Court Opinion

ID: 9955041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 16:01:23.50528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.193275
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRY EUGENE IVERSEN,                           No. 22-35076

                 Petitioner-Appellant,        D.C. No. 2:20-cv-
                                                 01524-AA
    v.

DAVE PEDRO,                                       OPINION

                 Respondent-Appellee.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the District of Oregon
            Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023
                      Portland, Oregon

                     Filed March 27, 2024

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Eric D. Miller, Circuit
          Judges, and Frank Montalvo, * District Judge.

                  Opinion by Judge Montalvo

*
 The Honorable Frank Montalvo, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Texas, sitting by designation.
2                         IVERSEN V. PEDRO

                          SUMMARY **

                         Habeas Corpus

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Terry
Eugene Iversen’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in a case in which the district court rejected
Iversen’s claim that a life without parole (LWOP) sentence,
imposed after Iversen pleaded guilty to public indecency,
was grossly disproportionate to his offense in violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.
    Applying the demanding standard required by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and
acknowledging that some fair-minded jurists may disagree
on the correctness of Iversen’s LWOP sentence, the panel
held that the Oregon state court’s decision concerning
Iversen’s sentence is not contrary to the Supreme Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The panel could not
conclude that Iversen’s sentence raises an inference of gross
disproportionality, and held that the sentence pursuant to
Oregon’s legislatively-mandated sex offender recidivism
statute is not constitutionally infirm in light of the gravity of
Iversen’s offense and criminal history.

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                      IVERSEN V. PEDRO                     3

                        COUNSEL

Steven R. Sady (argued), Chief Deputy Federal Public
Defender; Tihanne K. Mar-Shall, Assistant Federal Public
Defender; Federal Public Defender’s Office, Portland,
Oregon; for Petitioner-Appellant.
Rolf C. Moan (argued), Senior Assistant Attorney General;
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Oregon Attorney General; Oregon Department of Justice,
Office of the Oregon Attorney General (Salem), Salem,
Oregon; for Respondent-Appellee.
Walter Fonseca, Oregon Justice Resource Center, Portland,
Oregon, for Amicus Curiae Oregon Justice Resource Center.

                        OPINION

MONTALVO, District Judge:

    Oregon inmate Terry Eugene Iversen appeals the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. He maintains the district court erred in
rejecting a claim that a life without parole (LWOP) sentence
imposed after he pleaded guilty to public indecency was
grossly disproportionate to his offense.
                              I
   We have jurisdiction over Iversen’s appeal under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. We review de novo the district
court’s denial of his habeas petition. Murray v. Schriro, 745
F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). But we are constrained by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA),
which governs habeas review of state convictions. Valerio v.
4                      IVERSEN V. PEDRO

Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 763 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Under AEDPA, we must defer to the last state court’s
reasoned decision on any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits unless that decision is (1) “contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court” or (2) “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). Applying AEDPA’s “demanding” standard, we
affirm the district court’s denial of Iversen’s habeas petition.
Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 134 (2022).
    Iversen exposed himself and masturbated while sitting
behind a young woman on a light rail train in Washington
County, Oregon. He was arrested and pleaded guilty to
public indecency. At his plea hearing, he acknowledged five
prior convictions for public indecency, one prior conviction
for rape in the third degree of a 15-year-old female, and one
prior conviction for sodomy in the first degree of a 12-year-
old female. He further admitted three sentencing
enhancement factors applied to him: (1) “this crime involved
persistent involvement in similar offenses unrelated to this
current offense”; (2) “prior justice system sanctions have not
deterred [him] from reoffending”; and (3) he was “on
supervision for another offense at the time.”
    The Probation Officer prepared a presentence report
which was considered by the sentencing judge. It noted that
in addition to his prior convictions for public indecency,
rape, and sodomy, Iversen also had prior convictions for
multiple     assaults,     attempted     burglary,     and
methamphetamine possession. He observed Iversen was
diagnosed with “Exhibitionism . . . Paraphilia . . .
Hypersexuality of Sexual Impulse Control Disorder . . .
Antisocial Personality Disorder.” He reported that a sex
                      IVERSEN V. PEDRO                     5

offender treatment practitioner “did not believe that Iversen
got much benefit from treatment.”
    At the sentencing hearing, the State outlined Iversen’s
criminal history, providing testimony and evidence—
including several presentence investigation reports and
officer testimony—as to the circumstances of his prior
convictions and other uncharged or dismissed misconduct. It
also presented evidence that Iversen had shown little
progress during his rehabilitation.
    Because of Iversen’s criminal history, two recidivism
statutes applied. First, his prior convictions for public
indecency converted his instant offense—normally a Class
A misdemeanor—into a Class C felony. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 163.465(2)(b). Second, his instant and prior felony
convictions for public indecency, together with his prior
felony convictions for rape and sodomy, triggered a
presumptive LWOP sentence pursuant to the Oregon sex
offender recidivism statute. Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.719(1).
Nevertheless, his counsel argued that a LWOP sentence for
public indecency was both cruel and unusual—in violation
of Iversen’s rights under the Eighth Amendment.
    The trial court judge rejected Iversen’s arguments. He
found Iversen’s criminal history “absolutely horrendous.”
He described Iversen as “very dangerous” based on his
previous convictions. He noted Iversen had “been given
many, many opportunities . . . to reform,” but had not taken
advantage of them. He observed that “all we can do is
incarcerate you because that’s the only thing that works from
preventing you to offend again.” He explained “I don’t find
any mitigation whatsoever in this case that would
warrant . . . a departure.” He concluded Iversen had earned a
life without parole sentence. He opined that the Supreme
6                          IVERSEN V. PEDRO

Court’s Eighth Amendment cases did “not declare that a
sentence for this type of offense, a life sentence is
unconstitutional.” He clearly said, “I do not find that it is a[n]
unconstitutional sentence.” He noted, “[y]es this is a
misdemeanor act, but it’s the history, the prior convictions,
the failures that you have.” He then sentenced Iversen to life
without parole pursuant to the Oregon sex offender
recidivism statute. Or. Rev. Stat. § 137.719(1).
    On direct review, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed
the LWOP sentence with no reasoning other than a citation
to State v. Althouse, 375 P.3d 475 (Or. 2016). 1 State v.
Iversen, 435 P. 3d 837 (Or. App. 2019). The Oregon
Supreme Court denied further review. State v. Iversen, 451
P.3d 984 (Or. 2019).
   Iversen did not pursue post-conviction review in the state
courts. Iverson’s only claim is that the LWOP sentence for

1
   In Althouse, the Oregon Supreme Court explained “the Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence[,] but forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly
disproportionate to the crime.” 375 P.3d at 489 (quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003)
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion)) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment)). “[T]he inquiry starts ‘by comparing the gravity of the
offense and the severity of the sentence.’” Id. (quoting Graham v.
Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010)). “[D]etermining the ‘gravity’ of a given
offense in the context of a sentence imposed under a recidivist statute
includes consideration of the defendant’s criminal history.” Id. (citing
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29) (“In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we
must place on the scales not only his current felony, but also his long
history of felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to accord
proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the
legislature’s choice of sanctions.”).
                       IVERSEN V. PEDRO                      7

public indecency violated the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
    The district court—relying on cases involving recidivist
sentences—concluded Iversen could not “demonstrate that
the trial court’s determination that his sentence [did] not
violate the Eighth Amendment was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” It accordingly
denied Iversen habeas relief.
                              II
    The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids cruel and unusual
punishment. The Supreme Court has held that it prohibits a
sentence to a state prison that is disproportionate to the
offense. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910)
(quoting McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875
(Mass. 1899)). While the Court addressed the
proportionality principle in a series of subsequent cases, it
has not established “a clear or consistent path for courts to
follow” in determining when a particular sentence for a term
of years violates the Eighth Amendment. Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
    In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court upheld a life sentence
with the possibility of parole under Texas’ recidivist
sentencing statute where the defendant was charged with the
felony of obtaining $120 by false pretenses. 445 U.S. 263,
276, 285 (1980). The defendant’s previous convictions
included fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth
of goods and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36.
Id. at 265. It noted that “successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been
exceedingly rare.” Id. at 272. It added that “the length of the
8                       IVERSEN V. PEDRO

sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative” for crimes classified as felonies. Id. at 274.
    In Solem v. Helm, the Court concluded a LWOP sentence
under a South Dakota recidivist sentencing statute applied to
a conviction for uttering a “no account” check for $100 was
“significantly disproportionate” to the crime and violated the
Eighth Amendment. 463 U.S. 277, 281, 303 (1983). The
defendant’s offense “was ‘one of the most passive felonies a
person could commit,’” id. at 296 (quoting State v. Helm,
287 N.W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980) (Henderson J.,
dissenting)), and his six prior nonviolent felonies “were all
relatively minor,” id. at 296–97. The Court suggested that “a
court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth
Amendment should be guided by objective criteria,
including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at
292.
    In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Court affirmed a
mandatory LWOP sentence for possessing more than 650
grams of cocaine without any consideration of “mitigating
factors such as, in [defendant’s] case, the fact that he had no
prior felony convictions.” 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991). The
Court suggested that there is “no comparable requirement”
for an individualized determination that the punishment is
grossly disproportionate “outside the capital context,
because of the qualitative difference between death and all
other penalties.” Id. at 995 (Scalia, J.). Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist—in a non-plurality opinion,
declared that “Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth
Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.” Id. at
965. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices O’Connor and
                       IVERSEN V. PEDRO                       9

Souter—the plurality opinion, concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment, adopted a “narrow
proportionality principle,” rather than rejecting any
proportionality guarantee under the Eighth Amendment
outright. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J.). Though Justice Kennedy
acknowledged the three factors set forth in Solem v. Helm,
he thought the case “did not announce a rigid three-part test.”
Id. at 1004. Rather, he believed the Court should initially
examine the “crime committed and the sentence imposed”
and only proceed with intra and inter-jurisdictional analyses
“in the rare case” where the initial examination “leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 1005.
    In Ewing v. California, the Court upheld a California
three strikes sentence of 25 years to life for the felony grand
theft of three golf clubs together worth $1,200. 538 U.S. 11,
28, 30–31 (2003). Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, explained “[i]n weighing
the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales
not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony
recidivism.” Id. at 29 (plurality opinion). The plurality noted
“the legislature . . . has primary responsibility for making the
difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing
scheme.” Id. at 28. It further observed “the State’s public-
safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist
felons” is a “legitimate penological goal.” Id. at 29.
    In Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court concluded it was not a
clear violation of the federal prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment to impose two consecutive terms of 25
years to life under California’s three strikes statutes for
defendant’s two petty theft crimes, where the defendant also
had prior convictions for misdemeanor theft, residential
burglary, and transporting marijuana. 538 U.S. at 66–67, 77.
10                     IVERSEN V. PEDRO

    Finally, in Graham v. Florida, the Court held the Eighth
Amendment prohibited LWOP sentences for juveniles who
committed nonhomicide offenses because such sentences
are grossly disproportionate to the offenses. 560 U.S. 48, 82
(2010).
    We glean several broad principles from these Supreme
Court cases. First, the length of a particular sentence is a
matter of legislative prerogative. Rummel, 445 at 274. The
State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring
a recidivist felon is a legitimate penological goal. Ewing, 538
U.S. at 29. Finally, a defendant’s history of recidivism is
relevant in weighing both the gravity of his offense and the
proportionality of his sentence. Id.
    These principles are demonstrated in Gonzalez v.
Duncan where we ultimately reversed and remanded a denial
of habeas relief. 551 F.3d 875, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).
Gonzalez, a convicted sex offender, was charged with failing
to register a change of address pursuant to California’s sex
offender registration statute. Id. at 877. He was convicted,
which resulted in him receiving a sentence of 28 years to life
under California’s Three Strikes law. Id. at 878–79. We
recognized the State of California’s interest in deterring
recidivist felons. Id. at 886. We reviewed Gonzalez’s
extensive criminal history and we determined Gonzalez was
the type of “exceedingly rare” case that demonstrated gross
disproportionality. Id. at 882, 886–87.
    We did not reach that conclusion lightly. In finding an
inference of gross disproportionality, we noted that
Gonzalez’s failure to register was “an entirely passive,
harmless, and technical violation of the registration law.” Id.
at 885 (quoting People v. Carmony, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365,
372 (2005)). Further still, while Gonzalez’s criminal history
                       IVERSEN V. PEDRO                      11

“include[ed] convictions for possession of a controlled
substance and auto theft in 1988, attempted forcible rape and
lewd conduct with a child in . . . 1989, robbery in 1992, and
spousal abuse in 1999,” id. at 886; we discerned no “rational
relationship between Gonzalez’s failure to update his sex
offender registration . . . and the probability he will
recidivate as a violent criminal or sex offender,” id. at 887.
Thus, given the passivity of merely failing to register, and
the lack of connection between his criminal history and
potential recidivism as a sex offender, we concluded the
sentence was grossly disproportionate.
                              III
    Turning to Iversen’s case, we cannot conclude that his
sentence raises an inference of gross disproportionality.
Unlike Gonzalez, Iversen was not convicted of a harmless
regulatory offense. Instead, he was convicted of public
indecency for the sixth time. This is in addition to his
extensive history of sex offenses. The statute in question in
Gonzalez was centered on “the need for police to be able to
keep track of offenders.” 551 F.3d at 889. Here, Oregon’s
statute is aimed at punishing recidivist felony sex offenders.
Oregon has a public safety interest in incapacitating and
deterring recidivist felons like this. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29.
Iversen’s criminal history is directly related to the triggering
offense, and he has a clear pattern of recidivism which was
considered by the state court.
    While some fair-minded jurists may disagree on the
correctness of Iversen’s LWOP sentence, the Oregon state
court’s decision concerning his sentence is not contrary to
the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). Under the
“AEDPA standard we must apply here, ‘the only relevant
12                     IVERSEN V. PEDRO

clearly established law amenable to the “contrary to” or
“unreasonable application of” framework is the gross
disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which
are unclear.’” Gonzalez, 551 F.3d at 882–83 (citing Andrade,
538 U.S. at 73). This sentence is not constitutionally infirm
in light of the gravity of Iversen’s offense and criminal
history. Norris v. Morgan, 662 F.3d 1276, 1296 (9th Cir.
2010).
    The state courts (1) considered Iversen’s history of adult
felony recidivism; (2) acknowledged Iversen’s mental
health record, reviewed his failed opportunities to reform,
and concluded he remained very dangerous to others;
(3) determined a LWOP sentence was neither extreme nor
disproportionate to Iversen’s instant offense after
considering his past criminal conduct; (4) observed
Oregon’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and
deterring recidivist felons—like Iversen—is a legitimate
penological goal; and (5) sentenced Iversen to LWOP
pursuant to Oregon’s legislatively-mandated sex offender
recidivism statute.
    The district court correctly determined the Oregon state
court’s LWOP sentence for Iversen was not contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, the district
court did not err when it denied Iversen’s habeas petition.
     The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.