Court Opinion

ID: 9610568
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:43:22.649888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:01.873748
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, J.
(dissenting). I concur in the pronouncement of law contained in the first syllabus, and the reasoning in support thereof in the body, of the opinion of the majority of the court. However, I disagree with, and dissent to, the remainder of the opinion and the conclusion reached thereby, and think that I should express my views.
Reduced to a very condensed statement, the determinative facts and dates in this case are these:
Decedent, while the owner of the building and loan stock, died September 2, 1930;
Final account of his administrator was approved and order of distribution entered September 25, 1931;
Stock certificates were surrendered by, and final payment thereon made to, the discharged administrator January 28, 1935;
There is no evidence whatever indicating other than absolute good faith on the part of the defendant;
This action was filed December 19, 1941.
I think the majority opinion is correct in stating that,
“The foregoing statute fixing the liability of the building and loan company to the representative of (or) the heirs of a stockholder upon his death, though creating a sort of creditor-debt- or relationship, actually creates in law a cash deposit of the money paid in by the stockholder during his lifetime with interest thereon.”
but I do not agree with the next statement that “Like money deposited in a bank, this amount of money is subject to withdrawal on demand.”
The balance of that discussion then confuses the purpose for which the demand is necessary. The demand is not necessary to start the statute of limitations but to perfect a cause of action. Under the assumption that a demand is necessary (and it makes no difference in the result in this case whether it is necessary or not), the plaintiffs could not have filed a maintainable action until the demand was made. Nor could they personally control or extend the time when the period of limitations began, by delay in making such demand.
The rule is stated in 54 C. J. S. 212, as follows:
“Where the demand is a preliminary step referring only to the remedy and not to the right, the action will be barred if the demand is not made within the statutory period.”
The payment by the defendant to C. S. Young of the amount of the stock, made on January 28, 1935, was either authorized or unauthorized. If, at that time, Young was authorized to receive the money, payment to him discharged the indebtedness and the defendant’s liability was at an end. If, at that time, Young had no authority, he stood in the position of a stranger and the payment to him was a conversion of the funds by the defendant or, at least, a denial of plaintiffs’ title to the same. This would start the statute of limitations.
A very analogous situation was before this court in the case of Purcell Bank & Trust Co. of Purcell et al. v. Byars, 66 Okla. 70, 167 P. 216. That was a case wherein the plaintiff sued a former court clerk and the sureties on his official bond for money deposited with him in a previous con*620demnation proceeding involving plaintiff’s lands. The defendant court clerk had failed to turn this money over to his successor in office as required by statute and nine years later plaintiff brought the action. The statute of limitations was interposed as a defense. Plaintiff recovered judgment which was reversed on appeal. In deciding the case, this court said:
“It is urged by counsel for plaintiff that Siler in the instant case was a trustee for plaintiff, and that he held the money sought to be recovered under an express trust, and that the rules of law as to the limitation of actions between cestui que trust and trustee should be applied to the instant case. We think counsel for plaintiff is in error as to the proposition that Siler held these funds in trust. It is generally held that the clerk of a court holds funds paid to him in an official capacity for litigants as a bailee, and that he is a depositary of the funds. 5 R. C. L. 630. The distinction, however, is not material, since either in case of a trustee or a bailee a demand would set the statutes of limitation in motion, and the rule is that, when a demand is required to perfect a cause of action, such demand must be made within a reasonable time. The party entitled to make demand cannot extend the running of the statutes of limitation by delay in making demand. First National Bank v. King, 60 Kan. 733, 57 P. 952; Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Burlingame, 36 Kan. 638, 14 P. 271, 59 Am. Rep. 578; Rork v. Commissioners of Douglas County, 46 Kan. 175 26 P. 391; Reizenstein v. Marquardt (Iowa) 1 L. R. A. 318, note. So that in the instant case the plaintiff, having permitted the funds to remain in the registry of the court, when she was entitled to demand the same, for a period of nine years, cannot now avoid the bar of the statutes of limitation because she neglected and failed during that period to make a demand for her money.”
This same rule has been reaffirmed and followed numerous times since. In the recent case of Cook v. Bingman et al., 198 Okla. 421, 179 P. 2d 470, the defendant held property belonging to plaintiff as a bailee. Plaintiff sought to recover his property and defendant relied upon the statute of limitations. This court on appeal affirmed judgment for defendant holding:
“A gratuitous bailment with no duration specified may be terminated by the bailor at any time by demand for possession of his property, and a refusal thereof by the bailee constitutes a conversion.
“When demand and refusal are necessary to constitute a conversion of bailed property, such demand must be made within a reasonable time, not beyond the period of limitations prescribed by statute.”
In the body of that opinion, it was said:
“Under 15 O.S. 1941, chapter 11, sec. 448, demand is necessary in order to put the bailee in default. It is a general rule of law that where demand and default are prerequisites to the bringing of an action, the person on whom the duty of demand rests cannot toll the running of the statute of limitations by failure to make such demand. In the case of Purcell Bank & Trust Co. of Purcell et al. v. Byars, 66 Okla. 70, 167 P. 216, this court in the third paragraph of the syllabus said:
“ ‘Where a demand is required to perfect a cause of action, such demand must be made within a reasonable time, and the party entitled to make demand cannot extend the running of the statutes of limitation by delay in making demand.’
“To the same effect are State ex rel. Estill v. Board of County Commissioners of Pontotoc County, 119 Okla. 215, 249 P. 394, and Oklahoma City Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Swatek, 191 Okla. 400, 130 P. 2d 514.”
I think the same rule of law is applicable in the instant case; the latest date upon which the cause of action could have accrued was at the time of final payment to Young, January 25, 1935, nearly seven years prior to the filing of this action; the time within which suit could have been brought was five years (12 O.S. 1941 §95, subs. 1); *621the statute was not tolled by plaintiffs’ delay in making demand and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. To me, this is the only logical conclusion to be reached from the factual situation here presented and is the reasoning adopted in a majority of the jurisdictions (see Purcell Bank & Trust Co. of Purcell et al. v. Byars, supra).
If, however, the facts be viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs and the amount due be taken as “money deposited in a bank,” etc., as stated in the majority opinion, the same conclusion should be reached. As a deposit, it does not fall within the classification of a checking account but rather in that of a time deposit payable (because of the above statute) at the time of death of the stockholder. Although payable upon the happening of the contingency, it is governed by the same rule as though payable at a definite future date. The rule applicable to such a situation was stated in Gould v. Bank of Independence, 264 Ky. 511, 94 S. W. 2d 991, as follows:
“ ‘Time loan deposit certificate’ due and payable on definite date held ‘promissory note’ against which statute of limitations began running on due date thereof, as regards question whether suit by depositor’s administratrix to collect proceeds of certificate was barred.”
Going, however, a step further in viewing the matter favorably toward plaintiffs and assuming that the above rule was modified to the extent that a demand and refusal of payment were necessary to start the running of the statute, such demand would have to be made within a reasonable time. The longest period of time fixed as a reasonable time is, as adopted by the Idaho court in the case of Johnston v. Keefer, 48 Idaho 42, 280 P. 324, the period of limitations. Therein, it was said:
“When no time is fixed for making of demand, it will be presumed to have been made in a reasonable time or at expiration of period within which statute would have run upon claim if it had been due from its date, and statute of limitation is then set in motion.”
Under this rule, the instant action would have been barred 10 years (5 years for establishment of presumption of demand and 5 years for running of statute) after the date upon which the claim would otherwise be due — the date of death of stockholder, September 2, 1930.
Granting plaintiffs the further advantage of the rule that such period did not start to run until plaintiffs had the right to make the demand after the happening of the contingency, the date would be fixed as of the time of the decree of distribution, September 25, 1931. This date also is more than ten years prior to the filing of suit and therefore under this theory plaintiffs’ action was barred.
The conclusion that the action was barred, reached by either line of reasoning, is unaffected by the assumption of correctness of every other contention made by the plaintiffs, whether actually sustainable or not. Such assumptions, which are questions that need not be here determined, are as follows:
That the cause of action did not accrue ipso facto on September 2, 1930, the time of the stockholder’s death;
That the cause of action did not accrue on May 25, 1931, when the administrator demanded payment and delivered a certified copy of his letters and of the order of court authorizing collection;
That the cause of action did not accrue on September 25, 1931, when the probate court decreed distribution of the assets of the estate to plaintiffs;
That Young had no authority to receive payment as administrator on January 28, 1935, after his discharge, although having been theretofore ordered by the probate court to make such collections and necessary preliminary steps to that end had been taken;
*622That all the tacts surrounding Young’s actions including plaintiffs failure to take possession of the shares of stock or notify the defendant of the termination of Young’s authority did not make Young an ostensible agent of plaintiffs for collection, nor work an equitable estoppel against them to deny his authority;
That demand by plaintiffs, made upon defendant at a time when money was on hand to redeem the stock, was necessary to perfect a cause of action.
If all of these conclusions in plaintiffs’ favor be reached, whether correct or not, even then their cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations as hereinabove discussed.
I therefore respectfully dissent.