Court Opinion

ID: 9688856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:09:25.182625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:42.671822
License: Public Domain

*303R. L. Smith, J.,
(dissenting). The facts are set forth correctly in Judge Holbrook’s opinion. I concur in that opinion up to the point where it states:
"In the context of this case, the issue of whether plaintiffs "negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries is one of fact; therefore, we may not say that defendants are entitled to a judgment non obstante veredicto as a matter of law.”
I would grant judgment for the defendants on the ground that plaintiff was negligent as a matter of law, that her negligence was concurrent with that of the defendant and therefore she was not entitled to recover.
Prior to and until the moment of impact pláintiff was walking on the wrong side of the street in violation of MCLA 257.655; MSA 9.2355. Nothing in the record suggests that it would be impracticable to walk on the left side of the street facing oncoming traffic. There is nothing in the record to base a finding that plaintiff was faced with alternatives of only dangerous routes. In fact she had the option of walking on the sidewalk on the opposite side of the street or on the left side of the street facing traffic. Lee Drive is subject to heavy vehicular traffic and plaintiff was thoroughly familiar with the scene.
The issue comes into focus as to whether plaintiff’s contributory negligence is concurrent. I am unable to believe that reasonable minds could possibly differ on this issue and would hold plaintiff’s negligence concurrent and a contributing cause as a matter of law. Kubasinski v Johnson, 46 Mich App 287, 208 NW2d 74 (1973); Modzel v Norwalk, 325 Mich 693; 39 NW2d 226 (1949); Shafkind v Kroll, 367 Mich 42; 116 NW2d 58 (1962); Shepherd v Short, 53 Mich App 9; 218 *304NW2d 416 (1974); Kolcon v Smewing, 28 Mich App 237; 184 NW2d 244 (1970). See also Richardson v Grezeszak, 358 Mich 206; 99 NW2d 648 (1959) for the pros and cons on this issue.
LaCroix v Grand T W R Co, 379 Mich 417; 152 NW2d 656 (1967), is the classic example of a plaintiffs negligence coming to rest, viz.: his car stalled on the railroad tracks. In that situation it can be said that plaintiffs negligence had ceased to operate as a proximate cause and was only a remote cause.
The case law of Michigan has not yet arrived at the point where the negligence of the defendant alone is sufficient to allow a plaintiff to recover; there must be an absence of concurrent contributory negligence.
I would remand for entry of judgment non obstante veredicto. Costs to defendants.