Court Opinion

ID: 9789729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:40:35.127515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:24.102045
License: Public Domain

JUDGE DUBOFSKY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
I concur with the majority’s opinion except its conclusion that the admission of the prior malpractice claims was harmless error.
I agree that one of the dangers of permitting cross-examination on the previous malpractice claims against plaintiff’s expert is that, as he attempts to justify his position as to those claims, each claim would have the potential of becoming a trial within a trial. It is difficult enough *33for the fact-finder to understand the issues in a complicated malpractice case without adding additional medical issues from another case to this burden.
There are, however, several other reasons why the prior claims against the expert should not have been admitted into evidence.
Claims of poor prior medical practice are merely accusations and do not prove malpractice. Before a party should be permitted to impugn the credibility of an expert witness because of prior bad acts of malpractice, such party should, at a minimum, be required to demonstrate the claims were found to be valid by a judge or jury. See People v. King, 179 Colo. 94, 498 P.2d 1142 (1972).
Only a small percentage of malpractice claims brought against physicians results in verdicts adverse to the physicians. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical Malpractice Example, 51 Law & Contemp.Probs. 199 (Autumn 1988). Hence, the mere fact that a physician has “been sued” tells very little about such physician’s credibility.
Furthermore, even if the expert witness has been found liable for malpractice in a specific prior incident, it is doubtful that such finding is relevant either to the credibility of the physician or to the accuracy of his testimony in the subsequent but unrelated trial.
In my view, the use of cross-examination to reveal a witness’ collateral “bad acts” is becoming all too prevalent. Rather than meeting directly the testimony and evidence of the other side, the parties are attacking the other party’s and witnesses’ collateral “wrong doings.” See Dolan, Rule 403: ' The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S.Cal.L.Rev. 220 (1976).
To admit collateral evidence of unrelated prior bad acts is to alter the essential purpose of a trial from resolving the dispute on the direct evidence into a morality play in which the jury decides whether the parties and their witnesses are good or bad people. Such is not the proper purpose of a trial, and the courts should be on guard to prevent it.
Here, the other members of the panel and I agree that the cross-examination on this issue was not proper. Where we disagree is in whether it was prejudicial error.
In my view, contrary to the conclusion of the majority here, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the error of admitting the prior malpractice claims affected the outcome of the case and, thus, the substantial rights of the parties.
In concluding that cross-examination about the prior malpractice claims against the expert was harmless, the majority relies primarily on other collateral information used to impeach him. In my view, reliance upon the expert’s asserted lack of credibility is improper. Unlike this case, only in a rare situation should the harmless error analysis be predicated upon an appellate court’s view that the testimony of a key expert is not credible. See R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error (1970).
Both the “conflict” in the testimony as to the expert’s position at the medical school and as to his alleged prior inconsistent opinion are insufficient in my view to resolve the issue. Furthermore, I am not even convinced from this record that there is a direct conflict of evidence on these issues, but in any event, it ill behooves this court to choose defendant’s witnesses’ testimony over the expert’s and in turn to say these discrepancies make his opinion on the merits of the case also incredible.
In a medical malpractice case, it is generally incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove by expert testimony that defendant departed from the required standard of care. Smith v. Curran, 28 Colo.App. 358, 472 P.2d 769 (1970). Because a medical expert’s opinion on standard of care, causation, and damages is of such special importance in a medical malpractice case, the improper and prejudicial impeachment of the expert presumptively affects the jury’s verdict.
Since the expert’s opinion is often the determinative factor to the jury, if a party can disparage an opposing expert by improper and collateral impeachment, then that party’s chances of prevailing are sig*34nificantly increased. Thus, I view the impeachment of the expert here about the prior claims as being highly prejudicial to his credibility and therefore to the plaintiffs entire case.
Furthermore, I have reviewed the expert’s testimony and have concluded that he is an eminently qualified physician to render opinions on the standard of care, causation, and damages issues involved in this case.
The expert has been a neurosurgeon, practicing his specialty without interruption, for almost 30 years. He completed his neurosurgeon residency at Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, Michigan. He was certified by the Board of Neurological Surgeons in 1965. For almost 20 years, he taught neurosurgery at a medical school in the Detroit area. At the time of trial, he was still active on the staff of several hospitals. For a substantial period of time, he had been the Chief of Neurosurgery at two different hospitals. He is a member of the American College of Surgeons and belongs to numerous medical societies and organizations. He has testified for both plaintiffs and defendants in numerous court settings and has been recognized and accepted as an expert by those courts.
Moreover, there is nothing illogical or inherently inconsistent about the medical opinions that he gave. He essentially concluded that the surgery done by defendant was negligent and caused plaintiffs injuries because defendant entered the wrong area of the brain. The defendant admitted entering a part of the brain not intended to be within the scope of the surgery, but he claimed that this action was neither negligent nor the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Under this state of the record, it is apparent that the medical opinions of plaintiffs expert had a significant factual and logical basis, and the improper collateral attack on the expert likely had an unwarranted prejudicial effect on his credibility. Hence, in my view, there is at least a reasonable possibility that the error of permitting cross-examination about prior malpractice complaints affected the outcome of the case, and therefore, I would reverse the judgment.