Court Opinion

ID: 9915564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:00:40.984421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:35.195079
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30329         Document: 00517023155             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                       No. 23-30329
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                 January 5, 2024
                                     Summary Calendar
                                     ____________                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Kenny James Len Choate,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 1:22-CR-111-1
                      ______________________________

   Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Kenny James Len Choate was charged in a six-count indictment for
   possession and receipt of child pornography. Pursuant to a plea agreement,
   Choate pleaded guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). He was sentenced to 240 months of
   imprisonment and ordered to pay a total of $103,000 in restitution to
   identified victims.

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-30329       Document: 00517023155          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/05/2024

                                     No. 23-30329

          For the first time on appeal, Choate argues that the district court
   plainly erred under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 by awarding restitution to the victims
   of charges that were included in the indictment but were dismissed following
   his plea deal. According to Choate, restitution should have been ordered only
   for his “offense of conviction”—that is, for the one count to which he
   pleaded guilty.
          It is true that defendants convicted of certain crimes involving child
   pornography are statutorily obligated to pay restitution to only those victims
   identified in the “offense of conviction.” See United States v. Bopp, 79 F.4th
   567, 571 (5th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 660-
   61 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he restitution award can encompass only those losses
   that resulted directly from the offense for which the defendant was
   convicted.”). But defendants can agree, pursuant to a plea agreement, to pay
   restitution “to persons other than the victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.
   § 3663(a)(3). And that is what Choate did here. His plea agreement provides
   that he would “make restitution to the victim(s) in this case.” The plain
   meaning of the phrase “this case” is broad enough to encompass victims of
   the charges not only included in Choate’s plea agreement but also those in
   the indictment. Case, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“A
   civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit or controversy at law or in equity.”).
   The broader meaning of “this case” also tracks with how that phrase was
   used elsewhere in the plea agreement. In subsection B, for example, Choate
   agreed to “appear in open court and plead guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment
   pending in this case.”
          Choate, for his part, argues that “this case” is ambiguous at best and
   that, in any event, it should be strictly construed against the government. See
   United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 501 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] plea
   agreement is construed strictly against the Government as drafter.”). He also
   points to a handful of unpublished decisions that he says show how the

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Case: 23-30329         Document: 00517023155               Page: 3      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

                                          No. 23-30329

   government routinely uses alternative language in plea agreements when it
   seeks to expand restitution beyond the “offense of conviction.” 1
           We are unpersuaded. If indeed “this case” is ambiguous, Choate
   cannot show on plain-error review why his interpretation of it is not “subject
   to reasonable dispute.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).
   Nor are we inclined to say that the district court’s understanding of it was
   “clear or obvious” error, id., particularly when Choate’s reading would
   render the plea agreement’s restitution clause meaningless. See United States
   v. Cluff, 857 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2017) (“In interpreting terms of a plea
   agreement, courts are to apply general principles of contract law.”). As even
   Choate acknowledges, the one victim in his “offense of conviction” was not
   among the many who requested restitution. Under Choate’s interpretation,
   then, he owes $0 in restitution—an interpretation that sits uncomfortably
   with his submission below that he “d[id] not oppose the government’s
   request for the statutory minimum of $3,000 for victims whose images
   appeared in the evidence in this case.” We are thus unmoved to vacate the
   district court’s restitution order as plain error.
                                                                       AFFIRMED.

           1
              See, e.g., United States v. Childers, 740 F. App’x 417, 418 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (“Pursuant to his plea agreement, [the defendant] agreed ‘that restitution in this case is
   not limited to the offense of conviction . . . .’”); United States v. Lopez, 684 F. App’x 375,
   376 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[The defendant’s] plea agreement specifically provided that he would
   pay ‘full restitution’ to all victims ‘regardless of the count(s) of conviction.’”); United
   States v. Herrera, 606 F. App’x 748, 751 (5th Cir. 2015) (observing that the defendant’s
   plea agreement provided that her restitution “may include restitution arising from all
   relevant conduct, not limited to that arising from the offense of conviction alone”).

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