Court Opinion

ID: 9832006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:32:30.756768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:41.078932
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
The following matters not noted in our original opinion deserve attention:
Appellants assign error in “taxing all costs of all courts against all the appellants, principal as well as sureties, on replevy bond.” We sustain this assignment to the extent that the sureties are not liable for the costs of the trial court under the following authorities: Collier v Myers, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 312, 37 S. W. 183; Henderson v. Brown, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 464, 41 S. W. 406 (writ denied); McLeod v. Craig (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 934 (writ denied); Zimmerman v Pearson (Tex. Civ. App.) 51 S. W. 523; Pipkin v. Tinch (Tex. Civ. App.) 97 S. W. 1077; McIntyre v. Emerson (Tex. Civ. App.) 132 S. W. 947; Tripplett v. Hendricks (Tex. Civ. App.) 212 S. W. 754; Rose v. Brantley (Tex. Civ. App.) 262 S W. 193; Riggle v. Automobile Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 276 S. W. 439.
The judgment of the trial court taxed all costs against Masterson and his replevy bond sureties. There was no complaint of this action in that court, and no assignment of error raising the question. Under these circumstances the costs of appeal will not be assessed against appellees, for the reasons set out in our original opinion.
Both Masterson and his sureties were principals in the appeal bond, prosecuting a joint appeal from the trial court’s judgment, and therefore costs of appeal are properly taxed against all of them.
Appellants further contend that the trial court committed error in rendering any judgment against them “because the appel-lees contracted to and with the assignor of the notes purchased by Masterson to waive any damages whatever which might accrue in the premises, if it be found necessary to retake the property,” The chattel mortgage contained two provisions which form the basis of this contention. The first was to the effect that the title to the property was retained in the seller until the notes were fully paid, and upon default therein the payee “shall have the right, and is hereby authorized and empowered, to take and resume possession of and to remove into such possession any or all of the above-described property wherever found,” and the makers of the note “hereby waive any claim or action for trespass for damage on account of such taking.” In the alternative the instrument provided that the payee in the note, instead of taking possession of the property in satisfaction thereof, should in ease of default, either with or without suit, have the right to take possession of the property wherever found, without any liability for damages or other claim, sell the property at public or private sale, and apply the proceeds as a credit upon the mortgage debt. Masterson did not resort to any of the remedies given him to take possession of the property udthout suit, but resorted to the courts for the enforcement of his rights, contending, first, that he was the owner of the property because it had been surrendered to him by the Williams in satisfaction of the note; and, second, in the alternative, that he had a chattel mortgage on the property which he sought to foreclose. He resorted to the legal remedy of sequestration to get possession of the property. The jury having found against him on his claim of ownership, there was only left his right of foreclosure. The judgment awarded him the full amount of his claim against the property, and the only judgment recovered against him was the actual value of the property taken under sequestration writ and converted by him, less the amount of his lien claim. Clearly he was not entitled to defeat appel-lees’ rights which the judgment enforced by virtue of the mortgage instrument.
In order to conform to the above rulings our former judgment is set aside, and judgment rendered as follows: The trial court’s judgment is reformed so as to award appel-lees recovery against Masterson and his re-plevy bond sureties in the sum of $2,828.89, with interest thereon from November 4, 1925, the date of the trial court’s judgment. All costs of the trial court are assessed against appellant Masterson and all costs of appeal are assessed against appellant Masterson and his replevy bond sureties. In all other respects the trial court’s judgment is left undisturbed, and that judgment as thus reformed is hereby affirmed.
Granted in part, and in part overruled.