Court Opinion

ID: 9563608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:43:18.698316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:58.121071
License: Public Domain

Andrews, Chief Judge.
The appellants in this case are seven1 individual members of a neighborhood association who have sued the association and three members of the Board of Directors for breach of fiduciary duty and bad faith. The trial court granted summary judgment to the association and the directors, finding that appellants had not come forward with any additional evidence beyond their verified complaint. Appellants contend the specific facts set out in the verified complaint and four amended complaints are sufficient to raise issues of fact for a jury.
“To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. ... A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a [genuine] jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. ... A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” (Emphasis omitted.) Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, appellees submitted affidavits from the three board members, Layer, Praet, and Chambers. The affidavits are identical, all stating that the affiants performed their duties as a member of the Board of Directors in the good faith belief that they were acting in the best interests of the corporation and with the care of an ordinary person in like circumstances.
In opposing this motion, appellants rested on their verified pleadings, which claimed the defendants had (1) distributed funds from Mt. Yonah and bound the corporation to agreements without any authority; (2) acted in bad faith by refusing to allow appellants to inspect the corporate records; (3) made no accounting of corporate records and gave a non-board member custody of the corporate records; and (4) acted in bad faith by paving roads without the agree*259ment and approval of a majority of the members.
“A properly verified pleading containing specific factual allegations must be considered in opposition to affidavits filed in support of a motion for summary judgment and may defeat the motion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga. App. 594, 596 (370 SE2d 843) (1988). However, a verified pleading has no greater effect than an affidavit tendered pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) and must comply with the Rule 56 (e) requirement that both supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge. Id.
Here, we find the verified complaint, as set out above, contained specific factual allegations sufficient to withstand the affidavits submitted in support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. However, the verifications do not state that they are made on personal knowledge, nor do the contents of the pleadings themselves indicate that material parts of them are within the personal knowledge of the parties. Moore, supra at 596; Spires v. Relco, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 4, 5 (299 SE2d 58) (1983). For instance, with regard to their claim that a non-board member had custody of the records, the complaint states this was “to the best of Plaintiffs’ knowledge.” The complaint also states “[pjlaintiffs believe that the named defendants have continued to disburse monies. . . .” Thus, the complaint, although verified, is not made with personal knowledge but is simply a variation on the “information and belief” type. Moore, supra at 596; Computer Maintenance Corp. v. Tilley, 172 Ga. App. 220, 223 (322 SE2d 533) (1984); Spires, supra.
Moreover, the trial court, after several hearings and in three previous orders, had dealt with all the issues raised except for whether a receiver should be appointed and whether or not the defendants acted in bad faith and not in the best interests of the corporation in doing or failing to do the acts complained of in the complaint and amended complaints. A review of the complaint and amended complaints shows no averments as to personal knowledge of the plaintiffs as to whether or not defendants were acting in bad faith, nor do the contents of the pleadings themselves indicate that the parties have personal knowledge on this issue. See Moore, supra at 596; Spires, supra at 5. This is especially true when, as previously discussed, the amended complaint states: “The Defendants herein have acted in utmost bad faith, unlawfully and without proper authority, in continuing to insist on acting on behalf of the Corporation, MT. YONAH SCENIC ESTATES CLUB, INC. Plaintiffs believe that the named Defendants have continued to disburse monies and contractually bind the corporation when they no longer have any authority to represent the corporation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, there is simply no evidence in the amended complaint that *260defendants even performed some of the acts complained of, much less that these acts were performed in bad faith. In contrast, the affidavits of the defendants do indicate they have personal knowledge on this issue and state that they “at all times performed the duties of the office in the good faith belief that I was acting in the best interest of the Corporation.”
Therefore, whether or not some of the facts asserted in the amended complaint can be construed as within the personal knowledge of the plaintiffs is immaterial since there is no evidence before us tending to show that defendants were acting in bad faith. Lau’s Corp., supra at 495. Accordingly, the pleadings were not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment supported by sworn affidavits based on personal knowledge of the defendants. The trial court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J, Birdsong, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur. Beasley, Smith and Ruffin, JJ, dissent.

 The complaint was brought by seventeen members initially, but ten were voluntarily dismissed in the course of the litigation.