Court Opinion

ID: 9964008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 18:10:20.526996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.970550
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  DAVID FINK                                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 690 WDA 2023

           Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 9, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-SA-0000433-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED: April 26, 2024

       Appellant, David Fink, appeals pro se from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench

trial conviction for failing to stop at a stop sign.1 We affirm.

       The trial court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

           … Officer Kyle Taylor, with the Brentwood Borough Police
           Department, testified that he observed [Appellant] fail to
           stop at a stop sign on February 19, 2023, at approximately
           9:35 p.m. Officer Taylor was parked in an unmarked vehicle
           located on Kaplan Avenue, facing Greenlee Road, coming up
           Route 51. He observed [Appellant’s] vehicle drive up
           Greenlee Road and slowly approach the three-way
           intersection, then accelerate a little as it went through the
           stop sign. [Appellant] was driving and did not stop at the
           stop sign. Instead, he accelerated through it.

____________________________________________

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b).
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        [Appellant] testified during the hearing [before the trial
        court]. His defense was that the traffic citation lists the
        intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road and there
        is no stop sign at this intersection. [Appellant] did not
        dispute that he drove through a stop sign at Greenlee Road
        and Kaplan Avenue, but he argued that the stop sign was
        not at the location that was written on his citation.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/25/23, at 2) (record citations omitted)

(unnumbered).

     The trial court opinion set forth the remaining procedural history of this

appeal as follows:

        [Appellant] filed a summary appeal from a conviction in the
        magisterial district court for failing to stop at a stop sign, in
        violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323. [The trial] court found
        [Appellant] guilty following a de novo trial on June 9, 2023,
        and imposed a fine of $25.00, plus court costs. [Appellant]
        filed a timely [pro se notice of] appeal to the Pennsylvania
        Superior Court on June 14, 2023. On June 2[8], 2023, [the
        trial] court ordered [Appellant] to file a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b)
        statement of the errors complained of on appeal within 21
        days. [Appellant] filed a motion for an extension on July 11,
        2023, since the trial transcript had not been filed. He was
        granted an extension. … [Appellant] filed his [Rule]
        1925(b) statement on August 1, 2023.

(Id. at 1) (unnumbered) (some capitalization omitted).

     Appellant now raises five issues for our review:

        Were my rights to a fair procedural due process violated?

        Were there discrepancies between the hearing before [the
        trial court] and the transcript?

        Is there a stop sign at the intersection cited, Greenlee and
        Bremen?

        Did [the trial court] state in [its] opinion dated and filed
        October 23, 2023, that I had admitted to not stopping at the

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          stop sign at Kaplan and Greenlee?

          Did [the trial court] find me guilty of failure to stop at a non-
          existing stop sign at Bremen and Greenlee Roads in
          Brentwood Pa.?

(Appellant’s Brief at 5-6).

       On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court misconstrued his

testimony regarding whether he failed to stop at the stop sign at the

intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee Road.2            Appellant denies the

court’s assertion that Appellant “never disputed that [he] failed to stop at a

stop sign at Kaplan and Greenlee[.]” (Id. at 9). Appellant insists that he

“only testified to the intersection at Bremen and Greenlee which [he] was cited

for[.]” (Id.) Appellant maintains that the court should have afforded him the

opportunity to present additional evidence to demonstrate that there was no

stop sign at the intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road. Further,

Appellant baldly asserts that the court found him guilty because he refused to

enter a guilty plea to a lesser offense. Appellant effectively concludes that the

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and

____________________________________________

2 We note that the  argument section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into
separate parts that correspond to each issue presented in the statement of
questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating: “The argument shall be
divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have
at the head of each part … the particular point treated therein, followed by
such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”).
Nevertheless, this briefing defect has not hampered our ability to conduct
meaningful appellate review of the one issue Appellant has developed in his
brief.

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the verdict was against the weight of evidence.3 We disagree.

       In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

          As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
          claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
          favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
          benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
          evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
          verdict when it establishes each material element of the
          crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
          beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
          Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
          certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
          resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
          and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
          fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

          The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
          wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that
          the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a
          crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where
          the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
          therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
          Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that
____________________________________________

3 “Ordinarily, a challenge to the weight of the evidence is waived unless it is

presented in the first instance to the trial court. Preservation of this type of
claim normally takes the form of a post-sentence motion. However, a
defendant convicted of a summary offense is precluded from filing any post-
sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 679 A.2d 779, 784
(Pa.Super. 1996). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D) (stating there shall be no
post-sentence motion in summary case appeals following trial de novo). Here,
Appellant did not have the opportunity to file a post-sentence motion following
the trial court’s de novo review of the summary appeal. Consequently, we
decline to find Appellant’s issue waived on this basis. See Dougherty, supra
at 784-85 (declining to find weight issue waived on appeal following de novo
review of summary offense; noting it would be unjust to deprive appellant of
right to raise weight issue on grounds he failed to file motion he was not
entitled to file; moreover, trial court explicitly addressed credibility and weight
of evidence in its written opinion).

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          of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
          accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
          demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s
          crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
          convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

      Our standard of review regarding challenges to the weight of the

evidence is as follows:

             The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder
             of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
             evidence and to determine the credibility of the
             witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its
             judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may
             only reverse the … verdict if it is so contrary to the
             evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

          Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d
          666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has
          ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is
          not to consider the underlying question of whether the
          verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather,
          appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably
          abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(most internal citations omitted). We have also explained:

          [A] new trial should not be granted because of a mere
          conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
          facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather,
          the role of the trial court is to determine that
          notwithstanding all the evidence, certain facts are so clearly
          of greater weight that to ignore them, or to give them equal

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           weight with all the facts, is to deny justice.

Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 699 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 603 Pa. 340, 362, 983 A.2d 1211, 1225 (2009)).

      Additionally, the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part, as

follows:

           § 3323. Stop signs and yield signs

                                     *    *    *

               (b) Duties at stop signs.—Except when directed to
           proceed by a police officer or appropriately attired persons
           authorized to direct, control or regulate traffic, every driver
           of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly
           marked stop line or, if no stop line is present, before
           entering a crosswalk on the near side of the intersection or,
           if no crosswalk is present, then at the point nearest the
           intersecting roadway where the driver has a clear view of
           approaching traffic on the intersecting roadway before
           entering. If, after stopping at a crosswalk or clearly marked
           stop line, a driver does not have a clear view of approaching
           traffic, the driver shall after yielding the right-of-way to any
           pedestrian in the crosswalk slowly pull forward from the
           stopped position to a point where the driver has a clear view
           of approaching traffic. The driver shall yield the right-of-
           way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on
           another roadway so closely as to constitute a hazard during
           the time when the driver is moving across or within the
           intersection or junction of roadways and enter the
           intersection when it is safe to do so.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3323(b).

      Instantly, Officer Taylor was sitting in his unmarked patrol car on Kaplan

Avenue, and he was facing the intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee

Road. Officer Taylor noticed Appellant’s vehicle traveling down Greenlee Road

“at a slow rate of speed.”       (N.T. Trial, 6/9/23, at 7).    Appellant’s vehicle

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approached the “three-way stop intersection,” where there is a “bend” in

Greenlee Road. (Id. at 7, 9). Officer Taylor stated: “Coming up to the stop

sign, [Appellant] actually accelerated through the stop sign and the

intersection.” (Id. at 9). In response, Appellant testified: “If you look at the

ticket it says Greenlee and Bremen. There is no stop sign at Greenlee and

Bremen. We never approached Greenlee and Bremen and went through a

stop sign.” (Id. at 14).

      The parties subsequently engaged in the following exchange:

         THE COURT:          Officer Taylor said that [Appellant]
         approached at a slow rate of speed. He was parked. I don’t
         know if you remember parked.

         [APPELLANT]:         Yes, he was.

         THE COURT:           What was that, Kaplan?

         [APPELLANT]:         Kaplan and Greenlee.

         THE COURT:           Is there a stop sign at Kaplan?

         [APPELLANT]:         There is. That’s a three stop sign—

         THE OFFICER:         That’s the one that he went through.

         THE COURT:           Okay.

         [APPELLANT]:         The   ticket  shows     Bremen and
         Greenlee. We did not—we stopped at Kaplan. We were
         having a discussion about our house fire, we were not going
         fast.

         THE COURT:             Well, so you didn’t have to be moving
         in and of itself, the rule is you stop at a stop sign.

         [APPELLANT]:         There is no stop sign at Bremen and
         Greenlee.

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         [THE COURT]:         I got you. But you didn’t stop at the
         stop sign at Kaplan?

         [APPELLANT]:         But that’s not what is on the citation.
         Do you want—

(Id. at 14-15). At that point, the court found Appellant guilty.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported Appellant’s conviction. See

Sebolka, supra. Officer Taylor unequivocally testified that Appellant failed

to stop at the stop sign at the intersection of Kaplan Avenue and Greenlee

Road, thereby establishing a violation of Section 3323(b). See 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 3323(b). The trial court found Officer Taylor’s testimony credible. (See

Trial Court Opinion at 3) (unnumbered).       Although the court considered

Appellant’s argument that the citation listed the offense as having occurred at

the intersection of Bremen Avenue and Greenlee Road, the court found any

error on the citation to be “de minimis.” (Id. at 2) (unnumbered). Following

our review, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s weighing of

the evidence.   See Champney, supra; Landis, supra.           Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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FILED: 4/26/2024

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