Court Opinion

ID: 9628616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:26:38.827919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:47.096925
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — The majority opinion states:
• “ . . . The rule is well established in this country that the cash surrender value of insurance policies cannot be reached by garnishment. The rule is stated in 37 A. L. R. (2d) 286, § 5(b) as follows:
“ ‘Even though a life insurance policy has a cash surrender value which is available to the insured at his option, it is quite uniformly held by the courts that where the *777insured has not exercised his option to surrender the policy for its cash surrender value, a creditor of the insured cannot obtain such cash surrender value by means of garnishment proceedings, the general view being that where the surrender option has not been exercised there is no such present fixed liability or existing indebtedness on the part of the insurer to the insured as is requisite to the maintenance of garnishment! (Italics ours.)”
The situation in the instant case is by no means a typical one, where a judgment creditor attempts to implement or satisfy his judgment by garnishment- of the cash surrender value of life insurance policies. The particular life insurance policies were before the divorce court when a division was made of the property of the parties to the divorce action. The court awarded the policies to the husband, but subjected them to the provision that they would be security for his obligation to pay support money under the decree. • ■
The effect of such- a provision in the decree is to keep the husband’s property in the insurance policies under the continuing jurisdiction of the court to implement the’ terms of the decree if he failed to comply therewith. They are, therefore, subject to the disposition of the court for that purpose, rather than the discretion of the husband. See Heuchan v. Heuchan, 38 Wn. (2d) 207, 228 P. (2d) 470, 22 A. L. R. (2d) 1410. This jurisdiction of the court over the paid-up policies will-be terminated only by the children attaining their'majority, and, as to the other policy,' by the additional event of the wife’s remarriage or death. The instant garnishment action is ancillary to the divorce action (Kelly v. Ryan, 8 Wash. 536, 36 Pac. 478) and is a proper proceeding to enforce the support award. Boudwin v. Boudwin, 159 Wash. 262, 292 Pac. 1017. The cash surrender values of the policies represent definite property interests in specific amounts of money. The court’s judgment in garnishment implements it's continuing jurisdiction over the policies and is as binding upon the insurance companies as a demand by the husband would have been in the absence of the decree. The surrender value of the policies *778became a due and definite indebtedness within the meaning of the garnishment statutes because the court properly-acted in the husband’s stead.
Appellants contend that the insurance companies may have to pay the insurance- avails twice because the interests of the minor children in the policies have not been protected by a guardian ad litem.
I do not agree. The children have no property rights as such under a divorce decree. An award of custody is sufficient for the handling of support-money payments, and no guardian ad litem is necessary in connection therewith. The power of the court in a divorce action is only that which can be inferred from a broad interpretation of the divorce statutes. Palmer v. Palmer, 42 Wn. (2d) 715, 258 P. (2d) 475.
RCW 26.08.110 [ef. Rem. Supp. 1949, § 997-11] provides, inter alia:
“ . . . [the court] shall make provision for costs, and for the custody, support and education of the minor children of such marriage. ...”
The court has no power to make a property settlement upon children as distinguished from an award of support, and a provision for security for the payment of support money does not change the award into a property interest in the children for which a guardian ad litem is necessary. The garnishee is, of course, entitled to protection from being required to pay the insurance avails a second time. RCW 7,32.300 affords this protection by its provision that
“It shall be a sufficient answer to any claim of the defendant against the garnishee founded on any indebtedness of such garnishee or on the possession by him of any personal property or effects . . . for the garnishee to show that such indebtedness was paid or such effects delivered . . . under the judgment of the court in accordance with the provisions of RCW 7.32.010 through 7.32.050, and 7.32.100 through 7.32.310.”
I believe the judgment should be affirmed.