Court Opinion

ID: 9613330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:16:10.246656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:28.066310
License: Public Domain

BERMAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority opinion in all respects except as to that portion of part III dealing with the 1969 assessment of taxes. In my view the 1969 assessment was properly made pursuant to the law.
The trial court correctly relied upon § 39-22-601(6)(c), C.R.S.1973, in determining that the statute of limitations to make an assessment for the 1969 taxes did not expire until February 25,1976. The majority, however, insists that this section is not an exception to § 39-21-107(2). To arrive at this conclusion they overlook or ignore fundamental canons of statutory interpretation.
Section 39-22-601(6), C.R.S.1973, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any final determination of federal income made pursuant to the provisions of federal law under which federal taxable income is found to differ from the taxable income originally reported to the federal government shall be reported by the taxpayer to the executive director [of the Colorado Department of Revenue] within thirty days of such final determination with a statement of the reasons for the difference, in such detail as the executive director may require.

(c) If, from such report or return or from investigation, it appears that the tax with respect to income imposed by this article has not been fully assessed, the executive director shall, within one year after the receipt of such report ... assess the deficiency with interest prescribed in section 39-22-621. (emphasis added)
Section 39-21-107(2), C.R.S.1973, upon which the majority relies as a “general statute of limitations” provides in pertinent part:
In the case of income tax imposed by article 22 of this title, ... the assessment of tax, penalties, and interest shall be made within one year after the expiration of the time provided for assessing a deficiency in federal income tax ....
It is fundamental that the meaning of any one section of a statute must be gathered from a consideration of the entire legislative scheme, State Hwy. Comm’n v. Haase, 189 Colo. 69, 537 P.2d 300 (1975), and that two statutes concerning the same subject matter must be read together, People in Interest of M. K. A., 182 Colo. 172, 511 P.2d 477 (1973). Another fundamental rule of construction is to give effect to every word of an enactment if possible. Johnston v. City Council, 177 Colo. 223, 493 P.2d 651 *1307(1972). In other words, courts should not presume that the general assembly used language in a statute idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language. Blue River Defense Comm. v. Town of Silverthorne, 33 Colo.App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973).
The majority’s interpretation of its so-called “general statute of limitations” reads out of existence the underlined portions of the phrase “the executive director shall, within one year after the receipt of such report .... ” It also does violence to § 2-4—205, C.R.S.1973, which provides:
If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, it shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail.
I also disagree with the majority’s statement that § 39-21-107(2), C.R.S.1973, “merely allows the director to assess a deficiency only to the extent of the information contained in the RAR.” It creates a limitation on § 39-21-107(2) for which there is no justification and it ignores the 1977 amendment which added subsection (6)(g) which seemingly permits the very thing the majority contends is in the section before the 1977 amendment. See Session Laws 1977, p. 1799 § 1 (now contained in the 1980 Cum.Supp.). Indeed, a literal reading of subsection (6)(c) reveals just the contrary of the majority’s statement. It seems clear that if it appears “from such report or from investigation ” the tax has not been paid, the executive director shall assess the deficiency.
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm this judgment of the trial court in its entirety.