Court Opinion

ID: 9853863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:29.275922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:12.105321
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s analysis of Oregon’s rape shield law, OEC 412, and agree with its conclusion that evidence of a victim’s venereal disease should be considered evidence of past sexual behavior under that law. However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s *697failure to exercise its discretion as to whether to hold a competency hearing was harmless error.
The majority cites no authority for its application of harmless error analysis to the trial court’s failure to address the competency issue that defendant raised, and I can find none. In Oregon, the sole remedy for a court’s failure to exercise discretion under ORS 161.360 is to require the court to conduct a hearing to determine the defendant’s competence at the time the issue was raised. See State v. Gilmore, 102 Or App 102, 105, 792 P2d 1242 (1990). See also Brady v. Calloway, 11 Or App 30, 41, 501 P2d 72 (1972), rev den (1973) (construing an earlier statute). Cf. State v. Arndt, 1 Or App 608, 610-11, 465 P2d 486 (1970) (holding that, in a case where defendant did not raise the issue of his competence until his motion for a new trial, the trial court’s failure to order a competency hearing sua sponte during trial was not reversible error).
Similarly, federal cases have consistently held that the remedy for a trial court’s failure to order a competency hearing as required under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause is either to conduct a hearing to determine competence at the time of trial or to grant a new trial. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 US 162, 95 S Ct 896, 43 L Ed 2d 103 (1975) (ordering a new trial); Pate v. Robinson, 383 US 375, 86 S Ct 836, 15 L Ed 2d 815 (1966) (ordering a new trial); Dusky v. United States, 362 US 402, 80 S Ct 788, 4 L Ed 2d 824 (1960) (ordering a new trial); Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F3d 1128 (10th Cir 1999) (upholding trial court’s decision to order a hearing to determine whether a retrospective competency determination would be feasible).
Moreover, by deeming the trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion to be harmless error, the majority decides, in effect, that no evidence could be presented at a competency hearing that could establish that defendant was not competent to assist in his defense. Although the record contains evidence that arguably supports a finding that defendant was competent, the evidence was not presented for that purpose and it is not a substitute for evidence directed to that issue. There simply is no way for us to know, in advance, what evidence could be presented on that issue and, hence, *698there is no way that we can use this record to conclude that defendant is competent.
Finally, we held in Gilmore that a trial court’s failure to exercise its discretion under ORS 161.360(1) could not be overlooked on the ground that the defendant acted normally and appeared to be competent during trial. Gilmore, 102 Or App at 105. The majority wholly fails to reckon with our analysis in Gilmore, and it provides no explanation for its decision to take a novel approach to such an important issue. I would follow Oregon case law and order that a retrospective competency hearing be held. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s contrary decision.