Court Opinion

ID: 9865417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:08:41.991658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:42.834014
License: Public Domain

J-S23030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 CHARLES VINCENT MATTUCCI                 :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 30 EDA 2023

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 12, 2022,
              in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County,
           Criminal Division at No(s): CP-13-CR-0000577-2018.

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                  FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

      Charles Vincent Mattucci appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following revocation of his parole. Upon review, we affirm.

      The VOP court detailed the relevant facts and procedural history as

follows:

      On October 18, 2019, Defendant, Charles Vincent Mattucci, pled
      guilty to one count of driving under the influence, highest rate of
      alcohol [75 Pa. C. S.A. §3802 (c)], as a second offense, and one
      count of driving under suspension/DUI related [75 Pa.C.S.A. §
      1543(b) (1.1)(i)]. The date of offense was April 7, 2018.

      The Honorable Steven R. Serfass sentenced [Mattucci] on
      December 12, 2019, to a period of imprisonment in the Carbon
      County Correctional Facility to a term of not less than ninety days
      nor more than sixty months on the driving under the influence
      offense and a concurrent term of not less than forty-five days nor
      more than ninety days for driving under suspension/DUI related.
      On the driving under the influence offense [Mattucci] was given
      ninety-two days credit and [he] received ninety days credit on his
      sentence for driving under suspension/DUI related.
J-S23030-23

     At the time [Mattucci] was sentenced, he was in prison in the
     county jail, having failed to post bail. He was not being detained
     for any other reason and was not serving another sentence.

     On December 13, 2019, [a day after he was sentenced, Mattucci]
     was released from the Carbon County Correctional Facility. The
     authorization for this release is in question since the sentence
     Judge Serfass imposed did not grant [Mattucci] immediate parole
     upon serving his minimum sentence, did not subject [Mattucci] to
     a pre-parole investigation, and did not require [him] to report to
     the Carbon County Adult Probation and Parole Office (Probation
     Office) within 72 hours of his release. It did however impose a
     monthly supervision fee of fifty dollars.

     After [Mattucci] was released from prison, he was supervised by
     the County's Probation Office.     On January 22, 2020, two
     members of the Probation Office met with [Mattucci] at his home
     and discussed with him the special conditions of his parole,
     including the requirement that he attend treatment intervention
     group classes.

     On January 21, 2021, the Probation Office filed a Petition to
     Revoke [Mattucci's] Parole (Petition). The Petition alleged that
     [Mattucci] violated the conditions of his supervision in two
     respects: (1) that he failed to report to the Probation Office within
     72 hours of his release for an intake to be completed; and (2) that
     he was arrested and charged by the Pennsylvania State Police in
     Lehighton with driving under the influence of a controlled
     substance and false identification to law enforcement from an
     incident which occurred on January 6, 2021. The Petition was
     amended twice to include additional alleged parole violations: (1)
     by order dated February 5, 2021, for new criminal charges filed
     by the Pennsylvania State Police in Lehighton; and (2) by order
     dated March 25, 2021, for new criminal charges filed by the
     Pennsylvania State Police in Belfast. A hearing on the Petition was
     held before this court on December 9, 2022.

     At the hearing on December 9, 2022, the evidence established
     [Mattucci] pled guilty to driving under the influence of a controlled
     substance and to driving under suspension/DUI related with
     respect to the incident of January 6, 2021, the offense referred to
     in the Petition as originally filed, but that [he] had not yet been
     sentenced on these charges and had pending before the court a
     petition to withdraw his pleas.

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      With respect to the new criminal charges referred to in the order
      of February 5, 2021, [Mattucci] pled guilty to false identification
      to law enforcement, a misdemeanor of the third degree, in Monroe
      County on March 12, 2021, and was given a time-served sentence
      of four days. With respect to the new criminal charges filed by
      the Pennsylvania State Police in Belfast referred to in the March
      25, 2021 order, on September 16, 2021, [Mattucci] pled guilty
      and was sentenced in Northampton County to a period of
      imprisonment of not less than three months nor more than twelve
      months, was given seven days credit, and had yet to be paroled
      as of the date of the revocation hearing.

      At the December 9, 2022 [revocation] hearing, [Mattucci] did not
      dispute the new criminal charges or their disposition as presented
      by the Commonwealth, but took the position that he had never
      been placed on parole and therefore could not be in violation.
      [Mattucci] further testified that notwithstanding the clear
      language of the final judgment of sentence sentencing him to no
      less than ninety days nor more than sixty months in prison for
      driving under the influence, the minimum and maximum stated in
      the sentencing order were only guidelines, that he in fact received
      a flat sentence of ninety-two days, and that he had completed his
      sentence in its entirety by the time he was released from prison
      on December 13, 2019.

VOP Court Opinion, 1/24/23, at 1-4 (citations and footnotes omitted). At the

conclusion of the hearing, the VOP court found that Mattucci violated his parole

based upon the new convictions but not for his failure to report. Consequently,

the court revoked [Mattucci's] parole and recommitted him to the Carbon

County Correctional Facility to serve until the maximum date of his original

sentence, September 11, 2024.

      Mattucci filed this timely appeal. Mattucci and the court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      On appeal, Mattucci raises a single issue:

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       Were the parole revocation proceedings in the case sub judice
       fatally flawed in that [Mattucci] was never expressly advised he
       would be paroled nor of the conditions of supervision at the time
       of sentencing, no order granting parole ever appeared of record
       and as such [Mattucci] was never subject to any actual
       supervision?

Mattucci’s Brief at 4.

       On appeal, Mattucci claims that the trial court erred in concluding that

he violated parole, revoking it, and recommitting him. Specifically, Mattucci

argues that he never was informed that he was under parole supervision after

he completed the minimum period of incarceration. Mattucci’s Brief at 8-9.

Additionally, Mattucci argues that the trial court never informed him of the

terms and conditions of supervision at the time of sentencing. Mattucci cites

this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Koger, 255 A.3d 1285 (Pa. Super.

2021), in support of his position.1 Consequently, Mattucci maintains that no

revocation of parole proceedings properly could have been initiated against

him. Id. at 15-16. We disagree.

       In reviewing this matter, we observe that the purpose of a parole-

revocation hearing is to determine whether the parolee violated parole and, if

so, whether parole remains a viable means of rehabilitating the defendant and

deterring future antisocial conduct, or whether revocation, and thus

recommitment, are in order. Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 632 A.2d 934,

937 (Pa. Super. 1993). The Commonwealth must prove the violation by a

____________________________________________

1 As discussed infra, this Court’s decision in Koger was recently reversed by

our Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Koger, 295 A.3d. 699 (Pa. 2023).

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preponderance of the evidence and, once it does, the decision to revoke parole

is a matter for the court's discretion.   Id. at 937. In the exercise of that

discretion, a conviction for a new crime is a legally sufficient basis to revoke

parole. Commonwealth v. Galletta, 864 A.2d 532, 539 (Pa. Super. 2004).

       After revocation and recommitment, the sole issue on appeal is whether

the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in revoking appellant's parole and

committing him to a term of total confinement. See Mitchell, 632 A.2d at

936.

       Here, Mattucci does not dispute that he was arrested and convicted of

new offenses or that these convictions constituted violations of parole.

Instead, Mattucci claims that he was never informed that he was on parole

after he was released from the Carbon County Jail, and therefore he could not

be found in violation of parole or be recommitted.

       A review of the original sentencing transcript shows that, on December

12, 2019, after Mattucci pled guilty to DUI, the trial court sentenced him to

“not less than 90 days nor more than 60 months” incarceration.             N.T.,

12/12/19, at 3. The court further stated that Mattucci was to receive credit

for the 92 days that he had served. Id. The court also imposed a $50 monthly

probation supervision fee. Id.

       We observe that, as required by law, the trial court set a minimum and

maximum term of incarceration. The Code mandates that the sentencing court

impose not only a maximum sentence, but also a minimum sentence which

shall not exceed one-half the maximum. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b).       The terms

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of Mattucci’s sentence were clearly stated on the record. Thus, Mattucci’s

claims that the “90 days to 60 months” was merely a guideline or that his

sentence constituted a flat sentence of 92 days, which he had served, are

completely belied by the record. As the VOP court observed, what Mattucci

believed, thought, or assumed about his sentence is of no consequence.

Moreover, the VOP court found Mattucci’s claimed “lack of understanding”

about the terms of his sentence was incredible given his criminal history. See

VOP Court Opinion, 1/24/23, at 4, 8.

     Regarding whether Mattucci was paroled, we further observe that

Mattucci could not have been placed on parole without having served his

minimum sentence.      With an indeterminate sentence, as this was, “the

maximum term represents the sentence imposed for a criminal offense, with

the minimum term [] setting the date after which a prisoner may be paroled.”

Commonwealth v. Blount, 207 A.3d 925, 939, (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 218 A.3d 1198 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted). Thus, once Mattucci

served his minimum sentence, he was eligible to be paroled for the remaining

balance of his maximum sentence.

     Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9776(b), defendants generally may not be

paroled from a county sentence without filing a petition to request parole.

(“No inmate may be paroled under this section except on petition verified by

the oath of the inmate or by the inmate's representative and presented and

filed in the court in which the inmate was convicted.”). However, certain

counties, have passed administrative orders that permit prisoners to be

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automatically released on parole after they serve the minimum sentence.

Commonwealth v. Stafford, 29 A.3d 800, 802 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      Here, as the VOP court explained:

      Carbon County is one of several counties in this Commonwealth
      which has an administrative order granting automatic parole for
      defendants convicted of driving under the influence who receive a
      sentence in which the minimum term of imprisonment is not more
      than ninety days. See Administrative Order dated August 26,
      1991, docked to No, 073 MI 91. This order authorizes and directs
      the prison warden to release any defendant subject to its terms
      immediately upon serving the minimum sentence without further
      action or order of court.

VOP Court Opinion, 1/24/23, at 10. Although Mattucci’s sentencing order on

its face did not make him immediately eligible for parole upon serving his

minimum sentence, Carbon County’s Administrative Order allowed Mattucci to

be released from jail after serving the minimum sentence.        And although

Mattucci may not have been advised at the time of sentencing that he would

be immediately released on parole, he was released from jail after serving

only ninety-three days, his minimum sentence plus three days.         As such,

Mattucci was in fact paroled and still had to serve the remainder of his

sentence, either on parole or by being recommitted.

      This brings us to the issue of whether Mattucci had notice that he was

on parole.   As the trial court observed, Mattucci’s release from prison should

have put him on notice that he was paroled, particularly given his familiarity

with judicial proceedings related to DUI offenses. See VOP Court Opinion,

1/24/23, at 9.   Even if he was not immediately aware that he was being

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released on parole, a month after he was released, probation officers visited

him at his residence. Mattucci himself testified that they told him he was on

parole until 2024 (i.e., the date when his maximum sentence expired) and

reviewed some paperwork with him. The probation officer’s notes indicated

that the officer discussed the special conditions with Mattucci and the

requirements that he attend the treatment intervention group classes as soon

as possible and then the highway safety classes. N.T., 12/9/22, at 16-17, 21-

22. Thus, Mattucci was in fact notified that he was on parole despite the lack

of documentation to that effect. Furthermore, at the time of sentencing, the

trial court informed Mattucci that he had to pay a supervision fee, which

Mattucci never questioned. This also put Mattucci on notice that he would be

subject to supervision upon his release.

      Notably, the VOP court did not find that Mattucci violated his parole

based on his failure to report to probation within 72 hours of being released

from prison because this was not a condition of his parole. We observe further

that this possible reporting condition took place well before Mattucci was

formally notified that he was on parole. Rather, the VOP court only found that

Mattucci violated his parole based on crimes he committed and was convicted

of, which occurred after he was released from prison and was informed by the

probation officers that he was on parole. N.T., 12/9/22, at 40-41; VOP Court

Opinion, 1/24/23, at 5.

      Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Mattucci’s argument that

he was never on parole is without merit.

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      Mattucci next argues that the VOP court could not find that he violated

parole because the trial court did not inform him of the conditions of his parole

at the time of sentencing as required by this Court’s decision in Koger.

Likewise, this argument is without merit.

      Notably, our Supreme Court recently reversed this Court’s Koger

decision. See Commonwealth v. Koger, 295 A.3d 699 (Pa. 2023). After

conducting a statutory analysis as it pertains to revocation of parole as

opposed to revocation of probation, the High Court concluded that there is no

legislative mandate requiring the trial court, itself, to set forth the conditions

of parole or when a defendant must be advised of these conditions. Id. at

708. The Court found that this is particularly so for county parole. In county

parole cases, the trial court is required to “place the inmate in the charge of

and under the supervision of a designated probation officer.” Id. (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9776(d)).      Thus, the Supreme Court held that a trial court

imposing county parole is “authorized to delegate to county probation officers

the responsibility of communicating to defendants the conditions of their

parole, and to do so post-sentencing.” Id. at 709.

      Based upon the Supreme Court’s decision, the trial court here was not

required to set forth the conditions of Mattucci’s parole nor did it have to be

done at the time of sentencing. As discussed above, the probation officer who

visited Mattucci a month after he was released from jail reviewed the

conditions of parole with him. This was proper under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Koger.

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     In sum, we conclude that the VOP did not err when it revoked Mattucci’s

parole and recommitted him for the balance of his sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/25/2023

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