Court Opinion

ID: 9639366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:14:13.341278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:16.506286
License: Public Domain

*615RUIZ, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority in affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the owner’s suit for possession, but disagree with reversing the trial judge’s order requiring the owner to negotiate with the tenant as required by the Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act (“TOPA”), D.C.Code §§ 42-3401.01 to 42-8404.13 (2001). Specifically, I do not agree with the conclusion that, to be effective, the tenant’s expression of interest to purchase that triggers the negotiation period must be received by the owner within the period set in the statute. I believe that a contextual analysis, and the letter and purpose of TOPA lead to the conclusion that only mailing within the statutory period is required to preserve the tenants’ rights under TOPA.
The statute uses the phrase “upon receipt” of an offer of sale from the owner to trigger the 30-day period for tenants to give notice of interest to purchase the property. D.C.Code § 42-4304.09(1) (2001). Thus, it is clear that the legislature could have used similar language if it intended that the statement of interest also must be “received” by the owner within 30 days. It did not do so, however, and used instead the more ambiguous word “provide.”
In considering statutory language, the judicial task is to divine legislative intent and give it effect. Where a word’s precise meaning is uncertain, its use elsewhere in the statute can shed light on the legislature’s intent. See In re Jacoby, 945 A.2d 1193, 1198 (D.C.2008) (“[T]he familiar maxim of statutory interpretation ... counsels us to consider the statute as a whole, and, if possible, discern an interpretation that will harmonize and accord full force and effect to all of its provisions, without rendering any part meaningless.”). In addition, the TOPA statute itself provides the court with guidance on how it is to be interpreted, and specifically directs that “resolution of ambiguity by ... a court [be] toward the end of strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations to the maximum extent permissible under law.” D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001).
Here, the legislature used the same word “provide” in the next section of the statute, D.C.Code § 42-3404.10(1) (2001), which similarly sets out time periods for offers to and expressions of interest from tenants, but with respect to accommodations with two to four units, as opposed to the single family residence at issue in this case.1 In that section, the legislature equates “provide” with “submit.” See id. (“Upon receipt of a written offer of sale from the owner ..., a group of tenants acting jointly shall have 15 days to provide the owner and the Mayor with a written statement of interest. Following that time period, if the tenants acting jointly have failed to submit a written statement of interest, an individual tenant shall have seven days to provide a statement of interest to the owner and the Mayor.” (emphasis added)).
The majority considers this a “plain meaning” case and relies on the dictionary meaning of “provide” as synonymous with “supply for use” and “furnish.” From that definition, it reasons that for the tenant’s expression of interest to purchase to be of use, the owner must have received it within the statutory period. But the same dictionary defines “submit” — which the *616TOPA statute equates with “provide” — as “to send or commit for consideration, study or decision.” Webster’s Thied New International Dictionary 2277 (2002). For that reason, resort to the dictionary does not suffice to answer the question in this case.
Assuming, as seems reasonable, that the legislature intended “provide” to have the same meaning in the two sections of the statute dealing with tenants’ right to purchase single family dwellings and buildings with two to four units, TOPA should be interpreted to allow tenants to fully benefit from the time period in which to “provide” or “submit” a statement of interest, whether it be thirty, fifteen, or seven days.2 Had the legislature meant otherwise it would have said — as it did in connection with the statutory section concerning accommodations with five or more units where the response must be from a tenant organization, not individual tenants — that the expression of interest to purchase must be “deliver[ed] ... by hand or by first class mail” within the prescribed period. D.C.Code § 42-3404.11(1) (2001). Therefore, viewing the word “provide” in its statutory context, and the legislature’s unequivocal preference that tenants’ rights be strengthened “to the maximum extent permissible under the law,” D.C.Code § 42-3405.11 (2001), I would hold that appellant validly exercised his right under TOPA because he “provided” a timely statement of interest to the owner by mailing it within thirty days of receiving the offer of sale.
I believe that the majority’s analogy of the tenants’ rights under TOPA to an option contract does not hold up. The “mailbox rule” is usually held inapplicable to option contracts, and, as the majority notes, acceptance is operative only when exercise of the option is received. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63(b) (1981). Although by establishing a specific time period in which a tenant may express interest in response to the owner’s offer of sale, the TOPA scheme bears some superficial similarity to an option contract, closer scrutiny reveals that the analogy is misguided. An option contract is an agreed-upon exchange that, in the words of the Restatement, “limits the promisor’s power to revoke an offer.” Id. at § 25. “The key distinction between an option to purchase and a contract of sale is that an option does not impose a binding obligation to complete the purchase.” Am. Combustion, Inc. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm’n, 441 A.2d 660, 667 (D.C.1982). See also Ammerman v. City Stores Co., 129 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 329, 394 F.2d 950, 954 (1968) (“An option is more than an offer ... it is itself a contract and is not to be confused with the bilateral contract which it gives the optionee the power to bring into being.”). TOPA, on the other hand, imposes a statutory obligation on the owner to first offer the property for sale to the tenant before offering it to the general public, and a corresponding obligation on the tenant to timely notify the owner if the tenant intends to purchase the property. Under TOPA, the owner’s offer of sale is not an option contract that must be held open, in exchange for valuable consideration from the tenant, during the prescribed statutory time period. See Hackney v. Morelite Constr., D.C. Corp., 418 A.2d 1062, 1067-68 (D.C.1980) (finding an option contract where “(1) ... appellee ... *617made a promise to keep open an offer to sell the disputed property ‘for a fixed or reasonable period of time’ ... (2) that the promise was ‘given for valuable consideration’ ... and (3) that both the property and the term of the option offered were described in sufficient particularity....”). Unlike in an option contract, TOPA does not preclude the owner from revoking the offer during the statutory time period— the essence of an option contract.3
The reason why the “mailbox rule” is not applied to an option contract is the need for a “dependable basis for decision whether to exercise the option.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 63 cmt. f. Thus, whereas in the usual contract for sale the mailbox rule allocates the risk of loss or delay in delivering an acceptance on the offeror to allow for the fact that the offer may be revoked prior to acceptance, there is no similar reason to shift the risk in an option contract where the offeror’s right to revoke the offer is already restricted by contract. In short, although the TOPA scheme and option contracts both share the element of having specific time periods in which the offeree has to notify acceptance or exercise of the option, under the TOPA statute the tenant tenders no valuable consideration, as required in a valid option contract, and the owner may revoke the offer of sale even within the statutory time period, prior to acceptance. Therefore, there is no reason for abandoning the “mailbox rule” that normally applies to contracts for sale, as there is in the case of option contracts.
The rule articulated by the majority that the tenant’s acceptance must be received by the owner to be effective would be beneficial in providing certainty to the owner, and it could be considered — as the majority does — that the better policy is therefore to require that a tenant deliver the statement of interest within the statutory time period. But the statute does not permit this interpretation if it is at the expense of the tenant’s right because the legislative command to the court is that any ambiguity be resolved in favor of “strengthening the legal rights of tenants or tenant organizations to the maximum extent permissible under law.” D.C.Code § 42-3505.11 (2001).4 In a recent amendment, the legislature has demonstrated its intention to afford the tenant not only plenary use of the statutory period, but even an implicit extension. See supra, note 2. Resolution of the meaning of the word “provide” as used in the statute, therefore, must favor allowing tenants the full statutory period to consider and respond to the owner’s offer. I therefore *618dissent, and would affirm the trial court’s judgment enforcing the tenant’s TOPA rights.

. That section differs from the one in the appeal before us only in that it creates the possibility that the tenants may first act jointly to purchase their accommodations by expressing interest within fifteen days of receiving the owner's offer of sale or, failing joint action, any tenant has seven days to express an interest to purchase individually.

. The legislature recently amended TOPA to allow the time period in which a tenant must respond to commence upon the tenant’s receipt of the offer of sale, or the Mayor’s receipt of the same, "whichever is later." D.C. Law 17-234, § 2(b), 55 D.C.Reg. 9014, 9014-15 (2008). This means that in cases where the tenant receives the offer first, the amendment effectively extends the statutory time period in which the tenant may respond.

. In many situations under TOPA, the owner’s offer and the tenant’s expression of interest to purchase may simply initiate a period of negotiation, which may or may not result in a contract of sale. However, because TOPA requires that the owner make a firm offer of sale to a tenant, there might be cases where application of principles of contract law renders the tenant’s expression of interest an acceptance of the offer of sale that creates an enforceable contract of sale. See 1836 S St. Tenants' Ass’n, Inc. v. Estate of Battle, 965 A.2d 832 (2009). In this case, because the record does not contain the owner’s offer of sale, only the tenant’s expression of interest, it is inadequate to determine whether a binding contract was created.

. Unlike in contract cases, where the competing interpretations of interested parties do not suffice to render a contract’s terms ambiguous, the differing statutory interpretations of impartial judges does signify that terms are capable of more than one meaning. See Lincoln Sav. Bank, S.A. v. Wis. Dep’t of Revenue, 215 Wis.2d 430, 573 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) ("[W]hen courts or judges disagree about the interpretation of a law, the law is, by definition capable of being understood in two or more different senses by reasonably well-informed persons....”).