Court Opinion

ID: 9949904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-12 19:18:07.58148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:34:17.779501
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ROOSEVELT SCARBOROUGH                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 620 EDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-CR-0009059-2018

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                               FILED MARCH 12, 2024

       Roosevelt Scarborough (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury convicted him of one count each of involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse with a child, aggravated indecent assault of a

person less than 13 years old, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of a

minor, and endangering the welfare of a child.1 We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the facts presented at trial:

              In 2014, [Complainant] was nine years old and living in a
       house … in Philadelphia with her mother [(Mother)], her younger
       siblings, and [Appellant], who at the time was approximately 25
       years old and was the boyfriend of [M]other. [M]other and
       [Appellant] also had their own child together [(Appellant’s child)].

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A.        §§    3123(b),     3125(a)(7),   6318(a)(1),   6301(a)(1)(ii),
4304(a)(1).
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     [Complainant] sometimes shared a room with [Appellant’s child],
     who was still a baby at that time.

           [Complainant] considered [Appellant] to be a father figure,
     given that he had been present in her life for most of her
     childhood. When [M]other was at work, there were times when
     [Appellant] would be at home with [Complainant] and would be
     the only adult watching her and the other children. …

           During a time in 2014 when [Appellant] was alone with
     [Complainant] in the basement of the home, [Appellant] told
     [Complainant] that he had to ask her something but did not want
     to ask because he was afraid that [Complainant] would tell her
     [M]other. On a later date, [Appellant] asked [Complainant] if he
     could lick [Complainant]’s vagina. The following night, [Appellant]
     entered a bedroom where [Complainant] and [Appellant’s child]
     were sharing a bed and sleeping. The bed was pushed up against
     a wall, with [Appellant’s child] sleeping closer to the wall and
     [Complainant] sleeping on the outside edge towards the middle of
     the room. [Complainant] woke up to [Appellant] pulling down her
     underwear and saying that [Complainant] “might as well just let
     it happen.” [Appellant] proceeded to use his fingers to touch
     [Complainant]’s vagina and then began to lick and penetrate her
     vagina with his tongue. Eventually, [Appellant] stopped and,
     while walking out of the room, told [Complainant] that the cellular
     service on her cellphone, which had been turned off for some time,
     would be turned back on in the morning.

            The next morning, the cellular service on [Complainant]’s
     cellphone began working.          After the night of the assault,
     [Appellant] also took [Complainant] out to go shopping together
     for items that she had wanted, something which had not happened
     before. [Complainant] also noticed that [Appellant] had become
     less strict with her after the night of the assault.

           In approximately the fall of 2015, [Complainant] and her
     family, together with [Appellant], moved … to the home of
     [Complainant]’s grandfather … in Philadelphia. A number of other
     family members lived there as well. In that home, [Complainant]
     generally slept in the living room together with her siblings.

           One evening, while [Complainant] was sleeping on a pull-
     out sofa in the living room[,] together with [Appellant’s child,] …
     [Complainant] woke up as [Appellant] was pulling down her
     clothes. Her siblings were all asleep in different places in the living

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      room at that time. After pulling down [Complainant]’s clothes,
      [Appellant] again began to touch and lick [Complainant]’s vagina.
      [Appellant] finally stopped when one of [Complainant]’s brothers
      moved and appeared to be waking up. [Appellant] then left the
      living room and went into his bedroom.

            On a separate occasion, [Appellant] asked [Complainant] if
      she wanted to watch him shower. On a later date, [Complainant]
      discovered that [Appellant] had used his cellphone to attempt to
      record [Complainant] while she was in the bathroom taking a
      shower. [Complainant] noticed [Appellant]’s cellphone in the
      bathroom as she was undressing and getting ready to enter the
      bathtub. After seeing that the cellphone was recording video, she
      deleted the video. When [Appellant] realized that [Complainant]
      had discovered the cellphone, [Appellant] told [Complainant] that
      he was sorry.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

      The trial court also summarized the events occurring after the

abuse ended:

            At some point after the assaults on [Complainant],
      [Appellant] told [Complainant] that if [Complainant] were to tell
      her [M]other about what he had done to [Complainant],
      [Appellant] would have to go away and would no longer be able
      to be together with [Appellant’s child]…. Because [Complainant]
      had never had a father in her life, [Complainant] did not want to
      see [Appellant’s child] go through the same experience of not
      having a father.

            Approximately a year after the family moved to
      [Complainant’s grandfather’s house], the relationship between
      [Appellant] and [M]other ended, and [Appellant] moved out of the
      house. After that, [Complainant] saw [Appellant] infrequently,
      such as when [Appellant] came to visit [Appellant’s child]. There
      were no further incidents of abuse against [Complainant]. In
      December 2016, after a physical altercation between [Appellant]
      and [M]other, [M]other petitioned for and received a protection
      from abuse order against [Appellant].

           In the spring of 2018, [Complainant] disclosed the sexual
      abuse by [Appellant] to her best friend and then to [M]other. After
      [Complainant] told her about the abuse, [M]other confronted

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      [Appellant] on May 14, 2018, via text messages on her cellphone.
      In messages back to [M]other, [Appellant] repeatedly
      acknowledged that he had sexually abused [Complainant] and
      repeatedly expressed regret for what he had done. In one
      message, [M]other told [Appellant] that [Complainant] said that
      [Appellant] “gave her oral twice or something and [Appellant]
      liked her.” When [M]other asked [Appellant] “what was going
      through [his] head,” [Appellant] responded in a lengthy message
      that he “really [didn’t] know,” that he was “goin thru a lot
      mentally,” that he was “beyond wrong,” that “the guilt was eating
      at [him],” and that he had told [Complainant] that he was sorry.
      [Appellant] further stated in the message that he “[w]anted it to
      come out along [sic] time ago but [Complainant] didn’t wanna
      tell,” that he knew he had hurt [Complainant], that he wished he
      could “take it back,” and that he had “done the worst thing.”

Id. at 4-5 (record citations omitted).

      On January 4, 2019, the Commonwealth charged Appellant in a twenty-

one count information. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth withdrew all but the

five counts described above. A jury trial held in May 2022 resulted in a hung

jury. On September 29, 2022, following a retrial, a jury convicted Appellant

of all five remaining counts.

      On December 16, 2022, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence

of 16 to 32 years in prison, followed by four years of probation. Appellant’s

convictions also rendered him a Tier III offender under the Sexual Offender

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), subjecting him to lifetime

registration and reporting requirements. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 et seq.

      Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions on December 26, 2022,

and February 6, 2023.     Appellant claimed, inter alia, that the verdict was

against the weight of the evidence; the trial court improperly admitted text

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messages between Mother and Appellant into evidence; and the court

improperly allowed the jury to view the text messages during deliberations.

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions.    Appellant timely

appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following issues for review:

            I. Did the trial court err in overruling an authentication
      objection to the admission of purported text message screenshots
      where the proponent of the text messages had destroyed both the
      text messages themselves and the phone on which they were
      received, and where the law enforcement officers involved took
      no steps to corroborate the authenticity of the messages by
      attempting to preserve any of the phones involved, forensically
      examine them, or obtain proof that the messages were real or
      that the messages were even sent from the phone company?

            II. [Did the trial court err] in showing the purported text
      message screenshots to the jury during deliberations in violation
      of Pa.R.Crim.P. 646 and the coordinate jurisdiction rule[,] given
      that the messages, if real, amounted to a confession by
      [Appellant] and a prior judge had already ruled at the previous
      trial that the jury could not see the messages during
      deliberations?

            III. Should the trial court have granted a new trial because
      the verdict was against the weight of the evidence[,] where the
      only evidence was the inconsistent, nearly impossible-to-believe
      testimony of the [C]omplainant and effectively unauthenticated
      text message evidence offered by the [C]omplainant’s mother,
      who had destroyed the original text messages and phone
      involved?

Appellant’s Brief at 9-10.

      In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court improperly admitted

into evidence purported screenshots of text messages between Mother and

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Appellant. Id. at 24-30. He maintains Mother’s testimony was insufficient to

authenticate the screenshots, asserting Mother

      destroyed the original messages and the phone on which they
      were supposedly received, and the police, despite having access
      to the phone, did not conduct any independent investigation,
      forensic examination, or make any attempt to subpoena records
      from the phone company.

Id. at 21. He maintains the police’s failure to perform a forensic examination

of Mother’s phone or Appellant’s phone, or to obtain records from the phone

company,      rendered     the    authentication     insufficient   under       Rule

901(b)(11)(B)(ii). Id. at 28-30.

      The Commonwealth counters that the screenshots were properly

authenticated by testimony from Mother and Detective Toni Madgey.

Commonwealth Brief at 11-12.

      Under our standard of review,

      [t]he admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court
      and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting
      prejudice, constitutes reversible error. An abuse of discretion
      occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
      exercised was either manifestly unreasonable or the product of
      partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.

Commonwealth v. Bowens, 265 A.3d 730, 746 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901 requires that, “to satisfy the

requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the

proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item

is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E. 901(a). Rule 901(b) provides a

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non-exhaustive list of “examples … of evidence that satisfies the requirement”

of Rule 901(a), including:

      (1) Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an
      item is what it is claimed to be.

      ….

      (4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance,
      contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
      characteristics of the item, taken together with all the
      circumstances.

      ….

      (11) Digital Evidence. To connect digital evidence with a person
      or entity:

            (A) direct evidence such as testimony of a person with
            knowledge; or

            (B) circumstantial evidence, such as:

                  (i) identifying content;

                  (ii) proof of ownership, possession, control, or access
                  to a device or account at the relevant time when
                  corroborated by circumstances indicating authorship.

Pa.R.E. 901(b).

      “The proponent of digital evidence is not required to prove that no one

else could be the author.    Rather, the proponent must produce sufficient

evidence to support a finding that a particular person or entity was the

author.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 292 A.3d 601, 605-06 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(quoting Pa.R.E. 901, cmt.). Circumstantial evidence indicating authorship

“includes, for example, testimony from the person who sent or received the

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communication or contextual clues in the communication tending to reveal the

identity of the sender.” Id. at 606.

      The trial court described the evidence by which the Commonwealth

authenticated the screenshots:

      Prior to their admission, [M]other testified that she communicated
      with [Appellant] via a single telephone number that she knew
      belonged to him. She had telephone calls with [Appellant] using
      that telephone number. She recognized [Appellant]’s voice during
      her calls with [Appellant] on that telephone number. She also
      regularly used that telephone number to communicate with
      [Appellant] via text messages on a variety of subjects, including
      with respect to [Appellant’s child] and to make plans together.
      For example, [M]other testified that she would text [Appellant]
      using that number about bringing something for [Appellant’s
      child], and then he would appear later with the item for his [child].
      [M]other took screenshots of the text messages on May 14,
      2018[,] that were exchanged between her and [Appellant] on that
      number, identified at trial as Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2. The
      screenshots show the messages from [Appellant]’s cellphone as
      coming from “Bam,” a nickname for [Appellant] used by [M]other.
      [M]other saved contact information for [Appellant] in her
      cellphone under the name “Bam.” After reviewing the text
      messages contained in Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-2, [M]other
      testified that the exhibit contained a fair and accurate depiction of
      the text message conversation that she had with [Appellant] on
      May 14, 2018.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 13-14 (record citations omitted). The trial

court also noted, “Detective Toni Madgey testified that she personally called

the telephone number displayed on the screenshots of the text messages

provided by [M]other, and that the person who answered the call identified

himself as [Appellant].” Id. at 12 (record citation omitted). On the basis of

this evidence, the trial court determined the Commonwealth “met its burden

of authenticating the screenshots.” Id. at 14.

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     Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa.

Super. 2018), in which we upheld the trial court’s exclusion of certain

Facebook screenshots from evidence. There, we observed that

     social media records and communications can be properly
     authenticated within the existing framework of Pa.R.E. 901 and
     Pennsylvania case law, similar to the manner in which text
     messages and instant messages can be authenticated. Initially,
     authentication [of] social media evidence is to be evaluated on a
     case-by-case basis to determine whether or not there has been
     an adequate foundational showing of its relevance and
     authenticity. Additionally, the proponent of social media evidence
     must present direct or circumstantial evidence that tends to
     corroborate the identity of the author of the communication in
     question, such as testimony from the person who sent or received
     the communication, or contextual clues in the communication
     tending to reveal the identity of the sender.

Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1162 (citations omitted).

     In Mangel, the Commonwealth failed to present testimony by a person

with direct knowledge that the defendant used the Facebook account in

question. Id. at 1164. The Commonwealth relied solely on the testimony of

a detective, who had looked up the account online. Id. at 1156-57. However,

the detective admitted she could not say with certainty that the defendant

sent the messages depicted in the screenshots. Id. at 1157. The defendant

introduced evidence that a Facebook search revealed five different accounts

under the same name as defendant.       Id.   This evidence contradicted the

detective’s testimony that there was only one account under that name. Id.

at 1163. Under those circumstances, we discerned no abuse of the trial court’s

discretion in excluding the screenshots. Id. at 1164.

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       Our review discloses the instant case is distinguishable from Mangel.

Here, the Commonwealth authenticated the evidence through the testimony

of Mother. Mother had direct knowledge of Appellant’s authorship of the text

messages through her extensive past communications with him using the

same phone number.        See N.T., 9/28/22, at 126-30.     The content of the

messages further points to Appellant as the sender, as he was in a unique

position to possess knowledge of their subject matter. See Commonwealth

v. Orr, 255 A.3d 589, 601 (Pa. Super. 2021) (affirming authentication of text

messages where their subject matter indicated defendant wrote them).

Additionally, Detective Madgey testified that she called the number in question

and the person who answered the phone identified himself as Appellant. N.T.,

9/28/22, at 197-98.

      We conclude this evidence was sufficient to authenticate the screenshots

under Rule 901(b)(11). We further agree with the trial court that the evidence

satisfied the requirements for authentication under Rule 901(b)(1) and (b)(4).

See Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 13-14. We discern no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s admission of the screenshots. Accordingly, Appellant’s first

issue merits no relief. See Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 60 (Pa.

Super. 2020), aff’d, 265 A.3d 485 (Pa. 2021) (text message screenshots

properly authenticated by direct and circumstantial evidence without need for

original digital data).

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      In his second issue, Appellant argues the trial court improperly allowed

the jury to view the text messages during deliberations, in violation of both

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(C)(2) and the coordinate jurisdiction rule. See Appellant’s

Brief at 30-40.

      The trial court explained that,

      after beginning its deliberations, the jury requested an
      opportunity to examine the text messages between [Appellant]
      and [M]other. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the text
      messages constituted a confession and should neither be sent to
      the jury room nor shown to the jury. After hearing argument from
      both defense counsel and the Commonwealth, the [trial c]ourt
      decided against permitting the text messages to be sent into the
      jury room. Instead, the [trial c]ourt brought the jury into the
      courtroom and showed the screenshots of the text messages to
      the jury on a screen with the parties present.            After the
      screenshots were displayed on the screen for the jury in the
      courtroom, the [trial c]ourt cautioned the jury “not to give undue
      weight to just [the screenshots].” The [trial c]ourt further
      instructed the jury “to consider all of the evidence presented
      during the trial by both the Commonwealth and [Appellant] and
      your recollection of that evidence.” The [trial c]ourt then sent the
      jury back into the jury room to continue deliberating.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 15 (record citations omitted).

      We review a trial court’s decision as to whether a jury may review

materials during deliberations for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v.

Williams, 959 A.2d 1272, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2008).

      Pa.R.Crim.P. 646 provides, in relevant part:

      (A) Upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the
      trial judge deems proper, except as provided in paragraph (C).

      ….

      (C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:

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       ….

              (2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession
              by the defendant….

Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A), (C)(2).

       In Commonwealth v. Morton, 774 A.2d 750 (Pa. Super. 2001), we

held “that the overriding concern” of the rule’s “prohibition against written

confessions going out with the jury is that the physical presence of the

confession within the jury room may cause it to be emphasized over other

evidence in the form of testimony heard from the witness stand.” 2 Id. at 753

(emphasis added). However, in Morton, the confession “was never physically

in the jury room during deliberations.” Id. When the jury asked to see the

defendant’s written confession during deliberations, the trial court

       specifically refused to allow the written confession to go out with
       the jury. Instead, the jurors were called back into the jury box
       and then permitted to review the statement briefly while they
       remained in the jury box. They were not permitted to deliberate
       while in the jury box reviewing the confession…. Finally, the trial
       court specifically instructed the jurors that the confession was just
       one piece of evidence, they were not to give undue weight to it,
       and they were to consider all of the evidence presented during
       trial by both the Commonwealth and the defendant.

Id.   We concluded that “[t]he procedure employed by the trial court was

correct and analogous to re-reading a portion of the transcript to the jury.

This action is permitted within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.

____________________________________________

2 Morton involved Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114, the predecessor of the current
Pa.R.Crim.P. 646, which featured identical language pertaining to confessions.
See Morton, 774 A.2d at 753 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 1114).

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       In the instant case, the jury was never permitted to take the text

message screenshots into the jury room. The jury reviewed the screenshots

only in the courtroom, with the parties present.        Moreover, the trial court

appropriately instructed the jury not to give the screenshots undue weight,

but to consider all the evidence.          As in Morton, the procedure here was

analogous to re-reading a portion of the transcript to the jury. We conclude

the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to review the screenshots in this

manner did not violate Rule 646.

       Appellant argues in the alternative that the trial court’s decision violated

the coordinate jurisdiction rule. See Appellant’s Brief at 35-40. Appellant

asserts the trial court was bound by a ruling made during Appellant’s first jury

trial, by a different presiding judge, which prohibited review of the screenshots

during deliberations. Id.

       “Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer

of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial

judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a

transferor trial judge.” Zane v. Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d 25, 29 (Pa. 2003).3

“[I]t is not evident that the doctrine applies” in the context of a retrial,

____________________________________________

3 As application of the coordinate jurisdiction rule is a question of law, our
standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Zane v.
Friends Hosp., 836 A.2d at 30 n.8.

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“[b]ecause the grant of a new trial wipes the slate clean….” Commonwealth

v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 311 (Pa. 2002).

        When a court grants a new trial, the necessary effect thereof is to
        set aside the prior judgment and leave the case as though no trial
        had been held…. By the operation of an order granting a new trial,
        the cause, in contemplation of law, is precisely in the same
        condition as if no previous trial had been held.

Commonwealth v. Hart, 387 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1978) (citation and

quotation marks omitted).        As “[e]ach trial court has an independent

obligation to assure a just proceeding,” application of the coordinate

jurisdiction rule to evidentiary decisions “would deprive a trial court of

discretion it needs to execute its duty and to conduct a fair trial.” Id.

        Appellant argues the instant case is analogous to the situation presented

in Commonwealth v. Henderson, 520 A.2d. 1371 (Pa. 1987).                There, a

suppression court denied the defendant’s pre-trial suppression motion. Id. at

1372.     A trial resulted in a hung jury and, prior to retrial, the defendant

requested a new suppression hearing.        Id. Our Supreme Court held that,

where the defendant alleged no new evidence in support of his request, the

trial court correctly barred re-litigation of the suppression ruling under the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. at 1373.

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       Appellant’s reliance on Henderson is misplaced. The Henderson Court

distinguished Hart: “It is beyond peradventure that a pre-trial suppression

hearing is not part of the trial.” Id. (emphasis added).4

       Instantly, the trial court’s decision to allow the jury to review certain

evidence during deliberations is part of the trial. Thus, the trial court did not

err when it determined the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not bar the jury

from reviewing the screenshots during deliberations. See Trial Court Opinion,

5/19/23, at 16-17. Accordingly, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

       In his third issue, Appellant argues the verdict was against the weight

of the evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 41-45.

       Our standard of review of a weight claim is well settled:

       The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
       of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
       and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
       not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
       must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
       credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
       determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
       clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
       weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview
       is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court
       abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock
       its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists
       of a review of the trial court’s exercise of discretion, not a review
____________________________________________

4 The coordinate jurisdiction rule is “based on a policy of fostering the finality

of pre-trial [decisions] in an effort to maintain judicial economy and
efficiency.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995)
(emphasis added). “The core of the doctrine is that a court acting at a later
stage of a case should not reopen questions decided at an earlier stage by
another judge of the same court or by a higher court.” Paddy, 800 A.2d at
311.

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      of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
      weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 580 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citing

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)). When

a weight challenge “is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony,

[appellate] review of the trial court’s decision is extremely limited. Generally,

unless the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any

verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not

cognizable on appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Bowen, 55 A.3d 1254,

1262 (Pa. Super. 2012).       Conflicts in the evidence or contradictions in

testimony are exclusively for the fact-finder to resolve. Commonwealth v.

Sanders, 42 A.3d 325, 331 (Pa. Super. 2012). “Because the trial judge has

had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence presented, an appellate

court will give the gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced

by the trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination [as to whether]

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Id.

      Without   citing   to   the   record,   Appellant   argues   Complainant

inconsistently testified about the number of incidents and the dates of the

incidents. Appellant’s Brief at 42-43. He emphasizes the “extreme delay” in

Complainant’s reporting the abuse.      Id. at 43.    Appellant also makes an

undeveloped argument that Complainant and Mother had “a motive to

fabricate involving a protection from abuse order and the need for housing.”

Id. He further asserts “it is impossible to believe” that the assaults could have

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occurred with other people in the room (albeit asleep) without them seeing

something. Id. As to Mother’s testimony, Appellant rehashes his complaints

about Mother’s and the police’s failure to preserve the original text message

data. Id. at 44.

       Here, the trial court addressed the alleged inconsistencies in the

witnesses’ testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 5/19/23, at 10-12. In particular,

the trial court correctly observed, “[t]he testimony of a sexual assault victim

standing alone is sufficient weight to support a conviction.” Id. at 10 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Strutt, 624 A.2d 162, 164 (Pa. Super. 1993)). The trial

court found Complainant “testified credibly” and “provid[ed] compelling

evidence of [Appellant’s] crimes.” Id. The trial court found Appellant’s own

testimony “lacking in credibility based on [his] demeanor and the substance

of his testimony.”5 Id. at 10 n.3.

       The trial court’s reasoning is supported by the record. We discern no

abuse of discretion in its denial of Appellant’s weight claim.     Accordingly,

Appellant’s final issue merits no relief.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

5 Appellant testified that he never assaulted Complainant and did not send the

May 14, 2018, text messages to Mother. See Appellant’s Brief at 19.

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J-S02029-24

Date: 3/12/2024

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