Court Opinion

ID: 9531072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:07:09.390383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:20.343355
License: Public Domain

MATTINGLY-MAY, Judge,
dissenting.
The record does not reflect that any false information Jones provided was in the context of an official criminal investigation. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent as to Jones’ conviction of false informing.
The offense of false informing is committed when a person “gives false information in the official investigation of the commission of a crime, knowing the report or information to be false.” Ind.Code § 35-44 — 2—2(c)(1) (emphasis added). The state presented no evidence at trial that there was ever any investigation, official or otherwise, of the commission of a crime in connection with the motor vehicle accidents involving Jones and Dobbs on April 17,1997.
When the State filed its information against Jones, the information alleged that Jones “unlawfully [gave] false information to an officer, regarding his involvment [sic] in a property damage accident. ” (Amended Brief of Appellant, Exhibit A.) (emphasis added). The State’s charging information said nothing about the commission of a crime. It does not appear from the record that any charges other than false informing were filed against Jones as a result of the April 17, 1997 auto accidents.
In his testimony at trial, Officer Cham-berlin referred repeatedly to the incidents of April 17, 1997 as an “accident” and of his making an “accident report.” (Tr. at 20-27.) In his questioning of Chamberlin, the prosecutor repeatedly asked about the officer’s investigation of an accident. Id. Neither man ever mentioned any investigation of the commission of a crime.
I cannot agree with the majority’s assertion that Officer Chamberlin developed a reasonable belief that he was investigating more than a mere traffic accident and possibly a crime. I am unwilling to say *14that a police officer is engaging in the investigation of a crime every time he or she responds to a call involving a motor vehicle accident.
I am also unwilling to base a conviction upon mere speculation that a police officer was engaged in the official investigation of a crime when no evidence supports that an official investigation was ever undertaken. Matters outside the record cannot be considered by this court on appeal. Zapffe v. Srbeny, 587 N.E.2d 177, 180 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), reh’g denied) trans. denied. We must decide each case on the record before us and cannot speculate as to the actual facts of a case. Id. Upholding Jones’ conviction of false informing requires us to speculate as to whether Officer Chamber-lin was involved in an official investigation, as there is no direct evidence in the record to support that inference. I would therefore reverse Jones’ conviction of false informing.
I concur as to all other counts.