Court Opinion

ID: 9495918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:13:20.609144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:16.026513
License: Public Domain

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority erred when it held that the disclosure of the location of two of McClure’s victims’ bodies by his defense attorney did not constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). McClure’s attorney, Christopher Mecca, breached one of the most sacred obligations of the attorney-client relationship, the duty of confidentiality, and in turn violated McClure’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Based on an utterly unreasonable interpretation of the events surrounding the disclosure at issue in this case, the majority finds that Mecca met an exception to the duty of confidentiality. As a result, the majority holds that it was reasonable for Mecca to believe that two missing children were alive but dying, when he disclosed their location to authorities, without McClure’s consent, without asking McClure directly whether he had killed them, and without conducting any investigation to find out.
While purportedly applying the Strickland standard, “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, the majority conducts a wholly subjective analysis of Mecca’s behavior, not even attempting to define “reasonableness” or provide an objective standard by which Mecca’s behavior may be judged.
By applying a subjective analysis, the majority creates an unguided test which effectively undermines the basic tenet of the duty of confidentiality embodied in the *1249Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In essence, the majority’s rule allows a defense attorney to disclose client confidences in an alleged effort to prevent a future crime, even if:
(a) the attorney has made merely a nominal attempt to resolve his own doubts about whether disclosure is necessary and has never directly questioned his client to confirm or allay his suspicions;1
(b) the lawyer has virtually no evidence that the potential victims are in immediate danger;
(c) the evidence demonstrates that the attorney knew that the impending crime in question was likely concluded and was aware that her disclosure would fall so far below professional standards that it would likely result in disbarment.2
While defining “reasonableness” may be an elusive task, I refuse to subscribe to the majority’s opinion, which provides no limitations or guidance to practitioners. Instead, I look to existing case law and our profession’s ethical rules to guide my analysis in this case. Even accepting the facts as determined by the lower courts, an objective analysis of Mecca’s behavior reveals that it falls below not only professional ethical standards, but also constitutional standards for effective assistance of counsel under Strickland and its progeny. While Strickland and Model Rule 1.6 supply the standard under which Mecca’s conduct should be judged,3 there nevertheless remains the difficult task of defining what behavior is “reasonable.” Under either the “firm factual basis test” or even the majority’s broad inquiry, Mecca’s behavior fell well short of reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
I
The notion that lawyers are obligated to safeguard a client’s secrets and confidences is well established. An attorney’s duty of confidentiality emanates from the profession’s ethical rules, the evidentiary attorney-client and work product privileges, and the Sixth Amendment.4 One of *1250the oldest and most sacrosanct duties of an attorney, the duty of confidentiality in the United States dates back to 1908 and the first incantation of the ethical rules for lawyers, the American Bar Association’s Canons of Professional Ethics. Canon 6 provided that lawyers had an “obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences.” 5 While the duty of confidentiality has evolved as our profession has evolved, the underlying principle remains steadfast: an attorney should not reveal his client’s confidences without first obtaining their informed consent.6
The duty to guard a client’s confidences is, of course, not absolute, and the ethical rules recognize as much. Because an attorney’s duty of confidentiality must be balanced against the public’s interest in safety and justice, Model Rule 1.6 carves out two exceptions. Both exceptions allow an attorney to disclose a client’s confidences “to the extent [he or she] reasonably believes necessary,” 7 either “to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm,” or “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer” in particular controversies. The majority erroneously finds that the first exception applies in this case, thereby justifying Mecca’s disclosure of the location of the bodies of two of McClure’s victims, Michael and Tanya Jones.
The Supreme Court has made clear that an attorney’s duty of confidentiality intersects with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. “[The Sixth Amendment] obviously involves the right to keep the confidences of the. client from the ear of the Government which these days seeks to learn more and more of the affairs of men.” Russo v. Byrne, 409 U.S. 1219, 1221, 93 S.Ct. 21, 34 L.Ed.2d 30 (1972). As such, an attorney’s unwarranted breach of the duty of confidentiality is not only an ethical violation, but also implicates the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
II
Identifying the relevant rules and governing standard is merely the first part of *1251the analysis. As the majority correctly notes, the next logical step is determining what constitutes an objectively reasonable belief under the first exception to Model Rule 1.6 and for purposes of Strickland. In a somewhat distinct but related context, Justice O’Connor has commented that the word unreasonable “is no doubt difficult to define. That said, it is a common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (interpreting AEDPA’s requirement that a state court adjudication be “contrary to, or involve an unreasonable application of clearly established law.”). Thus, the majority’s failure to give meaning to the standard in this case is not excused by the inherent difficulty attached to the task.
As a general matter, Mecca’s behavior should be judged against that of a “reasonable attorney.”8 In other words, what would a reasonable attorney in Mecca’s position have done, if anything, with the information that McClure gave him? Framed in accordance with Strickland and Model Rule 1.6, was Mecca’s belief that the children were alive reasonable and was disclosure reasonable under the circumstances?
A. A “firm factual basis” is the proper standard for judging an attorney’s disclosure of client confidences under the ethical rules.
The majority embarks upon an erroneous path at the outset by rejecting McClure’s contention that Mecca was required to have a “firm factual basis” before disclosing the location of the children’s bodies to the authorities. Maj. Op. at 1245-46. As McClure notes, both case law and current ethical standards have long required that an attorney have a substantial basis for her belief that a client plans to engage in criminal conduct, before disclosing to the authorities.9 See, e.g., United States v. Omene, 143 F.3d at 1171 (stating that the court was “concerned that Omene’s counsel did not lay out a firm factual basis for his position.”); United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488, 493 (11th Cir.1990) (advising defendant that “he could be precluded from testifying, without confirmation that[he] intended to commit perjury ... forced [him] to choose between two constitutionally protected rights.”); United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445-46 (8th Cir.1988) (holding that “it is absolutely essential that a lawyer have a firm factual basis before adopting a belief of impending [criminal conduct]” by his client); Jackson v. United States, 928 F.2d 245, 248 (8th Cir.1991) (finding that the evidentiary hearing “provided a reasonable factual basis for believing that Jackson would lie if he took the stand.”).
While the standard is primarily applied in alleged perjury cases, therefore implicating a different set of ethical rules, the *1252underlying principles remain the same.10 By rejecting the “firm factual basis” standard, the majority creates the contradictory notion that the ethical rules and pertinent case law mandate a lower standard for breaching the duty of confidentiality in a manner that implicates a client in a murder, versus perjury. Nevertheless, the majority applies a totally unguided “objective reasonableness in light of the surrounding circumstances” standard. Maj. Op. at 1245.
While I am familiar with Strickland’s mandate that we give deference to a defense attorney’s choices and judgment, I do not believe Strickland permits the total abdication of meaningful review that the majority’s analysis reflects. Our case law and ethical rules suggest a number of factors that should enter into the reasonableness calculus. First, how much information did the attorney possess suggesting that a crime was going to be committed before he disclosed? Relatedly, how much investigation did the attorney conduct to inform herself of the circumstances and resolve any doubts she may have had? Third, how convinced was the attorney that their client was going to commit a crime (for example, did he believe beyond a reasonable doubt?)?
Applying the above analysis to the case at hand, it is obvious that Mecca’s chosen course of action fell short of what is required of effective counsel. Indeed, even under the majority’s open ended test, a review of the undisputed facts reveals that Mecca failed to engage in even a minimal level of investigation before disclosing the location of the children, rendering his belief that the children were alive both illogical and unreasonable.
B. Mecca’s behavior was unreasonable because he did not possess sufficient information to make his belief that the children were alive reasonable and it was unreasonable for him to rely on the little information he had.
The unreasonableness of Mecca’s belief that the children were alive becomes clear by reviewing what occurred in the days leading up to the disclosure. Mecca was hired by McClure’s family on Saturday, April 28, 1984. By Sunday, although McClure initially proclaimed his innocence, Mecca began to think that McClure “was involved in[Carol] Jones’s murder and the disappearance of her children.” This was because by this time McClure had sought Mecca’s assistance in destroying evidence which McClure said might contain blood, as well as due to a meeting between Mecca, McClure and McClure’s family during which it was revealed that McClure’s family believed he may have been involved in *1253the crime. By Monday evening, Mecca “became convinced that petitioner had killed Carol Jones and began to question whether petitioner had killed the children[,]” due in no small part to the manner in which McClure was beginning to reveal certain information, such as his sexual fantasies about young girls and his drug use. Despite his doubts, on Tuesday, Mecca never directly inquired whether McClure had killed the children, although they specifically discussed the children that day.
Curiously, Mecca based much of his belief that the children were alive on a comment that McClure made to him on Monday, that “Satan killed Carol,” but “Jesus saved the kids.” Specifically, Mecca wrote in his notes that these statements hit him so abruptly, he immediately assumed that it meant the children were alive. Maj. Op. at 1237. In the face of mounting evidence pointing to the fact that the children were most likely dead, this assumption was utterly unreasonable. As Mecca himself admits, it was a hope against all hope. By Tuesday, the date of the disclosure, a reasonable attorney would have understood the complete unlikelihood that McClure spared the children, particularly after viewing the map to the bodies that McClure drew for him.
While the above is sufficient to render Mecca’s belief that the children were alive unreasonable, the way in which McClure conveyed to Mecca the location of the bodies, as well as the content of the map itself, would not lead a reasonable attorney to believe the children were alive. McClure had exhibited odd behavior throughout the days preceding the disclosure, placing numerous desperate calls to Mecca from the jail and asking Mecca to dispose of crime scene evidence. When McClure finally told Mecca where the children were, he did so obscurely: in the course of discussing “places he had been with the family!,]” McClure drew a rough map, never directly telling Mecca what he would find there. The map showed two locations, which were more than sixty miles apart from one another, in a deserted and wooded area. Receiving such information after the children had been missing for eight days, although surely disturbing, is insufficient to lead a reasonable attorney to believe the children were alive and that disclosure of that information was warranted, much less necessary.11
The majority focuses on the fact that the District Court found that “McClure knew the true facts and he deliberately withheld them, leading Mecca to believe the children were alive[,]” noting that McClure “controlled the flow of information.” Maj. Op. at 1247. However, this does not change the fact that Mecca had very little information on which to base his belief and the little he had overwhelmingly and sadly pointed to the children’s demise.
C. Mecca’s conduct was unreasonable because, in the face of almost no information supporting his belief, Mecca conducted no investigation to verify his belief that the children were still alive.
Faced with almost no information to support his wishful thinking, Mecca compounded his error by conducting virtually no investigation about the children. The majority cites the District Court’s findings that Mecca “ ‘attempted to discern whether the children were alive’ and ‘that Mecca investigated to the best of his ability under extremely difficult circumstances.’ ” Id. at 1247. However, neither the District Court nor the majority ever identify what steps Mecca took to inform himself of the condi*1254tion of the children. This is because Mecca did not conduct any investigation whatsoever. The fact of the matter is that by the time Mecca disclosed the location of the children’s bodies, enough had transpired between himself, McClure’s family, and McClure that a reasonable attorney would not have reasonably believed the children would be found alive.
Mecca never directly asked McClure whether he had killed the children. Why Mecca did not do so is unexplainable. It could not have hurt McClure’s case had he answered in the affirmative; that information would certainly have been covered by the attorney-client privilege. The closest Mecca came to asking McClure was when Mecca advised him that they were obligated to disclose the location of the children if there was any possibility that they were alive, to prevent a possible assault from becoming murder. McClure did not respond. To infer that they were alive from McClure’s silence is illogical. In fact, a reasonable person would most likely have inferred that there was no possibility that the children were alive, because McClure had just been informed that he was required to disclose if there was.
Besides directly inquiring with McClure, Mecca could have also conducted some investigation outside of the jail cell. Mecca could have armed himself with the map and driven to the locations on the map to determine once and for all if the children were alive. Moreover, both Mecca and McClure testified that they discussed the option of Mecca doing so; why Mecca chose not to and instead went to the authorities is beyond reason. Indeed, if he truly believed the children were alive in the woods, at risk of exposure and starvation, it is inexplicable that he would not have immediately gone to assist them. While locating the bodies himself would undeniably have been a great burden, criminal defense attorneys should be prepared to meet the myriad challenges of their vocation — investigating and uncovering disturbing evidence related to their representation is but one; confronting moral and ethical dilemmas competently is another.
D. Mecca’s conduct was unreasonable because Mecca had no more than a bare suspicion, based entirely on his own wishful thinking, that the children were alive.
Mecca purportedly believed the children were alive; however, his words and actions at the time of the disclosure indicate that his belief was pallid. Since Mecca testified in hindsight about his belief that the children were alive, the majority emphasizes the lower courts’ credibility determination in favor of Mecca. Even accepting that veracity of Mecca’s belief, examining the strength of that belief betrays the government’s assertions that it was reasonable. It is true that Model Rule 1.6 does not indicate what is required beyond a “reasonable belief[,]” but surely an inkling alone cannot suffice to support a reasonable belief.
The majority omits a number of undisputed facts about the events leading up to Mecca’s disclosure that show Mecca was not as certain about the children’s vitality at the time of the disclosure as he is today. First, Mecca repeatedly used the word “bodies” when referring to the children in his notes taken shortly after the disclosure. For example, Mecca wrote: “ ‘McClure related to me ... one place where a body might be’ and then ‘described [where] the other body would be located.’ ” Maj. Op. at 1236. Additionally, Mecca recorded the following after the prosecutor had refused to negotiate a plea for McClure: “ ‘The only option I had, as far as I was concerned, was to disclose the whereabouts of the body [sic].’ ” Id. at 1237. Mecca also wrote, “ T arranged to *1255have the information released anonymously to the Sheriffs Department with directions to the bodies.’ ” Id. at 1237. Although Mecca attempted to explain his choice of words by explaining that he made the notes after the bodies were located, this answer is unsatisfying.
Examining Mecca’s mental state around the time of the disclosure is also illuminating. After his conversation with McClure on Monday, Mecca testified, “ ‘[t]he conclusion I came to was that, without telling me, he told me he had killed three people.’” Id. at 1238. When discussing McClure’s comment that “ ‘Satan killed Carol, but Jesus saved the kids[,]’ ” Mecca stated that he “ ‘kind of felt that[McClure] was talking about a sexual thing, but, in any event, [he] wasn’t sure.’ ” Id. at 1237. In addition, Mecca stated the following regarding the Jesus/Satan comment: “ ‘I allowed myself to believe that these kids might somehow be alive.’ ” Id. at 1239. Mecca’s own words suggest the absurdity of this belief — he allowed himself to believe it because it was so incredulous. Finally, Mecca practically admitted that his belief was weak in discussing the possibility that the children were alive. He testified that he “ ‘felt it was a possibility. I wouldn’t say a strong possibility.’ ” Id.
Finally, Mecca attempted to negotiate a deal with the prosecution in exchange for the information about the children’s bodies. If Mecca strongly believed the children were alive but dying, and his concern for their welfare was as great as he claims, why would he continue to jeopardize their fives by first trying to strike a deal for his client?
While it is true that the events leading up to Mecca’s disclosure unfolded rapidly and were no doubt incredibly stressful, it is not unfair to expect a reasonable criminal defense attorney to be capable of competently dealing with these types of situations. It was not such a brief period of time12 that Mecca’s lack of investigation and rash disclosure can be justified. In short, Mecca had agreed to represent an individual who was accused of killing a woman whose children were missing. Over the course of a few days, McClure revealed himself to be a mentally disturbed individual who fantasized about sex with young girls and enlisted his attorney’s help in destroying evidence related to the murders. Perhaps Mecca is correct that there was no way to be 100% certain at the time whether the children were alive or dead, and perhaps we should not question whether he truly personally believed that the children were alive. But as a criminal defense attorney, Mecca had a responsibility to inform himself, investigate, and support his belief by facts before taking the extreme step of disclosing McClure’s confidential information to the police. When an attorney falls below this standard, courts should not be afraid to name the problem: deficient performance under the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
In the end, it is clear that not only did Mecca lack a “firm factual basis” for his belief that the children were alive, he had virtually no basis whatsoever, nor did he make a reasonable effort to gain one — at best, Mecca’s “investigation” can be characterized as paltry. The danger of the majority’s decision is that it risks making Mecca’s conduct the standard for attorneys who may find themselves in a similar predicament in the future.
Ill
I too sympathize with Mecca for being concerned with the welfare of the children, *1256as do the majority, the District Court and the state court. It would scarcely be wrong to criticize him for, as the District Court stated, being “a human being.” However, because at the time of the disclosure Mecca was playing a critical and unique role as McClure’s defense attorney, I cannot sanction his behavior. It seems that the time has come for Mecca to take responsibility for the choice he made to breach his client’s confidence and for a court, this court, to recognize that whether or not Mecca did the “right” thing does not diminish the fact that his doing so constituted an abdication of his professional duties and rendered his performance as McClure’s defense attorney deficient under the Sixth Amendment. Mecca’s concern for the children is certainly understandable and laudable, however, it does not negate the infirmity of McClure’s conviction. Therefore, I must dissent.

. It is important to note that this is not a case where the client informed the attorney of an impending murder or other crime involving serious bodily injury; rather, it is a case in which the criminal acts were already completed and the only question was whether the alleged victims had died as a result or were alive at the time of the disclosure.

. Before making the disclosure to the authorities, Mecca told McClure's mother and sister that he could lose his license for doing so, thus revealing that Mecca was conscious that what he was planning to do was improper. Mecca now denies doing this but admits that he discussed the ethical implications of disclosure with other attorneys. In addition, the majority cites a law enforcement official’s testimony relaying that, although Mecca was advised not to provide information about the children to the authorities, Mecca " 'indicated that, even though there might be sanctions, ... he still was wanting to provide information that he had regarding the children.’ ” Maj. Op. at 1248.

. Compare Model Rule 1.6, “[a] lawyer may reveal ... information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary,” Model Rule 1.6(b) (emphasis added), with Strickland, “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,” Strickland at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added).

. Other ethical rules relevant to the duty of confidentiality in this case are DR 4-101 of the Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility, entitled "Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client,” which reads in relevant part:
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of the lawyer’s client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of the lawyer's client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of the lawyer’s client for the advantage of the lawyer or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
*1250(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(3) The intention of the lawyer’s client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.
In addition, Oregon Revised Statute § 9.460 entitled "Duties of Attorneys,” states in relevant part:
An attorney shall:
(3) Maintain the confidences and secrets of the attorney’s clients consistent with the rules of professional conduct established pursuant to ORS 9.490.... ”

. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics Canon 6, reprinted in Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 1181 (1986).

. ABA Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.6 reads:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.

.ABA Model Rule 1.6(b).

. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that
[u]nless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965).

. Contrary to the government's argument, the Supreme Court’s decision in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), does not weaken the "firm factual basis” test. Although in Whiteside the Court held that a defendant has no constitutional right to present perjured testimony, and thus a lawyer's refusal to facilitate a client's perjured testimony constitutes neither a breach of the professional codes nor ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 988, Whiteside does nothing to undermine the notion that an attorney has a duty to conduct a searching inquiry before disclosing because there the client had "announced plans to engage in future criminal conduct.” Id. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988.

. The perjury cases bear upon McClure's case in an interesting manner. First, as the Court noted in Whiteside, "the Model Code and the Model Rules do not merely authorize disclosure by counsel of client perjury; they require such disclosure.” Id. at 168, 106 S.Ct. 988. By contrast, Model Rule 1.6 merely permits disclosure, it does not mandate it. Because it is permissive, Rule 1.6 is therefore generally more lax than the mandatory ethical rule governing client perjury. To the extent that a lawyer is required to have a "firm factual basis” that his client is going to commit perjury before disclosing, it follows logically that a comparable showing should be required of a lawyer who discloses that his client is going to commit murder, where the stakes are substantially higher and the risk of error is that much greater.
Moreover, the difference between the crime of perjury and the crime at issue in this case, murder, is obvious and substantial. The consequences of a premature or erroneous disclosure or decision not to disclose by the lawyer are undeniably less severe in a perjury case than one involving imminent death or substantial bodily harm. Thus, a falsity or act of perjury before a tribunal, while it should in all cases be condemned, does not pose the same moral and ethical dilemmas that a crime involving substantial bodily harm does.

. Even the investigating officer, Undersheriff Carlton, testified in his deposition that the authorities "were faced with the likelihood that the children were dead, but we did not know that.”

. Mecca represented McClure for three days before he made the disclosure. During this period, they met seven times and spoke via telephone numerous times.