Court Opinion

ID: 9352976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 17:07:25.629861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:18.091189
License: Public Domain

J-S37039-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 TYREE PEEL                               :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 27 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 16, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0011697-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                          FILED JANUARY 10, 2023

      Appellant, Tyree Peel, appeals from the December 16, 2021 order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history as

follows:

      On the evening of August 15, 2015, Appellant encountered
      Thomas Holman, decedent, [“the victim”] at [7:00 p.m.] at the
      intersection of 53rd and Upland Streets in the city and county of
      Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The two men conversed briefly, and
      Appellant drew a handgun. [The victim] turned and tried to run
      away. Appellant fired several rounds at the unarmed [victim],
      striking him in the chest, ribs, and buttocks. [The victim] fell and
      began crawling away from Appellant. Appellant walked toward
      the victim, stood over him, and shot him in the head, killing him
      instantly.

      [] Appellant's jury trial [began] on May 15, 2017.      The
      Commonwealth presented the testimony of [] two eyewitnesses
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       who knew the Appellant previously and saw Appellant shoot the
       victim[.1] The Commonwealth also presented testimony from the
       police and the medical examiner. [The eyewitness] testified that
       she was standing on the front steps of her home at the time of
       the shooting. She [contacted the victim] to buy some marijuana
       from him. [The eyewitness] called out to him when she [saw] him
       at the nearby intersection [on the day of the incident], but he held
       up his index finger in a [“]just-a-minute[”] gesture and [then]
       crossed the street. [The eyewitness] saw him talking to Appellant,
       whom she knew as "Freaky.” Moments later, she saw Appellant
       pull out a [hand]gun, shoot [the victim], and then fire the final
       shot to the head as he stood over the fallen victim. [Upon seeing
       this, the eyewitness] ran into her house[. W]hen she came back
       out, she saw [the victim’s girlfriend] cradling [the victim] in the
       street and crying for help. [The eyewitness] viewed the murder
       from no more than 30 feet away, in broad daylight.

       [The victim’s girlfriend] testified that [the victim] was her
       boyfriend. They were going to a family cookout on the day of the
       murder, and [the victim] left the house ahead of her. [The victim’s
       girlfriend] followed shortly after. As she left the house, she saw
       Appellant conversing with [the victim] at the intersection [where
       the incident occurred, which was] about 45 feet [from where the
       victim’s girlfriend was located. The victim’s girlfriend] heard
       several gunshots a moment later. She dropped her bag and
       [tele]phone, looked up, and saw Appellant standing over [the
       victim]. Describing herself as "in shock," [the victim’s girlfriend]
       went to [the victim] as Appellant left.          [The victim] was
       nonresponsive and surrounded by "so much blood." A crowd
       gathered, and [the] police arrived a few minutes later. The
       frightened [victim’s girlfriend] noticed Appellant looking on from
       the crowd.

       On May 19, 2017, the jury returned a verdict of guilty [on the
       criminal charges of:] first[-]degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
       § 2502; possessing an instrument of crime, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 907;
       carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106; and
       carrying a firearm on a public street [in Philadelphia,
       Pennsylvania], 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6108. On May 19, 2017, the trial
       court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life in prison
____________________________________________

1For ease of identification and distinction, we refer to the two eyewitnesses
as “the eyewitness” and “the victim’s girlfriend.”

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       without the possibility of parole [for Appellant’s first-degree
       murder conviction. The trial court also imposed] an aggregate
       sentence of ten [] to twenty [] years[’ imprisonment] to run
       consecutive[ly] to the term of life [in prison] for the remaining
       charges. Appellant filed post-sentence motions on May 26, 2017,
       which the trial court denied on September 25, 2017[,] by
       operation of law.

       Appellant filed a timely appeal on October 23, 2017. Appellant
       raised a single claim on direct appeal: [whether] the trial court
       erred in denying his request for a Kloiber[2] instruction to be given
       to the jury[? This Court] affirmed his judgment of sentence on
       [November 14, 2018,] and [our] Supreme Court denied
       Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal on April 23, 2019.
       [See Commonwealth v. Peel, 2018 WL 5961394 (Pa. Super.
       filed Nov. 14, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
       207 A.3d 287 (Pa. 2019).]

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/22, at 1-3 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       On July 9, 2020, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition, his first. Counsel

was appointed for Appellant, and on January 22, 2021, counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition that included, inter alia, a request for a PCRA

evidentiary hearing. On April 13, 2021, counsel filed a motion for leave to file

a supplemental amended PCRA petition.                That same day, counsel filed a

supplemental      amended       PCRA    petition.3      On   August   3,   2021,   the
____________________________________________

2  Commonwealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954). “A Kloiber
instruction informs the jury that an eyewitness identification should be viewed
with caution when either the witness did not have the opportunity to view the
defendant clearly, equivocated on the identification of the defendant, or has
had     difficulties identifying   the   defendant     on    prior   occasions.”
Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 577 n.15 (Pa. Super. 2021)
(citation omitted).

3 The PCRA court docket does not include an order granting Appellant’s request
to file a supplemental amended PCRA petition. Nonetheless, because a

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Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss Appellant’s supplemental amended

PCRA petition. On November 22, 2021, the PCRA court provided Appellant

notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition

without an evidentiary hearing and provided Appellant 20 days to file a

response. Appellant did not file a response. On December 16, 2021, the PCRA

court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. This appeal followed.

       Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1.     Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant's PCRA
              petition without [an evidentiary] hearing because trial
              counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
              suppress the single photograph identifications of Appellant?

       2.     Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant's PCRA
              petition without [an evidentiary] hearing because trial
              counsel was ineffective for not calling Sharon Butcher or
              other identifiers of [a person other than Appellant as the
              shooter] as witnesses and confronting them with police
              paperwork that indicated that they had identified [this
              second person] as the shooter?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       In addressing Appellant’s issues, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition is limited to the

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,
____________________________________________

supplemental amended PCRA petition was filed and accepted by the PCRA
court, it logically follows that the PCRA court granted Appellant’s motion for
leave to file the same.

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992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”    Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.     Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      Appellant’s issues raise claims alleging that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Brief at 9-16. “It is well-established that

counsel is presumed effective[.]” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121,

132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691

(1984). To plead and prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a

petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit;

(2) counsel's actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual

prejudice resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v.

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93

A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014).       “A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the

petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.

Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). “In determining whether counsel's action

was reasonable, we do not question whether there were other more logical

courses of action which counsel could have pursued; rather, we must examine

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whether counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v.

Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).

      Our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed
      constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the
      particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis
      designed to effectuate his[, or her,] client's interests. The test is
      not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing
      a hindsight evaluation of the record.          Although weigh the
      alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of
      effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's
      decision had any reasonable basis.

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).                A petitioner

establishes prejudice when he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's [acts or omissions], the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966

A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).

      Appellant’s first issue alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

file a motion to suppress the single photograph identifications of Appellant as

the shooter by the eyewitness and the victim’s girlfriend. Appellant’s Brief at

9-12. Appellant asserts that, on February 15, 2017, he filed pro se a motion

to suppress the single photograph identifications by the eyewitness and the

victim’s girlfriend and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to litigate

said motion or to file a similar motion. Id. at 11. Appellant contends that he

was admitted to a health care facility prior to the incident and, as such, the

eyewitness and the victim’s girlfriend “could not have seen Appellant in the

area [of the incident] every day prior the murder” as they testified to at trial.

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Id. Appellant argues that, because the two witnesses could not have seen

him in the area every day prior to the incident, they did not have sufficient

familiarity with him to overcome the unduly suggestive nature of the single

photograph identification process. Id. at 10-11. Appellant contends that trial

counsel was aware of Appellant’s admission into a health care facility prior to

the incident and was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the

results of the single photograph identifications of Appellant as the shooter by

the two witnesses. Id. at 12.

      “The failure to file a suppression motion may be evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel[, but] if the grounds underpinning the suppression

motion or objection are without merit, counsel will not be deemed to have

been ineffective in failing to so move or object.”       Commonwealth v.

Ransome, 402 A.2d 1379, 1381-1382 (Pa. 1979); see also Commonwealth

v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 169 A.3d

574 (Pa. 2017). A petitioner “must establish that there was no reasonable

basis for not pursuing the suppression claim and that if the evidence had been

suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been

more favorable.” Watley, 153 A.3d at 1044.

      [A] pretrial procedure in which a witness views a photograph of
      the accused in an effort to “elicit identification evidence is
      peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors
      which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial.”
      United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218[] (1967); see also
      Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377[] (1968); Gilbert v.
      California, 388 U.S. 263[] (1967). If such an identification
      procedure of the accused is “so unnecessarily suggestive and
      conducive to irreparable mistaken identification, the accused is

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      denied due process of law.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
      302[] (1967). It is clear, then, that photographic identification of
      a person is unduly suggestive if, under the totality of the
      circumstances, the identification procedure creates a substantial
      likelihood of misidentification. See Commonwealth v. DeJesus,
      [] 860 A.2d 102 (Pa. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Crork, 966 A.2d 585, 588 (Pa. Super. 2009) (original

brackets omitted), appeal denied, 981 A.2d 217 (Pa. 2009). In evaluating the

totality of the circumstances, courts should consider

      (1) the manner in which the pretrial identification was conducted;
      (2) the witness' prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal
      act; (3) the existence of any discrepancies between the
      defendant's actual description and any description given by the
      witness before the photographic identification; (4) any previous
      identification by the witness of some other person; (5) any
      previous identification of the defendant himself; (6) failure to
      identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (7) the lapse of
      time between the alleged act and the out-of-court identification.

Commonwealth v. Fowler, 352 A.2d 17, 21 (Pa. 1976); see also

Commonwealth v. Sutton, 436 A.2d 167, 169 (Pa. 1981) (stating,

circumstances to be considered include “the opportunity of the witness to view

the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the

accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty

demonstrated at the confrontation, and time between the crime and the

confrontation”).

      In finding that Appellant’s underlying claim was without merit, the PCRA

court stated,

      [The eyewitness and the victim’s girlfriend] each had an
      independent basis for their identification of Appellant. [The
      eyewitness] testified that she was on her front step watching

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      because she was waiting to buy marijuana from the victim.
      According to [the eyewitness,] it was broad daylight, and she was
      only about 25 or 30 feet away from Appellant and the victim. [The
      eyewitness] testified that she knew Appellant as "Freaky," [] that
      she knew Appellant well[,] and that she saw him in the
      neighborhood most every day. [The victim’s girlfriend] also
      testified that she was only about 45 feet away from Appellant and
      the victim and that she saw Appellant in the neighborhood.
      Regarding how often [the victim’s girlfriend] saw Appellant in the
      neighborhood, she testified "you could say almost every day" [for
      a couple of] months before the murder.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/29/22, at 5-6. The PCRA court concluded that “[t]here

is no merit to the argument that the identifications made by [the eyewitness

and the victim’s girlfriend] should have been suppressed.” Id. at 6. Because

the underlying claim was without merit, the PCRA court determined that

Appellant’s ineffective assistance claim based on trial counsel’s failure to file

a motion to suppress the single photograph identifications was without

arguable merit. Id.

      Appellant’s assertion that neither identification witness had sufficient

familiarity with Appellant to overcome the suggestive nature of their single

photograph identifications of him as the shooter is belied by the record. The

eyewitness testified that she knew Appellant, who she referred to as “Freaky,”

from seeing him around the neighborhood in which she resided.              N.T.,

5/16/17, at 91-92. When asked how many times she had seen Appellant prior

to the incident, the eyewitness stated that she saw him “mostly every day” in

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the neighborhood.4 Id. On the day of the incident, the eyewitness observed

the interaction between Appellant and the victim from no more than 20 feet

away.    Id. at 85-86.      The eyewitness was focused on the victim, and his

subsequent interaction with Appellant, because she had “called out” to the

victim, upon seeing him in the street, and wanted to speak to him. Id. at 85.

The victim indicated to the eyewitness that he would come see her

momentarily, before he began to interact with Appellant. Id. The eyewitness

observed Appellant from a side profile when he initially shot the victim several

times before walking away from the victim. Id. at 87-91. When Appellant

walked back to the victim to administer the fatal shot, the eyewitness

observed a “full view” of Appellant’s face. Id. at 90-91, 103. The eyewitness,

who was 14 years old at the time of the incident, did not speak to the police

investigating the crime scene on the day of the incident because she was

“scared.” Id. at 92. Rather, the eyewitness contacted the police three days

after the incident on August 18, 2015.             Id. at 93; see also id. at

Commonwealth Exhibit 26. During her police interview, the eyewitness, in

recalling the incident, first identified the shooter verbally to the police as

“Freaky” and later, upon being shown a single photograph of Appellant,

____________________________________________

4 In her police investigation interview record, the eyewitness stated that she
first moved to “the neighborhood” in November 2014, which is when she first
became aware of Appellant. N.T., 5/16/17, at Commonwealth Exhibit 26.

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confirmed that Appellant was the person she referred to as "Freaky."5 Id. at

Commonwealth Exhibit 26.

       The victim’s girlfriend testified that she observed Appellant and the

victim initially talking and laughing with each other from 45 feet.      N.T.,

5/16/17, at 132-133. At the time, the victim’s girlfriend knew Appellant only

by the nickname “Freaky”. Id. at 133; see also Commonwealth Exhibit 27.

The victim’s girlfriend knew of Appellant for several months prior to the

incident because of Appellant’s association with her boyfriend. N.T., 5/16/17,

133-134; see also id. Commonwealth Exhibit 27. The victim’s girlfriend, who

initially was talking on her cellular telephone, became focused on the

interaction between Appellant and the victim after hearing gunshots. N.T.,

5/16/17, 133-136. When the victim’s girlfriend turned her attention toward

the gunshots, she observed Appellant from a side profile standing over the

victim as he administered the fatal shot to the victim’s head. Id. at 136-138.

Appellant then ran from the scene of the incident. Id. at 138. As the victim’s

girlfriend remained with the victim and after police and emergency personal

arrived and a crowd of on-lookers gathered, the victim’s girlfriend observed

Appellant standing in the crowd. Id. at 140. The victim’s girlfriend did not

indicate to the police that Appellant was present in the crowd because she was

____________________________________________

5 The photograph shown to the eyewitness and on which the eyewitness wrote
the name “Freaky” before signing and dating the photograph did not display
Appellant’s legal name or other identifying information. N.T., 5/16/17, at
Commonwealth Exhibit 26.

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scared. Id. at 140. Rather, the victim’s girlfriend spoke to the police three

days after the incident on August 18, 2015.        Id. at 141; see also id. at

Commonwealth Exhibit 27. During her police interview, the victim’s girlfriend

first identified the shooter as the person she knew only by the nickname

“Freaky.”    Id. at Commonwealth Exhibit 27.       After being shown a single

photograph of Appellant and being asked if she knew the person depicted

therein, the victim’s girlfriend responded that the person in the photograph

was the person she knew as “Freaky.”6 Id.

       The totality of the circumstances surrounding the use of the single

photograph of Appellant in both eyewitness identifications was not unduly

suggestive and did not create a likelihood of misidentification.     Both the

eyewitness and the victim’s girlfriend closely observed the interaction between

Appellant and the victim from short distances. Both eyewitnesses recognized

the shooter as the person they knew as “Freaky,” based upon their

observations of Appellant in the neighborhood or their observations of

Appellant interacting with the victim during the several months prior to the

incident. Moreover, both eyewitnesses identified “Freaky” as the shooter prior

to being shown a photograph of Appellant.             The photograph merely

corroborated that the person both eyewitnesses knew only by the nickname

____________________________________________

6 The photograph shown to the victim’s girlfriend and on which the victim’s
girlfriend wrote the nickname “Freaky” before signing and dating the
photograph did not display Appellant’s legal name or other identifying
information. N.T., 5/16/17, at Commonwealth Exhibit 27.

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“Freaky” was, in fact, Appellant. Therefore, we concur with the PCRA court

that Appellant’s underlying claim – the failure to file a motion to suppress the

single photograph identifications – was without merit and that trial counsel

cannot    be   ineffective    for   failing    to   raise   a   meritless   claim.   See

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 199 A.3d 365, 374 (Pa. 2018) (stating, if the

underlying claim is deemed meritless, trial counsel cannot be found to be

ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim).

       Appellant’s second issue raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to call, at trial, a potential witness, namely Sharon Butcher, who

identified a person other than Appellant as the shooter.7 Appellant’s Brief at

12-16.    Appellant asserts the alternate shooter’s alibi for the time of the

incident consisted of a retail store receipt and video surveillance depicting the

alternate shooter in the retail establishment. Appellant claims, however, that

the surveillance footage did not contain a date or timestamp indicating that it

was from the day of the incident. Id. at 14. Appellant contends that Butcher’s

testimony would have contradicted the alternate shooter’s alibi because she

____________________________________________

7 Appellant contends that Dexter Stinson also identified the same alternate
person as the shooter. Appellant’s Brief at 14. In his Supplemental Amended
PCRA petition, Appellant asserts that “[Appellant] wanted [] Butcher called as
a witness [] but she was not [called as a witness] despite being available and
present at trial.” Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition, 4/13/21, at 8; see
also Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant failed to aver that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call Stinson as a potential witness at trial and, as such,
has waived this claim.

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would have testified that she observed the alternate shooter in the area at the

time of the incident. Id.

      To reiterate, the three prongs of an ineffectiveness claim are: (1)

arguable merit, (2) lack of reasonable basis or strategy, and (3) prejudice.

Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706.        To establish the arguable merit prong of the

three-prong ineffectiveness test based on a failure to call a potential witness

to testify at trial, the petitioner must prove that:

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Matias, 63 A.3d 807, 810-811 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citations omitted), appeal denied, 74 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2013). In this context,

to establish prejudice, the petitioner "must show how the [potential witness']

testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case"

and "helpful to the defense" such that the absence of the testimony denied

the petitioner a fair trial.      Id. at 811 (citation omitted); see also

Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 546 (Pa. 2005) (holding, "[t]rial

counsel's failure to call a [potential witness] does not constitute ineffective

assistance without some showing that the [potential] witness' testimony

would have been beneficial or helpful in establishing the asserted defense"),

cert. denied, 549 U.S. 848 (2006).

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      In addition to establishing arguable merit, a petitioner must also

demonstrate that there was no reasonable basis for failing to call a potential

witness and that the failure to call a potential witness prejudiced the petitioner

such that there was a reasonable probability that the witness’ testimony would

have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Stewart, 84 A.3d at 706; see

also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 278 A.3d 336, 345-349 (Pa. Super.

2022).

      In denying Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim on this ground, the PCRA

court found that Appellant was “unable to establish that [Butcher] was

available and willing to testify [and] unable to show that [trial] counsel did

not have a reasonable basis for his act or omission[.]” PCRA Court Opinion,

6/29/22, at 8. The PCRA court explained,

      Appellant failed to supplement his [ineffectiveness] claim with
      evidence that [trial] counsel did not have a reasonable basis for
      deciding not to use evidence of an [alternate] suspect. Appellant
      did not supplement his petition with evidence that [] Butcher was
      available and willing to testify. There is evidence to believe that
      [] Butcher [] would not have been willing to testify because [she]
      declined to go to [the police] homicide [unit] to provide a [formal]
      statement. Moreover, there was evidence that [the alternate
      shooter] was at a [retail establishment] at the time of the murder.
      Even though[] Appellant claimed there was no surveillance video
      to    corroborate    [the    alternate   shooter’s]    alibi,  [the]
      Commonwealth noted that surveillance video showed [the
      alternate shooter] at a [retail establishment] and [the alternate
      shooter] also had a receipt for the [retail establishment].

Id. at 8.

      The record demonstrates that on the evening of the incident, a police

officer was “flagged down” by two individuals, one of whom was Butcher. N.T.,

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5/17/17, at Commonwealth Exhibit 53. Butcher reported that she observed a

male, who she knew as “Van” running in the area of the incident shortly after

she heard gunshots. Id. Although Butcher provided a verbal statement to

the police officer, she refused to go to the police homicide unit to provide a

formal written statement. Id. Detective Tracy Bayard, who served as the

lead investigator for the incident, stated that based upon information gathered

during the investigation, including, inter alia, the statement by Butcher, the

alternate shooter became a “person-of-interest” in the investigation. Id. at

58-59. The alternate shooter came forward two days after the incident and

provided an alibi to the police that established he was at a retail establishment

at the time of the incident.     Id. at 60-61.    The alternate shooter’s alibi

consisted of, inter alia, a sales receipt from the retail establishment issued on

the date of the incident and timestamped for a time close to when the incident

occurred. Id. at 61. Police officers corroborated the alternate shooter’s alibi

by viewing video surveillance from the retail establishment that showed the

alternate shooter at the retail establishment near the time of the incident.

Although the video surveillance footage did not contain a timestamp and a

copy of the surveillance footage could not be obtained, Officer Bayard stated

that she captured a photograph of the still-frame from the surveillance footage

showing the alternate shooter at the retail establishment near the time of the

incident. Id. at 63-64; see also id. at Commonwealth Exhibit 83. Based

upon the sales receipt and the video surveillance, Officer Bayard eliminated

the alternate shooter as a suspect. Id. at 64.

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       Upon review, we concur with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claim of

ineffective assistance for failing to call a potential witness lacks arguable

merit.    Appellant failed to demonstrate how the absence of Butcher’s

testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied him a fair trial.      Detective

Bayard testified that she was aware, as part of her investigation, that Butcher

identified an alternate shooter running in the area on the day of the incident

shortly after she heard gunshots. Based upon Butcher’s verbal statement, the

alternate shooter became a person-of-interest to the police but was later

eliminated as a suspect once his alibi was corroborated. Butcher’s testimony

would have provided only cumulative information – namely the notion of an

alternate shooter – that was already presented by the Commonwealth.8

Therefore, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the PCRA court’s

denial of Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim on this ground.9

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

8 Moreover, Appellant failed to demonstrate that Butcher was available and
willing to testify for the defense at trial. Although Butcher provided a verbal
statement to the police on the date of the incident, she declined to provide a
formal written statement.

9 We discern no error in the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition without
an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s supplemental amended PCRA petition did
not contain a certification, as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1), that
included, inter alia, the witness’s name, address, date of birth, and a brief
summary of her proposed testimony. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § (d)(1)(i and ii). As such,
Appellant’s failure to comply with Section 9545(d)(1) would have rendered
the potential witness’s testimony inadmissible at an evidentiary hearing. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1)(iii).

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J-S37039-22

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/10/2023

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