Court Opinion

ID: 9851557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:14:58.886498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.745323
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — Macey worked for Reynolds Metals Company for nearly 6 years. Reynolds accepted Macey's work and the State accepted Reynolds' contributions to the unemployment compensation fund. Those payments were made for Macey's benefit, and were as much a part of his compensation as contributions made on his behalf to social security, health insurance and workers' compensation. Six years after hiring him, the company discovered misconduct which had no bearing on Macey's work and from which Reynolds suffered no harm.1 He was then fired. The State denied him unemployment benefits. While it was the company's prerogative to dismiss Macey, he is nevertheless entitled to unemployment benefits. I dissent.
The Nelson Standard
We stated the test applicable to this type of case in Nelson v. Department of Empl. Sec., 98 Wn.2d 370, 375, 655 P.2d 242 (1982). Under that test, Macey is entitled to benefits because his employer has suffered no harm. The majority evades this result by inventing a new test to replace Nelson's which leads to its desired result. Because this standard is unnecessary, unfair and inconsistent with existing law, I would apply Nelson's standard and reverse.
The majority states a 3-part standard for determining what constitutes "misconduct" justifying the denial of unemployment under RCW 50.20.060(1). Misconduct is said to occur where: the employer imposes a reasonable rule; the employee's conduct is connected with his work; and the conduct violates the rule. The opinion rejects the *323requirements: (1) that the misconduct must be intentional and (2) that the conduct result in harm to the employer.
This standard, according to the majority, applies to on-duty misconduct. The opinion states that "[i]f the violation consists of off-duty conduct, however, the additional criteria of Nelson are applicable." Majority, at 319. However, the purported on-duty and off-duty standards do not dovetail. Where the majority's test does not duplicate Nelson's, it contradicts it, and the contradictions are not resolved by the on-duty/off-duty distinction. They are not justified at all.
Nelson states the following rule:
We adopt the rule that in order to establish misconduct connected with an employee's work as required by RCW 50.20.060 the employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonable person would find the employee's conduct: (1) had some nexus with the employee's work; (2) resulted in some harm to the employer's interest; and (3) was in fact conduct which was (a) violative of some code of behavior contracted for between employer and employee, and (b) done with intent or knowledge that the employer's interest would suffer.
Nelson, at 374-75.
Nelson makes no distinction between on-duty and off-duty conduct because no such distinction is necessary. The nexus and harm elements fully account for the different effects of on-duty and off-duty conduct in particular cases. To a great extent the majority's new rule simply duplicates Nelson and is unnecessary. The majority's requirement that the employer's rule be reasonable appears in Nelson's element (3)(a). The majority's requirement that the conduct at issue be connected to the job is nothing more than Nelson's "nexus" requirement. Naturally both tests require an act which violates the employer's rule.
The majority departs from Nelson on two points. It does not require a showing that the employer's interests have been harmed or that the employee acted knowingly or with intent. However, the majority's assigning Nelson to cases of *324off-duty conduct and its own test to on-duty conduct does not justify these departures from Nelson's standard, because the elements dropped are required by the logic of the unemployment compensation statute.
Harm to the Employer
The purpose of the unemployment compensation system is to maintain purchasing power in the economy as well as to relieve hardship. These basic policies should be served, that is, benefits should be granted, except where it is plain that the employee falls outside the broad scope of the statutory scheme. RCW 50.01.010 provides that: "this title shall be liberally construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment ..." Therefore, in interpreting the term "misconduct" in RCW 50.20.060(1), the question is whether the employee's conduct is equivalent to a voluntary termination of employment by the employee.
While lying may count as good cause for Macey's being fired, more is required if he is to suffer the penalty of not receiving unemployment benefits. The issues of good cause for firing and misconduct which amounts to a voluntary termination must be kept distinct. Otherwise, many of those clearly entitled to benefits would be unjustly denied compensation, and the purpose of the unemployment compensation system would be greatly undermined, if not destroyed. Heitman v. Cronstroms Mfg., Inc., 401 N.W.2d 425 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
Nelson's "harm to the employer" element maintains this distinction. It ensures that benefits will be denied only where the purposes of providing benefits — maintaining purchasing power in the economy as well as relieving hardship — are clearly outweighed by the adverse effects of the employee's conduct. That is not the case here, and Macey should not be unfairly denied benefits.
Macey worked for Reynolds for nearly 6 years after lying on his application. Reynolds suffered no direct or indirect harm or prejudice from the falsehood. The harm that will result from denying Macey benefits, however, is substantial *325and is far greater than the harm resulting from his misconduct. The State is left worse off through the loss in purchasing power and the increase in hardship of its citizens. In such a case, the basic policies of the unemployment compensation system should not be overridden or avoided. Because there was no harm to Reynolds, Macey falls within the broad remedial purpose of the statute and should receive benefits.
Intent
The majority's test does not require a showing of intent on the part of the employee. Nelson does require it. While intent was clearly present here, it is worthwhile to note the flaws in the majority opinion on this point, as an indication that the departure from Nelson is completely unjustified.
The majority's dropping Nelson's intent element simply cannot be accounted for. Unless intent — in the simple sense of knowing behavior — is included in the analysis, any failure to conform counts as misconduct, including an offense committed through justifiable neglect, because of a misunderstanding or through simple ignorance of the employer's rule. How can such acts amount to a voluntary termination by the employee? Obviously they cannot. The law's stress on involuntary unemployment necessarily requires us to ask whether the misconduct was intentional, or at least knowing.
The majority at page 318 attempts to avoid this consequence by referring to "repeated, but unexcused acts, especially after notice or warnings", but if "misconduct" occurs only in these instances, the majority's test does include a requirement of intent or knowledge. If so, there is no reason not to apply Nelson.
The majority's departure from Nelson on this point cannot be accounted for by an on-duty/off-duty distinction. The fact that the alleged misconduct occurs on duty would not justify cutting off benefits in cases of neglect, misunderstanding or ignorance of the employer's rule. Whether the conduct takes place on duty or off duty, there must be *326some basis for equating the conduct with a voluntary quit, and that cannot be done where the conduct is not knowing or intentional.
Conclusion
Given that there is no principled reason not to abide by our existing law, I would apply Nelson here and reverse the denial of benefits on the ground that there was no harm to the employer.
I dissent.
Utter, J., concurs with Dore, J.

Macey falsely stated in his joh application that he had never been convicted of a crime. Macey had been convicted of burglary in 1975, 4 years before applying with Reynolds.