Court Opinion

ID: 9908408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:09:03.588308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:10.283673
License: Public Domain

J-A18012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                              :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                              :
              v.                              :
                                              :
                                              :
 DARWIN MAURICE HERRING SR.                   :
                                              :
                       Appellant              :    No. 796 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 11, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-07-CR-0000722-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: December 8, 2023

     Appellant, Darwin Maurice Herring Sr., appeals from the aggregate

judgment of sentence of 25 to 117 years’ incarceration, imposed after he was

convicted by a jury of five counts of delivery of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), criminal conspiracy, 18

Pa.C.S. § 903, and criminal use of a communication facility, 18 Pa.C.S. §

7512(a). After careful review, we affirm.

     A detailed recitation of the facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions is

not necessary to dispose of the issues he raises on appeal. We only note that

Appellant’s drug-delivery and conspiracy convictions were premised on the

testimony   of     a   confidential   informant,   to   whom   Appellant   “sold   …

methamphetamine he obtained from Shawn Jackson on five occasions in

2019.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. “Because [Appellant] used a telephone to
J-A18012-23

arrange these sales, he was also convicted of [c]riminal [u]se of a

[c]ommunication [f]acility.” Id.

      Appellant was initially sentenced on January 12, 2022, to an aggregate

term of 25 to 127 years’ incarceration. However, in response to his timely-

filed post-sentence motion challenging his sentence, the court resentenced

him on June 14, 2022, to an aggregate term of 25 to 117 years’ incarceration.

Appellant timely filed another post-sentence motion, again challenging his

sentence, which the court denied on July 6, 2022. He then filed a timely notice

of appeal, and he complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On August 30, 2022,

the court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:

      I. Did the [trial court] … violate [Appellant’s] rights under the Fifth,
      Sixth and/or Fourteenth amendments to the United States
      Constitution; Article I § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and/or
      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 602 by ordering jury
      selection to proceed in [Appellant’s] absence[,] where [the court]
      did not require the Commonwealth to prove, and the
      Commonwealth did not prove, that [Appellant’s] absence was
      without cause? For these same reasons, did the trial court err by
      denying [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion for a new trial in the
      interests of justice?

      II. In a case involving non-violent, street level drug dealing, did
      the trial court abuse its discretion at sentencing by imposing a
      manifestly excessive, unduly harsh, and unreasonable aggregate
      sentence of 25 to 117 years of incarceration while failing to
      consider [Appellant’s] personal history, mitigating circumstances,
      and rehabilitative needs? Was this sentence the product of
      prosecutorial     and     judicial    vindictiveness   and/or   an
      unconstitutional “trial tax” imposed as punishment for exercising
      a constitutional right to a trial by jury?

                                       -2-
J-A18012-23

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Appellant first challenges the fact that the trial court proceeded with jury

selection in his absence. Based on the record before us and the parties’ briefs,

we glean the following, pertinent facts underlying this issue. See id. at 4-10.

At a pretrial proceeding on September 27, 2021, Appellant and his counsel,

James DePasquale, Esq., were notified that jury selection was scheduled to

begin on Monday, October 4, 2021, and that the jury trial would commence

on October 25, 2021. On October 4, 2021, Appellant failed to appear for jury

selection. At 9:10 a.m. that day, the court was joined in chambers by Attorney

DePasquale and the prosecutor, and they discussed, on the record, how to

proceed in Appellant’s absence.       See N.T. Excerpt from Jury Selection,

10/4/21, at 1. The court acknowledged that the Commonwealth wished to

move forward with jury selection because Appellant had proper legal notice

that he was to be in court that morning and had failed to appear. Id. In

response, Attorney DePasquale admitted that “it was made clear” at the

proceeding on September 27, 2021, “that both [Appellant] and counsel were

to be [in court] at 8 o’clock” that day. Id. at 4. Additionally, counsel stated

that he had spoken to Appellant two days earlier, i.e., on Saturday, October

2, 2021, and he had “no doubt … that [Appellant] was aware he had to be

here.”   Id.   Nevertheless, Attorney DePasquale objected to proceeding in

Appellant’s absence, arguing that “to command someone to be in court, that

person has to be subpoenaed.” Id. Noting that, to his knowledge, Appellant

“was not subpoenaed[,]” counsel stated that he was “objecting to proceeding

                                      -3-
J-A18012-23

without him because of that.” Id. After the parties indicated they had nothing

else to place on the record, the court proceeded with jury selection in

Appellant’s absence. Id. at 6. On October 13, 2021, the court issued an order

directing, inter alia, that the Commonwealth “make every effort through its

resources to locate and apprehend [Appellant] in advance of trial.” Order,

10/13/21, at 1 (unnumbered). Appellant was thereafter arrested at a hotel in

Allegheny County. See Sentencing Order, 1/11/22, at 11. He was “found to

be in the possession of drugs” and “admitted … that he was using … said

drugs.” Id.

      On October 21, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to reinstate bail, and the

court held a hearing on that motion on October 25, 2021. There, Appellant

explained his absence from jury selection, claiming that he had been in contact

with someone who had tested positive for Covid-19, and that he had then

tested positive on the morning of jury selection.     He alleged that he had

attempted to contact Attorney DePasquale via phone and email on Sunday,

October 3, 2021, to notify counsel that he did not feel well and that he was

going to take a Covid-19 test the next day.       However, Appellant did not

produce any medical documentation confirming that he had tested positive for

Covid-19, or proof that he had emailed his counsel. He also did not claim that

he attempted to notify the court that he would be absent from jury selection.

      At the close of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion to

reinstate bail, explaining that Appellant had “failed to provide sufficient

evidence to convince the [c]ourt that he in fact had a legitimate medical

                                     -4-
J-A18012-23

excuse” to justify his failure to appear for jury selection.      N.T. Hearing,

10/25/21, at 34. The court found that Appellant had instead taken “unilateral

action to absent himself from the court proceedings and … used an alleged

casual contact with someone who had been exposed to Covid as an excuse to

not appear.” Id.

        Now, on appeal, Appellant argues that he is entitled to a new trial

because his absence from the jury selection process violated his federal and

state constitutional rights, as well as Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure

602. Specifically, Appellant contends:

        [The trial court] did not require the Commonwealth to prove, and
        the Commonwealth did not prove, that [Appellant’s] failure to
        appear on the morning of jury selection was without cause.
        Moreover, [the court] failed to render findings of facts or
        conclusions of law concerning the requisite “without cause”
        determination prior to ordering jury selection in absentia.
        Because (a) the Commonwealth did not prove that [Appellant’s]
        absence was without cause, (b) [the court] did not determine
        [Appellant’s] absence was without ca[u]se, and (c) there is no
        evidence that [the court] exercised judicial discretion before
        ordering jury selection in absentia, [Appellant] respectfully
        requests and is entitled to a new trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.

        Before delving into the specifics of Appellant’s arguments, we recognize

that:
        The right to trial by jury is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
        to the U.S. Constitution and by the Pennsylvania Constitution,
        Article I, Section 6 and Section 9. A defendant’s right to be
        present at his or her trial is grounded in the Confrontation Clause
        of the Sixth Amendment and in the Due Process Clauses of the
        Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Supreme
        Court has determined that one of the most basic of the rights
        guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to

                                       -5-
J-A18012-23

     be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial. In addition,
     the High Court “has assumed that, even in situations where the
     defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence
     against him, he has a due process right to be present in his own
     person whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably
     substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the
     charge. Thus, a defendant is guaranteed the right to be present
     at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its
     outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the
     procedure.

     The High Court has explicitly affirmed that voir dire is a critical
     stage of the criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has
     a constitutional right to be present. The determination that voir
     dire is a critical stage of trial flows directly from the recognition
     that a defendant’s “life or liberty may depend upon the aid which,
     by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and to the court
     and triers in the selection of jurors.” However, certain decisions
     regarding the conduct of voir dire are properly made by counsel
     alone.

                                     ***

     Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Pennsylvania
     Rule of Criminal Procedure 602 guarantee the right of an accused
     to be present in the courtroom at every stage of a criminal trial.
     Rule 602(a) provides that the defendant shall be present at every
     stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury. As we have
     recently determined, this rule plainly states that the defendant
     has the right to observe every phase of the trial, including the
     impaneling of the jury. In addition, the jury selection process is
     crucial to the preservation of the right to an impartial jury as
     guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

     However, like the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court has recognized
     that the right to be present in the courtroom during one’s trial is
     not absolute.

Commonwealth v. Hunsberger, 58 A.3d 32, 37-38 (Pa. 2012) (cleaned up).

     For instance,
     [u]nder the constitutional standard, the right to be present at trial
     is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit
     but a shadow.      Due process only requires the defendant’s

                                     -6-
J-A18012-23

     presence to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be
     thwarted by his absence. As such, the constitutional rights at
     issue are circumscribed by a prejudice standard – a defendant
     must show that his absence from a trial proceeding could have
     undermined the fairness of the proceeding.

     However, Rule 602 provides for more protection than offered by
     either the United States or Pennsylvania Constitutions. Rule 602
     dictates that a defendant “shall be present at every stage of the
     trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
     verdict, … except as otherwise provided by this rule.”
     Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) (emphasis added).        The only exception
     provided by Rule 602 is where the defendant is “absent without
     cause….” Id.

Commonwealth v. DeCosta, 197 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa. Super. 2018) (cleaned

up; emphasis omitted).

     Additionally, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving, “by a

preponderance of the evidence[,] that the defendant is absent ‘without cause’

and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to be present.”

Commonwealth v Hill, 737 A.2d 255, 259 (Pa. Super. 1999); see also

Pa.R.Crim.P. 602 (Comment).

     [W]hen a defendant is unaware of the charges against him,
     unaware of the establishment of his trial date or is absent
     involuntarily, he is not absent “without cause” and therefore
     cannot be tried in absentia. Commonwealth v. Bond, [693 A.2d
     220,] 223 [(Pa. Super. 1997)] (citing Commonwealth v.
     Sullens, [619 A.2d 1349 (Pa. 1992)]).

     In United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert.
     denied, 409 U.S. 1063 … (1972), the Court of Appeals for the
     Second Circuit set forth a list of factors the trial court must balance
     before exercising its discretion to proceed with trial in the
     defendant’s absence:

        [T]he likelihood that the trial could soon take place with the
        defendant present; the difficulty of rescheduling,
        particularly in multiple-defendant trials; the burden on the
        Government in having to undertake two trials[]….

                                      -7-
J-A18012-23

      Id. at 1210. Our Supreme Court adopted the Tortora test in
      Commonwealth v. Wilson, … 712 A.2d 735 ([Pa.] 1998), but
      emphasized that the list of factors was not exhaustive. Moreover,
      Wilson held that the trial court is not required to postpone the
      trial in order to weigh such factors. [Id.] … at 739.

Hill, 737 A.2d at 259 (Pa. Super. 1999) (footnote omitted).

      Instantly, we first address Appellant’s argument that his constitutional

rights were violated by his absence at jury selection. Appellant acknowledges

that he “bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice, or that his absence

from the proceedings undermined their fairness.”        Appellant’s Brief at 24

(citation omitted). In this vein, he argues:

      Our Supreme Court has recognized that “the determination that
      voir dire is a critical stage of trial flows directly from the
      recognition that a defendant’s life or liberty may depend upon the
      aid which, by his personal presence, he may give to counsel and
      to the court and triers in the selection of jurors.” Hunsberger,
      58 A.3d at 37. Jury selection “is the primary means by which a
      court may enforce a defendant’s right to be tried by a jury free
      from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or predisposition about
      the defendant’s culpability.” Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S.
      858, 873 (1989) (cleaned up). A criminal defendant’s interest in
      participating in the selection of the very people who will decide his
      fate is particularly acute where, as here, the defendant is Black
      and is being tried by jury in an overwhelmingly white locale.

      [Appellant’s] exclusion from jury selection impaired his right to
      exercise peremptory challenges, which often are made only after
      a prospective juror’s non-verbal cues such as body language,
      facial expressions, eye contact, general demeanor toward the
      particular defendant on trial may be assessed. Under these
      circumstances, [Appellant’s] presence at his jury selection would
      be far from “useless, or the benefit but a shadow.” DeCosta, 197
      A.3d at 816.       Indeed, there is little question at all that
      [Appellant’s] presence at jury selection would have “contribute[d]
      to the fairness of that procedure[,]” Hunsberger, 58 A.3d at 37,
      and that the fairness of his jury selection proceeding was
      "thwarted by his absence.” DeCosta, 197 A.3d at 816.

                                      -8-
J-A18012-23

Appellant’s Brief at 38-39.

      Appellant’s vague and speculative prejudice argument is unconvincing.

We note that the transcript of the jury selection proceeding is contained in the

record before us, yet Appellant does not identify anything that occurred during

that proceeding that caused him prejudice by his absence. For instance, he

does not point to any aspect of the voir dire to which he would have objected

had he been present, or identify anything in the record indicating that any

juror selected had formed a fixed opinion or been otherwise subject to

disqualification for cause. See Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902 A.2d 419,

423 (Pa. 2006) (“The purpose of voir dire is to provide an opportunity to

counsel to assess the qualifications of the prospective jurors to serve. It is

therefore appropriate to use such an examination to disclose fixed opinions or

to expose other reasons for disqualification.”) (citations omitted). In other

words, Appellant does not claim, in any specific manner, that the jury chosen

in his absence was incompetent, unfair, biased, or prejudiced against him, and

he does not point to any portion of the record that would support such a claim.

See id. (“It is well settled that the sole purpose of examination of jurors under

voir dire is to secure a competent, fair, impartial and unprejudiced jury.”).

Therefore, Appellant has not demonstrated that his absence from jury

selection undermined the fairness of that proceeding, or the fairness of his

trial overall. Accordingly, Appellant’s constitutional challenge to the court’s

conducting jury selection in his absence is meritless.

                                      -9-
J-A18012-23

      We next address Appellant’s claim that Rule 602(A) was violated by the

jury selection in absentia. Appellant insists that the Commonwealth failed to

meet its burden of proving that his absence was without cause, complaining

that “the Commonwealth presented nothing at all concerning the reasons for

[Appellant’s] absence or, as the case law has suggested, evidence ruling out

a plausible explanation for [his] absence.” Appellant’s Brief at 28 (citations

omitted). For instance, “[t]he record does not reflect that any attempt was

made by the Commonwealth to ascertain [Appellant’s] whereabouts or

discover the reasons for his nonappearance.” Id.

      Appellant further maintains that the trial court
      was required to determine whether [Appellant’s] absence was
      without cause, and then to balance [Appellant’s] constitutional
      right to be present against the judicial economy interests
      described in Wilson. [It] did neither. There is simply no
      indication that [the court] exercised discretion in ordering jury
      selection in absentia, or even that [the court] viewed the matter
      as one calling for the exercise of his discretion. Critically, [the
      court] committed an error of law in failing to even render a legal
      determination that [Appellant’s] absence was without cause, as
      was his obligation, before ordering jury selection to proceed in
      absentia.

Id. at 30-31. Appellant concludes that, had the trial court properly considered

the Tortora factors, and the other relevant circumstances, it would have

postponed the jury selection proceeding. Finally, Appellant contends that “this

Court may not countenance the trial court’s reasoning” that Appellant “took

unilateral action to absent himself from court proceedings[,]” as that

determination was made based on facts presented at hearings after the

                                    - 10 -
J-A18012-23

decision to proceed with jury selection in absentia had been made. Id. at 34

(citation omitted).

      After carefully considering Appellant’s arguments, we conclude that no

relief is due. Initially, Appellant cites Hill to support his argument that the

Commonwealth was required to investigate the reasons for Appellant’s

absence, or present evidence “ruling out a plausible explanation for [his]

absence.” Id. at 28. In that case, Hill had signed two subpoenas ordering

him to appear for trial in two separate cases on February 19, 1997. Hill, 737

A.2d at 257. Nevertheless, Hill failed to appear in court on that date and,

after “[t]he court granted two continuances while the Commonwealth made

several attempts to locate [Hill],” trial commenced in his absence. Id. Hill

also failed to appear at his subsequent sentencing, and he was sentenced in

absentia.   Id. at 258.   On appeal, we found no abuse of discretion in the

court’s proceeding without Hill there, reasoning:
      A complete review of the record reveals that [Hill] was fully aware
      of the charges against him and of his original trial date. In fact,
      he signed two subpoenas ordering his appearance on February 19,
      1997. When he failed to appear on that date, the court allowed
      two continuances. However, [Hill] also failed to appear on the
      relisted trial dates. [Hill] was on bail at the time and, therefore,
      had an obligation to stand trial and submit to sentencing if found
      guilty. To date, he has failed to offer any explanation for his
      continued absences.

Id. at 259.   We also noted that the Commonwealth had made “numerous

attempts” to locate Hill, including looking for him at his last known addresses,

as well as hospitals, custodial facilities, and the morgue. Id.

                                     - 11 -
J-A18012-23

      Instantly, we first point out that Attorney DePasquale never requested

a continuance so that attempts could be made to locate Appellant.

Additionally, counsel only objected to proceeding in Appellant’s absence on

the basis that he was not subpoenaed to be in court on the day of jury

selection. See N.T., 10/4/21, at 4-5. Attorney DePasquale did “not deny in

any way that it was made clear last Monday that both [Appellant] and counsel

were to be [in court] at 8 o’clock” on October 4, 2021, “and that this case was

going to be tried the 25th, 26th and 27th of October.” Id. at 4. However,

counsel stated: “To my knowledge, [Appellant] was not subpoenaed and I am

objecting to proceeding without him because of that.” Id. at 4-5. Notably,

counsel never objected on the basis that the Commonwealth had failed to

meet its burden of showing that Appellant was absent without cause, thus

waiving this argument for our review.         See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not

raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.”).

      In any event, even if not waived, we would conclude that any ostensible

violation of Rule 602 would be harmless error in this case. As set forth, supra,

we have determined that Appellant’s constitutional rights were not violated by

his absence from jury selection, as he was not prejudiced. This Court has

declared that, as a general matter, “non-constitutional violations of Rule

602(A)” are susceptible to harmless error analysis.        Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1272, 1283 (Pa. Super. 2021).          Harmless error exists

where, inter alia, “the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice

                                     - 12 -
J-A18012-23

was de minimis.” Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super.

2013).

          Here, we discern no prejudice to Appellant by his absence from the jury

selection. Appellant’s attorney was present for the selection of the jurors, and

we presume that counsel effectively represented Appellant’s interests at that

proceeding. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987)

(“We … presume that counsel is acting effectively.”).            Additionally, as

explained above, the record contains the transcript of the jury selection

proceeding, yet Appellant does not identify any objection or opposition to a

potential juror that he would have wished to raise. He also does not explain

any way in which he was prejudiced by the jurors who were ultimately chosen.

Thus, we cannot discern any, non-speculative reason that conducting the jury

selection in Appellant’s absence could have contributed to the verdict.

Accordingly, we would conclude that even if Rule 602(A) was violated in this

case, that error was harmless, and Appellant’s first issue does not warrant

relief.

          Appellant next challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

          Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
          entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v.
          Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
          challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke
          this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
            [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
            Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
            preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
            modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]

                                        - 13 -
J-A18012-23

         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
         (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence
         appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing
         Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

      Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006),
      appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the
      discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they
      are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify
      the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788,
      794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.]
      2003).

      The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must
      be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul,
      925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question
      exists “only when the appellant advances a colorable argument
      that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent
      with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary
      to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.”
      Sierra, supra at 912–13.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).

      Here, Appellant filed a timely appeal, he preserved his claims in a post-

sentence motion, and he has included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his

appellate brief.   Therein, Appellant claims that the court’s imposition of

consecutive, aggravated range sentences was an abuse of discretion where

he committed non-violent, “street level drug deals,” and his criminal history

also consisted of only non-violent offenses. Appellant’s Brief at 41, 42. He

also argues that his sentence is excessive in light of his character and

mitigating circumstances, and that the aggregate term “was improperly

influenced by prosecutorial vindictiveness” and a “trial tax” imposed in

retaliation for his exercising his constitutional right to trial. Id. at 42, 43.

                                      - 14 -
J-A18012-23

         We conclude that Appellant’s arguments raise a substantial question for

our review. See Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1271-72 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (concluding the appellant’s claim that the imposition of

consecutive sentences was disproportionate to his crimes, and that the court

disregarded the nature and circumstances of his offense, presents a

substantial question); Commonwealth v. Perry, 883 A.2d 599, 602 (Pa.

Super. 2005) (finding an excessive-sentence claim, in conjunction with an

assertion that the court did not consider mitigating factors, raises a substantial

question); Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 997 (Pa. Super. 1999)

(holding that reliance on impermissible sentencing factors can raise a

substantial question).     Thus, we proceed to the merits of his arguments,

mindful that,
         [s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
         sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
         absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
         of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
         the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
         sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
         judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
         arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).

         We first address Appellant’s claim that his sentence is the result of

prosecutorial vindictiveness and a ‘trial tax’ due to his exercising his right to

trial.     He argues that this fact is “easily establish[ed]” where the

Commonwealth’s pre-trial plea offer was eight to 16 years’ imprisonment, yet

at sentencing, it requested a term of 60 to 120 years’ incarceration.

                                       - 15 -
J-A18012-23

Appellant’s Brief at 54, 55. Appellant further avers that the trial court’s refusal

to require the Commonwealth to address this disparity “fully exposes the trial

court’s bias against [Appellant] and its adoption of the Commonwealth’s

vindictiveness as its own.” Id. at 56.

       In response, the Commonwealth avers:
       [Appellant’s] “prosecutorial vindictiveness” argument goes
       nowhere: The trial court “rejected the Commonwealth’s
       sentencing recommendation and further had no involvement or
       knowledge of the Commonwealth[’s] pretrial offer to resolve the
       case.” [Trial Court Opinion,] 6/14/2022, … [at] 25 (emphasis
       added); see id. (the trial court “did not remotely adopt the
       Commonwealth’s       recommendation         and      fashioned     an
       individualized sentencing scheme for [Appellant] based upon the
       facts”). Lacking contrary evidence, [Appellant] resorts to baseless
       accusations of bias and rhetoric insulting the trial court’s findings.
       [See, e].g., [Appellant’s] Br[ief at] 56 (calling the court’s
       reasoning “farcical,” based on “obviously unjustifiable logic,”
       “bias[ed],” and “no doubt [made] at the Commonwealth’s
       urging”). [Appellant’s] bluster fails to show a substantial question
       or a “manifest abuse of discretion,” as required.

       Finally, [Appellant’s] “trial tax” argument fails as well. With full
       knowledge of his own criminal conduct in this case, his significant
       criminal history, and the nature of the Commonwealth’s favorable
       plea offer, [Appellant] rejected the offer (likely against counsel’s
       advice), brazenly fled from the court’s authority during the very
       jury trial that he demanded in order to use drugs, and then acted
       in a threatening and violent manner toward the Commonwealth
       and court, destroying court property, when the overwhelming
       evidence of his crimes persuaded the jury to find him guilty on all
       counts.[1] True, the plea offer was lower than the sentence
____________________________________________

1 Here, the Commonwealth refers to the fact that,

       [a]s the trial concluded, “a scuffle … occur[ed] in the courtroom,”
       an incident that [Appellant’s] brief does not mention. [N.T. Trial,
       10/27/2021,] at 46. Specifically, “[a]fter the jury’s excusal from
       the [c]ourtroom and within seconds of the adjournment of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 16 -
J-A18012-23

       imposed. But that does not make the sentence a “trial tax”;
       instead[,] it was the natural consequence of [Appellant’s]
       inveterate criminal behavior.

       Besides, as [Appellant’s] own cited law review article
       acknowledges (see [Appellant’s] Br[ief at] 62), the “[U.S.]
       Supreme Court has upheld the imposition of longer sentences on
       those who refuse to plead guilty,” Hessick & Hessick, Recognizing
       Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 47, 62 (2011)
       (citing, for example, Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 221-
       24 (1978)). Indeed, “[s]tate[s] may [constitutionally] encourage
       a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea,”
       and the High Court has “unequivocally recognize[d] the
       constitutional propriety of extending leniency in exchange for a
       plea of guilty and of not extending leniency to those who have not
       demonstrated those attributes on which leniency is based.”
       Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 221-24; see also, e.g., Bordenkircher v.
       Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“While confronting a defendant
       with the risk of more severe punishment [for going to trial] clearly
       may have a discouraging effect on the defendant’s assertion of his
       trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices is an inevitable
       — and permissible — attribute of any legitimate system which
       tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas[.]”).

Commonwealth’s Brief at 31-33.

       We agree with the Commonwealth.             Moreover, just before imposing

Appellant’s sentence, the trial court stated that it does “not punish defendants
____________________________________________

       proceeding while [the trial judge] was still on the bench,
       [Appellant] left counsel’s table and the custody of the Blair County
       Sheriff, grabbed a stainless steel pitcher from counsel’s table and
       crossed the courtroom while hurling the pitcher toward the
       prosecution’s table. The pitcher smashed a large screen television
       situated near the prosecution team,” while [Appellant’s] “family,
       who [was] sitting in the gallery, crawled over the jury box in an
       effort to reach [Appellant], who was being given commands from
       sheriff deputies.” [Trial Court Opinion,] 6/14/2022[,] … [at] 4.
       The court described the incident as “almost an all-out fiasco in the
       courtroom.” [N.T. Sentencing,] 1/11/2022[,] … [at] 3-4.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.

                                          - 17 -
J-A18012-23

for exercising their right to take a case to trial[,]” and that instead, it fashioned

an “individualized [sentence] to fit the convictions handed down by the jury

in this case, taking into account the entirety of the record, [Appellant’s]

history, his rehabilitative needs and consistent with the community

protections.” N.T. Sentencing at 45. We take the court at its word. Thus, as

the record does not demonstrate that Appellant was punished for his decision

to proceed to trial, no relief is due.

      We next consider Appellant’s contention that the court’s imposition of

an aggregate term of 25 to 117 years’ imprisonment — consisting of seven,

consecutive, aggravated-range sentences — is unduly harsh given the non-

violent nature of his crimes and his non-violent criminal history, as well as his

personal history, characteristics, and mitigating circumstances of his case. He

details the mitigating circumstances the court allegedly failed to consider,

including his “tough upbringing” surrounded by drug and gang activity, “that

three of his brothers and one of his own sons have been victims of homicide[,]”

that he is a “loving and supportive father” and has “made bona fide attempts,

especially in recent years, to earn an honest living by opening a barber shop

and operating a food and ice cream truck[,]” and that he “has a host of health

conditions” that “result in severe breathing problems.” Appellant’s Brief at 47

n.14. According to Appellant, “[t]he trial court did not mention a single one

of these facts about [him] in rendering its sentence.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

      Instead, he claims the trial court “cruelly portray[ed him] as nothing

more than a serial recidivist with no rehabilitative potential[,]” which was

                                         - 18 -
J-A18012-23

“both inaccurate and dehumanizing….” Id. at 48. Appellant insists that the

court “dramatically overstates [his] past opportunities to ‘revise his behavior’

and unacceptably insinuates that [Appellant] is simply irremediable. This is

not so.” Id. Appellant then explains that, although he has been sentenced

to five separate terms of imprisonment, “only one of them [was] significant

enough to have resulted in state time.” Id. at 49.

      Again, we conclude that no relief is due. We rely on the thorough and

thoughtful sentencing explanation offered by the trial court in its decision

ruling on Appellant’s post-sentence motions:

            i. Sentences imposed outside of the sentencing guidelines

      In cases where a court imposes a sentence outside of the
      sentencing guidelines, the court must give a contemporaneous
      statement of reasons in support of its sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.[]
      § 9721([b]). [The Superior C]ourt has stated:

         [A sentencing judge] … must demonstrate on the record, as
         a proper starting point, its awareness of the sentencing
         guidelines. Having done so, the sentence in court may
         deviate from the guidelines, if necessary to obtain a
         sentence which takes into account the protection of the
         public, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and the
         gravity of the particular offense as it relates to the impact
         of the life of the victim in the community, so long as it also
         states a record the factual basis and specific reasons which
         compelled it to deviate from the guideline range.

      Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254, 1264 (Pa. Super.
      2012)(citation and brackets omitted). However, “if the sentencing
      court proffers reasons indicating that its decision to depart from
      the guidelines is not unreasonable, the sentence will be upheld.”
      Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A. 2d 1172, 1177-[]78 (Pa.
      Super. 2004). See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa.
      2007) (noting difficulty of defining inquiry into reasonableness of
      sentence). At sentencing in the case at hand, this [c]ourt made
      the following pertinent statements:

                                     - 19 -
J-A18012-23

       The [c]ourt notes that this is a deviation from the guidelines.
       The [c]ourt has considered the guidelines, the presentation
       of the parties, the sentencing memorandum, the
       information in the [presentence investigation report (PSI)]
       and the presentations made this date by [Appellant’s]
       friends and family. We believe the guidelines depreciate the
       seriousness of the offenses to the extent that they do not
       acknowledge the significant prior history of [Appellant] in
       the criminal justice system and the need to protect the
       public. We believe [Appellant] has been offered numerous
       opportunities to revise his behavior. The [c]ourt would note
       that there is an overwhelming need, we believe, based upon
       this behavior to protect society…[. T]he sentence imposed
       takes into account the record, the Commonwealth’s
       reduction in charges from the Grand Jury Presentment to
       the jury tendering its verdicts, all mitigating evidence
       offered by [Appellant] and his history…. The [c]ourt would
       note … that [Appellant] so far has demonstrated that he is
       a poor candidate for rehabilitation. He has a pattern of little
       time passing between arrests or between supervision[,] …
       with arrest[s] or … violations while on supervision.
       Additionally, [Appellant] appears to be a career criminal
       beginning when he was a juvenile. The [c]ourt would note
       that from ages 16, 18-25, 28-29, and 34, [Appellant] was
       consistently in and out of the criminal justice system[,] and
       that does not include the numerous arrests for which
       [Appellant] was adjudicated guilty. Additionally, the [c]ourt
       agrees that [Appellant’s] behavior has created an
       impression with this [c]ourt that he fails to recognize the
       importance of authority. The [c]ourt would note by way of
       reference as an example his unilateral absenting himself
       from jury selection, the failure to provide a legitimate
       medical excuse when given the opportunity to purge
       himself[,] with knowledge of the outstanding bench warrant
       between jury selection and the start of the trial, [and] that
       he was apprehended approximately one and a half hours
       away from what he has declared as his home in Blair
       County.

       This belies his remarks that he was quarantining, [and] …
       upon his apprehension in a hotel in Monroeville,
       Pennsylvania, he was found to be in the possession of drugs.
       [Appellant] today has admitted himself that he was using
       said drugs, [and] his remarks that he kept in contact with

                                   - 20 -
J-A18012-23

        his attorney and bail bondsman but had no[] contact with
        the [c]ourt is troubling.

        Additionally, [Appellant], by his behavior, demonstrated
        contempt and disregard for this [c]ourt when he engaged in
        almost a brawl[-]like atmosphere in the [c]ourtroom when
        he grabbed a stainless steel pitcher, hurling it and crossing
        the [c]ourtroom at police officers with his family crawling
        over the jury box[,] and also risked being tasered (sic) in
        that event.

        While this [c]ourt is not basing this sentence on … that …
        activity, it does show a continued disregard … [and lack of]
        respect for authority and for the [c]ourt. These are only
        some examples of the [c]ourt’s concerns about [Appellant’s]
        ability to be rehabilitated and [why we] believe that the
        sentence of incarceration for a lengthy period of time is
        appropriate.

     While the sentencing guidelines compute a prior record score and
     an offense gravity score, the guidelines do not measure the length
     of time between arrests or convictions, nor [Appellant’s] failures
     to avail himself of services in order to show his ability to be a law[-
     ]abiding citizen. The guidelines do not take into account the
     abstract attitudes and behaviors that [Appellant] demonstrates
     toward authority again and again, either through his unsuccessful
     prior supervision or the examples of actions he took in the case at
     bar.

           ii. Sentence not manifestly excessive

     [Appellant] acknowledges that he has a significant prior record of
     delivering drugs and amassed a series of convictions for the same
     conduct. [Appellant] also agrees that the [c]ourt did not exceed
     the statutory maximums.2 (Paragraph 10 of [Appellant’s] Post
     Sentence Motion). Counsel lists the maximum sentence imposed
     and argues that the [c]ourt exceeded the maximum sentence
     “recommended[,”] citing the sentencing guidelines for
     [Appellant]. See [Appellant’s] Post Sentence Motion, Paragraph
     9 [(containing … a chart [with] the standard and aggravated
     ranges of sentence from the guidelines, but also includ[ing] a
     calculation of twice those amounts, presumably suggesting the
     “recommended” maximum flowing from the guideline ranges[)].
     The [d]efense uses the guidelines to aver that the maximum
     sentences are 92½ years above the high end of the standard
     guideline range.    (See Paragraph 11 of the Post Sentence

                                     - 21 -
J-A18012-23

     Motions). These types of statements are for flare in the defense
     argument, but are a deliberate misuse of the information and
     incorrect application of the guidelines. The defense calculation of
     these “maximums” are not part of the sentencing guidelines. 204
     Pa.Code [§] 303.1 et seq. Sentencing guidelines are not used as
     a tool for setting the maximum sentences imposed upon a
     [d]efendant.
        2 Withthe exception of Count 6, which is corrected under
        separate order this date.

     [Appellant’s] counsel wishes to focus only on her interpretation of
     the convictions[] as nonviolent and street level deals. First, these
     controlled     purchases      were      for  large    amounts       of
     methamphetamine. The defense characterization of [Appellant’s]
     activities also fails to account for other matters that the [c]ourt is
     tasked with evaluating when fashioning an individualized
     sentence.      Such factors include his lack of rehabilitative
     potential[,] with 17 prior convictions and 10 confinements as set
     forth in the PSI, as well as his complete disregard for the law. The
     [c]ourt referenced his history and the contents of the PSI which
     revealed that: [Appellant’s] criminal activity spanned from the
     time he was a juvenile and continued even while the instant action
     was pending. Of the 17 prior convictions, several were for drug-
     deliveries. He served a three (3) to six (6) year sentence in the
     state system. This sentence represents the lack of criminal
     activity in his PSI from 2012 to 2015. Upon his release[,] the
     interaction with law enforcement immediately resumes. He had 5
     paroles granted and one parole revoked. This recidivist history
     was cited by the [c]ourt in the sentencing order. Additionally, and
     as set forth under the discussion of above, [Appellant’s] disregard
     for the law goes beyond his voluminous prior criminal record and
     is evident in the other behavior toward the authority of the [c]ourt
     as cited on the record; including his failure to voluntarily
     participate in jury selection; his failure to provide medical
     documentation to support his COVID related excuse; his
     apprehension in another jurisdiction with drugs; his references to
     the [c]ourt by first name (during trial and at the post[-]sentence
     proceedings); his behavior in [c]ourt leaving sheriff’s custody;
     and[,] while the Judge was still on the bench[,] throwing a pitcher
     at officers and damaging the [c]ourtroom equipment in the
     process. []See Commonwealth v. Peck, 202 A.3d 739, 749 (Pa.
     Super 2019) [(]wherein defendant’s sentence of 20 to 40 years
     and statutory maximum sentence upheld).

                                    - 22 -
J-A18012-23

     This case stands in contrast to the record in Commonwealth v.
     [Coulverson], 34 A.3d 135 (Pa. Super. 2011), cited by the
     defense.    The Superior Court in [Coulverson] vacated the
     statutory maximum sentence where the trial [c]ourt offered only
     a general statement that the sexual assault and other crimes had
     a lasting impact upon the victim, her family and friends. The trial
     [c]ourt in [Coulverson] did not acknowledge the sentencing
     guidelines or provide any detailed rationale for the sentence. The
     appellate [c]ourt in [Coulverson] stated “…we are troubled by
     the [c]ourt’s cursory treatment of so weighty a matter, as the 90
     year aggregate maximum potentially consigns a 19 year old
     defendant with mental health problems to life in prison without
     even nod to relevant sentencing factors.”            Id. [a]t 146.
     ([e]mphasis added). The [c]ourt further said “the record reveals
     scant consideration of anything other than victim impact and the
     [c]ourt’s impulse for retribution on the victim’s behalf.” Id. at 148.

     In fashioning the instant sentence, the [u]ndersigned carefully
     evaluated all facets of Sections 9721(b) and 9781(d) as it related
     to this specific [Appellant] and to his convictions for selling larger
     quantities of methamphetamine to an individual, known to him as
     an addict[,] and conspiring with others to deal drugs. It was an
     individualized sentence, which took into account his poor history
     in the community with 17 prior arrests and his inability to
     recognize and adhere to authority.         Incorporated herein by
     reference hereto is the sentencing order of January 11, 2022[,]
     and the record of the sentencing hearing.

           iii. Consecutive sentences

     With regard to the imposition of consecutive sentences, the
     Pennsylvania Superior Court has stated:

        [T]he imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent
        sentences lies within the sound discretion of the
        sentenc[ing] [c]ourt. Longstanding precedent of this Court
        recognizes that 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721 affords the sentencing
        [c]ourt discretion to impose its sentence concurrently []or
        consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same
        time or to sentences already imposed. A challenge to the
        imposition of a consecutive rather than a concurrent
        sentence does not present a substantial question regarding
        the discretionary aspects of sentence. We see no reason
        why [a defendant] should be afforded a volume discount for
        his crimes by having all sentences run concurrently.

                                    - 23 -
J-A18012-23

         However, we have recognized that a sentence can be so
         manifestly excessive in extreme circumstances that may
         create a substantial question. When determining whether
         [a] substantial question has been raised, we have focused
         upon whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises
         the aggregate sentence to, what appears [upon] its face to
         be[,] an excessive level in light of the criminal conduct in
         the case. Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132
         (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

      In the case before this [c]ourt, [Appellant] has a prior history of
      drug trafficking offenses. The evidence established the jury
      convicted him of selling large quantities of methamphetamine on
      more than one occasion. Methamphetamine is a highly dangerous
      substance. Based upon the testimony of record, he was aware
      that the Commonwealth’s witness struggled with addiction.
      [Appellant] had been released on bail and failed to appear for jury
      selection. His failure to appear was determined to be without
      cause. His veracity as far as the reason for his nonappearance
      was questioned and was found to be lacking.            [Appellant]
      established a history of being incorrigible. He had numerous
      convictions over years and prior ignored opportunities for
      rehabilitation.   [Appellant] failed to adhere to appropriate
      behavior in [c]ourt and on previous supervision. This [c]ourt, like
      the Zirkle [C]ourt, found no reason to give [Appellant] a volume
      discount in his sentencing scheme….

Trial Court Opinion, 7/12/21, at 17-24 (some citations omitted, some

formatting altered).

      We conclude that the court convincingly addressed, and rejected,

Appellant’s sentencing challenges. The record as a whole demonstrates that

the court considered the various sentencing factors, mitigating circumstances,

history, and characteristics of Appellant, and determined that a lengthy term

of incarceration was warranted.     Appellant’s arguments on appeal fail to

establish that the court “acted with manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will,” or that its sentencing decision had “such lack of

                                     - 24 -
J-A18012-23

support as to be clearly erroneous.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d

1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010) (defining ‘abuse of discretion’ in the sentencing

context). Therefore, no relief is due.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 12/8/2023

                                    - 25 -