Court Opinion

ID: 9927713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 20:12:37.391996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:21.369916
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 23, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00608-CV
                           ———————————
                       WOODROW MILLER, Appellant
                                        V.
     MAPLEWOOD SQUARE COUNCIL OF CO-OWNERS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 295th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2021-52303

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This suit arises from a condominium association’s judgment against a unit

owner for delinquent maintenance assessments and subsequent foreclosure.

      In a previous lawsuit in the 113th District Court of Harris County, appellee

Maplewood Square Council of Co-Owners sued appellant Woodrow Miller for

breach of contract and sworn account, alleging that Miller was delinquent in paying
assessments owed on his condominium unit. Miller v. Maplewood Square Council

of Co-Owners, No. 01-18-00914-CV, 2020 WL 3422290 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] June 23, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Maplewood sought damages and

foreclosure of its assessment lien. The trial court granted summary judgment for

Maplewood and ordered the unit sold. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment on

appeal, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied Miller’s petition for review.

      Subsequently, Miller filed the instant lawsuit against Maplewood in the 295th

District Court of Harris County, seeking to invalidate the previous judgment.

Maplewood moved for a summary judgment on the grounds of res judicata and

collateral estoppel, and moved for sanctions against Miller for filing a frivolous

petition. The trial court rendered judgment for Maplewood and sanctioned Miller

by striking his petition with prejudice and ordering him to pay attorney’s fees.

      Miller appeals pro se. In fifty issues, he asserts that the trial court erred in

granting Maplewood’s motion for summary judgment and ordering sanctions.

      We affirm.

                                          2
                                    Background

      Because our previous opinion addresses the underlying facts, we present only

a summary of those pertinent to the issues before us. See id. at *1.

      2017 Lawsuit

      In 2017, Maplewood sued “Woodrow Miller d/b/a Judgment Recovery

Express” in the 113th District Court of Harris County for breach of contract and

sworn account, alleging that Miller was delinquent in paying maintenance

assessments on his condominium unit. Id. Maplewood sought damages and an order

authorizing the foreclosure of its assessment lien. Id.

      Subsequently, Maplewood moved for a summary judgment on its claims and

attached copies of deeds establishing a chain of title to the unit ending with Miller.

Id. at *4. Namely, New Texas, Inc. sold the unit to Yigal Bosch in 1998, who then

purported to sell it to Riverview of Highland in 2013. Id. We concluded, however,

that Riverview did not exist as a legal entity in 2013. Id. Therefore, the purported

transfer was of no effect. Id. The unit was later foreclosed upon to satisfy a judgment

against Bosch, and Miller’s company, “Judgment Recovery Express,” acquired the

property at a 2014 foreclosure sale. Id.

      In 2015, Miller, as president of “Judgments 2 Ca$h, LLC, dba Judgment

Recovery Express,” conveyed the unit to Miller, individually. Id. Maplewood also

                                           3
presented evidence that the account of “Woodrow Miller D/B/A Judgment Recovery

Express” was delinquent in paying the assessments due on the unit. Id.

      In his summary-judgment response, Miller asserted that questions of fact

existed regarding certain transfers within the chain of title that precluded summary

judgment for Maplewood. Id. at *6.

      On September 19, 2018, the trial court granted summary judgment for

Maplewood against “Woodrow Miller d/b/a Judgment Recovery Express” and

ordered the unit sold (the “2018 Judgment”).

      Among Miller’s complaints in his appeal from the 2018 Judgment was that

Maplewood had failed to prove that he was the owner of the unit at issue—namely,

that he was doing business as “Judgment Recovery Express.” Id. at *7. We noted in

our prior opinion that a suit against a person, individually and doing business as an

entity, is a suit against only one defendant—the individual. Id.         And, here,

Maplewood had provided the deed establishing Miller’s ownership, which Miller

had also judicially admitted. Id. at *5. We concluded that the evidence established

that Maplewood was entitled to summary judgment on its claims, and we affirmed

the trial court’s judgment. Id. The supreme court subsequently denied Miller’s

petition for review. Id. Our mandate issued and the unit was posted for a constable’s

sale on September 7, 2021.

                                         4
      2021 Lawsuit

      On August 20, 2021, Miller filed the instant suit in the 295th District Court of

Harris County to “quash” the constable’s sale and enjoin Maplewood from executing

on the 2018 Judgment. Miller asserted that the 2018 Judgment was “void” because

the 113th District Court lacked “jurisdiction over the person” of “the non-entity

Woodrow Miller d/b/a Judgment Recovery Express.”             He contended that his

certificate of assumed name as “Judgment Recovery Express” expired in 2009; that

he is doing business as “Judgments 2 Ca$h, LLC”; and that “Judgments 2 Ca$h,

LLC” is doing business as “Judgment Recovery Express.” He also asserted that the

unit was his homestead and therefore exempt from execution.

      On September 7, 2021, the constable sold Miller’s condominium unit.

      Maplewood later moved for a summary judgment on the affirmative defenses

of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Maplewood also moved for sanctions against

Miller,1 asserting that his petition was groundless and filed in bad faith and for

harassment purposes. It asked the trial court to strike Miller’s petition as frivolous

and to order Miller to pay attorney’s fees.

      Miller filed a summary-judgment response, again asserting fact issues in the

chain of title and quoting from this Court’s opinion in the first appeal. He did not

challenge Maplewood’s request for sanctions.

1
      See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
                                          5
        Miller then filed a Fourth Amended Petition, in which he challenged this

Court’s conclusions in its opinion in the previous appeal. In addition, he stated:

        Miller hereby adopts and incorporates [Maplewood’s] judicial
        admissions contained in the following exhibits which [Maplewood]
        filed on April 4, 2022 as part of its Motion for Summary Judgment:
        [list of filings in the 2017 Lawsuit, including the 2018 Judgment.]
        ....
        MILLER adopts and incorporates by reference the res judicata,
        collateral estoppel and other claims preclusions effects of [this Court’s
        opinion in the 2017 Lawsuit.]

        After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment for Maplewood and

sanctioned Miller by striking his pleadings, with prejudice, and ordering him to pay

attorney’s fees. Miller appeals.

                                          Sanctions

        In issues 32 and 42, Miller asserts that the evidence does not support the trial

court’s sanctions of striking his pleadings with prejudice and ordering him to pay

attorney’s fees.2 Because this issue is largely dispositive of this appeal, we address

it first.

2
        Miller’s briefing on appeal does not contain “clear and concise argument” to support
        his contentions or “appropriate citations to authorities and to the record,” as
        required. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). However, as our supreme court has instructed,
        “[w]e generally hesitate to turn away claims based on waiver or failure to preserve
        the issue[, and] we . . . construe briefing reasonably, yet liberally, so that the right
        to appellate review is not lost by waiver.” Weekley Homes, LLC, v. Paniagua, 646
        S.W.3d 821, 826–27 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotations omitted); Jackson v. Puckett,
        No. 01-22-00369-CV, 2023 WL 1786427, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
        Feb. 7, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “Simply stated, appellate courts should reach
        the merits of an appeal whenever reasonably possible.” Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d
                                               6
      Maplewood sought sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13,3

asserting that Miller’s petition was groundless and filed in bad faith and for the

purpose of harassment. Maplewood asserted that Miller knowingly and intentionally

filed his petition on the same issues already decided against him in the 113th District

Court, this Court, and the supreme court. It further asserted that Miller’s conduct

was egregious and that his extant filing, despite his repeated failure on these same

issues, “indicate[d] his deliberate attempt to delay and harass” Maplewood.

      Maplewood asked the trial court to strike Miller’s pleadings and to award it

“all costs for inconvenience, harassment, and out-of-pocket expenses incurred or

caused by the pleading.” It also sought sanctions “in the amount of $3,950.00 under

Rule 13,” representing reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees, for which it

attached an affidavit in support.

      After a hearing, the trial court granted Maplewood’s motion for sanctions.

The trial court ordered that Miller’s pleadings be dismissed with prejudice and that

Miller pay Maplewood $3,500.00 as reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and

costs.4

      585, 587 (Tex. 2008). “A brief’s issue statement is sufficient if it directs the
      attention of the appellate court to the error about which [the] complaint is made.”
      Weekley Homes, 646 S.W.3d at 827 (internal quotations omitted). Here, we
      understand from Miller’s issue that he challenges the trial court’s sanctions order.
3
      See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.
4
      Any transcript of the sanctions hearing was not included in the appellate record.
                                           7
A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision to impose sanctions under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. Nath v. Tex. Children’s Hosp., 446 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex.

2014). “A trial court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions only if it bases its

order on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the

evidence.” Robson v. Gilbreath, 267 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008,

pet. denied). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions if some

evidence supports its decision. Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97

(Tex. 2009).

      Our review is not limited to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the order. Phillips v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 01-18-00375-CV,

2019 WL 3121856, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 16, 2019, pet. denied)

(mem. op.). Rather, we “independently review the entire record to determine

whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192

S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006).

B.    Law

      As pertinent here, Rule 13 authorizes a trial court to impose sanctions against

a party who signs a pleading that is “groundless and brought in bad faith or

groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.5

5
      Rule 13 states:

                                          8
“Groundless” means having “no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith

argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” See id.

“Groundlessness turns on the legal merits of a claim.” Robson, 267 S.W.3d at 405.

      “Bad faith” requires evidence of the “conscious doing of a wrong for

dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purposes.” See Falk & Mayfield L.L.P. v.

Molzan, 974 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).

Because courts must presume that pleadings are filed in good faith, the petition alone

generally cannot establish that a plaintiff brought his case in bad faith or for the

purpose of harassment. Gomer v. Davis, 419 S.W.3d 470, 479 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Accordingly, Rule 13 requires that the trial court hold an

evidentiary hearing to make factual determinations about the motives and credibility

of the person signing the petition. Id. at 478; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.

      The signatures of attorneys or parties constitute a certificate by them that they have
      read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of their knowledge,
      information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry the instrument is not
      groundless and brought in bad faith or groundless and brought for the purpose of
      harassment . . . . If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this
      rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall
      impose an appropriate sanction available under Rule 215 upon the person who
      signed it, a represented party, or both.
      Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other papers are filed in good
      faith. No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good cause, the
      particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order. “Groundless” for purposes
      of this rule means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by good faith argument
      for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law . . . .

TEX. R. CIV. P. 13.

                                             9
      If a party violates Rule 13, the trial court “shall impose an appropriate sanction

available under Rule 215.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Available sanctions include striking

the pleadings, with or without prejudice, and ordering the party to pay reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees. See id. 215.2(b).             “[C]ase-determinative

sanctions may only be imposed in exceptional cases, where they are clearly justified

and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the

rules.” Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2004) (internal quotations

omitted).

C.    Discussion

      Miller’s burden on appeal is to demonstrate that the trial court erred in

determining that his pleadings were (1) groundless and (2) either filed in bad faith

or for the purpose of harassment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; Gomer, 419 S.W.3d at 477.

      (1)    Groundlessness

      Miller’s live pleading before the trial court at the time that it ruled on

Maplewood’s motion for sanctions was his Fourth Amended Petition.6 In his

6
      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63 states that “any pleadings . . . offered for filing
      within seven days of the date of the trial . . . shall be filed only after leave of the
      judge is obtained . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 63. The intent of Rule 63 is “to authorize
      amendment without leave of court if it is filed ‘seven days or more before the date
      of trial.’” Sosa v. Cent. Power & Light, 909 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1995) (quoting
      TEX. R. CIV. P. 63 cmt.); see also Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751
      S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988) (“A summary judgment proceeding is a trial within
      the meaning of Rule 63.”). The day on which the amended pleading is filed is not
      counted. TEX. R. CIV. P. 4; Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895. The last day of the period,
      which may be the day of the hearing, is included. Sosa, 909 S.W.2d at 895. Here,
                                            10
petition, Miller argued that, “contrary to [this Court’s] holding,” “there is no

evidence in the record that the conveyance[] of Unit 105 from Yigal Bosch has been

reversed or set aside”; that Riverview “did exist as a legal entity at the time of the

purported sale”; and that his evidence established that the “transfer[] to Riverview

[was] not void, and therefore, Riverview acquired an interest in the property.” He

asserted that, based on the foregoing, Maplewood “did not and could not acquire

ownership of Unit 105 at the foreclosure sale on September 7, 2021.”

      Thus, Miller’s lawsuit in the 295th District Court sought to relitigate various

transfers in the chain of title that had previously been found against him in the trial

court, in this Court, and in the supreme court. Accordingly, the trial court could

have reasonably concluded that Miller’s petition was groundless. See Robson, 267

S.W.3d at 406.

      (2)    Bad faith or purpose of harassment

      With respect to the trial court’s factual determinations as to bad faith or

harassment, however, Miller has failed to present a record from the hearing that

resulted in the sanctions order. See Gomer, 419 S.W.3d at 477. It is Miller’s burden

      Miller filed his Fourth Amended Petition on April 25, 2022, and the hearing on
      Maplewood’s motion occurred on May 2, 2022. Because Miller’s Fourth Amended
      Petition was timely filed seven days before the hearing, leave was not required, and
      it superseded his previous petitions and supplements. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 65; Cont’l
      Alloys & Servs. (De.) LLC v. YangZhou Chengde Steel Pipe Co., 597 S.W.3d 884,
      898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied).

                                           11
to furnish this Court with a record showing error requiring reversal. See Christiansen

v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990); Appleton v. Appleton, 76 S.W.3d 78,

87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Without a record, we cannot

determine whether the trial court committed error. See Bosch v. Armstrong, No. 01-

08-00847-CV, 2009 WL 1635318, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 11,

2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.). On this record, we can find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s granting of Rule 13 sanctions. See Appleton, 76 S.W.3d at 87.

      Because Miller has not provided a record of the sanctions hearing, and he has

not asserted that the trial court failed to conduct a hearing or provide him with proper

notice, we hold that any error is waived. See Neal v. Kuniansky, No. 01-05-00368-

CV, 2006 WL 1493735, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2006, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding appellant’s failure to file reporter’s record of hearing waived

any error regarding sanctions order striking pleadings); Appleton, 76 S.W.3d at 87;

Youngs v. Choice, 868 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,

writ denied).

      Further, in imposing Rule 13 sanctions, a trial court is required to make

particularized findings of good cause justifying the sanctions. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

13; Robson, 267 S.W.3d at 407. Here, the trial court made no such express findings.

But Miller made no objection to the trial court’s entry of sanctions without setting

out the findings or the particulars of good cause justifying the sanctions. By failing

                                          12
to object in the trial court, Miller has also waived any objection to the form of the

sanctions order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Alexander v. Alexander, 956 S.W.2d

712, 714 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).

      We therefore overrule issues 32 and 42 and uphold the trial court’s imposition

of Rule 13 sanctions.

                               Summary Judgment

      In issues 3, 12, 13–20, 24, 27, 34, and 44–49, Miller presents several iterations

of the same complaint—that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for

Maplewood.     He complains that Maplewood failed to establish by competent

evidence its right to judgment as a matter of law on its defenses of res judicata and

collateral estoppel.    In issue 31, Miller challenges the trial court’s summary

judgment in favor of Maplewood on its collateral estoppel defense.

      Because we have upheld the trial court’s imposition of Rule 13 sanctions

against Miller, including the striking of his pleadings, we do not reach, and are

unable to reach, Miller’s issues concerning the propriety of the trial court’s summary

judgment in favor of Maplewood on its affirmative defenses—res judicata and

collateral estoppel—to Miller’s live pleading. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94 (affirmative

defenses); Turner v. Turner, No. 14-00-00175-CV, 2001 WL 1098068, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 20, 2001, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]e find it

                                         13
axiomatic that if a party’s pleadings have been struck, the party no longer has the

right to present its case because it no longer has a case to present.”).

      Similarly, we do not reach Miller’s challenges in issues 21–23, 28–30, 35–41,

43, and 50 to the transfers within the chain of title,7 which again go to the trial court’s

conclusions on the issues of res judicata and collateral estoppel.

      We therefore overrule issues 3, 12–24, 27–31, 34–41, 43–50.

                                  Abandoned Claims

      In issues 1, 2, and 4–10, Miller complains about matters relating to his request

for injunctive relief. In issue 33, Miller argues that the condominium unit was his

homestead and exempt from execution.

      When Miller filed his Fourth Amended Petition, it superseded and supplanted

his prior petition and supplements, which can no longer be considered. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 65; Cont’l Alloys & Servs. (De.) LLC v. YangZhou Chengde Steel Pipe Co.,

597 S.W.3d 884, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). And, in

his Fourth Amended Petition, Miller omitted his previous requests for injunctive

7
      Miller asserts that Maplewood “judicially admitted” that “Judgments 2 Ca$h, LLC
      d/b/a Judgment Recovery Express owns legal title” to the property; that such
      assumed name “was begun on May 12, 2012 and continued throughout the 2017
      case”; that “Woodrow Miller d/b/a Judgment Recovery Express” expired in 2009;
      that Maplewood failed to show that “Judgments 2 Ca$h, LLC d/b/a Judgment
      Recovery Express” is the owner of the property; that “Judgments 2 Ca$h, LLC d/b/a
      Judgment Recovery Express” became the record owner of the property in trust in
      2015; that the property is “trust property”; that Miller is actually the “trustee”; and
      that Maplewood failed to name “the trust” in its lawsuit.

                                            14
relief,8 as well as his assertion that the unit was his homestead and therefore exempt

from execution. The law treats claims omitted from an amended pleading as

dismissed and abandoned. Cont’l Alloys & Servs. (De.) LLC, 597 S.W.3d at 898

(holding that plaintiff loses right to complain about error on appeal if, after

complained-of ruling, plaintiff files amended pleading abandoning claims upon

which trial court ruled).

       We thus overrule issues 1, 2, 4–10, and 33.

                                       Waiver

       In issue 11, Miller states:

       WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT RECOGNIZED, OBEYED AND
       EXECUTED THE FIRST COURT OF APPEAL’S MANDATE
       RENDERED IN CAUSE NO. 2017-84842 ON JUNE 23, 2020 THAT
       STATED THIS CASE IS AN APPEAL FROM THE FINAL
       JUDGMENT SIGNED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SEPTEMBER
       19, 2018.

       In issues 25 and 26, Miller asserts that his Fourth Amended Petition and

Motion for Summary Judgment are each a “live pleading because [Maplewood] did

not object to it.”

8
       Further, because it is undisputed that Miller’s condominium unit was sold during
       the course of the proceedings, the injunctive issues are moot. See Alsobrook v.
       MTGLQ Inv’rs, LP, 657 S.W.3d 327, 330 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2021), aff’d as
       modified, 656 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. 2022). Moreover, temporary restraining orders are
       not appealable. In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 813 (Tex. 2020).

                                          15
      As detailed above, we have upheld the striking of Miller’s Fourth Amended

Petition as a Rule 13 sanction. And Miller does not present cogent argument in

support of any of these issues—and none can be discerned. See TEX. R. APP. P.

38.1(i) (appellate brief “must contain a clear and concise argument for the

contentions made”); cf. Weekley Homes, 646 S.W.3d at 827. As a result, these issues

are not properly before us to consider. See Amrhein v. Bollinger, 593 S.W.3d 398,

403 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.).

      We therefore overrule issues 11, 25, and 26.

                                    Conclusion

      For all the reasons above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all things.

                                              Terry Adams
                                              Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

                                         16