Court Opinion

ID: 9705024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:54:58.349003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.487357
License: Public Domain

TERRY, Associate Judge,
concurring in the result:
The jurisdictional issue lurking in the shadows of this case is an extremely difficult one. On the one hand, D.C.Code § 16-4317 (1989), part of the Uniform Arbitration Act, appears to bestow jurisdiction on this court to consider Mr. Umana’s appeal.1 On the other hand, section 16-4317 was enacted in 1977 by the Council of the District of Columbia, not by Congress, and D.C.Code § 1-233(a)(4) (1992), part of the District of Columbia Self-Government Act (the “Home Rule Act”) enacted by Congress in 1973, prohibits the Council from enacting any legislation “with respect to” the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts. Thus, if the Council was without power to enact section 16-4317, then at least part of section 16-4317 is a nullity, including the part that serves as the purported jurisdictional basis for this appeal.
This tension between the Arbitration Act and the Home Rule Act is a matter that this court has not previously addressed. I think the court eventually will have to consider it en banc. In the meantime I am persuaded, at least tentatively, that Judge Ruiz is on the right track in concluding that we lack jurisdiction of the instant appeal, and for that reason I join in voting to dismiss it. What happens next with this case remains to be seen. If it is reheard en banc, I would expect the Corporation Counsel, on behalf of the District of Columbia, to remain in the case as amicus curiae and to participate in any further briefing or oral argument.

. D.C.Code § 16-4317(a)(3) states that an order "confirming or denying confirmation” of an arbitration award "shall be deemed final," and D.C.Code § ll-721(a)(l) (1995) grants this court jurisdiction over “all final orders and judgments of the Superior Court....”