Court Opinion

ID: 9520980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:54:23.539026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:25.404876
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the activities of the claimant, a traveling employee, were not reasonable and foreseeable and therefore did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. Based on Robinson v. Industrial Com. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 87, 449 N.E.2d 106, the most recent Illinois Supreme Court decision regarding traveling employees, I would hold that the activities of the claimant were both reasonable and foreseeable. In Robinson, the marketing director for a development company was required to travel between his employer’s office and sites where the employer was developing new homes. He had been given no instructions regarding routes he was to follow. At approximately 5 p.m. on the day in question he left the sales office to go to a new subdivision. He had planned to stop at home to pick up his son, whom he was going to take Christmas shopping after stopping at the subdivision. However, after leaving work he was killed in a one-car accident approximately two blocks from his home. It was undisputed that the route taken when the accident occurred was not the most direct route from the office to the subdivision. The arbitrator concluded that the decedent was on a personal mission when the accident occurred and denied compensation. The Industrial Commission affirmed, and on certiorari the circuit court confirmed. On review, the supreme court reversed. It stated that the accident would have been compensable had it happened while the decedent was traveling directly from the office to the subdivision and so recovery should not be denied simply “because he performed the reasonable act of stopping on the way to pick up his son.” If picking up a family member to go Christmas shopping is reasonable and foreseeable conduct, then I would find that going to the store to buy pens and a picnic table and benches is also reasonable and foreseeable conduct. The majority states that it was neither reasonable nor foreseeable that the claimant would stop at a store to buy pens. The sole basis the majority provides for this conclusion is that there was no “urgent and immediate” need for the claimant to obtain the pens on the day of her injury, even if none were available at the office. That is irrelevant. The claimant testified that while the respondent supplied red hard-tipped pens, she wanted a soft-tipped Flair. Mrs. Halverson admitted she did not know whether there were any soft-tipped pens in the office on the day of the claimant’s injury. Since the pens were not available and the claimant needed them for a chart, it was reasonable and foreseeable that she would stop to purchase them either on her way to the schools, or on her drive back to the office, as here after stopping by her home to pick up business mail. Her attempt to purchase the pens should not be rendered unreasonable and unforeseeable simply because the majority assumes there was no urgent and immediate need to buy them. The majority also states that it was not reasonable and foreseeable that the claimant would attempt to obtain additional seating. It reaches this conclusion because the claimant told her supervisor that she “might” need some extra seating, but did not discuss whether it would be bought, rented, or borrowed, and if so, by whom. That is also irrelevant. The claimant knew that the staff meeting, which was to be attended by the 14 health aides that she supervised, might require some extra seating and she told her supervisor so. It can hardly be said it was unreasonable and unforeseeable for the claimant to then go out and obtain additional seating. In addition, while a specific date had not been set for the meeting, it was to be held, and the claimant discussed it with numerous health aides prior to the day she was injured. Even assuming, and I do not, that the claimant’s trip to Goldblatt’s had no business-related purpose whatsoever, the result should not change. The test is whether the claimant’s conduct was reasonable and whether it might normally be anticipated or foreseen by the respondent. A business-related purpose is not included as part of the test and was not required by the supreme court in Robinson, in which there was no apparent business purpose associated with the decedent’s conduct. The majority states that each case must stand or fall on its own. Here, due to the nature of her job, the claimant was necessarily given a certain degree of discretion as she traveled to and from the Rockford office. For example, since she was required to supply a car for the job, it would be reasonable and foreseeable that she would stop at a service station for gas on the way to the schools or on her drive back to the office. There are undoubtedly instances in which all would agree that a traveling employee’s conduct was not reasonable or foreseeable. This simply is not one of them. I suggest that the conduct of the claimant in the case at bar was at least as reasonable as that of the decedent in Robinson, if not more so. In my view, the majority has improperly substituted its opinion for that of the arbitrator and the circuit court. I would hold, as does the majority, that the circuit court properly found as a matter of law that the claimant was a traveling employee. I would further hold that the Industrial Commission’s finding that the claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment was against the manifest weight of the evidence.