Court Opinion

ID: 9756526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:35:07.151606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:25.005949
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEAVITT.
I respectfully dissent. Assigning responsibility for what was purely judicial delay to PennDOT in this case misapplies the standard established in Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 562 Pa. 60, 753 A.2d 233 (2000). Further, the majority creates an unworkable standard for future cases where a license suspension matter is remanded to this Court or to a court of common pleas solely for reconsideration of a legal issue.
In Terraciano, as in the case sub judice, the trial court sustained the licensee’s statutory appeal, and PennDOT appealed to this Court. We found that the trial court had erred in a crucial evidentiary ruling and “reversed the order of the trial court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.” Terraciano, 562 Pa. at 65, 753 A.2d at 235 (emphasis added). The case languished for seven years until PennDOT praeciped the trial court for a hearing. When confronted with the question of whether to attribute the delay to Penn-DOT or the licensee, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hen PennDOT fails to take responsibility for moving a case forward under circumstances where it is reasonable for it to be expected to do so, the delay is attributable to PennDOT.” Id. at 66, 753 A.2d at 236 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court attributed the delay to PennDOT because, as the appellant to this Court, it “was responsible for pursuing its appeal to conclusion.” Id. at 67, 753 A.2d at 236-237. The Supreme Court noted that “to place the case back before the trial court, PennDOT merely had to file a praecipe after the Commonwealth Court issued its order remanding the case.... ” Id. at 67, 753 A.2d at 236.
The case at bar is markedly different from Terraciano. Here, this Court’s remand order did not contemplate further proceedings; it stated that:
The case is remanded to the common pleas court for [its] consideration of the issue, where such issue was previously raised, of whether the reporting requirements of Article III of the Compact were met, as articulated in our decision in Sweet v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 12A A.2d 1004 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).
*926Avato v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa.Cmwlth., No. 2138 C.D.1998, filed September 15, 1998) (emphasis added).1 Stated otherwise, there was no action required of PennDOT to have the appeal concluded. Nevertheless, the majority states in con-clusory fashion, purporting to apply Terra-ciano, that “PennDOT was responsible for taking the appropriate action to have the case heard.” Majority Opinion at 10. There are several glaring problems with this statement.
First, the majority reaches this conclusion without any explanation as to why it is “reasonable” to impose the burden on PennDOT in the circumstance where the court has failed to act upon a remand. Terraciano requires a case-by-case inquiry into the circumstances to determine whether it is “reasonable” to hold Penn-DOT liable. Contrary to this central feature of the Terraciano holding, the majority establishes an inflexible rule that arbitrarily chooses PennDOT as the party always liable for a “delay” that results from a court’s quiescence in responding to a remand order.
Second, the majority’s statement is opaque on what was to be “heard” in this case. The record was closed, and the case was not remanded for further evidentiary proceedings. The trial court was directed to write a new opinion, and it was slow to do so.
Third, the majority offers no analysis of what would be an “appropriate action” by PennDOT in this scenario, where, because of judicial inaction, the matter languishes on the docket. I posit that there is no such mechanism.
Pennsylvania’s rules of civil and appellate procedure do not provide for any type of application or motion by which Penn-DOT, or any litigant, can ask a court, appellate or trial, to speed up the discharge of its judicial duties. In this case, PennDOT sent a letter to the trial court, and this step resuscitated the proceedings. However, this informal communication is not an “appropriate” or reliable method for achieving that result in future cases. A petition for writ of mandamus is one possible mechanism but hardly a desirable option. It is doubtful that PennDOT could establish a clear legal right to expedited review, or a corresponding duty in the trial court to comply more quickly with a remand order. Whatever mechanism the majority may have in mind, it places Penn-DOT in the untenable position of acting as a “super-prothonotary” over the docket of any court, including this Court, that is directed by a higher court to reconsider a legal issue in a license suspension proceeding.
Finally, the majority offers no standard for when and how PennDOT must take this “appropriate action.” Should Penn-DOT wait six months, a year or two years before nagging the court? Is the standard different depending on whether PennDOT is awaiting a decision from our Supreme Court or from a court of common pleas? Is it different depending on whether the court of common pleas is a single-judge judicial district or has numerous judges?2
Unfortunately for Licensee, under applicable precedent, if one of the parties must bear the burden of moving the case forward, it is Licensee, as is suggested by a recent ruling of our Supreme Court in
*927Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Gombocz, — Pa. -, 909 A.2d 798 (2006). In Gombocz, the Supreme Court soundly reaffirmed the standards and rules of law announced in Terraciano. The Supreme Court also cited with approval this Court’s decision in Tarka v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 756 A.2d 138 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), for the proposition that “[t]he moving party has the burden to move the case forward.” Gombocz, 909 A.2d at 801. Because our Supreme Court has effectively given its imprimatur to Tarka, it is inappropriate for the majority to overrule that decision today. The rule in Tarka should control the outcome of this case.
In Tarka, the trial court sustained the licensee’s license suspension appeal and PennDOT appealed to this Court. We vacated the trial court’s order and remanded “for the Trial Court to re-examine its evi-dentiary rulings, reverse said rulings if deemed legally correct to do so, and to conduct additional hearings if appropriate.” Id. at 140. Further proceedings, though contemplated, were not required as was the case in Terraciano. Three years passed before the case was eventually docketed for a new hearing. In rejecting the licensee’s subsequent claim that the three-year delay was attributable to Penn-DOT, this Court held:
[TJhis Court’s order of April 25, 1995, which vacated and remanded the matter to the Trial Court, returned the parties to the status quo ante. Therefore, Tar-ka, having initially appealed the Department’s suspension of his license in the Trial Court, was again the Appellant and moving party, with the burden of moving his case forward.
Id. at 141.
A straightforward application of Tarka in the present case yields the same result: Licensee initially appealed PennDOT’s suspension of his license and prevailed before the trial court. PennDOT successfully appealed and obtained a remand order that directed the trial court to reconsider its decision. Licensee, having initially appealed his license suspension, was again the appellant and moving party, with the burden of moving his case forward.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the trial court’s conclusion that the delay should be chargeable to PennDOT.
Judge LEADBETTER and Judge COHN JUBELIRER join in the dissent.

. Licensee was one of twenty-seven appellants in Avato.

. PennDOT’s new role may be particularly vexing in a single-judge judicial district, where the judge considering PennDOT's request to hasten judicial action and the judge whose action PennDOT seeks to hasten will be one and the same.