Court Opinion

ID: 9664291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:12:28.147609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:04.464585
License: Public Domain

HAROLD L. LOWENSTEIN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully file this dissent, and would affirm the judgment.
The majority expresses concern about inclusion of additional facts being presented in the dissent. The following facts, and the reasonable inferences arising from those facts, are now presented for the following two purposes: (1) To establish a frame of reference for the evidentiary issue in dispute, and (2) To provide context for the rest of the points raised in this appeal since the facts are relevant and necessary to support an affirmance of the judgment.
*119Additional facts of matters admitted in evidence and favorable to the jury’s verdict are as follows: On the evening in question, the deceased, Ashli O’Dell, drove Dalton Howell and Dale Carriker to Bybee’s house. Ashli moved over to let Bybee (who brought four beers) drive. Bybee drove to a grocery store where someone bought beer for the teenagers. After more driving around, they again went to the same store and met Nathan Grice and Glen Roe. Dale left and Nathan Grice joined Bybee, who was still driving, Ashli and Dalton. The group decided to go to Jonathan Marshall’s house to get more beer, and with Bybee still at the wheel, left for the Marshall house located in the country. While en route on a county road, Grice called Jonathan to say they were on their way and that Bybee was driving at about 120 miles per hour. Shortly thereafter, Marshall heard a “clankin” sound and the phone went dead. The wrecked car was found a short time later by Marshall and Roe. It was uncontroverted that Dalton Howell had been in the back seat with his girlfriend, Ashli. Shortly after arriving at the scene, Corporal Bush asked Grice who had been driving. Grice answered that Bybee had been the driver. Bybee then said no, he had not been driving. Grice then said he could not remember who was driving, but that he had been in the front passenger seat. After Corporal Wilde arrived, Grice told him that he had been in the front seat and could not remember who was driving. Two days later Grice said Bybee had been driving. Grice later changed his story to saying he was a front seat passenger but could not remember who was driving.
When the State sought introduction of the police report into evidence, Bybee’s counsel objected saying that he did not have “an objection to the report per se ” but to “the hearsay statements in the report, the same as like in medical records, et cetera.” The objection was overruled, and counsel then argued the report frequently referred to Bybee as the driver; placed each of the four persons in specific seats; implicated alcohol as a contributing factor; referred to the speed limit; and referred to restrictions on Bybee’s driver’s license. The trial court overruled this objection stating the parties had stipulated that Sergeant Brown was an expert in accident reconstruction and was entitled to an opinion on ultimate facts.
Edgell v. Leighty, 825 S.W.2d 325, 328-29 (Mo.App.1992), is not a textbook example of how to apply the facts of the case at bar to the trial judge’s decision to allow the expert to render an opinion. The pivotal issue in Edgell was whether the plaintiff driver had his turn signal on or whether he made an improper turn. The court determined that hearsay statements of witnesses could not be relied upon by the expert to determine the yes or no answer to that question. In the case at bar, the expert could reasonably infer one of the four people in the car had been the driver. It would seem that an expert in reconstruction could reasonably rely on statements of the three survivors that O’Dell and Dalton were in the back seat at the time of the accident. Grice said several times that Bybee was the driver, and his last rendition was that he, Grice, had been a front seat passenger, but did not know who was driving. Bybee said he was not driving. These facts on which Brown relied, statements given to investigating officers, are of the type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field in forming an opinion as to the subject of who was driving the car. See. § 490.065.3.
This is certainly not the first case where more than one person is in a one-car accident. If an accident expert, subject to cross-examination, whether in law enforcement or a civilian, could not render an *120opinion where none of the occupants admitted to being the driver, then the law would be in a sorry state. “While it is true that expert witnesses may not testify regarding the credibility of witnesses, it is permissible for expert witnesses to testify to specific facts that may discredit the testimony of another witness. State v. Link, 25 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Mo.2000). “An expert does not improperly comment on credibility simply because his or her testimony, if accepted, may cause the jury to conclude that a witness is not credible.” Messina v. Prather, 42 S.W.3d 753, 764 (Mo.App.2001). In Messina, this court held that a police officer witness and accident reconstruction expert did not improperly comment on witness credibility by providing testimony that, if believed, would discredit one of the parties. Id. The trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion by allowing the report into evidence.
The additional points of error raised by Bybee do not warrant reversal.
His first point on appeal asserting that the Report, an exhibit, constituted an improper jury instruction is without merit, and was not preserved. His next point that the Report constituted improper bolstering is without merit and also is not preserved. In a similar vein, his next point that it was error to allow the jury’s request to view the Report is not error. His next two points as to Rule 25.03 discovery violations and a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) violation do not require a reversal. The next point, submitted on plain error review, that Jonathan’s testimony as to his telephone conversation with Nathan, just before the accident, constituted improper hearsay, should be denied. The point as to insufficient evidence to find him the driver and warranting a discharge is meritless. His last points that the punishment was excessive and the denial of probation was an abuse of discretion do not merit relief.
Bybee and Grice were the only two who could have been driving. Highway Patrol Trooper Brown was stipulated as an expert, and was qualified and entitled to determine who was driving. To now proclaim Brown was not qualified to make such a decision based on the circumstantial evidence and the statements taken by him from the three remaining persons in the car, leaves the matter of who was the driver in equipoise. Section 490.065.3, RSMo 2000 addresses this situation. The accident scene investigation conducted here by a veteran law enforcement officer, revealed facts and data of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field and supported his opinion that Bybee was the driver.