Court Opinion

ID: 9787242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:13:44.954481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:45.012847
License: Public Domain

TROUT, Chief Justice.
I.
NATURE OF THE CASE
Claimant Charles E. Cutsinger (Cutsinger) appeals the Industrial Commission’s (Commission) decision in which the Commission denied him benefits for the aggravation of his preexisting condition. We affirm.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Cutsinger suffered a left elbow injury in the eighth grade while he was playing foot*465ball. Cutsinger subsequently sought medical treatment for the injury, and he had several surgeries to correct the injury between 1980 and 1990.
In 1994, Cutsinger went to work as a fabricator at Spears Manufacturing (Spears), a manufacturer of pipe fittings and valves. While working for Spears, Cutsinger’s left arm and wrist began to bother him again. He continued to work for Spears until November of 1996, when he temporarily left to pursue another employment opportunity. He returned to work for Spears in February of 1997, and resumed his previous job duties. Following his return, Cutsinger complained of pain and swelling in his wrist, and he sought further medical attention, including another surgery. On April 8,1998, a medical doctor, Dr. Porter, linked Cutsinger’s wrist problem to his elbow injury and surgical attempts to correct the elbow injury. Dr. Michael Phillips, an orthopedic surgeon, examined Cutsinger on December 28,1998, and he stated that in his opinion, the wrist problem was totally attributable to Cutsinger’s elbow injury.
Cutsinger was given a release to return to work in January 1999, and he sought worker’s compensation for his wrist injury. The referee found that Cutsinger’s work activities, involving repetitive wrist movement, aggravated and/or accelerated his preexisting condition.
The referee, however, found that Cutsinger had not proven to a reasonable degree of medical probability that an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment caused the aggravatioñ or acceleration of his preexisting condition. The referee noted that even though Cutsinger had testified about two industrial accidents involving his left wrist, he had not presented medical evidence supporting a causal relationship between either of the alleged accidents and the aggravation of his condition. The referee further observed that Dr. Porter had cited the repetitive nature of Cutsinger’s work activity, and not a specific incident, as the cause of the symptoms. The referee thus concluded:
[Ejven assuming Claimant has met his burden of proving an occupational disease, his claim remains non-eompensable under Nistad, Nelson, [Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enters., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994)] and its progeny because proof of a precipitating accident is lacking. Thus, the remaining issues of occupational disease, medical benefits, temporary disability, permanent partial impairment, and attorney fees are rendered moot.
The Industrial Commission subsequently adopted the referee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Cutsinger filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court on December 13,1999.
III.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the sole issue raised is whether the legislature intended to overrule Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enter., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), and its progeny when it amended Idaho Code § 72-439 in 1997. Nelson required that there be an accident before a preexisting condition, which becomes aggravated, is covered by worker’s compensation benefits. This very issue was recently decided, in February 2002, by this Court in Koch v. Micron Technology, 136 Idaho 885, 42 P.3d 678. In Koch we wrote:
If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction. State v. Quick Transp., Inc., 134 Idaho 240, 999 P.2d 895 (2000). If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, then it will attempt to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. In construing a statute, this Court may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Id.
[The claimant] argues that the addition of subparagraph (3) to the statute was intended by the legislature to overrule Nelson. The language of subparagraph (3) is clear and unambiguous. It specifies which employer is liable ‘[w]here compensation is payable for an occupational disease.’ It addresses liability for benefits for an occupational disease once that oceu*466pational disease has been compensable. Because Nelson dealt with the compensability of an occupational disease, not which employer was hable, subsection (3) clearly cannot have been intended to overrule Nelson. There is nothing in the language of subparagraph (3) that purports to change the holding of Nelson that the aggravation or acceleration of an occupational disease is not compensable unless such aggravation or acceleration results from an industrial accident.
Id. at 887, 42 P.3d 678. We therefore affirm the Industrial Commission’s denial of Cut-singer worker’s compensation benefits because there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding of fact, that Cutsinger did not suffer an accident that aggravated his preexisting condition and that finding is not challenged on appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the Industrial Commission’s ruling and award costs to Spears on appeal.
Justices SCHROEDER, WALTERS and EISMANN, concur.