Court Opinion

ID: 9844640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:05:55.71692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:39.497409
License: Public Domain

WRIGHT, C. J.
I concur.
Were it hot for the subsequent passage of section 13338.11 I would regard Heckley v. Board of Education (1959) 53 Cal.2d 218 [1 Cal.Rptr. 4, 347 P.2d 4] as controlling this case, and would dissent from the court’s affirmance of the judgment herein. No tenable factual distinction exists between the instant case and Heckley. In both cases teachers were paid exactly what they were promised—part-time wages for what was, in terms of their fellow teachers’ obligations, part-time work.
The passage of section 13338.12 shortly after our decision in Heckley can only be regarded as legislative disapproval of the waiver of statutory salary rights permitted by Heckley. It is possible, as defendants contend, to construe the second paragraph of section 13338.1 as permitting just the sort of part-time, part-salary arrangement as is presented here. There are, however, several cogent objections to such a construction.
First, this would require us judicially to define the words “full-time” as used in section 13338; 1 in a sense contrary to that set forth by express statutory definition in section 13525: “ ‘Full time’ means not less than the minimum schoolday for each day the schools of the district are maintained during the school year.” Section 11003 in turn sets 180 minutes, the length of the kindergarten classes taught daily by plaintiffs, as the minimum schoolday for pupils of kindergartens.
Second, the exempting paragraph of section 13338.1 specifically refers to “governing boards of school districts” in permitting “governing boards” to employ persons for less than full-time teaching. At trial in the instant case, plaintiffs proved that they were hired without contracts by the su*492perintendent and assistant superintendent of the school district. Defendants in fact stipulated that “the specific written rules and regulations óf the board of trustees[3] do not make any reference to the particular position occupied by these employes [i.e., plaintiffs.]”4 Thus it does not appear that the hiring of plaintiffs as “long-term substitutes” without contracts by the superintendent and assistant superintendent of the school -district was an act of the “governing board” within the ambit of section 13338.1’s exempting paragraph.
Third, and most crucial to my concurrence in the court’s opinion, is the fact that the Education Code which encompasses section 13338.1 represents an extensive legislative effort at imposing state-wide educational standards on local school districts. “ ‘[T]he legislature [has] enjoined on [governing boards], within reasonable limits, the principle of uniformity of treatment as to salary for those performing like services with like experience. ... [H] Defendants contend that the ordinary rules of contract apply to a teacher, and that, since plaintiffs accepted their reduced rating, they are barred from now questioning its validity. While it is true that the relation between the [governing board] and a teacher is that of employer and employee, and that this relationship is created by contract, the terms of [the] contract are to be found in the authority granted the [governing board] by law.’ ” (Fry v. Board of Education (1941) 17 Cal.2d 753, 757, 760 [112 P.2d 229].) I believe that under the “ordinary rules of contract” plaintiffs had received prior to their suit everything to which they were entitled. Nevertheless, the Legislature has chosen, through section 13338.1, to ban waivers of benefits statutorily accorded to teachers. Section 13338.1 should thus be accorded a liberal construction in keeping with the legislative policy of insuring “uniformity of treatment” of teachers by governing boards.
Statutorily enforced “uniformity of treatment” of teachers is a step towards fulfillment of this court’s call for state-wide “uniformity of treatment” of pupils. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187].) Insofar as legislative efforts at standardizing teacher salaries serve “the cherished idea of American edu*493cation that in a democratic society free public schools shall make available to all children equally the abundant gifts of learning,” (id., at p. 619; italics added)- I believe the exempting paragraph of section 13338.1 should be narrowly construed. Thus despite my feelings as to the individual equities of this case, I concur in the court’s opinion.
Tobriner, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.

A11 references to code sections are to the Education Code.

Section 13338.1 provides:
“Except as provided in Sections 13406 and 13448, any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of.this chapter or any part thereof is null and void.
“Notwithstanding provisions of this or any other section of this code, governing boards of' school districts may employ persons in positions requiring certification qualifications on less than a full-time basis.”

Section 921 provides that a governing board may be denominated as either a “board of school trustees” or a “board of education.”

On cross-examination by plaintiffs of the superintendent of the school district who, as assistant superintendent, had hired plaintiffs as “long-term substitutes,” the following exchange occurred:
“Q. So far as the [plaintiffs] were concerned, because there was no contract, the governing board actually never passed on any contractual relationship between [plaintiffs] and the district, is that correct?
“A. That’s right.”