Court Opinion

ID: 9847386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:58:46.30348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:08.863218
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in concluding that the language of the 1931 deed was patently ambiguous and in denying plaintiffs the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence of whether the “three vacant lots” described in the 1931 deed included the disputed property. However, since defendant failed to present sufficient evidence of the essential elements of adverse possession, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict on defendant’s adverse possession claim. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A trial court must grant a moving party’s motion for a directed, verdict “where it appears, as a matter of law, that the nonmoving party cannot recover upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish.” Beam v. Kerlee, 120 N.C. App. 203, 210, 461 S.E.2d 911, 917 (1995). When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the evidence in the *442light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. “The party claiming title by adverse possession has the burden of proof on that issue.” Crisp v. Benfield, 64 N.C. App. 357, 359, 307 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1983). Here, the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict since the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, failed to establish as a matter of law that defendant was entitled to the subject property by virtue of adverse possession.
“To acquire title to land by adverse possession, the claimant must show actual, open, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession of the land claimed for the prescriptive period (seven years or twenty years) under known and visible lines and boundaries.” Merrick v. Peterson, 143 N.C. App. 656, 663, 548 S.E.2d 171, 176, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 364, 556 S.E.2d 572 (2001). “The requirement that possession must be hostile in order to ripen title by adverse possession does not import ill will or animosity but only that the one in possession of the lands claims the exclusive right thereto.” State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 180, 166 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1969). Further, “[a] claim of adverse possession is based upon an assertion of ownership rights as against all persons, not simply the record owner.” Lake Drive Corp. v. Partner, 108 N.C. App. 100, 103, 422 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1992). Possession for twenty years is necessary to acquire title by adverse possession unless the possession is under color of title which requires seven years. Marlowe v. Clark, 112 N.C. App. 181, 435 S.E.2d 354 (1993); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-40 (2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-38 (2001). In the case sub judice, defendant was required to prove actual, open, hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession of the subject land for twenty years since it had not had possession under color of title for the required seven years. “Successive adverse users in privity with prior adverse users can tack successive adverse possessions of land so as to aggregate the prescriptive period of twenty years.” Beam, 120 N.C. App. at 212, 461 S.E.2d at 918. Assuming arguendo that the families living on Maple Street who used the subject property prior to the formation of defendant were co-adverse possessors and defendant was in privity with these families to allow tacking, defendant has failed to show exclusive and hostile possession of the disputed tract prior to 1992.
Before 1992, the families living on Maple Street who used the disputed property believed that the property was owned by the Town of Lake Waccamaw (“the Town”). Thus, they thought their use was a permitted use and was available to all members of the general public. After the Town denied ownership of the disputed property, the fami*443lies residing on Maple Street began their efforts to claim the property by conveying any interests they had in the property to defendant by non-warranty deeds. Thus, the evidence shows that the attempt of the families to claim ownership of the property was triggered by their discovery that the Town was not the owner of the subject property. I do not dispute defendant’s possession of the property after 1992. However, prior to 1992, the Maple Street families did not have exclusive possession of the property nor were they claiming the property as their own as against all others.
There is no question that the families living on Maple Street prior and subsequent to 1978 used the disputed property as an access to the lake as well as a place for family recreational and social activities. These families also periodically provided maintenance of the disputed property, such as mowing, planting flowers, and picking up trash. However, there is no evidence that the Maple Street families had exclusive possession of the subject property. The general public still had access to the property since there were no barriers to the general public’s ingress onto the property or egress from the property. In addition, there were no “Do Not Trespass” or “Private Property” signs maintained on the property. Use of the property and amenities on the property such as picnic tables, play equipment, permanent steps leading from the shore to the lake, fire pits, and grills was not limited to the families residing on Maple Street. I acknowledge that the families installed posts on the property to prevent parking and littering and installed a “Private Parking” sign on the property to prevent people from drinking alcoholic beverages and disposing of their containers on the property. However, defendant has failed to direct us to any evidence which demonstrates that the families excluded everyone but themselves (and their guests) from using the subject property.
There is also no evidence that the families were asserting ownership rights prior to 1992 since the families used the property as if it were a neighborhood park owned by the Town. The majority opinion quotes Buddy Pope (“Mr. Pope”) who has lived on Maple Street since 1963 as stating, “ ‘Beverly [his wife] and I felt that it’s [the disputed property’s] ours, too.’ ” However, this statement does not show that Mr. Pope was claiming the disputed property under a claim of right. In fact, the following testimony elicited during cross and redirect examination of Mr. Pope illustrates his family’s perceived permissive use of the property prior to 1992:
*444Q. Now, your intention when you started working on the property which took place pretty soon after you moved in, didn’t it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was to maintain it for your satisfaction, wasn’t it?
A. Well, to the satisfaction of people on the street. We wanted it to look nice like somebody cared about it.
Q. But there was no intention to claim — to maintain it for the purpose of claiming it until 1991, was there?
Mr. Willis: Objection.
Court: Overruled.
A. No, there was no intention of claiming it. We thought it belonged to the Town.
Mr. Lee: No further questions.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. WILLIS:
Q. Well, you used the property just like it was yours, didn’t you, Mr. Pope?
Mr. Lee: Objection.
A. Yes.
Mr. Lee: He’s leading his own witness, Your Honor.
Court: Overruled.
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And I think what — when you say you had no intention to claim it, if somebody had come over there and tried to run you off of that property 20 years ago, would you have defended a lawsuit in court over that property 20 years ago?
Mr. Lee: Objection.
Court: Overruled.
A. Yes, probably would have; yeah.
*445Q. Well, why would you have done it if you didn’t have any intention to claim it, why would you have defended a lawsuit if you didn’t have any intention to claim it?
Mr. Lee: Objection.
Court: Overruled.
A. Well, we thought we had the right to use it and we didn’t want that right taken away from us by anyone and we would have tried to defend it, you know, if we could.
Q. Now, Mr. Lee said you were content to have the Town to [sic] control the property until you found out the Town didn’t own it. What control did the Town ever exert over that property?
A. They never did anything down there. They just — we thought it was theirs and — we kept it up, so they didn’t bother it.
(Emphasis added.) The majority opinion also states that Vernon Hall and her husband, who moved onto Maple Street in 1959, believed they had the right to use and enjoy the disputed property. The majority further points out that Barbara Elliot and her husband, who had lived on Maple Street since 1959, had used the property the same as they used their own. This evidence only shows that these people felt that they had the right to use the property not that they were claiming ownership of the property. Therefore, this evidence does not establish that the families’ possession was adverse for the required twenty years.
I recognize this Court’s holding
that where adverse possession originates in mistake but then, upon discovery of the mistake by the adverse possessor, is perpetuated by conscious intent, the uninterrupted periods of adverse possession may be tacked together and considered as one for the purpose of satisfying the prescriptive period set out in G.S. 1-40.
Enzor v. Minton, 123 N.C. App. 268, 271, 472 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1996). However, Enzor involved the adverse possessors taking possession of land, believing it to be theirs and using it as if it were theirs. Unlike Enzor, the Maple Street families in the instant case used the subject property prior to 1992 believing it belonged to the Town and believing they had permission from the Town to use the property. They were *446claiming a right to use the property, not claiming ownership of it. Therefore, their possession of the subject property was not adverse prior to 1992.
The instant case can be compared to Ramsey v. Ramsey, 229 N.C. 270, 49 S.E.2d 476 (1948), which involved a tract of land where a spring was located. The Court in Ramsey concluded that the defendant, who was claiming title of the tract through adverse possession, had not shown the necessary adverse and exclusive-possession. The spring had been used by the defendant and his predecessors in title as the source of their water supply for many years. However, it had also been used by others, such as the plaintiff, children at a nearby school, workmen at a nearby sawmill, and others residing in the neighborhood. The Court noted that the defendant used the spring more regularly and more extensively than others. Nevertheless, the Court still concluded that the defendant’s use was not enough to establish adverse possession for the statutory period of twenty years. In the instant case, the land in dispute was also used by the general public even though the neighborhood families used it more regularly and more extensively than others. Thus, as in Ramsey, defendant has failed to show the necessary adverse and exclusive possession to gain title to the subject land.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a directed verdict on defendant’s adverse possession claim because, even when viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the evidence was insufficient to establish the essential elements of adverse possession.