Court Opinion

ID: 9558447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:09:52.419388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:18.681446
License: Public Domain

JACKSON, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 31.1 respectfully dissent because I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Draper City (Draper).
ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND
¶ 32 When Harmon City, Inc. (Harmons) bought the property at issue, the property was zoned RR-43 for residential/agricultural use, but was in an area designated by Draper’s General Plan for Mixed Use (Planned Development).1 The property was also to be *330part of the “700 East Area Master Plan,” which had not yet been formulated.
¶ 33 Harmons supplemented its rezoning application to Draper with the following materials: a study by a certified property appraiser analyzing how neighborhood shopping centers affected the value of surrounding residential areas, a site lighting analysis, sketches of various aspects of the development, a study by a traffic engineer evaluating how the development would affect traffic, several endorsement letters and surveys from citizens living near other Harmons stores, an analysis of estimated economic gains and tax revenues from the development, expert explanations of the differences between neighborhood and regional shopping centers, and documentation of Harmons’s charitable support of neighborhood schools.
¶ 34 The Draper Planning Commission (the Commission) prepared a staff report dated January 2, 1998. In recommending that the city council approve the zoning change, the report stated, “The proposed area is master planned as Mixed Use; therefore, the proposed Zoning is consistent with the City’s General Plan.” The report further opined that “[t]he property, with the proposed conditions of approval, will be able to accommodate the proposed uses, if designed appropriately.” Finally, the report listed several conditions that had to be met to receive a conditional use permit for the site.
¶ 35 At a January 8, 1998 meeting, the Commission discussed Harmons’s application. A Harmons representative presented the material Harmons had submitted with its application, along with other information— e.g., regarding lighting, landscaping, and buffer zones vis-a-vis the adjacent residential neighborhood — showing the proposed development in a positive way. Several citizens spoke for and against the project. The Commission postponed making a decision on the application until after another meeting two days later to discuss the 700 East Area Master Plan. Then, at its January 13, 1998 meeting, the Commission voted to recommend that the city council grant Harmons’s request by adopting C-2 zoning for the property. The Commission stated the vote was supported by “[t]he reasons listed in the Staff Report dated January 2, 1998, which include C-2 zoning is 'in agreement with the City Master Plan for this area, as well as the 700 East Master Plan.”
¶36 The Commission then prepared a Staff Report for the City Council, recommending the zoning change and explaining the industry standard criteria upon which a grocery store like Harmons qualifies as a neighborhood use. On February 3,1998, the city council heard comments from a Harmons representative, the Commission, and a few citizens. The comments were primarily positive, with just a couple citizens arguing that the development would not be compatible with the adjoining homes.
¶ 37 After hearing the comments, the city council voted to deny Harmons’s rezoning request, expressing
concern about a 71,700 square foot, 24-hour store being considered because it is not in harmony with the Neighborhood Commercial useage [sic] of the area; the size and shape of the property is not suited for a complex of the size proposed; and the increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved.
One council member “added that on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial has been approved and, if the Council designates this area for C-2 commercial development, too many things are allowed in a C-2 zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods.”
¶38 I agree with Harmons that the trial court incorrectly selected the “reasonably debatable” standard of review to apply in upholding the city council’s decision. I believe the trial court should instead have applied the “substantial evidence” standard and concluded the evidence did not meet that standard.
ANALYSIS
A. Interpreting Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
¶ 39 Harmons argues the trial court incorrectly selected the law applicable to this case *331when it used the reasonably debatable criterion as the arbitrary and capricious standard under Utah Code Ann. § 10 — 9—1001(3)(b) (1999). Harmons contends that the correct criterion is substantial evidence. I agree,
¶ 40 Before the briefs were submitted in this case, the Utah Supreme Court had already decided this exact issue in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332. I am disconcerted that counsel for both parties elected to completely ignore Springville Citizens in their briefing, thus not giving us the benefit of any analysis. Similarly, my colleagues have sought to avoid or wiggle free from the direct precedential effect of Spring-ville Citizens. Despite the negative policy implications flowing from that decision, I believe we are compelled by stare decisis to follow the supreme court’s “clear[ ] ■ command.”
¶ 41 The majority opinion seeks to distinguish Springville Citizens from the instant case on the basis that Springville Citizens involved the review of an administrative decision (thus warranting review under the substantial evidence standard applied there), while the instant case involves the review of a legislative decision (thus warranting review under the reasonably debatable standard applied in past Utah cases). Such a mischarac-terization of Springville Citizens requires wily maneuvering around the facts and law set forth there.
¶ 42 The majority opinion specifically tries to distinguish Springville Citizens on three bases: (1) Past case law (predating Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (effective May 1, 1992) and Springville Citizens) supports the majority opinion. (2) The majority opinion describes the city council’s decision in Springville Citizens as entailing the approval of a planned unit development (PUD), as opposed to an actual rezoning. And, (3) the majority opinion depicts Springville Citizens as involving merely a challenge to the city council’s failure to follow its own mandatory ordinances, as opposed to the city council’s failure to show evidentiary support for its decision.
1. The Effect of Past Case Law
¶ 43 I agree with the main opinion that under majority rule in the United States and past Utah law administrative-type decisions have traditionally been reviewed under a higher standard, akin to substantial evidence, while legislative-type decisions have traditionally been reviewed under a lower standard, akin to reasonably debatable. And, greater deference is generally given to legislative decisions because public policy suggests that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of a legislative body serving at the pleasure of the citizenry. This is a solid, appealing argument.
¶44 However, past law and public policy should no longer matter to this court. We can cite and expound on past case law and public policy ad infinitum without affecting one whit the state of the law as it exists today. Although we had extensive case law in 1991 stating different standards of review for administrative and legislative land use decisions, the Legislature enacted a one-size-fits-all standard of review for “municipal[] land use decisions” when it passed section 10-9-1001. This statute states, “The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.” Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1999).
¶ 45 The supreme court took this broad language at face value in Springville Citizens, in not questioning whether the Legislature may have intended two different standards of review to arise from that single standard.2 The supreme court did not distinguish between city councils’ administrative *332and legislative functions in Spi'ingville Citizens. Instead, the court accepted the Legislature’s plain language without reservation, making the sweeping statement that “[a] municipality’s land use decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported by substantial evidence.” Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332.3
¶ 46 Regardless, then, of our own views of the policy difficulties suggested by this statement and our affection for past case law, our only recourse as a lower appellate court is to state and apply the law as most recently declared by our supreme court. The statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999), followed by the supreme court’s definitive interpretation of that statute in Springville Citizens, now supersedes any prior law recognizing a difference in the standards of review for city councils’ administrative versus legislative actions.
2. PUD Approval Versus Rezoning
¶ 47 The majority opinion makes much of its assertion that Springville Citizens involved the approval of a PUD “rather than the reclassification of the zoning district.” The majority regards the approval of a PUD to be administrative, while acknowledging that rezoning is a classic legislative activity. I have a few responses to this viewpoint.
¶48 First, without even considering further facts from Springville Citizens, my research reveals that PUD approval alone is widely regarded to be a legislative function. See, e.g., Stokes v. City of Mishawaka, 441 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (deeming legislative city council’s decision to approve application to zone land for PUD); State ex rel. Helujon, Ltd. v. Jefferson County, 964 S.W.2d 531, 535-36 (Mo.Ct.App.1998) (stating approval of PUD classification is legislative zoning decision); Todd Mart, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Webster, 49 A.D.2d 12, 370 N.Y.S.2d 683, 689 (N.Y.App.Div.1975) (noting “[a] majority of ... jurisdictions [considering this question] hold that the secondary determination, whether to approve a particular planned unit development district, is a legislative function exercised by the local zoning authority”); Harrison v. City of Kettering, No. 12728, 1991 WL 208408, at *2, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4911, at ⅜4 (Oct. 8,1991) (“Approval of a PUD plan is a legislative activity.”); Lutz v. City of Longview, 83 Wash.2d 566, 520 P.2d 1374, 1376 (1974) (stating, in analyzing legal effect of approving PUD for certain parcel of land, “[t]he authorities are clear that such a change in permitted uses is a rezone or amendment of the zoning ordi-nanee[;] ‘[t]he end product is, of course, an amendment to the zoning ordinance which reclassifies the land in question’ ” (citation omitted)). But see South Creek Assocs. v. Bixby & Assocs., Inc., 781 P.2d 1027, 1032 n. 8 (Colo. 1989) (“Although the enactment of a PUD enabling ordinance is a legislative function, the process of reviewing a particular PUD plan for approval is ‘administrative or adjudicative in nature’.... ” (Citation omitted.)).
¶49 However, even assuming the distinction between a PUD approval and a garden variety rezoning was implicitly important to the supreme court in setting forth the substantial evidence standard of review, if we dig deeper into the fact scenario underlying Spnngville Citizens, we see a city council decision that has all the characteristics of a legislative decision, not an administrative one. Approval of the PUD resulted in an ordinance amending the zoning map — the land at issue was rezoned to a classification that would accommodate the PUD. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶¶ 2, 10, 979 P.2d 332; 2 Kenneth H. Young, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 11.11, at 461 n. 14 (4th ed.1996) (noting “[z]oning ordinance which reclassified land *333... to planned development is a legislative act”); see, e.g., Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido, 15 Cal.App.4th 892, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 344, 355 (1993) (“It is the settled law of this state ‘that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative acts.’ ”); Fondren N. Renaissance v. Mayor and City Council of Jackson, 749 So.2d 974, 977 (Miss.1999) (reviewing as legislative city council’s decision to approve specific tract for PUD).
¶ 50 Obviously, this is all unpersuasive to my colleagues. Their opinion seems so invested in the policy considerations flowing from the labeling of the city council’s decision as administrative, instead of legislative, that it will not allow the law or the facts of Springville Citizens to interfere. Although the majority opinion concedes that “some authorities ... conclude that PUD approval is a legislative act,” it further observes “that those authorities ... went on to apply the highly deferential fairly debatable review appropriate to legislative acts.” However, assuming for a moment that no Utah case, including Springville Citizens, tells us whether Utah law considers PUD approvals legislative, it is inescapable that the majority of authorities do. That those same authorities go “on to apply the highly deferential fairly debatable review” is entirely inconsequential because our supreme court did not. It applied the substantial evidence standard, regardless of whether one makes the argument the decision reviewed was administrative or legislative.
¶ 51 Aside from that, I believe that Springville Citizens is good precedent for the proposition that Utah does recognize PUD approvals (at least those involving an amendment to the zoning map) as legislative. The citizens group in Springville Citizens had wanted to appeal the city council’s decision approving the PUD to a board of adjustment under Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9-703 and 10-9-704(l)(a) (1999). See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, No. 960400547, slip op. at 16-17 (Dist.Ct.Utah Sept. 5, 1997). However, the city disagreed, “asserting that the board of adjustment is not empowered to hear appeals from zoning decisions made by the city council.” Id. at 17. The district court concurred with the city:
In this case the city council approved an ordinance amending the city zoning map. That is a legislative action by a legislative body — the city council — as to which the board of adjustment has no appellate jurisdiction. I am persuaded that plaintiffs did not have a right to appeal to the board of adjustment from what they considered an adverse decision by the city council.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
¶ 52 When the citizens group appealed this decision to the supreme court, along with the other issues in Springville Citizens, the supreme court stated:
As to section. 10-9-703, the district court simply concluded that plaintiffs could not appeal the overall approval of the P.U.D. to the board of adjustments; this, however, overlooked the nature of plaintiffs’ claims under that section, namely, that certain City actions apart from the final P.U.D. approval were appealable to the board of adjustments, i.e., the City’s issuance of building permit 03675 and the recording of Plat 4.
Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 32, 979 P.2d 332 (emphasis added). Thus, the supreme court agreed with the district court that final PUD approval was not an administrative council action appealable to a board of adjustment. In this Utah case, the supreme court sanctioned the district court’s ruling that the final PUD approval was legislative.
¶53 Finally, to support the assertedly meaningful distinction that Springville Citizens involved the approval of a PUD “rather than the reclassification of the zoning district,” the majority opinion focuses on the portion of the property zoned H-l, which permitted PUD development but not subdivision development. The main opinion states, “The developer thus did not require a new zoning classification but rather required approval for a proposed PUD under the existing zoning classification.” This patently ignores the facts of Springville Citizens.
¶ 54 Before the PUD approval, the bulk of the land at issue had been primarily zoned RA-1-20,000, a residential agricultural zone, *334“permitting homes on lots having a minimum of 20,000 square feet.” Springville Citizens, No. 960400547, slip op. at 3. The small remainder of the parcel was zoned H-l, which only allows the use of “single family homes located in a PUD.” Id. at 3. Mischaracteriz-ing the facts, the majority opinion implies that the whole parcel was zoned to accommodate PUDs — which the majority opinion takes to mean that the zoning ordinance passed by the Springville City Council did not rezone the property.
¶ 55 Unless the only part of the property being used for the PUD was the small remainder of the parcel zoned H-l, the Spring-ville ordinance amending the zoning map necessarily effected a rezoning. After all, the residential agricultural zone did not include PUDs. Although Springville Citizens does not explicitly state which portion of the property was to be used for the PUD, I believe that the area zoned residential agricultural was at least partially rezoned to allow the PUD. I infer this from the fact that the residential agricultural zone required lot sizes to be a minimum of 20,000 square feet. And, one of the conditions that the city council had placed on its final approval of the PUD application was to “allow[ ] four of the lots to have less than 20,000 square feet but not less than 17,000 square feet.” Spring-ville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 9, 979 P.2d 332. Thus, it seems that at least four of the lots were to be drawn from the larger residential agricultural area.4
¶ 56 I am therefore unpersuaded by the majority’s assertion that categorizing the city council’s action as a PUD approval, as opposed to a rezoning, is a meaningful distinction between Springville Citizens and the instant case.
3. Review of Procedural Defects
¶ 57 I disagree that Springville Citizens was purely a review of procedural defects regarding the city council’s adherence to procedures mandated by city ordinances. To the contrary, immediately following the supreme court’s enunciation of the substantial evidence criterion for reviewing a municipality’s land use decision, the court proceeded in paragraph twenty-five to substantively review the facts in the record to determine whether the city council’s decision to approve the PUD application was arbitrary and capricious under section 10-9-1001, using the substantial evidence standard. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999); Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶¶ 24-25, 979 P.2d 332. After that paragraph, the opinion turned to a separate examination of whether the city council’s decision was illegal under section 10-9-1001, at which point the court reviewed the procedural irregularities in the approval process involving the city council’s noncompliance with, city ordinances. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1999); Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶¶ 26-30, 979 P.2d 332. I therefore see in this point no useful tool for differentiating Springville Citizens from our case.
¶ 58 Based on the above discussion, I believe Springville Citizens is directly on point with the instant case. With this precedent in place, I have no choice but to agree with Harmons that the arbitrary and capricious standard requires a review of the record for substantial evidence supporting the city council’s denial of Harmons’s rezoning application. In my view, the trial court incorrectly reviewed the record under a reasonably debatable criterion.
B. Substantial Evidence Review of Record
¶ 59 Having established my position that the substantial evidence standard should be applied in reviewing the Draper City Coun*335cil’s decision, I now analyze the record in this case to determine whether the city council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious under the substantial evidence standard.
¶ 60 Using the substantial evidence standard, I will “review the evidence in the record to ensure that the City proceeded within the limits of fairness and acted in good faith.” Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332. I also must decide if, in view of all the evidence before the city council, reasonable minds could arrive at the same conclusion as the city council did. See id. at 336— 37; Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct.App.1995). Still, I will not weigh the evidence afresh or insert my judgment in place of the municipality’s. See Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25, ¶24, 979 P.2d 332; Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604. Substantial evidence is “ ‘more than a mere “scintilla” of evidence ... though “something less than the weight of the evidence.” ’ ” Patterson, 893 P.2d at 604 n. 6 (citations omitted).
¶ 61 To begin my review, I again recite the city council’s reasons for its decision: (1) “concern about a 71,700 square foot, 24-hour store being considered because it is not in harmony with the Neighborhood Commercial useage [sic] of the area”; (2) “the size and the shape of the property is not suited for a complex of the size proposed”; (3) “the increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved”; and (4) because “on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial has been approved ..., if the Council designates [the property] for C-2 commercial development, too many things are allowed in a C-2 zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods.”
¶ 62 I now review the evidence in the record supporting each of these four reasons. First, I address the council’s fear that a grocery store of the size and hours proposed would not fit a neighborhood commercial use. (The development was planned to be about 100,000 square feet of building space on 10.277 acres.) The record evidence overwhelmingly suggests just the opposite of the council’s fear: The planning commission stated in its January 2, 1998 staff report that “the proposed uses, if appropriately designed for the site, are consistent with the purpose of the proposed zoning.”5 The certified appraiser’s report quotes an appraising treatise stating that a grocery store fits the definition of neighborhood commercial. The planning commission cited industry standard criteria for neighborhood commercial usage showed an expectation that such a usage would involve about 30,000-100,000 square feet per 5-7 acres, while community commercial runs about 100,000-300,000 square feet per 10-30 acres. Thus, the planning commission noted that this development is toward the top of neighborhood commercial and the very bottom of community commercial. The planning commission staff report, dated January 30, 1998, also quoted the Urban Land Institute’s Shopping Center Development Handbook as stating, “In neighborhood shopping centers the supermarket is the key,” and, “The Supermarket is the anchor tenant in traditional neighborhood centers.”
¶ 63 The sole contrary evidence in the record came from citizen Kent Cram who read the definition of mixed use areas into the record at a January 8, 1998 planning commission meeting, concentrating on the language that mixed uses “promote day and evening use.” He stated his opinion that the reference to day and evening use excludes “24-hour-a-day use.” He further remarked, “[A]lthough this area may be appropriate for commercial, a smaller scale use would respect the neighborhood character, and a 71,700-square-foot store. ... is not ‘small scale.’” Planning commission staff immediately replied, “[T]his development fits within ‘smaller scale,’ because it will not be a huge center that will attract regional traffic.” I would conclude that the unsupported *336opinion of a lone citizen with no known experience or training in these areas should hardly persuade a reasonable mind to choose that opinion over the extensive evidence from professional sources on the neighborhood commercial nature of this type of proposed development. Cf Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 712 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (stating, in conditional use permit case using substantial evidence review under arbitrary and capricious standard, that “ ‘[cjitizen opposition is a consideration which must be weighed, but cannot be the sole basis for the decision to deny’” and local government entity “ ‘must rely on facts, and not mere emotion or local opinion’ ” (citations omitted)).
¶ 64 I next review the city council’s concern that “the size and shape of the property is not suited for a complex of the size proposed.” Again, the evidence most vehemently leads to the opposite conclusion. The planning commission staff report of January 2, 1998 states, “The property, with the proposed conditions of approval, will be able to accommodate the proposed uses, if designed appropriately.”6 Further, the January 30, 1998 staff report quotes page forty-two of the Shopping Center Development Handbook which recommends that
[a]s a rule of thumb for checking the adequacy of site area for a shopping center, one can figure roughly 10,000 square feet of building area and 30,000 square feet of parking area for each 40,000 square feet (about one acre) of site area. For example a site of 10 acres for conventional shopping center development will readily accommodate 100,000 square feet of building area in the center.
The staff report thus made the following conclusion about the adequacy of the site area: “The proposed site is 10.27 acres in size and the gross leasable area (GLA) is 101,500 square feet. At a ratio of 1,000 square feet per acre, the square footage of the proposed structures appears to be in line with the size of the property.”
¶ 65 Meanwhile, the sole evidence suggesting otherwise was again Mr. Cram’s opinion. He stated at the January 8, 1998 planning commission meeting that “the size and shape of this property is not suited for a complex of this size.” While Mr. Cram is certainly entitled to his opinion, as I have stated, such an unsubstantiated assertion from a citizen with no known experience or training in this field cannot hold up to the learned conclusion of the planning commission, based on a professional treatise. See id. I would therefore hold that, based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable mind would not have endorsed Mr. Cram’s opinion over that of the planning commission.
¶ 66 I now visit the third reason given by the city council: “the increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved.” Mr. Cram is also the one who raised these potential trouble areas.7 Regarding traffic problems, he said
he has been advised the children living in Camden Park will be attending school at Sprucewood Elementary, which is located at approximately 1000 East and 12000 South. Children from Camden Park will have to cross 700 East to get to school, and parents are very concerned their safety will be compromised because of the increased traffic. In addition, residents feel accessing their subdivision will be more difficult because of the increased traffic.
Again, Mr. Cram did not corroborate his opinion — e.g., with evidence from school administrators or police traffic officers about the possibility that school children could be placed in jeopardy by the increase in traffic caused by the development. Further, Mr. Cram presented no traffic studies or evidence from police traffic officers or other experts showing how subdivision residents could perhaps be harmed by the increased traffic.
*337¶ 67 In contrast, the record is replete with evidence showing the increased traffic from the development would not substantially affect the area. For instance, Harmons commissioned a traffic study of the intersection at issue by transportation consultants Fehr & Peers Associates. The Fehr & Peers report concluded that forty-five percent of the traffic would be “pass-by trips”8 that would not “affect traffic volumes at the access locations.” The report further states that “[t]he intersection currently operates efficiently and will continue to operate effectively with the proposed development.” At the planning-commission meeting, planners noted that 11400 South has been “master planned for several years to be [a] 106-foot right[]-of-way (five lanes, two in each direction with a turning lane).” Thus, the evidence showed that the area was designated to be high traffic. In its January 30, 1998 staff report, the planning commission again quoted the Shopping Center Development Handbook which discusses typical types of access for each type of commercial development. The Handbook states that “[n]eighborhood centers are located for access from collector streets. The location must avoid having minor residential service streets as its principal access for automobile traffic.” The planning commission thus determined that “[t]he location of the project on 11400 South and 700 East, both streets designed to be major collectors, lends the site to a neighborhood or community commercial type development.”
¶ 68 Regarding potential child and family safety issues, according to the record, the only source for the city council’s concern was again Mr. Cram who stated at the January 8, 1998 planning commission meeting that “not only will a complex of this type encourage teen-age loitering and vandalism, but it will bring crime into the area as well.” The following excerpt from the meeting’s minutes shows Mr. Cram’s effort to back up his opinion:
To support his position, Mr. Cram gave the Commissioners a copy of a newspaper article which appeared in the Deseret News stating violent activities done by members of the Straight Edge movement are occurring, among other places, in shopping center parking lots. Mr. Cram then passed out a report obtained from the Roy City Police Department detailing the crimes that have taken place at the Roy City Harmons during 1997. He said there was a total of 259 crimes reported, with the most serious being a kidnaping and rape.
The record contains no other evidence about family safety or likelihood of increased crime in the area because of the development. Mr. Cram did not present information from the local police department about the activity level of Straight Edgers in the area, nor did he present information about crimes reported at grocery stores in the same county as Draper, let alone grocery stores in the same city. I am not convinced that a reasonable mind would accept these vague and distant reports as persuasive evidence of crime and safety issues that might occur at the particular site should it be developed as proposed.
¶ 69 Based on the above discussion, I would conclude that there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the city council’s reasoning that “increased traffic, child and family safety issues which have been raised have not been sufficiently resolved.”
¶ 70 Finally, I address the city council’s concern that “on the east side of the street smaller scale commercial has been approved and, if the Council designates [the property] for C-2 commercial development, too many things are allowed in a C-2 zone that are not compatible with residential neighborhoods.” I have scoured the record for evidence about this matter, but found not one shred of information to review. Consequently, I must conclude that the record would not support reasonable minds in relying on this reason.
¶ 71 Based on my review of the record regarding each reason the city council gave for its denial of Harmons’s rezoning request, I would conclude the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. I would thus conclude the city council’s decision was arbitrary and capricious under Utah Code Ann. § 10 — 9—1001(3)(b) (1999).
*338CONCLUSION
¶72 I would hold that the arbitrary and capricious standard under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(b) (1999) requires a review of the record for substantial evidence. I believe the trial court was thus incorrect in enunciating and applying the reasonably debatable criterion to the city council’s decision. Based on the undisputed facts in the record, I would further conclude that the council’s decision is not sustained by substantial evidence in the record. Because the decision would therefore be arbitrary and capricious, I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for Draper and remand for further proceedings consistent with this dissent.

. Although the policy argument that administrative decisions should be reviewed under a higher standard than legislative decisions makes good sense, it is also difficult to argue that the Legislature meant to encompass two different standards — substantial evidence for administrative decisions and fairly debatable for legislative decisions — by using the single term “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court went so far as to say: “ 'Fairly debatable’ is the antithesis of arbitrary and capricious. If a decision could be considered fairly debatable then it could not be considered arbitrary or capricious.” Fondren N. Renaissance v. Mayor and City Council of Jackson, 749 So.2d 974, 977-78 (Miss.1999).

. The majority opinion supports its analysis with the observation that the supreme court cited Patterson v. Utah County Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct.App.1995), a case involving the review of an administrative decision, in setting forth the substantial evidence standard in Springville Citizens. However, I do not see that as a basis for distinguishing Springville Citizens from the case at issue. After all, if — as I believe — Springville Citizens stands for the proposition that both administrative and legislative decisions are to be reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, it does not matter from which kind of case the enunciation of the substantial evidence standard is cited.

. Even if the entire parcel had been zoned H-l, which would allow a PUD, authority exists stating that the city council’s passage of an ordinance amending the zoning map and approving the PUD would still be legislative. See, e.g., Native Sun/Lyon Communities v. City of Escondido, 15 Cal.App.4th 892, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 344, 355 (1993) (stating "'zoning ordinances, whatever the size of the parcel affected, are legislative acts’ ” (citation omitted)); Gray v. Trustees, Monclova Township, 38 Ohio St.2d 310, 313 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1974) ("[T]he action of the board [of township trustees] in approving [a PUD] plat is the functional equivalent of traditional legislative zoning, even though the entire PUD area is covered by the same ‘nominal’ zoning classification both before and after approval of the plat.’’).

. The staff report says, "if appropriately designed for the site.” This does not suggest that, once the rezoning occurred, Harmons could at its discretion either appropriately or inappropriately design its development to fit the site. If the rezoning had been approved, Harmons would still have had to jump through the hoops required by the conditional use permit and site plan approval processes. Presumably, at those critical points, the planning commission would ensure that the development was appropriately designed.

. Here, the planning commission staff refers to the conditions it planned to put on the conditional use permit.

. Two other citizens stated for the record that they believed the proposed Harmons development would increase traffic in the area. However, these two citizens did not voice any negative inferences regarding their perceptions that traffic would increase.

. The Fehr & Peers study defines "pass-by trips” as “vehicles that are already in the area, but are attracted from adjacent streets to the site due to the type of development.”