Court Opinion

ID: 9624888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:20:50.610625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:56.088089
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent, and conclude that discovery should be permitted in both of the principal areas sought by defendant public entity.
I amplify somewhat on the factual recitation of the majority. Plaintiffs are 936 property owners and occupants of land contiguous to, or situated near, Lindbergh Field in San Diego. They have sued a public agency, San Diego Unified Port District, which operates the field, for “not less than” $9,360,000. The gravamen of the complaint, contained in 11 counts and urging 6 theories of recovery, is that because of the use of Lindbergh Field by jet aircraft, and the attendant noise, smoke and fumes, plaintiffs have suffered property loss and severe personal injuries, physical and mental, which have impaired plaintiffs’ ability to work or function in a normal manner. “As to each plaintiff the claimed damages for personal injuries are not less than $10,000 ....” It will thus be seen that the public agency faces very serious litigation involving multiple plaintiffs who allege very large losses for numerous and varied injuries.
*866In its answer the district has raised the defenses of the statute of limitations, the applicability of the 1-year and 100-day claims statutes (Gov. Code, § 911.2), the alleged failure of plaintiffs to mitigate their damages, and the issue of comparative negligence. (Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393].) To establish these defenses, the public agency commenced extensive discovery including service of notice to take depositions and to produce documents, as well as written interrogatories. Defendants sought to determine whether plaintiffs filed their action within the statutoiy limitations period which, by eveiyone’s agreement, would have commenced at the time when, as to each plaintiff, operation of aircraft to and from Lindbergh Field “substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ properties.” (Ante, p. 860, fn. 4, citing Aaron v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 471, 492 [115 Cal.Rptr. 162].) To that end, both in depositions and by written interrogatories, defendant asked certain plaintiffs a series of questions bearing on the issue of the commencement of the limitations period, which questions plaintiffs have refused to answer. Further, by written interrogatories defendant sought, in a second area relating to damages, to explore the medical histories of the various plaintiffs to ascertain whether and to what extent the claimed shock and injury to the nervous system, emotional upset, irritability, and loss of hearing may have been caused by historical origins other than plaintiffs’ exposure to Lindbergh Field. :Initially, some of plaintiffs responded fully to defendant’s inquiriés, but succeeding plaintiffs refused to answer, thereby triggering notices of motion by defendant to compel answers, notices of motion by plaintiffs for protective orders, and the present proceeding.
Plaintiffs make two objections to the district’s attempted discovery. First, as to those questions seeking to elicit information concerning meetings of persons at which the impact of Lindbergh Field may have been discussed, the plaintiffs assert that inquiry as to their associational activity violates plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and second, that the scope of questions as to their medical history is harassing and constitutes an abuse of the discovery process. After reviewing two broad principles of California discovery law, I examine, in sequence, these contentions and the majority’s analysis thereof.
Initially, I note that the majority, inexplicably, has either forgotten or has chosen to ignore what I had always considered to be our most definitive expression in the area of civil discovery. In 1961 through the careful analysis of Justice Peters, in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court *867(1961) 56 Cal.2d 355 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], we examined in very considerable depth the Discovery Act of 1957 (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016 et seq.). Under 79 headnotes we expressed the expansive views of this court on the legislative intent behind the act, compared new and old law, considered the nature of the trial court’s discretion, conducted a careful procedural review and scrutinized many matters related to discovery génerally.
In the 20 years since adoption of the act Greyhound has been considered by bench and bar as a prime authority in the interpretation of the act and the principles and policies on discovery matters. In considering the trial court’s function we noted in relevant part: “It is apparent, however, that each exercise of discretion will occur under a differing set of facts, and that each case must, of necessity, be decided in light of those particular facts. But it is possible to lay down certain general rules based upon the nature and purpose of the discovery statutes which can be used in determining the proper exercise of discretion in all discovery cases. To constitute a proper exercise of discretion, the factual determination of the trial court should clearly and unequivocally be based upon the following legal concepts: [If] 1. The legislative purposes [to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the truth and checking and preventing perjury; provide an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent and sham claims and defenses; make available in a simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not be proved except with great difficulty; expedite litigation; simplify and narrow the issues; and expedite and facilitate both preparation and trial] are not to be subverted under the guise of the exercise of discretion; [If] 2. Those purposes are to be given effect rather than thwarted, to the end that discovery is encouraged; . . .” (Pp. 382-383, italics added.)
Faithful to the foregoing overriding principles of Greyhound, we have consistently applied a liberal construction to the provisions of the act, permitting discovery and, while accepting the existence of privileges, have followed the strictures of Code of Civil Procedure section 2016, subdivision (b), wherein the Legislature has authorized discovery by deposition “. . . if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” On the issue of relevance, we were led to conclude in Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161 [84 Cal.Rptr. 718, 465 P.2d 854], that “. . . the relevance of the subject matter standard must be reasonably applied; in accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, doubts as to *868relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (P. 173, italics added.) Bearing in mind the foregoing established procedural guidelines, I examine plaintiffs’ two principal contentions.

The Associational A ctivities

The majority has accepted plaintiffs’ argument that compelled disclosure of meetings concerned with noise pollution from Lindbergh Field would violate their right of freedom of association, resulting in a “chilling effect” on individuals causing them to avoid such group participation. The premise is speculative and unconvincing.
All public displays of opinion or affiliation expose the participant to some degree of possible identification with a particular cause or concern. One who attends a meeting accepts the prospect that he will be seen, if only by others in attendance, with the possibility, indeed probability, that those in attendance will discuss with others the subject matter of the meeting and the identity of those who were present. I respectfully suggest that it would be an absurd extension of the concept of freedom of association to insist that such a hypothetical participant could require every other person present at the meeting to remain silent regarding either the nature of the meeting or the identification of those present lest someone’s constitutional right of association be thereby infringed. A rule of reason must apply. The protection of association has never been equated with an absolute guarantee of anonymity.
Because it seems to me clear that plaintiffs or others present at the meetings in question could, in their own discretion, voluntarily have revealed the topics of the meetings and the names of the participants without offending any common sense notion of the bounds of privacy, the question before us then becomes whether state action in the form of a discovery order reaching the same information is an impermissible First Amendment violation. I think not. As a practical matter, an individual is no more likely to be dissuaded from associational activities because his participation is revealed through compliance with a discovery order than through the voluntary disclosure by a coparticipant.
At this point, and with due deference, I suggest that the majority seriously errs in its very heavy reliance upon N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama (1958) 357 U.S. 449 [2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 78 S.Ct. 1163]. NAACP lends no support whatever for the extreme position taken by the majority herein. It is clearly distinguishable. In NAACP the Supreme Court held, *869“Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensible to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.” (P. 462 [2 L.Ed.2d pp. 1499-1500], italics added.) The high court stressed that “Petitioner has made an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to . . . loss of employment, threat ofphysical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility. Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure of petitioner’s Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate____” (Ibid., italics added.)
Lacking any precedent, by sheer force of will the majority has deliberately expanded NAACP to a general abstract principle that the disclosure of any information about associational activities constitutes an impermissible violation of the right to associate. Nothing in NAACP either mandates or authorizes such an extreme reading. NAACP closely tied the denial of disclosure to the particular and unique situation which clearly and unmistakably indicated that harassment would follow disclosure. In stark contrast, in the matter before us defendant public agency is not accused of having harassed anyone. Absolutely no showing, controverted or otherwise, has been made that in the past any economic reprisal or physical coercion or loss of employment has been directed individually or collectively against any members of the citizens’ groups to which plaintiffs belong. The underlying political considerations which motivated the actions of the State of Alabama are totally lacking in the matter before us. It is an altogether different case.
Unlike NAACP, the case presented to us involves no entity, private or public, blindly and illegally engaging in an historic racial vendetta, but rather a public body which must defend itself and its taxpayers against a multi-million dollar lawsuit for claimed injuries brought by hundreds of individuals. The district is not Seeking in any manner to use its power as a state agency to regulate or censor plaintiffs’ associational activities. It is a distortion to attempt to transform this case into some form of attempted “thought control” or censorship, for the record does not support any such inference, direct or remote. Defendant’s interrogatories were directed exclusively to discovery of membership in “organizations opposed to the way in which the Port District operates its airport.” Defendant is neither concerned with, nor does it seek to ascertain, plaintiffs’ political, social, economic, or religious beliefs or the lack *870thereof. It has no interest whatever in plaintiffs’ membership in particular organizations, except only insofar as such affiliation may establish that plaintiffs are barred from recovery in this civil suit because they neglected to file their action within the statutory period, or, possessing early and adequate notice of the condition complained of, failed to mitigate their damages, or conducted themselves in a manner that was contributorily negligent.
It seems readily apparent that the information sought was relevant. The date or dates on which individual plaintiff’s causes of action for personal injuries and property damage arose, bore directly on the commencement of the applicable statutes of limitations. The nature of the subjects discussed at associational meetings pertaining to claims against the airport all relate very directly to the issues of the statute of limitations and the defense of mitigation of plaintiffs’ damages. If, for example, the district is able to establish through attending witnesses that a particular plaintiff, at meetings 10 years before the action was filed, stated in strong terms that his residence was rendered almost uninhabitable because of airport noise, can it be contended that such expressions would not be relevant and probative on the issue of when his limitations period commenced? Similarly, if the district is able to prove that at a meeting, another plaintiff had expressed his great distress at fumes generated by the airport, but nonetheless had elected to purchase a new home somewhat closer to Lindbergh Field, can it seriously be urged that such testimony would not be relevant and probative on the issue of mitigation of damages? These areas of inquiry in my opinion are altogether proper.
What defendant is plainly attempting to do is to discover the identity of witnesses who may support its position that the claims of certain plaintiffs are barred by limitation of actions or that other plaintiffs have failed to mitigate their damages or have themselves been negligent. In failing to perceive this, in mandating the exclusion of all inquiry into any of the plaintiffs’ associational activities vis-a-vis the airport, the majority, with all due respect, has indulged in a graphic example of judicial overkill.
The district has not only the right, but the affirmative duty to its taxpayers in defending this litigation to assert vigorously every defense available to it. If the disclosure of information might have some conceivably deterrent effect on plaintiffs’ right of freedom of association, such effect is minimal and, under the facts presented to us, such an effect *871is outweighed substantially by defendant’s interest in preparing and presenting its defense. It was plaintiffs who brought the suit, alleged the injuries, opened the issues, imposed upon defendant the need for defenses, and thereby surely invited reasonable inquiry directed at the temporal and mitigating elements in the case. Fundamental fairness to opposing litigants requires that in the preparation and presentation of its available defenses the defendant not be required to face an “off-limits” sign where neither constitutional nor policy reasons require it. Nothing whatever in N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, compels such a result.
Although we had previously denied a hearing in Bakman v. Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 306 [133 Cal.Rptr. 703], which had upheld the propriety of a discovery order almost identical to that at issue in the present case, the majority now disapproves it. In Bakman, the court observed, “It is patent that by bringing the lawsuit, petitioners voluntarily subjected themselves to the judicial process, and discovery procedures are an inherent part of that process. In fact, to hold that petitioners can resort to the judicial process in the form of bringing a suit for damages seeking redress against real party for alleged wrongs it committed against them, and at the same time—without a showing of detriment of any kind—absolutely shield themselves from the city’s legitimate utilization would distort the salutary basis upon which the First Amendment right of freedom of association is grounded.” (Pp. 314-315, italics in original.) Such a conclusion is sound. There is no logical basis on which to distinguish Bakman, which was correctly decided, and our denial of hearing therein was proper.

The Medical Histories

Plaintiffs object to a trial court order, claiming that it is harassing and abusive, because it required them to list the dates and nature of their prior physical injuries and the nature and duration of treatment received for emotional disturbances. In my opinion the trial court acted well within its discretion and in accordance with correct discovery practice in ordering such disclosure.
It must be noted that the order in question did not require plaintiffs to furnish any medical records or physicians’ reports. Rather, they are ordered only to provide defendant with a description of prior physical injuries for which medical treatment was received along with a general description of each incident, the nature and duration of treatment therefor, and the nature and duration of any treatment for mental or *872emotional injury or illness. Such a discovery order, given plaintiffs’ general allegations of injuries, cannot be fairly described as “harassing.”
The information defendant seeks is directly relevant to its defense. As previously noted, plaintiffs’ claims of injury are broad and sweeping, as shown by their allegations that as a result of airport noise plaintiffs have been “injured in their health, strength, and activity, have sustained bodily injuries and shock and injury to the nervous system, emotional upset, irritability and loss of hearing, all of which causes physical and mental pain and suffering” and which impairs plaintiffs’ work and functioning. The complaint, now in its third amended form, does not, of course, specifically identify the precise nature of the mental or physical injury sustained by each of the 936 plaintiffs. This is not a class action. The very generality of the claimed injuries underscores the primary importance of discovery in seeking to ascertain the degree, if any, to which particular plaintiffs’ alleged mental and physical injuries can properly be attributed to causes other than the noise, smoke, and fumes generated at Lindbergh Field.
The majority, in considering the request for medical histories, commits a serious analytical error. It characterizes sections 990 and following, and 1010 and following, of the Evidence Code, relating to the physician- and psychotherapist-patient relationship, as the “relevant statutory provisions.” Noting the existence of a privilege of confidentiality in communications with the patient extending to medical histories and that sections 996 and 1016 constitute exceptions, the majority concludes that “The resolution of the instant case turns on the proper interpretation of the scope of these statutory exceptions.” (Ante, p. 863.) However, both sections 996 and 1016 are concerned with privileged “communication,” a term which is specifically defined in sections 992 and 1012 as “information, including information obtained by an examination of the patient, transmitted between a patient and a physician [or psychotherapist] in the course of that relationship . . . .” (Italics added.) A cursory examination of the interrogatories in question (see ante, p. 850) quickly discloses that much of the information requested, such as the mere fact of the existence of prior injury or medical treatment, cannot be deemed “communication” in any form within the definition of the cited sections.
The majority’s conclusion that none of the requested information is the proper object of discovery appears to ignore the basic legal concept, set forth in Greyhound v. Superior Court, supra, that “The trial courts in exercising their discretion should keep in mind that the Legislature has *873suggested that, where possible, the courts should impose partial limitations rather than outright denial of discovery; . . .” (56 Cal.2d at p. 383, italics added.) The majority would have demonstrated greater adherence to this principle by directing the trial court to review the interrogatories with a view to a possible limitation, given the claim of privileged communication, rather than by denial of discovery altogether.
Having laid a shaky statutory foundation, the majority constructs its argument from carefully selected quotations contained in cases which, on close inspection, underscore the weakness of the majority theses. Heavy reliance is placed, for example, on our expressions in In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415 [85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, 44 A.L.R.3d 1], and Roberts v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 330 [107 Cal.Rptr. 309, 508 P.2d 309]. I suggest that neither case supports the majority’s conclusion that the requested material was either privileged or irrelevant and therefore not discoverable. In Lifschutz we dealt with a substantially similar issue and our holding seems to me to be entirely contrary to the position urged by the majority. In that action for damages from an alleged assault, a psychiatrist was imprisoned for contempt for refusing to obey an order of the trial court which had instructed him to answer deposition questions and to produce records relating to communications with a former patient. The complaint alleged physical injuries, pain and suffering, and severe emotional distress. During the course of his deposition plaintiff admitted that he had received treatment from psychiatrist Lifschutz approximately 10 years earlier.
The majority’s lengthy quotation from Lifschutz serves only to reaffirm . a point not in dispute, namely, that “the scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 435.) Had the majority elected, however, to extend the quotation it would have reaffirmed our expression which has much greater significance to the matter before us, for we immediately continued, “In some situations, the patient’s pleadings may clearly demonstrate that his entire mental condition is being placed in issue and that records of past psychotherapy will clearly be relevant.” (Ibid., italics added.) We further noted: “In other cases, however, the determination of the specific ‘mental condition’ in issue may present more complex problems. The difficulties involved in analyzing the applicability of the exception in the instant case may be illustrative. The plaintiff’s complaint, containing the typical allegations of ‘mental and emotional distress’ arising out of a physical assault, does not specifically identify the nature of the ‘mental or emotional condition’ at *874issue .... The generality of the claim . . . does create the possibility that some feature ofplaintiff’s psychological history will be directly relevant to the determination of whether his emotional or mental distress can be properly attributed to the alleged assault. . . .[W]e cannot determine from the present state of the record whether plaintiff’s ‘mental and emotional’ distress is merely the ‘normal’ distress experienced as a result of physical assault or whether it includes unusual or particularly serious elements upon which prior history may be directly relevant.” (P. 436, italics added.) As noted, in our instant case plaintiffs allege “shock and injury to the nervous system, emotional upset, irritability ... which causes mental pain and suffering.”
The majority ignores the true and clear analogy between Lifschutz and the instant case. With more than 900 plaintiffs making complaints which reflect a wide variety of mental and physical conditions, it is impossible for us to determine from the state of the record whether and to what extent the prior history of any particular plaintiff could or could not lead to the discovery of evidence relevant to his complaint. Acknowledging that the evidence may have contained relevant material, in Lifschutz we held that the petitioner-psychiatrist had no right to refuse to produce the records in question even though the records were 10 years old. Furthermore, we held that “. . . the burden rests upon the patient initially to submit some showing that a given confidential communication is not directly related to the issue he has tendered to the court.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs have declined to delimit the areas of emotional and physical injury for which they seek recovery. Rather, they make only the most generalized assertions in this regard. Surely, in fairness, defendant is entitled to attempt to show in this civil action that there were independent causes, other than airport noise, for any emotional and physical conditions of which plaintiffs complain. It is self-evident that the human body is an integrated system; various conditions and injuries are not capable of being neatly categorized and catalogued into clearly separable functions and conditions by medical experts; there is a physiological interrelationship. This is particularly true in an area so fraught with uncertain etiology as “emotional upset” and “mental pain and suffering.” The defendant should be permitted to develop facts, if it is able to do so, showing that some or all of the injuries claimed by plaintiffs in fact resulted from sources other than the airport. The interrogatories objected to by plaintiffs are the first logical step in accomplishing that objective.
*875In Roberts v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal.3d 330, we reaffirmed Lifschutz’ narrow interpretation of the scope of the patient-physician exception, but nothing that we said in Roberts supports plaintiffs’ contention that the discovery order in the instant case is impermissibly overbroad. Plaintiff in Roberts claimed no damages for emotional distress or mental suffering. She sought only redress for pain in her neck, back, and legs. She had been asked questions concerning, and had described, previous illnesses and institutional confinement. She had, in fact, delivered to defendant various reports of the physicians who had treated her both before and after the collision from which the suit arose. Plaintiff objected to discovery only when defendants subpoenaed all of her medical records in the custody of the various physicians who had treated her, including those of her psychotherapist.
In Roberts, holding that the requested discovery exceeded permissible boundaries, we noted, “A fortiori, in a case such as this where there is no specific mental condition of the patient at issue, and discovery of the privileged communications is sought merely upon speculation that there may be a ‘connection’ between the patient’s past psychiatric treatment and some ‘mental component’ of his present injury, those communications should remain protected by the privilege of section 1014.” (Id, at p. 339, italics added.) In sharp contrast, as I have noted, the present plaintiffs have made a specific complaint that the noise level at the airport caused them to suffer emotional distress. Plaintiffs have placed the subject in issue and, unlike Roberts, the inquiries of defendant as to the mere fact of past medical treatments of plaintiffs are thus directly relevant to a specific mental condition voluntarily and expressly raised in the present litigation and initiated by plaintiffs.
It will be observed that discovery in this matter, a massive undertaking at best, can occur in one of two ways: Defendant can conduct oral depositions of the 936 plaintiffs. If three depositions a day are conducted five days per week, approximately one year and two months will be consumed. Doubtless the cost on either side will be extremely high. The alternative is through use of written interrogatories, attempting thereby to identify the more serious claims and to focus on them. This apparently is what defendant seeks, and it should be permitted to do so.
The majority’s statutory and legal analysis fails to survive close scrutiny. However, my concern with the majority’s misreading of precedent is overshadowed by what I view as its substantial reassignment of roles in the matter of pretrial discovery. I had thought it generally *876accepted that the tasks of determining what material is discoverable, what is relevant, and what is privileged, were primarily functions of the trial court. The majority, unaccountably, has determined that this duty can best be discharged by plaintiffs themselves.
The majority commends plaintiffs because “they are completely willing to provide defendant with medical information which relates in any way to the physical or emotional injuries for which they seek recovery.” (Ante, p. 862 italics added.) But the vital, unanswered question is, who decides what information “relates” to the claimed injuries? The majority concludes that “[t]he trial court thus obviously erred in ordering plaintiffs to disclose to defendant their entire lifetime medical histories” (ante, p. 864), and that plaintiffs “are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.” (Ibid., italics added.) It is clear that the majority intends that the plaintiffs are to determine what is “unrelated.” The majority fails to comment, as we did in Lifschutz, on the obvious important relationship between plaintiffs’ medical history and their present health. This is most strange. The majority’s formulation permits plaintiffs to serve as their own medical experts, picking and choosing between various injuries and diseases and deciding for themselves which are, or are not, relevant to the injuries which they presently claim. A particular plaintiff thereby becomes his own judge, thus depriving defendant of any opportunity to contest plaintiffs’ determination of relevancy. Such a result is unthinkable, for it contravenes every sound principle of fair and open discovery. It permits a plaintiff carefully, selectively, and conveniently to draw a curtain around those portions of his medical background which he elects not to disclose. Moreover, medical histories have their primary value and significance when subjected to medical not lay evaluation and review. An injury or disease which, to a litigant, may seem wholly irrelevant, may be clinically significant to a physician. The power to determine relevance in the discovery area should remain where it properly has been, with the trial court empowered to issue the discovery orders.
If in the proper pursuit of relevant probative evidence defendant’s inquiries constitute harassment, Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, subdivision (b)(1), offers a remedy. It permits the court to “make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarassment or oppression.” As we noted in Lifschutz, when “inquiry into the confidential relationship takes place before trial during discovery . . . the patient , . . may apply to the trial court for a *877protective order to limit the scope of the inquiry or to regulate .the procedure of the inquiry so as to best preserve the rights of the patient.” (2 Cal.3d at p. 437.) The availability of these protective orders remains as security against abuse.
In Bakman v. Superior Court, supra, 63 Cal.App.3d 306, the court observed that, “The issue narrows to whether real party’s statutory right to pursue legitimate discovery procedures and the state’s compelling interest in the enforcement of such procedures outweighs the deterring effect the disclosure sought has upon the First Amendment right to freedom of association of the persons whose identities real party is seeking to discover, so that it can be said, fairly, that under the facts of this case the qualified constitutional privilege must yield to a more compelling state purpose. We have concluded that the answer to this question is in the affirmative.” (P. 315, italics in original.)
In the matter before us the requested medical histories were not privileged information and were clearly relevant to the defense which defendant sought to prepare and establish. The request for such discovery was a reasonable and necessary request, and the trial court acted properly within its discretion in permitting such discovery.
As with the unanimous Courts of Appeal, both in Bakman and herein, I would affirm the trial court’s order of discovery.
Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.