Court Opinion

ID: 9796155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:50:37.487777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:23.336755
License: Public Domain

Maupin, J.,
with whom Becker and Hardesty, JJ., agree,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. First, I agree that no special relationship exists between a surety and a construction performance bond principal. Thus, the district court erred in allowing the jury to decide whether appellant Insurance Company of the West (ICW), committed a tortious breach of a contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Second, since no such tort was committed in these circumstances, the punitive damage award cannot stand. Third, no breach of an oral contract was proved below. Fourth, the trial judge’s predecessor abused his discretion in dismissing ICW’s express indemnity action. I write separately to amplify upon the errors committed in the dismissal of the indemnity claim.
ICW’s indemnity claim arose from an express indemnity provision contained in the bonding agreement with Gibson. This provision gave ICW, as the surety, a right of reimbursement against Gibson for any performance monies paid and any costs and fees generated in the enforcement of the agreement. During the course of the litigation below, Gibson concluded a separate settlement with its suppliers, to which ICW was not a party, and which was approved by the district court as having been reached in good faith ostensibly under NRS 17.225 et seq. The good-faith order did not address ICW’s indemnity action. When ICW moved for reconsideration of that approval, the district court, in an order drafted by Gibson’s counsel, both denied the motion and dismissed the indemnity claim. As noted, we now reverse this particular order as part of our resolution of the instant appeal.
In my view, the order dismissing ICW’s express indemnity claim suffers from two defects not addressed by the majority. First, the district court dismissed ICW’s indemnity claim without formal *466application and without notice of any kind to ICW, thus violating important due process considerations. Second, as a matter of law, dismissal based upon Gibson’s “good-faith” settlement with its suppliers completely ignored settled principles that a good-faith settlement between two parties never bars a claim by nonsettling parties for contractually based indemnity, i.e., express indemnity, such as that pressed below by ICW.1 In short, a good-faith settlement only immunizes the settling party from claims of contribution and noncontractual, i.e., implied, indemnity.2 Thus, while the order submitted by Gibson denying reconsideration of the good-faith ruling could properly dismiss any claim for implied indemnity without further application because such a result would have been compelled as a matter of law, the good-faith ruling could have no legal bearing upon ICW’s express indemnity action.
To conclude, the district court should have granted partial summary judgment in favor of ICW on the remainder of Gibson’s indemnity liability3 and proceeded to trial on the amounts owed.4

 See NRS 17.245; NRS 17.265; see also Doctors Company v. Vincent, 120 Nev. 644, 651, 98 P.3d 681, 686 (2004); Medallion Dev. v. Converse Consultants, 113 Nev. 27, 32, 930 P.2d 115, 118 (1997).

 Doctors Company, 120 Nev. at 654, 98 P.3d at 688; see also NRS 17.225 et seq.

 While Gibson has paid the underlying obligations secured by the bond, it is still subject to whatever costs and fees reasonably generated by ICW in the enforcement of the bonding agreement.

 I realize that the judge who tried the matter below inherited her predecessor’s erroneous ruling on the indemnity claim. However, the district court is empowered to correct erroneous rulings at any time prior to the entry of final judgment. See NRCP 54(b).