Court Opinion

ID: 9505614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:13:09.334264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:39.358796
License: Public Domain

DICKSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The plaintiff-parents in this case seek damages claiming that the defendant health care providers’ breach of medical duty prevented them from having the opportunity to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy because of pre-natal abnormalities. I believe this Court should not expand the common law to permit parents to seek damages in such a case. In Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630 (Ind.1991), we explained that “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” actions are distinguished solely by whether the actions seek damages on behalf of the child or the parent:
*1223The phrase “wrongful birth” applies to claims brought by the parents of a child born with birth defects alleging that due to negligent medical advice or testing they were precluded from an informed decision about whether to conceive a potentially handicapped child or, in the event of a pregnancy, to terminate it. When such action seeks damages on behalf of the child rather than the parents, the phrase “wrongful life” instead of “wrongful birth” is employed.
Id. at 633 (citations omitted). Actions for “wrongful life” and “wrongful birth” are different from other kinds of negligence actions. In Cowe, we held that “[dlamages for wrongful life are not cognizable under Indiana law,” id. at 635, for two principal reasons: (1) “[a] general conceptual unwillingness to recognize any cognizable damages for a child born with a genetic impairment as opposed to not being born at all,” and (2) the impossibility of calculating compensatory damages to restore a child born with a birth defect to the position he would have occupied were it not for the defendant’s negligence, id. at 634. But it was primarily the former concern upon which we focused, concluding that “ ‘life, even life with severe defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense.’ ” Id. at 635 (quoting Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1985)). Although this ease presents a claim for wrongful birth, the same concerns permeate it as well.
The majority opinion, treating the claim as a routine negligence claim, establishes troubling precedent, particularly as to the nature and extent of damages. If such claimants may recover all damages naturally flowing from a medical provider’s breach of duty, would this not also include the costs of raising and educating such “unwanted” children? Will the birth of a child with even slight congenital anomalies entitle the parents to claim medical malpractice damages, contending that “if they had only known” their child would have a birth defect, they would have terminated the pregnancy? Will our courts face actions by parents seeking child-rearing costs because the gender of their child was not as expected, when they had sought genetic counseling for the purpose of terminating the pregnancy in the event that the child was of the “wrong” gender? Will defendant health-care providers be entitled to claim a reduction in damages by presenting evidence and arguing that, if the plaintiff-parents had elected to terminate the pregnancy, they would likely have suffered substantial and continuing psychological trauma? Will the process of jury selection (and resulting appeals) become a new battleground for intense disagreements regarding the issue of abortion? These are but a few of the troubling, foreseeable consequences of the majority opinion.
I believe that, because of the resulting complex philosophical, moral, and political implications, this Court should not expand Indiana common law to permit parents to seek damages resulting from the loss of an opportunity to terminate a pregnancy. As we noted in Cowe, this involves “a calculation of damages dependent upon the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no life at all.” Cowe, 575 N.E.2d at 634 (quoting Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill.2d 230, 111 Ill.Dec. 302, 512 N.E.2d 691, 697 (1987)). Courts are ill-equipped to provide fair, reasonable, and intelligent resolutions to these questions.
I therefore dissent and believe that summary judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants.