Court Opinion

ID: 9541490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:25:57.338151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:59.161856
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority but disagree with its analysis of appellant’s 402A claim. I would also affirm the lower court’s finding that Section 402A “does not apply in the present case,” but for reasons different than those advanced by the majority. I do not believe that the insurability of appellant’s loss provides a basis for the denial of strict liability recovery. Rather I would find that the injury suffered by appellant is not of the type for which strict liability ought to be imposed.
I base my opinion on what I perceive to be the purpose of Section 402A. In Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968), our Supreme Court compared strict liability with the liability that stems from breach of warranty. The *364court quoted with approval the following statement of the policy considerations underlying the imposition of strict liability.
... these policy considerations are plain: the consumer’s inability to protect himself adequately from defectively manufactured goods. .. the implied assurance on the part of the seller that his goods are safe.. . the superior risk bearing ability of the manufacturer. (Emphasis added.) Id., 432 Pa. at 230, 246 A.2d at 864, n.6.
In Cornell Drilling Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Pa.Super. 129, 359 A.2d 822 (1976), this court discussed the meaning of the word “defect” in 402A actions. We wrote in part, “Dean Prosser has noted that ‘[t]he prevailing interpretation of “defective” is that the product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its safety.’ ” Prosser, Law of Torts, 659 (4th Ed. 1971). Finally, in Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975), our Supreme Court stated, “We emphasized the principle of liability without fault most recently by stating that the seller is “effectively the guaranter of his product’s safety.” (citing case) See also Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978).
The malfunction of the burglar alarm in this case did not render the alarm unsafe, although it certainly made it ineffective. The loss suffered by appellant was not physical injury resulting from an unsafe product, but rather, the foreseeable consequence of a malfunctioning burglar alarm.
Presented with an almost identical factual situation in the recent case, Fireman’s Fund American Insurance Companies v. Burns Electronic Security Services, 93 Ill.App.3d 298, 48 Ill.Dec. 729, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1981), the Illinois appellate court denied a plaintiff’s 402A claim. The plaintiff in that case had purchased a burglar alarm to be installed at a jewelry store. The alarm malfunctioned and burglars stole $800,000 worth of jewelry from the store.
As in the present case, the contract between the purchaser and seller of the alarm contained a limitation of liability.
*365The purchaser sued the seller on warranty, negligence and strict liability theories. The court wrote of the third count,
Plaintiff cast its third count in strict tort liability in an effort to circumvent the contractual limitation of liability. In arguing that this count should be reinstated plaintiff asserts that the loss of the jewelry was equivalent to its physical destruction and its value is recoverable therefore under a theory of strict tort liability.
The Illinois Court rejected that claim and considered the loss to be an economic loss, which is not recoverable in tort in Illinois. The court explained that this type of loss is covered by the contract. I agree with the following statement of the Illinois Court.
When goods are sold, their soundness is the core of the bargain. It is for the parties to decide what the consequences will be if the bargain founders. An entire body of law, contracts—of which product warranties is a part— is available to govern those areas of the relationship concerning which the bargain is silent. There is thus no need for the law of torts to define the rights of parties in privity when they have done so themselves. When a buyer loses the benefit of his bargain because the goods are defective, that is, when he suffers economic loss, he has his contract to look to for remedies. Tort law need not, and should not enter the picture.
See also, “Pennsylvania Products Liability: A Clarification of the Search For a Clear and Understandable Rule,” John E. Murray, 33 U. of Pittsburgh Law Review, 391 (1972), in which the author criticizes Pennsylvania cases which suggest that pure economic loss is recoverable in a 402A action. Dean Murray concludes,
The present notion of permitting a 402A action for pure economic loss threatens to encroach upon the legislative mandate established in the Code. If the relief sought is compensation for loss of bargain as contrasted with some physical injury, there can be little question that the Code with all of its qualifications was designed to deal with such matters and to protect the expectation interest of the parties. Id. at 427, 428.
*366I agree with the Illinois court’s unwillingness to characterize the type of loss suffered here as being within the terms of 402A. The appellant’s economic situation is worsened; but there is no evidence that the property was harmed. Additionally, any “harm” to the property was not the result of an unsafe condition of the alarm, but, rather, to its malfunctioning.
As Dean Murray notes in the earlier quoted article, application of 402A to such cases enables a purchaser to circumvent “Code notice requirements, effective disclaimers of warranty or effective limitations on consequential damages.” Id. at 426.
It is for these reasons that I would affirm the order of the lower court.1

. I add parenthetically that the majority’s reliance on the insurability of the loss seems misplaced. After all, aren’t automobiles and losses incurred from their malfunctioning insurable? Yet, a 402A surely is sustainable for injuries caused by defective automobiles.

. The somewhat complicated procedural history shows that following the close of pleadings, the Plaintiff’s deposition was taken, and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant. The lower court issued an Order denying Summary Judgment, but limiting Plaintiffs recovery to the terms of the limitation of damages clause in the contract between the parties. Upon Plaintiff’s Petition, the lower court amended its Order, to state that the Order, while not final, involved controlling questions of law, as to which there were substantial grounds for difference of opinion, pursuant to Pennsylva*367nia Rule of Appellate Procedure 1312. Plaintiff then filed a Petition for Permission to Appeal with our Court. This Petition was denied. The parties then agreed to a trial without jury. Subsequently, at the request of the parties, the lower court entered a Supplemental Opinion on questions of law. Thereafter, the parties entered into a stipulation concerning trial and the entry of an Order dismissing Plaintiffs Exceptions and entering judgment in favor of Defendant. The instant appeal was then filed.