Court Opinion

ID: 9580569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:06:12.529564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:22.120866
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
In this case the plaintiff obtained a verdict in the lower court, but the jury held there was no fraud involved. Plaintiff appeals to this court and the majority reverses, and holds the trial court erred in failing to charge certain phases of the law as to fraud. I respectfully dissent and set forth my reasons for dissent hereafter.
1. The majority opinion correctly sets forth the posture and the facts in the case.
2. There was no written request to charge as to the third enumeration of error, to wit, that a future promise is not fraudulent, unless such a future promise was a part of a general scheme to make one act as he otherwise would not have acted to his injury; and a promise made with no intention of performance, and for the very purpose of accomplishing a fraud, is a most apt and effective means of accomplishing fraud for which the victim would have a remedy. This charge was given generally in the very ample charge on fraud, particularly in charging that a wilful misrepresentation of a material fact, made to induce another to act, and upon which he does act to his injury, will give a right of action (see T. 516). Had there been a written request, the court would have been required to charge the principle of law suggested, although since Code Ann. § 70-207 has been amended (Appellate Practice Act, Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 31), a general charge on the question would suffice, without following the exact language requested. See Coral Gables Corp. v. Hamilton, 168 Ga. 182, 196 (147 SE 494); Floyd v. Morgan, 62 Ga. App. 711, 715 (5) (9 SE2d 717); Adamson v. Maddox, 111 Ga. App. 533, 535 (142 SE2d 313). But the only objection made after the charge which remotely complies with the standards as to objections is as to the giving of the excerpt complained of in the first enumeration of error, and the majority hold this charge was not erroneous. Counsel then stated that the charge in *474that language did not allow for the possibility that the parties making the promises never intended to perform them at the time they were made. To be reviewable, the objection must be unmistakable in directing the court’s attention and point distinctly to the portion of the charge challenged. Georgia Power Co. v. Maddox, 113 Ga. App. 642 (1) (149 SE2d 393); A-1 Bonding Service v. Hunter, 125 Ga. App. 173, 179 (4b) (186 SE2d 566), disapproving a portion of Georgia Power Co. v.Maddox, supra. There is no error in this enumeration.
I, therefore, respectfully contend that the lower court committed no error, and that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.