Court Opinion

ID: 9913141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:44.206319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:29.803333
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 P. v. Green CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081409

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCD290772)

THOMAS CHRISTOPHER GREEN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kimberlee A. Lagotta, Judge. Affirmed.
         Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, Donald W. Ostertag, and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Thomas Christopher Green shot a homemade firearm on a crowded
public boardwalk, hitting two victims with shrapnel. A jury convicted Green
of two counts of assault with a firearm. For each count, the jury also found
true that Green personally and intentionally discharged the firearm. After
weighing mitigating and aggravating factors, the trial court struck one
firearm enhancement, ordered the low-term sentence on the other, and
imposed a total prison term of seven years.
      Green appeals his sentence. We affirm. As we resolve this case by
memorandum opinion, we do not elaborate on factual and procedural
background beyond what is required for our analysis. (Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851-854.)
                                        I.
      First, Green contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to strike both firearm enhancements. The People respond that the trial court
considered the applicable factors and “struck a reasonable balance” by
striking one and imposing the low term on the other. The People thus argue
that the trial court’s decision was neither irrational nor arbitrary. We agree
with the People.
      We review the decision not to strike an enhancement for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) A trial court does
not abuse its discretion unless its decision is “so irrational or arbitrary that
no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) Green, as
appellant, bears the burden to “clearly” show the decision was irrational or
arbitrary. (Id. at p. 376.) If Green fails to do so, we presume the trial court
“acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives.” (People v. Parra Martinez
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322 (Parra Martinez).)
      Here, the trial court “balanc[ed] out” the aggravating and mitigating
factors before issuing its sentence. It considered “the totality of the evidence
in this case” as well as “the arguments of all sides.” The trial court noted

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that Green “fired off his weapon in the direction of vulnerable pedestrians on
the boardwalk” on a busy holiday weekend. Despite the potential for greater
injury, the trial court limited its sentencing decision to “what happened,” not
“what-ifs.” Green’s shot resulted in two separate victims. The victim of the
count with the firearm enhancement for which the trial court imposed prison
time “was particularly vulnerable,” getting “hit by shrapnel in her back as
she was walking away” with her two nieces. The trial court imposed the
middle term for that count and the lower term for the corresponding firearm
enhancement. The trial court, however, struck the firearm enhancement on
the other count because “this was a single shot” and it already “considered
the punishment” in the first count.
      Green concedes the trial court “understood the scope of its authority,”
and he does not claim that the trial court failed to consider both mitigating
and aggravating factors. “Accordingly, we may presume those factors were
properly considered.” (Parra Martinez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 323.)
      Green does not persuade us that the trial court’s decision was irrational
or arbitrary. Green emphasizes mitigating factors and downplays
aggravating ones to argue that the trial court should have reached a different

result.1 In essence, Green disagrees with how the trial court weighed the
factors. But we will not reverse “ ‘merely because reasonable people might
disagree.’ ” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978.)
Green thus does not present a valid basis for reversal here.

1     We do not consider Green’s argument, first raised in reply, that the
victims were “not especially vulnerable.” (See People v. Failla (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1519, fn. 3.) Green offers no reason for not making
this argument earlier, and it conflicts with his initial position that both
victims were “somewhat vulnerable.”
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                                        II.
      Second, Green argues the trial court unfairly penalized him for
exercising his right to a jury trial because he received a seven-year sentence
after rejecting a five-year pretrial plea offer. We disagree.
      At sentencing, a trial court is “in no way limited by the terms of any
negotiated pleas” offered by the prosecutor. (In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d
274, 281.) A more severe sentence conflicts with a defendant’s exercise of the
constitutional right to a jury trial only if the trial court imposes it because the
defendant opted for trial. (Ibid.) The “mere fact” that a defendant received a
greater sentence than was offered by plea deal, however, “does not in itself
support the inference that he [or she] was penalized” for going to trial.
(People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35.) In Szeto, our Supreme Court
affirmed a sentence after the defendant “admit[ted]” that the trial court “did
not say anything reasonably giving rise to the inference that [it] was
penalizing defendant for exercising his right to jury trial.” (Ibid.)
      Here, Green presents no evidence the trial court imposed the sentence
because he rejected the plea offer. Like the defendant in Szeto, Green admits
that “the trial court did not make any statement penalizing” him. And
Green’s claim that the trial court “imposed a longer sentence for lesser
convictions” is not accurate. Green turned down a pretrial offer to plead
guilty to one count of assault with a firearm with a firearm enhancement.
Despite Green’s focus on the attempted murder charge, it was not part of the
contemplated plea. After trial, the jury convicted Green of two counts of
assault with a firearm, each with a firearm enhancement. He thus received a
longer sentence for greater convictions. As a result, Green does not persuade
us that the trial court penalized him for taking his case to trial.

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                     DISPOSITION
     We affirm.

                                   CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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