Court Opinion

ID: 1002808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:16:13.428125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:50.793368
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 00-4254

DARRYL LAMONTE HERNDON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.
Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District Judge.
(CR-99-58)

Submitted: September 20, 2000

Decided: October 17, 2000

Before LUTTIG and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Stacey Williams Moreau, WILLIAMS, MORRISON, LIGHT &
MOREAU, Danville, Virginia, for Appellant. Craig Jon Jacobsen,
Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Darryl Lamonte Harris appeals from his convictions and sentence
on two counts of distributing more than five grams of cocaine base
(crack). See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). On appeal he alleges that:
(1) the district court erroneously denied his motions that the Govern-
ment struck two jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986); (2) the evidence at trial revealed that he was entrapped as
a matter of law; (3) the district court clearly erred by increasing his
offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 3C1.1
(1998); and (4) the Government engaged in "sentencing entrapment"
and "sentencing manipulation" by having their cooperating buyers
request that Harris sell them crack rather than powder cocaine. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.

First, we find that the district court properly conducted a Batson
inquiry, at Harris' request, and did not err in determining that Harris
failed to show that the Government struck the jurors at issue because
of purposeful discrimination. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-
68 (1995); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 420 (4th Cir. 1995).

Second, an appellate court cannot overturn a jury's rejection of a
defendant's entrapment evidence, unless no rational trier of fact could
have found that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176,
180 (4th Cir. 1992). Here, there was ample evidence that Harris was
predisposed to commit his drug distribution crimes. Likewise, Harris'
clear perjury on the witness stand that he was not actually a drug
dealer, gave the district court a proper basis with which to determine
that he merited a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. See
USSG § 3C1.1; United States v. Dunnigan , 507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993).

Finally, this court has declined to recognize claims of "sentence
entrapment" and "sentence manipulation" in similar cases and
declines to do so in this appeal. See generally United States v. Jones,
18 F.3d 1145, 1152-55 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we affirm Har-
ris' convictions and sentence. We deny Harris' motion to substitute
his attorney. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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