Court Opinion

ID: 9764268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:17:15.642034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:32.519474
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, appellee asserts that we erred in our decision because the County had judicially admitted in a pleading in another case that the boat ran aground on waters under the control of the County. For the reasons stated below, we disagree that the statement was a “judicial admission.” Because of the confusion that exists among some of the bench and bar in this area of the law, a review of some of the relevant principles of law is warranted. First, the factual setting.
After the KERRY DANCER ran aground on a sandbar in the Gulf of Mexico, the owners were unsuccessful in removing the boat. Sometime after Velasquez was injured, the County filed a suit for an injunction to require the owner and Coastal Diving to remove the boat. In its verified pleading, the County alleged that the “owner ... did then fail to have the boat removed from the waters of Cameron County ...” and that “after repeated demands ... Defendants did, and continue to refuse to remove the said KERRY DANCER from the beach of Andy Bowie Park.” In its prayer, the County requested of the court that the defendants be “temporarily enjoined from allowing the vessel, the KERRY DANCER, to remain on Plaintiff’s property and from allowing the said vessel, or parts thereof, to remain a hazard to users of the public beaches of the residents of Cameron County.... ” This pleading was admitted into evidence over this County’s objection.
As stated in McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence:
Unfortunately the term “admission” has for a long time been used without discrimination to cover two distinct situations. In one sense of the term, admission refers to a formal act, done in the course of judicial proceedings; which dispenses with the production of evidence and takes the matter out of the domain of proof so that neither court nor jury is required to make any finding in regard to it. This formal judicial admission as it may be termed is really a substitute for evidence. Such admissions include facts admitted by pleadings.... As long as the pleading remains unamended or the admission stands unretracted, the fact alleged or admitted, for the purposes of the case, is accepted as true by the court and jury and binding on the party making it, i.e. he cannot introduce evidence to contradict it.1
The other principle to which the term is applied is the subject of the present chapter [Admissions Of A Party]. It authorizes the receipt of any statement or conduct of a party inconsistent with his present position. These are often spoken of as extra-judicial admissions in an effort to distinguish them from the formal judicial admissions. As suggested by Professor Wigmore, they might more accurately be termed quasi-admissions. Instead of dispensing with evidence these admissions form a part of the evidence and are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.2
An admission, being merely a piece of evidence, is not conclusive on the party against whom it is offered. The admission not being conclusive, he may offer evidence in contradiction or explanation of it or even deny that he made the admission in question.
2 C. McCormick & R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence Civil and Criminal §§ 1127-28 (Texas Practice 2d Ed. 1956).
Also, §§ 1144 and 1145 of McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, state as follows:
§ 1144. Admissions in Pleadings—(a)
Pleadings in the Same Cause
[T]he pleadings in a particular case, for the purposes of use in that case, are to be regarded as formal judicial admissions *783rather than ordinary admissions. They are not evidence but a waiver of evidence. In taking advantage of the admission the process is not one of putting the pleading in evidence but one of invoking the language of the opponent’s pleadings as rendering certain facts indisputable. In other words the fact admitted is assumed, without the introduction of the pleading or presentation of other evidence to be conclusively established for the purposes of a particular case. Occasionally, however, the courts are found sanctioning the introduction of the pleading itself in evidence. This is unfortunate in that it leads the unwary to believe that the principle involved is that of ordinary admissions when in fact it is that of formal judicial admissions. (Emphasis added.)
See also J.A. Robinson Sons, Inc. v. Ellis, 412 S.W.2d 728, 733-34 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
§ 1145. Admissions in Pleadings—(b)
Pleadings in Other Causes
[UJnder the reformed systems of pleading, like that in Texas, pleadings in other actions which contain statements inconsistent with the party’s present position are receivable as admissions.
See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Murphree, 163 Tex. 534, 357 S.W.2d 744, 747 (1962).
Our Supreme Court has written about this area of the law as follows:
A party’s testimonial declarations which are contrary to his position are quasi-admissions. They are merely some evidence, and they are not conclusive upon the admitter. (Citations omitted.) The weight to be given such admissions is decided by the trier of fact. These are to be distinguished from the true judicial admission which is a formal waiver of-proof usually found in pleadings or the stipulations of the parties. A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, and it relieves the opposing party’s burden of proving the admitted fact, and bars the admitting party from disputing it. (Citations omitted.)
A quasi-admission will be treated as a judicial admission if it appears:
(1) That the declaration relied upon was made during the course of a judicial proceeding....
(2) That the statement is contrary to an essential fact embraced in the theory of recovery or defense asserted by the person giving the testimony....
(3) That the statement is deliberate, clear, and unequivocal. The hypothesis of mere mistake or slip of the tongue must be eliminated....
(4) That the giving of conclusive effect the declaration will be consistent with the public policy upon which the rule is based.
(5) That the statement is not also destructive of the opposing party’s theory of recovery.
Mendoza v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 606 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex.1980); see also Kirk v. Head, 137 Tex. 44, 152 S.W.2d 726, 729 (1941); William B. Roberts, Inc. v. McDrilling Co., 579 S.W.2d 335, 344-45 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979, no writ).
The Supreme Court has also written that:
Assertions of fact, not pled in the alternative, in the live pleadings of a party are regarded as formal judicial admissions. Any fact admitted is conclusively established in the case without the introduction of the pleadings or presentation of other evidence.
The facts alleged or admitted in the live pleadings of a party are accepted as true by the court and jury and are binding on the pleader. 1A R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 1127 (Texas Practice 3d ed. 1980). The party relying on his opponent's pleadings as judicial admissions of fact, however, must protect his record by objecting to the introduction of evidence contrary to that admission of fact and by objecting to the submission of any issue bearing on the fact admitted.
Houston First American Savings v. Musick, 650 S.W.2d 764, 767, 769 (Tex.1983).
*784With the above principles in mind, we hold that the statements made by the County in the injunction pleading do not constitute a judicial admission that the KERRY DANCER ran aground on land owned or occupied by Cameron County. The statement did amount to an admission which the County had a right to and did contest. Therefore, in order to sustain the judgment, it was Velasquez’ burden to have submitted and obtained an affirmative finding on the issue that the County owned or controlled the land in question. Furthermore, Velasquez did not contend in the trial court that this pleading was a judicial admission so as to dispense with the necessity of evidence on the point. They treated the matter as a disputed issue by introducing evidence thereon, particularly on the issue of the County’s control of the premises. The question of the pleading being a judicial admission was raised for the first time on the motion for rehearing. This question was therefore waived. Carter v. Walton, 469 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.Civ.App. —Corpus Christi 1971, no writ); Dallas Transit Company v. Young, 370 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
For these reasons we overrule appellee’s motion for rehearing and adhere to our original disposition.

. Neither the Texas nor Federal Rules of Evidence deal with the subject of judicial admissions.

. Under Rule 801(e)(2) Tex.Rules of Evidence an admission is not hearsay.