Court Opinion

ID: 9718571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:17.86155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.421600
License: Public Domain

*66COLEMAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I dissent from that portion of the Court’s opinion that holds International had no duty to place a warning on the quench tank to alert intended users of dangers inherent in its use without safety devices. In all other respects, I concur in the Court’s opinion.
The New Jersey Products Liability Act (Act) creates a failure to warn cause of action by providing that “[a] manufacturer ... of a product shall be liable in a product liability action only if the claimant proves ... that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it ... failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions----” N.J.S.A 2A:58C-2. The Act also defines the standard for determining the adequacy of the warning. N.J.S.A 2A:58C^L The Act must be read in conjunction with decisional law to determine when a duty to warn has been triggered.
The thrust of the Court’s opinion with respect to the absence of a duty to warn seems to be two-fold: First, the design specifications called for installation of safety devices by Maxwell House and its professional installer. Second, plaintiff produced no “evidence that the [quench] tank was so obviously dangerous that International had an obligation to warn the users of the trecarcarbon regeneration system.” Supra, at 63, 675 A.2d at 635.

I

The quench tank was fabricated by International in accordance with plans and specifications designed by Maxwell House and its engineers, Marquess and Nell, Inc. Although International was not required by the plans to prepare or install any safety devices, the plans required International to place certain holes in the tank so that three safety devices could be installed by Maxwell House’s assembler, Brennan Company, Inc. The plans informed International that the intended purpose of the quench tank was use as a reservoir for a carbon-water mixture that had been heated to 1700 degrees fahrenheit. The three safety devices described in the *67plans were intended to prevent the super-heated molten fluid from overflowing out of the quench tank and injuring persons in the area such as plaintiff.
The three safety devices are not designed so as to preclude use of the quench tank for its intended purpose without installation of those safety devices. The spectacle shut-off valve is similar to an electrical or manual water valve that shuts off the flow of water between point A and point B and was to be connected, according to the plans, to a certain pipe. Although the pipe was installed, the valve was not. Thus an uncontrolled stream of the superheated molten carbon flowed from the hearth furnace into the quench tank. Similarly, the high-level fluid sensor and the overflow pipe were not designed to prevent the quench tank from being used because it lacked safety devices.
-A-
The question becomes whether the fabricator of the quench tank, who knew of its intended purpose and who knew or should have known that the quench tank could be placed into service without installation of the safety devices, thereby making the tank dangerous, had a duty to warn intended users such as plaintiff of the danger. Given the knowledge of International, the analysis “becomes almost identical to [a] negligence analysis in its focus on the reasonableness of [International’s] conduct.” Feldman, supra, 97 N.J. at 451, 479 A.2d 374; accord Becker, supra, 138 N.J. at 153, 649 A.2d 613.
The determination of whether to impose a duty on the manufacturer of a component part to warn of dangers inherent in using a product not equipped with proper safety devices must be informed by whether it was feasible for the manufacturer-fabricator of the quench tank to place a warning on the tank. Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 395, 451 A.2d 179. “ ‘[I]mposing the requirements of a proper warning will seldom detract from the utility of the product.’” Becker, supra, 138 N.J. at 152, 649 A.2d 613 (quoting Freund, supra, 87 N.J. at 238 n. 1, 432 A.2d 925). In most failure-*68to-warn eases, the additional cost of a warning is rather minimal and “generally [has] little, if any, effect on a product’s utility.” Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 207, 485 A.2d 305 (1984) (citing Freund, supra, 87 N.J. at 238 n. 1, 242, 432 A.2d 925). An example of a case in which a warning may affect the product’s utility is nonprescription drugs. See Torsiello v. Whitehall Labs., 165 N.J.Super. 311, 322-26, 398 A.2d 132 (App.Div.) (holding that manufacturers of nonprescription drugs must warn self-prescribing public of every risk known to the manufacturers), certif. denied, 81 N.J. 50, 404 A.2d 1150 (1979).
I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that “there is no suitable location on the quench tank for a warning.” Supra, at 63, 675 A.2d at 635. Even after the tank was incorporated into the trecar-carbon regenerating system, it remained in the open. Moreover, any difficulty in observing the warning, as well as any expense associated with a proper warning, relate to whether a duty was breached rather than whether a duty existed. Macrie v. SDS Biotech Corp., 267 N.J.Super. 34, 42-44, 630 A.2d 805 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 565, 636 A.2d 522 (1993). Under appropriate common law risk-utility factors and the affirmative defense under N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-3a(l), I conclude that it was practical and technically feasible for International to have placed a warning on the tank.
-B-
The next issue is whether International, given its actual and presumed knowledge of the dangers inherent in using the quench tank for its intended purpose without installation of the safety devices, “acted in a reasonably prudent manner in ... [not] providing [a] warning[].” Becker, supra, 138 N.J. at 153, 649 A.2d 613.
The duty of a component part manufacturer to warn should not be limited to products containing a manufacturing or design defect as proposed by the American Law Institute, Tentative Draft No. 3, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 10 cmt. a *69(1996). “The whole theory of warning failure liability is that hidden danger constitutes a distinct category of defect, separate from manufacturing and design defect. The axiomatic point is totally erased if warning failure liability lies only in cases of design defect. Courts fumble badly by finding no duty to warn unless supplies are inherently unsafe. The crucial premise of warning failure liability is precisely that hidden danger makes a product inherently unsafe.” Mark McLaughlin Hager, “Don’t Say I Didn’t Warn You Even Though I Didn’t: Why the Pro-Defendant Consensus on Warning Law Is Wrong,” 61 Term. L.Rev. 1125, 1166 (1994). “The more knowledgeable the supplier [or manufacturer], the more susceptible it should be to liability.” Id. at 1163.
Furthermore, the duty to warn in a products liability case is “consonant with a manufacturer’s broader duty to place in the stream of commerce only products that are reasonably safe.” Coffman, supra, 133 N.J. at 598, 628 A.2d 710; Campos, supra, 98 N.J. at 207-08, 485 A.2d 305. The Act restricts the duty to warn to “the persons by whom the product is intended to be used.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C — 4. In Michalko, this Court stated that “when it is feasible for ... the manufacturer of component parts to incorporate a safety device and it fails to do so, the ... component part will be deemed to be a defective product when delivered by the manufacturer to its owner.” Supra, 91 N.J. at 395, 451 A.2d 179.
I agree with the Appellate Division that the rule in Michalko should drive the determination of whether a duty to warn exists in the present ease. Here, it was feasible for International to have attached a warning to the quench tank to caution intended users of the inherent dangers associated with using the tank for its intended purposes in the event Maxwell House failed to install the safety devices. In Michalko, this Court found that the manufacturer of a component part “is under a duty to warn owners and [intended] users of the dangers of using a particular machine if, "without such a warning, the machine is not reasonably safe.” Supra, 91 N.J. at 403, 451 A.2d 179. Furthermore, the Appellate Division properly interpreted Michalko to have determined that “where a safety *70device cannot be installed because of further processing of the product which would render the installation of the device premature, the manufacturer ... still has the duty to warn of the dangers of operating the machine without the protective device.” Lally v. Printing Mach. Sales & Serv. Co., 240 N.J.Super. 181, 186, 572 A.2d 1187 (App.Div.1990) (citing Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 402-03, 451 A.2d 179).
Similarly, the Appellate Division has interpreted Michalko as imposing a two-step duty on the manufacturer of component parts, “namely to install a safety device if it can be installed; if it cannot, to warn the employer to'install the device if possible, and to warn the employees of the danger.” Seeley v. Cincinnati Shaper Co., 256 N.J.Super. 1, 19, 606 A.2d 378 (App.Div.) (emphasis added), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 598, 617 A.2d 1220 (1992). “Further, the fact that the product was built according to the plans and specifications of the owner does not constitute a defense to a claim based on strict liability for [placing in the stream of commerce] a defective product when the injuries are suffered by an innocent foreseeable user of the product.” Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 395, 451 A.2d 179. Nor does Maxwell House’s “subsequent breach of duty [to install the safety devices] constitute a defense as a matter of law to plaintiffs strict liability claim against [the manufacturer].” Id. at 400, 451 A.2d 179.
A recent ease has applied Michalko to facts that are similar to those in Campos and the present ease. Molino v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 261 N.J.Super. 85, 89-90, 617 A.2d 1235 (App.Div.1992), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 482, 634 A.2d 528 (1993). In Molino, a tire and rim assembly exploded while plaintiff was attaching it to his truck. Ibid. The court imposed a duty on the manufacturer of a truck tire to warn the intended consumer of the danger inherent in handling one of the tires after it had been mounted on a rim assembly manufactured by another company and inflated. Id. at 93, 617 A.2d 1235.
The tire, conceded by plaintiff not to be defective, was manufactured by Uniroyal and contained no warning. Ibid. The rim *71assembly, manufactured by Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, was defective. Id. at 90, 93, 617 A.2d 1235. The court found that although the tire and rim assembly were manufactured by different companies, a jury should have been permitted to decide whether Uniroyal should have foreseen or had knowledge of the danger involved with the rim assembly used with its tires, and whether “Uniroyal’s duty to provide an adequate warning of hidden dangers to reasonably foreseeable users” had been breached. Id. at 94, 617 A.2d 1235.
Although the Molino court described the class of consumers as the “reasonably foreseeable users” identified in Suter, supra, 81 N.J. at 169, 406 A.2d 140, the Act imposes liability on a manufacturer or seller of a defective product only if “the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose____” N.J.S.A 2A:58C-2. That difference in language may suggest that the Act was intended to narrow the scope of Suter. Such a distinction, however, is unwarranted. Fabian, supra, 258 N.J.Super, at 273, 609 A.2d 487. First, the Act recognizes that the adequacy of a warning is to be determined, in part, based on “the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to, the persons by whom the product is intended to be used.” N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-4. Second, the Act did not intend to change the existing common law of the State. Jurado, supra, 131 N.J. at 384, 619 A.2d 1312. Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to the Act, makes clear that the Act did not intend to change Suter. Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 2805 (July 22,1987).
Furthermore, the public interest is best advanced by requiring the manufacturer of component parts to warn of dangers inherent in using the product without safety devices. Requiring the manufacturer to post a warning on the product furthers the public interest in that the warning serves to not only alert users of the inherent danger, but it also serves to alert intended users to check to see if safety devices have been installed. The duty to warn intended users in places of employment is particularly appropriate *72because the employee’s “ability to take care of himself’ or herself is limited. Cepeda, supra, 76 N.J. at 199, 386 A.2d 816 (Schreiber, J., concurring and dissenting); Campos, supra, 98 N.J. at 208, 485 A.2d 305; Bexiga, supra, 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d 281.
Simply because Maxwell House had an obligation to furnish its employees with a safe workplace did not relieve International of its duty to warn Maxwell House’s employees of dangers inherent in operating the quench tank without safety devices. Indeed, plaintiff was nearly scalded to death by the overflowing, quench tank, the precise hazard against which the safety devices were intended to guard if properly installed. International knew or should have known that the quench tank could be made operational without installation of the safety devices intended to protect against the very type of injury suffered by plaintiff. Whenever, as in this case, a jury can find that it is objectively foreseeable that an owner might use a product in a manner inconsistent with its intended purposes, such as by failing to install safety devices, then the manufacturer of component parts has a duty to warn the owner’s employees, provided that warning could have prevented or reduced the likelihood of an accident. Jurado, supra, 131 N.J. at 386-87, 619 A.2d 1312; Johansen v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 128 N.J. 86, 94-96, 607 A.2d 637 (1992); Soler, supra, 98 N.J. at 151, 484 A.2d 1225; Brown, supra, 98 N.J. at 168-69, 484 A.2d 1234. I do not believe the Act was intended to alter those aspects of the common law.
Contrary to defendant’s assertion, the duty to warn attaches without regard to the industry’s standards. Freund, supra, 87 N.J. at 243, 432 A.2d 925. Accordingly, custom in the trade does not control the fabricator’s duty to warn of dangers inherent in the use of the quench tank for its intended purpose without installation of safety devices. Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 397, 451 A.2d 179; Bexiga, supra, 60 N.J. at 411, 290 A.2d 281. Custom in the trade, however, may be of evidentiary value to a jury in determining the reasonableness of the fabricator’s decision not to attach a warning to the tank. See Mott v. Callahan AMS Mach. Co., 174 *73N.J.Super. 202, 206-09, 416 A.2d 57 (App.Div.1980) (finding that evidence of custom in trade presented a fact question for jury regarding reasonableness of decision not to warn). The fact that International may have understood that Maxwell House would install the safety devices in the holes it cut in the tank did not relieve International from potential liability based on its duty to warn. Ibid. That factor relates to proximate cause, not its duty to warn that I find to exist. Ibid.

II

The Court’s opinion also emphasizes that plaintiff did not produce evidence that the quench tank was defective for failure to warn. Plaintiff relied on the report of Angelo J. Valetutto, Engineering Consultant, plaintiffs expert. Valetutto stated in his report that plaintiff “and the other three operators were not given adequate warning on the potential for overflow of the Quench tank.” Because the claim based on a duty to warn was dismissed on a summary judgment. motion, plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of an inference that the above language was intended to cover International. Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523-24, 666 A.2d 146. Beyond that, expert opinion evidence is not always required to establish a need for a warning in an uncomplicated ease in which a jury has enough collective experience and knowledge to assess the claim. Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 283, 445 A.2d 1141 (1982); Macri v. Ames McDonough Co., 211 N.J.Super. 636, 643, 512 A.2d 548 (App.Div.1986). Moreover, the existence of a duty is a matter of law to be decided by the court. Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 15, 592 A.2d 527 (1991); Straum v. Canuso, 271 N.J.Super. 88, 100, 638 A.2d 141 (App.Div.1994), aff'd, 140 N.J. 43, 657 A.2d 420 (1995). Whether a duty exists is “largely a question of fairness or policy.” Strachan v. John F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp., 109 N.J. 523, 529, 538 A.2d 346 (1988); Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 194-95, 638 A.2d 1288 (1994). Because no warning was given, there is no issue about its adequacy.
*74Nor was an expert required on the issue of whether the absence of a warning was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries. Because the accident and the failure to warn in this case occurred in the employment context, plaintiff is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that he would have heeded a warning. That presumption establishes a prima facia case on the proximate cause issue. Coffman, supra, 133 N.J. at 599-603, 609, 628 A.2d 710; Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 133 N.J. 610, 622, 628 A.2d 724 (1993). It serves to “shift plaintiffs burden of proof on the issue of causation as it relates to the absence of a warning.” Coffman, supra, 133 N.J. at 603, 628 A.2d 710. Although the duty to warn is not automatically extinguished because the owner of the component part did not install safety devices, that intervening factor is another important consideration on the issue of proximate cause. Michalko, supra, 91 N.J. at 402, 451 A.2d 179.
I would affirm that portion of the Appellate Division decision that permitted plaintiff to proceed to trial on a theory of failure to warn.
HANDLER and O’HERN, JJ., join in this opinion.
For reversal — Chief Justice WILEÑTZ, and Justices POLLOCK, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 4.
For concurrence in part; dissenting in part — Justices HANDLER, O’HERN and COLEMAN — 3.