Court Opinion

ID: 9529888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:12.428664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:56.884433
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J., Concurring.
I have joined the concurring opinion of Justice Brown, which offers a cogent analysis of the relevance and admissibility of some expert testimony regarding the phenomenon sometimes known as battered women’s syndrome and the extent to which that testimony was relevant to issues in this case. I agree that the trial court erred prejudicially when it instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be considered in determining the objective reasonableness of defendant’s belief in the need to use deadly force in defense of self. I write separately, however, to emphasize my disagreement with the broad proposition of the majority that expert testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome is “generally relevant” to that issue and therefore admissible without regard to the facts of the particular case or the content of the expert testimony.
I also disagree with the implication in the majority opinion that only the two instructions which the majority consider “appropriate” need be given when expert testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome is admitted. If an instruction limiting jury consideration of all or some parts of the expert’s relevant testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome to a particular issue is requested, the instruction must be given. (Evid. Code, § 355;1 People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 83 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]. See also 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 313, p. 285.)
Although the majority recognize that all of the expert testimony given here was not relevant to both prongs of perfect self-defense, they fail to *1091define or circumscribe the scope of an expert’s testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome which they hold is “generally relevant” to a defendant’s belief that deadly force is necessary in defense of self. They imply that, even though Dr. Bowker’s testimony had limited relevance, section 1107 authorized admission of, and jury consideration of, substantially all of his testimony in this case. That is inaccurate. As Justice Brown explains, section 1107 permits admission, when relevant, only of expert testimony “regarding battered women’s syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence.” Much of Dr. Bowker’s testimony was not about battered women’s syndrome as such, but was about the experiences of this defendant and recounted the hearsay statements of defendant. That testimony was not made admissible by section 1107 and those hearsay statements were not admissible for their truth. (§§ 801-802.) Under the doctrine of limited admissibility, they were “ ‘admissible not as independent proof of the facts but as a part of the information upon which the physician based his diagnosis and treatment, if any. [Citations.] Upon request the jurors should be told . . . that the evidence was received and was to be considered for this narrow and limited purpose.’ ” (Whitfield v. Roth (1974) 10 Cal.3d 874, 895, fn. 25 [112 Cal.Rptr. 540, 519 P.2d 588], quoting with approval Kelley v. Bailey (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 728, 737-738 [11 Cal.Rptr. 228], italics in original; see also Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1523-1525 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 833].) Therefore, this part of Dr. Bowker’s testimony was not admissible under section 1107, and is not relevant and admissible for either of the purposes suggested in the majority opinion. It may be considered only to explain the basis for his opinion that defendant suffered from battered women’s syndrome and, on request, the jury should be so instructed.
Because I agree with Justice Brown as to the limited relevance of expert testimony about battered women’s syndrome and of the expert testimony admitted in this case, I cannot join the majority in suggesting that, as a matter of law, expert testimony regarding battered women’s syndrome is “generally relevant” to the subjective existence and objective reasonableness of a defendant’s belief in the necessity to use deadly force in self-defense. As Justice Brown explains, some evidence regarding battered women’s syndrome may be relevant in a particular case. And, as is true with all evidence, if an objection is made to introduction of evidence about battered women’s syndrome, the proponent of this evidence bears the burden of establishing its particular relevance. (§ 354, subd. (a); People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 648 [274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849].) If the evidence is admitted, the court, on request, must give instructions limiting consideration of the evidence to the specific issue or issues to which it is relevant.

All references to statutes are to the Evidence Code.
Section 355: “When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, the court upon request shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” (Italics added.)