Court Opinion

ID: 9682148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:06:00.537125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.650692
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the decision to affirm the judgment. I am still troubled, however, by the holding that merely overruling a Rule 403 objection means that the trial court “necessarily conducted the balancing test when it considered the objection.”
I continue to believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals, in deciding Montgomery v. State, intended that the trial judge engage in the balancing process under Rule 403 in such a way that the decision can be subjected to meaningful appellate review. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (on rehearing); Houston v. State. 832 S.W.2d 180, 187 (Tex.App.—Waco 1992) (Vance, J. dissenting), pet. dism’d improvidently granted, 846 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
In discussing the duty of the trial court when confronted with a Rule 403 objection, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Rather, we understand Rule 403 to impose a duty upon the trial court. The court would do well to inquire of the opponent what his view of the prejudice is. On the other hand, the court should ask the proponent to articulate his need. But once the rule is invoked, “the trial judge has no discretion as to whether or not to engage in the balancing process.” [22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Prooe-dure: Evidence § 5250, at 544-45 (1978) ]. When Rule 403 provides that evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,” it simply means that trial courts should favor admission in close cases, in keeping with the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence.
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When a further objection is made under Rule 403, it will not suffice for the trial court simply to determine that the evidence is relevant to some legitimate, non-character-related purpose such as one of those enumerated in Rule 404(b). “The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule 403.” Advisory Committee’s Note to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Factors that should go into the balancing are elaborated in Wright & Graham, supra, at 545-551. How compellingly evidence of the extraneous misconduct serves to make more or less probable a fact of consequence — in other words, its inherent probativeness — is certainly a factor. This is often, although by no means invariably, a function of the similarity of the extraneous transaction to the charged offense. See Robinson v. State, 701 S.W.2d 895, at 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Im-winkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, §§ 2:12, 8:07 (1984). It is also a function of the strength of the proponent’s evidence to show the opponent in fact committed the extraneous conduct. Wright & Graham, supra at 548. Another obvious factor is the potential the “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” have to impress the jury in some irrational but nevertheless indelible way. This is often a function of the nature of the misconduct. Imwinkelried, supra, § 8:03. How much trial time does the proponent need to develop evidence of the extraneous misconduct, such that the attention of the factfinder will be diverted from the indicted offense? Id.; Wright & Graham, supra, at 549. Finally, how great is the proponent’s “need ” for the extraneous transaction? This last inquiry breaks down into three subparts: Does the proponent have other available evidence to establish the fact of consequence that the extraneous misconduct is relevant to show? If so, how strong is that other evidence? And is the fact of consequence related to an issue that is in dispute? When the proponent has other compelling or undis*370puted evidence to establish the proposition or fact that the extraneous misconduct goes to prove, the misconduct evidence will weigh far less than it otherwise might in the probative-versus-prejudicial balance. Morgan v. State, [692 S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)]; United States v. Beechum, [582 F.2d 898, 914 (5th Cir.1978) ]; Wright & Graham, supra, at 546-47.
Id. at 389-90 (emphasis in original).
In discussing appellate review of the trial court’s decision under Rule 403, the court continued:
The appellate court should not conduct a de novo review of the record with a view to making a wholly independent judgment whether the probative value of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. It should reverse the judgment of the trial court “rarely and only after a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 597 (C.A.5 1986).
But reviewing the trial court’s judgment for abuse of discretion requires more of an appellate court than deciding that the trial judge did in fact conduct the required balancing and did not simply rule arbitrarily or capriciously. The appellate court must measure the trial court’s ruling against the relevant criteria by which a Rule 403 decision is to be made.
Id. at 392 (emphasis in original).
Most recently, the Court criticized the Fourteenth Court of Appeals’ determination of a Rule 403 question:
The court failed to detail the evidence it used in arriving at its conclusion. In fact, it is difficult to find much Rule 403 analysis at all in the five sentences the Court of Appeals dedicated to that question. Although the Court of Appeals properly ree-ognized that, when conducting a Rule 403 balancing test, the “probativeness” of the evidence “is the weightier consideration,” the court failed to discuss the factors necessary for a comprehensive Rule 403 analysis. Rankin [v. State, 872 S.W.2d 279, 283-84 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist] 1994) ]. As this Court has previously stated, and we now reiterate, a complete Rule 403 balancing test demands an inquiry as to all the factors set out in Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389-90, 392-93. Their job, however, does not end there. They must also, consistent with Arcila [v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) ], fully account for all the evidence relevant to their 403 analysis.
Rankin v. State, — S.W.2d -, No. 0374-94, slip op. at 6 (Tex.Crim.App. April 10, 1996).
In view of the Court’s delineation in Montgomery of certain “factors”1 that bear on the trial judge’s decision and its admonishment to appellate courts not to conduct a de novo review, how can a court of appeals comply with the mandate of Rankin? I find only one way: require that the trial court’s balancing process be, to some extent, disclosed by the record. Thus, I would sustain point of error five as it relates to Rule 403.
Having said that I would sustain point five, I must address the question of harm. As the majority points out, the two extraneous offenses were admissible under the “other purpose” provisions of Rule 404(b). Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 404(b). Applying the Harris factors relating to harm and the Montgomery factors relating to Rule 403, I would hold that the court’s failure to engage in the balancing process under Rule 403 was harmless because, had the court done so, it would have concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by *371the dangers set out in the Rule. Id. 403; Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 389; Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). Thus, I agree that the judgment should be affirmed.

. Factors that may be used in the balancing process include (1) the inherent probative value of the evidence, (2) the similarity of the conduct to the offense on trial, (3) the strength of the evidence of the extraneous conduct, (4) the nature of the extraneous conduct and its potential for impressing the jury in irrational, but indelible ways, (5) the trial time necessary to develop the evidence, giving consideration to whether the jury's attention will be diverted from the offense on trial, and (6) the State’s "need” for the evidence including (a) the availability of other evidence which tends to accomplish the same "other purpose,” (b) the strength of the other evidence, and (c) whether the purpose served by the admission of the extraneous conduct relates to an issue that is in dispute. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 389-90 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).