Court Opinion

ID: 9741429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:55:37.679431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:24.044956
License: Public Domain

G. R. Deneweth, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in holding plaintiff to be the prevailing party and concur that a remand is necessary to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fee award, but find myself unable to agree that 42 USC 1983 preempts the mediation rule.
I believe that the majority has misjudged the interplay of the federal remedy sought in state court and that state court’s procedural rules.
Congress, in its infinite wisdon, has chosen to grant federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction over deprivation of civil rights claims pursu*410ant to 42 USC 1983. Congress must be presumed to know that the state courts employ differing procedural rules which could well effect the remedy in a 42 USC 1983 action. Nonetheless, concurrent jurisdiction was allowed without any express intent to preempt local procedure and without an exhibition of any purpose to exercise Congress’s paramount authority over the subject of attorney fees. 42 USC 1988 simply states in relevant part:
"[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party * * * a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
The interplay of state procedural laws which operate in state court suits to enforce federal claims has been addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Dickinson v Stiles, 246 US 631; 38 S Ct 415; 62 L Ed 908 (1918), and Missouri, K & T R Co of Texas v Harris, 234 US 412; 34 S Ct 790; 58 L Ed 1377 (1914). Both cases involved claims brought in state courts where concurrent jurisdiction existed. They may be summarized as holding that state procedural law may operate in state court suits to enforce federal rights where state law does not erect artificial barriers to the use of the federal courts. 1 Derfner & Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, § 14.03, p 14-15.
The mediation rule in question raises no barrier to the use of the federal courts. Plaintiff elected to bring his action in state court to enforce a federal right. This was purely a voluntary and personal decision perhaps based on strategic reasons. He could have pursued his remedy in federal court and no question of mediation sanctions would have arisen. Having chosen to bring his action in state court, with its attendant procedural advantages and/or limitations, plaintiff cannot now complain that the mediation rule should not apply to him.
*411I would hold that the mediation rule is not "preempted” and that any award under it should offset an award to plaintiff under 42 USC 1983.