Court Opinion

ID: 9859811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:42:37.611119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:07:28.954920
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Arterburn, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion. On January 19, 1974 the bodies of Elizabeth Carter and her infant son were found in the burned remains of their home in Michigan City, Indiana. Later examination of the body of Mrs. Carter revealed that she had died of a .22 caliber gunshot wound inflicted prior to the fire.
Police were led to the Appellant through investigation of a .22 caliber revolver which was later determined to be the murder weapon. The Appellant was 16 years old, home on parole from the Indiana Boys School. He lived with his family some 150 feet across the street from the decedent’s home.
The majority opinion relies on the right of a juvenile to consult with his parent or guardian before waiving his rights under Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138. As in Hall v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584, I think that this court is placing too much emphasis on the technicalities of procedure and not enough on the substantive question of whether a confession was intelligently and voluntarily made.
The majority first speculates that police were aware of the Appellant’s “limited communicative skills” and limited means. What is really being said is that this young man was mentally defective to the extent that he was taken advantage *70of when he was taken into custody. Psychiatric testimony at' trial did establish that the mentality of the Appellant was “mild or borderline defective.” However, that same testimony concluded that the Appellant could understand his rights if they were explained in sufficiently simple terms. It is uncontradicted that the Appellant’s rights were explained to him on several occasions in terms simpler than the written form which was signed by the Appellant. On-each occasion the Appellant acknowledged that he understood those rights.
It should also be pointed out that the Appellant completed his education through the eighth grade. This was considered an adequate education not many years ago. This young man was considered to be of sufficient mental capability to be placed at large on parole.
The Appellant was originally held in the Juvenile Detention facilities of the police department upon the orders of his parole officer, James Howard. The initial interrogation occurred on February 18, 1974, from about 11:20 a.m. until 1:15 p.m. The Appellant’s uncle was present during this questioning. No information of. importance was received by police at this time.
The Appellant was again questioned on February 19, 1974, at approximately 1:40 p.m. The majority opinion concludes that the final interrogation of the Appellant was a continuation of this 1:40 p.m. session. The record reveals, however, that the Appellant was questioned for only five or ten minutes. He denied knowledge of the crimes of which he was suspected and was returned to Juvenile Detention.
■ The last' interrogation of the Appellant was at 4:40 p.m. that same day. His mother, who had been working during the earlier interrogation, was then present. She and her son were once more advised of his Miranda rights. The Appellant acknowledged that he understood them. His mother’s signature as a witness surely is the most impartial evidence of this acknowledgment. I do not think that this signature *71necessarily “obfuscates” her role of advisor to her son. Who would be a better witness? It was from subsequent questioning that the Appellant’s admission of guilt resulted. At approximately 7:02 p.m. a statement was typed and simultaneously tape recorded. This tape was heard by the trial court.
The record in this case fails to reveal a single fact which shows any threats of force used against this young man. Police officers and parole officers were no strangers to him. There is no showing that they intimidated him in any fashion. His mother, and his uncle, admonished the Appellant to tell the truth. This the majority seems to think of some significance to prove that this Appellant was taken advantage of. One need only ask what better advice can a mother (or uncle) give to a son (or nephew) ? The purpose of consultation with a parent or guardian is not to suppress the truth.
Indeed, an investigation and trial are for the purpose of seeking the truth. I can find nothing in the facts of this case to show that anything other than the truth was presented. The mere fact that' one confesses is not in itself proof of threats or coercion. This young man was not a person of “tender age” and information. The trial judge weighed the evidence of voluntariness in this case and we have no right to reweigh it on appeal.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Givan, C.J., concurs.
NOTE. — Reported at 351 N.E.2d 30.