Court Opinion

ID: 9391287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 19:02:45.175912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.297370
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/1/23 P. v. Burgess CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C095650

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                       (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-
                                                                                      FDV-2019-0012172)
           v.

    TRAVIS BURGESS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Travis Burgess guilty of assault likely to cause great
bodily injury, domestic violence, intimidating a witness (two counts), and dissuading a
witness. The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in state prison.
         On appeal, defendant contends that the witness dissuasion conviction under Penal
Code section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2)1 should be reversed, asserting the statute only
applies to efforts to dissuade a witness prior to charges being filed. The prosecution

1   Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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charged witness dissuasion based on telephone calls from jail defendant made to the
victim, more than a month after the prosecution filed a criminal complaint against him.
We will reverse defendant’s conviction for witness dissuasion and remand for
resentencing.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        The prosecution charged defendant in an information with assault likely to cause
great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1), willful infliction of corporal injury to a
cohabitant and a person with whom defendant had a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd.
(a); count 2), attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2);
counts 3 & 4), dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2);
count 5), and contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 6, 7, 8 & 9).2 As to counts 1
and 2, the information further alleged that defendant inflicted great bodily injury under
circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)) and, as to count 2,
defendant had suffered a prior domestic violence conviction (§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)).
        A detailed recitation of the facts underlying defendant’s assault and domestic
violence convictions is not necessary to resolution of this appeal. The following
summary will suffice.
        The victim began dating defendant in February 2018. Both the victim and
defendant used methamphetamine and alcohol daily, and their relationship, amicable at
first, turned into screaming matches and physical altercations. On two occasions in July
2019, the victim called police to the home she shared with defendant in Manteca,
reporting that defendant had struck her, pushed her, and thrown her into a wall.
        On September 10, 2019, the victim checked into a hotel in Stockton and invited
defendant to join her. An argument ensued because defendant believed another man had

2   Prior to trial, the prosecution dismissed counts 6 through 9 in the interest of justice.

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been in the room. Defendant choked the victim and threw her on the bed multiple times
when she tried to get up. She was bleeding from the nose and chest, and her blood was
on the blankets and sheets. On September 11, the victim and defendant changed rooms
and another argument erupted. Defendant pushed her into a wall, punched her face, and
kicked her. The hotel manager, responding to reports of a female screaming in the room,
knocked on the door and asked to speak to the woman in the room. Defendant told the
manager through the closed door that the woman was in the shower. When the victim
opened the door, the manager saw the victim with her makeup running, blood on her face,
a black eye, and what appeared to be a cigarette burn on her clavicle. She begged the
manager not to leave her alone with defendant. She said defendant was going to kill her.
The manager called police and defendant packed his belongings and left before they
arrived.
       On October 22, 2021, the jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 through 5 and
found true that defendant inflicted great bodily injury. Specifically relevant here, the jury
found defendant guilty of violating section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) for “[d]issuading a
witness from causing a Complaint or Information from being prosecuted . . . occurring on
or about October 22nd, 2019, to October 26th, 2019 . . . .” The trial court found true that
defendant had suffered a previous conviction for domestic violence.
       The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years on count 2, plus four
years for the enhancement; the middle term of two years on counts 3 and 4, consecutive;
and two years on count 5, concurrent. Pursuant to section 654, on count 1 the court
imposed and stayed a sentence of the middle term of three years, plus four years on the
enhancement.
       The court sentenced defendant to a total aggregate term of 13 years.
       Defendant timely appealed.

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                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                              Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2)
         Defendant asserts that his conviction under section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) must
be reversed for insufficient evidence, because the statute only applies to a defendant’s
efforts prior to arrest to prevent a crime being reported to law enforcement. Here, the
conduct in question consisted of defendant’s telephone calls from jail to the victim more
than a month after he was arrested and a criminal complaint filed.
         We agree with the court in People v. Reynoza (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 181, 189,
review granted May 11, 2022, S273797 (Reynoza), which held that “section 136.1[,
subdivision ](b)(2) requires proof that, among other things, the defendant attempted to
prevent or dissuade another person from causing a complaint, indictment, information,
probation or parole violation to be filed. If the defendant was aware the relevant charging
document had already been filed, and the defendant did not attempt to prevent or
dissuade the filing of any amended or subsequent charging document, the defendant has
not violated section 136.1[, subdivision ](b)(2).”
         Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction on count 5 for violation of section
136.1, subdivision (b)(2).
    A.      Background
         On September 12, 2019, the prosecution filed a criminal complaint against
defendant. On September 18, 2019, he was arrested.
         On October 22, 2019, defendant spoke to the victim by telephone from jail.3 The
victim told defendant that she would be attending his preliminary hearing, originally

3 The parties stipulated that the calls were properly authenticated and took place on the
dates indicated. The prosecutor passed out transcripts of the telephone calls to the jury
and played the audio recordings. The trial court admonished jurors that the transcripts

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scheduled for the following day. Defendant responded, “Oh man, that’s not good.”
When the victim asked if she should not attend, defendant said, “No, hell no.” When she
asked why, defendant said, “Babe I mean babe I’m not going to tell you what to do over
the phone but if you did, I’ll be gone, you won’t ever see me again probably.” Toward
the end of the conversation, defendant said, “I hope I don’t see you until you pick me up,
that’s all.”
        On October 24, 2019, in another telephone call from jail, the victim told defendant
she had been served with a subpoena. Defendant responded that he was “fucked,”
because “this all backfired this is not good.” He explained, “I was hoping they were
going to give me, I I denied you know what I mean because I figured that you know what
I mean? That you weren’t going to go.” Defendant said, “I’m not telling you what to do
babe at all, not even close, I’m just telling you that, you gotta say hey I want him out of
jail, I love him, and we could we could go to counseling together, that’s my husband, I
love him, I’m engaged to him. I mean you gotta.”
        On October 26, 2019, when defendant and the victim spoke again on the
telephone, defendant suggested the victim “could go to the doctors the night before [her
court appearance] and tell them you had an anxiety attack or something like that . . . .”
When the victim raised the possibility of the court issuing a bench warrant if she did not
appear, defendant said a friend in jail with him had suggested that the victim “could just
say we were drunk, just say hey we were, we we were drunk you know what I mean and
we were drinking all night and we were drinking all day and I don’t know what really
happened, I kind of blacked out and it will be a done deal.” Defendant reported that in
his friend’s case, “they did nothing to her uh, she said that she made up the whole story
because she was upset at him this and that and nothing ever happened to her,” and “his

were only an aid to follow and understand the recordings and the recordings were the
actual evidence. However, the transcripts were admitted as exhibits for purposes of
appeal and are cited by the parties in their briefs.

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deal got better and that was it.” Defendant urged the victim “you can do what you want
to do but uh, anything, just tell them the truth and just say I was drunk, we were up all
night drinking.” Defendant asked her to say, “I attacked him and he just pushed me off
him,” and he assured her that “[n]othing at all going to happen to you, they are going to
drop everything, drop charges and everything.” Defendant continued that the victim
should say, defendant “didn’t have a choice,” and “you came at me, but you can’t say like
that I tried to make you unconscious . . . .” Defendant acknowledged that “I know what
went down but for right now” she should say it was defendant protecting himself.
        On October 31, 2019, defendant told the victim “now you can get lost again, they
can’t find you, you just get lost again,” and “I’m just telling you you don’t have to show
up, don’t show up anymore you don’t have to, it’s up to you.”
   B.      Analysis
        In determining whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, “ ‘we do
not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we “examine the whole record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citations.] We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] . . . “[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify
the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” [Citation.]’ ” (People v.
Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 210.)
        We review the interpretation of a statute de novo. (People v. Gonzales (2018)
6 Cal.5th 44, 49.) Our objective is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent to effectuate the
purpose of the law. (People v. Johnson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1108.) “Because
the statutory language is generally the most reliable indicator of that intent, we look first
at the words themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning.” (Alford v.

                                              6
Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1040 (lead opn. of Werdegar, J.).) When the
statutory language is unambiguous, its plain meaning controls. (Johnson, at p. 1109.)
We also “generally must ‘accord[] significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and
sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose,’ ” and “ ‘[a] construction making some
words surplusage is to be avoided.’ ” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357.) If
the language supports more than one reasonable construction, we may look to extrinsic
aids, including legislative history. (People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1106.)
       The jailhouse telephone conversations the prosecutor offered to prove defendant
violated section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) occurred after the prosecution had filed the
initial criminal complaint and defendant had been arrested. At the time of the earliest of
these conversations, defendant appeared to be aware of the complaint being filed, given
that the first call referenced his preliminary hearing. Thus, the issue before us is whether
the statute applies under these circumstances.
       Section 136.1, subdivision (b) provides in relevant part: “[E]very person who
attempts to prevent or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who
is witness to a crime from doing any of the following is guilty of a public offense and
shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year or in the
state prison: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Causing a complaint, indictment, information, probation or
parole violation to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.” 4
       In People v. Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595 (Hallock), our colleagues in the
Fifth District summarized section 136.1, subdivision (b) as prohibiting three types of

4  The other two parts of section 136.1, subdivision (b) prohibit preventing or dissuading
a crime victim or witness from (1) “[m]aking any report of that victimization to any
peace officer or state or local law enforcement officer or probation or parole or
correctional officer or prosecuting agency or to any judge,” and (3) “[a]rresting or
causing or seeking the arrest of any person in connection with that victimization.”
(§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), (3).)

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witness intimidation: “Subdivision (b) prohibits preventing or dissuading a witness from
(1) reporting the victimization; (2) causing a complaint or similar charge to be sought;
and (3) arresting or causing or seeking the arrest of any person in connection with such
victimization.” (Hallock, at p. 606, italics added.) In People v. Fernandez (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 943, the court agreed with Hallock’s conclusion that “the offenses
defined in section 136.1, subdivision (b) targeted pre-arrest efforts to prevent a crime
from being reported to the authorities.” (Id. at p. 950.)
       However, in People v. Velazquez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 219, Division Four of
the Second Appellate District rejected the defendant’s claim that section 136.1,
subdivision (b) applied only to prearrest efforts to dissuade a witness from reporting a
crime, and not attempts to persuade a witness to drop charges after the arrest of the
perpetrators. (Velazquez, at p. 232.) Velazquez disagreed with Fernandez and rejected its
interpretation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) as dictum. (Velazquez, at p. 232.) The
court concluded: “Subdivision (b)(2) clearly encompasses more than prearrest efforts to
dissuade, inasmuch as it includes attempts to dissuade a victim from causing a complaint
or information to be prosecuted or assisting in that prosecution.” (Id. at p. 233, italics
added.)
       But, in People v. Brown (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1074, the court noted that “under
section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), the perpetrator must attempt to prevent a person from
causing a charging document to be sought and prosecuted and from assisting in the
prosecution. Thus, the prevention must occur before the relevant charging document has
been filed.” (Id. at p. 1082.)
       Here, the Attorney General urges us to adopt the Velazquez court’s interpretation
of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2), that essentially reads the word “or” into the statute.
Rather, we agree with the Reynoza court, which held: “We are persuaded instead by the
construction of the statute adopted in Hallock, Brown and Fernandez. Section 136.1[,
subdivision ](b)(2) prohibits attempts to dissuade a witness from causing a complaint ‘to

                                              8
be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.’ (§ 136.1, subd.
(b)(2), italics added.) The plain meaning of the words ‘[c]ausing a complaint . . . to be
sought and prosecuted’ necessarily includes the filing of a complaint. The Velazquez
court misconstrued the term ‘and’ to mean ‘or,’ thereby eliminating that required filing
element. By passing over the drafters’ use of the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive,
the court ignored the canon of statutory construction that ‘significance must be given to
every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a
construction that makes some words surplusage.’ [Citation.]” (Reynoza, supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 188.)
       We conclude that Reynoza has the better interpretation, for the obvious reason
that, unlike Velazquez, Reynoza does not resort to substituting words with very different
meanings to achieve its desired interpretation. However, the Attorney General proposes a
novel construction of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2) to avoid this defect. The Attorney
General argues that the phrase “any of the following” in section 136.1, subdivision (b)
subject to the statutory prohibition also refers to “assisting in the prosecution” in
subdivision (b)(2). Thus, the Attorney General argues that dissuading a witness from
“assisting in the prosecution” is a standalone violation of the statute, regardless of when it
occurs. This interpretation not only expands section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2)
dramatically to apply to witness dissuasion that occurs at any time, but, like Velazquez, it
requires us to ignore the meaning of a word, in this case “and.” We read the word “and”
that prefaces “assisting in the prosecution thereof” to indicate that this phrase as
modification of the preceding phrase “[c]ausing a complaint, indictment, information,
probation or parole violation to be sought and prosecuted.” Therefore, the subordinate
phrase cannot be unlinked from the main phrase in the manner the Attorney General
proposes.
       We believe a more reasonable interpretation of the phrase “any of the following”
is a reference to the enumerated parts (1), (2) and (3) of subdivision (b) that follow, and

                                              9
not an invitation to parse the language of these parts as if each phrase were its own
subpart. Further, as defendant points out, and Hallock makes clear, all three parts of
subdivision (b) of section 136.1 refer to stages of a criminal prosecution that typically
precede filing a complaint: reporting a crime, causing a criminal charge to be filed, and
seeking an arrest. (Hallock, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 606.) As Reynoza observed,
“[o]ther statutory provisions prohibit attempts to dissuade victims or witnesses where
charges have already been filed.” (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 189-190, citing
§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1) & (2) [dissuasion of a witness from testifying or attending trial];
§ 137, subd. (c) [attempting to influence testimony or information given to law
enforcement].) Thus, we do not interpret “assisting in the prosecution thereof” as an
independent action that violates section 136.1, subdivision (b) where criminal charges
have already been filed.
       Finally, insofar as the statutory language may be deemed ambiguous, in Reynoza,
the court pointed out that “the legislative history makes clear that legislators understood
[the term ‘sought and prosecuted’] to refer to the filing of a complaint. The bill analysis
generated by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice described this subdivision as
‘covering the prevention or dissuasion or attempts from . . . [c]ausing an accusatory
pleading to be filed, or parole or probation report sought.’ [Citation.] Similarly, the
report of the Senate Committee on Judiciary described the subdivision as making it a
crime ‘to dissuade or attempt to dissuade a person from . . . [c]ausing an accusatory
pleading to be filed.’ ” (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 188-189.)

                                             10
       We conclude, as did Reynoza, that “[a]bsent substantial evidence proving an
essential element of the offense, the conviction under section 136.1[, subdivision ](b)(2)
must be reversed.” (Reynoza, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 190.)5
                                               II
                                  Remand for Resentencing
       The jury convicted, and the court sentenced, defendant on multiple counts, only
one of which we reverse. Thus, we apply the rule that “upon remand for resentencing
after reversal of one or more subordinate counts of a felony conviction, the trial court has
jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the defendant’s sentence on the counts that were
affirmed, including the term imposed as the principal term.” (People v. Burbine (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1259; see also People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when
part of a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing
as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in
light of the changed circumstances’ ”]; People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46
[“full resentencing [is] appropriate given the ‘ “interlocking nature” ’ and ‘inherently
integrated nature’ of felony sentencing for a multiple-count conviction”].)
       As it happens, defendant also contends this case should be remanded for the trial
court to exercise its discretion under the amendments Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) made to section 654, effective January 1, 2022. Assembly Bill No. 518
amended section 654, subdivision (a) to provide that “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished und er either
of such provisions . . . .” (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1.) Former section 654 provided that
such an act or omission “be punished under the provision that provides for the longest

5 Accordingly, we need not consider defendant’s alternative claim that we should stay
the sentence on section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2), if we do not reverse his conviction on
section 136.1, subdivision (b)(2).

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possible term of imprisonment.” (Former § 654, subd. (a).) Defendant argues the trial
court should be afforded the opportunity to decide under amended section 654 whether to
stay the sentence on the domestic violence conviction, which has a higher triad than the
assault conviction.
       The Attorney General concedes that Assembly Bill No. 518 applies retroactively
to nonfinal cases such as defendant’s. But the Attorney General argues that defendant
forfeited the claim on appeal because he did not raise it in the trial court, and defendant’s
argument that defense counsel was ineffective does not resurrect the claim, because it
would have made no difference if the trial court had sentenced defendant under section
654 as amended.
       We need not resolve the matter. On remand the trial court can reconsider all its
sentencing choices based on the law and circumstances that apply at the time of
resentencing. (People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 893.)

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                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s conviction on count 5 for victim or witness dissuasion (§ 136.1, subd.
(b)(2)) is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for full resentencing on
defendant’s remaining convictions and sentencing enhancements, consistent with this
opinion, the amendments to section 654, and the law and circumstances in effect at the
time of resentencing. The court is further directed to prepare an amended abstract of
judgment reflecting defendant’s new sentence and forward a copy of the abstract to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

                                                      /s/
                                                  EARL, J.

We concur:

    /s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

    /s/
HULL, J.

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