Court Opinion

ID: 9948842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 00:09:19.765889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:05.465589
License: Public Domain

140 Nev., Advance Opinion l

                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   JOEY TERRALL CHADWICK,                               No. 86161-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA,
                   Respondent.
                                                                            FEB 2 9 2024

                               Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
                   verdict, of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury. Eighth
                   Judicial District Court, Clark County; Bita Yeager, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   Steven S. Owens, Henderson,
                   for Appellant.

                   Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Steven B. Wolfson, District
                   Attorney, and Alexander G. Chen and Karen Mishler, Chief Deputy District
                   Attorneys, Clark County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and
                   WESTBROOK, JJ.

                                                     OPINION

                   By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:
                               Appellant Joey Terrall Chadwick was convicted of one count of
                   leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury.       On appeal,

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                   Chadwick contends that the district court abused its discretion in admitting
                   other bad act evidence of his alcohol consumption and apparent intoxication
                   prior to the accident in contravention of NRS 48.045(2).
                                Nevada's appellate courts have not previously addressed the
                   admissibility of evidence of a defendant's alcohol consumption and apparent
                   intoxication while driving in cases where the defendant is charged with
                   leaving the scene of an accident in violation of NRS 484E.010. We conclude
                   that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence
                   because it was relevant to Chadwick's motive to flee, proven by clear and
                   convincing evidence, and not unfairly prejudicial.
                               Chadwick also argues that the district court erred by failing to
                   hold a Petrocellil hearing and provide Tavares2 limiting instructions prior
                   to the admission of testimony that he threatened a witness and belonged to
                   a gang. In addressing these arguments, we conclude that when bad act
                   evidence is directly elicited by the defendant, it is incumbent upon the
                   defendant to request a limiting instruction, and if they do not do so, the
                   district court is not obligated to raise the issue or provide one sua sponte.
                   Because Chadwick directly elicited testimony about the threat and did not
                   request a limiting instruction, the court did not err in failing to conduct a
                   Petroceili hearing or provide a Tavares instruction. Further, Chadwick has
                   not established unfair prejudice from the admission of gang affiliation
                   evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

                         'Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), superseded in
                   part by statute as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 44-45, 83 P.3d 818,
                   823 (2004).
                         2Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725, 30 P.3d 1128 (2001), holding modified
                   on other grounds by Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 182 P.3d 106 (2008).
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                                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               On October 31, 2021 (Halloween night), Chadwick accidentally
                   ran over and injured three-year-old T.B., who was crossing the street while
                   trick-or-treating, without stopping or returning to the scene. At the time of
                   the accident, Chadwick was driving an older white van with his friend,
                   Helen Henry, in the passenger seat. Chadwick and Henry were both
                   members of the Bloods gang, and the accident occurred in a neighborhood
                   where rival gang members lived.
                               The day after the accident, Henry returned to the scene and told
                   T.B.'s family that Chadwick was the one who hit T.B., though she did not
                   rnention that she was also in the van at the time of the accident. The
                   following day, Chadwick went to the police station and turned himself in.
                   He denied drinking the night of the accident and wrote a voluntary
                   statement indicating that he drove away because he thought he only hit a
                   pothole. Chadwick was eventually charged with leaving the scene of an
                   accident involving personal injury and reckless driving resulting in
                   substantial bodily harm.
                              Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of
                   Chadwick's intoxication to show his motive to flee from the scene of the
                   accident and to impeach his claims to law enforcement that he did not
                   consurne alcohol that night or know he was in an accident. The district
                   court held a Petrocelli hearing, where Henry testified about Chadwick's
                   alcohol consumption and apparent intoxication prior to the accident. Henry
                   testified that when Chadwick picked her up the night of the accident, his
                   eyes were red and he smelled of alcohol. According to Henry, they went to
                   a house party where Chadwick drank at least half a bottle of Hennessey
                   cognac, and they shared a bottle of Barton vodka. Henry also testified that
                   Chadwick snorted "powder."
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                               After the Petrocelli hearing, the district court granted the
                   State's motion in part and allowed Henry to testify about her direct
                   observations, including Chadwick's alcohol consumption prior to the
                   accident.   However, the court precluded Henry from testifying that
                   Chadwick snorted powder because Henry had no actual knowledge of what
                   the powder was.
                               The matter proceeded to a jury trial. In its case-in-chief, the
                   State introduced into evidence Chadwick's recorded interview with police
                   and his voluntary statement. The State's key witness was Henry.
                               On direct examination, Henry testified that when Chadwick
                   picked her up on the night of the accident, he smelled "[v]ery moderate[ly]"
                   of alcohol, his eyes were "yellowish red like you can tell he was drinking,"
                   and he appeared to be a "little drunk." Henry also testified about their
                   alcohol consumption at the house party with the aid of demonstrative
                   exhibits depicting bottles of Hennessey and Barton liquor similar to what
                   they consumed that evening. Henry testified that Chadwick drank "half' of
                   a 750 ml bottle of Barton and "[t]hree red cups" of Hennessey.
                               According to Henry, the accident occurred after they left the
                   party to get some food. Chadwick had slowed down at an intersection,
                   waiting for a group of children to cross the street after an adult called them
                   over. When Chadwick accelerated, Henry saw a little girl suddenly dart out
                   in front of the van so fast that Chadwick could not avoid hitting her. Henry
                   testified that it felt like "[a] speed bump" when the girl went under the
                   driver's side of the vehicle. Henry looked back and saw a body in the street,
                   then told Chadwick that he just hit a young girl. According to Henry,
                   Chadwick denied hitting the girl and told Henry "to calm down" and "say
                   nothing."

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                               Henry testified that Chadwick sped away from the scene and
                   did not slow down until they reached a nearby Dotty's Casino, where they
                   inspected the van for damage. Henry saw a shattered left headlight with
                   blood and pink barrettes in it. When Henry told Chadwick they needed to
                   call the police, Chadwick allegedly told her, "You're the only witness and
                   only person that knows I was driving." This comment made Henry feel
                   unsafe, so she left and got a ride home.
                               On cross-examination, Chadwick asked Henry about her status
                   as a gang member. Henry affirmed that she was in a gang, and when
                   Chadwick asked which gang she belonged to, the State objected before
                   Henry could answer. During a sidebar, the State argued that the question
                   about Henry's gang affiliation was highly prejudicial and would open the
                   door to questions about Chadwick's own gang affiliation.          Chadwick
                   responded that Henry's gang membership was relevant to why she did not
                   report the accident to law enforcement because "if word got [out] on the
                   street that she was" involved with the accident, she would face retaliation
                   frorn the rival gang. The court determined that Chadwick's question would
                   open the door to Chadwick's own gang affiliation because "[t]hat same
                   motive, if he is a part of a gang, goes as to why he wouldn't stop when he's
                   in a gang area[,] that they're the kids of gang members and he doesn't report
                   it. I think it goes both ways." Following the sidebar, Chadwick proceeded
                   to ask Henry what gang she was affiliated with, and she admitted to being
                   a member of the Bloods.      Chadwick then asked Henry an open-ended
                   question about why she did not report the accident, and Henry responded
                   that Chadwick had "threatened" her.
                               During redirect examination, the State asked Henry follow-up
                   questions about Chadwick's threat and how Chadwick's gang affiliation was

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                   related to that threat. In response, Henry testified that Chadwick was also
                   in the Bloods and that, after the accident, he told her, "{d]on't snitch"
                   because of "what happens to snitches." Chadwick did not object or move to
                   strike Henry's testimony about his gang affiliation or the threat.
                               The State presented testimony from members of T.B.'s family,
                   who witnessed the van speeding away from the scene.            T.B.'s mother
                   testified about T.B.'s injuries, including a gash on her forehead and scalp
                   damage, which required a two-week hospital stay. The State also presented
                   testimony from several individuals involved in the Las Vegas Metropolitan
                   Police Department (LVMPD) investigation. Of note, LVMPD hit-and-run
                   detective Michael Alrnaguer testified that when Chadwick's van was
                   impounded, the van's left headlight was nonfunctional and had significant
                   damage that appeared to be recent. Detective Alrnaguer also stated that
                   there were no irregularities in the roadway, such as potholes, near the scene
                   of the accident. On cross-examination, Almaguer confirmed that his initial
                   investigation did not indicate that drugs or alcohol were involved, but he
                   clarified that it was impossible to investigate and collect evidence of driving
                   under the influence because the driver left the scene.
                               After the State rested, Chadwick testified in his own defense.
                   Chadwick averred that when he drove himself and Henry to the house
                   party, neither of them had consumed any alcohol. Shortly after getting to
                   the party, Henry asked Chadwick to go to McDonald's. Chadwick testified
                   that when they left the house party, he still had not consumed any alcohol.
                               Chadwick testified that, on their way to McDonald's, he heard
                   a "thump" and believed he had hit a pothole in the street. Chadwick looked
                   in his rearview mirror and did not see anything, so he proceeded to
                   McDonald's. Chadwick testified that because the van often made similar

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                     noises and he did not see anything in his mirrors, he had no reason to think
                     he was in an accident. He further testified that there were no kids at the
                     intersection when he stopped, but in any event, he would not have been able
                     to see T.B. cross the street due to the van's height, the van's side window
                     tint, and the unlit streetlamps. Chadwick also testified that Henry was
                     leaning back in the passenger chair at the time of the accident, so she could
                     not have seen the accident, nor did she inform him that he hit a child.
                                 Chadwick testified that when they got to McDonald's, Henry
                     immediately asked him to take her home. From McDonald's, he drove to
                     Dotty's Casino, where Chadwick stated he was looking for a friend.
                     Chadwick did not find his friend at Dotty's but did notice that the left
                     headlight of the van was broken. He stated that the headlight still worked,
                     so he assumed the damage was from a rock or debris. Chadwick testified
                     that there was no blood or barrettes on the headlight. The two drove from
                     Dotty's toward Henry's house and passed by Chadwick's friend's house.
                     Chadwick said that he wanted to stop by quickly, at which point Henry
                     became upset and got out of the van. Chadwick drove alone to his mother's
                     house.
                                 Chadwick testified that the next morning, people told him that
                     a person was run over by a white van the night before in the area where
                     Chadwick had been driving, and they asked Chadwick if he was involved.
                     Chadwick "put two and two together" and felt compelled to "go up and clear
                     my name when I seen that family on that street on the news that evening."
                                 The jury ultimately found Chadwick guilty of leaving the scene
                     of an accident involving personal injury, but acquitted him of the other filed
                     charge, reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm. Chadwick
                     received a sentence of 72-240 months in prison and timely appealed.

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                                                   ANALYSIS
                    The district court did not err in adrnitting evidence of Chadwick's alcohol
                    consumption and apparent intoxication while driving
                                Chadwick contends that the district court abused its discretion

                    by admitting other bad act evidence of his alcohol consumption and "drunk
                    driving." NRS 48.045(2) governs the admissibility of "[e]vidence of other
                    crimes, wrongs or acts" and provides that such evidence may not be used to
                    establish a defendant's propensity to commit the alleged act. Nevertheless,
                    evidence of a defendant's other bad acts may be introduced for
                    nonpropensity purposes, for instance, to establish "proof of motive,
                    opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
                    mistake or accident." NRS 48.045(2). However, before a district court can
                    admit other bad act evidence, it must first conduct a Petrocelli hearing
                    outside the presence of the jury and determine that "(1) the incident is
                    relevant to the crime charged; (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing
                    evidence; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
                    outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Tinch v. State, 113 Nev.
                    1170, 1176, 946 P.2d 1061, 1064-65 (1997), holding modified by Bigpond v.
                    State, 128 Nev. 108, 270 P.3d. 1244 (2012); Tavares v. State, 117 Nev. 725,
                    731, 30 P.3d 1128, 1131 (2001), holding modified on other grounds by
                    Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 182 P.3d 106 (2008). This court reviews a
                    district court's decision to admit other bad act evidence for an abuse of
                    discretion. Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110.
                                Chadwick argues that the evidence of his alcohol consumption
                    and apparent intoxication while driving did not satisfy the three Tinch

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                   factors because it was irrelevant, unsupported by clear and convincing
                   evidence, and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.3
                               First, the evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and

                   apparent intoxication while driving was relevant to the charge of leaving
                   the scene of an accident involving personal injury. As noted above, motive
                   is a proper nonpropensity purpose for admitting bad act evidence. See NRS
                   48.045(2). In this case, evidence that Chadwick consumed copious amounts
                   of alcohol and appeared to be intoxicated while driving was relevant because
                   it provided a motive for him to flee after the accident. See, e.g., State v.
                   Sutton, No. 18CA0057-M, 2020 WL 2319311, 11 30 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11,
                   2020) (providing that, where a defendant was charged with the failure to
                   stop after an accident, an officer's testimony that he "smelled the odor of
                   alcohol on [the appellant's] breath had probative value with respect to [the
                   appellant's] ... possible motivation for leaving the scene"); Gillum v.
                   Commonwealth, No. 2002-SC-0415-MR, 2004 WL 1907027, *3 (Ky. Aug. 26,
                   2004) (stating that an officer's "testimony as to Appellant's consumption of
                   alcohol and state of intoxication appears to be relevant to the charge of

                         3The district court does not appear to have given      Tavares limiting
                   instructions in connection with this evidence; however, Chadwick did not
                   raise this issue in his appellate briefs, and only mentioned it in passing for
                   the first time at oral argument. Therefore, we do not consider it. See State
                   ex rel. Dep't of Highways v. Pinson, 65 Nev. 510, 530, 199 P.2d 631, 648
                   (1948) ("The parties, in oral arguments, are confined to issues or matters
                   properly before the court, and we can consider nothing else . . . ."); see also
                   State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane), 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 90, 521 P.3d 1215,
                   1221 (2022) ("[I]n both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on
                   appeal, we follow the principle of party presentation. That is, we rely on
                   the parties to frame the issues for decisions and assign to courts the role of
                   neutral arbiter of matters the parties present." (alteration in original)
                   (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))).
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                   leaving the scene of the accident . . . and was properly admitted"); State u.
                   Kovalik, No. 92-2213-CR, 1993 WL 112024, *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1993)
                   (concluding that evidence of driving while intoxicated was relevant to
                   appellant's motive and intent to elude an officer).
                                Chadwick argues that his motive to flee "was only minimally
                   relevant" because he admitted to leaving the scene of the accident, and
                   therefore the element of flight was already established.             See NRS

                   484E.010(1) (providing that "rtlhe driver of any vehicle involved in a
                   crash . . . resulting in bodily injury or death shall immediately stop his or
                   her vehicle at the scene of the crash or as close thereto as possible, and shall
                   forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the crash
                   until the driver has fulfilled the requirements of NRS 484E.030"). However,
                   the State was also required to establish criminal intent by proving that
                   Chadwick knew or should have known he was involved in an accident when
                   he left the scene. See Clancy v. State, 129 Nev. 840, 847, 313 P.3d 226, 230-
                   31 (2013). And Chadwick's motive to flee was relevant to this question of
                   criminal intent. See NRS 48.015 (stating that evidence is relevant if it has
                   any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable).
                                In a similar case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained why
                   evidence of driving under the influence would be relevant to establish that
                   the appellant had a motive to flee and therefore "knowingly fle[d] or
                   attempt[ed] to elude" an officer. Kovalik. No. 92-2213-CR, 1993 WL 112024,
                   *2. Like Chadwick, the appellant argued that the evidence was irrelevant
                   because "motive was not an element" of the crime and because "evidence of
                   intoxicated driving does not make it more probable that he knowingly
                   attempted to elude an officer." Id. In rejecting both arguments, the court
                   explained,

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                                 "Matters going to motive . . . are inextricably
                                 caught up with and bear upon considerations of
                                 intent . . . ." State v. Johnson, 121 Wis. 2d 237, 253,
                                 358 N.W.2d 824, 832 (Ct. App. 1984). [Appellant]
                                 does not persuade us that the trial court
                                 erroneously exercised its discretion in holding that
                                 the evidence was admissible as being relevant.
                                 Although it cannot be said that drinking makes a
                                 person more likely to try to elude the police, it is
                                 generally well known that penalties for [operating
                                 a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI)] are severe.
                                 The evidence that [appellant] may have been
                                 drinking or was intoxicated could make it more
                                 probable that [appellant] intended to elude the
                                 police in order to avoid the OWI penalties.
                     Id. (first and second alterations in original).
                                 We agree with the reasoning in Kovalik. "Even though motive
                     is not an element of a crime and need not be proven, it has virtually always
                     been an integral element of proof in a criminal trial." Richmond v. State,
                     118 Nev. 924, 942, 59 P.3d 1249, 1261 (2002) (Shearing, J., concurring in

                     part and dissenting in part); see also Shults v. State, 96 Nev. 742, 748-49,
                     616 P.2c1 388, 392-93 (1980) (holding that because "the prosecution is
                     entitled to present a full and accurate account of the circumstances
                     surrounding a crime," the district court did not abuse its discretion by
                     admitting other crimes evidence that was relevant to motive (internal
                     quotation marks omitted)). Motive has been described as the "reason that
                     nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent." United
                     States v. Benton, 63 F.2d 1052, 1056 (5th Cir. 1981). A motive thus operates
                     as an "incentive for criminal behavior." People v. McKinnon, 259 P.3d 1186,
                     1224 (Cal. 2011).

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KU NOR     Argirk,
                               Here, Chadwick's motive to flee was relevant to the knowledge
                   element of the crime because it offered an alternative explanation for why
                   he left the scene—that he knew he had hit a child but sought to avoid the
                   criminal penalties associated with driving under the influence of alcohol.
                   The State was entitled to present the jury with this alternative to the
                   explanation offered by Chadwick—that he failed to stop because he did not
                   know about the accident. Had Chadwick remained at the scene after hitting
                   T.B., officers may have determined that he was intoxicated. See, e.g.,
                   Weaver v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 494, 499, 117 P.3d 193,
                   197 (2005) (concluding that a police officer had a reasonable belief that the
                   appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident where he "smelled
                   strongly of alcohol, had watery bloodshot eyes, and slurred his speech when
                   he spoke"). Because the crash resulted in an injury, Chadwick risked being
                   arrested on a charge of driving under the influence causing substantial
                   bodily harm, which carries a potential sentence of imprisonment of 2 to 20
                   years. See NRS 484C.430(1).4 Instead, because Chadwick left the scene,
                   investigators could not determine whether alcohol was involved in the
                   accident, and he was not charged with that crime. Therefore, the evidence
                   of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and apparent intoxication offered a

                         4At oral argument, Chadwick suggested that, because the penalty for
                   leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury was the same as the
                   penalty for driving under the influence causing substantial bodily harm, he
                   would not have had a motive to flee. However, by leaving the scene,
                   Chadwick might have avoided any penalty, had his vehicle not been
                   identified by others, which he testified prompted him to come forward two
                   days later.
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                   motive for him to flee, making it less likely that he failed to stop simply
                   because he was unaware of the accident')
                               Second,   Chadwick's     alcohol   consumption and       apparent
                   intoxication while driving were established by clear and convincing
                   evidence through Henry's testimony at the Petrocelli hearing. Testimony
                   alone can establish an act by clear and convincing evidence. See Meek v.
                   State, 112 Nev. 1288, 1295, 930 P.2d 1104, 1108 (1996) (stating that "clear
                   and convincing evidence can be provided by a victim's testimony alone").
                   However, personal knowledge on the part of the testifying witness is
                   necessary. See Randolph v. State, 136 Nev. 659, 662, 477 P.3d 342, 347
                   (2020) (holding that "the district court erred in finding that the State proved
                   the prior bad acts by clear and convincing evidence by [a witness's]
                   testimony alone" where the testimony was not based on the witness's
                   firsthand knowledge); accord Lane v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 104 Nev. 427,
                   446, 760 P.2d 1245, 1257 (1988) ("[T]o be competent to testify, a witness
                   must have personal knowledge of the subject of his testimony.").
                               Here, Henry's testimony was based on her direct observations
                   of Chadwick and was rationally based on her perceptions. When Chadwick
                   picked Henry up, she saw that Chadwick had red eyes and smelled alcohol
                   on him.    Henry also watched Chadwick consume large quantities of
                   Hennessey and Barton at a party before getting behind the wheel of his
                   vehicle.   Because a proper foundation was laid in this case, Henry's

                         5Chadwick also suggests that the district court erred by overruling
                   his relevance objection to the generic pictures of liquor bottles. However,
                   the State utilized the photos for demonstrative purposes only to help Henry
                   identify the type and amount of liquor that Chadwick drank on the night of
                   the accident. This was not an abuse of discretion. Mclellan, 124 Nev. at
                   269, 182 P.3d at 110.
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                   eyewitness testimony about Chadwick's consumption and her lay opinion
                   testimony regarding Chadwick's apparent intoxication were admissible.
                   See NRS 50.265; Dooley v. United States, 577 F. Supp. 3d 229, 236 (S.D.N.Y.
                   2021) ("It is settled that a lay witness can offer an opinion as to a person's
                   intoxication."); Durant v. United States, 551 A.2d 1318, 1324 (D.C. Cir.
                   1988) ("[B]ecause alcohol intoxication is considered to be a matter of
                   common knowledge, lay witnesses may render opinion testiniony regarding
                   alcohol intoxication.").
                               To the extent that Chadwick argues Henry was not a credible
                   witness because she was intoxicated herself on the night of the accident, the
                   district court had an opportunity to observe Henry and determine her
                   credibility, which we do not reweigh on appeal. See Tinch, 113 Nev. at 1175,
                   946 P.2d at 1064 ("It is not this court's prerogative to determine the
                   credibility of witnesses below."). Indeed, the record reflects that the district
                   court meaningfully analyzed the evidence presented and we perceive no
                   abuse of discretion in its conclusion that Henry's testimony provided clear
                   and   convincing evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and
                   intoxication while driving.6
                                Third, evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and
                   intoxication was not "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
                   prejudice." Id. at 1176, 946 P.2d at 1064-65. Though the evidence was
                   prejudicial, "all evidence against a defendant will on some level 'prejudice'
                   (i.e., harm) the defense," and so the focus in NRS 48.045(2) is on "unfair"
                   prejudice. State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Armstrong), 127 Nev. 927, 933,

                         6 Notwithstanding the court's pretrial ruling. Chadwick was able to
                   argue to the jury that Henry's testimony was not credible because of her
                   own alcohol consumption.
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                       267 P.3d 777, 781 (2011). Unfair prejudice is defined as an appeal "to the
                       emotional and sympathetic tendencies of a jury, rather than the jury's
                       intellectual ability to evaluate evidence." Krause Inc. v. Little, 117 Nev. 929,
                       935, 34 P.3d 566, 570 (2001). In this case, the record does not reflect that
                       the evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and apparent intoxication
                       prevented the jury from intellectually evaluating the evidence.         To the

                       contrary, the jury acquitted Chadwick of felony reckless driving, which
                       implies that the jury was able to properly evaluate the evidence even after
                       learning of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and apparent driving while
                       intoxicated. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
                       discretion in admitting evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and
                       apparent intoxication while driving.7
                       Evidence of Chadwick's threat and gang affiliation
                                    Chadwick argues that the district court abused its discretion by
                       allowing Henry to testify that Chadwick was a gang member who
                       threatened her after the accident not to "snitch" because of "what happens

                             7Because this evidence was admissible to establish Chadwick's motive
                       to flee and, inferentially, his knowledge of the accident, we necessarily reject
                       Chadwick's claim that it was inadmissible in the State's case-in-chief "as
                       preemptive impeachment" using extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter.
                       Cf. Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. 129, 136-37, 110 P.3d 1058, 1063 (2005)
                       (discussing the collateral fact rule and stating, "[i]t is error to allow the
                       State to impeach a defendant's credibility with extrinsic evidence relating
                       to a collateral matter") (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
                       omitted)). To be "collateral," facts must be "outside the controversy,
                       or . . . not directly connected with the principal matter or issue in dispute."
                       Id. at 137, 110 P.3d at 1063 (quoting Lobato v. State, 120 Nev. 512, 518, 96
                       P.3d 765, 770 (2004)) (further internal quotation marks omitted)). Here,
                       the evidence of Chadwick's consumption and intoxication was directly
                       connected with an element of the charged crime—knowledge—and was not
                       collateral.
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                   to snitches."    Chadwick contends that this evidence was erroneously
                   admitted without a Petrocelli hearing or Tavares limiting instructions.
                         Failure to conduct a Petrocelli hearing
                               When the State seeks to admit bad act evidence, it bears the
                   burden of requesting a Petrocelli hearing outside the presence of the jury to
                   determine its admissibility under Tinch's three-part test.      See generally

                   Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 692 P.2d 503 (1985), superseded in part by
                   statute as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 44-45, 83 P.3d 818, 823
                   (2004).   However, the "failure to conduct a Petrocelli hearing is not
                   reversible error when the record is sufficient to establish that the evidence
                   is admissible under [Tinch] or the trial result would have been the same
                   had the trial court excluded the evidence." Diornarnpo v. State, 124 Nev.
                   414, 430, 185 P.3d 1031, 1041 (2008). Additionally, if the defendant fails to
                   object to the absence of a Petrocelli hearing, an appellate court may review
                   only for plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. Id.
                               Assuming for the sake of argument that Chadwick's threat was
                   a bad act that required a Petrocelli hearing,8 Chadwick invited any error in
                   its admission.   The invited error doctrine "establish[es] that ordinarily
                   inadmissible evidence may be rendered admissible when the complaining

                         8 Cornpare Evans v. State, 117 Nev. 609, 628, 28 P.3d 498, 512 (2001)
                   ("Evidence that after a crime a defendant threatened a witness with
                   violence is directly relevant to the question of guilt. Therefore, evidence of
                   such a threat is neither irrelevant character evidence nor evidence of
                   collateral acts requiring a hearing before its admission." (footnote omitted)),
                   overruled on other grounds by Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356, 366 n.5, 351 P.3d
                   725, 732 n.5 (2015), with Bellon u. State, 121 Nev. 436, 444-45, 117 P.3d
                   176, 181 (2005) (holding that a defendant's threat to officers during his
                   arrest was "more reflective of his frustration at being arrested than
                   demonstrative of his consciousness of guilt" and inadmissible under NRS
                   48.045(2)).
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i()) I 94713
                     party is the party who first broached the issue." Taylor u. State, 109 Nev.
                     856-67, 858 P.2d 843, 848 (1993) (Shearing, J., concurring in part and
                     dissenting in part).   Here, Chadwick directly elicited the testimony he

                     complains of on cross-examination by asking Henry an open-ended question
                     about why she did not report the accident.      In response to Chadwick's

                     questioning, Henry testified that he "threatened me that if I told, he was

                     going to do something to me." Although the State asked follow-up questions
                     about the substance of Chadwick's threat on redirect, Chadwick had already
                     introduced the bad act into evidence.      Under these circumstances, we

                     conclude that Chadwick invited any error from the admission of the threat
                     without a Petrocelli hearing. See Carter v. State, 121 Nev. 759, 769, 121
                     P.3d 592, 599 (2005) (holding that the defense elicited the bad act testimony
                     and was "estopped from raising any objection on appeal"); Taylor, 109 Nev.
                     at 866-57, 858 P.2d at 848.
                                 As for the gang affiliation testimony, Chadwick did not object
                     to its admission, and we conclude that the district court did not plainly err
                     in admitting it without a Petrocelli hearing." See Green v. State, 119 Nev.

                           "The State argues that Chadwick invited any error by asking Henry
                     questions about her gang affiliation after the district court warned him that
                     doing so would open the door to evidence of his own gang affiliation. We
                     disagree. The district court ruled that if Chadwick asked Henry about her
                     gang affiliation to establish her fear of a rival gang as a motive for her
                     actions, it would open the door to allow the State to ask about Chadwick's
                     gang affiliation to establish a similar motive for his actions—e.g., that he
                     fled the scene because he feared retaliation by the rival gang for running
                     over one of their children. However, the State did not use the evidence for
                     the limited purpose permitted by the court. Instead, during the State's
                     redirect examination of Henry, it questioned Henry about Chadwick's gang

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      NEVADA
                                                          17
iú   l9471i     ,
              .*Wp
                   542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) (holding that a defendant must show actual
                   prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to establish plain error). There is no
                   indication that the jury convicted Chadwick based on his gang affiliation.
                   Neither the State nor Chadwick argued that the accident itself was gang-
                   related or that Chadwick's gang affiliation went to any material element of
                   the offense. Rather, the evidence was offered for the limited purpose of
                   explaining Henry's conduct and substantiating why she did not report the
                   accident to law enforcement. Although the evidence was used to illustrate
                   the seriousness of Chadwick's threat, the State only made one brief
                   reference to it at trial. Chadwick's gang affiliation was also not mentioned
                   by either party in closing argument. In light of the minimal testimony on
                   the subject of Chadwick's gang affiliation and its collateral nature being in
                   relation to a witness's conduct rather than his own, Chadwick cannot
                   establish actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice from the admission of
                   his gang affiliation without a Petrocelli hearing, and therefore he cannot
                   demonstrate plain error. See Tinch, 113 Nev. at 1176, 946 P.2d at 1065

                   affiliation to provide context for his threat about what would happen to
                   Henry if she reported him to police.

                         Immediately after asking Henry about Chadwick's gang affiliation,
                   the State asked Henry to describe how he threatened her. In this way, the
                   State tied the evidence of Chadwick's gang affiliation to his threat about
                   what happens to "snitches," to make his threat appear more serious because
                   it carried the force of gang violence behind it. Because the evidence of
                   Chadwick's gang affiliation was introduced for a purpose that was outside
                   the scope of the district court's ruling, we cannot find that he invited this
                   alleged error by opening the door. Cf. Dickey v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 2,
                   540 P.3d 442, 451 (2024) ("When admitting evidence for limited purposes
                   under NRS 48.045(2), limiting instructions must instruct the jury to
                   consider only those purposes for which the evidence was actually
                   admitted.").
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                                                        18
   1')•17Il
                        ("Other state and federal courts have found gang-affiliation evidence
                        relevant and not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice when it tends
                        to prove rnotive." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
                              Failure to give Tavares instructions
                                    In Tavares, the Nevada Supreme Court imposed a burden on

                        the State to request "that a limiting instruction be given both at the time
                        the prosecutor introduces the [other bad act] evidence and in the final
                        charge to the jury." 117 Nev. at 727, 30 P.3d at 1129. If the State fails to
                        request the limiting instruction, the district court "should raise the issue"
                        sua sponte, giving the defendant an opportunity to decide whether such an
                        instruction is desirable. Id. at 731, 30 P.3d at 1132.
                                    When the State introduces bad act evidence, the failure to give
                        Tavares instructions is reviewed for harmless error, even if the defendant

                        does not request one. Id. at 731-32, 30 P.3d at 1132 ("Because the defendant
                        no longer has the burden of requesting a limiting instruction on the use of
                        uncharged bad act evidence, we will no longer review cases involving the
                        absence of the limiting instruction for plain error. Instead, we will review
                        future cases for error under NRS 178.598."). The standard of review "is
                        whether the error 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
                        determining the jury's verdict.' Thus, unless [the court is] convinced that
                        the accused suffered no prejudice . . . , the conviction must be reversed." Id.
                        at 732, 30 P.3d at 1132 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
                        States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
                                    On the other hand, "a party will not be heard to complain on
                        appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the
                        opposite party to commit." Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871 P.2d
                        343, 345 (1994) (quoting 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 713 (1962)).

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                                                              19
(())             -,s2
              4411
                   Thus, under the invited error doctrine, an appellant is not entitled to relief
                   if they "induced or provoked" the error in the trial court. Id.
                               As noted above, Chadwick introduced the threat into evidence
                   while cross-examining Henry and failed to object when the State asked
                   Henry follow-up questions about both the threat and his gang affiliation on
                   redirect. Additionally, Chadwick did not request Tavares instructions in
                   connection with either the threat (which he first elicited) or the gang
                   affiliation evidence (which the State first elicited).
                               Although the Tavares decision contains language suggesting
                   that a defendant has no burden to request a limiting instruction, that case
                   involved a situation where the State introduced the bad act into evidence,
                   not the defendant. The reason the supreme court placed the burden on the
                   State to request a limiting instruction had to do with the State's role in
                   admitting the bad act evidence:
                                     Because the prosecutor is the one who must
                               seek admission of uncharged bad act evidence and
                               because the prosecutor must do so in his capacity
                               as a servant to the law, we conclude that the
                               prosecutor shall henceforth have the duty to
                               request that the jury be instructed on the limited
                               use of prior bad act evidence.
                   Tavares, 117 Nev. at 731, 30 P.3d at 1132.
                                By contrast, a defendant who introduces a bad act into evidence

                   invites the error and is not automatically entitled to receive a Tavares
                   instruction without request. See LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 276, 321
                   P.3d 919, 928 (2014); Morton v. State, No. 83884-COA, 2022 WL 4391751,
                   at *4 (Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2022) (Order of Affirmance) (declining to reach
                   the appellant's argument that the district court erred by failing to give a
                   Tavares instruction where the defendant elicited the bad act evidence and

                   failed to request a limiting instruction). Other jurisdictions with statutes
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(0) t 9478
                       similar to NRS 48.045(2) have also determined that trial courts are not
                       obligated to sua sponte provide limiting instructions when the defendant
                       introduces bad act evidence. See, e.g., State v. Benitez, No. 96257, 2011 WL
                       5118418, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2011) (concluding that the trial court
                       was not required to give a limiting instruction because the bad act evidence
                       was initially raised by the defense on cross-examination); State v. Elston,
                       No. 98,344, 2008 WL 4291518, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2008) ("The
                       State did not present prior bad acts evidence requiring a limiting
                       instruction; the defendant's presentation of such evidence and failure to
                       request a limiting instruction constitutes invited error . . . .").
                                   Therefore, we hold that a defendant bears the burden of
                       requesting a limiting instruction when they directly elicit bad act evidence.
                       In such circumstances, the general rule set forth in NRS 47.110 applies:
                       "When evidence which is admissible . . . for one purpose but
                       inadmissible . . . for another purpose is admitted, the judge, upon request,
                       shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
                       accordingly." NRS 47.110 (emphasis added). Further, when a defendant
                       introduces a bad act and fails to request a limiting instruction, the district
                       court is not obligated to raise the issue or provide a Tavares instruction sua
                       sponte. In this case, Chadwick directly elicited Henry's testimony about his
                       threat, and therefore it was Chadwick's burden to request a Tavares
                       limiting instruction, if he desired one, to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice
                       in connection with the threat. See NRS 47.110. Because he did not request
                       a limiting instruction in connection with the threat, Chadwick invited any
                       alleged error regarding the absence of a Tavares instruction, and he is not
                       entitled to relief.

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         OF
      NEVADA
                                                             21
101 1947IS     5-,r,
                                  Although Chadwick was not entitled to a Tavares instruction
                      pertaining to the threat, he was entitled to a Tavares instruction to limit
                      the jury's consideration of his gang affiliation, which the State elicited on
                      redirect. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court's error in failing to give
                      that instruction was harmless.
                                  In Tavares, the supreme court determined that the absence of
                      a limiting instruction was prejudicial and warranted reversal when the
                      State introduced prior bad act evidence that the appellant had previously
                      engaged in the same behavior underlying the charge for which he stood trial.
                      117 Nev. at 728-33, 30 P.3d at 1130-33. The appellant was charged with
                      first-degree murder in the death of his three-month-old daughter. Id. at
                      728, 30 P.3d at 1130. The State's theory was that the appellant, who had a
                      history of mishandling children, broke his daughter's ribs and asphyxiated
                      her. Id. To prove its case, the State introduced evidence that the appellant
                      had mishandled another child six years earlier and also squeezed his infant
                      daughter and covered her mouth on prior occasions. Id. at 728-29, 30 P.3d
                      at 1130. No limiting instruction was given regarding the use or purpose of
                      this prior bad act testimony, which was admitted to establish Tavares's
                      propensity to engage in similar conduct. Id. The supreme court noted that
                      Tavares's conviction rested primarily on circumstantial evidence and prior
                      bad acts, and the prior bad act evidence "impermissibly tainted the jury's
                      verdict." Id. at 733, 30 P.3d at 1133.
                                   In contrast, Chadwick's conviction in this case did not rest
                      primarily on circumstantial evidence and prior bad acts. Chadwick did not
                      dispute that he was in an accident or that he left the scene. Further,
                      multiple witnesses, including Chadwick himself, testified to facts that
                      would imply he knew or should have known he was in an accident. Henry

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                                                           22
Olt   I947B   AW5ra
                   testified as a direct eyewitness to Chadwick's actions and stated that she
                   told him that he had struck a child with his van but he continued to flee the
                   scene.     She also testified that Chadwick had consumed a substantial
                   amount of alcohol, which provided a motive for him to flee and inferentially
                   established his knowledge of the accident. In addition, Chadwick testified
                   that he was driving through the intersection and heard a "thump" outside
                   his van.     While Chadwick testified that he believed he hit a pothole,
                   Detective Alrnaguer testified that there were no potholes or irregularities
                   in the road near the accident site. Several members of T.B.'s family also
                   testified that Chadwick drove away quickly after the accident.
                                 Further, Chadwick's gang affiliation was not offered to show
                   that he "acted in conformity therewith" to prove guilt of the underlying
                   charges, which was central to the supreme court's prejudice analysis in
                   Tavares. NRS 48.045(2). Therefore, we conclude that any error in failing
                   to provide a Tavares instruction to limit the jury's consideration of
                   Chadwick's gang affiliation was harmless and did not have a "substantial
                   and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776; see
                   also Tinch, 113 Nev. at 1176, 946 P.2d at 1065.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                                 In summary, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
                   its discretion in admitting evidence of Chadwick's alcohol consumption and
                   apparent intoxication prior to the accident. This evidence was admissible
                   to establish Chadwick's motive to flee and, inferentially, his knowledge that
                   he had been in an accident when he fled the scene. We also hold that when
                   a defendant directly elicits bad act evidence, it is the defendant's burden to
                   request a Tavares limiting instruction in connection with that evidence. If
                   the defendant fails to do so, the district court is not obligated to provide one

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 ()1   19471i
                   sua sponte. Because Chadwick has not established any basis to reverse his
                   conviction, we affirm the judgment of conviction.'"

                                                                                       J.
                                                      Westbrook

                   We concur:

                       L
                   l3ulla
                             awasftftwisaft,„,,..

                                     also argues that (1) the district court plainly erred in
                            1"Chadwick
                   admitting a 9-1-1 call; (2) the district court abused its discretion in
                   sentencing; and (3) cumulative error warrants reversal.            We have
                   considered those arguments and conclude that they lack     merit.  Insofar as
                   Chadwick has raised any other arguments           that are  not   specifically
                   addressed in this opinion, we have considered the same and similarly
                   conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.
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                                                        24