Court Opinion

ID: 9713170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:10:05.189498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.129017
License: Public Domain

Peterson, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I will refrain from discussing Division I of the majority opinion. I will only consider Division II. If my reasoning is correct as to said division, discussion of Division I is unnecessary and moot.
I. The majority opinion insists on connecting sections 276.13 and 276.16. It contends the last part of section 276.16 refers only to the districts with villages, etc., over two hundred, considered in section 276.13. On the contrary the two sections refer to two completely different subjects. Section 276.13 refers only to the narrow question of a district involved in the reorganization having a city, town or village within its borders with a population of over two hundred. The section states: “A school corporation containing a city, town or village.” This is only one of the component parts of the reorganized district. *555Section 276.16 pertains to tbe broad question of a new school corporation being organized by a combination of several districts, including any with cities, towns or villages. The section reads: “A new school corporation shall be organized.” This refers to the district as a whole.
The pertinent parts of section 276.16 are as follows: “* * * If the majority of the votes cast by the qualified electors are in favor of the proposition, a new school corporation shall be organized, except that in cases where separate ballot boxes are required by law, a majority of the votes cast by the qualified electors from their respective territories shall be required.” (Emphasis ours.)
The district never votes as one entity. Separate ballot boxes are required in all districts, in accordance with section 276.15: “The judges of election shall provide separate ballot boxes in which shall be deposited the votes cast by the qualified electors from their respective territories.”
The majority opinion indicates section 276.15 also pertains only to districts having villages within their area. Its position is that this supports the majority contention that section 276.16 pertains only to such districts.
As an evidence of this error is the fact that section 276.15 was carried into the 1958 Code as section 275.22 with exactly the same wording. There are no village provisions in the 1958 Code so consequently this provision cannot refer back to village school districts. The legislature would not have re-enacted 276.15 into the 1958 Code if it intended any such restricted meaning. This is conclusive evidence that the legislature at all times intended 276.15 as well as 276.16 to pertain to all districts in the new reorganization area, and not alone to village districts.
It is my contention that where section 276.16 reads “respective territories” it means the territory of “village” or “villages” on one side and the territory of “rural districts” on the other side. I contend that under this statutory provision the villages of Altoona and Pleasant Hill should be added together as one of the “respective territories.” The six rural districts should be added together as the other “respective territory.” The result is a majority in favor of reorganization in both “respective *556territories.” Under these circumstances the vote in the two villages would be yes 309; no. 145. The vote in the six rural areas would be yes, 1223; no, 103.
It is unbelievable that the legislature would intend that if a proposed district had a half dozen villages, one small village voting adversely could nullify the complete plan, provided the addition of votes in all villages had a majority for the plan.
We certainly would not say that one rural district voting adversely can destroy the reorganization, if the vote in all rural districts had a favorable majority. (Conversely, we cannot reasonably interpret the legislative intent to be that one small village casting less than 10% of the votes, such as Pleasant Hill, can nullify the reorganization. That is on condition that, added to vote of .the other village, there was a total favorable village majority, as there was in the case at bar.
In this case the districts voted in separate ballot boxes with the following results: Six rural districts: Four Mile Township yes 299, no 20; North Camp Township yes 104, no 45; Beaver Township yes 112, no 14; Clay Township yes 105, no- 45; Babbitt Independent yes 304, no 1; two. villages: Altoona Independent yes 304, no 10; Pleasant Hill Independent yes 5, no 135.
The interpretation of the majority as to section 276.16 is not only strained, but creates a legislative duplication. The majority would interpret the section as follows: “If a majority of the votes east by the qualified electors are in favor of the proposition, a new school corporation shall be organized, except that in Pleasant Hill Independent district a majority of the votes cast * * * shall he required.” This provision appears in section 276.13. Is it reasonable to assume the legislature would re-enact the provision in section 276.16 ? Surely the enactment in 276.16 refers to something else; the whole district.
In the ease at bar section 276.13 has. no force and effect. In both Altoona Independent and Pleasant Hill Independent the school district is coextensive with the village as to area and voters. There is no outside territory requiring duplicate ballot boxes.
Logically, we must return to the first position above-stated: *557that the legislative intent is that the “respective territories” mean one territory of villages and one of rural districts.
The majority opinion stresses the fact that the two villages are far apart and disconnected. This is of no significance. They are both within the boundaries of the new district to be formed. We can with the same reasoning- say because one rural district is at the east end of the district and another at the west end, several miles apart, we have no right to add the votes in such rural districts.
II. During the last ten years each session of the legislature has revised and amended school reorganization statutes. In each revision the provisions were liberalized. The vote of a majority was given more power to create reorganizations. It has become more difficult for small obstructing minorities to destroy the formation of new districts. This has all been in the interest of better education for more children. See section 276.16, 1950 Code; sections 275.20 and 275.22, 1954 Code; sections 275.20 and 275.23, 1958 Code.
It has ibeen the tendency of this court to liberalize our interpretation as to reorganization of school districts, to assist the Legislative branch of Government in this laudable endeavor. Zilske v. Albers, 238 Iowa 1050, 1056, 29 N.W.2d 189, 192.
In the above cited case we said: .“We have held emphatically that the statutes here in question are to be liberally construed. A majority of the electors in the territory involved has an absolute right to organize into a. single district provided the territory sought to be consolidated is such as the statute contemplates. Courts will go no further than to see that the methods pursued are in substantial accord with those prescribed by statute. State ex rel. Ondler v. Rowe, 187 Iowa 1116, 1123, 175 N.W. 32, 34. To adopt the language of the Rowe case: * * if such perfection of proceedings is to be demanded of them, few, if any, organizations of school districts could successfully withstand attacks at the hands of discordant and contentious minorities. The courts very properly * * * go to the limit of liberality in giving effect to the voice of a majority, wherever it can reasonably be done without violence to the manifest spirit and intent of the legislature.’ ”
III. The trial court did not consider the matter referred *558to in Division II of the majority opinion and in Division I of my dissent. However, appellees urged the matter, both in the trial court and in argument in this court.
The trial court held the reorganization had priority over the incorporation in accordance with Grant v. Norris, 249 Iowa 236, 85 N.W.2d 261. This case provided the reorganization should be concluded under the provisions of chapter 276. I would not word the conclusion of the court exactly as the trial court did, but the effect is the same. As stated in my first paragraph, discussion of this proposition is unnecessary.
The majority is correct in stating the issues involved in this ease will not form a precedent for the future. Chapter 276, 1950 Iowa Code, has been repealed and reorganization is now covered by sections 275.20 and 275.23, 1958 Iowa Code.
I would affirm.