Court Opinion

ID: 9750837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:36:56.617187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:23.812505
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion. Defendant was denied the meaningful participation of an attorney throughout the entire jury selection process—a critical stage of the trial. In the absence of facts sufficient to prove waiver, his conviction cannot stand. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
An attorney can and should play a significant role in the selection of jurors. Counsel may suggest that the trial judge pursue lines of inquiry or ask particular questions during voir dire. The judge may permit counsel to “supplement the court’s interrogation.” R. l:8-3(a); see State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 281-283 (1969). The attorney may request that potential jurors be excused for cause. See State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55 (1979). Perhaps most importantly, he may exercise defendant’s peremptory challenges. See N.J.S.A. 2A:78-7(c)-(e); R. l:8-3(d). The skillful assertion of his client’s rights is essential to empaneling an impartial jury. Thus, experienced counsel can provide invaluable aid during jury selection. The total deprivation of that assistance cannot be sanctioned.
Since the majority correctly recognizes that defendant need not demonstrate specific prejudice due to the denial of counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, I am troubled by the extensive *380discussion of the jurors who sat at trial. The majority points out that several veniremen, while not necessarily subject to excusal for cause, see State v. Singletary, would have been likely subjects of peremptory challenges by an experienced attorney. Although this observation is accurate, its legal relevance is unclear. Once it is shown that defendant did not waive counsel and was denied the effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage of the trial, the inquiry is at an end. Any assessment of the jurors’ impartiality is unnecessary. Apparently, the majority is merely illustrating the importance of counsel by examining the facts of this case. To this extent I agree.
Our holding today does not in any way affect the authority of the Court’s decision in State v. Singletary. Singletary delineated “the bounds of reasonable discretion” of a trial judge when refusing to excuse a prospective juror for cause. 80 N.J. at 58. By ruling that a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel during the selection of jurors, the Court today does not express any view regarding the proper disposition of challenges for cause.
If the defendant had received the assistance of counsel, and if challenges for cause had been made, there might have been an opportunity to apply the standards enunciated in Singletary. The majority notes that it “[does] not suggest that the circumstances of the respective jurors [involved in this case] would, without considerably more development thereof, have afforded grounds for a challenge for cause,” citing Singletary. See ante at 377. While I agree with that statement, in the interest of clarity I would add that Singletary would not justify a summary or per se denial of such a challenge. When a possible source of prejudice is uncovered, “all doubts concerning a juror’s ‘sense of fairness or mental integrity’ ” must be eliminated by further questioning and observation; otherwise, the venireman must be excused for cause. Singletary, 80 N.J. at 65 (quoting State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160 (1964), cert. den. sub nom. *381Ravenall v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed.2d 572 (1965)). The legitimacy of trial by jury is maintained only when prejudice is exposed or its appearance dispelled. Today’s decision guarantees the assistance of counsel during that process.