Court Opinion

ID: 9574361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:04:25.080394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:26.705834
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
concurring specially in Divisions 1 and 4.
I. I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Marchman v. State, 234 Ga. 40, 41-45 (215 SE2d 467) (1975) on the proper construction of Code Ann. § 26-507 dealing with former jeopardy. However, because I have failed to to convince a majority of this court, Marchman is now a precedent which must be followed until changed by this court or the General Assembly.
*3782. The provisions of Code Ann. § 59-705 do not confer upon counsel for the parties any absolute right as to the manner of conducting voir dire by counsel for the parties. On the contrary, this "control... is within the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and only in the event of manifest abuse will it be upset upon review.” Whitlock v. State, 230 Ga. 700 (5) (198 SE2d 865) (1973). "In regulating and controlling the business of the court, wide discretion is necessarily placed in the judge, and the appellate courts should never interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless it is made to appear that wrong or oppression has resulted from its abuse.” Kellar v. State, 226 Ga. 432 (4) (175 SE2d 654) (1970).
In my opinion, there has been no showing of manifest abuse of the trial court’s inherent power to control the voir dire proceeding.