Court Opinion

ID: 9719891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:08:02.714539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.813627
License: Public Domain

WALLIN, J., Dissenting
I agree with the majority’s conclusion we should consider the new developments posttrial in reaching our decision on this appeal. I respectfully disagree, however, with its conclusion those developments lead to an affirmance of the trial court decision.
Roger B. filed identical stepparent adoption petitions to adopt Shawn and Randi, the children of his then wife, Sharon B., from her former marriage to appellant Randall D. Roger B. and Sharon B. were then living happily with the children and the trial court appeared likely to approve the adoption. But the adoption proceedings were stymied when Randall D., the natural father, refused his consent. Roger B. then filed identical petitions to declare Shawn and Randi free from the custody and control of Randall D.
Without reiterating the details outlined in the majority opinion, it is clear from the record that Randall D. was anything but a model father. He neglected his children and did not provide for their support. The petitions *632declaring the children free from the custody of Randall D. were granted. The decision was supported by substantial evidence, the claimed trial court errors are insubstantial, and, without more, the judgments would unquestionably be affirmed.
But there is much more. Since then we have been informed that Roger B. is no longer proceeding with the petitions for stepparent adoption because he and Sharon B. are dissolving their marriage. He has not appeared in this court, has dismissed the stepparent adoption petitions, and is no longer an interested party in this matter.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion refers to him as the “petitioner” and affirms the judgment on his petitions, even though there is now no petitioner. The majority reaches this result by accepting the unsworn hearsay statements of counsel that the natural mother, Sharon B., and the children wish to have the freedom petition judgments affirmed. This result is contrary to accepted appellate practice, the procedure followed by the Supreme Court in In re Elise K. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 138 [187 Cal.Rptr. 483, 654 P.2d 253], and logic.
Appellate courts have the power to take evidence on appeal and consider facts arising after the trial court judgment (Civ. Code, § 909). It is a power rarely exercised, however, because it does not harmonize with the function of appellate review. When an appellate court does accept evidence, it should, at a minimum, follow the standards for admission of evidence required of a trial court. In this case we can take judicial notice of the dissolution of the marriage of Roger B. and Sharon B., Roger B.’s dismissal of the stepparent adoption proceedings, his abandonment of the freedom petitions at issue here, and his nonappearance in this appeal. Any trial court could do likewise. We should not, however, accept the unsworn hearsay statements of counsel as to the current wishes of the natural mother, Sharon B., and the two children. This is particularly true when, as in this case, the new information significantly alters the circumstances upon which the trial court acted. At a minimum this new information should be presented in admissible form to the trial court for a determination of its effect on the judgment. Substituting ourselves for the trial court usurps its function and also denies the losing party the opportunity to appeal our factual determinations.
The freedom petitions were only filed in this case to facilitate Roger B.’s stepparent adoption. In Elise K. the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a trial court judgment declaring a child free from the care and custody of her parent after learning that the child was no longer adoptable. While it is true the reversal was by stipulation, the result suggests the court unanimously believed termination of the adoption proceedings should also result in *633termination—or at least reconsideration—of the judgment on the freedom petition. (See In re Elise K., supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 150-151.) The majority reaches the opposite conclusion when it affirms the judgment in this case. As explained in a concurring opinion, “The termination of parental rights contemplated by section 232 is the ultimate sanction envisioned by the Legislature. It represents the total and irrevocable severance of the bond between parent and child. (§§ 232.6, 238.) The child’s emotional relationships with his or her natural parent and siblings are cut off. Any right to parental support or to an inheritance from biological family members is terminated. The parents, in turn, lose the right to the companionship, care, and custody—and the possibility of ever regaining visitation rights or custody—of their offspring. [1¡] The ‘fundamental interests’ which are at stake are ‘ranked among the most basic of civil rights . . . .’ [Citations.] Consequently, the parent-child relationship may be terminated under section 232 ‘only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood.’ [Citation.] [1|] Other provisions of statutory law permit a child to be taken from the custody of a deficient parent without extinguishing the parent-child relationship or terminating all parental rights. (See especially Welf. & Inst. Code., § 300.) Thus, resort to section 232 proceedings is generally inappropriate unless, inter alia, the state intends—and is reasonably likely—to provide the child with a satisfactory long-term replacement for the otherwise permanent parental relationship that is being terminated. In short, a termination of parental rights is normally appropriate only when adoption is realistically contemplated. [1f] Case law, legislative history, and statutory law all confirm this obvious conclusion. The courts of this state have long recognized that the ‘purpose of [a section 232 action] is to facilitate adoption of the minor child.’ [Citation.] Indeed, the statutory provisions regarding the termination of parental rights were originally transferred from the Juvenile Court Law to the Civil Code for precisely this reason: ‘What is contemplated by court action under [the Juvenile Court Law predecessor to section 232] is not continuing guidance and supervision by a governmental agency, but freeing the child for adoption by a private person. This is essentially an adoption problem and, therefore, should be handled by the civil court handling adoptions.’ [Citations.] [1|] In 1980, the Legislature once again made this point with unmistakable clarity. It enacted section 232.6, which provides in pertinent part that ‘[t]he purpose of this chapter [dealing with the termination of parental rights] is to serve the welfare and best interests of a child by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home when those conditions are otherwise missing from his or her life.’ ” (In re Elise K., supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 146, 147, fns. omitted (conc. opn. of Bird, C. J.).)
Finally affirmance of this judgment defies logic. How can we affirm a judgment on these freedom petitions now that there is no petitioner? How *634can we terminate parental rights and obligations under a statute which exists for the purpose of facilitating adoption when we know there is to be no adoption? The majority opinion reaches this result by confusing a freedom proceeding ancillary to an adoption with juvenile court wardship proceedings. As the previous quote from Elise K. states, the two are very different. “The action to have a minor declared free from the custody and control of his parents [(Civ. Code, § 232)] is distinct in nature and purpose from the Juvenile Court proceeding to declare a minor a ward of the court. [Civil Code section 232] deals with a neglected rather than a delinquent child; it is not designed to affect actual custody because the parents in nearly all cases have either abandoned the child or have been deprived of its custody; and it does not contemplate custody or care by Juvenile Court officers, but rather seeks to pave the way for adoption or other normal custody arrangements by eliminating the rights of the erring parents.” (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed.) Parent and Child, § 106, p. 4628.) Numerous decisions agree with Witkin’s comment that the purpose of Civil Code section 232 is to facilitate an adoption. (See In re Christina L. (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 737, 744-745 [173 Cal.Rptr. 722]; In re Marriage of O'Connell (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 849, 854-855 [146 Cal.Rptr. 26]; In re Shannon W. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 956, 961-962 [138 Cal.Rptr. 432]; and In re Eugene W. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 628-629 [105 Cal.Rptr. 736].) Today’s decision stands alone for the contrary proposition that a freedom petition filed to facilitate an adoption survives despite the withdrawal of the petition and termination of the adoption.
I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied July 20, 1989. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.