Court Opinion

ID: 9468651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:19:59.808291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:58.439382
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s judgment that these petitions for review should be denied. Unlike the majority, however, I would not decide the Fourth Amendment question that has been raised here by the petitioners, since I do not believe that such constitutional adjudication is necessary for the disposition of these appeals.1
The record reveals the following facts about the “area control operation” challenged by petitioners in this proceeding: Sometime in 1978, the Philadelphia office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) received “reliable” information that H&H Industries in Pennsauken, New Jersey, employed a number of aliens in violation of their immigration status. After a search of agency files identified one individual believed to be working illegally at H&H, an INS agent was dispatched to survey the facility and its surroundings. Subsequently during the early evening of February 1, 1979, six immigration inspectors visited the factory. Three inspectors remained at the plant’s front entrance, apparently to question any individual who attempted to leave. Two other agents went to the factory’s main office, but were informed that the person they sought was no longer employed at H&H. Thus, at this point, the agents had no reason to know that any of the occupants of the factory were illegal aliens.
There is conflicting testimony whether the agents asked for or received permission to enter the factory area proper; it is undisputed, however, that they lacked warrants when they entered. The investigators were led into the work quarters by a Polish-speaking night supervisor. Once inside, they thoroughly searched the building. The agents, proceeding at random, either questioned or sought to question every employee present as to his or her nationality and immigration status. No warnings were given. Individuals who attempted to elude the investigators were restrained and then questioned. The ten employees — including the six petitioners here — who admitted to being Polish, with a tourist visa, and without a “green card,” were taken into custody.
Were the story to end at this juncture, it would be necessary to determine whether the INS violated the Fourth Amendment in conducting this “area control operation.” For the reason set forth below, however, I believe that such a determination in this case need not be made. Nonetheless, in light of the majority opinion, I am impelled to observe that I find the Fourth Amendment question considerably more troubling than do my colleagues.2 In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), the Supreme Court held that the INS could not, consistent with the Constitution’s prohibition of *300unreasonable searches and seizures, deploy roving border patrols designed to stop vehicles randomly and question their occupants as to nationality. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell concluded that the Fourth Amendment “forbids stopping or detaining persons for questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be aliens,” id. at 884, 95 S.Ct. at 2581-82.
It is arguable that the INS agents who conducted the H&H operation did not satisfy the Brignoni-Ponce standard. Certainly there is nothing in the record to indicate that, before each petitioner — or, for that matter, before any other employee — was questioned as to his status, the inquiring agent entertained a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual was an alien. On the contrary, the record indicates that, prior to its “raid,” the INS knew only that some employees of H&H might have been illegal aliens; yet, the agents’ instructions were to interrogate every employee in the factory.
The majority arrives at its result by referring to Lee v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 590 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979), and by declaring that “the conduct of the INS agents at H&H Industries, although not exactly analogous to the conduct of the agents in Lee, meets the standards set forth in Lee.” Majority opinion, typescript op. at 296. In Lee, however, the Court was careful to identify a number of “specific factors” that the INS agent relied upon in arriving at his “reasonable suspicion” that Lee was an alien. Those factors included not only the agent’s pre-existing knowledge that a restaurant in the area had employed illegal aliens in the past, but also his detailed observations of the appearance, dress, language, and behavior of the suspect individual. 590 F.2d at 502. No such specific showing was made by the INS with respect to each petitioner questioned at H&H.
Primarily because broad-sweeping investigative procedures risk trenching upon the rights and liberties both of lawful aliens and of citizens, a number of courts have concluded that so-called “area control operations” similar to that conducted at H&H could not be reconciled with the commands of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, in Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (in banc), modifying 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976), aff’g 398 F.Supp. 882 (N.D.Ill.1975), the court enjoined the INS from stopping and questioning an individual as to his or her immigration status in the absence of a reasonable belief on the part of the agent that that individual was an alien. Pilliod involved, among other things, area control operations conducted within a number of workplaces. In one such operation found to violate the Fourth Amendment, thirty INS agents, following up an anonymous letter that alleged that illegal aliens were employed at a manufacturing plant in Mendota, Illinois, arrived at the plant, demanded to speak to the employees (95% of whom had Spanish surnames), interviewed nineteen workers, and arrested ten. 398 F.Supp. at 890-91. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the INS “had ample time to procure a search warrant” before commencing the Mendota raid, determined that “the district court was justified in concluding that ... successive interrogations of persons in factories violated the Fourth Amendment because these persons were singled out by the INS agents solely because they looked like Mexicans or had Spanish surnames.” 540 F.2d at 1070. To the same effect, see Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F.Supp. 100, 110-14 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (declaratory relief granted to plaintiffs who objected to INS area control operations).
It appears from the record, moreover, that the INS planned the H&H operation for an extended period of time. Given this information, it is difficult to understand why a warrant was not secured from a neutral magistrate before agents were ever deployed at the New Jersey factory. As Justice Harlan observed, albeit in another context, “under the Fourth Amendment, warrants are the general rule, to which the legitimate needs of law enforcement may demand specific exceptions.” Katz v. Unit*301ed States, 389 U.S. 347, 362, 88 S.Ct. 507, 517, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). See Blackie’s House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1217, 1223 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting that “the applicability of the Warrant Clause of the fourth amendment to INS enforcement activities can no longer be doubted,” and permitting an “area control operation” in a restaurant where INS agents had obtained a warrant).
Even were I to conclude, contrary to the majority, that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the INS operation at H&H — a conclusion, it should be stressed, that I do not reach — I would be constrained to dismiss these petitions for review. As is evident from the majority’s recitation of the facts, the record is not silent as to events that occurred after the action at H&H Industries. The petitioners were transported from the factory premises to an INS office in Newark. At that office, according to uncontradicted testimony, each petitioner was advised, in Polish, of the rights afforded to him under 8 C.F.R. § 287.3.3 Specifically, each petitioner was informed of his right to remain silent, of the fact that anything he said could be used against him at a deportation proceeding, and of his right to counsel. Each petitioner signed a statement, printed in Polish, waiving those rights. Five of the six petitioners then answered written questions. Each admitted to being a citizen of Poland, a holder of a tourist visa, and an employee of H&H Industries. The sixth petitioner in this case apparently did not provide the Service with similar written admissions, but his passport, which established that he was a Polish citizen who had overstayed his visa, was obtained by the INS and was introduced at his deportation hearing. Specifically, the Board of Immigration Appeals found that “[rjespondent Kowalczuk’s father-in-law gave these documents to an [INS] investigator” and that “[t]here was no objection to this delivery.” Record at 4.
Petitioners argue that because they were “unlawfully” apprehended at H&H, any evidence obtained from them at Newark should be suppressed as the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-87, 83 S.Ct. 407, 415-17, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). It is an open question whether or not some variant of the exclusionary rule exists to prevent the introduction in a deportation proceeding of evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 Even were this question to be resolved in the affirmative, however, it does not follow that all evidence acquired after a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred must be ignored — especially, where, as here, that evidence was volunteered by petitioners and is dispositive on the issue of deportability. The Supreme Court, in a recent criminal case which elaborated on Wong Sun, determined that, in certain instances, an otherwise valid confession could be suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). Rather than formulate a per se rule, though, the Court concluded that the “question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case.” Relevant factors to be considered in this connec*302tion include: whether the defendant received Miranda warnings; the “temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession”; the “presence of intervening circumstances”; and “the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. at 2261-62.
Even assuming that the principle of suppression enunciated in Brown is applicable in the deportation context — another question that need not be answered here — the facts in this case, in my view, do not compel suppression of petitioners’ Newark statements or Kowalczuk’s passport. For a number of reasons, I believe that “the causal connection between the statements and the [allegedly] illegal arrest is broken sufficiently to purge the primary taint of the [allegedly] illegal arrest,” Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2252, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). First, petitioners’ Newark “confessions” and Kowalczuk’s papers were secured at a time and place substantially removed from the events at H&H Industries. Second, INS officials in Newark complied in all respects with the due process and evidentiary requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3. In this regard, the Board of Immigration Appeals specifically found that “each [petitioner] was given a form which advised him in Polish of his right[s].” Record at 5. The record contains these forms, signed by the petitioners. Third, while it perhaps could be argued that foreign-speaking persons, removed at night from their workplace and transported to a strange locale for questioning, can never be sufficiently free of coercion to cooperate willingly with INS officials, petitioners advance no such argument here. Indeed, they never contend that the statements they provided to investigators at the Newark office were anything other than voluntarily obtained. Moreover, the Board found that all of the petitioners’ admissions — even those given to agents at the factory itself— were “voluntarily made.” Record at 7 — 8. Finally while INS investigators during the area control operation may have violated the Fourth Amendment, it would be difficult to hold without more that their conduct was “flagrant” or “obvious[ly]” improper, Brown, supra, 422 U.S. at 604, 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262. This would seem particularly so here inasmuch as today’s majority concludes that no constitutional rights of petitioners were violated whatsoever.
In sum, there is nothing in the record to indicate that what happened at H&H, “even assuming arguendo that it was illegal, bore a relationship to the information furnished hours later at the Service office,” In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N.Dec. (BIA 1979) (Appleman, Board Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the absence of any allegation, much less any substantiation, of undue influence on the free will of petitioners, I would not hold that the behavior of the agents at H&H Industries somehow “tainted” the information that was voluntarily obtained from petitioners in Newark.5
The task of a court of appeals, in reviewing a deportation order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals, is to determine whether that order is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). In my view, the documents obtained from a relative of petitioner Kow-alczuk, and the admissions made by petitioners at the Newark INS office, after they had been informed of and had freely waived their rights, constitute clear and convincing evidence of their deportability. Assuming arguendo that petitioners were seized at H&H in contravention of the Fourth Amendment, and assuming that any statements they made at that time should therefore be suppressed, there remains in *303the record sufficient untainted documentation to establish that petitioners Drzymala, Weszandize, Pilat, and Kowalczuk had overstayed their tourist visas in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2), and that petitioners Ba-bula and Lone had engaged in unauthorized employment in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(9). Accordingly, I would affirm the Board’s orders and deny the petitions presented for review on this appeal.

. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 569, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947) (constitutional pronouncements should not be rendered “in broader terms than are required by the precise facts to which the ruling is to be applied” or “if the record presents some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of”).

. Although the Supreme Court as of yet has not spoken definitively in this area, it would appear that some degree of protection under the Fourth Amendment is afforded to aliens illegally present within the country, given that the very language of that Amendment speaks of “the right of the people” and not the rights of “citizens.” Cf. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953).

. The relevant portion of 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 is quoted in the majority opinion at 297. As the majority points out, the regulation was amended by the INS subsequent to petitioners’ arrest.

. The Board of Immigration Appeals, in 1979, concluded, over a strong dissent, that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was not applicable in deportation proceedings. See In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 1979). The federal courts have yet to resolve the matter. Compare Wong Chung Che v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 565 F.2d 166, 169 (1st Cir. 1977) with Smith v. Morris, 442 F.Supp. 712, 714 (E.D.Pa.1977), appeal dismissed on other grounds sub nom. Smith v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 585 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1978). See Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Administrative Adjudicatory Proceedings, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 343, 371-78 (1981); Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Proceedings: A Time for Alternatives, 14 J. Int’l L. & Econ. 349 (1980); Note, Immigration — In re Sandoval: Deportation and the Exclusionary Rule, 58 N.C.L.Rev. 647 (1980).

. Cf. Avila-Gallegos v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 525 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1975); Huerta-Cabrera v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 466 F.2d 759, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1972); 1A C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure 5-117 (rev. ed. 1981) (“impropriety in procuring evidence does not exempt the respondent from deportability, and his deportation can properly be ordered on untainted evidence").