Court Opinion

ID: 9390318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:39.864441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.538176
License: Public Domain

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                                                   RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0550-MR

BARRY ELLIOTT                                                        APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM LOGAN CIRCUIT COURT
V.               HONORABLE JOE W HENDRICKS, JR., JUDGE
                             NO. 19-CR-00348

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                    MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                         REVERSING AND REMANDING

      The Logan Circuit Court held a one-day jury trial of Appellant Barry

Elliott on charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and being a

persistent felony offender. Over the course of that single-day trial the

Commonwealth made at least ten separate references to the jury regarding

Elliott’s possession of drugs and related paraphernalia at the time of his arrest,

despite the fact he was not currently on trial for those offenses. The

Commonwealth also made five separate references explicitly stating or

suggesting that Elliott was a drug dealer. The Commonwealth further made at

least six references to other charges pending against Elliott that also were not

at issue in the trial.
      The jury convicted Elliott of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

and being a persistent felony offender and recommended the maximum legal

enhanced sentence of twenty years. The trial court sentenced in conformity

with that recommendation. Elliott now appeals to this Court as a matter of

right. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

      Following a careful review, we conclude the Commonwealth’s numerous

references to Elliott’s possession of drugs and related paraphernalia, to his

alleged occupation as a drug dealer, and to the other charges pending against

him violated KRE1 404(b)’s prohibition against the admission of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts for the purpose of proving character to show action in

conformity therewith. We further conclude this was not harmless error and

therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The South Central Kentucky Drug Task Force conducted a drug

investigation that revealed reason to believe Appellant Barry Elliott was

trafficking drugs from a residence in Logan County. On September 24, 2019,

the Task Force obtained a search warrant permitting a search of that residence

for illegal drugs and other materials related to drug activity and drug

trafficking.

      In the course of executing the search warrant, the Task Force discovered

Elliott in the residence. In the same room with Elliott were alleged

methamphetamine, alleged marijuana, and a loaded and chambered shotgun.

      1   Kentucky Rule of Evidence
                                        2
Elliott was arrested and ultimately indicted on charges of first-degree

trafficking in a controlled substance, first-degree possession of a controlled

substance, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia,

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and being a first-degree persistent

felony offender (“PFO”).

      The trial court properly severed the firearm and PFO charges from the

remaining drug-related charges arising from Elliott’s arrest. The

Commonwealth proceeded with trial on the firearm and PFO charges. Though

the drug-related charges therefore were not at issue, the Commonwealth

nonetheless made frequent references throughout the one-day trial to Elliott’s

possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia at the time of his arrest, to his

alleged occupation as a drug dealer, and to the other charges pending against

him. In its opening statement, the Commonwealth told the jury it would see

body cam footage from the search showing alleged drugs and other

paraphernalia on a table and that Elliott had been arrested on charges other

than those at issue in the trial. Witness testimony further referenced the drugs

found during execution of the search warrant. Task Force Agent Fox informed

the jury that during the search law enforcement found methamphetamine,

digital scales commonly used to weigh drugs, and plastic bags consistent with

the storage of illegal drugs. The jury also observed body cam footage of the

search of the residence in which law enforcement noted the presence of illegal

drugs. The Commonwealth also referenced the drugs found with Elliott at least

three times during its closing argument and further stated “we don’t want

                                        3
people who are drug dealers . . . legally walking around with firearms,” and

that “if you’re a drug dealer you don’t want someone taking . . . your drugs.”

      Agent Fox also testified to an incident following Elliott’s arrest in which

Elliott asked Agent Fox to list the charges against him. Agent Fox testified that

he then listed the “numerous charges” for Elliott. Defense counsel objected

and moved for a mistrial, contending the proceedings had “turned into a

trafficking trial.” The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. Defense

counsel then requested an admonition to the jury regarding the other-charges

evidence, which the trial court provided.2 After the admonition, Agent Fox

testified that when he informed Elliott one of the charges against him was

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, Elliott stated he was keeping the

gun for his uncle.

      The jury convicted Elliott of the firearm and PFO charges and

recommended a sentence of five years enhanced to the legal maximum of

twenty years. Elliott filed a motion for a new trial alleging he was prejudiced by

admission of evidence regarding the drug-related charges. The trial court

denied that motion and sentenced in conformity with the jury’s

recommendation. Elliott now appeals.

                                   ANALYSIS

      Elliott argues that the trial court’s admission of numerous drug-related

statements and evidence at trial violated KRE 404(b). Elliott stated timely

objections to the admission of such evidence and thus his allegation of error is

      2   See supra Part III.
                                        4
preserved.3 KRE 103(a)(1); RCr4 9.22; Daniel v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.3d

626, 632 (Ky. 2020) (noting that alleged error “was properly preserved for our

review by [appellant’s] objection to the evidence on . . . KRE 404(b) grounds.”).

      Under KRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “is not

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in

conformity therewith.” As we have previously noted,

      [t]he reasons for the rule are salutary. Ordinarily, such evidence
      does not tend to establish the commission of the crime. It tends
      instead to influence the jury, and the resulting prejudice often
      outweighs its probative value. Ultimate fairness mandates that an
      accused be tried only for the particular crime for which he is
      charged. An accused is entitled to be tried for one offense at a
      time, and evidence must be confined to that offense. The rule is
      based on the fundamental demands of justice and fair play.

O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1982) (citation omitted).5

      Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible, however,

for another purpose, such as proving “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” KRE 404(b)(1).

      3  Four of the thirty-seven drug-related references at trial cited by Elliott in his
brief involve introduction of evidence of his prior conviction for trafficking in cocaine.
Elliott did not object to the admission of that particular evidence at trial, perhaps for
the obvious reason that a prior felony conviction was an essential element of the
Commonwealth’s proof for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Kentucky
Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 527.040. Elliott also presents no specific written argument of
error as to the admission of that evidence in his briefing to this Court. In any event, we
note that the admission of evidence of his prior felony conviction was not erroneous
given that such evidence was an essential element of the Commonwealth’s proof on the
charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
      4   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure
        5 Though O’Bryan predates our adoption of the current Kentucky Rules of

Evidence, its statement of the purpose of excluding evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is in accord with the purposes of KRE 404(b). Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d
90, 96 n.12 (Ky. 2007).
                                            5
Such evidence may also be admissible “[i]f so inextricably intertwined with

other evidence essential to the case that separation of the two (2) could not be

accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering party.” KRE

404(b)(2). KRE 404(b) is “‘exclusionary in nature’” and thus these exceptions

“‘should be ‘closely watched and strictly enforced’” given their “‘dangerous

quality and prejudicial consequences.’” Graves v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d

144, 147-48 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Clark, 223 S.W.3d at 96). We review a trial

court’s decision to admit evidence under KRE 404(b) for abuse of discretion.

Anderson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007).

      I.    The trial court did not err in admitting evidence that law
            enforcement discovered the charged offense in the course of
            executing a search warrant obtained in connection with a drug
            investigation.

      Elliott first contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence that law

enforcement discovered the firearm at issue while executing a search warrant

obtained in connection with the Drug Task Force investigation. We disagree.

      As noted above, KRE 404(b)(2) permits the admission of evidence of other

crimes, wrongs, or acts where they are so inextricably intertwined with

evidence essential to the crime charged that separating the two would result in

serious adverse effect on the offering party. One such circumstance arises

where evidence of the other crime, wrong, or act is necessary to allow the

Commonwealth to “paint an accurate picture” of the context and events

surrounding the charged offense:

      “One of the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence of other
      crimes arises when such evidence ‘furnishes part of the context of
      the crime’ or is necessary to a ‘full presentation’ of the case, or is

                                        6
      so intimately connected with and explanatory of the crime charged
      against the defendant and is so much a part of the setting of the
      case and its ‘environment’ that its proof is appropriate in order ‘to
      complete the story of the crime on trial by proving its immediate
      context or the “res gestae”’ or the ‘uncharged offense is “so linked
      together in point of time and circumstances with the crime charged
      that one cannot be fully shown without proving the other . . . .”
      [and is thus] part of the res gestae of the crime charged.’”

Webb v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Norton v.

Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Ky. App. 1994)). In other words, “the

Kentucky Rules of Evidence are ‘intended to be flexible enough to permit the

prosecution to present a complete, un-fragmented, un-artificial picture of the

crime committed by the defendant, including necessary context, background

and perspective.’” Id. at 328 (quoting Major v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 700,

708 (Ky. 2005)).

      We have previously held that consistent with KRE 404(b)(2)’s provision

for the admission of evidence to provide necessary background and context, the

Commonwealth may present proof that the defendant was the subject of a drug

investigation arising from other crimes, wrongs, or acts to explain why law

enforcement focused its attention upon the defendant. Peyton v.

Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504, 516 (Ky. 2008) (“[T]estimony explaining why a

defendant had become a suspect in a drug investigation is relevant . . . to avoid

any implication that the defendant was unfairly singled out in the drug sting

operation and to explain why the defendant was targeted.”); see also Gordon v.

Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Ky. 1995) (“[I]t was not improper to

admit evidence that appellant had become a suspect in the county-wide drug

investigation. This avoided any implication that appellant had been unfairly
                                        7
singled out . . . .”). We have similarly held that the Commonwealth may

present proof of warrants relating to other crimes, wrongs, or acts where the

execution of those warrants provides the context in which law enforcement

discovered the charged offense. Kerr v. Commonwealth, 400 S.W.3d 250, 262-

63 (Ky. 2013) (“The existence of the arrest warrants here was necessary to an

adequate understanding of the context of the officers’ conduct . . . [and]

provided the setting and context of the discovery of the crime. Excluding the

reason why police were observing [the defendant] and why they arrested him,

thereby gaining access to the contraband, would have left the jury with an

incomplete and fragmented picture of the circumstances surrounding how the

[charged offense] was discovered.”).

      Here, we find no error in the trial court’s admission of evidence that

Elliott was the subject of a Drug Task Force investigation or that the firearm

offense was discovered in the execution of a search warrant resulting from that

investigation. That Elliott was the subject of a drug investigation provided the

jury with necessary context to understand why law enforcement focused its

attention upon him, thereby avoiding the creation of an inaccurate

misperception that law enforcement lacked a basis for doing so. Evidence that

law enforcement executed a search warrant resulting from the drug

investigation similarly explained to the jury how law enforcement discovered

the firearm at issue. Accordingly, because evidence of the drug investigation

and resulting search warrant was necessary to allow the Commonwealth to

“paint an accurate picture” of the background and context of the charged

                                        8
offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence.

      II.   The trial court abused its discretion in admitting voluminous
            evidence that Elliott was in possession of drugs and related
            paraphernalia when arrested and that Elliott was a drug dealer.

      While we therefore discern no error in the trial court’s admission of

evidence of the drug investigation and resulting search warrant, we conclude

the trial court abused its discretion in admitting voluminous evidence that

Elliott possessed drugs and related paraphernalia at the time of his arrest and

that he was a drug dealer. We note that, unlike the Drug Task Force

investigation and search warrant, evidence of Elliott’s alleged occupation as a

drug dealer and possession of drugs and paraphernalia at the time of arrest

was not admissible under KRE 404(b)(2). First, such evidence was not

necessary to explain why law enforcement focused on Elliott or how it

discovered the charged firearm offense. Indeed, evidence of the drug

investigation and search warrant already accomplished that purpose. Second,

suppression of evidence of Elliott’s possession of drugs and occupation as a

drug dealer would not have necessarily also resulted in suppression of evidence

relating to the firearm charge. See Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740,

743-44 (Ky. 2005) (noting that evidence is “inextricably intertwined” when it

would be necessary to suppress evidence relating to the charged offense in

order to exclude evidence of the other crime, wrong, or act). To the contrary,

the trial court could have excluded all reference to Elliott’s possession of the

drugs and related paraphernalia and alleged occupation as a drug dealer

                                         9
without limiting proof that Elliott possessed a firearm while he was a convicted

felon. As such, the evidence was not inextricably intertwined with the charged

offense so as to warrant admission under KRE 404(b)(2).

      We therefore must consider whether evidence that Elliott possessed

drugs and was a drug dealer was nonetheless admissible under KRE 404(b)(1).

In determining whether to admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

under KRE 404(b), a trial court must consider the three factors of relevance,

probativeness, and prejudice as set forth in Bell v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d

882 (Ky. 1994). That is, the trial court must consider 1) whether the proffered

evidence is relevant for some purpose other than to prove the defendant’s

criminal disposition, 2) whether evidence of the other crime, wrong, or act is

sufficiently probative of its commission by the defendant, and 3) whether the

potential prejudice from admission of the proffered evidence substantially

outweighs its probative value. Id. at 889-91. In considering these factors, the

trial court “must apply [KRE 404(b)] cautiously, with an eye towards

eliminating evidence which is relevant only as proof of an accused’s propensity

to commit a certain type of crime.” Id. at 889.

      The first Bell factor of relevance requires a trial court to determine

whether admission of the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts would be in

furtherance of one of the permissible purposes under KRE 404(b)(1).

Southworth v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.3d 32, 49 (Ky. 2014). Here, evidence of

Elliott’s possession of drugs and related paraphernalia and alleged occupation

as a drug dealer was relevant because it established a motive for his unlawful

                                        10
possession of the firearm. More particularly, Elliott’s proximity to drugs and

related paraphernalia and alleged occupation as a drug dealer had a tendency

to establish a motive for his possession of the firearm, namely to protect

himself from those who might seek to steal the drugs or trafficking-related

money. Thus, the evidence was relevant for some purpose other than

establishing criminal disposition, namely to establish that Elliott had a motive

to possess the firearm despite being a convicted felon. See Webb, 387 S.W.3d

at 328 (“Crimes often have a set of surrounding circumstances which help shed

light on aspects such as motive and intent.”).

      The evidence also satisfied the Bell factor of probativeness, which

requires the trial court to determine whether the evidence is sufficiently

probative of the defendant’s commission of the other alleged crimes, wrongs,

and acts, i.e. whether “the jury could reasonably conclude that the act[s]

occurred and that the defendant was the actor.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 147

S.W.3d 709, 724-25 (Ky. 2004). Here, body cam footage depicted the alleged

drugs and related paraphernalia present at the time of Elliott’s arrest.

Moreover, the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that Elliott

was a drug dealer, given his prior trafficking conviction. Thus, the evidence

also satisfied the requirement of probativeness.

      Even where evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts satisfies the first

two Bell factors of relevance and probativeness, however, a trial court must

also consider whether “the tendency of the evidence [is] so strongly to lead the

jury into improper character inferences that that tendency ‘substantially

                                       11
outweigh[s] [the evidence’s] probative value’ with regard to its proper uses.”

Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 457 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Bell, 875

S.W.2d at 890). Moreover, a trial court’s duty as evidentiary gatekeeper does

not end even if the trial court has found all three Bell factors satisfied. Rather,

the trial court must continue to carefully guard against a use of such evidence

beyond its permissible purposes resulting in undue prejudice to the defendant.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 513, 516 (Ky. 1999) (“Even where

evidence of a prior crime has some relevance, the trial judge must use some

discretion in deciding to what extent the prior bad act may be utilized without

prejudice.”).

      Here, while evidence of Elliott’s possession of drugs and related

paraphernalia and alleged occupation as a drug dealer was relevant and

probative, we nonetheless conclude the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing the repetitious and cumulative admission of that evidence far beyond

what was necessary to establish Elliott’s motive to unlawfully possess the

firearm. As we have repeatedly noted, admission of evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts is “inherently and highly prejudicial to a defendant” because

“[i]t is very difficult for jurors to sift and separate such damaging information to

avoid the natural inclination to view it as evidence of a defendant’s criminal

disposition.” Bell, 875 S.W.2d at 890. Elliott was not on trial for either drug

possession or drug trafficking, but rather only for possession of a firearm by

convicted felon. While evidence that he possessed drugs and related

paraphernalia and was a drug dealer were relevant to establish his motive for

                                        12
possessing the firearm, those facts could have been established without undue

prejudice by limited references during opening and closing statements and

limited testimonial proof. It was thus incumbent on the trial court to ensure

that the admission of such evidence was strictly limited only to argument and

proof necessary to establish that motive. Brown, 983 S.W.2d at 516.

      However, the trial court admitted evidence of the presence of drugs and

Elliott’s alleged occupation as a drug dealer over Elliott’s objection at least

fifteen times over the course of the one-day trial. The prosecutor told the jury

twice during his opening statement that Elliott had been arrested in the

presence of alleged drugs. During the presentation of proof the jury then

watched body cam footage of the search showing the presence of those alleged

drugs and heard Agent Fox testify at least twice that he located drugs during

the search. In his closing statement, the prosecutor made at least five

references to the drugs in the room at the time of Elliott’s arrest and the related

search video. The prosecutor further stated that an innocent person would not

have been in the room with the drugs. Twice in closing the prosecutor referred

to the possession of firearms by drug dealers. During the penalty phase, the

prosecutor told the jury that Elliott was a “drug dealer in your community.”

This cumulative evidence far exceeded what was necessary for the

Commonwealth to show that Elliott’s possession of drugs and occupation as a

drug dealer established a motive for his unlawful possession of the firearm.

      We have previously held that an excessive presentation of otherwise

relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may result in undue

                                         13
prejudice to a defendant. Id. at 517 (“While the admission of evidence of

appellant’s [other crime] did not constitute error, the admission of excessive

evidence supporting that indictment was ‘unduly prejudicial and trial error.’”

(quoting Funk v. Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Ky. 1992))); Chumbler

v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Ky. 1995) (finding defendants were

denied a fair trial where “the Commonwealth presented evidence of [other acts]

far in excess of what was relevant to . . . establish motive.”). To be clear, a

limited use of evidence that Elliott possessed drugs and related paraphernalia

and was a drug dealer would have satisfied the third Bell factor balancing

probative value against prejudice, provided such use was limited to what was

necessary to establish motive. But, the Commonwealth’s cumulative

references to Elliott’s possession of drugs and related paraphernalia and

alleged occupation as a drug dealer transformed from an appropriately limited

presentation of evidence of motive to an urging of the jury to draw inferences of

criminal propensity based upon Elliott’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts. That is

the very evil KRE 404(b) aims to avoid. Graves, 384 S.W.3d at 150 (“[T]he only

relevance of the ‘other crimes’ evidence [lacking independent probative value] is

to suggest that the accused has the propensity to commit the offense under

review. That of course, is the very thing that KRE 404(b) prohibits.”). As such,

we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the presentation of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence to far exceed what was necessary to

establish a motive for Elliott’s possession of the firearm, thereby allowing the

                                        14
tendency of that evidence to lead the jury to improper character inferences to

substantially outweigh its probative value.

      III.   The trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of
             other pending charges against Elliott and its admonition did
             not cure the resulting prejudice.

      The trial court also abused its discretion in allowing the Commonwealth

to admit evidence that Elliott faced other pending charges at the time of trial.

On six separate occasions during trial, the Commonwealth made reference to

the other pending charges against Elliott. Some of these references related to

an incident following Elliott’s arrest during which Elliott asked Agent Fox to

read the charges against him and Elliott’s subsequent statement that he was

keeping the gun for his uncle. While the evident—and proper—purpose of this

proof was to establish that Elliott knowingly possessed the firearm, the trial

court abused its discretion in failing to limit the proof to that purpose by

excluding reference to the other pending charges.

      Evidence that Elliott faced other pending charges was not necessary to

provide context for law enforcement conduct or discovery of the charged

offense, nor was it so inextricably intertwined with the firearm charge that it

could not be excluded without serious adverse affect to the Commonwealth.

Thus, references to the other pending charges were not admissible under KRE

404(b)(2).

      Evidence regarding the other pending charges also did not satisfy any of

the Bell factors and therefore also was not admissible under KRE 404(b)(1).

First, that Elliott faced other pending charges was wholly irrelevant to the issue

                                        15
at trial, namely whether he was a convicted felon who had possessed a firearm.

Second, the evidence also was not probative of Elliott’s commission of the other

alleged crimes because the charges were pending rather than actual

convictions—indeed, Elliott was presumed innocent of those charges at the

time of trial. Third, Elliott faced undue prejudice as a result of the

Commonwealth informing the jury he had other pending charges. Thus, while

the trial court could properly admit Elliott’s statement that he was holding the

gun for his uncle, the admission of the additional evidence that he requested

and was read a list of “numerous” other charges was wholly unnecessary and

resulted in undue prejudice to Elliott. See Graves, 384 S.W.3d at 151 (holding

that admission of evidence of irrelevant and unproven charge was prejudicial).

This is particularly so given the reference to this evidence on at least six

separate occasions during the one-day trial. See id. (“[T]he prejudicial effect of

that evidence was compounded by the numerous references to it throughout

the trial . . . .”). As such, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the

Commonwealth to present evidence of the irrelevant and unproven charges

against Elliott.

      Finally, that the trial court admonished the jury to consider the other

charges only as context and background does not alter our conclusion. After

Agent Fox testified that Elliott faced “numerous” other charges, defense counsel

moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The defense then requested

a limiting instruction informing the jury that Elliott was presumed innocent of

the other pending charges and that the jury should not consider those charges

                                         16
in determining Elliott’s guilt or innocence on the firearm charge. The trial

court then provided the jury with the following admonition:

      Sometimes evidence is admissible for some purposes and not
      others. Evidence in reference to other charges, other than the
      charge which is being tried here today which is possession of
      firearm by a convicted felon, that evidence has been admitted for
      the limited purpose of showing—if it does, and that’s a matter for
      you to determine—the surrounding circumstances pertaining to
      this case. Any other reference to other charges will be dealt with or
      handled in other proceedings. So that’s the instruction I’m giving.

      An admonition is appropriate where “evidence which is admissible . . . for

one (1) purpose but not admissible . . . for another purpose is admitted.” KRE

105(a) (emphasis added). Here, the trial court admonished the jury that the

other pending charges were admissible for the limited purpose of showing the

surrounding circumstances of the case. As noted above, however, evidence of

the other pending charges was wholly unnecessary to show why law

enforcement focused on Elliott, how it discovered the firearm offense, or to

otherwise provide context or background for the charged offenses. Indeed, the

pending charges arose only after Elliott’s arrest, and therefore cannot logically

explain the context of his arrest or the charged offenses. As such, evidence of

those charges was not admissible under KRE 404(b)(2) for the purpose of

providing context and the trial court’s admonition to the jury to that effect itself

was erroneous and did not cure the prejudice resulting from admission of that

evidence.

      IV.   The trial court’s errors were not harmless.

      Finally, we also conclude that a new trial is required because the trial

court’s admission of voluminous, repetitive, and cumulative evidence of other

                                        17
crimes, wrongs, and acts was not harmless. Nonconstitutional evidentiary

errors “‘may be deemed harmless if the reviewing court can say with fair

assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’”

Mason v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 337, 339-40 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Murray

v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 398, 404 (Ky. 2013)). “The key inquiry is

‘whether the error itself had substantial influence [on the result]. If so, or if

one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.’” Rucker v.

Commonwealth, 521 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Winstead v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009)).

      Here, the jury heard repeated improper and unnecessary references

throughout the one-day trial to Elliott’s possession of drugs and related

paraphernalia, to his alleged occupation as a drug dealer, and to other pending

charges against him. The Commonwealth zealously pursued the admission of

that evidence, which the trial court erroneously allowed. Notably, such

evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts “is presumptively prejudicial.”

Graves, 384 S.W.3d at 150. Though proof of Elliott’s guilt for possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon may have been strongly supported by body cam

footage showing him in a room with the firearm, it is also noteworthy that the

jury recommended the maximum sentence of twenty years allowable under the

law. Under such circumstances, we cannot say with fair assurance that the

repeated improper references to other crimes, wrongs, and acts did not

substantially sway the jury’s decision. See Rucker, 521 S.W.3d at 570 (finding

admission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence not harmless, even though

                                         18
proof of guilt was strong, given the lack of necessity for the evidence, its

overwhelming potential for prejudice, the fundamentally flawed proceedings

resulting from the Commonwealth’s overzealousness and the trial court’s error

in admitting the evidence, and the jury’s recommendation of the maximum

possible sentence). We therefore cannot find the error merely harmless and are

thus constrained to remand for a new trial.

                                  CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Logan Circuit

Court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

      All sitting. Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Thompson, JJ., concur.

Vanmeter, C.J.; Nickell, J., concur in result only.

                                        19
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin Leigh Conder
Assistant Attorney General

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