Court Opinion

ID: 9943857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:00:50.145027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:35.183504
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13819   Document: 47-1    Date Filed: 02/26/2024   Page: 1 of 23

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-13819
                         ____________________

        STEPHEN SEWALK,
        an individual,
        SMS BUSINESS ENTITIES, INC.,
        a Colorado corporation,
                                                  Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        VALPAK DIRECT MARKETING SYSTEMS, LLC,
        a Delaware limited liability company,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13819

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-00168-AAS
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                 Plaintiffs-Appellants Stephen Sewalk and SMS Business En-
        tities, Inc. (SMS) (collectively, Appellants) appeal from two orders:
        (1) an order denying their motion to reopen the case “due to extor-
        tion in procuring [the] settlement agreement” (Motion to Reopen);
        and (2) an order denying their “motion for leave to disclose com-
        munications of [a] July 12 mediation pursuant to Local Rule 4.03(g)
        and for leave to resubmit [their] motion to reopen [the] case” (Mo-
        tion for Leave)—a motion that the district court construed as a mo-
        tion for reconsideration.
              After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument,
        we conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction over both orders.
        And because the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing Appellants’ motions here, we affirm.
             I.     FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                Valpak Direct Marketing Systems, LLC (Valpak), operates a
        full-service marketing agency that advertises for around 35,000 lo-
        cal businesses. On March 11, 2019, Valpak and SMS, a Colorado-
        based corporation, entered into the Valpak Direct Marketing Sys-
        tems, Inc. Franchise Agreement (the Franchise Agreement), in
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        22-13819                  Opinion of the Court                                3

        which Valpak granted SMS an exclusive franchise (the Franchise)
        to operate and sell advertising under the Valpak name in southern
        Colorado. Stephen Sewalk is SMS’s principal and an “Owner” un-
        der the Franchise Agreement, although he is not a party to that
        agreement.
                On July 28, 2021, Sewalk filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
        tion, 1 which listed the value of the Franchise as $12,000. See In re
        Sewalk, No. 1:21-bk-13895 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2021). Upon filing of
        the petition, an automatic stay was issued, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3),
        barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
        property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
        estate.” Under the Bankruptcy Code, debtors, such as Sewalk, are
        required to file bankruptcy schedules that include a complete list of
        all their assets, liabilities, and the contracts to which they are par-
        ties. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b). Sewalk filed several bankruptcy
        schedules in his bankruptcy case but did not identify the Franchise
        Agreement on those schedules as an asset or contract, nor did he
        identify Valpak as a creditor or contract counterparty. The bank-
        ruptcy schedules, however, did disclose that Sewalk held an inter-
        est in SMS, which Sewalk declared under penalty of perjury, valued
        at $12,000.
               Sewalk failed to have a plan of reorganization confirmed in
        his bankruptcy case, which was ultimately dismissed without ob-
        jection on November 15, 2021. However, on November 3, 2021,

        1 Sewalk jointly filed the bankruptcy petition with his wife. Because she is not

        a party to this case, we simply refer to the bankruptcy case as Sewalk’s.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                 22-13819

        before the November 15 dismissal, Sewalk informed Valpak of the
        bankruptcy petition. In response, on November 11, 2021, Valpak
        terminated the Franchise Agreement with SMS. In its termination
        letter to SMS, Valpak invoked section 13.1(a)(i) of the Franchise
        Agreement, which allows Valpak “to terminate [the Franchise
        Agreement] by delivering a written notice to [SMS]” if Sewalk, as
        Owner of SMS, “files or has filed against [him] a petition in bank-
        ruptcy.”
               Then, on January 1, 2022, Appellants sued Valpak in the
        Middle District of Florida, alleging that: (1) Valpak violated the au-
        tomatic stay as to the assets of Sewalk’s bankruptcy estate by ter-
        minating the Franchise Agreement before dismissal of the bank-
        ruptcy action; and (2) Valpak materially breached the Franchise
        Agreement by terminating it without cause. Appellants claimed
        that they suffered damages, including the loss of Sewalk’s Fran-
        chise, which they valued at around $1,000,000. Valpak moved to
        dismiss Appellants’ complaint. The magistrate judge 2 directed the
        parties to attend mediation in accordance with the Middle District
        of Florida’s Local Rules.
               Before engaging in mediation, the parties entered into a me-
        diation agreement, which provided that the parties “shall maintain
        the confidentiality of the mediation.” The mediation took place on
        July 12, 2022, via Zoom, with both parties represented by counsel.

        2 The parties consented to U.S. Magistrate Judge Amanda Arnold Sansone’s

        jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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        22-13819               Opinion of the Court                         5

        The mediation was conducted by a jointly selected mediator and
        resulted in a confidential settlement agreement.
               Then, on July 20, 2022, the district court, after receiving the
        mediation report on July 28, 2022, dismissed the case without prej-
        udice, “subject to the right of the parties, within sixty (60) days of
        the date of this order, to submit a stipulated form of final order or
        judgment, request an extension of time, or for any party to move
        to reopen the action upon a showing of good cause.” The order
        explained that, after sixty days, “the dismissal will be with preju-
        dice.”
               On August 15, 2022, Appellants filed their Motion to Reo-
        pen, at which point they also asked for sanctions against Valpak and
        its counsel. Appellants claimed that, at the mediation, they were
        “criminally extorted” by Valpak, which had allegedly threatened to
        report Appellants to the authorities for bankruptcy fraud if Appel-
        lants did not agree to the settlement agreement terms in one hour.
        In support of these allegations, Appellants attached an affidavit
        from Sewalk, which referenced statements allegedly made during
        the mediation. But Appellants failed to obtain permission of the
        court or Valpak to disclose any of the statements made during the
        mediation. Valpak opposed the Motion to Reopen.
               On September 6, 2022, the district court denied Appellants’
        Motion to Reopen and directed the Clerk to strike the motion for
        including confidential mediation negotiation details. The district
        court first stated that Appellants’ Motion to Reopen “improperly
        divulge[d] in great detail what occurred during the parties’
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13819

        confidential mediation.” The court then construed Appellants’
        claims of criminal extortion as an argument for setting aside the
        settlement agreement based on coercion and duress. Applying
        Florida law, the district court explained that Appellants must prove
        that (1) the settlement agreement was executed involuntarily, and
        (2) Valpak exerted some improper and coercive conduct over Ap-
        pellants to effectuate the settlement. The court, however, found
        that “Valpak’s negotiation position at the mediation was not extor-
        tion, coercion, or duress” under Florida law, relying on our un-
        published decision in United States v. Contents of Bank of America, 452
        F. App’x 881, 882 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), which stated that
        “Florida law appears to hold that the threat of criminal prosecution
        does not constitute duress and will not justify rescission of the set-
        tlement agreement.” Thus, Appellants had established neither that
        the settlement agreement should be set aside nor that good cause
        existed for reopening the case.
               On September 23, 2022, Appellants filed their Motion for
        Leave where Appellants asked permission to disclose communica-
        tions from the July 22 mediation and resubmit their motion to re-
        open the case. Appellants argued that the order denying their mo-
        tion to reopen was clearly erroneous because Valpak did not pro-
        vide any evidence that the threat of reporting them for alleged
        bankruptcy fraud was legally justified. Valpak opposed Appellants’
        motion, asserting that it was a poorly disguised motion for recon-
        sideration of the order denying Appellants’ motion to reopen the
        case and that the September 6 order was fully supported by the law
        and record.
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        22-13819                    Opinion of the Court                            7

               On November 9, 2022, the district court construed Appel-
        lants’ Motion for Leave as a motion for reconsideration and denied
        the motion. The court explained that Appellants raised identical
        arguments to those in their prior motion and requested leave to file
        the same Sewalk affidavit with confidential mediation testimony
        that was previously stricken. Further, there was neither an inter-
        vening change in controlling law nor a need to correct clear error
        or prevent manifest injustice. The court also noted that Appellants
        cited two Florida cases for the first time—Berger v. Berger, 466 So.
        2d 1149 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985) and Franklin v. Wallack, 576
        So. 2d 1371 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991)—and explained that both
        cases involved “family law marital property disputes and are thus
        factually unanalogous to the present dispute.” In citing Judge
        Sharp’s dissent in Franklin, the district court noted that “the sum of
        Florida case law appears to state ‘duress cannot be established by
        proof that a guilty person was threatened with criminal prosecu-
        tion, where the threat has a connection with the demand for which
        compensation is sought.’” 3 Therefore the court said that “to the
        extent Florida law allows for the threat of criminal prosecution as
        evidence supporting a contractual defense of duress, such a defense
        necessitates a finding that ‘the threat to prosecute had to be itself
        unjustified or illegal.’” 4
              Appellants filed their notice of appeal of the court’s orders
        on their Motion to Reopen and Motion for Leave with this Court

        3 576 So. 2d at 1373 (Sharp., J., dissenting).

        4 Id.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13819

        on November 11, 2022. Then, at the district court, Appellants
        moved to supplement the record on appeal with the Sewalk affida-
        vit pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e). Valpak
        opposed this motion, and the district court denied the motion, ex-
        plaining that Appellants failed to show that the proposed docu-
        ments were omitted from the appellate record by error or accident
        as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e).
              After Appellants filed their initial brief in this appeal, they
        moved to supplement the record with the Sewalk affidavit under
        Rule 10(e). Appellants argued that the Sewalk affidavit should be
        included in the record under Rule 10(e)(3) on the grounds that it is
        necessary for this court to have a fair understanding of what oc-
        curred in the proceedings below. Valpak opposed this motion.
               We originally carried Appellants’ motion to supplement the
        motion with the case but granted their request before oral argu-
        ment. Sewalk filed his affidavit under seal, and we have considered
        that affidavit in making our decision. 5
                                    II.     ANALYSIS
               On appeal, Appellants contend Florida law provides that ex-
        tortion is grounds for voiding a settlement agreement. They argue
        that they have alleged a prima facie case of extortion by Valpak
        during the mediation—based on the allegations made in their

        5 Because Sewalk’s affidavit references confidential mediation statements, this

        opinion only uses broad descriptions of what occurred without mentioning
        specific statements from the affidavit.
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        22-13819                Opinion of the Court                            9

        stricken motion to reopen the case and the accompanying Sewalk
        affidavit—such that an evidentiary hearing should have been held
        on their motion.
               In response, Valpak first asserts that we lack appellate juris-
        diction over the district court’s order denying Appellants’ Motion
        to Reopen because: (1) Appellants did not file their notice of appeal
        of that order within the thirty-day window required by Federal
        Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), and (2) Appellants’ Motion for
        Leave does not qualify as one of the enumerated motions set forth
        in Rule 4(a)(4) to toll the deadline to file a notice of appeal. Valpak
        also argues that the district court’s orders denying Appellants’ Mo-
        tion to Reopen and Motion for Leave should be affirmed for the
        reasons stated in those orders.
               We first address Valpak’s argument that we lack appellate
        jurisdiction, then move to the merits of Appellants’ appeal.
                                A. Appellate Jurisdiction
               We are required to review our appellate jurisdiction de novo
        because “[w]e have a duty to assure ourselves of our jurisdiction at
        all times in the appellate process.” Butler v. Gualtieri, 41 F.4th 1329,
        1334 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted).
               “In a civil case, except as provided in Rules 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(4),
        and 4(c), the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk
        within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”
        Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). When a party files certain enumerated
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13819

        motions 6 under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—and does so
        within the time allowed by those rules—“the time to file an appeal
        runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last
        such remaining motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Rule 4(a)’s
        thirty-day time limit is “‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Campbell
        v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 703 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Browder
        v. Dir., Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978)).
               Valpak contends that we lack jurisdiction over the district
        court’s order denying Appellants’ Motion to Reopen the case be-
        cause Appellants’ notice of appeal was untimely as to that order.
        Appellants filed their notice of appeal of the September 6, 2022, or-
        der on November 11, 2022—more than a month after Rule 4(a)’s
        thirty-day deadline. But Appellants filed a “motion for leave to dis-
        close communications of [a] July 12 mediation pursuant to Local
        Rule 4.03(g) and for leave to resubmit [their] motion to reopen
        [the] case” on September 23, 2022. Valpak asserts that Appellants’
        Motion for Leave does not fall within any of the enumerated mo-
        tions set forth in Rule 4(a)(4) and that, as such, it did not toll Rule

        6 These enumerated motions are: (i) for judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

        Procedure 50(b); (ii) to amend or make additional factual findings under Fed-
        eral Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b); (iii) for attorney’s fees under Federal Rule
        of Civil Procedure 54 if the district court extends the time to appeal under
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58; (iv) to alter or amend the judgment under
        Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59; (v) for a new trial under Federal Rule of
        Civil Procedure 59; or (vi) for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60
        if the motion is filed no later than twenty-eight days after the judgment is en-
        tered.
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        22-13819               Opinion of the Court                        11

        4(a)’s thirty-day deadline to file the notice of appeal of the Septem-
        ber 6 order.
                But while Appellants’ Motion for Leave does not rely on or
        reference any of the Rules listed in Rule 4(a)(4), e.g., Rule 59, we
        have stated that “[w]hether a motion for post-judgment relief can
        be categorized as a motion under Rule 59 is not determined by
        whether the movant so labels it. Rather, the court must determine
        independently what type of motion was before the district court,
        depending upon the type of relief requested.” Wooden v. Bd. of Re-
        gents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001) (quo-
        tations omitted). In their Motion for Leave, Appellants directly
        challenged the district court’s previous order as “clearly errone-
        ous.” The request seeking leave to file the Sewalk affidavit was just
        one part of their challenge to the order. In other words, Appellants’
        motion sought reconsideration of the merits of the dispute, which
        means Rule 59 applies. See id. Further, Appellants’ Motion for
        Leave cited a Middle District of Florida case setting forth the stand-
        ard for reconsideration, and the district court construed their mo-
        tion as one for reconsideration, although the court did not specifi-
        cally list either Rule 59 or 60.
                Therefore, Appellants’ Motion for Leave is best construed as
        a Rule 59(e) motion. Appellants filed their motion within Rule
        4(a)’s thirty-day window, and the motion thus tolled the time for
        Appellants to file the notice of appeal as to the September 6 order.
        And because Appellants filed their notice of appeal within thirty
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        12                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13819

        days of the order denying their Motion to Leave, we have jurisdic-
        tion to consider Appellants’ appeal of both orders.
               We now turn to the merits of the appeal.
                                         B. Merits
                We review the denial of a motion to reopen a case because
        a settlement agreement should be set aside for an abuse of discre-
        tion. Cf. Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1485
        (11th Cir. 1994). We also “review a district court’s denial of a mo-
        tion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.” See Corwin v. Walt
        Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007). But we “review de
        novo the district court’s interpretation of Florida law.” Int’l Fid. Ins.
        Co. v. Americaribe-Moriarty JV, 906 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2018).
               We first turn to the district court’s order denying Appellants’
        Motion to Reopen. Appellants argue that extortion is grounds for
        voiding a settlement agreement under Florida law and that they
        have alleged a prima facie case of extortion. As a result, the district
        court should have found good cause for setting aside the settlement
        agreement.
               As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must apply the sub-
        stantive law of Florida in this case. See Fioretti v. Mass. Gen. Life. Ins.
        Co., 53 F.3d 1228, 1235 (11th Cir. 1995). When Florida law is un-
        clear, we make an Erie guess as to how the Florida Supreme Court
        would rule on the issue. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,
        80 (1938); Nunez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 685 F.3d 1205, 1207 (11th Cir.
        2012). And that rule requires us to “follow decisions by the inter-
        mediate appellate court of the state except where there is a strong
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        22-13819               Opinion of the Court                       13

        indication that the state supreme court would decide the matter
        differently.” Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1086 (11th Cir.
        2004).
                “A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, its con-
        struction and enforcement are governed by principles of Florida’s
        general contract law.” Schwartz v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 807 F.2d 901,
        905 (11th Cir. 1987). “[A] plaintiff who executes a release within
        the context of a settlement pursuant to the advice of independent
        counsel is presumed to have executed the document knowingly
        and voluntarily absent claims of fraud or duress.” Myricks v. Fed.
        Rsrv. Bank of Atlanta, 480 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2007) (quota-
        tions omitted). And “Florida law favors the finality of settlements.”
        Pettinelli v. Danzig, 722 F.2d 706, 710 (11th Cir. 1984).
                In favoring finality, Florida case law demonstrates that the
        justified threat of criminal prosecution does not constitute duress
        under Florida law and will not justify setting aside a settlement
        agreement. For context, we will discuss three Florida Supreme
        Court cases that articulate this relevant principle.
               In 1907, the Florida Supreme Court recognized a general
        rule that “in order to obtain relief against a contract made under
        threats of criminal prosecution,” the plaintiﬀs must show that the
        “threats were of unlawful imprisonment.” Burton v. McMillan, 42
        So. 849, 851 (Fla. 1907) (emphasis added). In Burton, Mr. Beverly
        Burton worked as a state employee and his supervisor, A.M.
        McMillian, believed Mr. Burton to be embezzling public funds. Id.
        at 849. After agreeing to transfer property to avoid criminal charges
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13819

        against her husband, Mrs. Mary Burton sued to vacate the transfer
        because of duress in light of the threat to charge Mr. Burton with
        criminal prosecution of embezzlement. Id. at 850. But despite rec-
        ognizing the general rule, the court did not apply it here because
        Mrs. Burton “has been sick with a nervous disease for many years,
        and her nerves were so affected, and her mind so weakened by the
        shock” of the criminal prosecution. Id. Thus, the Florida Supreme
        Court found that the transaction should have been vacated. Id. at
        850–51.
               In 1937, the Florida Supreme Court applied this general rule.
        Tyler v. Hill Bros., 173 So. 147, 150 (Fla. 1937) (per curiam). In Tyler,
        Grady Tyler worked at Hill Bros., Inc. as a sales representative and
        his accounts were found to be short. Id. at 148. The company’s
        representative stated to Tyler’s brother that “unless satisfactory ar-
        rangement and adjustment of the shortage [in funds] was made,”
        the company would bring a criminal prosecution against Tyler for
        embezzlement. Id. Tyler’s brother executed a mortgage to the
        company and sought to void that mortgage. Id. at 148–49. But the
        Florida Supreme Court rejected the argument that “the mortgage
        was procured by blackmail” because there was “neither any plea
        nor [was] there any evidence in the record to show that [the com-
        pany] at any time maliciously threatened to accuse another of any
        crime or offense.” Id. at 150 (emphasis added). The court also
        noted that “[t]he facts in this case are entirely different from those”
        in Burton. Id.
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        22-13819                Opinion of the Court                         15

               The next year, the Florida Supreme Court decided that Bur-
        ton controlled instead of Tyler in Sheldon v. Wilfore. 186 So. 508, 510
        (Fla. 1939). In Sheldon, Mr. Wilfore handled money for his em-
        ployer and was required to keep proper accounting of all his ac-
        counts, but the accounts were found to be $15,000 short. Id. at 508–
        09. Ms. Wilfore was informed that if she executed a deed to her
        property, then there would be no criminal prosecution against her
        husband. Id. at 509. The Wilfores moved to dismiss the foreclo-
        sure proceedings on the property, which the trial court granted. Id.
        at 508. Like Burton, the court focused on the fact that Ms. Wilfore
        “had been sick with a nervous disease, and that her mind was
        shocked by” the embezzlement allegations against her husband in
        affirming the decision to dismiss the foreclosure proceedings. Id.
        at 509–10. The Florida Supreme Court noted that the case was
        ruled by its decision in Burton but not Tyler. Id. at 510.
                Synthesizing these cases, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
        nizes the general rule that a threat of lawful criminal prosecution
        will not constitute duress and will not justify obtaining relief from
        a contract. Although the court has identified factual scenarios (e.g.,
        where involved parties suffer mental and/or physical harm as a re-
        sult of the threat) where this rule would not apply, Florida’s inter-
        mediatory appellate courts have applied the general rule.
               Florida’s First District Court of Appeal reiterated this gen-
        eral rule in Norris v. Stewart, specifically noting that “[d]uress . . .
        requires a showing the act of the party compelling obedience of
        another is unlawful or wrongful.” 350 So. 2d 31, 31 (Fla. 1st Dist.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13819

        Ct. App. 1977) (per curiam). There, Mr. Norris received $15,000
        from Monroe Stewart to invest in property, and Mr. Norris misap-
        propriated the funds. Id. Stewart confronted Mr. Norris, saying he
        would take the matter to the authorities. Id. Meanwhile, Mrs. Nor-
        ris overheard the conversation and executed a promissory note for
        the amount so that her husband would not go to jail. Id. Mrs.
        Norris sought to get out of the promissory note citing Burton and
        Sheldon, but the court found those cases did not apply because there
        was no showing “that Stewart’s intimations were illegal.” Id. at 31–
        32. Instead, the court cited Tyler with approval for its resolution.
        Id. at 32.
               The Fifth District Court of Appeal again recognized this gen-
        eral rule, quoting Norris. Franklin v. Wallack, 576 So. 2d 1371, 1372
        (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Dennis and Voncile Franklin exe-
        cuted a mortgage on a property they owned in favor of Mrs. Frank-
        lin’s employer, Michael Wallack. Id. at 1371. Wallack discovered
        shortages in his firm accounts and confronted the wife, who admit-
        ted she had taken a sum of money. Id. Wallack “indicated he
        would not inform the authorities about [the wife’s] theft, if [the
        couple] would execute a note for $20,000.00 and a mortgage on
        their residence.” Id. The Franklins argued that it was “duress to
        ‘threaten’ an innocent person with prosecution of his spouse for an
        admitted crime unless he joins in the pledge of property owned
        jointly by the innocent as well as guilty spouse to secure the vic-
        tim’s loss.” Id. The court disagreed, stating that it was a “a case in
        which an innocent third party—in order to prevent legitimate pros-
        ecution of a loved one—pledges property (in this case joint
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        22-13819                   Opinion of the Court                               17

        property) to secure repayment of the damages suffered by the vic-
        tim.” Id. at 1372. The court in Franklin noted this tension between
        Tyler and Burton/Sheldon. Id. Specifically, the court explained that
        Burton/Sheldon found “the instruments were invalid less because of
        the threat than because of the lack of capacity to execute the instru-
        ment caused by the wife’s mental state.” Id.
                Considering this case law, we agree with the district court
        that Florida law recognizes that a threat of lawful criminal prose-
        cution will not constitute duress and will not justify obtaining relief
        from a contract—and, as in this case, nor will it justify rescission of
        a settlement agreement.
               Like we discussed above, Sewalk sought and received per-
        mission to file with this Court his affidavit detailing what happened
        at the mediation proceedings. Also in the record is Valpak’s affida-
        vit submitted in response to Sewalk’s motion. Sewalk says Valpak
        threatened to turn Sewalk in for bankruptcy fraud if Sewalk did not
        agree to settle with Valpak. Valpak vehemently denies this allega-
        tion. Like the district court, we assume that Valpak threatened to
        report Appellants for bankruptcy fraud in order to obtain the set-
        tlement. 7

        7 Part of Appellants’ argument is that we should return this case to the district

        court for an evidentiary hearing, but that is not necessary. Even if we re-
        manded to the district court for a factual determination that Valpak did
        threaten Sewalk, it still would not help Appellants in the analysis of whether
        the threat was justified.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13819

                To commit bankruptcy fraud and violate 18 U.S.C. § 152,
        the person must “knowingly and fraudulently make[] a false oath
        or account in or in relation to any case under title 11.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 152(2). “The false oath must pertain to a material matter.” United
        States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1079–80 (11th Cir. 1999).
                Sewalk filed for bankruptcy and listed his business as having
        a specific valuation, but then listed a different valuation in the com-
        plaint here and in a different case in which Sewalk had sued the
        prior franchise owner. Based on that information, Valpak justifi-
        ably believed that Sewalk had “knowingly and fraudulently” made
        false statements under oath. 18 U.S.C. § 152(2).
                Sewalk clearly meets the requirement that the statement
        was made under oath, and Sewalk doesn’t engage with Valpak’s
        arguments that the statements were false or material. The valua-
        tion of SMS was material to the bankruptcy proceedings. Although
        it is mostly circumstantial evidence, it is likely that Sewalk made
        false statements about the value of SMS. Sewalk argues that he
        lacked the requisite intent under the statute—knowingly making
        false statements. Sewalk’s affidavit supports this argument. But no
        evidence suggests that Valpak knew that Sewalk had prepared his
        own petition because Sewalk was represented in those proceed-
        ings, and there was no outward indication that Sewalk’s counsel
        did not know what he was doing. As a result, Valpak’s threat was
        of lawful criminal prosecution for bankruptcy fraud and does not
        amount to duress.
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        22-13819               Opinion of the Court                         19

                Appellants argue that even if the threat was justified, the
        threat still amounted to extortion, citing Florida’s extortion statute,
        see Fla. Stat. § 836.05. Accordingly, they argue that Valpak’s alleged
        extortion is sufficient to void the settlement agreement between
        the parties as seen in Florida case law. Section 836.05 provides, in
        relevant part:
               Whoever, either verbally or by a written or printed
               communication, maliciously threatens to accuse an-
               other of any crime or offense . . . with intent thereby
               to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatso-
               ever, or with intent to compel the person so threat-
               ened, or any other person, to do any act or refrain
               from doing any act against his or her will, commits a
               felony of the second degree . . . .
                The Florida Supreme Court has explained that it follows the
        plain text of a statute, wherein “the words of a governing text are
        of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is
        what the text means.” Coates v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 375 So. 3d
        168, 171 (Fla. 2023) (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Read-
        ing Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). Therefore, at
        first read, Appellants’ argument makes sense based upon the text
        of § 836.05. And Appellants contend that Valpak threatened to re-
        port Sewalk for bankruptcy fraud, thereby accusing Sewalk of a
        crime. This threat would pressure Appellants to settle with Valpak
        on their breach of contract claim, allegedly worth $1,000,000, for
        far less than that amount. The settlement would result in Valpak’s
        pecuniary gain—i.e., only paying a smaller amount versus what
        Appellants were originally seeking.
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13819

                But how does Florida’s criminal extortion statute square
        with the general rule that Florida has adopted—that a legally justi-
        fied threat cannot justify the rescission of a contract? To answer
        this question, Appellants point to Berger v. Berger, 466 So. 2d 1149
        (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
               In Berger, the husband and wife entered into a marital settle-
        ment agreement. 466 So. 2d at 1150. During the settlement nego-
        tiations, the husband insisted that the wife “sign it or he would turn
        her and her partners in to the Internal Revenue Service,” as “the
        wife had been failing to report substantial cash receipts from the
        operation of her beauty salon business.” Id. The wife’s “unrebut-
        ted testimony [was] that fear of the I.R.S. [was] the only reason that
        she signed it.” Id. While “[t]he husband argue[d] that the only rea-
        son that he made these threats was to make sure that the wife
        would not try to hide the level of her income in the divorce pro-
        ceedings in order to secure more alimony,” the Florida court found
        that the husband had committed the crime of extortion under Flor-
        ida law. Id. at 1150–51. The court explained that while “the hus-
        band had a legal right to actually turn her in to the I.R.S. and that a
        claim of coercion cannot be predicated on a threat to do an act
        which the person has a lawful right to do,” he did “not have the
        right to threaten to do it for his own pecuniary advantage.” Id. at 1151.
        The court found “clear and convincing evidence that the wife
        signed this agreement solely because of her husband’s threat to
        turn her and her partners in to the I.R.S.,” i.e., the wife had not
        voluntarily entered into the settlement agreement. Id.
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        22-13819                   Opinion of the Court                                 21

                Most of the other cases that cite Berger involve martial dis-
        putes. 8 See Bates v. Bates, 345 So. 3d 328, 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
        2021) (discussing Berger in relation to a prenuptial agreement that
        could have been invalidated had the evidence shown that the hus-
        band obtained his wife’s signature by threatening to tell her Cath-
        olic family about her abortion); Ziegler v. Natera, 279 So. 3d 1240,
        1243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Berger to support its hold-
        ing invalidating a prenuptial agreement where the husband had
        threatened to call off the marriage and impede his wife’s immigra-
        tion to the United States unless she signed it); see also Gordon v. Gor-
        don, 625 So. 2d 59, 62–63 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that
        the principles of Berger apply even when relief is sought more than
        a year after the allegedly coerced and duress-induced action or set-
        tlement).
               Appellants ask us to take a broad reading of Berger without
        considering the holdings in Tyler, Norris, or Franklin. We decline to
        do so. Florida courts lead us to this result. Neither the criminal
        extortion statute nor Berger provide a “strong indication” for why
        we should not follow older Florida Supreme Court cases and

        8 Another notable case that cites Berger comes from a criminal case at the First

        District Court of Appeal. See Duan v. State, 970 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1st Dist.
        Ct. App. 2007). In Duan, the appellate court cites Berger for the proposition
        that the defendant committed extortion by threatening to testify falsely at trial
        even if the defendant had a legal right to testify in general. Id. Like Florida’s
        treatment of extortion in marital-related disputes, the courts want to discour-
        age individuals threatening to testify falsely in criminal cases because false tes-
        timony can and has resulted in the loss of liberty for all too many defendants.
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        22                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13819

        Florida intermediary courts. 9 Chepstow, 381 F.3d at 1086. Berger
        deals specifically with the end of a marriage and the disputes that
        arise from those situations. Further, the cases that cite Berger for
        the proposition that a person does not have a right to threaten for
        pecuniary gain, even if it is a lawful right, are in the family law con-
        text. Considering this case law, Florida courts are more aware of
        the delicate nature of disputes within familial relationships and
        how that can “present an irresistibly tempting occasion for a dom-
        inating party to use coercion and duress, or extortion, to force a
        weaker party to capitulate without a real hearing in court.” Gordon,
        625 So. 2d at 63. Further, the weight of case law from the Florida
        Supreme Court recognizes the general principle that a threat of
        lawful criminal prosecution will not constitute duress. None of the
        factual scenarios identified in Burton or Sheldon apply here.
              Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing Appellants’ motion to rescind the settlement agreement.

        9 We also note that the Second Restatement of Contracts explains that “a

        threat of criminal prosecution is improper as a means of inducing the recipient
        to make a contract.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 176 (1981). And,
        under that Restatement, it is immaterial that the party making the threat “hon-
        estly believes that the recipient is guilty” or that the party being threatened is
        indeed guilty. Id. Yet simply because the Second Restatement of Contracts
        provides this rule does not mean that the Florida Supreme Court would
        choose to follow it. See Franklin, 576 So. 2d at 1373–74 (Sharp, J., dissenting)
        (recognizing that Florida law does not generally follow the Second Restate-
        ment of Contracts on this issue); but see DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC,
        112 So. 3d 85, 92 (Fla. 2013); Pro-Art Dental Lab, Inc. v. V-Strategic Grp., LLC, 986
        So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 2008).
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        22-13819               Opinion of the Court                         23

               Similarly, we cannot say the district court abused its discre-
        tion in denying Appellants’ motion for leave, which we construe as
        a Rule 59(e) motion. “The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59]
        motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or
        fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per cu-
        riam) (quotations omitted). A party cannot use a Rule 59(e) motion
        “to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that
        could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. (quota-
        tions omitted).
               In their Motion for Leave, Appellants largely raised the same
        arguments as in their Motion to Reopen, although they cited Berger
        and Franklin for the first time. But Appellants could have raised
        Berger and Franklin before the district court’s denial of their Motion
        to Reopen. As discussed above, there were no manifest errors of
        law with the district court’s decision denying Appellants’ request
        to rescind the settlement agreement. Thus, we cannot say the dis-
        trict court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’ construed
        Rule 59(e) motion.
                              III.   CONCLUSION
               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s orders.
               AFFIRMED.