Court Opinion

ID: 9955514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:13:17.749825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.103898
License: Public Domain

No. 7                     March 28, 2024                           133

            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 In the Matter of A. J. A.,
                          a Child.
          DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                  Respondent on Review,
                             v.
                           Y. B.,
                   Petitioner on Review.
         (CC 19JU05194) (CA A178747) (SC S069996)

   En Banc
   On review from the Court of Appeals.*
   Argued and submitted September 12, 2023.
   Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section.
   Robert Hansler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General, and Inge D.
Wells, Assistant Attorney General.
   MASIH, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of
the juvenile court are affirmed.

______________
    * Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Tiffany Underwood, Judge.
323 Or App 322, 522 P3d 564 (2022).
134   Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                               135

          MASIH, J.
         In this case, mother challenges a determina-
tion made by the juvenile court under ORS 419B.476(2)(a)
concerning the permanency plan for her child, A. In July
2019, A was made a ward of the court, committed to the
legal custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS),
and placed in substitute care.1 Following a three-day per-
manency hearing in 2022, the juvenile court changed the
permanency plan for A from reunification to guardianship,
based on its determination that, despite DHS’s reasonable
efforts, mother had not made “sufficient progress” under
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) to make A’s safe return home possible.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling
without a written opinion. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.,
323 Or App 322, 522 P3d 564 (2022). We allowed review to
clarify the nature of the determination assigned to the juve-
nile court by ORS 419B.476(2)(a) and to address the related
question of our standard of review for that determination.
         For the reasons that follow, we now hold that the
juvenile court’s “sufficient progress” determination is a legal
conclusion rather than a finding of fact, and we conclude
that the record developed in this case is legally sufficient to
support the juvenile court’s legal conclusion that mother’s
progress was insufficient to make possible A’s safe return
home and to support the court’s decision to change the
permanency plan from reunification to guardianship. We
therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the juvenile court.
                         I. BACKGROUND
A.   Standard of Review
        DHS bears the burden of proof at a permanency
hearing, and it must prove the facts supporting a change
to the permanency plan by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. ORS 419B.476(1) (requiring the permanency hear-
ing to be conducted in accordance with ORS 419B.310);
ORS 419B.310(3)(A) (requiring that “the facts alleged in the
    1
      “Substitute care” is an out-of-home placement directly supervised by DHS
or another agency and includes placement of a child in a foster family home, a
group home, or another child-caring agency. ORS 419A.004(34)(a).
136                                  Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

petition showing the child to be within the jurisdiction of
the court * * * must be established,” as pertinent here, “[b]y
a preponderance of competent evidence”); Dept. of Human
Services v. T. L., 358 Or 679, 692, 369 P3d 1159 (2016) (stat-
ing that “DHS has the burden to prove that a parent has
not made sufficient progress to have the children returned
despite its reasonable efforts”).
          In a dependency case in which we do not review
de novo, we generally review the juvenile court’s legal con-
clusions for errors of law,2 and we consider the evidence in
the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition
to determine whether it supports that court’s legal conclu-
sions. Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 40, 57,
430 P3d 1021 (2018). In addition, we defer to the juvenile
court’s findings of fact if there is any evidence in the record
to support them. Id. at 57 (affirming juvenile court ruling
because “explicit and implicit factual findings, and the evi-
dence in the record on which they were based, supported
the juvenile court’s legal conclusions”). And, as we discuss
further below, we review a legal conclusion that is heavily
fact-dependent—such as a juvenile court’s determination
of “sufficient progress”—to determine whether the evidence
was sufficient to support it.
B.    Historical Facts and Juvenile Court Jurisdictional Bases
         The events that led to this dependency proceeding
began in July 2019. Mother left her son, A, who was then
about 18 months old, with his regular babysitter for a cou-
ple of hours.3 Mother returned to the babysitter’s home with
a pizza. When A wandered into the kitchen, where mother
was preparing to bake the pizza, mother became angry
and began yelling at him. She grabbed A’s right arm and
swung him around the kitchen while slapping him on the
hands and head. The babysitter took A away from mother.
Mother left the babysitter’s home and did not come back
that night. The next day, the babysitter called emergency

     2
       No party requested de novo appellate review as permitted by ORS 19.415(3)(b),
either in the Court of Appeals or in this court, and we choose to review for errors
of law. ORS 19.415(1).
     3
       A spent a great deal of time at the babysitter’s home, including some over-
night stays, to accommodate mother’s shift-work schedule.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                                     137

services because A’s arm was swollen and he avoided mov-
ing it. A was transported to the hospital, and, because he
was alone, authorities contacted DHS. At the hospital, med-
ical personnel determined that A’s arm was fractured. They
also noted that the right side of his face was bruised and
there were superficial abrasions on other parts of his body.
They reported to the police that they suspected child abuse.
DHS placed A in protective custody and filed a dependency
petition alleging physical abuse and failure to attend to A’s
basic needs.4 The juvenile court issued a shelter order based
on DHS’s petition, and it committed A to DHS’s temporary
custody for placement in substitute care.
        Police and a Child Protective Services case worker
investigated the circumstances of A’s injuries and inter-
viewed mother and the babysitter, among others. Mother
denied that she had knowingly injured A, asserting, instead,
that she walked him out of the kitchen with both hands over
his head. Based on information provided by hospital staff
and the babysitter, the Marion County District Attorney’s
Office charged mother by information with first-degree
criminal mistreatment.
         In September 2019, the juvenile court issued an
order establishing dependency jurisdiction over A based on
mother’s admissions that she needed the assistance of the
court and state to acquire the skills and training necessary
to safely parent A and that the no-contact order resulting
from the criminal charge prevented her from being a place-
ment resource.5
         In January 2020, mother was indicted on one count
of first-degree criminal mistreatment and one count of
fourth-degree assault. In August 2020, following a bench
trial, mother was acquitted on the criminal mistreatment
charge but convicted of fourth-degree assault. The trial court
placed mother on probation and ordered her to complete an

    4
      A’s father was not available to parent A because he was serving a lengthy
prison sentence. The juvenile court also asserted dependency jurisdiction due to
father’s unavailability to parent A because of father’s incarceration. Father is not
a party on appeal.
    5
      The criminal court later amended the release agreement to allow mother to
have supervised contact with A.
138                        Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

anger management assessment and to participate in par-
enting classes.
         In October 2020, the juvenile court entered a sup-
plemental dependency order, based on the stipulations of
the parties, which amended the original order to reflect
that “mother was convicted of recklessly causing physical
injury to the child.” The amended dependency order also dis-
missed the allegation concerning mother’s failure to attend
to A’s basic needs. The order otherwise continued A’s ward-
ship, A’s placement in substitute care, and the permanency
plan of reunification. In addition, the court ordered mother
to undergo a psychological evaluation and to participate in
parenting classes and other recommended services.
         Mother subsequently submitted to a psychological
evaluation performed by Dr. Cook, who diagnosed mother
with various mental health conditions. Cook recommended,
among other things, that mother complete parenting classes
and engage in mental health treatment focusing on emo-
tional regulation and distress tolerance. Mother was also
interviewed by Dr. Carter, a domestic violence evaluator, who
concluded that, to parent A safely, mother needed to address
her unresolved “significant trauma issues” stemming
from events in her childhood and from her adult relation-
ships with her domestic partners. Beginning in June 2021,
mother began participating in trauma-based therapy with
Dean, a licensed clinical social worker. In July 2021, she
also began receiving one-on-one parenting coaching from
Keiser, a parent educator.
         In August 2021, mother seemed to be making
progress in acquiring safe parenting skills, and DHS
returned A—then three years old—to mother’s care with
in-home parenting coaching by Hummer, an in-home safety
and reunification services specialist. Shortly thereafter,
Hummer reported to DHS that mother was having diffi-
culty parenting. During that time, DHS also received two
calls on its emergency hotline concerning the family. Davis,
the DHS child abuse investigator, responded. Mother told
Davis that A would hit and kick her, and she acknowledged
that she struggled to manage that behavior, because it trig-
gered a trauma response in her. Mother reported that she
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                139

was having “near panic attacks” because of A’s aggressive
behavior toward her and that, on multiple occasions, she
had locked herself in a room away from A or locked A in a
room away from her. DHS also learned that, on one occa-
sion, mother had tied A’s arm from the shoulder with a jump
rope to prevent him from hitting her and as a form of dis-
cipline. In September 2021, because DHS had determined
that mother was having difficulty parenting A and that her
actions presented a safety concern, DHS again removed A
from mother’s care. A had been in mother’s care for about
three weeks at that point.
         After A was re-removed, DHS continued to pro-
vide mother with services aimed at reunification, including
continued therapy with Dean and parent-child-interaction
therapy with a new therapist, Irwin, which was designed
to help mother and A with bonding, attachment, behavior,
obedience, and parenting skills. DHS also facilitated super-
vised visitation with mother, including visits at mother’s
church and home to give her an opportunity to practice the
skills that she was learning. Although mother actively and
willingly engaged in the services that DHS provided to her,
her progress was slow.
         By February 2022, A had been in substitute care for
over two and a half years, and DHS continued to have con-
cerns about mother’s parenting. Accordingly, DHS recom-
mended that A’s permanency plan be changed from reuni-
fication to guardianship. In arguing for that change, DHS
focused on the length of time that A had been in substitute
care, his multiple placements, the failed attempt to return A
to mother’s care, certain incidents in which mother became
disproportionately upset with A over trivial matters, and
mother’s tendency to confuse A by not using direct, age-
appropriate commands when asking him to do something.
C. The Permanency Hearing and Juvenile Court’s Ruling
        The juvenile court conducted a permanency hear-
ing over the course of three days in February and April
2022. The court heard testimony from Cook, Carter, Keiser,
Hummer, Irwin, and Dean, as well as from DHS profes-
sionals who had interacted with mother and A, including
140                        Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

Rutherford, the family’s primary caseworker, and Davis,
the child abuse investigator. According to those witnesses,
although mother had begun to show observable improve-
ment in her ability to parent A effectively, she still had a
long way to go before A could be safely returned to her care.
The court also heard testimony from mother about her suc-
cessful completion or active participation in training and
services, implementation of training, and her plan for the
return of A, which included, among other things, using
her own mother (grandmother) as a babysitter or potential
live-in safety service provider.
         The juvenile court announced its ruling at the con-
clusion of the hearing. The court explained that, before it
could change the permanency plan from reunification to
guardianship, it would have to determine that DHS had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the family but that
mother had not made sufficient progress to allow A to be
safely returned home. In addition, under ORS 419B.476(5)(e),
if it were to determine that the permanency plan should be
the establishment of a legal guardianship, then it also would
be required to determine that neither placement of A with a
parent nor changing the plan to adoption was appropriate.
         The court first addressed whether DHS had made
“reasonable efforts” to reunify the family, as required by ORS
419B.476(2)(a). The court described the services that DHS
had provided to mother, including parent-child interactive
training with Irwin, trauma therapy with Dean, parenting
coaching with Keiser, parenting classes with Hummer, and
referrals for eye movement desensitization and reprocessing
therapy to address her trauma. The court determined that
those services represented “reasonable efforts * * * to make
it possible for the ward to safely return home.”
         Turning to whether mother had made “sufficient
progress” in safely parenting A, the juvenile court acknowl-
edged that mother had made some progress, and it agreed
that mother was “able to recite what she’s learned in parent-
ing classes [and] that she’s able to show that she’s absorbed
it.” However, the court concluded, mother “has not been
able to put that [knowledge] into practice.” The court noted
that mother remained unwilling to accept that her actions
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                                   141

had led to A’s removal and re-removal and that she did not
acknowledge her role in his broken arm or “the gravity of
tying [A] up with a jump rope.” The court observed that,
although mother had participated in trauma therapy, she
had not focused on the traumas that led her to respond inap-
propriately to A’s behavior and led Carter initially to refer
her to trauma therapy; instead, she had focused on other
traumatic experiences in her past that did not affect her par-
enting and had not been the primary basis for the referral.
Moreover, the court noted, when mother was asked whether
she intended to address the trauma that was affecting her
parenting, “her response was vague and noncommittal.”
         The juvenile court also noted that, on multiple occa-
sions during the attempted reunification, mother had locked
herself away from A or turned her back on him and ignored
him when she felt unable to cope with his behavior or his
demands, noting that that response was deleterious to A’s
need and ability to form strong attachments to mother and,
generally, to his emotional development. Additionally, the
court expressed concern that mother’s plan for the future
included permitting the grandmother to care for A. Mother
had obtained a restraining order against the grandmother
in June 2019, after the grandmother, in the presence of A,
attempted to strangle mother and slapped mother’s then
four-year-old daughter.6 The court found that, despite the
training and services that DHS had provided to mother
and despite how eagerly and willingly mother had engaged
in those services, “there is still a disconnect where mom
doesn’t quite get it, doesn’t understand why it is a problem
and a safety concern to permit somebody access to her child
who has previously attempted to strangle her and has previ-
ously assaulted another.” The court also pointed to mother’s
testimony that she had ignored the grandmother for a year
after the attempted strangulation as a means to make the
grandmother more sensitive to her and her children’s needs.
The court connected mother’s response to the grandmother
to evidence that mother ignored A when his demands or
behavior overtaxed her, and it concluded that that “ignor-
ing behavior appears to be something that[,] despite the

   6
       The daughter lived with her father but had regular visitation with mother.
142                         Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

training and services that [mother] has received[, mother]
still relies on believing that these ignoring behaviors are
helpful, and that’s not something [A] needs.”
         Ultimately, the court determined that a change in
the permanency plan from reunification to guardianship was
appropriate. In so concluding, the court stated, “I cannot con-
clude that [mother] has ameliorated the basis of jurisdiction
such that [A] could return home within a reasonable time,
as his health and [safety] are the top concern of the Court.”
The court observed that A had already been in substitute
care “for over one thousand days.” The court noted that Cook,
who had performed three parental-assessment psychological
evaluations on mother, the most recent of which had been
in October 2021, had testified that mother would need con-
tinuing mental health therapy in order to be able to respond
appropriately to parenting instruction, to reduce her “post-
traumatic reactivity” to A’s behavior, to meet A’s needs, and
to become a minimally adequate parent. Cook had opined
that it would take between one and two years to accomplish
those goals—“a substantial period of [A’s] life.”
         For those reasons, the court concluded that, even
though mother had made substantial progress, and despite
DHS’s reunification efforts, “[A] cannot be safely returned to
[mother’s] care at this time and the evidence does not support
a determination that further efforts will make it possible for
[A] to safely return home within a reasonable time.” In that
regard, the court observed, quoting from ORS 419A.004(26),
that a “reasonable period of time” is measured by A’s “emo-
tional and developmental needs” and his “ability to form and
maintain lasting attachments,” and A had already spent
most of his life in substitute care. The court then made the
additional determination that ORS 419B.476(5)(e) requires
when a court determines that the permanency plan for a
ward should be changed from reunification to legal guard-
ianship—namely, that placement with the ward’s parents or
adoption is not appropriate. It found that placement of A with
a parent was not appropriate because, despite DHS’s reason-
able reunification efforts, A could not safely be returned to a
parent within a reasonable time. It further found that, based
on A’s attachment to a parent, adoption would not be in A’s
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                                   143

best interest. Finally, the court found that remaining in sub-
stitute care was necessary and in A’s best interest. The court
subsequently entered a written judgment changing the per-
manency plan from reunification to guardianship. 7
          Mother appealed, challenging the juvenile court’s
ruling, and, as noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed without
opinion.
      II. THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
          On review, mother asserts that the juvenile court
applied an incorrect legal standard in making its “sufficient
progress” determination. As mentioned, the juvenile court, in
its oral ruling, stated, “I cannot conclude that [mother] has
ameliorated the basis of jurisdiction such that [A] could return
home within a reasonable time, as his health and [safety] are
the top concern of the Court.” Pointing to that statement,
mother argues that the juvenile court held her to a standard
that ORS 419B.476(2)(a) does not require. Mother asserts
that that statute does not require a parent to have completely
ameliorated the bases for the wardship to avoid a change in
A’s permanency plan. Rather, it requires sufficient progress
toward ameliorating the bases for the wardship to the extent
necessary to make the safe return of A to her care possible at
the time of the hearing or within a reasonable time after the
hearing. And, she argues, that is a question of law, not fact.
          In addition, mother contends that DHS failed to
meet its burden to produce evidence sufficient to support
a determination that she had made insufficient progress
to permit A’s safe return home. She asserts that many—if
not all—of the witnesses at the permanency hearing tes-
tified that mother had made significant progress. Mother
acknowledges that she will need continued services, but she
argues that that is not a reason to conclude that she had not
made sufficient progress.
          DHS, for its part, contends that whether a par-
ent has made sufficient progress to make possible the safe
return of a child is a factual finding, not a legal conclusion,
and that this court must defer to the juvenile court’s find-
ing in this case that mother had made insufficient progress

   7
       At the time of the hearing, no potential guardian had been identified.
144                          Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

if there is any evidence in the record to support it. DHS
agrees that the correct inquiry at the permanency hearing
was not whether the bases for dependency jurisdiction had
been completely ameliorated, but, rather, whether A could
safely be returned to mother’s care at the time of the hear-
ing or within a reasonable time thereafter. Here, however,
DHS argues that there was ample evidence in the record to
support the juvenile court’s finding that, despite mother’s
efforts, A would not be safe in her care, even with continued
support.
                      III.   ANALYSIS
A.    Permanency Proceedings
         As we explained in S. J. M., before interpreting
the statutes at issue, it is helpful to place the permanency
decisions at issue in the case in context. 364 Or at 50-51.
When the juvenile court makes a child a ward of the court,
a series of complex statutes and proceedings come into play.
The statutes seek to protect the safety and well-being of chil-
dren and the rights of the parents. See ORS 419B.090(2) - (4)
(describing constitutional and statutory rights of children
and parents). There is a “strong preference that children
live in their own homes with their own families,” and DHS
is obligated, except in cases involving “extreme conduct,” to
work with families toward family reunification at the outset,
ORS 419B.090(5); see ORS 419B.502 (concerning “extreme
conduct”). But the statutes also recognize that “it is not
always possible or in the best interests of the child or the
public for children who have been abused or neglected to be
reunited with their parents.” ORS 419B.090(5). Children
have a right to “permanency with a safe family,” ORS
419B.090(2)(a)(A), and the state has an “obligation to create
or provide an alternative, safe and permanent home for the
child,” ORS 419B.090(5). And, as this court stated in S. J. M.,
“[t]hat right to permanency sometimes can conflict with a
parent’s interest in having additional time to make sufficient
progress for the child to be safely returned home.” 364 Or at
51.
       The statutes governing permanency proceedings
(ORS 419B.470 to ORS 419B.476) were enacted in response
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                                   145

to federal legislation establishing requirements for state
substitute care and juvenile court systems, with the goal of
reducing the length of time that children spend in substi-
tute care. T. L., 358 Or at 689. ORS 419B.470 requires the
court to hold permanency hearings when a child is in sub-
stitute care and provides the deadlines for such hearings.
The purpose of a permanency hearing is to determine, or
update, the permanency plan for the child and to establish
the timetable and conditions for accomplishing that plan.
ORS 419B.476(2), (4), (5); T. L., 358 Or at 689 (so stating).
Permanency hearings provide court oversight of the perma-
nency plan, DHS’s efforts, and the parent’s progress in mak-
ing the child’s safe return home possible.
B.   The “Sufficient Progress” Determination
         ORS 419B.476 governs the conduct of permanency
hearings and changes to permanency plans. That statute
provides, in relevant part, that, at a permanency hearing,
if the case plan at the time of the hearing is to reunify the
family, the court “shall * * * determine whether [DHS] has
made reasonable efforts * * * to make it possible for the ward
to safely return home and whether the parent has made suf-
ficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely
return home.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). It also provides that, in
making that determination, “the court shall consider the
ward’s health and safety the paramount concerns.” Id. Thus,
at a permanency hearing, the juvenile court reviews both
DHS’s efforts to provide services to the parent and the par-
ent’s progress in ameliorating the conditions that led to the
child becoming a ward of the court to determine whether the
child’s safe return home is possible at the time of the hear-
ing. If not, the court may determine that the permanency
plan for the child should be something other than reunifi-
cation, such as adoption, guardianship, or placement with a
relative. ORS 419B.476(5)(b)(B) - (D).8
          In addition, ORS 419B.476(4)(c) gives the juvenile
court discretion to continue the current plan of reunification
if it determines that further efforts may make possible the
    8
      For a child 16 years of age or older, the juvenile court also can order that
the child be placed in “another planned permanent living arrangement.” ORS
419B.476(5)(b)(E).
146                                 Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

child’s safe return “within a reasonable time” and, if it so
determines, to order the parents to “participate in specific
services for a specific period of time and make specific prog-
ress within that period of time[.]” Finally, ORS 419B.476(5)(e)
provides that, if the determination is to change the plan to
legal guardianship, then the court’s order “shall include * * *
the court’s determination of why neither placement with
parents nor adoption is appropriate.”
         The “progress” that a parent must make is in ame-
liorating, to the extent necessary to make possible the child’s
safe return to the parent’s care, the circumstances that led
the juvenile court to make the child a ward of the court.
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) (court must determine whether the par-
ent has made “sufficient progress” to make it possible for
the ward to safely return home). “Progress” does not mean
completely ameliorating the bases for dependency jurisdic-
tion—inherent in the notion of “progress” is that the parent
need not establish at the time of the hearing that wardship
is no longer necessary and should be dismissed.9
         Context supports that interpretation. For example,
the definition of “substitute care” in ORS 419A.004 contem-
plates continuing DHS involvement with the family: ORS
419A.004(34)(b)(C) excludes from the definition of “substi-
tute care,” “[i]n-home placement subject to conditions or lim-
itations[.]” DHS regulations also reflect that understanding.
For instance, OAR 413-040-0017(1) provides, in part, that a
caseworker may recommend “returning the child * * * to a
parent” when the caseworker has verified that the “identi-
fied impending danger safety threats can be managed with
an ongoing safety plan.”
        Thus, we agree with mother and the state that a
parent can be found to have made sufficient progress to war-
rant the denial of a DHS request to change the permanency
plan away from reunification even if further services would
be required were the child to be returned home, and even if

    9
      Jurisdiction is based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence of the
facts alleged in the petition to make the child a ward of the court. ORS 419B.100;
ORS 419B.310(3)(a)(A). Thus, dependency jurisdiction will be dismissed only if
the conditions or circumstances giving rise to the court’s jurisdiction have been
completely ameliorated and DHS involvement is no longer necessary.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                  147

the child will remain in the legal custody of DHS and sub-
ject to the juvenile court’s ongoing supervision.
C. Nature of the Determination
          The juvenile court determined that DHS had made
reasonable efforts but that mother had not made sufficient
progress “to make it possible for the ward to safely return
home.” The parties disagree about whether that “sufficient
progress” determination is a finding of fact or a legal con-
clusion, and they contend that whether the juvenile court’s
permanency ruling should be affirmed depends upon that
distinction. We agree that the distinction is important: As
previously discussed, we accept the juvenile court’s findings
of fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them,
but we review legal conclusions for errors of law.
       DHS points out that this court suggested, in S. J. M.,
that both the reasonable-efforts and sufficient-progress
determinations are findings of fact:
   “In these cases, the juvenile court found that DHS had
   made reasonable efforts to reunite L and A with their
   parents. Those findings were not challenged. The juvenile
   court also made findings, unchallenged here, that mother
   and AJB had not made sufficient progress to allow them to
   be reunited with their children.”
364 Or at 57. DHS relies on this court’s reference to “findings”
in S. J. M. to infer that we have already held that “sufficient
progress” is a factual finding. However, that issue was not
presented in S. J. M. The fact that our opinion in that case
happened to use the word “findings” in passing to describe
the nature of the determination does not reflect any consider-
ation of the issue before us here, and we give it little weight.
         Mother, meanwhile, points to numerous Court of
Appeals decisions holding that “sufficient progress” is a
question of law. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. C. H.,
327 Or App 61, 63, 533 P3d 1112 (2023) (so stating); Dept.
of Human Services v. C. W., 312 Or App 572, 574, 493 P3d 74
(2021) (same); Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App
287, 294, 328 P3d 728 (2014) (same). Although those cases
are not controlling in this court, mother contends that they
correctly construe the statute.
148                            Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

         Whether “sufficient progress” is a question of fact or
law depends on its function within the statute. To determine
that function, we consider the wording of the statute as a
whole and the context in which that phrase is used, as well
as the nature of the determination assigned to the juvenile
court. See State v. A. R. H., 371 Or 82, 89, 530 P3d 897 (2023)
(applying similar methodology to resolve whether juvenile
court determination, under ORS 163A.030, that youth was
not rehabilitated and must report as a sex offender, is find-
ing of fact or conclusion of law).
         Turning first to the wording of the statute, we
observe that ORS 419B.476 does not direct the juvenile court
to “find” or make “findings” of reasonable efforts or sufficient
progress. Rather, it directs the juvenile court to “determine”
whether DHS’s efforts were reasonable and whether the par-
ent’s progress was sufficient to make it possible for the child
to safely return home. The word “determine” is ambiguous
and the use of that word rather than the word “find” does
not resolve the issue. However, this court has stated that the
terms “reasonable” and “sufficient” are important indicators
that determinations are legal and not factual:
       “We acknowledge the temptation to treat indefinite
   terms like ‘good cause,’ ‘sufficient reason,’ and ‘reasonable
   period of time’ as calling for a subjective determination
   and, thus, as invoking personal judgment. However, it is
   clear that, when such terms appear in a statutory context,
   they are focused on real, albeit sometimes difficult to dis-
   cern, legal standards: the legislature’s view of what is ‘good,’
   ‘sufficient,’ or ‘reasonable.’ ”
State v. Johnson, 339 Or 69, 86, 116 P3d 879 (2005) (empha-
sis in original).
         Thus, the text of the statute suggests that the
juvenile court’s determinations of “reasonable efforts” and
“sufficient progress” are legal conclusions. Statutory con-
text lends some support to that interpretation. Under ORS
419B.100, the juvenile court has dependency jurisdiction in
cases involving, among others, a person “[w]hose condition
or circumstances are such as to endanger the welfare of”
that person. ORS 419B.100(1)(c). Whether the person’s con-
ditions or circumstances endanger the person’s welfare is a
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                  149

legal determination, not a factual finding. That is, the role of
the juvenile court in a proceeding under ORS 419B.100(1)(c)
is to determine whether the facts as alleged and proved by
DHS establish the court’s authority to create or continue
the legal relationship between the child and the state as
required for wardship. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v.
N. P., 257 Or App 633, 639-40, 307 P3d 444 (2013) (a juve-
nile court’s determination of dependency jurisdiction, pred-
icated on its determination under ORS 419B.100(1)(c) that
a parent’s condition at the time of the hearing does or does
not present a risk of harm to a child, is a legal conclusion).
Similarly, under ORS 419B.476, “reasonable efforts” and
“sufficient progress” describe the legal standard that must
be met to justify the juvenile court’s decision to maintain or
change the permanency plan of a ward of the court.
         Consideration of the nature of the sufficient prog-
ress determination points us in the same direction. As this
court stated in T. L., “a change in permanent plan from
return to parent to either guardianship or [another planned
permanent living arrangement] marks a profound change
of course in the path to finality for children in care.” 358 Or
at 692. That is so because it “divests the parent of family
reunification services as a matter of right from that time
forward,” id. at 691, insofar as, after a permanency plan
changes from reunification to guardianship, “the parent’s
status as the preferred placement for the child is effectively
terminated, unless and until the plan is changed at a sub-
sequent permanency hearing,” id. at 693. The court in T. L.
further noted that, “[a]lthough that consequence is not so
drastic as the termination of parental rights, the magnitude
of deprivation—including the potentially permanent denial
to a parent of custody and care of children—nevertheless is
grave.” Id. at 693. The nature of the competing interests at
stake, as well as text and context calling for the application
of a legal standard, persuade us that the juvenile court’s
“determination” of sufficient progress is a legal conclusion
that this court reviews for errors of law.
         At the same time, we recognize that the suffi-
cient-progress determination, although ultimately a legal
conclusion, is heavily fact-driven. In N. P., the Court of
150                             Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

Appeals ably explained how an appellate court should apply
the error-of-law standard of review in evaluating whether
the juvenile court has erred in making a similarly fact-
driven, statutorily prescribed determination. As noted, the
issue in N. P. was whether the juvenile court’s dependency
jurisdiction over the child should continue. Under ORS
419B.100(1)(c), resolution of that issue depended on the juve-
nile court’s determination whether the child’s “condition or
circumstances [were] such as to endanger the welfare of
the person or others.” In explaining how it would apply the
error-of-law standard of review to the juvenile court’s deter-
mination, the Court of Appeals stated:
       “Our non-de novo review of such a determination is
   analogous to the deferential review of other factually pred-
   icated determinations that are, ultimately, circumscribed
   by limits of ‘matter of law’ sufficiency, for example, denials
   of motions for directed verdict or motions for judgment of
   acquittal. That is, we view the evidence, as supplemented
   and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in
   the light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition and
   assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally suf-
   ficient to permit that outcome. Specifically, with respect to
   a juvenile court’s determination under ORS 419B.100(1)(c),
   we: (1) assume the correctness of the juvenile court’s explicit
   findings of historical fact if these findings are supported
   by any evidence in the record; (2) further assume that, if
   the juvenile court did not explicitly resolve a disputed issue
   of material fact and it could have reached the disposition
   that it reached only if it resolved that issue in one way, the
   court implicitly resolved the issue consistently with that
   disposition; and (3) assess whether the combination of (1)
   and (2), along with nonspeculative inferences, was legally
   sufficient to permit the trial court to determine that ORS
   419B.100(1)(c) was satisfied.
      “We emphasize that our non-de novo appellate review
   function does not allow us to substitute our assessment of
   the persuasiveness of the evidence for the juvenile court’s,
   nor does it allow us to revisit the juvenile court’s resolution of
   factual disputes or its choice among reasonable inferences.
   Rather, as (again) with our review of rulings on motions for
   directed verdicts or motions for judgment of acquittal, our
   function is limited to determining whether the evidence
   was sufficient to permit the challenged determination.”
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                    151

257 Or App at 639-40. Because a juvenile court’s determi-
nation that a child’s conditions or circumstances are such
as to “endanger” the child’s welfare is comparable to the
“sufficient progress” determination that is at issue here,
we believe that the Court of Appeals’ approach in N. P. was
correct and equally applicable to our review of the juvenile
court’s determination of whether a parent has made “suffi-
cient progress” under ORS 419B.476(2)(a). Accordingly, we
adopt it here.
         To summarize, then, in reviewing a juvenile court’s
determination to change a permanency plan because a par-
ent has not made “sufficient progress” to allow a child to
safely return home, appellate courts are bound by the juve-
nile court’s factual findings as to what efforts DHS has made
and what actions the parent has taken, so long as there is
any evidence in the record to support them, and we assume
that the juvenile court found all facts necessary to its rul-
ing, even if it did not do so explicitly. But the juvenile court’s
determination that a parent has or has not made “sufficient
progress” to allow the child to return home safely is a legal
conclusion that appellate courts review for errors of law,
and they do that by examining whether the facts explicitly
and implicitly found by the juvenile court, together with all
inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, were legally
sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination. We
now turn to apply that standard of review here.
            IV. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE
         Mother does not dispute that the evidence in the
record was legally sufficient to permit the juvenile court to
determine that DHS had made reasonable efforts to make
the safe return of A possible. Thus, the primary issue before
this court is whether the juvenile court erred in determin-
ing that, at the time of the hearing, mother had not made
“sufficient progress to make it possible for the ward to safely
return home.”
         As we have discussed, the juvenile court’s “suffi-
cient progress” inquiry is to determine whether the parent
has ameliorated the conditions or circumstances that led the
juvenile court to make the child a ward of the court to the
152                        Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

extent necessary to make possible—with continued services
from DHS if necessary—the child’s safe return to the par-
ent’s care. In this case, the statutory basis for the juvenile
court’s dependency jurisdiction is that A’s “condition or cir-
cumstances * * * are such as to endanger the welfare of the
[child],” based on the allegations that “mother was convicted
of recklessly causing physical injury to A” and that “mother
needs the assistance of the court and state to acquire the
skills and training necessary to safely parent this child.”
         Here, the juvenile court principally based its deter-
mination that mother had not made sufficient progress in
alleviating the basis for the court’s dependency jurisdiction,
and, specifically, the allegations set out in the dependency
petition, on the following findings: (1) mother was unwill-
ing to accept that her actions had led to A’s removal and
re-removal, and she failed to acknowledge her role in his
broken arm or the gravity of tying up A with a jump rope;
(2) mother was unable to put the parenting lessons that she
had learned into practice; (3) mother failed or was unwilling
to address in therapy the past traumas that provoked inap-
propriate responses in her to A’s behavior; (4) mother chose
to lock herself away from A or turn her back on him and
ignore him when she felt unable to cope with his behavior or
his demands; (5) mother failed to understand why it would
be unsafe and unwise for her to permit the grandmother
to have contact with and responsibility for her child; and
(6), according to Cook, it would take mother another one to
two years of therapy and training to become a minimally
adequate parent.
         Mother does not dispute that those findings are
supported by evidence in the record. Rather, she points to
testimony at the hearing by Rutherford, her caseworker,
suggesting that A’s safety could not be ensured without a
full-time, live-in safety service provider, and by Hummer,
a parenting coach, expressing concerns for A’s safety when
mother is unsupervised. Mother contends that Rutherford’s
and Hummer’s testimony seemed to reflect an unachievable
standard: that, if A’s safety cannot be guaranteed, then
the parent necessarily has not made sufficient progress.
Moreover, she argues, the juvenile court seemed to rely, at
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                 153

least in part, on its finding that mother was “triggered” by
A’s normal, age-appropriate behaviors to bolster its con-
clusion that A’s safety could not be ensured. She contends
that there was no evidence in the record that episodes in
which she had felt “triggered” showed a pattern of violence
or otherwise demonstrated a safety threat to A to support
a determination of insufficient progress. In sum, mother
argues, the facts that the juvenile court set out in its ruling
and on which it relied are insufficient as a matter of law to
support the juvenile court’s determination that her progress
was insufficient, particularly given that many—if not all—
of the witnesses at the hearing testified that mother had
made significant progress, especially after A’s re-removal in
September 2021.
         We see nothing in the juvenile court’s ruling that
suggests that the juvenile court’s insufficient progress deter-
mination was based on a finding that A’s safety could not
be guaranteed or ensured. Moreover, evidence in the record
supported the juvenile court’s findings that mother contin-
ued to be triggered by A’s behavior, that mother had not ade-
quately addressed her trauma triggers in therapy, that she
had reacted in the past with physical discipline when she
was overwhelmed and stressed and frustrated, and that she
did not recognize that her approach to physical discipline in
the past was something that was harmful to A. The juve-
nile court reasonably could infer from that evidence that
mother might react in an extreme way that endangers A.
Thus, even though mother had not reacted violently toward
A in the months before the permanency hearing, the juve-
nile court reasonably could infer from evidence in the record
that, if mother were confronted with situations that trig-
gered her when she was alone with A, without the support of
a safety service provider, she might react in a more extreme
way than she would when there was supervision, including
resorting to physical violence, and A would not be safe in her
care.
         In reaching that conclusion, we are not unmindful
of the growing body of data and social science research that
mother has cited regarding the potential for bias in DHS’s
treatment of families of color, as hers is, which can lead to
154                                  Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B.

skewed assessment measures and disparate interventions in
state child-welfare systems. Cook recognized as much and
sought to avoid such effects in mother’s case, advising DHS “to
pay attention to possible racial issues.” However, even Cook
estimated that mother would need one to two years, from the
date of his October 2021 evaluation, of additional DHS ser-
vices, including regular therapy and classes to address her
post-traumatic stress, her reactivity to A’s behavior, and her
lack of parenting skills. That testimony supported the juve-
nile court’s determination that A could not safely be returned
to mother’s care within a reasonable time.
         To be sure, there is evidence in the record that, in
the months before the permanency hearing, mother had
engaged willingly and eagerly in the services DHS had pro-
vided her and that she had made some meaningful prog-
ress.10 Ultimately, however, the juvenile court’s “sufficient
progress” inquiry is explicitly centered on whether the
articulated bases for dependency jurisdiction have been suf-
ficiently ameliorated so that “the ward [may] safely return
home,” a determination that the juvenile court was required
to make with “the ward’s health and safety [as its] para-
mount concerns.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). What matters under
ORS 419B.476(2)(a) is whether the parent has made suffi-
cient progress, as a result of those services or otherwise,
to overcome the concerns that gave rise to juvenile court’s
dependency jurisdiction to the extent that it would be pos-
sible for the ward to safely return home, with or without
continued DHS services and support.11 Here, we conclude
     10
        Irwin, for example, submitted a report stating that mother had been mak-
ing real progress in acquiring parenting skills, and, at the time of the hearing, A
was compliant with mother’s requests 95 percent of the time. Rutherford testified
that, in the previous six to eight months, he had observed improvements in the
attachment and bond between mother and A; he had observed more warmth and
genuine feeling. Dean testified that mother’s ability to take criticism was improv-
ing, and Keiser noted improvement in mother’s ability to interact and play with
A, and in her responsiveness to parenting instruction.
     11
        Under ORS 419B.476, DHS’s goal in providing services is to make reuni-
fication possible. In cases in which the parent actively participates in and suc-
cessfully completes the services offered yet still is determined not to have made
sufficient progress to make possible the child’s safe return home, the question
may arise whether the services offered were reasonably aligned with the family’s
needs to effectuate the goal of reunification. That issue is not presented here,
however, as mother does not challenge the reasonableness of DHS’s efforts to help
the family achieve reunification.
Cite as 372 Or 133 (2024)                                                    155

that the facts found by the juvenile court were legally suf-
ficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that
mother had not made sufficient progress to make possible
the safe return of A, either at the time of the hearing or
within a reasonable time thereafter, and to support its deci-
sion to change the permanency plan from reunification to
guardianship.12
        The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-
ment of the juvenile court are affirmed.

     12
        We also reject mother’s contention that the juvenile court’s statement, in
its oral ruling, that it “cannot conclude [mother] has ameliorated the basis for
jurisdiction such that [A] could return home within a reasonable time” shows
that the juvenile court applied an incorrect standard in making its determina-
tion of insufficient progress. In context, that statement does not reflect a misap-
plication of the correct legal standard for a change in permanency plan; rather,
it is better understood to reflect the court’s determination that mother had not
made sufficient progress to make it safe for A to return home. Viewed as a whole,
the court’s statement of its findings of fact and conclusions of law reflects that
the court understood the nature of the determination it was to make under ORS
419B.476.