Court Opinion

ID: 9939546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:35.291759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:26.569191
License: Public Domain

J-A25012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: A.H., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: L.D-W., MOTHER                  :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 827 WDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): OC-3685-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED: February 9, 2024

       L.D-W. (“Mother”) appeals from the June 12, 2023 order involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her biological daughter, A.H., born in March

2020.1 After careful consideration, we affirm.

       We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the

certified record, which provides as follows. Clearfield County Youth and Family

Services (“CYS”) first became involved with this family in March 2020, when

CYS learned that Mother and A.H. both tested positive for amphetamines and

methamphetamines at the time of A.H.’s birth. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 7. On

April 8, 2020, CYS was granted emergency custody of A.H., which was

confirmed in a shelter hearing held the same day. Id. at 8. On April 13,
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 In a separate order filed the same day, the orphans’ court also involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of S.H. (“Father”), who did not file an appeal.
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2020, A.H. was adjudicated dependent. CYS was awarded legal custody, while

A.H. was initially returned to Mother’s physical custody. Id. at 9.

        A.H.’s initial dependency goal was established as reunification and

Mother was assigned several permanency goals related to the concerns

revealed by CYS’s investigations up to that point.       She was directed to

cooperate with CYS and other service providers, maintain her sobriety,

participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling, obtain stable

housing, secure consistent employment, and refrain from criminal activity.

See id. at 7, 15-17.     Mother was also ordered to undergo regular urine

screenings for substance abuse. In permanency review orders issued between

May 2020 and July 2021, the court found Mother’s compliance to be minimal.

        CYS removed A.H. from Mother’s physical custody in July 2020 after

Mother again tested positive for methamphetamines.          See id. at 9-10.

Thereafter, she was placed in a foster home with L.H.C. and E.C. (collectively,

“Custodians”). Mother was permitted supervised visitations with A.H. several

times a week, which she consistently participated in during the dependency

proceedings. See id. at 24. In December 2020, Mother continued to test

positive for methamphetamines and was, ultimately, held in contempt by the

dependency court. Id. In connection with this finding, Mother participated in

an in-patient rehabilitation which concluded in March 2021. See id. at 13-14.

        Subsequently, however, Mother’s urine screens indicated that she

continued to abuse methamphetamines upon her release from rehab in March

2021.     See id. at 15-16.   She tested positive for methamphetamines in

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screens administered every month during the seven-month period between

March 2021 and October 2021. Id. In August 2021, Mother underwent a

parental capacity evaluation administered by Dr. Bradley Beckwith. Based

largely upon Mother’s intransigent abuse of illicit substances, Dr. Beckwith

recommended that Mother “not serve as the primary parenting resource” for

A.H. See id. at 50.

      Contemporaneously, A.H. became a patient of audiologist Dr. Emily

Morris at UPMC Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after she failed

her “newborn hearing screening.” See id. at 69-70. A.H. was diagnosed with

significant hearing loss and was recommended for cochlear implant surgery in

her left ear. See id. at 70-71. Mother disputed this diagnosis and objected.

See id. at 10-11. Specifically, Mother was concerned that the surgery would

“sever” A.H.’s cochlear nerve and, thereby, preclude Mother from having her

voice “encoded” upon the child. See id. at 46. Mother was also difficult to

communicate with when her consent and input were required on these critical

issues.   See id. at 10.    Thus, CYS requested and was granted medical

decision-making authority as to A.H. in September 2020. See id. at 11.

      A.H. underwent successful cochlear surgery in February 2021. See id.

at 71. She also was fitted with a hearing aid in her right ear. See id. at 70.

Consequently, A.H. requires frequent check-ups and has significant daily

medical needs related to the upkeep of her auditory aids, including regular

disassembly, inspection, and replacement of the devices. See id. at 78-79.

These medical implants also have related software that must be monitored

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through a digital device like a cellular telephone. See id. at 75. Following

this successful medical intervention, A.H. performed “above average” with

respect to her developmental milestones. See id. at 80.

       Ultimately, on October 14, 2021, the dependency court awarded

Custodians subsidized permanent legal custody (“SPLC”) of A.H.2 See id. at

18. Mother did not file an appeal. While Mother’s parental rights were not

terminated by this determination, the SPLC order discharged A.H. from

dependency, terminated CYS’s oversight, and directed that CYS was no longer

obligated to provide reunification services to Mother. Id. In anticipation of a

forthcoming custody complaint from Mother, however, the SPLC order also

directed that Mother “shall continue to have weekly visits until an order is

entered in the civil docket.” Id. at 34; see also In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974,

977 (Pa.Super. 2004) (observing that when it is “deemed appropriate,” a trial

court may “permit continued visitation by the dependent child’s natural

parents” following an award of SPLC).

       The visitation portion of the SPLC order was intended to bridge the gap

between the closure of A.H.’s dependency and the anticipated initiation of a

custody proceeding by Mother. See id. at 96-98. However, Mother did not

____________________________________________

2 Subsidized permanent legal custody (“SPLC”) is “an arrangement whereby a

juvenile court discontinues intervention as well as supervision by a county
agency, and awards custody of a dependent child, on a permanent basis, to a
custodian. Parental rights are not terminated.” In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 977
(Pa.Super. 2013). Additionally, “[t]he custodian is typically provided a
financial subsidy for the child by the local county children and youth agency.”
Id.

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file a custody complaint concerning A.H., and disputes quickly arose between

Mother and Custodians regarding visitations with A.H.         Id.   Specifically,

Custodians were concerned that CYS would no longer be providing supervision

and drug testing services in connection with Mother’s visits. See id. at 34-

45, 55, 98-99.      Conflict also arose when Custodians would not utilize the

visitation service provider recommended by Mother since that organization did

not provide drug testing.         Id.    In December 2021, Mother filed in the

dependency court a petition for contempt against Custodians in connection

with Mother’s lack of visitation with A.H.

       On April 19, 2022, an unrecorded conference was held in chambers on

Mother’s contempt petition and the parties negotiated a temporary order

providing the general parameters for Mother and the Custodians to negotiate

a resolution to visitation. See Custodians’ Exhibit 8 at ¶¶ 1-7. Under the

terms of this order, if no agreement was reached within thirty days, Mother

was permitted to seek a conference or hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. On May 12,

2022, Custodians’ counsel at that time, Joshua S. Maines, Esquire, transmitted

a proposal for visitation to Mother’s attorney.3 See N.T., 12/22/22, at 34-45,

55, 98-99. Mother did not respond to this communication, nor did she request

a hearing or conference before the dependency court.

       On June 22, 2022, Custodians filed a petition seeking to involuntarily

terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)

____________________________________________

3   Custodians retained separate counsel in these termination proceedings.

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and § 2511(b).4 An evidentiary hearing was held on December 22, 2022, and

continued to February 9, 2023, before the same jurist that oversaw A.H.’s

dependency proceedings.5 At this point in time, A.H. was just shy of her third

birthday.     During the evidentiary proceedings, Custodians testified and

presented four witness: Dr. Beckwith, Dr. Morris, Attorney Maines, and CYS

caseworker Crystal Miller. Represented by counsel, Mother testified on her

own behalf.

       On June 12, 2023, the orphans’ court filed an opinion and order that

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(8) and (b) and set forth its rationale. On July 11, 2023, Mother

submitted a timely notice of appeal along with a concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In lieu

of a Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion, the orphans’ court submitted a letter advising

____________________________________________

4 We note that Custodians have both physical and legal custody of A.H. and
submitted a report of their intention to adopt A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2531. Although no party has challenged Custodians’ standing in this matter,
we note that they appear to be within the class of individuals entitled to pursue
the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2512(a)(3). See In re Adoption of J.F., 572 A.2d 223, 225 (Pa.Super.
1990) (noting that “custody” within the meaning of § 2512(a)(3) “means legal
custody, not merely physical custody” (emphasis omitted)).

5 On September 30, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed counsel to advocate
for A.H.’s legal interests pursuant to the mandates of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).
The child’s best interests were separately represented by a guardian ad litem
(“GAL”). In this Court, Custodians, legal-interest counsel, and GAL, filed a
consolidated brief collectively supporting the order terminating Mother’s
parental rights.

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this Court that it would rely upon the reasoning already set forth in its

thoroughly drafted June 12, 2023 opinion and order.

      Mother raises the following issues for our consideration:

      1.    Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit a
      reversible error of law when it held the statutory grounds for
      involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights had been
      established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) by clear and
      convincing evidence by Custodians?

      2.    Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit a
      reversible error of law when it held that the statutory grounds for
      involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights had been
      established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), by concluding
      that the conditions which initially led to the child’s removal from
      Mother’s care were still in existence?

      3.    Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit
      reversible error of law when it held that terminating Mother’s
      parental rights would best serve the needs of the child?

Mother’s brief at 6 (cleaned up).

      Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

      In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
      appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
      decree of the termination court is supported by competent
      evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
      accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility
      determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
      orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence,
      an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling
      unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

      An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
      reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
      facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
      may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
      of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
      will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial

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      courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
      hearings.

      In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’
      court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make
      decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her
      child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care,
      protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has
      significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and
      child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving
      party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing
      evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and
      convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction,
      without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of

the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon

the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant

termination.    Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11).             If the

orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for

termination under at least one of these subsections by clear and convincing

evidence, the court then assesses the petition pursuant to § 2511(b), which

focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

      Our analysis concerns § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:

      (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

         ....

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         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

      ....

      (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
      efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
      which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
      filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).

      In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the

child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Section 2511(a)(8) does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the

child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa.Super. 2017).

      Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions”

have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and child is imminent

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at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Thus, the statute recognizes “that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance

while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume

parenting responsibilities.    This Court cannot and will not subordinate

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of

progress and hope for the future.”       Id. at 11-12 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Finally, this Court has also explained that,

      while both [§] 2511(a)(8) and [§] 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
      the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
      the analysis relative to [§] 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the
      “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by [§] 2511(b);
      as such, they are distinct in that we must address [§] 2511(a)
      before reaching [§] 2511(b).

In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).

      With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Mother’s

claims for relief. Although framed separately, we discern that Mother’s first

two arguments essentially advance the same claim, namely, that the trial

court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) were not supported by sufficient

evidence.   See Mother’s brief at 9-10 (“The entire testimonial record . . .

demonstrates that the conditions that [led] to the removal of [A.H.] from

Mother’s care were no longer in existence, or alternatively, that Mother was

capable of remedying those conditions[.]”). We must disagree.

      Mother   challenges     the   orphans’   court’s   findings   pursuant   to

§ 2511(a)(8) based upon her perspective that the trial court relied upon

assumptions and speculation concerning her behavior in concluding that the

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conditions that led to A.H.’s removal continued to exist at the time of

termination.6 See Mother’s brief at 13-14. Specifically, Mother focuses upon

L.H.C.’s admission that she lacked direct knowledge of Mother’s condition

following the termination of CYS supervision and oversight in October 2021.

See id. at 13 (citing N.T., 12/22/22, at 176).

       However, Mother’s arguments ignore the significant evidence that

speaks directly to her failure to address the conditions that led to A.H.’s

removal. The orphans’ court determined that “Mother has not refrained from

using illicit substances; she has not refrained from criminal activity; she has

not completed drug and alcohol counseling; and she has not maintained safe

and stable housing.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 14. As discussed,

infra, we find ample support in the certified record for the court’s conclusions.

       This case revolves around Mother’s drug use.         Ms. Miller testified

extensively regarding Mother’s history of substance abuse during CYS’s

involvement with the case. As detailed above, Ms. Miller’s testimony reflects

that Mother used amphetamines and methamphetamines during A.H.’s

pregnancy. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 9-12. Thereafter, Mother continued to

abuse the same drugs with impunity, which ultimately resulted in her being

jailed for ninety days on contempt of court charges. See id. at 12-14. Even

following the completion of inpatient rehabilitation, Mother tested positive for

____________________________________________

6  There is no dispute that A.H. has been removed from Mother’s care for at
least twelve months. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).

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methamphetamines every month between March 2021 and October 2021,

when dependency was terminated by SPLC. See id. at 14-16.

      Although there is scarce direct evidence speaking to Mother’s continued

drug abuse after oversight by CYS ended, that is due largely to Mother’s failure

to submit to drug tests as a component of her visitations with A.H. Moreover,

we find Dr. Beckwith’s assessment of Mother to be instructive on the extent

to which Mother addressed her substance abuse. Specifically, he reported

that during his evaluation, Mother “denied almost all of the allegations of

substance use against her” and characterized the evidence of her drug use as

fabrications manufactured by CYS caseworkers. See id. at 43. Even when

she was willing to acknowledge her drug use on a limited basis, Mother

attempted to shift blame for her misdeeds upon A.H.’s father and her “other

paramours.” See id. at 44. Critically, Dr. Beckwith’s testimony noted that

Mother’s   substance   abuse    problems      would   persist   “until   she   took

accountability for her actions, sought treatment, and maintained sobriety for

a period of one or two years.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 9 (citing

N.T., 12/22/22, at 50).

      It is clear from Mother’s representations at the termination hearing that

she still lacks this necessary ability to take accountability for her actions.

Despite the voluminous evidence directly confirming her drug use up until at

least October 2021, Mother baldly insisted during her testimony that she

ceased abusing drugs in October 2020. See N.T., 2/9/23, at 77, 98. The

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orphans’ court found Mother lacked credibility concerning her alleged sobriety

and we are precluded from disturbing such a credibility determination that is

supported by the record. See M.E., supra at 829-30.

      Similarly, while Mother also claimed that she had completed drug and

alcohol counseling, she failed to provide any documentary proof or specific

information regarding her alleged completion of such a program. See N.T.,

2/9/23, at 101, 118, 126-27. Relatedly, she also failed to curtail her criminal

behavior and has accrued at least eight outstanding cases related to driving

with a suspended license, which carries the threat of incarceration. See id.

at 104-05.    Finally, Mother’s own testimony indicates that her housing

situation has significantly worsened since the close of dependency, as Mother’s

home has been foreclosed upon due to non-payment. See id. at 78, 109.

Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the orphans’ court did not abuse its

discretion in concluding that the conditions that led to A.H.’s removal

continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.

      Mother’s argument also implicates the parties’ failure to reach an

agreement concerning visitations prior to the filing of the underlying

termination petition.   See Mother’s brief at 10 (“Mother asserts that the

evidence introduced at the time of the hearing demonstrates that [Custodians]

were extremely difficult to work with, and unilaterally severed [A.H.’s] contact

with Mother in an effort to aid their adoption efforts.”). While the propriety of

the dependency proceedings is not directly before this Court, our review of

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those proceedings demonstrates that Mother failed to secure visits due to her

own inaction.     Specifically, she neglected to institute timely custody

proceedings or respond to the visitation proposal advanced by Custodians in

May 2022. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 34-45, 55, 98-99.

      As to the effect of the parties’ failure to reach consensus, Mother asserts

that Custodians’ insistence upon drug testing oversight and third-party

supervision created “obstacles” and erected “barriers” that impeded “free

communication and regular association’” between Mother and A.H.             See

Mother’s brief at 16-17 (quoting In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56

(Pa.Super. 2004)). The legal authority that Mother invokes for this proposition

concerns the termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), which

entails an assessment of whether the parent has “evidenced a settled purpose

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or failed to perform parental

duties.”   23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (emphasis added).           As part of that

evaluation, “[w]here a non-custodial parent is facing termination of his or her

parental rights,” Pennsylvania courts consider whether “a custodial parent has

deliberately created obstacles and has by devious means erected barriers

intended to impede free communication and regular association between the

non-custodial parent” and the child. B.N.M., supra at 855-56.

      The orphans’ court found this argument unpersuasive. See Orphans’

Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 8 (“[T]he argument that [Custodians] erected

barriers to prevent Mother from performing parental duties is moot, as

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[Custodians] are not seeking termination under an applicable subsection.”).

We agree with the trial court’s interpretation. We emphasize that involuntary

termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) does not involve consideration of the

parent’s respective ability to perform parental duties or ameliorate the

conditions that led to their child’s removal.        See M.A.B., supra at 446.

Rather, as outlined in our discussion of the primary component of Mother’s

argument, in order to preclude termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) the

record must indicate that the underlying conditions are already fully remedied

such that reunification is “imminent.” See I.J., supra at 11. Thus, Mother’s

assertion that Custodians erected barriers to impede her communication with

A.H. is misplaced.7

       Although Mother has not advanced any arguments related to the third

element of § 2511(a)(8), out of an abundance of caution we will briefly

consider the trial court’s findings with respect to whether termination would

best serve the needs and welfare of A.H.           See J.N.M., supra at 943.   At

bedrock, the trial court found that termination was warranted on this point

due to Mother having consistently “put her needs ahead of those of the

child[.]” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 14. Again, we agree.

____________________________________________

7  Assuming arguendo that In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847 (Pa.Super. 2004) is
pertinent to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), there is no allegation that Custodians’
failure to permit Mother’s visits with A.H. had any impact on her ability to
address the conditions that first led to the child’s removal, i.e., her persistent
substance abuse. Hence, the quarrel over Mother’s visitations with A.H. is not
pertinent to the orphans’ court’s assessment of § 2511(a)(8).

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      As detailed at length above, Mother has demonstrated a consistent

inability to address the problems that led to A.H.’s removal, which is indicative

of her repeated failure to prioritize the needs of her daughter. Moreover, the

testimony and documentation provided by Dr. Morris at the termination

hearing indicates that Mother’s passive attitude also extends to A.H.’s

specialized medical needs. Specifically, Dr. Morris testified that Mother did

not regularly attend A.H.’s medical appointments and, consequently, did not

gain critically important knowledge regarding the upkeep and monitoring of

A.H.’s medical implants. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 71-75, 87-88. Of nine total

medical appointments related to A.H.’s surgical procedure, Dr. Morris averred

that Mother attended just one meeting. See id. at 87-88, 92. Additionally,

Dr. Morris testified that Mother did not independently seek out information,

nor did she independently contact the hospital. See id. at 78.

      By contrast, the record indicates that Custodians have diligently and

aptly shepherded A.H. through her medical hardships. Ms. Miller averred that

A.H. is “flourishing” with Custodians.    See id. at 19.    Dr. Morris similarly

testified that Custodians are attentive with respect to A.H.’s medical needs

and, consequently, that the child is now considered developmentally “above

average.” See id. at 80-81.

      Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that termination would best serve A.H.’s

needs and welfare.      Therefore, we do not disturb the orphans’ court’s

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determination that involuntary termination was warranted pursuant to

§ 2511(a)(8). See J.N.M., supra at 943.

      We now turn to Mother’s arguments pursuant to § 2511(b), which

largely reiterate the arguments implicating § 2511(a)(8). See Mother’s brief

at 19-21 (repeating earlier arguments). Section 2511(b) requires that the

court “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Of note,

we “should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their]

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for

the parent.”   In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023).

Moreover, this determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must

be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each

child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106. Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of

factors that must be considered. Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular facts

of each case determine the factors to be considered, our precedent indicates

that relevant points of inquiry include “intangibles such as love, comfort,

security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267.

      Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation

pursuant to § 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her parent.

See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, the orphans’ court

must render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial

to the child[.]” K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves consideration

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of the effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent. Id. at 1109. In

termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is

the   kind   of   loss   that    would   predictably   cause   ‘extreme   emotional

consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.”         Id. at 1109-10 (quoting

E.M., supra at 484).            Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however,

“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse impact” in the

termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the High Court has cautioned

that Pennsylvania courts must not truncate their analysis and preclude

severance “based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to

the child.” Id. at 1114.

      Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, security, and

stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., supra at 1111

(emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, stated generally, we consider factors

that arise from the facts of each case, such as: (1) the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is bonded

with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs.

Id. at 1113. Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’

factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of

‘primary’ importance in the § 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109.

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      In giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of A.H., the orphans’ court determined that

termination was appropriate. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 18-19

(“[T]ermination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interest of

[A.H.] as Mother has failed to support, nurture, and provide security and

stability for [A.H.] and such termination would not cause the severing of a

beneficial bond as no bond exists.”). We must agree in the orphans’ court’s

assessment.

      We first observe that the certified record does not evince a beneficial

parental bond between Mother and A.H. aside from Mother’s own testimony.

It is well ensconced that, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond

between the parent and the child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”

In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008). Hence, we do not

disturb this aspect of the court’s determination.

      Moreover, assuming arguendo that Mother and A.H. share some manner

of a bond, it is not of such a nature that severance would predictably cause

A.H. “extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm.”

K.T., supra at 1109-10. Plainly, A.H.’s parental bond lies with Custodians,

whose care she has enjoyed for the virtual entirety of her life, from the age of

approximately four months. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 148. By Mother’s own

actions and omissions regarding the proposed visitation agreement concerning

drug testing, Mother has had no contact with A.H. since CYS ended supervision

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in October 2021. During this same time period, by contrast, Custodians have

been attentive to A.H.’s needs and development. In particular, L.H.C. testified

extensively regarding her close bond with A.H. See id. at 146-49.

      Overall, we find the orphans’ court’s summary to be apt: “[Custodians]

have been the people [A.H.] turns to for love and comfort. [Custodians] have

shown that they are reliable and present for the child; where Mother has been

unprepared to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.”       Orphans’ Court

Opinion, 6/12/23, at 18. Phrased differently, considering this matter from the

child’s perspective pursuant to K.T., supra at 105, it is apparent that the bond

between   A.H.   and    Custodians   should   be   preserved   as   serving   the

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of A.H. In contrast,

as we discussed in relation to § 2511(a)(8), the certified record is replete with

examples of how Mother minimized A.H.’s interests in favor of her own, and

it is apparent that Mother is not equipped to attend to her daughter’s needs.

      For all the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the orphans’ court’s needs-and-welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b).

Accordingly, we affirm the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights

to A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

      Order affirmed.

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DATE: 02/09/2024

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