Court Opinion

ID: 9645406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:23:38.157717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:27.373490
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hamilton,
dissenting.
I agree in the main with Justice Smith’s dissenting opinion in holding that the burden of establishing that the sale of real estate and securities was contemplated in the contract between Hard and Hall was on Hard. Hall did not request an issue on the disputed issues and should be held to have waived them. Be that as it may, I think the majority has made an erroneous disposition of the case even under its holding. The Court of Civil Appeals has held that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the jury on the issues submitted. That we cannot disturb, and the majority opinion does not seek to disturb it. The Court of Civil Appeals further has held that the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the contract between Hall and Hard contemplated the sale of real estate or of securities, and this court has upheld that holding. The Court of Civil Appeals, based on its holding on the tvzo points above, said that the trial court was in error in rendering a judgment non obstante veredicto and rendered judgment on the verdict which the trial court should have rendered, as is required by Rule 434, T.R.C.P., which in part says:
" “When the judgment or decree of the court below shall be reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained or the damage be assessed or the matter to be decreed is uncertain, in either of which cases the cause shall be remanded for a new trial.”
When plaintiff in the trial court made his motion for judgment on the verdict there had been no finding on the disputed issue of whether real estate or securities were involved. There had been no request by either party for a finding by the court on that issue. Consequently, the trial court, not being able to make a finding on the disputed issue, could enter but one judgment, and that was on the verdict. This court is reversing the Court of Civil Appeals and remanding the cause to the trial court when it has not pointed out one error that the Court of Civil Appeals has committed. Rule 324, T.R.C.P., in part provides:
*585* When judgment is rendered non obstante veredietp or notwithstanding the finding of the jury on one or more special issues, the appellee may bring forward by cross-point contained in his brief filed in the . Court of Civil Appeals any ground which would have vitated the verdict or would have prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been entered by the trial court in harmony with the verdict, including although not limited to the ground that one or more of a jury’s findings have insufficient support in the evedence or are against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as a matter of fact * * *. * * * The failure to bring forward by cross-points such grounds as would vitiate the verdict shall be deemed a waiver thereof, * *
Petitioner Hall brought to the Court of Civil Appeals three cross assignments of error. Two of them raised objections to the admission of testimony. The third one raises the question of the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence. The petitioner Hall brought to this court only the two evidence questions covered in his cross assignments of error in the Court of Civil Appeals. The majority opinion does not even pass on these points.
The petitioner did raise in the Court of Civil Appeals by way of counter proposition the questions whether or not as a matter of law the contract between Hard and Hall contemplated the sale of real estate and the sale of securities, and these questions are probably covered in his points of error Nos. 1 and 4 in this court, on which we granted the writ of error, but this court has held against the petitioner on those points by holding that the evidence does not show, as a matter, of law that the contract between Hall and Hard contemplated the sale of real estate and securities. Consequently, this court in its majority opinion has not sustained petitioner on any of his points claiming error of the Court of Civil Appeals.
This court, in the case of Le Master v. Fort Worth Transit Co., 138 Texas 512, 160 S.W. 2d 224, in an opinion written by Judge Critz involving a case tried and appealed prior to the effective date of amended Rule 324, T.R.C.P., held that where the trial court had erroneously granted a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto that the case be remanded to the district court with instruction to enter judgment on the verdict of the jury. In that-case the court said that after entry’ of judgment by the trial court- on the verdict for plaintiffs that defendants may present their motion for -new trial.¡and if .the motion is *586overruled, they have their appeal. After quoting from Rule 324, the Court had this to say:
“This case was tried and appealed before the effective date of the above-quoted provision of Rule 324. We therefore do not apply it here. We deem it proper, however, to call attention to the fact that it will be the duty of this Court to apply such provision in cases where judgment non obstante veredicto was rendered subsequent to its effective date. We interpret the above-quoted provision to mean that where on appeal the appellate court determines that judgment non obstante veredicto was erroneously entered, such court will reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in harmony with the verdict, unless the appellee is able to present such error against himself as would have prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been entered by the trial court in harmony with the verdict. The filing of points of error by the appellee will be treated as a necessary prerequisite to the right to have such errors considered on appeal. It will be sufficient'for the appellee to present his points of error in his brief. Rules 374, 418(b), 420.”
This court in its majority opinion has not sustained any point presented by the petitioner Hall which would have vitiated the verdict or would have prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been enterd by the trial court in harmony with the verdict. Consequently the Court of Civil Appeals should be upheld in entering judgment on the verdict of the jury.
Opinion delivered February 17, 1960.
Rehearing overruled May 18, 1960.