Court Opinion

ID: 9713843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:24:09.139524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.987203
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
1 agree with the majority’s conclusion that Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme governing sentencing determinations in capital cases, as presently amended to allow for the admission of victim impact evidence, does not violate constitutional precepts. This is so, because the General Assembly has now expressly allowed for the consideration of victim impact as a *336form of other aggravating evidence relevant only to “selection” of a defendant for imposition of a sentence of death after the defendant’s “eligibility” has been determined according to the statutorily-prescribed aggravating factors set forth at Section 9711(d) of the Judicial Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(a)(2). See generally Commonwealth v. Trivigno, 561 Pa. 232, 257-58, 750 A.2d 243, 256-57 (2000)(Saylor, J., concurring)(describing a capital sentencing body’s separate eligibility and selection determinations, the Eighth Amendment constraints attaching to the eligibility facet, and the constitutional validity of consideration of a wider range of circumstances in the selection process).
My difference with the majority, however, arises from its decision to abandon the prevailing interpretation concerning the general operation of the Pennsylvania death penalty statute as was reflected in Commonwealth v. Fisher, 545 Pa. 233, 266-68, 681 A.2d 130, 146-47 (1996). Fisher held that victim impact evidence and other forms of “selection” aggravating evidence were not admissible under the pre-amendment version of the death penalty enactment, since the statute did not expressly provide for the consideration of such evidence, nor did it allow for the open-ended presentation of evidence of aggravation in either the eligibility or selection processes. See id. This rationale was also the basis of my concurring opinion in Trivigno, in which I disagreed with the opinion of a plurality of the Court that an open-ended interpretation of Pennsylvania’s capital sentencing scheme such as that adopted by the present majority should be applied to permit consideration of a defendant’s future dangerousness in the selection determination. See Trivigno, 561 Pa. at 258-59, 750 A.2d at 256-57 (Saylor, J., concurring).
I continue to find Fisher’s interpretation to be amply supported in principles of statutory construction and in the historical background of the death penalty statute as described in that opinion,1 and I believe that it would be prudent to *337continue to relegate any additional expansion in terms of available “selection” aggravating considerations to future express dictates of the General Assembly, subject to constitutional limitations. Indeed, to the extent that the range of “selection” aggravating considerations is left unconstrained, the risk increases that the capital sentencing body’s objective eligibility decision may be clouded by more subjective selection considerations. Notably, such risk has prompted some other jurisdictions to take special precautionary measures, such as bifurcating the eligibility and selection processes. See, e.g., People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723, 739 (Colo.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 893, 120 S.Ct. 221, 145 L.Ed.2d 186 (1999).
Since, by virtue of the legislative amendment, victim impact evidence is now an available selection criterion under the statute, I am able to join the majority’s disposition. I also join in that portion of the majority opinion advocating careful and substantial control by the trial courts over the manner in which victim impact testimony is presented to sentencing juries in order to avoid the insertion of passion and undue prejudice into the proceedings.

. Unlike the majority, I also do not view Fisher as being inconsistent with the Court’s prior decision in Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. 188, 555 A.2d 846 (1989). As I read Abu-Jamal, the Court deemed the *337evidence at issue to have constituted rebuttal by the Commonwealth to the defendant’s case of mitigation, see Abu-Jamal, 521 Pa. at 214, 555 A.2d at 858, as opposed to independent “selection” aggravating evidence offered by the Commonwealth in support of imposition of the death penalty. Indeed, viewed in such light, Fisher itself gives full credit to the reasoning applied in Abu-Jamal. See Fisher, 545 Pa. at 268, 681 A.2d at 147 (slating that the death penalty statute under consideration "gave latitude to ihe Commonwealth to introduce evidence to counter and respond to whatever mitigating evidence was introduced”).