Court Opinion

ID: 9958349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 22:04:23.561316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:12.913739
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220818
            NOTICE
 Decision filed 04/08/24. The
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0818
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for
                                               IN THE
 Rehearing or the disposition of
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

DAVID J. FLETCHER, M.D.,                        )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )     Macon County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 11-L-64
                                                )
EDWARD F. FLYNN and WINTERS,                    )
FEATHERSTUN, GAUMER, POSTLEWAIT,                )
STOCKS & FLYNN,                                 )     Honorable
                                                )     James R. Glenn,
      Defendants-Appellees.                     )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
         Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

                                           OPINION

¶1       The plaintiff, David J. Fletcher, brought a legal malpractice action against the defendants,

Edward F. Flynn and Winters, Featherstun, Gaumer, Postlewait, Stocks & Flynn (collectively,

Flynn), alleging that Flynn failed to provide proper legal advice and services in relation to the

plaintiff’s real estate development project in Macon County, Illinois. Following a trial, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of Flynn. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motion for

a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the plaintiff claims

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because

the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to Flynn, so overwhelming favored the

plaintiff that no contrary verdict could ever stand. We affirm.

                                                  1
¶2                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶3      The plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against Flynn and his law firm on September

28, 2010. 1 In the second amended complaint, filed September 12, 2019, 2 the plaintiff alleged that

he retained Flynn in November 2004 to provide legal advice and services in regard to a proposed

homeowners’ subdivision development in Mt. Zion, Illinois, and at the time of the engagement,

Flynn knew the plaintiff had no experience in real estate development. The plaintiff further alleged

that Flynn breached his duty of care to the plaintiff in, among other things, failing to advise the

plaintiff to incorporate his real estate development project to limit his potential legal liability and

failing to investigate and advise the plaintiff about the legal implications of a pipeline easement

running through the property, including potential restrictions on subdividing and building on the

property. 3 The plaintiff claimed that he sustained economic losses proximately caused by Flynn’s

negligence, including diminution in property value, costs to resurvey the property, lost opportunity

costs, and legal fees to defend himself in a lawsuit by the development’s homeowners’ association.

In his answer, Flynn denied the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence. Flynn filed affirmative

defenses, alleging plaintiff’s contributory negligence, comparative negligence, failure to mitigate

his damages, as well as negligence by nonparties.

¶4      The trial began September 19, 2022, and ended on September 27, 2022. During the seven-

day trial, the jury heard testimony from the parties and their occurrence and expert witnesses, and

        1
           The plaintiff’s case was originally filed in Champaign County and subsequently transferred to
Macon County pursuant to Flynn’s forum non conveniens motion.
         2
           The second amended complaint included a count alleging breach of oral contract (count II). The
plaintiff dismissed the contract claim at the close of the proofs at trial, and the jury considered only the
count for legal malpractice during deliberations.
         3
           The plaintiff also alleged that Flynn failed to supervise an experienced associate attorney in his
firm and failed to supervise the engineer who prepared and recorded a defective plat of the subdivision;
however, those claims have not been raised in this appeal.
                                                     2
they viewed numerous documents. An overview of the evidence 4 pertinent to the two points on

appeal follows.

¶5                                A. The Real Estate Development

¶6      At the time of these events, the plaintiff was a licensed physician specializing in

occupational medicine. In 1991, the plaintiff purchased 133 acres of a property that would become

part of a real estate development called “Woodbine Park Prairie Estates” (Woodbine). The

Woodbine property is situated between Fort Daniel Conservation Area and Spitler Woods Park in

Macon County, Illinois. Prior to the purchase, the plaintiff did extensive research into the property.

He learned that the property had a rich history and that it was a key environmental corridor with

wetlands, lakes, and woodlands. Prior to the purchase, the plaintiff also obtained title insurance.

The title policy disclosed the existence of a natural gas pipeline easement. At the time, the plaintiff

was not concerned about the easement because he did not anticipate developing the property. The

plaintiff reviewed the easement document and noted that the easement had been granted to

Panhandle Illinois Pipeline Company (Panhandle) on December 17, 1930. He also noted that the

easement document did not identify or define any restrictions. The plaintiff asked one of his former

        4
          Although the trial transcript is voluminous, the plaintiff’s statement of facts in his opening brief is
a single page. The statement of facts contains a sparse summary of the plaintiff’s allegations of negligence
and the defendants’ answer and affirmative defenses, and it identifies the dates of trial proceedings, the date
on which the verdict it was returned, the date the plaintiff filed his motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the date that motion was denied, and the date the notice of appeal was filed. Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires the appellant to provide a cogent statement of the facts
necessary to an understanding of the case, without argument and with appropriate references to the record
on appeal. The plaintiff’s statement of facts fails to acquaint this court with any factual background relative
to the issue on appeal. The rules of procedure regarding appellate briefs are rules, not mere suggestions;
and it is within the discretion of the reviewing court to strike a brief and dismiss the appeal for failure to
comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure. Venturella v. Dreyfuss, 2017 IL App (1st) 160565,
¶¶ 22-23. Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 341(h)(6) does not preclude our review.
The issues raised on appeal are defined and each party has included citations to the trial testimony and
exhibits in support of their respective arguments. Accordingly, we will review the merits of the appeal,
while cautioning plaintiff’s counsel to comply with the rules of procedure in the future.
                                                       3
attorneys to do some research into the easement, but there is no testimony regarding the nature or

result of that research.

¶7      Following the purchase of the initial tract in 1991, the plaintiff began to clear the property

of abandoned cars and other debris. He also worked to restore the wetlands and reintroduce native

plants and grasses on the property. In 2000, the plaintiff purchased the remainder of the Woodbine

property. Over the next few years, the plaintiff continued the restoration work on the property.

¶8      Sometime in early 2003, the plaintiff began to explore the idea of developing the property

into a residential community governed by a homeowners’ association. He wanted to maintain the

“environmental mission” of the property while obtaining a return on his investment. The plaintiff

testified that he did not have any experience in real estate law or development and that he did not

understand how the pipeline might affect his proposed development. Before obtaining legal

counsel, the plaintiff contacted Panhandle to inquire about the pipeline easement and discuss his

development plan.

¶9      In a letter dated March 31, 2003, Panhandle provided a written response to the plaintiff’s

inquiry (the Panhandle letter). Panhandle informed the plaintiff that it had an “open” easement and

that it operated a 22-inch high-pressure natural gas pipeline across the northwest section of the

property. Panhandle stated that the boundaries of its easement included a 50-foot-wide strip on

each side of the pipeline and that no permanent structures could be erected or placed in the

easement area. Forbidden structures included storm drains, catch basis, fire hydrants, sign boards,

supports, brace poles, and telephone or power line poles. Panhandle also advised that any roads,

driveways, and utilities must cross the pipeline at right angles, and that road crossings must have

a minimum cover of 36” between the top of the pipeline and the bottom of the pavement. Proposed

street intersections and cul-de-sac areas were to be located outside the easement area, and no trees

                                                  4
or shrubs could be placed on the easement. Panhandle required the proposed site plan to

incorporate and accurately scale the location and depth of the pipeline and to include a warning

regarding the location of the pipeline. Panhandle requested copies of the preliminary development

plan and indicated that all planned construction or modifications to the construction design would

require preapproval by Panhandle. Panhandle indicated that it would send representatives out to

mark the location of the pipeline and the outer edges of the easement, and it provided contact

information for its representatives. In addition, Panhandle enclosed four development-planning

documents, entitled “General Requirements for Construction in the Vicinity of Panhandle’s

Pipeline or Easement,” “Easement Restrictions and Requirements,” “Right of Way Amended

Requirements,” and “How to Recognize and What to do about a Gas Leak.”

¶ 10   In 2004, the plaintiff hired a local engineering company to perform a feasibility study on

the project. The study was never completed because the company required the plaintiff to hire the

company for the engineering work and to retain a real estate development attorney for the project.

¶ 11   In November 2004, the plaintiff retained Flynn to provide legal advice and services related

to the Woodbine development. The plaintiff had an ongoing professional relationship with Flynn

and his firm, and he was aware that Flynn had experience in real estate development. The plaintiff

described himself as “a complete rookie,” who had no experience in real estate development and

who needed a lot of “handholding.” He testified that he hired Flynn to handle “all aspects” of the

real estate development. The legal work included taking all necessary actions to limit the plaintiff’s

personal liability related to his role as developer of the property, advising the plaintiff about any

encroachments that could affect his ability to subdivide the property for sale to future homeowners,

and preparing an owners’ declaration document that set forth the rights and obligations of the

developer and the homeowners. The plaintiff testified that “in his mind, as the client,” he believed

                                                  5
the scope of representation was “all-encompassing” and “open ended” to ensure the project was

successful. The plaintiff acknowledged that there was no written engagement letter or other

document memorializing the agreed-upon representation.

¶ 12   In November 2004, the plaintiff also hired Phillip Cochran as a surveyor and engineer to

analyze the property and determine what could be built on it given the existing flood plain and

waterways. The plaintiff knew that Cochran and Flynn had worked together on several projects.

He hired Cochran based upon Flynn’s recommendation. The plaintiff testified that he notified

Cochran about the pipeline easement and that Cochran indicated he would investigate it. The

plaintiff also testified that he provided a copy of the Panhandle letter to Cochran and Flynn. At

this time, the plaintiff was still considering whether to develop the Woodbine property or sell it as

a whole. The plaintiff knew that the Woodbine development would require rezoning and approval

from certain governmental agencies and that the project was not a “done deal.”

¶ 13   In March 2005, Cochran prepared a preliminary development plan for the Woodbine

property and sent it to the plaintiff. On April 25, 2004, the plaintiff sent an e-mail addressed to

Cochran, with a copy to Flynn. In the e-mail, the plaintiff indicated that he reviewed the plan and

had three “minor” concerns, only one of which involved the pipeline easement. The plaintiff’s

concern was that proposed lots 33 and 34 were adjacent to the easement and there was no driveway

to access those lots from Fletcher Lane. Three weeks later, Cochran sent the plaintiff a revised

plan reflecting a driveway that would provide access to lots 33 and 34 from Fletcher Lane. The

plaintiff testified that he had several conversations with Cochran about the pipeline easement and

that Cochran thought that the northwest corner lots could be developed and that a road could be

constructed to provide access to those lots.

                                                 6
¶ 14   In June 2005, Cochran created a plat that included 43 individual lots along with a defined

common area consisting of wetlands, lakes, walking trails, and a private road system. The common

area was to be conveyed to and maintained by a soon-to-be formed homeowners’ association. On

June 30, 2005, Cochran presented the plaintiff’s development plan to the Village of Long Creek

and the plan was approved. In the meantime, Flynn had completed the original owners’ declaration

document. The plaintiff signed that document on August 3, 2005. The plat and the owners’

declaration were recorded in Macon County that same day.

¶ 15   During the latter part of 2005, the plaintiff decided to develop the Woodbine property in

two phases to limit his initial financial outlay for infrastructure costs. Phase I included the common

areas depicted in the June 2005 plat and the property south of the common areas. It was subdivided

into 32 lots. The pipeline did not interfere with the development of those lots. Phase II involved

the acreage north of the common areas, identified as Lot 33. The long-term plan was to subdivide

Lot 33 into eight smaller lots for sale to individual homeowners.

¶ 16   On September 23, 2006, the plaintiff sent an e-mail addressed to Flynn and Cochran. The

plaintiff advised them that Phase I was nearly complete and that all of the infrastructure was in

place. The plaintiff stated that he intended to proceed with Phase II and get the county board to

approve the project. The plaintiff indicated that he needed Cochran’s “input and work with the

pipeline people” regarding “where and how to construct a private driveway for lots 33 to 35” on

the northwest part of the property. The plaintiff testified that though he directed his inquiry to

Cochran, he expected Flynn, as his attorney, to investigate and make sure the plaintiff could

proceed.

¶ 17   Over the next few years, the Woodbine development was beset with problems. The newly

formed Woodbine Park Prairie Estates Homeowners’ Association (Woodbine HOA) and

                                                  7
individual homeowners objected to the lack of a legal description of the common areas in the

owners’ declaration, and the plaintiff agreed to several amendments to address those objections.

At the plaintiff’s direction, Flynn prepared amended versions of the owners’ declaration. The

Woodbine HOA also objected to the plaintiff’s failure to convey the common areas in the time

promised. In addition, material defects were identified in the plats prepared by Cochran. The

plaintiff directed Cochran to complete a proper survey and legal description of the common area

and to correct the defects so that the common area could be conveyed to the Woodbine HOA. In

October 2008, Cochran provided a corrected plat and survey. The plaintiff then attempted to

convey the common areas, but the Woodbine HOA refused to accept the conveyance.

¶ 18   On October 13, 2008, the plaintiff terminated Flynn’s services on the Woodbine

development. Thereafter, the plaintiff became involved in additional litigation regarding the

development. In October 2009, the Woodbine HOA filed a lawsuit against the plaintiff. The suit

alleged that the plaintiff failed to deliver the common area in a timely fashion and that he failed to

meet Illinois Department of Transportation specifications for the design and construction of the

roads, bridges, and culverts in the development. The plaintiff brought an action against individual

members of the Woodbine HOA. The plaintiff also filed a lawsuit against Cochran and ultimately

settled the case for $550,000.

¶ 19                             B. The Litigation Against Flynn

¶ 20   In September 2010, the plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against Flynn. As noted

earlier, the plaintiff alleged that Flynn failed to advise him to incorporate the Woodbine

development and failed to investigate and advise him about the effect of the pipeline easement on

the Woodbine development. During his testimony, the plaintiff stated that he did not have any

discussions with Flynn about whether the Woodbine development should be placed under a

                                                  8
corporate entity. The plaintiff testified that he did not know about the potential pitfalls of real estate

development, and he did not realize the extent of the risk to himself as an individual. The plaintiff

admitted, however, that he was aware that there had been a drowning accident in one of the lakes

prior to his purchase of the property and that he had concerns about that type of liability. The

plaintiff also admitted that he was aware of the option of incorporating a business, having created

limited liability companies for businesses in December 2002 and January 2004. He also

acknowledged that he had incorporated his medical practice into a limited liability company in

January 2005, based upon the advice of an attorney. The plaintiff explained that as a “stand-alone”

practitioner, he had a lot of risks. He sought to limit his risks as a medical provider and as an

employer.

¶ 21    The plaintiff testified that he had several conversations with Flynn about the pipeline

easement. The plaintiff stated that he asked Flynn to investigate the easement and advise him of

any restrictions. He testified that he documented his requests, and he referred to the e-mail dated

April 25, 2004, and the e-mail dated September 23, 2006, as evidence of his request. The plaintiff

“believed” he provided a copy of the Panhandle letter to Flynn. He could not recall when he

provided the letter to Flynn, and he could not recall having any conversations about its contents.

The plaintiff described the pipeline easement as a “major” issue. He was concerned about street

access to the most desirable part of property—the northwest corner lots of the Woodbine property.

The plaintiff claimed that Flynn indicated that he would investigate the matter, and that Flynn

never looked into the restrictions on development and whether it would be feasible to build a road

over the easement.

¶ 22    During cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted that he knew of the existence of the

pipeline and the easement before he retained Flynn. Based upon his correspondence with

                                                    9
Panhandle, the plaintiff knew that he could not build on the pipeline easement, including 50 feet

on either side of the pipeline. The plaintiff admitted that the pipeline easement was not the only

issue affecting the development of Phase II. He acknowledged that the land was partially on a

floodplain and that a bridge that provided access to the lots in Phase II had washed out.

¶ 23   The plaintiff blamed both Flynn and Cochran for failing to investigate the pipeline

easement in connection with the Phase II development.

       “I placed the blame on both gentlemen. They didn’t investigate the easement. They never

       got a title policy. They never had communication with the Pipeline. They never got any

       permission to put the road that they have on the preliminary plat and the final plat that was

       approved by the Village of Long Creek to be able to do that. They didn’t get any of the

       documents. They didn’t challenge what the significance of the easement was. I know what

       the Pipeline says, but you hire professionals to interpret that and represent you and that’s

       what I did.”

¶ 24   Flynn was called as an adverse witness in the plaintiff’s case, and he also testified in his

own defense. Flynn stated that he was hired to perform specific tasks. He identified those tasks as

applying for rezoning of the property, preparing the owners’ declaration and later revisions of the

document, and forming a homeowners’ association. He also assisted the plaintiff with the sale of

a few lots. Flynn testified that he knew of the pipeline easement. Flynn also testified that the

plaintiff never gave him a copy of the Panhandle letter and never asked him to contact Panhandle

or investigate the pipeline easement.

¶ 25   Flynn also addressed the claim that he failed to recommend incorporation of the Woodbine

development. Flynn testified that sometime between November 2004 and March 2005, he told the

plaintiff that he did not think the Woodbine development was a good and prudent business for the

                                                10
plaintiff. Flynn suggested that the plaintiff partner with a professional real estate developer or sell

the entire property to a reputable developer. During a subsequent meeting, the plaintiff informed

Flynn that he intended to proceed as the sole developer. At that point, Flynn advised the plaintiff

that he needed to consider whether to incorporate. Flynn testified that he discussed the pros and

cons of incorporation with the plaintiff. He explained why some developers decide to incorporate

while others do not. Flynn advised the plaintiff to think about it and to let him know what the

plaintiff decided. Flynn was asked whether he committed legal malpractice in his representation

of the plaintiff on the Woodbine project. Flynn declined to offer an opinion. He explained that he

had answered the questions regarding the facts of what had occurred, that he was not testifying as

an expert, and that the ultimate determination was for the jury.

¶ 26   Cochran testified that he was the engineer and the surveyor for the Woodbine project. In

that position, Cochran was responsible for preparing a development plan, the plats, and the “metes

and bounds” legal description of the property. Cochran testified that during a walk around

Woodbine in 2004, he informed the plaintiff that there could be restrictions on building structures

near the pipeline. Cochran testified that questions regarding restrictions on building around an

easement are for an engineer, not a lawyer. Cochran testified that the plaintiff never gave him a

copy of the Panhandle letter. Cochran acknowledged that he had been sued in relation to his work

on the project and that he settled the case for $550,000.

¶ 27   Thomas Overmyer was the plaintiff’s expert in civil engineering. Overmyer testified that

he was initially hired to do some work on the Woodbine development in 2016 and that he was later

retained as an expert witness for the lawsuit. When he was originally hired to work on the

Woodbine project, one of his first tasks was to obtain title work. Overmyer acknowledged that at

the time he was hired, the plaintiff did not provide him with a copy of the Panhandle letter.

                                                  11
Overmyer recalled receiving a copy of the letter a few years after he was hired for the project. In

his capacity as an engineering expert, Overmyer testified that surveyors prepare plats and locate

easements that might affect property developments, that surveyors and engineers prepare legal

descriptions for property, and that engineers determine the “buildability” of property. He reviewed

the plat that Cochran prepared in 2005 and opined that the plat did not correctly depict the pipeline

easement. He further opined that three of the lots in Phase II of the development were not buildable

due to the pipeline easement and the topography of the land. Overmyer also testified about the real

estate development lawyer’s responsibilities as compared to engineers and surveyors. Overmyer

acknowledged that he was not a lawyer and that he did not know what the “standard of care” was

for Illinois lawyers.

¶ 28    Kevin Luebchow testified as the plaintiff’s legal expert. Luebchow testified that he is a

licensed attorney in Illinois. He has a “transactional practice,” primarily focused focusing on real

estate transactions and estate planning. Luebchow reviewed the depositions of the parties and other

witnesses, the pleadings, Flynn’s billing records, and the documents related to the Woodbine

development. Luebchow testified that he did not find any documents indicating that Flynn advised

the plaintiff to incorporate. He opined that Flynn’s failure to advise the plaintiff to incorporate the

Woodbine development was a breach of the standard of care for a practicing attorney in Illinois.

Luebchow testified that this was a “prime case” for setting up a limited liability company because

the development involved several lots, the client was required to make a significant financial outlay

for infrastructure, the client was not a professional developer, and the client had significant assets

outside of the real estate venture. Luebchow also testified that a real estate attorney has a duty to

investigate an easement that could restrict development and that Flynn’s failure to do so was a

breach of the standard of care. Luebchow testified that a real estate attorney had the responsibility

                                                  12
to advise the developer as to what restrictions are created by the easement and that the surveyor or

engineer has the responsibility to tell the developer whether there is enough room to build.

¶ 29    During cross-examination, Luebchow admitted that this was the first time he had testified

as an expert in a legal malpractice case. Luebchow acknowledged that he was not present at the

meeting between the plaintiff and Flynn and that he did not know what Flynn said to the plaintiff

in regard to incorporation. Luebchow agreed that the plaintiff knew about the Panhandle pipeline

easement and that he had some knowledge about the building restrictions on the easement prior to

retaining Flynn.

¶ 30    The plaintiff presented short excerpts from the testimony of Flynn’s withdrawn legal expert

witness, Michael Firsel. In one excerpt, Firsel testified that he “generally” agreed with the

proposition that it would be prudent for a person who derives their main source of income from a

field unrelated to real estate development to create a corporation or LLC for the purpose of

developing real estate. In another excerpt in which he responded to a hypothetical question, Firsel

testified that he would have explained the benefits and detriments of incorporation to a client such

as the plaintiff and then recommended that the client protect himself with some sort of corporate

entity. In a third excerpt, Firsel testified that in matters of incorporation, the lawyer has “a duty to

the client to explain the various options available to the client and the ramifications of making

decisions on each of those various options, and that the question of whether to incorporate is a

decision for the client to make.

¶ 31    On September 27, 2022, following seven days of testimony, the jury returned a verdict in

favor of Flynn. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a posttrial motion for a judgment notwithstanding

the verdict. The plaintiff asked the trial court to enter a judgment in his favor as to liability and

                                                  13
order a new trial on damages. The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and this appeal

followed.

¶ 32                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 33   On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying his posttrial motion

for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The plaintiff claims that he was entitled to a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict because he presented unrefuted evidence that Flynn failed to

investigate and advise him of the legal implications of a pipeline easement running through the

property, including potential restrictions on development, and failed to advise him to incorporate

his real estate development project into a corporate entity to limit potential legal liability. As for

relief, the plaintiff asks this court to set aside the judgment on the jury’s verdict, enter a judgment

for the plaintiff on liability, and remand the case for a new trial on damages.

¶ 34   In analyzing this issue, we are reminded of the differing responsibilities of the jury, the

trial court, and the appellate court. The jury has the responsibility to resolve conflicts in the

evidence, to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight should be given to

the testimony. Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1992). The trial court cannot reweigh the

evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or

conclusions or because the court feels that another result is more reasonable. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at

452. Similarly, the appellate court should not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its

judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from evidence that did not

greatly preponderate either way. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 452-53.

¶ 35   Here, the plaintiff is appealing the denial of his motion for judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. It is important to note that the standards related to a motion for a new trial and a motion

for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are distinct. See Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co.,

                                                  14
37 Ill. 2d 494, 509-10 (1967). In ruling on a motion for a new trial, the court weighs the evidence

and may set aside a verdict and order a new trial if the verdict is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 454. The court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is reviewed under

the abuse-of-discretion standard. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455.

¶ 36   In contrast, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict presents a question of law

as to whether, when all of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom are considered in a

light most favorable to the nonmovant, there is a total failure or lack of evidence to prove any

necessary element of a party’s case or defense. Lawlor v. North American Corp. of Illinois, 2012

IL 112530, ¶ 37. In ruling on a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a court does

not weigh the evidence, nor is it concerned with the credibility of the witnesses; rather it may only

consider the evidence, and any inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party

resisting the motion. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453.

¶ 37   A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only where all of the evidence,

when viewed in a light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that

no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Pedrick, 37 Ill. 2d at 510. The standard

for entering a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is a high one, and its entry is not appropriate

if reasonable minds can differ as to the inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.

Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics & Sports Medicine, S.C., 2021 IL 125150, ¶ 34; Pasquale v. Speed

Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 351 (1995). A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not

proper “if there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom,

demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses

or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome.” Maple, 151 Ill. 2d

at 454. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be entered merely because a verdict is

                                                   15
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 453. A ruling on a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict is reviewed de novo. Steed, 2021 IL 125150, ¶ 34.

¶ 38   To prevail on a claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must plead and prove the existence

of an attorney-client relationship that establishes a duty on the part of the attorney, a negligent act

or omission constituting a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and actual damages. Northern

Illinois Emergency Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 216 Ill. 2d 294, 306 (2005).

The injury resulting from legal malpractice is not a personal injury, but rather a pecuniary injury

to an intangible property interest caused by the lawyer’s negligence. Northern Illinois Emergency

Physicians, 216 Ill. 2d at 306; Eastman v. Messner, 188 Ill. 2d 404, 411 (1999). That an attorney

may have breached a duty of care is not, in itself, sufficient to sustain the client’s cause of action,

and therefore the client must demonstrate that the attorney’s negligence proximately caused actual

damages to the client. Northern Illinois Emergency Physicians, 216 Ill. 2d at 306-07.

¶ 39   In this case, the plaintiff initially claims that he is entitled to a judgment notwithstanding

the verdict because he presented unrefuted evidence that Flynn failed to advise him to incorporate

his real estate development project into a corporate entity to limit potential legal liability. Flynn

claims that there was conflicting testimony on this matter.

¶ 40   During the trial, Flynn testified that he spoke with the plaintiff sometime between

November 2004 and March 2005, and he told the plaintiff that he did not think the Woodbine

development was a good and prudent business for the plaintiff. Flynn suggested that the plaintiff

partner with a professional real estate developer or sell the entire property to a reputable developer.

When the plaintiff notified Flynn of his intention to proceed with the development, Flynn advised

the plaintiff to consider whether to incorporate the project. Flynn testified that he discussed the

pros and cons of incorporation and explained that some developers create corporations and others

                                                  16
do not. Flynn advised the plaintiff to think about it and let him know what the plaintiff decided.

The plaintiff denied that this conversation occurred. The plaintiff, however, did not deny being

aware of the risks of operating a business, such as a medical practice, and the risks he faced as a

practitioner and as an employer. The plaintiff acknowledged that he incorporated his own medical

practice. He also recognized some risks of liability attendant to the Woodbine property, such as

accidental drownings in the lakes and waterways. The plaintiff’s legal expert opinion, Kevin

Luebchow, opined that Flynn should have recommended that the plaintiff incorporate and that his

failure to so do constituted legal malpractice. Luebchow acknowledged he was not present for the

conversations between the plaintiff and Flynn and did not know what Flynn told the plaintiff.

¶ 41      A review of the record reveals conflicting testimony regarding Flynn’s advice as to

incorporation. The jury was required to decide whether the plaintiff or Flynn was more credible

on this point. The jury was also required to assess the credibility of plaintiff’s expert witness. Based

upon the trial testimony, a reasonable jury could have found that Flynn met the applicable standard

of care when he initially advised the plaintiff to partner with or sell to a qualified professional

developer, and subsequently advised the plaintiff to consider whether to incorporate the

development, and that the plaintiff ignored Flynn’s legal advice. Alternatively, the jury may have

concluded that the plaintiff was more than 50% contributorily negligent in failing to follow Flynn’s

advice.

¶ 42      The plaintiff also claims that he is entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict

because he presented unrefuted evidence that Flynn failed to investigate and advise him of the

legal implications of the pipeline easement. The plaintiff testified that he asked both Cochran, as

the engineer, and Flynn, as legal counsel, to investigate and advise him about the impact of the

pipeline easement on the development, and he produced two e-mails to support his testimony. In

                                                  17
those e-mails, the plaintiff made specific requests to Cochran, asking him to investigate the

pipeline easement and to contact Panhandle about its easement. Flynn testified that the plaintiff

never asked him to investigate the pipeline. Additionally, there was evidence that the plaintiff had

contacted Panhandle in 2003, and Panhandle provided information as to the boundaries of the

easement and various restrictions regarding placement of structures and roads on the easement.

There was also evidence that the plaintiff did not provide the Panhandle letter to Flynn or Cochran

or otherwise inform them of its contents. Cochran admitted that he, as the engineer, was

responsible for determining how the easement impacted buildability of the lots at issue, and the

plaintiff’s engineering expert agreed.

¶ 43   Again, the jury was tasked with making credibility determinations and resolving conflicts

in the testimony, and it could have found that Flynn’s testimony was more credible than the

plaintiff’s testimony. Based upon the evidence, a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff

had conducted his own independent research into the pipeline easement and learned about the

building restrictions attendant to the pipeline before he retained Flynn. The jury could have

concluded that the plaintiff did not ask Flynn to conduct further research into the pipeline

easement. Additionally, the jury could have found that Cochran, not Flynn, was responsible for

providing the plaintiff additional information related to the “buildability” of lots touching the

easement. Based upon this testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the plaintiff

failed to prove that Flynn breached the standard of care in regard to providing legal advice about

the easement. There was also evidence that other factors impacted the development of the lots near

the pipeline easement, including the inadequacy of the roads and bridges and the fact that one part

of a lot was in a floodplain. As a result, the jury could have concluded that the plaintiff’s alleged

damages resulted from the negligence of others.

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¶ 44                                 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 45   After reviewing the record, and viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable to

Flynn, we cannot say that the evidence so overwhelmingly favored the plaintiff that no contrary

verdict could ever stand. Therefore, we find the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s

motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

¶ 46   Affirmed.

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                     Fletcher v. Flynn, 2024 IL App (5th) 220818

Decision Under Review:    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County, No. 11-L-64;
                          the Hon. James R. Glenn, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys                 Michael T. Franz, of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &Smith LLP, of
for                       Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys                 Daniel B. Meyer and Edward C. Eberspacher IV, of Meyer Law
for                       Group LLC, of Chicago, for appellees.
Appellee:

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