Court Opinion

ID: 9562020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:20:23.652123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:10.602489
License: Public Domain

Brachtenbach, J.
(dissenting) — A rear-end collision resulted in this lawsuit. The case was tried by competent counsel before an able trial judge. The jury sorted out factual conflicts and various legal theories advanced by the parties. The jury allocated 85 percent of fault to the plaintiffs. I would defer to the jury's determination and affirm the trial court; thus, I would reverse the Court of Appeals.
However, the majority affirms the Court of Appeals and remands for a new trial limited to liability.
The trial court correctly instructed the jury that a statute provides:
Outside of incorporated cities and towns no person shall stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway.
The above section shall not apply to the driver of any vehicle which is disabled in such manner and to such extent that it is impossible to avoid stopping and temporarily leaving the vehicle in such position.
The majority, by some insight unknown to me, states: "The purpose of the park and stop statute is to eliminate the hazard posed when drivers stop their vehicles on high speed freeways for other than emergency reasons." Majority, at 705. The paucity of the majority's reasoning is illustrated by a comparison of the language of the statute with the majority's conclusory statement of legislative intent. Nothing is said about high speed freeways.
The statute is not ambiguous. This court has no authority to impress upon a clear legislative declaration its idea of what it would prefer the statute to mean. Yet that is what the majority does.
The statute does not single out "high speed freeways." It *709simply forbids any person, outside of incorporated cities and towns, to "stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle . . . upon the roadway." There is an escape section not factually applicable here.
Given the above recitation of the statute, did the evidence justify an instruction that the statute was applicable? The plaintiff's car was struck in the rear. The plaintiff driver closed his eyes and traveled almost a city block, and came to rest in the traveled lane of a freeway. The plaintiff driver could have stopped off the freeway. He had available to him a 12-foot-wide shoulder. He could have avoided being hit by defendant Hofstrand if he had paid attention to where he was. Arguably he violated the statute. Whether he should have or was excused from stopping on the highway was a jury question.
The majority states and premises its conclusion upon the fact that the plaintiffs' car was "out of control." What the majority omits is the fact that the car was totally operable, was being steered, was capable of being under control, but that the plaintiff driver chose to not have the car under control. It is a gross misstatement of the record to say that the car was out of control. What the majority fails to mention is that the experts agreed that the plaintiff's car was driven to its resting place on the freeway. The record is clear; there was no skidding, no braking, no effort to control the direction of the vehicle. That is a reasonable interpretation of the testimony, ignored by the majority and properly submitted to the jury.
In short, there was evidence that the plaintiff driver did not control his vehicle rather than that the vehicle was beyond his control. The jury's finding of 85 percent negligence on the plaintiff driver speaks more forcefully than my words. The majority's interpretation of the testimony simply fits its desired result.
At the time of trial the law was that violation of the statute would constitute negligence per se. Johnson v. Heitman, 88 Wash. 595, 598, 153 P. 331 (1915); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 *710(1983). In Bauman v. Crawford, 104 Wn.2d 241, 704 P.2d 1181 (1985), we changed that rule as to minors. The concurring opinion suggested that the per se doctrine should be reexamined in all tort cases (Brachtenbach, J., concurring at 249). Since such reexamination was not raised or briefed here, this is not the proper case to do so.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.
Dolliver, C.J., and Utter and Andersen, JJ., concur with Brachtenbach, J.