Court Opinion

ID: 9894817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 05:09:14.568065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:47.312192
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                    revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                             STATE OF MICHIGAN

                               COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH MANN,                                                            UNPUBLISHED
                                                                         November 2, 2023
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                        No. 361637
                                                                         Wayne Circuit Court
CITY OF DETROIT,                                                         LC No. 2021-003705-NO

                  Defendant-Appellant.

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and CAMERON, JJ.

SHAPIRO, P.J. (dissenting).

        I respectfully dissent. The question is whether an object embedded in the concrete sidewalk
and creating a five-inch vertical discontinuity in the middle of the sidewalk is “in the sidewalk”
for purposes of the highway exception to governmental immunity. The injury-causing object is
the remnant of a street sign installed before the sidewalk existed, when the area was grass-covered.
When the sidewalk was being constructed, the old street sign was supposed to be removed.
However, for reasons unknown, rather than removing the entire sign, the sign was cut five inches
above the ground and the stub was left in place when the sidewalk was poured. It appears that the
stub itself, which is four inches in diameter, was also filled with concrete when the sidewalk was
poured, as shown below:1

1
    The pop can in front of the pipe is for scale and is not otherwise relevant to this case.

                                                    -1-
       The majority agrees that the sidewalk in question is a “sidewalk” for purposes of applying
the highway exception to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1401(c), (f). MCL 691.1402a(1)
provides that “[a] municipal corporation in which a sidewalk is installed adjacent to a municipal,
county, or state highway shall maintain the sidewalk in reasonable repair.” (Emphasis added).

        MCL 691.1402a(3) grants municipal corporations a rebuttable presumption of reasonable
repair, which may be rebutted by (a) “a vertical discontinuity defect of 2 inches or more in the
sidewalk,” or (b) a “dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself of a particular character other than
solely a vertical discontinuity.”

         It is undisputed that the discontinuity that caused plaintiff’s injury was greater than two
inches. However, the majority concludes that the discontinuity is not “in the sidewalk.” I disagree.
The five-inch pipe is unquestionably “in the sidewalk”—it is bound to the sidewalk by concrete,
partially submerged beneath the concrete surface, immobile, and unremovable unless the sidewalk
slab is replaced.2

         The majority bases its decision on a misreading of LaMeau v Royal Oak, 490 Mich 949
(2011). The facts in LaMeau were far afield from those presented in the instant case. In that case,
the plaintiff was not injured because he struck or tripped over anything “in,” or even “on,” the
sidewalk. Rather, he was injured while riding a motor scooter when his head and neck struck a
guy wire several feet above the sidewalk. The wire ran from a point several yards up a nearby
utility pole and stretched diagonally to the ground where the wire was anchored to the far edge of
the sidewalk. Plaintiff made no contact with the anchor nor was there a claim that the surface
intended for walking caused his injury; the injury was caused by the guy wire exclusively. See
LaMeau v Royal Oak, 289 Mich App 153, 158-162; 796 NW2d 106 (2010), overruled by 490 Mich
949 (2011). In adopting the Court of Appeals dissent, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that,
because one end of the guy wire was anchored to the edge of the sidewalk, this somehow
transformed the entire guy wire into something “in” the sidewalk. See id. at 170. Common sense
reveals that a wire several feet above a sidewalk is not “in” the sidewalk.3

       The majority relies on the fact that, in LaMeau, the Court rejected the argument that the
wire was “connected” to the sidewalk. However, the object in the instant case was not merely
“connected” to the sidewalk; it was embedded in the concrete. In LaMeau, the only portion of the
guy wire in LaMeau that was actually in contact with the sidewalk was the anchor, which played
no role in the plaintiff’s injury. Moreover, in LaMeau, there was no vertical discontinuity, let
alone one greater than two inches in the sidewalk.

2
  According to Dictionary.com, the word “in,” when used as a preposition, means “inclusion with
a space, a place or limits.” Dictionary.com, In <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/in> (accessed
October 23, 2023).
3
  LaMeau made no comment as to whether the anchor would have been considered “in” the
highway if the plaintiff had tripped over the anchor rather than striking the elevated guide wire.

                                                -2-
        The majority also relies on Weaver v Detroit, 252 Mich App 239, 246; 651 NW2d 482
(2002), which held that a streetlight pole was also not part of the “highway.” Weaver, as well as
Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000), on which it was based,
rested on the fact that traffic signs and streetlight poles are not within the roadbed designed for
travel. But here, the remnant of the street sign was actually in the middle of the sidewalk. Despite
the fact that utility poles or streetlight poles are not deemed part of the highway in and of
themselves, if the five-inch-high remnant of one was embedded in the middle of the roadbed, it
would plainly render the roadway itself defective.4

       For these reasons, I would affirm the denial of summary disposition.

                                                             /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

4
  I also do not find persuasive the majority’s reliance on Ali v Detroit, 218 Mich App 581, 588;
554 NW2d 384 (1996), which held only that a freestanding structure does not constitute a defect
in the sidewalk. The pipe in this case was neither a structure nor freestanding.

                                                -3-