Court Opinion

ID: 9378794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 17:01:15.508692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.407749
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 23a0038p.06

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                             ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                             │
                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                              >        No. 22-5586
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 WENDY REINBERG,                                             │
                                 Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                             ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
              No. 2:21-cr-20071-2—John Thomas Fowlkes, Jr., District Judge.

                               Decided and Filed: March 13, 2023

               Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

                                      _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Serena R. Gray, Needum L. Germany, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant.      Naya Bedini, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Wendy Reinberg pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. She claims that
she was entitled to a shorter sentence under the safety-valve provision. But to receive the benefit
of that provision, she had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she disclosed
everything she knew about her crime and the surrounding circumstances. The district court
concluded that Reinberg failed to carry her burden. We affirm.
 No. 22-5586                        United States v. Reinberg                             Page 2

                                                I.

       The government was investigating Reinberg’s boyfriend, Matthew Kilbourne, for selling
meth. During that investigation, an informant arranged to buy meth at Kilbourne’s home. When
the informant arrived, Kilbourne was nowhere to be found. But Reinberg and an unidentified
man were there. So Reinberg offered to sell meth to the informant. The informant accepted and
purchased 8.4 grams of meth from Reinberg, even though he was hoping to buy 10 grams.

       While he was at the house, the informant asked Reinberg about purchasing a gun—
specifically, a 410-gauge Taurus Judge revolver. At first, Reinberg didn’t seem to know what
the informant was talking about. But when the unidentified man asked if the informant meant
the “gun he bought for [the informant],” Reinberg immediately caught on. Video at 9:10–9:14.
She asked if the informant meant “[t]he Judge.” Video at 9:15. He did, but Reinberg still wasn’t
sure about accepting the informant’s $400 offer: “I don’t know. She’s pretty too.” Video at
9:25–9:29.

       A little more than a minute later, the informant reiterated his offer of $400, but Reinberg
still hesitated: “I don’t know, she’s my—she’s pretty, ain’t it?” Video at 10:55–10:59. Finally,
before the informant left, Reinberg told him she would “have [Kilbourne] hit you up on that.”
Video at 14:50–14:52.

       Later, Kilbourne arranged to meet the informant. Kilbourne promised to bring the gun
and more meth since the informant hadn’t received as much from Reinberg as he had hoped.
When the two met, Kilbourne didn’t bring any meth, but he did sell the gun to the informant.

       Kilbourne was arrested and charged with gun and drug offenses. For her part, Reinberg
was indicted for possessing meth with intent to distribute, distributing meth, and aiding and
abetting Kilbourne in the same. She pled guilty without a plea agreement.

       Before sentencing, Reinberg met with the government to disclose what she knew. But
her counsel stopped her from answering questions about the gun because she wasn’t charged
with any gun offenses. So when Reinberg asked for safety-valve relief at sentencing, the
government opposed her request. Citing the video, the government argued that Reinberg hadn’t
 No. 22-5586                               United States v. Reinberg                                      Page 3

disclosed all she knew about the gun. The district court granted a continuance to allow Reinberg
to tell the government all she knew about the weapon.

        When Reinberg met with the government a second time, she claimed “she was aware of
the gun” but wasn’t involved in its sale. R. 79, Pg. ID 252. She also said she never possessed
the gun and didn’t know where it was. That led the government to oppose her safety-valve
request once again, claiming that the video showed Reinberg knew more than she was saying.
The district court agreed with the government, finding Reinberg’s comments during the drug sale
“dam[n]ing.” R. 79, Pg. ID 262. The court concluded that it was “pretty clear that she had
knowledge of the firearm,” that “[s]he was familiar with it,” and that there was “a pretty strong
indication that the firearm was there” as the conversation “took place.” Id. Thus, the district
court denied safety-valve relief and sentenced Reinberg to 60 months’ imprisonment. She timely
appealed.

                                                          II.

        The safety-valve provision allows a court to impose a sentence shorter than the statutory
minimum if the defendant satisfies five conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); see also U.S.S.G.
§ 5C1.2. The defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she
“meets each and every criterion.” United States v. Barron, 940 F.3d 903, 914 (6th Cir. 2019)
(cleaned up). The district court then makes a factual determination about each criterion, which
we review for clear error. United States v. Gardner, 32 F.4th 504, 526 (6th Cir. 2022).

        Here, our review is limited to one criterion: the defendant must tell the government “all
information and evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of
the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5).1 Indeed,
the safety valve “imposes an affirmative obligation on the defendant” to disclose relevant
information. United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 675 (6th Cir. 2001). That’s because the
safety valve applies “only [to] those defendants who truly cooperate.”                        Id. (cleaned up).

        1The   government argues that by possessing a gun Reinberg also failed to satisfy the safety valve’s second
criterion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(2). But because Reinberg failed to satisfy the fifth criterion, we do not address
the second.
 No. 22-5586                          United States v. Reinberg                             Page 4

So defendants must “produce evidence that demonstrates” complete and timely disclosure.
United States v. Adu, 82 F.3d 119, 125 (6th Cir. 1996).

       The district court concluded that Reinberg wasn’t eligible for safety-valve relief.
According to the court, the conversation indicated that the gun was present and Reinberg had
withheld information.

       The court’s finding wasn’t clearly erroneous.          United States v. Estrada-Gonzalez,
32 F.4th 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2022) (“The deferential clear-error standard requires us to defer to the
district court’s finding about what transpired even if we would have made the opposite finding,
so long as both stories are plausible on the record as a whole.” (cleaned up)). In fact, the district
court’s interpretation of the video was the most plausible. First, Reinberg identified the gun by
name, “the Judge.” Video at 9:15. Indeed, she concedes that the “410” and the “Judge” refer to
the gun that the informant eventually bought from Kilbourne. Appellant Br. 9. After she
identified the gun, twice she remarked “it’s pretty,” suggesting she was familiar with its
appearance. Video at 9:25–9:29, 10:55–10:59. Finally, Reinberg helped facilitate the later gun
transaction, promising she would have Kilbourne “hit [the informant] up on that.” Video at
14:50–14:52. So the district court’s interpretation of the conversation was the most plausible: it
was all about the gun.

       At best, the video is partially ambiguous. The latter parts of the conversation could have
been just about meth. But that would mean only that there are two plausible views of the
conversation. And when “there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564,
574 (1985).

       Reinberg’s counterarguments don’t hold up. First, she analogizes her case to United
States v. Barron, 940 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 2019). But in that case, Barron’s statements all along
were consistent, and “no evidence” conflicted with them. Id. at 919. That meant the district
court had no reason to deny Barron the safety valve. By contrast, the district court’s conclusion
here was well supported. Indeed, Reinberg’s own words suggest that she knew more about the
gun than she told the government. So Barron doesn’t help Reinberg.
 No. 22-5586                          United States v. Reinberg                                 Page 5

       Reinberg also claims that instead of conducting its own analysis, the district court merely
deferred to the government’s conclusion that she hadn’t provided complete and truthful
information.    But the sentencing transcript contradicts that claim.            The district court
independently concluded that Reinberg wasn’t eligible for the safety valve. See, e.g., R. 79, Pg.
ID 262 (“[M]y finding is based on what I’ve heard from both parties, that the defense has not
carried its burden. Factor Number 5 [for the safety valve] . . . [h]as not been satisfied.”).

       In sum, the court used the correct standard and came to the correct conclusion.

                                          *       *       *

       The bottom line here is simple: no evidence, no safety valve. Defendants seeking the
safety valve must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they’re entitled to it. Reinberg
hasn’t done that, so we affirm.