Court Opinion

ID: 9576326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:23:16.186703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:42.902489
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring). This reconsideration of State v. Thomas, 144 Wis. 2d 876, 425 N.W.2d 641 (1988) (Thomas I), results from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
While I vote with the majority in its ultimate disposition of this case, I write separately because I do not agree with several of the majority opinion's conclusions. First, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the standards set forth in Thomas I and Coy are necessarily the same. I think that the majority opinion has restated Thomas I in terms of Coy and that the opinion on reconsideration (Thomas II) in effect supersedes Thomas I. Second, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion (at 387-388) that the circuit court's reasoning supporting its exercise of discretion satisfied the *395requirements set forth in Coy. Finally, I think the majority opinion erroneously jumbles together the hearsay and confrontation issues that arise from the use of videotaped testimony.
In Coy, the child testified in the courtroom, before the factfinders, with a screen between her and defendant. Coy thus speaks directly to the requirements of the confrontation clause regarding admissibility of statements made by a witness at trial.
In Thomas the child testified outside the courtroom, before a judge (not the jury), with a screen between her and the defendant, and with counsel for both parties questioning the child in accordance with sec. 967.04(7)-(10). At the Thomas trial, the videotape of the child's testimony was shown to the jury in lieu of her live testimony. Thomas thus involves the admissibility of statements by a witness who does not appear live at trial.
I conclude, as does the majority, that both screen and videotape procedures implicate the central issue in Coy — when do special protective procedures for witnesses violate the core guarantee of the Confrontation Clause, i.e., the defendant's right to face a witness at trial. Although the majority subscribes to an undefined functional equivalency theory respecting videotape and live testimony at trial, it apparently concludes that videotape per se requires the same threshold showing of necessity as other procedures which the Supreme Court recognizes as constituting a significant interference with the defendants' "core" confrontation rights.
Thomas I. The majority opinion concludes that there is "no need to modify any of the language of Thomas [I]. We confirm it in its entirety ." At 394. The 23-page Thomas II opinion on reconsideration is characterized as "explanatory comments" (at 376) and as a supplement (at 394) to the original opinion. I agree with *396the state's suggestion that this court, for the sake of clarity, should issue an opinion which supercedes the Thomas I opinion. People should not have to read two lengthy opinions and try to figure out which one controls. I think the tests in Thomas I and II are stated differently. Compare, e.g., majority opinion at 386-387 (particularized findings) and 144 Wis. 2d at 892-93 balancing formula based on "best interest of the child."
When I read the two Thomas opinions, I believe, despite the majority opinion's protestations to the contrary, that Thomas II has, for all intents and purposes, superseded Thomas I.
The Coy Case. The Coy majority concluded that the irreducible literal meaning of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause is a guarantee to the defendant of a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact at trial. 108 S. Ct. at 2800. See also id. at 2803.
The Coy majority recognized, without acknowledging the constitutionality of particular exceptions,1 that whatever exception there may be to the "core" right established in the confrontation clause would have to meet at least two threshold requirements that the Court has previously recognized as applying to "exceptions from the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause." 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
*397First, any exception "would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy." Id. Second, "any conceivable exception" would require "individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection." Id.2
The majority opinion assumes that both the videotape and the screen must, at a minimum, meet these threshold requirements set forth in Coy. But see p. 377 supra and pp. 382-387 infra.
Public Policy Interest In Protecting Child Witnesses. The first requirement set forth in Coy is that any exception to the core right in the confrontation clause must further an important public policy. The Wisconsin legislature and this court have recognized that a child witness may suffer special trauma from exposure to typical trial procedures. Both the legislature and this court have concluded that child witnesses may need additional consideration and different procedures than those usually afforded to adults to protect the well-being of the child witness and to enable the child to give effective, truthful testimony. Sec. 967.04(7), Stats. 1987-88; State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 517-518, 326 N.W.2d 744 (1982). See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
1 conclude that the state has a compelling interest in safeguarding the well-being of a child witness and in enabling the child witness to give truthful testimony.
Thus, an exception to the constitutional requirement of face-to-face testimony before the factfinder may be justified when there is substantial likelihood that the child witness will suffer significant psychological or emo*398tional trauma if the child testifies in the presence of the defendant at trial.
Or an exception may be justified under the constitution when there is substantial likelihood that the child witness will not be able to give effective, truthful testimony in the presence of the defendant at trial, thereby undermining the purpose of confrontation as an aid to truth-finding. Cf. Coy at 2809 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
I would also conclude that, under Coy, a child's mere nervousness, excitement and reluctance to testify in the courtroom or before the defendant are not sufficient to justify an exception to face-to-face testimony before the factfinder.
Individualized Finding of Necessity for Special Protection. The second requirement set forth in Coy, and the essence of the Court's holding in that case, is that the trial court must make specific and particularized findings, grounded in the record, concerning the particular child's need to be excused from testifying face-to-face with the defendant at trial. Coy clearly states that generalized, legislatively imposed presumptions about traumatization of the child witness are an insufficient basis upon which a court may premise an exception to the constitutional right of face-to-face confrontation before the fact-finder. 108 S. Ct. at 2803.
In Globe Newspapers Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-608 (1982), the Court concluded that a trial court should consider the following factors, among others, in making a case-by-case determination in safeguarding the psychological and physical well-being of a child: the child's age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the child, and the interests of the parents and relatives. Section 967.04(7) (b), Stats. 1987-88, sets forth additional factors that might guide the circuit court in Wisconsin. I *399think that the individualized finding requirement in Coy might also be read as implying that the circuit court should explain, on the record, why it has ruled out alternatives that are less intrusive on the defendant's constitutional confrontation rights.
In Thomas, the only evidence from which the circuit court could determine the necessity of using the screen or the videotape were the state's written motion papers and the transcript of the child's testimony at the preliminary examination. There was no testimony on the issue of necessity.
The circuit court decided to allow videotaping after observing that the preliminary hearing transcript revealed that the child (with the support of her mother and others) had "some considerable difficulty" testifying. The circuit court said little if anything about the need for a screen.
The circuit court apparently assumed that a videotape and screen were needed for an eight-year-old child who had been subjected to severe sexual abuse and had considerable difficulty testifying at the preliminary examination. The circuit judge also cited two past experiences with children who were unable to testify or had great difficulty doing so as the basis for his ruling to allow videotaping under the statute. Although the circuit judge did not expressly find that this child would suffer emotional trauma from testifying live in the courtroom or without a screen, the majority opinion concludes that the circuit court found the videotape and the screen were necessary to avoid further traumatization of a vulnerable child witness. Majority opinion at pp. 389, 391.
I conclude that the circuit court in this case correctly interpreted sec. 967.04 (7) (a) 1 as granting it the discretion to authorize special protections for a child witness under the age of 12.1 further conclude that the *400transcript of the circuit court's decision to allow the videotape and the screen does not satisfy the Coy requirement of "individualized findings" that this particular witness needed special protection. Of course, the circuit judge did not have the benefit of Coy. However, I conclude that this court could not uphold the circuit court's decision in this case solely on the basis of the circuit court's findings and reasoning.
The majority opinion does not clearly establish its position on this score. The majority opinion, at pp. 387-388, 389, and 394, states that the circuit court's findings were adequate, under the standard of Coy, to support a determination of necessity for the videotape and screen procedures to avoid further traumatization. But the majority proceeds, at pp. 388-389, to "support" the circuit court's findings by recognizing additional facts which were not included in the circuit court's explanation of its decision.
I think that the circuit court's reasoning in this case was, for the most part, based on the kind of presumptions and generalizations the Coy majority struck down as inadequate. The fact that the generalizations and presumptions relied on in this case are set forth by a judge rather than by a legislature, as was the case in Coy, does not change the fact that they are not the kind of individualized findings required by the holding in Coy.
This is a meager record. I do not think the record, taken as a whole, is adequate to support a finding about the substantial likelihood of significant psychological or emotional trauma to the child from face-to-face or in-court testimony.
I do, however, conclude that the state's motion papers and the transcript of the preliminary examination can support the circuit court's discretionary determination that this particular child could not give effective testimony if she had to testify facing the defendant *401in the courtroom. See facts recited in the majority opinion at 382-383, 388.
I agree with the majority opinion that this court can, in this case, supply the circuit court's omission. Here, we review the same paper record that the circuit court studied to reach its decision. In most cases, however, the circuit court will also rely on its impressions of witnesses. In such cases this court will not be able to supply the specific and particularized findings required by Coy.
Videotaping and the Confrontation Clause. I believe the two procedures used in the Thomas trial present separate and distinct confrontation issues. The screen placed between the child and the defendant in both Coy and in this case raises an issue of physical face-to-face confrontation regardless of whether the screen is used in a trial or deposition setting. Although the standards for the use of a screen as an exception to the constitution's face-to-face confrontation requirement are not settled, see discussion supra at pp. 377-388, the Coy opinion makes it clear that a physical barrier between the witness and the defendant infringes on confrontation rights.
The use of videotape per se — that is, when the defendant and witness are face-to-face but outside the presence of the factfinder — presents a different confrontation issue.3 When a witness testifies under conditions *402identical to trial (before a judge and the defendant and subject to cross-examination) except that the jury is not present, it is arguable — -and the state so argues in this case — that "[t]here is nothing in Coy to suggest that the use of a videotaped deposition itself, absent the use of a screen, would violate the confrontation clause." State's brief at 9.
Thomas I discussed the use of videotape per se and the screen separately and can be read as setting forth two different tests under the constitution. Thomas II treats the two procedures the same for constitutional purposes and applies the Coy test to both. Majority opinion at 389-390.
Courts and commentators appear to be divided on the question of whether and to what extent the use of videotape per se violates confrontation rights. There is also a spectrum of opinion as to whether the use of a videotape in court should be analyzed as an evidentiary hearsay issue as well as a confrontation clause constitutional issue.4
*403Some view the use of the videotape at trial as hearsay evidence and as falling within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The statutes authorizing the use of videotape testimony, however, do not generally make reference to the hearsay rule. Videotape is, of course, unique as hearsay because it allows the factfinder the opportunity to observe both cross-examination and the demeanor of the absent witness.
Those who classify the videotape as hearsay generally conclude that in addition to the evidentiary question, the court must also address the constitutional confrontation question. Satisfying the evidentiary hearsay rule does not, of course, automatically satisfy the constitutional confrontation requirements. Courts look to the Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), tests of reliability and unavailability to determine the constitutionality of admitting the videotape classified as hearsay. Applying the Roberts test, some courts and commentators apparently conclude that the trial-like procedures applied at the videotaping render the witness's testimony so reliable that unavailability is not an issue. See, e.g., Thomas I, 144 Wis. 2d at 890. Others conclude that the Roberts unavailability requirement is satisfied by a showing that the witness is likely to be significantly traumatized or incapable of effectively communicating if forced to testify at trial. See, e.g., Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275, 286 (1987); State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 768 P.2d 164 (1989) (en banc).
*404Others, like the majority in its Thomas II opinion, conclude that the videotape testimony is not hearsay because it enables cross-examination, observation of witness demeanor, and testimony under oath. At 391-392. The majority characterizes the videotape as a statement "at trial" (at 391-392 and as the "functioned equivalent" of live, in-court testimony. At 392.5
The majority then concludes, relying on State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245, 1252 (1987), that because the videotape is not hearsay, the state need not prove unavailability. As I read his brief, the defendant is arguing that an unavailability test is necessary to determine the constitutionality of using videotaped testimony, whether or not the videotape is classified as hearsay. The majority opinion incorrectly relies on the Jarzbek case (see majority opinion at 392) in deciding the constitutional question whether unavailability must be proven before videotaped testimony is admissible under the confrontation clause. The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded in Jarzbek, solely for purposes of classifying videotape within the rules of evidence, that videotaped testimony is not hearsay, but rather the functional equivalent of testimony in court. The Jarzbek court was not addressing the constitutional right of confrontation when it was discussing functional equivalence. In Jarzbek, the defendant had withdrawn a claim that his constitutional right of confrontation was vio*405lated by virtue of the fact that the jury was not in the room observing the witness during her testimony. 529 A.2d at 1248, n. 5.
An unanswered question in the majority opinion, of course, is whether there is a legally significant distinction between the Coy tests, which the majority opinion applies to videotape per se, and the unavailability requirement established in Ohio v. Roberts. If the record meets the Coy particularized finding test, it arguably may also meet the definition of constitutional unavailability articulated in more recent cases involving child witnesses. See, e.g., State v. Vincent, 768 P.2d at 161-64.
Finally, I note that the majority does not respond to the defendant's argument that the videotape in this case violates confrontational rights because it did not allow the fact-finder a fair opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor. The defendant argues that, because the camera remained only on the child during her testimony, the jury was unable to view the interaction between the witness and others who were present. The majority opinion does not acknowledge the unavoidable differences between live testimony and testimony on a screen. Videotape is indisputably superior, for purposes of observing demeanor, to a written transcript. But viewing a videotape is different from viewing a person live. The camera selects and comments on what it sees, thereby affecting the juror's impressions and ability to determine credibility. For discussion of this issue, see Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366, 373 (1988); Armstrong, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 Or. L. Rev. 567, 574-75 (1976).
*406For the reasons set forth, I join the court's mandate but not the majority opinion.

 Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Coy rejected any suggestion in the Court's opinion that the "core" of the Confrontation Clause is absolute. Justice O'Connor's opinion emphasized that "if a court makes a case-specific finding of necessity, as is required by a number of state statutes . . . our cases suggest that the strictures of the Confrontation Clause may give way to the compelling state interest of protecting child witnesses." 108 S. Ct. at 2805.

 For discussions of Coy, see Forman, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 Hastings L.J. 437 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term, Leading Cases, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 151-161 (1988).

 For discussions of the constitutionality of admitting videotaped testimony, see Thumann, Admitting Videotaped Testimony in Cases Involving Sexual Abuse of a Minor: A Model Statute, 22 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Problems 489 (1989); Clark-Weintraub, The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving Child Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14 Hofstra L. Rev. 261 (1985); Wixom, Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional *402Rights?, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 461; Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 806 (1985).

 One observer summarizes the debate regarding the proper characterization of videotapes this way:
Some critics have argued that videotaped testimony of a child sexual abuse victim constitutes hearsay, the admission of which violates the confrontation clause. They argue that the testimony is hearsay because it presents statements (the child's testimony) which are made out of court (wherever the videotaping session occurs) by an out-of-court declarant (the child, who ordinarily is not required to testify or appear in court) and which are offered to prove the truth of a matter asserted in the statement (that the defendant committed the crimes alleged).
Other critics recognize that the trial-approximating conditions that some existing statutes require to surround videotaping sessions prevent videotaped testimony from constituting hearsay. They argue *403that under such statutes the videotaping session becomes a sort of trial itself, and any violation of constitutional norms which occurs during it renders the taped testimony inadmissible. Thumann, Admitting Videotaped Testimony in Cases Involving Sexual Abuse of a Minor: A Model Statute, 22 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Prob. 488, 535 (1989).

 The majority opinion says that the witness is available in court. At 393. Perhaps the child may be deemed available for purposes of the evidentiary hearsay issue but that does not mean that she is necessarily available in a sense that satisfies the requirements of the constitution. For that matter the statute provides that if the videotaped testimony is used, the child witness may not be called before the factfinder except under specified exceptional circumstances. Sec. 967.04(10) Stats. 1987-88.