Court Opinion

ID: 9859836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:46:46.488819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:24.719336
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting: Contrary to the majority’s thesis, cross-comparison analysis in this case is inappropriate, as the statutes at issue do not share a common purpose. In People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392 (2002), this court held that the purpose of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes is identical to that of the armed violence statute, namely, deterring the use of dangerous weapons in the commission of a felony. People v. Walden, 199 Ill. 2d 392, 396 (2002). In People v. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d 462 (1998), this court held that the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is entirely distinct from that of the armed violence statute. Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 478. Indeed, Lombardi taught that, while the armed violence statute targets “the risk of harm associated with the presence of a weapon during the commission of a felony,” the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is designed to “discourage individuals from inflicting injury by knowingly discharging a firearm.”2 Lombardi, 184 Ill. 2d at 478. If the purpose of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes is identical to that of the armed violence statute, while the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute is entirely distinct from that of the armed violence statute, it is analytically impossible for the purposes of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes and the aggravated battery with a firearm statute to be the same. Yet this is precisely what the majority holds. 206 Ill. 2d at 526. Moreover, the majority does so without either (1) acknowledging Lombardi’ s authoritative pronouncement concerning the purpose of aggravated battery with a firearm statute, or (2) explaining why the wholesale overruling of that pronouncement is compelled. Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I am convinced that the purpose of the aggravated battery with a firearm statute remains exactly what Lombardi declared it to be five years ago: discouraging the infliction of injury by knowingly discharging a firearm. Inasmuch as this purpose is wholly distinct from that of the 15/20/25-to-life statutes, I prefer not to participate in the majority’s cross-comparison analysis. I therefore dissent. JUSTICES KILBRIDE and GARMAN join in this dissent.  Although Lombardi addressed only the aggravated battery with a firearm statute, its conclusion applies equally to the aggravated discharge of a firearm statute, as this statute likewise targets the endangerment of another through the knowing or intentional discharge of a firearm, not the possession or use of a firearm in the commission of an unrelated felony.