Court Opinion

ID: 9564954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:12:14.640504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:17.090615
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority, citing United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2838, 61 L.Ed.2d 284 (1979), lists five elements that must be found in order to justify invocation of the equitable doctrine of estoppel. Those factors are:
1) the party to be estopped (Tetlin) must know the facts;
2) that party must intend that its conduct shall be acted upon;
3) the party claiming estoppel (the state) must be ignorant of the true facts;
4) that party must rely on its adversary’s conduct to its detriment; and, in the case of estoppel against the government,1
5) the action of the party to be estopped must constitute “affirmative misconduct.”
The superior court made no ruling on the estoppel issue. The majority, however, concludes that each of the elements of es-toppel has been satisfied, and that Tetlin is therefore estopped from denying the validity of the material sites. In my opinion this conclusion is incorrect because the third and fourth elements of estoppel have not been satisfied.
While the state may well not have known whether “BLM’s original interpretation, rather than its 1961 change in interpretation, was the ‘true’ interpretation,” it did know the following facts: that it had submitted two virtually identical applications to BLM within four days of each other; that BLM granted one application; that BLM rejected the other application, stating that it lacked authority- over the site because it was on the Tetlin Indian Reserve, and suggesting that the application be submitted to BIA; that the decisions on its two applications were inconsistent; that it did not submit the application which BLM rejected to BIA;2 and that it had not appeal*538ed the inconsistent decisions. As Tetlin argues, “the State chose the expedient route of ignoring the problem.”
The majority holds that because the state did not know which of the decisions concerning its applications was the “true” interpretation by BLM of the governing regulations, the state satisfies the third criterion for estoppel (ignorance of the true facts). But the state was not ignorant of the facts; it merely was ignorant of the proper resolution of the ambiguous situation created by those facts. The California Supreme Court, explicating the elements of estoppel, has noted that to satisfy the element of ignorance of the true facts “the ... party [claiming estoppel must be] not only destitute of the true [facts], but of the means of acquiring such knowledge.” City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 43, 476 P.2d 423, 443 (Cal.1970) (quoting Biddle Boggs v. Merced Mining Co., 14 Cal. 279, 367 (Cal.1859)). Not only did the state have knowledge of the facts, but it could have obtained a determination as to which of the contradictory decisions it had received was correct by appealing to BLM or immediately submitting an application to BIA. A “convenient and ready means to such end,” Mansell, 91 Cal.Rptr. at 44, 476 P.2d at 443-44, was thus available to the state. It chose not to take advantage of that opportunity. Thus, it can not now claim that it was ignorant of the true facts and is therefore entitled to estop Tetlin.
The fourth element of estoppel is the state’s reliance on the BIA grants of the material sites. In my view that reliance was not reasonable in light of the facts noted above. The state knew that BLM had made contradictory decisions concerning the state’s two applications. Rather than seek a resolution of this situation, however, the state was content to keep its BLM-granted site, and years later, to include the rejected site in a group of applications to BIA. Knowing that either BLM or BIA had authority to grant the material sites, and knowing that it had sites granted by BLM and sites granted by BIA, it was not reasonable for the state to assume that the BIA-granted sites were valid. The state realized that there was uncertainty as to which agency had authority to grant the material sites and the state had the means of acquiring the knowledge of the true facts (i.e. which agency had the authority to grant the applications in question). The state’s decision not to ascertain which agency could properly grant the material sites renders its “reliance” on BIA’s authority to grant them unreasonable.
Because the state was not ignorant of the true facts, and because its reliance on the validity of the BIA grants was not reasonable, it has not fulfilled the requirements for estoppel, and summary judgment for the state on that issue is improper.
On the other hand, since the state had a duty to seek clarification of the ambiguous situation resulting from the decisions on its applications to BLM, and the state did not do so, the state cannot now estop Tetlin from contesting the validity of the material sites. Therefore I would grant summary judgment in favor of Tetlin on the estoppel issue.3

. The majority opinion notes that "Tetlin’s interest in the material site easements is derived from the federal government through the 1981 patent.... Accordingly, Tetlin stands in the shoes of the federal government with respect to being estopped."

. I am not persuaded that the state chose "one of two alternative administrative remedies presented by the BLM” — i.e. that it submitted its rejected application to BIA. Rather, by waiting a year and a half, and then including an application for the site rejected by BLM in a group of *538applications to BIA, the state took no steps to resolve the problem presented by BLM’s inconsistent treatment of its site applications.

. As the Ninth Circuit has noted:
Generally, the existence of estoppel is a question for the trier of fact. However, if the facts are not disputed, and only one inference can be drawn from the evidence, the question of estoppel becomes one of law.... [I]n this case ... we find there to be no material facts in dispute and thus conclude that the question of estoppel is properly resolved at this time as a matter of law.
Sawyer v. County of Sonoma, 719 F.2d 1001, 1006 n. 12 (9th Cir.1983) (citations omitted).