Court Opinion

ID: 9503349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:42:23.633827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:24.330577
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in every respect except that part of its opinion holding that the OMIA’s exemption from the permit and fee requirements for on-premises signs violates Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. The majority incorrectly concludes that the OMIA impermissibly regulates the content of speech. I conclude that the OMIA is constitutional under Article I, section 8.
This court’s framework for analyzing claims under Article I, section 8, was set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 649 P2d 569 (1982). This court has summarized that framework as follows:
“In State v. Robertson, * * * this court established a framework for evaluating whether a law violates Article I, section 8. First, the court recognized a distinction between laws that focus on the content of speech or writing and laws that focus on the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results. The court reasoned that a law of the former type, a
*303law ‘written in terms directed to the substance of any “opinion” or any “subject” of communication,’ violates Article I, section 8,
“ ‘unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception that was well established when the first American guarantees of freedom of expression were adopted and that the guarantees then or in 1859 demonstrably were not intended to reach.’
“Laws of the latter type, which focus on forbidden results, can be divided further into two categories. The first category focuses on forbidden effects, but expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those effects. The coercion law at issue in Robertson was of that category. Such laws are analyzed for overbreadth:
“ ‘When the proscribed means include speech or writing, however, even a law written to focus on a forbidden effect * * * must be scrutinized to determine whether it appears to reach privileged communication or whether it can be interpreted to avoid such “overbreadth.” ’
“The second kind of law also focuses on forbidden effects, but without referring to expression at all. Of that category, this court wrote:
“ ‘If [a] statute [is] directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert (apart from a vagueness claim) that the statute could not constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted contrary to article I, section 8.’ ”
State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 163-64, 838 P2d 558 (1992), cert den, 508 US 974 (1993) (quoting Robertson-, internal citations and footnote omitted; alterations and emphasis in Plowman).
The majority correctly begins its analysis of the OMIA by considering whether the OMIA “focus [es] on the content of speech or writing” or whether it “focus [es] on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment of forbidden results.” See Plowman, 314 Or at 164 (emphasis deleted; setting out analysis). The majority errs, however, when it concludes that *304the OMIA unconstitutionally focuses on the content of speech or writing, the first class of laws identified in Robertson.
By laws that focus on the content of speech, this court in Robertson meant laws that restrict or prohibit a particular message or subject of communication, such as obscenity, “either because that content itself is deemed socially undesirable or offensive, or because it is thought to have adverse consequences.” Robertson, 293 Or at 416; see also State v. Ciancanelli, 339 Or 282, 318, 121 P3d 613 (2005) (such laws purport to protect against “any supposed harm that the message itself might be presumed to cause to the hearer or to society” (emphasis added)); City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or 547, 554 n 4, 761 P2d 510 (1988) (distinguishing between “the offensive form of some communication,” which may be regulated, and “the offensive character of an idea,” which cannot be regulated (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174, 182, 759 P2d 242 (1988) (speech “not immune from regulations imposed for reasons other than the substance of their particular message” (emphasis added)).
This court’s cases reflect the understanding that laws focus on the content of speech when they attack a particular, identifiable subject of communication. The cases relied on by the majority, plus others, struck down limits on just such particular subjects of communication. In State v. Henry, 302 Or 510, 732 P2d 9 (1987), for example, the challenged statute criminalized the distribution of obscene material. In Tidyman, the zoning ordinance at issue restricted the location of “adult bookstores”; this court noted that the ordinance was “flatly directed against one disfavored type of pictorial or verbal communication.” 306 Or at 184. In Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or 372, 845 P2d 1284 (1993), the challenged statute prohibited telemarketers from using automatic message machines to sell realty, goods, or services; the court noted that the statute “restricts expression because it is directed at a specific subject of communication[.]” Id. at 376. And, in Fidanque v. Oregon Govt. Standards and Practices, 328 Or 1, 969 P2d 376 (1998), the statute at issue required lobbyists to pay a licensing fee; the court noted that the statute “turns out not to be content-neutral at all. Its focus is political speech.” Id. at 8 n 4. Even this court’s most recent *305decisions involved the same sort of restrictions. See, e.g., City of Nyssa v. Dufloth/Smith, 339 Or 330, 339, 121 P3d 639 (2005) (“the ordinance applies only to one disfavored type of communication (nude performances) in one disfavored type of establishment (one that regularly features that type of entertainment)”).1
But the OMIA does not prohibit any particular subject of speech for being “socially undesirable or offensive” or for “hav[ing] adverse consequences.” Nor does it favor one subject of speech over another one.2 Indeed, the OMIA is not about the subject of the message at all. The majority nicely summarizes the state’s argument:
“[T]he distinction between ‘on-premises’ and ‘off-premises’ speech has no meaning in terms of the content of the speech; the only distinction is the relationship between the message on the sign and its location.”
340 Or at 294 (emphasis in original). “Any message can be an on-premises one, and any message can be an off-premises one,” as the state argues. It all depends on what the property owner does where the sign is located — and the property owner controls that, not the government.
The OMIA does not prohibit any identifiable message. It does not restrict speech as speech. It is not in the first class of laws described by Robertson, and the majority errs in concluding otherwise.
Instead, the OMIA falls within the second class of laws described by Robertson: It “focuses on forbidden effects, but expressly prohibits expression used to achieve those *306effects." Plowman, 314 Or at 164. The OMIA merely restricts one manner in which messages may be communicated — by billboard. It seeks to prevent the effects of speech carried on in that way — distracting drivers, blocking views of traffic hazards, blocking scenic views, etc. See, e.g., ORS 377.705 (OMIA intended, among other things, to “promote the public safety; to preserve the recreational value of public travel on the state’s highways; to preserve the natural beauty and aesthetic features of such highways and adjacent areas”); ORS 377.720(2) (prohibiting signs that block view of traffic signs or approaching traffic). Although the OMIA focuses on harmful effects, it expressly prohibits expression that is used to achieve those effects.
Because the OMIA falls within the second class of laws described in Robertson, we should consider whether the OMIA is overbroad. See, e.g., Plowman, 314 Or at 164 (so noting). A statute is overbroad when it prohibits a party from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct (here, free expression under Article I, section 8) in at least some situations:
“Unlike with other facial challenges, a challenger raising an overbreadth challenge need not demonstrate that the statute at issue is unconstitutional under the particular circumstances at hand. Rather, the challenger will prevail in his or her facial challenge if the court concludes that the statute in question prohibits constitutionally protected conduct of any kind.”
State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or 622, 628, 114 P3d 1104 (2005) (citation omitted).
The majority’s analysis here shows why the OMIA is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Only the limits on “outdoor advertising sign[s]” bar any manner of speech, so only those limits could render the OMIA unconstitutionally overbroad. (The exception for on-premises signs is beside the point, because that exception does not prohibit any constitutionally protected messages. It does not prohibit any messages at all — it allows them, and without discriminating in favor of any particular subject of communication.) As the majority explains, the “outdoor advertising sign” limits are constitutional as a reasonable manner restriction, and I agree. *307Because the off-premises advertising sign restrictions are constitutional, the OMIA is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
The OMIA is concerned with “the medium, not the message, as when park regulations ban fireworks even for a Fourth of July celebration.” Tidyman, 306 Or at 182-83. It is constitutional under Article I, section 8. Although I concur with much of the majority’s reasoning, I respectfully dissent on that point.

 The majority itself essentially relies on the same distinction elsewhere in its opinion. The majority rejects petitioner’s “prior restraint” argument because “the purpose of the prohibition on prior restraints” is “to bar the state from deciding in advance what expression it will permit.” 340 Or at 286. The majority also concludes that the permit scheme is constitutional because it “does not effectuate government censorship of speech.” 340 Or at 290.
The same purpose underlies the distinction between laws that focus on speech as speech and laws that focus on preventing harmful results. Yet, the majority refuses to recognize it here.

 In particular, let me reaffirm one other statement by the majority. The statute does not, contrary to petitioner’s arguments, favor commercial speech over political speech. “Pray for Peace,” for example, would qualify as an on-premises sign for a church. 340 Or at 293.