Court Opinion

ID: 9598649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:10:29.15537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:35.116782
License: Public Domain

Judge Smith
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion which reaches the merits of this purported appeal. As the majority acknowledges, plaintiff has made numerous rule violations in the instant case. Specifically, judgment was signed on 27 February 1995 and filed on 1 March 1995. The only document that might possibly be construed as a notice of appeal is captioned “APPEAL ENTRIES.” That document is dated and filed on 12 May 1995. Appellate Rule 3 requires that written notice of *432appeal in civil actions be served and filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. N.C.R. App. P. 3 (1995). “Appellate Rule 3 is jurisdictional and if the requirements of this rule are not complied with, the appeal must be dismissed.” Dillehay Bldg. Supply v. Frazier, 100 N.C. App. 188, 189, 394 S.E.2d 683, 683, appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 327 N.C. 633, 399 S.E.2d 326 (1990) (citation omitted).
The record on appeal was served on appellee on 12 May 1995 and filed with this Court on 23 October 1995. Appellate Rule 11(b) provides in pertinent part that the record on appeal becomes settled 21 days after service if no “objections, amendments or a proposed alternative record” are served. N.C.R. App. P. 11(b). Thereafter, an appellant has 15 days to file the record on appeal. N.C.R. App. P. 12(a). The record on appeal does not disclose that any objections, exceptions or a proposed alternative record on appeal were served or that any extension of time to file the record on appeal was granted pursuant to Appellate Rule 11(f).
Suspension of the appellate rules pursuant to our discretionary power uner N.C.R. App. P. 2 may not be used in this case to address the merits of plaintiffs appeal. As this Court has held that “[w]ithout proper notice of appeal, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and neither the court nor the parties may waive the jurisdictional requirements even for good cause shown under Rule 2.” Bromhal v. Stott, 116 N.C. App. 250, 253, 447 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1994) (citing Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 392 S.E.2d 422 (1990) and Brooks, Comm’r of Labor v. Gooden, 69 N.C. App. 701, 318 S.E.2d 348 (1984), disc. review denied, 339 N.C. 609, 454 S.E.2d 246, aff'd, 341 N.C. 702, 462 S.E.2d 219, reh’g denied, 342 N.C. 418, 465 S.E.2d 536 (1995).
A petition for certiorari has not been submitted as part of this appeal. Appellate Rule 21(b) requires a party seeking review by writ of certiorari to file a petition therefor with the clerk of court. N.C.R. App. P. 12(b). I do not believe the majority can properly treat this appeal as a petition for certiorari because in order to do so, the majority must suspend the appellate rules pursuant to Rul 2. Because this Court does not have jurisdiction of this appeal, it may not use Rule 2 to suspend the appellate rules, grant certiorari, and then address the merits of the appeal.
Even if the Court could properly grant certiorari in this case, I believe the majority improperly exercised its discretion in granting the purported petition. A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary reme*433dial writ which, in certain instances, may lie as a substitute for an appeal. Its object is to prevent an improper deprivation of appeal. Pue v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896 (1942). In the instant case, plaintiff flagrantly violated the appellate rules, and I do not believe she will be improperly deprived of an appeal by dismissing this case for such violations.
In a case similar to the instant case, our Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted certiorari to review our dismissal of an appeal for rule violations and affirmed. Booth v. Utica Mutual Ins. Go., 308 N.C. 187, 301 S.E.2d 98 (1983). In the case sub judice and in Booth, no notices of appeal were filed. However, in each case documents entitled “appeal entries” were filed. (In Booth, the entries were filed the day after entry of judgment which would have been timely for a notice of appeal. In the case at bar, they were filed on 12 May 1995 which would not have been timely for a notice of appeal.) In each case, the “appeal entries” were served on the appellees as part of the proposed record on appeal only. It is my opinion that the facts of the present case are substantially identical to the facts of Booth. If anything, the violations in Booth were less egregious than in this case because the “appeal entries” in Booth were filed within the time provided for giving notice of appeal.
Furthermore, in the instant case, the jury was presented with all relevant evidence and returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for one dollar. The record indicates that the jury heard all of the evidence regarding damages. The jury was properly instructed on the weight to be given to the evidence presented and that plaintiff had the burden of proving defendant’s negligence proximately caused her injury and the specific amount of damages resulting from those injuries. See Camalierv. Jeffries, 340 N.C. 699, 706, 460 S.E.2d 133, 136 (1995). It is obvious to me that the jury’s verdict is a determination that plaintiff had not carried her burden of proof on these issues. Therefore, I believe the majority invades the province of the jury in its opinion setting aside the jury’s verdict. There was no need to grant certiorari in this case.
For these reasons, I would dismiss this purported appeal for the appellate rule violations and do not believe this Court can treat the appeal as a petition for certiorari pursuant to our authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (1995) and Appellate Rule 2.