Court Opinion

ID: 9929354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:47.157191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:13.196060
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0477-MR

ANTHONY B. WHELAN                                                     APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM HART CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE CHARLES C. SIMMS, III, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 13-CR-00091

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND MCNEILL,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Anthony Whelan (“Appellant”) appeals from an

order of the Hart Circuit Court denying his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure

(“CR”) 60.02 motion for relief from judgment. Appellant argues that the circuit

court violated various constitutional safeguards when it failed to evaluate his

competency at the sentencing hearing, and when his trial counsel abandoned him at

a critical stage of the proceedings. He requests an opinion reversing the order on
appeal. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order of the Hart

Circuit Court.

                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On July 12, 2013, a Hart County grand jury indicted Appellant on

multiple counts of sex crimes involving three of his stepchildren under the age of

12. A competency hearing and pretrial hearing was conducted on September 27,

2013, at which time the court heard the testimony of Steven Sparks, Ph.D., and

entered his report into evidence. Dr. Sparks’ report stated that Appellant said he

had engaged in sex acts with children on many occasions; that he never did

anything the children did not want; and, that he never did anything to hurt the

children.

                The circuit court determined that Appellant was competent to stand

trial. The parties agreed that no plea agreement could be reached because

Appellant was not willing to implicate his wife in the crimes. Appellant, through

counsel, then stated that Appellant wished to enter a guilty plea on all charges,

with the court determining the sentence.

                On September 27, 2013, Appellant entered a plea of guilty in Hart

Circuit Court on five counts of rape in the first degree; 19 counts of sodomy in the

first degree; and 11 counts of sexual abuse in the first degree.1 The court engaged

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 510.040; KRS 510.070; and KRS 510.110.

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in a guilty plea colloquy with Appellant, with Appellant stating that he was

completely satisfied with defense counsel’s performance. During the colloquy,

Appellant asserted that the Webster’s Dictionary definition of rape differed from

that of the Kentucky statutes, and argued that he never raped a child because there

was no penetration. Appellant’s counsel then advised him that the slightest

penetration was sufficient to support the guilty plea, and that Appellant had already

admitted placing his penis near his stepdaughter’s vagina and that he pushed his

penis against it. After conferring with counsel, Appellant decided to continue with

the guilty plea on all charges.

             Thereafter, Appellant submitted to a Comprehensive Sex Offender

Pre-Sentence Evaluation. The examiner reported to the court that Appellant

admitted to sexually abusing his stepchildren; that he sexually abused his

biological daughter when she was 10 years old; that Appellant recognizes that he is

a sexual offender and a pedophile; and Appellant’s belief that he committed the

charged offenses and should never be a free person again. The report noted that

Appellant admitted to sexually abusing three other girls and a mentally disabled

male. The examiner opined that Appellant was a high risk for committing future

sex offenses and that he posed a significant threat to public safety. On December

3, 2013, the circuit court sentenced Appellant to life in prison.

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             On August 2, 2018, Appellant filed his first CR 60.02(f) motion

seeking to reduce his sentence to 20 years in prison. In support of the motion,

Appellant asked for the reduction so he could obtain psychological help and enter a

sex offender treatment program. The court denied the motion on November 20,

2018.

             On December 29, 2022, Appellant filed a second CR 60.02 motion

arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to investigate his guilt or innocence.

He also maintained that his defense counsel was ineffective during the guilty plea

phase of the proceedings. After considering the motion, the circuit court

determined that CR 60.02 was only available for claims which were not known nor

could have been known with the exercise of reasonable diligence at the time of

judgment and sentence. The court concluded that the circuit court’s alleged failure

to investigate, and counsel’s purported malfeasance, if any, were known or should

have been known at the time of judgment. Further, the court determined that the

motion was not brought within a reasonable time per CR 60.02, as nine years had

lapsed since the judgment and sentence.

             In addition, the court found that Appellant had failed to avail himself

of direct appeal or a Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (“RCr”) 11.42 motion

before seeking relief via CR 60.02. It also found that CR 60.02 relief is only

                                          -4-
available to correct a substantial miscarriage of justice, which the instant facts did

not support.

               Based on the foregoing, the Hart Circuit Court denied Appellant’s

second CR 60.02 motion on March 21, 2023. This appeal followed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

               “Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion

is whether the trial court abused its discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is

whether the trial court’s decision was ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ky. App.

2011) (citations omitted).

                          ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

               Appellant argues that the Hart Circuit Court committed reversible

error by failing to evaluate his competency at the sentencing hearing. He asserts

that at the time of sentencing, the circuit court had reasonable grounds to question

his competency, because he was confused and lacked the ability to make

reasonable decisions. Appellant contends that though the circuit court did

determine that he was competent on September 27, 2013, the record raises

questions as to whether that assessment was correct. Appellant argues that he was

even less competent some 7 weeks later at the time of sentencing. Further,

Appellant points out that he did not graduate from high school; does not have a

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general educational diploma (“GED”); was not equipped to understand complex

legal issues at the time of his plea and sentencing; and that these factors support his

claim for CR 60.02 relief.

              Appellant goes on to argue that the circuit court improperly failed to

investigate Appellant’s guilt or innocence; that he was deprived of due process

during the guilty plea and sentencing phase; and that the lack of due process

effectively coerced him into making a guilty plea. Lastly, Appellant contends that

his defense counsel effectively abandoned him at the critical plea and sentence

phase of the proceedings, in that counsel’s sole objective was to convince

Appellant to enter a guilty plea. Appellant maintains that these factors, considered

individually or in their totality, support his argument for CR 60.02 relief from

judgment. He argues that the Hart Circuit Court erred in failing to so rule.

              Having closely examined the record and the law, we conclude that

there are several reasons why the order of the Hart Circuit Court should be

affirmed. First, CR 60.02 provides that “[t]he motion shall be made within a

reasonable time[.]”2 Appellant’s second CR 60.02 motion was made some 9 years

after the judgment. This delay is not reasonable per CR 60.02, especially as each

of the arguments made by Appellant were known or should have been known to

2
 Appellant’s motion was made pursuant to CR 60.02(e) and (f), which is subject to the
“reasonable time” requirement. A motion made via CR 60.02(a), (b), or (c) must be filed within
one year of the judgment.

                                             -6-
him at the time of judgment. Appellant’s motion was also successive and

repetitive. “CR 60.02 does not permit successive post-judgment motions[.]” Foley

v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014). The nine year delay in

Appellant’s motion, and its successive nature, form a sufficient basis for affirming

the order on appeal.

             Further, in Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983), the

Kentucky Supreme Court set out the procedure for a post-conviction collateral

attack on a judgment. It stated,

                          [w]e hold that the proper procedure for a
                   defendant aggrieved by a judgment in a
                   criminal case is to directly appeal that
                   judgment, stating every ground of error which it
                   is reasonable to expect that he or his counsel is
                   aware of when the appeal is taken.

                          Next, we hold that a defendant is
                   required to avail himself of RCr 11.42 while in
                   custody under sentence or on probation, parole
                   or conditional discharge, as to any ground of
                   which he is aware, or should be aware, during
                   the period when this remedy is available to him.
                   Final disposition of that motion, or waiver of
                   the opportunity to make it, shall conclude all
                   issues that reasonably could have been
                   presented in that proceeding. The language of
                   RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant from
                   raising any questions under CR 60.02 which are
                   “issues that could reasonably have been
                   presented” by RCr 11.42 proceedings.

                                         -7-
Id. at 857. “CR 60.02 . . . may be utilized only in extraordinary situations when

relief is not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42.” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at

884 (citation omitted).

             Having entered a plea of guilty, Appellant waived his right to a direct

appeal. Additionally, he did not pursue RCr 11.42 relief. “Moreover, the law

favors the finality of judgments. Therefore, relief may be granted under CR 60.02

only with extreme caution and only under the most unusual and compelling

circumstances.” Age, 340 S.W.3d at 94 (citation omitted). With the benefit of

counsel, Appellant admitted in open court to raping and sodomizing his minor

stepchildren. After engaging in a full colloquy, he entered a guilty plea on all

charges. Arguendo, even if he had prosecuted a direct appeal, followed by an RCr

11.42 motion before seeking CR 60.02 relief, Appellant has not demonstrated

unusual and compelling circumstances per Age entitling him to such relief.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Appellant’s CR 60.02 motion was untimely and successive. In

addition, it did not comply with the procedural scheme and the arguments raised

were not so unusual and compelling as to justify relief from judgment. For these

reasons, we affirm the order of the Hart Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -8-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Anthony B. Whelan, pro se    Daniel Cameron
Wheelwright, Kentucky        Attorney General of Kentucky

                             Ken W. Riggs
                             Assistant Attorney General
                             Frankfort, Kentucky

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