Court Opinion

ID: 9908985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-12 14:10:18.893957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:39.285196
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, Huff and Athey
UNPUBLISHED

              CHRISTOPHER WARREN MCVEY
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 1701-22-1                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 DECEMBER 12, 2023
              CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
                                            Christopher R. Papile, Judge

                              (Daniel B. Winegard, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
                              appellant.

                              (Howard E. Gwynn, Commonwealth’s Attorney; Andrea Booden,
                              Senior Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a jury trial, the trial court convicted Christopher McVey of disorderly conduct in

              violation of a Newport News ordinance. McVey asserts that the evidence was insufficient to

              support his conviction. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously

              holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s

              judgment.

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the [City of Newport News], the prevailing party at trial.” Meade v.

              Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 796, 802 (2022) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
(2018)). “Accordingly, we regard as true all credible evidence favorable to the [City] and all

inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence.” Id. (quoting Gerald, 295 Va. at 473).

        On October 23, 2018, Newport News Chief of Police Drew encountered McVey after

McVey began taunting police trainees outside the police department. Chief Drew also saw an

American flag hanging upside down in a nearby tree on police station grounds. McVey shouted

racially charged slurs as he approached members of the group of training officers. Chief Drew

removed the flag and walked back toward the police building. McVey confronted Chief Drew,

alleged the flag was his, and demanded its return. Chief Drew refused and stated that the flag had

been abandoned. McVey followed Chief Drew inside the police station and became loud and

disruptive. He confronted Susan Bryan, who was working at the front desk, and accused her of

“making a face at him.” Having dealt with McVey before, and knowing that he “can be somewhat

difficult,” Bryan left her station and walked away. Chief Drew demanded that McVey leave the

building and began escorting him outside. McVey continued his loud and disruptive behavior, and

Chief Drew announced that he was under arrest for disorderly conduct and trespassing and took him

into custody. Following the jury’s guilty verdict on the disorderly conduct charge,1 the trial court

convicted McVey of disorderly conduct. McVey appeals.

                                               ANALYSIS

        “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, ‘the

relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Melick v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 122, 144 (2018) (quoting Kelly v.

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257 (2003) (en banc)). “This familiar standard gives full play to

the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

        1
            The jury acquitted McVey of the trespassing charge.
                                                 -2-
evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Raspberry v.

Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 19, 29 (2019) (quoting Burrous v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 275,

279 (2017)). “In conducting our analysis, we are mindful that ‘determining the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight afforded the testimony of those witnesses are matters left to the trier of

fact, who has the ability to hear and see them as they testify.’” Id. (quoting Miller v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 536 (2015)). “Thus, we will affirm the judgment of the trial

court unless that judgment is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Id. (quoting Kelly,

41 Va. App. at 257).

        On appeal, McVey argues that the evidence failed to “prove he engaged in conduct having a

direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person or persons at whom, individually, such

conduct is directed.”

        Section 28-11 of the Newport News City Code provides that

                  [a] person is guilty of disorderly conduct and a Class 1
                  misdemeanor if, with the intent to cause public inconvenience,
                  annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such
                  person . . . engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause
                  acts of violence by the person or persons at whom, individually,
                  such conduct is directed . . . . However, the conduct prohibited
                  under . . . this section shall not be deemed to include the utterance
                  or display of any words . . . .

McVey argues that Chief Drew did not have reason to believe that McVey’s conduct would

provoke a violent response from the person or persons at whom such conduct was directed, which is

a requisite element of a violation of Newport News City Code § 28-11. See Ford v. City of Newport

News, 23 Va. App. 137, 144 (1996) (interpreting an earlier but substantially similar version of the

ordinance). McVey asserts that his “loud statements, backing up, filming the police officers, and

momentarily pausing as he is being escorted out of the police station do not comprise conduct that

would tend to cause Chief Drew or anyone else at whom such conduct may be ‘directed’ to respond

with violence.”
                                                   -3-
        Here, however, McVey’s conduct exceeded that of the defendant in Ford. In addition to his

loud, disruptive behavior, McVey also made racial remarks, aggressively approached officers and

staff, and shoved his phone in Chief Drew’s face. Further, McVey ignored instructions to leave the

building and continued to resist Chief Drew’s authority as Chief Drew attempted to escort him

outside. McVey interrupted an on-going training class and his refusal to cease the disruptive

behavior would cause “a reasonable officer to respond with physical force” to stop McVey’s

harassment. Ford, 23 Va. App. at 144. Accordingly, the evidence supports the trial court’s denial

of McVey’s motion to strike and supports his conviction.

        McVey further argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the disorderly conduct

charge “because the court should have applied the other crimes proviso of Newport News

Ordinance Sec. 28-11 due to the conduct comprising trespass.” Newport News City Code § 28-11

provides, in pertinent part, that “the conduct prohibited under subdivision (a), (b) or (c) of this

section shall not be deemed to include . . . conduct otherwise made punishable under Title 18.2 of

the Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended.”

        In Battle v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 135, 140 (2007), we addressed the disorderly

conduct statute, Code § 18.2-415, which includes a similar proviso. We held that the “scope of the

other-crimes proviso . . . is finely calibrated.” Id. Specifically, it “does not say a disorderly conduct

charge must be dismissed anytime a defendant could be prosecuted under both the disorderly

conduct statute and another provision of Title 18.2.” Id. “The proviso, instead, focuses specifically

on ‘conduct prohibited under subdivision A, B or C’ and instructs that such conduct cannot include

words or conduct ‘otherwise made punishable under this title.’” Id. (quoting Code § 18.2-415).

        McVey concedes this issue is moot as the jury acquitted him of the trespassing charge and

only found him guilty of the disorderly conduct charge. Accordingly, we do not address this

assignment of error.

                                                  -4-
                                          CONCLUSION

        The Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that

McVey was guilty of disorderly conduct under the Newport News ordinance. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

                                                -5-