Court Opinion

ID: 9545459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:12:58.703208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:14:50.855570
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case follows the statutory and case law in this State and should not be reversed. This court’s statement that the interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeals is unjust and inequitable is unjustified. This court with this decision has exceeded the limit beyond which an appellate court should go in dispensing what it perceives to be justice and equity in a particular case. When, as here, the statutes and case law are not followed the lawyers and litigants cannot determine what is the law. They have to guess whether the law previously declared will be changed to arrive at what the individuals on the Supreme Court at any given time may deem a fair and equitable decision.
For instance, consider what is said in syllabus ¶ 1 in the court’s opinion. The first sentence of this syllabus recites the law as we have understood it except it does not state that post-judgment motions are required by statute to be filed within definite time periods. A motion for a new trial is required to be filed within ten days after entry of the trial judgment. If the court on its own initiative is to grant a new trial this also must be done within ten days after the entry of judgment.
With this in mind, the last sentence of syllabus ¶ 1 is totally confusing. It practically wipes out all statutory time requirements for post-trial motions by stating these time requirements do not commence to run until the requirement of K.S.A. 60-258 is met. The ten-day requirement for a new trial is no longer mandatory for the ten days does not begin to run from entry of judgment as provided by statute. The ten-day period is directed by this court to begin to run when the judgment form is served by the clerk on all attorneys.
The final sentence of K.S.A. 60-258 must, therefore, be disregarded. This final sentence reads: “Failure of service of a copy of the judgment form shall not affect the validity of the judgment.” Under the last sentence of syllabus ¶ 1 the judgment is not final unless and until the judgment form has been served on all attorneys of record. (The clerk has yet to make service in the present case.)
*46Now let us look at the appeal statute for Chapter 60 cases. The time for appeal from a judgment is 30 days. K.S.A. 60-2103. Attorneys will no longer be able to rely on the final sentence in K.S.A. 60-258. Appeal time may be extended by later proceedings on any judgment when not served as per K.S.A. 60-258. It now becomes imperative that the clerk make and file ..n affidavit of service in the case although this is not required by statute. Previously the attorneys and litigants could rely on the judgment being valid because the statute stated “failure of service of a copy of the judgment form shall not affect the validity of the judgment.” Under the law in syllabus ¶ 1 as I read it, the time for taking an appeal is now extended by this court indefinitely in any case where it can be established the clerk failed to serve a copy of the judgment. In the case of an appeal, if the record does not contain proof of service of a copy of the judgment form, any party against whom a judgment is entered has thirty days from the date service is accomplished to serve a motion for new trial regardless of what is said in the last sentence of K.S.A. 60-258 and 60-259(b). This may be considered more just and equitable by this court but it does violence to the statutes and it opens the plaintiff’s judgment to collateral attack for an indefinite period of time.
The majority opinion refers to the power of the trial court to grant a new trial on its own motion. This is limited by statute to a period of ten days after entry of the judgment. K.S.A. 60-259(e). The default judgment was entered in this case on August 30, 1976. The court eventually on its own initiative vacated its previous order of April 4,1977, and ordered a new trial on April 4, 1978. A year and eight months elapsed between the entry of judgment and the order for a new trial.
The cases cited by the majority fall in two categories, those decided prior to January 1, 1964, and those falling under our present code which became effective on that date. The Goertz, Dimit, King and State Investment Co. cases were decided under G.S. 1949, 60-3007 which provided:
“The district court shall have power to vacate or modify its own judgments or orders, at or after the term at which such judgment or order was made.”
There was no requirement in this former statute that a decision be rendered during a term of court; however, the statute did require that a new trial be granted “within the time and in the manner prescribed in this code,” and G.S. 1949, 60-3003 required *47the application for a new trial to be made within three days after the verdict or decision was rendered. We no longer are limited by terms of court under our present code.
I have no quarrel with the holding in Landscape Development Co. v. Kansas P. & L. Co., 197 Kan. 126, 415 P.2d 398 (1966), relied on in the majority opinion as supporting the granting of a new trial in this case. Our present code permits a new trial to be granted, based on one of the statutory grounds, if a motion is filed within ten days from the time the judgment is filed. In Landscape a party filed the motion within the required ten days and while the motion remained undecided and pending, the trial court on its own initiative and on different grounds granted the new trial. No uncertainty as to the validity of the judgment can result in such cases. So long as a motion is filed and is pending within the statutory ten-day period no one can be misled for the judgment remains open and has not become final.
The case of Wichita City Teachers Credit Union v. Rider, 203 Kan. 552, 456 P.2d 42 (1969), is distinguishable from the present case. In Wichita Teachers, a notice of appeal was filed within the required thirty-day period from entry of judgment. Under our procedure for appeals provided by K.S.A. 60-2103(g) and Rule No. 2.04, 225 Kan. xxxiv, the appellant has an additional ten days after filing the notice of appeal to file certified copies of the decision appealed from and the notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate courts. When that is accomplished and the docket fee is paid, the appeal is deemed to be docketed. We held in Wichita Teachers that a motion to set aside a judgment in a nonjury case under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6), although filed after notice of appeal is served, is made within a reasonable time if it is filed and acted upon before the appeal from the judgment is docketed in the Supreme Court. No question was presented in that case concerning the ten-day limitation on motions for new trials or concerning the thirty-day requirement for filing notice of appeals.
The holding in Darnall v. Lowe, 5 Kan. App. 2d 240, 615 P.2d 786 (1980), cited in the majority opinion, is much more limited than is indicated in that opinion. In the first place no new trial was granted in that case; secondly, the decision in the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded with directions; and thirdly Syllabus ¶ 2 of the case holds:
“K.S.A. 60-260(b) does not permit a district court to grant relief from a judgment *48or order on its own initiative, but requires that a motion be filed and that a notice of hearing be given to all parties who would be affected thereby.”
This is not our present case.
The majority opinion will add confusion to the law by practically repealing the last sentence of K.S.A. 60-258, and by raising serious questions on the finality of many judgments. It now appears that attorneys will have to require the clerk of the district court to execute and file a certificate to prove that a copy of the judgment form was served on all attorneys of record within three days after the judgment form is filed.
It is my opinion that under the protective mantle of liberal interpretation of the statutes this court has destroyed certainty in the law as it previously applied to the field of judgments. What the majority now perceive to be justified by justice and equity in this case may well result in confusion. I respectfully dissent.