Court Opinion

ID: 9387164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-15 06:00:13.635618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.894264
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     JEROME W. JOHNSON,                              DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-0752-16-0064-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,                         DATE: April 14, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Kevin McCants, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Robert Howard Walton, Norfolk, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member 2

                                       FINAL ORDER
¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
     2
       Member Leavitt’s name is included in decisions on which the three -member Board
     completed the voting process prior to his March 1, 2023 departure.
                                                                                           2

     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.            Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to find it unnecessary to make a determination regarding whether
     the agency proved its charge of absence without leave (AWOL) , and to VACATE
     the   administrative   judge’s   alternative    finding   regarding   the   appellant’s
     whistleblower reprisal affirmative defense, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed by the agency’s Naval Supply Systems
     Command (NAVSUP) as a Postal Supervisor, domiciled at a Naval District
     Washington (NDW) installation. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 51, 95. On
     April 2, 2015, he called the Veterans Administration (VA) Crisis Hotline and
     made a reference to the Washington Navy Yard shooting (in which 13 people
     were killed on September 16, 2013).            Id. at 45, 53.    According to the VA
     responder who took the appellant’s call, the appellant also threatened to kill
     several people and then commit suicide. Id. at 53. Individuals from the Crisis
     Hotline contacted the NDW and the appellant’s supervisor regarding the
     appellant’s statements. Id. at 63-64. As a result of safety concerns raised by the
     statements, the commanding officer of the NDW installation where the appellant
                                                                                      3

     worked issued the appellant a debarment letter and NDW officers escorted him
     out of his work location the same day. Id. at 64.
¶3        The appellant’s third-level supervisor placed the appellant on paid
     administrative leave from April 3 to June 26, 2015. IAF, Tab 7 at 79, 81-83, 86,
     Tab 27, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the appellant’s third -level
     supervisor); Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 6 at 89-90. On April 7, 2015,
     the NDW issued the appellant another letter, barring him from all NDW
     installations, including the one where he worked.     IAF, Tab 7 at 76-77.    The
     appellant appealed that barment order to the NDW Commandant, and his appeal
     was denied. Id. at 70-74.
¶4        On June 12, 2015, the appellant’s third-level supervisor warned the
     appellant that unless he was “able to resolve [his] barment from naval
     installations, enabling [him] to legally access [his] appointed place of work, [he
     would] be placed in an [AWOL] status” beginning June 29, 2015. Id. at 79. The
     appellant took annual leave from June 29 to July 23, 2015. PFR File, Tab 6 at 89;
     IAF, Tab 7 at 86. From July 24 to September 25, 2015, the agency designated the
     appellant’s leave status as AWOL. PFR File, Tab 6 at 88; IAF, Tab 7 at 86.
¶5        On September 25, 2015, the agency removed the appellant from the Federal
     service. IAF, Tab 7 at 51. The removal was based on one ch arge of making
     statements that resulted in disruption and anxiety in the workplace and one charge
     of being AWOL. Id. at 29-31.
¶6        The appellant timely filed an appeal with the Board.      IAF, Tab 1.    The
     administrative judge held the appellant’s requested heari ng. HCD. In her initial
     decision, the administrative judge sustained the agency’s charges, found that the
     appellant failed to prove his affirmative defenses of reprisal for making a
     protected disclosure or retaliation for engaging in the Equal Employment
     Opportunity (EEO) process, found that the agency proved nexus , and concluded
     that the agency-imposed penalty of removal was within the bounds of
     reasonableness. IAF, Tab 28, Initial Decision (ID) at 10-22.
                                                                                             4

¶7         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
     response opposing the petition. 3 PFR File, Tabs 1, 3. The Office of the Clerk of
     the Board ordered the parties to file evidence and argument addressing the
     appellant’s employment relationship to the NDW. PFR File, Tab 5. The agency
     has submitted a response, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge properly sustained the charge of making statements that
     resulted in disruption and anxiety in the workplace.
¶8         The administrative judge found that the agency met its burden to prove the
     charge of making statements that resulted in anxiety and disruption in the
     workplace. ID at 6-7, 13. We agree.
¶9         In making her determination, the administrative judge credited the
     testimony of the Crisis Hotline responder that the appellant referenced the Navy
     Yard shooting during his call and indicated that if the responder thought that that
     was bad, the appellant was going to take out a number of people and commit
     suicide. ID at 13; IAF, Tab 7 at 30, 53. The administrative judge found that, as a
     result of the appellant’s statements, his first-level supervisor experienced anxiety,
     his third-level supervisor reported to work on his day off, and NDW police
     intervened and escorted the appellant from his work location, ID at 13; IAF,
     Tab 7 at 30-31. See Gray v. Government Printing Office, 111 M.S.P.R. 184, ¶¶ 2,

     3
       In his petition for review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s
     finding that he failed to prove that the agency removed him because of his prior EEO
     activities. PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 18-19. Nor does the appellant seem to challenge the
     administrative judge’s finding that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of reprisal
     for making a protected disclosure. PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 16-18. Because the
     administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that he made a protected
     disclosure, we vacate her alternative finding that the agency proved by clear and
     convincing evidence that it would have removed the appellant in the absence of his
     alleged protected disclosure, ID at 16-17. Scoggins v. Department of the Army,
     123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28 (2016). We otherwise discern no basis to disturb her findings
     regarding these affirmative defenses. Further, we have reviewed the relevant legislation
     enacted during the pendency of this appeal and find that none impact the outcome.
                                                                                               5

      5-6, 16 (2009) (finding that an agency proved a charge of disruption in the
      workplace and because the appellant’s statements, including that he “might do
      something bad” to his supervisor, was “going to kill him with a machete, ” and
      was going to “cut . . . him to pieces,” caused anxiety to those who overheard
      them).
¶10         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred by
      “accepting testimony from” the responder who received the appellant’s call to the
      VA Crisis Hotline because he violated N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.46. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 4. That law requires any “mental health professional” to report to certain
      authorities when he reasonably determines that a person he is treating is likely to
      cause serious harm to himself or others. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.46. First, it
      is not clear that the responder is a mental health professional under the statute,
      and indeed the appellant argues that he is not. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Thus, the
      appellant has failed to show that the statute applies to the responder. Second,
      assuming that the responder violated the statute, the appellant has failed to
      explain why that would be cause for prohibiting his testimony. Id. Accordingly,
      we find the appellant’s argument unpersuasive. 4 To the extent that the appellant
      is seeking to assert a psychotherapist-patient privilege, we decline to find that any
      such privilege was violated. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5; IAF, Tab 14 at 4. The
      appellant was specifically cautioned by the counselor that his statements might
      trigger a duty to warn, yet he continued to make them. IAF, Tab 7 at 30, 53 -54,
      93; ID at 13; see Gray, 111 M.S.P.R. 184, ¶ 10 (explaining that whether an

      4
        Although the appellant did not raise this argument below, we have considered it for
      the first time on review because it is closely related to his argument below that st aff at
      the Crisis Hotline violated the statute by reporting his telephone call to the agency.
      IAF, Tab 14 at 2-4; see Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271
      (1980) (observing that the Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time
      in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence
      not previously available despite the party’s due diligence). The appellant has not
      re-raised this argument on review.
                                                                                               6

      appellant is aware his statements might not be kept confidential is a factor in
      determining whether they are covered by a psychotherapist -patient privilege).
¶11         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that the Crisis
      Hotline responder was credible. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5; ID at 11-13. In making
      this finding, the administrative judge considered the relevant factors used to
      assess credibility. Id. (citing Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453,
      458   (1987)     (listing   factors    to    be    considered   in   making     credibility
      determinations)). In crediting the responder, the administrative judge found that
      he was unbiased. ID at 12-13. She also found that the appellant’s testimony that
      he was calm when he made the hotline call was inherently improbable in light of
      his recent reassignment and harassment charges pending against him . Id.; IAF,
      Tab 7 at 63.
¶12         The      Board   must    defer    to    an    administrative   judge’s    credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. Haebe
      v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002).                We find no
      sufficiently sound reasons here.        The appellant argues that the administrative
      judge failed to consider that the responder read from his notes and talked to his
      supervisor during the hearing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant also asserts
      that the responder made inconsistent statements on April 2, 2015, regarding
      whether the appellant threatened to “kill his supervisor” or “take out several
      people.” Id. at 5. Finally, he argues that the responder testified that the hotline
      call lasted only 10 minutes, contradicting the responder’s earlier statement to the
      agency that the call was 35-40 minutes. Id.; IAF, Tab 7 at 53.
¶13         As to the length of the call, we decline to disturb the administrative judge’s
      finding that the responder’s error regarding the length of the call in his earlier
      statement to the agency did not significantly undermine his credibility. ID at 7-8,
      12 n.1; see Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                              7

      357, 359 (1987) (observing that mere reargument of factual issues already raised
      and properly resolved by the administrative judge below do not establish a basis
      for review). As to the responder’s alleged referral to his notes during the hearing,
      the appellant appears to misunderstand the hearing process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5.
      Although the responder initially looked at his prior statement to the agency while
      testifying, the administrative judge requested that he testify from his memory, and
      he proceeded to do so. 5 HCD (testimony of the responder). We also do not agree
      that the responder’s statements were inherently incons istent, as alleged by the
      appellant. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. The responder consistently stated, as charged by
      the agency, that the appellant referenced the Navy Yard shooting and said he was
      going to take several people out and then commit suicide. HCD (testimony of the
      responder); IAF, Tab 7 at 30, 53, 63-64.
¶14         The appellant contends that the administrative judge also erred in
      concluding that the responder stated that he left voicemail messages for the
      appellant because the responder testified that he did not know the appellant’s
      telephone number. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. In fact, the administrative judge found
      that the responder stated that he did not leave a voicemail message for the
      appellant. ID at 7. Accordingly, we find the appellant’s argument unav ailing.

      We find it unnecessary to make a determination regarding the AWOL charge .
¶15         The appellant further alleges that the administrative judge “erred by not
      recognizing his forced leave” while the agency investigated his alleged

      5
        As to the allegation that the responder spoke with his supervisor at some point during
      the proceedings, we have been unable to discern whether such conversations occurred
      on the record. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5. Further, the appellant has not alleged any
      improprieties in any such discussion. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument
      further. See Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992)
      (explaining that a petition for review must contain sufficient specificity to enable the
      Board to ascertain whether there is a serious evidentiary challenge j ustifying a complete
      review of the record); Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984) (declining to find that the presiding official’s failure to
      mention all of the evidence meant that she did not consider it), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062
      (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table).
                                                                                               8

      misconduct. 6 PFR File, Tab 1 at 5; ID at 14. We interpret this assertion as an
      argument that the administrative judge erred in sustaining the AWOL charge.
      Because the first charge regarding the appellant’s statements to the responder is
      sufficient to sustain his removal, we find it unnecessary to reach this issue of
      whether the agency proved its AWOL charge. See Gray, 111 M.S.P.R. 184, ¶ 17
      (finding it unnecessary to address the appellant’s arguments as to one of the
      charges because the other sustained charges warranted the penalty of removal).
      Because we do not address this charge, it is appropriate for purposes of assessing
      the penalty to treat this as a case in which not all charges are sustained . Id.

      The penalty of removal is within the bounds of reasonableness based on the
      sustained charge.
¶16         When an agency proves fewer than all of its charges, the Board may
      mitigate to the maximum reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not
      indicated either in its final decision or during proceedings before the Board that it
      desires that a lesser penalty be imposed on fewer charges. Gray, 111 M.S.P.R.
      184, ¶ 18. The Board may impose the same penalty imposed by the agency based
      on a justification of that penalty as the maximum reasonable penalty after
      balancing the mitigating factors. Id.; see Robinson v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 923 F.3d 1004, 1016-17 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (stating that in an appeal where
      not all of the charges are sustained, “the Board functions to determine whether or
      not the agency’s penalty selection was reasonable in light of the sustained
      charge[]”).
¶17         In his decision notice, the deciding official stated that he believed each
      charge, standing alone, was sufficient to warrant the appellant’s removal. IAF,
      Tab 7 at 22. The deciding official came to this conclusion after considering all of
      the appropriate factors. Id. at 19-27; see Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
      5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant

      6
        To the extent that the appellant is raising an enforced leave claim for the first time on
      review, we decline to consider it. See Banks, 4 M.S.P.R. at 271.
                                                                                       9

      to determining the appropriateness of a penalty for misconduct).      Beyond his
      dispute of the charges, the appellant did not make any argument regarding
      mitigation, either below or on review. ID at 22; PFR File, Tab 1.
¶18        We agree with the deciding official that the appellant’s sustained conduct of
      making statements that resulted in anxiety and disruption in the workplace was
      serious. IAF, Tab 7 at 21; see Gray, 111 M.S.P.R. 184, ¶¶ 11, 19-21 (finding that
      charges of making statements that caused anxiety and disruption in the workplace
      and using racially inappropriate language were sufficient to sustain a removal);
      Stoddard v. Department of the Army, 109 M.S.P.R. 199, ¶¶ 2, 10 (2008) (finding
      removal an appropriate penalty for an appellant charged with creating a
      disturbance by implying he would inflict bodily harm on his supervisor and
      coworkers).    The deciding official found that removal was within the
      recommended range of penalties for the sustained charge and was consistent with
      the agency’s growing concern with preventing workplace violence. IAF, Tab 7
      at 22. Further, he considered the appellant’s 5 years of service and acceptable
      performance. Id. at 21. Nonetheless, in light of the seriousness of the charge, he
      found that removal was appropriate.      Id. at 22.   We therefore find that the
      deciding official considered the Douglas factors most relevant to this case and
      that the agency reasonably exercised its management discretion. Accordingly, we
      find that the penalty of removal is within the tolerable limits of reasonableness
      for the charge of making statements that resulted in disruption and anxiety in the
      workplace.

      We decline to address the appellant’s arguments regarding his individual right of
      action (IRA) appeal.
¶19        Finally, the appellant previously filed an IRA appeal, which the
      administrative judge dismissed as untimely filed. Johnson v. Department of the
      Navy, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-16-0122-W-1, Initial Decision at 1 (Oct. 5,
      2016). That decision became final after neither party filed a timely p etition for
      review. In filing his petition for review, the appellant appears to challenge this
                                                                                           10

      determination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, 6. The Office of the Clerk of the Board
      provided him the opportunity to clarify whether he intended to file a petition for
      review in his IRA appeal. PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant was informed that if he
      failed to do so, the Board might assume that he did not intend to file a petition for
      review of his IRA appeal. Id. at 2. The appellant failed to respond to the Office
      of the Clerk of the Board’s order.        Accordingly, we decline to address the
      appellant’s assertions appearing to relate to his IRA appeal. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4, 6.
¶20         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision sustaining the appellant’s
      removal, as modified herein.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 7
             The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for you r situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to yo ur
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
      chosen forum.

      7
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        11

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of revi ew
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                12

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     13

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in secti on
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 8   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

8
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                14

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.