Court Opinion

ID: 9674987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:38:28.088749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:30.488664
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). Sec. 632.32(4) (a), Stats. 1981-82, requires an automobile liability insurance policy to protect the insured against loss resulting from injury by owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles who are liable to the insured under usual tort laws for injury. This case raises a single question of law: By limiting the insured’s coverage in a hit-and-run accident to an unidentified motor vehicle which has physical contact with the insured or the insured’s vehicle, does the insurance policy conflict with sec. 632.32(4) (a), which does not refer to physical contact, thereby rendering the physical contact requirement in the policy void ?
Sec. 632.32(4) (a), Stats. 1981-82, provides as follows:
“(4) Required uninsured motorist and medical payments COVERAGES. Every policy of insurance subject to this section that insures with respect to any motor ve-*86hide registered or principally garaged in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental thereto provisions approved by the commissioner:
“(a) Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident. The insurer may increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy.
“2. In this paragraph “uninsured motor vehicle” also includes:
“a. An insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction.
“b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit- and-run accident.
“3. Insurers making payment under the uninsured motorists’ coverage shall, to the extent of the payment, be subrogated to the rights of their insureds.”
I conclude that the physical contact requirement of the insurance policy conflicts with the uninsured motor vehicle statute and is unenforceable. I base this conclusion on two grounds:
First, the term “hit-and-run” as used in sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b. includes the “miss-and-flee” vehicle presented in this case. The majority’s reading the term “hit-and-run” to mean only “strike-and-flee” lacks support in the legislative history of the statute and contravenes the legislative purpose.
Second, even if “hit-and-run” in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. means only “strike-and-flee,” a “miss-and-flee” vehicle is included within the phrase “uninsured motor *87vehicle” under sec. 682.32(4) (a) 1. The majority mistakenly assumes that unless the uninsured motor vehicle fits within the “hit-and-run” provision of sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b., the insured does not have the benefit of the uninsured motorist coverage.1
I.
The majority’s holding that “hit-and-run” is an “unambiguous” term requiring physical contact is not supported by dictionary definitions or judicial interpretations of the statutory term.
Dictionary definitions of “hit-and-run” are not uniform. While some dictionaries refer to a striking and fleeing, others refer merely to causing an accident and fleeing.2 Several courts have concluded that “hit-and-*88run” in ordinary usage does not connote physical contact. See Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1719,-, 424 N.E.2d 234, 238 (1981); Halseth v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 730, 733 (Minn. 1978); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368, 1374 (1974). The majority’s reliance on Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969), is misplaced. The Amidzich court was not interpreting the term “hit-and-run” but was interpreting an insurance policy that expressly defined “hit-and-run” as requiring physical contact. Amidzich is therefore not relevant to define the statutory phrase.
It will not do, as the majority suggests, to bootstrap the definition of “hit” into the meaning of the term “hit-and-run.” It makes no more sense to isolate and define the word “hit” than it does to isolate and define the word “run,” a verb not normally associated with movement of an automobile. The term “hit-and-run” is a colloquialism, and not three distinct words.
As to judicial interpretations of the statutory term “hit-and-run” in uninsured motorist statutes,3 courts across the country have divided.
*89Those decisions which interpret the statutory phrases “uninsured motor vehicle” and “hit-and-run” to include “miss-and-flee” vehicles are of more recent origin and have now become the majority rule.4
After reading the dictionaries, the numerous cases from other jurisdictions, and the majority opinion, I conclude that the term “hit-and-run” in both common usage and in legal usage refers to a range of incidents. Since the term is ambiguous, that is, it is reasonably *90susceptible to more than one construction, I turn to the legislative history of sec. 632.32(4) (a) to determine which incidents the legislature intended to encompass with the term “hit-and-run.”
The legislative history shows that the Wisconsin Insurance Laws Revision Committee wanted to be sure that the unidentified “hit-and-run” motor vehicle was included as an uninsured motor vehicle, but the Committee never discussed what it meant by “hit-and-run.” It is apparent, from the Drafting File of the Wisconsin Insurance Laws Revision Committee, however, that the drafting staff knew that “hit-and-run” was an ambiguous term. See Staff Attorney Barbara Heaney’s Drafting File on sec. 632.32, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau, State Capitol, Madison, Wisconsin. The drafters knew that the meaning of “hit-and-run” had been litigated in other states, that courts had divided on the question of whether a miss-and-flee vehicle is an uninsured motor vehicle or a hit-and-run vehicle, and that some uninsured motorist statutes expressly defined “hit- and-run” as requiring a striking. Indeed copies of the Iowa and New York statutes which define “hit-and-run” as requiring physical contact are in the Drafting File. The drafters were well aware of the possibility of miss-and-flee vehicles. Had they wanted to make clear that hit-and-run vehicles are required to make physical contact, they would have said so. They did not.
Indeed the legislature itself recognized the ambiguity of the term “hit-and-run” by expressly adopting the following Legislative Council Note in ch. 102, Laws of 1979:
“Sub (4) [of sec. 632.32] continues former sub (3) and former s. 632.34(5) with major editorial changes but without intending change of meaning except to add an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle as an uninsured vehicle. A precise definition of hit-and-run is not neces*91sary for in the rare •ease where a question arises, the court can draw the line." (Emphasis added.)
A Legislative Council Note in an earlier version of sec. 632.32, also adopted by the legislature, states that the legislature did not attempt to resolve all ambiguities in this area of the law.5
The drafters, the committee, and then the legislature failed to define the term “hit-and-run,” apparently intentionally leaving it to a case-by-case construction.
The majority argues that since the standard automobile insurance contract contains a “hit-and-run” provision requiring physical contact, the drafters, the committee, and hence the legislature intended to incorporate the standard automobile insurance contract clause requiring physical contact into the statute. This argument has no basis in fact. Nothing in the files or in the tape-recorded proceedings of the committee meeting (to which the majority refers) shows that the committee or the legislature knew that the standard contract or that all or several Wisconsin auto insurance policies defined “hit- and-run” as requiring physical contact.
Professor Widiss, upon whom the majority relies for its information about the standard contract, explains that in most state statutes the terms “hit-and-run” and “uninsured motor vehicle” are not defined. He concludes that he could not determine from the history of uninsured motorist statutes in this country whether the legislatures’ failure to define “uninsured motor vehicle” or “hit-and-run” stems from effective lobbying by the insurance industry or from the legislatures’ deliberate decisions to incorporate into their statutes only that limited coverage which the industry was then writing in *92its policies. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, sec. 1.12, p. 16 (1969).6
Although a statutory term is ambiguous and its meaning remains uncertain after a review of the legislative history, the court must nevertheless determine what the legislature intended by the term. See, e.g., Dixon v. Dixon, 107 Wis. 2d 492, 499, 500, 319 N.W.2d 846 (1982). The key to the legislative intent as to “hit-and-run” may be found in considering the problems that the *93legislature addressed in the uninsured motorist statute and the goals the legislature sought to achieve. This court’s “cardinal rule in interpreting statutes is that the purpose of the whole act is to be sought and is favored over a construction that will defeat the manifest object of the act.” Student Assoc, of UW-M v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246 N.W.2d 622 (1976).
The legislature has not articulated its purpose in sec. 632.32(4) (a). Courts and commentators have concluded that the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to minimize financial loss for insured victims of automobile accidents caused by the negligence of unknown or uninsured motorists who cannot make the injured party whole. This court has said that “the purpose of uninsured motorists coverage is to compensate an injured who is a victim of an uninsured motorist’s negligence to the same extent as if the uninsured motorist were insured.” Vidmar v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 2d 360, 370, 312 N.W.2d 129 (1981).
If I were to consider only the statutory purpose of sec. 632.32 (4) (a), I would have to conclude that physical contact is an irrelevant and insignificant factor upon which to deny uninsured motorist coverage and that the insurance policy requirement of physical contact is void. In tort law it is not essential that contact be had in order for liability to arise. There is, however, need for further inquiry. We must ask whether there is a countervailing public purpose which “trumps” the purpose of sec. 632.32 (4) (a) and justifies the insurance policy requiring physical contact. In other words, looking only at the purpose of sec. 632.32(4) (a), I would conclude that “hit- and-run” as used in sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. should not be limited to instances of physical contact. If, however, the physical contact requirement serves an objective compatible with or overriding the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute, then the requirement is valid.
*94The only justification I could find for the physical contact requirement is prevention of fraudulent claims.7 The fear is that claimants will allege they were forced off the road by another vehicle (the phantom car) when in fact they lost control of their car through their own negligence. While the need to prevent fraudulent claims is of great concern and is compatible with the purposes of the uninsured motorist statute, the question is whether the fear of fraudulent claims justifies reading the uninsured motorist statute to exclude the “miss-and-flee” claim presented by this case.
I am unpersuaded by the fraud argument. Because the genuineness of a claim can be tested in our adversary system, the fear of fraudulent claims cannot justify depriving a claimant of a right to seek redress in court. Whether the accident occurred as the claimant says is a question of fact; the burden of proof is on the claimant. If the claimant can sustain the burden of proof, the claimant should be entitled to recover regardless of physical contact. In the more than 15 states which do not require physical contact, no fleets of phantom cars cruise the roads causing great numbers of fraudulent claims. See Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26, 30 (S.D. 1978).
*95The claimant’s injury, which the legislature intended to alleviate, occurs whether or not there is physical contact with the anonymous culprit. It does not make sense to me to hold that recovery is possible if there is a little dent in the claimant’s car and no witness to the accident, but that recovery is denied if there is no physical contact and there are several disinterested witnesses. We must remember that the physical contact requirement would disallow coverage in the miss-and-flee vehicle case whether or not there were eyewitnesses to the accident. See Brown v. Progressive Mutual Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1971).
The courts’ dissatisfaction with the injustices created by the physical contact requirement is seen in various courts’ creativity in finding satisfaction of the physical contact requirement in order not to dismiss valid claims. Thus the requirement of physical contact of the uninsured motorist has been satisfied by a rock or a third car hitting the insured. See DeMello v. First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd., 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d 304, 309 (1974).
Several commentators8 and many courts9 have concluded, as I have, that it is inconsistent with the remedial purpose of the uninsured motorist statute to permit the insurance company to evade coverage by using the fraud argument and erecting an arbitrary distinction between accidents with physical contact and those without.10
*96hH
The majority apparently assumes, without discussion, that because the physical contact requirement is not met, the “miss-and-flee” vehicle is not an uninsured motor vehicle. I submit that even if the hit-and-run term in the statute requires physical contact, a miss-and-flee vehicle may still fall within the statutory phrase “uninsured motor vehicle,” a phrase which is not defined in sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 1. “Uninsured motor vehicle” refers broadly to any vehicle to which no insurance policy applies at the time of the accident.
The legislature did not say uninsured motor vehicle “means” only a hit-and-run vehicle.11 Rather, the legislature said that uninsured motor vehicle “also includes” “an unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit-and-run accident.” Sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. The word “includes” suggests that all meanings of the phrase “uninsured motor vehicle” have not been enumerated.12 Indeed the legislature expressly stated in sec. 600.02(1) that the word “includes” as used in the insurance code, unless the context indicates otherwise, refers to a partial enumeration of a larger category. Sec. 600.02(1) provides that “ ‘includes’ means ‘including but not limited to.’ ”13
*97The use of the word “includes” in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2. was specifically brought to the attention of the Wisconsin Insurance Laws Revision Committee. On July 25, 1977, the committee discussed adopting revisions to the uninsured motorist statute. One member expressed a concern that in the draft before the committee the words “uninsured motor vehicle” could be construed as applying only to insolvent insurance companies and hit-and-run drivers, and not to other drivers who were without insurance. Dean Spencer Kimball, the research director for the committee, pointed out that the word “includes” in the statute and insurance code is defined as “includes but is not limited to.” Wisconsin Legislative Council tape recording of July 25, 1977, Meeting of the Insurance Laws Revision Committee; Wisconsin Legislative Council, Summary of Proceedings, Insurance Laws Revision Committee, July 25, 1977, pp. 9-10. The legislature obviously did not intend the “hit-and-run” clause in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. to describe all types of vehicles which may be within the broad phrase “uninsured motor vehicle” in sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 1.
Several examples come to mind which do not fall within the majority’s definition of “hit-and-run” and yet should be included within uninsured motorist coverage. Suppose, for example, an accident is caused by a “strike- and-stop” vehicle: A vehicle strikes the insured; the operator stops, renders aid, waits for the ambulance, but is unidentified or gives a fictitious name. Or a vehicle strikes the insured; the operator stops, renders aid, takes the insured to the hospital, and leaves his or her name and address with the hospital; the name and address of the operator are later lost. The majority tells us that an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle is not synonymous with an unidentified motor vehicle causing an accident; *98the majority limits sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. to an unidentified “strike-and-flee” vehicle. Under the majority’s reasoning- the insured could be precluded from recovering under the insurance policy if there is an unidentified strike-and-stop vehicle since such a vehicle does not literally fall within the majority’s “strike-and-flee” definition of “hit-and-run.” We know this result cannot be right. Even if the “strike-and-stop” vehicle is not a “hit-and-run” vehicle under sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b., obviously the strike-and-stop vehicle should be included within the statutory term “uninsured motor vehicle.” The legislature must have intended to treat claimants the same whether they were injured by an unidentified driver who strikes and flees or by an unidentified driver who strikes and stops and renders assistance.
Even though sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. does not enumerate all possible examples of an uninsured motor vehicle, the question remains whether the legislature intended to require a policy to provide coverage against an unidentified “miss-and-flee” vehicle.
The unidentified “miss-and-flee” vehicle has two attributes: it is unidentified and it has made no physical contact with the insured. That the vehicle or its operator is unidentified is not, in and of itself, a significant factor in determining uninsured motorist coverage. In 1969 this court concluded that the uninsured motorist statute did not require an insurance policy to cover an accident caused by an unidentified motor vehicle. The court reasoned that the statute required the insured to prove that the vehicle was uninsured and if the vehicle was unidentified the insured could not carry the burden. See Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969). Thus in Amidzich the court held that an insurance policy that provided coverage for a hit-and-run vehicle that had physical contact with the insured exceeded the coverage that was required by the *99uninsured motorist statute. After Amidzich the legislature included an unidentified vehicle in a hit-and-run accident within the term - “uninsured motor vehicle,” thereby stating in effect that an unidentified vehicle is assumed to be uninsured. With the 1979 statutory amendment, the Amidzich decision is outdated and irrelevant.
Physical contact with the insured is not, in and of itself, a significant factor in determining uninsured motorist coverage. If a miss-and-flee vehicle is identified after it flees and the vehicle is uninsured, it is clear that the identified uninsured miss-and-fleé vehicle does not fall within sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. but is an uninsured motor vehicle within sec. 632.32(4) (a) 1. and that the claimant could recover under his or her policy notwithstanding the fact that there was no physical contact.
The only reason why a combination of “unidentified” and “no physical contact,” as in this case, should cause a vehicle to be outside the scope of uninsured motorist coverage is to prevent fraud. As I explained previously, I find the fraud argument unpersuasive.
In light of the language of sec. 632.32(4) (a), the legislative history, and the legislative purpose, I conclude that a “miss-and-flee” vehicle is either a “hit-and-run” vehicle or an “uninsured motor vehicle.” I would therefore reverse the circuit court and hold that the insurance policy requiring physical contact is unenforceable since it conflicts with the uninsured motor vehicle statute. Accordingly, I dissent.
Fortunately the Wisconsin legislature can amend sec. 632.32(4) (a) and disavow the interpretation set forth in the majority opinion. Unfortunately legislative action will come too late for Michael Hayne.
I am authorized to state that Justice Louis J. Ceci joins this dissent.

 This premise becomes clear when one examines the majority’s statement of the issue: “The sole issue on appeal is whether sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2,b., Stats., requires uninsured motorist coverage for an accident involving an insured’s vehicle and an unidentified vehicle when there is no physical contact between the two vehicles.” Supra p. 68. See also supra p. 72.

 Dictionaries that refer to “hit-and-run” only as an accident or fleeing include: Random House Dictionary 426 (Concise ed. 1980) —“guilty of leaving the scene of an accident caused by a vehicle driven by oneself”; Vol. II Supplement to the Oxford English Dictionary 109 (1976) — “the action of the driver of a motor vehicle who fails to stop after an accident for which he is responsible”; A Dictionary of Americanisms (ed. M. Mathews 1951), p. 810 — “of or pertaining to accidents of automobiles, trucks, etc., in which the driver seeks to avoid detection by not stopping.”
Dictionaries that define “hit-and-run” to require physical contact include: Random House Dictionary of the English Language 674 (1966) — “hitting and running away, esp. from the scene of an automobile accident”; American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 625 (1969) — “ [designating or involving the driver of a motor vehicle who drives on after striking a pedestrian or another vehicle”; Black’s Law Dictionary 657 (5th ed. 1979)— “collision generally between motor vehicle and pedestrian or with another vehicle in which the operator of a vehicle leaves the *88scene without identifying himself. Such an act is a crime.”
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1183 (2d ed. unabridged, 1935) seems to define “hit-and-run” both ways: “[t]hat hits and runs away; orig. used of motor-vehicle drivers who flee after causing an accident.”

 Apparently all 50 states have uninsured motorist statutes. Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26, 27 (S.D. 1978). The statutes can be categorized generally into three types: (1) statutes that refer to uninsured motor vehicles but not to hit-and-run vehicles or physical contact; (2) statutes that refer to uninsured and hit-and-run vehicles but not to physical contact; (3) statutes that require physical contact within the definition of uninsured and hit-and-run vehicles. Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1719, -, 424 N.E.2d 234, 236-37 (1981); 2 Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance ch. 30 (rev. 1983).
*89The first two categories contain two lines of authority. One line of cases interprets “hit-and-run” or “uninsured motor vehicle” to require physical contact. See, e.g., Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498 (1967); Grace v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 197 Neb. 118, 246 N.W.2d 874 (1976); Hendricks v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 5 N.C. App. 181, 167 S.E. 2d 876 (1969); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reddick, 37 Ohio 2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454 (1974).
The other line does not interpret “hit-and-run” or “uninsured motor vehicle” to require physical contact. See, e.g., Abramowicz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 A.2d 691 (1977) (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd 386 A.2d 670 (Del. 1978); Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 225 Kan. 508, 592 P.2d 445 (1979); Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1719, 424 N.E.2d 234 (1981); Soule v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 595, 364 A.2d 883 (1976); Biggs v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 569 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1977); Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1978); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974).
For a collection of cases, see Annot., Uninsured Motorist Endorsement: Validity and Construction of Requirement That There Be a “Physical Contact” with Unidentified or Hit-and-Run Vehicle, 25 ALR3d 1299 (1969).

 See Abramowicz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 A.2d 691, 692 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd 386 A.2d 670 (Del. 1978); Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 225 Kan. 508, 592 P.2d 445, 449 (1979) (majority rule is that the physical contact requirement is contrary to public and legislative policy in uninsured or unknown motorist statutes); Surrey v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1719, -, 424 N.E.2d, 234, 237 (1981) (17 jurisdictions find physical contact requirement in insurance policies unenforceable under “hit-and-run” and unknown or uninsured motorist provisions; 14 courts find the requirement to be valid).

 See ch. 375, Subch. VI, Introductory Note, Laws of 1975.

 The majority advances other arguments which attempt to demonstrate that the legislature intended to exclude miss-and-flee vehicles from the scope of the hit-and-run provision of sec. 682.32 (4) (a)2.b. Alone or together they are unpersuasive. The majority reasons that because sec. 346.67, Stats. 1981-82, the criminal of-fence of failing to stop upon striking a person or occupied vehicle requires a striking, a striking is needed in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. These statutes are not in pari materia. While other courts have looked to the criminal statutes for guidance in interpreting the insurance law, the use of criminal statutes is not significant in interpreting the insurance laws.
The majority also argues that including “miss-and-flee” within sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. renders the words “hit-and-run” surplusage. Supra p. 76. The majority errs in its narrow interpretation of sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. because it erroneously views sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. as setting forth an all-inclusive definition of an uninsured motor vehicle.
Finally, the majority assumes that the committee or legislature considered and adopted the interpretation of hit-and-run set forth by this court in Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969). The majority’s use of Amidzich is unconvincing for several reasons. First, there is no reference to this case in the Drafting File or in the Laws Revision Committee’s minutes or taped proceedings. The court in Amidzich interpreted the term “hit-and-run” which was explicitly defined in the insurance policy to require physical contact. The Amidzich court interpreted the uninsured motorist statute as not requiring coverage of any unidentified vehicles — whether or not there was physical contact — Since the insured could not prove that the unidentified vehicle was uninsured. No reliance should, however, be placed on this aspect of Amidzich since the uninsured motorist statute was amended in 1979 to require coverage in accidents with unidentified hit-and-run vehicles.

 The following cases found the fraud argument unpersuasive: Montoya v. Dairyland Insurance Company, 394 P. Supp. 1337 (D. N.M. 1975); Farmers Insurance Exchange v. McDermott, 34 Colo. App. 305, 527 P.2d 918 (1974); Abramowicz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 A.2d 691, 693 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), aff'd 386 A.2d 670 (Del. 1978); Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Company, 249 So. 2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1971); DeMello v. First Insurance Company of Hawaii, Ltd., 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d 304, 308 (1974) ; Soule v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 595, 364 A.2d 883 (1976); Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 270 N.W.2d 26 (S.D. 1978); Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 83 Wash. 2d 576, 520 P.2d 1368 (1974).
The following cases found the fraud argument persuasive: Inter-Ins. Exch. of Auto. Club of So. Calif, v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 446, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965); Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 58 Ill. 2d 109, 317 N.E.2d 550, 552 (1974).

 See Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice secs. 5094, 5095, at 405, 414 (1981); Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, sec. 2.41 (1969) (1981 Supp.); Collins, The Uninsured Motorist Statute and the Phantom Vehicle: A View from the Southwest, 43 Ins. Counsel J. 358, 360, 367-69 (1976). Compare Case Note, Insurance, Automobile — Nebraska Supreme Court Upholds the Physical Contact Requirement for Phantom Vehicle Statutes Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 11 Creighton L. Rev. 222 (1977).

 See cases cited in note 7 supra.

 State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Lambert, 285 So. 2d 917 (Ala. 1973); Halseth v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1978).

 The word “means” “excludes any meaning that is not stated.” Wis. Bankers Ass’n v. Mut. Savings & Loan, 96 Wis. 2d 438, 446, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980).

 In Milwaukee Gas Light. Co. v. Dept. of Taxation, 23 Wis. 2d 196, 203, 204, 127 N.W.2d 64 (1964), this court interpreted the word “including” to mean “classifying that which follows as being a component part of the whole.” While noting that on occasion “including” had been read to mean “the only thing included,” this court stated that to interpret the word “including” “as being a word of limitation or restriction would be to accord it the exceptional rather than the commonly accepted meaning.” See also Schlukebier v. Arlington Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 480, 484, 99 N.W.2d 706 (1969).

 It is clear that the use of the word “includes” in see. 632.32 (4) (a) 2, rather than the word “means,” was purposeful. Sec. *97632.32(2) (a), (b) and (c) sets forth definitions which use either “includes” or “means.”