Court Opinion

ID: 9652529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:25:27.449309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:52.145040
License: Public Domain

PALLADINO, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The majority’s interpretation of the reasonable excuse provision contained in the six month notice requirement of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522 is contrary to the law of this commonwealth, Ramon1 and Yurechko2 notwithstanding.
In the case of In re Vacation of Portion of Dorney Park, 503 Pa. 67, 468 A.2d 462 (1983), the supreme court upheld a trial court’s refusal to permit a nunc pro tunc *359appeal which was filed eleven days after the established time for filing the appeal, holding that:
Where an act of assembly fixes the time within which an act must be done, as for example an appeal taken, courts have no power to extend it, or to allow the act to be done at a later day, as a matter of indulgence. Something more than mere hardship is necessary to justify an extension of time, or its equivalent, an allowance of the act nunc pro tunc____
Id., 503 Pa. at 72, 468 A.2d 465 (citation omitted) (quoting Wise v. Cambridge Springs Borough, 262 Pa. 139, 142-143, 104 A. 863, 864 (1918)). “The commands of a statute cannot be waived or dispensed with by a court.” Wise, 262 Pa. at 143, 104 A. at 864 (emphasis added). This is the effect of the majority opinion; it waives the six month notice requirement.
The statute in question in this case is clear and unambiguous: failure to meet the six month requirement is excused only upon “a showing of reasonable excuse”. When this court first addressed this section we held that “a government unit need not show that it was prejudiced by lack of timely notice. The statute imports no such requirement." Graffigna v. City of Philadelphia, 98 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 624, 630, 512 A.2d 91, 94 (1986) (emphasis added). The majority’s interpretation eviscerates the six month notice requirement. Under the majority’s view all a petitioner needs to show is lack of knowledge of the notice requirement, and then the burden shifts to the government entity to show prejudice, a factor which this court has previously said is not required. I can see no reason for holding that ignorance alone is a sufficient reason to excuse compliance with a statutory mandate. If mere ignorance were sufficient, the legislature would have worded the statute differently.
Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on Yurechko and Ramon is misplaced. Yurechko was not interpreting the statute in question, but rather the Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2547, formerly 53 P.S. § 5301, repealed by the Act of April *36028, 1978, P.L. 202. This statute was applicable only to municipalities, not commonwealth agencies. In addition, Yurechko was decided during that period of time when the courts were slowly chipping away at the judicial doctrine of governmental immunity, but had not yet abrogated the doctrine completely. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). After the supreme court abolished both governmental and sovereign immunity, Ayala; Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978), the legislature in this state took action to reaffirm the doctrines of immunity which had existed as judicial doctrines and established limited causes of action against the commonwealth and municipalities. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8501-8564. The courts of this state have repeatedly held that the statute holding commonwealth parties and municipalities liable for torts is an exception to the absolute rule of immunity and must be strictly construed, in favor of the governmental party. See Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987); Gallagher v. Bureau of Correction, 118 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 516, 545 A.2d 981 (1988); Davidow v. Anderson, 83 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 86, 476 A.2d 998 (1984). The six month filing requirement, being part of the act reestablishing sovereign immunity, must also be strictly construed. Applying the holding and reasoning of Yurechko to the case now before the court is an application of a case out of context, and constitutes a failure of the majority to abide by the mandate of this court and the supreme court to strictly construe the exceptions to the absolute rule of sovereign immunity.
Ramon is also inapplicable to this case. Ramon is limited to those instances where there is both ignorance of the law and the inability to understand the law. In the present case the Appellant has, at most, only shown an ignorance of the law. Appellant has not shown that English is not her native language, or that her intelligence is such that the plain words of the statute are incomprehensi*361ble. Accordingly, the necessary factors for the application of Ramon are not present.
Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court.

. Ramon v. Department of Transportation, 124 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 416, 556 A.2d 919 (1989).

. Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 243 A.2d 372 (1968).