Court Opinion

ID: 9570144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:28.766427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:00.816105
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 71. (dissenting). Justice Sykes has written a compelling dissent. It ably expresses several of my concerns, and I join it without reservation. I write separately because, for me, this case raises disconcerting questions about the future of trial by jury in civil cases.
¶ 72. The Wisconsin Constitution provides that: "The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law." Wis. Const, art. I, § 5.
¶ 73. We have said repeatedly that the right to trial by jury preserved by the constitution is the right as it existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1848. Town of Burke v. City of Madison, 17 Wis. 2d 623, 635, 117 N.W.2d 580 (1962); see also State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 234-37, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998).
¶ 74. Summary judgment did not exist as part of Wisconsin law in 1848. There should thus be sensitivity to the impact of summary judgment on jury trials as summary judgment practice evolves.
¶ 75. In the early part of the twentieth century there were numerous cases testing the compatibility of summary judgment with the right of trial by jury See Frank T. Boesel, Summary Judgment Procedure, 6 Wis. *366L. Rev. 5, 9-13 (1930).1 Most of the early cases upheld summary judgment procedure against constitutional attacks. In Dwan v. Massarene, 192 N.Y.S. 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922), for example, a New York court stated:
The constitution provides (art. 1, sec. 2): "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain inviolate forever." It secures the right to a jury trial of the issues of fact in those cases where it had been theretofore used. This did not deprive the court of the power to determine whether there was an issue of fact to be tried; but if the court determined there was such an issue, it must be tried by a jury. A false denial interposed for the purpose of delay did not create such an issue, any more than a false affirmative defense.
Dwan, 192 N.Y.S. at 581, quoted in Boesel, supra note 1, at 9.
¶ 76. In reviewing these early cases, one is struck by the caution with which courts addressed the constitutional issue. Courts defended summary judgment on the narrow grounds that judges should have the power to strike out sham or frivolous pleas, Eisele & King v. Raphael, 101 A. 200, 201 (N.J. 1917); Towne v. Dunn, 136 N.W. 562, 563 (Minn. 1912), and avoid unnecessary delay. Summary judgment was less encompassing then than it is today; even so, judicial opinions usually voiced *367allegiance to the principle that juries should decide disputed facts and juries should pass on credibility.
¶ 77. In his law review article advocating that Wisconsin adopt a summary judgment rule or statute, Frank Boesel acknowledged that "the ascertainment and determination of what is and what is not a real bona fide defense presents the most difficult problem in [summary judgment's] application and administration." Boesel, supra note 1, at 17.
Each case must, of course, be considered on its own particular facts and circumstances, and in disposing of each case presented to the court, little, if any, assistance will be derived from any attempts to apply general rules or principles. It would appear, however, that if there is any doubt whatever in the mind of the court as to the existence of such a bona fide issue, it should be resolved in favor of the defendant, and the matter determined only after a hearing or trial in the regular order. This is particularly true where a square question of credibility of witnesses arises....

Id.

¶ 78. In Wisconsin there are many cases that describe summary judgment as "a drastic remedy." For example, in Lecus v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston, 81 Wis. 2d 183, 260 N.W.2d 241 (1977), the court said: "We have often stated summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should not be granted unless the material facts are not in dispute, no competing inferences can arise, and the law that resolves the issue is clear. Summary judgment is not to be a trial on affidavits and depositions." Id. at 189.
¶ 79. As Justice Heffernan observed in Village of Fontana-on-Geneva Lake v. Hoag, 57 Wis. 2d 209, 203 N.W.2d 680 (1973), "summary judgment is a drastic remedy which, if granted, deprives the parties of a *368trial." Id. at 214. His opinion went on to express concern about a litigant being "deprived of his constitutional right to try the issues of fact." Id.
¶ 80. The Lecus case stands for the additional proposition that the issue of intent is not one that properly can be decided on a motion for summary judgment, Lecus, 81 Wis. 2d at 190, and this principle is not dead. Similarly, the court of appeals has stated that "Summary judgment should not be granted where the resolution of a dispositive issue depends on state of mind." Hudson Diesel v. Kenall, 194 Wis. 2d 531, 547, 535 N.W.2d 65 (1995) (citing Gouger v. Hardtke, 167 Wis. 2d 504, 517, 482 N.W.2d 84 (1992)).
¶ 81. In the rush to move cases along, summary judgments can be abused. Summary judgments will not be constitutionally suspect so long as courts faithfully limit them to situations in which material facts are not in dispute, intent and state of mind are not at issue, and the credibility of witnesses is not material. As Justice Sykes clearly demonstrates, that is not the situation here.
¶ 82. This is a tort case involving an insurer's alleged breach of duty of good faith in dealing with its insured. See Wis JI — Civil 2761. The plaintiff was required to prove, among other things, that there was no reasonable basis for the insurance company to deny its claim. The case is more difficult than a traditional bad faith case because the policy issued by the insurance company did not contain hired and non-owned coverage, as the insured requested. Hence, Tower must have grappled with questions of whether it had to reform its policy and had to pay damages, or whether liability would be assumed or shared by the negligent insurance agent's errors and omissions insurance carrier.
*369¶ 83. Despite this situation, Circuit Judge Marianne Becker found every element of the tort of bad faith by the insurer to be beyond dispute. Our court of appeals disagreed, but this court overrules the court of appeals' determination that material facts were in dispute and insists that no inferences helpful to the insurer could have been drawn from the facts. This is breathtaking. Surely, we have come a long way from the days when this court said that on summary judgment a court does not try the issues but only decides whether there is an issue for trial. Wis. Tel. v. Cent. Contracting, 254 Wis. 480, 483, 37 N.W.2d 24 (1949).
¶ 84. What the majority decision seems to ignore is that the tort of bad faith is inextricably linked to the punitive damages issue that went to the jury. At trial, Tower Insurance was not able to defend itself on a level playing field. The circuit court left handprints on the scales of justice by taking the bad faith issue from the jury and instructing the jury as to the defendant's bad faith.
¶ 85. The plaintiff was a church, the defendant was an insurance company, and the judge was making official pronouncements about the defendant's bad faith. Is there any wonder that the jury awarded $3,500,000 in punitive damages?
¶ 86. This case may be precedent for generations to come. The procedure we ratify is wrong, even if the result can be defended.

 Boesel begins his discussion with the following sentence:
In New York the question of the constitutionality of this rule arose almost immediately after its adoption, and its validity was vigorously attacked. It was earnestly contended that by applying this rule the defendant was deprived of his constitutional right to a trial by jury, as provided for by the New York Constitution.
Frank T. Boesel, Summary Judgment Procedure, 6 Wis. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1930).