Court Opinion

ID: 9627424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:43:27.128288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:49.089151
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court that reversed a denial of a zoning variance by the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment. We reverse.
In December, 1978, plaintiff Gary Xant-hos received notice from the Department of Building and Housing Services that certain of his premises located in Salt Lake City were not in compliance with city zoning ordinances. The notice ordered him to correct the deficiencies. Xanthos responded by applying to the Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment for a variance to allow a nonconforming use of the property.
The lot in question had a newly constructed duplex and a single-family dwelling in the rear of the duplex. Building the duplex caused the dwelling to not have frontage on a dedicated public street, to not have the required side and rear yards and to not have the required off-street parking for a residential R-2 district.
Following a hearing, the Board unanimously denied the requested variance. Xanthos then appealed to the district court for judicial review of the Board’s decision under the terms of U.C.A., 1953, § 10-9-15, which states: “The city or any person aggrieved by any decision of the board of adjustment may have and maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in any court of competent jurisdiction.” After a trial to the bench at which the judge heard evidence in addition to that adduced at the Board hearing and considered all of the evidence de novo, the court reversed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and ordered the Board to grant the variance.
Xanthos urges that we adopt the reasoning of the judge below, who held that: “Plenary action relief constitutes a complete review of the board of adjustment’s decision by trial de novo and the court has the same power as the board of adjustment to review the facts.”
*1034The city appeals that ruling, contending that the trial court erred by reviewing an appeal from a Board of Adjustment decision as a trial de novo. The city argues that the court was limited to consideration of whether the Board’s action was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.
This Court has not previously had occasion to interpret the language “plenary action for relief.”
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Public Service Commission,1 the statute there interpreted provided that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Commission with regard to a contract motor carrier’s license could bring an action for plenary review, which action “shall proceed as a trial de novo.” The Court held that “plenary review” meant a full review of the record made before the lower tribunal without the submission of new testimony. The purpose of the de novo requirement was to increase the scope of the review to include questions of fact, as well as of law.
In the statute before us there is no requirement for a trial de novo, and the structure and language of the Act do not contemplate such a de novo review. The statutory language “plenary action for relief therefrom ” presupposes the continued existence of the administrative action, thus suggesting an appeal rather than a trial de novo. However, the Act also does not lend itself to a review that extends no further than the examination of the record made below.
There is no requirement that a formal transcript be made of the proceedings before the Board of Adjustment. The formal record consists of the minutes of the hearing and the formal findings and order. While the proceedings before the Board are taped and the tapes retained for 90 days, there is no requirement that they be transcribed, and in fact they were not in this case. Therefore, as we said in Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement District:2 “The nature and extent of the review depends on what happened below as reflected by a true record of the proceedings, viewed in the light of accepted due process requirements.” 3 The Court went on to say that if the hearing had proceeded in accordance with due process requirements, the reviewing court could look only to the record, but where it had not or where there was nothing to review, the reviewing court must be allowed to get at the facts.
This analysis serves as well in the case before us. Since there is no record of the proceedings, due process would be denied if the district court could not get at the facts. Therefore, the court must be allowed to take its own evidence and need not necessarily be limited to the evidence presented before the Board of Adjustment. This does not mean that the hearing in the district court should be a retrial on the merits, or that the district court can substitute its judgment for that of the Board.
This Court has consistently held that: Due to the complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning, as in other fields where courts review the actions of administrative bodies, it should be assumed that those charged with that responsibility [the Board] have specialized knowledge in that field. Accordingly, they should be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed with a presumption of correctness and validity which the courts should not interfere with unless it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken.4
(Citations omitted.)
Therefore, it follows that the role of the district court in reviewing the Board *1035of Adjustment’s decision is to determine whether the action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious.5 In order to make that determination, the district court may take additional evidence, but it must be relevant to the issues that were raised and considered by the Board.
The next question that must be considered, based on this standard of review, is whether the Board of Adjustment’s decision not to grant the requested variance was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious.
In the case at hand, the district judge undertook to weigh anew the underlying factual considerations. While there may have been some evidence in the record to support the trial judge’s findings, it was not his prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. His role was limited to determining whether there was evidence in the record to support the Board of Adjustment’s action. The judge went beyond this role and decided the case according to his notion of what was in the best interests of the citizens of Salt Lake City. The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial judge reflect that his disagreement with the decision of the Board of Adjustment centered on the perceived economic impact on Xanthos (loss of $150 per month rent) and the loss of one low-cost rental unit in the city. The judge made it clear that he thought retention of low-cost housing, regardless of zoning considerations, should be the overriding policy in Salt Lake City. However, it does not matter whether the judge agrees or disagrees with the rationale of the Board or the policy grounds upon which a decision is based. It does not lie within the prerogative of the trial court to substitute its judgment for that of the Board where the record discloses a reasonable basis for the Board’s decision.6
The record in this ease clearly reflects that the Board of Adjustment’s action was not arbitrary or capricious and that there was a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it.
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § 10-9-12 states:
The board of adjustment shall have the following powers:

(3) To authorize upon appeal such variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing to special conditions a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship; provided, that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done. Before any variance may be authorized, however, it shall be shown that:
(a) The variance will not substantially affect the comprehensive plan of zoning in the city and that adherence to the strict letter of the ordinance will cause difficulties and hardships, the imposition of which upon the petitioner is unnecessary in order to carry out the general purpose of the plan.
(b) Special circumstances attached to the property covered by the application which do not generally apply to the other property in the same district.
(c) That because of said special circumstances, property covered by application is deprived of privileges possessed by other properties in the same district; and that the granting of the variance is essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other property in the same district.
Therefore, in order to justify a variance, the statute requires that the applicant show at a minimum that the variance *1036would not substantially affect the comprehensive zoning plan; that there are special conditions with regard to the property; that unnecessary hardship would result if the variance was not granted; and that substantial property rights enjoyed by other property in the area would be denied.
It is not enough to show that the property for which the variance is requested is different in some way from the property surrounding it. Each piece of property is unique. What must be shown by the applicant for the variance is that the property. itself contains some special circumstance that relates to the hardship complained of and that granting a variance to take this into account would not substantially affect the zoning plan. Respondent has failed to meet this burden.
The evidence adduced does not support respondent’s claim of special circumstance. The property is neither unusual topographically or by shape, nor is there anything extraordinary about the piece of property itself.7 Simply having an old building on land upon which a new building has been constructed does not constitute special circumstances. Both Albert Blair, Director of the Department of Building and Housing Services for Salt Lake City, and Mark Hafey, Director of Current Planning in the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning Department, testified that, although the dwelling itself prior to the construction of the duplexes was a nonconforming use8 and was therefore entitled to be maintained as it was absent new construction, city ordinances and policy did not allow the structure to be made illegal or more nonconforming by additional construction. Further, the record is replete with indications that the city was not made aware at any time during the application approval and inspection process that the structure on the lot, prior to building the duplexes, was a dwelling. The application, plot plan and building plans for the duplexes submitted to the city and relied on in granting the requisite building permit affirmatively stated that the land was vacant and without a dwelling on it. Both Blair and Hafey testified that the city relies on statements made in applications during the initial review process in both the zoning and building departments. In this case, had the application noted a dwelling on the lot, no permit would have been granted to construct the duplexes as initially proposed. Also, testimony indicated that, during inspections after building commenced, city inspectors had no reason to believe that the structure on the property was a dwelling. All indications were that the structure was little more than a shack and that there was no evidence of habitation. This evidence was bolstered by the testimony of Gary Xanthos. He testified that he had been living in the structure and had moved out in July, 1975. He further testified that the dwelling was vacant thereafter for from two to six months. Testimony by Mark Peguillan, a Salt Lake building inspector, indicated that the final inspections were done on the duplexes on September 30, 1975. Thus, according to Xanthos’ testimony, the dwelling was empty at the time of the inspections. Further, Peguillan testified that he had noticed the old building in the corner and had asked the chief building inspector about it. The chief inspector told Peguillan that the old building was going to be torn down. Finally, there was evidence that the structure was never listed as an independent residence in city records, did not have an assigned address and did not have authorized water, sewer or electrical service. For example, Hafey testified that the city building inspection department had only authorized eight meters to the Xanthos property, one for each unit in the duplex. However, upon visiting the property after notice of the zoning violation, Hafey found a brand new, unauthorized ninth box on the rear structure.
Xanthos claims that requiring him to now tear down the structure or to return it *1037to use as a storage building, thus resulting in loss of rental, is an unnecessary hardship that requires a variance. This argument has no merit.
Hardship is not demonstrated by economic loss alone.9 It must be tied to the special circumstances, none of which have been proven here. Every person requesting a variance can indicate some economic loss. To allow a variance anytime any economic loss is alleged would make a mockery of the zoning program. Further, the Xanthos’ brought their losses upon themselves. The application affirmatively alleged to the city that no dwelling existed on the land upon which he proposed to build duplexes, and the city relied on those allegations.
Xanthos contends that he should not be held responsible for the contents of the application for the building permit since it was not signed by the applicant, Xanthos’ father, Mr. Xanthos, but by Stan Conrad, apparently a subcontractor. This contention is without merit. First of all, the fact that the application was not signed by Mr. Xanthos is irrelevant. Xanthos does not contend that Mr. Xanthos was unaware of the contents of the application or disavowed them. Nor does he argue that the application submitted was not intended to function as the application for a building permit. Further, there is no testimony to that effect. Therefore, it is only reasonable to conclude that Conrad was the agent of Mr. Xanthos when he filled out and submitted the application. Mr. Xanthos is consequently charged with knowledge of the contents of the application.
Xanthos also contends the city should be estopped from enforcing the zoning ordinances because the plot plan showed an existing structure. Thus, he argues that the city had notice there was a structure on the property, and by failing to discover that it was a dwelling the city had misled Mr. Xanthos to his detriment.
This Court has recognized there are circumstances where it is inequitable to enforce a zoning ordinance.10 As we said in Utah County v. Young:11
To invoke the doctrine [of equitable es-toppel] the county must have committed an act or omission upon which the developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes in position or incurring extensive expenses. The action upon which the developer claims reliance must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature. If the claim be based on an omission of the local zoning authority, omission means a negligent or culpable omission where the party failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will not operate to work an es-toppel. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the landowner has a duty to inquire and confer with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of the property that would be permitted.12 [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
Further, as stated in Salt Lake County v. Kartchner:13
Estoppel, waiver or laches ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive relief against alleged violations of the zoning laws, unless the circumstances are exceptional. Zoning ordinances are governmental acts which rest upon the police power, and as to violations thereof any inducements, re-liances, negligence of enforcement, or like factors are merely aggravations of the violation rather than excuses or justification therefore.14
*1038Finally, estoppel may not be used as a defense by a person who has acted in bad faith, fraudulently or with knowledge.15
In light of these standards, Xant-hos’ argument has little merit. First of all, to hold that the city should have been put on notice that a dwelling existed on the land because an existing structure was noted on the plot plan, in the face of an affirmative statement that no such dwelling existed, would put a premium on prevarication, encourage equivocation and im-permissibly shift the burden of proof in variance cases to the city. None of these results is acceptable.
Secondly, the zoning regulations did not prohibit a structure located as the one at issue was as long as the structure was used for storage or garage purposes. Since testimony indicated that the structure appeared to be a garage or storage shed, and the application stated that no dwelling was on the property, the inspectors were in no way negligent in failing to find out that the structure was used as a dwelling. In addition, there was testimony that a building inspector on site had inquired about the old structure on the corner of the lot and had been told it was to be torn down.
Finally, there was evidence from a neighbor that Mr. Xanthos improved the structure to look habitable16 only after the duplexes were built and the final inspections were done. The neighbor also testified that Mr. Xanthos made the improvements after telling her he knew he was doing so illegally.
Based on the foregoing, the essential elements of equitable estoppel are missing, and Xanthos has not shown any other exceptional circumstances sufficient to constitute a defense to enforcement of the zoning ordinance. Therefore, based upon substantial evidence, the Board of Adjustment reasonably concluded that the granting of the requested variance would be mimical to the best interest of the district and contrary to the spirit and intent of the zoning ordinance. We reverse the decision of the district court and reinstate the order of the Board of Adjustment.
STEWART, DURHAM and OAKS, JJ., concurs in the result.

. 98 Utah 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940).

. 4 Utah 2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955).

. Id. at 887. See also Peatross v. Board of Comm’rs, Utah, 555 P.2d 281 (1976).

.Cottonwood Heights Citizen Ass’n v. Board of Comm’rs, Utah, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (1979).

. See also Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, Minn., 313 N.W.2d 409 (1981); Williams v. Zoning Adjustment Bd., Wyo., 383 P.2d 730 (1963); Rickard v. Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977); Demarest v. Mayor & Council of Hillsdale, 158 N.J.Super. 507, 386 A.2d 875 (1978).

. Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966). See also Levy v. Board of Adjustment, 149 Colo. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962).

. See Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 18.-34 (2d ed. 1977).

. Testimony indicated that the structure was built prior to 1927, when the zoning ordinances were passed.

. See, e.g., Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92 P.2d 724 (1939); Stice v. Gribben-Allen Motors, Inc., 216 Kan. 744, 534 P.2d 1267 (1975).

. Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, Utah, 552 P.2d 136 (1976); Wood v. North Salt Lake, 15 Utah 2d 245, 390 P.2d 858 (1964).

. Utah, 615 P.2d 1265 (1980).

. Id. at 1267-68.

. Supra, n. 10.

. Supra, n. 10 at 138 (quoting 8A McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (1965, Rev.Vol.), § 25.-349, pp. 491-2). See also Utah County v. Baxter, Utah, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (1981).

. Young, supra, n. 11 at 1267.

. Mr. Xanthos put on new siding, added a porch and made various other improvements thus making the structure look more like a little house.