Court Opinion

ID: 9449318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:07:57.606295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:03.949210
License: Public Domain

J-A11027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  BRIAN SCOTT CINKO                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 833 WDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 10, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-07-CR-0000074-2020

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED: August 4, 2023

       Appellant, Brian Scott Cinko, was convicted following a three-day jury

trial of thirty-two various sexual crimes against an eight-year-old boy over a

period of approximately two months. He was subsequently sentenced to an

aggregate term of 84.5 to 189 years of incarceration. Appellant’s issues on

appeal all concern his assertion that the victim was not competent to testify.

We affirm.

       S.W. and her husband, J.W., were parents to two children: A.W., the

victim in this case, and his sister, B.W. In early 2019, the family moved from

Arizona to Pennsylvania.        In September, the family moved in with S.W.’s

nephew, who worked with both Appellant and S.W. A few weeks later, the

family moved into Appellant’s apartment, intending to take it over a few days

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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later as Appellant was set to move elsewhere. Appellant did not follow through

with that plan and stayed with the family approximately sixty days.

      The parents initially slept on a couch in the living room while their

children slept in loft beds in one of the apartment’s bedrooms, with Appellant’s

bedroom across the hallway. Appellant would occasionally volunteer to watch

the children if S.W. and J.W. needed to go somewhere. Appellant “started

buying [A.W.] stuff[,] and [S.W. and J.W.] started to feel a little bit alarmed

by it.” N.T. Trial, 12/7/21, at 53 (testimony of S.W.). This included small

gifts such as a Halloween costume and candy. Appellant did not buy similar

gifts for their daughter. Appellant would also regularly have “movie night” in

his bedroom with A.W.

      One evening, B.W. woke her parents up sometime around midnight,

reporting that A.W. was preventing her from sleeping. S.W. decided to check

on A.W. and saw Appellant in bed with A.W., with Appellant wearing only

underwear. S.W. reported this behavior to A.W.’s doctor, who told them to

report the incident to the Office of Children, Youth and Family (“CYF”).

Caseworkers from that agency arranged for a “rollout” interview on November

19, 2019, at the Children’s Advocacy Center (“CAC”), which “typically happens

when there is not an allegation of abuse but there may be some outside source

or some reason for somebody to suspect that something could have

occurred….” N.T. Trial, 12/6/21, at 110. When the forensic interviewer asked

A.W. who he lived with, his answer included “[Appellant], but he moved.”

Transcript of Forensic Interview, 11/19/19, at 17.     The interviewer asked,

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“How come he moved?” and A.W. replied, “So my mom and my dad kicked

him out because he was doing like weird stuff. … He has been touching me

and he’s been telling me to touch him and I’m saying no….” Id. at 18. He

said that Appellant touched him “every single night” after going to bed. Id.

at 19. Appellant would “put[] his finger in … my butt,” id. at 36, as well as

“the thing that I said if you have to go pee,” which A.W. said referred to

Appellant’s “wiener.” Id. at 39. A.W. also disclosed incidents of oral sex,

including graphic descriptions of ejaculation. A.W. stated that these incidents

happened more than twenty times. As a result of these disclosures, Detective

David Hoover of the Logan Township Police Department was summoned to the

facility. He took a copy of the interview, questioned family members, and filed

charges against Appellant two days later.             At trial, the Commonwealth

consolidated the charges.1

       On September 14, 2020, Appellant filed a motion to determine A.W.’s

competency, arguing that his trial testimony would be tainted. The concept

of taint addresses the theory that a “child’s memory is peculiarly susceptible

to suggestibility” and probes whether the child’s memory is false or has been

distorted    by   suggestive     interview     techniques.   Commonwealth     v.

Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 35 (Pa. 2003) (“Delbridge I”). Appellant argued

that several comments from the CAC interview established that A.W. made

____________________________________________

1  The Commonwealth consolidated various charges based on A.W.’s
statements that the incidents happened at least twenty times. Appellant does
not raise any issues with respect to the charges or their consolidation.

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the accusations due to his parents’ planting the idea in his head. For example,

Appellant pointed out that, in the interview, A.W. “refers to [Appellant] having

a criminal past,” including saying that Appellant “did it to a 13-year-old girl[.]”

Motion to Determine Competency, 9/14/20, at ¶¶ 26; 29.2 Appellant cited

other portions of the transcript which, in his view, established that A.W. was

incapable of distinguishing fact from fiction.

       On September 23, 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion

and conducted an in camera examination of A.W. As relevant to Appellant’s

arguments, A.W. discussed two incidents involving wild animals. The first was

A.W.’s claim that he threw “a stick up in the air and knock[ed] out a squirrel”

that had been eating a nut. N.T. Competency Hearing, 9/23/20, at 51. The

second concerned a wild deer A.W. befriended in Arizona, which he named

George.    A.W. stated he would put stickers on George’s head “so I could

remember [what] he looks like.” Id. at 53-54. A.W. stated that he did not

try to make friends with deer in Pennsylvania because “[t]hey’re weird. They

… just stare and … run the other way….” Id. at 58.

       The trial court issued an order and opinion in support of its conclusion

that Appellant failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that A.W. was not

competent to testify. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate

term of 84.5 to 189 years of incarceration.           He filed a timely motion
____________________________________________

2 Appellant pled guilty in 1994 to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse based

on sexual abuse of a twelve-year old male. The trial court denied the
Commonwealth’s motion to introduce this conviction pursuant to Pa.R.E.
404(b).

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challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence

supporting the verdict, which the court denied. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(6);

607; 720(B). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the

order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement.      Appellant lists three

issues for our review:

      I. Whether the trial court erred in denying … [A]ppellant’s motion
      for judgment of acquittal where the jury’s guilty verdict was based
      entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of an eight-year-old
      alleged victim (ten at time of trial) who lacked testimonial
      competency, as demonstrated by the court’s finding that the child
      demonstrated a propensity to make fantastical statements “not
      grounded in apparent reality and to self-contradict and forget[?]”

      II. Whether the trial court erred in denying … [A]ppellant’s motion
      for judgment of acquittal and motion for [a] new trial where the
      incompetence of the child witness foreclosed … [A]ppellant, a
      criminal defendant, from an opportunity for effective and
      meaningful cross examination on the details of the criminal
      allegations and, thereby, deprived him of his 6th [A]mendment[,]
      constitutionally guaranteed rights to confront his accuser[?]

      III. Whether the trial court erred in denying … [A]ppellant’s motion
      for new trial where the jury’s guilty verdict is based solely on the
      uncorroborated testimony of a child who is not competent to
      testify and where, as a result, the verdict is not based on
      competent, credible evidence, but is, instead, the product of
      emotion and sympathy to a degree that “shocks one’s sense of
      justice[?]”

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Initially, we note that Appellant’s brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P.

2119(a), which states that the “argument shall be divided into as many parts

as there are questions to be argued….” Despite presenting three issues for

our review, the argument section of his brief is divided into two headings:

“Motion for judgment of acquittal – sufficiency of the evidence” and “Motion

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for new trial – weight of the evidence.” At bottom, each of the three issues

presented reduces to the assertion that A.W. was not competent to testify,

and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. Appellant’s three issues all cite

slightly different results of the purported error: incompetent testimony cannot

produce sufficient evidence to convict; an incompetent witness violates a

defendant’s confrontation rights; and testimony by an incompetent witness

leads to a verdict not supported by the weight of the evidence as the jury’s

verdict must be due to sympathy for the child victim. Because all three of

these claims turn on the trial court’s competency decision, we address them

together.

      Competency is addressed within Pa.R.E. 601, stating:

      (a) General Rule. Every person is competent to be a witness
      except as otherwise provided by statute or in these rules.

      (b) Disqualification for Specific Defects.           A person is
      incompetent to testify if the court finds that because of a mental
      condition or immaturity the person:

         (1) is, or was, at any relevant time, incapable of perceiving
         accurately;

         (2) is unable to express himself or herself so as to be
         understood either directly or through an interpreter;

         (3) has an impaired memory; or

         (4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to tell the
         truth.

Pa.R.E. 601(a), (b).

      Child witnesses are an exception to the presumption of competency, as

hearings must be held for any child witness under the age of fourteen.

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Commonwealth v. Moore, 980 A.2d 647, 651 (Pa. Super. 2009). In Rosche

v. McCoy, 156 A.2d 307 (Pa. 1959), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held

that the following prongs must be met for a child to testify:

       There must be (1) such capacity to communicate, including as it
       does both an ability to understand questions and to frame and
       express intelligent answers, (2) mental capacity to observe the
       occurrence itself and the capacity of remembering what it is that
       [he or] she is called to testify about and (3) a consciousness of
       the duty to speak the truth.

Id. at 310. Where the defendant alleges taint, that allegation is made part of

the competency hearing. Delbridge I, 855 A.2d at 40.

       To properly address Appellant’s claims, we first discuss the admission of

A.W.’s CAC statement under the Tender Years Hearsay Act (“TYHA”), 42

Pa.C.S. § 5985.1. As relevant here, the TYHA permits the introduction of an

“out-of-court statement made by a child victim or witness, who at the time

the statement was made was 16 years of age or younger,” describing certain

offenses including the ones at issue herein, provided that the trial court “finds,

in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is relevant and that the time,

content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of

reliability[.]”   42 Pa.C.S § 5985.1(a)(1)(i-ii).   The trial court granted the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine to introduce substantial portions of the

conversation recorded at the CAC facility under this statute.3

       The Commonwealth called A.W. on direct examination and the

testimony largely centered on competency issues, like whether A.W. could
____________________________________________

3 The Commonwealth agreed to remove certain portions of the interview.

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answer questions about himself, the importance of telling the truth, and

distinguishing between real life and fictional portrayals (e.g., “And Batman[:]

is … he real or is he make-believe?”). N.T. Trial, 12/6/21, at 98. With respect

to Appellant’s criminal charges, A.W. stated that Appellant touched “every

single potty area,” which A.W. said meant the “[p]ee and poop area.” Id. at

101. The specific accusations were largely established by the CAC interview,

which was approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes in length, as the discussion

of Appellant’s conduct on direct examination comprised four pages of

transcript.

       Appellant had previously requested to “defer my cross[-]examination of

[A.W.] until after the jury has heard all of his testimony and let’s face it, that’s

what the CAC interview was.”            Id. at 30.   Consistent with this choice,

Appellant cross-examined A.W. after the videotape was played to the jury.

His cross-examination also focused on competency issues in lieu of questions

about the abuse itself.4         Among other points, Appellant asked several

questions about George the deer, and A.W. stated that he had freed George
____________________________________________

4 As stated in the factual history section supra, A.W.’s family stayed with his

uncle shortly before moving into Appellant’s apartment. Like Appellant, A.W.’s
uncle had been previously convicted of sexual offenses. Following extensive
argument on the issue, the trial court permitted Appellant to ask Detective
Hoover if he had investigated A.W.’s uncle.

      During closing argument, Appellant argued that, “[u]nfortunately, this
boy was abused somewhere in the past. But it wasn’t by [Appellant]. … You
also know that [A.W.] was family [sic] for at least two weeks with a registered
child sex offender. … No, I am not saying he did it. I don’t know that and
either [sic] do you. But I would have liked to have that lead followed up on
and investigated and it wasn’t.” N.T. Trial, 12/8/21, at 124-25.

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from a bear trap. A.W. stated that he calmed George down with some corn

on the cob and then released the trap with a shovel. A.W. insisted that these

incidents were real.

       On appeal, Appellant generally maintains that A.W.’s statements were

fantastical to the degree he was denied his ability to confront A.W. at trial. He

insists that, “because of the incompetency of the alleged victim, … Appellant

was foreclosed from meaningful cross examination on the details of the

criminal allegations and was, therefore, deprived of his constitutionally

guaranteed right to confront his accuser.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant

maintains that “simply because cross[-]examination was available to …

Appellant does not mean … Appellant could engage in a thoughtful exchange

with … Appellant [sic].   Cross[-]examination does not cure incompetency.”

Id. at 21.

       “[T]he right of cross-examination is included in the right of an accused

in a criminal case to confront the witnesses against him. And probably no

one, certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value

of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the

trial of a criminal case.” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). As it

pertains to the admission of the TYHA statements, prior to 2004, introducing

hearsay statements from unavailable witnesses was deemed not to violate the

right of confrontation provided the statements bore “adequate ‘indicia of

reliability.’”   Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).               Under Roberts, the

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reliability of a statement was established if it fell “within a firmly rooted

hearsay exception” or if the statement had “particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness.”   Id. Crawford overruled Roberts’ Confrontation Clause

analysis. Statements admitted under the TYHA do not run afoul of Crawford

provided that the statements are non-testimonial.           Commonwealth v.

Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 173 (Pa. 2012).           If non-testimonial, traditional

evidentiary rules developed by the States governing the admission of hearsay

apply, as the Confrontation Clause does not apply to non-testimonial hearsay.

Id.

      Because A.W. was called at trial and subjected to cross-examination,

the core requirement that the witness be available was satisfied, making

irrelevant whether the statements were testimonial.         However, Appellant

maintained below that the Commonwealth’s TYHA motion should have been

denied   due   to   the   allegation   of   incompetency.    See Response     to

Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine, 11/24/20, at 6 (“Incompetent testimony

cannot be transformed into competent testimony through application of the

[TYHA].”). In his view, “the underlying competency of a child witness must

be a consideration” when admitting TYHA hearsay. Id. at 7. Appellant alludes

to a conclusion that A.W. was in fact unavailable at trial, notwithstanding his

physical presence, due to his purported incompetency. In turn, he argues

that this incompetency likewise bore on the reliability of his TYHA statements.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a)(1)(i) (instructing court to determine if the “time,

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content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of

reliability”).

       We disagree. Appellant attempts to transform the standard of review

for competency questions from an abuse of discretion into a question of law

based on a de novo review of the witness’ credibility. Caselaw is clear that

credibility is not a component of the competence assessment, and that the

trial court’s decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

       In Delbridge I, our Supreme Court authorized a pre-trial hearing to

determine whether a child’s testimony would be tainted by extrajudicial

influence. The victims in that case were four and six years old at the time of

the crimes, and Delbridge sought a competency hearing on the grounds that

their memory had been tainted by suggestive interviewing. The trial court

held a hearing but limited it to “questions examining the ability of the children

to understand the difference between truth and non-truth, the general

capacity to remember and the ability to communicate that memory.”

Delbridge I, 855 A.2d at 33. The Delbridge I Court concluded that a pre-

trial hearing on competency is the proper mechanism for assessing potential

taint. In terms of the Rosche factors, “[t]aint speaks to the second prong,”

and relates to whether the witness has the capacity to remember the subject

of their testimony. Id. at 40. The decision set forth additional procedural

standards, such as imposing the burdens of production and persuasion on the

moving party, establishing a clear and convincing standard, and granting the

trial court discretion to permit expert testimony.

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      The Delbridge I Court made clear that competency and credibility are

two separate considerations. “A competency hearing is not concerned with

credibility.   Credibility involves an assessment of whether or not what the

witness says is true; this is a question for the fact finder.”    Id. (quoting

Commonwealth v. Washington, 722 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa. 1998)). The Court

retained jurisdiction and affirmed after the trial court determined that the

children were competent following an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth

v. Delbridge, 859 A.2d 1254 (Pa. 2004) (“Delbridge II”). The Delbridge

II Court assessed the court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. “Each child

demonstrated the basic ability to communicate, to understand questions, and

provide appropriate responses, to observe and recall an event, to differentiate

between reality and make-believe, and to understand the consequences of

telling a lie.” Id. at 1258. Delbridge cross-examined the witnesses and “was

given great latitude in his questioning of [the victims] regarding the memories

of each child as to the interview process, their interactions with the various

interviewers, and any influence their mother exercised over them during the

investigation.” Id. Delbridge “failed to elicit any testimony from the children”

supporting his assertion of taint. Id.

      We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as A.W. gave

answers that satisfied each prong of Rosche. In its March 22, 2021 order

and opinion deeming A.W. competent, the trial court set forth its conclusions.

The trial court agreed that Appellant did advance some evidence of taint, as

the CAC interview showed that, at times, A.W. indicated that he learned about

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Appellant’s history of abuse from his parents. However, the court concluded

that Appellant failed to overcome the presumption of competency as required

by Delbridge I. Beginning with whether A.W. exhibited an understanding of

the need to tell the truth, A.W. testified that he understood the importance of

telling the truth, that telling the truth was good, and that telling a lie is bad.

A.W. correctly demonstrated that he knew the difference between the truth

and a lie based on questions by the assistant district attorney, who asked him

if it would be a lie if she said her shirt was purple. A.W. correctly responded

that it would be a lie because her shirt was yellow. A.W. also demonstrated

that he could cogently respond to questions about himself, as he knew his

birthdate, how old he was, his family members, and could discuss activities

that he enjoyed.    In ruling on a competency motion, we defer to the trial

court’s assessment as it observed the witness’ demeanor and responses

firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 883 A.2d 570, 577 (Pa. 2005)

(“[A] trial court can base its competency determination on criteria other than

specifically-targeted questions, criteria such as the witness’s demeanor,

alertness, thoughtfulness, sincerity and general responses and testimony.”).

On these Rosche factors, the trial court clearly did not abuse its discretion.

      The trial court acknowledged that regarding “the minimal capacity … to

communicate, to observe an event, and to accurately recall that observation,

the record is less clear.” Order and Opinion, 3/19/22, at 25. While A.W. “had

no problem communicating,” his ability to observe and accurately recall “is

clouded by his propensity, demonstrated in all interviews, to make fantastical

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statements not grounded in apparent reality, and to volunteer reams of

information, and to self-contradict or forget.” Id. By way of example, A.W.

began his CAC interview “with a long and garbled description of flag football,”

and in follow-up comments, “it was not clear whether [A.W.] understood the

rules of flag football ... or was being responsive to the interviewer’s

questions.” Id. at 26. The trial court also cited the stories about George the

deer, implicitly concluding that the story was not real. Simultaneously, A.W.

exhibited that he could distinguish fact and fantasy. He identified Darth Vader

as a “make believe” character and identified the judge as a real person. He

also described his favorite video game, and correctly explained that the

vehicles in the game were not themselves real, but were modeled after real

cars.

        Notwithstanding these issues, the trial court ultimately concluded that

Appellant failed to meet his burden and that A.W. was minimally competent.

The court opined that the fantastical aspects of A.W.’s testimony bore only on

his credibility and could be explored on cross-examination. It reasoned that

“[Appellant] will have ample opportunity and abundant material with which to

challenge the child witness’s credibility, including his fantastical statements

and his self-contradiction and forgetting in regards to the basic allegations of

offenses allegedly committed against him.” Id. at 32.

        In assailing the trial court’s ruling, Appellant asks us to focus on the trial

court’s acknowledgement that A.W. made statements not grounded in reality.

According to Appellant, the court’s finding in that regard means that A.W. was

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not competent to testify as a matter of law. Appellant specifically focuses on

A.W.’s comments about George the deer, which he repeated at trial on cross-

examination, as demonstrating that A.W. should be deemed incompetent.

      The trial court clearly determined that A.W. demonstrated some inability

to separate fact from fiction. This finding is supported by the record, and we

agree that it is difficult to believe that a wild deer allowed A.W. to put a sticker

on its forehead or remove a bear trap from its leg, even accepting that a small

child could pry such a trap open. However, we agree with the trial court that

these issues ultimately go to credibility, not competency, and caselaw

establishes    that    competency      determinations      have    been     upheld

notwithstanding a child’s testifying to matters that are highly implausible. The

Delbridge II Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in deeming the witness competent, even though one of the victims claimed

that when Delbridge “touched her ‘tee-tee’ she could not tell anyone because

she was still in diapers.” Delbridge I, 855 A.2d at 31. As Delbridge argued,

“this statement creates the incredible inference that [the victim] could recall

events that occurred while she was an infant.” Id. Our Supreme Court did

not find that this type of implausible detail established, as a matter of law, an

incompetence to testify.      Instead, the trial court retained discretion to

determine that, on balance, the witness satisfied the criteria for competency.

The case for overruling the trial court’s discretionary assessment is even

weaker here because, unlike in the Delbridge cases, the implausible aspects

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of A.W.’s statements are orthogonal to the allegations of abuse. We therefore

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.

       The same analysis applies to the admission of the TYHA statements and

the trial court’s finding that those statements satisfied the statutory criteria

for reliability, assuming that Appellant adequately preserved a challenge to

the   TYHA     statements       via   his      Confrontation   Clause   claims.5    In

Commonwealth v. Walter, 93 A.3d 442 (Pa. 2014), the Supreme Court held

that the competency of a witness does not bear on the admissibility of

statements under the TYHA. The victim, the four-year-old daughter of the

defendant, informed a CYS caseworker that she was afraid of her father

because of “Chuckie,” a name she used to refer to his penis. The victim was

placed in emergency foster case and subsequently made allegations of abuse

to four other witnesses.

       During an in camera hearing concerning her competency taking place

before the preliminary hearing, the victim, then age five, “appeared to give

appropriate answers” to basic numbers about her age and name. Id. at 446.

“However, when the Commonwealth asked the victim various questions

related to her understanding of truth and lies, the victim gave a number of

nonsensical or bizarre answers.”            Id.      The trial court deemed the victim
____________________________________________

5  Appellant does not separately challenge the admission of the TYHA
statements. The Commonwealth does not argue that Appellant has waived
any of his claims. Because the admission of the TYHA statements formed the
basis for Appellant’s convictions, and the cross-examination of A.W. was based
on the playing of the tape, we accept for purposes of our disposition that
Appellant has not waived his Confrontation Clause claims.

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competent to testify but unavailable for purposes of the TYHA “because

testifying would cause her serious emotional distress that would substantially

impair her ability to reasonably communicate to the jury.” Id. at 447. At the

subsequent preliminary hearing, the court called the victim to testify outside

the defendant’s presence, and deemed the victim incompetent to testify based

on her answers.       The Superior Court held that the child must be deemed

competent to testify before admitting statements under the TYHA.

      Our Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for review and

reversed. The Court explained the need “to recognize the difference between

the two legal concepts” at issue: competency and the TYHA hearsay exception.

Id. at 451. Competency “is not concerned with credibility. Credibility involves

an assessment of whether or not what the witness says is true.”             Id.

Competency thus simply “pertains to a witness’s capacity to testify,” whereas

the hearsay exception requires “assessing the particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness surrounding the circumstances under which the statements

were uttered to the person who is testifying.” Id. (quoting Delbridge I, 855

A.2d at 45).

      Appellant does not specifically challenge the trial court’s determination

that the TYHA statements satisfied the “sufficient indicia of reliability”

statutory standard. He instead argues that the two are not easily separated,

and points to the trial court’s concession that A.W. had some difficulty

distinguishing fact from fiction. Setting aside the fact that Appellant does not

specifically allege    that A.W. was unavailable      due   to this purported

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incompetency,      Appellant     fails   to    elaborate   upon   his   claim   that   his

Confrontation Clause rights were violated.            A.W. testified at trial and was

subject to cross-examination and was therefore available at trial. The right to

confront accusers is a procedural guarantee, not a substantive one. “[T]he

Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural

rather than a substantive guarantee.             It commands, not that evidence be

reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in

the crucible of cross-examination.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. A.W. was

subject to cross-examination, and Appellant does not provide any authority

for the proposition that the actual opportunity to confront A.W. is insufficient

even if we accept arguendo that A.W.’s inability to separate fact and fiction in

some instances does bear on the reliability of the disclosures.6

       The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every
       witness called by the prosecution will refrain from giving
____________________________________________

6 Then-Justice Saylor authored a concurring opinion in      Walter, highlighting
that the TYHA “does not speak in terms of ‘particularized guarantees,’ but
whether the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability,” and argued that the framework developed by
the United States Supreme Court in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990),
which addressed the admissibility of statements from incompetent witnesses
under the now-abrogated Roberts framework, should not be incorporated
wholesale into the TYHA. Walter, 93 A.3d at 458 (Saylor, J., concurring).

       Justice Saylor also argued that competency to testify and the indicia of
reliability assessment for hearsay statements under the TYHA can be
interrelated. “To the extent the alleged victim has a generalized difficulty
distinguishing fiction from reality, or believes it is normal and acceptable to
lie, the reliability of his or her prior hearsay statements is called into question,
as such statements may be the product of imagination or creativity.” Id. at
457.

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      testimony that is marred by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.
      To the contrary, the Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied
      when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and
      expose these infirmities through cross-examination, thereby
      calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving
      scant weight to the witness’ testimony.

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 21–22 (1985).            Cf. Kentucky v.

Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 744 (1987) (concluding that exclusion from

competency hearing adjudging witnesses competent to testify did not violate

Confrontation Clause; “the critical tool of cross-examination was available to

counsel as a means of establishing that the witnesses were not competent to

testify, as well as a means of undermining the credibility of their testimony”).

      Therefore, while A.W. demonstrated some degree of unreliability in

distinguishing fact from fiction, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s

ability to cross-examine on those topics and argue the issue to the jury

sufficiently satisfied his right to confront A.W. The trial court did not limit

Appellant’s cross-examination in any way, and he argued to the jury in closing

that A.W.’s grasp on what was real and what was not was so tenuous that the

jury should find Appellant not guilty. N.T. Trial, 12/8/21, at 127 (“And the

fact is that [A.W.] has no grasp o[n] reality.    … [W]ho among you would

convict [Appellant] knowing what you now know about [A.W.]’s capacity to

issue fantastical statements[?]”). We therefore find no violation of Appellant’s

right to confront A.W.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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J-A11027-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2023

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