Court Opinion

ID: 9733074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:52:47.116516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.210813
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority concludes that the warrant in this case, because of its “dragnet” character, was issued without probable cause. After study, though with some hesitation, I agree. I however dissent from the reversal because I am convinced the warrant was issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and that the officers reasonably relied on it.
I. As the majority recognizes, the United States Supreme Court adopted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule for cases involving searches conducted by police who reasonably rely upon a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3415, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 692 (1984). The court concluded that the decision to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be made on a case-by-ease basis. Id. at 918, 104 S.Ct. at 3418, 82 L.Ed.2d at 695. The exclusionary rule “is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d at 694. When officers act in good faith, society should not be de*415prived of reliable evidence for use in the truth-finding process at trial.
To be sure, the Leon holding is circumscribed; the court also concluded that good-faith reliance does not exist in any of the following situations: (1) “the magistrate or judge ... was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth”; (2) “the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role....”; (3) “a warrant [is] based on ‘an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable’ ”; and (4) “a warrant [is] so facially deficient — i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized — that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.” Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421, 82 L.Ed.2d at 698-99 (citations omitted).
II. The majority first relies on the fourth Leon escape from the good-faith exception. The majority concludes that the portion of the warrant authorizing the search of all persons and all vehicles at the Rodriguez residence was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not presume the warrant to be valid. It is impossible for me to agree that the officers could not believe in the validity of the warrant.
Several decisions have upheld vehicle searches executed pursuant to warrants containing an “all vehicle” type description. United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all vehicles found parked on the premises”); People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1292-93 (Colo.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles ... on the property”); State v. Booream, 560 So.2d 1303, 1304 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Richardson v. State, 547 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1989) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” on the premises); State v. Haugee, 402 So.2d 1216, 1218 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981) (upheld a warrant authorizing the search of a residence and “any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon”); Albert v. State, 155 Ga.App. 99, 100-101, 270 S.E.2d 220, 221-22 (1980) (upheld a warrant authorizing police to search “all automobiles” located within the curtilage of a service station where the vehicle was sufficiently connected to the premises); Green v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 131, 132, 275 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1955) (upheld warrant authorizing search of “all automobiles” on a used car lot). But see Peavy v. State, 336 So.2d 199, 202 (Ala.Crim.App.1976) (warrant authorizing the search of “any motor vehicle adjacent to [a] motor home” did not particularly describe the place to be searched); State v. Barnett, 788 S.W.2d 572, 576 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluded that an “all vehicles” description in a search warrant did not meet the fourth amendment particularity requirement).
Ordinarily a description is sufficient “if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.” Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757, 760 (1927). In United States v. Alva, 885 F.2d at 250, the Fifth Circuit relied only on this standard in evaluating whether a vehicle that arrived after a search began was within the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of “any and all motor vehicles” located at a residence.
III. The majority also claims that the third escape from the Leon good-faith exception is inapplicable because the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. I disagree. The perceived flaw is that the warrant allowed the search of all vehicles driven by people who stopped at the house without probable cause. The magistrate and district court found otherwise. Included in the affidavit was the fact that Rodriguez associated with known drug dealers, and that an informant, while under police surveillance, purchased drugs from the residence. By including the controlled buy in the warrant application, the police contended they established drug trafficking at the Rodriguez *416residence. They believed that, having done so, they were justified in searching any vehicles driven by people who stopped briefly at the residence. This is because customers of drug dealers typically carry drugs away from the place where they purchased them.
The officers thought the warrant was authorized under State v. Ballew, 456 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Iowa App.1990), which involved a warrant to search “any vehicles at the property under the control of the occupants” of a specified home. I am persuaded by the majority’s conclusion that Ballew is not on point and does not authorize the dragnet search permitted here. On the other hand I strongly disagree with the view that the officers were unreasonable in thinking otherwise. The factors distinguishing Ballew are more readily apparent to us on detached appellate review than they were to the harried officials at the time.
The validity of a warrant authorizing the search of “all vehicles” is an issue of first impression with us. The officers and the magistrate obviously did not have the guidance of the majority’s holding in this appeal disapproving the one issued here. Because they lacked that advantage, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the warrant application was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.
The officers’ actions strike me as having been in good faith. Indeed the majority’s narrow and restrictive view of Leon is apt to discourage officers in the future from applying for search warrants at all. It is arguable that, had the officers made a stop of defendant on a purely investigatory basis, the search of this defendant could be upheld as a Terry stop because the officers had “specific and articulable cause to support a reasonable belief that criminal activity may have occurred.” State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1982) (quoting State v. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa 1980)).
The Davenport police department watched while an informant purchased drugs from Terry Rodriguez’s house. They obtained a search warrant which allowed the police to search that house. The warrant also authorized the search of any people who were at Rodriguez’s house and the cars belonging to those people. Anthony Jamison arrived at Rodriguez’s house after this warrant was obtained. He parked within the curtilage of the Rodriguez home. He stayed for a short period of time, which was consistent with a drug transaction. As Jamison left, his car was followed. Pursuant to the search warrant obtained by the police, Jamison’s car was stopped. An officer, while approaching the car, saw Jamison trying to conceal something under his seat. Jamison was ordered out of his car. When he opened the car door, cocaine was spilled on the floorboard of his car.
The State is now deprived of this evidence because we now hold the dragnet warrant was invalid. The situation seems to me to be entirely appropriate for affirmance under Leon. I would affirm.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this dissent.