Court Opinion

ID: 9955348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 14:07:56.8063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:34.714218
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NOS. A-0392-21
                                                                    A-1828-21
                                                                    A-2728-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMEL LEWIS,
a/k/a ADUAL LEWIS,
TAREAK BOND, JAMAL BROWN,
ADWAL LEWIS, JAMAL LEWIS,
JAMIL LEWIS, KIREESE OCONNOR,
KIRESE OCONNER, JAMIL KHAN,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHARIF TORRES,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

     Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT HARRIS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________

          Submitted (A-0392-21 and A-1828-21) and Argued (A-
          2728-21) March 18, 2024 – Decided March 28, 2024

          Before Judges Mawla, Chase, and Vinci.

          On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
          Division, Union County, Indictment No. 10-03-0288.

          Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
          appellant Jamel Lewis (Steven M. Gilson, Designated
          Counsel, on the brief).

          Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
          appellant Sharif Torres (Andrew Robert Burroughs,
          Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

          Adam W. Toraya argued the cause for appellant Robert
          Harris (Bailey & Toraya, LLP, attorneys; Adam W.
          Toraya, on the brief).

          William C. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney
          for respondent in A-0392-21 (Milton Samuel
          Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the
          brief).

          Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor argued the
          cause for respondent in A-2728-21 (William C. Daniel,

                                                                    A-0392-21
                                    2
            Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Michele C.
            Buckley, of counsel and on the briefs in A-1828-21 and
            A-2728-21).

            Appellant Jamel Lewis filed a pro se supplemental
            brief.

PER CURIAM

      Defendants Jamel Lewis, Sharif Torres, and Robert Harris, separately

appeal from: July 29, 2021; July 24 and September 23, 2021; and July 29, 2021

and March 8, 2022 orders denying their respective petitions for post-conviction

relief (PCR). We consolidate these appeals and affirm for the reasons expressed

in this opinion.

                                      I.

      We previously recounted the facts when we affirmed defendants'

convictions and sentences in State v. Lewis, Nos. A-2411-15, A-2550-15, and

A-2551-15 (App. Div. Jan. 7, 2019) (slip op. at 2-9). To summarize, on October

28, 2008, defendants staged a kidnapping of Tanya Worthy from co-defendant

Rashawn Bond's home and used her car to go to her boyfriend Rahim Jackson's

home in Green Brook to rob him. While Jackson was home watching television,

he heard the garage door open, and when he opened the door to the garage, he

saw Worthy's car. A masked person emerged from the car holding a gun and

told Jackson not to move. Jackson closed and locked the door, the gunman

                                                                         A-0392-21
                                      3
returned to Worthy's car, and the vehicle left. Jackson ran to the home of a

neighbor, who then called police.       Approximately two hours later, first

responders found Worthy's vehicle aflame. Once the fire was extinguished, they

discovered Worthy's charred body. She died, having been shot three times prior

to being burned.

      The State's theory of the case was that Worthy had been killed in a robbery

gone awry, and that Lewis and Bond thought they could use Worthy to gain

entry to Jackson's home to rob him because he was allegedly a wealthy drug

dealer. To accomplish the robbery, Lewis and Bond enlisted Harris, Torres, and

an unindicted co-conspirator, Titus Lowery, as help. We described the role each

defendant played as follows:

                   According to the State, while Worthy was
            visiting Bond, with whom she was also romantically
            involved, defendants and Lowery stormed in, robbed
            her, and kidnapped her, and then Lewis and Lowery
            drove away in her car, with Worthy in the back seat,
            from Bond's Newark residence to Jackson's Green
            Brook residence. Bond, Harris, and Torres followed
            along in another car but didn't reach Jackson's residence
            in time to carry out the intended home invasion with
            Lewis and Lowery. Their plan botched, Lewis and
            Lowery fled Green Brook with Worthy still in the car,
            and Bond, Harris, and Torres changed course to meet
            up with them in Elizabeth to destroy the evidence,
            including Worthy and her vehicle.

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                                       4
                  The defense disputed any connection between or
           among defendants or between or among defendants and
           Worthy. But witnesses testified at trial, often with
           reference to photographs, that Bond and Lewis were
           cousins and close friends, that both were acquainted
           with Harris, and that Harris was acquainted with
           Torres. One witness in particular, Sean Williams,
           testified that he encountered Lewis, a family friend, at
           a party in Irvington three days prior to the crimes; at
           that time, Lewis asked Williams to steal a four-door
           vehicle that he needed to commit . . . [the] home
           invasion and robbery . . . of "one of [Bond's]
           b[*****]s." Lewis promised Williams that Bond would
           compensate him, but Williams ultimately declined to
           steal the car Lewis sought.

                 As for defendants' connection with Worthy,
           Bond's cousin Terron Billups confirmed that Worthy
           and Bond had been romantically involved. And
           Jasmine Campbell, another girlfriend of Bond's, found
           Worthy's business card in a black leather handbag Bond
           gave Campbell just hours after Worthy's body was set
           on fire. The bag, which was eventually turned over to
           police, led the investigation to Bond and then
           defendants.

           [Id. at 3-6 (second alteration in original).]

     The State's case included cell-site location information (CSLI), which

tracked phone numbers attributed to defendants, Bond, Lowery, and Worthy.

The State also had call records for those phone numbers. It adduced testimony

from telephone company records custodians about the call records and

subscriber information for accounts belonging to Worthy, Lewis, Bond, and

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                                       5
Karima Rose; Rose testified Harris was using her phone at the time. Worthy's

and Lewis's lines were on the Sprint network.          A telephone company

representative also identified Torres as a subscriber to an AT&T account "and a

representative of the Philadelphia County Adult Probation Department testified,

based on the department's records, about the phone number that Lowery

provided to a probation officer who was collecting his basic contact

information." Id. at 7.

      Engineers from AT&T and Sprint were qualified as experts in CSLI

information. The Union County Prosecutor's Office prepared maps "that plotted

the cell sites with which the phone for each account made connections during

the night in question. The individual who created the maps testified that he

prepared them based on CSLI records obtained from the service providers for

the respective phones." Ibid. We recounted what the CSLI evidence revealed:

                  According to call records, Bond contacted Lewis,
            who then placed three calls to Harris during the
            afternoon. During a thirty-minute span beginning at
            around 5:30 p.m., while Worthy was at [a] Newark
            restaurant, Torres called Bond, who called Worthy,
            then Lewis, and then Worthy again. Around 7:00 p.m.,
            both Worthy's and Bond's phones connected with a cell
            tower near Bond's Newark residence, supporting an
            inference that Worthy visited Bond after leaving the
            restaurant. Thirty minutes later, Worthy's phone, along
            with those used by Bond, defendants, and Lowery, all

                                                                         A-0392-21
                                      6
connected with that same tower within a few minutes
of one another.

       Around 8:00 p.m., when the prosecution claimed
the kidnapping occurred, the phones attributed to
Lewis, Lowery, and Worthy began connecting with a
westerly sequence of cell sites between Newark and
Green Brook. Partway there, Worthy's phone abruptly
ceased to track with the others and last connected with
a site near the intersection of Interstate 78 and Route
24; her phone was later recovered by police on the side
of the road in that vicinity.

       Call records showed that while Lewis and
Lowery were traveling with Worthy to Green Brook,
Bond called Campbell—the girlfriend to whom he
ultimately gave Worthy's handbag—several times,
initially without success. Campbell testified that when
Bond finally reached her at 8:19 p.m., he asked her to
pick him up at a Newark intersection so she could lend
him her car. She complied, and he left with her vehicle
after dropping her off at her residence. CSLI records
demonstrated that, soon thereafter, the phones
attributed to Bond, Harris, and Torres all began
connecting with a series of cell towers from Newark
toward Green Brook.

       At about 8:40 p.m., while the other three were on
their way, Lewis's and Lowery's phones connected to a
cell site across Route 22 from Jackson's Green Brook
residence. That timing coincided with Jackson's
recollection of when he encountered the masked
individual, and briefly preceded his neighbor's phone
call to police. Records confirmed that the neighbor's
call was placed at 8:48 p.m. At the same time, phones
belonging to Harris, Torres, and Bond were connecting
to cell sites near Watchung, ten minutes' driving
distance from Jackson's home. The same data revealed

                                                           A-0392-21
                           7
            an abrupt change in direction after the neighbor's call
            to police, showing that the phones used by the three
            began connecting with an easterly sequence of cell sites
            back toward Newark. Around the same time, Lewis's
            and Lowery's phones connected with a series of sites
            headed in the same direction between Green Brook and
            Newark. Call records also showed that Lewis and
            Harris were in constant contact during this period.

                  CSLI revealed that defendants and their cohorts
            converged at approximately 10:15 p.m., when their
            phones connected with a cell site in Newark about a
            mile from where Worthy was found burned inside her
            car. . . . Afterward, Shakeerah Scott, the mother of
            Lewis's child, testified that she picked up Lewis and
            two others at another Newark location; she gave them a
            ride to Lewis's car. Bond, meanwhile, returned
            Campbell's car to her at her house at 12:32 a.m., a time
            confirmed by the record of a phone call he placed to her
            announcing his arrival. When Campbell went outside
            to meet Bond, he handed her the car keys as well as the
            handbag in which she eventually found Worthy's
            business card.

            [Id. at 7-10.]

      Not long after defendants' trial, the United States Supreme Court decided

Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, __ (2018) (slip op. at 17-18), which

held individuals have an expectation of privacy in the records of their physical

movements as captured by CSLI, and that the government's acquisition of CSLI

constitutes a search.        Following the appellate briefing, defendants filed

supplemental briefs seeking a remand to adjudicate the validity of the

                                                                          A-0392-21
                                         8
constitutionality of the State's acquisition of their CSLI and the propriety of the

admission of this information at trial. We concluded their arguments were

untimely and declined to consider them. Moreover, although Carpenter was

decided after defendants' trial and pending their appeals, we noted "our Supreme

Court had already recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy and

established a warrant requirement for similar information in State v. Earls, 214

N.J. 564, 584 (2013)." Lewis, slip op. at 16-17. We also noted defendants never

moved to suppress the CSLI nor objected to its admission. Id. at 17. Therefore,

the record lacked the facts on which to determine whether Carpenter was

violated, and the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. Ibid.

      Defendants also argued the trial court abused its discretion when it

admitted redacted gang photos featuring Harris and Torres. Id. at 35. At trial,

defendants objected to the photos and sought to redact items indicative of gang

membership, including bandannas, hand gestures, and other individuals in the

photos whom the jury might associate with defendants. Id. at 36-37. The photos

were redacted to remove the bandannas. Id. at 37. On appeal, defendants argued

the redacted photos were nonetheless prejudicial and identified them as

members of the Bloods gang. Ibid.

                                                                             A-0392-21
                                        9
      We concluded the court had not erred because the gang membership

"argument was never asserted at trial and the photographs were never introduced

to show gang affiliation."     Id. at 38.    Furthermore, "they were redacted

specifically to remove the red bandannas and a sign mentioning 'B-Block,' the

only obvious indicia of that affiliation, as well as the hand gestures mimicking

holding a gun and [a] picture on [a] t-shirt, the only portions obviously

suggestive of violence." Ibid. The photos were not completely sterile because

they still "depicted individuals giving an obscene gesture, but that gesture is

ubiquitous and not unique to gang members."            Ibid.   Indeed, no expert

commented on the significance of the unredacted hand gestures "at trial, so there

was no reason to believe a juror would draw an inference that the individuals

depicted were gang members." Ibid.

      Defendants also argued there was insufficient evidence to support their

convictions at trial because the State's evidence was circumstantial and most of

it was data, which "inexactly established their locations at certain times." Id. at

41. We found otherwise, for the following reasons:

                  The significance of CSLI to this case was not that
            it ambiguously placed defendants at approximate
            locations at any one particular time, but that it
            demonstrated the unusual coincidence of their locations
            and directions of travel throughout the extended period
            during which this sequence of crimes occurred and

                                                                             A-0392-21
                                       10
during which call records revealed they remained in
contact with one another. Harris and Lewis remained
in frequent contact throughout, and Lewis and Torres
were both in contact with Bond just before the
kidnapping. CSLI then showed that all three converged
in the vicinity of Bond's home at the same time Worthy
was there, and that the two sets of cohorts separately
made their way west toward Green Brook and then
suddenly east back toward Newark after Jackson
encountered the masked individual in Worthy's car.
Though Harris and Torres failed to reach Green Brook
by that time, a cell cite across the highway from
Jackson's home placed Lewis there right in time for the
encounter.

       Harris is correct that the evidence showed he was
not in the car with Worthy when she was driven to
Green Brook. But he ignores that CSLI revealed he was
proceeding in the same direction from the same starting
point near Bond's home, that he abruptly changed
directions at the time Jackson's neighbor called the
police, and that he ended up in Elizabeth where
Worthy's body was later found. The same can be said
for Torres, whose phone followed the same
approximate path. And so did that of Bond, whose gift
of Worthy's handbag to Campbell ultimately steered the
criminal investigation in defendants' direction.

       Harris asserts in his pro se brief that the State
failed to establish even that he was the user of the phone
attributed to him because evidence showed several calls
from that phone were likely placed by Bond. But
Billups testified that he communicated with both Harris
and Bond on that phone, and Rose, the subscriber on
that phone's account, unequivocally testified that Harris
was the phone's user when the crimes occurred. Lastly,
insofar as Harris points out that Campbell never
identified him as one of the individuals with Bond when

                                                             A-0392-21
                           11
            she lent Bond her car, and that Scott never identified
            him as one of those she picked up with Lewis later that
            night, neither fact, even taken at face value, undermines
            the evidence we have already summarized to a degree
            that would call into question the integrity of the jury's
            verdict.

            [Id. at 41-43.]
                                          II.

      Each defendant filed a PCR petition. As relates to the issues raised on

these appeals, all three challenged the admission of the CSLI evidence and

claimed trial counsel were ineffective for not moving to suppress the evidence .

Lewis and Harris argued counsel were ineffective for failing to retain a CSLI

expert to rebut the State's proofs. Lewis and Torres asserted trial counsel were

ineffective for not adducing alibi testimony. Torres and Harris claimed trial

counsel coerced them not to testify and failed to fully advise them of their rights

to testify in their own defense. Torres alleged counsel failed to review discovery

with him and failed to move to suppress the gang member evidence. And Harris

claimed ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for not having argued there

was insufficient evidence to convict on appeal, and not moving to correct a

factual error in the appellate opinion.

      Judge John M. Deitch considered all three petitions and issued three

written opinions, one for each defendant, on July 29, 2021. Lewis's petition was

                                                                             A-0392-21
                                          12
denied without an evidentiary hearing. Torres's petition was mostly denied

without an evidentiary hearing, except for, as relevant here, his claims trial

counsel was ineffective for not pursuing an alibi witness, reviewing discovery,

and failing to counsel him regarding the right to testify.       Following the

evidentiary hearing, the judge issued a September 23, 2021 written opinion

denying Torres's petition.    Harris's petition was also denied without an

evidentiary hearing related to his claims against trial counsel, however, the

judge conducted an evidentiary hearing to assess his claims against appellate

counsel. The judge then issued his March 8, 2022 written opinion denying

Harris's petition regarding the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We

next address the judge's findings regarding each defendant related to the issues

they now raise before us.

                                      A.

      The judge found Lewis's claim trial counsel was ineffective for not

moving to suppress the CSLI information lacked merit because the information

was obtained pursuant to the search warrants, which the law treats as

presumptively valid. Lewis provided no evidence revealing the search warrants

for the cell phones and the cell tower data "were based on any false statements

in the police's certifications." Moreover, the judge who granted the warrants

                                                                          A-0392-21
                                      13
found probable cause because the lead investigator certified Campbell provided

him with her cell phone records and identified four numbers Bond used to

contact her.   The State's CSLI expert testified one of those numbers was

subscribed to by Torres. Bond used that number the night of the killing to

contact Campbell. Therefore, "trial counsel could not have filed a successful

motion to suppress under Carpenter or Earls" because "[t]here was ample

probable cause to support the issuance of the CDW [communications data

warrant] seeking, inter alia, CSLI, for these telephone numbers."

      Lewis argued Laquan Bond would have been a partial alibi witness and

adducing his testimony at trial would have rebutted Williams's testimony that

Lewis asked Williams to steal a car for the robbery.      Further, the defense

provided a certification from Maurice Williams that his brother Sean is a liar

and that Maurice 1 did not see Laquan 2 or Lewis at the party in which Lewis

asked Williams to steal the car.

1
 We use Maurice Williams's first name because he shares a surname with Sean
Williams. We intend no disrespect. From here on, when we refer to "Williams,"
we intend Sean Williams.
2
  We use Laquan Bond's first name because he shares a surname with Rashawn
Bond. We intend no disrespect. From here on, when we refer to "Bond," we
intend Rashawn Bond.
                                                                        A-0392-21
                                      14
      The judge rejected Lewis's argument regarding Laquan because Lewis did

not tell trial counsel about Laquan prior to trial and did not certify to the alibi

as part of the PCR petition. Moreover, Laquan was not an alibi witness but a

witness the defense could use to attack Williams's credibility. Therefore, the

judge found "any benefit would be tangential, at best.             Furthermore, if

Laquan . . . was shown to be incredible, that . . . could have a devastating effect

upon . . . Lewis." The judge noted Lewis's petition was "not critical of trial

counsel not contacting Maurice," nonetheless, Lewis had "not made any

showing that would require a hearing on trial counsel's actions regarding

Laquan . . . or Maurice."

      Lewis's petition included a report from a cell-site expert. However, the

judge found it did "not create a question warranting a hearing" because the

defense expert did "not dispute the location of the cell-towers[,] . . . [or] dispute

that one can get a general sense of where a cellphone is based upon which tower

it is connecting to," nor did he "point to any error in the data used to plot the

tower maps or the calls themselves." The defense expert report corroborated the

State's expert, who testified at trial that call detail records do not indicate the

caller's precise location and, even though the precise location is unknown, the

cell tower and sector used by the phone is known. The judge found the balance

                                                                              A-0392-21
                                        15
of the defense expert report merely criticized the State expert's maps for not

"showing the sectors geographically for each phone call" and trial counsel's

cross-examination of the State's expert. Lewis failed to make a prima facie

showing that warranted a hearing on the CSLI testimony because the State's

expert explained why the tower sectors were not on the map and the defense

expert failed to explain how trial counsel's cross-examination was deficient.

                                       B.

      The judge found Torres's claim that his counsel was ineffective for not

suppressing the gang member evidence was procedurally barred because Torres

conceded his attorney objected to the evidence, but it was admitted over his

objection. Even if the issue were not procedurally barred, the judge pointed out

that we addressed and rejected defendants' arguments related to the admissibility

of this evidence in the prior appeal. He added "the hand signs [were] ubiquitous

and not specific to gangs . . . so there was no reason for jurors to believe they

were associated with gangs." The judge rejected Torres's argument his counsel

was ineffective for not moving to suppress the CSLI evidence for the same

reasons expressed in Lewis's petition. However, he ordered an evidentiary

hearing regarding the claims defense counsel failed to review discovery,

                                                                           A-0392-21
                                      16
investigate an alibi witness, and explain defendant's state and federal

constitutional rights to testify in his own defense.

      Both defense attorneys and Torres testified at the evidentiary hearing.

Judge Deitch made detailed credibility findings, which we need not repeat here,

and concluded both attorneys were credible, and Torres was not. The judge

detailed the level of communication both attorneys had with Torres and

concluded the credible evidence showed they provided the discovery to Torres

and discussed it with him. Counsel had a good rapport with Torres; "[t]hey had

a free exchange of ideas"; and Torres knew the State's case "came down to 'the

phone and whether [he] possessed the phone.'"

      Torres claimed his employer was his alibi because she would have

testified he was at work hanging Halloween decorations at the time of the

kidnapping. Pursuant to the testimony, the judge concluded defense counsel did

investigate the alibi by speaking to Torres's employer, but "she had no

information to support an alibi for the day in question." Moreover, Torres's

employment application was unsigned, and he had given investigators a

statement that he did not begin working for this employer until after the killing.

Therefore, counsel exercised appropriate judgment by deciding not to call the

employer because it "would have been substantially detrimental to the defense."

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                                       17
      Torres's second alibi witness was a man named "Fat Mike" who Torres

claimed was Bond's cousin. Torres asserted he lent his phone to Fat Mike and

Fat Mike's testimony would disprove the State's CSLI evidence showing Torres

was with the other defendants the night of the murder. The judge found defense

counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate this alibi witness because

Torres never told counsel about the witness and the alleged alibi was "a post-

hoc contrivance by [Torres]."         Indeed, Torres provided "no particulars

concerning [the alleged alibi witness] to support his existence." The testimony

at the evidentiary hearing convinced the judge "trial counsel appropriately and

effectively reviewed the discovery with [Torres who] was well aware of . . . the

charges . . . and . . . the State's proofs . . . against him. He appreciated that the

case would hinge on connecting the cellular telephone to him." Therefore, the

judge found it was "beyond belief" Torres would have withheld information

from his attorney about who he lent his phone to.

      The judge rejected Torres's claim he was not counseled about his right to

testify. In addition to the fact the trial court had voir dired Torres about the right

to testify, the evidentiary hearing established Torres and defense counsel "were

in free and open communication [with another]. They were at the trial together

daily." The judge credited defense counsel's testimony that he informed Torres

                                                                                A-0392-21
                                         18
of the "right to remain silent, that the State could use his prior convictions

against him, and that he would be subject to cross-examination if he chose to

testify. He also discussed what [Torres] would 'add' to the case if he chose to

testify." However, given counsel's cross-examination of the lead investigator

on the issue of Torres lending his phone out to Fat Mike, the judge found "there

was little that [Torres] could add." Indeed, the judge had found Torres "to be

incredible, and it [was] highly likely a jury would have as well." There was no

evidence in the record showing Torres wanted to testify. The judge concluded

defense counsel had "appropriately counseled [Torres] on the issue, and [Torres]

made a fully informed decision to remain silent of his own free will."

                                        C.

      Judge Deitch found Harris's claim he was pressured by trial counsel not

to testify was "directly contradicted by [the] record at trial." The trial court had

voir dired Harris on the matter and he unequivocally said that he did not wish to

testify and no one had forced him into the decision. Harris also told the trial

court he understood the decision whether to testify was his to make. Further, it

was not duress for trial counsel to tell Harris the jury would not believe him if

he testified because it was counsel's obligation to inform him whether it was

wise to take the stand. The evidence supported the fact Harris should not have

                                                                              A-0392-21
                                        19
testified because he did not deny being in New Jersey on the day of the crime,

he made no reference to an alibi, and he did not explain how someone other than

him would have had his phone during the incident.

        The judge rejected the claims trial counsel was ineffective for not having

suppressed the CSLI evidence or retained a CSLI defense expert for the same

reasons as the other defendants. However, the judge ordered an evidentiary

hearing to address Harris's claim appellate counsel failed to communicate with

him and did not respond to a request to correct an error in the appellate decision

affirming his convictions and sentence.

        Harris and appellate counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, after

which the judge issued a written decision denying the remaining PCR claims on

March 8, 2022. The judge found appellate counsel credible and Harris not

credible. Harris's testimony at the evidentiary hearing contradicted his claims

appellate counsel did not communicate with him because: he admitted he spoke

with appellate counsel; raised issues he wanted argued with counsel, including

issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial; and appellate

counsel told him he could raise those issues in a pro se brief, which Harris did

file.

                                                                             A-0392-21
                                        20
      The error Harris claimed appellate counsel failed to address was our

finding that Billups testified Harris called him on the Rose cell phone. Appellate

counsel testified he did not recall the error, but having reviewed it at the

evidentiary hearing, he concluded it would not change the outcome of the

appeal. Moreover, the judge found Harris "admitted that he knew [four women

with whom he had relationships] and that he spoke to them all on the Rose phone

the day before and the day after the killing. However, he did not speak to them

on the day of the killing through that phone." Therefore, there was no error in

the appellate decision to correct.

      Even if Harris were correct about the error, the judge found it would not

have changed the outcome because "there was very strong circumstantial

evidence linking [Harris] to the Rose phone, and the Rose phone to the co-

defendants at trial." Indeed, Rose testified at trial that she considered Harris

family and she had given him the phone, and he would pay the bill. "Sometimes,

when she would call the number, others would answer[,] and she would leave a

message for [Harris]." He would call her from Rose the number. And the Rose

number received a call from Harris's girlfriend while the phone was in Newark

early in the morning of the killing.

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                                       21
      Campbell identified four telephone numbers Bond used to contact her in

October 2008. Two of those numbers exchanged calls with the Rose number on

the day of the killing. At trial, a T-Mobile representative testified to the exact

times the Rose phone exchanged calls with Bond's number as well as the exact

time and duration of the calls between Rose and Lewis's phone.                The

representative explained the Rose "phone hit off cell towers in Irvington,

Newark, Hillside, Springfield, and Nutley during the pertinent hours of October

28, 2008." The lead investigator testified the Rose phone was in contact with

Lewis's phone "between approximately 7:28 p.m., and 9:39 p.m." and "hit off

multiple cell towers between Newark and . . . Worthy's home" the night of the

killing.

      Therefore, the judge concluded "there was ample evidence for a jury to

find that [Harris] committed the crimes he was found guilty of." Moreover,

appellate counsel did argue the weight of the evidence on appeal because

            [i]n Point 1A of the appellate brief, counsel argue[d]
            that: "[t]he evidence against . . . Harris was insufficient
            as a matter of law, or at least should have been set aside
            as a manifest denial of justice." Counsel then goes on
            to detail the evidentiary shortcomings in his statement
            of facts[ and] . . . then argued [the point] cogently over
            five pages in the brief.

                                                                            A-0392-21
                                       22
                 Furthermore, [Harris] submitted a pro se brief,
            where he raised the same issues addressed by appellate
            counsel.

            [(Second alteration in original).]

      The judge noted appellate counsel specifically attacked the fact the State's

evidence did not meet the burden of proof to show Harris had any involvement

in the crime, including that there was no evidence "Harris knew Worthy or ever

called [her] cell phone." Appellate counsel also argued even though the State

attributed the Rose phone to Harris, "there is no direct evidence that Harris was

in fact operating this phone[] and the cell phones attributed to . . . co-

defendants."

                                       III.

      In A-0392-21, Lewis raises the following points on appeal:

            THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE . . .
            DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
            CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S INEFFECTIVENESS
            BY NOT SEEKING EXCULPATORY WITNESSES.

                  A. Trial Counsel Failed to Pursue an Expert
                  Witness to Rebut the State's Expert Witness
                  Regarding the Operation of Cellphone Towers.

                  B. Trial Counsel Failed to Pursue Laquan . . . and
                  Maurice . . . to Rebut the Testimony of . . .
                  Williams.

                                                                            A-0392-21
                                      23
Lewis's pro se supplemental brief raises the following points:

      POINT I

      TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
      FAILURE TO FILE A SUPPRESSING MOTION FOR
      THE ILLEGAL [CDW].

      POINT II

      TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
      ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO
      HIRE A DIGITAL FORENSIC EXPERT WITNESS
      DURING TRIAL.

      POINT III

      THE STANDARD FOR AN                    EVIDENTIARY
      HEARING HAS BEEN MET.

In A-1828-21, Torres argues the following points on appeal:

      POINT I

      AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN THAT HE
      RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE . . . ASSISTANCE OF
      COUNSEL, THE PCR COURT ERRED BY
      DENYING DEFENDANT'S PCR PETITION.

            (1) Trial counsel failed to consult with his client
            and adequately prepare for trial.

            (2) Trial counsel's failure to fully investigate an
            alibi defense denied defendant his constitutional
            right to effective legal representation and a
            complete defense.

                                                                  A-0392-21
                                24
                 (3) As trial counsel failed to adequately advise
                 defendant about the advantages of testifying at
                 trial, defendant did not make an informed
                 decision when he waived his constitutional right
                 to testify.

                 (4) Trial counsel failed to move to suppress
                 prejudicial gang related evidence.

                 (5) As the search warrant failed [to] establish
                 sufficient probable cause that defendant had
                 committed a crime, trial counsel's failure to file a
                 motion to suppress was prejudicial.

      And in A-2728-21, Harris raises the following points for our

consideration:

            POINT ONE

            DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
            ASSISTANCE   OF   COUNSEL     WHEN     HIS
            APPELLATE     ATTORNEY      FAILED     TO
            ADEQUATELY RAISE A POINT ON DIRECT
            APPEAL IN VIOLATION OF U.S. CONST.
            AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I,
            PAR. 10.

            POINT TWO

            THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
            REMAINING POINTS IN THE PETITION FOR
            [PCR]  WITHOUT    AFFORDING   HIM   AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS
            HIS   ASSERTION   THAT    HE  RECEIVED
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

                                      A.

                                                                        A-0392-21
                                     25
      PCR "is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of habeas corpus." State

v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459

(1992)). It provides a "built-in 'safeguard that ensures that a defendant was not

unjustly convicted.'" State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013) (quoting State v.

McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997)). It affords a defendant a final opportunity

to raise any legal error or constitutional issues, including a violation of the right

to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey

Constitution.    Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49-50; McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482.

"Ordinarily, PCR enables a defendant to challenge the . . . final judgment of

conviction by presenting contentions that could not have been raised on direct

appeal." Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 (citing McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482-83).

      The Constitution requires "reasonably effective assistance," so an

attorney's performance may not be attacked unless he or she did not act "within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases" and instead

"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344

(1980)). In addressing an ineffective assistance claim, we follow the two-

pronged standard formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland,

                                                                               A-0392-21
                                        26
which was adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J.

42, 58 (1987). "That is, the defendant must establish, first, that 'counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and, second,

that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" State v. Alvarez,

473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,

694). "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant asserting

ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving [their]

right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J.

339, 350 (2012). A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland/Fritz test

requires the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280

(2012).

      "To establish a prima facie case [for PCR], defendant must demonstrate a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-

10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013). "[A defendant] must do more

than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel."

Porter, 216 N.J. at 355 (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170

(App. Div. 1999)).

                                                                             A-0392-21
                                       27
      "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Reviewing courts must make "a strong presumption

that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance." Ibid. Indeed, "the court should recognize that counsel is strongly

presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The

burden rests with the defendant to rebut this strong presumption that counsel's

performance was adequate. Ibid. Further, because prejudice is not presumed,

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52, the defendant must demonstrate "how specific errors of

counsel undermined the reliability" of the proceeding. United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 659 n.26 (1984).

      As relates to claims against "appellate counsel[, they do] not have a

constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the

defendant." State v. Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 549 (App. Div. 1987) (citing

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755 (1983)).           Counsel will not be found

ineffective for failure to raise a meritless issue or errors an appellate court would

deem harmless. State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 361-62 (2009).

      "Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the

reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular

                                                                               A-0392-21
                                        28
case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

The court must "determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the

identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance." Ibid.

      "The mere raising of a claim of [ineffective assistance of counsel] does

not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing." State v. Peoples, 446 N.J.

Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016). A court should hold an evidentiary hearing

on a petition only if the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of

PCR, "there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by

reference to the existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to

resolve the claims for relief." R. 3:22-10(b).

      We will uphold a PCR court's factual "findings that are supported by

sufficient credible evidence."    State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021)

(quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). Review of a PCR court's interpretation of the

law is de novo. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540-41. We review a PCR judge's decision

to deny a defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing under an abuse -of-

discretion standard. See State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div.

2020). And where the PCR judge does not hold an evidentiary hearing, our

review of both the factual inferences drawn from the record by the PCR judge

                                                                          A-0392-21
                                      29
and the judge's legal conclusions is de novo. State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super.

326, 338 (App. Div. 2020).

      Having considered each defendant's contentions pursuant to these legal

principles, we affirm for the reasons expressed in Judge Deitch's thoughtful and

well-written opinions. Our de novo review of the findings he made without an

evidentiary hearing, and our review of the findings following the evidentiary

hearings he conducted, convince us he neither misapplied the facts nor

misinterpreted the law. His findings are amply supported by the evidence in the

record and are unassailable. For these reasons, we conclude the arguments

raised in each appeal lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed in A-0392-21, A-1828-21, and A-2728-21.

                                                                          A-0392-21
                                      30