Court Opinion

ID: 9458824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:02:28.198437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:54.190885
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I dissent from so much of the majority opinion as affirms dismissal of the first, third and fourth causes of action. I fully appreciate the time-consuming burden that this and similar cases impose on our district courts and have suggested that federal legislation to deal with the problem may be appropriate.1 In the absence of a legislative solution, however — particularly when this case must now be tried in any event on the second and fifth causes of action — I cannot agree that the problem should be solved by a rigid construction of the pleadings or by misapplied principles of qualified official immunity or by exclusive reliance on a dictum in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962).
In my view, Christman’s first cause of action fairly alleges harassment, by means of two separate instances of extraordinary confinement,2 in order tó intimidate him prior to contemplated court action and to punish him for pursuing efforts to obtain judicial relief. The complaint does, to be sure, allude to the memorandum to inmates as well as to violation of appellant’s first amendment rights of free speech and association. But it also alleges retaliation for Christ-man’s exercise of his right to petition the government for a redress of grievances — an allegation which, on the facts of this case, can only refer to his state court suit to enjoin cutting of the facial hair of pre-trial detainees. Construing the complaint liberally, as we must on a motion to dismiss, I would hold that the first cause of action presents the substantial federal question of interference with prisoner access to the courts. See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 200-201 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 92 S.Ct. 719, 30 L.Ed.2d 740 (1972) and 405 U.S. 978 (1972); cf. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
The third cause of action claims that restrictions on inmate receipt of reading material violated the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments,3 and seeks damages therefor. The majority affirms dismissal because Christman failed to allege that the defendants’ actions, pur*728suant to a then presumably valid regulation, were prompted by bad faith or wanton disregard of plaintiff’s rights. Although here, too, I would read the complaint more charitably,4 I am unable, in any event, to find warrant for placing this stringent burden of pleading on the plaintiff. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-557, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), which recognized the substantive basis of a “good faith” defense at least in the section 1983 damage suit then before the Court,5 cannot be read to justify this pleading burden; the Court emphasized that “the defense of good faith and probable cause ... is also available to [the officers] ... in the action under § 1983. This holding does not, however, mean that the count based thereon should be dismissed.” Id. at 557, 87 S.Ct. at 1219. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the Pierson Court distinguished earlier language in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), as follows:
We also held [in Monroe] that the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state that the officers had “a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right,” but this holding, which related to requirements of pleading, carried no implications as to which defenses would be available.
386 U.S. at 556, 87 S.Ct. at 1219. Taken together, Pierson and Monroe recognize good faith as an affirmative defense and place at least the burden of pleading on a section 1983 defendant.6 Accordingly, on this count I would reverse and remand to give defendants an opportunity to place their good faith in issue before the trier of fact and to give Christman an opportunity to show bad faith harassment through discriminatory and personalized enforcement of the allegedly unconstitutional regulation.7
Finally, I regard the language of the four-man Supreme Court majority in Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384 (1962), as an inadequate basis on which to dismiss the fourth cause of action, which alleged that Christman’s conversation with his sister was “monitored” shortly after he instituted suit in the state courts. After expressing doubt whether a prison *729was a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, Mr. Justice Stewart’s opinion assumed arguendo that it was, but reasoned that the exclusionary rule would probably not operate to bar questions propounded by a legislative investigating committee which were derived from conversation “unlawfully” overheard through eavesdropping devices. Id. at 145, 82 S.Ct. 1218. Regardless, said the Court, “the ultimate constitutional claim asserted . . ., whatever its merits, is simply not tendered by this record,” id. at 147, 82 S.Ct. at 1223, because petitioner’s contempt conviction resulted as well from his refusal to answer questions in no way traceable to any eavesdropping. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Court defined fourth amendment protection as prohibiting warrant-less electronic eavesdropping under circumstances in which a person had a justifiable reliance on privacy. The plurality opinion in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), which construed the Katz standard to bar eavesdropping only when an individual can anticipate no risk that his words will be disclosed, admittedly reinforces the Lanza dictum. The question remains whether the state has an absolute right to monitor all conversations under all circumstances between a prisoner and those visiting him. Given the uncertain state of the authorities, I am unwilling to accept that view, and, on the slender record before us, would not hold that Christman’s complaint fails to allege a substantial federal question, particularly when it is suggested that official eavesdropping commenced only after plaintiff sought judicial redress.
I should add that I share both the majority’s view that damages will be difficult to establish and its reluctance to so hold as a matter of law. And I join so much of the majority opinion as reverses dismissal of the second and fifth causes of action.

. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert. granted sub nom. Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 2459, 32 L.Ed.2d 805 (1972).

. Christman was placed in isolation on June 1, 1971, the day prior to commencement of his eventually successful state court suit. He was subsequently recon-fined on June 24, with two “civil” prisoners who were instructed not to mix with or talk to him.

. Even limited restrictions on reading material have been invalidated by courts of appeals in other circuits, see Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 541 (5th Cir. 1968); Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968), and by at least one district court in our own. Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y.1970) (Weinfeld, J.). The constitutionality of the blanket prohibition authorized by the regulations in effect during Christman’s incarceration thus surely presents a substantial federal question. Cf. Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 Yale L.J. 87 (1971).

. As to each and every cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that his action
seeks to alleviate unconstitutional actions which have been and are being performed by jail personnel at the Monroe County Jail under, upon' information and belief, the supervision and control of Defendants with their knowledge and consent.
I would construe this paragraph, specifying a knowing deprivation of constitutional rights, as sufficient to allege malice.

. Cf. Judge Wyzanski’s interesting discussions of the good faith defense in section 1983 damage suits in Rose Chalet Functions Corp. v. Evans, 264 F.Supp. 790, 796-797 (D.Mass.1967), noted in 55 Geo. L.J. 1168 (1967), and Richards v. Thurston, 304 F.Supp. 449, 456-457 (D.Mass. 1969).

. Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958), relied on by the majority, in no way suggests a different allocation of pleading burden. It is true that the trial court there found no suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard, but it did so only after two days of trial hearing, upon “substantial evidence.”

. The majority repeats this error when it affirms dismissal of that part of the' second cause of action, which complains of “censorship” (which I take to be reading) of Christman’s mail to his attorney. The majority distinguishes between censorship and refusal to mail, remanding as to the latter but dismissing as to the former on the ground of “qualified privilege.” I concur in the dismissal on the strength of our decisions in Sostre v. McGinnis, supra, 442 F.2d at 201, and Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 131-132 (2d Cir. 1972). In view of the adoption by the New York Department of Correctional Services of new rules regarding censorship, see Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 671 & n. 3 (2d Cir. 1972), I do not believe that this is an appropriate case to consider whether “this aspect of Sostre . . . might bear re-examination.” See Wright v. McMann, supra, 460 F.2d at 136 (concurring opinion of Oakes, J.).