Court Opinion

ID: 9615015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:30:20.797959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:41.301032
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting) :
To discriminate against the adopted child and deprive him of his share of the intended family trust is in my opinion a grave injustice. It is contrary to the clearly expressed intent of our statutory law; it is inconsistent with the better considered de-cisional law; and is out of harmony with sound policy considerations for the welfare of the family and society generally.
The clearly expressed intent of our adoption statutes in accordance with the conclusion above stated is set forth in Sec*800tion 78-30-9, U.C.A.1953, which provides that upon the order of adoption:
. [T]he child shall thenceforth be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the person adopting.
And the succeeding Section 10 states that:
. After adoption the two shall sustain the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights of that relation.
For the purpose of carrying out the clear mandate of those statutes, that the adopted child should have all legal rights the same as natural children, including those of inheritance and succession, our 1971 legislature re-enacted Chapter 189, S. L.U.1971. It is entitled “Interests of Adopted Children, An Act Amending Sections 74-1-24, [et seq.] . [enumerates all pertinent sections relating to wills and succession] Providing for Adopted Children to Have the Same Rights Under the Inheritance and Succession Laws as Natural Children .” The act then proceeds to re-enact the pertinent sections, adding at each of ten separate sections the provision that, “For the purposes of this section, issue shall include adopted children,” with slight variations appropriate to the text of some sections.
It requires but little reflection to see the fallacy in the concept of narrowing the adoption down to simply a contract between the adoptive parents of the child. It is just as erroneous as it would be to say that a marriage contract is only between the immediate parties. Whether we want to accept it or not, the immutable fact is that the adoptive proceeding, like the marriage ceremony, affects not only the immediate parties, but the family and all of society.
Coordinate to the foregoing, I can see no reason why a person should not have an absolute and inviolable right to acquire and establish his family in the manner he chooses; and that his child, whether acquired by natural birth or by choice and adoption, should become his child for all intents and purposes, social, legal and otherwise. Even more important, the child himself should have the right to become a member of the family for all purposes, not only in relation to his adoptive parents, but in relation to brothers, sisters and so on to all other relatives, and-to society in general. If this is not so, it is easy to see difficulties that may result as to the reciprocal rights and duties within the family and in relation to the public. Contrasted to this, by regarding the adoptive child as a bona fide member of the family for all intents and purposes the same as a natural child, much good would be accomplished and those difficulties eliminated.1
The main opinion itself, generously, but inconsistent with its own conclusion, quotes the definition of issue as a generic term.
The term “issue,” . . . includes descendants of every degree and is to be given that meaning in the absence of explanatory context.
This view, that the term should be given general meaning unless the contrary is shown is supported by abundant authority.2 A plethora of cases could be cited, but in order to avoid burdening the page, a few examples are sufficient for my purpose and anyone who desires to further pursue this subject.
In re Heard’s Estate,3 involved construction of a will creating a trust to be paid to the son’s lawful issue. As in our case, after the death of the testatrix, the son adopted a child. The court held that it would be assumed, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that the testatrix intended *801an adopted child to be included in the term “lawful issue” in view of the public policy to treat adopted children the same as natural children. It commented that there is no more probability that a person would adopt a child to adversely» affect someone else, than that he would deliberately have a blood.child for that purpose.
In O’Brien v. Walker4 the court expressly rejected the contention that the term “issue” when used in a will or trust instrument, meant only “children of the blood” and held that an adopted daughter took as “issue” of the trustor’s daughter.
In Dollar Savings & Trust Company of Youngstown v. Musto 5 the court held that a child adopted by the son of the testatrix 16 years after her death (1938) and 17 years after her will was executed (1937) was the son’s “issue” within the meaning of the will. The court said:
in modern days, after reading all of the cases submitted and after careful research, we find that the word “issue” has taken on a much broader meaning and feel that it now, and did at the time the will was drawn, include adopted children.
In re Holden’s Trust6 the testatrix died in 1926, one year after making her will. She provided for her own adopted son for his life. The question was whether a child adopted by her adopted son 11 years after her death was “lawful issue” of her adopted son. The Minnesota court, upon an exhaustive review of the decisions in this country, held the adopted child was such lawful issue.
In summary I think it appropriate and directly to the point to reiterate the words of Judge Goodrich in Carpenter v. United States:7
That the current of modern thought on the matter is wholly in the direction of placing the adopted child in the family of his adoption as completely as though the relationship from the beginning had been by blood. ⅛
Impelled by what has been said herein, I state with the utmost emphasis my conviction that-under the fair and clear interpretation and application of our statutes, and the better considered decisional law on the subject, an adoptive child should be regarded as emancipated to the rights of a natural child in every respect; and that therefore this particular adoptive child . should have his fair and lawful share of the trust. (All emphasis added.)

. To avoid repetition I refer to my dissent in In re Smith’s Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 326 P.2d 400, footnote 7 of main opinion.

. The main opinion quotes 57 Am.Jur., Wills, Sec. 1378 which see for numerous supporting eases; and see also Annotation, adopted-child as within class in testamentary gift, 82 A.L.R.2d 12.

. 49 Cal.2d 514, 319 P.2d 637 (1957).

. 35 Hawaii 104 (1939), aff’d 115 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1940); and to the same effect see decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, In re Estate of Cunha, 49 Hawaii 273, 414 P.2d 925 (1966).

. 88 Ohio L.Abst. 62, 181 N.E.2d 734 (Ct.App.1961).

. 207 Minn. 21, 291 N.W. 104 (Sup.Ct.1940). In the later case of In re Trusteeship Agreement with Nash, 265 Minn. 412, 122 N.W.2d 104 (1963), the court said: “. . . we hold that the settlor is presumed to intend that adopted children be included within the category of issue of a life tenant ‘who may hereafter be born,’ ” unless the contrary is shown. Similar holding in Prince v. Nugent, 93 R.I. 149, 172 A.2d 743 (1961), the court stated that gift to lawful issue in a deed of trust prima facie includes the grantees’ adopted child unless otherwise stated.

. 3 Cir., 168 F.2d 369, 372, 3 A.L.R.2d 841, 889.