Court Opinion

ID: 9948935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:01.19136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:22.094241
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2022-CA-0837-MR

RUSSELL COLEMAN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
MICHAEL G. ADAMS, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
MARK METCALF, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS KENTUCKY
STATE TREASURER; AND
ALLISON BALL, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS STATE AUDITOR
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS                                 APPELLANTS

          APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 22-CI-002228

ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS
COMMISSION;
DAVID KAREM, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ETHICS COMMISSION;
JONATHAN SHELL, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; AND
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION                  APPELLEES

AND

                    NO. 2022-CA-0838-MR

JONATHAN SHELL, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
COMMISSIONER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE                        APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 22-CI-002228

ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY;
DAVID KAREM, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS
COMMISSION;
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION;
ALLISON BALL, IN HER OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS STATE AUDITOR
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS;
MICHAEL G. ADAMS, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS

                            -2-
SECRETARY OF STATE;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
EX REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL
RUSSELL COLEMAN; AND
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS
COMMISSION                                       APPELLEES

AND

                   NO. 2022-CA-0991-MR

LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION                  APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE A. C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 22-CI-002228

ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
GOVERNOR OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; AND
DAVID KAREM, IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH ETHICS COMMISSION                         APPELLEES

                   OPINION AND ORDER
        REVERSING AND REMANDING IN ALL APPEALS;
        DENYING THE GOVERNOR’S MOTION TO DISMISS
                  IN NO. 2022-CA-0991-MR;
          AND DENYING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
         MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AN AMICUS BRIEF
                  IN NO. 2022-CA-0991-MR

                       ** ** ** ** **

                            -3-
BEFORE: COMBS, ECKERLE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

ECKERLE, JUDGE: The broad question before us is whether the General

Assembly has the Constitutional authority to distribute among the Governor and

the elected Constitutional Officers appointive and removal powers over inferior

state officers and members of executive branch boards and commissions? The

short answer is yes.

                Our affirmative answer to that question then requires we further

analyze whether a certain distribution is a legislative overreach in violation of

Sections 27, 28, 69, and/or 81 of the Kentucky Constitution because the Governor

does not possess the power to appoint the majority of members or to remove any

member for cause. Pursuant to the analysis below, we ultimately find the

complained-of House Bill contains no violation of the aforementioned Sections.

                                   BACKGROUND

                This case involves the General Assembly’s reorganization of the

membership board of an inferior state office, the Executive Branch Ethics

Commission (“EBEC”), that exists to investigate potential ethical violations of the

Executive Ethics Code (“Code”) within the Executive Branch. Both the EBEC and

the Code were codified in 1992 when KRS1 11A.001 et seq. was enacted. The

Code, and a later-adopted, similar code for the Legislative branch, were born from

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -4-
the Commonwealth’s interest “to eliminate the apparent/actual corruption from the

political system.” Associated Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, 912

S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1995). The Code outlines the policy reasons for its

existence:

             (1) It is the public policy of this Commonwealth that a
                 public servant shall work for the benefit of the people
                 of the Commonwealth. The principles of ethical
                 behavior contained in this chapter recognize that
                 public office is a public trust and that the proper
                 operation of democratic government requires that:

                (a) A public servant be independent and impartial;

                (b) Government policy and decisions be made through
                    the established processes of government;

                (c) A public servant not use public office to obtain
                    private benefits; and

                (d) The public has confidence in the integrity of its
                    government and public servants.

             (2) The principles of ethical behavior for public servants
                 shall recognize that:

                (a) Those who hold positions of public trust, and
                    members of their families, also have certain
                    business and financial interests;

                (b) Those in government service are often involved in
                    policy decisions that pose a potential conflict with
                    some personal financial interest; and

                (c) Standards of ethical conduct for the executive
                    branch of state government are needed to
                    determine those conflicts of interest which are

                                         -5-
                    substantial and material or which, by the nature of
                    the conflict of interest, tend to bring public
                    servants into disrepute.

KRS 11A.005.

             As the EBEC describes itself in its brief, it “is an independent agency

of the Commonwealth which has been given the responsibility of administering

and enforcing the provisions of the Code of Ethics.” EBEC’s Appellee’s Brief, p.

2. To perform its functions, the EBEC is authorized to “employ an executive

director and any other employees, agents, and consultants it considers necessary[.]”

KRS 11A.070. It may engage outside counsel and “make use of the services and

facilities of the office of the Attorney General or of any other state agency.” Id.

The EBEC “is granted statutory authority to enforce provisions of the [Code.]”

Kentucky Executive Branch Ethics Comm’n v. Atkinson, 339 S.W.3d 472, 474 (Ky.

App. 2010). The Code, with limited exceptions, applies to all “public servants,”

which is a broadly-defined term including the Governor, all Constitutional Officers

elected pursuant to Section 91 of the Kentucky Constitution (“Constitutional

Officers”), all employees in the executive branch, all officers in the executive

branch, merit employees in the executive branch, and certain government

contractors. KRS 11A.010(9); KRS 11A.040.

             Pursuant to the Code, “KRS 11A.080 mandates that the [EBEC] shall

investigate any alleged violation of KRS Chapter 11A.” Atkinson, 339 S.W.3d at

                                         -6-
474. The EBEC maintains subpoena power to carry out its investigations. KRS

11A.090. It may hold administrative hearings pursuant to the provisions of KRS

Chapter 13B and issue orders of reprimand, cease-and-desist orders, orders for

removal or suspension from office or employment, or issue civil penalties of not

more than $5,000, should those hearings show clear and convincing proof of a

violation of KRS Chapter 11A. KRS 11A.100; Turbyfill v. Executive Branch

Ethics Comm’n, 303 S.W.3d 124, 129-30 (Ky. App. 2009).

              Importantly, though, the EBEC has no authority to pursue criminal

prosecutions. “The EBEC is not empowered to impose any criminal sanctions,

leaving any criminal penalties to be pursued by the Office of the Attorney

General.” Turbyfill, 303 S.W.3d at 129. See also KRS 11A.100(5) (“The

commission shall refer to the Attorney General evidence of violations of KRS

11A.040 for prosecution. The Attorney General shall have responsibility for all

prosecutions under the law and may request from the commission all evidence

collected in its investigation . . . .”).

              When first enacted, the EBEC’s board was composed of five

members, all appointed by the Governor to serve staggered, four-year terms. KRS

11A.060. The Governor also had the power to remove any of the members for

cause. Id. The statute was amended four times over the years. One of those

changes involved detaching the EBEC from the office of the Governor and

                                            -7-
attaching it to the Finance and Administration Cabinet for administrative purposes.

KRS 11A.060(10). Two other changes were minor and not relevant to the instant

challenge.

                 The latest change, and the subject of the instant constitutional

challenge, occurred via House Bill 334 of the 2022 Regular Session of the General

Assembly (“HB 334”).2 The contents of HB 334, among other actions, terminated

the unexpired terms of the current members and changed the composition of the

EBEC’s board such that it would now consist of seven total members. The

Governor would appoint two of the members, the Lieutenant Governor would

appoint zero members, and the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer,

Commissioner of Agriculture, and Auditor of Public Accounts would each appoint

a member. HB 334 included some shorter terms of certain initial members so that

members of the EBEC would ultimately have staggered, four-year terms.

Additionally, the removal-for-cause provision was amended such that only the

“appointing authority who appointed” the particular member had the power to

remove him or her for cause. KRS 11A.060(7). A subsection was also added

prohibiting reorganization of the EBEC “except by statute.” KRS 11A.060(11).

                 Believing HB 334 violated multiple provisions of the Kentucky

Constitution, the Governor filed a declaratory judgment action in Jefferson Circuit

2
    2022 Ky. Acts ch. 203 (eff. Jul. 14, 2022).

                                                  -8-
Court. The respective parties each filed motions that could be dispositive of the

underlying claims. The Trial Court then granted summary judgment in favor of the

Governor and denied the other parties’ motions. The Trial Court found HB 334

violated Sections 27, 28, 69, and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution:

             The Governor is vested with “supreme executive power
             of the Commonwealth” under Section 69[] of the
             Kentucky Constitution. While presumably all branches
             of government have a shared interest, in keeping with
             Sections [sic] 81[] of the Kentucky Constitution, the
             Governor is the constitutional officer charged with the
             duty to take care (i.e. ensure) that the laws of Kentucky
             are faithfully executed. As such, and although the
             Legislature has the prerogative to withhold executive
             power from the Governor by assigning them to other
             constitutional officers, it cannot do so where the
             reassignment effectively creates another executive officer
             who will not be subject to the Governor’s supremacy or
             otherwise interferes with the Governor’s Constitutional
             duty/mandate to take care that the laws are faithfully
             executed. See Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 622
             (Ky. 1982); Legislative Research Commission by Prather
             v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 913 (Ky. 1984). The Court
             finds such to be the case in the instant case.

             In order to carry out the constitutional duty to take care
             that the laws of Kentucky are faithfully executed, a
             Governor must have sufficient control over the
             mechanisms through which that responsibility is effected.
             The Commission, as would be the case with any board or
             commission that is primarily administrative or executive
             in character, is just such a mechanism. A Governor’s
             ability to do so depends on his or her ability to appoint
             the commissioners, supervise their day-to-day activities
             and, where appropriate, remove them. HB-334 so
             severely divests, diminishes, and diverts the current
             Governor’s ability to do so that it functionally,

                                        -9-
               practically, and effectively prohibits him from ensuring
               (i.e. “taking care”) that the Executive Branch Code of
               Ethics (i.e. “the law”) is faithfully executed and cedes
               that authority and control to constitutional officers who
               are not charged with that same constitutional duty. In so
               doing, it improperly impedes his supreme executive
               authority as Chief Magistrate and, functionally,
               practically, and effectively creates a superior executive
               body (i.e. one over which the Governor has no control).
               As such, HB-334 is unconstitutional.

Opinion and Order, pp. 3-5. The Trial Court permanently enjoined HB 334 from

taking effect. One Constitutional Officer filed a notice of appeal before the other

Constitutional Officers filed their combined notice of appeal. Their appeals have

been consolidated for briefing purposes. The Trial Court also denied a motion to

dismiss filed by the Legislative Research Commission (“LRC”). The LRC timely

appealed. Separate briefing occurred, and two motions were filed in that case.3

                                         ANALYSIS

    I.     LRC Appeal No. 2022-CA-0991-MR

               We first address the LRC’s appeal. The Governor named the LRC as

a party to the underlying declaratory judgment action challenging the

constitutionality of HB 334. The LRC, alleging legislative immunity, moved to

3
 Two outstanding motions exist in this case as well. First, the Governor has filed a motion to
dismiss the case. Second, the Attorney General moved for leave to file an amicus brief. We
deny both motions for the reasons stated infra.

                                              -10-
dismiss the claims against it. The Trial Court denied the motion, and the LRC

appealed.

             In light of Stivers v. Beshear, 659 S.W.3d 313 (Ky. 2022), which

became final after the filing of LRC’s Appellant’s Brief in our Court, the LRC

should have been dismissed by the Trial Court, as the LRC was entitled to

immunity from suit. The Governor now concedes the LRC is entitled to legislative

immunity, but argues the proper remedy is to dismiss the LRC appeal as moot.

The Governor filed a separate motion to dismiss the instant appeal, and the motion

was passed to this panel for a ruling. The LRC argues that dismissal for mootness

is not the proper remedy; instead, the LRC prays that we reverse and remand the

instant appeal with directions to the Trial Court to dismiss the LRC with prejudice.

We agree with the LRC.

             This case is on all fours with Stivers, and its outcome for the LRC

should be no different. There, legislation was being challenged through a

declaratory judgment action, and the LRC appealed the denial of a motion to

dismiss. Finding the LRC was entitled to legislative immunity under Section 43 of

the Kentucky Constitution, the Kentucky Supreme Court reversed and remanded

the denial of the motion to dismiss. Specifically, the Supreme Court remanded

“with instruction to dismiss all claims against . . . the LRC with prejudice.” Id. at

326.

                                         -11-
               Such is the proper remedy here. If we were to simply dismiss the

appeal as the Governor suggests, the LRC would still be a party to the underlying

declaratory judgment action as the Trial Court’s order denying the motion to

dismiss the LRC would still be in effect. The LRC would still be a party unless

and until it is dismissed from the case. Because the LRC would remain a party

when it should be immune from suit and dismissed with prejudice, the case is not

moot because there has not been “a change in circumstance [that] renders th[e]

court unable to grant meaningful relief to either party.” Medical Vision Group,

P.S.C. v. Philpot, 261 S.W.3d 485, 491 (Ky. 2008). We can – and must – grant

meaningful relief to the LRC and reverse and remand for entry of an order

dismissing all claims against the LRC with prejudice. Accordingly, we deny the

Governor’s motion to dismiss the appeal. We also deny the Attorney General’s

motion to file an amicus brief, as all parties agree that Stivers is controlling; thus,

no additional exposition on legislative immunity is necessary for this appeal’s

disposition.

   II.    Constitutional Officers’ Appeal Nos. 2022-CA-0837-MR and 2022-

          CA-0838-MR

               At the heart of these appeals is a legislative act that takes away some

appointive and removal power from the Governor and disburses those powers to

other elected executive officers. Resolving whether this legislative act is

                                          -12-
constitutional requires us, the judicial branch, to consider the claims without

assigning a value, positive or negative, to the legislation itself or the politics

underlying the same. Johnson v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291 Ky. 829,

165 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1942) (“[I]t is a principle, basic in its recognition and

fundamental to the co-ordination of the two divisions of governmental power, that

the courts do not concern themselves with the wisdom, need or appropriateness of

legislation, nor the purposes motivating it.”). See also City of Lebanon v. Goodin,

436 S.W.3d 505, 516 (Ky. 2014) (“It would be equally unwise for the Court to

endeavor to discern the motivations of a particular legislator or legislative body in

making a policy decision or enacting legislation.”). Accordingly, the bare question

before us is whether HB 334 violates any or all of four Sections of our Constitution

– Sections 27, 28, 69, and 81. We begin our analysis with two of those Sections.

   A. Does HB 334 violate Sections 69 and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution?

             The Governor argues that HB 334 violates Sections 69 and 81 of the

Kentucky Constitution. Those Sections read, respectively:

             The supreme executive power of the Commonwealth
             shall be vested in a Chief Magistrate, who shall be styled
             the “Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”

             and

             He [the Governor] shall take care that the laws be
             faithfully executed.

                                          -13-
             The Governor claims that HB 334 violates the “supreme executive

power” and the “take care” clauses of these two Sections. Pursuant to these

clauses, the Governor argues that his duties as the supreme executive who must

take care that the laws are faithfully executed require that he have appointive

power for the majority of EBEC’s board members and removal-for-cause power

over all its board members. Specifically, the Governor states:

             With only two appointments to the seven-member
             commission, the Governor is unable to ensure the
             Commission will enforce the Code. As a minority, his
             appointments cannot ensure the Commission adopts
             appropriate regulations, carries out necessary
             investigations or properly disciplines executive branch
             employees for Code violations. The Commission could
             launch meritless politically-motivated investigations and
             make findings and impose civil penalties in those
             matters. The Governor would have no power to remedy
             such conduct and ensure the law is faithfully executed.
             The Governor would also be unable to remove members
             of the new Commission that he does not appoint, even for
             cause. If the Governor cannot appoint the majority of
             members of the commission and remove them for cause,
             he cannot ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

             ...

             Furthermore, HB 334 would dilute the Governor’s ability
             to take care that the laws are faithfully executed in favor
             of the other constitutional officers. While the General
             Assembly may diffuse power among other constitutional
             officers, it cannot subvert the Governor’s supreme
             executive power in favor of those officers.

Appellee’s Brief at 10-11.

                                        -14-
             One of the Governor’s principal arguments is that his take-care duties

under Section 81 of the Kentucky Constitution are akin to the “Take-Care” duties

of the President of the United State under Article II, Section 3 of the United States

Constitution. We initially note that there was a brief exposition about the limits of

the take-care clause during the Kentucky constitutional debates. When discussing

what was then numbered Section 14, but with identical text to our current Section

81, the delegates conducted a brief exchange:

             Mr. C.T. ALLEN. I would like to ask some information
             of the Chairman with reference to the meaning of that.
             Unless there is some power given to the Governor to
             enable him to compel officers to do their duty, it is
             utterly meaningless to me.

             Mr. DeHAVEN. In answer to the interrogatory put by
             the Delegate from Caldwell, I would say that is the
             identical provision, if my recollection serves me right,
             that is in the Constitution of the United States and the
             Constitution of this State. I apprehend that that means
             that all the executive power within which the Governor is
             vested shall be exercised whenever an emergency arises
             making it necessary to execute the law.

             Mr. C.T. ALLEN. Suppose a Sheriff in a county of this
             State were to refuse to do what the Governor directed
             him to do, or requested him to do, what would be the
             remedy?

             Mr. DeHAVEN. I do not know that the Governor has
             any right to direct a Sheriff to do any thing.

             A vote being taken, the section was adopted.

                                        -15-
Vol. I, OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION,

1051 (1890).4

                 From this brief debate we can conclude little of substance, save for the

fact that the clause is similar to the Federal Take-Care Clause and the delegates

expected limits on the office of the Governor. But while there are similarities in

terms between the Take-Care Clause in the Federal Constitution and the take-care

duty in the Kentucky Constitution, the structural difference of the Kentucky

executive branch highlights the limits on the Governor’s power and necessarily

hinders drawing parallels to the President’s power.

                 First, the accountability structure between our Governor and the

President is wholly disparate. In the Federal context “[t]he entire ‘executive

Power’ belongs to the President alone.” Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197, 207 L. Ed. 2d 494

(2020). In Kentucky, though, the executive power is not so singularly held. The

framers of our Constitution saw fit to create an executive branch consisting of

multiple, elected, independent executive officers that “provide convenient

receptacles for the diffusion of executive power.” Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d

616, 622 (Ky. 1982). This diffusion of executive power occurs because the

General Assembly may grant “such powers and responsibilities” to the

4
    Hereinafter the Debates will be cited as “Vol #, Debates, Page #.”

                                                -16-
Constitutional Officers through duly-enacted legislation.5 Id. at 621-22

(“Whatever, therefore, the Commissioner of Agriculture may have in the way of

functions, authority, funds or personnel can be removed to another agency at the

will of the General Assembly.”).

              This structural difference is significant. Under Kentucky’s executive

system, the citizenry elects multiple elected executive officials who have duties

prescribed by the General Assembly and Kentucky’s Constitution. Each elected

executive official is in turn held accountable by the electorate for his or her

respective decisions and actions. In contrast, the Federal executive branch is a

much narrower focus and magnified in a singular entity, the President, who, given

the immensity of the job, necessarily must appoint, oversee, and control lesser

officials to help the President carry out all federal executive powers across the

entire United States. See, e.g., Seila Law, 591 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct. at 2197.

              To take care that the Federal laws are faithfully executed by the lesser

officials, the President must have the power of appointment of certain executive

officers. The President’s power also includes the ability to remove certain

executive officials, “for it is ‘only the authority that can remove’ such officials that

they ‘must fear and, in the performance of [their] functions, obey.’” Id. (citation

5
  Two exceptions exist: the Attorney General possesses certain powers that existed at common
law, and the Secretary of State has certain clerical duties. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 621.

                                            -17-
omitted) (alteration in original). That power is not omnipotent, though, as

Congress may impose some removal restrictions depending on the character of the

office. Id. Additionally, granting the President both power to appoint and remove

allows the voting public to hold him or her accountable, because “‘[w]ithout such

power [to remove appointees], the President could not be held fully accountable for

discharging his own responsibilities; the buck would stop somewhere else.’” Id.,

591 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct. at 2191 (quoting Free Enterprise Fund v. Public

Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 541, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 177 L.

Ed. 2d 706 (2010)).

             Comparing the Governor and the President, then, results in a stark

contrast. Whereas the Federal executive places all “political accountability” in a

singular elected official, providing a “‘single object for the jealousy and

watchfulness of the people[,]’” Seila Law, 591 U.S. at ____, 140 S. Ct. at 2203

(citation omitted), the Kentucky Constitution creates multiple elected executive

officers, explicitly reserving some powers to the Governor, see, e.g., Sections 75-

80, and otherwise permitting the General Assembly to disburse executive power to

the other elected officers, see Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 622 (“independent executive

offices provide convenient receptacles for the diffusion of executive power”).

             Second, and as a result of the diffused accountability structure, the

corresponding power of removal is different. For example, over certain officials

                                         -18-
the President has a “power of removal” that “is incident to the power of

appointment[.]” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122, 47 S. Ct. 21, 27, 71 L.

Ed. 160 (1926). In situations where the “grant of the executive power is enforced

by the express mandate to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it

emphasizes the necessity for including within the executive power as conferred the

exclusive power of removal.” Id.

             In Kentucky, however, no power of removal is constitutionally

incident to any appointive powers the Governor possesses. Johnson v. Laffoon,

257 Ky. 156, 77 S.W.2d 345, 348 (1934) (citing McChesney v. Sampson,

Governor, 232 Ky. 395, 23 S.W.2d 584 (1930)). See also KRS 63.080, and

Beauchamp v. Rahm, 283 Ky. 50, 140 S.W.2d 633, 636 (1940) (citing Page v.

Hardin, 8 B. Mon. 648, 47 Ky. 648 (1848)) (“[T]he power to appoint d[oes] not

embody the power to remove.”).

             The reasons for the President’s having some removal power under the

Take-Care clause further highlights the President’s superior position. In the

Federal context, administrative appointments come in different varieties depending

on “the character of their service as prescribed in the law under which they act.”

Myers, 272 U.S. at 132, 47 S. Ct. at 30. “The highest and most important duties

which [the President’s] subordinates perform are those in which they act for [the

President].” Id. These appointments are “political” and act as “the President’s

                                        -19-
alter ego in the matters of that department where the President is required by law to

exercise authority[,]” id. at 132-33, 41 S. Ct. at 30, for example, when such officers

are acting to protect the public domain or to operate quasi-civil foreign

governments under the President’s direction as commander-in-chief, id. at 134, 41

S. Ct. at 31. “In all such cases, the discretion to be exercised is that of the

President in determining the national public interest and in directing the action to

be taken by his executive subordinates to protect it.” Id.

             The President places his “implicit faith” in such members of “his

official family” to act and do his will. Id. “The moment that he loses confidence

in the intelligence, ability, judgment, or loyalty of any one of them, he must have

the power to remove him without delay.” Id.

             In contrast, Kentucky’s inferior officers and members are not so

reflective of a single, superior executive officer, and their decisions do not affect

the entire national interest. Even in the present case, the EBEC’s decision-making

is not singularly reflective of the Governor, as the EBEC is statutorily tasked with

enforcing the Code for the entire executive branch, including the Governor.

             And, as we have already noted, the “power of removal is not incident

to the power of appointment” in Kentucky. Johnson, 77 S.W.2d at 348. Not only

that, but also “the power of removal is not inherent in the Governor.” Id. (citing

Page v. Hardin, 8 B. Mon. 648, 47 Ky. 648 (1848)). Nonetheless, the power of

                                          -20-
removal of an executive officer is “an administrative or executive function and not

a judicial one[.]” Holliday v. Fields, 207 Ky. 462, 269 S.W. 539, 540 (1925)

(affirming statute permitting governor to remove peace officers for cause). Thus,

the executive removal power should fall into the hands of the Governor or a

Constitutional Officer, as the General Assembly “definitely has the prerogative of

withholding executive powers from [the Governor] by assigning them to these

constitutional officers who are not amenable to his supervision and control.”

Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 622.

             Finally, not all of the Presidential powers derived from the Federal

Take-Care clause translate to the Governor’s duty to take care of the laws in

Kentucky. One such power is the removal power, discussed infra. Another is

prosecutorial discretion, see Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832, 105 S. Ct.

1649, 84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985), which, in the Federal context, is given to the

Attorney General and the United States Attorneys “because they are designated by

statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional

responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” United States v.

Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996).

In contrast, Kentucky’s Attorney General is a separately elected Section 91

Constitutional Officer and not the Governor’s statutory delegate. The Attorney

General serves as the chief law enforcement officer of Kentucky with resulting

                                        -21-
prosecutorial discretion. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 423 S.W.3d 718 (Ky.

2014); KRS 15.020.

            Notably, in the instant case, the Code requires any criminal

prosecutions be referred to the Attorney General, who would then exercise

prosecutorial discretion on pursuing criminal charges. See KRS 11A.100(5);

Turbyfill, 303 S.W.3d at 129.

            Beyond the above differences with the Federal government, in

Kentucky the “take-care” clause of Section 81 is a source of duty, not a source of

power. Indeed, Section 81 does not even require the Governor to implement every

law when doing so would require the Governor to perform a legislative action; “the

mere existence of a law does not mean that it must be implemented if doing so

requires the expenditure of unappropriated funds.” Fletcher v. Commonwealth,

163 S.W.3d 852, 869 (Ky. 2005). The plain and simple phrase “take care that the

laws be faithfully executed” in our Constitution is “an idle and meaningless

phrase” without some other power lodged in the Governor. Franks v. Smith, 142

Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484, 487 (1911) (emphasis added). As noted by the Franks

Court:

            The power to call out the state militia was vested in the
            Governor, the chief executive officer of the state, for the
            wise and wholesome purpose of enabling him to carry
            into effect the mandate of the Constitution that he must
            “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” If this
            power was not lodged in him, then this provision of the

                                        -22-
             Constitution would be an idle and meaningless phrase,
             because, although charged with the duty of taking care
             that the laws of the state should be faithfully executed, he
             would have no authority to enforce the obligation
             imposed upon him.

Id.

             So, the question is, does the Governor’s status as the supreme

executive under Section 69 grant him some power that can couple with the “idle

and meaningless phrase” in Section 81 to grant the Governor power to control

boards through appointment and removal? We are bound by precedent to answer

this question in the negative.

             Pursuant to Section 69, the Governor “has only such powers as the

Constitution and Statutes, enacted pursuant thereto, vest in him, and those powers

must be exercised in the manner and within the limitations therein prescribed.”

Royster v. Brock, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W.2d 707, 709 (1935). See also Barkley, 628

S.W.2d at 623 (“Practically speaking, except for those conferred upon him

specifically by the Constitution, his powers, like those of the executive officers

created by Const. Sec. 91, are only what the General Assembly chooses to give

him.”). The “supreme executive power” provision “only vests the Governor with

executive powers, just as Section 29 vests the General Assembly with legislative

powers and Section 109 vests the Court of Justice with judicial powers.” Fletcher,

163 S.W.3d at 869.

                                         -23-
             History supports this conclusion. Within a few decades of the current

Constitution’s adoption, our highest Court noted the Governor’s office has few

inherent powers. For example, “[t]he right to convene the General Assembly in

extraordinary session does not inhere in the office of Governor, nor is it a

necessary incident of the office.” Royster, 79 S.W.2d at 709. “[T]he office of

governor was ‘unknown to common law’ and created solely by our state

constitution.” Kentucky Employees Retirement System v. Seven Counties Services,

Inc., 580 S.W.3d 530, 539 (Ky. 2019) (citing Royster, supra). Pertinent to the

current issue of dispersing executive powers, our then-highest Court noted the

power to call a special session under Section 80 of the Kentucky Constitution

“might have been lodged in some other state official, or in the Legislature itself.”

Royster, 79 S.W.2d at 709 (emphasis added). See also Kentucky Employees

Retirement System, 580 S.W.3d at 539 (holding that construction of a statute as

giving the Governor the power to contract with any department for participation in

the Kentucky Employees Retirement System “would violate Kentucky law

providing that ‘[t]he Governor has only such powers as are vested in him by the

Constitution and the statutes enacted pursuant thereto’”) (quoting Martin v.

Chandler, 318 S.W.2d 40, 44 (Ky. 1958)). Compare with Guenthner v. Brown,

671 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. App. 1984) (Governor possesses the authority under Section

80 of the Kentucky Constitution to change or alter the date of an extraordinary

                                         -24-
session of the General Assembly); Stickler v. Higgins, 269 Ky. 260, 106 S.W.2d

1008 (1937) (Governor possesses the authority under Section 80 of the Kentucky

Constitution to amend, correct, or add to the subjects mentioned in the original

proclamation calling for an extraordinary session); Fletcher, 163 S.W.3d at 869

(Governor has no inherent power to order appropriations necessary for the

executive department to prevent the imminent collapse of government services).

             We do acknowledge the Governor has not argued that his power is

wholly eminent; the Governor’s argument implicitly, if not explicitly,

acknowledges the weight of the foregoing jurisprudence. Indeed, the Governor

concedes that “the General Assembly may diffuse executive power among other

constitutional officers,” but argues nonetheless that his executive power must

remain supreme per Section 69; meaning, the Governor must have the power to

appoint a majority of members and remove any member for cause. The Governor

cites to Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616 (Ky. 1982), for this proposition.

Having thoroughly reviewed Barkley, we do not come to the same conclusion.

             In Barkley, the then-Governor of Kentucky, John Y. Brown, issued an

executive order attempting to transfer functions, personnel, and funds from the

Department of Agriculture and place them in a newly created Energy and

Agriculture Cabinet. The then-Commissioner of Agriculture challenged the

validity of the executive order on statutory grounds, and the trial court agreed. The

                                        -25-
Governor appealed, claiming both statutory and constitutional authority to cause

the transfer and creation of the new cabinet. The Kentucky Supreme Court

disagreed, finding neither the statute nor the Constitution permits the Governor

such power. Id. at 618.

             In a thorough discussion of the interrelation of constitutional powers

granted to the Governor, the Constitutional Officers, and the General Assembly,

the Court noted two overriding principles. First, any unexpressed executive power

– whether implied or inherent – is “subservient to the overriding authority of

legislature[.]” Id. at 621. And second, the Constitutional Officers “have only such

powers and duties as are assigned to them by legislative enactment or by executive

order expressly authorized by statute.” Id.

             The office of Governor is established as the “supreme executive

power of the Commonwealth” in Section 69. Id. That office is given seven

expressly conferred powers and duties, namely that the Governor: is the

commander-in-chief of the military forces (Section 75); may fill vacancies in office

except as otherwise stated in the Constitution (Section 76); may grant pardons and

reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures (Section 77); may require written

information from the Constitutional Officers on subjects relating to their respective

offices (Section 78); shall report the state of the Commonwealth to the General

Assembly (Section 79); may call a special session of the General Assembly and

                                        -26-
adjourn the General Assembly in certain circumstances (Section 80); and must take

care that the laws are faithfully executed (Section 81). Id.

             Conversely, the Constitutional Officers, which are established

pursuant to Sections 91 and 93 of the Kentucky Constitution, have such duties as

are prescribed by law, save only that the Attorney General has some powers that

existed at common law, and the Secretary of State has some specifically prescribed

clerical duties. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 621-22.

             Noting this “naked” authority granted to the Constitutional Officers,

the Barkley Court asked the question why the Constitutional Officers are elected or

even mentioned at all in the Constitution. Id. at 622. “The answer, we think,

though it may not have been articulated by the framers of the Constitution in their

debates, is that these independent executive offices provide convenient receptacles

for the diffusion of executive power.” Id. (emphasis added). The Governor’s

authority as the “supreme executive power” negates the General Assembly’s

authority “to create another executive officer or officers who will not be subject to

that supremacy[.]” Id. However, the General Assembly “definitely has the

prerogative of withholding executive powers from him by assigning them to these

constitutional officers who are not amenable to his supervision and control.” Id.

             Barkley’s holding has been reaffirmed in the years since its passage:

                   In Brown v. Barkley, we held that the Governor
             could not transfer legislatively-created [sic] functions

                                         -27-
             from one executive agency to another executive agency
             without legislative authority to do so. Ky., 628 S.W.2d
             616, 623 (1982). In so holding, we stated that, if the
             Governor had the inherent executive power to make the
             transfers in question, then that inherent power was
             subordinate to the will of the General Assembly. Id.
             Other cases make clear that the executive power of
             removal is likewise subordinate to will of the General
             Assembly. See, e.g., McChesney v. Sampson, 232 Ky.
             395, 23 S.W.2d 584, 586 (1930) (Governor could not
             remove his own appointee without statutory authority).

                    Johnson [v. Commonwealth ex rel. Meredith, 291
             Ky. 829, 165 S.W.2d 820 (1942)] and B[arkley] stand for
             the proposition that the General Assembly may take
             common-law powers away from executive constitutional
             officers and assign them to different executive officers or
             agencies without violating the constitution, which is all
             that occurred in this case.

McClure v. Augustus, 85 S.W.3d 584, 586 (Ky. 2002), as modified (Oct. 8, 2002)

(alterations added).

             Our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Barkley in a case involving

largely the same instant parties:

                    Barkley is instructive in this regard, but not as the
             Governor argues. Under Section 15, the General
             Assembly might grant the Governor the power to
             suspend statutes. Or, it properly might grant that power
             to the Attorney General. See Barkley, 628 S.W.2d at 621
             (stating “the officers named in [Section] 91 have only
             such powers and duties as are assigned to them by
             legislative enactment or by executive order expressly
             authorized by statute[ ]”). In Barkley, we recognized the
             Constitution framers created these independent,
             statewide-elected officers to “provide convenient
             receptacles for the diffusion of executive power.” Id. at

                                         -28-
            622. Given the importance of the power to suspend laws,
            we see no valid reason why the General Assembly might
            not properly grant the power to two independently-
            elected constitutional officers.

                  The Governor argues that the immediately
            following sentence in Barkley supports his argument that
            by doing so, the General Assembly has impermissibly
            “create[d] another executive officer or officers who will
            not be subject to [the Governor’s] supremacy[.]” Id. The
            complete quotation is:

                   As the Governor is the “supreme executive
                   power,” it is not possible for the General
                   Assembly to create another executive officer
                   or officers who will not be subject to that
                   supremacy, but it definitely has the
                   prerogative of withholding executive
                   powers from him by assigning them to
                   these constitutional officers who are not
                   amenable to his supervision and control.

Cameron v. Beshear, 628 S.W.3d 61, 76-77 (Ky. 2021) (emphasis in original).

            The Cameron Court was concerned with the General Assembly’s

delegation of its Section 15 powers, while the instant case concerns the General

Assembly’s delegation of power under Section 93. Both Sections permit the

General Assembly to decide how powers will be used. Compare Section 15 (“No

power to suspend laws shall be exercised unless by the General Assembly or its

authority.”) (emphasis added), with Section 93 (“Inferior State officers and

members of boards and commissions, not specifically provided for in this

Constitution, may be appointed or elected, in such manner as may be prescribed

                                       -29-
by law, which may include a requirement of consent by the Senate . . . .”)

(emphasis added). Thus, we do not find a factual or legal distinction that changes

the analysis in the instant case, and we are bound to follow this precedent. Kindred

Healthcare, Inc. v. Henson, 481 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Ky. App. 2014).

             The weight of authority shows that in the absence of an explicit

statutory or constitutional power that requires the Governor to have majority

appointive power and complete removal power for members of administrative

boards, our Supreme Court has spoken – the General Assembly may “withhold[]”

executive powers from the Governor and “assign[]” them to the remaining

Constitutional Officers. Cameron, supra, and Barkley, supra. Neither Section 69

nor 81 grants more to the Governor.

             Beyond Cameron and Barkley, though, we note that Fox v. Grayson,

317 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2010), contains historical analysis that is pressing on whether

the Governor’s power should require that he appoint a majority of members of an

administrative board or membership. The Fox Court was tasked with determining

whether non-constitutionally mandated state officers could be confirmed by both

the Senate and the House, rather than just the Senate. See Section 93 of the

Kentucky Constitution (stating, in relevant part, “Inferior State officers and

members of boards and commissions, not specifically provided for in this

Constitution, may be appointed or elected, in such manner as may be prescribed by

                                         -30-
law, which may include a requirement of consent by the Senate . . . .”). The

Governor in Fox noted that “the framers of our 1891 Constitution rejected a

proposed section that would have required all non-constitutionally mandated state

officers to have been confirmed by the Senate.” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 11. Indeed,

the framers deleted a portion of Section 76, which then read:

            He [the Governor] shall appoint, with the advice and
            consent of the Senate, all State officers who are not
            required by this Constitution, or the laws made
            thereunder, to be elected by the people.

Vol. IV, Debates, 5728.

            The Court noted that this language “was originally intended only to

permit the Governor to appoint the state Librarian.” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at 12. The

language was not intended to give the Governor such broad powers of

appointment, as Delegate Charles J. Bronston of Fayette County stated to the

delegates, “It was not understood at that time that the appointing power should be

extended to any other official save that.” IV, Debates, 5728.

            The problem noted with this broad language in Section 76 is that it

would have removed from the General Assembly the “flexibility in determining

whether inferior state officers should be elected or appointed.” Fox, 317 S.W.3d at

12. That flexibility is derived from “the more general language of what ultimately

became § 93[.]” Id. Thus, the deletion of the language in Section 76 was not to

take away confirmation power from the Senate. Quite the opposite – its removal

                                       -31-
was to “give the General Assembly flexibility in determining which inferior state

officers must be subjected to confirmation at all.” Id.

             The Court in Fox quoted approvingly a portion of Delegate

Bronston’s comments during the Debates to arrive at the above conclusion. Id.

We reproduce the entirety of Delegate Bronston’s statement here:

             We did not deem that that would be wise, because, if that
             construction was given, unquestionably it would allow
             the Governor to appoint, not only the Librarian, but the
             Commissioner of Insurance and the Reporter of the Court
             of Appeals, and other subordinate officers, who are paid,
             by reason of their appointment for service in Frankfort,
             out of the State Treasury, and it would disturb that settled
             principle which, we believe, has been approved by the
             people, that as to all these subordinates, it should be left
             to the power of the General Assembly to say whether
             they should be elected or appointed, and if not elected
             by the people, by whom they should be appointed.

IV, Debates, 5728 (emphasis added).

             It appears, then, that the delegates were cognizant that deleting the

language from Section 76 would have at least three results pertinent to this case:

(1) the Governor would not by default have the power to appoint all non-

constitutional officers or members; (2) the General Assembly would have the

power to decide whether each non-constitutional officer or member should be

elected or appointed; and (3) the General Assembly would have the power to

determine “by whom” the non-elected, non-constitutional officers or members

should be appointed.

                                        -32-
              Indeed, almost a century ago our state’s highest Court affirmed an act

that reorganized a commission and wholly changed the Governor’s appointment

power over those members. In Rouse v. Johnson, 234 Ky. 473, 28 S.W.2d 745

(1930), the Governor previously appointed all four members of the State Highway

Commission. Under a new statute, a new agency was created. The new agency

had eight members, not four, and “the power to appoint the eight commissioners

provided for by that act was taken away from the Governor and lodged with an

‘Appointing Board’ therein provided for and to consist of the Governor, Lieutenant

Governor and Attorney General.” Id. at 746.6 Those members were then

confirmed by the Senate.

              The Governor challenged the act in part because, he argued, the

Lieutenant Governor’s office was primarily a legislative one. The Court rejected

any separation-of-powers violation under Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky

Constitution, because “the Lieutenant Governor is a member of the executive

branch of government.” Legislative Research Comm’n By and Through Prather v.

Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 923 (Ky. 1984) (discussing Rouse). “[T]he power of

appointment was indeed properly lodged in the commission, a part of the executive

branch of government.” Id.

6
 The Lieutenant Governor, at that time, was a separately elected position. See 1992 Ky. Acts ch.
168, § 19.

                                             -33-
             The instant legislation is similar in that the EBEC’s board under HB

334 will be composed of members appointed by executive branch officers. The

Governor distinguishes Rouse by noting that there the Governor remained as one

of the three executive branch officers on the “Appointing Board” for all eight of

the members, but under HB 334 the Governor only appoints two of the seven

members and has no say in the remaining five members. We believe this

distinction does not hold, as the Governor actually has more power under HB 334

than the Governor had in Rouse. Under HB 334 the Governor decidedly appoints

two members with no additional input from any other executive branch officer. In

Rouse, the Governor was only one of three members of the “Appointing Board,”

and the Governor could potentially have zero say in which members were

appointed if neither the Lieutenant Governor nor the Attorney General agreed with

the Governor’s choices.

             Also, to the extent the Governor in his Appellee’s Brief infers that HB

334 violates his Section 76 powers, Rouse controls:

             Section 76 of the Constitution confers upon the Governor
             the power, “except as otherwise provided in this
             Constitution,” to fill vacancies in office, but that section
             should be read in connection with section 93 of the same
             instrument, which says in part: “Inferior state officers,
             not specifically provided for in this Constitution, may be
             appointed or elected, in such a manner as may be
             prescribed by law,” etc. Evidently that excerpt falls
             within the inserted exception contained in section 76, and
             when so considered and the two sections read together it

                                         -34-
              would confine the vacancies mentioned in section 76 to
              such officers as are created by the Constitution, and not
              to the filling of vacancies in those created by the
              Legislature under the provisions of the inserted excerpt
              from section 93.

28 S.W.2d at 751.

              The Governor also implies that without his control of the EBEC’s

board, the EBEC will become an independent, fourth branch of government, which

is not permitted. See, e.g., Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 917. Respectfully, we do not

agree. The EBEC here exists to oversee the entire executive branch, including the

Governor and all Constitutional Officers. Its membership under HB 334 is wholly

appointed by executive branch officers. In contrast, the LRC in Brown was a

service agency of the General Assembly, independent of the Governor and the

executive branch, and subject to control by the General Assembly. Id. While the

EBEC does refer to itself as an independent agency, its independence is not of the

fourth-branch ilk.

              We further address the Governor’s argument that the Attorney

General made an inconsistent argument in Cameron v. Ball, Nos. 2022-CA-1419-

MR and 2022-CA-1490-MR, 2023 WL 8286690 (Ky. App. Dec. 1, 2023)

(consolidated).7 Those cases concern acts of the General Assembly that effectively

7
 By separate order on a motion filed after the briefing time expired in the instant case, we
granted the Governor’s motion to cite to the Attorney General’s Reply brief in Cameron v. Ball.

                                             -35-
prohibit the Governor from challenging legislation believed to be unconstitutional

by removing the financial means to bring such suits. On December 1, 2023, a Slip

Opinion was rendered by a panel of our Court holding that said legislation was

unconstitutional. While the Opinion in those cases is not yet final, we have

nonetheless reviewed the Attorney General’s argument in those cases and find it

neither inconsistent nor applicable to the instant case.

             Those cases concerned a broad removal of the Governor’s power to

initiate challenges to legislation that the Governor deemed unconstitutional, with

the Attorney General arguing the Governor could, pursuant to Section 81 of the

Kentucky Constitution, omit to perform legislation the Governor believed was

unconstitutional, thus teeing up a constitutional challenge in Court that the

Governor could then expend funds to defend. The Governor notes that in the

instant case the Constitutional Officers have argued that Section 81 of the

Kentucky Constitution requires the Governor to abide by, not omit to follow,

enacted legislation.

             The Constitutional Officers disagree that there is any inconsistency

with these two positions, claiming the Attorney General’s position in Cameron v.

Ball is simply a concession to the state of the law, which allows the Governor to

omit performance of a law he legitimately believes is unconstitutional. In the

instant case, though, the Constitutional Officers claim the Governor cannot omit

                                         -36-
performance but must follow the instant law because the General Assembly has the

authority to determine which executive officer can appoint board members. The

Attorney General also notes that in this case the Governor is not seeking to use the

Section 81 duty to omit performance, but instead is seeking to “wield[] Section 81

to argue that it empowers him to appoint a majority of the voting members of every

board and commission in Kentucky.” Response to Motion to Supplement, p. 2.

              Both parties are correct as these positions are facially inconsistent and

present a challenged nuance – is Section 81 a duty to follow the Constitution,

which requires the omission of a legislatively mandated act that is unconstitutional,

or is Section 81 a grant of power to follow the Constitution, which permits actions

contrary to a legislatively mandated act if the Governor believes the legislation is

unconstitutional? Or, perhaps, is it some mixture of both? Or neither? The facial

inconsistency at minimum proves our Supreme Court’s presaged maxim regarding

the tension between our current General Assembly and Governor, namely that

“hard cases will exist on the margins.” Stivers v. Beshear, 659 S.W.3d 313, 325

(Ky. 2022).

              In some respects, the inconsistency in position is simply a matter of

viewpoint. Consider a driver who happens upon a broken-down car blocking the

roadway. The driver knows she has an obligation to drive on the right side of the

road, and she can see that a double-yellow line would prohibit passing on the left

                                         -37-
side. If the driver chooses to pass around the vehicle by using the left lane, has she

followed a general duty to drive safely and omitted following the double-yellow-

line passage rule? Or has she used the duty to drive safely as a power allowing her

to bypass the double-yellow-line rule? A reasonable person could entertain both

arguments with full credulity. The analogy is incomplete, as all analogies are, but

highlights the “inconsistency” here.

             Indeed, the Governor’s argument in his Motion to Supplement shows

that the dual positions may be maintained. The Governor claims that per the

inconsistent positions, “the Governor must either blindly abide by unconstitutional

laws, which cannot be what Section 81 requires, or ignore the law and apply it as it

existed before HB 334 (R.S. 2022), which would create the chaotic situation of two

Ethics Commissions existing.” Motion to Supplement, 2. These extremes are

tantamount to driving through the broken-down car in our analogy and are outside

of the executive branch’s obligations. As our Supreme Court has stated, the

executive branch is not “free to disregard or refuse to enforce statutes that it

dislikes by summarily concluding that they are unconstitutional.” Stivers, 659

S.W.3d at 325. And, also, “where there is a reasonable legal argument that a

statute violates the Kentucky Constitution, the executive branch must carefully

choose how to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.” Id. Here, the

                                         -38-
Governor made the reasonable choice to drive around the broken-down car and

challenge the law in Court.

             We further note that while we have here considered the Attorney

General’s argument in Nos. 2022-CA-1419-MR and 2022-CA-1490-MR, we do

not pass on the merits of those consolidated cases. Instead, we hold that in this

case we believe the Constitutional Officers’ argument is responsive to the

Governor’s choice to what he perceived to be unconstitutional legislation, and it is

also not inconsistent with its position in Cameron v. Ball.

             Additionally, obscured by both parties in this tangential argument is

that the issue in the instant case is acutely narrower than in Cameron v. Ball.

Namely, and as it relates to a board that oversees the ethics of all officers and

employees of the entire executive branch, our question is this: does the Governor

have Constitutional authority to appoint the majority of the EBEC board’s

members and remove any member for cause? Wrapped up in that question is the

additional nuance that the instant legislation is much less restrictive than in

Cameron v. Ball, as the Governor still retains appointive and removal power over

two of its board members.

             Moreover, we note that our analysis of the narrow question is with a

strong presumption that the statute is constitutional:

             Another rule of interpretation is that we “‘presum[e] that
             the challenged statutes were enacted by the legislature in

                                         -39-
            accordance with constitutional requirements.’” [Beshear
            v.] Acree, 615 S.W.3d [780,] 805 [(2020)] (quoting
            Cornelison v. Commonwealth, 52 S.W.3d 570, 572 (Ky.
            2001)). “A constitutional infringement must be ‘clear,
            complete and unmistakable’ in order to render the statute
            unconstitutional.” Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep’t v.
            Green’s Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 806
            (Ky. 2009) (quoting Ky. Indus. Util. Customers, Inc. v.
            Ky. Utils. Co., 983 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Ky. 1998)).
            Considering that the General Assembly is the policy-
            making body for the Commonwealth, not the Governor
            or the courts, equitable considerations support enforcing
            a legislative body’s policy choices.

Cameron, 628 S.W.3d at 73.

            Coupling that strong presumption with the history and jurisprudence

of Sections 69 and 81, and the narrow legislation before us, we hold that HB 334

does not infringe on constitutionally derived appointive and removal powers, if

any, that the Governor possesses. We thus reverse the Trial Court’s order on this

issue.

   B. Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution.

            Next, the Governor argues HB 334 violates Sections 27 and 28 of the

Kentucky Constitution. Those Sections read:

            The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
            Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments,
            and each of them be confined to a separate body of
            magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one;
            those which are executive, to another; and those which
            are judicial, to another.

and

                                       -40-
             No person or collection of persons, being of one of those
             departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging
             to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter
             expressly directed or permitted.

             Those Sections may be referred to as the separation of powers. Prater

v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 898, 901 (Ky. 2002). They have existed in one form

or another in each of the Commonwealth’s three prior Constitutions and are

“designed to separate the powers of government and prevent concentrations of

power.” Id. In other words, they permit each branch of government to operate

only within their respective spheres of power. For example, the legislative branch

is to “discuss and enact laws, and to do nothing else.” Brown, 664 S.W.2d at 912

(citation omitted). And “a constitutional violation of separation of powers occurs

when, and only when, one branch of government exercises power properly

belonging to another branch.” Prater, 82 S.W.3d at 907 (emphasis in original).

             Having already found HB 334 does not violate Sections 69 and 81 of

the Kentucky Constitution, however, we are left with the stark analysis of whether

HB 334 violates the separation of powers by allowing the legislative or judicial

branches to act as the executive branch. Here, HB 334 only disburses the

appointment and removal powers of the executive branch among other members of

the executive branch. HB 334 gives neither the legislative branch nor the judicial

branch any say whatsoever in which members are appointed or removed. Thus,

there is no violation of the separation of powers because, “while the legislature

                                        -41-
may affect the executive branch’s appointments by establishing before-and-after-

the-fact parameters for the executive branch’s exercise of the power to make

appointments, the legislature cannot itself exercise the executive power of

appointment.” Prater, 82 S.W.3d at 909 (emphasis in original). HB 334 operates

by establishing the parameters, but it does not allow the legislature to exercise the

executive power of appointment. See Rouse, supra. Thus, HB 334 does not

violate Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution.

   C. Section 93 of the Kentucky Constitution.

             Finally, the Constitutional Officers argue that HB 334 is constitutional

as a legislative enactment because it was enacted pursuant to Section 93. As we

have previously discussed, Section 93 does impose upon the General Assembly the

authority to legislate whether inferior state officers and members of boards and

commissions are appointed or elected. See Brown, 664 S.W.2d 921-23. That

authority, however, is restrained by other Sections of the Kentucky Constitution.

See id. at 923-24. Thus, simply being a Section 93 enactment is not decisive of the

instant issues. We have analyzed HB 334 and find no violation of Sections 69, 81,

27, and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. This case is reversed and remanded for

entries of orders consistent with this Opinion and Order.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Our holdings and orders in the above-styled cases are as follows:

                                         -42-
                In Nos. 2022-CA-0837-MR and 2022-CA-0838-MR, we REVERSE

AND REMAND the Trial Court’s Order for entry of an order consistent with this

Opinion and Order.

                In No. 2022-CA-0991-MR, we REVERSE AND REMAND the Trial

Court’s Order for entry of an order dismissing the LRC with prejudice.

                In No. 2022-CA-0991-MR, we DENY the Governor’s motion to

dismiss.

                And in No. 2022-CA-0991-MR, we DENY the Attorney General’s

motion for leave to file an amicus brief.

                JONES, JUDGE, CONCURS.

                COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.

    ENTERED: _March 1, 2024__
                                              JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURRING: Mindful of the mandate of SCR8 1.030(8)(a)

that we follow the precedent of the Kentucky Supreme Court, I write this

concurrence rather than a dissent from the majority Opinion.

                It appears that we are inescapably bound by the reasoning and holding

of Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W. 2d 616 (Ky. 1982). Now forty-two years of age, it

8
    Kentucky Supreme Court Rules.

                                          -43-
has been affirmed numerous times over the years for the proposition that the

powers of the chief executive, the Governor, are circumscribed and dictated both

by the Constitution and by the fiat of the General Assembly. During the oral

argument on the case currently before us, counsel for the Attorney General

confidently declared that Brown amounted essentially to an impenetrable fortress

that could not -- and should not -- be re-visited by our Supreme Court.

             With that declaration, I respectfully disagree. I would hope that this

critically important case involving the very heart of the sacrosanct doctrine of

separation of powers will receive a thoughtful and serious review by our Supreme

Court. Obviously, many years have passed since Chief Justice Palmore authored

Brown. Many political winds -- both ill and fair -- have blown over the

Commonwealth since 1982. We have recently seen a proliferation of cases, at least

four major appeals, within the last eighteen months, involving restraints imposed

by the legislature on the exercise of executive powers by the Governor. In some

form or other, these cases all constitute an incremental but insistent incursion by

the legislative branch into the authority of the executive.

             At the heart of the case before is the issue laid out in Section 69 of the

Kentucky Constitution: what indeed is the essence of its grant of “the supreme

executive power of the Commonwealth” to the Governor? How far can that

“supreme executive power” be diluted, dispersed, distributed, or diverted under the

                                         -44-
presumed precedent of Brown? How many limitations can be imposed

legislatively without vitiating that authority to the point of a practical, de facto

nullity in violation of Sections 27 and 28 of the same Kentucky Constitution? A

balance among these various sections of the Constitution needs to be sought and

judicially defined in order to preserve the guarantee that the spirit as well as the

letter of the Constitution will be preserved, protected, and defended.

             The recent barrage of litigation on this critical issue convinces me that

review by the Supreme Court is indeed both needed and warranted.

                                          -45-
BRIEFS FOR LEGISLATIVE         BRIEF FOR ANDY BESHEAR,
RESEARCH COMMISSION:           GOVERNOR:

Gregory A. Woosley             S. Travis Mayo
Frankfort, Kentucky            Taylor Payne
                               Frankfort, Kentucky
BRIEFS FOR RUSSELL COLEMAN,
ATTORNEY GENERAL:           Mitchel T. Denham
                            Louisville, Kentucky
Matthew F. Kuhn
Harrison Gray Kilgore       BRIEF FOR DAVID KAREM,
Frankfort, Kentucky         MEMBER, EXECUTIVE BRANCH
                            ETHICS COMMISSION:
BRIEFS FOR MICHAEL ADAMS,
SECRETARY OF STATE:         Mitchel T. Denham
                            Louisville, Kentucky
Jennifer Scutchfield
Michael R. Wilson           BRIEF FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Frankfort, Kentucky         ETHICS COMMISSION:

BRIEFS FOR JONATHAN SHELL,     Susan Stokley Clary
COMMISSIONER OF                Frankfort, Kentucky
AGRICULTURE:
                               ORAL ARGUMENT FOR ANDY
Joseph A. Bilby                BESHEAR, GOVERNOR, AND
Frankfort, Kentucky            DAVID KAREM, MEMBER,
                               EXECUTIVE BRANCH ETHICS
BRIEFS FOR MARK METCALF,       COMMISSION:
TREASURER:
                               Mitchel T. Denham
Brittany J. Warford            Louisville, Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky

BRIEFS FOR ALLISON BALL,
AUDITOR:

Graham Gray
Frankfort, Kentucky

                             -46-
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH
COMMISSION:

Gregory A. Woosley
Frankfort, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR RUSSELL
COLEMAN, ATTORNEY
GENERAL:

Matthew F. Kuhn
Frankfort, Kentucky

                            -47-