Court Opinion

ID: 9711272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:27:52.072493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:03.283214
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioners have stated a cause of action in mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Commonwealth to decertify seven different Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) voting systems. Likewise, I do not believe that this Court can, by writ of mandamus, compel the Secretary to adopt “rational and appropriate” standards to guide his approval of DRE voting systems. The Secretary’s decision to approve, or to disapprove, electronic voting systems requires the exercise of discretion and, as such, cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus.
DRE voting systems are governed by standards in the Pennsylvania Election Code.1 Section 1107 of the Election Code, *51added by section 4 of the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600, 25 P.S. § 3031.7. An electronic voting system must, inter alia, provide for “voting in secret;” permit a “vote for a straight political party by one mark or act;” offer the voter “a ticket selected from the nominees of any and all political parties;” and preclude a voter “from voting ... more than once for the same candidate.” Section 1107-A (l), (3), (4) and (8), 25 P.S. § 3031.7(1), (3), (4) and (8). These standards are straightforward, but this is not the case with all of the statutory standards. For example, the Election Code provides that the Secretary must find that an electronic voting system:
(11) Is suitably designed for the purpose used, is constructed in a neat and workmanlike manner of durable material of good quality, is safely and efficiently useable in the conduct of elections and, with respect to the counting of ballots cast at each district, is suitably designed and equipped to be capable of absolute accuracy, which accuracy shall be demonstrated to the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
(12) Provides acceptable ballot security procedures and impoundment of ballots to prevent tampering with or substitution of any ballots or ballot cards.
(13) When properly operated, records correctly and computes and tabulates accurately every valid vote registered.
(14) Is safely transportable.
(15) Is so constructed that a voter may readily learn the method of operating it.
Section 1107-A of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3031.7(11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) (emphasis added). In sum, before the Secretary can approve any electronic voting system for use in Pennsylvania that system must satisfy no less than seventeen different requirements, ranging from the simple to the complex.2
Petitioners assert that the Secretary’s approvals of the seven DRE voting systems at issue were “sloppy, inadequate and illegal” because he did not properly test the systems. Petitioners’ Brief at 2. Specifically, they claim the Secretary’s testing methods were “ad hoc,” “idiosyncratic” and conducted on “machines ... cherry picked ... by the manufacturer [and] tested ... depending on the whim of the tester.” Petitioners’ Brief at 9. They accuse the Secretary of knowing that the seven DRE voting systems he approved “cannot be relied upon to record votes accurately, change votes from one candidate to another and can be tampered with using devices as commonplace as the key to a hotel mini-bar.” Petitioners’ Brief at 2.
These are serious allegations that we are required to accept as true. However, no matter how strongly worded or fevered the allegations in a complaint, the task for this Court remains the same: whether and how this Court can intervene.
This Court is bound by the statutory standards established for electronic voting systems. It is not for the courts, under any legal theory,3 to amend the General Assembly’s lengthy, detailed list of standards by adding new ones. Petitioners contend that the DRE voting systems are defective because they do not produce a *52physical paper receipt of the ballot cast so that each voter can check to see if the machine properly tallied her vote. This requirement is not anywhere stated in the list of seventeen standards set forth in Section 1107-A of the Election Code. Indeed, the Secretary does not have the authority to disapprove an electronic voting system for the reason that the system does not provide a “voter verified independent record.” A fortiori, this Court cannot order a voting system decertified on this account. Petition, ¶¶ 45, 49.
However, Petitioners direct us to the definitional section of the statute that describes an electronic voting system as one that “provide[s] for a permanent physical record of each vote cast.” 25 P.S. § 8081.1. First, it is a stretch to reach into the definitional section of a statute to find a substantive requirement. How can the Secretary violate a definition? Second, the statute does not say “paper;” it says “physical record.” What the legislature meant by “physical record” is less than clear; it likely means a recording sufficient to permit a recount. In any case, an action in mandamus is not the proceeding in which to establish legal rights but, rather, to vindicate those already clearly established. In re Bedow, 848 A.2d 1034, 1037 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).
Petitioners are quite critical of how the Secretary has done his job, but they fail to correlate these criticisms to the actual language of the Election Code. Absent authority in the Election Code, we may not order the Secretary to adopt “rational” standards by which to do his job. If the , standards in Section 1107-A are inade- ' quate, it is for the legislature, not this Court, to conduct hearings into how existing statutory standards might be improved.
This brings us to the question of how the Secretary is to decide whether electronic voting systems satisfy the demands of the Election Code. Again, the legislature has given clear directions.
Essentially, the Secretary’s job is to examine an electronic voting system and produce his own report “stating whether, in his opinion ... the system can be safely used by voters_” Section 1105-A(b) of the Election Code, added by section 4 of the Act of July 11, 1980, P.L. 600, as amended, 25 P.S. § 3031.5(b). Section 1105-A(b) provides in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Upon receipt of a request for examination or reexamination of an electronic voting system ..., the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall examine the electronic voting system and shall make and file in his office his report, attested by his signature and the seal of his office, stating whether, in his opinion, the system so examined can be safely used by voters at elections as provided in this act and meets all of the requirements hereinafter set forth.
25 P.S. § 3031.5(b). Notably, the statute neither proscribes nor prescribes the participation of the manufacturer in the Secretary’s examination of an electronic voting system. Petitioners assail the Secretary’s “ad hoc” testing, but because each electronic voting system will be different, each examination will be conducted differently, or as Petitioners call it, “idiosyncratically.”
It is the Secretary who has been given the responsibility and the discretion to evaluate electronic voting systems and determine whether they can be safely used. For the Secretary to determine that a system is “suitably designed,” constructed of “good quality,” offers “acceptable” security, is “safely transportable” and its use “readily” learned by the voter quite obvi*53ously requires the exercise of discretion and judgment. Because the application of the standards in the Election Code and the manner of examination require the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion, a writ of mandamus cannot issue.
A writ of mandamus will lie only where there is a clear right in the plaintiff to compel a public official’s performance of a mandatory act that is ministerial in nature. Pennsylvania Dental Association v. Pennsylvania Insurance Department, 512 Pa. 217, 227, 516 A.2d 647, 652 (1986). Mandamus does not perform the function of an appeal, i.e., it does not “review or compel the undoing of an action by ... an official.” Id. Most importantly, it does not compel the exercise of discretion in a particular way. Id.
The majority, however, asserts that the law of mandamus provides an exception for discretionary acts that have been tainted by the public official’s “mistaken” view of the law or “arbitrary” decisionmaking. Majority Opinion at 42. The precedent cited by the majority does not support the use of mandamus in this case.4 As explained in Chadwick v. Dauphin County Coroner, 905 A.2d 600, 603 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), the statement that mandamus will lie where discretion is arbitrarily or mistakenly exercised has its origin in cases where a public official has refused to exercise discretion at all. Lest there be any doubt, the Supreme Court established in Pennsylvania Dental Association, 512 Pa. at 227, 516 A.2d at 652, that mandamus does not “review or compel the undoing” of a public official’s action. Here, the Secretary has exercised his discretion; that Petitioners do not like the result does not entitle them to a writ of mandamus.
Every person who disagrees with the outcome of a public official’s exercise of discretion believes that public official has been “mistaken” or “arbitrary.” To allow a mandamus action in such circumstance would give redress to any person who believes herself aggrieved by the public official’s exercise of discretion. This turns mandamus into a type of appeal forbidden by our Supreme Court in Pennsylvania Dental Association, 512 Pa. at 227, 516 A.2d at 652.
Mandamus simply does not lie to compel the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion in a particular way. The Supreme Court’s direction on this point is clear:
[I]t is the discretion and judgment of the official (who is vested with discretionary *54power) which prevails and not that of a court or a jury or a person aggrieved; and a Court cannot compel such official to exercise his discretion in a manner which will produce a result which the court may deem wise or desirable.
Maxwell v. Farrell School District Board of Directors, 381 Pa. 561, 566, 112 A.2d 192, 195 (1955) (emphasis added). The majority wants to hold a hearing to force the Secretary to exercise his discretion in a way that will produce a “wise and desirable” result. This is error. I would sustain the Secretary’s demurrer to the extent Petitioners seek to have this Court issue a writ of mandamus to the Secretary (1) to adopt “rational” certification and testing guidelines and (2) to decertify the seven DRE voting systems at issue in the petition.5
What is not so clear is whether the Secretary can be compelled to reexamine four of the seven DRE voting systems as requested by Petitioners. Each reexamination request was made by ten or more electors who have tendered $450. The Secretary denied Petitioners a reexamination because “no credible evidence has been provided to this Department or come to our attention that any change or modification has been made to this system.” Petition ¶ 96. It is not clear that the Secretary can impose this condition upon a request for reexamination, given the language of the Election Code.
A reexamination may be undertaken at the request of a manufacturer, at the Secretary’s initiative or at the request of electors. Section 1105-A(a) of the Election Code states, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Any person or corporation owning, manufacturing or selling, or being interested in the manufacture or sale of, any electronic voting system, may request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to examine such system ... Any ten or more persons, being qualified registered electors of this Commonwealth, may, at any time, request the Secretary of the Commonwealth to reexamine any electronic voting system theretofore examined and approved by him. Before any reexamination, the person, persons, or corporation, requesting such reexamination, shall pay to the Treasurer of the Commonwealth a reexamination fee of four hundred fifty dollars ($450). The Secretary of the Commonwealth may, at any time, in his discretion, reexamine any such system therefore examined and approved by him....
25 P.S. § 3031.5(a) (emphasis added). Upon receipt of such a request, the Secretary “shall examine the electronic voting system.... ” Section 1105-A(b), 25 P.S. § 3031.5(b). In short, Section 1105-A of the Election Code establishes that the Secretary has a mandatory duty to perform a reexamination upon proper request.
The Secretary contends, however, that he has discretion to deny a request for reexamination. In support, he directs the Court to Section 1105-A(d) of the Election Code, which states as follows:
When an electronic voting system has been so approved, no improvement or change that does not impair its accuracy, efficiency or capacity or its compliance with the requirements hereinafter set forth, shall render necessary the reexamination or reapproval of such system.
*5525 P.S. § 3031.5(d). The Secretary reads this provision to mean that there must be a change that impairs an electronic voting system before he has to undertake a reexamination, whether on his own initiative or upon request of a manufacturer or ten electors. That is one reading. Another reading is simply that a change to an approved electronic voting system, no matter how small, does not in itself nullify a prior approval or compel the Secretary to reexamine a system.
The language of Section 1105-A(b) of the Election Code is plain and direct. Upon receipt of a request for reexamination, the Secretary must examine the electronic voting system. 25 P.S. § 3031.5(b). It does not contain a “provided, however” exception that references Section 1105— A(d). It is up to the Secretary how to examine the electronic voting system, but examine it he must under the most straightforward reading of Section 1105-A(a) of the Election Code.
A writ of mandamus can be used to compel an official to exercise discretion where he refuses to do so. Our Supreme Court has explained this principle as follows:
But where by a mistaken view of the law or by an arbitrary exercise of authority there has been in fact no actual exercise of discretion, the writ will lie.
Tanenbaum v. D’Ascenzo, 356 Pa. 260, 263, 51 A.2d 757, 758 (1947). A public official’s refusal to act could be intentional, i.e., arbitrary, or unintentional, i.e., the result of a mistaken view of the law.6 Where there has been no exercise of discretion, a -writ of mandamus will lie.
I would overrule the Secretary’s demurrer to the Petitioners’ request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary to reexamine four of the DRE voting systems. It goes without saying, however, that the content of the reexamination reports is beyond our review in a mandamus action. As explained by our Supreme Court,
[w]here the [public official] is clothed with discretionary powers, and has exercised those powers, mandamus will not lie to compel a revision of the decision resulting from such exercise of discretion, though in fact, the decision may be wrong.
Anderson v. Philadelphia, 348 Pa. 583, 587, 36 A.2d 442, 444 (1944).
Petitioners’ real complaint, apparently, is with the performance of specific computers that have been acquired by County Boards of Elections. There are many reasons why computers do not perform on election day to specifications: problems may arise from a defect in one computer; an improper installation of a good computer; or a lack of training by those working at the polling places. These problems are *56not of the Secretary’s making or within his ability to solve.
The Secretary reviews electronic voting systems to determine that they have been designed to satisfy the specifications set forth in Section 1107-A of the Election Code. The Secretary does not inspect each machine within a particular system to ensure it does not contain a manufacturing flaw or defect. His certification is not the equivalent of a manufacturer’s warranty. Such flaws, if any, are for the county and the manufacturer to resolve.
- If Petitioners’ constitutionally protected right to vote has been abridged in a particular county or at a particular polling place, this may be redressable in equity. The proper defendants, in such an action, are the counties. This was the approach taken by electors in Allegheny County in Taylor v. Onorato, 428 F.Supp.2d 384 (W.D.Pa.2006).7 Concluding that the plaintiffs in Taylor were not likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims, the U.S. District Court denied the request for a preliminary injunction. The court explained its decision as follows:
[I]t is of course possible that one or more of the electronic machines may malfunction on election day, just as the lever machines in the past have from time-to-time malfunctioned on election day. No election system is perfect and no machine built by man is infallible. Voting machine malfunction has been, and probably always will be, a potential problem in every election.
Taylor, 428 F.Supp.2d at 388. These are wise observations with relevance to Petitioners’ claims against the Secretary: the best approval process guided by the strictest statutory standards will not guarantee perfect electronic voting devices in each county.
I agree with the Secretary that the County Boards of Elections are indispensable parties. They made the decision to purchase one of the seven DRE voting systems approved by the Secretary. They will be affected by the decision of this Court, should it decide to order the Secretary to decertify the seven DRE voting systems. Their absence leaves this Court without jurisdiction over Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, and X of the petition. See, e.g., Polydyne, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 795 A.2d 495, 496 n. 2 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (this Court held it lacked jurisdiction in action brought by disappointed bidder, because winning bidder had not been named as a party and the winning bidder’s interests would not be represented by the city).
For all these reasons, I would sustain the Secretary’s demurrer to the petition to the extent it seeks to compel the exercise of the Secretary’s discretion in a particular way. Because Petitioners have failed to name indispensable parties, ie., the County Boards of Elections, as respondents, I would sustain the Secretary’s demurrer to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VIII, IX and X for lack of jurisdiction. The fundamental flaw in Petitioners’ case is that they would have this Court substitute its judgment for the Secretary’s, which is inappropriate in an action presented as an appeal; in an action at law, such as mandamus; or in a suit in equity. However, I would allow the case to go forward on the single question raised in Count VI, ie., whether the Secretary can be compelled by a writ of mandamus to do a reexamination of the DRE voting systems upon request of ten electors.
*57Judge LEADBETTER and Judge COHN JUBELIRER join in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2600-3591.

. There are more than seventeen, considering the subparts to the standards at Section 1107— A (16) and (17), 25 P.S. §§ 3031.7(16)(i)-(v), (17)(i)-(iii).

. Petitioners pursue relief under several theories: mandamus, declaratory judgment and equity.

. The majority cites to County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 556, 544 A.2d 1305 (1988) for the basic principles of mandamus. While I do not disagree with the recital, I note that County of Allegheny is not a mandamus case but an injunction case. Camiel v. Thornburgh, 507 Pa. 337, 489 A.2d 1360 (1985) is cited for the proposition that mandamus can compel discretionary acts where the exercise is “arbitrary” or "mistaken.” In Thornburgh, the issue was whether the governor’s facsimile signature on a Turnpike bond issue could be compelled by mandamus; the petition was denied because the matter was not ripe. Duncan Meter Corp. v. Gritsavage, 361 Pa. 607, 610, 65 A.2d 402, 403 (1949) is cited for the proposition that mandamus lies to compel "proper action” where discretion has been abused. In Duncan, a city controller was ordered to countersign a voucher warrant drawn on the city treasury to pay the plaintiff, who had done work for the city. The controller had refused because he believed the contract under which the plaintiff performed the work was breached. The Supreme Court explained that it was “neither the right nor the duty of the city controller to determine whether a contract is breached or whether a breach should be acted upon.” Id. at 612, 65 A.2d at 404. The Supreme Court approved the writ of mandamus in this circumstance. In any case, Duncan, decided in 1949, has been followed by the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Pennsylvania Dental Association that mandamus does not allow a court to interfere with the exercise of an official’s discretion.

. The Secretary is also correct that sovereign immunity bars mandatory injunctive relief. The majority dismisses this argument by con-eluding that the only relief sought is a writ of mandamus.

. In a subsequent restatement of Tanenbaum, the Supreme Court stated:
It is well settled that in a mandamus proceeding a court can compel a public official who is vested with a discretionary power to exercise that discretion; but (unless the discretion is arbitrarily or fraudulently exercised or is based upon a mistaken view of the law) it cannot interfere with or control the official’s discretion or judgment. Expressed another way, it is the discretion and judgment of the official (who is vested with a discretionary power) which prevails and not that of a court or a jury or a person aggrieved; and a Court cannot compel such official to exercise his discretion in a manner which will produce a result which the Court may deem wise or desirable.
Maxwell, 381 Pa. at 566, 112 A.2d at 195 (1955) (emphasis added). Taken out of context, the parenthetical phrase in the first sentence of the above-quoted passage can be read to mean that an arbitrary exercise of discretion is open to court interference. Read in its entirety, it is clear that discretion belongs to public officials, not to courts and not to plaintiffs.

. See also Kuznik v. Westmoreland County Board of Commissioners, 588 Pa. 95, 902 A.2d 476 (2006) (vacating this Court's injunction requiring Westmoreland County to abandon its plan to use a DRE voting system).