Court Opinion

ID: 9572427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:36.304576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:55.523054
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The contract at issue here contains conflicting clauses which in my view cannot be reconciled without considering parole evidence. After providing that the petitioner is to “furnish to the Hospital all radiology services which it may require during that term of this Agreement,” the contract goes on to state that such services are to include “radiology services to the in or out-patients of the Hospital’s Medical Staff upon request by any member of the Medical Staff.” (Emphasis added.) It is impossible to determine, solely from the contract language, whether the parties *259intended the contract to be exclusive or subject to each staff doctor’s discretionary choice of radiologists. If, as the majority opinion recognizes, a physician’s right to select professional consultants for his patients may be limited by an exclusive service contract, either construction would be reasonable.
Given this ambiguity in the contract’s language, the trial court properly received extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining the parties’ intent. Ryan v. Fitzpatrick Drilling Co., Inc., 139 Colo. 471, 342 P.2d 1040 (1959). Determination of that intent in light of the evidence then became a question of fact for the jury. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. City of Aurora, 449 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1971); Halsey v. Darling, 13 Colo. 1, 21 P. 913 (1889). See also Cosper v. Hancock, 163 Colo. 263, 430 P.2d 80 (1967). The record clearly reflects that ample evidence was presented to support the jury’s conclusion that an exclusive contract was in fact intended. Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.