Court Opinion

ID: 9960403
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 13:03:28.539563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:26.149513
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
  Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
  opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
  prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
  official text of the opinion.

                 SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA
                 Case No. S24C0144

                                                                           April 16, 2024

      The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to adjournment.

The following order was passed:

VICTORY MEDIA GROUP, LLC v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
                TRANSPORTATION

      The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari in
this case.

      All the Justices concur.

Court of Appeals Case No. A24D0007
                                       SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA
                                                  Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

                                         I certify that the above is a true extract from the
                                  minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.
                                         Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto
                                  affixed the day and year last above written.

                                                                                            , Clerk
     PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring.

     Plaintiff Victory Media Group LLC argues that the state law

regulating billboards violates their right to free speech. The trial

court ruled for the State without meaningfully addressing Victory

Media’s free speech argument, and the Court of Appeals denied

Victory Media’s application for discretionary appeal. The State

argues that our Court had resolved this claim in its favor 40 years

ago. The State is wrong; our decision from 1984 could not and did

not address Victory Media’s central argument, which focuses on

later developments in the United States Supreme Court’s treatment

of content-based speech restrictions. But this is not a proper case to

consider those developments. Even if Victory Media’s legal

arguments are correct, they still lose; the parts of the law that may

violate the First Amendment are not the parts of the law that

harmed Victory Media. Accordingly, I concur in the denial of the

petition for a writ of certiorari, but write to flag this important issue

for future litigants and courts.

     This case centers on Victory Media’s attempt to obtain a

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multiple     message        sign   permit      from     the    Department        of

Transportation.       The     Department        approved      Victory     Media’s

application but later revoked the permit because another sign,

which was already established pursuant to a permit, was located

less than 5,000 feet from the requested location for Victory Media’s

multiple message sign. See OCGA § 32-6-75 (c) (1) (C) (“No . . .

multiple message sign shall be placed within 5,000 feet of another

multiple message sign on the same side of the highway[.]”). In

appealing the Department’s decision, Victory Media challenges

among other things the constitutionality of the Outdoor Advertising

Control Act (“the Act”), which governs the permit application process

for outdoor advertising signs. Victory Media contends the Act is

unconstitutional because it imposes content-based restrictions on

speech.1

      1  For instance, Victory Media points to the Act’s direction that “[n]o
outdoor advertising shall be erected or maintained within 660 feet of the
nearest edge of the right of way and visible from the main traveled way of the
interstate or primary highways in this state, except the following: (1)
[d]irectional and other official signs and notices; (2) [s]igns advertising the sale
or lease of the property upon which they are located; (3) [s]igns advertising

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      In defense of the Act, the State relied below on our decision in

DOT v. Shiflett, where this Court rejected a claim that the Act

violated the right to free speech and held that it did “not violate the

freedom of expression.” 2 251 Ga. 873, 876 (1) (310 SE2d 509) (1984).

Because the case involved commercial speech and we concluded that

the Act indirectly controlled expression, we applied the four-part

analysis from Central Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.

activities conducted or maintained within 100 feet of the nearest part of the
activity . . . ; (4) [s]igns located in areas zoned commercial or industrial, which
signs provide information in the specific interest of the traveling public; (5)
[s]igns located in unzoned commercial or industrial areas, which signs provide
information in the specific interest of the traveling public; and (6) [d]irectional
signs, displays, and devices about goods and services in the specific interest of
the traveling public[.]” See OCGA § 32-6-72. Appellant contends that the “Act
further restricts permissible signs based on the type of message contained in
the sign[,]” and in support Appellant points to the “spacing, location, and
configuration requirements” and various exemptions in the Act.
       2 We did not specify whether the free speech claim was brought only

under the U.S. Constitution or was also brought under a similar provision of
the Georgia Constitution. Our analysis cited only federal caselaw decided
under the First Amendment. Accordingly, I do not understand Shiflett to have
decided anything about the Georgia Constitution’s speech protections, and note
further that there’s ample reason to think those protections may be different
from their federal equivalent. See, e.g., Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. City of Sandy
Springs, 304 Ga. 187, 196-197 (816 SE2d 31) (2018) (Peterson, J., concurring)
(noting textual differences between federal and state provisions).
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557 (100 SCt 2343, 65 LE2d 341) (1980).3 See Shiflett, 251 Ga. at

874-875 (1).

     But the State’s reliance on Shiflett is misplaced. To begin, we

did not consider there whether the Act contained content-based

restrictions on speech, which United States Supreme Court

precedent now makes clear is a critical consideration. See Nat. Inst.

of Fam. and Life Advocs. v. Becerra (“NIFLA”), 585 U.S. 755, 766 (II)

(A) (138 SCt 2361, 201 LE2d 835) (2018) (“When enforcing [the First

Amendment’s] prohibition [on laws that abridge the freedom of

speech], precedents distinguish between content-based and content-

neutral regulations of speech.”).

     “Content-based laws — those that target speech based on its

communicative content — are presumptively unconstitutional and

may be justified only if the government proves that they are

     3   That analysis considers whether (1) the commercial speech was
misleading or concerned an unlawful activity, (2) the governmental interest
was substantial, (3) the regulation directly advanced the government interest,
and (4) the regulation was more extensive than necessary to serve that
interest. See Shiflett, 251 Ga. at 874 (1); H&H Operations, Inc. v. City of
Peachtree City, 248 Ga. 500, 502 (2) (283 SE2d 867) (1981) (striking down sign
ordinance because we found “no substantial governmental interest in
permitting commercial signs yet prohibiting the posting of prices”).
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narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v. Town

of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (II) (A) (135 SCt 2218, 192 LE2d 236)

(2015). Strict scrutiny applies “when a law is content based on its

face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content

based[.]” Id. at 166 (II) (C) (1) (striking down content-based

regulations of speech in sign code that failed to survive strict

scrutiny); see also Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 724 (IV) (content-based

restriction on speech failed to satisfy the “most exacting scrutiny”).

“This stringent standard reflects the fundamental principle that

governments have no power to restrict expression because of its

message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” NIFLA, 585

U.S. at 766 (II) (A) (cleaned up; emphasis added). 4 “Laws that are

content neutral are instead subject to lesser scrutiny.” Reed, 576 U.S.

      4 In City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, the

United States Supreme Court indicated that “restrictions on speech may
require some evaluation of the speech and nonetheless remain content neutral”
and held that a regulation’s distinction between on-premise and off-premise
signs was content neutral because it did not turn on the substantive message
of the sign. 596 U.S. 61, 72-74 (II) (B) (142 SCt 1464, 212 LE2d 418) (2022).
But the statute here purports to distinguish permissible off-premise signs from
impermissible off-premise signs based in part on content, which creates
different issues than the ordinance at issue in City of Austin.
                                      6
at 172 (IV).

     At the time that Shiflett was decided, it had “[o]nly recently . .

. been recognized that commercial speech is afforded protection

under the First Amendment.” Shiflett, 251 Ga. at 874 (1). See

NIFLA, 585 U.S. at 767 (II) (B) (“professional speech” is not exempt

from the normal prohibition on content-based restrictions); see also

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (II) (A) (1) (131 SCt

2653, 180 LE2d 544) (2011) (“[c]ommercial speech is no exception”

to the general rule that content-based restrictions of speech warrant

heightened judicial scrutiny). To satisfy its burden to justify that a

content-based restriction on commercial speech is consistent with

the First Amendment, the State must show “at least that the

[burden] directly advances a substantial governmental interest and

that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.” Sorrell, 564 U.S.

at 571-572 (II) (B). This standard requires a proportional fit

“between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen to accomplish

those ends.” Id.

     In the light of this precedent, this Court has since struck down

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local sign ordinances that contained such content-based distinctions.

See Fulton County v. Galberaith, 282 Ga. 314, 317-319 (3) (647 SE2d

24) (2007) (affirming trial court’s ruling that sign ordinance that

banned all signs, including commercial ones, but exempted signs

from the ban on a case-by-case basis was the “the antithesis of the

narrow tailoring that is required under the First Amendment, even

in the context of commercial speech”); Union City Bd. of Zoning

Appeals v. Justice Outdoor Displays, Inc., 266 Ga. 393, 394-398 (467

SE2d 875) (1996) (striking down sign ordinances because they

imposed content-based restrictions on speech). But we have yet to

address whether the Outdoor Advertising Control Act contains such

content-based restrictions, and that important question remains

open in our precedent. See State v. Cafe Erotica, Inc., 270 Ga. 97, 97

(507 SE2d 732) (1998) (resolving challenge to the Act under Central

Hudson test without reaching whether the “legislation [was]

content-based and therefore . . . subject to strict scrutiny”).

     Victory Media points to provisions of the Act and regulations

promulgated under the Act that may well be content-based. See, e.g.,

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OCGA § 32-6-71 (defining among other things categories of signs

referenced in the Act); OCGA § 32-6-72 (limiting outdoor advertising

visible from the main traveled way of the state’s interstate or

primary highways to specific categories of signs); OCGA § 32-6-75

(a) (establishing additional conditions associated with certain

categories of permissible signs); Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 672-6-.03

(requiring a permit before the construction of certain categories of

signs). But none of those provisions were actually enforced against

Victory Media. Instead, Victory Media’s permit was revoked because

OCGA § 32-6-75 (c) (1) (C) directs that “[n]o multiple message sign .

. . be placed within 5,000 feet of another multiple message sign on

the same side of the highway[,]” and the Department had already

approved the permit of another multiple message sign located less

than 5,000 feet from the location that Victory Media requested.

     Our caselaw requires a party challenging a state statute as

unconstitutional to show that the unconstitutional provision

harmed the party. See Parker v. Leeuwenburg, 300 Ga. 789, 790 (797

SE2d   908)   (2017)   (“As   a   prerequisite   to   attacking   the

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constitutionality of a statute, the complaining party must show that

it is hurtful to the attacker.”); Black Voters Matter Fund, Inc. v.

Kemp, 313 Ga. 375, 393 (870 SE2d 430) (2022) (Peterson, J.,

concurring) (“One clear line of case law . . . holds that persons

seeking to challenge a state statute as unconstitutional may do so

only if that statute has injured them in some specific way.”).5 Victory

Media has failed to make that showing, and so we cannot reach the

open constitutional question they raise.

     5 Victory Media did not challenge the Act on overbreadth grounds. See

Bo Fancy Prods., Inc. v. Rabun County Bd. of Comm’rs, 267 Ga. 341, 344-345
(2) (a) (478 SE2d 373) (1996) (adopting a “more relaxed standard of ‘standing’
applicable to a First Amendment challenge of an allegedly overbroad statute”).
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