Court Opinion

ID: 9573111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:47:54.184663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:55.042715
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
In order to create an issue of fact for a jury, Lane must show that the elevator’s malfunction was caused by a problem with the leveling mechanism and that Montgomery had actual or constructive notice of the problem and failed to properly repair or correct it. Lane has not come forward with any evidence showing the cause of the malfunction or any evidence showing even slight negligence on Montgomery’s part. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
First, Lane cannot show any reason for the malfunction. There was expert testimony that the problem could have been due to a faulty leveling vein or it could have been caused by a power outage.
Second, there is no evidence that Montgomery was on notice of a leveling problem with any of the elevators at the hospital. The agreement between Montgomery and the Hospital provided that Montgomery would “employ all reasonable care to see that the elevator equipment is maintained in proper operating condition,” and there is no evidence that Montgomery breached this duty under the contract.
Two days before Lane’s accident, the elevator passed its semi*528annual inspection by the State’s inspector. On October 14, 1992, five days after the accident, Fred Blume, a Montgomery service repairman, met the State Inspector and they conducted a thorough examination of the elevator and could find nothing wrong. The elevator was returned to service with no repair or adjustment. There is an entry in the service record showing a leveling problem in May, some five months before the accident. Since the record also shows there were no further complaints received about the leveling malfunctions, this evidence supports Montgomery’s representation that any malfunctions reported were immediately corrected.
There is also no issue created by the entry in the service record showing a call to Montgomery to replace a blown fuse on the same day as the accident. The uncontradicted testimony of Blume was that he ordered the elevator removed from service. If it was somehow reactivated after Blume left, whether by the hospital, one of its employees, or whomever, this issue has no bearing on any alleged negligence of Montgomery.
The majority opinion mentions a possible issue of fact due to spoliation of evidence. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “spoliation” as “the destruction or the significant and meaningful alteration of a document or instrument.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin v. Reed, 200 Ga. App. 775 (409 SE2d 874) (1991). The only support for this proposition is an entry in Montgomery’s service call record which shows that the routine weekly maintenance, which Montgomery was obligated to provide, was performed on the elevators at the Hospital on October 12, 1992, after the accident and before the State Inspector’s visit. But, there is no further evidence or testimony in the record to show the elevator was even moved or disturbed, much less that there was any “tampering or destruction” of evidence.
There are no issues of fact created by any confusion as to whether the elevator in question was #1 or #3. As outlined above and in the majority’s opinion, Lane cannot show that Montgomery was on notice of a leveling problem with any of the elevators.
This Court has held that the owner or operator of an elevator or escalator is held to the higher duty of care chargeable to passenger carriers, and has impliedly held that the servicers of elevators are also charged with this higher standard of care. Millar Elevator Svc. Co. v. O’Shields, 222 Ga. App. 456, 458 (475 SE2d 188) (1996). But, this Court has never held that the owner or servicer was an insurer of the passengers’ safety. Id.; Ellis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 193 Ga. App. 797, 798 (388 SE2d 920) (1989). In James v. Otis Elevator Co., 854 F2d 429 (11th Cir. 1988), a case almost directly on point, the plaintiff fell down the elevator shaft and was injured when the door opened but the elevator had moved to another floor. The Eleventh Circuit held that because the plaintiff could not show that one of the *529conditions which could have caused the malfunction was present at the time of the service company’s last inspection, his theory of liability must necessarily fail. James, supra at 432.3
Decided February 24,1997
Reconsideration denied March 18,1997
Dozier, Lee, Graham & Sikes, Neal B. Graham, for appellant.
Buzzell & Pinkston, R. William Buzzell II, Loretta L. Pinkston, Paige J. Lee, Lokey & Smith, Sue K. Nichols, Jon W. Burton, for appellee.
The majority’s opinion also overlooks our holding in a recent case with similar facts. In Sparks v. MARTA, 223 Ga. App. 768 (478 SE2d 923) we stated that “[ajlthough the escalator was expected to malfunction, required repairs, and was sometimes dangerous, these facts do not show that MARTA or Millar was negligent in this case.” Id. at 770. In Sparks, as in this case, plaintiffs could present no evidence that the defendant had not complied with routine maintenance procedures or had any prior knowledge that the escalator was malfunctioning. Therefore, we affirmed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment to defendants. Id. at 770-771.
This Court has specifically rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases involving the malfunction of mechanical devices such as escalators and elevators. See Millar, supra at 457-458; Ellis, supra at 797-798. Accordingly, Montgomery is not required to disprove Lane’s allegations. The standard for summary judgment requires only that Montgomery point to an absence of evidence on one essential element of Lane’s claim. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).
Lane cannot point to any evidence of negligence by Montgomery. Lane’s only argument on appeal is that because a malfunction occurred, Montgomery was negligent. This is not the law and the trial court did not err in granting Montgomery’s motion for summary judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Beasley join in this dissent.

 Although federal decisions are not binding on this Court, we consider their reasoning persuasive, and in the absence of pertinent Georgia authority we are free to follow it. State v. David, 130 Ga. App. 872, 873 (204 SE2d 773) (1974).