Court Opinion

ID: 9889919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 19:04:27.878058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:52.553513
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 P. v. Aguinaga CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B320014

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA486462)
                   v.

GERARDO LALO AGUINAGA,
JR.,

    Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Curtis B. Rappe. Affirmed with directions.
      Miriam K. Billington, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
      Defendant and appellant Gerardo Lalo Aguinaga, Jr. was
convicted of assault with a firearm and related charges and
sentenced to 27 years, plus 360 days. He requests remand for a
new sentencing hearing, asserting the trial court failed to
exercise informed discretion and committed various sentencing
errors in light of recent changes to Penal Code sections 654, 1170,
and 1385.
      We affirm.
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
      Defendant was charged with four felonies and
two misdemeanors: attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
subd. (a), 664; count 1); shooting at an occupied vehicle
(Pen. Code, § 246; count 2); possession of a firearm by a felon
(Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3); misdemeanor hit and
run driving resulting in property damage (Veh. Code, § 20002,
subd. (a); counts 4 & 5); and assault with a semiautomatic
firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b); count 6). Personal firearm
use allegations were alleged as to count 1 (Pen. Code, § 12022.53,
subd. (c)) and count 6 (Pen. Code, § 12022.5, subd. (a)). It was
further alleged that defendant had suffered two prior serious
felony convictions.
      The charges arose from an incident on the afternoon of
April 4, 2020, during which defendant, an admitted member of
the Diamond Street gang, fired multiple rounds from a
semiautomatic handgun at an occupied vehicle. Videotape from
nearby security cameras captured the shooting. Defendant was
in the street with at least one other fellow gang member who was
seen speaking on a cell phone. When a car drove past, the
individual on the phone handed defendant a handgun and
defendant fired at the vehicle and then jumped into a car and

                                 2
sped off. A short distance away, defendant was involved in a
multi-vehicle accident. He was picked up from the scene of the
accident by someone in a truck. Law enforcement pursued the
truck and eventually took defendant into custody. Because
defendant’s contentions are limited to sentencing issues, we have
tailored our summary of the facts and procedure accordingly.
       Defendant’s jury trial took place in September 2021.
Videotape of the shooting was played for the jury. Defendant
stipulated he was a convicted felon, and admitted he suffered a
prior strike conviction in June 2008 for making criminal threats
(Pen. Code, § 422). The prosecutor dismissed the prior assault
conviction from 2002.
       The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder
(count 1) and found him guilty on the remaining counts. As to
count 6, the jury found true the allegation defendant personally
used a firearm in the commission of the offense.
       The sentencing hearing was held March 25, 2022. The
court and counsel discussed the changes to Penal Code
section 1170 and section 1385 brought about by the passage of
Senate Bill 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and Senate Bill 81 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.), respectively. These two pieces of legislation
were also discussed in defendant’s sentencing brief. Assembly
Bill 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) and the amendments to
section 654 were neither briefed, nor discussed at the hearing.
       The People argued an upper term sentence was
appropriate. Defense counsel argued there were numerous
mitigating factors warranting imposition of the low term,
asserting defendant did not have a serious criminal history, most
of his convictions took place when he was a much younger man,
and his most recent prison commitment was more than five years

                                3
before the present offenses. Defense counsel also argued
defendant was a good father to six children, one of whom was
autistic. Defense counsel said defendant was involved in his
community in a positive way, including participation in regular
walk-a-thons for disadvantaged children. Defense counsel asked
the court to impose the low terms on all counts and to strike the
2008 prior strike conviction.
       The court said it believed imposing the low term “would be
contrary to the interests of justice.” “[Defendant] continually
goes out and uses violence in the community. I mean, luckily
here no one was killed. [¶] But certainly his conduct is
absolutely 180 degrees from what you want me to believe is the
basis for the low term sentence.”
       After entertaining additional argument, the court
explained why it was rejecting defendant’s request for a low term
sentence. “Having reviewed all the aggravating and mitigating
factors, the court finds that the court is not going to impose the
low term, because it would be contrary to the interests of justice,
and the factors in aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation
that I have already mentioned, but I will repeat them. [¶] This
crime involved great violence, bodily harm, threat of bodily harm.
It was carried out with planning, sophistication and
professionalism. [¶] The defendant has engaged in violent
conduct that’s a serious danger to society, and his convictions as
an adult and sustained petitions in juvenile proceedings are
numerous, and he has had very bad performance on probation
and parole.”
       The court then said, “Based on the prior conviction, the
court is going to impose the high term [on] count 6, and under the
strike law it’s doubled to 18 years.” The aggregate sentence

                                 4
imposed by the court was 27 years, plus 360 days, calculated as
follows: the upper term of nine years on count 6 (assault with a
firearm), doubled due to the strike, plus a consecutive midterm of
four years for the firearm enhancement, and a consecutive five-
year prior felony enhancement; and consecutive 180-day terms on
each of counts 4 and 5. The court imposed and stayed upper
terms on counts 2 and 3. Defendant was awarded total
presentence custody credits of 829 days (721 actual, 108 conduct).
The court found defendant to be indigent and waived fines,
except for the minimum restitution fine.
       This appeal followed.
                           DISCUSSION
       Defendant’s request for a new sentencing hearing is based
on three pieces of legislation passed in 2021 that resulted in
amendments to three different statutes: (1) Senate Bill 567
which modified Penal Code section 1170; (2) Senate Bill 81 which
modified section 1385; and (3) Assembly Bill 518 which modified
section 654. All three pieces of legislation went into effect on
January 1, 2022, shortly before defendant’s sentencing hearing
on March 25, 2022. There is no question, as the People concede,
that the changes effected by this new legislation applied to
defendant’s sentencing.
1.     Penal Code Section 1170, as Amended by Senate
       Bill 567
       Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b) specifies a
presumptive midterm sentence and now expressly prohibits the
court from relying on aggravating factors to impose an upper
term, unless those factors have been found true by the trier of
fact or stipulated to by the defendant. (Id., subd. (b)(1), (2);
Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) An exception is set forth in

                                5
subdivision (b)(3) which allows the court to consider certified
records of prior conviction(s) without submission to the jury.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       Defendant concedes the amended statutory language
grants the trial court the authority to consider a prior conviction
without that fact being submitted and found true by the jury.
(Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(3) [“court may consider the
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on
a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury”].) Defendant argues the court nevertheless
violated section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) by relying on several
additional aggravating factors not submitted to or found true by
the jury. We do not agree.
       The transcript from the sentencing hearing demonstrates
the court understood the narrowed scope of its discretion under
amended Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). The court
discussed with counsel, at some length, the amendments to the
statutory language and acknowledged that under the amended
statute all aggravating factors, with the exception of prior
convictions, must be submitted to the jury.
       The court entertained defense counsel’s argument that a
low term sentence was appropriate based on various mitigating
factors and allowed one of defendant’s daughters to briefly testify
in favor of her father’s character.
       In accordance with Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (c), which requires the court to state the reasons for
its sentencing choices on the record, the court then explained why
it was rejecting defendant’s low term argument: “Having
reviewed all the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court
finds that the court is not going to impose the low term, because

                                6
it would be contrary to the interests of justice, and the factors in
aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation that I have
already mentioned, but I will just repeat them.” The court briefly
summarized the factors previously discussed with counsel in
more detail. It was specifically in this context of explaining why
the court did not impose the low term that the court recited
various aggravating factors.
       The court then turned to its decision to impose an upper
term on the base count of assault with a firearm. The court said,
“Based on the prior conviction, the court is going to impose the
high term [on] count 6, and under the strike law it’s doubled to
18 years.” (Italics added.) Nothing in the record indicates the
court believed it could rely, or did rely, on aggravating factors
other than the admitted prior strike conviction to impose the
upper term. Defendant has not affirmatively shown the court
committed error in applying newly amended Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (b).
       Our review of the record revealed the minute order for the
sentencing hearing contains a clerical error and does not properly
reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment. On remand,
the superior court shall order correction of the minute order nunc
pro tunc to accurately reflect that the upper term sentence was
imposed “based on the prior conviction” and not the other factors
erroneously cited in the minute order. (People v. Cervantes (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 213, 227, citing People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [“it is the court’s oral pronouncement of
judgment as reflected in the reporter’s transcript that controls,
not the minute order, and appellate courts may correct clerical
sentencing errors on appeal”].)

                                 7
2.     Penal Code Section 1385, as Amended by Senate
       Bill 81
       Defendant’s sentence includes two enhancements: a four-
year midterm for the personal use of a firearm and a five-year
prior felony enhancement based on defendant’s admitted 2008
strike conviction. Those two enhancements resulted in
defendant’s sentence being longer than 20 years. Defendant
contends the amended language of Penal Code section 1385
mandated dismissal of both enhancements. Alternatively,
defendant says that even if dismissal was not mandatory, the
court abused its discretion in applying the amended statute. We
reject both contentions.
       a.    Dismissal was not mandatory.
       Under Penal Code former section 1385, trial courts had the
discretion to strike or dismiss an enhancement (or the
punishment for an enhancement) in the furtherance of justice.
Trial courts retain that discretion under the amended statute.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1) provides: “Notwithstanding any
other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (Italics
added.)
       As relevant here, Senate Bill 81 amended the statutory
language to include certain mitigating factors that, if present,
must be considered by the court. The new language provides
guidance to trial courts on the exercise of discretion. Penal Code
section 1385 now provides that “[i]n exercising its discretion
under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are

                                8
present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Assembly Bill 200 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) subsequently renumbered some subdivisions and
made other changes not relevant here. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15.)
       Defendant contends Senate Bill 81 mandated dismissal of
the enhancements based on three of the enumerated mitigating
circumstances: Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)
(“Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this
instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed”); section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)C) (“The application of
an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In
this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed”); and
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(H) (“The enhancement is based on
a prior conviction that is over five years old”).
       Defendant concedes that reviewing courts have thus far
rejected a construction of the amended language that strips the
discretion long vested in trial courts and mandates dismissal of
an enhancement whenever a mitigating circumstance is proved.
(See, e.g., People v. Lipscomb (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 9, 18–21,
review den. Mar. 22, 2023, S278429 [rejecting argument that the
phrase “[i]n this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed”
requires mandatory dismissal]; People v. Walker (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 386, 397–398, review granted Mar. 22, 2023,
S278309 [“Nothing in Senate Bill 81 indicates an intent to
deprive trial courts of their discretion altogether—either

                                 9
generally or more specifically in the subset of cases where
multiple enhancements are alleged.”]; People v. Ortiz (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1096, review granted Apr. 12, 2023,
S278894 [“plain language of section 1385(c)(2) contemplates the
trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, even as it mandates
that the court give ‘great weight’ to evidence of enumerated
factors”]; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 240,
review granted Apr. 19, 2023, S278786 [“dismissal shall occur but
only if, in exercising its discretion and giving great weight to
certain factors, the court finds dismissal is in the interests of
justice or would not endanger public safety”]; People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 295, review den. Apr. 26, 2023,
S279144 [phrase “shall be dismissed” must be harmonized with
statute as a whole, not construed in isolation].)
       Pending further guidance from the Supreme Court, we
agree with these authorities and conclude the amended language
of Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) does not mandate
dismissal of defendant’s enhancements. The trial court’s
obligation to give great weight to certain enumerated factors did
not supplant the court’s obligation to exercise its discretion to
determine whether dismissal of the enhancements was in the
furtherance of justice or whether it would endanger public safety.
       b.     Abuse of discretion
       Defendant argues that if dismissal of the enhancements
was not mandatory, the court abused its discretion in declining to
dismiss either or both enhancements. He says the court
misapplied the phrase “endanger public safety.” Defendant
contends the court’s consideration of the danger he posed to
others must take into account the length of sentence imposed
with and without the enhancement, the age he would be at the

                                10
time of release, and the risk of danger he would present at that
time, not the risk he posed at the time of sentencing.
       “In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by
two fundamental precepts. First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the party
attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.” ’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
376–377.)
       Defendant has not shown the court’s decision to impose the
two enhancements was irrational or arbitrary. The only legal
authority defendant cites in support of his argument is People v.
Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490 (Garcia) in which the Supreme
Court held that a trial court, in a Three Strikes case, has the
discretion to strike a prior conviction as to some but not all
counts. That case is not instructive. In Garcia, the defendant
was convicted of two counts of burglary. The trial court imposed
a Three Strikes sentence on one burglary count but struck the
strike allegations on the second burglary count, thereby resulting
in a sentence of 30 years on one count and a consecutive sentence
of 16 months (one-third the midterm) on the second count.
(Garcia, at p. 495.) Garcia rejected the People’s contention that
the court could only strike prior strike convictions if the current
offenses differ from one another, or if they differ in their
relationship to the prior convictions. (Id. at p. 503.)
       In so concluding, the court in Garcia explained “[e]ven if
the current offenses are virtually identical, a defendant’s
‘prospects’ [citation] will differ greatly from one count to another

                                 11
because a Three Strikes sentence on one count will itself radically
alter those prospects. Here, for example, once the trial court had
sentenced [the] defendant to a term of 30 years to life for [one of
the burglaries], his ‘prospects’ for committing future burglaries
diminished significantly.” (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 500.)
       This dicta in Garcia by no stretch of logic supports the
contention that the trial court here was required to speculate on
whether defendant will have been rehabilitated, or not, while in
prison, thereby reducing the risk he will commit more violent
crimes upon his release. At the start of the hearing, the court
discussed its concerns about defendant’s history of violent crimes,
and that defendant “is a ticking time bomb in a sense.” From this
record, we are not persuaded there was any abuse of discretion in
the imposition of the two enhancements.
3.     Penal Code Section 654, as Amended by Assembly
       Bill 518
       Penal Code former section 654, subdivision (a) provided
that where an act or course of conduct was punishable in
different ways by different provisions of the law, a sentencing
court was required to impose sentence under the provision that
provided for the longest potential term of imprisonment. With
the passage of Assembly Bill 518, the requirement to impose the
longest possible term was removed. (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.)
Subdivision (a) now reads, in relevant part, that “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions,
but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more
than one provision.” (Italics added.)
       At the sentencing hearing, the court chose count 6 as the
base term, which provided for the longest possible term, and

                                12
imposed the upper term of nine years. (Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (b) [assault with a semiautomatic firearm carries triad of
three, six or nine years].) Because of the amendments to
section 654, the court had discretion to choose count 2 as the base
term and could have imposed a shorter upper term of seven
years. (§ 246 [sentencing triad for shooting at occupied vehicle is
three, five or seven years].)
       Defendant did not brief the amendments to Penal Code
section 654, nor raise them at the sentencing hearing. The
People urge us to find forfeiture and also argue that even if we
reach the merits, defendant is not entitled to resentencing
because he was sentenced under the One Strike law (§ 667.61).
The People rely on People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669
without any discussion.
       The People’s argument regarding the One Strike law is
without merit. Defendant was not sentenced under the One
Strike law. (Pen. Code, § 667.61.) The One Strike law sets forth
an alternative and stricter sentencing scheme for individuals
convicted of certain enumerated sex crimes. (People v. Mancebo
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 741.) “The One Strike law applies if the
defendant has previously been convicted of one of seven
enumerated offenses or if the current offense was committed
under one or more specified circumstances.” (People v. Anderson
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 107–108.) None of defendant’s present
offenses is a sex offense, nor are any of his prior convictions. The
One Strike law is wholly irrelevant to defendant’s sentencing.
       Defendant concedes his trial counsel did not expressly raise
the amendments to Penal Code section 654 below but says if we
find forfeiture, we should find ineffective assistance of counsel
and resolve the merits of his section 654 argument on appeal.

                                13
      Defendant has not established ineffective assistance of
counsel. In order to do so, defendant was required to show a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) Defendant
says that had the court been informed of its new discretion under
Penal Code section 654, it is reasonably probable it would have
chosen to impose sentence on count 2, with the more lenient
triad. He says since the court chose a midterm for the firearm
enhancement, it is reasonable to assume the court may have
chosen to impose the lesser seven-year upper term on count 2,
instead of the nine-year upper term on count 6.
      We are not persuaded. First of all, the fact counsel and the
court did not expressly discuss the amendments to Penal Code
section 654 on the record does not mean the court was unaware of
the scope of its discretion. Moreover, the record makes clear the
court imposed a midterm on the firearm enhancement because it
believed it could not impose the upper term on the enhancement
based on the prior conviction since its decision to impose the
upper term on the base charge rested on the same prior
conviction. The court otherwise imposed upper terms and ran all
terms consecutively and did not evidence any inclination to
impose a more lenient sentence.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
      On remand, the superior court shall order correction of the
March 25, 2022 minute order nunc pro tunc to accurately reflect
the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment that it imposed an
upper term sentence on the count of assault with a firearm

                               14
“[b]ased on the prior conviction” and not on any of the other
factors erroneously cited in the minute order.

                        GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        VIRAMONTES, J.

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