Court Opinion

ID: 9860715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:30:34.935358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:32.767126
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in that it holds the habitual offender statute may not be applied to both con-viections of appellant.
The majority opinion reads into Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8 a restriction which I do not perceive to be present. The mere fact that both felonies could have been joined in a single prosecution, but were not, does not justify the ruling of the majority. The majority correctly holds that it was entirely proper for the State to prosecute those crimes separately. Although both crimes involved dealing in controlled substances, they in fact were separate and unrelated felonies under the intent and purpose of Ind.Code § 85-50-2-8.
The majority cites as their authority, Starks v. State (1988), Ind., 523 N.E.2d 735. Justice Pivarnik and I dissented in that case with the statement that in our belief the majority "invades the province of the legislature and adds a restriction to the statute by judicial fiat." Id. at 787. I adhere to my dissent in that case. I do not think it is proper for this Court in effect to amend a statute by narrowing its operation where there is no language in the statute to justify such a restriction.
I would affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety.