Court Opinion

ID: 9966199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 14:07:14.931928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:45.620510
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3257-22

CHRISTOPHER BOHNYAK,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TOWN OF WESTFIELD, JAMES
GILDEA, and GREG O'NEIL,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________

                   Argued April 16, 2024 – Decided May 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Rose, Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Docket No. L-2878-20.

                   Thomas Henry Andrykovitz argued the cause for
                   appellant.

                   Richard A. Grodeck argued the cause for respondents
                   Town of Westfield, James Gildea, and Greg O'Neil
                   (Piro Zinna Cifelli Paris & Genitempo, LLC, attorneys;
                   Richard A. Grodeck, of counsel; Kristen Jones, on the
                   brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff Christopher Bohnyak appeals from a May 12, 2023 Law Division

order denying reconsideration of the March 23, 2023 order, which granted

summary judgment to defendants the Town of Westfield, James Gildea, and

Greg O'Neil dismissing with prejudice Bohnyak's claims under the New Jersey

Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and the

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. We

affirm.

                                       I.

      Bohnyak alleges that during the COVID-19 pandemic, defendants

discriminated against him based on his cardiac disability.      He specifically

maintains defendants refused to provide reasonable accommodations, including

medical-grade personal protective equipment (PPE), to clean Westfield's public

park restrooms.   Further, he alleges he was suspended and terminated in

retaliation for "blowing the whistle" on defendants' unlawful discrimination.

      Bohnyak began employment with Westfield's Department of Public

Works (DPW) in February 2015. In 2017, he was diagnosed with a cardiac

condition. O'Neil, the DPW Superintendent, supervised Bohnyak and all DPW

employees. Gildea, Westfield's Town Administrator, managed operations and

human resource matters.    Pursuant to Westfield's Personnel Policy manual,

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                                       2
Gildea was responsible for investigating and responding to employees' requests

for a reasonable accommodation.

      Westfield and Local Union N. 496 were parties to a collective bargaining

agreement (CBA). The agreement outlined the grievance process for employees'

complaints and governed discipline, stating: "The Town will not discharge,

discipline or suspend any employee without just cause." Further, it required

arbitration of unsettled grievances.

      In April 2020, early in the COVID-19 pandemic, Bohnyak self-isolated,

taking personal days. After returning to work in May, he was assigned to clean

litter. Bohnyak provided the DPW a doctor's note sometime between mid-May

and early June. The complete note, dated April 20, stated:

            Chris Bohnyak is my patient. He has a cardiac
            condition and if he cannot adequately perform social
            distancing during his work and receive adequate [PPE,]
            he must be isolated at home.

                  If further information is needed, please do not
            hesitate to call.

            [(Emphasis added).]

      On May 27, 2020, Westfield's mayor announced that on June 1, three park

restrooms would "reopen with an enhanced cleaning and sanitizing schedule."

The DPW had the responsibility to clean the restrooms twice daily. Richard

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                                       3
Eubanks, Bohnyak's direct supervisor, selected Bohnyak for the restroom

assignment, reasoning "with his previous experience . . . he would be a perfect

person." Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Bohnyak had occasionally cleaned

the restrooms.

      On May 28, 2020, Eubanks informed Bohnyak of his restroom

reassignment. Bohnyak expressed concerns, reminding Eubanks of his cardiac

condition, but cleaned the restrooms.       The DPW provided Bohnyak with

disinfectants and available PPE, including a cloth mask, rubber gloves, and

goggles. He was permitted to clean in isolation with the door open. Bohnyak

advised Eubanks he was not comfortable and required medical-grade PPE. He

stated, "if I have to do this, I would like . . . an N95 mask" and "a Tyvek suit."1

Eubanks referred the request to O'Neil as medical-grade PPE was unavailable.

O'Neil explained to Bohnyak that under State guidelines, the provided masks

and gloves were appropriate. The next day, Bohnyak relayed to O'Neil he was

still "not comfortable" "because of [his] heart." He requested an N95 mask,

Tyvek suit, and face shield be provided each time he cleaned a restroom,

amounting to thirty masks and suits per week. Bohnyak's union representative,

1
   Tyvek suits "prevent[] hazardous materials . . . from passing through the
material."    What is Tyvkek, Dupont, https://www.dupont.com/what-is-
tyvek.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2024).
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                                        4
Michael Broderick, requested O'Neil "get somebody with less seniority, without

a heart condition, to do the job."

      On June 1, 2020, Bohnyak returned to work, refusing the assignment

without medical-grade PPE. Eubanks contacted O'Neil to discuss Bohnyak's

request and the DPW's inability to provide the PPE. After O'Neil advised, "We

don't have to offer you that," Bohnyak again refused the assignment, and O'Neil

issued a one-day suspension without pay. O'Neil sent a memorandum to Gildea,

advising Bohnyak was "suspended for refusing to clean the municipal

lavatories," which Gildea approved.

      The same morning, Bohnyak emailed Gildea, O'Neil, and Westfield's

mayor    to    "memorialize   [his]   suspension   from   work"   and   request

accommodations, stating in part:

              I am currently under a doctor[']s care for which I
              provided DPW Supt. Greg O'Neil with doctor's notes
              describing my medical condition. . . .

                    I am not refusing to work[,] however, the work
              for which I have been recently assigned, cleaning park
              bathrooms, exacerbates my underlying medical
              condition with regards to the C[OVID]-19 virus and it
              puts me at greater risk.

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                                        5
Bohnyak also filed a union grievance claiming he was "put in unsafe work

conditions" despite "provid[ing] a d[octo]r['s] note to management," and was

"scared for [his] life."

      After receiving the email, O'Neil and Gildea discussed Bohnyak's work

assignment and refusal. O'Neil informed Gildea that due to Bohnyak's previous

issues with employees and supervisors in other DPW divisions, another

assignment was unavailable; and based on the doctor's note, the restroom

assignment was appropriate.

      On June 2, 2020, Bohnyak returned to work, continuing his refusal

without medical-grade PPE. O'Neil issued a three-day suspension. On June 5,

O'Neil suspended Bohnyak indefinitely for continuing to refuse the assignment.

O'Neil sent Gildea a memorandum, stating: "The above referenced employee

has been suspended indefinitely due to refusal to clean the public lavatories."

Gildea approved the suspension.

      On July 7, 2020, Westfield conducted a meeting concerning Bohnyak's

grievance, which Broderick attended. Bohnyak surreptitiously recorded the

meeting. He was asked if he would return to work if one N95 mask with filters

could be obtained, but he made clear that he required the medical-grade PPE

"[d]octors and nurses [we]re getting."    After the meeting, Gildea issued a

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                                      6
memorandum summarizing that "the parties discussed the safety of the

assignment." He noted Bohnyak received "the same PPE provided to all other

DPW employees," which complied with the doctor's note and the Center for

Disease Control and Prevention guidelines.         Further, Gildea memorialized

Bohnyak's request for "two sets of medical-grade PPE . . . including an N95

mask, a face shield, gloves, and surgical gowns," was "unreasonable" because

such PPE was "reserved for first responders."

      Westfield's Police Chief, Christopher Battiloro, corroborated Gildea's

PPE assertions, testifying the police department was "appropriately equipped,"

but did "not have an abundance" of PPE. Similarly, Broderick acknowledged

towns "could not get N95 masks" or "the suits" because "they were not

available." Broderick further conceded Bohnyak's request for medical-grade

PPE was unattainable "because everything was geared to either [emergency

medical services] responders, the police and/or . . . hospital[s]."

      On August 26, Bohnyak received Westfield's letter advising his failure to

return to work by September 4 would result in termination. On September 4,

Bohnyak returned with a second doctor's note stating he had "an elevated risk of

complications if he were to contract COVID[-]19" and requesting "adequate

[PPE]." Bohnyak again refused the restroom assignment and was suspended.

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                                         7
Thereafter, Gildea provided Bohnyak a termination letter, stating because

Bohnyak continued to refuse the assignment with the "requisite" PPE, his

employment was terminated, effective immediately. The same day, Bohnyak

filed a seven-count complaint alleging LAD and CEPA violations against

Westfield and O'Neil.

      On November 16, the parties attended a CBA grievance arbitration

hearing. The arbitrator found Westfield had just cause to suspend Bohnyak.

The arbitrator found he failed to establish "a factual, objective or lawful basis

for [his] refusal to perform an appropriate work assignment" and the April 20

doctor's note "d[id] not require the [PPE]" Bohnyak requested.

      On May 18, 2022, Bohnyak filed an eight-count amended complaint

adding Gildea as a defendant. The complaint averred defendants committed

disability discrimination in violation of the LAD by: failing to accommodate,

declining to engage in an interactive process, and retaliating against him. He

further alleged CEPA violations, arguing he suffered adverse employment

actions after reporting defendants' discrimination.

      On July 29, after the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary

judgment. Following oral argument, the motion judge issued an order and

accompanying statement of reasons granting summary judgment and dismissing

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                                        8
the amended complaint with prejudice.       In denying Bohnyak's motion for

reconsideration, the judge acknowledged he incorrectly found the arbitration

decision estopped Bohnyak from raising certain claims, but separately

determined Bohnyak failed to demonstrate defendants violated the LAD. He

found, "[d]efendants did not fail to reasonably accommodate []or engage in the

interactive process in good faith." Regarding the retaliation claim, the judge

found there was no causal connection between the June 1 email and any adverse

consequence because "the protected activity . . . occurred after the alleged

retaliation." Further, the judge found the CEPA claim failed because no material

fact demonstrated a "causal connection between the protected activities and his

suspensions and termination."    Regarding reconsideration, the judge found

Bohnyak failed to demonstrate the decision was "palpably incorrect."

      On appeal, Bohnyak argues material issues of fact exist and the judge

erroneously dismissed:    the LAD claims for failure to provide reasonable

accommodation, failure to engage in an interactive process, and retaliation; and

the CEPA count.

                                      II.

      We review a trial court's summary judgment decision "de novo and apply

the same legal standard" under Rule 4:46-2(c). See Crisitello v. St. Theresa

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                                       9
Sch., 255 N.J. 200, 218 (2023). "To decide whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in

favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472

(2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J.

469, 480 (2016)). A court must determine "whether the evidence presents a

sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one -

sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." DepoLink Ct. Reporting

& Litig. Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013)

(quoting Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell Amorso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-

46 (2007)). "A dispute of material fact is 'genuine only if, considering the

burden of persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the

motion, together with all legitimate inferences therefrom favoring the non -

moving party, would require submission of the issue to the trier of fact.'" Gayles

by Gayles v. Sky Zone Trampoline Park, 468 N.J. Super. 17, 22 (App. Div.

2021) (quoting Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 24 (2017)).

       We review orders denying reconsideration for abuse of discretion.

Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super. 449, 468 (App. Div. 2016). A court

abuses its discretion "when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

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                                        10
basis.'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 400 N.J. Super.

378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J.

561, 571 (2002)).

                                    A. LAD

      The LAD's remedial "purpose is 'nothing less than the eradication "of the

cancer of discrimination."'" C.V. ex rel. C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ.,

255 N.J. 289, 306-07 (2023) (quoting Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J.

587, 600 (1993)).        It prohibits unlawful employment practices and

discrimination "based on race, religion, sex, or other protected status[] that

creates a hostile work environment." Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 430 (2008);

see also N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(a). "There is no single prima facie case that applies

to all discrimination claims. Instead, the elements of the prima facie claim vary

depending upon the particular cause of action." Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383,

408 (2010).

      The LAD expressly "does not prevent adverse employment treatment

premised upon the employee's, or prospective employee's, conduct." Barbera v.

Di Martino, 305 N.J. Super. 617, 633 (App. Div. 1997). "Put another way, the

LAD acknowledges the authority of employers to manage their own

businesses." Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 446 (2005). "The LAD

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                                      11
was and is intended as a shield to protect employees from the wrongful acts of

their employers, and not as a sword to be wielded by a savvy employee against

his employer." Carmona v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354, 373 (2007).

      i. Failure to Accommodate and Engage in the Interactive Process

      "Although the LAD statute does not specifically address failure to

accommodate, 'our courts have uniformly held that the [LAD] nevertheless

requires an employer to reasonably accommodate an employee's handicap.'"

Royster v. N.J. State Police, 227 N.J. 482, 499 (2017) (alternation in original)

(quoting Potente v. County of Hudson, 187 N.J. 103, 110 (2006)). Our Supreme

Court has recognized "the obligation of employers to reasonably accommodate

an employee with a disability." Richter v. Oakland Bd. of Educ., 246 N.J. 507,

530 (2021) (citing N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)).

      To establish an LAD claim for failure to accommodate:

            a plaintiff must demonstrate he or she (1) "qualifies as
            an individual with a disability, or [ ] is perceived as
            having a disability, as that has been defined by statute";
            (2) "is qualified to perform the essential functions of
            the job, or was performing those essential functions,
            either with or without reasonable accommodations";
            and (3) that defendant "failed to reasonably
            accommodate [his or her] disabilities."

            [Royster, 227 N.J. at 500 (alternations in original)
            (quoting Victor, 203 N.J. at 410).]

                                                                          A-3257-22
                                       12
      N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5 "codif[ies] [an] employers' duty to reasonably

accommodate persons with disabilities in the workplace." Caraballo v. City of

Jersey City Police Dep't, 237 N.J. 255, 267 (2019).                     Specifically,

N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b) provides "[a]n employer must make a reasonable

accommodation to the limitations of an employee . . . who is a person with a

disability, unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would

impose an undue hardship."        Reasonable accommodations include "making

facilities . . . readily accessible"; restructuring jobs, such as providing "part-time

or modified work schedules or leaves of absence"; the "[a]cquisition or

modification of equipment or devices"; and "[j]ob reassignment[s]." N.J.A.C.

13:13-2.5(b)(1).    Employers are to "consider the possibility of reasonable

accommodation before firing, demoting or refusing to hire or promote a person

with a disability on the grounds that his or her disability precludes job

performance." N.J.A.C. 13:13-2.5(b)(2).

      The LAD does not require employers to provide an accommodation that

would pose an undue burden. Richter, 246 N.J. at 524. Under N.J.A.C. 13:13-

2.5(b)(3), the factors determining whether an accommodation presents an undue

hardship on the employer include: "[t]he overall size of the employer's business

with . . . the number of employees"; "type of the employer's operations . . .

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                                        13
workforce"; "nature and cost of the accommodation needed"; and "[t]he extent

to which accommodation would involve waiver of an essential requirement of a

job." Further, in determining the type of reasonable accommodation required,

an "employer must initiate an informal interactive process with the

employee. This process must identify the potential reasonable accommodations

that could be adopted to overcome the employee's precise limitations resulting

from the disability." Tyan v. Vicinage 13 of Superior Ct. of N.J., 351 N.J. Super.

385, 400 (App. Div. 2002) (citation omitted) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3)).

"[A]n employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind and know that he or

she must specifically say 'I want reasonable accommodation.'" Ibid. (quoting

Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999)). After a

request for an accommodation is "made, 'both parties have a duty to assist in the

search for appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good

faith.'" Ibid. (quoting Taylor, 184 F.3d at 312).

      An employer fails to engage in the interactive process if:         "(1) the

employer knew about the employee's disability; (2) the employee requested

accommodations . . . ; (3) the employer did not make a good faith effort to assist

the employee in seeking accommodations"; and (4) but for "the employer's lack

of good faith," it could have "reasonably accommodated" the employee. Id. at

                                                                            A-3257-22
                                       14
400-01.   An employer is lawfully permitted, pursuant to N.J.A.C. 13:13-

2.8(a), "to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where it can reasonably be

determined that an applicant or employee, as a result of the individual's

disability, cannot perform the essential functions of the job even with reasonable

accommodation."

      We begin by acknowledging that Bohnyak's cardiac condition

unquestionably constituted a disability under the LAD. Therefore, defendants

were required to provide a reasonable accommodation and engage in an

interactive process in good faith.

      Bohnyak contends the judge erroneously granted summary judgment

because material facts existed demonstrating defendants violated the LAD by

failing to: accommodate his disability by providing his requested medical-grade

PPE or reassignment; and engage in an interactive process.          We disagree.

Eubanks selected Bohnyak for the restroom assignment knowing he had

previously performed the job, had a disability, and would be provided available

PPE. Bohnyak only requested the accommodation of medical-grade PPE and an

alternative position after he was reassigned to the restrooms. In support of the

accommodation, Bohnyak submitted a three-sentence doctor's note, dated weeks

earlier, stating his cardiac condition required "social distancing . . . and

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                                       15
adequate" PPE. By allowing Bohnyak to clean the restrooms in isolation,

defendants accommodated Bohnyak's social distancing request.

      Notably, Bohnyak has not posited a material fact disputing the DPW's

available PPE was not "adequate PPE" for the assignment and his disability.

Bohnyak provided no medical documentation defining "adequate" PPE and the

doctor's notes did not specify medical-grade PPE was necessary. No facts in the

record demonstrate medical-grade PPE was available to anyone other than first

responders. Further, O'Neil's deposition testimony that no alternative DPW

division assignments were available because of Bohnyak's prior issues with

supervisors and staff was unrefuted. Mere statements that a factual dispute

exists are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Brill v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 529 (1995) (finding insubstantial arguments based

on assumptions or speculation are not enough to overcome summary judgment).

      We concur with the judge's finding that Bohnyak demonstrated no

material facts to dispute defendants acted in good faith by engaging in

discussions regarding his requested medical-grade PPE and advising that the

thirty N95 masks and Tyvek suits per week were unavailable. As required by

N.J.A.C.   13:13-2.5(b)(1),   defendants   considered   the   "[a]cquisition   or

modification of equipment" to accommodate Bohnyak's request. Bohnyak's

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                                      16
argument the DPW should have sought PPE from Westfield's first responders is

unavailing. As acknowledged by Bohnyak's union representative, N95 masks

and Tyvek suits were "definitely not available."         While DPW workers

unquestionably contributed during the COVID-19 pandemic, they were not

considered first responders and therefore were not provided medical-grade PPE.

Bohnyak's newly raised assertion that surgical masks were not provided is also

unavailing as he unequivocally "refuse[d] the job" without "N95 masks, [a]

Tyvek suit, and a face shield each time [he] cleaned a bathroom."

      An employer considering a reasonable accommodation need not

"acquiesce to the disabled employee's requests for certain benefits." Victor, 203

N.J. at 423 (quoting Raspa v. Off. of Sheriff of Gloucester, 191 N.J. 323, 339

(2007)).    The LAD only requires an employer undertake reasonable

accommodation "designed to make certain changes in the work environment or

structuring of employees' time that will allow disabled employees to remain at

work without their physical handicaps impeding their job performance."

Caraballo, 237 N.J. at 268 (quoting Jones v. Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J.

Super. 412, 426-27 (App. Div. 2001)).

      We also reject Bohnyak's argument that a jury had to consider: if his

requests were reasonable; if the provided PPE was "adequate"; and what the

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                                      17
doctor intended by "adequate PPE." While an expert is generally unnecessary

to support an LAD claim when a disability is established, we have "h[e]ld that

where the extent of a[n] LAD claimant's disability is relevant to the

reasonableness of the accommodations offered or demanded, the claimant must

establish it by expert medical evidence." Wojtkowiak v. N.J. Motor Vehicle

Comm'n, 439 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div. 2015).

      Additionally, our Supreme Court has held "a plaintiff's disability can be

effectively addressed by [a treating physician's] testimony limited to the

plaintiff's diagnosis and treatment." Delvecchio v. Township of Bridgewater,

224 N.J. 559, 580 (2016). Bohnyak has failed to proffer any medical evidence

regarding the necessity for medical-grade PPE and other necessary

accommodations.      Therefore, we discern no reason to disturb the judge's

determination that Bohnyak failed to demonstrate a factual dispute regarding the

reasonableness of Bohnyak's requests and defendants' accommodation.

      We only briefly comment on Bohnyak's argument that because defendants

"made no effort to contact" his doctor, a failure to accommodate was established.

Bohnyak has not cited, nor has our research revealed, any authority supporting

an independent obligation to contact his doctor to "clarif[y] . . . what 'adequate'

meant." While defendants were required to and did engage in an interactive

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                                       18
process, they had no obligation to unilaterally contact his doctor to ascertain his

medical needs.

      We next consider Bohnyak's argument defendants failed to engage in an

interactive process. The record demonstrates defendants sufficiently engaged

with Bohnyak through multiple interactions after he requested accommodations

and provided the first doctor's note. Defendants discussed the possibility of

other placements, conducted an in-person grievance meeting, and provided

Bohnyak three months to return to work by September 4 or be terminated.

Bohnyak returned in September, refused the assignment, and provided a second

doctor's note again requesting "adequate" PPE without further explanation,

which resulted in termination. Bohnyak had a reciprocal obligation to act in

good faith. See Tyan, 351 N.J. Super. at 400. We discern no reason to disturb

the judge's decision granting summary judgment on Bohnyak's LAD claims for

failure to provide a reasonable accommodation and engage in the interactive

process.

                                  ii. Retaliation

      We also are satisfied Bohnyak failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of

retaliation under the LAD. The judge found "the undisputed facts demonstrate

[Bohnyak] was not suspended and terminated due specifically to his June 1,

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                                       19
2020 email, but because he refused to perform his assigned task, and with all

inferences drawn to [Bohnyak] there is no showing same was simply pretext."

We agree.

      To establish an LAD claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must show: "(1) [he]

was in a protected class; (2) [he] engaged in [a] protected activity known to the

employer; (3) [he] was thereafter subjected to an adverse employment

consequence; and (4) that there is a causal link between the protected activity

and the adverse employment consequence." Victor, 203 N.J. at 409. If the

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the employment decision. See

Tisby v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 448 N.J. Super. 241, 248 (App. Div.

2017). If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back, and the plaintiff must

then prove the employer's proffered explanation is merely a pretext for

discrimination. Ibid.

      It is uncontroverted Bohnyak's first suspension for refusing the restroom

assignment occurred before he sent the protected email. The record supports the

judge's conclusion that each adverse employment action thereafter occurred

because Bohnyak continuously refused the assignment without thirty N95 masks

and Tyvek suits weekly. As we have already stated, prior to the COVID-19

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                                      20
pandemic, Bohnyak had been assigned to the clean the restrooms. It was only

upon Bohnyak's reassignment to the restrooms that he provided a medical note

requesting the accommodation of "adequate PPE" and social distancing. While

engaging in an interactive process, defendants consistently maintained

Bohnyak's refusal would result in adverse employment actions. Contrary to

Bohnyak's assertions, the record yields insufficient facts supporting a causal link

between his email alleging         disability discrimination and defendants'

employment actions taken. See Young v. Hobart West Grp., 385 N.J. Super.

448, 467 (App. Div. 2005) ("Where the timing is not 'unusually suggestive ,' the

plaintiff must set forth other evidence to establish the causal link.").

      We conclude Bohnyak failed to materially dispute that defendants

engaged in non-discriminatory, progressive disciplinary measures, which were

in response to his continued refusal to complete his assignment. See Nardello

v. Township of Voorhees, 377 N.J. Super. 428, 434 (App. Div. 2005) ("[N]ot

every employment action that makes an employee unhappy constitutes 'an

actionable adverse action.'" (quoting Cokus v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co., 362

N.J. Super. 366, 378 (Law Div. 2002))). We discern no reason to disturb the

judge's determination that summary judgment was warranted on the LAD

retaliation claim.

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                                        21
                                   B. CEPA

      We also reject Bohnyak's CEPA arguments that sufficient facts were

established to show: a causal connection between his protected email and

subsequent suspensions and termination; and the adverse employment actions

were pretext, rather than repercussions for his continuous refusal "to perform

the duties of [his] position."

      "The Legislature enacted CEPA to 'protect and encourage employees to

report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and

private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.'" Allen v. Cape May

Cnty., 246 N.J. 275, 289 (2021) (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451,

461 (2003)). CEPA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who

perform a whistleblowing activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3.

      To establish a prima facie CEPA claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate:

             (1) he or she reasonably believed that his or her
             employer's conduct was violating either a law, rule, or
             regulation promulgated pursuant to law, or a clear
             mandate of public policy; (2) he or she performed a
             "whistle-blowing" activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-
             3(c); (3) an adverse employment action was taken
             against him or her; and (4) a causal connection exists
             between the whistleblowing activity and the adverse
             employment action.

                                                                        A-3257-22
                                      22
            [Allen, 246 N.J. at 290 (quoting Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at
            462).]

      At issue is whether Bohnyak satisfied a prima facie showing under the

fourth CEPA element. To satisfy the fourth CEPA element, a plaintiff must

demonstrate "a causal connection . . . between the whistle-blowing activity and

the adverse employment action."         Dzwonar, 177 N.J. at 462.       A causal

connection "can be satisfied by inferences that the trier of fact may reasonably

draw based on circumstances surrounding the employment action." Maimone v.

City of Atl. City, 188 N.J. 221, 237 (2006). "The temporal proximity of

employee conduct protected by CEPA and an adverse employment action is one

circumstance that may support an inference of a causal connection." Ibid. Once

a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that the employer took an adverse

employment action, "the burden of persuasion is shifted to the employer to rebut

the   presumption      of   discrimination   by   articulating   some   legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action." Allen, 246 N.J.

at 290-91 (quoting Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 478 (App. Div. 1999)).

Once an employer proffers a legitimate reason, "plaintiff has the ultimate burden

of proving that the employer's proffered reasons were a pretext for the

discriminatory action taken by the employer." Id. at 291 (quoting Kolb, 320

N.J. Super. at 478).

                                                                            A-3257-22
                                        23
      Bohnyak argues a causal connection between his protected activity and

defendants' adverse employment actions is established by the temporal

proximity connecting his email and his second assignment refusal suspension.

The record belies this contention. As we similarly observed, and need not

repeat, in discussing Bohnyak's retaliation claim, Bohnyak's first suspension for

refusing to perform the assignment was before his protected email and after he

was notified his requested medical-grade PPE was unavailable. "[A]ccepting all

[Bohnyak's] allegations as true," the judge correctly found he "did not

demonstrate [a] causal connection between the protected activities and his

suspensions and retaliations."    Mere assertions of a causal connection are

insufficient to overcome summary judgment. See Dickson v. Cmty. Bus Lines,

Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522, 533 (App. Div. 2019) ("'[C]onclusory and self-serving

assertions by one of the parties are insufficient to overcome' a motion for

summary judgment." (quoting Puder v. Buechel, 183 N.J. 428, 440-41 (2005))).

      Bohnyak next argues defendants' proffered reason for their adverse

employment actions—his suspension and termination for refusing to perform an

essential job function while provided the available "requisite PPE" and social

distancing—was pretext for disability discrimination. We observe Bohnyak's

email acknowledged he was "memorializ[ing] [his] suspension from work," for

                                                                           A-3257-22
                                      24
refusing to clean the restrooms and he continuously refused to perform the

assignment. Bohnyak has failed to sufficiently refute that no other assignments

were available because of his prior issues with DPW supervisors and staff. We

observe it is Bohnyak's burden to demonstrate defendants' proffered reason was

a pretext. Accepting all reasonable inferences in favor of Bohnyak, the record

amply supports the judge's conclusion that he failed to factually dispute

defendants' nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment actions was

not in violation of CEPA. Thus, summary judgment on his CEPA claim was

appropriate.

      Affirmed.

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                                     25