Court Opinion

ID: 9533048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:27:49.480412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:54.209311
License: Public Domain

Marbury, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
With regret I find myself in disagreement with the majority opinion dealing with the adequacy or inadequacy of the publication of the text of Chapter 269 of the Acts of 1959 (the Potomac River Compact of 1958) prior to the vote taken on November 8, 1960. It has been said that the only useful purpose in filing a dissenting opinion is perhaps to underscore what the law is not and to point up what it ought to be. In this instance I am so deeply concerned with the precedent established by the majority opinion that I feel constrained to express my own views with reference to the constitutional principles here involved.
The majority hold that constitutional and statutory provisions are mandatory before an election, but that statutory provisions are directory only after the election, so that the result of the election may only be successfully contested by showing that the inadequacy of publication might reasonably *503be supposed to have affected the result. They candidly concede that the publication of the text of Chapter 269 in only one of fifty-six newspapers was not in substantial compliance with Article 33, § 170, as enacted by Chapter 739 of the Acts of 1957, which was in implementation of Article XVI, § 5 (a) of the Constitution; and treat the requirement that furnishing of the text of referred laws, as required by § 170, establishes a statutory rather than a constitutional requirement. They draw a distinction between violation of a mandatory constitutional provision, Baltimore & Drum Point RR. Co. v. Pumphrey, 74 Md. 86, 21 Atl. 559, and violation of a mandatory statutory provision and hold that the mandatory provision of the statute before the election becomes directory only after the vote has taken place. I can not find this distinction to be valid.
The referendum article of the Constitution, Article XVI, § 1 (b), provides that “The provisions of this Article shall be self-executing; provided that additional legislation in furtherance thereof and not in conflict therewith may be enacted.” Section 5 (a) of the same Article requires that “The General Assembly shall provide for furnishing the voters of the State the text of all measures to be voted upon by the people; provided, that until otherwise provided by law the same shall be published in the manner prescribed by Article XIV of the Constitution for the publication of proposed Constitutional Amendments.” Article XIV, § 1 requires that a bill proposing an amendment to the Constitution shall be published by order of the Governor, in at least two newspapers, in each County, where so many may be published, and where not more than one may be published, then in that newspaper, and in three newspapers published in the City of Baltimore, once a week for four weeks immediately preceding the next ensuing general election, at which the proposed amendment shall be submitted.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the Legislature first implemented Article XVI, § 5 by the passage of Chapter 335 of the Acts of 1941 (codified as Code, 1951, Art. 33, § 208). This required the publication of referred laws at least once in some daily newspaper of general circulation throughout the *504State. This remained the law until the passage of Chapter 739 of the Acts of 1957 (now codified as Art. 33, § 170), which in substance changed the law to read substantially as provided in Article XIV, § 1 of the Constitution before any legislative enactment on the subject was passed. It is obvious that both Chapter 335 of the Acts of 1941 and Chapter 739 of the Acts of 1957 carried mandatory provisions as to the publication of referred laws, as did Article XIV, § 1 of the Constitution. They were, therefore, in conformity with Article XVI, § 1 (b), since they were in furtherance of and not in conflict with that Article. Had the Legislature, in enacting either the 1941 Act or the 1957 Act, undertaken to have substituted the directory word “may” for “shall” as provided in Article XIV, § 1, it is obvious that this attempt would have been repugnant to and in contravention of the mandatory provision of that Article of the Constitution. Since the General Assembly was powerless to pass an act which would be clearly unconstitutional, how can it be said that the courts may do this by construing the word “shall” as mandatory before the election and directory thereafter? The ahswer must be in the negative. The provisions of the Constitution and the laws enacted pursuant thereof are binding upon all branches of the government and the citizens of the State, and can not be disregarded by tenuous interpretation by the courts.
Since Article 33, § 170, by the express provisions of Article XVI, § 1 (b), is in pari materia, the former can only be construed in its literal constitutional sense. In the language of Judge Cooley, quoted in Archer v. State, 74 Md. 443, 448, 22 Atl. 8, in discussing mandatory and directory constitutional provisions, it is said:
“Courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a Constitution. Constitutions do not usually undertake to prescribe mere rules of proceeding, except when such rules are looked upon as essential to the thing to be done; and they must be regarded in the light of limitations upon the power to be exercised. It is the province of an instrument of this solemn *505and permanent character to establish those fundamental maxims, and fix those unvarying rules by which all departments of government must at all times shape their conduct. * * * We are not, therefore, to expect to find in a Constitution provisions which the people in adopting it have not regarded as of high importance, and worthy to be embraced in an instrument which, for a time at least, is to control alike the government and the governed, and to form a standard by which is to be measured the power which can be exercised as well by the delegate as by the sovereign people themselves. If directions are given respecting the times or modes of proceeding in which a power should be exercised, there is at least a strong presumption that the people designed it should be exercised in that time and mode only; and we impute to the people a want of due appreciation of the purpose and proper province of such an instrument when we infer that such directions are given for any other end; especially, as has already been said, it is but fair to presume that the people in their Constitution have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, and with a view to leave as little as possible to implication. Cooley Const. Lim. 78, 79.”
See 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 61; dissenting opinion of Judge Phelps in State v. Long, (Okla.), 63 P. 2d 60, 65, a five to four decision.
The appellee’s contention, which was embraced in the majority opinion, that in spite of the almost total disregard of the statutory provision as to publication of the text of Chapter 269, there is no showing that the voters were misinformed or misled when they voted in favor of its adoption is not persuasive. While it is true that much publicity was given the fact that an election was to be held, at which the voters would be called upon to vote upon this referred question, by means of newspaper articles, editorials, radio and television programs, *506in which the writers or speakers gave their views pro and con, this was not the mode of information envisaged in the constitutional and statutory requirements as to publishing the text of the referred law. There was much discussion through these news media, some of which dealt with only portions of the Act, some from the point of view of the proponent or opponent, with varying degrees of accuracy, which leaves the question open as to whether the electorate was fairly informed as to the subject matter of the Act.
While it may be true that the average citizen does not read the text of referred laws in his county or city paper, nevertheless a number of publicly interested citizens do read them and these, on the basis of their opportunity to familiarize themselves with the text, can materially aid in formulating public sentiment for or against proposed legislation. This was the intent of the framers of the Constitution, and undoubtedly that of the Legislature when it amended that section of the election laws in 1957. Until the Constitution, or a statute passed pursuant thereto, provides some other means for informing the people, I think the courts are not at liberty, in the enforcement of a statute, to disregard any mandate or requirement of the organic law of the State. The need for adherence to strict interpretation of the Constitution and laws of the State becomes overwhelmingly apparent where, as in this case, it is sought to submit to the voters of the State an act which would amend the compact between Virginia and Maryland, which has existed since 1785.
I would reverse the chancellor’s decree because of the noncompliance with the requirement as to publication of the text of this law.