Court Opinion

ID: 9910919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 20:02:14.735823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:55:00.233322
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/18/23 P. v. Muhammad CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B327083

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. NA118377)
          v.

 ABDUL QADIR MUHAMMAD,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lenore De Vita, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Scott Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       A jury found Abdul Qadir Muhammad guilty of making
criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422,
subdivision (a),1 and second degree burglary in violation of
section 459. Muhammad appeals, contending the evidence was
insufficient to support both convictions. We affirm the judgment.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In the early fall of 2021, Muhammad and his family moved
into a homeless shelter in San Pedro, California. The shelter
contained 22 studio apartment units. Only families with minor
children were eligible to stay at the shelter. Residents were
required to comply with shelter rules, which prohibited weapons
and pets that were not emotional support animals. Families
were permitted to stay at the shelter for up to 90 days. During
that time, they were required to participate in a case plan
designed to help them secure permanent housing.
       On October 18, 2021, Muhammad was asked to leave the
shelter. Muhammad’s children and their mother had moved out,
so he was no longer eligible to stay. He had violated shelter
policies by bringing in swords, missing required bed nights,
acting aggressively towards staff, and failing to follow his
family’s case plan. He also brought two pit bulls into the shelter
without permission. Two witnesses described the dogs as
“aggressive.”
       When asked to leave, Muhammad became angry and
defiant. Either Iran Guzman, the shelter’s director of housing, or
Michael Beers, the shelter’s manager, changed the locks, but

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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Muhammad returned with a locksmith who removed those locks
and installed new ones for Muhammad. The police declined to
respond to the shelter’s call for assistance, explaining that any
eviction actions needed to proceed through the court system.
       On the evening of November 3, 2021, Guzman saw
Muhammad in the children’s area of the shelter with his dogs.
Guzman told Muhammad the shelter was only for families, but
that there were other options for him. Muhammad responded
that he had a right to be there because it was a homeless shelter.
He also told Guzman, “ ‘You see all of these homeless people on
the corner[?] They need to be in here.’ ”
       Guzman returned to her office, where, through the window,
she saw Muhammad trying to open the door and window of one of
the apartments. Realizing that Muhammad planned to enter
units, perhaps to bring in other people, she ran to a few units she
knew were unlocked and locked them.
       Guzman also called Beers and told him Muhammad was
trying to open up units to bring in other people to stay in them.
Beers immediately checked the shelter’s security camera footage
on his phone and saw Muhammad trying doors and windows on
several units, and successfully opening three of them. He also
saw Guzman relock those units. Beers watched Muhammad
leave the shelter and return with Lee, a man who typically slept
on the street outside the shelter. Muhammad and Lee attempted
to reopen the doors Muhammad had previously unlocked.
       After relocking several doors, Guzman went inside a unit
and locked the door. As she began to close the unit’s window,
Muhammad ran up with one of his dogs. From the surveillance
video, Beers saw Muhammad and Lee approach the unit.
Guzman called Beers and told him Muhammad was outside the

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unit. Beers described Guzman as “really scared.” He called 911
and drove to the shelter.
        Muhammad demanded that Guzman unlock the door,
yelling things like, “ ‘Bitch, unlock the door.’ ” When Guzman
refused and tried to close the window, he warned, “ ‘Don’t you do
it, bitch,’ ” and continued ordering Guzman to unlock the door.
Muhammad’s statements “escalated.” Guzman remembered him
saying, “ ‘I’m going to cut you,’ ” or “ ‘I’m going to pop you,’ ” or
“something of that nature.” When Muhammad referred to his
dog, Guzman feared he was going to let the dog loose on her
because it had already “rushed” the door and the windowsill.
        During the altercation, Muhammad reached through the
window and unlocked the door. Guzman felt trapped and scared
because Muhammad was standing at the unit’s entrance, with
his dog, yelling at her. Muhammad yelled that every unit in the
shelter should be full and there were people outside who needed
to be in the units. Although Guzman told Muhammad there were
other services available to him and other homeless individuals,
Muhammad was not receptive and instead continued yelling.
        During this interaction, Guzman called 911 twice. Some of
Muhammad’s statements were recorded in the calls. On the first
call, Muhammad swore at Guzman and told her to “get the fuck
up out of here.” The first call ended abruptly. On the second call,
Guzman asked the police to come to the shelter, reporting that
Muhammad broke in and was acting “very heightened.”
Muhammad told Guzman she better “get [her] ass up out of
here.” Guzman told the dispatcher Muhammad was threatening
her. Muhammad said, “If you want to keep it going, I’m going to
keep this motherfucker going,” and, “You better get off that
motherfucking phone.” Guzman asked Muhammad, “Are you

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threatening me?” He replied, “I ain’t threatening your ass. I
ain’t threatening you.” Muhammad later exclaimed, “Fuck, you
think I’m scared of your ass? You better think again,” and,
“Fucking blast on your ass.” Guzman felt terrified.
       Beers arrived at the shelter. He saw Muhammad and his
dog standing in the doorway of the unit. Beers described
Muhammad as “quite upset” with Guzman, who was inside.
Beers could hear Muhammad and Guzman “going back and forth”
in “high-pitched voices.” Beers testified Guzman looked “shaken”
and “very frightened.” Beers feared for Guzman’s safety because
of Muhammad’s large pit bull. Beers observed Muhammad look
at Guzman as he said, “ ‘Don’t let me catch you out on the street,
you or your family.’ ”
       Muhammad was charged by information with one count of
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a)), based on his statements to
Guzman, and one count of second degree commercial burglary
(§ 459). He represented himself at his jury trial and did not
testify or offer any evidence. The jury convicted him on both
counts. The trial court sentenced him to a term of 16 months on
each count, and stayed the sentence on count 2 under section 654.
       Muhammad timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Muhammad contends his convictions are not supported by
sufficient evidence. He asserts his statements to Guzman were
not criminal threats but rather angry outbursts stemming from
his frustration that he and Lee were not allowed to stay at the
shelter. He also argues his burglary conviction must be reversed
because there was no evidence he had the intent to commit the
underlying felony of criminal threats when he broke into the unit.
We conclude substantial evidence supported both convictions.

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I.      Standard of Review
        To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
criminal conviction, “we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment of the trial court. We evaluate whether
substantial evidence, defined as reasonable and credible evidence
of solid value, has been disclosed, permitting the trier of fact to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Vargas (2020) 9
Cal.5th 793, 820 (Vargas).) We presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence, and we accept logical inferences the
jury might have drawn from circumstantial evidence. (People v.
Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1103.) We do not reverse unless it
appears “ ‘ “ ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support’ ” the jury’s verdict.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Penunuri (2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142.)
II.     Substantial Evidence Supports Muhammad’s
        Criminal Threats Conviction
        To establish the offense of making criminal threats under
section 422, subdivision (a), the prosecution must prove:
“ ‘(1) that the defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime
which will result in death or great bodily injury to another
person,” (2) that the defendant made the threat “with the specific
intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if
there is no intent of actually carrying it out,” (3) that the threat—
which may be “made verbally, in writing, or by means of an
electronic communication device”—was “on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made[ ] . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,” (4) that the threat actually caused the

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person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,” and (5) that
the threatened person’s fear was “reasonabl[e]” under the
circumstances.’ [Citations.]” (In re George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
620, 630 (George T.).)
        Muhammad contends the evidence was insufficient to allow
the jury to conclude his statements to Guzman were sufficiently
“unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific” to
constitute criminal threats. We disagree.
        Considering Muhammad’s words alone, there is sufficient
evidence to support his criminal threats conviction. A threat is
an “ ‘ “expression of an intent to inflict evil, injury, or damage on
another.” ’ [Citation.]” (In re M.S. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 698, 710.) It
is “ ‘sufficiently specific [to support a criminal threats conviction]
where it threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not
insufficient simply because it does “not communicate a time or
precise manner of execution . . . .” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806.) Guzman
testified Muhammad said something like, “ ‘I’m going to cut you’ ”
or “ ‘I’m going to pop you.’ ” Muhammad did not present any
evidence to the contrary. These uncontroverted statements
specifically threatened immediate and unconditional great bodily
injury or death.2 We find them sufficient to constitute criminal
threats. (Id. at p. 814 [statement that inmate would “find” an

2     Muhammad argues his threats could not be heard on the
911 calls. However, Guzman testified that the recordings of the
911 calls did not convey everything that happened between her
and Muhammad. Before Guzman called 911 the first time,
Muhammad was already yelling at her. Moreover, some parts of
the 911 calls were unintelligible. The jury was thus permitted to
rely on Guzman’s uncontroverted testimony.

                                  7
officer and “blast him” when released from custody in 10 months
sufficiently specific criminal threat].)
       Even if the words Muhammad used were ambiguous, when
taken in context, a reasonable jury could find his statements
sufficiently “ ‘unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific’ ” to constitute criminal threats. (George T., supra, 33
Cal.4th at p. 635.) “A communication that is ambiguous on its
face may nonetheless be found to be a criminal threat if the
surrounding circumstances clarify the communication’s
meaning.” (Ibid.; In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 860
(Ryan D.) [“ ‘[I]it is the circumstances under which the threat is
made that give meaning to the actual words used’ ”].) “[A]ll of the
surrounding circumstances should be taken into account . . . .
This includes the defendant’s mannerisms, affect, and actions
involved in making the threat . . . .” (People v. Solis (2001) 90
Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013.)
       During the altercation with Guzman, Muhammad stood at
the door of the unit and demanded, “ ‘Bitch, unlock the door.’ ”
He also referred to his dog and allowed it on the windowsill while
Guzman was inside. He reached through the window and
unlocked the door. He later stood in the doorway with his dog,
effectively blocking Guzman’s exit. Muhammad yelled “nonstop”
at Guzman while the dog barked. Muhammad also told Guzman,
“If you want to keep it going, I’m going to keep this motherfucker
going,” and, “You better get off that motherfucking phone,” while
she called 911. He told her, “ ‘Don’t let me catch you out on the
street, you or your family.’ ” When viewed as a whole, a
reasonable jury could conclude Muhammad’s statements and
actions conveyed unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and
specific threats. (Cf. People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745,

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754–755 [finding sufficient evidence where defendant called
victim a “ ‘fucking bitch,’ ” told her to mind her own business or
she would get hurt, he and others surrounded her, and he
grabbed her arm, conveying intent to use force].)
       Muhammad also asserts his statements were merely angry
outbursts conveying his frustration that neither he nor Lee could
stay at the shelter. Muhammad points out that he told Guzman
to “[g]et the fuck up out of here,” and said he was not threatening
her. He contends this shows he was simply expressing his
irritation that the units were empty, and his intent was to
“persuade” Guzman to allow homeless people into the units.
       It is true that “section 422 does not punish . . . ‘mere angry
utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent.’ [Citation.]”
(Ryan D., supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 861.) This is because
section 422 “ ‘was not enacted to punish emotional outbursts, it
targets only those who try to instill fear in others.’ [Citation.]”
(Ibid.) However, ordering Guzman to leave the unit, and saying
he was not threatening her, does not negate his statements that
he also would “cut” or “pop” her, particularly when viewed in the
context detailed above which supported a finding that he
intended these words as a threat. We do not reweigh the
evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.
(People v. Palma (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1567.) As the Court
of Appeal, we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
judgment. (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 759.)
       Muhammad’s reliance on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87
Cal.App.4th 1132, is misplaced due to the materially different
facts of that case. In Ricky T., a 16-year-old student left the
classroom to use the restroom. (Id. at p. 1135.) The classroom
door was locked when he returned. When the teacher opened the

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door, it swung out and hit the student. (Ibid.) The student
became angry, cursed at the teacher, and said, “I’m going to get
you” or “I’m going to kick your ass.” (Id. at pp. 1135–1136.) The
Court of Appeal determined the student’s statement was made in
response to the accident with the door and was “no more than a
vague threat of retaliation without prospect of execution” that
could not support a conviction for criminal threats. (Id. at
p. 1138.) The court emphasized there was no evidence suggesting
that “a physical confrontation was actually imminent.” (Ibid.)
The court further reasoned that there was no evidence the
student’s “angry words were accompanied by any show of
physical violence” or evidence that he “exhibited a physical show
of force.” (Ibid.)
       In contrast, Muhammad’s statements were not a reflexive
reaction to an unanticipated injury or altercation. They were
precipitated by other confrontational and angry behavior aimed
at shelter staff. (People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333,
1340 [the parties’ history can be considered in determining if
statements constituted criminal threats].) Muhammad
previously violated shelter rules by, among other things, bringing
in weapons and aggressive dogs. Muhammad had also defied the
shelter’s demand that he move out, going so far as to bring in his
own locksmith to replace the shelter’s locks.
       Nor were Muhammad’s threats to “cut” or “pop” Guzman
mere words unaccompanied by any physical show of force.
Muhammad and his dog cornered Guzman in a unit, which he
unlocked after she refused to do so. Muhammad also allowed his
dog to approach Guzman through the window, which she had
attempted to close.

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         Substantial evidence permitted the jury to find Muhammad
guilty of making criminal threats beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 820.)
III. Substantial Evidence Supports Muhammad’s
         Burglary Conviction
         Muhammad also contends his conviction for second degree
burglary must be reversed because there was insufficient
evidence he intended to threaten Guzman when he entered the
unit. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
judgment, we conclude substantial evidence supports
Muhammad’s burglary conviction.
         Burglary is the entering of a building “with intent to
commit . . . any felony.” (§ 459.) “Burglary is a specific intent
crime. [Citation.] It requires not only that a defendant enter a
structure, but that he or she do so with a particular objective in
mind . . . .” (People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 939.)
“Commonly, that intent must be inferred from the circumstances
. . . .” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 669 (Holt).)
“[B]urglary is seldom established with direct evidence but instead
is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the crime.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,
643 (Lewis).) “The question here is whether the evidence,
including that of defendant’s conduct during and after his entry,
supports a reasonable inference” of intent to commit the charged
offense at the time of entry. (Holt, at p. 670.)
         The prosecution argued Muhammad committed the
burglary not when he entered the shelter facility, but when he
went to the unit Guzman was attempting to secure, reached
through its open window, and unlocked the door. Muhammad
argues the evidence established only that his intent was to obtain

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shelter for Lee or other homeless people, not to threaten Guzman.
We disagree.
       Substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that
Muhammad entered the unit with the intent to threaten
Guzman. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that when
Muhammad unlocked the unit, he intended to confront her.
Before he unlocked the door, he stood outside the unit, yelling at
Guzman and allowing his dog to advance towards her through
the window. Still angry, he reached through the window
Guzman had attempted to close and unlocked the door,
furthering the confrontation. These actions did not appear to
advance a singular or exclusive goal of opening the unit for a
homeless person, given that Guzman was inside telling him he
could not enter.
       Moreover, “[e]ven if we were to find that a rational trier of
fact could draw from this evidence the inferences [Muhammad]
suggests,”— that he was entering the locked unit without any
intent to threaten Guzman—“reversal of the judgment would not
be warranted.” (Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 643.) Our high
court has made clear that “[i]f the circumstances reasonably
justify the jury’s findings as to each element of the offense [of
burglary], the judgment may not be overturned when the
circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding.”
(Id. at pp. 643–644.) Here, the evidence reasonably justifies the

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jury’s finding that Muhammad entered the unit that Guzman
was in to threaten her. We affirm the burglary conviction.3
                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                        ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                 LAVIN, Acting P. J.

                 EGERTON, J.

3     Muhammad also argues that because his convictions were
not supported by the evidence, his constitutional rights were
violated. Substantial evidence supported both convictions. We
therefore find there was no violation of Muhammad’s
constitutional rights.

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