Court Opinion

ID: 9850818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:17.689835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.178222
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
concurring and dissenting: I concur with the majority that K.S.A. 16-204 controls the rate of interest on the judgment and that the appropriate appellate court and not the district court should award attorney fees for appellate work.
I respectfully dissent from the majority holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal on its merits. I disagree with syllabus ¶ 1 and the corresponding portions of the majority opinion. The majority acknowledges that under the Snodgrass rule, Provident’s notice of appeal was out of time, since it should have been filed within 30 days of July 7, 1989. I disagree that the Snodgrass rule “constituted a departure from our prior rulings” which requires a retroactive application that would be unfair in the present case. We did not mention “any prior rulings” in Snodgrass, let alone depart from them.
In Snodgrass we interpreted the meaning of the term “final decision” under K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-2102(a)(4) and adopted the federal rationale as stated in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178, 108 S. Ct. 1717 (1988). The rule we adopted in Snodgrass is applicable to the present case. It is no less unfair to bar the appeal in the present case than it was to allow the appeal in Snodgrass. I would find that the notice of appeal was not timely and grant partial dismissal of the appeal.