Court Opinion

ID: 9724288
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:52:01.743987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:58.996122
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
Plaintiff underwent a surgical bilateral cataract extraction at the age of ten. Thereafter plaintiff could only differentiate between light and dark and detect some movement. However, with the aid of glasses and contact lenses his vision could be corrected to a 20/25 vision in each eye. Despite this handicap plaintiff worked for defendant from 1947 to 1964.
On November 17, 1964, plaintiff received an injury within the course of his employment resulting in the loss of industrial use of his left leg.
On August 20, 1969, the referee decided that plaintiff had lost his eyes within the meaning of Lindsay v Glennie Industries, Inc, 379 Mich 573; 153 NW2d 642 (1967), prior to the loss of his left leg so as to qualify him for differential benefits from the Second Injury Fund under the then worded MCLA 412.8a; MSA 17.158(1).1
On April 28, 1972, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board entered an opinion and order affirming the decision of the referee. The Court of Ap*46peals denied leave on July 28, 1972. We granted leave on November 2, 1972. 388 Mich 793 (1972).
This case is controlled by Lindsay, supra, and Whitt v Ford Motor Co, 383 Mich 726; 178 NW2d 917 (1970), and we decide it within the specific limits of those two cases.
The Lindsay case decided two different points. First, in a case of "first impression”, the "surgical removal of the natural lens * * * is loss of an eye within the meaning of the amended statute.” (M01A 412.10; MSA 17.160 as amended by 1956 PA 195.) Second, the removal was "made necessary by an injury arising out of and in the course of claimant’s employment”. 379 Mich 573, 578. In Lindsay, the loss of the eye was the only injury involved and thus had to be employment related in order for the claimant to recover for the specific loss.
In Whitt, this Court held that for compensation the second injury must be an injury arising out of and in the course of claimant’s employment. We applied the reasoning of Verberg v Simplicity Pattern Co, 357 Mich 636; 99 NW2d 508 (1959) and stated:
"The creation of the Second Injury Fund under § 8a is a legislative limitation on the decision of Weaver v Maxwell Motor Co., supra [186 Mich 588; 152 NW 993 (1915)], insofar as it allows an employee to recover compensation for total and permanent disability from the Second Injury Fund where the employee has suffered the loss of one member from injuries related or unrelated to employment covered by the workmen’s compensation law and subsequently suffers the loss of another member from causes arising out of and in the course of employment covered by the workmen’s compensation law. To this extent it removes the effect of Weaver.”383 Mich 726, 731. (Emphasis added.)
*47The second point decided in Lindsay, namely that the injury resulting in surgery was employment related is not to be construed as a specific limitation and requirement in all cases of bilateral cataract extraction. In Lindsay there was only one injury and in order to be compensable it had to be employment related and is not a specific limitation for that kind of loss.
In Hilton, the bilateral cataract extraction was the first of two injuries. The second injury was employment related, satisfying Whitt. Verberg, discussing the purpose behind the legislative creation of the Second Injury Fund, held the first injury did not have to be employment related. Hence, on the authority of Lindsay as to loss, Verberg as to first injury not having to be employment related, and Whitt requiring as is the case in Hilton that the second injury be employment related, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to compensation for permanent and total disability.
The Second Injury Fund argues that to allow recovery, whereas here the employee had lost visióii due to a surgical bilateral cataract extraction, but could work due to glasses and contact lenses, here would mean that the employee would not be entitled to compensation if a subsequent eye injury left him with no corrected vision because he would be deemed to have already lost his sight. We recognize this argument might create a problem, but not being applicable to this case, we will resolve this issue when it comes before the Court.
Further, the Lindsay Court recognized:
"[T]hat substituting an artificial lens has 'restored’ vision to the otherwise sightless eye. We point out that a specific loss award is not made as compensation for diminution of use of the involved organ or member. It is *48not awarded to compensate for loss of earnings or earning capacity. It is awarded irrespective of either fact or both. If ophthalmological advances and refinements in the use of contact lens has in fact rendered the amended statute inconsonant with its original legislative intent, it is the province of the legislature to say so. We construe the statute in the plain meaning of its wording.” 379 Mich 573, 578.
Thus the fact that vision can be corrected does not change the holding that there was a total loss caused by the surgical removal of the natural lens.
The order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board is affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Kavanagh, C.J., and T. E. Brennan, Swainson, and Levin, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
T. G. Kavanagh, J., concurred in the result.

 At the time of the 1964 injury, § 8a read in part:
"If an employee has at the time of injury permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hánd or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability after subtracting the amount of compensation received by the employee for both such losses. The payment of compensation under this section shall begin at the conclusion of the payments made for the second permanent disability.”