Court Opinion

ID: 9803916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:10:49.772317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:03:57.039111
License: Public Domain

J-S17021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WILLIAM EDWARD ZAGWOSKI                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 623 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 22, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0005558-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED: August 31, 2023

       Appellant, William Edward Zagwoski, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered on April 22, 2022. We affirm.

       On November 3, 2020, Appellant pleaded guilty to burglary and theft by

unlawful taking.1 During the plea colloquy, Appellant stipulated to the facts

contained in the affidavit of probable cause. N.T. Guilty Plea, 11/3/20, at 11.

The affidavit declared:

         On May 1, 2019, Doreen Booth filed a burglary report from
         her residence [in Pittsburgh]. She reported entry [into her
         residence] was made via an unlocked front door. She
         indicated her purse was stolen and contained several jewelry
         items, US Currency and personal documents valued in excess
         of $20,000.00.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(1)(ii) and 3921(a), respectively.
J-S17021-23

       On May 3, 2019, I [] interviewed Doreen Booth. Booth
       informed me her residence was burglarized on May 1, 2019
       at approximately [5:00 p.m.]. She informed me [Appellant]
       is the suspect. Booth informed me her neighbor (Harley
       Sunderlin) has security video of the incident. Booth informed
       me a neighbor known as Bill [] has been assisting her with
       yard work. On May 1st she spoke to Bill earlier in the day.
       She had gone to the second floor to check on her
       roommate/boyfriend (Dennis Bronson). Upon returning to
       the first floor [living room,] she discovered her purse was
       missing from near the couch and approximately six feet
       inside the front door. She indicated her brown Leather Giani
       Vernini shoulder strap purse contained the following items:
       $400.00 of gold scrap metal, 6-Diamond & gold rings
       (Champagne diamond, Sapphire, etc. size 4-5) 1-sapphire &
       diamond ring & necklace set, 1-1oz gold nugget, 1-.25 gold
       eagle coin, 9-Credit Cards (PNC Bank, Macy's, etc.), wallet
       belonging to Michael Dimperio (father-age 98) that contained
       his personal documents, PNC checkbook belonging to
       Florence Dimperio (mother), First National Bank checkbook
       (Booth), calendar/date book, keys (house, filing cabinets,
       etc.) and five envelopes containing US Currency
       (1-$1,377.00, 1-$790.00, 1-$1,500.00, 1-$70.00 &
       1-$25.00). Booth indicated the money envelopes were from
       recently cashed checks for Dimperio, Bronson and herself.
       Booth informed me she received the last name of Bill as
       Zagwoski from a neighbor. She described him as white male,
       age 48-49, 5'7" - 5'10" 140 lbs, thin build, gray hair with gray
       goatee.

                                     ...

       [Appellant] resides [on the same street as Booth and lives]
       with his wife (Irene), five children and the [Bundy-Shields]
       family (Felicia & Hymie & their children).

                                     ...

       On May 7, 2019, I spoke to Booth. She informed me she
       received a flash drive (provided to Pittsburgh Police) with the
       recording of her burglary from Harley Sunderlin. Booth
       indicated she viewed the video and photographs and
       recognized [Appellant] as he ran from her residence carrying
       her purse.

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                                      ...

        On May 7, 2019, [] Detective Carl Sanchioli and I arrived at
        [Booth’s residence] to re-interview Booth and present [a]
        photo array. We spoke to Booth on her front porch at her
        request. Booth reiterated her previous comments about the
        burglary. . . . Sanchioli presented the [photo array] to Booth
        (eight folders with a single photograph in each). . . . Booth
        positively identified [Appellant] from the array. . . .

        I viewed the security video recording. . . . [The recording
        depicts Appellant exiting his house and walking up the stairs
        of Booth’s residence. Shortly afterwards, Appellant is shown
        carrying the stolen purse and running back to his house].

Affidavit of Probable Cause, 5/9/19, at 1-2 (some capitalization omitted); see

also N.T. Guilty Plea, 11/3/20, at 11.

      As the trial court explained:

        At the time of [Appellant’s] April 22, 2021 sentencing, [the
        trial court] was presented with testimony of Doreen Booth,
        the victim; Dominic Zaccone, [Appellant’s] employer; Irene
        Zagowski, [Appellant’s] wife; and [Appellant]. [Appellant’s]
        guideline sentence called for [36] months in the mitigated
        range and [48 to 60] months in the standard range. After
        considering all of this evidence, along with the pre-sentence
        report, [the trial court] stated:

            See, I'm a little concerned that [Appellant] knew the
            victim and still he does this crime after doing the work
            and Ms. Booth apparently paying him for what he had
            done. I mean, knowing her circumstances and she has a
            blind friend she cares for, her elderly parents. Then to
            take off someone in that situation is pretty callus. I mean,
            now granted, he entered a plea, but there was evidence
            that put him at the scene, photographs from the video
            from the neighbor's home. I mean, I take that into
            consideration. He entered the plea nevertheless my heart
            is not bleeding for [Appellant] as far as his problem.
            Granted, I'm concerned that he has a group of children
            that he cares for, that is all admirable, but nevertheless

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          we're here today because of a very cruel crime that he
          perpetrated on Ms. Booth.

       [N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/21, at 29]. When asked about
       [Appellant’s] ability to repay the restitution to the victim,
       [Appellant], his wife, Mr. Zaccone, and his counsel had an
       off-the-record discussion. Thereafter, Mr. Zaccone testified
       that he would pay [Appellant] $1,000 per month to work for
       him on a daily basis. Mr. Zaccone would then submit this
       amount directly to the court for payment toward restitution.
       Additionally, counsel for [Appellant] stated:

          I was informed by [Appellant] and his wife that they will
          be receiving their income [tax refund] check in the next
          two months where they will be able to pay $4,000 in a
          lump sum to the victim in this case, so, essentially, the
          proposed plan is $4,000 payment in approximately two
          months, $1,000 a month after that so the restitution will
          be paid in roughly 14 months. Well, maybe 15 months
          considering the calendar year.

       [N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/21, at 39].        Based upon these
       representations, [the trial court] sentenced [Appellant to
       serve five years of probation, with 18 months of electronic
       home monitoring,] to allow [Appellant] to remain in the home
       with his five children and continue working to pay his
       restitution to the victim in this case. However, [Appellant]
       was advised by [the trial court] as follows:

          So that will be 18 months house arrest, five years
          probation, and [Appellant] is to make payments of $1,000
          a month to Ms. Booth for the next 17 months. If that
          payment is not made, then I'm going to view that as a
          probation violation. I'm sure you've [heard] the saying
          bring your toothbrush with you if you're back here on a
          probation violation.

          I don't like to pre-judge or anything but please take to
          heart, I think you probably do take to heart, how I view
          this crime as being very serious and the impact. So, in
          essence, you're getting a break because you have some
          children and I want to see full restitution to Ms. Booth.
          Sending you to the state correctional institution will not
          get her any restitution, I don't think will ever get her a

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            dime, but it might give her some satisfaction but I want
            to see her get that restitution. If she doesn't get the
            restitution, then you will go to a state prison, okay?

        [N.T. Sentencing, 4/22/21, at 41-42].

Trial Court Opinion, 10/17/22, at 5-6.

      In November 2021, Appellant’s probation officer charged Appellant with

violating the conditions of his probation.       Specifically, it was alleged that

Appellant violated his probation by: committing over 50 electronic violations

during the time he was on electronic home monitoring; testing positive “for

cocaine, opiates, and fentanyl on five occasions;” failing to pay the victim

restitution in the initial, agreed-upon amount of $4,000.00; and, failing to pay

the victim restitution in the agreed-upon amount of $1,000.00 per month.

See Violation of Probation (“VOP”) Hearing, 1/14/22, at 3.

      The trial court held Appellant’s VOP hearing on January 14, 2022.

During the hearing, Appellant was represented by an attorney from the

Allegheny County Public Defender’s Office.

      Appellant told the trial court that he was currently employed as an

automobile mechanic for Midas. Id. at 11. He further told the court that, if

he were able to continue working, he would be able to pay the victim in full

because “[m]y wages will be attached, so I can’t touch it.” Id. at 12.

      Further, the Commonwealth spoke with Appellant’s attorney and

informed the trial court:

        Your Honor, after speaking with . . . [Appellant’s attorney], I
        think we have come to an agreement, if Your Honor’s okay
        with it, to try this last-ditch effort to essentially try to get [the

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       victim] her money where he can be transferred to Renewal
       so that will allow him to leave for a job and be in a custodial
       setting, but I made it clear that if he does not pay this
       restitution or this isn’t working, we would be asking
       for a state sentence, because at the last – you did say that
       if payment is not made, I’m going to view that as a probation
       violation, and I’m sure you’ve heard the saying “Bring your
       toothbrush with you” because you will go to state prison.

Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added).

     Appellant’s attorney then reiterated:

       So I think if we keep [Appellant] not on electronic home
       monitoring, which seems like it’s not successful, but in a
       carceral setting like [the Allegheny County Treatment
       Alternative (“ACTA”)] or the Renewal Center, in custody, he
       leaves to go to work only, he comes back and the payments
       are made directly, if that doesn’t work out in the next 90 days
       – it’s like his last-ditch chance to show [the trial court] that
       he is actually going to make an effort moving forward if he’s
       connected with treatment. I think, Your Honor, I don’t have
       a great argument if we come back after the next 90 days or
       four months and no change is made. I think if he can show
       this court some good faith, then we can continue to keep him
       in ACTA moving forward, but sending him to state prison now
       would not allow the victim to receive any restitution, and
       looking out for that interest, I think that potentially allowing
       him one last chance to make restitution payments here,
       because he’s had almost a year to do it, Your Honor, and
       hasn’t made any progress, but one last chance allows [the
       victim] to start becoming whole and potentially resolving this
       case towards that. . . .

       Your Honor, I would just impress upon the fact that I
       understand the victim wants [Appellant] to go to state prison,
       but trying to make her whole is, I think, what I was trying to
       focus on with probation and [the Commonwealth]. We were
       trying to reach that agreement. I think that after 90 days,
       if there’s no progress made on that, I don’t have an
       argument to make to the court as to that, but at last,
       Judge, one final shot.

Id. at 7-8 and 9-10 (emphasis added).

                                    -6-
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      The trial court accepted the agreement between Appellant and the

Commonwealth and provided Appellant a 90-day “trial period,” where

Appellant would be incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail, “with permission

to go to Renewal so that he can work in a custodial setting” and pay his

restitution.   Id. at 14-15.   Further, in response to Appellant’s claim of

employment, the trial court instructed the Commonwealth to investigate

whether Appellant was actually employed in the manner that Appellant

averred during the hearing. Id. The trial court, however, impressed upon

Appellant that the hearing would reconvene in 90 days and “if this doesn’t

work out or [your claim of work is] not true, then [Appellant] had his chance.”

Id. at 15.

      The VOP hearing reconvened on April 22, 2022, where Appellant was

represented by a new attorney from the Allegheny County Public Defender’s

Office (hereinafter “Appellant’s Counsel” or “Counsel”). At the beginning of

the hearing, the Commonwealth informed the trial court:

         The last time we were here, Your Honor, you stated that you
         would like me to contact his supervising officer here in
         Allegheny County, [Appellant] stated that he had a work
         history at Midas in Washington, PA. I did speak to his
         [supervisor], she stated that she spoke to Midas's District
         Manager, Dale, he informed her that [Appellant] had worked
         at Midas in Washington, but no longer does. He did not have
         the dates available, but he said he worked early summer of
         2021 and that was for a couple of months at most and he just
         stopped showing up for work.

         Since his incarceration [in November] 2021, there have been
         some payments. He was originally court-ordered to pay

                                     -7-
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         $16,782 to the victim, he has paid $194 since incarceration,
         Your Honor.

N.T. VOP Hearing, 4/22/22, at 3-4.

       During the hearing, Appellant’s Counsel informed the trial court that she

had “just [been] assigned this [case] last week” and she requested a

continuance so that she could “get our social workers involved to possibly draft

some    kind of aid in     sentencing   document because       in   [Appellant’s]

conversations there are significant mental health and, obviously, substance

abuse problems.” Id. at 6 and 10. As to why Appellant’s Counsel failed to

request a continuance earlier, Counsel declared:

         I [] would also like to point out that the report that I was
         provided was dated November 24, 2021, and the
         recommendation at that point in time was to get permission
         for [Appellant] to transfer to alternative housing to address
         the substance abuse and to begin making payments to his
         financial obligations. So, that was the last recommendation
         that I was provided until we were here today.

Id. at 7-8.

       The trial court did not expressly rule on Counsel’s request for a

continuance; nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to sentencing. Prior to

sentencing, Appellant’s Counsel informed the trial court:

         [S]ince [Appellant’s] been incarcerated he has[,] on his own
         volition[,] completed the Hope Program so he is starting to
         address his long history of substance abuse. He is also on,
         basically, he is on medication for his mental illness.

Id. at 13-14.

       The trial court then sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of

three-and-one-half to seven years in prison, followed by four years of

                                      -8-
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probation, for his convictions. Id. at 15. Appellant’s sentence fell within the

mitigated range of the sentencing guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

      Appellant filed a timely motion to modify his sentence and claimed that

his sentence was excessive because the trial court failed to consider his

mitigating circumstances. See Appellant’s Motion to Modify, 5/2/22, at 1-6;

see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). The trial court did not rule upon Appellant’s

motion and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E)

(“[a] motion to modify a sentence imposed after a revocation shall be filed

within 10 days of the date of imposition. The filing of a motion to modify

sentence will not toll the 30-day appeal period”).

      Appellant raises two claims on appeal:

        1. Did the probation violation court abuse its discretion when
        it denied Appellant’s request to postpone his April 2022
        probation violation re-sentencing hearing in order to permit
        his attorney to prepare a mitigation plan for him, given that
        (A) a mitigation plan from the defense was essential if the
        court below was to be fully-informed as it decided upon
        sentence; (B) the attorney representing Appellant was newly-
        assigned to the case, and had not had the opportunity to
        develop a mitigation plan; (C) the delay sought was of
        modest length, with Appellant to remain detained during the
        delay; and (D) the interest of both the Commonwealth and
        of the judiciary would have been largely unharmed had the
        hearing been postponed?

        2. Was Appellant’s [three-and-one-half to seven] year
        confinement sentence, imposed at his probation violation
        hearing, a clearly unreasonable sentence, given that (A) his
        post-teenage criminal history was negligible (with his prior
        conviction history over 34 years following his 19th birthday
        consisting of a single misdemeanor forgery conviction), (B)
        his burglary conviction was a purse snatching that did not
        involve physical harm to any person or damage to the victim’s

                                     -9-
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        home, and (C) considerable mitigation existed in the case
        that the probation court indicated it would not consider?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      Appellant first claims that the trial court erred when it denied his request

for a continuance.

        A decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the
        sound discretion of the trial court. We will not reverse a trial
        court's decision absent a showing of abuse of that discretion
        or prejudice to the defendant. An abuse of discretion is not
        merely an error of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused
        when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
        exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
        partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence
        or the record.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 966 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation

marks, citations, and corrections omitted). “A bald allegation of an insufficient

amount of time to prepare will not provide a basis for reversal of the denial of

a continuance motion.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 57 A.3d 85, 91 (Pa. Super.

2012). Instead:

        an appellant must be able to show specifically in what manner
        he was unable to prepare his defense or how he would have
        prepared differently had he been given more time. [An
        appellate court] will not reverse a denial of a motion for
        continuance in the absence of prejudice.

Id. (quotation marks, citations, and corrections omitted).

      We further note that Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 106

governs the granting of continuances. The rule provides:

        (A) The court . . . may, in the interests of justice, grant a
        continuance, on its own motion, or on the motion of either
        party.

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                                      ...

        (C) When the matter is in the court of common pleas, the
        judge shall on the record identify the moving party and state
        of record the reasons for granting or denying the
        continuance. . . .

        (D) A motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall
        be made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the
        proceeding. A later motion shall be entertained only when
        the opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the
        defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or
        the interests of justice require it.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106.

      On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion

when it failed to grant his request for a continuance, so that Appellant’s

Counsel could “consult with a team of social workers employed by [the

Allegheny County Public Defender’s Office] in order to develop a [mitigation

plan] for the consideration of the [trial court] – a plan that would enable the

[trial court] to punish Appellant for his misconduct while simultaneously

working to treat him for ills and while facilitating the payment of restitution.”

Appellant’s Brief at 40 (emphasis omitted). This claim fails.

      At the outset, we conclude that Counsel’s motion was untimely.

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 106(D) states:

        A motion for continuance on behalf of the defendant shall be
        made not later than 48 hours before the time set for the
        proceeding. A later motion shall be entertained only when
        the opportunity therefor did not previously exist, or the
        defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or
        the interests of justice require it.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D).

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      Here, Appellant’s Counsel was assigned the case approximately one

week prior to the Friday, April 22, 2022 hearing.      See N.T. VOP Hearing,

4/22/22, at 10 (Counsel informed the trial court that she had “just [been]

assigned this [case] last week”). Further, during the prior hearing on January

14, 2022, Counsel’s predecessor from the Allegheny County Public Defender’s

Office expressly agreed that the VOP hearing would reconvene in 90 days and

“if this doesn’t work out or [Appellant’s claim of work is] not true,” then

Appellant would most likely begin serving a state sentence. See N.T. VOP

Hearing, 1/14/22, at 6-15.       Since the January 14, 2022 hearing was

transcribed, Counsel’s claim of ignorance at the April 22, 2022 hearing

regarding the possibility of a state sentence rings hollow and Counsel’s request

for a continuance was thus untimely. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 106(D).

      We also note that Appellant did not submit a “mitigation plan” to either

the trial court or this Court – and, thus, we have no ability to determine

whether Appellant suffered prejudice in this case. Therefore, Appellant’s claim

fails for this second, independent reason. Ross, 57 A.3d at 91 (“[an appellate

court] will not reverse a denial of a motion for continuance in the absence of

prejudice”).

      Finally, to the extent the mitigation plan was based upon Appellant’s

history of mental illness and substance abuse, the trial court in this case was

well-aware that Appellant suffered from both of these illnesses. See, e.g.,

N.T. VOP Hearing, 4/22/22, at 13-14. Moreover, a mere 98 days prior to the

April 22, 2022 VOP hearing, the trial court, Appellant, and the Commonwealth

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arrived at a plan to “enable the [trial court] to punish Appellant for his

misconduct while simultaneously working to treat him for ills and while

facilitating the payment of restitution.” See Appellant’s Brief at 40 (emphasis

omitted). To be sure, during the January 14, 2022 VOP hearing, the trial court

ordered Appellant incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail, “with permission

to go to Renewal so that he can work in a custodial setting” and pay his

restitution. Therefore, the trial court was well-aware of possible plans that

might serve “as an alternative to state confinement” – and Appellant’s claim

of error regarding a generic and unspecified mitigation plan thus fails for this

third reason.

      On appeal, Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion

when it imposed a “manifestly excessive” sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 46.

      Pursuant to statute, Appellant does not have an automatic right to

appeal the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Instead, Appellant must petition this Court for permission to appeal the

discretionary aspects of his sentence. Id.

      As this Court has explained:

        To reach the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we
        conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
        appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, Pa.R.A.P. 902,
        903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
        sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence,
        Pa.R.Crim.P. [708]; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal
        defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
        substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not
        appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 [Pa.C.S.A.]
        § 9781(b).

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Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11 (Pa. Super. 2007).

      Here, Appellant has complied with the first three requirements. He filed

a motion to modify his sentence, filed a timely notice of appeal, and included

a concise statement of the reasons relied upon pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

Thus, Appellant preserved his current appellate claim. We will now determine

whether Appellant's claim presents a “substantial question that the sentence

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.”        Cook, 941

A.2d at 11.

      Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must “advance

a colorable argument that the trial judge's actions were: (1) inconsistent with

a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental

norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. McKiel,

629 A.2d 1012, 1013 (Pa. Super. 1993); Commonwealth v. Goggins, 748

A.2d 721, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc).        Additionally, in determining

whether an appellant has raised a substantial question, we must limit our

review to Appellant's Rule 2119(f) statement. Goggins, 748 A.2d at 726.

This limitation ensures that our inquiry remains “focus[ed] on the reasons for

which the appeal is sought, in contrast to the facts underlying the appeal,

which are necessary only to decide the appeal on the merits.”       Id. at 727

(emphasis omitted).

      Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion at sentencing

because the trial court failed to consider the following mitigating evidence: 1)

Appellant’s “post-teenage criminal history was negligible;” 2) Appellant’s

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burglary conviction was a “purse snatching that did not involve physical harm

to any person or damage to the victim’s home;” and 3) Appellant suffered

from “childhood sexual victimization and homeless[ness,] PTSD diagnosis,

drug addiction, and physical ailments.”2 See Appellant’s Brief at 46.

       This Court has held that “an excessive sentence claim – in conjunction

with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating factors – raises a

substantial question.” Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (citations omitted), citing Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d

1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117

A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (same). Nevertheless, Appellant's

claim fails because, during the sentencing hearing, the trial court was

informed by a presentence investigation report (“PSI”).

       “Our Supreme Court has determined that where the trial court is

informed by a [PSI], it is presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate

sentencing factors and considerations, and that where the court has been so

informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”         Commonwealth v.

Edwards, 194 A.3d 625, 637 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted).            “The

sentencing judge can satisfy the requirement that reasons for imposing

sentence be placed on the record by indicating that he or she has been
____________________________________________

2 The trial court sentenced Appellant following the revocation of his probation

for technical violations; hence, the sentencing guidelines were “the same as
the initial sentencing guidelines.” 204 Pa.Code §§ 303.1(b) and 307.3(a).
Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant in the mitigated range of the
sentencing guidelines. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-9.

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informed by the [PSI]; thus properly considering and weighing all relevant

factors.” Id. (citation omitted). Further, as this Court has held: “[w]here a

PSI exists, we presume that the trial court was aware of relevant information

regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along

with mitigating statutory factors. A PSI constitutes the record and speaks for

itself.” Commonwealth v. Bonner, 135 A.3d 592, 605 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).

      A PSI was part of the record in this case.      See N.T. VOP Hearing,

1/22/22, at 12 (Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that “there was a [PSI]

done in this case”). Therefore, we presume the trial court weighed all of the

appropriate sentencing factors, including the mitigating factors that Appellant

now claims were ignored. See Bonner, 135 A.3d at 605. Appellant’s claim

on appeal thus fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2023

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