Court Opinion

ID: 9787155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:11:38.33329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:52.811856
License: Public Domain

JUDGE TAUBMAN
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's analysis in Part I with respect to the removal issue. I write separately to express my disagreement with the majority concerning the trial court's limited award of attorney fees to mother.
The gravamen of mother's contention on appeal is that the trial court did not determine what portion of her claimed attorney fees were unreasonable and unnecessary, and the extent to which its award of attorney fees equalized the parties' financial cireumstances. In my view, a trial court must first determine the amount of requested attorney fees which is reasonable and necessary, and it then must apportion that amount based on the parties' relative economic cireumstances. Because the trial court did not conduct such an analysis and made insufficient findings, I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion in Part IL, and I dissent from that part of its opinion.
Section 14-10-119, C.R.98.2000, permits a trial court to apportion attorney fees and costs in dissolution matters based upon the relative economic cireumstances of the parties in order to equalize their status and to ensure that neither party suffers undue economic hardship as a result of the proceeding. In re Marriage of Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo.1997).
In awarding fees and costs under that section, the trial court "must consider the relative financial status of each party by making findings concerning their relative incomes, assets, and liabilities. The district court then apportions fees and costs in light of the statute's equitable purpose, making findings that explain how and why it arrived at the specific amount of the award." In re Marriage of Aldrich, supra, 945 P.2d at 1378 (citation omitted).
In considering an award of attorney fees under § 14-10-119, the trial court must consider not only the reasonableness of the hourly charges, but also the necessity of the services for which the hours were billed. In re Marriage of Mockelmann, 944 P.2d 670 (Colo.App.1997). This inquiry is in addition to the inquiry regarding the parties' relative economic cireumstances.
Thus, although it has not been so articulated, our case law requires a two-part inquiry for the proper determination of attorney fees pursuant to § 14-10-119. First, the trial court must determine the amount of a reasonable attorney fee, which is usually based upon the "lodestar" amount, the product of a reasonable hourly fee and a reasonable number of hours expended in the litigation. See Tallitsch v. Child Support Services, Inc., 926 P.2d 143 (Colo.App.1996).
Second, pursuant to Aldrich, the trial court must consider the relative financial status of each party by making findings concerning their relative incomes, assets, and labilities. Then, the trial court may apportion fees and costs, after making additional findings explaining how and why it arrived at the specific award.
*1290Here, the trial court made certain findings with respect to the above factors, but it did not follow the procedure outlined above. As a result, as in Aldrich, the trial court's findings are not sufficient to support an award of fees under § 14-10-119, and I would remand for further proceedings on this issue.
At the hearing on attorney fees, mother presented expert testimony in support of her request for fees and costs in the amount of $49,800. This amount was in addition to $2,000 in attorney fees that she had been awarded at temporary orders. Mother's attorney billed his time at $150 per hour, a rate mother's expert testified was reasonable, and father agreed.
Mother's expert also testified that the approximately 364 hours mother's attorney had spent in this litigation between January 1997 and September 1998 were reasonable based upon her review of the file and conferences with mother's attorney and his staff. Father vigorously disputed the reasonableness of the number of hours expended in the litigation.
In its findings, the trial court stated that "the court was not persuaded by the testimony of [mother's expert] that all of [mother's attorney's] fees were reasonable and necessary. I am persuaded from what I observe that this is not the case." The trial court also noted that "there must be a limit to reasonable attorney fees," and found that, in light of all of the cireumstances of this case, $4,000, less $450 to pay for mother's share of a custody evaluation, was a reasonable fee in addition to the $2,000 awarded at temporary orders.
Father contends, and I agree, that the trial court did not articulate the amount of attorney fees that it felt was reasonable and necessary. Because it did not make such determination, it is impossible on appellate review to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. This is best illustrated by an example.
If the trial court had determined that not all of mother's attorney fees were reasonable, but that $35,000 was a reasonable amount, a reviewing court could then compare the trial court's consideration of the parties' relative financial cireumstances in determining that mother should be awarded $4,000 in attorney fees. In such cireumstance, the trial court would need to explain clearly why, given $35,000 in reasonable attorney fees and a significant disparity in income between the parties, an award of only $4,000 in attorney fees was appropriate.
On the other hand, if the trial court determined that only $10,000 of mother's requested attorney fees were reasonable, a reviewing court could also determine whether an award of $4,000 in attorney fees was appropriate in light of the party's relative financial cireurastances. In this situation, an award to mother of $4,000 out of $10,000 in reasonable attorney fees might more readily be perceived as equalizing the parties' financial circumstances.
Thus, because the trial court did not determine an amount of reasonable attorney fees in this case, a reviewing court cannot determine whether the trial court properly considered the amount of reasonable attorney fees before considering the parties' relative financial circumstances.
I also conclude that the trial court's findings were insufficient with respect to the parties' relative financial cireumstances. As noted, In re Marriage of Aldrich, supra, requires the trial court to make findings concerning the parties' relative income, assets, and liabilities. Then it must apportion fees and costs in light of the statute's equitable purposes, and make additional findings that explain how and why it arrived at the specific amount of the award.
Here, the trial court acknowledged the parties' relative financial resources and that father "has immensely superior financial resources to Ms. Woolley,. He earns a very high salary. Ms. Woolley is currently on social security disability." However, the court did not make specific findings with respect to their incomes. The testimony at the attorney fees hearing was that father's salary in 1998 was $164,000, while that of mother was approximately $18,000, based on income from social security disability and maintenance.
With respect to assets and liabilities, the trial court noted that mother was awarded *1291more of the marital property than father. It also noted that father had paid immense expenses for custody evaluations and other litigation expenses. While the court stated that the evidence indicated that mother had depleted her marital property markedly since permanent orders, there was no determination as to whether such depletion, to the extent that it occurred, was reasonable and necessary in light of mother's relatively poorer economic circumstances.
Finally, while testimony was presented at the hearing that father had substantial credit card debt that he was obligated to pay, there was also testimony that he owned residences in both Houston and Denver.
Thus, although the court considered the parties' relative financial circumstances to some extent, here, as in Aldrich, the court did not articulate how it arrived at the specific amount of attorney fees awarded and did not explain why the amount awarded served to equalize the economic status of mother and father.
Accordingly, even if I were to assume that not all of mother's requested attorney fees were reasonable and necessary, I still would remand the matter of attorney fees to the trial court for further findings in accordance with the views expressed herein.