Court Opinion

ID: 9898045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:04.171569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:43.218181
License: Public Domain

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                                                                                                         Filed
                                                                                                   Washington State
                                                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                                                    Division Two

                                                                                                   February 14, 2023

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                 DIVISION II
        FRANK WILLIAMS,                                                       No. 56240-5-II

                                        Appellant,

                v.
                                                                  ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
        STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT                         PUBLISH AND PUBLISHING OPINION
        OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES,

                                        Respondent.

               Respondent, the Department of Social and Health Services, filed a motion to publish this

       court’s opinion filed on October 25, 2022. After consideration, the court grants the motion. It is

       now

               ORDERED that the final paragraph in the opinion which reads “A majority of the panel

       having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will

       be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.” is deleted. It is further

               ORDERED that the opinion will now be published.

               FOR THE COURT

               PANEL: Jj. Lee, Cruser, Veljacic

                                                             LEE, JUDGE
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                                                                                                     Filed
                                                                                               Washington State
                                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                                Division Two

                                                                                               October 25, 2022

           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                               DIVISION II
        FRANK WILLIAMS,                                                    No. 56240-5-II

                                      Appellant,

               v.

        STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
        OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES,

                                      Respondents.

              LEE, J. — Frank Williams sued the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS),

       alleging age and race discrimination under the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD),

       chapter 49.60 RCW. Williams appeals the trial court’s order granting CR 50 judgment as a matter

       of law for DSHS after Williams presented his case-in-chief at trial. Williams argues that the trial

       court erred by granting DSHS’s motion to quash a notice for the secretary of DSHS to attend trial

       and by granting DSHS’s CR 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. Williams also argues that

       he is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal should he ultimately prevail on remand.

              We hold that the trial court did not err by granting DSHS’s motion to quash the notice for

       the secretary of DSHS to attend trial or by granting DSHS’s CR 50 motion for judgment as a matter

       of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order granting judgment as a matter of law for

       DSHS. We also deny Williams’ request for appellate attorney fees and costs.
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       No. 56240-5-II

                                                     FACTS

               Williams worked for Western State Hospital (WSH)1 as an institutional counselor.

       Williams applied for one of 28 open ward program administrator positions at WSH. Williams did

       not receive an interview because his application was rejected after an initial screening of all

       applications.

               Williams sued DSHS, alleging age and race discrimination under the WLAD. Williams

       also alleged that DSHS refused to hire him in retaliation for a lawsuit he had previously initiated

       against DSHS complaining of unfair and discriminatory hiring practices. DSHS generally denied

       the allegations.

               DSHS moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial court granted summary

       judgment to DSHS on the retaliation claim but denied summary judgment as to the race and age

       discrimination claims, which went to trial.

       A.      MOTION TO QUASH

               Prior to trial, Williams’ counsel deposed Cheryl Strange, the secretary of DSHS. At the

       deposition, Williams’ counsel asked Secretary Strange about the creation of the ward program

       administrator positions.   Secretary Strange explained that the ward program administrator

       positions were created as part of a systems improvement agreement to prevent WSH from being

       decertified. Secretary Strange testified that the only role she had in the creation of the ward

       program administrator position description was in signing the form. Secretary Strange also

       1
           DSHS operates WSH.

                                                       2
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       No. 56240-5-II

       testified that she did not recall specifics about recruitment for the ward program administrator

       positions, but it was likely that she received updates about how many positions were filled.

              Williams’ counsel asked Secretary Strange about her interactions with Williams. Secretary

       Strange testified that she parked next to Williams and chatted casually with Williams several times.

       Secretary Strange observed Williams leading a community meeting and was “very impressed”

       with Williams and his client interactions. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 73. Secretary Strange thought

       Williams would be a great ward program administrator and wondered if that was possible.

       However, Secretary Strange did not know Williams’ credentials or qualifications for the position.

       Secretary Strange reached out to Dr. Marylouise Jones, WSH’s chief clinical officer, to bring

       Williams to Dr. Jones’ attention and to have Dr. Jones notify Williams about the ward program

       administrator positions. Secretary Strange testified that she did not remember having any further

       conversations with Dr. Jones about Williams. Secretary Strange also did not recall whether

       Williams applied for the position.

              Williams served a CR 43(f)2 notice for Secretary Strange to attend trial, and DSHS moved

       to quash the notice. At the hearing on the motion to quash, DSHS argued that Secretary Strange’s

       testimony was not relevant to Williams’ claims. DSHS also argued that Secretary Strange had a

       busy schedule, that she would have to prepare to testify, and that she would have to find a suitable

       place to testify while DSHS was still under COVID-19 lockdown. Williams’ counsel agreed that

       Secretary Strange was not a decision-maker in the ward program administrator hiring process.

       2
         CR 43(f)(1) provides that parties or managing agents of parties may be examined at the instance
       of any adverse party. The witness’ attendance may be compelled solely by notice in lieu of a
       subpoena. CR 43(f)(1).

                                                        3
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       No. 56240-5-II

               The trial court noted that Secretary Strange had “fairly limited relevance, although she may

       have some factual knowledge.” 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Mar. 26, 2021) at 14.

       The trial court also noted that it was trying to understand “what’s reasonable” and understood that

       Secretary Strange had a lot of responsibility, and there was precedent for protecting high-level

       government officials from being dragged into litigation simply because of their positions. 1 VRP

       (Mar. 26, 2021) at 14. At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated that it did not think there

       was any factual dispute that Secretary Strange suggested that Williams apply and was later copied

       on an email encouraging him to apply for the ward program administrator position. The trial court

       provisionally granted DSHS’s motion to quash but stated that it would revisit the motion during

       the trial if Secretary Strange’s testimony became relevant. Williams did not raise the issue again,

       so the trial court did not revisit the issue.

       B.      TRIAL

               Williams presented his case-in-chief at a jury trial. Williams and his wife both testified.

       Williams called Lindsey White as a witness, who worked in talent acquisition for DSHS. Williams

       also called an individual who applied and was hired for one of the ward program administrator

       positions. Portions of both Secretary Strange’s and Dr. Jones’ depositions were published and

       read aloud for the jury. The testimony and admitted exhibits provided the following facts.

               Williams started working at WSH in 1998. Williams worked in different positions

       throughout his time at WSH and was working as a licensed institutional counselor in 2016.

       Williams never had a supervisory position at WSH.

                                                        4
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       No. 56240-5-II

               In September 2016, DSHS sought to fill 28 open positions for ward program administrator.

       The position description stated that ward program administrator was a supervisory position. The

       position description listed the following as requirements:

               A Master’s degree in Psychology, Sociology, Social Work, Social Sciences,
               Nursing, or in an allied field, AND three years of professional experience in case
               work, social services, planning, directing, and/or coordinating group and activities
               in an institution setting or experience in a related field AND three years of
               supervisory and/or managerial experience, including program administration,
               personnel management, and budgeting.
               OR
               A Bachelor’s degree in Psychology, Sociology, Social Work, Social Sciences,
               Nursing, or in an allied field, AND three years of professional experience in case
               work, social services, planning, directing, and/or coordinating group and activities
               in an institution setting or experience in a related field AND five years of
               supervisory and/or managerial experience, including program administration,
               personnel management, and budgeting.

       Ex. 17 at 5.

               Secretary Strange parked next to Williams at work and chatted casually with Williams

       several times. Secretary Strange observed Williams leading a community meeting and was “very

       impressed” with Williams and his client interactions. Ex. 58 at 7. Secretary Strange thought

       Williams would be a great ward program administrator and told Dr. Jones to explore that

       possibility.

               In September 2016, Dr. Jones emailed Williams telling him that Secretary Strange had

       spoken with him a few months before. Dr. Jones’ email stated that Secretary Strange had indicated

       to her that Williams “had a number of very good ideas about the direction of the hospital as well

       as a wealth of knowledge from having been part of WSH for so long.” Ex. 3 at 1. Dr. Jones sent

       Williams the link to apply for a ward program administrator position and “encourage[d] [him] to

                                                        5
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       No. 56240-5-II

       apply if [his] skills and interests match with this position.” Ex. 3 at 1. Dr. Jones copied Secretary

       Strange on this email.

                Williams applied for the ward program administrator position.         At the time of his

       application, Williams was approximately 73 years old.3 Williams’ cover letter stated that he had

       “over twenty-five years of supervisory skills, team building, and influencing men and women to

       work in a cohesive manner with each other to accomplish the job.” Ex. 2 at 1. Williams’ resume

       listed the following as employment history:

                •   SECURITY OFFICER-TACOMA, WA.                                    1990-1990
                    Provided security in and out of the library and parking lot

                •   IMMIGRATION SERVICE-SEATTLE, WA.                                1990-1998
                    Shift Lieutenant; responsible for reports and security of all Immigrant during
                    my shift

                •   WESTERN STATE HOSPITAL- LAKEWOOD, WA.                      1998-Pres[ent]
                    Facilitator; for groups in the Adult Therapy Program (ATP)

       Ex. 2 at 2. Williams’ resume listed the following as experience:

                •   US ARMY 1SG SERGEANT                                            1964-1990
                •   US IMMIGRATION SERVICE SHIFT LIEUTENANT                         1990-1998
                •   TRAINING IN LEADERSHIP QUALITIES
                •   LICENSED COUNSELOR

       Ex. 2 at 2. Although not stated in his application, Williams testified at trial that he supervised

       people during his time in the U.S. Army and during his time as a lieutenant.

                WSH received 169 applications for the 28 ward program administrator positions. White

       sent all applications to Dr. Jones. Dr. Jones and Joyce Stockwell, another WSH employee, were

       the only individuals who did the initial screening of all the application materials, including

       3
           Williams was born in 1944.

                                                         6
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       No. 56240-5-II

       Williams’.4 Dr. Jones did not work directly with Williams, but she knew who Williams was. Dr.

       Jones was aware that Williams “looked African-American” and believed that Williams was

       somewhere between 40 and 60 years old. Ex. 56 at 19.

                On October 26, after Dr. Jones and Stockwell did the initial screening of all applications,

       DSHS emailed Williams informing him that the hiring team had chosen to move forward with

       other applicants in the hiring process. Williams did not receive an interview for the ward program

       administrator positions. Dr. Jones and Stockwell had screened out 109 applicants during their

       initial screening.

                DSHS stated in an interrogatory response that the reason Williams was not selected for an

       interview was because his resume “did not exhibit the management or supervisory experience,

       qualifications sought by the defendant for positions in question.” 4 VRP (June 7, 2021) at 27. Dr.

       Jones stated in a deposition excerpt that was read to the jury that she believed Williams did not

       meet the minimum qualifications to receive an interview because

                even like he referenced in his cover letter that he had 25 years of supervisory . . .
                skills, it actually did not match what was described in the resume. There was no
                description in the resume about, for instance, how many people he had provided
                supervision, how he ran a department. There was nothing really to fill out kind of
                that.

                       So it wasn’t easy to see on his . . . resume that he did have supervisory skills
                that would be a good fit for this position.

       Ex. 56 at 21. Dr. Jones also stated that she did not know what scope of supervision a “lieutenant”

       might have, if any.

       4
           Stockwell was not deposed and did not testify at trial.

                                                          7
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       No. 56240-5-II

              Because DSHS had not yet filled all vacancies for the ward program administrator positions

       in December 2016, White sent an email to Dr. Jones asking if she wanted to look again at the 109

       applicants that had been rejected. Dr. Jones said it would be better to avoid reviewing the

       applications that were already rejected and asked if they could repost the positions. According to

       White, it was “not uncommon” to decide not to review applications that had already been rejected.

       4 VRP (June 7, 2021) at 15. White reposted the positions at least three times after 2016.

              A document listing 25 of the people ultimately hired as ward program administrators

       showed that 18 were white, 6 were Black, and 1 was American Indian/Alaskan Native. The

       document also showed that, in 2016, 2 individuals were in their 20s, 7 or 8 individuals were in

       their 30s, 10 or 11 individuals were in their 40s, 3 individuals were in their 50s, and 2 individuals

       were in their 60s.5 All but 1 of the individuals listed in the document submitted applications that

       provided some detail about their supervisory and/or management experience.                The other

       individual’s application is not included in the record and is not listed as an admitted exhibit.

       C.     JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

              At the conclusion of Williams’ case-in-chief, DSHS moved for a directed verdict

       (judgment as a matter of law) under CR 50. DSHS argued that Williams had presented insufficient

       evidence that his race or age was a substantially motivating factor for him being screened from

       hiring. DSHS argued that Williams did not provide any evidence that Dr. Jones or Stockwell knew

       the races of the individuals who were eventually hired, so the successful applicants could not be

       used as circumstantial evidence of discrimination. DSHS also argued that the resumes from

       5
        This document showed 9 people younger than 40, 15 people older than 40, and 1 person who
       was around 40 at the time of hire.

                                                         8
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       No. 56240-5-II

       successful applicants were highly detailed about supervisory/management experience, while

       Williams’ resume did not show any supervisory experience.

               Williams argued that DSHS’s motion should not be granted because Dr. Jones knew

       Williams’ age and race. Williams also argued that some successful applicants had fewer than three

       years of supervisory experience or lacked other qualifications for the position.

               The trial court noted that the successful applicants’ resumes were “highly detailed with all

       of their experience and an explanation for the skills that they have, which [Williams’] resumé

       lacked. [Williams’] resumé didn’t have any explanations on it whatsoever.” 6 VRP (June 8, 2021)

       at 13. The trial court compared Williams’ resume, which “[did] not provide any real understanding

       or explanation of any supervisory experience that he may have, supervisory or managerial” to the

       resumes of people who were interviewed. 6 VRP (June 8, 2021) at 25. From this comparison, the

       trial court concluded that “there’s just simply no evidence from which a jury can conclude that the

       reason that [Williams] was denied an interview was because of his race or his age.” 6 VRP (June

       8, 2021) at 25. The trial court also stated that there was “a fundamental problem with damages as

       well, in that the jury would be forced to speculate as to whether [Williams] would have been

       selected for a position.” 6 VRP (June 8, 2021) at 25. For these reasons, the trial court granted

       DSHS’s CR 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of DSHS and dismissed Williams’

       suit.

               Williams appeals.

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       No. 56240-5-II

                                                  ANALYSIS

       A.     MOTION TO QUASH

              Williams argues that the trial court erred by granting DSHS’s motion to quash the CR 43(f)

       notice for Secretary Strange to attend trial. We disagree.

              CR 43(f)(1) provides that a party or the managing agent of a party may be examined by the

       adverse party, and the witness’ attendance may be compelled by a trial notice. The witness shall

       not be precluded from testifying at trial based on the fact that the adverse party has already taken

       their deposition. CR 43(f)(2). However, trial courts may make protection orders for the witness

       if there is good cause shown under CR 26(c). CR 43(f)(1).

              There is no relevant published case law regarding CR 43(f) notices to attend trial.

       Therefore, we rely on case law discussing CR 26 because CR 43(f) provides for protection orders

       for good cause shown under CR 26(c). We review orders under CR 26 for an abuse of discretion.

       Diaz v. Wash. State Migrant Council, 165 Wn. App. 59, 73, 265 P.3d 956 (2011). We will find an

       abuse of discretion only upon a clear showing that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was

       manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. Id.

              CR 26(c) provides that the party or person from whom discovery is sought can bring a

       motion for a protective order. If the person shows good cause, the trial court may make any

       protective order which justice requires to protect the person from annoyance, embarrassment,

       oppression, or undue burden or expense, including that the discovery not be had. CR 26(c). “To

       establish good cause, the party should show specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective

       order is issued.” McCallum v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Wn. App. 412, 423, 204 P.3d

       944, review denied, 166 Wn.2d 1037 (2009). The party should use affidavits and concrete

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       No. 56240-5-II

       examples to demonstrate the specific harm that will be suffered; “broad or conclusory allegations

       of potential harm may not be enough.” Id. A trial court must weigh the respective interests of the

       parties in exercising its discretion to issue a protective order under CR 26(c). Id.

              Williams implies that the trial court quashed the notice for Secretary Strange to attend trial

       based solely on the fact that Williams had already taken her deposition. But none of the trial

       court’s statements suggest that the trial court’s decision to quash the trial notice was based on the

       fact that Williams had already taken Secretary Strange’s deposition.

              Instead, the record shows that trial court made its decision based largely on the “fairly

       limited” relevance of Secretary Strange’s testimony to Williams’ claims. 1 VRP (Mar. 26, 2021)

       at 14. At the hearing on the motion to quash, Williams’ counsel agreed that Secretary Strange was

       not a decision-maker in the hiring process for the ward program administrator positions. Further,

       Secretary Strange did not recall having any involvement in the hiring process aside from receiving

       occasional updates about how many spots had been filled.

              While Secretary Strange had seen Williams performing his job as an institutional counselor

       and wanted him to consider applying for the ward program administrator position, she did not

       recall if Williams ultimately applied for a ward program administrator position. Nor did Secretary

       Strange have any knowledge of Williams’ credentials or qualifications for the ward program

       administrator position.

              The trial court weighed the limited relevance of Secretary Strange’s testimony against

       Secretary Strange’s responsibilities as a high-level government official and “look[ed] at what’s

       reasonable.” 1 VRP (Mar. 26, 2021) at 14. The trial court heard DSHS’s arguments regarding

       Secretary Strange’s inherent time constraints as the head of DSHS, the time requirement for

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       No. 56240-5-II

       Secretary Strange to prepare her testimony, and the fact that Secretary Strange would be required

       to find a suitable place to testify while DSHS was under COVID-19 lockdown. The trial court

       came to the conclusion that the motion to quash should be provisionally granted and left open the

       possibility of revisiting the motion during trial if Secretary Strange’s testimony became relevant.

       There is no record that any party sought to have the trial court’s provisional order revisited. Given

       the burden on Secretary Strange and the fact that her testimony would not be relevant to Williams’

       claims based on his application being rejected after the initial screening during the hiring process,

       the trial court’s decision was not manifestly unreasonable nor was it based on untenable grounds.

       See McCallum, 149 Wn. App. at 423. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

       granting DSHS’s motion to quash. See Diaz, 165 Wn. App. at 73.6

       6
         Even if we assume that that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the notice for
       Secretary Strange to attend trial, the trial court’s decision is generally subject to harmless error
       analysis. Jones v. City of Seattle, 179 Wn.2d 322, 356, 314 P.3d 380 (2013). We review non-
       constitutional errors for whether there is any reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
       would have been materially affected had the error not occurred. Budd v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 21
       Wn. App. 2d 56, 88, 505 P.3d 120, review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1030 (2022).

               Had Secretary Strange testified, she would not have been able to provide any details about
       how the screening decisions were made because she was not one of the decision-makers in the
       hiring process. Moreover, Secretary Strange did not recall any involvement in the hiring process
       aside from receiving updates about how many positions had been filled. Further, the trial court
       allowed Williams to publish much of Secretary Strange’s deposition for the jury. Because
       Secretary Strange could not have provided details about the hiring process and because her
       deposition was published at trial, Williams has failed to show that the outcome of the trial would
       have been materially affected had the trial court denied DSHS’s motion to quash. See id.
       Therefore, any error by the trial court in granting DSHS’s motion to quash was harmless.

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       No. 56240-5-II

       B.     CR 50: JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW

              Williams argues that the trial court erred by granting DSHS’s CR 50 motion for judgment

       as a matter of law.7 We disagree.

              We review a trial court’s CR 50 decision de novo. Mancini v. City of Tacoma, 196 Wn.2d

       864, 877, 479 P.3d 656 (2021). Trial courts should grant CR 50 motions “only when a party has

       been fully heard on an issue and ‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable

       jury to find or have found’ for that party on that issue.” Id. at 876-77 (quoting CR 50(a)(1)). A

       CR 50 motion is properly granted when, “‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

       nonmoving party, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom to support a

       verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Id. at 877 (quoting H.B.H. v. State, 192 Wn.2d 154, 162, 429

       P.3d 484 (2018)). Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded, rational

       person that the declared premise is true. Id. We may affirm the trial court’s decision on any

       ground that is supported by the record. Id.

              The WLAD was designed to eliminate and prevent workplace discrimination. RCW

       49.60.010; Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 181 Wn.2d 439, 441, 334 P.3d 541 (2014). We construe the

       WLAD liberally. RCW 49.60.020. The WLAD prohibits employers from refusing to hire any

       person on the basis of age or race, among other bases. RCW 49.60.180(1). The protected class

       for age discrimination is individuals above the age of 40. RCW 49.60.205; RCW 49.44.090(1).

       7
         Williams appears to claim in his opening brief that the trial court “perpetuated discriminatory
       stereotypes” by granting judgment as a matter of law for DSHS. Br. of Appellant at 25. DSHS
       responds to this argument as though Williams is making a separate claim against the trial court.
       However, Williams makes clear in his reply brief that he is not claiming the trial court was biased;
       rather, Williams is claiming that “[t]he court erred by blocking the jury from deciding [Williams’]
       claims.” Reply Br. of Appellant at 29.

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       No. 56240-5-II

               If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of discrimination, we evaluate WLAD claims using the

       three-prong burden-shifting analysis articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

       792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973). Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 445. Under the first

       McDonnell Douglas prong, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case

       of discrimination, which creates a presumption that discrimination occurred. Id. at 446. The

       second McDonnell Douglas prong shifts the burden to the employer to “articulate a legitimate,

       nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. If the employer meets its

       burden, the third McDonnell Douglas prong requires the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence

       that the employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action was pretextual.

       Id.8

               1.      Williams’ Prima Facie Case Of Discrimination

               Under the first McDonnell Douglas prong, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of

       establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a presumption that discrimination

       occurred. Id. An employee makes a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is

       part of the protected class; (2) “he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was

       seeking applicants”; (3) “despite his qualifications, he was rejected”; and (4) after his rejection,

       the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from other individuals

       with the plaintiff’s qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.

       8
          Generally, if an employee makes a prima facie case of employment discrimination and produces
       evidence showing that the employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory justification was pretextual, the
       evidence is sufficient to submit to the jury. Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., 128 Wn. App.
       438, 448, 115 P.3d 1065 (2005), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1027 (2006). “But even in this
       situation, an employer will still be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if no rational trier of fact
       could conclude that discrimination was a substantial factor in the employer’s action.” Id.

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       No. 56240-5-II

              Washington courts look to federal case law interpreting antidiscrimination statutes as a

       guide to interpreting the WLAD. Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 180 Wn.2d 481, 491, 325 P.3d

       193 (2014). While federal cases are not binding on this court, we are “‘free to adopt those theories

       and rationale which best further the purposes and mandates of our state statute.’” Id. (quoting

       Grimwood v. Univ. of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wn.2d 355, 361-62, 753 P.2d 517 (1988)). Federal

       courts focus on the actual knowledge and actions of the decision-maker when evaluating

       employment discrimination claims. Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270,

       1274 (11th Cir. 2002). We apply the federal courts’ guidance and require employees to show that

       the decision-maker knew about their qualifications at the time of the adverse decision.

              Here, Williams was over 40 years old at the time he applied for the ward program

       administrator position, and no one contests that Williams was part of the protected class for both

       his age and his race. Williams has shown that DSHS was seeking applicants for the ward program

       administrator positions, Williams applied for the position, and he was rejected. Williams also

       produced evidence that some ward program administrator positions remained open and that DSHS

       continued to seek applications from other individuals with the same qualifications.

              However, Williams failed to present any evidence that DSHS knew he possessed the

       required supervisory/management experience for the position. Williams never had a supervisory

       or managerial position at WSH, so there was no reason for DSHS to know that he had supervisory

       or managerial experience unless he provided that information in his application/resume. Williams’

       resume was devoid of any details about most of his previous positions, and Williams’ job titles or

       descriptions in his resume did not show that he had any experience as a supervisor or manager. A

       single phrase in Williams’ cover letter stated that he had “over twenty-five years of supervisory

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       No. 56240-5-II

       skills, team building, and influencing men and women to work in a cohesive manner with each

       other to accomplish the job,” but that statement does not convey that he possessed the “supervisory

       and/or managerial experience, including program administration, personnel management, and

       budgeting” sought by DSHS. Ex. 2 at 1; Ex. 17 at 5 (emphases added).

              Even considering Williams’ application in the light most favorable to him, no fair-minded,

       rational person could be convinced that Williams’ application/resume showed that he met the

       supervisory/management requirement for the position or that DSHS knew or was informed that

       Williams had the requisite supervisory/management experience for the position. See Mancini, 196

       Wn.2d at 877. Therefore, Williams has failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination. See

       McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Walker, 286 F.3d at 1274.

              2.      No Evidence Of Pretext In Williams’ Case-In-Chief

              If the employer provides a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, 9 the third

       McDonnell Douglas prong requires the plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence to show that the

       employer’s alleged nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 446. An

       employee shows that an employer’s alleged reason is a pretext if the proffered justification has no

       basis in fact, is an unreasonable ground upon which to base the decision, or was not a motivating

       factor in employment decisions for other similarly-situated individuals. Griffith v. Schnitzer Steel

       9
         The second McDonnell Douglas prong shifts the burden to the employer to “articulate a
       legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d
       at 446. Williams presented evidence that DSHS asserted Williams was not selected for an
       interview because his resume did not exhibit the management or supervisory experience required
       for the position. This proffered justification—lack of minimum supervisory/managerial
       qualifications—is legitimate and nondiscriminatory. Therefore, evidence showing the second
       McDonnell Douglas prong was presented in Williams’ case-in-chief.

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       No. 56240-5-II

       Indus., Inc., 128 Wn. App. 438, 447, 115 P.3d 1065 (2005), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1027

       (2006). An employee can also satisfy the pretext prong by showing “‘that although the employer’s

       stated reason is legitimate, discrimination nevertheless was a substantial factor motivating the

       employer.’” Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 527, 404 P.3d

       464 (2017) (quoting Scrivener, 181 Wn.2d at 446-47).

              Here, DSHS’s proffered justification was that Williams’ resume did not show that he had

       the supervisory experience required for the position. Williams did not present evidence in his

       case-in-chief that DSHS’s proffered justification has no basis in fact. And Williams does not argue

       that lack of supervisory experience is an unreasonable ground upon which to deny his application.

              Instead, Williams attempts to show pretext by arguing that the lack of supervisory

       experience was not a motivating factor in DSHS’s employment decisions for other similarly-

       situated individuals.    But the applicants who were ultimately hired for a ward program

       administrator position communicated in their applications that they had supervisory or managerial

       experience and provided details about their experience in their resumes.10 And Williams did not

       10
          Williams contends that certain successful applicants did not submit applications that showed
       their supervisory or managerial experience. The record belies this contention. For example,
       Williams asserts that Danielle Strassle, Enos Mbajah, Mario Williams-Sweet, William Woehl, and
       Shikha Gapsch (formerly Hoelscher) did not meet the minimum supervisory qualifications.

              Strassle’s application showed experience as a therapies supervisor in which they were
       responsible for program development, administration, and supervising ten employees.

              Mbajah’s application mentioned experience “supervising both clinical (Therapist and
       bachelors level clinicians) and non-clinical (behavior support specialists, family support specialists
       and peer mentors).” Ex. 38 at 3. Further, Mbajah’s most recent position on their resume was
       “Clinical Supervisor” and listed several bullet points with details about supervisory job
       responsibilities. Ex. 38 at 4 (emphasis omitted).

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       No. 56240-5-II

       present any evidence beyond these comparators that his age or race was a substantial factor

       motivating DSHS to reject his application.11 Therefore, Williams failed to present any evidence

       in his case-in-chief that DSHS’s proffered justification was pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm

       the trial court’s order granting CR 50 judgment as a matter of law for DSHS.12

               Williams-Sweet’s application listed experience as a program manager in which they
       “[p]rovide[d] professional oversight and guidance of behavioral support services.” Ex. 53 at 3.
       Further, Williams-Sweet listed a previous position as “Residential Supervisor” and listed the
       position’s duties as supervising, training, monitoring, and assisting five residential counselors. Ex.
       53 at 4 (emphasis omitted).

             Woehl’s application listed one previous position with the job title “Licensed Therapist /
       Manager” in which they supervised two individuals. Ex. 54 at 1.

              Gapsch was hired in mid-2019, nearly three years after Williams applied. Further,
       Gapsch’s resume listed experience leading projects and developing trainings to improve retention
       and recruitment of foster homes, training and mentoring CPS specialists, leading student
       organizations, and “[e]xperience supervising colleagues in a fast-paced environment.” Ex. 32 at
       3.
       11
          Williams argues at several points throughout his briefing that certain successful applicants did
       not have health care experience, had a criminal record, or lacked other qualifications for the
       position. But health care experience was not a requirement for the position, and the other
       qualifications are irrelevant to DSHS’s proffered justification—lack of supervisory/managerial
       experience. Therefore, the applicants’ other qualifications and backgrounds cannot show that
       DSHS’s proffered justification was pretextual.
       12
          DSHS makes several alternative arguments for why we should affirm the trial court’s order
       granting CR 50 judgment as a matter law. Because we affirm the trial court’s CR 50 order based
       on the fact that Williams failed to meet his burden under the first and third prongs of McDonnell
       Douglas, we do not address DSHS’s alternative arguments.

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       No. 56240-5-II

                                       ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

               Williams argues that under RCW 49.60.030(2),13 he is entitled to attorney fees and costs

       on appeal should he ultimately prevail on remand. We affirm the trial court’s order granting

       judgment as a matter of law for DSHS, which precludes the possibility of Williams prevailing on

       remand. Therefore, we deny Williams’ request for attorney fees and costs on appeal.

                                                CONCLUSION

               The trial court did not err in granting DSHS’s motion to quash the notice for the secretary

       of DSHS to attend trial nor did the trial court err in granting DSHS’s CR 50 motion for judgment

       as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court and deny Williams’ request for attorney

       fees on appeal.

               A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

       Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

       it is so ordered.

                                                            Lee, J.
        We concur:

        Cruser, A.C.J.

        Veljacic, J.

       13
         RCW 49.60.030(2) provides in relevant part that a person claiming injuries under the WLAD
       may seek to recover the cost of suit including reasonable attorney fees.

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