Court Opinion

ID: 9918346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 18:00:52.917372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:38.581324
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PUNCHBOWL, INC., a Delaware                          No.21-55881
corporation,
             Plaintiff-Appellant,                      D.C. No.
                                                    2:21-cv-03010-
  v.                                                 SVW-MAR

AJ PRESS, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company,                                        OPINION
               Defendant-Appellee.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
             for the Central District of California
         Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

            Argued and Submitted October 2, 2023
                     Las Vegas, Nevada

                      Filed January 12, 2024

    Before: John B. Owens and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit
     Judges, and Sidney A. Fitzwater,* District Judge.

                     Opinion by Judge Bress

* The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for

the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2                PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

                          SUMMARY**

                           Lanham Act

    The panel reversed the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of the defendant in a trademark
infringement suit involving two companies that used the
word “Punchbowl” in their marks and remanded for further
proceedings.
     Applying Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products
LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), the panel held that the
defendant’s use of the Punchbowl mark was not outside the
scope of the Lanham Act under the “Rogers test.” Under this
test, a trademark dispute concerning an expressive work
protected by the First Amendment does not fall within the
Lanham Act unless the defendant’s use of the mark was not
artistically relevant to the work or explicitly misled
consumers as to the source or the content of the work. Jack
Daniel’s held that the Rogers test does not apply when the
accused infringer has used a trademark to designate the
source of its own goods. The panel concluded that, following
Jack Daniel’s, the Ninth Circuit’s prior precedents were no
longer good law insofar as they held that Rogers applied
when an expressive mark was used as a mark, and that the
only threshold for applying Rogers was an attempt to apply
the Lanham Act to something expressive.
    The panel held that Rogers did not apply here because
the defendant was using the Punchbowl mark to identify and
distinguish its news products. The panel instructed that, on

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.   It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC            3

remand, the district court should proceed to a likelihood -of-
confusion analysis under the Lanham Act.

                        COUNSEL

Peter J. Willsey (argued) and Vincent Badolato, Brown
Rudnick LLP, Washington, D.C.; Rececca M. Lecaroz and
Melanie D. Burke, Brown Rudnick LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts; David Stein, Brown Rudnick LLP, Irvine,
California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Ian C. Ballon (argued) Nina D. Boyajian, and Rebekah S.
Guyon, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Los Angeles, California,
for Defendant-Appellee.
Cara L. Gagliano and Corynne McSherry, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, San Francisco, California, Amici
Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation.
Eugene Volokh, UCLA First Amendment Clinic, UCLA
School of Law, Los Angeles, California, Amici Curiae Law
Professors.

                         OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

     This case requires us to apply the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP
Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), to a trademark
infringement dispute involving two companies that use the
word “Punchbowl” in their marks. Prior to Jack Daniel’s,
and bound by Ninth Circuit precedent, we held that under the
4             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

“Rogers test,” see Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989), the defendant’s use of the term “Punchbowl” was
expressive in nature and not explicitly misleading as to its
source, which meant it fell outside the Lanham Act as a
matter of law. See Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC
(Punchbowl I), 52 F.4th 1091 (9th Cir. 2022), opinion
withdrawn, 78 F.4th 1158 (9th Cir. 2023). With the benefit
of Jack Daniel’s, we now hold that Rogers does not apply
because the defendant is using the mark to identify its
products. Although it does not follow that the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail or even survive a future dispositive
motion, it does mean that the defendant’s use of its mark is
not immune from the traditional likelihood-of-confusion
inquiry.
    We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
                              I
                             A
    The following facts come verbatim from our initial
opinion in this case. See Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1094–96.
    Punchbowl, Inc. (Punchbowl), is a self-described
“technology company that develops online communications
solutions for consumers,” with a “focus on celebrations,
holidays, events and memory-making.”            Punchbowl
provides “online event and celebration invitations and
greetings cards” and “custom sponsorships and branded
invitations,” as part of a subscription-based service.
Punchbowl also works with companies such as The Walt
Disney Company, Chuck E. Cheese, and Dave & Busters to
help them promote their brands through online invitations.
    Punchbowl has used the mark Punchbowl® (the Mark)
since at least 2006. It registered the Mark with the United
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC             5

States Patent & Trademark Office in 2013. The Mark was
registered primarily in connection with the “[t]ransmission
of invitations, documents, electronic mail, announcements,
photographs and greetings”; “[p]arty planning”; and
“[p]reparation of electronic invitations, namely, providing
. . . software that enables users to . . . customize electronic
invitations.”
    Punchbowl promotes itself as “The Gold Standard in
Online Invitations & Greeting Cards,” as reflected in this
record excerpt from Punchbowl’s website:

A larger example of Punchbowl’s Mark and logo (a punch
ladle) is shown here:
6             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

    But this is not the only Punchbowl. Journalists Jake
Sherman and Anna Palmer are the co-founders of AJ Press,
LLC, a company that “provides curated, non-partisan
commentary, opinions, and critiques.” In 2021, Palmer and
Sherman co-founded Punchbowl News with reporter John
Bresnahan. Punchbowl News is a subscription-based online
news publication that covers topics in American government
and politics. AJ Press owns and operates Punchbowl News,
choosing which topics to cover and how to address them. AJ
Press concentrates its reporting on the “insiders” who make
decisions in Washington, D.C., (i.e., politicians, aides, and
lobbyists), and on events and news that affect American
political dynamics and elections.
    Given the publication’s focus on Beltway politics, AJ
Press wanted a name that evoked its subject matter. It chose
“Punchbowl” because that is the nickname the Secret
Service uses to refer to the U.S. Capitol. The title
Punchbowl News was thus selected to “elicit the theme and
geographic location” of the publication. AJ Press has filed
trademark applications to register the marks “Punchbowl
News” and “Punchbowl Press.”
    Punchbowl News often uses a slogan—“Power. People.
Politics.”—in connection with its name and logo. Like its
name, AJ Press chose its slogan to reflect the subject matter
and theme of the Punchbowl News publication. Similarly,
AJ Press selected a logo to allude to the publication’s focus
on insider news and political commentary. The logo depicts
an overturned U.S. Capitol filled with bright pink/purple
punch—an apparently playful homage to a blend of the
traditional red and blue associated with America’s leading
political parties that emphasizes the publication’s
nonpartisan stance. This is an example from the record of
              PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC            7

Punchbowl News’s logo in conjunction with its slogan, as it
appears on its website:

     Punchbowl News frequently promotes its connection to
its founders. Its website depicts a large image of Sherman,
Palmer, and Bresnahan accompanied by text stating that
Punchbowl News was “founded by journalists and best-
selling authors Jake Sherman and Anna Palmer, and co-
founded by veteran Capitol Hill reporter John Bresnahan.”
Punchbowl News’s publications state at the top, near the
name “Punchbowl News,” that they are “by John Bresnahan,
Anna Palmer, and Jake Sherman.”
                             B
   The parties’ coinciding uses of “Punchbowl” led to this
lawsuit. Punchbowl sued AJ Press, alleging violations of the
Lanham Act for trademark infringement and unfair
competition. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Punchbowl also
brought related state law claims.
    The district court converted AJ Press’s motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment. The court then granted
summary judgment to AJ Press, concluding that its use of the
name “Punchbowl” did not give rise to liability under the
Rogers test because it constituted protected expression and
was not explicitly misleading as to its source. The district
court also denied Punchbowl’s request for a continuance
8             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) to conduct
additional discovery.
    In November 2022, we affirmed. See Punchbowl I, 52
F.4th at 1094. Applying circuit precedent, including this
court’s decision in VIP Products LLC v. Jack Daniel’s
Properties, Inc., 953 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2020), vacated, 599
U.S. 140 (2023), we held that AJ Press’s use of the Mark was
expressive in nature and outside the scope of the Lanham Act
under the Rogers test. See Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1097–
1104. That was so even though AJ Press used the Mark to
identify its commercial brand. Id. at 1099–1100.
    The week after we issued our opinion in Punchbowl I,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jack Daniel’s, a case
in which our court applied Rogers to hold that a dog chew
toy resembling a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey was
protected First Amendment expression, to which the
Lanham Act did not apply. Because our opinion in
Punchbowl I relied on both our court’s decision in Jack
Daniel’s and a body of Ninth Circuit precedent applying
Rogers, we promptly stayed the mandate in Punchbowl I to
await the Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s. In
June 2023, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Jack
Daniel’s, reversing this court.
   In light of the Supreme Court’s decision, we withdrew
our opinion in Punchbowl I. See 78 F.4th 1158. We then
ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs and heard re-
argument. Our review here is de novo. Miranda v. City of
Casa Grande, 15 F.4th 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2021).
                             II
   The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., “creates a
comprehensive framework for regulating the use of
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC             9

trademarks and protecting them against infringement,
dilution, and unfair competition.”         Gordon v. Drape
Creative, Inc., 909 F.3d 257, 263 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand
Mgmt., Inc., 618 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Traditionally, courts apply a likelihood-of-confusion test to
claims brought under the Lanham Act. See id. at 264. Under
this test, we ask “whether a ‘reasonably prudent consumer’
in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of
the good or service bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks
Prod. Grp. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.
1998) (citation omitted); see also Lodestar Anstalt v.
Bacardi & Co., 31 F.4th 1228, 1252 (9th Cir. 2022). That
analysis requires consideration of the eight “Sleekcraft”
factors: “(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods;
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion;
(5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7)
defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood
of expansion of the product lines.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other
grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353
F.3d 792, 810 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003). Under Rogers, however,
we have held that background First Amendment concerns
sometimes require a heightened showing for a trademark
infringement claim to proceed.
    The question in this case is whether Punchbowl’s claims
against AJ Press fall under Rogers. In Punchbowl I, we said
“yes.” But that was before Jack Daniel’s. We now hold that
Rogers does not apply to this case. To explain why Jack
Daniel’s dictates a different result than we reached
previously, we first provide an overview of our circuit’s pre-
Jack Daniel’s case law applying Rogers, as well as our prior
10             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

decision in Punchbowl I. We then examine the Supreme
Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s. Finally, we explain why
Jack Daniel’s limitation of the Rogers test governs this case.
The upshot is that Punchbowl’s claims against AJ Press are
not excluded from the Lanham Act under Rogers, even as
additional questions remain as to whether this lawsuit can
proceed further or ultimately succeed.
                              A
    We begin with Rogers. Our precedents applying Rogers
were borne of the idea that some trademarks have expressive
value and that in those situations, trademark law’s traditional
likelihood-of-confusion test “fails to account for the full
weight of the public’s interest in free expression.” Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
To “avoid conflict” between the First Amendment and the
Lanham Act, Gordon, 909 F.3d at 264, we adopted the
approach of the Second Circuit in Rogers v. Grimaldi to
frame the inquiry into when the Lanham Act applies to a
trademark dispute. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
     Under the Rogers test, and prior to Jack Daniel’s, the
defendant must first “make a threshold legal showing that its
allegedly infringing use is part of an expressive work
protected by the First Amendment.” Gordon, 909 F.3d at
264. If the defendant meets this burden, the Lanham Act
does not apply unless “the defendant’s use of the mark (1) is
not artistically relevant to the work or (2) explicitly misleads
consumers as to the source or the content of the work.” Id.
(citing Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902). “Neither of these prongs is
easy to meet.” Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. ComicMix LLC,
983 F.3d 443, 462 (9th Cir. 2020). “Artistic relevance” in
Rogers’s first prong means artistic relevance “merely . . .
above zero,” such that a trademark infringement plaintiff can
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC             11

avoid Rogers only if the use of the mark has “no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever.” E.S.S. Ent.
2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099–
1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902). And
to be “explicitly misleading” under Rogers’s second prong,
there must be “‘an explicit indication, overt claim, or explicit
misstatement’ about the source of the work.” Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P., 983 F.3d at 462 (quoting Brown v. Elec. Arts,
Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1245 (9th Cir. 2013)). When the Rogers
test applies, it often precludes claims of trademark
infringement. See Gordon, 909 F.3d at 261.
     Our precedents have applied Rogers to a range of
expressive works. For example, the Rogers test applied to a
suit by Mattel, the manufacturer of Barbie dolls, against a
European band that produced the song “Barbie Girl.”
Mattel, 296 F.3d at 901. We held that the song, which
featured lyrics such as “I’m a blond bimbo girl, in a fantasy
world,” used the Barbie mark in a way that was artistically
relevant to the work’s satirical commentary on the “Barbie”
lifestyle. Id. at 902. The work was also not “explicitly
misleading” under Rogers’s second prong because it only
used the name “Barbie” in the song and title and “d[id] not,
explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by
Mattel.” Id. In addition to Mattel, we have applied Rogers
to various other expressive works. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss
Enters., L.P., 983 F.3d at 461 (applying Rogers to the use of
“Seussian font” and “Seussian style of illustration” in a
comic book); E.S.S. Ent. 2000, 547 F.3d at 1100 (applying
Rogers where the defendant distributed a video game that
parodied the plaintiff’s strip club); Walking Mountain
Prods., 353 F.3d at 807 (applying Rogers to the use of the
Barbie mark in titles of photographs).
12            PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

    But our precedents also rejected the theory that “the
Rogers test includes a threshold requirement that a mark
have attained a meaning beyond its source-identifying
function.” Twentieth Century Fox Television v. Empire
Distrib., Inc., 875 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2017). Instead,
this was “merely a consideration under the first prong of the
Rogers test.” Id. The result was that “the only threshold
requirement for the Rogers test [wa]s an attempt to apply the
Lanham Act to First Amendment expression.” Id. at 1198.
We thus held in Twentieth Century Fox that the use of the
“Empire” mark as an umbrella brand did not take the case
outside of Rogers. Id. at 1196–97.
    Our decision in Jack Daniel’s emerged from this line of
cases. There, VIP Products sold a “Bad Spaniels Silly
Squeaker” rubber dog chew toy that, with humorous dog-
themed alterations, resembled the distinctive bottle of Jack
Daniel’s Old No. 7 Black Label Tennessee Whiskey. 953
F.3d at 1172. We held that the Rogers test barred Lanham
Act liability for the Bad Spaniels Silly Squeaker. Id. Rogers
applied because “the Bad Spaniels dog toy, although surely
not the equivalent of the Mona Lisa, is an expressive work.”
Id. at 1175.
    This was the state of the law when we decided
Punchbowl I. In that first iteration of this appeal, we held
that Punchbowl’s trademark infringement claim against AJ
Press failed as a matter of law because Rogers and its
progeny insulated AJ Press from liability under the Lanham
Act. We first rejected Punchbowl’s argument that this case
“lies outside of Rogers’s domain” because Rogers “does not
extend to the brand name of a commercial enterprise.”
Punchbowl I, 52 F.4th at 1097 (brackets and quotation marks
omitted). We disagreed with that proposition because under
circuit precedent, “[t]he only threshold requirement for the
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC            13

Rogers test is an attempt to apply the Lanham Act to First
Amendment expression,” meaning that “whether ‘a mark has
attained a meaning beyond its source-identifying function’
is not a threshold requirement for applying Rogers.” Id. at
1097, 1099 (brackets omitted) (quoting Twentieth Century
Fox, 875 F.3d at 1198). AJ Press used the word
“Punchbowl” to convey a “D.C. insider perspective” and a
“gossipy” political theme. Id. at 1098. Relying on our
court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s, we observed that “[i]f a
rubber dog toy is expressive under Rogers, we have little
doubt that AJ Press’s use of the Punchbowl Mark is as well.”
Id. (citation omitted).
    Turning to the two prongs of the Rogers test, we held that
AJ Press’s use of the mark was artistically relevant to its
publications and that AJ Press did not explicitly mislead
consumers as to the source or content of its work. Id. at
1100–03. Although AJ Press used the same core word in its
mark (“Punchbowl”), under our case law “the mere use of a
trademark alone cannot suffice to make such use explicitly
misleading.” Id. at 1100 (quoting E.S.S. Ent., 547 F.3d at
1100). Because AJ Press was using the mark in a different
context than Punchbowl (the former for political news and
the latter for online greeting cards), and because AJ Press
had added its own expressive content, such as a slogan and
logo, AJ Press’s use of the Mark was not explicitly
misleading. Id. at 1101–03. Thus, Rogers applied, and AJ
Press was not subject to trademark liability for its use of the
Mark.
                              B
    Enter the Supreme Court in Jack Daniel’s. The Court in
Jack Daniel’s was careful to note that it was not opining on
the broader validity of the Rogers test. See 599 U.S. at 145
14             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

(“[W]e do not decide whether the threshold inquiry applied
in the Court of Appeals is ever warranted.”); id. at 163 (“We
do not decide whether the Rogers test is ever appropriate . .
. .”). At the same time, Jack Daniel’s held that the Rogers
threshold inquiry “is not appropriate when the accused
infringer has used a trademark to designate the source of its
own goods—in other words, has used a trademark as a
trademark. That kind of use falls within the heartland of
trademark law, and does not receive special First
Amendment protection.” Id. at 145.
    Jack Daniel’s was clear on this point. Said the Court:
“Without deciding whether Rogers has merit in other
contexts, we hold that it does not when an alleged infringer
uses a trademark in the way the Lanham Act most cares
about: as a designation of source for the infringer’s own
goods.” Id. at 153; see also, e.g., id. at 156 (the Rogers test
does not “insulate[] from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use
of trademarks as trademarks, ‘to identify or brand a
defendant’s goods or services.’” (alterations omitted)); id. at
163 (“Rogers does not apply when the challenged use of a
mark is as a mark.”). This rule applies, the Court went on,
even if “the use of a mark has other expressive content—i.e.,
because it conveys some message on top of source.” Id. at
157. In the Supreme Court’s view, because “trademarks are
often expressive,” applying Rogers whenever a trademark
has expressive connotations would allow Rogers to “take
over much of the world.” Id. at 158.
    The Court located its “use of a mark as a mark” carveout
from Rogers in both the Lanham Act itself and the body of
lower court precedent applying Rogers.             From the
perspective of the Lanham Act, “whether the use of a mark
is serving a source-designation function” is “crucial” for the
Act’s objective of “ensur[ing] that consumers can tell where
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC           15

goods come from.” Id. at 163. And, Jack Daniel’s
explained, lower courts applying Rogers had similarly
“confined it” to cases “in which a trademark is used not to
designate a work’s source, but solely to perform some other
expressive function.” Id. at 154. The Court cited as an
example our decision in the Mattel case, which, as discussed
above, held that Rogers applied to the song “Barbie Girl.”
Id. In Mattel, “the band’s use of the Barbie name was ‘not
as a source identifier’” because “[t]he use did not ‘speak to
the song’s origin.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Mattel,
296 F.3d at 900, 902).
    Jack Daniel’s explained that when a mark is not used as
a mark, lower courts had found that the risk of consumer
confusion about the source of a work was “slight” and
“unlikely,” providing greater justification for Rogers’s
threshold test. Id. at 153, 155 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). This “cabined” understanding of Rogers more
properly aligned with the Lanham Act, the purpose of which
is to ensure that consumers are not confused about source.
Id. at 155, 157. That confusion “is most likely to arise when
someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark—meaning
again, as a source identifier—rather than for some other
expressive function.” Id. at 157. In the Supreme Court’s
view, when “a mark is used as a mark,” the traditional
likelihood-of-confusion test “does enough work to account
for the interest in free expression.” Id. at 159.
    From these principles, the Supreme Court had little
difficulty concluding that Rogers should not apply to the Bad
Spaniels dog toy. VIP Products had conceded that it used
the Bad Spaniels trademark as a source identifier. Id. at 160.
And that was how VIP Products used the mark in operation.
Id. Thus, there could be “no threshold test working to kick
out” the claims of Jack Daniel’s, and “the only question in
16             PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

this suit going forward is whether the Bad Spaniels marks
are likely to cause confusion.” Id. at 161. The Supreme
Court remanded the case for further development on this
point.
    Of note, however, the Supreme Court recognized that the
Bad Spaniels expressive message could still be relevant to
the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. The Court specifically
flagged that “a trademark’s expressive message—
particularly a parodic one, as VIP asserts—may properly
figure in assessing the likelihood of confusion.” Id. Indeed,
the Court reasoned, “although VIP’s effort to ridicule Jack
Daniel’s does not justify use of the Rogers test, it may make
a difference in the standard trademark analysis.” Id. These
observations were consistent with the Supreme Court’s
acknowledgment that in some instances, a plaintiff may fail
to plausibly allege likelihood of confusion at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage. Id. at 157 n.2.
     It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Jack
Daniel’s altered the law that governed us when we decided
Punchbowl I. To the point that our precedents previously
held that Rogers applies when an expressive mark is used as
a mark—and that the only threshold for applying Rogers was
an attempt to apply the Lanham Act to something
expressive—the Supreme Court has now made clear that this
is incorrect. In that specific respect, our prior precedents are
no longer good law. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,
893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), overruled on other grounds
by Sanchez v. Mayorkas, 141 S.Ct. 1809 (2021) (holding that
a three-judge panel does not follow circuit precedent when
“the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is
clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of
intervening higher authority”). At the same time, however,
because the Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s was
               PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC           17

confined to a “narrow” point of law, 599 U.S. at 163, that
Rogers does not apply when a mark is used as a mark,
preexisting Ninth Circuit precedent adopting and applying
Rogers otherwise remains intact and binding on three-judge
panels. Cf. id. at 165 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[W]e
necessarily leave much about Rogers unaddressed.”).
                              C
    We now re-examine this case under Jack Daniel’s and
hold that Rogers does not apply.            The reason is
straightforward: AJ Press is using the Mark to “designate the
source of its own goods—in other words, has used a
trademark as a trademark.” Jack Daniel’s, 599 U.S. at 145.
The Mark is used to “identify and distinguish” AJ Press’s
news products. Id. at 160 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, AJ Press has filed trademark applications
to register the marks “Punchbowl News” and “Punchbowl
Press.” Under the clear holding of Jack Daniel’s, Rogers
does not apply to the use of a mark as a mark (the addition
of the more generic terms “News” and “Press” does not take
away from AJ Press’s use of “Punchbowl” in its mark, as a
mark). It is true that as used by AJ Press, the Punchbowl
Mark has expressive qualities. But that was true in Jack
Daniel’s as well. It did not change matters there, and it
cannot do so here. See id. at 157 (“Nor does th[e] result
change because the use of a mark has other expressive
content—i.e., because it conveys some message on top of its
source.”).
    AJ Press nonetheless contends that we should read Jack
Daniel’s more narrowly, so that Rogers should still apply
here. AJ Press notes that, in Jack Daniel’s, it was undisputed
that the defendant’s Bad Spaniels mark was a deliberate
variation of the Jack Daniel’s mark. Here, AJ Press
18            PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC

emphasizes, it is not using the Punchbowl Mark to parody or
refer to Punchbowl, Inc., the greeting card company. In AJ
Press’s view, when two companies in different markets use
the same common English word to identify their brand, the
Rogers test still applies.
    We cannot accept this argument given the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Jack Daniel’s. The Court was
unequivocal in holding that “Rogers does not apply when the
challenged use of the mark is as a mark.” 599 U.S. at 163.
Jack Daniel’s was not limited to direct references or
parodies. Quite the opposite: the Supreme Court held that
Rogers did not apply notwithstanding the parodic use of the
mark, and notwithstanding that the Bad Spaniels toy
explicitly disclaimed any affiliation with Jack Daniel’s the
whiskey company. Id. at 150, 161. The fact that the
Punchbowl Mark involves a common English word does not
exempt AJ Press from the rule that “Rogers does not apply
when the challenged use of the mark is as a mark.” Id. at
163. We have no basis to carve out exceptions for the use of
common words in trademarks when the Supreme Court
created no exception for parodies. Nor, as a general matter,
do we apply a different analysis simply because AJ Press is
a media company. As in Jack Daniel’s, AJ Press must thus
“meet [the] infringement claim on the usual battleground of
‘likelihood of confusion.’” Id. at 156 (citation omitted).
    To be clear, however, the expressive nature of AJ Press’s
use of the Punchbowl Mark and the fact that “punchbowl” is
a common word will certainly be relevant in the likelihood -
of-confusion analysis. As we noted above, the Supreme
Court made the same point in Jack Daniel’s in the context of
parodies. See id. at 161. A similar point holds true here.
When companies operating in different spaces use the same
common words as trademarks with different expressive
                  PUNCHBOWL , INC. V. AJ PRESS, LLC                    19

connotations, it reduces the likelihood of confusion. Cf. id.
(“[A] parody is not often likely to create confusion.”). And
although AJ Press emphasizes that it uses “Punchbowl” in
connection with “Punchbowl News” and “Punchbowl
Press,” this likewise does not show that Rogers applies, even
though it will be a relevant consideration in assessing the
likelihood of confusion.1
     On remand, the district court should proceed to a
likelihood-of-confusion analysis. The court may, in its
sound discretion, consider whether this analysis can be
conducted on the present record. See Jack Daniel’s, 599
U.S. at 157 n.2 (noting that not “every infringement case
involving a source-identifying use requires full-scale
litigation” and that some cases can be resolved at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage).
    The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1 In Jack Daniel’s, the Supreme Court allowed that there might
“potentially” be “rare situations” in which, although a mark is used as a
mark, the likelihood-of-confusion test does not sufficiently protect First
Amendment interests. 599 U.S. at 159. AJ Press does not argu e that it
meets any such “rare” exception.