Court Opinion

ID: 9514937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:52:35.783607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:22.908579
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 21.] I agree with Justice Amund-son’s dissent that the jury was improperly instructed on flight. I write separately to reiterate that such instructions should be cautiously applied. A sparing approach to such an instruction is required. State v. Menard, 424 N.W.2d 382, 384 (S.D.1988). It is troubling that despite our cautionary warning these instructions have been readily made available to the jury. See State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶¶ 59-61, 622 N.W.2d 246 (Sabers, J., dissenting).
[¶ 22.] An instruction on flight is always collateral to the primary issue of whether a crime was committed by this defendant and therefore is “only marginally probative as to the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.” United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1050 (5th Cir.1977). Such an instruction highlights to the jury collateral evidence as “consciousness of guilt” and diminishes the burden of demonstrating “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and throws out the “presumption of innocence.” As stated in Frazier, “we have recently unanimously reversed under somewhat similar downplaying of these two key instructions.” Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶ 60, 622 N.W.2d 246 (Sabers, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Nelson, 1998 SD 124, ¶ 20, 587 N.W.2d 439, 447). We should also reverse where, as here, the presumption of innocence instruction is diluted by other instructions. Under the evidence adduced at trial, it was error to instruct the jury that they could infer from Fender’s actions he committed the crime charged.
[¶ 23.] Therefore, I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand for a new trial.