Court Opinion

ID: 9477330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:20:29.033396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:49.044765
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
Bay State requests reconsideration of our decision that the judgment in NAD’s favor cannot be used defensively by way of collateral estoppel to bar a new trial against it. Because of the consequences NAD fears for itself by way of a possible indemnity claim it joins in Bay State’s request, by separate petition. The petitions are denied.
In its original brief, in addition to claiming, without a scintilla of supporting authority, that the admission in its answer was to be ignored, in disregard of Fed.R. Civ.P. 8(d), Bay State argued that even if the directed verdict was error, it should succeed on this appeal if NAD succeeded. We recite its brief.
II. THE JUDGMENT ENTERED IN FAVOR OF BAY STATE SHOULD BE UPHELD ON THE BASIS OF THE JURY VERDICT, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER BAY STATE WAS ENTITLED TO A DIRECT VERDICT
*437Even if this Court were to determine that Judge Mazzone should not have directed a verdict in favor of Bay State, the Judgment in favor of Bay State should be upheld on the basis of the jury verdict in favor of N.A.D. [Footnote omitted] As discussed previously, the only claim presented by the plaintiffs against Bay State was for breach of warranty, based upon allegations that the Narkomed 2 machine was defective and that Bay State was a link in the chain of sale from N.A.D. to the Lahey Clinic. Bay State could not have been found liable unless the jury determined that the Narkomed 2 machine was defective and that the defect caused Mrs. Meschino’s injuries. Such a determination would have also resulted in a finding against N.A.D. Indeed, Bay State could not have been found liable, based upon the claims presented, without N.A.D. also having been found liable. Consequently, a finding that N.A.D. is not liable necessarily requires a finding that Bay State is not liable.
The verdict returned by the jury upon special questions related only to the issue of causation. The jury found that the negligence of doctors, nurses or technicians at the Lahey Clinic was the “sole cause” of the injuries to Mrs. Meschino.
* * ' # * * #
The causation question, decided by the jury, was a “common factual issue” relative to the claims against both N.A.D. and Bay State. B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.,1984). The issue was “actually litigated” at trial and was “necessary to the determination” of the claims against N.A.D. Moreover, the plaintiffs clearly had “substantial control” over the litigation. Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., 614 F.Supp. 1327, 1330 (D.C.Mass., 1985). Consequently, unless this Court were to overturn the jury verdict and the judgment in favor of N.A.D., the plaintiffs are precluded from relitigating the question of causation against Bay State and the Judgment entered in favor of Bay State, therefore, must be upheld.
In ruling against Bay State we stated,
Finally, Bay State contends that since in the matter of warranty [footnote omitted] it and NAD were in the same boat (which, of course, is true, see, e.g., Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 380 N.E.2d 653, (1978); Killeen v. Harmon Grain Products, 11 Mass.App. 20, 413 N.E.2d 767 (1980)), plaintiff, having had a full trial, should be collaterally estopped by the findings and judgment in favor of NAD. For this it cites B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1984) seemingly without observing that we there noted that while this is the general rule, [footnote omitted] Massachusetts adheres to principles of mutuality and, for collateral estoppel, requires identity of parties. See 727 F.2d 12, n. 2. While there are, indeed, statements to this effect in some Massachusetts opinions, it is possible that there are exceptions that B.C.R. Transport failed to realize. The burden of showing error on our part, however, is on Bay State, and, even had it been relevant, this burden is not met by its citing one district court case. We will not do counsel’s work for him.
In light of the fact that Bay State had obtained its directed verdict by what even the district court regarded as “lawyer-ing,” 1 we saw no reason to come to its rescue by going behind our single decision which Bay State itself had cited {B.C.R. Transport). We said,
By removing itself at the close of plaintiffs case Bay State sought a heads-I-win, tail-you-lose situation since collateral estoppel, in all probability, would not work offensively, i.e., plaintiff probably could not, if the directed verdict were ultimately vacated, use a finding in its favor against Bay State, but Bay State could, but for the apparent Massachusetts rule, use the finding defensively if plaintiff lost. Instead, Bay State now finds itself at the dead end of a one-way street, as it has now been litigated and *438determined that it cannot use the findings and judgment in favor of NAD defensively.
In its petition Bay State asserts that we “misapprehended or overlooked Massachusetts law concerning the issue of collateral estoppel.”
Counsel for Bay State apologizes to this Court for the fact that the misapprehension of Massachusetts law may have been caused by Bay State’s citation of B.C.R. Transport Co., Inc. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.1984). Bay State submits, however, that B.C.R. Transport was cited only in support of the fact that collateral estoppel applies when there is a “common factual issue” (Bay State’s Brief, p. 25). The case was not cited in relation to any questions of mutuality or identity of parties, because Bay State did not perceive those questions as being germane to this action. Based upon the fact that Bay State was a party to the action throughout the presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, as well as the fact that Massachusetts has not required identity of parties in regard to the defensive use of collateral estoppel since the 1968 decision in Homeowners Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Northwestern Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 354 Mass. 488 [448], 455 [238 N.E.2d 55] (1968), Bay State maintains that its failure to perceive or address issues pertaining to mutuality or identity of parties was not unreasonable and should not preclude consideration of the question at this time.
There then follows an extensive briefing of Massachusetts law going back well before B.C.R. Transport and suggesting we were there in error.
As an apology this is difficult to accept. It was scarcely necessary to cite B.C.R. Transport — or anything else — to show that there was a “common factual issue.” It is elementary that a “common factual issue” does not stand alone, but, of necessity, there are additional issues, mutuality (vel non), and identification of parties. Bay State had merely to read its own citation, B.C.R. Transport, and see, fully flagged, that we had held that the Massachusetts law was against it.
In Massachusetts, collateral estoppel requires the concurrence of three circumstances: “(1) a common factual issue; (2) a prior determination of that issue in litigation between the same parties; and (3) a showing that the determination was in favor of the party seeking to raise the estoppel bar.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, [383 Mass. 497] 420 N.E.2d [319] at 321 [ (1981) ] (emphasis added). Thus, on the second of these three criteria alone— mutuality of estoppel — Fontaine’s claim of collateral estoppel/fails. [Footnote omitted] (727 F.2d at 12)
Bay State errs when it says we “misapprehended.” We used the phrase “apparent Massachusetts Rule” precisely in order to disclose that we were making no final pronouncement.2 Nor did we “over look” anything. Rather, we pointed out that we did not “look”. What Bay State, in spite of its verbiage, is now asking is that we overlook what we can only regard as gross negligence on its part in raising a point and citing nothing but one case, a case that conspicuously spoke against its position. We do not accept its explanation that we made a “demonstrable mistake,” as to the Massachusetts law and that it was “not unreasonable” for it not to have briefed it because the law in defendant’s favor “came to its judicial repose in ... 1968.”
Rather than a mistake, we quoted our previous opinion which, in turn, had quoted a Massachusetts opinion verbatim. Common. v. Lopez, 383 Mass, at 499, 420 N.E.2d 319 (1981) (sic). We refrained from saying whether this was correct, and expressly refrained from pursuing the matter. We are bound by our previous decisions unless they can be shown clearly incorrect; Bay State’s own citation made obvious what it should have done for itself. This is a busy court, and many times, in order to avoid making bad law we are obliged to supplement work of unperceptive or ineffective counsel. This time we *439chose not to do counsel’s work, and merely noted that we were making no authoritative finding.
We proceed to the next point. NAD, by its separate petition, states that it has standing to object to a new trial for plaintiff against Bay State because, if Bay State loses, then Bay State will come after it, seeking indemnity. Accordingly, it has standing to prevent the possibility of its ultimately becoming the bag-holder. At the same time, it says, we should deny plaintiff the opportunity to try a second time against Bay State because, due to the law of collateral estoppel, “a retrial can produce but one result, to wit, a judgment in favor of Bay State.”3
Whatever problems there may be in connection with the first point,4 there are none in the second. Bay State chose to litigate the issue of collateral estoppel and lost. Both it and plaintiffs are parties hereto, and the matter is res judicata.
We have little sympathy for Bay State’s predicament. This is a matter of principle; too often we find ourselves obliged to do counsel’s work. Nor should counsel expect it who engage in “lawyering,” and then want another chance when it is they that are in trouble.
At first blush we might feel differently about NAD. But then, again, we read NAD’s nine page present argument, citing 12 Massachusetts cases, and wonder why they are tendered only now. Footnote 4 to its petition supplies the answer.
4. _[Collateral estoppel ... was raised, presented and briefed to the Court by Bay State in its brief on appeal (Point II commencing at p. 22), and NAD (at p. 12 of its brief) expressly incorporated those arguments by reference. Although the Court found Bay State’s treatment lacking and incomplete, the argument was made, and it was adopted by NAD. We are sympathetic to the Court’s complaint that it was not adequately supported by counsel in their presentation of this aspect of the law on appeal. In candor, NAD did not foresee that the Opinion would reverse as to Bay State and hold, as we prove here erroneously, that Bay State could not rely upon collateral estoppel It is now apparent that the Court’s ruling on estoppel could expose NAD to claims based on the very warranty allegations which it defeated below. (Emphasis supplied).
This may be an explanation, but it is hardly an excuse. Even less was the statement “at p. 12 of its brief.”
NAD respectfully defers to Boehringer and Bay State with respect to the two issues applicable only to them and herein incorporates by reference their responses thereto. (Emphasis supplied).
Was NAD so unastute as to think collateral estoppel did not concern it, too (a conclusion it vigorously now denies)? If so, why “incorporate” Bay State’s argument? Either NAD woke up late in the game, or it was content to rest on the quite inadequate argument made by Bay State. Either way, it has no one to blame but itself.
These are, we believe, competent counsel; they represent substantial clients, and, money-wise, the case is important. They are entitled to our handling what is presented to us once. We do not care to entertain a petition for rehearing on the ground that we made a demonstrable mistake, when the demonstration was clearly up to the parties and they did not choose to make it.
While this is not as clear a case as Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486 (1st Cir.1979), where we denied a petition for rehearing based on the ground that petitioner-appellant had cited the wrong statute, we said, at page 492,
“We find it an intolerable imposition on our time and limited resources to grant a rehearing for the purpose of entertaining arguments addressed to that hitherto undisclosed statute.”
It is more difficult for us to look up Puerto Rico statutes than Massachusetts cases, but the principle is the same: we must *440have a right to expect professionalism from the bar.

The petitions for rehearing are denied.

. Bay State’s position was that it was immaterial that plaintiff "simply forgot.’

. NAD construes this "as an invitation to set forth the correct state of the Massachusetts law.” It most certainly was not. We know how to issue an invitation.

. This ambivalence continues on page 12 of its original brief, post.

. We do not think it at all clear that Bay State could now pursue a claim for indemnification against NAD. For one thing, it bowed out of the case where everything could have been settled at once. Secondly, if the law is that it should have been able to claim collateral estoppel, it lost that benefit by its own conduct. There may be other points — we make no suggestion as to the proper result.