Court Opinion

ID: 9947284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 16:00:35.086728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.182237
License: Public Domain

22-3184-cr (L)
United States v. Strong

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

Present:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                  Chief Judge,
            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
            DENNY CHIN,
                  Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                          Appellee,

                 v.                                                 22-3184-cr, 22-3199-cr

CALVIN STRONG,

                  Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________

For Appellee:                             PAUL D. SILVER, Assistant United States Attorney
                                          (Richard D. Belliss, Assistant United States Attorney on
                                          the brief), on behalf of Carla B. Freedman, United States
                                          Attorney for the Northern District of New York.

For Defendant-Appellee:                   ELIZABETH A. FRANKLIN-BEST, Elizabeth Franklin-
                                          Best, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina.

        Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New

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York (Scullin, J.).

       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the appeal from the judgment of the district court, entered on December 14, 2022,

convicting Defendant-Appellant of possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted

of a felony is DISMISSED, while the December 14, 2022 judgment convicting him for violations

of supervised release is AFFIRMED.

       Defendant-Appellant Calvin Strong appeals from two judgments entered in the United

States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.) on December 14, 2022:

one judgment convicting him, upon his guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, of one count of

possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2),

and sentencing him, in relevant part, to 85 months in prison; and the other judgment sentencing

him to 12 months’ imprisonment, to run consecutively to the 85-month term, for his admitted

violations of supervised release.   On appeal, Strong argues that the district court erred with

respect to both judgments.    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, which we recount here only as necessary

to explain our decision to DISMISS as to the first judgment sentencing Strong to an 85-month

term and to AFFIRM as to the second judgment imposing a consecutive 12-month term for

violation of supervised release.

                                         *      *       *

       As to the first judgment, Strong’s plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal

or otherwise challenge “[a]ny sentence to a term of imprisonment of 100 months or less.”      Joint

App’x 64.     The district court sentenced Strong to 85 months’ imprisonment.         Strong now

contends that the evidence did not support the court’s application of a four-level enhancement to

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his base offense level for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense”

pursuant to United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).        We conclude, however, that

we need not reach this question because Strong’s appellate waiver is enforceable.

        Strong signed a written plea agreement providing that he “waive[d] . . . any and all rights .

. . to appeal and/or collaterally attack . . . [a]ny sentence to a term of imprisonment of 100 months

or less.”   Joint App’x 63–64.   During his plea hearing, Strong twice confirmed that he carefully

reviewed the plea agreement and was aware of and consented to the terms of the waiver provision.

See Joint App’x 50 (confirming his careful review and awareness of the waiver provision); id. at

53 (responding “Yes, Your Honor” when asked if he “fully underst[ood]” the waiver terms).

While we apply plea waivers narrowly and construe them strictly against the government, see

United States v. Pearson, 570 F.3d 480, 485 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam), “[i]n no circumstance . .

. may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily

waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to

the agreement,” United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). “Waivers of

the right to appeal a sentence are presumptively enforceable.” United States v. Arevalo, 628 F.3d

93, 98 (2d Cir. 2010).

        Strong posits in his reply brief that the waiver provision is “ambiguous” because the plea

agreement notes the government’s intention to argue for the four-level enhancement at sentencing

and also Strong’s intent to challenge its application.     Grey Br. 2.     Strong contends that the

statement “memorializ[ed]” his objection to the enhancement.        Id. at 2.   But the parties’ clear

intention to dispute the enhancement’s application before the district court in no way undercuts

the clarity of the appellate waiver.      There is no evidence in the record that suggests the

government intended to release Strong from the plain terms of the waiver provision, nor that he

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misunderstood those terms.      Nor does Strong argue that the district judge was biased or “reached

[Strong’s sentence] in a manner that the plea agreement did not anticipate.”           United States v.

Riggi, 649 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We

conclude that Strong’s argument does not warrant voiding his appeal waiver and thus that his

appeal as to the first judgment should be dismissed.

         Strong’s argument as to the second judgment on appeal is that the district court

procedurally erred by failing to explain the reasons for imposing a 12-month consecutive sentence

for his admitted violations of supervised release. Strong did not raise this issue before the district

court, and so our review is for plain error. United States v. Keppler, 2 F.3d 21, 23–24 (2d Cir.

1993).    “Plain error review requires a defendant to demonstrate that (1) there was error, (2) the

error was plain, (3) the error prejudicially affected his substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously

affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”        United States v.

Cook, 722 F.3d 477, 481 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

         There is no plain error here. A district court commits procedural error where it “fails

adequately to explain its chosen sentence.”      United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir.

2008) (en banc).    But this Circuit “require[s] less rigorous specificity where . . . a court sentences

a defendant for violation of supervised release.” United States v. Aldeen, 792 F.3d 247, 253 (2d

Cir. 2015), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in United States v. Smith, 949

F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 2020). Here, the district court explained that “the most serious violation [in

Strong’s case] had to do with [a] gun,” and, in an earlier colloquy, noted that it “[was] not the first

time [Strong had] been in possession of a weapon.”       Joint App’x 135. The court explained that

Strong had “been given many opportunities by th[e] Court to move forward with [his] life” but

“turned them down.”        Joint App’x 135.       Moreover, the district court had considered the

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sentencing factors in the earlier sentencing colloquy on Strong’s firearm conviction, which took

place immediately before the colloquy on Strong’s violation of supervised release. The district

court suggested as much when it asked the parties whether they “wish[ed] to be heard further” on

the violation after a “short break.” Joint App’x 136.       The court’s subsequent imposition of a

within-Guidelines sentence for violating the terms of supervised release by unlawfully possessing

a firearm yet another time, was thus supported by the court’s earlier consideration and explanation

of the sentencing factors. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court committed any

error, let alone plain error.

                                         *      *       *

        We have considered Strong’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal as to the first judgment sentencing Strong to an 85-month

term and AFFIRM as to the second judgment imposing a consecutive 12-month term for violation

of supervised release.

                                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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