Court Opinion

ID: 9751169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:09:56.371951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:08.460367
License: Public Domain

J-S12040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  GUY C. HAUGHWOUT, SR.                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1366 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the Order Entered September 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0001537-2014

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  GUY C. HAUGHWOUT, SR.                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1367 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 15, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0003790-2013

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                              FILED AUGUST 28, 2023

       Appellant, Guy C. Haughwout, Sr., appeals pro se from the order of the

Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County that dismissed his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541, et seq.

He previously entered guilty pleas to failing to comply with registration

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S12040-23

requirements and failing to provide accurate registration information under 18

Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1), (3).1 He now challenges the legality of his sentence,

the constitutionality of his convictions, and the effectiveness of his prior

counsel.    After careful consideration, we agree that Appellant’s convictions

violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania

Constitutions and, as a result, Appellant is serving an illegal sentence. We

vacate the PCRA court’s order, reverse Appellant’s convictions, vacate his

judgments of sentence, and remand with instructions.

       On February 15, 2002, Appellant was determined to be a sexually violent

predator (SVP) pursuant to Megan’s Law II, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791-99, in cases

docketed at CP-40-CR-0003884-2000 and CP-40-CR-0001199-2001, in which

Appellant had entered guilty pleas to, inter alia, two counts of indecent

____________________________________________

1 At the time of Appellant’s plea, this section provided:

       (a) Offense defined.--An individual who is subject to
       registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (relating to applicability)
       commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:

              (1)    register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required
                     under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of
                     registration), 9799.19 (relating to initial registration)
                     or 9799.25 (relating to verification by sexual
                     offenders and Pennsylvania State Police);

                                               …

              (3)    provide accurate information when registering under
                     42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15, 9799.19 or 9799.25.

18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1), (3) (version effective from December 20, 2012,
to June 11, 2018).

                                           -2-
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assault.2 Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 482 (Pa. Super.

2003). The indecent assault charges were based on “incidents involving his

five-year-old daughter in the Fall of 2000 and a ten-year-old girl during the

Fall of 1996.”     Id.   As a sexually violent predator under Megan’s Law II,

Appellant was subject to lifetime registration requirements. Id. at 487, citing

42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(b)(3).

       On September 17, 2015, Appellant entered a guilty plea to single counts

of failure to provide accurate registration information and failing to comply

with registration requirements at CP-40-CR-0001537-2014, and two counts of

failing to provide accurate registration information at CP-40-CR-0003790-

2014. N.T. 9/17/15, 2-3, 8. With respect to the former case, Appellant failed

to “provide accurate information and, in fact, provided false information when

registering,” and, in the latter case, he “failed to report that he owned a

vehicle both on March 8th, 2013, and May 6th, 2013.”          Id. at 6-7.   At a

deferred sentencing hearing, the plea court imposed an aggregate term of

eleven to twenty-two years’ imprisonment.3 N.T. 9/17/15, 8; N.T. 10/26/15,

____________________________________________

2 Both counts of indecent assault were violations of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7).

See Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 837 A.2d 480, 482 (Pa. Super. 2003).

3 The individual terms of sentence included concurrent mandatory minimum

prison terms of five to ten years and three to six years for failure to provide
accurate registration information and failing to comply with registration
requirements at CP-40-CR-0001537-2014, and consecutive prison terms of
three to six years for the two counts of failing to provide accurate registration
information at CP-40-CR-0003790-2014. N.T. 10/26/15, 12-14; Sentencing
Order, 10/26/15, 1.

                                           -3-
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12-14; Sentencing Order, 10/26/15, 1.            Appellant appealed.   This Court

vacated the judgments of sentence and remanded for resentencing.

Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 161 A.3d 376 (Pa. Super. 2017) (table).

       On remand, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea that the

plea court denied. On October 6, 2017, the plea court resentenced Appellant

to an aggregate term of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment.4 N.T. 10/6/17,

10-11. A subsequent appeal was dismissed due to Appellant’s failure to file a

docketing statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517. PCRA Petition, 2/20/18, ¶¶

6-7. After Appellant filed a PCRA petition, the lower court reinstated his direct

appeal rights nunc pro tunc. Order, 2/20/18, 1. On direct review, Appellant

argued that our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164

A.3d 1189 (2017) (plurality), rendered the Sexual Offender Registration and

Notification Act (“SORNA I”), the former 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41,

unconstitutional in its entirety and that the prior law under which Appellant

was deemed a lifetime registrant could not be revived.5 Commonwealth v.
____________________________________________

4  The individual judgments of sentence included four to eight years’
imprisonment for failing to provide accurate registration information to be
followed by two to four years’ imprisonment for failing to comply with
registration requirements at CP-40-CR-0001537-2014, and consecutive
prison terms of two to four years for the two counts of failing to provide
accurate registration information at CP-40-CR-0003790-2014. N.T. 10/6/17,
10-11; Sentencing Order, 10/6/17, 1.

5 In Muniz, the Supreme Court concluded that SORNA I’s registration and
notification requirements were punitive in effect and, therefore, the
retroactive application of SORNA I’s registration provisions to offenses
committed prior to SORNA’s effective date (December 20, 2012) violated the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -4-
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Haughwout, 198 A.3d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2018). On October 30, 2018,

this Court affirmed the judgments of sentence. Id. On April 30, 2019, our

Supreme Court denied allocatur. Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 207 A.3d

905 (Pa. 2019) (table).

       Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition in which he asserted that

his plea counsel had provided ineffective assistance by: (1) not interviewing

witnesses; (2) not gathering “electronic evidence;” (3) not petitioning for relief

based on Muniz; (4) inducing his plea by leading him to believe that he would

be sentenced to a term of “5 to 10;” (5) refusing to request the withdrawal of

his guilty plea “while at his formal arraignment;” and (6) “conspiring with law

enforcement and … court officials to attempt to manufacture evidence … in the

event [Appellant] would be granted his request to withdraw his plea of guilty

prior to being resentenced.” PCRA Petition, 2/21/20, § 6(A). He also asserted

in the petition that direct appeal counsel provided ineffective assistance by:

(1) “making multiple factual errors [about Appellant’s] length of sentence,

which version of Megan’s Law [he] was sentenced under, and the dates of

[his] predicate offense;” (2) failing to demonstrate that SORNA I “violated the

ex post facto clauses of both the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions and how

[he] was disadvantaged by the retroactive application and enhanced reporting

requirements of said act;” and (3) failing to challenge the legality of his

sentence “for his predicate offense” which subjected him to lifetime
____________________________________________

ex post facto clauses in the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. 164
A.3d at 1193.

                                           -5-
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registration requirements as an SVP. Id. He lastly raised an ex post facto

challenge to his sentences in the instant cases. Id. at § 15 (“whether (SORNA

I)   as   applied   to   [Appellant]     is    an   ex   post   facto   violation   under

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)[,] and its progeny”).

       The PCRA court appointed counsel. Order, 3/13/20, 1.                 On May 29,

2020, PCRA counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc), along with a petition to

withdraw as counsel.6        After the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss,

Appellant filed a pro se response to counsel’s Finley letter in which he

asserted, inter alia, that PCRA counsel provided ineffective assistance by

failing to file a requested amended PCRA petition and abandoning Appellant

by filing the Finley letter and the withdrawal motion. Pro Se Response to

Finley Letter, 11/3/20, ¶ 6. In a supplemental pro se filing, Appellant argued

that his convictions under § 4915.1 were illegal and could not be based on his

indecent assault convictions which predated the effective date of SORNA I.

Pro Se Motion for Relief Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(a), 1/19/21, 1-6.

       On May 17, 2021, the PCRA court presided over a video-conference

hearing during which Appellant restated his objections to counsel’s Finley

letter. N.T. 5/17/21, 3, 10-22. The court took the matter “under advisement”

at the end of the hearing. Id. at 28; Order, 5/17/21, 1. While a decision
____________________________________________

6 Appellant claimed at a video-conference hearing on September 18, 2020,
that he did not receive a copy of the Finley letter. N.T. 5/17/21, 6. The PCRA
court ordered counsel to mail a new copy of the letter to Appellant and the
court attached a copy of the letter to its order issued on that date. Id.

                                              -6-
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remained pending, Appellant filed a petition for leave to file an amended PCRA

petition that the PCRA court denied because the new claim that Appellant

wanted to raise in the proposed petition was based on a decision of the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court that had been vacated in the meantime. Pro Se

Petition for Leave to Amend, 10/22/21; Order Regarding Petition to Amend,

12/30/21, 1. On December 30, 2021, the PCRA court issued an opinion setting

forth reasons for its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition and granted

counsel’s withdrawal motion.           Rule 907 Dismissal Notice, 12/30/21, 1.

Appellant untimely filed a pro se response restating his illegal sentence and

ineffective assistance of counsel claims.7 Pro Se Response to Rule 907 Notice,

2/3/22, 1-2; Order 12/30/21, 1 (permitting Appellant twenty days to file a

response).     On September 15, 2022, the PCRA court docketed an order

dismissing Appellant’s petition. Order, 9/15/22, 1-2. Appellant filed timely

notices of appeal.8 Notices of Appeal, 9/26/22, 1. We sua sponte consolidated

the resulting appeals. Order, 10/12/22, 1.
____________________________________________

7 Appellant also filed notices of appeals in each of the underlying cases on May

26, 2022. Appeals resulting from those notices, which were docketed at 800-
801 MDA 2022, were quashed because the PCRA court’s notice of its intent to
dismiss Appellant’s petition was not a final appealable order. See Appellate
Dockets for 800-801 MDA 2022, Entries for 9/12/22.

8 We note that each of Appellant’s separate notices of appeal list the dockets

numbers for both of his underlying criminal cases, but each has a different
docket number highlighted. The notices comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341, which
“requires that when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one
docket, separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each
docket.” Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021); see
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
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       Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

       1.     In considering issues presented in the context of the PCRA,
              do the previous litigated requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. §
              9543(a)(3) invalidate the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542
              which specifically provide for an action by which persons
              serving an illegal sentence may obtain collateral relief and
              the PCRA’s time limits are satisfied?

       2.     In considering issues presented in the context of the PCRA,
              do the previous litigated requirements of 42 Pa.C.S. §
              9543(a) apply t[o] the instant case where the Pennsylvania
              Supreme Court has since ruled contrary t[o] their decision
              in Commonwealth v. Haughwout, 198 A.3d 403,[ ]404
              (Pa[.] Super[ 2018]), creating or clarifying a new
              substantive rule of law where the retroactive application of
              the Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA
              I) runs afoul of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutional
              prohibitions against ex post facto [laws] which are not
              distinguished by the length of an offender[’]s registration
              requirements?

       3.     Did [the] PCRA court err[ ] when it denied Appellant’s PCRA
              [petition] given his sentence for violations of 18 Pa.C.S. §
____________________________________________

also Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1145-48 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc) (finding a single defendant appealing from multiple dockets
may include multiple docket numbers on each notice of appeal, but still must
file separate notices of appeal for each docket).

Appellant’s notices of appeal did not contain the date of the PCRA court’s
dismissal order; however, he attached a copy of the order dated September
15, 2022, to his docketing statement filed with this Court. Accordingly, we
have considered the attachment as confirmation that this appeal is from the
dismissal order and have amended our caption to reflect that.

While this appeal has been pending, we remanded for a hearing pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998) (requiring an on-the-
record inquiry to determine whether a waiver of counsel is knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary), at which the PCRA court permitted Appellant to
proceed pro se. Order, 11/17/22, 1-2; Order, 12/2/22, 1; Order, 12/6/22, 1-
2.

                                           -8-
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            4915.1(a)(1) and (3) (SORNA I) are illegal pursuant to the
            Pennsylvania     Supreme     Court’s       decisions     in
            Commonwealth v. Muniz, [164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017)],
            and [its p]rogeny?

      4.    Did [the] PCRA court commit a legal error when it denied
            Appellant’s PCRA [petition] given Appellant could not
            lawfully be made subject to the requirements of [SORNA I]
            retroactively after the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in
            Commonwealth v. Wilson, [910 A.2d 10 (Pa. 2006)]?

      5.    Whether trial counsel … was in[eff]ective for recommending
            guilty pleas to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4915.1(a)(1) and (3) at both
            docket numbers which could not lawfully be applied to
            Appellant’s Megan’s Law convictions in light of our Supreme
            Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Wilson, [910 A.2d
            10 (Pa. 2006)]?

      6.    Did [the] PCRA court violate Appellant’s Fourteenth
            Amendment right to due process and equal protection under
            the law when it denied his PCRA [petition] and relief
            requested when Appellant is serving an illegal sentence for
            [a] violation of a law that has been held to be an
            unconstitutional ex post facto law [under] U.S. Const. Art[.]
            I § 9 and P[a]. Const. Art[.] I § 17[?]

      7.    Was PCRA counsel ineffective when he failed to amend
            Appellant’s PCRA [petition] and when he filed a
            Turner/Finley [no-merit] letter along with a motion to
            withdraw[ ]which the lower court granted on May 17, 2021?

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (capitalization, emphasis, and case parenthetical

omitted).

      Our scope and standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition are

well-settled:

      [O]ur scope of review is limited by the parameters of the [PCRA].
      Our standard of review permits us to consider only whether the
      PCRA court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record
      and whether it is free from legal error. Moreover, in general we

                                     -9-
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      may affirm the decision of the [PCRA] court if there is any basis
      on the record to support the [PCRA] court’s action; this is so even
      if we rely on a different basis in our decision to affirm.

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation

omitted). With respect to challenges to the legality of a sentence, we note

those claims present pure questions of law and thus, for those claims, our

scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.

Commonwealth v. Petrick, 217 A.3d 1217, 1224 (Pa. 2019).

      Appellant contends that the retroactive application of SORNA I in his

case where he had been sentenced to reporting requirements under Megan’s

Law II constituted a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United States

and Pennsylvania Constitutions. He raises separate claims to that effect citing

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Muniz,

164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), and Commonwealth v. Wilson, 910 A.2d 10 (Pa.

2006). Due to his perceived violation of his constitutional rights, Appellant

asserts that his sentences for violating section 4915.1 are illegal and that his

prior counsel were ineffective for advising him to enter the guilty pleas, not

properly challenging the legality of his sentence, and not adopting his

ineffective assistance of counsel and legality of sentence claims in an amended

PCRA petition. Anticipating possible grounds for waiver, Appellant also argues

that his prior litigation of an illegal sentence claim pursuant to Muniz on direct

review should not preclude this Court from presently evaluating the legality of

his sentence.

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       In his first issue presented, Appellant argues that his legality of

sentence claim cannot be considered waived as previously litigated under 42

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (addressing a PCRA petitioner’s burden to plead and

prove that his claims for collateral review have not been previously litigated

or waived). Appellant’s Brief at 5-6. He is not so much presenting a claim for

relief as much as he is addressing the reviewability of his challenge to the

legality of his sentence.     Though Appellant has not cited any caselaw

addressing the applicability of Section 9543(a)(3) in the context of our review

of legality of sentence claims, we agree with Appellant that his legality of

sentence claim cannot possibly be considered waived as previously litigated

under the PCRA:

      [I]t is black-letter law that challenges to the legality of a judgment
      of sentence [cannot] be waived. Commonwealth v. Belak, 573
      Pa. 414, 852 A.2d 1252, 1257 (2003).

                                        …

      Legality-of-sentence claims are simply not subject to the waiver
      provision of the PCRA. Our Supreme Court has found that [42
      Pa.C.S. §] 9544(b) was intended to apply only to those claims that
      are required to be preserved before trial, at trial, on appeal, or
      in a prior post-conviction proceeding.           Commonwealth v.
      Brown, 582 Pa. 461, 872 A.2d 1139, 1154 (2005). As the Brown
      court explained, “[i]f the nature of the claim involves a right so
      fundamental to a fair trial that it renders it non-waivable, then the
      claim is not required to be preserved and is not subject to the
      waiver provision of the PCRA.” Id. As stated above, legality-of-
      sentence claims are non-waivable and thus not required to have
      been preserved at any prior stage of litigation in order to obtain
      review thereof.

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Commonwealth v. Jones, 932 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Pa. Super. 2007)

(emphasis in original; footnote omitted). Accordingly, we decline to accept

the Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellant waived his legality of sentence

claim.9 Appellee’s Brief at 11-12; see Commonwealth v. Olson, 179 A.3d

1134, 1137 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“As long as this Court has jurisdiction over the

matter, a legality of sentence issue is reviewable and cannot be waived.”);

Jones, 932 A.2d at 183 (“waiver, for purposes of the PCRA, is equally

inapplicable to legality-of-sentence claims a petitioner raises for the first time

in post-conviction proceedings and those previously characterized as

waived.”).

       In his second and third issues, Appellant asserts that the PCRA court

erred by denying his illegal sentence claim as previously litigated and that his

sentence is illegal based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in

Muniz and more recent decisions of this Court that addressed Muniz in

Commonwealth v. Wood, 208 A.3d 131 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc), and

Commonwealth v. Lippincott, 208 A.3d 143 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc).

Appellant’s Brief at 6-9. Given that our standard of review for a legality of

sentence claim is de novo, we need not address the PCRA court’s review of

Appellant’s claim and may address it on the merits in the first instance.
____________________________________________

9 Where a defendant raises challenges to the legality of his sentence on direct

and collateral review, the collateral review claim may be summarily rejected
as meritless for the reasons this Court addressed on direct review, absent
changes in the law, however, it may not be brushed aside on the basis of
waiver given our controlling precedent on the non-applicability of waiver to
legality of sentence claims.

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Appellant argues that his sentences for violating Section 4915.1 are illegal

because the retroactive application of the SORNA I’s reporting requirements

to him constituted an ex post facto violation where he was originally subjected

to lifetime reporting requirements under Megan’s Law II and the application

of SORNA I did not increase the length of his reporting requirements. Id.

      When Appellant raised a claim based on Muniz on direct review, he

argued that SORNA I was unconstitutional in its entirety and that Megan’s Law

II, which deemed him a lifetime registrant,          could not be revived.

Haughwout, 198 A.3d at 405. We denied his claim by distinguishing Muniz

on the basis that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that SORNA I was

unconstitutional as applied to Muniz because the retroactive application of

SORNA I increased the time span of the registration requirement for Muniz

whereas for Appellant, in the instant case, the enactment of SORNA I did not

change the length of his reporting period. Haughwout, 198 A.3d at 405.

      Appellant’s attempt to raise a new ex post facto/legality of sentence

claim based on Muniz on collateral review where he previously litigated a

claim based on that case on an identical theory for relief on direct review

would ordinarily fail under the “law of the case” doctrine and the coordinate

jurisdiction rule. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa.

1995) (“this Court has long recognized that judges of coordinate jurisdiction

sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions.”);

Commonwealth v. McCandless, 880 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005)

(en banc) (explaining the general rule that under the “law of the case”

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doctrine, a court involved in later phases of a litigated matter should not

reopen questions decided by another judge of the same court or by a higher

court in earlier phases of the matter).         The departure from the general

prohibition under each of those principles, however, is permissible in

“exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening

change in the controlling law.” Starr, 664 A.2d at 1332. Here, we appreciate

that more recent caselaw from our Supreme Court contradicts our former

reason for denying Appellant’s earlier claim under Muniz. As the Supreme

Court abrogated our prior theory for denying relief based on Muniz, we can

revisit the legality of Appellant’s sentence.

      In Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528, 536 (Pa. 2021), our

Supreme Court rejected the notion that the ex post facto analysis in Muniz

was based on whether the retroactive application of SORNA resulted in an

increased period of a registration requirement.         It stressed that, upon

reviewing an ex post facto claim based on Muniz concerning the application

of SORNA I to a defendant who had moved to Pennsylvania after being subject

to registration requirements in another state,

      [t]he question is not whether [the New York Sex Offender
      Registration Act, which originally subjected Santana to a lifetime
      registration requirement,] and SORNA impose the same or
      different registration periods. The analysis does not examine
      whether a new resident’s crossing of Pennsylvania’s borders
      actually increased the length of Santana’s punishment. It does
      not even matter where Santana committed the triggering offense.
      For present purposes, what matters most is when that crime
      occurred.

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Id. at 536 (emphasis in original). The Santana Court further clarified that its

statement of ex post facto law in Muniz “was incomplete[,]” as “[t]he United

States Constitution does not require a defendant to prove that he, in fact, was

disadvantaged by the retroactively applied law.” Id.; see also California

Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995) (“[T]he

focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change

produces some ambiguous sort of ‘disadvantage,’ … but on whether any such

change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by

which a crime is punishable.”).    The Court then distilled the ex post facto

analysis to the following questions:

      First, a court must ask when the initial offense was committed.
      Second, the court must ask whether the challenged law was
      enacted after the occurrence of the triggering offense and was
      then applied retroactively. If so, the final question is whether that
      retroactive law is punitive or increases the penalty for the existing
      crime.

Santana, 266 A.3d at 537 (emphasis added).

      The Santana decision makes clear that this Court undertook the wrong

analysis of Appellant’s ex post facto claim based on Muniz on direct review.

Accordingly, we must conduct the analysis set forth in Santana to address

the central claim at the heart of Appellant’s challenges to the legality of his

sentence and the effectiveness of his prior counsel: that his convictions and

sentences for failure to comply with his registration requirements cannot be

sustained because they rest upon an unconstitutional retroactive application

                                       - 15 -
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of punitive notification and registration provisions of SORNA I in violation of

the ex post facto clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions.

      As we noted above, see supra n.5, our Supreme Court declared SORNA

I unconstitutional because it violated the ex post facto clauses of both the

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189. The

Muniz Court determined that SORNA I’s purpose was punitive in effect,

despite the General Assembly’s stated civil remedial purpose. Id. at 1218;

see also Santana, 266 A.3d at 538 (“[The Pennsylvania Supreme Court

ruled] in Muniz that [SORNA I’s registration and notification requirements]

are punitive in nature.”); Wood, 208 A.3d at 135 (“The Muniz Court reasoned

that despite the legislature’s designation of SORNA[ I] as a civil remedy, it

was punitive in nature[.]”). Therefore, a retroactive application of SORNA I

to past sexual offenders violated the ex post facto clause of the United States

Constitution. Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218. SORNA I also violated the ex post

facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it placed a unique

burden on the right to reputation and undermined the finality of sentences by

enacting increasingly severe registration laws. Id. at 1223.

      Because Appellant committed his underlying offenses that gave rise to

his registration requirements in 1996 and 2000, years before SORNA I became

effective, SORNA I was clearly applied to him retroactively. See Santana,

266 A.3d at 536 (explaining that because Santana committed the triggering

offense for registration requirements nearly thirty years before SORNA I’s

enactment, the statute was clearly retroactive when applied to him). In these

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circumstances, Appellant’s convictions for failing to properly register under

SORNA I must be considered nullities and the sentences resulting from those

convictions must be considered void. Cf. Commonwealth v. Derhammer,

173 A.3d 723, 728 (Pa. 2017) (“It is undisputed that a conviction based on an

unconstitutional statute is a nullity … [a] conviction under [an unconstitutional

statute] is illegal and void, and cannot be a legal cause of imprisonment.”)

(citations omitted).

      In light of our Supreme Court’s decisions in Muniz and Santana, we

conclude that SORNA I was unconstitutionally applied to Appellant, that he

could not have committed the crimes in violation of Section 4915.1 that

criminalized his failure to properly register under SORNA I, and thus he is

presently serving an illegal sentence. See Santana, 266 A.3d at 536 n.49

(where Santana committed a rape in 1983 in New York giving rise to

registration requirements and was later convicted of violating Section

4915.1(a)(3) for failing to comply with SORNA I’s registration requirements

after moving to Pennsylvania, it “logically followed” that SORNA I was

unconstitutionally applied to Santana and he could not have committed a

violation of 4915.1); Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1193 n.3 (noting SORNA I became

effective on December 20, 2012); Wood, 208 A.3d at 137 (“for purposes of

our ex post facto analysis, it is SORNA[ I]’s effective date, not its enactment

date, which triggers its application”); see also Commonwealth v. Griffith,

2020 WL 17335934, *6 (Pa. Super., filed Nov. 30, 2022) (reversing a Section

4915.1 conviction and vacating a judgment of sentence on PCRA appeal where

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Griffith committed the underlying offense sexual offense in 2000 and was

prosecuted for failing to register pursuant to SORNA I) (cited for its persuasive

value under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 2022 WL 2287021,

*11-12 (Pa. Super., filed June 24, 2022) (vacating registration requirements

under SORNA I for Cruz who committed a rape, among other offenses, in

2011)    (cited   for   its   persuasive   value   under   Pa.R.A.P.   126(b));

Commonwealth v. Popejoy, 2022 WL 1154699, *5 (Pa. Super., filed Apr.

19, 2022) (reversing Section 4915.1 convictions and vacating judgments of

sentence on direct review where Popejoy committed his underlying sexual

offense in 1992 and was prosecuted for failing to register pursuant to SORNA

I) (cited for its persuasive value under Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)).

      Our grant of relief on Appellant’s illegal sentence claim pursuant to

Muniz eliminates our need to review Appellant’s remaining issues presented

in this appeal.

      Even though our result today vacates Appellant’s sentences for failing

to register under SORNA I and reverses his convictions for violating Section

4915.1, we note that Appellant remains subject to lifetime registration

requirements.     In response to Muniz, the Pennsylvania General Assembly

amended SORNA I by enacting Act 10 on February 21, 2018, and Act 29 on

June 12, 2018, which are collectively known as SORNA II. See Act of Feb.

21, 2018, P.L. 27, No. 10 (“Act 10”); Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29

(“Act 29”). SORNA II now divides sex offenders into two subchapters: (1)

Subchapter H, which applies to an offender who committed a sexually violent

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offense on or after December 20, 2012 (the date SORNA I became effective);

and (2) Subchapter I, which applies to an individual who committed a sexually

violent offense on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012,

whose period of registration has not expired, or whose registration

requirements under a former sexual offender registration law have not

expired. Appellant is therefore subject to the registration requirements under

Subchapter I of SORNA II. See 42 Pa.C.S. 9799.15(b) (lifetime registration

requirements for individuals with two or more convictions of offenses included

in subsection (a) which include indecent assault convictions where the offense

was graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree or higher and was committed

on or after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012).         Because our

Supreme Court has held that Subchapter I of SORNA II is not punitive, it may

be retroactively applied to Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 234

A.3d 602, 626-27 (Pa. 2020) (holding that the registration requirements in

Subchapter I of SORNA II are non-punitive and, thus, retroactive application

of those requirements does not violate the constitutional proscription against

ex post facto laws). In an abundance of caution, we remand for the lower

court to provide proper notification of the applicable registration requirements

under Subchapter I of SORNA II.

      Order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition vacated.       Convictions for

failing to register pursuant to SORNA I reversed.      Judgments of sentence

vacated.   Remanded for further proceedings to ensure that Appellant is

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properly notified of his present registration requirements pursuant to SORNA

II. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/28/2023

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