Court Opinion

ID: 9942633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:10:47.694764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:23.239627
License: Public Domain

J-S45001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  MATTHEW FIALKOWSKI                           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRIDGETE CARRELLI                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 995 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 30, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Civil Division at
                           No(s): 23-FC-40703

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 21, 2024

       Bridgete Carrelli (“Mother”) appeals from the final protection from abuse

(“PFA”) order entered in favor of Matthew Fialkowski (“Father”) and the

parties’ eight-year-old child, J.F. We affirm and grant the petition to withdraw

filed by Joseph V. Sebelin, Jr., Esquire, Mother’s privately retained counsel.

       Mother and Father never married. Their relationship ended while Mother

was three months pregnant with J.F.            She subsequently married Matthew

Mullen, with whom she has two children who are not subject to the PFA order

or involved in this appeal.        Since the child’s birth, Mother has maintained

primary custody of J.F., either informally or pursuant to a 2021 custody order

entered in Carbon County. Prior to the events that gave rise to the PFA order,

J.F. resided with Mother, Mr. Mullen and J.F.’s two younger half-sisters in

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S45001-23

Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania. Father exercised periods of weekend custody at

his home in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania.            The couple shared legal

custody.

       On the evening of May 4, 2023, Mother left J.F. and two younger half-

siblings unattended at the family residence for one hour and seventeen

minutes while she walked down the street to retrieve money from an

automobile that was parked approximately ninety feet from the residence.

Upon her return to the residence, Mother admonished J.F. for calling Father

during her absence, and an argument ensued. The altercation escalated to

the point where J.F. threw the telephone at her.           Mother responded by

spanking J.F. and demanding that J.F. remove his clothes and leave the

residence. During the evidentiary hearing she further explained,

       I was like, “You know what, if this is how you’re going to treat me,
       you’re going to disrespect me, you’re going to throw things at me,
       I’m done with you too." . . . I was like, “if this is how you’re going
       to treat the only person who does everything for you, you can get
       out of my house too.” And I was like, “if those clothes you are
       wearing, . . . if I bought you those clothes, you’re to take them
       off and you can get out too.”

N.T., 6/12/23, at 26-27.1 Mother denied striking her son and estimated that

J.F. was outside for approximately five minutes before she brought him inside,

apologized, and comforted him. Id. at 27.

____________________________________________

1 While Mother, Father, and J.F. all testified during the hearing, the trial court
subsequently sealed the child’s testimony. See Order, 9/27/23. Insofar as
Mother’s reproduced record includes the unredacted transcript, we strike the
sealed testimony from that document.

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       During Father’s next scheduled period of physical custody, J.F. told

Father that he was terrified to return to Mother’s home and informed Father

about the ordeal, including being stripped, struck, and sent out of the house.

Id. at 3-4, 6-7. Thereafter, Father contacted local authorities, including the

local child service agency, and refused to return J.F. to Mother’s custody due

to his concern for his son’s safety.2 Id. at 7. He informed Mother that he was

not relinquishing custody of J.F. until he was directed by a judge or the police.

Id. at 19. In response, Mother barraged Father with telephone calls, text

messages, and post on social media. Id. at 15. Father testified that Mother

spoofed his girlfriend’s telephone number and when he answered the

telephone call, she threatened, “I'm gonna fucking kill you. Give me my son

back.” Id. Father stated that he contacted the local police department but

he did not indicate whether the threat was investigated. Id. Mother admitted

“calling and texting [but] getting no response.” Id. at 19. She stated, “I did

call him multiple times, frantically, wondering what was going on[.]”         Id.

However, she denied making any threats to kill him. Id. at 22.

       On June 1, 2023, Father filed in Lackawanna County a PFA petition

against Mother seeking protection for himself and J.F. The trial court granted

a temporary PFA order, and following an evidentiary hearing on June 12, 2023,

where Mother, Father, and J.F. testified, the trial court issued a final PFA order
____________________________________________

2  The certified record does not reveal whether the child service agency
pursued the matter beyond interviewing Mother and investigating her home.
N.T., 6/12/23, at 32. Nevertheless, the record bears out that the agency did
not remove the younger children from the home. Id.

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that expires in June 2024.       Although the trial court did not specify the

subsection upon which it based its finding of abuse, it found that Father

presented sufficient credible evidence to establish abuse under the PFA Act.

See PFA Order, 6/12/23, at 1; Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 3-4. The court

awarded Father temporary primary physical custody of J.F. and granted

Mother periods of visitation with her son. The order permitted physical contact

but prohibited Mother from striking the child. The court also encouraged J.F.

to maintain telephone contact with Mother. As to the provisional nature of the

court’s custody award, the PFA order read, “The custody provisions of . . . this

order are temporary. Either party may initiate custody proceedings pursuant

to the custody statute at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5321-5340. Any valid custody order

entered after the final Protection From Abuse order supersedes the custody

provisions of this order.” PFA Order, 6/12/23, at 2.

      This   timely   appeal   followed.    Mother   complied   with   Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(ii), and presented three issues for our review:

      A.    Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
      and/or error of law by granting [Father’s] request for a PFA on his
      behalf and on the child's behalf against [Mother]?

      B.    Whether, in the alternative, the trial court committed an
      abuse of discretion and or error of law . . . by entering a PFA order
      in regard to the child and against [Mother] . . . where the trial
      court failed to apply the parental privilege found in 23 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 6304(c) and 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6304(d), the parental privilege
      found in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 509, and failed to follow the holding of
      Chronister v. Brenneman, 742 A.2d 190 (Pa. Super. 1999) and
      the authority therein set forth.

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      C.     Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
      and or error of law by . . .granting the protection from abuse
      petition against [Mother] and failing to apply the custody factors
      set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 as well as the relocation factors
      of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337, and in particular failing to consider
      [Mother’s] longstanding status as the primary custodian, failing to
      consider that by awarding custody to [Father] constituted a
      relocation, ignoring that the order will necessitate a change in the
      child's school district, disregarding [Father’s] extensive and
      serious criminal record, etc., such that the PFA order directed
      [Father] to have primary custody, all of which is not in the best
      interests of the child?

Mother’s brief at 7 (cleaned up). Father did not file a brief in this matter.

      We begin with a review of the applicable law.            As this Court has

observed: “In the context of a PFA order, we review the trial court’s legal

conclusions for an error of law or abuse of discretion.” E.K. v. J.R.A., 237

A.3d 509, 519 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up). To obtain a final PFA order,

the petitioner must establish abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, that

is, “the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., enough to tip a scale slightly.”

Id. (cleaned up). Notably, the intent of the alleged abuser is not relevant to

our determination. Buchhalter v. Buchhalter, 959 A.2d 1260, 1263

(Pa.Super. 2008).

      Mother’s first issue implicates the court’s finding by a preponderance of

the evidence that the PFA was warranted in this case. First, as to Father,

Mother contends that her interactions with Father were not tantamount to

abuse, threat of abuse, or a pattern of abusive conduct. Mother’s brief at 20-

23. In this same vein, Mother argues that the evidence was insufficient to

support the PFA order and that her physical contact with J.F. was acceptable

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corporal punishment under her parental privilege rather than any form of

physical abuse. Id. at 23-25. We address these issues seriatim.

      When the respondent in a PFA petition challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain the PFA order, we view the evidence admitted in the light

most favorable to the petitioner, “granting [him] the benefit of all reasonable

inferences[.]” Id. at 19 (cleaned up). Since trial courts observe the witnesses

firsthand, we defer to their credibility assessments.       Id.   Indeed, “[t]he

petitioner’s testimony is sufficient if it is believed by the trial court.” Custer

v. Cochran, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc). Finally, we

“do not review a diminished record.      Rather, the law is clear that we are

required to consider all evidence that was actually received, without

consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or whether the trial

court’s evidentiary rulings are correct.” Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d

341, 350 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

      Regarding the specific elements that had to be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence in this case, the PFA Act defines “abuse” as

follows:

      “Abuse.” The occurrence of one or more of the following acts
      between family or household members, sexual or intimate
      partners or persons who share biological parenthood:

            (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or
            recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury,
            rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual
            assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent
            assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a
            deadly weapon.

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            (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent
            serious bodily injury.

            (3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18
            Pa.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).

            (4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children,
            including such terms as defined in Chapter 63
            (relating to child protective services).

            (5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or
            repeatedly committing acts toward another person,
            including following the person, without proper
            authority, under circumstances which place the
            person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The
            definition of this paragraph applies only to
            proceedings commenced under this title and is
            inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions commenced
            under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102.

      Sitting en banc, this Court has further explained that the “purpose of

the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who

perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of

physical and sexual abuse.” Custer, 933 A.2d at 1054. Thus, the PFA Act

does not require actual physical harm before issuing a PFA order. See E.K.,

237 A.3d at 522 (noting that “[b]ecause the goal of the PFA Act is to prevent

physical and sexual abuse, a victim does not have to wait for physical or sexual

abuse to occur for the PFA Act to apply”). Since there is a multitude of ways

to convey a threat of physical harm, a showing of “‘reasonable fear’ is

sufficient.” S.W. v. S.F., 196 A.3d 224, 231 (Pa.Super. 2018) (quoting 23

Pa.C.S. § 6102).

                                     -7-
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      As to the PFA order protecting Father, Mother initially asserts that there

is no evidence of abuse or threat of abuse beyond Father’s “speculation,

conjecture,     and   inuendo.”   Mother’s     brief   at   20.     Then,    apparently

acknowledging the unassailable fact that Father testified that Mother had

threatened to kill him, she asserts that the threat alone is insufficient to

warrant a PFA order without additional evidence of intent, such as past

conduct, or evidence that Father expressed concern for his safety. Thus, she

concludes that, absent corroborating evidence, the reasonable inference is

that Mother did not commit the acts alleged.            Id. at 22.      In sum, Mother

opines,   “To    conclude   otherwise,    encourages        a   party   to   engage   in

gamesmanship in a custody scenario, incite the other into uttering ‘special

words,’ and then capitalize upon it by filing a PFA. This honorable court should

not condone such conduct.” Id. at 22-23. For the following reasons, Mother’s

arguments are unconvincing.

      First, notwithstanding Mother’s assertions, the alleged abuser’s intent is

irrelevant to our determination. See Buchhalter, 959 A.2d at 1263. Further,

as it relates to Mother’s threat to kill Father, this Court addressed a similar

issue in Burke ex rel. Burke v. Bauman, 814 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa.Super.

2002), and confirmed that a telephone threat may be sufficient to warrant a

PFA order.      We explained, “[i]t is possible for a person to be placed in

reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury based on telephone calls,

particularly when coupled with the alleged abuser's past history of violence.”

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See also, McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905 (Pa.Super. 2006) (evidence

was sufficient where respondent with noted anger issues, and a history of

altercations with other individuals, stood in front petitioner’s car blocking her

egress while yelling obscenities and verbal); D.H. v. B.O., 734 A.2d 409, 412

(Pa.Super.1999) (assuming that telephone calls may form the basis of PFA,

but reversing PFA order because the alleged abuser did not make physical

threats).

       Instantly, Father not only testified about the threats that Mother leveled

against him but also testified that he previously filed a prior PFA order against

Mother in Monroe County, which resulted in a temporary PFA order. N.T.,

6/12/23, at 4, 35. The trial court found Father’s testimony to be credible and,

through her counsel, Mother conceded the temporary PFA order that was

previously entered against Mother in Monroe County. See Trial Court Opinion,

8/9/23, at 3; N.T., 6/12/23, at 35. Thus, in contrast to Mother’s assertions,

the certified record, in fact, includes credible evidence of not only Mother’s

threat to kill Father but also corroborating evidence of her past conduct which

resulted in a Monroe County court entering a temporary PFA order against

her.   Insofar as the trial court relied upon Mother’s threat coupled with

evidence of past allegations of abuse to find that Father established abuse by

a preponderance of the evidence, we discern neither an abuse of discretion

nor error of law. See Burke ex rel. Burke, 814 A.2d at 209.

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      As to the portion of the PFA order relating to J.F., the trial court

explained that it found Mother lacked credibility concerning whether she struck

J.F. as part of her outburst that culminated in the child being stripped and

forced from the home.      Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 4.     In contrast, it

accepted as credible Father’s testimony that J.F. reported Mother striking the

child prior to excluding him from the residence. Id. “Additionally, [the c]ourt

found [Father’s] testimony credible in stating [that J.F.] reported to be

terrified to return to [Mother’s] residence.” Id.

      In assailing the trial court’s decision, Mother asserts, “The record in this

matter contains no evidence to support the [c]hild’s PFA against . . . Mother.”

Mother’s brief at 23. Specifically, she contends that Father failed to present

evidence that Mother struck J.F. and, apparently ignoring the trial court order

sealing the child’s testimony, she argues that J.F. “never testified that Mother

had spanked him.”      Id. (emphasis in original).     In this vein, she posits,

“Inexplicably, and in direct opposition to [the testimony of Mother and J.F.],

the trial court concluded that Appellant Mother spanked the [c]hild. There is

no testimonial basis which supports this conclusion.” Id. at 23-24 (incomplete

citation to Trial Court Opinion omitted).

      The certified record belies Mother’s protestations.      First, as outlined

supra, Father testified that he initiated the PFA proceedings after J.F.

explained to him how Mother “came home, made him strip naked, spanked

him, [and] sent him out into the street.” N.T., 6/12/23, at 4. While Mother

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objected to this testimony as violating the rule against hearsay, the trial court

did not rule on the objection or strike the testimony. Id. On appeal, without

citation to relevant authority, Mother states, “this honorable court has the

authority to rule on these objections and find them inadmissible.” Mother’s

brief at 24. However, mindful of our standard of review of a claim that the

evidence presented was insufficient to support the verdict, we reject Mother’s

invitation to rule on her evidentiary objection in the first instance as a

concomitant component of her sufficiency claim. See Arias, 286 A.3d at 350

(this Court will not review sufficiency claims on a diminished record).

      Furthermore, to the extent that Mother attempts to assert a separate

claim of trial court error based on its evidentiary decision, she was required

to include that claim in the Rule 1925(b) statement that she filed

simultaneously with the notice of appeal. As she failed to preserve this issue

in the Rule 1925(b) statement, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)

(“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with

the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

      Thus, based upon a careful review of the evidence included in the

certified record and the relevant law, we do not disturb the trial court’s

determination that Father proved his allegations of abuse by a preponderance

of the evidence.

      Next, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in failing to apply the

parental privileges addressed in the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa.C.S.

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§§ 6301-6388 (“CPSL”), and § 509 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, all of

which we outline below. Overall, Mother argues that to the extent that she

spanked J.F., she was entitled to use corporal punishment to discipline the

child for his deviant behavior. For the following reasons, we disagree.

       At the outset, we observe that this issue regarding Mother’s use of

permissible corporal punishment is waived because she did not assert it during

the PFA hearing. Indeed, rather than lay a foundation for justification, Mother

specifically denied spanking her son before ejecting him from the home

without clothes. N.T., 6/12/23, at 26 (mother testifying, “I did not put my

hands on any child”).         As this novel argument concerning the “parental

privilege” was not presented to the trial court, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal.”). Moreover, even if Mother had raised the claim in the

trial court, it would fail on the merits.

       Section 6304 of the CPSL excludes from the definition of “child abuse”

the use of reasonable force in the following situations:3

____________________________________________

3   We note that the PFA Act specifically incorporates the CPSL’s definition of
“child abuse” in its enumerated definition of “abuse.” See e.g., 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 6102(a) (“(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children including such
terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child protective services)).”
However, “for a remedy to be available under the Protection from Abuse Act,
it is not necessary that the physical harm to the child be as serious as that
which is required for a child to be removed from his home and placed in
protective custody.” Miller on Behalf of Walker v. Walker, 665 A.2d 1252
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       [T]he use of reasonable force on or against a child by the child’s
       own parent or person responsible for the child's welfare shall not
       be considered child abuse if any of the following conditions apply:

       (1) The use of reasonable force constitutes incidental, minor or
       reasonable physical contact with the child or other actions that are
       designed to maintain order and control.

       (2) The use of reasonable force is necessary:

          (i) to quell a disturbance or remove the child from the scene
          of a disturbance that threatens physical injury to persons or
          damage to property;

          (ii) to prevent the child from self-inflicted physical harm;

          (iii) for self-defense or the defense of another individual; or

          (iv) to obtain possession of weapons or other dangerous
          objects or controlled substances or paraphernalia that are
          on the child or within the control of the child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6304(c).

       Similarly, the CPSL specifically excludes from the definition of abuse,

“reasonable force on or against their children for the purposes of supervision,

control and discipline of their children.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6304(d).

       Finally, the Pennsylvania Crime Code permits the justifiable use of force

if:

       (1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly
       responsible for the general care and supervision of a minor or a
       person acting at the request of such parent, guardian or other
       responsible person and:

____________________________________________

(Pa.Super. 1995); Spivey v. Benjamin, 2023 WL 4742381 (Pa.Super. 2023)
(non-precedential decision at *5).

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          (i) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or
          promoting the welfare of the minor, including the preventing
          or punishment of his misconduct; and

          (ii) the force used is not designed to cause or known to
          create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily
          injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or
          gross degradation.

18 Pa.C.S. § 509(1).

      With these principles in mind, we address Mother’s argument that the

trial court erred in failing to consider that Mother’s corporal punishment of J.F.

was non-abusive behavior that was protected by the relevant sections of the

PFA, CPSL, and the crimes code. Mother’s brief at 31-32.

      Mother’s position is founded upon our holding in Chronister v.

Brenneman, 742 A.2d 190 (Pa.Super. 1999), which examined the foregoing

statutory framework to distinguish abuse from discipline.        In that case, a

father administered corporal punishment to his sixteen-year-old daughter by

striking her across the buttocks with a belt. The trial court entered a PFA

order against the father, and this Court reversed. We held that because the

father’s conduct related solely to discipline and did not result in any degree of

bodily impairment, it did not constitute abuse. Id. at 192-93. It reasoned,

“There is no evidence that it was a malevolent infliction of pain or an attempt

to terrorize his daughter, nor did the trial court conclude to the contrary.” Id.

at 192.

      In rejecting Mother’s argument, the trial court reasoned as follows:

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      [T]his Court found [Father’s] testimony credible in that [Mother]
      hit the minor child. It is clear from the record and the unconverted
      testimony [Mother] attempted to terrorize the minor child by
      instructing the minor child to leave the residence naked. While
      this Court recognizes a parent’s statutory right to use corporal
      punishment for supervision, control and discipline of their
      children, the totality of the circumstances for which [Mother] hit
      the minor child dictates she intended to inflict pain and terrorize
      the minor child. [Mother] far exceeded her parental privileges
      when hitting the minor child and having the minor child leave the
      residence naked for a period of five minutes.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/23, at 6 (cleaned up).

      Again, we find neither legal error nor an abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s determination.   Corporal punishment is not the blanket justification

that Mother suggests, and when administered in anger, it may in fact, warrant

a PFA. Miller, 665 A.2d at 1258. In contrast to the dearth of evidence that

this Court found regarding the parent’s attempt to terrorize his child in

Chronister, the trial court in the case sub judice made a specific finding that

J.F. was terrified to return to Mother’s home and the aggregation of Mother’s

acts committed against her son amounted to a finding of abuse under the PFA

Act. Considering Mother’s noted anger at J.F. for throwing the telephone, her

fundamental denial of using any form of physical discipline, and Father’s

testimony regarding his son being terrified to return to Mother’s home, we

defer to the trial court’s credibility determination and conclude that Mother’s

actions met the definition of abuse set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). See id.

(rejecting father’s assertion of permissible corporal punishment where father

spanked child with a board).

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      Mother’s last argument relates to the temporary award of physical

custody.   Specifically, while acknowledging that the trial court need only

consider the risk that Mother posed to J.F., she simultaneously argues that

the trial court erred in failing to consider the best-interest factors outlined in

Section 5328(a) of the child Custody Law. Mother’s brief at 35 (“the case at

bar illustrates the fatal error of neglecting the best interests' analysis.”).

Mother’s claim fails for at least two reasons.

      Principally, Mother once more finds her issue waived pursuant to Rule

302(a) because she failed to assert it in the trial court. Second, even if we

addressed the merits of this contention, it would not warrant relief.

      Simply stated, the trial court is empowered by § 6108(a)(4) to award

temporary custody with regard to minor children in granting relief under the

PFA. See C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 1281 (Pa.Super. 2019) (“Absent

guidance from our Legislature or our Supreme Court, we conclude that a PFA

court need not conduct a best interests custody analysis to award temporary

custody as form of relief under section 6108 of the Protection From Abuse

Act.”) (emphasis in original).   As we explained,

             The purpose of the Protection From Abuse Act is to protect
      victims of domestic violence from the perpetrators of that type of
      abuse and to prevent domestic violence from occurring. It is well-
      settled that trial courts have the authority to enter protection from
      abuse orders that conflict with custody orders. The PFA Act allows
      the court to award temporary custody or establish temporary
      visitation rights with regard to minor children. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
      6108(a)(4). . . .

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             Custody wise, a PFA order is not designed to impose
      anything but emergency relief. To understand this, look no further
      than the PFA Act: “Nothing in this paragraph relating to temporary
      custody as a form of relief shall bar either party from filing a
      petition for custody under Chapter 53 (relating to custody) or
      under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.”             See
      § 6108(a)(4)(v). But while the domestic violence emergency is
      still pending, a PFA order may alter a pre-existing custody order
      and remand for clarification to avoid conflict. See Dye for McCoy
      [v. McCoy, 621 A.2d 144, 145 (1993 Pa.Super)]. “To hold
      otherwise would have the effect of emasculating the central and
      extraordinary feature of the PFA which is to prospectively control
      and prevent domestic violence.” Id.

Id. (select citations omitted) (cleaned up).

      Instantly, Mother presented evidence that outlined ongoing custody

litigation in Carbon County and identified the pending petition for contempt

that Mother filed against Father for retaining custody of J.F. in contravention

of the extant custody order. N.T., 6/12/23, at 5-6, 9, 16, 19-20. That petition

sought sole physical custody and a limitation of Father’s interaction with his

son to supervised visitation. Id. at 6. The custody court will undoubtedly

have to perform a complete best-interest analysis in ruling on Mother’s

petition. Thus, insofar as the PFA order is not the final determination of the

parties’ custodial rights, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in

awarding Father temporary physical custody pending the finalization of the

custody proceeding in Carbon County. Accordingly, Mother’s claim of error

warrants no relief.

      Finally, we address the petition for relief that Joseph V. Sebelin, Jr.,

Esquire, filed in this Court and served upon Mother and Father seeking to

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withdraw from representation of Mother in this matter pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.

1012(c), due to an “irrevocable breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.”

Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 12/15/23, unnumbered at 2.          Counsel’s

verified petition highlighted that upon filing Mother’s brief and Reproduced

Record in this Court, Mother refused to pay her legal fees. Id. In addition,

Mother “telephoned the office and acted in a rude, obnoxious, and unkind

manner,[and] posted a false and defamatory review” about Attorney Sebelin

on social media. Id. Mother did not respond to the petition.

      Although the PFA Act requires the court to advise a respondent, such as

Mother, that she has the right to legal representation, it does not create a

statutory right to court–appointed counsel.      See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a);

Varner v. Holley, 854 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa.Super. 2004) (“a PFA action is not

the type of proceeding which involves the deprivation of a constitutional right

so as to require the appointment of counsel.”); Davis v. Davis, 2021 WL

4281300, **3 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision) (quoting Weir v.

Weir, 631 A.2d 650, 657 (Pa.Super. 1993) (“The right to be represented by

counsel cannot be equated with the right to receive court-appointed

counsel.”)).   As Mother has no statutory or constitutional-based right to

appointed counsel, we review Attorney Sebelin’s petition in accordance with

the rules of appellate and civil procedure.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 102, regarding the definition

of counsel of record, states, in pertinent part, that counsel may withdraw when

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“an application for withdrawal is granted by the appellate court.” Pa.R.A.P.

102.   While the Appellate Rules do not set forth the requirements of the

application for withdrawal from representation in this Court, Pa.R.Civ.P.

1012(c) provides the following notice requirements when the location of the

client is known:

       (d)(1) If the whereabouts of the party on whose behalf the
       appearance was entered are known, the attorney shall

            (i) set forth the address of that party in the petition.

            (ii) serve notice of the petition on the party in the manner
                provided by Rule 440.

            (iii) file a certificate of service of the notice with the
                 petition, and

            (iv) immediately notify the party by ordinary mail of the
               entry of an order granting leave to withdraw. The
               notice shall include a copy of the order.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1012(d)(1).

       Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16, a

lawyer may withdraw where the client has rendered representation

unreasonably difficult or refused to fulfill an obligation to pay for the lawyer’s

services.   See Pa.R.P.C. 1.16 (b)(5) and (6); see also id. at Explanatory

Comment, Optional Withdrawal [8] (“A lawyer may withdraw if the client

refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation,

such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting

the objectives of the representation.”).

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       Our review of the record in this matter confirms that Attorney Sebelin

complied substantially with the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 1012(d)4 and set

forth two acceptable bases to withdraw, i.e., (1) a break down in the attorney-

client relationship; and (2) Mother’s refusal to satisfy her financial obligation

for the services that Attorney Sebelin rendered in this matter. Accordingly,

we grant the petition to withdraw.

       Based upon our review of the certified record and the relevant law, we

hold that Father established the allegations of abuse by a preponderance of

the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting PFA relief to Father

and J.F. for one year.

       Petition to withdraw filed by Joseph V. Sebelin, Jr., Esquire, is granted.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/21/2024

____________________________________________

4 Although Mother’s address is not set forth in the petition as required by Rule
1012(d)(1)(i), Attorney Sebelin listed her address on the certificate of service
that he filed with the petition.

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