Court Opinion

ID: 9890798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 15:08:12.121027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:23.093790
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re C.S., 2023-Ohio-3754.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      JACKSON COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:                         :

                                          C.S.,                    :    CASE
                                          NO. 23CA12

                                               Adjudicated Neglected     :
                                               and Dependent Child.
                                                     DECISION & JUDGMENT
                                               ENTRY
                                          :

________________________________________________________________
                           APPEARANCES:

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.

Dana E. Gilliland, Jackson, Ohio, for Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:10-6-23
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from a Jackson County Common Pleas

Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted Jackson County

Job and Family Services, appellee herein, permanent custody of

four-year-old C.S.

        {¶2}     Appellant, the child’s biological mother, raises the

following assignment of error:

                 “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
                 MOTHER-APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
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           DISQUALIFICATION THEREBY DENYING HER THE DUE
           PROCESS RIGHTS REQUIRED UNDER THE UNITED
           STATES AND OHIO CONSTITUTIONS.”

    {¶3}   On December 8, 2021, appellee filed a complaint that

alleged C.S. is an abused, neglected, and dependent child and

requested temporary custody.     The complaint alleged that on

October 4, 2021, appellee received a referral that appellant had

been using drugs.     The next day, a caseworker visited

appellant’s home and found it to be in disarray.     On appellant’s

bed appeared “a plate with a white powdery substance crushed up

in a line and a tube on it.”     Appellant stated “that the powder

was her Suboxone/Subutex and she was getting ready to take it

when” the caseworker arrived.

    {¶4}   The caseworker contacted the Wellston Police

Department to report that she had discovered a white, powdery

substance inside appellant’s home.     Police investigated and

charged appellant with drug possession and drug-paraphernalia

possession.   Appellant agreed to place the child with

appellant’s mother pursuant to a safety plan.    About one month

later, appellant asked appellee to place the child with the

child’s father.     Appellee later approved the father as a

placement for the child.

    {¶5}   On December 5, 2021, the father notified a caseworker
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that appellant had removed the child from his home.       Caseworkers

could not locate appellant, but she did return the child to the

father.        On January 3, 2022, appellee filed a motion for a

temporary-custody predispositional order.       Appellee asserted

that the father allowed appellant to remove the child from his

care and the parents are avoiding contact with the agency

caseworkers.       The court subsequently entered an emergency,

interim order that placed the child in appellee’s temporary

custody.

        {¶6}   On February 1, 2022, the trial court adjudicated the

child a neglected and dependent child and continued temporary

custody.1      Approximately one month later, the court entered a

dispositional order that placed the child in appellee’s

temporary custody.

        {¶7}   On January 3, 2023, appellee requested the court

modify the disposition to permanent custody.       Appellee alleged

that the child has been in its permanent custody for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period, the child cannot be

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not

be placed with either parent, and permanent custody is in the

1
    Appellee agreed to dismiss the abuse allegation.
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child’s best interest.

    {¶8}   On April 21, 2023, the trial court held a hearing to

consider appellee’s permanent-custody motion.   At the start of

the hearing, the father’s counsel indicated that the father

recently realized that the judge previously represented the

father in a 2015 criminal case and appellant in a 2019 case.

The father thus asked the judge to recuse himself and to request

another judge be appointed.

    {¶9}   The judge explained that he did not recall

representing either parent, but he did check the records after

the father’s counsel raised the issue and confirmed that he had

represented the father in a 2014 case and appellant in a 2019

case.   The judge then allowed the parties to address the matter.

    {¶10} Appellee’s counsel pointed out that to disqualify a

judge, a party must file a disqualification affidavit with the

Ohio Supreme Court at least seven days before the proceeding.

Appellee noted that the father did not file a disqualification

affidavit.   Appellee further argued that, even if the court

considered the issue, the father could have raised the issue at

an earlier point in the proceedings.   Appellee also argued that

the previous cases are not relevant to the permanent-custody
                                                                    5
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proceedings.

    {¶11} Appellant’s counsel stated that appellant joined in

the father’s disqualification request on the basis of the

appearance of impropriety.     Counsel indicated that appellant’s

“main concern would be that you’d have some knowledge of her

former, like prior to this case, uh, that could be negative in

your mind.”

    {¶12} The trial court then discussed Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 on the

record and explained its reasoning process.     The court stated

that it did not recall the facts of the earlier cases and, after

a review of the entire rule, the court indicated it did not

believe that it would be unable to act without bias or

prejudice.     The court stated that it has been, and would

continue to be, impartial.     Thus, the court found no basis for

recusal.

    {¶13} The trial court then recited the case history and

asked appellee’s counsel whether she was prepared to proceed

with the permanent-custody hearing.     Appellee’s counsel

responded affirmatively, and further stated that the court must

decide the permanent-custody motion within 120 days of its

filing (January 3, 2023) and 12 days remain.     Counsel also

pointed out that neither father nor appellant asked for a
                                                                     6
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continuance with respect to the disqualification motions.      At

that point, the judge interjected and asked both the father’s

and appellant’s counsel whether either wished “to request a

continuance, on behalf of your client based on the issue of

disqualification.”    The parents’ counsel stated that they did

not.    The court thus proceeded with the permanent-custody

hearing.

       {¶14} The evidence adduced at the hearing shows that both

parents are incarcerated and neither will be available to care

for the child for several years.    Moreover, the child currently

resides with a foster family who meets all of his needs.      The

foster parents also intend to adopt if the court grants appellee

permanent custody.

       {¶15} On April 28, 2023, the trial court granted appellee’s

motion for permanent custody of the child.    In its decision, the

court noted that both parents had requested the trial-court

judge to recuse himself because he previously had represented

the parents in separate criminal proceedings.    The court

observed that it had considered Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 and discussed

the matter on the record with the parties and their counsel, but

it “could not identify any applicable grounds for recusal, after

consideration of each section of the rule with opportunity for
                                                                    7
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all parties to be heard on the issue of recusal.”    The court

further pointed out that none of the parties sought to use

evidence from previous cases during the permanent-custody

hearing.    The court thus denied the parents’ recusal request.

    {¶16} The trial court found that the child has been in

appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a

consecutive 22-month period.   The court further noted that the

mother recently entered guilty pleas to two counts of conspiracy

to commit murder and that the father entered guilty pleas to two

counts of voluntary manslaughter.    The court reported that, at

the time of its decision, the parents had yet to be sentenced

and are facing, at a minimum, three years in prison.

    {¶17} The trial court also determined that placing the child

in appellee’s permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.

The court noted that the foster parents meet all of the child’s

needs and are interested in adopting the child.    The court thus

granted appellee permanent custody of the child.    This appeal

followed.

    {¶18} In her sole assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court erred by denying her disqualification

motion.    She contends that the trial judge’s refusal to recuse

deprived her of her due-process rights under the state and
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federal constitutions.   Appellant further claims that the court

structurally erred by applying the wrong legal standard when

evaluating her disqualification motion.   She alleges that “the

trial court applied an actual conflict standard to her motion to

disqualify instead of an intolerable probability of actual

bias.”

    {¶19} Appellant recognizes that litigants seeking to

disqualify a judge must file a disqualification affidavit with

the Ohio Supreme Court, and further acknowledges that

intermediate appellate courts lack authority to disqualify

trial-court judges, but contends that intermediate appellate

courts can address arguments that a trial-court judge’s bias

violated a litigant’s right to a fundamentally fair proceeding.

    {¶20} Initially, we note, and both parties recognize, that

this court does not have the authority to disqualify a judge

presiding over a permanent-custody hearing or any other

proceeding.   R.C. 2701.03 governs the process that a party must

follow when seeking to disqualify a judge:

         (A) If a judge of the court of common pleas
    allegedly is interested in a proceeding pending before
    the court, allegedly is related to or has a bias or
    prejudice for or against a party to a proceeding pending
    before the court or a party's counsel, or allegedly
    otherwise is disqualified to preside in a proceeding
    pending before the court, any party to the proceeding or
    the   party's  counsel   may   file   an  affidavit   of
                                                                   9
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    disqualification with the clerk of the supreme court in
    accordance with division (B) of this section.
         (B) An affidavit of disqualification filed under
    section 2101.39, 2501.13, 2701.031, or 2743.041 of the
    Revised Code or division (A) of this section shall be
    filed with the clerk of the supreme court not less than
    seven calendar days before the day on which the next
    hearing in the proceeding is scheduled and shall include
    all of the following:
         (1) The specific allegations on which the claim of
    interest, bias, prejudice, or disqualification is based
    and the facts to support each of those allegations or,
    in relation to an affidavit filed against a judge of a
    court of appeals, a specific allegation that the judge
    presided in the lower court in the same proceeding and
    the facts to support that allegation;
         (2) The jurat of a notary public or another person
    authorized to administer oaths or affirmations;
         (3) A certificate indicating that a copy of the
    affidavit has been served on the probate judge, judge of
    a court of appeals, judge of a court of common pleas,
    judge of a municipal or county court, or judge of the
    court of claims against whom the affidavit is filed and
    on all other parties or their counsel;
         (4) The date of the next scheduled hearing in the
    proceeding or, if there is no hearing scheduled, a
    statement that there is no hearing scheduled.
         * * * *

    {¶21} Thus, the statute requires a party who seeks to

disqualify a judge to file a disqualification affidavit with the

Ohio Supreme Court.   Furthermore, the Ohio Constitution “vests

exclusive authority to pass on disqualification matters in the

chief justice or her designee.”   State v. Osie, 140 Ohio St.3d

131, 2014-Ohio-2966, 16 N.E.3d 588, ¶ 62, citing Beer v.

Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978).

Consequently, “any attempt to obtain a judge’s recusal must be
                                                                   10
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made in consideration of the filing requirements of R.C. 2701.03

and other principles underlying” the disqualification process.

In re Navarre, 156 Ohio St.3d 1208, 2019-Ohio-850, 124 N.E.3d

843, ¶ 5.

    {¶22} For these reasons, intermediate appellate courts lack

the “authority to pass upon disqualification or to void the

judgment of the trial court upon that basis.”   Beer, 54 Ohio

St.2d at 442; accord Citibank, N.A. v. Hine, 2019-Ohio-464, 130

N.E.3d 924, ¶ 126 (4th Dist.).   Likewise, appellate courts lack

jurisdiction to review a trial court’s decision regarding a

disqualification or recusal motion.   State ex rel. Hough v.

Saffold, 131 Ohio St.3d 54, 2012-Ohio-28, 960 N.E.2d 451, ¶ 2;

State v. Light, 2023-Ohio-1187, 212 N.E.3d 1025, ¶ 58 (11th

Dist.); Brown v. Schmidt, 4th Dist. Ross No. 15CA3523, 2016-

Ohio-2864, ¶ 18.   Accordingly, we lack authority to review the

merits of the trial court’s decision regarding appellant’s

disqualification motion.

    {¶23} Appellant nevertheless contends that a permanent-

custody hearing before a biased judge constitutes a structural

error that violates her due-process right to a fundamentally

fair proceeding.   We point out, however, that at no point during

the permanent-custody hearing did appellant argue that the trial
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court acted in a biased manner.   Instead, she limited her

argument to asserting that the trial-court judge should have

determined, before the hearing began, that the prior

representation created an appearance of impropriety.    Although

we question whether appellant properly preserved this

structural-error argument, we nonetheless will consider it.

    {¶24} “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic

requirement of due process.”   In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,

136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); accord Caperton v. A.T.

Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d

1208 (2009).   For purposes of the due-process guarantee,

fairness “requires the absence of actual bias in the trial of

cases” and “a system of law [that] endeavor[s] to prevent even

the probability of unfairness.”   Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.

Thus, a “trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair and

denies a defendant due process of law.”   State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio

St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, 34, citing Rose v.

Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986);

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64

L.Ed.2d 182 (1980) (“the Due Process Clause entitles a person to

an impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and

criminal cases”).   Accordingly, appellate courts may review
                                                                   12
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judicial-bias claims that allegedly violate a litigant’s due-

process rights.   State v. Loudermilk, 2017-Ohio-7378, 96 N.E.3d

1037, ¶ 19 (1st Dist.); King v. Divoky, 9th Dist. Summit No. CV

29769, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 45; In re A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

108107, 2019-Ohio-4063, ¶ 65, fn. 10 (because permanent-custody

proceedings must be fundamentally fair to comply with due

process, parents are entitled to a permanent-custody hearing

free from judicial bias and prejudice).

         Judicial bias has been described as “a hostile
    feeling or spirit of ill will or undue friendship or
    favoritism toward one of the litigants or his attorney,
    with the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment on
    the part of the judge, as contradistinguished from an
    open state of mind which will be governed by the law and
    the facts.”

State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d

97, ¶ 47, quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St.

463, 58 O.O. 315, 132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph four of the

syllabus; accord Culp v. Olukoga, 2013-Ohio-5211, 3 N.E.3d 724,

¶ 55 (4th Dist.).     Judges are “presumed to follow the law and

not to be biased, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must

be compelling to overcome these presumptions.”     In re

Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-5489,

798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.     Consequently, “[a]llegations that are based

solely on innuendo and speculation are insufficient to establish
                                                                  13
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bias or prejudice.”   In re Disqualification of Pokorny, 135 Ohio

St.3d 1268, 2013-Ohio-915, 986 N.E.2d 993, ¶ 6.   Moreover,

opinions that a judge forms based upon “prior proceedings” do

not demonstrate bias “unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment

impossible.”   Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114

S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed. 2d 474 (1994); accord State v. Dean, 127

Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 49.     We

additionally observe that “‘[b]ias against a party is difficult

to question unless the judge specifically verbalizes personal

bias or prejudice toward a party.’”   Culp v. Olukoga, 2013-Ohio-

5211, 3 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 55 (4th Dist.), quoting Frank Novak &

Sons, Inc. v. Brantley, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77823, 2001

WL 303716 (Mar. 29, 2001).

    {¶25} In the case sub judice, appellant did not cite any

part of the permanent-custody-hearing transcript to suggest the

trial-court judge harbored hostile feelings or ill will towards

her or any other party.   Instead, appellant rests her argument

upon bare allegations that the judge’s previous representation

renders the judge unable to act in a fundamentally fair manner

when conducting the permanent-custody hearing and ruling on
                                                                    14
JACKSON, 23CA12

appellee’s motion.   However, bare allegations of bias are

insufficient to establish a due-process violation.     King v.

Divoky, 9th Dist. Summit No. CV 29769, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 49;

Ramsey v. Ramsey, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-840, 2014-Ohio-

1921, ¶ 72; see In re Disqualification of Blanchard, 150 Ohio

St.3d 1260, 2017-Ohio-5543, 80 N.E.3d 504, ¶ 5 (“parents’

general and nonspecific claim” that judge who presided over

parents’ drug-court hearings and permanent-custody proceeding

“‘heard numerous prejudicial facts’ about them in drug-court

hearings” was not sufficient “to overcome the presumption of the

judge’s impartiality”).     Furthermore, appellant did not point to

anything in the record to establish that the judge’s previous

representation caused him to develop “deep-seated favoritism or

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”     Liteky,

510 U.S. at 555; see generally Blanchard at ¶ 4 (“the fact that

the same judge presides over a parent’s dependency case and her

drug-court hearings does not, without more, mandate the judge’s

disqualification from one of those matters”).

    {¶26} We, therefore, after our review, do not agree with

appellant that the permanent-custody proceeding was

fundamentally unfair.     Accordingly, based upon the foregoing

reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole assignment of error and
                                                     15
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affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                     JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JACKSON, 23CA12

                                                                  16
                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

    It is ordered that the appeal be affirmed and that appellee

recover of appellant the costs herein taxed.

    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this

appeal.

    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this

Court directing the Jackson County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile

Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Hess, J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                    For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.