Court Opinion

ID: 9546843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:36:28.652796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:56.435454
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
specially concurring.
This appeal calls for a construction of § 23-408, OCLA, (Criminal Abortion Act) and §§54-901 to and including 54-945, OCLA, as amended, (Medical Practice Act). The question before us is, should the two acts be construed together or should we say that the second is foreign to the first and that it must be ignored in the construction of the first.
The following three possible interpretations present themselves: (1) the two acts should be read together and they should be held to mean that a licensed physician may relieve a woman of her unborn child if he finds that the woman’s health is imperiled by her pregnant condition [the majority adopt that interpretation of the legislation]; (2) the two acts should be read together, but they should be deemed to mean that the Medical Practice Act repeals, so far as physicians are concerned, the Criminal Abortion Act; (3) the Medical Practice Act has no bearing *106whatever upon the Criminal Abortion Act and must be ignored in applying the latter.
If the third alternative were embraced by the court, the result would be that a physician would be guilty of manslaughter under § 23-408, OCLA, although he could not be ejected from the medical profession in the following set of circumstances: (1) a pregnant woman called upon him with a complaint concerning her health; (2) he found, in good faith, that her health was imperiled by her pregnant condition and that an abortion was necessary; (3) he consulted with other licensed medical physicians (in no way related to or associated with him) and they concurred in a finding that the woman’s imperiled health demanded an abortion; (4) the physicians placed their finding in writing, including a statement that an abortion was necessary to save the woman’s imperiled health; and (5) the physicians filed their signed writing in the office specified by Oregon Laws 1951, Ch 265, § 3. May I add that in such an instance the writing which the physicians signed, in reliance upon Oregon Laws 1951, Ch 265, § 3, would turn against them and would be an admissible item of evidence leading to their conviction under §23-408, OCLA. Obviously, under such circumstances, no physician would take the course offered by the Medical Practice Act. Thereby legislation, which had its genesis in the 1937 legislative session, and which, through amendments since that year has taken its present form, would become a trap and a snare for the unwary. It would be shunned by all except the unsuspecting, and the result which it was intended to yield would be thwarted.
The majority opinion, which adopts the first of the three mentioned choices, is criticized in the minority opinion of this court. It appears to me that had the *107third choice been embraced by the court, it would be subject to criticism of manifest merit, for to hold that an ethical physician who wishes to comply with our laws may be convicted of a felony, after he has faithfully followed an enactment of the legislature, would assign to legislation a meaning so palpably absurd and truculent that all would recoil from it and declare that the legislature could not have intended to bring about such a result.
Beginning with the session of 1937, the legislature began to insert provisions in the Medical Practice Act delineating and regulating a physician’s right to relieve a woman of her unborn child. In that year, through Oregon Laws 1937, Ch 277, the right of a physician to relieve a pregnant woman was clarified by making the Medical Practice Act read:
“ * * * unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril after duo- consultation with another licensed medical physician and surgeon.”
In 1939 the act again had the attention of the legislature, but I shall pass on to Oregon Laws 1951, Ch 265, § 3, which amended the provision just quoted so as to make it read:
íí * * * unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition after due consultation with another duly licensed medical physician and surgeon who is not an associate or relative of the physician or surgeon and who agrees that an abortion is necessary. The record of this consultation shall be in writing and shall be maintained in the hospital where the consultation occurred or in the offices of all physicians and surgeons involved for a period of at least three years after the date of such abortion.”
*108It seems clear that the legislature believed that its enactments, beginning with 1937 and culminating in the provision just quoted, stated with clarity the conditions under which a physician could relieve a woman of her linborn child. Likewise, it appears plain that the legislature reasoned that those laws would render more certain the conviction of the guilty and the protection of ethical physicians. The legislature, obviously, thought that a physician, who, in good faith, contemplated the performance of the operation, would willingly consult with another and that the two would not object to placing their findings in writing and filing the latter in the appropriate office. Only the unscrupulous would object to that course, so the legislature manifestly reasoned. Hence, the legislation, as perfected by the 1951 amendment, which the minority deem as virtually vacuous, was designed to yield a desirable result. It was intended to afford protection to ethical practitioners and render more certain the conviction of the unscrupulous. Under it the prosecution of abortionists would no longer be stymied by the unwillingness of the woman to cooperate.
Oregon Laws 1945, Ch 128, which forms a part of the enactments pertaining to osteopathic physicians, is a counterpart of the 1939 act, with the exception that it employs the term “osteopathic” in lieu of “medical” physician. Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 183, § 2, likewise pertaining to osteopaths, is substantially a duplicate of the 1951 statute above quoted. The legislature has not subjected other elements of the medical profession to the legislation just reviewed. As recently as the 1953 session, the legislature was concerned with chiropractors (Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 556) and naturopaths (Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 555), but did not recognize in either of those branches of the *109profession a right to relieve a pregnant woman of her child for the preservation of her health.
In view of the foregoing many enactments which recite with clarity the powers of physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors and naturopaths, and, going on, set forth the standards to which they must conform in dealing with pregnancy, it would be unreasonable to believe that this extensive legislation was intended to accomplish nothing except to save from revocation the licenses of physicians and osteopaths who rendered the service described in those legislative enactments. Surely, the legislature would not have gone to all of that trouble to do nothing more than to save a license from revocation, especially not if it deemed that the licensee’s service to his patient was felonious. The extensive enactments which our legislative assembly has been perfecting since 1937 would not really save an osteopathic or medical physician’s license from revocation even if he complied meticulously with, respectively, Oregon Laws 1953, Oh 183, § 2, and Oregon Laws 1951, Ch 265, because after he had been convicted under the Criminal Abortion Act, the Board of Medical Examiners would be compelled to revoke his license on account of Ms conviction of the crime: §54-931, subd (i), OCLA, and Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 183, § 2. Thus, legislation represented by a half dozen or so acts, and intended to combat the unscrupulous, would be even less productive than the mountain in Aesop’s fable wliich labored but brought forth only a mouse. Unless the above cited enactments dealing with physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors and naturopaths were intended to set forth their powers and the standards to which they must conform, they are completely useless and the legislature frittered away its time when it adopted them.
*110Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 540, which extends the provisions of our nuisance laws (§§ 9-407 through 9-411, OCLA) to premises in which abortions are performed, includes the following:
“ * * * unless such is done for the relief of a woman whose health appears in peril because of her pregnant condition after due consultation with a duly licensed medical or osteopathic physician and surgeon under the conditions and restrictions prescribed in subsection (2) of section 54-931 or section 54-831, O.C.L.A., * * * ”
It will be observed that the quoted words are, for all practical purposes, the same as those in the medical and osteopathic physicians acts. Let us suppose that a building is occupied by a group of physicians, one of whom relieves a patient of her unborn child for the purpose of preserving her imperiled health. Let us also assume that before the physician took that course he consulted, in good faith, other licensed physicians and that they pursued, in similar good faith, the course exacted by the Medical Practice Act, particularly Oregon Laws 1951, Ch 265; that is, let us assume that the physicians placed their diagnosis in writing, signed it and filed it with the hospital authorities. Under those circumstances, if the contentions of the minority are correct, the physician could be convicted under the Criminal Abortion Act and the writing would be material evidence in his case;, but, upon the other hand, the owner of the premises would be guilty of nothing. Yet, in the two instances, the legislation would, for all relevant purposes, be the same. In the instance of the physician, the legislation would mean nothing except that his license could not be revoked; in fact, the certificate which he signed, pursuant to the demands of that legislation, would render certain *111his conviction. In the instance of the property owner, the legislation would mean that the operation of his premises was lawful, and the document which the physicians signed would be his (the owner’s) protection. Thus, the act would be Janus-faced. The face confronting the doctor would declare to him that the act merely saved for him his license, but rendered his conduct felonious. The face toward the owner would announce that he had committed no crime whatever. Surely the legislature did not intend by this enactment to utter out of the two corners of its mouth such bizarre pronouncements.
Let us carry the situation projected by the minority’s view one step further. Let us assume that the physician and the property owner are one and the same individual; that is, that the physician is the owner of the building in which his office is located. In that event, the purported criminal in the two cases would be the same person. Likewise, the alleged criminal conduct (the abortion) would be the same, and, finally, the controlling statutory provision applicable to both cases would be couched in the same terms. Yet, in that situation, the defendant, as property owner, would be held not guilty, but, as physician, he would be found guilty. Does not this demonstrate that when the legislature wrote into the Medical Practice Act the provision under scrutiny, it was not concerned merely with the license but with delineating the rules governing the physician’s right to relieve a woman of her unborn child.
The minority opinion declares that, since the 1953 amendment to the state’s nuisance legislation says that its mention of the manslaughter act (Criminal Abortion Act) shall not be “deemed to modify, alter or amend” that act, therefore this court is precluded *112from holding that the 1951 amendment to the Medical Practice Act and the 1953 amendment to the osteopathic act likewise did not modify or amend the manslaughter act. The contention is plainly illogical. Indubitably the provision about the manslaughter act was written into the nuisance act to make it clear that the standard applicable to all who effect abortions, except medical men, is that which is employed in the manslaughter act [“to preserve the life of such mother ”]. If the legislature had not wished to ‘ ‘modify, alter or amend” the manslaughter act as to medical men, it surely would not have announced its purpose in the nuisance act (or in any other type of legislation such as acts dealing with perjury, usury, highways, etc.) but in its legislation dealing with medical men, and, as we have seen, it adopted in 1953 extensive legislation dealing with them and with the right of osteopaths, chiropractors and naturopaths to relieve a woman of her unborn child. It did not say in that legislation that its enactments should not be deemed to affect the manslaughter act.
The minority say: “Section 23-408, OCLA, concerning manslaughter by abortion is incorporated without material change in the Oregon Revised Statutes and appears therein as section 163.060. The Revised Statutes were adopted as law. Oregon Laws 1953, chapter 3.” Indeed they were, but so, also, was all other legislation which had been adopted in this state prior to January 12, 1953. See Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 3. And, accordingly, the extensive legislation which the assembly had written prior to 1953 defining a physician’s right to effect an abortion was likewise adopted by Oregon Revised Statutes “as law”. In other words, the Medical Practice Act and the osteopathic act were as much adopted “as law” by Oregon *113Laws 1953, Ch 3, as the manslaughter act. Moreover, the 1953 legislation concerning chiropractors, naturopaths, osteopaths and nuisance was adopted after, not before, Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 3. Nothing is gained by indulging in the observations of the minority about our Eevised Statutes. But let us not drop the matter at that point. As we see from the contention made by the minority, the Medical Practice Act and the Criminal Abortion Act are now parts of our Eevised Statutes and both were adopted simultaneously by Oregon Laws 1953, Ch 3. They were adopted, if the minority are right, as parts of one great omnibus act. Accordingly, they are parts of one act as much as two paragraphs of our Statute of Limitations or the several parts of an appropriation act. Since such are their nature, we do not apply to them the rules of implied repeal, to which the minority opinion gives much attention, but the rule that the several parts of a single act must be read and construed as a whole.
Obviously, the legislature, in creating the Eevised Statutes, never intended that consequences such as the minority call to their aid should come from its efforts to give us a better compilation of our laws. I have indulged in the above observations to show the lack of merit in the reasons which brought the minority to their point of view.
The minority find that the Medical Practice Act is administrative in character and, having reached that conclusion, hold that it can have no effect whatever upon the Criminal Abortion Act. I shall not disagree with the minority’s characterization of the act, although I believe that it would be better to term it a licensing act. I call attention especially to §§ 54-921 through 54-924, OCLA, as amended.
*114Licensing acts, whether we deem them administrative in character or otherwise, generally confer power. They authorize the licensee to exercise privileges or engage in activities which he otherwise could not do. Not infrequently they protect him from liabilities or criminal penalties to which he would be subject if he did not possess his license. Let us explore that a little further. A license to practice medicine, like a license to practice law or engage in engineering, is not easily won. Tears of schooling, followed by a difficult examination conducted by a state board of examiners must be undergone before the license is issued. Valuable privileges and powers await those who can run the hard course. The long schooling and the hard examination are the means which the state employs for selecting those to whom it will entrust the momentous powers. When the license has finaly been received, the licensee finds himself authorized to do things which the layman cannot do without subjecting himself to damage actions or possibly even to criminal prosecution. I shall mention some examples. It is unlawful for a layman to use or possess narcotic drugs, but a physician can prescribe, administer and dispense morphine, cocaine and other narcotics. A young man who passes the state bar examination, and thereby wins a license from this court to practice law, may thereupon make statements, orally or in writing, to a court without subjecting himself to damage liability or criminal prosecution for defamation. One who meets the tests and gains for himself an apothecary’s license may possess and sell substances in which a layman cannot deal. One who gains the right to wear the robes of a cleric becomes invested with the power to perform marriage ceremonies and with exemptions, such as those from taxation and military *115service. Anyone, upon a moment’s thought, will bring to mind many additional instances showing that the purpose of licensing acts is to confer power and grant exemptions. Hence, we do not stop when we find that an act under review is administrative or licensing in nature; to the contrary, we go on and view it as one whereby the legislature very likely intended to confer upon the licensee powers which the ordinary layman does not possess. This is especially true in the event that other legislation required the licensee to undergo long training and meet severe tests before he won his license. No one would seek a license if, without one, he could do the things which the license authorizes him to do.
The very fact that the authority to relieve a woman of her unborn child, under the circumstances delineated in the 1937 and 1951 enactments, is set forth in a licensing act is surely significant. That is the place where one would expect, to find a statement of the power granted to the licensee.
I do not deem it necessary to carry further an analysis of the two acts (Criminal Abortion Act and Medical Practice Act). I believe that the legislature has made sufficiently clear the meaning which the opinion of the Chief Justice attributes to that legislation. When the legislature has made its meaning manifest, it must be accepted by the courts without' equivocation. It is never becoming a court to say to the legislature concerning one of its enactments, “We see what you mean, but, since you have not expressed yourself in the terms which we would have chosen, we will pay no attention to what you said.”
Possibly one more observation may be in order. The minority say that the defendant is “a guilty man”. Generally, courts confronted with problems *116of statutory construction deem irrelevant the identity of the appellant and reserve, until is has agreed upon the meaning of the act under scrutiny, a conclusion as to his guilt or innocence. The identity or culpability of the appellant should not influence the court in construing a challenged statute. But if, in order to sustain a judgment which holds this defendant guilty, we adopt the minority’s construction of the challenged legislation, the State of Oregon will pay a big price, for, in that event, legislation which is the product of sixteen years of repeated effort, and which is intended to protect the ethical practitioner but render more certain the conviction of the abortionist, will be reduced to a state of abject impotence.
I concur in the opinion written by the Chief Justice.