Court Opinion

ID: 2964792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:10.65541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.826417
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                ____________________
          No. 96-1850
                          NAVIEROS INTER-AMERICANOS, S.A.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellee,
                                         v.
                             M/V VASILIA EXPRESS et al.,
                               Defendants, Appellants,
                                 DUSAN JEFTIMIADES,
                          Petitioner, Intervenor-Appellant.
                          _________________________________
          No. 96-1851
                          NAVIEROS INTER-AMERICANOS, S.A.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellee,
                                         v.
                             M/V VASILIA EXPRESS et al.,
                               Defendants, Appellants,
                             COASTAL SHIP REPAIR, INC.,
                          Petitioner, Intervenor-Appellant.
                          _________________________________
          No. 96-2174
                          NAVIEROS INTER-AMERICANOS, S.A.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellee,
                                         v.
                             M/V VASILIA EXPRESS et al.,
                               Defendants, Appellants,
                          MOTOR-SERVICES HUGO STAMP, INC.,
                          Petitioner, Intervenor-Appellant.
                          _________________________________

          No. 96-2175
                          NAVIEROS INTER-AMERICANOS, S.A.,
                                Plaintiff, Appellee,
                                         v.
                             M/V VASILIA EXPRESS et al.,
                               Defendants, Appellants.
                          _________________________________
                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
                      [Hon. Jose A. Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                           Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
               Harry A. Ezratty for intervenor-appellant Dusan Jeftimiades.
               Francisco 
                         G. 
                            Bruno and  Lilia 
                                             R. 
                                                 Rodriguez 
                                                           Ruiz, with whom
          McConnell 
                    Valdes was on brief, for intervenor-appellant Coastal
          Ship Repair, Inc.
               Antonio M. Bird, Jr., with whom Bird Bird and Hestres was on
          brief, for intervenor-appellant Motor-Services Hugo Stamp, Inc.
               Stephen  
                       T.  
                           Perkins for defendant-appellants M/V VASILIA
          EXPRESS et al.
               Mark 
                    C. 
                       Landry, with whom  Carlos 
                                                  J. 
                                                     Quilichini, Robert 
                                                                         A.
          Mathis, and Newman, 
                               Mathis, 
                                       Brady, 
                                              Wakefield 
                                                         & 
                                                           Spedale were on
          brief, for appellee Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co.
                                ____________________
                                    July 28, 1997
                                ____________________

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This admiralty case features
            seven competing claimants, each trying to take from the
            proceeds of the sale of a seized vessel, the M/V VASILIA
            EXPRESS. Three claimants, in addition to the original
            charterer plaintiff, were allowed to intervene; all four won
            judgments after a three-day, expedited bench trial. Suit was
            originally brought in rem against the vessel. The vessel's
            corporate owner and its shipping agent both appeared, however,
            in 
              personam to defend the action, and were also held liable on
            two of the judgments (for the original charterer and another
            intervening charterer). The proceeds of the sale are
            insufficient to satisfy even these four successful claims.
            Various other claimants, whose claims would further tax the
            available funds, were not allowed to intervene. Three of
            these, the ship's captain and two repair companies, appeal.
            The owner of the vessel, the shipping agent, and the vessel
            itself also appeal together, arguing that the district court's
            entry of judgment against them is in error, and hence that
            there should be no division of proceeds at all. Alternatively,
            they argue that the two charterers were awarded excessive
            damages. These four appeals were consolidated.
                      We affirm the judgment against the vessel and the two
            in personam defendants, but we vacate the damages awards to
            both charterers and remand for a reassessment of damages. We
            also affirm the denial of intervention to the captain, but we
                                         -2-
                                          2

            reverse the denials of the two repair companies' motions to
            intervene and remand to the district court to entertain those
            companies' proof, to calculate damages due them, if any, and to
            determine how the proceeds from the sale of the vessel should
            be allocated among the various judgment winners.
                                         I.
                      The underlying facts are not now in dispute. On the
            morning of March 28, 1996, Navieros Interamericanos S.A., Inc.
            ("Navieros"), a Florida corporation, entered a fixed time
            charter party with the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS on a standard New
            York Produce Exchange form through a ship's broker, Jan Gisholt
            Shipping, Inc., also of Florida. According to the charter
            party, the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS was owned by Royal United
            Shipping, Inc. ("Royal United"), and was registered in the West
            Indies. During this litigation it was established that,
            despite this written representation, the vessel was actually
                                
            1.  A "charter party" is "a specialized form of contract for
            the hire of an entire ship, specified by name." 2 Schoenbaum,
            Admiralty & Maritime Law
                                    S 11-1, at 169 (2d ed. 1994). A "time
            charter party," one of several different types of charter
            parties, is a contract "to use a ship in order to ship goods
            for a specific period of time."   Id. S 11-5, at 178. Under
            such agreements, "[t]he carrier makes the ship's capacity
            available to the time charterer for this purpose. The
            charterer bears the expenses connected with each voyage and
            pays hire to the carrier based upon the time the ship is under
            charter."  Id.
                A charter party is "fixed" when there is "a meeting of the
            minds, evidenced by the parties' communications, on the
            significant 'main terms' of a charter."  Id. S 11-2, at 172.
                                         -3-
                                          3

            owned by Vasilia, Inc. ("Vasilia"), a corporation with close
            links to Royal United.
                      Navieros chartered the vessel for two round-trips
            between Florida and Guatemala, with an option for a third
            round-trip, for a total engagement of about 27 days, at $2,300
            per day. Navieros intended to ship, on behalf of various
            clients, "general merchandise, freight [of] all kinds,
            electrical material, toys, hardware, food stuffs, . . . heavy
            equipment, . . . road building construction-type machinery,
            and . . . used vehicles." The time charter party stated that
            delivery of the vessel to Navieros, the charterer, was to occur
            upon the vessel's arrival at the pilot station in Port
            Everglades, Florida, where Navieros's cargo was to be loaded.
            The charter party stated that this would happen "any time, day,
            night" after the fixing of the charter on March 28.
                      At approximately 2:00 in the afternoon on March 28,
            Kenneth Coleman, the President of Navieros, boarded the vessel
            at dock in Miami, about 30 miles from Port Everglades. Coleman
            discussed the stowage plan with the captain, Dusan Jeftimiades,
            and with Michael Psarellis and instructed the captain to berth
                                
            2.  Vasilia is a Liberian corporation with its principal place
            of business in Greece. Steven Psarellis, a Louisiana attorney,
            is described as the attorney-in-fact for the corporation.
                Royal United is a Delaware corporation. Vasilia Psarellis,
            Steven's mother (and the person after whom the vessel is
            named), is the president. Her other son, Michael, is the
            "principal operating manager."
                                         -4-
                                          4

            at Pier 19 when he arrived at Port Everglades, instead of at
            the pilot station.
                      The next day, the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS left its berth
            in Miami, apparently headed for Port Everglades. The only
            deviation from the written agreement that Coleman had mentioned
            involved the berthing of the ship at a different point in Port
            Everglades, but the ship never reached Port Everglades.
                      The vessel experienced problems with its bridge
            tachometer and stopped for repairs at Bicentennial Park, still
            inside the Port of Miami.  Kenneth Coleman and his brother
            William, also a Navieros officer, visited the ship four or five
            times over the next week. During this time, Navieros also
            ordered fuel for the vessel, confirmed its reservation of the
            berth space at Port Everglades, and issued the necessary check
            in payment of United States customs dues.
                      During this unexpected delay, Royal United, the
            putative owner of the vessel, entered into a second time
            charter party with Comet Lines Agency, Inc. ("Comet"), which
            was unaware of the charter party with Navieros. Royal United
            apparently believed at this time that the Navieros charter
            party had not yet been fixed. The Comet charter party,
            brokered by Americana Marine Services, began on April 4 and was
                                
            3.  The record does not reveal the name of the company which
            made these repairs. We infer that it was Motor-Services Hugo
            Stamp, Inc., one of the two repair company appellants denied
            intervention in this case.
                                         -5-
                                          5

            to last for a period of 30 days. It brought a more lucrative
            charter rate, $2,630 per day, than did the Navieros charter.
            Comet intended primarily to carry cargo between San Juan,
            Puerto Rico and Venezuela. Since the vessel was in Miami at
            the start of the charter, Comet arranged to have some
            Venezuela-bound cargo brought down from Jacksonville and loaded
            there; Comet's intention was to have the vessel proceed to San
            Juan where more cargo would be loaded, and then to sail to
            Venezuela.
                      Upon the vessel's arrival in the port of San Juan on
            April 13, however, the United States Coast Guard detained the
            vessel for a litany of safety violations and ordered it not to
            proceed to sea without Coast Guard approval.
                      Navieros subsequently learned that the vessel was
            being detained in Puerto Rico. On April 18, while the ship was
            still in detention, Navieros filed a complaint in the federal
            district court in Puerto Rico, initiating this litigation.
            Initially, the action was 
                                     in 
                                        rem against the vessel to enforce
                                
            4.  The violations of the  International 
                                                      Convention  
                                                                 for 
                                                                      the
            Safety of Life at Sea
                                , 32 U.S.T. 47, T.I.A.S. No. 9700 (1974),
            listed in the Coast Guard citation include: intoxication of
            the master (Jeftimiades); inability of intoxicated master to
            produce the necessary documents and certificates to Coast Guard
            officers; non-compliance with minimum safe manning certificate;
            various problems with electrical wiring in the engine room;
            lighting in engine room not covered; watertight door in engine
            room could not be closed due to installation of cable through
            doorway; non-working aft port fire hose; unreadable fire
            control plan; absence of dangerous cargo manifest for dangerous
            cargo on board; and carbon dioxide alarm system disconnected
            and activation pull cable not labeled.
                                         -6-
                                          6

            an alleged maritime lien based on the breach of a time charter
            agreement.
                      Later that same day, April 18, the district court, in
            an ex  parte proceeding, ordered the arrest of the vessel
            pursuant to Rule C of the Supplemental Rules for Certain
            Admiralty and Maritime Claims to the Federal Rules of Civil
            Procedure. Rule C allows the holder of a maritime lien to
            proceed in rem against the vessel that is the subject of the
            lien. In its order, the court stated that Navieros had made a
            prima facie showing of a maritime lien against the vessel.
                      Vasilia, as claimant of the  in  rem defendant M/V
            VASILIA EXPRESS, filed a motion for a post-arrest hearing on
            April 23. Vasilia claimed that the arrest of the vessel was
            improper because Navieros had no maritime lien. The only
            argument advanced by Vasilia at this point against the
            existence of a lien was that the charter party between Navieros
            and Royal United had not been fixed. A charterer's maritime
            lien, a right derived from a contract, will not arise in the
            absence of a fixed charter party, that is, in the absence of an
            enforceable contract.
                      In response to Vasilia's motion, Navieros amended its
            complaint on April 24 and moved alternatively for attachment of
                                
            5.  Later, Vasilia would argue that there was no lien because
            the contract was still executory at the time of the breach;
            maritime liens do not arise from the breach of an executory
            charter party.
                                         -7-
                                          7

            the vessel under Supplemental Rule B. Navieros also added
            Royal United as an 
                              in 
                                 personam defendant. One of the pertinent
            differences between Rules C and B is that the latter does not
            require the existence of a maritime lien. Rule B allows an
            admiralty plaintiff to acquire quasi in rem jurisdiction over
            a defendant by attaching his property in the district; this
            approach is available only if the defendant "shall not be found
            within the district." As required by Rule B, Navieros
            submitted an affidavit stating that, to the best of its
            knowledge, after a diligent search, defendant Royal United
            could not be found within the district.
                      The court ordered attachment of the vessel pursuant
            to Rule B on April 29. In its May 1, 1996 answer to Navieros's
            amended complaint, Vasilia reiterated that Navieros had no
            maritime lien because there was no fixed charter party.
            Vasilia also filed a counterclaim against Navieros for wrongful
            arrest, and asserted that if the court should find that there
            was a fixed charter party, then the dispute "would be subject
            to compulsory arbitration." Vasilia did not move to compel
            arbitration at this time.
                      The next day, April 30, Vasilia filed a "request for
            amended process of arrest" in which it asserted that the Rule
            B attachment was wrongly ordered by the court because Vasilia
            had designated an agent in the district upon whom process could
            be served on behalf of Vasilia. Navieros then amended its
                                         -8-
                                          8

            complaint again to name Vasilia as 
                                              in 
                                                 personam defendant along
            with Royal United. Trial ultimately proceeded on this second
            amended complaint.
                      That same day, the court held a hearing and ordered
            the case expedited. The court accelerated discovery and set a
            May 23 trial date. The court later explained, in its June 7
            memorandum opinion, that this rushed schedule was necessary
            because the vessel had "a fair market value of $500,000," it
            "was accruing significant expenditures incidental to the
            arrest," and there were "liens or potential liens exceeding its
            fair market value." The court also denied Vasilia's motions
            to vacate the Rule C arrest of the vessel and the Rule B
            attachment of it. The court stated that the arrest could be
            lifted by the posting of a $200,000 bond. No bond was posted.
                      On May 8, Vasilia filed a "second motion to vacate
            arrest and attachment and for second post-arrest hearing."
            Vasilia now claimed that "there are new reasons" showing that
            the Rule C arrest was illegal. Vasilia argued that Navieros
            had no maritime lien because the vessel had not been delivered
                                
            6.  On the first day of trial, the court again expressed its
            concern with the problems that would be caused by delay: "It's
            a vessel of marginal value in a marginal trade with charters
            and owners of marginal economic solvency and all that we're
            going to create [by transferring the case to arbitration] is a
            bigger problem for everybody here."
            7.  This motion and most subsequent submissions were filed by
            Vasilia alone, not by Royal United or the vessel. Hence, we
            often describe the collective defendants as "Vasilia."
                                         -9-
                                          9

            to Navieros, the charter party was still executory, and a
            maritime lien will not arise from the breach of an executory
            charter party. Vasilia cited for the first time Navieros's
            oft-repeated assertion in its pleadings that the vessel had not
            been delivered as required by the charter party. Both      in
            personam defendants then waived the requirement that they be
            served with process and waived any objections to lack of
            personal jurisdiction. The court summarily denied Vasilia's
            motion on May 20, three days before trial commenced.
                      On May 13, Comet and Transcaribbean Maritime Corp.
            ("Transcaribbean") filed motions to intervene as plaintiffs in
            the lawsuit. Comet is the second charterer; like Navieros, it
            pleaded a breach of contract claim. Transcaribbean is a San
            Juan-based ship's agent and stevedoring contractor which paid,
            on behalf of the vessel, harbor and port dues, pilot fees, and
            other expenses incidental to the ship's arrival and its
            subsequent detention in the Port of San Juan. On May 20, the
            court allowed both claimants to intervene.
                      On May 22, on the eve of trial, Captain Jeftimiades
            filed a motion to intervene as plaintiff, asserting a maritime
            lien for unpaid seaman's wages. On May 23, the day the trial
            started, Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. ("Gulf Coast"), the holder
            of a first preferred mortgage on the vessel, filed a motion to
            intervene as plaintiff in order to request foreclosure.
                                        -10-
                                         10

                      At the start of trial, the court ruled from the bench
            on the two motions to intervene. After establishing that
            neither Captain Jeftimiades nor his counsel were present in the
            courtroom, the judge ascertained from Navieros's counsel that
            Jeftimiades's counsel was aware that the trial was starting.
            The court then denied Jeftimiades's motion to intervene,
            stating:
                      Well, the captain is not here. His lawyer
                      is not here. Everybody is aware of the
                      fact that this case was being tried or
                      there was no reason not to know.
                      Therefore, at this point in time I am
                      denying for obvious lack of interest, they
                      are not here, the motion for permission to
                      intervene . . . .
            Gulf Coast's motion to intervene was granted.
                      On this first day of trial, the court also ruled from
            the bench on Vasilia's motion to compel arbitration, filed the
            day before. Vasilia's motion relied on an arbitration clause
            in the charter party between Navieros and Royal United (and on
            a similar clause in the charter party with Comet). The motion
            came two days after Vasilia's pre-trial concession regarding
            the existence of a fixed charter with Navieros, a point Vasilia
            had been contesting until then.
                      The court characterized this motion as among the
            "strongest" of the many pre-trial motions, but nevertheless
            denied it. The court stated that Vasilia had conducted itself
            thus far in the litigation in a manner inconsistent with a
            desire to enforce a contractual arbitration clause, and that it
                                        -11-
                                         11

            had "by its actions moved away from its right to arbitrate."
            Sending the case to arbitration, said the judge, would also, by
            causing further delay, increase the costs attendant to the
            continuing arrest of the vessel, and "create a bigger problem
            for everybody here."
                      Because Vasilia admitted the existence and breach of
            a charter party with Navieros, trial proceeded on the question
            of damages alone. Vasilia argued that Navieros had no right to
            arrest the vessel under Rule C or to attach it under Rule B.
            Moreover, Navieros's resort to these procedures, Vasilia said
            in its counterclaim, had caused Vasilia to breach its contract
            with Comet and to incur other liabilities. Relying on the
            venerable executory contract doctrine, Vasilia argued that the
            Rule C arrest was improper because the vessel had not yet been
            delivered to Navieros at the time of the breach, and the
            charter party was still executory. Consequently, argued
            Vasilia, Navieros had no maritime lien and its resort to Rule
            C was invalid. Rule B attachment was also invalid, argued
            Vasilia, because this measure may only be invoked where the
                                
            8.  Had Vasilia filed the motion to compel arbitration earlier
            in the pleadings, stated the court, "it would have been very
            difficult not to grant it." Additionally, the court indicated
            that, despite its belief that Vasilia had waived the right to
            arbitration, it might have granted the motion if Vasilia, while
            arguing the motion at trial, had expressed a willingness to
            post a $200,000 bond to release the vessel from arrest, thus
            hastening a conclusion to the expensive arrest. Vasilia's
            counsel responded, however, that his client could not post such
            a bond.
                                        -12-
                                         12

            defendant cannot be found within the district, and Vasilia had
            appointed an agent within the district for service of process
            on its behalf.
                        The trial concluded on May 29, and the court issued
            its written memorandum and order on June 7. The court upheld
            both the Rule C arrest and the Rule B attachment. Rejecting
            Vasilia's Rule C argument, the court held that the vessel was
            effectively delivered to Navieros prior to the breach when
            Coleman boarded the vessel in Miami. The court stated:
                      Although the vessel was to be technically
                      delivered at the pilot station in Port
                      Everglades, a location less than thirty
                      nautical miles away, due to the proximity
                      of the locations, the master and Mr.
                      Psarellis accepted Kenneth Coleman's
                      instructions to proceed further to Port
                      Everglades and, with a pilot, to berth at
                      Pier 19 in Port Everglades for loading.
                      The vessel was, for all purposes,
                      delivered to the charterer when Mr.
                      Psarellis and the ship's master accepted
                      Mr. Coleman's verbal instructions to
                      proceed under the charter party agreement
                      to Pier 19 at Port Everglades for loading.
            The court also upheld the Rule B attachment, rejecting
            Vasilia's argument that the attachment was improper because
            Vasilia had appointed an agent for service of process within
            the district. The court emphasized that Vasilia, a Liberian
            corporation, had had no corporate presence whatsoever in the
            district. The court stated that the eleventh hour appointment
            by Vasilia of counsel as local agent for service of process was
                                        -13-
                                         13

            a "strategic appointment directed at defeating the necessity of
            the rule" and could not be used to elude attachment.
                      The court entered judgment against the vessel and the
            two in personam defendants: for Navieros in the amount of
            $182,952; for Comet in the amount of $100,312.13; for
            Transcaribbean in the amount of $24,777.26; and for Gulf Coast
            in the amount of $285,428.91. The total of the judgments
            against Vasilia amounted to $593,470.30. The court ordered
            that the vessel be sold by the United States Marshal at auction
            to satisfy these judgments.
                      The court ruled that Gulf Coast had complied with the
            requirements of the Ship Mortgage Act, 46 U.S.C. S 30101   et
            seq., and had successfully shown that it had a preferred
            mortgage. The court, however, did not rank the four judgment
            winners. Nor did the court know, at the time the judgments
            were handed down, how much money would be available from the
            eventual sale of the vessel to satisfy the judgments.
                      Several more would-be plaintiffs moved to intervene
            as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) after the
            decision was handed down; these motions were denied. We
            discuss only those parties that appeal. The first of these
            post-judgment movants was Motor-Services Hugo Stamp, Inc.
                                
            9.  We note that Gulf Coast's compliance with the provisions of
            the Ship Mortgage Act was the subject of considerable dispute
            in the district court. That question, however, is not before
            us.
                                        -14-
                                         14

            ("Motor-Services"), a Florida-based ship repair and supply
            company which sought to intervene on June 7, the day judgment
            issued. Motor-Services asserted a maritime lien in the amount
            of $76,460.55 for unpaid receivables due for work done on the
            M/V VASILIA EXPRESS and materials supplied to it between
            February 28 and March 29, 1996. The second post-judgment
            movant was Coastal Ship Repair, Inc. ("Coastal"), a Louisiana
            corporation which sought intervention on June 11. Coastal,
            too, asserted a maritime lien for moneys due for work performed
            and materials supplied the vessel, from May 2, 1995, through
            July 1, 1995. Coastal asserted a lien in the amount of
            $144,800. The court denied these two late motions on July 3 by
            separate written orders.
                      The public auction was held July 2, but the required
            minimum bid of $400,000 was not achieved. A second auction was
            held on July 23 with a lower minimum of $300,000. Gulf Coast,
            the first preferred mortgage holder, bought the ship for
            $300,000. After confirmation of the sale, Jeftimiades,
            Coastal, and Motor-Services moved to stay disbursement of the
            proceeds until final resolution of these appeals. This motion
            was granted, and the proceeds of the sale, less certain
            administrative costs and fees, remain in an escrow account
            pending resolution of the appeal.
                                         II.
                      Vasilia appeals on four grounds: (1) that the arrest
                                        -15-
                                         15

            and attachment were invalid; (2) that the motion to compel
            arbitration was wrongly denied; (3) that the court awarded both
            charterers, Navieros and Comet, excessive damages; and (3) that
            the court improperly pierced Vasilia's corporate veil. We
            resolve Vasilia's claims without the benefit of briefs from
            Navieros  or any of the other plaintiffs in whose favor
            judgment was entered.
            A.  Arrest and Attachment
                      Vasilia admitted before trial that it was in breach
            of the charter party with Navieros. The main issue on appeal
            is whether Navieros was entitled to take the measures it took
            prior to trial regarding the vessel. Vasilia's position
            remains that (1) Navieros had no maritime lien and thus no
            right to arrest and (2) Vasilia had appointed an agent within
            the district for service of process on its behalf and so
            attachment was improper. Vasilia apparently infers that
            Navieros is responsible for the chain of events set in motion
            by the subsequent unavailability of the vessel:    i.e., the
            breach of the Comet charter; Gulf Coast's decision to bring its
            foreclosure action; and the need for Transcaribbean to incur
            the custodial costs associated with the arrest of the vessel.
                                
            10.  Navieros, the original plaintiff in this action, chose not
            to participate in this appeal. Navieros did not file a brief
            and did not appear at oral argument. Presumably, Navieros
            concluded that further participation in this litigation would
            be fruitless given the $285,000 judgment awarded Gulf Coast on
            its preferred mortgage lien.
                                        -16-
                                         16

            Vasilia's position appears to be that Navieros should have
            brought an in  personam suit against Vasilia for breach of
            contract, rather than moving against the vessel under Rules C
            and B, and that this would not have resulted in the same domino
            effect.
                      Navieros first invoked Rule C, seeking the arrest of
            the vessel on the basis of an asserted maritime lien. After
            Vasilia challenged the existence of a maritime lien, Navieros
            moved alternatively for Rule B attachment.       The two
            strategies, though similar in effect, are based on entirely
            different theories.
                      An in rem action [under Rule C] differs
                      from maritime attachment [under Rule B] in
                      that an in rem action is brought against
                      the vessel itself as defendant. By
                      contrast, a vessel is attached only as an
                      auxiliary to an in personam claim because
                      the vessel is property belonging to the
                      defendant.
            2 Schoenbaum, supra, S 21-3, at 478-79. The district court
            ordered both Rule C arrest and Rule B attachment of the vessel,
            and ruled both procedures proper in its written opinion.
            Vasilia challenges both rulings on appeal. Either procedure
            standing alone would have been sufficient to enable Navieros to
                                
            11.  The two rules may be invoked simultaneously.  See, e.g.
                                                                        ,
            Amstar Corp.
                        v. 
                           S/S Alexandros T.
                                            , 664 F.2d 904, 906 (4th Cir.
            1981); 2 Schoenbaum, supra, S 21-2, at 469 n.2, 470.
                                        -17-
                                         17

            ensure the continued presence of the vessel in Puerto Rico
            while the litigation proceeded.
            1.  Arrest
                      The Rule C question is a close one, and it takes us
            into waters uncharted by this circuit. In order to invoke Rule
            C to arrest a vessel, a plaintiff must have a valid maritime
            lien against the defendant's vessel.     See Bunn v.   Global
            Marine, Inc.
                       , 428 F.2d 40, 48 n.10 (5th Cir. 1970) ("a maritime
            lien is the foundation of a proceeding 
                                                  in 
                                                     rem"); 
                                                            Rainbow Line,
            Inc. v. M/V 
                        Tequila, 480 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (" in
            rem jurisdiction in the admiralty exists only to enforce a
            maritime lien"); 2 Schoenbaum, supra, S 21-3, at 478-79. We
            affirm the district court holding that Navieros had a maritime
            lien. The Rule C arrest was thus valid.
                      Under the executory contract doctrine, charterers
            have no maritime lien until performance of the charter contract
                                
            12.  It is unclear from the record whether (and for how long)
            the United States Coast Guard detention of the vessel in Puerto
            Rico, effected on April 14, would have also detained the
            vessel. This could be an important matter because Vasilia's
            counterclaim -- based on the claim that Navieros wrongfully
            deprived it of the use of its vessel -- would be entirely moot
            if we could determine with any certainty that the Coast Guard
            detention would have continued at least through June 7, the
            date judgment was entered for Navieros. If this were the case,
            any wrongful arrest or wrongful attachment would likely be
            harmless error, cured by the judgment. The district court
            opinion, issued on June 7, does state "[a]s of this date, the
            vessel is still detained at the port of San Juan, Puerto Rico,
            by virtue of the U.S. Coast Guard prohibition for the cited
            safety violations." But there is no evidence in the record
            before us on this point. In the absence of such evidence, we
            address Vasilia's arguments on their merits.
                                        -18-
                                         18

            begins.  Krauss 
                             Bros. 
                                   Lumber 
                                           Co. v. Dimon 
                                                         S.S. 
                                                              Corp. 
                                                                     (The
            Pacific Cedar), 290 U.S. 117, 121 (1933); Osaka Shosen Kaisha
            v. Pacific Export Lumber Co. (The Saigon Maru), 260 U.S. 490,
            495 (1923). "Liability arises in the admiralty as elsewhere
            from breach of any valid contract, but until the parties have
            entered in performance remedy for the breach is  in  personam
            only; the added advantages of lien status are reserved to
            claimants under executed contracts." Gilmore & Black, The Law
            of Admiralty S 9-22, at 635 (2d ed. 1975); see also Bunn, 428
            F.2d at 48 n.10 ("The rule in admiralty is well settled that no
            lien attaches for the breach of an executory contract. . . .
            [U]ntil the parties have entered into performance, the remedy
            in admiralty for the breach is  in personam only.");  Rainbow
            Line, 480 F.2d at 1027 n.6;    The  
                                               Oceano, 148 F. 131, 133
            (S.D.N.Y. 1906); Rule C(1) (setting forth when an action 
                                                                   in 
                                                                      rem
            may be brought).
                      Here the goods to be shipped were never actually
            loaded on the vessel. The vessel never got to the dockside for
            loading. There is no evidence that the goods to be shipped
            were ever in the custody or control of the vessel master.
            Ordinarily, those facts would most likely end any claim of
            maritime lien.  See Gilmore & Black, supra, S 9-22, at 636.
                      The great majority of cases addressing the executory
            contract doctrine, however, have concerned contracts of
                                        -19-
                                         19

            affreightment evidenced by bills of lading or voyage charters.
            E.A.S.T., 
                      Inc. v. M/V 
                                  Alaia, 673 F. Supp. 796, 802 (E.D. La.
            1987), aff'd, 876 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir. 1989). This case
            involves a time charter agreement. The district court relied
            heavily on the reasoning in      E.A.S.T., where the court
            distinguished between voyage charters and time charters as to
            when the contract is no longer executory (and, consequently, as
            to when a maritime lien arises). With voyage charters, whether
            control over the cargo shifted to the vessel will most likely
            determine whether a maritime lien exists.   E.A.S.T., 673 F.
            Supp. at 802-04. With time charters, however, a maritime lien
            may arise even before control of the cargo shifts to the
            vessel.  Id.;  see also Rainbow 
                                             Line, 480 F.2d at 1027 n.6
            (noting that cargo need not be loaded for time charter to lose
            executory status).
                      This distinction is sensible because under a time
            charter the shipowner agrees to put his vessel, master, and
            crew to the service of the time charterer for a named period.
            E.A.S.T., 673 F. Supp. at 802. The time charterer must begin
            his performance "well before cargo is, if ever, loaded on the
            vessel -- by paying hire, appointing and funding a port agent,
                                
            13.  A "voyage charter" is a contract of affreightment under
            which the carrier, who either owns or manages a ship, agrees to
            transport a certain amount of the charterer's cargo ("freight")
            from one port to another. The charterer pays for the shipment
            of freight by the voyage. 2 Schoenbaum, 
                                                   supra, S 11-4, at 175-
            76.
                                        -20-
                                         20

            and arranging and paying for pilotage, tug assistance and line
            handlers and all else necessary to berth the vessel in order to
            load cargo."  Id. at 803.
                      Here, the time charter form agreement specified that:
                      Vessel to be placed at the disposal of the
                      Charterers, at Delivery Arrival Pilot
                      Station Port Everglades Any Time, Day,
                      Night . . . .
            The president of the plaintiff charterer boarded the vessel 30
            miles from Port Everglades, and changed the instructions as to
            the destination (berthing at Pier 19 at Port Everglades instead
            of at the pilot station). The vessel proceeded until it
            experienced mechanical problems and it stopped for repairs
            short of Port Everglades. While it was undergoing repairs, the
            charterer boarded the vessel four or five times, ordered fuel
            for the vessel, confirmed its reservation of a berth space, and
            issued a check to pay U.S. Customs fees.
                      Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the
            experienced trial judge erred in concluding that there was
            sufficient delivery of the vessel to the charterer, Navieros,
            and sufficient performance of the contract that the charter was
            no longer "executory." Accordingly, there was a maritime lien
            and the Rule C arrest was proper.
            2.  Attachment
                                
            14.  We reach this conclusion, as the district judge also did,
            notwithstanding Navieros's claim in its pleadings that the
            vessel had not been delivered to it.
                                        -21-
                                         21

                      We also affirm the Rule B attachment because Vasilia
            was not "within the district" at the time attachment was sought
            and granted.
                      On April 30 Vasilia submitted to the court a copy of
            a letter saying that Vasilia had appointed an agent for service
            in the district. The letter, dated April 26, 1996, states in
            its entirety:
                           This is to confirm that owners are
                      authorizing CALVESBERT and BROWN as
                      attorneys to accept service of process on
                      behalf of VASILIA INC. who is the owner of
                      M/V VASILIA EXPRESS which was named in a
                      suit filed by Navieros Interamericanos in
                      Federal District Court in Puerto Rico.
            There is no addressee designated on the face of the letter.
            There is evidence at the top of the page that the letter had
            been sent via fax to the recipient on April 29.
                      Rule B allows the attachment of a vessel or other
            tangible property under certain circumstances to gain 
                                                                 quasi 
                                                                       in
            rem jurisdiction over a defendant. A Rule B attachment may
            only proceed when the defendant is not "found within the
            district." The case law makes it clear that:
                      whether or not [a foreign defendant] can
                      be found within the district presents a
                      two-pronged inquiry: first whether it can
                      be found within the district in terms of
                      jurisdiction, and second, if so, whether
                      it can be found for service of process.
                           The first inquiry is directed to
                      whether or not the respondent is present
                      within the district by reason of
                      activities on its behalf by authorized
                      agents so as to subject it to [the
                      district court's] jurisdiction in      in
                                        -22-
                                         22

                      personam proceedings. If not, then the
                      respondent cannot be found within the
                      district and this ground alone would be
                      sufficient to support the attachment.
                           Even if the foreign respondent be
                      found within the district in a
                      jurisdictional sense, its property is not
                      immunized from attachment. The second
                      question . . . then presents itself.
                      Could the respondent be found within the
                      district with due diligence for service in
                      the libel proceeding?
            United 
                   States v. Cia. 
                                  Naviera 
                                          Continental 
                                                      S.A., 178 F. Supp.
            561, 563-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (footnote omitted). If the
            respondent can be found within the district, then attachment
            may not proceed.
                      As to the first inquiry, it is undisputed that by
            purposefully sending its vessel into Puerto Rico, Vasilia
            subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in that district. As
            to the second inquiry, Vasilia argues that the attachment was
            wrongful because it had appointed an agent for service of
            process in the district. But the fact is Vasilia's purported
            appointment of the agent came, at the earliest, on April 26,
            two days after Navieros moved for an order of attachment (and
            after Navieros filed an affidavit, as required by Supplemental
            Rule B, saying Navieros had been unable to find the defendant
            within the district).  
                                
            15.  Navieros's affidavit says that Navieros could not find
            Royal 
                  United within the district. No mention was made of
            Vasilia, the actual owner of the vessel. However, Navieros is
            not to blame for this. Royal United held itself out as the
            owner of the vessel in the charter party agreement with
            Navieros. The two entities are obviously closely related.
                                        -23-
                                         23

                      The district court was not unjustified in stating
            that Vasilia's argument would eviscerate the time-honored
            process of maritime attachment. If we were to accept Vasilia's
            position, a defendant who was otherwise safely outside the
            service power of the district could effectively avoid Rule B
            attachment by waiting until after the plaintiff filed a Rule B
            motion to designate an agent for service.
                      Nor was Vasilia, simply by virtue of its subsequent
            appearance in this action, entitled to dissolution of the
            attachment.  Swift v. Compania 
                                           Colombiana, 339 U.S. 684, 693
            (1950).  But Vasilia was not without options. Prior to trial,
            Vasilia had the opportunity, pursuant to Supplemental Rule
                                
            Whatever prejudice Vasilia may have suffered by virtue of the
            fact that Navieros did not submit an affidavit stating that
            Vasilia could not be found within the district properly falls
            on Vasilia.
            16.  Moreover, the evidence defendant relies on here is simply
            a letter from defendant to an unstated addressee purporting to
            "confirm" that Calvesbert & Brown has been authorized to accept
            service of process on Vasilia's behalf. This letter cannot be
            enough to establish presence in the district within the meaning
            of Rule B. The letter was not published and presumably neither
            Navieros nor the court knew (nor could have known) about the
            arrangement between Vasilia and its lawyers until after Vasilia
            submitted a copy of the letter to the court.
            17.  Rule B, the modern codification of the ancient right of
            foreign attachment in admiralty,     see  Swift v.   Compania
            Colombiana, 339 U.S. 684, 693 (1950), has two recognized
            purposes: (1) to assure defendant's appearance and (2) to
            assure satisfaction in case the suit is successful.   Id. at
            693-95; 
                   LaBanca v. 
                              Ostermunchner, 664 F.2d 65, 68 n.4 (5th Cir.
            1981); 
                  Seawind Compania, S.A.
                                         v. 
                                            Crescent Line, Inc.
                                                               , 320 F.2d
            580, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1963). Post-attachment appearance may
            moot the first purpose but it does not address the second
            purpose.
                                        -24-
                                         24

            E(5)(a), to post a bond of $200,000 in order to obtain the
            release of the vessel. Vasilia declined to exercise this
            right.
            B.  Arbitration
                      The district court found that Vasilia had waived its
            contractual right to arbitration by participating in the
            litigation for over a month before filing a motion, one day
            before the start of trial, to compel arbitration. Vasilia
            protests that this ruling was error, but its arguments are not
            persuasive.
                      Vasilia complains that it could not have moved to
            compel arbitration earlier because it was not until two days
            before the start of trial that Vasilia admitted the existence
            of the charter party under which the right to arbitration was
            established. Indeed, Vasilia did assert, at various stages of
            the pleadings, that, if the court should determine the
            existence of a charter party, then the case should be removed
            to arbitration. Had it moved for arbitration earlier, Vasilia
            says, this step could have been interpreted as a concession
            that the charter party was fixed, because the right to
            arbitration comes from a clause in the charter party. By not
            moving until the day before trial, on the other hand, Vasilia
            was found to have waived the right. Vasilia says the district
            court's position presented Vasilia with a Hobson's choice
            between admission and waiver. Litigation frequently puts
                                        -25-
                                         25

            parties to hard choices, particularly as to which of seemingly
            inconsistent theories to pursue. Vasilia is responsible for
            the consequences of its choices.
                      Review of a district court's determination of waiver
            of the right to arbitration is plenary.  Menorah 
                                                             Ins. 
                                                                  Co. v.
            INX Reinsurance Corp.
                                , 72 F.3d 218 (1st Cir. 1995); 
                                                               Commercial
            Union 
                  Ins. 
                       Co. v. Gilbane 
                                      Bldg. 
                                             Co., 992 F.2d 386, 390 (1st
            Cir. 1993). The party opposing the motion to compel
            arbitration -- that is, the party urging a waiver -- must show
            prejudice.  Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
            Inc., 807 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1986).
                      There was prejudice here. The delay was not long in
            absolute terms; it was only one month. But in the unusual
            context of this litigation this delay was both long and
            prejudicial. The delay lasted from the filing of the complaint
            to the eve of trial. In the interim, in this expedited
            litigation, the parties scrambled to prepare their cases for
            trial, incurring expenses that would not have been occasioned
            by preparing for an arbitration. That is enough to show
            prejudice.  Menorah, 72 F.3d at 212.
                      The desirability of enforcing arbitration clauses is
            much recognized.  Mitsubishi 
                                         Motors 
                                                Corp. v. Soler 
                                                                Chrysler-
            Plymouth Inc.
                        , 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985). Arbitration may be "a
            mutually optimal method and forum for dispute resolution
            [which] serves the interests of efficiency and economy."
                                        -26-
                                         26

            Menorah, 72 F.3d at 223. But we have also recognized that the
            very rationale for arbitration may be undercut if a party is
            permitted to pursue a claim through the courts and then later
            claim a right to arbitration.     Id. Accordingly, we have
            repeatedly held that a party may, by engaging in litigation,
            implicitly waive its contractual right to arbitrate.     Id.;
            Caribbean Ins. Servs., Inc.
                                       v. 
                                          American Bankers Life Assurance
            Co., 715 F.2d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 1983);    Jones 
                                                            Motor  
                                                                  Co. v.
            Chauffeurs 
                       Local 
                             Union 
                                    No. 
                                        633, 671 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir.
            1982); 
                  Gutor Int'l AG
                                 v. 
                                    Raymond Packer Co.
                                                      , 493 F.2d 938, 945
            (1st Cir. 1974).
                      Vasilia complains of self-inflicted wounds. Vasilia
            denied it had a valid charter party with Navieros up until the
            eve of trial. It then switched positions, admitted the
            validity of the charter party, and sought to invoke arbitration
            under the charter party. We agree with the district court that
            this conduct amounted to a waiver.
            C.  Corporate Status of Vessel Owners
                      The Vasilia parties object to certain references in
            the district court's opinion which, they believe, imply that
            the court had pierced the corporate veils of Vasilia and Royal
            United, without conducting the proper legal analysis. They ask
            us to strike from the district court opinion these statements
            (and strike from the pleadings similar references made by
            plaintiffs). The argument is misplaced. It is a basic
                                        -27-
                                         27

            principle of appellate jurisdiction that we review judgments,
            not the editorial commentary in opinions.
                      To the extent that appellants mean to argue that the
            district court's imputation of liability for the Navieros and
            Comet judgments to the in personam defendants  -- Vasilia and
            Royal United -- was erroneous, they also fail. There are two
            distinct issues here: (1) whether Vasilia, the owner of the
            vessel, can be held liable for any damages apart from the
            proceeds obtained from the sale of the vessel, and (2) whether
            Royal United, the shipping agent and a nominally separate
            corporation, can be held so liable. We agree with the district
            court that the answer to both questions is yes.
                      The normal rule in admiralty actions 
                                                          in 
                                                             rem, such as
            this one was initially, is that judgment creditors, absent
            service of process on the vessel owner under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4,
            are only entitled to enforce their liens against the vessel
            itself.  See Orbis 
                               Marine 
                                      Enters., 
                                               Inc. v. TEC 
                                                           Marine 
                                                                   Lines,
            Ltd., 692 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 
                                                        East Asiatic Co.,
            Ltd. v. 
                   Indomar Ltd.
                               , 422 F. Supp. 1335, 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
            2 Schoenbaum, 
                         supra, S 21-2, at 469; 
                                               cf. 
                                                   Cooper v. 
                                                             Reynolds, 77
            U.S. 308, 318-19 (1870) (same principle in non-admiralty action
            in rem). The owners of the vessels against which actions   in
                                
            18.  The district court's finding of liability against Vasilia
            and Royal United is limited to the judgments of the two
            charterers, Navieros and Comet. The judgments of Gulf Coast
            and Transcaribbean run only against the in rem defendant the
            M/V VASILIA EXPRESS.
                                        -28-
                                         28

            rem are brought are not, in such cases, personally liable for
            judgments in excess of the value of the vessel, if any.
                      But this is not the normal case. Here, both      in
            personam defendants, Vasilia and Royal United, waived the
            requirement of service of process and waived all defenses
            related to personal jurisdiction. They both appeared
            voluntarily as  in personam defendants. We recognize, of
            course, that this was done for strategic reasons. The waivers
            and appearances came as part of defendants' ultimately
            unsuccessful campaign against Rule B attachment of the vessel
            by Navieros.
                      Nevertheless, Vasilia and Royal United must live with
            the consequences of their choices. The waivers and appearances
            allowed the action to blossom into the full in personam case
            against the two defendants for breach of the charter party that
            Navieros had contemplated in its pleadings. Cf. 
                                                            Atkins v. 
                                                                      The
            Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272, 298 (1873). We see no error
            in the district court's finding of liability against both
            defendants.
            D.  Damages
                      Vasilia complains that both Navieros and Comet were
            awarded excessive damages.  The propriety of the amount of
                                
            19.  We are dubious about the practical significance of this
            matter. It is clear that there will be nothing left of the
            proceeds for Vasilia. The parties who may have the greatest
            interest in reducing the share awarded Comet or Navieros --
            namely, the competing judgment winners -- have not complained.
                                        -29-
                                         29

            damages awarded is an issue of fact, which we review for clear
            error.  Reilly v. United 
                                     States, 863 F.2d 149, 166 (1st Cir.
            1988).
            1.  Navieros
                      The breach of the Navieros time charter occurred when
            the vessel was diverted to the use of Comet, after performance
            of the Navieros contract commenced but before Navieros's cargo
            was loaded. Without noting the distinction, defendants assert
            that the measure of damages should be that which is used in
            cases where the owner breached the charter party by repudiating
            it 
              before performance began
                                      . The general rule for recovery in
            that situation was stated long ago by Judge Learned Hand: "the
            withdrawal of the ship entitled [the charterer] prima facie to
            damages measured by the difference between the hire reserved in
            the charter and the hire necessary to secure such another
            bottom."  The 
                          Ada, 239 F. 363, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), rev'd 
                                                                       on
            other grounds, 250 F. 194 (2d Cir. 1918); see also Sanders v.
            Munson, 74 F. 649, 651 (2d Cir. 1896); 2 Schoenbaum,   supra,
            S 11-17, at 204-05 ("The charterer's damages for cancellation
            are equal to the difference between the contract hire in the
                                
            And, indeed, neither Navieros nor Comet has appeared to defend
            the judgments in their favor. However, in light of the
            affirmance of the district court's liability finding as to the
            two 
               in 
                  personam defendants, it is possible that Navieros and/or
            Comet will seek to enforce their judgments against the     in
            personam defendants. And so, we must visit this matter. We
            also note that, as discussed later, the denial of intervention
            to Motor-Services and Coastal was in error, and accordingly
            those two parties may have an interest in these damages awards.
                                        -30-
                                         30

            broken charter and the hire necessary to secure another
            vessel."). It seems reasonable to apply this general rule
            here, provided the victim of the breach is also allowed to
            recover out-of-pocket expenses incidental to preparing for the
            arrival of the ship for loading.
                      Inherent in that rule, of course, is a duty of
            mitigation; the victim of the breach must make reasonable
            efforts to locate a substitute vessel.    See Glidden 
                                                                  Co. v.
            Hellenic 
                     Lines, 
                            Ltd., 315 F.2d 162, 164 (2d Cir. 1963);   The
            Ada, 239 F. at 364; 
                               Sanders, 74 F. at 651; 2 Schoenbaum, 
                                                                   supra,
            S 11-17, at 204-05. If the charterer is unable to locate a
            suitable substitute vessel, then the proper measure of damages
            for the breach is its lost profits. See 
                                                    Polar Steamship Corp.
            v. 
              Inland Overseas Steamship Corp.
                                             , 136 F.2d 835, 842 (4th Cir.
            1943); The 
                       Ada, 239 F. at 364. Here, the trial court found
            that Navieros was unable to locate an adequate substitute.
            Defendants argue that Navieros in fact found a suitable
            substitute, but did not use it. We review findings of fact for
            clear error. Roche v. 
                                  Royal Bank of Canada
                                                      , 109 F.3d 820, 827
            (1st Cir. 1997).
                      William Coleman's deposition testimony at trial and
            Kenneth Coleman's trial testimony were the only evidence
            offered by any of the parties on the question of mitigation.
            According to William Coleman's uncontroverted testimony,
            Navieros conducted an intensive but fruitless search for a
                                        -31-
                                         31

            replacement vessel. Cf. 
                                    Polar Steamship Corp.
                                                        , 136 F.2d at 842
            ("The evidence is that efforts were made to obtain [another
            vessel] but without success."). It is true that Navieros
            learned about an available vessel and did consider using it in
            place of the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS, but decided in the end that
            this vessel was too slow.    Such a decision was within
            Navieros's rights. See 
                                   Sanders, 74 F. at 652 (charterer "under
            no obligation to accept a slower and smaller vessel than the
            [originally chartered vessel] had been represented to be").
            The district court was not obliged to credit William Coleman's
            testimony, but it is certainly not clear error for it to have
            done so.
                      Even using the rule advocated by defendants,
            therefore, the proper measure of damages for the breach here
                                
            20.  Defendants claim that this alternate vessel would have
            been a suitable replacement, as its speed -- which William
            Coleman stated to be 8 to 9 knots per hour -- was roughly the
            same as the speed of the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS. Coleman's
            deposition, taken in context, reveals that his concern was with
            the speed in relation to other costs.
                      The thing that made her unattractive was
                      her speed, okay, related to her
                      costs. . . .  Her speed, with the size tug
                      that they were talking about and the
                      barge, she would be offering you eight to
                      nine knots but the daily cost and the fuel
                      consumption was such that her per diem
                      cost was way high.
            We are persuaded that Navieros's choice not to use this
            alternate vessel was not a violation of its duty to mitigate. 
                                        -32-
                                         32

            was Navieros's lost profits.  The court purported to apply
            such a measure, but defendants argue that it awarded Navieros
            "lost revenues"  instead, a far more generous dollar amount.
            Indeed, the court's choice of words was at times confusing; for
            instance, it titled the table of damages calculations "Gross
            Loss of Revenue." We must look past the question of word
            choice and determine if the correct measure was applied.
                      These are the components of damages awarded Navieros:
                      (1)  gross freight in the amount of
                           $67,000, returned to shippers upon
                           demand;
                      (2)  canceled bills of lading issued in
                           Guatemala, representing $118,000 of
                           freight charges for three voyages;
                      (3)  freight charges [of $71,175] on
                           southbound cargo received in Port
                           Everglades, eventually returned to
                           shippers;
                      (4)  net loss of $3,377 over $26,000 worth
                           of freight rerouted through another
                           steamship line providing service to
                           Guatemala.
            From this "Gross Loss" of $259,552, the court subtracted
            "charter hire expense" of $57,600 and "fuel expense" of
                                
            21.  Profit is "the excess of returns over expenditure in a
            transaction."  Webster's 
                                      Third 
                                            New 
                                                International 
                                                               Dictionary
            1811 (6th ed. 1993).
            22.  Revenue is, in this context, "the total income produced by
            a given source." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
            1942. Revenues are greater than profit; a portion of one's
            revenues, in a successful venture, is profit.
                                        -33-
                                         33

            $19,000. The "Net Loss" was $182,952, and the court awarded
            damages in this amount.
                      That the court subtracted charter hire and fuel
            expense from the sub-total seems to indicate that, despite its
            choice of words, the court did not see the award as one of lost
            "revenues" per se.
                      However, a radically different conception of
            Navieros's lost profits is found in William Coleman's
            deposition. Coleman stated that Navieros expected to make
            $28,500 in profits from the shipping of cargo under the M/V
            VASILIA EXPRESS charter (this estimate included the exercise by
            Navieros of its option on a third round-trip).
                      Kenneth Coleman also testified at trial that Navieros
            charters approximately 50 voyages per year and that Navieros's
            1995 net profits were roughly $495,000. The average profit per
            voyage is thus just under $10,000. Given this, it is hard to
            understand how the loss of the    three M/V VASILIA EXPRESS
            voyages caused $182,952 in lost profits.
                      Because it is unclear on what basis the district
            court calculated lost profits, we vacate the damages award and
            remand the question of Navieros's damages to the district court
            for clarification.
            2.  Comet
                                        -34-
                                         34

                      Defendants challenge six of the thirteen components
            of the $100,312.13 award to Comet. They claim (1) that Comet
            should not have been awarded the stevedoring fees ($4,500) and
            ship's agency fees ($4,999.26) incurred at the port of origin,
            Miami, because Comet would have incurred these expenses even if
            the charter had not been breached; (2) that the award of fuel
            costs for both the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS ($5,312) and the
            replacement vessel secured by Comet ($7,326) was duplicative;
            and (3) that the award of the entire cost of the substitute
            vessel ($15,000), along with the reimbursement of the M/V
            VASILIA EXPRESS charter hire ($39,450), was likewise
            duplicative. Defendants also argue that the district court
            "failed to account for the fact that cargo problems were part
            of the reason why the U.S. Coast Guard initially detained the
            M/V VASILIA EXPRESS in Puerto Rico, which, along with the
            arrest by Navieros, led to the vessel's inability to carry
            Comet's cargo."
                      The final point borders on frivolous, in light of the
            numerous vessel-related and captain-related deficiencies cited
                                
            23.  We need not be detained by the district court's statement
            that Comet's damages were "announced as a stipulation of the
            parties." If this were so, of course, defendants would have no
            leg to stand on. But there was no such stipulation.
            Defendants simply stipulated that they would not challenge the
            admission of certain documents Comet intended to use to prove
            its damages; they made clear their objections to the underlying
            merits of the damages claims.
                                        -35-
                                         35

            by the Coast Guard. See footnote 4 
                                              supra. But the first three
            claims have considerable merit.
                      The damages award included reimbursement for the
            stevedoring costs associated with transferring the cargo from
            the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS to the replacement vessel. In light of
            this, the award of costs for the original loading of the M/V
            VASILIA EXPRESS was inappropriate. The award of the
            stevedoring costs at the port of origin ($4,500) is thus
            vacated. Comet did not make a claim for reimbursement for any
            shipping agency fee for the replacement vessel, so there was no
            double dipping there. But that is also why the fee paid by
            Comet at the port of origin ($4,999.26) is not recoverable:
            Comet apparently incurred no additional shipping agency costs
            as a result of the breach. That award too is vacated.
                      There was excessive recovery for the fuel costs too.
            Comet should pay only for the fuel used by the M/V VASILIA
            EXPRESS on the initial Miami-San Juan run, which was completed
            before the breach, but not for the additional fuel, if any,
            that it deposited in that vessel's gas tanks in Miami in
            expectation of the continuation of the voyage to Venezuela.
            Comet is also entitled to differential money damages; that is,
            it should be reimbursed for that portion of the fuel purchased
            for the replacement vessel that was in excess of the expected
            cost of fuel for the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS, had the latter ship
            fulfilled its contractual obligations. These are calculations
                                        -36-
                                         36

            that are necessarily based on estimates and expectations. The
            record indicates that the replacement vessel consumed more fuel
            than the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS, but we are unable to glean
            precise details about this or about whether the M/V VASILIA
            EXPRESS was left with any Comet-purchased fuel when detained
            and arrested in the Port of San Juan, and if so, how much. We
            thus vacate the two fuel cost awards ($5,312 & $7,326) and
            remand to the district court for an amended award in light of
            this discussion.
                      Comet was awarded excessive damages for charter hire
            too. Comet is entitled to differential damages. Where the
            substitute vessel costs less than the one originally chartered,
            the charterer is entitled to a refund of the price paid for the
            original, but it should pay for the substitute. If the
            replacement costs more, the charterer should get reimbursed for
            this difference in cost. It is difficult to imagine a
            situation where the charterer would be entitled to a refund of
            the original charter hire and an award of replacement costs.
            Here, Comet's replacement vessel ($15,000) cost less than the
            M/V VASILIA EXPRESS ($39,450). Comet therefore is entitled to
            a refund of the M/V VASILIA EXPRESS charter hire, but not to an
            award of costs for the hire of the replacement. The $15,000
            award is thus vacated.
                                        III.
                      We turn to the appeals of the various would-be
                                        -37-
                                         37

            claimants whose motions for intervention were denied, and who
            thus missed out on the chance to compete for a share of the
            proceeds.  We review a district court's denial of a motion to
            intervene for abuse of discretion. Conservation Law Found. of
            New 
                England v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1992);
            International Paper
                               v. 
                                  Town of Jay
                                             , 887 F.2d 338, 343 (1st Cir.
            1989); 
                  cf. 
                      Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
                                                  v. 
                                                     Greenblatt, 964 F.2d
            1227, 1230 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992). We analyze the district
            court's rulings against the backdrop of a purposefully
            accelerated litigation in which scarcely more than a month
            passed between the arrest of the vessel and the start of trial,
            with the memorandum and order admirably following trial by less
            than two weeks. We are also mindful of the fact that the
            standards for timeliness are less strict for Rule 24(a) motions
            to intervene (intervention as a matter of right) than for such
            motions under Rule 24(b) (permissive intervention), and that
                                
            24.  Gulf Coast, the preferred mortgage holder who won judgment
            in the district court, appeared in this appeal to defend the
            district court's decisions to deny intervention. Gulf Coast
            obviously fears that the liens of the three would-be
            intervenors would prime its own lien, severely diminishing, if
            not eliminating entirely, its ultimate recovery in this action.
            See 46 U.S.C. S 31326(b)(2) (for certain foreign vessels,
            preferred mortgage lien subordinate to maritime lien for
            necessaries provided in the United States); id. S 31326(b)(1)
            (preferred mortgage lien subordinated to "preferred maritime
            liens"); 
                    id. S 31301(5) (lien for seaman's wages is "preferred
            maritime lien"); 
                            see 
                                also 1 Schoenbaum, 
                                                   supra, S 9.6, at 510. 
                                        -38-
                                         38

            all three appellants here invoked Rule 24(a).  Banco Popular
                                                                        ,
            964 F.2d at 1227 n.2;  Fiandaca v. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825,
            832-33 (1st Cir. 1987); Stallworth v. Monsanto 
                                                           Co., 558 F.2d
            257, 266 (5th Cir. 1977). We conclude that the district court
            properly exercised its discretion in denying Captain
            Jeftimiades's attempted intervention, but that it abused its
            discretion in denying the attempted interventions of Motor-
            Services and Coastal.
            A.  Captain Jeftimiades
                      Captain Jeftimiades, asserting a maritime lien for
            unpaid seaman's wages, moved to intervene a day before the
            start of trial. The district judge denied Jeftimiades's motion
            from the bench on the first day of trial after learning that
            neither the captain nor his attorney were present in the
            courtroom. Unlike the motions of Coastal and Motor-Services,
            the captain's motion was not denied on timeliness grounds;
            indeed, the judge indicated that he probably would have allowed
            intervention had the captain or his attorney been present at
            the start of trial.
                      The judge carefully determined that the captain's
            attorney had been duly informed of the trial date before
                                
            25.  Motor-Services, alone among the post-judgment movants, did
            not specify in its motion that it was seeking intervention as
            of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), as opposed to permissive
            intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). But Motor-Services
            captioned the motion as one to intervene "as a matter of
            right," and so we give it the benefit of the doubt.
                                        -39-
                                         39

            announcing that he was denying the motion. Jeftimiades does
            not argue on appeal that his counsel had not been informed of
            the May 23 trial date; he simply states that counsel
            "erroneously thought the trial date was May 30th" and that he
            was in New Jersey on May 23 and could not have appeared.
                      Jeftimiades argues that his counsel's associate was
            available to represent the captain and that the court should
            have requested that this associate appear on the captain's
            behalf. However, the judge was not told that counsel was out
            of the Commonwealth, and, while the judge certainly could have
            inquired further into the matter if he wished, he was not
            obliged to do so.
                      Captain Jeftimiades also argues that, as a seaman, he
            is a ward of the court who is entitled to greater protection
            than the average intervenor. Courts have allowed seamen to
            avoid rules of common law which affect them particularly
            harshly because of their vocation. This is true where a rule
            of law has especially harsh results on a seaman because he is
            a seaman
                   . For instance, in Socony-Vacuum Oil Company
                                                                v. 
                                                                   Smith,
            305 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1939), the leading case cited by
            Jeftimiades, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
            whether a seaman who had used a dangerous appliance on board
            could have his claim barred by the doctrine of assumption of
            risk. The Court cautioned against the application of the
            doctrine in admiralty cases because seamen often have fewer
                                        -40-
                                         40

            alternatives than do land-based workers, and are often in less
            of a position to avoid dangerous situations. 
                                                        Id. This case is
            easily distinguishable. Captain Jeftimiades's failure to
            appear at trial through counsel is not explained by any special
            disabilities attendant to his status as a sailor.
                      Jeftimiades does not address the issue of whether
            there would be any prejudice to the existing plaintiffs if he
            were allowed now to intervene. Clearly, there would be
            prejudice in light of the Coast Guard citation, which described
            Jeftimiades as drunk at the time the vessel was detained.
            Vasilia or some of the claimants might have attempted at trial
            to prove that the captain forfeited his maritime lien for
            wages.  Cf. Johnston v. M/V Dieu Si Bon, 1996 WL 866112 (W.D.
            Wa. 1996) (question of fact whether seaman forfeited lien for
            wages by deserting ship). Of course, no one made this argument
            at trial because the captain's attempted intervention was
            denied. Allowing Jeftimiades to intervene now would
            necessitate ordering new proceedings in which the parties could
            attempt to make this claim. We recognize that the prejudice to
            Jeftimiades is also severe, but he had the opportunity to make
                                
            26.  His maritime lien is destroyed. It is a basic principle
            of admiralty law that execution of a maritime lien extinguishes
            all other liens on ship.   See, 
                                            e.g.,  Tamblyn v. River 
                                                                     Bend
            Marine 
                   Co., 837 F.2d 447, 448 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam);
            Point Landing, Inc.
                               v. 
                                  Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co.
                                                                    , 261
            F.2d 861, 866 (5th Cir. 1958); 
                                         see 
                                             also Gilmore & Black, 
                                                                   supra,
            S 9-85, at 786-87.
                                        -41-
                                         41

            his case and did not take advantage of this chance. There was
            no abuse of discretion.
            B.  Motor-Services
                      Motor-Services moved to intervene on June 7, two
            weeks after the start of trial and the day on which the
            district court issued its memorandum and order. This motion
            was denied as untimely by written order on July 3. The court
            analyzed the motion under what it called "the First Circuit
            standard of 
                       Banco Popular
                                    ." The timeliness standard applied in
            Banco Popular
                        , 964 F.2d 1227, is derived from the Fifth Circuit
            opinion of Stallworth v. Monsanto 
                                              Company, 558 F.2d 257 (5th
            Cir. 1977).  See Culbreath v.  Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 20 (1st
            Cir. 1980) (adopting Stallworth test).
                      The four factors are: the length of time the would-
            be intervenor knew or reasonably should have known that its
            interest was imperilled before it moved to intervene; the
            foreseeable prejudice to the existing parties if intervention
            is granted; the prejudice to the would-be intervenor if
            intervention is denied; and exceptional circumstances which may
            militate against or in favor of allowing late intervention.
            Banco Popular, 964 F.2d at 1231.
                      The district court, weighing the matter by relying on
            the facts as alleged by Motor-Services in the motion, first
            determined that the credit term extended to Vasilia by Motor-
            Services expired on April 29, and that from that date until
                                        -42-
                                         42

            June 7 Motor-Services sought payment of the overdue receivables
            only by leaving telephone messages that went unreturned. The
            obvious implication of this finding (not stated by the court)
            is that Motor-Services sat on its rights when it should have
            been moving more decisively to protect its interest.
                      Moving on to the second factor, the court then noted
            that the proposed intervention would prejudice the existing
            parties because:
                      intervention on the day judgment was
                      entered seeks to disturb the core of the
                      judgment. The M/V VASILIA EXPRESS is
                      appraised at $500,000 and the court has
                      recognized plaintiffs by judgment in the
                      aggregate amount of $593,469.39. The
                      realities of the public sale market for
                      vessels dictated that the public sale
                      ordered would have an initial bidding
                      price set at $400,000. Any sale proceeds
                      will not be enough to cover the existing
                      plaintiffs' rights. It is not fair to
                      reopen the case for late-comers to gain an
                      undue advantage under the circumstances.
            The court next found that no prejudice would inure to Motor-
            Services as a result of the denial of the motion because Motor-
            Services had waived its maritime lien by relying on the credit
            of Michael and Steven Psarellis, the vessel owners, and the
            credit of Royal United, the shipping agency. Finally, the
            court found that there were no exceptional circumstances
            militating in favor of intervention, as Motor-Services, in the
            court's view, would still be fully able to litigate the matter
            in personam against the vessel owners.
                                        -43-
                                         43

                      The denial of the intervention was, in large part,
            based on erroneous legal conclusions reached by the district
            court. We believe the district court abused its discretion and
            that Motor-Services should have been allowed to intervene.
                      The court found that the first factor weighed against
            Motor-Services because Motor-Services should have realized, as
            of April 29, that its interests were imperilled, but it failed
            to do anything about this until June 7, other than to try a few
            times (unsuccessfully) to reach the vessel owners by telephone.
            In the context of this expedited litigation, a period of
            inaction lasting nearly six weeks would be difficult to excuse.
            But the dates recited are not correct. In fact, it was not
            until 
                 May 19
                        that the Vasilia account became overdue and Motor-
            Services actively sought to collect but was misled by the
            owners.  Less than three weeks later, and within a few days of
            learning of the suit, Motor-Services had a motion before the
            court.
                      In the days after May 19, the president of Motor-
            Services attempted to reach the vessel owners by telephone on
            three separate occasions. He was told that the owners would
            get back to him, but they never did. The secretary who
            answered the phone did not tell him about the arrest of the M/V
            VASILIA EXPRESS. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that
                                
            27.  The invoice was issued on April 19 with a 30 day credit
            term.
                                        -44-
                                         44

            Motor-Services, which was actively trying to follow up on a
            recently overdue account, was guilty of inaction. It was not
            until June 3 that Motor-Services actually learned of the arrest
            of the vessel.  Local counsel was retained the next day, and
            the motion to intervene was filed shortly thereafter, on June
            6. Motor-Services had no way of knowing its maritime lien was
            imperilled prior to June 3; once it learned, it took prompt
            action to protect its interest. The first factor thus clearly
            militates in favor of allowing intervention.
                      The district court, in discussing the second factor,
            concluded that the existing plaintiffs would be prejudiced by
            Motor-Services' intervention simply because the entry into the
            case of another party, with an arguably superior lien, would
            diminish the ultimate recovery available to those plaintiffs.
            This may well be true, but it is not enough to outweigh the
            other three factors, all of which favor intervention
            (particularly since the plaintiffs' rights to a specific share
            in the recovery had not yet become final and the sale proceeds
            had not yet been disbursed).
                      On the third factor, the court found that there was
            no prejudice to Motor-Services because Motor-Services had
            waived its maritime lien. This was error. In inferring that
            Motor-Services had waived its maritime lien on the vessel, the
                                
            28.  The president of Motor-Services was told of the arrest by
            a mechanic in Florida. He promptly called Navieros for
            confirmation.
                                        -45-
                                         45

            court relied on the existence of a promissory note given by
            Michael Psarellis to Motor-Services and on the fact that Motor-
            Services billed Royal United, the vessel's agent, rather than
            the vessel owners for much of the work done on the vessel.
                      Motor-Services' maritime lien on the vessel arises by
            operation of federal law (the Maritime Lien Act). 46 U.S.C.
            S 31342. In order to acquire a lien on a vessel, a person
            providing necessaries to the vessel is "not required to allege
            or prove in the action that credit was given to the vessel."
            Id. S 31342(a)(3); see Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog v. Signal
            Oil & Gas Co.
                        , 310 U.S. 268, 273 (1940). This is assumed to be
            the case unless proven otherwise; the party disputing the
            existence of the lien is required to show that "[t]he party
            entitled to the lien [took] affirmative actions that
            manifest[ed] a clear intention to forego the lien."   Farrell
            Ocean Servs.
                        v. 
                           United States
                                        , 681 F.2d 91, 94 (1st Cir. 1982).
            The taking of additional security by the provider of
            necessaries from the vessel owner,   without more, does not
            constitute such a step. 
                                   Dampskibsselskabet Dannebrog
                                                               , 310 U.S.
            at 276-77; 
                      Farrell Ocean Servs.
                                          , 681 F.2d at 93-94; 
                                                               Crustacean
            Transp. Corp. v. Atalanta Trading Corp., 369 F.2d 656, 660-61
            (5th Cir. 1966); Gilmore & Black, 
                                             supra, S 9-84, at 786. "The
            party attacking the lien has the burden of . . . showing that
                                
            29.  Here, Motor-Services obtained a personal guarantee and
            promissory note from Michael Psarellis for $40,000.
                                        -46-
                                         46

            the party rendering the service [Motor-Services] relied 
                                                                   solely
            on personal credit."   Farrell 
                                           Ocean 
                                                 Servs., 681 F.2d at 93
            (emphasis added). No such showing has been made here.
                      The district court, in finding a waiver, also relied
            on the fact that Motor-Services billed Royal United, the M/V
            VASILIA's agent, rather than the owner of the vessel, for many
            of the services provided. However, "the submission of a bill
            to the owner's agent with whom the supplier has been dealing
            rather than to the owner and the vessel [does not] constitute
            waiver." Id. at 94; 
                                see 
                                    also 
                                        Nacirema Operating Co.
                                                               v. 
                                                                  S.S. Al
            Kulsum, 407 F. Supp. 1222, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("mere fact"
            that stevedore billed ship's agent for services provided vessel
            "not sufficient to indicate that there was an implied waiver of
            its right to a lien against the ship"). There was no waiver
            here.
                      Because Motor-Services' lien was not waived by its
            conduct, it is the execution of the other liens on the vessel
            in this in rem proceeding which would strip Motor-Services of
            its lien, which would be forever extinguished. See 
                                                               supra note
            27. Clearly, there is ample prejudice to Motor-Services here.
                      Finally, the district court stated that there were no
            special circumstances militating in favor of intervention
            because Motor-Services could still bring an action 
                                                              in 
                                                                 personam
            against the vessel's owners. The record is silent as to
            whether the defendants are presently solvent or not, but Motor-
                                        -47-
                                         47

            Services is justifiably fearful that this right would be an
            empty one. At any rate, it is a right that pales in comparison
            to the right to exercise a lien against an identifiable sum of
            money. In light of this, and the fact that trial was
            expedited, we think there were special circumstances favoring
            intervention. Intervention should have been allowed.
            C.  Coastal
                      Our Coastal analysis, in substance, tracks the Motor-
            Services analysis. Coastal moved to intervene on June 11,
            1996, asserting a maritime lien for repair work done on the
            vessel and supplies furnished the vessel the previous summer.
            The district court, by written opinion on July 3, denied the
            motion on untimeliness grounds. The court applied the four-
            factor test discussed above, and its reasoning was much the
            same as that used in the Motor-Services' denial. The only
            substantive difference in the court's analysis involved the
            third factor, where the court found that Coastal had explicitly
            waived its lien by agreeing to a payment plan with a clause
            obligating Coastal to forebear from going in rem against the
            vessel.
                      On the first factor, in finding that Coastal did not
            move expeditiously to protect its interests, the court stressed
            the 22-day gap between the time Coastal first learned of the
            arrest and the time it sought intervention. We conclude that,
                                        -48-
                                         48

            under the unique circumstances of this case, Coastal acted
            reasonably promptly to protect its interests.
                      Vasilia was required, under the terms of its credit
            agreement with Coastal, to make monthly payments of $17,500;
            payments were due on the 8th of each month, starting in April
            1996.  Vasilia made only partial payment in April, and failed
            to make the May payment. Coastal's president called Royal
            United on May 15, a week after the May 8 due date, to inquire
            about the non-payment. He was informed by Royal United that
            there was an ongoing dispute with Navieros and Comet regarding
            the charter of the vessel. While this is more information than
            Motor-Services was able to obtain when Vasilia failed to make
            its payment to Motor-Services at about the same time (May 19),
            Coastal, like Motor-Services, was not told of the arrest and
            the impending trial.
                      It is true that Coastal heard something about an
            arrest through other channels  during the week of May 20, but
            the information it obtained consisted only of "unconfirmed
            reports." Coastal moved expeditiously to confirm these
            reports. By early June, it had learned the details, and by
                                
            30.  This credit agreement was negotiated and signed in January
            1996, after Vasilia proved unable to meet the payment schedule
            originally agreed upon by the parties after Coastal's work on
            the vessel was completed in July 1995.
            31.  The record does not reveal how Coastal learned about the
            arrest. The district court fixed on May 20 because that is the
            date Coastal stated, in its motion to intervene, that it first
            heard about the arrest.
                                        -49-
                                         49

            June 11 had moved to intervene. That Motor-Services managed to
            get its motion in four days earlier is immaterial. The first
            factor weighs in Coastal's favor.
                      As to the other factors, Coastal is in a similar
            position to Motor-Services and we will not repeat the
            analysis.  Two of the remaining three factors clearly favor
            intervention, and intervention should have been allowed.
                                         IV.
                      We affirm the judgment against the defendants, but
            vacate the awards of damages to Navieros and Comet and remand
            for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We  affirm the
            denial of Captain Jeftimiades's motion to intervene. But we
            reverse the denial of Motor-Services' and Coastal's motions to
            intervene, and 
                          remand to the district court to entertain their
            proof, calculate the damages due them, if any, rank the liens,
            and order disbursal of the funds to the various judgment
            creditors.
                      Each party to bear its/his own costs.
                                
            32.  We pause only to note that, contrary to the district
            court's findings, there was no explicit waiver of lien by
            Coastal. Coastal's agreement not to proceed against the vessel
            in rem was, by its terms, given "in consideration for [the
            renegotiated] payment schedule" on the Vasilia account. It was
            not a waiver of lien, but rather was an agreement by Coastal to
            forebear from doing something that Coastal was otherwise
            entitled to do. When Vasilia ceased making the required
            payments under the schedule, however, Coastal's temporary
            obligation to forebear from in rem action also ceased.
                                        -50-
                                         50