Court Opinion

ID: 9811358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:18:37.4189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:06.221423
License: Public Domain

Ct/ARK, J.,
dissenting. The Constitution of North Carolina, Art. X, sec. 6, provides: “The real and personal property of any female in this State, acquired before marriage, and all property, real .and personal, to which she may, after marriage, become in any manner entitled, shall be and remain the sole and separate estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for any debts, obligations or engagements of her husband, and may be devised and bequeathed, and, with the written assent of her husband, conveyed by her as if she were unmarried.” ■
To anyone who reads this section, as it is written, it must be clear that the property rights of a married woman remain as if she were unmarried, with the single'exception that she can not convey without the written assent of her husband. That is the sole restriction upon her disposition of her property while living, and there is not even that restriction upon her disposition of it at death. The emancipation of married *427women as to their property rights could not be more unequivocal. Her property is to remain her sole and separate estate and property, as if she were unmarried, except she can not convey without her husband’s written assent. With that exception, her property rights remain unimpaired and unchanged by marriage. To the rights guaranteed them by the Constitution, married women are entitled as fully as anyone else. There is no restriction upon her jus disponendi or using her property, as'“if she were unmarried,” save in the one respect recited in the constitutional guarantee. There is no disability whatever imposed upon her freedom to contract, or avoiding the possible effect thereof upon her property. There is no constitutional presumption that a married woman, by the fact of marriage, becomes less intelligent, or less competent to contract than “if she were unmarried” — a state in which she is as free to contract as any man.
Two arguments have been advanced why the courts should exercise a paternal supervision of the Constitution and construe that it does not mean as to married women what the language unmistakably and unequivocally says.
The first is, that, as married women can not convey without the written assent of the husband, to allow them to contract without such assent would be to allow them to do indirectly what they can not do directly. That is an argument which might have been addressed to the Constitutional Convention, and doubtless was, but as it did not induce the Convention to shackle the property rights of married women by inhibition of their contracting on the faith and credit of property ownership, the courts should not do it.
The statute of frauds for more than two centuries has rendered invalid conveyances of realty unless in writing, but it has never occurred to any court to hold that no one could be liable upon a verbal contract whereby his realty *428could be subjected to sale, because “that would permit to be done indirectly what can not be done directly.” The constitutional emancipation of married women should bear the same construction as has been for centuries given to the provision in the statute of frauds. A requirement of “writing” in one case, and of “written consent” in the other, as to “conveyance” can not be construed differently, so as to forbid “contracts” in the- one case and not in the other.
The other objection is that the absolute property rights of a married woman “as if she remained unmarried” are in conflict with the common law precedents. That is exactly why the provision has been put in the Constitution, which is, and was intended to be, a complete break with the past in this as in several other respects.
In Shuler v. Millsap, 71 N. C., 298, Settle, J., says: “The Constitution of 1868, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, have so changed preexisting laws on the subject of the estates of females, and the remedies affecting the same, that neither the elementary books nor' our own Reports afford us much light in determining tire questions presented by the record. We are called upon to malee a new departure, leaving old ideas behind, and adapting ourselves to the new order of things
In Walker v. Long, 109 N. C., 511, MeebimoN, C. J., says: “The Constitution, Art. X, sec. 6, has wrought very material and far-reaching changes as to' the rights respectively of husband and wife in respect to her property, both real and personal, and enlarged her personality and her power in respect to, and control over her property.”
There are many other judicial enunciations recognizing the radical and complete break with the common law as to the status of married women. Whether that law was based upon the conception that a single woman (who had full con-*429ti’ol of her property) by the fact of marriage gave conclusive proof of imbecility and incompetency, or that only those women who were lacking in discretion married, whatever the basis, the constitutional provision of 1868 swept away the disabilities of married women and guaranteed them the same rights of pi’operty “as if remaining unmarried,” save that as to conveyances there must be the written assent of the husband.
The fanciful doctrine of “charges in equity” is a late creation by purely judicial legislation, for there is not a line of any statute to support it, and it is in direct conflict with the beneficent and liberal provision of the Constitution. The oft-quoted sec. 1826 of The Code, requires only written assent, of the husband — nothing more. To require a “charging” is harking back to the time when a married woman not only had no control over her property, but was a chattel herself, and when Shakespeare correctly expressed the English law as to wives by making Petruchio say:
“ I will be master of what is my own ;
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house ;
My household stuff, my field, my barn.
My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything.”
. The Constitution does not disable a married woman to contract, but oor tlie contrary leaves her as free to do so as her single sister. Tt follows that when the plaintiff endorsed the note in hank and placed it in the stream of commerce, anyone who bought it or loaned money on it in the absence of fraud or collusion (which is not charged) got a good title to it as against her, as fully as if she had been á single woman or a man.
■ The jus dispon endi is inherent in the ownership of property, and remains in the married woman by the constitutional provision that her property is to remain hers as if she were *430unmarried, with the single exception of conveyances, which word refers to cases in which “conveyances” are required, i. e., deeds and leases of realty and mortgages of realty or personalty. No “conveyance” is required to pass personalty except by mortgage. This Court has held that the Legislature can not deprive anyone of the jus disponendi, which is a vested right protected by the United States Constitution. Hughes v. Hodges, 102 N. C., 239; Bruce v. Strickland, 81 N C., 267. But if it were held that the Legislature could restrict the “sole ownership” of her property guaranteed to a married woman by the provision of The Code, sec. 1826, it is to be observed: (1) That though that section has strangely enough been construed to apply to conveyances, when in its terms it applies to contracts only, by the same decisions the requirement of the husband’s written assent has always been restricted to deeds and mortgages; .and (2) that if it applied to personalty, the husband has here' given his written assent by his letter to the Wilmington bank. It is true such assent was subsequent to the endorsement of the note in blank by the wife, but the assent need not be simultaneous. Bates v. Sultan, 117 N. C., 94.
Nor indeed is the endorsement in blank of a promissory note “a contract to affect her real or personal estate” in the purview of this action. The note is secured by mortgage, and appears to be collectible. This is not an action to make her chargeable with its payment (when that question might arise), but an action by her to recover possession of the note which she has endorsed, allowed to be put in deposit as collateral, and which is now so held with the written assent of the husband. Nor does the fact that the note was past due when endorsed cut any figure as to the plaintiff. The doctrine of sets-off in case of paper passed after maturity applies in favor of the maker, and not between the payee pr endorser and endorsee.
*431It can hardly be contended that the endorsement of a bill or note in blank is a “conveyance,” for if so, all such endorsements are void for want of a grantee. But if it were a conveyance, there is, as above said, the written assent of the husband. Bates v. Sultan, supra. The word “conveyance” ordinarily refers to deeds of realty, or mortgages of either’ realty or personalty, i. e., to cases in which a “conveyance” is required. Kelly v. Fleming, 113 N. C., 133. And such is its meaning in this'provision of the Constitution. It can not mean that a married woman can not sell a horse, a cow, a ear-ring, or cash a check without the written assent of her husband.
In this day, when married women own so large a share of stocks, bonds, promissory notes, drafts and checks, it is of far-reachirrg consequence to hold that the endorsement by them of such papers is invalid, especially when (as in this case) the paper endorsed by the wife is tendered as a collateral in a written instrument containing not only the written assent of the husband but his request that it be so used. Commercial paper is sexless. When by proper endorsement it is put into the currents of trade, the taker of it before maturity should regard it as a “courier without luggage,” and not be held to inquire and scrutinize whether any of the endorsers were or were not widows, wives or spinsters. And if he takes after maturity, he should be liable only to sets-off in favor of the maker. Apart from the constitutional rights of married women over their property being the same as that of single women (except as to “conveyances” which refer to deeds and mortgages), the commercial laiv has never before held the taker of commercial paper to scrutinize the sex or marital condition of endorsers of such paper. The endorsement by a. married woman payee of a check stands on the same footing as her endorsement when payee of a promissory *432note, so far, certainly as entitling tbe bolder to receive tbe proceeds of the check or note, which is the only matter at issue here.
The recent statute, revising and codifying the law of negotiable instruments, chap. 7i33, Laws 1899, was-drawn by a committee of able lawyers appointed by the American Bar Association to secure uniformity of legislation upon the subject, and has been adopted by many States. In it, there is no intimation that the doctrine of the disability of married women has been imported into, the mercantile law or invalidates the endorsement of a promissory note by a married woman. This is at least a legislative construction. It must further be remembered that in the present case it is not even found that, the holders of this paper, taking when so endorsed, knew that the endorser (who was not the original payee), was a married woman.
Even at common law, the endorsement of a note by a married woman was valid to transfer the note (though not to make, her liable as endorser) if the husband was present (Menkins v. Heringhi, 17 Mo., 297), or if made with his authority or consent (Prestwick v. Marshall, 4 C. & P., 594; Stevens v. Bank, 10 Cush., 291; Mudge v. Bullock, 83 Ill., 22; McClain v. Weidemayer, 25 Mo., 364; Nimes v. Bigelow, 45 N. H., 343), and the husband’s authority may be presumed from his conduct or subsequent ratification. Prince v. Brunette, 1 Bing. N. C., 435; Mudge v. Bullock, supra; Coxlia v. Connelly, 15 Ind., 141; Cobb v. Duke, 36 Miss., 60. It would be strange, therefore, if since the liberal provisions of our Constitution an endorsement of a promissory note by a married woman should now be invalid to carry title to it, especially under the circumstances of this case.