Court Opinion

ID: 9810680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:56:11.194258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:09.140169
License: Public Domain

Walker, J.,
dissenting: It will be necessary to a proper understanding of the case, as we view it, that we should make a brief rehearsal of the facts:
The action was brought by plaintiff to recover damages on account of personal injuries received by her, after she had alighted from one of the defendant’s street cars, by being run over and dragged by an automobile driven-by Mrs. H. E. Coleman, of Baltimore, Md. The plaintiff, on 5 July, 1916, became a passenger on one of the defendant’s street cars for the purpose of going to her home west of the city of Greensboro, and when the said street car had reached a point upon its run nearly opposite-*705Fields’ store, and being about one-balf mile west of the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro, it stopped for the purpose of allowing passengers to alight therefrom, at a regular stopping place for defendant’s cars, it being the destination of plaintiff upon this occasion. The plaintiff alighted from the street car, when she was immediately stricken by an automobile driven by Mrs. H. F. Coleman at a very high rate of speed, receiving the injuries for which this action was brought. The automobile, at the time it ran over the plaintiff, was going east and in an opposite direction to that of defendant’s car, and was running at the rate of 25 to 35 miles an hour. Mrs. Coleman, who was driving the automobile, not only was violating the law as to the excessive speed at which she was running, but was driving the same upon the left-hand side of the road in violation of the law. If the plaintiff did not see the automobile when she looked straight ahead, the line of vision being free from any obstruction for a long distance, it must necessarily have been on the other side of the road, and it could not have appeared six feet from the side of the car when first seen by plaintiff’s witnesses without having been suddenly veered from its course. The evidence shows that the defendant’s track beyond the corporate limits of the city of Greensboro is located on the right-hand side of the public highway going west, and to the left of the street car track going west is a well-constructed way, about 30 feet wide, paved with asphalt, for the use of pedestrians and various kinds of vehicles, including automobiles. It had been the custom and rule of defendant for twelve years to discharge its passengers from its car going west at this point, on the left-hand side of said car, and this custom or rule was known to plaintiff prior to the time of her injury upon this occasion. The place where plaintiff alighted was paved with asphalt and was smooth, while upon the right-hand side of the track there was a ditch and poles, except at one point directly in front of Fields’ store, where there was a sidewalk running a short distance, paved with cinders, and in wet weather a passenger getting off on that side would have to step in the mud. The accident happened about 4 o’clock p. m., and at this point a person could see both east and west along the highway a distance of one-half mile. Plaintiff was familiar with the conditions there existing at the time of her injury, having on numerous "occasions prior to her injury gotten off defendant’s cars at that stopping place.
At the close of plaintiff’s evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the action and for judgment as in case of nonsuit, under the statute, and this motion was renewed at the close of all the testimony. The motion being refused, defendant appealed to this Court.
It is a familiar principle that a defendant in an action of this kind can only be made liable in damages for a breach of duty to the plaintiffs— *706tbat is, of a duty wbicb was owing to ber at tbe time sbe was injured by tbe automobile. If there was no duty owing to tbe. plaintiff, or no breach of a duty, it follows tbat there is no liability.
A street car company has no right of way save that upon which its tracks are laid, and for this reason the Courts have generally held that where a car stops in public streets or other highways, for the purpose of discharging a passenger, the relation of carrier and iiassenger is terminated as soon as the latter alights from the car, for be is then not upon the premises of the company, but upon the street over which the company has no control. It may be true; as argued, that the carrier is not allowed to discharge passengers at a place where the street is out of repair and in such a dangerous condition that to alight from the car upon the highway would be perilous; but however this may be, it is not the case when the street is in good condition at the place of alighting, for then the passenger, as soon as be leaves the car, occupies the position of a traveler on the highway, with the same relative rights and responsibilities. It has been so decided in several cases by Courts of the highest authority.
Speaking of a passenger who had just alighted from a car on a public highway, the Court, in Creamer v. West End St. Ry. Co., 156 Mass., 320, said: “He was not a passenger when the accident occurred, and be ceased to be a passenger when be alighted upon the street from bis car. Tbe street is in no sense a passenger station, for the safety of which a street railway company is responsible. "When a passenger steps from the car upon the street, be becomes a traveler upon the highway, and terminates bis relationship and rights as a passenger, and the railway company is not responsible to him as a carrier for the condition of the street or for bis safe passage from the car to the sidewalk. When a common carrier has the exclusive occupation of its tracks and stations, and can arrange and manage them as its sees fit, it may be properly held tbat persons intending to take passage upon or to leave a train have the relation and rights of passengers in leaving or approaching the cars at a station (Warren v. Fitchburg R. B. Co., 8 Allen, 227; 85 Am. Dec., 700; McKimble v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 139 Mass., 542; Dodge v. Boston, etc., Steamship Co., 148 Mass., 207, 214; 12 Am. St. Rep., 541); but one who steps from a street railway car to the street is not upon the premises of the street railway company, but upon a public place where be has the same rights with every other occupier, and over which the company has no control. His rights are those of a traveler upon the highway, and not of a passenger.”
In that case, the passenger was killed immediately-after leaving the car by another car of the same line, running in an opposite direction upon a parallel track, so that this case is stronger for this defendant than was the case cited for the one there sued. Other cases to the same *707effect are: Bigelow v. W. E. Street Ry. Co., 161 Mass., 393; Oddy v. W. Street Ry. Co., 178 Mass, 341; Cit. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Boddin, 105 Term., 666.
It appeared in Oddy v. W. E. Street Ry. Co., supra, that the plaintiff upon leaving the ear was stricken by a hose cart immediately upon reaching the ground and before he had an opportunity to take a step after doing so. The Court said: “Street car companies carrying passengers in ordinary public streets or highways are not negligent in not providing means for warning passengers about to leave a car of the danger of colliding with or of being run over by other vehicles in the street. The risk of being hurt by such vehicles is the risk of the passenger, and not that of the carrier. It is not a danger against which the carrier is bound to protect the passenger or to give him warning.” And in the Tennessee case, the Court said: “If the passenger relation did not terminate when the defendant safely alighted from the car, when would it end? Would it continue only while he was crossing the parallel track, or until he had reached a point of comparative safety on the far side of the street? Or if, after reaching the ground, he had directed his steps to the other side of the street, would it have continued until he reached the pavement? We think that the Massachusetts Supreme Court was wise in adopting the rule that this relation terminates the moment passengers descend to the street. This is the fixed point free from all speculation or uncertainty.”
The same doctrine is stated in a note to Duchemin v. Boston Elev. Ry. Co., 104 Am. St. Rep., at p. 589, where it is said: “The instant a passenger steps or frees himself from the car on which he has been riding, he, for most purposes, ceases to be a passenger. The street is in no sense a passenger station, for the safety- of which a street railway company is responsible. When a passenger steps from a car upon the street, he becomes a traveler upon the highway, and terminates his relation and rights as passenger, and the railway company is not responsible to him as a carrier for the condition of the street or his safe passage from the car to the sidewalk. One who steps from a street railway car to the street is not upon premises of the railroad company, but upon a public street, where he has the same rights of any other occupier, and over which the company has no control.”
In this case there is no evidence of any inherent defect in the street, or anything over which defendant had any control. If we do not adopt the principle of the cases which have been cited, it would be next to impossible for a street railway to operate its cars for the convenience and accommodation of the public. The decision in this case will result in a peculiar hardship to the defendant. The proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to the defendant, but to the recklessness of *708another which could not well have been foreseen. If it was not the sole cause, it was at least an intervening one and still the proximate cause. There are physical circumstances which tended to show, and from them the inference is clearly deducible, as we have stated, that the automobile was not on the side of the road where the street car was just before it struck the plaintiff, and, therefore, that it must have been suddenly turned from, its course and driven in the direction of the street car. The view to the west along the road was clear and unobstructed, and if it had been on the side where the street car was the plaintiff was bound to see it when she looked, for plaintiff’s witnesses showed that it would be in the line of vision, and she stated that it was not in sight. It was impracticable for the defendant to have prevented the collision with the plaintiff. It was not bound to anticipate that Mrs. Coleman would so suddenly, and in such a reckless manner, drive her automobile so near the street car and imperil the lives of passengers while they were alighting therefrom.
It is also to be said that the law of this State provides: “In approaching or passing a car of a street railway which has been stopped to allow passengers to alight or embark, the operator of every motor vehicle shall slow down, and if it be necessary for the safety of the public, he shall bring said vehicle to a full stop. Upon approaching a pedestrian who is upon the traveled part of any highway, and not upon a sidewalk, and upon approaching any intersecting highway or a curve, or a corner in a highway where the operator’s view is obstructed, every person operating a motor vehicle shall slow down and give a timely signal with his bell, horn or other device for signaling.” Gregory’s Supplement, p. 446.
The defendant’s servant in charge of the street car was not bound to anticipate a violation of the positive law by Mrs. Coleman, or any one else. The laws of the road are well known, and if they had been obeyed, there would have been no injury to the plaintiff. There was a clear and wide space between the proper position of the automobile, under the law, and the place where the plaintiff alighted from the street car. If the automobile had stopped, or even had the speed been reduced, there would have been no accident. It was not a natural and probable consequence that the automobile would be driven so near the street car as to injure a passenger then in the act of alighting, and the conductor was not, in law, required to look out for such an unexpected event. 29 Oyc., 528.
The law of the State regulating the speed and use of automobiles on highways was enacted for the very purpose of protecting persons when leaving street cars without the necessity of their conductors to look in every direction before discharging passengers. The plaintiff had already looked in the direction of the approaching automobile, when she had a *709clear and unobstructed view, and did not see it. Sbe bad a better ebance to see it, if witbin tbe range of vision, tban tbe conductor, because sbe was occupying tbe steps in tbe act of getting off tbe car, while be was behind her on tbe platform. It would seem that if tbe law required the conductor to look, which we deny, be was not required to do so in this instance, because be would not have seen as well as sbe could, and certainly not any better than sbe did. If sbe was where the automobile could have been seen, and did not see it, bow could be have seen it if he bad looked in tbe same direction? There is no reason why tbe conductor should have helped tbe plaintiff off tbe car, for sbe was fully able to help herself. Sbe said, “I just bad cleared tbe car when tbe automobile got me.”
If the rule we have laid down, and supported by well-considered precedents, is the correct one, we do not see bow the street railway company can be liable when she admits that she bad cleared the car, and therefore was in the highway when she was struck by the automobile. But there is testimony from two disinterested witnesses, introduced by the plaintiff (and not by the defendant), who were in the car at the time and looking out of the windows, that she was well in the street, one stating the distance from the car to be six feet, and the other that the street car was moving when the automobile first was seen, before it reached her, and that when she was struck by the automobile, she fell “very near the middle of the street” and was lying there when the automobile passed her. One of these witnesses, for the plaintiff, testified that “passengers always get off on the left-hand side at this place,” and the other that “it was the usual custom to do so.”
There was a width in the street of 25 feet. It will make the case appear more clearly for the defendant if we conclude by quoting the testimony of L. A. Jackson, a witness for the plaintiff: “The automobile was passing the window where I was sitting when I first saw it. It was running very fast. Mrs. Coleman was driving it, so I beard. I did not see the automobile strike Mrs. Wood. I think the automobile was five or six feet from the street car when it struck her. Tbe street car track is off from the paved part of the road. When the automobile passed the street car it was going straight ahead. After the automobile passed the window where I was seated, it would have to go about 25 feet before it struck Mrs. Wood. I heard Mrs. Wood scream-and looked out the window. Sbe was about in the center of the paved part of the road and was about the center when the automobile finally left her— about 30 feet from the car. I think the street car bad just started when the automobile went by the window.”
This proves that sbe was not by tbe side of tbe street car when sbe was stricken by tbe automobile, but from 20 to 30 feet, at the very near*710est, at least 6 feet away from it. She was necessarily excited, and perhaps rendered unconscious and oblivious of the events by the sudden impact, whereas her witnesses were not under such disadvantages. If they give the true account of the matter, there was no negligence on the part of the defendant. But her own testimony places her on the ground when she was stricken, and that is sufficient to have severed the relation of carrier and passenger at the time of her injury.
The two persons who were on the car, and who testified most strongly against her, were her own witnesses (Mr. M. E. Boyles and Mr. L. A. Jackson), and they placed her near the middle of the street when the' automobile left her. But in any view of - the testimony, when construed most favorably for her, she was on the ground, and not on the premises of the company, when she was hurt; and one of her witnesses, Mr. L. A. Jackson, stated that the street car had started before she was stricken and as the automobile passed the window where she was sitting. In this case, if the conductor had looked ahead, he would have seen no more than the plaintiff herself saw, and besides, after a conductor looks, and fails to see, an automobile driven at a high rate of speed could reach the steps where passengers are being discharged before he could, reach the platform again and assure them of safety and then let them off. And that was the reason for passing the law and restraining the chauffeurs, as the Legislature knew of the difficulty and danger in the other method.