Court Opinion

ID: 9679768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:05:46.871047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:19.747696
License: Public Domain

CORNYN, Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree that the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, I disagree with the plurality’s holding that the issue of state law immunity was not preserved for our review. The police officers’ motion for summary judgment (entitled Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplement to Defendants’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment) and the plaintiffs’ response unmistakably raised this issue in the trial court and it has been preserved for our review. By unnecessarily avoiding this issue, the plurality has condemned the litigants to further rounds of expensive, time-consuming and inconclusive litigation.1 Official immunity is an unsettled and important issue in our jurisprudence and cries out for elucidation for the benefit of future litigants too.2 Finally, because the offi*101cers’ entitlement to immunity is dispositive of the City’s liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), I believe this issue is before the Court and should be addressed as well. Because the plurality fails to address either of these issues, I write separately to do so.
I.
The plurality holds that “[n]either the motion for summary judgment nor the motion for reconsideration ...” raise the issue of state law immunity. At 100. I disagree. The record reveals that the issue of the police officers’ state law immunity was raised in the officers’ original motion for summary judgment. Following the trial court’s partial summary judgment in favor of the officers and City for claims made under section 1983,3 the officers later filed a motion for reconsideration, styled Motion for Reconsideration of Defendants’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplement to Defendants’ First Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, in part based on the then recent decision in Dent v. City of Dallas, 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Seeking to avail themselves of each defense raised and upheld in Dent, the officers stated that the Dent court held “on almost identical facts ... that the officer was entitled to official immunity.” By so doing, the respondents presented the basis of their claim and cited its source, putting the issue directly before the court.
A party who wishes to place an issue before the court on summary judgment is required to “expressly set out” the issue by “written motion, answer or other response.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Tex.1979). The purpose of this rule is to ensure that the non-movant has adequate notice of the mov-ant’s claims such that it will enable the non-movant to prepare a response. West-chester Fire Ins. Co. v. Alvarez, 576 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex.1978). See also Thomas v. Cisneros, 596 S.W.2d 313, 316 (Tex.App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (grounds for summary judgment are sufficiently specific where they consist of a concise statement sufficient to give notice to the non-movant of the grounds upon which judgment is sought). It is apparent that both the trial court and opposing counsel were fully aware of the officers’ reliance on the affirmative defense of official immunity. Because the parties squarely presented the question of official immunity for determination, and the trial court decided this issue in granting the motion, it can be only by applying a tortuous application of Rule 166a(c) that the plurality concludes that this issue has not been preserved.
Travis’s briefs filed in the court of appeals and in this court demonstrate Travis’s acknowledgement of the officers’ reliance on the affirmative defense of official immunity. In section four of her response to the respondents’ motion for reconsideration, Travis paraphrased the definition of good faith immunity, but argued that it only applied to federal law claims, and stated that “there should be no granting of summary judgment based on the applicability of the doctrine of qualified immunity....” Point of error five in Travis’ brief in the court of appeals states in summary that “police officers [are] not entitled to qualified immunity for their negligent or grossly negligent acts.” Since the trial court had previously granted both the City and the officers summary judgment as to Travis’s section 1983 claims, Travis could only be addressing immunity to state law claims, namely official immunity. Furthermore, in Travis’s response to the argument *102raised by the Texas Department of Public Safety as amicus curiae, Travis urges that “[t]here is no official immunity for police officers.” Though no doubt the officers could have more clearly and distinctly articulated the basis for their state law immunity defense, in light of the confusing manner in which official immunity has been addressed by our courts, their quandry is understandable.
When the non-movant has notice of the grounds upon which summary judgment is sought, the purpose of Rule 166a(c) has been sufficiently met to preserve error. Because Travis briefed and argued the issue of the officers’ immunity from state law claims, the issue was joined and preserved such that it is properly before this Court.4
II.
Official immunity to negligence liability attaches to a government employee’s official actions only when the employee’s job requires the exercise of personal judgment and discretion. When a government employee carries out the discretionary duties of his job in good faith and acts within the scope of his authority, the employee is entitled to official immunity from suit. Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex.Civ. App.—San Antonio 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In contrast, a government employee’s performance of duties that are merely ministerial in nature are not cloaked with official immunity. At the threshold, then, we are confronted with the issue of whether the officers’ actions about which Travis complains were discretionary or ministerial.
The distinction between discretionary and ministerial acts has been problematic for legal commentators5 and courts alike. As Professors Prosser and Keeton point out, “the conclusion that the officer’s acts were ‘discretionary’ is probably only a shorthand notation for a more complex policy decision.” PROSSER & KEETON at 1062. However, more than one hundred years ago this Court distinguished discretionary and ministerial acts in this manner:
[Ministerial acts are those] where the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.... [B]ut where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial.
Rains v. Simpson, 50 Tex. 495, 501 (1878) (quoting Commissioner of the General Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 479 (1849)); see also Wyse v. Department of Public Safety, 733 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“[d]is-cretionary actions are those which require personal deliberation, decision and judgment, while ministerial actions require obedience to orders or the performance of a duty as to which the actor is left no choice”); Austin v. Hale, 711 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, no writ); Baker, 621 S.W.2d at 645.
As a general proposition, it seems obvious that police officers performing discretionary duties in good faith and acting *103within the course and scope of their employment should be entitled to official immunity. Nowhere else in public service is official immunity more appropriate or necessary than in police work. In their routine work, police officers must be free to make split-second judgments in good faith based on their experience and training, without fear of personal liability. To hold otherwise “would likely cause other peace officers under similar circumstances to flinch from acting because of fear of liability.” Carpenter v. Barner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). “Creating that potential does not serve the public’s interest.” Id. Were there no immunity from personal liability under such circumstances, “the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties.” Baker, 621 S.W.2d at 643-44.
Plainly, the police officers in this case were performing discretionary duties. The police officers’ decision to pursue the suspects at high speed was an exercise of discretion and judgment and not one required by any policy. In fact, the Mesquite city policy governing police chases explicitly makes the decision to continue a chase discretionary. Furthermore, it is undisputed that the police officers were acting within the scope of their employment. It is undisputed that while their initial contact with the suspects was as security guards for the truck stop, their subsequent pursuit of the suspects was in their capacity as police officers. Thus, the only issue left to resolve is whether the police officers were acting in good faith when they chose to pursue the suspects at high speed.
“Good faith,” like the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts, has proven to be an elusive concept for our courts. Historically, Texas courts have focused more on the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts and have glossed over the issue of good faith. See Austin, 711 S.W.2d at 68; Russell v. Texas Dept. of Human Resources, 746 S.W.2d 510, 514 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied). Unwittingly compounding the confusion, Texas courts have occasionally failed to acknowledge that official immunity is an affirmative defense and have erroneously shifted the burden to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith. See Carpenter, 797 S.W.2d at 101; Pierson v. Independent School Dist., 698 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Only a few cases discuss good faith in the context of a claim of official immunity to a common law cause of action. Because of the similarity between good faith as it applies to the defense of qualified immunity to section 1983 claims, these cases addressing good faith in that context are instructive.
The United States Supreme Court addressed good faith in qualified immunity cases in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997-98, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). The Wood Court determined that a proper balance of competing interests was best achieved by adopting a definition of “good faith” that incorporated both a subjective and an objective element.6 Id. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1000-01. In a decision specifically limited to the context of school discipline, the Court held that a public official is not immune from liability under section 1983 if:
he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected [the objective element], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student [the subjective element].
Wood, 420 U.S. at 322, 95 S.Ct. at 1001. The Court later, however, adopted the quoted language as a “general statement of the qualified immunity standard.” Har*104low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 n. 25, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737 n. 25, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
In this case we are faced with a similar need to balance clearly competing interests. On one hand, we must readily acknowledge:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.
Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1688, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). On the other hand, the courts are duty bound to protect the rights of innocent bystanders when a police officer totally disregards public safety. In my view, to properly balance both of these considerations, the test for “good faith” as an element of official immunity in police chase cases should contain both objective and subjective elements. Hence, a proper resolution of the good faith element in the affirmative defense of official immunity requires an inquiry into the permissible intentions of the police officer and the reasonableness of the officers’ actions in light of the risk of harm to the public.
In light of these considerations, I would hold that an officer fails to act in “good faith” if:
1) the officer knows that a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit substantially outweighs the need to immediately apprehend the suspect (the subjective element); or
2) a reasonably prudent police officer, under the same or similar circumstances, would know that the clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit substantially outweighs the need to immediately apprehend the suspect (the objective element).
Under this standard, the plaintiffs burden is to defeat one or more of the elements of the affirmative defense of official immunity once a prima facie case for its application is established. Such a standard preserves a meaningful immunity upon which police officers may rely in performing their duties, and yet protects innocent persons injured by police conduct when an element of the affirmative defense is found lacking by the trier of fact. This standard seeks to achieve a balance between the competing interests we have described and represents the most workable accommodation of the rights of all parties involved.
Here, however, the summary judgment evidence fails to establish either the subjective and objective elements of good faith as a matter of law. There is no evidence in the record of the police officers’ subjective belief that they were acting in good faith in their high speed chase. Our standards for summary judgment require the officers to produce summary judgment evidence establishing all elements of their claim to official immunity as a matter of law. See Roark v. Stallworth Oil and Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 495 (Tex.1991). Additionally, the sole evidence of the officers’ objective good faith is Dr. Territo’s deposition testimony. This opinion evidence is not predicated on a proper legal standard and, thus, falls short of the quality of evidence necessary to sustain a summary judgment on this basis. See Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987). Since the summary judgment evidence fails to establish either prong of the test for good faith, the summary judgment cannot be affirmed on the basis of official immunity.
III.
Similarly, the record fails to demonstrate that the City was entitled to summary judgment under the Texas Tort Claims Act (“TTCA”). As a general rule the State, its agencies and political subdivisions are immune from tort liability based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. State v. Brannan, 111 S.W.2d 347, 348 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1937, writ ref'd). As a political subdivision of the State, the City of Mesquite enjoys absolute immunity from tort liability absent a specific waiver of such immunity. See Turvey v. City of *105Houston, 602 S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex.1980); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). The applicable waiver provision of the TTCA provides:
A governmental unit in the state is liable for:
1) property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within the scope of employment if:
A) the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and
B) the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law; and
2) personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal property or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a private person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law.
Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code § 101.021 (emphasis supplied).
It follows from the plain language of section 101.021 that the City’s liability under the TTCA depends on the personal liability of its police officers. Carpenter, 797 S.W.2d at 102; Wyse, 733 S.W.2d at 228; Dent, 729 S.W.2d at 117. Because there is a fact issue pertaining to the officers’ liability, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed on this ground as well.
* * * * * *
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the Court’s judgment. However, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the opinion which holds that respondents have failed to preserve error on the issue of official immunity and the City’s liability under the TTCA.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and GONZALEZ, J., join in this concurring opinion.

. It is worth noting that the trial court signed the order granting the defendants final summary judgment on all claims on May 6, 1987. Hopefully, it will not be another five years before this case is finally resolved.

. The terms "qualified” and "official” appear to be used indiscriminately and interchangeably by some courts. The logical explanation appears to be that, in state court, claims under both the Texas Tort Claims Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are frequently joined. Furthermore, the elements of official immunity and qualified im*101munity appear for all practical purposes to be the same. In fact, as further indication of the confusion over the proper designation of this type of immunity, official immunity has been called a number of different names by a number of different courts: See e.g. Carpenter v. Burner, 797 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex.App.—Waco 1990, writ denied) (immunity variously known as governmental, official, quasi-judicial or qualifled); Stimpson v. Plano Indep. School Dist., 743 S.W.2d 944, 947-48 (Tex.App.— Dallas 1987, writ denied) (good faith immunity); Baker v. Story, 621 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Tex.Civ.App. —San Antonio 1981, writ refd n.r.e) (quasi-judicial immunity).

. All references to § 1983 refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

. Parenthetically, it is significant that the Legislature amended Section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code in 1989 to allow a government employee an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a summary judgment based on official immunity. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(5). This rare opportunity for interlocutory appellate review reveals just how important the legislature considers the defense of official immunity for government employees to be. When successfully invoked, such procedure renders an officer's immunity an immunity from suit, not just immunity from liability. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (addressing right to interlocutory appeals from denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to section 1983 claims). The very reasons for the grant of immunity are effectively unsalvageable if the official is determined to be immune from liability only after a trial on the merits. Id. at 525, 105 S.Ct. at 2814-15 (cases cited). The articulated basis for such immunity is: the importance of avoiding distraction of officials from their governmental duties; the desire to avoid inhibition of discretionary action; minimizing deterrence of able people from public service; avoiding the costs of an unnecessary trial; and insulating officials from burdensome discovery. Id.

. See e.g., W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 1062 (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895D, comment b.

. Were good faith merely subjective, there would rarely, if ever, be a jury trial on the affirmative defense of official immunity. The officer's affidavit, attesting to the requisite mental state, could not be readily controverted by the plaintiff, if at all. Under such circumstances, official immunity would be essentially absolute, regardless of the objective evidence.