Court Opinion

ID: 2964911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:52.915799+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.685842
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

        No. 96-1398

                              CLAIR INTERNATIONAL, INC.
                            AND FOREIGN MOTORS WEST, INC.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                        MERCEDES-BENZ OF NORTH AMERICA, INC.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                       Aldrich and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges,
                                        _____________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Richard B. McNamara, with whom Gregory A. Holmes and Stephanie A.
             ___________________            _________________     ____________
        Bray were on brief for appellants.
        ____
             Mark P. Szpak, with whom Peter K. Levitt and Ropes & Gray were on
             _____________            _______________     ____________
        brief for appellee.

                                                     
                                 ____________________
                                  September 5, 1997
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,   Senior   Circuit   Judge.     Plaintiffs   Clair
                    CYR,   Senior   Circuit   Judge.     
                           ________________________

          International,  Inc. and Foreign Motors West,  Inc. appeal from a

          district court  judgment dismissing  their respective  claims for

          breach  of contract  and violation  of  Mass. Gen.  Laws ch.  93B

          against  Mercedes-Benz  of  North  America  ("MBNA"),  the  North

          American distribution organization for Mercedes-Benz automobiles.

          The  central  controversy   concerns  whether  the  restructuring

          effected by MBNA among its franchisees in the Greater Boston area

          during  the  mid-1990s  breached its  dealership  agreement  with

          plaintiffs-appellants.  We affirm the district court judgment.

                                          I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    During the  early 1990s,  MBNA was  represented by  two

          dealerships  in the  North Shore  area of  Greater Boston:   Auto

          Engineering, Inc.  ("Auto Engineering"),  located in  Burlington,

          and Gauthier Motors,  Inc. ("Gauthier"), located in Salem.   Auto

          Engineering closed in  April 1993,1 leaving Gauthier  as the only

          MBNA  presence on  the North  Shore.   Gauthier, among  the older

          Mercedes-Benz dealerships  in  the United  States, operated  from

          what  MBNA considered an  inadequate facility, a  small, outmoded

          dealership located  in  downtown  Salem.   In  early  1993,  MBNA

          approved a plan for relocating  the Gauthier dealership to  Route
                              
          ____________________

               1Auto  Engineering  relocated  its dealership  without  MBNA
          authorization on November 2,  1992.  See McLane  v. Mercedes-Benz
                                               ___ ______     _____________
          of  North America, Inc., 3  F.3d 522, 523 (1st  Cir. 1993).  As a
          _______________________
          result,  Mercedes gave notice  of termination.   Auto Engineering
          then  obtained  a  temporary  injunction prohibiting  termination
          until April 11,  1993, at which time the injunction expired.  See
                                                                        ___
          id. at 523-24.  See infra p. 9.
          ___             ___ _____

                                          2

          128,  which would  enable it  to service  the entire  North Shore

          area.   Whereupon,  Gauthier  began  its search  for  an  outside

          investor to finance its relocation plan. 

                    Unable to secure  a suitable investor, in  October 1994

          Gauthier  decided  to  sell its  dealership  outright  to Michael

          Cantanucci, an  experienced automobile dealer  who already  owned

          more  than twenty non-MBNA franchises.  In due course, Cantanucci

          obtained a purchase and sale agreement on a  parcel of land along

          Route  128, as  the  site  of the  proposed  new, exclusive  MBNA

          dealership.   After completing  a routine "due  diligence" check,

          which took approximately  one month, MBNA approved  the franchise

          transfer to Cantanucci.  

                    The exclusivity provision was important to MBNA,  which

          faced  increased competition from new luxury automobile lines and

          planned to shift  to larger,  exclusive dealerships  in order  to

          meet the challenge.  At the time, moreover, MBNA had no exclusive

          dealership  in the  Greater Boston  area,  and Mercedes-Benz  was

          developing several new products, at  least one of which, a sports

          utility vehicle, was to be sold only at exclusive dealerships.

                    Upon  learning   of  the  proposed   location  for  the

          Cantanucci dealership, Herb  Chambers, a Mercedes-Benz  dealer in

          Somerville, Massachusetts, protested to  MBNA, claiming that  the

          proposed  Route   128  site  was  too  close  to  his  Somerville

          dealership.  In December 1994, Chambers brought an action against

          MBNA to enjoin construction of its proposed Route 128 dealership.

          Although the  suit was  dismissed in April  1995, six  months had

                                          3

          elapsed   during  which   Cantanucci  had   not   proceeded  with

          construction  of the new dealership facility  due to the Chambers

          litigation.

                    Meanwhile, differences were developing between MBNA and

          Cantanucci concerning  the proposed new  dealership, particularly

          the  timetable  for  construction, since  MBNA  had  been without

          adequate  North Shore representation for approximately two years.

          Moreover,  during the  summer of  1995 Cantanucci  had agreed  to

          acquire  a Mercedes  dealership in  Connecticut, which  concerned

          MBNA  for  two  reasons.    First,  MBNA  had  never  dealt  with

          Cantanucci before, yet suddenly was faced with the  prospect that

          he could  control two MBNA  dealerships in New England.   Second,

          the   $10,000,000  investment   required   for  the   Connecticut

          dealership could leave  Cantanucci without adequate  financing to

          proceed with the North Shore dealership, where MBNA considered an

          adequate Mercedes-Benz presence vital. 

                    These   concerns  were   borne   out  when   Cantanucci

          approached MBNA for permission to construct a smaller facility on

          Route 128, then attempted to renege on the exclusivity provision.

          Although Cantanucci later agreed to meet the original terms after

          MBNA declined his  request, the new  permanent facility on  Route

          128 could not be completed for approximately ten more months, and

          Cantanucci declined to  open a temporary service  facility during

          the interim as MBNA had requested.

                    At this point,  with Gauthier running out  of operating

          capital and MBNA  confronting the prospect that  there might soon

                                          4

          be no Mercedes-Benz presence on  the North Shore, MBNA decided to

          offer its North Shore dealership to Chambers.

                    The MBNA decision  was based in  part on its  perceived

          need to move quickly, due to the extended period during which the

          North Shore had  been without a suitable  Mercedes-Benz presence,

          especially in light of the competition from new luxury automobile

          lines being marketed  at large, exclusive dealerships.   Further,

          MBNA  considered Chambers the  Mercedes-Benz dealer best  able to

          become an immediate force in the North  Shore market area.  As an

          established Massachusetts automobile  dealer, Chambers had access

          to  advertising opportunities  on  a scale  no  new dealer  could

          match.  Indeed, MBNA regarded  Chambers as its top dealer  in the

          Greater Boston area, especially since  he had the highest  profit

          margin  and  was rated  its  best  dealer  "at point  of  sale."2

          Moreover,  Chambers was well  capitalized and planned  to proceed

          immediately with construction of an exclusive dealership facility
          ___________

          meeting  all MBNA  specifications, on  a very  desirable site  he

          already owned in Danvers, Massachusetts.

                    In  the  meantime,  Chambers had  agreed  to  operate a

          temporary  MBNA dealership  facility  at  a  site  in  Lynnfield,

          Massachusetts, pending  construction of  the permanent  facility.

          Finally, he not only agreed to operate an exclusive Mercedes-Benz

          dealership  on  the  North Shore,  but  to  convert  his existing

                              
          ____________________

               2The  "point of sale" rating assesses the degree of customer
          satisfaction  with  the   dealer  at  the  time  the  vehicle  is
          purchased.   Chambers  fared less  well in  terms of  the vehicle
          "service" rating.

                                          5

          Somerville  dealership to an exclusive dealership as well, giving

          MBNA two exclusive dealerships in an important market  area where

          it had none.

                    At this  point, MBNA approached  Cantanucci, explaining

          that it intended to honor its commitment  to him but would prefer

          that the North Shore dealership go to Chambers.  MBNA offered  to

          make Cantanucci whole, however, by reimbursing him for the amount

          paid  to Gauthier for  the North Shore franchise,  as well as any

          out-of-pocket  costs  incurred.3    In  August  1995,  Cantanucci

          readily agreed to withdraw.

                    On  September  27, 1995,  Gauthier  ceased  to operate,

          leaving  MBNA with no  permanent Mercedes-Benz dealership  on the

          North  Shore,   though  Chambers  was   operating  the  temporary

          dealership   in  Lynnfield,  Massachusetts.    See  supra  p.  5.
                                                         ___  _____

          Thereafter, MBNA  never sought  another candidate  for the  North

          Shore  area,  having  already  concluded,  even  before  Gauthier

          proposed Cantanucci,  that Chambers was the  preferred candidate,

          except for  the fact that Chambers already  owned a Mercedes-Benz
          ______ ___  ___ ____ ____ ________ _______  _____ _ _____________

          dealership in Somerville, a contiguous MBNA market area.
          __________ __ __________  _ __________ ____ ______ ____

                    MBNA  had a  longstanding  policy against  granting the

          same dealer more  than one dealership in contiguous market areas.

          Its dealership agreements in 1992 stated the policy as follows:  

                    [T]o foster  competition among  Mercedes-Benz
                              
          ____________________

               3MBNA further proposed to make up any difference between the
          price Cantanucci had paid to acquire the Route 128 site,  and the
          price received for  it.  Ultimately, however, Cantanucci sold the
          land to Chambers  for the original purchase price.  But see infra
                                                              ___ ___ _____
          pp. 16-17.

                                          6

                    dealers, it is  Mercedes-Benz's policy not to
                    permit,      except      in     extraordinary
                                 ______      __     _____________
                    circumstances, an existing  dealer, owner, or
                    _____________
                    operator to have interest in the ownership or
                    management of  another competitive  Mercedes-
                    Benz sales and service dealership in the same
                    area  of responsibility  or  in a  contiguous
                    market area. 

          (Emphasis added.)   Nonetheless, a standard  dealership agreement

          provision states: 

                    Notwithstanding any provision  of this Agree-
                    ment, the final decision whether to establish
                          ___ _____ ________ _______ __ _________
                    additional dealers, or relocation of [sic] an
                    __________ _______
                    existing dealer, shall be made by MBNA solely
                                     _____ __ ____ __ ____ ______
                    pursuant to  its own  business judgment,  and
                    ________ __  ___ ___  ________ ________
                    nothing in this  Agreement shall be construed
                    to   require   Dealer's    consent   to   the
                    establishment  of  an  additional  dealer  or
                    relocation of an existing dealer.

          (Emphasis added.)   This  "business judgment"  provision and  all

          other standard dealership  agreement provisions are  incorporated

          by reference into each dealership agreement.  

                    By the time MBNA awarded the North Shore  dealership to

          Chambers, however,  it was  operating under  a policy adopted  in

          April 1993:

                    [A]  policy that  existed in  the  past which
                     _   ______                             _____
                    prohibited a proven  successful Mercedes-Benz
                    __________ _         __________
                    operator from operating more  than one Point,
                    ________ ____ _________ ____  ____ ___ _____
                    does not  lend itself to  the most  effective
                    ____ ___  ____ ______ __
                    and efficient way to meet today's competitive
                                         ____ _______ ___________
                    challenges.   Today it is the strength of the
                    __________
                    overall  dealership  operation  that  insures
                    customer  satisfaction in  terms of  products
                    and services.  

                    Therefore,  it is in  our best interests   to
                                __ __ __  ___ ____ _________   __
                    permit,  in  appropriate  circumstances,  the
                    ______   __  ___________  _____________
                    common ownership  of  more  than  one  dealer
                    ______ _________  __  ____  ____  ___  ______
                    point for the express purpose  of meeting the
                    _____
                    challenges of a competitive marketplace.

                                          7

          (Emphasis added.)4

                    On December 4, 1995, three dealers brought suit against

          MBNA:  Clair  International,  Inc., located  in  Dedham;  Foreign

          Motors West,  Inc., located in  Natick; and Smith Motor  Sales of

          Haverhill,  Inc., in  Haverhill.   Their  complaint alleged  that

          awarding Chambers a second dealership,  to be based in Danvers   

          a  market area  contiguous to  the  Somerville market  area where

          Chambers  already had a  dealership    breached  their dealership

          contracts and  violated Mass. Gen.  Laws ch. 93B.   The complaint

          sought only to  enjoin Chambers from opening and  operating a new

          dealership in Danvers, Lynnfield, or any other area contiguous to

          the Somerville dealership.

                    Following a  three-day bench trial,  the district court

          found that MBNA had breached  its contract with Smith, though not

          with Clair or Foreign Motors.5  It determined that the dealership

          provision governing contiguous  market areas, see supra  pp. 6-7,
                                                        ___ _____
                              
          ____________________

               4Although  MBNA did not  provide advance notice  to existing
          dealers regarding its amended policy, appellants raise the notice
          issue solely in connection with their belated attempt to assert a
          chapter 93B claim independently of any  breach-of-contract claim.
          See infra pp. 16-17 & note 7.
          ___ _____

               5The trial court decided that MBNA's conduct vis-a-vis Smith
          had been based on a "mixed" motive.  It  found that Smith did not
          operate the type  of dealership MBNA wanted  to work with in  the
          future  and that  MBNA had  already  tried to  persuade Smith  to
          relocate to the larger Manchester, New Hampshire, market.   Thus,
          the court found that MBNA had installed Chambers not only to meet
          its own  pressing marketing  needs in the  North Shore  area, but
          also to  foster its  goal of promoting  larger dealerships.   The
          district court  further found that  MBNA had  not violated  Mass.
          Gen.  Laws ch.  93B, however,  and  denied the  injunctive relief
          requested by  Smith.   Finally, since the  court directed  that a
          trial on damages  be scheduled in the Smith case at a later date,
          Smith is not a party to the present appeal.

                                          8

          was contractual in nature, rather  than a mere recital of company

          policy.    The  court  nonetheless  ruled  that  the  unambiguous

          contract  language required  it to  ascertain,  from the  vantage
                                                          ____ ___  _______

          point  of  MBNA,  whether  or not  "extraordinary  circumstances"
          _____  __  ____

          warranted  its  business  judgment  to  install  Chambers  in  an

          additional dealership in  a contiguous  market area.   The  court

          went  on to  find that  the  demise of  the Gauthier  dealership,

          coupled with the  closing of Auto Engineering, see  supra note 1,
                                                         ___  _____

          had given  rise to an  extraordinary circumstance in the  eyes of

          MBNA.   The court  further found that  it was vital  to MBNA that

          Chambers be  installed in the  North Shore dealership,  given the

          extended duration of its dealership  problems in the area and the

          increased  competition from other  luxury automobile lines.   The

          district  court findings  foreclosed  all  relief  to  Clair  and

          Foreign  Motors, whose claims for injunctive relief under chapter

          93B  were premised  exclusively on  the  alleged breach  of their

          contracts by  MBNA.   Finally, the  district court  certified the

          judgment  against Clair  and Foreign Motors  pursuant to  Fed. R.

          Civ. P. 54(b) ("Rule 54(b)").

                                          II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

          1.   Appellate Jurisdiction 
          1.   Appellate Jurisdiction
               ______________________

               A.   Rule 54(b)
               A.   Rule 54(b)
                    _________

                    MBNA has moved  to dismiss  the appeal,  on the  ground

          that the  Rule  54(b) certification  was  improper.   Rule  54(b)

          permits entry of a final judgment as to fewer than all parties in

                                          9

          a civil  action upon "an  express determination that there  is no

          just  reason for delay."  After  provisionally denying the motion

          to  dismiss, we  instructed the  parties to  brief both  the Rule

          54(b)  certification challenge and whether 28 U.S.C.   1292(a)(1)

          might afford an  alternate jurisdictional ground for  the appeal,

          see part II, 1.B, infra.
          ___               _____

                    The Rule 54(b) certification is problematic.  First, it

          includes  no findings on  the relationship between  certified and

          uncertified claims.  See Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Bio-Vita,
                               ___ ___________________________    _________

          Ltd., 78 F.3d  698, 706 (1st Cir. 1996);  Feinstein v. Resolution
          ____                                      _________    __________

          Trust  Corp., 942  F.2d 34,  39-40  (1st Cir.  1991); Spiegel  v.
          ____________                                          _______

          Trustees  of Tufts  College, 843  F.2d  38, 43  (1st Cir.  1988).
          ___________________________

          Moreover,  our review of  the record reveals  substantial overlap

          between the Clair and Foreign Motors cases, on the one  hand, and

          the Smith  case awaiting  trial in the  district court.   Yet the

          present  appeal would  have us  interpret contractual  provisions

          common to all three dealership agreements.  See Bio-Vita, 78 F.3d
                                                      ___ ________

          at  707-08  (Rule 54(b)  certification  improvidently  granted in

          light of overlap between certified and pending claims); Kersey v.
                                                                  ______

          Dennison Mfg. Co., 3 F.3d 482, 487-88 (1st Cir. 1993) (Rule 54(b)
          _________________

          certification improper given  interlocking factual issues  common

          to  adjudicated and unadjudicated  claims); Spiegel, 843  F.2d at
                                                      _______

          44-45  (Rule 54(b)  certification  improper  where dismissed  and

          pending   claims  "stem   from  essentially   the  same   factual

          averments").

                    Second, the central benefit identified in  the district

                                          10

          court's decision to  certify the adverse judgments  against Clair

          and Foreign Motors    that  the appellate court might resolve the

          Mass. Gen. Laws  ch. 93B claims  in the process     is  illusory,

          especially  since  the  district  court has  yet  to  address any

          chapter 93B claim.  See infra p. 16.6 
                              ___ _____

               B.   Interlocutory Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.   1292(a)(1))
               B.   Interlocutory Jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.   1292(a)(1))
                    ___________________________________________________

                    The  courts of  appeals are invested  with jurisdiction

          over  appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts

          . .  . granting,  continuing, modifying,  refusing or  dissolving

          injunctions, or refusing to dissolve  or modify injunctions."  28

          U.S.C.     1292(a)(1).    Clair  and  Foreign  Motors   have  not

          demonstrated   that   section    1292(a)(1)   confers   appellate

          jurisdiction over their claims. 

                    The  district court order  had the practical  effect of

          denying  injunctive relief  to  these  appellants.    See,  e.g.,
                                                                ___   ____

          Manchester Knitted Fashions, Inc. v. Amalgamated Cotton Garment &
          _________________________________    ____________________________

          Allied Indus.  Fund, 967 F.2d  688, 690 (1st Cir.  1992) (partial
          ___________________

          summary judgment had  practical effect  of granting  injunction);

          Plymouth Cty. Nuclear Info. Comm., Inc. v. Boston Edison Co., 655
          _______________________________________    _________________

          F.2d  15,  17-18  (1st Cir.  1981)  (order  precluding injunctive

          relief  on  stricken  claims had  "practical  effect"  of denying
                              
          ____________________

               6We would have no occasion  to address any chapter 93B claim
          at the present time.  Were we to conclude that the district court
          erred in its interpretation of the dealership contract, or in its
          determination that MBNA  did not  breach the  contract, we  would
          remand to  the district court  for further  consideration of  the
          Clair  and Foreign  Motors claims.   As there  is no  chapter 93B
          ruling to review, however, our  remand order would leave any such
          claims  for  resolution  by  the  district  court  in  the  first
          instance.

                                          11

          injunction).   Consequently, appellants must satisfy the test set

          out in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981).
                 ______    _____________________

                    There,   the   Supreme   Court    announced   that   an

          interlocutory order which  has the practical effect  of granting,

          denying, or altering an injunction, is not immediately appealable

          as of right  under section 1292(a)(1),  unless the appellant  can
                                                  ______

          show that the  order "might have a serious,  perhaps irreparable,

          consequence, and that [it] can  be effectually challenged only by

          immediate appeal."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   See
                              ___                                       ___

          also Casas Office Machines, Inc.  v. Mita Copystar America, Inc.,
          ____ ___________________________     ___________________________

          42 F.3d 668,  672-73 (1st Cir. 1994).   Appellants, however, have

          identified  no immediate  and  irreparable  harm  that  would  be

          occasioned  were   the  district  court   order  not  immediately

          appealable. 

                    Nevertheless, given  both the problematic nature of the

          Rule 54(b) certification and the  time which has passed since its

          entry, we conclude that the  interests of justice are best served

          by proceeding to  the merits.   See United  States v. Connell,  6
                                          ___ ______________    _______

          F.3d 27,  29 n.3  (1st Cir. 1993)  (It is  well settled  that "an

          appellate court  may forego  the resolution  of a  jurisdictional

          question if,  as is  true here, the  appeal is  uncomplicated and

          easily  resolved in  favor  of  the party  to  whose benefit  the

          jurisdictional  question would  redound.");  see  also Norton  v.
                                                       ___  ____ ______

          Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976);  Sierra Club v. Larson, 2 F.3d
          _______                             ___________    ______

          462,  466 (1st Cir.  1993); In re  Unanue Casal, 998  F.2d 28, 33
                                      ___________________

          (1st Cir. 1993); Narragansett Indian  Tribe v. Guilbert, 934 F.2d
                           __________________________    ________

                                          12

          4, 8 n.5 (1st Cir. 1991); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Caledonia
                                    __________________________    _________

          Inv. Corp., 862 F.2d 378, 381 (1st Cir. 1988).
          __________

          2.   Construing the Dealership Agreements
          2.   Construing the Dealership Agreements
               ____________________________________

                    The  dealership  agreements   included  two  provisions

          directly pertinent  to the MBNA  decision to install  Chambers in

          the North Shore area  dealership.  The first  provision prohibits

          MBNA  from awarding franchises  to the same  dealer in contiguous

          market areas except in "extraordinary circumstances."  The second

          provision sweeps more broadly, however, enabling MBNA to exercise

          its  business  judgment  as to  whether  an  additional franchise

          should be  awarded to an  existing dealer in a  contiguous market

          area.  

                    The  district court  made  two important  legal rulings

          regarding these  provisions.  First, it held that the "extraordi-

          nary  circumstances"  provision  is  contractual  in  nature  and

          binding   upon  MBNA.    It  then  construed  the  "extraordinary

          circumstances" provision  in relation to the  "business judgment"

          provision, as follows: 

                    But what does  it mean?  In  the context read
                    in light of  the more sweeping  clause . .  .
                    which leaves  to Mercedes-Benz  the virtually
                    unfettered,  save  by  the covenant  of  good
                    faith  and fair dealing .  . . what does this
                    more limited  but more  precise clause  mean?
                    Legally . . . to read it in harmony in .  . .
                    a  way that effectuates  the intention of the
                    parties, it  means that  this clause  is read
                    such that, absent extraordinary circumstances
                    in the  eyes of Mercedes-Benz, they  will not
                    appoint  a  dealer  to  have  two  points  in
                    contiguous  market areas  and that  they will
                    interpret the  implementation of  this policy
                    in a  fashion  as to  foster competition,  to
                    give   the  phrase   to  foster   competition

                                          13

                    significance,  in its  context.   Now, that's
                    what this language means on its face.

          Thus, the  district court rejected  both the MBNA claim  that the

          "extraordinary  circumstances"  provision  was  simply  a  policy

          statement,  and  the  theory  advanced  by  appellants  that  the

          "business judgment" provision  had no application in  the present

          context. 

                    Appellants challenge the  district court ruling on  the

          ground  that  its   "extraordinary  circumstances"  determination

          should have been  based on an objective  reasonableness standard,

          not merely on reasonableness in the eyes of MBNA.  As the present

          claim challenges the district court's construction of unambiguous

          contractual terms in  an integrated agreement, we  review de novo
                                                                    __ ____

          the "plain  meaning" the district court ascribed  to these terms.

          State Police Ass'n  v. Commissioner of Internal  Revenue, No. 97-
          __________________     _________________________________

          1319,  slip op.  at 5  (1st Cir.  Aug. 20,  1997); United  States
                                                             ______________

          Liability  Ins. Co. v. Selman, 70  F.3d 684, 687 (1st Cir. 1995).
          ___________________    ______

          The   choice-of-law  provision   in   the  dealership   agreement

          designates New Jersey  law.  See McCarthy v. Azure,  22 F.3d 351,
                                       ___ ________    _____

          356 n.5 (1st Cir. 1994) (reasonable choice-of-law provision to be

          respected).   Since MBNA has  its principal place of  business in

          New Jersey, we honor this designation.

                    As the district court recognized, "a document should be

          read to  give effect  to all  its provisions  and to render  them

          consistent  with each  other."   Mastrobuono  v. Shearson  Lehman
                                           ___________     ________________

          Hutton, Inc. 115  S. Ct. 1212, 1219 (1995)  (Illinois law; citing
          ____________

          RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS   203  and cmt. b (1979);   202

                                          14

          (5)); see also Coolidge & Sickler, Inc. v. Regn, 80 A.2d 554, 557
                ___ ____ ________________________    ____

          (N.J. 1951) ("'The design of the parties to a written contract is

          to be collected from the instrument as an entirety. . . .  Words,

          phrases and  clauses are  not to be  isolated but related  to the

          context  and the  contractual scheme  as a  whole, and  given the

          meaning that comports with  the probable intention.   The literal

          sense  of  the terms  may  be  qualified  by context.'"  (quoting

          Mantell  v. International Plastic  Harmonica Corp., 55  A.2d 250,
          _______     ______________________________________

          255 (N.J.  1947))); Andreaggi v.  Relis, 408 A.2d 455,  468 (N.J.
                              _________     _____

          Super.  1979) ("All  provisions of  a document  must be  read and

          should  be  harmonized  where possible  in  interpreting  a docu-

          ment.").   Unlike appellants,  the district  court construed  the

          dealership agreement  as a whole,  in the  sense that it  did not

          render meaningless the broad contractual caveat that MBNA, in the

          exercise  of  its  exclusive business  judgment,  was  to be  the

          ultimate  arbiter.   Thus construed,  the "extraordinary  circum-

          stances" provision  simply encapsulates  the essential  nature of

          the business judgment MBNA is permitted to make regarding whether

          to award the  same dealer more than one  dealership in contiguous

          market areas.

          3.   "Extraordinary Circumstances"
          3.   "Extraordinary Circumstances"
                ___________________________

                    The   district    court   based    its   "extraordinary

          circumstances" determination  on the  evidence adduced  at trial.

          Focusing especially on the extended period  during which MBNA had

          been without adequate representation on the North Shore, it found

          that  "the demise  or imminent  demise of  Gauthier on  the North

                                          15

          Shore, coupled with the squeezing  out of Auto Engineering .  . .

          [was] an extraordinary circumstance in the eyes of Mercedes."  We

          review its finding  only for "clear  error."  Selman, 70  F.3d at
                                                        ______

          687  ("clear error" standard  "pertains whenever the  trial court

          decides  factual matters that  are essential to  ascertaining the

          parties' rights in  a particular situation (though  not dependent

          on the meaning of contractual terms per se)").

                    The district court reasonably  found that the  extended

          absence  of  an  adequate  MBNA  presence  on  the  North   Shore

          constituted  an extraordinary circumstance  in the eyes  of MBNA,

          especially  since MBNA was facing aggressive competition from new

          luxury   automobile   lines  operating   from   large,  exclusive

          dealerships,  whereas MBNA  had no  exclusive  dealership in  the

          North Shore market area and  soon could be without any dealership

          there.   MBNA's  decision to  award a  North Shore  dealership to

          Chambers in these extraordinary  circumstances, see supra Section
                                                          ___ _____

          I, was  well within the  broad and exclusive  "business judgment"

          discretion conferred upon it by the dealership agreement.   There

          was no clear error.

                    Next, we  consider appellants' claims  under Mass. Gen.

          Laws ch. 93B.   Since there  was no breach  of contract by  MBNA,

          their  chapter 93B claims  fail as well.   See supra  pp. 10-11 &
                                                     ___ _____

          note 6. 

                    Appellants assert that MBNA promulgated a secret policy

          inconsistent  with  the   contractual  restrictions  on  multiple

          dealerships in contiguous  market areas, and that  MBNA "secretly

                                          16

          subsidized"  Chambers by  affording him  financial  assistance in

          acquiring the Route 128 property from Cantanucci.  See supra note
                                                             ___ _____

          3.  Appellants  mischaracterize the trial court  record, however,

          in attempting  to demonstrate  that enough  evidence of  "general

          unfairness" by MBNA  came in by consent,  at trial, to raise  the

          specter of a chapter 93B violation notwithstanding the absence of

          a breach of contract.

                    The district court initially  excluded all evidence  of

          subsidies, since appellants had never alleged a chapter 93B claim

          independent  of  their  breach-of-contract claims.7    Clair  and

          Foreign  Motors then changed course, and ultimately the proffered

          evidence  was  admitted,  but  only  to establish  "extraordinary

          circumstances."  We  cannot conclude, on such a  record, that the

          proffered  evidence  came  in by  consent  to  establish "general

          unfairness."    To the  contrary, neither  MBNA nor  the district

          court acquiesced, let alone consented,  to the trial of a chapter

          93B claim  predicated on  general unfairness.   Nor did  Clair or

          Foreign Motors move to amend their pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
                                                        ___

          15(b),  to  reflect  their  newfound  general unfairness  theory.

          Given  the  explicit  restrictions  repeatedly  imposed  by   the

          district  court  in  allowing  the "extraordinary  circumstances"

          evidence, we conclude that the general unfairness  theory was not

          tried below.   See DCPB, Inc. v.  City of Lebanon, 957  F.2d 913,
                         ___ __________     _______________
                              
          ____________________

               7Further,  based on the fact that  the complaint included no
          independent  chapter 93B  claim, the  district  court ruled  that
          MBNA's failure to give  its dealers notice of the  new policy was
          immaterial,  since  MBNA  had  complied  with the  "extraordinary
          circumstances" provision in the dealership agreement. 

                                          17

          917  (1st  Cir.  1992) ("The  introduction  of  evidence directly

          relevant to  a pleaded issue  cannot be  the basis for  a founded

          claim that  the opposing  party should have  realized that  a new

          issue was  infiltrating the  case.").  See  also In re  Rauh, ___
                                                 ___  ____ ___________

          F.3d ___,  ___,   1997 WL  394424, *7  (1st Cir.  July 18,  1997)

          (collecting cases). 8

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    Accordingly, the district  court judgment is  affirmed;
                                 ___ ________  _____ ________ __  ________

          costs to MBNA.
          _____ __ ____

                              
          ____________________

               8Appellants' further contention    that an injunction should
          have  been granted  under  the common-law  standard     was never
          raised below.   See Violette v. Smith  & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62
                          ___ ________    _____________________________
          F.3d  8,  10-11  (1st Cir.  1995),  cert.  denied, 116 S. Ct. 1568
                                              _____  ______
          (1996); Desjardins v.  Van Buren Community Hosp.,  969 F.2d 1280,
                  __________     _________________________
          1282 (1st Cir. 1992) (collecting cases).

                                          18