Court Opinion

ID: 9577964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:00.599967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:43.159229
License: Public Domain

Quillian, J.,
dissenting. The defendant insists that it was not liable on the contract because the plaintiffs violated one of the terms of the policy. The policy provided: “Conditions suspending or restricting insurance. Unless otherwise provided in writing added hereto this company shall not be liable for loss occurring (A) . . . (B) while described building, whether intended for occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive days.” The agreed statement of facts shows that the property was vacant for more than 60 consecutive days. Therefore, the only question to bq determined is whether the defendant’s agent waived this provision and whether he had authority to do so. The facts show that the agent told the plaintiffs “not to worry about it, that they were covered.” It is clear that the agent endeavored to waive the vacancy clause of the policy. The policy contained the clause: “Waiver provisions: No permission affecting this insurance shall exist, or waiver of any provision be valid, unless granted herein or expressed in writing added hereto.” The question then arises whether the agent had authority to orally waive the vacancy clause of the policy.
It was held in Askew v. Maryland Ins. Co., 66 Ga. App. 564, 566 (18 S. E. 2d 564) as follows: “We do not think that such notice would be binding on the company for any reason. Contracts of fire insurance are required to be in writing. When the policy is delivered its terms become binding on the parties. An agent has no authority to make an oral agreement at the time the policy is issued which is .contrary to the explicit terms of the policy. He has no such authority after the policy is issued.” The *277provision in the policy that all waivers must be in writing to be effective was notice to the plaintiffs that the agent did not have authority to waive the provisions of the policy unless such waiver was in writing and attached to the policy. Code § 56-801; McAfee v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 18 Ga. App. 192 (89 S. E. 181); May v. Globe &c. Ins. Co., 23 Ga. App. 798 (99 S. E. 631). It was held in Corporation &c. Assur. of London v. Franklin, 158 Ga. 644 (124 S. E. 172, 38 A. L. R. 626), that the insurance company was estopped to deny that its agent had executed the waiver and attached it to the policy,- but in that case the policy was in the possession of the insurance company. In Brooker v. American Ins. Co., 65 Ga. App. 713, 718 (16 S. E. 2d 251), it was held that the prerequisites of estoppel on the part of the insurance company to deny the waiver of a provision of the policy were: “First, the company must have access to the policy; second, there must have been a reliance on the promise of the agent by those to whom the promise was made and for whose benefit it was made.” It was further held that in the absence of any allegation that the policy was delivered to the insurance company it could not be presumed that it was so delivered. In the case at bar the stipulated facts do not show that the agent had possession of the policy and I cannot assume that he did. Therefore, the insurance company was not estopped to deny that the vacancy clause of the policy was waived.
The plaintiffs insist that the defendant had waived its right to insist upon the terms of the policy by accepting a portion of the premium after a breach of the occupancy provision was known to the company. When the policy was issued and the risk assumed, the entire premium was earned, and the defendant’s acceptance and retention of the premiums in no wise prevented it from asserting its rights under the policy. Everett-Ridley-Ragan Co. v. Traders Ins. Co., 121 Ga. 228, 230 (48 S. E. 918, 104 Am. St. R. 99); McAfee v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 18 Ga. App. 192; Nalley v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 56 Ga. App. 555 (2) (193 S. E. 619).