Court Opinion

ID: 9795781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:38:53.910262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:36:44.277259
License: Public Domain

THORNE, Judge
(concurring in the result):
1 39 I concur in both the result reached by the majority opinion and its analysis, except for its determination that. defense counsel's performance was deficient when counsel did *815not object to the jury instruction defining a position of special trust based on an ex-post-facto law. I disagree with the majority that there was no tactical reason for failing to object. The majority finds that no tactical advantage exists because if defense .counsel had objected to the jury instruction defining a position of special trust, then the State, alleging only the aggravating factor of special trust, could not have simply pursued an alternative aggravating factor under Utah Code section 76-5-404.1(8), see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(8) (1995), without going back to the beginning of the prosecutioh.
{40 Regarding counsel's performance, " 'we must indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy'" State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ¶ 17, 153 P.3d 804 (quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct.App.1998)), cert. denied, No. 20070144, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah June 12, 2007). "We give counsel wide latitude to make tactical decisions," Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995), and we will reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel only when there is a "lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions," Bryant, 965 P.2d at 542 (quotations and citations omitted).
41 I am not persuaded that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for defense counsel's lack of objection. To the contrary, had defense counsel objécted, the State could have decided to pursue an alternate aggravating theory and to charge additional offenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(g) (aggravating the offense of sexual abuse of a child when "[the accused committed ... more than five separate acts, which if committed ... would constitute an offense described in this chapter, and were committed at the same time, or during the same course of conduct, or before or after the instant offense"). Although the State may have been required to go back to the beginning of prosecution to pursue such an alternate aggravating theory, it is nonetheless conceivable that defense counsel made a strategic decision not to object to protect Defendant from additional charges that might be raised as a result. Indeed, S.W.'s and Officer Lane Cole's trial testimony provides a basis for such a concern. That testimony demonstrates that Defendant abused S.W. on approximately twenty-four to thirty-two occasions during the summer of 1996.1 Thus, it is conceivable that defense counsel considered the possibility that additional charges could be forthcoming if the State was forced to proceed under an alternative aggravating theory, and decided not to object. Because I would find that a conceivable trial strategy in not objecting to the jury instruction on special trust exists, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was objectively deficient. Therefore, I do not address, nor do I believe, that we need to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. See State v. Marble, 2007 UT App 82, ¶ 15, 157 P.3d 871.

. At trial, SW. testified that the incidents occurred "a couple of times a week." Officer Cole testified that after interviewing S.W. and her Mother, he determined that the abuse was ongoing, starting at least as early as May 1996.