Court Opinion

ID: 9407644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 19:03:59.704211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.396222
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/7/23 In re J.J. CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In re J. J., a Person Coming                               B322284
 Under the Juvenile Court
 Law.                                                       (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. Nos.
                                                             18CCJP01157,
                                                             18CCJP01157B)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,

           v.

 A.J.,

      Defendant and
 Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
      Paul Couenhouven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

        Mother A.J. appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights over her son, J., following a
hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section
366.26.1 She argues that the trial court erred in denying her
section 388 petition on the grounds that she failed to show that
reinstating her reunification services was in the child’s best
interests. We find no error and affirm the trial court’s order.
                          BACKGROUND
I.      Prior Dependency History
        Mother has six children, E. (born 2011), H. (born 2013), Z.
(born 2014), J. (born 2018), D. (born 2020), and C. (born 2022).2
Mother had an extensive history with the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as a minor
and then as a parent. In 2011, DCFS filed a petition alleging
that mother placed E. in a dangerous situation by leaving him in
the care of maternal grandmother, who had a long history of
illicit drug use. The petition also alleged that mother had mental
and emotional problems and was involuntarily hospitalized, and

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
      2 This appeal concerns only J. The identity of J.’s father

(father) is unknown and he is not a party to the appeal. We
discuss details regarding mother’s other children where helpful
for background or relevant to the appeal.

                                 2
that E.’s father failed to provide the child with necessities
including food and shelter. Mother was still a minor at the time
and E. was only six weeks old. E. was removed from mother, her
reunification services were terminated, and the child was
adopted. In 2013, DCFS filed a petition on behalf of H. shortly
after the child’s birth, alleging that mother admitted to using
marijuana the day prior to giving birth, and had a history of
aggressive behavior and untreated mental health issues,
including bipolar disorder and depression. H. was removed,
reunification services were denied, and the child was adopted.
       In 2016, DCFS received a referral for Z. alleging physical
and emotional abuse by mother. The referral alleged that mother
became verbally aggressive toward Z.’s father, Robert, and
threatened to kill herself. DCFS closed the referral as
inconclusive after failing to contact mother.
II.    Referral and Petition
       The instant case arose in January 2018, when mother
presented at the emergency room with “a depressed and flat
affect.” Mother stated that she had no support at home and could
not care for Z. (then three years old) because mother slept all day.
Mother was 36 weeks pregnant with J. and stated that she had
not had any prenatal care because she did not feel like it and did
not know if she wanted to keep the child.
       A DCFS children’s social worker (CSW) met with mother in
the hospital. A nurse told the CSW that mother was on morphine
for pain and might be a little tired. Mother stated that her
pregnancy was due to a rape; she did not provide father’s
identity. Mother reported that she had been feeling depressed
due to the pregnancy, but intended to keep the baby and could

                                 3
care for the baby and Z. Mother told DCFS that she used
marijuana edibles. She denied mental health or substance issues.
      Mother gave birth to J. in February 2018. Two days after
the birth, the hospital’s medical social worker told the CSW that
hospital staff was concerned that mother might not wake up to
feed the baby once discharged. She stated that mother was a
deep sleeper and her medication was making her drowsy. Mother
confirmed that the medication was causing her to sleep deeply,
but stated that she had support at home from Z.’s father and her
roommate, and was capable of feeding J. on a schedule. The
following day, J.’s doctor reported that mother did not want to
wake up to care for or feed the baby, and that mother had fallen
asleep while feeding J., which caused J. to choke.
      The court granted a warrant to remove Z. and J. from
mother’s care on February 16, 2018. Z. remained with her father,
while J. was placed in foster care.
      DCFS filed a dependency petition on February 21, 2018 on
behalf of Z. and J. under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j).3
In counts b-1 and j-1, the petition alleged that mother had
“mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of Bi-
Polar Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression,”

      3  Section 300 states, in relevant part, “A child who comes
within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a
dependent child of the court: . . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has
suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or
inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or
protect the child. . . . [¶] (j) The child’s sibling has been abused or
neglected . . . and there is a substantial risk that the child will be
abused or neglected.”

                                   4
which rendered mother incapable of caring for the children. The
petition further alleged that mother failed to take her
psychotropic medication as prescribed and that E. and H.
previously received permanent placement services due to
mother’s mental and emotional problems. Counts b-2 and j-2
alleged that mother had a history of substance abuse, including
abusing marijuana during her pregnancy with J., and was a
current user of marijuana, rendering her incapable of caring for
Z. and J. Counts b-3 and j-3 alleged that mother had
“demonstrated limitations” in her ability to care for J., including
that on a number of occasions, mother “was unable to remain
awake when the child required care.” The petition further
alleged that mother was “unwilling to follow medical advice to
ensure the safe supervision of the child.”
       At the February 22, 2018 detention hearing, the court
found a prima facie case for jurisdiction over Z. and J. under
section 300. The court ordered Z. and J. detained; Z. remained
placed with her father, Robert, while J. remained in foster care.
The court ordered family reunification services for mother and
monitored visitation three times per week.
       In March 2018, J. was placed with maternal great-aunt
(MGA), with whom mother was living. At mother’s request and
over DCFS’s objection, the court allowed mother to continue to
live with MGA as long as she was fully compliant with her
medications, continued to see her psychiatrist and therapist
regularly, and was not left alone with the child.
III. Jurisdiction/Disposition Report
       In its April 2018 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS
reported that on March 14, mother called DCFS saying MGA was
upset with her because mother had not been home for five days.

                                 5
Mother got into an argument with MGA, then MGA’s adult son
threw mother against a wall.
       MGA told DCFS that things had been going well with J.
and mother, but then mother came back after being gone for six
days, and she “seemed agitated and looked like she had been on
the streets for days.” Mother started to argue and MGA told her
to leave so that things would not escalate in front of J. MGA told
DCFS that she had not spoken to mother since, but noted that
mother left her psychotropic medication behind. MGA opined
that mother was not capable of caring for any of her children.
       DCFS reported that J. was doing well with MGA. Mother
was visiting Z. regularly but had not visited J. since leaving
MGA’s home. DCFS recommended sustaining the petition with
no family reunification services for mother.
IV. Adjudication and disposition
       At the June 2018 adjudication hearing, the court sustained
the petition, exercising jurisdiction over Z. and J. under section
300, subdivisions (b) and (j), and finding that removing the
children was necessary.
       The court ordered monitored visitation for mother and
ordered DCFS to set up a written visitation schedule. The court
continued the matter for disposition.
       In August 2018, DCFS reported that mother had not
maintained contact with the department. Attempts to reach her
at her last known address and phone numbers were unsuccessful.
Thus, DCFS was not able to assess mother’s progress or generate
a visitation schedule.
       At the disposition hearing in August 2018, mother testified
that her parental rights had been terminated as to E. and H.
because she had no support and DCFS “wasn’t trying to help me

                                6
. . . and they terminated my parental rights immediately.”
However, she acknowledged that she was offered reunification
services for E., and that the case for those children lasted almost
four years. As to J., the court denied family reunification services
for mother per section 361.5, subdivision (b).4 The court ordered
monitored visitation for mother and ordered DCFS to establish a
written visitation schedule.
V.      Termination
        DCFS filed a section 366.26 report in December 2018,
reporting that J. was placed with maternal great-cousin (MGC)
and her husband after MGA became ill. J. appeared very bonded
with them, but DCFS could not approve them for permanent
placement because of MGC’s husband’s criminal history. DCFS
reported that mother visited J. once in June and then eight times
in September through November. Mother was generally
appropriate and attentive during visits. She was affectionate and
J. responded by smiling and laughing. Mother fed and changed
him without assistance.
        In a January 2019 status report, DCFS stated that mother
had remained in contact with the department during this period
and had been visiting J. Mother attended 18 visits between
August 2018 and January 2019. DCFS reported that mother
usually attended visits with Z. and mother’s boyfriend, Duane.
Mother’s “behavior has improved and [she] has become more
friendly and open.” Mother’s behavior with J. was always

      4  Section 361.5, subdivision (b) permits a court to deny
reunification services upon a finding by clear and convincing
evidence that, as relevant here, the parent failed to reunify with
a sibling or half-sibling of the child, resulting in termination of
reunification services and/or parental rights for that sibling.

                                 7
appropriate, she was able to soothe him and attend to his needs.
Mother expressed her desire to regain custody of J.
      The court ordered adoption as the permanent plan on
February 13, 2019. DCFS sought to place J. with a prospective
adoptive family, given the issues with permanent placement with
MGC and her husband. At the request of counsel for J., the court
ordered J. not to be removed from MGC’s custody without noticed
hearing or exigent circumstances, and ordered DCFS to assess
MGC for legal guardianship.
      In July 2019, DCFS reported that MGC was appealing the
denial of approval of her home for adoption. J. was happy,
healthy, and strongly bonded to MGC and her family. Mother
had been seeing a therapist and psychiatrist weekly since
November 2018. Mother was regularly attending her visits with
J. and was interactive and engaging during the visits.
      In a last-minute information filed September 25, 2019,
DCFS reported that mother continued to visit with J. once per
week, monitored by MGC. The visits were going well, mother
was appropriate in playing with J., changing his diaper, and
feeding him. There were no concerns reported. DCFS
recommended that the court lift the do-not-remove order and
refer J. for adoptive matching.
      At multiple hearings throughout 2019, the court denied
DCFS’s request to lift the do-not-remove order, and continued the
contested permanency planning hearing pending resolution of
MGC’s appeal regarding the adoption. MGC’s appeal was
dismissed in December 2019.5

     5 MGC submitted a request to reopen her appeal in early
2020. The do-not-remove order remained in effect until June
2021.

                                8
       Mother filed a section 388 petition (form JV-180) on
January 29, 2020. She requested that the court change its order
denying her family reunification services. In the section
regarding changed circumstances, mother stated that she had
engaged in mental health counseling and an outpatient program
since of November 2018. She also stated that she had completed
a mental health assessment and started a treatment plan. She
requested that the court grant unmonitored visits, including
overnights and weekends, and/or return J. to her custody. She
stated that it was in J.’s “best interest to be reunited with his
now stable mother.”
       The court set the section 388 petition for a hearing and
ordered DCFS to file a responding report. The hearing and the
permanency planning hearing were continued due to the COVID-
19 pandemic.
       In a December 2020 report, DCFS stated that mother and
Duane had moved into a new apartment together in May 2020,
and since then their relationship had been “very rocky.” Mother
gave birth to D., her child with Duane, in June 2020. In July
2020, Duane was granted sole custody of D. DCFS reported that
mother had verbally threatened and physically struck Duane and
Renee, D.’s paternal grandmother who was monitoring mother’s
visits. Mother also ran into a retaining wall with D. in the car
following a disagreement with Duane. After Renee filed a
restraining order against mother, the court suspended mother’s
visits with D.
       Mother continued to have weekly monitored visits with J.
and was “very interactive and engaging” with the child.
However, DCFS expressed concerns with mother’s mental state
and behaviors in late 2020, as she was the subject of six referrals

                                 9
with allegations of general neglect as to Z., J., and D. DCFS also
noted that mother had also been involved in multiple domestic
violence incidents with Duane.
       In October 2020, DCFS filed a section 300 petition
regarding D., alleging general neglect by mother and Duane. D.
was removed from mother and Duane and placed with Renee.
That same month, mother’s therapist reported that mother had
not continued with her weekly therapy sessions. The therapist
told DCFS that she had not seen or heard from mother since
August, and prior to that time, the counseling sessions were
inconsistent. In December 2020, DCFS reported that mother had
not been in contact with the department in over a month and
efforts to contact her were not successful.
       On December 29, 2020, the court denied mother’s section
388 petition following a hearing, finding no change in
circumstances. The court continued the permanency planning
hearing to June 2021.
       On April 1, 2021, DCFS received a call from mother’s
neighbor reporting that she heard mother “screaming and
cussing” at J. The CSW then found a video posted online
recording the incident. As described by the CSW, on the video a
woman could be heard yelling, “Look at that TV, and I will whip
that ass! Face the wall!” A child is then heard screaming, with
sounds of a person or object being struck repeatedly and a
woman’s voice stating, “Bring your ass over here! Stop fucking
running! . . . You’re three years old bro!”
       DCFS concluded that MGC had violated the court’s orders
by allowing mother unlimited access to J., including
unmonitored, overnight visits at mother’s home. Consequently,

                                10
DCFS detained J. and Z.6 and placed them both with a foster
family (the A. family). DCFS reported that these allegations
were later substantiated.
       DCFS reported that mother had minimal contact with J.
after he was placed with the A. family. Mother’s visitation
schedule included one in-person visit per week and virtual
contact every day during a set window of time. However, mother
had only two virtual visits in April 2021 and one in-person visit,
during which the caregiver reported that mother seemed distant
from J. and paid more attention to Z. The caregiver also stated
that mother had not made herself available for Facetime calls.
Additionally, mother had not made herself available to make a
statement to DCFS during this period.
       On June 1, 2021, the A. family stated that they could no
longer care for J., as his behaviors were escalating and they were
moving. At a hearing on June 29, 2021, the court lifted its prior
do-not-remove order, allowing J. to proceed to adoptive matching.
The court continued the permanency planning hearing.
       In June 2021, J. was placed into the home of prospective
adoptive parents Ms. Y. and Mr. C. (the Y. family). In a report
filed in October 2021, DCFS stated that J. was doing well with
the Y. family and appeared bonded to them. The Y. family
expressed a desire to adopt J.

      6 Previously, the court had terminated jurisdiction over Z.
with a family law order giving Robert sole physical and joint legal
custody. Mother continued to have monitored visitation with Z.,
but Robert had allowed mother to have unmonitored visitation in
violation of the court’s orders. Following this incident, Z. was
removed from both mother and Robert.

                                11
       Mother had two in-person visits in August 2021. During a
visit on August 11, 2021, J. greeted mother and Duane by calling
them “mom” and “dad” and hugging them. The CSW, Wade
Shinn, observed J. throw sand at mother, who responded, “Stop
throwing that shit at me I will throw it back,” and also stated,
“Don’t you fucking dare throw that again.” The second visit, the
following week, was monitored by Renee, D.’s paternal
grandmother, and included J., Z., and D. Renee reported no
concerns with mother’s interactions with J. CSW Shinn reported
that visits were then put on hold due to an “unexpected family
tragedy,” but were scheduled to resume on September 29, 2021.
       In October 2021, the court continued the permanency
planning hearing to January 2022 to allow J. to meet the
adoption criteria of living with the Y. family for six months. At
the request of mother’s counsel, the court also ordered DCFS to
provide an update as to mother’s visitation.
       In a status review report filed in December 2021, DCFS
stated that J. continued to appear comfortable with the Y. family
and was bonding with them. Ms. Y reported that J.’s tantrums
had decreased. The Y. family remained committed to adopting J.
       DCFS reported that since the last hearing in October,
monitored visits with J. stopped because mother changed her
phone number and did not provide the new number to DCFS.
The CSW was able to obtain mother’s number from Renee on
November 18, and visits resumed on November 22, 2021.
       At a hearing on February 8, 2022, the court continued the
permanency planning hearing at the request of J.’s counsel.
Mother’s counsel asked the court to order DCFS to facilitate
visitation and to provide a written schedule, noting that there
had been a “delay” in visits for the past month and a half. The

                               12
court ordered DCFS to file an update regarding visits and to
provide a written visitation schedule for mother.
       CSW Shinn monitored a visit between mother and J. on
February 12, 2022. CSW Shinn reported that upon arrival, J. did
not acknowledge mother, but ran to hug Z. The CSW also
reported that mother was visibly pregnant. J. played with Z. for
most of the visit, and mother watched from a distance but
“participated when physically capable.” The CSW observed that
mother paid most of her attention to D.
       Mother contacted CSW Shinn on February 21, asking about
visits. He informed mother on March 1, 2022 that he was
attempting to acquire a monitor or to rearrange his own schedule
if necessary. The next scheduled visit occurred on March 5, 2022.
Mother had given birth to C., her second child with Duane, a few
days prior. During the visit, mother, J., and CSW Shinn went to
a convenience store. CSW Shinn reported that, while exiting the
store, mother was not holding J.’s hand and he began to run into
the parking lot toward the street. Mother had no reaction to the
incident and the CSW had to run to J. to stop him. Mother also
did not hold J.’s hand walking through the parking lot or crossing
the street, so the CSW did so. At the end of the visit, J. said he
was tired and wanted to go home to the Y. family, whom he called
“mom and dad.” J. also referred to their adopted nephew as “my
brother.”
       CSW Shinn texted mother on March 26 and April 2, 2022 to
cancel visits due to family emergency and illness. Mother
responded to the first text only. According to CSW Shinn, mother
did not respond to his texts or calls on April 5, 8, or 11 to
schedule makeup visits.

                               13
       A Human Service Aide (HSA) was assigned to monitor
visits in early April, with the first visit set for April 12, 2022.
Mother did not respond until April 21, sending a text from an
unknown number, asking “what is going on with my visits?” The
CSW responded with the day, time, and location for weekly visits
going forward and asked mother to confirm with the CSW or the
HSA 24 hours in advance. The CSW stated that he scheduled the
visits for a weekday as mother had previously requested, at
Norman O. Houston park (Houston park). Mother responded on
April 22 that Houston park was “too far” and that she could not
make the selected day because she had to work. After mother
failed to confirm monitored visits for three weeks, the HSA-
monitored visits were terminated. Mother told the CSW that she
wanted the visits on the weekend at a different park.
       The CSW submitted a new HSA request for a monitor. The
CSW contacted mother on May 18 to attempt to schedule a visit
but mother became agitated and terminated the call.
       In DCFS’s May 2022 report, CSW Shinn stated that
mother’s contact with him had been sporadic since the February
2022 hearing, made from several different phone numbers. He
also reported that mother failed to provide a current address and
when asked about providing an updated phone number, mother
responded, “I don’t need to, it’s your job to get it.” Mother told
the CSW that she was doing well, she was living with Duane, and
was participating in anger management and domestic violence
classes. She stated that DCFS was “trying to keep me away from
my son.” CSW Shinn explained that mother’s refusal to provide
updated contact information or to keep in contact with DCFS
meant that he was unable to meet with mother to review and
sign a written monitored visitation agreement. DCFS attached

                                14
an unsigned written visitation schedule, reflecting weekday
visitation for two hours once per week.
      DCFS also reported that mother was not granted family
reunification services in the cases involving D. and Z. Mother
also had an open case involving her youngest child, C. As to J.,
DCFS recommended terminating mother’s parental rights and
visitation.
      Mother filed a second section 388 petition on May 24, 2022.
She asked the court to return J. to her care, or to grant family
reunification services and/or unmonitored and overnight and
weekend visits. She stated that the change would be in J.’s best
interests because J. would “benefit from the already established
relationship with his mother.”
      In her accompanying declaration, mother stated that she
had “participated in the recommended services and have been
addressing the case issues that brought this matter before the
Court.” Mother stated that she completed 12 sessions of domestic
violence classes on March 14, 2022 and 16 sessions of a parenting
program on June 21, 2021. She also completed an anger
management program with 21 sessions on January 17, 2022, and
continued to participate in the program for support. She applied
for mental health services and individual counseling, but stated
that she did not qualify because she was not in crisis. She also
did not qualify for a substance abuse program for her marijuana
use. Mother stated she had tested negative for all substances
three times since February 26, 2022. She declared that she was
focused on being in her children’s lives and would do anything to
have them returned to her. As evidence of her progress, she
pointed to the decision by DCFS to allow infant C. to remain in

                               15
her care. Mother attached certificates of completion for domestic
violence program, parenting education, and anger management.
       Mother also stated that the weekly visits with J. “have
been difficult to schedule since my social worker has been
consistently unavailable to monitor the visits or does not respond
to my requests.” She stated that she believed J. and D. would
benefit from being returned to her care and “continuing to
establish their relationship with their mother in the comfort and
safety of our own home.”
       The court ordered a hearing on mother’s petition and
ordered DCFS to submit a response. DCFS filed a status review
report on June 29, 2022. CSW Shinn reported that he attempted
to contact mother on June 16 to schedule visitation but received
no response. J.’s caregiver, Ms. Y., told the CSW that the
visitation location requested by mother was too far to travel and
requested weekday visits. Mother texted the CSW on June 17
stating that she could only visit J. on the weekend and that it had
to occur at the park she had requested. DCFS concluded that it
had accommodated mother’s requests for visits, but mother
continued to vacillate in her requests regarding an acceptable
schedule and failed to maintain regular contact with DCFS.
       DCFS filed a response to the section 388 petition on July 5,
2022. CSW Shinn stated that he spoke with CSW Jennifer
Fregoso, who was assigned to D.’s case. CSW Fregoso stated that
mother told her she worked nights Monday through Saturday,
contrary to mother’s statement to CSW Shinn that she worked
Monday through Friday during the day. Fregoso also reported
that mother did not visit consistently with D. and when she did
visit, she spent the visit doing Z.’s hair. CSW Shinn also reported
that when he attempted to contact mother in June by phone and

                                16
email to discuss visitation, mother responded by text, “I have
already told you what I can do, and where I am comfortable doing
the visit. I do not have to talk to you.”
       DCFS filed a last-minute information on July 12, 2022,
reporting that on July 12, 2022, the CSW sent mother a new
visitation schedule, with weekly visits occurring on Saturdays at
a recreation area halfway between mother and the Y. family
residence. Mother responded by text that “I told you where I
wanted to have my visit,” because it was near her other child’s
daycare and she did not “know if that’s a safe area for my son and
me to have my visit.” DCFS concluded that mother “remains
unwilling to work with the Department as to the location of the
monitored visitation.”
       Mother submitted an exhibit list in advance of the section
388 hearing, including a declaration from Renee disputing CSW
Shinn’s description of the February 12, 2022 visit between
mother, J., and J.’s siblings. Renee stated that J. hugged mother
when she arrived, and that mother played with J. for most of the
visit. Renee also denied telling CSW Shinn that she could no
longer monitor visits.
       Mother also attached excerpts of text message
conversations with CSW Shinn,7 including texts by mother on
February 14 and 16, asking when she would have her next visit,
and a response by Shinn on February 17 that he would call later
that day, he was “trying to confirm dates.” This was followed by
texts from mother on February 18, 21, 23, and March 1, asking
about visits. CSW Shinn responded on March 4 that there was a

      7 The phone numbers are not listed, but there appear to be
text threads from at least two phone numbers used by mother.

                               17
visit scheduled for the following day. The visit proceeded on
March 5.
       The text chains also included texts from mother on March
11, 14, 16, 18 asking about visits. On March 18, mother stated
that it would be the second week she had not seen J. On March
24, 2022, CSW Shinn texted that the next scheduled visit was set
for March 26 at Houston park. Mother responded that she did
not have gas to drive that far, and thought they were meeting at
Lynwood park. CSW Shinn texted on March 26 that the visit
scheduled for that day would be cancelled due to a personal
family emergency, and that he would contact mother the
following week to reschedule. Mother responded, “Ok.” CSW
Shinn also texted to cancel the visit on April 2, stating that he
was not feeling well, and rescheduling for the following Saturday.
       Mother texted on April 14 and 21, asking “what is going on
with my visits,” and noting that she had not seen J. in a month.
CSW Shinn responded on April 22, stating that he had been
attempting to reach mother using a different phone number for
the past two weeks. CSW Shinn informed mother that he was
“able to move the visit date and time,” to Tuesday afternoons at
Houston park, and asked mother to confirm with Shinn or the
HSA. Mother responded that the park was too far and she could
not have visitation on Tuesdays because she had to work. On
April 28 and May 7, mother texted asking about visits.
       The court held a hearing regarding permanency planning
and mother’s section 388 petition on July 13, 2022.8 In support of

      8  In addition to issues regarding J., the court terminated
jurisdiction as to Z., granting sole legal and physical custody to
Robert, with monitored visitation to mother. The court also

                                 18
her section 388 petition, mother testified that she suffered from
postpartum depression after giving birth to D., which caused
issues in her relationship with Duane, and acknowledged that
there was domestic violence in their relationship. She also
acknowledged mental health issues and physical abuse as
reasons for DCFS involvement, and testified that she had
attended parenting, domestic violence, and anger management
classes to address those issues. Mother stated that she was
trying to get back into therapy, but had not yet been approved.
Mother also detailed what she had learned in her classes. In
addition, mother testified that during their visits, J. would run to
her, scream “mommy,” and give her a hug. She stated that
during the last visit, J. said he missed her and wanted to come
home. She testified that she did not have any visits with J. from
October 26 to December 22, 2021, and that in 2022, she had only
had two visits.
       During argument, mother’s counsel stressed her completion
of programs and her testimony regarding what she had learned
in arguing that mother had shown a change of circumstances
supporting her section 388 petition. She argued that there had
been no new domestic violence incidents since December 2020
and that infant C. had been released to mother’s care. She also
cited to evidence that J. loved and missed mother.
       J.’s counsel argued mother had not established changed
circumstances, noting that mother had stopped her therapy in
2021. He also argued that granting the petition was not in J.’s
best interests, given that mother had failed to consistently visit J.
He argued that it was a consistent pattern for mother in failing to

terminated jurisdiction as to D., awarding a legal guardianship to
Renee.

                                 19
take advantage of any of the virtual visits offered or consistently
attend in person visits, despite the length of the case. Counsel
for DCFS also argued for denial of the petition, noting that
mother had not consistently engaged in services regarding her
mental health, despite that being an ongoing issue in multiple
petitions. She also argued that mother had not established that a
change would be in J.’s best interest, noting that although
mother was focusing on recent issues with visitation, “there is a
large portion of 2021 where mother was not actively visiting,”
and she had failed to maintain consistent contact with DCFS.
       The court found that mother had demonstrated changed
circumstances, noting that she completed several programs and
was able to retain custody of C. However, the court found it
would not be in J.’s best interest to grant the petition. The court
observed that J. had spent more time outside mother’s custody
than in her custody. The court also noted that “the timelines for
children of that age with respect to parents’ compliance with
their case plans are shorter,” and although mother recently had
begun to make an effort, it had less bearing on J.’s best interests
given the long duration of the case. The court therefore denied
the petition.
       Turning to permanency planning, the court found that
continued jurisdiction was necessary and by clear and convincing
evidence that J. was adoptable. The court further found that no
exceptions to adoption applied, as mother had not maintained
regular visitation with J., had not established a bond with the
child, and that any benefit from his relationship with mother was
outweighed by the benefit received through the permanency and
stability of adoption. The court noted that there was evidence of
“some delays by the social worker in getting back to mom,” but

                                20
that those issues arose “in 2022, and they come at the very end of
a frankly prolonged period of this child not being in mom’s
custody, as well as coming at the end of a period in 2021 where
mom did not have any visits or had very limited visits that
started to grow shorter in frequency.” The court therefore
terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights. The court
found it was in J.’s best interest to set adoption as the permanent
plan and identified the Y. family as the prospective adoptive
family.
      Mother timely appealed the court’s July 13, 2022 orders.
                           DISCUSSION
      Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in denying
her second section 388 petition. She argues that DCFS failed to
provide the weekly visitation ordered by the court after April
2021, therefore breaking the bond she had previously shared with
J. and leading to the court’s finding that granting the petition
would not be in J.’s best interest. Mother urges us to reverse the
denial of her section 388 petition and, consequently, reverse the
termination of her parental rights. We find no abuse of
discretion.
      A.     Legal Principles
      Pursuant to section 388, a parent may petition the juvenile
court for modification of any previous order based upon changed
circumstances or new evidence. (In re Alayah J. (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 469, 478.) A parent may seek relief under section
388 even after the juvenile court has terminated family
reunification services. “After reunification services have been
terminated, it is presumed that continued out-of-home care is in
the child’s best interests. [Citation.] Section 388 allows a parent
to rebut that presumption by demonstrating changed

                                21
circumstances that would warrant modification of a prior court
order.” (Ibid.)
       To obtain modification of an order under section 388, the
parent must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence,
both a change of circumstances or new evidence, and that the
proposed change is in the best interests of the child. (In re
Alayah J., supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 478; In re Mickel O. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) In evaluating a section 388 petition,
the juvenile court may consider factors such as “the seriousness
of the reason leading to the child’s removal, the reason the
problem was not resolved, the passage of time since the child’s
removal, the relative strength of the bonds with the child, the
nature of the change of circumstance, and the reason the change
was not made sooner.” (In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th
at p. 616; see also In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519,
530-532.) The analysis is a searching one; the court may consider
the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re
Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) “In assessing the
best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal
of assuring stability and continuity.’” (Ibid.)
       “Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the
focus shifts [from reunification] to the child’s need for
permanency and stability,” and a presumption arises that
“continued care [under the dependency system] is in the best
interest of the child.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295,
309–310.) After reunification services are terminated, inquiry
into a child’s best interests includes consideration of his or her
need for permanency and stability. (In re J.C. (2014) 226
Cal.App.4th 503, 526–527.)

                                  22
       We review the juvenile court’s denial of a section 388
petition for abuse of discretion. (In re C.J.W. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081.)
       B.    Analysis
       Mother argues that DCFS’s failure to provide her with
court-ordered weekly visitation deprived her of her due process
rights and “effectively predetermined” the court’s denial of her
section 388 petition. We disagree.
       Mother focuses exclusively on the latter part of 2021 and
the beginning of 2022, arguing that her “strong bond” with J. was
broken due to lapses in visitation during that period. She points
to several instances where CSW Shinn failed to timely respond to
her text messages, cancelled visits, or failed to schedule them for
several weeks.
       There is evidence in the record to support mother’s claim
that some visits were missed due to communication issues on
DCFS’s part. However, mother ignores the evidence that she too
bore responsibility for the lack of visitation. As documented by
DCFS, there were multiple months when mother failed to
respond to DCFS and failed or refused to provide updated contact
information to the CSW. Indeed, after months of attempts by the
CSW to secure an HSA to monitor visitation, mother repeatedly
failed to confirm visits, resulting in cancellation of that monitor.
CSW Shinn also documented his repeated attempts to work with
mother and J.’s caregivers on a visitation schedule, which was
stymied by mother’s inflexibility regarding time and location of
the visits. Tellingly, although mother had four and a half years
of visitation, she never progressed beyond monitored visits. She
cannot point to missed visits at the very end of that time period
as the basis for her inability to strengthen her bond with J.

                                23
       Additionally, we find that it was well within the juvenile
court’s discretion to conclude that mother’s request for
reunification services or custody was not in J.’s best interest.
Notably, the court did not cite mother’s visitation (or lack thereof)
as a basis for this finding. Rather, the court was entitled to
consider the entire record, including evidence that mother
continued to struggle with addressing the issues that brought her
before the court. Notably, although mother’s brief argued that
J.’s removal from MGC in April 2021 resulted in a breakdown in
visitation, she does not include a discussion of her conduct
precipitating J’s removal. Specifically, mother violated the
court’s orders by having unmonitored visits with both J. and Z.,
then physically and verbally abused three-year-old J. to the
extent that her neighbors called law enforcement and recorded
video of the incident.
       The court was also entitled to weigh J.’s interest in
permanency and stability. At the time of the hearing on mother’s
petition, J. had been involved in the current dependency
proceedings for four and a half years, since shortly after he was
born. He had lived out of mother’s custody for most of that time,
had lived with the Y. family for more than six months, and was
well-bonded to and comfortable with them. The court was not
required to disrupt J.’s life at this late stage based on mother’s
belated claims here. (See In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
38, 47 [“‘[C]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become
adequate.’”].) As the trial court found, the fact that mother was
allowed to retain custody of C. at the beginning of his case helped
to establish changed circumstances, but was not highly relevant
to whether she had met her burden to demonstrate that it would
be in J.’s best interest to delay permanency after more than four

                                 24
years by reinstating reunification services. (See In re C.J.W.,
supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 1081 [“there was no showing
whatsoever of how the best interests of these young children
would be served by depriving them of a permanent, stable home
in exchange for an uncertain future”], citing In re Stephanie M.
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.)
       Mother’s reliance on In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th
1497 (Hunter) is misplaced. There, the five-year old minor was
detained and placed with a grandmother while the mother was
incarcerated. (Id. at pp. 1500-1501.) The mother maintained
contact with the minor through monthly letters, complied with
her case plan, and completed several programs while in prison.
(Ibid.) When the mother was released over a year and a half
later, she entered a rehabilitation center where she attempted to
maintain contact with the minor via phone. The child began
refusing to accept the mother’s calls and stopped responding to
her letters. (Id. at p. 1501.) The juvenile court ordered DCFS to
set up “visitation for [the mother] as can be arranged through her
[rehabilitation program.” (Ibid.) Although the mother
persevered in her efforts to visit the child, he refused almost all
contact with her and refused all visitation. (Id. at p. 1502.)
Although the mother and her counsel repeatedly informed the
court during two years of proceedings that she had not seen her
son, the court failed to rule on the mother’s requests. (Id. at pp.
1502-1504.) The juvenile court denied the mother’s section 388
petition, terminated her parental rights, and found the child
adoptable. (Id. at p. 1504.)
       The Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court had
erred in granting the mother monitored visitation “as can be
arranged.” (Hunter, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.) The

                                25
court reasoned that “[w]hile the court granted visitation in
theory, none was permitted in reality.” The appellate court
concluded that the effect of the juvenile court’s order was to give
the child “virtually complete discretion to veto visitation, and
indeed all contact, with his mother, a discretion he exercised
without any oversight or direction by the court. This was clearly
improper. The juvenile court cannot impermissibly delegate to
the child’s therapist, DCFS or any third person, unlimited
discretion to determine whether visitation is to occur.” (Ibid.)
The court further found that the juvenile court erred in denying
the mother’s section 388 petition, which was “the court’s last
opportunity to rectify three years of errors in failing to enforce
the visitation orders, errors which led inexorably to erosion of the
intimate bond [the mother] once shared with her son. (Id. at p.
1506.)
      Here, by contrast, the court ordered weekly visitation for
mother throughout the pendency of the case. As discussed above,
although the record suggests some lapses by DCFS in its ability
to provide weekly visits, mother also played a substantial part in
the failure to comply with the court-ordered visitation. Mother
also continued to have at least some visitation, but despite over
four years of proceedings, she was never able to advance beyond
monitored visits. Thus, she has not shown that any error by the
juvenile court or DCFS deprived her of the opportunity to
establish a bond with J. such that she was entitled to
reinstatement of her reunification services.

                                26
                        DISPOSITION
     The orders denying mother’s section 388 petition and
terminating her parental rights are affirmed.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, ACTING, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

      
        Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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