Court Opinion

ID: 9378566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 20:03:01.855973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.208487
License: Public Domain

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                                                              Electronically Filed
                                                              Supreme Court
                                                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                              10-MAR-2023
                                                              08:47 AM
                                                              Dkt. 33 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

                                ---o0o---

                       HOOMOANA FOUNDATION,
             Respondent/Respondent/Appellant-Appellee,

                                    vs.

               LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAII,
             Respondent/Petitioner/Appellee-Appellant,

                                    and

PUUNOA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; AND COURTNEY L. LAMBRECHT,
          Petitioners/Respondents/Appellees-Appellees.

                            SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
       (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX consolidated with CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX;
                       CIV. NO. 16-1-0160)

                             MARCH 10, 2023

              NAKAYAMA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.,
AND McKENNA, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM RECKTENWALD, C.J., JOINS

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

          This case concerns a proposed overnight campground

development for unhoused and commercial campers on “class B”

land in an agricultural district near Lahaina, Maui.            At issue
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is whether the Hoʻomoana Foundation’s (the foundation) proposed

campground project can be authorized by special use permit or

whether a district boundary amendment is required.            The specific

exclusion of overnight camps from permitted uses in Hawaiʻi

Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-4.5(a)(6)1 means that the public and

private recreational use of overnight camps is not permitted in

class A and B land in agricultural districts, and cannot be

permitted by special use permit.          In addition, Mahaʻulepu v. Land

Use Commission, 71 Haw. 332, 790 P.2d 906 (1990), superseded by

statute, 2005 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, §§ 2-3 at 669-71, which

held that a use not permitted under HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) could be

authorized by special use permit, is overruled because it was

1     Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 205-4.5 (Supp. 2015) “Permissible uses
within the agricultural districts” provides in relevant part:

            (a) Within the agricultural district, all lands with soil
                classified by the land study bureau's detailed land
                classification as overall (master) productivity rating
                class A or B and for solar energy facilities, class B
                or C, shall be restricted to the following permitted
                uses:

                  . . . .

                  (6) Public and private open area types of
                  recreational uses, including day camps, picnic
                  grounds, parks, and riding stables, but not including
                  dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters, golf
                  courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs, and
                  overnight camps[.]

                  . . . .

            (b) Uses not expressly permitted in subsection (a) shall be
                prohibited, except the uses permitted as provided in
                sections 205-6 and 205-8[.]

            . . . .
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incorrectly decided.       Because the foundation’s proposed

campground project includes a public or private recreational

overnight camp use, the project requires a district boundary

amendment.

                              I.    BACKGROUND

A.    Factual Background

            The Land Use Commission (LUC) described the

foundation’s proposed campground project as follows:

            DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY

            8.    The Property is situated along Hokiokio Place,
            adjacent to and bounded by the Lahaina Bypass Road between
            the Puamana Planned Unit Development and the agriculturally
            zoned Puʻunoa Subdivision . . . at Lahaina, Maui, Hawaiʻi.
            Kauaʻula Stream flows on one side of the Property. The lots
            within the Puʻunoa Subdivision are situated immediately
            mauka of the Property.

            9.    The Property consists of approximately 7.9 acres of
            land and represents a portion of the approximately 22.678-
            acre parcel[].

            10.   The Property is situated within the State Land Use
            Agricultural District.

            11.   The Property is owned by Kauaula Land Company, LLC,
            and is leased to Hoʻomoana.

            12.   The Property has soil classified by the [Land Study
            Bureau’s] detailed land classification as overall (master)
            productivity rating class B. Specifically, the Property is
            situated on “B87i” rated land.

            13.   The Property was previously used for sugarcane
            cultivation.

            14.   In addition to the Property, [the parcel] includes an
            approximately 9-acre area used as a retirement stable for
            horses and approximately 5.8 acres that are part of the
            Lahaina Watershed Flood Control project area.

            PROPOSED USE OF THE PROPERTY

            15.   Hoʻomoana plans to develop the Project as an overnight
            campground for homeless and commercial campers with an

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            agricultural field for possible future uses by the campers
            on the Property. The name of the Project is Kauaula
            Campground.

            16.   Under Hoʻomoana’s proposal, the Project would consist
            of 2 acres, while the remaining adjacent 5.9 acres would be
            reserved as an agricultural field to be used by the
            campground occupants for therapy and work. It is
            envisioned that the [homeless] campers may work in the
            agricultural field to supplement their rental fees.
            Homeless campers are expected to pay $10 a night, while the
            commercial campers would be charged more. The camping fees
            are anticipated to underwrite the expenses of the
            campground. Although some of the campers may wish to
            participate in farming activities on the Property, there is
            no guarantee that the agricultural field would result in
            future agricultural productivity nor is there a current
            requirement placed upon the campers to engage in
            agricultural pursuits.

            17.   The 2-acre area of the Project would have up to 26
            pods for tents accommodating up to 80 people. Tents are to
            be provided by the campers. It is intended that both the
            homeless campers and the commercial campers would be
            camping alongside each other. In addition to the pods,
            showers, toilet facilities, fire pits or camp stove areas,
            a paved parking area, and a charging station for campers
            are proposed. Homeless campers would be allowed to stay
            for two to three months or more as approved by the
            campground manager. It is unclear how long commercial
            campers would be allowed to use the grounds, but any stay
            would need to be approved by the manager.

            18.   Hoʻomoana does not know whether there will be
            sufficient use to justify continued operations, nor does
            Hoʻomoana know whether the Project will prove successful in
            addressing some of the needs of the homeless [people] in
            West Maui.

            19.   The Project is being initiated on a trial basis.

(Footnotes omitted.)2

2     No party challenged the LUC’s Findings of Fact describing the property
and the proposed campground project before the circuit court or before the
Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). Findings of fact that are not
challenged on appeal are binding on the appellate court. See Bremer v.
Weeks, 104 Hawaiʻi 43, 63, 85 P.3d 150, 170 (2004).

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B.    Procedural History

      1.    Administrative Proceedings

            The foundation filed an application for a special use

permit with the Maui Planning Commission, which held a hearing

regarding the application on July 28, 2015.

            On December 4, 2015, the Puʻunoa Homeowners Association

and its president Devonne Lane (the homeowners3) filed a petition

with the LUC seeking a declaratory order that the campground

project required a district boundary amendment and could not be

authorized by a special use permit.          The homeowners live next to

the proposed project site.        The homeowners argued that the

foundation’s proposed use did not promote the objectives of

chapter 205 because there was no guarantee of agricultural

activity at the proposed campground, making a special use permit

unwarranted.

            The County of Maui Department of Planning (Maui

Planning Department); the Office of Planning, State of Hawaiʻi

(State Planning Office); and the foundation all filed position

statements with the LUC arguing that a special use permit, not a

3     Reference to “the homeowners” includes the Puʻunoa Homeowners
Association and Devonne Lane until Ross Scott was substituted for Devonne
Lane during the ICA proceedings on February 5, 2019. From February 5, 2019
until February 8, 2023, “the homeowners” refers to the Puʻunoa Homeowners
Association and Ross Scott. On February 8, 2023, Courtney L. Lambrecht was
substituted for Ross Scott. From February 8, 2023 onward, “the homeowners”
refers to the Puʻunoa Homeowners Association and Courtney L. Lambrecht.
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district boundary amendment, is appropriate.          The foundation

also petitioned to intervene in the action.

           On February 24, 2016, the LUC heard the homeowner’s

petition and the foundation’s petition to intervene at a public

meeting.   The LUC heard testimony from nearby residents, and

from the homeowners’ counsel, the Maui Planning Department’s

counsel, the State Planning Office’s counsel, and the

foundation’s counsel.     A majority of the LUC voted to grant the

homeowners’ petition, and then unanimously voted to deny the

foundation’s motion to intervene as moot.

           The LUC’s March 3, 2016 declaratory order concluded

that the campground project could not be permitted by special

use permit and required a district boundary amendment.            The LUC

determined:

           5.    In this case, the clear prohibition of overnight
           camps on class A and class B rated lands is irreconcilable
           with the provisions of HRS § 205-6 that permit certain
           “unusual and reasonable uses” within agricultural districts
           other than for which the district is classified. By
           expressly prohibiting overnight camps on class A and class
           B rated lands, the legislature effectively determined that
           the use of overnight camp facilities on class A and class B
           rated lands is unreasonable.

           6.    To adopt the interpretation of Hoʻomoana, [the State
           Planning Office], and the [Maui Planning Department] that a
           special use permit may be used to allow the Project on
           class A and class B rated agricultural lands despite the
           clear language to the contrary would mean that the counties
           could define away completely any statutory restrictions on
           agricultural uses. It results in treating a clear and
           explicit statutory prohibition as a nullity, and it results
           in treating an implicit determination of the legislature
           that overnight camps on land classified as class A and
           class B is an unreasonable use on such land as a nullity,
           and as such must be rejected. The only way that overnight
           camps such as those proposed in the Project can be allowed
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           on the Property is to change its land use classification to
           one where overnight camps would be permitted. A change in
           the land use classification would require a district
           boundary amendment.

The LUC also filed an order denying the foundation’s petition to

intervene as moot.

     2.    Circuit Court Proceedings

           On March 29, 2016, the foundation appealed the LUC’s

declaratory order and order denying the foundation’s motion to

intervene to the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit

court).   The foundation asked the circuit court to reverse the

LUC’s orders.    The foundation argued the plain language of HRS

§ 205-4.5(a)(6) does not mean that overnight camps can never be

allowed, but rather means that overnight camps are not an “open

area type of recreational use” and may be permitted if

determined to be an “unusual and reasonable use[].”            The

foundation also argued the LUC failed to follow Mahaʻulepu, which

“found that HRS § 205-4.5(b) allows uses for which special

permits may be obtained under HRS § 205-6”4 and applies to the

present matter.

4    HRS § 205-6 (2017) provides in relevant part:

           (a) Subject to this section, the county planning commission
               may permit certain unusual and reasonable uses within
               agricultural and rural districts other than those for
               which the district is classified. Any person who
               desires to use the person's land within an agricultural
               or rural district other than for an agricultural or
               rural use, as the case may be, may petition the
               planning commission of the county within which the
               person's land is located for permission to use the
               person's land in the manner desired. Each county may
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          The LUC countered it properly interpreted HRS §§ 205-

4.5 and 205-6: the more specific restrictions against overnight

camps should prevail against the more general provisions for

special use permits, and overnight camps can never be

“reasonable” uses under HRS § 205-6 because they are explicitly

excluded in HRS § 205-4.5.      Further, a contrary reading would

render the specific restrictions against overnight camps a

nullity, which should be avoided.

          The homeowners argued the foundation was attempting to

circumvent the land use laws and achieve spot zoning by seeking

a special use permit.     The homeowners emphasized the Hawaiʻi

Constitution and HRS chapter 205 both enshrine the protection of

agricultural lands.

              establish the appropriate fee for processing the
              special permit petition. Copies of the special permit
              petition shall be forwarded to the land use commission,
              the office of planning, and the department of
              agriculture for their review and comment.

              . . . .

          (c) The county planning commission may, under such
              protective restrictions as may be deemed necessary,
              permit the desired use, but only when the use would
              promote the effectiveness and objectives of this
              chapter; provided that a use proposed for designated
              important agricultural lands shall not conflict with
              any part of this chapter. A decision in favor of the
              applicant shall require a majority vote of the total
              membership of the county planning commission.

              . . . .

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          On February 16, 2017, the circuit court entered its

Final Judgment in favor of the foundation, pursuant to its

January 4, 2017 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order

Vacating the Land Use Commission, State of Hawaiʻi’s Decisions

and Orders Entered on March 3, 2016.        The circuit court held

that overnight camps are allowable by special use permit.             The

circuit court held HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) unambiguously means that

overnight camps are not “open area types of recreational uses”

and noted the relevant statutory language had been directly

addressed in Mahaʻulepu.

     3.   Intermediate Court of Appeals Proceedings

          The LUC and the homeowners appealed the circuit

court’s Final Judgment to the ICA.

          Before the ICA, the LUC asserted that HRS § 205-4.5(a)

creates three categories of uses: (1) expressly permitted uses,

(2) uses not mentioned in HRS § 205-4.5(a) that are prohibited

by default per HRS § 205-4.5(b) but can be approved by special

permit, and (3) uses expressly not permitted under HRS § 205-

4.5(a).   Regarding the third category, the LUC explained,

“[b]ecause the use is specified, that implies that the

Legislature disapproves of the use and considers it inconsistent

with the purposes of the land use statutes and the agricultural

classification.    Therefore, such a use should not be subject to

the special permit process.”      (Footnote and citations omitted.)
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The LUC argued that because the third category of uses fails to

satisfy the criteria applicable to special permits as a matter

of law, allowing such uses to go through the special permit

process would be pointless.      The LUC noted HRS § 205-4.5(b)

applies to uses subsection (a) is silent on, but does not apply

to uses expressly not permitted.       As to Mahaʻulepu, the LUC

argued that because the legislature clarified that golf courses

cannot be authorized by special permit in 2005, the same should

be presumed for the other uses excluded in HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6).

           The homeowners contended that Mahaʻulepu is no longer

good law and emphasized that the relevant legislative history

evinces an intent to protect agriculture.

           The foundation maintained the statute refers to two

categories of uses: (1) expressly permitted uses and (2) all

other uses that are prohibited by default, because the statute

does not refer to “expressly not permitted” uses.           The

foundation also noted that overnight stays on agricultural lands

are not contrary to the objectives of chapter 205 because HRS

§ 205-4.5(a)(14) permits “[a]gricultural tourism activities,

including overnight accommodations of twenty-one days or less

. . . .”

           On May 23, 2022 the ICA issued a memorandum opinion

vacating the circuit court’s decision with regard to the

intervention issue and remanded. The ICA concluded it was bound
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by Mahaʻulepu, making the LUC’s decision contradicting Mahaʻulepu

palpably erroneous.     However, the ICA observed that the specific

exclusion of overnight camps should control over the general

availability of special permits in keeping with canons of

statutory construction and furthering the statutory scheme.             The

ICA issued its Judgment on Appeal on June 24, 2022.

     4.    Application for Writ of Certiorari

           In timely applications, the LUC and the homeowners

both argue Mahaʻulepu should be overruled and special permits

should not be used to approve expressly not permitted uses on

class A and B agricultural land.

           In response, the foundation argues the doctrine of

stare decisis is particularly strong regarding statutory

interpretation because if the legislature disagrees with a

court’s interpretation of a statute, the legislature can amend

the law.   The foundation further contends overruling Mahaʻulepu

is unwarranted.

           The foundation’s procedural due process argument

regarding intervention raised before the circuit court and the

ICA was not raised on certiorari, and as such will not be

addressed.

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                         II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.    Review of agency decisions
            [T]he standard of review, as set forth in HRS § 91-14, is
            as follows:

                  Upon review of the record, the court may affirm the
                  decision of the agency or remand the case with
                  instructions for further proceedings; or it may
                  reverse or modify the decision and order if the
                  substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
                  prejudiced because the administrative findings,
                  conclusions, decisions, or orders are:

                  (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
                  provisions;

                  (2) In excess of the statutory authority or
                  jurisdiction of the agency;

                  (3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

                  (4) Affected by other error of law;

                  (5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
                  probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
                  record; or

                  (6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
                  abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise
                  of discretion.

            HRS § 91-14(g).

                  Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, pursuant to
            subsections (1), (2) and (4); questions regarding
            procedural defects are reviewable under subsection (3);
            findings of fact (FOF) are reviewable under the clearly
            erroneous standard, pursuant to subsection (5), and an
            agency’s exercise of discretion is reviewed under the
            arbitrary and capricious standard, pursuant to subsection
            (6). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under
            the clearly erroneous standard because the conclusion is
            dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the
            particular case.

In re Hawaiʻi Elec. Light Co., 145 Hawaiʻi 1, 10–11, 445 P.3d

673, 682–83 (2019) (cleaned up).

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B.    Statutory interpretation

            “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

which this court reviews de novo.”          State v. Thompson, 150

Hawaiʻi 262, 266, 500 P.3d 447, 451 (2021) (citing State v.

Ruggiero, 114 Hawaiʻi 227, 231, 160 P.3d 703, 707 (2007)).

            First, the fundamental starting point for statutory
            interpretation is the language of the statute itself.
            Second, where the statutory language is plain and
            unambiguous, our sole duty is to give effect to its plain
            and obvious meaning. Third, implicit in the task of
            statutory construction is our foremost obligation to
            ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
            legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the
            language contained in the statute itself.

Ito v. Invs. Equity Life Holding Co., 135 Hawaiʻi 49, 61, 346

P.3d 118, 130 (2015) (quoting Haw. State Tchrs. Ass’n v.

Abercrombie, 126 Hawaiʻi 318, 320, 271 P.3d 613, 615 (2012)).

                              III. DISCUSSION

A.    The uses specifically not permitted by HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6)
      cannot be authorized by special use permit.

            The state-level land use system is set out in HRS

chapter 205.     Land in Hawaiʻi is divided into four land use

districts: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation.                HRS

§ 205-2(a) (2001).      Agricultural lands are further classified by

soil productivity level from “A” to “E,” with class A denoting

the highest productivity level and class E denoting the lowest.

Neighborhood Bd. No. 24 (Waianae Coast) v. State Land Use

Comm’n, 64 Haw. 265, 267 n.2, 639 P.2d 1097, 1099 n.2 (1982).

Under HRS § 205-4.5, agricultural districts are restricted to

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certain uses, which depend on the productivity rating.

Subsection (a) of HRS § 205-4.5 provides that class A and B

agricultural lands “shall be restricted to the following

permitted uses . . . .”     Subsection (a) then enumerates

permitted uses, such as “(1) [c]ultivation of crops, including

crops for bioenergy, flowers, vegetables, foliage, fruits,

forage, and timber;” and “(2) [g]ame and fish propagation

. . . .”   At issue here is the sixth enumerated use: “(6)

[p]ublic and private open area types of recreational uses,

including day camps, picnic grounds, parks, and riding stables,

but not including dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters, golf

courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight camps

. . . .”   (Emphasis added.)

           Next, subsection (b) provides: “Uses not expressly

permitted in subsection (a) shall be prohibited, except the uses

permitted as provided in sections 205-6 [special permits] and

205-8 [nonconforming uses] . . . .”

           HRS § 205-6 sets forth the law on special use permits.

It provides: “the county planning commission may permit certain

unusual and reasonable uses within agricultural and rural

districts other than those for which the district is

classified.”   HRS § 205-6(a) (emphasis added).         Further, “[t]he

county planning commission may, under such protective

restrictions as may be deemed necessary, permit the desired use,
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but only when the use would promote the effectiveness and

objectives of this chapter . . . .”        HRS § 205-6(c) (emphasis

added).

           The question before this court is whether the public

and private open area types of recreational uses explicitly not

permitted in HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) – dragstrips, airports, drive-

in theaters, golf courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs,

and overnight camps – can be permitted by special use permit

under HRS §§ 205-4.5(b) and 205-6.

           “[T]he fundamental starting point for statutory

interpretation is the language of the statute itself. . . .

[O]ur foremost obligation [is] to ascertain and give effect to

the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained

primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.”

Invs. Equity Life Holding Co., 135 Hawaiʻi at 61, 346 P.3d at 130

(quoting Abercrombie, 126 Hawaiʻi at 320, 271 P.3d at 615).

           Special use permits are available only for “unusual

and reasonable uses” and “only when the use would promote the

effectiveness and objectives of this chapter.”          HRS § 205-6(a)

and (c).   HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) specifically lists uses that are

not permitted in class A and B agricultural district land.             By

explicitly banning certain uses in HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6), the

legislature indicated those uses on class A and B agricultural

land are inherently not reasonable.        Therefore, a plain reading
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of the text demonstrates that special use permits are

unavailable to authorize the public and private recreational

uses of “dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters, golf courses,

golf driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight camps” because

those are not reasonable uses on class A and B agricultural

land.

          Further, the statutory rule against superfluity

establishes that special use permits are unavailable for the

public and private recreational uses of “dragstrips, airports,

drive-in theaters, golf courses, golf driving ranges, country

clubs, and overnight camps” on class A and B agricultural land.

“It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts are

bound to give effect to all parts of a statute, and that no

clause, sentence, or word shall be construed as superfluous.”

State v. Bautista, 86 Hawaiʻi 207, 213, 948 P.2d 1048, 1054

(1997) (quoting State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai‘i 358, 372, 917 P.2d

370, 384 (1996)).    If special use permits were available for the

explicitly not permitted uses listed in HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6), HRS

§ 205-4.5(a)(6)’s clause banning such uses would be superfluous.

Therefore, to give effect to HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6)’s clause

excluding the public and private recreational uses of

“dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters, golf courses, golf

driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight camps” from

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permitted uses on class A and B agricultural land, such uses

cannot be permitted by special use permit.

          Another principle of statutory interpretation confirms

that HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6)’s specific list of not permitted uses

controls over the general default rule and special use permit

exception of HRS § 205-4.5(b).

          It is the generally accepted rule of statutory construction
          that unless a legislative intention to the contrary clearly
          appears, special or particular provisions control over
          general provisions, terms or expressions. . . . It is also
          elementary that specific provisions must be given effect
          notwithstanding the general provisions are broad enough to
          include the subject to which the specific provisions
          relate.

In re R Child., 145 Hawai‘i 477, 485, 454 P.3d 418, 426 (2019)

(quoting State v. Coney, 45 Haw. 650, 662, 372 P.2d 348, 354

(1962), overruled on other grounds by City and Cnty. of Honolulu

v. Bonded Inv. Co., 54 Haw. 385, 507 P.2d 1084 (1973)).            HRS

§ 205-4.5(a)(6)’s express list of not permitted uses is more

specific than HRS § 205-4.5(b)’s default prohibition and general

special use permit exception.       As such, HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6)’s

express list of not permitted uses controls.

          A closer examination of HRS § 205-6 reinforces that

special use permits are unavailable for the public and private

recreational uses of “dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters,

golf courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight

camps” on class A and B agricultural land.         Using class A and B

agricultural land for such uses of “dragstrips, airports, drive-

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in theaters, golf courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs,

and overnight camps” does not appear to promote the objectives

of HRS chapter 205, which is required by HRS § 205-6(c) to

qualify for a special use permit.        See HRS § 205-6(c) (“The

county planning commission may, under such protective

restrictions as may be deemed necessary, permit the desired use,

but only when the use would promote the effectiveness and

objectives of this chapter . . . .” (emphasis added)).

           The “overarching purpose” of HRS chapter 205 is to

“protect and conserve natural resources and foster intelligent,

effective, and orderly land allocation and development.”            Kaua‘i

Springs, Inc. v. Planning Comm’n of Cnty. of Kaua‘i, 133 Hawai‘i

141, 169, 324 P.3d 951, 979 (2014) (quoting Curtis v. Bd. of

Appeals, Cnty. of Haw., 90 Hawai‘i 384, 396, 978 P.2d 822, 834

(1999)).   Relevant here, HRS chapter 205 is intended in part to

protect agricultural land for agricultural use.          See HRS § 205-

2(a)(3) (“In the establishment of the boundaries of agricultural

districts the greatest possible protection shall be given to

those lands with a high capacity for intensive cultivation[.]");

Curtis, 90 Hawai‘i at 396, 978 P.2d at 834 (noting that one of

the purposes of HRS chapter 205 is to “[u]tilize the land

resources in an intelligent, effective manner based upon the

capabilities and characteristics of the soil and the needs of

the economy” (emphasis added) (quoting H. Stand. Comm. Rep. No.
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395, in 1961 House Journal, at 855–56)).         Moreover, the

legislature declared that “the people of Hawaii have a

substantial interest in the health and sustainability of

agriculture as an industry in the State.         There is a compelling

state interest in conserving the State's agricultural land

resource base and assuring the long-term availability of

agricultural lands for agricultural use . . . .”           HRS § 205-41

(2017).   HRS § 205-41 was enacted pursuant to article XI,

section 3 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, which enshrines the

protection of agricultural lands: “The State shall conserve and

protect agricultural lands, promote diversified agriculture,

increase agricultural self-sufficiency and assure the

availability of agriculturally suitable lands.”

          Thus, in addition to the foregoing reasons, it appears

special use permits cannot authorize the public and private

recreational uses of “dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters,

golf courses, golf driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight

camps” on class A and B agricultural land, because these uses of

class A and B agricultural land do not appear to promote the

objectives of chapter 205, as required by HRS § 205-6(c).

          In sum, HRS §§ 205-4.5(a)(6) and 205-6 are clear: the

“public and private open area types of recreational uses” of

“dragstrips, airports, drive-in theaters, golf courses, golf

driving ranges, country clubs, and overnight camps” are not
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permitted on class A and B agricultural land, and cannot be

permitted by special use permit.5

B.    A district boundary amendment is required for the
      foundation’s proposed campground.

            Public and private recreational uses of “dragstrips,

airports, drive-in theaters, golf courses, golf driving ranges,

country clubs, and overnight camps” are not permitted uses on

class A and B rated agricultural land and cannot be subject to a

special use permit.       (Emphasis added.)

            The foundation’s proposed campground is clearly an

“overnight camp” within the meaning of HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6).               The

LUC found that “Hoʻomoana plans to develop the Project as an

overnight campground . . . The name of the Project is Kauaula

Campground.”6     The campground project is intended for

recreational use by commercial campers, in addition to use by

unhoused campers.      Because the campground project includes a

5     This opinion does not construe “overnight accommodations” within the
meaning of HRS § 205-2(d)(12), relating to agricultural tourism activities,
because this issue was not raised on certiorari, except briefly by the
foundation in the separate context of arguing Mahaʻulepu v. Land Use
Commission, 71 Haw. 332, 790 P.2d 906 (1990), superseded by statute, 2005
Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205, §§ 2-3 at 669-71, was not abrogated.

6     In its answering briefs before the ICA, the foundation argued the
record is inadequate because it does not include the special use permit
application. The special use permit application is not in the record, though
the homeowners appear to have attached excerpts of the special permit
application as an exhibit. The foundation did not raise the issue on
certiorari. Given our disposition in this case – that the special use permit
procedure is not available for overnight camps on class A and B rated
agricultural district land – the fact that the special use permit is not in
the record is inconsequential. Throughout its briefing, the foundation
admitted it is “seeking a special use permit for the operation of an
overnight campground.”
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recreational use of an overnight camp, the project cannot be

authorized by special use permit.          Accordingly, the proposed

campground requires a district boundary amendment to change the

land use classification to one where recreational overnight

camps are permitted.       See generally HRS § 205-3.1 (2005).

C.    Mahaʻulepu v. Land Use Commission is overruled.

            Mahaʻulepu v. Land Use Commission, 71 Haw. 332, 790

P.2d 906 (1990), superseded by statute, 2005 Haw. Sess. Laws Act

205, §§ 2-3 at 669-71, rests on flawed statutory analysis and

was incorrectly decided.

                  “[A] court should not overrule its earlier decisions
            unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic
            require it.” Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., 92
            Hawai‘i 398, 421, 992 P.2d 93, 116 (2000) (quoting State v.
            Stocker, 90 Hawai‘i 85, 95, 976 P.2d 399, 409 (1999)).
            Nevertheless, “there is no necessity or sound legal reason
            to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare
            decisis.” State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i 200, 206, 29 P.3d
            919, 925 (2001) (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. 641,
            653 n.10, 658 P.2d 287, 297 n.10 (1982)). The doctrine is
            “subordinate to legal reasons and justice and we should not
            be unduly hesitant to overrule a former decision when to do
            so would bring about what is considered manifest justice.”
            Ariyoshi, 65 Haw. at 653 n.10, 658 P.2d at 297 n.10
            (quoting McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Haw. 174, 180,
            504 P.2d 1330, 1335 (1973)).

State v. Chang, 144 Hawai‘i 535, 553, 445 P.3d 116, 134 (2019).

Mahaʻulepu is overruled because inescapable logic and the cogent

reasons enumerated above require it.          The statutory analysis in

Mahaʻulepu is flawed, and “there is no necessity or sound legal

reason to perpetuate an error under the doctrine of stare

decisis.”     Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i at 206, 29 P.3d at 925.

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             Mahaʻulepu held that golf courses on class A and B

agricultural land can be authorized by special use permit under

HRS §§ 205-4.5(b) and 205-6, despite the fact that golf courses

are not a permitted use on class B agricultural land under HRS

§ 205-4.5(a)(6).       Mahaʻulepu, 71 Haw. at 336–37, 790 P.2d at 908-

09.    The opinion did not reconcile HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6)’s list of

explicitly not permitted uses with HRS § 205-4.5(b)’s and HRS

§ 205-6’s special use permit provisions.            Instead, the opinion

analyzed the effect of Act 298 - the 1985 amendment to HRS

§ 205-2 relating to golf courses - on HRS § 205-4.5(b).               Id. at

337-38, 790 P.2d at 909-10.          Because Mahaʻulepu failed to engage

with the plain language of HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) prohibiting

certain uses in class A and B agricultural districts, ignored

principles of statutory interpretation, and failed to effectuate

the purpose of the statutory scheme, it is overruled.7

                               IV.    CONCLUSION

             The specific exclusion of overnight camps from

permitted uses in HRS § 205-4.5(a)(6) means that the public and

private recreational use of overnight camps is not permitted,

even by special use permit, on class A and B agricultural

district land.       Accordingly, the foundation’s proposed

7     The LUC’s contention that the foundation waived its argument regarding
Mahaʻulepu will not be addressed in light of this decision overruling
Mahaʻulepu.
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campground project requires a district boundary amendment.

Further, Mahaʻulepu v. Land Use Commission, 71 Haw. 332, 790 P.2d

906 (1990), superseded by statute, 2005 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 205,

§§ 2-3 at 669-71, was incorrectly decided and is overruled.

          Accordingly, we reverse the ICA’s June 24, 2022

Judgment on Appeal.

Robert T. Nakatsuji                      /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
(Kimberly T. Guidry
on the briefs) for                       /s/ Michael D. Wilson
petitioner Land Use
                                         /s/ Todd W. Eddins
Commission

Douglas R. Wright
(Deborah K. Wright on
the briefs) for petitioners
Puʻunoa Homeowners Association,
Inc. and Courtney L. Lambrecht

James W. Geiger for
respondent Hoʻomoana
Foundation

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