Court Opinion

ID: 9958802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 21:00:35.528965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:41.550723
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4531

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        NARKEVIA LEWIS,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:20-cr-00074-TSK-MJA-24)

        Submitted: February 26, 2024                                       Decided: April 8, 2024

        Before HARRIS and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: David Schles, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld,
        United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, Zelda E. Wesley, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Narkevia Lewis pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the maintaining of a premises

        for storing and distributing controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2)

        and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court sentenced Lewis to 151 months of imprisonment, the

        bottom of her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Lewis appeals, arguing that her

        sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

               “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

        abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,

        or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212

        (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41

        (2007)).   In performing that review, we first “evaluate procedural reasonableness,

        determining whether the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly

        calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to

        adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212. If “the district court has

        not committed procedural error,” we then assess the substantive reasonableness of the

        sentence. Id.

               Lewis first contends that the district court erred in declining to find that her base

        offense level should be capped at 26.            See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

        §§ 2D1.8(a)(2) (2023). Under the Guidelines, the base offense level for a defendant

        convicted of violating § 856(a) shall not exceed 26 if “the defendant had no participation

        in the underlying controlled substance offense other than allowing the use of the premises.”

        Id. The Guidelines, however, clarify that § 2D1.8 does “not apply to . . . a defendant who

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        allowed the use of more than one premises.” USSG § 2D1.8 cmt. n.1. The district court

        correctly found that Lewis allowed the use of multiple apartments and a storage unit rented

        under her name for the storage and distribution of controlled substances, and moreover,

        that her involvement was not limited to maintaining those premises. Accordingly, the

        district court did not clearly err in denying the application of USSG § 2D1.8(a)(2). See

        United States v. Lynn, 912 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We review the factual findings

        underlying a district court’s application of [the] Guidelines for clear error and the court’s

        legal conclusions de novo.”); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009)

        (explaining that district court’s credibility determinations at sentencing are entitled to great

        deference).

               Lewis also argues that the district court erred in denying her a mitigating role

        reduction pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2. Lewis contends that the district court failed to

        address the factors in USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) or her argument that she was less culpable

        than the average participant of the conspiracy. A defendant should only receive a minor

        role adjustment when the defendant is “substantially less culpable than the average

        participant in the criminal activity.” USSG § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (discussing factors courts

        consider in determining whether the totality of the circumstances supports the reduction).

        Notably, “[a] defendant seeking a downward adjustment for [her] minor role in a criminal

        offense bears the burden of proving by preponderance of the evidence that [she] is entitled

        to such adjustment.” United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049, 1058 (4th Cir. 1993). Here, the

        court rejected Lewis’ assertion that she was less culpable than many of the members of the

        conspiracy, as she provided an indispensable service of providing places to store and divide

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        up the drugs for distribution, had been previously caught transporting a large amount of

        drugs across state lines, and was surveilled driving a coconspirator to a drug transaction.

        Accordingly, we are satisfied that the district court did not clearly err in denying Lewis the

        application of a mitigating role reduction.

               Lewis next argues that the district court failed to sufficiently address her arguments

        for a downward variance or explain its reasoning for denying it. “When rendering a

        sentence, the district court must place on the record an individualized assessment based on

        the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v. Mitchell, 78 F.4th 661, 667

        (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the court must “explain

        adequately the sentence imposed to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote

        the perception of fair sentencing.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation should provide some

        indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors” and “considered [the]

        defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a lower sentence.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 212-13

        (cleaned up). However, “in a routine case, where the district court imposes a within-

        Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate or lengthy.” United States v.

        Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 174-75 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The district court stated its factual findings as they applied to the § 3553(a) factors,

        including Lewis’ history and characteristics and the seriousness of the offense, reiterated

        the sentencing goals, and explained how the sentence met those goals.               The court

        meaningfully considered and addressed Lewis’ mitigation arguments and explained why it

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        rejected her arguments for a variant sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that Lewis’

        sentence is procedurally reasonable.

               Finally, Lewis challenges the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. “When

        considering the substantive reasonableness of a prison term, we examine the totality of the

        circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that

        the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3353(a).” Arbaugh, 951 F.3d

        at 176 (cleaned up). “Any sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines

        range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption can only be

        rebutted by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against

        the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (citation omitted). Here, the district court determined that a within-Guidelines-range

        sentence was appropriate given the relevant drug weight, the seriousness of the offense

        conduct, and the lack of mitigating circumstances in Lewis’ personal history. Based on the

        factors identified by the district court, we conclude that Lewis has failed to rebut the

        presumption of substantive reasonableness afforded to her within-Guidelines sentence.

               Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

        this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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