Court Opinion

ID: 9895497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 16:02:19.282552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.228399
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13686    Document: 46-1    Date Filed: 11/07/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                               No. 22-13686
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       RITA D. TAYLOR,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
       PAULA MCCORMACK,
       Supervisor, Revenue Oﬃcer (Retired),
       PRIM ESCLEONA,
       US Attorney,
       COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13686

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                      D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00596-RDP
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Rita D. Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       dismissal on the ground that her suit was time-barred. In a
       nutshell, Taylor alleged that a cadre of city, state, and federal
       officers committed a series of unconstitutional acts against her
       during and following an arrest. Accordingly, Taylor brought
       claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
       Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Despite the
       many allegations levied here, the issue before us on appeal is
       straightforward: Do any of Taylor’s claims survive the relevant
       statute of limitations? After careful review, we determine that they
       do not, and thus affirm.
                                          I
              The issues presented in this appeal stem from Taylor’s arrest
       and her subsequent journey through the legal system. That
       journey began on December 6, 2019, when City of Huntsville
       police officers arrested Taylor for resisting arrest and obstructing
       government operations. She was held in custody until the next
       day, December 7, 2019. In exchange for having her criminal
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       22-13686                Opinion of the Court                          3

       charges dropped, Taylor then signed an agreement with the City
       on February 20, 2020, releasing all claims against the City and its
       officers arising from her arrest. More than two years later, Taylor
       filed this suit on May 9, 2022, alleging that various state, local, and
       federal officials violated her constitutional rights during her arrest
       and detainment. The district court dismissed Taylor’s complaint
       on the ground that none of Taylor’s claims survived the relevant
       two-year statute of limitations.
              This is Taylor’s appeal. Although her arguments are difficult
       to discern, she seems to present two arguments. First, she
       contends that her § 1983 and Bivens claims met the two-year statute
       of limitations. Second, she asserts, for the first time on appeal, that
       an FTCA claim from a previously dismissed case extends the
       limitations period long enough for her current (non-FTCA) claims
       to survive.
                                          II
               We review de novo both the district court’s dismissal of a
       complaint for failure to satisfy the relevant statute of limitations,
       see Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2007), and the
       district court’s interpretation and application of a statute of
       limitations, see Dotson v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259, 1264 (11th Cir.
       2022). In general, we construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally.
       Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). A district
       court must give a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to amend
       her complaint before dismissing it with prejudice, unless such an
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13686

       amendment would be futile. See Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit,
       927 F.3d 1123, 1132–33 (11th Cir. 2019).
                                         III
              We ﬁrst consider whether Taylor ﬁled her § 1983 and Bivens
       claims before the relevant statute of limitations expired. We then
       assess whether Taylor’s previously dismissed FTCA claim
       somehow extends the limitations period for the § 1983 and Bivens
       claims in this suit. Finally, we determine whether the district court
       erred either by not allowing Taylor to amend her complaint or by
       dismissing the complaint before the federal defendants responded.
                                         A
                The statute of limitations for § 1983 and Bivens claims is the
       limitations period for personal-injury torts in the state where the
       action is brought. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (§ 1983);
       Kelly v. Serna, 87 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1996) (Bivens). Although
       state law determines the limitations period, federal law dictates
       when the claims accrue. Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir.
       1996). Under federal law, the statute of limitations does not begin
       to run until the facts that would support a cause of action are
       apparent or should be reasonably apparent. Id. at 561–62. In other
       words, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiﬀ should know (1)
       that she was injured and (2) who inﬂicted the injury. Id. at 562.
              Taylor brought her claims in a federal district court in
       Alabama. The relevant statute of limitations for these claims is
       therefore two years, the period that applies to personal-injury torts
       under Alabama law. McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir.
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       22-13686                Opinion of the Court                           5

       2008). In terms of determining the proper accrual date, there are
       two relevant episodes. First, there is Taylor’s release from jail on
       December 7, 2019, because her complaint alleges civil-rights
       violations surrounding her arrest and detention, and these events
       are the source of her alleged injuries. See Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561–62.
       Second, there is Taylor’s act of signing a release agreement with
       the City on February 20, 2020, in which she pledged not to bring
       forward any claims related to her arrest. Because Taylor did not
       ﬁle her action until more than two years past the start of either
       plausible accrual date, any claim under § 1983 or Bivens is time-
       barred. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387; Kelly, 87 F.3d at 1238.
                                          B
              We construe Taylor’s argument that a previously brought
       FTCA claim suspends the statute of limitations for her § 1983 and
       Bivens claims in this case as a request for equitable tolling. Under
       the doctrine of equitable tolling, a statute of limitations is paused
       “when a litigant has pursued [her] rights diligently but some
       extraordinary circumstance prevents [her] from bringing a timely
       action.” Fedance v. Harris, 1 F.4th 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2021)
       (quotation marks omitted). But, signiﬁcantly, the party seeking to
       toll the limitations period bears the burden of showing “(1) that
       [s]he has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that some
       extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way and prevented
       timely ﬁling.” Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 839 F.3d 958, 971
       (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
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       6                         Opinion of the Court                       22-13686

              Taylor’s argument that her old FTCA claim tolled the statute
       of limitations for the claims brought here also falls short.1 While
       we must construe Taylor’s contentions liberally, these arguments—
       so far as we can tell—were not raised below. As a result, they have
       been forfeited. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
       1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an
       issue not raised in the district court and raised for the ﬁrst time in
       an appeal will not be considered by this court.” (quotation marks
       omitted)). But even assuming that she did successfully preserve
       them, Taylor fails to identify any authority supporting her assertion
       that her previously brought FTCA claim extends the statute of
       limitations in this case. Nor did she argue that her previously
       denied FTCA claim amounts to an “extraordinary circumstance”
       that “stood in [her] way and prevented [a] timely ﬁling” of her §
       1983 or Bivens claims. Villarreal, 839 F.3d at 971. Consequently,
       equitable tolling does not apply.
                                             C
              Finally, Taylor did not challenge on appeal the district court’s
       determination that it would have been futile to allow her to amend
       her complaint further. Accordingly, that issue is likewise forfeited.
       Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330 (“[T]he law is by now well settled in
       this Circuit that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed

       1 To the extent that Taylor means to ask us to reverse a district court’s ruling

       in a separate, previously dismissed case involving an FTCA claim, we lack ju-
       risdiction because she did not appeal from that decision in a timely manner.
       See Fed. R. App. P. 4.
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       22-13686               Opinion of the Court                         7

       before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits will not be
       addressed.”). So, too, are any possible claims that the district court
       erred because the federal defendants had not yet responded to
       Taylor’s complaint and did not move to dismiss it. Id.
             AFFIRMED.