Court Opinion

ID: 9412682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 14:06:53.910935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:29.851107
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-379

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                               BETTY N. MWANGI.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

 negligent operation of a motor vehicle.            By this appeal, she

 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her

 conviction.     We affirm.

       Background.     "We recite the facts the jury could have

 found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

 Commonwealth, while reserving certain details for later

 discussion."     Commonwealth v. Combs, 480 Mass. 55, 57 (2018).              A

 Southborough police officer was patrolling Turnpike Road 1 at

 approximately 1:42 A.M. on the Friday morning after

 Thanksgiving.     The officer was driving in the lefthand lane when

 1 Turnpike Road is a public way with two lanes in each direction
 and a Jersey barrier in the middle of the roadway. At certain
 points where there is a turning lane, the road may have three
 lanes.
the defendant's car drifted directly in front of him from the

righthand lane without using a turn signal. 2    The officer

followed the car for approximately one-eighth of a mile,

observing as it "kind of drifted . . . back into the right-hand

lane about three feet," "corrected itself," and "drifted over

onto the marked divided lines in the middle between the right-

hand [and] left-hand lanes."   Concerned that the defendant might

be intoxicated, the officer turned on the cruiser's emergency

lights to pull the car over.   The defendant pulled over in a

"dangerous" spot at the crest of a hill, with the car's left

tires on the line separating the breakdown lane from oncoming

traffic.

     When the officer neared the defendant's vehicle, he

immediately smelled alcohol inside.   The defendant explained

that she was coming from a family party where she had had one

glass of wine and one glass of Scotch, and that she was taking

two different medications for her anxiety.      The defendant's

speech was slurred, and her eyes were glassy and bloodshot.       The

defendant also said that she may have been drifting because she

was using her cell phone.

     The officer ordered the defendant out of the vehicle; as

she alighted, he smelled alcohol on her person.      The defendant

2 The defendant stipulated to operation and to Turnpike Road's
status as a public way.

                                 2
was unsteady on her feet, and "almost fell over" as she was

walking and turned to face the officer.    Although she agreed to

perform field sobriety tests, the defendant was unable to follow

the officer's instructions (repeated several times) for either

the nine-step walk and turn or the one-legged stand test.    After

forming the opinion that the defendant was intoxicated, the

officer arrested her.   The defendant was charged with operating

a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor, G. L. c. 90, § 24

(1) (a) (1), and negligent operation of a motor vehicle, G. L.

c. 90, § 24 (2) (a).    A jury found the defendant guilty only of

negligent operation.

     Discussion.   We review this sufficiency claim, considering

the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to

the Commonwealth, to determine whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671,

677-678 (1979), bearing in mind that guilt may be established by

circumstantial evidence and that inferences drawn from such

evidence "need only be reasonable and possible and need not be

necessary or inescapable."   Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770,

779 (2005), S.C., 450 Mass. 215 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v.

Longo, 402 Mass. 482, 487 (1988).     Negligent operation requires

proof that the defendant "(1) operated a motor vehicle (2) upon

a public way (3) negligently so that the lives or safety of the

                                  3
public might be endangered."    Commonwealth v. Ross, 92 Mass.

App. Ct. 377, 379 (2017).   "The statute only requires proof that

the defendant's conduct might have endangered the safety of the

public, not that it in fact did."     Commonwealth v. Ferreira, 70

Mass. App. Ct. 32, 35 (2007).    We direct our analysis at the

third element.   See note 2, supra.

     A rational jury reasonably could have found that the

defendant's conduct might have endangered the safety of the

public.   After consuming alcohol, the defendant, while driving,

drifted "directly in front of" a marked police cruiser in the

early-morning darkness.   The officer described the defendant as

"driving a little erratic[ally]," and noted that another vehicle

was approaching at the same time.     When the officer initiated

the stop, the defendant pulled over in a "pretty dangerous" spot

and admitted to (1) drinking alcohol, (2) using her cell phone

while driving, and (3) taking two medications. 3   See Ross, 92

Mass. App. Ct. at 380 ("The fact that the jury ultimately did

not convict the defendant of OUI does not preclude their

consideration of the evidence of intoxication in considering the

negligent operation charge").    That the defendant had at least

3 The defendant testified, and on cross-examination admitted that
she knew those medications could cause dizziness, drowsiness,
and difficulty concentrating when mixed with alcohol. As to the
required finding issue, we consider the evidence at the close of
the Commonwealth's case.

                                  4
some difficulty concentrating was reasonably inferable from the

officer's testimony and the dashboard camera footage that

captured both her driving and her unsuccessful field sobriety

tests.     A rational jury reasonably could conclude that the

defendant put the safety of the public in danger when, after

mixing medication with alcohol, she used her cell phone while

driving and drifted between lanes without regard for the other

cars on the road.     See Commonwealth v. Teixeira, 95 Mass. App.

Ct. 367, 371 (2019); Ross, 92 Mass. App. Ct. at 380-381;

Ferreira, 70 Mass. App. Ct. at 35.     See also Lao, 443 Mass. at

779 ("[if], from the evidence, conflicting inferences are

possible, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies,

for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly in

their province").

                                       Judgment affirmed.

                                       By the Court (Neyman, Grant &
                                         Hershfang, JJ. 4),

                                       Clerk
Entered:    August 1, 2023.

4   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                   5