Court Opinion

ID: 9537205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:14:12.252506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:11.861214
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
concurring.
Although I accede to today’s judgment and concur in the court’s pronouncement, I write separately to add that the insurer’s own act prevented this claim from qualifying as one that was denied “in whole or in part” within the meaning of 51 O.S.1981 § 157.1
I
When the insurer wrote to the plaintiffs’ counsel on March 30, 1983 to propose a settlement conference on April 13,1983 the insurer unequivocally manifested its conscious recognition of the plaintiffs’ claim as one that still stood in unrejected status.
Since under the terms of 51 O.S.1981 §§ 156(C)2 and 157 no action may be brought until a claim has been denied, plaintiffs could not initiate their suit before April 13, 1983. They hence had, at a minimum, six months from that day to institute the present action.3 Their July 7, 1983 filing was hence timely.
II
A. The time limit during which no action may be commenced against a political subdivision is procedural and must be viewed as a true statute of limitations.
Two conceptually distinct time bars are recognized by the common law — (1) an “ordinary” or “true” statute of limitations that regulates the time to bring an action and (2) a time limit that conditions the exercise of a right and must hence be viewed as a substantive element of the claim.4 The former bars only the remedy; the latter extinguishes the right as well as the remedy.
*458If the triggering mechanism provided by 51 O.S.1981 § 1575 to mark the commencement of a six-month period for bringing an action, or to mark the end of an interval during which no suit may be filed, could be viewed as a “negative ” statute of limitations 6 — a time bar to an action’s premature commencement — its provisions would be deemed to affect only the remedy. On the other hand, if that mechanism’s 90-day time bar were to be regarded as a condition on the right or as a substantive element of the claim, it would limit the court’s power to entertain the claim. In the latter event estoppel could not be invoked to prevent the governmental tortfeasor’s use of the § 157 rejection-or-settlement interval as an absolute defense. This is so because the power of the court to entertain the claim would automatically cease7 at the expiration of the very period prescribed for its exercise.
Unless the statute explicitly states otherwise, the time for bringing a claim against the government is procedural and should be viewed as a statute of limitations.8 Whether the § 157 triggering mechanism of The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act [Act]9 constitutes a limitation on the exercise of judicial power and a condition on the right, or merely limits the time during which an action may not be filed, is to be determined from its language.10
The terms of § 156(C) plainly evince a legislative design to limit the right to sue if no notice has been given to the governmental tortfeasor or if no action is timely brought. Notice-of-claim requirements have been said to embody a legislative policy that the right to sue a governmental body requires compliance with the prescribed statutory conditions.11 The pertinent language of that section which demonstrates clearly that failure to give notice or timely to file suit is fatal to the claim is:
“ * * * No action for any cause arising under this act shall be maintained unless valid notice has been given and the action is commenced within six (6) months after notification of denial of the claim by the clerk of the political subdivision. * * * ” [Emphasis added.]
In contrast, the 90-day period during which no action may be brought clearly was intended as a negative statute of limitations. No language comparable to that in § 156(C) is used in § 157 to condition a right or limit the court’s power,
a* * * £ claim is denied if the political subdivision fails to approve the claim in its entirety within ninety (90) days, unless the interested parties have reached a settlement before the expiration of that period. * * * ” [Emphasis added.]
In short, the § 156(C) notice and the commencement-of-action provisions affect the right; the 90-day time limit in § 157 is but a negative statute of limitations — a remedial device that bars an action’s premature commencement. Because I distinguish the time span for giving notice and for filing an action from the 90-day time interval —the end of which triggers the six-month period for commencing suit — and consider *459only the former as a condition on the exercise of the claimant’s right to seek redress, I read the latter as one that has the same attributes as any ordinary statute of limitations.
B. The insurer’s misleading conduct es-tops it from asserting that the action was not timely brought.
Estoppel may be applied against a governmental entity if its interposition would further some principle of public policy or interest.12 The pivotal question here is whether the facts and circumstances of the instant case implicate some prevailing public interest that will except it from the general rule that precludes the use of estoppel against the government. I believe they do.
The public interest clearly favors the plaintiffs’ position of promoting the settlement of claims rather than of encouraging long court proceedings. Any efforts by the parties to effect a settlement would become meaningless if the 90-day period in § 157 were construed as requiring the claimant to file a lawsuit in the face of unqualified assurances of settlement from the insurer or the governmental agency. It is my view that protection of the settlement process implicates sufficient public-policy considerations to afford here a basis for interposing estoppel against a public agency.
Whether a defendant is estopped from interposing the defense of a § 157 time bar could be raised by a plaintiff’s allegations and proof that the defendant had made (a) some assurance of settlement negotiations reasonably calculated to lull the plaintiff into a sense of security and to delay action beyond the 90-day period, (b) an express and repeated admission of liability in conjunction with promises of payment, settlement or performance, or (c) any false, fraudulent or misleading conduct, or some affirmative act of concealment that would exclude suspicion and preclude inquiry or would induce one to refrain from bringing an action in a timely manner.13
According to the record, the plaintiffs agreed on October 2,1982 to settle with the insurer on prepayment of the vehicle’s damages while negotiations would go on to settle the personal injury element of their claim. The insurer’s actions of proposing a settlement conference manifested its conscious recognition of the unrejected status in which the plaintiffs’ claim was held. The insurer knew or should have known that the claimant was relying on these negotiations and would not treat the claim as having been rejected until the April 13th conference had failed. Because the plaintiffs doubtless placed reasonable reliance upon the insurer’s actions to their detriment, the insurer’s misleading conduct es-tops it from asserting that the 90-day bar of § 157 began earlier than April 13.

. The terms of 51 O.S.1981 § 157 provided: "Within ninety (90) days after receiving the filing of a claim, the clerk of the political subdivision shall notify the claimant in writing of the approval or denial of the claim. A claim is denied if the political subdivision fails to approve the claim in its entirety within ninety (90) days, unless the interested parties have reached a settlement before the expiration of that period. A person may not initiate a suit against a political subdivision or employee whose conduct gave rise to the claim unless the claim has been denied in whole or in part." [Emphasis supplied.]

. The terms of 51 O.S.1981 § 156(C) provided: "The written notice of claim shall state the time, place and circumstances of the claim and the amount of compensation or other relief demanded. Failure to state either the time, place, circumstances and amount of . compensation demanded shall not invalidate the notice unless the claimant declines or refuses to furnish such information within ninety (90) days after demand by the political subdivision. No action for any cause arising under this act shall be maintained unless valid notice has been given and the action is commenced within six (6) months after notification of denial of the claim by the clerk of the political subdivision. The time for giving written notice of claim does not include the time during which the person injured is unable due to incapacitation from the injury to give such notice, not exceeding ninety (90) days of incapacity.”

. See 51 O.S.1981 § 156(C), supra note 2; see also in this connection, Harvey v. Kern County, 107 Cal.App. 590, 290 P. 648, 651 [1930].

. Pinson v. Robertson, 197 Okl. 419, 172 P.2d 625, 627 [1946]; Saak v. Hicks, Okl., 321 P.2d 425, 429 [1958]; Hiskett v. Wells, Okl., 351 P.2d 300, 304 [1959]; Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States Fidel. & G. Co., Okl., 442 P.2d 303, 305 [1968] and Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Leeco Oil Co., 692 P.2d 1364, 1367 [1984].

. See footnote 1 supra for the text of 51 O.S. 1981 § 157.

. A "negative” statute of limitations is one that provides a period during which an accrued cause of action may not or need not be brought. See 85 O.S.1981 § 106; United Brick and Tile Company v. Roy, Okl., 356 P.2d 107, 109 [1960] and Smith v. State Industrial Commission, 182 Okl. 433, 78 P.2d 288, 289 [1938].
The negative-statute-of-limitations concept is at times referred to as a waiting period during which as action against a governmental tort defendant may not be brought. See Annot., Plaintiff’s Right to Bring Tort Action Against Municipality Prior to Expiration of Statutory Waiting Period, 73 A.L.R.3d 1019 [1976].

. Hiskett v. Wells, supra note 4; Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States Fidel & G. Co., supra note 4, and Jarvis v. City of Stillwater, Okl., 732 P.2d 470, 472, 473 [1987].

. See Taylor v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal.App.2d 255, 4 Cal.Rptr. 209, 214 [1960].

. 51 O.S.1981 §§ 151 et seq. The title of the Act was changed in 1984 to “The Governmental Tort Claims Act," Okl.Sess.L.1984, Ch. 226, § 1, eff. October 1, 1985 (51 O.S.Supp.1984 § 151).

. State ex rel Cent. State Griffin Mem. Hosp. v. Reed, Okl., 493 P.2d 815, 817-818 [1972].

. See Annot., Actual Notice or Knowledge by Governmental Body or Officer of Injury or Incident Resulting in Injury as Constituting Required Claim or Notice of Claim for Injury — Modem Status, 7 A.L.R.4A § 2, 1063, 1066 [1981].

. Burdick v. Independent School Dist., Okl., 702 P.2d 48, 53 [1985] and Board of Ed. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 48, Hughes Cty. v. Rives, Okl., 531 P.2d 335, 337 [1974]. The rationale for giving a governmental entity a shield from estoppel is to enable the state to protect public policies and interests from being jeopardized by judicial orders that prevent full performance of legally imposed duties. Burdick, supra, and lndependent School Dist. No. 4 v. State Board of Ed., Okl., 451 P.2d 684, 686 [1969].
See Annot., Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give required notice of claim of injury to municipality, county, or other governmental agency or body, 65 A.L.R.2d 1278 [1959].

. See Jarvis v. City of Stillwater, supra note 7 at 472-473.