Court Opinion

ID: 9847488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:00:43.356791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:17.325437
License: Public Domain

Deen, Judge.
There is no dispute as to the facts of this case. We are asked to decide whether Bass had uninsured motorist coverage as to bodily injury to himself, and, if so, whether a jury question is presented as to sums sought as penalty and attorney fees for bad faith. The parties agree that the insurer stands on three and only three defenses as follows: (1) Uninsured motorist coverage written as a part of the policy of insurance naming the 1966 Pontiac did not cover the appellant while the appellant was *287driving the 1953 Plymouth in which the accident occurred; (2) The rejection of uninsured motorist coverage in the application for insurance on the 1953 Plymouth prevented the uninsured motorist endorsement written on the 1966 Pontiac from applying to the appellant while the appellant was driving the 1953 Plymouth; (3) The uninsured motorist endorsement on the Pontiac policy contained an exclusionary clause making this coverage inapplicable while the insured was driving the Plymouth. We examine each of these contentions in turn.
That the named insured must be driving the vehicle described in the policy. This question has already been decided contrary to the defendant’s contentions. First of all, the endorsement clearly defines an "insured” as (1) the first person named in the declarations [i. e., the plaintiff] and while residents of his household, his spouse and the relatives of either; and (2) any other person while occupying an insured automobile. The covering agreement is "to pay all sums which the insured ... shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle” because of bodily injury (a) to the insured or (b) to an owned motor vehicle "to which the liability coverage of the policy applies.” Thus, property damage recovery is limited to the designated vehicle in the policy; bodily injury recovery is limited to an insured, and insured means the named insured, his spouse and relatives while residing with him regardless of whether or not they are in a vehicle, and, if so, what vehicle they are in, but other persons are insured only while in the vehicle described in the policy declaration. This has been unequivocally held in a number of cases. "The coverage applies not only to the owner of an insured automobile, but to his spouse and relatives of either if they live in his household. It covers them while riding in the insured car, in any other automobile, or while a pedestrian if the injury is caused *288by an uninsured motorist.” Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, 290 (154 SE2d 411). Since under Code Ann. § 56-407.1, no automobile liability insurance policy shall be issued (unless rejected in writing) which does not undertake to pay the insured for bodily injury which results from the fault of an uninsured motorist, any policy provision conflicting with this requirement is void. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Williams, 119 Ga. App. 414 (167 SE2d 174) (holding that the insured was covered while a passenger in another car, also covered, and was entitled to stack coverage to the extent of his loss or the combined policy limits, whichever was less). The same result was reached in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710 (177 SE2d 257), a case in which this defendant was also the insurer and where it litigated coverage of an insured under its policy killed by an uninsured motorist while riding in a vehicle not named in the policy. It follows that State Farm had actual knowledge at the time it filed the first of the above defenses that Georgia had decided the question, in a case where it was the named defendant, in a manner contrary to its contentions.
That the insured had rejected uninsured motorist insurance on the Plymouth. This defense would be good in law if the defendant were insuring only the automobile, but as it happens it is also insuring the person of the named insured, wherever he may be. When one rejects coverage as to an automobile named in the declaration, he has no right to any coverage under that policy. If he has another policy which does contain uninsured motorist insurance, he as the named insured is covered wherever he is, whether in that car, another car, or no car. But the uninsured car is not covered, and certain classes of persons are not covered unless they are in an insured vehicle. If a vehicle is not covered, no benefits under the liability policy of that vehicle exist so far as uninsured motorist insurance is concerned, but that is *289the end of the matter. If there is another policy, and other coverage, such policy will be construed according to its own provisions, unaffected by the existence or nonexistence of an unrelated policy of insurance. If two policies exist they may be stacked. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, supra. If only one exists, it is applicable without regard to the other. In Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, supra, the plaintiff, covered by uninsured motorist insurance on one of his owned vehicles, sustained an otherwise compensable injury while driving another owned vehicle, and the defense was that "said policy did not provide uninsured motorists protection in connection with” the car he was operating. The court specifically ruled that this defense was untenable: "The effect of the restriction contained in the endorsement limiting the uninsured motorists coverage to 'Car No. 3 only’ was merely to exclude Car No. 1 and Car No. 2 from the definition of 'insured automobile’ under the uninsured motorists coverage, so that this coverage would be afforded to other persons only while occupying Car No . 3” but the insured was covered as such regardless of whether he was driving an owned insured automobile or an owned uninsured automobile. This being the case, and hinging upon the common-sense conclusion that to determine coverage one looks to the provisions of the policy in effect (not to the existence or nonexistence of some other policy), if there is a policy, and if it covers the insured wherever he may be, it is irrelevant that he owns another car which he is occupying and which does not have such coverage. It is also irrelevant, if the car has no coverage, whether the reason is that at the time the policy was issued the law requiring uninsured motorist coverage had not come into effect, or whether it was in effect, but the insured had elected to reject the coverage. The rejection of coverage under one policy does not work a forfeiture or estoppel as to coverage which exists under *290another valid policy. The defendant puts forth no argument, and we can find none, which would determine the efficacy of existing coverage by the reason for failing to have other and different policies of insurance on other property. The fact of coverage having already been adjudicated is controlling as against this contention.
The proviso in Code Ann. § 56-407.1 (a) that an insured may reject coverage in writing and that, if he does so, coverage need not be provided unless thereafter requested in writing, obviously has no application where, after the rejection, the insurer again offers the coverage and the insured accepts the offer according to its tenor by retaining the endorsement and paying the increased premium charged for the uninsured motorist coverage. To hold otherwise would be to hold that there was no coverage at all regardless of the payment and acceptance of premium. To reiterate: When the insured paid for the Pontiac renewal he was entitled to such coverage as it afforded. Since no claim was made under the Plymouth policy, its provisions are not involved in this case. This should have been obvious from the decision in McNeal, supra.
That a different situation exists where two automobiles are covered under a single policy, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 126 Ga. App. 45 (190 SE2d 113).
That the insured is not covered by virtue of an exclusion provision. This defense is a bit more complicated. The U coverage endorsement on the Pontiac contained the following exclusion: "This insurance does not apply ... to bodily injury to an insured while occupying ... a vehicle owned by the named insured ... if such vehicle is not an 'insured automobile.’ ” The endorsement has certain included specific definitions, one of which is: "Insured automobile ... an owned motor vehicle provided the use thereof is by such first named insured..This definition would seem to cover the insured in any vehicle he might *291own, but under "Definitions” in the endorsement we are cited to certain words defined in the liability section of the policy, among them the term "owned vehicle,” which, when located, restricts the term to an owned vehicle named in the policy declaration. Placing these three provisions together, of course, would reach a result contrary to the implication of the definition of "insured” in the endorsement, which, as we have said, means the named insured wherever he is and certain other persons "while occupying an insured automobile.” More particularly, however, it runs counter to the provisions of Code Ann. § 56-407.1 (b) defining "insured” as the named insured "while in a motor vehicle or otherwise,” as distinguished from guests and permittees who are covered in the vehicle "to which the policy applies.” Both the Supreme Court and this Court have held that conditions contrary to the statute are void. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. 710, supra, and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Barnard, 115 Ga. App. 857 (156 SE2d 148), cases both involving this defendant. In particular, however, State Farm was the defendant in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Harper, 125 Ga. App. 696 (188 SE2d 813), where examination of the record reveals that the exact exclusion here relied upon has been held void because contrary to the provisions of the statute. In Harper, the insured owned two separate policies covering a Ford and Corvair respectively, both having liability and uninsured motorist coverage. Harper was driving the Ford when he collided with an uninsured motorist. State Farm paid uninsured motorist to the policy limit under the Ford policy but denied coverage of the insured (who had a judgment against the uninsured motorist in the sum of $20,000) under the Corvair policy because of the above quoted exclusion and the fact that the insured was not driving the Corvair at the time he was injured. This court held the clause in question void and unenforceable as *292contravening the clear intent of the Uninsured Motorists’ Act, and further held that the plaintiffs, Harper and his wife "were in the position of being insureds in the Ford policy, both because they were insured persons and the insured automobile was involved, and were insured under the Corvair policy since they fell in the class of the named insured and his spouse.” The position of Harper under the Corvair policy and Bass under the Pontiac policy in this case is identical; the policy provisions are identical, and the definitions and exclusion clauses are identical.
It follows that Bass was covered under the uninsured motorist endorsement as a named insured, and that the restriction attempted in the exclusionary clause is void.
State Farm, being the named defendant, in the Harper, Murphy and Barnard cases, could not have been unaware that each of its defenses had been decided adversely to its contentions here in cases where it was actually involved. It follows that the prayers of the complaint setting out these facts and seeking penalty and attorney fees under Code Ann. § 56-1206 raise a jury issue on the question of bad faith in attempting to relitigate these issues.
The trial court erred in granting a judgment on the pleadings to the defendant.

Judgment reversed.

Bell, C. J., Pannell, Quillian, Evans and Stolz, JJ., concur. Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., and Clark, J., dissent.