Court Opinion

ID: 9897423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:22.47161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.862137
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Apr 19 2023, 8:53 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                      ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Michelle C. Harter                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Lekse Harter, LLC                                           Attorney General of Indiana
Greenwood, Indiana                                          Frances Barrow
AMICUS CURIAE PRO SE CURT NISLY                             Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                            General
Curt Nisly
                                                            Indianapolis, Indiana
Milford, Indiana

                                             IN THE

     COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Thomas Charles Bookwalter,                                  April 19, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                            22A-PL-1981
        v.                                                  Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                            Court
Indiana Election Commission,                                The Hon. Cynthia J. Ayers, Judge
Gregory L. Irby, and Cody                                   Trial Court Cause No.
Eckert,                                                     49D04-2203-PL-8226
Appellees-Respondents.

                                 Opinion by Judge Bradford.
                               Judges May and Mathias concur.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023                               Page 1 of 12
      Case Summary                    1

[1]   Indiana law requires a person declaring candidacy for a party’s primary election

      to confirm that the person is, in fact, affiliated with the party. Pursuant to

      Indiana Code section 3-8-2-7 (“the Statute”), a would-be primary candidate can

      make this showing by voting for the party in the two most recent primary

      elections in which he voted, Ind. Code § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(A), or by obtaining

      certification of affiliation with the party from the party’s county chairperson.

      Ind. Code § 3-8-2-7(a)(4)(B). After failing to establish party affiliation to run for

      United States Representative in the May of 2022 Republican Party’s primary

      election by either method provided by the Statute, Thomas Bookwalter brought

      a combined suit for judicial review under the Administrative Orders and

      Procedures Act (“AOPA”) and for declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial

      court dismissed Bookwalter’s suit. Bookwalter contends that the trial court

      erred in dismissing his AOPA suit on the ground that he did not file the agency

      record on time, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground

      that they are moot, and his constitutional challenges to the Statute on the

      ground that they lack merit. Because we conclude that Bookwalter has failed to

      preserve his AOPA suit for appellate review and that his other claims are moot,

      we affirm.

      1
        We held oral argument in this matter on March 30, 2023. We commend counsel for the high quality of
      their presentations. We also thank amicus Curt Nisly for helpful briefing in this matter. Finally, we thank
      those in attendance for their interest.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023                                Page 2 of 12
      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On January 6, 2022, Bookwalter submitted to the Indiana Election Division

      form CAN-2, declaration of candidacy for primary nomination in 2022, seeking

      placement on the primary ballot of the Republican Party for the office of United

      States Representative. The Statute provides, in part, as follows:

              (4) A statement of the candidate’s party affiliation. For purposes
              of this subdivision, a candidate is considered to be affiliated with a
              political party only if any of the following applies:
                   (A) The two (2) most recent primary elections in Indiana in
                   which the candidate voted were primary elections held by the
                   party with which the candidate claims affiliation. If the
                   candidate cast a nonpartisan ballot at an election held at the
                   most recent primary election in which the candidate voted, a
                   certification by the county chairman under clause (B) is
                   required.
                   (B) The county chairman of:
                       (i) the political party with which the candidate claims
                       affiliation; and
                       (ii) the county in which the candidate resides;
                   certifies that the candidate is a member of the political party.
      Ind. Code § 3-8-2-7(a)(4). A candidate may indicate on the CAN-2 form that he

      meets either the party affiliation voting requirement or has obtained

      certification from the county chair affirming membership in the party.

      Bookwalter checked neither box on the form he submitted to the Indiana

      Election Division.

[3]   On February 8, 2022, Gregory Irby filed a CAN-1 form with the Indiana

      Election Commission (“the Commission”) (which is a challenge to a candidate

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023              Page 3 of 12
      filing) on the basis that Bookwalter “[d]id not vote in 2 Republican Primaries.

      No approval from Chair.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 51. Cody Eckert also

      filed a CAN-1 form two days later, asserting that Bookwalter had filed an

      incomplete CAN-2. “More specifically, this individual left question 3 on the

      form blank. It is also known, this individual has not voted in 2 republican

      primaries as required.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 56.

[4]   On February 18, 2022, the Commission conducted a hearing and heard

      testimony on the challenges to Bookwalter’s candidacy. Bookwalter testified

      that he had not voted in the 2020 Republican primary because the party

      candidates had run unopposed. Bookwalter also testified that the county chair

      had “refused to certify that I’m a party member despite my having provided her

      with an affidavit detailing my lifelong support for the party and of living its best

      core values.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 69. Bookwalter argued that the

      Statute is unconstitutional, asking that the Commission refrain from enforcing

      the Statute and deny the challenges to his candidacy. The Commission voted

      unanimously to uphold the challenges to Bookwalter’s candidacy.

[5]   On March 14, 2022, or twenty-four days after the Commission’s decision,

      Bookwalter petitioned for judicial review, filed a complaint for declaratory and

      injunctive relief, and petitioned for an emergency stay. Bookwalter’s petition

      for judicial review asked the trial court to reverse the Commission’s decision

      and restore his name to the ballot. Bookwalter argued that the Statute violated

      his right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth

      Amendments, is vague and overbroad, and is an invalid ex post facto law as

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023         Page 4 of 12
      applied to him. The petition for stay asked the trial court to stay the

      Commission’s ruling and restore his name to the ballot.

[6]   The trial court denied the petition for stay on April 1, 2022. The trial court

      observed that March 14, 2022, the date on which Bookwalter had filed his

      petition for judicial review, was also the statutory deadline for counties to

      receive delivery of printed absentee ballots, and March 19, 2022, was the

      statutory deadline for counties to begin mailing absentee ballots to eligible

      voters. “Ballots have already been mailed and some voters have returned their

      ballots and have designated their candidate choices.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

      p. 13. The trial court found that “Bookwalter effectively acceded to the printing

      and mailing of ballots without his name included as a candidate.” Appellant’s

      App. Vol. II p. 13.

[7]   On April 27, 2022, Bookwalter filed a motion to certify the April 1, 2022, denial

      of his petition for a stay for interlocutory appeal. The primary election was

      conducted on May 3, 2022. The Commission moved to dismiss on May 11,

      2022, arguing that Bookwalter had not filed the agency record as required by

      AOPA and, because the May of 2022 primary election had concluded, his

      complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was moot. Following a hearing,

      the trial court declined to certify the denial of Bookwalter’s petition for a stay

      for interlocutory appeal.

[8]   On August 8, 2022, the trial court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss.

      The trial court determined that Bookwalter had not timely filed the official

      certified agency record, thereby mandating dismissal of his AOPA complaint.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023         Page 5 of 12
       The trial court also concluded that Bookwalter’s complaint for declaratory and

       injunctive relief was moot because the May of 2022 primary election had

       concluded, meaning that any decision by the trial court on his constitutional

       claims “would be an impermissible advisory opinion.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II

       p. 24.

       Discussion and Decision
[9]    At the outset, it should be noted that, pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional

       avoidance, this court avoids addressing the constitutionality of a statute when

       another avenue is available. Ind. Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., Inc. v. State ex rel.

       Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 695 N.E.2d 99, 108 (Ind. 1998). This “policy of

       judicial restraint” stems from our tripartite system of government. Id. at 107.

       As the Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

                On occasion, to perform properly its constitutional function, a
                court must address and resolve the constitutionality of a legislative
                enactment. But when it does so, it is an exercise of the power to
                decide the case before it. To do so when not required to decide the
                case can impinge upon the law-making function which separation
                of powers reserves for the legislature.
       Id. Put differently: “[I]t is a cardinal principle of the judicial function that we

       will pass upon the constitutionality of a coordinate branch’s action only when it

       is absolutely necessary[.]” Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 786 (Ind. 2011)

       (emphasis omitted).

[10]   With this in mind, we turn to Bookwalter’s argument that the trial court erred

       in granting the Commission’s motion to dismiss. We review a trial court’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023         Page 6 of 12
       ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo. Charter One

       Mortg. Corp. v. Condra, 865 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 2007). “A motion to dismiss

       for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted tests the legal

       sufficiency of the claims, not the facts supporting it.” Thornton v. State, 43

       N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015) (citing Kitchell v. Franklin, 997 N.E.2d 1020, 1025

       (Ind. 2013)).

       I.      Bookwalter’s AOPA Claim
[11]   Bookwalter filed his petition on March 14, 2022, and had thirty days within

       which to file the agency record or request an extension of time to do so. Ind.

       Code § 4-21.5-5-13. It is undisputed that Bookwalter did not file the agency

       record by the April 13, 2022, deadline or at any time thereafter. The

       Commission argues that the trial court properly dismissed Bookwalter’s petition

       for judicial review on this basis, while Bookwalter argues that, pursuant to

       relevant Indiana Supreme Court precedent, dismissal of a petition for judicial

       review for failure to file the agency record is not appropriate when the facts are

       undisputed.

[12]   Indiana Code section 4-21.5-5-13 requires that a petitioner for judicial review

       “shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the agency record

       for judicial review of the agency action” and further provides that “[f]ailure to

       file the record within the time permitted by this subsection, including any

       extension period ordered by the court, is cause for dismissal of the petition for

       review by the court.” The Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted these

       provisions as requiring dismissal of a petition for judicial review where the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023          Page 7 of 12
       petitioner fails to file the agency record or request an extension in a timely

       manner. Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dept. of Educ. and State Bd. of

       Educ. (TOPS), 20 N.E.3d 149, 155 (Ind. 2014); see also First Am. Title Ins. v.

       Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757, 762–63 (Ind. 2014) (relying on TOPS). In TOPS, the

       Indiana Supreme Court held that “a petitioner for review cannot receive

       consideration of its petition where the statutorily-defined agency record has not

       been filed.” 20 N.E.3d at 155; see also First Am. Title Ins., 19 N.E.3d at 761–63

       (concluding that the trial court had erred in not dismissing petition for judicial

       review where petitioner had failed to file the agency record within thirty days of

       filing the petition).

[13]   Bookwalter argues that his case falls under what he refers to as the “Meyer

       exception,” while the Commission argues that TOPS does not allow for any

       exceptions to the filing rule and that the Court was merely noting that Indiana

       Family and Social Services Administration v. Meyer, 927 N.E.2d 367 (Ind. 2010),

       had presented “extremely narrow” circumstances under which a failure to file

       the agency record had been excusable in that case. We need not determine

       whether TOPS allows for a Meyer exception, however, as the facts of that case

       are easily distinguished.

[14]   The Meyer exception—even if we assume that TOPS recognizes one—only

       seems to apply when a factual issue is dispositive of the case and the respondent

       on judicial review concedes its error. Neither of those circumstances are

       present here. The arithmetic error in the agency decision in Meyer was a

       factual error that resulted in denial of a Medicaid application based solely on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023           Page 8 of 12
       the value of the applicant’s resources. Bookwalter does not identify any factual

       error in the Commission’s decision that affected the outcome of the case.

       Rather, Bookwalter’s case before the Commission and on judicial review rested

       on his argument that the Statute was unconstitutional, which the Commission

       has never conceded. The trial court correctly dismissed Bookwalter’s AOPA

       claim.

       II. Mootness
[15]   Bookwalter argues that the public-importance exception to the mootness

       doctrine renders his appeal justiciable, while the State argues that he has failed

       to establish justiciability. A case is moot “when it is no longer live and the

       parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome or when no effective

       relief can be rendered.” Liddle v. Clark, 107 N.E.3d 478, 481 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2018) (citing Save Our Sch. v. Ft. Wayne Cmty. Schs., 951 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2011), trans. denied), trans. denied. Specifically, a request for injunctive

       relief is moot when no relief is possible or if the relief sought has already

       occurred. See, e.g., Medley v. Lemmon, 994 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2013) (request for injunctive relief regarding visitation restrictions became moot

       when those restrictions expired), trans. denied.

[16]   A court may not, in general, consider a request for declaratory judgment if the

       case is moot or calls merely for an advisory opinion. City of Hammond v. Bd. of

       Zoning App., 284 N.E.2d 119, 126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (citing Rauh v. Fletcher

       Sav. & Trust Co., 207 Ind. 638, 641, 194 N.E. 334, 336 (1935)). An opinion is

       “advisory when it would not change or affect legal relations between the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023          Page 9 of 12
       parties.” Saylor v. State, 81 N.E.3d 228, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

       By the time the Commission filed its motion to dismiss on May 11, 2022, the

       May 3, 2022, primary election had already occurred, rendering any decision by

       the court regarding the constitutionality of the Statute an impermissible

       advisory opinion. Consequently, the matter had been rendered moot.

[17]   That said, both sides acknowledge that Indiana courts recognize an exception

       to the mootness doctrine for matters of “great public interest which [are] likely

       to recur.” T.W. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 121 N.E.3d 1039,

       1042 (Ind. 2019). The parties differ, however, on whether the additional

       element of the issue evading review must also be present, with Bookwalter

       arguing that it need not be established and the Commission arguing that it must

       be. As Bookwalter points out, the Indiana Supreme Court’s most recent

       pronouncements on the matter do not include “evading review” as a part of the

       great-public-interest exception to mootness. See Eunjoo Seo v. State, 148 N.E.3d

       952, 954 n.1 (Ind. 2020) (“But irrespective of mootness, this case presents a

       novel, important issue of great public importance that will surely recur.”). We

       need not address the question of whether this issue evades review, however, if

       we conclude that Bookwalter has failed to establish either that the issues in this

       case are of great public interest or likely to recur. We need only address

       whether Bookwalter has carried his burden to establish that the issues in this

       case are likely to recur. We conclude that he has not.

[18]   Bookwalter argues that the issues in this case are certain to recur, perhaps with

       himself. Bookwalter also argues that the issues in this case may affect many

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023       Page 10 of 12
       other potential candidates, i.e., persons who change party allegiance, a situation

       of which Bookwalter argues the Statute makes no allowance. Bookwalter notes

       that, as most Hoosiers do not vote in primaries, would-be candidates could be

       surprised to find themselves ineligible to run for office pursuant to the Statute,

       which would bar those who started voting in the primaries this year from

       running for office as a Republican or Democrat in the next primary.

       Bookwalter, however, does not establish that such things are likely to recur,

       only arguing that they could recur. Bookwalter points to nothing in the record

       tending to show that potential candidates are routinely denied appearances on

       primary ballots by operation of the Statute or that such denials will recur.

       Without more, given the bar on addressing constitutional issues unless

       absolutely necessary, see, e.g., Snyder, 958 N.E.2d at 786, we conclude that

       Bookwalter has failed to carry his burden to establish that the issues in this case

       are likely to recur. Lacking that showing, Bookwalter has failed to establish

       that the great-public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies. 2

[19]   Moreover, we cannot ignore the fact that Bookwalter chose to wait over three

       weeks to petition for judicial review following the Commission’s ruling. In fact,

       Bookwalter’s petition was filed on the day of the statutory deadline for counties

       to receive delivery of printed absentee ballots, followed five days later by the

       statutory deadline for counties to begin mailing absentee ballots to eligible

       2
         Because of our disposition, we do not address Bookwalter’s various constitutional challenges, nor do we
       address the arguments in the brief filed by amicus curiae, former Indiana State Representative Curt Nisly,
       which includes challenges to the Statute pursuant to Article 1, section 23, and Article 4, section 7, of the
       Indiana Constitution. (Amicus Br. 5, 8).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023                               Page 11 of 12
       voters. After these statutory deadlines passed, any ruling the trial court might

       have made in Bookwalter’s favor would have amounted to nothing more than

       closing the barn door after the horse had left the barn. Under the circumstances

       of this case, with its admittedly compressed timeline, Bookwalter’s delay in

       filing effectively eliminated any chance he had to keep his case “live.”

       Bookwalter could have petitioned for judicial review the day after the

       Commission’s ruling, or soon thereafter, but chose to wait twenty-four days,

       until the very day absentee ballots were required by law to be delivered to

       counties. We agree with the trial court that Bookwalter effectively acceded to

       the preparation and distribution of absentee ballots without his name on them,

       after which it was too late.

[20]   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

       May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-PL-1981 | April 19, 2023         Page 12 of 12