Court Opinion

ID: 9797333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:18:24.858799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:54:27.656472
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
—The Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989 (Pen. Code, § 12275 et seq.; hereafter the Act) bans certain semiautomatic firearms as “assault weapons,” listing them by *511make and model.1 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that many other guns not banned by the Act are identical to or functionally indistinguishable from those that are banned. According to plaintiffs, the Act draws no rational distinction between the guns that are prohibited and those that are not, thus violating state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws.
Unlike the majority, I agree with the Court of Appeal that plaintiffs’ complaint has adequately alleged an equal protection violation and that therefore plaintiffs are entitled to present evidence in support of their allegations.
Although I disagree with the majority’s rejection of plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, I join fully in parts I.B. and I.C. of the majority opinion, rejecting plaintiffs’ separation of powers and due process claims.
I
On January 17, 1989, a mentally disturbed man armed with a semiautomatic rifle fired 105 rounds at a Stockton schoolyard, killing five children and wounding many others. This tragedy prompted the Legislature’s passage of the Act some six months later.
In section 12275.5, the Act sets out the Legislature’s intent for its ban on assault weapons: “The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state. The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions on the use of assault weapons and to establish a registration and permit procedure for their lawful sale and possession. It is not, however, the intent ... to place restrictions on the use of those weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities.”
The Act defines as “assault weapons” certain semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns, listing them by manufacturer and model. (§ 12276.) It also contains a judicial “add-on” procedure allowing the Attorney General to *512petition a court to add certain other makes and models of firearms to the assault weapons list. (§ 12276.5, subd. (a)(1) and (2).)2
For guns classified as assault weapons, the Act makes their manufacture, distribution, import into the state, sale, or loan a felony punishable by up to eight years in state prison. (§ 12280, subd. (a)(1).) The Act also prohibits possession of such guns, an offense punishable by up to one year of imprisonment. (§ 12280, subd. (b).) But the Act has a “grandfather” provision allowing persons who owned assault weapons before June 1, 1989, or before they were judicially added to the list of assault weapons, to register them with the Department of Justice and then to have limited use of those guns. (§ 12285, subds. (a), (b)(1) and (c).)
II
In April 1991, plaintiffs filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the Act on various grounds. The first amended complaint asserted that section 12276.5’s judicial add-on procedure, which allows the Attorney General to petition a court to add certain other firearms to the assault weapons list, impermissibly assigned legislative functions to the judicial branch in violation of California Constitution, article VI, section 1. The complaint also alleged that the Act failed to provide fair warning to owners of the judicially added-on guns, thus violating principles of due process under the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 29). As I noted at the outset, I agree with the majority that as to either allegation plaintiffs have failed to adequately state a cause of action.
Plaintiffs’ complaint also alleged violations of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state Constitutions, contending the Act was constitutionally underinclusive because there was no rational basis for regulating the listed firearms but not regulating other identical or functionally indistinguishable guns.
The Attorney General demurred to plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeal reversed. This court granted the Attorney General’s petition for review, which raised, among others, this issue: Does a penal statute listing *513firearms by model, type, and series, and prohibiting their possession, sale, and use, violate principles of equal protection by failing to include on the list other functionally indistinguishable firearms? The answer is “yes,” as I explain below.
Ill
A
The federal Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1.) This provision does not create substantive rights. (San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez (1973) 411 U.S. 1, 33 [93 S.Ct. 1278, 1296-1297, 36 L.Ed.2d 16].) “Instead, it embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly.” (Vacco v. Quill (1997) 521 U.S. 793, 799 [117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, 138 L.Ed.2d 834].)
Like the federal Constitution, the California Constitution provides that “[a] person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a).)
As I stated recently in my dissenting opinion in Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 652 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 283, 982 P.2d 154]: “The United States Supreme Court and this court have enunciated three standards of review for deciding constitutional equal protection challenges. (See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) §§ 16-32, p. 1601 et seq.) For legislation containing a ‘suspect’ classification, such as race, or touching upon a fundamental interest, such as voting, courts have been directed to apply strict scrutiny and to uphold the legislation only if its classification is precisely tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. [Citations.] For legislation discriminating on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, courts are to apply intermediate scrutiny and to uphold the legislation only if its classification serves an important governmental objective and is substantially related to achievement of that objective. [Citations.] Finally, when the conditions requiring either strict or intermediate scrutiny are absent, courts are to apply what is commonly called the ‘rational basis’ standard of review, under which challenged legislation is upheld if its classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. [Citations.]”
Here, plaintiffs assert that the Act, when evaluated under the deferential rational basis test, violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws. Because I conclude that plaintiffs have adequately pled an equal *514protection cause of action under that standard, I do not address the applicability of any stricter test.
Although the majority and I both apply the rational basis test to this case, we reach different conclusions. I do, however, agree with the majority’s general observation that the right to equal protection granted to “persons” by the federal and state Constitutions extends not just to persons but to persons’ interests in things, such as plaintiffs’ interests in particular firearms covered by the Act. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 479-480, in this regard disagreeing with Benjamin v. Bailey (1995) 234 Conn. 455 [662 A.2d 1226, 1235-1237]; and disapproving California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1326 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591].)
B
The United States Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that its cases applying the rational basis standard have described that standard in differing, and oftentimes conflicting, ways. (See U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz (1980) 449 U.S. 166, 176-177, fn. 10 [101 S.Ct. 453, 460, 66 L.Ed.2d 368] [“The most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all of [this court’s rational basis] cases applied a uniform or consistent test under equal protection principles”].) But in its most recent pronouncements on the rational basis test, the high court has said this: “In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 313 [113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211]; accord, Central State Univ. v. American Assn. of Univ. Professors, Central State Univ. Chapter (1999) 526 U.S. 124, 127-128 [119 S.Ct. 1162, 1163, 143 L.Ed.2d 227] (Central State Univ.) [“‘a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose’ ”].)
The United States Supreme Court does not “require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, [and considers it] entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. at p. 315 [113 S.Ct. at p. 2102]; Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992) 505 U.S. 1, 15 [112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, 120 L.Ed.2d 1] [equal protection “does not demand for purposes of rational-basis *515review that a legislature . . . actually articulate ... the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”]; see also Central State Univ., supra, 526 U.S. at p. 129 [119 S.Ct. at p. 1164] (conc. opn. of Ginsburg, J.) [“for the mine run of economic regulations that do not trigger heightened scrutiny . . . ‘the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification’ ”].) And the high court has said that “those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.’ ” (FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., supra, 508 U.S. at p. 315 [113 S.Ct. at p. 2102].)
Although perhaps difficult to do, refuting every conceivable basis that might support the rationality of a legislative classification is not impossible. “[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, [courts must ascertain] the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained. The search for the link between classification and objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause.” (Romer v. Evans (1996) 517 U.S. 620, 632 [116 S.Ct. 1620, 1627, 134 L.Ed.2d 855].) That clause “does not forbid classifications,” but it does forbid “governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” (Nordlinger v. Hahn, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 10 [112 S.Ct. at p. 2331].) Thus, a statute may violate equal protection if it is underinclusive (benefiting or burdening only some members of a group of similarly situated individuals), and if there is no rational basis for its discriminatory treatment of different members of the group.
Here, the Act treats manufacturers and owners of semiautomatic firearms classified by make and model in section 12276’s list of assault weapons differently from those who manufacture and own other semiautomatic firearms. Manufacturers of firearms included in the list of assault weapons cannot make or sell those guns in California. (§ 12280, subd. (a)(1).) And owners of such firearms must register them with the Department of Justice to have even limited use of their guns. (§ 12285, subds. (a) and (c).) Noncompliance with these restrictions is punishable as a felony. (§ 12280, subds. (a)(1) and (b).) But for all other semiautomatic firearms, the Act imposes no registration requirement or limitation on their manufacture, transfer, or use.
Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the Act is unconstitutionally underinclusive because the regulated firearms are identical or functionally indistinguishable from unregulated firearms. According to the complaint, firearms covered by the Act pose no greater risk to the public than any other semiautomatic firearms, and Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics show that, in comparison to all other firearms, the guns classified in the Act’s list of assault weapons are rarely used in crime. The complaint further alleged *516that some of the guns not covered by the Act are actually more deadly than those classified as assault weapons, because the latter generally are designed for “down-powered military ammunition” intended to maximize wounding, not killing, in deference to the laws of war, while the former include hunting rifles, intended for killing. Plaintiffs assert that other omitted semiautomatic firearms are identical in weight or lighter than regulated guns, and shoot “similar or identical military-caliber ammunition at the same rate of fire, from magazines holding an equal number of rounds.”
Because the trial court here dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without giving them the opportunity to present evidence, those allegations must be “deemed true for the limited purpose of determining whether [the] plaintiff[s] [have] stated a viable cause of action.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157]; Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083].) Therefore, I assume the truth of plaintiffs’ allegations that the semiautomatic firearms specified in the Act as assault weapons are not in any material respect different from other semiautomatic firearms that, although identical to or functionally indistinguishable from the banned guns, are not subject to the Act.
As .1 have explained, the constitutional principle of equal protection prohibits a law from “treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” (Nordlinger v. Hahn, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 10 [112 S.Ct. at p. 2331]; see also Peoples Rights Organization, Inc. v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1998) 152 F.3d 522, 532-533 [invalidating on this ground the registration provision of an assault weapon law treating differently owners of functionally indistinguishable guns].) If in this case the factual allegations pleaded in plaintiffs’ complaint are true, the Act violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws by irrationally banning some but not all similar firearms. In my view, plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a cause of action alleging the Act’s equal protection violation.
In rejecting plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the majority states that the Legislature could properly address the prohibition and regulation of semiautomatic firearms one step at a time, banning some now and leaving until later the decision to ban others. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 488.) The majority wholly misapplies the rule it invokes, however. It fails to recognize that legislation does not automatically satisfy the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws simply by addressing only part of a problem. Contrary to the majority, it is not enough that the Legislature here thought that banning some—but not all—similar guns “would make California a safer place, even if only marginally and incrementally.” (Id. at p. 491.) Rather, the Legislature *517must have some rational basis for drawing the lines that it does; it may not arbitrarily choose whom to regulate and whom to leave untouched. Not only must the legislative objective (here, a reduction in gun violence) be rational, but the classifications drawn to advance that objective (here, the division between the weapons prohibited by the Act and those it permits) must also be rational.
“[Wjhen the legislative body proposes to address an area of concern in less than comprehensive fashion by ‘striking the evil where it is felt most’ [citation], its decision as to where to ‘strike’ must have a rational basis in light of the legislative objectives. The same principle was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305 [16 L.Ed.2d 577, 86 S.Ct. 627], when it stated, at pages 308-309 [86 S.Ct. at pages 1499-1500]: ‘The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within a class it establishes. [Citation.] It also imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. ... [T]he Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have “some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.” [Citations.]’ ” (Hays v. Woods (1979) 25 Cal.3d 772, 791 [160 Cal.Rptr. 102, 603 P.2d 19].)
The United States Supreme Court applied the requirement that any step-by-step approach have a rational basis for the disparities it creates in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. (1981) 449 U.S. 456, 466 [101 S.Ct. 715, 725, 66 L.Ed.2d 659]. There, Minnesota banned plastic disposable milk containers while permitting paper ones. Relying on a full record created by “extensive evidentiary hearings” (id. at p. 460 [101 S.Ct. at p. 722]), the high court explained that the distinction was justified by evidence of differences in the environmental consequences of the two different types of containers. It was only because of these differences between the two types of containers, demonstrated in the evidentiary hearings, that the court concluded that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not deny the State of Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to cause environmental problems [plastic], merely because another type [paper], already established in the market, is permitted to continue in use.” (Id. at p. 466 [101 S.Ct. at p. 725].)
Here, plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that the Act discriminates between owners and makers of different models of functionally indistinguishable guns, with members of one group facing severe criminal penalties for conduct that remains completely legal for similarly situated members of the other group. The majority cites no United States Supreme Court authority upholding any similar legislative scheme, much less authority for doing so at *518the pleading stage without conducting any evidentiary proceedings to resolve the merits of the issue. Just this year the high court reiterated that a complaint alleging, as does plaintiffs’ complaint here, that the government has treated similarly situated persons differently and that its differential treatment is irrational and arbitrary is “sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” (Village of Willowbrook v. Olech (2000) 528 U.S. 562, 565 [120 S.Ct. 1073, 1075, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060].)
In concluding that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ equal protection cause of action, I express no view on plaintiffs’ likelihood of success in proving the similarities between the regulated and unregulated semiautomatic firearms. At this juncture, I conclude only that plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts at the pleading stage permitting them to go forward on their equal protection claim.
Conclusion
Because of all-too-frequent tragic instances of gun violence, such as the Stockton schoolyard massacre that prompted the Legislature’s 1989 enactment of the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act at issue here, many in our society see the need for strict gun control. Others oppose all firearm regulation, believing that it threatens what the United States Supreme Court has called the “long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country.” (Staples v. United States (1994) 511 U.S. 600, 610 [114 S.Ct. 1793, 1799, 128 L.Ed.2d 608].) That public debate on gun policy is not before us here.
Californians who are divided on the need for strict gun control are generally united in supporting the constitutional principle of equal protection—that the government should treat similar cases alike, free of arbitrary or invidious distinctions. Here, plaintiffs have alleged that the Act, which bans some semiautomatic weapons but not others, lacks any rational basis for its choice of the guns that are subject to its requirements. At this early stage of the litigation, those allegations are sufficient, and plaintiffs should now be given the opportunity to prove, if they can, what they have so far only alleged. Unlike the majority, I would grant them this opportunity.
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied August 16, 2000. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
*519Appendix1
§ 12275. Short title
This chapter shall be known as the Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989. (Added by Stats.1989, c. 19, § 3.)
§ 12275.5. Legislative findings and declarations
The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the proliferation and use of assault weapons poses a threat to the health, safety, and security of all citizens of this state. The Legislature has restricted the assault weapons specified in Section 12276 based upon finding that each firearm has such a high rate of fire and capacity for firepower that its function as a legitimate sports or recreational firearm is substantially outweighed by the danger that it can be used to kill and injure human beings. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to place restrictions on the use of assault weapons and to establish a registration and permit procedure for their lawful sale and possession. It is not, however, the intent of the Legislature by this chapter to place restrictions on the use of those weapons which are primarily designed and intended for hunting, target practice, or other legitimate sports or recreational activities.
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 19, § 3.)
§ 12276. Assault weapon
As used in this chapter, “assault weapon” shall mean the following designated semiautomatic firearms:
(а) All of the following specified rifles:
(1) All AK series including, but not limited to, the models identified as follows:
(A) Made in China AK, AKM, AKS, AK47, AK47S, 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S.
(B) Norinco 56, 56S, 84S, and 86S.
(C) Poly Technologies AKS and AK47.
(D) MAADI AK47 and ARM.
(2) UZI and Galil.
(3) Beretta AR-70.
(4) CETME Sporter.
(5) Colt AR-15 series.
(б) Daewoo K-l, K-2, Max 1, Max 2, AR 100, and AR 110C.
(7) Fabrique Nationale FAL, LAR, FNC, 308 Match, and Sporter.
*520(8) MAS 223.
(9) HK-91, HK-93, HK-94, and HK-PSG-1.
(10) The following MAC types:
(A) RPB Industries Inc. sMIO and sMll.
(B) SWD Incorporated Mil.
(11) SKS with detachable magazine.
(12) SIG AMT, PE-57, SG 550, and SG 551.
(13) Springfield Armory BM59 and SAR-48.
(14) Sterling MK-6.
(15) Steyer AUG.
(16) Valmet M62S, M71S, and M78S.
(17) Armalite AR-180.
(18) Bushmaster Assault Rifle.
(19) Calico M-900.
(20) J&R ENG M-68.
(21) Weaver Arms Nighthawk.
(b) All of the following specified pistols:
(1) UZI.
(2) Encom MP-9 and MP-45.
(3) The following MAC types:
(A) RPB Industries Inc. sMIO and sMll.
(B) SWD Incorporated M-ll.
(C) Advance Armament Inc. M-ll.
(D) Military Armament Corp. Ingram M-ll.
(4) Intratec TEC-9.
(5) Sites Spectre.
(6) Sterling MK-7.
(7) Calico M-950.
(8) Bushmaster Pistol.
(c) All of the following specified shotguns:
(1) Franchi SPAS 12 and LAW 12.
(2) Striker 12.
(3) The Streetsweeper type S/S Inc. SS/12.
(d) Any firearm declared by the court pursuant to Section 12276.5 to be an assault weapon that is specified as an assault weapon in a list promulgated pursuant to Section 12276.5.
(e) The term “series” includes all other models that are only variations, with minor differences, of those models listed in subdivision (a), regardless of the manufacturer.
(f) This section is declaratory of existing law, as amended, and a clarification of the law and the Legislature’s intent which bans the weapons enumerated in this section, the weapons included in the list promulgated by the Attorney General pursuant to Section 12276.5, and any other models which *521are only variations of those weapons with minor differences, regardless of the manufacturer. The Legislature has defined assault weapons as the types, series, and models listed in this section because it was the most effective way to identify and restrict a specific class of semiautomatic weapons.
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 19, § 3. Amended by Stats.1991, c. 954 (S.B.263), §2.)
(Amended by Stats. 1992, c. 427 (A.B.3355), § 134; Stats.1993, c. 606 (A.B.166), § 19 eff. Oct. 1, 1993.)
§ 12276.1. Assault weapon; further definition
(а) Notwithstanding Section 12276, “assault weapon” shall also mean any of the following:
(1) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine and any one of the following:
(A) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon.
(B) A thumbhole stock.
(C) A folding or telescoping stock.
(D) A grenade launcher or flare launcher.
(E) A flash suppressor.
(F) A forward pistol grip.
(2) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has a fixed magazine with the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds.
(3) A semiautomatic, centerfire rifle that has an overall length of less than 30 inches.
(4) A semiautomatic pistol that has the capacity to accept a detachable magazine and any one of the following:
(A) A threaded barrel, capable of accepting a flash suppressor, forward handgrip, or silencer.
(B) A second handgrip.
(C) A shroud that is attached to, or partially or completely encircles, the barrel that allows the bearer to fire the weapon without burning his or her hand, except a slide that encloses the barrel.
(D) The capacity to accept a detachable magazine at some location outside of the pistol grip.
(5) A semiautomatic pistol with a fixed magazine that has the capacity to accept more than 10 rounds.
(б) A semiautomatic shotgun that has both of the following:
(A) A folding or telescoping stock.
(B) A pistol grip that protrudes conspicuously beneath the action of the weapon, thumbhole stock, or vertical handgrip.
(7) A semiautomatic shotgun that has the ability to accept a detachable *522magazine.
(8) Any shotgun with a revolving cylinder.
(b) “Assault weapon” does not include any antique firearm.
(c) The following definitions shall apply under this section:
(1) “Magazine” shall mean any ammunition feeding device.
(2) “Capacity to accept more than 10 rounds” shall mean capable of accommodating more than 10 rounds, but shall not be construed to include a feeding device that has been permanently altered so that it cannot accommodate more than 10 rounds.
(3) “Antique firearm” means any firearm manufactured prior to January 1, 1899.
(d) This section shall become operative January 1, 2000.
(Added by Stats.1999, c. 129 (S.B.23), § 7, operative Jan. 1, 2000.)
§ 12276.5. Temporary suspension of manufacture, sale, distribution, transportation, importation, or lending of alleged assault weapon; distribution of description
(a) Upon request by the Attorney General filed in a verified petition in a superior court of a county with a population of more than 1,000,000, the superior court shall issue a declaration of temporary suspension of the manufacture, sale, distribution, transportation, or importation into the state, or the giving or lending of a firearm alleged to be an assault weapon within the meaning of Section 12276 because the firearm is either of the following:
(1) Another model by the same manufacturer or a copy by another manufacturer of an assault weapon listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12276 which is identical to one of the assault weapons listed in those subdivisions except for slight modifications or enhancements including, but not limited to: a folding or retractable stock; adjustable sight; case deflector for left-handed shooters; shorter barrel; wooden, plastic or metal stock; larger magazine size; different caliber provided that the caliber exceeds .22 rimfire; or bayonet mount. The court shall strictly construe this paragraph so that a firearm which is merely similar in appearance but not a prototype or copy cannot be found to be within the meaning of this paragraph.
(2) A firearm first manufactured or sold to the general public in California after June 1, 1989, which has been redesigned, renamed, or renumbered from one of the firearms listed in subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 12276, or which is manufactured or sold by another company under a licensing agreement to manufacture or sell one of the firearms listed in subdivision (a) , (b), or (c) of Section 12276, regardless of the company of production or distribution, or the country of origin.
(b) Upon the issuance of a declaration of temporary suspension by the superior court and after the Attorney General has completed the notice *523requirements of subdivisions (c) and (d), the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 12280 shall apply with respect to those weapons.
(c) Upon declaration of temporary suspension, the Attorney General shall immediately notify all police, sheriffs, district attorneys, and those requesting notice pursuant to subdivision (d), shall notify industry and association publications for those who manufacture, sell, or use firearms, and shall publish notice in not less than 10 newspapers of general circulation in geographically diverse sections of the state of the fact that the declaration has been issued.
(d) The Attorney General shall maintain a list of any persons who request to receive notice of any declaration of temporary suspension and shall furnish notice under subdivision (c) to all these persons immediately upon a superior court declaration. Notice shall also be furnished by the Attorney General by certified mail, return receipt requested (or substantial equivalent if the person who is to receive the notice resides outside the United States), to any known manufacturer and California distributor of the weapon which is the subject of the temporary suspension order or their California statutory agent for service. The notice shall be deemed effective upon mailing.
(e) After issuing a declaration of temporary suspension under this section, the superior court shall set a date for hearing on a permanent declaration that the weapon is an assault weapon. The hearing shall be set no later than 30 days from the date of issuance of the declaration of temporary suspension.
The hearing may be continued for good cause thereafter. Any manufacturer or California distributor of the weapon which is the subject of the temporary suspension order has the right, within 20 days of notification of the issuance of the order, to intervene in the action. Any manufacturer or California distributor who fails to timely exercise its right of intervention, or any other person who manufactures, sells, or owns the assault weapon may, in the court’s discretion, thereafter join the action as amicus curiae.
(f) At the hearing, the burden of proof is upon the Attorney General to show by a preponderance of evidence that the weapon which is the subject of the declaration of temporary suspension is an assault weapon. If the court finds the weapon to be an assault weapon, it shall issue a declaration that it is an assault weapon under Section 12276. Any party to the matter may appeal the court’s decision. A declaration that the weapon is an assault weapon shall remain in effect during the pendency of the appeal unless ordered otherwise by the appellate court.
(g) The Attorney General shall prepare a description for identification purposes, including a picture or diagram, of each assault weapon listed in Section 12276, and any firearm declared to be an assault weapon pursuant to this section, and shall distribute the description to all law enforcement agencies responsible for enforcement of this chapter. Those law enforcement agencies shall make the description available to all agency personnel.
*524(h) The Attorney General shall promulgate a list that specifies all firearms designated as assault weapons in Section 12276 or declared to be assault weapons pursuant to this section. The Attorney General shall file that list with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations. Any declaration that a specified firearm is an assault weapon shall be implemented by the Attorney General who, within 90 days, shall promulgate an amended list which shall include the specified firearm declared to be an assault weapon. The Attorney General shall file the amended list with the Secretary of State for publication in the California Code of Regulations.
Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 11340) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, pertaining to the adoption of rules and regulations, shall not apply to any list of assault weapons promulgated pursuant to this section.
(i) The Attorney General shall adopt those rules and regulations that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purposes and intent of this chapter. (Added by Stats. 1989, c. 19, § 3. Amended by Stats. 1990, c. 874 (S.B.2444), § 1; Stats. 1991, c. 954 (S.B.263), § 3.)
§ 12277. Person
As used in this chapter, “person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or any other group or entity, regardless of how it was created.
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 19, § 3.)
(Amended by Stats. 1994, c. 1010 (S.B.2053), § 201.)
§ 12280. Manufacture, distribution, transportation, importation, sale, possession, or lending of assault weapon; punishment; commission of other crime; exceptions
(a) (1) Any person who, within this state, manufactures or causes to be manufactured, distributes, transports, or imports into the state, keeps for sale, or offers or exposes for sale, or who gives or lends any assault weapon, except as provided by this chapter, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for four, six, or eight years:
(2) In addition and consecutive to the punishment imposed under paragraph (1), any person who transfers, lends, sells, or gives any assault weapon to a minor in violation of paragraph (1) shall receive an enhancement of one year.
(b) Except as provided in Section 12288, and in subdivisions (c) and (d), any person who, within this state, possesses any assault weapon, except as provided in this chapter, is guilty of a public offense and upon conviction *525shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a county jail, not exceeding one year. However, if the person presents proof that he or she lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to June 1, 1989, or prior to the date it was specified as an assault weapon, and has since either registered the firearm and any other lawfully obtained firearm specified by Section 12276 or 12276.5 pursuant to Section 12285 or relinquished them pursuant to Section 12288, a first-time violation of this subdivision shall be an infraction punishable by a fine of up to five hundred dollars ($500), but not less than three hundred fifty dollars ($350), if the person has otherwise possessed the firearm in compliance with subdivision (c) of Section 12285. In these cases, the firearm shall be returned unless the court finds in the interest of public safety, after notice and hearing, that the assault weapon should be destroyed pursuant to Section 12028.
(c) A first-time violation of subdivision (b) shall be an infraction punishable by a fine of up to five hundred dollars ($500), if the person was found in possession of no more than two firearms in compliance with subdivision (c) of Section 12285 and the person meets all of the following conditions:
(1) The person proves that he or she lawfully possessed the assault weapon prior to the date it was defined as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276.1.
(2) The person is not found in possession of a firearm specified as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276 or Section 12276.5.
(3) The person has not previously been convicted of violating this section.
(4) The person was found to be in possession of the assault weapons within one year following the end of the one-year registration period established pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 12285.
(5) The person has since registered the firearms and any other lawfully obtained firearms defined by Section 12276.1, pursuant to Section 12285, except as provided for by this section, or relinquished them pursuant to Section 12288.
(d) Firearms seized pursuant to subdivision (c) shall be returned unless the court finds in the interest of public safety, after notice and hearing, that the assault weapon should be destroyed pursuant to Section 12028.
(e) Notwithstanding Section 654 or any other provision of law, any person who commits another crime while violating this section may receive an additional, consecutive punishment of one year for violating this section in addition and consecutive to the punishment, including enhancements, which is prescribed for the other crime.
(f) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to the sale to, purchase by, or possession of assault weapons by the Department of Justice, police departments, sheriffs’ offices, marshals’ offices, the Youth and Adult Corrections Agency, the Department of the California Highway Patrol, district attorneys’ offices, Department of Fish and Game, Department of Parks and Recreation, *526or the military or naval forces of this state or of the United States for use in the discharge of their official duties.
(g) Subdivision (b) shall not prohibit the possession or use of assault weapons by sworn peace officer members of those agencies specified in subdivision (f) for law enforcement purposes, whether on or off duty.
(h) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not prohibit the sale or transfer of assault weapons by an entity specified in subdivision (f) to a person, upon retirement, who retired as a sworn officer from that entity.
(i) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon by a retired peace officer who received that assault weapon pursuant to subdivision (h).
(j) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon, as defined in Section 12276, by any person during the 1990 calendar year, during the 90-day period immediately after the date it was specified as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276.5, or during the one-year period after the date it was defined as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276.1, if all of the following are applicable:
(1) The person is eligible under this chapter to register the particular assault weapon.
(2) The person lawfully possessed the particular assault weapon described in paragraph (1) prior to June 1, 1989, if the weapon is specified as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276, or prior to the date it was specified as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276.5, or prior to the date it was defined as an assault weapon pursuant to Section 12276.1.
(3) The person is otherwise in compliance with this chapter.
(k) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to the manufacture by persons who are issued permits pursuant to Section 12287 of assault weapons for sale to the following:
(l) Exempt entities listed in subdivision (f).
(2) Entities and persons who have been issued permits pursuant to Section 12286.
(3) Entities outside the state who have, in effect, a federal firearms dealer’s license solely for the purpose of distribution to an entity listed in paragraphs
(4) to (6), inclusive.
(4) Federal military and law enforcement agencies.
(5) Law enforcement and military agencies of other states.
(6) Foreign governments and agencies approved by the United States State Department.
(1) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon registered under Section 12285 or that was possessed pursuant to subdivision (g) or (i) which is disposed of as authorized by the probate court, if the disposition is otherwise permitted by this chapter.
*527(m) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to a person who is the executor or administrator of an estate that includes an assault weapon registered under Section 12285 or that was possessed pursuant to subdivision (g) or (i), if the assault weapon is possessed at a place set forth in paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 12285 or as authorized by the probate court.
(n) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to:
(1) A person who lawfully possesses and has registered an assault weapon pursuant to this chapter who lends that assault weapon to another if all the following apply:
(A) The person to whom the assault weapon is lent is 18 years of age or over and is not in a class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms by virtue of Section 12021 or 12021.1 of this code or Section 8100 or 8103 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(B) The person to whom the assault weapon is lent remains in the presence of the registered possessor of the assault weapon.
(C) The assault weapon is possessed at any of the following locations:
(1) While on a target range that holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range.
(ii) While on the premises of a target range of a public or private club or organization organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets.
(iii) While attending any exhibition, display, or educational project that is about firearms and that is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, firearms.
(2) The return of an assault weapon to the registered possessor which is lent by the same pursuant to paragraph (1).
(o) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to the possession of an assault weapon by a person to whom an assault weapon is lent pursuant to subdivision (n).
(p) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to the possession and importation of an assault weapon into this state by a nonresident if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) The person is attending or going directly to or coming directly from an organized competitive match or league competition that involves the use of an assault weapon.
(2) The competition or match is conducted on the premises of one of the following:
(i) A target range that holds a regulatory or business license for the purpose of practicing shooting at that target range.
(ii) A target range of a public or private club or organization that is organized for the purpose of practicing shooting at targets.
(3) The match or competition is sponsored by, conducted under the auspices of, or approved by, a law enforcement agency or a nationally or state recognized entity that fosters proficiency in, or promotes education about, *528firearms.
(4) The assault weapon is transported in accordance with Section 12026.1 or 12026.2.
(5) The person is 18 years of age or over and is not in a class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms by virtue of Section 12021 or 12021.1 of this code or Section 8100 or 8103 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(q) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to any of the following persons:
(1) A person acting in accordance with Section 12286.
(2) A person who has a permit to possess an assault weapon issued pursuant to Section 12286 when he or she is acting in accordance with Section 12285 or 12286.
(r) Subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not apply to any of the following persons:
(1) A person acting in accordance with Section 12285.
(2) A person acting in accordance with Section 12286 or 12290.
(s) Subdivision (b) shall not apply to the registered owner of an assault weapon possessing that firearm in accordance with subdivision (c) of Section 12285.
(t) Subdivision (a) shall not apply to the importation into this state of an assault weapon by the registered owner of that assault weapon, if it is in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (c) of Section 12285.
(u) As used in this chapter, the date a firearm is an assault weapon is the earliest of the following:
(1) The effective date of an amendment to Section 12276 that adds the designation of the specified firearm.
(2) The effective date of the list promulgated pursuant to Section 12276.5 that adds or changes the designation of the specified firearm.
(3) The operative date of Section 12276.1, as specified in subdivision (b) of that section.
(Added by Stats.1989, c. 19, § 3. Amended by Stats.1989, c. 959, § 1; Stats. 1990, c. 177 (S.B.830), § 5, eff. June 27, 1990; Stats. 1990, c. 653 (S.B.2480), §2; Stats. 1991, c. 952 (A.B.1904), §4; Stats. 1991, c. 954 (S.B.263), § 4.5.).
(Amended by Stats.1992, c. 1326 (A.B.3552), § 13; Gov.Reorg.Plan No. 1 of 1995, §51, eff. July 12, 1995; Stats.1996, c. 305 (A.B.3103), §52; Stats. 1999, c. 129 (S.B.23), § 8.)

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

To be added to the assault weapon list under the judicial add-on procedure, a gun must be “[ajnother model by the same manufacturer or a copy by another manufacturer” of a listed firearm (§ 12276.5, subd. (a)(1)), or a firearm first manufactured or sold in California after June 1, 1989, that had been “redesigned, renamed, or renumbered” from a listed firearm, or a firearm “manufactured or sold by another company under a licensing agreement” for one of the listed firearms (id., subd. (a)(2)).

Derived from West’s Annotated Penal Code (CD-Rom, Jan. 2000).