Court Opinion

ID: 9911958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-21 15:06:21.538662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:32.790046
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

                                 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                 APPELLATE DIVISION
                                 DOCKET NO. A-0377-20
                                            A-0437-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,              APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
                                              AS REDACTED
v.                                            December 21, 2023

                                           APPELLATE DIVISION
FUQUAN K. KNIGHT,
a/k/a FUQUAN K. KNIGHT, JR.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAQUAN K. KNIGHT,
a/k/a SHAQUAN KYLE, and
SHAQUAN KYLEKNIGHT,

     Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________

          Submitted (A-0377-20) and Argued (A-0437-21)
          November 6, 2023 – Decided December 21, 2023

          Before Judges Sabatino, Marczyk, and Chase.

          On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
          Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 19-01-0010.
            Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
            appellant Fuquan K. Knight (Andrew R. Burroughs,
            Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

            Morgan A. Birck, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
            argued the cause for appellant Shaquan K. Knight
            (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney; Morgan
            A. Birck, of counsel and on the briefs).

            Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
            Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey
            in A-0377-20 (Caitlinn Raimo, Special Deputy
            Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of
            counsel and on the briefs).

            Hannah Faye Kurt, Special Deputy Attorney
            General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
            for respondent State of New Jersey in A-0437-21
            (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
            Prosecutor, attorney; Hannah Faye Kurt, of counsel and
            on the brief).

      The opinion of the court was delivered by

SABATINO, P.J.A.D.

      These two appeals, which we consolidate for purposes of this opinion,

arise out of a joint trial in which two brothers, Fuquan K. Knight (defendant in

A-377-20) and Shaquan K. Knight (defendant in A-437-21), were found guilty

by a jury of armed robbery and other offenses. 1 The State's proofs showed that

1
  For sake of clarity, we refer to defendants and their father by their first names
in this opinion; no disrespect is intended.

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                                        2
defendants, along with their father Kyler Knight, robbed the victim behind a

deli, threatening him with a knife and at gunpoint.         The victim identified

defendants to the police as two of the three robbers, confirming his identification

of them at a pretrial Wade2 hearing.

       The victim died of unrelated causes before trial, but his earlier testimony

at the Wade hearing and his post-robbery 9-1-1 call to the police were presented

to the jury over defendants' objection. Other evidence substantiated defendants'

guilt, including, among other things, surveillance videos that recorded events

inside and outside the deli, as well as incriminating items seized by police from

their residence. Defendants did not call witnesses or testify at trial, but disputed

the victim's identification and their involvement in the robbery.

       The trial court sentenced Fuquan, who was twenty-seven at the time of the

robbery, to an aggregate custodial term of sixteen years. The judge sentenced

Shaquan, who was nineteen at the time of the robbery, to a term of eleven years.

Both sentences were subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period

under the No Early Release Act ("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendants

raise substantially overlapping issues on appeal, contesting their convictions and

respective sentences.

2
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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                                         3
      A key issue raised by both defendants is whether the trial court erred by

allowing the jury to observe multiple times, in slow motion and with pauses, an

approximately six-second segment of a surveillance video. That video, which

was filmed through a glass door in the rear of the deli, shows the victim quickly

being escorted by the three culprits outside the building. One culprit appears to

be pointing a firearm at the victim, and another appears to be pushing defendant

forward. The State presented the video as part of its case-in-chief without

objection, and then played it again several times in closing argument without

objection, once in slow motion. During both days of their deliberations, the

jurors requested the video to be replayed several more times, in slow motion and

at other varying speeds and with intermittent pauses. The trial judge permitted

those jury playbacks under her supervision in the courtroom, over defendants'

objection.

      Defendants contend they were unduly prejudiced by these video

playbacks, citing research indicating that slow-motion presentations can

increase a viewer's perception or inferences of intentional conduct. To date,

there are no published New Jersey opinions that address the question.

      As a matter of first impression, we hold that—subject to offsetting

concerns of undue prejudice—surveillance video footage may be presented to

jurors in slow motion or at other varying speeds, or with intermittent pauses, if

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the trial court in its discretion reasonably finds those modes of presentation

would assist the jurors' understanding of the pertinent events and help them

resolve disputed factual issues. We further hold—again subject to offsetting

concerns of undue prejudice—that trial courts in their discretion may grant a

jury's requests during deliberations to replay the videos in such modes one or

more times, provided that the playbacks occur in open court under the judge's

supervision and in the presence of counsel.

      We discern no reversible error concerning the video playbacks in this case,

which would have aided the jurors in resolving the parties' disputes over the

robbers' identities and their respective actions with the victim behind the deli.

Going forward, we offer several non-exclusive factors to guide the court when

considering whether to allow videos to be shown in varying speeds or with

intermittent pauses during the trial and summations, and on a jury's request

during deliberations. We further recommend that the Model Criminal Jury

Charge Committee consider crafting an instruction to guide jurors when

surveillance videos are presented in such modes.

      In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude defendants'

remaining arguments to set aside their convictions are unpersuasive, although

we remand solely for reconsideration of their sentences.

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                                       5
                                        I.

      The facts relating to the robbery are largely based on the victim's

testimony at the Wade hearing, as well as the surveillance videos played at trial.

A.    Wade Hearing

      On October 11, 2018, the victim, Thaddeus Osbourne, went to Poppie's

Deli3 in East Orange to cash a betting slip. He had won $500 in cash. As was

later revealed, Osbourne was also at the deli to buy marijuana.

      Shaquan was at the deli, wearing a black hoodie with white letters on it.

Osbourne identified him at the Wade hearing, stating that he knew Shaquan from

the neighborhood and had bought marijuana from him once before. While inside

the deli, Shaquan offered to sell marijuana to Osbourne, and, when Osbourne

tried to pay him, Shaquan told him to walk outside because it was "too hot,"

meaning there were too many police around.

      As Osbourne followed Shaquan outside to the rear of the deli, a man

grabbed him, pushed him towards the back of the building, and held a knife to

his neck. Another person held a gun to his face. Osbourne later identified the

person with the knife as Kyler, describing him as a shorter "older guy" with a

3
  The store in question was referred to in the record as Poppie's, Poppy's, and
Poppie's Deli. For the sake of consistency, we refer to it as Poppie's.

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                                        6
beard, dark skin, and a burgundy hoodie. He identified Fuquan as the person

with the gun, stating he had dreadlocks and wore a black and gold hoodie.

        Osbourne said the gun was black with a brown handle, and approximately

shoulder width in length. 4 He never saw the knife, but only felt it against his

neck. According to Osbourne, while he was held at gunpoint and knifepoint,

Shaquan patted him down, searched his pockets, and took his keys and wallet .

        Osbourne testified that an observer in a parking lot yelled at defendants to

"stop or whatever." Kyler yelled back that Osbourne owed them money, which

made the observer "mind his business or whatever." When the robbery was

completed, defendants ran off and Osbourne yelled to them asking for his keys,

which defendants threw back to him.

        After the robbery, Osbourne said that he briefly followed defendants—

observing that they headed towards Princeton Street—and then returned to his

home on Evergreen Place and called 9-1-1. Osbourne told the operator that he

had been robbed and that he did not know the perpetrators.5 During cross-

examination, Osbourne agreed he had lied about not knowing the robbers, but

4
    The State contended it was a sawed-off shotgun.
5
    The 9-1-1 call, which we discuss in Part III, was played for the jury.
                                                                              A-0377-20
                                          7
then clarified that he did not know them personally and did not know their

names.

      When the police arrived, they drove Osbourne back to Poppie's and

watched the surveillance video together inside the deli. Osbourne identified one

of the suspects in the video (Shaquan) and provided the police with descriptions

of all three suspects. The police then transported Osbourne to the station and

obtained a recorded statement, which included photo identifications of Fuquan

and Shaquan. Osbourne testified that although he did not know their names, he

had previously seen Shaquan five or six times, had purchased marijuana from

him once before, and had seen Fuquan with Shaquan once.

      Osbourne initially told the police that he had left Poppie's and was walking

to his car when he was robbed. However, during his testimony, he agreed that

he had lied about this, and that he had been trying to buy marijuana. Although

he did not tell the police this during his original statement, he claimed that he

had mentioned this detail to an unnamed police officer while at the station. He

also stated that he never brought up this detail again, until the day before the

Wade hearing, when he disclosed this fact to the prosecutor's office.          He

explained that he had not mentioned the marijuana because he thought it was

irrelevant. A few days later, Osbourne returned to the station and identified

Kyler's photograph as depicting the third suspect.

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                                        8
B.    The Investigation

      Officer Hassan Gafaar was one of the police who initially responded to

the robbery. Osbourne described to Officer Gafaar the robbery and the suspects,

whom he then portrayed as strangers. Gafaar first took Osbourne to Poppie's,

where they reviewed the surveillance video, and then drove him to police

headquarters for a statement.

      At headquarters, the lead detective assigned to the case, Felix Lantigua,

met with Officer Gafaar and Osbourne. This conversation was not recorded, and

it was meant to gather "the basics" of the incident, including what happened, a

description of the suspects' clothing, and what weapons they used.

      Next, Detective Lantigua canvassed the area to locate surveillance

cameras. Law enforcement collected videos from the interior of Poppie's and

from a liquor store neighboring Poppie's, which showed the front and back of

the deli. After watching the videos, Lantigua recognized Shaquan, whom he

knew from the community. At some point Lantigua also identified Fuquan as

the suspect in the black and gold top. Based on his familiarity with Fuquan and

Shaquan, Lantigua collected photos of them for Osbourne to view. During his

later testimony, the detective also identified Kyler as the suspect in the burgundy

sweatshirt.

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                                        9
      Detective Lantigua then took a formal statement from Osbourne. During

this statement, Osbourne did not disclose that he had cashed in a bet or had

attempted to buy marijuana from Shaquan. According to Lantigua, Osbourne

said "he was familiar with two of the suspects from having encounters numerous

times in the area." Based on this information, Lantigua presented Osbourne with

the two photos of Fuquan and Shaquan. He described this procedure as a "one

on one" photo array, and said it was an appropriate identification method if the

witness was familiar with the suspects, as Osbourne was. Osbourne identified

both defendants as the robbers.

      Based on these identifications, Lantigua obtained arrest warrants for

Fuquan and Shaquan. Lantigua went to defendants' home to arrest them, but

only Kyler was present.6 Lantigua "immediately" recognized Kyler as the third

suspect, based on his facial hair and because "he walked with a limp." However,

he did not immediately arrest Kyler because he was not "familiar with [him] and

neither was the victim."

      Lantigua then asked an officer to generate a six-photo array for Kyler,

which Sergeant Stephen M. Rochester administered.         Osbourne positively

identified Kyler's photograph.    Consequently, Lantigua obtained an arrest

6
   It appears from testimony that defendants' home was located within a few
blocks of the deli.
                                                                          A-0377-20
                                      10
warrant for Kyler and attempted to effectuate the warrant that same day, but no

one was home. He went back to defendants' home that evening to retrieve

surveillance footage from the shared spaces in the home, which was a multi-

family residence. After reviewing this surveillance footage, Lantigua obtained

a search warrant for defendants' unit.

      Two days later, Lantigua and other officers effectuated the search warrant

at defendants' residence.   They found clothing that matched the garments

apparently worn during the robbery by Shaquan and Kyler, as well as a wallet

containing Osbourne's identification cards and debit card. The officers did not

retrieve a gun, knife, or the clothing apparently worn by Fuquan.

C.    The Indictment and Pretrial Events

      In January 2019, a grand jury indicted Fuquan on the following four

counts: (1) second-degree conspiracy to commit robbery against Osbourne,

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(a)(1); (2) first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; (3)

third-degree unlawful possession of a shotgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(c)(1); and (4)

second-degree possession of a shotgun for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

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                                         11
4(a). Shaquan was similarly indicted on only the first two counts and not the

weapon possession charges.7

      In October 2019, the court held a Wade hearing on defendants' motion to

suppress Osbourne's out-of-court identification of Fuquan and Shaquan, which

involved a single-photo array of each defendant. In addition to describing the

robbery and subsequent events at the hearing, Osbourne testified that he knew

Fuquan and Shaquan from around the neighborhood and acknowledged he had

purchased drugs from Shaquan once in the past.

      After the Wade hearing, the court ruled that Osbourne's prior

identifications were admissible, finding that Osbourne was truthful, the

surveillance videos showed that Shaquan and Osbourne knew each other, and

consequently the trial court found it was appropriate for the police to have shown

Osbourne a single-photo array when identifying Fuquan and Shaquan.

      On November 13, 2019, the State notified the court that Osbourne had

passed away. While his cause of death was unknown, defendants were not

7
  Defendants' father, Kyler, also was charged but was not tried with defendants
because he was being held out-of-state on different charges. Kyler did not
participate in any aspect of this proceeding, and he subsequently pled guilty to
second-degree conspiracy to commit a robbery or bodily injury, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2(a)(1), 2C:15-1(a)(2), and third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), and was sentenced to a six-year term.

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                                       12
implicated in his passing. The court subsequently granted the State's application

to admit Osbourne's Wade testimony at trial under N.J.R.E. 804(b)(1)(A) (prior

testimony of an unavailable witness), finding that defendants had a sufficient

opportunity to cross-examine Osbourne at the Wade hearing and had a similar

motive in conducting this cross-examination.

D.    The Trial

      Trial commenced six days later on November 19, 2019, and continued for

three non-consecutive days, concluding with testimony on December 4, 2019.

The State's proofs included Osbourne's testimony at the Wade hearing and his

9-1-1 call to the police, surveillance video footage taken at and near the deli, the

incriminating clothing and victim's wallet found at defendants' residence, and

the testimony of police and civilian witnesses.

      Defendants did not testify or present any witnesses. Through his attorney,

Fuquan disputed whether Osbourne was robbed, and, if so, whether he took part

in such a robbery. He also disputed possessing a firearm.

      Shaquan's counsel acknowledged that his client had an interaction with

Osborne that day inside the deli, but that he denied taking part in robbing

Osbourne outside.     In summation, Shaquan's attorney argued that even if

Shaquan was one of the three men shown on video with Osbourne behind the

building, Shaquan was merely present and was not taking part in any

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                                        13
wrongdoing. The State, meanwhile, characterized Shaquan as the mastermind

of the robbery.

      In the afternoon of its second day of deliberations, the jury informed the

court that it was at a "standstill" on one charge and requested guidance should it

be unable to reach a decision.      The court instructed the jury to continue

deliberating, and thirty minutes later, the jury delivered a guilty verdict on all

charges.

E.    Sentencing

      On February 18, 2020, the court sentenced Fuquan to an aggregate term

of sixteen years, and Shaquan to an aggregate term of eleven years. We discuss

those sentencing details below in Part V.

                                       II.

      Fuquan argues on appeal:

            POINT I

            THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
            SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
            WHEN IT PERMITTED THE INTRODUCTION OF
            THADDEUS OSBORNE'S WADE HEARING
            TESTIMONY AT TRIAL.

            POINT II

            THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
            CONFRONTATION   RIGHTS  WHEN    IT

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                                       14
PERMITTED THE INTRODUCTION         OF   A
TESTIMONIAL 9-1-1 CALL AT TRIAL.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT PERMITTED
THE 9-1-1 CALL TO BE PLAYED UNDER THE
EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DEFENDANT HIS
RIGHT TO A FAIR AND RELIABLE TRIAL WHEN
IT  PERMITTED     SURVEILLANCE     VIDEO
RECORDINGS TO BE REPLAYED IN SLOW
MOTION AND PAUSED MULTIPLE TIMES OVER
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION.

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
ACCEPT A PARTIAL VERDICT.

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS
DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL.

POINT VII

THE [SIXTEEN]-YEAR SENTENCE IMPOSED WAS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE GIVEN THE UNIQUE
FACTS OF THE CASE.

                                            A-0377-20
                  15
Meanwhile, Shaquan argues on appeal:

     POINT I

     THE TRIAL COURT COERCED A VERDICT WHEN
     IT MADE CLEAR THE TRIAL WOULD END ON
     DECEMBER 6 AND REFUSED TO TAKE A
     PARTIAL VERDICT ON THAT DATE.

     POINT II

     THE ADMISSION OF THE VICTIM'S WADE
     HEARING TESTIMONY WAS HEARSAY AND
     VIOLATED   DEFENDANT'S  RIGHT   TO
     CONFRONTATION.

     POINT III

     THE ADMISSION OF THE 9-1-1 CALL WAS ALSO
     HEARSAY THAT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S
     CONFRONTATION RIGHTS.

     POINT IV

     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
     INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ONE-ON-ONE
     IDENTIFICATIONS OR LACK OF A BLIND
     ADMINISTRATOR.

     POINT V

     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE
     SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE TO BE PLAYED IN
     SLOW MOTION.

     POINT VI

     THE SENTENCE WAS THE RESULT OF AN
     IMPERMISSIBLE TRIAL PENALTY AND IS

                                                A-0377-20
                             16
            EXCESSIVE WHEN COMPARED TO THE
            CODEFENDANT'S—HIS     FATHER—SENTENCE
            OF SIX YEARS OF INCARCERATION.

We address these issues in a reorganized sequence.

                                      III.

      The first issue we address—a novel one under our case law—concerns the

repeated playback of the surveillance video footage in slow motion and at other

varying speeds, and in intermittent-pause modes.

                                       A.

      The State played several surveillance videos during the trial, including

videos from the interior of Poppie's, from a neighboring property showing

different angles of the exterior of Poppie's, and from defendants' residence. The

key video at issue here is exhibit S-31, which shows a rear view of Poppie's

interior, including its back door which offered a brief glimpse into the back

parking lot where the robbery took place. The video has no audio track. 8

      Starting at 11:41:38, the video shows four men walking by the back door.

The video appears to show Osbourne, closely followed by a man the State

contended was Kyler, who seemed to be holding onto Osbourne by the neck or

8
  We have reviewed the video evidence as part of our consideration of the issues
raised on appeal. The approximate six-second segment in which the four men
are filmed passing by Poppie's rear door is the most pertinent.
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                                      17
shoulder. Walking behind them is another man, who the State contended was

Fuquan, holding a black and brown object in one hand. The last man walking

in the group allegedly is Shaquan, who does not appear to be holding anything.

The robbery apparently occurred off-camera.

      The jurors first were shown this portion of the video (from 11:41:30 to

11:43:05) during the State's case-in-chief, seeing it once at normal speed.

      Later, during their summations, defendants did not replay any of the

videos for the jury. However, Shaquan's attorney told the jury that the State

would likely play the videos in slow motion during its own summation.

      As anticipated, the State replayed in closing argument numerous sections

of the videos, mostly at normal speed, and with a few sections fast-forwarded.

The State also played in slow motion and with pauses the video showing the rear

of Poppie's. Defendants did not object to that presentation.

      On the first day of deliberations, the jury made a number of requests. They

asked to review several of the surveillance videos, hear the 9-1-1 call again, and

review Osbourne's Wade testimony. All counsel and the court agreed with

Shaquan's attorney's position that the video should be played at normal speed,

"[u]nless," the court added, "they ask for something different."

      Before the playback took place, the jury amended its request and asked

for a replay only of the video from the rear interior of Poppie's, requesting that

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                                       18
it be replayed "at least three times, slowly and pause[d]" at 11:41:41, the point

when the men the State claimed to be Fuquan and Shaquan walked by the back

door. At this point, Fuquan's attorney objected, arguing that case law required

the video to be played in the same way as it had been presented at trial. The

court asked counsel to use the lunch break to research this point. Following the

lunch break, Fuquan's attorney said he was unable to find the case law but

presented studies about how playing videos in slow motion "increase[d] the

likelihood of conviction." Shaquan's attorney relied on Fuquan's arguments on

this point.

      The State contended the articles cited by the defense were unreliable "junk

science," and that playing the videos in slow motion was not interfering with the

jury's function but instead was honoring their request. The court disagreed that

the studies constituted junk science, but found that defendants' arguments were

not supported by case law, and as a trial court, it was not in a position to create

new law.

      Consequently, the court permitted the deliberating jurors to view the

videos in slow motion, as they requested. Before doing so, the court directed

the jury to select a "pauser," designating a juror to direct the State when to pause,

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                                        19
rewind, and replay the video.9 The State then played the video for the jury that

day a total of ten times, at varying speeds and starting points.

        On the second day of deliberations, the jury asked to see the same six-

second video clip again, from 11:41:39 to 11:41:45. They specifically asked the

court to play the video slowly three times, "zoomed in," and paused at 11:41:41.

The State and defendants agreed they could not zoom in the video, as that would

constitute altering the evidence.        The judge granted the jurors' request,

permitting the six-second segment of the video to be played five more times,

played at a speed of five times slower, with a final pause at 11:41:41.

        In total, the jurors watched portions of the video fifteen additional times,10

mostly at slower speeds and sometimes with intermittent pauses.

        On appeal, both defendants 11 argue that the court erred in allowing the

jury to repeatedly view the surveillance videos in slow motion during

9
   Defendants did not object to the jury's designation of a pauser, and do not
claim error on appeal about that designation. The transcript reflects that, when
the videos were replayed in open court, another juror voiced several requests to
replay the footage several times in slow motion, and those requests were also
honored.
10
     The briefs calculate the total as fourteen additional times.
11
    The only significant difference between defendants' two appellate briefs is
that Shaquan cites two more articles addressing the dangers of playing videos at
a trial in slow motion.
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                                         20
deliberations. They contend the deliberating jurors should have watched the

video as it was presented during the trial. They assert the repeated playing of

the video in slow motion and at varying speeds with intermittent pauses resulted

in the jury being exposed to a "distorted reality." They further argue that, at the

very least, the court should have given the jury a limiting instruction about how

playing a video at different speeds can manipulate their perception. No such

limiting instruction was requested, however.

                                        B.

      As we have previously noted, there has been an "explosive growth in the

number of surveillance cameras in operation."12 State v. Watson, 472 N.J.

Super. 381, 472 (App. Div. 2022), rev'd on other grounds, 254 N.J. 558 (2023).

Police investigations involve "canvassing the surrounding neighborhood not just

for potential suspects and eyewitnesses but also for public and privately -owned

video cameras that may have captured a reported crime, the events leading up to

it, or its aftermath (e.g., flight from the scene)." Ibid. Consequently, such

"recordings have become a staple of criminal trials." Ibid.

12
   A study published in 2018 reported that, as of that time, within the United
States, "there are approximately 30 million surveillance cameras shooting about
4 billion hours of footage each week." Yael Granot, et al., In the Eyes of the
Law: Perception Versus Reality in Appraisals of Video Evidence, 24 Psych.,
Pub. Pol'y & L. 93, 94 (2018). The frequency has surely grown since that article
was published.
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                                       21
      The probative value of such surveillance footage can be enormous. As

our   Supreme    Court    has   recognized,   "[t]he   power    of   a   video    of

contemporaneously recorded events at the crime scene can hardly be disputed."

State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 431 (2021). "[A] video recording is a valuable

tool[,]" and can "enhance[] a judge or juror's assessment of credibility by

providing a more complete picture of what occurred." State v. Cole, 229 N.J.

430, 450-51 (2017) (internal citations omitted); see also Garcia, 245 N.J. at 431-

32 (quoting that same observation).

      The Court recently recognized that potential evidential value in State v.

Watson, which involved a fifty-seven-second surveillance video that showed an

entire robbery committed inside the bank. 254 N.J. 558, 570 (2023). Among

other things, the video in Watson was highly relevant to the core disputed issue

of identification, i.e., whether defendant was the person shown on the video

demanding money from the teller, and whether the robber's fingers touched areas

where fingerprints could have been left but were not found. Ibid.

      Our New Jersey courts have not yet addressed in a published opinion the

standards for presenting to trial jurors surveillance video footage in slow motion,

assuming it satisfies the applicable requirements for authenticity, relevance, and

other Rules of Evidence. In particular, we have no precedents specifically

addressing the issues raised here concerning the playback of surveillance videos

                                                                             A-0377-20
                                       22
in slow motion and in other altered modes to jurors at their request during

deliberations.

      Lacking precedential guidance on these discrete issues, the trial court and

counsel consulted our somewhat analogous case law regulating the playback

during deliberations of video-recorded or audio-recorded trial testimony. Under

that case law, a court's decision to replay a recording of trial testimony for

deliberating jurors is vested in the discretion of the trial judge. State v. A.R.,

213 N.J. 542, 559 (2013). "Absent 'some unusual circumstance,' those requests

should be granted." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 119-20 (2011) (referring to

the playback of trial testimony) (quoting State v. Wolf, 44 N.J. 176, 185 (1965)).

      "Generally, once an exhibit has been admitted into evidence, the jury may

access it during deliberations, subject to the court's instructions on its proper

use." State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 133-34 (2008) (citing R. 1:8–8). Indeed,

"[v]ideo playbacks of witness testimony during deliberations at the jury's

request are commonplace." State v. Muhammad, 359 N.J. Super. 361, 380 (App.

Div. 2003).

      In Miller, 205 N.J. at 122, the Court provided guidelines for ruling on a

jury's request to replay testimony. In doing so, the Court emphasized that

"judges should ordinarily grant a jury's request to play back testimony." Ibid.

(citing State v. Wilkerson, 60 N.J. 452, 460 (1972)). The Court's guidelines

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emphasized replaying recorded evidence in a manner that accurately responds

to the jury's request, although it also noted that trial courts "retain discretionary

authority to try to narrow a jury's request" if too "extensive." Id. at 122-23.

      Our case law has addressed the dangers of allowing a jury to review

playbacks of previous testimony during their deliberations, and what steps

courts can take to safeguard against these dangers. See, e.g., A.R., 213 N.J. at

547, 559-60; Miller, 205 N.J. at 122; Burr, 195 N.J. at 135. Those dangers

include, among other things, the prejudicial repetition of the recorded footage

and its potential capacity to overshadow other evidence in the case. A.R., 213

N.J. at 555. As the Court cautioned in A.R., in a context involving the video

replays of a sexual assault victim's interview and video of a defendant's police

interrogation recorded before trial:

             Although the video recording of a defendant's statement
             or a victim's statement is admissible evidence,
             playbacks of such testimony have the capacity to permit
             a jury to place undue emphasis on a single item of
             evidence. An audio recording permits the jury to hear
             every inflection, every hesitation, and every
             equivocation in the voice of the witness. A video
             recording magnifies the effect of a playback of
             testimony. Repeated jury review of a video recorded
             statement is tantamount to a second, third, or even
             fourth appearance of the same witness at trial.

             [213 N.J. at 546 (emphasis added).]

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      In light of these concerns, the Court has imposed constraints on

testimonial video playbacks. As the Court held in Burr, 195 N.J. at 119, and

reiterated in Miller, 205 N.J. at 109, and again in A.R., "a video-recorded

statement must be replayed in open court under the direct supervision of the

judge." 213 N.J. at 546-47. The trial court retains the "ultimate discretion" to

deny such playback requests. Id. at 555 (quoting Burr, 195 N.J. at 135).

      The context presented here is different than in those cases because there

is no testimonial component to the surveillance video of the crime scene. As is

frequently the case with outdoor surveillance videos, 13 the recording in this case

contains no soundtrack. As such, the specific dangers of jurors affording undue

weight or attention to spoken content of the recordings is not present.

      Even so, we recognize there is a potential for undue prejudice that can

result from repetitive showings of the videos if they are incriminating. In

addition, as defendants argue, the slow motion and other modifications of the

speeds at which surveillance videos are replayed might cause undue prejudice,

at least in certain contexts. We proceed to explore these issues in the pages that

follow.

13
   We do not address in this opinion the boundaries of what may be legally
permissible audio to record under pertinent statutes and case law.
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                                         1.

        The case law of other jurisdictions addressing the slow-motion replays

have generally authorized the presentation of video evidence in that mode within

the trial court's discretion, subject to offsetting considerations. For instance, in

State v. Brewington, 471 S.E.2d 398, 403 (N.C. 1996), the Supreme Court of

North Carolina ruled that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a

criminal jury to watch a surveillance videotape of a homicide in slow motion.

The Court agreed with the trial court the slow motion playing of the recording

was relevant to the "critical issue" of the "sequence of events which took place

at the time of the shooting." Ibid.

        The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly held that a trial court did not

abuse its discretion by allowing surveillance video footage to be played for a

jury in slow motion. Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1277 (Pa. 2016).

The Court reasoned that "playing portions of the video in slow motion enhanced

the jury's understanding of the events surrounding the murder." Ibid. The video

did so "by allowing [jurors] to have a better view of Appellant's face, thereby

establishing Appellant's identity as the perpetrator, and by giving it the

opportunity to observe that two shots had been fired from Appellant's gun, a

detail which was not ascertainable when the video was played at normal speed."

Ibid.

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                                        26
      In that same vein, in Burkhart v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 848, 850

(Ky. 2003), a criminal mischief prosecution, the Supreme Court of Kentucky

found no abuse of discretion in the trial court allowing a slow-motion replay of

a store's surveillance video under the "controlled conditions of open court."

Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the re-playing of video footage

in slow motion as not an abuse of discretion "because the jury showed concern

about it" during their deliberations. Brown v. State, 411 S.E.2d 366, 367 (Ga.

App. 1991). See also United States v. Plato, 629 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2010)

(upholding the district court's exercise of discretion in allowing a surveillance

video of a drug sale to be replayed for a jury in slow motion). Defendants have

presented no contrary out-of-state published opinions holding that trial courts

lack such discretion.

                                       2.

      Defendants cite to research indicating that the slow-motion presentation

of video evidence can have the capacity to increase observers' perceptions that

the conduct of the persons shown on the videos was intentional or flagrant.14

14
    Eugene M. Caruso et al., Slow Motion Increases Perceived Intent, 113
Proceedings of the Nat'l Acad. of Scis. 9250 (2016). This study has been the
subject of several other articles, which have been furnished to us on appeal by
defense counsel. See Homa Khaleeli, How Slow-Motion Video Footage
Misleads Juries, Guardian, Aug. 2016; Bob Yirka, Showing People Slow Motion
Video of Crime Found to Distort Perceived Intent, MedicalXpress, Aug. 2016.
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The main article cited by defendants in this regard ("the Caruso study"),

involved several experiments that included research participants watching video

footage from a murder case and violent contact occurring in broadcast replays

of professional football games. Id. at 9251. The Caruso study concluded that

playing videos in slow motion, as compared to normal speed, "can cause viewers

to perceive an action as more intentional." Id. at 9250. According to the study's

authors, this so-called "slow motion intentionality bias" may be attributed to the

slow motion causing the research participants "to feel like the actor had more

time to act, even when they knew how much clock time had actually elapsed."

Ibid.    Additional experiments in the Caruso study revealed that "allowing

viewers to see both regular speed and slow-motion replay mitigates the

[intentionality] bias, but does not eliminate it." Ibid.

        Although we appreciate counsel's citation to the Caruso study and other

similar literature, and we concur with the trial judge's reaction that it does not

appear to be per se unreliable, the context in which the surveillance video

footage was replayed in this case—particularly the six-second segment showing

the four men quickly walking by the back of Poppie's—assisted the jurors in

resolving critical disputed issues of identification. The video shows the physical

appearances of the four men, their sizes, their features, and their clothing. The

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video also shows where each of three alleged culprits were walking in relation

to the victim, and what they individually were doing at that time.

      The context here is distinguishable from the two experiments that were

the subject of the Caruso study because it involves identifying multiple actors

and their respective actions. The Caruso study focused on video footage of: (1)

a single defendant robbing and shooting a store clerk, and (2) a single football

player making disallowed helmet-to-helmet contact with an opposing player. In

such contexts, concerns about a slow-motion presentation of the video

exaggerating the intentionality of the single actor are likely to be greater. For

the single-robber example, a central question for the jury was whether the

defendant intended to kill the victim.      For the football example, a central

question for the referees was whether the sole defender intended to strike the

runner's helmet with his own. Intentionality in both examples was at the heart

of the matter.

      By contrast, it was crucial for this jury to sort out: (1) who were the three

men walking with Osbourne behind the deli; and (2) what each person was doing

during that segment. The jury had to identify the actors and ascertain what each

of them individually appeared to be doing. To be sure, the video was also

evidential of the actors' displayed apparent intent to rob Osbourne. But that was

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not as vital as identifying who they were and their respective actions in the

footage.

      Shaquan argues in his brief that the video was potentially influential in

affecting how the jury evaluated his degree of involvement in the events at the

scene, assuming they found he was one of the men walking in the group.

According to the State's interpretation of the video, Shaquan was the last man in

the group, and he was not holding the gun pointed at Osbourne or wielding a

knife. Shaquan asserts in his brief that "it was clear the jury was attempting to

understand what had really happened behind Poppies." He asserts that "[t]he

replay of the video showed that the jury was seriously assessing the role [he]

played in the robbery."     The video segment "would have been crucial to

determining whether Shaquan's theory of the case created reasonable doubt that

he was involved in the robbery." The video therefore "went to the question of

guilt itself, and [the jury] viewing it so many times in slow motion was highly

prejudicial."

                                        3.

      We are unpersuaded that the trial court misapplied its discretion in

granting the deliberating jurors' requests to replay the surveillance video in slow

motion and multiple times, with starts and stops. As neither defendant disputes,

the video was relevant.        Because it showed the perpetrators' physical

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appearances, the video evidence would have been helpful in deciding whether

defendants resembled the men who took part in the robbery, and whether

Osbourne's identification of them and his descriptions of their actions were

credible. The slow motion and repeated presentation of the video footage—

notably at the request of the deliberating jurors—would have aided the jurors in

discerning the appearances of the men who quickly walked by during the key

six-second segment. In the circumstances presented, the replays of the video

were within the trial court's discretion. 15

      We are likewise unpersuaded by Shaquan's contention that the slow-

motion replaying of the video was highly prejudicial to him because "it showed

that the jury was seriously assessing the role [he] played in the robbery." The

objective of a trial is just that: to have the factfinder "seriously assess" the

evidence and assess the conduct of the parties. The video segment was not

necessarily at odds with Shaquan's contentions that he was not a central

15
   We are mindful that a civil case involving an automobile accident, we found
that a plaintiff was unduly prejudiced when the defendant introduced a video
simulation of an accident and played it in "extreme slow motion." Suanez v.
Egeland, 330 N.J. Super. 190, 193-95 (App. Div. 2000). Among the other issues
with the video, we reasoned that viewing the video simulation in such "extreme
slow motion" may have affected the jury's perception of the accident. Suanez is
distinguishable from the present case for at least two reasons: (1) the video was
a simulation created for the adversarial process by an expert and not, as here,
real evidence of the actual events; and (2) the case did not involve, as here, a
request by deliberating jurors to review a video in slow motion.
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                                         31
participant in a robbery. The video depicts a fourth man, purported to be

Shaquan, walking behind the other two culprits and Osbourne. Unlike them, he

does not appear to be wielding a gun or pushing Osbourne. We recognize the

State argued in summation that in the video Shaquan did not appear to be scared

or surprised, a point the defense has not refuted. Nonetheless, to the extent the

video had probative value of "intentionality" beyond its bearing upon

identification, we conclude it was not unduly prejudicial to Shaquan's interests.

      The trial court had the discretion to reject or limit the slow-motion replays,

and we defer to its exercise of discretion. The judge prudently required the

videos to be replayed under her supervision in the courtroom in the presence of

counsel, consistent with the case law governing other kinds of video replays.

By agreement of counsel, the videos were not magnified.            The six-second

segment apparently did not take long to replay, whether it was shown at normal

speed or slower speeds. In short, the judge rightly endeavored to support the

jurors in their manifest and conscientious effort to understand the proofs and

consider them carefully.

      We are cognizant that defendants have stressed on appeal the number of

times the video was played for the jurors was unduly prejudicial. However, we

note that defendants did not object to the prosecutor replaying the video multiple

times and in slow motion, with pauses, during closing argument. They only

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                                       32
raised concerns about the slow-motion presentation when the jury requested

playbacks. Given the very short, rapid activity in the six-second segment that

is not easy to follow at normal speed, the replays were reasonably allowed.

                                         4.

      Defendants argue that, even if we find the slow-motion video replays were

not improper, the court was required to provide the jurors with a special

cautionary instruction on how to consider such evidence and to not place

inordinate weight on them. Because defendants both failed to make such a

request or raise this objection, we consider this issue under a standard of plain

error. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 473 (2007) (citing R. 1:7-2; R. 2:10-2).

In determining whether a trial court's decision or omission constitutes plain

error, the reviewing court must determine: "(1) whether there was error; and (2)

whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result,' . . . that is

whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to a

result it otherwise might not have reached[.]'" State v. Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531,

544 (2021) (quoting State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016)).

      Here, no present case law or model charge specifies jury instructions for

the playback of non-testimonial video evidence. In Miller, the Court remarked

that "[j]udges should take precautions to prevent juries from placing undue

emphasis on the particular testimony that is replayed" during deliberations. 205

                                                                               A-0377-20
                                        33
N.J. at 123 (emphasis added). "[A]t the time the testimony is repeated, judges

should instruct jurors to consider all of the evidence presented and not give

undue weight to the testimony played back." Ibid. (emphasis added). This

holding is reflected in the Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Playback of

Testimony" (approved Apr. 16, 2012). This rule refers to the playback of

witness testimony. There is no similar existing instruction for playback of other

forms of video evidence.

      As the Miller Court noted, "[a]lthough the trial judge did not give a

specific instruction regarding the replayed testimony—as judges should do in

the future—the jury charge he delivered the day before directed jurors to

consider all of the evidence submitted." 205 N.J. at 126. Similarly, here the

trial court generally instructed the jury to consider all the evidence during its

general jury charge. Thus, even if the trial court was required to give the jury a

separate instruction prior to playing surveillance videos during deliberation, the

general jury charge offset any alleged error from the omission. No plain error

occurred.

                                        5.

      That said, going forward it will be beneficial to trial judges and counsel

to have guidance in dealing with the admission of surveillance videos and with

requests by deliberating juries to replay surveillance video evidence, and to do

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                                       34
so at modified speeds or with intermittent pauses. To assist the bench and bar,

we prospectively offer the following non-exclusive factors for consideration:

         • Subject to offsetting considerations of undue prejudice
           or other factors warranting exclusion under N.J.R.E.
           403, relevant surveillance video evidence may be
           presented during a trial or closing argument to jurors in
           slow motion or at other varying speeds, or with
           intermittent pauses, if the trial court reasonably finds
           those modes of presentation would assist the jurors'
           understanding of the pertinent events and help them
           resolve disputed factual issues.

         • Subject to offsetting considerations of undue prejudice,
           trial courts have the discretion to grant a jury's requests
           during deliberations to replay surveillance videos in
           such modes one or more times, provided that the
           playbacks occur in open court under the judge's
           supervision and in the presence of counsel.

         • In exercising their discretion in admitting into evidence
           or allowing the replay of surveillance video recordings,
           trial courts should consider, among other things, (a)
           whether the video has a soundtrack that contains
           recorded statements of the filmed persons; (b) whether
           the video is difficult to discern when played only at
           normal speed; (c) whether the video can assist in
           resolving disputed issues of identification; (d) whether
           the video bears upon disputed issues of intentionality;
           (e) whether the video contains content that is
           particularly disturbing or inflammatory to watch
           repeatedly in slow motion.

      Apart from these non-exclusive factors, we recommend to the Model

Criminal Jury Charge Committee that it consider creating a model charge that

specifically addresses situations in which, as here, a jury requests the replaying

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                                       35
of surveillance video evidence, and to caution jurors to afford such evidence

only appropriate and not undue weight in comparison with the other evidence at

trial.16 Such a model charge might also usefully draw to the jurors' attention the

possibility that viewing such video evidence in slow motion might

subconsciously increase their perceptions of an actor's intentionality.17 The

content and contours of charge, if one is adopted, are best developed by the

Committee, with the benefit of additional study and the consideration of

practices in other jurisdictions.

      Having set forth these prospective principles, we affirm the trial court's

rulings and its handling of the jury's requests concerning the slow-motion

surveillance video replays in this case.

         [At the direction of the court, the published version of
         this opinion omits Parts IV and V pursuant to See
         R. 1:36-3.]
                                     VI.

      Affirmed as to both convictions, but remanded for resentencing. We do

not retain jurisdiction.

16
   Of course, there are situations in which the jury rationally determines the
video evidence is the most important proof in the case and that it refutes or
substantiates the recollections of the testifying witnesses.
17
    Depending on the fact pattern, the actor whose apparent intention might be
interpreted from the video footage could be someone other the defendant, such
as the alleged aggressor in a case involving a claim of self-defense.
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