Court Opinion

ID: 9955509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:12:32.337919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.568401
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Halton v. Halton, 2024-Ohio-1165.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

JOCELYN O. HALTON,                                  :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                             No. 113090
                v.                                  :

BEN HALTON,                                         :

                Defendant-Appellee.                 :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;
                            AND REMANDED

                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 28, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Domestic Relations Division
                                Case No. DR-22-392116

                                              Appearances:

                Cavitch Familo & Durkin, L.P.A., and Roger L. Kleinman,
                for appellant.

                James R. Tanner, Jr., for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

               Plaintiff-appellant Jocelyn O. Halton appeals following a judgment

entry of divorce. Upon review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the

matter to the trial court with instructions.

               Jocelyn and defendant-appellee Ben Halton were married in 2005

and have two minor children. A complaint for divorce was filed in October 2022.

The matter proceeded to trial on May 10, 2023.

               At the beginning of the trial, it was represented that the parties had

resolved nearly all the issues in the case, but they had not reached a full agreement,

with the primary asset in question being the marital home. It appears from the

transcript that Jocelyn, who wished to retain the marital home, was willing to pay

Ben $50,000, but the resources were not available to pay that amount outright as

Ben wanted. Jocelyn’s attorney stated that “[w]e are agreeable to either refinancing,

or if we can’t refinance, to selling the home once the youngest child graduates, which

is in four [years].” Jocelyn’s attorney also indicated there was a substantial amount

of debt, and Jocelyn agreed to “absorb all of the debt that’s in her name” as well as

“the mortgages on the home.” The record reflects Jocelyn’s annual income was

approximately three times Ben’s annual income. Ben’s attorney indicated that “we

are prepared for the Court to determine equitable division of the marital assets.”

               Because the parties were unable to come to a full agreement, the case

proceeded with trial. The parties entered joint stipulations. They agreed on the
value of assets and the amount of debt, and they agreed to certain divisions. They

agreed to a mutual waiver of spousal support and child support. The parties also

had entered a shared parenting plan. Testimony and evidence were provided in the

matter, which this court has reviewed.

              The trial court issued a judgment entry of divorce on July 17, 2023.

The trial court determined that the termination date of the marriage was May 10,

2023. The trial court recognized that the parties submitted joint stipulations

addressing various aspects of the property division.

              The trial court noted that the parties stipulated to the real property’s

then present value of $425,000 and that there was a total debt on the property of

$259,792.99. The trial court observed that “due to [Jocelyn’s] debt, in addition to

current mortgage rates, [Jocelyn] would be unable to refinance the real property.”

Therefore, the trial court found “[Jocelyn] shall be allocated exclusive possession of

the real property.”    The trial court required that “[Jocelyn] shall bear sole

responsibility for all the debt on the real property,” imposed several conditions, and

indicated that “[i]f either party files a post-decree motion, the Court will consider

ordering the property sold.” The court further required that “[o]nce the minor

children have graduated from high school — if the property has not already been

sold — the real property shall be sold and any remaining proceeds after the

satisfaction of the remaining debts shall be divided equally between the parties.”

              The trial court ordered “any retirement assets earned during the

marriage shall be divided equally between the Parties.” The trial court found that
Jocelyn had a 401(k) from her employment and that Ben did not have any

retirement assets.

               The trial court also divided the other property and debts acquired

during the marriage.      Regarding debts, the trial court found “[Jocelyn] has

$287,671.37 consumer debt which includes credit card debt and student loan debt”

and “the parties stipulated that [Jocelyn] shall retain this debt” and that “[Ben] shall

retain his own debt” of approximately $9,118.09. The trial court set forth the

division of vehicles, financial accounts, and personal property, all as agreed to by the

parties. Consistent with the parties’ stipulations, neither party was required to pay

spousal support or child support to the other party. The trial court approved the

parties’ shared parenting plan. Other determinations were made by the trial court.

               Jocelyn timely filed this appeal from the trial court’s judgment. She

raises two assignments of error for our review.

               Under her first assignment of error, Jocelyn argues that “the trial

court’s decision that the division of assets and debts is ‘equal’ is an abuse of

discretion and contrary to the weight of the evidence.”            Under her second

assignment of error, appellant argues that “the trial court’s decision granting [Ben]

an interest in [Jocelyn’s] post marital mortgage payments and improvements to the

formal marital residence is error as a matter of law.”

               “In any divorce action, the starting point for a trial court’s analysis is

an equal division of marital property.” Daniel v. Daniel, 139 Ohio St.3d 275, 2014-

Ohio-1161, 11 N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 7, citing R.C. 3105.171(C)(1); Neville v. Neville, 99 Ohio
St.3d 275, 2003-Ohio-3624, 791 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 5. Pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(C), it is

only when an equal division of marital property would be inequitable that a trial

court must instead divide it between the spouses in the manner that the court

determines to be equitable with consideration of all relevant factors, including the

factors set forth in R.C. 3105.171(F). “Since a trial court has broad discretion in the

allocation of marital assets, its judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion.” Neville at ¶ 5.

               Initially, we recognize that the parties reached joint stipulations as to

the division of nearly all assets and debts in this matter. Insofar as these divisions

were made in accordance with the joint stipulations, we find no abuse of discretion

by the trial court.

               The trial court divided the remaining assets and debts equally, which

included an equal division of Jocelyn’s 401(k) and an equal division involving the

marital home. The record shows that at the time of trial, the parties stipulated that

the marital home had a fair market value of $425,000 and that there was a total debt

on the property of $259,792.99, leaving the then equity in the home at $165,207.01.

The trial court ordered appellant to be responsible for all debt on the real property

and allowed for satisfaction of the remaining debt from the eventual sale of home,

and the court required the remaining proceeds to be divided equally. Upon our

review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to divide these

remaining assets and debts equally. However, we find the trial court abused its
decision by ordering an equal division to be determined at the time of the future sale

of the marital home.

               We recognize that R.C. 3105.171(J)(1) permits the trial court to issue

an order, if it deems it to be equitable, “granting a spouse the right to use the marital

dwelling * * * for any reasonable period of time.” In this case, the trial court did so

for the benefit of the children and ordered the real property to be sold once the minor

children graduate from high school, if not already sold. However, the trial court

used the date of the future sale of the home as the date for dividing the remaining

equity in the real property. As argued by appellant, the trial court effectively divided

Jocelyn’s post-marital property rights.

               “‘As a general matter, a trial court should consistently apply the same

set of dates when evaluating marital property that is subject to division and

distribution in a divorce proceeding.’”       Owens v. Owens, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-210488, 2022-Ohio-3450, ¶ 19, quoting Kachmar v. Kachmar, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 08 MA 90, 2010-Ohio-1311, ¶ 47. Although circumstances may allow

for a trial court to choose a different date, such as a de facto termination of marriage

date, for valuation purposes, “‘[t]he trial court abuses its discretion when it chooses

a division date that occurs after the end of the marriage.’” Id., quoting Kachmar at

¶ 47. “‘This is so because ‘[t]he duration of the marriage is critical in distinguishing

marital, separate, and post-separation assets and determining appropriate dates for

valuation.’” Kachmar, quoting Harris v. Harris, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2002-A-

81, 2003-Ohio-5350, ¶ 10.
                Accordingly, we sustain the second assignment of error with respect

to the use of a future date for determining the equal division of the remaining equity

in the real property. On remand, the trial court is to enter a new order in accordance

with this opinion that equally divides the $165,207.01 marital equity in the home

that existed on May 10, 2023, which may be paid from the proceeds from the sale of

the home. We are not otherwise persuaded by appellant’s arguments.

                Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part. Case remanded with

instructions.

      It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, domestic relations division, to carry this judgment into

execution. Case remanded to the trial court.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR