Court Opinion

ID: 9384701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 18:06:20.799894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.778845
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-1120.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  BELMONT COUNTY

                                            STATE OF OHIO,

                                            Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                   DONALD THOMAS BOYD,

                                           Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                            Case No. 21 BE 0048

                                   Criminal Appeal from the
                        Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
                                     Case No. 20 CR 22

                                           BEFORE:
                   Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                                JUDGMENT:
                                                  Affirmed.
                                              Limited Remand.

Atty. J. Kevin Flanagan, Belmont County Prosecutor and Atty. Jacob A. Manning,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 52160 National Road, St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950, for
Plaintiff-Appellee

Atty. Brian A. Smith, Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC, 123 South Miller Road, Suite 250,
Fairlawn, Ohio 44333, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                           Dated: March 30, 2023
                                                                                        –2–

WAITE, J.

       {¶1}    Appellant Donald Thomas Boyd appeals an October 14, 2021 judgment

entry of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas convicting him of various crimes.

Appellant raises several arguments challenging the joinder of two separate incidents in

one trial, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, and the imposition of

consecutive sentences. Appellant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel. For the reasons that follow, Appellant’s arguments are without merit and the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed. However, the matter is sua sponte remanded for

the limited purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc entry to correctly reflect the indeterminate

nature of a portion of Appellant’s sentence.

                                Factual and Procedural History

       {¶2}    This appeal concerns two separate incidents that were combined in a single

indictment and corresponding trial. The first occurred on August 2, 2018. On that date,

Corporal Jason Schwarck of the Belmont County Sheriff’s Department ran a license plate

check on a vehicle during his patrol. He learned that the license plate was not registered

to the vehicle. He also learned that the plate was registered to a person who had a

suspended license and an outstanding arrest warrant. As a result, Corp. Schwarck

initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.

       {¶3}    When Corp. Schwarck confirmed that Appellant, the driver of the vehicle,

was the person to whom the plate was registered, he placed Appellant under arrest

pursuant to the arrest warrant. Corp. Schwarck located a silver pill container when

searching Appellant’s person. Inside the container, Corp. Schwarck discovered foil with

two pieces of suspected LSD. Appellant admitted that it was LSD. Corp. Schwarck also

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found marijuana and other drug paraphernalia, but it does not appear that Appellant was

charged with these related offenses. Despite Appellant’s arrest in early August of 2018,

it does not appear that he was officially charged in this matter until May of 2021. It is

unclear why charging in this matter was delayed.

        {¶4}   The second incident occurred on September 12, 2018.             Many of the

following facts stem from testimony provided by an accident reconstructionist who

conceded that reconstruction is subjective and that another investigator may arrive at a

different conclusion. However, it is the only information available, as it does not appear

that any eyewitness saw the entire event. Other facts are taken from witnesses, including

the parties involved.

        {¶5}   At the time of the incident, Appellant was under a driver’s license

suspension. However, he borrowed a white pickup truck from someone in West Virginia.

The photographs in evidence depict a two-lane road surrounded on both sides by brush

and weeds. The site of the crash itself appears to be located just before a bend in the

road.

        {¶6}   Appellant was driving the borrowed truck on Willow Grove Road in the

Village of Neffs, Belmont County. Appellant operated the truck within the posted speed

limit. Everett Dean Hartley was driving a grey pickup driving in the opposite direction.

The victim, Robert Hartley, sat in the front seat of his brother’s truck. Everett is referred

to as both Everett and Dean in this record, but his first name will be used, here. The

Hartleys were travelling from a convenience store to a job site.

        {¶7}   Through Appellant’s testimony and reconstruction efforts, it appears that

Appellant’s truck drifted left of center from the right lane and into the opposing lane, then

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off the berm and into the brush/weeds. Appellant’s vehicle then reentered the road into

opposing traffic and struck Everett’s truck, causing him to lose control of his vehicle. The

impact caused Everett’s truck to veer off of the road, where it eventually hit an

embankment. Everett’s truck apparently came to rest against some object halfway down

the embankment.

       {¶8}   Everett testified that he may have been rendered temporarily unconscious

immediately following the impact. When he regained consciousness, he found his brother

lying in the backseat. He placed his hand on his brother, who was not responsive. He

exited the truck through a window and saw Appellant sitting on a tire that had come off of

the borrowed truck. Appellant stated: “Dean [Everett], the reason I hit you, my wheel fell

off.” (Trial Tr., p. 360.) A significant amount of blood is visible in the truck Appellant was

driving, particularly on the deployed airbag. It appears that Appellant suffered some sort

of head injury as a result of the incident, however, neither he nor Everett were apparently

seriously injured.

       {¶9}   The crash occurred at approximately 7:45 a.m. A pedestrian in the area

called 911 and emergency vehicles arrived fairly quickly. The local fire department

arrived first. Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Daniel Moran was dispatched to the

scene at 7:48 a.m. and arrived a short time thereafter.

       {¶10} Captain Chris Brokaw of the Neff Fire Department testified that he saw

Everett and Appellant walking in the street when he arrived. (Trial Tr., p. 318.) He

observed Appellant’s vehicle and noticed that the front passenger’s side tire was laying

in the road in front of the truck. At the time, Robert was still inside the grey truck. Before

he attempted to check on Robert, Captain Brokaw took a hose and put water on the

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engine, which appeared to be smoking. He then entered the bed of the truck, reached

inside and placed a heart monitor pad on Robert, which showed a “flat line.” (Trial Tr., p.

336.) He contacted dispatch, declared Robert dead on arrival, and was instructed to

leave the body alone and allow the investigation to proceed. He testified that he complied

with those instructions.

       {¶11} Mary Mansfield, a firefighter and EMT, testified that she first approached

Everett and requested to be allowed to medically treat him, however, he declined

treatment until he knew his brother’s condition. She then saw Appellant, who appeared

to be “staggering a little bit on the roadway, so I grabbed ahold of him and I said, ‘Are you

okay?’ ” (Trial Tr., p. 342.) Appellant also initially refused treatment, however, Mansfield

persisted. Appellant kept asking her “[d]id someone pass away? Did someone die?”

(Trial Tr., p. 343.) She informed him that she did not know and began to address his

wounds. As she and Appellant talked, “more and more, I noticed he was kind of like --

just he wasn’t all there. His altered mental status started kicking in a little bit more.” (Trial

Tr., p. 344.) Although she believed he was impaired, she conceded that it was “[v]ery

possible” that his behavior was the result of a head injury based on the impact of his head

hitting the windshield. (Trial Tr., p. 350.)

       {¶12} Trooper Moran testified that he did not expect to find a fatality when he

arrived and was surprised when the fire department informed him there had been a death.

He learned the name of all parties involved, but did not speak to either Appellant or Everett

at the scene because they were being medically treated. He photographed the scene

and attempted to trace the path of the vehicles to learn what may have caused the

accident. He was told Appellant claimed that mechanical failure had been responsible

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for the accident. However, Trooper Moran did not find any evidence that he believed

would support that claim. Sgt. Frank Cook later completed the accident reconstruction.

In summation, he also could find no evidence to support Appellant’s claim of mechanical

failure.

       {¶13} At some point, Trooper Moran did speak with both Appellant and Everett,

who were being treated at two different area hospitals. Trooper Moran first visited

Appellant, who was in an emergency room and receiving fluids intravenously. Appellant

admitted to Trooper Moran that his driver’s license was suspended. Appellant also

admitted he had ingested a small amount of marijuana at either 5:00 or 5:30 that morning.

He explained that he uses marijuana daily to treat various medical conditions. He denied

any other drug use. Trooper Moran placed Appellant under arrest for DUI based on his

admission regarding marijuana use. He obtained a urine sample that was taken around

10:00 a.m. Trooper Moran could not state at trial the exact time requirement for obtaining

urine samples pursuant to law, but believed that they should be taken within two or three

hours following an incident. He conceded that Appellant’s test was taken at the outer

parameter of the timeline.

       {¶14} Appellant’s urine sample tested positive for several substances. Kimberly

Belvin, a criminalist for the Ohio State Highway Patrol crime lab, provided testimony

regarding the legal limits for an OVI and about Appellant’s results. First, he tested positive

for amphetamine. The per se legal limit for purposes of an OVI is that a subject tests at

greater than 500 nanograms per milliliter. Appellant’s sample tested at more than 1,000

nanograms per milliliter. Belvin explained that once a sample is found to be more than

twice the legal limit (1,000 nanograms for purposes of amphetamine), testing is cut off at

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that point. Second, Appellant’s sample tested positive for methamphetamine. Belvin

stated that the legal limit for this drug is greater than 500 nanograms per milliliter.

Appellant tested at more than 1,000 nanograms per milliliter. Third, Appellant’s sample

tested positive for marijuana. Belvin testified that the legal limit for marijuana is 35

nanograms per milliliter and testing is cut off at 200 nanograms per milliliter. Appellant’s

sample tested positive for greater than 200 nanograms per milliliter.

       {¶15} Trooper Moran also interviewed Everett, who was being seen at a separate

hospital. Everett denied any drug use. During questioning, Trooper Moran obtained a

urine sample. Although the state attempted to have this testimony excluded at trial, the

court permitted the defense to disclose the result of Everett’s urine sample, which tested

positive for both cocaine and glucose. The legal limit pertaining to cocaine for purposes

of an OVI is 150 nanograms per milliliter; Everett’s sample tested 213.94 nanograms per

milliliter +/- 19.25 nanograms per milliliter. According to Everett, it had been several days

since he had used cocaine. Everett’s sample also tested positive for glucose, which

usually triggers the necessity of a second alcohol screening test to be completed a week

later. For some reason, Everett’s second round of testing did not occur. Everett pleaded

guilty to an OVI charge and served an unspecified term of incarceration. He was released

at some point prior to trial in this case.

       {¶16} Trooper Moran later returned to the scene and searched Appellant’s

vehicle, where he located a glass smoking pipe with a residue he believed to be

methamphetamine.         Testing later revealed that the substance was, in fact,

methamphetamine. The pipe was found on the floor of the front passenger’s seat next to

two baggies, one containing a substance that appeared to be marijuana and the other

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containing seeds. Testing confirmed the first substance was marijuana, but the seeds

were not tested.

       {¶17} On February 6, 2019, Appellant was charged with two counts of aggravated

vehicular manslaughter by means of a Rule 4 Complaint.            On February 28, 2019,

Appellant failed to appear at arraignment and an arrest warrant was issued. Appellant

was subsequently located and was arraigned, and was released on a recognizance bond.

On March 5, 2020, Appellant was indicted on two counts of vehicular manslaughter.

       {¶18} Due to COVID-19 and the continuances it caused, the procedural history

after this point is somewhat unclear. It appears that these delays allowed the state more

time to obtain testing results, which then led to additional charges.

       {¶19} On May 6, 2021, in what appears to be a superseding indictment, Appellant

was indicted on both the earlier charges and several new charges:           one count of

aggravated vehicular manslaughter, a felony of the second degree in violation of R.C.

2903.06(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a); one count of aggravated vehicular manslaughter, a felony of

the second degree in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(b)(1); one count of

operating a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance (“OVI”), a

misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1), (J)(I), (G)(1)(a); one

count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance (“OVI”),

a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1), (J)(IX), (G)(1)(a);

one count of operating a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance

(“OVI”), a misdemeanor of the first degree in violation of R.C. 4511.19 (A)(1), (J)(VIII),

(G)(1)(a); one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree in

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violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a); and one count of possession of LSD, a felony of

the fifth degree in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(5)(a).

       {¶20} For the sake of clarity as it relates to this appeal, we note that count seven

pertains to the traffic stop that occurred on August 2, 2018. Counts one through six relate

to the traffic accident that occurred on September 12, 2018. All counts were included in

the same indictment, no motion was made to sever these counts, and the trial court did

not sever them sua sponte.

       {¶21} During trial, the state presented the following witnesses: Kimberly Belvin,

(Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab), Jennifer Acurio (Ohio Bureau of Criminal

Investigations, forensic scientist), Captain Chris Brokaw (Neff Fire Department), Mary

Mansfield (Neff Fire Department firefighter/EMT), Everett Hartley (victim’s brother),

Jeffrey Turnau (Ohio State Highway Patrol Crime Lab), Trooper Daniel Moran (Ohio State

Highway Patrol), Frank J. Cook (Ohio State Highway Patrol accident reconstructionist),

and Corporal Jason Schwarck (Belmont County Sheriff’s Office). After a three-day trial,

the jury convicted Appellant of all offenses.

       {¶22} At the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the following: eleven to

sixteen and one-half years of incarceration on count two; six months each for counts

three, four, and five; and one year for counts six and seven. The court merged counts

one and two. Counts three, four, and five were ordered to run concurrently and counts

six and seven consecutively to count two. The total aggregate sentence then, was

thirteen years to eighteen and one-half years. However, although not raised by the

parties, the court’s judgment entry failed to note that count two involved an indeterminate

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sentence. Instead, the judgment entry imposed an eleven year determinate sentence on

count two.

      {¶23} Appellant filed a motion for a delayed appeal in this matter, which was

granted. Appellant also filed a motion to suspend execution of his sentence pending

appeal in both the trial court and this Court. Both motions were denied.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

      The trial court abused its discretion in engaging in improper joinder and

      trying the offenses contained in the Indictment together, prejudicing

      Appellant and violating Appellant's right to a fair trial and to Due Process

      under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

      Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3

      The failure of Appellant's trial counsel to object to testimony relating to the

      August 2, 2018 incident constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in

      violation of Appellant's right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth

      Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of

      the Ohio Constitution.

                           ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4

      The failure of Appellant's trial counsel to request relief from prejudicial

      joinder and severance of Count Seven from Counts One through Six of the

      Indictment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of

Case No. 21 BE 0048
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       Appellant's right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to

       the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio

       Constitution.

       {¶24} In each of these assignments of error, Appellant contends that it was error

to join the charges from the two separate incidents in one trial. Because both involved

drugs and traffic violations, Appellant complains that the jury could not be reasonably

expected to separate the evidence. He contends that his admission to LSD possession

in count seven likely portrayed him as a drug user to the jury, damaging his argument that

the drugs found in the truck might not have belonged to him, particularly since he had

borrowed it from someone else whose criminal record is unknown. Appellant argues that,

but for the failure to sever count seven, Corp. Schwarck’s testimony concerning his prior

possession of LSD during his traffic stop would not have been admissible in the accident

case as a prior bad act.

       {¶25} In response, the state highlights that because no request to sever was made

and no objection raised, Appellant is limited to a plain error review. Regardless, the state

argues that the evidence pertaining to each offense was simple and direct, negating the

need to conduct the “other acts” analysis.      As to Appellant’s ineffective assistance

argument, the state contends that motion would not have been successful and Appellant

is unable to demonstrate prejudice in any event.

       {¶26} Ohio law favors joining multiple criminal offenses in a single trial. State v.

Harrison, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 19 JE 0009, 2020-Ohio-3624, ¶ 55, citing State v.

Franklin, 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 122, 580 N.E.2d 1 (1991), citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d

160, 163, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). “[J]oinder and the avoidance of multiple trials is favored

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for many reasons, among which are conserving time and expense, diminishing the

inconvenience to witnesses and minimizing the possibility of incongruous results in

successive trials before different juries.” State v. Torres, 66 Ohio St.2d 340, 343, 421

N.E.2d 1288 (1981).

       {¶27} Crim.R. 8(A) provides:

       Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment, information

       or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,

       whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar

       character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two

       or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a

       common scheme or plan, or are part of a course of criminal conduct.

       {¶28} A defendant may move to sever trial of joined offenses pursuant to Crim.R.

14 if he can establish prejudice. Lott, supra, at 163. In relevant part, Crim.R. 14 provides

that: “[i]f it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by * * * such joinder for trial

together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an election or

separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide such other relief as

justice requires.”

       {¶29} The state may counter a claim of prejudice in one of two ways. The state

may demonstrate that the evidence presented at trial for each offense was simple and

direct. State v. Moore, 2013-Ohio-1435, 990 N.E.2d 625, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.), citing State v.

Coley, 93 Ohio St.3d at 259, 754 N.E.2d 1129 (2001). Failing that, the state must show

that all of the evidence presented at the combined trial would have been admissible in

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each case if tried separately. Id. If the state can demonstrate that the evidence is simple

and direct, then it is not required to prove the stricter admissibility test. State v. Harris,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 37, 2015-Ohio-2686, ¶ 29, citing State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio

St.3d 95, 109, 723 N.E.2d 1054 (2000). Evidence is simple and direct when it is apparent

that the jury was not confused about which evidence proved which act. Harrison at ¶ 60,

citing State v. Harris, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 37, 2015-Ohio-2686, ¶ 30; Coley at

259.

       {¶30} The test for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is two-part: whether

trial counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether the deficiency resulted in

prejudice. State v. White, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 13 JE 33, 2014-Ohio-4153, ¶ 18, citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v.

Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 107. In order to prove

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” State v. Lyons, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 14 BE 28, 2015-Ohio-3325, ¶ 11, citing

Strickland at 694. The appellant must affirmatively prove the alleged prejudice occurred.

Id. at 693.

       {¶31} As both are necessary, if one prong of the Strickland test is not met, an

appellate court need not address the remaining prong. Id. at 697. The appellant bears

the burden of proof on the issue of counsel's effectiveness, and in Ohio, a licensed

attorney is presumed competent. State v. Carter, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 2000-CO-32,

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2001 WL 741571 (June 29, 2001), citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289, 714

N.E.2d 905 (1999).

       {¶32} Because defense counsel did not request a hearing on the issue of joinder,

we are without evidence as to whether the issue was contested at any point or whether

the parties agreed to joinder of the offenses. Appellant’s first argument, however, is that

the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte sever the seventh charge.

       {¶33} Appellant is correct that at least some prejudice may have occurred as a

result of joinder in this matter. His admission to possession of LSD at his traffic stop could

reasonably have been expected to hinder his ability to present certain defenses to the

charges resulting from the traffic accident. The evidence may have portrayed him to the

jury as a person who abuses illegal drugs while operating a motor vehicle. That said, a

showing of possible prejudice is not necessarily enough to overcome joinder.

       {¶34} We note that the state occasionally treated the two incidents as separate

events and sometimes indicated that they were intertwined. For example, during the

state’s opening, the prosecutor stated:

       This case will be presented to you in two parts and will in some ways mesh

       together, because what I just told you about was the September 12, 2018,

       incident. But you’re also going to hear of an incident on August 2, 2018.

       You will hear about that for two reasons. No. 1, you will hear from the

       deputy that stopped [Appellant] on August 2, 2018, and he will tell you that

       [Appellant] was under a suspension on that day, about 40 days, if you will,

       prior to this incident. And he will also tell you that he seized LSD from

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       [Appellant]. And you will look at that case, as well, throughout the course

       of this.

(Trial, Tr., p. 234.)

       {¶35} While we acknowledge that Crim.R. 8(A) requires some sort of link between

joined offenses, it appears from the opening statement and throughout the trial that the

state attempted to conflate the link between the two incidents. However, it is clear from

this record that while two incidents both involved operation of a motor vehicle and illegal

drugs, they occurred more than a month apart, involved different narcotics, and one

involved mere possession of a drug while the other involved driving under the influence

of drugs. The only identical fact was that both occurred while Appellant was driving

despite a suspended license. Hence, while it appears that these two incidents are similar

in nature, to “mesh” the incidents together as the state indicated would contradict the

standard requiring the evidence for each must be simple and direct. Our review of this

record reveals that even though the state may have stretched its application of Crim.R.

8(A) in the opening statement, there is no question that the evidence in support of each

of these cases was simple and direct.

       {¶36} Contrary to Appellant’s assertion at oral argument, the long established

standard in Ohio in order for joinder to be appropriate requires the state to prove only one

of the following tests after a show of possible prejudice: that the evidence is simple and

direct for each charged crime, or that the evidence in one would have otherwise been

admissible in the other. Here, count seven involved only one witness and involved only

the possession of LSD discovered during a traffic stop. On the other hand, counts one

through six involved the testimony of various first responders, an accident

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reconstructionist, lab technicians, and a police officer, none of whom were involved with

or testified in the first case. The bulk of testimony on counts one through six addressed

testing results of a urine sample that did not test positive for the single drug involved in

count seven.

       {¶37} For these reasons, the trial court’s failure to sua sponte sever the charges

was not error. For the same reasons, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise

the issue. As such, Appellant’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error are without

merit and are overruled.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

       Appellant's convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

       {¶38} Appellant argues that his aggravated vehicular manslaughter conviction is

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant specifically questions whether the

state demonstrated that impairment was the proximate cause of the crash. Appellant also

attacks the testimony of Sgt. Cook, who wrote a report containing a reconstruction of the

accident. He takes issue with the testimony of Trooper Moran, who testified that he

obtained Appellant’s urine sample at the outer limits of the timeline. Appellant also

highlights Trooper Moran’s concession that Appellant was receiving unknown

medications intravenously at the time he collected the sample.

       {¶39} The state argues that multiple witnesses testified Appellant appeared to be

in an impaired state shortly after the accident. While the state concedes that the urine

sample was taken after the time limitations, there is no evidence in the record that it

occurred after the timeline for collection had expired. The state also relies on Trooper

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Moran’s testimony that none of the officers at the scene could find any evidence to

corroborate Appellant’s claim that mechanical failure caused the accident to support its

theory of impairment as the cause of this accident.

       {¶40} Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the other.”

(Emphasis deleted.) State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

It is not a question of mathematics, but depends on the effect of the evidence in inducing

belief. Id. Weight of the evidence involves the state's burden of persuasion. Id. at 390,

678 N.E.2d 541 (Cook, J. concurring). The appellate court reviews the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,

and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed.

State v. Lang, 129 Ohio St.3d 512, 2011-Ohio-4215, 954 N.E.2d 596, ¶ 220, citing

Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. This discretionary power of the appellate court to

reverse a conviction is to be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction. Id.

       {¶41} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses

are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-

6524, 960 N.E.2d 955, ¶ 118, quoting State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d

212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact is in the best position to weigh

the evidence and judge the witnesses' credibility by observing their gestures, voice

inflections, and demeanor. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461

N.E.2d 1273 (1984). The jurors are free to believe some, all, or none of each witness'

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testimony, and they may separate the credible parts of the testimony from the incredible

parts. State v. Barnhart, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09 JE 15, 2010-Ohio-3282, ¶ 42, citing

State v. Mastel, 26 Ohio St.2d 170, 176, 270 N.E.2d 650 (1971). When there are two

fairly reasonable views of the evidence or two conflicting versions of events, neither of

which is unbelievable, we will not choose which one is more credible. State v. Gore, 131

Ohio App.3d 197, 201, 722 N.E.2d 125 (7th Dist.1999).

      {¶42} Appellant limits his arguments to the events of September 12, 2018,

involving counts one through six. It is somewhat unclear whether Appellant challenges

his conviction on all six counts, as he devotes most of his argument toward the vehicular

homicide charges and only briefly addresses an argument in regard to his urine sample,

relevant to his OVI convictions. Appellant makes no reference to the possession of drugs

charge (count six), which stems from the discovery of marijuana in his truck after the

accident, nor does he address his conviction stemming from the traffic stop incident.

Thus, we will review only the aggravated vehicular homicide and OVI convictions.

      {¶43} Aggravated vehicular manslaughter is described within R.C. 2903.06.

Appellant was charged under a specific subsection of this statute, R.C. 2903.06(A)(1)(a),

which provides:

      (A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor

      vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall

      cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's

      pregnancy in any of the following ways:

Case No. 21 BE 0048
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      (1)(a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of

      section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent

      municipal ordinance;

      ***

      (2) In one of the following ways:

      (a) Recklessly;

      (b) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in

      the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a

      reckless operation offense, provided that this division applies only if the

      person whose death is caused or whose pregnancy is unlawfully terminated

      is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the

      reckless operation offense in the construction zone and does not apply as

      described in division (F) of this section.

      (3) In one of the following ways:

      (a) Negligently;

      (b) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in

      the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a

      speeding offense, provided that this division applies only if the person

      whose death is caused or whose pregnancy is unlawfully terminated is in

      the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                          – 20 –

       speeding offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described

       in division (F) of this section.

       (4) As the proximate result of committing a violation of any provision of any

       section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor

       misdemeanor or of a municipal ordinance that, regardless of the penalty set

       by ordinance for the violation, is substantially equivalent to any provision of

       any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor

       misdemeanor.

       {¶44} Appellant asserts that the state failed to demonstrate his alleged impairment

was the proximate cause of the accident. Within this argument, Appellant attacks the

investigation as a whole and, more specifically, in regard to his claims of mechanical

failure and the collection of his urine sample. He also contends that Everett’s state of

impairment should have been addressed as a contributing factor of the accident.

       {¶45} We note at the outset that in his arguments, Appellant fails to consider that

once the state proved Appellant’s urine sample contained levels of prohibited substance

in excess of any acceptable levels pursuant to the OVI statues, and proved that an

accident did, in fact, occur, the state likely established his guilt as a matter of law. In other

words, the problem with Appellant’s arguments regarding his allegation of mechanical

failure and his dissatisfaction with the police investigation is that even if he is correct that

a mechanical failure occurred, the evidence still demonstrated that Appellant operated

the vehicle that lost control and caused an accident resulting in a death.

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                                                                                       – 21 –

       {¶46} Even if mechanical failure was some sort of contributing factor, the evidence

proves that Appellant had drugs in his system at levels well over the legal limit. Thus,

there is no way for him to disprove that his impairment was the cause or the major

contributing factor. At best, Appellant has presented the possibility there may have been

two additional, equally viable, causes of the accident, neither of which can be definitely

proved or disproved. The standard of manifest weight review is clear. We may not

choose between two equally viable versions of an event and determine which is more

credible. Again, credibility is a matter for the trier of fact. The jurors in this matter were

well aware of Appellant’s claims that the truck sustained a mechanical failure which

caused him to lose control, despite his argument that the police investigation was

deficient.   The jurors either disbelieved Appellant, or determined that Appellant’s

impairment and inability to maintain control was the root cause of the accident and the

victim’s death despite any alleged mechanical failure. As Appellant concedes that he lost

control, travelled into oncoming traffic, and crashed into Everett’s truck, any impairment

on Everett’s part was irrelevant. Appellant’s concession on these facts operates as an

admission as to cause.

       {¶47} Appellant also challenges the value of his urine sample based on the time

it was collected and the nature of his treatment at the emergency room. At trial, his

counsel elicited testimony from Trooper Moran, who admitted that he collected

Appellant’s urine sample at the outer limits of the collection period. Defense counsel then

entered the following colloquy with Trooper Moran:

       Q. What is the timeframe for -- or what was the timeframe, actually, for the

       collection of blood then?

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                                                                                           – 22 –

       A. To tell you right now, I could not honestly tell you.

       Q. Could you tell us what it was for urine?

       A. It was either two or three hours.

(Trial Tr., pp. 499-500.)

       {¶48} Defense counsel then elicited testimony from Trooper Moran that he was

dispatched to the scene at 7:48 a.m. and did not collect the sample until 10:30 a.m.,

almost three hours after the accident. This fact was known to the jury.

       {¶49} Despite        the   collection   time   of   the   urine   sample,   it   contained

methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana at levels more than double the levels

allowed by law for purposes of an OVI. It is entirely probable that had his sample been

more promptly taken, it would have contained even higher levels. Thus, Appellant’s

arguments in this regard are puzzling, at best. We also note that Appellant admitted to

marijuana use during his interrogation.          This alone, significantly limits his ability to

challenge his corresponding OVI conviction.

       {¶50} Appellant posits that he was receiving an unknown substance intravenously

at the time his sample was taken, which could have affected his sample. However, it

does not seem likely that Appellant could have been receiving any medication during his

treatment that could have caused him to test positive for these particular substances.

Regardless, as this was not addressed at trial, Appellant’s argument here amounts to

speculation on his part.

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                         – 23 –

       {¶51} For these reasons, sufficient and credible evidence supports the Appellant’s

convictions. As such, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is

overruled.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5

       The failure of Appellant's trial counsel, to promptly object to Trooper Daniel

       Moran's testimony regarding the accident, without the trooper being

       qualified as an expert witness in accident reconstruction, constituted

       ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of Appellant's right to counsel

       under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

       Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

       {¶52} Appellant argues that his counsel’s representation was ineffective based on

his counsel’s failure to object to testimony from Trooper Moran. Appellant explains that

Trooper Moran testified regarding technical issues pertaining to accident reconstruction.

Trooper Moran stated that when he undertook his reconstruction of this accident, he found

no mechanical problem on the part of Appellant’s borrowed truck that could have been

the cause of the accident. Although Appellant concedes that his counsel did object to this

testimony, he did not do so until several minutes into Trooper Moran’s testimony.

Appellant claims that the damage to his defense caused by Trooper Moran had already

been done by that time. Appellant believes the error is compounded by that fact that

Trooper Moran is the only witness who was present at the scene of the accident to have

testified about these issues.

Case No. 21 BE 0048
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       {¶53} At trial, the state asked Trooper Moran about Appellant’s claims that

mechanical failure, particularly a tire “locking up,” caused the accident. For ease of

understanding, all relevant testimony will be cited below.

       [Trooper Moran] In this particular case, off to the side of the road, there

       were weeds. And from -- it’s easy to see from -- you can tell if a tire is in

       motion or if a tire is locked up. If a tire is in motion and it goes through

       weeds, you are just going to see basically the weeds bent over and you’ll

       be able to just tell what direction the vehicle was going. If the vehicle has a

       locked up tire, obviously you’re going to see the weeds either pulled up or

       you’re going to see dirt from where the actual--– the locked tire is skidding

       across the grass and the weeds.

       Now, once the vehicle gets into the weeds, it is -- people describe it as being

       on ice. It’s harder to stop. But in this case, looking at the mark from the

       white pickup truck [belonging to Appellant], it was free rolling. The weeds

       were just smooshed down. There was nothing indicating that there was any

       type of braking or a vehicle tire being locked up, or it would be skidding.

(Trial Tr., pp. 412-413.)

       {¶54} Later, Trooper Moran was asked about Appellant’s claims that the truck

“wiggled back and forth” and “[t]hen it locked up.” (Trial Tr., p. 427) The following

testimony was given during the state’s direct examination of Trooper Moran:

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                      – 25 –

      Q How about, based on your training and experience, the wiggle of the tire?

      Does that also leave a mark behind?

      A With my training and experience with other crashes that have had tires

      that have either gone flat or, you know, fallen off, you’re going to see some

      type of movement from that tire. You’re going to see lug nuts that may have

      fallen off. You’re going to see --

      [Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: I’m going to object at this point. This witness

      hasn’t been qualified as an expert regarding accident reconstruction or any

      of the signs thereof.     I think that we’ve gone beyond his personal

      experience. We’re now delving into an area where he would need to be

      qualified as an expert.

      THE COURT: Sustained.

      [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

      Will the Court permit him, then, to testify to his personal experience?

      THE COURT: I will let him to [sic] testify as to his experience.

      [PROSECUTOR]: Okay.

      Q.   Based on your experience, when -- and again, we will hear from

      Sergeant Cook later on, but based on your experience, when you see this

      wiggle in or on a -- or from a tire, does it leave marks on the roadway?

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       A. Based on my training and experience, not all the time, but there are

       times where yes, there will be a marking or a squiggle mark on the roadway.

(Trial Tr., pp. 429-431.)

       {¶55} Appellant contends that his counsel should have objected much earlier in

Trooper Moran’s testimony. However, the record demonstrates that counsel’s cross-

examination caused Trooper Moran to walk back his statement that tire issues will always

cause a mark on the road and to soften his assertion, clarifying that this is not always the

case. Even so, it was made clear to the jury that Trooper Moran was not qualified as an

expert witness.

       {¶56} Later in Trooper Moran’s testimony, it became apparent he had limited

knowledge of the mechanical nature of vehicles. When asked about certain aspects of a

tire and the surrounding mechanics, he admitted that he is not a mechanic. He responded

to a mechanical question by stating “I’m not sure exactly what the term is. It’s an auto

part. What it is, I don’t know.” (Trial Tr., p. 504.) He was then asked what occurs when

an upper ball joint is loose or breaks, and he replied that he had no understanding of this

process. Thus, the jury understood that Trooper Moran was not a mechanical expert and

the state did not attempt to qualify him as an accident reconstruction expert. As such, the

timing of trial counsel’s objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6

       The cumulative errors of Appellant's trial counsel constituted ineffective

       assistance of counsel in violation of Appellant's right to counsel under the

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                       – 27 –

       Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and

       Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

       {¶57} Appellant asserts that the cumulative effect of counsel’s alleged errors

caused the state’s case to appear more credible than it was and also violated his

constitutional right to counsel and due process. Appellant emphasizes that each of his

asserted errors affected his ability to present a mechanical failure defense and bolstered

the state’s theory of Appellant’s impairment.

       {¶58} The state contends that none of Appellant’s arguments rise to the level of

error. However, even if errors were made, Appellant is unable to show that those errors

affected the outcome of the trial.

       {¶59} “Cumulative error exists only where the harmless errors during trial actually

‘deprive[d] a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial.’ ” State v. Dawson, 2017-

Ohio-2957, 91 N.E.3d 140, ¶ 54 (7th Dist.), citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191,

509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. In Ohio, it is generally recognized

that “given the myriad [of] safeguards provided to assure a fair trial, and taking into

account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing

as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial.”

State v. Rupp, 7th Dist. No. 05 MA 166, 2007-Ohio-1561, ¶ 83, quoting State v. Jones,

90 Ohio St.3d 403, 422, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000).

       {¶60} Based on our analysis of Appellant’s arguments, he has not shown any

error, and so clearly cannot demonstrate cumulative error. As such, Appellant’s sixth

assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                            ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 7

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                         – 28 –

       The trial court's sentence of Appellant was contrary to law for failing to make

       the required findings, pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), to impose

       consecutive sentences.

       {¶61} Appellant argues that in imposing sentence, the court failed to make any

findings under R.C. 2914.14(C)(4) subsections (a), (b), or (c). He also contends that there

is no connection between the two separate incidents that were joined for trial, thus

negating the court’s finding of a course of conduct. He further argues that the court’s sole

statement as to his criminal history was that it was “quite lengthy,” which was not enough

on which to base the consecutive sentences.

       {¶62} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), before a trial court can impose consecutive

sentences on a defendant, the court must find:

       [T]hat the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future

       crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not

       disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the

       danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of

       the following:

       (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the

       offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed

       pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or

       was under post-release control for a prior offense.

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                         – 29 –

       (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or

       more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the

       multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

       (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive

       sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the

       offender.

       {¶63} A trial court must make the consecutive sentence findings at the sentencing

hearing and must additionally incorporate the findings into the sentencing entry. State v.

Williams, 2015-Ohio-4100, 43 N.E.3d 797, 806, ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.), citing State v. Bonnell,

140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37. The court is not required to

state reasons in support nor is it required to use any “magic” or “talismanic” words, so

long as it is apparent that the court conducted the proper analysis. Williams at ¶ 34, citing

State v. Jones, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13 MA 101, 2014-Ohio-2248, ¶ 6; State v. Verity,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 12 MA 139, 2013-Ohio-1158, ¶ 28-29.

       {¶64} The Ohio Supreme Court has recently readdressed consecutive sentence

review. State v. Gwynne, -- Ohio St. 3d --, 2022-Ohio-4607, -- N.E.3d --. As to the

standard of review, the Gwynne Court held that:

       The evidentiary standard for changing the trial court's order of consecutive

       sentences is not deference to the trial court; the evidentiary standard is that

       the appellate court, upon a de novo review of the record and the findings,

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                       – 30 –

      has a “firm belief” or “conviction” that the findings—the criteria mandated by

      the legislature to be met before the exception to concurrent sentences can

      apply—are not supported by the evidence in the record.

Id. at ¶ 23, citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231,

¶ 22; see also Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954).

      R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not require the high level of deference that comes

      with an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. This type of deference

      would permit a court of appeals to modify a defendant's sentence or to

      vacate the sentence and remand only when no sound reasoning process

      can be said to support the decision, or where the trial court exhibited an

      arbitrary or unconscionable attitude when it imposed the consecutive

      sentences.

Gwynne at ¶ 19, citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990); Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19

Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985).

      {¶65} The Court then provided “practical guidance on consecutive-sentence

review.” Id. at ¶ 24. The court explained that a consecutive sentence review is two-fold:

first, whether the record contains the requisite R.C. 2929.14(C) findings. Id. at ¶ 25.

Second, “[i]f the appellate court determines that the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) consecutive-

sentence findings have been made, the appellate court may then determine whether the

record clearly and convincingly supports those findings.” Id. at ¶ 26. “The point here is

that if even one of the consecutive-sentence findings is found not to be supported by the

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                         – 31 –

record under the clear-and-convincing standard provided by R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), then the

trial court's order of consecutive sentences must be either modified or vacated by the

appellate court.” Id., citing R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

       {¶66} “When reviewing the record under the clear-and-convincing standard, the

first core requirement is that there be some evidentiary support in the record for the

consecutive-sentence findings that the trial court made.”         Id. at ¶ 28. “The second

requirement is that whatever evidentiary basis there is, that it be adequate to fully support

the trial court's consecutive-sentence findings. This requires the appellate court to focus

on both the quantity and quality of the evidence in the record that either supports or

contradicts the consecutive-sentence findings.” Id. at ¶ 29. We note that Gwynne was

released after briefing concluded in this matter, thus the parties do not cite Gwynne or

apply its law.

       {¶67} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found “[c]onsecutive service is

necessary to protect the public from further crime and to punish the offender, and

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s

conduct, and to the danger the offender poses to the public.” (Sentencing Hrg. Tr., p. 20.)

The court also found that Appellant’s criminal history was extensive and demonstrated

the need to protect the public from future crimes. The court relied heavily on the fact that

Appellant “should never have been in that truck or that car, that vehicle, that afternoon.

Forgetting his operation, the way he operated the vehicle, forgetting that, he should not

have been in the vehicle driving it.” (Sentencing Hrg. Tr., pp. 20-21.)

       {¶68} On appeal, Appellant complains that the only record of his criminal history

is a single line in the transcript stating that his history is quite lengthy. However, the court

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                      – 32 –

had ordered a presentencing investigation (“PSI”), which details Appellant’s criminal

history in both Ohio and California. The PSI reveals thirty-three prior criminal charges, a

significant amount of which involve conduct similar to the conduct giving rise to the instant

charges.   We note that other charges were discussed at the sentencing hearing.

However, after Appellant’s counsel informed the court that those charges had been

expunged, the court expressly stated it would not consider them. This refutes Appellant’s

assertion that the trial court did not understand Appellant’s criminal history.

       {¶69} There is a plethora of evidence to support the court’s conclusion as to

Appellant’s criminal history and the need to protect society from future crimes. The court

emphasized that the underlying conduct, driving under the influence, has been a recurrent

theme for Appellant as evidenced by the prior charges and convictions. The harm is

particularly serious in this matter as it resulted in a death. This record contains evidence

to support the court’s imposition of consecutive sentences. We note that only counts two,

six, and seven were ordered to run consecutively. Counts three, four, and five (the OVI

convictions) were ordered to run concurrently.

       {¶70} However, although not raised by the parties, we note that the court made a

clerical error in its judgment entry. At the sentencing hearing, the court properly ordered

an indeterminate sentence of eleven to sixteen and one-half years on count two. In its

judgment entry, the court simply ordered a sentence of eleven years, with no mention of

the maximum term. As the court properly announced the sentence at the hearing, we

remand the matter for the sole purpose of issuing a nunc pro tunc entry to correct

Appellant’s sentence in this regard.

Case No. 21 BE 0048
                                                                                    – 33 –

      {¶71} Appellant’s seventh assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

However, the matter is remanded for a nunc pro tunc entry concerning Appellant’s

sentence as to count two.

                                       Conclusion

      {¶72} Appellant raises several arguments essentially challenging the joinder of

two separate incidents in one trial, ineffective assistance of counsel, sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions, and imposition of consecutive sentences. For the

reasons provided, Appellant’s arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed. However, the matter is sua sponte remanded to the trial court for the

limited purpose of obtaining a nunc pro tunc entry to correct Appellant’s sentence on

count two reflecting the indeterminate nature of this sentence.

Robb, J., concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 21 BE 0048
[Cite as State v. Boyd, 2023-Ohio-1120.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. However, we hereby sua

sponte remand this matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of obtaining a nunc pro

tunc entry to correctly reflect the indeterminate nature of a portion of Appellant’s sentence

according to law and consistent with this Court’s Opinion. Costs waived.

        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                           NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.