Court Opinion

ID: 9777730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:21:57.720612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:00.356986
License: Public Domain

ROBERTSON, Justice,
concurring.
I reluctantly concur in the result reached by this Court. However, I am of the opinion that this case presents another example of trial by ambush. Griffin was represented by counsel of his own choosing. He remained silent throughout the contempt proceedings and never requested a jury, nor has he asserted any disputed issues of fact to be decided by a jury. Now in this *263Court, he complains for the first time that he was denied a fundamental right because there is no record that he formally waived a jury trial.
Contempt is a unique, quasi-criminal sanction. Procedural safeguards for contempt do not derive from the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but from traditional notions of due process. Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616, 80 S.Ct. 1038, 1042, 4 L.Ed.2d 989 (1960). Therefore, the full panoply of Sixth Amendment rights available to persons in ordinary criminal proceedings should not apply in contempt proceedings. I refer to my previous dissent in Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 422-423 (Tex.1983).