Court Opinion

ID: 9688058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:59:01.302401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.845136
License: Public Domain

FOURNET, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I fully recognize the need for a domed stadium in the metropolitan center, just as I am sure we all realize the need for so many other vital facilities to improve the economic, social, and cultural environment of this city so that the image it once held as the “Queen City of the South” and the cultural center of the new world may be regained. Nevertheless, with due respect to my colleagues who hold the majority view, and for whom I entertain the highest regard and respect, I could not, in good conscience, join them. And, because of the great importance of the issues in this case, I am impelled by the duties of the office I have held for so long to express my reasons for not subscribing to their view.
The Board of Commissioners of the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District, availing itself of the provisions of Section 47 of Article XIV of the constitution of Louisiana, adopted pursuant to Act 556 of 1966, entered into a contract termed a ■“Lease Agreement” with the State of Louisiana for the acquisition, construction, and operation of an enclosed and covered multipurpose stadium, together with parking and other facilities relative and appertaining thereto. Executed contemporaneously therewith were implementing documents termed the “Bond Resolution” and the “Management and Operating Agreement.”
The matter is now before us on an appeal from a judgment of the district court declaring the lease agreement and implementing documents to be unconstitutional, null, and void, and enjoining defendants from carrying out their provisions or expending any sums whatsoever in the execution of the lease.
The lease agreement was entered into pursuant to paragraph (E) of Section 47 of Article XIV, which authorizes the state, "Any other constitutional or statutory provisions * * * to the contrary notwithstanding,” to lease the facilities of the stadium district “and provide for the payment of consideration therefor through the appropriation of funds or otherwise,” and the obligations of the state as lessee under such an arrangement “shall constitute a charge against the revenues” of the state “to the extent and in the manner agreed upon by the parties thereto.” (The emphasis has been supplied.)
While the validity of the lease contract is attacked on several grounds, as pointed out in the main opinion the principal thrust of the attack “has been centered upon the argument that adoption of the bond resolution and execution of the lease and man*627agement agreement have obligated the faith and credit of the state as security for the bonds to be issued by the district contrary to paragraph (S)” of the amendment, which provides that “No bond issued under this amendment shall be secured by the faith and credit of the state.”
The learned trial judge in resolving this issue in a well-considered opinion reasoned that under the broad grant and power conferred in paragraph (E) of the amendment the state has, in the lease, unconditionally pledged the full faith and credit of the state to pay the bonds issued by the stadium district and all expenses connected therewith, thus, under a device denoted as “rentals,” seeking to accomplish indirectly that which is directly prohibited in paragraph (S) of the amendment, as well as by Sections 2 and 12 of Article IV of the constitution;1 further, that in the event the state defaults on the lease, it has also assumed, through a device termed “additional rentals,” the payment of all costs and expenses the stadium district incurs in connection with its administrative duties in running the-project, in further contravention of these: sections.
The trial judge’s conclusion in this respect is predicated upon the fact that the-“base rental” provided in the lease is “an-amount equal to the amount required * * to pay the interest and principal and redemption premiums, if any, on all bonds becoming due,” as well as the fees, expenses, and all bank charges in connection with the-payment of the bonds,” and this is to be-appropriated annually and paid directly into a “Bond Fund” created in the bond', resolution, while the “additional rental” includes a sum equivalent to all costs and expenses the district may incur in the event the state defaults in any respect under the-lease, including attorney fees and the costs, of any suit or action the district may institute to enforce the terms and conditions' of the lease2
It is apt to observe that the obligations-thus undertaken by the state are to continue so long as there are any outstanding-*629bonds, even though the stadium is never completed, or is damaged and/or destroyed and not repaired or rebuilt.
The main opinion, with three justices agreeing, concur, as I do, in the trial judge’s conclusion that the obligation of the state under the lease as thus outlined constitutes a pledge of the full faith and credit of the state to the discharge of the bonds, as well as the other expenditures of the stadium district that the state will be called upon to make under the other numerous provisions of the lease and management and bond resolution agreements, while the fourth member of the court forming the majority felt “It is wholly within the power of the people to forbid directly, as they have, the pledge of faith and credit to the district’s bonds and yet to accomplish indirectly a similar result by providing for a pledge to a lease of revenues which are in turn pledged by the district to assist in retiring the bonds.”
The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that the overwhelming majority of the court, as the other dissenting opinions will further reflect, are of the opinion that the full faith and credit of the state has been pledged in this lease and its implementing agreements to secure the bonds issued by the stadium district, in circumvention of the express provisions of paragraph (S) of the very amendment authorizing their execution and confection, and in direct violation of the provisions of Sections 2 and 12 of Article IV of the constitution.
In thus placing the stamp of constitutionality on such circumvention of the prohibition in paragraph (S) the majority, as pointed out in the main opinion, was particularly impressed with the dominant idea that paragraph (E), because it contains the phrase “Any other provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary notwithstanding,” “is a constitutional grant of authority that cannot be modified, altered or impinged upon by any other constitutional or statutory provision,” and since the two paragraphs in the same amendment are irreconcilable, it must be held “paragraph (B) prevails over paragraph (S) and all other provisions of the Constitution and statutes of this State.” (The emphasis has been supplied.)
Although the majority profess the will of the people must be carried out, they obviously overlook the fact that by ignoring and deleting paragraph (S), specifically included as a limitation on the authority granted under the amendment, they are actually thwarting the will of the people.
I feel we should take judicial cognizance of the fact that in giving their stamp of approval to this amendment the people did so on a ballot that provided only:
FOR or AGAINST “the proposed amendment to Article XIV of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana of *6311921, adding a new Section 47 thereto, creating the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District and prescribing the powers and duties thereof,”
and that their favorable action was undertaken in the light of the information disseminated by the news media, as well as that carried to all parts of the state through a public relation campaign and representatives of those having a personal interest in the project. This was to the effect that under the amendment the people were simply authorizing the creation of the “Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District,” whose function would be to construct a covered stadium and to issue in the neighborhood of $30,000,000 in revenue bonds to pay therefor, with the assurance this would not cost the state one penny as the bonds would not be secured by the faith and credit of the state. They never dreamed they were, in fact, authorizing the state to issue approximately $100,000,000 in bonds that were secured by the full faith and credit of the state.
The majority, besides flouting the will of the people and ignoring the wisdom of the members of the legislature as representatives of the people in including the limitations of paragraph (S) in this amendment to Article XIV of the constitution, has, additionally, by deleting the provisions of paragraph (S), amended Sections 2 and 12 of Article IV of the constitution without reference to these sections, contrary to the provisions of Section 1 of Article XXI of the constitution. This has the effect of rendering the entire amendment null and void. See, Graham v. Jones, 198 La. 507, 3 So.2d 761.
I am fortified in these conclusions for those preparing the lease agreement and its-implementing documents, cognizant that paragraph (S) and its provisions constituted a limitation on the authority conferred by the amendment, provided the bonds themselves should carry in the inscription the stipulation that they “shall not in any manner or to any extent * * (b) constitute or be a debt of the State of Louisiana, nor are the Bonds secured by the faith and credit of said State.” (The emphasis has been supplied.)
In an effort to bolster this scheme, however, the drafters of these agreements sought to impress the prospective bond market with the fact that the payment of the bonds was enforceable by including in the lease agreement the provision that the district has the right to sue or take any action at law needed to enforce its terms. And to facilitate this it was stipulated in the lease agreement that the covenants undertaken, by the state "shall be construed to be ministerial duties imposed by law and it shall be the ministerial duty of each and every public official of the lessee [state] to take such action and do such things as are required by law in the performance of such official duty.” (The emphasis and *633material within brackets have been supplied.)
I cannot conceive of an independent and responsible legislature, in the face of the limitations in paragraph (S) and the specific stipulation in the bonds themselves to this same effect, appropriating annually the large sums that will be required to pay the bonds, purported to be “rentals,” and now estimated to represent a face value that may well exceed $100,000,000 — not the $30,000,000 the legislature and the people were led to believe it would cost when they approved the project — as well as such other enormous sums as the state is obligated to pay over and above the bond debts under the terms of these documents.
Nor can I envision under our form of government any power or authority vested in the judicial branch to coerce the legislative department to make such appropriations upon the mere ipsi dixit of the executive branch in this scheme to circumvent the prohibitions of paragraph (S) of Section 47 that the acts of the public officers and officials of Louisiana in carrying out the covenants of the lease constitute “ministerial duties.”
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
FOURNET, C. J., and HAMLIN, J., dissent from the refusal of a rehearing.
McCALEB, J., will not participate because of his absence.

. Section 2 provides “the Legislature shall have no power to contract directly or through any state board or state agency the incurring of debt or the issuance of bonds involving the dedication of all or any part of the tax revenues imposed and collected by the state except upon the two-thirds vote of the elected membership of each of the Houses and then only if the funds are to be used to make capital improvements, repel invasion or suppress insurrection.” Section 12 provides that “The funds, credit, property or things of value of the state, or of any political corporation thereof, shall not be loaned, pledged or granted to or for any person or persons, associations or corporations, public or private * *

. The trial judge also points out that there is a “further additional rental” that will obligate the state to pay all of the expenses connected with the bonds, the bonds themselves, and the administration of the project, including insurance premiums, as long as there are any bonds outstanding, in the event the state dismisses the district as the operator and manager of the stadium.