Court Opinion

ID: 9645205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:16:18.689051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:24.910804
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I concur in the result of the majority in reversing this case and sending it back for a new trial; however, I dissent from the portion of the opinion tht would allow part of the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal warrant to be used in evidence at the new trial. I cannot understand how the majority can hold that the arrest warrant was invalid yet allow the fruits of the poisonous tree to be used against the appellant. The majority recognized that Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); and Rodriquez v. State, 262 Ark. 659, 559 S.W. 2d 925 (1978), required the suppression of evidence received as a result of a search based on an illegal warrant. They attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground that the search was of an automobile in those two cases rather than the search of the person. It is my opinion that a person has as much protection under the constitution as his automobile. In fact, part of the evidence in the present case was obtained by the search of an automobile, although the car was not the appellant’s. In Rodriquez v. State, supra, we held that when an officer relied upon information furnished by another officer to effect an arrest, the officer furnishing the information must have had probable cause to believe that the accused had committed the offense before the fruits of the illegal search could be introduced and the evidence used against the accused. We stated that the state must demonstrate, at a supression hearing, that the sending officer possessed the requisite probable cause to act. In this case it is admitted that the warrant was invalid; therefore, the sending officer had no probable cause and the evidence should have been suppressed. In Rodriquez v. State, supra, we quoted from Whiteley v. 'Warden, supra, which stated: We do not, of course, question that the Laramie police were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where, however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest. In the case of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1973), the district court and the court of appeals held the arrest illegal but allowed an oral confession at the time of the arrest, as well as certain drugs surrendered by third parties, to be admitted into evidence. The United States Supreme Court stated there was not probable cause for an arrest warrant, therefore the fruits of the arrest were inadmissible. The Court stated: ... It is basic that an arrest with or without a warrant must stand upon firmer ground than mere suspicion . . . though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence which would suffice to convict. The quantum of information which constitutes probable cause-evidence which would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that a felony has been committed, ... must be measured by the facts of the particular case. The history of the use, ... of the power to arrest cautions that a relaxation of the fundamental requirements of probable cause would “leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176. The test in cases such as we have before us is “whether the officer could, on the information which impelled them to act, have procured a warrant for the arrest.” Without a doubt, the sending officer had no information of any sort to indicate the appellant had committed a felony. The only information on file was a stale invalid warrant for a misdemeanor, which was of doubtful origin in the first place. In fact, it was defective on its face. In Wong Sun v. United States, supra, the Court stated: In order to make effective the fundamental constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the person, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, this Court held nearly half, a century ago that evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383. The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 383_ Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12.1, provides for a search of a person and property incident to a lawful arrest; neither this rule nor any other rule authorizes even a “pat-down” search pursuant to an illegal arrest. The search pursuant to a legal arrest is made for the purpose of protecting the officer. I have never heard of anyone being injured by a bag of marijuana, a packet of pills, or any similar item; nor do I think it is reasonable for an officer to fear injury from such items. In fact, it was conclusively proven in this case that the officer had no fear of injury from the container-in which the ten pills were found; because, after examining them, the officer replaced them in appellant’s pocket. There can be no stronger evidence that there was no fear of danger by the officer. The only purpose of such a complete and exclusive search, under the guise of a pat-down, is to discover incriminating evidence. Before such items may be used against an accused, the items must be discovered incidental to a legal arrest or the result of a valid search warrant. I am unwilling to be a part of any decision that would legalize procedures expressly prohibited by the const1: • tion nor will I participate in overruling our own decisions through such a disguise. Therefore, I would hold that all of the evidence received as a result of this illegal warrant be excluded. I am authorized to state that Mays, J., joins me in this opinion.