Court Opinion

ID: 9410534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 18:00:42.42146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.378181
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50457        Document: 00516829053             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/21/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                     July 21, 2023
                                       No. 22-50457
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                      Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Ivan Mendoza,

                                                                 Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:21-CR-1492

   Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Ivan Mendoza pled guilty to assaulting a federal officer, transporting
   aliens for profit, and aiding and abetting to transport aliens for profit.
   Mendoza was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for the assault charge
   (the statutory maximum for the assault offense charged) and 27 months’
   imprisonment for each of the two transporting offenses, all of which were to
   be served concurrently. Mendoza challenges multiple sentencing

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                        No. 22-50457

   adjustments as well as the district court’s decision not to group all of the
   charges together. We AFFIRM.
                                              I.
                                             A.
           Shortly after midnight on August 11, 2021, Mendoza was driving a
   Jeep with a female passenger in the front seat when he was stopped at an
   immigration checkpoint in El Paso, Texas. Mendoza answered immigration
   officers’ questions, including those posed to his companion. A United States
   Border Patrol agent asked the passenger to exit the vehicle and, upon her
   doing so, proceeded to ask her questions regarding her citizenship. Mendoza
   remained inside the parked car. Eventually, the passenger admitted to
   immigration officers that she was a Guatemalan citizen and lacked
   authorization to enter the United States. After instructing the passenger to
   enter the building, the agents approached the driver’s side of the Jeep. When
   agents attempted to open the driver’s side doors, Mendoza started his engine
   and began driving away. 1 Ignoring commands to stop moving, Mendoza fled,
   “dragging [an] agent for a few feet [and] causing him to fall to the ground.”
   Border Patrol agents followed Mendoza onto the highway “with their
   emergency equipment on. The chase continued for a few miles until [the]
   agents lost visual of the vehicle’s brake lights,” prompting them to “turn[]
   off their emergency equipment, terminate[] pursuit, and return[] to the
   checkpoint.”

           1
             The PSR notes that Mendoza first put the car in reverse and backed up in the
   direction of Border Patrol agents, though Mendoza challenged that. Video from the
   incident confirms Mendoza’s recitation. Ultimately, this factual dispute is immaterial to
   the challenges at issue.

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           Later that day, agents found Mendoza’s Jeep at a residence in El Paso
   and observed Mendoza driving the vehicle. When an agent attempted to
   arrest Mendoza, “Mendoza began swinging his arms free while yelling at the
   agents. After a brief struggle, agents handcuffed Mendoza and he was read
   and informed of his rights.”
           Following his arrest, Mendoza admitted that he had been paid to
   transport his travel companion through the checkpoint. Mendoza also
   admitted that he had “fled in the Jeep Cherokee, striking a [Border Patrol]
   agent.”
           Mendoza was charged with three separate offenses: (1) assaulting a
   federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1); (2) aiding and abetting the
   transportation of aliens for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
   1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II), (a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i); and (3) transporting an alien
   for profit in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), (a)(1)(B)(i). 2 Mendoza
   pled guilty without a plea agreement.
                                               B.
           The Probation Office’s Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)
   bifurcated the three counts into two groups: the assault offense group and the
   transporting offenses group. For the assault, the PSR calculated a base
   offense level of 10, added a three-level specific offense characteristic
   adjustment because the offense involved physical contact, and added two
   more levels as an obstruction of justice adjustment because Mendoza had
   recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to
   another while fleeing from a law-enforcement officer. 3 This resulted in an

           2
            Mendoza was initially charged with two counts of transporting an alien for profit,
   but ultimately pled guilty to one count of each offense.
           3
               U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.4, 3C1.2.

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   adjusted offense level of 15 for the assault offense group. The transporting
   offense group incurred a base level of 12, 4 with a two-level specific offense
   characteristic adjustment for intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial
   risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person, 5 but U.S.S.G.
   § 2L1.1(b)(6) dictates that the level must be raised to a floor of 18. Therefore,
   the PSR assessed an adjusted offense level of 18 for the transporting
   convictions.
          Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4, each group was assigned one unit, and
   because the greater of the two units was a level 18, that level was adopted.
   Two levels were added for the number of units assigned, 6 leaving a combined
   adjusted offense level of 20. Three levels were then taken off for Mendoza’s
   acceptance of responsibility and for his assistance to authorities in the
   investigation and prosecution. 7 Therefore, Mendoza’s total offense level was
   17. Given a total offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of II, the
   PSR assessed a Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment.
          Mendoza objected to the report for two reasons. First, Mendoza
   argued that the agent “created the risk on his own accord” by approaching
   the car and that the agent’s “irrational actions” should not be attributed to
   him in the form of specific-offense-characteristic adjustments. Second,
   Mendoza claimed that he was entitled to a mitigating role adjustment. The
   probation officer declined to amend the report.
          At sentencing, Mendoza renewed his objections. The Government
   disputed Mendoza’s first objection, arguing that Mendoza “had control of

          4
              U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(a)(3).
          5
              U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(6).
          6
              U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4.
          7
              U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

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   the situation,” that “[i]t was his intent to flee,” and that “all the Border
   Patrol agent did who was dragged by the vehicle is open the door and attempt
   to move towards the interior of the vehicle” without having any “warning of
   what was going to happen.” The Government also argued that Mendoza is
   “role neutral,” namely that he should not be entitled to a minor role
   adjustment.
           The district court overruled Mendoza’s objections with respect to the
   creation of substantial risk, though it granted the minor role adjustment.
   Accordingly, Mendoza’s final total offense level was 15. Mendoza’s
   Guidelines range was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment, and he was sentenced
   to 27 months.
           Mendoza now appeals two sentencing adjustments as well as the
   district court’s decision not to group the transporting counts with the assault
   count. While Mendoza raised objections below regarding the adjustments, he
   concedes that his objections below are distinct, namely “based on fact
   issues[,] and [he] therefore did not preserve the errors raised in this appeal,”
   which bring questions of law.
                                                II.
           “This Court reviews the district court’s ‘interpretation or application
   of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear
   error.’” 8 “The questions of whether and how to group a defendant’s
   offenses are legal questions, as they involve ‘a purely legal interpretation of
   Guidelines terminology and the application of that terminology to a particular

           8
              United States v. Sincleair, 16 F.4th 471, 474 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States
   v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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   set of facts.’” 9 It follows, then, that “[t]he decision whether to group
   offenses is a question of law we review de novo.” 10 “The standard of
   appellate review of a reckless endangerment finding is clear error, and the
   district court’s finding will be upheld if the finding is plausible in light of the
   record as a whole.” 11 However, if an objection was not sufficiently raised in
   the district court, we review for plain error. 12
           To establish plain error, a criminal defendant must demonstrate: (1)
   “an error that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned”; (2)
   that is “plain—that is to say, clear or obvious”; and (3) that “affected the
   defendant’s substantial rights.” 13 Upon making this threefold showing, an
   appellate court “should exercise its discretion to correct the forfeited error if
   the error ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
   judicial proceedings.’” 14 In other words, “granting relief under plain error
   review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” 15 Satisfying these
   requirements “is difficult.” 16

           9
             United States v. Patterson, 962 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States
   v. Ballard, 919 F.2d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 954 (1991)).
           10
             United States v. Tolbert, 306 F.3d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States
   v. Garcia-Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179, 190 (5th Cir. 2014) (“We review the district court’s
   grouping de novo.”); Patterson, 962 F.2d at 416.
           11
                United States v. Kelley, 40 F.4th 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2022).
           12
              See United States v. Hernandez, 690 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United
   States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 317 (5th Cir. 2013).
           13
                Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194 (2016).
           14
                Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)).
           15
                United States v. Seale, 600 F.3d 473, 488 (5th Cir. 2010).
           16
                Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).

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                                         III.
          As stated previously, Mendoza raises three separate challenges: (1)
   the application of a six-level upward adjustment to the transporting
   convictions for intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
   or serious bodily injury to another person; (2) the application of a two-level
   upward obstruction of justice adjustment to the assault conviction for
   reckless endangerment during flight from a law-enforcement officer; and (3)
   the refusal to group the assault and the transporting convictions pursuant to
   U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) and, in doing so, applying a two-level upward
   multicount adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4. For clarity, we address
   these issues in a different order—grouping offenses first, followed by
   scrutiny of the respective adjustments—and ultimately conclude that the
   district court may have erred in one respect, but it was in any event harmless.
                                         A.
          We start with whether Mendoza’s offenses should have been grouped.
   Section 3D1.2 of the Guidelines provides:
          All counts involving substantially the same harm shall be
          grouped together into a single Group. Counts involve
          substantially the same harm within the meaning of this rule:
                 (a) When counts involve the same victim and the same
                 act or transaction.
                 (b) When counts involve the same victim and two or
                 more acts or transactions connected by a common
                 criminal objective or constituting part of a common
                 scheme or plan.
                 (c) When one of the counts embodies conduct that is
                 treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other

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                                          No. 22-50457

                     adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the
                     counts. 17
   Broadly speaking, this Section “prevents ‘double counting’ of offense
   behavior” where “the offenses are closely related.” 18
          Returning to the language of the Guidelines, specifically, § 3D1.2(c),
   whether the counts should have been grouped depends on whether the
   assault count “embodies” the conduct underpinning the “substantial risk of
   death or serious bodily injury” adjustment, under § 2L1.1(b)(6), to the
   transporting offenses. The Government argues that this requirement is not
   met because the § 2L1.1(b)(6) adjustment to the transporting offenses is
   justified by Mendoza’s conduct subsequent to his physical assault upon the
   Border Patrol agent, that is, his hurried departure from the inspection station
   followed by the high-speed highway chase. Mendoza rebuts that that cannot
   be the case because “there is no evidence in the record that [he] engaged in
   a high-speed chase on the highway.” We disagree.
          The PSR states that “[Border Patrol] agents followed Mendoza on
   Highway 62/180 with their emergency equipment on” after he “drove off at
   a high rate of speed,” describing the pursuit as a “chase.” Moreover, the
   PSR states that despite “chas[ing]” Mendoza, the officers “lost visual of the
   vehicle[].” Though these particular facts—adopted by the district court in
   full without objection from Mendoza—do not paint the most vivid picture
   possible, we know enough: a car “chase” required law enforcement’s use of
   emergency lights at night on a major highway, resulting in successful evasion
   of law enforcement. This picture gives rise to the pursuit alone as a plausible
   basis for the § 2L1.1(b)(6) adjustment to the transportation offenses that is

          17
               U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(a)–(c).
          18
               Id. § 3D1.2 cmt. n.5.

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   independent of the assault conduct: Mendoza posed a threat to drivers and
   others on or near the highway.
          Mendoza’s contention that the Government makes this argument
   “for the first time on appeal” is also incorrect. True, when discussing this
   adjustment at sentencing, the Government primarily focused on the
   argument that Mendoza made at that time, i.e., that the Border Patrol agent
   created the risk, rebutting this objection by noting that Mendoza “ha[d]
   control of that vehicle at that point” and was “the one that makes the
   decision as to what to do, whether to comply or not, whether to end the
   situation peacefully or flee the checkpoint.” But the Government also made
   the secondary argument regarding the chase on which it now rests: “The
   PSR indicates also a high speed flight to the extent that the Border Patrol
   agents activated the emergency lights.” At sentencing, the district court
   rejected Mendoza’s objections, saying: “Based on the objections, the [c]ourt
   will overrule [them]. The [c]ourt will find it is correctly scored with risk of
   serious bodily injury and physical contact, and I will overrule the objections.”
   In sum, the district court’s “substantial risk of death” adjustment is plausibly
   supported by the chase itself. It follows that, as the assault offense conduct
   does not “embod[y” the highway chase, the district court did not
   impermissibly “double count[]” the misconduct. 19 Thus, the district court
   did not plainly err in deciding against grouping the transporting and assault
   offenses together.
                                                B.
          We turn now to whether the district court erred in applying an
   adjustment to the transporting offenses based on the high-speed chase for
   recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to

          19
               Id. § 3D1.2; id. cmt. n.5.

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   another. Section 2L1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides a two-level
   upward adjustment for an offense involving the transport of an alien “if the
   offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death
   or serious bodily injury to another person.” 20 Further, the Guidelines dictate
   that if the resulting offense level is less than 18, it is increased to level 18. 21
   Further, the commentary explains that:
          Reckless conduct to which the adjustment from subsection
          (b)(6) applies includes a wide variety of conduct (e.g.,
          transporting persons in the trunk or engine compartment of a
          motor vehicle; carrying substantially more passengers than the
          rated capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel; harboring persons
          in a crowded, dangerous, or inhumane condition; or guiding
          persons through, or abandoning persons in, a dangerous or
          remote geographic area without adequate food, water, clothing,
          or protection from the elements). 22
   In short, “[t]his is a fact-specific inquiry that must uncover ‘a substantial risk
   of death or serious bodily injury.’” 23
          Mendoza in essence argues that he fled after he was pulled over and
   the passenger had been removed from the Jeep, meaning that Mendoza “was
   no longer engaged in the criminal offense to which the [G]uideline []
   applied.” Because the scope of the offense conduct extends only to “the
   commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in
   the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that

          20
               Id. § 2L1.1(b)(6).
          21
               See id.
          22
               Id. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.3.
          23
             United States v. Ramirez, 37 F.4th 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)
   (citing United States v. Mata, 624 F.3d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); and then
   quoting United States v. Zuniga-Amezquita, 468 F.3d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 2006)).

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   offense,” Mendoza contends, the adjustment is inapplicable. Further,
   Mendoza asserts that this adjustment is only appropriate when “applied to
   situations where the smuggling itself creates the risk” and that there exists
   no analogous precedent for applying this adjustment to similar conduct.
   Instead, he argues the risk at issue was better addressed by a different
   adjustment—one that did not include a level 18 floor.
           The heart of Mendoza’s argument misses the mark. First, the
   Guidelines Section that Mendoza cites regarding the scope of conduct
   expressly provides that “all acts and omissions committed . . . in the course of
   attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense” are subject to
   offense-specific adjustments. 24 That Mendoza fled to avoid liability for the
   transporting offense is not in dispute, meaning the flight and its attendant
   harms to the pursuing agents and members of the public fall within the scope
   of the offense-specific conduct adjustments.
           Second, as the Government correctly notes, the “commentary
   expressly contemplates the application of the adjustment in similar
   circumstances.” Per the Guidelines Commentary for § 2L1.1, the Reckless
   Endangerment During Flight adjustment in § 3C1.2 should not also be
   applied for purposes of double-counting when the “basis” for the conduct
   giving rise to the § 2L1.1 adjustment is “fleeing from a law enforcement
   officer.” 25
           Though Mendoza may be correct as to where the adjustment at issue
   is typically applied, no binding precedent forecloses the adjustment in these
   circumstances. The district court did not err.

           24
                U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (emphasis added).
           25
                Id. § 2L1.1 cmt. n.3.

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                                                C.
           Finally, we ask whether the district court erred by applying a two-level
   obstruction of justice adjustment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 to the assault
   offense for creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury during
   flight. As the Government concedes, this is “a close question,” but it is one
   that we need not and here do not answer today: Mendoza concedes that this
   error alone “would be harmless,” as “it would not affect the final offense
   level.” We agree. Mendoza’s offense level for the transporting offenses was
   16, while his offense level for the assault, inclusive of this adjustment, was 15.
   Therefore, even if the district court had not applied the two-level adjustment,
   his hypothetical offense level of 13 for the assault would still be within 4
   offense levels of the transporting offenses, meaning the units would still be
   assigned one point each, and Mendoza’s combined adjusted offense level
   would remain at 18. 26 In other words, there would not be a change in his
   Guidelines range, and any error—to the extent this was erroneous, a question
   on which we do not engage—must be deemed harmless. 27
                                              *****
           We AFFIRM.

           26
                Id. § 3D1.4(a).
           27
              See United States v. King, 979 F.3d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[W]here a
   sentencing court makes an error in calculating the Guidelines range that does not have an
   effect on the ultimate Guidelines range that is applied, the error will be harmless unless the
   defendant can show that the error somehow affected the ultimate sentence that was
   imposed.”); United States v. Nimerfroh, 716 F. App’x 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpublished)
   (per curiam) (“[A]ny error by the district court was harmless because [the defendant]
   would have received the same guidelines range . . . even without the [erroneously applied]
   enhancement.”).

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