Court Opinion

ID: 9395440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 21:00:57.957459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:08.350149
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 1 of 20

                                              PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1465

        INDUSTRIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., d/b/a Universal Blastco,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JOSH DOBSON, in his official capacity as North Carolina Commissioner of Labor;
        KEVIN BEAUREGARD, in his official capacity as Director of the Occupational Safety
        and Health Division of the North Carolina Department of Labor,

                             Defendants - Appellants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cv-00090-MR-WCM)

        Argued: January 27, 2023                                          Decided: May 16, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Wilkinson and Judge Heytens joined.

        ARGUED: Stacey Alayne Phipps, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Travis Wayne Vance, FISHER & PHILLIPS,
        LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Joshua H. Stein, Attorney
        General, Victoria L. Voight, Special Deputy Attorney General, NORTH CAROLINA
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. David I. Klass,
        FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 2 of 20

        GREGORY, Chief Judge:

               The North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Hazard Association (“NC

        OSHA”) issued several itemized citations to Industrial Services Group (“ISG”) following

        the on-site deaths of two ISG employees. Soon thereafter, ISG filed for declaratory and

        injunctive relief against two North Carolina state officials, Josh Dobson, the North Carolina

        Commissioner of Labor and acting Chief Administrative Officer for the North Carolina

        Department of Labor (“NCDOL”), and Kevin Beauregard, the Director of NCDOL’s

        Occupational Safety and Health Division, (collectively “Defendants”), in their official

        capacities. ISG alleged that the issued citations were unlawful because they stemmed from

        North Carolina’s occupational health and safety plan, which in their view violates 29

        U.S.C. § 657(h) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”), a

        provision that forbids Defendants from evaluating their employees’ enforcement activities

        based on the number of penalties they have assessed and citations they have issued.

               The district court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for judgment on

        pleadings, holding, inter alia, that they were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign

        immunity because ISG’s claims satisfied the Ex Parte Young exception. Through this

        interlocutory appeal, the parties ask us to grapple with that same issue. Defendants also

        raise, for the first time, two arguments questioning ISG’s standing and insist that the

        abstention doctrine bars federal courts from hearing ISG’s suit. For the reasons that follow,

        we affirm the district court’s decision to deny Defendants Eleventh Amendment immunity

        and decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ newly-raised claims.

                                                     2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 3 of 20

                                                      I.

                                                      A.

               Enacted in 1970, the OSH Act establishes a comprehensive regulatory scheme

        designed “to assure so far as possible . . . safe and healthful working conditions” for “every

        working man and woman in the Nation.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). Along with the OSH Act,

        Congress created the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) to

        ensure the OSH Act’s enforcement nationwide.

               In addition to establishing federal regulations, the OSH Act “encourag[es] the States

        to assume the fullest responsibility for the administration and enforcement of their

        occupational safety and health laws,” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11), and to “provide[] for the

        development and enforcement of safety and health standards relating to one or more safety

        or health issues” covered by the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 667(c)(2). To assume this responsibility,

        the State must submit—and OSHA must approve—a “State Plan” which guarantees

        standards “at least as effective in providing safe and healthful employment” as those

        developed by the OSH Act. Id. A State Plan must also “provide a program for the

        enforcement of the State standards which is, or will be, at least as effective as that provided

        in the Act, and provide assurances that the State’s enforcement program will continue to

        be at least as effective as the Federal program.” 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3(d)(1).

               After OSHA approves a State Plan, it will “make a continuing evaluation of the

        manner in which [the] State . . . is carrying out such plan.” 29 C.F.R. § 667(f). If OSHA

        determines “that in the administration of the State plan there is a failure to comply

        substantially with any provision of the State plan (or any assurance contained therein),” the

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 4 of 20

        Secretary of Labor will inform the State Agency of their withdrawal of approval, and once

        notice of receipt is received, the State Plan will “cease to be in effect.” Id. And, as relevant

        here, in 1998, Congress amended the OSH Act to forbid the Secretary from “us[ing] the

        results of enforcement activities, such as the number of citations issued or penalties assessed,

        to evaluate employees directly involved in enforcement activities under this chapter or to

        impose quotas or goals with regard to the results of such activities.” 29 U.S.C. § 657(h).

               With that background in mind, we turn to the facts before us.

                                                      B.

               ISG—a South Carolina based corporation—is a heavy industry business, often

        performing fabrication, installation, repairs, and inspections of industrial equipment on

        behalf of its customers. The corporation, which operates under the trade name “Universal

        Blastco,” frequently conducts its business outside the state, including in North Carolina,

        where the events underlying this appeal transpired.

               On September 21, 2020, two ISG employees were onsite at the Evergreen Packaging

        Paper Mill in Canton, North Carolina conducting lamination-based work when a fire broke

        out. Tragically, the two ISG employees lost their lives due to carbon monoxide poisoning

        and blunt force trauma stemming from the fire. ISG properly reported the fatalities to the

        NCDOL, which initiated an inspection of the worksite. Following their inspection, on

        March 16, 2021, NCDOL’s Occupational Safety and Health Division issued ISG three

        citations with thirteen overall violations: one “Willful Serious” violation, nine “Serious”

        violations, and three “Non-Serious” violations resulting in total penalties of $112,000.

                                                       4
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 5 of 20

        Shortly thereafter, ISG filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western

        District of North Carolina against Dobson and Beauregard in their official capacities.

               ISG’s Complaint raised three primary claims. Counts One and Two, brought under

        28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, contended that Dobson and Beauregard could not lawfully

        issue these citations because they maintain a practice of employee performance evaluation

        in violation of § 657(h). Specifically, the Complaint asserted that Dobson, who plays a

        role in administering the North Carolina State Plan (“NC State Plan”) 1 as the

        Commissioner of Labor, “has admitted that the performance of ‘compliance officers’—

        who inspect workplaces for hazardous conditions and issue citations for alleged

        violations—is evaluated based on . . . ‘the number of inspections opened and closed, and

        the number of citations issued and upheld.’” J.A. 8. Given the Commissioner’s admission,

        the Complaint alleged that the NC State Plan “directly violates” § 657(h) and therefore “is

        preempted by” the federal OSH Act. Id.; J.A. 11.

               ISG’s third claim, raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted that Defendants had

        violated their due process rights by “engaging in enforcement activities against ISG despite

        lacking the proper legal authority to do so” and “incentivizing their compliance officers to

        commence investigation and enforcement activities and issue citations and penalties

        against ISG pursuant to an official policy or practice that violates and is preempted by

               1
                The NC State Plan received initial approval in 1973 and final approval in 1996; it
        “covers all private-sector employers and employees, with several notable exceptions, as
        well as State and local government employers and employees, within the State.” See
        www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1952/1952.5 (last visited May 5,
        2023); J.A. 10. The NC State Plan is administered by the NCDOL and the NC OSHA.
                                                     5
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465        Doc: 25        Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 6 of 20

        federal law.” J.A. 26. For these reasons, ISG argued, Defendants cannot lawfully issue

        citations pursuant to their illegal operation of the NC State Plan nor enforce a policy

        preempted by federal law. ISG seeks, inter alia, six forms of declaratory relief and two

        requests for injunctive relief. 2

               2
                 Specifically, ISG’s Complaint states the following prayers for declaratory and
        injunctive relief:
               (a) A declaration that Defendants’ official policy or practice of evaluating
               compliance officers’ performance based on the number of citations issued or
               penalties assessed violates the OSH Act;
               (b) A declaration that the official policy or practice described in subsection
               (a) has placed Defendants’ administration of the North Carolina State Plan
               out of compliance with the OSH Act;
               (c) A declaration that the official policy or practice described in subsection
               (a) has placed Defendants’ administration of the North Carolina State Plan
               out of compliance with the stated terms of the Plan itself;
               (d) A declaration that the official policy or practice described in subsection
               (a) is preempted by the OSH Act;
               (e) A declaration that by maintaining the official policy or practice described
               in subsection (a), Defendants have violated ISG’s substantive due process
               rights under the Fourteenth Amendment;
               (f) A declaration that by maintaining the official policy or practice described
               in subsection (a), Defendants have violated ISG’s procedural due process
               rights under the Fourteenth Amendment;
               (g) A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, their
               officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in
               active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
               injunction from engaging in enforcement activities against ISG, including
               initiating or maintaining administrative proceedings;
               (h) A preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants, their
               officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons in
               active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the
               injunction from engaging in enforcement activities against any employer that
               has been inspected or issued citations under the official policy or practice
               described in subsection (a), including issuing citations, prosecuting existing
               citations, or initiating or maintaining administrative proceedings.
        J.A. 27.

                                                     6
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 7 of 20

               Defendants moved to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Relevant to this

        appeal, they asserted that ISG’s suit is barred because ISG’s claims in effect seek suit

        against the state agency, which is protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. On

        January 7, 2022, a magistrate judge issued a Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) that

        recommended denying both motions. In relevant part, the magistrate rejected Defendants’

        Eleventh Amendment argument because it determined that ISG’s suit fell squarely within

        the parameters of the Ex Parte Young exception.

               In parallel proceedings, ISG pursued dismissal or stay of the issued citations with the

        North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (“NC OSHRC”) on

        August 13, 2021, arguing that Dobson lacked “the legal authority to institute and prosecute

        this administrative action.” J.A. 700. In denying ISG’s motions, the NC OSHRC Hearing

        Examiner concluded that § 657(h) is not an OSH Act standard that states are required to

        enforce and, further, that there is no statutory or regulatory support for treating the provision

        as a requirement under the State Plan. The Hearing Examiner also upheld several itemized

        citations and dismissed one. Finally, the decision left open the opportunity for either party

        to “raise the issue of staying these proceedings again, should a decision issue from the federal

        court which suggests that further consideration is appropriate.” J.A. 710.

               After the parties filed timely objections and responses, the district court accepted

        the magistrate’s R&R, affirming denial of the motions. From that decision, Defendants

        filed this interlocutory appeal. See Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 548 (4th

        Cir. 1999) (demonstrating this Court’s authority to hear, on interlocutory appeal, a district

                                                       7
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 8 of 20

        court’s order denying Eleventh Amendment immunity). Thus, we have jurisdiction to hear

        Defendants’ interlocutory appeal.

                                                      II.

               We review the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. See Benjamin v.

        Sparks, 986 F.3d 332, 351 (4th Cir. 2021).          That includes “a district court’s legal

        determination of whether Ex Parte Young relief is available,” which is an “immediately

        appealable” issue. Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 192–93 (4th Cir. 2002); Antrican v.

        Odom, 290 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 2002). We similarly review motions for Rule 12(c)

        judgment on the pleadings de novo. Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009).

                                                     III.

               Defendants challenge the district court’s conclusion that ISG’s suit satisfies the

        parameters of the Ex Parte Young exception, which denies Defendants Eleventh

        Amendment immunity protection and allows ISG’s claims to proceed. Defendants also

        argue—for the first time on appeal—that: (1) ISG lacks Article III standing and (2) the

        abstention doctrine (without indicating which specific abstention doctrine) bars federal

        courts from hearing this case because it is also being actively litigated in state proceedings.

        In response, ISG argues that Defendants have implicitly requested this court’s discretion

        to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over their newly raised issues. ISG urges us to

        decline that invitation and to affirm the district court’s decision denying Eleventh

        Amendment immunity.

                                                      8
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023       Pg: 9 of 20

               We agree with ISG on both scores. Taking each argument in turn, we first address

        Defendants’ Ex Parte Young argument and hold that the district court correctly denied them

        Eleventh Amendment immunity. We then explain why we decline to exercise pendent

        appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ standing and abstention arguments.

                                                       A.

               Turning to the most fundamental issue, we consider whether ISG’s suit falls within

        the Ex Parte Young exception, thereby placing Defendants beyond the Eleventh

        Amendment’s ambit.

                                                       1.

               The Eleventh Amendment prohibits “any suit in law or equity, commenced or

        prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

        Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. This immunity “has been judicially

        interpreted to run as well to actions by a state’s own citizens, by [Native American] tribes,

        and . . . by foreign states.” Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622, 627 (4th Cir.

        1998) (internal citations omitted). It not only precludes suits against states as named parties

        but also against state agents or officials “that are in fact actions against the state as the real

        party in interest.” Id.

               In Ex Parte Young, the Supreme Court devised an exception to Eleventh Amendment

        immunity for suits brought against state officials. See id.; Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160

        (1908). State officers or agents acting in violation of the Constitution are “stripped of [their]

        official or representative character and [are] subjected in [their] person to the consequences

        of [their] individual conduct.” Id. Thus, this exception “allows private citizens, in proper

                                                        9
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 10 of 20

        cases, to petition a federal court to enjoin State officials in their official capacities from

        engaging in future conduct that would violate the Constitution or a federal statute.” Antrican,

        290 F.3d at 184. To satisfy this exception, “a court need only conduct a straightforward

        inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief

        properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S.

        635, 645 (2002) (cleaned up); see also Allen, 134 F.3d at 627. Taking ISG’s Complaint at

        face value, we find that this suit falls well within Ex Parte Young’s bounds.

                                                      2.

               As stated, the magistrate judge briefly determined that because ISG sued Defendants

        in their official capacity and the declaratory and injunctive relief sought was prospective,

        “as to future actions NC OSHA may take against” the company, the suit appropriately met

        the Ex Parte Young exception, and Defendants were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment

        immunity. J.A. 728. On appeal, Defendants contend that the district court erred in failing

        to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds because NCDOL, and therefore the

        state of North Carolina (rather than the named Defendants) is the “real, substantial party in

        interest,” Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464; and ISG’s requested relief is retrospective in

        nature. 3 Upon review, we reject these arguments.

               At the outset, ISG’s Complaint properly alleges that Defendants’ supposed violation

        of the federal OSH Act is “ongoing” or “continuing.” Our Ex Parte Young inquiry “does

               3
                 Defendants also assert, and ISG does not deny, that NCDOL (and therefore North
        Carolina) did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. And there is no indication in
        the record that North Carolina and NCDOL have waived sovereign immunity.
                                                      10
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 11 of 20

        not include an analysis of the merits of the claim.” Verizon, 535 U.S. at 646. Instead,

        “[t]he requirement that the violation of federal law be ongoing is satisfied when a state

        officer’s enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional state law is threatened, even if the

        threat is not yet imminent.” McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 399 (4th Cir. 2010)

        (quoting Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 330 (4th Cir. 2001)).

        Stated differently, to qualify for the exception, ISG need not prove that Defendants’ alleged

        employee evaluation actions are an ongoing or continuing violation of the federal OSH

        Act. Rather, it is sufficient that ISG’s Complaint merely alleges the ongoing behavior. See

        Verizon, 535 U.S. at 645–46.

               That is precisely what the Complaint achieves. ISG’s claims focus on the NC State

        Plan’s past and continuing violation of § 657(h), which prohibits consideration of the

        number of citations issued or penalties assessed, as well as the implementation of quotas

        or goals with regard to such, in the course of employment evaluations. ISG’s Complaint

        also alleges Dobson’s repeated admissions that NC OSHA’s compliance officers’

        performance is based, in part, on the number of citations they issue. See, e.g., J.A. 12

        (“[A]dmitted, in that the number of citations issued are one of a number of factors

        considered when reviewing compliance officer performance.”); J.A. 15 (“Complainant

        does admit that inspectors are reviewed as required by law annually which consider the

        performance of the inspector including . . . the number of inspections opened and closed,

        the number of citations issued and upheld.”). Therefore, we conclude that ISG properly

        alleges an ongoing or continuing violation of federal law.

                                                     11
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 12 of 20

                                                     3.

               Moreover, the relief ISG requests is prospective in nature. Without explanation,

        Defendants urge us to view ISG’s prayers for relief as a wolf in sheep’s clothing: an

        attempt to attain “retrospective relief in the form of rescission of its citations.” Opening

        Br. at 22. We do not accept this notion.

               ISG’s two injunctive requests are quintessential examples of prospective injunctive

        relief not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at

        159–60. Their injunctive claims ask to prohibit Defendants “from engaging in enforcement

        activities against ISG, including initiating or maintaining administrative proceedings” and

        “from engaging in enforcement activities against any employer that has been inspected or

        issued citations under the official policy or practice . . . including issuing citations,

        prosecuting existing citations, or initiating or maintaining administrative proceedings.”

        J.A. 27–28.     To the extent that portions of the requested injunctive relief have

        “retrospective” characteristics, that concern is easily addressed by our precedent.

               Specifically, we look to CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bd. of Public Works of State of West

        Virginia, 138 F.3d 537 (4th Cir. 1998) for guidance. There, the district court concluded

        that an injunction against future tax collection from West Virginia’s Board of Public Works

        (“Board”) requested retrospective relief, and was therefore “improper under Ex parte

        Young, once the amount of the taxes had been assessed.” Id. at 540. The district court

        reasoned that the plaintiffs’ requested injunction would “hold invalid and change the past

        assessment,” making it a retrospective order due to the fact that the amount to be collected

        had already been decided. Id. at 541 (cleaned up). On appeal, however, we rejected the

                                                    12
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 13 of 20

        district court’s conclusion because it would foreclose any injunction “pursuant to Ex parte

        Young if the action to be enjoined had already been decided upon by a state official.” Id.

        at 542. Because plaintiffs in those circumstances “have no way to know that they must sue

        to enjoin an official’s action until after the official has decided to take that action,” we held

        that “[a]n injunction against the future collection of the illegal taxes, even those that already

        have been assessed, is prospective, and therefore available under the Ex parte Young

        doctrine.” Id. at 541–42.

               This case is on all fours with CSX. ISG’s Complaint indicates that Defendants have

        issued multiple citations against the company following the on-site death of two of their

        employees. We do not take the tragic facts underlying these citations lightly. However,

        our review finds that, like the plaintiff in CSX, ISG seeks relief that would prohibit

        Defendants from any additional or future allegedly unlawful actions. That is, ISG’s

        Complaint does not seek to expunge their past citations, 4 but rather to preclude Defendants

        from continuing their alleged illegal policies or practices (which ISG likely could not have

        discovered until after the citations were issued) that they believe are in violation of the

        federal OSH Act. See Coakley v. Welch, 877 F.3d 304, 305 (4th Cir. 1989) (affirming

        district court’s decision denying state official Eleventh Amendment immunity where

        plaintiff alleged state official had violated their due process rights and sought injunctive

        relief ordering reinstatement to their job, based on conclusion that termination was an

        ongoing harm preventing the plaintiff from obtaining the benefits of employment). Even

               4
                This course of relief, however, is actively being pursued in state proceedings. See
        supra note 3.
                                                       13
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 14 of 20

        assuming that ISG’s requested relief relies on Defendants’ previous allegedly unlawful

        actions, the true “essence,” see Allen, 134 F.3d at 628, of the relief is prospective.

               In sum, ISG’s prayers for relief are not retrospective, as Defendants claim, but

        properly prospective, and satisfy the second piece to the Ex Parte Young exception.

                                                      4.

               Finally, Defendants insist that NCDOL, and therefore the state of North Carolina,

        is the true party in interest. Not so.

               Courts find that “the state is the real, substantial party in interest” when the “relief

        sought nominally against an officer is in fact against the sovereign if the decree would

        operate against the latter.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101

        (1984) (quoting Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963)). Here, ISG’s Complaint alleges

        that the NC State Plan has and continues to violate the OSH Act. It also claims that Dobson

        and Beauregard, who in their official capacities are responsible for overseeing NCDOL’s

        implementation of the NC State Plan and its conformity with federal law, are accountable

        for the unlawful employee evaluation practices. Relying on that, the Complaint does not

        seek action by North Carolina, but rather, by the named Defendants who are at the helm of

        the NC State Plan’s operation. Thus, Dobson and Beauregard were properly named as such

        in this suit. See D.T.M. ex rel. McCartney v. Cansler, 382 F. App’x. 334, 338 (4th Cir.

        2010) (concluding that Secretary of North Carolina’s Medicaid program was not entitled

        to Eleventh Amendment immunity because he, in his official capacity, was the “person

                                                      14
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 15 of 20

        responsible for assuring that the agency’s decision compl[ies] with federal law”)

        (unpublished). 5

                                                    B.

               Given that Defendants are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity, we now

        address whether we should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’

        freshly-raised standing and abstention claims. We decline to do so.

                                                     1.

               Our “appellate jurisdiction is limited to final orders from the district courts.” Rux

        v. Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 474 (4th Cir. 2006). Importantly, however, the

        collateral order doctrine creates an exception to that rule for claims involving Eleventh

        Amendment immunity. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506

        U.S. 139, 144 (1993). On the other hand, the collateral order doctrine does not provide us

        with appellate jurisdiction over Defendants’ standing and abstention claims. Therefore,

        we must determine whether we have “pendent appellate jurisdiction, a judicially-created,

        discretionary exception to the final judgment requirement,” over those new arguments.

        Rux, 461 F.3d at 475.

               Intended to be “of limited and narrow application driven by considerations of need,

        rather than of efficiency,” this exception allows appellate courts to review issues that are

        not otherwise subject to immediate appeal when such issues “are so interconnected with

               5
                Defendants briefly cite to our recent holding in Cunningham v. Lester, 990 F.3d
        361 (4th Cir. 2021), for further support. However, because Cunningham does not analyze
        the Ex Parte Young exception—which is the integral issue before us today—it is
        unnecessary to address here.
                                                    15
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023      Pg: 16 of 20

        immediately appealable issues that they warrant concurrent review.” Id. Pendent appellate

        jurisdiction is exclusively available “(1) when an issue is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a

        question that is the proper subject of an immediate appeal; or (2) when review of a

        jurisdictionally insufficient issue is ‘necessary to ensure meaningful review’ of an

        immediately appealable issue.” Id. at 475 (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514

        U.S. 35 50–51 (1995)).

               “Two separate rulings are ‘inextricably intertwined’ if ‘the same specific question

        will underlie both the appealable and the non-appealable order, such that resolution of the

        question will necessarily resolve the appeals from both orders at once.’” Scott v. Fam.

        Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 111 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ealy v. Pinkerton Gov.

        Servs., Inc., 514 F. App’x 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam, unpublished)). Moreover,

        “review of a pendent issue will be necessary to ensure meaningful review of an

        immediately appealable issue if resolution of the pendent issue is necessary, or essential in

        resolving the immediately appealable issue.”        Ealy, 514 F. App’x at 309 (internal

        quotations omitted).

               Because a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment

        immunity grounds is immediately appealable, see Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 147, our

        consideration of Defendants’ standing and abstention arguments thus hinges on whether

        those issues are “inextricably intertwined” with or “necessary to ensure meaningful review

        of” the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim. See Rux, 461 F.3d at 476. Because we find

        that they are not, we cannot exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over those claims.

                                                     16
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465        Doc: 25           Filed: 05/16/2023       Pg: 17 of 20

                                                         2.

               We begin with Defendants’ new standing claim. Standing is the “irreducible

        constitutional minimum” required to make “Cases” or “Controversies” justiciable under

        Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

        (1992). It is axiomatic that standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue that must be

        determined before a court can consider the merits of a case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

        Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). But while standing is a vital threshold issue, it is not

        an essential prerequisite to determining the other jurisdictional, immediately appealable

        claim in this case: Eleventh Amendment immunity.

               The Supreme Court has long recognized that passage of the Eleventh Amendment

        highlights “the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity [which] limits the grant of

        judicial authority in Art. III.” Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97. Absent unequivocal expression of

        consent from a state, this immunity bars citizens from bringing suits against it, id. at 99, and

        also its officials if, upon further analysis, the suits truly seek to establish “the state as the real

        party in interest,” Allen, 134 F.3d at 627. Thus, like standing, Eleventh Amendment

        immunity presents a jurisdictional question that may bar a suit from advancing to the merits.

        See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that “it has been well settled . . .

        that the Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional

        bar.”); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (holding that Eleventh Amendment

        immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.”).

               With that in mind, Defendants’ standing assertion is not so “inextricably

        intertwined” with their Eleventh Amendment immunity claim because resolution of the

                                                         17
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25          Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 18 of 20

        former does not underlie or necessarily resolve the latter. The immediately appealable

        Eleventh Amendment immunity issue asks us to determine whether this suit falls within

        the parameters of the Ex Parte Young exception, thereby barring Defendants from

        immunity. As discussed above, that analysis required our inquiry into the form of the relief

        requested. That analysis in turn required us to determine whether the relief sought was

        prospective or retrospective, as well as whether ISG sufficiently alleged that Defendants’

        unlawful conduct was ongoing.

               Defendants’ pendent standing argument, on the other hand, would require us to

        undertake an entirely irrelevant inquiry. For instance, under the standing doctrine’s “injury

        in fact” prong, this Court would examine whether ISG suffered a “concrete and

        particularized” and “actual and imminent” injury, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, by Defendants.

        This prong alone would require a fact-intensive analysis that bears on considerations not

        relevant to the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim, such as whether the violations, fines,

        and penalties Defendants issued to ISG caused the company harm. See Sierra Nat. Ins.

        Holdings, Inc. v. Credit Lyonnais S.A., 64 F. App’x 6, 7 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to

        exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction, in part, over a “quite fact-dependent” standing issue

        in an interlocutory appeal stemming from a district court’s denial of state immunity

        protection) (unpublished). Where Defendants’ standing argument asks us to grapple with

        such questions, the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim does not. See Moniz v. City of Fort

        Lauderdale, 145 F.3d 1278, 1281 n.3 (11th Cir. 1998) (declining to exercise pendent appellate

        jurisdiction over a newly raised standing claim on appeal because the Court could “resolve

        the qualified immunity [immediately appealable] issue . . . without reaching the merits of

                                                     18
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465       Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 19 of 20

        appellants’ challenge to . . . standing.”). Thus, the standing argument does not rest on the

        “same specific question” that “will necessarily resolve” or would be necessary to review the

        Eleventh Amendment immunity issue. Ealy, 514 F. App’x at 309 (emphasis added).

               For similar reasons, the standing analysis is not “necessary to ensure meaningful

        review of” Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment claim. Id. While a standing analysis could

        foreclose the need to address the immunity defense if ISG does indeed lack standing, that

        is not the pendent jurisdiction test. We therefore hold that we do not have jurisdiction over

        the pendent standing issue.

                                                      3.

               We are, also, unpersuaded by Defendants’ pendent abstention argument. The

        abstention doctrine articulated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), compels federal

        courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over state proceedings if there is (1) “an

        ongoing state judicial proceeding, instituted prior to any substantial progress in the federal

        proceeding,” (2) that “implicates important, substantial, or vital state interests,” and (3)

        “provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the federal constitutional claim

        advanced in the federal lawsuit.” Laurel Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Wilson, 519 F.3d 156, 165

        (4th Cir. 2008). Specifically, Defendants insist that the district court must abstain from

        hearing this case because it stems from the same set of circumstances and seeks some of

        the same relief; and the state-court decision, which is being actively litigated, would

        ultimately decide the validity of the citations issued.

               We fail to see how the pendent abstention issue is “inextricably intertwined” with

        the immediately appealable issue here. Defendants’ abstention claim asks us to consider

                                                      19
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1465      Doc: 25         Filed: 05/16/2023     Pg: 20 of 20

        whether the district court should refrain from hearing the case, given the ongoing nature of

        the state proceedings and both cases’ foundation in the same set of facts. But answering

        this question will have no bearing on how we resolve Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment

        claim. In other words, this is not the same specific question as the underlying, appealable

        immunity question discussed above. Nor is it necessary to review the doctrine of abstention

        to resolve the immunity defense properly before this Court. Hence, we will not decide this

        adjoining pendent issue. 6

                                                   ****

               Defendants’ standing and abstention arguments may be meritorious, but they are not

        sufficiently related to the Eleventh Amendment claim before us. Accordingly, we are

        without jurisdiction to review them.

                                                    IV.

               For the preceding reasons, we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over

        Defendants’ standing and abstention arguments. We also agree with the district court and

        conclude that Defendants are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity because

        ISG’s suit fits squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception. Thus, ISG may proceed with

        the merits of its claims below. We, therefore,

                                                                                          AFFIRM.

               6
                  ISG also argues that Defendants’ standing and abstention arguments are not
        properly before this Court as they were not raised below. However, because we have
        determined that we cannot hear these claims based on our lack of pendent appellate
        jurisdiction over them, we need not address this argument.
                                                    20