Court Opinion

ID: 9657104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:14:14.513865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.904587
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). I am unable to agree with my colleagues’ disposition of this matter.
The statute governing the case, as I read it, provides in relevant part:
“the term of service of grand jurors shall be 6 months unless extended by specific order of the judge who summoned such jurors or his successor for an additional period not to exceed 6 months, # # # 1
Following the above-quoted language and separated therefrom by a comma, there appears this language:
“except that the grand jurors may be recalled at *170any time by the judge who summoned such jurors or by his successor to conclude business commenced during their term of service.”2
In another section of the statute, the limits of punishment for contempt are recited, as are the effect of a grant of immunity.
“Any witness who neglects or refuses to appear or testify * * * after service of a true copy of an order granting the witness immunity * * * shall be guilty of a contempt and after a public hearing in open court and conviction of such contempt shall be fined not exceeding $10,000.00 or imprisoned not exceeding 1 year or both. If the witness thereafter appears before the court to purge himself of such contempt, the court shall order the recalling of the grand jury to afford such opportunity * # * .”3
After the Legislature stated flatly that the term of service of the grand jurors shall be six months unless extended by specific order for an additional period not to exceed six months, it said everything there was to be said as to the term of the grand jurors summoned.
As to the “except” for recall to conclude business commenced during their term, this contingency has to happen during the first six months or the additional six months originally authorized. The same is true of the “if” of a contemnor seeking to purge himself, in which event the court must recall the grand jury.
I hold the term of service of the grand jurors under this statute cannot exceed 12 months for any reason or under any circumstances.
1 think it significant that in the proviso relating to concluding business commenced during the term *171of service of the grand jurors, the Legislature used the word “recall,” and not “resummon.” It seems to me that “recall” can only relate to a period during which the grand jury has either completed its investigation or temporarily suspended its activities, hut the term of the jurors has not been terminated by formal order or has not expired by the self-operative words of the statute.
I cannot ascribe to the Legislature the intent that a eontemnor sentenced to one year on the last day of the term of the grand jurors would have a year to contemplate his decision while the grand jurors sat around, subject to recall dependent upon his decision.
The foregoing must be the construction already placed upon the statute by our Supreme Court under its order of remand specifically referring us to Shillitani v. United States (1966), 384 US 364, 371 (86 S Ct 1531, 1536; 16 L Ed 2d 622, 627). The whole ratio decidendi of Shillitani is found in the sentence,
“Where the grand jury has been finally discharged, a contumacious witness can no longer be confined since he then has no further opportunity to purge himself of contempt.”
If our Supreme Court had concluded that the “if” or “except” could extend the term of this grand jury it would not have remanded to us with specific reference to Shillitani where no “ifs”, “buts”, “ands”, or “excepts” beclouded the issue. If the Supreme Court concluded that the term of the grand jurors under this statute could be extended beyond the definite one-year period, it certainly would not have referred us to Shillitani because Shillitani obviously could not control. The irreducible fact is petitioner-appellant is being illegally confined for *172the precise reason expressed in Shillitani, vis.: the term of the grand jury has expired.
The sentence imposed hy Judge Nathan Kaufman was perfectly legal and proper when he imposed it. He sentenced petitioner to six months or until the “expiration of this particular citizens grand jury” or until “you purge yourself of contempt”.
Petitioner did not purge himself. He did not serve six months. He was in confinement under the sentence when the term of this particular citizens’ grand jury expired, May 10,1971. The fact that he did not serve the six months is not to the point. In SMllitam’s language (pp 371, 372),
“The objection that the length of imprisonment thus depends upon fortuitous circumstances, such as the life of the grand jury and when a witness appears, has no relevance to the present situation # * . Once the grand jury ceases to function, the rationale for civil contempt vanishes, and the contemnor has to be released.”
Petitioner’s period of legal confinement has expired. Habeas corpus directing his unconditional release should issue.

 MOLA § 767.7a (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.947[1]).

 MOLA § 767.7a, supra.

MCLA § 767.19c (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.959[3]).