Court Opinion

ID: 9568308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:02:28.609664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:34.996911
License: Public Domain

Judge BRIGGS
specially concurring.
While I concur in the outcome, I write separately for two reasons. First, I cannot join the opinion without expressing my concerns with a familiar litany: The party challenging a legislative enactment must present proof beyond a reasonable doubt the enactment is unconstitutional. Second, my concurrence is driven, not just by what issues are raised, but also by what is not raised.
I.
When rejecting a constitutional challenge, Colorado appellate opinions typically begin by referencing the supposed requirement of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, the supreme court has never actually applied the requirement as a basis for rejecting a constitutional challenge. I do not take the reference as literally adding a step to be *656applied in a proper constitutional analysis. Nor do I believe it should be added and applied, particularly in its present incantation.
When added to an opinion addressing the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt appears innocent enough. However, it subtly mutates the accepted beginning point for a constitutional analysis, creating an additional and final step which, even when taken properly, is treacherous. More importantly, it is a step seldom, if ever, properly taken.
A.
The genesis of the phrase is the familiar observation that a court, when addressing the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, must accord deference to a co-equal and representative branch of government. This but recognizes that the structures of our national, state, and local governments are based on the doctrine of separation of powers. In this system, the courts must recognize the political and administrative responsibilities of the legislature and must not, even negatively, undertake to legislate. See generally H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (W. Eskridge & Frickey eds.1994); J. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of The American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L.Rev. 129 (1893).
A principle long ago derived from this deference is that a legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional. See Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 25 U.S. 213, 6 L.Ed. 606 (1827); People ex rel. Tucker v. Rucker, 5 Colo. 455 (1880). This rephrasing of general deference as a derivative presumption merely creates an obvious beginning point for a constitutional analysis: Unless persuaded otherwise, a court will not strike down a legislative enactment as unconstitutional.
The presumption retains the necessary sensitivity to the court’s task. See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927)(resolving a constitutional challenge to a legislative enactment is the gravest and most delicate duty that a court is called on to perform.). At the same time, courts also retain the inherent authority, and duty, to determine independently whether a legislative enactment violates a constitutional right or prohibition. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.1984). Hence, in converting deference into a presumption, nothing untoward has occurred.
B.
The next derivative step, also taken long ago, was to espouse that a legislative enactment must be “proved unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Alexander v. People, 7 Colo. 155, 2 P. 894, 896 (1884); see also Ogden v. Saunders, supra. Despite its benign appearance, the result is to extend necessary deference to an extreme degree, while at the same time creating analytical difficulties.
Typically, with a presumption of constitutionality as a starting point, a court proceeds with its analysis by articulating and applying an appropriate standard of review. For example, in addressing a substantive due process or equal protection challenge, a court must first determine whether the challenged legislative enactment creates a suspect class or affects a fundamental constitutional right. Lorenz v. State, 928 P.2d 1274 (Colo.1996). If so, then the court must “strictly scrutinize” the challenged provision to determine whether it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. If not, then the court need only determine whether the enactment bears a “rational relationship” to a legitimate governmental purpose. People v. Young, 859 P.2d 814 (Colo.1993).
The court next applies the appropriate standard of review, such as by striking a proper balance between competing interests. See Cole v. State, 673 P.2d 345 (Colo.1983). Finally, having applied the standard of review, the court comes to its conclusion. If it is persuaded the enactment is unconstitutional, the presumption of constitutionality has been overcome.
This would seem to be the end of the analysis. However, by requiring that the *657court’s conclusion be based on “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” a court creates “something more than a mere form of language.” See J. Thayer, supra, 7 Harv. L.Rev. at 143. No longer is it sufficient that the court is persuaded a legislative enactment is unconstitutional. Having otherwise completed its analysis and reached that conclusion, the court must now additionally determine whether it is convinced of its decision by a degree of certainty, or firmness of conviction, that is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is this additional step that raises several concerns.
C.
Requiring a court to be persuaded that a legislative enactment is unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt” is an extreme degree of deference, one that itself is not, and has never been, free of doubt. Among the concerns raised by such a degree of deference is its failure to recognize that members of a legislative branch may vote for a law because it is politically expedient to do so, even though they doubt or at least question the enactment’s constitutionality. Further, requiring such an extreme degree of certainty is not without impact on the constitutional rights of citizens. See generally G. Lawson & C. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Inte'i'pretation, 81 Iowa L.Rev. 1267 (1995-96); J. Thayer, supra.
In addition, the requirement places a heavier burden of persuasion on citizens in our state courts than on those in our federal courts. When the identical challenge is raised under our federal constitution in state and federal courts, it is not clear why the burden of persuasion should vary.
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has never provided the expressed basis for striking down a legislative enactment in any of our state’s appellate opinions. The very fact that many decisions upholding legislative enactments have been far from unanimous arguably indicates that our courts often have not actually deferred to such an extreme degree. Indeed, it would be surprising to see any appellate court that was firmly convinced a legislative enactment was unconstitutional nevertheless conclude the statute must be upheld because the majority was not convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
D.
Apart from the questionable wisdom in theory of adding “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” as an additional and final step in a constitutional analysis, the more serious concern comes in practice. The requirement has simply not been properly applied. The three most common- misapplications are: 1) misstating what should be, at best, a heightened burden of persuasion as an evidentiary burden of proof; 2) merging what should be, at best, the last step in a constitutional analysis into an earlier step; or 3) espousing the litany, but then never applying it.
1.
It is typical to state both that a legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and that the burden of “proof’ is “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This resembles nothing so much as the presumption of innocence and burden of proof involved in a criminal case— an evidentiary burden of proof.
The purpose of a constitutional analysis is of course not to make factual findings. Some underlying factual disputes may have to be resolved. However, no heightened standard of proof applies, and the ultimate purpose is still the resolution of a constitutional challenge through legal analysis.
Even when the challenge is to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment as applied, the “evidence” required for the legal analysis is often undisputed, consisting of no more than the legislative enactment, a factual context, and perhaps some uncontested legislative history. The “evidence” may even take the form of mere rational speculation. See F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2102, 124 L.Ed.2d 211, 222 (1993)(“[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”). When the challenge is that a legislative enactment is facially overbroad, the underlying facts may become even less important. See *658People ex rel. Tooley v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348 (Colo.1985).
Nevertheless, because of the striking similarities, the two unrelated analyses, one legal and one factual, are easily confused. The unfortunate result can be a misdirected focus in a constitutional analysis on the “evidence” presented, thus improperly implying that a question of fact controls and must be resolved. See generally L. Gibson, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Colorado’s Standard For Reviewing A Statute’s .Constitutionality, 23 Colo. Law. 835 (April 1994)(“Colorado courts do not find statutes unconstitutional absent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added)).
To the contrary, the court’s ultimate degree of certainty, or firmness of conviction, in a conclusion resolving a constitutional challenge does not result from the evidence, or “proof,” presented. It results from the force, or persuasiveness, of legal argument.
2.
The confusion does not end there. It is not unusual to see this supposedly final analytical step in a constitutional analysis instead merged into the earlier steps of selecting and applying an appropriate standard of review, such as “rational relationship” or “strict scrutiny.”
When this happens, no longer does the lesser standard of “rational relationship” merely require that a legislative enactment be upheld so long as the governmental classification is based on differences that are real and not illusory and is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. Under the merged “rational relationship” test, the challenging party must also “prove” the enactment unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Colorado Auto Auction Services Corp. v. City of Commerce City, 800 P.2d 998, 1004 (Colo.1990).
Conversely, if the classification affects a fundamental right or suspect class, under the merged test the consequence is not just to subject the enactment to “strict scrutiny” in order to determine if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, the “burden of proof’ shifts to the government, not just to come forward with justification for the enactment, but also to prove the constitutionality of the enactment — albeit by some unarticulated degree of certainty apparently less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Rickstrew v. People, 822 P.2d 505 (Colo.1991); see also Denver Publishing Co. v. City of Aurora, 896 P.2d 306 (Colo.1995).
What is of interest in this merging of separate analytical steps is that the deference to which a co-equal branch of government is entitled appears and disappears, ease by case, depending on the nature of the constitutional right or classification asserted. While it may be appropriate to vary the standard of review in a constitutional analysis on such bases, it is unclear why the respect and sensitivity to which each branch of government is entitled should be anything less than invariable.
3.
The final, and most common, use of the litany is simply to state at the outset of the legal analysis that a challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The supposed requirement is then never mentioned again.
Its purpose is never explained. Because the supposed constitutional principle is typically recited and ignored in opinions in which the challenged legislative enactment is upheld, it appears as no more than a thinly-veiled rationalization. Whatever the purpose, its use in this manner neither adds to nor clarifies a constitutional analysis.
E.
I recognize the United States Supreme Court first formulated the incantation. Context, however, is critical. It was not until Marbury v. Madison, supra, that the Court had even addressed the issue of judicial authority to review the constitutionality of legislative declarations. The decision in Marbury hardly quieted the debate. See generally J. Thayer, supra.
*659It is thus not surprising that an extremely sensitive and cautious Supreme Court, in Ogden v. Saunders, supra, 25 U.S. at 270, found it politically astute to add an additional observation: “It is but a decent respect due to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
However, it is likewise not surprising that the United States Supreme Court has not uttered the phrase as part of a constitutional analysis in more than half a century. See Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 S.Ct. 394, 67 L.Ed. 785 (1923). In its place, the Supreme Court has returned to a simple expression of deference. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985).
F.
The parties have raised no issue concerning the framework for analyzing the constitutional issue before us. Repeating the litany of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” has not impacted the result we reach in this case. As already noted, it has not impacted the result in any published case — thus far.
I nevertheless write separately because it is, after all, a constitutional principle we are supposedly espousing. It has impact on the perception of our state’s appellate courts:
[Appellate opinions] serve to uphold the moral power of the courts, without which the judiciary would be ineffectual.... [T]he prestige of the judiciary ... is related to the quality of the opinions of the courts as statements of reasoning. When the reasoning of an opinion fails adequately to support the decision in a case, it is the entire judicial process that suffers.
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One of the most intense ... controversies in recent American jurisprudence has centered precisely on the point of adequate judicial reasoning in reaching decisions.... The reasons of decision become constitutional principles, and as principles they acquire a force of their own.... [T]hey stand around ‘like a loaded weapon’ waiting to be fired when the constitutional occasion arises.
C. Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, pp. 11-14 (1969); see also R. Aldisert, The Judicial Process Ch. 3, § 4 (1976)(diseussing the role of judicial rules and principles).
What is important in the final analysis, constitutional or otherwise, is that appellate courts articulate principles and standards that are needed and useful. It is debatable whether requiring any heightened degree of deference is either. Cf. Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, supra. Even if both, requiring that a constitutional challenge rest on “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is neither.
II.
United asserts a violation only of the Commerce Clause. It does not, for example, assert that the Denver Municipal Code, so interpreted, violates due process by failing to give fair advance notice of just what activities and properties are subject to taxation. Hence, our review is limited to the single issue raised on appeal.
In construing Denver’s taxing scheme not to violate the Commerce Clause, the majority relies on the exemption from sales and use taxes set forth in Denver Revised Municipal Code § 53-91(11). It exempts “[a]ll sales which the city is prohibited from taxing under the constitution or laws of the United States or the Constitution of the state.” The majority construes this to exempt from taxation all sales and purchases that Denver is otherwise constitutionally prohibited from taxing.
Like' the majority, I am persuaded (although perhaps not beyond a reasonable doubt) that this construction reflects Denver’s intent. So construed, the exemption necessarily defeats any constitutional challenge to any tax on any sale or any purchase. If a court determines a particular application of § 53-96(1) would otherwise violate the *660Commerce Clause, under § 53-97(11) it must construe § 53-96(1) to exclude that application. It thus becomes a tautology to say that the tax imposed under the Denver Municipal Code does not violate the Commerce Clause.
Therefore, in light of the limited issue before us, I concur.