Court Opinion

ID: 9839631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 17:03:54.954892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:10.475345
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/13/23 P. v. Rojas CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B324281

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. YA038816)
           v.

 DAVID GILBERT ROJAS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Amy N. Carter, Judge. Dismissed.
      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Rama R. Maline, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

       In 1999 a jury convicted David Gilbert Rojas on nine counts
of robbery. The trial court sentenced Rojas as a third strike
offender to a prison term of 271 years eight months to life. In
2022 Rojas, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing
under recently enacted ameliorative legislation. The superior
court resentenced Rojas under Penal Code former section 1171.1
(now section 1172.75),1 struck two one-year prior prison term
enhancements (execution of which the trial court had stayed),
and otherwise denied Rojas’s petition.
       Rojas argues that, when the superior court granted his
petition under section 1172.75, he was entitled to a full
resentencing and that the court, in addition to striking the two
one-year enhancements, should have exercised its discretion
whether to strike enhancements for prior serious felony
convictions and personal use of a firearm and whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive terms on the robbery counts. We
conclude that, because Rojas was not authorized to file a petition
under section 1172.75, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to
rule on his petition. Therefore, the superior court’s order is not
appealable, and we dismiss Rojas’s appeal.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     A.     Rojas Is Convicted and Sentenced
     In 1998 Rojas and two others participated in an armed
robbery of a bartender and eight patrons at a bar. A jury

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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convicted Rojas on nine counts of robbery (§ 211). The jury found
true allegations that Rojas personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subd. (b)) and that a principal was armed with a firearm
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). Rojas admitted that he had two prior
serious or violent felony convictions within the meaning of the
three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))
and two prior convictions for serious felonies within the meaning
of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and that he had served two
prior prison terms within the meaning of former section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
       The court sentenced Rojas under the three strikes law to an
aggregate prison term of 271 years eight months to life, which
included enhancements for prior serious felony convictions and
personal use of a firearm. The court also imposed and stayed
execution of two one-year prior prison term enhancements under
former section 667.5, subdivision (b). We affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Rojas (June 4, 2001, B140418) [nonpub. opn.].)

       B.    Rojas Files a Petition for Resentencing
       In 2022 Rojas, representing himself, filed a petition for
resentencing and identified as grounds for relief Proposition 57,
Senate Bill Nos. 81, 775, 1393, and 1437, Assembly Bill No. 1540,
and section 1172.6. The superior court treated Rojas’s petition as
one for resentencing under sections 1172.6 and 1172.75 and
appointed counsel. At the hearing on Rojas’s petition, counsel for
Rojas conceded that most of the authority Rojas cited in his
petition did not entitle him to relief. The superior court
resentenced Rojas under section 1172.75 by striking the two
(stayed) one-year prior prison term enhancements and otherwise
denied the petition. Rojas timely appealed.

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                          DISCUSSION

       Rojas argues that, when the superior court resentenced him
and struck the prior prison term enhancements under
section 1172.75, the court erred in failing to consider whether to
exercise its discretion to strike the firearm enhancements and the
serious felony enhancements and whether to impose concurrent
terms on some or all of the robbery counts.2 But even before
resentencing, there was a fundamental problem with Rojas’s
petition: The Legislature did not authorize defendants to file a
petition under section 1172.75; only the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) can initiate the
resentencing process.
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3) added section 1171.1, later renumbered as
section 1172.75, which provides: “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any enhancement
imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense . . . is
legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) Section 1172.75
prescribes the procedure for resentencing affected defendants.

2      Effective January 1, 2018, Senate Bill No. 620 (Stats. 2017,
ch. 682, §§ 1-2) amended sections 12022.5 and 12022.53 to give
trial courts discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements
imposed under those sections “in the interest of justice pursuant
to Section 1385” in “any resentencing that may occur pursuant to
any other law.” (§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (h).)
Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2), effective
January 1, 2019, amended sections 667 and 1385 to give trial
courts discretion to strike or dismiss prior five-year serious felony
enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

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The CDCR and the county correctional administrator must first
identify individuals serving terms that include no-longer-valid
enhancements and then provide certain information about those
individuals “to the sentencing court that imposed the
enhancement.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (b); see People v. Newell (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 265, 268.) “Upon receiving the information,” the
superior court, if it determines a judgment includes an invalid
enhancement, must “recall the sentence and resentence the
defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Section 1172.75 prescribes two
timelines for this process. For “individuals who have served their
base term and any other enhancement and are currently serving
a sentence based on the [now-invalid] enhancement,” the
deadline for review and resentencing was October 1, 2022.
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(1).) For individuals like Rojas, who are not
yet serving time on an invalid enhancement, the deadline is
December 31, 2023. (§ 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).)
       Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), provides that
resentencing under the statute must “result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of
the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would
endanger public safety.” Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2),
provides that the court must “apply the sentencing rules of the
Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.”
“The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have

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reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
       The superior court may well recall Rojas’s sentence and
resentence him under section 1172.75 by the end of the year.
(See § 1172.75, subd. (c)(2).) But the court cannot do so on
Rojas’s petition. Under the “express procedure” provided in
section 1172.75, “any review and verification by the court in
advance of resentencing is only triggered by receipt of the
necessary information from the CDCR Secretary or a county
correctional administrator, not by any individual defendant.”
(People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 384.) “Section
1172.75 contains no provision for an individual defendant to file”
a petition under that statute. (People v. Newell, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268; see People v. Escobedo (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1250, 1257 [“section 1172.75 does not authorize
appellants to file a petition or a motion to strike the unauthorized
enhancements”]; Burgess, at p. 384 [“section 1172.75 simply does
not contemplate resentencing relief initiated by any individual
defendant’s petition or motion”].)
       Because Rojas did not have authority to file a petition
under section 1172.75, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to
hear his petition and resentence him. (See People v. King (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 629, 634 [“‘once a judgment is rendered and
execution of the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have
jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence’”]; see also People v.
Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 381 [same].) “And, ‘[i]f the
trial court does not have jurisdiction to rule on a motion to vacate
or modify a sentence, an order denying such a motion is

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nonappealable, and any appeal from such an order must be
dismissed.’” (King, at p. 634; accord, People v. Newell, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 268-269; Burgess, at p. 381.) Therefore, we
must dismiss Rojas’s appeal.

                        DISPOSITION

     The appeal is dismissed.

                                            SEGAL, J.

We concur:

                 PERLUSS, P. J.

                 FEUER, J.

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