Court Opinion

ID: 9599318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:17:46.565552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:27.953534
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
On December 30, 1971, the petitioner and *631one Vicky Lynn Marx sought to file their respective divorce actions in the Superior Court for Pierce County. They presented their proposed summonses and complaints, affidavits of poverty, affidavits of merit, and motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and for payment for cost of service at public expense, to the presiding judge. Notice of presentation was given to Pierce County, which appeared through the prosecuting attorney, in opposition to the motions. After argument the court denied the motions in all respects.
Both plaintiffs applied to the Court of Appeals, Division Two, for a writ of mandamus requiring the court to grant their motions. After the submission of briefs and argument by petitioners’ counsel and the Prosecuting Attorney for Pierce County, the Court of Appeals on May 17, 1972, entered an order directing the writ of mandamus to issue in the case of Vicky Lynn Marx, whose husband resided and was present in Pierce County.
The court cited Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held on similar facts that refusal by the Connecticut courts to allow access to the courts in actions for divorce because of indigency is a denial of due process of law. The court also cited and followed our case of O’Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969), holding that under that case the Superior Court has inherent power to waive the filing fees in a case of this kind, and also the inherent power to direct the Sheriff for Pierce County to serve process without charge.
With regard to the petitioner’s case, the Court of Appeals said:
[W]e doubt that the Superior Court has the inherent power to direct the fiscal agency of the county to disburse county funds to underwrite costs of publication. There is no court rule or legislative authority which would grant the fiscal agent the power to make such a disbursal of funds. The constitutional obligation to provide such funds would, in our judgment, fall on the state. *632See Boddie v. Connecticut, [401 U.S. 371, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113, 91 S. Ct. 780 (1971)]. The state is not a party to this action and, consequently, we must deny the petition of Lois Ashley for publication costs. However, she has the right to file her action and seek the direction of the Washington State Supreme Court for obtaining cost of service by publication or some other means of substituted service.
A writ of mandamus was granted to the extent that the trial court was directed to allow the filing of the petitioner’s summons and complaint without payment of the filing fees. The remainder of her petition was denied.
We granted the petitioner’s application for certiorari, waiving the filing fee as had the Court of Appeals. The Attorney General of the State of Washington was asked to file a brief on behalf of the state to aid the court in its determination of the question presented, and a brief was submitted by that office as amicus curiae. After hearing argument we filed an opinion (Ashley v. Superior Court, 82 Wn.2d 188, 509 P.2d 751 (1973)).
A petition for rehearing has been granted. We adhere to the views expressed in the earlier opinion to the extent they are repeated herein.
We should state at the outset that in its original opinion filed in this case, the court addressed itself to an issue squarely presented only in the facts of the Marx case, although no appeal had been taken by the Prosecutor for Pierce County from the Court of Appeals’ judgment. The question whether the court could waive the sheriff’s fees within the state of Washington was not before the court. The appellant’s brief in the case before us assumed that the matter was at issue and argued the propriety of the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The prosecutor’s brief, as well as that of amicus, also exhibited that same assumption. Upon reexamination of the record, the court rules that this issue has not properly been brought before the court and should not now be addressed.
Furthermore, since the prosecutor took no appeal from *633that portion of the judgment of the Court of Appeals which granted the petitioner the writ of mandate requiring the Superior Court to waive the filing fees in this action and makes no assignment of error directed to that ruling of the Court of Appeals, the only question before this court is whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the Superior Court could not order payment of the costs of publication or of sheriff’s service in Oregon. ■
Upon reconsideration of the issue which is properly before the court, the court has concluded that it should not at this time decide the question whether a court may order payment out of funds within its control or may order a state officer to pay expenses of an indigent litigant, where the legislature has not seen fit to appropriate money for that purpose. We reach this conclusion because we are convinced that the petitioner is in a position to provide the defendant husband with sufficient notice of the pending action to satisfy constitutional requirements without the necessity of incurring the expense of either publication or sheriff’s service.
It is not disputed that the petitioner is indigent and that her cause of action has merit. Her allegation is that she and her husband have lived separate and apart for a period of more than 2 consecutive years, a ground for divorce under ROW 26.08.020 (9). The Supreme Court of the United States has said in Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, that a state may not, consistent with the obligations imposed upon it by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, preempt the right to dissolve the legal relationship of marriage without affording all citizens access to the means prescribed for doing so. It held that the plaintiffs in that case could pursue their divorce actions without the necessity of paying court fees, such fees being a restriction upon their access to the courts, the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand.
In this case, of course, we are not concerned with the question whether a state can require indigents to pay filing *634fees prescribed by the legislature and to be charged by the courts in connection with the bringing of an action, such fees having been ordered waived by the Court of Appeals, in conformity with our decision in O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra. Waiver or payment of the costs of service of process is the problem before us. The United States Supreme Court was not directly confronted with this problem in Boddie v. Connecticut, supra at 382. However, it was cognizant of the problem and made the following statement concerning it:
[W]e think that reliable alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid sheriff if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of official service. This is perforce true of service by publication which is the method of notice least calculated to bring to a potential defendant’s attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra [339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950)]. We think in this case service at defendant’s last known address by mail and posted notice is equally effective as publication in a newspaper.
CR 4(d) (3) ■ incorporates RCW 4.28.100 and RCW 4.28.110. RCW 4.28.100 provides that when the defendant cannot be found within the state and upon the filing of an affidavit of the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, with the clerk of the court stating that he believes the defendant is not a resident of this state and cannot be found therein, and that he has deposited a copy of the summons, substantially in the form prescribed in RCW 4.28.110, and complaint in the post office directed to the defendant at his place of residence, unless it is stated in the affidavit that such residence is not known to the plaintiff, and stating the existence of one of the cases therein specified, which include actions for divorce, the service may be made by publication of the summons by the plaintiff or his attorney. RCW 4.28.110 provides that publication shall be made in a newspaper in the county in which the action is brought. RCW 4.28.180 provides that personal services of summons or process may be made upon the party outside the state.
RCW 4.28.070 provides that the summons shall be served *635by the sheriff or by a person 18 years of age or over, who is competent to be a witness in the action, other than the plaintiff.
The United States Supreme Court has said in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at pages 314-15:
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [Citing cases.] The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information [citing case], and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance [citing cases]. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. “The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the subject with which the statute deals.” American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 67 [55 L. Ed. 82, 31 S. Ct.200 (1911)] . . .
But when notice is a person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to inform those affected . . . [citing cases], or, where conditions do not reasonably permit such notice, that the form chosen is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes.
The court said further:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here, is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that their rights are before the courts. It is not an accident that the greater number of cases reaching this Court on the question of adequacy of notice have been concerned with actions founded on process constructively served through local newspapers. Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resi*636dent an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed.
Until notice, actual or constructive, is given to a defendant, the court has no jurisdiction in any case to proceed to judgment. Ware v. Phillips, 77 Wn.2d 879, 468 P.2d 444 (1970), and authorities cited therein. It is also the general rule that, in order to acquire jurisdiction by constructive service, the statute permitting such service must be strictly followed. Yarbrough v. Pugh, 63 Wash. 140, 114 P. 918 (1911). Also, where a special statute provides a method of process, compliance therewith is jurisdictional. Sowers v. Lewis, 49 Wn.2d 891, 307 P.2d 1064 (1957).
We are not here concerned with a special statute providing a method of process, but with the general statute which has been incorporated in Civil Rule for Superior Court 4.
RCW 2.04.190 provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe from time to time the mode and manner of giving notice and serving writs and process of all kinds. It further provides that the Supreme Court will have the power to regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and the kinds and character of the entire pleading, practice and procedure to.be used in all suits, actions and appeals and proceedings of whatever nature by the Supreme Court, superior courts and justices of the peace of the state.
The constitutionality of this act was upheld. State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928), and State v. Pavelich, 153 Wash. 379, 279 P. 1102 (1929). Pursuant to this statute our Civil Rule for Superior Court 4 was promulgated.
The court has inherent power to waive its rules. O’Connor v. Matzdorff, supra. The power to waive the requirements of a rule necessarily includes the power to impose conditions upon the waiver. Of course, this power does *637not extend to the waiving of a defendant’s constitutional right to notice, but we think it is within the power and the discretion of this court and of the Superior Court to waive the particular provisions of a rule providing the method by which notice is to be given upon the condition that another method, more reasonably calculated to effectively give notice, is utilized.
The exercise of such power is in harmony with RCW 2.28.150, which provides:
When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution of this state, or by statute, conferred on a court or judicial officer all the means to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding is not specifically pointed out by statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of the laws.
We have before us a case in which a plaintiff who has the right to bring her action for divorce in the Superior Court of this state will be effectively denied the exercise of that right if our rules providing methods of process are strictly imposed, since both publication of summons and complaint and service by the sheriff of the foreign jurisdiction involve expenses which the plaintiff cannot afford to pay. To date the legislature has not recognized the need of indigent persons for state financial assistance in pursuing their rights in civil cases, although it has made provision for indigent defendants in criminal cases (RCW 10.01.110 and 10.01.112).
The court is therefore faced with this dilemma. If the right of the plaintiff is to be protected, it must either order the payment of public funds when no appropriation has been made to cover the cost of publication and/or sheriff’s service, or it must fashion a different method of service which will involve only a minor cost to the plaintiff. We think the latter course is the most appropriate under the circumstances.
According to the uncontradicted allegations of the plaintiff, the defendant no longer resides in the state of *638Washington, consequently to publish notice of the impending action in Pierce County as prescribed by the rule (incorporating the statute) would be of doubtful efficacy in conveying actual notice to the defendant. Since, according to the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant spends most of his time traveling and his itinerary is unknown to her, the prospect that the sheriff could successfully serve the defendant personally in Oregon is also remote. We think that a method of service by mail would be equally effective under the circumstances.
The petitioner states that her best information is that her husband occasionally stays with his parents at Scappoose, Oregon. It would appear, therefore, in the absence of any other information concerning his whereabouts, that the best chance of giving him notice of the pending proceedings is to address a copy of the summons and complaint to him at his parents’ address, by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and also to address a copy to his parents, return receipt requested, and to enclose a letter to them asking them to deliver the summons and complaint to their son at the earliest opportunity, and to advise the petitioner when this has been done or to advise where he may be reached. To encourage a response a return addressed and stamped envelope should be enclosed.
We think that it can safely be assumed that notice sent in this manner will eventually reach the defendant husband. The method comports with the test set forth in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). It is one which a person desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish this purpose.
Of course when this method is employed the court cannot be certain of the date upon which notice was actually given, unless the defendant signs the return receipt or the parents respond to the request for advice as to the date of delivery. It is important that the defendant should have the full 60 days from the date of receipt of the summons, pre*639scribed by CR 4(e) (2) and RCW 4.28.180, within which to respond to the complaint if he wishes to do so. On the other hand, the petitioner, if her allegations are true, has a right to her divorce and should not be required to wait an unreasonably long time to obtain her decree. If the defendant is determined to ignore the summons and persuades his parents not to respond to the request for advice, we think it can be safely assumed that he is willing to forfeit his right to contest the divorce.
Recognizing the natural bonds of affection and concern which ordinarily exist between parents and children, it can be reasonably assumed that, in the absence of any showing to the contrary, the defendant’s parents are in communication with their son and are concerned with his welfare sufficiently to advise him that they have received notice of pending divorce proceedings instituted by his wife. It also can be assumed that if they are unable to contact him or know of another address where he can be reached, they will so advise the petitioner in order to protect their son’s interest.
If the defendant himself does not sign a receipt of the summons and complaint, a reasonable time must be allowed for the delivery of summons and complaint to him. If his parents do not respond to the request for advice as to the date of service, a time must be set within which it can be reasonably assumed that actual notice was given but that both parents and son elected not to acknowledge the same. We think that 30 days is a reasonable time to allow for this eventuality. This added to the 60 days in which to answer is a longer period of time than is granted the defendant under CR 4(d)(3) (RCW 4.28.110), where constructive service is made by publication; and the probability that actual notice will be given is greater than it would be if publication were the method employed.
Therefore, if the petitioner decides to utilize the procedure for service which we provide herein, the 60-day period provided in RCW 4.28.180 shall begin to run from the *640date the return receipt is signed by the defendant, if he signs it; or from the date the parents deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant, as reported by them in response to the petitioner’s request; or from a date 30 days after the two copies of the summons and complaint are deposited in the mail, if actual service upon the defendant cannot be proved.
The petitioner, in her letter to the parents of the defendant, should also advise them that the court has decreed that if no response is received from either the defendant or his parents within 90 days after the date of mailing, it will be assumed that he consents to the divorce and the petitioner will be allowed to take her decree.
When the petitioner can show to the Superior Court that these steps have been taken and that the defendant has received actual notice or that he has failed to respond within 90 days after mailing of the summonses and com- • plaints to him and to his parents, the court should grant the decree.
This case is of course simplified by the fact that there is no property to be distributed. That is presumably the case ordinarily where indigency is claimed. There are minor children of the parties, and the duty to support the children exists regardless of the marital status. His alleged conduct in abandoning his family manifests an indifference to his marital rights which justifies the court in concluding that his consent to a divorce decree can be assumed if he fails to respond to notice delivered to a place where he can normally be expected to receive it and into the hands of persons who can reasonably be expected to deliver it to him or advise him of its receipt.
We realize that the procedure which we have fashioned in this case cannot be expected to satisfy the demands of due process in every case and that the problem of costs of process where indigent plaintiffs are concerned is not confined to persons situated exactly as the plaintiff in this case. The problem is of course greatly complicated by the fact *641that the legislature has not taken any action to provide funds for costs of civil litigation for the poor. We assume that it will be asked to consider this matter in the near future.
In the meantime the court will be open to suggestions for changes in its rules regarding process service, with a view to making the methods authorized not only less expensive but also more effective in conveying actual notice to the defendant. The court would be interested in receiving opinions and any data that is available on the efficacy of the present methods in this regard, and the practicality and probable utility of other available methods. If, after study, a change is indicated, a new rule will be promulgated.
The cause is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to waive the filing fee, in accordance with the order of the Court of Appeals; and, if no appearance is made by the defendant, to grant the divorce if and at such time as the petitioner is able to show to the court’s satisfaction that she has served notice upon him in accordance with the procedure set forth herein and that the prescribed time has elapsed.
Finley, Hunter, and Hamilton, JJ., concur.