Court Opinion

ID: 9819021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:18:00.27134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:07.905396
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE NICKELS, also dissenting: In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549,116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996), I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution does not forbid Kimery’s criminal prosecution. Nonetheless, I believe Kimery is protected from prosecution under our state constitution’s double jeopardy clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10). We are bound to follow the United States Supreme Court’s decisions on matters of federal constitutional law. However, the obligation to apply those decisions when interpreting parallel provisions of our state constitution is one that this court has imposed upon itself under the so-called "lockstep doctrine.” Under this doctrine, courts apply decisions of the United States Supreme Court based on federal constitutional provisions to the construction of comparable provisions of the state constitution unless the language of the state constitution or debates and committee reports of the constitutional convention show that the framers intended a different construction. People v. DiGuida, 152 Ill. 2d 104, 118 (1992); see also People v. Mitchell, 165 Ill. 2d 211, 217 (1995). Thus, the determination whether to follow United States Supreme Court precedent depends on a comparison of the state and federal constitutions; the quality of the reasoning underlying the Court’s decisions plays no role in the calculus. I believe the time has come to reconsider the lockstep approach in this respect. Where a provision of the state constitution was intended to have the same meaning as a federal constitutional provision, decisions of the United States Supreme Court are entitled to consideration. However, examination of the reasoning behind those decisions should not categorically be foreclosed. I would follow the approach suggested by Justice Clark in his concurrence in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d 209 (1988): "[A]s to our State constitutional provisions, Federal precedents are not stare decisis. They are persuasive and not determinative. Where their reasoning persuades us, we should follow them. Where they do not, we should not.” Joyce, 126 Ill. 2d at 225 (Clark, J., concurring). I dissent not because I believe the state and federal double jeopardy provisions necessarily have different meanings. Rather, I dissent because I am convinced that the Court’s decision in Ursery fails to give the double jeopardy clause its proper effect, and in interpreting our state constitution, this court is not obliged to make the same error. Ursery is premised upon the fanciful notion that in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding, it is the seized property that is punished rather than the owner of the property. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 300-01, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 576, 116 S. Ct. at 2153 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice Stevens’ partial dissent in Ursery persuasively demonstrates that the majority opinion in that case represents an abrupt and unwarranted departure from the Court’s prior double jeopardy jurisprudence. See Ursery, 518 U.S. at 297-321, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 574-89, 116 S. Ct. at 2152-63 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). I am convinced that our original opinion in this case, In re P.S., 169 Ill. 2d 260 (1996), properly applied the applicable double jeopardy principles and reached the correct result. For purposes of our state constitution, I would adhere to the analysis in our original opinion. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.