Court Opinion

ID: 9676636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:29:13.669642+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:49.996427
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The majority concludes that jury trials are not available in chapter 601A civil rights actions brought in the district court pursuant to a “release to sue.” The arguments which the opinion advances in support of that conclusion are not persuasive and fly in the face of the general legislative classification of civil actions and the consequences which attend that classification. This supposed exercise in statutory interpretation is really a case of the majority expressing why it would not have permitted jury trials had it been the legislature.
Actions in the district court are classified by Iowa Code section 611.2 (1989) as being of two types: civil and special. That statute provides:
A civil action is a proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong. It may also be brought for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.
Every other proceeding in a civil case is a special action.
Id. The language of Iowa Code section 601A.16(2) (1989) simply provides:
Upon a request by the complainant, and after the expiration of one hundred twenty days from the timely filing of a complaint with the commission, the commission shall issue to the complainant a release stating that the complainant has a right to commence an action in the district court.
Id. (emphasis added). I submit that the “action in the district court” which is authorized by the preceding statute is an ordinary civil action. A plaintiff in such an *387action demands relief against another party known as the defendant.
The only statutory classification of ordinary civil actions is that contained in Iowa Code section 611.3 (1989) which provides that there are only two kinds: ordinary (or law actions) and equitable actions. Under the statutory scheme which antedated our rules of civil procedure, jury trials were mandated in all ordinary actions unless waived. See Missildine v. Brightman, 234 Iowa 1339, 1344, 14 N.W.2d 700, 704 (1944); LaForge v. Cooter, 220 Iowa 1258, 1260, 264 N.W. 268, 269 (1935). The last statute to so provide was Iowa Code section 11429 (1939), which provided:
Issues of fact in an ordinary action must be tried by jury, unless the same is waived.
(Emphasis added.) This statute was superseded by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 177 adopted in 1943. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 1(d) (1943) and Appendix I annexed thereto. The only change in the former procedure which resulted from the adoption of rule 177 was that now jury trials are mandated in all ordinary actions where trial by jury is demanded. Whether an action is an equitable action or an ordinary action has traditionally been determined by the relief demanded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in the present case seeks only to recover money damages.
Although the practice just described probably received its impetus from the provisions of article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution concerning the right of jury trial, the criteria for determining that right developed by case decisions which paralleled the statutory law of juries antedating our rules of civil procedure and continued with the force and effect of statute under those rules. Consequently, these criteria have taken on legislative as well as constitutional significance. A departure therefrom should therefore require some express legislative directive. No such directive is to be found in that legislation which recognizes a right to bring a civil action after obtaining a release from the civil rights commission.
It should not come as a great surprise to the legislature that actions seeking traditionally legal relief for civil rights violations are triable to a jury under established procedures. Jury trials were available in civil rights actions brought under our earlier statutory law. See Brown v. The J.H. Bell Co., 146 Iowa 89, 123 N.W. 231 (1910); Humburd v. Crawford, 128 Iowa 743, 105 N.W. 330 (1905). Moreover, courts in other jurisdictions have concluded there is a right to jury trial in civil rights actions where traditionally legal relief is demanded. See Reiner v. New Jersey, 732 F.Supp. 530 (D.N.J.1990) (seventh amendment right to jury in state civil rights action in federal court); Stewart v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 230 (E.D.Mo.1988) (same); McMillan v. Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 678 F.Supp. 89 (D.N.J.1988) (same); Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 647 F.Supp. 1359 (D.D.C.1986) (right to jury trial under D.C. act and seventh amendment); Loomis Elec. Protection, Inc. v. Schaefer, 549 P.2d 1341 (Ala.1976) (right to jury under state constitution); Broward County v. La Rosa, 505 So.2d 422 (Fla.1987) (same); King v. General Motors Corp., 136 Mich.App. 301, 356 N.W.2d 626 (1984) (same); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 136 A.D.2d 229, 527 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988) (right to jury under rule declaring and enlarging state constitutional right); Perilli v. Board of Educ. Monongalia County, 387 S.E.2d 315 (W.Va.1989) (right to jury under state constitution).
The majority seeks to avoid the path over which our established procedures travel by characterizing jury trials as “incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication.” In support of this claim, it states that the district court sits as the administrative agency. This is clearly not correct. The district court does not sit as a civil rights commission; it does not screen cases as does the commission; it does not investigate cases like the commission; nor does a court hear cases under the commission’s rules. When the legislature sought to provide a partial answer to the backlog of undisposed claims before the civil rights commission, it did so by providing an alter*388native to the administrative proceeding in the form of an ordinary civil action.
The analogy to Title YII actions which the majority employs is not persuasive. Title YII of the federal act, by its terms, contemplates only equitable relief. A better analogy is found under Title VIII of the federal act. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an action under Title VIII is one to enforce a “legal right.” In Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 94 S.Ct. 1005, 39 L.Ed.2d 260 (1974), the Court stated:
Whatever doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory right's, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.
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We think it is clear that a damage action under [Title VIII] is an action to enforce “legal rights” within the meaning of our Seventh Amendment decisions. A damage action under the statute sounds basically in tort — the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant’s wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeals noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law. More important, the relief sought here— actual and punitive damages — is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.
Id. at 194-96, 94 S.Ct. at 1008-09, 39 L.Ed.2d at 266-67 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
In an effort to avoid the result which is dictated by the nature of the relief demanded in the present case, the majority mis-characterizes “the essential nature” of this plaintiffs suit. As the path of time leads us farther away from the common law which existed in 1857, when the Iowa Constitution was ratified, we must be careful not to limit the right to a jury trial in statutorily based actions to those instances where these statutes merely codify 1857 common law. We should instead continue to apply the general statutory classification of ordinary and equitable actions based on the nature of the relief available under the newly created causes of action. Judged by this standard, the nature of the injury and the relief sought in the present case would have merited a jury trial in 1857.
The majority also draws some inaccurate conclusions concerning the effect of its decision on the administration of civil rights cases. It states that a jury trial with its attendant delays would be counterproductive in fulfilling the explicit legislative goal. If this is true, the fault lies in the fact that the commission does not have the capacity to fulfill the legislature’s goal. Consequently, the legislature has seen fit to provide an alternative. The fact that such an alternative has become necessary is the circumstance which frustrates the original legislative goal. This has very little to do, however, with the procedure which should be employed in the civil actions which have been made available as an alternative to administrative adjudication. I submit that, ideally, administrative agencies should function in the manner of administrative agencies, and courts should function in the manner of courts.
The majority opinion overlooks the fact that, in many types of civil rights cases, and in employment-related cases in particular, a civil rights claim will be only one theory of recovery in a multifaceted claim for relief. In cases where the civil rights claim is brought before the commission and remains for commission consideration, the claimant must necessarily piecemeal the multifaceted assault. Where there has been a release to sue, however, there is a tremendous advantage for purposes of judicial administration in permitting all counts of the multifaceted claim to be joined in a single action and tried under a common procedure be it court trial or jury trial. An example of a case in which that procedure worked expeditiously is Annear v. State, 454 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1990), filed April 18, 1990.
*389As a final note, I would point out the obvious fact that, since the enactment of the section 601A.16(2) right-to-sue clause, there have in fact been actions brought pursuant thereto in which jury trials have been permitted. More than one of these cases has reached this court with the right-to-jury issue never being litigated. The first such case was Ayala v. Center Line, Inc., 415 N.W.2d 603 (Iowa 1987), filed November 25, 1987. The most recent civil rights jury case to reach this court on appeal was Annear. Between the filing of Ayala and the filing of Annear, the Seventy-Second General Assembly (second session) and the Seventy-Third General Assembly (first and second sessions) have convened and adjourned without noting any displeasure with the jury trial procedure.
I am confident that the legislature closely monitors the field of civil rights litigation in order to determine whether its goals and expectations are being realized. Given this circumstance, I can only conclude that the legislature has been aware that courts have been permitting jury trials in this type of litigation. The fact that it has taken no action to disapprove the jury trial procedure is a strong indication that the procedure is not contrary to that which the legislature intended.
I would hold that the district court erred in not granting plaintiffs request for jury trial, and would reverse the judgment on that ground.
LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ., join this dissent.