Court Opinion

ID: 9457432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:21:45.11412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:20.856750
License: Public Domain

BUTZNER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree that the Board’s refusal to order the reinstatement of Betty S. Allen is supported by substantial evidence.
I dissent from the denial of enforcement of the Board’s order. The Board’s finding that J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., violated § 8(a) (1) of the Act by making coercive statements is based on the *599following summary of its superintendents’ speeches to employees:
“[T]hat a situation could arise in which it would be necessary to produce signed cards in a public courtroom and the corresponding signing employees could be required to testify, and, by way of illustration, the superintendents referred to a Board proceeding involving its Statesboro plant where this procedure had taken place. In this connection, Lee [a superintendent] testified that ‘we covered the dangers of signing union cards, or repercussions that can come from signing union cards,’ while Crawford [a superintendent] testified that he pointed out the ‘danger’ of an employe [e] signing a union card thinking it could never be seen.”
I reject the company's defense that it was simply exercising its right to tell its employees the truth. The superintendents told only half the truth. The unspoken half is that, notwithstanding the protection afforded by law, the company has a well-deserved reputation of discharging union adherents on pretext of cause.1
When the whole truth is known, there can be no doubt that the speeches were coercive. Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Finesilver Mfg. Co., 400 F.2d 644, 645 (5th Cir. 1968). The Board was warranted in adopting the following finding of the trial examiner:
“For, as the employees could not but be well aware, [Stevens] was given to ferreting out the identity of union supporters and, armed with such knowledge, to discriminating against them. Bearing in mind also that two of the superintendents referred to the dangers signers would face as a result of public exposure of their identity, and that the superintendents gave the employees no counteracting assurances, the employees could reasonably, if not necessarily, regard the superintendents’ remarks as a warning that card signing carried with it the possibility of both exposure to [Stevens] and retaliation by it.”
Reliance on § 8(c) of the Act is misplaced. The statute on its face makes a clear distinction between the protected “expressing of any views, argument or opinion” and the unprotected “threat of reprisal.” The superintendents’ guarded warnings of “repercussions” and of the “danger” of signing a union card rightfully can be viewed as a “threat of reprisal” that forfeits the protection of § 8(c). N. L. R. B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969).
The Board’s ruling that the dismissal of Hux violated § 8(a) (3) is well supported. Its decision is based on findings that other qualified employees were readily available to fill in for Hux, that the company’s refusal to accept a replacement for an employee absent by necessity from a regular tour of duty was contrary to its practice, and that Hux— a known proponent of the union — was *600treated differently from other employees whose jobs were filled by substitutes. The company, it should be noted, readily secured a substitute on Saturday. It is familiar law that “to support a finding of § 8(a) (3) violation, it is enough that a discriminatory motive was a factor in the employer’s decision.” Winchester Spinning Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 402 F.2d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1968). And the Board may rely on circumstantial evidence of discrimination. N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 602, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368 (1941); Corrie Corp. of Charleston v. N. L. R. B., 375 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir. 1967).
Finally, although the company attacks the Board’s remedy as too broad, and the union challenges it as too narrow, I believe that it lies within the Board’s administrative competence for reasons discussed by Chief Judge Brown in J. P. Stevens & Co. v. N. L. R. B., 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969).
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING
Upon consideration of the petition of the respondent, National Labor Relations Board, for a rehearing and of its suggestion for a rehearing en banc, it is
Ordered that the second paragraph of 597 of the opinion be, commencing “It startles,” and it is hereby deleted, but with this exception, the said opinion be confirmed; and it is further
Ordered that the petition and suggestion in all other respects be denied, neither a majority of the judges who rendered the decision in this case, nor a majority of the Circuit Judges in regular active service having voted to grant the petition or the suggestion.
WINTER, CRAVEN and BUTZNER, Circuit Judges, dissenting from this order, with HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, not participating.

. See, e. g., J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005, 88 S.Ct. 564, 19 L.Ed.2d 600 (1967) (Stevens I) ; Textile Workers Union of America, A.F.L.-C.I.O. v. N. L. R. B., 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, J. P. Stevens & Co. v. N. L. R. B., 393 U.S. 836, 89 S.Ct. 112, 21 L.Ed.2d 107 (1968) (Stevens II) ; J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 406 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968) (Stevens III and IV) ; J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969) (Stevens V). Stevens’ conduct is noted, not to prejudge its actions currently under review, but to disclose the context in which employees could reasonably interpret statements by the company. See N. L. R. B. v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 231, 69 S.Ct. 541, 93 L.Ed. 638 (1949). Other Stevens cases are: Black Hawk Corp., 177 NLRB No. 120 (1969), enf’d in part, 431 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1970) (Stevens VI) ; J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 179 NLRB No. 47 (1969), pending review, Nos. 28,631 and 29,037 (5th Cir.) (Stevens VII); J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 181 NLRB No. 97 (this proceeding) (Stevens VIII) ; J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 183 NLRB No. 5 (1970) (Stevens IX) ; Black Hawk Corp., 183 NLRB No. 34 (1970) (Stevens X).