Court Opinion

ID: 9897419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:19.465848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:24.276051
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                             Apr 25 2023, 9:45 am

                                                                                 CLERK
                                                                             Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                  and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Zachary J. Stock                                            Theordore E. Rokita
Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C.                     Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
                                                            Ellen H. Meilaender
                                                            Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                            General
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana

                                             IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joshua D. Clark,                                            April 25, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-CR-2421
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Hendricks
                                                            Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                           The Honorable Rhett M. Stuard,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                         Judge
                                                            Trial Court Cause No.
                                                            32D02-2105-F4-27

                                   Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                                Judges Vaidik and Foley concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                                   Page 1 of 11
      Case Summary
[1]   Joshua Clark appeals his conviction for child solicitation, a Level 4 felony.

      Clark argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for

      a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. We disagree and, accordingly,

      affirm.

      Issue
[2]   Clark raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court

      abused its discretion by denying Clark’s request for a jury instruction on the

      defense of entrapment.

      Facts
[3]   Predator Catchers, Inc. (“PCI”) is a 501(c)(3) organization founded by Eric

      Schmutte. PCI’s mission is to “expos[e] men and women that are looking to

      engage in sexual activity with minors.” Tr. Vol. II p. 132. To expose, or

      “catch,” child predators, PCI uses images from adult volunteers to create decoy

      online profiles and pose as minors online. PCI then posts online videos of PCI

      confronting individuals who solicit sex from the decoy profiles. PCI’s efforts

      have led to over three hundred “catches” and approximately ten convictions.

[4]   On March 28, 2021, Clark, a thirty-six-year-old police officer with the Portland

      Police Department, messaged a PCI decoy profile named “Mackenzie,” 1

      1
          The photos for “Mackenzie’s” profile were supplied by an adult PCI volunteer.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                  Page 2 of 11
      which was operated by Schmutte on Skout, a social app. Over the next several

      weeks, Clark and “Mackenzie” communicated over text and several other

      social apps, including Kik and Snapchat.

[5]   In a text message sent on April 15, 2021, “Mackenzie” informed Clark that she

      was age fourteen. 2 Clark responded, “If I don’t know[,] I can’t say anything . . .

      So delete that message.” Ex. Vol. IV p. 47. Clark then texted “Mackenzie,”

      “Your [sic] 18 right[.]” Id. On several other occasions, “Mackenzie” informed

      Clark that she was age fourteen, and Clark instructed her to delete the message

      and say she was age eighteen.

[6]   Over the course of their communications, Clark sent the following messages to

      “Mackenzie”: “What do you wanna do to me[?]”; “I want all of you”; “Damn I

      wanna eat you”; “[L]et’s meet [and] see if we like each other[.] [W]ho knows[,]

      maybe just get a hotel room”; “Sit on me”; “Make you c*m all over me”; “I’m

      trying to get with you”; and “Have to see you naked before I know you[’re] the

      best lol.” Id. at 60-61, 66, 81, 144, 146, 149, 164. When “Mackenzie” told

      Clark she was “[a]bout to shower,” Clark responded, “I wanna see.” Id. at 128.

      Clark also changed the settings for their Snapchat communications so that

      messages would disappear immediately after being viewed; 3 referred to

      2
          It is unclear if “Mackenzie” also informed Clark of her age at an earlier time.
      3
       The ability to make photographs and message disappear after being viewed is an inherent feature of the
      Snapchat app.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                             Page 3 of 11
      Mackenzie as “hun” and “baby”; and requested that “Mackenzie” send photos

      of herself, including “a[n] old pic,” multiple times. Id. at 36, 60, 66.

[7]   Clark and “Mackenzie” arranged to meet at an Olive Garden in Avon on May

      13, 2021. Clark texted “Mackenzie,” “Better not be cops waiting on me lol.”

      Id. at 110. When Clark arrived, Schmutte and several PCI volunteers

      confronted Clark and livestreamed the encounter on Facebook. Schmutte and

      the volunteers stated several times that Clark was free to leave, however, Clark

      chose to speak with them for several minutes in the Olive Garden parking lot.

[8]   One of the livestream’s viewers was Avon Police Department Detective Jacob

      Boggess, who viewed the livestream on his personal Facebook feed. Detective

      Boggess testified that he treated the livestream like “a tip” and began his own

      investigation into Clark’s communications with “Mackenzie.” Tr. Vol. II pp.

      246-47. Detective Boggess contacted Schmutte, who provided his cell phone

      along with photos and videos of Clark’s communications with “Mackenzie.”

      Detective Boggess verified that Clark’s phone number was the one that texted

      “Mackenzie” and that Clark drove to the Avon Olive Garden on May 13.

      Detective Boggess also learned that Clark had researched online “the criminal

      code for child solicitation” and whether Clark had “a warrant or reports to that

      effect.” Tr. Vol. III p. 8.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023         Page 4 of 11
[9]    On May 25, 2021, the State charged Clark with child solicitation, a Level 4

       felony. 4 The trial court held a jury trial in July 2022.

[10]   Schmutte testified that PCI’s decoy profiles never initiate communication with

       other individuals online and are never the first to propose a meeting. Schmutte

       also testified to the following regarding PCI’s relationship with law

       enforcement: PCI is not affiliated with any police department and does not

       receive any training, advice, or assistance from law enforcement. PCI does not

       notify law enforcement until after PCI “catches” a person who has solicited sex

       from a decoy profile. PCI does not operate in jurisdictions where “the

       prosecutor in that county does not want us doing it there.” Tr. Vol. II p. 138.

       PCI receives all of its funding from private donations.

[11]   Detective Boggess testified regarding his investigation into Clark. He further

       testified that PCI was “a civilian group” and not “related [to] law enforcement

       in any way . . . .” and that he did not assist PCI in “catching” Clark. Id. at 245.

[12]   At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence, Clark requested a jury

       instruction on the defense of entrapment. The trial court found that there was

       insufficient evidence that PCI and Schmutte were agents of law enforcement

       and denied the requested jury instruction.

       4
        The State also charged Clark with one count of attempted child solicitation, a Level 5 felony. The State
       moved to dismiss this charge on June 8, 2022, and the trial court granted the motion the following day.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                               Page 5 of 11
[13]   The jury found Clark guilty of child solicitation, a Level 4 felony. The trial

       court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Clark to six years in the

       Department of Correction. Clark now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[14]   Clark argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for

       a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment. Specifically, Clark argues that

       Schmutte and PCI were “apparent agent[s]” of law enforcement. 5 Appellant’s

       Br. p. 7. We disagree.

[15]   We review a trial court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse

       of discretion. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). We consider:

       “‘(1) whether the instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is

       evidence in the record to support the giving of the instruction; and (3) whether

       the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which

       are given.’” Id. (quoting Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (Ind. 2002)).

       “A trial court may refuse a jury instruction only when ‘[n]one of the facts’ in

       the record would support the legal theory offered in the instruction. Humphrey

       v. Tuck, 151 N.E.3d 1203, 1207 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Sims v. Huntington, 271 Ind.

       368, 373, 393 N.E.2d 135, 139 (1979)).

       5
           Clark does not argue that any other type of agency relationship existed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023             Page 6 of 11
[16]   The defense of entrapment is defined by Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-9(a),

       which provides:

               It is a defense that:

                        (1)      the prohibited conduct of the person was the
                                 product of a law enforcement officer, or his agent,
                                 using persuasion or other means likely to cause the
                                 person to engage in the conduct; and

                        (2)      the person was not predisposed to commit the
                                 offense.

       (Emphasis added).

[17]   An agency relationship may be actual, implied, or apparent. See Menard, Inc. v.

       Dage-MTI, Inc., 726 N.E.2d 1206, 1210-11 (Ind. 2000). As relevant here,

       apparent agency does not depend on the principal’s express or implied

       authorization for the agent to act on the principal’s behalf; rather, apparent

       agency exists when “a principal’s manifestations induce a third party to

       reasonably believe there is a principal-agent relationship.” Arrendale v. Am.

       Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E3d 1064, 1068 (Ind. 2022); see also Pepkowski v. Life

       of Ind. Ins. Co., 535 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. 1989) (“It is essential that there be

       some form of communication, direct or indirect, by the principal, which instills

       a reasonable belief in the mind of the third party.”). “[T]he placing of the agent

       in a position to perform acts or make representations which appear reasonable

       to a third person is a sufficient manifestation to endow the agent with apparent

       authority.” Gallant Ins. Co. v. Isaac, 751 N.E.2d 672, 677 (Ind. 2001).
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023              Page 7 of 11
[18]   Clark directs us to no caselaw holding that our entrapment statute encompasses

       apparent agents of law enforcement. We need not decide that issue, however,

       because we find that there are no facts in the record that would support an

       apparent agency relationship between Schmutte or PCI and law enforcement.

[19]   PCI is a private, civilian organization separate and apart from law enforcement.

       PCI receives no training, advice, or assistance from law enforcement, and

       receives all of its funding from private donations. PCI also does not notify law

       enforcement until after they “catch” someone, and here, Detective Boggess

       discovered PCI’s allegations against Clark by viewing the livestreamed

       encounter on his own personal Facebook feed and only contacted Schmutte

       after PCI livestreamed the encounter. Further, Detective Boggess treated the

       livestream merely as “a tip” from which he launched his own, independent

       investigation into Clark. Tr. Vol. II p. 246-47. Clark also concedes that there

       was no “cooperation” between Schmutte or PCI and law enforcement. Reply

       p. 4.

[20]   Clark argues that “[b]y not doing anything to stop Schmutte and actively

       accepting his ‘help,’ the State of Indiana has placed him in a position to perform

       acts that appear to any reasonable person to endow him with the power of the

       [S]tate.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. Similarly, in Clark’s Reply Brief, Clark makes

       the reference that “Batman is not the apparent agent of Commissioner Gordon

       simply because the Commissioner puts up the Bat Signal. Batman is an

       apparent agent because everyone knows Commissioner Gordon reaps the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023       Page 8 of 11
       rewards for Batman’s efforts.” Reply p. 6. We disagree.6 First, law

       enforcement lit no “Bat-signal” calling Schmutte and PCI to action. Rather, as

       we have explained, law enforcement did not become involved until after PCI

       livestreamed its encounter with Clark. Moreover, law enforcement agencies

       routinely rely on the general public for tips, evidence, and other information,

       and the mere collection of that information says nothing about whether the

       State has authorized an individual to act on its behalf. In addition, such an

       interpretation of our entrapment statute would seem to convert civilians into

       law enforcement agents only after the civilian’s efforts have been completed. Cf.

       Drake v. Maid-Rite Co., 681 N.E.2d 734, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that

       franchisee lacked apparent authority in selling restaurant when purchaser

       “offer[ed] no evidence of any communication or contact, direct or indirect,

       between herself and [franchisor] prior to purchasing the restaurant from

       [franchisee]”).

[21]   Clark also relies on the fact that PCI does not operate in jurisdictions where law

       enforcement agencies do not wish them to operate. PCI’s strategic decisions,

       however, are at most manifestations by PCI but are not manifestations by law

       enforcement and, therefore, cannot support a finding of apparent agency. See

       Pepkowski, 535 N.E.2d at 1167 (“Statements or manifestations made by the

       6
         Nor is it clear that Batman is an agent of Commissioner Gordon. See Joshuah Lisk, Note, Is Batman A State
       Actor?, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1419, 1440 (Spring 2014) (concluding, in the context of the Fourth
       Amendment, “[t]he government’s lack of knowledge and acquiesce[nce] to Batman’s actions is sufficient to
       create a separation between private conduct and official state action.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                             Page 9 of 11
       agent are not sufficient to create an apparent agency relationship.”). Law

       enforcement’s discouragement of PCI operating in certain jurisdictions,

       meanwhile, manifests the opposite of an agency relationship. In short, the

       record simply contains no manifestations from Detective Boggess or any other

       law enforcement authority that suggests Schmutte or PCI were acting as agents

       of law enforcement.

[22]   Even if an apparent agency relationship existed, however, Clark fails to

       demonstrate that he was not predisposed to commit the offense. 7 We have

       explained that the critical question regarding predisposition “‘is whether

       criminal intent [was] deliberately implanted in the mind of an innocent

       person[.]’” Ferge v. State, 764 N.E.2d 268, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting

       Kats v. State, 559 N.E.2d 348, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)) (internal quotation

       marks omitted). That is not the case here.

[23]   “Mackenzie” informed Clark on several occasions that she was age fourteen,

       and Clark repeatedly instructed her to delete the message and say that she was

       age eighteen. Clark attempted to conceal his communications with

       “Mackenzie” by arranging for their Snapchat messages to disappear

       immediately after being viewed. Clark also repeatedly asked for pictures of

       “Mackenzie,” including “a[n] old pic” of her, and, after Clark and

       7
        Clark’s argument on this issue consists of three sentences and is devoid of any citation to caselaw or other
       authority. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that each argument be supported be “cogent reasoning”
       and “citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023                               Page 10 of 11
       “Mackenzie” arranged to meet at the Olive Garden, Clark texted, “Better not

       be cops waiting on me lol.” Ex. Vol. IV pp. 60, 110. Clark’s conduct suggests

       that he knew his communications with “Mackenzie” were illegal, yet he

       continued to engage with and solicit her.

[24]   We find that the evidence does not indicate that: 1) Schmutte or PCI were

       apparent agents of law enforcement; and 2) Clark was not predisposed to

       commit child solicitation. Accordingly, the record contains no evidence to

       support a jury instruction on the defense of entrapment, and the trial court did

       not abuse its discretion.

       Conclusion
[25]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Clark’s request for a jury

       instruction on the defense of entrapment. Accordingly, we affirm.

[26]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2421 | April 25, 2023       Page 11 of 11