Court Opinion

ID: 9718520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:26:34.252362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.021154
License: Public Domain

ASHBY, J.
—Concurring and Dissenting.This case represents a classic example of some of the defects in our juvenile “justice” system. By definition, this case arrived at superior court only after the juvenile court found, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, that defendant is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law in that he would not be amenable to the care, treatment, and training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court. Defendant was properly subject to trial as an adult for a heinous crime.
Defendant’s prior record contained 14 entries dating back to age 12, including unsuccessful camp placement on prior sustained petitions under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
The circumstances of defendant’s present crime are as follows: As Mr. C. R. Knight approached his car parked on Franklin Avenue in Hollywood at approximately 2 a.m. on July 12, 1975, defendant and three companions, Walter, Blackwell, and an unknown suspect, surrounded him and by force removed money and jewelry from his person. The victim was then physically forced into the trunk of his 1970 Ford Thunderbird and driven to 520 West. 68th Street, a location near several vacant houses. It was decided by the four to kill him. Walker walked to the nearby home of his parents and obtained a butcher knife. Defendant took the knife. Mr. Knight was then taken to a location between some houses. Defendant then stabbed him several times in the back. Mr. Knight tried to get away but was knocked to the ground by Blackwell, after which defendant continued to stab him. Mr. Knight, mortally wounded but still alive, was then dragged between two houses and covered with a tarp from his car. Defendant and the others took the victim’s money, totaling about $86, and personal property, including jewelry which they divided. They then drove his car to an after-hours *79club near Adams and Crenshaw where they remained until about 6 a.m., when Blackwell transported them to their various homes and retained the car.1
The probation officer evaluated defendant as a high-risk danger to life and property, who showed absolutely nó remorse, and who was incapable of rehabilitation and in need of long-term confinement and removal from the community. The probation officer concluded that it would be a miscarriage of justice if this defendant were not committed to state prison, together with his crime partners, but that in view of the recent legislation, only a commitment to the Youth Authority was possible.
I concur in the opinion that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 compels reversal of defendant’s sentence to the state prison. However, I would remand the case to the trial court with two options: (1) to sentence defendant in accordance with section 707.2 on his plea of guilty to second degree murder or (2) to vacate the plea and require defendant to plead anew to the original charge of first degree murder.2
It is a common occurrence that after a trial court initially approves a plea bargain it thereafter learns additional facts which render the plea bargain contrary to the interests of justice. In such circumstances the court may withdraw its approval, restore the original charges and give defendant another opportunity to plead. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5; People v. Johnson, 10 Cal.3d 868, 872-873 [112 Cal.Rptr. 556, 519 P.2d 604]; People v. Delles, 69 Cal.2d 906, 910-911 [73 Cal.Rptr. 389, 447 P.2d 629]; see In re Sutherland, 6 Cal.3d 666, 671-672 [100 Cal.Rptr. 129, 493 P.2d 857]; People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal.3d 480, 487 [102 Cal.Rptr. 744, 498 P.2d 992].) This procedure is explicit in Penal Code section 1192.5 which provides in part: “If the court approves of the plea, it shall inform the defendant prior to the making of the plea that (1) its approval is not binding, (2) it may, at the time set for the hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment, withdraw its approval in the light of further consideration of the matter .... [1] If such plea is not *80accepted by the prosecuting attorney and approved by the court, the plea shall be deemed withdrawn and the defendant may then enter such plea or pleas as would otherwise have been available.” (See also Pen. Code, § 1192.4.)
In the instant case everyone involved at the time of the entry of the plea assumed that defendant could be sentenced to the state prison. Defendant was specifically advised: “It is possible for Judge Leetham, upon receiving a probation report, to do any of the following: To grant you probation, to send you to the California Youth Authority for an indeterminate sentence or to sentence you to State Prison for the term prescribed by law which is five year [óyc] to life and one to ten years,” and defendant stated that he understood this. The court subsequently learned from the probation report of (1) defendant’s prior record; (2) the circumstances of the murder; and (3) the existence of Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2.
It is understandable that upon learning these additional facts and erroneously not viewing section 707.2 as precluding its power to do so, the trial court felt it could not in good conscience approve any other sentence than state prison.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.2 denies to the adult court the range of sentencing alternatives-which would otherwise be available for adults. It makes the juvenile court’s determination that a juvenile be tried as an adult an almost méáningless ritual. Although there is a possibility that the Youth Authority in this case will exercise its power to have defendant committed to the state prison, in my opinion the sentencing judge should be able to exercise that power directly in a proper case.
Defendant stated that he expected to serve county jail time or maybe go to the C.Y.A. With the “no consequence treatment” afforded him as a result of his prior criminal acts, it is not surprising that he did not expect any substantial punishment for his latest and most vicious crime. What is surprising is the low value our society places on the lives of victims of juvenile murderers. The cost to defendant for brutally taking the life of Mr. Knight veiy well may be only a short period of time at a C.Y.A. facility.
*81One can hope that cases such as this will draw the attention of the Legislature to urgently needed reforms in a juvenile “justice” system which does no justice to the public or to the youthful offenders the system was intended to protect.
A petition for a rehearing was denied October 6, 1976, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Ashby, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied November 24, 1976. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Walker and Blackwell were Youth Authority parolees in residence at a C.Y.A. halfway house in Los Angeles.

If convicted of first degree murder, defendant could be sentenced to state prison.