Court Opinion

ID: 9543499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:45:58.328205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:26.246322
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority today acknowledges that there are problems •with the legislative redistricting plan. It states (331 Md. 574, 614, 629 A.2d 646, 666):
“the GRAC appears to have relied to some extent on improper non-legal criteria in formulating the City/Baltimore County region of the Governor’s plan.... The GRAC chairman publicly announced that the GRAC created districts to ‘cross local jurisdiction lines and to group communities that share interests,’ thereby possibly diluting the full application of the ‘due regard’ provision. Thus, the Governor’s plan in the City/Baltimore County region comes perilously close to running afoul of Article III, § 4.”
The majority also states that “the Governor’s plan appears to favor Baltimore City[,] [b]y packing that region with districts containing barely more than the minimum constitutionally permissible population.” 331 Md. at 596, 629 A.2d at 657. Yet, the majority holds that it is “not prepared to say that this favorable result for the City rises to the level of a constitutional violation.” 331 Md. at 596, 629 A.2d at 657. The plan was deliberately drawn to ignore the boundaries of subdivisions in certain areas, regard for which is a constitutional imperative. Moreover, the plan deviates from equality of population for a reason other than the reason which has been accepted by the Supreme Court for such deviation—respect for the boundaries of subdivisions. The plan thus transgresses federal and state constitutional requirements regarding legislative districting in two critical, interrelated ways. While the majority holds that *617the plan is only “perilously close” to the edge of unconstitutionality, I believe that it is over the edge.1
I.
The Maryland Constitution mandates that a redistricting plan for the General Assembly conform to certain specified requirements. Article III, § 4, provides as follows:
“Each legislative district shall consist of adjoining territory, be compact in form, and of substantially equal population. Due regard shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions.”
Article III, § 5, states that the Governor’s “plan shall conform to Sections 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.” The constitutional language requiring due regard for natural boundaries and political subdivisions was adopted by Ch. 363 of the Acts of 1972 and was ratified on November 7, 1972. Rather than accept these mandates for preparing the Governor’s redistricting plan, the GRAC announced that the plan had been drafted based upon the following principles (Remarks of GRAC Chair at beginning of December 10, 1991, hearing):
“1) [To represent people fairly—Legislative districts fall within 5 percent of the ideal population of 101,733.
2) To be compact.
3) To provide minority voters the opportunity to elect candidates of their choosing.
4) [To r]ecognize communities of interest—where districts cross local jurisdictional lines and to group communities that *618share interests (interests such as shopping centers, utility systems, transportation, and other community facilities).
5) To keep municipalities whole where possible.
6) To support regional interests through the intra-regional sharing of districts.”
It is apparent from these remarks of the Chairman, as well as from the numerous times that the Plan crossed political subdivision lines, that the constitutional requirement of due regard for the boundaries of political subdivisions was ignored in favor of the promotion of “regional interests.” As we stated in In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 681, 475 A.2d 428, 439 (1982), “the ‘due regard’ requirement is of mandatory application.... ”
The majority attempts to dilute this constitutional imperative by stating that the due regard provision is the “most fluid” of the constitutional guidelines and therefore “will often be the first to yield.” 331 Md. at 615, 629 A.2d at 667. The majority’s analysis is disingenuous. The due regard requirement in this case has not yielded to other constitutional imperatives such as substantial equality of population, contiguity or compactness. This constitutional mandate has yielded to a nonconstitutional program of attempting to promote “communities of interests” and supporting “regional interests.” These considerations are not set forth in Article III of the Maryland Constitution. To the contrary, they may be antithetical to the “due regard” requirement mandated by the Constitution. Moreover, as the majority recognizes, this Court “explicitly stated in 1982 that ‘communities of interest’ are an unworkable basis on which to apportion districts.” 331 Md. at 614, 629 A.2d at 666. It is certainly possible that the due regard requirement may have to yield to other constitutional mandates, including federal law made supreme by the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States2 *619and Art. 2 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.3 It is impermissible, however, to subjugate a constitutional mandate to lesser principles. The GRAC’s deliberate decision to ignore the boundaries of political subdivisions for a reason other than to conform to constitutional principles or federal law renders the legislative redistricting plan invalid.
The majority’s dismissal of the requirement of due regard for political subdivisions is unsupported by the history and reality of governance in this State. Earlier legislative districting plans have considered the counties and Baltimore City to be the primary element in apportionment, and have only crossed subdivision boundaries when necessary to achieve population equality. See Report to the Governor of Maryland by the Commission to Study Reapportionment of the General Assembly (January 31, 1964) (assuming that all representation is determined with reference to subdivision boundaries); Final Report of the Committee on More Equitable Representation in the General Assembly of Maryland (January 15, 1960) (same).
The political subdivisions have always been central to our system of state government. From the early history of Maryland, political subdivisions have played a critical role. See generally Matthew P. Andrews, History of Maryland, 617 (1929) (“In the matter of representation Maryland has been likened to a ‘confederacy of counties,’ or a federated republic—the counties and the city of Baltimore ... being comparable to the states in the Federal Union”); Theodore J. Maher, *620State-County Relations in Maryland, 312-319 (1971) (discussing the importance of county governments within the organization of the State). See also Hughes v. Maryland Committee, 241 Md. 471, 498-509, 217 A.2d 273, 289-295, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 950, 86 S.Ct. 1569, 16 L.Ed.2d 547 (1966) (Barnes, J., dissenting) (discussing at length the importance of the political subdivisions). Unlike many other states, Maryland has a small number of basic political subdivisions: twenty-three counties and Baltimore City.4 Thus, “[t]he counties in Maryland occupy a far more important position than do similar political divisions in many other states of the union.” 241 Md. at 499, 217 A.2d at 290, quoting the Maryland Geological Survey, “The Counties of Maryland, Their Origin, Boundaries and Election Districts,” 419 (1907).
The Maryland Constitution itself recognizes the critical importance of counties in the very structure of our government. See, e.g., Art. I, § 5; Art. Ill, §§ 45, 54; Art. IV, §§ 14, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 40, 41, 41B, 44, 45; Art. V, §§ 7, 11, 12; Art. VII, § 1; Art. XI; Art. XI-A; Art. XI-B; Art. XI-C; Art. XI-D; Art. XI-F; Art. XIV, § 2; Art. XV, § 2; Art. XVI, §§ 3, 4, 5; Art. XVII, §§ 1, 2, 3, 5, 6. After the State as a whole, the counties are the basic governing units in our political system. Maryland government is organized on a county-by-county basis. Numerous services and responsibilities are now, and historically have been, organized at the county level.5
*621The boundaries of political subdivisions are a significant concern in legislative redistricting for another reason: in Maryland, as in other States, many of the laws enacted by the General Assembly each year are public local laws, applicable to particular counties. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 580-581, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1391, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 538 (1964) (“In many States much of the legislature’s activity involves the enactment of so-called local legislation, directed only to the concerns of particular political subdivisions”). Many of Maryland’s counties have not established local legislative bodies.6 *8 For these “non-home rule” counties, the Maryland General Assembly is the local legislature. In practice, members of the General Assembly from such county (the county delegation) decide upon the legislation for the county and are the defacto local legislature. Home rule counties under Art. XI-A of the Constitution, which have local legislative bodies, may enact laws on subjects enumerated in the Express Powers Act, Code (1957, 1990 Repl.Vol., 1992 Cum.Supp.), Art. 25A, § 5, and in Art. 4, § 6, of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland. On subjects not covered by these grants of express powers, however, the county delegation in the General Assembly *622serves as the legislative body even for a home rule county. In addition, the General Assembly regularly makes exceptions to and variations in public general laws on a county-by-county basis. In addition, the State’s annual Budget frequently makes appropriations on a county-by-county basis.
Dr. Carl Everstine, former Director of the Department of Legislative Reference, described the legislative procedure for local laws enacted by the General Assembly (Everstine, Maryland Legislative Council, Local Government: A Comparative Study, Research Report No. 23, 17 (September 1944)):
“The rules of procedure adopted and followed by the legislatures of other states' show an interesting contrast with those of Maryland, with respect to the committees to which local bills may be assigned.
“Local bills introduced into the General Assembly of Maryland usually are referred to the select committees made up, in the House, of the members of the county delegation concerned, and in the Senate, of the Senator from the county concerned and the senators from two adjoining counties. Occasionally, a bill which would affect only one county may yet have implications of State-wide importance which will lead to its being referred to a standing committee, but it is the general practice to refer all local bills to select committees, and the rest of the legislature accepts without question the recommendations of these committees. There are no standing committees to which all local bills may be referred, simply by virtue of their being local bills.”
See also George A. Bell and Jean E. Spencer, The Legislative Process in Maryland, 85-87 (2d ed. 1963). In exercising these legislative functions, it is of paramount importance that the county delegations exist in the General Assembly. If county lines are ignored in the legislative redistricting process, this entire system of government will not function properly. Furthermore, a legislator simply cannot “represent his constituents properly—nor can voters from a fragmented district exercise the ballot intelligently—when a voting district is *623nothing more than an artificial unit divorced from, and indeed often in conflict with, the various communities established in the State.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 787, 103 S.Ct. 2653, 2689, 77 L.Ed.2d 133, 178 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The great practical and historical significance of counties in Maryland is reflected in well-established constitutional principles. As discussed in Part II below, respect for political subdivision lines is the primary ground upon which deviation from equal population may be acceptable under equal protection principles. Moreover, respect for subdivision boundaries may well prevent other unwarranted tinkering with legislative districts. See Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 578-579, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 537 (“Indiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering”). In addition, where various groups, such as minorities, have striven to attain influence in a particular subdivision, and have finally succeeded in acquiring such influence in the subdivision, a General Assembly redistricting plan which combines subdivisions for reasons other than population equality can undermine that political influence.
Even under the federal Constitution, where there is no express constitutional requirement that any regard be given to the boundaries of political subdivisions, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of this consideration. In Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2816, 2827, 125 L.Ed.2d 511, 528 (1993), the Supreme Court discussed the “traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions ” (emphasis added). In Maryland, where Art. Ill, § 4, of the State Constitution explicitly commands that “Due regard shall be given to ... the boundaries of political subdivisions,” it is unfathomable to have a legislative redistricting plan which sets out to disregard county lines. This plan’s stated goal of not giving regard to subdivision lines but, instead, of promoting “regionalism,” directly contravenes practical necessity, historical precedent, and, most importantly, violates the constitutional mandate.
*624The plan allows senatorial districts to overlap county boundaries 18 times. Five senatorial districts overlap the Baltimore City-Baltimore County border; the Baltimore City border is invaded four times for House districts. This Court should not hold valid a plan which unabashedly flouts the Maryland Constitution by failing to give the high regard to the boundaries of political subdivisions which is due.
II.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires every State to “make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 577, 84 S.Ct. at 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d at 536. Any deviation from the equal population standard must be based on “ ‘legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.’ ” Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325, 93 S.Ct. 979, 985, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, 330 (1973). The right to vote includes the right to have one’s vote count fully; “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555, 84 S.Ct. at 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d at 523-524.
These principles are fortified in Maryland by Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights which “embodies the concept of equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 353, 601 A.2d 102, 107 (1992). In addition, Art. Ill, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution expressly requires that districts be of “substantially equal population.” Thus, deviation from equal population in legislative redistricting implicates three separate constitutional provisions.
The petitioners in this case argue that the votes of residents of Montgomery County were impermissibly diluted by dividing the County into districts containing large populations, while at the same time, the votes of residents of the Baltimore area *625(Baltimore City and Baltimore County) were impermissibly overweighted by dividing the area into districts of considerably smaller populations.
The right to vote is a fundamental right of citizens in a democratic society. “[SJince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 562, 84 S.Ct. at 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d at 527. Consequently, the appropriate equal protection analysis is one employing the standard of strict scrutiny. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625-630, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889-1891, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 588-591 (1969), relying on Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 562, 84 S.Ct. at 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d at 527.7 See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 241-264, 82 S.Ct. 691, 723-736, 7 L.Ed.2d 663, 700-713 (1962) (Concurring opinions). Under this standard, “the Court must determine whether the [inequalities] are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.” Kramer v. Union Free School District, supra, 395 U.S. at 627, 89 S.Ct. at 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d at 589. We should examine first the policies which the plan is said to advance. Then, if the policies are legitimate, and sufficiently important, we should examine *626the population disparities between districts to see if they exceed constitutional limits.
The redistricting plan contains legislative districts which are significantly unequal in population. The majority acknowledges these inequalities, and further acknowledges that the inequalities systematically benefit one area of the State—the metropolitan Baltimore area. 331 Md. at 596, 629 A.2d at 657. The stated reasons for the unequal distribution of representation under the plan are to promote “regionalism” and to recognize “communities of interest.” I assume for the moment that these stated policies were not mere pretexts for pure discrimination in favor of one area of the State and against another area. Nevertheless, these policies cannot be considered legitimate legislative goals in light of the constitutional mandate to respect the boundaries of political subdivisions, which these policies directly contravene.
This Court has, in the past, decried the use of “communities of interest” as guidelines for legislative districting. See In re Legislative Districting, supra, 299 Md. at 692-693, 475 A.2d at 445 (calling the concept of communities of interest “nebulous” and stating that “no reasonable standard could possibly be devised to afford them recognition in the formulation of districts within the required constitutional framework”). Moreover, the Supreme Court has. set forth the reasons which it considers sufficient to justify population discrepancies; the desires to promote regionalism and to support communities of interest are not among them. In Reynolds v. Sims, supra, the Supreme Court discussed at length the principles on which deviation from strict population equality might be accepted, and expressly rejected the notion that group interests can override the equal population principle. The Court stated (377 U.S. at 578-580, 84 S.Ct. at 1390-1391, 12 L.Ed.2d at 537-538, emphasis added):
“A State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in *627designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid considerations may underlie such aims.
“So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two houses of a bicameral state legislature. But neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based representation.”
The Supreme Court in other cases has upheld deviations from the equal population principle only on the basis of the State’s desire to preserve the integrity of its political subdivisions. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1159, 122 L.Ed.2d 500, 516 (1993) (a State can justify deviations by its desire to maintain political subdivision lines); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 846-848, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2698-2699, 77 L.Ed.2d 214, 224-225 (1983) (population deviations were constitutionally permissible in light of the need to preserve county representation in Wyoming); Mahan v. Howell, supra, 410 U.S. at 325-326, 93 S.Ct. at 985-986, 35 L.Ed.2d at 330-331 (deviations from equal population are justified on the basis of respect for the political jurisdictional lines of the counties and cities). See also Karcher v. Daggett, supra, 462 U.S. at 740, 103 S.Ct. at 2663, 77 L.Ed.2d at 147 (deviations may be justified by the policy of respecting municipal boundaries, among others); Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187, 91 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 29 L.Ed.2d 399, 403 (1971) (upholding an apportionment for a county legislative body having a maximum deviation of 11.9%, in light of New York’s long history of maintaining the integrity of existing local government units within the county). I am aware of no Supreme Court case which upholds a deviation from the equal population principle on any other basis. The population deviations in the plan now before us are not a result of this legitimate and important concern.
*628Moreover, I doubt that “communities of interest” and “regionalism” provided the major impetus for the population disparities in the plan. The majority apparently does not believe this rationale either, stating that “the Governor’s plan appears to systematically afford the City the maximum number of representatives in the legislature as its population can support.” 331 Md. at 596, 629 A.2d at 657. It is undisputed in this case that the districts with the smallest numbers of voters per district lie in the Baltimore area; eleven of the twelve smallest districts in the State are in the Baltimore City-Baltimore County area. The implication is that the drafters of the plan made a systematic attempt to overrepresent the voters in one area of the State by affording them the largest number of representatives for the fewest number of people, and conversely, to underrepresent the voters in other areas.
Obviously uncomfortable with the clearly discriminatory plan, the majority seeks to justify it by asserting that, although the deviations benefit the voters of the Baltimore area, they do not do so at the expense of any other region.8 I do not agree. The plan obviously discriminates against the Washington metropolitan area, and particularly Montgomery County. The districts with the largest number of voters in each district lie in Montgomery and Prince George’s Counties; these counties account for nine of the fourteen largest districts in the State. According to the 1990 census, the population of Montgomery County exceeds that of Baltimore City. Under the Plan, however, the voters of Baltimore City elect 8 Senators and 24 Representatives, while the voters of Montgomery County elect only 7 Senators and 21 Representatives. It *629seems that the citizens of Montgomery County bear much of the expense of the Baltimore area’s overrepresentation.
Furthermore, there is harm to the voters living in every other area of the State, even assuming that the plan does not intentionally discriminate against any particular region. The General Assembly consists of a finite number of delegates and senators. Under Art. Ill, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, there are 141 Delegates and 47 Senators. Any increase in the number of representatives for one area necessarily results in a decrease in the number of representatives per capita for other areas of the State. “Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the votes of those living there.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 563, 84 S.Ct. at 1382, 12 L.Ed.2d at 528. The majority seems to recognize the relationship between granting excessive representation to the people of one area, and underrepresentation to others. Nevertheless, the majority seems to be willing to overlook the resultant dilution of votes because, in its view, no particular “region in the State is seriously and disproportionately underrepresented as a result.” 331 Md. at 598, n. 19, 629 A.2d at 658, n. 19. In setting out this high threshold for recognizing an injury, the majority all but ignores the fundamental right of every citizen in every region of the State to have his or her vote count equally. The standard set forth by the majority allows deliberate vote dilution on the basis of pure geographic favoritism.
After dismissing this geographic discrimination as not rising to the level of a constitutional violation, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657, the majority further implies that this discrimination might be constitutionally justifiable. The majority implies that systematically favoring the Baltimore metropolitan area (a region “with waning political clout but urgent political needs”) with disproportionately high representation could constitute a rational state policy “so long as no other region in the State is seriously and disproportionately underrepresented as a result.” 331 Md. at 598, n. 19, 629 A.2d at *630658, n. 19.9 This implication is an assault on the very concept of representative government. The “political needs” of an area cannot justify diluting the votes of the rest of the citizens of the State. The Supreme Court “clearly established that the fundamental principle of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of people, without regard to race, sex, economic status, or place of residence -within a State.” Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 560-561, 84 S.Ct. at 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d at 526, discussing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). Later, the Supreme Court specifically “underscored the danger of apportionment structures that contain a built-in bias tending to favor particular geographic areas or political interests.... ” Abate v. Mundt, supra, 403 U.S. at 185-186, 91 S.Ct. at 1907, 29 L.Ed.2d at 403. See also Brown v. Thomson, supra, 462 U.S. at 843-844, 103 S.Ct. at 2696-2697, 77 L.Ed.2d at 222-223 (upholding Wyoming’s redistricting plan, which contained a substantial deviation from equal population, and noting that it exhibited no “built-in bias tending to favor particular political interests or geographic areas”). The purposeful promotion of the interests of one region of the State over others cannot be a legitimate basis for deviation from equal population principles as a matter of law. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380, 83 S.Ct. 801, 808, 9 L.Ed.2d 821, 830 (1963) (“the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications”).
The GRAC’s stated rationales for the significant population deviations within the plan are not compelling or even legitimate State interests. Consequently, the plan fails the equal protection scrutiny to which we must subject it.
The majority, however, skips entirely the first step in this equal protection analysis and refuses to examine the justifica*631tion for the disparities. Instead, it holds that population disparities between legislative districts of less than ten percent are virtually insulated from review. The majority relies on the dictum in Brown v. Thomson, supra, 462 U.S. at 842, 103 S.Ct. at 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d at 222, to the effect that, as a general matter, deviations of less than ten percent are de minimis. The majority overlooks another statement in Brown, making it clear that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the unique situation presented by that case “does not mean that population deviations of any magnitude necessarily are acceptable.” 462 U.S. at 844-845, 103 S.Ct. at 2697, 77 L.Ed.2d at 223. The majority also ignores the Supreme Court’s holdings that deviations from the strict equal population principle are permissible only when “necessary to permit the State[ ] to pursue other legitimate objectives.” Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. at 842, 103 S.Ct. at 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d at 221 (emphasis added). See also Mahan v. Howell, supra, 410 U.S. at 325, 93 S.Ct. at 985, 35 L.Ed.2d at 330 (“deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally permissible” only “so long as the divergences ... are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy”); Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 581, 84 S.Ct. at 1392, 12 L.Ed.2d at 538-539 (“careful judicial scrutiny must of course be given, in evaluating state apportionment schemes, to the character as well as the degree of deviations from a strict population basis”) (emphasis added). Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, supra, 376 U.S. 1, 18, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481, 492 (discussing “our Constitution’s plain objective of making equal representation for equal numbers of people the fundamental goal ... ”).
Contrary to the majority’s view, the equal population principle is of utmost importance. The Supreme Court has stated (Reynolds v. Sims, supra, 377 U.S. at 581, 84 S.Ct. at 1392, 12 L.Ed.2d at 539):
“even [if] as a result of a clearly rational state policy of according some legislative representation to political subdivisions, population is submerged as the controlling consideration in the apportionment of seats in the particular legisla*632tive body, then the right of all of the State’s citizens to cast an effective and ádequately weighted vote would be unconstitutionally impaired.”
The majority’s view that “the Supreme Court has unequivocally built a 10% degree of flexibility into the one person, one vote requirement so that states can accommodate important concerns in reapportioning their legislatures,” 331 Md. at 595, 629 A.2d at 656, is simply incorrect. A significant deviation of less than 10% is permissible only for valid reasons.
The ten percent rule serves only as a threshold for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If the population deviation between legislative districts is greater than ten percent, a citizen challenging the districting plan has established a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden to the State to show that the plan is not discriminatory. If the population disparity is less than ten percent, however, citizens must still have an opportunity to show that the population deviations were not based on legitimate considerations. As the Court stated in Brown v. Thomson, supra, 462 U.S. at 845-846, 103 S.Ct at 2697-2698, 77 L.Ed.2d at 224:
“The consistency of application and the neutrality of effect of the nonpopulation criteria must be considered along with the size of the population disparities in determining whether a state legislative apportionment plan contravenes the Equal Protection Clause.”
The majority, however, asserts that unless “the plaintiff can present compelling evidence that the drafters of the plan ignored all the legitimate reasons for population disparities and created the deviations solely to benefit certain regions at the expense of others,” 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657, deviations under ten percent will not be scrutinized. Furthermore, the majority will not accept the plan itself as evidence of improper discrimination, even when, as in this case, the plan on its face favors one area over all others generally and discriminates against certain areas in particular. As an initial matter, there is no reason to discount the evidentiary value of the plan in making out a prima facie case of discrimination; *633the best possible evidence of improper geographic discrimination would seem to be the plan itself. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, supra, — U.S. at -, -, 113 S.Ct. at 2824, 2832, 125 L.Ed.2d at 525, 536 (redistricting plan “on its face” was such that “it rationally can be viewed only as an effort” to accomplish an illegitimate purpose “without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification”).
Moreover, there is no support in the cases for the view that population deviations of less than ten percent are never subject to question. Brown v. Thomson, supra, and Voinovich v. Quilter, supra, each hold that major deviations from population equality, in themselves, are sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. A deviation of less than ten percent is not considered “major” within this rule, according to Brown. Therefore, as pointed out above, a citizen challenging the apportionment must show more than the mere percentage deviation in order to make out a prima facie case and in order to require justification by the State. The rule is not, as the majority opinion states, that deviations of less than ten percent do not require justification by the State; the rule is that deviations of less than ten percent do not, in and of themselves, require justification by State in the manner that larger deviations do. The Broum case simply does not stand for the proposition that a percentage deviation of less than ten percent is constitutional under all circumstances, as the majority opinion suggests.10
The overriding constitutional objective in legislative districting is population equality among districts; this objective is not served by ignoring so-called minor deviations which are not based on legitimate principles. As pointed out by the Su*634preme Court, “[i]f state legislators knew that a certain de minimis level of population differences was acceptable, they would doubtless strive to achieve that level rather than equality.” Karcher v. Daggett, supra, 462 U.S. at 731, 103 S.Ct. at 2659, 77 L.Ed.2d at 141. In fact, this is exactly what happened in the case at bar. The GRAC’s goal was not population equality; instead, the GRAC crafted the plan with the express target of ten percent deviations between districts. The GRAC on June 11, 1991, adopted a set of “Legal Standards for Plan Development,” which included the following statement of principle: “The population of any legislative subdistrict shall be substantially equal to the appropriate fraction of the Senate district population. Deviations from the ideal Senate district or legislative subdistrict population should not exceed +5% or - 5% (except as may be necessitated by other constitutional requirements).” The GRAC Chairperson later remarked (at the beginning of the December 10, 1991 hearing) that it was one of the committee’s goals to have “legislative districts fall within 5 percent of the ideal population.” Thus, instead of making the required good faith effort to construct districts which are virtually equal in population, deviating only to accommodate other constitutional requirements, the GRAC set out to construct a plan which contained districts of unequal population as an initial matter.
The plan deviates significantly from the overriding constitutional imperative of equal population, and the deviations were not for legitimate constitutionally recognized reasons. Consequently, the votes of numerous citizens of this State have been impermissibly diluted.
III.
The majority’s decision upholding this legislative redistricting plan, I am afraid, sends a message to future Governors for many decades that, in preparing a General Assembly redistricting plan, they need not be concerned about the constitutional criteria set forth in Art. Ill, § 4, because, as long as the population discrepancies are no greater than 10%, the Court of Appeals will uphold the plan regardless of the reasons for the *635population discrepancies and regardless of the other constitutional criteria.
I would hold that the legislative redistricting plan at issue violates the Equal Protection Clause, of the Fourteenth Amendment, violates Art. 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and violates Art. Ill, § 4, of the Maryland Constitution. Consequently, I would refer the plan to a Special Master. The Special Master could be Judge Smith, who has already served in that capacity, or, if he is unavailable, a different Special Master. The Special Master should recommend to this Court modifications of the plan so that the constitutional deficiencies regarding the districts for Baltimore County, Baltimore City and Montgomery County might be rectified. In making his recommendations, the Special Master should consider any alternate plans which have already been submitted in this redistricting effort, as well as any new submissions from the parties which they may wish to make, although he should not be limited to particular alternate plans which have been or will be submitted.
Only the districts relating to Baltimore County, Baltimore City and Montgomery County have been specifically challenged, but the Special Master’s recommendations might affect other areas. This effect is not likely to be great; nonetheless, the necessary modification should be accomplished with as little disruption to other areas as possible.
I realize that I would have the Court take on what may seem to be a difficult task. I point out, however, that the Court has invalidated a redistricting plan in the past. See In re Legislative Districting, 271 Md. 320, 317 A.2d 477, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 840, 95 S.Ct. 70, 42 L.Ed.2d 67 (1974). Moreover, it is the constitutional duty of this Court to grant relief from an unconstitutional legislative districting plan. The perceived difficulty of the task should not excuse its performance.
Judge ROBERT M. BELL has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.

. Since I believe that the redistricting plan is invalid on two grounds, namely its failure to give due regard to political subdivision boundaries and its population deviations, and that the plan should be modified to rectify its deficiencies in both of these areas, I need not and do not express any opinion concerning the other grounds on which the plan was challenged. If the plan were modified to rectify the deficiencies regarding political subdivision boundaries and population deviations, some of the other challenges might disappear or might be of a different nature.

. Article VI, cl. 2, of the Constitution of the United States provides:
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the *619supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

. Article 2 of the Maryland Declaralion of Rights states:
"The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, are, and shall be the Supreme Law of the Slate; and the Judges of this State, and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

. Under Art. XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, Baltimore City is the equivalent of a home rule county. Consequently, general references to "counties” in this opinion will include Baltimore City unless the context indicates otherwise.

. Many of the most important functions of government in Maryland are performed by counties. Maryland’s public schools are organized at this local level, with one school board for each county and Baltimore City.. The counties and Baltimore City operate libraries, hospitals, clinics, jails and parks. Other functions carried out at the county level include zoning and land use planning, public works projects, health inspections, building inspections, and sanitation services. The local governments provide fire and police protection. Real estate taxes are largely determined by the counties and Baltimore City.
*621Numerous other functions are carried out by the State on a county-by-county basis. By Art. IV, § 19 of the Maryland Constitution, our State judicial system is organized according to political subdivisions; each judicial circuit is made up of several counties. Each county has a circuit court, and each county has at least one circuit judge. Art. IV, §§ 20, 21. The State is represented by a State's Attorney in each county. Art. V, § 7. The State carries out registration of voters on a political subdivision basis, with an election board in each county. Furthermore, several national programs, such as the cooperative extension service and the soil conservation service, are operated on a county-by-county basis.
For thorough reviews of the responsibilities undertaken by and in political subdivisions, see Theodore J. Maher, State-County Relations in Maryland, 142-243 (1971); Don L. Bowen and Robert S. Friedman, Local Government in Maryland, 39-49 (Bureau of Governmental Research, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Maryland, 1955).

. County Commissioners, under Art. VII, § 1, of the Maryland Constitution, largely "act as administrators or in an executive capacity,” City of Bowie v. County Comm’rs, 258 Md. 454, 461, 267 A.2d 172, 176 (1970).

. The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny in invalidating a state election law in Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969), which was not a reapportionment case. The Supreme Court reasoned, however, that because strict scrutiny is appropriate in reapportionment cases, it was also appropriate in that case. The Court stated (395 U.S. at 626-627, 89 S.Ct. at 1889—1890, 23 L.Ed.2d at 589):
"[S]tate apportionment statutes, which may dilute the effectiveness of some citizens’ votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court. Reynolds v. Sims, supra. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968). No less rigid an examination is applicable to statutes denying the franchise to citizens who are otherwise qualified by residence and age.... Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."

. The majority’s comment, 331 Md. at 597, 629 A.2d at 657, that people and not territory are to be represented in the General Assembly, serves only to distract from the real issues at hand. We are concerned here with the systematic dilution of the votes of citizens living outside of a favored territory, not with some scheme of representation of the territory itself. We measure disparities between districts because of the principle that districts are to be comprised of equal numbers of people, not because we are concerned with discrimination against the "district” per se.

. A merely “rational” state policy would be insufficient to justify the significant deviations from population equality in the plan. As discussed earlier, only a compelling state interest may justify significant deviations, and even then, it only justifies those deviations which are necessary to serve that interest.

. The majority opinion cites two cases as authority for its notion that population deviations of less than ten percent never require justification by the State: Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983), and Voinovich v. Quilter, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 122 L.Ed.2d 500 (1993). Voinovich merely quotes the Brown opinion; it does not provide more guidance in this matter. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1159, 122 L.Ed.2d at 516.