Court Opinion

ID: 9762182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:14:59.718743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:31.495695
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION BY
BOWES, J.:
¶ 1 Although I concur with the result reached by the majority and join in its well-reasoned analysis of Appellants’ fraudulent nondisclosure claim, I write separately to clarify my position regarding Appellants’ contention that they should be allowed to offer parol evidence of the realtor’s alleged oral misrepresentation concerning the condition of the property.
¶ 2 As a preliminary matter, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Appellants’ complaint lacks specificity because it does not describe how Ms. Knight “indicated” that there were no problems with the subject property. This Court has observed that in order to comply with Pa. R.C.P. 1019(b), which states that “[a]ver-ments of fraud ... shall be averred with particularity,” the plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. See McGinn v. Valloti, 363 Pa.Super. 88, 525 A.2d 732 (1987). In my view, Appellants’ complaint satisfies Rule. 1019(b) because the allegation that Ms. Knight advised Appellants that there were no problems with the property was sufficient to permit Appellees to prepare a defense.
¶ 3 Turning to the merits of Appellants’ substantive argument, the majority correctly observes that Appellants seek to invoke the “real estate inspection” exception to the parol evidence rule, which originated in LeDonne v. Kessler, 256 Pa.Super. 280, 389 A.2d 1123 (1978). In that case, the plaintiffs purchased a house and subsequently instituted an action in trespass against the sellers, asserting that they had agreed to buy the home in reliance upon the sellers’ fraudulent misrepresentations that the septic system had been repaired and that the sundeck and cellar had no leaks. The plaintiffs further alleged that shortly after they moved into the house, the septic system malfunctioned and the sundeck and the cellar began to leak water, damaging numerous items of personal property.
¶4 The sellers filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and requested summary judgment, arguing that the parol evidence rule barred the plaintiffs from prosecuting the action. Specifically, the sellers asserted that the plaintiffs could not prevail because the sixth paragraph of the agreement of sale provided, “The parties have full knowledge of the physical appearance of the land and buildings and of the value thereof and there are no verbal representations as to *553character or quality.” Id. at 1126. The trial court interpreted this language “as a complete integration clause which barred testimony of all oral representations concerning the ... transaction,” id. at 1129, and granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers.
¶ 5 When the plaintiffs appealed, this Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, reasoning that the language cited by the trial court “only deni[ed] the existence of verbal representations as to the character or quality of land and building conditions reasonably apparent from an inspection of the premises.” Id. (emphasis added). Consistent with that view, we held that the plaintiffs were precluded from offering testimony regarding “pre-agreement representations concerning the quality and condition of the sundeck and cellar” because there was evidence that the plaintiffs visually inspected those areas before signing the agreement, and they detected signs of water leakage. Id. at 1130. However, with respect to the septic system, we concluded that the plaintiffs could sustain their cause of action based on the following rationale:
Because the septic system was underground, [the plaintiffs] could not have possessed full knowledge of its physical appearance and adequacy and could not have readily ascertained whether a drainage problem existed. They observed a purported drainage field, but this observation would not reasonably put them on notice that the subterranean septic system still malfunctioned. Indeed, the opposite inference would be more logical. Because [the plaintiffs] could not discern through visual inspection alone the existence of the septic system problem of which they now complain, the wording of paragraph six does not bar the admission of evidence of [the sellers’] alleged misrepresentations concerning septic system problems.
Id. at 1129 (citations omitted).
¶ 6 In the case at bar, Appellants suggest that they, like the plaintiffs in Le-Donne, should be permitted to submit evidence of the pre-contractual representation allegedly made by Ms. Knight because a visual inspection of the property would not have revealed the latent defect in the sewage system. However, the agreement of sale provided that Appellants agreed to purchase the property without relying “upon any representation made by the Seller ... or by any Agent [of the Seller] .... ” Agreement of Sale, 7/17/01, at 2. Moreover, the agreement contained an integration clause, and it provided that Appellants agreed to purchase the property in its “present condition,” Id. Thus, the present case is clearly distinguishable from LeDonne, supra, since the contract herein unequivocally stated that Appellants were not buying the property in reliance upon any prior representations concerning the condition of the property. Consequently, I reach the same result as the majority because the agreement of sale specifically addressed the issue at hand. Therefore, Appellants cannot introduce parol evidence to modify or void the terms of the agreement. Accord HCB Contractors v. Liberty Place Hotel Associates, 539 Pa. 395, 652 A.2d 1278 (1995) (builder could not offer parol evidence to modify or supersede terms of written, integrated contract because builder’s claims related to subjects that were specifically addressed in contract).