Court Opinion

ID: 9882929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:22:03.145797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:11.130799
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Sweitzer v. 56 Auto Sales, 2023-Ohio-2997.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                            MADISON COUNTY

 CHRISTINA L. SWEITZER, et al.,                        :
                                                           CASE NO. CA2022-12-026
        Appellee,                                      :
                                                                OPINION
                                                       :         8/28/2023
     - vs -
                                                       :

 56 AUTO SALES,                                        :

        Appellant.                                     :

               CIVIL APPEAL FROM MADISON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
                               Case No. CVF 1700475

Mark J. Pitstick, for appellee.

Shannon M. Treynor, for appellant.

        S. POWELL, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, 56 Auto Sales ("56 Auto"), appeals the decision of the Madison

County Municipal Court denying its motion to dismiss or, alternatively, its Civ.R. 60(B)

motion for relief from the trial court's judgment ordering it to pay appellee, Christina L.

Sweitzer, actual and treble damages above its $15,000 jurisdictional limit. For the reasons

outlined below, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified.
                                                                           Madison CA2022-12-026

                                  Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On November 8, 2016, Sweitzer purchased a truck from 56 Auto for

$14,739.62. The truck turned out to be a lemon. Sweitzer then sued 56 Auto and, following

a trial, received a judgment awarding her with actual and treble damages of $44,809.52,

well above the trial court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit.1 On September 26, 2022, within a

year after the trial court rendered its judgment, 56 Auto filed a motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. Within that motion, 56 Auto

argued that it was improper for the trial court to issue a judgment to Sweitzer above its

$15,000 jurisdictional limit, thereby requiring the case be dismissed or, at the very least,

entitling it to relief from that judgment. The trial court denied 56 Auto's motion on November

16, 2022. 56 Auto then appealed. Oral argument was thereafter held before this court on

July 17, 2023. 56 Auto's appeal now properly before this court for decision, 56 Auto has

raised two assignments of error for review. For ease of discussion, we will address 56

Auto's two assignments of error out of order.

                                   Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶ 3} THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY NOT MODIFYING THE JUDGMENT TO

CONFORM TO THE JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT VIA

DEFENDANT'S 60(B) MOTION.

       {¶ 4} In its second assignment of error, 56 Auto argues the trial court erred by

denying its Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. This is because, according to 56

Auto, it was improper for the trial court to grant a judgment to Sweitzer awarding her with

damages above its jurisdictional limit of $15,000. We agree.

       {¶ 5} Municipal courts are created by statute. Cheap Escape Co., Inc. v. Haddox,

1. Sweitzer was also awarded attorney fees in the amount of $5,517.50. That award is not at issue in this
appeal.
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L.L.C., 120 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-6323, ¶ 7. So too are municipal courts' subject

matter jurisdiction. Id. Pursuant to R.C. 1901.18(A)(2), a municipal court has original

jurisdiction within its territory, subject to the monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts, "[i]n

any action or proceeding at law for the recovery of money or personal property of which the

court of common pleas has jurisdiction[.]" See Starks v. Patrick, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2004-03-030, 2004-Ohio-5654, ¶ 5. The monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts is set

by R.C. 1901.17. Estate of Rossi v. Click, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA87-02-020, 1987 Ohio

App. LEXIS 8766, *3 (Sept. 21, 1987). Currently, the monetary jurisdiction of municipal

courts is $15,000. See Liberty Retirement Community of Middletown, Inc. v. Hurston, 12th

Dist. Butler No. CA2013-01-006, 2013-Ohio-4979, ¶ 6, citing R.C. 1901.17. There are two

exceptions to this jurisdictional limit, however. "[T]his limit does not apply to the housing

division or environmental division of a municipal court." R.C. 1901.17. Therefore, for

municipal courts to have jurisdiction, with limited exceptions, the amount in controversy

must not exceed $15,000. See Millers v. Kasnett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100448, 2015-

Ohio-298, ¶ 11.

       {¶ 6} The trial court in this case granted judgment to Sweitzer awarding her

damages above its $15,000 jurisdictional limit. There are only three instances in which a

municipal court may render a judgment awarding damages in excess of $15,000. Those

three instances occur where the excess consists of: (1) interest; (2) damages for the

detention of personal property; or (3) costs accrued after the commencement of the action.

R.C. 1901.17. None of those three instances occurred here. It was therefore error for the

trial court to issue a judgment to Sweitzer awarding her damages in excess of its $15,000

jurisdictional limit. Under these circumstances, we believe it best to affirm the trial court's

decision as modified, thereby amending the trial court's judgment to the trial court's $15,000

jurisdictional limit. To hold otherwise would be contrary to judicial efficiency and judicial

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economy given the history of this case and the parties involved. This case is now years

old, generating extensive attorney fees, all over the sale of a used truck that occurred nearly

seven years ago. This case deserves to be put to rest.

        {¶ 7} In so holding, we note that "'because the monetary restrictions in R.C. 1901.17

limit the municipal court's subject matter jurisdiction,'" dismissal is required "'when an initial

pleading seeks relief beyond this statutory authority.'"                  Miami Valley Constr. Group v.

Thompson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-03-024, 2021-Ohio-4358, ¶ 44, quoting State ex

rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Servs. v. Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cty., 49 Ohio St.3d

49, 50 (1990). In this case, however, Sweitzer's complaint did not request relief beyond the

trial court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Rather, as expressly stated within her complaint,

Sweitzer requested actual, compensatory, and treble damages in an amount "not to exceed

$15,000.00," plus interest and attorney fees. Sweitzer was therefore requesting relief up to

the trial court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit, rather than in excess of that limit.2 Accordingly,

to the extent set forth above, 56 Auto's second assignment of error is sustained and the trial

court's judgment awarding Sweitzer damages in the amount of $44,809.52 is modified to

the trial court's jurisdictional limit of $15,000.

                                       Assignment of Error No. 1:

        {¶ 8} THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS PREMATURE.

        {¶ 9} In its first assignment of error, 56 Auto argues the trial court erred by denying

its motion to dismiss. However, given this court's resolution of 56 Auto's second assignment

2. The dissent determines there was no subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance and urges a complete
dismissal. However, in her answer brief, Sweitzer herself argues that her complaint "made clear" that she
"sought no damages in excess of $15,000," and that whether in law or in equity, her complaint is being
"improperly construed" if interpreted by this court as going beyond the trial court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit.
Therefore, it is not just the majority, but even Sweitzer herself who concludes that any argument claiming the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in this case should "fail on the merits."
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of error, we find the first assignment of error raised by 56 Auto Sales has now been rendered

moot. Pursuant to App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), "[u]nless an assignment of error is made moot by a

ruling on another assignment of error," a court of appeals shall "decide each assignment of

error and give reasons in writing for its decision." "'[A]n assignment of error is moot when

an appellant presents issues that are no longer live as a result of some other decision

rendered by the appellate court.'" Martin v. Ohio Univ., 4th Dist. Athens No. 22CA14, 2023-

Ohio-2511, ¶ 54, quoting State v. Gideon, 165 Ohio St.3d 156, 2020-Ohio-6961, ¶ 26.

Therefore, in accordance with App.R. 12(A)(1)(c), 56 Auto's first assignment of error is moot

and need not be addressed.

                                         Conclusion

       {¶ 10} For the reasons outlined above, the trial court's judgment ordering 56 Auto to

pay Sweitzer actual and treble damages above its jurisdictional limit of $15,000 is modified

down to that $15,000 jurisdictional threshold. The trial court's judgment in all other respects

remains unchanged and is affirmed.

       {¶ 11} Judgment affirmed as modified.

       PIPER, J., concurs.

       M. POWELL, J., dissents.

       M. POWELL, J., dissenting.

                      The Municipal Court's Monetary Jurisdiction

       {¶ 12} "In deciding the jurisdiction of municipal courts, monetary jurisdiction is treated

as an aspect of subject-matter jurisdiction." Miami Valley Constr. Group v. Thompson, 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2021-03-024, 2021-Ohio-4358, ¶ 43, citing State ex rel. Natl. Emp.

Benefit Serv., Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 50 (1990).

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                                                                    Madison CA2022-12-026

"Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits

of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time." Pratts v. Hurley,

102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. "If the amount in controversy exceeds the limit

set in R.C.1901.17, there is no subject matter jurisdiction and any judgment is void."

Mountain States Adjustment v. Nath, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-013, 2011-Ohio-6810, ¶ 13,

citing Goody v. Scott, 5th Dist. Richland No. 95CA31, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5984 (Oct.

18, 1995). "[B]ecause the monetary restrictions in R.C. 1901.17 limit the municipal court's

subject matter jurisdiction, * * * dismissal is also required when an initial pleading seeks

relief beyond this statutory authority." Thompson at ¶ 44. In this respect, Civ.R. 12(H)(3)

provides, "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks jurisdiction on the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." "An appellate

court reviews de novo a trial court's determination regarding the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction[.]" Urteaga v. Urteaga, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-08-109, 2015-Ohio-2465,

¶ 15.

            Discussion Of Pertinent Facts And Procedural Considerations

        {¶ 13} On September 26, 2022, 56 Auto moved to dismiss the entire action and

effectively vacate the judgment because Sweitzer's complaint sought damages exceeding

the trial court's monetary subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court summarily overruled the

motion to dismiss, agreeing with Sweitzer's contention that "[o]nce a final judgment is

entered, the correct procedural method to seek relief is via 60(B) Motion, and no dismissal

can be granted until relief is obtained. Once relief is granted, a timely Rule 12(B)(1) Motion

to Dismiss can be filed."

        {¶ 14} Sweitzer's complaint's prayer for relief sought damages not to exceed

$15,000 on her first three causes of action, and "three times their actual damages (not to

exceed $15,000)" on her Consumer Sales Practices Act ("CSPA") cause of action. On its

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face, Sweitzer's complaint sought as much as $30,000 (i.e., up to $15,000 on her first three

causes of action and up to $15,000 on her CSPA claim). Additionally, the complaint is

unclear as to whether the parenthetical limitation on damages in Sweitzer's CSPA claim

was intended to apply to the actual damages or to the trebled amount of actual damages.

If the limitation applied only to the actual damages, then Sweitzer was seeking damages of

up to $45,000 on her CSPA claim alone. Indeed, the municipal court certainly construed

Sweitzer's complaint as seeking more than $15,000 as it awarded judgment in her favor for

more than $44,000, exclusive of attorney fees.

      {¶ 15} As discussed below, if the trial court had not summarily denied 56 Auto's

motion to dismiss on procedural grounds and had considered the motion on its merits, it

would have been clear that Sweitzer's complaint sought damages in excess of the trial

court's $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Because subject-matter jurisdiction may not be waived

and the issue may be raised at any time, the trial court erred by denying 56 Auto's motion

to dismiss as procedurally defaulted.

                          The Import Of Sweitzer's Complaint

      {¶ 16} Sweitzer's briefing makes clear that her complaint sought damages exceeding

the $15,000 jurisdictional limit. Although Sweitzer states that she "sought no damages in

excess of $15,000," she is referring only to the actual damages she claimed and not to her

claim for treble damages. Indeed, Sweitzer contends that CSPA treble damages do not

count against the municipal court's $15,000 monetary limit because otherwise it

             would only allow a claim in the municipal court under the
             Consumer Sales Practices Act of $5,000. Clearly, it was never
             the intention of the Legislature not to allow a discretionary award
             by a Municipal Court judge of an amount in excess of $15.000.
             ***

             Clearly, the Legislature, in granting the municipal court the
             power to adjudicate under the Uniform Sales Practices Act,
             granted it the power to award treble damages, meaning that the
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              court's $15,000.00 jurisdictional monetary limit could be
              exceeded to whatever amount was necessary up to three times
              its jurisdictional limit, as is the case at bar.

Sweitzer's complaint admittedly sought actual damages of up to $15,000 and treble

damages of up to $45,000.

       {¶ 17} Sweitzer advances two arguments in support of her contention that CSPA

treble damages do not count against the municipal court's jurisdictional monetary limit.

First, Sweitzer claims that CSPA treble damages are "not automatic" but discretionary.

Second, Sweitzer asserts that CSPA treble damages are within the municipal court's

equitable jurisdiction to provide complete relief to the parties pursuant to R.C. 1901.18(A).

Neither of these arguments has merit.

       {¶ 18} As an initial matter, Sweitzer does not cite any authority supporting the

proposition that money damages which may be awarded in the court's discretion should not

be considered in determining whether the municipal court's monetary limit is exceeded, and

I have found none. Furthermore, even if one accepts Sweitzer's claim that an award of

CSPA treble damages is an exercise of the municipal court's equitable jurisdiction, it would

make no difference. Although R.C. 1901.18(A)(3) invests a municipal court with jurisdiction

"to hear and determine all legal and equitable remedies necessary or proper for a complete

determination of the rights of the parties to [a] contract, " the exercise of that jurisdiction

remains subject to the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction as plainly set forth at the

beginning of R.C. 1901.18(A):

              Except as otherwise provided in this division or section
              1901.181 of the Revised Code, subject to the monetary
              jurisdiction of municipal courts as set forth in section 1901.17 of
              the Revised Code, a municipal court has original jurisdiction
              within its territory in all of the following actions or proceedings
              and to perform all of the following functions[.]

(Emphasis added.)

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       {¶ 19} In support of her argument that an award of treble damages under the CSPA

is discretionary and not subject to the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction, Sweitzer cites

White v. Hornbeck, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 01CA0057, 2002-Ohio-3037. Hornbeck did not

hold that an award of CSPA treble damages under R.C. 1345.09(B) is discretionary.

Rather, the Hornbeck court held that an award of attorney fees under R.C. 1345.09(F) was

discretionary. Furthermore, Hornbeck has nothing to do with the municipal court's monetary

jurisdiction. Indeed, Hornbeck was an appeal from a common pleas court. Hornbeck does

not support the proposition that an award of CSPA treble damages is discretionary or that

such a discretionary award would not count against a municipal court's monetary limit.

       {¶ 20} In any event, an award of treble damages under the CSPA is not discretionary.

R.C. 1345.09(B) provides

              Where the [CSPA]violation was an act or practice declared to
              be deceptive or unconscionable by rule adopted under division
              (B)(2) of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code before the
              consumer transaction on which the action is based, or an act or
              practice determined by a court of this state to violate section
              1345.02, 1345.03, or 1345.031 of the Revised Code and
              committed after the decision containing the determination has
              been made available for public inspection under division (A)(3)
              of section 1345.05 of the Revised Code, the consumer may
              rescind the transaction or recover * * * three times the amount
              of the consumer's actual economic damages or two hundred
              dollars, whichever is greater[.]

       {¶ 21} Pursuant to R.C. 1345.09(B), if a consumer-plaintiff proves a CSPA violation

and that the violation occurred either after the act or practice was declared to be deceptive

or unconscionable pursuant to rule adopted by the attorney general or by court decision

made available for public inspection, then the consumer-plaintiff is entitled to treble

damages if such remedy is elected in lieu of recission of the consumer transaction.

Sweitzer's complaint is clear that she sought an award of treble damages, not recission of

the transaction. An award of treble damages is therefore not discretionary in this case.

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       {¶ 22} In support of her argument that the award of CSPA treble damages is an

exercise of the municipal court's equitable jurisdiction and should not count against the

court's monetary jurisdiction, Sweitzer cites Behrle v. Beam, 6 Ohio St.3d 41 (1983). In

Behrle, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a counterclaim in a forcible entry and detainer

action for specific performance of an option to purchase real estate for $170,000 did not

deprive the municipal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Explaining why a prayer for

specific performance did not implicate the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction, the

supreme court held

                We conclude it to be a reasonable interpretation of [R.C.
                1901.17] that when an action is brought at law upon a contract,
                and a counterclaim raises equitable issues involving the right to
                possession under an exercise of an option of purchase within
                the contract, the municipal court may retain jurisdiction of the
                matter and hear and determine all legal and equitable issues
                and remedies necessary for the complete determination of the
                rights of the parties. We hold this to be so even though the
                amount that is involved in the contract is greater than the
                monetary jurisdiction of the municipal court, as long as no
                amount greater than the monetary jurisdiction of the court is
                claimed by the counter-claimant.

Id. at 44-45.

       {¶ 23} Sweitzer misconstrues Behrle to hold that a municipal court's authority to

exercise its equitable jurisdiction authorizes a money judgment exceeding $15,000. Behrle

did not involve an award of damages exceeding the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction

but a judgment for specific performance, an equitable remedy.

       {¶ 24} Moreover, an award of treble damages in a CSPA case is not an exercise of

the municipal court's equitable jurisdiction because money damages is a remedy at law and

not an equitable remedy. See Countrywide v. Huff, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2007-T-0121,

2008-Ohio-4974, ¶ 25 (money damages is a remedy at law); Dunning v. Varnau, 12th Dist.

Brown Nos. CA2016-09-017 and CA2016-10-018, 2017-Ohio-7207, ¶ 26 (equitable remedy

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                                                                     Madison CA2022-12-026

of injunction not available where money damages are available); Total Quality Logistics,

L.L.C. v. Leonard, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-09-048, 2023-Ohio-2271, ¶ 49-50

(equitable remedy of injunction unavailable where money damages may redress the

wrong); and Sorrell v. Micomonaco, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-07-060, 2017-Ohio-

1498, ¶ 27-28, (equitable remedy of specific performance unavailable where money

damages adequately compensate plaintiff for breach of contract).

       {¶ 25} In a recent opinion, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals acknowledged, in

dicta, that CSPA treble damages should be charged against the municipal court's monetary

limit. Nelson v. Powers, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2019-G-0214, 2020-Ohio-1076. The court

of appeals observed that a municipal court's award of CSPA treble damages surpassing

$15,000 exceeds a municipal court's subject-matter jurisdiction: "Initially, the magistrate did

not actually award treble damages. $9,250, 'trebled,' would be $27,750 and this would

exceed the municipal court's subject-matter jurisdiction of $15,000, the amount awarded in

this matter." Id. at ¶ 12, fn.1, citing R.C. 1901.17.

                                         Conclusion

       {¶ 26} This court has no jurisdiction to reduce the judgment to $15,000 because the

municipal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to begin with. In State ex rel. Natl. Emp.

Ben. Serv., 49 Ohio St.3d 49, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether to allow writs of

prohibition and mandamus where a municipal court transferred a case pursuant to Civ.R.

13(J) to the common pleas court because a supplemental complaint sought damages in

excess of the municipal court's monetary jurisdiction.       The supreme court ruled that

Civ.R.13(J) provided no authority for the transfer and that such a transfer would conflict with

Civ.R. 12(H)(3) which requires dismissal when it appears that there is a lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction. In allowing the writs, the supreme court held

              [T]he Shaker Heights Municipal Court had no jurisdiction to

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               transfer the Adler case and appellant's counterclaim to the Court
               of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County and, correspondingly,
               that the common pleas court had no basis upon which to
               assume jurisdiction. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the
               court of appeals and issue writs of prohibition, procedendo and
               mandamus, and we order that the common pleas court be
               prohibited from hearing and determining the entire Adler matter
               and that it return the entire Adler matter to the municipal court;
               and further, that the municipal court dismiss the complaint,
               answer and counterclaim in the Adler case without prejudice,
               pursuant to Civ.R. 12(H)(3).

Id., 49 Ohio St.3d at 50-51. See also State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell,

163 Ohio St.3d 541, 2021-Ohio-1205.

       {¶ 27} Just as the common pleas court in State ex rel. Natl. Emp. Ben. Serv. had no

jurisdiction to do anything but return the case to the municipal court for dismissal, we

likewise have no jurisdiction to do anything other than order the case dismissed or remand

to the trial court for dismissal.

       {¶ 28} For these reasons, with regard and respect for my colleagues in the majority,

I dissent.

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