Court Opinion

ID: 9897356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:34.244112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:09.492533
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     Jun 28 2023, 8:53 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nathaniel C. Henson                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Devon DeMarco                                             Attorney General of Indiana
Rhame, Elwood & McClure, PC                               Evan Matthew Comer
Portage, Indiana                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jason Gibbs,                                              June 28, 2023
Appellant-Defendant                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1041
        v.                                                Appeal from the Porter Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Michael A. Fish,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          64D01-1604-F6-3024

                                     Opinion by Judge Pyle

                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Riley concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023                                Page 1 of 19
      Statement of the Case

[1]   Jason Gibbs (“Gibbs”) appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, for two

      counts of Class A felony child molesting,1 two counts of Class B felony incest,2

      one count of Level 4 felony incest,3 two counts of Class C felony sexual

      misconduct with a minor,4 and two counts of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct

      with a minor.5 Gibbs also appeals the aggregate sentence imposed for his nine

      felony convictions. Gibbs argues that the trial court abused its discretion when

      it denied his motion for a mistrial and that his aggregate sentence is

      inappropriate. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when

      it denied Gibbs’ motion for a mistrial and that his aggregate sentence is not

      inappropriate, we affirm Gibbs’ convictions and sentence.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issues
                 1.        Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
                           denied Gibbs’ motion for a mistrial.

                 2.        Whether Gibbs’ sentence is inappropriate.

      1
          IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2007).
      2
          I.C. § 35-46-1-3(a) (1994).
      3
          I.C. § 35-46-1-3(a) (2014).
      4
          I.C. § 35-42-4-9(b)(1) (2007).
      5
          I.C. § 35-42-4-9-(b)(1)(2014).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023               Page 2 of 19
      Facts
[1]   The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that Gibbs and Michelle

      Howisen (“Mother”) are the parents of: (1) Victoria (“Victoria”), who was

      born in April 1995, when Mother was fifteen years old; (2) Jason, Jr., who was

      born in April 1996; (3) Steven, who was born in October 1997; (4) K.G.

      (“K.G.”), who was born in October 1998 and is one of two victims in this case;

      (5) N.G. (“N.G.”), who was born in November 1999 and is the second victim

      in this case; and (6) Stephanie, who was born in June 2002. Gibbs and Mother

      have been married twice and divorced twice. Gibbs also has four or five

      additional children with two other women. One or more of those children were

      born while Gibbs was married to Mother. The three youngest of those children

      were born in 2005, 2010, and 2012 and have the same mother.

[2]   In late October or early November 2011, Gibbs, Mother, and their six children

      moved to a house in Wheeler, Indiana (“the Wheeler house”). K.G. was

      thirteen years old, and N.G. was twelve years old. Shortly after moving into

      the Wheeler house, Gibbs took K.G. shopping for bras and underwear. While

      K.G. tried on bras in the dressing room, Gibbs placed his hands on K.G.’s

      breasts, explaining that he was determining what bra cup size she needed.

      Gibbs also told K.G. to try on thong underwear so that he could see how the

      underwear looked on her.

[3]   Also, while the family lived in the Wheeler house, Gibbs went into K.G.’s

      bedroom in the middle of the night, woke her up, and took her into his

      Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023           Page 3 of 19
      bedroom.6 Gibbs placed K.G. on his bed, rubbed her thighs and her vagina,

      and told her that Mother no longer “showed [him] any love or affection.” (Tr.

      Vol. 3 at 33). Thereafter, Gibbs placed his finger between the lips of K.G.’s

      vagina and “jerk[ed] off” with his other hand until he ejaculated. (Tr. Vol. 3 at

      34). Gibbs referred to the act of placing his finger between K.G.’s vagina lips

      while he masturbated as the “easy way” (“the easy way”). (Tr. Vol. 3 at 38).

      Other incidents of the easy way occurred for three years.

[4]   When K.G. turned fourteen years old and the family still lived at the Wheeler

      house, Gibbs began placing his penis between the lips of her vagina while he

      “hump[ed] forward and back.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 39). Gibbs referred to this act as

      the “hard way” (“the hard way”). (Tr. Vol. 3 at 41). Other incidents of the

      hard way occurred for two years. After Gibbs had inappropriately touched

      K.G., either the easy way or the hard way, Gibbs often rewarded K.G. with

      body piercings, tattoos, hair dyes, electronics, and shopping trips.

[5]   In addition, on another occasion, while the family lived at the Wheeler house,

      Gibbs went into the bathroom while K.G. was showering and told her that he

      wanted her to shave her pubic hair because “he like[d] it bald.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at

      36). After K.G. had shaved her pubic hair, Gibbs “rub[bed] against [K.G.’s]

      vagina lips with his fingers,” “jerked off[,]” and ejaculated onto the bathroom

      floor. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 37).

      6
          Mother regularly slept on the living room couch.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023           Page 4 of 19
[6]   Gibbs also began sexually abusing N.G. while the family lived in the Wheeler

      house. On one occasion, while N.G. was taking a shower, Gibbs walked into

      the bathroom, “whipped the [shower] curtain open[,]” and stared at N.G. (Tr.

      Vol. 3 at 206). N.G. got out of the shower and got dressed. As N.G. started to

      walk out of the bathroom, Gibbs took her into his bedroom, sat on the bed with

      her, told her that she needed to shave her pubic area, and told her to pull down

      her pants. When N.G. refused to pull down her pants, Gibbs pulled them down

      to her knees, “spread the lips of [her] vagina open,” “show[ed] her the middle

      part[,]” “told her that [was] [her] clit[,]” and began “touching it.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at

      208-09). When N.G. began crying, Gibbs pushed her down on her bed, “stuck

      his index finger inside of [her,]” and asked her if she liked what he was doing.

      (Tr. Vol. 3 at 210). N.G. responded that it hurt and that it “fe[lt] like [she]

      ha[d] to pee[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 211.) Gibbs also told N.G. that she had “big

      boobs” for her age and “lift[ed] them up[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 211).

[7]   On another occasion, shortly before St. Patrick’s Day, N.G. asked Gibbs to

      purchase her a green shirt to wear to school. On the way to purchase the shirt,

      Gibbs stuck his hand down N.G.’s pants and attempted to insert his finger in

      her vagina. When N.G. squeezed her thighs together, Gibbs asked her “what

      the fuck [was] wrong with [her]” and told her that she was not getting “a

      fucking shirt[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 213).

[8]   One night, while Mother was sleeping in an upstairs bedroom, and N.G. was

      sleeping on the living room couch, Gibbs got on the couch with N.G. and

      “spooned” her. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 2016). N.G. felt Gibbs’ hard penis touching her

      Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023             Page 5 of 19
       buttocks. Gibbs attempted to stick his hand in N.G.’s pants but left the living

       room when N.G. told him that she heard Mother coming down the stairs. On

       another occasion, Gibbs went into N.G.’s bedroom while she was sleeping,

       squeezed her breasts, stuck his hand under her underpants, and rubbed her

       vagina with two of his fingers.

[9]    In addition, one Wednesday evening, while N.G. was cleaning Gibbs’ bedroom

       before going to church, Gibbs told her that she was “not going to fucking

       church” that night. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 222). Gibbs placed N.G. on the bed and

       removed her pants and underwear. When N.G. told Gibbs to stop because she

       did not want to do that, Gibbs slapped N.G., leaving his fingerprints on her

       face. Gibbs then inserted his middle finger in N.G.’s vagina and moved his

       finger around. When N.G. told Gibbs to stop, Gibbs told N.G. to “stop with

       [her] bitch-ass attitude[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 223). N.G. asked Gibbs why he was

       doing that to her, and Gibbs responded that her “mom wasn’t giving [him]

       any.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 225). When N.G. told Gibbs that she was going to tell

       Mother what he had been doing to her, Gibbs responded, “your mom’s a

       bitch.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 224). Gibbs further told N.G. that Mother did not have

       money to support the family and that if N.G. wanted to be hungry, then that

       was on her. Gibbs sexually abused N.G. every few months for three years.

[10]   At some point in 2013, Gibbs and Mother separated, and Gibbs moved to a

       house in Portage (“the Portage house”). Gibbs continued to sexually abuse

       K.G. when she visited him at the Portage house. One morning in 2014, after

       Gibbs had just finished doing it the hard way, Gibbs was sitting at the kitchen

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023          Page 6 of 19
       table in his bathrobe, and K.G. was standing naked between the kitchen and the

       living room. As Gibbs and K.G. were talking, K.G. heard someone entering

       the house. K.G. ran to the bedroom as her aunt (“aunt”) and uncle (“uncle”)

       walked in the back door. When K.G. returned to the kitchen, she had a sheet

       draped around her. K.G. told aunt and uncle that Gibbs had hurt her and that

       she wanted to go home.

[11]   In November 2014, K.G. told Mother that Gibbs had been sexually abusing her

       for the previous three years. During their conversation, Gibbs arrived at

       Mother’s home with the electronic device that he had promised K.G. as a

       reward for doing it the easy way at the Portage house. Gibbs, Mother, and

       K.G. went to Gibbs’ car to talk privately. Gibbs asked K.G. if she had told

       Mother what had been happening. K.G. responded that she had, and Gibbs

       apologized to Mother and told her that he had “made a mistake, [he had]

       touched the girls[.]” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 89).

[12]   The State initially charged Gibbs with three felony counts in March 2016.

       Following several delays in the case, the State charged Gibbs with ten felony

       counts in a January 2022 second amended information. Specifically, the State

       charged Gibbs with: (1) Class A felony child molesting for knowingly or

       intentionally penetrating K.G.’s sex organ with his finger between November 8,

       2011 and October 26, 2012, when K.G. was under fourteen years old and Gibbs

       was at least twenty-one years old; (2) Class A felony child molesting for

       knowingly or intentionally penetrating N.G.’s sex organ with his finger between

       November 8, 2011 and November 7, 2013, when N.G. was under fourteen

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023          Page 7 of 19
years old and Gibbs was at least twenty-one years old; (3) Class B felony incest

for knowingly or intentionally engaging in deviate sexual conduct with K.G.

between November 8, 2011 and June 30, 2014, when Gibbs knew that K.G.

was related to him biologically as a child and was less than sixteen years old,

and Gibbs was eighteen years of age or older; (4) Class B felony incest for

knowingly or intentionally engaging in deviate sexual conduct with N.G.

between November 8, 2011 and June 30, 2014, when Gibbs knew that N.G.

was related to him biologically as a child and was less than sixteen years old,

and Gibbs was eighteen years of age or older; (5) Level 4 felony incest for

knowingly or intentionally engaging in deviate sexual conduct with K.G.

between July 1, 2014 and October 23, 2014, when he knew that K.G. was

related to him biologically as a child and was less than sixteen years old, and

Gibbs was eighteen years of age or older; (6) Level 4 felony incest for

knowingly or intentionally engaging in deviate sexual conduct with N.G.

between July 1, 2014 and October 23, 2014, when he knew that N.G. was

related to him biologically as a child and was less than sixteen years old, and

Gibbs was eighteen years of age or older; (7) Class C felony sexual misconduct

with a minor for knowingly or intentionally performing or submitting to any

fondling or touching of either K.G. or himself with the intent to arouse or

satisfy the sexual desires of either K.G. or himself between October 27, 2012

and June 30, 2014, when K.G. at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen

years old and Gibbs was at least twenty-one years old; (8) Class C felony sexual

misconduct with a minor for knowingly or intentionally performing or

submitting to any fondling or touching of either N.G. or himself with the intent
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023            Page 8 of 19
       to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either N.G. or himself between

       November 8, 2012 and June 30, 2014, when N.G. was at least fourteen years

       old but less than sixteen years old and Gibbs was at least twenty-one years old;

       (9) Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor for knowingly or

       intentionally performing or submitting to any fondling or touching of either

       K.G. or himself with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either

       K.G. or himself between July 1, 2014 and October 23, 2014, when K.G. was at

       least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old and Gibbs was at least

       twenty-one years old; and (10) Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor

       for knowingly or intentionally performing or submitting to any fondling or

       touching of either N.G. or himself with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual

       desires of either N.G. or himself between July 1, 2014 and October 23, 2014

       when N.G. was at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old, and

       Gibbs was at least twenty-one years old.

[13]   At Gibbs’ March 2022 five-day trial, the trial court instructed the jury as

       follows:

                               PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTION #11

                                                 *        *        *

               Occasionally, the Court may strike evidence from the record after
               you have already seen or heard it. You must not consider such
               evidence in making your decision.

               Your verdict should be based only on the evidence admitted and
               the instructions on the law. Nothing that I say or do is intended
               to recommend what facts or what verdict you should find.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023              Page 9 of 19
       (App. Vol. 3 at 23).

[14]   Also, at trial, the jury heard the facts as set forth above during the testimony of

       then twenty-three-year-old K.G. and then twenty-two-year-old N.G. In

       addition, Mother testified that Gibbs had always instructed her to shave her

       pubic area because “he like[d] no hair.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 88). Aunt testified that

       shortly before trial, Gibbs had telephoned uncle. During the telephone

       conversation, aunt had heard Gibbs tell uncle that aunt and uncle had “better

       get the story straight.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 148). Gibbs further told uncle that he

       would “make trouble” for aunt and uncle if they did not tell the truth at trial.

       (Tr. Vol. 3 at 148).

[15]   Victoria also testified at Gibbs’ trial. During direct examination, the State

       asked Victoria about her relationship with Gibbs. Victoria testified that she and

       Gibbs had initially had a good relationship but that the relationship had

       changed. When the State asked Victoria why the relationship with Gibbs had

       changed, Victoria responded because “[h]e inappropriately touched me.” (Tr.

       Vol. 3 at 109). Gibbs made an oral motion to strike Victoria’s testimony, which

       the trial court granted. The trial court also admonished the jury “to disregard

       the statement made . . . by the witness” and took a brief recess. (Tr. Vol. 3 at

       109). During the recess, Gibbs orally moved for a mistrial. After reviewing

       case law, the trial court denied Gibbs’ motion. Thereafter, additional witnesses

       testified that afternoon. The following morning, Gibbs renewed his motion for

       a mistrial and alternatively asked the trial court to allow him to cross-examine

       Victoria regarding the veracity of her statement. The trial court denied Gibbs’

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023            Page 10 of 19
       motion for a mistrial and told him that he could recall Victoria as a witness

       during his case-in-chief.

[16]   During closing argument, the State reviewed the elements of each of the ten

       charges against Gibbs. The State then pointed to specific testimony from K.G.

       and N.G. and argued that the young women’s testimony provided evidence for

       each element of the ten charges. During Gibbs’ closing argument, Gibbs’

       counsel told the jury that he generally put the elements of the charged offenses

       up on a screen and attempted to “knock them out.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 167). Gibbs’

       counsel further explained that he was not going to do that in this case because

       Gibbs’ position was “that these allegations [had been] fabricated.” (Tr. Vol. 4

       at 167). Specifically, according to Gibbs’ counsel, K.G. and N.G. had

       fabricated the allegations against Gibbs because they had been angry at him for

       fathering children with other women while he was married to Mother.

[17]   The jury convicted Gibbs of both counts of Class A felony child molesting, both

       counts of Class B felony incest, one count of Level 4 felony incest, both counts

       of Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and both counts of Level 5

       felony sexual misconduct with a minor. The jury was unable to reach a verdict

       on the remaining Level 4 felony incest charge, and the State dismissed that

       charge.

[18]   At Gibbs’ March 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed Gibbs’ pre-

       sentence investigation report, which revealed that Gibbs had two prior felony

       convictions for the fraudulent purchase of firearms as well as prior gang

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023          Page 11 of 19
       membership. Also, at the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Gibbs had

       been “convicted of distinct acts with each victim and deserve[d] distinct

       sentences for each of those.” (Tr. 4 at 193). Gibbs, on the other hand, argued

       that the imposition of multiple sentences would violate the Indiana substantive

       double jeopardy clause. According to Gibbs, the “lessers . . . merge[d] into” the

       Class A felony child molesting convictions. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 200). Gibbs further

       argued that he should be sentenced to the minimum twenty-year sentence for

       each of the Class A felony convictions and that the two sentences should run

       concurrently with each other for an aggregate sentence of twenty years.

[19]   After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court found the following

       “significant and troubling” aggravating circumstances: (1) K.G. and N.G. were

       Gibbs’ biological daughters; (2) Gibbs had prior felony convictions and prior

       gang involvement; (3) the harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by K.G. and

       N.G. was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the

       commission of the offenses as demonstrated by the young women’s trial

       testimony; (4) Gibbs had threatened victim N.G. and witnesses aunt and uncle;

       and (5) Gibbs had harmed K.G. and N.G. multiple times and abused them over

       a significant period of time. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 203). The trial court found as a

       mitigating factor that Gibbs had three young children who depended on him for

       support. In addition, the trial court rejected Gibbs’ double jeopardy argument

       because “the State . . . presented separate incidents proving each of the nine

       counts on which the jury convicted [Gibbs]. In some of those counts, there

       were multiple occurrences of the crime. The acts happened at different times

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023           Page 12 of 19
       and in different places. Each count contains distinct characteristics.” (Tr. Vol.

       4 at 204).

[20]   Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Gibbs to forty-five (45) years for each Class

       A felony conviction, eighteen (18) years for each Class B felony conviction,

       eleven (11) years for the Level 4 felony conviction, six (6) years for each Class C

       felony conviction, and three (3) years for each Level 5 felony conviction. The

       trial court further ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other,

       resulting in an aggregate sentence of 155 years.

[21]   Gibbs now appeals his convictions and sentence.

       Decision
[22]   Gibbs argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion

       for a mistrial and that his sentence is inappropriate. We address each of his

       contentions in turn.

       1. Motion for Mistrial

[23]   Gibbs first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

       motion for a mistrial. The denial of a motion for a mistrial rests within the

       sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s decision only

       for an abuse of that discretion. Brittain v. State, 68 N.E.3d 611, 619 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2017), trans. denied. Further, the trial court is entitled to great deference

       on appeal because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the relevant

       circumstances of a given event and its probable impact on the jury. Id. at 620.

       To prevail on appeal from the denial of a motion for mistrial, a defendant must
       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023            Page 13 of 19
       demonstrate that the statement in question was so prejudicial that he was

       placed in a position of grave peril. Id. The gravity of the peril is measured by

       the challenged conduct’s probable persuasive effect on the jury’s decision, not

       the impropriety of the conduct. Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind.

       2001). Granting a mistrial “is an extreme remedy that is warranted only when

       no other action can be expected to remedy the situation.” Kemper v. State, 35

       N.E.3d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Further, a timely and

       accurate admonishment is presumed to cure any error in the admission of

       evidence. Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ind. 2002). In addition, “[w]e

       presume the jury followed the trial court’s admonishment and that the excluded

       testimony played no part in the jury’s deliberation.” Francis v. State, 758 N.E.2d

       528, 532 (Ind. 2001). We also presume that the jury followed the trial court’s

       instructions. Weisheit v. State, 109 N.E.3d 978, 989 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied.

[24]   Here, our review of the record reveals that before the jury heard any evidence,

       the trial court read Preliminary Instruction Number 11, which advised the jury

       that the trial court might strike evidence from the record after the jury had

       already heard it. The trial court further instructed the jury that it must not

       consider such evidence in making its decision. During the trial, the trial court

       admonished the jury to disregard Victoria’s statement immediately after she had

       made it. Both the trial court’s instruction and admonition were clear, and we

       find nothing in the record to suggest that the jury did not follow the instruction

       and the admonition. As such, we presume that the jury followed the trial

       court’s admonition and instruction and conclude that the trial court’s timely

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023            Page 14 of 19
       admonishment sufficiently dispelled any grave peril and justified the denial of

       Gibbs’ motion for a mistrial. We further note that Victoria’s brief statement in

       the five-day trial was never mentioned again, and K.G. and N.G. both gave

       detailed testimony about the specific and repeated sexual acts that Gibbs had

       perpetrated against them. See Szpyrka v. State, 550 N.E.2d 316, 318 (Ind. 1990)

       (concluding that where the victims had positively identified the defendant, “it

       stretche[d] credulity to believe that the jury could have been swayed to such an

       extent that except for the improper remark by the police officer appellant would

       have been acquitted.”). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

       Gibbs’s motion for a mistrial.7

       2. Inappropriate Sentence

[25]   Gibbs also argues that his aggregate 155-year sentence is inappropriate. Indiana

       Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by

       statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the

       sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character

       of the offender. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that

       his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind.

       2006). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate turns on the “culpability

       7
        Gibbs alternatively argues that the trial court should have allowed him “cross[-]examination into the
       veracity of Victoria[’s] . . . statement regarding uncharged conduct.” (Gibbs’ Br. 13). However, Gibbs has
       waived appellate review of this one-sentence argument that is not supported by citation to authority or
       portions of the record. See Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d 468, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (explaining that a party
       waives an issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate citation to authority
       and portions of the record).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023                                   Page 15 of 19
       of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and

       myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895

       N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[26]   When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we acknowledge that

       the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an

       appropriate sentence for the crime committed. Childress, 848 N.E.2d at 1081.

       Here, the jury convicted Gibbs of two Class A felonies, two Class B felonies,

       one Level 4 felony, two Class C felonies, and two Level 5 felonies. The

       sentencing range for a Class A felony is between twenty (20) and fifty (50)

       years, and the advisory sentence is thirty (30) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(a). The

       sentencing range for a Class B felony is between six (6) and twenty (20) years,

       and the advisory sentence is ten (10) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(a). The sentencing

       range for a Level 4 felony is between two (2) and twelve (12) years, and the

       advisory sentence is six (6) years. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-5.5. The sentencing

       range for a Class C felony is between two (2) and eight (8) years, and the

       advisory sentence is four (4) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(a). Lastly, the sentencing

       range for a Level 5 felony is between one (1) and six (6) years, and the advisory

       sentence is three (3) years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b).

[27]   The trial court sentenced Gibbs to forty-five (45) years for each Class A felony

       conviction, eighteen (18) years for each Class B felony conviction, eleven (11)

       years for the Level 4 felony conviction, six (6) years for each Class C felony

       conviction, and three (3) years for each Level 5 felony conviction. The trial

       court further ordered the sentences to run consecutively to each other, resulting

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023           Page 16 of 19
       in an aggregate sentence of 155 years. This 155-year aggregate sentence is

       considerably less than the potential maximum sentence of 180 years.

[28]   With regard to the nature of the offenses, we note that Gibbs began regularly

       sexually abusing his two biological daughters when they were twelve and

       thirteen years old. The abuse included Gibbs placing his fingers between the

       lips of K.G.’s vagina while he masturbated and placing his penis between the

       lips of K.G.’s vagina while he humped back and forth. Gibbs nicknamed these

       acts as the easy way and the hard way and rewarded K.G. with body piercings,

       tattoos, hair dyes, electronics, and shopping trips when she complied with his

       sexual demands. In addition, Gibbs sexually abused N.G., including digitally

       penetrating her multiple times. When N.G. asked Gibbs to stop the sexual acts

       against her, he rebuffed her plea by inflicting physical harm upon her, such as

       by slapping her face. Further, after N.G. had threatened to tell Mother about

       Gibbs’ acts, he manipulated N.G. to believe that she would be the cause of the

       family going hungry and experiencing financial loss if she were to reveal his

       actions to Mother. Gibbs perpetrated these heinous acts against his daughters

       for three years. Moreover, Gibbs blamed his criminal actions on Mother,

       telling his daughters that he was engaging in sexual acts with them because

       Mother would no longer have a sexual relationship with him. Our Indiana

       Supreme Court has explained that “when the perpetrator commits the same

       offense against two victims, enhanced and consecutive sentences seem

       necessary to vindicate the fact that there were separate harms and separate acts

       against more than one person.” Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023         Page 17 of 19
       2003). “Similarly, additional criminal activity directed to the same victim

       should not be free of consequences.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. The

       supreme court has further explained that “[a] harsher sentence is also more

       appropriate when the defendant has violated a position of trust that arises from

       a particularly close relationship between the defendant and the victim, such as a

       parent-child . . . relationship.” Hamilton v. State, 955 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ind.

       2011).

[29]   With regard to Gibbs’ character, we note that the evidence presented at trial

       about Gibbs’ multiple sexual offenses against his daughters over multiple years

       reveals the disturbing and manipulative aspects of Gibbs’ character. Moreover,

       Gibbs threatened aunt and uncle, who had discovered K.G. draped in a sheet at

       the Portage house and whom K.G. had told that Gibbs had hurt her, to get their

       story straight before testifying at trial. In addition, we note that Gibbs’ prior

       felony convictions and gang membership speak poorly to his character. See

       Quintanilla v. State, 146 N.E.3d 982, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that

       even a minor criminal history speaks poorly to a defendant’s character).

[30]   Based on the nature of the offenses and his character, Gibbs has failed to

       persuade this Court that his aggregate 155-year sentence for his nine felony

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023            Page 18 of 19
       convictions for sexual offenses perpetrated against his biological daughters over

       a period of three years is inappropriate.8

[31]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.

       8
        Gibbs also argues that his convictions violate Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy. He specifically
       contends that his Class B and Level 4 felony convictions for incest and his Class C and Level 5 felony
       convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor are all lesser included offenses of his Class A felony child
       molesting convictions. The State responds that “the trial court did not run afoul of Indiana’s substantive
       double jeopardy principles” because Gibbs was “properly convicted of more than one crime[.]” (State’s Br.
       41). The State specifically contends that “the facts from trial showed that [Gibbs’]actions constituted
       multiple criminal transactions for which he could be held separately liable.” (State’s Br. 41). The State is
       correct.
       In Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 247 (Ind. 2020), our Indiana Supreme Court recognized that “[s]ubstantive
       double jeopardy claims come in two principal varieties: (1) when a single criminal act or transaction violates a
       single statute but harms multiple victims, and (2) when a single criminal act or transaction violates multiple
       statutes with common elements and harms one or more victims.” (emphasis added). Here, however, Gibbs
       was convicted of multiple criminal acts or transactions that occurred over a three-year period of time. There is
       no violation of substantive double jeopardy because the facts show separate and distinct crimes. See id. at 249
       (explaining that if the facts show separate and distinct crimes, there is no violation of substantive double
       jeopardy).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 22A-CR-1041| June 28, 2023                                    Page 19 of 19