Court Opinion

ID: 9718653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:29:05.453025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.956854
License: Public Domain

CONNOR T. HANSEN, J.
(dissenting). I recognize that the Rules of Evidence prohibit the impeachment of a witness’ credibility by extrinsic evidence of instances of the witness’ prior misconduct, other than criminal convictions. Sec. 906.08(2), Stats. In my opinion this statute was never intended to be construed so as to per*163mit a defendant in a criminal case to testify falsely with impunity.
The rule excluding evidence of prior misdeeds rests on the concerns that such evidence will (1) result in confusion of issues and distraction of the jury with collateral matters; (2) unfairly surprise the defendant, who has not prepared evidence to rebut allegations about his prior conduct; and (3) unfairly prejudice the defendant by suggesting to the jury that he is a violent or lawless person likely to commit crimes and deserving of punishment. Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967). In the present case, however, considerations of confusion, unfair surprise and prejudice are outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to protect the integrity of the proceedings at trial.
This is not a case in which the impeaching evidence confused the jury with collateral issues. The testimony of Robbie Isabell was admitted, not for the purpose of impeaching a minor witness, but to impeach the defendant himself. Where the defendant takes the stand and asserts an alibi defense, his credibility is central to the case. In the case at bar, the defendant, on direct examination, made a sweeping statement that he had not been involved in criminal activity since 1972. On cross-examination he elaborated on this testimony by specifically denying that he had entered the Isabell home at gunpoint. This testimony was then directly contradicted by the testimony of Robbie Isabell, without undue consumption of time or diversion of the trial into collateral issues. I do not believe this was the type of excursion into distracting or ancillary matters which the rules of evidence are meant to prohibit.
Nor can the defendant complain that he was unfairly surprised by the testimony of Robbie Isabell. It was the defendant and his counsel who, on direct examination, broached the subject of the defendant’s criminal activity *164since Ms last conviction. TMs is not a case in which inquiry is made into an area for the first time on cross-examination and where the cross-examiner who ventures to raise the question must be content to “take his answer” as he receives it.
Nor can the defendant complain that he was prejudiced by evidence of his past actions when he took it upon himself, on direct examination, to make a blanket statement that he had not been involved in criminal activity since 1972. This testimony opened the door and, once open, it should be equally open to the prosecution. As applied by the majority, sec. 906.08(2), Stats., limits the prosecution to whatever testimony it can elicit from the defendant on cross-examination. Such a construction of the statute forewarns the defendant that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to impeach his false testimony. If he adheres to his story, he can lie baldly about any collateral matter, free of exposure by other witnesses or by documentary evidence. In such a situation, I believe any danger of prejudice to the defendant from the admission of extrinsic evidence is far outweighed by the compelling interest in the effective determination of truth at trial, which requires that a false impression, deliberately created by the defendant, be subject to contradiction by other witnesses.
In Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), a defendant charged with the sale of narcotics testified on direct examination that he had never possessed, sold, conveyed or handled any narcotics. The United States Supreme Court held that by making this claim, the defendant had opened the door, and that a government agent could therefore testify that heroin had been seized from the defendant’s home, in the defendant’s presence, in an unrelated incident two years earlier. Introduction of this impeachment testimony was permitted despite the fact that the heroin had been seized unlawfully, and *165would not have been otherwise admissible against the defendant.
The court declined to permit the defendant to turn the inadmissibility of the evidence to his own advantage as a “shield against contradiction of his untruths.” Walder v. United States, supra, at 65. “[T]here is hardly justification,” the court said, “for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credi-. bility.” Walder v. United States, supra, at 65.
This reasoning is sound and has been applied in other, analogous situations to prevent a defendant from lying with impunity. Thus an incriminating statement unlawfully obtained from a defendant is ordinarily inadmissible, but may be admitted for purposes of impeachment, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) ; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and the nature of a defendant’s prior criminal convictions, although ordinarily inadmissible, may be shown where the defendant denies having been convicted or fails to accurately state the number of convictions. State v. Hungerford, 54 Wis.2d 744, 748, 749, 196 N.W.2d 647 (1972).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am hereby authorized to state that Mr. Justice CALLOW joins in this dissent.