Court Opinion

ID: 9954516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 15:15:42.25321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:50.222251
License: Public Domain

Supreme Court

                                                   No. 2023-141-Appeal.
                                                   No. 2023-162-Appeal.
                                                   (PC 10-2433)

        Dania Mateo               :

             v.                   :

Davidson Media Group Rhode        :
 Island Stations, LLC, et al.

        NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision
        before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers
        are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme
        Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence,
        Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or
        Email      opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov,      of     any
        typographical or other formal errors in order that
        corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
                                                          Supreme Court

                                                          No. 2023-141-Appeal.
                                                          No. 2023-162-Appeal.
                                                          (PC 10-2433)

             Dania Mateo                :

                  v.                    :

    Davidson Media Group Rhode          :
     Island Stations, LLC, et al.

                Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, and Robinson, JJ.

                                   OPINION

      Justice Robinson, for the Court. The plaintiff, Dania Mateo, appeals from

a September 6, 2022 order entered in Providence County Superior Court, granting

partial summary judgment in favor of the defendants, Maggie Giraud, Felix Perez,

Cesar Salas, Quilvio Perdomo, and Jane or John Doe with respect to a complaint

consisting of twenty-two counts. The plaintiff contends that the grant of partial

summary judgment should be vacated, arguing that the hearing justice erred

(among other reasons) because: (1) there remained genuine issues of material fact

in dispute; (2) his ruling that the plaintiff had not proffered competent evidence to

support her civil conspiracy claim was erroneous; and (3) the Doe defendants were

improperly dismissed.

                                        -1-
      Very significantly, defendants cross-appeal from the entry of partial final

judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure

(entered on January 24, 2023), asserting that the hearing justice erred in granting

plaintiff’s motion for the entry of partial final judgment because he failed to make

an express determination that there was no just reason for delay.

      The instant appeal and cross-appeal came before the Supreme Court

pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues

raised therein should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’

written and oral submissions and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude

that cause has not been shown and that these appeals may be decided without

further briefing or argument.

      For the reasons set forth hereinafter, it is our opinion that defendants’

cross-appeal is meritorious and that the January 24, 2023 partial final judgment

must be vacated and the case remanded to the Superior Court for further

proceedings. For that reason, we do not reach the issues raised in plaintiff’s

appeal.

                                        -2-
                                         I

                                Facts and Travel

      In setting forth the sequence of events which form the basis of this action,

we rely on the August 31, 2022 and January 17, 2023 bench decisions of the

hearing justice and other documents contained in the record.

      On April 23, 2010,1 plaintiff filed a twenty-two-count complaint against

Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC (Davidson) and several of its

employees, alleging violations of the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act

(RIFEPA) and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA). That rather prolix

complaint also contained several allegations of sexual harassment, liability under

the doctrine of respondeat superior, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of

emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery,

negligence, false imprisonment, defamation, and conspiracy to commit defamation.

      The factual crux of this case is that, on or about January 20, 2008, plaintiff

was hired as an “on air radio personality” for the morning show broadcast by

Davidson (Latina 100.3). On that morning show, plaintiff played a fictitious

1
       We have been unable to find anything in the record that constitutes an
adequate justification for the extremely long pendency of this particular civil
action, which has been pending in the Superior Court for almost fourteen years.
See Greensleeves, Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 294 n.19 (R.I. 2007) (“It appears
to us that this case has taken on a life of its own; we can perceive no sufficient
reason why this particular litigation did not come to an end long ago. * * * We find
the long pendency of this case to be truly regrettable * * *.”).

                                       -3-
“scripted character” named “Anaconda.” She further alleged that the morning

show included other fictitious characters—including but not limited to “El Baron”

(played by Darvin Garcia, who was plaintiff’s “direct morning show supervisor” as

well as “a person who [plaintiff] had been previously romantically involved with”).

      The plaintiff alleged that Cesar Salas, who was at that time the “Director of

Sales” at Davidson, sexually harassed her; she further purported to have reported

that alleged harassment to Mr. Garcia and to Joseph Rizza, who was the “North

East Regional Manager.”         According to plaintiff’s complaint, “Davidson

compelled all employees to have a sexual harassment seminar.” However, she

further alleged that, in spite of this training, the sexual harassment of her

continued. The plaintiff also alleged that, at some later point, both Mr. Garcia and

she were fired and that, “[s]oon thereafter, Salas and Perdomo, and possibly others

(John or Jane Doe), conspired to lie and stated on the live morning show broadcast

on multiple occasions, that [plaintiff] and Garcia had been fired from Davidson

because they had been caught having sex in the office.” According to plaintiff, as

a result of what she alleged were “false statements,” she “underwent mental health

counseling, attempted to commit suicide, and suffered great economic hardship

and emotional distress.”

      On October 6, 2010, defendants moved pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss

nineteen of the twenty-two counts of plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a

                                       -4-
claim upon which relief can be granted.2 A hearing on defendants’ motion to

dismiss was held on December 14, 2010, and a written decision was issued on

April 30, 2013.3 The decision mandated the dismissal of the majority of the counts

set forth in plaintiff’s complaint.4 However, the hearing justice denied defendants’

motion to dismiss as to Counts Nineteen, Twenty, Twenty-One, and Twenty-Two.

Five years later, on January 9, 2018, an order dismissing the RIFEPA claim against

Mr. Salas (Count One) was entered. Consequently, as of that time, the only six

counts remaining were the following: RICRA violations against Mr. Rizza (Count

Four); RICRA violations against Ms. Giraud (Count Five); defamation against Mr.

Salas (Count Nineteen); defamation against Mr. Perdomo (Count Twenty);

defamation against “John/Jane Doe” (Count Twenty-One); and conspiracy to

defame against Mr. Perez, Mr. Salas, Mr. Perdomo, and John Doe (Count Twenty-

Two).

        On March 3, 2022, defendants moved for summary judgment on Counts

Five and Twenty-Two as well as for the “dismissal of Counts [Twenty-One] and

2
       The three counts for which defendants did not seek dismissal in their 2010
motion to dismiss alleged the following: RIFEPA violations against Mr. Salas
(Count One); RICRA violations against Mr. Rizza (Count Four); and RICRA
violations against Maggie Giraud (Count Five).
3
      The hearing justice who rendered the decision on the motion to dismiss in
2010 was not the justice who granted plaintiff’s motion for partial final judgment
in 2023.
4
        The complaint against Felix Lopez was dismissed in its entirety.

                                         -5-
[Twenty-Two] against John/Jane Doe.”          On July 15, 2022, plaintiff filed an

objection to defendants’ motion for summary judgment; a hearing on that motion

took place on August 31, 2022, after which the hearing justice rendered a bench

decision granting defendants’ motion; and an order to that effect entered on

September 6, 2022, from which order plaintiff appealed.

      On December 2, 2022, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s appeal

on the ground that plaintiff had “not obtained an entry of partial judgment * * *.”

The plaintiff filed an objection to that motion on December 7, 2022. Then, on

January 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a “Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Nunc Pro

Tunc,” to which motion defendants objected. A hearing on that motion took place

on January 17, 2023.

      At the hearing on plaintiff’s “Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Nunc Pro

Tunc,” counsel for plaintiff indicated that plaintiff was asking “for the Final

Judgment to enter [nunc pro tunc] for the purposes of perfecting [plaintiff’s] ability

to conduct [plaintiff’s] appeal to the Supreme Court.” Counsel for defendants,

citing Rule 54(b), contended that plaintiff had failed to show that the granting of

such partial final judgment would be in the interest of justice and that there was

“no reason to delay.” Counsel for plaintiff noted that, “in order for a * * * litigant

to appeal to the Supreme Court, there has to be an entry of Final Judgment.” The

hearing justice agreed, stating that he was going to grant the motion so that

                                        -6-
plaintiff could perfect her appeal. A judgment was entered on January 24, 2023,

providing as follows:

             “Pursuant to the Partial Summary Judgment Granted in
             favor of the Defendants September 6, 2022, Final
             Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants,
             against the Plaintiff dismissing Count [Five], against
             Defendant Maggie Giraud, dismissing Count [Twenty-
             Two], against Defendants Perez, Salas and Perdomo and
             dismissing Counts [Twenty-One] and [Twenty-Two],
             against the John/Jane Doe. The Final Judgment is
             retroactive to September 6[th], 2022 to allow Plaintiff to
             perfect her appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.”

The defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on January 26, 2023. The Court

consolidated plaintiff’s and defendants’ appeals on September 20, 2023.

                                          II

                                  Issues on Appeal

      On appeal, plaintiff contends that the hearing justice erred in granting partial

summary judgment (1) when he failed to take into account that there remained

genuine issues of material fact in dispute; (2) when he ruled that plaintiff had not

proffered competent evidence to support her civil conspiracy claim; and (3) when

he improperly dismissed the Doe defendants.

      In their cross-appeal, defendants contend that, in light of the criteria set forth

in Rule 54(b), the hearing justice erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for entry of

partial final judgment.

                                         -7-
                                        III

                                     Analysis

      We first address defendants’ contentions in their cross-appeal, since it will

become clear that we need go no further.

      The defendants argue that “the prerequisites for partial final judgment under

Rule 54(b) have not been met” and that “therefore [the] immediate appeal should

be denied.” The defendants point out that “[b]oth the transcript and the written

order” make no mention of “any express finding that there was no just reason for

delay for entry of final judgment, much less the basis for [the hearing justice’s]

ruling.”

      Rule 54(b) provides, in relevant part:

            “When more than one (1) claim for relief is presented in
            an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim,
            or third party claim, or when multiple parties are
            involved, the court may direct the entry of a final
            judgment as to one (1) or more but fewer than all of the
            claims or parties only upon an express determination that
            there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
            direction for the entry of judgment.” (Emphasis added.)

This Court has clearly stated that “[t]he purpose of [Rule 54(b)] is to avoid

piecemeal appeals.” Astro-Med, Inc. v. R. Moroz, Ltd., 811 A.2d 1154, 1156 (R.I.

2002) (quoting 1 Kent, R.I. Civ. Prac. 396, 397 (1969)).5 This policy “militates in

5
       The Court in Astro-Med, Inc. further pragmatically observed that “by
limiting entry of final judgment under Rule 54(b) to those instances in which a

                                        -8-
favor of delaying judgment until all claims involving all parties are ripe for

disposition and entering judgment as to all only when that time arrives.” Id.

(quoting 1 Kent, § 54.3 at 400); see also Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC, 136

A.3d 1113, 1121 (R.I. 2016) (noting this Court’s “strong preference for avoiding

piecemeal appellate review”) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We

have emphasized that “[a] hearing justice should enter final judgment under Rule

54(b) only in unusual and compelling circumstances.” Astro-Med, Inc., 811 A.2d at

1158 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      When this Court reviews a Rule 54(b) certification of the entry of final

judgment, it “employs a two-part inquiry.” Cathay Cathay, Inc., 136 A.3d at 1118.

First, this Court “assess[es] whether the [hearing] justice properly determined that

the action below involved either multiple parties or multiple claims and whether

the lower court’s disposition adjudicated one or more but fewer than all of the

claims before it.” Id. at 1118-19 (internal quotation marks omitted). If this Court

is satisfied that the requirements of the first step have been met, it “next ask[s]

whether the [hearing] justice properly determined that there was no just reason for

delay.” Id. at 1119 (internal quotation marks omitted).           We review that

determination under the abuse of discretion standard. See Westinghouse

hearing justice finds no just reason for delay, this Court is spared from having to
keep relearning the facts of a case on successive appeals.” Astro-Med, Inc. v. R.
Moroz, Ltd., 811 A.2d 1154, 1156 (R.I. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                       -9-
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Dial Media, Inc., 122 R.I. 571, 577, 410 A.2d 986, 989

(1980). And we constantly bear in mind that the abuse of discretion standard

“includes review to determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal

conclusions.” Votolato v. Merandi, 747 A.2d 455, 460 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Koon v.

United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)).

      In the case at bar, neither party disputes that the first prong of the Rule 54(b)

two-part inquiry has been satisfied; for that reason, we shift our focus to the second

prong. Our careful review of the record reveals that it is entirely devoid of any

reasoning that is required for a Rule 54(b) analysis. Specifically, the hearing

justice’s decision is bereft of an “express determination that there [was] no just

reason for delay * * *.” Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The hearing justice’s sole reason

for granting the plaintiff’s motion for entry of partial final judgment “nunc pro

tunc” was so that the plaintiff could perfect her appeal. We note that this ruling

occurred after the defendants articulated their position that the plaintiff had failed

to make a showing that the entry of partial final judgment would have been “in the

interest of justice” and that there was “no reason to delay.” Accordingly, it is our

opinion that the hearing justice erred in entering partial final judgment pursuant to

Rule 54(b) due to the fact that he failed to determine whether or not the criteria

clearly set forth in Rule 54(b) had been satisfied. Given our holding with respect

                                        - 10 -
to the hearing justice’s failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 54(b), the

issues raised in the plaintiff’s appeal are not properly before us at this time.

                                          IV

                                      Conclusion

      It is our opinion that the defendants’ cross-appeal is meritorious and that the

January 24, 2023 partial final judgment must be vacated. Accordingly, we vacate

that judgment and remand the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings.

In light of the length of time that this case has been pending, we direct that it

proceed expeditiously to trial, and it is to be hoped that any further appeal will be

deferred until after the entry of final judgment.

      The record may be returned to the Superior Court.

      Justice Lynch Prata and Justice Long did not participate.

                                         - 11 -
                                          STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
                                     SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
                                           Licht Judicial Complex
                                             250 Benefit Street
                                           Providence, RI 02903

                                 OPINION COVER SHEET

                                     Dania Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island
Title of Case
                                     Stations, LLC, et al.

                                     No. 2023-141-Appeal.
Case Number                          No. 2023-162-Appeal.
                                     (PC 10-2433)

Date Opinion Filed                   March 26, 2024

Justices                             Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, and Robinson, JJ.

Written By                           Associate Justice William P. Robinson III

Source of Appeal                     Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court    Associate Justice R. David Cruise

                                     For Plaintiff:

                                     Christopher J. Petrarca, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
                                     For Defendants:

                                     Vicki J. Bejma, Esq.

SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)