Court Opinion

ID: 9368860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 12:09:34.16566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.226233
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                     San Antonio, Texas
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                        No. 04-22-00089-CR

                                    Jessie Jermaine PEARSON,
                                              Appellant

                                                 v.

                                       The STATE of Texas,
                                             Appellee

                     From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2019CR7768
                           Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Beth Watkins, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 1, 2023

AFFIRMED

           A jury convicted appellant Jessie Jermaine Pearson on three counts — aggravated sexual

assault of a child, indecency with a child by contract, and indecency with a child by exposure.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.021(a)(1)(B), 21.11. For each count, the trial court assessed

punishment at imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Institutional Division

for concurrent terms of forty-five and ten years and a consecutive term of twenty years. In four

issues, which we construe as two, Pearson complains that the trial court erred by (1) overruling his
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hearsay objections to questions posed by the State to a school district police officer and (2)

sustaining the State’s objections to questions he posed to a private investigator. We affirm.

                                                 I. BACKGROUND

         Pearson was indicted on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, one count of

indecency with a child by contract, and one count of indecency with a child by exposure. C.M.,

the complainant; Officer Joseph Ramirez, a police officer with the San Antonio Independent

School District (“SAISD”); D.M., C.M.’s mother; and Shelma Peterson, a private investigator

retained by Pearson; among others, 1 testified at trial.

         C.M., who was fifteen years old at the time of trial, testified that her family and Pearson’s

family had been close since she was approximately six years old. C.M. testified that, when she

was approximately twelve years old, Pearson attempted to have vaginal intercourse with her.

However, because C.M. “was being too loud”, Pearson switched to anal intercourse. C.M. further

testified that Pearson engaged in anal intercourse with her “quite often.” In addition to anal

penetration, C.M. testified that Pearson would force her to perform oral sex on him. C.M. did not

tell anyone about Pearson’s contact because she was scared of Pearson, elaborating that she knew

Pearson “can tend to get really angry.” Nevertheless, when C.M. was in the sixth grade and

attending a SAISD school, law enforcement began investigating whether Pearson was sexually

abusing C.M. 2

         Officer Ramirez testified that he is a certified peace officer who is employed by SAISD.

He was assigned to patrol duty at the school where C.M. attended. Officer Ramirez recalled

1
  Pearson testified as well. However, his testimony is not relevant to our disposition. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The
court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised
and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
2
  C.M. later learned that her little sister had “told her friend about things [Pearson] did to both [C.M.] and her, and
[the friend] made an outcry to a teacher.”

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receiving a call “[f]or a student who made an outcry.” Pearson then objected to Officer Ramirez’s

testimony on the grounds that it “calls for backdoor hearsay” and that the State did not properly

designate him as an outcry witness. The State responded by asserting that the purpose of calling

Officer Ramirez was “for the nature of his investigation, how [the San Antonio Police Department

(“SAPD”)] became involved, how CPS became involved, the starting step.” The trial court

overruled Pearson’s objections. Officer Ramirez then testified about how he contacted SAPD and

Child Protective Services.

       D.M. testified that her and Pearson’s families were very close. The two families became

close while D.M.’s husband at the time and Pearson’s wife both served in the military, and both

families were next door neighbors in military housing in Killeen, Texas. While cross examining

D.M., Pearson’s attorney asked:

       PEARSON:       But, in fact, you allow your daughters to run around the house
                      without underwear, don’t you?

       D.M.:          No, I do not.

       PEARSON:       Do you remember talking to a lady named Shelma?

       D.M.:          Who?

       PEARSON:       Shelma.

       D.M.:          No.

D.M. denied knowing about Pearson’s sexual abuse of C.M. until the school notified her that the

police and CPS needed to speak to her.

       During Pearson’s case-in-chief, he called Private Investigator Shelma Peterson. She

testified that, as part of her private investigation, she interviewed Pearson, D.M., and a CPS

investigator. Pearson, through his counsel, then asked:

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           PEARSON:          Okay. And in your investigation of the environment and the
                             background of — from the State’s witnesses’ side, did you uncover
                             anything concerning to you for us?

           PETERSON:         I had asked [D.M.] some questions that I usually ask —

           STATE:            Object as to relevance.

           COURT:            What is?

           PEARSON:          First of all, [D.M.] and I did not speak with Shelma.

           COURT:            Well, you can ask her if she — if she’s spoken to her.

           PEARSON:          I did, Judge. She just said she.

           COURT:            That’s the answer to that question, but anything else?

           PEARSON:          There was a specific question I asked, it was denied, as well. I can
                             ask that question.

           COURT:            See, but here’s the problem. In order for you to bring in extraneous
                             evidence of an inconsistent statement, then the person has to be told
                             — the person who is on the witness stand, has to be told who the
                             statement was made to, the date that it was made, under what
                             circumstances, and my recollection is that that was not done with
                             [D.M.]. Only that she said she didn’t talk to her. So I don’t know
                             whether she was asked — and I could go back in my notes whether
                             she was asked whether it was Shelma Peterson or Shelma Walton[3]
                             at the time, because I don’t know what it was, but that’s my
                             recollection of the testimony. So in order for you to bring in
                             extraneous evidence of a prior inconsistent statement or a prior
                             statement, it has to be done in a very specific way.

                                                       ...

           PEARSON:          Specific statement, I recall the child was that the mother denied that
                             she allowed her children to run around without underpants. And just
                             she specifically asked that and she specifically said that.

           COURT:            I know, but did you say, on this date, you spoke to this —

           PEARSON:          No, I did not, Judge.

           COURT:            No, you did not. And that’s the predicate for opening.

3
    Peterson’s last name changed before trial.

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                                                                                    04-22-00089-CR

       PEARSON:       Okay.

       COURT:         Do you see what I’m saying [defense counsel]? Because that’s the
                      rule. She had to have been told what date the statement was made.
                      She had to have been told exactly to whom the statement was made.

       PEARSON:       I did everything except the date, so —

       COURT:         So —

       STATE:         I could be wrong, absolutely. My recollection is she was asked, do
                      you allow this to happen and she said, no. Wasn’t that the extent of
                      the testimony?

       COURT:         And then you asked the children, do you remember talking to — but
                      I don’t think you followed it up with the question. I’m — that’s my
                      memory. I’m sorry?

       STATE:         It’s not in my notes as far as the date.

       COURT:         It is — it is probably in my notes, but that’s my recollection. Go on
                      with the testimony and I’m going on go back through my notes, but
                      right now, stay away from that because I don’t think the proper
                      predicate was laid. Okay?

       PEARSON:       All right. I pass the witness.

       The jury convicted Pearson on one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, one count

of indecency with a child by contract, and one count of indecency with a child by exposure. The

trial court assessed punishment at imprisonment for consecutive terms of forty-five and twenty

years for the aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by contract,

respectively.   It also assessed punishment at imprisonment for a term of ten years, to run

concurrently with the term assessed for the aggravated sexual assault of a child count. Pearson

timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.

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                                                                                      04-22-00089-CR

                                         II. DISCUSSION

A.     Standard of Review

       Both of Pearson’s issues challenge the trial court’s rulings as to the admissibility of

evidence. An appellate court reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence must

utilize an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2000); Prystash v. State, 3 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In other words,

the appellate court must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Weatherred, 15 S.W.3d at 542; Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990). In addition, the appellate court must review the trial court’s ruling in light of

what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made. Hoyos v. State, 982 S.W.2d 419,

422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130, 133 n. 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

B.     Hearsay

       Pearson’s first two issues, as briefed, argue that the trial court erred in allowing the State

to “introduce backdoor hearsay testimony concerning inadmissible sexual abuse outcry evidence”

and that such admission violated Pearson’s substantial rights. Properly framed against existing

law, we construe Pearson’s first issue as complaining that the trial court erred by overruling his

hearsay objections to questions posed by the State to Officer Ramirez.

       Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d).

Hearsay is generally not admissible unless it fits into one of the exceptions provided by the Texas

Rules of Evidence or other rule or statute. See id. at R. 802. In Kimball v. State, the Tenth Court

of Appeals wrote:

       Almost always it will be relevant for a testifying officer to relate how she happened
       upon the scene of a crime or accident; thus, it is permissible for her to testify that
       she was acting in response to information received. An arresting officer should not

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       be put in the false position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene, [s]he
       should be allowed some explanation of [her] presence and conduct.

24 S.W.3d 555, 564 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, no pet.) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

       Officer Ramirez testified that he received a call “[f]or a student who made an outcry.” The

trial court may have concluded that this statement by Officer Ramirez was not offered for the truth

of the matter asserted. Such a conclusion would have been supported by the testimony’s context.

After overruling Pearson’s hearsay objection, Officer Ramirez testified about how he contacted

SAPD and Child Protective Services. Under a plain reading of Rule 801 of the Texas Rules of

Evidence, as elaborated by Kimball, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

overruling Pearson’s hearsay objection. Pearson’s first issue is overruled.

C.     Relevancy

       Pearson’s third and fourth issues, as briefed, argue that the trial court erred in preventing

his counsel from “impeaching D.M.” with extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement

made to Peterson. Properly framed against existing law, we construe Pearson’s second issue as

complaining that the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s relevancy objections to questions

he posed to a private investigator.

       Regarding a witness’s prior inconsistent statement, Rule 613(a) of the Texas Rules of

Evidence provides:

       (1) Foundation Requirement. When examining a witness about the witness’s prior
       inconsistent statement — whether oral or written — a party must first tell the
       witness:

       (A) the contents of the statement;

       (B) the time and place of the statement; and

       (C) the person to whom the witness made the statement.

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       (2) Need Not Show Written Statement. If the witness’s prior inconsistent statement
       is written, a party need not show it to the witness before inquiring about it, but must,
       upon request, show it to opposing counsel.

       (3) Opportunity to Explain or Deny. A witness must be given the opportunity to
       explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement.

       (4) Extrinsic Evidence. Extrinsic evidence of a witness’s prior inconsistent
       statement is not admissible unless the witness is first examined about the statement
       and fails to unequivocally admit making the statement.

       (5) Opposing Party’s Statement. This subdivision (a) does not apply to an
       opposing party’s statement under Rule 801(e)(2).

TEX. R. EVID. 613(a).

       Assuming Pearson pointedly asked D.M. whether she admitted to Peterson that she allowed

C.M. and her younger sister to “run around the house without underwear”, Pearson did not, as the

trial court aptly noted, inform D.M. of the time and place where such statement was made. See id.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the State’s

objection. See Rivera v. State, No. 05-19-00002-CR, 2020 WL 415932, at *4 (Tex. App.—Jan.

27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (applying TEX. R. EVID. 613(a) and

finding that appellant did not establish the predicate for impeaching the complainant with any prior

inconsistent statements) (citing Maya v. State, No. 05-14-00486-CR, 2015 WL 4627218, at *3

(Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 4, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).

Pearson’s second issue is overruled.

                                         III. CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                  Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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