Court Opinion

ID: 9587651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:43.878173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:57.325604
License: Public Domain

*39TYSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I would reverse the order and remand for further proceedings toward reunification, consistent with the minor child’s best interest, in light of the overriding purpose of the Juvenile Code toward reunification of a child with the natural parent. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court appropriately entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Because I would hold that the trial court erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights based on neglect, G.S. § 7B-1111(1), I will also address the additional independent grounds on which the trial court based termination: (1) respondent’s willfully leaving the child in foster care for more than 12 months, G.S. § 7B-1111(2); and (2) respondent’s willful failure to pay child support, G.S. § 7B-1111(3). I would hold that there is not clear, cogent and convincing evidence to support either of these additional grounds for the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights.
A. Purpose of the Juvenile Code
The essential intent and aim of the Juvenile Code “is to reunite the parent(s) and the child, after the child has been taken from the custody of the parent(s).” Matter of Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 596, 319 S.E.2d 567, 573 (1984). G.S. § 7B-100 sets forth the purposes of the Juvenile Code:
(1) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents: (2) To develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the juvenile, and the strengths and weaknesses of the family; (3) To provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles’ needs for safety, continuity. and permanence: and (4) To provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-100 (1999) (emphasis supplied). The Juvenile Code, including G.S. § 7B-1111, applicable to termination of parental rights, must be interpreted and construed so as to implement these *40goals and policies. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-100.1 review the record in this case in light of these overriding goals.
B. Standard of Review
Our standard of review for the termination of parental rights is whether the court’s “ ‘findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and convincing evidence’ and whether the ‘findings support the conclusions of law.’ ” In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 292, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000), appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, -N.C.-, — S.E.2d-(No. 523P00) (1 February 2001) (citing In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996)); see also, In re McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 428, 533 S.E.2d 508, 509 (2000). Our review of the trial court’s findings of fact is limited to whether there is competent evidence to support the findings; however, the trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo. Starco, Inc. v. AMG Bonding and Ins. Services, Inc., 124 N.C. App. 332, 335-36, 477 S.E.2d 211, 214-15 (1996).
Clear, cogent and convincing evidence “is greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard required in most civil cases.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109-10, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984) (citation omitted). It has been defined as “evidence which should fully convince.” Williams v. Blue Ridge Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 207 N.C. 362, 177 S.E. 176, 177 (1934) (quotation omitted) (emphasis supplied).
C. Background
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that, at the time of the hearing, respondent was a thirty-nine year old college-educated woman. Respondent holds an undergraduate B.S. degree in recreational therapy, and has a high level of intelligence. Respondent lived in a home for pregnant and unwed women from February to August, 1997. The baby was bom on 25 May 1997 and weighed 7 pounds, 10 ounces. Respondent left California and returned home to North Carolina in December, 1997, where she lived with her parents in Raleigh.
Respondent’s sister, Sherry Foster, visited Raleigh during December 1997. During this visit, Ms. Foster took the child to a doctor in Raleigh without respondent’s knowledge or permission. The doctor examined the child, and found her to be in satisfactory condition. Also during this visit, Ms. Foster dissuaded respondent from taking the child to the hospital in Raleigh after respondent expressed concern over her child’s congestion.
*41Ms. Foster returned to Raleigh in February 1998. On or about 22 February 1998, respondent consented to Ms. Foster’s taking her child to the Foster’s home in Asheville ostensively for a visit. On 23 February 1998, Ms. Foster took the child to a doctor in Asheville without respondent’s knowledge. The child was admitted to the hospital for “failure to thrive.” The child was approximately 9 months old, and weighed approximately 12 pounds. Respondent never regained custody of her child. Despite respondent’s requests to have the matter transferred to Wake County, respondent’s child remained in Buncombe County. Respondent was forced to relocate her home and secure employment in Asheville in order to be close to her child, and defend the allegations in this case.
D. Neglect
I disagree with the majority’s opinion that the trial court appropriately terminated respondent’s parental rights under G.S. § 7B-1111(1). A prior adjudication of neglect cannot be the sole basis for terminating parental rights. In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 713-14, 319 S.E.2d 227, 231 (1984). Rather, in determining neglect, “the trial judge must find evidence of neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 611, 543 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2001) (citing Ballard at 716, 319 S.E.2d at 232).
Although the record here contains evidence supporting the prior adjudication of neglect, the record must contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent would continue to neglect the child at the time of the termination proceeding. I would hold that the record does not contain such clear, cogent and convincing evidence as to support the trial court’s findings and conclusion that, as of the date of the termination proceeding, respondent would neglect the minor child.
Respondent complied with all court orders, and completed all DSS-recommended services in the case plan to prepare her for reunification with her minor child. The trial court found that respondent made “a sincere effort to be reunited with her daughter and to comply with court orders.” Both the trial court and DSS found that respondent “dearly loves [the minor child]” and visits her twice a week. DSS reported to the court that the visits go well, that respondent “is anxious to have the child returned to her care,” and that respondent “is willing to do whatever is necessary to have her child returned to her.” Respondent testified that she attended and com*42pleted weekly parenting classes over a period of several weeks. The record reflects that respondent attended every class.
The record also reveals that, after completion of the DSS case plan, respondent’s ability to care for her minor child improved. DSS submitted a report to the court on 1 June 1998, stating that respondent was nearing completion of parenting classes, and that “[d]uring the supervised visitation [respondent] interacts with [the minor child] appropriately and demonstrates appropriate parenting skills.”
On 22 September 1998, DSS further reported to the court that respondent was doing well in her DSS-recommended monthly therapy sessions, and that respondent’s therapist, Nancy Mercer, “reports that [respondent] is doing well and that she [Mercer] has no concerns.” In a report from Mercer dated 4 March 1999, Mercer states that respondent “has appropriately owned responsibility and regret for the circumstances surrounding her daughter’s removal from her custody. . . . [T]he concerns she has presented to me regarding the child have always seemed legitimate and appropriate. . . . [Respondent] appears to be functioning well and has no symptoms of mood, anxiety or substance abuse problems. Her overall attitude has been one of cooperation, willingness and motivation.”
I would hold that the record does not contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent would continue to neglect the child at the time of the termination proceeding, and after respondent’s completion of all DSS-required services. The evidence shows respondent’s acknowledgment of regret for past decisions regarding the child, and improvement in respondent’s ability to care for the child and understand the child’s needs. The essential purpose in interpreting G.S. § 7B-1111 is to assure “fairness and equity” for both juveniles and parents, and to work toward reunification while preventing the inappropriate separation of juveniles from their natural parents. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-100.1 cannot agree with the majority’s opinion that termination of respondent’s parental rights under these circumstances was proper, or that the result reached was “fair and equitable,” consistent with the express purposes of G.S. § 7B-100, as interpreted by Shue, supra.
E. Willfully Leaving Child in Foster Care
The trial court concluded that respondent violated G.S. § 7B-1111(2), in that respondent “willfully left the child in foster care for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the *43court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made within 12 months in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the child.” I would hold that this conclusion is clearly erroneous for the reasons enumerated above. The record does not contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence that respondent failed to show “reasonable progress under the circumstances.” To the contrary, the evidence clearly shows that respondent willingly completed all DSS case plan requirements and improved her ability to care for the child.
Moreover, respondent consented to the child’s initial placement in non-secure custody with respondent’s sister. Respondent regularly visited her child, until her visitation rights ceased in May 1999, approximately 5 months prior to termination of her parental rights. A June 1998 DSS report indicated that respondent had not missed a single session of visitation with her child. Throughout the child’s placement with the Fosters, the evidence showed that respondent and Ms. Foster had few discussions, and that their relationship cooled considerably over time. Ms. Foster did not always allow respondent to speak to her child. Ms. Foster also resisted allowing grandparent visitation. Ms. Foster further testified that respondent was upset to learn that the child called the Fosters “Mama” and “Daddy.”
The record does not contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence that supports the trial court’s conclusion of law that (1) respondent willfully left the child in foster care; and (2) respondent failed to show reasonable progress in her ability to care for the child during the child’s placement with DSS. I would reverse and remand.
F. Willful Failure to Pav Support
The trial court concluded that respondent “for a continuous period of six months. . . has willfully failed for such period to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for the minor child although physically and financially able to pay some portion greater than zero,” in violation of G.S. § 7B-1111(3). I would hold that the clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the record mandates the opposite conclusion.
The evidence establishes that respondent was never under court order to pay support. The record does not contain any evidence that DSS initiated legal proceedings requiring that respondent pay sup*44port. A DSS witness testified that she was not aware that any such court order had been issued. Respondent also testified that she had “never been under any court order to pay support.” Moreover, although DSS knew that respondent had initiated proceedings to require that the child’s biological father pay child support in California, there is no evidence that DSS attempted to assist respondent or to follow through in procuring support from the child’s biological father.
Notwithstanding the lack of a court order, respondent testified that on many occasions, she stated to the Fosters, “[i]f there’s anything you need, just let me know. I can get a hold of it.” On various occasions, respondent brought food and clothes to the child. Respondent also requested from DSS a list of the Foster’s expenses for the child. DSS did not provide respondent with the requested list.
Respondent testified that the Fosters “were willing to help out” with respondent’s own expenses. Ms. Foster testified that the Fosters were willing to help support respondent financially upon her relocation to Asheville. Mr. Foster told respondent, “[w]e’re willing to help you,” and offered to assist with respondent’s rent payments. Ms. Foster further testified that they “never formally asked [respondent] to provide any support for the child,” and that the Fosters never contacted the support agency to initiate support proceedings.
The word willful as applied in termination proceedings under the statute has been defined as “ ‘disobedience which imports knowledge and a stubborn resistance.’ ” Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1, 14, 449 S.E.2d 911, 919 (1994), appeal dismissed, 340 N.C. 109, 458 S.E.2d 183 (1995) (quoting In re Roberson, 97 N.C. App. 277, 280, 387 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1990)). “ ‘Willful’ has also been defined as ‘doing an act purposely and deliberately.’ ” Id. (quoting Roberson at 281, 387 S.E.2d at 670).
I cannot agree that the clear, cogent and convincing evidence reveals a willful failure to pay support where (1) the record does not establish that respondent was ever under a court order to pay support; (2) Ms. Foster led respondent to believe they were helping respondent with her expenses; and (3) respondent did provide food and clothes to the child while the child was in the Foster’s care. The record does not contain clear, cogent and convincing evidence that supports the trial court’s conclusion of law that respondent violated G.S. § 7B-1111(3).
*45In light of the essential aims of the Juvenile Code, I would reverse the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights, and remand for further proceedings toward reunification. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.