Court Opinion

ID: 9353084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:00:57.917917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:29.457759
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 YOUSOF RAHIMIAN,

                        Plaintiff,

                        v.                            Civil Action No. 22-785 (BAH)

 ANTONY J. BLINKEN, in his official                   Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell
 capacity as Secretary of State, et al.,

                        Defendants.

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Plaintiff Yousof Rahimian, a U.S. citizen, seeks to compel defendants—various federal

officials in their official capacities—to adjudicate his wife’s visa application, which has been

pending without decision for over three years. Amended Compl. (“Am. Compl.”) ¶ 14, ECF No.

2. Plaintiff claims defendants have unreasonably delayed the visa application in violation of the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), id. ¶ 14–29, and the Mandamus Act, id. ¶ 30–34, and

have done so intentionally by applying the policies of the Controlled Application Review and

Resolution Program (“CARRP”) to their review of the visa application, id. ¶ 35–39, in violation

of the Immigration and National Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., Article 1, Section 8,

Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the APA,

id. ¶ 40. Defendants have moved to dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction, under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss & Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”) at 1, ECF No. 8. For the

reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

I.     BACKGROUND

                                                  1
       Following a brief review of the statutory and regulatory background, the factual history

underlying the claims and procedural history of this case are summarized below.

       A.      Statutory and Regulatory Background

       The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., authorizes the

issuance of visas to different categories of immigrants, including relatives of U.S. citizens. 8

U.S.C. § 1154; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1), (b). A U.S. citizen seeking to obtain lawful permanent

resident status for an immediate relative, including a spouse, must file a Form I-130, Petition for

Alien Relative, with U.S. Customs and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154,

1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (defining a spouse as an “immediate relative” of a citizen for the purposes of

Form I-130 petitioners); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). If USCIS approves the petition, the case is

forwarded to the National Visa Center (“NVC”), which is the U.S. Department of State (“State

Department”) visa application processing center. Id. § 204.2(a)(3). The foreign spouse must

then submit additional paperwork and fees to NVC. See 22 C.F.R. § 42.67 (outlining application

fees and additional documentation that an applicant must submit to NVC to complete the

application, including an oath and a signature on Forms DS-230 and 260, a “[f]orm of attestation

for certain repeat applications due to COVID-19,” registration requirements, and fingerprints).

After processing the requisite materials, NVC schedules an interview for the applicant with a

consular officer at the embassy with jurisdiction over the applicant’s residence. Id. § 42.62.

Following the interview, the consular officer must either issue or refuse the visa. Id. § 42.81(a).

       B.      Factual Background

       In February 2018, plaintiff filed an I-130 visa petition on his wife’s behalf with USCIS,

hoping to have her join him in the United States as a lawful permanent resident. Am. Compl. ¶¶

1, 14. USCIS approved plaintiff’s petition on July 24, 2019, and forwarded the application to

                                                 2
NVC on November 6, 2019, id. (showing plaintiff’s USCIS receipt number); Case Status Online,

U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., https://egov.uscis.gov/casestatus/landing.do (last visited

on Jan. 9, 2023) (showing plaintiff’s USCIS case status, based on the provided receipt number,

as “Case Was Approved”), and plaintiff has paid all the requisite fees, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 31.

Unfortunately, and very frustrating to plaintiff and his spouse, the application has yet to be

adjudicated. Id. ¶ 1. The next step in the process is for plaintiff’s wife to attend a consular

interview in Turkey, where she currently resides, so that her visa application can be finally

adjudicated. 22 C.F.R. § 42.62; see Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (identifying plaintiff’s State Department

application number); Visa Status Check, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://ceac.state.gov/CEACStatTracker/Status.aspx (last visited on Jan. 9, 2023) (showing

plaintiff’s case status, based on the provided application number, as “At NVC”).

        In March 2020, the State Department temporarily suspended visa services at all U.S.

embassies and consulates, including the embassy in Turkey, due to the onset of the COVID-19

pandemic. Suspension of Routine Visa Services, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/visas-news-

archive/suspension-of-routine-visa-services.html (July 22, 2020). 1 In July 2020, the State

Department authorized a phased resumption of visa services. Id. Subsequently, in November

2021, the State Department returned broad discretion to embassies and consulates in determining

how to prioritize appointments as safely as possible in all visa categories. Visa Services

Operating Status Update, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/News/visas-news/visa-services-operating-status-

update.html (Nov. 19, 2021).

1
         The Court may take judicial notice of information posted on official public websites of government
agencies. See Cannon v. District of Columbia, 717 F.3d 200, 205 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

                                                        3
       Despite efforts to resume pre-pandemic processing capabilities, many embassies and

consulates face a substantial backlog of immigrant visa applications. See National Visa Center

(NVC) Immigrant Visa Backlog Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,

https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-resources/visas-backlog.html

(last visited Jan. 9, 2023); see also Briefing, Julie M. Stufft, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary,

Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Update on U.S. Immigrant Visa Processing at

Embassies and Consulates (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-

centers/update-on-u-s-immigrant-visa-processing-at-embassies-and-consulates/. This backlog

has caused increased wait times for individual applicants awaiting an appointment date from

NVC. Id. According to the State Department’s website, the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey,

much like other embassies around the world, is experiencing a substantial pandemic-related

backlog in every visa category, resulting in significant delays in the scheduling of consular

interviews. See Immigrant Visas, U.S. Embassy in Turkey,

https://tr.usembassy.gov/visas/immigrant-visas/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2023). Nonetheless, the State

Department has publicly committed “to resolve backlogs and process visas as quickly and

efficiently as [it] can” while also ensuring that the “health and safety of [its] personnel and [its]

clients coming into [the] consular sections abroad” remain “the department’s highest priority

during the pandemic.” Briefing, Julie Stufft.

       Despite plaintiff’s repeated attempts to contact NVC regarding his case, NVC has yet to

provide any meaningful status update or any information on processing times. After USCIS

approved plaintiff’s petition on July 24, 2019, plaintiff sent multiple requests to USCIS and NVC

inquiring as to the status of his petition. Declaration of Yousof Rahimian (“Rahimian Decl.”) at

1, ECF No. 9-2. Then, on December 8, 2020, NVC approved plaintiff’s application and

                                                   4
responded to his previous inquiries, informing him that the application had been approved. Pl.’s

Opp’n Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 5, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff was then informed that his

“case status had been moved to the final stage whereby an appointment would be scheduled at

the U.S. Embassy in Turkey.” Id. at 5. On April 3 and 7, 2021, plaintiff sent expedite requests

to NVC and explained “the strenuous circumstances [plaintiff’s] wife was living under.”

Rahimian Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. NVC responded on August 3, 2021, informing plaintiff that the

embassy in Turkey would not grant plaintiff’s wife an interview at that time. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff

then requested that the case be transferred to the U.S. embassy in Abu-Dhabi, but the request was

denied on September 8, 2021. Id. ¶ 12–13. Since then, plaintiff contacted NVC three times

requesting updates and expedition of his application, but the Turkish embassy has not yet

scheduled an interview for plaintiff’s wife. Id. ¶¶ 14–17.

       As a result, plaintiff and his wife have remained separated for more than five years with

no indication as to when the delay in adjudicating the application may be resolved. Pl.’s Opp’n

at 5–6. This prolonged separation “has caused significant personal and emotional hardship” for

the couple. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. In plaintiff’s words, “[i]n Muslim culture, once a woman is

married, she is supposed to leave her parents and move in with her husband.” Id. Plaintiff’s

wife “moved out in November 2021,” and she “has been living alone in Turkey without support,

waiting for the visa application to be issued.” Id. This delay has also placed significant financial

strain on plaintiff, has delayed his wife’s pursuit of her Ph.D., and has derailed plaintiff and his

wife’s plan to start a family. Id.

       C.      Procedural Background

                                                  5
        On March 23, 2022, plaintiff filed this case “to compel the [d]efendants to take action on

and adjudicate his wife’s [] visa application.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1. 2 Plaintiff alleges that

“[d]efendants owe a non-discretionary duty to adjudicate this immigration case,” which duty he

seeks to enforce with relief under the APA and the Mandamus Act. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff also claims

that defendants have unlawfully delayed his wife’s visa application, pursuant to the Controlled

Application Review and Resolution Program (“CARRP”), a Department of Homeland Security

program “which intentionally delays the applications of Muslims or those from predominantly-

Muslim countries due to perceived security concerns.” Id. ¶ 5.

        Defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defs.’ Mot. at 1. Specifically, defendants argue that the

federal officials named as defendants “cannot provide the relief requested” because “either they

have no role in adjudicating the request for a visa or they completed their role in the process.”

Id. at 6. Alternatively, defendants contend that “the delay in adjudication of plaintiff’s visa

application by the State Department is not unreasonable,” id. at 7, and so plaintiff “fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted,” id. at 5; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants’ motion is

now ripe for review.

II.     LEGAL STANDARD

        A.       Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

        “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256

(2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)), and

“have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted

2
         Plaintiff filed an initial complaint on March 22, 2022, see Complaint, ECF No. 1, then amended the
complaint the next day, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), see Am. Compl. ECF No. 2. All
references herein are therefore to the Amended Complaint.

                                                       6
by Congress pursuant thereto,” Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 980

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986)). To

survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff thus

“bears the burden of invoking the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797

F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

        When a jurisdictional argument “present[s] a dispute over the factual basis of the court’s

subject matter jurisdiction, . . . the court must go beyond the pleadings and resolve” any dispute

necessary to the disposition of the motion to dismiss. Feldman v. FDIC, 879 F.3d 347, 351

(D.C. Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting Phoenix Consulting v. Republic of Angola, 216

F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The court must accept as true “material factual allegations in the

complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences

that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). In addition,

however, the “court may properly consider . . . evidentiary material in the record,” again

affording the plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Feldman, 879 F.3d at 351.

        B.      Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

        To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the “complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–58 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009)). A facially plausible claim pleads facts that are not “‘merely consistent with’ a

defendant’s liability” but that “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)); see also Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir.

                                                    7
2012). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must consider the whole complaint,

accepting all factual allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Courts do not, however, “assume the truth of legal conclusions . . . nor . . . accept inferences that

are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19 (internal citation

omitted). “In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim,” a court “may consider only

the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the

complaint and matters of which [courts] may take judicial notice.” Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d

178, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621,

624–25 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).

III.     DISCUSSION

         Defendants provide three reasons for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6): first, the

federal officials plaintiff names cannot grant the relief he seeks, Defs.’ Mot. at 6–7; second,

plaintiff fails to state a claim of unreasonable delay in the adjudication of his visa application

under the APA and Mandamus Act, id. at 7–17; and, finally, plaintiff’s CARRP claims are

conclusory and lack any kind of factual basis, id. at 17–18. 3 For the reasons explained below,

defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted on all three grounds. Before addressing the merits,

defendant’s threshold jurisdictional issue must be addressed. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a

Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any

cause.” (internal citation omitted)).

         A.       Plaintiff’s Claims Against Certain Federal Officials Are Moot

3
          In this case, omission of an index of the administrative record is proper because the index requirement
applies to agency action, rather than the agency inaction challenged here. Consequently, the agency administrative
record is not necessary for resolution of the pending motion. Connecticut v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 344 F. Supp. 3d
279, 294 (D.D.C. 2018).

                                                          8
       Defendants contend that claims asserted against officials from the Department of

Homeland Security and its component, USCIS, should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) because

those officials have completed their role with respect to plaintiff’s visa application and therefore

cannot provide the relief plaintiff seeks. Id. at 6–7.

       “Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to ‘cases’ and

‘controversies.’” Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 160 (2016) (quoting U.S.

CONST. art. III, § 2). The Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement to “demand that ‘an

actual controversy . . . be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is

filed.’” Id. (omission in original) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.

43, 67 (1997)). “[A] case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the

parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Porzecanski v. Azar, 943 F.3d 472,

479 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C.

Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018) (requiring

the resolution of a dispute to “have direct consequences on the parties involved” (quoting

Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 71 (2013))). The initial “heavy” burden of

establishing mootness lies with the party asserting a case is moot, see Motor & Equip. Mfrs.

Ass’n v. Nichols, 142 F.3d 449, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1998), but the opposing party bears the burden of

showing an exception applies, see S. Co. Servs., Inc. v. FERC, 416 F.3d 39, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

“A case that becomes moot at any point during the proceedings is ‘no longer a “Case” or

“Controversy” for purposes of Article III,’ and is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”

Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1537 (quoting Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013)).

       Plaintiff’s claims against officials from the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS

are moot. When plaintiff filed his complaint, USCIS, a component of the Department of

                                                  9
Homeland Security, had already approved plaintiff’s visa petition and forwarded it to NVC for

further processing. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14; see also Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. Accordingly, the

Department of Homeland Security’s and USCIS’ roles in processing the visa application are

complete. For the application process to proceed, the State Department must schedule a consular

interview, after which a consular officer will issue or refuse the visa. 22 C.F.R. §§ 42.62, 42.81.

         Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support the claim that officials from the Department of

Homeland Security or USCIS have continued involvement in processing the application for

plaintiff’s wife beyond NVC’s handling of the case. 4 Likewise, plaintiff’s claim that “sometimes

an immigration case may be sent back to the USCIS,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, stops short of alleging

that such transfer occurred in his case, let alone cites any factual basis for this argument. In the

absence of such supporting facts, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that an “‘actual and

concrete dispute’ exists between the parties.” Mahmood v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-

cv-1262 (RC), 2021 WL 5998385, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 2021) (dismissing similar claims

asserted against officials from the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS for failure to

allege sufficient facts showing that either agency was still involved in plaintiff’s visa processing

(citing Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1537)); Brzezinski v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-

cv-376 (RC), 2021 WL 4191958, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2021) (same). Accordingly, plaintiff’s

4
          More specifically, plaintiff contends that “[g]overnment [d]efendants work together and frequently transfer
cases back and forth,” and “sometimes an immigration case may be sent back to the USCIS.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10.
Plaintiff further argues that “[b]ecause these [g]overnment entities frequently transfer cases back and forth, and they
work together, calling a case moot against one agency because it’s temporarily in the possession of another would
frustrate any attempt at litigation.” Id. This argument is similarly unpersuasive. Even if plaintiff is correct that
there could be a potential transfer of his case between agencies, nothing in the record suggests that such a transfer is
occurring or would occur in this case. This assertion is far too speculative to avoid the finding that plaintiff’s claim
against the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS are moot.

                                                          10
claims against officials from the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS must be

dismissed as moot. 5

         B.       The Alleged Delay in Decision on Plaintiff’s Application Is Not
                  Unreasonable, Requiring Dismissal of Claims for Failure to State a Claim

         Plaintiff next argues that the delay in visa adjudication is unreasonable, and therefore, a

violation of the APA and the Mandamus Act. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 14–34. Defendants counter that

plaintiff’s claim must fail, as a matter of law, because the forty-one-month delay at issue in this

case is not unreasonable. Defs.’ Mot. at 7–17. 6

         The APA requires agencies to “proceed to conclude a matter presented to [them]” in a

“reasonable time,” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and authorizes reviewing courts to “compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). In determining whether a delay in

agency action is unreasonable, the D.C. Circuit has enumerated six factors for consideration:

                  (1) [T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by
                  a rule of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or
                  other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to
                  proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply
                  content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable
                  in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human
                  health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the
                  effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher
                  or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the
                  nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the

5
          For similar reasons, officials from the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) are dismissed as parties to this case. Plaintiff claims that these defendants “together [] are responsible for
adjudicating visa petitions, implementing the Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’), and ensuring compliance
with all applicable federal laws, including the APA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 9; accord id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff, however, does not
state facts to show how officials from the Department of Justice and FBI have any involvement in the remaining
steps of plaintiff’s visa processing. As with plaintiff’s claims against the Department of Homeland Security and
USCIS officials, claims against Department of Justice and FBI officials may be dismissed as moot. See Sanchez-
Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1537. Alternatively, plaintiff’s claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a claim because plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that officials from the Department of Justice or FBI
had any hand in causing the complained-of delay in the processing of the visa application. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more
than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

6
         The last government action in this matter occurred in July 2019. Am. Compl. ¶ 14.

                                                          11
               court need not find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude
               in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.

Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC (“TRAC”), 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (internal

citations omitted and formatting modified). This standard applies to claims of unreasonable

delay under both the Mandamus Act and the APA. See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542

U.S. 55, 63–64 (2004); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2016). In

analyzing and balancing the TRAC factors as applied in this case, the agency delay in

adjudicating plaintiff’s visa application is not unreasonable.

               1.      TRAC Factors 1 & 2

       The first TRAC factor is the most important, In re Core Commc’ns Inc., 531 F.3d 859,

855 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and is “typically considered together” with the second TRAC factor,

Milligan v. Pompeo, 502 F. Supp. 3d 302, 317 (D.D.C. 2020). Both these factors weigh in

defendants’ favor.

       As defendants correctly point out, “Congress has established no firm timetable for

processing the visa request at issue here,” Defs.’ Mot. at 9; see also Mahmood, 2021 WL

5998385, at *7 (finding the same). Instead, Congress has given “agencies wide discretion in the

area of immigration processing.” Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2017)

(finding that a two-year delay in processing a visa application “does not typically require judicial

intervention”). Looking to “supply content for th[e] rule of reason,” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80,

plaintiff points to 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b), the preamble to legislation providing for the institution of

measures to reduce the backlog in processing of immigration benefits by the now-defunct

Immigration and Naturalization Service, which states “[i]t is the sense of Congress that the

processing of any immigration benefit application should be completed not later than 180 days

after the initial filing of the application,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b)).

                                                 12
Plaintiff argues that this language proves Congress’s intent to set a six-month timetable for the

State Department’s processing of applications. Id.

       This Court has previously found Section 1571(b) to add some weight in a plaintiff’s favor

for the second TRAC factor. See Nibber v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., No. 20-cv-3207

(BAH), 2020 WL 7360215, at *6 & n.5 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2020) (collecting cases finding 8 U.S.C

§ 1571(b) relevant to the TRAC analysis in cases involving unreasonable delay by USCIS in

adjudicating immigration benefit applications). Yet, as defendants note, plaintiff has failed to

identify any authority holding that the preamble applies to the State Department’s scheduling of

visa application interviews. Defs.’ Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 3–4, ECF No.

10. In fact, several cases suggest otherwise. See Logan v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-2275 (FYP), 2022

WL 3715798, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2022) (“[T]he language of 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) ‘is best

interpreted as non-binding . . . [a]nd [that] a contrary holding would ignore the overwhelming

caselaw rejecting unreasonable delay challenges for applications that remained pending well

beyond the 180-day window that Congress contemplated in 8 U.S.C. § 1571.’” (quoting

Mohammad v. Blinken, 548 F. Supp. 3d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2021)) (internal citation omitted));

Murway v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1618 (RJL), 2022 WL 493082, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2022)

(rejecting the argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) applies to visa cases alleging unreasonable delay

in processing by consular officials at the State Department); El Centro Reg’l Med. Ctr. v.

Blinken, No. 21-cv-361 (DMS), 2021 WL 3141205, at *4 & n.2 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2021)

(“[T]he plain text of § 1571 indicates that it applies to the processing of immigrant benefit

applications by USCIS, not consular officials at the State Department.”). Accordingly, Section

1571(b) does not salvage plaintiff’s claim.

                                                 13
        “Absent a congressionally supplied yardstick, courts typically turn to case law as a

guide.” Sarlak v. Pompeo, No. 20-cv-35 (BAH), 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (D.D.C. June 10,

2020); see Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (collecting cases). No bright lines exist in this context,

but “[d]istrict courts have generally found that immigration delays in excess of five, six, seven

years are unreasonable, while those between three to five years are often not unreasonable.”

Sarlak, 2020 WL 3082018, at *6 (quoting Yavari v. Pompeo, No. 19-cv-02524 (SVW), 2019 WL

6720995, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2019)); see also Skalka, 246 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (concluding

based on “comparable cases” that “a delay of [two years] does not typically require judicial

intervention”); Arab v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1852 (BAH), 2022 WL 1184551, at *8 (D.D.C. Apr.

21, 2022) (ruling that a thirty-month delay was not unreasonable). Plaintiff cites no persuasive

authority holding otherwise. Furthermore, a court in this District deemed a similar delay of

forty-two months “insufficient to warrant emergency relief in this district” under the first and

second TRAC factors. See Zaman v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-3592 (ABJ), 2021

WL 5356284, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 16, 2021). Accordingly, the forty-one-month delay in this case

is not long enough to tilt the first two TRAC factors in favor of plaintiff.

       Of course, whether a “rule of reason” exists for agency action “cannot be decided in the

abstract, by reference to some number of months or years beyond which agency inaction is

presumed to be unlawful, but will depend in large part . . . upon the complexity of the task at

hand, the significance (and permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the

agency.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir.

2003). Defendants explain that “the operational impacts of COVID-19 have delayed scheduling”

the consular interview required to adjudicate plaintiff’s visa application. Defs.’ Mot. at 3;

accord id. at 10. In March 2020, eight months after USCIS approved plaintiff’s petition and

                                                  14
forwarded the application to NVC, U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide shut down due to

the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the State Department authorized a phased resumption of

visa services in July 2020, it gave broad discretion to embassies and consulates to determine how

to prioritize visa appointments as safely as possible in all visa categories. The temporary

suspension and limited resumption of services has resulted in a substantial backlog at the U.S.

Embassy in Turkey. Id. at 3. Given this backlog and ongoing public health considerations

impacting consular staff operations, the first two TRAC factors weigh decisively in defendants’

favor. See Murway, 2022 WL 493082, at *3 (finding that “operational delays due to the

COVID-19 pandemic favor the Government on the first two [TRAC] factors”); Zaman, 2021 WL

5356284, at *6 (same); Khan v. Blinken, No. 21-cv-1683 (JEB), 2021 WL 5356267, at *3

(D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2021) (same); see also Tate v. Pompeo, 513 F. Supp. 3d 132, 150–51 (D.D.C.

2021) (finding that the government’s determination of “how to allocate scarce resources in a

global pandemic outweigh[s] [visa applicants’] interests in immediate adjudication of their

visas”).

                2.      TRAC Factors 3 & 5

        The third and fifth TRAC factors consider whether “human health and welfare are at

stake” and the “nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80.

In this case, these factors weigh in plaintiff’s favor.

        The delay in processing plaintiff’s visa petition has exacerbated the five-year separation

endured by plaintiff and his wife, which has put a strain on the couple financially and

emotionally, delayed his wife’s education, and prevented the couple from being able to start a

family. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The impact of the delay risks the health and welfare of plaintiff and his

wife. See Didban v. Pompeo, 435 F. Supp. 3d 168, 177 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding the third and

                                                  15
fifth TRAC factors to weigh in plaintiff’s favor in light of the prolonged separation of spouses);

see also Bagherian v. Pompeo, 442 F. Supp. 3d 87, 95 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding the third and fifth

TRAC factors to weigh in plaintiff’s favor in light of the prolonged separation of an engaged

couple); Tate, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 150 (finding the third and fifth TRAC factors to weigh in

plaintiffs’ favor in light of the separation of friends, family, and loved ones). Defendants do not

contradict that finding, but instead offer that the visa interview of plaintiff’s wife “has been

delayed further due to measures necessary to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and protect the

safety of U.S. officials—and visa applicants—abroad.” Defs.’ Mot. at 15–16. That point is valid

and understood, but the nature of plaintiff’s interests and prejudice to those interests from delay

in processing the visa still weigh in his favor. 7

                 3.       TRAC Factor 4

        The fourth TRAC factor requires the court to “consider the effect of expediting delayed

action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. The D.C.

Circuit affords the fourth TRAC factor great weight, see Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council,

Inc., 336 F.3d at 1100, and this factor conclusively favors defendants’ position here.

        As discussed above, defendants face an extraordinary backlog of visas not only in the

embassy in Turkey but around the world. Accordingly, deference must be given to the State

Department’s priority-setting and resource-allocation decisions. See Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at

319 (“[D]elays stemming from resource-allocation decisions simply do not lend themselves to

‘judicial “reordering[s] [of] agency priorities.”’ (alterations in original) (quoting Bagherian, 442

F. Supp. 3d at 96); Liberty Fund, Inc. v. Chao, 394 F. Supp. 2d 105, 117 (D.D.C. 2005)

(“[W]here resource allocation is the source of the delay, courts have declined to expedite action

7
         Relevant to TRAC factors 3 and 5, defendants add that plaintiff simply advocates for jumping the line ahead
of other visa applicants. Defs.’ Mot. at 15. That point is better considered under the TRAC factor four analysis.

                                                        16
because of the impact on competing priorities.”); Tate, 513 F. Supp. 3d at 149 (“Relief that

would simply ‘reorder’ a queue of applicants seeking adjudication is generally viewed as

inappropriate when ‘no net gain’ in such adjudications is achieved.” (quoting In re Barr Labs.,

Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991))); see also, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192

(collecting cases that “rejected mandamus claims that would have had the effect of allowing the

plaintiffs to jump the line, functionally solving their delay problem at the expense of other

similarly situated applicants”).

       Plaintiff responds with non-binding, out-of-circuit opinions holding “that there is

insufficient evidence in the record as to the existence of a queue, the plaintiff’s place in the

queue, or procedures for determining the order of adjudications,” and, even if such a queue

existed, he and his family “should not be penalized for a lack of agency resources,” Pl.’s Opp’n

at 14. First, the State Department website describes the backlog of immigrant visa applications

worldwide and the 377,953 applicant interviews still pending scheduling after all December

2022 interview slots were taken. See National Visa Center (NWC) Immigrant Visa Backlog

Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/visa-information-

resources/visas-backlog.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2023). Plaintiff’s application is among those

many thousands. Second, despite the significant burdens the pandemic and defendants’

necessary responses impose on blameless applicants, D.C. Circuit precedent recognizes “no basis

for reordering agency priorities” when an “agency is in a unique—and authoritative—position

to . . . allocate its resources in the optimal way.” In re Barr Labs, 930 F.2d at 76. As a result,

the fourth factor weighs in defendants’ favor.

               4.      TRAC Factor 6

                                                  17
        Finally, TRAC factor six states that “the court need not ‘find any impropriety lurking

behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is “unreasonably delayed.”’” TRAC,

750 F.2d at 80. Here, plaintiff does not allege that the agencies involved in the adjudication

process have acted improperly, see Pl.’s Opp’n at 18 (“[W]hether an agency’s impropriety

contributed to the delay[, that] helps a plaintiff if bad faith is present, but its absence does not

impair an otherwise strong claim.”), nor could he because the government’s good faith efforts to

address processing delays caused by the pandemic weigh against relief. See Tate, 513 F. Supp.

3d at 150 (holding the same citing Liberty Fund, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d at 119–20)). Plaintiff is

understandably frustrated that defendants’ lack of resources and response to the pandemic has

unfairly resulted in profound hardship for him and his wife, but that does not cure the pleading

deficiency in his complaint.

                5.      TRAC Factors Considered in Totality

        Considering all six TRAC factors, plaintiff has not stated a claim under the APA or the

Mandamus Act for unreasonable delay. Murway, 2022 WL 493082, *5 (reaching the same

conclusion); Logan, 2022 WL 3715798, at *7 (same); Arab, 2022 WL 1184551, at *10 (same);

Zaman, 2021 WL 5356284, at *6–8 (same); Mahmood, 2021 WL 5998385, at *9 (same);

Milligan, 502 F. Supp. 3d at 320 (same). Although TRAC factors three and five lean in

plaintiff’s favor, after evaluating the factors holistically, the delay is not unreasonable in light of

the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court deeply sympathizes with plaintiff’s hardship and the effect

it has had on his family. Unfortunately, many other families are in similar, difficult

circumstances and defendants face challenges in determining how best to deploy scarce

resources during an unprecedented global pandemic. Taking the factors as a whole, the rule of

reason found in the caselaw coupled with “the government’s interests in balancing its own

                                                  18
priorities” outweighs the real hardship this delay has caused plaintiff and his wife. Milligan, 502

F. Supp. 3d at 320 (quoting Bagherian, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 95–96); see, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n,

812 F.3d at 192 (collecting cases “reject[ing] mandamus claims that would have had the effect of

allowing the plaintiffs to jump the line, functionally solving their delay problem at the expense of

other similarly situated applicants”). The State Department delay does not warrant judicial

intervention at this juncture, but as circumstances surrounding the pandemic change, the Court’s

consideration of these factors might also change in the face of continued, extended delays. See,

e.g., Scott Pelley, President Joe Biden: The 2022 60 Minutes Interview, CBS NEWS, Sept. 18,

2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/president-joe-biden-60-minutes-interview-transcript-

2022-09-18/ (President Biden: “The pandemic is over. We still have a problem with COVID.

We’re still doing a lotta work on it. It’s-- but the pandemic is over. [I]f you notice, no one’s

wearing masks. Everybody seems to be in pretty good shape. And so I think it’s changing.”).

       C.      Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim of Intentional Delay Based on CARRP

       Plaintiff claims that “[d]efendants are intentionally delaying this visa application because

of an application of the CARRP program.” Am. Compl. ¶ 39. According to plaintiff, the

Department of Homeland Security uses CARRP “far more expansive[ly] than the security-

related ineligibility criteria for immigration applications set forth by Congress in the INA” by

using “deeply flawed and expansive government watchlists, and other vague and overbroad

criteria.” Id. ¶ 38. Given that plaintiff’s wife is from a predominantly Muslim country, plaintiff

alleges that the unlawful application of CARRP brands “innocent, law-abiding residents, like

[p]laintiff and his wife as ‘national security concerns’ on account of innocuous activity and

associations, and characteristics such as national origin.” Id. Defendants counter that plaintiff’s

CARRP claim is “untenable” because “he offers nothing more than speculation that CARRP has

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played any role in the [d]elay” of his visa application. Defs.’ Mot. at 17. At the outset, officials

from the Department of Homeland Security and USCIS are dismissed from this action, see supra

Section III.A, and so their alleged unlawful application of CARRP is of no consequence here.

Even assuming, however, that the State Department utilizes CARRP in coordinating with the

Department of Homeland Security, as plaintiff alleges, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35–37, defendants are

correct that the CARRP claim fails.

         Plaintiff’s CARRP claim fails to provide sufficient factual support and instead relies “on

information and belief” that “[d]efendants are intentionally delaying this visa application because

of an application of the CARRP program.” Id. ¶ 39. Courts “do not assume the truth of legal

conclusions, . . . nor do [they] ‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the

complaint.’” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Islamic Am. Relief

Agency (IARA-USA) v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (2007)). Given the absence of any factual

predicate, defendants’ motion to dismiss the CARRP claim is granted. See Ghadami v. U.S.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19-cv-397 (ABJ), 2020 WL 1308376, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2020)

(dismissing a similar claim because plaintiffs failed to “set forth any factual allegations to

support” the conclusion that defendants intentionally delayed plaintiff’s vis application pursuant

to CARRP); Mahmood, 2021 WL 5998385, at *6 (same); Al-Saadoon v. Barr, 973 F.3d 794, 804

(8th Cir. 2020) (affirming a dismissal of CARRP claims on the same ground). 8

8
         Indeed, CARRP is a USCIS policy, and USCIS has completed its role in processing the application.
Moreover, as several other courts have found, publicly available documents released by USCIS state that CARRP
does not apply to I-130 petitions. See Mahmood, 2021 WL 5998385, at *5–6 & n.6 (citing U.S. Citizenship and
Immigr. Servs., Fraud Detection & National Security Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program
(CARRP) Independent Study 28 (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/FDNS-CARRP-Independent-Study-Powerpoint-v.-1.1-Dec.-28-2011.pdf); Ghadami, 2020
WL 1308376, at *6 (same); Alshawy v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 21-cv-2206 (FYP), 2022 WL
970883, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2022) (same); see also Abbas v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 20-cv-03192 (CJN),
2021 WL 3856625, at *2 n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2021) (noting that CARRP is not used in the Form I-130 context).
Consequently, plaintiff's unsupported allegations fail to establish that CARRP played or continues to play a role in
any delay in processing the visa application at issue.

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IV.   CONCLUSION

      For the reasons given, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. An order consistent with

this Memorandum Opinion will be entered contemporaneously.

Date: January 10, 2023

                                                  __________________________
                                                  BERYL A. HOWELL
                                                  Chief Judge

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