Court Opinion

ID: 9965754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:07:38.912863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.141867
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0562-MR

JOSEPH E. WHITE                                                   APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 21-CI-001215

FACILITIES MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, P.B.C.                                                     APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Joseph E. White (“White”) appeals from an order of the

Jefferson Circuit Court granting summary judgment on his discrimination claims in

favor of his former employer, Facilities Management Services, P.B.C. (“FMS”).

After careful review, finding no error, we affirm.
             FMS hired White, an African-American male, in February 2017 as a

member of the commercial cleaning team. He later received a promotion to the

post-construction janitorial team, which included a slight raise. When business

slowed in post-construction, he was assigned to the janitorial team.

             In February 2020, White worked on a janitorial team that was

assigned to Martha Layne Collins High School in Shelbyville. Ron Johnson

(“Ron”), an African-American male, was his team lead and supervisor. Paula

Johnson, a white female and Ron’s wife, was his other supervisor, and she was also

responsible for payroll and making sure the contracts remained within her budget.

             A regular shift for White’s team was seven to eight hours long and

started at the “home” office in Lexington. The employees clocked in at the home

office before departing with Ron to the job site in Shelbyville. At the end of their

shift, Ron dropped each team member off at their residence, and they were

instructed to clock out when they arrived at their respective residences.

             On February 26, 2020, FMS terminated White for allegedly

repeatedly stealing time by clocking out long after he arrived or should have

arrived at his home. FMS alleged that he was previously given a final written

warning for leaving the job site while on the clock and using abusive language

with coworkers.

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             On February 25, 2021, White filed his complaint against FMS

alleging his employment was terminated due to race and/or gender discrimination.

The parties engaged in written discovery and took depositions.

             FMS then moved for summary judgment. FMS argued White was

terminated “because he repeatedly clocked out extremely late, which increased his

paycheck.” Record (R.) at 134. White’s “termination had nothing to do with his

race. In contrast, most of FMS’s employees are minorities, including the

supervisor who terminated his employment and the other supervisor who caught

him clocking out late.” Id. White responded opposing the motion.

             On January 3, 2023, the circuit court entered an opinion and order

granting summary judgment in favor of FMS. The circuit court made the

following findings of fact:

                   FMS contends that:

                   On 2/20/20, Mr. White punched out at 12:14 am,
             whereas Ron Johnson punched out at 11:39 pm, which
             demonstrates Mr. White wrongfully charged
             approximately 65 minutes of time.

                   On 2/21/20, Mr. White punched out at 12:16 am,
             whereas Ron Johnson punched out at 11:42 pm, which
             demonstrates Mr. White wrongfully charged
             approximately 64 minutes of time.

                   On 2/24/20. Mr. White punched out at 12:17 am,
             whereas Ron Johnson punched out at 12:03 am, which
             demonstrates Mr. White wrongfully charged
             approximately 44 minutes of time.

                                        -3-
                    On 2/25/20, Mr. White clocked out at 11:29 pm,
             over 3 hours after his shift had ended. Plaintiff’s wife
             had already picked him up at the job site at
             approximately 8:00 pm, prior to him completing the
             cleaning of the building. Mr. Johnson and coworkers had
             to finish cleaning the rooms.

                   On February 26, 2020, Plaintiff’s employment was
             terminated for repeatedly “stealing time.” Also, Plaintiff
             had previously been given a final written warning for not
             being on the jobsite while on the clock and using abusive
             language to coworkers.

R. at 244-45.

             The circuit court found:

                   FMS asserts that Mr. White cannot prove that he
             was replaced by a person outside the protected class.
             Specifically it argues that Mr. White, an African-
             American male was replaced by another African-
             American male.

                    Mr. White asserts in his response that he was
             treated differently than a female who was also on staff.
             He makes these assertions without providing any
             evidence that race and/or sex was at the basis of his
             firing. A bald assertion that a female employee was
             treated differently than he was is not enough to meet the
             threshold of “direct evidence” or “circumstantial
             evidence” is necessary under McDonnell Douglas. A For
             these reasons, the Court will grant FMS’s Motion and
             dismiss the action against it.

R. at 247.

             This appeal followed.

                                        -4-
             We apply the following standard in reviewing the circuit court’s grant

of summary judgment:

             The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial
             judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is
             whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows
             there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
             moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
             The trial judge must view the evidence in a light most
             favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in
             its favor. Because summary judgment does not require
             findings of fact but only an examination of the record to
             determine whether material issues of fact exist, we
             generally review the grant of summary judgment without
             deference to either the trial court’s assessment of the
             record or its legal conclusions.

Bruner v. Cooper, 677 S.W.3d 252, 269 (Ky. 2023) (quoting Hammons v.

Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010)).

             On appeal, White argues he established a prima facie case for racial

and gender discrimination and successfully rebutted FMS’s pre-textual reason for

termination. We disagree. Under Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)

344.040(1)(a), “[i]t is an unlawful practice for an employer: . . . to discharge any

individual . . . because of the individual’s race, color, . . . [or] sex.” “There are two

paths for a plaintiff seeking to establish . . . [a] discrimination case. One path

consists of direct evidence of discriminatory animus. Absent direct evidence of

discrimination, Plaintiff must satisfy the burden-shifting test of McDonnell

                                           -5-
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).”

Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 184 S.W.3d 492, 495 (Ky. 2005).

                The McDonnell Douglas framework requires a plaintiff to prove the

following four elements to establish a prima facie case of discrimination: “(1) was

a member of a protected class, (2) was discharged, (3) was qualified for the

position from which he was discharged, and (4) was replaced by a person outside

the protected class.” Charalambakis v. Asbury University, 488 S.W.3d 568, 577

(Ky. 2016) (quoting Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 496).

                FMS concedes that White proved the first three elements of his case.

However, FMS asserts, and White does not dispute, that White was replaced by an

African-American male. R. at 132. Thus, White failed to prove the fourth element

of his claim.

                Although FMS and the circuit court cite Charalambakis for the four-

element test, White urges us to apply the factors in Murray v. Eastern Kentucky

University, 328 S.W.3d 679, 682 (Ky. App. 2009): “(1) she was a member of a

protected group; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; (3) she

was qualified for the position; and (4) ‘similarly situated’ non-protected employees

were treated more favorably.” We believe the Charalambakis factors are more

applicable in this instance because White was discharged from his position and not

subjected to some other adverse employment action, and Charalambakis is a more

                                           -6-
recent case on national origin discrimination. However, we will apply the fourth

element of the factors in Murray to be thorough.

             White’s claim also fails under the fourth element in Murray. He

failed to prove that a “similarly situated” non-protected employee was treated more

favorably. White argues a female employee, Taylor Clemons, who is either mixed

race or African-American, was treated more favorably because she, nor any other

employee, was penalized for clocking out using their phone. Though White and

Clemons are opposite genders, they are both part of a protected racial class.

Additionally, we agree with the circuit court that White’s “bald assertion that a

female employee was treated differently than he was is not enough to meet the

threshold . . . necessary under McDonnell Douglas.” R. at 247. As White failed to

establish a prima facie case, we do not reach the burden-shifting analysis of

whether the employer “articulate[d] a ‘legitimate nondiscriminatory reason’ for the

termination decision.” Williams, 184 S.W.3d at 497.

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Jefferson

Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Megan E. Ziegman         Joshua T. Rose
Kendra L. Rimbert        Louisville, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky

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