Court Opinion

ID: 9945777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 16:04:44.256042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:10.358772
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2023-0516
                  _____________________________

MARK C. BOWDEN,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Joshua M. Hawkes, Judge.

                         February 28, 2024

PER CURIAM.

     Mark Bowden, whose judgment and sentence became final in
1995, appeals the circuit court’s order dismissing his petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Bowden’s petition included a claim
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to support his
conviction. He also claimed that his confession should not have
been admitted at his 1992 trial because it was obtained in violation
of Miranda.

     Bowden was charged in 1992 for capital sexual battery. The
victim was two years old. After a jury trial, Bowden was found
guilty and sentenced to life in prison. This court affirmed his direct
appeal. See Bowden v. State, 642 So. 2d 769 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
     In 2023, Bowden filed his habeas petition in the circuit court.
As that court correctly expressed, Bowden’s claims should have
been raised on direct appeal or by a timely postconviction motion.
Finding no error by the circuit court, we affirm. See Baker v. State,
878 So. 2d 1236, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that a trial court may
dismiss, rather than transfer, a habeas petition when the
petitioner seeks relief that “(1) would be untimely if considered as
a motion for postconviction relief under rule 3.850, (2) raise claims
that could have been raised at trial or, if properly preserved, on
direct appeal of the judgment and sentence, or (3) would be
considered a second or successive motion under rule 3.850 that
either fails to allege new or different grounds for relief, or . . . that
were known or should have been known at the time the first
motion was filed.”). Bowden’s claim was not only untimely, it is
also successive. See Bowden v. State, 109 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA
2013). Bowden raised the same sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim in
the rule 3.850 motion he filed in 2009.

     This is the third time Bowden has sought to collaterally attack
his judgment and sentence in this Court. See Bowden v. State,
1D04-0688 (dismissing rule 3.850 motion for failure to file timely
notice of appeal); Bowden, 109 So. 3d 1157 (affirming an order
denying a rule 3.850 motion).

     The court finds that this appeal is frivolous and refers Bowden
to the Department of Corrections for sanctions. See § 944.279, Fla.
Stat. (2023) (providing that “[a] prisoner who is found by a court to
have brought a frivolous or malicious suit, action, claim,
proceeding, or appeal . . . is subject to disciplinary procedures
pursuant to the rules of the Department of Corrections”); Ponton
v. Willis, 172 So. 3d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (explaining that
a Spencer order is not required before referring an inmate for
disciplinary action under the statute based on a frivolous filing).

    Bowden is warned that any future filings that this court
determines to be frivolous or malicious may result in the
imposition of further sanctions, including a prohibition against
any future pro se filing in this court.

     AFFIRMED.

ROWE, NORDBY, and LONG, JJ., concur.
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                _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Mark C. Bowden, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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