Court Opinion

ID: 9734009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:22:35.645968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.019821
License: Public Domain

FILES, P. J., Dissenting in part.
—I concur in the reversal as to Henry, but would affirm Champion’s conviction.
Champion was seen driving the Pontiac just 16 hours after its owner had locked up. It is a reasonable inference that a person driving such a vehicle so soon after the theft is the person who took it. This was a relatively new and valuable car. Ownership of an automobile does not pass casually from hand to hand, like cigarettes, liquor or neckties. The defendant could not have purchased it, for motor vehicles are not salable without the ownership certificate. It is possible to borrow an automobile, but a jury might think it unlikely that someone other than Champion or his agent stole this car during Wednesday night and then loaned it to Champion on Thursday.
The Supreme Court declared in People v. McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, at p. 755 [26 Cal.Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449], “The great weight of authority in other jurisdictions *34recognizes that an inference of guilt is permissible where recently stolen property is found in the conscious possession of a defendant and the possession is not explained. ’ ’
Prior to McFarland, courts occasionally said that “mere possession” of stolen goods was not enough. One difficulty with that language is that almost any case presents some other circumstances, e.g., the nature of the goods, the time, the place, the manner of possession. The real question in any ease is the weight of the evidence as a whole. The McFarland opinion repudiated the “mere possession” theory and expressly disapproved People v. Chambers (1861) 18 Cal. 382, which had held that possession of the loot is not “of itself” sufficient to support a conviction for theft.
Some of the statements in McFarland concerning the effect of the defendant’s silence in the face of questioning have been overruled by People v. Cockrell (1965) 63 Cal.2d 659, 670 [47 Cal.Rptr. 788, 408 P.2d 116] ; and comment upon the defendant’s silence is forbidden under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229] ; see People v. Summerfield (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 626 [69 Cal.Rptr. 10].
Nevertheless, the inference to be drawn when a person is found driving a stolen car is in no way diminished by the existence of his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant need not explain. But possession, under some circumstances, speaks for itself with sufficient authority to support a verdict. As in any case which depends upon circumstantial evidence, “ ‘We must assume in favor of the verdict the existence of every fact which the jury could have reasonably deduced from the evidence, and then determine whether such facts are sufficient to support the verdict.’ If the circumstances reasonably justify the verdict of the jury, the opinion of the reviewing court that those circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with the innocence of the defendant will not warrant interference with the determination of the jury.” (People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678. 681 [104 P.2d 778].)
By this standard, the jury’s verdict as to Champion should not be overturned.