Court Opinion

ID: 9594666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:42.526781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:24.325116
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority holds that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the issue of the defendant's character and, even if there was error, the error was harmless. The record, unquestionably, shows that the defendant was entitled to a good character instruction and that the trial court erred in refusing to give any instruction on the issue. Given the circumstantial nature of the State's case and the significant role character evidence played in the defendant's theory of the case, the failure to instruct on the use of good character evidence was prejudicial error. I would reverse.
Good Character Instruction
A defendant is allowed to prove good character on the premise that it is improbable that a person with certain "good" character traits would commit a crime inconsistent with those traits. See ER 404(a)(1), ER 405(a); 1A J. Wig-more, Evidence § 56, at 1161 (rev. ed. 1983). The purpose of a good character instruction is to explain to the jury the *868rules applicable to character evidence, the purpose for which it may be considered, and the legal effect which it may be given. 13 R. Ferguson, Wash. Prac., Criminal Practice and Procedure § 3911, at 389 (1984).
The majority states that our cases addressing the proper wording of a good character instruction are in disarray. Our cases are not in the state of confusion suggested by the majority and are easily harmonized.
Since the earliest days of statehood, this court has followed the rule that a criminal defendant is entitled, if requested, to a specific instruction on the use of character evidence when the defendant introduces evidence of good character. State v. Allen, 89 Wn.2d 651, 654, 574 P.2d 1182 (1978); State v. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527, 533, 45 P. 145 (1896); see 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1208 (1961). This court's Committee on Jury Instructions recommends that a good character instruction be given in "every case" where evidence of the defendant's character has been admitted on the issue of guilt. Comment, WPIC 6.12 (Supp. 1986). Our cases, however, have quibbled over the precise wording of a good character instruction.
In Allen, this court approved the following instruction:
Evidence has been presented in this case which bears upon the good character and good reputation of the defendant. Such evidence is pertinent and proper in a criminal proceeding, and may in and of itself create a doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Certainly such evidence should be considered by you, along with all the other evidence, in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
(Italics mine.) Allen, at 653. In State v. Mark, 94 Wn.2d 520, 618 P.2d 73 (1980), the defendant requested a good character instruction nearly identical to the one approved in Allen. The trial court, declining to honor this request, gave an alternative instruction which deleted the language that good character may "in and of itself" create a doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. This court held that although such instructional language is a correct statement of the *869law, it is not error to omit the "in and of itself" phrase where the jury is otherwise instructed on the issue of good character. Mark, at 525-26; accord, State v. Humphreys, 118 Wash. 472, 477-78, 203 P. 965 (1922). Read together, our cases stand for the proposition that a good character instruction must be given, if requested, in every case where the defendant has introduced evidence of his good character on the issue of guilt, but inclusion of the "in and of itself" phrase is left to the discretion of the trial court.
The defendant requested the following instruction on the use of the good character evidence:
Evidence of the defendant's good character may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt whether the defendant is guilty, where doubt would otherwise not exist.
Clerk's Papers, at 19. Although this instruction was a correct statement of the law at the time of trial (see Mark, at 525-26; Allen, at 658), the majority holds the instruction was properly refused because it implies that good character evidence may "in and of itself" generate reasonable doubt. In so holding, the majority overrules Mark and Allen. *870this instruction under the mistaken belief that no good character instruction was necessary.
*869In any event, the majority's focus on the appropriateness of an instruction that suggests that character evidence may "in and of itself" create a doubt as to the guilt of the defendant turns a blind eye to the record. At the jury instruction conference, defense counsel agreed to delete the language the majority now finds offensive. Defense counsel then requested that the jury be instructed that evidence of the defendant's good character be taken into consideration, along with all other evidence, in determining guilt.1 A careful review of the record shows that the trial court rejected
*870This proposed modification is, in substance, identical to the instruction adopted today by the majority. Curiously, the majority fails to discuss whether the failure to give this instruction was error.
I am also unable to agree with the implication in the majority opinion that the trial court's error is cured by the remaining instructions read and viewed as a whole. See State v. Elder, 70 Wn.2d 414, 419, 423 P.2d 533 (1967). The instructions that the jury consider "all of the evidence" do not cover the substance of the requested instruction. Missing from the court's instructions is an explanation of character evidence, its purpose and the legal effect it can be given.
Here, the defendant introduced evidence of his good character on the issue of guilt. His proposed instruction that evidence of good character may "in and of itself" raise a reasonable doubt correctly expressed the law at the time of trial. The defendant also had the foresight to propose an instruction that is, in substance, identical to the instruction adopted by the majority. In the face of clear and unmistakable authority, the trial court refused both instructions, and refused to give any instruction on the issue of good character. This was error.
Harmless error
The majority concedes that the defendant's theory of the case was that since he had a good reputation for sexual decency, it would be unlikely that he would commit the crime charged. A refusal to give a requested instruction constitutes reversible error where the absence of the instruction prevents the complaining party from fully and sensibly arguing his theory of the case to the jury. See State v. Jones, 95 Wn.2d 616, 623, 628 P.2d 472 (1981); *871State v. Walker, 82 Wn.2d 851, 855-56, 514 P.2d 919 (1973).
The majority does not find reversible error because defense counsel was permitted to mention the testimony of the witnesses during closing argument. While defense counsel mentioned the good character testimony in closing argument, the jury was left without any guidance as to what part the defendant's good character could play in their verdict. The jury was not informed that the defendant was allowed to present evidence of his good character to raise the inference that it is improbable that a person of good character would have committed the offense charged; that good character is a substantive fact capable of generating a reasonable doubt; and that such evidence is to be considered, along with the rest of the evidence, in determining whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the charge. In the absence of a good character instruction, it is highly probable that the jury "discount[ed] or ignore[d] character evidence, not perceiving its relevance to the issue of guilt." Allen, at 655.
Furthermore, the court instructed the jury that it must "accept the law from the court" and advised that the "attorneys may properly discuss any specific instructions they think are particularly significant." Clerk's Papers, at 5. Later the court charged the jury:
Counsel['s] remarks, statements and arguments are intended to help you understand the evidence and apply the law. They are not evidence, however, and you should disregard any remark, statement or argument which is not supported by the evidence or the law given to you by the court.
(Italics mine.) Clerk's Papers, at 6. The jury was told in no uncertain terms that it was not to consider matters not sanctioned by the court. Because defense counsel was denied the opportunity to tie the good character evidence to any law in the case, the only reasonable conclusion the *872jury could reach was that good character was not a fact to be considered.
The majority next makes the absurd argument that error was harmless because the character evidence represents 14 pages of testimony and because one more sentence in the instructions would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Majority, at 863-64. These statements provide clear evidence that the majority does not understand either the purpose of good character evidence or the role such evidence plays in a criminal case.
Finally, the majority states that it reviewed the record and then makes the conclusory statement that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected by the omitted instruction. The record does not support the majority's conclusion.
The proof at defendant's trial was totally circumstantial. The defendant denied that he raped the victim. Some evidence tended to show that another man in the house may have committed the assault. The medical testimony did not conclusively establish the time of the alleged rape and certain expert testimony was inconsistent with the victim's recollection of the assault. Identification was also in doubt as the victim did not see her assailant and there was no physical evidence linking the defendant to the crime.
The trial turned entirely on the credibility of the victim and the defendant. The defendant's good character was directly tied to the believability of his claim that he did not commit the crime and his character was the only defense he could present to the jury. See State v. Hosey, 54 Wash. 309, 103 P. 12 (1909).
Character evidence is highly relevant where, as here, the defendant denies having committed the crime and the State's case is based on circumstantial evidence. Given these circumstances, I can only conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial was affected by the trial court's failure to properly instruct the jury on the use of the good character evidence.
*873Conclusion
The trial court's failure to instruct on the use of character evidence was prejudicial error. I would reverse the trial court and the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial.
Goodloe, J., concurs with Dore, J.

CrR 6.15 evidences a preference for written instructions. See CrR 8.7; CR 51(f). I do not believe that the defendant should be penalized for not submitting the proposed modification in writing. The record indicates that the trial judge understood the substance of the request as well as the proposed language, thereby enabling the judge to correct the error before the jury was instructed. See Seattle v. Rainwater, 86 Wn.2d 567, 571, 546 P.2d 450 (1976).