Court Opinion

ID: 9499192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:40:25.695193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:20.357027
License: Public Domain

BYE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of 132 months. I believe the district court acted properly, and because today’s decision affords too little deference to the broad discretion visited upon sentencing courts under the now-advisory guideline system, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.
We have consistently stated “[ujnder the post-Booker advisory system, the Federal Sentencing Act ‘requires a sentencing court to consider Guidelines ranges, but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.’ ” United States v. Archuleta, 412 F.3d 1003, 1006 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 757, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005)). Nothing indicates the advisory Guidelines range is anything more than one factor, among many, the sentencing court is obligated to consider before imposing a sentence. We have held a sentence within the Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable, United *958States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir.2005), but have rejected the notion “that the range of reasonableness is essentially co-extensive with the Guidelines range” because such a rule “would effectively render the Guidelines mandatory.” United States v. Winters, 416 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir.2005). Instead, “[w]e have been directed to review a sentence for reasonableness based on all the factors listed in § 3553(a)(6). The Guidelines range is but one such factor. We cannot isolate possible sentencing disparity to the exclusion of all the other § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Under the mandatory Guidelines scheme, district courts were prohibited from considering a defendant’s characteristics in “any manner other than as a basis for a Guidelines departure.” United States v. Ryder, 414 F.3d 908, 920 (8th Cir.2005). Now, § 3553(a) requires a district court to consider a defendant’s characteristics independent of the guidelines. Id. (“Now coupled with the requirements in § 3553(a) ... the district court would be well within its discretion to ... consider ... ages and medical conditions as non-Guidelines factors on remand”); see also United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir.2005) (holding the district court properly considered non-Guidelines sentencing factors such as prior military service, wife’s pregnancy, the need to care for other children and entrepreneurial spirit). Indeed, “[w]e believe it would seriously affectf] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings ‘to not allow the district court to consider these factors now.’ ” Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d at 756 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Ceballos, 407 F.3d 937, 941-42 (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotations omitted)). “Sentences varying from the guidelines range ... are reasonable so long as the judge offers appropriate justification under the factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). How compelling that justification must be is proportional to the extent of the difference between the advisory range and the sentence imposed.” United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 480 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 426-27 (7th Cir.2005) (citation omitted)). A “range of reasonableness” is within the court’s discretion. Id. (quoting United States v. Saenz, 428 F.3d 1159, 1165 (8th Cir.2005)).
The exercise of a district court’s sentencing discretion
[Ijmplies the absence of a hard-and-fast rule. The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action. Discretion means the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances.
The Styria v. Morgan, 186 U.S. 1, 9, 22 S.Ct. 731, 46 L.Ed. 1027 (1902) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). “[Discretion] takes account of the law and the particular circumstances of the case and is directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 223, 53 S.Ct. 154, 77 L.Ed. 266 (1932) (internal quotations omitted).
The record demonstrates the district court carefully considered all the relevant circumstances and arrived at a just and proper result. I find nothing to suggest it strayed from the proper exercise of discretion by taking into account improper or irrelevant factors or by ignoring factors which should have been given significant weight. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2005). Among other circumstances, the district court considered McDonald’s criminal history and the serious nature of his current crimes; his addiction to methamphetamine and mental health problems; the need for treatment and rehabilitation; the tragic death of his *959daughter; his employment history; and the need to protect the public and impose a significant sentence to minimize the likelihood of future criminal conduct. The eleven-year sentence imposed by the court represents a significant period of incarceration and reflects a reasoned attempt to arrive at a proper sentence in light of the myriad sentencing factors it was called upon to consider and balance. The sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and specifically takes into account the need to protect the public until such time the likelihood of future criminal conduct would be minimized. The lengthy sentence also provides McDonald the opportunity to receive the treatment and rehabilitation he .needs to overcome his drug addiction and mental health problems and once again become a productive member of society. I recognize another judge might have imposed a different sentence but I find nothing to convince me the district court abused its discretion.
The majority holds the district court did not adequately explain the reasons behind the 132-month sentence. I disagree. We have repeatedly stated: “Nothing in § 3553(a) ... requires ‘robotic incantations’ that each statutory factor has been considered.” Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d at 756 (citations omitted). Nor do we “require a district court to categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes sentence so long as it is clear that they were considered.” United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.2006); see also United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir.2005) (“The relevant inquiry is not whether the district court quoted or cited § 3553(a); it is whether the district court actually considered the § 3553(a) factors.”).
The majority also relies on the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities as a basis for rejecting the district court’s sentence. Sentencing disparities were predicted by the Supreme Court in Booker:
[Rjegardless, in this context, we must view fears of a “discordant symphony,” “excessive disparities,” and “havoc” (if they are not themselves “gross exaggerations”) with a comparative eye. We cannot and do not claim that use of a “reasonableness” standard will provide the uniformity [in sentencing] that Congress originally sought to secure.
Booker, 543 U.S. at 263,125 S.Ct. 738.
Accordingly, while uniformity remains an important component of sentencing, it cannot serve as the touchstone in a system which orders district courts to consider and balance a multitude of other factors. Such an approach would simplify sentencing but undermine Booker. We are now the arbiters of a sentencing system driven by reasonableness — a much more fluid standard — and no longer have the luxury of treating sentencing like a mathematical equation. We must be prepared to accept that with discretion comes some disparity. I am confident district courts exercise their discretion with wisdom and restraint and believe appellate courts should only rarely reverse such decisions.
I believe today’s decision is symptomatic of the growing pains our courts are experiencing as we mpve away from a constitutionally infirm system of mandatory sentencing to the advisory system commanded by Booker. If we fail to implement the promise of Booker and do not relinquish greater discretion to experienced district court judges whose proximity to sentencing renders them eminently more qualified to appreciate the subtleties of each case, we will find ourselves the architects of a new — and equally unconstitutional — de facto mandatory sentencing system crafted from the ashes of the last.
*960I also wish to lend my voice to the concerns expressed by Judge Heaney in United States v. Meyer, 452 F.3d 998, 1000 n. 3 (8th Cir.2006). I too have noticed our court routinely affirms sentences above the Guidelines range, while reversing most sentences imposed below the Guidelines range.
Judge Heaney noted that since Booker, our court has affirmed twelve sentences in excess of the recommended Guidelines range but reversed only one. To his list of cases affirming sentences in excess of the Guidelines range, I add the following: United States v. Maurstad, 454 F.3d 787 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Hacker, 450 F.3d 808 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Donelson, 450 F.3d 768 (8th Cir.2006), and United States v. Porter, 439 F.3d 845 (8th Cir.2006). My research reveals no additional cases in which the court reversed a sentence in excess of the recommended Guidelines range. Thus, by my count, we have affirmed sixteen above Guidelines cases while reversing only one.
Judge Heaney further noted the court has reversed sixteen sentences which were below the Guidelines range and affirmed three. To his list of cases reversing below Guidelines sentences, I add the following: United States v. Collier, No. 05-4386, slip op., — Fed.Appx. —, 2006 WL 2290513 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 2006), United States v. Brown, — Fed.Appx. -, 2006 WL 2192716 (8th Cir. Aug.4, 2006), United States v. Robinson, 454 F.3d 839 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Lee, 454 F.3d 836 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Medearis, 451 F.3d 918 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Rivera, 439 F.3d 446 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415 (8th Cir.2006), United States v. Feemster, 435 F.3d 881 (8th Cir.2006), and United States v. Coyle, 429 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir.2005). To his list of cases affirming below Guidelines sentences, I add: United States v. Krutsinger, 449 F.3d 827 (8th Cir.2006). Thus, by my count, we have reversed twenty-five below Guidelines sentences while affirming only four.
Like Judge Heaney, I recognize other considerations may explain the disparity. Nonetheless, I believe it should be the catalyst for the court to take a critical look at how we dispose of such cases.
If we are to be deferential when the Government persuades a district judge to render a non-Guidelines sentence somewhat above the Guidelines range, we must be similarly deferential when a defendant persuades a district judge to render a non-Guidelines sentence somewhat below the Guidelines range. Obviously, the discretion that Booker accords sentencing judges to impose non-Guidelines sentences cannot be an escalator that only goes up.
United States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir.2006).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.