Court Opinion

ID: 9586911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:16:22.909423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:55.723866
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which holds that there was a valid common law dedication of the strip of land in question. In my view, the trial court’s finding that there was no acceptance of the offer of dedication should be upheld. I would, however, remand the case to the trial court for additional findings concerning the trial court’s conclusion that there was not a valid statutory dedication.
The majority relies heavily on the decision of our Court of Appeals in Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (App.1982), rev. den. (1983). In Pullin, the Court of Appeals held: “Whether an acceptance of a proposed dedication has occurred is an issue of fact.” Id. at 881, 655 P.2d at 88. In vacating summary judgment that had been granted by the trial court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Here, from the proof of the sale between the parties, it may be inferred that the lots ... were sold in reference to the' plat of the subdivision. Such an inference could result in a finding that the dedication ... had been “accepted.”
Id. at 882, 655 P.2d at 89.
This is not a summary judgment case, but a case that was tried to the trial court without a jury. The trial court found that there had not been an acceptance. I.R.C.P. 52(a) provides: “Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” The fact that the trial court might have inferred from the sale of the lots that they were sold in reference to the plat did not require the trial court to find that there had been acceptance. The trial court weighed the evidence concerning the sale against the fact that the roadway contained in the offer of dedication “began at the bank of a river where no bridge ever existed, and extended up a steep hill to a point connecting to nothing.” I would affirm the trial court’s decision that there was no com*228mon law dedication on the ground that the finding of no acceptance was not clearly erroneous.
The majority correctly points out that the trial court did not explain why it concluded that there had never been a valid statutory dedication of the strip in question. I would remand the case to the trial court for further findings on this issue.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.