Court Opinion

ID: 9761842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:56:43.7396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:27.069979
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
The Majority in its proposed opinion in this case embarks upon the sea of “final and appealable orders” a sea that is *243unchartered, dark and dangerous. Unfortunately, while the Majority seeks to allow Appellant to arrive at the shore of jurisdiction in this court, it has, in my view, been sunk on the reef of inaccurate analysis.
Frank Zarnecki filed a mortgage foreclosure action against Doreen Shepegi based upon an underlying instrument. Ms. Shepegi filed an answer, new matter and counterclaim to which a reply to the counterclaim and new matter were filed by Mr. Zarnecki. Various discovery matters were undertaken and on January 31, 1985, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. This was responded to by the defendant and subsequently considered by the trial court. In a comprehensive opinion, filed by the Honorable Frederick P. Anthony, a partial summary judgment was entered on behalf of the plaintiff and against the defendant determining that the defendant’s signature on the underlying instruments was not forged. The trial court’s determination was based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel since this issue had been raised in a previous action between the same parties on the same instrument and had been finally decided against the defendant.
On September 4, 1985, the defendant filed an appeal to this court from the partial summary judgment entered by the trial court. It is now 1987 and this case is still pending in the appellate courts. This case demonstrates the error of our ways in permitting appeals from interlocutory non-litigation ending orders entered at the trial court level.
My dispute with my colleagues in the Majority is in their analysis of the appealability of this order. Certainly, the Majority’s citation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 742, which vests this court with appellate jurisdiction from final orders is correct. The definition of a final order as “one which usually ends the litigation, or alternatively, disposes of the entire case” Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978) is additionally correct. The Majority errs, however, when it continues with its analysis. The Majority would characterize as final and appealable an order which prevents a party from introducing evidence on a particular point during the *244trial, reasoning that the party is effectively “out of court” on that particular point. Admittedly, there is some support for this general proposition but it is found in cases arising from the pleading stage where a party has been precluded from raising a defense, a counterclaim or a reply thereto.
Here a partial summary judgment was entered based upon the trial court’s determination that no issue of fact existed and, therefore, the matter could be disposed of by a judicial determination. The cases are numerous which hold that partial summary judgments, when granted in the course of litigation are not subject to appeal or review until the litigation ends. This is not an order that precluded the defendant from presenting an affirmative defense. This is an order which determined that no question of fact existed and that the law on an issue was clear.
However, while I disagree with the majority’s analysis and certainly its characterization of the order appealed from as a “pre-trial order” I must also call attention to what, in my view, is an area of the law that needs to be re-examined.
An order dismissing various counts in a multi-count complaint, an order refusing to allow the amendment of an answer, new matter or counterclaim, an order granting partial summary judgment, does not result in a litigant being “out of court”. Rather, those orders postpone the litigant’s right to have the issue resolved until a later time.
I would point out that I believe the doctrine contained in Praisner v. Stocker, 313 Pa.Super. 332, 336-7, 459 A.2d 1255,1258 (1983) and Cloverleaf Development Inc. v. Horizon Financial F.A., 347 Pa.Super. 75, 500 A.2d 163 (1985) should be reexamined.
In my view, the better practice would be to disallow appeals from any order, which is entered during the course of litigation at the trial level, until a party has been totally dismissed from a case or the case has ended for all purposes at the trial court level. The only exceptions to this rule should be those enumerated in Pa.R.A.P. 311 or where it is clearly established that the postponement of review would cause the claimed right to be irrevocably lost. See *245Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975).
I realize that there are those who would argue, as was done in Praisner, that the dismissal of a count in a complaint, which is not related to other counts contained in the complaint, is the dismissal of a cause of action and, therefore, is appealable. It is argued that this conclusion is warranted since had the claim, which was dismissed, been presented in a separate and distinct complaint it would have been appealable. I understand and accept this argument but not the conclusion that the dismissed claim should be appealable while the remaining counts of the complaint are viable. I would point out that it was the individual litigants choice to bring all the issues in the same complaint. Having so chosen, the litigant must bear the risk that if some of the causes of action alleged in the multi-count complaint are dismissed, review will be postponed until the remaining counts have reached a final disposition. To find otherwise frustrates and delays the administration of justice, as is evident in the case sub judice which, at the time of this opinion, has been delayed almost two years.
The present state of the law in this area is confusing to say the least. Our appellate courts have held that the failure to immediately appeal one of these misnomered “final and appealable orders” results in a loss of the right to have the trial court action later reviewed. See Mineo v. Tancini, 349 Pa.Super. 115, 502 A.2d 1300 (1986), Fidelity Bank v. Duden, 361 Pa.Super. 124, 521 A.2d 958 (1987); (dissenting opinion by Del Sole, J.). This in and of itself invites cautious counsel, when faced with the difficult question of determining whether or not an order is appealable, to take an immediate appeal, delay the litigation at the trial level and further burden the appellate courts of Pennsylvania.
Further, the application of the rule of “final and appeal-able” is inconsistent. As an example, an order striking an affirmative defense raised in a new matter which alleges forgery of a document would be considered “final and *246appealable” for interlocutory appeal purposes. However, a trial court’s ruling during trial disallowing expert testimony to establish the alleged forgery would not be “final and appealable”. In either event, the result to the litigant is the same and in both cases the review of the respective orders could be postponed until the conclusion of all activity at the trial court level.
Recently, a panel of this court, in Elderkin v. Sedney, 354 Pa.Super. 253, 511 A.2d 858 (1986), held that a sanction order which prevented a party from introducing evidence at the time of trial and which was entered for failure to comply with pre-trial rulings was not final and appealable. Accordingly, the appeal was quashed. While this court sitting en banc in Fidelity Bank v. Duden, 361 Pa.Super. 124, 521 A.2d 958 (1987) questioned the analysis found in Elderkin, supra, and particularly the application of Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985) to that case, I wish to point out that the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the position taken in Elderkin by its decision in Bruno v. Elitzky, 515 Pa. 47, 526 A.2d 781 (1987).
In Bruno, supra, the Supreme Court quashed an appeal as interlocutory which was based upon a trial court’s order dismissing an answer and new matter filed by the defendants. The order was entered as a sanction for violation of the discovery rules when the defendants failed to answer interrogatories. The interesting aspect of the Bruno decision is in the Supreme Court’s holding that the review of the entry of the sanction order could await the final disposition of litigation. Nevertheless, the Majority would have us hold today that the review of a partial summary judgment order cannot await such a final disposition.
The law in this area, as I have said, is unclear and dangerous to litigants and lawyers. A total re-examination and re-evaluation must be forthcoming so that these interlocutory appeals which are taken from misnamed “final orders” would not be permitted.
Certainly, in this case, where the court has entered a partial summary judgment, no appeal should be permitted *247pending the final disposition of the underlying action. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.
BECK, J., joins.