Court Opinion

ID: 9947059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 22:02:37.135632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.118497
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 P. v. Watts CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      A166114
 v.                                                                      (Alameda County
 CAMREN WATTS,                                                           Super. Ct. No. 20CR011859C)

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Armed with pistols and an assault rifle, Camren Watts and two other
men surrounded a parked car, with two sleeping men inside. The three men
opened fire, shooting into the car at close range, and severely injuring the
occupants. Watts shot into the car five times. A jury convicted him of several
felonies, including attempted murder and shooting at an occupied motor
vehicle. The trial court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term.
         Watts raises six claims on appeal. We stay the punishment for
shooting at an occupied vehicle pursuant to Penal Code section 654.
(Undesignated statutory references are to this code.) We otherwise affirm.1

         1 After this appeal was fully briefed, Watts filed a habeas petition

alleging the prosecutor failed to disclose material and exculpatory evidence.
(Case No. A169453.) By separate order filed today’s date, we issue an order
to show cause returnable to the superior court. The facts as recounted in this
opinion are based solely on the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution.

                                                               1
                              BACKGROUND
      On a morning in September 2020, Harlon McElevaine and Bernard
VanBuren were at a house on 63rd Avenue.2 Thereafter, Watts — who was
wearing red shoes — and a woman arrived in a silver Nissan. The four
people congregated around McElevaine’s Mercedes SUV for approximately
two hours. During that time, Watts pointed a tan handgun at the sky.
      At approximately 11:00 a.m., the group left the house in a Mercedes
driven by McElevaine. An Instagram live video recorded at 11:00 a.m. — and
posted on McElevaine’s account — shows him driving the Mercedes.
VanBuren is in the passenger seat, and Watts is in the seat behind the
driver. VanBuren is holding an assault-style rifle, and Watts points a tan
pistol with a drum magazine at the phone. The woman, sitting next to Watts,
points a black pistol with an extended magazine at the phone.
      At approximately 1:00 p.m., the Mercedes picked up David Keller. The
Mercedes drove to the corner of West and 51st Streets and parked. Watts —
still wearing red shoes — McElevaine, and Keller stood outside the Mercedes.
The men approached and surrounded a compact car parked across 51st
Street, in which B.Q. and T.F. were sleeping.
      Watts had a dark object in his hand, McElevaine held his waistband,
and Keller carried a rifle. Watts pointed the dark object at the car with his
arm extended and shot at the car; so did McElevaine and Keller. B.Q. and
T.F. awoke to gunfire. B.Q. suffered three gunshot wounds and, believing he

      2 We provide an overview of the facts here and additional detail in the

discussion of Watts’s claims. Numerous police officers surveilled McElevaine
on the day of the shooting and, while doing so, personally observed the events
leading up to, and including, the shooting. This summary is derived from
their testimony.
                                       2
would die if he stayed in the car, fled along with T.F. Watts, McElevaine,
and Keller peered inside the car, ran back to the Mercedes, and drove away. 3
      After the shooting, the Mercedes dropped off Keller at a nearby mall,
where police officers arrested him. The Mercedes then drove to a residence
on 57th Avenue. VanBuren got out of the car, walked down the driveway,
and disappeared behind a duplex. Thereafter, an older man left the duplex
with a duffel bag and drove away in a red Acura. A police officer stopped the
Acura immediately, searched the vehicle, and found an assault-style rifle, a
black pistol with an extended 30-round magazine, and a tan pistol with a 50-
round drum magazine.
      The Mercedes continued on its journey. It drove a few blocks away, to
63rd Avenue, where another person got out of the car. Shortly thereafter,
police officers saw Watts on the same street in a silver sedan. Less than ten
minutes later, officers arrested Watts on 89th Avenue shortly after a silver
sedan parked there.
      An evidence technician found 10 shell casings around B.Q. and T.F.’s
car. A criminologist concluded five casings were fired from the tan pistol.
The remaining casings were fired from the assault-style rifle and the black
pistol.
      The jury convicted Watts of the attempted murder of B.Q. (§§ 187, 664;
count 2); assaulting B.Q. and T.F. with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245,
subd. (b); counts 4 & 5); shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6);
unlawful firearm activity (§ 29820, subd. (b); count 7); and carrying a loaded

      3 Neighbors heard gunshots.  One neighbor saw a group of men — one
of whom was carrying an assault rifle — walking down the street. Another
neighbor heard numerous gunshots, and saw a man with a rifle and another
with a pistol. The neighbor saw the man with the pistol fire two shots as he
fled.
                                        3
firearm in public (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 8). It also found true various
aggravating circumstances and sentencing enhancements, including that he
used a firearm in the commission of count 2. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) Watts
admitted he had a prior strike conviction. (§ 1170.12.) The trial court
sentenced him to 22 years, 8 months in prison.
                                 DISCUSSION
        Watts advances six theories of error on appeal. We address each
argument in turn.4
                                        I.
        Watts contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court
prejudicially erred by excluding him from the “initial meeting” between the
court, counsel, and prospective jurors in the jury selection room on June 9,
2022.
        To place the issue in context, we provide additional background: On
June 9, 2022, the trial court met with prospective jurors in its jury selection
room — rather than its courtroom — due to social distancing requirements
because of the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the meeting, and outside the
presence of any jurors, the court noted it would not allow Watts to be present
at the meeting because the room had numerous exits and could not be
secured. Watts objected to “not being present during that initial meeting
with the jury.”
        The trial court overruled the objection. It explained that under the
county’s COVID regulations, the courtroom could only hold 37 potential
jurors rather than the 82 it did before the pandemic. As the court explained,

        4 We address Watts’s arguments on the merits to obviate the need to

adjudicate Watts’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (People v.
Williams (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 649, 657.)
                                        4
it would take three days to fill out hardship questionnaires in the courtroom,
and doing so was impractical. Relying on Elias v. Superior Court (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 926, the court concluded it could exercise its judgment to
control its calendar with economy. The court explained to Watts that, in his
absence, it would only take roll, hand out questionnaires, and get hardship
forms back; the court assured Watts that he’d be present for jury selection —
where 18 prospective jurors would be questioned at a time.
      In Watts’s absence, the clerk swore in prospective jurors on voir dire,
the judge and counsel introduced themselves, and potential jurors were given
hardship questionnaires. The trial court ruled on the completed
questionnaires and instructed the jury to return on June 15, 2022, for voir
dire and jury selection. Watts was present for voir dire, jury selection, and
the swearing in of the jury.
      A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is
guaranteed under the federal and state Constitutions and by statute. (People
v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77, 81.) “Under the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant has the right to be personally present at any proceeding in which
his appearance is necessary to prevent ‘interference with [his] opportunity for
effective cross-examination.’ ” (People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 861.)
“Due process guarantees the right to be present at any ‘stage . . . that is
critical to [the] outcome’ and where the defendant’s ‘presence would
contribute to the fairness of the procedure.’ ” (Ibid.) The state constitutional
right “ ‘is generally coextensive with the federal due process right.’ ” (Ibid.)
Sections 977 and 1043 require, among other things, that defendants charged
with felonies be present for trial and “all other proceedings,” unless the
defendant waives their presence or they are removed for disruptive behavior.
(People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 634–635.)

                                        5
      “ ‘Neither the state nor the federal Constitution, nor the statutory
requirements of sections 977 and 1043, require the defendant’s personal
appearance at proceedings where his presence bears no reasonable,
substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him.’ ”
(People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 799.) The “ ‘[d]efendant has the
burden of demonstrating that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a
fair trial.’ ” (Ibid.) We review a trial court’s exclusion of a criminal defendant
from trial, in whole or in part, de novo. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th
690, 741.)
      The trial court did not violate Watts’s right to be present at trial by
excluding him from the June 9, 2022 “initial meeting,” where the court
distributed — and ruled on — hardship questionnaires. Our high court has
held hardship screening of the jury pool, even when conducted by the trial
judge, is not a crucial stage of the proceedings and, as a result, a defendant
has no absolute right to be present. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48,
72–74; People v. Streeter (2012) 54 Cal.4th 205, 233 [“[h]ardship screening of
the jury pool is not a critical stage of the proceedings”]; People v. Basuta
(2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 395.) Watts does not dispute this premise or
distinguish these cases.
      Relying on Gomez v. United States (1989) 490 U.S. 858, 873 and People
v. Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703, 707–708, Watts argues jury
selection and voir dire are critical stages of trial. This is true as far as it
goes, but Watts was present for both. He only missed hardship screening.
Put simply, he has not shown anything occurring on June 9 was critical to the
proceeding.
      Even if we assume the trial court erred in excluding Watts on June 9,
Watts has not established his absence affected his ability to defend himself or

                                         6
otherwise prejudiced his case. (People v. Blacksher, supra, 52 Cal.4th at
p. 800.) He was present for jury selection, voir dire, and the swearing in of
the jury, where he had the opportunity to observe and consider the demeanor
of prospective jurors. (People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1057, 1061
[defendant who missed voir dire of six potential jurors, the exercise of
peremptory challenges, and the swearing in of the jury suffered no prejudice
because it was not reasonably probable “a different jury would have been
chosen or that the jury . . . would have reached a different verdict”].) This
case bears no resemblance to Larson v. Tansy (10th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2d 392,
where the defendant’s absence from jury instructions, closing arguments, and
the rendition of the verdict was prejudicial. (Id. at pp. 395–396.)
      Moreover, any assumed error was not structural. The cases Watts cites
are inapposite. Larson v. Tansy, supra, 911 F.2d 392 and People v. Wall,
supra, 3 Cal.5th 1048 evaluated the defendant’s absence from trial for a
reasonable probability of a different result — the former for a constitutional
error, and the latter for a statutory error.
      Nor are we persuaded by Watts’s suggestion that he suffered prejudice
because his absence could have led to the inference he was a security risk, or
that the trial court should have taken “lesser alternatives” to prevent an
escape attempt such as shackling his ankles in ways that weren’t visible to
potential jurors or “severing . . . voir dire” into multiple panels. (Italics
omitted.) These arguments are forfeited and lack record support. (See People
v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589–590.) Contrary to his assertions,
Watts was present for voir dire.
      In sum, Watts has not shown he missed a critical stage of the
proceedings nor has he established his absence affected his ability to defend
himself.

                                         7
                                        II.
      Watts challenges his conviction for the attempted murder of B.Q. on
several grounds. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence that he
intended to kill B.Q. when he shot into the car. Not so.
      Attempted murder requires “a specific intent to kill” and a “direct but
ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.” (People v. Mejia
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 605.) “ ‘When considering a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Avila (2009)
46 Cal.4th 680, 701.) We presume “ ‘in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
“ ‘This standard applies whether direct or circumstantial evidence is
involved.’ ” (Ibid.) Intent to kill “ ‘may . . . be inferred from the defendant’s
acts and the circumstances of the crime.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Watts intended to
kill B.Q. Police officers saw Watts and his confederates fire eight bullets
from close range into a compact car containing two occupants. Watts fired
five times, and B.Q. suffered three gunshot wounds. On this record, the jury
could reasonably conclude he intended to kill B.Q. (People v. Smith (2005)
37 Cal.4th 733, 736–737 [sufficient evidence supported conviction for
attempted murder where the defendant fired a single bullet through rear
windshield from a few feet behind the car].)
      Second, Watts argues the jury was required to acquit because it faced
two conflicting inferences as to whether he intended to kill while shooting

                                         8
into the car. The argument misapprehends the standard of review. We
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the jury. (People v. Cravens (2012)
53 Cal.4th 500, 507–508.) If the circumstances justify the jury’s findings, we
cannot reverse merely because the circumstances “ ‘ “ “ ‘might also reasonably
be reconciled with a contrary finding.” ’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 508.) As discussed
above, ample evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Watts intended to
kill B.Q.
      Third, Watts argues the prosecutor relied on a kill zone theory as a
basis for proving his intent to kill, and insufficient evidence supported that
theory. Watts misunderstands the theory.
      A kill zone theory allows “a concurrent intent to kill as a permissible
theory for establishing the specific intent requirement of attempted murder.”
(People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602, italics omitted.) Generally,
without a kill zone theory, when “a single act is charged as an attempt on the
lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined
independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim.” (Ibid.) In other
words, “an intent to kill cannot be ‘transferred’ from one attempted murder
victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.” (Ibid.) Under the
kill zone theory, however, “the nature and scope of the attack directed at a
primary victim may raise an inference that the defendant ‘ “intended to
ensure harm to the primary victim by harming everyone in that victim’s
vicinity.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The kill zone theory is “an additional, alternative ground
by which to prove the requisite intent to kill.” (Id. at p. 603.) It does not
preclude the conclusion that a defendant intended to kill two people simply
because they fired one bullet at the two people. (People v. Smith, supra,
37 Cal.4th at pp. 736–737, 745–746 [rejecting kill zone theory, and finding

                                        9
sufficient evidence to support two attempted murder convictions, where
defendant fired one bullet into car with two people].)
      There is nothing in the record indicating the prosecutor relied on a kill
zone theory. The prosecutor did not argue Watts had a “primary victim” and
that he intended harm to everyone in that victim’s vicinity. (People v.
Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 602.) Instead, the prosecutor argued Watts
intended to kill B.Q. and T.F. For example, the prosecutor began closing
arguments by stating, “Watts tried to murder two people.” And he
emphasized Watts “tried to kill” B.Q. and T.F. when he pulled the trigger; he
“tried to murder those two human beings.” When reviewed in its entirety,
the record clearly demonstrates the prosecutor did not argue the kill zone
theory. (See People v. Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 701; People v. Stone
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 134–141 [finding evidence sufficient that defendant
intended to kill without the assistance of a kill zone theory — and that kill
zone theory instruction was inappropriate — when defendant fired a single
shot at a group of rival gang members at a distance of four to five feet].)
      We also find unpersuasive Watts’s contention that the trial court had a
sua sponte duty to instruct on the kill zone theory. Although a trial court
“must instruct on general principles of law that are commonly or closely and
openly connected to the facts . . . and that are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case,” the court is “under no obligation to sift through
the evidence to identify an issue that conceivably could have been, but was
not, raised by the parties, and to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on that issue.”
(People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047, 1050.) The parties did not
raise the kill zone theory, and the court had no duty to instruct on it. (Ibid.)

                                       10
                                       III.
      Watts argues the trial court erred by failing to give 2023 jury
instructions at his 2022 trial. We disagree.
      For background, in addition to the charges, the prosecutor also alleged
aggravating circumstances. They included: Watts’s crimes involved great
violence, great bodily harm, the threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty; he was armed with or used a weapon; and
he engaged in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to society.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2) & (b)(1).) The trial court gave
CALCRIM No. 3250, the 2022 pattern jury instruction on the prosecution’s
burden to prove aggravating circumstances.
      Watts argues the trial court should have given CALCRIM Nos. 3224,
3225, and 3226 — the 2023 pattern jury instructions defining aggravating
circumstances. The revised instructions now require the jury to find the
aggravating circumstances are distinctly worse than an ordinary commission
of the underlying crime. (CALCRIM Nos. 3224, 3225, & 3226 (2023 new).)
      Jury instructions are not the law and “are not authority to establish
legal propositions or precedent.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48,
fn. 7.) Moreover, the fact that jury instructions have been amended with
additional clarifying language to better assist jurors does not make previous
versions of the instruction incorrect. (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th
838, 902.) Watts provides no authority — and our research has disclosed
none — requiring a trial court to give jury instructions created after the
conclusion of his trial. He also cites People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799,
817, but Black merely defines aggravating circumstances. (Ibid.) Black does
not require the court to instruct on that definition. (Ibid.)

                                        11
                                            IV.
      Watts argues we must remand for resentencing because the trial court
erred in imposing a 10-year sentencing enhancement — for his personal use
of a firearm — on the attempted murder of B.Q. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).)
      Before addressing the argument, we set forth the following additional
background: The jury found the following sentencing enhancements: in the
commission of count 2, Watts used a firearm while attempting murder, and
he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily
injury while attempting murder. (§ 12022.53, subds. (b) & (d).) On count
4 — the assault of T.F. — the jury found he personally used a firearm.
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a).)
      On count 2 — the attempted murder of B.Q. — the trial court imposed
the upper term plus a 10-year enhancement for personally using a firearm.
The court dismissed the other enhancements — including the longer 25-year-
to-life enhancement on count 2 for causing great bodily injury — “based upon
[its] analysis of 1385(c),” specifically citing Watts’s “significant childhood
trauma” and that imposition would “result in a sentence of more than 20
years.” During sentencing, the court stated there were “overwhelming factors
in aggravation.” It called his crimes “senseless,” reflecting “an attitude of
just not caring about who you hurt.” The court believed his “cold
behavior . . . show[ed] a complete lack of caring,” considered him “lucky that
[B.Q.] didn’t die” and imposed a “lengthy prison sentence” so he could “come
out . . . not living this life any more.”
      Section 1385 requires a court to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so.” (Id., subd. (c)(1); People v. Coleman (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723–724.) In “exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence

                                            12
offered by the defendant to prove” the presence of a statutorily enumerated
mitigating circumstance. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); Coleman, at p. 724.) As
relevant here, these mitigating circumstances include “application of an
enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years,” “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case,” the “current offense is connected
to prior victimization or childhood trauma,” and the “defendant was a
juvenile when they committed” a “prior offense[].” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
“Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (Ibid.; Coleman, at p. 724.)
“ ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 16.)
      We review a trial court’s decision to not dismiss an enhancement for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376–377.) A
“trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Ibid.) “The court is
presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an
affirmative record to the contrary.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th
305, 310.)
      The trial court’s decision to impose the 10-year enhancement was not
irrational or arbitrary. The record amply supports an implied conclusion
that Watts was a danger to public safety. (See People v. Myers, supra,
69 Cal.App.4th at p. 310].) As stated above, the court found “overwhelming
factors in aggravation,” described Watts’s crimes as “senseless,” “cold,” and
reflecting “an attitude of just not caring about who you hurt.” Moreover —
and contrary to Watts’s claim — the court did “afford great weight” to the

                                        13
mitigating circumstances. Indeed, the court dismissed two of three
enhancements explicitly because of the mitigating circumstances and its
analysis of section 1385. We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision
to impose the 10-year enhancement. (People v. Ponder (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
1042, 1052–1053, review granted on different grounds Jan. 10, 2024,
S282925.)
                                       V.
      Watts asks us to stay the sentence on count 6 — shooting at an
occupied vehicle. Watts argues — and we agree — the trial court
impermissibly punished his act of shooting at the car twice under two
separate provisions — shooting at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; count 6) and
attempted murder (§§ 187, 664; count 2).
      Section 654 bars multiple punishments on convictions arising out of an
indivisible course of conduct that are committed pursuant to a single criminal
intent and objective. (People v. Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) But if
the “defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, [they] may be
punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective,
‘even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321,
335.) Whether section 654 applies “ ‘is a question of fact for the trial court,
which is vested with broad latitude in making its determination.’ ” (People v.
Vang (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 912, 915–916.) When a “ ‘court sentences a
defendant to separate terms without making an express finding the
defendant entertained separate objectives, [it] is deemed to have made an
implied finding each offense had a separate objective.’ ” (In re L.J. (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 37, 43.) We review the court’s “ ‘determination in the light

                                       14
most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every fact
the . . . court could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (Vang, at p. 916.)
      Here, the trial court impermissibly imposed multiple punishments on
convictions arising out of an indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Trotter
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 363, 367–368.) That Watts shot five times in rapid
succession, without other evidence, cannot sustain an implied finding of
different objectives. (Trotter, at p. 368 [different objectives inferred from
different shots when separated by enough time for defendant to reflect and
consider his next action].) Indeed, the prosecutor argued imposing sentence
on count 2 and 6 violated section 654. We stay the sentence of one year, eight
months for shooting at an occupied vehicle.
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court is ordered to amend the abstract of judgment to stay the
sentence on count 6 pursuant to section 654, and to correct the spelling of
Watts’s name from “Carmen” to “Camren.” The court shall forward the
amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

                                        15
                                 _________________________
                                 RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A166114

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