Court Opinion

ID: 9897215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:45.367063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.576119
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                     Jun 27 2023, 1:04 pm

                                                         CLERK
                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                          and Tax Court

                          IN THE

  Indiana Supreme Court
            Supreme Court Case No. 23S-CR-163

                     State of Indiana,
                   Appellant (Plaintiff below),

                              –v–

                     Bryan D. Lyons,
                   Appellee (Defendant below).

       Argued: November 3, 2022 | Decided: June 27, 2023

     Interlocutory Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court
                     No. 47D01-1707-F1-973
           The Honorable John M. Plummer, III, Judge

    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                        No. 21A-CR-2187

                   Opinion by Justice Molter
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, and Goff concur.
Molter, Justice.
   When police were investigating whether Bryan D. Lyons molested his
daughter, he agreed with the prosecutor that he would sit for a polygraph
and that the State of Indiana could offer the results into evidence at trial in
any resulting prosecution. But on the eve of trial, the deputy prosecutor
disclosed that she would not do so because she had just learned that when
Sergeant Dan Gress administered the exam years earlier, he had concerns
about Lyons’ mental state, so he unilaterally changed the exam to a “non-
stipulated,” inadmissible investigatory examination. Sergeant Gress had
omitted those facts when testifying at a prior suppression hearing about
the admissibility of the polygraph examination and Lyons’ related
statements, and he failed to provide prosecutors his notes reflecting that
change. Based on this late disclosure, the trial court continued the trial and
released Lyons from custody. And as a discovery sanction for Sergeant
Gress misleading the parties and the court, the judge suppressed the
incriminating statements Lyons made to Sergeant Gress immediately after
the exam.

   Through an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with a
unanimous, published opinion. The State then requested that we “grant
transfer and affirm that the exclusion of admissible evidence as a
discovery violation sanction is just only when that violation has been
blatant and deliberate or it causes substantial prejudice to the defendant.”
Pet. to Trans. at 5. We grant transfer today and hold that before excluding
evidence as a Trial Rule 37 discovery sanction, a trial court must find that
(1) the exclusion is the sole remedy available to avoid substantial
prejudice, or (2) that the sanctioned party’s culpability reflects an
egregious discovery violation. The trial court’s order enforced Trial Rule
37 within those limits, so we too must affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
   Three days after Lyons’ young daughter reported to her grandmother
that Lyons sexually abused her, Bedford Police Detective Kevin Jones
interviewed Lyons at the police department. Lyons denied the allegation
and agreed to sit for a polygraph. While polygraph results are generally

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023          Page 2 of 12
inadmissible at trial, Lyons, still unrepresented at this point, signed a
written stipulation with the prosecutor agreeing the results of his
polygraph would be admissible if the State ultimately charged him with a
crime.

   The State and Lyons agreed Sergeant Gress would administer the
polygraph examination at the Jasper Indiana State Police Post a few days
later. Detective Jones observed from another room, and Sergeant Gress
began the examination by reviewing the polygraph waiver and consent
form with Lyons, which advised him of the voluntary nature of the
polygraph examination and his constitutional rights under Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Both Lyons and
Sergeant Gress signed the document, and based on the executed
stipulation, Sergeant Gress wrote “stipulated” at the top of the polygraph
examination form.

  Sergeant Gress then questioned Lyons to determine his mental and
physical suitability for the examination. In response to that questioning,
Lyons revealed he had been diagnosed with generalized anxiety, attention
deficit, personality, and bipolar disorders. He also explained he saw
“spiritual shadows” that spoke to him two or three days before the
examination. Tr. Vol. II at 60–61. While Lyons confirmed he had “a grasp
for reality,” Sergeant Gress concluded Lyons was not a suitable candidate
for an “evidentiary polygraph,” the results of which are admissible in
court under an agreement between the State and the defendant, so he
unilaterally converted the examination to an “investigatory” polygraph,
the results of which are not admissible in court. Id. at 61. Yet Sergeant
Gress did not change the “stipulation” notation on the polygraph
examination form to reflect a non-stipulated, investigatory polygraph.

   At the end of the examination, Sergeant Gress concluded Lyons’ results
revealed “significant reactions” to questions about his daughter that were
“very close to deception.” Id. at 66. Sergeant Gress then interviewed Lyons
about those reactions, and within minutes Lyons made incriminating
statements. Once the interview ended, Sergeant Gress scanned his official
report, the polygraph examination form, and his handwritten notes into a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023        Page 3 of 12
case management system. He placed the original documents in his paper
file.

   A couple of weeks later, the State charged Lyons with child molesting,
a Level 1 felony. The trial court appointed a public defender to represent
Lyons, and defense counsel moved to suppress the polygraph results and
related statements to the police. Lyons’ motion argued, among other
things, that he “was illegally coerced into giving an untruthful statement
to officers as a result of psychological and mental manipulation,” and “[i]n
addition to being obtained unconstitutionally, the statements are
inherently unreliable and therefore should not be admitted as evidence” at
trial. App. Vol. 2 at 108. Counsel also requested a pre-trial hearing to
determine whether Lyons’ statements “were voluntary and reliable.” Id.

   The trial court set an evidentiary hearing on Lyons’ motion to suppress.
In preparation, Sergeant Gress reviewed the documents in the case
management system and the video of the polygraph examination. He
added handwritten notes to the original polygraph examination form in
his paper file and, remembering he had changed the exam to a non-
stipulated polygraph, he wrote “non-stipulated” at the top. But he did not
scan a copy of the document with his new handwritten notes into the case
management system. Since the prosecutor’s office only had access to those
documents in the case management system, it was unaware of his paper
file and new handwritten notes.

   The parties appeared for the hearing on Lyons’ motion, and Sergeant
Gress was one of the witnesses. As Sergeant Gress testified, he referred to
his notes. He explained that certain circumstances might lead to a
determination that a person is not a suitable candidate for a polygraph,
such as if they suffered from seizures, heart attacks, or mental issues that
might compromise their ability to understand reality. Sergeant Gress
recalled that Lyons disclosed his mental health diagnoses and that he saw
spiritual shadows which spoke to him, but Sergeant Gress was
nonetheless “comfortable” having Lyons sit for the test. Tr. Vol. II at 64.
Even though Sergeant Gress testified about the admissible nature of a
stipulated polygraph, provided a general step-by-step recollection of the
nearly four-and-a-half hours he spent with Lyons before and after the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023         Page 4 of 12
examination, and relied on his notes while testifying, he never mentioned
that he had changed the polygraph to a non-stipulated, investigatory
examination because of his concerns about Lyons’ mental condition.

   After the hearing, and based in part on Sergeant Gress’ testimony, the
trial court denied Lyons’ motion to suppress. Lyons petitioned for an
interlocutory appeal, which the trial court certified, but the Court of
Appeals declined jurisdiction.

  The trial court set a five-day jury trial to begin on July 19, 2021, which
was roughly four years after Lyons had been charged and a year after the
hearing on the motion to suppress. As the deputy prosecutor prepared for
trial, she spoke with Sergeant Gress. For the first time, just a few days
before trial, Sergeant Gress revealed to the prosecutor that he had
unilaterally changed the polygraph from a stipulated, evidentiary
examination to a non-stipulated, investigatory examination based on his
concerns about Lyons’ mental condition, and he provided a copy of the
handwritten notes he made in preparation for the suppression hearing,
which reflected that change. The prosecutor promptly provided this
information and a copy of the document with Sergeant Gress’
handwritten notation to defense counsel.

   In light of these developments, Lyons moved to continue his trial, and
he asked the trial court to suppress his statements related to the polygraph
examination based on the State’s untimely disclosure of exculpatory
evidence. Although the jury was present and ready for trial, the trial court
granted Lyons’ motion for continuance and scheduled a suppression
hearing. In the meantime, Lyons was released from custody. The trial
court also asked the State to investigate whether Sergeant Gress had
committed perjury during the suppression hearing, emphasizing that the
court found the late disclosure “very troubling” because “Sergeant Gress
knew what the issues were when he testified” at the suppression hearing.
Id. at 103. The court also explained that it believed “there is a substantial
likelihood that [the court] has been misled by Sergeant Gress” based on
the information then available to the court. Id. at 126–27. The court was
especially concerned that when “law enforcement in general[] keep

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023         Page 5 of 12
material evidence from the [p]rosecutor,” “[t]hat’s how innocent people
wind up in prison.” Id. at 127.

   A few weeks later, the trial court held another suppression hearing to
determine whether Lyons’ rights were violated because the State failed to
timely disclose that Sergeant Gress “had made a unilateral determination
that the polygraph stipulation was invalid” after Lyons revealed he had
recently seen shadows on the wall which spoke to him just days before the
examination. App. Vol. 3 at 14. At that hearing, Sergeant Gress
acknowledged that when he testified at the previous suppression hearing
he understood that questions from the State, defense counsel, and the
court were all directed at Lyons’ mental state during the polygraph; that
he referred to his notes during that testimony; and that he never
mentioned during his testimony that he had unilaterally changed the
polygraph examination from stipulated to non-stipulated. He testified that
he assumed the prosecutor was aware of the change because, when he
changed the exam from stipulated to non-stipulated, he instructed
Detective Jones to inform the prosecutor.

  Detective Jones also testified at the hearing, but his recollection was
much different. He did not recall Sergeant Gress informing him of a
decision to change the examination to a non-stipulated investigatory
exam, and he believed he likely would have remembered it if that had
happened. In fact, Detective Jones did not recall any time in his career
when a polygraph examiner switched an exam from a stipulated
evidentiary examination to a non-stipulated investigatory examination,
and he was unsure what he would do in those circumstances. He
explained that, at a minimum, he would contact the prosecutor’s office for
guidance because the stipulation is an agreement between the prosecutor
and the defendant, and the police are not a party.

   Following the hearing, the court entered a detailed order sanctioning
the State for its discovery violation by “excluding any and all evidence
generated or acquired by S[ergeant] Dan Gress,” including Lyons’
agreement to take a polygraph, the polygraph, and the post-polygraph
interview. Id. at 17. After the trial court certified the State’s motion for
interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023          Page 6 of 12
affirmed. State v. Lyons, 189 N.E.3d 605, 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). In a
published opinion, a unanimous Court of Appeals explained it was
“unconvinced by the State’s argument that the discovery violation
resulted in no significant prejudice to Lyons’s defense because the
argument fails to acknowledge the broader implications that pretrial
discovery violations may have on a case.” Id. at 611. For example, the
court explained, “[i]t is easy to imagine a scenario in which Lyons entered
into a plea agreement with the State before ever finding out that the
polygraph results would not have been admissible in a trial.” Id.

   The State then petitioned our Court for transfer, which we now grant,
vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
   Trial courts maintain broad discretion to manage discovery, and that
includes sanctioning parties to enforce discovery rules and orders.
Williams v. State, 714 N.E.2d 644, 649 (Ind. 1999). “We presume that the
trial court will act in accord with what is fair and equitable in each case,
and thus we will only reverse if the trial court’s decision is clearly against
the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if
the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Wright v. Miller, 989 N.E.2d
324, 330 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).

Discussion and Decision
   The issue before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding the State’s evidence as a discovery sanction. We conclude the
trial court did not because it based its sanction on a finding that Sergeant
Gress misled the court, and that finding is reasonably supported by the
record.

   Trial Rule 37 authorizes courts to impose sanctions for discovery
violations through “such orders in regard to the failure as are just,” Ind.
Trial Rule 37(B)(2), including orders prohibiting a party “from introducing
designated matters in evidence,” T.R. 37(B)(2)(b); see also Fields v. State, 679

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023           Page 7 of 12
N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997).1 For sanctions addressing a party’s late
disclosure of evidence, our cases have long recognized three governing
principles: (1) we generally treat late disclosures the same whether the
State or the defendant committed the discovery violation; (2) the two
typical remedies are to continue the trial or to exclude the evidence; and
(3) we exclude evidence only if (a) that is the sole remedy available to
avoid substantial unfair prejudice, or (b) the discovery violation was
intentional, flagrant, in bad faith, or otherwise reprehensible. Wiseheart v.
State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988–92 (Ind. 1986);2 see also Armstrong v. State, 499
N.E.2d 189, 191 (Ind. 1986) (discussing the exclusion of evidence for
discovery violations which are “flagrant and deliberate,” “misleading,” or
in “bad faith”); Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264, 274 (Ind. 1986)
(discussing violations which are “grossly misleading” or “demonstrate[]
bad faith”).

   Courts treat defendants and the State the same because “the office of
criminal discovery in Indiana is reciprocity,” the discovery rules must “be
fairly balanced between the State and the defendant,” and the discovery
rules are “most effective” through equal treatment. Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d
at 990. Courts exclude evidence only as a last resort because that remedy
frustrates a trial’s truth-seeking function. Id. Thus, “[w]hile sanctions for
failure to comply with discovery are within the trial court’s discretion, the
primary factors which a trial court should examine are whether the breach
was intentional or in bad faith and whether substantial prejudice has
resulted.” Id. at 988.

1Criminal Rule 21 provides that Indiana’s “rules of trial and appellate procedure shall apply
to all criminal proceedings,” so long as they do not conflict with any other rules from our
Court. Ind. Crim. Rule 21; see also Minges v. State, 192 N.E.3d 893, 899 (Ind. 2022) (noting the
amendment to Criminal Rule 21, effective March 1, 1997, which incorporated the trial rules
into the criminal rules).
2At oral argument, defense counsel argued Wiseheart does not apply because it predates our
amendment to Criminal Rule 21 incorporating Trial Rule 37 into our criminal rules. But we
have continued to embrace these governing principles long after we published amended
Criminal Rule 21 in 1997. Cain v. State, 955 N.E.2d 714, 718 (Ind. 2011); Rohr v. State, 866
N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ind. 2007); S.T. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 632, 635–36 (Ind. 2002); Warren v. State, 725
N.E.2d 828, 832–33 (Ind. 2000); Fields v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ind. 1997).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023                             Page 8 of 12
   Here, the State acknowledges its disclosure to Lyons that Sergeant
Gress had unilaterally changed the polygraph examination to a non-
stipulated, investigatory polygraph based on concerns about Lyons’
mental condition was exceedingly late under the local rules governing
discovery and was therefore a discovery violation. But it argues any
prejudice was cured by releasing Lyons from custody and continuing the
trial. As for the trial court’s concern that the State was on the cusp of
admitting the polygraph at trial, and the Court of Appeals’ concern that
Lyons could have been misled into pleading guilty, the State argues these
sorts of “hypothetical” prejudice are not enough to exclude evidence. Pet.
to Trans. at 14.

   We agree with that much. When considering whether an order
excluding evidence is the sole remedy to avoid substantial prejudice, a
court can only consider real—not hypothetical—prejudice. And
continuing the trial in this case cured the prejudice to Lyons. But the trial
court did not base its sanction solely on prejudice to Lyons; it also
concluded that Sergeant Gress’ conduct amounted to an egregious
discovery violation.

   The State acknowledges a trial court may exclude evidence where the
“discovery violation was blatant and deliberate.” Id. at 5. That is because
“[a] trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner which
facilitates the ascertainment of truth, ensures fairness, and obtains
economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society
and the criminal defendant.” Armstrong, 499 N.E.2d at 191. And “the
purpose of sanctioning discovery violations is not merely to penalize
those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to
deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such
a deterrent.” Whitaker v. Becker, 960 N.E.2d 111, 115 (Ind. 2012) (quotations
omitted). So even when there is no remaining prejudice, a trial court may
reasonably conclude that excluding evidence is necessary to deter
egregious discovery misconduct.

   That is what the trial court concluded here. In particular, the court
found that Sergeant Gress intentionally “misled” all the parties and the
court. App. Vol. 3 at 14. The court based its conclusion on Sergeant Gress’

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-CR-163 | June 27, 2023          Page 9 of 12
acknowledgment that when he testified in the first suppression hearing,
he understood that defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court
were all asking him questions about Lyons’ mental state during the
polygraph examination, and that was a key focus of the hearing.
Discussing Lyons’ mental condition specifically, Sergeant Gress testified at
that hearing that Lyons did not say “anything different that [Sergeant
Gress had not] heard from twenty-five percent of [the] people that take a
test,” and Sergeant Gress confirmed he “felt comfortable giving [Lyons] a
polygraph examination.” Tr. Vol. II at 64. Sergeant Gress also testified
polygraphs are admissible in court if the defendant and the prosecutor
stipulate to their admissibility. Yet Sergeant Gress never divulged that he
had unilaterally changed the polygraph to a non-stipulated, inadmissible
investigatory examination based on his concerns about Lyons’ mental
condition, and he never provided the prosecutor his notes to the same
effect, until roughly a year later on the eve of trial.

   The State downplays this as a case of misfeasance rather than
malfeasance. But that is not what the trial court concluded. Instead, the
trial court concluded that Sergeant Gress’ misleading omissions were so
egregious that the State should undertake a perjury investigation. And the
trial judge explained to the State:

      I hope that the Prosecutor understands that this is not a
      personal ruling against the State but it is a professional decision
      that the Court [makes] to protect the rights of the accused, to
      make sure that the trial has integrity, to make sure that the
      lawyers have integrity in this court, to make sure that we don’t
      have false testimony presented at any time in this court,
      especially by people as powerful as Sergeant Gress. And I
      would hope that the prosecutors understand that ruling
      because the integrity of these proceedings is—means
      everything.

Id. at 127.

   From the trial court’s perspective, part of what made this an egregious
discovery violation warranting the exclusion of Lyons’ statements to

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Sergeant Gress was the highly unusual context for both the statements
and Sergeant Gress’ subsequent omissions. Lyons, who was not
represented by counsel, signed the stipulation around the same time he
believed shadows were speaking to him. The court credited the testimony
of a defense polygraph expert concluding “that when a polygraph
examiner determines in the pre-polygraph interview that the examinee
has mental issues to such an extent as to render the stipulation invalid, the
polygraph examiner should immediately terminate the encounter and end
the meeting.” App. Vol. 3 at 15. After all, as the court explained, Sergeant
Gress “changing the terms of the contract unilaterally without the
permission of the prosecutor or the Defendant frustrated the entire
purpose of the Defendant meeting with [Sergeant] Gress.” Id. at 17. And
“but for the Defendant entering into the stipulated agreement (i.e. the
contract), he would have never spoken to [Sergeant] Gress.” Id.

   While the State has not concluded Sergeant Gress’ omissions rose to the
level of perjury, it has acknowledged its own frustration and concerns
with Sergeant Gress’ failure to timely share information with the
prosecutors. Sergeant Gress’ only explanation was that he was relying on
Detective Jones to relay to the prosecutor that the polygraph was no
longer a stipulated evidentiary exam, but Detective Jones testified he does
not recall any such conversation. Just the opposite, Detective Jones does
not recall any point in his career—including this incident—when a
polygraph examiner informed him that the examiner was changing a
stipulated, evidentiary exam to a non-stipulated, investigatory exam. And
counting on Detective Jones to relay the information to the prosecutor still
does not explain why Sergeant Gress omitted this critical fact from his
own testimony at the first suppression hearing, which was all about his
polygraph examination.

    In sum, our prior cases have explained that trial courts may exclude the
State’s evidence when a discovery violation is “grossly misleading or
demonstrates bad faith.” Thompson, 492 N.E.2d at 274. Because the trial
court found that level of culpability here, and the record supports (even if
it does not compel) that conclusion, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. See, e.g., Whitaker, 960 N.E.2d at 117 (holding that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence when a party provided

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“false and misleading” responses to discovery requests); Cameron v. State,
274 Ind. 436, 444, 412 N.E.2d 1194, 1199 (1980) (“Where the violation is
grossly misleading or demonstrates bad faith, exclusion of the evidence
may be required.”).

Conclusion
   For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order excluding the State’s
evidence as a discovery sanction.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Angela Sanchez
Jodi Kathryn Stein
Andrew Kobe
Office of the Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Joel C. Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana

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