Court Opinion

ID: 9730668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:20:28.354281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:08.490369
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
Draper, J.
In his petition for rehearing the appellant calls our attention to the fact that he properly challenged the sufficiency of the facts stated in count one of the indictment to constitute a public offense under the laws of the State of Indiana, by addressing a motion in arrest of judgment thereto. The motion was overruled.
The appellant contends that the reckless homicide statute upon which count two of the indictment is based is specific, includes all the elements necessary to prove the more general offense of involuntary manslaughter, and so only the reckless homicide statute is presently in effect. Since count one of the indictment (involuntary manslaughter) was based upon driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor as the proximate cause of death, and wholly fails to charge facts constituting the offense of reckless homicide, the appellant insists count one of the indictment was insufficient.
We think all of appellant’s arguments in support of his position are fully answered by Burns’ 1952 Repl., §47-2002, which reads as follows:
“All proceedings under section 52 (§47-2001) *502of this act shall be subject to the following provisions :
“(1) Each of the three (3) offenses defined in this section is a distinct offense. No one of them includes another, or is included in another one of them. Section 52, subsection (a) (§47-2001 (a)), in creating the offense of reckless homicide, does not modify, amend or repeal any existing law, but is supplementary thereto and to the other sections of this act. All three (3) of the offenses, or any two (2) of them, may be joined in separate counts in the same indictment or affidavit. One (1) or more of them may be joined in separate counts with other counts alleging offenses not defined in this section, such as involuntary manslaughter, if the same act, transaction or occurrence was the basis for each of the offenses alleged. With respect to the offenses of reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter, a final judgment of conviction of one (1) of them shall be a bar to a prosecution for the other; or if they are joined in separate counts of the same indictment or affidavit, and if there is a conviction for both offenses, a penalty shall be imposed for one (1) offense only.”
The appellant does not attempt to point out that the quoted section is in any way ambiguous, ineffective, inapplicable or invalid. In fact he does not even mention this section. In this situation we take the statute at face value.
Rehearing denied.
Flanagan, C. J., Bobbitt, Emmert, Gilkison, JJ., concur.
NOTE. — Reported in 120 N. E. 2d 176.
Rehearing denied 121 N. E. 2d 732.