Court Opinion

ID: 9763898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:00:36.318085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:51.006526
License: Public Domain

WOODLEY, Judge
(dissenting).
The testimony of Ranger White quoted in the majority opinion remained a part of the evidence in this case solely because appellant declined to agree that it be withdrawn.
The only objection to the testimony was that it was immaterial and “had no place in this case.” That objection was not made until after the jury had heard the testimony which the majority conclude was obviously hurtful and not admissible for any purpose.
A search of the record fails to reveal that the trial court’s attention was directed to the claim that the testimony of Ranger White was prejudicial; was hurtful, or was injected into the record with the purpose in mind of obtaining the benefits of it and then withdrawing it. The sole complaint was that the testimony the jury had heard was not material.
Having reserved this objection, and having declined to agree that the evidence be withdrawn, appellant did nothing further in regard to the matter until after the jury had returned its verdict.
The sole complaint in the motion for new trial in regard to the testimony set out in the majority opinion was that the court erred in permitting the state to introduce it “over the objection of the defendant to the effect that such statements were immaterial to the issues in this case.”
The contention sustained by the majority is advanced for the first time on appeal.
Appellant made the statement to Ranger White about the rumor in Elgin in explanation of his failure to keep his promise to fully cooperate with the investigating officers and to come to the Department of Public Safety in Austin for that purpose. There is not the slightest suggestion that the state was contending that appellant killed his first wife. Ranger White had suggested that his failure to fully cooperate in checking the facts surrounding the death of the deceased would indicate to the investigating officers that he was guilty.
*27It is in the light of this testimony that the claimed error should be appraised.
The general rules of law which are recognized by appellant in his brief require a timely objection; a more specific objection than that the proffered testimony is immaterial; and require that the defendant seek to relieve himself of the effect of evidence that has been heard by the jury by requesting that it be withdrawn and the jury instructed to disregard it.
I cannot agree that the statement of appellant to Ranger White is such as to excuse the failure of appellant to comply with these rules.
In addition, this case comes clearly within the rule in Wall v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. R. 239, 240 S.W. 2d 763, which is that it was necessary that he move for mistrial rather than to speculate upon a favorable verdict.
Wall appealed from a verdict assessing the extreme punishment for murder. He complained that on his cross-examination he was questioned three times concerning prior term or terms served in the penitentiary. His objections were sustained and the questions were not answered, and he said no more.
On rehearing, in disposing of Wall’s complaint as to the disposition of this bill of exception, we found it fundamentally defective and said:
“For the appellant to here complain, it was incumbent upon him to ask the court to instruct the jury not to consider the the questions. This he failed to do.
“It was further incumbent upon appellant, if he thought the asking of the questions was such a serious error that an instruction to disregard would be ineffective, to then move the court to declare a mistrial. This he also failed to do.”
Unless the Wall case is to be overruled, the testimony of Ranger White is not ground for setting aside the jury’s verdict.
I respectfully dissent.