Court Opinion

ID: 9400679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-08 19:14:08.018122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.277054
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                                 FILED
                                    January 2023 Term                       June 8, 2023
                                                                              released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                          EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                          SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                               OF WEST VIRGINIA

                          Nos. 22-0384, 22-0387, and 22-0388

                              IN RE A.T.-1, A.T.-2, and B.T.-1

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Berkeley County
                        The Honorable Bridget Cohee, Judge
                   Case Nos. 21-JA-197, 21-JA-198, and 21-JA-199

                              VACATED AND REMANDED

                                 Submitted: April 25, 2023
                                    Filed: June 8, 2023

Phil Isner, Esq.                                   Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Isner Law Office LC, Inc.                          Attorney General
Elkins, West Virginia                              Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for Petitioner B.T.-2                      Lee Niezgoda, Esq.
                                                   Assistant Attorney General
Jeremy B. Cooper, Esq.                             Fairmont, West Virginia
Blackwater Law, PLLC                               Counsel for Respondent
Aspinwall, Pennsylvania                            Department of Health and Human
Counsel for Petitioner E.T.                        Resources

Jared M. Adams, Esq.
Adams Law Firm, PLLC
Martinsburg, West Virginia
Guardian ad Litem
CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to

de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts

without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and

shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or

neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly

erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the

finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not

overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must

affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety.” Syllabus Point 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va.

223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996).

              2.     “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a

question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of

review.” Syllabus Point 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415

(1995).

              3.     “The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, West

Virginia Code § 48-20-101, et seq., is a jurisdictional statute, and the requirements of the

                                              i
statute must be met for a court to have the power to adjudicate child custody disputes.”

Syllabus Point 6, Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W. Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008).

             4.     “All courts must be watchful for jurisdictional issues arising under the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), West Virginia

Code §§ 48-20-101 to -404 (2001). Even if not raised by a party, if there is any question

regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA then the court should sua

sponte address the issue as early in the proceeding as possible.” Syllabus Point 5, In re

Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021).

                                            ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:

                  The conduct that led to the filing of the abuse and neglect petition in this case

occurred while a family that lives in Pennsylvania was at a relative’s home in West

Virginia, and there is no dispute that the circuit court appropriately exercised temporary

emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement

Act (UCCJEA) 1 in removing the children from the care of their parents on a temporary

basis.       But, the circuit court conducted an adjudicatory hearing and issued rulings

adjudicating the parents as abusive and neglectful. And then after the hearing, but before

the adjudication order was entered, the circuit court contacted the home state of

Pennsylvania about jurisdiction. After Pennsylvania declined jurisdiction, the court then

entered the adjudicatory order, proceeded to disposition, and terminated the parental rights

of the mother and father. On appeal, the petitioner parents argue that the circuit court’s

order is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. We agree that the

limitations of the circuit court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction did not permit it to

entertain an adjudication of the abuse and neglect petition unless and until Pennsylvania,

the home state, declined jurisdiction.         We therefore vacate the circuit court’s order

terminating the parents’ parental rights and remand with instructions.

                          I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         1
             W. Va. Code §§ 48-20-101 to -404 (2001).
                                              1
              On September 8, 2021, the Department of Health and Human Resources

(DHHR) in Berkeley County filed an abuse and neglect petition against the parents, E.T.

and B.T.-2, alleging that they had abused and/or neglected their three children, A.T.-1,

A.T.-2, and B.T.-1. A.T.-1 and A.T.-2 are siblings who were adopted by the parents, and

B.T.-1 is the parents’ older, biological child. The petition acknowledged that the parents

and the subject children were Pennsylvania residents but outlined conduct that had

occurred while the children were at the grandmother’s home in West Virginia. 2 The

petition alleged that the children’s mother forced A.T.-1 to sing a song with lyrics that

everyone hated him and hit him with an open hand and a belt. The petition alleged that the

mother screamed that she hated him and was going to kill him, then threw him onto the

ground and choked him until petitioner father pulled her off the child. The petition also

alleged that A.T.-2 and B.T.-1 witnessed the abuse. Specifically, A.T.-2 told the Child

Protective Services (CPS) worker that her mother choked A.T.-1 until his face turned blue.

B.T.-1 gave a similar version of events, and also disclosed that it had happened before, but

not as bad, and that A.T.-1 enjoyed pushing the mother’s buttons.

              The children’s aunt called law enforcement and was told to take the child

from the scene and wait in the car. EMS arrived and took A.T.-1 to Berkeley Medical

              2
                Consistent with our treatment of cases involving sensitive facts, we use
initials where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re
K.H., 235 W. Va. 254, 256 n.1, 773 S.E.2d 20, 22 n.1 (2015). See also W. Va. R. App. P.
40(e).

                                             2
Center for examination.    The petition alleged that, during transport, A.T.-1 disclosed a

history of abuse, including choking and starvation for “do[ing] something bad” and that he

is the only one to get punished because the parents only wanted his sister, A.T.-2, and “got

stuck with him too.” A.T.-1 also disclosed that his father “doesn’t like to do it” but that

his mother makes the father hit A.T.-1 with a belt, too. A.T.-2 corroborated that the parents

don’t let A.T.-1 eat when he is bad.

              The maternal aunt, according to the petition, disclosed that she and the

grandmother had A.T.-1 for the last three months until about two weeks prior to the incident

as petitioner mother had threatened to harm him. She corroborated A.T.-1’s statement that

petitioner mother wanted only A.T.-2 and that petitioner mother would only give A.T.-1

oatmeal and water and make him stay in his bedroom night and day.

              The grandmother told CPS workers that petitioner mother is a doting mother

to the other two children, but A.T.-1’s behavioral problems have put her at wit’s end.

According to the grandmother, the mother has tried to have him tested for autism or put in

a behavioral/alternative school, but the school doesn’t think he has any issues. She also

disclosed that petitioner parents lock his bedroom door so that he can’t get out and that he

has climbed out of his bedroom window to get into the kitchen to get food, that he drinks

out of the toilet, drinks perfume, eats dog food, and has eaten out of the trash can.

                                              3
                The petition alleges that A.T.-1 was both an abused and neglected child based

on those allegations and alleged that A.T.-2 and B.T.-1 were abused children as they

resided in the home and had witnessed the abuse. As to the father, it alleged physical and

emotional abuse as well as a failure to protect the children from the mother.

                The circuit court entered an order on September 8, 2021, placing custody of

the children with DHHR pending the preliminary hearing. Petitioner parents waived their

preliminary hearing and filed answers to the petition, admitting to the substantive

allegations in the petition. The circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing on November 9,

2021. During that hearing, petitioner parents admitted to the substantive allegations of the

petition consistent with their answers to the petition and waived their right to a contested

adjudication after a colloquy with the court to that effect. The court also made a finding

on the record of aggravated circumstances.         It acknowledged that adjudication was

complete and set the case for disposition. After accepting the stipulations, the court then

addressed jurisdiction, noting that the case involved Pennsylvania respondents and children

as alleged in the petition and acknowledged that its jurisdiction fell under emergency

jurisdiction.

                Later, on November 19, 2021, the circuit court contacted a Pennsylvania

court to address jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and the Pennsylvania court declined

jurisdiction, agreeing that West Virginia was the more appropriate forum, for, among other

reasons, the fact that an adjudicatory hearing had already been conducted.               The
                                              4
administrative order as to jurisdiction relays that the Pennsylvania court agreed West

Virginia was the more appropriate forum due to the significant connection of the children

to the kinship providers in West Virginia, declination of home state jurisdiction, and the

substantial evidence available in the State of West Virginia. The circuit court entered an

order as to jurisdiction on December 17, 2021.

               The circuit court entered the order reflecting its rulings at the November 9,

2021 adjudicatory hearing on January 7, 2022. Consistent with the rulings made from the

bench, the order noted the stipulations of petitioner parents to the substantive allegations

of the petition and the finding of aggravated circumstances. The case proceeded to

disposition.

               The parents obtained their own services since DHHR was not required to

provide them due to the aggravated circumstances finding. At the dispositional hearing,

the parents minimized the incident in West Virginia, with the mother stating that the reason

they were there was because she had lost her temper and spanked A.T.-1. In response to

follow up as to whether there was anything else, she responded “no.” Petitioner parents

also blamed their conduct on A.T.-1’s behavioral problems and said that petitioner mother

had her hands on A.T.-1’s “collarbone” and she denied ever choking him. The circuit court

learned that B.T.-1 did not want his parents’ rights terminated and that he wished to be

reunited with them. It also heard testimony that B.T.-1 was withdrawn due to the absence

                                             5
of his parents, especially considering that he had some serious health issues and wanted

their comfort.

                 Ultimately, the circuit court terminated the parents’ rights to all three

children but left open post-termination visitation in a therapeutic setting with B.T.-1. On

appeal, there are two separate issues. First, the parents raise a jurisdictional challenge

under the UCCJEA. They contend that the circuit court adjudicated them prior to obtaining

declination jurisdiction from the home state of Pennsylvania, and, relatedly, do not have

the necessary information to substantively challenge jurisdiction because the circuit court

failed to make a record of its communication with the Pennsylvania court. Second, the

parents and the Guardian ad Litem, on behalf of B.T.-1, challenge the circuit court’s

decision to terminate parental rights as to B.T.-1 over his express wishes.

                                II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                 In reviewing dispositional rulings in abuse and neglect cases, we apply the

following standard of review:

                        Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court
                 are subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse
                 and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the
                 circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
                 evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
                 law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These
                 findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
                 clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
                 although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing
                 court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
                 conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a
                                                6
              reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
              would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
              finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible
              in light of the record viewed in its entirety.[3]

In examining the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, our review is de

novo: “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or

involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” 4 With

those standards in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments.

                                       III. ANALYSIS

              Jurisdiction in interstate child custody disputes, including abuse and neglect

proceedings, is governed by the UCCJEA. 5 The UCCJEA’s requirements have been

determined by this Court to demand a subject-matter jurisdiction analysis before a circuit

court may proceed to reach the merits of an abuse and neglect petition: “[t]he Uniform

Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, West Virginia Code § 48-20-101, et seq.,

is a jurisdictional statute, and the requirements of the statute must be met for a court to

              3
                  Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177
(1996).
              4
                  Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415
(1995).
              5
                See W. Va. Code § 48-20-201(b); In re J.C., 242 W. Va. 165, 170, 832
S.E.2d 91, 96 (2019) (“We note at the outset that, for purposes of the UCCJEA, an abuse
and neglect proceeding comes under its definition of a ‘child custody proceeding.’”)
(citation omitted).

                                               7
have the power to adjudicate child custody disputes.” 6 Under the UCCJEA, a “child

custody determination” means “a judgment, decree or other order of a court providing for

the legal custody, physical custody or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes

a permanent, temporary, initial and modification order[.]” 7

               West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a) outlines when a court of this State has

jurisdiction over abuse and neglect proceedings that implicate the UCCJEA due to

interstate contacts of the subject family: 8

              (a) Except as otherwise provided in section 20-204, a court of
              this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
              determination only if:

              (1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the
              commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the
              child within six months before the commencement of the
              proceeding, and the child is absent from this state but a parent
              or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state;

              (2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under
              subdivision (1) of this subsection, or a court of the home state
              of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground
              that this state is the more appropriate forum under section 20-
              207 or 20-208, and:

              (A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least
                  one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant

              6
                  Syl. Pt. 6, Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W. Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008).
              7
                  W. Va. Code § 48-20-102(c).
              8
                See id. § 48-20-201(b): “[s]ubsection (a) of this section is the exclusive
jurisdictional basis for making a child custody determination by a court of this State.”

                                               8
                      connection with this state other than mere physical
                      presence; and

               (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning
                   the child’s care, protection, training and personal
                   relationships;

               (3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or (2)
               of this subdivision have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
               ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum
               to determine the custody of the child under section 20-207 or
               20-208; or

               (4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under
               the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2) or (3) of this
               subsection.

The jurisdictional criteria was helpfully summarized in In re K.R. as “1) ‘home state’

jurisdiction; 2) ‘significant connection’ jurisdiction; 3) ‘jurisdiction because of declination

of jurisdiction’; and 4) ‘default’ jurisdiction.” 9

               Importantly, “[t]hese jurisdictional bases do not operate alternatively to each

other, but rather, in order of priority—reaching the next basis of jurisdiction only if the

preceding basis does not resolve the jurisdictional issue.” 10 We have discussed that “but

for the exercise of ‘temporary emergency’ jurisdiction as provided in Section 204 of the

UCCJEA, to exercise jurisdiction to determine child custody, a court of this state must

               9
                   229 W. Va. 733, 740, 735 S.E.2d 882, 889 (2012).
               10
                    Id.

                                                9
satisfy one of the four bases of jurisdiction set forth in Section 201(a).” 11 And, jurisdiction

may not be obtained under this statute until there is declination of home state jurisdiction

(assuming, where, as here, there is an undisputed home state) because West Virginia Code

§ 48-20-201(a) is a descending priority statute; the subsections are not alternative sources

of jurisdiction. The analysis does not move to a subsequent basis of jurisdiction if there is

a home state that satisfies subsection (1): “[o]ne of the requirements under West Virginia

Code § 48-20-201(a)(2) (2001), for a circuit court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction of a

child whose home state is not West Virginia, is that a ‘court’ of the home state of the child

must decline to exercise jurisdiction[.]” 12 To this point—that a court of this state obtains

jurisdiction when another state having a higher statutory priority of jurisdiction declines

it—this Court has previously quoted, by way of example, from a California case that the

“‘California court obtained jurisdiction on July 19, 2017, the date the Nevada court

declined to exercise jurisdiction.’” 13

              But West Virginia Code § 48-20-204(a) permits courts to take temporary

emergency jurisdiction if the circumstances so warrant:

              11
                   Id.
              12
                Syl. Pt. 4, in part, In re J.C., 242 W. Va. 165, 832 S.E.2d 91 (emphasis
added); see also, Syl. Pt. 9, In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. 456, 859 S.E.2d 399 (2021) (requiring
home state and any state with significant connection to decline jurisdiction before a court
may obtain jurisdiction under West Virginia Code § 48-20-201(a)(3)).
              13
                In re J.C., 242 W. Va. at 174, 832 S.E.2d at 100 (quoting In re E.R., 238
Cal. Rptr. 3d 871, 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)).

                                              10
              A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if
              the child is present in this state and the child has been
              abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
              child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is
              subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.

No party here challenges that the circuit court had the authority to exercise temporary

emergency jurisdiction over the children based on West Virginia Code § 48-20-204(a), but

the petitioner parents contend that the circuit court exceeded the scope of that temporary

emergency jurisdiction by conducting an adjudicatory hearing prior to Pennsylvania

declining to exercise home-state jurisdiction. And, for that reason, they argue that the

circuit court was without authority to have terminated their parental rights. DHHR and the

Guardian ad Litem argue that because the circuit court had obtained declination jurisdiction

by the time the adjudicatory order was entered, the circuit court appropriately exercised

jurisdiction in this case and that no interests are served by vacating and remanding. Those

arguments require that we consider the limitations on the scope of a court’s authority when

it exercises temporary emergency jurisdiction before the home state has declined

jurisdiction over the abuse and neglect proceeding.

              As the name suggests, temporary emergency jurisdiction is, first and

foremost, temporary.     And, the scope of the circuit court’s temporary emergency

jurisdiction, being emergent in nature, is narrow. We have rejected the notion that

emergency jurisdiction under West Virginia Code § 48-20-204(a) might double as

continuing subject-matter jurisdiction under § 48-20-201(a) to empower the circuit court

to preside over the merits of the abuse and neglect petition:
                                             11
             Courts addressing temporary emergency jurisdiction, under
             their version of the UCCJEA, have found that the power of a
             court under this provision is limited. It has been held that “[b]y
             its very nature, temporary emergency jurisdiction exists only
             for a limited period.” Beauregard v. White, 972 A.2d 619, 626
             (R.I. 2009). It has also been recognized that the “exercise of
             temporary emergency jurisdiction may not last until the trial
             court can enter an adjudicatory order finding a child dependent
             and neglected.” In re State ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d 1220, 1225
             (Colo. App. 2004). See In re Brode, 151 N.C.App. 690, 566
             S.E.2d 858, 860 (2002) (“When a court invokes emergency
             jurisdiction, any orders entered shall be temporary protective
             orders only.”); Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533, 549 (Tex.
             App. 2002) (“A court’s exercise of temporary emergency
             jurisdiction is temporary in nature and may not be used as a
             vehicle to attain modification jurisdiction for an ongoing,
             indefinite period of time.”). Under the facts of the instant case,
             the circuit court’s temporary emergency jurisdiction ended
             when DHHR filed the abuse and neglect petition. See WP v.
             MS, 141 Hawai’i 246, 407 P.3d 1282 (Ct. App. 2017)
             (“Temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is
             temporary and limited and does not include the authority to
             make permanent custody determinations.”); In re Gino C., 224
             Cal. App. 4th 959, 965–66, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 193, 197 (2014)
             (“temporary emergency jurisdiction does not confer authority
             to make a permanent child custody determination.”); In re
             N.R., 2009 WL 1508568, at *14 (Neb. Ct. App. May 26, 2009)
             (“we conclude that while the juvenile court had temporary
             emergency jurisdiction with regard to Ay.R., the juvenile court
             erred when it terminated Rony’s and Jessica’s parental rights
             to Ay.R. without satisfying the requirements of the
             UCCJEA.”).[14]

             Consistent with that case law, we reiterate that the scope of temporary

emergency jurisdiction under West Virginia Code § 48-20-204(a) is limited to protecting

             14
                  In re J.C., 242 W. Va. at 174 n.28, 832 S.E.2d at 100 n.28.

                                             12
the child pending action by the home state, if one exists. Other courts have likened the

scope of temporary emergency jurisdiction to the entry of a temporary protective order,

effective only until the home state is notified and either assumes jurisdiction over the

children or declines to do so. 15

              We have made similar conclusions based on West Virginia Code § 48-20-

204(b). That statute provides, in relevant part, that:

              [i]f a child custody proceeding has not been or is not
              commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under
              sections 20-201 through 20-203, inclusive, of this article, a
              child custody determination made under this section becomes
              a final determination, if it so provides and this state becomes
              the home state of the child.

In In re Z.H., this Court addressed the argument that West Virginia Code § 48-20-204(b)

permitted emergency jurisdiction (to enter an order ratifying removal of a child) to evolve

into a permanent order since another state did not institute abuse and neglect proceedings. 16

That argument was rejected, in part, because under our State law, pre-petition removals are

always temporary and emergent pending the filing of the petition and because there was no

reason for a court of another state to step in post-emergent removal when it was not made

              15
                 See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Biggs, 848 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Neb. 2014) (“under
the UCCJEA, a court may exercise emergency temporary jurisdiction under the act, but
such a determination remains in effect only until a court that would have jurisdiction to
make an initial custody determination (i.e., the home state of the child) enters an order.”);
accord, In re D.N.H.W., 955 So.2d 1236, 1239 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 2007).
              16
                   245 W. Va. at 468, 859 S.E.2d at 411.

                                             13
aware that there was any emergent situation that needed addressed. 17 Underscoring the

limited scope of temporary emergency jurisdiction, the Court concluded that temporary

emergency jurisdiction in that case ended upon the filing of the petition. “[W]hile the

circuit court was entirely within its authority and jurisdiction to protect [the child] from

imminent harm by ratifying the emergency, pre-petition removal, West Virginia Code §

48-20-204 did not confer home state jurisdiction upon the circuit court to continue

presiding over the subsequent litigation.” 18 Temporary emergency jurisdiction, then, did

not provide a basis of subject-matter jurisdiction for the circuit court to have reached the

merits of the abuse and neglect proceedings that ensued after the removal of the children.

              In this case, the children’s home state is Pennsylvania. So, Pennsylvania was

the only state with jurisdiction to reach the merits of an abuse and neglect proceeding

relative to the custody of the children until it ceded that jurisdiction. In other words, under

§ 48-20-201, no West Virginia court could assume jurisdiction over this abuse and neglect

proceeding and adjudicate the parents until Pennsylvania declined to exercise its home-

state jurisdiction. Here, the circuit court adjudicated the parents before Pennsylvania

declined to exercise jurisdiction, meaning the court adjudicated them without the authority

to do so.

              17
                   Id. at 468-69, 859 S.E.2d at 411-12.
              18
                   Id. at 469, 859 S.E.2d at 412.

                                               14
               DHHR and the Guardian ad Litem advocate that any jurisdictional defect in

adjudication can be cured since the circuit court had obtained declination jurisdiction by

the time it entered the adjudicatory order. While a court speaks through its orders, we have

clarified that in the UCCJEA context, temporary emergency jurisdiction does not permit a

circuit court to “continue presiding over the subsequent litigation” of child custody as

though West Virginia is the home state. 19 Bearing in mind that temporary emergency

jurisdiction is a basis of authority to protect a child, not a basis of subject-matter jurisdiction

over the resulting abuse and neglect proceedings, the question in adjudication of cases

involving the UCCJEA is not whether jurisdictional authority was at some point properly

acquired, the question is whether the circuit court had the jurisdiction to entertain the merits

of the child abuse and neglect proceeding pursuant to West Virginia Code § 48-20-201

when it did.

               In this case, subject-matter jurisdiction under West Virginia Code § 48-20-

201 was not “obtained” until Pennsylvania declined to exercise jurisdiction 20 and the

circuit court conducted an adjudicatory hearing prior to contacting the court in

Pennsylvania. During that hearing, it made rulings of a permanent nature in adjudicating

the parents as abusive and neglectful, made a finding of aggravated circumstances, and set

the case for disposition – all while purporting to proceed under temporary emergency

               19
                    Id.
               20
                    See supra n.13.

                                                15
jurisdiction. 21 Later, when the Pennsylvania court declined jurisdiction, it did so, in part,

because an adjudicatory hearing had already been cond ucted. At that point, West Virginia

then obtained jurisdiction to make a child custody determination under West Virginia Code

§ 48-20-201, meaning that the rulings as to adjudication made by the circuit court before

then were simply void.

              The inability to “cure” a jurisdictional defect in the UCCJEA context by later

acquiring jurisdiction is best illustrated by the instructions issued in In re J.C. In that case,

this Court concluded that Virginia had never declined jurisdiction, meaning that no West

Virginia court had actually obtained jurisdiction to reach the merits of the abuse and neglect

proceedings. 22 And even if Virginia declined, we found that North Carolina was a more

appropriate forum than West Virginia. 23 Importantly, this Court did not conditionally

vacate the dispositional order pending contact with Virginia and North Carolina to

determine whether jurisdiction could be cured. Rather, we remanded the case with

instructions for the circuit court to contact Virginia and, alternatively, North Carolina, and,

              21
                   See In re K.R., 229 W. Va. at 739 n.14, 735 S.E.2d at 888 n.14 (“It is clear
that the adjudication hearing conducted on April 14, 2011, was for the purpose of
determining permanent guardianship and was no longer of a ‘temporary’ or ‘emergency’
nature . . . .”). See also supra n.14, citing In re State ex rel. M.C., 94 P.3d 1220, in which
a Colorado appellate court concluded “[w]e disagree with the district court’s conclusion
that temporary emergency jurisdiction could be exercised up to the date of the adjudicatory
hearing[.]” Id. at 1225.
              22
                   In re J.C., 242 W. Va. at 175, 832 S.E.2d 101.
              23
                   Id. at 175-76, 832 S.E.2d at 101-02.

                                               16
upon declination of jurisdiction in those states, required the circuit court to hold de novo

adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. 24 Instructions requiring de novo adjudicatory

and dispositional hearings were likewise issued in In re Z.H., another case where home-

state declination was necessary before the West Virginia court had the jurisdictional

authority to hear the abuse and neglect case. 25 We find the facts of this case similarly

require the circuit court to conduct de novo adjudicatory and dispositional hearings.

               This resolution is far from ideal; we acknowledge that no interests are served

by vacation and remand. But in this UCCJEA analysis, subject-matter jurisdiction does

not ask whether interests are served, it asks whether the legal criteria for an exercise of

authority was met. It is for that reason that this Court held in In re Z.H. that in cases that

even so much as hint that the UCCJEA may apply, the jurisdictional question needs

addressed immediately:

                      All courts must be watchful for jurisdictional issues
              arising under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
              Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), West Virginia Code §§ 48-20-
              101 to -404 (2001). Even if not raised by a party, if there is
              any question regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
              under the UCCJEA then the court should sua sponte address
              the issue as early in the proceeding as possible.[26]

              24
                   Id. at 176, 832 S.E.2d at 102.
              25
                   245 W. Va. at 472, 859 S.E.2d at 415.
              26
                   Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.

                                               17
              This case is not one of murky home-state facts where the circuit court needed

to be “watchful” of hidden jurisdictional questions. Rather, the circuit court was aware

upon the filing of the petition that Pennsylvania was the home state, knew it needed to

contact the Pennsylvania court before it did anything else in the case, but nonetheless held

an adjudicatory hearing and issued a ruling from the bench adjudicating the parents. 27 Well

intentioned as it may have been, the circuit court exceeded the scope of its temporary,

emergency jurisdiction in doing so prior to contacting the Pennsylvania court and obtaining

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the abuse and neglect petition. For that reason, we

are forced to vacate the termination order that stemmed from that adjudication:

              “A decree entered in a pending suit in which the court lacks
              jurisdiction of the subject-matter is to that extent void[.]” Syl.
              Pt. 5, in part, State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W. Va.
              83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958), overruled on other grounds by
              Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W. Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981);
              see also, J.C., 242 W. Va. at 175, 832 S.E.2d at 101 (declaring
              abuse and neglect dispositional order void for circuit court’s
              lack of subject matter jurisdiction under UCCJEA); Universal
              Underwriters, 239 W. Va. at 347, 801 S.E.2d at 225
              (concluding that order deciding motion to dismiss was “void
              and unenforceable” because circuit court lacked subject matter
              jurisdiction); TermNet Merch. Servs., 217 W. Va. at 700, 619
              S.E.2d at 213 (recognizing that “any decree made by a court
              lacking jurisdiction is void”); Jackson v. Pszczolkowski, 2018

              27
                We have also held that “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, West Virginia Code § 48-20-101, et seq.,
cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel[,]” Syl. Pt. 5, Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.
Va. 402, 664 S.E.2d 743 (2008), and that lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first
time in this Court. See Syl. Pt. 4, In re Z.H. But we stress that where, as here, the parents
and the Guardian ad Litem were fully aware of the presence of a clear jurisdictional issue,
it behooves all involved to raise the issue and have the circuit court resolve it before
proceeding because only the children suffer from any delay in the failure to do so.

                                             18
              WL 5099642, at *2 (W. Va. Oct. 19, 2018) (memorandum
              decision) (“Without subject matter jurisdiction, any ruling
              issued by the circuit court would have been void.”).[28]

                                     IV. CONCLUSION

              For the above-stated reasons, we vacate the April 18, 2022 order terminating

the parents’ parental rights and remand for the circuit court to contact the appropriate court

in Pennsylvania to confirm it is declining to exercise jurisdiction given the outcome of this

appeal. 29 If Pennsylvania declines jurisdiction, then the circuit court will have subject-

matter jurisdiction to proceed under West Virginia Code § 48-20-201 and it is instructed

to conduct de novo adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. To facilitate expeditious

resolution, the mandate of this Court is issued contemporaneously with this Opinion.

              28
                   In re Z.H., 245 W. Va. at 472, 859 S.E.2d at 415.
              29
                  We require the circuit court to contact the Pennsylvania court to confirm it
is declining to exercise jurisdiction for two reasons. First, one of the reasons stated for
declination of jurisdiction was that the adjudicatory hearing had already been conducted
and, here, we conclude the circuit court was without jurisdiction to have conducted that
hearing. Second, there are references in the record to contact with Pennsylvania authorities
similar to our own DHHR, and we are without sufficient information to conclude whether
there is (or was) any pending action in Pennsylvania. Because we require this confirmation
from Pennsylvania, we need not address petitioner parents’ assignment of error relative to
the circuit court’s failure to make a record of its original communication. Nevertheless,
we remind the circuit court of the import of complying with West Virginia Code § 48-20-
110 (2001) when making that communication with Pennsylvania on remand. And, because
we vacate the dispositional order for lack of jurisdiction, we need not address the petitioner
parents’ assignment of error relative to the merits of that order.

                                              19
     Vacated and remanded.

20