Court Opinion

ID: 9925610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 15:06:06.670392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:18.343742
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1398-22

GLENN LIOU,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

RONALD LIGNELLI,

     Defendant-Respondent.
________________________

                   Submitted November 6, 2023 – Decided January 22, 2024

                   Before Judges DeAlmeida and Berdote Byrne.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. SC-000808-
                   22.

                   Glenn Liou, appellant pro se.

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

          Plaintiff Glenn Liou appeals from two orders of the Special Civil Part: (1)

an October 26, 2022 order dismissing his complaint alleging an entitlement to
the return of two months' rent and a security deposit he paid to defendant Ronald

Lignelli; and (2) a December 23, 2022 order denying his motion for

reconsideration of the October 26, 2022 order. We affirm.

                                         I.

      On September 21, 2022, Liou filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part

alleging that Lignelli illegally rented him a room on June 27, 2022. Liou alleged

that Lignelli did "not have a permit to rent his property" from the township in

which the residence is located. Liou alleged that he paid rent of $1,115 for July

2022 and $1,115 for August 2022 and a security deposit of $1,485. He sought

a judgment for $3,175, which represents all of the funds he paid to Lignelli.

      Liou was the only witness at trial. He testified that he and Lignelli signed

a "Wi-Fi storage rental agreement," which he claimed was "a scheme" intended

to appear he was renting storage space as a false cover for an illegal residential

lease. He testified that the agreement was issued even though Lignelli did not

have a certificate of occupancy for the premises. Liou did not offer a copy of

the Wi-Fi storage rental agreement as evidence, alleging that Lignelli kept all

copies of the contract after Liou signed it.

      Liou testified that he paid rent to Lignelli pursuant to the agreement and

in exchange lived at the property for two months. He argued that he is entitled

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to the return of his rent because of the invalidity of the Wi-Fi rental storage

agreement, which he argued was illegal because of the absence of a certificate

of occupancy. In addition, Liou testified that he paid a security deposit to

Lignelli. In support of this testimony, he relied on a June 27, 2022 check that

the court found was "made out to cash" and that "doesn't say security deposit

anywhere on what I'm seeing." Although the court described the June 27, 2022

check in some detail, it did not mark the check as an exhibit or admit it into the

evidence.

      At the conclusion of Liou's testimony, the trial court issued an oral

opinion. With respect to Liou's demand for the return of the two months' rent,

the court found that Liou knew the Wi-Fi rental storage agreement was illegal

when he executed it, which precluded him from seeking judicial relief under the

agreement. The court explained, "[i]t seems to me that if you knew that it was

illegal, you entered into it illegally, and now you're seeking to void your end

and get your part of the bargain back after you already benefitted by staying

there, and that[] just . . . violates public policy."

      As to Liou's demand for the return of his security deposit, the court found

             I don't find you credible with respect to this . . . security
             deposit issue, Mr. Liou, and the story just does not add
             up in this context.

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            ....

            There's no contract here that's been provided and I don't
            find you credible on this, sir. I'm sorry, you have to
            prove your case and I'm not convinced, based on the
            proofs you provided, that the story is credible.

            ....

            [A]nd I don't find that the check made out to cash that
            has nothing in the memo is for a security deposit based
            on your representations here which, again, I just don't
            find it to be credible, trying to get the benefit of the
            bargain then trying to get out from under on an illegal
            contract in this context. . . . You do have the burden
            of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
            evidence and I don't find the documentary evidence to
            be convincing in any way by a preponderance of the
            credible evidence nor do I find your testimony to be so
            either, so I'm going to deny your application.

      An October 26, 2022 order dismissed Liou's complaint.

      Twenty-three days later, Liou moved for reconsideration of the October

26, 2022 order. He attached to his moving papers a copy of the Wi-Fi rental

storage agreement signed by Liou but not by Lignelli. Liou stated that he

obtained a copy of the agreement through a public records request for the file in

the Special Civil Part action in which Lignelli sought to evict Liou from the

property.   He also included a document entitled "WiFi/Storage Payment

Receipt" indicating that in June 2022, $1,115 in cash was paid to Lignelli for

"utilities." The payee line on the receipt is blank.

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      On December 23, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying Liou's

motion for reconsideration.      In a written statement of reasons, the court

concluded Liou: (1) filed the motion beyond the twenty-day period for seeking

reconsideration of a final order established in Rule 4:49-2; (2) failed to attach a

copy of the transcript of the court's opinion contrary to Rule 4:49-2; (3) did not

cite with specificity controlling legal precedent overlooked by the trial court in

making its decision; (4) included with the motion evidence not adduced at trial,

but which he could have obtained prior to trial; and (5) failed to demonstrate an

entitlement to reconsideration of the order which was based primarily on the

trial court's conclusion that Liou's trial testimony lacked credibility.

      This appeal followed.      In support of his appeal, Liou reiterates the

arguments he made in the trial court and contends Lignelli should not benefit

from an illegal contract by retaining the rent and security deposit he collected

from Liou. Liou acknowledges he filed his motion for reconsideration late and

argues the trial court should have considered the October 26, 2022 order to be

interlocutory for purposes of the timing of the motion in the interests of justice.

                                        II.

      Our scope of review of the judge's findings in this nonjury trial is limited.

We must defer to the judge's factual determinations, so long as they are

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supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort,

Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). This court's "[a]ppellate

review does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making independent

factual findings; rather, [this court's] function is to determine whether the re is

adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial." Cannuscio v.

Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J. Super. 342, 347 (App. Div. 1999). However,

"[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow

from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan

Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).

      We have carefully reviewed the record and find no basis on which to

disturb the trial court's conclusion that Liou is not entitled to the return of the

rent he paid to Lignelli for July and August 2022. Liou failed to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence the existence of a lease between the parties .

Although he testified that he executed a Wi-Fi rental storage agreement, he did

not describe the terms of the agreement in detail or produce a copy of the

document. At best, Liou established that he paid two months of rent to Lignelli

for July and August 2022 and admitted that he resided in Lignelli's property

during those months. Liou did not testify that the residence was defective or

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uninhabitable, that he was precluded from enjoying the use of the space he

rented, or that Lignelli violated the terms of their agreement in any way.

      Liou argued only that Lignelli did not have a certificate of occupancy for

the residence, which rendered the Wi-Fi rental storage agreement illegal. We

see no error in the trial court's conclusion that Liou did not establish an

entitlement to relief on this basis.        First, Liou did not establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that Lignelli lacked a certificate of occupancy

for the residence. The only evidence offered in support of this contention was

Liou's testimony.    The trial court, however, found Liou to be lacking in

credibility. In addition, even if the court were to have accepted that Lignelli

was not authorized to rent the premises, no legal precedent required the court to

order the return of the rent Liou paid for the time he lived at the property. While

a property owner is not entitled to enforce a lease of property for which a

certificate of occupancy has not been issued, Khoudary v. Salem Cty. Bd. of

Soc. Servs., 260 N.J. Super. 79, 85 (App. Div. 1992), a tenant who is aware of

an illegal lease but pays rents and occupies the premises subject to the illegal

lease is not entitled to the return of the rent after the occupancy ceases. See

McQueen v. Brown, 342 N.J. Super. 120, 128 (App. Div. 2001) (holding that,

where a tenant has occupied premises for which no municipal rental permit was

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issued, "[w]e know of no precedent that would allow a tenant to raise an

illegality defense to his or her obligation to pay rent in circumstances w here no

evidence is presented to demonstrate that the premises were uninhabitable or,

for that matter, that the premises were even defective."). A contrary result would

bestow on Liou benefits – rent-free living space – for having knowingly

participated in an illegal contract.

      Nor do we see any error in the trial court's December 23, 2022 order

denying reconsideration. We begin our analysis with the trial court's conclusion

that Liou's motion was filed late. According to Rule 4:49-2, "a motion for

rehearing or reconsideration seeking to alter or amend a . . . final order shall be

served not later than 20 days after service of the . . . order upon all parties . . . ."

As the Supreme Court explained, "[b]y definition, an order that 'does not finally

determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining

to the cause[,] and which requires further steps . . . to enable the court to

adjudicate the cause on the merits[,]' is interlocutory." Moon v. Warren Haven

Nursing Home, 182 N.J. 507, 512 (2005) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 815

(6th ed. 1990)); see also Wein v. Morris, 194 N.J. 364 (2008).

      The October 26, 2022 order, on the other hand, finally determines all of

Liou's claims as to all parties. It is, therefore, a final order. The twenty-day

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time period for filing a motion for reconsideration established in Rule 4:49-2

applies.

      Rule 1:3-4 prohibits the court from enlarging the twenty-day period.

Because of its late filing, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider

Liou's motion for reconsideration. Murray v. Comcast Corp., 457 N.J. Super.

464, 469-71 (App. Div. 2019). We need not, therefore, address the several other

grounds for denial of the motion, including Liou's submission with the motion

of new evidence available to him at trial, his failure to produce a transcript of

the trial court's opinion, and the absence of citation to any controlling legal

precedent overlooked by the trial court when it issued its decision after trial.

      Affirmed.

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