Court Opinion

ID: 9773928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:04:14.749725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:59.515610
License: Public Domain

SMART, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the analysis of the principal opinion as it relates to our review of the issues raised. I write separately to add emphasis to the proposition that it is improper for a reviewing court to require the state to justify a sentence when there was no motion in the trial court directed to the sentence, either before or after the trial judge sentenced the defendant.
The dissent is willing to assume that, had there been a motion related to sentence, the trial court would have automatically rejected the argument that the jury’s sentence recommendation may have been influenced by improper evidence. I fail to see that we are entitled to make that assumption.
In the midst of the trial, evidentiary rulings are generally made quickly. Decisions are frequently made on terse objections unsubstantiated by any authority. After a trial, counsel has an opportunity to research an issue, obtain authority, and prepare a thorough analysis of the issue. The trial court, if persuaded, is able to grant relief. Here, counsel filed a motion for new trial, arguing that the court erred in allowing evidence of drug abuse as it might have affected the conviction. As noted in the principal opinion, there was no assertion that such evidence may have influenced the sentence nor was there any request for reduction of sentence. It is possible that counsel did not believe that the inadmissible evidence had any effect on sentence. It is also possible that the trial court actually agreed with the proposition that evidence of drug abuse should not have been admitted, but denied the motion for new trial on the ground that the error had no effect on the verdict of guilt. At no time was the court asked to consider whether the inadmissible evidence may have influenced the jury’s sentence recommendation.
It is a rare case in which a reviewing court should consider an argument not made to the trial court. Rule 29.11(d). Such an argument may be considered under Rule 30.20 *483when it is a “plain error” affecting substantial rights and the injustice or miscarriage of justice is manifest. In this case, appellant does not argue that any injustice with regard to the sentence is manifest. Appellant offers no discussion as to why, without prosecutorial error, she would have received a much lighter sentence. Rather, appellant argues simply that the burden is on the state to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence was not affected by the improper evidence.
There is little authority for an appellate court to review a sentence merely because improper evidence was admitted, where the issue has not been preserved as to the sentence. State v. Hernandez, 815 S.W.2d 67 (Mo.App.1991) is of questionable value as authority. In that case, the court chose to order a new trial in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution after inflammatory inadmissible evidence was used by the prosecution to argue for a maximum sentence. I believe a fair reading of that case suggests that the court found the admission of the inflammatory evidence, and the use of that evidence, was prejudicial both as to conviction and as to sentence, and ordered a new trial. It is not clear that in Hernandez the prejudice went only to the sentence. Nowhere in the opinion of the court in Hernandez is there any conclusion by the court that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming,1 or that the defendant admitted guilt, or any conclusion that the error was harmless as to conviction. It is true that, in looking at the issue of prejudice, the court focused on the prosecutor’s argument for a maximum sentence. It is likely, however, that the court believed that the same argument also hindered impartial and reasonable consideration of the evidence as to conviction. Thus, the reviewing court’s order of a new trial may well have been based upon the court’s belief that the improper evidence may have affected the jury’s finding of guilt of involuntary manslaughter, as well as the sentence. In contrast, in the case before us, it is clear that the improper evidence was harmless as to conviction. Further, unlike the obviously inflammatory argument in Hernandez, the prosecution’s closing argument in this ease was extremely matter-of-fact, and not inflammatory. There was no reference to drug abuse or any other improper matters. The only reference to punishment (“ninety days in jail is not too much to ask for this offense”) was made without any supporting argumentation.
It is true that, as an abstract proposition, ninety days in jail seems an unusually harsh sentence in the case of a mother interfering with custodial rights. However, we are not the most competent judges of the appropriate sentence in the particular case. We are not told why the court in the domestic matter severely restricted defendant’s visitation rights. There was evidently no appeal of the custody decision, and the facts of the custody ease were not part of the record in this case. I am not willing to order a new trial on the mere supposition that the trial judge gave no thought to the fairness of the sentence.2 I also do not see that it is manifest that the jurors, two of whom were already acquainted with the defendant before trial and all of whom observed her testimony at trial, allowed their judgment to be highjacked by prosecutorial improbity.
It is always possible that some inadmissible evidence may have influenced a jury’s recommendation of sentence. But unless the trial court had an opportunity to address the issue, or the injustice is manifest, it is improper to presume prejudice by shifting the burden to the state to disprove prejudice.

. The opinion of the court recites the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, so we do not know what evidence was presented in behalf of the defendant. Id. at 69. The opinion of Shrum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, indicates that Judge Shrum viewed the evidence of guilt as "strong.” Id. at 74. His view of the evidence of guilt was, in fact, part of the reason for his dissent from the reversal of the conviction of involuntary manslaughter. Id.

. There are many things we do not know about the defendant. The record suggests that Ms. McClanahan may suffer from emotional disturbance and has had various conflicts with authority. E.g., State v. McClanahan, 930 S.W.2d 489 (Mo.App.1996). Whether or not jail time is an appropriate sanction for Ms. McClanahan is a difficult question, one which would not necessarily be resolved by ordering a new trial.