Court Opinion

ID: 9641340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:29:28.643002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:36.392636
License: Public Domain

CLEMENS, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent and would affirm defendant’s conviction.
The issue: Where there is conflicting evidence about whether police mistreated defendant when arresting him and a defense witness testified two policemen did mistreat defendant, did the court on cross examination properly allow the State to demonstrate the witness’ bias against police by showing the witness had been arrested on many occasions ?
Two rules of evidence must be reconciled. One declares that although a witness may be impeached by showing he has been convicted of a criminal offense it may not be shown he has been arrested for or accused of a criminal offense. We will refer to this as the “arrest rule.” The other declares a witness may be cross examined about facts which tend to show he is biased for or against a party and will be referred to as the “bias rule.” The reason behind the “arrest rule” is that a convicted person is unworthy of belief; the reason behind the “bias rule” is that the witness’ interest affects the weight to be given his testimony.
At common law and by early Missouri statutes persons convicted of certain crimes were considered so depraved in character that they were unworthy of belief and could not “be sworn as a witness.” (§ 66, c. 20, G.S.1865: State v. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 (1883)). That disability has long since been removed and § 491.050 now states: “Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is, notwithstanding, a competent witness; but the conviction may be proven to affect his credibility . . .”
We noted this statute applies to persons who have been convicted of a criminal offense. A long line of cases holds the credibility of a witness, i.e., his general character, cannot be attacked by showing a mere arrest or accusation since that would destroy the presumption of the witness’ *620innocence.1 Applying this “arrest rule” to the case at hand and disregarding the “bias rule,” discussed infra, we would have to declare the trial court erred in permitting cross examination to show the witness’ multiple arrests.
The “bias rule” has statutory approval by § 491.010: “No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any civil suit or proceeding at law or in equity, by reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise, but such interest may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility . . . ” (Our emphasis). This is also firmly implanted in our case law.
The “bias rule” is tersely stated in State v. Johnson, 163 S.W.2d 780 [8] (Mo.1942) : “It is always proper to show the feeling existing between the parties, or that of a witness against or for the parties.” The interest of a witness is an essential factor in the fact-finding process. In State v. Pigques, 310 S.W.2d 942 [6] (Mo.1958), the court said: “It is said the bias or prejudice and interest of a witness is never irrelevant, and always may be shown as affecting the witness’ credibility.” See also State v. Curry, 372 S.W.2d 1 [7] (Mo.1963) and other Missouri cases at notes 30 and 31, 98 C.J.S. Witnesses, § 539, supporting the text statement: “The fact that a witness is interested in the result of the action or proceeding in which he testifies, or is biased or prejudiced in favor of or against any of the parties thereto, is proper to be shown and considered as bearing on the credit which should be accorded to his testimony . . . ”
Superficially there is a conflict between the “arrest rule” and the “bias rule” but both are based on the reliability of the witness’ testimony. The “arrest rule” challenges the general character of the witness; the “bias rule” challenges only the tendency of a witness to color his testimony in a particular case. The distinction is explained by Wigmore on Evidence, III A, § 943: “Rice, C.J., in McHugh v. State, 31 Ala. 317, 320 (1858): In considering the various modes by which the credit of a witness may be assailed, Courts must observe the distinction between an attack upon his general credit, and an attack upon his credit in the particular case. Particular facts cannot be given in evidence to impeach his general [i.e., moral character] credit only, but may be to affect his particular credit, that is, his credit [due to bias or interest] in the particular cause. Thus the general credit of a witness for the prosecution may be unassailable; he may be hostile to the prisoner, and on cross examination may deny that he is so; in such case, who can doubt the right of the prisoner to prove the hostility ?”
The two rules are brought into harmony at 20 ALR 2d, p. 1440-1441, Anno: Witness — Impeachment—Arrest or Charge: “It is generally held, even in jurisdictions where such evidence is not ordinarily admissible, that the fact that a witness has been arrested or charged with crime may be shown or inquired into where it would reasonably tend to show that his testimony might be influenced by interest, bias, or a motive to testify falsely.”
The distinction was noted in Holden v. Berberich, 351 Mo. 995, 174 S.W.2d 791 [4] (1943), and again in State v. Sanders, 360 S.W.2d 722 [4] (Mo.1962): “An exception to the [arrest] rule has infrequently been noted where the inquiry showed a specific interest of the witness.”
In this case the prosecutor stated he wanted to show defense witness Lindsay was biased against the State witness police officers because police had arrested him 12 times for acts for which he was never_ convicted.2 Defendant’s objection was *621based on the “arrest rule.” The precise issue here is whether the trial court erred in permitting the cross examination.
Cross examination of a witness to show his interest is an absolute right and “the trial court has considerable discretion as to how far the inquiry may be pursued in detail.” Thornton v. Vonallmon, 456 S.W.2d 795 (Mo.App.1970). See State v. Brewer, 286 S.W.2d 782 [3-5] (Mo.1956), holding: “Cross-examination to show motive, interest or animus of a witness may be permitted and, as defendant says in his brief, ‘the latitude of cross-examination in a criminal proceeding rests to a very large extent within the discretion of the trial court.’ ” The case of State v. Sherry, 64 S.W.2d 238 (Mo.1933) concerned cross examination of a witness about “being arrested and whether he had been selling liquor in violation of the law.” The court followed the “bias rule” in the case of State v. Nasello, 325 Mo. 442, 30 S.W.2d 132, saying, “If not too remote in time, the admissibility of specific acts tending to impeach or disparage the testimony of a witness is largely within the discretion of the trial court.”
Further support for the admission of the challenged evidence is found in the principle that where evidence is admissible for one purpose but inadmissible for another, it should be admitted. See Jackson v. Thompson, 358 Mo. 1001, 218 S.W. 97 [1] (1949), and a host of cases listed at 27 Mo.Dig., Trial,.
The trial court having seen and heard the police witnesses and observed the attitude and demeanor of witness Lindsay may well have concluded it was possible Lindsay’s contradiction of the police officers’ testimony was colored by an animus growing out of his many questionable arrests by other policemen and have also concluded this was permissible evidence for the jury to consider in assessing the weight to be given Lindsay’s testimony.
I cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the challenged cross examination.

. Holden v. Berberich, 351 Mo. 995, 174 S.W.2d 791, [1-3] (1943); and cases listed in Note 8 to § 491.050, V.A.M.S.

. This motive was demonstrated in the prosecutor’s closing argument where he said the jury should know how Mr. Lindsay felt about police officers.