Court Opinion

ID: 9738846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:19.553555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.034462
License: Public Domain

Shanahan, J.,
dissenting.
Saying that the fatal intersection was “partially obstructed” does not make it so, especially since the quoted characterization is only the majority’s conclusion and not a reflection of evidence in the Stauffer case. A verbal characterization of the intersection cannot displace visual truth. Consequently, attempted description is no substitute for actual depiction. While the majority offers that “it is very doubtful the trees and bushes were sufficient to obscure the bus as it approached the intersection,” photographic evidence removes all semblance of doubt whatsoever. Since “[o]ne picture is worth more than a thousand words, ” here is at least a thousand words:
*604[[Image here]]
*605The preceding photograph shows Theresa Stauffer’s view to her left, looking southeast, as she drove her pickup south toward the intersection. At the extreme left of the photograph, a tree at the east-west fence line marks the bottom of a hill several hundred feet east of the intersection which Theresa Stauffer was approaching in her pickup. At that time, Peters was driving the bright-yellow 36-passenger schoolbus, which was 22 feet 4 inches long and 9 feet 6 inches high, down the westward-sloping hill at 30 to 35 miles per hour. One can readily discern that a schoolbus is not only painted yellow to be easily seen, but is designed so that the busdriver has a panoramic view for safe operation of the vehicle. In the driver’s seat of the bus and while looking from right to left and vice versa, Peters had an elevated vantage point 8 feet above the ground as the westbound bus began accelerating to 40 miles per hour on the road behind the volunteer and intermittent scrub depicted in the photograph. The light-blue Stauffer pickup was 17 feet long and had a “camper” located in the pickup’s bed just behind the cab, which was approximately 5V2 feet from its top to ground level. Accompanying Theresa Stauffer in the family pickup was the Stauffers’ 7-month-old son, Adam, and both were secured with seatbelts. Adam survived the collision.
As shown in the photograph, no tree is large enough or dense enough to completely conceal the bus. Thus, nothing obstructed Theresa Stauffer’s total view of the big yellow bus as it traveled the distances between or behind the trees or shrubs. To paraphrase a well-known expression, while a tree might have concealed some of the bus some of the time, no tree concealed all the bus at any time. Also, Peters, recounting his panoramic view of the intersection, never mentioned that any obstruction was a factor for him regarding the collision. Rather, as Peters described the collision to Trooper Rodaway, Peters “ [d]idn’t see [Stauffers’] pickup till [the] crash, and didn’t have time to brake.” Peters testified that he failed to see the Stauffer vehicle until the very “ [s]plit second” before the bus struck the Stauffer vehicle at the juncture of the pickup’s cab and bed.
Both Theresa Stauffer and Peters were acquainted with the intersection. The only direct evidence of vehicular velocity pertains to the schoolbus, namely, 40 miles per hour at impact. *606Neither the Stauffer pickup nor the schoolbus left marks on the road surface to indicate braking or evasive action.
In that factual setting, the district court concluded that Theresa Stauffer “was contributorily negligent, sufficient to bar recovery because of her failure to maintain a proper lookout and because she operated her automobile at an unreasonable rate of speed under the traffic conditions then existing,” negligence which “when compared with that of [defendant school district] was more than slight and the negligence of the defendant, when compared with that of the decedent, was less than gross.” The exact nature of the deficiency in Theresa Stauffer’s “lookout” is undisclosed. However, in a further factfinding step, the majority concludes that Theresa Stauffer’s view “to the left was partially obstructed as she approached the intersection ... at a speed which the trial court could find was unreasonable”; hence, according to the majority, a partially obstructed view of the intersection rendered the pickup’s velocity, whatever that velocity may have been, “unreasonable.”
“Negligence is never presumed, and cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an accident happened.” Bixby v. Ayers, 139 Neb. 652, 662, 298 N.W. 533, 539 (1941). Accord Howell v. Robinson Iron & Metal Co., 173 Neb. 445, 113 N.W.2d 584 (1962). Also, contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the burden to prove contributory negligence. See, Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1, 459 N.W.2d 178 (1990); Lynn v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 225 Neb. 121, 403 N.W.2d 335 (1987).
The preceding expressions of Nebraska law bring us to a rule which this court has frequently expressed over several years: A decedent is presumed to have exercised reasonable care for the decedent’s own safety, a rule which is based on the instinct of self-preservation and the natural inclination to avoid personal harm. See, Pearson v. Richard, 201 Neb. 621, 271 N.W.2d 326 (1978); Sheets v. Davenport, 181 Neb. 621, 150 N.W.2d 224 (1967); Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, 176 Neb. 358, 126 N.W.2d 178 (1964). The foregoing “presumption” is, perhaps, nothing more than a combination of procedural rules pertaining to production of evidence: To recover in a negligence action, a *607plaintiff must prove the defendant’s negligence, but a recovery may be barred by the plaintiff’s contributory negligence proved by the defendánt. In the Stauffer case, however, the evidénce clearly establishes negligence on the part of Peters, the school district’s driver, but fails to establish any negligence of Theresa Stauffer.
As an additional rule, one of the “Nebraska Rules of the Road,” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-635(1) (Reissue 1988), provides: “When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection from different roadways at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right.” In Reese v. Mayer, 198 Neb. 499, 502, 253 N.W.2d 317, 319 (1977), this court construed § 39-635(1) and stated:
When two vehicles approach an intersection at approximately the same time, the vehicle on the right has the right to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to the vehicle on the left. In other words, the vehicle on the right has the right to the immediate use of the intersection, and it is this use of the roadway that the vehicle on the left is required to yield to the vehicle on the right.
It should be noted that the right-of-way which the vehicle on the left is required to yield to the vehicle on the right is a qualified right-of-way. The driver on the right must exercise due care, may not proceed in disregard of the surrounding circumstances, and where necessary to avoid a collision may be required to yield the right-of-way.
(Emphasis omitted.)
In Wolstenholm v. Kaliff, supra at 363-64, 126 N.W.2d at 182, an action for wrongful death caused by an intersection accident in which the decedent had the directional right-of-way, this court, affirming a plaintiff’s verdict, stated:
The evidence herein is undisputed. Janet A. Kaliff did not see the vehicle being driven by the deceased. No evidence was adduced which would impose any duty on the deceased to raise a question as to the right to proceed. The vehicle of the deceased did have the directional right-of-way, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, deceased was presumed to be exercising due *608regard for her own safety and the safety of others. [Citations omitted.] Deceased also had the right to assume that the driver of any other vehicle approaching the intersection in an unfavored position would take the steps necessary to permit her to clear the intersection.
To sustain appellants’ contention that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, we must assume contributory negligence merely because a collision occurred. This we cannot do. Negligence is never presumed, and it cannot be inferred from the mere fact that an accident happened. [Citation omitted.] Negligence must be proved by direct evidence, or by facts from which negligence can reasonably be inferred. In the absence of such proof, negligence will not be presumed.
Remarkably similar to the Stauffer case is the situation considered in Price v. King, 161 Neb. 123, 72 N.W.2d 603 (1955), which was also a wrongful death action on account of a fatal intersection accident in which the plaintiff’s decedent, Nellie Price, in the operation of her automobile had the directional right-of-way over a truck owned by Orville Conn and driven by Harry King. Nellie Price was driving her car north on a gravel county road. At the same time, King was driving the truck eastbound at 35 miles per hour on a county road which eventually intersected the road on which Nellie Price was driving. King never slowed the truck’s speed as he approached the intersection and did not apply the truck’s brakes before impact. The truck struck Price’s automobile on the east side of the intersection’s north-south centerline. After the accident, physical facts were inconclusive. King gave contradictory versions concerning his observation, or lack of observation, with respect to the Price automobile before the collision. In an extrajudicial version expressed shortly after the collision, King admitted that “he did not see [Price] until he hit her.” 161 Neb. at 125, 72 N.W.2d at 605. In another version, expressed at trial, King testified that he saw the Price auto approaching the intersection and assumed that he had time to pass safely through the intersection. King and Conn appealed from an adverse verdict. In affirming the plaintiff’s verdict, this court rejected the King-Conn contention that contributory *609negligence precluded recovery in Price’s case and stated:
The defendants contend primarily that the evidence shows Nellie Price was guilty of negligence more than slight as a matter of law when compared with the negligence of the defendants. The only negligence shown on the part of Nellie Price was that she was driving fast. There is no evidence that she was violating any speed limit fixed by statute. Whether she was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, or in failing to yield the right-of-way, is dependent upon the facts proved .... The presumption is that she used due care. There is a natural presumption that everyone will act with due care. The mere fact that an accident happens does not prove contributory negligence. Negligence must be proved by direct evidence or by facts from which such negligence can be reasonably inferred. In the absence of such proof, negligence cannot be presumed.... It cannot be said that Nellie Price was guilty of negligence which would as a matter of law preclude a recovery. From the record before us, she could well have assumed that her right-of-way was going to be respected by the driver of the truck.
161 Neb. at 128-29, 72 N.W.2d at 607.
Therefore, in any analysis of Theresa Stauffer’s operation of the pickup, there is a “presumption” that she was operating her vehicle with due care. Consequently, the defendant school district had the burden to prove Theresa Stauffer’s contributory negligence based on established facts. Applying the preceding to the Stauffer case, Peters, from his elevated vantage point inside the bus, glanced at the southbound approach to the intersection for which the Stauffer pickup had the directional right-of-way. Notwithstanding the majority’s characterization that a southbound driver’s view of the intersection was “partially obstructed,” the photographic evidence emphatically and totally dispels the mistaken notion that the entire schoolbus was hidden at any time from Theresa Stauffer’s view. Hence, there is no evidence which can legitimately serve as a basis for the conclusion that Theresa Stauffer was prevented from seeing the westbound schoolbus as it approached the intersection.
*610In the absence of evidence that Theresa Stauffer was prevented from seeing the bus, this court must operate on the premises that she exercised due care and saw the westbound bus, which was visible during its approach to the intersection. Theresa Stauffer then had every reason to believe that Peters saw her vehicle approaching the intersection and that Peters would yield the directional right-of-way. See, Steinauer v. Sarpy County, 217 Neb. 830, 353 N.W.2d 715 (1984) (driver had right to assume that a nonfavored driver would respect the directional right-of-way); Price v. King, supra (driver had a right to assume that a nonfavored driver would respect directional right-of-way). “[W]e are not prepared to say that the driver of a motor vehicle must slow down at every intersection in anticipation that the driver of the vehicle on the nonfavored street is about to commit a negligent act.” Steinauer v. Sarpy County, supra at 840, 353 N.W.2d at 722.
Hence, the photographic evidence blows away the arboreal smokescreen. With elimination of the trees as an obstruction to Theresa Stauffer’s view, as readily acknowledged in the majority’s statement “it is very doubtful the trees and bushes were sufficient to obscure the bus as it approached the intersection,” the bogus issue of lookout falls out. Undaunted at the evaporation of the lookout issue, the majority rushes to the pickup’s “speed” as a basis to defeat Stauffer’s recovery. However, there is no direct evidence concerning velocity of the Stauffer pickup. But “[w]hen there’s a will there’s a way.” The majority settles on the bus’ bent tow hooks and comes to rest at the postaccident position of the two vehicles. Given that the rapidly moving juggernaut of a bus drilled the southbound Stauffer pickup at a point behind the pickup’s left front or driver’s door, the bus’ kinetic energy was transformed into a counterclockwise reactive movement by the Stauffer pickup as the fast-moving and much larger bus tended to come to rest after impact. Thus, the postimpact evidence is so utterly indecisive regarding vehicular velocity that the only reasonable conclusion is absolute inconclusiveness of the physical facts on the question of speed. At that point, without the boot of negligence by Theresa Stauffer, the majority pulls itself up by its bootstraps in a factually unsupported conclusion: Theresa *611Stauffer was driving her pickup at an unreasonable rate of speed sufficient to bar recovery. Quite to the contrary, the evidence fails to support the majority’s conclusion and the district court’s findings.
Moreover, in pertinent part, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 185 (Reissue 1989) states:
In all actions brought to recover damages for injuries to a person . . . caused by the negligence ... of another, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence... of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the [fact finder] in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff....
Through a process of evaluation and reevaluation involving various calculations for operation of her vehicle, Theresa Stauffer decided that, at her pickup’s present velocity, she could enter and pass safely through the intersection, that is, if Peters would honor the statutory directional right-of-way. Even if Theresa Stauffer, at the edge of the intersection, made a last-second decision against abandoning her right-of-way, or if, just before entry into the intersection, her failure to brake, accelerate, or veer might be characterized as negligence, such conduct would be, at the utmost, negligence not more than slight when compared with Peters’ virtually reckless driving, which was grossly negligent in light of the comparative operation of the colliding vehicles. If there were any negligence on the part of Theresa Stauffer, her negligence is not considered in the abstract and evaluated by reference to a hypothetical, fictional, or mythical person, namely, the reasonably or ordinarily prudent person. Rather, Theresa Stauffer’s negligence, if any, must be analyzed in concrete actuality: her negligence compared with Peters’ negligence. After such comparison, the conclusion reached by the trial court and this court, “plaintiff’s decedent was guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to bar any recovery,” is unrealistic and unsustainable under the evidence and applicable Nebraska *612precedential decisions.
Consequently, the Stauffer case does not turn on a question of fact, but, rather, on the question whether there is fact, a factual basis for the conclusion reached by the district court. Neither creating facts nor arriving at a conclusion without a factual foundation has a legitimate place in the process of factfinding appropriate in a trial, much less in an appellate review. Consequently, the district court was clearly erroneous in its conclusions that Theresa Stauffer failed to maintain a proper lookout and exceeded a reasonable rate of speed under the circumstances. If “comparative negligence” has any meaning in Nebraska, nothing in Theresa Stauffer’s conduct precludes a recovery on account of the school district’s unquestionably gross negligence. Since there was ample evidence on the wrongful death damages sustained by Theresa Stauffer’s next of kin, the district court’s judgment should have been reversed and this cause remanded for a determination of damages.
Not too long ago, in Koncaba v. Scotts Bluff County, 237 Neb. 37, 464 N.W.2d 764 (1991), this court set aside a plaintiff’s recovery when there was evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act. It seems only logical and fair that this court set aside a judgment for a political subdivision when there is no supportive evidence; hence, the district court’s judgment should have been reversed in the Stauffer case.
White, J., joins in this dissent.