Court Opinion

ID: 9606116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:47:10.595395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:33.117002
License: Public Domain

Prager, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from syllabus ¶ 4 and the corresponding portion of the opinion which hold the felony-murder doctrine to be applicable in this case. Here the aggravated burglary, the so-called independent felony required for invocation of the felony-murder rule, had, as an essential element, the intent to commit the same aggravated assault which was made upon the victim of the homicide. I cannot agree that the intent to commit the same assault may be used both as an element of the aggravated burglary and also as an element of the homicide, so as to make the felony-murder rule applicable. In that situation, the aggravated burglary is not a collateral felony but merges into the act of homicide. In his brief, counsel for the defendant offers two examples which demonstrate the injustice of the rule followed by the majority in this case. If a defendant approaches another man who is seated in an automobile, draws a gun, thrusts his arm through the window in the car, shoots, and unintentionally kills the man inside, he can be found guilty of felony murder. If on the other hand, a defendant approaches a man seated in an automobile, draws a gun, shoots and unintentionally kills the man inside, without thrusting his arm through the window, the defendant cannot be found guilty of felony murder. Such a distinction is not legally sound and is manifestly unjust. I reaffirm a similar position taken in my concurring and dissenting opinion in State v. Foy, 224 Kan. 558, 582 P.2d 281 (1978).