Court Opinion

ID: 9622168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:13:04.472207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:37.460172
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I do not join the court in invalidating the forfeiture of the van because I do not agree that the warrantless seizure deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(2) (Supp. 1987) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the property. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant;
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended to be used in violation of this act.
The language of the statute and of its federal counterpart1 is plain and unequivocal. It authorizes the seizure of property that is subject to forfeiture when the seizure is incident to arrest and also when there is probable cause to believe that the *1185property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of the Act.
The facts of this case clearly fall within the statutory exceptions to the need for process to effect seizure. The seizure was made incident to the arrest of the owner of the van. Also, beyond a doubt, probable cause existed for the seizure by reason of the fact that an undercover officer had previously witnessed the van being used to facilitate the purchase and transportation of marijuana in violation of the Act.
Not having heretofore interpreted the Utah statute, it is instructive to look to the interpretation given its substantially similar federal counterpart. However, the courts that have refused to read the statute literally and instead have read an exigent circumstances requirement into it constitute a distinct minority.2
In United States v. Pappas, the court reasoned that a literal reading of the probable cause exception would, in effect, swallow up the general rule that property subject to forfeiture shall be seized “upon process issued.” The court took the view that “to adhere to the literal language of the (b)(4) exception ... would render essentially meaningless the basic provision it purports to qualify.”3 However, in United States v. Bush,4 the court declined to follow Pappas and instead gave the statute a “more straightforward interpretation.”5 The court reasoned that the explicit nature of the statute, which provides that “ ‘seizure without such process may be made when ... the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of this subchapter,’ ” 6 conveyed its plain meaning. The court further reasoned that “ ‘we must be mindful that the language of the statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context’ ”7 and that “ ‘[i]n the absence of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of the statute must prevail.’ ”8
The court in Bush found no conflict between the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history, the purpose of the statute being to “strengthen existing law enforcement authority in the field of drug abuse”9 and the clear intention being “to liberalize, not restrict, the existing authority of law enforcement officers to seize property used in contravention of the drug control laws. Thus, to read an exigent circumstances requirement into the statute would be consistent with neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the Act.”10 Numerous other courts have reached the same result.11
The Bush court further concluded that the warrantless seizure was consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. In so doing, the court observed that a majority of the courts of appeals that have considered the issue, including the Third Circuit,12 have held that a warrantless seizure of forfeit property is constitutional, notwithstanding the absence of exigent cir*1186cumstances.13
The Bush court also pointed out the doctrinal development in fourth amendment analysis which recognizes the distinction between searches and seizures,14 concluding:
[Notwithstanding the apparent identity of the standard for search with that for seizure, it is now clear that the test of reasonableness for a search is, in at least certain situations, more stringent than the test of reasonableness for a seizure, for a seizure may be made without a warrant in circumstances where a search could not lawfully be made without one.15
I am of the view that the Bush court and the others that have refused to read an exigent circumstances requirement into the statute have the best of the argument and that it has equal application in the interpretation of the Utah statute.
I would affirm the forfeiture.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, C.J.

. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(b) (1976), which reads in pertinent part:
(b) Any property subject to forfeiture to the United States under this subchapter may be seized by the Attorney General upon process issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims by any district court of the United States having jurisdiction over the property, except that seizure without such process may be made when—
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(4) the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or is intended to be used in violation of this subchapter.

. See United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1469 (9th Cir.1983) (following United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 329-30 (1st Cir.1979)).

. Pappas, 613 F.2d at 329.

. 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.1981).

. Id. at 367.

. Id. at 368 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1385, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976)).

. Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201, 96 S.Ct. at 1385).

. Id. (quoting Aaron v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 446 U.S. 680, 700, 100 S.Ct. 1945, 1957, 64 L.Ed.2d 611 (1980)).

. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong.2d Sess. 1 (1970)).

. Id.

. United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir.1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401-02 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818, 102 S.Ct. 97, 70 L.Ed.2d 88 (1981); United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d 444, 450 (1st Cir.1980).

. United States v. Troiano, 365 F.2d 416, 418-19 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 396, 17 L.Ed.2d 303 (1966).

. See United States v. One 1975 Pontiac LeMans, 621 F.2d at 450; United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. LaVecchia, 513 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. White, 488 F.2d 563, 564-65 (6th Cir.1973); United States v. Stout, 434 F.2d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir.1970); see also Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1150 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24 L.Ed.2d 427 (1969). But see United States v. Pruett, 551 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir.1974).

. In Bush, the court observed:
In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the Court held that due process does not require notice and a hearing before government agents seize property pursuant to a forfeiture statute. See generally, Kandaras, Due Process and Federal Property Forfeiture Statutes: The Need for Immediate Post-Seizure Hearing, 34 Sw.LJ. 925 (1980). The Calero-Toledo Court refused to address the "question whether the Fourth Amendment warrant or probable cause requirements are applicable to [forfeiture] seizures.” 416 U.S. at 679-80, n. 14, 94 S.Ct. at 2089-90 n. 14.
Bush, 647 F.2d at 368-69 n. 15; see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2400, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (opinion of Stevens, J.) (it is "settled that an officer’s authority to possess a package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents"); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763-64, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592-93, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1970).

.Bush, 647 F.2d at 369 (footnote omitted).