Court Opinion

ID: 9844531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:04:19.218468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:37.003164
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE METCALF:
(dissenting).
Since the decision of this court in State v. Peres, 27 Mont. 358, 71 Pac. 162, a uniform rule respecting the admissibility of evidence of other similar offenses has been repeatedly applied. The rule has been variously stated in the cases but its import has remained constant. A typical statement is: “It is the general rule, that upon the trial of one accused of crime, evidence of a distinct and independent offense is not admissible. To enlarge the scope of the inquiry beyond the facts pertinent to the offense for which the accused is being tried would ordinarily subject him to the danger of surprise against which no possible foresight might be able to prepare and no innocence defend. But, if particular facts tend to establish an element of the offense for which he is being tried, they may be proved and the evidence is not the less relevant because it may disclose or tend to disclose that the accused had committed another crime. ’ ’ State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 Pac. 1106, 1108.
In addition to the element of surprise mentioned the courts have been reluctant to admit evidence of other offenses because collateral issues are brought in that have no place in the orderly conduct of a trial and particularly where the crime charged is a revolting one the jury is prejudiced because they are convinced that the defendant is a bad man and should be punished whether or not they are. certain he is guilty of the crime charged. “From the time when advancing civilization began to recognize *477that the purpose and end of a criminal trial is as much to discharge the innocent accused as to punish the guilty, it has been held that evidence against him should be confined to the very offense charged and that neither * * * bad character nor commission of other specific disconnected acts, whether criminal or merely meretricious, could be proved against him. This was predicated on the fundamental principle of justice that the bad man no more than the good ought to be convicted of a crime not committed by him.” State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 15 Pac (2d) 233, 237, quoting from Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771, 774.
Nevertheless certain evidence of this nature is of sound probative value and logically should be admitted. Therefore, the above general rule has been qualified by certain so-called exceptions.
“The rule, not questioned, is that evidence of other acts of a like nature is admissible to prove a uniform plan or course of action on part of the accused for the purpose of disclosing his motive, guilty knowledge or criminal intent, or to negative the idea that the particular offense complained of was the result of mere inadvertence, accident, or mistake; and, if such evidence also tends to establish the commission of another offense, it is not for that reason inadmissible.” State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 433, 227 Pac. 49, 52.
Some of the eases in which the above exceptions have permitted the introduction of evidence relating to other offenses are:
Statutory Rape: State v. Gaimos, 53 Mont. 118, 162 Pac. 596; State v. Keeler, 52 Mont. 205, 156 Pac. 1080, L. R. A. 1916E, 472, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 619; State v. Vinn, 50 Mont. 27, 144 Pac. 773; State v. Peres, 27 Mont. 358, 71 Pac. 162.
Forgery: State v. Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 127 Am. St. Rep. 732; State v. Newman, 34 Mont. 434, 87 Pac. 462.
Larceny: State v. Semmens, 105 Mont. 113, 71 Pac. (2d) 913; State v. Lund, 93 Mont. 169, 18 Pac. (2d) 603; State v. Hughes, *47876 Mont. 421, 246 Pac. 959; State v. Hall, 45 Mont. 498, 125 Pac. 639; State v. McCarthy, 36 Mont. 226, 92 Pac. 521.
Burglary: State v. Hill, 46 Mont. 24, 126 Pac. 41.
Robbery: State v. Hopkins, 68 Mont. 504, 219 Pac. 1106.
Receiving Stolen Property: State v. Keays, 97 Mont. 404, 34 Pac. (2d) 855; State v. Groom, 89 Mont. 447, 300 Pac. 226; State v. Moxley, 41 Mont. 402, 110 Pac. 83.
Murder: State v. Simpson, 109 Mont. 198, 95 Pac. (2d) 761.
Sale of Intoxicating Liquor: State v. Cesar, 72 Mont. 252, 232 Pac. 1109; State v. Roop, 73 Mont. 177, 235 Pac. 336.
False Statements: State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 433, 227 Pac. 49.
Rule 311 of the American Law Institute’s Model Code of Evidence declares that “evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion is inadmissible as tending to prove that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another occasion if, but only if, the evidence is relevant solely as tending to prove his disposition to commit such a crime or civil wrong or to commit crimes or civil wrongs generally.”
Such a test would eliminate any reference to a predisposition to a crime, but would make relevance the sole question of admissibility otherwise. That is apparently the rule in England, Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv. Law Rev. 954 (1933). Logically that would seem to be the proper rule. See the thorough analysis of this question in Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv. Law Rev. 988 (1938).
However, this jurisdiction has usually expressed the rule as a general rule of exclusion subject to the different categories of exceptions, L e., admissible to show intent or malice, motive, guilty knowledge, plan or system, identity or for corroboration. But see State v. Lund, 93 Mont. 169, 18 Pac. (2d) 603, 610: “Ordinarily, in a criminal case, testimony is admissible against a defendant in regard to other similar offenses”. Within those categories the evidence of other similar offenses has always been admissible providing it was relevant. “The test is, not whether the offered evidence tends to prove an independent offense, but *479whether it is relevant as tending to prove any fact material to the issue in the ease before the court.” State v. Cesar, 72 Mont. 252, 232 Pac. 1109.
In the cases in which evidence of other offenses was refused such refusal was grounded upon the lack of relevance or the remoteness of the offered evidence. Examples are: State v. Simanton, 100 Mont. 292, 49 Pac. (2d) 981; State v. Ebel, 92 Mont. 413, 15 Pac. (2d) 233; State v. Moxley, 41 Mont. 402, 110 Pac. 83; State v. Knox, 119 Mont. 449, 175 Pac. (2d) 774.
The case of State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 Pac. (2d) 731, was no different. The rule in State v. Sauter was quoted from 44 Am. Jur., Rape, p. 948, sec. 79. “The courts universally refuse to admit evidence of the commission of other and distinct crimes where such evidence is not otherwise relevant, and * * * it is well settled on a prosecution for rape that evidence of another rape or other sex crime committed at a different time and on or against another person, and having no connection with the crime charged, is not admissible.”
And from 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, see. 682, p. 1084: “The general rule, which is subject to exceptions stated in secs. 683-690, infra, is that, on a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which shows or tends to show that accused has committed another crime wholly independent of, and unconnected with, that for which he is on trial, even though it is a crime of the same sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible”. The exceptions enumerated in secs. 683-690 are the same that have been made in previous Montana cases.
In State v. Sauter, Justice Angstman and I did not disagree with the general rule as cited but we were of the opinion that the other crime shown did have a “connection with the crime charged”, that it was not a “crime wholly independent of, and unconnected with” the crime for which the defendant was on trial and therefore the evidence was admissible.
But even though the general rule with all its exceptions was quoted with approval as the basis for the Sauter decision, we now learn that the rule therein promulgated is a flat declaration *480that evidence of other crimes is not admissible for any purpose. This constitutes a reversal of many precedents in the criminal law of this state.
The state called the other boys to testify that the defendant committed the same acts upon them. In its offer of proof the state submitted evidence to show “that the acts in connection [with the other boys] were committed in the same manner, in the same place and under circumstances of a general plan of operation, scheme and course of conduct.”
One of the exceptions noted in the C. J. S., citation quoted in State v. Sauter is as follows: “As a general rule, evidence of other crimes is competent when it tends to establish a common scheme, plan, or system, at least where such other crimes are similar to, closely connected with, and not too remote from, the one charged.” 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, sec. 688, p. 1109.
Actually the Sauter Case held that the evidence of the other offense was not relevant. “Sexual acts, whether rape or no rape, originating in barroom pickups, powered by the urge, and consummated in automobiles, are entirely too common in this day and age to have much evidentiary value in showing a systematic scheme or plan.” Likewise the dissent was on a question of relevance and not on the validity of the rule of exclusion.
The rule as stated in previous Montana cases is plain. By requiring that the evidence admitted under the various categories be relevant the danger of surprise on collateral matters is avoided. Prejudice is inevitable in such matters. The mere charging of an individual with a heinous or revolting crime creates prejudice. But as in analogous eases in other fields of the law the answer to' this dilemma is in each case to leave it to the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge to determine if the offered evidence is relevant and proper. This has been done in statutory rape and incest cases where the victim was of tender years, so that the other offenses shown were as revolting as in the instant case. There is no reason why the same rules aren’t applicable to a crime against nature.
I believe the evidence offered relating to similar offenses *481committed upon the bodies of other boys was admissible. There were enough points of similarity that a common plan or design to debauch the prosecuting witness was shown. The testimony was also admissible to corroborate the prosecuting witness.
MR. JUSTICE ANGSTMAN:
Having disagreed with the majority opinion in State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 232 Pac. (2d) 731, I accept the ruling in that ease as stare decisis when applied to sex crimes, and since I see no substantial distinction between the facts showing plan, design and purpose in that case and those here involved, I think it rules this case.