Court Opinion

ID: 9711263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:27:41.534713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.247670
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
While I concur in Issue II of the majority opinion, I must dissent to the conclusions reached by the majority in Issue I concerning the trial court’s overriding of the jury’s recommendation against the death penalty. This issue is not new to this court nor has it failed to visit itself upon the various jurisdictions throughout this country, culminating in the United States Supreme Court resolution in Spaziano v. Florida (1984), 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340.
The majority proposes to establish a new standard which would hold that before a judge could override a jury verdict against death, the facts justifying a death sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could disagree that death was appropriate in light of the offender’s character and his crime. Actually this is a standard to which this court adheres in reviewing any sentence, particularly where the sentence imposed is increased from the basic statutory term because of a finding of aggravating circumstances. The majority then finds the facts of this case indicate reasonable people could differ on the appropriateness of the death penalty for Martinez Chavez. I fail to find support for this conclusion. I detect that the majority is saying the jury was composed of reasonable people who made a determination, the judge was a reasonable person, and that they disagreed, and therefore reasonable people could differ. Obviously, if this logic is applied, there would be no case in which a judge could override a jury even though the law clearly provides for it.
In truth, the test to be applied where a trial judge imposes a death sentence is based on the determination that the judge entered written findings according to his independent review of the evidence, and from which he finds aggravating circumstances justifying the death penalty under the law. These aggravating circumstances must overcome any mitigating circumstances and demonstrate the result was not irrational or arbitrary. This is true whether the jury recommends death or against death. This is .true because the judge is the ultimate sentencer regardless of what the jury recommends. At the risk of being repetitious, I emphasize that the trial judge must do these things even if the jury recommends death because a death penalty cannot be imposed except by the trial judge.
The judge in the instant case made lengthy findings which were supported by the evidence. He found that the evidence clearly showed Martinez Chavez was equally responsible for the intentional killing of Francisco Alarcon while committing the crime of robbery. He found there was an agreement between Rondon and Martinez Chavez to rob Alarcon with the understanding there might be a need to kill Alar-con if he resisted. He found the Alarcon home was a small bungalow, that there were signs of violence demonstrated by broken glass and bloodstains in every room of the house, and that both Rondon and Martinez Chavez were in the home for some time. He found it would have been impossible for Martinez Chavez to have been merely a bystander under the circumstances as described. The trial court further pointed out that Martinez Chavez was the only occupant of the back seat of the car used to leave the scene and that the *740back seat was blood stained after the murder. The trial judge concluded the intentional murder in perpetration of a robbery was a joint enterprise between Martinez Chavez and Rondon, that they were equally culpable, and it would be an injustice for both not to be treated equally.
The evidence supports the trial court’s findings. The question is not which of the defendants was more culpable, but how culpable was Martinez Chavez. In Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 467, 104 S.Ct. at 3166, 82 L.Ed.2d at 357, Justice Blackmun reasoned: “Whether or not ‘reasonable people’ could differ over the result here, we see nothing irrational or arbitrary about the imposition of the death penalty in this case.” Again, Justice Blackmun stated: “Our responsibility, however, is not to second-guess the deference accorded the jury’s recommendation in a particular case, but to ensure that the result of the process is not arbitrary or discriminatory.” Id. at 465, 104 S.Ct. at 3165, 82 L.Ed.2d at 356. This is the test to be applied in a review of the death penalty or, as a matter of fact, any sentence a trial court imposes. This court has set standards to be applied in making this determination in virtually hundreds of cases, some of which the majority refers to and cites. The trial judge in this case is a very experienced criminal judge. He has made his findings in writing that comport with the law and are supported by the evidence. I would affirm his judgment in all respects.