Court Opinion

ID: 9670885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:48.070884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:11.122019
License: Public Domain

*264STEINMETZ, J.
(concurring). I agree with the result of the majority opinion, but I disagree with the majority’s recognition of qualified expert testimony on the effect of intoxication on a person’s capacity to form the specific intent to commit a crime. I concurred in State v. Flattum, no. 83-1142-CR, filed this date, for this same reason. In the Flattum concurring opinion I stated:
“In this case, the trial court properly excluded the psychiatrist’s testimony of the effect of the defendant’s intoxication and his psychiatric history on his capacity to form a specific intent. ... I write separately because I see no more reliability or trustworthiness in expert testimony based on the defendant’s intoxication than that based on the defendant’s psychiatric profile. . . .

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‘‘Steele [97 Wis. 2d 72, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980)] stated: ‘What we bar from introduction at the guilt phase of the trial is expert opinion testimony tending to prove or disprove the defendant’s capacity to form the requisite criminal intent.’ 97 Wis. 2d at 98. I would apply the same bar to expert opinion testimony tending to prove or disprove the defendant’s capacity to form the requisite criminal intent when the foundation of such opinion testimony is alcoholic consumption for the same reasons stated in Steele, which were: ‘[W]e have substantial doubt about the competency, relevance, and probativeness of the particular testimony for the purpose of showing diminished capacity to form intent.’ Id. at 98-99.
“The result of the majority opinion will be a contest of alcoholic influence experts in areas where the jury can arrive at its decision by balancing the testimony of the alcohol consumption against the defendant’s actions before, after and at the time of the crime as testified to by observers and the defendant himself if he testifies. Under the rule adopted by the majority opinion, we will be confronted by trial court records which will show a marked propensity of those who purport to have alcoholic influence expertise to tailor their testimony to the particular client whom they represent. (See Steele at 97 for the statement of dismay as applied to testimony *265of psychiatric expertise.) The jury is better equipped to make the decision of the influence of alcohol on the defendant’s mental capacity as applied to form a specific intent than it is to determine on the effect of a defendant’s psychiatric history on the capacity to form intent. The jury does not need the so-called help of expert hired guns to offer their opinions which are lacking in scientific soundness and especially where there is substantial legal doubt that those opinions have probative value on the point for which they will be asserted.
“Muench v. Israel, 715 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1988), stated: ‘We therefore hold that a state is not constitutionally compelled to recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity and hence a state may exclude expert testimony offered for the purpose of establishing that a criminal defendant lacked the capacity to form a specific intent.’ Id. at 1144-45.” Concurring op. at pp. 808, 311-315.)
I would reverse Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976) directly since I believe it was reversed by implication by Steele. I would also affirm in this case but for the reasons stated in this concurring opinion.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE WILLIAM G. CALLOW and JUSTICE LOUIS J. CECI join this concurring opinion.