Court Opinion

ID: 9847057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:52:58.889488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:59.951763
License: Public Domain

ANNUNZIATA, Judge,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur in the opinion of the majority with the exception of Section II, from which I dissent.
An expert witness may express an opinion relative to the existence or nonexistence of facts not within common knowledge, but “the admission of expert opinion upon an ultimate issue of fact is impermissible because it invades the function of the fact finder.” Llamera v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 262, 264, 414 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1992). In Llamera, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in allowing an expert witness to state that ninety-three grams of cocaine packaged in a number of separate plastic “baggies” had been “packaged that way for distribution” and that the quantity of cocaine found “would suggest that the owner of the cocaine was a person who sold cocaine.” Id. The Court reversed Llamera’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute, reasoning that the expert expressed an opinion on one of the ultimate issues, viz., intent to distribute. Id. at 265, 414 S.E.2d at 599. The Court did not accept the Commonwealth’s contention that the expert’s use of the word “suggest” was a qualification, not a statement of fact. Id. at 264-65, 414 S.E.2d at 598-99. See also Bond v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 534, 536-39, 311 S.E.2d 769, 770-72 (1984) (trial court in murder case erred in admitting report of medical examiner which ruled out possibility that victim’s death resulting from a four-story fall was caused by either accident or suicide); Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 245, 249-52, 105 S.E.2d 155, 158-60 (1958) (trial court erred in allowing expert in arson case to conclude, based upon set of hypothetical facts, that fire was of incendiary origin).
In the present case, appellant asserted the defense of duress. Accordingly, whether appellant acted under duress *269was the “precise and ultimate issue in the case,” upon which expert opinion could not be expressed. See Cartera v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 516, 519, 248 S.E.2d 784, 786 (1978) (reversing rape conviction where medical expert allowed to express opinion that victims had been raped).
To support a defense of duress, [appellant had to] demonstrate that [her] criminal conduct was the product of [More-head’s] unlawful threat that caused [her] reasonably to believe that performing the criminal conduct was [her] only reasonable opportunity to avoid imminent death or serious bodily harm, either to [her]self or another.
Daung Sam v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 312, 324, 411 S.E.2d 832, 839 (1991).
' Appellant proffered that her psychologist would testify, inter alia, that appellant suffered from a disorder which made her “susceptible to duress” and that “[appellant] got to the point where she believed escape from [Morehead] or disobedience would result in her death or death of a family member.” In my opinion, the proffered testimony expresses an opinion on the precise and ultimate issue in this case and was, therefore, properly excluded by the trial court.
Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the trial court.