Court Opinion

ID: 9538773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:41:30.116577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:09.314792
License: Public Domain

Wedell, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part): I concur in the opinion insofar as it sustains the award for actual damages. I, of course, also agree with syllabus ¶ 5 as an abstract statement of law.
I, however, do not agree the statement is sufficiently broad to embrace the facts in this case. In my opinion there was sufficient evidence of an arbitrary and willful disregard to plaintiffs’ rights to require submission of the question of punitive damages to the jury. No doubt the defendant had ample provocation to be enraged concerning the conduct of the Hanna Motor Company but that did not justify its arbitrary and willful disregard of plaintiffs’ rights.
Nearness of the decision hour prevents a chronological review of all facts disclosing defendant’s full knowledge of plaintiffs’ rights. One incident alone, however, will suffice to reflect defendant’s attitude and willful disregard of plaintiffs’ rights which the jury had a right to consider. There was direct evidence defendant’s branch manager, Mr. Steele, was informed by Mrs. Craig, the office manager of the Hanna Motor Company, that plaintiffs, automobile dealers, had not been paid for the Mercury car; that plaintiffs were demanding payment and that “they had to pay for it.” To this direct information Mrs. Craig said Mr. Steele replied, “to hell with them, he wasn’t going to give them the money.”
It will be observed Steele did not say he did not believe, or doubted, plaintiffs were entitled to payment but on the contrary clearly disclosed his arbitrary disregard for plaintiffs’ rights. The jury had a right to conclude defendant’s conduct reflected an attitude to grab everything defendant could lay its hands upon in order to recoup the losses it had sustained in its dealings with the Hanna Motor Company, irrespective of defendant’s invasion of the rights of others. Defendant sold the Mercury and retained the proceeds of the sale knowing plaintiffs, automobile dealers, had not received payment for the car. It is generally held, “. . . the intentional doing of a wrongful act with full knowledge of its character, and without cause or excuse, is malicious and warrants an award of exemplary damages.” (Rusch v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 163 Kan. 11, Syl. ¶ 5, 180 P. 2d 270.)
*613Here the defendant knowingly adopted the misconduct of the Hanna Motor Company for its own benefit. A party cannot accept the benefits of wrongful and inexcusable conduct of another and reject its burdens for punitive damages. (Will v. Hughes, 172 Kan. 45, 238 P. 2d 478.) See, also, Motor Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 133 P. 2d 149, on the general subject of awarding punitive damages for the wrongful and wanton invasion of the rights of others.
The jury was specifically instructed on the subject of punitive damages. Defendant made no objection to the giving of such an instruction or to the character of the instruction given. The instruction, therefore, became the law of the case on that subject and defendant cannot complain that the court instructed thereon. (Will v. Hughes, supra, p. 55.) Both the special findings and the general verdict are in harmony with the award for punitive damages. It was the jury’s province to determine whether defendant’s conduct .was vindictive and malicious. It determined that fact and this court should not disturb its verdict.