Court Opinion

ID: 9377930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 01:00:32.751052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.915318
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60322        Document: 00516670417             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/08/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                                        FILED
                                                                                     March 8, 2023
                                       No. 22-60322
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk
   Cactus Canyon Quarries, Incorporated,

                                                                               Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission;
   Martin Walsh, Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor,
   Mine Safety and Health Administration,

                                                                             Respondents.

                     On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                  Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Commission
                           Docket No. CENT-2021-0090

   Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Petitioner Cactus Canyon Quarries, Inc. (“Cactus Canyon”) appeals
   a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Federal Mine Safety
   and Health Review Commission (“Commission”).

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60322       Document: 00516670417             Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/08/2023

                                       No. 22-60322

          In 2020, Cactus Canyon was issued three citations by the Mine Safety
   and Health Administration (MSHA). At issue here is Citation No. 9641812
   (“Citation”), which alleges that:
          The air brake system on the #34 yellow International end dump truck
          . . . was not maintained in functional condition. When inspected[,] the
          operator (CDL license holder) demonstrated the correct method of
          testing the low brake pressure alarm[;] the low brake pressure alarm
          system failed to work in two attempts.
   Sec’y of Labor v. Cactus Canyon Quarries Inc., 44 FMSHRC 289, 298 (Apr.
   2022).1 The low brake pressure alarm failure violated Section 56.14101(a)(3),
   which requires that “[a]ll braking systems . . . be maintained in functional
   condition.” 30 C.F.R. § 56.14101(a)(3).
          Cactus Canyon contested its citations before an ALJ. See 30 U.S.C. §§
   815(d). The ALJ heard fact witness testimony and concluded that the alarm
   was part of the braking system. Cactus Canyon, 44 FMSHRC at 295. The
   Citation was maintained, but Cactus Canyon’s negligence determination was
   reduced from moderate to low. Id. at 296–99. A penalty of $123 was assessed.
   Id. Cactus Canyon appealed.
          As the circuit in which the violation occurred, we have jurisdiction to
   review this agency adjudication. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). We review the ALJ’s
   legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for substantial evidence.
   Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015).
          We hold that the ALJ properly interpreted Section 56.14101(a)(3) to
   include the low brake pressure alarm as a component of the truck’s “braking

          1
              The ALJ vacated the remaining citations. Cactus Canyon also raises issues
   regarding the vacated citations on appeal, but it cannot pursue those arguments here—
   Cactus Canyon is no longer “adversely affected or aggrieved by” the Commission on those
   citations. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1).

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                                    No. 22-60322

   system.” Cactus Canyon contends that the alarm is not such a component,
   because it has no effect on the braking system’s ability to stop and hold
   equipment. But the regulation’s plain language and purpose support the
   inclusion of the alarm in the “braking system.”
          In interpreting this regulation, we must first determine whether the
   standard is “genuinely ambiguous.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415
   (2019). We find that it is not, so the regulation “just means what it means.”
   Id. at 2416. The Commission engaged in this exercise in Secretary of Labor v.
   Daanen & Janssen, when it determined that “the plain language of the stand-
   ard mandates a finding of violation when a component of the braking system
   is not maintained in functional condition, regardless of whether the braking
   system is capable of stopping and holding the vehicle.” 20 FMSHRC 189
   (Mar. 1998).
          When we independently do the same, we conclude that the braking
   regulation unambiguously supports the Government’s interpretation. Since
   a “system”—by definition at the time of the regulation’s passage—is com-
   posed of parts, the Section’s reference to “braking systems” extends to its
   related components, including those that do not simply function to stop and
   hold the vehicle. WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (UNA-
   BRIDGED) 2322   (1986) (defining “system” as “a complex unity formed of
   many often-diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a common pur-
   pose.”). The maintenance of this component advances the regulation’s pur-
   pose of ensuring miner safety, and the plain text of the regulation is not coun-
   ter to this interpretation—an alarm that sounds based on the condition of the
   braking system is a component of the “braking system[].” 30 C.F.R. §
   56.14101(a)(3); see Sec’y of Labor v. Dolese Bros. Co., 16 FMSHRC 689, 693
   (Apr. 1994) (“A safety standard ‘must be interpreted so as to harmonize with
   and further . . . the objectives of’ the Mine Act.”) (quoting Emery Mining Co.
   v. Sec’y of Labor, 744 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 1984)).

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                                         No. 22-60322

           The ALJ’s findings of fact corroborate this interpretation and are
   supported by substantial evidence.2 The inspector testified that (1) the alarm
   alerts drivers whenever the brake pressure is low and (2) if the air pressure
   drops too low, backup brakes could suddenly stop the truck. The alarm serves
   to prevent actual failure and injury.
           The ALJ did not need expert testimony to come to this conclusion, as
   Cactus Canyon lengthily contends.3 Specifically, Cactus Canyon asserts that
   the Secretary’s evidence should have been admitted only as expert testimony
   under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because of the technical complexities of
   the braking system. The ALJ correctly addressed Cactus Canyon’s
   arguments—the inspector testified on personal knowledge which he was
   equipped to do in light of the simplicity of the issues—but the Federal Rules
   of Evidence also do not control Commission hearings. See Sec’y of Labor v.
   Mid-Continent Res., Inc., 6 FMSHRC 1132, 1139 n.6 (May 1984) (“While the
   Federal Rules of Evidence may have value by analogy, they are not required
   to be applied to our hearings—either by their own terms, by the Mine Act, or
   by our procedural rules.”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 1101 (identifying
   proceedings to which the rules apply).
           We finally address Cactus Canyon’s due process arguments regarding
   notice. Cactus Canyon contends that it was not provided requisite notice of
   this regulation because no prior inspector had issued a citation related to the

           2
             Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ’s finding that the alarm was not
   functional, which the parties do not dispute. The witnesses unanimously agreed that the
   alarm did not work.
           3
             Cactus Canyon’s contention that it was denied due process because of the ALJ’s
   evidentiary errors accordingly fails. We note that this argument has other defects including
   the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701, et seq., does not apply to
   Commission hearings or to this court’s review of Commission decisions. 30 U.S.C. § 956;
   Noranda Alumina, L.L.C. v. Perez, 841 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2016).

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                                    No. 22-60322

   low air pressure warning alarms on any of its vehicles. But inconsistent
   enforcement is no excuse here. See Mainline Rock & Ballast, Inc. v. Sec’y of
   Labor, 693 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he MSHA cannot be
   estopped from enforcing its regulations simply because it did not previously
   cite the mine operator.”). Cactus Canyon had adequate notice of this
   interpretation based on the Commission’s longstanding decision in Daanen
   & Janssen. See Corbesco, Inc. v. Dole, 926 F.2d 422, 427–28 (5th Cir. 1991).
   Fair notice does not require “explicit prior notice of a specific prohibition or
   requirement.” Sec’y of Labor v. Ideal Cement Co., 12 FMSHRC 2409, 2416
   (Nov. 1990).
          We thus DENY Cactus Canyon’s petition for review and AFFIRM
   the ALJ’s Decision and Order.

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