Court Opinion

ID: 9474398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:56:12.805779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:03.555205
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in Parts B through D of the majority opinion. Because I believe that Louisiana law prohibits the application of comparative fault on these facts, I respectfully dissent from Part A.
The majority has fairly and accurately stated the two-step test of Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So.2d 166, 171-72 (La. 1985). As to the first step of the Bell test, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that application of comparative fault here would provide consumers with an incentive for careful use. The majority makes much of the fact that Mr. Nicholas was not an employee. I believe that the significance of Mr. Nicholas’ non-employee status is confined solely to the first step of the Bell test and supports the majority’s conclusion that comparative fault would provide an incentive for careful use to consumers.
As to the second step of the Bell test, I agree with the majority’s statement that “Louisiana law prohibits application of comparative fault” where its application will drastically reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to make a safer product. After that, we part company. My reading of Bell and the cases decided under it compel the conclusion that Louisiana courts would not apply comparative fault on the facts of this case. In Bell, a defective product and the plaintiff’s ordinary contributory negligence combined to cause the plaintiff’s injury. The Louisiana Supreme Court refused to apply comparative fault, concluding that its application “would only tend to defeat the basic goals of strict products liability doctrine by reducing economic incentive for product quality control.” 462 So.2d at 172. In Láñelos v. Rockwell International Corp., 470 So.2d 924 (La.Ct. App.1985), a defective product and the plaintiff’s ordinary contributory negligence combined to cause the plaintiff’s injury. The Louisiana court of appeal refused to apply comparative fault, concluding that its application “would drastically reduce Rockwell’s incentive to manufacture a safer product.” 470 So.2d at 933. In McCaskill v. Welch, 463 So.2d 942 (La.Ct.App.1985), the Louisiana court of appeal applied comparative fault to reduce the plaintiff’s recovery. The manufacturer in that case was a one-man welding outfit, and the court concluded that the liability attributed to him “may well act to dissuade him from engaging in any more manufacturing ventures, or at the very least, induce him to make safer products.” 463 So.2d at 947. Homelite more closely resembles the manufacturers in Bell and Landos than in McCaskill. Accordingly, I believe a Louisiana court would conclude that application of comparative fault would reduce Homel-ite’s incentive to make a safer chain saw and therefore would refuse to apply comparative fault. The result should be no different because diversity of citizenship provided Homelite an avenue to remove to federal district court.
The federal district court opinions applying Bell point to the same result. In Winston v. International Harvester Co., 606 F.Supp. 187 (E.D.La.1985), the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a tractor after he carelessly allowed the tractor to veer off the road and into a cane field. The tractor was found defective because it had no seat-belt; the plaintiff was found 97% contribu-torily negligent. Following Bell, the court refused to apply comparative fault. 606 F.Supp. at 188. I find Burnett v. Gehl Co., 605 F.Supp. 183 (W.D.La.1985) inapposite because, in denying plaintiff’s motion in limine, the court decided only that the manufacturer could introduce evidence of the plaintiff’s fault. The court’s statement regarding the application of Bell to the facts before it was dicta.
In addition, I find Holmes v. State Through Department of Highways, 466 *1157So.2d 811 (La.Ct.App.1985) and Hayes v. State Through Department of Transportation and Development, 467 So.2d 604 (La.Ct.App.1985) inapposite because neither is a products liability case. In both cases, plaintiffs alleged that the Louisiana Department of Highways was strictly liable under La.Civ.Code Ann. Art. 2317 for its failure to maintain roadways and shoulders. In both cases, the courts applied comparative fault to reduce the awards of plaintiffs who were drunk or speeding. Both cases relied on Dorry v. Lafleur, 399 So.2d 559, 561 (La. 1981), which stated that there was no policy reason to deny strictly liable defendants the defense of contributory negligence where the defendants derived no income from the instrumentality causing the harm. See Hayes, 467 So.2d at 608; Holmes, 466 So.2d at 824. The rationale in Hayes and Holmes does not apply to strict products liability cases involving defendants who derive income from manufacturing and marketing their products. In Bell, the Louisiana Supreme Court articulated the two basic policies of strict products liability: “(a) the reduction of the incidence of injuries by providing an incentive for manufacturers to produce safer products; (b) the placing of the burden of accidental injuries caused by defective products on those who market them, to be treated as a cost of production.” 462 So.2d at 171. These policies are not fully applicable to a state agency that derives no income from its maintenance of highways. They do fully apply to a manufacturer like Homelite.
The majority suggests that Mr. Nicholas’ conduct cries out for application of comparative fault more than did the conduct of the plaintiffs in Bell, Landos, and Winston. The jury found Mr. Nicholas contrib-utorily negligent. The only evidence in the record to support this finding was that Mr. Nicholas had experienced kickback once prior to the kickback that caused his death. The only evidence of the circumstances of the first kickback was the testimony of Mr. Nicholas’ widow: “[I]t happened so fast he just couldn’t realize what happened.” The jury specifically found that Mr. Nicholas did not assume the risk.1 From the jury’s findings, I can discern no basis for treating Nicholas any differently from the plaintiffs found contributorily negligent in Bell, Landos, and Winston.
Finally, I note that the Louisiana Supreme Court limited the extension of comparative fault to “certain categories” of products liability cases. Bell, 462 So.2d at 171. I find troubling the majority’s statement that “[n]o reasonable manufacturer can rely on future careless use of its products to offset its full liability with any predictability that would alter the manufacturer’s duty to produce the safest product possible.” By suggesting that application of comparative fault does not reduce the manufacturer’s incentive to make a safer product, this statement renders the second step of the Bell test meaningless and requires application of comparative fault whenever the first step of the Bell test is met. Further, I believe this statement is inconsistent with the holding in Bell that application of comparative fault in that case would have reduced the manufacturer’s economic incentive for product quality control. 462 So.2d at 172; see also Láñe-los, 470 So.2d at 933.
While the future of Bell may be uncertain, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to overrule Bell, but refused to do so. See Landos v. Rockwell International Corp., ATI So.2d 87 (La.1985) (denying writ of certiorari) (Marcus, Blanche, and Lemmon, J.J. dissenting; Marcus would grant to reconsider Bell; Blanche would grant to overrule Bell). Therefore, Bell and its progeny control the resolution of the case before us today. Under Bell, Louisiana courts have refused to apply comparative fault to strict products liability cases involving manufacturers like *1158Homelite. Because I believe we are required to do the same, I respectfully dissent.

. The district court instructed the jury that the manufacturer was entitled to the defense of assumption of risk if: (1) the dangerous situation or defect was open and obvious or the deceased knew of the danger or defect; and (2) the deceased voluntarily exposed himself to the danger or defect and was killed thereby.