Court Opinion

ID: 9409445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 14:05:39.350264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.622977
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 129248

                                          IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT
                                             OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                     (Docket No. 129248)

 JAMES R. ROWE, Kankakee County State’s Attorney, et al., Appellees, v. KWAME RAOUL,
                   Attorney General of Illinois, et al, Appellants.

                                 Opinion filed July 18, 2023.

          CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

         Justices Neville, Cunningham, and Rochford concurred in the judgment and
      opinion.

          Justice O’Brien specially concurred, with opinion.

          Justice Overstreet dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Holder White.

                                          OPINION

¶1        This appeal concerns the constitutionality of Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104
      (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), which dramatically changed the statutory framework for pretrial
     release of criminal defendants in Illinois. The circuit court of Kankakee County
     held that certain provisions of those acts violated the bail clause (Ill. Const. 1970,
     art. I, § 9), the crime victims’ rights clause (id. § 8.1(a)(9)), and the separation of
     powers clause (id. art. II, § 1) of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. For the reasons
     that follow, we reverse that decision.

¶2                                         BACKGROUND

¶3        In 2017, this court established the Illinois Supreme Court Commission on
     Pretrial Practices (Commission) and charged it with “conducting a comprehensive
     review of the State’s pretrial detention system” and with making recommendations
     on potential reforms to that system. Ill. S. Ct. Comm’n on Pretrial Practices,
     Preliminary Report 4 (2018), https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-
     resources/resources/3c2435c7-c00a-4a7e-bebb-141afa154102/12-18.pdf
     [https://perma.cc/S8VA-83S9]. In 2020, the Commission issued its final report,
     listing more than 50 recommendations to reform pretrial practices to “ensure
     defendants are not denied liberty solely due to their inability to financially secure
     their release from custody.” Ill. S. Ct. Comm’n on Pretrial Practices, Final Report
     22       (2020),      https://ilcourtsaudio.blob.core.windows.net/antilles-resources/
     resources/227a0374-1909-4a7b-83e3-c63cdf61476e/Illinois%20Supreme%20
     Court%20Commission%20on%20Pretrial%20Practices%20Final%20Report%20-
     %20April%202020.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4FU-GJKL]. The Commission
     observed that the General Assembly bore responsibility to amend the Code of
     Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 2020)) in that
     regard, and it urged the legislature to ensure that “conditions of release will be non-
     monetary, least restrictive, and considerate of the financial ability of the accused.”
     Ill. S. Ct. Comm’n on Pretrial Practices, Final Report 69 (2020).

¶4       The following year, such reform occurred. In 2021, the General Assembly
     passed, and the Governor signed, Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly
     known as the Safety, Accountability, Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act
     (Act). 1 The Act comprehensively overhauled many aspects of the state’s criminal
     justice system. The Act revised the standards for police officers’ use of force in

         The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither
         1

     name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.

                                                   -2-
     making arrests (id. § 10-216), conferred new authority on the Attorney General to
     investigate and combat alleged civil rights violations by law enforcement agencies
     (id. § 10-116.7), and imposed new requirements for correctional facilities,
     including the requirement that those institutions report all deaths in custody (Pub.
     Act 101-652, § 3-1 (eff. July 1, 2021)). Most importantly and relevant to this
     appeal, the Act, along with Public Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (Follow-Up
     Act), dismantled and rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release
     of criminal defendants. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255, 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan.
     1, 2023) (amending 725 ILCS 5/art. 110).

¶5       The Act’s pretrial release provisions center on the abolition of monetary bail.
     See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (adding 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5)
     (“the requirement of posting monetary bail is abolished”). Instead of monetary bail,
     the Act’s pretrial release provisions, as amended by the Follow-Up Act, establish a
     default rule that all persons charged with an offense shall be eligible for pretrial
     release on personal recognizance (Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023)
     (amending 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a))), subject to conditions of release that the trial
     court deems appropriate, such as electronic monitoring or home supervision (id.
     (adding 725 ILCS 5/110-5(c), 110-10)). Although the Act eliminates monetary bail
     and provides that “[a]ll persons charged with an offense shall be eligible for pretrial
     release before conviction” (id. (amending 725 § 110-2(a))), the pretrial release
     provisions allow the State to seek, and the trial court to order, pretrial detention of
     criminal defendants in certain specified cases. See id. (amending 725 ILCS 5/110-
     2, 110-6.1). The court may order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant
     is charged with any of an array of enumerated felony offenses and “poses a real and
     present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” Id.
     (amending 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)). The court may also order a defendant
     detained pending trial, if the defendant has been charged with an enumerated
     offense or any felony “other than a Class 4 offense” and if the court concludes there
     is “a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.” Id. (adding 725 ILCS
     5/110-6.1(a)(8)). Under this new statutory scheme, “[a]ll defendants shall be
     presumed eligible for pretrial release,” and the State bears the burden of
     establishing a defendant’s eligibility for pretrial detention. Id. (amending 725 ILCS
     5/110-6.1(e)).

                                              -3-
¶6       The Act also revised section 110-5 of the Code by removing all references to
     the term “bail” and all references to the trial court’s discretion in the determination
     of “the amount of monetary bail.” See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1,
     2023) (amending 725 ILCS 5/110-5). The Act replaced the provisions addressing
     the determination of “the amount of monetary bail” with provisions that set out
     factors the court must consider in determining the conditions of pretrial release. Id.
     The Act also repealed section 110-7 of the Code, which provided for the deposit of
     10% of any required monetary bail. Id. § 10-260 (repealing 725 ILCS 5/110-7). The
     Act’s pretrial release provisions were scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2023.

¶7       On September 16, 2022, plaintiffs James Rowe, the State’s Attorney of
     Kankakee County, and Michael Downey, the Sheriff of Kankakee County, filed a
     lawsuit in the Kankakee County circuit court against Illinois Attorney General
     Kwame Raoul, Illinois Governor Jay Robert Pritzker, Illinois House Speaker
     Emanuel Christopher Welch, and Illinois Senate President Donald Harmon. The
     plaintiffs raised claims that challenged the constitutionality of the Act as a whole
     and, alternatively, claims that challenged only the constitutionality of the pretrial
     release provisions.

¶8        The plaintiffs’ first amended complaint contained eight counts. Count I alleged
     that the Act’s pretrial release provisions are, in effect, an invalid attempt by the
     legislature to amend the Illinois Constitution. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV. Count
     II alleged that the Act is unconstitutional in its entirety due to the legislature’s
     alleged failure to comply with the Illinois Constitution’s single subject rule. See id.
     art. IV, § 8(d). Count III alleged that the pretrial release provisions violate the bail
     clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. art. I, § 9. Count IV alleged that the pretrial
     release provisions violate the crime victims’ rights clause. Id. § 8.1(a)(9). Count V
     alleged that the pretrial release provisions violate the separation of powers clause.
     Id. art. II, § 1. Count VI alleged that the Act in its entirety violates the three-readings
     requirement. See id. art. IV, § 8(d). Count VII alleged that the various provisions
     of the Act violate due process due to vagueness. And, finally, Count VIII requested
     injunctive relief.

¶9      Subsequently, additional state’s attorneys and sheriffs filed lawsuits in other
     counties throughout the state, all of which raised essentially the same constitutional
     challenges. On October 31, 2022, this court transferred and consolidated those

                                                -4-
       lawsuits with the initial lawsuit in Kankakee County. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 384 (eff. July
       1, 2017). Several other similar lawsuits were later consolidated with the Kankakee
       County lawsuit by agreement of the parties.

¶ 10       In November 2022, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
       After the motions were filed, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor
       signed, Public Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), which amended various provisions
       of the Act. The trial court ordered supplemental briefing on the effect of the Follow-
       Up Act’s amendments. On December 28, 2022, the trial court issued a 33-page
       memorandum of decision, granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

¶ 11        The trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments in counts II and VI that the Act
       violated the single-subject rule and the three-readings requirement in article IV,
       section 8(d), of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. Before addressing the merits of
       the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims, the trial court discussed the plaintiffs’
       standing. According to the trial court, “[p]laintiffs, elected State’s Attorneys and
       Sheriffs, are in a unique position as representatives of not only their offices but the
       citizens of their respective counties,” and “they are uniquely qualified to challenge
       unconstitutional legislation in a way the average citizen cannot.” The court referred
       to the state’s attorneys’ oath to uphold the constitution, adding that, if these
       plaintiffs lack standing, “it becomes difficult to imagine a plaintiff who would have
       standing to bring a declaratory action” before the Act becomes effective. The trial
       court observed that the State “is the only entity permitted to petition the court to
       deny pretrial release under the Act.” Because state’s attorneys are regulated by
       those provisions, they “have a clear interest in their constitutionality, as well as a
       cognizable injury should they be tasked with enforcing an unconstitutional act.”
       The court further posited that state’s attorneys and sheriffs may be forced to expend
       funds to abide by the Act, causing additional cognizable injuries that would support
       standing.

¶ 12       Regarding count I and the plaintiffs’ argument that the Act was an improper
       attempt to amend the constitution, the trial court agreed. The court asserted that,
       “had the Legislature wanted to change the provisions in the Constitution regarding
       eliminating monetary bail as a surety, they should have submitted the question on
       the ballot to the electorate at a general election and otherwise complied with” article
       XIV, section 2, of the constitution. See id. art. XIV, § 2.

                                                -5-
¶ 13        Regarding count III and the plaintiffs’ argument that the pretrial release
       provisions of the Act violate the bail clause, the trial court asserted that that clause
       has a “much broader” purpose than simply conferring rights on criminal defendants.
       The court stated that bail “exists *** to balance a defendant’s rights with the
       requirements of the criminal justice system, assuring the defendant’s presence at
       trial, and the protection of the public.” The court noted that the defendants did not
       explain why the Act “strips courts of the authority to ever consider monetary bail
       as a condition of pretrial release in every case.” The court further noted that the
       plaintiffs “are not arguing to seek to require monetary bail in every case, but the
       Act *** eradicates monetary bail as a judicial consideration in every case.” Citing
       a law review article from 1982, the court maintained that bail, or the pretrial release
       of a defendant after posting security to ensure appearance at trial, has been the
       centuries-long approach in this country. According to the trial court, persons are no
       longer bailable with sufficient sureties pursuant to the pretrial release provisions
       because sufficient sureties no longer include monetary bail.

¶ 14       Regarding count IV and the plaintiffs’ argument that the pretrial release
       provisions of the Act violate the crime victims’ rights clause, the trial court held
       that “eliminating monetary bail in all situations in Illinois[ ] prevents the court from
       effectuating the constitutionally mandated safety of the victims and their families.”
       The court referred to article I, section 8.1(a)(9), and its use of the phrase “fixing the
       amount of bail.” According to the trial court:

           “The plain reading of ‘fixing the amount of bail’ *** clearly refers to the
           requirement that the court consider the victims’ rights in setting the amount of
           monetary bail as the court does and has done since the passage of this
           amendment. In eliminating monetary bail, the discretion constitutionally vested
           to the courts to protect victims and their families by this method is gone. The
           constitutional requirement of bail is meant to help ensure victims’ safety, the
           defendant’s compliance with the terms of release, and the defendant’s
           appearance in court. The Act instead leaves courts with no ‘amount of bail’ to
           fix and confines the court to legislatively enacted standards for detention.”

¶ 15       Regarding count V and the plaintiffs’ argument that the pretrial release
       provisions of the Act violate the separation of powers clause, the trial court held
       that, because bail is an administrative matter for the courts, the legislature

                                                 -6-
       encroached upon the authority of the judiciary. Relying upon People ex rel.
       Hemingway v. Elrod, 60 Ill. 2d 74, 79 (1975), the court surmised that the pretrial
       release provisions offend separation of powers principles embodied in the Illinois
       Constitution because the enactment strips the “courts of the authority to ever
       consider monetary bail as a condition of pretrial release,” impermissibly impeding
       their inherent authority to detain defendants pending trial. Regarding count VII, the
       trial court rejected the plaintiffs’ void-for-vagueness argument. Finally, regarding
       count VIII, the trial court found that a preliminary injunction was not appropriate
       because summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs.

¶ 16        After entering its memorandum of decision, the trial court subsequently entered
       a written judgment granting the plaintiffs summary judgment with respect to counts
       I, III, IV, and V of their first amended complaint. The defendants appealed directly
       to this court under Rule 302(a). Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). On
       December 31, 2022, this court issued an order staying the Act’s provisions pending
       the outcome of this appeal. We allowed the Illinois Network for Pretrial Justice and
       389 other individuals to file an amici curiae brief in support of the defendants’
       position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). We also allowed Chicago
       Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 7 and Sean Kennedy of the Maryland Public
       Policy Institute to file amicus curiae briefs in support of the plaintiffs’ position.

¶ 17                                       ANALYSIS

¶ 18       We begin with bedrock principles that guide us in deciding constitutional
       claims.

¶ 19        The General Assembly “is without restriction or limit in the exercise of
       legislative power except as bounds are set or restrictions imposed by the
       constitution.” Sutter v. People’s Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 640 (1918);
       accord Droste v. Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495, 498-99 (1966). Our role is not to judge the
       wisdom of legislation but only to determine when it offends the constitution.
       Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (2009)
       (“ ‘ “[W]e do not sit as a superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation nor to
       decide whether the policy which it expresses offends the public welfare.” ’ ”
       (quoting Hayen v. County of Ogle, 101 Ill. 2d 413, 421 (1984), quoting Day-Brite
       Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952))). The judiciary’s power to

                                               -7-
       declare a statute unconstitutional is “the gravest and most delicate duty that [courts
       are] called on to perform.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes,
       J., concurring, joined by Brandeis, Sanford, and Stone, JJ.). It is not an endeavor
       that we take lightly. If it is reasonably possible for us to conclude that a challenged
       statute is constitutional, we are obligated to do so. Cwik v. Giannoulias, 237 Ill. 2d
       409, 416 (2010); Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306-07 (2008).

¶ 20        Statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality because the legislature
       is principally responsible for determining the public policy of our state. Lebron v.
       Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 260 (2010) (“Because the formulation
       and implementation of public policy are principally legislative functions, the courts
       afford substantial deference to legislative enactments.”); People v. McCarty, 223
       Ill. 2d 109, 135 (2006). A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears
       the heavy burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation. People v.
       Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 584 (2007). Additionally, where, as here, the party
       challenging the statute has raised a so-called facial challenge, the burden is even
       more onerous. See People v. Villareal, 2023 IL 127318, ¶ 14; Burns v. Municipal
       Officers Electoral Board of Elk Grove Village, 2020 IL 125714, ¶ 13. The party
       must prove there is no imaginable set of circumstances under which the statute
       would be valid. People v. Eubanks, 2019 IL 123525, ¶ 34. The issue of whether a
       statute is constitutional presents a question of law, which this court reviews
       de novo. People v. Austin, 2019 IL 123910, ¶ 14.

¶ 21        “The construction of constitutional provisions is governed by the same general
       principles that apply to statutes.” Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36. Our
       primary objective is “to determine and effectuate the common understanding of the
       citizens” who adopted the provisions. Id. To accomplish that objective, we “first
       and foremost” look to the plain language used in its natural and popular meaning
       when the constitutional provision was adopted. Hooker v. Illinois State Board of
       Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 47. Importantly, “[w]here the language of a
       constitutional provision is unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to
       other aids for construction.” Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36.

¶ 22      Before addressing the three constitutional claims in this appeal, we must briefly
       address the plaintiffs’ standing. Standing is a prudential doctrine that falls under the
       umbrella of justiciability. See State ex rel. Leibowitz v. Family Vision Care, LLC,

                                                -8-
       2020 IL 124754, ¶ 27 (“ ‘Standing “is not simply a procedural technicality” (59
       Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 30, at 416 (1987)), but rather is an aspect or a component of
       justiciability.’ ” (quoting In re Estate of Wellman, 174 Ill. 2d 335, 344 (1996))).
       The plaintiff, however, need not allege facts establishing standing. Id. ¶ 29 (citing
       Wexler v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 22 (2004)). The defendant bears the burden
       to plead and prove lack of standing as an affirmative defense. Id.; cf. Greer v.
       Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462,                494 (1988).
       Consequently, standing may be waived. See Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 n.1
       (2002).

¶ 23       Standing is typically a threshold determination (see Umrani v. Sindhi Ass’n of
       North America, 2021 IL App (1st) 200219, ¶ 34), but this case is anything but
       typical. In its opening brief, the State referred to the “unusual circumstances of this
       case” and acknowledged “the public interest would be served by the adjudication
       of [the] plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.” We turn to those claims and their merits.

¶ 24                                  I. THE BAIL CLAUSE

¶ 25        Count III of the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleged that the pretrial
       release provisions of the Act violate the bail clause. Illinois’s first constitution was
       ratified in 1818. Article VIII, section 13, of that document provided that “all
       persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,” except those held for capital
       offenses. Ill. Const. 1818, art. VIII, § 13. The 1870 Illinois Constitution identically
       preserved that clause. Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, § 7. The Illinois Constitution of 1970,
       as amended, now similarly provides:

               “All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for the following
           offenses where the proof is evident or the presumption great: capital offenses;
           offenses for which a sentence of life imprisonment may be imposed as a
           consequence of conviction; and felony offenses for which a sentence of
           imprisonment, without conditional and revocable release, shall be imposed by
           law as a consequence of conviction, when the court, after a hearing, determines
           that release of the offender would pose a real and present threat to the physical
           safety of any person.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 9.

                                                 -9-
¶ 26       The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that the pretrial release
       provisions violate the bail clause, but the court’s reasoning is difficult to follow.
       The trial court acknowledged the defendants’ position that “the bail provision exists
       to confer a right on criminal defendants,” but it asserted the purpose of that
       provision is “much broader.” The court continued, “Bail exists, as it has for
       centuries, to balance a defendant’s rights with the requirements of the criminal
       justice system, assuring the defendant’s presence at trial, and the protection of the
       public.” Noting that the Act “eradicates monetary bail as a judicial consideration in
       every Illinois case,” the trial court concluded that, “under the Act, *** ‘persons are
       no longer bailable by sufficient sureties’ pursuant to the pretrial release provision
       of the Act because ‘sufficient sureties’ does involve monetary bail as one the
       conditions of bail which is abolished with the Act.”

¶ 27      We reject the trial court’s uneven reasoning for three reasons.

¶ 28       First, the trial court ignored the plain language of the constitution. The bail
       clause does not include the term “monetary,” so it did not cement the practice of
       monetary bail, however long-standing and prevalent across Illinois, into our
       constitution. “Sufficient sureties” is not limited to sufficient monetary sureties, and
       we cannot append or supplement the constitutional text.

¶ 29       Second, the trial court correctly recognized that the bail clause strikes a finely
       constructed balance between the interests of criminal defendants in pretrial release
       and the interest of the State “obtaining the greatest possible assurance” that the
       defendant will appear for trial (People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 34 Ill. 2d 623,
       626 (1966)), as well as the State’s interest in public safety, but the court incorrectly
       assumed that abolishing monetary bail undermines the State’s interests. The court
       appeared to believe that monetary bail is the only way to assure a defendant’s
       presence and to protect the public. In doing so, the court elevated the system of
       monetary bail over the plain language of the bail clause. While the clause
       establishes an individual constitutional right to bail, that right is not absolute (see
       Hemingway, 60 Ill. 2d at 80) but conditioned by “sufficient sureties” and, more
       importantly, by exceptions intended to keep the most serious, and potentially
       dangerous, offenders in custody after a hearing to establish they pose a real and
       present threat.

                                                - 10 -
¶ 30       The Act’s pretrial release provisions complement the bail clause in that regard
       by allowing the State to seek, and the trial court to order, pretrial detention of certain
       criminal defendants. See 725 ILCS 5/110-2, 110-6.1 (West 2022). The Act requires
       the court to consider the “nature and seriousness of the real and present threat to
       the safety of any person or persons *** that would be posed by the defendant’s
       release.” See id. § 110-5(a)(4).

¶ 31       Third and relatedly, the trial court misapprehended what the drafters of the bail
       clause actually did. The drafters consciously chose to leave the clause largely
       identical to the 1870 Constitution, which was largely identical to the original 1818
       Constitution. See 1 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
       699 (describing the current bail clause as a “minor rephrasing” of the 1870 version,
       leaving “[t]he substance *** unchanged”). Thus, the historical antecedent for the
       meaning of “bailable by sufficient sureties” is the meaning of bail in 1818. See
       generally People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, ¶ 35.

¶ 32       As the State correctly observes, “monetary bail was all but unknown at the time
       the 1818 Constitution was drafted.” A dictionary published that year defined bail
       as “the freeing or setting at liberty one arrested or imprisoned *** under security
       taken for his appearance” but did not mention money as the sole or even primary
       means of providing that security. 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
       Language (H.J. Todd ed. 1818). Monetary bail emerged later in the mid-to-late
       nineteenth century. See Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 293 (3d Cir. 2018); see
       also Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567, 575 (1912) (“[t]he distinction between
       bail and suretyship is pretty nearly forgotten,” and “[t]he interest to produce the
       body of the principal in court is impersonal and wholly pecuniary”). And a
       comprehensive system concerning pretrial release was not codified in Illinois for
       another century, when the General Assembly enacted the Code of Criminal
       Procedure in 1963, which contained article 110.

¶ 33       The drafters were cognizant of the legislature’s foray into that area, which
       included section 110-8 of the Code and outlawed professional suretyship by bail
       bondsmen. 2 The drafters clearly understood that Illinois’s approach to pretrial
       release had evolved since the State was established and clearly understood that

           2
            That provision was approved by this court in Ingram, 34 Ill. 2d at 626, decided in 1966, only
       a few years before the Constitutional Convention in 1970.

                                                    - 11 -
       approach would continue to evolve, and they used language that would allow that.
       Delegate Bernard Weisberg offered a minority proposal that would have allowed
       all criminal defendants to remain at large until convicted, unless there was a judicial
       determination that confinement or bail was necessary to assure a defendant’s
       presence at trial. That proposal was ultimately rejected, and Delegate Roy Pechous
       explained why it should be:

              “I recognize, as our committee has recognized, that there are problems and
          inequities in the present bail system. However, the time-honored language of
          [the 1870 Constitution] has *** permitted the legislature to delve into the
          problems and to do something about them, and—as the present statutory
          language that was presented to the Convention indicates—the legislature has
          taken up the cudgel and has done something about it. ***

              *** I think that it is important, considering the fact that we have—as I say—
          time-honored language that has created very little litigation and has permitted
          the legislature to operate in the vacuum, recognizing constitutionally that there
          is a right to bail and permitting the legislature and the courts to construe the
          particulars of how the bail system should exist and how it should operate, I think
          it is important that we retain the present language with the very minor
          amendment that our committee has made with respect to one comma.

              *** And I think that the present language and the case law that has
          construed it—or pardon me, the legislative action that has operated to guide the
          administration of bail—I think that they are completely adequate, and I think
          that the bail structure in the state of Illinois is well on its way to being better
          than it is now; and I said before, it is a great deal better than it was four years
          ago.” See 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
          1674-75 (comments of Delegate Pechous).

¶ 34       Legislative latitude in regulating pretrial release, thus, was a fundamental
       underpinning of the bail clause. The legislature has once again engaged in the
       process of bail reform, and its efforts are consistent with the drafters’ intent. The
       plaintiffs’ bail clause claim fails.

                                               - 12 -
¶ 35                       II. THE CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS CLAUSE

¶ 36       Count IV of the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleges that the pretrial
       release provisions violate the crime victims’ rights clause. Initially adopted in 1992
       and since amended, article I, section 8.1, of the Illinois Constitution sets out the
       constitutional rights of crime victims in Illinois and now includes 12 explicitly
       defined “rights” that crime victims “shall” have. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1. The
       crime victims’ enumerated rights include, inter alia, “[t]he right to have the safety
       of the victim and the victim’s family considered in denying or fixing the amount of
       bail, determining whether to release the defendant, and setting conditions of release
       after arrest and conviction.” Id. § 8.1(a)(9).

¶ 37        The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs. The court stated that “the plain
       reading” of “fixing the amount of bail *** clearly refers to the requirement that the
       court consider victims’ right in the setting of the amount of monetary bail.” The
       trial court continued that, by removing that method of ensuring victims’ safety, the
       legislature improperly removed the discretion constitutionally given a trial court by
       the clause. According to the trial court, the Act leaves a court with no “amount of
       bail” to fix, impairing its ability to protect victims and their families.

¶ 38       We reject the trial court’s reasoning for three reasons.

¶ 39       First, the trial court again ignored the plain language of the constitution. The
       crime victims’ rights clause mentions the “amount of bail,” not the amount of
       monetary bail. The word “amount” connotes quantity and does not only mean a
       quantity of money but rather, consonant with the bail clause, a quantity of sufficient
       sureties. 3

¶ 40       Second, the trial court appeared to forget that the pretrial release provisions of
       the Act expressly take crime victims into account. As we have already mentioned,
       those provisions require a court to consider the “nature and seriousness of the real
       and present threat to the safety of any person or persons that would be posed by the
       defendant’s release,” including crime victims and their family members, “as
       required under” the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act (725 ILCS 120/1

           3
            To the extent that “amount” may imply an amount of money, the crime victims’ rights clause
       simply reflected the reality of Illinois’s bail system at the time it was adopted. That reality has
       changed.

                                                     - 13 -
       et seq. (West 2022)). See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(4) (West 2022). The provisions also
       require the court to give notice to crime victims before holding a pretrial release
       hearing, before revoking a condition of pretrial release, and in a range of other
       contexts. See id. §§ 110-5(a)(j), 110-6(h), 110-6.1(m). Thus, the pretrial release
       provisions secure, rather than contravene, the rights guaranteed by the clause, in
       that they require the court to consider the safety of victims at every stage at which
       the court determines whether and on what conditions a defendant should be
       released.

¶ 41       Third, the trial court failed to grasp that, like the bail clause, the crime victims’
       rights clause is part of the bill of rights. Both are equally important and work in
       concert. The bail clause concerns the individual rights of criminal defendants, but
       in its “real and present threat” exception, it acknowledges the State’s interest in
       public safety. The crime victims’ rights clause, initially adopted in 1992, not only
       bolstered that interest but created a new and watershed structure of individual rights
       for crime victims. The latter clause was adopted with only one focus, victims. See
       People v. Richardson, 196 Ill. 2d 225, 231 (2001) (stating that the crime victims’
       rights clause was intended to serve as a shield to protect the rights of victims). We
       believe that it would dilute the purpose of that clause to hold that it had another,
       tangential purpose—namely, to mandate a system of monetary bail for criminal
       defendants across Illinois. Nothing in the crime victims’ rights clause’s plain
       language indicates such an intent to upend suddenly, after 174 years, the
       constitutional history of bail in Illinois. See People v. Nestrock, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1,
       10 (2000) (stating that the clause does “not alter the fundamental principles on
       which our legal system is based”). The plaintiffs’ crime victims’ rights clause claim
       fails.

¶ 42                    III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS CLAUSE

¶ 43       Count V of the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint alleges that the pretrial
       release provisions of the Act violate the separation of powers clause. Article II,
       section 1, of the Illinois Constitution provides, “The legislative, executive and
       judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging
       to another.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1.

                                                - 14 -
¶ 44       The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs. According to the trial court, this court
       has held that the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising judicial power
       (see People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 256 (1977)), and statutes that undermine
       traditional and inherent judicial roles violate separation of powers (Best v. Taylor
       Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 411 (1997)). Relying upon Hemingway, 60 Ill. 2d
       at 79, the trial court concluded that the authority to deny or revoke bail to preserve
       the orderly process of criminal procedure is an administrative matter inherently
       entrusted solely to the courts. The trial court added that, by encroaching on that
       authority in abolishing monetary bail, the legislature violated the separation of
       powers clause.

¶ 45     We reject the trial court’s reasoning and, particularly, its overreading of
       Hemingway.

¶ 46       In Hemingway, the defendant was charged with capital murder, and the trial
       court denied his motion to set bail. Id. at 76. The defendant filed a motion for leave
       to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which this court granted. Id. After
       noting that the bail clause contained an exception for capital offenses, this court
       found that the defendant was not eligible for the death penalty under Furman v.
       Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and was therefore bailable. Hemingway, 60 Ill. 2d
       at 79. Still, we declined the defendant’s invitation to reverse the trial court’s
       decision to deny bail. We stated, “the constitutional right to bail must be qualified
       by the authority of the courts, as an incident of their power to manage the conduct
       of proceedings before them, to deny or revoke bail when such action is appropriate
       to preserve the orderly process of criminal procedure.” Id. We added that courts
       have “the inherent power” to deny bail when the defendant may interfere with
       witnesses or may not appear for trial. Id. at 80.

¶ 47       The issue in Hemingway, however, did not involve whether the defendant had
       a right to a set amount of monetary bail but whether he had a right to bail at all.
       That is, we decided the very narrow question of whether a trial court has the
       inherent authority to deny pretrial release. Having decided that question, we drifted
       into obiter dicta. We declined to endorse “the principle of preventative detention,”
       finding it unnecessary “to discuss the wisdom or the constitutionality of that
       principle.” Id. Instead, we noted that “[t]he object of bail *** is to make certain the
       defendant’s appearance in court” but acknowledged “the need to balance the right

                                                - 15 -
       of an accused to be free on bail against the right of the general public to receive
       reasonable, protective consideration by the courts.” Id. at 81. We reviewed the
       American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Pretrial Release and linked them
       to provisions in article 110 of the Code that provide conditions for admitting a
       defendant to bail. Id. at 81-84 (citing ABA Standards Relating to Pretrial Release
       (1968)). We surmised that those standards and Code sections, when properly
       applied, achieved “an appropriate balance” between “the right of an accused to be
       free on bail pending trial and the need of the public to be given necessary
       protection.” Id. at 84. If we believed that bail was exclusively a matter for the
       judiciary, we would not have quoted those statutory provisions. Further, since we
       construed it in Hemingway, the bail clause has been amended twice to broaden the
       exceptions beyond simply capital offenses.

¶ 48       Indeed, the legislature has long regulated the bail system. In 1963, the General
       Assembly codified, for the first time, criminal procedure in Illinois. The Code
       included detailed standards and procedures for Illinois courts to utilize in
       determining how and when a criminal defendant can be detained or should be
       released from custody prior to trial. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, § 110-1 et seq.
       In the nearly six decades between then and the passage of the Act in 2021, the
       legislature has revised article 110 more than 20 times. Specifically, before the Act,
       section 110-5(a) identified a dizzying array of more than 100 factors that a court
       “shall” consider in “determining the amount of monetary bail or conditions of
       release.” See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2020). The plaintiffs (or their
       predecessors in office) never faulted the legislature’s earlier forays into this area.
       Presumably, they found those amendments palatable. However, the substance of
       the amendment is irrelevant. If the legislature could reconsider bail over the course
       of so many years, it could do so again in 2021 without offending separation of
       powers principles.

¶ 49       Our conclusion is consistent with other areas of criminal procedure. For
       example, this court has held that sentencing is exclusively a judicial function (see
       People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161 (1982)) but has also held that “ ‘the legislature
       may restrict the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing, such as by providing
       for mandatory sentences’ ” (People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 208 (1984) (quoting
       People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 77 Ill. 2d 531, 549 (1979)). The plaintiffs’

                                               - 16 -
       separation of powers claim fails.

¶ 50                                       CONCLUSION

¶ 51       The Illinois Constitution of 1970 does not mandate that monetary bail is the
       only means to ensure criminal defendants appear for trials or the only means to
       protect the public. Our constitution creates a balance between the individual rights
       of defendants and the individual rights of crime victims. The Act’s pretrial release
       provisions set forth procedures commensurate with that balance. For the reasons
       that we have stated, we reverse the circuit court’s decision to grant summary
       judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

¶ 52       On December 31, 2022, this court granted a supervisory order staying the effect
       of pretrial release provisions in Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104, along with
       various amendments to Illinois Supreme Court rules that facilitated the
       implementation of those provisions. See People ex rel. Berlin v. Pritzker, No.
       129249 (Ill. Dec. 31, 2022) (supervisory order). Sixty days after the filing of this
       opinion, on September 18, 2023, this court’s stay of pretrial release provisions in
       Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104 shall be vacated. On that date, the circuit courts
       are directed to conduct hearings consistent with Public Acts 101-652 and 102-1104,
       and Illinois Supreme Court Rules implementing those pretrial release provisions
       shall become effective. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11 (West 2022).

¶ 53      Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 54      JUSTICE O’BRIEN, specially concurring:

¶ 55        I concur with the majority’s finding with respect to the constitutionality of
       Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety,
       Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today Act (Act), as amended by Public Act
       102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). Specifically, I agree that the pretrial release provisions
       of the Act do not violate the Illinois Constitution’s bail clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art
       I, § 9), crime victims’ rights clause (id. § 8.1(a)(9), or separation of powers clause
       (id. art. II, § 1). I write separately, however, to highlight the majority’s failure to

                                                - 17 -
       address defendants’ affirmative defense that plaintiffs lack standing, which
       defendants pled in their summary judgment motion before the trial court.
       Furthermore, upon reviewing this issue, I find that defendants cannot satisfy their
       burden of proof with regard to standing due to certain representations defendants
       made during oral argument.

¶ 56       At the outset, I agree with Justice Overstreet that the majority has given “short
       shrift” to the issue of standing. Infra ¶ 67. I also agree with Justice Overstreet’s
       statement that “[t]he majority skirts this issue and does not address it.” Infra ¶ 70.
       Simply put, the majority’s offering fails to offer any substantive analysis as to the
       question of plaintiffs’ standing. More importantly, the majority’s offering fails to
       provide a dispositive answer on the issue. Instead, after citing authority for the
       proposition that standing “may be waived” (supra ¶ 22), the majority “analysis”
       provides, in its entirety:

               “Standing is typically a threshold determination [citation], but this case is
           anything but typical. In its opening brief, the State referred to the ‘unusual
           circumstances of this case’ and acknowledged ‘the public interest would be
           served by the adjudication of [the] plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.’ We turn to
           those claims and their merits.” Supra ¶ 23.

¶ 57        The majority notes that “standing is typically a threshold determination” (supra
       ¶ 23) but then curiously fails to offer any determination on the threshold matter. In
       scenarios where a trial court or the appellate court engages in such behavior, we
       often issue a supervisory order or an opinion remanding the matter to the respective
       court with instructions to analyze and answer the threshold matter or operative
       question. Moreover, it must be emphasized that a case’s “unusual circumstances”
       or the “public[’s] interest” in a case (see supra ¶ 23) are not relevant factors Illinois
       courts utilize when attempting to determine whether a plaintiff has common-law
       standing to pursue a claim. Instead, the operative factor in Illinois is whether the
       plaintiff has suffered an injury or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury.
       Illinois Road & Transportation Builders Ass’n v. County of Cook, 2022 IL 127126,
       ¶ 13; Piccioli v. Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System, 2019 IL
       122905, ¶ 12; Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of Chicago,
       189 Ill. 2d 200, 206 (2000); Messenger v. Edgar, 157 Ill. 2d 162, 171 (1993); Greer
       v. Illinois Housing Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 492 (1988). In other

                                                - 18 -
       words, “[t]he function of the doctrine of standing is to insure that issues are raised
       only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy.” Wexler
       v. Wirtz Corp., 211 Ill. 2d 18, 23 (2004). “In more pedestrian terms, it is an answer
       to the very first question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains
       of another’s actions: ‘What’s it to you?’ ” Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
       as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 881,
       882 (1983).

¶ 58       The asking and answering of this question has a long history within American
       jurisprudence. Its earliest philosophical seedlings can be found scattered throughout
       the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
       Cranch) 137 (1803). One such example: “The very essence of civil liberty certainly
       consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
       whenever he receives an injury.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 163. Beginning in the
       1920s, those philosophical seedlings began to sprout and continued to develop over
       the following decades into what we now recognize today as the doctrine of
       standing. While standing requirements apply in both Illinois’s federal and state
       courts today, the doctrine in the federal system is not perfectly interchangeable with
       the doctrine in the state system. It must also be noted that the issue of standing
       arises generally in at least three different types of legal scenarios: (1) statutorily,
       (2) constitutionally, and (3) under the common law, which must be pled as an
       affirmative defense in Illinois state courts. The determination of the applicable
       scenario depends upon both the type of claim being raised by plaintiff and the
       particular court system in which plaintiff is raising said claim. This fact is but one
       of many reasons why the doctrine of standing and its application are often confusing
       for both courts and litigants.

¶ 59       The instant case, however, does not require this court to wade into the depths
       of standing jurisprudence. Here, defendants present the question of standing to us
       as an affirmative defense, which defendants have the burden to plead and prove.
       See Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1, 189 Ill. 2d at 206. Based on defendants’
       representations at oral argument, I cannot say defendants have met their burden.

¶ 60       In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, defendants raised a challenge to
       plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit challenging the Act’s pretrial release provisions.
       Before this court, however, defendants acknowledged that plaintiffs suffered an

                                               - 19 -
       injury as a result of the Act’s pretrial release provisions. Specifically, I note the
       following exchange at oral argument:

              “JUSTICE O’BRIEN: Sir, are you making *** a standing argument that if
          someone were to raise this claim in terms of the crime victims clause that it
          needs to be a crime victim rather than the State [and] can you address the
          [standing] question in terms of the separation of powers claim, who is the
          aggrieved party ***?

              ALEX HEMMER (COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS): Yes, Justice
          O’Brien. So as to the first question, yes, we are making a form of standing
          argument with respect to the crime victims’ rights clause. Now, we aren’t
          arguing across the board that plaintiffs aren’t injured in the constitutional
          sense by the pretrial release provisions. We aren’t arguing that the Court should
          toss the entire case. We are invoking the rule that plaintiffs generally have to
          assert their own rights, they can’t assert the rights of third parties like crime
          victims and criminal defendants and so that comes up here in the context of the
          crime victims’ rights clause, and it comes up a couple of other places in the case
          too, but we aren’t making an across-the-board standing argument, and we aren’t
          making a standing argument that would apply to plaintiffs’ separation of powers
          claim.” (Emphasis added.)

¶ 61       As I discussed above, a plaintiff has standing where there has been some injury
       to a legally cognizable interest. This means that the claimed injury, whether actual
       or threatened, must be distinct and palpable, traceable to the defendant’s actions,
       and substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested
       relief. Greer, 122 Ill. 2d at 492-93. Stated more simply: No injury caused by
       defendant, no standing for plaintiff.

¶ 62       Here, plaintiffs brought an action against defendants, whereby they challenged
       the constitutionality of the Act. Defendants, in turn, challenged plaintiffs’ standing.
       The trial court found that plaintiffs would suffer a cognizable injury if they were
       tasked with abiding by and enforcing the Act. On appeal, defendants expressly
       acknowledged at oral argument that they are not arguing “that plaintiffs aren’t
       injured in the constitutional sense by the pretrial release provisions.” (Emphasis
       added.) In essence, defendants have conceded that plaintiffs have suffered an injury
       and therefore plaintiffs have their own individual “real interest in the outcome of

                                               - 20 -
       the controversy.” Wexler, 211 Ill. 2d at 23. Accordingly, I cannot say that
       defendants have carried their burden of proving plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

¶ 63       In coming to this conclusion, I offer no opinion on whether plaintiffs in fact
       have standing to pursue their claims. “Under Illinois law, a plaintiff need not allege
       facts establishing standing.” International Union of Operating Engineers, Local
       148 v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 215 Ill. 2d 37, 45 (2005). Also,
       I need not reach the question addressed by the dissent—whether plaintiffs have
       statutory standing to defend the constitutional rights of crime victims and their
       families. Likewise, I offer no opinion on whether plaintiffs can pursue their
       declaratory judgment action on behalf of the Illinois judiciary (separation of
       powers) or individual defendants who will now be subject to the pretrial release
       provisions of the Act (bail clause). Instead, I would simply hold that defendants
       cannot satisfy their burden of proof with regard to standing considering their
       admission that plaintiffs have been injured as a result of the Act.

¶ 64       JUSTICE OVERSTEET, dissenting:

¶ 65       I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ conclusion that the pretrial release
       provisions of Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (Act), as amended by Public
       Act 102-1104 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), do not offend any principles embodied in our
       state’s constitution. On the contrary, the legislature’s abolishment of monetary bail
       is in direct violation of the plain language of our constitution’s bill of rights and,
       more specifically, the vested rights of crime victims set out in article I, section 8.1,
       of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(a)(9). Therefore, this court
       has an absolute obligation to declare the pretrial release provisions of the Act to be
       invalid and unenforceable no matter how beneficial the abolishment of monetary
       bail may be.

¶ 66                                          I. Standing

¶ 67       At the outset, I first note that the majority has given short shrift to an issue that
       was vigorously contested in the proceedings before the circuit court and before this
       court. That issue concerns the standing of plaintiffs to bring this lawsuit,
       particularly their standing to challenge the constitutionality of the pretrial release

                                                 - 21 -
       provisions of the Act on the basis that the legislation violates our constitution’s bill
       of rights. Several plaintiffs, as state’s attorneys, are constitutional officeholders
       who brought this action on behalf of the citizens of their respective counties. Our
       Attorney General expressly told this court, in defendants’ brief and during oral
       argument, that state’s attorneys have no power to do so.

¶ 68      I am compelled to address the full merits of this issue, as I believe that is this
       court’s obligation to the public. This standing issue concerns the proper role of
       constitutional officeholders in a dispute involving the interpretation of our
       constitution, and the issue is squarely before this court; it is contested and has not
       been waived. The public is owed an answer.

¶ 69       In the proceedings below, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to
       raise an actual controversy because the named defendants do not enforce the pretrial
       provisions of the Act. Defendants argued that a judgment against the named
       defendants cannot provide plaintiffs with any relief. In this appeal, however,
       defendants stated in their brief that they are not raising this narrow issue due to “the
       unusual circumstances of this case.” They explained that this court exercises
       “supervisory authority” over the courts that do enforce the pretrial release
       provisions and, in addition, that “the public interest would be better served by the
       adjudication of plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.” Defendants cite Lebron v. Gottlieb
       Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 253 (2010), for the proposition that
       justiciability may be waived. Therefore, defendants elected not to make an issue
       with respect to whether plaintiffs have named the proper defendants.

¶ 70       In making this concession, defendants did not ask this court to address all of
       plaintiffs’ constitutional claims on their merits, contrary to what the majority
       suggests. 4 Although acknowledging the importance of resolving the merits of
       plaintiffs’ claims to the citizens of this state, defendants told us we should not
       consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the Act’s pretrial release provisions violate our
       constitution’s bill of rights because, defendants assert, plaintiffs lack sufficient

           4
            In their brief and at oral argument, defendants stated that they were waiving their standing
       argument only with respect to plaintiffs’ claim that the pretrial release provisions violate the
       separation of powers clause in the constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1).

                                                    - 22 -
       personal interest in crime victims’ vested constitutional rights to bring this
       challenge. The majority skirts this issue and does not address it.

¶ 71       In support of their argument, defendants maintain and are correct that, as a
       general rule, a proponent must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, rather
       than basing his or her claim for relief upon the rights of third parties, citing State v.
       Funches, 212 Ill. 2d 334, 346 (2004). However, defendant’s argument based on
       general standing principles applicable to individual citizens bringing lawsuits is
       flawed because the argument entirely overlooks standing principles that apply
       directly to state’s attorneys in actions that concern the interests of the citizens of
       their counties and the citizens of this state.

¶ 72       Here, we are concerned with the standing requirements to bring a declaratory
       judgment action. We apply the declaratory judgment remedy liberally and do not
       restrict it with “unduly technical interpretations.” Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Ass’n
       v. Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443, 452 (1979). Section 2-701(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure
       provides for declaratory judgment actions as follows:

           “The court may, in cases of actual controversy, make binding declarations of
           rights, having the force of final judgments, whether or not any consequential
           relief is or could be claimed, including the determination, at the instance of
           anyone interested in the controversy, of the construction of any statute,
           municipal ordinance, or other governmental regulation, or of any deed, will,
           contract or other written instrument, and a declaration of the rights of the parties
           interested.” 735 ILCS 5/2-701(a) (West 2020).

¶ 73       Based on this statutory language, we have held that there are essentially two
       main requirements for standing to bring an action for declaratory relief: (1) the case
       must present “a concrete dispute admitting of an immediate and definitive
       determination of the parties’ rights, the resolution of which will aid in the
       termination of the controversy or some part thereof” (actual controversy), and
       (2) the party bringing the declaratory judgment action must “possess a personal
       claim, status, or right which is capable of being affected” (interest in the
       controversy). Underground Contractors Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371,
       375-76 (1977).

                                                - 23 -
¶ 74                                  A. Actual Controversy

¶ 75       Here, plaintiffs’ complaint satisfies the standing requirement of an actual
       controversy because, as defendants concede in their brief, this court’s resolution of
       plaintiffs’ claims “on their merits” serves the “public’s interest.” The majority and
       I agree with defendants’ assessment of the public interests at stake in resolving the
       merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the statute. Accordingly, the first
       requirement for standing is met. Defendants have implicitly recognized that
       plaintiffs are, in fact, asking the court to decide an “actual controversy,” one of
       great public import, and are not merely asking the court to answer “abstract
       questions.” See Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 252 (the standing doctrine seeks to ensure
       that courts decide actual controversies and not abstract questions); Kluk v. Lang,
       125 Ill. 2d 306, 315 (1988) (“[Standing] is not meant to preclude a valid controversy
       from being litigated.”). This is true because the merits of issues before this state’s
       highest court, the resolution of which directly impacts the public’s interest, defy
       categorization as abstract questions. Instead, claims raised before us that directly
       impact the public’s interest are actual controversies worthy of our consideration.

¶ 76                              B. Interest in the Controversy

¶ 77       Although acknowledging the importance of resolving the merits of plaintiffs’
       claims to the citizens of this state, defendants, nonetheless, ask us to decline
       consideration of plaintiffs’ constitutional claims on their merits (except for the
       separation of powers issue) on the basis that plaintiffs lack sufficient personal
       interest in protecting crime victims’ vested constitutional rights. Defendants’
       argument on this point makes no mention of the statutory and constitutional powers
       and duties of state’s attorneys.

¶ 78                  1. State’s Attorneys’ Statutory Duty to Commence and
                      Prosecute Civil Actions That Concern the Public Interest

¶ 79      The legislature has, by statute, assigned state’s attorneys with the power and
       duty of commencing and prosecuting “all actions, suits, indictments and
       prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which the
       people of the State or county may be concerned.” (Emphases added.) 55 ILCS 5/3-

                                               - 24 -
       9005(a)(1) (West 2020). This statutory duty provides the state’s attorney plaintiffs
       in this case with statutory standing to raise the constitutional challenges that are set
       out in their declaratory judgment action.

¶ 80       For example, in American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees,
       Council 31 v. Ryan, 347 Ill. App. 3d 732, 735-36 (2004), appeal denied, 211 Ill. 2d
       569 (2004), the state’s attorney of Madison County and other plaintiffs brought a
       civil action against the Department of Human Services (Department) and the
       governor to enjoin the defendants from closing the civil unit of the Alton Mental
       Health Center. The civil unit provided care to patients who were civilly committed.
       Id. at 735. The Department ran the Alton Mental Health Center and sought to close
       the civil unit due to a reduction in funding. Id. The Department planned to transfer
       civil unit patients to another facility or private hospitals or discharge them to
       nonresidential mental health services in the community. Id.

¶ 81       The state’s attorney had no personal interest in the Department’s closing of the
       facility’s civil unit. Nonetheless, the state’s attorney filed a lawsuit seeking to
       enjoin the Department from closing the civil unit until the Department complied
       with the requirements of the Illinois Health Facilities Planning Act (Planning Act)
       (20 ILCS 3960/1 et seq. (West 2002)). Ryan, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 735. The circuit
       court agreed with the state’s attorney and entered an order enjoining the Department
       from closing the facility and ordered the Department to follow the procedures set
       out in the Planning Act. Id.

¶ 82       On appeal, the defendants argued that the state’s attorney lacked standing to
       bring the action. Id. The defendants argued that the Planning Act does not allow for
       suits by state’s attorneys to enforce its provisions. Id. at 736. The appellate court,
       however, noted that “[o]ne important duty of the State’s Attorney is to ‘commence
       and prosecute all actions, suits, indictments[,] and prosecutions, civil and criminal,
       in the circuit court for his county, in which the people of the State or county may
       be concerned.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 741 (quoting 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1)
       (West 2002)). The appellate court held that “[a]ccess to quality local mental health
       care services and the opportunity to participate in the permit process through public
       hearings [citation] are matters of public interest in which the people of Madison
       County have an interest.” Id. The appellate court, therefore, held that the state’s
       attorney had standing to bring the suit.

                                                - 25 -
¶ 83       Likewise, in the present case, similar to the defendants in Ryan, defendants here
       assert that the crime victims’ rights clause in the constitution does not allow for
       suits by state’s attorneys to assert crime victims’ rights enumerated in article I,
       section 8.1. However, it is self-evident that the legislature’s infringement on a
       vested constitutional right, the purpose of which is to protect the safety of crime
       victims and their families, is a matter of considerable public interest for the people
       in each of the state’s attorneys’ respective counties and for every citizen of this
       state; this conclusion requires neither citation nor analysis, as its truth is plainly
       evident.

¶ 84       Therefore, a state’s attorney-initiated lawsuit to defend the vested constitutional
       rights of crime victims and their families falls squarely within the state’s attorneys’
       statutorily defined duties in section 3-9005(a)(1) of the Counties Code. 55 ILCS
       5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2020) Accordingly, the state’s attorneys in this case have
       standing to bring this constitutional claim the same as the state’s attorney’s standing
       in Ryan to challenge the Department’s closing of the civil unit of the Alton Mental
       Health Center.

¶ 85        Our “extended line of cases” has “always viewed” the state’s attorney as “the
       one to represent the county or People in matters affected with a public interest.”
       (Emphasis added.) People ex. rel. Kunstman v. Nagano, 389 Ill. 231, 249 (1945).
       State’s attorneys, therefore, have comprehensive standing to file suit with respect
       to matters that concern the public’s interest, unlike individual citizens in the cases
       cited by defendants. Although the legislature has defined this power in broad terms,
       state’s attorneys are entrusted with this statutory power because it is presumed “that
       [the state’s attorney] will act under such a heavy sense of public duty and obligation
       for enforcement of all our laws that he [or she] will commit no wrongful act.” Id.
       at 252. As we stated in County of Cook ex rel. Rifkin v. Bear Stearns & Co., 215
       Ill. 2d 466, 481 (2005), “if the voters are unsatisfied with the State’s Attorney’s
       manner of discharging his duties, they have a remedy every four years in the
       election booth.”

¶ 86       In challenging standing, defendants maintain that the crime victims’ rights
       clause makes it clear that only crime victims have standing to assert any of the
       rights enumerated in article I, section 8.1, and only in a pending criminal case. Ill.
       Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(b) (“The victim has standing to assert the rights

                                               - 26 -
       enumerated in subsection (a) in any court exercising jurisdiction over the case.”
       (Emphasis added.)). While this provision provides for crime victims’ standing to
       assert their rights in a particular case, contrary to defendants’ assertion, nothing in
       the language of the clause prohibits declaratory judgment actions by state’s
       attorneys seeking to invalidate legislative enactments that unlawfully infringe on
       any of the constitutional rights enumerated in the clause.

¶ 87       Furthermore, the crime victims’ rights provision in the Illinois Constitution, in
       conjunction with the legislature’s enactments designed to give effect to those
       enumerated rights, creates statutory duties of state’s attorneys with respect to
       enforcing and giving effect to crime victims’ rights. 5 These statutory duties provide
       additional grounds for the state’s attorneys to have standing to challenge the
       legislature’s infringement on crime victims’ constitutionally protected rights.

¶ 88                        2. State’s Attorneys’ Statutory Duties Specific to
                                          Crime Victims’ Rights

¶ 89        The legislature has set out the statutory scheme for enforcement of crime
       victims’ constitutional rights in the Rights of Crime Victims and Witnesses Act
       (Crime Victims Act) (725 ILCS 120/1 et seq. (West 2020)). The Crime Victims Act
       expressly states that the “prosecuting attorney *** may assert the victim’s rights.”
       (Emphasis added.) Id. § 4.5(c-5)(3). Section 4.5(c-5)(4) of the Crime Victims Act
       further defines the duties of the prosecuting attorney in seeking enforcement of
       victims’ rights and, alternatively, what the prosecutor must do if the prosecutor
       elects not to assert or seek enforcement of a victim’s rights. Id. § 4.5(c-5)(4). I agree
       with the Attorney General that “[s]ection 4.5(c-5)(4) places the primary
       responsibility to assert and enforce a victim’s right on the prosecuting attorney.”
       Ill. Att’y Gen., Violence Prevention and Crime Victim Serv. Div., Enforcement of
       Crime Victims’ Rights: A Handbook for the Prosecution Team and Advocates, at 8

           5
             Although the crime victims’ rights clause in the constitution states that “[n]othing in this
       Section shall be construed to alter the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the prosecuting
       attorney” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(b)), nothing in this plain language prohibits the legislature
       from altering the statutory powers, duties, and responsibilities of state’s attorneys in order to give
       effect to crime victims’ constitutional rights, and it has done just that.

                                                       - 27 -
       (2021),    https://ag.state.il.us/victims/IL%20OAG%20Crime%20Victims%20
       Manual_0721.pdf [https://perma.cc/74JB-9HSR].

¶ 90       Moreover, as plaintiffs observe, under the legislature’s statutory scheme under
       the Act, the state’s attorney is the only party permitted to petition the court to deny
       pretrial release and must abide by the requirements in those sections of the pretrial
       release provisions of the Act (Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023)
       (amending 725 ILCS 5/109-1(b)(4), 110-6.1); Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1,
       2023) (same)). Section 4.5 of the Crime Victims Act sets out requirements that
       state’s attorneys and circuit courts must follow to ensure that the constitutional and
       statutory rights of crime victims are honored during criminal proceedings. 725
       ILCS 120/4.5 (West 2020). Subsection (c) requires the circuit court to “ensure that
       the rights of the victim are afforded” (id. § 4.5(c)), and subsection (c-5)(3) states
       that prosecuting attorneys “may assert the victim’s rights” (id. § 4.5(c-5)(3)).

¶ 91       The pretrial release provisions of the Act alter article 110 of the Code of
       Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) in a way that prohibits state’s attorneys from
       arguing for a monetary bail “amount” that would serve the safety interests of crime
       victims and their families in all criminal cases in Illinois. This impact on the state’s
       attorneys’ official duties supports the standing of state’s attorneys to challenge the
       Act’s unconstitutional infringement on crime victims’ constitutional rights. It
       cannot be said that state’s attorneys have merely a curious concern about the pretrial
       release provisions’ infringement on our constitution’s bill of rights or are strangers
       to the dispute because their personal interests are not at stake.

¶ 92       Likewise, the state’s attorneys’ interest in this controversy cannot be seriously
       described as merely a generalized grievance common to all members of the public.
       The remedies sought by the state’s attorneys, if granted, would allow them to fulfill
       their statutory duties that they owe to the people of their respective counties,
       stemming from their statutory responsibility to give effect to victims’ constitutional
       rights by advocating for a specific “amount” of bail that takes into account the
       safety of victims and their families. As it stands, state’s attorneys would be
       prohibited from fulfilling this statutory duty under the Act’s pretrial release
       provisions.

¶ 93      The state’s attorneys, therefore, have shown sufficient interest in this actual
       controversy; they have established that their official statutory duties are “capable

                                                - 28 -
       of being affected” by granting their requested relief. See Greer v. Illinois Housing
       Development Authority, 122 Ill. 2d 462, 493 (1988); Illinois Gamefowl Breeders
       Ass’n, 75 Ill. 2d at 450-51. Because of their duties stemming from the crime
       victims’ rights clause and the Crime Victims Act, the state’s attorneys’ interest in
       the matter is more than adequate “to assure sufficient sharpness in defining the
       issues so that the court may be aided in deciding the case,” which is the very
       “purpose” of the standing requirement. Kluk, 125 Ill. 2d at 315; see J.E. Keefe Jr.,
       Annot., Interest Necessary to Maintenance of Declaratory Determination of
       Validity of Statute or Ordinance, 174 A.L.R. 549, § 12 (1948) (“It seems that where
       the duties, powers, or emoluments of a public official may be directly affected by
       a statute or ordinance, the official has a sufficient interest to obtain a declaration of
       the validity of the statute or ordinance, assuming of course that the other elements
       necessary to raise a justiciable controversy are present.”).

¶ 94                          3. State’s Attorneys’ Power and Duties
                                   vis-à-vis the Attorney General

¶ 95       In addition to a state’s attorney’s statutory duties under the Counties Code and
       under the Crime Victims Act, the analysis of a state’s attorney’s standing to bring
       actions on behalf of the citizens of her county to challenge the constitutionality of
       a statute must also account for the constitutional nature of the office that she holds.
       Defendants’ argument on appeal fails to offer any discussion on this point.

¶ 96       A state’s attorney is a constitutional officer with rights and duties “analogous
       to or largely coincident with the Attorney General.” Nagano, 389 Ill. at 249.
       Therefore, because our state’s attorneys’ powers and duties are largely coincident
       with the attorney general, in analyzing their standing to challenge the
       constitutionality of the Act, it is relevant to consider the attorney general’s standing
       to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute.

¶ 97       The office of the attorney general has roots that extend to the Crown of England
       under common law. People ex rel. Barrett v. Finnegan, 378 Ill. 387, 392 (1941).
       Therefore, in Illinois, the attorney general has all the powers known at common law
       in addition to any further duties imposed by the legislature. Id. at 392-93. As a
       result, the attorney general “may exercise all such power and authority as public
       interest” requires and may bring all such suits necessary for “the protection of

                                                - 29 -
        public rights.” Id. at 393. Like a state’s attorney’s statutory power under the
        Counties Code, the attorney general’s constitutional powers include the power to
        “maintain an action in any case which affects the public generally.” Id.

¶ 98        With respect to state’s attorneys’ constitutional power, we have consistently
        held that a state’s attorney’s constitutional power mirrors that of the attorney
        general. For example, in Rifkin, we stated that, similar to the attorney general, the
        powers of a state’s attorney are derived from the constitution. Rifkin, 215 Ill. 2d at
        475. We explained, “[i]t is because the office of State’s Attorney was created by
        the constitution and functions like the Attorney General in his or her own county
        that the State’s Attorney is deemed to have constitutional powers similar to those
        of the Attorney General.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 478. Based on their parallel
        constitutional powers, we have “blurred the line between the authority of the
        Attorney General and that of State’s Attorneys.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Gaughan,
        2016 IL 120110, ¶ 31.

¶ 99        In People v. Pollution Control Board, 83 Ill. App. 3d 802, 806 (1980), the
        appellate court astutely observed that “the Attorney General’s duty to defend the
        constitution necessarily encompasses a duty to challenge, on behalf of the public, a
        statute which the Attorney General regards as constitutionally infirm.” See also
        People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park District, 66 Ill. 2d 65, 68 (1976) (where the
        attorney general brought an action to declare a senate bill void). State’s attorneys,
        likewise, have the same constitutional power to challenge constitutionally infirm
        statutes when the public’s interest is negatively impacted. 6

¶ 100       The legislature may not take away the constitutional powers of either the
        attorney general or state’s attorneys, and this court may not do so either. The

            6
              Although state’s attorneys have broad power to bring suits where the public’s interest is at
        stake, this power does not preclude the courts, in lawsuits brought by state’s attorneys or the attorney
        general, from analyzing whether the public is the real party in interest and dismissing lawsuits for
        lack of standing when the public is not the real party in interest. See People ex rel. Moloney v.
        General Electric Ry. Co., 172 Ill. 129 (1898) (the attorney general was found not to have standing
        where the attorney general’s suit did not involve public rights and the real parties in interest were
        rival railroad companies); People ex rel. Courtney v. Wilson, 327 Ill. App. 231, 243 (1945) (noting
        that this court has dismissed cases brought by the public’s authorized representatives “where it has
        appeared that the real party in interest is some individual seeking to further a personal cause”). Here,
        there is no question that the public is the real party in interest when the issue before us is whether
        the legislature has impermissibly nullified a constitutionally protected right that has the purpose of
        protecting the safety of crime victims and their families.

                                                        - 30 -
        legislature may add to the powers of our state’s attorneys (Gaughan, 2016 IL
        120110, ¶ 32) and has done so, as stated above, in the Counties Code and the Crime
        Victims Act. However, their powers are broader than and not limited to those
        granted by the legislature. A state’s attorney has constitutional powers vis-à -vis the
        attorney general with respect to matters of public interest, and this distinguishes the
        standing analysis in the present case from the standing analysis of litigants lacking
        similar powers derived from the constitution, statutes, and the common law. The
        cases cited by defendants on the issue of an individual citizen’s standing to bring
        suit or raise a constitutional challenge have no relevance in this appeal.

¶ 101       We have previously stated that “the Attorney General is the sole officer
        authorized to represent the People of this State in any litigation in which the People
        of the State are the real party in interest.” People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill.
        2d 485, 500 (1976). However, this principle has never been raised to defeat a state’s
        attorney’s standing to do so as well. Instead, we have clarified that this “generic
        statement” was rendered in a different context and is not dispositive with respect to
        the powers and duties of state’s attorneys. Gaughan, 2016 IL 120110, ¶ 24.

¶ 102       Although the Attorney General, in the present case, has taken a position
        contrary to that of the state’s attorneys, this dispute between the constitutional
        officeholders does not defeat the state’s attorneys’ standing to bring their claims,
        contrary to the positions taken by the Attorney General. Our state’s attorneys and
        the Attorney General hold concurrent constitutional authority to represent the
        interests of the public, and they may exercise their authority in an independent and
        autonomous manner, at their discretion and as held accountable by the public during
        elections, not by the courts under the standing doctrine.

¶ 103       In People v. Walker, 119 Ill. 2d 465, 472-73 (1988), in an appeal as of right to
        this court, the state’s attorney took the position that the circuit court properly found
        that a statutory provision was unconstitutional, while the attorney general was
        permitted to file an amicus brief disagreeing with the state’s attorney and asking
        this court to reverse the circuit court’s ruling that invalidated the provision.

¶ 104       Likewise, in Gaughan, while discussing the powers of state’s attorneys, we
        cited People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL 120729, noting, with approval, as
        follows: “Attorney General appears on behalf of, and supports the legal position
        taken by, [the] circuit judge but does not dispute State’s Attorney’s right or standing

                                                 - 31 -
        to bring a mandamus action in a proper case for fully presenting alternative views
        for judicial determination.” (Emphasis added.) Gaughan, 2016 IL 120110, ¶ 32 n.5.
        Here, the state’s attorneys’ powers derived from the Illinois Constitution afford
        them standing to challenge the constitutionality of the pretrial release provisions of
        the Act and offer views different than those of the Attorney General in this dispute. 7
        We have no judicial authority to nullify this constitutional power.

¶ 105                      C. This Court’s Power to Sua Sponte Consider the
                                     Constitutionality of a Statute

¶ 106       Standing aside, the fact remains that plaintiffs’ lawsuit presents us with an
        actual controversy in which defendants have conceded justiciability and over which
        we have jurisdiction. This is undisputed. We have previously stated that “[i]t is
        hornbook law that an unconstitutional statute is void.” In re Contest of the Election
        for the Offices of Governor & Lieutenant Governor Held at the General Election
        on November 2, 1982, 93 Ill. 2d 463, 471 (1983); People ex rel. Peoria Civic Center
        Authority v. Vonachen, 62 Ill. 2d 179, 181 (1975) (this court on its own initiative
        considered a constitutional question not raised by the parties and held the governing
        statute unconstitutional). Therefore, in this case, we may even exercise our power
        to sua sponte consider the constitutionality of the statute before us. See In re
        Contest of the Election for the Offices of Governor & Lieutenant Governor Held at
        the General Election on November 2, 1982, 93 Ill. 2d at 470-71 (this court
        considered the constitutionality of the statute involved in the dispute “in view of
        the nature of the proceedings and the public interest involved,” although none of
        the parties raised the issue (emphasis added)); see also People ex rel. Chicago Bar
        Ass’n v. State Board of Elections, 136 Ill. 2d 513, 523 (1990) (“Although the
        Attorney General questions the standing of the amicus to raise the constitutional

            7
              Other states that have addressed the authority of the attorney general or prosecuting attorney
        to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute have reached conflicting conclusions. State v.
        Chastain, 871 S.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Tenn. 1994) (identifying cases from different jurisdictions).
        However, the majority of reported decisions from our sister states uphold the authority of an attorney
        general or prosecuting attorney to challenge the constitutionality of a statute by reference to
        traditional concepts of standing. Id. at 662-65 (discussing cases). In Chastain, the Supreme Court
        of Tennessee held that prosecuting attorneys (the district attorneys general) “should also be allowed
        to challenge the constitutionality of statutes” under the same avenues available to the Tennessee
        attorney general. Id. at 665.

                                                       - 32 -
        issue, we note that even had the issue not been raised by one of the respondents,
        our court may consider the constitutionality of a statute sua sponte.”). 8 Defendants’
        challenge to plaintiffs’ standing does not prevent us from considering the
        constitutionality of the pretrial provisions of the Act in this justiciable controversy.

¶ 107                                    D. Standing of the Sheriffs

¶ 108       Because the state’s attorneys who have brought this suit have standing to
        challenge the pretrial provisions of the Act by invoking the constitutional rights set
        out in the crime victims’ rights provision in the Illinois Constitution, there is no
        need to determine whether sheriffs also have standing to raise any challenges to the
        statute. People ex rel. Wofford v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 161118, ¶ 24
        (“[B]ecause we find plaintiff-appellant has standing as a sitting alderman of the
        City, we need not determine whether either Mr. Wofford or Mr. Nesbit also have
        standing.”).

¶ 109                    II. The Vested Constitutional Rights of Crime Victims
                          Set Out in the Illinois Constitution’s Bill of Rights

¶ 110       Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges, my analysis begins
        and ends with the enumerated rights of crime victims set out in article I, section 8.1,
        of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art I, § 8.1. The constitutional rights of
        crime victims set out in our constitution’s bill of rights include, among other rights,
        “[t]he right to have the safety of the victim and the victim’s family considered in
        denying or fixing the amount of bail ***.” (Emphasis added.) Id. art. I, § 8.1(a)(9).
        The pretrial release provisions of the Act effectively nullify this right, and in doing
        so, the legislature has impermissibly usurped the ultimate sovereign power in this
        state, i.e., the citizens.

            8
             It would be improper for this court to sua sponte consider whether a statute is
        unconstitutionally applied without the necessary factual findings to conduct such analysis. People
        v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872, ¶ 47. The present case, however, concerns whether the statute is
        unconstitutional on its face, which is purely a question of law. Oswald v. Hamer, 2016 IL App (1st)
        152691, ¶ 3.

                                                      - 33 -
¶ 111                       A. This State’s Ultimate Sovereign Power Is
                                Vested With the Citizens of Illinois

¶ 112       The majority correctly explains, and I agree, that we may not declare a statute
        to be unconstitutional on any basis that is “not prohibited by the constitution and
        within the legislative discretion.” People ex rel. Mooney v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill.
        486, 495 (1898); Droste v. Kerner, 34 Ill. 2d 495, 498-99 (1966) (the General
        Assembly basically may enact any law, provided it is not inhibited by some
        constitutional provisions). A constitutional challenge to a statute begins with a
        strong presumption of validity because the legislature is principally responsible for
        determining the public policy of our state. Lebron, 237 Ill. 2d at 260 (“Because the
        formulation and implementation of public policy are principally legislative
        functions, the courts afford substantial deference to legislative enactments.”).

¶ 113        Although the legislature’s enactments are shrouded with a strong presumption
        of constitutionality, this presumption is not authority for Illinois courts to disregard
        vested constitutional rights impaired by legislative action. We have repeatedly held
        that “the General Assembly cannot enact legislation that conflicts with provisions
        of the constitution unless the constitution specifically grants it such authority.” In re
        Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 81. This is true because the ultimate
        sovereign authority of our state lies with its people who can withhold or entrust
        government powers with such limitations as they choose. Hawthorn v. People, 109
        Ill. 302, 305-06 (1883). Importantly, “[t]he people of Illinois give voice to their
        sovereign authority through the Illinois Constitution,” which is where they
        “decree[ ] how their sovereign power may be exercised, by whom and under what
        conditions or restrictions.” In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 79.
        “Where rights have been conferred and limits on governmental action have been
        defined by the people through the constitution, the legislature cannot enact
        legislation in contravention of those rights and restrictions.” Id. The legislature is
        prohibited from exceeding “the bounds imposed by the constitution or, through
        legislative decree, seek[ing] to alter them.” Id. ¶ 80.

¶ 114      Regardless of whether the public policy underlying the abolishment of
        monetary bail is sound, we cannot “sustain a law where there is a want of power to
        enact it, merely because it is wise in policy or just in its provisions.” Hutchinson,
        172 Ill. at 495-96. If a statute is unconstitutional, we are obligated to declare it

                                                 - 34 -
        invalid no matter how desirable or beneficial the legislation may be. Best v. Taylor
        Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 378 (1997). We have this obligation because our
        constitution “is supreme, and whatever the purpose of the people may have been in
        imposing a restriction upon legislation it must be obeyed.” Sutter v. People’s Gas
        Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 641 (1918); People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 398
        (1990) (“In cases where we determine that a statute is repugnant to the Constitution,
        our duty to declare the law void, in order to protect the rights which that document
        guarantees, is a paramount and constitutionally mandated function of our court
        system.”). In addition, our duty to declare an unconstitutional statute invalid cannot
        be evaded nor negated by “dire consequences” that may follow if the statute is held
        unconstitutional. Grasse v. Dealer’s Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 190 (1952).

¶ 115        Accordingly, this court’s task in this appeal is strictly an exercise in ensuring
        that the legislature has not exceeded the bounds of its power as limited by Illinois
        citizens in their constitution. The individual rights vested in the Illinois
        Constitution’s bill of rights are not subordinate to legislative power; the opposite is
        true. Therefore, in exercising our judicial power, this court may not alter or ignore
        the plain language of our constitution as set out by the citizens, no matter how
        strongly the court agrees with the public policy underlying the abolishment of
        monetary bail. The majority’s analysis, however, does just that.

¶ 116       Our constitution gives crime victims a constitutionally protected “right” to have
        their safety, and the safety of their family, considered in denying or fixing the
        amount of bail. We have previously emphasized that the crime victims’ rights
        provision in the Illinois Constitution is part of our constitution’s “bill of rights” and
        that, “[w]here any act of the legislature *** tends to infringe upon the rights thus
        preserved, we must assume that it was the intent of the framers thereof that there
        should be no curtailment of such rights.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Richardson,
        196 Ill. 2d 225, 231 (quoting People ex rel. Wellman v. Washburn, 410 Ill. 322,
        328-29 (1951)). It has been a long-standing principle in this state that the legislature
        has no power to impair or infringe upon rights vested in our state constitution. City
        of Chicago v. Ward, 169 Ill. 392, 412 (1897). Under the pretrial release provisions
        of the Act, however, there is no set of circumstances in which the safety of crime
        victims and their families can be considered in setting the amount of bail; the
        amount of bail is effectively set at zero for all cases under the Act. The pretrial
        release provisions of the Act, therefore, infringe on a constitutionally protected

                                                 - 35 -
        right to such an extent that the right is wholly nullified. See Pub. Act 101-652, § 10-
        255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (adding 725 ILCS 5/110-1.5) (“the requirement of posting
        monetary bail is abolished”).

¶ 117       The citizens of Illinois created this constitutional right in 2014 when they
        adopted the proposed amendment to the constitution by referendum during the 2014
        general election, by an overwhelming majority of the voters. See Ill. State Bd. of
        Elections, Official Canvass, November 4, 2014 General Election, at 4 (Nov. 2014),
        available     at    https://www.elections.il.gov/electionoperations/DownloadVote
        Totals.aspx [https://perma.cc/24PH-X2YL] (reflecting that more than 78% of
        votes cast on this question were for it). The drafters of this constitutional
        amendment are presumed to have acted with full knowledge of existing statutory
        law and the public policy of this state when this amendment was proposed to the
        voters in 2014. See Carmichael v. Laborers’ & Retirement Board Employees’
        Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 30.

¶ 118                             B. Determining the “Amount” of
                                  Bail in 2014 and Decades Prior

¶ 119        Beginning in 1963 and continuing for decades leading up to the 2014 adoption
        of the constitutional right at issue, article 110 of the Code has set out detailed
        standards and procedures that Illinois courts utilize in determining how and when
        an accused can be detained in custody or should be released from custody prior to
        trial. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1965, ch. 38, § 110-1 et seq. The Code expressly referred to
        setting an “amount” of monetary bail as the primary means for a defendant to secure
        pretrial release in this state.

¶ 120       The origins of article 110 of the Code derive from legislation passed in 1963 in
        which the legislature revised Illinois’s bail system to “restrict the activities of
        professional bail bondsmen and to reduce the cost of liberty to arrested persons
        awaiting trial.” Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 38, art. 110, Committee Comments-1963, at 273
        (Smith-Hurd 1980); see People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 445 (1997) (“[W]hen
        enacting article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1963, [the legislature]
        was concerned with inequities posed by the administration of bail in criminal
        cases.”). The legislature effectively eliminated the use of professional “bail
        bondsmen” by adding section 110-7(a) to the Code, which required courts to release

                                                - 36 -
        defendants upon a deposit of 10% of any monetary bail required. 1963 Ill. Laws
        2836 (§ 110-7(a)); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 360 (1971) (noting that the bail
        bondsman abruptly disappeared in Illinois due primarily to the success of the 10%
        bail deposit provision).

¶ 121       Effective January 1, 1964, section 110-7(a) of the Code provided, “The person
        for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail bond and deposit with the clerk of
        the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money equal to 10% of
        the bail.” 1963 Ill. Laws 2836 (§ 110-7(a)) (adding Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 110-
        7(a)); People v. Bruce, 75 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1046 (1979) (“The Committee
        Comments to section 110-7 state that the section ‘is new and provides the procedure
        for depositing ten per cent of the amount of bail as security for appearance. ***’
        [Citation.]”).

¶ 122       Article 110 of the Code also provided that courts shall determine an “amount of
        bail” that is (1) sufficient to assure the accused’s compliance with the conditions
        set forth in the bail bond, (2) not oppressive, (3) commensurate with the nature of
        the offense charged, (4) considerate of past criminal acts and conduct of the
        defendant, and (5) considerate of the financial ability of the accused. Ill. Rev. Stat.
        1965, ch. 38, § 110-5(a). (Emphasis added.)

¶ 123       Since the 1963 codification of article 110 of the Code and leading up to the
        2014 amendment to our constitution, the legislature has revised article 110 of the
        Code numerous times. Throughout this period the legislature maintained the
        practice of defendants posting monetary bail to secure their pretrial release and
        maintained the circuit court’s corresponding duty to exercise its discretion in
        determining the “amount of bail,” specifically in reference to monetary bail.
        Depositing 10% of the monetary bail amount by the accused was “designed as the
        principal method to be used in giving bail.” Schilb v. Kuebel, 46 Ill. 2d 538, 546
        (1970). This was Illinois’s public policy when the citizens amended the
        constitution, vesting crime victims with a constitutionally protected right in this
        very process of determining the amount of monetary bail.

¶ 124                  C. The Plain Language of the Victims’ Rights Clause

                                                - 37 -
¶ 125       When the plain language of the vested right is considered in light of our state’s
        public policy that existed at the time the voters vested this right, it is plainly evident
        that the people’s intent in amending the constitution was to decree that, as a matter
        of public policy in this state, the determination of the amount of monetary bail, as
        was set out in article 110 of the Code, is a judicial process that furthers the interests
        of the safety of crime victims and their families and is worthy of constitutional
        protection. This court must give deference to the public’s wisdom in adopting this
        constitutional amendment with the same vigor, if not greater, as the majority gives
        to the legislature’s wisdom in passing the pretrial release provisions of the Act.

¶ 126       Whether fixing an amount of monetary bail effectively furthers the safety
        interests of crime victims and their families and whether alternative means better
        serve this purpose are not questions that we are empowered to answer in analyzing
        the constitutionality of the pretrial release provisions of the Act. Like the public
        policy underlying legislation, we are not authorized to second-guess the citizens’
        wisdom in making public policy determinations when they amend the constitution.
        The ultimate sovereign authority of our state, its people, can define constitutional
        rights as they choose and limit government powers in doing so. Hawthorn, 109 Ill.
        at 305-06.

¶ 127       The majority alters the scope of this vested constitutional right with the
        following strained logic: “The word ‘amount’ connotes quantity and does not only
        mean a quantity of money but rather, consonant with the bail clause, a quantity of
        sufficient sureties.” Supra ¶ 39. The majority’s assertion that the word “amount”
        does not pertain to monetary amount does not stand up to any meaningful scrutiny
        under constitutional jurisprudence.

¶ 128       For example, in Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, we addressed the
        constitutionality of statutory amendments passed by our legislature that eliminated
        union service credit for leaves of absence for participants in public pension funds.
        We held that the statutory amendments violated the express language of the pension
        protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII, § 5).
        Carmichael, 2018 IL 122793, ¶ 32. In Carmichael, the State advanced an argument
        similar to defendants’ argument in the present case, and this court outright rejected
        that argument as being “manifestly inaccurate.” Id. ¶ 30.

                                                  - 38 -
¶ 129       In Carmichael, in defense of the unconstitutional legislation, the State argued
        that the delegates and voters did not intend that the benefit that was eliminated by
        the legislature would be protected by the constitution’s pension clause. Id. In the
        present case, defendants, likewise, argue that the drafters and voters did not intend
        for crime victims to have constitutional protection in setting an amount of monetary
        bail. In Carmichael, this court rejected the argument as “pure speculation” and
        being “manifestly inaccurate” (id.), and we should do so in this case as well.

¶ 130      The Carmichael court reasoned that

           “the right to earn service credit on a leave of absence working for a teacher
           labor organization was one of the retirement system benefits in the Pension
           Code for many years prior to and at the time the Illinois Constitution was
           debated by the drafters and then ratified by the voters [citation].” (Emphasis
           added.) Id.

        We concluded, therefore, that “it was the public policy of the State at the time our
        constitution was adopted to grant a path to such service credit as a benefit of
        participation in at least one of the public retirement systems.” Id. We noted,
        “[s]imilar to a legislature that is presumed to act with knowledge of all prior
        legislation, the drafters of the constitution are presumed to have acted with full
        knowledge of existing statutory law and the public policy of this state. [Citation.]”
        (Emphasis added.) Id. In setting out a meaningful constitutional analysis of the
        issue, this court stated:

           “If the drafters had intended to prevent any benefit related to service credit in
           connection with work done for a labor organization while on a leave of absence,
           they could have so specified, especially where union service credit was already
           part of the existing pension statute to some extent. But they did not. Rather, the
           drafters chose ‘expansive language’ that broadly defines the range of benefits
           encompassed.” Id.

¶ 131       This constitutional analysis applies with equal force in the present case. As
        explained above, since 1963, article 110 of the Code provided for a procedure
        involving the circuit court’s exercise of discretion in determining an amount of
        monetary bail. Like the union service credits at issue in Carmichael, the practice of
        setting an “amount” of monetary bail was firmly rooted as part of the Code for

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        many years prior to and at the time the people vested this constitutionally protected
        right, defining the constitutional right in terms of “amount of bail.” The drafters of
        the crime victims’ rights clause are presumed to have acted with full knowledge of
        existing statutory law and the public policy of this state. Id. In 2014, the judicial act
        of setting the “amount of bail” in this state, unquestionably, referred to monetary
        bail.

¶ 132       If the drafters and voters did not believe that fixing an “amount” of monetary
        bail serves the interest of safety of crime victims and their families and, therefore,
        should not be constitutionally protected, they would not have agreed to include that
        specific language in defining the right. The plain language the drafters used vests
        crime victims with the constitutionally protected right to have their safety and the
        safety of their family considered “in denying or fixing the amount of bail *** and
        setting conditions of release after arrest and conviction.” (Emphasis added.) Ill.
        Const. 1970, art. I, § 8.1(a)(9). Similar to what this court stated in Carmichael, if
        the drafters intended for the right to mean what the majority suggests, the drafters
        would have defined the right in more general terms, defining the right to having
        crime victims’ safety considered merely in “setting conditions of release after
        arrest,” i.e., other sureties. The right is not defined in these terms as the majority
        suggests. Instead, the drafters used specific language, constitutionally binding the
        safety of victims and their families with the judicial act of setting the “amount of
        bail.” If our constitution has any meaning, the constitutional bond between these
        two policies simply cannot be severed by legislative decree or judicial fiat. The
        constitutional bond can be broken only by the same method that it was created.

¶ 133       In addition, the majority’s construction of the crime victims’ rights clause
        impermissibly reduces the phrase “in denying or fixing the amount of bail” to
        meaningless surplusage. See Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of
        Elections, 65 Ill. 2d 453, 466 (1976) (“The drafters of the Constitution, if the
        defendants’ construction of the section were adopted, would have unnecessarily
        used the words ‘structural and procedural,’ ***. *** However, the language of the
        drafters cannot be so facilely disregarded.” (Emphasis added.)).

¶ 134       The majority compounds its flawed construction with the untenable assertion,
        “[t]o the extent that ‘amount’ may imply an amount of money, the crime victims’
        rights clause simply reflected the reality of Illinois’s bail system at the time it was

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        adopted. That reality has changed.” (Emphasis added.) Supra ¶ 39 n.2. This court
        cannot ignore portions of the express language used to define the right, making it
        mean less than what it plainly states. The majority’s suggestion otherwise upends
        the constitutional foundation of this state.

¶ 135        The abolishment of monetary bail may promote the public-policy goal of
        greater fairness in the pretrial release process; however, we cannot ignore the Act’s
        infringement on the plain language of our constitution even when unwise results
        may follow. See Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 30
        (“It is for the voters to decide whether a proposed constitutional amendment is wise
        or workable ***.”); 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 65 (May 2023 Update)
        (“The aim of judicial construction” is “not to delete sections from the constitution
        on the theory that if conditions had been different, they would not have been
        written,” and “the duty of the judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of the
        plain language stated in the constitution.”). The remedy for an unwise or outdated
        constitutional right is to seek a constitutional amendment, not to force a legislative
        or judicial annulment.

¶ 136       The majority supports its conclusion in this case with the assertion that the
        adoption of this constitutional amendment in 2014 did not enact sweeping changes
        to the criminal justice system. However, giving effect to the plain language of the
        crime victims’ rights clause requires no such conclusion. As explained above,
        determining “amount of bail” had been firmly rooted in article 110 of the Code
        since article 110’s adoption decades prior to this constitutional amendment. The
        constitutional amendment did not enact sweeping changes to this practice, but what
        it did do was endow crime victims with an explicitly defined constitutionally
        protected right in the process of determining the amount of bail, a right that was not
        constitutionally protected prior to the adoption of the 2014 constitutional
        amendment. By amending the constitution, the citizens, in the exercise of their
        wisdom, deemed the safety of crime victims and their families worthy of
        constitutional protection in the bail process that was set out in article 110 of the
        Code at the time the right was created.

¶ 137       Therefore, by creating a constitutionally protected right of crime victims in
        setting the “amount of bail,” the citizens of Illinois expanded the public policy
        purpose of determining an amount of monetary bail to include the stated goal of

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        furthering the safety of crime victims and their families. The people have the
        ultimate sovereign power of this state, and neither the legislature nor the judiciary
        has the power to invalidate their constitutional amendment by second-guessing the
        wisdom in how they exercise their sovereign authority.

¶ 138       By amending the constitution in 2014, the citizens decreed how their sovereign
        power may be exercised with respect to bail and under what conditions and
        restrictions. Until the citizens amend our state constitution, the safety of crime
        victims and their families must be considered in setting the amount of bail. The
        pretrial release provisions of the Act wholly nullify this constitutional right by
        mandating that the amount of bail in every criminal case be zero with no
        consideration of the safety of crime victims and their families. Accordingly,
        regardless of whether the abolishment of monetary bail might result in greater
        fairness in the pretrial release process, in passing the pretrial provisions of the Act,
        the legislature overstepped constitutional bounds by infringing on a constitutionally
        protected right that is set out in our constitution’s bill of rights. As a result, we are
        obligated to declare the pretrial release provisions of the Act constitutionally
        invalid.

¶ 139                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 140       “In a representative government, such as we enjoy in Illinois, all powers of
        government belong ultimately to the people in their sovereign corporate capacity.
        Under such a government the people may distribute, for the purposes of
        government, the various powers thereof.” People ex rel. Elliott v. Covelli, 415 Ill.
        79, 88 (1953). This court underscored this truth more than 195 years ago in an
        opinion published in the very first volume of our official reports: “ ‘[The Illinois
        Constitution] is the supreme, permanent and fixed will of the people in their
        original, unlimited and sovereign capacity, and in it are determined the condition,
        rights and duties of every individual of the community.’ ” In re Pension Reform
        Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, ¶ 79 (quoting Phoebe v. Jay, 1 Ill. 268, 271 (1828)).

¶ 141       The people of Illinois exercised their ultimate sovereign power in 2014 when
        they vested crime victims with constitutionally protected rights. They did so by
        amending the bill of rights in our state constitution, setting out specific enumerated
        rights to be enjoyed by all crime victims in this state. Those enumerated rights

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        include the explicitly defined right to have their safety and the safety of their
        families considered by the courts in “denying or fixing the amount of bail.”

¶ 142       This constitutionally protected right is, without question, a limitation on the
        General Assembly’s authority. Before the legislature can abolish monetary bail,
        effectively requiring the “amount” of bail to be zero for every criminal proceeding
        in this state, the legislature must first ask the people to again exercise their ultimate
        sovereign power and reconsider the scope of this constitutionally protected right.
        Until that has occurred, the legislature may not, under any circumstances, usurp the
        people’s exercise of their ultimate sovereign power and undermine their
        embodiment of this right as cemented in the bill of rights of our constitution.

¶ 143        When the state of New Jersey overhauled its pretrial release practices to
        prioritize nonmonetary means of pretrial release, it amended its constitution to
        accommodate this fundamental change in that state’s public policy. See Holland v.
        Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 279-80 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that both the new legislation
        and the constitutional amendment took effect on January 1, 2017). Here, in Illinois,
        to abolish monetary bail and the corresponding judicial determination of the
        “amount of bail,” the legislature must, likewise, first ask the citizens of this state to
        reconsider the constitutional mandate that the safety of crime victims and their
        families be considered in setting the amount of bail. The legislature has not done
        so, but this is constitutionally required no matter how desirable it may be to abolish
        monetary bail. Accordingly, in the interests of preserving our representative form
        of government, this court is obligated to declare the Act’s infringement on the
        Illinois Constitution’s bill of rights to be invalid and unenforceable. For these
        reasons, I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s validation of this
        unconstitutional statute.

¶ 144       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE joins in this dissent.

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