Court Opinion

ID: 9915822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 18:02:33.479001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:18.422502
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/8/24 In re A.T. CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re A.T., a Person Coming Under
 the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                         D082737
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
 AND HUMAN SERVICES
 AGENCY,                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. EJ4673)
            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.

 A.T.,

            Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed.
          William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      A.T. (Father)1 appeals following the jurisdictional findings and removal
order in the dependency case of his son, A.T. (Son), contending that they are
unsupported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
                                       I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Son was approximately 10 days old when the San Diego Health and
Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a protective custody warrant and

dependency petition on his behalf (Welf. & Inst. Code,2 § 300, subd. (j)). Son’s
dependency petition alleged he was in need of juvenile court protection under
section 300, subdivision (j), because his older sibling, S.T. (Daughter)
sustained nonaccidental injuries in the care of her parents. Because Son’s
dependency petition is inextricably linked with Daughter’s, we begin by
reviewing Daughter’s dependency matter.
A. Daughter’s Injuries and Dependency Petition
      Father and J.V. (Mother) (together the parents) had Daughter in June
2021. At that time, the family lived together with the paternal grandmother,
paternal great-grandmother, paternal aunt, and paternal uncle.
      When Daughter was approximately two months old, her parents
brought her to a children’s hospital emergency room “due to unresponsive
behaviors,” “overheating,” and “her eyes . . . rolling back.” The parents
claimed they believed Daughter was suffering a “heat seizure.” Daughter
“presented with bruising on her left cheek and left arm” as well as bruises
and scratches on her face and body, and inside her cheek. Father claimed

1     Mother is not a party to this appeal.

2     All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
                                        2
that Daughter urinated on him the night before, which increased his anxiety,
and that she subsequently slipped from his hands and into the sink while he
washed her. Father stated that the paternal grandmother was present in the
home during the incident, but in fact she was out of town. While the bruising
on Daughter’s left side “aligned with the fall into the sink,” she also had
abrasions on the inside of her mouth, the right side of her head, and behind
her right ear. Accordingly, staff at the children’s hospital made a report with
the police.
      Two weeks later, a “skeletal survey showed [Daughter] had five
fractures on her legs.” All were healing, though some were newer than
others. Neither parent disclosed the source of the fractures, which medical
staff determined to be nonaccidental. These fractures were inconsistent with
a fall or drop into the sink. Daughter’s doctor explained the fractures “can
only happen by shaking the baby, slamming the baby down, or violently
pulling the baby’s extremities.”
      The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency)
filed a section 300, subdivision (a), petition in August 2021 on Daughter’s
behalf. Father and Mother maintained that they “[had] no idea how
[Daughter] obtained multiple fractures to her body.” Daughter was initially
placed with a foster family in August 2021. Father reportedly told others
that he believed the doctor who reported on Daughter’s injuries was lying,
and that the numerous fractures could be “growth fractures.” Mother
believed the fractures “were likely due to [Father] swaddling [Daughter] ‘the
wrong way.’ ” Paternal grandmother asserted to the Agency that Daughter’s
neonatal jaundice made her bones “soft,” which the doctor disputed.
      San Diego Police arrested Father in August 2022 for felony violations of
Penal Code sections 273a(a) (child cruelty) and 273d(a) (inflicting injury upon

                                        3
a child.) In conjunction with his arrest, the criminal court issued a criminal
protective order for Daughter. Father texted his mother that he was stressed
and “ ‘[j]ust going to plead guilty.’ ” Around the time of Father’s arrest, in the
summer of 2022, when Daughter was approximately 14 months old, Mother
returned Daughter to her caregiver after a supervised visit “with scratches
and redness on her upper back.” During another visit, Mother’s dog bit
Daughter. The maternal aunt who supervised that visit blamed the dog bite
on Daughter, stating, “[Daughter] decided that she wanted to get close to the
dog” and that Mother and the aunt knew the dog “isn’t very friendly with
younger kids.”
      In January 2022, the juvenile court sustained the Agency’s petition and
declared Daughter a dependent under section 300, subdivision (a). Shortly
thereafter, Father and Mother moved alone into on-base military housing in
Coronado. At the subsequent March 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile
court determined neither Mother nor Father made progress “toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement,” and ordered
continued placement away from them. A nonrelative family member
(Caregiver) accepted placement of Daughter in March 2022.
      Mother and Father briefly separated in November and December 2022,
During this period, Father reported feeling suicidal, but he later denied
making those statements. Mother and Father currently live together, and
Father continues to serve in the military.
B. Son’s Birth and Subsequent Agency Involvement
      In March 2023, Father and Mother had Son after an unplanned
pregnancy. After his birth, the hospital declined to discharge Son with the
parents due to the history of child abuse. The following day, the child abuse
hotline received a report, citing concern for Son.

                                        4
      On March 29, 2023, the Agency filed a section 300, subdivision (j)
petition alleging “there is a substantial risk that [Son] will be abused or
neglected.” To explain the risk, the Agency cited the extensive physical
injuries Daughter sustained when she was two months old. Son was taken
into protective custody under section 340, subdivision (a) and placed with
Daughter in the same resource family home. The Agency inquired if the
parents had any family or friends who could live with them to ensure Son’s
safety, but the parents were unable to identify anyone. An attempt to hold a
child family team meeting with the parents was unsuccessful as they
canceled in the hours before.
C. Parents’ Engagement in Services and Responsiveness to the Agency
      At Father’s criminal preliminary hearing in April 2023, the judge found
probable cause to proceed on both charges. Father did not respond to the
Agency’s inquiries into the status of his criminal case.
      Both parents were slow to begin services after Daughter was removed
from their custody and were inconsistent with their participation in services.
While the parents eventually participated in a handful of marriage
counseling sessions, they continued to fight and subsequently stopped
attending. Notably, Father did not engage in individual therapy until late
January 2023. His therapist believed he was withholding information from
her, including the nature of Daughter’s injuries, and recommended Father
continue in individual therapy to address his anxiety and other issues. We
can find no evidence in the record that he has done so. Father made
“ ‘modest progress’ ” in his child abuse parenting group, though he often
earned mediocre scores for his empathy and insight. Insight reflects the
“ability to understand that something did happen to the baby that was not
accidental.” Without insight, the Agency is concerned that the focus is not on

                                        5
the children, what happened to Daughter, or providing safety. Although his
parenting group leader stated he had “no concerns” about Father, he also
described the group as “superficial.” He disclosed that his assessment is
based only on what group members “want [him] to know.” Father neither
acknowledged that Daughter experienced abuse nor admitted his role in the
injuries. Finally, although Father was asked to complete a 12-week domestic
violence program, he failed to do so.
      Mother attended her child abuse group from approximately January
2022 until April 2022 before quitting. She reenrolled in the group in August
2022. However, she was “disengaged and not interested” in the group; she
completed only three homework assignments and seven journal entries over
the course of 27 sessions. According to the group leader, Mother does only
“the ‘bare minimum.’ ” Mother began attending the group nearly a year after
Daughter was removed, after she learned she was pregnant with Son. After
nearly 18 months of receiving services for Daughter’s dependency case,
Mother still did not have a child abuse safety plan and she “ ‘made no
improvement, has little empathy for [Daughter], and is not showing insight.’ ”
Mother was “unable to identify warning signs or red flags of child abuse,”
despite her classes, and demonstrated “distorted blame.” Mother indicated
she “would come up with a safe word with her children,” but they were both
too young to use safe words.
      Further, Mother “ ‘doesn’t understand why the Agency is making her
complete a [domestic violence] group’ ” in spite of reporting domestic violence
herself. After attending only a few sessions, she quit the domestic violence
program; again, she reengaged only when she was “very pregnant” with Son.
She disclosed that she often fought with Father “over small things” and his
fidelity, and that Father engages in “financial abuse in their marriage.

                                        6
Despite her claim that there have been no physical altercations, she disclosed
to her domestic violence group that she once called Father an “idiot” and that
it led to “him putting hands on her.” This incident occurred in January 2022.
The Caregivers became uncomfortable supervising joint visits “due to
‘arguing, jealousy, and disrespect’ ” between Father and Mother. The
paternal grandmother reported that Father pushed Mother out of the way
during a visit with Daughter and other family during a 2022 Easter
celebration. In December 2022, the Caregiver witnessed the parents “trying
to snatch phones out of each other’s hands” while Daughter was in Mother’s
lap. Finally, Mother was often rated only a 2 or 3 for acceptance of
responsibility and empathy, and a 0 for insight.
      Ultimately, as the parents neared the 18-month review of their
dependency case for Daughter, they had made “minimal progress in their
case plan” and maintained only “supervised visit[s]” with Daughter. Despite
their extensive and prolonged services, both parents “show little insight” as
to Daughter’s injuries. Daughter had not been returned to their custody and
the Agency did not believe either parent was prepared to move to
unsupervised visitation with either child. Further, the criminal protective
order remained in place, limiting Father’s contact with Daughter.
      The Caregivers reported that the Mother and Father did not check in or
ask for pictures of their children. They did not maximize their time with
their children and were “often late.” Mother and Father have canceled visits
with little warning and inconsistent explanations. The Caregiver also
reported Father panicking while changing Daughter’s diaper, and being
rough with Daughter. The paternal grandmother had similarly warned
Father to play more gently. Father became overwhelmed with services and
voluntarily decreased his individual visits, then indicated he was not

                                       7
available during proposed supervised visitation dates and times. When
Father received a copy of the Agency’s report, he confronted the Caregiver
over her reported statements, which the Caregiver described as him “trying
to bully” her.
D. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing for Son
      After Son’s detention, the Agency requested that the court make a true
finding on the petition and an order that Son be removed from parents’
custody. Son’s counsel supported the Agency’s request. In July 2023, the
court held a multi-day contested evidentiary hearing. At the conclusion of
the hearings, the court stated that it had considered the totality of the
circumstances, including the injuries Daughter endured, Daughter’s age at
the time of the injuries, the parents’ participation in services, and domestic
violence concerns, and found that Son was at substantial risk for
nonaccidental injury. The court credited Father’s participation in a child
abuse program, but noted that Father’s progress was offset by his failure to
acknowledge the abuse to Daughter “despite medical evidence to the
contrary.” The court therefore made a true finding as to the petition and
declared Son a dependent of the juvenile court. Further, considering the
evidence in support of the jurisdictional finding as well as unaddressed
domestic violence and a lack of commitment to marriage counseling, the court
ordered removal from the parents’ custody, with supervised visitation.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdiction Order
      On this record, we disagree with Father’s contention that there was
insufficient evidence to support the jurisdictional order.

                                       8
      Section 300, subdivision (j) allows the court to declare a child a
dependent of the court when (1) “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or
neglected” and (2) “there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or
neglected” as defined in subdivisions (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i).
      At the jurisdictional hearing, the court considers only whether the child
is a person described by section 300. The Agency must prove that a child is a
person described by section 300 by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re
Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318; § 355, subd. (a).) “The court
shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the
sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of
the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other
factors the court considers probative . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (j).)
      On appeal, Father has the burden of showing the jurisdictional findings
are unsupported by substantial evidence. (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135; disapproved on another ground by Renee J. v.
Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) In applying this standard,
“the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have
found it highly probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996.) We view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of
fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the
evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence. (Id. at p. 996.)
      Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings under section 300, subdivision (j). It is undisputed that Daughter
was adjudged a dependent under section 300, subdivision (a) due to the

                                           9
nonaccidental harm inflicted upon her by a parent.3 Thus, we consider
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is a substantial risk that Son will
suffer serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon him by a parent.
(See § 300, subds. (a) and (j).)
        It is undisputed that the parents have not physically harmed Son. This
fact is not particularly helpful in the analysis, however, because Son has
never lived with the parents and has never had unsupervised time with
them.
        At the time the court declared Son a dependent, he was approximately
four months old. As found by the court in her dependency case, when
Daughter was similar in age, and while she lived with six family members,
she suffered serious nonaccidental injuries inflicted by a parent or guardian.
A doctor specializing in child abuse concluded Daughter’s injuries were both
nonaccidental and inconsistent with the various purported explanations
offered by Father, Mother, and their family members. Her skeletal survey
suggested repeated abuse, given the healing and new fractures in her legs.
Father now faces charges for inflicting those injuries upon her.
        Against this backdrop of injury to Son’s sibling, we consider the parents
and their commitment to becoming safe and protective. The Agency designed

3      As Father admits, “no party disputes that [Daughter] ‘has been abused
or neglected as defined by section 300[,] [subdivision (a).]’ ” Father is
estopped from relitigating the nature of Daughter’s injuries. (In re Joshua J.
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 984, 994–995.) As in Joshua J., we reject Father’s
“suggestion that the juvenile court’s prior true finding in [Daughter’s]
dependency proceeding had limited relevance . . . [because the] true finding
was a conclusive adjudication on the merits that [Daughter] was abused,
which was one of two issues presented by the section 300, subdivision (j)
petition.” (Id. at pp. 993–994.)
                                        10
a plan to remedy the identified issues and to support the parents in
reunifying with Daughter, but the parents declined to meaningfully
participate in those services until they identified the risk of a second
dependency petition upon the birth of Son. The parents stopped participating
in child abuse group, domestic violence group, individual therapy, and
marriage counseling. Additionally, Father failed to participate in visitation
with Daughter for a period of time. The lack of commitment and lack of
progress indicate that parents have not learned how to address the conditions
that gave rise to Son’s dependency matter.
      The parents have, further, failed to gain insight into Daughter’s abuse.
While Father, alone, appeals, we must contextualize his progress alongside
Mother’s. Son, if returned to Father’s care, would also reside with Mother.
The parents and their identified support system insist that the fractures are
growth fractures, that the doctor is lying, that swaddling caused the multiple
fractures, and that Daughter’s jaundice at birth made her bones “soft.” A
child abuse doctor disagrees with these explanations. Because of these
assertions, the Agency and various service providers repeatedly reported that
the parents lack insight into Daughter’s injuries. Their continued lack of
insight into Daughter’s injuries demonstrates their inability to understand
what protection and safety entails and they, therefore, cannot provide
protection and safety to Son.
      While the parents expressed affection and care for Son, the record is
clear that they made the same assertions regarding Daughter, who
nevertheless experienced significant physical abuse. We conclude there was
substantial evidence to support the court’s finding by a preponderance of the
evidence that there was a substantial risk that Son, who was similar in age,
affection, and vulnerability to Daughter, would suffer serious physical harm

                                       11
inflicted nonaccidentally. Therefore, the court did not err in finding that the
petition was true and in declaring Son to be a dependent of the juvenile court.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Dispositional Order
      Concluding the juvenile court had substantial evidence to find
jurisdiction over Son, we turn to whether substantial evidence supports the
court’s dispositional order removing Son from Father’s physical custody.
      “The fundamental right to the care and custody of one’s child is
protected by Constitution and statute.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 522, 525 (Henry V.); accord In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398,
419–420; In re James T. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 58, 64.) “A child may not be
taken from a parent’s physical custody during juvenile dependency
proceedings, except for a temporary detention period, unless clear and
convincing evidence supports a ground for removal specified by the
Legislature.” (Henry V., at p. 525.)
      Section 361 imposes restraints on the juvenile court’s authority to
remove a child from a parent’s physical custody. (§ 361, subd. (c).) It
provides that “[a] dependent child shall not be taken from the physical
custody of his or her parents, . . . unless the juvenile court finds clear and
convincing evidence” that “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the
minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means
by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the
minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)
The statute further provides “[t]he court shall consider, as a reasonable
means to protect the minor,” the option of removing the offending parent
from the home (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(A)), and whether the nonoffending parent

                                        12
“presents a plan acceptable to the court demonstrating that he or she will be
able to protect the child from future harm” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1)(B)).
      “In determining whether a child may be safely maintained in the
parent’s physical custody, the juvenile court may consider the parent’s past
conduct and current circumstances, and the parent’s response to the
conditions that gave rise to juvenile court intervention.” (In re D.B. (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 320, 332.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor
need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus
of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 126, 135–136.) The court has broad discretion in selecting a
disposition that serves the child’s best interests. (In re Nada R. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 1166, 1179.)
      We review a dispositional order removing a child from a parent for
substantial evidence, “ ‘keeping in mind that the trial court was required to
make its order based on the higher standard of clear and convincing
evidence.’ ” (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) Here, Father, as the
party challenging the juvenile court’s order, has the burden to show there is
insufficient evidence to support the court’s decision. (In re Lana S. (2012) 207
Cal.App.4th 94, 103.)
      We conclude that the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings
also supports the dispositional order, even under the higher “clear and
convincing evidence” standard. As discussed above, there is substantial
evidence that returning Son to the parents would have resulted in a
substantial danger to his physical health. We conclude there is also
substantial evidence to support the court’s finding by clear and convincing
evidence that removal was necessary to protect Son from the type of abuse
suffered by his sibling.

                                       13
      Father asserts removal from their collective physical custody was
improper and we, accordingly, will evaluate the parents collectively,
particularly because the parents live together.
      In the prior section, we have discussed Father’s first contention,
regarding the substantial danger to Son’s physical health, safety, and
protection above. Next, we address Father’s second contention, regarding
domestic violence. He contends that the domestic violence dynamic “has no
bearing on whether [Son] is at substantial risk of being abused or neglected.”
Though Father did not take part in the voluntary domestic violence classes,
Mother did and she is or should be aware of “the effects of domestic violence
to the brain of children.”
      Multiple parties including Mother report that they continue to fight
often. Father asserts on appeal that the altercation he had with Mother in
2022 was “a [s]ingle [i]ncident.” Our review of the record indicates it was one
of three such disclosed incidents in the calendar year. These incidents,
coupled with the asserted financial abuse, support the court’s concerns
regarding domestic violence dynamics between Father and Mother and the
effect it would have on Son. While Father stated they “do not believe to
resorting to violence” when it comes to parenting, we find his claim
challenging to reconcile with the incidents described and the record as a
whole.
      Next, we address the parents’ “response to the conditions that gave rise
to the court’s intervention.” They demonstrate a pattern of briefly engaging
in services before quitting. The success of their reunification services is
dependent on their willingness to participate. Father’s therapist believed he
was withholding information critical to moving forward. Mother rarely
completed homework assignments and did only the bare minimum. Father

                                       14
faces charges for the injuries Daughter sustained and Mother has not
developed a plan to keep a child or children safe. Father mischaracterizes
their efforts and states both parents have made “significant progress” toward
reunifying with Daughter. The court describes the progress as limited, and it
is significant that after 18 months, the parents had not yet graduated to
unsupervised visits with Daughter. Mother’s “lack of overall progress” was
actually “a huge concern” for the Agency and it was “below expectation.”
      We note that both Father and Mother name their family members as
their support network. When Daughter sustained her bruises and fractures,
there were four other adults living in the home, many of whom are now listed
as supports for the parents. The same family members are among those who
have been unwilling to admit that Daughter was nonaccidentally injured,
have failed to protect her during visits, and have blamed her for being bitten
by a dog when she was 12 months old. They cannot reasonably be expected to
now ensure Son’s safety should he be returned to the parents’ physical
custody. Further, Father and Mother are living alone together in on-base
military housing. They were unable to provide the name of someone who
could live with them to protect Son. If Son returned to their physical custody,
there is no one else present to monitor their interactions with Son or ensure
his safety and well-being. Son’s young age means that he is incapable of
protecting himself from the sort of physical violence that caused Daughter’s
injuries. As a young child, he is deserving of special protection (In re Rocco
M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824), and the paramount purpose underlying
the dependency proceeding is the protection of the child. (In re Jason L.
(1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) A dependency petition is brought to
benefit the child, not to punish the parents. (In re La Shonda B. (1979) 95
Cal.App.3d 593, 599.)

                                       15
     On these facts, we conclude there was substantial evidence to order
removal from the parents.
                              DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

HUFFMAN, J.

                                    16