Court Opinion

ID: 9756362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:25:43.358715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:49.413751
License: Public Domain

HUDOCK, J.,
Dissenting.
¶ 1 Because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and conclusion that the jury’s award of medical expenses without compensation for pain and suffering was improper, I respectfully dissent. I believe that the jury’s award is consistent with the evidence presented at trial and in accord with our Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Mullen, 565 Pa. 386, 773 A.2d 764 (2001).5
¶ 2 In Davis, Jeffrey Mullen fell asleep behind the wheel of his Ford Tempo and crossed the line dividing the two-way road he was traveling upon, colliding head-on with Jody Davis’ fully loaded tractor-trailer. The tractor-trailer traveled up an embankment and turned onto its right side. An ambulance took Davis to a local hospital where he was treated and released with a prescription for pain medication. Davis testified at trial that he was in pain over the weekend, but returned to his normal work schedule the following Monday, which consisted of ten hours a day, five to seven days a week. Twenty days later, Davis began treatment with Dr. Scott Owens,' a chiropractor, complaining of neck *771and low-back pain and a tingling feeling in his left leg. Dr. Owens diagnosed Davis with a muscle spasm and misalignment of the cervical spine. After twenty treatments with Dr. Owens, Davis discontinued treatment.
¶ 3 Subsequently, Davis sued Mullen for damages arising out of the accident. At trial, Mullen admitted liability for the accident but disputed the extent of Davis’ injury. Dr. Owens testified that he could not say for certain if the spinal injury was related to the accident at issue or one of the three prior automobile accidents in which Davis had been involved. Davis denied that the other accidents had caused his injuries.
¶ 4 The jury awarded Davis compensation only for his medical expenses and payment for the personal property that was damaged. As a result, Davis requested a new trial, claiming the damages were grossly inadequate because the jury did not compensate him for pain and suffering. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, we reversed finding the damage award inconsistent with the evidence and remanded for a new trial. Our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s ruling, holding that “a jury’s award of medical expenses without compensation for pain and suffering should not be disturbed where the trial court had a reasonable basis to believe that: (1) the jury did not believe the plaintiff suffered any pain and suffering, or (2) that a preexisting condition or injury was the sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering.” Davis, 565 Pa. at 391, 773 A.2d at 767. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s assessment that the following evidence provided a reasonable basis for the jury to believe that Davis did not suffer pain and/or that his alleged injury was preexisting:
[Davis] did not miss any work as a result of the accident; he waited twenty days after the accident before visiting a doctor; he quit treatment after only twenty visits with the doctor; ... he has not received any medical treatment for the injuries he claims to have suffered as a result of the accident since July of 1995 [and his] doctor also admitted that he could not say for certain if the spinal injury was related to the accident or whether it was caused by some other event.
Id., 565 Pa. at 396-97, 773 A.2d at 770.
¶ 5 Following Davis, the Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, vacated our decisions which upset jury verdicts that award expenses associated with the injury but declined to award damages for pain and suffering. The Court remanded those appeals for reconsideration in light of the standard articulated in Davis. See e.g., McDermott v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 567 Pa. 561, 789 A.2d 203 (2001); Closky v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 567 Pa. 70, 785 A.2d 491 (2001). In McDermott, a jury awarded Shaun McDermott $12,729.00 for lost wages but did not award damages for pain and suffering in an action filed by McDermott against his employer Consolidated Rail Corp. for negligently failing to provide safe working conditions that allegedly caused him to develop carpal tunnel syndrome and required surgery on both of his hands. At trial, the parties disputed causation. They presented several physicians and occupational health experts who testified as to whether or not McDermott’s work caused the carpal tunnel syndrome. Following entry of judgment on the verdict, McDermott filed a post-trial motion requesting a new trial on the issue of damages. The trial court denied the motion and, on appeal, this Court reversed. See McDermott v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 A.2d 348 (Pa.Super.2001). We reasoned “[s]ince carpal tunnel syndrome is an injury to the nerves *772in the wrist and since [McDermott] underwent two surgeries, he inevitably experienced compensable pain and suffering.” Id. at 351. Thus, we concluded that “the existing damage award [was] both inadequate to compensate [McDermott] and inconsistent with the finding that [Consolidated Rail Corp.] caused [McDermott’s] carpal tunnel syndrome.” Id. at 351-52. Thereafter, our Supreme Court vacated our decision and remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of the Court’s decision in Davis. McDermott, supra.
¶ 6 In Closky, while a passenger on a USAir airplane, Kevin Closky was struck in the right knee with a beverage cart which was being pushed down the aisle by a flight attendant. Three days after the incident, Closky sought treatment at an emergency room. Thereafter, he was treated by orthopedic surgeons and various other physicians. Closky subsequently underwent two arthroscopic surgeries and an open knee surgery. Closky filed suit against USAir seeking damages for his injury. USAir conceded liability, but disputed the extent and severity of Clo-sky’s injury. USAir proceeded on the theory that Closky merely suffered a bump and a bruise as a result of the incident and not a serious injury. The parties provided numerous medical experts disputing causation and the severity of the injury. Following trial, the jury returned an award of damages of $3,584.88, which was equivalent to the medical expenses incurred by Closky during his treatment, beginning with his emergency room visit through treatment with his first two doctors. Clo-sky filed a motion for post-trial relief challenging the adequacy of the verdict due to the jury’s failure to award damages for pain and suffering, and the trial court awarded a new trial limited to the issue of damages. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial on damages. Closky v. USAirways, Inc., 778 A.2d 730 (Pa.Super.2001) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court granted USAirways petition for allowance of appeal and vacated our order, directing this Court to reconsider its decision based on the standard set forth in Davis. See Closky, supra.
¶ 7 Similarly, I believe that the holding in Davis controls the present appeal. Here contradictory testimony was presented as to the severity of the impact. Zeig-ler testified that as she approached the intersection she did not decelerate because her light was green. She further stated that, upon impact, her body hit the steering wheel and her head hit something in the interior of her vehicle. Conversely, Detweiler testified that the impact was a mere bump, and at first he thought a stone had hit the van he was driving. At the time of the accident, Detweiler was in the process of delivering flowers to local churches. He stated that the bump was so minimal that the flower arrangements remained in an upright position. Zeigler’s own witness, Mr. David Mohl, testified that Zeigler was stopped at the light at the intersection and, at the time of impact, neither vehicle was “going fast at all.” N.T., 1/24/01, at 19. Contradictory evidence likewise was presented as to whether Zeigler had sustained any injury as a result of the accident. Zeigler’s doctors testified that the accident aggravated Zeigler’s degenerative disc disease and spinal stenosis and necessitated back surgery, while Detweileris doctors opined that there was no cause and effect relationship between the accident and any injury alleged and that the surgery was solely attributed to the natural advancement of her pre-existing spinal stenosis and degenerative disc disease. Testimony at trial also revealed that the police were not called to the accident, the vehicles were able to be driven by the parties following the acci*773dent, and Zeigler advised both Detweiler and Mr. Mohl that she was fíne immediately following the accident. Additionally, Zeigler was not treated for any alleged injuries until four days later during a visit with her family physician, Frank DeLeo, M.D., a visit which had been scheduled prior to the accident. Testimony by Zeig-ler further revealed that she had treated with Dr. DeLeo in October 1991 and again, in August 1997, only three months prior to the accident, for back problems. Presented with this evidence, the jury, as factfinder, could have found that Detweiler’s negligence caused an injury but that the injury caused was not compensable or that a pre-existing condition or injury was the sole cause of the alleged pain and suffering. Thus, the trial court overstepped its authority by effectively substituting its judgment for that of the jury with respect to the weight to be accorded the evidence. Consequently, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding a new trial on damages and, as such, would reinstate the jury’s verdict.

. Davis was decided after trial in the present case but before the court’s decision to grant a new trial limited to damages.