Court Opinion

ID: 9575600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:15:16.357228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:36.093884
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the majority opinion but I write to distinguish Hall v. *531State, 196 Ga. App. 523 (— SE2d_) (1990) from the present case. In Hall, this court held that the defendant was entitled to introduce evidence of prior molestations of the child, not to show the victim’s reputation for nonchastity or her preoccupation with sex, but rather to show other possible causes of behavior by the victim that was ascribed to the “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.” In the present case, the hearsay sought to be admitted was not proffered for the limited purpose allowed by Hall. The hearsay evidence at issue clearly falls within the general rule set out by the majority that evidence of a child’s past sexual history, including acts committed by people other than the accused, is irrelevant and inadmissible. Invoking OCGA § 24-3-38 does not avail defendant, because only the remaining parts of an admission or conversation used by the State that are relevant are admissible. Brown v. State, 119 Ga. 572 (5) (46 SE 833) (1904).
Decided July 12, 1990.
Jerry C. Gray, for appellant.
Timothy G. Madison, District Attorney, Jeffrey G. Morrow, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.