Court Opinion

ID: 9897562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:09.379925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:53.237787
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                   SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                   APPELLATE DIVISION
                                   DOCKET NOS. A-2377-22
                                               A-2378-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                            APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
v.                                                 August 10, 2023
                                                APPELLATE DIVISION
DAANDRE J. WADE,

     Defendant-Respondent.
_________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MALIK T. STRINGER,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

           Argued June 6, 2023 – Decided August 10, 2023

           Before Judges Gilson, Rose, and Messano.

           On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
           Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County,
           Indictment No. 22-11-1041.

           Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
           for appellant (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County
            Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and
            on the briefs).

            Scott M. Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
            argued the cause for respondent Daandre J. Wade
            (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Scott
            M. Welfel, of counsel and on the briefs).

            James R. Lisa, attorney for respondent Malik T.
            Stringer, joins in the briefs of respondent Daandre
            Wade.

            David Chen, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
            cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New
            Jersey (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney;
            Angela Cai, Deputy Solicitor General, and David Chen,
            of counsel and on the briefs).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

GILSON, P.J.A.D.

      The issue presented on these appeals is whether New Jersey's gun-carry

permit statute and the statute criminalizing permit violations were facially

unconstitutional in 2019 under the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution. In May 2019, defendants Daandre Wade and Malik Stringer were

found in possession of two loaded handguns while driving a car on public roads.

Neither defendant had a permit to carry a handgun. Both defendants were

indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit

in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).

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      Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in New York State

Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), defendants

moved to dismiss those criminal charges, arguing that the version of the gun-

carry permit statute in effect at the time of their arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018),

was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. Defendants contended that because

the "justifiable need" provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) was

unconstitutional, all provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

5(b)(1) were unconstitutional.     The trial court agreed, granted defendants'

motion, and issued an order dismissing those charges. We granted the State

leave to appeal the order as it related to both defendants and now consolidate

the appeals for purposes of this opinion.

      We hold that defendants did not have standing to challenge the statutes

because neither defendant had applied for a permit to carry a handgun.

Nevertheless, we address the merits of the constitutional challenge because it is

a significant issue that warrants consideration. See Petro v. Platkin, 472 N.J.

Super. 536, 564 (App. Div. 2022) (explaining that we can decide to reach the

merits of a constitutional challenge even when the challenger lacks standing).

We hold that N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018) and N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) were not

facially unconstitutional because the justifiable need requirement set forth in

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N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) was severable and the remaining provisions of

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), were constitutional

and enforceable. Therefore, in 2019, each defendant needed a permit to carry

handguns outside their homes and if the State proves that they did not have

permits, they will be guilty of a crime under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).

Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order dismissing the two counts of the

indictment charging defendants with unlawful possession of a handgun without

a permit. We remand and direct the trial court to reinstate both counts.

                                        I.

      The matter came before the trial court on a motion to dismiss two counts

of a criminal indictment. Consequently, on this appeal, we accept the facts as

alleged by the State. 1 See State v. Cobbs, 451 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 2017).

      On May 4, 2019, defendants were in a motor vehicle, driven by Stringer

with Wade as the sole passenger. While driving in New Brunswick, two police

officers on patrol observed and checked the vehicle's temporary license plate

and learned that it was not valid. Accordingly, the police stopped the vehicle

1
  In discerning the facts, we have reviewed the record, including the indictment
and a police report that summarized the events leading to the stop and search of
the defendants' vehicle.

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                                        4
and Stringer could not produce a valid registration for the vehicle. While

speaking with Stringer, an officer smelled the odor of raw marijuana emanating

from the car, and the officers then searched the vehicle. 2 During that search, the

police found two handguns: a 9 mm. Taurus, loaded with six bullets, in the

center console; and a 9 mm. Springfield Armory XDS, loaded with seven

hollow-point bullets and equipped with a laser sight, under the floormat on the

passenger side of the vehicle.     Neither defendant had a permit to carry a

handgun.

      A grand jury indicted defendants for three crimes: in count one, Stringer

was charged with second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun without a

permit; in count two, Wade and Stringer were charged with second-degree

unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit; and in count three, both

defendants were charged with fourth-degree possession of hollow-point bullets

in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f).

2
   At the time of the stop, unauthorized possession and use of marijuana was
illegal. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3), (a)(4), and (b) (1997). Under the automobile
exception to the warrant requirement, law enforcement officers can search a
vehicle without a warrant if there is "probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the circumstances giving rise
to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." State v. Witt, 223 N.J.
409, 447 (2015). At the time of defendants' arrest, the odor of raw marijuana
could supply officers with probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a
vehicle. See State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 25-26 (App. Div. 2019).
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      In December 2022, after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Bruen,

Wade moved to dismiss count two of the indictment and Stringer joined that

motion to include count one. In support of Wade's motion, his counsel submitted

a certification representing that on the day of his arrest, Wade "had never been

convicted of any indictable offense or disorderly persons offense involving an

act of domestic violence" and "had not been adjudicated delinquent for any

offense that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime (a) enumerated

in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 (the No Early Release Act) or (b) that involved the

unlawful use or possession of a weapon, explosive or destructive device." The

certification also asserted that Wade "was not subject to any of the disabilities

enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c) [(2016)] which would render him unable to

obtain a permit under a licensing scheme that removes the unconstitutional

justifiable need requirement" and that "under a licensing scheme that did not

require . . . Wade to show a justifiable need, he would have otherwise qualified."

Neither Stringer nor his attorney filed a certification in support of the motion to

dismiss. Both defendants do not contest that they had never sought a permit to

carry a firearm.

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      On March 31, 2023, after hearing oral argument, the trial court granted

defendants' motion and entered an order dismissing counts one and two of the

indictment. The court explained the reasons for its ruling in a written opinion.

      The trial court ruled that defendants could challenge the gun-carry permit

statute even though neither defendant had applied for a permit. In reaching that

conclusion, the trial court relied on First Amendment cases, as well as other

constitutional decisions, that reasoned if a permit statute was facially

unconstitutional the person challenging the statute did not need to have first

applied for a license or permit. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394

U.S. 147, 151 (1969); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958); Lovell

v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553,

562 (1931). The trial court also rejected the State's argument that the provision

in subsection (c) of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018), which contained the justifiable

need requirement, could be severed and the remainder of the statute, as well as

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), could still be enforced. The trial court concluded that

"New Jersey's handgun-carry permitting regime at the time of defendant[s']

arrest prohibited law-abiding citizens from exercising their Second Amendment

right and was, therefore, unconstitutional."     Consequently, the trial court

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                                       7
concluded that defendants were free to possess handguns on May 4, 2019,

without a permit.

      In two motions, the State sought leave to appeal the trial court's order. We

granted leave and stayed the dismissal of the charges pending this appeal.

                                       II.

      On appeal, the State argues:

             THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON
             NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL [ASS'N] V.
             BRUEN, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. CT. 2111 (2022), TO
             HOLD THAT PROSECUTIONS UNDER N.J.S.A.
             2C:39-5([b])(1) ARE NOW PRECLUDED BECAUSE
             BRUEN RENDERED N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 [(2018)]
             FACIALLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

      We also granted the New Jersey Attorney General permission to appear

and submit a brief as an amicus curiae. The Attorney General contends that the

trial court erred for three reasons:

             POINT I – NEW JERSEY'S REQUIREMENT TO
             OBTAIN A PERMIT BEFORE CARRYING A
             FIREARM IN PUBLIC REMAINS VALID AFTER
             BRUEN.

             POINT II – THREE PRINCIPLES PREVENT
             COLLATERAL ATTACKS ON THE PERMITTING
             LAW:

                    A.   Defendants Who Possess Other
                    Disqualifiers Cannot Collaterally Attack

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                                        8
                  The "Justifiable Need" Requirement As A
                  Defense To Prosecution.

                  B.    Defendants Who Never Applied For
                  The Relevant Permit Cannot Collaterally
                  Attack The Permitting Law As A Defense
                  To Prosecution.

                  C.    Defendants Who Were Denied A
                  Permit By A Court Cannot Collaterally
                  Attack The Permitting Law And Related
                  Court Order As A Defense To Prosecution.

            POINT III – [THESE] DEFENDANT[S] [ARE] NOT
            ENTITLED TO CHALLENGE THE PERMITTING
            LAW.

      In response, defendants argue N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) could not be

enforced while the justifiable need requirement in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018)

was in effect because that requirement was unconstitutional under Bruen.

According to defendants, the "confluence" of those statutes created a facially

invalid permitting scheme, which they were entitled to disregard because they

would have qualified for a gun-carry permit but for that unconstitutional

requirement. In that regard, they contend that the justifiable need requirement

"was virtually impossible to meet." Therefore, despite not having applied for a

permit, defendants argue that they have standing to challenge the gun-permitting

scheme because it would have been futile for them to have tried to satisfy that

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                                       9
requirement and because they are contesting the permitting scheme's facial

validity.

                                      III.

      It is well established that a grand jury indictment is presumptively valid.

See State v. Feliciano, 224 N.J. 351, 380 (2016); State v. Francis, 191 N.J. 571,

587 (2007). "[A] court should dismiss [an] indictment 'only on the clearest and

plainest ground, and only when the indictment is manifestly deficient or

palpably defective.'" State v. Bell, 241 N.J. 552, 560 (2020) (quoting State v.

Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 531-32 (2018)).          Moreover, legislative acts are

presumptively valid and constitutional. See State v. Comer, 249 N.J. 359, 384

(2022); State v. Buckner, 223 N.J. 1, 14 (2015).

      The issues presented on these appeals are questions of law and involve

interpreting the Constitution and New Jersey's gun-carry permitting statutes,

which we review de novo. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 380 (2017); see also

Twiggs, 233 N.J. at 532 ("When the decision to dismiss [counts of an

indictment] relies on a purely legal question . . . we review that determination

de novo."). To place the issues in context, we briefly review the Supreme

Court's jurisprudence on the Second Amendment. We also summarize New

Jersey's gun-carry permitting laws.

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                                       10
      A.    The United States Supreme Court's Jurisprudence on the Second
            Amendment and the Bruen Decision.

      The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "A well

regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the

people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II.

In 2008, the United States Supreme Court ruled, for the first time, that the

Second Amendment protects the right of individual citizens to keep and bear

arms apart from service in a militia. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 595, 599 (2008). In Heller, the Court addressed a challenge to the District

of Columbia's restrictions to the possession of handguns in homes and the

requirement that permitted guns in homes be unloaded and disassembled. The

Court held that those restrictions and requirement were unconstitutional

violations of the Second Amendment. Id. at 635.

      Two years later, the Court held that the Second Amendment "is fully

applicable to the States" through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City

of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). In McDonald, the Court addressed

challenges to ordinances of the City of Chicago and one of its suburbs. The

city's ordinances banned the possession of firearms without proper registration

and prohibited the registration of most handguns, and the suburb's ordinances

banned the possession of handguns. Ibid. The city and the suburb argued their

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                                        11
ordinances were constitutional because the Second Amendment did not apply to

the States. Ibid. In rejecting that argument, the Court held that the "Second

Amendment right recognized in Heller" is applicable to the States. Id. at 791

(plurality opinion). In short, in Heller and McDonald, the Court "recognized

that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of an ordinary,

law-abiding citizen to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense." Bruen,

142 S. Ct. at 2122.

      In 2022, the Court held "that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments

protect an individual's right to carry a handgun for self-defense outside the

home." Ibid. In Bruen, the Court addressed a New York law that required

people seeking to carry a handgun outside the home to show "proper cause" to

obtain a permit to do so. Id. at 2122-23. New York courts had interpreted

"proper cause" to require a showing that the applicant had a "special need for

self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community." Id. at 2123

(citation omitted).   The Court held that the proper cause requirement was

unconstitutional because it prohibited most people from obtaining a gun -carry

permit. Id. at 2138, 2156.

      In so holding, the Court adopted a textual analysis that requires courts to

look to the text of the Second Amendment and "the Nation's historical tradition

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                                      12
of firearm regulation." Id. at 2130. "Only if a firearm regulation is consistent

with this Nation's historical tradition may a court conclude that the individual's

conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'" Id. at

2126 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 50 n.10 (1961)).

Accordingly, because "the Constitution presumptively protects [individual

conduct]" covered by "the Second Amendment's plain text," the government

must justify its regulation of that conduct by establishing "not simply . . . that

the regulation promotes an important interest," but that "the regulation is

consistent with this Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." Ibid.

      Focusing on New York's "proper-cause requirement," the Court held that

provision of New York's gun permitting regime was unconstitutional. Id. at

2138, 2156. In making that ruling, the Court found that requirement was not

justified by an "American tradition." Id. at 2138, 2156. The Court also noted

that New Jersey had a similar restriction in its justifiable need provision in

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018). Id. at 2124 n.2.

      In Heller and Bruen the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized that its

holdings were not effectuating a wholesale invalidation of state gun licensing

and permit systems. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9; id. at 2157-58 (Alito, J.,

concurring); id. at 2161-62 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-

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                                       13
27. For example, the Court in Bruen expressly endorsed gun-permitting regimes

that contained narrow, objective, and definitive standards to guide officials in

determining whether applicants were "in fact, 'law-abiding, responsible

citizens,'" including specifically referencing "shall-issue" permitting regimes

that "often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms

safety course." Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S.

at 151). In that regard, the Court explained:

            To be clear, nothing in our analysis should be
            interpreted to suggest the unconstitutionality of the
            [forty-three] States' "shall-issue" licensing regimes,
            under which "a general desire for self-defense is
            sufficient to obtain a [permit]." Because these licensing
            regimes do not require applicants to show an atypical
            need for armed self-defense, they do not necessarily
            prevent "law-abiding, responsible citizens" from
            exercising their Second Amendment right to public
            carry.

            [Ibid. (second    alteration   in   original)   (citations
            omitted).]

      The concurring opinions of Justices Alito and Kavanaugh similarly stated

that the holding in Bruen was limited. Justice Alito explained:

            Our holding decides nothing about who may lawfully
            possess a firearm or the requirements that must be met
            to buy a gun. Nor does it decide anything about the
            kinds of weapons that people may possess. Nor have
            we disturbed anything that we said in Heller or

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                                      14
            [McDonald] about restrictions that may be imposed on
            the possession or carrying of guns.

            [Id. at 2157 (Alito, J., concurring).]

      Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, added:

            First, the Court's decision does not prohibit States from
            imposing licensing requirements for carrying a
            handgun for self-defense. In particular, the Court's
            decision does not affect the existing licensing
            regimes—known as "shall-issue" regimes—that are
            employed in [forty-three] States.

                  ....

            Likewise, the [six] States including New York [and
            New Jersey] potentially affected by today's decision
            may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns
            for self-defense so long as those States employ
            objective licensing requirements like those used by the
            [forty-three] shall-issue States.

            Second, as Heller and McDonald established and the
            Court today again explains, the Second Amendment "is
            neither a regulatory straightjacket nor a regulatory
            blank check."     Properly interpreted, the Second
            Amendment allows a "variety" of gun regulations.

            [Id. at 2161-62 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citations
            omitted).]

      B.    New Jersey's Gun Permit Scheme.

      For over 100 years, New Jersey has regulated the carrying of firearms

outside the home. See Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 553 (1971) (noting that the

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Legislature had regulated the carrying of guns "[a]s early as 1882"). Beginning

in 1905, New Jersey required private citizens seeking to carry a concealed

firearm to have a permit. See L. 1905, c. 172.

      An applicant seeking a gun-carry permit must follow a two-step process.

First, the applicant must apply to either the local chief of police or the

superintendent of the State Police.           N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c).     In 2019, the

application required biographical information and the endorsement of "three

reputable persons who ha[d] known the applicant for at least three years . . . and

who . . . certif[ied] . . . that the applicant is a person of good moral character and

behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b) (2018).

      In addition, an applicant must satisfy certain criteria. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3

and -4. An applicant must "not [be] subject to any of the disabilities set forth in

[N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)]," which consider the applicant's age, mental and physical

health, criminal history, and potential danger to public safety. N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

4(c); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c).        The applicant must also demonstrate

"familiar[ity] with the safe handling and use of handguns," evidenced by

certified completion of a training course, submission of scores, or passage of a

test. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c); see also N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4(b) and (c). In 2019, an

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applicant also had to establish a "justifiable need to carry a handgun" based on

an "urgent necessity for self-protection." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018).

      Second, the chief of police or superintendent conducts a background

check, including interviews of the applicant and persons endorsing the

application. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c). If the application is denied, the applicant can

request a hearing in the Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(e). An applicant

dissatisfied with the decision of the Superior Court can appeal the decision "in

accordance with law and the rules governing the courts of this State." Ibid. In

2019, if the chief of police or superintendent of the State Police approved the

application, the applicant also had to submit it to the Superior Court for review.

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d) (2018). If the Superior Court denied the application, the

applicant could appeal that denial. Ibid.

      On June 24, 2022, the day after the decision in Bruen was issued, the New

Jersey Attorney General issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2022-07, which

directed that New Jersey would no longer require applicants to show a justifiable

need for a gun-carry permit. The directive also instructed law enforcement

agencies to consider all other mandatory requirements for obtaining a gun-carry

permit before issuing one. Off. of the Att'y Gen., Law Enf't Directive No. 2022-

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07, Directive Clarifying Requirements for Carrying of Firearms in Public 1-2

(June 24, 2022).

      Six months later, in December 2022, the Legislature passed, and the

Governor signed, a law revising the gun-permitting scheme to formally

eliminate the justifiable need requirement and to revise other requirements. See

L. 2022 c. 131. The new law did not change the requirement that a person obtain

a permit before lawfully carrying a gun in public. See id.; N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).

Among other revisions, the new law provides that an applicant for a gun-carry

permit must now be endorsed by four reputable people who certify that the

applicant "has not engaged in any acts or made any statements that suggest the

applicant is likely to engage in conduct, other than lawful self-defense, that

would pose a danger to the applicant or others." L. 2022 c. 131, § 3. The new

law also requires the applicant to obtain liability insurance to carry a gun in

public. Id. §§ 3, 4.

      C.    Defendants' Lack of Standing.

      A defendant may raise a defense that the crime charged in an indictment

or accusation "is based on a statute or regulation . . . which is unconstitutional

or invalid in whole or in part." R. 3:10-2(d). To make that challenge, however,

the defendant must have standing to raise the constitutional objection. State v.

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Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 208-09 (1977). Accordingly, the defendant "must show

sufficient injury before his [or her challenge] will be heard." State v. Varona,

242 N.J. Super. 474, 487 (App. Div. 1990). "Th[is] rule limits a criminal

defendant to constitutional claims related to his [or her] own conduct [and] rests

on the principle that legislative acts are presumptively valid and will not be

overturned on the basis of hypothetical cases not actually before the court."

Saunders, 75 N.J. at 208-09.

      Generally, to establish standing to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional

permit statute, the challenger must have applied for a permit or license under the

statute. See, e.g., United States v. DeCastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2012);

Westfall v. Miller, 77 F.3d 868, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1996); Kendrick v. Bruck, 586

F. Supp. 3d 300, 308 (D.N.J. 2022). Nevertheless, there is a recognized

exception to the submission requirement if the challenger can "make a

substantial showing that submitting to the government policy would [have been]

futile." Bruck, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 308 (citing Ellison v. Am. Bd. of Orthopedic

Surgery, 11 F.4th 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2021)); see also DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 164;

Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (2d Cir. 1997).

      Neither defendant in these appeals applied for a permit to carry a gun.

Wade's counsel submitted a certification representing that Wade had no other

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                                       19
disqualifying factors and that he would have qualified to receive a permit but

for the justifiable need requirement. Stringer and his counsel did not submit a

certification concerning Stringer's qualifications for a permit.

      Initially, we point out that neither Stringer nor Wade has established the

factual basis for challenging New Jersey's gun-permit statutes. Stringer has

provided no factual basis whatsoever. The certification submitted by Wade's

counsel is not based on counsel's personal knowledge; rather, it is based on

information received from his client and, therefore, is insufficient to establish

facts in dispute. See R. 1:6-6; see also DeCastro, 682 F.3d at 164 (explaining

that defendant's reliance on the "hearsay statement of an unidentified police desk

officer" was insufficient to make a substantial showing of futility).

      Even if we accept the certification of Wade's counsel, it does not establish

that Wade would have qualified for a gun-carry permit excluding the justifiable

need requirement. To receive a permit, Wade would have been required to

demonstrate that he was "thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of

handguns." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018). Moreover, he would have had to

submit certifications from "three reputable persons who ha[d] known [him] for

at least three years" and who certified that he was "a person of good moral

character and behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b) (2018). Nothing in the record

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                                       20
establishes that Wade would have been able to comply with those requirements.

Consequently, the record does not reflect that it would have been futile for Wade

to have applied for a permit even in the absence of the justifiable need provision.

      The insufficient record supporting defendants' constitutional challenge

illustrates why a motion to dismiss criminal charges is not the proper venue for

demonstrating that defendants would have been granted a gun-carry permit but

for the justifiable need requirement. If defendants had applied for gun-carry

permits, there would be a complete record of why they were not granted the

permits. In other words, we would not be left to speculate that defendants were

denied the permits because of the justifiable needs requirement.

      Moreover, law-abiding citizens are not free to ignore a statute and

presume that they would have been granted a permit but for one potentially

invalid provision of a permit statute. See Borough of Collingswood v. Ringgold,

66 N.J. 350 (1975). In Ringgold, defendants challenged their municipal-court

convictions for engaging in door-to-door solicitations without a permit. Id. at

354, 364.    They contended that the ordinance requiring the permit was

unconstitutional. Id. at 364. The ordinance permitted the chief of police to deny

registrations in certain circumstances but did not set forth the standard or

principle the chief should use in deciding whether to grant or deny a permit. Id.

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at 366-67. The Court held that the provision granting the chief discretion to

deny a permit was unconstitutional but concluded that the remainder of the

ordinance was valid. Id. at 367, 371. The Court then affirmed defendant's

convictions explaining that the ordinance was "not a model of clarity," but wa s

"sufficient on its face so that it could not properly be ignored with impunity by

these defendants." Id. at 364.

      Defendants contend that their challenge to the facial constitutionality of

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018) "is another basis to find that [they have] standing

despite never having applied for a permit." They rely on cases concerning the

First Amendment and argue that a person faced with a facially invalid licensing

law can disregard the law and contest its validity if they are charged with

violating it. See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151; Staub, 355 U.S. at 319; Lovell,

303 U.S. at 452.

      We reject that argument. No New Jersey decision or federal decision

addressing New Jersey's gun-permit statutes has held that a defendant has

standing to challenge the permit statutes without first having applied for a

permit.   Courts from other jurisdictions have looked at First Amendment

jurisprudence in analyzing Second Amendment cases, but generally those courts

have not incorporated wholesale the application of First Amendment law to a

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Second Amendment analysis. See Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Att'y

Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 122 n.28 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has "consulted First Amendment

jurisprudence" but has "not wholesale incorporated it into the Second

Amendment").      Indeed, "[w]hile First Amendment cases have permitted

standing for plaintiffs who have not sought permits, Second Amendment cas es

have not." Bruck, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 309 (collecting relevant cases). We

similarly decline to apply wholesale First Amendment caselaw to a Second

Amendment analysis. In short, defendants' and the trial court's reliance on First

Amendment jurisprudence to support their claim of standing was misplaced.

      D.    Whether the "Justifiable Need" Provision Could Be Severed.

      The holding and analysis in Bruen make it clear that the justifiable need

provision in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) is unconstitutional under the Second

and Fourteenth Amendments. Indeed, the State concedes that point. Therefore,

even if defendants had standing to make a constitutional challenge, the question

becomes whether the justifiable need provision was severable.

      When a provision in a statute is declared unconstitutional, the remaining

"provision[s] shall, to the extent . . . [they are] not unconstitutional . . . be

enforced and effectuated." N.J.S.A. 1:1-10. Accordingly, courts can "save an

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enactment that otherwise would be constitutionally doomed" by "sever[ing] the

offending portion" of the statute. State v. Natale, 184 N.J. 458, 485-86 (2005).

"Severability is a question of legislative intent." Affiliated Distillers Brands

Corp. v. Sills, 56 N.J. 251, 265 (1970). In that regard, the New Jersey Supreme

Court has explained:

            The governing principle is whether it can be fairly
            concluded that the Legislature designed the statute to
            stand or fall as a unitary whole. In reaching this
            conclusion, [a court] must determine whether the
            objectionable feature can be excised without substantial
            impairment of the principal object of the statute. An
            entire statute will not be invalidated when one clause is
            found to be unconstitutional unless that clause is so
            intimately interconnected with the whole that it can be
            reasonably said that the Legislature would not have
            enacted the statute without the offending clause.

            [Ibid. (citations omitted).]

      In other words, we can sever a statutory provision "where the invalid

portion is independent and the remaining portion forms a complete act within

itself." Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 72 N.J. 412, 423 (1977). Whether

a statute contains a severability clause is not determinative. See id. at 422; State

by McLean v. Lanza, 27 N.J. 516, 527 (1958).

      In 2019, when defendants were charged, New Jersey's gun-permit statutes

were not dependent on the justifiable need provision set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

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4(c) (2018). The rest of that provision, as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3 (2016),

described other criteria that were independent from, and served purposes

separate from, the justifiable need requirement. For example, in 2019, someone

seeking a permit to carry a handgun had to demonstrate that he or she was

mentally and physically capable of handling a handgun and was not a potential

danger to the public. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)

(2016). An applicant also had to demonstrate that he or she had completed a

training course in the safe handling and use of handguns. N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.4(b)

and (c). Consequently, the Legislature designed the gun-permit statutes to

address several safety concerns.     Accordingly, we construe the gun-permit

statutes as they existed in 2019 not to have been dependent on the justifiable

need provision.

      Indeed, the Legislature made that statutory construction clear when, six

months after Bruen was issued, it amended various gun-permit statutes,

including N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.      The Legislature deleted the justifiable need

provision but left in and revised various other criteria for obtaining a permit to

carry a gun in New Jersey. In those amendments, the Legislature also revised

New Jersey's gun-permitting scheme to become a shall-issue regime. In that

regard, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c), now states that a person "shall not be denied a

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permit to purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card, unless"

that person has certain disqualifying criteria.

      Moreover, following Bruen, we upheld the constitutionality of the "public

health, safety or welfare," requirement for the issuance of a firearms purchaser

identification card or handgun purchase permit set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -

3(c)(5).   In re M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J.

Super. 148, 163, 193-94 (App. Div. 2023). Accordingly, we have already held

that, consistent with Heller and Bruen, New Jersey can continue to regulate who

can purchase and carry a handgun in public so long as those regulations are

consistent with the text of the Second Amendment and our Nation's historical

tradition of firearm regulation. In M.U., we construed the 2022 amendments to

the gun-permit statutes to be prospective, and not to apply retroactively. Id. at

195. Nevertheless, those amendments demonstrate that the Legislature intended

to enforce the valid provisions of the statutes regulating guns if any provision

was found to be unconstitutional.

      The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the Second Amendment makes

clear that carrying guns in public can still be regulated and subject to a permit

requirement. Consequently, at a minimum, New Jersey's gun-permit statutes

were and continue to be constitutional in requiring background checks to

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confirm that the applicant is not a convicted felon or does not have a mental

disability and to ensure that the applicant has reasonable training in the safe

handling of guns. See Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2138 n.9; id. at 2161-62 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27. In short, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) was

constitutional and enforceable at the time of defendants' arrest.

                                       IV.

      In summary, we hold that defendants did not have standing to challenge

the gun permit statutes because neither defendant had applied for a handgun-

carry permit. In addition, having considered the merits of defendants'

constitutional challenge, we hold that the justifiable need requirement in

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c) (2018) was severable and the remaining provisions of

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4 (2018), as well as N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1), were constitutional

and enforceable.

      Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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