Court Opinion

ID: 96583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:41:37+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:55.063009
License: Public Domain

204 U.S. 302 (1907)
WALKER
v.
McLOUD.
No. 140.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 8, 1907.
Decided February 4, 1907.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
*306 Mr. W.N. Redwine, with whom Mr. Chester Howe, Mr. George R. Walker, Mr. Preslie B. Cole and Mr. J.O. Poole were on the brief, for appellant.
*308 Mr. John W. McLoud and Mr. Charles B. Stuart, for appellees, submitted.
*307 `MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Circuit Court of Appeals decided but one question in this case, and that one related to the validity of the sale of the property by the sheriff on credit instead of for cash. In our opinion that question was rightly decided by the court when it held such sale absolutely void, and it is unnecessary for us to refer to or decide any other.
The son of the deputy sheriff, who conducted the sale, bid off property worth $60,000 for $270, and gave his note for that amount, payable when possession was given him, or he, by some means, had otherwise obtained it. He has not yet obtained it, and the note has never been paid.
The Court of Appeals held the sale void, as in violation of the statute under which the sheriff assumed to sell. The proceedings of the sheriff were under the act of the Choctaw legislature, approved October 30, 1888, referred to in the foregoing statement. By that act it was provided that the sheriffs of the counties in which the improvements were located should advertise the improvements for sale for thirty days, and should "sell the same at the appointed time to the highest Choctaw citizen bidder for cash."
The sale was a clear violation of the provisions of the statute, under which alone there was authority to sell at all.
The appellant answers this objection by stating that the parties consented to the sale for credit instead of cash. We find no evidence of such consent, so far as the coal company was concerned or its receivers. The buildings were, as alleged by appellant, erected by the company or its receivers, although outside the right of way, and, therefore, as is claimed by appellant, they became forfeited to the Choctaw Nation. It is unnecessary to decide this question at present. But if the *309 property were to be taken away from the company or its receivers, on the ground of the alleged forfeiture, they certainly had the right to demand that it should be taken from them pursuant to law, and not in open violation thereof. When a party, whose only title to property depends upon its sale to him under a statute, demands possession of such property from one who is in possession under a bona fide claim of right, the party making such demand must show some right to it, and this obligation he does not meet, by showing that he purchased it under a sale, which was in plain violation of the very statute under which the sale took place. Hockett v. Alston, 110 Fed. Rep. 910. The coal company or the receivers, therefore, had great interest in this property, as owners, until, at least, their title was divested upon a valid sale. They never consented to any sale on credit.
The appellant asserts that the railroad or the receivers had forfeited the property by building outside the right of way, and hence they had no right to be heard as to the manner of sale, whether in violation of the statute or not. But, assuming the validity and applicability of the Indian statute, the title to the property did not become forfeited by the mere act of building. There must be at least some valid action looking towards the enforcement of the forfeiture. To assert that those who are in possession are intruders upon the land and have forfeited their property, and therefore are not entitled to be heard upon the question whether those who claim the property have complied with the law, is to say that one in possession and claiming to be the owner may be deprived of his property without due process of law. On the contrary, he is entitled to insist upon obedience to law by those who assume to take his property by reason of an alleged forfeiture. To insist upon a forfeiture the person who claims it must show some legal right to insist upon it. In case of a sovereign State or nation, its conclusion to insist upon a forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent may be by legislation, Atl. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mingus, 165 U.S. 413, 431, and that legislation must be *310 followed in asserting and enforcing the forfeiture by those acting for the State. So the owners of this property, even if it be liable to forfeiture, may nevertheless insist upon obedience to the statute by those assuming to act under it. Their consent to its violation is most essential. They did not become outlaws by building outside of the right of way.
It is also urged on the part of the appellant that the act of the sheriff was ratified both by the principal chief and also by the Council of the Nation. The only proof of the ratification by the principal chief (even if he had power to ratify, which cannot be assumed) is given in the deposition of the appellant's intestate, referred to in the foregoing statement of facts. Therein the sheriff said that the chief ratified his action as to the sale and payments on the property, and instructed him to proceed at once to employ attorneys to assist him in getting possession of the property for the purchaser. The statement that the chief ratified his action was a mere conclusion of law. It gave no facts upon which such alleged ratification was based, and was clearly inadmissible as proof of ratification. The same witness had already testified that before the sale he was directed by the Chief of the Choctaw Nation "to proceed according to law to dispose of the buildings which had been built by the Choctaw Coal and Railway Company off of its right of way." It would hardly be supposed that he would at once ratify a violation of law in the conduct of the sale. But the proof of ratification by the principal chief is totally insufficient and is, as already said, a mere conclusion of law by the witness. And, as a separate and distinct reason, we find no proof of any power of the chief to ratify a violation of this act.
Nor is the alleged ratification by the General Council of the Choctaw Nation of any greater effect. This ratification consists in the passage by the General Council of the act approved October 30, 1895, and already referred to. It appropriates the sum of $2,000, to be used by the principal chief in the employment of counsel for the purpose of defending the interest of the Nation in all suits pending or that may thereafter come *311 before the United States courts, "in any manner relative to the full and complete execution of the laws of the Choctaw Nation by the sheriffs of each and every county in the confiscation of property of non-citizens who are now occupying lands or buildings or who may hereafter occupy, not in conformity with the laws of the Choctaw Nation."
Certainly there is nothing in that act which in any way ratifies or purports to ratify an illegal sale by a sheriff assuming to act under the law providing for sales by sheriffs of buildings erected on land outside the right of way of the railroad company. It appropriates money to defend the Nation in suits relative to the full and complete execution of the laws and nothing else; not a suspicion of any ratification of an illegal sale under those laws.
The record shows a gross violation of the act under which the sale was made, and an entire absence of any evidence showing a ratification of such act either by the principal chief, assuming he could ratify, or by the council of the Nation. The case is not one in which any court would strive to find a way to uphold such a proceeding.
Without going into the other questions which arise, it is sufficient to say that upon the ground above discussed the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is right.
Decree affirmed.