Court Opinion

ID: 9541247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:52.770056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:03.117745
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting: Section 52 of our Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 52 (now section 2—1009 of our Code of Civil Procedure, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2—1009)), which governs voluntary dismissals of complaints, provides in relevant part: “The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each party who has appeared or his attorney, and upon payment of costs, dismiss his action ***.” (Emphasis added.) Our Rule 208, after specifically directing which of the parties shall initially pay the various fees and charges involved in taking and transcribing depositions, provides in subsection (d): “The aforesaid fees and charges may in the discretion of the trial court be taxed as costs.” (73 Ill. 2d R. 208(d).) That language, in my opinion, plainly vests in the trial judge authority to tax as costs in cases of voluntary dismissal such of those charges as he deems appropriate. But, even if that language were less plain, I would have thought that in interpreting our own rules we would in this case, as we have in others (People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 138, 150; Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 407, 426; People v. Fritz (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 72, 77), looked to the accompanying committee comments and historical and practice notes for guidance. The latter clearly state: “The rule authorizes the court, in its discretion, to tax deposition fees and charges as costs, although such fees and charges are not usually taxed as costs in Illinois.” (Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 110A, par. 208, Historical and Practice Notes, at 158 (Smith-Hurd 1968).) It would have been difficult to express the purpose of the rule more clearly than was done. “The aforesaid fees and charges” can refer only to all deposition fees and charges since there is no hint of an intent to limit the authority to tax such amounts as costs only if the deposition is used at trial, as the majority now holds. Nor should the fact that deposition expenses are not normally taxable as costs be significant in light of the fact that the notes expressly point out that Rule 208(d) represented a departure from the usual practice theretofore prevailing in this State. Apparently because these sources would not support the desired result, my colleagues cite as authority cases from other jurisdictions which arise from differing factual situations and involve differing statutory language. By doing so, they have achieved a result which I view as in direct conflict with the unequivocal language of our rule. Nor does it seem to me logical to attempt to bolster the result by stating that it is necessary to limit reimbursable deposition expense to those depositions used at trial because including those not so used would encourage increasing use of depositions since the expense might be recoverable. Rather, I would think, the prospect that unused deposition expense might be included as costs could serve to eliminate or reduce “fishing expeditions” and limit the deposition activity of both parties to those which offered reasonable promise. There has been in this case and in others coming before us considerable discussion of alleged discovery abuses by both plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants here allege their litigation expense aggregates some $2 million, of which it is said some $200,000 is allocable to deposition expense. Defendants assert numerous changes in plaintiffs’ theories of liability occurred as earlier theories proved to be unsubstantiated, and that the purpose of the litigation is designed to coerce a settlement. Conversely, plaintiffs assert defendants complied with some discovery requests only after court orders were secured and that expenses increased when defendants insisted upon taking depositions in distant locations. I intend no implication as to the merits of these assertions, since those matters are not before us, although I note that the trial judge was troubled by the fact that the plaintiffs had moved to voluntarily dismiss only after he had denied their motion for a six-month continuance to permit investigation of a Canadian plane crash. Their expressed intention to refile their complaint pursuant to section 24 of the Limitations Act (El. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 83, par. 24a), in effect, overruled the court’s denial of the continuance. I note, too, that the judge expressly stated in taxing the costs that “if I thought I had the authority, I would do something more.” Given the questions regarding abuses of discovery and the possible unfairness of a voluntary dismissal and refiling prompted by a desire to avoid trial, I would implement what seems to me the clear purpose of section 52 of the Civil Practice Act and our Rule 208(d) by holding the trial judge vested with discretion to tax as costs such of the deposition fees and charges as, in the exercise of sound discretion, he deems appropriate, irrespective of whether those depositions were used at trial. Wisely exercised, that authority can be an effective remedy for such problems as may exist in this area. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court and remand the cause to the circuit court to permit the trial judge to exercise his sound and informed discretion. RYAN, C.J., and WARD, J., join in this dissent.