Court Opinion

ID: 9778414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:03:47.570694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.555997
License: Public Domain

DOUGLAS, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority grants relief because counsel represented Alaniz and a co-indictee and that there was a conflict of interest. This was based on a letter written by the co-in-dictee to the district attorney. This letter recited that the marihuana belonged to the co-indictee. The majority overlooks the evidence that the co-indictee had previously made a statement that the marihuana was not his and that it belonged to the petitioner.
A second evidentiary hearing was held on November 29,1977, at which time both petitioner and his original trial attorney testified. Margarito Pina, the co-indictee, was subpoenaed but he was not present.
The record reflects that on November 4, 1972, Officer Thompson stopped a car for running a red light in Monahans. Thompson determined that Pina, the driver, was intoxicated and in the course of his investigation he located a brown paper bag on the passenger’s side of the car. The bag contained marihuana. Thompson then arrested both Pina and petitioner, who was sitting on the passenger side of the car. At this time the co-indictee, Pina, stated that Alan-iz had the bag which contained marihuana when Alaniz got into the car.
Pina and petitioner both retained the same attorney to represent them. Pina has never been brought to trial. Prior to petitioner’s trial, Pina wrote a letter to the district attorney stating that the marihuana was his, that petitioner knew nothing of it and that petitioner should be released. The district attorney gave this letter to the defense attorney. Pina did not testify at petitioner’s trial and the letter was not introduced.
In the instant application, petitioner contends that his attorney’s failure to utilize Pina’s letter denied him the effective assistance of counsel. He argues that his attorney could not exploit the letter because of his dual representation which constituted a conflict of interest.
Where a trial attorney has an actual conflict between his client’s interest and some competing interest, a defendant is denied the effective assistance of counsel. Holloway v, Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). However, representation of multiple defendants by one attorney is not, per se, such an actual conflict. Glasser v. United States, supra; see Pete v. State, 533 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
The test to determine the adequacy of retained counsel is whether there was wilful conduct by counsel, without the defendant’s knowledge, which amounts to a breach of a legal duty. Harrison v. State, 552 S.W.2d 151 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). In Stutes v. State, 530 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.*386App.1975), we applied this test to a situation where it was alleged that retained counsel had a conflict of interest. We held that, where counsel is retained, “ ‘there is no ineffectiveness on such grounds unless the attorney’s representation was fettered or restrained by his commitments to others, and such commitments were unknown to the defendant.’ ” Accord, Harrison v. State, supra. Thus, in order for petitioner to prevail, he must show both an actual conflict and his lack of knowledge of the conflict.
At the November 29, 1977, evidentiary hearing, both petitioner and his attorney testified about petitioner’s knowledge of the possible conflict. The attorney testified that petitioner knew he represented Pina. He then testified:
“Q. Well, then you don’t remember exactly when you first discussed that letter with Mr. Alaniz. Is that correct?
“A. Well, it would be at one of those pretrials.
“Q. At any rate, it was prior to the trial date of 1973.
“A. Yes, sir.

“Q. All right. At any rate, do you recall Mr. Alaniz mentioning or suggesting that you should introduce the letter and you refused to try to introduce the letter, or anything of that nature?
“A. Well, the only way you are going to produce the letter, it looks to me like, is to bring the Defendant.
“Q. So you don’t recall refusing any request he made other than the fact that he wanted to take the stand and you didn’t think he should?
“A. Well, I don’t think he insisted, the best I recall.”
Petitioner testified that he knew his attorney represented Pina, that he was aware of the letter, that he asked his attorney to introduce the letter at the trial and his attorney refused. Despite some differences, the testimony of both petitioner and his attorney indicated that petitioner knew of the dual representation and was fully aware of the letter.
Shortly after his arrest Pina told the police that the brown paper bag belonged to petitioner and that petitioner was carrying it when Pina picked him up in his car. The record also reflects that, while petitioner denied forcing Pina to write the letter, he was present at the time it was prepared. Petitioner’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing includes the following:
“MR. HOLCOMBE: You did say you saw Mr. Pina write this letter and you saw him sign the letter.
“PETITIONER: Yes, sir, and I read it, too.
“THE COURT: You read it before it was taken out of Mr. Pina’s hands?
“PETITIONER: Yeah, because he wanted me to know what he was doing in my favor, in my behalf.”
Also, petitioner’s trial attorney was asked at the evidentiary hearing if he now thought there was a conflict of interest in the case. He responded:
“A. Well, I didn’t at the time because I know a lot of . things that you don’t know and to divulge it would be a violation of the confidence of me and Mr. Alaniz.”
The court then stated that, because of the writ-, petitioner had waived the attorney-client privilege and, if petitioner wanted to pursue the question, he would order the witness to answer. Petitioner declined this invitation. In view of the prior inconsistent statement and the circumstances under which the letter was written, it may well have been the best tactical decision not to attempt to introduce the letter (which was not admissible). In addition, the evidence, left only partially developed by petitioner at the hearing, implies that there may have been other valid reasons why the letter was not offered.
The examination of the record of the original trial shows that petitioner was present in the car with a bag of marihuana next to his feet. Counsel timely filed a motion to suppress the marihuana and se*387cured a hearing on his motion. After this issue was decided adversely, petitioner went to trial on the theory that he did not know what was in the bag. Counsel carefully questioned the jury on the voir dire examination and actively cross-examined the State’s witnesses and called one defense witness in order to develop his theory. The record reflects that petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel..
The relief requested should be denied.