Court Opinion

ID: 9755174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:28:58.533694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:04.214855
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(concurring).
I concur with the majority opinion in this case.
I agree that in the posture in which this case is before us the result is compelled by the December 11, 1973, decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Robinson, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, - U.S. , 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973).
Lest a casual reader might draw unwarranted conclusions from this opinion and from the majority "opinion in Gustafson, I desire to restate for emphasis that which is clearly stated in the majority opinion in this case and which is readily apparent from a careful reading of Robinson and Gustafson.
In this case:
(a) the defendant does not dispute that his incarceration was lawful;
(b) in this case defendant’s claim of illegality is predicated entirely upon asserted violations of the Fourth Amendment as binding on the states by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
The majority opinion does not suggest, nor should it, what position we would take if the claim of illegality was predicated on the provisions of Sec. 5, Art. I, of the Constitution of Maine.1
I would also emphasize that in Gustaf-son, although the defendant was taken into custody for the offense of driving his automobile without a valid operator’s license, the defendant conceded the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest and thus removed the issue from the case. *913(See concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Stewart.)
I finally emphasize that in Robinson, the Court in footnote 2 took pains to point out that the standard operating procedures of the Metropolitan Police Department required a full custody arrest in the circumstances there described.2

. It should be pointed out as we said in State v. Stone, Me., 294 A.2d 683, 693, fn. 15:
“Prior to being constitutionally obliged by Mapp [Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081] and Ker [Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726], supra, to follow an exclusionary rule for evidence acquired by Fourth Amendment violations, Maine had declined to provide such sanction”. See: State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 92 A. 867 (1915).
If a claim of illegality was asserted under the provisions of the Maine Constitution, a reexamination of State v. Schoppe, supra, would be required.

. Contra see Standard 4.2, National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals; Standard 2.2, Amer. ican Bar Association Standards relating to Pretrial Release. See also Glassman, Maine Practice, See. 4.1, p. 26, fn. 17.