Court Opinion

ID: 9656709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:57:02.04903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:34.787416
License: Public Domain

DUANE BENTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Because the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion in holding trial in St. Louis County, I dissent.
This Court recites the proper test:
not whether the community remembers the case, but whether the actual jurors have fixed opinions such that they could not judge impartially whether the defendant was guilty [citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889, 81 L.Ed.2d 847, 855 (1984) ].
Therefore, much of this Court’s discussion — particularly of the public-opinion poll and of the jury’s awareness of media reports — is dicta. True, one juror initially said that media reports made him believe *652the defendant was guilty. He, however, later swore — under repeated questioning by counsel and the judge — that he could* disregard that opinion and decide the case based on the evidence. The trial judge’s determination of credibility is entitled to “special deference” and should be reversed only for “manifest error.” Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038, 1031-32, 104 S.Ct. at 2892, 2888-89, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858, 854. See State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Molasky, 655 S.W.2d 663, 665-67 (Mo.App.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1049, 104 S.Ct. 727, 79 L.Ed.2d 187 (1984); Provenzano v. Florida, 497 So.2d 1177, 1183 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1024, 107 S.Ct. 1912, 95 L.Ed.2d 518 (1987).
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has reviewed the extensiveness of voir dire, in order to determine whether a fair trial can be held in a particular place. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038, 104 S.Ct. at 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d at 858; Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-03, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036-38, 44 L.Ed.2d 589, 595-97 (1975); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556-57, 82 S.Ct. 955, 963-64, 8 L.Ed.2d 98, 111-12 (1962). See also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431-32, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1908, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 509-10 (1991). Here, voir dire lasted two, long days— from 9:03 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. until late in the evening — to pick 15 jurors from 99 veniremembers. In this case, “the testimony suggests that the voir dire resulted in selecting those who had forgotten or would need to be persuaded again.” Patton, 467 U.S. at 1034, 104 S.Ct. at 2890, 81 L.Ed.2d at 856. See United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1213-15 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027, 105 S.Ct. 3501, 87 L.Ed.2d 632 (1985).
The circuit judge reasoned that the passage of nine years since the shooting in May 1992 allowed a fair trial in St. Louis County. “The voir dire testimony revealed that this lapse in time had a profound effect on the community and, more important, on the jury in softening and effacing opinion.” Patton, 467 U.S. at 1033, 104 S.Ct. at 2889, 81 L.Ed.2d at 855. While the United States Supreme Court has not identified any particular lapse of time that in itself permits a fair trial, that Court approved a trial held four-and-a-half years after the crime, in a relatively rural county where the crime occurred. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1026-28, 104 S.Ct. at 2886-87, 81 L.Ed.2d at 851-52. This Court has affirmed a trial held six-and-a-half years after a widely-publicized series of murders in the St. Louis area. State v. Leisure, 749 S.W.2d 366, 376 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 932, 109 S.Ct. 324, 102 L.Ed.2d 342 (1988), on habeas review as Leisure v. Bowersox, 990 F.Supp. 769, 795-97 (E.D.Mo.1998).
In this case, this Court rules that holding the trial where the shooting occurred is “inherently prejudicial.” Having state witnesses as custodians of the jury—as happened in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965)—is a structural defect that is inherently prejudicial. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 (1991). A closer analogy to the present case is the use of extra, identifiable security guards in the courtroom — which is not inherently prejudicial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, 533-34 (1986). In terms of jurors, presence of alternates with the deliberating jury is not inherently prejudicial. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1781, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 523 (1993). Equally, photographic or broadcast coverage of criminal trials is not inherently prejudicial. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 574, 101 S.Ct. 802, 809, 66 L.Ed.2d 740, 751 (1981). Nor is misjoinder of defendants inherently prejudicial. United States v. Lane, 474 *653U.S. 438, 446, 106 S.Ct. 725, 730, 88 L.Ed.2d 814, 823 (1986).
No doubt, the State may not personalize its case by suggesting personal danger to the jurors. State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 901 (Mo. banc 1995). This record shows nothing like that. This Court’s references (at footnotes 6-7) are tepid, passing comments. No juror would have thought he or she were one of the victims — the defendant’s spouse, the attorneys, the bailiffs, law enforcement, or a judge.
If facts were disputed, the jurors’ awareness of the scene, beyond the evidence, could be reversible error. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751, 756 (1961). The disputed issues here — state of mind, deliberation, and appropriate sentence- — are not affected by holding trial in the building where the murder occurred. “It is not required ... that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved.” Id. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d at 756.
I believe the defendant received a fair and impartial trial, free of the influence of pretrial publicity, a huge wave of public passion or an inflammatory atmosphere. St. Louis County — with over a million citizens, larger than seven of the states- — was a proper venue for this case.