Court Opinion

ID: 9917119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 17:04:04.664749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:00.505206
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                              Jan 11 2024, 8:54 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                 Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Thomas B. O’Farrell                                        Rodney T. Sarkovics
McClure | O’Farrell                                        Sarkovics Law
Zionsville, Indiana                                        Carmel, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jessica Pilkington,                                        January 11, 2024
Appellant-Petitioner,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-DC-575
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Hamilton
                                                           Superior Court
Caleb Pilkington,                                          The Honorable P. Chadwick Hill,
Appellee-Respondent.                                       Magistrate
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           29D05-2112-DC-8687

                             Opinion by Judge Kenworthy
                    Chief Judge Altice and Judge Weissmann concur.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                             Page 1 of 24
      Case Summary
[1]   Caleb Pilkington (“Father”) and Jessica Littrell 1 (“Mother”) were married in

      2013 and welcomed a daughter (“Child”) in 2020. Mother petitioned for

      dissolution of the marriage in December 2021. While these proceedings were

      pending, Mother gave notice of her intent to relocate with Child. A magistrate

      presided over the provisional and final hearings and signed an order settling

      property- and child-related issues in February 2023. Mother appeals, raising

      three issues:

                      1. Did the magistrate have authority to sign the final order?

                      2. Did the trial court err in denying Mother’s motion to
                         relocate with Child?

                      3. Did the trial court err in awarding the parties joint legal
                         custody of Child?

[2]   We conclude that under current statutes, the magistrate had authority to sign

      the final order, and the decisions about relocation and joint custody are not

      clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   Mother was raised in Utah and moved to Indiana in 2010 for college. Her

      parents, her grandfather, and her brother and his family still live in Utah, but

      1
          Mother’s maiden name of Littrell was restored as part of the dissolution decree.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                    Page 2 of 24
      she also has some relatives in Indiana she sees occasionally. Father was raised

      in Indiana and his father, mother and stepfather, and younger brothers as well

      as aunts, uncles, and cousins live in Central Indiana.

[4]   Father and Mother were married in 2013 while Mother was still in college.

      Mother obtained a graduate degree in occupational therapy in 2018 and holds

      two positions in Indiana—as director of a clinic and as an in-home provider for

      First Steps. In 2022, Mother accepted a job in Utah. While these proceedings

      remained pending, she continued working at her two local jobs while also

      working remotely at the Utah job. Father is an hourly employee at Beck’s

      Hybrids. Although he often goes to work early in the morning and works

      longer hours during certain times of year, his schedule is flexible.

[5]   Father and Mother welcomed Child in April 2020. Mother breastfed Child and

      Father’s “job” was to prepare and freeze milk Mother pumped. Tr. Vol. 4 at

      108. Father assisted in bathtime by being “the drier” and gave Child an

      occasional bottle. Id. He also changed diapers regularly, especially at night.

      Covid-19 pandemic restrictions affected Father’s ability to attend medical

      appointments with Mother and Child in the months after Child’s birth.

[6]   Father continued to work in person during the pandemic and returned to work

      about a week after Child’s birth. Mother returned to work six weeks after

      Child’s birth, initially on a part-time hybrid schedule. She eventually worked

      up to being in person four days a week. On the days both parents worked

      outside the home, Father’s mother (“Grandma”) cared for Child in Grandma’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024     Page 3 of 24
      home. Father’s and Mother’s work hours were a little offset: Father went to

      work early, and Mother took care of Child and dropped her off at Grandma’s in

      the morning; then Father picked up Child and took care of her while Mother

      worked a little later in the evening. Mother then considered bathtime “her

      time” with Child since Father had time with Child before Mother got home. Id.

      at 110.

[7]   In 2021, Mother and Father bought a house with help from Father’s

      grandparents. A few months later, Mother and Father separated, but continued

      to reside in the house together. While they were still residing in the same

      house, Father tried to learn Child’s bath and bedtime routines. Mother had

      traditionally kept those times for herself: “I had my connection with [Child],

      and that was just our routine.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 22. Mother said she was “not

      letting [Father] do [bedtime] every night but . . . would attempt to let him do

      bedtime periodically to try to get [Child] used to it[.]” Id. at 23. In October,

      Father cared for Child by himself while Mother was gone for several days.

      Mother had “concerns about how [Child] was being cared for” because she did

      not believe she received an appropriate amount of communication from Father

      about Child while she was gone. Id. at 26.

[8]   By the end of October, Mother asked Father to move out. Mother and Child

      remained in the marital residence and Father moved into Grandma’s home

      approximately fifteen to twenty minutes away. He has his own room there and

      there is a connected but separate room for Child. After moving out, Father

      asked to have Child overnight, but Mother initially said no.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024       Page 4 of 24
[9]    Mother filed a petition for dissolution in December. A magistrate presided over

       all the proceedings in this case. The parties appeared for a provisional hearing

       in March 2022 to address temporary custody and parenting time. Mother

       described herself as Child’s primary caretaker and testified Father only became

       interested in spending time with Child—asking to attend her swim lessons and

       to take care of the bedtime routine—after the petition for dissolution was filed.

       Mother said she and Father agreed to a schedule for Father to see Child

       throughout the week and on weekends, with Mother “letting [Father] . . . come

       spend time with [Child] at the house,” Tr. Vol. 2 at 31, and “allowing him to

       have [Child] from 5 to 7 on Mondays,” id. at 36. Mother acknowledged she

       denied Father’s request to spend more time with Child, but explained she

       wanted to keep Child’s life “as consistent and steady as possible,” id. at 57, and

       told Father Child “needs her mom,” Tr. Vol. 4 at 116. Mother did not want

       Father to have overnights with Child during the week because Child “waking

       up [Monday through Friday] and being with me is what I believe is best.” Tr.

       Vol. 2 at 72. When asked, Mother said she did not intend to relocate to Utah.

[10]   Only Mother was able to testify at this hearing during the time allotted, and the

       hearing was continued to June. No provisional or interim order was entered in

       the meantime.

[11]   Mother and Child visited Utah several times while the dissolution was pending.

       In May, Mother filed a Notice of Intent to Relocate with Child to Utah. The

       Notice stated she intended to move “as soon as possible but no later than thirty

       (30) days from the date of this Notice” to be “near her family and friends.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 5 of 24
       Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 29–30. Father objected, and the trial court considered

       relocation at the start of the June hearing.

[12]   Mother wished to relocate with Child to Utah because her support system in

       Indiana—Father’s family—“is nothing now.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 14. To illustrate

       this, Mother testified that at Child’s second birthday party—held jointly with

       both families in April—no one from Father’s family other than Father himself

       spoke to her. She claimed communication with Grandma while Child was in

       Grandma’s care had significantly decreased. Mother “wholeheartedly

       believe[d] [her] parents would always support [Father and Father’s] whole

       family” and had expected Father’s family to “support[] both of us.” Id. at 53–

       54. Mother had applied for jobs in Utah but did not yet have employment

       there. She intended to live with her parents at first and assured the court “she

       would have a job by July 1st which is when she would be intending to move.”

       Id. at 60. Mother also noted she would have the support of her significant other

       who lives in Utah. Mother suggested it would be reasonable for Father’s

       parenting time to be a weekend visit every other month and a five-to-seven-day

       visit every few months. She also voiced no objection to Father moving to Utah

       and offered that solution as a “Proposed Parenting Time Opportunit[y]” if she

       relocated. Ex. Vol. 6 at 131. The trial court denied Mother’s request to relocate

       with Child.

[13]   The parties then continued with the provisional hearing. Mother testified that

       since the March hearing, Father typically has Child for short periods of time

       three evenings a week and every other weekend from Friday evening until

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 6 of 24
       Sunday afternoon. Father also had Child for an extended time in April.

       Mother first said no to the April vacation because she “didn’t know the

       stipulations of where he was going, why he was going.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 84.

       Mother expressed concern that Child had “come home sick twice now” after

       being with Father, and blamed Father for Child being sick. Id. at 74. She also

       expressed concern “about who [Child] is around that she wasn’t previously”

       when with Father and criticized him for decisions such as allowing Child to

       swim at a friend’s house when Mother did not think the temperature was

       “appropriate for her to be swimming.” Id. at 74–75. When asked on cross-

       examination if Father was a good dad, Mother replied, “I want [Child] to be

       involved with him at some level, yes.” Id. at 94.

[14]   Again, Mother was the only person able to testify in the allotted time. Before

       adjourning, and over Mother’s objection, the trial court ordered that Father

       have a midweek overnight with Child in addition to the parenting time he had

       been exercising. Father assured the court he could adjust his work hours so he

       could care for Child himself in the morning or the evening rather than leaving

       her in Grandma’s care. The provisional hearing was continued to September.

[15]   In July, Mother filed a second Notice of Intent to Relocate with Child to Utah,

       alleging she had been offered a job there with increased pay and benefits over

       her Indiana employment and asserting it was in Child’s best interest “to remain

       with the parent that has raised her.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 47. Father again

       objected. The provisional hearing set for September was converted to a final

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 7 of 24
       hearing at which all issues, including relocation, would be heard. The final

       hearing was held on one day in September and one day in December.

[16]   Mother again testified at the now-final hearing. As to the parenting time

       schedule ordered by the trial court in June, Mother said Child “has continued

       to struggle even more . . . being apart from [Mother].” Tr. Vol. 4 at 6–7. She

       claimed Child is “not safe” in Father’s care because “[s]he doesn’t have a

       routine over there.” Id. at 9. She said Child never gets sick when she’s in

       Mother’s care; instead, Mother is “always healing her and being her safe

       space.” Id. at 65. She maintained that Father has “not been a stable parent to

       [Child] her whole life. He’s doing what he thinks is going to look good in court

       versus what’s best for [her].” Tr. Vol. 5 at 52.

[17]   As for her intent to relocate, Mother testified she now had a “dream job” in

       Utah, “something that [she’s] been looking for, for years, in Utah specifically.”

       Tr. Vol. 4 at 10. She had already started the position, working remotely, and

       had given notice to her Indiana employers that she would be leaving in thirty

       days. Explaining why it was in Child’s best interest to relocate, Mother said:

               [Child] is going to thrive in that position in Utah. She has a
               family. She has three cousins that are right around her age that
               she adores. She has my parents. She has my brother and his
               wife. She has my grandpa. She has the support and foundation
               in Utah that’s going to help her thrive.

       Id. at 13. Mother denied the relationship between Father and Child would be

       strained if Child was living in Utah: “He can be fun Dad for his week and have

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024        Page 8 of 24
his time and do those kind of things that he’s been doing with her. And then

her stability and safe zone and structure would be in Utah.” Id. at 88. On

cross-examination, the following exchange occurred:

        [Father’s Attorney:] Who do you think is more important in
        [Child’s] life: [Father] or your mom and dad?

        [Mother:] My mom and dad.

        ***

        The Court: Wait a minute. Say that again.

        [Q.] I said, who do you think is more important in [Child’s] life:
        [Father], your soon-to-be ex-husband, or your mom and dad?

        [A.] My mom and dad.

        Q. . . . I want to be clear. You’ve now testified twice that your
        mom and dad are more important in [Child’s] life than [Father];
        right?

        A. That such an unfair question. I love my mom and dad more
        than him. . . . But it’s not – I don’t think one needs to be above
        the other.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024          Page 9 of 24
       Id. at 76–77. 2

[18]   Father, for the first time in these proceedings, also testified at the final hearing.

       He explained his position with his employer had changed since the last hearing

       and his hours were flexible: “If I need to come in earlier or work later on

       different days to fit my home, slash, [Child’s] schedule, that is available.” Id. at

       106. Since the trial court ordered a midweek overnight, Father had been going

       to work later on the mornings he had Child so that he could fix her breakfast

       and get her ready for the day.

[19]   As far as raising Child, Father said he and Mother “do a really good job

       together[.]” Id. at 116. “[I]f we were talking about what [Child is] doing or

       how she’s feeling or going to do stuff with her, . . . we laugh, make fun of each

       other sometimes. The drop-offs and exchanges go very well.” Id. at 117. But if

       conversation “pertain[s] to getting more time or less time with [Child],” then

       things get “uneasy between the two of us.” Id. at 116–17. Father described

       Mother as an “[a]bsolutely” good mom. Id. at 118. But he believed Child’s

       relocation to Utah would hurt his relationship with Child because he “wouldn’t

       be able to just do little things every night [or] pick her up at school or help her

       with homework.” Id. at 119. Father said he wants Child to see him as a stable

       father figure “that she looks up to and [can] be like, that’s a good Dad.” Id. at

       2
         The trial court later questioned Mother about this, wanting to make sure it did not misunderstand her
       testimony. Mother again said she believed her parents are more important to Child than Father. See id. at
       90.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                            Page 10 of 24
       118. He acknowledged Child needs to have a stable environment to grow up

       and said, “I can provide that for her.” Id. Father asked for joint legal custody

       and a split parenting time schedule.

[20]   Shortly after the December hearing, the trial court dissolved the parties’

       marriage, leaving all property and child issues to be decided on a later date. In

       February, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon, again

       denying Mother’s request to relocate Child and ordering the parties to share

       joint legal custody of Child with equal parenting time.

       Standard of Review
[21]   At Father’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions

       thereon.3 When we review judgments with findings of fact, we “shall not set

       aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be

       given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the

       witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when

       there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the

       judgment.” In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). In assessing

       3
         Mother asserts the trial court signed Father’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon and
       insinuates there are problems with the order as a result. See Appellant’s Br. at 17 n.2. We make two
       observations about this assertion. First, Mother does not support her claim with citations to the record and
       we find nothing in the record showing the trial court adopted Father’s proposed findings in whole or in part.
       Second, Indiana Trial Rule 52(C) allows trial courts to request that parties submit proposed findings and
       conclusions and the trial court is not prohibited from adopting verbatim a party’s proposed order. See In re
       Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091, 1095–96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). When a trial court does so, the court
       adopts the findings of fact and conclusions thereon as its own and is ultimately responsible for their
       correctness. Scoleri v. Scoleri, 766 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                             Page 11 of 24
       whether a judgment is clearly erroneous, we do not reweigh the evidence,

       instead examining it in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision.

       E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018). Clear error is “that which leaves

       us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Masters v.

       Masters, 43 N.E.3d 570, 575 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep’t of

       Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992)).

[22]   Together with the standard of review under Trial Rule 52, we give considerable

       latitude and deference to the decisions of our trial court judges in family law

       matters. Trial judges have “unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-

       face, often over an extended period of time,” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502

       (Ind. 2011), whereas we “look at a cold transcript of the record,” Steele-Giri v.

       Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, “our trial

       judges are in a superior position to ascertain information and apply common

       sense, particularly in the determination of the best interests of the involved

       children.” Best, 941 N.E.2d at 502. We will not substitute our own judgment if

       any evidence or legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment. See In

       re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1993). “The concern for

       finality in custody matters reinforces this doctrine.” Baxendale v. Raich, 878

       N.E.2d 1252, 1258 (Ind. 2008). 4

       4
         Before addressing Mother’s allegations of error, we must note our concerns about the brief and appendices
       filed by Mother’s counsel.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                            Page 12 of 24
       The Magistrate Had Authority to Issue the Final Order
[23]   Mother asks us to set aside the judgment because the magistrate lacked

       authority to enter the final order without the elected trial judge’s

       countersignature. Mother cites Indiana Code Sections 33-23-5-8 and 33-23-5-9

       in support of her position. Until June 30, 2018, Section 33-23-5-8(2) stated,

       “[A] magistrate . . . may not enter a final appealable order unless sitting as a

       judge pro tempore or a special judge.” That provision of the statute was

       removed effective July 1, 2018. See Ind. P.L. 161-2018, § 47. And until June

       30, 2019, Section 33-23-5-9 stated, “[A] magistrate shall report findings in an

       evidentiary hearing, a trial, or a jury’s verdict to the court. The court shall enter

       the final order.” That language was removed effective July 1, 2019, and

       Counsel’s filings fail to comply with the Appellate Rules in several respects. To mention but a few, the
       appendix contains the CCS, the appealed order, and exhibits that are already included in the transcript, but it
       contains no pleadings. See Ind. Appellate Rule 50(a)(2)(f), (h) (stating an appendix should include pleadings
       necessary for resolution of the issues and should not include record material already included in the
       transcript). In this particular case, at the very least Mother’s two Notices of Intent to Relocate were
       necessary for resolution of the issues she raises. Also, the statement of the facts section of the brief—which is
       intended to be a vehicle for informing this Court—improperly contains self-serving statements and argument
       which prevented us from relying on it as an accurate representation of the proceedings. See App.R. 46(A)(6)
       (instructing that facts should be stated “in accordance with the standard of review”).
       But we are most troubled by the tone and content of Counsel’s brief. The brief includes many instances of
       inappropriate editorializing and unfounded characterizations of Father and the magistrate. We caution
       counsel to temper his language and avoid the generally inflammatory tone of this brief in future filings with
       this Court. See Clark v. Clark, 578 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (noting a brief should not be used “as
       a vehicle for the conveyance of hatred, contempt, insult, disrespect, or professional discourtesy of any
       nature”) (quotation omitted); see also WorldCom Network Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 698 N.E.2d 1233, 1236–37
       (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[O]verheated rhetoric is unpersuasive and ill-advised. Righteous indignation is no
       substitute for a well-reasoned argument.”) (footnote omitted) (opinion on reh’g). And—as will be discussed
       below—Counsel relies on statutory language that was amended or removed altogether at least three years
       before the brief was filed in support of an argument. We remind counsel of his professional responsibility to
       provide competent representation to his client by, in part, “keep[ing] abreast of changes in the law[.]” Ind.
       Professional Conduct Rule 1.1, Cmt. ¶ 6. “A brief should not only present the issues to be decided on appeal,
       but it should be of material assistance to the court in deciding those issues.” Young v. Butts, 685 N.E.2d 147,
       151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). This brief fails to meet that standard.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                                Page 13 of 24
       Section 33-23-5-9 has now been repealed in its entirety. See Ind. P.L. 266-2019,

       § 3 (amending Section 33-23-5-9); Ind. P.L. 162-2020, § 4 (repealing Section 33-

       23-5-9).

[24]   The current law regarding the authority of magistrates is found in Section 33-

       23-5-8.5. Pursuant to that Section—with one limited exception not applicable

       here—the magistrate had “the same powers as a judge” on February 16, 2023,

       when the final order was issued. Ind. Code § 33-23-5-8.5 (2020). Mother’s

       argument that the magistrate lacked authority to enter the final order lacks

       merit. 5

       The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Child’s Relocation
[25]   Here, the trial court was considering relocation in the context of making an

       initial custody determination. In an initial custody determination, both parents

       are presumed equally entitled to custody, and “the court shall . . . enter a

       custody order in accordance with the best interests of the child.” I.C. § 31-17-2-

       8 (2017). In determining the child’s best interests, the court must consider all

       relevant factors, including the child’s age and sex; the parents’ wishes; the

       child’s wishes; the child’s relationship with parents, siblings, and any other

       person affecting the child’s best interests; and the child’s adjustment to home,

       school, and the community. See id.

       5
           We also note that when Father asked the case to be set on the regular judge’s calendar, Mother objected.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                               Page 14 of 24
[26]   When a parent who has or is seeking custody of a child intends to relocate, the

       relocating parent in most circumstances must file a notice of that intention. I.C.

       § 31-17-2.2-1(a) (2020). Indiana Code Section 31-17-2.2-2(a) provides that

       when a party gives notice of relocation at an initial hearing to determine

       custody, “the court may consider the factors set forth in [the relocation] chapter

       in the court’s initial custody determination.” 6 The relocation factors are:

                (1) The distance involved in the proposed change of residence.

                (2) The hardship and expense involved for the nonrelocating
                individual to exercise parenting time[.]

                (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
                nonrelocating individual and the child through suitable parenting
                time . . . arrangements, including consideration of the financial
                circumstances of the parties.

                (4) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct by the
                relocating individual, including actions by the relocating
                individual to either promote or thwart a nonrelocating
                individual’s contact with the child.

                (5) The reasons provided by the:

       6
        When a parent who already has custody of a child seeks to relocate with the child, the nonrelocating parent
       may file a petition to modify custody. See I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(a). In determining whether to modify an
       existing custody order due to relocation, the “court shall take into account” the relocation factors. I.C. § 31-
       17-2.2.-1(c). In this context, “[o]ther factors affecting the best interest of the child” include the general
       custody factors from Section 31-17-2-8. Baxendale, 878 N.E.2d at 1257. But the court need not find a
       substantial change in any of the general custody factors in order to modify custody in that circumstance. Id.
       at 1256–57.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                               Page 15 of 24
                        (A) relocating individual for seeking relocation; and

                        (B) nonrelocating parent for opposing the relocation of the
                        child.

               (6) Other factors affecting the best interest of the child.

       I.C. § 31-17-2.2-1(b) (2020). If the nonrelocating parent objects to the child’s

       relocation, “[t]he relocating individual has the burden of proof that the

       proposed relocation is made in good faith and for a legitimate reason.” I.C. §

       31-17-2.2-5(a), (e) (2019). If the relocating parent shows good faith and a

       legitimate reason for relocating, “the burden shifts to the nonrelocating parent

       to show that the proposed relocation is not in the best interest of the child.”

       I.C. § 31-17-2.2-5(f).

[27]   In this case, the trial court’s order shows it considered both the general custody

       factors and the relocation factors. The court first determined that Mother failed

       to establish her proposed relocation to Utah was made in good faith and for a

       legitimate reason. Although noting Mother’s new employment in Utah is “her

       ‘dream job’ which pays more money,” the trial court stated Mother has “an

       excellent career in Indiana” and “appears motivated to relocate to Utah because

       her boyfriend and extended family resides there[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 13.

       The trial court determined relocation “fails to offer any benefits to [Child]

       which are not already in place in Indiana.” Id.

[28]   The trial court also determined that Father established the proposed relocation

       was not in Child’s best interest, citing these reasons: the distance involved in the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024       Page 16 of 24
       move was significant; there would be significant expense and hardship to

       Father to exercise parenting time; and Father would miss out on Child’s daily

       activities and “bonding time together.” Id. at 14. The trial court also found:

               91. . . . Mother’s testimony that she considered her parents’
               relationship with [Child] more important than [Child’s]
               relationship with her father reflects that Mother would and/or
               has attempted to thwart [Child’s] relationship with Father.

               92. There was also evidence that . . . there have been times that
               Mother has not encouraged a relationship between Father and
               [Child].

       Id.

[29]   Ultimately, the trial court denied Mother’s request to relocate to Utah with

       Child and determined Mother and Father should share physical custody of

       Child, exercising equal parenting time with her. On appeal, Mother does not

       challenge the trial court’s physical custody decision; she challenges only the

       trial court’s findings that she failed to prove good faith and a legitimate reason

       for relocation and that relocation was not in Child’s best interests.

[30]   There are no explicit criteria for determining whether a relocation request is

       made in good faith and for a legitimate reason. Gold v. Weather, 14 N.E.3d 836,

       842 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. This Court has generally required the

       relocating parent to show an objective reason that is “more than a mere

       pretext” for relocating. T.L. v. J.L., 950 N.E.2d 779, 787 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 17 of 24
                [I]t is common in our society that people move to live near
                family members, for financial reasons, or to obtain or maintain
                employment. We infer that these and similar reasons . . . are
                what the legislature intended in requiring that relocation be for
                “legitimate” and “good faith” reasons.

       Id. at 787–88. Unless the stated reasons for relocation “are solely pretextual (or

       illegitimate on their face), a rather low bar in application,” Lynn v. Freeman, 157

       N.E.3d 17, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), the resolution of a relocation request

       should ultimately turn on a judicial determination of the best interests of the

       child involved, T.L., 950 N.E.2d at 788.

[31]   In light of the trial court’s findings that Mother’s proposed relocation was to

       live closer to her family and significant other and for a better employment

       opportunity, the trial court erred in concluding Mother’s proposed relocation

       was not made in good faith and for a legitimate reason. 7 Mother’s reasons for

       relocating are not solely pretextual and reflect the common realities of life

       previously acknowledged by this Court. But our inquiry does not end there,

       because the trial court also concluded relocation was not in Child’s best

       interests.

       7
         Mother’s brief emphatically and repeatedly claims one of her reasons for relocating is “for the purposes of
       avoiding domestic abuse[.]” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Although Mother testified to an incident she perceived as
       Father “tracking” her via the Find My Friends app on her phone and an instance of Father “cussing [her]
       out,” Tr. Vol. 2 at 27; Tr. Vol. 5 at 60, domestic abuse was not advanced as a reason for Mother’s move before
       the trial court. In addressing the general custody factors, the trial court found there was no evidence of
       domestic violence between these parties. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 19 (citing I.C. § 31-17-2-8(7)). We will
       not reweigh the evidence and further, we note this claim on appeal is at odds with Mother’s proposal at trial
       that Father could also move to Utah.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                               Page 18 of 24
[32]   The trial court received evidence on several of the relocation factors. No

       specific evidence was offered about the distance between Central Indiana and

       Salt Lake City, Utah, or about the time and cost of travel between the two

       locations. But it is uncontested that Utah is very far from Father’s home in

       Central Indiana and short, frequent trips between the two states for parenting

       time would likely not be feasible, financially or otherwise. At the time of the

       final hearing, Father was exercising parenting time with Child every other

       weekend and several evenings each week, including an overnight. Mother’s

       relocation to Utah with Child would substantially curtail the amount and

       regularity of Father’s visitation with Child and negatively impact the

       relationship between the two. In addition, Child has been cared for by

       Grandma several days a week for most of her life. A move would also impact

       their relationship, as well as Child’s relationships with Father’s extended family

       who live nearby.

[33]   Aside from the complexities that arise from physical distance in any case, the

       trial court identified Mother’s attitude about the relationship between Father

       and Child as a cause for concern. Throughout this case, Mother has revealed a

       sense of entitlement to dictate how and when Father and Child interact.

       Mother assumed the role of primary custodian and acted as the gatekeeper for

       Father’s parenting time without any legal basis, as no provisional order

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 19 of 24
       regarding custody and parenting time was ever entered. 8 Mother’s actions and

       testimony show at best a reluctance to acknowledge Father is also Child’s

       parent and equally able and entitled to make decisions for her, even if they are

       not the decisions Mother would make. And as the trial court pointed out,

       Mother testified four times that she believed Child’s relationship with maternal

       grandparents was more important than Child’s relationship with Father.

       Mother’s cavalier attitude about preserving Father and Child’s relationship

       warrants the trial court’s concern about whether Mother would encourage and

       facilitate a relationship between the two if Mother were to relocate with Child

       to Utah. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. 3 at 94 (Mother stating she wants Child to be

       involved with Father “at some level”); Tr. Vol. 4 at 88 (Mother testifying Father

       “can be fun Dad for his week” but Child should live with her in Utah).

[34]   Affording the trial court the considerable deference due in family law matters,

       we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in denying Mother’s request to

       8
         To the extent Mother and her counsel implicitly relied on Child’s sex and young age as a basis for Mother
       to assume the lead role as custodian and decision-maker for Child and then used that assumption to argue
       Child should “remain with the parent that has raised her,” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 47, Father correctly points
       out that the “Tender Years Doctrine” (also known as the Maternal Preference Rule) is “an outdated
       principle.” Appellee’s Br. at 24. The purpose of the statute declaring there is no presumption in favor of either
       parent when making an initial custody determination is, in part, “to overcome . . . the maternal preference
       rule followed in many [older] cases wherein the mother [was] given preference particularly as to custody of
       children of tender years or female children.” D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                                Page 20 of 24
       relocate with Child. The trial court’s best interest determination was well

       supported by the court’s findings and the evidence presented below. 9

       The Trial Court Did Not Err by Ordering Joint Legal Custody
[35]   Mother also challenges the trial court’s decision that she and Father should

       share joint legal custody of Child. The trial court found that Mother and Father

       “are able to effectively communicate except close in time to hearing dates” and

       determined joint custody would be in Child’s best interests. Appellant’s App. Vol.

       2 at 20.

[36]   In determining whether an award of joint legal custody is in the best interest of

       the child, “the court shall consider it a matter of primary, but not determinative,

       importance that the persons awarded joint custody have agreed to an award of

       joint legal custody.” I.C. § 31-17-2-15 (2008). The court also considers:

                (1) the fitness and suitability of each of the persons awarded joint
                custody;

       9
         Mother contends the trial court did not allocate the burden of proof appropriately, requiring Mother to
       prove relocating was in Child’s best interests rather than requiring Father to prove relocating was not in her
       best interests. See Appellant’s Br. at 20. The trial court did ask Mother during the provisional hearing related
       to her first notice of intent to move how moving would serve Child’s best interests. But Father did not get to
       testify in these proceedings until more than halfway through the next hearing, after Mother had filed a second
       notice of intent to relocate, the denial of which is on appeal now. Once Father took the stand, he did offer
       reasons why relocating would not be in Child’s best interests; namely, she would not have the benefit of a
       close, hands-on relationship with both parents. And, importantly, the trial court specifically found that Father
       had “rebutted any inference that the relocation was in [Child’s] best interests,” showing the court applied the
       correct standard. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 28.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024                               Page 21 of 24
               (2) whether the persons awarded joint custody are willing and
               able to communicate and cooperate in advancing the child’s
               welfare;

               (3) the wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
               child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age;

               (4) whether the child has established a close and beneficial
               relationship with both of the persons awarded joint custody;

               (5) whether the persons awarded joint custody:

                        (A) live in close proximity to each other; and

                        (B) plan to continue to do so; and

               (6) the nature of the physical and emotional environment in the
               home of each of the persons awarded joint custody.

       Id.

[37]   Joint legal custody means “that the persons awarded joint custody will share

       authority and responsibility for the major decisions concerning the child’s

       upbringing, including the child’s education, health care, and religious training.”

       I.C. § 31-9-2-67 (2009). Thus, the willingness and ability to communicate and

       cooperate in advancing the child’s welfare “is of particular importance in

       making legal custody determinations.” Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 56 N.E.3d 634,

       641 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). That is, the trial court decides “whether the parents

       have the ability to work together for the best interests of their children.” Arms v.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024       Page 22 of 24
       Arms, 803 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). “[I]f the parties have made

       child-rearing a battleground, then joint custody is not appropriate.” Periquet-

       Febres v. Febres, 659 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.

[38]   Mother’s argument that joint legal custody is inappropriate rests almost entirely

       on her assertion that she is the victim of domestic violence. As noted above,

       supra n.7, the trial court found no evidence of domestic violence and we will not

       reweigh the evidence to conclude otherwise. The parties did not agree to joint

       custody—Father requested joint custody; Mother testified that she wants to be

       the one to make decisions for Child. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 84. But Father testified he

       and Mother “do a really good job together” of parenting Child. Tr. Vol. 5 at

       116. Their primary source of contention in the absence of a court order was

       parenting time, and the trial court’s final order has settled that issue. There was

       no evidence child-rearing was a “battleground.” The trial court’s order shows it

       analyzed each factor relevant to a joint custody determination and determined

       joint legal custody was appropriate and in Child’s best interests. Evidence in

       the record supports the court’s findings. Considering the substantial discretion

       afforded to trial courts in custody determinations, we cannot say the trial

       court’s decision to award joint legal custody was clearly erroneous.

       Conclusion
[39]   The magistrate had authority to enter a final order here and did not clearly err

       in denying Mother’s request to relocate Child to Utah or in awarding the parties

       joint custody. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024      Page 23 of 24
[40]   Affirmed.

       Altice, C.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-575 | January 11, 2024   Page 24 of 24