Court Opinion

ID: 9376562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:02.437322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.589791
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 357543
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
CHRISTOPHER LOUIS SINDONE,                                           LC No. 17-000304-01-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SERVITTO and GARRETT, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        After remand from this Court, defendant Christopher Sindone appeals as of right from his
resentencing, as a third-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to 11 to 40 years’ imprisonment
for second-degree arson, MCL 750.73(1), and 4 to 10 years’ imprisonment for preparation to burn
a dwelling, MCL 750.79(1)(d)(vi). Sindone’s arguments are foreclosed by binding precedent and
the law-of-the-case doctrine, so we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        At a bench trial, the trial court found Sindone guilty of second-degree arson and preparation
to burn a dwelling after Sindone set fire to his estranged wife’s trailer. The trial court originally
sentenced Sindone, as a third-offense habitual offender, to 12 to 40 years’ imprisonment for
second-degree arson and 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment for preparation to burn a dwelling. On direct
appeal, we affirmed Sindone’s convictions and upheld the trial court’s assessment of 15 points for
Offense Variable (OV) 2 and 10 points for OV 4. People v Sindone, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 11, 2019 (Docket No. 340328), pp 1, 8-10 (Sindone
I). But because of errors in the scoring of OVs 1 and 9, we remanded for resentencing. Id. at 8,
10-12. On remand, the trial court held Sindone’s resentencing hearing via Zoom because of the
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Sindone did not waive his right to be physically present at
sentencing, nor did he object to the virtual resentencing proceeding. The trial court resentenced
Sindone as noted above. Sindone filed a motion to correct an invalid sentence and for resentencing,
which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

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                      II. PHYSICAL PRESENCE DURING SENTENCING

       Sindone first argues he is entitled to resentencing because he did not waive his right to be
physically present at sentencing.

        Generally, “[t]o preserve claims of error, a party must object before the lower court.”
People v Anderson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 354860); slip op at 4.
Sindone did not object to appearing remotely via Zoom for his resentencing. Therefore, he failed
to preserve this issue for appellate review. We review this unpreserved constitutional claim for
plain error affecting Sindone’s substantial rights. Id.

       Under the plain-error rule, [Sindone] bears the burden to prove: 1) an error
       occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
       substantial rights, i.e., prejudiced [Sindone] by affecting the outcome of the
       proceedings. If [Sindone] satisfies those three requirements, we must determine
       whether the plain error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
       of the judicial proceedings independent of defendant’s innocence. [Id. (citations
       omitted).]

Prejudice in this context requires Sindone to establish that “had he been physically present in the
courtroom, there is a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different.” Id. at 6.

        Sindone’s primary argument on appeal is that Anderson was wrongly decided. Sindone
contends that a violation of the right to physical presence at felony sentencing is a structural error,
such that prejudice is presumed. As Sindone acknowledges, however, Anderson held that remote
participation at sentencing was not a structural error. Id. at 6-7. Under MCR 7.215(C)(2), “[a]
published opinion of the Court of Appeals has precedential effect under the rule of stare decisis.”
Because we are bound by Anderson, we must apply plain-error review.1

       Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to be physically present at felony
sentencings. Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5. See also People v Heller, 316 Mich
App 314, 318; 891 NW2d 541 (2016). Appearing virtually is not a suitable substitute for physical
presence. Heller, 316 Mich App at 318. While “two-way interactive video technology saves
courts money and time” and “dramatically lessens security concerns,” its use for felony sentencing
is “simply inconsistent with the intensely personal nature of the process.” Id. at 319. In this case,

1
  Sindone states that he is making the argument about structural error “to preserve it for further
appellate review.” Our Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in a similar case to determine
whether “a defendant’s unpreserved claim regarding his or her lack of physical presence at
sentencing is subject to review for plain error” or whether instead “lack of presence at sentencing
is structural error.” People v Enciso, 509 Mich 937; 972 NW2d 49 (2022). The Court ordered
that the Anderson defendant’s application for leave to appeal be held in abeyance pending a
decision in Enciso. People v Anderson, 978 NW2d 835 (Mich, 2022). “The filing of an application
for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court . . . does not diminish the precedential effect of a
published opinion of the Court of Appeals.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Thus, we remain bound by
Anderson under the rule of stare decisis. Id.

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there is no record evidence that Sindone or his counsel waived Sindone’s right to be physically
present at resentencing. Thus, by resentencing Sindone via Zoom “for a felony for which he had
the right to appear in court at sentencing,” and failing to obtain a waiver of that right, the trial court
committed plain constitutional error. See Anderson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.

        Nevertheless, Sindone has failed to establish that this plain error affected his substantial
rights. That is, Sindone cannot show that “had he been physically present in the courtroom, there
is a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different.” Id. at 6. Aside from his
remote participation, Sindone has not presented evidence of any “irregularities” in the resentencing
proceeding. See id. at 8 (“Defendant does not suggest any irregularities with the sentencing other
than he was not present in the courtroom at the time of sentencing.”). Sindone’s counsel indicated
on the record that she had an opportunity to speak privately with Sindone during the remote
proceeding. Counsel made several objections to the scoring of the sentencing guidelines, and the
trial court explained its ruling on each challenge. Sindone provided allocution and the parties
presented argument on a requested sentence. As in Anderson, “the trial court appeared to have no
difficulty listening to [Sindone], and was familiar with him given a bench trial had been
conducted.” Id. at 8. The trial court then provided a thorough and reasoned explanation when
imposing a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range. Following resentencing, Sindone
moved to correct an invalid sentence or for resentencing, arguing that he did not waive his right to
be physically present at sentencing. Relying on Anderson, the trial court denied the motion and
stated that it “would have imposed the same sentence even if [Sindone] was physically present in
the courtroom.” In sum, “[t]here is no evidence, inference, nor indication that [Sindone’s]
treatment likely would have been different had he been face-to-face with the sentencing judge.”
Id. Sindone has failed to establish that the trial court’s plain error affected his substantial rights,
so he is not entitled to resentencing.2

                                    III. GUIDELINES SCORING

      Next, Sindone challenges the scoring of 15 points for OV 2 and 10 points for OV 4. As
Sindone concedes, the law-of-the-case doctrine controls our analysis.

         “The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that an appellate court’s decision regarding a
particular issue is binding on courts of equal or subordinate jurisdiction during subsequent
proceedings in the same case.” People v Owens, 338 Mich App 101, 120; 979 NW2d 345 (2021)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this doctrine, “if an appellate court has passed on a
legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal question will not be
differently determined in a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially
the same.” People v Zitka, 335 Mich App 324, 334; 966 NW2d 786 (2020) (quotation marks and
citations omitted). In Sindone’s first appeal, we affirmed the scoring of 15 points for OV 2 and
10 points for OV 4. Sindone I, unpub op at 8-10. Our Supreme Court denied Sindone’s application
for leave to appeal that decision. People v Sindone, 507 Mich 851; 952 NW2d 491 (2021). On
this second appeal following remand, the facts related to the scoring of OVs 2 and 4 remain

2
 Because Sindone is not entitled to resentencing, we decline to address his argument that he should
be resentenced before a different judge.

                                                   -3-
materially the same, so the law-of-the-case doctrine controls. See Zitka, 335 Mich App at 334.
Accordingly, we are bound by Sindone I and reject Sindone’s guidelines-scoring challenges.

                     IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii)

        Finally, Sindone raises a facial challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).
This statute provides that following a guilty verdict, the trial court may impose “any cost
reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those
costs involved in the particular case . . . .” MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). Sindone argues that the statute
is unconstitutional because it pressures trial courts to convict defendants to impose court costs,
thus creating an appearance of impartiality that violates due process. He also contends that the
statute violates the separation-of-powers doctrine. Thus, he argues that court costs imposed on
him by the trial court should be vacated.

        In People v Johnson, 336 Mich App 688, 690-691; 971 NW2d 692 (2021) (Johnson I), this
Court rejected facial due-process and separation-of-powers challenges to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).
Sindone again acknowledges that we are bound by this binding precedent, see MCR 7.215(C)(2),
and he seeks to preserve his argument for our Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court has granted
leave to appeal to review this Court’s decision in Johnson I, but it has not yet issued any opinion.
People v Johnson, 509 Mich 1094; 976 NW2d 862 (2022). “[A] Supreme Court order granting
leave to appeal does not diminish the precedential effect of a published opinion of the Court of
Appeals.” MCR 7.215(C)(2). Thus, we must reject Sindone’s constitutional challenge in
accordance with Johnson I.

       We affirm.

                                                               /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                               /s/ Deborah A. Servitto
                                                               /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

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