Court Opinion

ID: 9671708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:42:16.922241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:45.572235
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
In our original opinion we did not intend to cite the Smerke case on the question of presumed error, but cited it only on the cumulative effect of the evidence relating to the sale of the $75,000 concrete mix as detailed in the opinion and the argument of counsel made in connection therewith. We have given much consideration to the appel-lees’ motions for re-hearing and have reviewed the decisions written by our Courts of Civil Appeals, and our Supreme Court relating to Rules 327, 434 and 503 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, with the view and hope of making a correct application of the Harmless Error Rule to the question here before us. In Cloud v. Zellers, Tex., 309 S.W.2d 806, 808, we find this statement:
it ⅜ * * the reversal of the trial court’s judgment was not justified unless an examination of the record as a whole leads to the conviction that the error was calculated to cause and probably did cause the jury to give the an*518swers it did give to all issues which will support the judgment. * * *
“The question of the prejudicial character of the testimony as it hears on the issues of contributory negligence is much the same as the question with which we were concerned in Mrs. Baird’s Bread Co. v. Hearn, 157 Tex. 159, 300 S.W.2d 646. That case reached us on a question of jury misconduct, but the legal problem was the same as the problem in this case. * * * In refusing to hold that the improper testimony of the juror probably caused the jury to make the finding it did make on the contributory negligence issue, we emphasized that the impact of the statement of the juror on that issue ‘was rather remote and inferential’. * * * We also emphasized the fact that the jury had returned a verdict evidencing a discriminating effort to answer the issues intelligently and conscientiously from the evidence properly before them.”
In Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. McCaslin, Tex., 317 S.W.2d 916, 918, the Court, in discussing the Harmless Error Rule said:
“There is no requirement that the party asserting error must show injury beyond a reasonable probability in order to secure a reversal of a judgment. And in estimating the probability of injury, the act of overt misconduct in itself may be the most compelling factor in establishing prejudice. * * ”
Again in this opinion we find:
“Rule 327 does not preclude the drawing of logical inferences of prejudice and unfairness from the overt act itself for an action or occurrence may be so highly prejudicial and inimical to fairness of trial that the burden of going forward with proof of harm is met, prima facie at least, by simply showing the improper act and nothing more.”
In Condra Funeral Home v. Rollin, Tex., 314 S.W.2d 277, 280, we find this statement:
“Under Rules 434 and 503, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, appellate courts are directed not to reverse a trial court judgment for errors of law committed during the course of the trial of a case unless the error complained of ‘amounted to such a denial of the rights of the appellant as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment in the case.’ In enforcing those Rules we have held with respect to many and various types of errors that a reversal may be ordered only when a review of ‘the whole record’ convinces the reviewing court that but for the error a different verdict or judgment would probably have been rendered.”
It is obvious from the pronouncements of our Supreme Court that the task of correctly applying the Harmless Error Rule is not one of easy solution here. It becomes more difficult in the case at bar because although there was a wide divergence in the testimony as to value, yet the jury’s answers to the value of the land taken and for the damages sustained to the remaining tract is substantial in each instance; however, when we consider the testimony complained of, its direct and heavy impact upon the issue of damages, and having in mind the record as a whole, we think appellants have carried their burden by showing the improper testimony and the harmful argument thereon. It seems to us that the proof of harm is met prima facie, at least by simply showing the improper and the highly prejudicial testimony and the argument of appellees’ counsel thereon. Since appellants’ land is being taken from them without their consent they should have a trial as near as possible free from prejudicial error.
*519Accordingly it is our view that the testimony complained of and the argument of counsel thereon requires in all fairness that this cause be reversed and remanded and appellees’ motions for re-hearing are overruled.