Court Opinion

ID: 9404102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 07:10:10.287748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:11.495144
License: Public Domain

In The
                                 Court of Appeals
                        Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                        No. 07-22-00200-CR

                                  PAUL ADAMS, APPELLANT

                                                  V.

                              THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                             On Appeal from the 460th District Court
                                     Travis County, Texas1
            Trial Court No. D-1-DC-20-202363, Honorable Selena Alvarenga, Presiding

                                           June 16, 2023
                                MEMORANDUM OPINION
                        Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

        Appellant, Paul Adams, appeals his jury convictions for the offenses of murder and

tampering with evidence. The jury recommended a 52-year sentence for the murder

conviction and a 20-year sentence for the tampering conviction. The trial court entered

        1 Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts, this case was transferred to this
Court from the Third Court of Appeals. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. In the event of any conflict,
we apply the transferor court’s case law. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
judgment consistent with the jury’s recommendations.         We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                     BACKGROUND

      Appellant and Robin Hatcher began a romantic relationship in early 2019.

Appellant frequently stayed at Hatcher’s apartment throughout their relationship.

Appellant has been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, schizo-affective disorder, bipolar

disorder, and substance-induced psychosis. Hatcher has been diagnosed with bipolar

disorder and schizophrenia, for which she had been prescribed medication. She has also

had a long history of substance abuse. While the couple were sometimes off-and-on,

they appeared to have a happy and healthy relationship.

      On August 12, 2019, Hatcher left from her place of employment with a man

presumed to be Appellant. After this point in time, Hatcher never returned to work or had

any contact with friends or family. A default judgment was entered against Hatcher after

she failed to appear for an August 27 eviction proceeding.

      In the week following Hatcher’s disappearance, Domonique, her daughter, went to

Hatcher’s apartment to check on her. Domonique found the apartment in disarray; she

found food left out and rotting, clothes strewn about “everywhere,” and one of Hatcher’s

wigs on the floor. Domonique described the state of the apartment as “unusual” in that

Hatcher usually kept the apartment “clean.” Domonique also testified that it was unusual

to find Hatcher’s wig on the floor because that was the wig Hatcher usually wore. Hatcher

cared about her appearance and frequently wore wigs when in public. Also, Domonique

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noted that Hatcher’s medication was still in the apartment and that Hatcher was generally

compliant in taking her medications.

        Hatcher’s family attempted to contact Hatcher through phone calls and social

media. They asked neighbors if anyone had seen her. They posted flyers in the area

around Hatcher’s apartment and at a mortuary, but not at homeless shelters or churches.

On August 16, Domonique contacted the Austin Police Department (APD) to perform a

welfare check on Hatcher.

        On August 23, Domonique made a formal report to APD that Hatcher was a

missing person. As part of the missing person investigation, APD canvassed Hatcher’s

apartment complex. They also researched Hatcher in police and civilian databases and

obtained her cell phone, Google, and Facebook records.                       Hatcher received Social

Security benefits which were placed on a NetSpend card, but that card was not used after

August 12. Hatcher also received financial assistance on a Lone Star card. This card

was used on August 13 and 15. Video surveillance footage established that Appellant

used the card on August 13, without Hatcher being present. It was further discovered

that Appellant pawned Hatcher’s cell phone on August 15. APD was unable to locate

Hatcher or any indicia that she used her financial resources or social media after August

15.2

        During its investigation, APD conducted multiple interviews with Appellant. The

first of these occurred on September 10. Appellant told Detective Martin that he and

        2 The uses of Hatcher’s Lone Star card on August 13 and 15 were the only financial transactions
involving Hatcher’s financial resources after August 12. No social media activity was found following August
12.

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Hatcher had gotten into an argument and broken up in early August, and his subsequent

efforts to contact Hatcher by phone had been unsuccessful. He stated that he assumed

she had blocked his number. At this interview, Appellant stated that Hatcher had been

suicidal at the time she broke up with Appellant. Detective Martin interviewed Appellant

again on November 13, where Appellant’s story remained consistent other than, at this

interview, Appellant described Hatcher as having “murderous tendencies.”

      On April 2, 2020, APD officers were dispatched to respond to an assault at a

convenience store. When they arrived, Appellant claimed to have been assaulted. After

he was examined by EMS, Appellant told the officers that he had “personally asphyxiated”

Hatcher and disposed of her body. One of the officers to whom he made this confession

noted that Appellant has had mental health issues so his confession “could be a hoax.”

Based on his confession, APD officers transported Appellant for another interview with

Detective Martin. During this interview, Appellant stated that, on August 12, he and

Hatcher got into an argument after which he went to a convenience store. When he

returned to the apartment, he found Hatcher’s body lying on the bed. Appellant said that

he put her body in some sort of luggage, which he disposed of in the apartment dumpster.

      The following day, Appellant called Detective Martin to request another interview.

Before the time for the interview arrived, Appellant flagged down an officer on Interstate

35 in downtown Austin, almost running into the highway to do so. He requested that the

officer detain him because he had committed a homicide. Detective Martin subsequently

interviewed Appellant. During this interview, Appellant stated that, while on PCP, he had

grabbed Hatcher by the throat, choked her, and then suffocated her with a pillow to ensure

that she was dead. At the conclusion of this interview, Appellant was arrested.
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       Appellant was indicted for the offenses of murder and tampering with evidence.

He proceeded to trial. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant moved for a

directed verdict on the basis that the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule, which

requires evidence outside of Appellant’s confessions to establish that Hatcher was

murdered by someone. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Further, at the close

of the guilt-innocence portion of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury that it would

have to find that evidence independent of Appellant’s out-of-court confessions

established that Hatcher had been murdered.           The jury returned a verdict finding

Appellant guilty of the murder of Hatcher and tampering with evidence by disposing of her

body. Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was expressly denied

by the trial court. Appellant then timely filed his notice of appeal.

       By his appeal, Appellant presents two issues. Appellant contends that there was

insufficient evidence to meet the corpus delicti rule as to the murder of Hatcher (Issue

One) or that Appellant tampered with evidence (Issue Two).

                                   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Due process requires that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every

element of the crime charged. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and

reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622

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(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and

amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State,

323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring). When reviewing

all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is whether

the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07 & n.26. In our review,

we defer to the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See id. at

899. As such, even if we would have resolved the conflicting evidence in a different way,

we must defer to the jury’s findings that are supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 901–

02 (discussing Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)).

       “It is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the defendant’s guilt;

circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a defendant’s

guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish guilt.” Nisbett, 552

S.W.3d at 262. Not all facts need to point directly and independently to guilt if the

cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.

Id.

                                THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE

       The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidentiary sufficiency “affecting cases in which

there is an extrajudicial confession.” Miller v. State, 457 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015). The rule provides that, “[w]hen a conviction is based on a defendant’s

extrajudicial confession, that confession does not constitute legally sufficient evidence of

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guilt without corroborating evidence independent of that confession showing that the

essential nature of the offense was committed.” Miranda v. State, 620 S.W.3d 923, 928

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021).      Essentially, the corpus delicti rule requires an additional

requirement of proof beyond our traditional Jackson sufficiency analysis for cases

involving extrajudicial confessions. See Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2021) (“In cases involving extrajudicial confessions when ‘beyond a reasonable

doubt’ is the burden, not only must the evidence be legally sufficient under Jackson but

also it must tend to show the corpus delicti of the offense.”).

       To meet the corpus delicti rule, corroborating evidence need not independently

prove the crime; rather, it must simply make the occurrence of the crime more probable

than it would be without the evidence. Id. The corpus delicti rule has been traditionally

applied to ensure that a person is not convicted “solely on his own false confession to a

crime that never occurred.” Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). The corpus delicti rule originated in England more than 300 years ago and Texas

has applied the rule for more than one hundred and sixty years. Shumway v. State, 663

S.W.3d 69, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022).

       The corpus delicti of a particular crime is “the fact that the crime in question has

been committed by someone.” Fisher v. State, 851 S.W.2d 298, 303 (Tex. Crim. App.

1993). The rule is satisfied with proof that the crime itself occurred; the State is not

required to prove that the specific defendant committed the criminal act. Id. The corpus

delicti of murder is established “if the evidence shows the death of a human being caused

by the criminal act of another, and the State is not required to produce and identify the

body or remains of the decedent.” Nisbett, 552 S.W.3d at 263 (citing McDuff v. State,
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939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). The ultimate question is whether the

evidence, when viewed as a whole, is sufficient to establish the victim’s death. Id. at 264.

       A confession alone cannot be used to satisfy the corpus delicti. Shumway, 663

S.W.3d at 76. “We have long held that ‘in the establishment of the corpus delicti, the

confessions are not to be excluded, but are to be taken in connection with the other facts

and circumstances in evidence.’” Id. (quoting Kugadt v. State, 44 S.W. 989, 996 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1898)). In other words, rather than being completely ignored, the confession

can be used to help analyze other available evidence. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals

has explained,

       Although a court can use the confession in its analysis, there must be some
       evidence outside of the confession that, standing alone or in conjunction
       with the confession, provides proof “that the crime charged has been
       committed by someone.” Essentially, the Kugadt Rule simply allows a
       confession to “render sufficient circumstantial evidence that would be
       insufficient without it,” but it still requires “other facts and circumstances”
       outside of the confession.

Id. (quoting Watson v. State, 227 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950)).

                                         ANALYSIS

       By his first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence establishing

the corpus delicti of murder. After reviewing all of the evidence, we believe that the

evidence was sufficient to allow a rational jury to conclude that Hatcher had been

murdered by someone and, therefore, that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied. The

evidence establishes that Appellant was the last person seen with Hatcher. According to

a statement he gave to police, he and Hatcher got into an argument on the night of her

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disappearance. Appellant was seen alone using Hatcher’s Lone Star card within days of

her disappearance. However, in his statement to police, Appellant claimed that he only

used Hatcher’s Lone Star card in her presence. Appellant also pawned Hatcher’s cell

phone but told police that he did not know the owner of the phone. Before being contacted

about Hatcher’s disappearance, Appellant performed Google searches for missing

persons reports in the area. Hatcher’s daughter, Domonique, testified that Hatcher’s

apartment was in disarray compared to the way that Hatcher kept it. The disarray of the

apartment could allow a rational inference that an altercation had occurred there.

Domonique also testified that it was unusual to find Hatcher’s wig on the floor because

Hatcher cared for her appearance. Domonique implied that Hatcher would not voluntarily

leave the apartment without wearing the wig. The presence of the wig on the floor could

also allow for a reasonable inference that an altercation had occurred in the apartment.

There was also evidence that Appellant had broken down Hatcher’s front door prior to her

disappearance. The evidence establishes that Hatcher did not use any income from a

known source after her disappearance on August 12, 2019. She also had no contact with

family or friends after that date or posted anything to social media, even though Hatcher

had always stayed in contact with her family and was an avid social media user. Likewise,

Hatcher did not report to work after August 12, and allowed a default judgment to be taken

against her in an eviction proceeding after she failed to appear for the hearing. APD did

an exhaustive search for Hatcher but was unable to locate her or her body. Appellant

concedes that the “circumstantial evidence does indicate [that Hatcher] is likely dead.”

Finally, when we consider Appellant’s confession, in which he claims to have

“asphyxiated” Hatcher, we note that such a manner of murder is consistent with the state

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of the apartment. Considering all of the evidence admitted in this case, we conclude that

a reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion that Hatcher was the victim of

murder.3 Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish the

corpus delicti of murder and, thus, overrule Appellant’s first issue.

        By his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

establish the corpus delicti of tampering with physical evidence. The corpus delicti rule

does not strictly apply where the confession involves multiple, closely related criminal

episodes within a single criminal episode or course of conduct. Miller, 457 S.W.3d at 927.

This exception to the corpus delicti rule “applies only when the temporal relationship

between the offenses is sufficiently proximate that introduction of the extrajudicial

confession does not violate the policies underlying the corpus delicti rule.” Id. Having

already determined that the evidence establishes the corpus delicti of Hatcher’s murder,

we need only determine whether the claim that Appellant tampered with evidence was

closely related to Hatcher’s murder and part of the same criminal episode or course of

conduct. Appellant has consistently told the police that immediately after discovering

Hatcher’s body, he put her body in some luggage and disposed of the luggage in the

apartment’s dumpsters. Appellant’s explanation of what he did with Hatcher’s body is

consistent throughout his confessions. Clearly, Appellant’s confessed action in disposing

        3 Appellant raises the possibility that Hatcher may have died from a drug overdose. While the
evidence would allow for that inference, we are mindful that Appellant’s issue challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury’s decision that the evidence established the corpus delicti of murder. Our
conclusion that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could decide that Hatcher was
murdered is all that is necessary for us to overrule Appellant’s first issue.

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of Hatcher’s body is closely related to her murder and part of the same criminal episode.

As such, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.

                                       CONCLUSION

         Having overruled both of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

                                                       Judy C. Parker
                                                          Justice

Do not publish.

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