Court Opinion

ID: 9690999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:59:51.279893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:08.361647
License: Public Domain

Josephine Linker Hart, Judge, dissenting. I am baffled by the majority’s opinion in this case. In rejecting Ms. Singleton’s argument, they assert that there is a paucity of evidence regarding the statutory factors that should guide us in making an unequal disposition of marital property. Specifically, they state that she “offered no evidence, other than the parties’ 2003 and 2004 tax returns and her own statement that she was ‘uninsurable,’ ” that had “any bearing on these factors.” This is simply not true. Given this patently incorrect statement, I must conclude that my esteemed colleagues have misunderstood the nineteen-page abstract; otherwise they would not make such an obvious mistake of fact. The testimony of Ms. Singleton and her ex-husband, addressed all of the statutory factors enumerated in Arkansas Code Annotated section. 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2002), with the exception of whether there would be detrimental income-tax consequences of a particular property division. While I am mindful that we defer to the trial judge’s “superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony,” see, e.g., Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 2 S.W.3d 60 (1999), this case does not hinge on Ms. Singleton’s credibility. Indeed, there are virtually no disputed facts relating to the section 9-12-315(a)(l)(A) factors. It is important to note, if only in dissent, that there is evidence that relates to each of the statutory factors. These are as follows:  The length of the marriage. The parties were married for sixteen years, long enough to be considered a marriage of substantial duration. Consequently, the likely standards of living of both parties post-divorce should be equalized if possible.  Age, health, and station in life of the parties. Ms. Singleton is still in her thirties, but she has had back surgery and has heart problems that were severe enough to result in her receiving a $300,000 settlement in her personal-injury case. Conversely, there is no evidence, save for Mr. Singleton’s use of illegal drugs, to suggest that he has any impairments to his health.  Occupation of the parties. Ms. Singleton runs her own barber shop and has waited on tables and worked in a flower shop. With this experience, but for her health problems, she should be able to attain at least a minimal standard of living. However, Ms. Singleton’s health issues overshadow this factor. By comparison, Mr. Singleton is an experienced supervisor, who has demonstrated the ability to earn several times what Ms. Singleton has been able to realize from her employment. His earning potential should continue to increase.  Amount and sources of income. As the majority notes, Mr. Singleton has demonstrated the ability to earn approximately $40,000 per year over the last three years, while Ms. Singleton’s employment has resulted in a loss. As noted previously, the onset of her health problems does not suggest that her earning potential will increase.  Vocational skills. Ms. Singleton is a trained barber and Mr. Singleton an experienced supervisor. Even without Ms. Singleton’s health problems, this factor should not weigh equally for the parties. I cannot ignore the fact that she did present unrebutted testimony that she doubted that she could work the kind of hours that would allow her to support herself, and Mr. Singleton did not really dispute this assessment.  Employability. Ms. Singleton has serious health problems that will certainly make her less attractive to future employers. Mr. Singleton, conversely, demonstrated the ability to secure new employment when his previous employer, International Paper, discontinued its operations.  Estate, liabilities, and needs of each party and opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income. Ms. Singleton has virtually no chance of securing another home. Her personal injury, while eventually debilitating, did give her a chance at securing the comfort of her own home. Mr. Singleton is entering his prime earning years, so presumably his opportunities to accrue more property should only be greater in the years to come.  Contribution of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital property, including services as a homemaker. Ms. Singleton, through her unfortunate experience with a diet drug and her consequent personal-injury settlement, was responsible for bringing to the marriage all of the significant marital assets. I believe it is proper to consider that the marital estate in its present form existed for only about one year of the sixteen-year marriage. Moreover, if Ms. Singleton had been more selfish, none of the proceeds of her personal-injury settlement would even have become marital property. Mr. Singleton, on the other hand, helped spend Ms. Singleton’s personal-injury settlement by purchasing a thirty-two foot travel trailer, a ski boat, and a new truck, not to mention the use of illicit drugs. I certainly cannot imagine why anyone from the bench, bar, or street would have trouble weighing these factors. I do not understand why the majority chooses to ignore the obvious. In addition to missing this evidence, the majority fails to grasp the essence of Ms. Singleton’s argument. Instead they spend a full paragraph of their rather limited analysis speculating that the trial judge “could have decided that, because the settlement money was deposited into joint accounts and was used to purchase, among other things, a house titled in both names, it lost its character as appellant’s separate property.” Ms. Singleton, however, does not make a tracing argument here. Again, it was undisputed that almost every single piece of significant marital property with the exception of a barbecue grill and a lawnmower, came from the proceeds of Ms. Singleton’s personal-injury settlement. This undisputed fact directly corresponds to section 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) factors vii and viii, relating to the “opportunity of each for further acquisition of capital assets and income” and “contribution of each party in acquisition . . . of marital property,” respectively. I would regard this failure on the part of the majority as a mixed mistake of law and fact, given their earlier erroneous statement that there was no evidence having a “bearing” on these factors. I recognize that our review in traditional equity cases has become increasingly deferential; however, our review is still de novo. Skokos v. Skokos, 344 Ark. 420, 40 S.W.3d 768 (2001). As such, the appellate courts of this state are charged with determining where the equities lie. Applying the undisputed facts to the section 9-12-315(a)(1)(A) factors leads me to tíre inevitable conclusion that Ms. Singleton should have gotten a larger share of the marital property. I simply cannot subscribe to the majority’s bald assertion that “equity does not compel an unequal division in appellant’s favor where she commingled the settlement proceeds, where she voluntarily spent a considerable amount of those proceeds on non-essential items with full knowledge that she was ‘uninsurable’ and there would be no more money with which to pay her future medical expenses, and with full knowledge that she had suffered losses in her business in each of the last three years prior to the divorce.” While it is true that Ms. Singleton purchased a four-wheeler for $3,500 and spent $3,000 on a vacation in Hot Springs, the balance of her expenditures, identified by her ex-husband as “non-essential items,” included a $14,500 car for the parties’ daughter, $2,100 for insurance, payment on medical bills and a new washing machine. With the exception of the washing machine, all of these purchases were undisputedly made while the parties were living together as husband and wife. I cannot understand why the majority would conclude that equity would not compel a more favorable distribution of the marital assets to Ms. Singleton where her ex-husband took from her personal-injury settlement a thirty-two-foot travel trailer; a pick-up truck; a second stainless steel barbecue grill; fishing equipment; and a ski boat, trailer and motor; particularly where there was unrebutted testimony that the marriage broke down due in large part to appellee’s use of illegal drugs. Today’s majority opinion establishes what I have labeled the “doctrine of worthier toys,” i.e., that a washing machine for a household that contains three teenagers is “nonessential” and, by implication, it is somehow “essential” for a single man to have a thirty-two-foot travel trailer and ski boat. By the majority’s reckoning, equity has a new face. Lastly, and most importantly, the biggest problem with the majority’s opinion is that it is simply too myopic. Because this is an equity case, we are afforded significant latitude in how we dispose of a case on review. It is not the all-or-nothing situation that the majority seems to believe. On de novo review of a fully developed record in an equity case, where we can plainly see where the equities lie, we may enter the order that the trial judge should have entered. See White v. White, 50 Ark. App. 240, 905 S.W.2d 485 (1995). I submit that the trial judge was largely correct, opining that Ms. Singleton should remain in the home that was purchased with the proceeds of her personal-injury settlement. I disagree only with the length of time that she should be allowed to stay. While it is certainly in the best interest of the children to allow them to spend the rest of their minority in their new home, this decision ignores the fact that, given her health problems, in seven years Ms. Singleton will be less able to achieve even the modest standard of living she enjoyed in her sixteen-year marriage. I would therefore affirm this case as modified, leaving Ms. Singleton in possession of the house for the rest of her life, not merely until her duties as a mother and primary caretaker of the parties’ minor children are considered at an end by this court.