Court Opinion

ID: 9678774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:31:52.718083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:07.465584
License: Public Domain

McGIVERIN, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I respectfully concur in division III of the majority opinion — constitutionality of Iowa Code chapter 20 — and dissent as to the remaining divisions. I would affirm the ruling of the trial court that the arbitration decision was without effect because chapter 279 provides the exclusive means of challenging the school board’s termination decision as to plaintiff teacher, Janice Gardner.
The district court decided two issues: (1) Whether the preponderance of the competent evidence in the record supports the Board’s decision to terminate the contract of Janice Gardner; and (2) what impact an arbitrator’s award has on that determination. The court found that the evidence supported the Board’s decision and that arbitration may not be used in place of the provisions of chapter 279 as to the final decision in a teacher termination case.
On appeal, the controlling issue, as viewed by the majority, is whether a grievance arising from a teacher termination due to staff reduction may be resolved by arbitration.1
I believe that the majority opinion misconstrues the legislature’s intent as to the exclusivity of chapter 279. The majority holds that the chapter 279 procedures are just another option available to an aggrieved teacher. I would hold that the chapter 279 procedures are a teacher’s only option in regard to a termination decision.
Our task is to harmonize chapter 279 — a specific statute dealing with teacher contracts and termination procedures — and *484chapter 20 — a more general statute dealing with collective bargaining for public employees. Acknowledgment of the exclusivity of chapter 279 procedures not only gives preference to the more specific statute, see Iowa Code § 4.7 (1983), but it also furthers the purpose of chapter 20.
I. Rales of statutory construction. Iowa Code chapter 4 provides rules for statutory construction to be observed when determining the legislative intent of a statute. Iowa Code § 4.1.
Because chapter 20 is a general statute dealing with collective bargaining for public employees and chapter 279 is a more specific statute dealing with teacher contracts and termination procedures, the rule of section 4.7, favoring the more specific statute over a general statute, is observed by recognizing the exclusivity of chapter 279.
The same result is obtained when following the rule of Iowa Code § 4.8 which favors the statute most recently enacted when irreconcilable differences arise between statutes. We take notice of the fact that Iowa Code § 279.13 was amended by 1976 Iowa Acts, ch. 1151, (to provide for the adjudicatory review procedures of sections 279.13-19) which was two years after the general assembly enacted the Public Employment Relations Act (codified as Iowa Code chapter 20). Both of these general rules of statutory construction lend support to viewing chapter 279 as the exclusive procedure for review of teacher terminations.
More specifically, chapter 20 includes a provision to guide its interpretation.
II. Iowa Code controls over collective bargaining contract. Iowa Code chapter 20 anticipates potential inconsistencies between the Code and collective bargaining agreements and has chosen to resolve such differences by deferring to the Code:
A provision of the code which is inconsistent with any term or condition of a collective bargaining agreement ... shall supersede the term or condition of the collective bargaining agreement unless otherwise provided by the general assembly.
Iowa Code § 20.28 (emphasis added). The use of the word “shall” indicates that such deference is mandatory. The issue before us involves two inconsistent procedures for reviewing teacher terminations: binding arbitration provided for in the collective bargaining agreement versus an adjudicatory hearing provided for in Iowa Code § 279.15 and the appeal process therefrom. We are directed, by section 20.28, to resolve this inconsistency by relying on the adjudicatory procedures provided for in Iowa Code § 279.15 et seq. Therefore, the arbitrator’s decision is without effect because the collective bargaining agreement’s provision for arbitration to review teacher terminations is preempted by Iowa Code § 279.-15.
III.The purpose of chapter 20 not furthered by arbitration here. The above view is also supported by the purpose of chapter 20, which was enacted to help promote the public policy objectives of “assuring effective and orderly operations of government.” Iowa Code § 20.1. Collective bargaining and arbitration are a means of achieving this goal, but nowhere in chapter 20 are these tools given preference over other statutory tools of effective government. See City of Des Moines v. Public Employment Relations Board, 275 N.W.2d 753, 761 (Iowa 1979).
In the present case, effective government requires that school boards have the power to decide when staff reductions are necessary. Section 20.7 recognizes this need and empowers school boards (public employers) to “[sjuspend or discharge public employees for proper cause.” Furthermore, the collective bargaining agreement here between the Shenandoah School Board and the Shenandoah Education Association provides that in the case of terminations due to staff reductions “the Board of Education shall determine which employee(s) is to be terminated according to the needs of the school district,” based on staff reduction criteria *485negotiated under Iowa Code section 20.9.2 The Board made this determination concerning Gardner following the procedural steps of chapter 279.
Indeed, the majority recognizes the exclusivity of chapter 279 procedures for terminations for just cause personal to the teacher under section 279.27. Terminations due to staff reductions are also for just cause. Board of Education of Fort Madison Community School District v. Youel, 282 N.W.2d 677, 680 (Iowa 1979). See also Smith v. Board of Education of Mediapolis School District, 334 N.W.2d 150, 151 (Iowa 1983). The procedures detailed in sections 279.-15(2)-.19 are to be followed in both types of termination, and I see no reason not to afford all teachers faced with termination, the school boards and the public with the same procedural protections.
Arbitration in a case such as this does not insure the effective and orderly operation of government. Although the advantage of arbitration is touted to be its speed and economy, the present case demonstrates that these advantages are, at best, one-sided. Gardner’s position was terminated because of budgetary constraints on the school district. But even the arbitrator’s May 15 decision that she should not be terminated came too late for the school board to seek another position to terminate in order to stay within its budgetary limits. Notice of recommendation for termination must be given to a teacher by March 15. Iowa Code § 279.15(1). Thus the statutory time limit had passed for the- Board to start the chapter 279 procedures to terminate “teacher D” who the arbitrator believed should have been terminated rather than Gardner. Assuming the arbitrator was correct, the Board could not have instituted termination of “teacher D,” or any other teacher, for “staff reduction” reasons until March 1982. Iowa Code § 279.15(1). Absent a proper notice by March 15, due to the provisions of Iowa Code sections 279.13-19 which are now written into teacher’s contracts in Iowa, Bruton v. Ames Community School District, 291 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1980), the contracts of “teacher D” and other teachers were automatically renewed for another year. Id. at 357; Iowa Code § 279.13.
Admittedly, the chapter 279 procedures do not eliminate the cause of cases such as this — lack of sufficient funds for education — but the chapter 279 procedures do afford protection to the teacher, the school board and the public through judicial review. The reviewing court must be assured that staff reduction is not merely a pretext for terminating an unwanted teacher and that the decision is not the result of arbitrariness or capriciousness. Smith, 334 N.W.2d at 152.
IV. Recognition that chapter 279 is exclusive means of teacher termination review. The exclusivity of the specific procedures in chapter 279 was recognized in Moraavek v. Davenport School District, 262 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Iowa 1978), in which we held that, under the then existing version of chapter 279, teacher contract terminations could not be submitted to arbitration as a matter of public policy. The majority distinguishes Moravek on the basis of the finality language which was present in Iowa Code section 279.13 (1975) but which was subsequently deleted by the legislature. See 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1151, § 1.
While focusing on the deletion of the “finality” language from chapter 279, the majority loses sight of subsequent legislative action as to the specificity and exclusivity of the chapter 279 teacher termination procedures. These, too, should be considered in construing chapter 279. City of Des Moines, 275 N.W.2d at 762 (“Subsequent legislative action on a subject can assist in discerning the meaning of a statute.”).
Changes after Moravek did not abandon the chapter 279 procedure of giving a teacher recommended for termination the right *486to a private hearing before the school board and specific reasons for the termination. Iowa Code § 279.13 (1975) and § 279.15(2) (1981). Rather, the changes after Moravek increased the specificity by which these rights were detailed in the statute. Compare Iowa Code §§ 279.15(2)-.16 (1981) with Iowa Code § 279.13 (1975).
I believe that this increase in specificity manifests the legislature’s intent that the chapter 279 procedures be the sole avenue for a teacher to challenge a proposed termination. The legislature in chapter 279 has preempted this area of the law. I believe the Moravek case principles are still viable: that arbitration of a teacher termination decision by the school board violates legislative intent that chapter 279 controls termination decisions; and that arbitration in such circumstances is against public policy. Moravek, 262 N.W.2d at 805.
The trial court correctly ruled that the arbitration award was not binding and should be vacated.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP and SCHULTZ, JJ., join this concurrence in part and dissent in part.

. Iowa Code section 20.18 provides that the agreement between the public employer and the employee organization “may provide for binding arbitration of public employee grievances and of disputes over the interpretation and application of existing agreements.”

. It should be noted that Iowa Code section 20.9 only requires negotiation between the public employer and the employee organization concerning “procedures for staff reduction” and not as to the actual decision involving which employee will be terminated in carrying out a staff reduction.