Court Opinion

ID: 9450409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:46:21.44789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:18.210568
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
After appellant was committed to the custody of the Attorney General for the term of his imprisonment in accordance with 24 D.C.Code § 425,1 intervening *748events brought about a change in his custody. While serving his sentence in a District of Columbia penal institution the Director of the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia became of the opinion that appellant was mentally ill. In accordance with 24 D.C. Code § 302,a he referred appellant to the Legal Psychiatric Service functioning under Section 24 D.C.Code § 106. The examining psychiatrists certified that appellant was mentally ill. The Director, under the authority of Section 302, thereupon transferred appellant to St. Elizabeths Hospital. Thus, the physical custody of appellant was removed to an institution in no manner under the supervision, administration or control of the Attorney General. It is part of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and is administered by the Secretary of that Department through a Superintendent responsible to him.
Appellant escaped from St. Elizabeths. But he was not indicted under those provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 751,2
3 applicable to an escape from an institution in which one has been confined by direction of the Attorney General, “whether maintained by * * * ^he federal government, or otherwise,” language quoted in the court’s opinion from 24 D.C.Code § 425. The indictment rests solely upon the provision of Section 751 covering an “escape from the custody of the Attorney General.”
The Federal Escape Act is of course a criminal statute; and the ordinary meaning of its language above quoted covers only an escape from the physical custody of the Attorney General or an agent or authorized representative of the Attorney General, which did not here occur. There is language in Section 751 which covers an escape from an institution in which a person had been confined under the direction of the Attorney General, but the indictment in this case does not charge such an offense, as the United States concedes.
The court’s opinion, however, takes the position that appellant escaped from “the custody of the Attorney General,” as charged, upon the theory that he remained in the legal or constructive custody of the Attorney General after his actual or physical custody had been transferred under Section 302 of the D.C.Code to entirely different officials in another Department of the Government. I cannot accept this theory. It seems to be based on the right of the Attorney General to assign prisoners to institutions “whether maintained by * * * the federal government, or otherwise” under 24 D.C.Code § 425. I would have no difficulty in agreeing that a prisoner so assigned would be chargeable with escape from the custody of the Attorney General if he escaped from such an institution. But appellant was not assigned to St. Elizabeths under this authority, nor is the indictment based upon the provisions of Section 751 applicable to such an escape.
The legal custody of the Attorney General or his agent or representative must be either physical or constructive. There is no third legal category. Since appellant when he escaped was not in the physical custody of the Attorney General or his agent or representative he did not escape from the custody of the Attorney General unless from his constructive custody, as the court recognizes. He could be said to have escaped such constructive custody under the present indictment and under the facts of this case only if his original commitment for the term of his imprisonment, under 24 D.C.Code § 425, has the effect of continuing the custody of the Attorney General regardless of the supervening transfer of physical custody from the Attorney General to another Department, under statutory authority. If the original commitment is so construed then, it seems to me, the resulting constructive custody of the Attorney General remained after appellant’s escape from St. Elizabeths. He never *749escaped, from such a constructive custody at all. He merely escaped from confinement at St. Elizabeths, with such constructive custody of the Attorney General following him.
I see no reason in policy, or in the language used by Congress, to construe the statute otherwise than according to its ordinary meaning. So construed it does not embrace this case. The fact is appellant escaped from the custody of those in charge of him at St. Elizabeths, not from the custody of the Attorney General or an agent of the Attorney General. His confinement at St. Elizabeths under Section 302 was to continue under the provisions of that section for the duration of his mental illness. He could be returned to the Attorney General’s custody to serve out his term of imprisonment, but only by authority of the Superintendent of St. Elizabeths. See 24 D.C.Code § 303(b).4 There is this residual right of custody in the Attorney General after that of St. Elizabeths terminates, but while at that institution in the circumstances of this case the custody of the Attorney General is superseded.
Congress has not dealt with the problem of an escape by one confined in St. Elizabeths, except insofar as confinement there is by direction of the Attorney General, which is not claimed to have occurred in this case. No doubt Congress has not legislated in this particular area because those ordinarily confined in St. Elizabeths and who escape therefrom are mentally ill.
I would reverse and remand for dismissal of the indictment. Appellant is subject to confinement until the end of his original sentence of 6 to 13 years. This confinement should not be increased by the added sentence of 6 to 18 months for conduct which I believe, with respect, does not constitute a crime based on a theory of constructive custody which either has no application to the facts of this case or which precludes the escape from being an escape at all.

. Set forth in footnote 4 of the court’s opinion.

. get forth in footnote 2 of the court’s opinion.

. get forth in footnote 3 of the court’s opinion.

. The fact that credit is given for time served at St. Elizabeths has no bearing on custody. This is prescribed by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 4242.