Court Opinion

ID: 9741979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:04:53.073802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:27.620060
License: Public Domain

*202ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). When the defense is alibi, I would hold that it is prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to grant a continuance to the defendant when the chief prosecution witness, on the date of trial, changes her testimony as to the date of the alleged offense. The majority opinion seems to hold that even where the defendant and the state are surprised by the change in the witness's testimony, actual prejudice must be shown. I believe that actual prejudice is presumed under these circumstances.
The complaint charged that the offense was committed on August 2, 1974. At the preliminary hearing on September 19, 1974, the witness testified she saw the defendant beginning at 11 a.m. on August 2, 1974, and that the alleged offense took place at about midnight of August 2, 1974. On cross examination she indicated that she was not “positive” about the date. The state filed the information on September 19, 1974, setting forth August 2, 1974, as the date of the offense. The defendant’s amended notice of alibi was given to the district attorney on November 27,1974, pursuant to sec. 971.23 (8), Stats.1 The state is obliged to advise the defendant within ten days after receipt of notice of alibi of witnesses whom the state proposes to offer in rebuttal of the alibi.2 De*203fendant’s alibi listing witnesses for his whereabouts on August 2d relied on the date set forth in the testimony at the preliminary hearing and the date used in the information.
“Defendant states that at the time of the alleged crime to have been committed, to-wit: in the evening hours of August 2, 1974-, at approximately midnight, he was at places in the City of Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin, other than at a parking lot on Jones Island, 2400 South Lincoln Memorial Drive, City of Milwaukee. That said alibi is based upon the notice of the time of the alleged offense given to the defendant by the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing by the State’s witness . . . and the information filed by the District Attorney charging said defendant with a violation of Wisconsin Statutes, 944-06. . .” Amended Notice of Alibi (emphasis supplied).
After the preliminary examination and prior to trial the defendant received no information which would have or should have led him to believe that the crime would be proven to have occurred at any time other than around midnight of August 2d.
The state admitted to the trial court that the change in the witness’s testimony came as a surprise to it as well as to the defendant.
Obviously when the witness changed her testimony the defendant’s case was significantly harmed. The state had to prove “what, where, who and when.” The defense was based upon the assumption that the state could not prove the “when” beyond a reasonable doubt. Usually a variance as to time set forth in a complaint or information and the proof of time is not fatal. See. 971.26, Stats.3 In *204my opinion, the change of date here was fatal to the defendant’s chance of getting a fair trial. The alibi statute requires the defendant, twenty days in advance of trial, to particularize alibi evidence as to place and persons at the time when the crime is alleged to have been committed It similarly requires the state to list its rebuttal witnesses. By interpreting these provisions to permit the state on the date of trial to change the date of the offense, the majority has defeated the purpose of the statute. The only rational and fair interpretation of the alibi statute is that the defendant must advise of alibi, the state must advise the defendant of its witnesses and the state must give the defendant timely information as to any change in the time or place of the offense. If the state fails to give such timely information to the defendant, the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial. Without adequate reciprocal discovery opportunity the defendant is denied due process.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes requiring the criminal defendant to notify the prosecution of an alibi defense. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S. Ct. 1893, 26 L. Ed.2d 446 (1970). However, the Court emphasized that the constitutionality of such statutes might depend on “whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the state.” Williams, supra, at 82, n. 11. In Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S. Ct. 2208, 37 L. Ed.2d 82 (1973), the United States Supreme Court was squarely faced with the question of the right to reciprocal discovery of a defendant forced to comply with a “notice of alibi” statute. The Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids enforcement of alibi *205rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants. The Court said it was unfair to force the defendant to reveal his defense and to allow the state to surprise the defendant on the very piece of evidence the defendant disclosed to the state.4
The very situation condemned in War dins is present in the instant case. I see no difference between surprising a defendant by testimony rebutting his alibi and surprising him by changing the time of the crime he is alleged to have committed, and for which he had advised the state of his alibi. If anything, the latter is the more damaging and unfair to the two. For this reason, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
I have been authorized to state that Mr. Justice HEF-FERNAN and Mr. Justice DAY join in this dissent.

 Sec. 971.23(8), Stats. 1973:
“(8) NOTICE OP ALIBI, (a) If the defendant intends to rely upon an alibi as a defense, he shall give written notice thereof to the district attorney at the arraignment or at least 20 days before trial stating particularly the place where he claims to have been when the crime is alleged to have been committed together with the names and addresses of witnesses to the alibi, if known.
“(b) In default of such notice, no evidence of the alibi shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise.
“(c) The court may enlarge the time for filing a notice of alibi as provided in par. (a) for cause.

 Sec. 971.23(8) (d), Stats. 1973:
“(d) Within 10 days after receipt of the notice of alibi, or such other time as the court orders, the district attorney shall *203furnish the defendant notice in writing of the names and addresses, if known, of any witnesses whom the state proposes to offer in rebuttal to discredit the defendant’s alibi. In default of such notice, no rebuttal evidence on the alibi issue shall be received unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise.”

 Sec. 971.26, Stats. 1973:
“FORMAL DEFECTS. No indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other *204proceedings be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice the defendant.”
See also Burkhalter v. State, 52 Wis.2d 413, 422, 190 N.W.2d 502 (1971).

 “Notice-of-alibi rules, now in use in a large and growing number of States, are based on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at trial. [Citations omitted.] The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary development which, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system. As we recognized in Williams, nothing in the Due Process Clause precludes States from experimenting with systems of broad discovery designed to achieve these goals. ‘The adversary system of trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right always to conceal their cards until played. We find ample room in that system, at least as far as “due process” is concerned, for [a rule] which is designed to enhance the search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both the defendant and the State ample opportunity to investigate certain facts crucial to the determination of guilt or innocence.’ 399 U.S., at 82 (footnote omitted).
“Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded, but ef. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), it does speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser. . . .
*206“. . . [W]e do hold that in the absence of a strong showing of state interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street. The State may not insist that trials be run as a ‘search for truth’ so far as defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining ‘poker game’ secrecy for its own witnesses. It is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of evidence which he disclosed to the State.” 412 U.S. at 473-476.