Court Opinion

ID: 9487229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:11:26.324932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:09.633846
License: Public Domain

MANTON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
It is not often that we review a case in which two coordinate branches of government clash in such a dramatic fashion. I concur in all respects and add a few thoughts about the intriguing collision between the executive and judicial branches which Judge Duffs disqualification of the government’s attorneys prompted.
In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized a judge’s authority to appoint a private attorney to prosecute criminal contempt. The Court reasoned that the unique nature of contempt as a crime against the judiciary permitted judicial prosecution. Justice Sca-lia, in a concurring opinion, disagreed that the judiciary has constitutional authority to prosecute contempt cases, arguing that authority resides exclusively in the executive branch under. Article III, Section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution. As this ease illustrates, Young may have caused some confusion about the executive’s role in prosecuting contempt. In this appeal the district court relies on Young to argue that the executive has no authority to prosecute criminal contempt, absent an invitation from the judge: “Criminal contempts are not like other crimes against the United States; they are crimes against the judiciary’s authority and therefore fall within the judiciary’s and not the executive’s power to prosecute.” The district court has raised a compelling separation of powers question: if prosecution of criminal contempt is essentially a judicial function, what right has the uninvited (or even the unfairly disqualified) executive to intrude?
The answer is that the executive branch has every right to intrude. Young does contain language that could give rise to argu*764ments for or against a court’s right to take dominion over prosecution for criminal contempt. The court today affirms the executive’s authority to prosecute contempt even when faced with a judge who, for various reasons, sought to control the prosecutorial function. To the extent Young may have caused any question this court has answered it; the executive branch has constitutional authority to prosecute contempt. This result is consistent with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Young, that “courts should first request the appropriate prosecuting attorney to prosecute contempt actions, and should appoint a private prosecutor only if the request is denied.” 481 U.S. at 801, 107 S.Ct. at 2134. The Court was not merely making a suggestion about the most prudent course a judge should follow when faced with criminal contempt: that the judge should first offer the ease to a federal prosecutor because he is best equipped, in training and experience, to prosecute any case. This case demonstrates that the prosecutor should be given the right of first refusal to prosecute contempt, because prosecution of.contempt — even though it is a crime against the judiciary — is a responsibility which the Constitution gives to the executive branch.