Court Opinion

ID: 9947271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 15:07:59.351758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.049829
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3033-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

J.M.G.,1

     Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________

                   Submitted February 12, 2024 – Decided March 4, 2024

                   Before Judges Chase and Vinci.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 19-10-
                   0125.

                   Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Samuel Clark Carrigan, Assistant Deputy
                   Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent (Jennifer E. Kmieciak, Deputy Attorney
                   General, of counsel and on the briefs).

1
  The parties' initials are used to protect confidentiality, pursuant to R. 1:38-
3(c)(12).
             Appellant filed pro se supplemental briefs.

PER CURIAM

       After the trial court granted the State's motion to admit defendant J.M.G.'s

statement given following the administration of Miranda2 warnings and denied

defendant's motions to suppress physical evidence, defendant, a previously

convicted sex offender, entered a guilty plea to first-degree aggravated sexual

assault of A.C.B. when she was less than thirteen years old, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(a)(1). He was sentenced to a fifteen-year term of incarceration to be served

without the possibility of parole under the Jessica Lunsford Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-

2(a) and (d).

       On appeal, defendant's counseled brief raises the following point for our

consideration:

       POINT I

             THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
             MOTION TO ADMIT DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED
             STATEMENTS BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT
             PROVE A KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT
             WAIVER OF RIGHTS BEYOND A REASONABLE
             DOUBT.

2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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                                         2
Defendant's pro se brief presents the following additional arguments for our

consideration:

       POINT I

             THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
             DEFENDANT['S] MOTION FOR REQUESTING A
             FRANKS[3]   HEARING    AND   ALSO   NOT
             SUPRESSING (SIC) EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM
             [A] DEFECTIVE VERIZON SUBPOENA BASED ON
             MISUSE OF EVIDENCE AND PURPOSELY
             MISLEADING       THE     JUDGE     WITH
             MISSTATEMENTS      AND   OMISSIONS   OF
             MATERIAL FACTS CONTAINED WITHIN THE
             SEARCH     WARRANT      AFFIDAVIT   AND
             SUBPOENA AT QUESTION.

       POINT II

             THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE
             DEFENDANT['S] MOTION FOR SUPRESSION
             (SIC)  OF   EVIDENCE  FROM   MOBILE
             APPLICATION KIK THAT WAS IMPROPERLY
             GAINED BY LAW ENFORCEMENT.

Based on our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we reject

defendant's arguments and affirm.

3
    Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
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                                       3
                                       I.

      We glean the following facts from the record and the testimonial hearing

conducted in the trial court during which the only witness presented by the State

was Senior Parole Officer James MacFarlane. Defendant did not produce any

witnesses.

      In February 2018, New Jersey State Police Detective Jennifer Amato

joined a youth chatroom on Chat-Avenue.com and adopted an undercover

persona of a thirteen-year-old girl. A user named "john.01" sent Amato a private

message. Amato told "john.01" she was a thirteen-year-old girl from New

Jersey. "john.01" described himself as a sixteen-year-old boy from the Cherry

Hill area who was 5'9", 160 pounds, athletic build, with brown eyes and hair and

a "9" d**k." After Amato told "john.01" she was thirteen years old, "john.01"

asked her how many boys she kissed, whether she was ready to do anything

more than kissing, whether she shaved her genitals and what size bra she wore.

      Amato then asked if "john.01" had a Kik Messenger account and provided

him with her username. Shortly thereafter, Amato received a message on Kik

from an account with the username "jonnoneya" and a display name of "Jonny

Duh." After confirming that "Jonny Duh" was "john.01" on Chat-Avenue,

Amato sent him a non-sexual image of an undercover officer posing as a

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                                       4
thirteen-year-old girl. "Jonny Duh" then sent a photo of himself. The photo

depicted "a white male wearing only boxer briefs," but the camera flash

obscured his face. "Jonny Duh" then sent a picture of his penis, followed by a

picture of himself which showed his face and depicted an individual who was

approximately fifty years old. He also asked Amato for a picture of her in her

bra.

       On February 28, 2018, Amato sent a preservation request to Chat-Avenue

relating to chat activity of "@john.01" between the times of 2:06 p.m. and 3:31

p.m. on February 27, 2018. Chat-Avenue responded and indicated they had no

information as to that usernames at that time but did have an individual with the

handle "John.01"; however, the user's activity did not match the times requested.

Chat-Avenue provided an IP address for "John.01." The IP address geolocated

to Medford and was serviced by Verizon. Verizon identified the IP address as

belonging to J.G. in Medford Township. Amato, who continued to communicate

with "Jonny Duh" over Kik Messenger, searched law enforcement databases for

J.G. She learned J.G. had a son, defendant. Amato also learned defendant is a

registered sex offender from Burlington County.

       Amato then contacted defendant's parole officer, Ben Devuyst, who

confirmed defendant was a registered sex offender and that defendant was the

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individual in the pictures provided by "Jonny Duh."        Amato continued to

communicate with "Jonny Duh" into June of 2018. The State then applied for,

and was granted, a search warrant for defendant's father's residence in Medford

Township. Police executed the search warrant on June 12, 2018.

      Officer MacFarlane testified at the Miranda hearing that he had been a

parole officer for six years and in June 2018 he was assigned to defendant. On

June 12, he went to defendant's residence with other officers after receiving

information defendant may have been violating conditions of his parole

supervision. After the officers were let into the residence, Officer MacFarlane

explained to defendant the allegations concerning his violation of parole

conditions. He then handcuffed defendant. At that time, he removed a Miranda

card from his tactical vest pouch and read defendant his rights. A copy of a

similar Miranda card was admitted into evidence. Officer MacFarlane testified

defendant was properly informed of his protections afforded under Miranda. He

stated:

            The [Miranda] warnings would be number one, that
            [defendant] would have the right to remain silent and
            refuse to answer any questions. Number two, anything
            that he would say would be used against him in a court
            of law. Number three, that he have the right to consult
            with an attorney at any time and have him or her present
            before and during questioning. Number four, that if he
            could not afford an attorney, one would be provided, if

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            he so decided, prior to any questioning. And number
            five, that a decision to waive these rights is not final
            and he may withdraw his waiver whenever he wished,
            before or during the questioning. And then I confirmed
            with [defendant] that he was read his Miranda rights, he
            had an understanding of those rights and that he would
            like to waive those rights and speak with me.

Officer MacFarlane further testified he verbally confirmed defendant heard his

rights. He never threatened or struck defendant, and from his perspective

defendant understood and then verbally waived his rights.

      After defendant waived his rights, the officers inspected defendant's room

and observed two cell phone chargers near defendant's bed connected to a surge

protector. Officer MacFarlane stated he was concerned because the terms of

defendant's parole barred him from using or possessing any internet-capable

device without prior approval and at that time defendant only had one approved

device. The officers found the approved device in defendant's bedroom.

      The officers then transported defendant to the Medford Township Police

Department where they spoke with other task force officers, including members

of the New Jersey State Police Digital Technology Investigations Unit.

According to Officer MacFarlane, while at the Medford police station, Sergeant

Cullen from the Parole Board went to the vehicle where defendant had been

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                                       7
placed and re-confirmed that he understood his Miranda rights and that he was

being arrested.

      Officer MacFarlane then drove defendant to his father's house where a

search warrant was to be executed. Once the search was completed and Officer

MacFarlane learned that a laptop and cell phone that matched the charger in

defendant's room were recovered, he asked defendant, who was still handcuffed

and sitting in MacFarlane's vehicle, if he was familiar with those items and if

they belonged to him. Defendant confirmed they did. His father also confirmed

defendant was the sole owner and user of the cell phone.

      The officers and defendant returned to Medford Police Station, and

defendant was placed in an interview room and re-Mirandized. At that point,

defendant declined to give a statement.         On cross-examination, Officer

MacFarlane testified that, although he had a pen, he did not have defendant sign

the Miranda card, and although he had a smart phone, he did not record the

reading of defendant's Miranda rights.

      The motion judge found Officer MacFarlane's testimony to be credible,

indicating his "tone and demeanor on direct and cross-examination" led the court

to believe that he had no intent to deceive it. Additionally, he was found to have

"a good recollection of the facts" and "direct knowledge of his interactions with

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                                         8
defendant." The motion court also held the officer's testimony was "reasonable"

and "he did not make any inconsistent or contradictory statements."

      Detectives conducted a forensic review of the cell phone recovered at

defendant's father's house and discovered several social-media-networking

applications, including Kik Messenger. In addition, they located the images sent

to Amato. During a complete forensic examination of the cell phone, police

found a thumbnail image that appeared to depict child pornography.

      The forensic examination also revealed a chat on Kik Messenger between

"Jonny Duh" and another individual with the handle "~Furry Girl~." "~Furry

Girl~" was later identified as A.C.B., an eleven-year-old girl from Michigan.

The conversations occurred in June 2018 while "Jonny Duh" was also

communicating with Amato. "Jonny Duh" asked A.C.B. how old she was, and

she informed him she was eleven years old. "Jonny Duh" asked A.C.B. multiple

sexually explicit questions, and sent her a picture of a penis, which was later

determined to be the same image he sent to Amato and found on his device.

"Jonny Duh" also asked A.C.B. to send him sexually explicit photographs via

Kik Messenger.

      Police later recovered various images of A.C.B. "in which she exposed

her breasts, sat on a toilet with her legs spread exposing her vagina and

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                                       9
penetrated her vagina with her finger." A.C.B. was located in Michigan and

interviewed by law enforcement. She told police defendant began chatting with

her on another social-media platform, Discord, before transitioning over to Kik

Messenger. Defendant then began pressuring A.C.B. to send him nude pictures.

A.C.B. confirmed she and defendant exchanged nude photographs of

themselves. She also confirmed "that she photographed herself inserting her

finger into her vagina and sent the image to defendant pursuant to . . . defendant's

instructions."

                                         II.

      On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in finding his waiver of

Miranda rights prior to his initial statement was voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent. He argues the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

waived his Miranda rights because he did not sign a Miranda form and the

waiver of his rights was not recorded. Although not argued below, defendant

argues his statement should have been suppressed because the police could have

waited until they got back to the police station to record his interrogation.

      To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation , "the State

must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238

                                                                                A-3033-21
                                        10
N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)). The

court considers factors including the defendant's "age, education, intelligence,

previous encounters with law enforcement, advice received about [their]

constitutional rights, the length of detention, the period of time between

administration of the warnings and the volunteered statement, and whether the

questioning was repeated and prolonged in nature or involved physical or mental

abuse." State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 614 (1999).

      A waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights must not be the product of police

coercion, but instead must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary based on "the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the custodial interrogation." State v.

A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 398 (2019).        The evidence must establish beyond a

reasonable doubt the statement was given voluntarily and not because the

defendant's will was overborne. State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462 (2005)

(citing State v. Galloway, 133 N.J. 631, 654 (1993)).

      Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings on a motion

to suppress a defendant's statement to the police will be upheld when they are

supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record. State v. S.S., 229 N.J.

360, 374 (2017). We do not disturb the motion court's factual findings unless

those findings are so clearly mistaken as to demand intervention in the interests

                                                                            A-3033-21
                                      11
of justice. Ibid. This is particularly true where the findings of the trial judge

"are substantially influenced by his opportunity to hear and see the witnesses

and to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State

v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161

(1964)). However, we owe no deference to the motion court's conclusions of

law, which are reviewed de novo. A.M., 237 N.J. at 396.

      Contrary to defendant's arguments on appeal, there is no requirement that

Officer MacFarlane's testimony be corroborated by video or other evidence. At

the time they executed the search warrant, there was no indication that police

were aware of the facts that would later give rise to the aggravated sexual assault

charge involving A.C.B. The motion judge had the ability to observe Officer

MacFarlane and was aware that there was no video or signed Miranda card.

Additionally, defendant did not present any witnesses to counter the State's

credible witness. In short, we defer to the motion court's credibility and factual

findings, and thus affirm the order admitting defendant's statement and

defendant's conviction for the aggravated sexual assault of A.C.B. Defendant's

arguments go more to the weight of such evidence rather than its admissibility.

      Defendant asserts for the first time on appeal that a recording was required

under Rule 3:17 because the officers could have held defendant in the police

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                                       12
station the entire time. That Rule sets forth electronic recordation requirements

for custodial interrogations of those charged with certain enumerated serious

offenses.   State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).         Significantly, the

electronic recordation requirement only applies to "custodial interrogations

conducted in a place of detention." R. 3:17(a). "Place of detention" under the

Rule means:

            a building or a police station or barracks that is a place
            of operation for a municipal or state police department,
            county prosecutor, sheriff or other law enforcement
            agency, that is owned or operated by a law enforcement
            agency at which persons are or may be detained in
            connection with criminal charges against those persons.

      Here, defendant was Mirandized at his house when he was first placed in

custody. Officers asked defendant if he understood his rights while in the police

car. This clearly does not constitute a "place of detention" as expressly defined

by Rule 3:17. Under these circumstances, the State is not required to prove that

one of the seven enumerated exceptions to electronic recordation in Rule 3:17(b)

applies because the questioning did not occur in a "place of detention" as defined

in paragraph (a).

      Moreover, after the execution of the search warrant, defendant was

brought back to the station so a formal recorded statement could be taken as part

of the continued investigation. At this point he exercised his Fifth Amendment

                                                                            A-3033-21
                                       13
right to remain silent, which the officers scrupulously honored. After hearing

firsthand from the parole officer, the motion judge fully credited the officer's

testimony that he verbally advised defendant of his Miranda rights before

questioning him. We give deference to the trial judge's factual findings based

on his opportunity to hear and see the witness. There is no basis to jettison these

factual findings based on defendant's argument that Rule 3:17 required

electronic recordation of his statements at his father's residence.

                                       III.

      When a defendant challenges the veracity of a search warrant affidavit, a

Franks hearing is required "where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary

showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, was included . . . in the warrant affidavit, and if the

allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." 438

U.S. at 155-56. The defendant "must allege 'deliberate falsehood or reckless

disregard for the truth,' pointing out with specificity the portions of the warrant

that are claimed to be untrue." State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567 (1979)

(quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171).

      Only where a defendant also establishes "the allegedly false statement

[was] necessary to the [issuing judge's] finding of probable cause, [does] the

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                                       14
Fourth Amendment require[] that a hearing be held at the defendant's request."

State v. Desir, 245 N.J. 179, 196 (2021) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56).

"These allegations should be supported by an offer of proof including reliable

statements by witnesses." Howery, 80 N.J. at 567 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at

171). Where the defendant fails to make this substantial preliminary showing,

"no hearing is required." Franks, 438 U.S. at 172. "[A] Franks hearing is not

directed at picking apart minor technical problems with a warrant application; it

is aimed at warrants obtained through intentional wrongdoing by law

enforcement agents." State v. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. 228, 240 (App.

Div. 2009).

      A defendant may also challenge a warrant affidavit on grounds the affiant

made a material omission in the application. State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 193

(1997) (stating "[m]aterial omissions in the affidavit may also invalidate the

warrant"). The Franks hearing "requirements apply where the allegations are

that the affidavit, though facially accurate, omits material facts."    State v.

Stelzner, 257 N.J. Super. 219, 235 (App. Div. 1992).

      We review a trial court's decision denying a Franks hearing for an abuse

of discretion. Broom-Smith, 406 N.J. Super. at 239. An abuse of discretion will

be found where the "decision [was] made without a rational explanation,

                                                                           A-3033-21
                                      15
inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis." United States v. Scurry, 193 N.J. 492, 504 (2008) (alteration in original)

(quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

      Defendant's claim that a remand is mandated for a Franks hearing is

unsupported by a credible showing that the detectives made false

misrepresentations or material omissions in their affidavit. Defendant argues

the search warrant contained a material misstatement because Chat-Avenue gave

Detective Amato information for "John.01" not "john.o1." He further claims the

IP address of his father's house was obtained for the wrong "John.01."

      The affidavit for the search warrant reflected Detective Amato's chatroom

conversations and that the investigation led to defendant's father's house. Based

on the totality of the circumstances, the motion court was "unpersuaded that the

inaccuracy between 'John.01' and 'john.01' represented either intentional

wrongdoing or reckless disregard for the truth. There [was] no credible evidence

presented to support the argument that the affidavit's interchangeable uses of

usernames were [n]either a reckless disregard for the truth nor intentional

wrongdoing."

      In addition, the motion court found a hearing "is not necessary when

probable cause exists even after the alleged false statements are excised."

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                                       16
Significantly, the affidavit stated the same IP address was used by "jonnoneya"

to access Kik Messenger. Detective Amato continued to communicate with

"jonnoneya" on Kik Messenger and he sent her pictures of himself. Officers

were "able to confirm that the photographs [Detective Amato] received were of

[defendant]," and although the target address was not defendant's registered

address with the Parole Board, Officer DeVuyst "believe[d] he [was] staying at

the target location and using devices there to commit the crime of Attempted

Obscenity for Persons under 18." It is immaterial whether information from

Chat-Avenue was or was not included in the affidavit because there was still

ample probable cause to support the search warrant for defendant's father's

residence.

      Nor was a Franks hearing required because the affidavit omitted

information that the Kik Messenger account for "jonnoneya" was also linked to

a Comcast account subscribed to by another person at an address in Glassboro.

The fact that the Kik account was linked to additional IP addresses does not

diminish the probable cause to search defendant's father's residence. This is

especially so because the search-warrant affidavit stated that the IP address

linked to defendant's father's residence was used by "jonnoneya" to access Kik

                                                                         A-3033-21
                                     17
Messenger on February 27, 2018—the date Detective Amato began chatting

with "Jonny Duh."

                                      IV.

      Defendant's argument that the State should have secured a wiretap order

to obtain his subscriber information is without merit as this issue has already

been decided by our Supreme Court in State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 401 (2008).

There, the Court held subscriber information kept by an Internet Service

Provider is constitutionally protected but can be lawfully obtained with a grand

jury or trial subpoena, as was done here. Ibid.

      To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining

arguments, it is because we find them to be without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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