Court Opinion

ID: 9711326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:29:27.115777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.792716
License: Public Domain

Knutson, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
I agree with the result reached by the majority in answer to the first question propounded respecting the construction to be placed upon the statutory limitation of three words. It is obvious that some occupations cannot be named in one word in the literal and restricted sense. The same is true of the names of some cities and villages in the state. It cannot be supposed that the legislature intended to exclude all such occupations and places of residence as could not be designated in three simple words within this permissive legislation. We must give the statute such construction as to make possible the accomplishment of the purpose for which the act was passed. When compound words or a combination of words express only one thought or idea, such as an occupation or place of residence, and it is necessary to use such compound words or combination of words to express the occupation or place of residence, they should be counted as one word. In so doing, we do no violence to accepted rules of construction, keeping in mind that the fundamental purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature.
When we come to the second question propounded, we have a different situation. The question here is really a very simple one, namely, what is the meaning of “occupation”? In construing statutes, we are and should be governed by rules established both by statute law and by our own decisions. The expediency of a partic*76ular case should not control our decision. Pertinent rules for construing statutes established by our legislature are M. S. A. 645.08, which provides in part:
“In construing the statutes of this state, the following canons of interpretation are to govern, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute:
“(1) Words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as have acquired a special meaning, or are defined in this chapter, are construed according to such special meaning or their definition; * * *.”
Section 645.16 reads as follows:
“.The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.
“When the words of a law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.
‘When the words of a law are not explicit, the intention of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
“(1) The occasion and necessity for the law;
“(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted;
“(3) The mischief to be remedied;
“(4) The object to be attained;
“(5) The former law, if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;
“(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation;
“(7) The contemporaneous legislative history; and
“(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of the statute.” (Italics supplied.)
Our decisions are to the same effect. See, 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 8940.
*77Unlike the answer to the first question, here there is no ambiguity, nor is there any need for judicial construction in order to give effect to the legislative intent exactly as it has been expressed by the legislature. It is a fundamental rule that construction of a statute lies only in the field of ambiguity, and where the language of the statute is clear and free from ambiguity there is no room for judicial construction. Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co. 80 Minn. 32, 82 N. W. 1088; Pierce v. Grand Army of the Republic, 224 Minn. 248, 28 N. W. (2d) 637; State ex rel. Bergin v. Washburn, 224 Minn. 269, 28 N. W. (2d) 652.
In Rice v. City of St. Paul, 208 Minn. 509, 518, 295 N. W. 529, 533, we said:
“* * * By reading the entire statute * * *, no doubt is left that it is clear and free from uncertainty or ambiguity. In that situation judicial duty requires that we give to the language chosen its plain meaning, since it is ‘only where the language of an act is ambiguous, and needs, by reason of such ambiguity, to be judicially construed, that the history of such act or its title should be resorted to for aid in its construction.’ Town of Hinckley v. Kettle River R. Co. 80 Minn. 32, 37, 82 N. W. 1088, 1089. Or, as stated in Railroad Comm. of Wisconsin v. C. B. & Q. R. Co. 257 U. S. 563, 589, 42 S. Ct. 232, 238, 66 L. ed. 371, 383, 22 A. L. R. 1086: ‘But when, taking the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the court, extraneous aid * * * cannot control the interpretation.’ ”
While the word “occupation” has not been expressly defined in connection with the statute here involved, it has a recognized and well-accepted meaning. Webster’s New International Dictionary (2 ed.) (1947) defines it, so far as applicable here, as follows:
“2. That which occupies, or engages, the time and attention; the principal business of one’s life; vocation; business.”
By way of explanation we find the following:
*78“* * * One’s occupation is that to which one’s time is devoted, or in which one is regularly or habitually engaged; * *
I have found no definition of occupation that means otherwise. It has been defined by our legislature in connection with other laws. See, M. S. A. 177.02, subd. 9. The definition quoted above from Webster’s New International Dictionary is generally accepted by the courts in connection with cases of various kinds.
In Lorentz v. Aetna L. Ins. Co. 197 Minn. 205, 209, 266 N. W. 699, 701, involving the construction of a life insurance policy, we said:
“* * * occupation here must have the same meaning as employment, that is, either working for wages when employed by another, or for the reward or profit obtained from one’s own labor in an occupation or vocation.”
See, also, Monahan v. Supreme Lodge, etc., 88 Minn. 224, 92 N. W. 972.
The same definition has been generally accepted by courts of other states. Industrial Comm. v. Roth, 98 Ohio St. 34, 120 N. E. 172, 6 A. L. R. 1463; Dorrell v. Norida Land & Timber Co. 53 Idaho 793, 27 P. (2d) 960. For other cases, see 29 Wd. & Phr. (Perm. ed.) p. 160.
The most cogent argument against the reasoning of the majority is the fact that the word “former” has been used preceding the office heretofore held by the candidate involved. Use of the word “former” refutes the claim that it is now the candidate’s occupation. How can a position formerly held by one, which he now concedes he no longer holds, be his occupation under any definition or construction which might be placed upon that word?
As long ago as 1932, the attorney general in an opinion held exactly the opposite of what the majority now holds. An attempt has been made to distinguish that opinion upon the facts, but I do not believe any such distinction is possible, nor are there any *79facts before us which would justify it. The opinion, so far as here pertinent, reads:
“Hon. Mike Holm,
Secretary of State,
Building.
“Dear Sir:
“This is in answer to your letter of May 2áth, 1982, addressed to the attorney general, inquiring as to the legality of certain descriptive words which a candidate having the same surname as another candidate desires to have inserted after his name on the ballots for the coming primary election.
“Mason’s Statutes of 1927, section 285, permits a candidate in such case to have added after his name on the ballot not to exceed three words, indicating his occupation and residence.
“The first proposed designation is:
“ ‘Ex-Representative’
followed by the name of the place of the candidate’s residence. In my opinion this designation is not permissible, since it does not indicate the candidate’s present occupation, but apparently refers to an office formerly held by him. The statute contemplates that the statement shall refer to the candidate’s present occupation.”
We have no facts before us showing whether the occupation there involved was more remote from that now under consideration. Even if it were, are we to place decision on the question of remoteness, or lack of it, of the former occupation? If so, how remote must the former occupation be before it ceases to come within the definition of occupation as used in this statute? Obviously, no such distinction can be made. I think that this opinion was right when written and that it is still right and should be followed. It has stood unchallenged since 1932. Several sessions of the legislature have been held since that time, but the legislature has apparently been satisfied with the construction placed upon the statute by the attorney general. As such, it is entitled to considerable weight.
*80The legislation under consideration is permissive only. Without such legislation, a candidate could not have any identification after his name. In providing such permission, the legislature has prescribed the exact method by which the candidate may be identified and what he may show. It is limited to two things: occupation and residence. It must necessarily follow that the method prescribed is exclusive. Here there is no ambiguity. The language under consideration is clear and unequivocal. Occupation can have only one meaning. There is no need for judicial construction in order to accomplish the legislative purpose exactly as the legislature has granted permission to do so.
In Ledin v. Holm, 203 Minn. 434, 281 N. W. 762, we considered this statute in connection with an attempt on the part of a candidate to insert after his name the words “Present Senator, Isanti,” because of the fact that another candidate had a name which was similar but not the same. We there held that the statute did not cover a situation where the names were similar, but only those cases where the surnames were the same. The names there involved were Lodin and Ledin. We there said (203 Minn. 435, 281 N. W. 763):
“* * * The purpose of [Mason St. 1927] § 285 3 is to avoid the confusion that may arise from the appearance upon the ballot of identical surnames. It sets forth a single and exclusive circumstance under which words of designation may be added. Its framers might have gone much farther. They might have dealt with similarity as well as identity of surnames and stopped there. They might have covered similarity as well as identity of both given and surnames. But they did nothing of that kind. Of the whole field which they might have covered they have reached by express inclusion only identity of surnames. To project the statute beyond that field and make it include similarity as well as identity of surnames would in our judgment extend its effect beyond the scope limited by the clear phraseology chosen by the legislature. The result would be an *81inadvertent but no less an actual amendment of the statute rather than an interpretation of it.”
In this case, had the legislature intended to include former occupations as permissive identification on the ballot, it could easily have said so. In line with respondent’s arguments, it would have been simple to have the statute read, “indicating his occupation if he has one, otherwise his former occupation.” The simple fact is that the legislature did not do so. Were we to draft the statute, we might well permit more than three words to be used, and we might also include provisions for including former occupations, but for us to read such provision into a statute which is clear and free from doubt is not construction, but judicial legislation and amendment. It is not our function to pass laws, but to construe them.
I think that an order should issue restraining the secretary of state from including on the ballot the words here involved.

As amended, now M. S. A. 205.70.