Court Opinion

ID: 9791869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:19:40.850918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.094678
License: Public Domain

Fatzer, J., dissenting:
Giving consideration to the purpose of the 1961 amendment to G. S. 1961 Supp. 44-556 (L. 1961, Ch. 243, §5), (the pertinent provisions here involved being identical to K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556), and looking through form to substance, the purpose of K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556 was to stay the payment of compensation until the employer perfected his appeal to the district court so as to permit that tribunal to determine the validity and amount, if any, of the compensation awarded, but,
“. . . the perfection of an appeal to the district court shall not stay the payment of compensation due for the ten-week period next preceding the director’s decision, and for the period of time after the director’s decision and prior to the decision of the district court in such appeal.” (K. S. A. 1969 Supp. 44-556.)
Once the employer’s appeal is perfected to the district court, compensation for the ten-week period prior to the director’s decision and during the pendency of the appeal is due and payable. Hence, the compensation being due and payable, a demand for payment of the same under K. S. A. 44-512a is proper, and is the method by which the legislature has provided that claimants enforce their rights pending an appeal.
In the instant case, the claimant’s demand was served upon *164respondents after they perfected their appeal to the district court. Their appeal removed the ban of the statute of nonpayment of compensation. Thereafter, compensation for the ten-week period preceding the director’s award was due, and the statutory demand was not premature and ineffective. When the respondents failed to comply with the written demand, the action was properly commenced. I would reverse the judgment of the district court.
Kaul, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.