Court Opinion

ID: 9883408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:42:05.668874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:23.107200
License: Public Domain

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 45. {concurring). The majority opinion affirms the conviction of Jaime Romero for the manufacture, distribution or delivery of more than 40 grams of cocaine, party to the crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 961.41(lm)(cm)4. and 939.05 (2005-06).1 I agree with this conclusion.
¶ 46. I write separately for two reasons: (1) I conclude that the majority opinion could be read, mistakenly, as re-establishing a rigid two-prong test for evaluating the sufficiency of the allegations in a warrant affidavit, similar to the test employed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The United States Supreme Court set aside Aguilar in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 *43(1983), when Gates established the totality of the circumstances approach for assessing the sufficiency of the information provided to obtain a search warrant.2 (2) I conclude that the majority opinion could be read, mistakenly, as requiring a determination of the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, of a person who is not a known confidential informant, here Mr. X,3 rather than assessing the reliability of Mr. X's statements through a common sense interpretation of the record before the magistrate. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 47. This case turns on whether the search warrant issued for Romero's home was based on sufficient evidence to show that probable cause existed that evidence of wrongdoing would be found therein. The evidentiary record to support the search warrant consists of the affidavit of Officer Miguel Correa. His affidavit incorporates hearsay from a known confidential informant, which includes hearsay statements from Mr. X, who was not a confidential informant.4 Officer Correa also based his affidavit on observations of law *44enforcement that were present at the scene of what turned out to be a controlled buy of cocaine from Romero.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 48. We accord great deference to a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 469, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987). In so doing, we review as a matter of law whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that a search of Romero's residence would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d at 469.
B. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
1. General principles
¶ 49. An affidavit to support a search warrant may be based on hearsay. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). When reviewing the factual context to determine if probable cause to issue the search warrant existed, a court will sustain a magistrate's ruling "so long as the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for .. . concluding]' that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing." Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citing Jones, 362 U.S. at 271). "[T]he Fourth Amendment requires no more." Id.
¶ 50. In the 19 years immediately prior to Gates, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a "substantial *45basis" to support probable cause to issue a search warrant under a "two-prong test," established in Aguilar, for occasions when the affiant did not have personal knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit. Both prongs of the Aguilar test had to be satisfied before probable cause to issue a warrant was established. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15. The two prongs of Aguilar are: (1) the basis of the information prong, which was explained as the factual circumstances that showed the basis for the knowledge of the informant; and (2) the veracity of the information prong, which was explained as a showing of the underlying circumstances that led the affiant to believe either that the "informant. . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'" Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
¶ 51. The veracity of the information prong of the Aguilar test did not require two determinations — one for the credibility (sometimes referred to as the veracity) of the informant and one for the reliability of his information. Rather, it could be satisfied by determining "either the inherent credibility of the informant [i.e., his truthfulness,] or the reliability of his information on this particular occasion." 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(a), at 100 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis in LaFave) (citing Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741, 773 (1974)).
¶ 52. In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the formalistic two-prong test of Aguilar and determined that the "totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every informant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31. The Supreme Court also explained that in addressing determinations of prob*46able cause, a court is dealing with probabilities, not absolutes. Id. at 231. The Supreme Court directed that during this process, "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act" should be a court's guide. Id. The Court also cautioned that "probable cause is a fluid concept — turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts — not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 232.
¶ 53. The Court in Gates explained that one of its reasons for abandoning the two-pronged test oí Aguilar was because the two prongs had been analyzed independently, rather than as potential parts of the totality of the circumstances that a court should review in determining the reliability of the information upon which the affiant sought a search warrant. Id. at 233. The Court explained that while the credibility of the informant or the reliability of his information may be factors, as may the basis for the informant's knowledge, they were not tests that needed to be satisfied. Id. Accordingly, "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability." Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 54. We have employed the approach of Gates, as we must for the Fourth Amendment, but we also employ the Gates approach in ascertaining whether the guarantees of Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution have been preserved. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d at 461-62, 468-69.
¶ 55. As the Supreme Court stepped away from the rigidity of the two-prong test of Aguilar, it provided suggestions that could assist a court in assessing the reliability of the information presented in an applica*47tion for a search warrant. The Supreme Court instructed that if the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, of an informant was known to law enforcement due to past interactions, that was significant evidence of the reliability of the information currently provided. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 243. However, if the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, of the informant was not known to law enforcement, then a court could examine the reliability of the information by corroborating it with other observations. See id. at 243-44. Or, a court could conclude that based on a common sense interpretation of surrounding facts, the information was reliable. See id. at 244. Or, a court could conclude that because the statement was an admission against penal interests, it was reliable. See LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(c), at 131. The determination of the reliability of the information requires the court to focus on the nature of the information given and the circumstances under which it was provided. Id.
¶ 56. When the information relayed by a confidential informant to law enforcement contains factual assertions obtained from a person unknown to law enforcement, the confidential informant's veracity, i.e., truthfulness, is established by evidence that he has provided reliable information to law enforcement in the past. State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶ 11, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 744 (concluding that in assessing whether there was probable cause to arrest based on information provided by a known confidential informant, the first question is whether law enforcement was entitled to rely on the confidential informant's statement). Furthermore, in the context of determining whether probable cause to arrest exists, the hearsay statements of one unknown to law enforcement, which are relayed by a known confi*48dential informant, may be relied upon "without independently determining the reliability of the informant's source or the source's information." McAttee, 248 Wis. 2d 865, ¶ 12. Law enforcement has "discretionary authority" to determine whether additional information or corroboration is needed before deciding whether to execute an arrest. Id. "Rigid legal rules [for determining probable cause] are ill-suited to an area of such diversity." Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
2. Application of Gates ¡Anderson
¶ 57. The information that was supplied by the confidential informant in the case now before us was provided by one whom law enforcement knew to be truthful. The confidential informant had provided tips about drug trafficking on more than three occasions. All of those tips had proved reliable. Therefore, all of the facts asserted by the confidential informant based on his own knowledge pass muster under Gates and Anderson as reliable information. Our major focus, then, is on the statements attributed to Mr. X as repeated by the confidential informant.
¶ 58. The confidential informant said that he contacted Mr. X, who said he could get cocaine from an unnamed person. The confidential informant communicated this to law enforcement, who provided buy-money for a controlled buy of cocaine. The confidential informant said he picked up Mr. X, who told the confidential informant to drive to 205 East Montana Street. While driving, the confidential informant heard Mr. X call and order cocaine from someone named "Jaime." The confidential informant was observed by officers driving Mr. X to 205 East Montana Street. When the confidential informant and Mr. X reached 205 East Montana Street, the confidential informant said *49that Mr. X asked for money, and he gave Mr. X a quantity of the buy-money law enforcement had provided. The confidential informant said that Mr. X told him to remain in the car, which he did.
¶ 59. Law enforcement observed Mr. X exit the confidential informant's automobile and an unnamed Hispanic male come out of the front door of 205 East Montana Street and motion Mr. X to go to the garage at the rear of the lot. Law enforcement also observed the unnamed Hispanic male walk toward the garage. Law enforcement observed the garage door that faced the alley open and Mr. X walk into the garage and a short time later, Mr. X exit the garage by the same door. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement observed the garage door close and the unnamed Hispanic male walk back to the front of 205 East Montana Street and enter the house.
¶ 60. The confidential informant said that when Mr. X re-entered his vehicle, Mr. X gave the confidential informant a clear sandwich bag that contained a white powdery substance, which the confidential informant subsequently gave to law enforcement. Law enforcement determined that the substance was cocaine. Law enforcement also corroborated through various official records that the defendant, Jaime Romero, resided at 205 East Montana Street; that Romero matched the physical description of the unidentified Hispanic male law enforcement observed at 205 East Montana Street; and that all of the events set out in the affidavit had occurred within the last 72 hours.
¶ 61. The facts supplied by Mr. X are: (1) the supplier of the cocaine was named "Jaime"; (2) Jaime had cocaine to sell at 205 East Montana Street; and (3) Jaime sold him the baggie of cocaine that Mr. X gave to the confidential informant. That a Jaime Romero was *50a resident of 205 East Montana Street was corroborated by law enforcement through independent records. No one saw Romero inside of the garage, except Mr. X, and no one saw Romero sell Mr. X the cocaine that Mr. X gave to the confidential informant, except Mr. X. However, there are also the following law enforcement observations: (1) Romero motioning Mr. X to the garage; (2) Romero walking to the garage; (3) the opening of the garage door and Mr. X's entry into the garage and exit from it; and (4) Romero returning from the area of the garage to the front of the house. If these facts, together with the facts supplied by the confidential informant, are given a common sense interpretation, they are sufficient to conclude that Mr. X's assertion that Romero sold cocaine to him in the garage at the rear of 205 East Montana Street is reliable. Because this occurred within 72 hours of the petition for a search warrant, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that evidence of wrongdoing would be found at 205 East Montana Street.
C. Majority Opinion
¶ 62. The term, "veracity," can be understood in more than one way. Veracity can be understood as referring to: (1) a person's general propensity for truthfulness; or (2) the reliability of the information a person provided on a particular occasion. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. The majority opinion could be misread to require satisfaction of a two-part test that we do not intend to create. To explain further, the majority opinion could be misread as requiring both a finding of the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, of Mr. X and a finding that the information he provided on this occasion was reli*51able before the magistrate would have sufficient evidence to issue a search warrant.5
¶ 63. For example, the majority opinion states, "Facts set forth in the affidavit demonstrate Mr. X's veracity to a degree sufficient to show, considering the totality of the circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing commissioner, that the commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing at the defendant's residence."6 The majority opinion, repeatedly, does not distinguish between the "veracity of Mr. X" and the reliability of his information.7 However, a determination of Mr. X's veracity, i.e., his truthfulness, was not necessary to the sufficiency of the affidavit that was presented to the magistrate. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244. Under the totality of the circumstances set out in Gates, a common sense approach is applied to determine the reliability of Mr. X's statements, which were repeated by a known confidential informant. Id. Under that approach, Mr. X's statements may be utilized by the magistrate who issued the warrant without an inquiry into Mr. X's general propensity for truthfulness. See id.; see also McAttee, 248 Wis. 2d 865, ¶ 12.
*52¶ 64. It is important to keep in mind that a court's review of a magistrate's decision is confined to the record before the magistrate when he issued the search warrant. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d at 554. The veracity of a person, when understood as his truthfulness, may be established by evidence that in past dealings with law enforcement he has provided reliable information. Id. at 555. However, Mr. X had no prior dealings with law enforcement. Accordingly, based on the affidavit of Officer Correa, upon which the magistrate relied in deciding to issue the search warrant, it is not possible to determine Mr. X's veracity, i.e., his truthfulness. All that can be determined is that under the totality of the circumstances, the information Mr. X provided on that occasion probably was reliable.
¶ 65. Mr. X may be a person who generally is not truthful. The magistrate had no way of knowing, nor do we. Rather, the magistrate was to interpret the reliability of the information Mr. X provided as part of a common sense interpretation of the totality of the circumstances set forth in Officer Correa's affidavit. He did so.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 66. Because the majority opinion may be read, mistakenly, as requiring a finding of both the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, of Mr. X and the reliability of the information he provided before a search warrant may issue, I respectfully concur. I do so in order to set aside any potential misunderstanding that Mr. X's general propensity for truthfulness is necessary to the conclusions reached in the majority opinion, which I join.
*53¶ 67. I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence.

 Majority op., ¶ 1.

 It is the totality of the circumstances approach that we employ in ascertaining whether the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and of Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution are observed when a search warrant is issued. State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 469, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987).

 The majority opinion employs this shorthand, so I do as well. Majority op., ¶ 9.

 It appears that Mr. X did not realize he was providing information to an informant for law enforcement when he spoke with the confidential informant.

 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶ 32, 34-36.

 Id., ¶ 34.

 Id., ¶¶ 35-36. In ¶ 21 n.16 of the majority opinion, it is acknowledged that the veracity (truthfulness) of a declarant is sometimes confused with the reliability of the information provided. I agree that may have occurred, as precise terms have not been central to many opinions. However, when one has no basis for ascertaining whether the declarant is a truthful person, the distinction between the truthfulness of the declarant and the reliability of the information he has supplied will affect the analysis. That is why I bring this concern to the reader's attention.