Court Opinion

ID: 9624080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:50:14.510486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:05.615056
License: Public Domain

Judge HUDSON
concurring in the result.
I agree that the decision of the Industrial Commission must be affirmed, but for different reasons than those above.
Unlike the majority, I believe this Court was correct when it stated in Brewington v. N.C. Dept. of Correction, 111 N.C. App. 833, 839, 433 S.E.2d 798, 801, disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 552, 438 S.E.2d 142 (1993), that, in cases under the Tort Claims Act, “the responsibility of weighing the credibility of the witnesses lies solely with the hearing commissioner.” In cases under the Workers’ Compensation Act, on the other hand, the Full Commission is required to make its own credibility determinations, and is not bound by the deputy commissioners who initially hear the cases. See Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998). There are differences in the language of the Tort Claims Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act that lead me to believe the legislature intended for the Full Commission to have an enhanced role on review in workers’ compensation claims that it did not intend or provide in the Tort Claims Act.
Under the Tort Claims Act, the Industrial Commission is specifically “constituted a court for the purpose of hearing and passing upon tort claims against the State [departments and agencies].” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 (1999). Although the Commission may promulgate rules for the processing of these claims, the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence specifically apply to tort claims. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-300 (1999). The claims are initially heard by a deputy commissioner sitting as trial judge. The first appeal of a decision is to the Full Commission, and “shall be heard ... on the basis of the record in the matter and upon oral argument of the parties.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-292 (1999). The Full Commission may not take new evidence in deciding the case. See id.
By contrast, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, the Industrial Commission was created by the General Assembly as “a commission.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-77(a) (1999). The Commission is “primarily an administrative agency of the State, charged with the duty of administering the provisions of the North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act.” Hanks v. Utilities Co., 210 N.C. 312, 319, 186 S.E. 252, 257 (1936) (citing In re Hayes, 200 N.C. 133, 139, 156 S.E. 791, 793 (1931)); see also Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 168, 128 *594S.E.2d 215, 217 (1962). The Commission is explicitly not a court of general jurisdiction, but is a quasi-judicial board with jurisdiction limited to that conferred upon it by the Legislature. See Letterlough, 258 N.C. at 168, 128 S.E.2d at 217; Bryant v. Doughtery, 267 N.C. 545, 548, 148 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1966). In workers’ compensation cases, the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Evidence do not apply, and the Commission is empowered to make its own rules; in fact, the statute requires that “(processes, procedures and discovery under this Article shall be as summary and simple as reasonably may be.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-80(a) (1999). The Workers’ Compensation Act provides for disputes to be heard by a deputy, and for review of the award of the deputy by the Full Commission. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-84, 97-85 (1999).
In conducting such review, the Full Commission “shall review the award, and, if good ground be shown therefor, reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, [and] rehear the parties or their representatives.” N.C.G.S. § 97-85. In Adams, the Supreme Court explicitly relied on this section in holding that “the ultimate fact-finding function [lies] with the [Full] Commission — not the hearing officer. It is the Commission that ultimately determines credibility, whether from a cold record or from live testimony.” Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 413. In a tort claims case, the Full Commission may not hear additional evidence and need not make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, in a workers’ compensation case, the commission can and must make its own findings of fact and conclusions. See Brewington, 111 N.C. App. at 838-39, 433 S.E.2d at 801. The courts have made it very clear that the Full Commission in a workers’ compensation case may not simply affirm and adopt the findings of a deputy commissioner, but is required to conduct its own review of the evidence, including credibility rulings. See Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 552-53 (2000) (citing Adams, 349 N.C. at 680-81, 509 S.E.2d at 413-14); Keel v. H & V Inc., 107 N.C. App. 536, 542, 421 S.E.2d 362, 367 (1992). I believe that the General Assembly has created a uniquely expansive role for the Full Commission in workers’ compensation cases and has not done so in tort claims. While the statute and the courts have clearly described the nature of this role in workers’ compensation cases, the Tort Claims Act does not have the same provisions and does not provide a basis for us to treat Full Commission review in tort claims any different from the way we typically treat credibility ridings by a judge, on appeal from a non-jury trial.
*595In a non-jury trial, the trial judge acts as both judge and jury, and resolves credibility issues as the trier of fact. See In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1996) (citing Williams v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 288 N.C. 338, 342, 218 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1975)). This court has summarized the usual standard of review of such findings as follows:
The findings of fact by a trial court in a non-jury trial have the force and effect of a verdict by a jury and are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence. . . . Henderson County v. Osteen, 38 N.C. App. 199, 247 S.E.2d 636 (1978), [judgment affirmed, 297 N.C. 113, 254 S.E.2d 160 (1979)]. [T]he trial court, having had the fullest opportunity to hear the testimony and observe the demeanor of the parties, to weigh any competent evidence either party cared to place before the court and arrive at appropriate conclusions [regarding the issues], . . . should be accorded deference unless his findings and conclusions are manifestly unsupported by the record.
McAulliffe v. Wilson, 41 N.C. App. 117, 120-21, 254 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1979). Given the different language in the Tort Claims Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act regarding review by the Full Commission, I do not find a reason to conclude that the Legislature intended to empower the Full Commission to overrule credibility determinations of the hearing officers in tort claims, as it clearly intended in workers’ compensation cases. I therefore conclude that review by the Full Commission of findings of the deputy commissioner in a tort claim is governed by this usual standard.
Here, the Full Commission completely disregarded the Deputy Commissioner’s determination that Trooper Stephenson’s testimony was not credible, which I do not believe it was empowered to do. Furthermore, in this determination it made a finding, challenged by plaintiff, that in my opinion is not supported by competent evidence in the record. In this finding (number 25), the Commission wrote that “Trooper Stephenson’s testimony regarding his actions as they relate to the shooting of Mr. Fennell is uncontradicted and is accepted as credible.” To the contrary, Trooper Stephenson’s testimony, particularly regarding the' distance between himself and Fennell during the shooting, was plainly contradicted by his own prior statements and by the forensic evidence.
However, because plaintiffs did not assign error to several other significant findings of the Full Commission, I concur in *596the result reached by the majority. Among these findings are the following:
15. After the two men separated, Mr. Fennell ran to and picked up the black bag and began to unzip it. Trooper Stephenson removed his service revolver when Mr. Fennell picked up the bag and told Mr. Fennell that if Mr. Fennell continued to attempt to get the gun, Trooper Stephenson would shoot him. Despite this warning, Mr. Fennell continued to attempt to remove the gun from the bag.
16. When Trooper Stephenson saw the butt of the gun coming out of the bag in Mr. Fennell’s hand, he fired once at Mr. Fennell. Trooper Stephenson did not know at that time whether he had hit Fennell with his first shot. After the first shot, Trooper Stephenson waited to determine what Mr. Fennell was doing. When Trooper Stephenson discovered that Mr. Fennell was still attempting to gain control of the gun, he again told Mr. Fennell not to remove the gun. After determining that Mr. Fennell was continuing to remove the gun from the bag, Trooper Stephenson fired a second shot at Mr. Fennell. After the second shot, Mr. Fennell continued removing the gun with his right hand. When Mr. Fennell cleared the gun from the bag and positioned it in Trooper Stephenson’s direction, Trooper Stephenson fired the third and fourth shots in rapid succession. These shots caused Mr. Fennell to spin to his right, where he fell with his face to the ground. Additionally, after these final two shots, Mr. Fennell’s gun flew from his hand. A gun was found later approximately twelve feet from the location of Mr. Fennell’s body.
As plaintiffs did not assign error to the above findings of fact, they are binding on appeal. See Long v. Morganton Dyeing & Finishing Co., 321 N.C. 82, 84, 361 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1987); N.C.R. App. P. 10(a). These findings do support the Commission’s conclusion that Trooper Stephenson believed he was in danger of being shot by Fennell and that he intended to inflict deadly force when he shot Fennell. Since the Tort Claims Act does not cover intentional acts which are reasonable, plaintiffs cannot recover. See Frazier v. Murray, 135 N.C. App. 43, 48, 519 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1999), appeal dismissed, 351 N.C. 354, 542 S.E.2d 209 (2000).