Court Opinion

ID: 7819749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:49:44.851628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:42.426207
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result, but I never reach the considerations which bring the majority to it. There was a finding by the chancery court that the activities of Dr. Cooper were in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4111 (Repl. 1964). Viewed in the light most favorable to the court’s decree, Dr. Cooper’s testimony may be summarized as follows: The Progressive Labor Party of which I am a member believes that there is a ruling class, consisting of a very small group of people, which controls the country’s economy, and through that power, also controls the government and that this control creates oppression. The Party also believes that there must be a dictatorship of the working class, but since the ruling class will not surrender its power voluntarily, there will be violence. The Party is prepared for that eventuality. I joined the Party knowing of these guidelines. I adhere to them and believe that violence and a revolution are necessary. I explain to my students that I believe revolution is necessary. The Party believes that the government, as the agent of the small group constituting the ruling class, practices violence on most people, who can only escape this violence by violence and I agree. I do not believe the Progressive Labor Party can obtain power through constitutional means. I explain to my students that, looking at the record of American history, the only possible solution is revolution. The Progressive Labor Party thinks we have to overthrow the government of the United States. I personally adhere to this philosophy. I view the necessity for the revolution as a moral imperative but I am not talking about anything imminent or in the near future. I do not think the overthrow of the government will occur in the next few years. I discuss politics with teachers and students and tails about the situation and what I think should be done about it. Dr. Cooper and his party believe that violence and a revolution are necessary. I take this to mean essential, indispensable, requisite, denoting that which fills an urgent need. The American Heritage Dictionary; Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. (see “needful”) See also, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Rodale, The Synonym Finder. He explains this to his students. This necessity, to him is a moral imperative. This means that it is obligatory, mandatory, directive, compulsory; more than urgent need or demand that cannot be deferred or evaded; something to be acted on; an unavoidable fact compelling or insistently calling for action. The American Heritage Dictionary; Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2d Ed. They believe the only possible solution is revolution — that they have to overthrow the government. This seems to be rather compelling and seems to be more than the expression of an idea. Just the belief that his dreams are not going to come true within the next few years does not conceal the fact that he believes in and advocates that which he thinks should be done now. To me, advocacy and encouragement of action are implicit in his expression and explanation of these beliefs. Clearly, Dr. Cooper has the specific intent to further the unlawful aims of his organization, shares its unlawful purposes and is an active member. The Party’s aim, of which he seems to be fully aware, is established by his own testimony. Assuming that they may not be unlawful, his own characterization is that they are not “constitutional means”. It may be that one must command or invite an instantaneous assault upon the officers or seat of government before he is removed from the area of First Amendment protection, under some of the authorities cited in the majority opinion. Permitting a veil so transparent, woven largely from finespun semantical thread, to become a constitutional shield against such “teaching” is so distasteful to me that I prefer to take another approach to the matter. Unlike the majority, I consider the very first point for reversal relied upon by appellant, i.e., that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-4113(c) (Repl. 1964) is an unconstitutional bill of attainder. With this argument, I must agree, although there seems to be some lack of consistency in decisions where the Communist Party is involved. Article I, § 10 of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall pass a bill of attainder, i.e., a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. The constitutional provision was adopted as a direct reaction to English bills of attainder, some of which were enacted for retribution and some for preventive purposes. The latter were legislative judgments, based largely on past acts and associations, that a given person or group was likely to cause trouble, perhaps overthrow the government, and therefore deprivations were inflicted upon the person or group in order to prevent the feared event. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484. There can be no disavowal of such a purpose in § 41-4133(c). For that reason it seems to me to be an unconstitutional bill of attainder which cannot be viewed in any other light, under the most recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court by which we are bound in matters involving the federal constitution. The decisions from which I reach this result span a century and are completely consistent. The bill of attainder had been a device to which resort was frequently had in England in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for dealing with persons who had attempted, or threatened to attempt to overthrow the government. Our constitutional prohibition was adopted by the Constitutional Convention unanimously and without debate.1 United States v. Brown, supra. “Bill of attainder” under the federal constitutional provision is an all-inclusive term, encompassing what formerly had been known as bills of pain and penalties, which were, along with the classic bill of attainder imposing the death penalty, legislative acts inflicting punishment without a judicial trial. Cummings v. The State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866)2; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The word punishment, in the sense of the constitutional provision, is more comprehensive than when used to describe imprisonment, fines, or deprivation of life. In the constitutional sense, it also includes penalties of a civil nature, by deprivation or suspension of civil or political rights, depending upon attendant circumstances and the causes of the deprivation. Disqualification from the pursuit of a lawful profession or vocation, as well as a bar from government service, may constitute this type of punishment. Cummings v. The State of Missouri, supra; Ex parte Garland, supra; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073, 90 L.Ed. 1252 (1946); United States v. Brown, supra. Bill of attainder may be directed against individuals or against a whole class or easily ascertainable group. Cummings v. The State of Missouri, supra. United States v. Lovett, supra; United States v. Brown, supra. It seems to me that under United States v. Brown, supra, the latest and most authoritative case on the subject § 41-4113(c) must fall as a bill of attainder because it makes eligibility for employment dependent upon non-membership in a Nazi, Fascist or Communist society, and not upon the activities in which either the person or society may be engaged. See, Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Hoard, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S.Ct. 1357, 6 L.Ed.2d 625 (1961). I am not unaware of American Communications Assn. v. Douds. 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1949) which upheld a provision of the National Labor Relations Act, as then written. I do feel that, in Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, in distinguishing Douds, strictly limited it, to say the least, and, in effect, removed a part of its foundation, saying that this part resulted from a misreading of United States v. Lovett, supra.3 Be that as it may, the court pointed out in Douds that the bar of access of a union having an officer who was a member of the Communist party to the National Labor Relations Board did not necessarily bar any Communist party member from office in his union, even though loss of his position was a possible indirect result. Here, and in Brown, the bar was absolute. Concluding language in the Brown opinion seems pertinent and applicable. Since I think it requires that § 41-4113(c) as written be declared void as a bill of attainder, I quote it, as follows: We do not hold today that Congress cannot weed dangerous persons out of the labor movement, any more than the Court held in Lovett that subversives must be permitted to hold sensitive government positions. Rather, we make again the point made in Lovett: that Congress must accomplish such results by rules of general applicability. It cannot specify the people upon whom the sanction it prescribes is to be levied. Under our Constitution, Congress possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adjudication must be left to other tribunals. This Court is always reluctant to declare that an Act of Congress violates the Constitution, but in this case we have no alternative. As Alexander Hamilton observed: “By a limited constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.” Since it appears clear to me. that this is a bill of attainder I would avoid penetrating the more tangled jungle in which cases involving bars to employment, those involving mere qualifications for employment and those requiring test oaths seem to be so intermingled and intertwined that drawing clear distinctions is difficult, if not impossible. I must add that I agree with the majority on the jurisdictional question. If § 41-4113(c) rendered Dr. Cooper’s employment an illegal contract, it was unenforceable. K. & S. Sales Co. v. Lee, 164 Ark. 449, 261 S.W. 903; Tallman v. Lewis, 124 Ark. 6, 186 S.W. 296. The payment of his salary would be an illegal exaction under those circumstances. See, Tollman v. Lewis, supra. Enjoining that payment from tax funds is not the enforcement of the criminal law any more than refusing to enforce a gambling contract would be. To enforce a contract prohibited by law would permit the law to aid in its own undoing. Tallman v. Lewis, supra. For the reasons I have stated I would reverse the decree.  For an enlightening discussion of the history of the bill of attainder, both in England and the United States, and the application of our constitutional prohibition, see Notes and Comments, the Bounds of Legislative Speculation: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale Law Journal 330 (1962-1963).   It is worthy of note that this case involved the right of Augustus H. Garland to continue to practice law before the Supreme Court of the United States after he had served first as a representative and later as a senator in the Congress of the Confederate States. Except for this decision Attorney General Garland could not have been the first Arkansawyer to serve in the president’s cabinet.   The efficacy of Douds on this point seems to have been doubtful in the minds of several members of the court many years ago. See dissenting opinions in Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 82 S.Ct. 302, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 and in Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 90 S.Ct. 355, 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969), where the majority declined to decide whether the section of the act questioned in Douds and later repealed, would then have passed constitutional muster and whether Douds would be reaffirmed. Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting, pointed out that only 6 members of the court participated in Douds, and their analysis indicates that only one half of them joined in this part of the “opinion of the Court.”