Court Opinion

ID: 9657221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:17:42.943195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:42.269184
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Although I concur with an affirmance of the lower court’s decision, I would modify the Starnes appellate review test for the standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),* and refined in Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781, 784 (S.D.1984):
[A] defendant must show: 1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. The test for prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
This case is, essentially, an ineffective assistance of counsel case. It is crucial to a determination herein to quote from appellant’s brief (page 4), for it illuminates the meritorious disposition of this case:
At the outset, petitioner [appellant] concedes that he is unable to show any specific instances of prejudice arising from the fact that his counsel was State’s Attorney in an adjoining county.
Conclusion: No prejudice, no ineffective assistance of counsel, no reversal. Finis. However—
A question arises. May there be an imputation of “deficient performance” where a defense is interposed by the State’s Attorney of a neighboring county? Or to beget even a more tender ethical/conflicting loyalties scenario: What type of a situation do we have where a plea bargain is reached between two State’s Attorneys of adjoining counties? Our words in Starnes, as quoted in the majority opinion, take on a sensible trumpet of warning. Such situations should be avoided.
Before us, a very experienced, capable trial judge proceeded with great caution. The transcript of the arraignment reflects:
THE COURT: Mr. Caffrey, you may approach the bench with your counsel. Mr. Caffrey, the first thing I want to talk to you about is appointment of counsel. When this case began, the court appointed Mr. Stanley Whiting of Winner, South Dakota, as your attorney and that appointment has continued throughout the proceedings, however, in the meantime Mr. Whiting’s firm was appointed to represent Todd County as a prosecuting attorney and the Supreme Court has a rule that the court cannot appoint an attorney who is a prosecuting attorney to represent an indigent person, however, Mr. Whiting was appointed as your counsel long before his firm undertook to be prosecuting attorney for Todd County, but I want to advise you that if you want another counsel appointed to represent you, the court would appoint another counsel since Mr. Whiting’s firm is the prosecuting attorney for Todd County and wouldn’t be authorized to be appointed if this were a new case. I just [sic] you to be made aware of that. If you’re not satisfied with Mr. Whiting’s representation or if you feel for any reason that you would want the court to appoint another counsel for you, the court would do so. What is your feeling about that, Mr. Caffrey?
MR. CAFFREY: Stick with him, I guess.
THE COURT: You understand that the court would appoint another counsel for you if that were your desire, do you understand that?
MR. CAFFREY: Yeah.
*284THE COURT: You want to continue with Mr. Whiting as your attorney, is that correct?
MR. CAFFREY: Yes.
How, then, after having been informed of the possible conflict, can appellant now complain? He has, on the record, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights with respect to effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Sheridan, 383 N.W.2d 865 (S.D.1986); and State v. Christians, 381 N.W.2d 214 (S.D.1986).
Finally, appellant’s advocacy rests on a presumed prejudice analysis. Boiled down in a legal beaker, this presumption is said to arise from an unconscious erosion of defense counsel’s zeal. Thus, a per se rule is birthed prohibiting a prosecutor in one county from acting as defense counsel in another. Accord: People v. Rhodes, 12 Cal.3d 180, 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363 (1974); Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir.1974). A student might well peruse Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), which cases support this premise. However, after mulling these honorable authorities, one scholastically ventures back to Strickland. There, in 1984, the Highest Court in our land expressed:
Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and that “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.”
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 (citation omitted). We are thus taught that this presumption of prejudice can only arise by an analysis of the facts in each case. Examining the facts here, I am left with an unswerving conclusion that no presumption attached; further, that there appears to be no actual conflict of interest; and, most importantly, there was absolutely no deficient performance demonstrated on Attorney Whiting’s part. Thus, I join my Brothers in affirming the trial court’s decision, albeit specially.

 It is only logical that we do so. Starnes did not just relate to conflict of interest, it also expressly referred to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Starnes, 85 S.D. at 494, 186 N.W.2d at 504. This Court has cited Strickland in State v. Anderson, 387 N.W.2d 544, 546 (S.D.1986) (Henderson, J., specially concurring), and State v. Dombusch, 384 N.W.2d 682, 686 (S.D.1986).