Court Opinion

ID: 9773544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:49:02.43406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:54.919750
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority as to its decision that Bethea’s trial counsel was not *270ineffective, but I respectfully dissent as to its decision regarding the effectiveness of Bethea’s appellate counsel. As noted by the majority, the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized three types of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) denial of access to appeal; (2) failure to raise issues that should have been raised; and (3) failure to present issues well. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1203 (Ind.2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1019, 122 S.Ct. 1610, 152 L.Ed.2d 624 (2002). Where, as here, an ineffectiveness claim is based upon the second category, we employ the following two-part test to judge counsel’s performance: “(1) whether the unraised issues are significant and obvious from the face of the record; and (2) whether the unraised issues are clearly stronger than the raised issues.” Gray v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 605-606 (Ind.2001) (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir.1986))), trans. denied (quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we “must be ‘particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the chaff in appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel’s choice of some issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the precedent available....’” Id. Thus, as noted in Gray, the test may also be stated as whether “appellate counsel’s performance was deficient where counsel failed to present a significant and obvious issue for reasons that cannot be explained by any strategic decision.” Id. If deficient performance is so found, the defendant must then establish prejudice by showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 1219.
In this case, I find that Bethea has met his burden on a number of grounds regarding the ineffectiveness of his appellate counsel. Initially, Bethea correctly notes that the sole issue cogently raised by appellate counsel on direct appeal, namely, that under Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2, the trial court erred in sentencing him because the crimes he was convicted of constituted a single episode of criminal conduct, was easily disposed of on direct appeal because that statute did not apply to Bethea’s convictions. Bethea v. State, No. 18A02-0703-CR-247, 2007 WL 3378461, slip op. at 3 (Ind.Ct.App. Nov. 15, 2007) (holding that “[bjecause he pled guilty to a crime of violence as defined in [Ind.Code § 35-50-l-2(a)(12) ], Bethea’s two consecutive sentences are not subject to the limitation in Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2”). Thus, Bethea argues that “nearly any viable claim would have been a stronger claim.... ” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
Bethea cites multiple issues which I find to be significant and obvious from the record constituting deficient performance and which prejudiced Bethea. Specifically, Be-thea argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to: (A) challenge certain improper sentencing factors; and (B) challenge his sentence as inappropriate under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
A. Unchallenged Improper Sentencing Factors
Bethea makes a number of arguments for the proposition that appellate counsel should have raised the issue that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him, each of which arguments the majority finds to be lacking. Bethea was sentenced pursuant to the current advisory sentencing scheme in which a court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence — including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any-but the record does not support the *271reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly-supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind.2007). If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491. However, the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.
In particular, I am at odds with Judge Crone’s choice to decline to follow our previous decisions in Roney v. State, 872 N.E.2d 192, 201 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), and Farmer v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1025, 1027 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), regarding a trial court’s decision to use the harm, injury, and loss suffered by the victims as an aggravating circumstance. In Farmer, defendant Shane Farmer, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, pled guilty to attempted murder, and in exchange the State dismissed charges of burglary resulting in bodily injury, intimidation and resisting law enforcement. 772 N.E.2d at 1026. At sentencing, the trial court identified the following aggravators: (1) that the offense occurred in the victim’s home; (2) that Farmer failed to release the victim upon the officer’s command; and (3) that Farmer screamed threats that the victim was going to die. Id. at 1027. On appeal, Farmer argued that “the sentencing court’s reliance on facts that supported the burglary, intimidation and resisting law enforcement charges dismissed as part of his plea agreement essentially circumvents the plea agreement and is therefore improper.” Id. We agreed, holding that sentencing Farmer more harshly in reliance upon facts which related to the dismissed charges resulted in Farmer not receiving “the full benefit of his plea agreement,” and that we would give effect to the parties’ intent because “[a] plea agreement is a contract, binding upon both parties when accepted by the trial court.” Id.
We similarly found that the court abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant in Roney when it considered “the multiple injuries inflicted upon [the victim] and the fact that the State could have charged Roney with more crimes, namely robbery and criminal confinement.” 872 N.E.2d at 200. We held that “the trial court’s consideration of these uncharged crimes violates the plea agreement, under which the State agreed to file no additional charges arising out of the incident,” because when “a trial court accepts a plea agreement under which the State agrees to drop or not file charges, and then uses facts that give rise to those charges to enhance a sentence, it in effect circumvents the plea agreement.” Id. at 201.
Similarly here, Bethea, pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, pled guilty to one count of robbery against Gates as a class B felony and one count of criminal confinement with respect to Dailey as a class B felony,7 and in exchange the State agreed to dismiss the other charges filed against Bethea, which again included burglary resulting in bodily injury as a class A felony, armed robbery as a class B felony, *272two counts of criminal confinement as class B felonies, two counts of intimidation as class C felonies, and auto theft as a class D felony. However, in its sentencing order the court identified the following aggravator:
The harm, injury, and loss suffered by the victims was significant and greater than that otherwise anticipated by the offenses; in addition to being armed at gunpoint, the male victim was beaten and “pistol whipped” ... in addition to being confined at gunpoint, the female victim was injured by being pulled out of bed and thrown to the floor, resulting in medical treatment. [Bethea] committed the offenses inside the victims’ residence. The Court gives this factor very significant weight, as [Bethea] acted in a manner more violent than required for the offenses and caused significant injuries to the victims.
Direct Appeal Appendix at 219.
Thus, the court circumvented Bethea’s plea agreement by enhancing his sentence based upon conduct which was the subject of dismissed charges. Specifically, the court recited the injuries caused to Dailey and the fact that the offenses were committed inside the victims’ residence; however, this conduct was the subject of Count I, burglary resulting in bodily injury, which also was the only class A felony with which Bethea had been charged. Indeed, it would be reasonable to surmise that the dismissal of Count I was at the very core of Bethea’s decision to plead guilty. Accordingly, I would hold that it was deficient performance on the part of Bethea’s appellate counsel to fail to challenge this aggravator, which the court accorded “very significant” weight, and I would apply the rule from Fainter and Roney to Bethea’s sentence.
In addition, there were other problems with most of the other significant aggravating circumstances cited by the court at sentencing, which only made the issue of abuse of discretion more obvious and which provides additional empirical evidence that this decision (or lack thereof) was not of a strategic nature but rather was the case of deficient performance. First, the court found as an aggravator that he “has a conviction for Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine as a felony in Norfolk, Virginia” and assigned it “significant weight.” Direct Appeal Appendix at 218. However, as noted by Be-thea he actually pled guilty to and was convicted of only possession of cocaine.
Second, the court’s sentencing order stated that Bethea is among “the very worst offenders,” and that he therefore should be sentenced to the maximum, that “the State of New York provided extensive services to [Bethea] as a juvenile, although they were not correctional in nature. [He] did not take advantage of those services.” Id. at 220. As argued by Bethea, “[t]he record clearly shows that [he] suffered a horrific childhood” in which he “was abused physically, emotionally, and sexually as a child, both by his father and foster parents,” and that it was therefore inexplicable that the court aggravated Bethea’s sentence by noting that he “did not take advantage of those services,” especially in that the court was effectively “ignoring the fact that [he] was abused by these same service providers.... ” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Indeed, the majority and I are in agreement on the point where it is noted:
Bethea argues that his difficult childhood — in which he was exposed to poverty, abuse, and institutionalization— should have been identified as a mitigating factor or, alternatively, that this evidence negated the trial court’s finding that his failure to benefit from services was an aggravating factor. We agree with Bethea that the record does not *273support the trial court’s finding that he received “extensive services” as a juvenile. Sentencing Tr. at 75. Bethea testified that he spent most of his childhood in foster homes or juvenile facilities, that he was abused in several of these placements, and that he was never offered treatment for his drug addiction. The State did not present any evidence concerning the nature of any services provided to Bethea as a juvenile or present any evidence contradicting his account of his childhood years.
Supra, Op. at 266. However, to the extent that the majority’s conclusion that these unsupported findings would not “have resulted in a different sentence” because the court “also considered Bethea’s failed attempts at rehabilitation as an adult,” especially when considered in conjunction with the other sentencing problems discussed above, I disagree. Id. at 266.
Based on the numerous aggravators which the court found to be significant and which are questionable, I believe that it is obvious from the face of the record that the issue of whether the court abused its discretion in sentencing Bethea should have been raised on appeal, and I cannot find a strategic reason for having not done so. Also, taken as a whole, due to the significance the court attached to each of these aggravators I believe there is a reasonable probability that, had the issue been presented on appeal, the result would have been favorable to Bethea. Indeed, these aggravators constitute most of the significant aggravators identified by the court in finding Bethea to be among the very worst offenders and imposing a maximum sentence. Accordingly, I conclude that Bethea’s appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to present cogent argument that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him.
B. Failure to Challenge Appropriateness of Aggregate Sentence
Bethea also points to appellate counsel’s failure to request this court to review his sentence under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) as a separate ground in support of his argument that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.2006).
At sentencing, the court stated that it was “well aware that it should reserve the maximum sentence for the very worst offenders” and that Bethea, who was twenty-five years old at the time of the offenses, “fits within this category of offenders.” Trial Transcript at 75. The court then, after weighing the aggravators and miti-gators, imposed the maximum sentence of twenty years for each conviction, and it ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of forty years.
Although Bethea does have a criminal history, it seems facially apparent that the court’s decision to classify Bethea as among the very worst was error. Indeed, Bethea’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) reveals that Bethea did not have a juvenile criminal history, and most of his criminal offenses were nonviolent in nature. In 2000, Bethea was charged with possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor in the State of New York. In 2001, Bethea pled guilty to obstructing justice, petit larceny, and possession of cocaine in the State of Virginia under sep*274arate cause numbers. Bethea was also found guilty of being an accessory after the fact on a robbery charge in that year. In addition to Bethea’s convictions, the PSI also notes three instances in which the relevant authorities applied to revoke his probation. Finally, the PSI reveals that Bethea has active warrants issued for his arrest in the States of New York (stemming from charges filed in 2005) and in Virginia (stemming from a violation of probation).
Put simply, although Bethea does have a fairly significant criminal history, I believe that he is far from the very worst of offenders. The only conviction on Be-thea’s record which contains a violent element is his conviction for being an accessory after the fact to robbery. Although robbery itself is a violent crime, Bethea’s accessory liability implies that his criminal act was not violent in nature. To be sure, Bethea’s record does demonstrate a certain amount of contempt for the law in that he has multiple outstanding warrants for his arrest, but I do not believe that his record, taken as a whole, places him in the realm of the worst of the worst, and I find that Bethea has met his burden of demonstrating that a reasonable probability exists that, had this issue been presented on direct appeal, the outcome would have been different. Accordingly, I conclude that Bethea’s appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to present an argument under Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B).
Thus, Bethea has demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel when counsel failed to brief arguments that the court abused its discretion in sentencing him and that Be-thea’s sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. I would reverse the trial court’s denial of Bethea’s petition for post conviction relief and resentence him accordingly.

. The robbery charging information charged Bethea as a class B felony because the act against Gates was "committed while the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a gun....” Direct Appeal Appendix at 14. The criminal confinement charging information charged Bethea as a class B felony because Bethea committed the act against Dailey while "being armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a gun....” Id. at 17.