Court Opinion

ID: 9761029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:29:37.276372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:54.375855
License: Public Domain

FENNER, Judge,
dissenting.
Dr. Lai was the emergency room physician. David Carlyle was transferred from the emergency room to the intensive care unit at approximately 5:15 a.m. on August 7,1984. This was approximately two hours and forty-five minutes after his admission in the emergency room. David was transferred from Dr. Lai’s care on orders from Dr. Folkner who was his family doctor as well as the admitting and attending physician. Dr. Folkner also authorized Dr. Lai to call a surgeon in on the case.
When David was taken to the intensive care unit his vital signs were stable, his skin was indicative of hydration and his orientation was improved from the time of his admission to the emergency room. On admission to the intensive care unit David was alert, coherent and cooperative.
Dr. Hanna was the surgeon on call at the time of David’s admission. Dr. Lai attempted to contact Dr. Hanna at 3:30 a.m. Dr. Hanna could not then be contacted, but he was finally contacted by the police at 5:30 a.m. Dr. Hanna arrived at the hospital twenty minutes later. Dr. Hanna did not operate on David upon his arrival at the hospital, but performed elective surgery on another patient.
At 9:00 a.m. David’s condition changed; he became restless and confused. At 10:50 a.m., approximately five and one-half hours after he left the emergency room, David went into respiratory distress and died. The experts who testified on behalf of Dr. Lai stated that David could have been saved if Dr. Hanna had acted properly in performing surgery on David upon Dr. Hanna’s arrival at the hospital.
The majority bases its reversal upon the testimony, at trial, of David’s mother, Mrs. Kramer, in regard to when she first retained an attorney and the subsequent argument to the jury on this issue. The applicable testimony was as follows:
Q. Ma’am, your son died on August 7th of 1984, did he not?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. And just 15 days after he died, you hired Mr. Rahm to sue in this matter, did you not?
MR. RAHM: Your Honor, I object to that, and I think that’s entirely improper and obviously—
MR. TURNER: That’s a speaking objection.
MR. RAHM: I move that the question be stricken.
THE COURT: Overruled, proceed.
Q. (By Mr. Turner) Ma’am, that’s a fact, isn’t it? Just 15 days after your son died, you hired Mr. Rahm to prosecute an action in this case, didn’t you?
MR. RAHM: Your Honor, I object. That’s irrelevant and immaterial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
Q. (By Mr. Turner) Didn’t you ma’am?
A. Yes, I did.
The majority correctly states that to warrant a new trial, the question to Ms. Kramer must be irrelevant and prejudicial. Roque v. Kaw Transport Company, 697 S.W.2d 254 (Mo.App.1985); Dent v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 231 Mo.App. 283, 98 S.W.2d 123, 125 (1936). Simply asking an irrelevant question does not merit reversal.
The test for relevancy applied in Missouri is whether an offered fact tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue or corroborates other relevant evidence. Lawson v. Schumacher & Blum Chevrolet, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Mo.App.1985). The amount of proof required to meet the rele*931vancy threshold is attained when the truth of the offered fact makes probable the existence of the fact in issue. Id. Because of the obvious subjective nature of such a determination, the trial court is granted broad discretion which will be disturbed by this court only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. Non-prejudicial error will not justify reversal of a judgment by an appellate court. Roque v. Kaw Transport Company, 697 S.W.2d 257.
There were many instances throughout the trial that the appellants challenged Dr. Lai’s memory of the events of August 7, 1984. There were many questions asked of Dr. Lai to which he stated he could not respond because he did not remember the details to the extent that counsel inquired. As might be expected in a case of this nature, there were efforts made by opposing counsel to discredit Dr. Lai, to show that he had something to hide and that he was not truthful with the jury.
The facts in this case were clearly at issue and the credibility of the witnesses was a matter to be decided by the jury. There were matters before the jury that could make relevant the point in time that the respective parties began to prepare their side of the case and the resulting effect on their ability to recall the facts. Furthermore, in opening statement appellant’s counsel advised the jury that he had been involved with the case for four years. By virtue of this statement, thé jury was already aware that the appellants had obtained counsel shortly after their son’s death. Trial was in September of 1988 and David Carlyle died in August of 1984.
I do not approve of the plaintiffs being asked in this cause when they hired their attorney, but under the facts of this case I do not believe that it was an abuse of discretion, which resulted in prejudice, for the trial judge to overrule counsel’s objection to the question at issue. There cannot be a finding of prejudice when the information of which appellants complain was already placed before the jury by the appellants themselves.
The majority opinion also places significance on the fact that, in closing argument, respondent’s counsel referenced when appellants hired counsel. However, it should be noted that there was no objection to, this argument. Where no objection is made at the time of an opponent’s argument of which complaint is made on appeal, the objection is waived. Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 616 (Mo. banc 1969).
This was a lengthy and involved trial that lasted five days and is recorded by 1438 pages of transcript. Testimony was presented to the jury from twenty-three different witnesses, fifteen of whom were physicians. The trial judge was in a far superior position than this court to determine the prejudicial effect, if any, of the question which covers twenty-one lines, inclusive of objections, on one page of the record, in reference to a subject that was initially brought up by the appellants.
To find prejudice against the respondents on this matter is tantamount to finding prejudice against the appellants because appellants’ counsel argued that when opposing counsel came to court on the first day of trial “with all the lawyers from his other offices, and with all those briefcases, I knew right then that they knew they were in big trouble, that this was going to be a big case, to have him coming over here from Great Bend, Kansas ... he’ll be back in Kansas doing the same thing next week.”
The point is that lawyers sometimes become overzealous and do not always conduct themselves in the most appropriate fashion possible, but it is for the trial judge to determine the effect of such conduct on the jury.
There was substantial evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict and the record does not support a finding by this court of prejudicial error. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.