Court Opinion

ID: 9684057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:40.938543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:52.526085
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Only two of appellant E.F. Hutton’s fifteen points of error on motion for rehearing merit further discussion. In its twelfth and thirteenth points, appellant complains of this Court’s holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of appellees’ attorney’s fees. The trial court permitted appellees’ expert witnesses to testify about the reasonableness and necessity of these fees even though their names were not disclosed in response to appellant’s interrogatory requesting the identities of all experts scheduled to be called at trial.1 Appellant now argues that our decision conflicts with that in GATX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesow Petroleum Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The GATX Court held that the trial court erred in permitting the plaintiff’s attorney, who did not list himself as an expert in response to a relevant interrogatory, to testify about his fees. The court noted that TEX.R. CIV.P. 215(5) requires the exclusion of testimony by unidentified expert witnesses “unless the trial court finds that good cause sufficient to require admission exists.” Since the record supplied no evidence of such good cause, the GATX Court ruled that the testimony was improperly admitted.
*872Our decision on original submission is in accord with GATX. Unlike that court, however, we found that the trial court’s decision to permit the testimony was supported by good cause, for the following reasons:
After testifying about his fees, Sam Bashara, appellees’ attorney, called Doyle Coatney, a local attorney, to give his expert opinion of the reasonableness and necessity of Bashara’s fees. Appellant objected, citing Rule 166b (quoted in full in our original opinion). Bashara explained that he had only that day decided to call Coatney and that he had informed appellant’s attorney that Coatney would be available that evening for deposition. He also referred to the trial court’s offer to postpone Coat-ney’s testimony until the next day if appellant’s attorney so wished, which he declined. The court then overruled the objection and permitted the testimony. As we did in our original opinion, we again conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly finding that good cause existed to permit the disputed testimony.
All of appellant’s points on motion for rehearing are overruled.

. For a thorough analysis of this identical issue, see our recent opinion in Modern Exploration, Inc. v. Maddison, 708 S.W.2d 872 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986); cf. H.E.B., Inc. v. Morrow, 704 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ pending) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to permit a lay witness to testify).