Court Opinion

ID: 9709565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:51:13.434146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.142946
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I find that defendant’s constitutional right to due process was violated because the People failed to prove defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. I find that defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because the fingerprint evidence was insufficient to link him to this crime. “[I]t is not for the defendant to establish his innocence, but for the People to establish his guilt.” (People v. Benson (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 50, 61.) In People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467, the Illinois Supreme Court held: “It is a fundamental doctrine of our system of criminal jurisprudence that the law presumes the innocence of an accused until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The presumption is ‘founded on the first principles of justice, and is intended, not to protect the guilty, but to prevent, so far as human agencies can, the conviction of an innocent person.’ [Citation.] Equally basic is the rule of law that the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and to establish by the same degree of proof the perpetration of the crime by the person accused; that is to say, the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all the material and essential facts constituting the crime. [Citations.] The burden of such proof never shifts to the accused, but remains the responsibility of the prosecution throughout the trial.” Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d at 469-70. See People v. Brown (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 528, 531. Defendant has correctly noted that fingerprint evidence is circumstantial evidence. (People v. King (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 152, 155.) Our supreme court has held that in order to justify a conviction based upon circumstantial evidence, “circumstantial evidence must be of such a nature as to produce a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused committed the crime.” People v. Magnafichi (1956), 9 Ill. 2d 169, 173; People v. Ware (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303. Our supreme court also made the following mandate with respect to the sufficiency of fingerprint evidence: “In order to sustain a conviction solely on fingerprint evidence, fingerprints corresponding to the fingerprints of the defendant must have been found in the immediate vicinity of the crime under such circumstances as to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprints were impressed at the time the crime was committed.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Rhodes (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 241, 249. See People v. Taylor (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 165, 168. In the instant case, the People failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint found on the stereo either belonged to defendant or that it was impressed at the time of the crime. The People claim they established beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint belonged to defendant. However, the record shows that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the fingerprint belonged to defendant. Mr. Theatrice Patterson, a fingerprint technician, testified that he manually compared the fingerprint found on the stereo with defendant’s fingerprint. The print taken from the stereo was 60% of a full fingerprint impression. Mr. Patterson, however, testified that this did not affect the identification. He also testified that he found 19 points of comparison when he matched the latent print with a set of prints belonging to defendant. Mr. Patterson charted 10 of these points during his testimony. He testified in detail as to these points of comparison and concluded that the fingerprint found on defendant’s stereo was defendant’s fingerprint. Yet, he conceded that one unexplained dissimilarity would void a match. During cross-examination, Mr. Patterson admitted that another expert would probably disagree with his findings. He mentioned several apparent dissimilarities between the fingerprints found on the stereo and defendant’s fingerprints. These differences could not be visually detected by the trial court. The People also maintain that they established beyond a reasonable doubt that the latent print found on the stereo was impressed at the time of the crime. Even if the fingerprint belonged to defendant, the fingerprint was not found “under such circumstances as to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that [it] [was] impressed [by defendant during] the [commission of the] crime.” (People v. Rhodes, 85 Ill. 2d 241, 249.) During cross-examination, Mr. Patterson acknowledged that he did not know the age of the fingerprint. Since Mr. Patterson could not determine when the fingerprint was impressed upon the stereo, the fingerprint could have been impressed at any time. The People’s position that they established beyond a reasonable doubt that the print was impressed during the crime is also unsupported by the facts of the case. If the print had been impressed during the commission of the crime, it would indicate that the assailant was not wearing gloves. If the perpetrator did not wear gloves, more fingerprints should have been found. The victim’s daughter testified that the stereo was moved from the dresser to the bed during the commission of the crime. Therefore, there should have been more than one fingerprint on the stereo. In addition, the evidence technician, Mr. Kelly, testified that he dusted several items for fingerprints on the day the crime occurred. Therefore, if defendant touched the stereo while committing the crime, other fingerprints belonging to defendant should have been found on other surfaces, such as bannisters and doorknobs, in the residence. The case at bar is analogous to People v. Ware (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 297, and the standard enunciated in Ware should have been applied to the case at bar. In Ware, the victim was killed between 9:30 and 10:30 p.m. The only evidence leading to the defendant’s guilt was his fingerprint left on a glass in the decedent’s apartment after 3:30 p.m. (Ware, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 300, 304), and the testimony of a neighbor that the defendant was near the scene of the crime between 8:30 and 9:30 p.m. (Ware, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 302). This court concluded that the fingerprint evidence showed only that the defendant could have been in the apartment at the time of the murder, but that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the defendant was in the decedent’s home earlier during the day and left before the crimes were committed. (Ware, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 305.) The court then reversed the defendant’s murder conviction, holding that since the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the defendant’s fingerprint may have been impressed at a time unrelated to the crime, the People did not establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ware, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 305. I find the evidence of defendant’s guilt in the instant case insufficient to support his conviction. The evidence adduced does not show with a reasonable and moral certainty that defendant committed murder. (See Ware (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 297, 303.) Before his death, the victim stated that two black men forced their way into his home after attacking him. There was no description of the assailants and no competent evidence of a time frame diming which the crime was committed. The People have failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint impressed upon the stereo belonged to defendant and that the fingerprint was impressed at the time of the crime. The aforementioned statement by the victim, coupled with a lone fingerprint, does not substantiate proof of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is more likely that the single fingerprint was impressed at some other time. Defendant testified that he performed odd jobs in various houses in the neighborhood where the decedent resided, but, after eight years, he could not remember being in the decedent’s home. Such an activity could reasonably explain defendant’s fingerprint being on the stereo. While I recognize that it is the function of the trial court to determine the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony (Ware, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 303), for the aforementioned reasons I find that the People have not met their burden of proof, and a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt remains. I would reverse the trial court.