Court Opinion

ID: 9408178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 19:01:20.67211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:42.377451
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12018    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 07/11/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12018
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       WAYMON BRYANT, JR.,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00019-LMM-WEJ-1
                          ____________________
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                  22-12018

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Waymon Bryant appeals his 84-month sentence imposed af-
       ter Bryant pleaded guilty to possession of a ﬁrearm by a convicted
       felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). No reversible error has
       been shown; we aﬃrm.
              Before Bryant’s sentencing, a probation oﬃcer prepared a
       Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). According to the PSI,
       Bryant had two prior felony convictions that constituted “crimes of
       violence” within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines: a 2003
       Georgia conviction for armed robbery and a 2018 Georgia convic-
       tion for aggravated assault. Based on these convictions, the PSI --
       pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) -- assigned a base-oﬀense level of
       24. Bryant’s resulting advisory guideline range was calculated as
       100 to 120 months’ imprisonment.
               In his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hear-
       ing, Bryant argued that his 2018 Georgia aggravated-assault convic-
       tion -- a violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) -- did not qualify as a
       “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines.1 Relying on
       the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct.
       1817 (2021), Bryant argued chieﬂy that his conviction for Georgia

       1 That Bryant’s 2003 armed-robbery conviction constitutes a “crime of vio-
       lence” is undisputed.
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       22-12018               Opinion of the Court                          3

       aggravated assault was no crime of violence because that oﬀense
       could be committed with a mens rea of recklessness.
               The district court overruled Bryant’s objection. The district
       court concluded -- in the light of our decision in United States v. Mo-
       rales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) -- that Bryant’s 2018 ag-
       gravated-assault conviction qualiﬁed as a crime of violence. The
       district court then imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 84
       months.
              On appeal, Bryant reasserts his argument challenging the
       designation of his 2018 Georgia aggravated-assault conviction as a
       crime of violence. “We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior
       conviction qualiﬁes as a ‘crime of violence’ under the Sentencing
       Guidelines.” United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1326
       (11th Cir. 2010).
              Under the Guidelines, a defendant who commits an oﬀense
       involving the unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm is assigned a base-
       oﬀense level of 24 if he committed the oﬀense after sustaining at
       least two felony convictions for a “crime of violence.” See U.S.S.G.
       § 2K2.1(a)(2). For purposes of section 2K2.1, the term “crime of
       violence” means a federal or state oﬀense punishable by more than
       one year that satisﬁes one of the clauses in section 4B1.2(a). See id.
       comment. (n.1) (adopting the deﬁnition of “crime of violence” set
       forth in section 4B1.2(a)); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). The “elements
       clause” deﬁnes “crime of violence” as an oﬀense that “has as an
       element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
       against the person of another.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-12018

       “enumerated-oﬀenses clause” contains a list of oﬀenses that qualify
       as crimes of violence, including “aggravated assault.” Id. §
       4B1.2(a)(2). For purposes of this appeal, we need only consider the
       enumerated-oﬀenses clause.
               Bryant’s argument on appeal is foreclosed by our decision in
       Morales-Alonso. In Morales-Alonso, we concluded that Georgia ag-
       gravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) constitutes a
       “crime of violence” under the enumerated-oﬀenses clause of
       U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2: a clause that lists “aggravated assault” among the
       oﬀenses deﬁned as a crime of violence. See Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d
       at 1317, 1320 (examining language in the 2015 Sentencing Guide-
       lines). In reaching that conclusion, we explained “that the elements
       of aggravated assault in violation of O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) are
       substantially the same as the elements of generic aggravated as-
       sault . . ..” Id. at 1320.
               Although Morales-Alonso dealt with a diﬀerent guidelines
       provision than the provision involved in this case, both section
       2L1.2 and section 4B1.2 deﬁne the term “crime of violence” to in-
       clude “aggravated assault” in its list of enumerated oﬀenses. Com-
       pare U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 comment. (n.2), with id. § 4B1.2(a)(2). No ma-
       terial diﬀerence exists between these two deﬁnitions: our decision
       in Morales-Alonso steers the outcome of this appeal.
              Bryant acknowledges that his argument on appeal is fore-
       closed by this Court’s precedent. Nevertheless, Bryant contends
       that recent decisions in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021),
       United States v. Carter, 7 F.4th 1039 (2021), and United States v. Moss,
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       22-12018               Opinion of the Court                        5

       920 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 2019), mandate a conclusion in this case that
       Georgia aggravated assault constitutes no “crime of violence” be-
       cause it can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness. We dis-
       agree.
              Under our prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by a
       prior panel’s decision “unless and until it is overruled or under-
       mined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this
       court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352
       (11th Cir. 2008). “While an intervening decision of the Supreme
       Court can overrule the decision of a prior panel of our court, the
       Supreme Court decision must be clearly on point.” Id.
              Nothing in Borden or in our decisions in Moss and Carter in-
       dicates that our decision in Morales-Alonso has been overruled or
       undermined to the point of abrogation. Those dissimilar decisions
       dealt only with whether an oﬀense constitutes a “violent felony”
       under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
       (“ACCA”) -- not whether an oﬀense constitutes a “crime of vio-
       lence” under the enumerated-oﬀenses clause of section 4B1.2. See
       Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1834 (concluding that a criminal oﬀense with a
       mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under
       the ACCA’s elements clause); Carter, 7 F.4th at 1041, 1045 (conclud-
       ing -- in the light of Borden and Moss -- that a conviction under
       O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a)(2) did not qualify as a “violent felony” under
       the ACCA’s elements clause); Moss, 920 F.3d at 754, 758, opinion re-
       instated, 4 F.4th 1292 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (concluding that a
       Georgia conviction for aggravated assault under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12018

       21(a)(2) does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s el-
       ements clause because the oﬀense can be committed with a mens
       rea of recklessness). And -- unlike section 4B1.2’s enumerated-of-
       fenses clause -- the ACCA’s enumerated-oﬀenses clause does not list
       “aggravated assault” among the oﬀenses that constitute a violent
       felony. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
       That the opinion in Morales-Alonso never addressed expressly the
       mens rea argument now asserted by Bryant is immaterial: the Mo-
       rales-Alonso decision remains binding law. See In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d
       789, 794 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting that “a prior panel precedent can-
       not be circumvented or ignored on the basis of arguments not
       made to or considered by the prior panel”).
             The district court committed no error in concluding -- based
       on our decision in Morales-Alonso -- that Bryant’s 2018 Georgia ag-
       gravated-assault conviction constituted a “crime of violence” un-
       der section 4B1.2’s enumerated-oﬀenses clause. Because Bryant
       had two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence, the district
       court applied properly a base-oﬀense level of 24, under section
       2K1.2(a)(2).
              AFFIRMED.