Court Opinion

ID: 9958520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 16:01:51.980482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.892387
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11153    Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024   Page: 1 of 21

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11153
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JEFFREY W. BOONE, JR.,
        a.k.a. younginsboo,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cr-00071-MCR-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 2 of 21

        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11153

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        HULL, Circuit Judge:
               Defendant Jeffrey Boone appeals his 840-month sentence
        imposed after he pled guilty to using a minor to produce child
        pornography, and distributing and possessing child pornography,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252A. As detailed later, the
        child pornography Boone produced included images and videos of
        his serious and horrific sexual abuse of his own four-year-old
        daughter, and Boone’s 840-month sentence is equal to the advisory
        guidelines sentence. After careful review and with the benefit of
        oral argument, we affirm Boone’s sentence.
                               I. BACKGROUND
        A.    Offense Conduct
               In October 2021, a three-count indictment charged Boone
        with using a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the
        purpose of producing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2251(a) and (e) (Count 1); distributing child pornography, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Count 2); and
        possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2) (Count 3). Boone pled guilty to all three
        counts pursuant to a plea agreement in which the Government
        agreed not to file any further charges arising out of the same
        transactions. We recount the undisputed facts based on the factual
        proffer for Boone’s guilty plea and the presentence investigation
        report (“PSR”).
USCA11 Case: 22-11153       Document: 49-1        Date Filed: 04/09/2024      Page: 3 of 21

        22-11153                 Opinion of the Court                            3

               On October 1, 2021, an online covert employee (“OCE”)
        with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) received two
        separate private messages via Kik Messenger from a user with the
        name “younginsboo” that contained child pornography.1
        Specifically, each message contained a separate image of a
        prepubescent girl who was clearly less than ten years old holding
        onto an adult man’s erect penis that was exposed out of a pair of
        camouflage shorts. In both images, the girl was wearing a
        distinctive outfit with pine trees on it and navy-blue bedsheets were
        visible in the background.
               Younginsboo subsequently sent another private message to
        the OCE stating, “Soon I’ll have a video for you.” In response, the
        OCE asked, “[W]hat do you mean?” Younginsboo replied that he
        and the child in the images he previously sent “should get some
        play time soon” and that he was waiting for his wife to leave. The
        OCE replied, “You with her?”, to which younginsboo responded
        “mmm hmmm.” Younginsboo then sent the OCE a purple-
        colored devil emoji, followed by an image of the same child
        standing on a bed with her pants pulled down showing her
        underwear and her shirt spread open exposing her bare stomach
        area, again with navy-blue bedsheets in the background. The
        image led the OCE to believe the younginsboo individual had
        taken the pictures just prior to sending them and that he had
        immediate access to the child.

        1 Kik Messenger is an instant messaging application for mobile devices that

        allows users to share photographs, among other things.
USCA11 Case: 22-11153        Document: 49-1       Date Filed: 04/09/2024       Page: 4 of 21

        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11153

               Via an emergency disclosure request, the FBI obtained
        subscriber records from Kik Messenger for the username
        younginsboo and subscriber records from Cox Communication,
        Inc. for the IP address associated with younginsboo. The records
        identified Boone as the owner of the younginsboo account.
        Through law enforcement databases, the FBI located Boone’s
        registered address in Shalimar, Florida and identified him as an
        active-duty member of the military. The FBI also determined that
        Boone had three minor children, one of whom appeared to be the
        child in the images sent to the OCE from younginsboo.
                A magistrate judge issued a search warrant for Boone’s
        residence, which was executed within a few hours, late in the
        evening of October 1. In the residence, the officers conducting the
        search found the child wearing the distinctive pine trees outfit seen
        in the images described above, the navy-blue bedsheets, and Boone
        wearing the camouflage shorts seen on the adult man in the
        images.
               When they searched Boone’s personal electronic device, the
        officers found fifteen images and two videos featuring the same
        child—later confirmed to be Boone’s four-year-old daughter—
        including depictions of the child masturbating Boone, of Boone
        slapping his penis against the child’s exposed vagina, and of the
        child lying on her back in the bed with her genitals exposed. 2

        2 In Boone’s sentencing memorandum, his counsel represented that Boone

        “recorded three videos over a two-day span,” while the PSR provides that the
        child sexual abuse material Boone produced of his daughter “included two
USCA11 Case: 22-11153         Document: 49-1        Date Filed: 04/09/2024        Page: 5 of 21

        22-11153                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        Boone’s device also contained 249 images and 158 videos involving
        the sexual abuse of other children not produced by Boone. This
        evidence resulted in the possession, production, and distribution of
        child pornography charges set out above.
        B.     Presentence Investigation Report
               After Boone pled guilty to the charges, a PSR was prepared.
        The PSR grouped Boone’s three counts together and assigned a
        total offense level of 43 after factoring in enhancements based on
        the victim’s age and other offense characteristics. Pertinent to this
        appeal, the PSR recommended applying a five-level increase
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b) because (1) the offense was a
        covered sex crime and neither § 4B1.1 nor § 4B1.5(a) applied and
        (2) Boone “engaged in a pattern of activity involving prohibited
        sexual conduct.” As explained in the PSR, the pattern-of-activity
        enhancement applied because Boone “produced child sexual abuse
        material on at least two separate occasions,” including
        “images/videos of the victim masturbating him and of him
        ‘slapping’ his penis on the victim’s vagina.”
               With a criminal history category of I and a total offense level
        of 43—the highest total offense level in the Sentencing Guidelines’
        sentencing table—Boone’s advisory guidelines range was life
        imprisonment. However, Boone’s statutory maximum sentence
        for the production offense in Count 1 was 30 years, see 18 U.S.C.

        videos.” Because this difference is immaterial to the disposition of this case,
        we will proceed with the assumption that there were two videos featuring
        Boone’s sexual abuse of his daughter on his device.
USCA11 Case: 22-11153          Document: 49-1          Date Filed: 04/09/2024          Page: 6 of 21

        6                           Opinion of the Court                        22-11153

        § 2251(e), and for the distribution and possession offenses in
        Counts 2 and 3 was 20 years each, see id. § 2252A(b)(1), (b)(2).
        Because the statutory maximum sentence for each count was less
        than the original advisory guidelines sentence of life, U.S.S.G.
        § 5G1.2 provided that the sentences “shall run consecutively,”
        which in turn yielded a total advisory guidelines sentence of 840
        months. 3
               As special sentencing considerations, the PSR identified:
        (1) Boone’s active military service, (2) his reported recurring
        nightmares and other issues stemming from his service in
        Afghanistan, (3) Boone’s various traumatic childhood experiences,
        including years of undisclosed sexual abuse by a male relative,

        3 “Because the statutory maximum on each count was less than the advisory

        guidelines range of life imprisonment, the statutory maximum on each Count
        became the advisory guidelines range for each Count.” United States v. Sarras,
        575 F.3d 1191, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980,
        986 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Kirby, 938 F.3d 1254, 1257-58 (11th Cir.
        2019); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 cmt. 3(B) (“The defendant’s guideline range on the
        Sentencing Table may be affected or restricted by a statutorily authorized
        maximum sentence or a statutorily required minimum sentence not only in a
        single-count case, see § 5G1.1, but also in a multiple-count case.”). And
        § 5G1.2(d) provides that “[i]f the sentence imposed on the count carrying the
        highest statutory maximum is less than the total punishment, then the
        sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts shall run consecutively,
        but only to the extent necessary to produce a combined sentence equal to the
        total punishment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d). Therefore, in this case, § 5G1.2(d)
        “called for the sentences for multiple counts to run consecutively as the
        advisory guidelines sentence.” Sarras, 575 F.3d at 1209.
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 7 of 21

        22-11153               Opinion of the Court                        7

        (4) the absence of any prior criminal history, and (5) the fact that
        the victim was Boone’s four-year-old daughter.
              Boone filed no objections to the PSR.
        C.    Sentencing
               During the sentencing hearing, Boone affirmatively stated
        that (1) he was subject to the pattern-of-activity enhancement
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1), and (2) the PSR correctly
        calculated his guidelines range at 840 months given his total offense
        level of 43 and the combined statutory maximum sentences for
        each count of his conviction.
                Additionally, in his sentencing memorandum, Boone
        acknowledged that the pattern-of-activity enhancement was
        applied based on the videos he had recorded “over a two-day span
        involving the same victim” and advised that his “[c]ounsel did not
        object to the addition of these points because she is aware of case
        law that supports the addition of the points . . . .” Boone asked the
        district court to consider that his conduct overall appeared limited
        to a short period of time, that only one victim was involved, and
        that the sexual contact depicted in the videos did not include
        penetration. Boone also urged the district court to factor into his
        sentence his lack of any prior criminal history, his active-duty
        military service, and the recurring nightmares he experienced
        related to his service in Afghanistan. Boone concluded his
        memorandum by asking the district court to impose a term that
        was “less than the current guideline range of 840 months.”
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 8 of 21

        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11153

               At the sentencing hearing, Boone raised no objections to the
        PSR. Defense counsel advised the district court that she had
        “researched the case law” and “[a]ll the pattern points apply in this
        case.” In mitigation, defense counsel emphasized that Boone had
        no prior criminal record, was active-duty military for five years
        prior to committing the offense, and had served in Afghanistan.
        Defense counsel also asked the district court, again, to consider that
        Boone made the videos underlying his production offense in Count
        1 “over a two-day timeframe” and that they were relatively short
        videos.
                In response to the district court’s query, the Government
        confirmed that Boone’s contact with the victim in the penis-
        slapping video would constitute a capital sexual battery under
        Florida law, subjecting Boone to a life sentence if the crime was
        prosecuted in state court. The district court noted further that,
        pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2241, Boone’s crime would have carried a
        mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years to life if it had occurred
        on a military base. Boone agreed with the Government and the
        district court’s assessment as to the sentences that would be
        applicable to his crime under Florida law and § 2241.
                After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court
        expressly reviewed the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The
        district court observed that to fashion an appropriate sentence, it
        was required to consider the nature and circumstances of Boone’s
        offenses and his history and characteristics, among other factors.
        The court also cited the need for the sentence to reflect the severity
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 9 of 21

        22-11153               Opinion of the Court                         9

        of the offenses and promote respect for the law, explaining that was
        why it had asked about Florida law and 18 U.S.C. § 2241. Analyzing
        those factors, the district court acknowledged that Boone had no
        criminal history and was abused himself as a child, but the court
        did not find those facts to mitigate the seriousness of Boone’s
        offenses, which the court determined to be grave and depraved in
        that they involved planning and recording the sexual abuse of his
        own very young child.
                Furthermore, the district court expressed its belief that
        Boone was particularly dangerous because his conduct was
        uncharacteristic, such that no one would be on the lookout for it.
        Countering defense counsel’s argument that the offenses took
        place over a relatively short period of time, the district court found
        it significant that Boone orchestrated and chatted about the sexual
        abuse of his daughter, engaged in “multiple incidents” of abuse
        “over the course of at least a couple of days,” and by every
        indication would have continued and escalated the abuse if not for
        the swift response by law enforcement.
               The district court also found that Boone’s membership in
        the military was not a mitigator but rather an aggravator, because
        it meant Boone was in a position of honor and trust in the
        community that enabled him to commit the abuse more easily and
        without being discovered. Noting the need to avoid unwarranted
        sentence disparities, the district court stressed that it had imposed
        life sentences in less egregious cases and that Boone’s conduct
USCA11 Case: 22-11153        Document: 49-1         Date Filed: 04/09/2024         Page: 10 of 21

        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11153

        “ranks at the top of the list in terms of egregious and heinous
        because it involve[d] [his] own child and at such a young age.”
               Ultimately, after weighing all the relevant considerations,
        the district court imposed an 840-month sentence, comprised of
        consecutive terms of 360 months on Count 1 and 240 months each
        on Counts 2 and 3, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.
                                     II. DISCUSSION
               On appeal, Boone argues the district court erred at
        sentencing by (1) applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s pattern-of-
        activity enhancement based on two or three images all involving
        the same victim at around the same time and (2) considering his
        military service as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor in
        determining his sentence.
        A.      Standard of Review
               We use a two-step process to review the reasonableness of a
        sentence imposed by the district court. United States v. Cubero, 754
        F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014). First, we determine whether the
        sentence is procedurally sound. Id. Assuming it is, we then
        examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable given
        the totality of the circumstances and the sentencing factors set out
        in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 4 Id. At both steps of the process, the party

        4 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

        and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need to reflect the
        seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
        punishment for the offense, (3) the need for deterrence, (4) the need to protect
        the public, (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed education or
USCA11 Case: 22-11153         Document: 49-1         Date Filed: 04/09/2024         Page: 11 of 21

        22-11153                   Opinion of the Court                                11

        challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing it is
        unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
        2008).
               Where a defendant fails to object at sentencing, as occurred
        here, we review procedural reasonableness for plain error. See
        United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275, 1293 (11th Cir. 2021). To
        prevail on plain error review, the defendant must show an error
        with respect to his sentence that is “plain—that is to say, clear or
        obvious” and that affects his “substantial rights.” Rosales-Mireles v.
        United States, 585 U.S. 129, 134 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
        An error is plain if “the explicit language of a statute or rule or
        precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolves
        the issue” and establishes that an error has occurred. United States
        v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks
        omitted and alteration adopted). An error affects the defendant’s
        substantial rights if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for
        the error, the outcome” of the sentencing proceeding would have
        been different. Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 134-35 (quotation marks
        omitted). If the defendant carries his burden, we have “discretion
        to correct the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the
        fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
        at 135 (quotation marks omitted).

        vocational training or medical care, (6) the kinds of sentences available, (7) the
        sentencing guidelines range, (8) pertinent policy statements of the sentencing
        commission, (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
        (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
USCA11 Case: 22-11153     Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 12 of 21

        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11153

                As for the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we
        apply a “deferential abuse of discretion standard.” United States v.
        Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Gall v. United
        States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)). We may vacate the sentence only if we
        are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
        committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
        factors to arrive at an unreasonable sentence based on the facts of
        the case. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010)
        (en banc).
        B.    Invited Error
               As a preliminary matter, Boone’s arguments related to the
        five-level pattern-of-activity enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)
        are precluded by the invited error doctrine, which is implicated
        when a party induces the district court to make a decision that the
        party later challenges on appeal as erroneous. Relevant here, the
        invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of an argument
        that a party “expressly disclaimed before the district court.”
        Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1085. In Innocent, for example, this Court
        applied the invited error doctrine to preclude review of the
        defendant’s argument that he was not subject to a sentencing
        enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)
        where defense counsel represented during the sentencing hearing
        that he had researched the issue and could not file a legal objection
        to the ACCA enhancement. See id.
              Like the defendant in Innocent, Boone here expressly
        represented to the district court in his sentencing memorandum
USCA11 Case: 22-11153     Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024    Page: 13 of 21

        22-11153               Opinion of the Court                       13

        that the five-level pattern-of-activity enhancement under U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.5(b)(1) applied to his case. At the sentencing hearing, defense
        counsel explained that she had researched the case law and that the
        enhancement applied based on the facts of Boone’s case. Thus, to
        the extent the district court erred by applying § 4B1.5(b)(1), the
        error was invited by Boone. See id. As such, Boone is precluded
        from asserting such error on appeal.
        C.    Procedural Reasonableness
               Moreover, as an independent and alternative ground for
        affirming Boone’s 840-month sentence, we conclude that Boone
        has not shown any procedural error in his sentence.
               We will overturn a sentence on procedural grounds only if
        the district court commits a “significant procedural error, such as
        failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the [g]uidelines
        range, treating the [g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
        the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
        erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
        sentence.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We
        explain why no procedural error occurred here, much less plain
        error.
               In the district court, Boone conceded his 840-month
        guidelines sentence was correctly calculated, and the sentence was
        based on agreed-upon facts, including that Boone recorded the two
        videos of himself sexually abusing his daughter over a two-day
        period and “on at least two separate occasions.” There is no
        indication that the district court treated the guidelines as
USCA11 Case: 22-11153        Document: 49-1         Date Filed: 04/09/2024        Page: 14 of 21

        14                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11153

        mandatory, and the record reflects the court’s careful consideration
        of the relevant § 3553(a) factors to arrive at the sentence it
        determined was sufficient but not greater than necessary to
        accomplish the objectives of sentencing under § 3553(a). The
        district court provided a lengthy and considered explanation for the
        sentence during the sentencing hearing.
               Boone suggests that the district court committed procedural
        error by (1) applying U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s five-level
        enhancement based on images created of the same victim at
        around the same time and (2) viewing Boone’s active-duty military
        status as an aggravating rather than a mitigating factor in
        determining his sentence. Again, because Boone did not object on
        these grounds in the district court—indeed, he did not object to the
        procedural reasonableness of his sentence on any ground and he
        expressly agreed that his guidelines calculations were correct—
        Boone can prevail in his appeal only by showing plain error. See
        Rosales-Mireles, 585 U.S. at 134. 5
                Among other things, the plain error standard generally
        requires clear statutory language or controlling precedent
        establishing that an error has occurred. Innocent, 977 F.3d at 1081;
        see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (an error is
        “plain” when it is clear or obvious). Boone does not cite, and the
        Court has not found, a statute or controlling case establishing that
        a sentencing court errs by applying the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1)

        5 Boone acknowledges in his appellate brief that at sentencing he did not object

        to the U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(b)(1) pattern-of-activity enhancement.
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024      Page: 15 of 21

        22-11153                Opinion of the Court                         15

        pattern-of-activity enhancement in the manner the district court
        applied it here, or by considering a defendant’s military status to be
        an aggravator rather than a mitigator in a case like this one, where
        such status increases a defendant’s danger to society by placing him
        in a position of trust and honor that enables him to avoid suspicion.
               Even applying de novo review, Boone has shown no
        procedural error. Indeed, as to § 4B1.5(b)(1), this Court has held
        that the enhancement applies if the defendant engaged in
        prohibited sexual conduct on at least two separate occasions,
        regardless of whether the crimes were committed against the same
        victim or different victims. See United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275,
        1280-81 (11th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980,
        994 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming application of the pattern-of-activity
        enhancement where the defendant produced child pornography of
        the same victim on February 22 and February 24); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5
        cmt. n.4(B)(i) (providing that a defendant has engaged in “a pattern
        of activity” if the defendant has “on at least two separate occasions”
        participated in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor).
               This Court explained in Fox that:
               The plain meaning of “separate occasions” does not
               require two events that are unrelated. It requires only
               events that are independent and distinguishable from
               each other. Multiple, distinct instances of abuse—
               whether ongoing, related, or random—meet the
               enhancement under § 4B1.5(b)(1).
        Fox, 926 F.3d at 1280; see also Isaac, 987 F.3d at 994 (concluding a
        defendant “engaged in a pattern” where the “production of child
USCA11 Case: 22-11153     Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 04/09/2024    Page: 16 of 21

        16                    Opinion of the Court                22-11153

        pornography occurred on two different days and was not
        continuous”).
               As defense counsel acknowledged at the sentencing hearing,
        that requirement was met here by the fifteen images and two
        videos showing Boone commit multiple, discrete instances of
        sexual abuse against his four-year-old daughter. Moreover, Boone
        has never disputed that the two videos found on his personal
        electronic device were recorded over a period of two days, which
        belies his claim that the images and videos were all part of “one
        incident.”
               Boone argues that only the three images he sent to the OCE
        via Kik Messenger on October 1, 2021 can support the
        enhancement. Boone points out that in these three images he and
        his daughter were wearing the same distinctive clothing and were
        in the same room, indicating they were taken “within a very short
        time span.”
              But in calculating a defendant’s offense level, the district
        court must consider all relevant conduct, which would include all
        the images and videos found on Boone’s personal electronic
        device, not just the three images he sent to the OCE. See U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.3(a). Further, the PSR specifically cited the two videos Boone
        agreed were recorded over two days as the basis for the
        § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement.
              Given our binding precedent in Fox and Isaac and the
        guidance in the Guidelines commentary—all of which indicate that
        only “two separate occasions” of prohibited sexual conduct are
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 17 of 21

        22-11153               Opinion of the Court                         17

        required for a pattern of activity—Boone cannot show the district
        court erred, much less plainly erred, in applying § 4B1.5(b)(1)’s five-
        level enhancement.
               Regarding Boone’s military service, Boone also has not
        cited, and this Court has not found, a statute or controlling case
        law clearly establishing that such service must always—even in a
        case like this one where a defendant’s crime involves a serious
        abuse of the authority and trust generally conferred by society on
        military personnel—be a mitigator rather than an aggravator.
                In short, there is no procedural basis upon which to overturn
        Boone’s 840-month sentence. Boone cannot establish error in the
        district court’s calculation of his advisory guidelines sentence, and
        the record reflects that the district court carefully considered the
        relevant § 3553(a) factors, including Boone’s military service,
        selected a sentence based on facts that were agreed upon by the
        parties, and explained the sentence in detail at Boone’s sentencing.
        There is no procedural error that warrants disturbing the district
        court’s exercise of its discretion here.
        D.     Substantive Reasonableness
              Boone also contends           his   840-month      sentence    is
        substantively unreasonable.
               The substantive reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence is
        measured based on the “totality of the facts and circumstances”
        considering the § 3553(a) factors. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. On
        substantive reasonableness review, we will vacate a sentence only
        if we are left with the “definite and firm conviction that the district
USCA11 Case: 22-11153      Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 18 of 21

        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11153

        court committed a clear error of judgment” in weighing those
        factors and applying them to the facts and circumstances of the
        case. Id. at 1190 (quoting Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191). Such an error
        may occur if the district court fails to consider relevant factors,
        gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or
        weighs the factors unreasonably. Id. at 1189. However, this Court
        has emphasized that the “decision about how much weight to
        assign a particular sentencing factor is committed to the sound
        discretion of the district court.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789
        F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
                Applying this standard, we find no basis upon which to
        overturn Boone’s sentence as substantively unreasonable. As an
        initial matter, we note that the sentence is on par with the advisory
        guidelines sentence of 840 months’ imprisonment. “Although we
        do not automatically presume a sentence within the guidelines
        range is reasonable, we ordinarily . . . expect [such] a sentence . . .
        to be reasonable.” United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir.
        2008) (quotation marks omitted). And that is the case here.
               Boone argues that his sentence is nevertheless unreasonable,
        primarily on the ground that the sentence is so long he likely will
        not survive it. According to Boone, the sentence is thus a “cruel
        and excessive” example of the general trend in this country of
        excessively punishing and inhumanely “warehousing” criminal
        defendants rather than rehabilitating them. But we have upheld as
        reasonable equally lengthy sentences in cases involving child sex
        crimes based on the nature of the offense. See United States v. Sarras,
USCA11 Case: 22-11153     Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 04/09/2024    Page: 19 of 21

        22-11153              Opinion of the Court                       19

        575 F.3d 1191, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming a total sentence
        of 1,200 months and observing that “[c]hild sex crimes are among
        the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal offenses,
        and courts have upheld lengthy sentences in these cases as
        substantively reasonable”). Indeed, as the Government points out,
        we have “upheld time and again sentences that will outlast a child
        pornographer’s life.” Issac, 987 F.3d at 996 (affirming as
        substantively reasonable a 960-month sentence). Given the nature
        of Boone’s offense—specifically, the fact that it involved planning
        and chatting about, engaging in, and recording the sexual abuse of
        his four-year-old child—the fact that Boone is not likely to outlive
        his sentence does not mean the sentence was substantively
        unreasonable.
                Boone also argues that 327 months—the sentence the
        district court indicated it would have imposed if U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.5(b)(1) did not apply—is “more than sufficient to meet all
        goals of sentencing.” Again, as explained above, the district court
        did not err in applying the § 4B1.5(b)(1) enhancement.
        Furthermore, Boone cannot prevail on a substantive
        reasonableness challenge simply by showing that a lesser sentence
        is more reasonable in his own judgment, or even that it might be
        more reasonable to another judge. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1191 (“A
        district court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it
        need only be a reasonable one.”). Instead, Boone must show that
        the sentence imposed by the district court “lies outside the range
        of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case” and the
        relevant sentencing factors. Id. at 1190 (quotation marks omitted).
USCA11 Case: 22-11153     Document: 49-1      Date Filed: 04/09/2024     Page: 20 of 21

        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11153

        Boone’s argument that a lesser sentence would, in his opinion, be
        more appropriate does not suffice.
               Finally, Boone suggests the district court arrived at a
        substantively unreasonable sentence by viewing his military
        service as an aggravator rather than a mitigator. This Court has
        held that it is within the district court’s discretion to find that a
        factor the defendant argues to be mitigating is instead aggravating.
        See United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it
        considered certain factors “to be either aggravating or irrelevant
        rather than mitigating evidence warranting a lesser sentence”). In
        this case specifically, the district court acted within its discretion
        when it found that Boone’s military service placed him in a position
        of trust and authority in the community, making him more
        dangerous given the violation of trust and abuse of authority
        inherent in his offense.
               The record reflects that at sentencing the district court
        conducted an individualized assessment of the facts, balanced the
        competing considerations—specifically, weighing the nature and
        circumstances of Boone’s offense, the need to impose respect for
        the law, and deterrence considerations, among other factors—and
        ultimately determined that a guidelines sentence of 840 months for
        Boone’s multiple child pornography counts was necessary and
        warranted by the specific facts of this case. We cannot say the court
        committed a clear error of judgment in its decision, or that the 840-
USCA11 Case: 22-11153    Document: 49-1    Date Filed: 04/09/2024   Page: 21 of 21

        22-11153             Opinion of the Court                     21

        month sentence is outside the range of reasonable sentences given
        the facts and circumstances of the case.
                              III. CONCLUSION
             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Boone’s total 840-
        month sentence.
              AFFIRMED.