Court Opinion

ID: 9860844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:34:18.099761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:45.600902
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, specially concurring: While I also affirm because of the absence of a rule, I respectfully do not agree that the Board’s finding of willfulness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, I do not agree that harm to the employing unit did not exist merely because the uniforms were recovered. The rule in Illinois is that findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on factual questions are prima facie true and correct. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 3—110.) Further, a court cannot reweigh the evidence; the agency’s finding must be affirmed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Smith v. Department of Public Aid (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 584, 586-87, 502 N.E.2d 42; Meyers v. Illinois Department of Public Aid (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 288, 291, 448 N.E.2d 1176.) In order for a finding to be considered against the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. Kelley v. Department of Labor (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 958, 962, 513 N.E.2d 988; Smith, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 587. Here, the Board found plaintiff’s conduct to be willful as evidenced by his statement “that he was not going to be picking up after a bunch of babies.” Certainly this is evidence from which a finder of fact could infer a willful state of mind. Whether defendant’s conduct did or did not constitute willfulness was a determination to be made by the Board and as such can only be reversed if an opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Such is not the case here. While the majority discusses findings made by the referee and the trial court, neither are germane. The referee’s decision is not subject to judicial review. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 471.) The Board may affirm, modify, or set aside a referee’s decision. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 473.) The Board, not the referee, is the ultimate finder of fact. (Gregory v. Bernardi (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 376, 379, 465 N.E.2d 1052.) Similarly, the trial court is not a finder of fact in an administrative review action; rather, its function is to determine whether the Board’s decision was or was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. I submit that it was not. Finally, the majority holds that no harm occurred in this instance because the once discarded uniforms were retrieved. While I agree that no harm occurred in this instance because of the de minimis nature of the incident, I believe that carried to its extreme, such a narrow construction would be incompatible with the underlying policy of the Unemployment Insurance Act. The purpose of the Act, after all, is to provide benefits to workers whose unemployment is not occasioned by their fault. (Grobe v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor (1951), 409 Ill. 576, 583-84, 101 N.E.2d 95.) An employee caught stealing would find protection in the majority’s opinion and receive unemployment benefits so long as the items were recovered. Such a result could not have been what the legislature had in mind in enacting section 602(A) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 48, par. 432(A)).