Court Opinion

ID: 9556169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 14:11:50.09491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:33.458220
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
               In The Supreme Court

   The State, Petitioner-Respondent,

   v.

   Charles Dent, Respondent-Petitioner.

   Appellate Case No. 2021-001246

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                Appeal from Beaufort County
             Alex Kinlaw Jr., Circuit Court Judge

                     Opinion No. 28172
        Heard April 20, 2023 – Filed August 16, 2023

              REVERSED AND REMANDED

   Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
   Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch
   Jr., both of Columbia; and Isaac McDuffie Stone III, of
   Bluffton, all for Petitioner-Respondent.

   E. Charles Grose Jr., of The Grose Law Firm, LLC, of
   Greenwood, for Respondent-Petitioner.
JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Charles Dent was convicted and sentenced on one count
of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and two counts of
disseminating obscene material to a minor. Dent appealed, and a divided court of
appeals' panel reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in
failing to give the requested circumstantial evidence charge this Court articulated in
State v. Logan, 405 S.C. 83, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013). State v. Dent, 434 S.C. 357,
863 S.E.2d 478 (Ct. App. 2021). Because this ruling was dispositive, the court of
appeals did not reach Dent's other assignments of error. We granted the State's
petition for a writ of certiorari and now reverse. While we agree with the court of
appeals' finding of error in the trial court's failure to charge circumstantial evidence
pursuant to Logan, the error was harmless. We reverse and remand to the court of
appeals for consideration of Dent's remaining issues on appeal.

                                           I.
Dent's minor granddaughter (Granddaughter) accused Dent of sexually abusing her
when she was eight and nine years old. Following her disclosure, Granddaughter
underwent two forensic interviews.          During the first forensic interview,
Granddaughter revealed that one of the initial incidents of abuse occurred when Dent
went to the bathroom, took lewd pictures of himself, and showed them to
Granddaughter. Granddaughter told the forensic interviewer, "After he showed me
all of his pictures—he took like ten of them— . . . he told me, 'Here, go take pictures
of yours,' and I said, 'No!'" Granddaughter also detailed occasions when Dent would
touch her vagina, breasts, and buttocks: "He was just touching me everywhere. He
was kissing me on the mouth." Granddaughter stated Dent made her watch a
pornographic video. Dent also took pictures of Granddaughter's vagina while she
was asleep and later showed the pictures to Granddaughter.
In Granddaughter's second forensic interview, she wrote on a piece of paper: "He
made me touch it more than once," indicating that her hand had touched Dent's penis.
Granddaughter also wrote, "He made me lick it," and stated Dent's penis had gone
inside her mouth on multiple occasions. Granddaughter disclosed that Dent touched
her vagina with his mouth and that his hands went inside her vagina. Granddaughter
described seeing Dent's "urine," which she recalled was "whiteish" in color, looked
"like a flour mix," and stained the carpet. In both forensic interviews, Granddaughter
stated Dent bribed her with money and toys. Dent was paying rent for the house
Granddaughter lived in, and he threatened that if Granddaughter reported the abuse,
he would kick the family out of their home.

Dent was indicted for two counts of first-degree CSC with a minor and two counts
of disseminating obscene material to a minor. At trial, the State presented mostly
direct evidence against Dent. Granddaughter testified, "I remember he started
kissing me, like, on my face, my mouth. He started licking my belly, like, my belly
button and started, like touching me in weird places. And he took pictures of his
private parts and told me to take pictures of mine." Granddaughter stated Dent
touched her "private parts" and "made [her] lick his private parts." Granddaughter
also testified that Dent showed her videos of "[p]eople having sex." In addition to
Granddaughter's direct, in-court testimony, the trial court admitted videos of both
forensic interviews into evidence, and the videos were published to the jury.

The State also presented circumstantial evidence at trial, including testimony from
Granddaughter's mother and her mother's boyfriend concerning changes in
Granddaughter's behavior around the time of the abuse.
At the end of trial, defense counsel requested a circumstantial evidence charge in
accordance with Logan. See Logan, 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452 (providing
language that trial courts should include in a circumstantial evidence charge when
the charge is requested by a defendant). The State, to its credit, did not oppose the
circumstantial evidence charge. The trial court, nevertheless, refused to provide the
jury with the mandated Logan instruction. Dent noted his objection and, following
the verdict, unsuccessfully moved for a new trial based in part on the Logan issue.
Dent subsequently appealed, raising eleven issues to the court of appeals. Finding
the Logan issue dispositive, the court of appeals' majority declined to address Dent's
remaining ten issues on appeal. The court of appeals held the trial court erred in not
giving the full Logan charge and reversed and remanded for a new trial. Judge
Thomas dissented. While Judge Thomas concurred with the finding of error in the
trial court's failure to give the Logan charge, she pointed to the wealth of direct
evidence and concluded "the error committed by the trial court was ultimately
harmless." Dent, 434 S.C. at 364, 863 S.E.2d at 481 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals'
decision. The State argues the trial court's failure to give the entire Logan charge
was harmless error. Dent filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari, raising as
additional sustaining grounds the ten issues the court of appeals declined to address.
We held Dent's cross-petition in abeyance pending resolution of the State's petition.
                                           II.

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v.
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). "When requested, the Logan
charge must be given in cases based in whole or part on circumstantial evidence."
State v. Herndon, 430 S.C. 367, 371, 845 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2020). Nevertheless,
"[i]n reviewing jury charges for error, this Court considers the trial court's jury
charge as a whole and in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial." Logan,
405 S.C. at 90, 747 S.E.2d at 448. "To warrant reversal, a trial [court's] refusal to
give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the
defendant." State v. Brandt, 393 S.C. 526, 550, 713 S.E.2d 591, 603 (2011) (quoting
State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 479, 697 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2010)).
                                          III.

The parties concede the trial court erred in refusing to give the Logan circumstantial
evidence charge following Dent's request. Therefore, the only issue before us is
whether the trial court's failure to give the Logan charge was harmless. See Herndon,
430 S.C. at 373, 845 S.E.2d at 502 (acknowledging the failure to give a requested
Logan charge is subject to a harmless error analysis); State v. Burdette, 427 S.C.
490, 496, 832 S.E.2d 575, 578 (2019) ("An erroneous instruction alone is insufficient
to warrant this Court's reversal.").
"Harmless error analyses are fact-intensive inquiries and are not governed by a
definite set of rules. Rather, appellate courts must determine the materiality and
prejudicial character of the error in relation to the entire case." State v. Jenkins, 412
S.C. 643, 651, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909–10 (2015) (citations omitted). Our appellate
courts have found a trial court's failure to give a requested Logan charge is
prejudicial when the evidence against the defendant is almost entirely circumstantial.
For example, in Herndon, this Court stated, "We acknowledge there may be a case
in which a trial court's failure to give the Logan charge might be harmless error, but
this is not such a case. The State's case against Petitioner was almost exclusively
circumstantial." 430 S.C. at 373, 845 S.E.2d at 502 (emphasis added); see also State
v. Sanchez, 435 S.C. 468, 475–76, 867 S.E.2d 595, 598–99 (Ct. App. 2021) (finding
the error prejudicial where, "[s]imilar to Herndon, the evidence of [the defendant's
guilt] was largely circumstantial").
Here, the evidence was largely direct, especially Granddaughter's extensive
testimony. See 30 S.C. Jur. Evidence § 154 (Supp. 2021–2022) ("'Direct evidence'
is the testimony of a person who asserts or claims to have actual knowledge of a fact,
such as an eyewitness." (citation omitted)); Logan, 405 S.C. at 99, 747 S.E.2d at 452
("Direct evidence directly proves the existence of a fact and does not require
deduction."). Before the jury, Granddaughter directly named Dent as her abuser and
detailed the sexual acts he perpetrated on her. The jury watched almost two hours
of videotaped forensic interviews, during which Granddaughter recounted Dent's
abuse over a two-year period. This was direct evidence.

It cannot be said that the evidence presented was almost entirely circumstantial. In
discussing the nature of the evidence, the court of appeals' majority decision noted
the absence of physical evidence of sexual abuse. We construe this finding as a
comment on the issue of credibility, especially Granddaughter's credibility. See
Herndon, 430 S.C. at 373 n.6, 845 S.E.2d at 502 n.6 ("Fundamental to a jury's role
as fact-finder is making credibility determinations, which lie in the sole province of
the jury."). Whether Granddaughter's testimony was credible is an entirely distinct
issue from whether direct evidence existed. The fact that the State also utilized
circumstantial evidence does not detract from the existence of direct evidence. The
State recognized the importance of the direct evidence, highlighting Granddaughter's
trial testimony and two forensic interviews in its initial closing argument.

Moreover, we agree with the State that the trial court's instruction, as a whole,
accurately charged the law to be applied. Our appellate courts have previously held
the failure to give the Logan charge was harmless error where "[t]he trial court's jury
instruction, as a whole, properly conveyed the applicable law." Logan, 405 S.C. at
94 n.8, 747 S.E.2d at 449 n.8; see also State v. Jenkins, 408 S.C. 560, 573, 759
S.E.2d 759, 766 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding "any error in the omission of other
language from the Logan instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
because the trial court's instruction, as a whole, properly conveyed the applicable
law"); State v. Drayton, 411 S.C. 533, 546, 769 S.E.2d 254, 261 (Ct. App. 2015)
(same), aff'd in result and vacated in part on other grounds, 415 S.C. 43, 780 S.E.2d
902 (2015); State v. Lynch, 412 S.C. 156, 178, 771 S.E.2d 346, 357–58 (Ct. App.
2015) (same).

Other than the error in failing to give the Logan circumstantial evidence charge, the
trial court thoroughly and properly charged the jury on the law, including the
presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. As a result, in
light of the trial court's charge as a whole and in light of the direct evidence, we hold
the trial court's failure to give the requested Logan charge was harmless error. We
reverse the court of appeals' opinion and remand this matter for the court of appeals
to address Dent's remaining issues on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

BEATTY, C.J., FEW, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Jan B. Bromell Holmes,
concur.