Court Opinion

ID: 9588115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:30:21.098787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:57.376557
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice:
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The only issue is whether there exists any competent evidence, direct or circumstantial, which reasonably tends to establish appellant’s intent to distribute marijuana in Ker-shaw County. I find none whether our traditional “any evidence” standard of review is applied, see State v. Halyard, S. C., 264 S. E. (2d) 841 (1980), or the recently enunciated federal standard of review is used, i. e., whether any rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime present beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 560 (1979). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial judge for his failure to direct a verdict of acquittal.
It can be inferred from the circumstances appellant at one time had in his possession, aboard the aircraft, a large quantity of marijuana. And I have no quarrel with the further logical inference he intended to distribute the contraband. *430But when appellant off-loaded the marijuana his intent to distribute came -to fruition and vanished with the contraband. Where that occurred we know not, but there is simply no evidence in this record it took place in Kershaw County. On the contrary, the evidence is conclusive that the contraband was disposed of before the plane landed at the Camden airport. The record is barren of evidence the aircraft touched down at any other spot in Kershaw County prior to landing at the Camden airport or that appellant was in possession in Kershaw County of more than the 3.47 grams of marijuana leaf and seeds introduced at trial.
Even assuming the circumstantial and opinion evidence of a smuggling operation was admissible against appellant, one cannot reasonably infer he intended to gather and distribute the less than one-seventh of an ounce of spilled marijuana leaf and seeds from the carpet and seats of the aircraft after having dumped his cargo of smuggled marijuana elsewhere. The State’s own witnesses testified such a small amount of residue would not be vacuumed for distribution by smuggling operatives.
We have consistently held a case must not be submitted to .the jury where the evidence raises mere suspicion of guilt. See Cases collected in West’s South Carolina Digest, Criminal Law, at Key Nos. 741(1) and 753 (2).
“When a motion for a directed verdict is made the trial judge is concerned with the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not with its weight. It is his duty to submit the case to the jury, if there is any evidence, either direct or circumstantial which reasonably tends, to prove the guilt of the accused or from which guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. However, the motion for a directed verdict should be granted where evidence merely raises a suspicion of guilt, or is such as to permit the jury to merely conjecture or to speculate as to the accused’s guilt.” State v. Brown, 267 S. C. 311, 227 S. E. (2d) 674, 677 (1976).
*431See also State v. Smith, S. C., 266 S. E. (2d) 422 (1980). In my view the conviction affirmed by the majority today was for the possession and distribution in Kershaw County of that speculative but unknown quantity of marijuana which was the subject of much surmise and conjecture by the State’s experts 1. The record is not only without any evidence the offense took place in Kershaw County but clearly establishes that it did not. The appellant may be guilty of the offense elsewhere, but not in Kershaw County. I would reverse appellant’s conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in Kershaw County.

 The offense of possession of marijuana was not at issue at trial. 272 S. E. (2d) 10