Court Opinion

ID: 9767715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:24:04.796929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:32.585092
License: Public Domain

DICE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of passing and uttering a forged instrument in writing relating to and affecting title to land, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for ten years.
The prosecution and conviction is under Article 1008 of Title 14, Ch. 2, Vernon’s Ann. P.C., Acts of 1876, Fifteenth Legislature, Page 59 et seq., which provides, in part, as follows:
“Every person who knowingly utters, publishes, passes, or uses, or who in any way aids, assists in or advises the uttering, publishing, passing or using as true and genuine any false, forged, altered, or counterfeited certificate, * * * acknowledgment or proof for record or certificate of record belonging to or pertaining to any instrument or paper, or any evidence of any right, title or claim of any character whatsoever, or any instrument in writing, document, paper, memorandum or file, or any official or private seal, or any scroll, mark, date, or signature in any way relating to, or having any connection with land, or any interest in land in this State, with the intent mentioned in article 1006 of this chapter, or with any other fraudulent intent whatsoever, shall be deemed guilty and be punished in like manner as is provided in article 1006 of this chapter. * * *” (sic.)
Article 1006, V.A.P.C. provides in part as follows:
“Every person who falsely makes, alters, forges * * * or causes or procures to be falsely made, altered, forged * * * any * * * acknowledgment * * * in relation to or affecting lands, or any interest in lands in this State, with the intent to make money or other valuable thing thereby * * * shall be deemed guilty of *356forgery and be punished by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary at hard labor not less than five nor more than twenty years.”
Article 1007 V.A.P.C. provides in part:
“If any person authorized by law to take the proof of acknowledgment of any instrument, document or paper whatsoever, affecting or relating to the title of lands in this State, wilfully and falsely certify that such proof or acknowledgment was duly made, * * * he shall be deemed guilty of forgery and punished as provided in article 1006 of this chapter.”
We shall first consider appellant’s contention that, the allegations of the indictment are insufficient to charge the offense of uttering and passing a forged instrument.
The second count of the indictment, under which appellant stands convicted, charged in part as follows:
“AND THE GRAND JURORS aforesaid,, upon their oaths aforesaid, in said Court, do further present that B. R. Sheffield on or about the 20th day of May, A.D. 1954 and before the presentment of this indictment in the County of Travis and State of Texas did then and there unlawfully and without lawful authority, and with the intent to make money and with the intent to defraud, knowingly utter, publish, pass and use as true and genuine to the Veterans’ Land Board of the State of Texas, an agency of the State of Texas, a certain false and forged acknowledgment to a certain instrument in writing relating to and affecting title to land in the State of Texas, which said certain instrument in writing is referred to throughout the body of this indictment as ‘certain instrument in writing’ and which said ‘certain instrument in writing’ and said false and forged .acknowledgment thereto are to the tenor following:
“ASSIGNMENT
“STATE OF TEXAS
“county of McCullough
“I, Alfonso Gutierrez Míreles, the buyer of the above described tract, do solemnly swear that I desire to purchase the land for myself, and that no other person or corporation is interested in the purchase thereof either directly or indirectly, and do hereby assign and transfer unto the Veterans’ Land Board *357of Texas all of my right, title and interest in and to the above contract of sale and the tracts of land described therein subject to the terms and conditions herein stated and subject to acceptance by said Board’s authorized representative.
“This 18 day of May, 1954.
“/s/ Alfonso G. Míreles “Assignor (Veteran) ”
“STATE OF TEXAS
“County of McCulloch
“Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared Alfonso Gutierrez Míreles known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed and in the capacity therein stated.
“Sworn to and subscribed to before me on this 18 day of May, 1954.
“Given under my hand and seal of office, this the 18 day of May, 1954.
“DORIS SAYLES, Notary Public”
McCulloch County, Texas
/s/ Doris Sayles
“Notary Public in and for McCulloch County, Texas “LVB4-43-lb”
The indictment then sets out according to its tenor the contract of sale referred to and mentioned in the “assignment” and “certain instrument in writing.” [sic.]
Following the instrument the indictment alleges:
“* * * and the aforesaid false and forged acknowledgment to the said ‘certain instrument in writing’ purported to have been duly and lawfully made on the 18th day of May, A.D. 1954 by the aforesaid Alfonso Míreles before a Notary Public in and for McCullough County, Texas, to-wit: the aforesaid Doris Sayles, the said Doris Sayles being then and there a Notary Public, in and for McCullough County, Texas, and as such Notary Public, being authorized by law to take the acknowledgment of any in*358strument, document or paper affecting or relating to the title of land in the State of Texas, when in truth and in fact the said acknowledgment to the said ‘certain instrument in writing’ was not duly and lawfully made by the said Alfonso Míreles before the said Notary Public Doris Sayles (the said Doris Sayles as such Notary Public having wilfully, fraudulently and falsely certified that the said acknowledgment was duly and lawful made before her by the said Alfonso Míreles), and the said B. R. Sheffield then and there, when he did utter, publish, pass and use as true and genuine to the aforesaid Veterans’ Land Board as aforesaid, well knew that the said acknowledgment to the said to the said ‘certain instrument in writing’ was false and forged, as aforesaid and in manner aforesaid * *
Appellant insists that the allegations of the indictment are insufficient to charge an offense because, first, it is not alleged that the instrument declared upon as the subject of forgery and uttering purported to be the act of another as required under the general forgery statute, Art. 979, V.A.P.C.; and second, that Articles 1007 and 1008, supra, when enacted did not create a new and different type of offense of forg-ery and therefore the allegations of the indictment under these statutes were insufficient to charge an offense.
Articles 1007 and 1008, supra, as enacted in 1876 and which have remained unchanged, were part of an act entitled an act “to provide for the detection and conviction of all forgers of land titles.” [sic]
It was not until passage of the act of 1876 that certificates of acknowledgment became the subject of forgery in this state. Rogers v. State, 8 Texas App. 401 and Johnson v. State, 9 Texas App. 249.
Appellant cites and relies upon the Rogers and Johnson cases, supra, decided after the passage of the Act of 1876, in support of his contention that the act did not create a new and different type of forgery from that then existing under the general forgery statute, Pase. Dig. Art. 2093, now Art. 979, supra.
While the opinions in the two cases contain language which would support appellant’s contention, we do not construe the decisions as so holding.
In the cases mentioned the offenses charged were the forgery and passing as true of certain forged certificates of ac*359knowledgment purporting to be the act of another. The alleged act of forgery was not the making of a false acknowledgment by a person authorized to take the proof of acknowledgment and the court was not called upon to decide whether such an act constituted the offense of forgery under the Act of 1876.
We hold that under the provisions of Art. 1007, supra, the offense of forgery includes the wilful making of a false certificate of acknowledgment to any instrument affecting or relating to the title to lands by any person authorized by law to take the proof of acknowledgment of such instrument. We think that such was the intent of the legislature in passing the Act of 1876 and that the indictment charged the offense of uttering and passing a forged instrument under Art. 1008, supra.
We are aware of no reason why the legislature was lacking in power to create the new offense and denominate it forgery, and to provide a punishment for uttering or passing such forgery. The false certificate of acknowledgment requires no allegation that it purported to be the act of another.
Appellant next contends that there is a conflict as to the punishment provided in Article 1007, supra, and Article 360, V.A. P.C,. and that because of such conflict neither is enforceable. Article 360 reads as follows:
“If any notary public or other officer authorized by law, shall give a false certificate for the purpose of authenticating any instrument of writing for registration, he shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years.”
It was a part of the Old Code. As stated, in 1876, Article 1007, supra, was enacted.
A comparison of the two statutes clearly reflects that Art. 360, supra, is a general statute pertaining to the giving of a false certificate for the purpose of authenticating any instrument in writing for registration whereas Art. 1007, supra, is a special statute applicable only to the making of false certificates of acknowledgment to instruments affecting or relating to title to lands.
It is a rule of statutory construction that where two statutes cover the same subject matter, the one general and the other special, the special statute will control, not upon any theory of implied repeal, but upon the broad rule that all parts of the acts *360or statutes must stand if possible, and that the intention of the legislature is more clearly reflected by the special statute than by the general one. Both are permitted to stand, each applying in its proper place, the special statute being treated as though it were a proviso excepting something from the general one. Fortinberry v. State, 283 S.W. 146, Hunt v. Atkinson, 12 S.W. 2d 142, 17 S.W. 2d 780, City of Marshall v. State Bank of Marshall, 127 S.W. 1083 (Civ. App.) error refused. Ex parte Townsend, 64 Texas Cr. Rep. 350, 144 S.W. 628.
An application of these rules of statutory construction to the statutes in question leads to the conclusion that the legislature, by the subsequent enactment of Art. 1007, supra, intended that such statute be an exception to Art. 360, supra, and that from and after its enactment, the act of making a false certificate to an instrument affecting or relating to the title of lands be an offense under Art. 1007, supra, rather than Art. 360, supra.
To prove that the false acknowledgment, upon which the prosecution was based, was a forgery, under the provisions of Art. 1007, supra, it was necessary to show the official capacity of Doris Sayles as a Notary Public. The only evidence of her official capacity is her testimony that she was a notary public. She was an accomplice as a matter of law and was so recognized by the court in his charge to the jury and her testimony upon this material fact stands uncorroborated in the record.
The uncorroborated testimony of Doris Sayles was insufficient to show that she was authorized to take the proof of acknowledgment.
The instrument set out in the indictment purports to show that Doris Sayles was a notary public in and for McCulloch County, Texas.
The indictment alleges, however, that she was a notary public in and for McCullozigA County, Texas and as such was authorized by law to take the acknowledgment of any instrument, document or paper affecting or relating to the title to land in the State of Texas, and also alleged that the assignment purported to have been made before a notary public in and for McCullough County, Texas to-wit: The aforesaid Doris Sayles.
The witness Doris Sayles was permitted to testify that she was a notary public over the objection that the records were the best evidence.
*361Had the state sought to support the allegation of the indictment in this regard by the records, they would have been faced with the fact that there is no McCullough County in Texas. It is evident, therefore, that records were not available to prove the allegation of the indictment that Doris Sayles was a notary public in and for McCuIlough County, Texas.
In the event of further prosecution, a new indictment should be sought in which the county should correctly be named and upon the trial the state should be required to prove the allegation that Doris Sayles was a notary public by the record showing her appointment and qualification.
The trial court’s remark to the jury to the effect that if they separated “it could cause reversible error in the case which we hope won’t happen,” was serious error and one which constitutes grounds for reversal. Mahaney v. State, 95 Texas Cr. Rep. 443, 254 S.W. 946 and Ables v. State, 103 Texas Cr. Rep. 456, 281 S.W. 858.
In view of the foregoing we find it unnecessary to pass upon the effect of the variance in the name of the veteran referred to in the indictment as “Alfonso Gutierrez Míreles,” “Alfonso G. Míreles” and “Alfonso Míreles.” [sic]
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Opinion approved by the Court.