Court Opinion

ID: 9386787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 17:01:02.114681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:08.517738
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
              C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                            ________________________

                                 No. ACM 40281
                            ________________________

                               UNITED STATES
                                   Appellee
                                         v.
                          Dylan D. O’HARA
              Senior Airman (E-4), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                            ________________________

         Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                             Decided 12 April 2023
                            ________________________

Military Judge: Michael A. Schrama.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged on 3 March 2022 by a GCM convened at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Sentence entered by military judge on 14
April 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 26 months, total
forfeiture of pay, reduction to E-1, and a reprimand.
For Appellant: Major Megan E. Hoffman, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Major Mor-
gan R. Christie, USAF; Captain Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen
Payne, Esquire; Alexis R. Wooldridge (Legal Intern). 1
Before JOHNSON, ANNEXSTAD and GRUEN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Judge ANNEXSTAD delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief
Judge JOHNSON and Judge GRUEN joined.
                            ________________________

1 Ms. Wooldridge was a legal intern with the Government Trial and Appellate Opera-
tions Division of the Military Justice and Discipline Directorate and was at all times
supervised by attorneys admitted to practice before this court.
                     United States v. O’Hara, No. ACM 40281

      This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
      precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                         ________________________
ANNEXSTAD, Judge:
    On 3 March 2022, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial at
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, convicted Appellant, in accordance with his
pleas and pursuant to a plea agreement, of one charge and nine specifications
of sexual abuse of a child under the age of 16 years in violation of Article 120b,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920b.2 Pursuant to the
plea agreement, the military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable dis-
charge, confinement for 26 months, total forfeiture of pay, reduction to the
grade of E-1, and a reprimand.3
   Appellant raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether Appellant’s sentence
was inappropriately severe; and (2) whether Appellant was denied the effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment4 for alleged deficiencies in
the performance of his trial defense counsel during sentencing argument.5
    As to Appellant’s second issue, we find it does not warrant further discus-
sion or relief. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361 (C.M.A. 1987).
   Finding no error that materially prejudiced a substantial right of Appel-
lant, we affirm the findings and sentence.6

2References to the punitive article concerning Specification 1 of the Charge are to the
Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2016 ed.). All other references to the UCMJ
are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
3 The sentencing parameters in the plea agreement included a range of confinement
from 12 to 36 months for each specification, with all confinement running concurrently.
The plea agreement also specified that Appellant would receive a punitive discharge.
4   U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
5Issue (2) was personally raised by Appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon,
12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).
6 We note that because Appellant was convicted of at least one offense that occurred
prior to 1 January 2019 the convening authority was required to take action on his
sentence, and that the convening authority’s failure to do so in this case was error. See
Executive Order 13,825, § 6(b)(1), 83 Fed. Reg. 9889, 9890 (8 Mar. 2018); United States
v. Brubaker-Escobar, 81 M.J. 471, 472 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (per curiam). We also note that
Appellant specifically asserted in his brief to this court that he has not suffered any
prejudice due to this error. We agree and conclude that Appellant did not suffer any
material prejudice as a result of this error. See Brubaker-Escobar, 81 M.J. at 475 (hold-
ing an Appellant must demonstrate “material prejudice” to be entitled to relief for the
convening authority’s error for failing to take action on the sentence).

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                   United States v. O’Hara, No. ACM 40281

                               I. BACKGROUND
    In December 2018, while Appellant was stationed at Eglin Air Force Base
in Florida, his wife discovered several social media accounts that she believed
Appellant was using to communicate with underage girls. After initially deny-
ing any communication with underage girls, Appellant eventually admitted to
his wife that he had “an attraction to” and had messaged a number of “teenage
girls” on social media platforms. As a result of these discoveries, Appellant and
his wife met with a marriage counselor. During an appointment, Appellant’s
wife described to the counselor some of the messages Appellant sent to the
teenage girls. The marriage counselor then stopped the session and explained
to the couple that she was a mandatory reporter. She subsequently called the
Fort Walton Beach Police Department (FWBPD). After discerning that Appel-
lant was an active-duty servicemember, the FWBPD informed the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
    Soon thereafter, law enforcement officers searched Appellant’s person, res-
idence, and vehicle, and seized four cellular phones, a laptop computer, an Ap-
ple iPad, and a hard drive. When conducting an initial search of Appellant’s
iPhone, AFOSI agents located messages between Appellant and his wife, one
of which contained Appellant’s admission, “I do have attraction to teenage
girls.” The devices were then sent to the Defense Cyber Crime Center for anal-
ysis. There, computer forensic examiners conducted a search of Appellant’s de-
vices and recovered messages detailing Appellant’s online activities.
     During Appellant’s guilty plea inquiry, he admitted to initiating communi-
cation with nine different girls between the ages of 12 and 15 years old through
Snapchat, a social media application. In each instance, Appellant acknowl-
edged that he requested the girl’s age, and knew either their actual age or that
they were under 16 years old. Appellant then described in detail to the military
judge that he engaged in sexually explicit conversations with the girls, includ-
ing asking a 13-year-old girl to “finger” herself and then send him the audio
file, telling another 14-year-old girl that she was “sexy” and asking her if she
wanted to see his “c*ck,” and also asking a 12-year-old girl to “help [him] cum”
and asking whether she masturbates. Appellant also admitted that on each
occasion concerning the specifications to which he pleaded guilty, he requested
sexually explicit photos of each of the girls. Appellant explained on one occa-
sion he asked a 14-year-old girl to send him a video of her masturbating. Addi-
tionally, Appellant admitted that he sent two pictures of his erect penis to a
14-year-old girl. Appellant acknowledged that he sometimes sent a picture of
himself in his Air Force uniform, or he would inform them that he was in the
Air Force. Finally, Appellant told the military judge that he discussed the pos-
sibility of meeting at least two of the girls in person.

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                   United States v. O’Hara, No. ACM 40281

                                II. DISCUSSION
    Appellant argues that his sentence to 26 months of confinement is inappro-
priately severe. Specifically, Appellant contends that his sentence failed to
take into account two points: (1) that his offenses were “on the lower end of the
severity spectrum . . . because he did not ever attempt to see, meet, or touch
another person in real life”; and (2) the fact that he has “proven rehabilitative
potential.” We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments and find that the
sentence is not inappropriately severe.
    During presentencing, the Government introduced Appellant’s personal
data sheet, enlisted performance reports, and an administrative demotion ac-
tion for separate and unrelated misconduct. The military judge also received a
victim impact statement from one of the teenage girls, in which she described
how Appellant’s actions impacted her in a negative way. Appellant, mean-
while, introduced an affidavit from a forensic psychologist, who provided—
without specifically getting into Appellant’s background or offenses—that the
general recidivism rate for “non-contact” cases was low. Appellant also pre-
sented five character letters addressing his rehabilitative potential. Finally,
Appellant’s mother testified about his childhood, military service, and her pos-
itive observations of him as both a husband and father.
    We review sentence appropriateness de novo. United States v. Lane, 64
M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation omitted). We may affirm only as much of the
sentence as we find correct in law and fact and determine should be approved
on the basis of the entire record. Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(1).
“We assess sentence appropriateness by considering the particular appellant,
the nature and seriousness of the offense[s], the appellant’s record of service,
and all matters contained in the record of trial.” United States v. Sauk, 74 M.J.
594, 606 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 67 M.J. 703, 705 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2009) (per curiam)). While we have great discretion in determining whether a
particular sentence is appropriate, we are not authorized to engage in exercises
of clemency. United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
    We have considered the nature and seriousness of the offenses and have
given individualized consideration to Appellant, including his upbringing, rec-
ord of service, acceptance of responsibility, and pleas of guilty. We have also
considered the materials offered by Appellant during presentencing. We find
that 26 months of confinement is not an inappropriately severe punishment
for Appellant, who had sexually explicit conversations with nine girls between
the ages of 12 and 15 years old in order to gratify his sexual desires. We also
find it noteworthy that the record does not support Appellant’s argument that
he never attempted to meet any of the girls in person, as he admitted in both
the stipulation of fact and during his guilty plea inquiry that he told one 13-

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                   United States v. O’Hara, No. ACM 40281

year-old girl, “I was gonna [sic] see if you wanted to meet up sometime after
we got to know each other,” while also admitting that he told one 12-year-old
girl, “I wish I could come to your house lol.” (Alteration in original). After care-
ful consideration of Appellant’s arguments and the matters contained in the
record of trial, we conclude the sentence is not inappropriately severe.

                                III. CONCLUSION
   The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred. Articles
59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the findings
and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

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