Court Opinion

ID: 9711073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:01.968481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.050149
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority opinion on Issue I. The majority goes far beyond the Supreme Court cases it purports to rely on, and establishes a new, absurd, illogical and unworkable “rule” concerning the filing of charges where the defendant has successfully appealed from a conviction on a separate, distinct charge.
The majority purports to rely on North Carolina v. Pearce, (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, and Blackledge v. Perry, (1974) 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, and freely quotes apparently supportive language from those cases. In North Carolina v. Pearce, the defendant received what amounted to a greater sentence after an appeal, reversal and retrial for the same charge he had been convicted of in the first trial. The Court phrased the issue presented there in terms of “constitutional limitations upon the imposition of a more severe punishment after conviction for the same offense upon retrial.” 395 U.S. at 715-16, 89 S.Ct. at 2075, 23 L.Ed.2d at 664 (emphasis added). The Court held that a defendant’s exercise of his right to appeal may not be deterred by the threat of “retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.” Id. at 725, 89 S.Ct. at 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d at 669. Thus, “whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reason for his doing so must affirmatively appear.” Id. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081, 23 L.Ed.2d at 670. Nowhere does the Court suggest or even imply that this rule would also apply to separate, distinct charges of which the defendant has neither been previously convicted nor sentenced.
In Blackledge v. Perry, supra, the United States Supreme Court applied the notions expressed in Pearce to prosecutors. In Perry, the defendant was initially charged with assault, a misdemeanor under North Carolina law. After being convicted in the misdemeanor court, Perry filed notice of his intent to exercise his absolute statutory right to a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction. Thereafter, the prosecutor obtained an indictment charging Perry with assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill, a felony. Perry pleaded guilty and received a substantially greater sentence than he had received for the misdemeanor conviction. Following the logic of North Carolina v. Pearce, the Supreme Court found this result denied Perry due process. The Court specifically noted: “The indictment covered the same conduct for which Perry had been tried and convicted in the District Court.” 417 U.S. at 23, 94 S.Ct. at 2100, 40 L.Ed.2d at 631. The Court in Blackledge v. Perry again focused on the “danger of vindictiveness.” And, as it had done in Pearce, the Court in Perry specifically defined the context in which such possible vindictiveness is relevant:
“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration.”
Id. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102 03, 40 L.Ed.2d at 634 35 (emphasis added). Thus, both Pearce and Perry specifically concerned only cases involving the same or substituted charges which pertained to exactly the same conduct. Again, just as in Pearce, there is nothing in Blackledge v. Perry which even remotely suggests that this rule *310applies to separate, distinct crimes of which the defendant has not been previously convicted or sentenced.
Supreme Court cases subsequent to North Carolina v. Pearce also recognized the limited context in which “vindictiveness” is relevant. In Colten v. Kentucky, (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584, the defendant argued that Pearce was applicable to Kentucky’s two-tier system of processing misdemeanors. The Court addressed Colten’s contention and described Pearce in this fashion:
“[Pjearce did not turn simply on the fact of conviction, appeal, reversal, recon-yiction, and a greater sentence. The court was there concerned with two defendants who, after their convictions had been set aside on appeal, were reconvict-ed for the same offenses and sentenced to longer prison terms.”
407 U.S. at 116, 92 S.Ct. at 1960, 32 L.Ed.2d at 593 (emphasis added). While the rule of North Carolina v. Pearce was not extended to the situation presented in Colten v. Kentucky, that case also involved only one offense. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, (1973) 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714. See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (discussed infra). Thus, the United States Supreme Court is one of the courts which has, as the majority opinion states, “attempted to limit Blackledge [v. Perry] and Pearce to fact situations in which there has been only the substitution of a more serious charge and not the addition of charges.” At 306.
The language of these cases plainly and consistently reveals the United States Supreme Court’s concern with the treatment of the same or substituted charges by courts and prosecutors. Just as plainly, these cases in no way implicitly suggest or logically require the applicability of the vindictiveness rule to cases involving separate, additional crimes. Clearly, then, the majority here is not simply following the dictates of Pearce and Perry, but is fashioning out of whole cloth a rule for situations to which Pearce and its progeny undoubtedly were never intended to apply. The logic of the majority opinion would give rise to a suggestion of vindictiveness whenever a prosecutor files any other, additional charges against a defendant after that defendant has successfully appealed a conviction for a separate crime. I have very serious doubts as to whether Pearce and Perry dictate such a result.
Further, the majority opinion, by its terms, is not restricted in its application only to refiled charges which arose out of the same general incident, which happens to be true in this case. Thus, we must assume the majority’s sweeping language would apply to any charges which the prosecutor has the misfortune to file after the defendant has obtained a reversal of a conviction for some totally unrelated charge. In fact, the thrust of the majority’s opinion indicates that this vindictiveness rule would apply to additional charges which have never before been filed. The majority repeatedly emphasizes the timing of the refiling, as evidence of the alleged vindictiveness. Of course, the initial filing of an unrelated charge could also occur shortly after the defendant has successfully appealed some other, unrelated conviction. The timing of such a filing could be coincidental, or, obviously, it could be justifiably prompted by the reversal the defendant has obtained. In such a situation, the majority would apparently require the prosecutor to justify the timing of the new filing of charges. I do not believe he should be required to make such a justification, and, more importantly, I do not read Pearce and its progeny to require this justification. I do not believe the Court in Pearce and its progeny intended to curtail or limit the prosecutor’s otherwise broad discretion in the sweeping, substantial fashion the majority has here. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra.
In an astoundingly summary manner, the majority equates the filing of a more severe charge with the refiling of an additional charge or charges. The logic of such an equation is fatally flawed. In the former situation, the more severe charge, by definition, covers the same conduct as the original charge; in the latter situation, as in the *311case before us, the additional charge, by definition, covers altogether different, independently culpable conduct. Thus, in the Pearce line of cases, the defendant received a greater penalty upon conviction of the same or substituted charges which arose out of the same conduct. In the case now before us, Cherry received a greater total sentence for three charges, one of which -at Cherry’s request-was not tried in the first trial, and two of which were later dismissed and then reinstated by the prosecutor.
Saying, as the majority does, that the additional charges in this case pertained to “the same basic criminal conduct”-which, emphatically, they do not-does not bring the case before us under the principles of Pearce and Perry. The fact that the rape occurred shortly before or shortly after the criminal deviate conduct, does not mean that these two charges are for “the same basic criminal conduct.” It would seem even more obvious that the habitual criminal charge, which does not really require any additional acts, does not involve “the same basic criminal conduct” as either of the other two charges. This newly coined phrase only confuses the issue and attempts to blur the fundamental distinction between refiling the same but greater charge, and refiling separate charges, which concern completely separate acts. Further, this “standard” of “the same basic criminal conduct” raises many more questions than it answers. For example, may we now logically say that, if the rape charge and the deviate conduct charge do involve “the same basic criminal conduct” for purposes of this issue, are they not also the “same” for double jeopardy purposes? See Elmore v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 532, 382 N.E.2d 893.
The critical distinction between the situation found in North Carolina v. Pearce and its progeny and the situation presented here may be seen in another way. In the Pearce line of cases, the application of the vindictiveness rule occurred only when the sentencing authority or the prosecutor attempted to “up the ante” and retaliate against the defendant for having successfully pursued his appeal rights and, in effect, punish him more severely for precisely the same conduct, i. e., for the same or a substituted charge. In those cases, it was only because the defendant had exercised his right to appeal that the prosecutor or sentencing authority was even in a position where he could attempt to “up the ante.” In other words, if the defendant had not fully exercised his rights, the specter of vindictiveness would never have arisen in any of the Pearce line of cases. The facts of Blackledge v. Perry, supra, illustrate this proposition. In that case, if the defendant had not pursued his right to a trial de novo, and the prosecutor had nonetheless obtained the indictment for the felony charge, that charge undoubtedly would have been subject to dismissal as a violation of Perry’s right against double jeopardy. Thus, the guidelines of Pearce and its progeny necessarily presuppose the defendant’s successful exercise of his appeal rights.
In the case before us, however, the initial filing and the refiling of the rape and habitual criminal charges were never contingent upon Cherry’s exercise of any of his rights. From their inception, these charges stood independently from the criminal deviate conduct charge. As long as the rape charge and the habitual criminal charge were validly brought initially, they remained valid regardless of the outcome, at trial or on appeal, of the deviate conduct charge. Even if Cherry had lost on his motion to correct error and lost on appeal, the prosecutor would have been acting within his discretion in refiling the rape and habitual criminal charges. The same would be true if Cherry had been acquitted of the deviate conduct charge in the first trial. Likewise, the prosecutor would have been acting within his discretion if he had never dismissed the two charges. (In retrospect, he no doubt wishes he had not done so.) Further, he could have dismissed and then refiled the charges after sentencing but before the court’s decision on the motion to correct error, or even before that motion was filed. Thus, the prosecutor here was in a position of dealing with the rape and habitual criminal charges as he wished and when he wished, and his alternatives with *312respect to those charges were in no way limited by the defendant’s course of action, or the result of that action, with respect to the deviate conduct charge. Therefore, because these charges retained validity regardless of the outcome of Cherry’s motion to correct error concerning the deviate conduct conviction, there could have been no possible fear on Cherry’s part that the State would retaliate by filing a more severe charge in lieu of the deviate conduct charge. See Blackledge v. Perry, supra, 417 U.S. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102, 40 L.Ed.2d at 634-35.
On the other hand, obviously, none of the alternatives discussed above which were present in this case would have been available in any fashion to the prosecutor in Blackledge v. Perry. The reason is equally obvious: his alternatives were wholly dependent upon the defendant’s actions. This was the central point of the Pearce line of cases. Plainly, then, it is in that context when the prosecutor’s vindictiveness becomes relevant. If, as in this case, his dispositional alternatives are not dependent on the defendant’s exercise of his rights, the prosecutor’s motivation in pursuing any of those alternatives is not relevant to determining the validity of the resulting convictions.
Finally, in my view, this case is closely analogous to Bordenkircher v. Hayes, (1978) 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604, to which the majority opinion fails to pay even the most cursory lip service. In Borden-kircher v. Hayes, the defendant was charged with uttering a forged instrument, an offense carrying a two -to ten year prison term. After arraignment, during subsequent plea negotiations, the prosecutor informed Hayes that if he did not plead guilty to the indictment and accept the prosecutor’s recommended five year sentence, the prosecutor would seek another indictment charging Hayes under Kentucky’s habitual criminal statute. Conviction under that statute carried with it (at that time) a mandatory life sentence. Hayes refused to plead guilty to the forgery charge, and the prosecutor then obtained the habitual criminal indictment. Hayes was found guilty on both counts, and subsequently challenged the enhanced sentence as being violative of Blackledge v. Perry, supra.
The United States Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s action in seeking the additional indictment did not violate due process. In explaining this result, the Court emphasized the “give-and-take” present in a plea -bargain situation, and also pointed out: “It is not disputed that the recidivist charge was fully justified by the evidence, that the prosecutor was in possession of this evidence at the time of the original indictment, and that Hayes’ refusal to plead guilty to the original charge was what led to his indictment under the habitual criminal statute.” Id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 666, 54 L.Ed.2d at 608. The Court noted that, so long as the defendant was free to accept or reject the prosecutor’s offer and thereby assert or waive his right to plead not guilty there is no element of prosecutorial punishment or retaliation.
Insofar as prosecutorial vindictiveness is concerned, the right to plead not guilty is similar to the right to appeal. In the former situation, the defendant may waive his right to plead not guilty because he wants a “better deal” of some sort. That “deal” may include the prosecutor’s dismissal of other valid, independently chargeable offenses. On the other hand, he may exercise his right to plead not guilty. If he does so, under Bordenkircher v. Hayes, he runs the risk that the prosecutor will exercise his wide discretion to this detriment, by making the defendant “fac[e] [additional] charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution.” Id. at 365, 98 S.Ct. at 669, 54 L.Ed.2d at 612.
In the latter situation, the defendant in this case was faced with parallel alternatives. Cherry chose to exercise his right to appeal, just as the defendant Hayes exercised his right to a trial. Cherry could have waived his right to appeal, just as Hayes could have accepted the prosecutor’s offer and waived his rights. Cherry knew, or should have known, just as Hayes knew, *313that the added charges might be brought against him. In fact, in Cherry’s case at least, the added charges could have been maintained regardless of Cherry’s decision on whether to exercise or waive his rights. Of course, the prosecutor probably would not have refiled the rape and habitual criminal charges if Cherry had lost his appeal from the deviate conduct conviction. However, “[d]efendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choices in response to prosecutorial persuasion. . . . ” Id. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 668, 54 L.Ed.2d at 611. Thus, I would view this case as being analogous to Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, and I would hold that the prosecutor was merely presenting Cherry with charges the latter knew might be refiled (in any event) and on which he was plainly subject to prosecution.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Borden-kircher v. Hayes also effectively challenges the majority’s assertion that “[t]he underlying concern of the Blackledge [v. Perry] and Pearce decisions is that it is the realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, rather than vindictiveness in fact, which controls.” At 306. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court explained the problem in Pearce and Perry in this fashion:
“The Court has emphasized that the due process violation in cases such as Pearce and Perry lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred from the exercise of a legal right, see Col ten v. Kentucky, (1972) 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, (1973) 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714, but rather in the danger that the State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.”
434 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 667 68, 54 L.Ed.2d at 610. If the majority here would equate the “realistic apprehension of vindictiveness” with “the possibility that a defendant might be deterred,” then, according to Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the majority’s reading of Pearce and Perry is flawed in this respect as well. Equally inaccurate, then, is the majority’s claim that the “underlying concern” of Blackiedge v. Perry is “with the appearance of vindictiveness and its chilling effect on defendants.” At 306.
In sum, I believe the majority has grossly misinterpreted Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of vindictiveness, and thereby reached a result which the Supreme Court never contemplated and, no doubt, never intended. I would affirm the convictions for rape and habitual criminality.
GIVAN, C. J., concurs.