Court Opinion

ID: 9789281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:33:13.360784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:21.257190
License: Public Domain

Justice HOBBS,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority acknowledges that section 19-2-511(5) "requires that a juvenile be accompanied by a parent when making statements to the police, unless the juvenile and parent expressly waive that right." Maj. op. at 547. (emphasis added). I agree. The majority also acknowledges that the statute requires a written waiver to this effect. Maj. op. at 549. I agree. The majority then holds that the written waiver the parents, but not the juvenile, signed in this case effectively waived the juvenile's right under the statute to have a parent present during the police interrogation. Maj. op. at 550. I disagree.
The statute does not give effect to a waiver executed by a parent but not the juvenile. The statutory right to have a parent present during custodial interrogation is the juvenile's right to waive, and this may not be waived solely by his parents on his behalf. See § 19-2-511(5), 6 C.R.S. (2001). Jeron Grant did not write the waiver, sign, or initial it. There are no indications on the face of this document that Jeron Grant adopted the waiver form as his own. Therefore, there is no juvenile express waiver in writing in this case.
L.
A. The Written Waiver Here . Is Only The Parent's
The waiver in this case was not the juvenile's, regardless of whether or not he signed it. The written instrument the majority assumes to be the juvenile's waiver is plainly only. a written parental waiver, not-as the majority acknowledges to be the law-a written juvenile and parental waiver. The instrument did not include a clear written statement that (1) the right to have a parent present during the interrogation is the juvenile's and (2) having been advised of this right, the juvenile expressly waives it.
The waiver form stated the following: .
JUVENILE INTERVIEW WAIVER
I, KATHY E. HOWELL, his or keeKH parent/guardian/legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement that *551the parent/guardian/legal or physical custodian be present during interrogation of the juvenile. >
This express waiver shall be in writing and shall be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and his or kerKH parent/guardian/legal or physical custodian of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement by a law enforcement official.
If said requirement is expressly waived, statements or admissions of the juvenile shall not be inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of the juvenile's parent/guardian/legal or physical custodian during interrogation.
The waiver form next contained a line requesting the name and date of birth of the juvenile, which was apparently filled in by the police officer. Finally, the form contained a signature line for the "Person Signing the Waiver" and a line requesting the signing person's "Relationship" to the juvenile. Kathy E. Howell signed the form and stated her relationship to the juvenile as "mother."
Nowhere on the document does a space exist for the juvenile to indicate his acceptance or rejection of the waiver. This accords with the entire language and tenor of the document. It contemplates only a written parental waiver. The first line of the waiver form states, "I, KATHY E. HOWELL, his parent /guardian/legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement that the parent/guardian/legal or physical custodian be present during interrogation of the juvenile" (Emphasis added.) The clear and unequivocal purpose of this document was to obtain and record Kathy Howell's written waiver, not her son's.
The writing here does not comply with section 19-2-511(5). Where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, "there is no need to resort to interpretive rules of statutory construction." Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, Inc., 48 P.8d 1215, 1218 (Colo.2002). "In construing statutory provisions, our obligation is not to make policy decisions but rather to give full effect to the legislative intent." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d 465, 469 (Colo.1998). We must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly, not second guess its judgment. Id.
Here, the plain language of the statute is clear and unambiguous. A parent's presence 1, during custodial interrogation of a juvenile is mandatory. Nicholas v. People, 978 P.2d 1213, 1216 (Colo.1999). Statements or admissions of a juvenile obtained in violation of this rule are inadmissible. See § 19-2-511(1), 6 C.R.S. (2001). Section 19-1-511(5) and (6) contain two exceptions to this mandatory requirement: subsection (5) allows a parent and the juvenile to waive the parent's presence in writing, and subsection (6) provides a good faith and reasonable reliance exception when the juvenile makes a deliberate misrepresentation affecting the applicability of mandatory parental presence. Section 19-1-511(5) provides: .
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile and his or her parent ... may expressly waive the requirement that the parent ... be present during the interrogation of the juvenile. This express waiver shall be in writing and shall be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and his or her parent. ... If said requirement is expressly waived, statements or admissions of the juvenile shall not be inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of the Juvenile's parent.
Section 19-2-511(6) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile shall not be inadmissible into evidence by reason of the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if the juvenile makes any deliberate misrepresentations affecting the applicability or requirements of this section and a law enforcement official, acting in good faith and in reasonable reli*552ance on such deliberate misrepresentation, conducts a custodial interrogation of the juvenile that does not comply with the requirements of subsection (1) of this seetion. '
The section 19-2-511(6) exception is inapplicable to this case, and the plain langitage of section 19-2-511(5) is unambiguous. There must be an "express waiver" of the mandatory parental presence requirement by the "juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, legal or physical custodian," and it "shall be in writing." § 19-2-511, 6 C.R.S. (2001)(em-phasis added). "The use of the term 'shall indicates that the rule is mandatory Nicholas, 978 P.2d at 1216.
The words that the waiver "shall be in writing" are plain and unambiguous: the juvenile and the parent's agreement to waive the juvenile's right to have the parent present during the interrogation must appear on the face of the written instrument. The court, in my view, should give effect to the "in writing" requirement's evident purpose: to protect juveniles who are subjected to police interrogation."
The General Assembly enacted the parental presence rule because children require additional protection and assistance when confronted by police officers who are investigating them for criminal acts. See Nicholas, 973 P.2d at 1218-19; People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691, 694 (Colo.1998)(stating that the purpose of the parental presence requirement was to provide additional and necessary assurances that the juvenile's Fifth Amendment right against self-inerimination will be afforded to him); People v. Saiz, 620 P.2d 15, 19-20 (Colo.1980); People v. Maes, 194 Colo. 285, 287, 571 P.2d 305, 806 (1977)(holding that "the clear purpose of the Children's Code is to afford a special protection to a juvenile who is in police custody because of alleged criminal acts"). The parental presence rule guards against invalid waivers of important constitutional and statutory rights by minors acting without assistance. Nickolas, 973 P.2d at 1218 ("The plain language of this statutory mandate reflects the General Assembly's recognition that juveniles generally lack the capacity to make important legal decisions alone."); People in the Interest of GL., 631 P.2d 1118, 1120 (Colo.1981)("The purpose of [the] section ... is to provide a child with parental guidance during police interrogation, and to ensure that any waiver of the child's Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel will be made knowingly and intelligently."); Saiz, 620 P.2d at 19-20.
The written waiver requirement impresses upon the parent and the juvenile (1) the importance of the juvenile's parental presence right, and (2) alerts both parent and juvenile that waiver of this right can have serious consequences. The evident statutory purpose underlying a properly written juvenile and parental waiver is to: (1) solemnize the occasion of the waiver, (2) remind the police that the right belongs to the juvenile, and (3) provide evidentiary proof of the opportunity to review the waiver and the waiver's validity.
The absence of a juvenile's parents during police interrogation is a significant legal event, of importance equal to or greater than other legal events requiring signatures. Seq, eg., People v. Gall, 830 P.3d 145, 158 (Colo.2001)(holding that search warrant forms must be signed or sworn to by the affiant); § 18-1-405(4), 6 C.R.S. (2001)(waiv-er of statutory right to speedy trial and agreement to continuance must be signed by the defendant;}; § 1511-502, 5 CRS. (2001)(a will must be reduced to writing and signed by the testator); § 38-10-108, 10 C.R.S. (2001)(contracts for interest in land must be evidenced by signed memorandum).
In my view, the written waiver must clearly call for the parent's and juvenile's assent to it, and the juvenile as well as the parent must adopt the writing as their own. This would most usually occur by the juvenile and the parent both signing the instrument. However, we need not examine the absence of Jeron Grant's signature here, because the *553waiver is invalid on its face. The language of the instrument does not contain a clear written statement that (1) the right to have a parent present during the interrogation is the juvenile's and (2) having been advised of this right, the juvenile expressly waives it.
In my view, the majority's discussion of a signature requirement is beside the point. Maj. op. at 547-48. ° The instrument itself fails as an effective written waiver under section 19-2-511(5).3 The court need not reach the signature issue.
B.
A Totality Of The Circumstances Test Is Inapplicable
The majority analyzes the totality of the cireumstances surrounding the mother's written waiver and holds that the written waiver is the juvenile's waiver as well. Maj. op. at 549-50. I disagree. First, a totality of the cireumstances analysis is inapplicable to this case. Second, the facts demonstrate that the police obtained the parent's written waiver but only the juvenile's oral waiver.
The majority utilizes a totality of the circumstances test without applying that appellation to the test it creates. The majority states, "[A] trial court may also examine the cireumstances that purportedly gave rise to the waiver.... The trial court should examine all relevant cireumstances bearing on the reliability of the written waiver and uphold it when appropriately supported." Maj. op. at 549. The majority lists a number of factors to consider. The majority then concludes that the "written waiver in this case adequately recorded the intent of Grant and his parents to relinquish their statutory right to parental presence." Maj. op. at 550.
In my view, a totality of the circumstances test is inapplicable. In Nicholas, we held that the statute did not create a totality of the circumstances test, rather section 19-2-511 mandated a per se rule of inadmissibility. Nicholas, 978 P.2d at 1219. "In Colorado, through section 19-2-210, the legislature has enacted an explicit statutory rule of evidence that operates as a per se or automatic rule of exclusion in the absence of the procedural safeguards set forth in that section." Id. at 1220 (section 19-2-210 is currently codified at section 19-2-511). We expressly rejected a totality of the circumstances test in substitution for the express statutory language:
The first is an after-the-fact review of the totality of the cireumstances to determine «whether a juvenile's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The second is the adoption of initial safeguards and a rule of exclusion whenever the juvenile has not been afforded the special assistance required. This "per se" approach automatically excludes a waiver based on the absence of certain cireumstances i.e., on the absence of the requisite procedural safeguards. One reason for the adoption of a per se rule is to ensure more consistent application than is possible with a totality of the cireumstances test.
Id. at 1219 (citation omitted).
In 1999, the General Assembly responded to the Nickolas decision in two ways. It added section 19-2-511(6) to address situations, such as the one in Nicholas, where a juvenile deliberately misrepresented his age or some other material fact-which the police then relied on in good faith-to conclude that the mandatory parental presence requirement did not apply to the case. Ch. 258, see. 1, § 19-2-511, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 1017.
Significantly, the legislature also amended section 19-2-511(2) to include a totality of the cireumstances test, but-by its express terms-this test applies only when the juvenile makes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of rights and the juvenile was emancipated, a runaway from another state of sufficient age and understanding, eighteen *554years or older at the time of interrogation, or misrepresented his or her age to be over eighteen:
19-2-511 Statements. (@)(a) - Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, statements or admissions of a juvenile shall-not-be-admissible MAY BE ADMISSIBLE in evidence, by-reason-of NOTWITHSTANDING the absence of a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian, if THE COURT FINDS THAT, UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE - JUVENILE MADE A KNOWING, INTELLIGENT, AND - VOLUNTARY - WAIVER - OF RIGHTS AND:
(I) The juvenile is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the interrogation OR THE JUVENILE MISREPRESENTS HIS OR HER AGE AS BEING EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL ACTS IN GOOD FAITH RELIANCE ON SUCH MISREPRESENTATION IN CONDUCTING THE INTERROGATION; if
(IT) The juvenile is emancipated from the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian; or #>
(III) The juvenile is a runaway from a state other than Colorado'and is of sufficient age and understanding.
Ch. 332, see. 10, § 19-2-511(2), 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 1869, 1374-75. Because the juvenile in the case before us did not fit any of the conditions stated in section 19-2-511(2)(a), the totality of the cireumstances test the majority utilizes is plainly inapplicable under the statute.
In my opinion, we cannot graft the totality of the cirenmstances test onto section 19-2-511(5) because the General Assembly did not choose to do so in making its post-NMicholas amendments. We must presume that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of our judicial precedent on the subject. Pierson, 48 P.8d at 1219; Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049, 1054 (Colo.1995). We consider the General Assembly's course of action and intent when enacting and amending statutes. Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Colo.2001). Therefore, because the General Assembly-in deciding how to address our Nicholas decision-chose not to create a totality of the cireumstances test for written waivers of parental presence under section 19-2-511(5), except as provided in section 19-2-511(2), I must conclude that it did not intend a totality of the circumstances test to be applied to section 19-2-511(5)'s written waiver requirement.
Moreover, the facts the majority relies upon do not support its conclusion that the written waiver is the juvenile's as well as his parent's. The majority recites that both Jer-on Grant and his parents signed a written Miranda waiver and his statement was voluntary and in full compliance with his constitutional rights. Maj. op. at 550. The majority observes that the juvenile and his parents had the opportunity to consult before the police interrogation, and they did so. Maj. op. at 550. However, the majority cites to no facts that show that the police presented the juvenile with the section 19-2-511(5) written waiver, that he read it, that he acknowledged its contents as his own, or that it was intended to be his written waiver. The opening recitation of the written instrument is solely in the "I ... expressly waive" of the mother; no parallel "I" or "we" recitation records this instrument to be the son's written waiver. The face of the document evidences otherwise. The police were intent on securing the mother's written waiver and had only an oral waiver from the son. The juvenile's oral waiver is not sufficient under the statute.
C.
Not Harmless Error
The trial court's error in admitting Jeron Grant's second statement in absence of his written waiver was not harmless. An error is harmless if it does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. Crim. P. 52(a). Where the error is not of constitutional dimension, the error will be disregarded if there is not a reasonable probability that the error contributed to the defendant's convic*555tion. Salcedo v. People, 999 P.2d 888, 841 (Colo.2000).
In this case, it is more than reasonably probable that the error in admitting Jeron Grant's confession to being an accessory by disposing of the shotgun contributed to his conviction for accessory. Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 888, 342 (Colo.1986). The error could have substantially influenced the verdict and affected the fairness of the proceedings. Tevlin, 715 P.2d at 342. Therefore, Jeron Grant's confession stating that he helped dispose of the shotgun was not harmless because there is a significant probability that the admitted statement substantially influenced the jury's verdict. Salcedo, 999 P.2d at 841.
IL.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justice MARTINEZ and Justice BENDER join in this dissent.

. I use the term "parent" in this dissent to refer to "parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian" as set forth in section 19-2-511(5).