Court Opinion

ID: 9687975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:55:52.102244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:33.871662
License: Public Domain

Newton, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion. Decree of divorce was entered herein on May 7, 1970, following a hearing at which both parties were represented by able counsel. A stipulation had been entered into regarding disposition of the property of the parties, custody of a minor daughter, and one unborn child, child support for the children including the one not born, and medical expenses. On October 26, 1970, plaintiff filed her petition for an increase in child support payments previously fixed at $150 per month by stipulation incorporated in the decree. The court decreed an increase to $200 per month.
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was earning $260 per month, her apartment rent, with utilities included, was $135 per month, defendant’s salary was. $745 per month and remains unchanged. Plaintiff moved to Sidney, Nebraska, and is presently employed at a salary of $320 per month. She has purchased a house carrying monthly payments of $80 and has utilities expense of $35 per month. She had an automobile before the divorce *83and there has been no change in transportation expense except that she has purchased a new car and is making payments of $50 per month. She states her baby-sitting expense has increased by about $45 per month and wishes to stend the 3%-year-old daughter to preschool at a cost of $100 per month. Her house expense is now $20 per month less than the rent she formerly paid and with each payment she increases her equity in the house. S'he now enjoys a salary increase of $60 per month. These factors nearly offset the increase in car payments and baby-sitter’s fees. The only new element of consequence is plaintiff’s presently conceived desire to send her child to preschool which is not ordinarily considered necessary for a child’s welfare and has not been shown to be such in the present case.
It is a rule of long standing that any application for modification of a divorce decree with respect to care, custody, and maintenance of minor children must be founded on new facts which have arisen since entry of the decree. See Hossack v. Hossack, 176 Neb. 368, 126 N. W. 2d 166. In the present instance modification of the decree was sought within 6 months of its entry. Under such circumstances the court has power to vacate or modify the decree. See § 42-340, R. R. S. 1943.
The right to set aside or modify a divorce decree within 6 months is not absolute but must be exercised within a sound judicial discretion. Good reason must be shown for such action. See, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 176 Neb. 768, 127 N. W. 2d 503; Zachry v. Zachry, 185 Neb. 336, 175 N. W. 2d 616. Here we have a stipulation regarding the matter at issue entered into by the parties knowingly, willingly, and with advice of competent counsel. No substantial change in circumstances appears, no deceit is charged or proved, and no good reason for modifying the stipulation and decree is shown. The order modifying the original decree should be reversed.
If the rule mentioned above is not followed, the trial *84judge will be at liberty to tinker with divorce decrees at will during the 6-month period following entry of decree.