Court Opinion

ID: 9907571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 18:03:00.787353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:00.541695
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/6/23 ACR Services v. LSM Group CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 ACR SERVICES, INC.,                                                  D082256

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. CIVRS1303806 )

 LSM GROUP, INC.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, John M. Tomberlin, Judge. Affirmed.
         Clapp Moroney Vucinich Beeman & Scheley, Adrianne C. Duncan,
Austin R. Wallick, and Christopher J. Beeman, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Law Office of Thomas W. Sardoni, Thomas W. Sardoni, Daniel L.
Schnebly, and Nathan T. W. Sardoni, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
         ACR Services, Inc. (ACR) provided emergency services and materials in
response to a water leak at a restaurant operated by LSM Group, Inc. (LSM).
However, LSM refused to pay ACR for its services. ACR therefore sued LSM
for breach of contract, quantum meruit, a common count (work, labor,
services, and materials), and unjust enrichment.
      The dispute proceeded to a bench trial on the first three causes of
action, and the trial court found in favor of ACR in the amount of $104,647.01
plus prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees. LSM appeals, contending
that the trial court erred in finding a valid contract between the parties. In
addition, LSM argues the two-year statute of limitation for equitable claims
not based on a written contract had expired. As such, LSM maintains the
trial court erred in finding in favor of ACR and awarding it any damages.
      We disagree with LSM’s contentions; thus, we affirm the judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                                Trial Evidence1
      In 2009, LSM operated a pizza restaurant, Pizza Di Mario, located on
Haven Avenue in Rancho Cucamonga. Pizza Di Mario operated in a
commercial building, and it shared a wall with a karate studio that operated
out of the suite next door. At that time, Lynnette Samson was the principal
owner of LSM. On February 15, 2009, the Rancho Cucamonga Fire
Department called Samson to inform her that it was responding to a water
leak at Pizza Di Mario. The water leak emanated from a loose water hose

connected to an ice machine in that restaurant.2

1     We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. (See
Sacramento Sikh Society Bradshaw Temple v. Tatla (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
1224, 1227.)

2     Although a water leak caused by a loose water hose to an ice maker
may sound minor, the damage caused here was anything but. Despite not
being thoroughly explained in the briefs, the loose water hose apparently
allowed water to spill across Pizza Di Mario and overwhelm the floor drains,
which backed up, causing the entire property to flood. Some of that water
was contaminated with harmful bacteria.

                                       2
      When Samson arrived at Pizza Di Mario on February 15, a crew from
the fire department was there, “cleaning up [and] draining the floors.”
Samson stated that the fire chief told her “to clean up, sanitize the pizza and
he’ll come back in the evening to inspect.” Samson and another employee
cleaned Pizza Di Mario the rest of the day and met with a representative of
the fire department that evening. According to Samson, the representative
told her that she just needed “to contact the health department and [she]
[could] actually open right there.” However, Samson did not open the
restaurant that evening. Instead, she decided to open it the next day.
      ACR is a licensed contractor providing emergency water, sewage, and
fire remediation for commercial and residential real properties. Brandt

Benson3 is the chief executive officer of ACR. On February 16, 2009, Knicko
Askari called Brandt requesting that ACR come to Pizza Di Mario because
the property had suffered “sewage damage” and “had been red tagged by the
fire department.” Askari had been contacted by the property manager and
served as “a project coordinator.”
      When Brandt arrived at Pizza Di Mario, he reviewed a closure order for
the business issued by the Rancho Cucamonga Fire Department. The closure
order called for sanitizing all surfaces, discarding any exposed food packaging
that was unsealed, obtaining San Bernardino Health Department approval,
clearing floor drains, and removing water from floor areas. All five of these
tasks were required to be completed before the business could reopen.
      Brandt could smell the sewage when he entered Pizza Di Mario. There,
he approached Samson, who had arrived at the property. He told her that
“based on where everything ha[d] gotten wet, . . . the karate studio was

3    Because Brandt Benson’s brother Michael testified at trial, we refer to
Brandt and Michael by their respective first names.
                                       3
affected as well, . . . [and] the walls around the perimeter were being affected
by sewage.” Brandt further informed Samson that he needed “to look at all
the property, then come back and have a quick conversation . . . about what
needs to be happening.”
      After further inspecting the property, Brandt told Samson that a
certified hygienist was required to determine whether the water was
contaminated, which would impact the scope of the cleanup of the property.
In addition, Brandt informed Samson that they needed to talk with the
insurance adjuster. Despite the need for additional information regarding
the scope of the necessary work, Brandt and Samson signed a written

Emergency Services Agreement (ESA).4 The ESA listed the address of Pizza

Di Mario and referenced Askari as the project coordinator.5 According to
Brandt, the ESA “has basic rates and so forth that are established in the
service call, right down to the equipment.” However, Brandt admitted that
several sections of the ESA were not filled out. Brandt explained that the
sections were left blank because, at the time it was executed, the project was
“going day by day. It was a time and materials job once it was established
with the adjuster and the hygienist.”
      The ESA also included an attachment, which contained rates (e.g.,
service call $158.91, labor $56.75) that were based on rates from Xactimate, a
billing software commonly used by insurance companies. Further, Brandt

4     The ESA was an exhibit at trial. However, the trial exhibits are not
part of the record. Although this case concerns the validity of the ESA,
surprisingly, neither party cites directly to it in any of the briefs. In other
words, the parties have not indicated where the ESA exists in the record.

5    The owner of the karate studio also signed an emergency services
agreement.
                                        4
informed Samson that billing for the project would “be produced
on . . . Xactimate.”
      On the day the ESA was executed, Brandt also told Samson that, “on
the first day,” “all we’re going to do is treat the areas, disinfect them, put
some equipment to stabilize the air, and . . . extract what we can as far as the
free water or free sewage that’s floating around the property.”
      Brandt also discussed with Samson the need to clean up the
neighboring karate studio that had been damaged by the water leak at Pizza
Di Mario. And he informed her that they would meet with the hygienist and
insurance adjuster the following day.
      According to Brandt, the hygienist’s report would determine the scope
of the work. As such, he told Samson:
            “[W]e needed to have a certified hygienist to be able to do
            testing to determine what the damages are, then the scope
            or the protocol he would establish to tell us as the
            emergency service company what we will be removing, how
            we are cleaning, to get to a clearance so that we can get this
            ready for San Bernardino County Health Department to
            give us a final go ahead. You can reopen the food
            establishment. You can reopen the dojo, whatever, so
            people won’t get affected or get hurt by the contaminants
            that were left.”

      After Brandt and Samson discussed and executed the ESA, Brandt
contacted ACR’s office to have a crew come to the property. In addition,
Brandt reached out to three hygienist companies, and one such hygienist,
Robert Menald (president of Titan Environmental, Incorporated (Titan)),
provided a preliminary protocol over the phone so ACR could start the
cleanup. Thus, ACR extracted floors, disinfected, and set up
dehumidification and air scrubbing to “stabilize the air” as well as the
building.

                                          5
      The next day, on the morning of February 17, 2009, Brandt and
Samson met at Pizza Di Mario along with Terri Warde (the insurance
adjuster), the property manager, and Menald. The group discussed the
amount of damages and affected areas at the property as well as what would
be required to properly remediate the property after Menald provided a
laboratory report evaluating the water. As such, the scope of the work ACR
was to perform was deliberated, and Brandt claimed that he followed the
proposed scope. Further, it was agreed that Menald would go forward with
the testing and return with a protocol to remediate the property so that the
health department would allow it to reopen.
      Titan prepared a report based on samples of the water at Pizza Di
Mario and the karate studio. The report indicated that the property suffered
a “Category 3 water loss,” which means the water contained certain bacteria,
like coliform, E. coli, and Enterococci, and sat for over 48 hours. Although
the report was dated February 23, 2009, Menald verbally communicated the

suggested protocol to Brandt, Samson, and Warde on February 17, 2009.6 In
addition, Menald indicated that he met with Samson and she (along with the
insurance adjuster) authorized Titan’s testing of the property.
      ACR completed its work on February 27, 2009. Because it was retained
only to perform the remediation and cleanup of the property, ACR did not
rebuild any portion of it. The health department provided clearance for the

6      The protocol involved removing any porous or semiporous materials,
cleaning the area, vacuuming the area, wiping the area with antimicrobial
and antibacterial wet wipes, utilizing solvent type cleaners, and drying all
the wet substrates. In performing the remediation work, the crew would
continue until it reached a clean area, which would indicate no further water
stain, fungal growth, bacteria, or moisture. Additionally, the workers at the
site were required to wear personal protective material, including gloves,
coveralls, and respiratory protection.
                                       6
property to reopen, which required remediation of both Pizza Di Mario and
the karate studio. Ultimately, ACR billed $44,892.22 for its work at Pizza Di
Mario and $33,696 for its work at the karate studio. In addition, as part of
the agreed work at the property, a subcontractor, Inland Tri Tech, performed
“the build back, restoration work after remediation was completed and
clearances were achieved.” Inland Tri Tech billed a total of $26,058.79, and
ACR paid Inland Tri Tech directly. Inland Tri Tech then assigned its claim
to ACR.
      Michael Benson, the chief financial officer of ACR, testified that ACR
sent invoices directly to the insurance carrier as the carrier instructed. This
arrangement allowed ACR to discuss with the insurance adjuster any issues
with the bill, make appropriate adjustments, and get the invoices processed
timely. Michael stated that he typically provided documentation to the
business owner. He further indicated that Samson never instructed him to
handle invoices differently.
      Michael explained, in instances where ACR is providing emergency
services, the company does not provide a bid. Rather, ACR indicates what
equipment is going to be needed, but it does not know, in the beginning, how
long a particular job will take. As such, ACR typically bills the insurance
company while documenting the services provided through labor logs,
material logs, and equipment logs. Also, ACR would provide pictures of the
site and the work performed.
      Michael stated that ACR never received any payment for the three
invoices related to the remediation project at Pizza Di Mario.
                               Statement of Decision
      After the conclusion of trial and further briefing from the parties, the
trial court issued a statement of decision. There, the court determined the

                                        7
evidence sufficient to establish “all the elements of an enforceable contract
were formed based on the parties’ written Emergency Services Agreement
and supplemental oral terms.” To support its finding, the court credited
Brandt’s testimony that he explained to Samson that Pizza Di Mario and the
karate studio would both need to be sanitized and a certified hygienist would
need to prepare the applicable protocol.
      The court also found credible Brandt’s testimony that Brandt informed
Samson that not all the terms of the ESA could be completed until the
hygienist performed environmental sampling and prepared the protocol. The
court further observed that Brandt and Samson conducted a walkthrough of
the property with Menald and Warde and that Brandt explained to Samson
that the total cost of ACR’s services would be determined by the scope of
necessary work set forth in the protocol as well as rates set by Xactimate.
      The court also found LSM was liable for the cost to cleanup and
remediate the karate studio. To this end, the court relied upon Brandt’s
testimony that he told Samson remediation would be required at the karate
studio, the flooding was caused by a loose water hose at Pizza Di Mario, and
the standard of care required cleanup of the entire affected area (which
included the karate studio).
      Additionally, the court determined that ACR’s claims for quantum
meruit and a common count were not barred by the two-year statute of
limitations because the evidence at trial established that “ACR provided
valuable emergency services and materials for LSM’s benefit, at LSM’s
request, in reliance on Ms. Samson’s signing of the February 16, 2009
Emergency Services Agreement.”

                                       8
      Finally, the court found that the assignment of rights between ACR

and Inland Tri Tech was valid and enforceable.7
                                  DISCUSSION
      Here, LSM raises three issues. First, it claims the trial court erred in
determining that a valid contract existed between ACR and LSM. Second,
LSM argues it was not a party to any contract between ACR and the karate
studio; thus, the trial court erred in awarding damages to ACR for LSM’s
failure to pay for services provided to the karate studio. Finally, LSM
contends the two year statute of limitations precludes ACR’s equitable
claims.

      A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

      Here, LSM implores us to apply a de novo standard of review to
address a “pure error of law.” To this end, it argues the issues before us “rely
entirely on the interpretation of statutes and case law.” Yet, we note that
LSM claims that no valid contract exists, and the trial court erred in finding
otherwise.
      Where the existence of a contract is at issue and the evidence is
conflicting or admits of more than one inference, it is for the trier of fact to
determine whether the contract actually existed. But whether the material
facts are certain or undisputed, the existence of a contract is a question for
the court to decide. (Robinson & Wilson, Inc. v. Stone (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d
396, 407 (Robinson & Wilson).) Below, the court considered conflicting
evidence, made findings of fact, and found a contract existed between ACR
and LSM. As to that issue, considering the record before us, we would review

7     Because LSM does not challenge this finding on appeal, we do not
discuss the evidence upon which the court relied to support its conclusion.
                                         9
the trial court’s factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.
(Cf. Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 364 (Foreman).) Under
this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to
support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the findings. (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 602, 613 (Gevorgian).)
      A single witness’s testimony may constitute substantial evidence to
support a finding. (Gevorgian, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 613.) It is not
our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess witness
credibility. (Foreman, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)
      However, LSM also claims that any contract between ACR and LSM is
not sufficiently definite to be enforceable. Therefore, it argues the ESA
lacked sufficient material terms to allow LSM to understand what it was
agreeing to. Whether a contract is sufficiently definite to be enforceable is a
question of law. (See Bustamante v. Intuit, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 199,
209; Hunter v. Sparling (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 711, 721.)
      In addition, as to other claims of error, we are reviewing a judgment
following a bench trial wherein the court issued a statement of decision.
Accordingly, we review questions of law de novo (Cuiellette v. City of Los
Angeles (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 757, 765) and apply a substantial evidence
standard of review to the trial court’s findings of fact (Foreman, supra, 144
Cal.App.4th at p. 364).

      B. Analysis

      Here, LSM argues the trial court erred in finding a valid contract
existed between the parties. Subsumed in this argument is LSM’s assertion
that the subject contract’s terms are too indefinite to be enforceable. And

                                       10
critical to LSM’s position here is its contention that the ESA is the complete
contract: “The single page that was signed by [Samson] constitutes the
entirety of any agreement between the parties.” Yet, that conclusion is belied
by the explicit findings of the trial court as set forth in the statement of
decision. Moreover, the court made specific factual findings that LSM largely
ignores. As we explain post, LSM’s singular focus on the ESA hinders its
ability to show error below.
      “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be correct on
appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133;
accord Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson); Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham) [“ ‘All intendments and
presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”].) “[T]he burden is on
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson, at p. 609; see Denham, at p. 564.) Additionally,
“[u]nder the doctrine of implied findings, the reviewing court must infer,
following a bench trial, that the trial court impliedly made every factual
finding necessary to support its decision.” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu
Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.)
      With LSM’s reliance on the ESA, we would expect that LSM would, at
the very least, cite to that agreement in the record and then review the terms
(or lack thereof) in detail to persuade us the parties did not enter into a valid
contract. This is especially true because the ESA was an exhibit at trial.
Nonetheless, LSM does not cite to the ESA. Instead, LSM refers to witness
testimony about the ESA’s terms. Although the testimony suggests that the

                                        11
ESA was a form agreement that contained a lot of blanks that were not filled
out at the time it was executed, we note there was testimony that the ESA
contained certain terms, such as the hourly rates of a service call, labor, and

trucks as well as the cost per day of certain equipment.8
      That said, we understand that Samson testified there were no
attachments to the ESA and the ESA itself did not provide for the scope of
ACR’s proposed work. But the trial court did not find this omission fatal to
ACR’s claim. Rather, it determined that an enforceable contract was formed
based on the ESA and “supplemental oral terms.” These supplemental oral
terms were described by Brandt at trial wherein he testified that he informed
Samson that some of the terms of the ESA could not be completed until the
hygienist performed environmental sampling and prepared a protocol, and
the scope of work would be determined based on that protocol, billed on rates
set by Xactimate. Brandt further told Samson what work would be conducted
on the first day (February 16), and Samson walked through the property with
Brandt, Menald, and Warde to assess the damages and discuss what needed
to be done to reopen Pizza Di Mario. Indeed, the statement of decision cited
to this evidence in finding a valid contract existed between ACR and LSM.
And a written contract may have its terms explained or supplemented by
“evidence of consistent additional terms” and/or “course of dealing or usage of

8     We have independently reviewed the record and found a document that
appears to be the ESA. It is part of several documents attached to a
declaration filed in support of LSM’s motion for summary judgment. But the
subject declaration simply refers to this collection of documents as “copies of
excerpts from [ACR’s] responses to [LSM’s] Request for Production, Set One.”
Although we cannot be sure that the document we found in reviewing the
record is the same ESA that the parties offered as an exhibit at trial, the
document appears to be consistent with the trial testimony describing the
ESA. Additionally, it is signed by Samson, authorizing ACR to “perform the
emergency services described in this document and its attachments.”
                                       12
trade or by course of performance.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1856,
subds. (b) & (c).) Therefore, we find no error simply based on the trial court’s
reliance on evidence showing that the parties agreed to additional terms

orally.9
      Additionally, LSM’s appeal here is undermined because it did not
address the evidence upon which the court relied. Instead, the statement of
facts in the opening brief primarily consist of Samson’s testimony and her
version of events (namely, she was not told anything about the scope of the
work to be performed at the property). LSM makes no mention of the
evidence on which the court relied to find a valid contract between the

parties.10

9     LSM does not advance any arguments that the ESA could not be
supplemented by oral agreement or course of dealing of the parties. For
example, it does not argue that the ESA contained an integration clause
indicating that the ESA was the complete and exclusive statement of the
terms of the agreement. (See Code. Civ. Proc., § 1856, subd. (b).) To the
contrary, Brandt testified at trial that the parties did not intend the ESA to
contain all the terms of the agreement between the parties. And LSM
concedes this point in the opening brief.

10    This is improper. An appellant’s opening brief “must . . . [p]rovide a
summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record” (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)) and must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in
the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where
the matter appears” (id. at rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81
Cal.App.4th 17, 29 [“It is axiomatic that an appellant must support all
statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the record . . . .”]). These
burdens placed on the appellant are logical in that it is not our role to scour
the record in search of the appellant’s arguments. (See In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; Howard v. American
National Fire Ins. Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 498, 534 [“It is not our place to
comb the record seeking support for assertions parties fail to substantiate”];

                                       13
      Further, to the extent LSM acknowledged ACR’s trial evidence, it
summarily dismissed it as lacking specifics and argued the trial court simply
ignored Samson’s testimony. In so arguing, LSM glosses over the trial court’s
role below, as the trier of fact, to determine the credibility of witnesses.
Clearly, the court did not find Samson credible as it disregarded most of her

testimony and agreed with Brandt.11 On appeal, we cannot reweigh the
evidence. (Foreman, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 365.)
      Simply put, we determine LSM has not carried its burden here to show
prejudicial error as to the court’s finding that a contract existed. It has not
discussed or addressed the proper standard of review. (See Ewald v.
Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [concluding the
failure to articulate the standard of review on appeal is potentially a fatal
omission].) LSM did not cite to or sufficiently analyze the terms of the
challenged contract. And LSM failed to adequately address the evidence on
which the court relied to find a valid contract.

City of Lomita v. City of Torrance (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1062, 1069 [“ ‘It is
neither practical nor appropriate for [a reviewing court] to comb the record on
[an appellant’s] behalf’ ”].)

11    Samson’s trial testimony painted a very different picture of what
occurred at the property. For example, Samson testified that when she
arrived at Pizza Di Mario on February 16, 2009, “many people [were] inside
with mask[s].” She described the scene as “[e]verything in shamble[s], all the
walls were cut up.” Regarding the execution of the ESA, she said that she
signed the agreement because people were “tearing up [her] place.” Samson
claimed that no one told her what was going on or what was required to
remediate Pizza Di Mario so it could reopen. However, on cross-examination,
Samson admitted that she had talked to Warde, the insurance adjuster,
about what was occurring at Pizza Di Mario and the karate studio. She
further admitted that she was provided a claim number by her insurance
company related to the water damage. Additionally, Samson acknowledged
that she believed her insurance adjuster was handling the claim for her.
                                        14
      Further, our analysis does not change if we consider Gateway Rehab
and Wellness Center, Inc. v. Aenta Health of California, Inc. (C.D. Cal.,
Apr. 10, 2013, No. SACV 13-0087-DOC (MLGx)) 2013 WL 1518240 as LSM
urges us to do. That case concerned a motion to dismiss in federal court
involving allegations of an implied contract. It is not analogous to the
situation before us.
      Similarly, we are not persuaded by LSM’s argument that the law does
not allow one party to a contract to unilaterally modify the terms with after
the fact notification to the other party. (See Badie v. Bank of America (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 779, 791.) The trial court did not find that ACR unilaterally
changed any terms. To the contrary, it concluded that the parties orally
discussed the scope of the contract and what needed to be done to remediate
and reopen Pizza Di Mario.
      Having concluded that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that a contract between ACR and LSM actually existed, we next turn
to LSM’s argument that the terms of that contract were too uncertain to be
enforced.
      “Under California law, a contract will be enforced if it is sufficiently
definite (and this is a question of law) for the court to ascertain the parties’
obligations and to determine whether those obligations have been performed
or breached.” (Ersa Grae Corp. v. Fluor Corp. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 613, 623.)
“To be enforceable, a promise must be definite enough that a court can
determine the scope of the duty[,] and the limits of performance must be
sufficiently defined to provide a rational basis for the assessment of
damages.” (Ladas v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761,
770; Robinson & Wilson, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 407.) “Where a contract
is so uncertain and indefinite that the intention of the parties in material

                                        15
particulars cannot be ascertained, the contract is void and unenforceable.”
(Cal. Lettuce Growers v. Union Sugar Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 474, 481; Civ.
Code, § 1598; see Ladas, at p. 770.) “The terms of a contract are reasonably
certain if they provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and
for giving an appropriate remedy.” (Rest.2d Contracts, § 33, subd. (2); accord,
Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) But
“[i]f . . . a supposed ‘contract’ does not provide a basis for determining what
obligations the parties have agreed to, and hence does not make possible a
determination of whether those agreed obligations have been breached, there
is no contract.” (Weddington, at p. 811.)
      Below, the trial court determined that the terms of the contract were
sufficiently certain to be enforced. Simply because we are reviewing that
conclusion de novo does not mean that we shall scour the record for LSM’s
benefit or that LSM is otherwise relieved of its responsibility to affirmatively
demonstrate error. (Cf. Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th
359, 372.) Here, once again, LSM has not carried its burden.
      “The cases make clear that the specificity required for an enforceable
contract depends on the circumstances.” (S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers
Bros. Parking-Western Corp., (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 173, 182; see, e.g.,
Coleman Engineering Co. v. North American Aviation, Inc. (1966) 65 Cal.2d
396, 405-406, 417 [finding contract enforceable despite the dissent’s assertion
that neither design specifications, price, nor time of performance had been
agreed on and the parties’ negotiations demonstrated that they deemed both
the specifications and price to be essential]; Bettancourt v. Gilroy Theatre Co.
(1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 364, 369 [finding a contract to build a “First class
Theatre” sufficiently definite and certain to create and impose a contractual
obligation because the expression “first class theatre” enabled the defendant

                                       16
“to know what it had undertaken to do”]; Mason v. Ennes (1959) 172
Cal.App.2d 99, 100-101 [concluding contract enforceable that involved the
construction of building 30 by 70 feet in which the materials were specified,
the building was to conform to the local building code requirements and could
accommodate a trucking business].) Often, courts must imply and interpret
to deal with ambiguities and omissions. (See Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 852.) “ ‘[T]he modern trend of the law favors
carrying out the parties’ intention through the enforcement of contracts and
disfavors holding them unenforceable because of uncertainty.’ [Citation.]”
(Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1065.)
      Here, ACR was brought in to handle an emergency situation— a leak
that had flooded Pizza Di Mario and the karate studio next door. Thus, ACR
moved quickly to remediate and clean the property. It is undisputed that the
ESA did not contain all the terms of the agreement between the parties.
Indeed, the final terms of the agreement were not known at the time that the
parties executed the ESA. Further, the objective of both ACR and LSM in
entering into a contract was to clean up and remediate the property so that
Pizza Di Mario could reopen.
      As Brandt explained to Samson, a protocol following a test of the water
was necessary to determine the scope of the required work. Moreover, the
court found that the terms of the ESA were supplemented based on the
evidence that Brandt told Samson what needed to be done, Samson was
involved in discussions regarding the scope of the work, Samson was
informed how the work would be billed, Samson approved Titan’s
environmental testing, and Samson was privy to and did not object to Titan’s
recommended protocol. Also, Samson was present at the property most of the

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days on which ACR was working, and she admitted that she took no action to

remove ACR during the 11 days its workers were cleaning the property.12
      Here, LSM does not address this evidence. Rather, it offers only its
narrative of events that Samson, as LSM’s principal, was uninformed about
the scope of the work at the property and received no invoices or change

orders related to the work at the property.13 LSM urges us only to consider a
single page of the ESA as the entire agreement of the parties. Yet, by
ignoring the evidence relied on by the trial court that Samson was both
informed about and involved in creating the scope of work necessary to
cleanup Pizza Di Mario, LSM has not carried its burden of showing the trial
court erred in concluding the contract was sufficiently certain so that it was
enforceable.
      Similarly, we are not persuaded by LSM’s argument that the court
erred in finding LSM was responsible for the costs of cleaning up the karate
studio. Specifically, LSM contends the emergency services agreement
between ACR and the karate studio cannot bind LSM because LSM is not a
signatory to that agreement and that contract has the same deficiencies as
the ESA. However, the court did not find LSM responsible to pay the costs to

12    However, Samson’s trial testimony was somewhat confusing on this
point. Although she admitted that she did not attempt to stop ACR from
performing work at the property, she nevertheless testified that she fired the
people working on her property at some point. Samson also stated that she
hired another contractor to repair the property, but she failed to provide any
details regarding the amount she paid the contractor. And she admitted that
the company she claimed to have hired did not perform any cleanup or
remediation services at Pizza Di Mario.

13    At trial, Samson did admit that her insurance adjuster provided her
with documentation that it had paid Titan in connection with the
remediation work.
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remediate the karate studio based on LSM being a party to the contract
between ACR and the karate studio. Rather, the court found LSM liable
because the karate studio was damaged by the leak at Pizza Di Mario.
      To this end, the court emphasized that when Samson executed the ESA
on behalf of LSM, Brandt explained to her that “based on the odor and visual
evidence of sewage throughout the property, and based on the fact that the
flooding which originated in Pizza Di Mario also extended to the karate
studio next door, the restaurant and karate studio would both need to be
sanitized and a certified hygienist would need to prepare a protocol for the
sanitation process.” Further, the court noted that LSM stipulated at trial
that “the flooding was caused by a loose rubber hose that came loose from the
ice machine in Pizza Di Mario.”
      In concluding that LSM was liable for the cleanup at the karate studio,
the court also credited the testimony of Menald, explicitly observing that he
testified that it was industry standard, for a remediation job like the one at
issue, to “continue removal until you get all removed, wet drywall, wet wall
materials. So [remediation is] continued until you receive clearance, and
clearance, you would have to remove and mitigate any materials that were
impacted by the loss.” Moreover, Menald stated this process would include
“[t]he entire affected area.”
      Additionally, the court found that “to adequately sanitize Pizza Di
Mario and obtain Health Department clearance to reopen as required by the
Rancho Cucamonga Fire Department’s closure order . . . , it was necessary to
remediate the contaminated materials at the karate studio with which the
restaurant shared a dividing wall.”
      LSM does not address these findings by the court or otherwise explain
why substantial evidence does not support the court’s conclusions. As such,

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we determine that LSM has not satisfied its burden as appellant on this
issue. (See Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608–609; Denham, supra, 2
Cal.3d. at p. 564.)
      LSM’s final argument here is that the two year statute of limitations
applies to ACR’s equitable claims because those claims are not based upon a
written contract. (See Code. Civ. Proc., § 339.) But that argument depends
on LSM successfully arguing that the trial court erred in finding ACR and
LSM entered into a valid contract. Because we were not persuaded by LSM’s
challenge to the validity of the ESA, its final contention regarding the
appropriate statute of limitations that applies to ACR’s equitable claims
necessarily fails.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. ACR is awarded its costs of appeal.

                                                       HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

KELETY, J.

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