Court Opinion

ID: 9707883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:23:51.979815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.329246
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: I agree that it was within the trial judge’s discretion to entertain the motion to suppress even though defense counsel offered no explanation for the failure to present the motion prior to trial, as should have been done (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 114 — 11(a)). I do not agree that the defendant may now complain of the court’s denial of that motion. When the court indicated a willingness to entertain the motion to suppress, defense counsel called only one witness — defendant’s mother. At the conclusion of her testimony, defendant rested, and the prosecution made a two-sentence statement pointing out that the defendant had not met his burden and emphasizing that defendant’s statement had been prompted by his parents’ urgings. Defense counsel then stated: “Judge, that isn’t what the testimony I anticipated that witness was going to testify to so I have no argument on it.” While that statement may not have been the equivalent of withdrawal of the motion, defense counsel certainly seemed to be acquiescing in the prosecutor’s position. Clearly, counsel’s statement indicated her belief that the motion should be denied. Having led the court into what my colleagues now categorize as error, defendant should not be allowed to profit from it. People v. Van De Rostyne (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 364, 370. There is an additional reason why defendant’s conviction should be affirmed. There exists, in my judgment, not the slightest doubt that the defendant is the individual who threatened the complainants with a gun. Even if that gun, the evidence of where it lay, and the testimony that defendant led the officers to it are all suppressed as the appellate court held they should be, it is, to me, well-nigh incredible that a jury could reach a verdict other than guilty. Three eyewitnesses positively identified defendant. He did not testify, and his only defense was his sister’s testimony that she and defendant, who was drunk, had been at her home and were riding around in her car between 1 and 2 a.m. when the offense was committed. The error, if such it was, in denying the motion to suppress was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824; People v. Spicer (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 173, 183. I would reverse the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. MR. JUSTICE RYAN joins in this dissent.