Court Opinion

ID: 9895881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:14:12.085101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:19.940502
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                                                               FILED
JORDAN LINZY,                                                              November 8, 2023
Plaintiff Below, Petitioner                                                  EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                          INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                 OF WEST VIRGINIA
vs.)   No. 23-ICA-31          (Cir. Ct. Raleigh Cnty. No. CC-41-2022-C-51)

BECKLEY GALLERIA, LLC;
PARAMOUNT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION;
PARAMOUNT DEVELOPMENT PROPERTIES, LLC;
MARQUEE CINEMAS, INC.;
MARQUEE CINEMAS-WV, INC.; and
MARQUEE CINEMAS, HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendants Below, Respondents

                              MEMORANDUM DECISION

      Petitioner Jordan Linzy appeals the January 5, 2023, order of the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County. Respondents filed a joint response brief. 1 Mr. Linzy did not file a reply.
The issue on appeal is the circuit court’s dismissal of Mr. Linzy’s action against
Respondents alleging general negligence and negligent hiring, training, retention, and
supervision.

       This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2022). After considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the record on
appeal, and the applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no
prejudicial error. For these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s
order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

         This matter arises out of events from the night of May 30, 2020, in the parking lot
of the Marquee Cinemas Galleria 14 movie theater in Beckley, West Virginia (“the parking
lot”). 2 At some point before midnight that evening, Mr. Linzy was standing in the bed of a

       1
         Petitioner Jordan Linzy is represented by Stephen New, Esq. Respondents Beckley
Galleria, LLC, Paramount Development Corporation, and Paramount Development
Properties, LLC, (collectively “Paramount”) are represented by Cy A. Hill, Jr., Esq., and
Jayson T. Hamrick, Esq. Respondents Marquee Cinemas, Inc., Marquee Cinemas-WV,
Inc., and Marquee Cinemas Holdings, Inc., (collectively “Marquee”) are represented by
Jared C. Underwood, Esq. and Chip E. Williams, Esq.
       2
           The theater is owned by Paramount and operated by Marquee.
                                             1
friend’s pickup truck while it was performing a burnout in the parking lot, causing Mr.
Linzy to be thrown from the truck, resulting in him sustaining serious injuries and requiring
a prolonged period of hospitalization. Relevant to these events, at this time, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the State of West Virginia had ordered the closure of nonessential
businesses and ordered members of the public to remain at home. 3 It is undisputed that, on
the night in question, the theater was closed.

       On June 8, 2022, Mr. Linzy filed an amended complaint in the Circuit Court of
Raleigh County against Respondents, alleging two counts: negligence and negligent hiring,
training, retention, and supervision. In his complaint, Mr. Linzy alleged that Respondents
were aware that local teenagers used the parking lot as a late-night “hang-out spot.” Below,
Mr. Linzy argued that Respondents had a duty of care to employ security personnel to
protect persons on the premises, maintain a lookout or monitor for dangerous activity, and
implement appropriate safety measures. 4 Regarding the negligent hiring claim, Mr. Linzy
argued that Respondents failed to hire security guards to monitor the location and failed to
provide appropriate training, education, and instruction to its employees.

       In response, both Paramount and Marquee moved for dismissal, arguing they did
not owe any duty to Mr. Linzy. On January 5, 2023, the circuit court issued an order
granting both motions and dismissing the case in its entirety. The circuit court concluded
that Respondents owed no duty to Mr. Linzy because these events were not reasonably
foreseeable, and that Mr. Linzy had failed to sufficiently plead a negligent hiring claim
because he did not allege any act by an agent of Respondents who had injured him. It is
from this order that Mr. Linzy now appeals.

       We review a circuit court’s order granting a motion to dismiss de novo. See Syl. Pt.
2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 773, 461
S.E.2d 516, 519 (1995) (“Appellate review of a circuit court's order granting a motion to
dismiss a complaint is de novo.”).

       On appeal, Mr. Linzy raises six assignments of error, but we need address only
one—whether Respondents owed any duty to him. On appeal, Mr. Linzy argues
Respondents had a duty to employ security personnel to protect persons on the premises.
Our negligence jurisprudence is well-settled: “[n]o action for negligence will lie without a
duty broken.” Syl. Pt. 3, Aikens v. Debow, 208 W. Va. 486, 488, 541 S.E.2d 576, 578
(2000) (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Jack v. Fritts, 193 W. Va. 494, 457 S.E.2d 431 (1995)). The
scope of a duty is determined by the foreseeability of harm:

       3
           See Exec. Ord. No. 9-20.
       4
         Mr. Linzy asserts that Respondents should have erected barriers or fencing to
prevent incidents such as this.

                                             2
       The ultimate test of the existence of a duty to use care is found in the
       foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would
       the ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or
       should have known, anticipate that harm of the general nature of that suffered
       was likely to result?

Syl. Pt. 3, Sewell v. Gregory, 179 W. Va. 585, 586, 371 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1988). When
considering the scope of duty, the surrounding circumstances must be considered.
Wheeling Park Comm'n v. Dattoli, 237 W. Va. 275, 280, 787 S.E.2d 546, 551 (2016)
(“Negligence is the violation of the duty of taking care under the given circumstances. It is
not absolute; but is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, manner, or
person.”) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, Dicken v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 41 W. Va. 511, 23 S.E.
582 (1895)).

        Applying these principles, we conclude that Mr. Linzy’s injury was not a
foreseeable event under these circumstances. We agree with the circuit court’s reasoning;
a reasonable person would not foresee a need to hire security personnel to monitor a
parking lot to ensure an individual does not harm himself by falling from the back of a
pickup truck while the truck is performing a burnout. Mr. Linzy emphasizes that the
Respondents had notice of these activities, but again, even taking that allegation as true,
the circumstances of this case foreclose foreseeability. During the relevant events, due to a
global pandemic, the theater was closed as a nonessential business, and members of the
public were subject to a stay-at-home order; with that in mind, we decline to proclaim Mr.
Linzy’s actions were reasonably foreseeable under these circumstances. 5 To hold otherwise
would require Respondents to become the insurers of Mr. Linzy. Hawkins v. U.S. Sports
Ass'n, Inc., 219 W. Va. 275, 278, 633 S.E.2d 31, 34 (2006) (“This Court has invariably
maintained that the owner of premises upon which an injury occurs is not to be considered
an insurer of the safety of [a] . . . person present upon such premises.”) (citing Puffer v.
The Hub Cigar Store, Inc., 140 W. Va. 327, 84 S.E.2d 145 (1954), overruled on other
grounds by Mallet v. Pickens, 206 W. Va. 145, 522 S.E.2d 436 (1999)).

       5
         Moreover, beyond anticipating that individuals would be in the parking lot of a
closed business amidst a state-wide shutdown, one would need to foresee: (1) that these
individuals would be engaging in burnouts, despite the danger that activity could present
to the driver and pedestrians, and (2) that a typical danger presented by the activity of
performing a burnout includes a man falling from standing atop a truck and injuring his
head (as opposed to damages caused by a driver’s loss of control of the vehicle, or damage
to the vehicle’s internals from the strain a burnout inflicts on it). Again, we are unwilling
to go so far.

                                             3
        As to the dismissal of Mr. Linzy’s count for negligent hiring, training, retention, and
supervision, 6 our above discussion controls, because he failed to identify any duty owed to
him, this count must be dismissed; without an underlying duty, there can be no negligent
hiring. Furthermore, each of these theories is predicated upon the conduct of an unfit
employee. 7 As the circuit court recognized, in his amended complaint, Mr. Linzy asserts
that liability stems from Respondents’ failure to hire or employ security personnel, not that
he was harmed by an individual employed by Respondents. Accordingly, we conclude that
Mr. Linzy’s theory is not cognizable under West Virginia law. 8

       We affirm the January 5, 2023, order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County.

                                                                                  Affirmed.

ISSUED: November 8, 2023

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Thomas E. Scarr
Judge Charles O. Lorensen

       6
        See C.C. v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 245 W. Va. 594, 604, 859 S.E.2d 762,
772 (2021) (noting that negligent hiring, supervision, and retention contain discrete
elements, constituting separate claims).

       See C.C. v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 245 W. Va. at 604–710, 859 S.E.2d at
       7

772–778.
       8
           As to any issue of premises liability, we conclude that Mr. Linzy has failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Mr. Linzy alleges that Respondents did
not maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition, the amended complaint fails to
set forth any facts that could establish a defect of the parking lot. See McDonald v. Univ.
of W. Va. Bd. of Trustees, 191 W. Va. 179, 183, 444 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1994) (“the record fails
to show that there was any pit, bump, or depression, or the like, present in the University's
lawn that was not generally characteristic of a lawn or that rose to the level of a hidden
danger, trap, snare, pitfall, or the like”); see also Hawkins v. U.S. Sports Ass'n, Inc., 219
W. Va. 275, 279, 633 S.E.2d 31, 35 (2006). Moreover, a premises owner who is not
negligent cannot be held liable for premises liability. McDonald, 191 W. Va. at 181, 444
S.E.2d at 59 (“The owner . . . of [a] premises . . . is not an insurer of the safety of an invited
person present on such premises and, if such owner or occupant is not guilty of negligence
. . . he is not liable for injuries there sustained by such invited person . . . .”) (quoting Syl.
Pt. 3, Puffer v. Hub Cigar Store, 140 W. Va. 327, 327, 84 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1954), overruled
on other grounds by Mallet v. Pickens, 206 W. Va. 145, 522 S.E.2d 436 (1999)).
                                                4