Court Opinion

ID: 9548485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:04:12.064508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:02.406577
License: Public Domain

MATTHEWS,
Justice, joined by RABI-NO WITZ, Chief Justice, dissenting.
In my view, the state is not subject to liability in tort for failing to impose conditions of parole, either at the parole board or the parole officer level. Such decisions are akin to decisions which a sentencing judge must make in deciding on the terms of a sentence of probation and are plainly discretionary.1 The fact that such decisions may be made by parole officers does not make them different in the degree or type of discretion involved from those made by the parole board.2
With respect to the question of whether a parole officer, and the state, may be liable for negligently supervising a parolee, I believe that there may be liability should a parole officer fail to respond appropriately upon receiving notice of a parole violation having potentially serious implications.3 I would not take the next step and hold that there can be liability for an alleged failure to seek out parole violations. Such a ruling would interfere with decisions which are necessarily discretionary, involving a balancing of the sometimes competing goals of obtaining the maximum degree of rehabilitation while avoiding unnecessary interference with the parolee, protecting the public, and maximizing the effective allocation of available resources.
Concerning the failure to warn claim, in my view the state was entitled to summary judgment that as a matter of law there was no duty to warn. The only events from which one might conclude that Nukapigak was dangerous occurred before he was imprisoned. His wife, his step-daughter, and the inhabitants of Point Lay in general knew of these acts. Nukapigak did not develop any mental illness in jail nor did he make any threats while he was there. The state knew nothing significant about Nuka-pigak that was not generally appreciated in Point Lay.
Imposing a duty to warn is appropriate only where there is superior knowledge. Thus the California Supreme Court in the leading case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 27, 551 P.2d 334, 347 (1976) stressed the danger that might result from “a concealed knowledge of the therapist that his patient was lethal.” The requirement of superior knowledge is consistent with the duty to warn as it exists generally in the law of torts. A manufacturer need only warn of substantial hazards inherent in his product which are not readily recognized by the ordinary consumer, Prince v. Parachutes, Inc., 685 P.2d 83 (Alaska 1984) and the owner of land need not warn of obvious dangers, W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 61 at 394 (4th ed. 1971). Since the state did not have superior knowledge of Nukapigak’s dangerous propensities no duty to warn arose.
With respect to the claim that the state should be liable for failing to provide Nuka-pigak effective therapy in jail, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that reversal is warranted. In plaintiffs’ statement of genuine issues submitted in opposition to the state’s motion for summary judgment, no *1138such contention was raised. Thus, the state was entitled to summary judgment on the counts relating to this claim.
For these reasons I would reverse the decision of the superior court and remand this case with directions to enter judgment for the state.

. Cf. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 443-44 (Alaska 1970) (sentencing is a discretionary judicial function which involves the judicious balancing of the many and ofttimes competing factors encompassed within the constitutional touchstones of reformation and protection of the public).

. "[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor that gdverns whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case.” United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2765, 81 L.Ed.2d 660, 674 (1984). See also Earthmovers of Fairbanks, Inc. v. State, 691 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1984) (police officer’s decision to reduce speed limit is discretionary).

.See City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309 (Alaska 1985) (police officer has duty to respond upon receiving notice of a life-threatening situation).