Court Opinion

ID: 9621021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:50:38.990137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:08.119582
License: Public Domain

*822Dissenting opinion by
Chief Justice LAMBERT.
Respectfully, I dissent.
A cardinal principle of statutory construction is that courts refrain from a construction that would produce a ridiculous or absurd result.1 In my view, the majority opinion violates this principle.
Throughout, the majority opinion repeats the “owner of record” language in the statutes, but nowhere is there any explanation as to why the Legislature would have created a gaping hole in this ad valorem tax statute for the benefit of a handful of taxpayers and to the detriment of all other taxpayers. I suggest that the “owner of record” language is nothing more than boilerplate to describe “owner;” that “of record” is utterly meaningless and was placed in the statute by sheer inadvertence.
As noted in the majority opinion, KRS 186.010(7)(a) defines “owner” as one who holds.legal title or one who has received physical possession pursuant to a bona fide sale. Under either of these definitions, the O’Daniels were owners. The majority acknowledges as much, but reaches the mysterious conclusion that “We agree that the O’Daniels owned the vehicle on January 1, 1995, but we disagree with the Revenue Cabinet’s conclusion that ownership alone is sufficient to subject the O’Daniels to tax liability for the vehicle.” One must ask what possible reason the Legislature could have had for creating such a bizarre result, ie., exemption of an owner from an ad valorem tax which is a tax on the value of owned property.
In Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru,2 we held that for purposes of determining liability insurance coverage, “when the proper legal documents are transferred, from the dealer to the buyer, the responsibility for insurance coverage on the part of the dealer ceases.”3 This is a practical conclusion based on the principle that responsibility for compliance with the law rests upon the actual owner of the property. Instead of applying this sound principle to the ad valorem tax at. issue here, the majority has effectively placed responsibility on the prior owner, the automobile dealer who sold the vehicle, and required that dealer to pay ad valorem *823taxes on property which had been sold to another.

. Executive Branch Ethics Com’n v. Stephens, 92 S.W.3d 69 (Ky.2002). ("If there is any doubt from the language used by the legislature as to the intent and purpose of the law, then courts in interpreting the statute should avoid a construction which would be unreasonable and absurd in preference to one which is reasonable, rational, sensible and intelligent.”); Johnson v. Frankfort and Cincinnati, 303 Ky. 256, 197 S.W.2d 432 (1946) ("The words of the statute are to be given their plain meaning unless to do so would constitute an absurd result.”); See Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832 (Ky.1984); Cosby v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 56 (Ky.2004). ("General principles of statutory construction hold that a court must not be guided by a single sentence of a statute but must look to the provisions of the whole statute and its object and policy."); County of Harlan v. Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607, 611 (Ky.2002) ("No single word or sentence is determinative, but the statute as a whole must be considered.”) Id. (In addition, "[w]e have a duty to accord to words of a statute their literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion.”); Bailey v. Reeves, 662 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky.1984) (Moreover, "[i]n construing statutory provisions, it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.”); Commonwealth, Central State Hosp. v. Gray, 880 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky.1994) (The legislature's intention "shall be effectuated, even at the expense of the letter of the law.”); and Commonwealth v. Rosenfield Bros. & Co., 118 Ky. 374, 80 S.W. 1178, 1180 (Ky.1904).

. 947 S.W.2d 36 (Ky.1997).

. Id. at 38-39.