Court Opinion

ID: 9630467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:11:32.225162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:03.948966
License: Public Domain

GREENWOOD, Judge:
(concurring and dissenting).
I concur in Judge Bench’s opinion concerning expert testimony, but dissent from the opinion’s conclusion that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s conviction of negligent homicide. The majority opinion correctly states the necessary quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being where the defendant should have been aware of a substantial and unjustified risk of death, but was not. State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Also, the risk must be such that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize it. State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983). Therefore, in this case, the State was required to convince the jury that there was a substantial and unjustified risk that the infant would die if he did not receive medical care in a hospital-type setting; that defendant was unaware that the risk existed; and that an ordinary person in defendant’s position would have recognized that risk. Our task as an appellate court, is to determine if the evidence presented, when viewed favorably to the jury verdict, “is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.” State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)).
My assessment of the evidence supporting the jury verdict is as follows: defendant was a licensed physician who had maintained a family practice since 1968, including . obstetrical care; defendant assumed responsibility for the infant’s physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at *1210home; defendant did not insist on examining the mother when she reported vaginal bleeding to determine if premature birth was likely or if so, what precautions should be taken to minimize the likelihood of premature birth; defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to position the infant in a way which relieved the symptoms but would not alleviate the condition itself; defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant’s condition to Ivy and Joanne; three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant could die from the disease and that the disease was progressive; defendant could not himself admit the infant into a hospital because he lacked malpractice insurance, so would have to call another physician or have the infant admitted through an emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told her to watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color and respiration, without advising her as to the degree of change which might indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or Joanne that death could result from the disease; and defendant left the infant in the care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence which would indicate that defendant should not have been aware that a substantial risk existed. However, the existence of conflicting evidence, by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah Ct.App.1989). The jury has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing the evidence presented in this most difficult case, and I do not think that we should appropriately substitute our judgment for that of the jury. The jury’s conclusion was based on what defendant knew or the jury believed he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he should have known the risks. I do not find the evidence “sufficiently inconclusive,” as do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I would conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant should have been aware that a substantial and unjustified risk of death existed, and to convict defendant of negligent homicide as a result.