Court Opinion

ID: 9542637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:36:51.096503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:30.582895
License: Public Domain

SCHEINEMAN, J., dissenting. I am obliged to note my dissent in this case with apologies to my colleagues. Differences of opinion exist in the interpretation of Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill2d 612, 210 NE2d 182. There are some who contend that the doctrine of contributory negligence has been abolished so far as cases involve the question of products liability. The theory has been asserted that there can be no contributory negligence in a case that does not involve negligence of the defendant. Some may base this notion on the fact that, prior to Suvada, all cases involving contributory negligence of the plaintiff also involved an issue of defendant’s negligence, therefore, if a case does not involve an issue of defendant’s negligence, it cannot involve contributory negligence. Surely this obvious violation of the basic principles of Logic cannot justify the theory. Nor is there anything to justify the theory in the Suvada opinion. It is possible that plaintiff’s attorney in that case, seeking to blaze a new trail in the law, and wishing to avoid having some side issue divert attention from the objective, may have included in the count on products liability, the usual allegation that plaintiff was using due care. Certainly there was no argument on this point, since the opinion makes no reference to it. In the subsequent case of People ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Bua, 37 Ill2d 180, 226 NE2d 6, the court found that the case involved the question of liability for a defective product, and recited the requirements of such a case as specified in Suvada, adding, “However, under both counts it is necessary to prove that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety.” The Federal Court has followed this ruling. In Dazenco v. James Hunter Mach. Co., 393 F2d 287 (7th Cir) a plaintiff’s verdict was reversed for failure of the trial court to instruct that plaintiff must prove he was in the exercise of due care of his own safety. Reference has been made to the Restatement 2d Torts, section 402-A, on the subject of products liability. Therein it is stated that contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when it consists merely in a failure to discover the defect. It further describes conduct of a plaintiff which would be a bar to his claim. The sentence which makes this assertion begins: “On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in . . . ,” etc. So, by this authority, when the plaintiff’s conduct was such that his claim would be barred, it is properly called “contributory negligence” in products liability cases. That the foregoing note states one fact which does not bar a claim, presents no novel idea. In any negligence case the question may arise whether the plaintiff’s own conduct amounted to contributory negligence. If the court holds it does not, this would not be a precedent that the principle of contributory negligence is abolished. The indications are already plainly to be seen, that adoption of this theory leads to confusion and difficulty of explanation, without accomplishing any basic change in the law. Negligence of the plaintiff may still bar his claim even though it is called by some other name. Apparently a substantial segment of the legal profession sees no significance in the poetic suggestion that “a rose, called by any other name, will smell as sweet.” As examples of the difficulty caused by the theory see Sweeney v. Matthews, 94 Ill App2d 6, 236 NE2d 439. Also Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill App2d 334, 236 NE2d 125. These cases involved products liability. In both the court arrived at the conclusion that the evidence did not justify a decision of the case as a matter of law, but that there was presented a question for the jury whether the plaintiff’s acts amounted to negligence barring his claim. An effort was made to state this result without using the word “negligence.” It was suggested there might be reference to the doctrine of assumed risk which presented other problems. The effort to avoid the use of the plain English word “negligence” fully understood by the bench and bar required great length. As a result, reading time for either opinion is about one hour. The case at bar is an example of the confusion and detrimental effect of the theory upon jury instructions. The attorneys on both sides accepted the theory that contributory negligence should not be mentioned in a products liability case, hence, the jury was not instructed on what effect it would have. However, plaintiff tendered a version of IPI No. 12.05, Revised, which, in effect, tells the jury that if the alleged wrong of the defendant (issuing defective product) was proved to be a proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, it was not a defense that there was some other concurring cause. There was evidence of lack of due care on the part of the plaintiff, including violation of the manufacturer’s warnings. Therefore, the instruction would be misleading since the negligence of the plaintiff might be a “concurring cause.” This was the reason the trial judge modified the instruction. It is my opinion the theory that plaintiff’s negligence cannot be mentioned in a products liability case should be summarily rejected by the court as a nuisance to orderly processes of the law, without any logical basis or authoritative backing. In my opinion the supposed ban of any mention of contributory negligence, left the jury without guidance as to its effect, and made it necessary to modify the tendered instruction. I think the modification should be approved under the stated conditions and should not be a basis for reversal. The remaining ground for reversal, the exclusion of certain testimony, is not of sufficient importance, by itself, to justify reversal. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment.