Court Opinion

ID: 9427923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:15.560005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:10.567034
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stevens,
concurring in the result.
The federal claim asserted by respondent was that New York had deprived her of the right to practice her profession without the due process of law required by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The New York proceedings that ultimately determined that she had no such right as a matter of state law were not concluded until November 1975. Since her federal action was filed only seven months later, I believe it was timely, though for somewhat different reasons than those stated by the Court of Appeals.
*493Having relied on developments in the state-court litigation to defend the merits of respondent’s due process challenge,2 I would not permit the State simultaneously to contend that all aspects of the federal controversy had crystalized before respondent sought review in the state court system. Cf. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F. 2d 1311, 1319 (CA7 1975), modified, 545 F. 2d 565 (1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U. S. 932. As the Court notes, ante, at 491, a litigant is not required to exhaust state remedies before bringing a § 1983 action in federal court. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, 183. But I would not penalize a litigant who decides to bring suit in the state courts first; for such a decision gives the State an opportunity to correct, through construction of state law, a potential constitutional error, and may obviate entirely any need to present the claim to a federal court. It would also make no sense to me in terms of either federalism or judicial administration to require a litigant who files an action in state court to proceed simultaneously in federal court in order to avoid a time bar. I therefore disagree with the Court’s holding that respondent’s claim is barred by limitations.3
On the merits, however, I am not persuaded that New York’s licensing procedure is unfair. Examinations are a permissible method of determining qualifications, and lines must be drawn somewhere. The fact that respondent was just short of the passing mark does not raise any federal question. Indeed, respondent does not claim that the examination itself denied her due process. And I agree with Judge Lumbard, who dissented in the Court of Appeals, that the fact that *494New York has provided for a waiver in the discretion of the Board of Regents does not substantially change the State’s licensing procedure. Respondent was given an adequate opportunity to advise the Board of the reasons why she should receive a waiver and she ultimately received an adequate explanation for the refusal. She does not allege that others who have failed the examination have obtained a waiver, or, indeed, any facts suggesting any arbitrariness in the New York procedure.
In short, I find no merit in respondent’s constitutional challenge and would reverse for that reason.

 “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .” U. S. Const., Amdt. 14, § 1.

 Petitioners rely on the papers in the New York action as having provided respondent with an adequate statement of the reasons for the denial of a waiver. See Brief for Petitioners 4.

 Even if I agreed with the view that the federal claim was complete in November 1971 when respondent’s application for a waiver was denied, I would remand to the Court of Appeals to determine the state-law tolling issue rather than have this Court decide that state-law question in the first instance.