Court Opinion

ID: 9683709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:35:34.094795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.802403
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellees forcibly argue that above conclusion permits defendant to convert to his own use the involved corpus of estate without any provision whatever for safe delivery to them of their one-half interest in the proceeds of sale on termination of the homestead right. It is their position that our opinion and judgment should at least be modified to give appellees a charge or lien against appellant’s interest in the ten acres “subject to the homestead exemption.”
This sale of gravel, ratified and acquiesced in by appellees, includes of course the reversionary interest and we agree that their part of the proceeds should be made as secure, if possible, as though the gravel had remained in place. However we are not convinced of the feasibility concerning above suggestion of security. These proceeds are not under control of the Court whereby an investment of appellees’ one-half part could be required, with interest only payable to the life tenant as was the case in Davis v. Bond, 138 Tex. 206, 158 S.W.2d 297. Nor are we authorized to demand of appellant the execution of a properly secured note as in McCanless v. Devenport, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 903.
No forced lien of any character can be imposed upon homestead property by judicial decree; and the exemption, having once attached, would continue until terminated by death, abandonment, or alienation. Posey v. Commercial Nat. Bank, Tex.Com.App., 55 S.W.2d 515. We submit that a lien on appellant’s one-half interest in the ten-acre tract, even of the form suggested, would undoubtedly restrict his right of alienation.
The motion for rehearing must be overruled.