Court Opinion

ID: 9744352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:01:16.891698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.703538
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hoffman, J.
I dissent. The judgment of the trial court should be upheld by this court upon any theory which is supported by the evidence. Sheraton Corp. of Am. v. Kingsford Packing Co., Inc. (1974), 162 Ind. App. 470, 319 N.E. 2d 852.
*170In the case at bar, the trial court ordered the bond posted by the appellants forfeited on November 15, 1974, for the failure of the defendant to appear on October 29, 1971. There is no contention that the’ appellants were not notified of this event. The trial court then waited until July 8, 1975, to hold a hearing on such bond forfeiture and enter a judgment forfeiting the bond.
IC 1971, 35-4-5-12 (Burns Code Ed.), requires that a trial court allow a bondsman 180 days after a defendant’s failure to appear to produce the defendant or satisfactorily explain his absence. IC 1971, 35-4-5-8 (Burns Code Ed.), provides that “legal notice” be given to a bondsman that a defendant is required to appear at least 72 hours before such appearance is scheduled. The appellants assert that because no appearance was scheduled for the defendant at the time when their bond was undertaken and they had no “legal notice” that an appearance date had been set, a statutory precondition to their liability has not been satisfied. The majority opinion agreed with this contention.
There is, however, a fatal flaw in the reasoning adopted by the majority. Even assuming that the appellants had no notice that the defendant had been scheduled to appear on October 29, 1971, still they had notice that they would be required to produce the defendant on a certain day through the operation of IC 1971, 35-4-5-3 (Burns Code Ed.), which provides, in pertinent part:
“If no day is fixed for the appearance of the defendant, or an impossible day, or a day in vacation, the undertaking, * * * if for his appearance in a court for trial, shall bind the defendant so to appear on the first day of the next term of the court which shall commence more than three [3] days after the giving of the undertaking.”
This statute should be read in conjunction with IC 1971, 33-1-6-4 (Burns Code Ed.).
While the majority opinion concludes in its footnote No. 1 that IC 1971, 33-1-6-4, supra, was impliedly repealed by the *171enactment of Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 72(A), I cannot agree with such contention. In order to find such a repeal by implication, it is necessary to find an “irreconcilable conflict” between the enactments in question. Chaffin V. Nicosia (1974), 261 Ind. 698, 310 N.E. 2d 867. A consideration of the language of IC 1971, 33-1-6-4, supra, establishes that it is not in irreconcilable conflict with the purpose ascribed to Trial Rule 72(A), supra, by the majority:
“Period in lieu of statutory time fixed by term of court. —Wherever, in any statute, rule or order, a period of time is described or fixed by a term of court, a period of sixty [60] days for the purposes of time limitation shall be substituted in lieu of a term of court.”
Rather, it must be concluded that this provision was intended to amend all statutes, such as the statute at issue in this case, which compute a time period by reference to the commencement of a term of court. Thus, this court should hold that IC 1971, 35-4-5-3, supra, has been amended to provide that bondsmen such as the appellants must produce the defendant they have bonded within 60' days, if no time for such defendant’s appearance has been fixed by the trial court.
In the case at bar, appellants’ bond recited that the defendant was to appear for trial. The latest date upon which appellants were required to produce the defendant under these statutes occurred 60 days after appellants posted their bond on October 11, 1971, and long before the trial court’s initial order of forfeiture on November 15, 1974. Appellants thus had notice long before November 15, 1974, that the defendant was required to appear in court. Furthermore, the trial court gave the appellants several years after such date to produce the defendant before entering an order of forfeiture. Thereafter, the trial court allowed the appellants substantially longer than the statutory 180-day period to produce the defendant before entering its judgment of forfeiture. The defendants had notice as required by statute and *172the trial court allowed them every opportunity to produce the defendant.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Note. — Reported at 346 N. E. 2d 612.