Court Opinion

ID: 9372804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:47.244445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.719901
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     KHURSHID KHAN MUHAMMAD,                         DOCKET NUMBERS
                 Appellant,                          DE-1221-15-0371-W-2
                                                     DE-1221-16-0182-W-1
                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
       AFFAIRS,                                      DATE: February 21, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Khurshid Khan Muhammad, Artesia, California, pro se.

           Tanya Burton, Bay Pines, Florida, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his requests for corrective action in these joined individual right of action
     (IRA) appeals.    For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
     petition for review, AFFIRM the administrative judge’s findings denying

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

     corrective action concerning the alleged termination of his appointment, denial of
     work, and termination of his clinical privileges, and REMAND the appeals to the
     Denver Field Office for further adjudication regarding the appellant’s request for
     corrective action concerning the alleged threat to terminate his appointment.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant filed a timely IRA appeal alleging that the agency retaliated
     against him for protected whistleblowing disclosures by threatening to terminate
     and then terminating his appointment in November 2014.                    Muhammad v.
     Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-15-0371-W-1,
     Initial Appeal File (0371 IAF), Tab 1. The appellant later filed a second IRA
     appeal   alleging   that   the   agency    retaliated   against    him   for   protected
     whistleblowing disclosures when it terminated his clinical privileges and refused
     to assign him work.        Muhammad v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. DE-1221-16-0182-W-1, Initial Appeal File (0182 IAF), Tab 1. The
     administrative judge joined the two appeals.            Muhammad v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-15-0371-W-2, Refiled Appeal File
     (0371 RAF), Tab 3; 0182 IAF, Tab 7.
¶3         The first appeal arose from the appellant’s October 20, 2014 appointment as
     a Fee Basis Physician at the New Mexico Veterans Affairs Healthcare System in
     Albuquerque, New Mexico. 0371 IAF, Tab 1 at 11; 0371 RAF, Tab 43 at 4. The
     appointment covered the period from October 20, 2014, through September 30,
     2015, and provided that the appellant would receive $80.00 per patient visit. 2

     2
        Under 38 U.S.C. § 7405(a)(2)(A), the agency is authorized to employ medical
     providers on a fee basis. See 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). The agency hires permanent,
     temporary, and “fee basis” physicians. Hearing Compact Disc (testimony of Executive
     Director, Primary Care Operations). Permanent staff physicians may be either full -time
     or part-time. Id. Locum tenens physicians are salaried staff physicians hired under
     temporary appointments and deployed to sites where the agency needs additional
     physicians. Id. Fee Basis Physicians are also temporary appointees, but they receive a
     set fee per visit or procedure rather than a salary and benefits. Id. Fee Basis Physicians
                                                                                               3

     0371 RAF, Tab 43 at 4.        The appointment letter listed a maximum utilization
     limit of $300,000 per year but stated that neither the agency nor the appellant was
     obligated to reach that limit. Id.
¶4         Before any physician begins employment at an agency facility, the agency’s
     credentialing department must check his or her credentials and issue clinical
     privileges. Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of credentialing Program
     Specialist).   The credentialing department is also responsible for terminating
     clinical privileges for physicians who no longer work at the facility. Id. When a
     physician departs the facility, the agency conducts an exit interview, in which it
     documents the reason for the departure. Id. If a physician has been terminated
     for cause, the agency may be required to report such information to the
     appropriate state licensing board. Id.
¶5         For purposes of workload management, the agency typically assigns
     patients to panels. HCD (testimony of Associate Chief of Staff). Each panel is
     assigned to a physician, who serves as a point of contact for those patients. Id.
     When a physician leaves the facility, his patients are assigned to another
     physician. Id. Thus, existing panels may be divided among multiple physicians.
     Id. Agency physicians assigned a panel of patients are responsible for handling
     “view alerts” for those patients. Id. View alerts are electronic notifications and
     reports on a wide variety of events, including test and laboratory results and
     prescription refill requests.    Id.   Some view alerts may be urgent and require
     immediate action. Id.
¶6         The appellant began seeing patients on October 27, 2014. 0182 IAF, Tab 5
     at 33; 0371 RAF, Tab 48 at 9. At some point during his first week, the agency
     assigned him a panel of 1,195 patients. 0182 IAF, Tab 1 at 8; 0371 RAF, Tab 48

     are not paid for any administrative time or for duties that do not involve patient visits or
     procedures. Id.
                                                                                        4

     at 9. On November 4, 2014, the Associate Chief of Staff for Ambulatory Care 3 at
     the facility sent him the following email message:
           I am working on re-arranging and re-distributing the panel you are
           covering. Would you have any interest i[n] continuing to work
           [Monday-Friday] for a short period of time, until I can get this done?
           If not, let me know what your ideal schedule is. Thx.
     0182 IAF, Tab 5 at 23. The appellant alleged that he spoke with the Associate
     Chief of Staff by telephone later that day, in which he raised a patient safety issue
     regarding the assigned patient panel and he refused to participate in the unsafe
     medical practice of treating patients without seeing them. 0182 IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
     He claimed that she became angry and threatened to terminate his appointment.
     Id. at 5, 10-11, 15, 23; 0371 IAF, Tab 1 at 5, 11, 13-14; 0371 RAF, Tab 24 at 6.
     The appellant later sent an email message responding to her earlier email,
     indicating that he was unable to work full-time because of personal and family
     commitments. 0182 IAF, Tab 5 at 21-22. He offered to work 5 days per week on
     a temporary basis, but he enumerated several reasons why he should not be
     assigned a full panel of patients at that time. Id.
¶7         Specifically, the appellant explained that he did not want to receive a panel
     of patients because, given the temporary nature of his assignment, such patients
     would not have continuity of care. Id. at 21. He expressed concern that he would
     be “bombarded” with view alerts for patients he did not know and would not be
     able to see in the near future.     Id.   He also explained that any work he did
     involving patients he had not seen would be unremunerated because he was only
     paid for actual patient visits.   Id. at 21-22.   Finally, he indicated that he was
     already spending more than the 30 minutes typically allotted for each patient
     because he was generally seeing “older and very hi[gh] acuity patients that
     have not been seen for a while” and suffered from multiple medical conditions.

     3
       The Associate Chief of Staff was in acting status when the eve nts in this appeal
     transpired. She was later appointed to the position on a permanent basis. HCD
     (testimony of Associate Chief of Staff).
                                                                                          5

     Id. at 22.   The appellant then presented five options that would allow him to
     provide services to the agency while maintaining what he believed to be an
     acceptable level of patient safety.     Id.   Only one of these options involved
     assigning him a panel of patients, and he proposed that the panel be limited to
     400 patients. Id. The appellant concluded, “If none of the above is workable
     then I am afraid I am unable to provide what you are expecting,” in which case
     she could keep him on staff on an as needed basis for occa sional needs. Id. He
     said he could continue to work for the next few days or weeks as needed but
     patients should be “unassigned” unless he had seen them. Id.
¶8         The Associate Chief of Staff responded: “This is fine. I am working on
     reassigning the patients. I[f] you would consider working the rest of this week, I
     would appreciate it. I do have a part-time position in Gallup[, New Mexico,] if
     you are interested.” Id. at 21. The appellant thanked her and indicated that he
     would work the rest of the week, but he reiterated that he was not interested in the
     position in Gallup because of the commuting distance. Id. at 20. He asked if she
     wanted to retain him as a fee basis provider on an as-needed basis or if he would
     be terminated instead. Id. The Associate Chief of Staff responded: “Thank you
     for working the rest of the week. Will let you know about future needs.” Id.
¶9         The appellant continued to see patients through Friday, November 7, 2014.
     Id. at 35. On Sunday, November 9, 2014, he emailed the Associate Chief of Staff
     to thank her for expediting his hiring process and to apologize for not being able
     to “help out the situation exactly as you expected.” Id. at 26-27. He also stated
     that he had met another physician, who only came into the facility about once a
     month and saw only new patients. Id. at 27. He asked the Associate Chief of
     Staff whether a similar arrangement might be available to him.              Id.   She
     responded the next day: “I will let you know if we need you. Thanks.” Id. at 26.
     Later that morning, an administrative officer assigned to the Associate Chief of
     Staff notified the facility credentialing office that the appellant’s credentials were
                                                                                        6

      being terminated and that he would no longer be working there as a Fee Basis
      Physician. Id. at 24.
¶10        On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, the appellant emailed the Associate Chief
      of Staff regarding his employment status. Id. at 31. In response, the Associate
      Chief of Staff told him she would “check [with] credentials and . . . email you
      back with the start/stop dates for accuracy.” Id. at 30. After a brief exchange of
      messages, in which the appellant stated that he “was under the false impression of
      continued employment and privileges,” the Associate Chief of Staff stated:
            You did not want the position offered and thus privileges were
            terminated. There was nothing adverse about it. Fee based providers
            are not the same as employees of the facility . . . . Privileges were
            terminated Nov 7 due to facility needs. . . . You[r] goals and [those]
            of the facility did not match.
      Id. at 29. On January 9, 2015, the Associate Chief of Staff completed a Provider
      Exit Review form for the appellant indicating that he had been cleared from the
      facility on November 7, 2014, because he had resigned.       Id. at 25.    The form
      stated that the appellant “[m]et generally accepted standards of clinical practice,
      and there was no concern for the safety of patients.” Id.
¶11        In January 2015, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
      Counsel (OSC), OSC File No. MA-15-1650, alleging that the agency retaliated
      against him for whistleblowing. 0371 IAF, Tab 1 at 8-20. In that complaint, he
      alleged that the agency first threatened to terminate, then terminated , his
      employment and clinical privileges because he disclosed to the Associate Chief of
      Staff his safety and other concerns about having to handle a large number of view
      alerts for patients he had not yet seen in person.      Id. at 11-18.     After OSC
      informed him that it was closing its investigation into his complaint, he filed a
      Board appeal.    Id. at 5, 20-21.   The administrative judge determined that the
      Board had jurisdiction over the IRA appeal and the appellant would be granted a
      hearing on the merits. 0371 IAF, Tab 7 at 2-3. During the processing of that
      appeal, however, the appellant learned that his appointment was still effective and
                                                                                        7

      had not been terminated in November 2014. 0371 IAF, Tab 16 at 2; 0182 IAF,
      Tab 5 at 32. The administrative judge informed him that, if he wanted to raise a
      claim of whistleblower reprisal in connection with the agency’s ongoing decision
      not to assign him any work under an existing appointment and the apparent
      continued suspension of his hospital privileges, he would need to exhaust those
      claims with OSC, as he had not done so in his existing OSC complaint.
      0371 IAF, Tab 16 at 1-2, Tab 18.        With the consent of both parties, the
      administrative judge dismissed the appeal without prejudice to refiling.
      0371 IAF, Tab 21.
¶12        The appellant filed his second OSC complaint, OSC File No. MA-16-0722,
      in November 2015.      0182 IAF, Tab 1 at 8-29.     Therein, he alleged that the
      Associate Chief of Staff stopped assigning him work after he disclosed to her that
      she was forcing him to take clinical actions regarding patients he had not yet seen
      and would not be able to see in the future. Id. at 9-12, 15-28. Such a practice, he
      alleged, was inherently unsafe and contrary to accepted standards of medical care.
      Id. at 10, 16. The appellant filed his second IRA appeal after OSC informed him
      that it was closing its investigation. Id. at 1-7, 29-30. The administrative judge
      then joined the two pending IRA appeals for adjudication.       0371 RAF, Tab 3;
      0182 IAF, Tab 7.
¶13        After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision denying
      corrective action. 0371 RAF, Tab 61, Initial Decision (ID). The administrative
      judge found that the appellant made a protected disclosure when he disclosed to
      the Acting Associate Chief of Staff his belief that assigning him to a panel of
      over 1,000 patients would create a substantial and specific danger to public health
      and safety.   ID at 11-13.   The administrative judge found that, because the
      appellant’s appointment itself was not terminated, he failed to prove his reprisal
      claim for that particular alleged personnel action. ID at 13 n.6. Applying the
      knowledge/timing test to the agency’s decision to not assign him additional work
      and to terminate his clinical privileges, however, the administrative judge found
                                                                                          8

      that the appellant established that his disclosure was a contributing factor in th ose
      other personnel actions.    ID at 13-14.    The administrative judge nevertheless
      found that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      taken the same actions in the absence of his disclosure.         ID at 14-20.     The
      administrative judge thus denied his request for corrective action. ID at 21.
¶14         The appellant has filed a petition for review, primarily arguing that the
      administrative judge erred when deciding that the agency showed by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions in the absence of
      any disclosure. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 8-32.

                                          ANALYSIS
      The administrative judge properly denied corrective action concerning the
      appellant’s alleged termination, denial of additional work, and termination of
      clinical privileges.
¶15         On review, neither party has contested the administrative judge’s findings
      that the appellant established a prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing in
      connection with the decision to not assign him additional work and to terminate
      his clinical privileges. We find no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s
      findings on these issues. ID at 11-14. 4 If an appellant meets his burden of proof
      to show retaliation for whistleblowing, the agency may still prevail if it shows by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action
      or actions in the absence of any protected disclosure. Scoggins v. Department of
      the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 26 (2016). Clear and convincing evidence is that
      measure or degree of proof that produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
      belief as to the allegations sought to be established. 5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e). In
      determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
      it would have taken the personnel action in the absence of the protected activity,

      4
         Neither party contests the AJ’s finding that the agency did not terminate the
      appellant’s appointment in November 2014, and we find no reason to disturb it. ID
      at 13 n.6.
                                                                                             9

      the Board will consider all of the relevant factors, including the following factors
      (Carr factors): (1) The strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action;
      (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
      officials who were involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency
      takes similar actions against employees who did not engage in such protected
      activity, but who are otherwise similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also Carr v. Social Security Administration,
      185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 5 The Board considers all the evidence,
      including evidence that detracts from the conclusion that the agency met its
      burden. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11; see also Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
¶16         The administrative judge considered all three Carr factors, finding the
      agency’s evidence particularly compelling for the first two factors. ID at 14-20.
      Regarding the first Carr factor, the strength of the evidence in support of the
      agency’s actions, the administrative judge concluded that the Associate Chief of
      Staff and the appellant may not have had the same understanding regarding the
      nature of services the agency needed and the extent to which the appellant was
      willing and able to provide those services. ID at 14-15. The administrative judge
      based this assessment on the Associate Chief of Staff’s testimony that she
      declined to assign the appellant additional work and terminated his clinical
      privileges because she learned that he could not meet the agency’s requirement
      for a physician who could cover a panel of more than 1,000 patients on a
      temporary basis. ID at 15.

      5
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act, Pub. L. No. 115-195, 132 Stat. 1510, appellants may file
      petitions for judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any
      circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      Therefore, we must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek
      review of this decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                      10

¶17        The administrative judge pointed out that the appellant’s appointment letter
      did not specify a particular schedule or require that he serve a minimum number
      of hours each week.        ID at 14; 0371 RAF, Tab 43 at 4.      Additionally, the
      administrative judge explained, the appellant was offered the appointment by the
      Associate Chief of Staff’s predecessor. ID at 14. The Associate Chief of Staff
      and another witness testified that her predecessor had hired the appellant on a
      full-time basis, but the appellant testified that he and the predecessor had agreed
      to a part-time schedule.    ID at 14-15.   The predecessor did not testify at the
      hearing.   ID at 14 n.8.       The administrative judge determined that any
      unmemorialized discussions about part-time work that may have occurred
      between the predecessor and the appellant had not been communicated to the new
      Associate Chief of Staff, and she genuinely believed that the appellant had
      committed to a full-time schedule.     ID at 15.   Conversely, the administrative
      judge added, the predecessor may have simply believed that the appellant would
      cover an entire panel of patients as a part-time physician because he had been
      willing to work a “flexible” schedule.       ID at 15 n.9.     In any event, the
      administrative judge concluded, the extent of the appellant’s commitment to
      provide coverage and the agency’s expectations were not documented in
      advance. Id.
¶18        Further, the administrative judge explained, the Associ ate Chief of Staff
      seemed reluctant to redistribute the patients from an existing panel because she
      believed a full-time physician would be available in the near future to cover the
      panel. ID at 15-16. The Associate Chief of Staff testified that the agency had
      recently hired a full-time staff physician to be assigned the panel, and the
      appellant was to have covered the panel temporarily while the agency resolved a
      credentialing delay for the new physician. Id. The administrative judge credited
      her testimony that she weighed the added cost of employing the appellant as a
      part-time fee basis provider against the benefit that would accrue to the agency
                                                                                       11

      from his services and concluded it was not cost-effective to employ him if she
      had to break up an existing panel to do so. ID at 16.
¶19        The administrative judge credited the Associate Chief of Staff’s testimony
      that she terminated the appellant’s clinical privileges because he would no longer
      be seeing patients and thus would not be subject to the monthly peer review
      process the agency used to reassess eligibility for privileges.           Id.   The
      administrative judge additionally credited her testimony that she did not assign
      the appellant work for the remainder of his appointment because she needed a
      full-time, rather than a part-time, physician. Id. Indeed, the administrative judge
      explained, the Associate Chief of Staff testified that she would have been willing
      to use the appellant on a full-time basis had he become available and, further, it
      would not have been unusual for the agency to restore his clinical privileges
      under such circumstances. ID at 17 & n.11.
¶20        In considering the Associate Chief of Staff’s testimony, the administrative
      judge applied the factors set forth in Hillen v. Department of the Army,
      35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987). ID at 17. In particular, the administrative judge
      found that her hearing testimony regarding the reasons she declined to assign the
      appellant additional work and terminated his clinical privileges was consistent
      with her contemporaneous statements and actions after she learned he was unable
      to work full-time and cover a full panel of patients. Id.; see Hillen, 35 M.S.P.R.
      at 458 (listing, among other factors for assessing credibility, the contradiction of
      the witness’s version of events by other evidence or its consistency with other
      evidence). The administrative judge further found that the Associate Chief of
      Staff’s willingness to allow the appellant to work the rest of the week after
      making his disclosure and her suggestion that he might take a part -time position
      in Gallup undermined his contention that she had acted from retaliatory animus.
      ID at 17; 0182 IAF, Tab 5 at 21.
¶21        The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge should have
      examined the “obvious inconsistencies” between the Associate Chief of Staff’s
                                                                                       12

      prior statements and actions and her hearing testimony. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8. For
      instance, based on materials he obtained during discovery, the appellant argues
      that the agency was not seeking a full-time physician when he was hired and only
      needed coverage for 350 additional patients “with the opportuni ty to move up to
      about [ ] 1000 patients.”    PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-13; 0371 IAF, Tab 5 at 6-7.
      However, as the administrative judge explained, the Associate Chief of Staff
      testified that she had initially received inaccurate information about the size of
      the panel to be covered by a temporary Fee Basis Physician. ID at 14 n.7. The
      appellant has not identified any record evidence contradicting that testimony.
¶22        Next, the appellant asserts that the Associate Chief of Staff’s testimony
      regarding termination of his privileges was disingenuous.        PFR File, Tab 1
      at 13-14. He argues that the record evidence shows that she instead had called
      into question his attitude towards patients and competence as a physician.       Id.
      at 11-15; 0371 RAF, Tab 48 at 7. The interrogatory response the appellant cites
      in support of his argument states that two physicians had “expressed concern” to
      the Associate Chief of Staff about his performance.       0371 RAF, Tab 48 at 7.
      However, the same response also states that she had reviewed his charts in
      response to the concerns, and she determined that he met the facility performance
      standards. Id. Further, in the contemporaneous email exchange upon which the
      administrative judge relied, the Associate Chief of Staff assured the appellant she
      had acted because “[his] goals and that of the facility did not match.” 0182 IAF,
      Tab 5 at 29. She explained that no adverse action had been taken against him and
      that she considered his credentials to be “solid.” Id. at 29-30. On the Provider
      Exit Review form, she further certified that the appellant “[m]et generally
      accepted standards of clinical practice, and there was no concern for the safety of
      patients.” Id. at 25. The appellant has not identified any record evidence that the
      agency held him in disregard.     No unfavorable reports were made to outside
      parties. HCD (testimony of credentialing Program Specialist). Finally, the fact
      that the Associate Chief of Staff did not cancel the appellant’s appointment and
                                                                                               13

      suggested that he apply for the part-time position in Gallup supports the
      conclusion that his performance and attitude towards patients were not at issue. 6
      0182 IAF, Tab 5 at 21, 32.
¶23         The appellant asserts that the speed with which his clinical privileges were
      cancelled is “glaring proof of retaliation” and should have raised the
      administrative judge’s suspicions. PFR File, Tab 1 at 28-30 (emphasis omitted).
      However, like the administrative judge, we find the Associate Chief of Staff’s
      explanation of the agency’s monthly peer review process to be consistent with the
      immediate cancellation of privileges.          ID at 16.      We have considered the
      appellant’s alleged contradictory evidence regarding other part -time physicians
      with active privileges. PFR File, Tab 1 at 29. As explained below, we agree with
      the administrative judge’s finding that they were not similarly situated.                ID
      at 19-20. Considering the record as a whole, we find that the speed with which
      his clinical privileges were terminated under the circumstances is not a strong
      indicator of retaliatory motive and does not undermine the strong evidence
      supporting the nonretaliatory reasons for the agency’s actions.
¶24         The appellant argued below and on review that the Associate Chief of Staff
      falsely stated that he resigned on the Provider Exit Review form, and by doing so,
      she sought to cover up the real reason for her actions. ID at 18; PFR File, Tab 1
      at 6, 11, 16, 24-27.     The administrative judge found that, given the available
      choices, it was reasonable for the Associate Chief of Staff to characterize the
      appellant’s actions as a resignation.          ID at 18.      The administrative judge
      additionally explained that the characterization was harmless because the agency

      6
        The appellant views both of these matters with suspicion. He asserts that the offer of
      a position in Gallup was the agency’s “first attempt to avoid culpability” because he
      had not specified that location on his application. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. He interprets
      the agency’s noncancellation of his appointment as a “calculated move” to hide the real
      reason for its actions. Id. at 24. However, we find the agency’s actions more indicative
      of a willingness to use the appellant’s services at a later date if he had been available on
      the agency’s terms.
                                                                                       14

      only shares information from the Provider Exit Review form when it has
      identified concerns to report to state licensing boards and the agency had no such
      concerns in the appellant’s case. ID at 18 & n.12. The administrative judge thus
      found no reason to conclude that the Associate Chief of Staff was trying to hide
      the real reason of retaliatory animus for her actions. ID at 18.
¶25         We agree. Although the appellant did not write a formal resignation letter,
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 24, his email messages to the Associate Chief of Staff clearly
      stated that he was unavailable to work under the conditions the agency was
      offering and that he knew his appointment might be terminated for that reason,
      0182 IAF, Tab 5 at 20-22.     Additionally, the form gives the exit interviewer
      limited options for describing the reason for a provider’s departure. Id. at 25. Of
      the available options, “resigned” best describes the appellant’s departure from the
      facility.   In any event, the appellant was not disfavored by the agency’s
      characterization of his departure as a resignation.        When we consi der all the
      pertinent evidence in the record, including that which might fairly distract from
      the conclusion, we thus find that the strength of the agency’s evidence in support
      of its actions weighs in favor of a finding that it would have taken the same
      actions in the absence of any disclosure.
¶26         Regarding the second Carr factor, the existence and strength of any motive
      to retaliate on the part of the agency officials involved in the decisions at issue,
      the administrative judge acknowledged that the Associ ate Chief of Staff might
      have had some motive to retaliate against the appellant, but she found that such
      motive would not have been strong.          ID at 18-19.    The administrative judge
      explained that the 1,195-patient panel was consistent with the agency’s saf ety
      guidelines, and there was no evidence that the appellant’s disclosure had led to or
      would lead to any action being taken against the Associate Chief of Staff or any
      other person.    ID at 19.    Additionally, the administrative judge found the
      Associate Chief of Staff’s immediate response to the disclosure —to ask the
      appellant if he would be willing to work for the rest of the week and to notify him
                                                                                           15

      about an available part-time position—was inconsistent with a strong retaliatory
      motive. Id. Indeed, our reading of the email exchange between the appellant and
      the Associate Chief of Staff suggests that she may not have even perceived his
      concerns about the size of the panel to have been a disclosure. 0182 IAF, Tab 5
      at 20-22.
¶27         However, we have found that those responsible for the agency’s
      performance overall may well be motivated to retaliate even if they are not
      directly implicated by the disclosures, as the criticism reflects on them in their
      capacities as managers and employees. Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 65; Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 28-29.
      However, in assessing Carr factor two, the Board and its administrative judges
      should avoid an overly restrictive analysis and should fully consider whether a
      motive to retaliate can be imputed to the agency officials involved and whether
      those officials possessed a “professional retaliatory motive,” because the
      whistleblower’s disclosures implicated agency officials and employees in general.
      See Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1370-71. In conducting this analysis, all of the record
      evidence relevant to whether there was a motive to retaliate and the extent of that
      motive must be considered. 7 See id. at 1368; Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11.
¶28         In the instant case, we find that the administrative judge took too narrow an
      approach in her analysis of Carr factor two and placed too much emphasis on the
      fact that the appellant’s immediate managers did not suffer any consequences as a
      result of his disclosures.   However, there is no evidence in this case that the
      appellant’s disclosures attracted the attention of high-level agency managers. In
      his petition for review, the appellant asserts that the lack of any justification for

      7
        In Robinson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 923 F.3d 1004, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
      for example, the court noted that the administrative judge failed to discuss whether the
      deciding official had a “professional motive to retaliate,” but ultimately decided that
      Carr factor two slightly favored the agency based on its conclusion that the
      administrative judge’s crediting of the deciding official’s testimony that he lacked a
      motive to retaliate was “not unreasonable.” Robinson, 923 F.3d at 1019-20.
                                                                                      16

      the personnel action at issue and the speed with which the agency imposed it
      following his disclosure proves retaliatory motive.      As discu ssed above, the
      administrative judge     thoroughly considered and rejected the appellant’s
      arguments that the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action were not
      reasonable or credible, and the appellant has not otherwise proffered any reason
      why the administrative judge’s findings concerning the second Carr factor were
      incorrect. We find, therefore, that the administrative judge properly concluded
      that the agency’s motive to retaliate was slight.
¶29         As for the third Carr factor, the agency has not identified any evidence that
      it took similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers.          The
      appellant reiterates his argument regarding other Fee Basis Physicians who were
      treated differently. PFR File, Tab 1 at 19-20, 29-31. However, the administrative
      judge found that not all Fee Basis Physicians are similarly situated employees.
      ID at 19.   Instead, she found that the agency appointed Fee Basis Physicians
      under individualized arrangements to meet specific needs. Id. For example, one
      of the other fee basis providers was hired to see patients at a Saturday clinic, to
      see new patients and walk-ins on other days, and to cover for other physicians as
      her schedule allowed. ID at 19-20. She testified that she would not have taken a
      full-time position had one been offered and that she negotiated the specific terms
      of her appointment before accepting the position. ID at 20. The administrative
      judge found that such physicians were not similarly situated to the appellant and
      the evidence regarding their conditions of employment would not be persuasive
      under the third Carr factor. Id. The appellant has not identified any evidence in
      the record that suggests he negotiated the arrangement he believed he had in
      advance of accepting an appointment.       When there is no relevant comparator
      evidence, the third Carr factor is effectively removed from consideration,
      although it cannot weigh in favor of the agency. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6 ¶ 18; see
      also Rickel v. Department of the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2022).
      We find that this factor is neutral.
                                                                                       17

¶30         If the first two Carr factors are only supported by weak evidence, the
      failure to present evidence of the third Carr factor may prevent the agency from
      carrying its overall burden.      Smith, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶ 30; see also Miller v.
      Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1262-63 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (where an agency
      presented little or weak evidence for the first two Carr factors, the lack of Carr
      factor three evidence “if anything[ ] tends to cut slightly against the
      government”). Here, based on the entire body of evidence, the administrative
      judge found that the agency showed by clear and convincing evidence that the
      Associate Chief of Staff would have terminated the appellant’s clinical privileges
      and not assigned him additional work in the absence of his disclosure. ID at 20.
      We have considered the appellant’s arguments and agree that his inability to meet
      the agency’s workload and scheduling expectations after he was appointed, rather
      than his protected disclosure, led to the termination of his clinical privileges and
      the agency’s decision not to assign him additional work. Accordingly, we affirm
      the findings in the initial decision.

      The administrative judge must make findings on the appellant’s request for
      corrective action regarding the alleged threat to terminate his appointment.
¶31         The administrative judge did not make findings on the merits for every
      personnel action that she found to be within the Board’s jurisdiction. In his first
      whistleblower complaint, OSC File No. MA-15-1650, the appellant alleged that
      the agency first threatened to terminate him, then terminated his employment and
      clinical privileges after he made his disclosure to the Associate Chief of Staff.
      0371 IAF, Tab 1 at 11-18. He references this alleged verbal threat several times
      in his petition for review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 15, 25. A threatened personnel
      action may be a basis for the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal. See 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8); see, e.g., Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110,
      ¶¶ 24-27 (2015) (finding that the administrative judge erred in failing to reach the
      merits of whether the appellant’s protected disclosure was a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to threaten to take a personnel action against him ). The
                                                                                          18

      administrative judge here found that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that the agency threatened termination of his employment in response to his
      alleged protected disclosure. 0371 IAF, Tab 7 at 2-3. He is thus entitled to a
      decision on the merits of that claim. Mastrullo, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 26.

                                            ORDER
¶32         For the reasons discussed above, we remand these appeals to the Denver
      Field Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 8

      FOR THE BOARD:                             /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      8
        As explained above, we affirm the administrative judge’s findings with respect to the
      personnel actions at issue in MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-16-0182-W-1. However, in
      order to efficiently process these appeals, which are based upon the same intertwined
      facts, we remand both appeals. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(a)(5). The administrative
      judge should incorporate her earlier findings concerning the alleged termination of the
      appellant’s appointment, denial of work, and termination of the appellant’s clinical
      privileges into the remand initial decision and provide review rights for both appeals.