Court Opinion

ID: 9412324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-29 17:10:18.127661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.509943
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00623-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

OMAR JESUS GARZA,                                                      Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                     Appellee.

                  On appeal from the 105th District Court
                        of Kleberg County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

                 Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva

      Appellant Omar Jesus Garza pleaded guilty to criminal mischief of more than

$2,500 but less than $30,000 and evading arrest with a vehicle, see TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. §§ 28.03, 38.04, offenses enhanced to third-degree and second-degree felonies,

respectively, by appellant’s prior criminal history. See id. §§ 12.42(a), 12.425(a).
Appellant was placed on deferred community supervision, which the trial court

subsequently revoked and thereafter adjudicated appellant. By a single issue, appellant

argues that his sentences of ten- and twenty-years’ incarceration constitute cruel and

unusual punishment. We affirm.

                                     I.     BACKGROUND

       On January 19, 2022, appellant entered into a plea bargain agreement and

pleaded guilty to felony criminal mischief and evading arrest with a vehicle, offenses

alleged to have occurred in the early morning hours of September 25, 2019. As part of

the plea bargain agreement, appellant was prohibited from communicating with the

complainant, Lynn Garza, or her family. Appellant further stipulated to the veracity of the

following evidence:

       On September 25, 2019, Kleberg County Sheriff’s Office Deputy Jonathan

Jimenez received a dispatch notice that appellant, driving an older black model Nissan

sedan, was in route to harm Lynn. Deputy Jimenez observed a vehicle matching the

description and confirmed the vehicle was registered to Lynn. Jimenez thereafter

activated his emergency lights on his marked patrol unit and attempted to initiate a traffic

stop. Appellant refused to pull over and accelerated his vehicle once nearing a residence

later determined to belong to Lynn’s mother. Deputy Jimenez witnessed appellant collide

into a parked vehicle in the driveway, which sustained an estimated $4,604.97 of damage.

       Deputy Jimenez then instructed appellant to exit his vehicle. In response, appellant

remained in his vehicle and pulled out a “large knife.” Deputy Jimenez approached

appellant’s vehicle with his weapon drawn and instructed appellant to drop the knife.

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Appellant initially refused and began yelling, “I want you to f[-]cking kill me! F[-]cking kill

me!” Appellant then exited the vehicle and began taking steps towards Deputy Jimenez,

while stating, “[K]ill me mother f[-]cker[;] kill me. . . . Let’s do suicide by cop mother f[-

]cker.” After Deputy Jimenez declined to engage and attempted to de-escalate the

situation, appellant retreated to his vehicle, telling Deputy Jimenez, “Y’all are lucky I

couldn’t find a gun. I was going to bring a shotgun[,] but my homeboy didn’t let me have

it.”

       Unprovoked, appellant later told Deputy Jimenez he had refused to pull over his

vehicle “on purpose bro,” to make Deputy Jimenez “chase” him. Appellant also confessed

he had not come over to the residence to talk to Lynn, stating, “F[-]ck no[.] I came to f[-

]ck this b[-]tch up.”

       Appellant also stipulated to the contents of a signed emergency protective order

and affidavit written by Lynn, wherein Lynn stated that earlier that same day, appellant

had followed her to work, and he had called her threatening to send her coworkers

personal pictures he had taken of her unknowingly. Appellant later informed Lynn that he

was waiting for her at her apartment and sent her photographs depicting her broken

dresser mirror and her destroyed clothing. According to Lynn, when she returned to her

apartment after the incident at her mother’s residence, she found that appellant had

“sliced [her] sofas with a knife,” broken the television, “dumped everything” out of the

cabinets in the kitchen, and left her bedroom a “disaster.” The only rooms untouched in

her apartment belonged to their two daughters.

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       On March 24, 2022, less than four months after being placed on community

supervision, the State filed a motion to revoke and adjudicate guilt in both causes. The

State filed subsequent amended motions to revoke his community supervision, and at the

revocation hearing on November 29, 2022, the State proceeded on its third amended

motion. The State abandoned one of twelve alleged violations, and appellant pleaded true

to all the remaining allegations, which included testing positive for alcohol and

communicating with Lynn or a member of her family in March 2022 via social media and

via phone between October and November 2022. 1

       Appellant testified at the revocation hearing, explaining he had been in a

relationship with Lynn since they were teenagers and was struggling with his mental

health at the time of the September 2019 offense. On cross-examination, appellant

conceded there is a three-and-a-half-year difference between them, their relationship

began when Lynn was twelve years old, and they got married when Lynn was fifteen.

Appellant also conceded he was arrested for the offense of injury to a child, which

transpired when Lynn was in high school, and he maintained it was “the only time [he]

ever put hands on her.”

       The trial court found the allegations to be true, revoked appellant’s community

supervision in both causes, and sentenced him in each cause with sentences to be served

concurrently. This appeal ensued.

       1 Arnold Salinas, an investigator with the Kleberg County Sherriff’s Office, testified appellant had

made over 160 calls between October and November 2022.

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                                    III.   PUNISHMENT

       By his sole issue, appellant asserts that the sentences imposed were

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense committed and amount to cruel and

unusual punishment.

       An allegation of excessive or disproportionate punishment is a legal claim

“embodied in the Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment” and based on a

“narrow principle that does not require strict proportionality between the crime and the

sentence.” State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)); see U.S.

CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,

nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); see also Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d

189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (acknowledging that the Eighth Amendment is applicable

to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Robinson v. California, 370

U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962))). A successful challenge to proportionality is exceedingly rare

and requires a finding of “gross disproportionality.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 322–23

(citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)); Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925,

928 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2005, pet. ref’d).

       However, to preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly

disproportionate or cruel and unusual, a defendant must present to the trial court a “timely

request, objection, or motion” stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a); see Smith v. State, 721 S.W.2d 844, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (“It is

well settled that almost every right, constitutional and statutory, may be waived by the

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failure to object.”); Toledo v. State, 519 S.W.3d 273, 284 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. ref’d) (concluding defendant had failed to preserve disproportionate-

sentencing complaint); see also Wade v. State, No. 02-13-00251-CR, 2014 WL 1257387,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 27, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding issue was unpreserved where appellant was sentenced to life

imprisonment for criminal mischief); Adams v. State, No. 13-09-00334-CR, 2010 WL

2783745, at *8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 15, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (concluding the same where appellant was sentenced to

forty years’ imprisonment for evading arrest, enhanced by his felony habitual offender

status).

       At no time prior to the appeal did appellant argue that the sentences imposed were

disproportionate to the offenses charged or in violation of his constitutional rights.

Accordingly, appellant failed to preserve his complaint for review. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 927–28. Moreover, even assuming appellant did preserve

error, the sentences appellant received of ten- and twenty-years’ imprisonment were each

within the statutory range which had been elevated due to his repeat felony offender

status. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.42(a), 12.425(a). Sentences within the statutory

range, such as appellant’s, are generally not excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Wood v.

State, 560 S.W.3d 162, 168 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928; see also

Stuckey v. State, No. 13-19-00529-CR, 2021 WL 1045803, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Mar. 18, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding appellant’s sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment for the offense of

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possession of a controlled substance, penalty group 1, one gram or more but less than

four grams enhanced by prior felony convictions is within the statutory range, and, thus,

likely not excessive or cruel); McCann v. State, No. 02-16-00450-CR, 2017 WL 3428849,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 10, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding appellant’s sentence of twenty years’ imprisonment for evading

arrest, enhanced by his prior convictions, fell within the applicable range prescribed by

the legislature, and is not grossly disproportionate or excessive, cruel, or unusual). We

overrule appellant’s sole issue.

                                   III.   CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                             CLARISSA SILVA
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of July, 2023.

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