Court Opinion

ID: 9639147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:05:50.909995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:13.023530
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting.
I cannot agree that the trial judge properly excluded a transcript of the testimony of Stephen Rassa. Rassa’s testimony was critical to Huffington’s defense, and Rassa could not be found. Huffington therefore offered a transcript of testimony given by Rassa as a State’s witness in the prosecution of Deno Kanaras, but this evidence was rejected on the ground the State had no opportunity to cross-examine its own witness. The majority recognizes that direct-examination by the party against whom the testimony is offered may be sufficient to justify the admission of previous testimony, but affirms on the basis that the motives of the State at the time it offered the evidence differed significantly from those of Huffington when he offered it. A careful analysis of the facts will disclose, however, that Huffington and the State each wanted to develop precisely the same facts from Rassa, and that each did so for the purposes of impeaching Kanaras’ credibility and discrediting his claim of duress. That the State’s motive in the first case was to convict Kanaras by discrediting his testimony and its motive in the second case was to convict Huffington by relying on Kanaras’ testimony is simply irrelevant. It is the identity of the motives of the two parties who offer the testimony that is material, and not the shifting motives of the State.
The general rule applicable in this situation is not in dispute. Professor Wigmore wrote:
[T]he whole notion of cross-examination refers to one’s right to probe the statements of an opponent’s witness, *597not one’s own witness; thus, if A has taken X’s deposition or called X to the stand, and B has cross-examined, it is not for A to object that he has not had the benefit of cross-examination; that benefit was not intended for him nor needed by him; it was intended only to protect against an opponent’s witness, who would be otherwise unexamined by A; and if A has had the benefit of examining a witness called on his own behalf, he has had all that he needs, and the right to probe by cross-examination is B’s, not A’s.
5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1389 at 105 (3d ed. 1940).
And in a more recent text the authors pose and answer the question in this fashion:
Is the opportunity for direct and redirect examination the equivalent of the opportunity for cross-examination? If party A (or his predecessor in interest) calls and examines a witness in the first hearing, and this testimony is offered against A in a second trial, may it come in against the objection of want of opportunity to cross-examine? The decisions sensibly hold that it may.
McCormick on Evidence § 255 at 762 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
Fed.ft.Evid. 804(b)(1) is to the same effect, and describes the circumstances under which the former testimony of an unavailable witness will not be excluded by operation of the hearsay rule:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
The pivotal question, then, is whether the State had a motive similar to that of Huffington to develop the testimony of Rassa. This in turn requires a consideration of the *598issues intended to be addressed by the testimony in each case, and as indicated by the following advisory committee note to Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) the question is whether there exists a “substantial” identity of issues.
The common law did not limit the admissibility of former testimony to that given in an earlier trial of the same case, although it did require identity of issues as a means of insuring that the former handling of the witness was the equivalent of what would not be done if the opportunity were presented. Modern decisions reduce the requirement to “substantial” identity. Since identity of issues is significant only in that it bears on motive and interest in developing fully the testimony of the witness, expressing the matter in the latter terms is preferable. (Citation omitted).
We look first at Huffington’s motive in seeking to introduce the testimony of Rassa. It was clear from the State’s evidence that only two persons in addition to the victim were present on the occasion of each murder — Kanaras and Huffington. Kanaras was therefore the State’s principal witness against Huffington. Kanaras testified that he was with Huffington on the night of the murders, but that Huffington killed each victim. Kanaras denied any previous knowledge that Joseph Hudson or Diane Becker were going to be robbed or murdered, and he further asserted that while he had been forced by Huffington at gunpoint to provide some assistance he did not assist in any way in the actual killing of the victims.
Kanaras testified he had known Hudson and Huffington for some time, and had purchased drugs from both of them. On the night in question he and Huffington were attempting to purchase cocaine when they met Hudson and Becker (Hudson’s girlfriend) at a bar. Arrangements were made to buy the drug from Hudson, and Kanaras drove Huffington to the trailer shared by Hudson and Becker. Kanaras said Hudson sold them 3.5 grams, which appeared to be about half the supply Hudson had on hand. He said he and Huffington then returned to Huffington’s apartment where *599they used some cocaine and Huffington apparently made calls in an attempt to broker the sale of Hudson’s remaining cocaine. Acting on the belief that Huffington had found a buyer, and upon the promise that Huffington would give him some additional cocaine for providing transportation, Kanaras said he drove Huffington back to the Hudson trailer, where Hudson joined them. He then drove, at the direction of Huffington, to a rural area in Harford County and stopped near a farmhouse. According to Kanaras, he was walking alongside Hudson toward the farmhouse to meet the prospective purchaser when Huffington fired five shots into Hudson. Kanaras said that Huffington then reloaded the pistol, rolled the body of Hudson over, and fired two more shots into Hudson’s head at point-blank range. Kanaras admitted that the weapon used had once been owned by him, but claimed he had sold it to Huffing-ton about five weeks earlier.
Kanaras said Huffington then pointed the gun at him and ordered him to drive back to the trailer. Once inside the trailer Kanaras was directed to search for Hudson’s money. Following a successful search, Kanaras said Huffington struck the sleeping Diane Becker several times with a heavy bottle, and then repeatedly stabbed her with a knife Huffington produced from his boot. Kanaras testified he was then forced to accept a large amount of the money that had been stolen from Hudson, and to assist Huffington in destroying or disposing of evidence and attempting to establish an alibi. Kanaras denied he had been to Hudson’s trailer during the week preceding the murders, and denied having possessed a gun at that time.
Rassa’s testimony dealt with the events of May 20, 1981, five days before the murders. Rassa testified he and Kanaras had driven to Hudson’s trailer on that date, to buy cocaine. In response to direct questions by the State’s Attorney, Rassa described the events immediately preceding entry into Hudson’s trailer:
A. Well, there had been a lot of discussion on the way down Long Bar Harbor Road between Deno and myself, *600and Deno had told me he was interested in going to Joe’s trailer — Joe Hudson — to buy some cocaine.
% 5js sjs sfc j}: >*:
Deno became very quiet. He wasn’t holding any conversation with me. Because I had had prior conversations with him about Joe Hudson and Diane Becker. I was nervous and I wasn’t sure what was going to happen down that road and I wanted a chance to kind of find out what he was thinking about so that I might be able to talk him out of it____
Q. [By State’s Attorney] ... As a result of certain conversations you had with Deno in the car right before you got to Hudson’s trailer on the 20th, tell us — right before you went into the trailer, tell us what you said to him and what he said to you?
A. Okay. As he was pulling his car to a stop outside of the motor home — excuse me — I want'to be absolutely sure. I can remember that as the car was coming to a stop he turned towards me and he reached underneath of my seat, and I said, “What are you doing”, and he said, “I’m getting my gun.” And I said, “Leave it there. Don’t get your gun. I don’t want any parts of anything like this.” And I looked both ways outside of the car because I didn’t want to be seen. I wasn’t really sure what was going to happen at that time____
* * * * * *
I said, “Come on, Deno, let’s go in.”, and he said, he reached under the seat again, and I said again, “What are you doing?”, and he said, “I’m just getting my gun. I just want to show it to you,” And I said, “Deno, I don’t need to see your gun. I’ve seen it before. Just leave it there.” At that time I said to Deno “Is there something you’re not telling me? Do you owe Joe money?” And there was no reply. I looked at him and I said, “Do you actually think that you could actually rob and shoot somebody in the middle of a crowded trailer park like this *601in daylight, and do you actually think you could shoot someone?” And there was no reply. Deno then — excuse me — I said to Deno — no, excuse me again — Deno said, “I have a knife in the glove compartment.” And I said, “Are you crazy? Do you actually think you could stab someone with a knife?” He said, “No, but you could”, referring to myself. And I told him “I didn’t want any parts of any of this.”
On cross-examination Rassa said that on several occasions prior to May 20th he and Kanaras had discussed the possibility of robbing Hudson, and that he, rather than Kanaras, had initiated further discussion of the subject on that day.
Huffington’s motive in offering this testimony is clear. Rassa directly contradicted Kanaras’ testimony that he had not been to the Hudson trailer on May 20th, that he had not had a gun on that date, and that he had not discussed robbing Hudson at that time. Furthermore, if the jury believed that Kanaras was contemplating a robbery of Hudson just five days before the robbery and murders occurred, and was discussing with Rassa the possible use of the very types of weapons actually thereafter used, the jury would most likely refuse to believe Kanaras’ protestations of being an innocent pawn in the hands of Huffington. Rassa’s evidence permitted a reasonable inference that Kanaras had been a principal actor in the robbery and murder, and such evidence may well have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that Huffington was the actual killer.
Turning to the State’s motive in offering the testimony of Rassa during the trial of Kanaras, it is apparent that it was substantially, if not precisely identical to Huffington’s motive. Testimony given by Kanaras in his own behalf was the same as that later given by him against Huffington. See Kanaras v. State, 54 Md.App. 568, 570-72, 460 A.2d 61, cert. denied, 297 Md. 109 (1983). Kanaras’ defense was that he did not knowingly aid or abet in the death of Hudson, and that any assistance rendered thereafter was under duress. Following Kanaras’ testimony, the State *602offered the testimony of four rebuttal witnesses. The proffered testimony of these witnesses was summarized by the Court of Special Appeals as follows:
It was proffered that Stephen Rassa would testify that on May 20, 1981, shortly before purchasing cocaine from Hudson and Becker, Kanaras supposedly had to be dissuaded from robbing Hudson and stealing his cocaine. It was further proffered that Dale Saunders, Jr. would testify that Huffington and Kanaras came to “shake him down for money” due on a drug debt. Maryland State Trooper Gary Aschenbach, according to the State’s proffer, would testify that while working undercover in early 1981, Kanaras had purchased drugs for him, had on one occasion carried a gun in anticipation of a large drug deal, and had expressed interest in an illegal scheme to destroy a boat for money. The testimony of Thomas Wagner, according to the State, would show that Kanaras had shown him what was to be the murder weapon. Kanaras v. State, supra, 54 Md.App. at 589, 460 A.2d 61.
Expressing some uncertainty that all the evidence proffered by the State was properly offered as rebuttal, the trial judge allowed the State to reopen its case, and thus Rassa’s testimony became a part of the State’s case in chief.
The majority states that “the purport of Rassa’s testimony was that a few days before the incident in question Kanaras was still involved with drugs” and that this evidence was offered in rebuttal to Kanaras’ earlier testimony that he had been free from drugs for some time before the murders. From this the majority concludes that the very limited objective of the State in offering this testimony differed substantially from the broader scope later intended by Huffington, and that the State therefore had no reasonable opportunity or motive to fully develop the facts about which Huffington was later concerned. The majority’s conclusion is not supported by the facts. Kanaras had at all times readily admitted his involvement as a buyer and user of drugs. He did deny, however, that he sold drugs. The Court of Special Appeals held that rebuttal evidence *603would be proper to show that Kanaras had been involved as a seller, but this clearly was not the principal thrust of Rassa’s testimony.1 A fair reading of the entirety of Rassa’s testimony discloses an intent on the part of the State to discredit Kanaras’ testimony, and show him to have been a principal. The Court of Special Appeals summed up the intent of the State when it said:
[A]n important facet of the State’s case was to prove that the appellant was a voluntary participant in the crimes. As such, it was proper to show that Kanaras both needed and lusted for money, had participated in prior drug transactions, and may have specifically considered robbing Hudson. The additional State’s evidence supplied a motive for the crimes and supplied evidence of advance preparation for the crimes. As such, it was admissible to show an independent intent and motive to commit the crimes.
Kanaras v. State, supra, 54 Md.App. at 595, 460 A.2d 61.
The importance of Rassa’s testimony to assist the trier of fact in assessing the credibility of Kanaras is perhaps best illustrated by the argument of the State’s Attorney in support of the State’s motion to have Kanaras called as a court’s witness.2
The following reasons, I’m going to basically go through a skeleton sketch of what he would testify and and why we don’t believe we can believe him. His first indication would be that the first time that he had heard this particular incident or that this came about that he was aware that anybody was going to rob Joseph Hudson and Diane Becker was that night that it actually occurred — first of all, a witness tes — has testified, a State’s witness has testified in a prior trial that Kanaras had discussed with him and tried to get him to rob Hudson *604sometime prior to this, and therefore we believe — it is the State’s contention that we believe — what we believe is that Kanaras wanted to rob Hudson, didn’t have the whatever to do it by himself, and continued looking for someone to help him with this robbery after that contact with that particular individual, and that he was successful in finding this other person in the person of the defendant before the Court. That’s the State’s theory of the case.
The previous sworn testimony of Rassa was necessary for the proper presentation of the defendant’s case and substantial reasons existed to assume its reliability. The testimony was admissible under accepted rules of evidence in this State, and in any event admissible to afford the defendant due process of law. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.
I am authorized to state that Judges ELDRIDGE and COLE concur in the views here expressed.

. Rassa did not testify to any sale of drugs by Kanaras, but he did say that he and Kanaras had on occasion jointly attempted to sell methamphetamine.

. This motion was denied, and Kanaras was called as a State’s witness.