Court Opinion

ID: 9954616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:09:19.766969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:06.423574
License: Public Domain

STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                    IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A22-0960

Court of Appeals                                                              McKeig, J.

State of Minnesota,

                      Respondent,

vs.                                                               Filed: March 20, 2024
                                                               Office of Appellate Courts
John Ishmael Bradley, III,

                      Appellant.

                              ________________________

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, and;

Kimberly J. Maki, Saint Louis County Attorney, Aaron Welch, Assistant Saint Louis
County Attorney, Virginia, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Greg Scanlan, Assistant State
Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
                             ________________________

                                      SYLLABUS

      1.     Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict of second-degree assault

when the State presented evidence that an ordinary object was likely to produce death or

great bodily harm in the manner in which it was used.

      2.     For purposes of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1) (2022),

which provides that a person “may be convicted of either the crime charged or [a lesser

                                           1
degree of the same crime], but not both,” domestic assault is not a “lesser degree” of

second-degree assault.

       Affirmed.

                                       OPINION

MCKEIG, Justice.

       This appeal requires us to interpret two criminal statutes in the context of a

defendant who broke a broom handle over the head of his romantic partner. First, we

examine the manner-of-use definition of “dangerous weapon” found in Minnesota Statutes

section 609.02, subdivision 6 (2022). Next, we must determine whether a district court

violates Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1 (2022)—which provides, in

relevant part, that a person “may be convicted of either the crime charged or [a lesser degree

of the same crime], but not both”—by convicting a defendant of both second-degree assault

and domestic assault when the two convictions arise from the same criminal act.

       Respondent the State of Minnesota charged appellant John Ishmael Bradley, III with

second-degree assault with a dangerous weapon and felony domestic assault for striking

his girlfriend over the head with a broom handle. A jury found Bradley guilty of each

charge, and the district court convicted Bradley of both counts. Bradley challenged his

convictions, claiming that the broom handle was not a dangerous weapon because the State

did not prove he used it a manner likely to cause great bodily harm, and that his two

convictions for one assaultive act was improper. The court of appeals affirmed the

convictions. Because there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that

the broom handle was a dangerous weapon, and because Minnesota Statutes

                                              2
section 609.04, subdivision 1, does not prohibit convicting Bradley of both second-degree

assault and domestic assault, we affirm.

                                           FACTS

       In January 2022, Bradley and his girlfriend R.C. argued at her apartment over a

misplaced cell phone. During the argument, Bradley struck R.C. over the head with an

approximately 1-inch thick and 2- to 3-foot-long broom handle. The broom handle broke

and Bradley fled the scene. After the police arrived, an ambulance took R.C. to the hospital

where she received seven stitches for a 6-centimeter gash in her head. The State charged

Bradley with second-degree assault under Minnesota Statutes section 609.222,

subdivision 1 (2022), and felony domestic assault under Minnesota Statutes

section 609.2242, subdivision 4 (2022).

       At a jury trial, R.C. testified for the State but was treated as a hostile witness because

her testimony was evasive and she claimed not to remember much. Other statements R.C.

made about the assault were admitted into evidence, however. For example, in recorded

jail calls with Bradley, R.C. repeatedly said, “you could’ve killed me,” and in text messages

between the two, R.C. wrote, “you meant to harm me and bad too,” and “I looked in your

eyes when you swung. I will never forget that.” An officer who arrived shortly after the

assault testified that the crack in the broom handle she observed was “clean fresh wood,”

which led her to believe it broke when Bradley struck R.C. over the head with it.

       The jury found Bradley guilty of both counts. At the sentencing hearing, defense

counsel inquired whether convictions should be entered for both counts considering both

stemmed from the same behavioral incident. The district court responded that a conviction

                                               3
for both counts could be entered. The district court then entered a judgment of convictions

on both counts but sentenced Bradley only for the second-degree assault conviction.

Bradley appealed to the court of appeals.

       At the court of appeals, Bradley challenged his second-degree assault conviction by

arguing that the State did not prove the broomstick was a dangerous weapon because “the

evidence presented was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that he used the

broomstick in a manner calculated or likely to produce great bodily harm.” State v.

Bradley, No. A22-0960, 2023 WL 2962250, at *2 (Minn. App. Apr. 17, 2023). He also

argued “that felony domestic assault is an included crime of second-degree assault and,

therefore,” Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1, precluded entry of judgment

of conviction for that offense. Bradley, 2023 WL 2962250, at *1. The court of appeals

affirmed. It concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove the broom

handle was a dangerous weapon based on its manner of use. Id. at *2. It also held that

domestic assault is not part of the multi-tiered statutory scheme in which second-degree

assault is found, so Bradley’s “domestic-assault conviction is not an included offense of

second-degree assault” under section 609.04, subdivision 1. Id. at *4.

       We granted Bradley’s petition for further review.

                                       ANALYSIS

       This appeal presents two issues. The first issue involves whether the State presented

sufficient evidence to prove that Bradley used a dangerous weapon when he assaulted R.C.

The second issue involves whether Bradley can be convicted of both second-degree assault

and domestic assault for the same behavioral incident.

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                                              I.

       We first address whether the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Bradley’s

conviction for second-degree assault. “When a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim turns on

the meaning of the statute under which a defendant has been convicted, we are presented

with a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.” State v. Henderson,

907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). After deciding the meaning of the statute, we apply

that meaning to the facts to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the

conviction. See Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893, 903 (Minn. 2023); Douglas v. State,

986 N.W.2d 705, 711 (Minn. 2023).

       Second-degree assault is unique to other types of assault in Minnesota because it

requires the use of a “dangerous weapon.” See Minn. Stat. § 609.222, subd. 1 (making it

a crime to “assault[] another with a dangerous weapon”); id., subd. 2 (2022) (making it a

crime to “assault[] another with a dangerous weapon and inflict[] substantial bodily harm”).

A “dangerous weapon” is defined in Minnesota’s criminal code as:

       [A]ny firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a
       weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm, any
       combustible or flammable liquid or other device or instrumentality that, in
       the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce
       death or great bodily harm, or any fire that is used to produce death or great
       bodily harm. 1

1
       “Great bodily harm” is defined as “bodily injury which involves a temporary but
substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment
of the function of any bodily member or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily
member.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 8 (2022).

                                              5
Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6 (emphasis added). Specifically at issue here is the italicized

language, which we will refer to as the manner-of-use definition of a dangerous weapon.

We have long held that “an item which is not designed as a weapon but which, in the

manner used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily

harm” may be considered a dangerous weapon under section 609.02, subdivision 6. State

v. Moss, 269 N.W.2d 732, 735–36 (Minn. 1978).

       As a preliminary matter, Bradley asserts that courts determine as a matter of law if

an object is a dangerous weapon based on the manner-of-use definition. As support, he

cites a sentence from our decision in State v. Basting. See Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285

(stating “as a matter of law, that the manner in which [the defendant] used his fist did not

constitute the use of a dangerous weapon for purposes of an analysis under Minn. Stat.

§ 609.222, subd. 2”). We reject this reading of Basting.

       At issue in Basting was whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that

Basting’s fist was a dangerous weapon. Id. We “conclude[d] that the courts below

misapplied the proper legal standard” for determining whether Basting’s fist was a

dangerous weapon by relying exclusively on Basting’s “athletic career” as a professional

boxer. Id. at 282. The sentence Bradley cites did not establish that it is a question of law

whether an ordinary object’s manner of use transformed it into a dangerous weapon.

Instead, this sentence was the conclusion to our analysis—that when the correct legal

standard was applied, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Basting’s fist was a

dangerous weapon. And contrary to Bradley’s claim, we have long held that whether an

object was a dangerous weapon based on the manner-of-use definition is a question for the

                                             6
factfinder. See, e.g., State v. Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871 (Minn. 2024) (concluding “a

reasonable jury could conclude from the facts alleged by the State that the vehicles used in

the ‘takeovers’ were dangerous weapons”); State v. Born, 159 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1968)

(concluding “the jury could reasonably find that defendant employed an instrumentality

which was dangerous”).

       With that in mind, we must determine whether there was sufficient evidence offered

at trial to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that the broom handle was a dangerous

weapon based on the manner-of-use definition. Bradley claims that the way he used the

broom handle was not likely to cause death or great bodily harm. As part of this argument,

Bradley asks us to interpret “likely” here using the “highly likely” standard that we adopted

for civil commitment proceedings for sexually dangerous persons. See In re Linehan,

557 N.W.2d 171, 180 (Minn. 1996) (holding “future harmful sexual conduct must be highly

likely to commit a proposed patient under the [Sexually Dangerous Person] Act” despite

the applicable statute only requiring “likely” future harmful contact (emphasis added)),

cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997). But Linehan

is distinguishable. There is a dramatic difference between whether a person is “likely” to

sexually offend in the future and be subject to indefinite confinement and whether an

inanimate object was “likely” to produce a specific amount of harm based on how the

defendant already used it.

       We recently addressed the meaning of “likely” in the manner-of-use definition of a

dangerous weapon in Abdus-Salam. There, we held that “likely” does not mean “highly

likely,” but rather means “ ‘probable or reasonably expected’ in the context of the manner-

                                             7
of-use definition of a dangerous weapon.” 2 Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d at 877. We apply this

same meaning to “likely” here: an object is “likely to produce death or great bodily harm”

if it is used in a manner where death or great bodily harm is a probable or reasonably

expected result. Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 6.

       Before applying this interpretation of “likely” to the facts here, we must address one

final argument Bradley makes. Bradley again cites Basting, claiming that “the strength

and size of the aggressor and the victim, the vulnerability of the victim, the severity and

duration of the attack, the presence or absence of victim provocation, and the nature and

the extent of the injuries” should be considered when determining whether the requisite

harm was likely. 572 N.W.2d at 284. But as discussed above, Basting examined whether

the defendant’s fist was a dangerous weapon. Id. at 285. We characterized the factors cited

by Bradley as applying to a determination of “whether a fist or a foot is a dangerous

weapon.” Id. at 284. We have not applied these factors beyond that factual circumstance,

and we decline to do so here.

       We turn then to whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that the

broom handle was a dangerous weapon because it was used in a manner where death or

great bodily harm was a probable or reasonably expected result. When we consider a

sufficiency of the evidence claim, “ ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and assume that the factfinder disbelieved any testimony conflicting with that

2
        This was in response to the interpretation used by the court of appeals, which held
that “likely” means the manner in which an object is used is “known to be capable of
producing” the harm. State v. Abdus-Salam, 988 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Minn. App. 2023).

                                             8
verdict.’ ” State v. King, 990 N.W.2d 406, 416 (Minn. 2023) (quoting State v. Fardan,

773 N.W.2d 303, 321 (Minn. 2009)). If a factfinder could reasonably decide that the

defendant is guilty of the charged offense based on the evidence offered, “[w]e will not

disturb the verdict.” Id.

       The evidence viewed in a manner most favorable to the verdict shows that: 1) the

broom handle was 2- to 3-foot-long and an inch in diameter; 2) Bradley was in an argument

with R.C. when he struck her with the broom handle; 3) Bradley swung at and hit R.C.’s

head, a particularly vulnerable part of the body; 4) while attacking; 5) which caused a gash

requiring transportation to the hospital by ambulance for medical treatment including seven

stitches; and 6) caused the broom handle to break. A jury could reasonably conclude that

great bodily harm was a probable or reasonably expected result from using a broom handle

in this manner. In fact, we previously rejected a claim that there was insufficient evidence

to support a conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon when the defendant struck the

victim one time in the head with a similar object—a pool cue—causing a cut to the victim’s

head. State v. Upton, 306 N.W.2d 117, 117–18 (Minn. 1981). We therefore hold that there

was sufficient evidence to allow the jury—which was properly instructed using the

language of the statute—to find the broom handle was a dangerous weapon because the

manner in which it was used was likely to cause death or great bodily harm. 3

3
       Because the evidence is sufficient to prove that Bradley’s use of the broom handle
was likely to cause great bodily harm, we do not need to decide whether Bradley used the
broom handle in a manner calculated to cause death or great bodily harm. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 6 (stating that an object is a dangerous weapon if “the manner it is used or
intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm”).

                                             9
                                             II.

       We next consider whether the district court erred when it entered convictions for

both second-degree assault and domestic assault for the same criminal act. This question

revolves around Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, which provides that “[u]pon

prosecution for a crime, the actor may be convicted of either the crime charged or an

included offense, but not both.” 4 Minn. Stat. § 609.04, subd. 1. The statute thus proscribes

multiple convictions when those convictions are for the crime charged and an “included

offense.” Id. The statute lists five categories of included offenses, id.; one of which is “a

lesser degree of the same crime,” id., subd. 1(1). This category is the only one that could

apply in this case. We must determine whether this category in Minnesota Statutes

section 609.04 prohibits convictions for a second offense that is not included in the

ordinally numbered statutory degrees of assaultive conduct—i.e., first- through fifth-

degree assault—but is nevertheless an assaultive act. Because this question involves

statutory interpretation, it “presents a question of law, which we review de novo.” State v.

Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2015).

       Bradley argues that domestic assault is a “lesser degree” of second-degree assault,

which would prohibit his conviction for domestic assault under Minnesota Statutes

section 609.04, subdivision 1. Accordingly, we must determine the meaning of “degree”

4
       Minnesota Statutes section 609.04 does not explicitly state that an “included
offense” is necessarily an offense which is committed in the same criminal act as the
charged offense, but our case law acknowledges and adopts such an inference. See State
v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 447 (Minn. 2006) (“A defendant may not be convicted of
both the charged offense and a lesser-included offense for the same criminal act.”).

                                             10
in the category of “a lesser degree of the same crime.” We have stated that “[i]f the lesser

offense is a lesser degree of the same crime or a lesser degree of a multi-tier statutory

scheme dealing with a particular subject, then it is an ‘included offense’ under

section 609.04.” State v. Hackler, 532 N.W.2d 559, 559 (Minn. 1995). Bradley argues

that what makes a crime a greater or lesser degree of the same crime is not its relation to

the ordinal degrees found in the statutory scheme, but rather, whether the offense is of a

different intensity. The State contends that the term “degree” refers only to offenses within

an ordinal statutory scheme. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.221–609.2231, 609.224 (2022).

       “The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and

effectuate the intention of the legislature.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022); see also State v.

Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021). We must “first determine whether the

statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.” State v. Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d 620, 624

(Minn. 2020) (quoting Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn.

2001)). A statute’s language is ambiguous if it is “subject to more than one reasonable

interpretation.” State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). When considering if

statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, “we consider

the canons of interpretation listed in Minn. Stat. § 645.08.” Riggs, 865 N.W.2d at 682.

“ ‘[W]ords and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their

common and approved usage.’ ” Shefa v. Ellison, 968 N.W.2d 818, 825 (Minn. 2022)

(quoting Minn. Stat. § 645.08 (2022)). However, “technical words and phrases and such

others as have acquired a special meaning . . . are construed according to such special

                                             11
meaning.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1); see also State v. Schouweiler, 887 N.W.2d 22, 25

(Minn. 2016).

       When we decide “whether words in a statute have a technical meaning or an

ordinary meaning, we look at the context in which the phrase appears.” Housing & Redev.

Auth. of Duluth v. Lee, 852 N.W.2d 683, 691 (Minn. 2014). The statutory context in which

Minnesota Statutes section 609.04 is found is Chapter 609, Minnesota’s criminal code.

The criminal code contains dozens of statutes that specifically differentiate the severity of

a particular offense using the word “degree.” See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185–609.195

(2022) (establishing the crimes of first- through third-degree murder); Minn. Stat.

§§ 609.342–609.3451 (2022) (establishing the crimes of first- through fifth-degree

criminal sexual conduct).

       When “construing statutes, we assume that the Legislature enacts statutes ‘with full

knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject.’ ” State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606,

609 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Meister v. W. Nat. Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 372, 378 (Minn.

1992)). Chapter 609, including Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, was enacted in 1963.

See Act of May 17, 1963, ch. 753, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1188 (codified as amended at

Minn. Stat. § 609.01, et al. (2022)). Before this, Minnesota’s criminal code contained

numerous examples of the word “degree” consistent with differentiating between the

severity of a particular offense.      See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 619.07–609.10 (1961)

(establishing the crimes of first- through third-degree murder); Minn. Stat.

§§ 619.42–619.44 (1961) (establishing the crimes of first- through third-degree robbery).

With that knowledge, the Legislature specifically chose to use the term “degree” in

                                             12
section 609.04, subdivision 1(1)—a word that has a clear technical meaning within the

greater context of Chapter 609—rather than a word that would suggest a non-technical

meaning, such as Bradley’s suggested “intensity.”

       Because the only reasonable interpretation of the term “degree” in context is the

technical meaning referring to the ordinally numbered degrees found throughout the

criminal code, we therefore conclude the meaning of “degree” as used in Minnesota

Statutes section § 609.04, subd. 1(1), to be unambiguous.

       “When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and

free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of

pursuing the spirit.” Minn. Stat. § 645.16; see also Johnson v. Cook Cnty., 786 N.W.2d

291, 293–94 (Minn. 2010). We recognize Bradley’s argument that second-degree assault

and domestic assault are both, by their very names, assaults. However, having a similar

name for an offense does not place one crime into the multi-tier statutory scheme of

another. For example, the crimes of theft, Minn. Stat. § 609.52 (2022), and mail theft,

Minn. Stat. § 609.529 (2022), have similar names and are both theft-based offenses, but

they are clearly not different degrees of one another. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3

(creating its own multi-tier statutory scheme for basic theft by including misdemeanor,

gross misdemeanor, and felony level penalties). Even though both second-degree assault

and domestic assault have been titled as “assaults” by the Legislature, it would be

inappropriate for us to ignore the plain, unambiguous language of Minnesota Statutes

section 609.04, subdivision 1(1), which only applies to “a lesser degree of the same crime.”

                                            13
       On a final note, two of the three types of third-degree assault involve a specific type

of victim.   Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.223, subd. 1 (2022) (assaulting another and

inflicting substantial bodily harm), with id., subd. 2 (2022) (assaulting a minor and

engaging in a past pattern of child abuse), and id., subd. 3 (assaulting a victim under four)

(2022). This detail shows that if the Legislature had wanted to fold domestic assault—an

assault similarly involving a specific type of victim—into one of the ordinal degrees of

assault, it knew how to do so. But instead, it chose to place domestic assault outside the

multiple degree scheme set forth in sections 609.221–609.2231 and 609.224.

       Having determined the term “degree” in the phrase “lesser degree of the same

crime” in Minnesota Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1(1), is an unambiguous technical

term referring to offenses within an ordinal statutory scheme, we conclude that domestic

assault is not a lesser degree of second-degree assault. Because of this, we hold that the

district court did not err when entering convictions for both second-degree assault and for

domestic assault. 5

                                      CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

       Affirmed.

5
       We note that the district court also appropriately sentenced Bradley for only one of
the assault convictions. As we have previously recognized, generally, “if a defendant
commits multiple offenses against the same victim during a single behavioral incident,
Minn. Stat. § 609.035 provides that the defendant may be sentenced for only one of those
offenses.” State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Minn. 1995).

                                             14