Court Opinion

ID: 9363059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 17:07:41.846904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.073687
License: Public Domain

J-S39004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: B.J.S., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: A.S., MOTHER                  :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 938 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9106

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.F.S., A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                                          :
 APPEAL OF: A.M.S., MOTHER                :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 939 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Decree Entered May 26, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
                      Orphans' Court at No(s): A-9107

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:               FILED: JANUARY 13, 2023

      A.S. (“Mother”) appeals the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas’

decree involuntarily terminating her parental rights to B.J.S. and A.M.F.S.

(collectively “Children”). Mother argues the orphans’ court abused its

discretion by finding that the conditions which led to the removal of Children

still existed, and that termination of Mother’s parental rights to Children would
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best serve their needs and welfare. We discern no such abuse of discretion,

and we therefore affirm.

      Mother is the biological mother of B.J.S., born in October 2014, and

A.M.F.S., born in December 2017. B.J.S. and A.M.F.S. have different biological

fathers. Children were living with Mother on May 31, 2019, when a caseworker

from the Luzerne County Children and Youth Services Agency (“Agency”) went

to Mother’s house after Mother refused telephone calls and other attempts of

contact from the Agency about allegations it had received concerning Mother.

The caseworker discovered Children lacked suitable beds in Mother’s house,

and that there were several unidentified individuals in the house. The

whereabouts of both biological fathers was unknown at the time. It was later

discovered that the father of B.J.S. had died and the father of A.M.F.S. was

incarcerated. The Agency took Children into custody pursuant to an

emergency care shelter order and placed them into the care of foster parents,

where Children remain today.

      After Children’s removal from Mother’s care, Mother was ordered to

undergo services for parenting education, mental health treatment and drug

and alcohol treatment, and attend supervised visits with Children. Based

largely on Mother’s noncompliance with Agency-referred services to meet her

goals, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to

Children pursuant to Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8) and (b). The

Agency filed the petition on January 7, 2021, at which time Children had been

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in placement for over 19 months. The Agency also filed a separate petition to

terminate the parental rights of A.M.F.S.’s father as to A.M.F.S. on that same

date. This appeal only pertains to the termination of Mother’s parental rights,

as A.M.F.S.'s father filed a separate appeal from the decree that ultimately

terminated his parental rights to A.M.F.S.1

        The orphans’ court held hearings on the termination petitions on July

28, 2021, September 15, 2021, January 31, 2022 and March 7, 2022. At the

hearing on July 28, 2021, Mother’s counsel represented to the court that

Mother was not in attendance as she intended to turn herself into authorities

because there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest.

        The matter proceeded, and the Agency presented the testimony of

several witnesses. The Agency called Barbara Blanner, a case manager for the

Intensive Family Reunification Program at Family Service Association of

Northeast Pennsylvania, to the stand. Blanner testified that her program

received a referral from the Agency for Mother in September 2019, but they

were unable to get in touch with Mother until December 2019. See N.T.,

7/28/21, at 46. Mother, however, missed several of her appointments and her

case was ultimately closed for noncompliance in February 2020. See id. at

48, 49.

____________________________________________

1   That appeal is docketed in this Court at 916 MDA 2022.

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      Mike Barna, the program director for the Supervised Visitation Program

at Vision Quest National, testified the Agency also referred Mother to Vision

Quest for supervised visitation with Children. According to Barna, Mother had

two visits with Children through Vision Quest. During the first visit, Mother left

the visitation area to take a phone call and smoke a cigarette. See id. at 76.

Then, at the second visit, Mother became aggressive towards, and screamed

profanities at, the supervising caseworker. See id. at 76-77. Vision Quest

terminated the visit, and told the Agency it would no longer supervise Mother’s

visits because of her behavior. See id. at 77.

      The Agency also called Lisa Ross to the stand. Ross identified herself as

a caseworker for Concern, another agency that received a referral to provide

Mother with intensive family reunification services and visit coaching. Ross

testified her initial assessment of Mother demonstrated that Mother needed to

improve her parenting skills, and that she would benefit from a parenting

course. See id. at 23-24. However, Ross had difficulty contacting Mother and

Mother’s attendance and participation in services was inconsistent. See id. at

13-14, 18. Ross testified she ultimately closed Mother’s case because of these

issues. See id. at 14, 15.

      Cara Wagner, a site manager at Concern, testified Mother failed to

appear for her first two scheduled supervised visits with Children, and was

arrested prior to her third visit with them. See id. at 32-33. Wagner reported

that after Mother was released from prison, Mother attended a supervised visit

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with Children, but that she had been unable to contact Mother after that visit.

See id. at 40. Wagner testified Mother’s case was closed out for

noncompliance on January 16, 2021. See id. at 40.

         Alicia Singer, an outpatient mental health therapist at the Robinson

Counseling Center, also testified at the hearing on July 28, 2021. She reported

she had received two referrals from the Agency for Mother. Mother failed,

however, to appear for either of her scheduled intake appointments. See id.

at 58, 60.

         Tony Bellizia, a caseworker for the Agency who had been involved with

Childrens’ case since August 2019, testified for the Agency at the hearings on

September 15, 2021, January 31, 2022 and March 7, 2022. He stated that

after Children were removed from Mother’s care, Mother was ordered to

engage in services for parenting, and to obtain an evaluation for mental health

and an evaluation for substance abuse, should the Agency-directed urinalysis

return a positive result. See N.T., 9/15/21, at 14. Bellizia reported, however,

that Mother never submitted for a urinalysis despite being placed on the “color

call” system. See id. at 12, 15.2 He further testified Mother failed to complete

the two parenting programs to which the Agency had referred Mother. See id.

at 14.

____________________________________________

2Bellizia agreed that the “color call” system is one where the client is assigned
a certain color, and then must call into the system to determine if their
assigned color requires them to report for a urinalysis screen for drugs and
alcohol that day. See id. at 29.

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      Bellizia acknowledged Mother independently pursued mental health

services at the Columbia, Montour, Snyder and Union treatment center

(“CMSU”). She also independently underwent a drug and alcohol evaluation

at CMSU, but did so without a referral from the Agency and the background

information accompanying such a referral. See id. at 15, 28.

      Bellizia testified Mother had been incarcerated twice since he had

assumed responsibility for the case. See id. at 17, 42. As for visits with

Children, Bellizia testified that Mother failed to appear for many scheduled

visits. According to Bellizia, B.J.S. had become so upset by Mother’s failure to

appear for visits that he no longer wished to visit Mother. See id. at 17-18.

      As for the scheduled visits Mother did attend, Bellizia testified Mother

came unprepared and the visits were chaotic. See N.T., 1/31/22, at 13-14.

He further testified that meals at restaurants were also chaotic, with Mother

on her phone and “paying no attention to the kids.” Id. at 14. During one

visit, one of the children choked on a potato chip. See id. Bellizia maintained

that the conditions prompting placement of Children continued to exist, and

Mother had not shown she could remedy those conditions. See N.T., 9/15/21,

at 17, 19.

      Mother testified at the hearing on March 7, 2022. She reported she was

incarcerated from July 2019 to October 2019, from September 2020 to

November 2020 and then from August 2021 to December 2021, when she was

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released on bail. Mother agreed that the most recent charges remained

unresolved at the time of the hearing. See id. at 38-39.

       Mother stated she did not have a driver’s license because it had been

suspended. See id. at 17, 41. At times, this led to transportation issues as far

as visits with Children and her ability to get to parenting classes and to drug

screens. See id. at 24, 32-34. Mother testified she completed a parenting

class while she was incarcerated at Columbia County jail. See id. at 25, 34,

36.

       Following the hearings, the orphans’ court entered a decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights to B.J.S. and a decree terminating her parental rights

to A.M.F.S. Both decrees were entered pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and

2511(b). Mother filed a notice of appeal from each decree, and this Court

consolidated Mother’s appeal challenging the termination of her parental rights

to A.M.F.S. with her appeal challenging the termination of her parental rights

to B.J.S.3 Mother raises the following two issues in her consolidated appeal:

        I.    Did the trial court abuse its discretion, commit[ ] an error of
              law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support in
              terminating the parental rights of [A.S.], natural mother of
              A.M.F.S. and B.J.S., as the grounds pursuant to 23
              Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2), (5), (8) were not established by
              clear and convincing evidence, and such granting of a
              petition to terminate parental rights was against the weight
              of the evidence presented by the parties.
____________________________________________

3 The Agency mistakenly believes Mother’s appeals were also consolidated with
the appeal filed by A.M.F.S.’s father. They were not. As noted above,
A.M.F.S.’s father filed a separate appeal from the termination of his parental
rights to A.M.F.S.

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      II.   Did the trial court abuse[ ] its discretion, commit[ ] an error
            of law, and/or there was insufficient evidentiary support for
            the court’s decision that the best needs and welfare of the
            minor children A.M.F.S.[and B.J.S.] would be served by
            terminating natural mother’s parental rights as required by
            23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511 (B).

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (proposed answers omitted).

      When this Court reviews an order of an orphans’ court terminating

parental rights, we must accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the court as long as the record supports them. See In the

Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 911 (Pa. Super. 2020). If the findings of

fact are supported by the record, this Court may only reverse the order if the

orphans’ court made an error of law or abused its discretion. See id. We may

not reverse merely because the record could support an alternate result. See

id. Instead, we give great deference to the orphans’ court because those

courts often have the opportunity to observe the parties first-hand over the

course of multiple hearings. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d 662,

670 (Pa. Super. 2019). Further, the orphans’ court, as the fact-finder, is free

to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to

resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See id.

      Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. Under Section 2511, the orphans’

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.

See In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). Initially, the court must

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find that the party seeking termination has proven by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies any one of the eleven statutory

grounds set forth for termination under Section 2511 (a). See id.; 23 Pa.

C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(1-11). If the orphans’ court finds that one of those

subsections has been satisfied, it must then, pursuant to Section 2511(b),

make a determination of the needs and the welfare of the child under the best

interests of the child standard. See In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511; 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(b).

     Here, regarding the first prong of the analysis, the orphans' court found

that the Agency had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mother’s

conduct met the grounds for termination of her parental rights under Section

2511 (a)(8), which provides that parental rights may involuntarily be

terminated on the grounds that:

             The child has been removed from the care of the
             parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
             with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
             the date of removal or placement, the conditions
             which led to the removal or placement of the child
             continue to exist and termination of parental rights
             would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

     Under Section 2511(a)(8), then, the Agency was required to produce

clear and convincing evidence that: (1) Children have been removed from

Mother’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement of Children continue to exist; and (3) the termination

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of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children.

See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa. Super. 2003).

We have explained that:

      Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to
      remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the
      court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the court
      must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
      [children’s] removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable
      good faith efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time
      period. Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require
      the court to evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to
      remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the
      availability or efficacy of Agency services.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

      Mother does not dispute that, at the time of the filing of the petition,

more than 12 months had elapsed since Children were removed from her

home. Rather, Mother argues “the Agency failed to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the specific conditions that led to placement were no

longer at issue.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. This claim does not entitle Mother to

any relief.

      In finding the conditions leading to Children’s placement continued to

exist, the orphans’ court detailed the testimony of the Agency caseworker

responsible for Children’s case since August 2019, Tony Bellizia, regarding

Mother’s failure to comply with court-ordered services, see Orphans’ Court

opinion, 7/27/22, at 7-10; the testimony of the two caseworkers at Concern,

Lisa Ross and Cara Wagner, outlining Mother’s missed appointments and

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visits, see id. at 10-13; the testimony of the case manager at the Family

Service Association of Northeast Pennsylvania, Barbara Blanner, also outlining

Mother’s missed appointments there, see id. at 13-14; the testimony of the

outpatient therapist Mother had been referred to, Alicia Singer, also outlining

Mother’s failure to appear for appointments, see id. at 14; and the testimony

of the program director of Vision Quest, which terminated its supervision of

Mother’s visits as a result of Mother’s volatile and threatening behavior, see

id. at 14-15. The court then stated:

      Based on the above testimony and evidence presented, this Court
      finds that Mother has not successfully completed the services
      requested of her and has not remedied her parenting issues,
      mental health issues, and substance abuse issues.

Id. at 15. We see no abuse of discretion or error of law in this conclusion.

      Mother argues, however, that she did address her mental health and

substance abuse issues by independently seeking mental health services and

a drug and alcohol evaluation at CMSU. Mother contends that the drug and

alcohol evaluation did not require her to seek further treatment, and the

orphans’ court therefore erred by finding that she did not comply with the

drug and alcohol component of her plan. In addressing this argument below,

the orphans’ court stated that:

      Bellizia testified that he was aware of the letter that he received
      from CMSU which stated that Mother had a drug and alcohol use
      evaluation and that she did not need treatment. Bellizia testified,
      however, that [the Agency] requested that Mother seek another
      drug and alcohol evaluation because CMSU was not provided
      Mother’s appropriate background information for the evaluator to
      conduct a proper assessment. Bellizia testified that based on

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      Mother’s behaviors and the arrest records that deal with substance
      abuse, having an appropriate drug and alcohol evaluation was
      necessary in this case.

Id. at 18 (citations to notes of testimony and title before Bellizia’s name

omitted). Given this testimony, we are not persuaded by Mother’s argument

that the trial court erred in finding that she had not successfully addressed

the drug and alcohol component of her permanency plan.

      Mother also asserts, in essence, that the court failed to take into account

that she was unable to complete the parenting programs to which she was

referred and to attend drug screens because she had transportation issues.

However, as this Court has stated, Mother, like all parents, was required “to

make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

responsibilities.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation

and quotation marks omitted). And while Mother also maintains the court

erred by failing to take into account that she participated in a parenting course

while in prison, that course was not one Mother had been referred to by the

Agency and does not negate her repeated failure to attend parenting programs

to which the Agency did refer her.

      Again, we see no abuse of discretion or error of law in the court’s

conclusion that the conditions which led to the placement of Children continue

to exist, and therefore that the Agency established the first two prongs of the

Section 2511(a)(8) test. The third prong of the test under Section 2511(a)(8)

required the orphans’ court to determine that termination of Mother’s rights

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would best serve the needs and welfare of Children. As noted above, Section

2511(b) also required the court to conduct a needs and welfare analysis of

Children.

      “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved

in the inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d

1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). In determining a child’s

needs and welfare, the orphans’ court is required to consider “whatever bonds

may exist between the children and [the natural parent], as well as the

emotional effect that termination will have upon the [children].” In re

Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

At the same time, the court should also consider the intangibles, such as the

“love, comfort, security, and stability,” the child might have with the foster

parents. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

      In conducting the analysis here, the orphans’ court highlighted the

testimony of Jensen Cirelli, who had worked regularly with Children and their

foster family as a case manager at Kids Peace Foster Care and Community

Center. Cirelli stated that Children got along very well with the foster family,

including the other children in the home; that B.J.S. consistently indicated he

wanted to live with his foster family; that A.M.F.S. also indicated she wanted

to live with her foster family; and that A.M.F.S. is doing “phenomenally” in

preschool and B.J.S. is doing very well in school. See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

7/27/22, at 22-23 (citing N.T., 3/7/22, at 78-81).

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      The orphans’ court also noted Bellizia’s testimony that Children are

assimilated into the home of the foster family, who wish to adopt them. See

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/27/22, at 20. The court pointed to Bellizia’s

testimony that the foster family meets the physical, developmental, and

emotional needs of Children, and there is a bond between Children and their

foster family. See id. Children both call the foster parents “Mom and Dad,”

and seek them out for comfort and security. See id. at 21

      The court further noted Bellizia opined that termination of Mother’s

rights would not have a detrimental impact on Children and in fact, would be

positive because Children would have more consistency and predictability.

See id. at 21-22.

      Based on the above, along with testimony from the foster father, see

id. at 22-24, the orphans’ court concluded that it would best serve the needs

and welfare of Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). We discern no abuse of discretion in this

conclusion.

      In challenging the court’s conclusion, Mother essentially complains the

court placed undue weight on the caseworkers’ testimony about the needs

and welfare of the children without duly considering “environmental factors”

such as her transportation issues and the COVID-19 pandemic. According to

Mother, these environmental factors impeded her ability to bond with

Children. In the first place, it is within the province of the orphans’ court, as

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fact-finder, to determine what weight is to be accorded to each witness’s

testimony. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A3d 298, 306 (Pa. Super.

2017). Moreover, the orphans’ court was well aware of Mother’s testimony

regarding her transportation issues, see Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/27/21, at

16-17, and that the COVID-19 pandemic occurred during Children’s

dependency, see id.

      As for Mother’s bond with Children, the orphans’ court acknowledged

Bellizia’s testimony that A.M.F.S. had been participating in visits with Mother

and enjoying them. Bellizia believed, however, that A.M.F.S. was “simply

having fun” with Mother, and A.M.F.S. feels more secure in the foster home.

See id. at 21. As for B.J.S., the court cited Bellizia’s testimony that B.J.S. had

requested that he no longer have visits with Mother, and that B.J.S.’s therapist

did not believe it was in the best interest of B.J.S. to continue visits with

Mother at that time. See id. at 21.

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      Based on all of the above, we see no abuse of discretion in the court’s

decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 (a)(8)

and (b).

      Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/13/2023

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