Court Opinion

ID: 9679463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:53:38.697209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:00.523314
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). The question of whether the operation of a school is a governmental function *702has been the subject of considerable judicial scrutiny in Michigan. This is not surprising in view of the diverse approaches taken by the seven Michigan Supreme Court justices to resolve questions raised by the doctrine of governmental immunity. Consequently, a divergence has developed in this Court on how to apply recent Supreme Court decisions on governmental immunity. Although a unity in shaping the doctrine of governmental immunity in Michigan is preferable, I must disagree with certain aspects of the majority opinion.
I
I first address the question of whether the school district is immune from suit for its own negligence in allegedly failing to exercise due care in the hiring and supervision of Mr. Becker. The law as to what constitutes governmental immunity for some years has been in a state of flux. I am aided by appellate court opinions which have begun to construe language in the governmental immunity statute. MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq. I agree with the analysis by a panel of this Court in Deaner v Utica Community School Dist, 99 Mich App 103; 297 NW2d 625 (1980), that the operation of a public school constitutes a governmental function. In Deaner, the application of the common-law test by Justices Coleman, Ryan, and Williams would require a finding of immunity for school districts. In addition, the operation of a school district presents factors that would make such activity "governmental” under Justice Moody’s broader statement of the governmental essence test. See also Churilla v School Dist for City of East Detroit, 105 Mich App 32; 306 NW2d 381 (1981), and Smith v Mimnaugh, 105 Mich App 209; 306 NW2d 454 (1981).
*703Since the function at issue in this case is governmental, I next must determine whether the specific acts complained of were done in the exercise or discharge of that function. See Antkiewicz v Motorists Mutual Ins Co, 91 Mich App 389; 283 NW2d 749 (1979). In this case, the activity complained of is the screening, hiring, and supervision of school personnel. I find this to be within the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Bozarth v Harper Creek Board of Education, 94 Mich App 351, 353; 288 NW2d 424 (1979), citing Galli v Kirkeby, 398 Mich 527; 248 NW2d 149 (1976) (Williams, J.). Hence, I conclude that plaintiff has not stated an actionable claim against the district for liability arising from its own negligence and that summary judgment was properly granted.
This two-tiered approach insures that an underlying activity which is found to be a governmental function, in this case education, does not cloak with immunity all acts not in the exercise or discharge of that function.
II
I next consider whether the superintendent or the principal is immune from suit for the alleged negligence of each in the hiring and supervision of Mr. Becker. The Supreme Court has not reached a consensus on the proper method to employ for determining whether public employees are protected by governmental immunity. See Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979). In absence of recent guidance, I follow other panels of this Court and employ the widely utilized distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts. See O’Toole v Fortino, 97 Mich App *704797, 811; 295 NW2d 867 (1980), Cook v Bennett, 94 Mich App 93; 288 NW2d 609 (1979). Thus, my analysis centers on whether the hiring and supervision of teachers falls within the superintendent’s or principal’s discretionary or ministerial powers.
Since almost any act involves some discretion, the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts is one of degree. Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 132, p 990. Discretionary acts are those of a legislative, executive, or judicial nature. Sherbutte v City of Marine City, 374 Mich 48, 54; 130 NW2d 920 (1964). Ministerial acts occur where the public employee has little decision-making power during the course of his performance, but rather his conduct is delineated. Cook, supra, 100.
In Vargo v Svitchan, 100 Mich App 809; 301 NW2d 1 (1980), and Cook, it was held that even though the supervisory powers of a school principal are incident to a public function, he has the duty to exercise those powers reasonably in such a way as to minimize injury to students in his charge. Where the principal negligently performs this duty, governmental immunity does not operate to insulate him from all liability. Principal DeMarte has a duty to exercise supervisory powers reasonably so as to minimize injury to his students. The principal of the school maintains direct control over all activities and conduct of teachers while engaged in their teaching function. Moreover, the plaintiff alleges that principal DeMarte was negligent because he failed to investigate or take action upon receiving notice of Becker’s acts. Therefore, if school teacher Becker was, in fact, improperly supervised, the defendant principal could bear direct responsibility.
*705However, in Vargo, the Court found the superintendent entitled to protection of the governmental immunity statute. This case is distinguishable from Vargo. Here we are able to discern, in the complaint, allegations of personal neglect on the part of the superintendent. The possible negligence of the principal cannot be imputed to the superintendent merely because he was in a supervisory position. Id., 818. The essence of the plaintiffs allegations is that Mr. Steudle was negligent in his personal supervision over other school employees. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Steudle failed to investigate complaints made concerning Becker’s alleged tortious behavior and thus failed to prevent harm to students.
Accordingly, as to the individual defendants, I would hold that the lower court erred in granting summary judgment. I note that this only removes a defense and does not impose a liability. A full trial still would be forthcoming where plaintiff would be required to prove her allegations by a preponderance of this evidence. My opinion in no way addresses the actual merits concerning the alleged negligence of these defendants.
Ill
The next question is whether vicarious liability lies against the defendant school district under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under respondeat superior:
"The employer is also liable for the torts of his employee if 'the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation’. 1 Restatement Agency, 2d, § 219(2)(d), p 481.” McCann v *706State of Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 71; 247 NW2d 521 (1976) (Kavanagh, C.J.).
The question as to whether the protection afforded a school district under the governmental immunity statute extends to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior is presently unsettled in Michigan. This issue, under the present statute, was first addressed by the Michigan Supreme Court in McCann. The question in McCann was whether a state mental hospital, some of the employees of which allegedly put a newspaper publisher out of business through pressures on advertisers and subscribers, was shielded by governmental immunity from possible vicarious liability. In three opinions, four justices remanded to determine whether there was vicarious liability.
Justices Fitzgerald, Coleman, and Lindemer found that the hospital employees’ tortious activity was personally motivated, was not within the scope of their employment, and was not performed in furtherance of any legitimate business of defendants. Accordingly, they held that the defendants were not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This holding was an application of respondeat superior as applied to the unique facts of McCann and not an analysis" that respondeat superior precludes state liability.
"Our determination that the hospital officials acted outside of their scope of authority does not automatically absolve the state from vicarious liability. The general proposition that vicarious liability may be imputed to the master for intentional torts committed by his servant when the servant’s purpose, however misguided, is wholly or partly to further the master’s business remains viable. However, we perceive a distinction between furthering the legitimate goal of providing care and treatment to the mentally ill and *707insulating the hospital from public disclosure of alleged acts of mismanagement in the conduct of their business.” Id., 87.
Later the same year, in Galli, Justices Kavanagh, Levin, and Fitzgerald held that a school board did not enjoy immunity against a claim of vicarious liability because the day-to-day operation of a school is not a governmental function.
Justices Williams and Ryan voted to remand the case to determine whether the school board is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. They did not consider the issue of vicarious liability since it was not raised or briefed.
Justices Coleman and Lindemer held that the statute grants immunity to a school district from tort liability in all cases in which it is acting within its governmental function. They stated that if the Legislature finds it better public policy to exclude governmental units from immunity where employees act outside of their scope of employment and commit personal offenses, the Legislature should act accordingly.
More recently, a panel of this Court in Bozarth, supra, addressed the vicarious liability issue. The operative facts arose out of alleged homosexual attacks upon plaintiff’s son by his teacher. As in Galli, plaintiff alleged that defendant school board was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Relying on Justice Coleman’s opinion in Galli and Justice Kavanagh’s opinion in McCann, the panel found that homosexual assaults were clearly outside the scope of the teacher’s employment. Therefore the respondeat superior doctrine did not apply so as to subject the governing school board to liability. The panel stated that the proper application of the principle of liability enunciated in 1 Restatement Agency, *7082d, § 219(2)(d), cited in McCann, is limited to situations where, from the viewpoint of the person being harmed, the agent appears to have been acting within the scope of his employment.
In Michigan, no court has found a school district to be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees. However, I perceive a trend in this state to limit severely governmental immunity. No majority of our Supreme Court has found respondeat superior to be inapplicable to school districts. Therefore, I would hold that the protection afforded a school district under the governmental immunity statute does not extend to liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Thus, in this case, the issue becomes whether any factual development of plaintiffs allegations under Count III could justify recovery against defendant school district under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In looking at the facts pled in a light most favorable to plaintiff, I find that the complaint contained allegations which, if proven, would properly allow the factfinder to determine that torts were committed by the school district’s employee who was acting within the apparent scope of his authority. It is possible to distinguish the homosexual attacks at issue in Bozarth, which were obviously outside the scope of a teacher’s employment, and the allegations made in plaintiffs complaint. A teacher may use reasonable physical force on a student for the purpose of maintaining proper discipline. MCL 380.1312(2); MSA 15.41312(2). Becker’s actions, from the viewpoint of the plaintiffs son, reasonably could have been viewed as occurring within the scope of the teacher’s employment and apparent authority. Thus, the granting of summary judgment on Count III was in error.
*709I am not persuaded that this line of reasoning renders the governmental immunity statute useless since claimants need only plead vicarious liability on the part of a school district for its employees’ acts. A teacher’s wrongful acts do not automatically impute the resulting liability to the school district. I conclude that a school district cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor. The mere fact that an employee’s employment situation may offer an opportunity for tortious activity should not make the employer liable to the victims of that activity. Bozarth, supra, 355.
Defendants superintendent and principal are not liable for the torts of a teacher under respondeat superior. Although Steudle and DeMarte may be authorized to appoint teachers, the person appointed is not the representative of the appointing employees but acts solely on account of the school district. Therefore, Becker is neither a subagent nor subservant of Steudle and DeMarte. Hence they cannot be vicariously liable.
In summary, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the school district for its alleged negligence in the screening, hiring, and supervision of Becker. I disagree with the majority and would hold that summary judgment in relation to the principal’s and superintendent’s alleged negligence is incorrect. Lastly, I find that vicarious liability could lie against the school district, but not the other defendants, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
I would affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for trial.