Court Opinion

ID: 9680827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:39:22.185305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.802348
License: Public Domain

Justice CASTILLO,
dissenting on motion for rehearing.
I respectfully dissent. The majority departs, without explanation, from our own precedent. See Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ). I would hold that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury’s finding of the existence of an employment contract between appellant Matagorda County Hospital District and appellee Christine Burwell. I would grant MCHD’s motion for rehearing, reverse the judgment, and render a take-nothing judgment against Burwell.
THE UNILATERAL-REVOCATION RULE
Our complete holding in Reynolds was this:
[Tjhere is no evidence of any express agreement which dealt with procedures for discharge of employees, unless the employee handbooks can be read as such. We do not believe that they can be so read. Reynolds was in no way prevented from unilaterally amending or even totally withdrawing its handbook. In fact, the original handbook was amended once during Mendoza’s employment. We believe that the handbooks constituted no more than general guidelines.
Reynolds, 644 S.W.2d at 539 (emphasis added). Here, the undisputed evidence at trial proved that MCHD retained the right to unilaterally revoke its Personnel Policy Manual. This single fact is not only dis-positive but also indistinguishable from the facts in Reynolds.
For compelling reasons, on occasion we do overrule earlier decisions. I dissent here because the unilateral-revocation rule we articulated in Reynolds is ensconced firmly in Texas jurisprudence. In the twenty years since we handed down that decision, Reynolds’ progeny in case after case have followed our unambiguous holding: when an employer retains the right to revoke or amend an employee manual, termination procedures outlined in the manual do not alter the employees’ at-will status. Id.1 The majority disregards our own *90precedent as well as a basic tenet of Texas employment law.
Federal courts also have followed Reynolds.2 The Fifth Circuit cited our opinion in analyzing the effect in Texas of employee manuals on at-will status: “Texas law ‘generally] reject[s] the claim that employment manuals issued unilaterally by an employer can per se constitute written employment contracts and create specific limitations which take the cases out of the at-will doctrine.’ ” Zimmerman v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1987)).
Nonetheless, the majority focuses on two facts: (1) MCHD’s Personnel Policy Manual details procedures for employee discharge;3 and (2) MCHD’s representatives testified they believed they only could terminate an employee for cause. As to the first circumstance, the unilateral revo-cability of MCHD’s Personnel Policy Manual renders any limitation contained in the manual on MCHD’s right to terminate an employee of no legal consequence. Reynolds, 644 S.W.2d at 539. Thus, I do not find that evidence of detailed termination procedures in the manual supports the jury’s verdict in this case. As to 'the second circumstance, the subjective belief of an employer’s managers in the necessity of compliance with termination procedures in an employee handbook does not create an exception to the at-will doctrine. Zimmerman, 932 F.2d at 472. Thus, I also do not find relevant, or dispositive, the testimony of Burwell and other MCHD managers that they understood that an MCHD employee could be terminated only for cause. Id. Finally, MCHD’s Personnel Policy Manual not only specified grounds supporting termination for cause but also inconsistently provided that “[ejmployment at the Hospital is by mutual arrangement and may be terminated by either the employee or the employer.” Accordingly, I would hold that evidence of the unilateral revoeability of MCHD’s Personnel Policy Manual conclusively established as a matter of law the opposite of Burwell’s claim of a binding employment contract. Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Hamer, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.1997).
CONCLUSION
We follow precedent for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and legitimacy. Strong policies4 support our practice of adhering to settled rules of law “unless there exists the strongest reasons for chang[e].” Benavides v. Garcia, 290 S.W. 739, 740-41 (Tex. Comm’n App.1927, judgm’t adopted). My dissent should not be read to condemn reasoned evolution when continued application of a judicially created rule of law no longer furthers the interests it once served and “the general interest will suffer less by such departure, than from a strict adherence.” See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 215 (Tex.2001) (quoting Benavides, 290 S.W. at 740). In that event, we should not hesitate to revisit a prior holding.
*91The majority does not give a reason for our departure today from Reynolds, and with that I also disagree. The majority should announce a repudiation of Reynolds so that employers, particularly publicly funded entities like MCHD, know they may rely no longer on the unilateral-revocation rule as a bulwark against breaeh-of-contract claims by terminated employees.

. See, e.g., Stephens v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 50 S.W.3d 621, 635 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (supp. op. on mot. for reh’g); Mott v. Montgomery County, 882 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied); Alcorn v. Vaksman, 877 S.W.2d 390, 422 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 69-70 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Ryan v. Superi- or Oil Co., 813 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Berry v. Doctor’s Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, no writ). I find only one exception in Texas to a straightforward application of the unilateral-revocation rule. United Transp. Union v. Brown, 694 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Brown is distinguishable in that the jury found that the employer on hiring had expressly promised the employee, who resigned at the employer’s request from a union that guaranteed certain employment conditions, that she would not lose any job protection rights.

. See, e.g., Glagola v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 705 F.Supp. 1220, 1222 (E.D.Tex. 1989).

. The majority concludes that we distinguished in Reynolds cases involving employee manuals containing express procedures for employee discharge. However, the facts in Reynolds included just such a manual.

.We should give due consideration to the settled expectations of litigants who justifiably rely on the principles articulated in our precedents. See Quill Corp. v. N. Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321, 112 S.Ct. 1904, 119 L.Ed.2d 91 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[R]eliance on a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance. . ..").