Court Opinion

ID: 9771290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:38:34.654058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:28.095887
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, concurring. Though I agree with the majority that the responsibility for payment of legal fees in this capital murder case rests with the state, I do not agree that this court struck down the fee cap statute, Ark. Code Ann. § lb-92-108 (1987), as unconstitutional on its face in Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991). On the contrary, in Kemp we held: “[W]e must find that section 16-92-108 does not pass constitutional muster, as applied.” 306 Ark. at 304, 813 S.W.2d at 776. (Emphasis added.) The fee cap statute is also unconstitutional as applied to the facts of the present case for the same reasons as those set forth in Arnold v. Kemp, supra. And the Independence County Ordinance adopted pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 14-20-102 (Supp. 1991) is inoperable in this case because it contemplates payment of capped legal fees under § 16-92-108. In the absence of clear direction from the General Assembly as to which political entity, state or county, is liable for legal fees under these circumstances, I turn to the State Constitution for guidance. There is no question that the crime committed in this instance is a crime against the state and that the right to counsel is provided by the State Constitution in Article 2, Section 10, as interpreted, and not because of some conferment of rights by Independence County. With that right goes a price tag. I would assess payment of the price for legal services against the State of Arkansas because that is where the right has its origin, and there is no effective legislative pronouncement to the contrary. Holt, C.J., joins.