Court Opinion

ID: 9735862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:33:17.948705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:01.402132
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KAPALA, dissenting: Respondent concedes that he waived his right to challenge for the first time on appeal the admissibility of the testimony of the State’s experts regarding their use of three actuarial instruments: the RRASOR, the MnSOST-R, and the Static 99. I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which circumvents waiver by concluding that it was plain error to admit expert testimony regarding the use of those three instruments. Plain error is a limited and narrow exception to the general waiver rule, to be invoked only when the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so substantial that it denied the defendant a fair trial. People v. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d 105, 128 (2001). It is the defendant who has the burden of showing plain error. People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003). In this case, the evidence was not closely balanced on the issue of respondent being a sexually violent person. Respondent had a history of prior sex offenses. The evidence also showed he denied wrongdoing, refused to undergo treatment, and placed blame on the victims. More importantly, both State experts, relying on information separate from the actuarial instruments, opined he was a sexually violent person who had a high risk of reoffending in the future. Dr. Buck based her opinion on her clinical assessment of respondent, his past history, and her experience. Dr. Heaton relied on similar information to reach his opinion. Even respondent’s own expert, Dr. Brown, diagnosed respondent as suffering from adult antisocial behavior and paraphilia. He also testified that respondent did not accept full responsibility for his acts. Moreover, he conceded respondent posed a “moderate risk to reoffend.” I simply cannot conclude, in light of this evidence showing the seriousness of respondent’s sexual disorder and his likelihood of reoffending, that the evidence was so closely balanced as to justify imposition of the plain error doctrine. I also do not consider the error in allowing the experts to testify regarding the actuarial instruments to be so substantial that it deprived respondent of a fair trial. This second prong of the plain error exception is to be invoked only where the possible error is so serious that its consideration is necessary to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Kuntu, 196 Ill. 2d at 128. Here, the reliance by the State’s experts on the actuarial instruments was, at best, insubstantial. Dr. Buck utilized the Static 99 and MnSOST-R but not the RRASOR. Dr. Heaton utilized the RRASOR and the MnSOST-R but not the Static 99. Further, their use of these instruments played a minimal role, if any, in reaching their ultimate opinions as to respondent’s likelihood of reoffending. Dr. Buck testified that she had already formulated her opinion that respondent qualified as a sexually violent offender before utilizing the actuarial instruments. She also stated on redirect examination that the two instruments “simply confirmed [her] clinical opinion” and that she would never form an opinion of the probability of someone committing future acts of sexual violence based on actuarial studies alone. In a similar vein, Dr. Heaton testified, with no mention of actuarial instruments, that based on his evaluation and experience he believes respondent suffers from paraphilia and other psychological disorders that predispose him to commit acts of sexual violence. As for the RRASOR and the MnSOST-R, Dr. Heaton testified that they do not reflect a particular individual’s risk of reoffending, but merely place a person in a category of people who have a certain risk of committing sex offenses. According to Dr. Heaton, he would never form an opinion of someone’s risk to reoffend based on an actuarial study alone because it is only a screening tool and there are a “number of other significant risk factors” and “all kinds of information” that must be considered. Dr. Heaton conceded that in respondent’s case, the RRASOR is not an accurate indicator because it underestimates respondent’s risk to reoffend based on the additional information that indicates his risk is much greater. Dr. Heaton added that it is not good practice to rely solely on a combination of actuarial instruments, and they should only be compared to the independent assessment of an individual. It is worth noting that this case involves more than just respondent neglecting to object to the State’s experts’ testimony regarding the actuarial instruments. Respondent’s own expert, Dr. Brown, used the RRASOR and the MnSOST-R to evaluate respondent and incorporated the results in his testimony on behalf of respondent. It is evident when the record is viewed in its entirety that any error in admitting testimony regarding the use of the three actuarial instruments at issue in this case was not so substantial as to have deprived respondent of a fair trial. It is clear that the State’s experts limited their use of the actuarial instruments as a method of cross-reference. They also stated unequivocally that they did not use the actuarial instruments to formulate their opinions but, rather, to confirm them. Based on the three experts’ explanations of the limited purpose of the actuarial instruments, it would seem unlikely the trial court placed much, if any, weight on the use of those instruments in reaching its finding that respondent is a sexually violent person. Under the facts of this case, I would not find plain error and would, therefore, affirm the order of the circuit court.