Court Opinion

ID: 9604485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:22:36.014089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:12.366566
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
This proceeding was prosecuted for the express and only purpose of having annulled a decree of sale of real estate entered in a chancery cause which decreed the sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment. The present suit is independent, separate or distinct from the old chancery cause. In the instant suit it is alleged that the prior suit “purports to be brought on a judgment lien to subject the sale of real estate to satisfy the judgment and that said suit was not instituted by Joe Bradshaw, Sr., for the benefit of himself and all other creditors”, and the answer to the bill of complaint admits that the old “chancery suit was brought in said court to enforce the judgment lien of $792.00 against said real estate”; that *666the decree entered in the old suit was “void” for the reason that “no process was ever executed and delivered” to any of plaintiffs except Ella Gilkerson; that plaintiffs “had no knowledge” of the pendency of the suit; that the suit was not matured for hearing at the time of the entry of the decree of sale; that the sale was never advertised as required by statute; that the creditors were not convened; and that no order was ever entered confirming the alleged sale. In addition, the decree of sale entered in the old chancery suit shows on its face that there was no finding or adjudication as to whether the “rents and profits of the real estate” alleged to be subject to the lien of the judgment were insufficient to “satisfy the judgment in five years”. Neither does the decree show any finding or adjudication that “an execution or fieri facias” had been issued or returned or that such an execution or fieri facias had not issued within two years from the date of the judgment.
Depositions were filed in the independent suit establishing definitely, and the circuit court found and held, in effect, that the allegations of the bill had been proved. The original file of the old chancery cause was before the court, and it is definitely shown that no convening of creditors was had; that the decree of sale was entered before the cause had matured; that no finding or adjudication was made as to whether the “rents and profits of the real estate” alleged to be subject to the lien of the judgment were insufficient to “satisfy” in five years the judgment sought to be enforced; and that no finding or adjudication was made as to any question relating to the issuance or return of any execution or fieri facias.
The authorities are practically unanimous in holding that a judgment may be directly attacked as being void, not merely voidable, in such an independent proceeding as the instant cause, and that such an attack may be made whether the fatal defect appears on the face of the judgment attacked, on the face of the record of the case wherein the judgment attacked was entered, or on independent evidence produced in support of proper al*667legations. This is clearly and unequivocally held in Smith v. Johnson, 44 W. Va. 278, 29 S. E. 509. See Stephenson v. Ashburn, 137 W. Va. 141, 70 S. E. 2d 585; Bennett v. Bennett, 137 W. Va. 179, 70 S. E. 2d 894; Cable v. Cable, 132 W. Va. 620, 53 S. E. 2d 637; Chilhowie Lumber Co. v. Lance & Co., 50 W. Va. 636, 642, 41 S. E. 128. In 49 C.J.S., Judgments, Section 421, it is said: “A judgment or decree which is void for want of jurisdiction is open to contradiction or impeachment in a collateral, as well as a direct, proceeding. In order to be collaterally attacked the want of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear on the face of the record, and the facts showing the want of jurisdiction must be alleged.” In the same section, it is pointed out that “* * * although the court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction with respect to the power of the court to render the particular judgment or decree, as where the court, in entertaining jurisdiction and rendering judgment in a particular case, exceeds the powers conferred on it by constitutional or statutory provisions * * See 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, Sections 597 and 604; 11 M.J., Judgments and Decrees, Section 145. West Virginia decisions cited in the majority opinion are in accord. See White Sulphur Springs, Inc. v. Ripley, 124 W. Va. 486, 20 S. E. 2d 794.
Code, 38-3-9, provides that the lien of a judgment may be enforced in a court of equity only “If it appear to such court that the rents and profits of the real estate subject to the lien will not satisfy the judgment in five years * * Another condition precedent to the power of the court to enter such a decree of sale is provided by that section in this language: “The lien of a judgment may be enforced in a court of equity after an execution or fieri facias thereon has been duly returned to the office of the court or to the justice from which it issued showing by the return thereon that no property could be found from which such execution could be made: Provided, that such lien may be enforced in equity without such return when an execution of fieri facias *668has not issued within two years from the date of the judgment * *
In Westinghouse Lamp Co. v. Ingram, 79 W. Va. 220, 90 S. E. 837, this Court held: “1. A judgment debtor’s real estate can not be decreed for sale to pay the judgment liens thereon until such real estate has been properly ascertained and it appears to the court that the rents and profits thereof will not satisfy such liens within five years.” In the opinion, the Court said: “The law is plain as to the duty of the court in enforcing judgment liens against real estate. It says: ‘If it appear to such court that the rents and profits of the real estate subject to the lien will not satisfy the judgment in five years, the court may decree the said real estate, or any part thereof to be sold and the proceeds applied to the discharge of the judgment.’ Section 7, chapter 139 of the Code. This is a condition precedent to the right to sell. No sale can be had unless the rents and profits will not satisfy the judgment in five years. This must affirmatively appear. This has been the law since 1882. Newlon et al. v. Wade et al., 43 W. Va. 283; point 3 of the syllabus, Dunfee v. Childs, 45 W. Va. 155.” To the same effect is the holding in Abney-Barnes Co. v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 292, 300, 98 S. E. 298. These cases appear to leave no doubt that before decreeing the sale of real estate for the satisfaction of a judgment, the court, before entering a decree of sale, must have “ascertained” that the rents and profits will not satisfy the judgment within five years and that the provision in the statute constitutes “a condition precedent to the right to sell”. Courts act only by their orders and, since no decree shows any ascertainment of the jurisdictional fact, the decree appears without question to be void. If void, it may be, under the authorities cited, attacked, collaterally or directly. I am not unaware of the fact that the bill of complaint in the old chancery cause was not produced and that it may possibly have contained all necessary allegations to bring the matter before the court. However, allegations can not amount to an ascertainment of a fact. The fact remains that the court did not “ascertain” such *669facts and that the only decrees entered in that cause, brought before the court, show no such finding was made.
Yet, for another reason, the decree of sale is void on its face, for lack of jurisdiction of the court. The record in the old chancery cause, before the trial court, does not show, nor does it otherwise appear, that an execution was first issued directed to the sheriff of the county wherein the judgment debtor “resided”, as to the judgment lien sought to be enforced, before the institution of that cause. In Lewis, Trustee v. Fisher, Judge, 114 W. Va. 151, 171 S. E. 106, this Court held: “In order to give a circuit court jurisdiction to entertain a judgment lien creditors’ suit to subject the real estate of the judgment debtor to the lien of the judgment, it must appear that an execution was first issued directed to the sheriff of the county wherein the judgment debtor resides, if a resident of this state, and that such execution was returned ‘no property found’.” In the opinion, the Court stated: “* * * It is thus seen that the lien of a judgment upon land is purely statutory. Being a purely statutory lien, the jurisdiction of a court of equity, whether it be inherent or whether it be conferred by statute, is in any event based upon the statute, and the court of equity taking jurisdiction for its enforcement may not extend it to cases not provided for in the statute itself. Canal Company v. Gordon, 6 Wallace 561, 18 L. Ed. 894; Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips, 118 Mich. 162, 76 N. W. 871, 74 Am. St. Rep. 380, 42 L.R.A. 531; Buchan v. Sumner, (N.Y.) 2 Barbour’s Chancery 165, 47 Am. Dec. 305.
“Having determined that both the lien and the remedy for its enforcement are dependent upon the statute, the question arises: is the issuance and return ‘no property found’ upon an execution made a jurisdictional matter by the statute in question? We think that it undoubtedly is. This requirement is intended to be the statutory method by which it is shown that the legal remedy has been pursued without result. Under the statute, it is then and then only that court of equity takes jurisdiction to *670grant relief by enforcing the lien of a judgment against land * * See Cooper v. Mullenax, 126 W. Va. 256, 28 S. E. 2d 426; Early v. Fogle & Co., 125 W. Va. 466, 24 S. E. 2d 899; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Eary, Judge, 116 W. Va. 477, 181 S. E. 817.
In the case of Mills v. Woods, 183 W. Va. 689, 57 S. E. 2d 713, we held: “A special commissioner’s deed for land, containing a provision not in conformity with the requirements of the decree confirming sale and directing execution of the deed, is pro tanto void.” Is it logically consistent to hold that a special commissioner’s deed is “void” because not in “conformity” with the decree of confirmation, while a special commissioner’s deed is “not void” where there was no attempt to enter such a decree ?
In my view, these plain, precise holdings as to the statute controlling, and as to the exact questions here involved, should be not overlooked or ignored, and, when considered, they require a conclusion just opposite the conclusion reached by the majority.
For the reasons indicated, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the final decree of the Circuit Court of Wayne County.