Court Opinion

ID: 9426343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:37.446194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:00.369018
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, concurring.
I join in most of the Court's opinion, and I agree with its conclusion that an order preventing a defendant from consulting with his attorney during an overnight recess violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Court notes that this case does not involve an order barring communication between defendant and counsel during a “brief routine recess during the trial day.” 1 Ante, at 89 n. 2. That is, of course, true. I would add, however, that I do not understand the Court’s observation as suggesting that as a general rule no constitutional infirmity would inhere in an order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney during a “brief routine recess.” In my view, the general principles adopted by the Court today are fully applicable to the analysis of any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney, at least where that communication would not interfere with the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.
Thus, as the Court holds, a defendant who claims that an order prohibiting communication with his lawyer impinges upon his Sixth Amendment right to counsel need not make a preliminary showing of prejudice. Such an *93order is inherently suspect, and requires initial justification by the Government.
The only justification expressly considered by the Court in its opinion is the desire to avoid the risk of unethical counseling by an attorney.2 The Court holds that the fear of unethical conduct is not a sufficient ground for an order barring overnight communication between a defendant and his attorney, and the same would hold true absent the most unusual circumstances, I take it, for an order barring consultation between a defendant and his attorney at any time before or during the trial.3 If our adversary system is to function according to design, we must assume that an attorney will observe his responsibilities to the legal system, as well as to his client. I find it difficult to conceive of any circumstances that would justify a court’s limiting the attorney’s opportunity to serve his client because of fear that he may disserve the system by violating accepted ethical standards. If any order barring communication between a defendant and his attorney is to survive constitutional inquiry, it must be for some reason other than a fear of unethical conduct.

 I would assume, however, that the Court’s repeated reference to the length of the overnight recess in this case — 17 hours — is not intended to have any dispositive significance, and that the Court’s holding is at least broad enough to cover all overnight recesses.

 For the distinction between ethical and unethical counseling, see ante, at 90 n. 3.

 The Court suggests, however, that “doubts that defense counsel will observe the ethical limits on guiding witnesses” would justify such actions as postponing the luncheon recess or extending the normal adjournment hour in order to complete the defendant’s testimony. Ante, at 90-91. I would assume that trial courts generally take such steps out of a desire to move the trial along in an orderly and expeditious fashion, not out of fear that defense counsel might exceed the bounds of ethical conduct if given the opportunity. And I am unwilling to endorse the notion that where the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial would not be served, the trial court should nevertheless feel free to continue the defendant’s testimony without interruption because of a belief that defense counsel is likely to act unethically.