Court Opinion

ID: 9953533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:08.964742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.830511
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2023-CA-0259-MR

MICHAEL DARREN BOYD                                                APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM CUMBERLAND CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE DAVID WILLIAMS, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 19-CI-00053

MARK SCHWENKE AND GLENDA
SCHWENKE                                                           APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: LAMBERT, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This appeal concerns a dispute between Michael Darren

Boyd (“Boyd”) and Mark and Glenda Schwenke (“Schwenke”) over a roadway.

Following a jury trial, the Cumberland Circuit Court entered a judgment which

held the Schwenkes had a prescriptive easement over the roadway, enjoined Boyd

from obstructing the roadway, and awarded the Schwenkes $5,000 in damages.
Boyd appeals the permanent injunction and damage award.1 For the reasons

below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                Boyd and the Schwenkes own neighboring real estate in Cumberland

County, Kentucky. In 2019, the Schwenkes purchased an 8-acre plot of land for

Mark Schwenke’s (“Mark”) brother to live on, the only access to which was an

unimproved road. Shortly after the Schwenkes bought the property, Boyd blocked

the roadway with a shipping container, preventing their access. The Schwenkes

brought an action in Cumberland Circuit Court, seeking a permanent injunction,

recognition of their right to use the road, and damages. Boyd eventually removed

the container, but by that time the Schwenkes had been unable to access their

property for one and a half years.

                A jury trial was held on the easement and damages claims. Mark

testified he bought the property for his brother, Luke, to live on. But when Boyd

blocked the road, that was delayed. The road became overgrown during that time

because they could not use or maintain it. Luke currently lives on the property in

his recreational vehicle, and Mark has built a small cabin that he uses weekly for

Bible studies. Luke confirmed he had lived on the property for eighteen months.

He maintains the property and pays rent, although not a set amount.

1
    Boyd does not appeal the easement determination.

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             Following the evidence, the jury found in favor of the Schwenkes and

awarded $5,000 in damages. In its judgment, in addition to the damage award, the

court issued a permanent injunction, ordering that Boyd “shall not obstruct the

passage of anyone along said road . . . [or] place any obstacle on, over or in the

road.” Boyd moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing the

damage award was not supported by substantial evidence. He also moved to alter,

amend, or vacate the damage award, and the permanent injunction because it was

not supported by the jury’s verdict, or within its purview since it is an equitable

remedy. The court denied the motion. This appeal followed.

              “[T]he standard of review regarding the amount of damages awarded

is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied [appellant]’s motion

for JNOV.” Banker v. University of Louisville Athletic Association, Inc., 466

S.W.3d 456, 463 (Ky. 2015). Further, “[t]he amount of damages is a dispute left to

the sound discretion of the jury . . . . If the verdict bears any reasonable

relationship to the evidence of loss suffered, it is the duty of the trial court and this

Court not to disturb the jury’s assessment of damages.” Hazelwood v. Beauchamp,

766 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Ky. App. 1989). Boyd argues the jury’s damage award was

not supported by substantial evidence. We agree.

             “The measure of damages for obstruction of a passway is the

diminution in value of the use of the property during the time the obstruction

                                           -3-
continued, and rental value is a relevant factor in determining the amount of

damages.” Wells v. Sanor, 151 S.W.3d 819, 825 (Ky. App. 2004) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, there was no evidence or testimony

concerning the rental value of the property during the 1.5 years the Schwenkes

were denied access. Mark testified he bought the property for his brother to live on

and that that was delayed when Boyd blocked the roadway. Luke currently lives

on the property and pays some money towards rent, but the amount was not

specified.

             “[D]amages must always be proven with reasonable certainty.”

Curry v. Bennett, 301 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Ky. App. 2009), as modified (May 1,

2009) (citation omitted). “[T]here must be introduced in evidence some tangible

figure from which the value of the use reasonably can be deduced, else the court

and jury are left to draw entirely on their experience aliunde, or upon naked

speculation.” Adams Const. Co. v. Bentley, 335 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ky. 1960). This

tangible figure could be “the rental value of the dwelling in question or . . . the

rental value of other comparable property.” Id. In this case, the best evidence of

damages would likely be what Luke would have paid Mark over the 1.5 years the

roadway was blocked. Other evidence would also suffice, such as the rental value

of comparable property. But there must be some “tangible figure from which the

                                          -4-
value of the use reasonably can be deduced[.]” Id. Therefore, we must reverse for

a new trial on damages.

                Boyd also argues the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief

because the jury made no such finding and has no authority to award injunctive

relief. Essentially, he argues the court should not have included equitable relief in

its judgment following a jury trial because that issue was not properly before the

court. We disagree.

                 “[I]njunctive relief is basically addressed to the sound discretion of

the trial court. Unless a trial court has abused that discretion, this Court has no

power to set aside the order below.” Maupin v. Stansbury, 575 S.W.2d 695, 697-

98 (Ky. App. 1978) (citations omitted). An abuse of that discretion occurs only

when the “decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound

legal principles.” Commonwealth ex rel. Conway v. Thompson, 300 S.W.3d 152,

162 (Ky. 2009).

                The Schwenkes complaint sought a determination of their easement

rights to the roadway, injunctive relief, and damages. The easement and damages

questions were tried by jury. At that time, the issue of a permanent injunction was

still pending before the court. Once the jury determined the Schwenkes had an

easement, the court could rule on the permanent injunction. See CR2 65.01 (“A

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -5-
party may obtain injunctive relief in the circuit court by . . . permanent injunction

in a final judgment.”). We find no error in the trial court’s procedure of including

the injunction in its final judgment following the jury trial.

             We further find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing

the injunction. The final judgment found the Schwenkes have a prescriptive

easement over the roadway and permanently enjoined Boyd from “obstruct[ing]

the passage of anyone along said road . . . [or] plac[ing] any obstacle on, over or in

the road.” Boyd has not appealed the easement determination, thus there is no

question the Schwenkes have the right to use the roadway free from Boyd’s

interference. Instead, Boyd appears to take issue with the broad language of the

court’s injunction. He argues he “has a right to protect his land and can erect a

gate or other[wise] restrict access provided he does not unreasonably interfere with

[the Schwenkes’] access[,]” citing the general rule that a servient “owner cannot

unreasonably interfere with the rights of the holder of the easement.”

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife Resources v. Garner, 896 S.W.2d 10, 14

(Ky. 1995) (citations omitted).

             The problem with Boyd’s argument, however, is that there was no

evidence Boyd owned the roadway. Jake Staton, the licensed surveyor who

surveyed Boyd’s property, testified the roadway was the boundary line to Boyd’s

                                          -6-
property. Thus, Boyd would have no right to restrict anyone’s access to the

roadway because he does not own it. Therefore, we find no error.

             Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Cumberland Circuit

Court is affirmed as to the permanent injunction and reversed as to the damage

award with directions that a new trial be granted on the sole question of damages.

As noted above, “[t]he measure of damages for obstruction of a passway is the

diminution in value of the use of the property during the time the obstruction

continued, and rental value is a relevant factor in determining the amount of

damages.” Wells, 151 S.W.3d at 825 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). Any damage award must be supported by “some tangible figure from

which the value of the use reasonably can be deduced[.]” Adams Const. Co., 335

S.W.2d at 914.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Winter R. Huff                            Gary A. Little
Monticello, Kentucky                      Albany, Kentucky

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