Court Opinion

ID: 9493150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:59:27.461103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:40.648087
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The crucial issue is whether a district court has discretion under the Sentencing Guidelines to consider a downward departure because disparate district-wide plea-bargaining policies of U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in contiguous federal districts in Central, Eastern, Southern, and Northern California have created unjustified sentencing disparities for violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 by the most serious offenders. The district court concluded that it did not have such discretion. The majority opinion affirms. I would reverse.
I believe that a district court has such sentencing discretion. Departures based *979on the distorting effect that disparate district-wide plea-bargaining policies have on sentences for illegal re-entry are neither “forbidden,” “encouraged,” nor “discouraged” by the Sentencing Guidelines. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). To the contrary, intracircuit sentencing disparities — whether the result of disparate judicial interpretations of a guideline or prosecutors’ disparate district-wide plea-bargaining policies — defeat the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines: “reasonable uniformity in sentencing” among federal districts. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro., p.s. 3, at 3.
Moreover, I believe that the majority opinion errs as a matter of law in “categorically” banning departures on this or any basis. See United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556, 560 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc) (“[W]e cannot categorically forbid a district court from departing downward on any basis except those specifically proscribed by the Guidelines.”); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 106-07, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (“[F]or the courts to conclude a factor must not be considered under any circumstances would be to transgress the policy-making authority vested [by Congress] in the [Sentencing] Commission.”).
Accordingly, I would hold that the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the departure requested was legally precluded by the Sentencing Guidelines and remand for the district court’s reconsideration. Cf. United States v. Karlic, 997 F.2d 564, 567-68 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that the incorrect application of the guidelines requires remand so that the district court may properly exercise its discretion).
ANALYSIS
A. The Standardized, District-Wide Plea-Bargaining Policies
As the majority opinion explains, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in the contiguous Southern, Eastern, and Northern Districts of California have adopted a “fast-track” plea-bargaining program for aliens charged with illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. See Majority Op. at 971; see also Thom Mrozek, Prosecutions on the Rise: U.S. Attorneys Take Varying Approaches to Illegal Re-Entry, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 21, 1995, at 1, 9 (“Mrozek”). Under the fast-track program, “the vast majority of defendants — except those convicted of the most violent and depraved acts — are offered a deal under § 1326(a), which carries a statutory maximum sentence of two years in prison.” Id. Those offered the two-year deal include defendants who are in the top two criminal history categories of the Sentencing Guidelines (i.e., categories Y and VI). See id. “Those few defendants who face longer prison terms under [§ ] 1326(b)[ (2) because of a past aggravated felony conviction] are offered plea bargains that see their sentences top out at five years” or 60 months. Id. at 9.
The U.S. Attorneys’ Office in the neighboring Central District of California, however, has chosen not to adopt this fast-track plea-bargaining policy. See id. Instead, it purportedly has decided to prosecute only the “worst” § 1326 offenders. This includes those aliens illegally reentering the United States who were previously deported after receiving any felony conviction, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1), or those deported after a conviction for an aggravated felony, see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). In addition to a base offense level of eight, these offenders are eligible for sentencing enhancements of four levels under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) or sixteen levels under § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B). As a result, the “worst” offenders in the Central District of California may be subject to imprisonment for sentences as long as 125 months (assuming an offense level of 24 (base level 8 plus specific offense characteristics of 16) and a criminal history of category of VI). See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
Thus, because Banuelos-Rodriguez was arrested in the Central District of Califor*980nia, pled guilty to the crime of reentering the United States illegally, was eligible for the aggravated-felony enhancement under § 1326(b)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2,1 and fell into a criminal history category of V, the government sought a prison sentence between 70 and 87 months. Had Banue-los-Rodriguez been arrested in the Southern, Eastern, or Northern Districts of California, he would have been sentenced to a maximum of 5 years or 60 months of imprisonment, even though he pled guilty to the same offense, was sentenced under the same Guideline, and had the same sentencing profile. That is an unjustified sentencing disparity. It is a sentencing disparity that results from different plea-bargaining policies systematically applied district-wide, regardless of the specific “features” of a defendant’s case. It is not the result of prosecutors exercising their discretion on a case-by-case basis. Nor is the reduction in the maximum sentence imposed by prosecutors in the Eastern, Southern, and Northern Districts the result of such permitted factors as the defendant’s “acceptance of responsibility” under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 or “substantial assistance to the government” under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
The standardized district-wide plea-bargaining policies were developed strictly to deal with the administrative pressures of prosecuting § 1326 offenders in California. “[Ijllegal re-entry is the single most prosecuted federal offense in the state.” Mro-zek at 9. The costs and staffing needs to prosecute all § 1326 offenders have put such a strain on California U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, see id., that they were compelled to devise district-wide solutions. The solution chosen by the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in four neighboring federal districts in California is standardized plea-bargaining policies for § 1326 offenders. Three districts opted for one blanket policy, and the fourth chose another. The sentences offered under these policies thus have nothing to do with the legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases. Instead, the sentences offered arise from district-wide policies based on community demographics and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices’ differing administrative choices. These policies — not U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 — effectively make location of arrest the key factor impacting a defendant’s sentence for illegal re-entry. As a result, they distort the “heartland” of § 2L1.2 cases in California and undermine the sentencing uniformity mandated by the Sentencing Commission.
B. A Sentencing Court’s Authority to Depart
The Sentencing Commission stated unequivocally “that sentencing is a judicial function and that the appropriate sentence in a guilty plea case is to be determined by the judge.” U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B intro., cmt. A sentencing court “must impose on a defendant a sentence falling within the range of the applicable Guideline, if the case is an ordinary case.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 92, 116 S.Ct. 2035. But the sentencing court may depart from the applicable sentencing range if it “ ‘finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different than that described.’ ” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). An aggravating or mitigating sentencing factor that the Commission adequately took into consideration will be reflected “only in the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.” Id. A fortiori, a factor bearing on a case that the Commission does not mention anywhere is of a kind that “the Commission did not adequately” consider in formu*981lating the guidelines. Standardized plea-bargaining policies that vary from district to district in California and systematically alter the sentence imposed for illegal reentry based on the location of the defendant’s arrest constitute a factor that the Sentencing Commission never considered.
C. Factors Considered in Departure Decisions
The majority opinion asserts that factors warranting departure can only flow from the conduct of the defendant himself. The majority is mistaken. The majority’s assertion is based on an erroneous reading of Koon that first appeared in United States v. Stevens, 197 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir.1999). In Stevens, a three-judge panel stated: “In Koon, 518 U.S. at 104-05, 116 S.Ct. 2035, the Court explained that the proper comparison [for determining whether departure is permitted] is between the conduct of the defendant and the conduct of other offenders” convicted of the same offense. Stevens, 197 F.3d at 1268. This is a misstatement of the Supreme Court’s description of the proper “heartland” departure analysis. In Koon, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the departure analysis involves “a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome ” of a case and comparing them “with the facts of other Guideline cases.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 98-99, 116 S.Ct. 2035, quoted with approval in U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 cmt. At no point did the Court limit the “heartland” analysis involved in departure decisions to a comparison of “the conduct of the defendant and the conduct of other offenders,” as the majority opinion asserts. To the contrary, the Supreme Court stated that the “relevant question” is “whether the particular factor is within the heartland given all the facts of the case.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 99-100, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (emphasis added).
The discussion in Koon on pages 104-05, 116 S.Ct. 2035 that is cited in Stevens concerns the Court’s consideration of the question whether Rodney King’s misconduct in provoking the officers’ conduct may be considered a ground for downward departure. The Court stated that the “correct inquiry” to resolve that question would be to “compare[ ] official offenders who are provoked with official offenders who are not,” as opposed to comparing them with “civilian offenders.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 105, 116 S.Ct. 2035. Because “[t]he punishment prescribed by [the applicable guideline] contemplates unprovoked assaults,” the Supreme Court concluded that the district court had the discretion to depart downward because of “[Rodney King’s] misconduct in provoking the wrong.” Id. Thus, Koon clearly stands for the proposition that conduct of others or circumstances beyond the control of a defendant may sufficiently affect the circumstances of a case to warrant a downward departure — especially if that factor is not contemplated by the applicable guideline.
The Court in Koon also emphasized that the Sentencing Commission did “‘not intend to limit the kinds of factors ... that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.’ ” Koon, 518 U.S. at 93, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 1 pt. A intro., cmt. 4(b)). The Court further explained that:
The Commission ... says it has formulated each Guideline to apply to a heartland of typical cases. Atypical cases were not “adequately taken into consideration,” and factors that may make a case atypical provide potential bases for departure. Potential departure factors “cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance,” 1995 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, of course. Faced with this reality, the Commission chose to prohibit consideration of only a few factors, and not otherwise to limit, as a categorical matter, the considerations which might bear upon the decision to depart.
Id. at 94, 116 S.Ct. 2035.
Applying these rules to the defendants in Koon, the Court concluded that three factors that have nothing to do with the *982defendants’ conduct justified downward departure. Those three factors were: (1) that Rodney King’s misconduct contributed significantly to provoking the officers’ offense conduct; (2) that the extraordinary national media attention the case garnered made the officers “unusually susceptible to prison abuse”; and (3) that the decision of federal prosecutors to try the officers “following a state acquittal based on the same underlying conduct ... significantly bur-dented] the defendants.” Id. at 103-05, 111-13, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
Finally, the Guidelines themselves broadly define the factors that may warrant a departure. Under the “Other Grounds for Departure” section, the Guidelines provide that
[a]n offender characteristic or other circumstance that is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should he outside the applicable guideline range may be relevant to this determination if such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the “heartland” cases covered by the guidelines in a way that is important to the statutory purposes of sentencing.
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (emphasis added). Sentencing uniformity is the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines. Departures that advance this goal are therefore in harmony with the Sentencing Guidelines.
In determining whether a specific ground for departure is in fact permissible under the Sentencing Guidelines, the Supreme Court has directed sentencing courts to ask the following questions:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ “heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case?
2) Has the Commission forbidden departures based on those features?
3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features?
4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those features?
Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir.1993)) (emphasis added). The district court in the present case did not consider these factors when confronted with Banuelos-Rodriguez’s motion for downward departure. Nor does the majority opinion in reviewing the district court’s decision. My review of these factors convinces me that sentencing disparities for illegal re-entry among defendants sentenced in contiguous federal districts based on U.S. Attorneys’ plea-bargaining policies can be a ground for departure in the appropriate case.
I first note that a disparity in sentencing among federal districts arising from plea-bargaining policies of U.S. Attorneys is not one of the factors forbidden by the Commission. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10, p.s. (forbidding “Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion, and Socio-Economic Status” as grounds for sentencing departure). Nor is such a disparity specifically “discouraged” by the Sentencing Guidelines. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (discussing specific offender characteristics that are discouraged as bases for departure under the Sentencing Guidelines). On the other hand, sentencing disparities that result from disparate plea-bargaining policies in contiguous federal districts are not described as an “encouraged” basis for departure in the Sentencing Guidelines. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s. (encouraging departures based on a defendant’s “significantly reduced mental capacity”).
Disparity in sentencing for illegal reentry among defendants sentenced in contiguous federal districts arising from the plea-bargaining policies of U.S. Attorneys is simply not a factor mentioned in the Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, the departure analysis turns to consideration of “the *983structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines taken as a whole.” Koon, 518 U.S. at 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
D. Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2
The structure and theory of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 suggest that a downward departure may be appropriate in this case. According to this guideline and the underlying statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1326, an alien’s sentencing exposure for entering the United States illegally after being deported varies dramatically depending on the nature of the underlying eonviction(s) that prompted his or her deportation. In general, if the alien was deported after “any” felony conviction, his or her offense level increases four levels. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(l)(B). If the alien’s underlying conviction was for an “aggravated” felony, his or her offense level increases sixteen levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2)(A).
The theory behind this guideline is manifest in its structure: the more extensive a reentering alien’s criminal history, the more severe the sentence. Conspicuously absent from the guideline is any reference to the location of arrest. It is simply not a factor in the guideline’s sentencing calculus. The Commission apparently never contemplated that the sentencing calculus for illegal re-entry would vary among contiguous districts. Yet, because of the disparate plea-bargaining policies among contiguous districts in California, the single most influential factor in sentencing a defendant for violating § 1326 is the location of his or her arrest. The “worst offender” with a criminal history category of VI and an offense level of 24, who crosses an invisible county line faces a maximum sentence in the Central District of 125 months, but only 60 months in the Southern, Eastern, or Northern Districts of California. For Banuelos-Rodriguez, crossing that invisible county line into the Central District of California meant that he faced a maximum sentence of 87 months, instead of 60 months. The structure and theory of § 2L1.2 certainly does not contemplate this sentencing disparity.2 As such, it is unjustified and may warrant a downward departure.
E. The Guidelines as A Whole
My examination of the structure and theory of the Sentencing Guidelines taken as a whole also leads me to conclude that sentencing disparities for § 1326 offenders arising from disparate district-wide plea-bargaining policies may warrant downward departure.
A central goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is to eliminate sentencing disparity. The purpose of the Sentencing Commission was to establish guidelines that “avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” • 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). As the Commission explained, “Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders.” U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, p.s. 3.
“Reasonable sentence uniformity” cannot be successfully achieved for § 1326 offenders unless the applicable guideline, § 2L1.2, is “read and applied in a consis*984tent manner.” William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 63, 71 (1993) (“Wilkins & Steer”).3 Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in contiguous districts in California are systematically reading and applying § 2L1.2 inconsistently by employing radically different plea bargaining policies in otherwise-similar cases. They do so not because defendants have accepted responsibility for their crimes, substantially assisted the government, or because other “features” of an individual defendant’s case warrant disparate treatment. They do so because of the serious administrative strain that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in these four California districts face in order to prosecute the most prosecuted offense in the state, i.e., illegal re-entry.
As a result, these disparate plea-bargaining policies have distorted the “heartland” of cases under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 in the State of California. This is a highly unusual set of circumstances that render § 1326 cases “rare” and “atypical” within the meaning of the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 cmt. The severity of the sentencing disparities, the lack of any connection between the disparities and the “features” of individual cases, coupled with the serious administrative strain on U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in four districts in California persuade me that the district court has discretion to consider a downward departure in this case.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion repeatedly insists that recognizing the discretionary authority of a district court in the Central District of California to depart in a § 1326 case on this basis amounts to impermissible judicial interference with the “prosecutor’s discretion regarding whom to prosecute, what charges to file, and whether to engage in plea negotiations.” See Majority Op. at 976. The law is indeed well-settled that “the discretion a prosecutor exercises when he decides what, if any, charges to bring against a criminal suspect[ ] ... is an integral feature of the criminal justice system, and is appropriate, so long as it is not based upon improper factors.” United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762, 117 S.Ct. 1673, 137 L.Ed.2d 1001 (1997). But the sentencing disparities at issue here are not the result of the exercise of a prosecutor’s charging discretion. They are the result of district-wide administrative decisions impacting defendants charged with the same offense and subject to the same enhancement factors. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that violations of § 1326(a) and 1326(b) constitute the same offense and that subsections 1326(b)(1) and (b)(2) merely set forth the sentencing enhancement for violations of § 1326(a)).
Similarly, while I recognize that a prosecutor has broad discretion in adopting plea-bargaining practices, I am nonetheless mindful that the Sentencing Guidelines “are intended to ensure that plea negotiation practices ... do not perpetuate unwarranted sentencing disparities.” U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B, intro., cmt. To this end, a court may accept a plea agreement “if the court determines that accepting the agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the sentencing guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a) (policy statement). The Sentencing Commission, however, recognized “the difficulty anticipating problems in this area.” U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B, intro., cmt. For this reason, the Commission deemed its policy statements on plea agreements to be “a first step toward implementing 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E). Congress indicated that it expects judges ‘to examine plea agreements to make cer*985tain that prosecutors have not used plea bargaining to undermine the sentencing guidelines.’ ” U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B, intro., cmt. (quoting S. Rep. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 68, 167 (1984), U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3246, 3350) (emphasis added).
In addition, the Sentencing Commission declared that imposing “substantive restrictions on judicial discretion would be premature at this stage of the Commission’s work” and that “sentencing guidelines [in this area] are themselves to some degree experimental.” Id. The Sentencing Commission also stated:
The present policy statements [concerning plea agreements] move in the desired direction in two ways. First, the policy statements make clear that sentencing is a judicial function and that the appropriate sentence in a guilty plea case is to be determined by the judge. This is a reaffirmation of pre-guidelines practice. Second, the policy statements ensure that the basis for any judicial decision to depart from the guidelines will be explained on the record. Explanations will be carefully analyzed by the Commission and will pave the way for more detailed policy statements presenting substantive criteria to achieve consistency in this aspect of the sentencing process.
U.S.S.G. ch. 6, pt. B, intro., cmt. (emphasis added).
Despite the majority opinion’s protestations to the contrary, see Majority Op. at 975-76, the Sentencing Commission explicitly wanted to eliminate “unwarranted sentencing disparity” stemming from the inappropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining. The Commission clearly stated that unjustified reductions in sentences granted by prosecutors in plea agreements “will tend to undermine the sentencing guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2, cmt. (policy statement). More importantly, the Commission stated that it will look to the judiciary to ensure that plea bargains do not undermine the Guidelines. By doing so, courts will alert the Commission to the need to adjust the relevant guidelines and policy statements. Indeed, “[t]he process of appellate review of sentences was designed both to ensure the appropriate application of the law and guidelines in the particular case and to aid the development of sentencing policy.” Wilkins & Steer, 50 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. at 69-70 & n. 37.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion asserts that if a sentencing court were permitted to grant a departure to offset plea-bargaining practices that undermine sentencing uniformity, the Doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be violated. See Majority Op. at 976-77. This doesn’t make sense, especially in light of the Commission’s own policy statements as the above discussion makes clear. Moreover, the majority premises its entire Separation of Powers discussion on the mistaken belief that the departure sought here is to equalize the sentences of defendants who pled guilty to different crimes. Under Almendarez-Torres, that is not the situation. Section 1326 defendants in the four contiguous federal districts in California are charged with the same offense: illegal re-entry in violation of § 1326.
Thus, prosecutors are not exercising their charging discretion or authority to plea bargain on a case-by-case basis among co-defendants or co-conspirators. If they were, there is no question that departure to offset the unequal treatment of such defendants is not permitted. See United States v. Mejia, 953 F.2d 461, 468 (9th Cir.1992). “Basic notions of fairness[, however,] dictate that defendants should be sentenced in proportion to their crimes.” Id. That is why “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines attempt to ensure that all defendants receive like sentences for like crimes.” Id. When prosecutors’ district-wide plea-bargaining practices frustrate such proportional sentencing results, departure may be warranted.
*986The government argues that each district’s U.S. Attorneys’ Office has the right to address their criminal problems differently. One cannot argue with that statement in the abstract. But the Sentencing Commission made it clear that the goal of national uniformity trumps “unbridled license to take community opinion and the incidence of particular types of crime into account” in determining the proper sentence for defendants convicted of the same offense. United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 352 (1st Cir.1989). This rule should apply whether the discretion of federal judges or prosecutors is at issue because permitting unjustified sentencing disparities for the same offense solely on the basis of “where the[ ] crimes occurred, would serve only to foster the very kind of wide variations in sentence severity which Congress apparently abhorred. Because both Congress and the Commission plainly intended the guidelines to be a means of eliminating regional disparity in sentencing ...,” such disparities should not be countenanced. Id. at 353; accord United States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 921 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1499 (5th Cir.1990).
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors in the Central, Southern, Eastern, and Northern Districts of California are using their authority to plea bargain on a wholesale, district-wide basis in a way that distorts the “heartland” of Guideline § 2L1.2 and defeats sentencing uniformity for violators of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Under such unique circumstances, a district court should be able to exercise its discretion to depart downward • to correct an unjustified sentencing disparity if the case warrants it.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the decision of the district court and remand so that the court may exercise its discretion and determine whether the circumstances of Banuelos-Rodriguez’s case warrant a downward departure.

. Banuelos-Rodriguez’s sole aggravated felony conviction involved one gram of methamphetamine. Because of this conviction, his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 is automatically enhanced 16 levels. Guideline § 2L1.2 does not distinguish between aggravated felony convictions involving 100 kilos of a controlled substance and one gram of a controlled substance. The sentencing enhancement is the same.

. Indeed, Congress never contemplated such a wide disparity between the minimum and maximum range of a sentence either. To foster both sentencing uniformity and proportionality of punishment on an individual basis, Congress mandated the boundaries of any guideline sentencing range. See William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, The Role of Sentencing Guideline Amendments in Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing Disparity, 50 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 63, 70-71 & n. 44 (1993). Section 994(b)(2) of Title 28 provides that "the maximum range established by [a guideline] shall not exceed the minimum term of the range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months....’’ 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). The difference between 60 months and 87 months exceeds those bounds.

. The authors of this article are Judge William A. Wilkins, Jr., Circuit Judge for tire United Slates Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and Chairman of the United States Sentencing Commission; and John R. Steer, General Counsel, United Slates Sentencing Commission.