Court Opinion

ID: 9912584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 19:06:56.599831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:23.798692
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Reed, 2023-Ohio-4694.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
                                                Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
 -vs-
                                                Case No. 2023CA00033
 CHARLES ALBERT REED

          Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Stark County Court of
                                                Common Pleas, Case No. 2022-CR-1059

 JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        December 21, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant

 KYLE L. STONE                                  JEFFREY JAKMIDES
 Prosecuting Attorney                           JULIE JAKMIDES
 Stark County, Ohio                             325 East Main Street
                                                Alliance, Ohio 44601
 CHRISTOPHER A. PIEKARSKI
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
 Appellate Division
 110 Central Plaza South, Suite #510
 Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                       2

Hoffman, P.J.
       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Charles Albert Reed appeals the judgment entered by

the Stark County Common Pleas Court convicting him following jury trial of felonious

assault with a firearm specification (R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), (2); R.C. 2941.145(A)) and

menacing by stalking (R.C. 2903.211(A)(1)) and sentencing him to an aggregate prison

term of nine to twelve years. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

                           STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

       {¶2}   In 2017, Appellant moved in across the street from the victim and his wife.

One day shortly after moving in, Appellant asked the victim if he could help the victim

move a piece of paneling out of the victim’s truck. The victim declined the offer, and

Appellant seemed offended. Appellant began trying to annoy the victim with his behavior,

including barking at the victim’s dogs and houseguests, walking up and down the sidewalk

clucking like a chicken, mocking the victim’s post-surgery limp, mowing his lawn while

openly carrying a gun, installing and aiming high-wattage spotlights at the victim’s house,

and blinding the victim with his car headlights in the morning when the victim attempted

to leave for work.

       {¶3}   On August 26, 2019, the victim and Appellant engaged in a verbal

altercation which turned physical. Appellant suffered injuries to his face which required

medical treatment. On several occasions thereafter, Appellant pulled out a gun in the

presence of others when the victim was outside. Police were called to the neighborhood

multiple times. In June of 2021, following an alleged rock-throwing incident, Appellant

told a Stark County Deputy Sheriff he would hate to have to use the new self-defense

law.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                           3

       {¶4}   On May 23, 2022, Appellant and the victim both found themselves at the

same gas station in Alliance, Ohio. The victim pulled into the gas station to get a sandwich

and a drink for lunch. He saw Appellant’s truck parked. The victim walked around the

side of the building where he saw Appellant filling water jugs. No words were exchanged,

and Appellant immediately pulled out a gun. The victim remained still with his thumbs in

his pockets. Appellant shot the victim in the chest.

       {¶5}   Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with attempted

murder, felonious assault and menacing by stalking. Prior to trial, Appellant filed a notice

of his intent to claim self-defense. Appellant also filed an expert report of Dr. James

Pritchard, which detailed Appellant’s significant medical history and advanced the

doctor’s expert opinion an older person such as Appellant, who has heart disease, ,would

fare far worse than a younger person in an altercation if he sustained a fall. The expert

opinion opined Appellant could sustain significant or grave consequences from a verbal

and/or physical assault, especially if the attacker is twenty years younger, taller, heavier,

and in better physical condition.

       {¶6}   The State filed a motion in limine to prohibit Dr. Pritchard from testifying at

trial, to exclude Dr. Pritchard’s expert report, and to require Appellant to provide additional

evidence of a bona fide belief Appellant was entitled to use self-defense in this case. The

trial court found Dr. Pritchard’s report did not provide knowledge or expertise beyond that

of a lay person as a juror, as a lay person is perfectly capable of comprehending older

adults who fall or break bones fare far worse than younger adults, and the 78-year-old

Appellant could easily sustain grave consequences from an altercation with the younger,

heavier victim. The trial court granted the State’s motion in part, allowing Dr. Pritchard to
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                         4

testify as to Appellant’s significant medical history, but precluding his testimony as to the

potential consequences of an altercation between Appellant and the victim and its effect

on Appellant’s state of mind at the time of the shooting.

       {¶7}   The case proceeded to jury trial. At trial, Dr. Pritchard testified about

Appellant’s significant medical history, including prostate cancer, heart disease, lung

disease, hypertension, prediabetes, and Agent Orange exposure. Appellant testified at

trial he obtained a concealed carry permit following a mass shooting during the Batman

movie in Colorado. Appellant testified the victim referred to him as “dick head,” while he

called the victim “pecker head.” Tr. (3A) 208. Appellant testified he heard the victim had

told a deputy sheriff if Appellant ever pulled a gun on the victim, the victim would shove

the gun up Appellant’s ass. Tr. (3A) 214. Appellant believed something was going to

happen with the victim, and so he began carrying his gun. Appellant said following the

physical altercation in 2019, the victim threatened to beat him up again.

       {¶8}   On the day of the shooting, Appellant testified the victim pulled his vehicle

next to Appellant at the gas station, rolled down the window, and said, “Hey, dick head.”

Tr. (3A) 221. Appellant was apprehensive, but the victim pulled out of the gas station.

Appellant testified the victim then turned around, returned to the gas station, got out of

his vehicle, and started walking toward Appellant. Because the victim’s thumb was in his

pocket, Appellant testified he did not know if he was reaching for a weapon. When

Appellant pulled his own pistol out, he said the victim didn’t raise his hands or say not to

shoot, and Appellant thought the victim was going to assault him. Appellant then shot the

victim. Appellant testified his health was not good, and he feared for his life if he went

through another beating from the victim.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                     5

      {¶9}   While the jury deliberated, Appellant made the following proffer:

             MR. JAKMIDES: Yeah, this is Jeff Jakmides. I would proffer that if I

      had been permitted to ask Dr. James Pritchard hypothetical questions, I

      would have asked him question number one: Given the information you

      have about Charlie Reed, I would ask you, if – hypothetically if he was yelled

      at or put in a position of stress, within a reasonable degree of medical

      certainty, could that be fatal?

             Dr. Pritchard would have answered yes.

             I also wanted to ask Dr. Pritchard a hypothetical question that given

      the medical conditions of Charlie Reed, within a reasonable degree of

      medical certainty, could Charlie Reed suffer death as a result of being

      pushed down?

             He would have answered yes.

             And then finally I would have asked Dr. James Pritchard a

      hypothetical question that given Charlie Reed’s conditions, within a

      reasonable degree of medical certainty, could he be killed by a blow to any

      part of his body or any part of his head?

             Dr. Pritchard would have answered that question yes as well.

             Tr. (3B)86-87.

      {¶10} The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted murder, and guilty of

felonious assault and menacing by stalking. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                        6

of six to nine years incarceration for felonious assault, three years incarceration for the

firearm specification, to be served consecutively to the sentence for felonious assault,

and eighteen months incarceration for menacing by stalking, to be served concurrently to

the sentence for felonious assault, for an aggregate term of incarceration of nine to twelve

years. It is from the March 24, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his

appeal, assigning as error:

              THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PRECLUDING DEFENDANT’S

       EXPERT FROM TESTIFYING REGARDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT

       RELATIVELY MINOR CONFRONTATIONS COULD PROVE FATAL TO

       THE DEFENDANT DUE TO HIS FAILING HEALTH.                    TO ESTABLISH

       SELF-DEFENSE, DEFENDANT WAS REQUIRED TO SHOW A BELIEF

       THAT HE WAS IN IMMINENT DANGER OF DEATH OR GREAT BODILY

       HARM AND THAT SUCH BELIEF WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE

       UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.                 DR. PRITCHARD’S TESTIMONY

       REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MEDICAL HISTORY AND PHYSICAL

       CONDITION WAS OFFERED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS BELIEF

       WAS OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE, AND BY PRECLUDING DR.

       PRITCHARD FROM DRAWING THAT CONNECTION THE TRIAL COURT

       IMPROPERLY         EXCLUDED        EVIDENCE        CRITICAL       TO     THE

       DEFENDANT’S CASE.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                                      7

        {¶11} Appellant claimed self-defense at trial. The elements of self-defense in the

use of deadly force are: (1) the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving

rise to the affray; (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief he was in imminent danger of

death or great bodily harm and his only means of escape from such a danger was in the

use of such force, and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the

danger.1 State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).

        {¶12} The second element of self-defense requires the evidence tends to show

the accused had reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief, even if mistaken, he

or another was in imminent or immediate danger of death or great bodily harm. In State

v. Thomas, the Ohio Supreme Court explained:

                [T]he second element of self-defense is a combined subjective and

        objective test. As this court established in State v. Sheets (1926), 115 Ohio

        St. 308, 310, 152 N.E. 664, self-defense “is placed on the grounds of the

        bona fides of defendant's belief, and reasonableness therefor, and whether,

        under the circumstances, he exercised a careful and proper use of his own

        faculties.” (Emphasis sic.) See, also, McGaw v. State (1931), 123 Ohio St.

        196, 174 N.E. 741, paragraph two of the syllabus. In Koss, we once again

        stated this test by approving similar jury instructions to those given in the

        case sub judice:

                “In determining whether the Defendant had reasonable grounds for

        an honest belief that she was in imminent danger, you must put yourself in

1 In the instant case, Appellant had no duty to retreat pursuant to R.C. 2901.09 because he was in a place

where he lawfully had a right to be.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                     8

      the position of the Defendant * * *. You must consider the conduct of [the

      assailant] and determine if such acts and words caused the Defendant to

      reasonably and honestly believe that she was about to be killed or to receive

      great bodily harm.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d at 216, 551

      N.E.2d at 973. Thus, the jury first must consider the defendant's situation

      objectively, that is, whether, considering all of the defendant's particular

      characteristics, knowledge, or lack of knowledge, circumstances, history,

      and conditions at the time of the attack, she reasonably believed she was

      in imminent danger. See 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986,

      Supp. 1996) 654, Supp. 71, Section 5.7. See, also, generally, State v.

      Shane (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 634, 590 N.E.2d 272, 276 ... Then, if the

      objective standard is met, the jury must determine if, subjectively, this

      particular defendant had an honest belief that she was in imminent danger.

      See 1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law (1986, Supp. 1996) 654,

      Supp. 71, Section 5.7. See, also, generally, Shane, supra, 63 Ohio St.3d at

      634, 590 N.E.2d at 276.... 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 330-331, 673 N.E.2d 1339

      (1997).

      {¶13} Appellant argues the trial court erred in excluding Dr. Pritchard’s testimony

concerning the medical outcome to Appellant of an altercation with a man the victim’s age

and size, as such evidence would have demonstrated Appellant reasonably believed his

life was in danger when he shot the victim.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                        9

       {¶14} “A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the

rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d

1056 (1991).

       {¶15} Evid. R. 702(A) provides a witness may testify as an expert if the “witness'

testimony either relates to matters beyond the knowledge or experience possessed by

lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay persons.” The trial court

found the testimony proffered in the instant case did not relate to matters beyond the

knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons, and did not dispel a misconception

common among lay persons.

       {¶16} Appellant relies on the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Koss, 49

Ohio St.3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970 (1990), in support of his argument expert testimony was

admissible on the issue of whether his belief he was in imminent danger from the victim

was reasonable.     In Koss, the court found testimony concerning battered women’s

syndrome was admissible on the issue of self-defense:

               Expert testimony regarding the battered woman syndrome can be

       admitted to help the jury not only to understand the battered woman

       syndrome but also to determine whether the defendant had reasonable

       grounds for an honest belief that she was in imminent danger when

       considering the issue of self-defense. “Expert testimony on the battered

       woman syndrome would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception

       that a woman in a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. The
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                  10

     expert evidence would counter any ‘common sense’ conclusions by the jury

     that if the beatings were really that bad the woman would have left her

     husband much earlier. Popular misconceptions about battered women

     would be put to rest, including the beliefs that the women are masochistic

     and enjoy the beatings and that they intentionally provoke their husbands

     into fits of rage. See Walker, The Battered Woman, 19–31 (1979).” State v.

     Hodges (1986), 239 Kan. 63, 68–69, 716 P.2d 563, 567. See, also, Smith

     v. State, supra, 247 Ga. at 618–619, 277 S.E.2d at 683; Hawthorne, supra;

     Torres, supra, 128 Misc.2d at 133–134, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 362.

           As the Supreme Court of New Jersey stated in State v. Kelly, supra,

     97 N.J. at 193, 478 A.2d at 371:

           “[‘]Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate

     relationships with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered

     woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any

     woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it

     occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a

     battered woman.[’]” (Quoting Walker, The Battered Woman [1979], at xv.)

           “ * * * [E]xpert testimony would be essential to rebut the general

     misconceptions regarding battered women.

           “The difficulty with the expert's testimony is that it sounds as if an

     expert is giving knowledge to a jury about something the jury knows as well

     as anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of imminent

     serious danger. That is not at all, however, what this testimony is directly
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                       11

       aimed at. It is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of

       the jury may be very much mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn

       from their own experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an

       area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their

       prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.”

       (Emphasis sic) Kelly, supra, at 206, 478 A.2d at 378.

       {¶17} Id. at 216–17, 551 N.E.2d at 973–74.

       {¶18} The Ohio Supreme Court later extended the holding in Koss to child abuse

situations, finding testimony on the syndrome or psychological effects of abuse is

essential to proving the elements of a self-defense claim, because nonconfrontational

killings do not fit the general pattern of self-defense. State v. Nemeth, 82 Ohio St.3d 202,

208, 694 N.E.2d 1332 (1998). Without expert testimony, a trier of fact may not be able to

understand the defendant at the time of the killing could have had an honest belief he

was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and it is difficult for the average

person to understand the degree of helplessness an abused child may feel. Id. Thus,

expert testimony would help dispel the ordinary lay person's perception that a [person] in

a battering relationship is free to leave at any time. Id.

       {¶19} In both Koss and Nemeth, the expert testimony aided the jury in dispelling

a common misconception a woman or child in an abusive relationship is free to leave any

time. However, in the instant case, no such misconception exists. It is not a commonly

held belief an older person with numerous health problems is no more susceptible to

death from an altercation than a younger person in good health. Dr. Pritchard testified
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                        12

at trial as to numerous health conditions from which Appellant suffered. Appellant testified

because of his poor health, he feared for his life should he have another physical

altercation with the victim.   Further, the jury heard testimony from both the victim and

Appellant, and was in a position to physically see the differences in age, size, and physical

condition between the two men. As found by the trial court, expert testimony was not

necessary for a lay person to understand the potential fragility of an older person in poor

health who is involved in a verbal or physical altercation, and to evaluate the objective

reasonableness of Appellant’s belief he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm

if engaged in an altercation with the victim. We find the trial court did not err in finding

Dr. Pritchard’s opinion was not admissible under Evid. R. 702(A), as the proffered

testimony was not beyond the knowledge or experience of a lay person and did not dispel

any misconception common amongst lay persons.

       {¶20} Appellant also argues the State opened the door for expert testimony in the

following exchange during the State’s cross-examination of Dr. Pritchard:

              Q: Okay. So you had said that you’re shocked that someone could

       have so many ailments and still be alive; yet it doesn’t surprise you that he

       lived on his, on his own?

              A: I never said I was shocked

              Q: Well, I think that’s ex –

              A: I said I, I never saw anybody that had as many – that – people

       that were alive that had as many diagnosis (sic) that he has and that I expect

       him to die any day.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                                      13

             Q: So those are based on records from Ju – July of 2022 and yet

      here we are all these months later?

             A: No, it’s not based on that. It’s based on all my medical knowledge

      and all my years of education and my time in the coroner’s office and

      reading medical literature about people just exactly like Mr. Reed that’s (sic)

      been taking aspirin, that has (sic) minor injuries, that die from bumps on

      their head in the car doors.

      {¶21} Tr. (3A) 172-73.

      {¶22} The prosecutor’s objection to this answer was sustained, and the statement

was stricken from the record.

      {¶23} We find the prosecutor did not open the door by cross-examining the doctor

on his testimony he was surprised Appellant was still alive. Under the “opening the door’

doctrine, the introduction of inadmissible evidence by one party allows an opponent, in

the court's discretion, to introduce evidence on the same issue to rebut any false

impression which might have resulted from the earlier admission. State v. Gordon, 5th

Dist. Stark No. 2017CA00073, 2017-Ohio-9357, ¶ 25. In the instant case, Dr. Pritchard’s

testimony was not in response to any inadmissible evidence presented by the State.

Rather, he delved into areas previously deemed inadmissible by the court in response to

questioning by the State.
Stark County, Case No. 2023CA00033                                             14

      {¶24} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stark County

Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.
Wise, J. and
Baldwin, J. concur