Court Opinion

ID: 9786592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:58:54.745062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:46.563662
License: Public Domain

Buser, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority’s holding that Commissioner Lively’s findings of fact and conclusions of law are void and, as a result, the matter relating to Respondents Janice Lynn King, Rosemary Denise Price, and Pro Se Advocates should be remanded to the Commissioner. I also concur in the denial of the individual Respondents’ second Motion to Dismiss. I dissent, however, from the majority’s holding that Respondent David Martin Price, by making oral argument before the court in this case, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
David Martin Price stated his appearance as “pro se.” He also advised the court he was “making oral presentation for the [Respondents].” Under questioning by the court, David Martin Price agreed he was “appearing” and “advocating” on behalf of the other Respondents, but these were not his words. I understood that Price merely wanted to read a written statement prepared by all the individual Respondents. When it was suggested to Price, for example, that the document he wished to read could be filed as a supplemental brief, he responded that “we wanted to go over these to give our expression of view and what our position is.”
Of course, “[o]nly members of the bar are permitted to represent clients in this court.” Hickock & Smith v. Hand, 190 Kan. 224, 225, 373 P.2d 206 (1962), cert, denied 372 U.S. 924 (1963). I am not convinced, however, that Janice Lynn King and Rosemary Denise Price were the clients of David Martin Price when he read their collective statement and responded to questions from the court. They were parties—as was he—and the fact that Price was the party designated to read what all the individual Respondents *402wanted to say does not constitute, in my estimation, the unauthorized practice of law. As David Martin Price said, he was appearing “pro se,” and I would rather apply the liberal construction traditionally afforded such litigants. See Bruner v. State, 277 Kan. 603, 605, 88 P.3d 214 (2004); Key v. Hein, Ebert & Weir, Chtd., 265 Kan. 124, 129, 960 P.2d 746 (1998).
Secondly, the gravamen of the petition in quo warranto is that David Martin Price provided legal advice, research, and wrote pleadings that were filed by pro se litigants. The petition did not include, however, an allegation that Price ever appeared in court as a purported attorney or legal representative, although that is the sole basis upon which the majority’s decision is grounded. “Every matter asserting the unauthorized practice of law must be considered on its own facts on a case-by-case basis.” State ex rel. Stephan v. Williams, 246 Kan. 681, 689, 793 P.2d 234 (1990). Under the circumstances, I believe justice would be better served if this matter was remanded to Commissioner Lively with respect to all of the allegations made against David Martin Price. What Price said before this court may or may not provide a basis for further inquiry upon remand, but it seems premature to decide this matter without the benefit of the Commissioner’s thorough factfinding regarding all of the allegations contained in the petition.
Finally, the injunction issued against David Martin Price goes beyond the court’s finding that he “engaged in the unauthorized practice of law . . . during his oral arguments on behalf of his fellow Respondents.” An injunction is an equitable remedy “governed by the principles of equity.” Smith v. State, 264 Kan. 348, 355, 955 P.2d 1293 (1998). Given the majority’s finding that Price appeared as a legal representative for the other individual Respondents, it is equitable for this court to enjoin him from “appearing in any Kansas legal proceeding in a representative capacity for another.” See K.S.A. 60-901 (an injunction is “an order to do or refrain from doing a particular act”); Sheila A. v. Finney, 253 Kan. 793, 797, 861 P.2d 120 (1993) (“for an injunction to issue, there must be some indication that there is a threatened injury”).
This injunction goes further, however, and prohibits David Martin Price from
*403“taking any action intended to assist nonmembers of the state bar of Kansas in the presentation of any legal matter; from preparing or aiding in the filing of any pleading or legal document in a Kansas controversy or legal proceeding, except when doing so solely on his own behalf; and/or from counseling or advising any nonmember of the state bar on any legal matter whatsoever.”
On the present record, there is no finding that David Martin Price has done any of these acts. See State ex rel. Stovall v. Martinez, 27 Kan. App. 2d 9,13, 996 P.2d 371, rev. denied 269 Kan. 941 (2000) (injunction was “narrowly tailored” to “prevent . . . the unauthorized practice of law”); see also Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St. 3d 221, 224, 626 N.E.2d 59, cert, denied 513 U.S. 933 (1994) (“Equity requires that an injunction should be narrowly tailored to prohibit only the complained of activities.”). For this additional reason, I would remand for further findings and conclusions as to all the allegations of unauthorized practice of law set forth in the petition against David Martin Price.