Court Opinion

ID: 9732651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:29:57.209133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:27.875483
License: Public Domain

V. J. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). Defendant, the Secretary of State, appeals from a decision of the Wayne County Circuit Court in which William Robert Dillon, the father of David Gary Dillon, was awarded damages against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund for the loss of services of his son. Defendant argues that MCLA 257.1123; MSA 9.2823 bars any recovery on the part of the father since the son recovered the full amount allowed by *595that section.1 The trial judge, Judge Theodore R. Bohn, held that the father was not limited by his son’s recovery and, therefore, held that the father was entitled to recover the amount of his judgment. My colleagues, reversing the trial judge, believe that the statute is clear and that it limits the plaintiffs to one recovery. I respectfully disagree and adopt the trial judge’s opinion in this matter, as reproduced below, as my dissent:
"In the present matter, minor plaintiff David Gary Dillon, injured in an accident between a motorcycle upon which he was a passenger and a 'phantom vehicle,’ (one that leaves the scene of the accident and cannot be identified) has been awarded a judgment of $20,082.00 against the Secretary of State for his injuries. His father, William Robert Dillon, was awarded a separate judgment of $8,031.98 for loss of services of his son. Upon application by plaintiff to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund for payment, the Fund allowed plaintiff David Gary Dillon payment of $12,334.77 in order to cover the $10,000 statutory ceiling, plus interest and costs. The judgment in favor of William Robert Dillon was disallowed in its entirety. The Fund’s reason for disallowing the claim was that since William’s claim was based solely on David’s bodily injuries and resultant inability to perform services for William, the limitation in the Fund was invoked after David received his $10,000.00 plus costs. Plaintiffs have now moved for a determination of the amount of judgment payable by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, MCLA 257.1101 et seq.
"The applicable sections of the statutes read as follows:
" 'MCLA 257.1107_
*596"' Section 7 (1)* * * where a person recovers in any court in this state a judgment for damages on account of injury to or the death of any person or property damage occasioned in this state by an uninsured motor vehicle * * * he may make application, in the form prescribed by the secretary and the secretary shall pay the amount of the judgment * * * subject to the limitations provided in this act with respect to death or personal injury * * * .’ [Emphasis supplied.]
" 'MCLA 257.1123
"'Section 23 (]_)*** the secretary shall not pay out of the fund, (a) more than $10,000.00, exclusive of costs on account of injury to or the death of one person, and, subject to such limit for any one person so injured or killed, not more than $20,000.00, exclusive of costs, on account of injury to or the death of 2 or more persons in any one accident;’ [Emphasis supplied.]
"The issue to be resolved is whether plaintiff William Robert Dillon is entitled to a separate $10,000.00 limit on his derivative claim as an injured person under MCLA 257.1123.
"There are no Michigan cases arising under the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act which deal with the language at issue. There is however a long history of interpretation of similar limitation clauses in insurance contracts.
"In such cases it is generally held that a limitation of 'personal injuries’ allows separate claims for consequential damages invoking a separate limit, while a limitation using the words 'bodily injuries’ limits the covered damages to those of the party physically injured. See 13 ALR3d 1228, 1244. Among the jurisdictions following this interpretation are Florida, (Malone v Costa, 151 Fla 144, 9 So 2d 275 (1942), New Jersey, (Nuzzi v United States Casualty Co, 122 NJL 249, 1 A2d 890 (1938), New York, (Goodier v National Surety Co, 125 Misc 65, 210 NYS 88 (1925), (Bakker v Aetna Life Insurance Co (1933), 148 Misc 162, 265 NYS 231, affd 240 App Div 880, 267 NYS 956, affd 264 NY 150, 190 NE 327, Gaouette v Aetna Life Ins Co, 253 App Div 388, 2 NYS2d 497 (1938) * * * .
"A Michigan case cited by defendants, Pastucha v *597Roth, 290 Mich 1 [287 NW 355] (1939), held that a limitation of 'bodily injury liability’ applied to the aggregate amount of both injured son’s recovery and the father’s claim for expenses. One limit per son was allowed. However, this case is in line with the distinction made in other jurisdictions between 'personal injury’ claims and 'bodily injury’ claims.
"One may note that the statutes involved use the terms 'injury’ and 'personal injury’ interchangeably. The insurance cases involved tend to construe any ambiguity against the insurance company. Pastucha v Roth, 290 Mich 1, 13. Two of the New York cases cited, supra, Bakker v Aetna Life Insurance Co, and Gaouette v Aetna Life Ins Co, dealt with policies that used the terms 'bodily injury’ and 'personal injury’ interchangeably. Both cases applied the more liberal 'personal recovery’ standards in line with the policy of resolving any ambiguities against the insurer.
"The cases cited above are all insurance cases. The question remaining is whether the policies outlined in these cases apply to a state managed fund. Plaintiffs cite a New York Memorandum Opinion, Morisi v Motor Vehicle Accident Indem Corp, 19 AD2d 727 (1963) which holds that a husband of an injured person is a 'qualified person’ to sue for loss of services under the New York act. MCLA 257.1112 dealing with unidentified motorists specifically authorizes a derivative suit in Michigan when it states ' * * * any person who would have a cause of action against the owner or driver in respect to the death or personal injury may bring an action against the secretary * * * .’
"While this Court is aware that when applying insurance law to the Fund, that the purpose of the two are not the same, the fact remains that the Legislature used the words 'injury’ and 'personal injury’ which seems clearly to include derivative actions of spouses and parents.
"Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a liberal statutory construction because the statute is remedial. In Steele v Wilson, 29 Mich App 388, 392 [185 NW2d 417] (1971) the first division Court mentioned: 'Both parties to this litigation agree that the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act is remedial in nature.’ The Court *598then cited approvingly a New Jersey case arising under a similar New Jersey Statute. Gray v Tice, 52 NJ Super 309, 145 A2d 353, 355 (1958) held that interpretation of the Act should be not literal but liberal ' * * * when a liberal construction thereof will * * * support its reason and spirit as a whole.’ Steele v Wilson, supra, was cited in Lisee v Secretary of State, 32 Mich App 548, 556 [189 NW2d 50] (1971) as holding that the Act was remedial in nature and should be liberally construed.
"Two Michigan Supreme Court cases have discussed the definitions of remedial statutes versus those in derogation of common law. These two cases, Hansen-Snyder Co v General Motors Corp, 371 Mich 480 [124 NW2d 286] (1963) and Ballog v Knight Newspapers, Inc, 381 Mich 527 [164 NW2d 19] (1969) both dealt with the question of whether an amendment to a statute was remedial and, therefore, retrospective, or substantive and, therefore, to be applied prospectively. The definition of a remedial statute that emerges from these two cases is a statute that modifies a remedy or procedure for enforcing an existing right. If the statute does not disturb vested rights or create new liabilities between parties it is remedial. Applying this doctrine, one may argue that creation of the fund is creation of a procedure for satisfying a claim that had existed at common law. Ballog v Knight, supra, held that a change in the interest on judgments is a procedural change even though it expanded liability of defendants to some extent. If the interest increase in Ballog was a procedural matter, it is possible to analogize and say satisfaction from a fund created to satisfy judgments is also a procedural matter, since it comes into action after a common law tort liability is established. For this reason, this Court adopts the reasoning of the first division Michigan Court of Appeals, in its ruling that the statute is remedial and should be construed liberally in favor of plaintiffs. (In re School Dist No 6, 284 Mich 132, 144 [278 NW 972] (1938), Rookledge v Garwood, 340 Mich 444 [65 NW2d 785] (1954).
"The terms 'injury’ and 'personal injury’ as used in the limitation clauses have been interpreted in many jurisdictions to include derivative suits such as that of *599plaintiff William Robert Dillon. Giving the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act a liberal construction as a remedial statute, plaintiff William Robert Dillon is entitled to a separate limit under the act, and may recover on his judgment.”
I would also reject defendants’ equal protection challenge to the above interpretation of the statute. The above interpretation speaks in terms of the rights of those who have suffered consequential damages, not merely the rights of minors or the rights of parents of minor children. The classification upon which this argument is based simply does not exist.
I would affirm.

 MCLA 257.1123; MSA 9.2823 was amended by 1971 PA 119 to raise the limit for the death or injury of one person to $20,000. This amendment, however, applies only to "motor vehicle accidents occurring in this state on or after [October 1, 1971]”. Since the accident here occurred on August 28, 1967, the action is governed by the $10,000 limitation.