Court Opinion

ID: 9607336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:57:42.205155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:58.163154
License: Public Domain

Gordon, J.,
concurring in result.
I concur in the decision to reverse and remand on the ground that clause 3 of Instruction No. 1 was erroneous, in that it applied the comparative negligence rule for failure to sound the whistle. My only substantial disagreement is with the holding that clause 4 of Instruction No. 1 {ante, footnote 1) correctly set forth the bell-ringing requirements of the Staunton ordinance, upon which the *183application of the comparative negligence rule rested. In my opinion, the deviation is not proper in this case.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, §§ 56-414 and 56-416 of the Code of Virginia prescribe only mitigation of damages for comparative negligence, instead of the bar of contributory negligence, if the signals required by law are not given — so far as here pertinent, if the bell was not rung as required by ordinance of the city of Staunton.
The Staunton ordinance (Sec. 13-44, ante, footnote 2) requires that the “bell shall be rung whenever the engine is to cross a street and shall continue ringing until such engine shall have passed such crossing”, and ordains that the owner of the engine and the person having control of the engine shall be “guilty” of violation of the ordinance “If any such engine shall pass across any street in the city without first ringing and continuing to ring such bell in the manner aforesaid”. (Emphasis supplied) Clause 4 of Instruction No. 1, on the other hand, requires that the bell be rung “continuously from such distance east of the crossing as would give the plaintiff reasonable notice of the approach of the train”, upon pain of the invoking of the comparative negligence rule against the defendant. This, I believe, is not “required” by the Staunton ordinance, and is an improperly liberal interpretation of the intent of the Staunton ordinance in this case.
As stated in the majority opinion with respect to Code § 56-416, “Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms”. The common law rule that contributory negligence is a bar to recovery has been followed in this State for many years. The only deviation authorized by the Legislature, I believe, is found in Code §§ 56-414 and 56-416, applying the comparative negligence rule for failure to give the required railroad signals.1
In Instruction No. 3 a, a finding instruction for the defendant, the court told the jury that the defendant was not guilty of negligence if (among other matters) “the bell on the locomotive was ringing for a reasonable distance east of the crossing”. This was an instruc*184tion on the common law duties and, as such, not objectionable. But the case is quite different, I believe, in instructing the jury on comparative negligence (as was the case in Instruction No. 1) where the instruction is based on an interpretation of enactments in derogation of the common law.
It may be conceded that varying interpretations might be given to the intent of the Staunton ordinance. It requires ringing “whenever the engine is to cross a street” and declares the ordinance violated if the engine has “passed across any street” without first ringing and continuing to ring “in the manner aforesaid”. It does not state expressly that the ringing shall begin immediately before the engine reaches the outer limit of the street, and it specifies no point at which the ringing shall begin. Moreover, if the intent of the ordinance is to require bell-ringing only immediately before reaching the outer limit of the street, it may be regarded as a rather ineffectual accident-preventive enactment. But these considerations do not serve as the basis for arguing that this court should conclude that the Staunton ordinance requires what it obviously does not require by its language, when we are dealing with enactments in derogation of the common law. Such arguments should be addressed to the Staunton city Council, if the language of the ordinance is to be changed.
Violation of the bell-ringing ordinance is a misdemeanor. (Section 1-5 of the Staunton Code provides a criminal penalty for violation of Sections 13-43 and 13-44, the whistle-blowing and bell-ringing ordinances.) It is obvious, I believe, that a person should not be convicted of the crime of failing to ring a bell “whenever the engine [under his control] is to cross a street”, upon evidence supporting only the finding that he failed to ring the bell “continuously from such distance east of the crossing as would give . . . [another person] reasonable notice of the approach of the train”. Nevertheless, by approving clause 4 of Instruction No. 1, this court is saying that this reasonable notice is a requirement of the ordinance. It should follow, then, that a jury would be permitted to convict an accused by applying a standard that is not mentioned in, nor reasonably implied by the language of, the ordinance.
Furthermore, I am not persuaded that the court properly searched the mind of the city Council before giving clause 4 of Instruction No. 1, even if such mind-searching were permitted. The language of the whistle-blowing and bell-ringing ordinances (Sections 13-43 and 13-44, ante, footnote 2) evidences the concern of the city *185Council about disturbing noises within the city limits, and the ordinances may properly be interpreted to require the least whistle-blowing and bell-ringing practicable. The expressed purpose of the whistle-blowing ordinance is to prevent the blowing, with an exception: “to give appropriate and necessary signals or to warn or prevent accidents”. The bell-ringing ordinance does not contain the language just quoted, and the city Council in its wisdom may have concluded that bell-ringing only while in the crossing was most consistent with its objectives.

 It may be noted that, In adopting § S6-414, the Legislature took pains to describe the precise point at which the signals must begin. The Legislature did not lay down the standard of reasonable notice, leaving it to the jury to determine whether the standard had been observed, but fixed the precise places where the signals should be given and continued.