Court Opinion

ID: 9693001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:15:23.179565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:28.818010
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
In my view, the undisputed facts of this case support the trial court’s conclusion that the doctrine of implied revocation applies to revoke the decedent’s will. See D.C.Code § 18-109. The rule has developed in this jurisdiction that a divorce and property settlement or a divorce and adjudication of the parties’ property rights in the divorce action *332impliedly revokes a will executed during the marriage in favor of the testator’s former spouse. Estate of Liles, 435 A.2d 379, 381-82 (D.C.1981); Luff v. Luff, 123 U.S.App. D.C. 251, 253, 359 F.2d 235, 237 (1966). Under either theory, the will was revoked by implication in this case.
Here, the former husband, who was represented by counsel at the time, filed under oath a complaint for divorce from the testatrix in which he swore that there were no property rights to be adjudicated between the parties. The testatrix filed pro se a verified answer admitting the same. Relying on the parties’ solemn declarations, the trial court made a finding to that effect, and accordingly, made no assignment of property rights as required by D.C.Code § 16-910. The clear implication is that the parties had either resolved any property claims among themselves or had none. Having been represented by counsel, the former husband must have known at the time that, upon divorce, the parties became tenants in common of their only jointly owned real property, as he later claimed. See Travis v. Benson, 360 A.2d 506, 509 (D.C.1976) (“entry of a final divorce decree dissolves the tenancy by the entirety and converts it into a tenancy in common”);1 see also Coleman v. Jackson, 109 U.S.App. D.C. 242, 243-44, 286 F.2d 98, 99-100 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 933, 81 S.Ct. 1656, 6 L.Ed.2d 391 (1961). Thereafter, the incidences of ownership were governed by the nature of their interest as tenants in common, including any agreement with respect thereto, not by the incidences of their former marital relationship. Indeed, the former spouse later acknowledged that he and the testatrix had such an agreement.
The former husband asserted that he and the testatrix had a property settlement agreement in a pleading which he signed and filed with the court in an effort to obtain $30,000 from the textatrix’ estate for waste she allegedly committed to his half interest in their former marital abode. Specifically, he stated in his signed pleading that the parties became tenants in common as a matter of law upon divorce and that “[ujnder an understanding between [himself] and the Decedent, the Decedent was to maintain and keep the property in reasonable condition so long as she resided in the property_” He also asserted that he owned a fifty percent interest in the property, which would not necessarily have been the extent of the parties’ interest if the' determination had been left to the discretion of the divorce court rather than the parties’ agreement. See D.C.Code § 16-910(b) (distribution of marital property by the court is to be made in a manner which is reasonable, equitable and just, considering various factors); Gassaway v. Gassaway, 489 A.2d 1073, 1075 (D.C.1985). The former husband’s admission in his pleading provides significant evidence that he and the textatrix had a property settlement agreement. See Wines v. Wines, 291 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C.1972); Smith v. Smith, 256 A.2d 833, 836 (D.C.1969).
Finally, the divorce decree made no reservation of alimony to either spouse. Thus, both were relieved of any further support obligation to the other. Carter v. Carter, 473 A.2d 395, 397 (D.C.1984); Jackson v. Jackson, 200 A.2d 380, 382 (D.C.1964). All of these factors support the claim of the estate of the testatrix that the parties divorced and settled their respective property rights. A determination by the divorce court in a final decree, at the partiés’ behest, that there are no property rights for adjudication, does not differ in any meaningful way with a final adjudication assigning specific interests, particularly when coupled with evidence that the parties settled their property rights. “[T]o treat differently a property settlement agreed to by the parties, and a division of property made by the divorce court, would be to rest a decision of great import on an artificial distinction.” Liles, supra, 435 A.2d at 381. As this court has stated “once [the parties] have divorced and settled their respective rights in each other’s assets, if they intend to make additional provision, ‘the law should require this to be done anew in a manner provided by statute for valid testamentary disposition.’ ” Liles, 435 A.2d at *333382 (quoting Luff, supra, 123 U.S.App. D.C. at 255, 359 F.2d at 239).
Contrary to his sworn statements in the divorce action, the final decree of divorce, and his signed pleading making a claim for $30,000 against the decedent’s estate, the former husband filed in the present action an affidavit in which he now claims that the parties never finally settled their respective rights. In support of this conclusory assertion, he points to the testatrix’ use and occupation of the former marital property after the separation and subsequent divorce. This factor supports rather than dispels his earlier declarations of an agreement. That the testatrix remained in the property without his interference tends to show that the parties’ agreement was performed in part. In any event, their continued ownership of the property as tenants in common created new incidents of ownership which allowed for her occupancy, subject to his right to occupy as well or to demand partition. These incidents of ownership do not arise out of the marital relationship and would exist even though the parties had settled their respective interests, subject to any agreement, of course. See D.C.Code § 16-2901. An essential characteristic of a tenancy in common is unity of possession, i.e., “each tenant [in common] is entitled to possess the whole property and every part of the whole concurrently with every other tenant.” Second Realty Corp. v. Krogmann, 98 U.S.App. D.C. 283, 285, 235 F.2d 510, 512 (1956); Deming v. Turner, 63 F.Supp. 220, 223 (D.D.C.1945). Both were entitled to the use and occupancy of the property, and each remained entitled to an accounting for “rents and profits of the property to his own use _” D.C.Code § 16-2901(e). Thus, that the former wife occupied the property, to her advantage according to the former husband, is immaterial in determining whether their marital rights with respect to the property had been resolved. She had a right to occupy as a tenant in common, the status they took as a result of the positions they took in the divorce case, subject to his right to demand partition and an accounting or enforcement of the terms of any agreement.
Similarly, the former husband’s claim that they carried insurance on the property in both names lends no support to his efforts to refute that they had no agreement for disposition of their property interests. As tenants in common, both had an insurable interest in the property; therefore, no significance attaches to this fact in determining whether they had, as previously claimed, settled then.' property rights.
The remaining evidence upon which the former husband relies in support of his claim that the parties had not resolved their property rights by agreement or as shown by the decree consists of a bank account and charge account listed in their joint names and some items of personalty in which he claims both retained an interest. Significantly, the former husband does not contend that he ever used or was authorized to use the charge account subsequent to the divorce or that he ever paid the bill. With respect to the bank account, he acknowledges that the testatrix stopped using it at an unspecified time, but he does not suggest that she retained or claimed any interest in the funds on deposit in the account after the divorce and their agreement was reached. Therefore, he has offered no support for his assertion that either account remained an unresolved property issue between the parties. Assuming that some few items of personalty remained in which the former spouses each claimed an interest, and the former husband has not so asserted, it would not be sufficient, in my opinion, to defeat the showing of the testatrix’ heirs at law that the parties had an agreement resolving their major respective property rights arising out of the marriage such that revocation of the will was triggered under the statute. See Berryman v. Thorne, 700 A.2d 181, 183 (D.C.1997). The question is whether the divorce and final adjudication or agreement with respect to their interests “create[d] such a change both in status and responsibility as to raise the presumption of change in intention which lies at the basis of the doctrine [of implied revocation].” Luff, supra, 123 U.S.App. D.C. at 255, 359 F.2d at 239. Here, the resolution of their most significant property interests as shown by then-sworn statements and the decree effected such a change.
*334Finally, absent a claim of fraud or mistake, the heirs of the former husband, and his privies, are bound by his sworn and unsworn statements to the court that the parties had an agreement with respect to them property interests which resulted in the court’s decree that the parties had no property rights for adjudication. See Major v. Inner City Property Mgmt., Inc., 653 A.2d 379, 381-82 (D.C. 1995). There is no claim of fraud or mistake here. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the textatrix’ estate. See Berryman, supra, 700 A.2d at 183. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court,

. In spite’of the revisions to D.C.Code § 16-910, this principle, no doubt continues. See Kleiman v. Kleiman, 633 A.2d 1378, 1381 n. 5 (D.C.1993); see also D.C.Code § 45-216 (1990).