Court Opinion

ID: 9780806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 02:55:56.490982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:14.164119
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, but I cannot agree with the majority that there was evidence to support the jury’s determination that Husband’s retirement account was his separate property. The only evidence was Husband’s testimony that he had contributed $49,000 to the account during his marriage to Wife, and that his employer also had made contributions to the account during the marriage.3 Property “acquired as a direct result of the labor and investments of the former husband during the course of the marriage ... is subject to equitable division.” White v. *783White, 253 Ga. 267, 269 (319 SE2d 447) (1984). Retirement benefits acquired during the marriage are marital property subject to equitable division. Taylor v. Taylor, 283 Ga. 63 (656 SE2d 828) (2008). As a result, the amount contributed to the retirement account by Husband and his employer during the marriage is marital property subject to equitable division, and the jury’s verdict finding the account to be Husband’s separate property is reversible because it is without evidentiary support. See Payson v. Payson, 274 Ga. 231 (1) (b) (552 SE2d 839) (2001).
I believe the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed, however, because Wife waived any alleged error in the jury’s verdict when her counsel stated affirmatively that Wife had no objections to the form of the verdict returned by the jury. After the closing arguments, counsel for each side agreed to the special verdict form the trial court proposed to give the jury. The verdict form listed the various items of property and instructed the jury to determine which items were separate property and which were marital, to indicate which spouse owned the separate property, and to divide the marital property. Upon the jury’s return of the completed verdict that found the retirement account to be Husband’s separate property and the publication of the verdict by the court clerk, the completed verdict form was displayed to counsel for the parties and the trial court inquired if there was any objection to the form of the verdict as framed, to which both counsel affirmatively stated there was no objection.
The phrase “form of the verdict” may arise in three distinct set of cases: (1) where the form of the verdict provided to the jury was allegedly in error (see, e.g., Cheddersingh v. State, 290 Ga. 680 (724 SE2d 366) (2012); Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., 288 Ga. 79 (702 SE2d 139) (2010)); (2) the way in which the jury wrote the verdict was allegedly in error (see, e.g., Williams v. State, 46 Ga. 647 (1872); Wilkes v. State, 210 Ga. App. 898 (437 SE2d 837) (1993)); or (3) the substance of the verdict was allegedly in error. See, e.g., Ray v. Stinson, 254 Ga. 375 (329 SE2d 502) (1985); Smith v. State, 282 Ga. App. 339 (638 SE2d 791) (2006); Evans v. Maiuro, 170 Ga. App. 672 (318 SE2d 69) (1984). A claim to a new trial on the basis of the form of the jury’s verdict is waived when the appellant fails to object to the form of the verdict before the jury is discharged. Ray v. Stinson, supra, 254 Ga. 375 (appellant’s contention that the verdict is invalid on its face is waived since counsel for appellant, after the return of the verdict, responded in the affirmative when asked if the verdict was in proper order). Waiver occurs when a party “made no objection to the verdict when it was announced so as to enable the jury which heard the evidence to return a proper verdict. Upon hearing an improper verdict rendered, a litigant should not sit silently by, *784hoping to gain a retrial by failing to object. [Cit.]” Clifton v. Clifton, 249 Ga. 831 (2) (294 SE2d 518) (1982). See Ga. R. &c. Co. v. Tompkins, 138 Ga. 596, hn. 9 (75 SE 664) (1912) (where the verdict did not reflect on which of the two counts it was based, “if this furnished any ground for objection to the verdict when returned, it was no cause for a new trial in the absence of any such objection”).
By its very nature, this waiver exists only when a jury returns a verdict. Compare Rude v. Rude, 241 Ga. 454 (246 SE2d 311) (1978), cited by the majority. The Rudes had a bench trial and this court ruled that a written waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law occurred when counsel signed the final order under the recital “Approved By.”4 The requirement that an objection to the form of the verdict be voiced before the jury is dispersed is obvious — the only way to remedy the error in the jury’s verdict form is to have a new trial. Where, however, a judge sits as trier of fact and makes an error in the form of the verdict, the judge may correct the error without presiding over a new trial. See, e.g., Payson v. Payson, supra, 274 Ga. at 233 (2).
There is, however, an exception to the rule that the failure to object to the form of the verdict prior to the discharge of the jury constitutes a waiver. “[A] party does not waive an objection to a verdict that is void, as opposed to voidable, by failing to object to the verdict form or the verdict as rendered before the jury is released.” Benchmark Builders v. Schultz, 289 Ga. 329 (1) (711 SE2d 639) (2011). That is so because we cannot endorse entry of a valid judgment on a void verdict solely due to a party’s failure to object to the void verdict before the jury is dismissed. Anthony v. Gator Cochran Constr., supra, 288 Ga. at 80. A verdict is void when the jury does something it is not authorized to do, e.g., it returns an inconsistent verdict (id.); it, in the absence of an award of damages or affirmative relief, awards attorney fees under a statute authorizing such an award only to the “prevailing party” (Benchmark Builders v. Schultz, supra, 289 Ga. 330 (1)); it returns a purportedly unanimous verdict that, upon polling the jury, a juror states is not his verdict (Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 466 (602 SE2d 631) (2004)). Where the verdict is one that the jury properly could have found, the jury’s verdict is not illegal and void. Since the jury was authorized to *785determine whether the IRA was marital property or Husband’s separate property, the jury’s verdict is not a void verdict. As a result, appellant waived her objection to the verdict when she failed to object to it after it was rendered and prior to the release of the jury.
Decided March 23, 2012.
Shaffer, Raymond & Dalton, Philip T. Raymond III, for appellant.
Walter C. Green II, Brenda H. Trammell, for appellee.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court because Wife waived her objection to the verdict when she failed to object to it after it was rendered and prior to the release of the jury.

 Husband testified that his contributions were made to a 401(k) account that was rolled over into the IRA when he left that employment.

 Berry v. Risdall, 1998 S. D. 18 (576 NW2d 1) (SD Sup. Ct. 1998), cited by the majority, is not applicable to the case at bar because South Dakota’s statute governing the procedure to be followed when a jury verdict is announced (SDCL 15-14-30) is applicable only “where a verdict is irregular on its face and can be easily corrected as in the case where interest is omitted or the foreman fails to sign the verdict.” Id., 576 NW2d at 7. Other verdict irregularities must be addressed in a motion for new trial. In Georgia, we have not made such a distinction.