Court Opinion

ID: 9726324
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:44:28.985768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.064784
License: Public Domain

SHARPNACK, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the lead opinion. However, I write separately to emphasize the relationship between the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, Ind.Code § 34-18, ("MMPA") and the Indiana Wrongful Death Act, Ind.Code $ 34-28-1, ("WDA"). The tort of wrongful death predates the MMPA and was created by the WDA. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546, 548 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (noting that the "right to maintain an action for wrongful death is purely statutory and did not exist at common law"). The tort of wrongful death did not come about as a development in the common law as did the tort of medical malpractice. Compare id. (discussing the development of tort of wrongful death) with Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 387, 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (1980) (discussing development of tort of medical malpractice), abrogated on other grounds by Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994). The WDA provided the cause of action and specified who could bring it, against whom it could be brought, what damages could be recovered, and for whose benefit those damages were recoverable. See I.C. § 34-23-1.
The tort of medical malpractice also predates the MMPA and came as a development of the common law. See Johnson, 273 Ind. at 387, 404 N.E.2d at 594 (noting that the relationship of health care provider and patient imposed a common law legal duty upon the health care provider). So, too, did derivative causes of action for loss of services, etc., for tortious injuries to spouses and children. See Dearborn Fa*823bricating and Eng'g Corp., Inc. v. Wickham, 551 N.E.2d 1135, 1136 (Ind.1990) (discussing a parent's common law claim for injuries to a child and a person's common law claim for injuries to a spouse). Children, at common law, have no claim for loss of services, etc., by reason of tor-tious injury to a parent. See Dearborn Fabricating, 551 N.E.2d at 1139 (holding that, at common law, a child "may not maintain an action for loss of parental consortium when the parent is negligently injured by a third person").
If this case were for the death or injury to Walpole's father caused by the tort of a negligent truck driver, Walpole would have no cause of action because he is a nonde-pendent child and not the personal representative of the decedent. See I.C. § 34-28-1. However, Walpole brought this action under the MMPA. Thus, the issue is whether the MMPA created causes of action with respect to medical malpractice that did not exist before its adoption, or merely required that already recognized causes of action for death or injury by reason of medical malpractice be processed through the MMPA for purposes of determining liability and limiting damages.
The dissent in this case essentially comes to the conclusion this court came to, over dissent, in Warrick Hosp., Inc. v. Wallace, 435 N.E.2d 263 (Ind.Ct.App.1982), an opinion authored by Judge Ratliff, There, a widow brought an action based on the death of her husband resulting from alleged medical malpractice on the part of the defendant. Id. at 265. She also claimed a loss of consortium and services for the time from her husband's admission to the defendant hospital until his death there some twelve days later. Id. The widow was not the personal representative of her husband's estate at the time she brought the action. Id. She was not appointed personal representative until more than a year later, and nearly three years after her husband's death. Id. Under the authority of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546 (Ind.Ct.App.1981), the widow would have had no cause of action for the death of her husband by reason of failing to meet the requirement of becoming the personal representative and bringing the action in that capacity within two years of his death as required by the WDA. Warrick, 435 N.E.2d at 266.
Our court in Warrick put the issue as "[dloes the Medical Malpractice Act create a cause of action for wrongful death separate and distinct from that created by the Wrongful Death Act?" Id. at 265. Our court held that:
The wrongful death statute was enacted to provide a remedy which did not exist at common law, that is, a cause of action for damages for death caused by the wrongful act of another. On the other hand, the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act was enacted to meet the problems of the rapidly escalating cost to physicians of malpractice insurance, the near unavailability of such coverage to physicians engaged in certain high risk specialties, and because "(h)ealth care providers had become fearful of the exposure to malpractice claims and at the same time were unable to obtain adequate malpractice insurance at reasonable prices." Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., (1980) [273] Ind. [374], 404 N.E.2d 585, 589-90. The legislature thus responded to the vital needs of the community to preserve the availability of health care services to the citizens of this state. Id. The obvious purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act is to provide some measure of protection to health care providers from malpractice claims, thus to preserve the availability of such professional health care services to the community. Sue Yee Lee v. La*824fayette Home Hospital, Inc., (1980) Ind.App., 410 N.E.2d 1319, trans. denied. We do not believe that the Medical Malpractice Act (IC 16-9.5-1-1 et seq.) 9 created any separate cause of action for wrongful death or that the legislature intended to do so. The obvious purpose of the act was to protect health care providers from malpractice claims, Sue Yee Lee v. Lafayette Home Hospital, Inc., supra, not to create new and additional causes of action. Were it to create a separate cause of action it would increase the incidence of such claims rather than protect against them.
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We hereby hold that the right to prosecute a claim for wrongful death based upon medical malpractice is governed by the wrongful death statute with regard to the parties eligible to institute such proceeding, the persons for whose benefit recovery may be had, and the manner of distribution of such proceeds. We also hold that such a plaintiff must meet and comply with all conditions precedent necessary to bring such an action, specifically including being duly appointed as the patient's personal representative within two years of the date of death. We further hold that the procedural requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, the filing of the proposed complaint and submission to the medical review panel, must be met if the defendant is a qualified health care provider under that act. Finally, we hold that the limitations on the amount of recovery in the Medical Malpractice Act apply to such a claim.
Since the claim for wrongful death here did not meet the required conditions precedent of the Wrongful Death Act in that Mary E. Wallace was not duly appointed personal representative of Clarence's estate within two years of his death, summary judgment should have been granted on this claim. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's judgment denying summary judgment on the wrongful death claim.
Warrick, 435 N.E.2d at 267-269. Judge Robertson dissented in Warrick, writing, inter alia:
I believe that language of IC 16-9.5-1-6 clearly authorizes Mary Wallace to maintain an action for wrongful death. The language provides that a "patient or his representative having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death" to file a complaint subject to the provisions of chapter nine. Mary Wallace is a "representative" within the definition of IC 16-9.5-1-1(f) by the nature of her marital relationship with the deceased. I do not accept the idea that the Legislature did not intend, the provisions of Medical Malpractice Act to apply where the patient died as a result of the alleged malpractice. The express use of the language "bodily injury or death" evidences an intent by the Legislature that IC 16-9.5-1-6 should apply when the patient dies. The majority opinion ignores the rule of statutory construction that, if possible, effect and meaning must be given to each word and that no part of a statute is to be held meaningless if that part can be reconciled with the rest of the statute. Foremost Life Insurance Co. v. Department of Insurance, (1980) [274] Ind. [181], 409 N.E.2d 1092.
Warrick, 435 N.E.2d at 272 (footnote omitted).
*825There things stood until 1986, when our supreme court decided Cmty. Hosp. of Anderson and Madison County v. McKnight, 493 N.E.2d 775, 776 (Ind.1986), reh'g denied. There, a widow and her son (it does not appear whether the son was a dependent or a minor) filed a proposed complaint under the MMPA. Id. at 776. Neither of them was acting as personal representative of the decedent. Id. The trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id. Our court, on the authority of Warrick, reversed. See Cmty. Hosp. of Anderson and Madison County v. McKnight, 482 N.E.2d 280 (Ind.Ct.App.1985), reh'g denied. Our supreme court granted transfer and vacated the court of appeals opinion. See McKnight, 493 N.E.2d at 777. In doing so, it wrote as follows:
The resolution of this case turns on whether a person pursuing a claim, which involves the death of a patient, against a health care provider must first be appointed personal representative under the Wrongful Death Statute, I.C. § 34-1-1-2. We hold that the clear language of the Medical Malpractice Act I.C. § 16-9.5-1-1 et seq. renders such a requirement unnecessary. The pertinent parts of the act are set forth here:
1.C. § 16-9.5-1-1(c)
(c) "Patient" means a natural person who receives or should have received health care from a licensed health care provider, under a contract, express or implied, and includes any and all persons having a claim of any kind, whether derivative or otherwise, as a result of alleged malpractice on the part of health care provider. Derivative claims include, but are not limited to, the claim of a parent or parents, guardian, trustee, child, relative attorney, or any other representative of such patient including claims for loss of services, loss of consortium, expenses and all such similar claims.
1.C. § 16-9.5-1-1(f)
(£) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee, attorney, or other legal agent of the patient.
1.C. § 16-9.5-1-6
Subject to chapter 9 [of this article], a patient or his representative having a claim under this article for bodily injury or death on account of malpractice may file a complaint in any court of law having requisite jurisdiction and demand right of trial by jury. No dollar amount or figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice complaint, but the prayer shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises. [I.CO. § 16-9.5-1-6, as added by Acts 1975, P.L. 146, § 1.]
The above provisions clearly designate who is qualified to prosecute a claim. Plaintiffs-Appellees here fall within the seope of qualified persons: Lucille McKnight as spouse, and Shane Keith McKnight as child.
Defendants-Appellants argue that the above provisions should be construed in conjunction with the Wrongful Death Statute, LC. § 34-1-1-2, and that such a construction supports a requirement that a plaintiff must first be appointed personal representative. Traditional rules of statutory construction do not support appellant's position.
When the meaning of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. See State v. Jacobs (1924), 194 Ind. 327, 142 N.E. 715. The Medical Malpractice Act is plain and unambiguous in designating who qualifies as a representative and in designating those who are eligible to pursue derivative claims. The Medical Malpractice Act is also plain and unambigu*826ous in designating that such claims can be for bodily injury or death.
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Appellants further argue that the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act concerning a claim for death are dependent upon the estate distribution mechanisms inherent in the Wrongful Death Statute. Consequently, without the appointment of a personal representative to trigger the distribution mechanisms, it is impossible to determine the proper beneficiaries of a successful claim for death under the provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act. This argument has no merit. A trial court is particularly well suited to effect a just and proper distribution of damages if such distribution be necessary. Furthermore, the absence of distribution mechanisms in the Medical Malpractice Act does not render its definitions of those qualified to file a claim dependent on the Wrongful Death Statute.
To the extent that the holding in Warrick Hospital, Inc. v. Wallace (1982), Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 263 conflicts with the holding here, it is expressly overruled.
McKnight, 493 N.E.2d at 776-777.
As I see it, McKnight is controlling here. One could argue that the widow and son would be the ones for whose benefit a wrongful death action could be brought, but it remains the case that neither of them, as individuals, could maintain a wrongful death action under the WDA. In McKnight, their right to proceed was based on the provisions of the MMPA. The plaintiff here is a child of the deceased patient. He falls within the provisions of the MMPA and may assert a claim for "loss of services, loss of consortium expenses, and all such similar claims." Ind. Code § 34-18-2-22. Therefore, I concur.

. Repealed by Pub.L. No. 2-1993, § 209 and recodified as Ind.Code § 27-12, which was repealed by Pub.L. No. 1-1998, § 221 and recodified as Ind.Code § 34-18.