Court Opinion

ID: 9786854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:03:49.198526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:47.515051
License: Public Domain

DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice,
concurring:
1[ 81 I concur in Judge Jackson's lead opinion upholding the Midvale city ordinance governing licensure of sexually-oriented businesses. I write additionally regarding the issue of standing to express an alternative rationale for denying Dr. John's facial challenge, to address its "as applied" challenge, and to express my view that the "good cause" exception does not need to be severed or given a limiting instruction at this time.
I. STANDING-FACIAL CHALLENGE
182 Dr. John's facially challenges Mid-vale's ordinance governing licensure of sexually-oriented businesses as being unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. While I coneur that Dr. John's lacks standing to mount a facial challenge, I base my decision on a different analysis than Judge Jackson. Judge Jackson concludes that Dr. John's lacks standing "to mount a facial attack on the Midvale ordinance because it has not shown that the ordinance has any deterrent effect on expression." - However, Judge Jackson does not address the full scope of the ordinance in making his determination. Because Dr. John's challenges Midvale's ordinance facially, I believe we must look at the full seope of the ordinance when making this determination because different standing rules apply if a facial challenge involves First Amendment protections.
183 Midvale's ordinance requires adult bookstores, adult video stores, adult motion picture theaters, and other such businesses to obtain a sexually-oriented business license before operating. Midvale City, Utah, Code §§ 5.56.010, 5.56.040 (1998). Because some books, magazines, periodicals, films, and videos "depict[ing] or describ[ing] sexual activities or specified anatomical areas," id. § 5.56.010(A)(2), have been afforded some First Amendment protection, I believe Dr. John's facial challenge encompasses First Amendment rights.
184 When facial challenges are made on First Amendment grounds, normal standing requirements do not strictly apply. Z.). Gifts D-4, LLC. v. City of Littleton, 811 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir.2002). Nevertheless, to have standing in this context a party must still " 'demonstrate its own cognizable injury in fact? " Id. at 1227 (quoting Nat'l Council for Improved Health v. Shalala, 122 F.3d 878, 883 (10th Cir.1997)). requirement is satisfied where the [party] is engaged 'in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution." " Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2801, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979)). While Midvale's ordi*351nance may encompass protected speech, I do not believe that Dr. John's itself "is engaged 'in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest' " For this reason, I concur that Dr. John's lacks standing to mount a facial challenge to Midvale's ordinance.
4 85 According to the trial court's findings of fact, Dr. John's sells hundreds of sexual devices,1 along with some candles, lotions, and lingerie. Additionally, it also sells a few sexually-explicit videos, books, and playing cards, but the number of these items are minimal in comparison to the other products sold by Dr. John's. Since the sale or rental of sexual devices yields no First Amendment protections, FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 253-54 & n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), for the "simple reason" that such products "express[ ] nothing," Yorko v. State, 690 S.W.2d 260, 271 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Teague, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), Dr. John's is not "engaged 'in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest." "
86 The mere inclusion by Dr. John's of some videos or books in its store's inventory does not alter this analysis because the minimal number of such items in its inventory in comparison to the constitutionally unprotected products sold by Dr. John's is insufficient to vest it with a constitutional interest. To conclude otherwise would mean that any business could mount a facial challenge to such licensing ordinances if it simply included a magazine rack with a few pornographic magazines on its premises. This would be contrary to standing requirements, especially since such a party could not "reasonably be expected properly to frame the issues and present them with the necessary adversarial zeal." Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 LEd.2d 786 (1984) (citation omitted). Hence, Dr. John's lacks the requisite injury in fact to mount a facial challenge.
II. "AS APPLIED" CHALLENGE
87 Although the court concludes that Dr. John's lacks standing to mount a facial challenge, I believe it is still necessary to address Dr. John's challenge of Midvale's ordinance as it has been applied to him. Since Judge Jackson does not expressly address this issue, I turn now to a discussion of Dr. John's "as applied" challenge. Dr. John's has been "permanently enjoined from operating a sexually oriented business within the boundaries of Midvale City, and from selling sexually oriented products ... without first receiving a sexually oriented business license pursuant to Midvale City Code." It argues that the injunction is improper because Midvale's or-dinanee is unconstitutionally vague and over-broad as applied to it. I disagree.
A. Vagueness Challenge
4 88 Under Midvale's ordinance, a business must obtain a sexually-oriented business license if the principal purpose of the business is to "offer{[ ] for sale or rental ... instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities, except for legitimate medically recognized contraceptives." Mid-vale City, Utah, Code §§ 5.56.010(A)(2), 5.56.040 (1998). Dr. John's contends that the phrase "principal purpose" is unconstitutionally vague as applied to it.
189 On June 28, 2000, Midvale denied Dr. John's application for a general business license based on its conclusion that Dr. John's must apply for a sexually-oriented business license because it carried some sexually-oriented items. While it is unclear whether Dr. John's initially operated a sexually-oriented business when it first applied for a general business license, later actions by Dr. John's demonstrate that its principal purpose was to operate a sexually-oriented business. The trial court made several findings of fact that support this conclusion. First, following Midvale's initial inspection, Dr. *352John's added over 500 sexually-oriented devices and paraphernalia to its inventory. Second, it advertised its products in a sexually-oriented magazine and its advertisement depicted "a partially clad female in a provocative pose." Finally, Dr. John's anticipated making an eighty-percent profit on its sexually-oriented merchandise. Based on these findings, Dr. John's unquestionably was operating a sexually-oriented business and the phrase "principal purpose" was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to it.
B. Overbreadth Challenge
€90 Dr. John's also contends that Mid-vale's ordinance is overbroad as applied to it because it vests too much discretion in city officials with respect to its business license application. Specifically, it argues that the fact that city officials determined it had to apply for a sexually-oriented business license rather than a general business lcense demonstrates unbridled discretion.
91 Typically, overbreadth challenges are made on the grounds that an ordinance "vests too much discretion in licensing officials in granting or denying a license," Z.J. Gifts D-4, 311 F.3d at 1227, or it vests too much discretion in licensing officials because it fails "to place brief, specific time limits on the decision-making process," Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202 F.3d 884, 889 (6th Cir.2000) (citations omitted). While Dr. John's brief is not a model of clarity on this point, its overbreadth challenge does not appear to encompass either of these grounds. Instead it contends that the ordinance vests too much discretion in licensing officials because it authorizes Midvale officials to determine the type of license for which a business must apply. According to Dr. John's, this confers unbridled discretion on decision-makers. I am unaware of any cases that support Dr. John's contention. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has implicitly recognized a city's authority to require sexually oriented businesses to obtain a different type of license than other businesses. See FW/ PBS, 493 U.S. at 223, 110 S.Ct. 596 (implicitly recognizing that city officials may require sexually-oriented businesses to obtain a different type of license from other businesses by not ruling that such licensing schemes are a per se violation of the Constitution). Finally, it is beyond question that Dr. John's was operating a - sexually-oriented - business. Hence, Dr. John's "as applied" challenge fails because Midvale's licensing officials did not have unbridled discretion when they determined the type of license for which Dr. John's must apply.
IIH. "GOOD CAUSE" EXCEPTION
{92 Under Midvale City Code section 5.56.8360, if a person appeals a denial or a qualified approval of a license, the hearing board must hear the appeal "within twenty days from the date of the appeal unless such time shall be extended for good cause." Midvale City, Utah, Code § 5.56.360(B) (1998) {emphasis added). lthough the code sets forth a specific time frame in which an appeal must be heard, the "good cause" exception contains no corresponding time limit.
193 Having concluded that Dr. John's lacks standing to make a facial challenge to Midvale's ordinance, however, we need not address this issue.2 Whether the "good cause" exception creates the possibility of an indeterminate delay such that it should be severed or given a limiting construction is a matter better left for another day. Because Judge Jackson's opinion may be somewhat ambiguous on this point, I expressly note my view that the "good cause" exception does not need to be severed or given a limiting construction at this time.
1 94 Justice RUSSON and Justice WILKINS concur in Associate Chief Justice DURRANT's opinion.

. Midvale's ordinance requires businesses to obtain a sexually-oriented business license if the principal purpose of a business is to "offer{[ ] for sale or rental ... instruments, devices or paraphernalia which are designated for use in connection with specified sexual activities, except for legitimate medically recognized contraceptives." Midvale City, Utah, Code §§ 5.56.010(A)(2), 5.56.040 (1998).

. Because Dr. John's did not file an administrative appeal, and the "good cause" exception only applies to the administrative appeal process, Dr. John's also lacks standing to challenge this provision as applied to it. See Z.J. Gifts D-4, 311 F.3d at 1228.