Court Opinion

ID: 9443581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:25:14.838292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:32.578786
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Anderson, while a member of the armed forces, became totally disabled on January 28, 1942 and remained continuously so disabled until his death on July 11, 1946. From May 6, 1942 to September 12, 1945 he was a prisoner of the Japanese. On July 11, 1942 and again on September 30, 1944, while Anderson was such a prisoner, Congress amended the provision under which he had been granted automatic gratuitous life insurance so as to require a written application for the continuance of the insurance, 56 Stat. 657 and 58 Stat. 762. As last amended the statute reads as quoted in the Court’s opinion, 38 U.S.C.A. § 802(d)(3) (A). The Court now holds that, within eighteen days after he was liberated from the Japanese prison and before he could be evacuated to a hospital in the United States, Anderson must have become acquainted with all of his legal rights, including the changes enacted by Congress while he was in prison, and must have forwarded an application in writing for the continuance of his insurance to which admittedly he would have been entitled without further payment of premiums.
Of course, if the law requires such a harsh ruling, there is nothing to be said except to express our regrets. Usually, however, the law is not so unreasonable, and I do not think that it is so in this instance when all of the pertinent statutes are read together. Section 802(d) (3) (A) providing for the automatic gratuitous insurance refers in two places to the waiver *886of premiums under subsection (n). It would seem clear, therefore, that subsection (n) applies to such gratuitous insurance. Subsection (n) is the later expression of the will of Congress, having been amended August 1, 1946, while subsection (d) (3) (A) was last amended September 30, 1944. Under subsection (n) the application for waiver of premiums might be made within one year after August 1, 1946, and subsection (n) permits the filing of the application for waiver by the beneficiary in the event of the prior death of the insured. The veteran’s widow and beneficiary actually filed such an application on June 30, 1947, within the time allowed by subsection (n). The Court holds that subsection (n) has no application to gratuitous insurance, because of its provision that the disability must have commenced “(2) while the insurance was in force under premium-paying conditions”. That reasoning is refuted, I think, by the direct reference heretofore noted in subsection (d) (3) (A) to subsection (n). Subsection (n) is expressly made applicable to gratuitous insurance where the total disability commenced prior to the effective date of such insurance and hence no premium was ever payable. “Premium-paying conditions”, therefore, does not restrict the application of subsection (n) to the usual policy upon which premiums are actually being paid. That construction is negatived also by the main clause of subsection (n) reading “payment of premiums on such inswrcmce may be waived during the continuous total disability of the insured” (emphasis supplied). “Such insurance” covers all of the types of insurance described in preceding subsections including the gratuitous insurance described in subsection (d) (3) (A). The provision “(2) while the insurance was in force under premium-paying conditions” refers to the time when the insured’s disability commences, not to the types of insurance covered. “Premium-paying conditions” means simply conditions under which payment of premiums or waiver of such payment would continue the policy in force, and that applies to gratuitous insurance. If, prior to August 1, 1947, ji veteran with gratuitous insurance either commenced payment of premiums or established his right to a waiver of premiums, it seems to me that his gratuitous insurance would continue in effect. I do not think that Congress was faint hearted in its gratitude toward combat veterans, or that it intended to put veterans with gratuitous insurance in any less advantageous position than veterans who had “sufficient time to apply for such insurance prior to engaging in combat”. Subsection 4, Public Law 360, 77th. Congress. Neither of the cases cited in the Court’s opinion militates to the contrary. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied; RIVES, Circuit Judge, dissenting.