Court Opinion

ID: 9785140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:05:45.047718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:07.398701
License: Public Domain

Jones, J. (dissenting).
Relying on People v Glover (57 NY2d 61 [1982]), the majority holds Supreme Court did not err in refusing to charge criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. I disagree because a trial judge’s failure or refusal to charge seventh degree or simple possession as a lesser included offense in a drug case where the agency defense is properly submitted to the jury may *25lead to incongruous and deleterious results. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, an exception to Glover is warranted. Accordingly, I dissent and would reverse the order of the Appellate Division.
The first requirement under Glover—“that it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at the same time committing the lesser” (57 NY2d at 64; see CPL 1.20 [37])—does not consider the realities that typically attend a drug sale prosecution where the agency defense is asserted. Although it is theoretically possible to commit criminal sale in the third degree without concomitantly, by the same conduct, possessing the drugs, the likelihood of that happening is remote. This is why prosecutors in the real world frequently charge defendants in drug sale cases with both criminal sale and possession.
To be sure, the uniformity that arises from consistent application of a legal standard is important. However, blindly fitting the Glover standard to this type of case flies in the face of common sense and fundamental fairness.
The very nature of the agency defense supports the view that strict application of Glover is inappropriate here. The agency defense is unique in that it requires the defendant to admit he/ she criminally possessed drugs as an agent of the buyer. We have stated this defense
“is not a complete defense. The defendant who has been a party to a drug sale is not relieved of all criminal responsibility simply because he was acting for the buyer. The agency concept is essentially a means of determining the extent of the intermediary’s culpability, and thus the nature of his crime, under a statutory scheme which reserves the most severe penalties for [drug sellers]. Evidence that the defendant was acting solely as an agent of the buyer is properly employed to determine whether he is guilty of possession, instead of sale” (People v Lam Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, 74 [1978] [citations omitted]).
To set forth the facts underlying the admitted wrongdoing the defendant will usually take the stand, bringing his/her credibility into question. The jury, therefore, must determine whether defendant’s testimony should be credited and, ultimately, whether defendant should be held criminally liable as an agent of the buyer (i.e., to the same extent as the buyer).
In a drug sale case such as this, not charging simple possession where the trial court properly submits the agency defense *26to the jury undermines the defense. That is, a jury weighing a defendant’s testimony that he/she was an agent of a purchaser of drugs, without the lesser charge that the defendant all but admitted, gives less credence to the agency defense. Further, submitting the agency defense without simple possession may have a coercive effect on a jury. Given only one choice, a jury which believes the agency defense may acquit a defendant who admitted to criminal drug possession or, out of a belief that the defendant should be held criminally liable for the offense admitted to, convict the defendant of a greater crime than the one actually committed.
Here, the Appellate Division, after noting that this Court has recognized an exception to the “impossibility” test, stated that “whether another exception . . . should be recognized on account of the agency defense ... is a matter best left to [this Court]” (People v Davis, 54 AD3d 575, 577 [1st Dept 2008]). Based on the foregoing and the fact that in the instant case there was a reasonable view of the evidence from which the jury could have concluded that defendant committed the crime of simple possession (Supreme Court saw fit to submit the agency defense to the jury), this Court should recognize simple possession as such an exception and view it as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. This conclusion is consistent with this Court’s prior decisions recognizing exceptions to the statutory definition of “lesser included offense” (see People v Miller, 6 NY3d 295 [2006] [held defendants’ second degree murder convictions (intentional and standard felony murder) were lesser included under their first degree murder convictions (intentional felony murder) even though it was theoretically possible to commit intentional felony murder without committing standard felony murder]; People v Green, 56 NY2d 427 [1982]). Moreover, charging simple possession in this sort of case would not amount to reversible error. Nor does such a charge aggrieve the People. If the evidence adduced at trial makes out criminal possession in the seventh, that is what defendant will be convicted of.
Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Ciparick; Judge Jones dissents and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs.
Order affirmed.