Court Opinion

ID: 9706201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:34:16.593928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:20.087488
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.,
concurring.
KENT C. SULLIVAN, Justice, concurring.
I respectfully concur. I agree with the majority’s handling of the alleged competency issue presented in this appeal because appellant’s conclusory self-diagnosis of incompetence, by itself, did not require the trial court to conduct a competency inquiry. See McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 711 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). However, I write separately to note my discomfort with the apparent lack of specific, practical guidance given to trial judges under current law to assist them in resolving complicated questions as to a given defendant’s mental competence to stand trial. This lack of a consistent, reliable competency-analysis process increases the risk of inconsistent outcomes at the trial court and may significantly complicate effective appellate review.
Generally, a trial court should undertake an informal competency inquiry if it receives information sufficient to raise a bonafi.de doubt about a defendant’s competence, such as evidence indicating “recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” Id. at 710; Reed v. State, 112 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d); Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004 (Vernon 2006). The issue, of course, is how a trial judge, who is likely untrained as to the relevant companion medical and psychiatric issues, can most reliably accomplish this feat before compelling a defendant to stand trial.
Trial courts face a somewhat similar dilemma in the civil context when required to evaluate potential scientific testimony. *737This responsibility sometimes forces a judge into the role of “amateur scientist.” See S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 41 (Tex.1996) (Cornyn, J., concurring). In the civil arena, however, trial courts are at least given a more comprehensive set of nonexclusive factors to consider in discharging their duties as evidentiary “gate-keepers,” and they benefit from an area of the law that is particularly well-developed through E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson 1 and its progeny.
Unfortunately, the workings of the human mind — the specific subject of a competency determination — may be too complex to allow for easy resolution under some brief list of non-exclusive factors. See, e.g., S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 41 (Cornyn, J., concurring) (“[Tjrial courts face additional problems in behavioral science cases ... because these disciplines cannot be readily evaluated under the nonexclusive factors enunciated in Robinson.”). Thus, in other jurisdictions, trial courts are encouraged to broaden their competency analysis by considering some of the following questions as appropriate:
(1) whether the defendant has sufficient mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things;
(2) whether his elementary mental processes permit him to understand that he is in a court of law charged with a criminal offense;
(3) whether he realizes there is a judge on the bench;
(4) whether he understands that there is a prosecutor present who will attempt to convict him of a criminal charge;
(5) whether he understands he has a lawyer who will try to defend him against the charge;
(6) whether he knows that he should tell his lawyer all he knows or remembers about the events involved in the alleged crime;
(7) whether he understands that a fact-finder, such as a jury, will review the evidence in determining his guilt or innocence;
(8) whether he has sufficient memory and ability to formulate responses to questions posed to him, either on the stand or through informal, unrecorded conversations with his lawyer;
(9) whether he has established some degree of rapport with his attorney;
(10) whether he can follow the testimony and evidence reasonably well;
(11) whether he can meet stresses without having his rationality or judgment break down;
(12) whether he has at least some “minimal contact with reality”;
(13) whether he has at least the minimum intelligence necessary to understand the events unfolding before him;
(14) whether he can confer coherently with some understanding of the proceedings;
(15) whether he can both give and receive advise from his lawyer;
(16) whether he can divulge facts with distress or paranoia;
(17) whether he can decide upon a plea or course of action;
(18) whether he can testify, if necessary and considered appropriate,
(19) whether he can make simple decisions; and
(20) whether he has a desire for justice in lieu of undeserved punishment.2
*738See State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501, 299 N.W.2d 538, 545 (1980) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring) (citing Wieter v. Settle, 193 F.Supp. 318, 321-22 (W.D.Mo.1961)). Consideration of such a broad range of practical factors may provide better insight as to whether a defendant might lack (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational and factual awareness of the proceedings against him. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003(a) (Vernon 2006).
Admittedly, it is not for this Court to impose new competence-inquiry procedures on trial courts. However, in light of the constitutional implications involved, the trial court’s competency determination should certainly not be rooted in simply hoping that a defendant can provide useful information in response to such questions as “Are you competent?” or “Are you insane?” such as were asked in this case. Incompetence to stand trial, of course, is not synonymous with legal insanity. See McCoin v. State, 56 S.W.3d 609, 613 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (“Competence is only concerned with a defendant’s present ability to comprehend and aid in his defense, whereas an insanity defense is concerned with a defendant’s state of mind at the time of the commission of the crime.”). To its credit, the trial court pursued the question of appellant’s competence by asking him (1) whether he knew why he was in the courtroom that day, (2) whether he understood the nature of the charge against him, and (3) if he had been advised to seek medical treatment for his learning disability. However, because the law does not well equip trial judges to handle closer calls as to a defendant’s legal competence, I respectfully concur.

. 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995).

. Similarly, many courts and experts consult a thirteen-point checklist known as the “McGarry Scale” to resolve competency questions. See Stowe v. State, 272 Ga. 866, 536 S.E.2d 506, 508 (2000), overruled, on other grounds by Sims v. State, 279 Ga. 389, 614 *738S.E.2d 73 (2005); State v. Garfoot, 207 Wis.2d 214, 558 N.W.2d 626, 632 n. 7 (1997); State v. Shields, 593 A.2d 986, 1000 n. 23 (Del.1990). Generally, the McGarry Scale examines the defendant's ability to understand the charges and course of proceedings, effectively consider possible legal defenses, participate in planning legal strategy, and communicate relevant facts as needed. See Shields, 593 A.2d at 1000 n. 23. A simpler formulation of these considerations, consisting of five factors, was adopted as the appropriate legal test in Mississippi. See Martin v. State, 871 So.2d 693, 697 (Miss.2004).