Court Opinion

ID: 9514114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:44:28.888773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:11.924141
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring specially.
[¶ 27] In support of a motion for change of custody, the grandmother submitted an affidavit. The affidavit was substantially based on what the grandmother had been told and was framed in that way. “I understand” and “apparently” were used repeatedly, although the dissent omits those phrases in its condensation.
[¶ 28] At the hearing, the mother’s lawyer objected on the ground of hearsay, and the grandmother was not permitted to testify to what the child had told her. For reasons not explained in the record, the child did not testify. Thus, the portions of the grandmother’s affidavit that were based on what the grandmother had been told were not supported by testimony at the hearing.
[¶ 29] At the close of the hearing, the mother’s lawyer argued that the affidavit statements unsupported by testimony at the hearing were “fraudulent” and “deceptive.” The court specifically rejected both contentions.
[¶ 30] In its October 14, 2008, order, the court said, “Adding to the Courts [sic] difficulty is the Interim Order which is based upon an Affidavit that was filled with non-factual information. I cannot stress how disappointing it is to have ‘factual representations’ made in an Affidavit which are not true.”
[¶ 31] But in its October 31, 2008, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, the court characterized the “affidavit that was filed in this case in support of the Interim Order” not as containing “non-factual information” or as “not true,” but instead as “not fully supported by testimony at trial.”
[¶ 32] To the extent there is a discrepancy between the earlier document and the findings of fact, the latter prevails. Adoption of Schneider, 347 N.W.2d 126, 130 (N.D.1984); Ned Nastrom Motors v. Nastrom-Peterson-Neubauer Co., 338 N.W.2d 64, 71 n. 8 (N.D.1983); Schmidt v. Plains *690Electric, Inc., 281 N.W.2d 794, 801 (N.D.1979).
[¶ 33] The statute in effect at the time provided:
14-09-06.2. Best interests and welfare of child — Court consideration — Factors.
1. For the purpose of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child is determined by the court’s consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child. These factors include all of the following when applicable:
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1. The making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02.
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(l)(Z) (2004).
[¶ 34] The dissent says, “Because the district court found facts in the affidavit to be false, the district court was required as a matter of law to consider them under factor (l).” This statement is not correct. The legislative history reflects that the provision as introduced at the legislature did not contain the phrase “not made in good faith.” The bill was amended in the Senate to add the phrase. Bonnie Pale-cek, in her testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, said:
The North Dakota Council on Abused Women’s Services and Coalition Against Sexual Assault in North Dakota wishes to provide the House Judiciary Committee with information concerning false allegations of child sexual abuse and express concern both over the reality of false allegations and concern for the possible chilling effect on reporting that might occur if all “unfounded allegations” result in an automatic penalty to the parent putting forth the allegation.
No one can dispute that false allegations of child sexual abuse are devastating to the one accused. And there is also certainly a public perception that charging sexual abuse is an increasingly common manipulation of the courts to gain custody.
The challenge is to strike a balance in which false allegations are discouraged and valid incidents of child sexual abuse are reported and aggressively prosecuted.
As the Committee is no doubt aware, “Any person who willfully ... makes a false report” under section 50-25.1-13 of the Century Code is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. HB1378 would add to this penalty by requiring court costs and legal fees to be paid by the person making the “unfounded allegation.” The amendment offered in the Senate sought to strike a balance and bring into synch the current penalties for false reports and the penalties set forth in this bill.
Our experience with deeply dysfunctional families is that usually the reality of sexual abuse is acknowledged for the first time when the victim of abuse has chosen to sever the relationship. To raise it earlier would not make sense because it is such a serious allegation it often can be raised safely only from a distance, especially if there has been violence in the relationship.
Therefore, we would urge the Committee to look favorably upon the amendment presented in the Senate and carefully guard the security of the person putting forth a good faith allegation of child sexual abuse, as well as the integrity of the person possibly falsely accused. To preserve the best interests of the child, which must remain our central concern, both aspects of this issue must be addressed.
Hearing on S.B. 24,88 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 53d N.D. Legis. Sess. (March 2, 1993) (testimony of Bonnie Pale-*691cek, Executive Director, N.D. Council on Abused Women’s Services and Coalition Against Sexual Assault in North Dakota).
[¶ 35] Additionally, the statutory provision requires that the false allegations, not made in good faith, must be made “by one parent against the other.” The primary objection here is to the allegations in the grandmother’s affidavit. The lack of good faith would have to be on the part of the father.
[¶ 36] Finally, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 refers to the “making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02.” N.D.C.C. § 14 — 09—06.2(l)(i) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, neither “harm” nor “harm to a child” is, in fact, defined in section 50-25.1-02. Bonnie Palecek’s testimony suggests that the district court’s interpretation of this ambiguous statutory provision may, in fact, be the correct one — that it was intended to apply to reports under N.D.C.C. ch. 50-25.1.
[¶ 37] DALE V. SANDSTROM