusions on Pacific martens remained
similarly consistent. Its 2017 EA concluded that the project
would have “little direct or indirect” impact on martens
generally across the project area, no impact within the
marten units, and could possibly even improve some habitat
components. Its 2018 EA concluded the same, but also cited
a study Earth Island discussed in its 2017 objections. Since
24                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

the 2018 EA maintained the same conclusions as the 2017
EA regarding the black-backed woodpecker and Pacific
marten and otherwise only contained minor modifications,
the Service was not required to offer another public
comment period.
     3. The 2020 Bark-Beetle Outbreak
   Earth Island argues that, following the 2020 bark-beetle
outbreak, the Service was obligated to supplement its NEPA
analysis for the Three Creeks Project.
    NEPA requires agencies to prepare a supplemental EA
when “[t]here are significant new circumstances or
information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing
on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.9(d)(1)(ii) (2020).      “New circumstances” are
circumstances which significantly change the underlying
project, and “new information” is intervening information
not already considered. Prot. Our Cmtys. Found. v.
LaCounte, 939 F.3d 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that
information is not new when it merely confirms concerns
that an EIS articulated and considered). Agencies need not
supplement their NEPA analyses every time new
information or circumstances emerge. Rather, the new
information or circumstances must show that the action will
affect the quality of the human environment in a significant
manner or to an extent not already considered. Marsh v. Or.
Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989). 6 NEPA and its

6
  Earth Island argues that Marsh should not apply, because it articulates
the standard for supplementing an EIS rather than an EA. 490 U.S. 360.
But the standard for supplementing an EA or EIS is the same. See Price
Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc., 113 F.3d at 1509 (holding that the
standard for supplementing an EA is the same as for an EIS); see also
                  EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                    25

implementing regulations do not explain how agencies are
to evaluate the significance of new information or
circumstances, but we condoned the use of Supplemental
Information Reports (SIRs) for this purpose. Idaho Sporting
Cong. Inc. v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 2000).
Supplementation is not required when an agency takes a
“hard look” at the new circumstances or information in an
SIR and determines that the impact will not be significantly
different from those it already considered. Idaho Wool
Growers Ass’n v. Vilsack, 816 F.3d 1095, 1107 (9th Cir.
2016). An agency’s decision not to supplement its NEPA
analysis is set aside if it was arbitrary and capricious. Marsh,
490 U.S. at 376.
    Earth Island contends that the 2020 bark-beetle outbreak
triggered the Service’s duty to supplement its NEPA
analysis, and the Service’s failure to supplement its analysis
was arbitrary and capricious, for two reasons: first, the
Service’s removal of two of the three marten units from the
Three Creeks Project constituted a significant new
circumstance; second, the Service altered the Three Creeks
Project to an extent its 2018 EA did not consider, which also
constituted a significant new circumstance. The Service
denies that these decisions were “significant new
circumstances” that would demand supplemental NEPA
analysis.
    The 2020 bark-beetle outbreak killed 220 acres of trees
within the Three Creeks Project area. In response to the
outbreak, the Service published an SIR explaining that the
outbreak and resulting tree death “progressed to a level such
that the Three Creeks treatment prescription [was] no longer

Tri-Valley CARES v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113, 1130 (9th Cir.
2012) (applying Marsh’s EIS supplementation standard to an EA).
26               EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

adequate to stop or slow the spread of the beetle kill” in the
220 affected acres. The Service elected to remove the
entirety of the two affected units—a total of 559 acres—
from the project.
    These units were two of the Three Creeks Project’s three
“marten units”: acres of generally high-quality marten
habitat within the project area where marten use was well-
documented. But Inyo National Forest is home to many
acres of marten habitat beyond the Three Creeks Project
area. As the 2020 SIR explained, the forest hosts 205,000
total acres of moderate-and high-quality marten habitat,
1.8% of which was lost to the bark-beetle outbreak. The SIR
concluded that the area affected by the outbreak is “so small
compared to the overall available habitat that it [would] not
affect overall marten success in its range on the Inyo
National Forest, and Project treatments will not further
reduce this overall habitat availability.”
    Earth Island contends that the lost marten habitat
constituted a “significant new circumstance” requiring
supplemental NEPA analysis because ninety percent of the
Three Creeks Project’s marten habitat was removed from its
footprint, martens “rarely use Project areas outside of the
three identified units,” and it is not “biologically realistic that
the resident martens will now all occupy the [Project’s]
remaining [ten] percent of marten habitat.” Earth Island’s
argument presumes that martens are limited to the Three
Creeks Project area, and that the bark-beetle outbreak in the
project’s marten units would therefore force the martens
from the marten units into the larger, less hospitable project
area. Earth Island has offered no support for this argument,
which the record belies. As the 2020 SIR states, Inyo
National Forest is home to 205,000 total acres of marten
habitat. The vast majority of this habitat lies outside the
                  EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                     27

Three Creeks Project area, in the martens’ preferred red fir
and mixed conifer habitats. Only 1.8% of the total marten
habitat—a “minor loss”—was affected by the beetle
outbreak. Since, as the 2018 EA states, martens seldom use
the Three Creeks Project area, it stands to reason that the
martens would occupy the larger, preferred marten habitat
rather than the smaller, less-preferred project area. Because
the bark-beetle outbreak and changes to the Three Creeks
Project footprint did not alter the marten habitat outside the
project area, neither constituted a “significant new
circumstance.” 7
    Earth Island cites League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue
Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton for the
proposition that an agency must supplement its NEPA
analysis when it eliminates provisions intended to lessen a
project’s environmental impact. 752 F.3d 755 (9th Cir.
2014). In Connaughton, the Service adopted a final EIS for
a logging project. Id. at 760. In its EIS, the Service

7
  Earth Island also argues that a supplemental EA is required if new
significant information has “uncertain” potential impacts. This argument
was made for the first time in Earth Island’s reply. Earth Island claims
that since it is “uncertain” where the martens will move following the
bark-beetle outbreak, the Service must conduct supplemental NEPA
analysis beyond the 2020 SIR. It quotes Price Road—a case concerning
the redesign of a highway interchange—for this contention. 113 F.3d at
1508-09 (“[I]f the environmental impacts resulting from the design
change area significant or uncertain, as compared with the original
design’s impacts, a supplemental EA is required.”). This quote must be
interpreted in the specific context of the redesign plan contemplated in
Price Road. Otherwise, requiring an agency to produce a supplemental
EA or EIS every time any uncertainty arises (regardless of the
significance of the uncertainty) would conflict with our established
precedent, and certainly burden agencies to supplement their NEPA
analyses far beyond the current standard.
28             EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

acknowledged the project would likely harm elk and
proposed a travel management plan to improve elk security.
Id. But following the EIS adoption, the Service withdrew
the travel management plan. Id. at 760-61. We found that
the Service was required to supplement its EIS following the
plan’s withdrawal because the logging project relied on the
plan to mitigate its harm to elk. Id. at 761. Here, Earth
Island analogizes the elk with the marten, and the withdrawn
travel management plan with the removed marten units. But
the two cases are not analogous. In Connaughton, the
Service acknowledged within its EIS that the logging project
would harm elk and relied on a travel management plan to
address that harm. But in the Three Creeks Project, the
Service determined that “[t]here would be no long-term
change in marten habitat sustainability.” In other words,
unlike the traffic management plan in Connaughton, the
Three Creek Project’s marten units were not intended to
mitigate the project’s “little direct or indirect impact on
martens,” but were rather intended to retain already-existing
marten habitat in the units. Therefore, the removal of two
marten units from the Three Creeks Project did not
significantly change the project’s already minimal effect on
the marten.
    Earth Island also alleges that removal of two marten
units caused the Three Creeks Project to fall “qualitatively
[outside] the spectrum of alternatives that were discussed”
in the 2018 EA, and therefore requires supplemental NEPA
analysis. Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
668 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011). Essentially, Earth
Island wants the public to have the opportunity to comment
on the 2018 EA for the Three Creeks Project, less two marten
units.
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS               29

    Curiously, Earth Island cites Russell Country Sportsmen
to support its claim. In Russell Country Sportsmen, we
adopted the Council for Environmental Quality’s guidance
on changes to a proposed action that require supplemental
NEPA analysis. Id. at 1045. We held that supplementation
is not required when 1) the modified project is a minor
variation of one of the alternatives discussed in the draft
EA/EIS, and 2) the modified project is qualitatively within
the spectrum of alternatives that were discussed in the draft
EA/EIS. Id. As discussed above, the marten units as
described in the 2018 EA were not intended to mitigate the
Three Creeks Project’s harm to martens, because the project
did not harm martens. Therefore, the removal of two marten
units was not a “substantial change[]” relevant to
environmental concerns, but a “minor variation[]” that
geographically shrunk the project’s footprint and remained
“qualitatively within the spectrum of alternatives that were
discussed” in the 2018 EA. Id. at 1047. As in Russell
Country Sportsmen, the Service here had “very little reason
to believe the modified [Three Creeks Project] plan [would]
have environmental impacts that the agency had not already
considered.” Id. at 1049.
   4. The Inyo Craters Project
   Finally, Earth Island alleges that the Service was
required to supplement the 2018 EA in response to the Inyo
Craters Project. Earth Island raised this claim for the first
time in its summary judgment motion. Since this claim was
not properly presented to the district court, we will not
consider it.
    In its complaint, a plaintiff must give the defendant fair
notice of its claims and the grounds upon which its claims
rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc.,
30              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

457 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2006). Rule 8’s pleading
standard is “liberal,” but still requires that the defendant
receives notice as to what is at issue in the case. Id.; Am.
Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of Oregon, 690
F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1982). “[S]ummary judgment is not
a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate
pleadings.” Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Southwall Techs., Inc.,
435 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2006).
    Earth Island filed its amended complaint on June 11,
2021. It raised the Service’s alleged failure to undertake
supplemental NEPA analysis in response to the bark-beetle
outbreak and subsequent removal of the marten units from
the Three Creeks Project, as discussed above. Three days
after Earth Island filed its amended complaint, on June 14,
2021, the Service announced the Inyo Craters Project. This
new project’s purpose was to remove dead or dying trees—
victims of the bark-beetle outbreak—from hazardous
positions next to roads and trails. The Inyo Craters Project
shared some borders, but not land, with the Three Creeks
Project.
    Since Earth Island did not again amend its complaint
following the project announcement, Earth Island’s
complaint did not mention the Inyo Craters Project, did not
notify the Service that the Inyo Craters Project would be at
issue in the litigation, and did not tell the Service the grounds
of its Inyo Craters Project claim. Instead, Earth Island’s
failure-to-supplement claim was limited to the effect of the
2020 bark-beetle outbreak on the Three Creeks Project’s
marten units. The claim did not mention possible future
projects, and certainly not future projects that did not share
land or purpose with the Three Creeks Project. Earth Island
now claims that since the Inyo Craters Project was “within
                EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS                31

the scope” of its failure-to-supplement claim, the project’s
absence from its amended complaint is “immaterial.”
    Earth Island cites Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck,
222 F.3d 552, 558-59 (9th Cir. 2000), to contend that we
have “upheld the ability of environmental plaintiffs to
support their claim alleging the Forest Service’s failure to
prepare supplemental NEPA analysis by raising new facts
not alleged in their complaint.” Our holding in that case,
however, was not quite so broad.
     Friends of the Clearwater concerned the Service’s
failure to supplement a ten-year-old EIS regarding a timber
sale. Id. at 555-56. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
the Service’s EIS had become outdated after ten years of
intervening information. Id. at 555. It focused on multiple
species of animals present in the timber area that had been
listed under the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 555. In its
motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff maintained the
bones of its claim but shifted its factual focus to two sources
of “significant new information”: first, that the Service
designated seven species present in the timber sale area as
“sensitive species,” and second, that the Service published a
document acknowledging the information on which its
timber sale EIS relied was inaccurate and required a new
analysis and standards. Id. at 555-56. We held that the
plaintiff’s failure to specify these supporting facts until
summary judgment did not excuse the Service’s failure to
evaluate its EIS over the preceding ten years. Id. at 558-59.
We did not hold that this plaintiff—or any other
environmental law plaintiff—is absolved of its duty to
include the factual basis of its claims in its complaint or is
free to raise new claims in its motion for summary judgment.
32              EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS

     Earth Island is correct that the Service, like any agency,
has a duty to gather and evaluate new information relevant
to the environmental impact of its actions, and must be aware
of information it generates itself. Id. at 559. But Earth Island
conflates knowledge of facts with knowledge of claims. The
Service was aware of its announcement of the Inyo Craters
Project. But the Service was not aware that the Inyo Craters
Project would be at issue in this litigation because Earth
Island failed to allege such a claim in its amended complaint.
    To hold the Service responsible for predicting an
unalleged claim would be to expect the Service—or any
agency—to act as mind readers and foresee all possible
unalleged claims that may fall under a complaint. Since
Earth Island did not plead this claim in its complaint, it was
not properly before the district court, and fails.
 IV. Conclusion
   For these reasons, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the Service is AFFIRMED.