Court Opinion

ID: 9904821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 23:13:40.632691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.133436
License: Public Domain

2023 UT App 143

               THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

                         STATE OF UTAH,
                            Appellee,
                                v.
                        JOSE LUIS GARCIA,
                           Appellant.

                            Opinion
                        No. 20220275-CA
                    Filed November 24, 2023

           Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
              The Honorable Randall N. Skanchy
                          No. 201911847

                 Janet Lawrence and Hillary King,
                      Attorneys for Appellant
              Sean D. Reyes and Karen A. Klucznik,
                     Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and AMY J. OLIVER concurred.

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1     Jose Luis Garcia pleaded guilty to burglary with intent to
commit a theft. As part of his plea agreement, Garcia agreed to
pay, jointly and severally with a co-defendant, $1,000 in
restitution. Garcia also agreed that restitution would be kept open
for additional claims. Some months later, the State filed a motion
seeking approximately $20,000 in additional restitution. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court granted the State’s motion,
concluding that the conduct for which Garcia had pleaded guilty
was the proximate cause of the damages for which additional
restitution had been sought. Garcia now appeals the court’s
restitution order, arguing the State did not meet its burden to
establish that his admitted criminal conduct was the proximate
                          State v. Garcia

cause of all the damages incurred in this criminal event. For the
reasons set forth below, we agree with Garcia and therefore vacate
the restitution order.

                        BACKGROUND

¶2     In July 2020, a property owner (Owner) called the police to
report that someone had broken into his home. At the time,
Owner had been out of town for several days, but a friend who
had been checking on the home noticed that some items had been
moved and a light had been left on. When officers arrived, it
quickly became apparent that “multiple people” had been staying
in the home. Officers found fingerprints in the home belonging to
Garcia and another individual (Co-defendant), as well as other
partial fingerprints that were not sufficient to be identified.

¶3      In October 2020, Garcia was charged with burglary, a
second-degree felony. Eight months later, Garcia pleaded guilty
to burglary, a class A misdemeanor. In the plea agreement, Garcia
admitted that he “entered a building with the intent to commit a
theft.” Garcia agreed to pay $1,000 in restitution to cover Owner’s
insurance deductible and that restitution would “remain open for
additional claims during [the] statutory period.” 1

¶4      Three months after sentencing, the State filed a motion for
restitution, requesting that Garcia be ordered to pay an additional
$20,109.59 in restitution to reimburse Owner’s insurance
company for the payout it provided to cover Owner’s losses.
Garcia objected to the restitution request, arguing the State had
failed to explain what the funds were for or how Garcia’s criminal

1. Both the plea agreement and the subsequent restitution order
provide that restitution is to be paid jointly and severally by and
between Garcia and Co-defendant.

 20220275-CA                    2               2023 UT App 143
                           State v. Garcia

conduct was the proximate cause of the loss and requesting that
the district court hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.

¶5      At the evidentiary hearing, Owner testified that he had
been a victim of property damage and criminal mischief. Owner
explained that property had been taken from his home and that
he sent a list to the police of “the things that [he] thought were
stolen.” Owner explained that he later submitted a second list of
missing items to his insurance company so that he could be
reimbursed for the missing items. In addition to the missing
property, Owner testified that he incurred “damage to [his]
dwelling” as “the result of the break-in.” At no point did Owner
testify, or even suggest, that his losses were specifically the result
of Garcia’s actions.

¶6     A representative from Owner’s insurance company
(Agent) testified that Owner had been paid $20,109.59 for a claim
“related to a burglary that occurred on July 7.” Of that amount,
$17,863.64 was paid to cover lost personal property and $2,245.95
was reimbursement for structural property damage. Agent’s
testimony was strictly based on the information contained in the
claim documents submitted by Owner. Agent had no
independent knowledge of the events giving rise to the claim, and
he did not opine as to the underlying cause of the damages.

¶7     Following the evidentiary hearing, Garcia filed an
amended objection to the State’s motion for restitution, again
asserting that imposition of additional restitution was improper
because Garcia’s actions were not the proximate cause of all the
pecuniary losses claimed by Owner. Citing State v. Hight, 2008 UT
App 118, 182 P.3d 922, the State countered that because Garcia
participated in the initial crime where the property was lost, the
court could order Garcia to pay restitution for all of Owner’s
damages. The State also suggested that Garcia’s “agreement to
pay restitution for [Owner’s] insurance deductible implies
responsibility for the claim made by [Owner] to insurance.”

 20220275-CA                      3               2023 UT App 143
                            State v. Garcia

¶8      The district court considered the parties’ arguments during
a restitution hearing. At the close of the hearing, the court agreed
with the State that Garcia’s criminal conduct was the proximate
cause of the damages and therefore ordered that Garcia pay
$20,109.59 in restitution to reimburse Owner’s insurance
company. The court reasoned that Garcia “was involved in the
crime. He [pleaded] guilty to that crime. The evidence . . .
produced was that the crime resulted in this damage and [lost]
property.”

             ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶9      Garcia now appeals the district court’s restitution order,
arguing the court erred in ordering Garcia to pay restitution
because the State did not prove that his criminal acts were the
proximate cause of the damages. “We will not disturb a district
court’s restitution determination unless the court exceeds the
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.” State v.
Calata, 2022 UT App 127, ¶ 12, 521 P.3d 920 (quotation simplified),
cert. denied, 525 P.3d 1268 (Utah 2023). “To the extent that the
district court made legal determinations in connection with its
restitution analysis, we review those legal determinations for
correctness.” State v. Grant, 2021 UT App 104, ¶ 24, 499 P.3d 176
(quotation simplified), cert. denied, 505 P.3d 56 (Utah 2022); see also
State v. Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 24, 416 P.3d 1132 (“We review
questions of statutory interpretation for correctness.”). 2

2. The State contends we should review this issue for clear error
because Garcia’s challenge concerns the district court’s factual
finding that Garcia was the proximate cause of Owner’s damages.
Although causation is generally a question of fact, a court may
decide an issue of proximate cause as a matter of law where there
are no issues of fact as to the causation element. See Zendler v.
University of Utah Health Care, 2020 UT App 143, ¶ 18, 476 P.3d
                                                    (continued…)

 20220275-CA                      4                2023 UT App 143
                           State v. Garcia

                            ANALYSIS

¶10 The Crime Victims Restitution Act requires a district court
to order restitution “[w]hen a defendant enters into a plea
disposition or is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages.” Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1) (2020). 3 For
purposes of restitution, “[c]riminal activities” means “any . . .
offense of which the defendant is convicted” or “any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to
the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing
the criminal conduct.” Id. § 77-38a-102(2). A defendant, therefore,
“cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for
which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not
convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution.” State v. Randall,
2019 UT App 120, ¶ 13, 447 P.3d 1232 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 455 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2019).

¶11 Here, Garcia pleaded guilty to burglary, a class A
misdemeanor, for “enter[ing] a building with the intent to commit
a theft.” As part of the plea agreement, Garcia agreed to pay
$1,000 restitution to Owner to cover Owner’s insurance
deductible. However, Garcia later objected to the State’s request

1009, cert. denied, 481 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2021); Kerby v. Moab Valley
Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App 280, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d 944, cert. denied,
366 P.3d 1213 (Utah 2016). That is what the court did here. Thus,
the issue of proximate cause in this case is a legal determination
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 101,
¶ 15, 427 P.3d 495.

3. Garcia pleaded guilty on June 7, 2021, and was sentenced at the
same hearing. On July 1, 2021, the Crime Victims Restitution Act
was repealed and renumbered. We cite the version in effect at the
time of Garcia’s entry of plea and sentencing. See State v. Clark,
2011 UT 23, ¶ 13, 251 P.3d 829 (noting that we apply “the law as it
exists at the time of the event regulated by the law in question”).

 20220275-CA                     5               2023 UT App 143
                           State v. Garcia

for approximately $20,000 in additional restitution to reimburse
Owner’s insurance company for property damage and lost
property that was allegedly the result of Garcia’s burglary on the
grounds that the amount sought was “for losses related to crimes
other than the crime which Garica admitted responsibility for and
pleaded guilty to.” The district court dismissed Garcia’s objection
and ordered Garcia to pay the additional sum.

¶12 Although Garcia agreed to pay a set amount of restitution
for criminal actions, the State was nevertheless required to prove
that Garcia’s burglary “resulted in [Owner’s] pecuniary
damages” to recover additional restitution above the agreed upon
amount. See Utah Code § 77-38a-302(1); see also State v. Becker, 2018
UT App 81, ¶ 12, 427 P.3d 306. The State has failed to carry its
burden here.

¶13 To assess whether a criminal activity has resulted in
pecuniary damages, courts apply a proximate cause test. State v.
Ogden, 2018 UT 8, ¶ 48, 416 P.3d 1132. “Proximate cause is that
cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new cause, produced the injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred.” Randall, 2019 UT App 120, ¶ 20
(quotation simplified). “It requires proof of two elements: (1) but-
for causation and (2) foreseeable harm.” State v. Watson, 2021 UT
App 37, ¶ 15, 485 P.3d 946. A court need not address both
elements, however, when a case obviously fails under one of
them. See Becker, 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 17. “In restitution cases, the
burden is on the State to prove proximate cause.” State v. Morrison,
2019 UT App 51, ¶ 13, 440 P.3d 942.

¶14 The evidence presented at the restitution hearing clearly
established that Owner suffered pecuniary damages; however,
that evidence did not establish that those damages were a result
of Garcia entering Owner’s home merely “with the intent to
commit a theft,” but with no proof that he actually committed a
theft, nor any admission by Garcia that he had done so. Indeed, at

 20220275-CA                     6               2023 UT App 143
                          State v. Garcia

the hearing, both Owner and Agent testified regarding the items
stolen from Owner’s home and the value of the items. Similarly,
both testified regarding the property damage to Owner’s home
and the cost to repair the damage. While both accounts were
detailed, the information provided was merely a “bare itemized
list of expenses.” See Becker, 2018 UT App 81, ¶ 15. It did not
include information specifically “relating the listed items” to
Garcia’s criminal conduct. See id. Garcia did not plead guilty to
theft or property damage and there was no evidence presented
that he engaged in either activity. “Thus, there was no
information provided to the court to demonstrate that [Garcia’s]
conduct produced the injury, and without which the injury would
not have occurred, and therefore did not meet the standards for
restitution.” See id. (quotation simplified).

¶15 The State resists this conclusion, arguing that State v. Hight,
2008 UT App 118, 182 P.3d 922, is controlling precedent and that
Garcia has not attempted to distinguish that case. 4 But the State’s
reliance on Hight is misplaced. Contrary to the State’s assertion,

4. The State also argues extensively that Garcia has inadequately
briefed his argument and has thus not carried his burden of
persuading us that the district court’s proximate-cause
determination was clearly erroneous. But the State’s position on
this point is based in part on a misunderstanding of the applicable
standard of review. As discussed, supra note 2, the court’s finding
of proximate cause in this case presented a legal question, rather
than a factual question. As such, Garcia was not required to show
that the court’s finding was clearly erroneous. And aside from this
confusion, we disagree with the State’s characterization that
Garcia’s briefing is inadequate. Garcia’s brief contains sufficient
“citations to legal authority and the record” explaining why he
“should prevail on appeal.” See Utah R. App. P. 24(8); see also Bank
of Am. v. Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶ 12, 391 P.3d 196 (“[T]here is not a
bright-line rule determining when a brief is inadequate.”). We
therefore find it adequate.

 20220275-CA                     7              2023 UT App 143
                          State v. Garcia

the facts in Hight are not “directly on point,” and importantly,
Hight was decided under a different standard of causation.

¶16 In Hight, the defendant admitted to burglary and stealing
marijuana. Id. ¶ 4. At a restitution hearing, the homeowner
testified that after the burglary, he noticed other items were
missing from his home, including “a watch, keys, and a silver
dollar collection.” Id. ¶ 6. Based on the homeowner’s
“unopposed” testimony, the trial court ordered the defendant to
pay restitution for all the missing items, including those which he
did not admit to taking. Id.

¶17 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred
by ordering him to pay restitution for items that he did not admit
to taking, asserting that “following a guilty plea for a broad
offense such as burglary, [a defendant’s] responsibility for any
particular missing items must be firmly established before the
court can order restitution for them.” Id. ¶ 4 (quotation
simplified). This court disagreed and upheld the restitution
award. Id. ¶ 5. The court reasoned that once the defendant
“pleaded guilty to burglary, the trial court acted within its broad
discretion, after reviewing the evidence presented at the
restitution hearing, in ordering restitution for any pecuniary
damages clearly resulting from the burglary.” 5 Id.

5. Although not necessary for disposition of the appeal, the Hight
court also concluded it was “unlikely” that the defendant had
admitted responsibility for all the missing items merely by
admitting to “breaking into, burglarizing, and stealing marijuana
from the homeowner’s residence.” State v. Hight, 2008 UT App
118, ¶ 7 & n.3, 182 P.3d 922. The court reasoned that “although
[the defendant] readily admitted responsibility for his criminal
actions, his attorney objected at both the sentencing and the
restitution hearing to the inclusion of [the] other items in the
                                                    (continued…)

 20220275-CA                    8               2023 UT App 143
                           State v. Garcia

¶18 Factually, Hight is distinguishable from the case at hand.
Unlike the defendant in Hight, Garcia was not a lone actor. Indeed,
the evidence here is unequivocal that there were multiple actors,
including Co-defendant and various others whose identities were
never confirmed. Further, Garcia did not admit to theft of any
item, whereas the defendant in Hight admitted to theft of at least
one item, in addition to admitting to the underlying burglary. See
id. ¶ 4.

¶19 Moreover, Hight was decided prior to State v. Ogden, 2018
UT 8, 416 P.3d 1132, wherein our supreme court replaced the
modified but-for causation standard for restitution with the
proximate cause standard in effect today. See id. ¶ 48.
Notwithstanding this fact, the State contends that reliance on
Hight is still proper, noting that in State v. Randall, 2019 UT App
120, 447 P.3d 1232—which was decided after Ogden—this court
“approvingly cited Hight’s holding.” But the State misreads the
proposition for which Hight was cited in Randall.

¶20 In Randall, the defendant challenged the propriety of a
restitution award, arguing that the district court erred in
determining the scope of the award and that the State had not
proven causation. 2019 UT App 120, ¶¶ 12, 19. This court
disagreed on both points and upheld the award. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22, 27.
Citing Hight, the court first found that the district court correctly
determined the scope of restitution, reasoning that once the
defendant “pled guilty to the broad offense of engaging in a
pattern of unlawful activity,” the district court acted within its

restitution order.” Id. ¶ 7 (footnote omitted). Ultimately, it was the
evidentiary “hearing, not the plea, that provided a sufficient basis
for the restitution order.” Id. So too here. Even though Garcia
admitted responsibility for the burglary, he objected to the
additional restitution. Thus, we cannot conclude, nor does Hight
require, that Garcia’s plea alone provided a sufficient basis for the
restitution order. See supra ¶ 12.

 20220275-CA                      9               2023 UT App 143
                          State v. Garcia

discretion in determining the amount of restitution owed to the
victims harmed by the defendant’s unlawful activity. Randall,
2019 UT App 120, ¶¶ 16–17. Next, citing Ogden and State v. Oliver,
2018 UT App 101, 427 P.3d 495 (applying the proximate cause
standard to a restitution award), the court analyzed causation,
examining whether the State had established that the defendant’s
crimes were the proximate cause of the pecuniary losses suffered
by the victims. Randall, 2019 UT App 120, ¶¶ 19–22. Thus, the
Randall court’s reliance on Hight concerned only whether the
district court had properly determined the scope of the restitution
award—i.e., the number of victims who were impacted by the
defendant’s admitted criminal conduct; however, the court’s
causation analysis relied solely on Ogden and Oliver.

¶21 In sum, Garcia pleaded guilty to burglary and agreed to
pay restitution for that crime. He did not admit responsibility,
however, for Owner’s property damages and losses, nor did he
agree to pay for Owner’s losses as part of his plea agreement.
Therefore, to support an award of restitution, the State was
required to prove that the conduct for which Garcia agreed to pay
restitution (burglary) caused Owner’s damages. Because the State
has not done so, we need not determine whether the damage was
foreseeable.

                         CONCLUSION

¶22 The district court erred in ordering Garcia to pay
restitution to Owner’s insurance company because the State did
not present sufficient evidence to establish that Garcia’s criminal
conduct was the proximate cause of all of Owner’s claimed
property damage and losses. Accordingly, we vacate the district
court’s restitution order.

 20220275-CA                    10              2023 UT App 143