Court Opinion

ID: 9534985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:44:24.517314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:08.957480
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The practice of submitting questions to the public in the form of a non-binding referendum has obvious appeal. It allows a munici*153pality quickly to poll the public on a specific issue. It also affords the voting public a sense of participation in municipal affairs.
In contrast, the procedure for reviewing proposed zoning amendments, established under the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -129, L. 1975, c. 291, involves a lengthy, deliberative process, in which public opinion constitutes but one of many factors that must be considered before a governing body may approve an amendment to a zoning ordinance. The purpose of that elaborate process is to safeguard the public from the effects of arbitrariness and political influence in zoning decisions.
The Court today holds that a proposed amendment to a zoning ordinance may be the subject of a non-binding referendum. In doing so, the Court undermines a process that has been carefully developed over more than sixty years to protect property owners and the public from zoning decisions based on considerations other than sound and comprehensive planning.
I
A
“Zoning is a separation of the municipality into districts, and the regulation of buildings and structures in the districts so created, in accordance with their construction and the nature and extent of their use.” Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 149, 198 A. 225 (Sup.Ct.1938). Zoning regulates “the type of building development [that] can take place on the land * * *.” Levin v. Township of Livingston, 35 N.J. 500, 506, 173 A.2d 391 (1961). Municipal planning, on the other hand, “is concerned with the interrelationships and organization of land uses, including not only the physical ways in which land is developed but the manner of its use and the existence of municipal facilities to facilitate such use.” 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 1.05, at 1-49 (1994). Thus, zoning is the mechanism for the regulation of development, *154whereas planning provides a context and guides the manner in which that mechanism is to be applied. See ibid.
A history of the development of both zoning and planning in New Jersey highlights the recognition by the Legislature and the courts that the proper exercise of the zoning power requires a planning framework. For example, this Court has indicated that zoning changes that occur in a “haphazard or piecemeal” fashion may be found to be invalid. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 166, 131 A.2d 1 (1957); see also Riggs v. Township of Long Beach, 109 N.J. 601, 616, 538 A.2d 808 (1988) (noting that zoning ordinance inconsistent with master plan supports conclusion that ordinance was adopted for invalid purpose). Thus, the MLUL’s requirement that any amendment to a zoning ordinance be reviewed in relation to the municipality’s master plan should be understood not as a procedural nicety but rather as a mandatory and essential step to safeguard the validity of a proposed zoning amendment. Any deviation from the procedural framework established by the MLUL should be scrutinized closely to determine if it furthers the purposes of that Act.
When the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 was amended in 1927 to enable the Legislature to pass general laws authorizing municipalities to enact zoning ordinances, zoning and planning were considered related activities that could nevertheless be implemented separately. See Roger A. Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey by Means of Zoning, 14 Rutgers L.Rev. 37, 38-39 (1959). Accordingly, the Legislature enacted New Jersey’s first zoning enabling statute, the Zoning Act of 1928, two years prior to the State’s first planning enabling legislation, the Planning Act of 1930 (Planning Act). The Planning Act provided for the creation of municipal planning boards authorized to “make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality,” L. 1930, c. 235, § 5, and to make recommendations to the local governing body regarding changes or additions to the official map of the municipality, L. 1930, c. 235, § 7.
*155In 1953, however, the relationship of municipal planning and zoning was expressly recognized when the Legislature combined the planning and zoning authority in the Municipal Planning Act (MPA), L. 1953, c. 433. Although the MPA altered the language concerning the establishment of master plans to make them permissive rather than mandatory, the Act strengthened the relationship between planning and zoning by requiring that municipal planning boards also serve as “zoning commissions,” L. 1953, c. 433, § 8, which were authorized to “recommend the boundaries of the various districts and appropriate regulations to be enforced therein.” L. 1948, c. 305, § 3. The Act reinforced the power granted to planning boards by earlier amendments enacted in 1948 that required municipal governing bodies to submit any amendment or change to the zoning ordinance to the planning board for its “approval, disapproval or suggestions.” L. 1948, c. 305, § 4. In the case of an unfavorable report by the planning board, the governing body was required to approve the proposed amendment by a favorable two-thirds vote before the amendment became effective. Ibid.; see Roger A. Cunningham, Control of Land Use in New Jersey under the 1953 Planning Statutes, 15 Rutgers L.Rev. 1, 46 (1960).
Because the adoption of master plans was permissive under the MPA, some municipalities continued to enact zoning ordinances without having adopted master plans. In Kozesnik, supra, 24 N.J. at 164-66, 131 A.2d 1, Chief Justice Weintraub attempted to reconcile the permissive nature of master plans under the MPA with the statutory requirement that zoning regulations be adopted “in accordance with a comprehensive plan”:
No doubt good housekeeping would be served if a zoning ordinance followed and implemented a master plan, but the history of the subject dictated a different course. * * *
********
* * * Our own decisions emphasize that [the function of a comprehensive plan] is to prevent a capricious exercise of the legislative power resulting in haphazard or piecemeal zoning. Without venturing an exact definition, it may be said for present purposes that “plan” connotes an integrated product of a rational process and “comprehensive” requires something beyond a piecemeal approach, both to be *156revealed by the ordinance considered in relation to the physical facts and the purposes authorized by R.S. 40:55-32.
[I'd. at 165-66, 131 A2d 1 (citations omitted).]
In Kozesnik, the Court stressed the importance of a rational and deliberative approach to zoning that would examine a zoning proposal in the context of related planning objectives. However, it stopped short of requiring that zoning changes conform to a plan that would exist independently of the zoning ordinance itself. Id. at 166, 131 A2d 1.
In 1975, the Legislature formally acknowledged the interdependence between planning and zoning by passing the MLUL, one of the primary purposes of which was “to achieve a better coordination of land use planning and regulation.” Statement of the Senate County and Municipal Government Committee on Senate Bill No. 3054 (1975). “[0]f particular importance [was] the requirement for a stricter conformity between the master plan, official map and zoning ordinances.” Id. at 2. Discussing the heightened role of planning in the MLUL, Justice Handler noted in Riggs, supra, that
a prerequisite of the exercise of the zoning power by a municipality is the preparation and adoption of a master plan. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62. In addition, the envisioned master plan is a much more detailed, rigorous and systematic exercise in planning than that which sufficed under the old Planning Act * * *. A master plan under current law must include a statement of objectives and assumptions as well as a land use plan element and housing element. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-28b. The plan must also state its relationship to other potential plan elements, such as transportation, utilities, community facilities, recreation, environ-' mental and energy conservation, and historic preservation. See N.J.S.A 40:55D-28b(l) — (10).
[109 N.J. at 619-20, 538 A.2d 808 (Handler, J., concurring).]
Under the MLUL, the process by which a municipality enacts a zoning ordinance or a zoning amendment begins with the same procedure by which that municipality would adopt any other ordinance. See N.J.S.A 40:49-2; William M. Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration § 34AL, at 498 (1994). However, additional requirements attend the adoption of zoning ordinances and amendments. A zoning ordinance may be adopted only after the planning board has adopted the land-use-plan and *157housing-plan elements of a master plan. N.J.S.A 40:55D-62a. Furthermore, to ensure that a proposed zoning amendment is consistent with the master plan, the governing body must refer the proposed amendment to the planning board for comment and report. N.J.S.A 40:55D-64, -26a.
A planning board must evaluate a proposed zoning amendment in relation to its master plan. N.J.S.A 40:55D-26a. If a municipality adopts an ordinance that is inconsistent with its current master plan, it must do so by a majority of the full authorized membership of the governing body and must set forth in a resolution reasons for the inconsistency. N.J.S.A 40:55D-62a; Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 621, 538 A.2d 808. Compliance with the procedures established by the MLUL thus ensures that zoning changes occur in a manner consistent with the planning objectives of the community, as reflected by the master plan.
The MLUL also requires municipalities to engage in continued planning by calling for a periodic review of master plans. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-89; see also Levin v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 82 N.J. 174, 181 n. 3, 411 A.2d 704 (1980) (“[T]he legislative intent is that a municipality should reexamine its land use regulations periodically.”) When revising its master plan, a municipality can examine its future development and planning needs and can make changes in the master plan to reflect those needs.
In enacting the MLUL, the Legislature also took into account the importance of public participation in the planning process. It established standards for public notification of meetings and hearings of the planning board, all of which are open to the public, N.J.S.A 40:55D-9, and required public access to records relating to land-use proposals under review, including minutes of all regular meetings and hearings, N.J.S.A 40:55D-10.
Since the adoption of the MLUL, this Court has “increasingly emphasized that planning, and not ad hoc decision-making, is the cornerstone of sound governmental policy in this area.” Kaufmann v. Planning Bd., 110 N.J. 551, 557, 542 A.2d 457 (1988). As *158developed in case law that predates the MLUL, “ ‘[t]he specific requirement of a “comprehensive plan” is intended to avoid an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious exercise of the zoning power[,]’ and is thus a guarantee that the zoning power is used for the public good to secure reasonable neighborhood uniformity.” Riggs, supra, 109 N.J. at 623-24, 538 A.2d 808 (quoting Speakman v. Mayor of N. Plainfield, 8 N.J. 250, 256, 84 A.2d 715 (1951)). Our concern that decisions affecting zoning be grounded in a thoughtful and rational decision-making process has been reflected in other areas of land use law as well. For example, regarding the review of variance applications, we have noted that “the key to sound municipal decision-making is a clear statement of reasons for the grant or denial of a variance.” Kaufmann, supra, 110 N.J. at 566, 542 A.2d 457. Similarly, in North Bergen Action Group v. Planning Board, 122 N.J. 567, 585 A.2d 939 (1991), we emphasized: “Because zoning restrictions are enacted to further municipal planning and zoning objectives, it is fundamental that resolutions granting variances undertake to reconcile the deviation authorized by the Board with the municipality’s objectives in establishing the restriction.” Id. at 578, 585 A.2d 939.
B
The provision in the MLUL, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-62b (section 62b), that the Court interprets today is contained in the same statutory section that requires zoning changes or amendments to be “substantially consistent ■with” or “designed to effectuate” the land-use element of the master plan. See N.J.S.A 40:55D-62a. The Court, however, ignores or overlooks the obvious significance of the placement of the anti-referendum provision within the same section requiring that zoning ordinances adhere to the master plan.
Section 62b states: “No zoning ordinance and no amendment or revision to any zoning ordinance shall be submitted to or adopted by initiative or referendum.” The municipality argues that section 62b precludes the use of binding referenda but allows non*159binding referenda as a means of polling the public on a proposed zoning change, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 19:37-1. The purpose of non-binding referenda “is to encourage citizen interest and participation in municipal affairs.” Borough of Eatontown v. Danskin, 121 N.J.Super. 68, 76, 296 A.2d 81 (Law Div.1972). Furthermore, non-binding referenda are considered “so obviously useful to those who are burdened with the duty of promoting the public welfare that a court should interfere only where a misuse is plain * * Id. at 75, 296 A.2d 81. The process for presenting a question to the public under N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 is straightforward. The governing body of a municipality must adopt an ordinance or a resolution requesting the county clerk to print on the ballots to be used at the next general election “a certain proposition to be formulated and expressed in the ordinance or resolution in concise form.” N.J.S.A. 19:37-1. The request must be filed no later than seventy-four days prior to the election. Ibid.
II
The majority concludes that the plain language of section 62b demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to bar the submission of zoning ordinances or amendments to non-binding referenda. However, a careful reading of that provision reveals that the term “referendum” was intended to include both binding and non-binding referenda.
The plain language of the statute expressly prohibits zoning ordinances and amendments from being “submitted to or adopted by * * * referendum.” (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority’s understanding that section 62b is directed only at binding referenda, because such referenda “review[ ] already-taken governmental action and constitute[ ] final voter acceptance or rejection of that action,” ante at 145, 644 A2d at 602, the Legislature’s use of the term “submitted” demonstrates that it was not concerned solely with binding referenda. That the Legislature chose to bar the submission, as well as the adoption, of zoning proposals through referendum emphasizes the Legislature’s intention to *160insulate zoning ordinances or amendments from either binding or non-binding expressions of public opinion. Accordingly, by prohibiting the submission of zoning proposals to the referendum process, the Legislature effectively conveyed its intention to protect the carefully established statutory-review process for zoning ordinances from the influences of a non-binding public-opinion poll.
The majority’s primary argument is that the common understanding of the term “referendum” includes “binding public actions only.” Ante at 144, 644 A.2d at 602. Although N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 speaks of “submitting” a “question” to the legal voters of a municipality, that section is located within Subtitle 10 of the Elections Law, which is entitled “Nonbinding County or Municipal Referenda.” See N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 to -5. This Court has used the terms “public question,” “non-binding referendum,” and “referendum question” interchangeably to refer to questions submitted to the voters under N.J.S.A 19:37-1. See AFL-CIO v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 121 N.J. 255, 259, 579 A.2d 1231 (1990) (describing N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 as “the non-binding referendum law”); Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Szaferman, 117 N.J. 94, 563 A.2d 1132 passim (1989) (describing question proposed for inclusion on ballot under N.J.S.A. 19:37-1 as “referendum question”); see also Danskin, supra, 121 N.J.Super. at 76, 296 A.2d 81 (describing question submitted under N.J.S.A 19:37-1 as “referendum”). The majority’s legalistic interpretation of the term “referendum” to include only binding expressions of public opinion is unrealistically restrictive and is contradicted by this Court’s prior use and understanding of the term.
To the extent that the plain-language of section 62b may not be thought dispositive, the question remains whether the Legislature ever contemplated that non-binding referenda could be used as a mechanism to gauge public opinion on a zoning matter. See State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 658, 628 A.2d 735 (1993) (“When a statute has more than one possible meaning, courts must look beyond its literal language to determine the legislative intent.”). *161The MLUL represents the culmination of decades of efforts by land-use lawyers and municipal officials to establish a coherent and comprehensive land-use statute that adequately recognizes the importance of planning as a prerequisite for sound zoning. See Stephen Sussna, The New Municipal Land Use Law, 99 N.J.L.J. 81 (1976); The Municipal Land Use Law, New Jersey Municipalities, March 1976, at 6. The MLUL, for the first time, required municipalities to have the land-use and housing elements of the master plan in place before adopting any new zoning ordinances. In fact, the very section of the law that the Court today construes to permit submission of zoning ordinances and amendments to non-binding referenda is the same section that requires that such ordinances and amendments be adopted in accordance with the master plan. The Court’s conclusion that the Legislature simultaneously decided, in the same section of the MLUL, to authorize submission of zoning amendments to public referenda while inextricably linking the zoning function with comprehensive planning is simply incongruous.
That the deliberative process established for reviewing zoning proposals under the MLUL is inconsistent with the non-binding referendum process is incontrovertible. Non-binding referenda condense complex issues into one-sentence questions that permit only a “yes” or “no” response. The extent to which voters considering those questions will be informed of the underlying planning issues that should guide decisions affecting zoning is obviously unknown. However, the impact of a non-binding referendum is clear. Public officials will be diverted from the required focus on planning principles and instead be encouraged to heed the expression of popular will. The Mayor of Point Pleasant effectively conceded the influence of the referendum at issue when he explained his reasons for not vetoing the zoning ordinance passed by the Borough Council. The Mayor observed: “The people have spoken.” Carlos Sadovi, Zoning Change Denies A & P Plan, Asbury Park Press, Dec. 22, 1993, at Cl.
*162Today the Court interprets a provision of the MLUL in the abstract, ignoring the long history of efforts to safeguard zoning from haphazard or politically-motivated decisions, a history to which this Court has contributed significantly. Were we faithful to that history, we would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.
HANDLER, J., joins in this dissent.
For affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 4.
For reversal — Justices HANDLER and STEIN — 2.