Court Opinion

ID: 9836198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:01:56.400011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:14.322096
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON, J.,
Coneur in Part and Dissent in Part, joined by GURICH, J., and MITCHELL SJ and THORNEBRUGH, S.J.
11 I concur vvith_the Court's treatment of the ballot title but disagree how the challenge to the gist should be adjudicated. I write to explain, why the.Court is required to address a challenge to the glst of the peti*146tion. I conclude that the gist did not create a fraudulent initiative petition process and the matter should proceed with a corrected ballot title. f
2 Prior to 2015, the statutory procedure authorized a person to file objections to proposed law prior to cireulation of an initiative petition by filing an objection to the law's ballot title.1 An objection to a proposed law based upon its constitutionality could be made after signatures had been collected.2 The proper time to challenge the gist was not specified by statute.
1 3 In 2015 the Legislature specified that a protest raising a constitutional issue may be made and heard by the Court prior to collection of signatures.3 This new legislation also states that an objection made after collection of the signatures "must relate only to validity or number of the signatures or a challenge to the ballot title."4 Again, this legislation is silent on the express issue of when a challenge is made to the gist of an initiative petition.
T4 This Court has reviewed a challenge to a gist made in protest proceedings after collection of signatures. For example, we have performed this review in cases from 1990 (three times), 1991 (twice), 1994, 1995, 1996, and 2007.5 During this period the Court also explained when the Legislature does not amend a statute after the Court's construction of that statute then such amounts to "legislative acquiescence to that construction."6 This principle has remain unchanged and is a current method for understanding legislative intent.7 If no change had been made in the statutory protest procedures, then the legislative silence would be legislative acquiescence - to a procedure allowing a challenge to a gist in proceedings after collection of the signatures.
5 The issue becomes: in 2015 when the Legislature stated that an objection made after collection of the - signatures "must relate only to validity or number of the signatures or a challenge to the ballot title," was this language a breaks in legislative silence and the Legislature intended to include challenges made to the gist of an initiative petition as untimely challenges when made after collection of the signatures? The 2015 amendment expressly discusses challenges based upon constitutionality of the proposal, ballot title, and sufficiency of the signatures, The 2015 amendment does not mention challenges to a gist.
€ 6 Generally, when determining legislative intent we have followed the rule that the mention of one thing in a statute implies exclusion of something else, "empressio unius est excelusio alterius," but application of this rule is not allowed to override a contrary *147legislative intent 8 or to create an unconstitutional construction of a statute.9 The purpose of the gist "is to prevent fraud, deceit or corruption in the initiative process."10 Our opinions entertaining challenges to a gist ree-ognize a legally cognizable right by a challenger to judicially defeat an initiative petition based upon a legally invalid gist, because noncompliance with the statutory provision for the gist is fatal to an initiative petition.11 We have explained "the Legislature has deemed the gist a necessary part of the pamphlet and we are not at liberty to ignore that requirement, since we must presume that the Legislature 'expressed its intent' in creating the gist requirement and 'that it intended what it so expressed.12 Judicial protest challenges to the gist is the method by which this Court does not ignore the requirements set by the Legislature.
T7 In the previous proceeding involving this initiative petition and these parties, this Court declined to determine whether the gist was proper, although three members of this Court examined the gist in a dissenting opinion in proceeding 2016 OK 1, 367 P.3d 472. The Court's opinion takes a statute which is poorly worded on the issue of a challenge to
the gist and raises it as a bar to adjudicating the legal propriety of the gist. Twenty years ago this Court explained in the context of a jurisdictional statute that a poorly written statute would not be implemented by this Court in a manner which was a procedural trap for the unwary.13 The integrity of the judicial process is protected in the present proceeding by affording a judicial remedy to parties seeking to challenge the gist who are seeking to use the remedy recognized by this Court for the previous twenty years. The principle of due process applies to judicial proceedings as well as quasi-judicial proceedings and legislative enactments.14 Construing the implication of newly amended statutory language as requiring challenges to the gist to occur prior to collection of signatures requires making the Court's ruling on this point as prospective as to the parties before the CourtA.15 While providing a judicial enforcement mechanism of a "political right" may not be required by due process,"16 this Court has not treated a challenge to a gist as enforcement of a political right, but a legal right possessed by an Oklahoma voter to have fraudulent initiative petitions be judicially disapproved. Public policy favors the integrity and purity of a ballot free from *148fraud.17 I would thus construe the legislative intent behind the new language in the 2015 amendment as not changing this Court's recognition of a judicial remedy for voters who want to challenge a gist in an initiative petition.
T8 This Court may, consistent with due process and in the absence of an express statutory procedure, create a legal procedure for the judicial enforcement of a legal right 18 by requiring a challenge to a gist to be made prior to cireulation of the petition and at the time a challenge to constitutionality is made. But application of such a rule must be predicated upon a proponent filing the official gist with the Secretary of State and that gist actually being used for the circulation. If a gist is not filed in a manner which allows a timely pre-cireulation challenge, or a different gist is used during cireulation, then a post-cireulation judicial challenge to a gist must be allowed. But this newly erafted judicial rule of procedure should not be used against these parties. :
19 Even if the Court determined that the 2015 amendment changed the time to file a challenge to a gist; that statute and this Court's previous order cannot, consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, be used to prevent this Court from providing to these parties a judicial remedy consistent with the longuestablzshed practice of this Court.
{10 The challenge to the gist must be examined, and upon that examination I find nothing to invalidate the petition. In 1995, we explained: The gist of a proposition, which is required by law to appear at the top of.each signature page, need only contain "a simple statement of the gist of the proposition."19 A gist "need not satisfy the more extensive requirements for ballot titles"20 We explained: "The gist of a proposition must be short. As it must appear at the beginning of every page of the petition, it can contain no more than a shorthand explanation of a proposition's terms.21 As we have previously explained: "The sole question presented for the court's determination is whether the absence of a more detailed gist statement ... perpetrates a fraud on the signatories."22 The issue is not whether a more complete or more accurate gist may be crafted, but whether a gist's inaccuracies amount to fraud or deceit: "We will approve the text of a challenged gist if it is free from the taint of misleading terms or deceitful language."23
{11 I agree with the petitioners that the gist in this case could be better, but I also agree with respondents that possible practical. effects of the proposal are not required to be included in a gist.24 I find nothing fraudulent in the gist that would mislead voters when compared to the new ballot title as written by the Court.
*14912. In conclusion, I would address the challenge to the gist, deny that challenge, and rewrite the ballot title as the Court has done.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 397, 2014 OK 23, 326 P.3d 496.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 382, 2006 OK 45, 142 P.3d 400.

. Laws 2015, c. 193, § 4, (B), (E), emerg. eff, April 28, 2015, amending 34 O.S. 2011 § 8.

. Laws 2015, c. 193, § 4, (I), emerg. eff, April 28, 2015, amending 34 0.8. 2011 § 8.

. - In re Initiative Petition No. 341, 1990 OK 53, 796 P.2d 267, 268, 274; In re Initiative Petition No. 344, 1990 OK 75, 797 P.2d 326, 329; In re Initiative Petition No. 342, 1990 OK 76, 797 P.2d 331, 333; In re Initiative Petition No. 347, 1991 OK 55, 813 P.2d 1019, 1028-1029; In re Initiative Petition No. 348, 1991 OK 110, 772, 779 (public docket for Okla. Sup. Ct. No..76, 277 shows the filing of 64 boxes of signatures with the Court prior to its review); In re Initiative Petition No. 360, 1994 OK. 97, 879 P.2d 810, 817 (public docket for Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 82,648 shows tabulation of signatures prior to Court's adjudication); In re Initiative Petition No. 362, 1995 OK 77, 899 P.2d 1145 (public docket for Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 84, 769 shows tabulation of signatures prior to Court's adjudication); and In re Initiative Petition No. 363, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558 (public docket for Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 86,375 shows tabulation of signatures prior to Court's adjudication); In re Initiative Petition No. 384, 2007 OK 48, ¶¶ 4-13, 164 P.3d 125.

. R.R. Tway, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1995 OK 129, 910 P.2d 972, 976.

. In re Estate of Dicksion, 2011 OK 96, ¶ 5, 286 P.3d 283, 294, quoting Owings v. Pool Well Service, 1992 OK 159, ¶ 8, n. 10, 843 P.2d 380, 382 ("Failure to amend a statute after its judicial construction constitutes legislative acquiescence to that construction ... 'Legislative silence, when it has the authority to speak may be considered as an understanding of legislative intent." "). *

. In re M.S., 2010 OK 46, ¶ 12, 237 P.3d 161, 165, citing Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 1951 OK 276, 206 Okla. 510, 244 P.2d 852, 856.

. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Com'n, 1975 OK 15, 543 P.2d 546, 551 (The Court presumes the Legislature has no legislative intent to enact unconstitutional statutes.); TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Com'n, 1992 OK 39, 829 P.2d 964, 968-969 (Legislative intent is upheld by this Court when it adopts a construction of a statute that is consistent with the presumed constitutionality as intended by the Legislature.).

. In re Initiative Petition No. 363, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558, 567.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 342, 1990 OK 76, 797 P.2d 331, 333.

. In re Initiative Petition No, 384, 2007 OK 48, ¶ 13, 164 P.3d 125, quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK 39, 829 P.2d 964, 969 and citing Neer v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 1999 OK 41, ¶ 15, 982 P.2d 1071, 1078.

. Bushert v. Hughes, 1996 OK 21, 912 P.2d 334, 335.

. Larry Jones Intern. Ministries, Inc. v. Means, 1997 OK 125, 19, 946 P.2d 669, 671 ("'The consthutional guaranty of -due process of law applies to administrative as well as judicial proceedings where such proceedings are quasi-judicial in nature."); City of Edmond v. Wakefield, 1975 OK 96, 537 P.2d 1211, 1213 ("state statutes which attempt to take away vested property interests ... are unconstitutional as violations of due process.").

. Bushert v. Hughes, 1996 OK 21, 912 P.2d at 335, citing of Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Company, 1964 OK 162, 394 P.2d 515, 520.

. - See, e.g., Toliver v. Thompson, 2000 OK 98, 17 P.3d 464, ('The judiciary in this State does not create equitable remedies for challenging elections in District Courts for claims based solely upon political rights."); Macy v. Oklahoma City School District No. 89, 1998 OK 58, 961 P.2d 804, 807-808 (explaining that private individuals do not possess a legally cognizable interest to challenge the creation of a school district in a quo warranto proceeding).

. Turner v. State Election Bd., 1946 OK 169, 197 Okla. 153, 169 P.2d 285, 287 (Riley, J., concur'ring specially) ("The public policy in Oklahoma, as evidenced by constitutional provision and statute, amongst other things, is one to preserve the purity of the ballot and to prevent and punish fraud in elections.").

. The Oklahoma Constifution guarantees that all courts "shall be open to every person, and a speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or Feputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice." Okla, Const. art. 2, § 6.
The Supreme Court does not create election-jurisprudence remedies unknown at common 'law. Ethics Commission v. Keating, 1998 OK 36, n.2, 958 P.2d 1250. However, the Legislature's long silence and acquiescence to the Court's construction of both the statutory requirement for a gist and a person's right to challenge a gist show a statutory right enforced by a remedy in this Court. See In re Estate of Dicksion, supra, at n. 7, and R.R. Tway, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, supra, at note 6, and the discussion of legislative acquiescence to the Court's construction, of statutes.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 362, 1995 OK 77, 899 P.2d 1145; 1150.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 362, 1995 OK 77, 899 P.2d at 1150.

. - In re Initiative Petition No. 362, 1995 OK 77, 899 P.2d at 1150.

 In re Initiative Petition No. 363, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558, 567.

, In re Initiative Petition No. 384, 2007 OK 48, ¶ 8, 164 P.3d 125.

. In re Initiative Petition No. 384, 2007 OK 48, ¶ 10, 164 P.3d 125.