Court Opinion

ID: 9863706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 05:53:07.899792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:09.465050
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOYLE,
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the result of this case, but I most strongly dissent to that part of the opinion at page 393 wherein the following quotation appears.
“In 31 C.J.S. Evidence § 200, at p. 940, it is said that, ‘it is considered that knowledge acquired in the line of official duty or employment is not objectionable as based on hearsay.’ ”
The reason actuating this partial dissent is the fact that the above quotation has absolutely nothing to do with criminal prosecution but on the contrary refers to officers or employees of corporations and businesses engaged in their usual tasks, *400as to their practice and method concerning their several duties.
In criminal cases, the arresting or investigating officer will often explain his going to the scene of the crime or his interview of the defendant, or his search and seizure, by stating that he did so “upon information received” and this of course will not be objectionable as hearsay, but if he becomes more specific by repeating definite complaints of a particular crime by the accused, this is so likely to be misused by the jury as evidence of the fact asserted that it must be excluded as hearsay.
In Smith v. United States, (1939) 70 App. D.C. 255, 105 F.2d 778, the court there held an officer may testify before a jury that, acting upon information, he did certain things, but he may not go further and testify precisely what he was told about the particular place or the particular person.
In People v. Goltra, 115 Cal.App. 539, 2 P.2d 35, the court there held:
“[Officer] Kelly’s testimony concerning his investigation which disclosed that the records of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company failed to show that Charles Gordon ever worked for such company on the Bakersfield division was hearsay and should not have been admitted.”
In People v. Luce, 135 Cal.App. 1, 26 P.2d 501, the court said: “A revolver and a sweater which he had discarded were recovered and also were identified. During direct examination of the defendant by his counsel and in an effort to establish an alibi, objections by the people to offered testimony that he had been with a third party at the time of the commission of the offense and had heard him state that he had ‘shot a man’ were sustained. This was hearsay and the ruling was correct that evidence which does not tend to disprove established facts cannot avail the party offering it, and that ‘evidence “which does not derive its force solely from the credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests, also, in part, on *401the veracity and competency of some other person” * * * is as self-evident as any truism/ is a familiar rule.”
In Seigler v. State, 54 Okl.Cr. 141, 15 P.2d 1048, the court held that:
“The rule is also well established in this state that a third person may not testify to conversations had with a husband or wife in the presence or absence of the other, concerning an offense alleged to have been committed by the other. This evidence is held to be incompetent upon two grounds: First, that the husband or wife may not be a witness against the other, except for an offense committed against the one testifying; that, since the wife or husband is incompetent to testify against the other, the rule may not be evaded by permitting a third person to testify to conversations or admissions made by the husband or wife where the other is charged with crime; second, because such evidence is hearsay.”
In the case of State v. Martinez, 67 Ariz. 389, 198 P.2d 115, the court there held:
“However we think that the court very properly refused to admit in evidence the ‘booking slips’ from the police department. A mere reading of the comments on defendants’ exhibit No. 2 for identification, which is typical of the exhibits offered, ‘This woman was drunk on the street. She told Officer Norris that she had stayed with five men this afternoon. She was in company with a known prostitute Josephine Bustomonte/ shows its inadmissibility. It is the rankest kind of hearsay, a mere informal memoranda of possible acts and not proof of acts.”
The quotation in the majority opinion wreaks no violence upon the decision in this cause. However, the writer feels compelled to alert prosecutors that a literal following of this Corpus Juris Secundum quotation can lead to a reversal in the field of criminal prosecution.