Court Opinion

ID: 9657045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:11:35.215566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.227797
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I write separately to express certain concerns which arise therefrom.
The delay in Dennis Uchtman’s trial, from November/December, 1988 to April 1990, on a charge of violating city ordinances, is inordinately long. The fact there were a number of persons tried for similar offenses should not compromise his right to a speedy trial. I agree with the majority opinion that after Uchtman demanded a change of judge on January 5, 1990, the newly assigned judge held the trial with due dispatch. But that does not explain or excuse the delay that occurred prior to the time of the demand. Presumably, the only legitimate reason for concluding that Uchtman was not denied his right to a speedy trial is that the time between the demand for a speedy trial, November 21, 1989, and the actual time of the trial, on April 6, 1990, was not excessive when, during that period of time, Ucht-man demanded a change of judge. Because the demand for a prompt trial was not made earlier, I reluctantly concur that Uchtman’s right to a speedy trial was not unconstitutionally denied. State v. Wunderlich, 338 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1983).
I also write to mark the distinction between the right to protest, protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.1991), and a violation of the law in exercising that right. Nevertheless it would be naive to believe that protests of activities “afforded legal protection” such as the Viet Nam conflict, nuclear power, etc., traditionally recognized as exercises of the First Amendment, did not occasionally violate some statute or ordinance in those protests. Many of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court upholding the First Amendment right to protest involved a charge that some criminal statute or ordinance had been violated. E.g., Texas v. Johnson, supra, and cases cited therein.
*195It has been through such protests that otherwise “legal” activities have been shown to be contrary to constitutional principles. For example, until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), was decided, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896), legalized statutes and ordinances providing for “separate but equal” schools, public accommodations, etc., for the different races. For those of us old enough to remember, Brown was accompanied by several years of public demonstrations, and, most probably, convictions of the protesters of trespass. Traditionally, defendants who have been charged with violating statutes and ordinances have, at the least, been permitted to demonstrate in court their belief in the illegality of the statute or ordinance which they have been charged with violating. That is a protected and respected method of challenging an illegal and unjust precept of the law. Here, however, we are one step removed from those situations. The defendants have not been convicted of violating a statute which they allege to be unconstitutional. Rather, in their attempt to prohibit actions which they believe to be evil, they have been convicted of violating ordinances prohibiting trespass.
I do not necessarily agree that the defendants could not have been acquitted on a “necessity” defense. To conclude, as does the majority, that the evil, harm or injury sought to be avoided “must be legally cognizable to be justified as necessity” and “because as long as the laws or policies being protested have been lawfully adopted, they are conclusive evidence of the community’s view on the issue” accords more infallibility to government edicts than even I am willing to do. I would not so restrict the “judicial development of other justifications” in this State. It is the right of the citizens, whether they be a minority or a majority, to object to the “community’s view” on an issue and our history is replete with instances in which such protests have served either directly or as a catalyst to reform the “community view.”
The defendants were entitled to explain to the court why they violated the law prohibiting trespass. Although there is confusion in the records as to what occurred at the various proceedings involved in these several cases, it appears that for the most part the defendants were able to do so, albeit not to the extent they desired. There is little doubt that the fact-finders knew and understood the reason for the action of the defendants.
I understand the majority opinion concerning the "necessity” defense to be narrow in its application. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D.1983), was concerned with self-defense (see NDCC § 12.1-05-03), and defense of justification and excuse under chapter 12.1, NDCC. We discussed the defense of excuse generally and observed: “A defense of excuse ... does not make legal and proper conduct which ordinarily would result in criminal liability; instead, it openly recognizes the criminality of the conduct but excuses it because the actor believed that circumstances actually existed which would justify his conduct when in fact they did not.” State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 814-15.
We pointed out that a person who believes the force he uses is necessary to prevent imminent unlawful harm is justified in using such force if his belief is a correct belief; that if, on the other hand, the person reasonably but incorrectly believes that the force he uses is necessary, his use of force is excused. We concluded that decisive under our law is not whether a person’s beliefs are correct, but rather whether they are reasonable and thereby excused or justified.
Although certain of the precepts applied in Leidholm may apply to circumstances similar to those with which we are concerned today, I do not understand that a specific instruction in the nature of Leid-holm was requested. Rather, from the records before us, in those cases which were tried to a jury as well as those which were not, the defendants moved, prior to trial, to introduce evidence of opinions as to when life begins, methods of abortion and other matters which would support their position that their actions were necessary to prevent the death of unborn children. *196When the motions for introduction of evidence were denied, it appears that no particular instruction was requested. Therefore these cases before us do not directly concern the issues of justification and excuse as defenses in the sense of Leidholm, but rather are concerned with the extent to which the trial court is required to permit evidence to be adduced to support those defenses. The trial court is given considerable latitude in determining the quantity of evidence to be introduced. E.g., State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460 (N.D.1985). The Leidholm defenses are concerned not with the quantity of the evidence but with the reasonable belief of the defendants.
The defendants concede in their arguments that the necessity defense requires four basic elements, the first of which is the defendant must act voluntarily “and with an objective, rather than subjective, belief in the necessity of avoiding a greater harm.” Thus the defenses in this case were not justification and excuse as described in Leidholm but were predicated on the premise that abortion is evil and that the act of trespassing causes less severe harm than does abortion. Unless the defendants can convince the United States Supreme Court of the validity of their position, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), effectively prevents us from concluding that abortion is a greater harm, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements that it need not decide when life begins and the belief of the defendants that life begins at conception.