Court Opinion

ID: 9405463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 17:01:02.718004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.327987
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13150    Document: 30-1      Date Filed: 06/28/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13150
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MALCOM ANWAR WILLIAMS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60120-KAM-2
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-13150

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Malcolm Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
        court’s dismissal in part and denial in part of his motion for a
        sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that
        the district court abused its discretion by (1) construing his
        § 3582(c) motion as a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
        to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte whether he had
        exhausted his administrative remedies; and (3) failing to consider
        his arguments concerning intervening changes in the law and his
        rehabilitation as required by Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct.
        2389 (2022). After review, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
               Williams pleaded guilty in 2015 to Hobbs Act robbery
        pursuant to a written plea agreement. At sentencing, Williams was
        deemed a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) on the basis that
        the Hobbs Act robbery conviction qualified as a “crime of
        violence,” and Williams had two prior state offenses that qualified
        as either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 1 The

        1 At the time of Williams’s sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines provided
        that a defendant was a career offender if (1) he was at least 18 years’ old when
        he committed the instant offense, (2) the instant offense was a felony that was
        “either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” and (3) the
        defendant had two prior felony convictions for “either a crime of violence or
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        22-13150                   Opinion of the Court                               3

        district court imposed a sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment.
        Williams did not appeal. Two of his codefendants did, however,
        and successfully challenged their respective career-offender
        enhancements on the basis that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
        of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Eason, 953
        F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir. 2020).
              In 2020, Williams filed a pro se 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) motion
        seeking a sentence reduction based on “extraordinary and

        a controlled substance offense.”      U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2014).    “Crime of
        violence” was defined as:
                any offense . . . punishable by imprisonment for a term
                exceeding one year, that—
                (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
                of physical force against the person of another, or
                (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use
                of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
                serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
        Id. § 4B1.2(a) (2014). In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the
        “residual clause”—the clause capturing offenses that “otherwise
        involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
        injury to another”—in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as
        unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 606
        (2015). The ACCA’s residual clause was identical to the residual clause
        in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) with
        U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Following Johnson, in 2016, the Sentencing
        Commission amended § 4B1.2(a)(2) and removed the residual clause
        from the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2016); see also United
        States v. Eason, 953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing
        amendment).
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                22-13150

        compelling reasons,” namely, that (1) Hobbs Act robbery is no
        longer considered a “crime of violence” due to an amendment to
        the crime of violence definition in the Guidelines; (2) two of his
        codefendants had their career-offender designations based on
        Hobbs Act robbery vacated on appeal; and (3) one of his state
        convictions should not have counted as a predicate offense for
        purposes of the career-offender enhancement. The district court
        denied the motion, concluding that it lacked authority to reduce
        Williams’s sentence because a change in law did not constitute an
        extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to
        reduce a sentence. Furthermore, it explained that, even if it had
        the authority to reduce his sentence, consideration of the 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduction. Finally, the district
        court noted that releasing him early would be inconsistent with the
        policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 because Williams presented
        a danger to the community.
               Williams appealed the denial of his § 3582(c) motion, and we
        affirmed. United States v. Williams, No. 20-14360, 2021 WL 6101491
        (11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021).
                Thereafter, in August 2022, Williams filed a renewed
        motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that
        the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Concepcion v. United
        States, required the district court to consider intervening changes
        in the law and changes of fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation,
        when deciding § 3582(c) motions for a sentence reduction. Thus,
        he argued that, under Concepcion, the district court was bound to
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        22-13150              Opinion of the Court                        5

        consider that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence
        under the amended guidelines as evidenced by this Court’s
        decision in Eason, as well as his evidence of postconviction
        rehabilitation. In terms of evidence of rehabilitation, Williams
        noted that he had an “excellent” prison record with no disciplinary
        problems, he mentored other inmates, he completed over 500
        hours of educational programming, he had no other felony
        convictions and was not a danger to society, and he had maintained
        positive business and personal relationships in society so that he
        would be a productive member upon release. In terms of
        compassionate release, Williams alleged that he was “healthy,” but
        had been recently diagnosed as “pre-diabetic,” with high A1C levels
        and “high sodium.” He maintained that “[a] home diet would
        substantially improve these conditions.”
               The district court dismissed the motion in part and denied it
        in part. First, the district court concluded that, to the extent
        Williams sought a sentence reduction based on Concepcion, “the
        present motion [was] effectively [an unauthorized] successive
        petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255” over which the court lacked
        jurisdiction. Second, as for Williams’s request for a sentence
        reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court denied his
        motion because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies
        and he did not satisfy the definition of “extraordinary and
        compelling reasons” set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. This appeal
        followed.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13150

                                   II.    Discussion
                 Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion
        by (1) construing his § 3582(c) motion as a second or successive
        § 2255 motion to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte
        whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies; and
        (3) failing to consider his arguments concerning intervening
        changes in the law and his rehabilitation as required by Concepcion.
               We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an 18
        U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996
        F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). We
        review a district court’s denial of a movant’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
        for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911
        (11th Cir. 2021).
              Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
        once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
        3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the following limited exception:
              the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP],
              or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant
              has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may
              reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after
              considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
              the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . .
              extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
              reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
              with applicable policy statements issued by the
              Sentencing Commission.
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        22-13150                  Opinion of the Court                                7

        Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 2 Thus, the district court may reduce a movant’s
        imprisonment term if: (1) there are extraordinary and compelling
        reasons for doing so, (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
        favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the policy
        statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th
        1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). If the district court finds against the
        movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief,
        and need not analyze the other requirements. United States v. Giron,
        15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38
        (explaining that “nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
        requires a court to conduct the compassionate-release analysis in
        any particular order”).
              The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and
        compelling reasons” in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
        Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under
        which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the
        defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness” or (ii) a permanent
        health condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the
        defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a
        correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to
        recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is

        2 “In 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the First Step Act.”
        Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248. Section 603(b) of the First Step Act amended § 3582(c)
        and “expanded who could file a motion for a sentence reduction” by
        permitting prisoners to file their own motions. Id. at 1250; see also The First
        Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (amending
        18 U.S.C. § 3582).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13150

        experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or
        mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of
        his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”; (C) the
        defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor
        child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or
        incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or
        minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s
        spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist “other”
        extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the
        Director of the [BOP].” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)).
        “[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission’s definition of
        ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”
        Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; see also Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (“[T]he only
        circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and
        compelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those
        extraordinary and compelling reasons as described by [§] 1B1.13.”).
               Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by the
        holdings of Bryant and Giron unless they have been “overruled or
        undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
        by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347,
        1352 (11th Cir. 2008). “To conclude that we are not bound by a
        prior holding in light of a Supreme Court case, we must find that
        the case is ‘clearly on point’ and that it ‘actually abrogate[s] or
        directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s], the
        holding of the prior panel.’” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249,
        1265 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 1376 (2022), (alterations
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        22-13150               Opinion of the Court                          9

        in original) (quoting United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th
        Cir. 2009)).
                Here, the gravamen of Williams’s argument is that
        Concepcion changed the framework and analysis that the district
        court must conduct when deciding motions for a sentence
        reduction under § 3582(c), but his reliance on Concepcion is
        misplaced. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court discussed the factors
        that a district court must consider when deciding sentence-
        reduction motions for crack-cocaine convictions under § 404 of the
        First Step Act. 142 S. Ct. at 2401–04. The Court held that when a
        district court was deciding whether to exercise its discretion and
        award an eligible defendant a sentence reduction, it could
        “consider other intervening changes of law . . . or changes of fact,”
        reasoning that there were no statutory constraints in place that
        prevented district courts from considering such information. Id. at
        2396, 2400. But Williams was not convicted of a crack-cocaine
        offense and is not an eligible defendant seeking a sentence
        reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. Instead, he is seeking a
        sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions of
        § 603(b) of the First Step Act. Because Concepcion did not address
        compassionate release motions, it is not directly on point and does
        not directly conflict with or abrogate our precedent in Bryant and
        its progeny that, in determining whether a defendant is eligible for
        a sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions,
        the district court is limited to “the Commission’s definition of
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        10                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13150

        ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”
        Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1265. 3
               Moreover, in Concepcion, the Supreme Court noted that
        Congress may cabin what district courts may consider when
        sentencing (or resentencing) a defendant, and it expressly cited the
        compassionate release statute as an example: “For [§ 3582(c)]
        proceedings, Congress expressly cabined district courts’ discretion
        by requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s
        policy statements.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2401. This statement
        is consistent with our decision in Bryant. 996 F.3d at 1262.
              Because Concepcion did not change the analysis for
        determining whether a movant is eligible for a § 3582(c) sentence
        reduction, it had no application to Williams’s case and the district

        3 We note that several of our sister circuits to have considered this issue have
        concluded similarly that Concepcion does not bear on the initial question of
        whether the movant is eligible for compassionate release—i.e., whether the
        movant has establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See,
        e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 65 F.4th 1000, 1003–04 (8th Cir. 2023);
        United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied King v. United
        States, No. 22-5878, 2023 WL 3046170 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2023); United States v.
        McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1061–62 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied McCall v.
        United States, No. 22-7210, 2023 WL 3571586 (U.S. May 22, 2023); United States
        v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2022); But see United States v. Chen, 48
        F.4th 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that Concepcion supported the Ninth
        Circuit’s precedent which permits district courts to consider “an extraordinary
        and compelling reason a defendant might raise, including . . . non-retroactive
        changes in sentencing law”).
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        22-13150               Opinion of the Court                         11

        court was not required to consider the changes in law or evidence
        of rehabilitation proffered by Williams in determining whether
        there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction
        under § 1B1.13. Accordingly, to the extent that Williams argued
        for a reduction based on Concepcion and other changes in the law,
        he was in essence collaterally attacking his conviction and
        sentence. A prisoner cannot use § 3582(c)(2) as a vehicle to
        collaterally attack their conviction or sentence. Rather, “a § 2255
        motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally
        attack his conviction and sentence . . . .” Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P.
        Atl., 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Williams had
        previously filed a § 2255 motion and had not sought leave from this
        Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C.
        §§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(h). Consequently, the district court lacked
        jurisdiction to consider his collateral challenge to his conviction
        and sentence. See Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th
        Cir. 2003) (holding that, without the necessary authorization from
        the appropriate court of appeals, “the district court lacks
        jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition”). Thus, the
        district court did not err in dismissing in part the motion as an
        unauthorized successive § 2255 motion.
              Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
        in denying his motion for a sentence reduction under
        § 3582(c)(1)(A). In order to be eligible for such a reduction,
        Williams needed to show an extraordinary or compelling reason
        under § 1B1.13. He did not. Aside from the changes in law and his
        evidence of rehabilitation, which as discussed above are not
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                     22-13150

        relevant to the threshold eligibility determination, Williams
        alleged that he was “healthy,” and that he had been diagnosed as
        being pre-diabetic with high A1C and sodium. He did not allege
        that those health conditions substantially diminished his ability to
        provide self-care in prison or that he was not expected to recover
        from those conditions. Thus, he did not satisfy § 1B1.13(A). Nor
        did he include any other allegations that would satisfy subsections
        (B)–(C) of § 1B1.13. And the BOP did not determine that other
        extraordinary and compelling reasons existed in Williams’s case for
        purposes of subsection (D). The absence of an extraordinary and
        compelling reason as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 foreclosed
        Williams’s motion for a sentence reduction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at
        1237–38. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
        discretion in denying his motion.4
               AFFIRMED.

        4 Because we conclude that Williams failed to establish the existence of an
        extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of compassionate release, it
        is unnecessary for us to address his argument concerning the exhaustion of
        administrative remedies.