Court Opinion

ID: 9829990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:47:45.718658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:10.686959
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
In the original opinion we said, concerning the action of the court in overruling the motion of appellant to set aside the receiver’s sale, before confirmation of the sale, that:
“The court was also apprised of the fact that appellant was willing to pay $1,000 for the linotype alone, to be credited upon its indebtedness.”
It was because we so understood the fact to be that we reached the conclusion it was the duty of the court to sustain the motion and set aside the sale, permitting appellant to have foreclosure of its lien, either independently of the receivership or without being chargeable with the expense thereof. .
Appellee’s motion for rehearing makes it plain that we were in error in thinking that, at the time of the hearing on the receiver’s report, the court had information that $1,000 had been offered for the linotype machine alone. This fact, it seems, was developed in the trial of the case, something like a year later. We are now confronted with the necessity of re-examining o.ur conclusions, based in part at least upon the misunderstanding of an important fact, to determine if such conclusions are, nevertheless, correct, or whether a different disposition must be made of the case.
As we noticed in the original opinion, appellant did not except to the order of the court approving the receiver’s report and confirming the sale'to the purchaser, E. J. Negy. We questioned if the appellant’s motion to set the sale aside, heard the same day as the receiver’s report, and to the action of the court in overruling which exception was duly taken, should be treated as an exception to the action of the court in approving the sale. We did not decide the point; it being unnecessary to do so because of our conclusion that there was error in the refusal of the court to set the sale aside on appellant’s motion. But it now becomes necessary for us to determine if such contest was made of the confirmation of the sale, and such exception made to the action of the court in approving the sale as will 'entitle appellant to have the sale now disturbed.
We are rather reluctantly forced to the conclusion that the action of the trial court in ordering sale of the property and confirming the sale to Negy cannot now be reviewed by us. The purchaser was not a party to the suit at the time the court acted on the- motion to set the sale aside, or when the sale was approved,. True, he would have been bound by any order the court made, since, as, purchaser of the property, his rights did not mature until the sale was confirmed. After confirmation of the sale the purchaser was charged with knowledge of everything in his chain of title, including recitations in- the order approving the sale.' That order; however, contained no recitation showing that any party to the suit objected to the approval of the sale. We do not think, however, that the purchaser was charged with notice of the order of the court refusing, upon appellant’s motion, to set aside the sale. This was a different proceeding. For aught the record discloses, the purchaser may have been in entire ignorance of that proceeding; we cannot say that, if he had had knowledge of the court’s action in refusing to set aside the sale, and that exception was duly reserved to such action, he would have paid his money for the property.
There is still another reason that leads us to the conclusion that we cannot disturb the sale. Most of the grounds urged in the motion to set aside the sale were without merit. The one or two that may have been good involved questions of fact necessary to be- established by evidence! The evidence, if any, offered in support of the motion, is not shown. Under such circumstances it is our duty to presume either that no evidence was offered, or, if so, that it failed to support the grounds urged in the motion.
We are convinced that the trial court erred,, however, in refusing to grant in part ■appellant’s motion to apply the proceeds of the sale of the property, after payment of certain court costs, upon the debt of appellant. All the proceeds could not be thus applied, since included in the sale was other *203property not covered by appellant’s lien, but sucb part of tbe $425, proceeds of tbe sale of tbe property, as represented tbe value of tbe linotype machine, should, without any deduction for receivership expenses, after the payment of the necessary costs incurred by appellant in its original suit, have been applied upon the judgment that was finally rendered in favor of appellant.
The motion of appellees for a rehearing is accordingly granted. The judgment of the trial court in ordering and confirming sale of the property is affirmed. That part of the judgment of the trial court directing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale is reversed and remanded, with directions to the trial court to proceed to determine what part. of the entire proceeds of the sale was represented by the linotype machine alone, to require, if necessary, accounting from the other parties to the suit by reason of the distribution of the fund originally made, and to make distribution as herein directed.