Court Opinion

ID: 9940227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 18:01:16.508872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:39.576727
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 13 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUIS FERNANDO MORALES                            No.   22-1958
VALENCIA,
                                                 Agency No. A200-155-772
                Petitioner,

 v.                                              MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                              Submitted February 9, 2024**
                                 Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner Luis Fernando Morales Valencia (“Valencia”) seeks review of a

decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming a decision by an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying him an additional continuance. We review an

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
agency’s decision to deny a continuance for abuse of discretion. Cui v. Mukasey,

538 F.3d 1289, 1290 (9th Cir. 2008). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252,

and we deny the petition for review.

      Here, the IJ did not abuse its discretion in denying Valencia a continuance.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.29 permits an agency to grant a continuance where good cause is

shown. In determining whether a continuance is appropriate, courts consider a

number of factors, including: “(1) the importance of the evidence, (2) the

unreasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court,

and (4) the number of continuances previously granted.” Cui, 538 F.3d at 1292.

The decision to grant a continuance is committed to the sound discretion of the

agency. Sandoval-Luna v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 2008). The

agency abuses that discretion where it acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to

law. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011).

      The timeline of relevant events underscores the reasonableness of the IJ’s

decision not to grant Valencia another continuance. When the IJ denied Valencia a

continuance in September 2019, Valencia had been in removal proceedings for

over seven years and without counsel for over two years. The IJ had

administratively closed proceedings once and continued proceedings twice, one

time explicitly so Valencia could get an attorney. But Valencia did not obtain

counsel in his extra time. Seven years and three delays later, it was not

                                           2
unreasonable for the IJ to want to get the show on the road. See Gonzalez-Veliz v.

Garland, 996 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that it was not an abuse of

discretion to deny a request for more time to obtain an attorney after the IJ had

already granted a two-month continuance for that purpose). Viewed in context, the

IJ did not act arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to law in denying the continuance.

See Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678.

      Valencia protests that the IJ abused its discretion because he had

demonstrated good cause for a continuance, namely that he had been in an accident

and was unable to work and earn money to hire an attorney. But Valencia’s bare

allegation that he had been in an accident that prevented him from securing counsel

does not amount to good cause. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. He did not elaborate on

the circumstances surrounding his accident, the nature of his injuries, or their

impact on his ability to work for ten months. In light of those shortcomings, it was

not an abuse of discretion for the IJ to determine that Valencia had not

demonstrated good cause for a continuance. See Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 678.

      Finally, even if the IJ erred in denying Valencia an additional continuance,

that error was harmless because Valencia had not submitted an application for

relief from removal. If Valencia had submitted an application for relief, the BIA

reasonably determined that he would not have been eligible.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                           3