Court Opinion

ID: 9845137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:15:47.43437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:52.679068
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion sufficiently summarizes the pleadings except defendants’ answer pleads a set-off and in division V of defendants’ counterclaim they allege an $11,331.57 indebtedness owed by plaintiff to them as vested patronage dividends.
I. I disagree with the majority holding the summary judgment entered June 23, 1976 was only an interlocutory order and therefore not appealable as a final judgment. It ordered:
“1. That Plaintiff have and recover judgment against the Defendant in the sum of $9,613.48 with interest thereon of $2.363971 per diem from and after September 26, 1975.
*765“2. Judgment is entered against the Defendant for the costs of this action to the extent attributable to Plaintiff’s claim herein adjudged.
“3. That the rights of the Defendants as to their Counterclaim are in no way affected by this Judgment Entry.” (Emphasis added.)
The note involved, signed by both defendants, was filed with the district court clerk who wrote across the face thereof, “In Judgment 6-23-1976.” Identity of “the defendant” is not shown in the record.
On July 16, 1977 plaintiff obtained from the clerk an execution as the first step to enforce payment of the judgment. The execution was returned unsatisfied and a judgment debtor examination followed. Thereafter plaintiff levied on defendants’ personal property. The record does not disclose events thereafter.
On July 12, 1976 defendants gave proper and timely notice of appeal from the judgment entered June 23, 1976.
Obviously the parties and court officials considered the June 23 order a final appeal-able order. It rightly should be so held under the rationale and pronouncements of the following authorities.
“In the absence of a statutory definition, a final judgment, order, or decree has been held to be, or defined as, one that finally disposes of, adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some right or rights, of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on some definite and separate branch thereof, and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside; * * *4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 94, pages 257, 258.
In addition to statement of the above general principles in 4 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, section 53, the editor writes:
“ * * * . It has also been recognized that there may be finality in a decision which disposes not of the whole, but merely of a separate and distinct branch of the subject matter in litigation. It has also been said that a final judgment is not necessarily the last one in an action, and that a decision which is conclusive of any question is final as to that question.” The above cited section from 4 Am.Jur.2d
is cited and relied on in McGuire v. City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 189 N.W.2d 592, 596, 597.
We have repeatedly held a final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties. It must put it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original position. Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, Iowa, 236 N.W.2d 299, 302; Heiland v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 601, 604; Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, Iowa, 203 N.W.2d 613, 614; Johnson v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 257 Iowa 810, 812, 134 N.W.2d 916, 918 and citations.
In Crowe v. DeSoto Cons. Sch. Dist., 246 Iowa 38, 40, 66 N.W.2d 859, 860, we state:
“ * * * . A final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicates the rights of the parties, and it must put it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original positions. It is a determination which may be enforced by execution or in some similar manner. In re Estate of Swanson, 239 Iowa 294, 305, 31 N.W.2d 385, 391, and citations.”
In order to determine the question of finality of the order, we must examine its scope and intent and the motion itself. Swets Motor Sales, Inc. v. Pruisner, supra, 236 N.W.2d at 302; Flynn v. Lucas County Memorial Hospital, supra, 203 N.W.2d at 615.
To me it seems clear the judgment entered June 23, 1976 was a final appealable order. It was not interlocutory. Defendants’ appeal should not, on our own motion, be dismissed.
II. Assuming arguendo the trial court was correct in ruling favorably on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, entry of judgment should have been stayed until the counterclaim was adjudicated. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Stoller Fisheries, Iowa, 227 N.W.2d 481, 486; Harrington v. Polk Co. *766Fed. S. & L. Ass’n of Des Moines, Iowa, 196 N.W.2d 543, 547; International Milling Co. v. Gisch, 256 Iowa 949, 952, 129 N.W.2d 646, 648; Folkner v. Collins, 249 Iowa 1141, 1145, 91 N.W.2d 545, 547; Hedinger v. Herweh, 239 Iowa 1146, 1148, 34 N.W.2d 202, 203 and citations.
Farm Service Company of Emmetsburg v. Askeland, Iowa, 169 N.W.2d 559, cited by the majority but not followed procedurally, is factually almost identical with the case at bar. There plaintiff sued defendant on an open account and defendant counterclaimed for the value of stock owned in plaintiff corporation. Summary judgment was entered on plaintiff’s petition with provision jurisdiction was retained to consider the counterclaim on its merit. At page 561 we ordered; “This case is affirmed with instructions to delay entry of the summary judgment until the counterclaim is adjudicated.”
Such an order should be made in this case. Economic fairness and an opportunity to have one definite judgment and one appeal from adjudication of the claim and counterclaim would thus result. Those matters were not reached in Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, Iowa, 248 N.W.2d 145, on which the majority so strongly relies.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this dissent.
MASON, REES and REYNOLDSON, JJ., join in this dissent.