Court Opinion

ID: 9405719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 00:00:31.877813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:23.936608
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20577     Document: 00516803616         Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/28/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                ____________                                      FILED
                                                                              June 28, 2023
                                  No. 21-20577                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                ____________                                      Clerk

   Jillian Ostrewich,

                                            Plaintiff—Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

                                      versus

   Clifford Tatum, in his official capacity as Harris County Elections
   Administrator; Jane Nelson, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of
   Texas; John Scott, in his official capacity as the Attorney General of
   Texas,

                                       Defendants—Appellees/Cross-Appellants,

   Kim Ogg, in her official capacity as Harris County District Attorney,

                                            Defendant—Appellee.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:19-CV-715
                  ______________________________

   Before Clement, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          America’s “early elections were not a very pleasant spectacle” for
   voters. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 202 (1992) (plurality opinion)
   (quotation omitted). Indeed, in the nineteenth century, polling places were
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   often a place of bedlam: “Sham battles were frequently engaged in to keep
   away elderly and timid voters,” id. at 202, “[c]rowds would gather to heckle
   and harass voters who appeared to be supporting the other side,” and
   “[e]lectioneering of all kinds was permitted,” Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky,
   138 S. Ct. 1876, 1882–83 (2018). To facilitate more orderly voting, states
   came to institute a number of reforms, including restrictions on “election-
   day speech in the immediate vicinity of the polls.” Id. at 1883 (quotation
   omitted). “Today, all 50 states and the District of Columbia have laws
   curbing various forms of speech in and around polling places on Election
   Day.” Id.
          At issue in this case are three such Texas laws: Texas Election Code
   sections 61.003, 61.010, and 85.036 (collectively, the “electioneering laws”).
   Jillian Ostrewich filed this action, alleging that she was unconstitutionally
   censored under the electioneering laws when she voted in 2018 and that the
   statutes unconstitutionally “chilled” her right to free speech by criminalizing
   political expression within polling places. The district court, adopting the
   magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, upheld section 61.010 as
   constitutional, but concluded that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are facially
   unconstitutional under the First Amendment.            Both sides appealed,
   contesting jurisdictional issues as well as the merits. Following Mansky, we
   hold that all three electioneering laws pass constitutional muster.
                                         I.
                                        A.
          Sections 61.003 and 85.036—which are near duplicates—prohibit
   “electioneering” near polling places. Section 61.003 states, in relevant part:
          (a) A person commits [a misdemeanor] offense if, during the
          voting period and within 100 feet of an outside door through

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          which a voter may enter the building in which a polling place
          is located, the person:
                 (1) loiters; or
                 (2) electioneers for or against any candidate, measure,
                 or political party.
          ...
          (b) In this section:
                 (1) “Electioneering” includes the posting, use, or
                 distribution of political signs or literature.
   Tex. Elec. Code § 61.003. Section 85.036 is substantively the same but
   applies during the early voting period instead of on Election Day itself. Tex.
   Elec. Code § 85.036. Section 61.010, entitled “Wearing Name Tag or
   Badge in Polling Place,” complements the first two statutes, restricting what
   a person may wear in a polling place. Section 61.010 reads:
          (a) . . . [A] person may not wear a badge, insignia, emblem, or
          other similar communicative device relating to a candidate,
          measure, or political party appearing on the ballot, or to the
          conduct of the election, in the polling place or within 100 feet
          of any outside door through which a voter may enter the
          building in which the polling place is located.
          ...
          (c) A person commits an offense if the person violates
          Subsection (a). An offense under this subsection is a Class C
          misdemeanor.
   Tex. Elec. Code § 61.010.
                                        B.
          Houston’s 2018 election ballot included a proposition (“Prop B”) to
   amend the City Charter to guarantee Houston’s firefighters pay parity with
   the City’s police officers. Prop B supporters actively campaigned for the

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   initiative, including through street demonstrations. Many supporters wore
   distinctive yellow t-shirts that contained a union logo and the words
   “Houston Fire Fighters.” Prop B supporters also wore the shirts while
   advocating around polling locations.
           Jillian Ostrewich, a self-proclaimed “fire wife,” and her firefighter
   husband wore these shirts when they headed to the polls to vote during
   Houston’s early voting period. When Ostrewich reached the front of the
   voting line, an unidentified election worker pointed at her shirt and told her
   that “[y]ou are not going to be allowed to vote,” because voters were “voting
   on that.” This was consistent with the policy established by the polling
   location’s presiding judge, the official who manages polling locations in
   Texas. See Tex. Elec. Code § 32.075(a). 1 For Ostrewich to be permitted
   to vote, the election worker instructed her to go to the restroom to turn her
   shirt inside-out. 2 Ostrewich complied, then returned to the line and voted.
   The next day, the Harris County Administrator of Elections advised election
   workers that only yellow firefighter t-shirts explicitly promoting Prop B
   needed to be covered up; union-logoed, yellow firefighter t-shirts—like the
   one Ostrewich had worn—were permissible.
           After the election, Ostrewich filed suit, alleging that she was
   unconstitutionally censored and that Texas’s electioneering laws
   unconstitutionally chilled her right to free speech. She sued both local and

           _____________________
           1
            Under section 32.075(a), the presiding judge “shall preserve order and prevent
   breaches of the peace and violations of this code in the polling place and in the area within
   which electioneering and loitering are prohibited . . . .” See also Tex. Elec. Code
   § 32.071 (“The presiding judge is in charge of and responsible for the management and
   conduct of the election at the polling place of the election precinct that the judge serves.”).
           2
             While the election worker was who instructed Ostrewich to change her shirt, the
   policy originated from the presiding judge. Our analysis therefore refers to the presiding
   judge as the relevant actor.

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   state defendants in their official capacities, including the Texas Secretary of
   State, Texas Attorney General, Harris County Clerk, and Harris County
   Attorney, (collectively, the “State”). 3 After discovery, both Ostrewich and
   the State moved for summary judgment. The case was assigned to a
   magistrate judge, who recommended rejecting the State’s assertions that
   Ostrewich’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity and, alternatively,
   that she lacked Article III standing. Addressing the merits, the magistrate
   judge recommended upholding section 61.010 as constitutional because it
   was sufficiently limited to apparel “relating to a candidate, measure, or
   political party appearing on the ballot,” but concluded that sections 61.003
   and 85.036 were facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment
   because they contained no such limiting language. The district court adopted
   the recommendation in full. Both sides timely appealed the ruling.
           On appeal, Ostrewich asserts the district court erred in upholding
   section 61.010 as constitutional, both facially and as applied. The State
   disagrees, asserting that the district court should not have ruled on
   Ostrewich’s constitutional claims because she lacks standing and the
   Eleventh Amendment bars her claims against Texas’s Attorney General and
   Secretary of State. On the merits, the State contends all three sections pass
   constitutional muster.

           _____________________
           3
             Various officeholders have changed during the pendency of this appeal. We have
   previously granted unopposed motions to substitute and refer to each officer using his or
   her official title for consistency.
             We recognize that the defendants encompass both state and local government
   officials. However, because the defendants are represented by a single brief, we refer to
   them collectively as “the State” for simplicity.

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                                        II.
          We review a “district court’s judgment on cross motions for summary
   judgment de novo, addressing each party’s motion independently, viewing
   the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
   party.” CANarchy Craft Brewery Collective, LLC v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
   Comm’n, 37 F.4th 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). Summary
   judgment is appropriate if “the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue
   as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” High v. E-Sys. Inc., 459 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2006); Fed
   R. Civ. P. 56.
          When interpreting Texas statutes, this court employs “the same
   methods of statutory interpretation used by the Texas Supreme Court.”
   Camacho v. Ford Motor Co., 993 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2021). That court
   instructs that “text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.”
   Id. (quoting BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76,
   86 (Tex. 2017)).
                                        III.
          Before addressing the merits, we must traverse a couple of threshold
   issues: the proper parties to this action, and Ostrewich’s standing. Both
   implicate the court’s jurisdiction to consider the case. We conclude that
   Texas’s Attorney General and Secretary of State enjoy sovereign immunity,
   but that Ostrewich has standing to bring her claims against the remaining
   defendants.

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                                                 A.
          The district court found that the Ex parte Young 4 exception to
   Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity permitted Ostrewich to bring her
   claims against Texas’s Attorney General and Secretary of State. This was
   incorrect; the exception only applies if the state officials have a sufficient
   connection with enforcing the electioneering laws. Per our precedent, they
   do not.
          Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity “prohibits suits against
   state officials or agencies that are effectively suits against a state.” City of
   Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019). The Young exception to
   this rule “allows private parties to bring suits for injunctive or declaratory
   relief against individual state officials,” but only if those officials have “some
   connection with the enforcement of the challenged act.” Id. (cleaned up).
   To show this required “connection,” a state officer must have a “particular
   duty to enforce the statute in question and a demonstrated willingness to
   exercise that duty.” Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 978 F.3d 168, 181 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (quoting Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014)).
   It is insufficient for a party to show only that a state officer has “a general
   duty to enforce the law.” Id. In the Young context, “enforcement” means
   “compulsion or constraint.” Richardson v. Flores, 28 F.4th 649, 655 (5th Cir.
   2022) (quoting City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1000); see also Tex. All. for Retired
   Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 672 (5th Cir. 2022) (“If the official does not
   compel or constrain anyone to obey the challenged law, enjoining that official
   could not stop any ongoing constitutional violation.”).
          We first address the Secretary of State. To overcome her sovereign
   immunity via Young, Ostrewich must show that the Secretary has “some
          _____________________
          4
              209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).

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   connection with the enforcement” of the “specific election code provisions”
   at issue. Richardson, 28 F.4th at 653–54 (quotation and citation omitted). She
   may not rely simply on the Secretary’s “broad duties to oversee
   administration of Texas’s election laws.” Id. at 654. The Secretary’s
   “[o]ffering advice, guidance, or interpretive assistance” to local officials
   does not constitute enforcement. Id. at 655.
          The district court concluded that the Secretary had a sufficient
   connection to the enforcement of Texas’s electioneering laws because she is
   responsible for training presiding judges to enforce elections law, and she
   issues election advisories interpreting the electioneering laws, which guide
   presiding judges’ discretionary decisions “under threat of removal.” See
   Tex. Elec. Code § 32.111 (“The [S]ecretary of [S]tate shall adopt
   standards of training in election law and procedure[s] for presiding and
   alternate judges.”). But the Secretary’s training and advisory duties fall
   short of the showing required for her to face suit under Young.
          In Texas, presiding judges are exclusively entrusted with enforcing
   the electioneering laws at polling locations.      See Tex. Elec. Code
   § 32.075; see also supra n.1. Both parties agree that a presiding judge has
   absolute discretion in exercising that enforcement power. See § 32.075 (“[A]
   presiding judge has the power of a [state] district judge to enforce order and
   preserve the peace[.]”). The Secretary, thus, does not directly enforce the
   electioneering laws, but only provides interpretive guidance. And, because
   “[o]ffering advice, guidance, or interpretive assistance does not compel or
   constrain” presiding judges in fulfilling their duties, Young does not operate
   to strip the Secretary of her sovereign immunity. See Richardson, 28 F.4th at
   655.
          The same goes for the Attorney General. Ostrewich must show that
   he has a particular duty to enforce the electioneering laws and has

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   demonstrated willingness to do so. See City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1000–02.
   The district court determined that Ostrewich met this burden because there
   was no evidence that “the Attorney General will not prosecute violators in
   the future.” The court further determined that the Attorney General had
   two specific statutory duties that require him to enforce the electioneering
   laws:   Texas Election Code sections 273.001 (triggering an obligatory
   investigation by local authorities upon receipt of two or more complaints and
   permitting the Secretary to refer a complaint to the Attorney General for
   criminal investigation), and 273.021(a) (permitting the Attorney General to
   prosecute election law offenses).
           A recent opinion from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is
   dispositive of this question. In State v. Stephens, the Court of Criminal
   Appeals held that section 273.021(a) violated Texas’s Constitution because
   the Attorney General has no independent authority to prosecute election-
   related criminal offenses. 663 S.W.3d 45, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), reh’g
   denied, 664 S.W.3d 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). According to the Court of
   Criminal Appeals, section 273.021(a)’s plain language merely allows the
   Attorney General to “prosecute with the permission of the local prosecutor”
   but, critically, “[he] cannot initiate prosecution unilaterally.” Id. at 55.
   Indeed, the section does not require the Attorney General to prosecute
   election law violations at all—rather, it uses the permissive term “may”
   instead of a mandatory term like “shall.” Id. at 54–55. As such, “nothing in
   [the] statute ‘requires’ the Attorney General to prosecute election cases.”
   Id. at 55. The Attorney General’s power related to election laws is therefore
   limited—he does not have the ability to “compel or constrain local officials”
   to enforce the electioneering laws, nor can he bring his own proceedings to
   prosecute election-law violators. Cf. City of Austin, 943 F.3d at 1001 (finding
   application of Young warranted when the Attorney General prohibited

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   payments, set rates, and sent letters threatening formal enforcement
   actions).
          This holds true irrespective of section 273.001. As with section
   273.021(a), the Attorney General lacks the power to prosecute election-
   related criminal offenses directly under section 273.001. Instead, section
   273.001 simply empowers the Attorney General to investigate criminal
   conduct upon a triggering event—namely, referral by the Secretary. Nothing
   in this section gives the Attorney General the ability to prosecute, as that
   power would come from section 273.021(a) if it did not contravene the Texas
   Constitution. Ultimately, as with the Secretary, the Young exception does
   not strip the Attorney General of his sovereign immunity. Richardson, 28
   F.4th at 655. The district court erred in holding otherwise. Accordingly, we
   reverse the district court’s holding regarding sovereign immunity and
   dismiss Ostrewich’s claims against the Secretary of State and Attorney
   General for lack of jurisdiction.
                                           B.
          To have standing against the remaining two defendants, Ostrewich
   must (1) have suffered an injury in fact (2) that is fairly traceable to the
   challenged action of one of the remaining defendants and (3) that will likely
   be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
   560–61 (1992). Ostrewich alleges two injuries: First, an election worker—
   while enforcing the electioneering laws—unconstitutionally censored her
   speech by instructing her to turn her firefighter t-shirt inside-out; second, the
   electioneering laws unconstitutionally chilled her speech. The State argues
   neither injury is sufficient to confer standing, maintaining that the first is not
   traceable to a named defendant, and the second is not an injury-in-fact. We
   disagree; Ostrewich’s allegation that Texas’s electioneering laws
   unconstitutionally chilled her speech establishes standing.

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           In the pre-enforcement context, this court has repeatedly held that
   chilling a plaintiff’s speech is a constitutional harm adequate to satisfy the
   injury-in-fact requirement. E.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319,
   330–31 (5th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases). A plaintiff sufficiently pleads such
   an injury when she “(1) has an ‘intention to engage in a course of conduct
   arguably affected with a constitutional interest,’ (2) [her] intended future
   conduct is ‘arguably proscribed by the policy in question,’ and (3) ‘the threat
   of future enforcement of the challenged policies is substantial.’” Id. at 330
   (cleaned up) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 161–
   64 (2014)).
           The State argues that Ostrewich fails to “show a threat of future
   enforcement” because she provides no evidence that she—or any Texas
   voter—has or will ever face a credible threat of prosecution for violating the
   electioneering laws. But the State’s argument is refuted by Speech First,
   where we explained that for pre-enforcement challenges to newly enacted or
   “non-moribund” statutes restricting speech, this court “assume[s] a
   credible threat of prosecution in the absence of compelling contrary
   evidence.” Id. at 335; see also id. at 331 (“It is not hard to sustain standing for
   a pre-enforcement challenge in the highly sensitive area of public regulations
   governing bedrock political speech.”). 5 Ostrewich has standing because her
           _____________________
           5
             The State tries to circumvent this analysis by arguing that Speech First is
   inapplicable because the electioneering laws are not new. Yet the State completely ignores
   that Speech First also applies to “non-moribund” statutes. 979 F.3d at 335. Moreover, the
   electioneering laws at issue are routinely invoked by Texas and enforced by election judges.
   See,           e.g.,           Election          Advisory           No.            2020-06,
   https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2020-06.shtml.
            Similarly, the State asserts that it presented “compelling contrary evidence” that
   Ostrewich does not face a threat of prosecution, as no voter has been prosecuted for
   violating the law for at least a decade. But “a lack of past enforcement does not alone doom
   a claim of standing”—more evidence is needed. Speech First, 979 F.3d at 336; see also Ctr.
   for Individual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 660 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Controlling

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   “claim is that the [non-moribund] policy causes self-censorship among those
   who are subject to it, and [her] speech is arguably regulated by the policy[.]”
   Id. at 336–37.
                                             IV.
           We now turn to the merits of Ostrewich’s appeal.                    The First
   Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”                       U.S.
   Const. amend. I. Texas’s electioneering laws, forbidding certain forms of
   electioneering and political apparel, plainly restrict a form of expression
   within the First Amendment’s ambit. But such laws do not always run afoul
   of the First Amendment.           Indeed, states are often faced “with [this]
   particularly difficult reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to
   engage in political discourse with the right to vote.” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at
   1892 (quoting Burson, 504 U.S. at 198).
           The Supreme Court has articulated a “reasonableness” test for
   dealing with such situations. In Mansky, a group of voters, like Ostrewich,
   challenged a Minnesota electioneering law that prohibited voters from
   wearing a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia . . . at
   or about the polling place.” Id. at 1883. Recognizing that a polling place is a
   “nonpublic forum,” as polling locations have not traditionally been “a forum
   for public communication[,]” the Court held that Minnesota could
   reasonably restrict speech—based on content—to further the state’s interest
   “in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and disruption.” Id. at
   1885, 1891 (quotation omitted). Under this flexible standard, states are
   required only to draw a reasonable line that “articulate[s] some sensible basis
   for distinguishing what [speech] may come in from what must stay out.” Id.

           _____________________
   precedent . . . establishes that a chilling of speech because of the mere existence of an
   allegedly vague or overbroad [law] can be sufficient injury to support standing.”).

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   at 1888. States may entrust election workers, like Texas’s presiding judges,
   with discretion to enforce these restrictions at the polls, so long as the law
   guides that discretion by “objective, workable standards.” Id. at 1891.
          Here, as in Mansky, the electioneering laws regulate conduct within
   polling places—which, as noted, are nonpublic forums. Tex. Elec. Code
   §§ 61.003 (limiting the restriction to “within 100 feet” of a polling place);
   61.010(a) (similar); 85.036(a) (similar). The district court, heavily relying on
   Mansky, determined that section 61.010 is a constitutional restriction on
   speech because it is limited to specific political apparel “relating to a
   candidate, measure, or political party appearing on the ballot,” but held
   sections 61.003 and 85.036 facially unconstitutional because they contain no
   such limiting principle.
          On appeal, Ostrewich contends the district court erred in holding
   section 61.010 constitutional, and she challenges the constitutionality of all
   three sections. She contends the electioneering laws were unreasonably
   applied to her and that they are incapable of reasonable application because
   they are facially overbroad or vague. The State disagrees, arguing that all
   three sections pass constitutional muster, both facially and as applied. We
   agree with the State. We first address section 61.010, which the district court
   upheld, before turning to sections 61.003 and 85.036, which the court struck
   down. Last, we address Ostrewich’s claim for nominal damages deriving
   from her alleged constitutional injuries.
                                         A.
          Ostrewich contends that section 61.010 violates the First
   Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, both facially and as applied to her

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   wearing the firefighter t-shirt. 6 The district court rejected these arguments
   and, correctly, held the section constitutional.
                                                1.
           When a litigant brings both facial and as-applied challenges, we
   generally decide the as-applied challenge first because it is the narrower
   question. Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2019). So we
   begin with Ostrewich’s contention that the State’s enforcement of section
   61.010 violates the First Amendment as applied to her sporting her firefighter
   t-shirt at the polling location. We agree with the district court’s conclusion
   that section 61.010 provided a reasonable and constitutional basis for
   restricting Ostrewich from doing so.
           “Casting a vote . . . is a time for choosing, not campaigning. The State
   may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that

           _____________________
           6
              Ostrewich also asserts that the district court erroneously interpreted section
   61.010 to apply to Texas voters, rather than poll watchers. But her interpretation does not
   comport with the statute’s unambiguous text: It prohibits, “except as provided by
   Subsection (b), a person” from wearing a “badge, insignia, emblem, or other similar
   communicative device.” Subsection (b) exempts presiding judges, clerks, and peace
   officers, which shows that if the Texas Legislature wanted to exempt voters or otherwise
   limit section 61.010(a) only to poll workers, it knew how to do so. Moreover, other Texas
   election provisions—including section 61.003, which Ostrewich agrees applies to voters—
   use “person” without further defining the term.
           Ostrewich further argues that the district court’s interpretation renders section
   61.010 superfluous because sections 61.003 and 85.036 already prohibit persons from
   electioneering at the polling place and include apparel restrictions. But the three laws can
   be read congruently. Sections 61.003 and 85.036 broadly prohibit electioneering for any
   candidate, measure, or political parties, while section 61.010 more narrowly prohibits
   expression relating to a candidate, measure or political party appearing on the ballot.
           Finally, Ostrewich posits that section 61.010’s prohibition does not apply to
   apparel. But the Supreme Court has previously held that laws prohibiting political badges,
   buttons, or other insignia apply to apparel. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1883. As the State argues,
   “apparel,” can certainly contain an “emblem” or “insignia.”

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   distinction.” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1887. Thus, to prevent partisan discord,
   Texas may restrict voter apparel in a polling place during the voting period
   “as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable.” Id. at 1885. The question
   is whether a presiding judge, by enforcing section 61.010, could reasonably
   restrict Ostrewich from wearing her firefighter t-shirt in order to maintain a
   polling place free of partisan influence.
          The district court concluded that Ostrewich’s firefighter t-shirt was
   synonymous with the campaign in favor of Prop B. Moreover, Ostrewich
   herself testified that she wore the shirt to the polls because she was excited
   to vote on the measure. From these facts, the district court concluded that
   Ostrewich’s firefighter t-shirt related to a measure appearing on the ballot,
   so that the presiding judge permissibly censored her to further Texas’s
   interest in ensuring a campaign-free polling place.
          Ostrewich argues the district court erred because section 61.010 can
   only constitutionally proscribe “express advocacy.”         And wearing her
   generic firefighter t-shirt did not constitute express advocacy because it did
   not contain any explicit message supporting Prop B. But a shirt, even one
   lacking words, can constitute advocacy for a political issue. See Tinker v. Des
   Moines Indep. Comm’y Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (voters donning
   black armbands to express disapproval of Vietnam war). As explained by the
   district court, “the State’s interest in preventing partisan discord at the
   voting booth ‘may be thwarted by displays that do not raise significant
   concerns in other situations.’” Based on the undisputed evidence, the
   district court correctly concluded that Ostrewich’s firefighter t-shirt
   expressed support for Prop B and the presiding judge properly had “clear
   authority” under section 61.010 to order Ostrewich to change her shirt.
   Ostrewich’s as-applied challenge to section 61.010 fails.

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                                          2.
          We move to her facial challenge. See Buchanan, 919 F.3d at 854
   (“Generally, we proceed to an overbreadth issue only if it is determined that
   the statute would be valid as applied.” (quotation omitted)). In the First
   Amendment context, litigants can challenge a statute “because of a judicial
   prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others
   not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
   expression.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Ostrewich
   lodges such a claim against section 61.010, asserting that the statute does not
   pass constitutional muster under Mansky and is overbroad or vague.
          Ostrewich’s theories for facial unconstitutionality collapse into each
   other—essentially, Ostrewich contends that section 61.010 flunks Mansky’s
   reasonableness standard because it does not provide “objective, workable
   standards” to guide presiding judges’ discretion, rendering it overbroad or
   vague. According to her, because section 61.010 prohibits content “related
   to” ballot measures, the statute impermissibly relies on presiding judges’
   discernment of whether speech is sufficiently “related to” ballot issues.
   Without additional guidance, presiding judges are left to guess at what may
   “come in from what must stay out,” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888, leading to
   inconsistent and haphazard enforcement. Section 61.010, in Ostrewich’s
   telling, thus fails to provide a sufficient limiting construction, permitting
   presiding judges to censor arbitrarily any type of apparel they deem to be
   related to a candidate, measure, or political party on the ballot.
          The State disagrees, asserting that the statute’s “related to” proviso
   constitutes a workable standard. Rather than requiring presiding judges to
   retain a mental index of various political issues and positions, section
   61.010’s standard is clear and simple to apply: When a “candidate, measure,

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                                    No. 21-20577

   or political party” is on the ballot, its “badge, insignia, [or] emblem” is
   prohibited.
          “Clear and simple” may be a bit of an overstatement. The record
   offers many examples of Texas officials inconsistently applying section
   61.010. Nonetheless, while there may be room for interpretation, “[p]erfect
   clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that
   restrict expressive activity.” Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1891 (quoting Ward v.
   Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989)).
          In Mansky, the Supreme Court was particularly concerned that
   Minnesota’s law lacked any limiting principle.         By Minnesota’s own
   admission, its statute could apply to ban content promoting any
   “recognizable political view.” Id. at 1890. In contrast, section 61.010 only
   prohibits Texans from wearing apparel related to a candidate, measure, or
   political party “appearing on the ballot,” thereby remedying the Mansky
   Court’s concerns about overbroad or vague electioneering restrictions.
   Indeed, this may explain why the Court explicitly referred to section 61.010
   as a law that “proscribes displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms”
   than the Minnesota statute at issue in Mansky. Id. at 1891.
          As the district court succinctly explained,
          [Section 61.010] targets people who have gathered at a
          government-designated spot at a government-designated time
          to perform a civic task—vote. Its restrictions extend no
          further . . . . By limiting its reach to issues appearing on the
          ballot, the Texas law provides fair notice of what is expected of
          people gathered in and around the polling place on election day
          and during early voting.
   Section 61.010 draws the requisite line between permitted and prohibited
   content to meet Mansky’s “reasonableness requirement.”

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           Ostrewich also argues section 61.010 is unconstitutional because the
   law undermines Texas’s interest in ensuring a distraction-free polling place.
   According to her, section 61.010 counterintuitively fosters polling place
   distractions by requiring presiding judges to confront voters. But this belies
   the brash history of electioneering that led every state to adopt some sort of
   electioneering and secret ballot protections. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1883;
   Burson, 504 U.S. at 202. And even disregarding that history, states may
   properly “respond to potential deficiencies in the electoral process with
   foresight, rather than react reactively,” as long as “the response is
   reasonable.” Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1986).
   We agree with the district court that section 61.010 is constitutional.
                                                B.
           Ostrewich next challenges the facial constitutionality of sections
   61.003 and 85.036. We agree with the State that the district court erred in
   holding the statutes unconstitutional because the court ignored their limiting
   language. 7     The statutes prohibit “electioneering,” which is generally
   defined to include “political signs and literature.” Tex. Elec. Code
   §§ 61.003, 85.036. The district court concluded that the word “political” is
   unmoored from any limiting language, thus allowing presiding judges
   broadly, and impermissibly, to ban voters from wearing “political apparel.”
   As the State contends, however, the district court misconstrued the statutes.
           _____________________
           7
             The State also asserts that the district court did not need to address these
   constitutional claims once the court concluded that section 61.010 properly prohibited
   Ostrewich’s firefighter t-shirt in the polling location. But this construes Ostrewich’s claims
   too narrowly, as only related to her firefighter t-shirt. She asserts a broader claim, that all
   three statutes unconstitutionally chill her right to free expression at polling locations. She
   may assert such a pre-enforcement challenge as to sections 61.003 and 85.036 because these
   laws arguably restrain her from wearing expressive apparel unrelated to measures on the
   ballot. See Speech First, 979 F.3d at 336 (holding plaintiffs suffer an injury-in-fact when a
   censoring regulation chills speech).

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   Indeed, both sections state “a person may not electioneer for or against any
   candidate, measure, or political party.” Tex. Elec. Code § 85.036; see
   also § 61.003 (same). The sections then define “electioneering” to include
   the “posting, use, or distribution of political signs or literature.” When read
   together, these electioneering laws prohibit people from deploying political
   signs or literature “for or against any candidate, measure, or political party”
   “within 100 feet of . . . [a] building in which a polling place is located.” Id.
   § 85.036. Thus, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, sections 85.036
   and 61.003 are in fact cabined by a limiting principle that meets Mansky’s
   standard. See 138 S. Ct. at 1888.
          The district court also erred in holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036
   lack an objective, workable standard. Unlike section 61.010, these two
   sections are not limited to candidates, measures, or political parties appearing
   “on the ballot.” Without the “on the ballot” limitation, the district court
   reasoned, sections 61.003 and 85.036 leave presiding judges with
   impermissible discretion. But in Mansky, the Supreme Court endorsed,
   albeit in dicta, similar prohibitions on “items displaying the name of a
   political party, items displaying the name of a candidate, and items
   demonstrating ‘support of or opposition to a ballot question’” as “clear
   enough.” 138 S. Ct. at 1889. By contrast, the Minnesota law at issue there
   instructed election workers to restrict any political-issue or political-group
   content. The electioneering laws at issue in today’s case are narrower—
   Texas’s presiding judges are limited to excluding content that would
   constitute electioneering “for or against” candidates, measures, and political
   parties.
          We reach this conclusion mindful that the standard for holding these
   sections facially unconstitutional is “daunting” and requires us to find that
   “a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in
   relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.” Voting for Am., Inc. v.

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                                    No. 21-20577

   Steen, 732 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). The Supreme
   Court has never suggested that electioneering restrictions could only
   proscribe content related to issues appearing on the ballot, and the district
   court failed to explain how these two statutes would otherwise be
   unconstitutional in “a substantial number” of their applications.          We
   certainly do not foresee that they would be. The district court therefore erred
   in holding sections 61.003 and 85.036 unconstitutional.
                                        C.
          Based on our conclusion that all three electioneering laws pass
   constitutional muster, such that Texas elections workers had a constitutional
   basis for prohibiting Ostrewich from wearing her firefighter t-shirt at the
   polling place, her claim for nominal damages fails as a matter of law. See
   Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 802 n.* (2021) (“Nominal damages
   go only to redressability and are unavailable where a plaintiff has failed to
   establish a past, completed injury.”). We therefore affirm the district court’s
   denial of nominal damages.
                                        V.
          In sum: We REVERSE the district court’s holding denying Texas’s
   Secretary of State and Attorney General sovereign immunity under the
   Eleventh Amendment and DISMISS those defendants for lack of
   jurisdiction. We AFFIRM that Ostrewich has standing to bring her claims
   against the remaining two defendants. We also AFFIRM the district court’s
   holding that section 61.010 is constitutional. However, we REVERSE and
   RENDER the district court’s holding that sections 61.003 and 85.036 are
   unconstitutional and instead uphold all three electioneering laws. Finally, we
   AFFIRM the district court’s denial of nominal damages.

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