Court Opinion

ID: 9402691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 16:06:57.933444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.400888
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                     No. 263PA21

                                  Filed 16 June 2023

 IN THE MATTER OF: J.U.

      On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 from an unpublished

decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-812 (N.C. Ct. App. July 6, 2021)

(unpublished), vacating in part an adjudication order entered on 12 February 2020

and vacating a disposition order entered on 16 July 2020 by Judge Rebecca Blackmore

in District Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 26 April 2023.

      Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Janelle E. Varley, Assistant Attorney
      General, for the State-appellant.

      Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Heidi Reiner, Assistant Appellate
      Defender, for juvenile-appellee.

      BERGER, Justice.

      We address here the jurisdictional sufficiency of allegations in a juvenile

delinquency petition. Just as “it is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands

of the State with technical rules of pleading,” State v. Williams, 368 N.C. 620, 623

(2016) (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 311 (1981)), the plain language of

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 does not require the State in a juvenile petition to aver the

elements of an offense with hyper-technical particularity to satisfy jurisdictional

concerns. Because the juvenile petition sufficiently pled the offense of misdemeanor
                                              IN RE J.U.

                                          Opinion of the Court

sexual battery and provided adequate notice to the juvenile, the pleading

requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 were satisfied. We reverse the decision of the

Court of Appeals.

                                     I.      Background

      A juvenile petition alleged that J.U. had committed misdemeanor sexual

battery against B.A., a classmate.1 J.U. and B.A. became friends when they were in

seventh grade. In the fall of their eighth-grade year, J.U. snapped B.A.’s bra strap,

prompting her to yell at him and draw the attention of their teacher. Thereafter, as

part of the investigatory process, B.A. submitted an initial written statement which

detailed the incident. Two other students submitted written statements, one of which

described a separate incident in which J.U. had touched B.A. on her buttocks, breasts,

and vaginal area. B.A. also submitted a second statement detailing inappropriate

touching by J.U. B.A. testified that she did not report these actions to the school

because she did not think anyone else witnessed the events and feared that she would

not be believed.

      On 6 November 2019, the State filed a juvenile petition, which the State later

dismissed. On 9 January 2020, the State filed three additional juvenile petitions

alleging that J.U. committed simple assault and sexual battery. One of the juvenile

petitions alleging sexual battery was later dismissed by the trial court. The other

sexual battery petition specifically alleged that “the juvenile did unlawfully, willfully

      1   Initials are used to refer to juveniles pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 42(b).

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                                   Opinion of the Court

engage in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching [her] vaginal area, against the

victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual gratification.”   Prior to the adjudication

hearing, J.U. waived the formal reading of the petitions and entered a plea of not

guilty. J.U. did not object to the language of the sexual battery petition, nor did he

move to dismiss due to a deficiency in the charging document.

      On 12 February 2020, the Honorable Rebecca Blackmore of the District Court,

Cumberland County, adjudicated J.U. delinquent for simple assault and sexual

battery. The trial court entered a Level II disposition order, and J.U. was required

to complete twelve months of probation and up to fourteen twenty-four-hour periods

of secure custody in addition to fulfilling certain other requirements.

      J.U. timely appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that: (1) the juvenile

petition charging sexual battery was “fatally defective in failing to allege the

necessary element of force”; (2) the State “failed to present sufficient evidence of all

elements of sexual battery”; (3) his trial counsel committed per se ineffective

assistance of counsel by “conceding guilt to simple assault” without the trial court

conducting a colloquy with J.U. to determine “whether the concession was knowing

and voluntary”; and (4) the disposition order lacked “findings of fact sufficient to

support the punishment imposed.” In re J.U., No. COA20-812, slip op. at 1–2 (N.C.

Ct. App. July 6, 2021).

      In analyzing the charging language in the juvenile petition, the Court of

Appeals determined that “[a]s with criminal indictments, a juvenile petition ‘is

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subject to the same requirement that it aver every element of a criminal offense, with

sufficient specificity that the accused is clearly apprised of the conduct for which he

is being charged.’ ” Id. at 6 (quoting In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. 151, 153 (2006)).

Further, the Court of Appeals stated that the element of force in the sexual battery

statute was defined as “force applied to the body,” id. at 7 (quoting State v. Scott, 323

N.C. 350, 354 (1988)), and that element was “present if the defendant use[d] force

sufficient to overcome any resistance the victim might make.” Id. (quoting State v.

Brown, 332 N.C. 262, 267 (1992)).2

       The Court of Appeals relied on State v. Raines, 72 N.C. App. 300 (1985), to

conclude that the allegation in the petition that J.U. touched B.A.’s vaginal area

against her will “does not, standing alone, disclose that he accomplished that act

through an application of force to her body sufficient to overcome any resistance the

victim might make.” In re J.U., slip op. at 7 (cleaned up). The Court of Appeals

therefore vacated the lower court’s adjudication order in part and disposition order

in whole, holding that the juvenile petition charging J.U. with sexual battery “was

fatally defective and failed to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction over the petition.”

Id. at 15.

       On 4 May 2022, this Court allowed the State’s petition for discretionary review

       2 The Court of Appeals did not address the juvenile’s arguments concerning sufficiency
of the evidence or the contents of the trial court’s disposition order; however, the case was
remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.

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                                         IN RE J.U.

                                    Opinion of the Court

under N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 to determine a single issue: whether the Court of Appeals

erred in holding that the sexual battery petition was fatally defective and failed to

invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.

                                   II.    Analysis

A. Pleading Standards

      The district court division “has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case

involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1601(a) (2021).

Generally, a delinquent juvenile is an individual under the age of eighteen but over

the age of ten who “commits a crime or infraction under State law or under an

ordinance of local government.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1501(7) (2021).

      A juvenile petition is the pleading in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1801 (2021). To properly allege that a juvenile is a delinquent juvenile,

and thus under the court’s jurisdiction, juvenile petitions must “contain a plain and

concise statement, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserting facts

supporting every element of a criminal offense and the juvenile’s commission thereof

with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the juvenile of the conduct which is the

subject of the allegation.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 (2021).

      The General Assembly has instructed that the statutes related to juvenile

delinquency are to be “interpreted and construed”:

             (1) To protect the public from acts of delinquency.

             (2) To deter delinquency and crime, including patterns of
                 repeat offending:

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                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Opinion of the Court

                    a. By providing swift, effective dispositions that
                       emphasize the juvenile offender’s accountability
                       for the juvenile’s actions; and

                    b. By providing appropriate rehabilitative services
                       to juveniles and their families.

             (3) To provide an effective system of intake services for the
                 screening and evaluation of complaints and, in
                 appropriate cases, where court intervention is not
                 necessary to ensure public safety, to refer juveniles to
                 community-based resources.

             (4) To provide uniform procedures that assure fairness and
                 equity; that protect the constitutional rights of
                 juveniles, parents, and victims; and that encourage the
                 court and others involved with juvenile offenders to
                 proceed with all possible speed in making and
                 implementing determinations required by this
                 Subchapter.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500 (2021).

      While juvenile delinquency proceedings are not “criminal prosecutions,” In re

Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529 (1969), the General Assembly utilized nearly identical

language to describe the necessary content of juvenile petitions and criminal

pleadings. Compare N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, with N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2021). Our

appellate courts have long held that petitions alleging delinquent acts “serve[ ]

essentially the same function as an indictment.” In re S.R.S., 180 N.C. App. at 153

(quoting In re Griffin, 162 N.C. App. 487, 493 (2004)). Despite obvious procedural

differences in the issuance of a juvenile petition and a true bill of indictment, “juvenile

petitions are generally held to the standards of a criminal indictment.” Id. (quoting

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                                   Opinion of the Court

In re B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. 760 (2006)).

      Criminal pleadings, including indictments, are:

             [S]ufficient in form for all intents and purposes if [they]
             express the charge against the defendant in a plain,
             intelligible, and explicit manner; and the same shall not be
             quashed, nor the judgment thereon stayed, by reason of
             any informality of refinement, if in the bill of proceeding,
             sufficient matter appears to enable the court to proceed to
             judgment.

N.C.G.S. § 15-153 (2021).

      It is well-established that “it would not favor justice to allow [a] defendant to

escape merited punishment upon a minor matter of form.” Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at

311. This Court has been consistent in retreating from the highly technical, archaic

common law pleading requirements which promoted form over substance:

             “[I]t is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands
             of the State with technical rules of pleading,” and . . . we
             are no longer bound by the “ancient strict pleading
             requirements of the common law.” Instead, contemporary
             criminal pleading requirements have been “designed to
             remove from our law unnecessary technicalities which tend
             to obstruct justice.”

Williams, 368 N.C. at 623 (first quoting Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 311, then quoting

State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436 (1985)). “An indictment need not conform to any

technical rules of pleading but instead must satisfy both . . . statutory strictures . . .

and the constitutional purposes which indictments are designed to satisfy,” i.e., notice

sufficient to prepare a defense and to protect against double jeopardy.          State v.

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                                    Opinion of the Court

Oldroyd, 380 N.C. 613, 617 (2022) (cleaned up).3

      Initially, we observe that the plain language of “N.C.G.S. § 15A-924 does not

require that an indictment contain any information beyond the specific facts that

support the elements of the crime.” State v. Rambert, 341 N.C. 173, 176 (1995)

(emphasis added); see also Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 309 (declaring that an indictment

must set forth “a lucid prosecutive statement which factually particularizes the

essential elements of the specified offense”).

      Moreover, the common law rule that defective indictments rob a court of

jurisdiction is “an obsolete rule that detrimentally impacts the administration of

justice in our State.”    State v. Rankin, 371 N.C. 885, 919 (2018) (Martin, C.J.,

dissenting). Persuasively noting that jurisdictional concerns were a “relic of the code

pleading era,” id. at 906, Chief Justice Martin’s dissent in Rankin thoroughly

recounted the history of criminal pleadings, ultimately concluding that because “our

criminal law and procedure became ‘hopelessly outdated,’ ” id. at 908, (quoting

Legislative Program and Report to the General Assembly of North Carolina by the

Criminal Code Commission, at i (1973)), by 1974, legislative reforms, including the

adoption of N.C.G.S. § 15A-924, evolved from requiring elemental specificity to a more

simplified requirement that indictments allege “facts supporting each essential

      3  Here, J.U.’s counsel conceded that the petition at issue provided adequate notice.
Thus, the only question remaining is whether the petition satisfied relevant statutory
strictures. See Oral Argument at 44:24, In re J.U. (No. 263PA21) (Apr. 26, 2023),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HqMqqgKRxFI (last visited May 10, 2023).

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                                    Opinion of the Court

element of the charged offense.” Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5) (2017)).

       Consistent with a proper understanding of indictment jurisprudence and the

express language of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, a juvenile petition “does not have to state

every element of the offense charged,” so long as the elements are “clearly inferable

from the facts, duly alleged.” State v. Jordan, 75 N.C. App. 637, 639, cert. denied, 314

N.C. 544 (1985). Stated differently, magic words are not required; all that is required

by N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802 and our precedent concerning criminal pleadings is that the

charging document contain factual allegations supporting the elements of the crime

charged.

       “It is generally held that the language in a statutorily prescribed form of

criminal pleading is sufficient if the act or omission is clearly set forth so that a person

of common understanding may know what is intended.” State v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432,

435 (1984). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of a juvenile petition is to clearly identify the crime

being charged and should not be subjected to hyper[-]technical scrutiny with respect

to form.” In re D.S., 197 N.C. App. 598, 601–02 (2009) (cleaned up), rev’d in part on

other grounds, 364 N.C. 184 (2010). As with criminal pleadings, “[n]o provision of

Chapter 7[B] mandates that flawed [petitions] have the effect of depriving the trial

court of jurisdiction,” Rankin, 371 N.C. at 911 (Martin, C.J., dissenting), and such a

reading would be inconsistent with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500.

B. Sufficiency of the Petition

       The crime of sexual battery is committed when any person, “for the purpose of

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                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Opinion of the Court

sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, engages in sexual contact with

another person . . . [b]y force and against the will of the other person.” N.C.G.S. § 14-

27.33(a) (2021).    The petition here alleged that J.U. “unlawfully [and] willfully

engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching [her] vaginal area, against the

victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual gratification.”

       The Court of Appeals below relied on this Court’s statement that the force

element “is present if the defendant uses force sufficient to overcome any resistance

the victim might make,” In re J.U., slip op. at 7 (quoting Brown, 332 N.C. at 267), to

conclude that the allegation that J.U. “touched B[.A.] does not, standing alone,

disclose that he accomplished that act through an application of force to her body

sufficient to overcome any resistance the victim might make.” Id. (cleaned up). In so

doing, the Court of Appeals viewed the pleading requirements of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802

through a hyper-technical lens not intended by the plain language of the statute and

routinely cautioned against by this Court.

       Although the term “by force” is not defined in the relevant statutory scheme,

this Court has stated that “ ‘[p]hysical force’ means force applied to the body.” Scott,

323 N.C. at 354. Further, the “requisite force may be established either by actual,

physical force or by constructive force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion.” Brown,

332 N.C. at 267 (quoting State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 45 (1987)).

       In Brown, the defendant “entered [a] hospital in which the victim was a

patient[,] . . . pushed open the door of the victim’s hospital room[,] . . . pulled back the

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                                       IN RE J.U.

                                   Opinion of the Court

bedclothes on the victim’s bed, pulled up her gown, [and] pulled down her panties”

before sexually assaulting her.     Id. at 270.     The Court of Appeals reversed the

defendant’s conviction for second-degree sexual offense after concluding that “no

substantial evidence was introduced at trial to support a reasonable finding that the

defendant . . . used force in the commission of the offense charged.” Id. at 265.

      Because this Court concluded that the evidence presented in Brown “tended to

show the defendant used actual physical force surpassing that inherent in the sexual

act he committed upon the victim,” we reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Id. at 269. However, this Court left open the question of whether the “physical force

which will establish the force element of a sexual offense may be shown simply

through evidence of the force inherent in the sexual act at issue,” and we “expressly

defer[red] any decision on that question until we [we]re presented with a case which

requires its resolution.” Id.

      Put simply, the question this Court declined to answer in Brown was whether

“physical force” is present when an assailant engages in unlawful, nonconsensual

sexual contact with a victim, or whether “physical force” requires some level of force

beyond the unlawful, nonconsensual touching itself. Here, J.U. argues that the

petition was fatally defective because it “did not allege physical force” and therefore,

the trial court was deprived of jurisdiction.

      However, just as “common sense dictates that one cannot unlawfully kidnap or

unlawfully restrain another with his consent,” Sturdivant, 304 N.C. at 310, one

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                                   Opinion of the Court

cannot engage in nonconsensual sexual contact with another person without the

application of some “force,” however slight. See Scott, 323 N.C. at 354; Brown, 332

N.C. at 267.

      The petition here alleged that J.U. “engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by

touching [her] vaginal area, against the victim[’]s will for the purpose of sexual

gratification.” By alleging that J.U. touched B.A.’s vaginal area without her consent,

the petition asserted a fact from which the element of force was, at the very least,

“clearly inferable,” Jordan, 75 N.C. App. at 639, such that “a person of common

understanding may know what [wa]s intended.” Coker, 312 N.C. at 435. Thus, the

factual allegations in the juvenile petition supported each element of misdemeanor

sexual battery. The petition, therefore, complied with statutory pleading standards,

and no jurisdictional defect existed.

      The Court of Appeals erred in requiring a rote repetition of the elements of the

offense of misdemeanor sexual battery rather than analyzing the ultimate question

of whether the element of force was clearly inferable from the facts alleged in the

petition. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to

the Court of Appeals for determination of the issues not considered in its previous

decision.

      REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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                                          IN RE J.U.

                                      Earls, J., dissenting

       Justice EARLS dissenting.

       It stands to reason that our laws must serve to protect people from unwanted

touching, sexual assault, and unwanted sexual advances in general. This is especially

true in the case of a minor victim, who through qualities inherent to childhood is

rendered particularly vulnerable. In a perfect world, our laws would provide this

protection through a victim-centered legal framework that emphasizes the victim’s

sexual autonomy over the perpetrator’s intent. Under this framework, the focus

would not be on whether the perpetrator used force or intended to hurt the victim.

Rather, the focus would be on whether the actions taken by the perpetrator were

welcome and whether in taking those actions the perpetrator violated the victim’s

freedom to choose not to consent to that action. However, this is not the choice our

General Assembly has made.

       In North Carolina, our legislature has determined that force is required to

commit sexual battery. N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a) (2021).1 Thus, any petition alleging

sexual battery must provide facts supporting this element of the offense. N.C.G.S. §

7B-1802 (2021). While North Carolina is not alone in requiring force as an element of

sexual battery, see, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-505 (West 2021); Ind. Code Ann. §

       1 To be clear, North Carolina’s sexual battery statute requires the use of force unless
the victim has “a mental disability[, is] mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, and the
person performing the act knows or should reasonably know that the other person has a
mental disability or is mentally incapacitated or physically helpless.” N.C.G.S. § 14-
27.33(a)(2).

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                                       IN RE J.U.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting

35-42-4-8 (West 2014), other states have determined that force is not necessary to

commit this offense, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.1 (West 2023); Miss. Code.

Ann. § 97-3-95 (West, Westlaw through 2023 Regular Session effective through April

21, 2023); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5505 (West 2021). Thus, if the General Assembly had

wanted to, it could have written a statute similar to those in effect in Utah,

Mississippi, and Kansas. However, “make no mistake: [the General Assembly] wrote

the statute it meant to.” Sackett v. EPA, No. 21-454, 2023 WL 3632751, at *29 (U.S.

May 25, 2023) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment). Today the majority chooses to

override that legislative choice. Cf. West Virginia v. EPA, 142 S. Ct. 2587, 2628 (2022)

(Kagan, J., dissenting) (admonishing the majority for “overrid[ing]” Congress’s

legislative choice to grant the EPA the power to curb emission of greenhouse gases).

       In 2015, the previous sexual battery statute, N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5(a), was

recodified as N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33, which is the version of the statute in effect today.

While changes were made to other areas of the statute, the requirement that sexual

battery be “[b]y force and against the will of the other person” remained the same.

Compare N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5(a) (2015), with N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33 (2021). Furthermore,

our Court has long held that we are to “presume that [when enacting a statute] the

Legislature [chooses] its words with due care.” C Invs. 2, LLC v. Auger, 383 N.C. 1,

10 (2022) (citing Sellers v. Friedrich Refrigerators, Inc., 283 N.C. 79, 85 (1973)). Yet

by determining that J.U.’s petition was sufficient to plead sexual battery, despite

failing to include facts supporting the necessary element of force, the majority’s

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                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting

opinion “alters . . . the statute [the General Assembly] drafted.” See Sackett, 2023 WL

3632751, at *29 (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment). Accordingly, I disagree with

the majority that J.U.’s petition was sufficient to plead misdemeanor sexual battery

under North Carolina law. I agree with the Court of Appeals that J.U.’s adjudication

and disposition must be vacated because the State’s petition failed to allege all

necessary elements of the offense. See In re J.U., No. COA20-812, slip op. at 5 (N.C.

Ct. App. July 6, 2021) (unpublished). Thus, I respectfully dissent.

      It is well established that a delinquency proceeding is not a criminal

prosecution. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529 (1969). Unlike the North Carolina

Criminal Procedure Act, our Juvenile Code specifically identifies the rehabilitation of

juveniles as one of its primary purposes. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500 (2021). Similarly, this

Court’s own precedent explains that “[i]n the Juvenile Code, the General Assembly

enacted procedural protections for juvenile offenders with the aim that delinquent

children might be rehabilitated and reformed and become useful, law-abiding

citizens.” State v. Dellinger, 343 N.C. 93, 96 (1996). Consistent with these principles,

“[t]he state has a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile

proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.” State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 24 (1983)

(Martin, J., concurring in result). Accordingly, our Court “shall” protect “[t]he right

to written notice of the facts alleged in the petition” in order “to assure due process of

law.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2405 (2021); see also N.C. Const. art. I, § 23 (identifying the rights

of the accused, including “the right to be informed of the accusation”).

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                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting

         In delinquency proceedings, notice must “set forth the alleged misconduct with

particularity” and identify “the specific issues [the juvenile] must meet.” In re Gault,

387 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1967). Accordingly, our state statute requires a delinquency

petition to contain “a plain and concise statement, without allegations of an

evidentiary nature, asserting facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and

the juvenile’s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the

juvenile of the conduct which is the subject of the allegation.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802.

Under subsection 14-27.33(a), sexual battery occurs, in pertinent part, when a person

“for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse, engages in

sexual contact with another person . . . [b]y force and against the will of the other

person.” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a). Because force is an element of sexual battery, it must

be pled alongside “facts supporting” J.U.’s use of force. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. The

element of force “may be established either by actual, physical force or by constructive

force in the form of fear, fright, or coercion.” State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 45 (1987).

Physical force refers to force that is applied to the body, State v. Scott, 323 N.C. 350,

354 (1988), and “is present if the defendant uses force sufficient to overcome any

resistance the victim might make[,]” State v. Brown, 332 N.C. 262, 267 (1992).

“Constructive force is demonstrated by proof of threats or other actions by the

defendant which compel the victim’s submission to sexual acts.” Etheridge, 319 N.C.

at 45.

         Rather than plead the necessary element of force, J.U.’s petition only alleged

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                                    Earls, J., dissenting

that J.U. “unlawfully, willfully engage[d] in sexual contact with [B.A.] by touching

[B.A.]’s vaginal area, against [B.A.’s] will for the purpose of sexual gratification.”

J.U.’s petition does not allege the use of physical or constructive force, nor does it

allege that J.U. used “threats or other actions . . . which compel[led] [B.A.’s]

submission to sexual acts.” Id. Additionally, the allegation that J.U. “touch[ed]

[B.A.]’s vaginal area” does not, standing alone, show that J.U. accomplished this act

by any application of physical force or force to B.A.’s body “sufficient to overcome any

resistance [B.A.] might make.” Brown, 332 N.C. at 267. In short, the indictment does

not allege facts supporting the required element of force.

       Furthermore, while the petition alleges that J.U. acted “against [B.A.’s] will,”

acting against the will of the victim and acting with force are not synonymous, and

the law draws a distinction between both actions. See State v. Jones, 304 N.C. 323,

330 (1981) (stating the four elements of first degree sexual offense are: “(1) a sexual

act, (2) against the will and without the consent of the victim, (3) using force sufficient

to overcome any resistance of the victim, [and] (4) effected through the employment

or display of a dangerous or deadly weapon.”); State v. Alston, 310 N.C. 399, 407

(1984) (“[S]econd degree rape involves vaginal intercourse with the victim both by

force and against the victim’s will.”). Moreover, a petition that only alleges the victim

was “touch[ed]” is not sufficient to meet the necessary element of force as required

under North Carolina’s sexual battery statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-27.33(a). Thus,

because J.U.’s petition did not contain “a plain and concise statement . . . asserting

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                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting

facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the juvenile’s commission

thereof,” his delinquency petition was fatally defective. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802.

      Additionally, while the majority argues that a juvenile petition “ ‘does not have

to state every element of the offense charged’ so long as the elements are ‘clearly

inferable from the facts, duly alleged,’ ” quoting State v. Jordan, 75 N.C. App. 637,

639 (1985), the statutory language of section 7B-1802 and subsection 15A-924(a)(5)

are not consistent with this idea. See N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1802, 15A-924(a)(5) (2021).

While section 7B-1802 is concerned with the standards for juvenile petitions,

subsection 15A-924(a)(5) provides the standard for a criminal indictment. Both

statutes use similar language to state that a juvenile petition and criminal indictment

require “[a] plain and concise factual statement” that “asserts facts supporting every

element” of the offense and “the defendant’s [or juvenile’s] commission thereof.”

N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(5); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. These two statutes, both

serving similar functions, do not contain any limiting language stating that a failure

to “assert[ ] facts supporting every element of a criminal offense,” see N.C.G.S. § 7B-

1802, “is not ground[s] for dismissal of the charges or for reversal of a conviction.” See

N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(6).

      In contrast, subsection 15A-924(a)(6) states that a pleading must contain

             [f]or each count a citation of any applicable statute, rule,
             regulation, ordinance, or other provision of law alleged
             therein to have been violated. Error in the citation or its
             omission is not ground for dismissal of the charges or for
             reversal of a conviction.

                                           - 18 -
                                       IN RE J.U.

                                   Earls, J., dissenting

N.C.G.S. § 15A-924(a)(6) (emphasis added). By including subsection (a)(6), the

General Assembly has shown that it knows how to use such language when it intends

to. The General Assembly’s choice not to include similar language in section 7B-1802

or in subsection 15A-924(a)(5) shows a clear intent by the General Assembly not to

excuse the failure to list facts supporting every element of an offense and instead

shows that such a failure is grounds for dismissal of the allegations or reversal of an

adjudication or a conviction.

      It is not this Court’s function to usurp the role of the legislature and change

the expressed will of the General Assembly or the people of North Carolina. Indeed,

this Court “may not rewrite [the General Assembly’s] plain instructions because they

go further than preferred.” See Sackett, 2023 WL 3632751, at *30 (Kagan, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Here, those instructions mandate that “[a] petition in

which delinquency is alleged shall contain a plain and concise statement . . . asserting

facts supporting every element of a criminal offense.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802. And

because force is a necessary element of sexual battery, a delinquency petition alleging

sexual battery must include “facts supporting” the use of force. See id.; N.C.G.S. § 14-

27.33(a)(1).

      While the majority characterizes the pleading requirements listed in section

7B-1802 as “highly technical[ ] [and] archaic[,]” those requirements are more properly

characterized as constitutional procedural due process protections. Procedural due

process is “a guarantee of fair procedure.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125

                                          - 19 -
                                        IN RE J.U.

                                    Earls, J., dissenting

(1990). While state action that deprives a person of “ ‘life, liberty, or property’ is not

in itself unconstitutional; what is unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an

interest without due process of law.” Id. As Justice Frankfurter previously noted,

“[t]he history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”

Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

       In 1967, in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the United States Supreme Court

determined that constitutional due process protections applied to juvenile offenders.

To ensure that our legal system is fair and just, “[d]ue process of law [acts as] the

primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom.” Id. at 20. Furthermore,

procedural due process serves to “define[ ] the rights of the individual” while also

“delimit[ing] the powers which the state may exercise.” Id. Notably, procedural due

process protections allow courts to pursue the truth by “enhanc[ing] the possibility

that truth will emerge from the confrontation of opposing versions [of events] and

conflicting data.” Id. at 21. Thus, while the majority appears to reduce the pleading

requirements under section 7B-1802 as only requiring that notice be sufficient “to

prepare a defense and to protect . . . [against] double jeopardy,” State v. Oldroyd, 380

N.C. 613, 618 (2022), due process protections are far broader and relate to all areas

of procedural fairness, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20.

      The statutory framework in section 7B-1500 is consistent with these

constitutional principles and requires juvenile delinquency statutes to be

“interpreted and construed so as to implement” a set of “purposes and policies.”

                                           - 20 -
                                          IN RE J.U.

                                      Earls, J., dissenting

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1500. Importantly, these statutes must be “interpreted and construed”:

                 (4) To provide uniform procedures that assure fairness and
                 equity; that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles,
                 parents, and victims; and that encourage the court and
                 others involved with juvenile offenders to proceed with all
                 possible    speed    in   making     and     implementing
                 determinations required by this Subchapter.

Id. Although the majority cites section 7B-1500, its opinion glosses over the fourth

prong of the statute. But there is no “get-out-of-text-free card[,]” see West Virginia v.

EPA, 142 S. Ct. at 2641 (Kagan, J., dissenting), and the majority cannot choose to

ignore the statutory text in either section 7B-1500 or section 7B-1802.

       Because section 7B-1802 requires that a delinquency petition “contain a plain

and concise statement, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserting facts

supporting every element of a criminal offense,” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1802, and the petition

filed against J.U. failed to include facts supporting the necessary element of force, the

adjudication and disposition should be vacated. Until the North Carolina General

Assembly changes the law, force is a necessary element of the offense of sexual

battery and not merely a technicality that can be inferred from an act against the

victim’s will.

       Justice MORGAN joins in this dissenting opinion.

                                             - 21 -