Court Opinion

ID: 9545882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:21:30.878287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:40.663605
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
While I believe the decision of the Court of Appeals should be vacated and this matter returned to the trial court for further consideration, I disagree with the majority’s holding as to the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), the Supreme Court of the United States decided that a preponderance standard is constitutionally impermissible in involuntary psychiatric commitment proceedings.
“The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of fact-finding, is to ‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’ In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1076, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.
* * * * * *
* * * [E]ven if the particular standard-of-proof catchwords do not always make a great difference in a particular case, adopting a ‘standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise.’ In cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, ‘[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’ ” Id. at 423, 425, 99 S.Ct. at 1809, 60 L.Ed.2d at 329, 330 (citations omitted).
I certainly think that, if a preponderance standard is constitutionally impermissible in involuntary psychiatric commitment proceedings, it is equally or even more impermissible where there is sought, as here, to terminate the relationship of parent and child. The standard of proof, as Addington indicates, points up the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision. At stake in termination proceedings is the family’s fundamental and constitutionally protected right to be free from undue state intervention. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the rights to conceive and to rear one’s children are “essential,” Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923), “basic civil rights of man,” Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 1660 (1942), and indeed “[r]ights far more precious * * * than property rights,” May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, 73 S.Ct. 840, 843, 97 L.Ed. 1221, 1226 (1953). The right to family integrity has been accorded protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. at 626, 67 L.Ed. 1045, tlae Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113, 86 L.Ed. 1660, and in the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 522 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
It is unquestionable that the benefits flowing from continued and unwavering recognition of these previous rights inure to children and parents alike. I do not question the state’s legitimate interest in protecting children from neglectful or unfit parents. But the right of family integrity should not be swallowed up by the belief of social workers, well-ir.tentioned as they may be, that the child will receive better care or deyelop more fully in another set*537ting. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Arizona Department of Public Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296. P.2d 298 (1956).
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized:
“Studies * * * suggest that social workers of middle-class backgrounds, perhaps unconsciously, incline to favor continued placement in foster care with a generally higher-status family rather than return the child to his natural family, thus reflecting a bias that treats the natural parents’ poverty and lifestyle as prejudicial to the best interests of the children.” Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2104, 53 L.Ed.2d 14, 29 (1977).
The real danger of an erroneous determination influenced by impermissible considerations compels that courts be required to reach the termination decision only by evidence capable of withstanding the most exacting scrutiny the courts can muster. A preponderance standard is inappropriate in termination proceedings because, to a trial judge, anything can preponderate since his discretion to disregard testimony he would prefer to ignore is almost unbridled.