Court Opinion

ID: 9723187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:05:36.376847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.411425
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: Today, the majority holds that an employer may discriminate against a person, in this case deny employment to a person, based on to whom that person is married. The majority concludes that such conduct is not included in the Human Rights Act’s prohibition of discrimination based on "marital status.” 171 Ill. 2d at 238. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion and its underlying reasoning. I would defer to the conclusion of the Human Rights Commission that marital status discrimination includes discrimination based on the identity of one’s spouse. Such discrimination is excused only where a bona fide occupational qualification is present. Accordingly, I do not join the majority opinion. However, I agree with the Commission that the State Police did not violate the Act in this case. Accordingly, I concur in the result. The majority focuses exclusively on the dictionary meaning of the statutory language, as did the appellate court (267 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652). The majority states that the goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Further, the plain language of a statute is the best indicator of the legislative intent. Where the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, a court applies the statute without resorting to other aids of statutory construction. 171 Ill. 2d at 237. Of course, this statement of the law is correct as far as it goes. However, the majority either pays little attention to, or fails to acknowledge altogether, several additional pertinent legal principles. My application of these principles to the facts of this case prevents me from joining the majority opinion. I. Deference to Agency Expertise The majority acknowledges the principle of judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statute that the agency administers. (171 Ill. 2d at 239.) However, the majority pays little attention to it in holding that marital status discrimination does not include discrimination based on the identity of one’s spouse. Of course, a court is not bound by an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute. However, courts give substantial weight and deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with administering and enforcing the statute. The agency’s interpretation expresses an informed source for ascertaining the legislative intent. A significant reason for this deference is that agencies can make informed judgments upon the issues, based on their experience and expertise. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 97-98 (1992). Indeed, courts have held that where a broad statutory standard has been delegated to an agency’s discretion, a court should rely on the agency’s interpretation as controlling whenever there is reasonable debate as to its meaning. Bruns v. Department of Registration & Education, 59 Ill. App. 3d 872, 876 (1978); Ranquist v. Stackler, 55 Ill. App. 3d 545, 551 (1977). In the present case, the administrative law judge relied on In re Burton & Allied Chemical Corp., 13 Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n Rep. 246 (1984). In Burton, the Commission considered the statutory definition of "marital status” to be ambiguous and to have two meanings, one narrow and one broad. The narrow meaning of marital status refers only to whether a person is married or not. Thus, discrimination based on the identity of a person’s spouse is not discrimination based on that person’s marital status. The broad meaning of marital status includes to whom a person is married. The reasoning of the broad meaning is that if a person had remained single, or obtained a divorce, that person would not have been treated differently. Thus, that person is nonetheless being discriminated against based on his or her marital status. The Commission concluded that the broad meaning of marital status was more in keeping with the overall purposes of the Act and with this court’s mandate that the Act be liberally construed, which I will discuss later. Burton, 13 Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n Rep. at 250-51, 255. In Burton, the Commission considered both meanings of "marital status” to be reasonable. Burton, 13 Ill. Hum. Rts. Comm’n Rep. at 251. In River Bend Community Unit School District No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm’n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 838, 842-43 (1992), the appellate court likewise recognized the reasonableness of both meanings in a thoroughly researched discussion. The court in River Bend upheld the Commission’s adoption of the broad meaning of marital status. Accord Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co., 72 Haw. 350, 353-54, 816 P.2d 302, 303-04 (1991). In the present case, the Commission relied on River Bend in again concluding that marital status includes spousal identity. The majority reasons that if the legislature intended to include spousal identity in marital status discrimination, then "it would have done so in specific and certain terms.” 171 Ill. 2d at 238. However, this is precisely the type of case that calls for judicial deference to the administering agency. The task of an administrator, in this case the Commission, is to extrapolate from the broad language of the enabling statute and, using the regulatory tools that the legislature provided, to deal with the problems that the legislature sought to address. Stofer v. Motor Vehicle Casualty Co., 68 Ill. 2d 361, 370 (1977); Ranquist, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 550-51. The majority’s reliance solely on the dictionary meaning of individual words ignores an important purpose of an administrative agency. Further, the appellate court in River Bend correctly noted that the legislature has amended the Act many times subsequent to Burton. However, the legislature has not overruled Burton or amended the statutory definition of marital status in any way. River Bend, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 843. "A reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute by the governmental officers or departments charged with its enforcement, if contemporaneous, consistent, long-continued, and in concurrence with legislative acquiescence, creates a presumption of correctness which is only slightly less persuasive than a judicial construction of the same act.” People ex rel. Watson v. House of Vision, 59 Ill. 2d 508, 514-15 (1974); accord National Labor Relations Board v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 177, 70 L. Ed. 2d 323, 330, 102 S. Ct. 216, 222 (1981). "Such acquiescence appears where the legislature, presumably aware of the administrative interpretation in question, has amended other sections of the act since that interpretation but left untouched the sections subject to the administrative interpretation in question.” Pielet Brothers Trading, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 110 Ill. App. 3d 752, 756 (1982). Based on these principles of judicial deference, this court should uphold the Commission’s broad interpretation of "marital status,” which the appellate court upheld in River Bend. II. Reading Entire Statute Turning to any one of several canons of statutory construction, it is clear that this court should uphold the Commission’s adoption of the broad meaning of marital status discrimination under the Act. However, the majority fails to acknowledge them altogether. When construing a statutory provision, a court gives the statutory language not only its ordinary and popularly understood meaning, but also the fullest rather than narrowest possible meaning to which it is susceptible. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (1993). Additionally, a court must evaluate a statute as a whole. Each provision should be construed in .connection with every other section (Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 91); no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless (Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111). Since courts are to construe statutes according to the legislative intent, a court should regard a case that is within a statute’s object, spirit, and meaning as within the statute, although the case is not within the letter of the statute. Conversely, a court should not regard a case that is within the letter of a statute as within the statute unless the case is also within the statute’s object, spirit, and meaning. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. McCarthy, 10 Ill. 2d 489, 494-95 (1957); In re Estate of Abell, 395 Ill. 337, 346 (1946). Courts have long observed that ascertaining the legislative intent is not always properly accomplished by mechanically applying the dictionary definitions of individual words and phrases. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 10 Ill. 2d at 495; Whelan v. County Officers’ Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (1994); Boyer v. Onion, 108 Ill. App. 612, 614 (1903). Based on these principles, this court has explained: "Therefore, when the spirit and intent of the legislature are clearly expressed and the objects and purposes of a statute are clearly set forth, the courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause that might defeat such clearly expressed intent. [Citation.] Ambiguity caused by a literal and confined construction may be modified, changed or rejected to conform to an otherwise clear legislative intent [citations], and the judiciary has the authority to read language into a statute that the legislature omitted through oversight [citation]. Existing circumstances at the time the statute was enacted, contemporaneous conditions, and the object sought to be achieved all may be considered.” Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 112. Accord People ex rel. Barrett v. Thillens, 400 Ill. 224, 231 (1948). The Act clearly sets forth its purposes. Section 1 — 102(A) declares that it is the policy of this State "[t]o secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from discrimination because of *** marital status.” (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/1 — 102(A) (West 1992). It is also the policy of this State: "To promote the public health, welfare and safety by protecting the interest of all people in Illinois in maintaining personal dignity, in realizing their full productive capacities, and in furthering their interests, rights and privileges as citizens of this State.” (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/1 — 102(E) (West 1992). The majority’s cramped interpretation of the statutory definition of marital status contravenes and renders meaningless the legislature’s policy declaration. By allowing a person to be discriminated against based on to whom that person is married, the majority fails to protect the interests of all Illinois citizens in maintaining personal dignity; realizing their full productive capacities; and furthering their interests, rights and privileges. This discrimination may hinder a spouse from obtaining employment. This could create real adversity, especially in smaller communities where one employer could dominate the job market. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Board, 51 N.Y.2d 506, 515-16, 415 N.E.2d 950, 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d 961, 966 (1980) (Cook, C.J., dissenting). Viewing the entire statute, the majority’s confined interpretation of the statutory definition of marital status actually causes ambiguity by casting doubt on the meaning and scope of the Act’s stated purposes. The Commission read the statutory definition of marital status to include spousal identity. Such a reading is consistent with the spirit and intent of the legislature as clearly expressed in the Act. III. Remedial Nature of Act The majority also fails to recognize that the Act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Human Rights Comm’n, 88 Ill. 2d 22, 26 (1981). Such recognition precludes the holding reached by the majority today. "A liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes the statutory rule or principle apply to more things or in more situations than would be the case under a strict construction.” 3 N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 60.01, at 147 (5th ed. 1992). The Act, therefore, as a remedial statute, must be “made to apply to all cases which, by a fair construction of its terms, it can be made to reach.” Smith v. Stevens, 82 Ill. 554, 556 (1876). I note that in Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 197 Ill. App. 3d 105, 117 (1990), the appellate court concluded that this rule of liberal construction applies only to those whom the Act was intended to protect. Therefore, according to the appellate court, the rule could not be applied to determine whether a case fell within the protection of the Act in the first place. I believe that this conclusion is erroneous in light of the above-stated authorities. The Act was enacted to secure for all persons in Illinois freedom from discrimination and to promote the public health, welfare, and safety. 775 ILCS 5/1 — 102(A), (E) (West 1992). It cannot be disputed that these are fundamental needs. "[A] statute enacted to meet a need of the people shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent and meaning of the General Assembly may be carried out.” Prosk v. Allstate Insurance Co., 82 Ill. App. 2d 457, 459 (1967). The Commission considered it reasonable to read the statutory definition of marital status to include spousal identity. The majority’s requirement that the legislature say so "in specific and certain terms” (171 Ill. 2d at 238) ignores the intent of the legislature to meet these needs of the people. IV. Constitutional Considerations In addition to frustrating the legislative will by its cramped interpretation of the statutory definition of marital status, the majority also raises legitimate doubts as to the Act’s constitutionality. It is a court’s duty to so interpret a statutory provision as to promote the statute’s essential purposes and to avoid, if possible, a construction that would raise doubts as to the statute’s constitutionality. Craig v. Peterson, 39 Ill. 2d 191, 201 (1968). By prohibiting marital status discrimination, the legislature intended to forbid arbitrary classifications relating to marriage. This legislative judgment reflects the protected status that marriage and family life enjoy in our society. Nicpon v. Nicpon, 145 Ill. App. 3d 464, 466 (1986) (collecting cases). In accord with these fundamental principles, Illinois has a strong public policy in favor of strengthening and preserving the integrity of marriage. Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. 102(2), Historical & Practice Notes, at 9-10 (Smith-Hurd 1980); 21 Ill. L. & Prac. Husband & Wife § 2, at 212 (1977). The majority’s narrow definition of marital status and uncritical upholding of no-spouse policies in the workplace has an unconstitutional effect. Such a policy could discourage similarly situated persons from marrying, or encourage them to divorce. Thus, a no-spouse policy in the workplace undermines the preferred status enjoyed by the institution of marriage. See Manhattan Pizza Hut, 51 N.Y.2d at 515-16, 415 N.E.2d at 955, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 966 (Cook, C.J., dissenting). V. The Commission’s Decision An employer violates the Act when the employer acts with respect to the terms, privileges, and conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful discrimination. 775 ILCS 5/2 — 102(A) (West 1992). The record shows that the State Police offered the Boadens options including working in the same geographical area but on different shifts, or working on the same shift (including the same vacations and personal days off) but in different geographical areas. However, the Boadens wanted to work on the same shift in the same geographical area. The Commission concluded that the identity of a coworker is not a term, privilege, or condition of employment. Thus, the Commission concluded that the State Police did not violate the Act. 171 Ill. 2d at 236. I would uphold the Commission’s decision on this basis. Unlike the no-spouse policies in River Bend and Burton, the policy of the State Police in this case simply did not affect the terms, privileges, or conditions of the Boadens’ employment. Under the policy, Jim and Colleen would each perform the same tasks absent the policy, either in the same area or at the same time. The policy affected only the identity of their co-workers. As with its interpretation of “marital status” under section 1 — 103(J) of the Act, the Commission’s interpretation of “terms, privileges or conditions of employment” under section 2 — 102(A) is likewise entitled to great deference. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 97-98; Ranquist, 55 Ill. App. 3d at 551. VI. Conclusion In sum, the Commission: (1) considered the statutory term, "marital status” to be susceptible to either a broad or a narrow meaning, and (2) adopted the broad meaning. The Commission’s determination is entitled to great weight and deference. Turning to any one of several canons of statutory construction, it is clear that this court should uphold the Commission’s adoption of the broad meaning of the term. In the name of "giving effect to the intent of the legislature” (171 Ill. 2d at 239), the majority actually confounds the legislative will. Further, the majority’s cramped definition of marital status discrimination raises doubts as to the Act’s constitutionality. I do not join the majority opinion. However, the Commission concluded that the no-spouse policy of the State Police did not affect a term, privilege, or condition of the Boadens’ employment. This determination is likewise entitled to great weight and deference. Accordingly, I concur in the result.