Court Opinion

ID: 9412581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-31 20:04:47.527722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:09.822604
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/31/23 In re W.Y. CA1/4
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 In re W.Y. et al., Persons Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.

 W.K.Y. et al.,
           Petitioners,                                                        A167653
 v.
                                                                               (Contra Costa County
 SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA
                                                                               Super. Ct. Nos. J2200428,
 COSTA COUNTY,
                                                                               J2200429)
           Respondent,

 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU,
 Real Party in Interest.

         J.F. and W.K.Y. (Mother and Father, collectively Parents) petition for
extraordinary writs compelling the juvenile court to vacate its order denying
them reunification services with their children, W.Y. and A.Y., and setting a
hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 to
terminate parental rights. The order rests on findings that Parents caused
the death of the children’s 18-month-old sibling O.Y. by abuse or neglect.
Parents also contend that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying

         1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                               1
them visitation with the surviving children, and Father contends that the
court erred in implicitly finding that the Contra Costa County Children and
Family Services Bureau (the Bureau) satisfied its duty of further inquiry into
whether the children are subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq. (ICWA)), after it discovered reason to believe that they might be
Indian children.
      Parents have shown no abuse of discretion in the setting of a section
366.26 hearing. However, while there was substantial evidence that
visitation would be detrimental to W.Y., there was no such evidence as to
A.Y., whose distinct interest in visitation was not meaningfully addressed. We
thus vacate the order insofar as it denies visitation with A.Y. and direct the
juvenile court to assess visitation specifically as to her.
      The court also erred in implicitly finding that the Bureau satisfied its
duty of further inquiry under California law related to ICWA (§ 224 et seq.).
After Father stated that his grandfather had Cherokee ancestry and provided
contact information, the Bureau did not document its efforts to contact the
grandfather in a way sufficient to permit a finding of diligence. And while the
Bureau reported sending inquiry notices about the children to three Cherokee
tribes, it did not submit copies of the notices to enable evaluation of their
adequacy by the court. We thus conditionally affirm the disposition order
subject to the court’s duty to confirm that the Bureau will satisfy its duty of
further inquiry.
      As the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of
the case, and this opinion does not warrant publication, we need not recite
the full history. (People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.) We instead
summarize as necessary the parts of that history relevant to the issues raised
by the petitions. While the propriety of a section 366.26 hearing is plainly the

                                         2
central issue, we discuss that of visitation first, as it gives rise to and informs
our assessment of one argument raised about the section 366.26 order.
      1. The Court Properly Denied Visitation with W.Y. But Must
      Separately Assess the Propriety of Visitation with A.Y.2
      At the initial hearing on August 30, 20223, the court ordered weekly
joint supervised visitation for both parents. On September 29, after two visits
that went well, the Bureau applied ex parte to suspend visitation because,
after the second visit, three-year-old W.Y.’s aggressive behavior toward four-
month-old A.Y., and a younger child in the home where they were placed,
escalated in a way necessitating a change in placement. The Bureau reported
no harmful effects of visitation on A.Y. It also noted that Parents were
exhibiting conflict and volatility and showing signs of substance abuse. The
court granted the request.
      At a hearing a week later, the court left visitation suspended, noting
the likelihood of harmful effects on W.Y. The court identified no detriment to
A.Y. It renewed the suspension of visitation on October 27 and November 17,
each time referring only to detriment to W.Y.
      The next hearing was the jurisdiction hearing two and a half months
later, on February 2. Its focus was medical testimony, but the court allowed
counsel to briefly address visitation. Noting that W.Y. had begun therapy

      2 Of necessity, Parents limit their requests for prospective writ relief to

the order denying visitation now in effect, issued at the disposition hearing.
We discuss the prior orders suspending visitation both because they provide
background essential to the operative order and because Mother contends
that the prior denials unfairly prevented her at the disposition hearing from
demonstrating bonds with the children, which could have enabled her to
prove that reunification services were in their best interest (see part 2, post).
      3 All proceedings at issue occurred between August 2022, when the case

was filed, and the April 2023 disposition hearing, so all unspecified
references to dates are correspondingly to 2022 or 2023.

                                         3
that day, the Bureau’s counsel represented that the therapist recommended
delaying contact with Parents. The court asked “What about for [A.Y.]?” but
then said, “Oh, [A.Y.] is seven months [old].” In cross-talk, the Bureau’s
counsel said, with apparent regard to A.Y., “The information, I believe, was
that it would be detrimental to do that right now.” Each parent’s counsel
asked to be put on the waitlist for therapeutic visitation. The court declined
to resume visitation or order that parents be put on the therapeutic-visitation
waitlist, noting only the detriment to W.Y.
      The record does not make clear the basis for the Bureau’s counsel’s
representation that supervised visitation would be detrimental for A.Y. The
social worker had spoken a week earlier with the therapist who had been
assigned to (but not yet begun treating) W.Y. The therapist “reported that
she will be monitoring [A.Y.]’s mental health status as she is not currently
displaying any signs of concern.” The therapist, as paraphrased in the report,
noted that although A.Y. “was only four-months-old when she was detained
. . . [,] she was still exposed to ongoing domestic violence and the incident with
[O.Y.],” and that “studies have shown” that even if a child is an infant when
exposed to trauma, “there is still an impact on their emotional and mental
health.” The record does not indicate that the therapist had assessed A.Y., or
expressed a view as to the effects of visitation on her.
       The jurisdiction hearing resumed on March 23 (after continuances due
to illness). At that point, each parent requested that visitation resume, but
the court deferred the issue to the disposition hearing, which occurred on
April 20. In its memo, the Bureau reported a discussion on March 1 with the
therapist who had begun play therapy with W.Y. and opined it was too soon
in the process to reintroduce visitation.

                                        4
        At the April 20 disposition hearing, Father again asked to resume
visitation; each parent objected to a finding of detriment. In its disposition
ruling, the court found that reunification was not in the children’s best
interest because “it is clear, and this also dovetails with the detriment issue
with respect to visitation, that even visits with the parents resulted in
disastrous, but very enlightening effects on [W.Y.], in particular.” In
summarizing those effects, the court did not identify any that were felt by
A.Y. It found that supervised visitation “would be detrimental to the children,
given the information . . . provided, in particular, by the children’s therapist,
but also by . . . the caretakers . . . as to the detrimental reactions that the—
[W.Y.], in particular, underwent after his visits.”
        We review visitation orders for abuse of discretion (In re Emmanuel R.
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 452, 465) and findings that visitation would be
detrimental for substantial evidence. (In re A.J. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 154,
160.)
        Here, the court made a series of well-grounded rulings that visitation
would be detrimental to W.Y.; substantial evidence supported those rulings,
which were well within the court’s discretion.
        As to A.Y., however, the record lacks substantial evidence to support
the findings of detriment. The Bureau contends as to both children, the court
did not abuse its discretion given its denial of reunification services. The
Bureau cites subdivision (f) of section 361.5, which states that if, pursuant to
subdivision (b), a court denies reunification, it may permit visitation pending
a permanency hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental, in
which case it may not order visitation (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450,
457). The Bureau contends that the court did not abuse its discretion by
treating the children as a unit for purposes of visitation in light of the

                                        5
importance, once reunification was denied, of avoiding detriment to A.Y. by
stabilizing the children’s placement and keeping them together, which
depended on W.Y. moving past his aggression toward younger children.
      While we agree with the benefits of keeping A.Y and W.Y. together,
there is no evidence that it would be detrimental to let Parents visit A.Y.
alone. While their final visit with both children together correlated with and
may have caused aggressive behavior by W.Y., nothing in the record suggests
that past visits detrimentally affected A.Y., or suggests how a future
supervised visit with A.Y. alone would detrimentally affect either child.
Further, the Bureau’s reliance on the denial of reunification services is
problematic for two reasons: (1) it cannot justify the lack of visitation with
A.Y. in the seven months before the denial of reunification; and (2) nothing in
the record suggests that the court considered this fact and used it as a basis
for its decision.
      The only time the record shows the court distinctly considered whether
visitation would be detrimental to A.Y. is the February 2 hearing. The only
ground raised was the Bureau’s counsel’s representation—based, we assume,
on a good-faith misunderstanding—that “The information, I believe, was that
it would be detrimental to do that right now.” In fact, W.Y.’s therapist had
said only that, in general, a four-month-old could suffer trauma from seeing
abuse—not that she had concluded that A.Y. did so. The record thus contains
no evidence that visitation would have been detrimental to A.Y.
      Accordingly, the order denying visitation is affirmed as to W.Y. but
reversed as to A.Y., and the court is directed to consider whether supervised
visitation with A.Y. alone would be detrimental to A.Y. In so ruling, we are
mindful that, “[a]fter the termination of reunification services, the parents’
interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer

                                        6
paramount” and “ ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency
and stability’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317), and that after
reunification ends, section 361.5 merely gives a court discretion to order
visitation if it would not be detrimental (In re J.N., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 457). While the court may find that supervised visitation for the rest of this
case would be detrimental to A.Y., or may choose not to exercise its discretion
to allow visitation, it must base those decisions on the distinct effects of
visitation on A.Y. herself.
      2. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Denying
      Reunification Services and Setting a Section 366.26 Hearing
      In deciding to deny reunification services and set a section 366.26
hearing, the court relied on section 361.5, subdivision (b), which states that
“[r]eunification services need not be provided to a parent . . . when the court
finds, by clear and convincing evidence, . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (4) That the parent . . .
has caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.” That
provision is mandatory, but subject to an exception allowing a court to order
services for such a parent who bears the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interests of the child.
(§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2); see In re A.E. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1141
[subdivision (a) of section 361.5 “provides that reunification services are
mandatory unless a bypass provision applies”; subdivision (b) “lists the bypass
provisions and provides that reunification services are discretionary if any of
them apply”; but subdivision (c) “provides that denial of reunification services
is mandatory, not discretionary, with respect to nearly all of the bypass
provisions, unless the court makes certain countervailing factual findings”].)
      The court found by clear and convincing evidence, based on the
undisputed testimony of an expert in the medical evaluation of child abuse
and neglect, that one or both parents inflicted O.Y.’s fatal injuries, and that

                                           7
both must have been aware that something was horribly wrong with her for
hours before Mother called 911—a delay that eliminated the possibility of
medical care saving O.Y.’s life. In sum, “[b]oth parents should have known
something significant was wrong, and both parents were negligent at best,
and horribly abusive, at worst.”
      Neither parent challenges the presence of substantial evidence to
support the finding that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4) applied. Each argues
instead that the court abused its discretion in failing to find that they bore
their burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification
was nonetheless in the best interests of their surviving children pursuant to
subdivision (c)(2), or alternatively that the court’s decisions about visitation,
and a delay in starting therapy for W.Y., unfairly made it impossible for them
to bear that burden, and for the court to assess fairly if reunification might be
in the children’s best interest. We review for abuse of discretion the finding
that Parents did not bear their burden under subdivision (c)(2). (In re A.E.,
supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1140–1141.)
      In In re Ethan N. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 55 (Ethan N.), the Fifth
District clarified the tremendous burden imposed by section 361.5:
“Subdivision (b)(4) . . . evidences the Legislature’s recognition that some
situations are so extreme as to require extraordinary caution in recognizing
and giving weight to the usually desirable objective of family preservation.
. . . [W]hen child abuse results in the death of a child, such abuse ‘is simply
too shocking to ignore’ in determining whether the offending parent should be
offered services aimed at reunification with a surviving child. ‘The fact of a
death and a subsequent petition . . . arising out of that death simply
obliterates almost any possibility of reunification . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 65.) In
preserving some “possibility of reunification” in subdivision (c)(2), the

                                           8
Legislature “left open ‘a tiny crack’ to the parent who has been responsible
for the death of his or her child.” (Ibid.) Relevant factors in assessing the best
interest of surviving children include “ ‘a parent’s current efforts and fitness
as well as the parent’s history’ ”; “ ‘the gravity of the problem leading to
dependency’ ”; “the strength of the bonds between the child and the parent
and the child and the caretaker,” and the “ ‘child’s need for stability and
continuity.’ ” (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1228, quoting
In re Ethan N., at pp. 66–67.)
      Here, Parents have failed to show that the court abused its discretion
in finding that they did not bring themselves, by clear and convincing
evidence, within the very narrow exception at issue.
      While the record demonstrates that both parents completed their case
plans in a prior dependency proceeding based on substance abuse that was
closed in April 2022, and that Father took some actions during these
proceedings to address his issues (including parenting and domestic violence
classes and individual therapy),4 each parent failed to appear for all but a
handful of drug tests during the time the case was pending. Most
importantly, as the County notes, Parents’ success in reunifying with the
children in April 2022 “rings quite hollow” in light of O.Y.’s horrific death,
four months later, from abuse and neglect.
      The record thus supports the court’s findings that Father’s and Mother’s
progress toward alleviating the causes that necessitated foster care had been
“minimal” and “none,” respectively. The efforts by the Parents still fall far

      4 While social workers substantiated Father’s claim of insurance-based

problems in accessing substance abuse treatment, the question under section
361.5, subdivision (c)(2) is whether a parent has shown that reunification is
in the best interests of surviving children—not whether he has made a good-
faith effort to address the problems that led to their removal.

                                        9
short of the exemplary progress required for parents responsible for a child’s
death to bring themselves within the “tiny crack” left open by section 361.5,
subdivision (c)(2). (Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.5th at p. 65.)
      The remaining factors also support the court’s decision. The gravity of
the problem leading to dependency could hardly be greater, and the evidence
of parent/child bonds was weak. A.Y. was not yet four months old when
detained, and by the time of the disposition hearing eight months later had
spent over half her life thriving in the undisputedly loving care of foster
caregivers to whom she had bonded and who were prepared to care for her
indefinitely. Thus, the record supports the court’s finding that reunification
would not be in A.Y.’s best interest.
      As to W.Y., while the children had two pleasant parental visits early in
the case, and W.Y. tried to leave with Parents at the end of one, and cried
briefly when separated, he was “easily consoled” and, in five months with his
foster caregivers, “never mentioned or asked about his parents.” The record
compellingly shows that W.Y.—who very likely witnessed the fatal abuse of
O.Y. and has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—,
suffered the effects of PTSD after the final visit with Parents, which, after
other triggering events, caused him to become deeply upset and troublingly
aggressive. His caregivers reported that, when his placement began, he
several times said “baby hurt, baby hurt” while making a punching motion,
and sang himself to sleep saying, “mommy, daddy, ouchie, ouchie,” but later
came to say “happy happy happy happy.” The record contains other vivid
examples of how the greater strength of W.Y.’s bonds with his current
caregivers, and his profound need for stability and continuity in a placement
that will not trigger his PTSD, made it impossible to show that reunification
would be in W.Y.’s best interest.

                                        10
      Parents note that, from early in the case, each asked that W.Y. receive
therapy and/or therapeutic visitation, and that he was diagnosed with PTSD
in October yet did not begin therapy until February, four months into the
case. Mother contends that therapy could have enabled visitation, which
could in turn have strengthened her ability to show bonds with the children,
as required to satisfy section 361.5, subdivision (c)(2).
      These contentions, even if true, fail to show that had the court allowed
visitation with A.Y., and had W.Y. timely begun therapy, any marginal
improvement in Parents’ ability to demonstrate strong bonds with the
children could have made a difference in their ability to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that reunification was in the children’s best interest. (See
Ethan N., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 68 [even though mother had made
significant progress, reunification was not proper because it is rare that
reunification will serve the best interests of the child when the parent is
responsible for the death of a child through abuse or neglect].)
      3. The Court Erred in Implicitly Finding that the Bureau
      Satisfied Its Duty of Further Inquiry under ICWA5
      “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address concerns regarding the
separation of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster
care placement, usually in non-Indian homes. [Citation.] ICWA established
minimum standards for state courts to follow before removing Indian children
from their families and placing them in foster care or adoptive homes.
[Citations.] In 2006, California adopted various procedural and substantive
provisions of ICWA..” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1048 (Guerrero,
J.) (D.S.).) D.S., authored by our now–Chief Justice when on the Court of

      5 The Bureau’s and court’s duties arise from ICWA, federal regulations

implementing it, and California statutes that implement and augment duties
imposed by federal law. For brevity, we refer to this set of laws as “ICWA.”

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Appeal, describes the framework of federal and state law governing the duty
of the court and Bureau to inquire whether children in dependency
proceedings qualify as “Indian children.”6 (D.S., at pp. 1048–1051.) In brief,
the process has three stages: The Bureau first has a duty of initial inquiry,
which, if it reveals a reason to believe that a child may be an Indian child,
triggers a duty of further inquiry, which, if it yields reason to know the child
is an Indian child, entitles the tribe to receive notice of and intervene in the
proceeding. (Ibid.) This case concerns only the duty of further inquiry triggered
by a “reason to believe.”
      California law “specifies the steps the [Bureau] and the juvenile court
are required to take in determining a child’s possible status as an Indian
child,” a term ICWA defines to mean a child who “ ‘. . . is either (a) a member
of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is
the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . . .’ ” (D.S., supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048, citing § 224.1, subd. (a).) “The [Bureau] and the
juvenile court have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency
proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies. (§ 224.2, subd. (a) . . . ;
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)” (D.S., at p. 1048.)
      “Section 224.2, subdivision (b) specifies that once a child is placed into
the temporary custody of a county welfare department, . . . the duty to inquire
‘includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian,
Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in
the child, and [any] party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child
is, or may be, an Indian child.’ When the [Bureau] has ‘reason to believe’ that

      6 Because “Indian children” is a defined statutory term, we use it rather

than “Native American” or “indigenous.” For the same reason, we use the
defined term “tribe” in a generic way to refer to Native American political
entities that define themselves as nations, tribes, or bands.

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an Indian child is involved, further inquiry . . . is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)
The required further inquiry includes (1) interviewing the parents and
extended family members;[7] (2) contacting the [BIA] and State Department of
Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with, and
anyone else, that might have information regarding the child’s membership
or eligibility in a tribe.[ ] At this stage, contact with a tribe ‘shall, at a
minimum,’ include . . . contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt of
ICWA notice, and ‘sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for
the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well as
information on the current status of the child and the case.’ (§ 224.2,
subd. (e)(3).)” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1048–1049.)
      “ ‘The juvenile court may . . . make a finding that ICWA does not apply
because the [Bureau]’s further inquiry and due diligence was ‘proper and
adequate’ but no ‘reason to know’ whether the child is an Indian child was
discovered. (§ 224.2, subds. (i)(2), (g).) Even if the court makes this finding,
the [Bureau] and the court have a continuing duty under ICWA, and the
court ‘shall reverse its determination if it subsequently receives information
providing reason to believe that the child is an Indian child and order the
social worker or probation officer to conduct further inquiry.’ (§ 224.2, subd.
(i)(2).)” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050.)
      At the start of this case, each Parent filled out a Judicial Council form,
indicating that none of the circumstances that subject a child to ICWA applies.

      7 Section 224.1, subdivision (c) adopts ICWA’s definition of “extended

family members,” which generally includes grandparents but not great-
grandparents. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).) However, the duty of further inquiry
also extends to “any other person that may reasonably be expected to have
information regarding the child's membership status or eligibility” (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B)–(C)), a category that plainly encompasses
a living great-grandparent alleged to have Native American ancestry.

                                           13
At several hearings, the court asked Parents and relatives if any of them
knew of reason to believe the children might be “Indian children” for
purposes of ICWA.
      The first positive responses came at the February 2 hearing, at which
Father said he had recently learned that his grandfather is “50 percent Native
American.” Also in attendance was Father’s mother (Paternal Grandmother),
who specified that Father’s grandfather George Young (Paternal Great-
Grandfather)—who was not present—is of Cherokee descent. Father’s half-
sister (Paternal Half-Aunt), an enrolled Comanche Native tribe member,
expressed a belief that the children would qualify to be enrolled in the
Cherokee—not Comanche—tribe.8
      The court found reason to believe the children are Indian children and
ordered the Bureau “to complete further inquiry as required by . . . section
224.2(e) and file with the court evidence of this inquiry, . . .” After health-
related continuances, the court next addressed ICWA 11 weeks later, at the
April 20 disposition hearing. The Bureau filed a memo detailing its further
inquiry.
      A table in the memo listed contacts with relatives including Paternal
Half-Aunt, who had tried to gather information about the paternal side of
Father’s family. An entry for a February 23 conversation with Father stated
that he had identified “an Aunt Bertie (last name unknown), who was
possibly enrolled in the Cherokee nation, specific tribe unknown” and
provided a phone number for paternal great-grandfather George Young.
Father “reported that George Young lived in Grass Valley, and is difficult to

      8 Father and Paternal Half-Aunt have the same mother, but her

Comanche ancestry is through her father, so W.Y. and A.Y. have no genetic
Comanche ancestry. No one suggested below that the children might be
eligible for membership in the Comanche Native tribe.

                                         14
get ahold of [because] he doesn’t always answer his phone. [Father] reported
[that George Young] would be the holder of any additional information [and]
have Aunt Bertie’s last name, but [the social worker] would need to contact
him multiple times . . . to gain needed information.”
      Entries on February 27 and March 13 for “George Young | Paternal
great grandfather” state only, “No response. Message left.”9
       The report next describes how the social worker sent “ICWA inquiry
letters” by certified mail on February 27 to three tribes—the Cherokee
Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah
Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma—and the BIA. The Bureau did not
submit copies of the inquiry letters with its memo (or otherwise).
      The Bureau did attach copies of three responses. The Eastern Band
wrote that the children are not eligible to register as members; the Cherokee
Nation wrote that they are not “Indian children”; and the BIA sent a letter
stating that the Bureau had not provided documentation that the children are
eligible for membership in a recognized tribe. As of April 20, the United
Keetoowah Band had not responded.
      At the hearing that day, the court assessed the Bureau’s inquiry.
Summarizing its report, the court stated that Paternal Half-Aunt “does have
tribal affiliations, but it appears that [they] are for the side of the family that
is unrelated to [Father].” It noted “some possibility of . . . ancestry through
father, specifically, through an Aunt Bertie, whose last name is unknown to

      9 A final entry on March 14 states that Paternal Half-Aunt emailed the

social worker that she had spoken with Paternal Second Cousin, who knew
nothing of Native American ancestry, but passed on the request to her
mother. The entry states that the social worker requested contact information
for Paternal Second Cousin and the name of her mother. The report, filed five
weeks later, does not note any response or follow-up.

                                        15
all parties” and “some indication that, perhaps, the paternal great
grandfather would at least have Aunt Bertie’s last name,” but added, “it
appears . . . that [the social worker] and all relatives have attempted to get in
touch with that paternal great grandfather and have been unable to do so,
and it has been a couple of months that parties have been working on that.”
Finally, the court summarized the responses (or lack thereof) from the three
Cherokee tribes.
      The court stated, “I will find that . . . while there was a reason to
believe, there is currently no reason to know, that the children are Indian
children. However, . . . pending that final letter from the Keetoowah Band of
Cherokee,. . . I will withhold further ruling on that particular issue until we
hear from that particular tribe.” Father’s counsel interjected that Paternal
Great-Aunt had recently said that she believes the unfound relative is
“Bernice,” not “Bertie,” and is a paternal great-grandmother, not an aunt; the
court replied, “I imagine that the difference between ‘Bertie’ and ‘Bernice’ is
not the salient problem . . . . It is that we need a last name.” After adding,
“should that last name come to anyone’s knowledge in this courtroom, you are
to let the Bureau and the court know immediately so that we can . . . follow
up,” the court ended the ICWA part of the hearing.
      We review ICWA-related findings for substantial evidence; if the facts
are undisputed, “we independently determine whether ICWA’s requirements
have been satisfied.” (D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.) Father
contends that the court erred for three reasons in implicitly finding that the
Bureau showed that it had discharged its duty of further inquiry as to the
two tribes that responded to its notices: (1) the Bureau failed to submit copies
of the notices, leaving the court unable to confirm that it had given the tribes
all available information; (2) it did not make adequate efforts to contact

                                        16
George Young; and (3) it chose not to contact the Comanche Native tribe
based on an unfounded assumption that the children’s lack of genetic ties to a
member precluded eligibility. We agree with the first two points.
      When an agency sends a further-inquiry notice, it “must include
enough information for the tribe to ‘conduct a meaningful review of its
records to determine the child’s eligibility for membership’ ” (D.S., supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050). “ ‘ICWA notice requirements are strictly
construed.’ ” (In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 557, disagreed with on
other grounds by In re Dezi C. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 779, review granted
Sept. 21, 2022, S275578.) The Bureau bears the burden to “ ‘obtain all possible
information about the minor’s potential Indian background and provide that
information to the relevant tribe.’ ” (Ibid.)
      For present purposes, we need not determine exactly what information
the Bureau was obliged to provide to the tribes, for the record does not
include copies of the inquiry notices, which were essential for the juvenile
court to assess the adequacy of the information provided. A court may not
simply assume that an agency’s notices were sufficient. (See, e.g., In re K.R.
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709 [“Nor can the juvenile court assume that
because some information was obtained and relayed to the relevant tribes,
the social services agency necessarily complied fully with its obligations”],
disagreed with on other grounds by In re Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at
p. 779.) We lack a record enabling us to affirm the court’s implied finding.
      Further, the Bureau’s showing regarding George Young, the great
grandfather identified as the only lead for further information about
Cherokee ancestry, is insufficient. The relevant table entries state only,
“[Date] | George Young | Paternal great grandfather | No response. Message
left.” We cannot conclude that those entries suffice to support the implied

                                         17
finding that the Bureau discharged its duty of further inquiry as to Mr.
Young. The entries contain no facts showing that the message was left at a
correct, current number for Mr. Young or the likelihood that he would receive
the message. Given the insufficient description, we cannot determine if the
Bureau’s leaving of two messages amounted to due diligence in light of its
failure to make any contact by a postal or email address or other means of
contact (the record does not indicate any efforts to obtain alternative methods
of contact), and whether two messages were sufficient in light of the warning
that the Bureau would need to contact him “multiple times” to obtain
information. As part of its duty to pursue “ ‘all reasonable investigative
leads’ ” (In re Y.W., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 554), an agency must “make a
meaningful effort to locate and interview extended family members” (In re
K.R., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 709). While we do not hold that leaving
unreturned phone messages can never amount to diligence in the further-
inquiry context, nor can we hold on this record that doing so in an unspecified
manner was sufficient in these circumstances.10
      As for the assumption that the lack of genetic tie to a Comanche Native
tribe member made the children ineligible for membership, it is true that a
tribe’s “determination of a child’s membership or eligibility for membership in
the tribe “ ‘shall be conclusive’ ” (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, quoting
§ 224.3, subd. (e)(1)), and that a tribe could have membership criteria that, in
some circumstances, make persons eligible despite having no genetic descent

      10 Father also contends that the Bureau should have done more to

contact the mother of the second cousin whom Paternal Half-Aunt described
contacting (see fn. 9, ante). ICWA’s definition of “extended family,” however,
does not encompass a second cousin once removed (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2)), and
nothing the Paternal Half-Aunt said indicated that the woman was a “person
that may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child's
membership status or eligibility” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B)).

                                        18
from a tribe member. Father, however, identifies no facts giving rise to a
reason to believe that he had a relationship with his half-sister’s father that
could have made him or his children members of or eligible for membership in
the Comanche Native tribe. The court did not err with regard to that tribe.
                                   Disposition
      The order denying reunification services and setting a hearing pursuant
to Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26 is conditionally affirmed with
directions to ensure that the Children and Family Services Bureau complies
with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law; any implied finding that
it has done so is vacated. The order denying visitation with W.Y. is affirmed,
but that order denying visitation with A.Y. is vacated with instructions to
consider whether visitation with A.Y. alone would be detrimental to A.Y. and,
if not, to exercise discretion (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd. (f)) whether to
allow it. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

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                                           _________________________
                                           Fineman, J.*

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Brown, P. J.

_________________________
Streeter, J.

A167653

      * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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