Court Opinion

ID: 9763799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:56:03.412088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:56:41.223047
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that, although the employer in this case filed a modification petition, the employer put Robert Brehm (Claimant) on notice that it was seeking a suspension of benefits; thus, the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) properly affirmed the suspension of Claimant’s benefits by a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ). The majority also holds that the WCAB properly remanded this case to the WCJ for recalculation of Claimant’s average weekly wage. For the reasons that follow, I cannot agree with the majority on these issues. Unlike the majority, I would reverse the WCAB.
I. Modification Petition
Claimant contends that the employer’s modification petition sought only to put Claimant on partial disability status as of January 1, 1996, thereby limiting the employer’s liability to 500 weeks of benefits. A WCJ has authority to grant relief that an employer does not request in a modification petition,1 but only if the employer puts the claimant on notice that it is seeking such relief and the claimant has an opportunity to defend against it. Foyle v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Liquid Carbonic I/M Corp.), 160 Pa.Cmwlth.534, 635 A.2d 687 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993), appeal denied, 538 Pa. 660, 648 A.2d 791 (1994).
Here, the employer alleged in its modification petition that Claimant was no longer entitled to total disability benefits. The employer explained at the first hearing that it filed the petition because it *1086believed that Claimant was working and, therefore, was entitled only to 500 weeks of partial disability benefits. (O.R., 8/29/96 hearing, N.T. at 9-10.) At the final hearing in this case, the employer agreed with the WCJ that the only issue to be decided was whether Claimant had earnings to support the modification of his compensation. (O.R., 3/6/97 hearing, N.T. at 4.) Because Claimant did not have notice that the employer was seeking a suspension and because Claimant did not have an opportunity to defend against a suspension,2 I believe that the WCJ erred in granting a suspension here. The WCJ was empowered only to grant a modification as of January 1, 1996 and to limit the payment of Claimant’s benefits to 500 weeks.
The majority’s contrary position is that the employer “clearly” put Claimant on notice that it was seeking a suspension because “the WCJ” questioned Claimant about having income since his injury. (Majority op. at 1082.) First, I fail to see how the WCJ can put a claimant on notice that an employer is seeking greater relief than the employer requested in its petition. Second, the question that the WCJ asked was precisely the question before the WCJ on the modification petition, i.e., whether Claimant had income after becoming disabled. If Claimant had earnings that did not equal his pre-injury wages, then the employer was entitled to a modification of Claimant’s benefits.
The employer never considered the possibility of a suspension of benefits, or even a modification of Claimant’s benefit rate, because Claimant’s average weekly wage was so high. (See O.R., 8/29/96 hearing, N.T. at 7.) With an average weekly wage of $1,200.00, representing an annual income of $62,400.00 per year, Claimant could have earned almost $30,000.00 per year while disabled, and he still would have been entitled to the maximum benefit rate of $419.00 per week. Consider, for instance, Claimant’s earnings of $28,869.84 in 1994.3 To determine partial disability benefits, we calculate two-thirds of the difference between the employee’s average weekly wage and the earning power of the disabled employee. See section 306(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. § 512. In 1994, the difference between Claimant’s $1,200.00 average weekly wage and his $555.194 per week earning power was $644.81. Two-thirds of that difference is $429.87, which exceeds the maximum benefit rate of $419.00. Thus, the employer did not have sufficient evidence to support even a decrease in Claimant’s benefits. Knowing this, Claimant certainly could not have imagined that the employer was seeking a suspension of benefits.
To justify a suspension of Claimant’s benefits, the employer needed evidence showing that Claimant was earning at least $62,400.00 per year. The employer *1087had no such evidence. Because the math was clear, I am unable to understand the majority’s view that the employer “clearly” put Claimant on notice that it was seeking a suspension. That simply cannot be when the employer had no evidence to justify a suspension. This is a case where the parties could figure out by doing the math whether there could be a suspension, and the employer “clearly” had no basis for seeking a suspension here.
Moreover, the WCJ made no finding of fact to justify a suspension of benefits as of January 1, 1996. The WCJ found only that Claimant’s earnings in 1996 were in excess of $20,000.00. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 16(g), 16(h).) As indicated above, the WCJ had to find that Claimant’s earnings in 1996 were equal to his pre-injury wages of $62,400.00 per year. The WCJ’s indefinite finding that Claimant earned in excess of $20,000.00 does not support a suspension of benefits. The WCJ appears to justify the suspension based on a finding that Claimant violated sections 1102(10) and 1102(11) of the Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1039.2(10) and 1039.2(11), provisions which relate to insurance fraud. However, the Act does not give a WCJ jurisdiction over criminal matters to make findings of criminal wrongdoing and to suspend benefits based thereon.5
Certainly, Claimant could not have anticipated that the majority of this court was going to authorize the suspension of benefits where a claimant does not provide income tax returns in a modification proceeding. In fairness to Claimant, the majority should not retroactively apply its holding, especially when the question before us is whether Claimant was put on notice that there could be a suspension of benefits in this case. Because I believe that Claimant did not have notice that the employer was seeking a suspension of benefits, I would reverse.
II. Review Petition
As for the review petition, the majority affirmed that portion of the WCAB’s order remanding this case for a recalculation of Claimant’s average weekly wage. The WCAB directed that the WCJ should allocate Claimant’s bonus in accordance with Lane Enterprises, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Patton), 537 Pa. 426, 644 A.2d 726 (1994). Given the record and the findings of fact in this case, I do not believe this is legally permissible.
In Lane Enterprises, Inc., our supreme court held that a bonus calculated on the basis of yearly performance must be prorated over the whole year. However, the record before us contains no evidence that Claimant’s bonus was calculated on the basis of yearly performance. Moreover, the WCJ found as a fact that the employer submitted “no evidence” indicating that Claimant’s average weekly wage was anything other than $1,200.00 as of the date of Claimant’s injury. (WCJ’s Findings of Fact, No. 17.) Thus, it would be legally improper for the WCJ to recalculate Claimant’s average weekly wage by allocating Claimant’s bonus over the course of a year.
The majority suggests that the employer should have another chance to meet its burden of proof on the review petition because Claimant was not cooperative in providing evidence about his bonus. (Majority op. at 1084.) However, the WCAB remands for a recalculation of Claimant’s average weekly wage, not for the taking of *1088additional evidence about the bonus. Because the existing record and the findings do not support a recalculation of the average weekly wage by allocating Claimant’s bonus over a year, I would reverse the WCAB’s remand order.

. (See majority op. at 1081 - 1082.)

.During the final seconds of the last hearing, just before the WCJ closed the record, the employer asked permission to amend its modification petition to indicate that Claimant "admitted income from 1991 up until 1996, even though we don't know the full extent of it because they won't cooperate.” (O.R., 3/6/97 hearing, N.T. at 71-72.) The WCJ allowed the amendment over Claimant's objection. Id. Although the amendment lacks clarity, to the extent that the amendment suggests the possibility of a suspension, I point out that, under the circumstances, Claimant had no opportunity to prepare and offer a defense.

. The employer presented no evidence that Claimant ever earned more than this amount in any one year since his injury.

. Claimant's annual earnings of $28,869.87 divided by fifty-two weeks in a year gives a result of $555.19.

. See section 1105(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 1039.5(a) (stating that a person who violates section 1102 is guilty of a felony of the third degree), and section 1109 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 1039.9 (stating that the District Attorney and Attorney General may institute criminal proceedings for a violation of section 1102).