Court Opinion

ID: 9943428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 16:04:54.738209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:00.020905
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1096
                     LT Case No. 22-0526N
                 _____________________________

NEKEISHA WILSON, on behalf of
and as parent and natural
guardian of Syriah Pinkney, a
minor,

    Appellant,

    v.

FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED
NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

Administrative appeal from the Florida Division of
Administrative Hearings.

Jonathan Mann and Robin Bresky, of Schwartz Sladkus Reich
Greenberg Atlas LLP, Boca Raton, for Appellant.

Tana D. Storey, Stephen A. Ecenia, and J. Stephen Menton, of
Rutledge Ecenia, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                       February 23, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    Appellant petitioned for benefits from the Florida Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (“NICA”).
NICA determined that Appellant’s claim was not compensable,
and the case proceeded to a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”). Appellant and NICA agreed that Appellant’s
daughter (“Child”) experienced “some degree of birth-related
oxygen deprivation,” but disagreed about whether the oxygen
deprivation caused a brain injury that rendered Child
permanently and substantially impaired. The parties stipulated
that the sole legal issue for the ALJ’s adjudication was whether
Child “suffered a birth-related neurological injury” as defined by
section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes.

     Each side presented expert deposition testimony concerning
the disputed facts. The ALJ’s final order evaluated this testimony
and the rest of the evidence, including Child’s medical records, in
detail. Based on her evaluation of the evidence, the ALJ found that
Child “suffered oxygen deprivation during the course of labor,
delivery, and the post-delivery period.” However, the ALJ did not
find that this oxygen deprivation caused a brain injury—let alone
one that resulted in Child’s permanent and substantial
impairment. Because the ALJ did not find the existence of a “birth-
related neurological injury,” the ALJ dismissed Appellant’s
petition for NICA benefits with prejudice.

     On appeal, Appellant contends the ALJ failed to apply a
statutory presumption that relieves NICA claimants from having
to prove when an injury occurred if they show the other elements
of a “birth-related neurological injury.” See § 766.309(1)(a), Fla.
Stat. “An ALJ’s interpretation of the [NICA] plan is reviewed de
novo, while its findings of fact are upheld if supported by
competent, substantial evidence.” Pediatrix Med. Grp. of Fla., Inc.
v. Falconer, 31 So. 3d 310, 312 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

     “The NICA Plan does not cover all incidents of brain damage
sustained by an infant delivered by an obstetrician.” Bennett v. St.
Vincent’s Med. Ctr., Inc., 71 So. 3d 828, 836 (Fla. 2011). Instead,
coverage is reserved for when an infant suffers a “birth-related
neurological injury,” which is a statutory term of art. Id. at 836–
37; see § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. (defining the term). Under the
statute, “a birth-related neurological injury has four components:
(1) an injury to the brain or spinal cord; (2) which is caused by
oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury; (3) during labor, delivery,

                                 2
or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period; and (4)
which renders the infant permanently and substantially
impaired.” Bennett, 71 So. 3d at 837.

     When a claimant demonstrates the existence of elements (1),
(2), and (4) “to the satisfaction of the administrative law judge,”
then a rebuttable presumption arises in the claimant’s favor as to
the existence of element (3). See § 766.309(1)(a), Fla. Stat.
“Therefore, if the claimant . . . knows only that the infant has
sustained a brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation that has
rendered the infant permanently and substantially impaired, the
claimant does not have to establish that the incident occurred
during labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate
postdelivery period.” Bennett, 71 So. 3d at 844.

     The ALJ’s order correctly states this law. The ALJ found the
presumption did not apply because Appellant did not prove the
existence of a brain injury resulting in permanent and substantial
impairment, elements without which the timing presumption
remains inactive.* The ALJ’s findings about the absence of a brain
injury and resulting impairment are supported by competent,
substantial evidence—i.e., “evidence that is ‘sufficiently relevant
and material that a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate
to support the conclusion reached.’” Demichael v. Dep’t of Mgmt.
Servs., Div. of Ret., 334 So. 3d 691, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022)
(quoting De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957)).

     The ALJ credited the testimony of NICA’s experts, who
indicated that Child did not sustain a brain injury and did not have
permanent and substantial impairments. As noted by the ALJ,
NICA’s experts based their testimonies, at least in part, on the
battery of tests taken before Child’s discharge from the hospital,
which did not reveal a brain injury. NICA’s experts also testified
that the purported developmental delays Child is experiencing can
be attributed to a variety of factors that are unrelated to a brain

    * We note the ALJ found that Child’s oxygen deprivation took

place “during the course of labor, delivery, and the post-delivery
period.” Therefore, the timing element that the presumption would
have supplied was already present.

                                 3
injury. While Appellant’s experts did not share these views, the
ALJ—as was her duty—resolved this “battle of the experts.” See
Rossi v. Brown, 581 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (observing
that “a ‘battle of the experts’ has become the norm in modern
trials” and that “no matter how difficult or complex” an issue
becomes, “[c]ourts must resolve the issues upon which the experts
differ”); see also Olesky ex rel. Est. of Olesky v. Stapleton, 123 So.
3d 592, 594 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (reflecting that medical cases often
become “a ‘battle of the experts’”).

     We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ’s “as to
the weight” to ascribe to this competent, substantial evidence. See
§ 120.68(10), Fla. Stat.; see also Bill Salter Advert., Inc. v. Dep’t of
Transp., 974 So. 2d 548, 551 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (noting that in
administrative cases, the appellate court is not permitted to “judge
the credibility of the witnesses” since that task is left to the ALJ).
Indeed, reversal in this case would require a reweighing of the
evidence, something the law precludes us from doing. See Matteini
v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological, 946 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2006) (“[I]t appears that the Matteinis are asking this Court
to reweigh the evidence considered by the ALJ. . . . While the
Matteinis offered countervailing testimony from various experts
and lay witnesses, the ALJ credited NICA’s witnesses more
heavily. The ALJ’s factual finding . . . is supported by substantial
competent evidence and is conclusive and binding on this Court.”).

     Because the ALJ concluded that Appellant did not show a
“birth-related neurological injury” as defined by section
766.302(2), and because the findings underlying this conclusion
are supported by competent, substantial evidence, we must affirm.

    AFFIRMED.

MAKAR, JAY, and SOUD, JJ., concur.
                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

                                   4