Court Opinion

ID: 9374858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 15:05:44.786031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.565931
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2022-CA-0336-MR

HENRY VOLENTINE,
INDIVIDUALLY; HARDIN COUNTY
OFFICE OF SHERIFF; AND HENRY
VOLENTINE, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CAPACITY AS HARDIN COUNTY
DEPUTY SHERIFF                                                  APPELLANTS

                 APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 16-CI-01433

SUSAN SHEEHY AND MAURICE
GREEN                                                             APPELLEES

                                  OPINION
                                 REVERSING

                                ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; DIXON AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Henry Volentine, individually and in his official capacity as a

Hardin County Deputy Sheriff, and the Hardin County Office of Sheriff (HCOS)

appeal from the order denying them immunity entered by the Hardin Circuit Court
on February 28, 2022. Following a careful review of the briefs, the record, and the

law, we reverse.

           BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              On October 14, 2014, Hardin County Deputy Sheriff Henry Volentine

ran the license plate number of a vehicle being operated by Maurice C. Green and

discovered it was registered to a different vehicle. Consequently, Volentine

initiated a traffic stop.

              Green pulled into a Speedway parking lot, but as Volentine

approached Green’s vehicle, Green “took off.” Volentine perceived that Green, as

he fled, struck a female pedestrian near her vehicle at a gas pump and nearly struck

a man walking toward the entrance of the gas station, causing the man to jump out

of the way to avoid being hit.

              Given these events, Volentine decided to pursue Green and kept in

contact with the HCOS dispatcher via radio. Near the end of the pursuit, Green

threw a black duffle bag from his vehicle. Shortly after, Green’s vehicle crossed

the centerline and hit a vehicle operated by Susan Sheehy head-on.

              Sheehy was injured in the collision and had to be extricated from her

vehicle and transported to a local hospital. She underwent multiple surgeries, but

still has lasting pain and injuries. Accordingly, she filed the underlying lawsuit in

2016.

                                         -2-
             Volentine and the HCOS answered Sheehy’s complaint and amended

their answer to include their immunity defenses. Trial was set multiple times but

was continued and reset for various reasons. In 2021, after substantial discovery

was conducted, Volentine and the HCOS moved the trial court for summary

judgment on immunity grounds. After the matter was fully briefed and a hearing

held, the trial court denied summary judgment, finding no immunity. This appeal

followed.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             This appeal is properly before us because an order denying a claim of

immunity is immediately appealable. Harrod v. Caney, 547 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Ky.

App. 2018); Breathitt Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Ky.

2009); Mattingly v. Mitchell, 425 S.W.3d 85, 89 (Ky. App. 2013). Entitlement to

immunity is a question of law. See Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d

644, 647 (Ky. 2017); Rowan Cnty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Ky. 2006)

(citing Jefferson Cnty. Fiscal Ct. v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 825 (Ky. 2004)).

Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d at 647 (citing

Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644,

647 (Ky. 2007)).

             Additionally, summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

                                         -3-
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” CR1 56.03. An appellate court’s role in reviewing a summary judgment is to

determine whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v.

Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. App. 1996). A grant of summary judgment is

reviewed de novo because factual findings are not at issue. Pinkston v. Audubon

Area Cmty. Servs., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 188, 189 (Ky. App. 2006) (citing Blevins v.

Moran, 12 S.W.3d 698 (Ky. App. 2000)).

                                    LEGAL ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Volentine and the HCOS contend the trial court erred in

finding they were not entitled to sovereign and/or qualified immunity. Sovereign

immunity is broad, protecting the state not only from the imposition of money

damages but also from the burden of defending a lawsuit. Meinhart v. Louisville

Metro Gov’t, 627 S.W.3d 824, 830 (Ky. 2021); Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty.

Gov’t v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 409-10 (1982)

(“Immunity from suit includes protection against the ‘cost[s] of trial’ and the

‘burdens of broad-reaching discovery’ that ‘are peculiarly disruptive of effective

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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government.’”)). The doctrine of sovereign immunity also covers departments,

boards, and agencies that are integral parts of state government, such as law

enforcement agencies and their employees. See Bryant v. Louisville Metro Hous.

Auth., 568 S.W.3d 839, 846 (Ky. 2019). The immunity of governmental and

quasi-governmental agencies is referred to as “governmental” as opposed to

“sovereign” immunity, although this delineation in terminology is a distinction

without a difference. Id. The immunity that extends to governmental employees

in their individual capacities is commonly referred to as “qualified” immunity.

Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky. 2001).

             Whether qualified immunity extends to an individual turns on whether

their actions – or inactions – were discretionary or ministerial. Id. “Generally, a

governmental employee can be held personally liable for negligently failing to

perform or negligently performing a ministerial act.” Marson v. Thomason, 438

S.W.3d 292, 296 (Ky. 2014). By contrast, such employees are immune when

performing discretionary acts, so long as they act in good faith. Thus, qualified

immunity “rests not on the status or title of the officer or employee, but on the

function performed.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 521.

             While this case is certainly not identical to Meinhart, it is similar

enough factually that we are obligated to follow the Supreme Court’s application

of the law in that case. By contrast, the case herein is factually distinguishable

                                          -5-
from Mattingly, 425 S.W.3d 85, in which an officer initiated an unauthorized

pursuit based solely on speeding.

             In Meinhart, a police officer initiated a pursuit against an assault

suspect which led to an automobile accident and lawsuit. The “dominant nature of

the act” was a pursuit of a suspected violent felon fleeing the scene of the alleged

felony. There, the officer was able to reasonably articulate why he believed the

suspect was a felon as required by his law enforcement agency’s Standard

Operating Procedures (SOPs). Meinhart, 627 S.W.3d at 832. The relevant SOP in

that case provides, “The officer must have a reason to believe that the violator

being pursued is a felon or suspected felon.” Id. at 833.

             In the case herein, the dominate nature of the act at issue was also the

pursuit of a suspected felon fleeing the scene of the alleged felony. Here,

Volentine was able to articulate why he believed Green was a felon as required by

the SOPs of the HCOS. The relevant SOP provides, “The deputy must have

reasonable suspicion to believe that the violator being pursued is a felon or a

suspected felon.” At the Speedway, Volentine believed that he witnessed Green

commit either assault in the first or second degree, both of which are felony

offenses, upon two persons in the parking lot. See Kentucky Revised Statutes

(KRS) 508.010 and 508.020.

                                         -6-
              In both Meinhart and the case herein “the SOPs required officers to

consider various factors in reaching a decision on how to balance those factors and

when to begin or end a pursuit.” 627 S.W.3d at 832. With regard to pursuits by

law enforcement, “Officers are required to make split-second decisions under

challenging circumstances with imperfect, incomplete, or uncertain information. It

is difficult to imagine a situation in which the exercise of significant, independent

professional judgment would be more necessary.” Id. at 834. Accordingly, “the

decision of whether to begin, continue, or end a pursuit constituted a discretionary

act.” Id. at 832. See also City of Brooksville v. Warner, 533 S.W.3d 688, 694 (Ky.

App. 2017).

              Ultimately, the trial court erroneously disregarded Volentine’s real

time perception of the events leading up to the pursuit and, instead, impermissibly

relied on its review of Speedway’s video footage in hindsight. Volentine exercised

his discretion in determining whether to initiate the pursuit, entitling him to

qualified immunity.

              The trial court also erred in finding that Volentine violated the HCOS

SOP that “Deputies Will Terminate A Pursuit When: . . . No Field Supervisor or

higher authority can be contacted to approve the pursuit’s continuation.” At the

time, Volentine was the most senior officer on duty. At his deposition, he testified

that he could not personally contact a higher authority without stopping and

                                          -7-
making a phone call and, because everything was happening so quickly, he was

unsure whether dispatch was trying to call a higher authority on his behalf to

approve continuation of the pursuit.

             Although it does not appear that this exact issue has been addressed

by our Kentucky courts, it is well-established that “[q]ualified immunity gives

government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions. When properly applied, it protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 743, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Additionally,

             we must avoid substituting our personal notions of proper
             police procedure for the instantaneous decision of the
             officer at the scene. We must never allow the theoretical,
             sanitized world of our imagination to replace the
             dangerous and complex world that policemen face every
             day. What constitutes “reasonable” action may seem
             quite different to someone facing a possible assailant
             than to someone analyzing the question at leisure.

Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Volentine’s belief

that he complied with this SOP entitles him to qualified immunity, even if his

belief was mistaken.

             The trial court also erred in finding Volentine violated the HCOS SOP

that “Deputies Will Terminate A Pursuit When: . . . The circumstances of the

                                        -8-
pursuit present an extreme safety hazard to the public, the deputy, or the suspect.”

The trial court failed to note that the HCOS’s policy also provides:

             Despite the risks, experts recognize that well-regulated
             deputy pursuits are occasionally necessary. Otherwise, if
             law enforcement agencies were to adopt an absolute no-
             pursuit policy, more criminals would have incentive to
             flee, and possibly to go on to commit more crimes.

             ...

             It is difficult if not impossible to describe exactly how a
             fleeing motorist can or should be apprehended or the
             manner in which the deputies should respond to calls or
             emergency assistance, except to say that it must be done
             legally and safely. It is also difficult to list the specific
             traffic regulations that officers may or may not disregard.
             Likewise one cannot set a safe maximum speed or in all
             cases specify the maximum number of deputies and
             vehicles that should be involved. The pursuing/
             responding deputy and/or supervisor shall, in a short
             period of time, use their own best judgment including
             their training and experience, bearing in mind, the
             policies and procedures and directions outlined in these
             guidelines and apply them collectively to the existing
             circumstances.

Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has held:

             we are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to
             allow fleeing suspects to get away whenever they drive
             so recklessly that they put other people’s lives in danger.
             It is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would
             create: Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is
             within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per
             hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and
             runs a few red lights. The Constitution assuredly does
             not impose this invitation to impunity-earned-by-
             recklessness.

                                          -9-
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 385-86, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1779, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686

(2007).

               Here, Sheehy twists Volentine’s words so that it appears he violated

this SOP because he acknowledged that pursuit driving – including this pursuit – is

dangerous and that Green was driving very dangerously. Although the wording of

the HCOS SOP appears mandatory or ministerial, it requires an officer’s discretion

to determine when the “circumstances of the pursuit present an extreme safety

hazard to the public, the deputy, or the suspect.” Given the facts and

circumstances of this case, the trial court erroneously found Volentine violated this

SOP and was, therefore, not entitled to immunity.

               For the reasons discussed herein, Volentine’s decisions to initiate and

continue this pursuit were discretionary in nature. Sheehy does not allege that

Volentine acted in bad faith or outside the scope of his authority. Thus, the trial

court erred in finding Volentine and the HCOS unimmune to Sheehy’s claim.2

               We also further echo the sentiments of the Supreme Court of

Kentucky:

               it is not in the public’s interest to allow a jury of laymen
               with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the

2
  “[T]he plain language of KRS 70.040 leaves no room for any other reasonable construction
than a waiver of the sheriff’s official immunity (the office of sheriff) for the tortious acts or
omissions of his deputies.” Jones v. Cross, 260 S.W.3d 343, 346 (Ky. 2008) (emphasis added).
Therefore, it stands to reason that since Volentine did not commit a tortious act or omission, the
HCOS is not liable to Sheehy, and its immunity from suit remains intact.

                                               -10-
            exercise of a police officer’s discretionary professional
            duty. Such discretion is no discretion at all. There is
            considerable discretion inherent in law enforcement’s
            response to an infinite array of situations implicating
            public safety on a daily basis. . . .

                   Finally, we pause to note immunity is intended to
            act as a shield, not just from liability, but also the burdens
            of a suit.

Meinhart, 627 S.W.3d at 835-36.

                                  CONCLUSION

            Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the order of the Hardin

Circuit Court is REVERSED.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SUSAN
                                           SHEEHY:
R. Keith Bond
Elizabethtown, Kentucky                    Adrian Mendiondo
                                           Lexington, Kentucky

                                           NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE
                                           MAURICE C. GREEN.

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