Court Opinion

ID: 9492629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:45:32.641184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:23.796309
License: Public Domain

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Rita Warren applied to Fairfax County, Virginia, for a permit to display a creche and other objects conveying her message of “love, hope, and peace” on a grassy median on the grounds of the Government Center Building. After the County denied the permit because the median was designated for displays only by county residents and employees and Warren was neither, she filed this action, contending that the County’s restriction violated her First Amendment rights.
The district court dismissed Warren’s action, holding that Fairfax County “made unmistakably clear its intention” to establish the median as a “limited public forum” for use by individuals and groups who have a specified relationship with Fairfax County and that the “use restriction [was] reasonable in light of the purposes served by the [median].” Warren v. Fairfax County, 988 F.Supp. 957, 964, 966 (E.D.Va.1997). For the reasons that follow, I would affirm.
I.
Through regulation, Fairfax County has designated the common areas of three buildings and their grounds (including driveways, sidewalks, and parking areas) for use for displays, performances, fairs, and the like by residents and employees of *200Fairfax County. While all three buildings are located on Government Center Parkway — the Government Center Building at 12000; the Pennino Building at 12011; and the Herrity Building at 12055 — the regulation does not purport to extend beyond the grounds of these buildings to the Parkway itself or its sidewalks. This case involves the application of the regulation to deny Warren a permit to display a creche on the median area in front of the Government Center Building.
The Government Center Building appears to be located in an otherwise largely wooded area that is removed from residential, commercial, and office areas where people would be likely to gather. The building is accessed from Government Center Parkway by a horseshoe-shaped driveway that leads from the Parkway to the front door of the Building and back to the Parkway. Enclosed by the driveway is a median consisting of grass, trees, brick, and concrete. This median, often referred to as the Center Island, has a width, according to the majority, of 30 yards. It was primarily designed, as the district court observed, “for aesthetic purposes such as plantings,” Warren, 988 F.Supp. at 962, and it is a part of the grounds around the Government Center Building that are subject to Fairfax County’s “Procedural Memorandum No. 08-05,” addressing “Regulations for Public Use of Facilities and Grounds at the Fairfax County Government Center Complex.” That Memorandum defines the purpose of its regulations as follows:
It is a policy of the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors to encourage use of the common areas [defined as buildings, grounds, and parking lots] of the Government Center Complex by Fair-fax County nonprofit organizations and individual citizens of Fairfax County for civic, cultural, educational, religious, recreational, and similar activities of a nonprofit nature — and for intergovernmental purposes — so as not to interfere with County government functions or conflict with official activities of the Board of Supervisors, Board-appointed commissions, the Board of Zoning Appeals or County agencies.
Fairfax County allows the use of the grounds around the Government Center Building by eight classes of entities, including “[a]ny individual resident of Fair-fax County ... for nonprofit personal/private use” and “[a]ny employee of the Fairfax County government for personal/private use.” The regulation allows “[attended displays” on the Center Island, but each display is limited to one week per year, must be attended by an adult at all times, and must clearly state that it is a private display. A person is required to obtain a permit before erecting an attended display.
Rita Warren, a resident of Fairfax- City, which is a neighboring political subdivision distinct from Fairfax County, applied for a permit to erect a creche and a cross aimed at spreading her message of “love, hope, and peace.” Because Warren was neither a resident nor an employee of Fairfax County, her application was denied. She filed this action against Fairfax County, claiming, among other things, that the denial of her permit application violated her First Amendment right to free speech as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
II.
The question presented by this appeal is whether Fairfax County can limit to county residents and employees the use, for the purpose of placing displays, of a grassy median within the horseshoe-shaped driveway in front of its Government Center Building. In resolving this question, we assume that the placement of a creche and a cross on the median to spread the message of love, hope, and peace would be speech, protected by the First Amendment.
Under established Supreme Court precedent, the extent to which government may limit access to a particular place for *201speech depends on the character of the property at issue — whether the forum is a “traditional public forum,” a “designated public forum,” or a “nonpublie forum.” See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633, 140 L.Ed.2d 875 (1998); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Because “[njothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property,” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, an inquiry into the nature and function of the property is necessary to determine the kind of restriction that is permissible under the First Amendment.
A traditional public forum, where restrictions on speech receive the highest scrutiny, is a public place where, by long history, the public has gathered to speak, debate, and exchange ideas. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. Only those “ ‘[p]ublic places’ historically associated with the free exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be ‘public forums.’” United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480-81, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (holding that residential streets are traditional public fora). Such places are considered traditional public fora because they “have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948 (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939)).
Until now, only streets, sidewalks, and parks have been identified as traditional public fora and then only when the street, sidewalk, or park has been dedicated to the “free exchange of ideas.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. The characterization of a place as physically a street, sidewalk, or park, without more, is not adequate to define a traditional public forum. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion) (“The mere physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis”). Similarly, the mere fact that property is publicly owned or freely accessible to people to come and go at will does not make it a traditional public forum. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (“Publicly owned or operated property does not become a ‘public forum’ simply because members of the public are permitted to come and go at will”). Thus, while Main Street in a small town may be a traditional public forum, an interstate highway might not be one. Similarly, a sidewalk on a public thoroughfare generally will be a traditional public forum, see id. at 179-80, 103 S.Ct. 1702, whereas a sidewalk dedicated to one public building or on the grounds of that public building is not, see Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (plurality opinion) (concluding that a United States Post Office sidewalk leading from the parking area to the front door of the post office was not a traditional public forum); see also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-37, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (holding that footpaths and portions of state and county streets that were within military jurisdiction were not public fora even though they were freely open to civilian pedestrian and automobile traffic); cf. Grattan v. Board of Sch. Comm’rs, 805 F.2d 1160, 1162-63 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that public school parking lots are not public fora). Similarly, a public square or commons is surely a traditional public forum, whereas a zoological park, a public cemetery, or even a public university is not. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(f), (g) (restricting picketing, orations, displaying of placards, distribution of handbills, solici*202tation, and other forms of speech in the Arlington National Gemetery out of respect for the “honored dead”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Thus, a traditional public forum is a narrower category than the aggregate of its physical properties might suggest; it must be a public property with general accessibility that has as “a principal purpose ... the free exchange of ideas.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439.
We thus may conclude that the Supreme Court cases have 'limited the traditional public forum to streets, sidewalks, and parks,1 and then only to streets, sidewalks, and parks that have provided a place for expression as a principal purpose. We have found no case extending the traditional public forum beyond these bounds. Indeed, the Supreme Court “has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678, 118 S.Ct. 1633 (citation omitted).
In traditional public fora, in order for government to enforce a content-based restriction, “it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. The government may, however, impose a content neutral regulation on the time, place, or manner of expression as long as the regulation is “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest” and “leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication.” Id . (citations omitted).
The second type of forum relevant to our analysis is the designated public forum. A designated public forum is created by the purposeful designation by government of a place for expressive activity. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439. This designation can limit forum access to a class of people or for certain topics, see Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 948, thereby creating a “limited public forum,” which allows the government to “legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.” Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829-30, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). Where a designated public forum is thus limited to a certain class of persons, restrictions on the speech of members of that class are subject to the same scrutiny as in the traditional public forum, but restrictions on the speech of persons outside that class are permissible so long as they are reasonable and not based on viewpoint. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30, 115 S.Ct. 2510; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S.Ct. 948.
Government properties that are neither traditional public fora nor designated public fora “are either nonpublic fora or not fora at all.” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633 (citing International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678-79, 112 S.Ct. 2701, 120 L.Ed.2d 541 (1992)). “The government can restrict access to a nonpublic forum ‘as long as the restrictions are reasonable and [are] not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’ ” Id. at 677-78, 112 S.Ct. 2701 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (alteration in original)). This is the same standard as that used to judge restrictions in limited public fora on persons who are outside the class of per*203sons for whom a given forum was designated.
With these general principles in hand, I now turn to consider Fairfax County’s restrictions on the median (Center Island) located on the grounds of its Government Center Building.
III.
We have found no case that has concluded that a median, a traffic island, or a similar plot separating public roadways or even dedicated roadways on public grounds is a traditional public forum.2 Surely, such a median is not a place dedicated to bringing citizens together to exchange ideas. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. The majority’s rebanee on the dictionary definition of “park” does not advance the discussion because the Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the mere characterization of a particular place as a park, street, or sidewalk is not determinative of whether that place is a traditional pubhc forum. See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (plurality opinion); Greer, 424 U.S. at 838, 96 S.Ct. 1211. Indeed, we have once before fallen into this same analytical error, see United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 702-03 (4th Cir.1989) (holding that because sidewalks are generally traditional public fora, the sidewalk before the court must be a traditional public forum), only to be reversed by the Supreme Court, see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990). Rather than rely solely on the physical characteristics of a park or sidewalk, we are instructed to focus on whether the property has been “devoted to assembly and debate,” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, or whether it has as a principal purpose “the free exchange of ideas,” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. See also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677, 118 S.Ct. 1633.
*204Leaving the majority’s flawed analysis in this regard and applying the Supreme Court’s criteria, it is apparent that not even every park is a traditional public forum because not every park is “devoted to assembly and debate” or “the free exchange of ideas.” The Everglades or Yellowstone National Park are public parks open to the public. Yet, those parks are not dedicated to assembly and debate, and, indeed, in many portions of these parks, physical access is denied altogether to preserve the natural environment. Similarly, Arlington National Cemetery is a public park with physical features — driveways, trees, and grass — common to parks in general. Yet, because it is a place of burial, honor, and remembrance, to preserve decorum consistent with the park’s function, the^ government has prohibited all picketing, demonstrating, displaying of placards, and distribution of handbills, pamphlets and leaflets at the cemetery. See 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(f), (g). Indeed, it even prohibits the public from engaging in “partisan activities” there. 32 C.F.R. § 553.22(i). Other national parks and monuments have similar restrictions. See, e.g., 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3)(ii)(A) (prohibiting demonstrations or special events in the vicinity of the Washington Monument on the National Mall in Washington, D.C.); 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3)(ii)(D) (prohibiting demonstrations or special events. in the vicinity of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on the National Mall, an area stretching from Constitution Avenue to the sidewalk by the reflecting pool).3
We have also found no case that has concluded that even a street, sidewalk, or park forming part of the grounds of a governmental building that is dedicated to a particular governmental function is a traditional public forum. To the contrary, such adjunct spaces are associated with the building and are thought to be dedicated to' the limited use for which the building is dedicated. Thus, they are designated public fora, limited public fora, or nonpublic fora, but not traditional public fora. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 727-29, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (plurality opinion) (parking lot and sidewalk on U.S. Post Office grounds); Grace, 461 U.S. at 178-80, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (lawn, plaza, and steps on Supreme Court grounds); Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-39, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (publicly accessible footpaths and streets in military reservation); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41, 47, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966) (grounds outside jailhouse); Grattan, 805 F.2d at 1162-63 (parking lot on public school grounds). A fortiori, if streets, sidewalks, and parks forming a part of the grounds of a public building dedicated to a particular governmental function are not traditional public fora, neither are medians located on such grounds.
The scope of restrictions in this case, both in geography and in kind, are analogous to those considered in Grace . There, the Supreme Court left standing a regulation for the Supreme Court grounds in Washington, D.C., that prohibits “processions or assemblages” or the “display [of] any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement.” 40 U.S.C. § 13k. In ruling that this regulation, which applied to the Supreme Court grounds, as well as the perimeter sidewalks, could not apply to the perimeter sidewalks because those sidewalks were “indistinguishable from any other sidewalks in Washington, D.C.,” Grace, 461 U.S. at 179, 103 S.Ct. 1702, the Court explained:
We do not denigrate the necessity to protect persons and property or to maintain proper order and decorum within the Supreme Court grounds, but we do question whether a total ban on carrying a flag, banner, or device on the public sidewalks substantially serves these purposes.
*205Id. at 182, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (emphasis added); see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733-37, 110 S.Ct. 3115 (plurality opinion) (upholding U.S. Postal Service regulations limiting speech on post office grounds); Greer, 424 U.S. at 839, 96 S.Ct. 1211 (upholding governmental regulations limiting speech on public streets and footpaths in military reservation); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 42-43, 87 S.Ct. 242 (upholding a trespass statute as applied to demonstrators on grounds outside a jailhouse); Grattan, 805 F.2d at 1163-64 (upholding use of a state statute to remove an individual distributing flyers in a school parking lot).
The Government Center Building in this case is located on public grounds, remote from other public areas, and contiguous to Government Center Parkway. While Government Center Parkway is a public thoroughfare providing access to the Government Center Building as well as other places, the driveway leading to the Government Center Building is located on the Building’s grounds and is dedicated solely for access to that building for persons having business there. While the Parkway itself and the sidewalks of the Parkway may be traditional public fora, as they exist for general use by the public, the limited purpose driveway to the Government Center Building is more analogous to the access sidewalk located on the United States Post Office grounds in Kokinda, or the plaza, lawn, and steps around the Supreme Court in Grace, or the public pathways and streets in the military complex in Greer, or the jailhouse grounds in Adderly, or the school parking lot in Grattan. And as the horseshoe-shaped driveway to the Government Center Building in this case is dedicated to a limited purpose, so too is the median dividing the sides of the driveway.
In short, the median dividing the driveway of the Government Center Building has not, by “long tradition,” been “devoted to assembly and debate.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct. 948. And it does not have as a “principal purpose,” the “free exchange of ideas” by the public generally. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439. Indeed, medians generally' are not areas devoted to those purposes. They are for dividing traffic, usually for aesthetic and safety purposes. As importantly, the median in this case forms part of the grounds of the Government Center Building and is dedicated for use in connection with that building. It is not the traditional public forum of which the Supreme Court has spoken where people are historically free and likely to gather to express ideas. In light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts should not extend traditional public forum status “beyond its historic confines,” Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678, 118 S.Ct. 1633 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 680-81, 112 S.Ct. 2701), I conclude that the median at the Government Center Building is not a traditional public forum for First Amendment purposes.
IV.
Even though medians in general, and this median in particular, are not traditional public fora, a median may nevertheless be designated as a public forum or a limited public forum by a deliberate act of government. That designation cannot occur “by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (emphasis added) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 103 S.Ct. 948). To be sure, courts “will not find that a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent.” Id. at 803, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we must look to the Fairfax County regulation governing the use of the Government Center Building and its grounds to discover the County’s intent as to the use of the median within these grounds.
In Procedural Memorandum No. 08-05, Fairfax County unambiguously designates the Government Center Building and its grounds, including its parking lot, as a “ ‘limited’ public forum.” Perry, 460 U.S. *206at 48, 103 S.Ct. 948. Its intent is clearly stated — to provide access to these areas for the civic, cultural, religious, recreational, and similar activities of its citizens and employees. Proc. Memo. No. 08-05, I.A. The Memorandum also imposes a number of other restrictions. Any use, for example, must be “nonprofit [and] personal/private.” In addition, time limits are set for uses of the grounds; there are prohibitions against disruptive noise levels; displays are physically limited, and some must be attended; uses of bulletin boards have additional restrictions. There are special time, place, and manner rules for banners, temporary signs, artwork, performances, bake sales,, fairs, picketing, demonstrations, receptions, and the like. But there is no effort to impose any of these limitations beyond the grounds of the Government Center Building (or beyond the grounds of the other two buildings covered by the policy). Specifically, there is no limitation imposed on the public’s use of the public thoroughfare in front of the Government Center Building (Government Center Parkway) or the adjacent sidewalk, both of which may be traditional public fora.
Thus, through deliberate governmental action, Fairfax County has designated a public forum for limited use by a specified group of people, and there can be no mistake about the County’s intent. Accordingly, under clear Supreme Court instruction, we must not find that “a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent” — a mandate conveniently overlooked by the majority. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803, 105 S.Ct. 3439.
Accordingly, in the face of Fairfax County’s clear intent, I would conclude that Fairfax County has designated a limited public forum at its Government Center Building and on the grounds of that building.
V.
When government designates a limited public forum, restricted for use, for example, to a class of persons, such restriction is valid so long as it is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 49, 54, 103 S.Ct. 948. Such a policy need only “rationally further a legitimate state purpose.” Id. at 54, 103 S.Ct. 948; see also the majority opinion (adopting Warren v. Fairfax County, 169 F.3d 190, 201 (4th Cir.1999) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting)).
No argument has been made that Fair-fax County’s limitations on access to its Government Center Building and grounds are viewpoint based. Indeed, the very same display that Warren wanted to erect could have been erected by a Fairfax County resident or employee. Likewise, a display with an opposing viewpoint (one promoting hate, despair, and violence) would be disallowed if sought by a nonresident or nonemployee, such as Warren, but would be allowed if sought by a county resident or employee. The operation of the policy is totally unrelated to viewpoint. Rather, it depends entirely on whether a person is a member of the specified class.
I readily conclude also that the policy rationally furthers legitimate county purposes. It is a legitimate purpose to further access of citizens and government employees to their own government, promoting accountability and community. And it is also legitimate to celebrate the art, ideas, and culture of the citizenry, providing them a location for display within the community. The policy is analogous to a bulletin board in the lobby of a city hall that is dedicated to showing art made by children in that city’s public schools. The paintings of the local children may have no more objective artistic value than paintings made by children in the next town, but the city has a legitimate interest in displaying the work of its own children to foster a sense of community.
These policies accordingly enhance the Fairfax County community spirit and tend to promote pride in the County and its government. As well, they facilitate communication between citizens and their gov*207ernment. Thus, in restricting display permits at the Government Center Building and its grounds to county residents and employees, Fairfax County rationally advances its legitimate policy.
VI.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Wilkinson apparently finds comfort for the majority position in his generalized observation that “[sjpeech is presumptively a national commodity.” What he fails to note is that not every place can be an appropriate or unrestricted market for that commodity. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800, 105 S.Ct. 3489 (explaining that “[n]othing in the Constitution requires Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property”). Free speech, open debate, and public discourse form the backbone of an open, democratic government, and no one of us desires in the least to undermine any defense necessary to protect that structure. But we all also recognize that, so long as the free exchange of ideas is protected, there is a concomitant need to restrict the time and place for exercising that fundamental right. These limitations to no degree threaten free speech, public debate, or the free exchange of ideas. On the contrary, they enhance it by providing order in the same way that travel restrictions, such as requirements that traffic move on the right side and stop at traffic lights, enhance rather than restrict free travel.
In recognition of this axiom, Congress found it appropriate, for example, to prohibit orations, picketing, displaying of placards, and distribution of handbills and leaflets at the Arlington National Cemetery where the honor of the dead deserves that public debate be conducted elsewhere. Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that significant limitations on speech and debate are appropriate in other public places, such as in public airport terminal buildings (Lee); on U.S. Post Office grounds, including post office sidewalks (Kokinda); on Supreme Court grounds, including the Court’s plaza, lawn, and steps (Grace); on the grounds of state universities (Widmar); on public streets and footpaths within a military reservation (Greer); and on grounds outside jailhouses (Adderly).
Fairfax County has adopted reasonable restrictions applicable to its designated limited forum at its Government Center Building and grounds, and they are no more intrusive than other similar restrictions in analogous contexts. In failing to recognize the limited nature of the forum in this case and in blindly adhering to rigid categories defined not by the requirements of the First Amendment but by undiscerning dictionary definitions, the majority yields to a fear that could, at extremes, trample necessary, reasonable rules of order.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Widener and Judge Williams join in this opinion.

. The majority cites Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), for the proposition that a theater can be a traditional public forum. To the contraiy, the Supreme Court said there that the auditorium at issue in that case was a "public forum[ ] designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.” Id. at 555, 95 S.Ct. 1239 (emphasis added). It is thus clear that the Court found the auditorium to be a designated public forum rather than a traditional public forum.

. None of the cases cited by the majority hold otherwise. In International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness of New Orleans, Inc. v.City of Baton Rouge, 876 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.1989), the court merely assumed without deciding that streets and roadways were public fora and upheld an ordinance prohibiting the solicitation of drivers in their automobiles. See id. at 497-99. The court in ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1986), upheld a similar ordinance, stating that "we need not decide whether public streets are perpetual public fora." Id. at 1267 (emphasis added). There is no holding that medians are traditional public fora. In ACORN v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591 (8th Cir.1991), the court upheld another ban on roadway solicitations. The court suggested that "the streets" constituted "a public forum," id. at 594, but did not hold that medians are traditional public fora. In Ater v. Armstrong, 961 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir.1992), the court upheld yet another regulation on expressive activity on or by the street as applied to a Ku Klux Klansman distributing literature to motorists from the median. The court did hold "that the streets of Jefferson County, Kentucky are traditional public fora.” Id. at 1227. But it said no such thing about medians standing alone. The word "median” does not appear anywhere in the majority opinion after the court's rendition of facts. See id. at 1226-30.
The issue in all four of these cases was essentially the same, and it had little to do with the case before us. The Eighth Circuit summed up the problem that the various solicitation restrictions were targeting when it observed that “solicitors [were] walking across lanes of traffic while cars were moving, detaining cars after the light turned green, and crossing between the front of one car and the rear of another. The solicitors regularly returned to the median only after the light turned green.” St. Louis County, 930 F.2d at 596. The regulations were (permissibly) targeting dangerous activity occurring on the streets — solicitation of drivers in their cars, not of persons on the medians. The courts were not faced with whether the medians themselves were traditional public fora.
In Sloman v. Tadlock, 21 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir.1994), the final circuit court case cited by the majority, the court found viewpoint discrimination, see id. at 1468-69. This case has nothing to do with the traditional public forum doctrine, and the court did not even use the term "traditional public forum." Indeed, the court did not use the word "forum” at all.
The two district court cases that the majority cites, News & Sun-Sentinel Co. v. Cox, 702 F.Supp. 891 (S.D.Fla.1988), and Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 606 F.Supp. 16 (E.D.La.1984), also say nothing about whether medians are traditional public fora.

. In Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179 (D.C.Cir.1992), the D.C. Circuit struck down the restriction as applied to leafletting on the perimeter sidewalks that are between 100 and 260 feet from the memorial, but it left standing the remainder of the regulation.