Court Opinion

ID: 9553653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:09.246265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:59.085000
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice, Retired,
dissenting.
The majority opinion properly recites the fact that
“We will not disturb the decision of the trial court in this regard [modification of child custody] in the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse of discretion.”
Here there is not only a “serious procedural error,” but, more importantly, there is a “clear and grave abuse of discretion” and a “violation of a recognized principle of law.”
PROCEDURAL ERROR
The majority opinion considers “the controlling issue here” to be whether an earlier modifying judgment1 awarding custody of the children to appellant was void because the court lacked jurisdiction to enter such judgment. The majority of the court decides that such modifying judgment was void because appellee was not properly served with appellant’s petition to modify the child custody provisions of the original divorce decree.2 The majority opinion then notes that, since appellee already had legal custody of the children when she initiated this proceeding to obtain such custody, she did not have the burden of establishing a change of circumstances to warrant a modification of the decree. The record is not positive as to whether the award in this matter in favor of appellee was because she was required to carry such burden and did so, or whether it was because such burden was on appellant and he failed to carry it.3 We should not presume either to have been the case. Certainly, the parties had no clear understanding in this respect, and this procedural defect could have had an effect on the rational presentation of the evidence.
The majority opinion recognizes this procedural error as serious and as a “controlling issue.” Accordingly, it should not simply be disregarded. The error should be corrected by having the substantive issues tried under a correct procedure wherein the court and the parties understand and agree on the procedural status of the matter. The error is sufficiently serious to prevent the trial court and this court from resolving the substantive issue.
*314ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND VIOLATION OF A PRINCIPLE OF LAW
The fact that the “welfare and best interests” of the children are of paramount consideration in determining their custody has become a recognized principle of law. Linch v. Harden, 26 Wyo. 47, 176 P. 1546 (1918); Crummer v. Crummer, 44 Wyo. 1, 7 P.2d 223 (1932); Burt v. Burt, 48 Wyo. 19, 41 P.2d 524 (1935); Curran v. Curran, 51 Wyo. 217, 65 P.2d 243 (1937); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 76 Wyo. 188, 301 P.2d 377 (1956); Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923 (Wyo. 1961); Henson v. Henson, 384 P.2d 721 (Wyo.1963) (visitation question); Taylor v. Taylor, 388 P.2d 192 (Wyo.1964); Wilson v. Wilson, 473 P.2d 595 (Wyo.1970).
A corollary thereto is that consideration of the real or supposed derelictions of one parent or the other is pertinent only as such may pertain to the “welfare and best interests” of the children and not for the purpose of punishing or rewarding one of the parents. Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426 (Wyo.1985); Wilson, 473 P.2d at 595; Henson, 384 P.2d at 721.
In this case, the evidence and the consideration thereof emphasized the parental faults without relating such faults to the “welfare and best interests” of the children — excepting the damage inflicted upon the daughter of the parties as a result of appellee’s immorality.
The uncontradicted evidence was that appellee brought one Terry Patterson, a convicted felon, into her home and lived with him without marriage. The children observed this immoral situation. Terry Patterson was, and is, a pervert, and he sexually assaulted one of the children, S.G., a female, age 11 years, over the period of one and a half years. Finally S.G. reported the assaults to her teacher — not to her mother. In the note to her teacher, she said, “I need help can you help us píese [sic]?” The note resulted in Patterson’s arrest and subsequent plea of guilty to second decree assault4 on S.G. He was sentenced to a term of one to two years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. He acknowledged that he had a problem with molesting young girls.
The uncontradicted evidence also reflected that the children received poor grades in school when in custody of appel-lee, causing them to be held back a grade, whereas the grades improved considerably when the children were in the temporary custody of appellant. Such evidence further reflected that the children and their clothes were “filthy” when appellee delivered their temporary custody to appellant.
The uncontradicted evidence also indicated that appellant did not exhibit much interest in the children in the nature of telephone calls, presents, etc., subsequent to the time they left Germany with appel-lee.
The emphasis placed on all of this evidence at the trial was directed at the fault of the parties rather than its effect on the “welfare and best interests” of the children. For example, the trial court commented on appellant’s failure to exhibit much interest in the children after they left Germany as a dereliction on his part. The “welfare and best interests” of the children *315could well have been served by this failure if contacts by appellant simply created arguments and tensions having adverse effects on the children. The receipt of the children by appellant from appellee in a “filthy” condition could have been caused by an isolated occurrence on that particular day.
The reason that S.G. did not confide in her mother with reference to the assault on her could bear on S.G.’s “welfare and best interests.” The explanation given to the children for, and their understanding of, the immoral relationship between appellee and Patterson could bear on the children’s “welfare and best interests.” Evidence was received concerning appellee's contacts with Patterson subsequent to his arrest and to her allowing the children, other than S.G., to accompany Patterson when he was out on bond before sentencing. The more pertinent consideration concerning the “welfare and best interests of the children” would be appellee’s propensity to associate intimately with others of a character similar to Patterson’s.5 These and like concerns could have been presented at the trial if the emphasis there had been on the “welfare and best interests” of the children.
At trial, the parties and the court referred to the rule relative to the “welfare and best interests” of the children, and the trial court made a ruling that such was served by placing custody in appellee.
Normally, the trial court’s findings are presumed correct, and such findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless inconsistent with the evidence, clearly erroneous, or contrary to the great weight of the evidence. Wangler v. Federer, 714 P.2d 1209 (Wyo.1986); Broyles v. Broyles, 711 P.2d 1119 (Wyo.1985); Yost v. Harpel Oil Co., 674 P.2d 712 (Wyo.1983); City of Bock Springs v. Police Protection Association, 610 P.2d 975 (Wyo.1980). In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this court assumes that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the successful party s evidence and gives the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference that may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it. Broyles, 711 P.2d at 1119; City of Rock Springs, 610 P.2d at 975.
In this case there was little conflict in the evidence. Since the only evidence favorable to appellee was appellant’s failure to exhibit interest in the children when they were in appellee’s custody, the finding that the “welfare and best interests” of the children were served by awarding custody to appellee was not sustained by the evidence and is contrary to the great weight of the evidence as the evidence now exists.
Therefore, the result reached by the trial court was not reasonable under the circumstances. There exists an abuse of discretion.
“ ‘A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances.’ Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).
“An abuse of discretion is that which shocks the conscience of the court and appears so unfair and inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 616 P.2d 707 (1980).”
Waldrop v. Weaver, 702 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo.1985).
Accordingly, I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial in which the procedural status of the parties is well defined, and in which the evidence concerning custody is directly related to the “welfare and best interests” of the children.

. The appellant was plaintiff in the original divorce action wherein custody of the children was given to appellee.

. Of interest is whether or not the mailing, without more, of such petition of appellant under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is sufficient for jurisdiction when the notice is returned marked, as here, "refused by addressee [appellee]." Such Uniform Act provides that such notice may be:
"By any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a receipt].]" W.S. 20 — 5—106(a)(iii) (emphasis added).

.The trial court was additionally handicapped by the fact that the trial was interrupted and delayed for long periods of time on more than one occasion and by the fact that some of the witnesses testified out of order.

. The plea was to an information charging violation of second degree sexual assault as defined in W.S. 6-2-303(a)(v) and W.S. 6-2-306(a)(ii). W.S. 6-2-303(a)(v) provides:
"(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first degree: ******
"(v) At the time of the commission of the act the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the actor is at least four (4) years older than the victim[.]”
"Sexual intrusion” is defined as follows in W.S. 6-2-301:
"(a) As used in this article:
******
"(vii) ‘Sexual intrusion’ means:
“(A) Any intrusion, however slight, by any object or any part of a person’s body, except the mouth, tongue or penis, into the genital'or anal opening of another person’s body if that sexual intrusion can reasonably be construed as being for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse; or "(B) Sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus or anal intercourse with or without emission."
W.S. 6-2-306(a)(ii) provides the punishment for second degree sexual assault to be not more than 20 years.

. The trial court ruled that appellee’s future association with Patterson would be a basis for further consideration of the custody statutes. In any event, Patterson cannot inflict further harm on the children until he is released from confinement.