Court Opinion

ID: 9887656
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 18:04:00.741343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:14:49.007292
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 In re M.C. CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yolo)
                                                            ----

    In re M.C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile                                             C097947
    Court Law.

    YOLO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN                                                (Super. Ct. No. JV2020-0222)
    SERVICES AGENCY,

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,

             v.

    C.C.,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

            Appellant C.C., mother of the minor, M.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s
orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 §§ 366.26, 395.) Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by: (1) finding the

1           Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) beneficial parental relationship exception did not
apply to prevent the termination of parental rights; and (2) the Yolo County Health and
Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). We will conditionally
affirm subject to full compliance with the ICWA on remand, as described in this opinion.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                             I
                             Initial Dependency Proceedings
       The minor was born prematurely at 28 weeks gestation and remained in the
neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) from the time of her birth until the time of detention.
On November 3, 2020, the Agency filed a petition alleging that the minor (then age two
months) came within the provision of section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect).
The petition alleged that the minor was at substantial risk of harm due to the mother’s
unstable mental health; alcohol abuse by the father of the minor, S.D.; and domestic
violence. The minor was placed into protective custody. The Agency’s detention report
stated that the minor had undergone hernia surgery and was on oxygen 24 hours a day.
Mother tested positive for marijuana and amphetamine. Mother reported she had
Cherokee ancestry and father reported he had Cherokee and Blackfeet ancestry.
       At the detention hearing on November 4, 2020, the juvenile court ordered the
minor detained and ordered video visits for the parents. The court found there was a
reason to believe that the minor may be an Indian child, and the Agency was ordered to
complete further inquiry.
                                             II
                               Jurisdiction And Disposition
       The Agency’s December 9, 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report recommended
sustaining the petition, removing the minor from the parents’ care, and providing
reunification services to mother. The Agency recommended providing reunification

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services to father if he was found to be the biological or presumed father. The report
noted that the father spoke with the social worker and claimed that he had Cherokee and
Comanche ancestry, not Blackfeet. Mother reported to the social worker that she no
longer thought she had Cherokee ancestry based on the results of a DNA test. The social
worker reported sending notices of child custody proceeding for Indian child (ICWA-
030) forms with detailed family information to the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, and the Comanche
Nation. However, as to mother, the notices indicated that any Indian tribe or band was
“none” or “unknown” and possible Indian ancestry to search for the maternal side was
not listed. As to father’s paternity, the ICWA notices indicated that the parentage of the
minor was “unknown.” The Agency received responses from the Cherokee Nation, the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, the Comanche Nation, and the United Keetoowah
Band of Cherokee Indians advising that the minor was not eligible for membership.
         At the December 9, 2020 jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the minor’s counsel
informed the juvenile court that the minor’s condition had worsened. The juvenile court
continued the hearing, pending paternity test results. On January 4, 2021, the Agency
learned that the minor would need a gastrostomy tube. The minor’s pediatrician
recommended that due to the minor’s medical condition, she should not have contact with
anyone outside the foster placement and essential medical personnel.
         On January 11, 2021, the juvenile court took jurisdiction, found the father to be
the presumed father, and ordered family reunification services to both parents. The court
would not allow in-person visits until the minor’s pediatrician advised it was safe for the
minor.
         At the time of the subsequent visitation review on March 8, 2021, the minor
continued to be dependent on the gastrostomy tube, oxygen, and various machines and
medications. The minor was diagnosed with bronchopulmonary dysplasia,
developmental delay, abnormal muscle tone, chronic lung disease of prematurity,

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dysphagia, cerebral palsy, static encephalopathy, ventricular septal defect, visual
impairment, gastroesophageal reflux, seizures, patent foramen ovale, anemia of
prematurity, respiratory distress syndrome, congenital heart disease, immature retina, and
retinopathy of prematurity level 3. At the visitation review hearing, the juvenile court
declined to allow in-person visits and set a further review of visitation.
       In April 2021, the minor’s pediatrician continued to recommend against in-person
visits until mother obtained her own housing because she was living in a communal
setting, and the COVID-19 pandemic posed a high risk to the minor. In June 2021, the
juvenile court authorized mother to attend in-person medical appointments and in-person
visits after obtaining safe housing.
                                             III
                                       Status Review
       The Agency’s July 12, 2021 six-month status review report recommended
terminating services to father and continuing services to mother. Mother participated in
the minor’s medical appointments in person and had video visits with the minor three
hours per week and the visits were generally positive.
       On July 19, 2021, the juvenile court held the six-month review hearing, and
mother submitted on the recommendation but argued that the Agency did not provide
reasonable services because there were no in-person visits. The court terminated father’s
services, continued services to mother, and set a visitation review. The court found that
the Agency provided reasonable services and ordered that mother would have supervised
in-person visits with a medical professional present.
       At the 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court ordered further services
to mother on the Agency’s recommendation. The Agency retained a registered nurse to
monitor the minor’s medical needs during visits and provide training to mother.
       In its 18-month status review report, the Agency recommended ceasing services to
mother because she remained incapable of safely caring for the minor despite extensive

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medical training and continued to struggle with tasks like changing the minor’s clothes
and detangling the minor’s medical cords. Mother did not request return of the minor but
instead requested an additional six months of services. The registered nurse tasked with
training mother expressed the opinion that mother would require full-time home support
to be able to care for the minor. The minor struggled after visits with mother, becoming
fatigued, irritable, and adverse to touch; these issues improved somewhat by adding rest
time to visits and dimming the lights, but the issues worsened each time visits with
mother increased. At the July 25, 2022 contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile
court found clear and convincing evidence that return would create a substantial risk of
detriment and that offering more services would not be in the minor’s best interests. The
court then terminated reunification services to mother and set a selection and
implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
                                            IV
                                 Section 366.26 Hearing
       On November 15, 2022, the Agency filed a section 366.26 report recommending
termination of parental rights with a plan of adoption. The minor was also diagnosed
with autism spectrum disorder, level 3, which will require lifelong care. At medical
appointments, mother was unable to perform simple tasks to care for the minor and
continued to be argumentative or dismissive of the minor’s issues. It was reported that
mother would repeatedly pick up the minor to hold her despite the minor wiggling away
from mother. At many of the visits, the minor exhibited signs of stress, tiredness, or
unhappiness. The minor was reported to respond better to virtual visits with mother
when she could be comfortable in her home environment.
       At the contested section 366.26 hearing on January 18, 2023, mother presented no
witnesses or evidence. The social worker testified that the minor was physically
exhausted after visits. The minor demonstrated reflexive eye rolling when in-person
visits started with mom, but that decreased when visits with mother decreased. The

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social worker testified that she did not believe there would be any detriment to the minor
if visits with mother ended and the minor was not getting any benefit from the visits,
which benefitted mother more than the minor. She testified that the benefits of
permanency outweighed any relationship or visits with mother.
       The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence it was likely the minor
would be adopted, none of the exceptions pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)
existed, termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to the minor, and it was
in the best interest of the minor to terminate parental rights. As to the beneficial parental
relationship exception, the court found that the first element of consistent visitation was
met. But the court then found that mother failed to meet her burden to show a significant
positive emotional attachment and the level of detriment to the minor in terminating
parental rights would outweigh the benefit to the minor of placement in an adoptive
home. The court reasoned that: “[Mother] has faithfully visited, but I don’t see and I
haven’t seen ever where the visits have been for [the minor’s] benefit. They have always
been for [mother’s] benefit; [mother] trying to learn how to take care of her, [mother]
wanting to spend time with this baby, but they’ve been difficult for [the minor]. They
make her tired. They make her sick. They give her problems, and yet we still tried and
tried and tried to give [mother] that chance. It’s just not there, and I don’t think [the
minor] has bonded at all with her mother.” The court further reasoned that the visitation
notes did not evidence a significant bond between the minor and the mother, and because
the court could not find such a bond, “the benefit of maintaining that relationship
certainly is not going to outweigh the benefits of being adopted.”
       The juvenile court then ordered the parents’ parental rights terminated and freed
the minor for adoption. The court also found: “This child is not an Indian child, and
[the] ICWA does not apply.”

                                              6
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                        Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to find the beneficial parental
relationship exception to adoption applied based on her relationship with the minor. She
argues that the juvenile court erred in its analysis under In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 629 (Caden C.) by discussing improper factors and because the evidence supported
application of the exception. We disagree.
       At the section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing, a juvenile court must
choose one of the several “ ‘possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . .
The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] If
the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent
circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court
to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would
be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is the
so-called beneficial parental relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)
[beneficial parental relationship exception]; Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 629.)
       The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of
any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243,
1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(d)(2).) The parent “must show regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted.
Moreover, the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship. And the parent must show that terminating that

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attachment would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against the
countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., at p. 636.)
       The beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption “must be examined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child
bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s
particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.”
(In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) The factual predicates of the
exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its
discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) We do not substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile
court as to what is in the child’s best interests. (Id. at pp. 640-641.)
       Here, the fact that mother consistently visited the minor was undisputed. As to the
second element, the juvenile court conducted a detailed analysis and found that there was
not a significant positive emotional attachment between mother and the minor. As to the
third element, the juvenile court concluded because there was no significant bond, mother
could not meet her burden to establish that termination of the positive attachment would
be detrimental to the minor. From the time she left the NICU months after birth, the
minor spent two years in her placement with her caregivers, while mother’s contact with
the minor was limited to visits. The juvenile court found those visits were not always
positive, causing the minor distress, illness, and exhaustion.
       Mother presented no evidence or testimony to meet her burden of establishing a
substantial positive bond. (Cf. Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637.) Conversely,
the Agency provided the juvenile court with sufficient evidence, including reports on
visitation and testimony from the social worker, to determine the minor did not have the
kind of relationship with mother that would trigger the beneficial parental relationship
exception. Mother relies extensively on a report and testimony during the 18-month

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review from the nurse who trained mother, who stated that she thought there was a bond
between mother and the minor because there was eye contact and the minor responded to
mother during visits. However, this testimony was both earlier in the case and refuted by
a psychological evaluation of the minor finding that “[s]he displayed no non-verbal
behaviors, such as eye contact or use of gestures.” (Italics omitted.) Additionally, there
is no indication in the record that the juvenile court relied on the opinion of the nurse
from the earlier proceeding in finding that the beneficial parental relationship exception
did not apply at the section 366.26 hearing. Further, we do not reweigh the credibility of
witnesses. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
       There was no significant evidence that the minor would benefit from continuing
the relationship. While she appeared to sometimes enjoy her visits, there were many
visits where she pulled away from mother or returned home from the visits exhausted and
stressed. The minor had significant developmental and language delays and was not
capable of expressing if she was excited to see mother, sad to see her leave, or if she
missed her between visits. The record supports the juvenile court’s finding that the visits
were physically demanding of the minor and did not significantly benefit her. In light of
the evidence in the record that we have set forth ante, as well as the stability the minor
enjoyed in her caregivers’ home, there was a dearth of evidence demonstrating the minor
would suffer detriment from the loss of a significant bond if parental rights were
terminated.
       Mother further contends that the juvenile court applied improper factors when, at
the outset of its analysis, the court summarized the case and noted that mother clearly
loved the minor and had made efforts toward reunification but was not in a position to
take the minor. The contention lacks merit. The court followed this preface by stating:
“Right now, this isn’t a question of whether or not she’s going back to mom. It’s a
question of whether or not she’s adoptable, and she is.” The court then followed this

                                              9
finding that the minor was adoptable with a detailed analysis of the beneficial parental
relationship exception in accordance with Caden C., applying the factors appropriately.
       Having considered both the evidence and oral argument, and noting mother had
the burden to show the exception applied, the juvenile court found there was insufficient
evidence of a significant bond and of detriment, appropriately comparing the harm
caused by the termination of the parental relationship to the benefits of an adoptive home,
as required under Caden C. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [“in assessing
whether termination would be detrimental, the trial court must decide whether the harm
from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of
placement in a new adoptive home”].) We conclude the juvenile court’s finding is well
supported by the record. The court did not err in finding the beneficial parental
relationship exception did not apply.
                                             II
                                        The ICWA
       Mother contends that the Agency and the juvenile court failed to comply with their
duty of further ICWA inquiry after the initial inquiry showed there was reason to believe
the minor may be an Indian child. Specifically, she contends that while the Agency
performed some inquiry as to the father’s claims of Indian ancestry, the notice to the
tribes failed to include mother’s reported Indian ancestry and the adjudication of father’s
paternity, and the record does not show that the Agency inquired with mother’s extended
family. We agree and, as we explain, the failure to fully comply with the requirements of
the ICWA requires remand for further proceedings.
       As this court recently explained: “ ‘The ICWA protects the interests of Indian
children and promotes the stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum
standards for removal of Indian children from their families, and by permitting tribal
participation in dependency proceedings. [Citations.] A major purpose of the ICWA is
to protect “Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an

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Indian tribe.” [Citation.]’ (In re A.W. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 655, 662.) The ICWA
defines an ‘ “Indian child” ’ as a child who ‘is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or
(b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member
of an Indian tribe.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) The juvenile court and the social services
[agency] have an affirmative and continuing duty, beginning at initial contact, to inquire
whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a); § 224.2, subd. (a).)” (In re G.A. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
355, 360, review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276056.)
       “[S]ection 224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding [the] ICWA in dependency
proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his [or her] family,
the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons whether the child may be
an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason
to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry
regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as
practicable.’ (Id., subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a
reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of section
224.3 apply. (See § 224.2, subd. (c) [court is obligated to inquire at the first appearance
whether anyone ‘knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child’]; id.,
subd. (d) [defining circumstances that establish a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child]; § 224.3 [ICWA notice is required if there is a ‘reason to know’ a child is an Indian
child as defined under § 224.2, subd. (d)].)” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,
1052.) We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Native American ancestry
for substantial evidence. (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.)
       Here, mother’s disclosure that she had Cherokee ancestry and father’s disclosure
that he had Cherokee or Comanche ancestry gave the Agency and the juvenile court
“reason to believe” the minor was an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA,
triggering the Agency’s duty of “further inquiry” under the ICWA. (In re T.G. (2020)

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58 Cal.App.5th 275, 292; see In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1052; see also
§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1), (2).) The Agency was thus required to follow the provisions set
forth in section 224.2. Further inquiry includes interviewing the parents, Indian
custodian, and extended family members to gather available familial and tribal
enrollment information. (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A); 224.3, subd. (a)(5).) Further inquiry
also includes contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of Social
Services for assistance with identifying tribes in which the child may be a member of or
eligible for membership. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(B).) Finally, further inquiry also includes
contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with, and anyone else, that might have
information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a tribe. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C).) “Contact with a tribe shall, at a minimum, include telephone, facsimile, or
electronic mail contact to each tribe’s designated agent for receipt of notices under the
[ICWA]” and “include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the
tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination, as well as information on the
current status of the child and the case.” (Ibid.)
       Here, the Agency’s reports indicate that it undertook an inquiry of the father’s
family and sent notices to the tribes with extensive family information, and the tribes
advised the minor was not eligible for enrollment. However, the record does not disclose
that the Agency inquired with any maternal relatives about her claim. Although mother
later claimed that she took a DNA test and did not have Cherokee ancestry, this is not
dispositive and did not discharge the Agency’s duty of further inquiry regarding mother’s
claim under section 224.2, subdivision (e)(2). Because of this error, the notices to the
tribes did not accurately disclose mother’s claim and pertinent family history. (See
In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744 [a child welfare agency “does not discharge
[its] duty of further inquiry until [it] make[s] a ‘meaningful effort’ to locate and interview
extended family members”].) Further, the record does not show that the Agency made an
adequate effort to update the tribes with the minor’s parentage information once father’s

                                             12
paternity was determined. While the Agency correctly asserts it was not required to
complete an ICWA-030 form and was only required to share with the tribes “information
identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility
determination,” an essential part of that information surely must include the mother’s
claim of Cherokee heritage, which was fully omitted. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1)(C).) We
cannot say these errors were harmless. The Agency should have, at a minimum, after
conducting further inquiry with relatives, listed what information it was able to gather
from these sources and provided information regarding mother’s claim of Cherokee
ancestry to the tribes. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C).) For these reasons, we conclude the
Agency did not adequately discharge its duty of further inquiry, and as such, the juvenile
court’s finding that the ICWA did not apply was not supported by substantial evidence.
(See In re Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1430.)
       Limited remand is necessary for the Agency to adequately discharge its duty of
further inquiry under section 224.2. If that further inquiry results in a reason to know the
minor is an Indian child within the meaning of the ICWA, then the formal notice
requirements of section 224.3 apply. The Agency either did not take sufficient
affirmative steps to investigate the minor’s possible Indian ancestry on the maternal side
or did not document its efforts to do so, and the juvenile court failed to ensure that an
adequate investigation had been conducted. In the absence of evidence of the Agency’s
efforts to fulfill its continuing duty of inquiry, we cannot say the failure of ICWA
compliance was harmless. A failure to conduct a proper ICWA inquiry requires a limited
remand for proper inquiry and any required notice. (In re A.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th
832, 839; In re D.T. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1449, 1454-1456.) We must therefore
remand for limited proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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                                     DISPOSITION
      The orders terminating parental rights are conditionally affirmed subject only to
full compliance with the ICWA as described in this opinion. If, on remand, the juvenile
court determines the ICWA applies, the court shall vacate its previous orders terminating
parental rights and conduct further proceedings consistent with the ICWA, including a
new section 366.26 hearing. (25 U.S.C. § 1914; § 224, subd. (e).)

                                                /s/
                                                ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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