Court Opinion

ID: 9470346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:03:06.322652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:50.815898
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I am in full accord with the analysis, discussion and result of the Majority Opinion. I note, however, that personally I would have ordered relief that was slightly greater than the relief afforded by the Majority in that I would have directly cured the result of the Secretary’s breach of his own regulations by effectively ordering a hearing. The Secretary’s conceded violation of his own regulations1 would lead me to instruct the district court that on remand the Secretary should be directed to grant Penner’s request for the out-of-time filing of Penner’s motion requesting a hearing. Once that request was granted, the hearing would follow as a matter of course. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980) and the regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.930 and 20 C.F.R. § 404.933 (1982).
There can be no dispute that the Secretary’s failure to notify Penner’s counsel, rather than Penner himself, has given rise to these extended proceedings. But for the Secretary’s failure to observe his own regulations, Penner would have long since had the hearing he seeks. Thus, by ordering the Secretary to extend the time for Penner’s motion, that hearing would now be available.
However, I cannot seriously quarrel with the remedy prescribed by the Majority which “will reverse the district court’s order and will remand with instructions that the district court direct the Secretary to make a determination, after considering such evidence as may be presented, whether mental incapacity prevented Mr. Penner from *262understanding and pursuing his administrative remedies.” Maj.Op. at 261. The Majority has patterned its relief after the relief afforded in analogous cases, see Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir.1981); Schrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.1980), and, more importantly, in accordance with the relief sought by Pen-ner himself (see Penner’s brief at 23).
Thus while I believe that ultimately Pen-ner will receive the hearing to which he is entitled, I cannot fault the Majority for eschewing the shortcut to that remedy which I would prefer. Suffice it to say, that these protracted proceedings and Pen-ner’s expenditure of money, time and effort, to say nothing about the delay in possible future benefits, could have been readily avoided had the regulations which the Secretary had himself promulgated, by which he is bound, and which are designed to prevent the occurrence of this type of situation, been properly followed.

. As the Majority Opinion correctly observes (see Maj.Op. at 259 & n. 3), the Secretary was required to give notice to Penner’s counsel once the Secretary had been notified to do so. It is not contradicted that such notification was received by the Secretary, and indeed, the Secretary, at oral argument, conceded that his regulations in this respect had not been followed.