Court Opinion

ID: 9856761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:57:18.654113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:34.088754
License: Public Domain

SPEAR, Justice.
I dissent.
While I agree with the majority opinion that the constitutional and statutory provisions together with the state and federal decisions cited therein require a trial judge in Idaho to inform any defendant charged with a felony violation of his right to counsel before being arraigned and to assign counsel to defend such defendant when he desires to have counsel and arrange for payment of the attorney’s fees at the expense of the county; and while I also agree that in most cases it would be well for any trial judge to take an additional ten or fifteen minutes to interrogate a defendant in open court thus making a record of the efforts of the trial judge to fully inform the defendant of the seriousness of the crime with which he is charged to ascertain, if possible, the extent of the defendant’s intelligence and his ability to understand the gravity of his situation and his right to counsel at every stage of the proceeding; nevertheless under the circumstances of this particular case I feel the interrogation by the trial judge presiding over the arraignment, acceptance of defendant’s plea and subsequent sentencing of him was sufficient.
The petitioner in this habeas corpus proceeding was no eighteen-year-old youth who was standing before a district judge for the first time upon his first brush with the law. Instead we have here a man who, by his own admissions, has spent about twenty of his thirty-five years of life in penitentiaries, having been convicted of at least nine felonies. If there ever were one, this is an example of the professional criminal standing before a trial’ judge, willingly pleading guilty of another felony and urging the authorities to send him to the prison in "Idaho rather than returning him to the prison in the State of California where he feared for his life at the hands of fellow convicts.
The extent of the interrogation of a defendant by a trial judge necessarily must vary with the circumstances of each individual defendant. I cannot subscribe to a rule requiring an Idaho trial judge to waste the time of the court, the attaches thereof, and the defendant himself, by indulging in an interrogation of one who understands his constitutional . right to counsel and, nevertheless, wishes to waive such right. There is respectable authority sustaining my opinion in this regard: State v. Lawrence, 70 Idaho 422, 220 P.2d 380; Proffer v. United States, 288 F.2d 182 (5th Cir., 1961); O’Keith v. Johnston, 129 F.2d 889 (9th Cir., 1942); Huffman v. Beto, 260 F.Supp. 63 (S.D.Texas 1966); United States v. Redfield, 197 F.Supp. 559 (D.C.Nev., 1961); Williams v. Swope, 186 F.2d 897 (9th Cir., 1951); Commonwealth v. Maroney, 228 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super.Ct.1967).
To carry the reasoning of the majority opinion to its ultimate conclusion, if Louis Nizer, the famous New York attorney, or if J. W. (Jake) Ehrlich, the outstanding criminal attorney of San Francisco, California, were defendants in a felony proceeding, the district judge would be required to interrogate them extensively to ascertain whether or not they understood their rights under the United States and Idaho Constitutions and if they were intelligent enough to properly waive the right of counsel, in face of the fact known to every judge in this state that either one of such attorneys are as knowledgeable, if not more, concerning these rights and the effect of a waiver thereof than any judge in the State of Idaho. Such conclusion is obviously erroneous. It would result in the trial judge performing an entirely and completely useless act. This our courts have never required. O’Keith v. Johnson, supra; Proffer v. United States, supra.
The majority opinion would have us blindly and literally apply the principles laid down in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. *598458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357, and Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, namely, “courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights” and “[t]he record must show, or there must he an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused' was offered counsel hut intelligently and understanding^ rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.” An enlightened discussion of these principles is contained in In re Woods, 64 Cal.2d 3, 48 Cal.Rptr. 689, 409 P.2d 913 (1966), in which, among other things, the court points out:
“It is clear, however, that the matter of waiver of constitutional rights is to be determined on the facts of each particular case (In re Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.2d 325, 335, 42 Cal.Rptr. 228, 398 P.2d 420), and that an inflexible exclusive adherence to the strict record is neither constitutionally required nor in the best interests of effective judicial administration. * * *
“In Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S. Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367, it was held that, although the Fourteenth Amendment would not permit a presumption of waiver from the appearance of the accused without counsel and the silence of the record as to a request, a fact issue as to whether an effective waiver had occurred was raised by his plea of guilty. There petitioner’s denial of waiver by word or act was controverted by the state’s allegation of waiver, and a hearing was ordered. Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S.Ct. 884, 8 L.Ed. 2d 70, explicitly approved the Rice rationale, but held that a hearing was not required in that case because the state did not allege that there had been an affirmative waiver. (Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884.) In the course of that decision the court uttered its well-known language to the effect that waiver will not be presumed from a silent record (Carnley v. Cochran, supra, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884), but it clearly did not hold that non-waiver will be presumed from a silent record. Thus, the clear position of the highest court is that the determination of waiver is not to be based wholly on the strict record of proceedings below, though a party who does not raise the fact issue by proper allegations may be bound by that record.
“Our conclusion on this question is reinforced by these words of Judge Kaufman in United States v. LaVallee which, though specifically directed to the U. S. District Courts relative to their examination of past state convictions, are peculiarly applicable to our inquiry herein: ‘Gideon has changed a rule of law, but it has not abrogated the traditional responsibility of the District Courts accurately to determine the factual patterns upon which that law is to be applied. While issues of “fundamental fairness” have been removed from their consideration, the District Courts will now be confronted with factual determinations as to whether each appellant was, in fact, advised of his right to counsel, whether he waived that right, and if not, and if indigent, whether he was afforded court-appointed counsel. In resolving such questions, there is no reason to suppose that the Courts will not employ the methods and techniques which have long been familiar to our judicial system. Thus, they will undoubtedly consider the appellant’s credibility; available court records; the prevailing practices of a particular state; any evidence which the State might choose to offer; and all other relevant considerations.’ (United States v. LaVallee, supra, 330 F.2d 303, 313.)”
In addition to the many penitentiary terms served by the petitioner the last one of which was terminated only eighteen days before his conviction of petty larceny and incarceration in the county jail in Lewis-ton, Idaho, the record shows by testimony of the prosecuting attorney that,
*599“At the time I talked to Mr. Abercrombie I started first to give Mr. Abercrombie an explanation both as to what he was going to be charged with and as to what his rights were. I recall that when I got to the section of what Mr. Abercrombie’s rights might be he said, ‘I know all of that’ but I went through it with Mr. Abercrombie. I explained to him what he is being charged with. I explained to him what the procedure was both on a charge and also as to what would take place in court. I told Mr. Abercrombie that when he got into district court on this an attorney could be appointed. He was not interested in having an attorney. I had a long conversation with him. As a matter of fact, I talked to Mr. Aber-crombie two or three times after this first time.’’ (emphasis supplied)
This conversation between the prosecuting attorney and the petitioner was had prior to petitioner’s appearance in any court.
Additionally on cross-examination of the prosecutor by the attorney appointed for petitioner to represent him in a habeas corpus proceeding the record discloses the following:
“Q All right, I’ll ask you did you tell Mr. Abercrombie that the charge lodged against him was a felony?
“A Yes, I did. He knew he was being sent to the penitentiary, Mr. Aber-crombie, I found to be well versed in the law.” (emphasis supplied)
and also:
“Q Do you specifically recall having advised Mr. Abercrombie that he would have an attorney appointed for him in district court if he were unable to furnish an attorney himself ?
“A Yes I do.
“Q When was this admonition or this advice?
“A This would have been the first time I talked with Mr. Abercrombie.”
Furthermore, the record contains the testimony of the Justice of the Peace Maynard who at the time of the hearing had held such office for more than thirteen years in Nez Perce County, that the usual procedure when any case was brought before him on a criminal complaint was to advise him that,
“I explained then that in the district court he would be entitled to be represented by counsel, and in that court if he had no funds and he desired counsel one would be provided for him. That that was not the case in the justice court at that time.”
It is true that Justice Maynard could not testify positively that he in fact did so advise the petitioner at the time of his first appearance and prior to waiving the preliminary hearing, but such customary procedure can be recognized in determinations of this kind. Madison v. Maxwell, 177 Ohio St. 84, 202 N.E.2d 617 (1964)1
Under this record and all the circumstances as related herein I cannot hold that the trial judge was in error in failing to interrogate the petitioner any more than the record discloses he did. I am convinced, as was the sentencing trial judge and another learned trial judge who ruled against petitioner in the habeas corpus proceeding, that petitioner did know of his rights to have counsel appointed for him, and he intelligently and understanding^ waived that right in the course of the following proceedings:
“The Court: Do you have an attorney ?
“Mr. Abercrombie: No.
“The Court: Do you want an attorney?
“Mr. Abercrombie: No.
“The Court: Do you understand your rights to have an attorney if you want one?” (emphasis supplied)
“Mr. Abercrombie: (nodded affirmatively.)”
The order remanding the petitioner to the custody of the warden of the Idaho State Penitentiary and quashing petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed.