Court Opinion

ID: 9556068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:08:07.137892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.744668
License: Public Domain

08/15/2023

                                      DA 23-0010

         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                     2023 MT 156N

IN THE MATTER OF:

D.Y.H-J and R.J.,

           Youths in Need of Care.

APPEAL FROM:        District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
                    In and For the County of Cascade, Cause Nos. BDN-19-146 and
                    BDN-19-174
                    Honorable Elizabeth A. Best, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

             For Appellant:

                    Austin Wallis, Hathaway Law Group, Whitefish, Montana

             For Appellee:

                    Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie F. Schulz, Assistant
                    Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                    Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Rachelle Lynn, Deputy County
                    Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: July 12, 2023

                                                           Decided: August 15, 2023

Filed:

                                  ir,-6ta•--if
                    __________________________________________
                                      Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Q.B.J. (Father) appeals the Order terminating his parental rights to his children

D.Y.H-J. (D.J.) and R.J. issued by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, on

December 13, 2022. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in accordance with

this Opinion.

¶3     The following is a non-comprehensive background of the case provided to address

the issues—whether the District Court employed the correct burden of proof for

termination and whether the Department provided active efforts to prevent the breakup of

the Indian family as required by § 1912(d) of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25

U.S.C. § 1901, et seq.

¶4     On April 24, 2019, the children were removed and placed into emergency custody

following a report of domestic violence between Father and his girlfriend, where it was

reported Father was the aggressor and would be arrested. At the time of removal, Father

could not identify an appropriate caregiver for the children to stay with until his release.

¶5     On May 1, 2019, the Child and Family Services Division of the Montana

Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) filed a Petition for
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Emergency Protective Services (EPS), Adjudication as Youths in Need of Care (YINC),

and Temporary Legal Custody (TLC). As Father is an enrolled member of the Rosebud

Sioux Tribe (the Tribe), the Tribe filed a notice of intervention. Throughout the entirety

of the proceedings, the children were considered Indian Children under ICWA.

¶6       The show cause hearing was held June 20, 2019, at which the CPS caseworker

Mandy Kelsey testified the Department initially got involved due to physical violence and

partner-family member assault but then learned there had been a prior child dependency

case in South Dakota where drug use was involved.1 CPS Kelsey spoke to the CPS worker

in South Dakota, following which the drug use concerns were not resolved and she

determined Father’s completion of various programs in 2018 did not address Father’s

current inability to provide a safe and stable home for the children. At that hearing, Father

admitted he had pending criminal charges and did not have a consistent residence. Upon

expressing concerns that the initial safety concerns may have passed, the District Court

granted EPS and Temporary Investigative Authority to allow the Department to further

investigate Father’s parenting capacities and provide Father opportunity to pursue

appropriate housing. Over the next few months, the Department’s concerns regarding

Father’s ability to provide a safe and stable home did not abate.

¶7       On September 3, 2019, the Department filed for adjudication of the children as

YINCs and sought TLC. Following a couple of continuances, the adjudication and

1
    During the pendency of the 2017 South Dakota case, the children spent 10 months in foster care.

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disposition hearing was held on November 7, 2019. Father was not present at the hearing.

After expressing appropriate concern regarding the “whisker” thin active efforts provided

by the Department and expressing that the children needed to be in an ICWA-compliant

placement as they were currently not, the District Court adjudicated the children to be

YINCs, granted TLC to the Department, and approved the Department’s proposed

treatment plan for Father.

¶8     On February 4, 2021, the Department filed a petition seeking to terminate Father’s

parental rights. On May 20, 2021, the hearing on the Department’s petition seeking

termination of Father’s parental rights commenced and continued thereafter on July 15,

2021, September 30, 2021, August 25, 2022, and November 18, 2022.2

¶9     At the November 18, 2022 termination hearing, the District Court granted the

Department’s request to limit evidence to the issues pled in the amended petition in

accordance with § 41-3-609(4)(c), MCA—long-term incarceration. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the Department argued Father would be incarcerated more than a year and,

given the circumstances of the children, it would be in the best interests of the children to

terminate Father’s parental rights. The Department further asserted the Department had

2
  The Department originally sought termination pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, asserting
Father failed to successfully complete his treatment plan and the conduct rendering him unfit or
unable to parent was not likely to change in a reasonable period of time. Following
commencement of the termination hearing, the Department amended its petition seeking an
alternate basis for termination pursuant to § 41-3-609(4)(c), MCA—a treatment plan was not
required as Father will be incarcerated for more than a year and reunification is not in the best
interests of the children.

                                               4
made active efforts to place the children in an ICWA-compliant placement but the only

identified placements had been denied during the ICPC process.3 Father’s counsel asserted

the Department did not make active efforts to place the children in an ICWA-compliant

placement or to provide rehabilitative services to prevent the breakup of this Indian family.

The District Court engaged in discussion with Mr. Lloyd Guy, ICWA legal counsel for the

Rosebud Sioux Tribes. Mr. Guy related it was the Tribe’s position that active efforts had

not been provided as required by ICWA. Further, Mr. Guy advised the District Court that

even if Father’s parental rights were terminated, family still has a placement preference

with regard to adoptive placement preferences. Ultimately, the District Court terminated

Father’s parental rights, explaining “under the theory of long-term incarceration, I am

finding that the [D]epartment has made active efforts to prevent a break up of the Indian

family, and has provided active efforts, and there is good cause in terms of the current

placement. . . . And I am just satisfied that the State has made the efforts and the

[D]epartment has made the efforts required under law by the burden set forth under the law

to meet its burden.” 4 Prior to this oral pronouncement, neither party argued nor advised

the court as to the legal evidentiary standard it must apply. Further, the District Court did

not specifically delineate what it believed “the burden set forth under the law” to be and

3
    An ICPC is a home study done pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.
4
  The District Court did not specifically identify any specific efforts of the Department it
considered to be active efforts.

                                                 5
made no reference whatsoever to the applicable “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.

The court further found, “there is good cause in terms of the current placement” but

indicated this finding “does not mean permanent placement,” which the District Court left

open for consideration by the court handling any future adoption action.

¶10    The District Court issued its written order terminating Father’s parental rights on

December 13, 2022. In this order, the District Court made conclusions of law that: there

was “clear and convincing evidence” that Father would be incarcerated in excess of one

year and reunification was not in the children’s best interests; there was “clear and

convincing evidence” that the conduct or condition rendering Father unfit or unable to

parent was not likely to change in a reasonable period of time; and there was “clear and

convincing evidence” that appropriate active efforts were made by the Department but

were ultimately unsuccessful. In this order, the District Court again did not detail specific

efforts it considered to be active efforts taken by the Department prior to removal and those

taken after removal prior to termination.

¶11    Father appeals the termination of his legal rights asserting the Department did not

provide Father with “active efforts to provide Father with services and to prevent the

breakup of the Indian family as required by § 1912(d) of ICWA.” Father asserts the

Department’s efforts were, at best, passive, and not specific to his needs. He asserts the

Department was untimely in conducting ICPCs for potential ICWA-compliant placements

and failed to describe why it could not reunify after the emergency situation leading to the

children’s removal had ended. Additionally, Father asserts reversible error as the District
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Court used the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, rather than the “beyond a

reasonable doubt” standard required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).

¶12    The Department counters that the record supports that active efforts were made and

further substantial, credible evidence supported finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a

treatment plan was not required to terminate Father’s parental rights because of his

long-term incarceration, the condition that rendered Father unfit or unable to parent was

not likely to change in a reasonable period of time, and continued custody with Father

would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children.              The

Department asserts the District Court made a scrivener’s error related to the burden of proof

in its written termination order as all parties were aware that ICWA standards applied, “so

it is more than likely the court’s misstatement of the burden of proof was simply a scrivener

error.” Alternately, the Department asserts that even though the District Court did not issue

a specific finding on the burden of proof applicable in an ICWA case, it was implicit in the

court’s statements. The Department asserts substantial evidence exists to establish the state

and federal termination criteria beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the Department asserts

that should we determine the District Court applied an incorrect legal standard, remand to

allow the District Court to apply the correct legal standard is the appropriate remedy.

¶13    We review a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of

discretion under the applicable standards of Title 41, chapter 3, MCA, and ICWA. In this

context, a court abuses its discretion if it terminates parental rights based on clearly

erroneous findings of fact, erroneous conclusions of law, or otherwise “acts arbitrarily,
                                             7
without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting

in substantial injustice.” Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if not supported by

substantial evidence, the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or this Court has

a definite and firm conviction that the lower court was mistaken. In re B.Y., 2018 MT 309,

¶ 7, 393 Mont. 530, 432 P.3d 129 (citing In re D.E., 2018 MT 196, ¶ 21, 392 Mont. 297,

423 P.3d 586). We review conclusions of law de novo for correctness. In re B.Y., ¶ 7

(citing In re D.E., ¶ 21).

¶14    There is no dispute that the children at issue herein are Indian children and the

requirements of ICWA apply. ICWA requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a state

seeking termination of parental rights to an Indian child has made “active efforts” to

provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of

the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful. In re B.Y., ¶ 8; 25 U.S.C.

§ 1912(d). Active efforts prior to removal must be proven by clear and convincing

evidence. In re B.Y., ¶ 8 (citing In re G.S., 2002 MT 245, ¶ 33, 312 Mont. 108, 59 P.3d

1063). Non-ICWA cases are subject to § 41-3-423, MCA, which requires the Department

to make “reasonable efforts.”

¶15    Federal regulation requires courts to ensure “active efforts” were made:

       (a) Prior to ordering an involuntary foster-care placement or termination of
       parental rights, the court must conclude that active efforts have been made to
       prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts have been
       unsuccessful.

       (b) Active efforts must be documented in detail in the record.

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25 CFR 23.120; accord 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d). Thus, a district court must document in detail

in the record how active efforts have been made by clear and convincing evidence prior to

removal and beyond a reasonable doubt prior to termination. In re B.Y., ¶ 9. Federal

regulations specifically define “active efforts”:

       Active efforts means affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts
       intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with his or her
       family. Where an agency is involved in the child-custody proceeding, active
       efforts must involve assisting the parent or parents or Indian custodian
       through the steps of a case plan and with accessing or developing the
       resources necessary to satisfy the case plan. To the maximum extent possible,
       active efforts should be provided in a manner consistent with the prevailing
       social and cultural conditions and way of life of the Indian child’s Tribe and
       should be conducted in partnership with the Indian child and the Indian
       child’s parents, extended family members, Indian custodians, and Tribe.
       Active efforts are to be tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case and
       may include, for example:

       (1) Conducting a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the
       Indian child’s family, with a focus on safe reunification as the most desirable
       goal;

       (2) Identifying appropriate services and helping the parents to overcome
       barriers, including actively assisting the parents in obtaining such services;

       (3) Identifying, notifying, and inviting representatives of the Indian child’s
       Tribe to participate in providing support and services to the Indian child’s
       family and in family team meetings, permanency planning, and resolution of
       placement issues;

       (4) Conducting or causing to be conducted a diligent search for the Indian
       child’s extended family members, and contacting and consulting with
       extended family members to provide family structure and support for the
       Indian child and the Indian child’s parents;

       (5) Offering and employing all available and culturally appropriate family
       preservation strategies and facilitating the use of remedial and rehabilitative
       services provided by the child’s Tribe;
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      (6) Taking steps to keep siblings together whenever possible;

      (7) Supporting regular visits with parents or Indian custodians in the most
      natural setting possible as well as trial home visits of the Indian child during
      any period of removal, consistent with the need to ensure the health, safety,
      and welfare of the child;

      (8) Identifying community resources including housing, financial,
      transportation, mental health, substance abuse, and peer support services and
      actively assisting the Indian child’s parents or, when appropriate, the child’s
      family, in utilizing and accessing those resources;

      (9) Monitoring progress and participation in services;

      (10) Considering alternative ways to address the needs of the Indian child’s
      parents and, where appropriate, the family, if the optimum services do not
      exist or are not available;

      (11) Providing post-reunification services and monitoring.

25 CFR 23.2.

¶16   There is no dispute that the District Court’s written order terminating Father’s

parental rights references application of an incorrect legal standard for this ICWA case—

one of “clear and convincing evidence” rather than proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The Department asserts this to be a scrivener’s error. A scrivener’s error is “[a]n error

resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence and not from judicial reasoning or

determination; esp. a drafter’s or typist’s technical error that can be rectified without

serious doubt about the correct reading.” Clerical error, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.

2019 (“Also termed scrivener’s error[.]”).

                                             10
¶17    The record is insufficient for us to determine the District Court’s specific and

repeated reference concluding the existence of “clear and convincing evidence” really

meant it employed the legal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The District

Court made no mention upon its oral pronouncement of employing the legal standard of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the parties did not beforehand advise the court of the

correct legal standard.5

¶18    Next, the Department asserts it was implicit in the court’s statements that it applied

the correct burden. We are not persuaded by this argument. We agree that the District

Court recognized the requirement that the Department was required to provide active

efforts. However, as already discussed, the record of the court’s oral pronouncement and

the context surrounding it, do not make it clear the District Court understood the heightened

evidentiary burden related to active efforts and its written order on its face applies a lesser

evidentiary standard.

¶19    Father asserts that the District Court employed an incorrect evidentiary standard

such that the proper remedy is to reverse and remand to nearly the outset stage of the case—

to the Department’s Petition for Adjudication and TLC. Conversely, the Department

5
  While the Department notes that throughout the proceedings its pleadings set forth the required
heightened burden of proof, we find this insufficient as there is nothing in the record upon the
District Court’s oral pronouncement that it understood the heightened burden at that time and was
in fact applying that heightened burden—especially when considered in conjunction with its
subsequent written order which repeatedly asserts application of the lesser “clear and convincing
evidence” burden of proof.

                                               11
argues that when a court applies the wrong standard of proof, the matter should be

remanded to the court to apply the correct standard of proof.

¶20    In its oral pronouncement and in its written termination order, other than

proclaiming the Department engaged in active efforts, the District Court did not provide

detailed findings as to what active efforts were made by the Department to comply with

ICWA placement preferences and thereafter to prevent the breakup of this Indian family.

The lack of detailed findings of what active efforts have been made to prevent the breakup

of the Indian family and that those efforts have been unsuccessful fails to comply with

ICWA. In re B.Y., ¶ 10. Further, from the record before us, we cannot determine whether

the District Court applied the correct standard of proof.           From the court’s oral

pronouncement that it is “satisfied that the State has made the efforts and the [D]epartment

has made the efforts required under law by the burden set forth under the law to meet its

burden[,]” it is possible the District Court fully understood the heightened burden of proof

required in ICWA cases and from its written order it is equally possible the court employed

a lesser standard of proof. Given this, the termination orders, both oral and written, issued

by the District Court should be vacated and the matter remanded to the District Court to

enter a new order to “document in detail” if the Department met its burden of providing

“active efforts” by clear and convincing evidence prior to removal and beyond a reasonable

doubt prior to termination pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) and 25 CFR 23.2, and to conduct

any additional proceedings it determines necessary to make this determination. Upon

applying the proper evidentiary proof standard, if the District Court determines the
                                             12
Department met this burden it may issue an Order terminating Father’s parental rights

expressly setting forth the active efforts made at each stage and its analysis consistent with

this Opinion. On the other hand, if the District Court determines the Department failed to

meet its burden to provide active efforts prior to removal, prior to termination, or both, then

the court shall conduct further proceedings as necessary to meet these standards.

¶21    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶22    Reversed and remanded for action consistent with this Opinion.

                                                   /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE

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