Court Opinion

ID: 9777757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:23:24.566638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.206968
License: Public Domain

JACK SMITH, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish the instant case from the holding of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Young v. State, 603 S.W.2d 851 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Although the reasoning set forth by my brethren is persuasive, I am not persuaded.
The issue in Young and the instant case is identical; that is, may a wife be called to testify against her husband when she is not the injured party being tried?
In Young, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in its original opinion and in its opinion on motion for rehearing, emphasized that the wife could not testify against her husband because “The exception in the statute [Art. 38.11] that a wife testify against another [spouse] for injuries committed against the other [spouse] does not apply in this case because the wife was not the injured party in the case being tried.” Young at 852 and 853.
In the instant case, the appellant was being tried for the murder of his wife’s daughter; his wife was not the injured party. The record reflects that the wife was attacked, shot at, and kidnapped in the course of events that occurred when her daughter was murdered. Although it seems grossly unjust, under the facts of this case, not to permit the appellant’s wife to testify against him, Art. 38.11, Tex.Code Crim.P. prohibits such testimony. It is the prerogative of the legislature to add further exceptions to Art. 38.11, not the courts.
I do not believe that the facts of this case are distinguishable from Young. I would sustain appellant’s ground of error one, and hold that the trial court erred in admitting appellant's wife’s testimony. I would reverse and remand.