Court Opinion

ID: 9949341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:11:30.506764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:30:25.114509
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 7, 2024

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                              NO. 01-23-00164-CV
                            ———————————
                      DIOGU KALU DIOGU II Appellant
                                        V.
               DAVID MELANSON, DENISE ROBBINS,
          EDDIE M. KRENEK, AND TRICIA KRENEK, Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 434th District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 21-DCV-280847

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Diogu Kalu Diogu II filed a notice of appeal challenging the order

of the Presiding Judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region of Texas dated

February 3, 2023, denying his motion to recuse District Court Judge Christian

Becerra. Diogu’s notice of appeal states that the Administrative Judge’s order
“subsumes a prior order of Judge Becerra” declaring him a vexatious litigant. Thus,

it appears Diogu also challenges Judge Becerra’s order granting Appellee David

Melanson’s motion to declare Diogu a vexatious litigant, signed on July 15, 2021.

      Appellees David Melanson, Denise Robbins, Eddie M. Krenek, and Tricia

Krenek filed a Motion to Dismiss Diogu’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing

that “[b]ecause [Diogu] presents no live controversy for this Court to decide, this

appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Diogu filed a

response and amended response to Appellees’ motion. In his amended response,

Appellant argues that Judge Becerra’s July 15, 2021 order affirming Associate Judge

Argie Brame’s order declaring him a vexatious litigant “was void ab [sic] intio and

had no legal effect” because Diogu “objected to a hearing before the Associate

Judge[,] . . . . [who] was, therefore precluded from continuing with the hearing and/or

entering an [o]rder as a result of the hearing.”

      We grant Appellees’ motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a); see also State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6

(Tex. 2018). All pending motions are denied as moot.

                                           2
                                        Background

      On February 11, 2021, Diogu filed suit in Fort Bend District Court against

David Melanson, Denise Robbins, Eddie M. Krenek, and Tricia Krenek.1 The case

was assigned to the 434th District Court, Fort Bend County, Judge Christian Becerra

presiding. After Diogu filed his lawsuit, Appellee David Melanson moved to have

Diogu declared a vexatious litigant and to require him to post a bond to proceed.

Judge Becerra referred the motion to Associate Judge Brame.2 Judge Brame held a

hearing and signed an order on May 27, 2021, declaring Diogu a vexatious litigant

and ordering him to post a $30,000 bond to continue his lawsuit, noting that failure

to do so would result in dismissal of the case with prejudice. Diogu requested de

novo review of Judge Brame’s order.

      Judge Becerra held a de novo hearing, and on July 15, 2021, he signed an

order granting Melanson’s motion. He declared Diogu a vexatious litigant and

ordered him to post a bond in the amount of $30,000 to proceed. Diogu did not pay

the bond. Instead, on July 15, 2021, he filed a notice of nonsuit, resulting in an order

of dismissal signed by Judge Brame on July 20, 2021, dismissing Diogu’s case

without prejudice.

1
      It is not clear what claims Diogu filed against the named defendants because his
      petition in the underlying case is not included in the record.
2
      See TEX GOV’T CODE § 54A.106 (judge may refer cases to associate judge for
      resolution).

                                           3
       Over a year later, on December 12, 2022, in an ex-parte letter sent to then-

Administrative Judge of the 268th District Court, Fort Bend County, O’Neil

Williams, Diogu claimed Judge Becerra’s vexatious-litigant order was “void as a

matter of law,” and he requested that Judge Williams remove him from the

vexatious-litigant list. On December 20, 2022, Judge Williams signed Diogu’s

proposed order, removing him from the vexatious-litigant list.

      Upon learning of Judge Williams’ order on December 27, 2022, Melanson

filed a motion before Judge Becerra requesting emergency relief.          Melanson

requested that Judge Williams’ order be declared void and that Judge Becerra’s prior

vexatious-litigant order be confirmed as valid. Judge Becerra held a hearing on

Melanson’s emergency motion and on December 28, 2022, he entered an order

declaring Judge Williams’ order void ab initio and confirming his July 15, 2021

vexatious-litigant order.3

      On December 28, 2022, Diogu filed a motion to recuse Judge Becerra and

Judge Brame. Judge Becerra declined to recuse himself and referred Diogu’s motion

to the Administrative Judge of the Eleventh Administrative Judicial Region for a

ruling. The Administrative Judge denied Diogu’s motion to recuse on February 3,

2023. This appeal followed.

3
      On December 29, 2022, Judge Williams entered a docket entry, reversing and
      declaring his December 20, 2022 order void.

                                         4
                                    Discussion

A.    Order Declaring Diogu a Vexatious Litigant

      To the extent Diogu challenges Judge Becerra’s order declaring him a

vexatious litigant, Diogu’s appeal is untimely. Pursuant to Section 11.101(c) of the

Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, an appeal of a vexatious-litigant order

must be filed “within twenty days of the order’s issuance.” See Manning v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 08-20-00211-CV, 2021 WL 365914, at *2 (Tex. App.—El

Paso Feb. 3, 2021, no pet.) (holding vexatious-litigant order is interlocutory and

subject to same time deadlines as other interlocutory appeals).

      Judge Becerra entered his order declaring Diogu a vexatious litigant on July

15, 2021. Diogu did not file his notice of appeal until March 6, 2023, almost two

years after he was declared a vexatious litigant. Even assuming the appellate

timetable started on December 28, 2022—the date on which Judge Becerra declared

Judge Williams’ order void and confirmed his July 15, 2021 order—Diogu’s notice

of appeal is still untimely because it was filed more than twenty days after the

December 28, 2022 order. See id. We thus lack jurisdiction to consider Diogu’s

challenge to Judge Becerra’s vexatious-litigant order. See Margetis v. Bayview Loan

Servicing, LLC, 553 S.W.3d 643, 644 (Tex. App.—Waco 2018, no pet.) (holding

court of appeals did not have jurisdiction over trial court’s order finding appellant

vexatious litigant because appellant did not file notice of appeal within time

                                         5
specified); Restrepo v. All. Riggers & Constructors, Ltd., No. 08–15–00011–CV,

2015 WL 999950, at *2 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 4, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(same).

B.    The Administrative Judge’s Order

      In his notice of appeal, Diogu challenges the order from the Administrative

Judge denying Diogu’s motion to recuse Judge Becerra, claiming Judge Becerra

“declined to recuse himself, and acted in contravention of T[exas] R[ules] [of]

C[ivil] P[rocedure] 18a.”

      Diogu’s appeal of this order is moot. “A case becomes moot when (1) a

justiciable controversy no longer exists between the parties, (2) the parties no longer

have a legally cognizable interest in the case's outcome, (3) the court can no longer

grant the requested relief or otherwise affect the parties’ rights or interests, or (4)

any decision would constitute an impermissible advisory opinion.” Elec. Reliability

Council of Texas, Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619

S.W.3d 628, 634-35 (Tex. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Zipp v. Wuemling, 218

S.W.3d 71, 73 (Tex. 2007) (“An appeal is moot when a court’s action on the merits

cannot affect the rights of the parties.”).

      Diogu filed a notice of nonsuit in the trial court on July 15, 2021. The trial

court signed an order of dismissal on July 20, 2021, effectively dismissing Diogu’s

case, then pending before Judge Becerra, without prejudice. Diogu thus

                                              6
“extinguished [his] case or controversy” against Appellees. See Univ. of Texas Med.

Branch at Galveston v. Est. of Blackmon ex rel. Shultz, 195 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex.

2006).

      Diogu’s motion to recuse Judge Becerra, filed on December 28, 2022, was

filed more than a year after the trial court signed its order of dismissal. Diogu did

not refile his claims nor was there any pending case or claims when Diogu filed his

motion. Diogu’s appeal from the denial of his motion to recuse is thus moot. See

Fears v. Box, No. 05-95-01671-CV, 1997 WL 36972, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan.

31, 1997, writ denied) (holding motion to recuse judge as moot because trial court

granted appellant’s request for nonsuit). There is no controversy left to decide

between the parties, and we will not depart from the “axiomatic” command “that

appellate courts do not decide cases in which no controversy exists between the

parties.” Camarena v. Texas Emp. Comm’n., 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988).

C.    Damages

      Appellees request that we award damages against Diogu on the ground that

his appeal is “objectively frivolous.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 45. “Rule 45 does not

mandate that this [C]ourt award just damages in every case in which an appeal is

frivolous; rather the decision to award such damages is a matter within this [C]ourt’s

discretion, which we exercise with prudence and caution after careful deliberation.”

                                          7
Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2011). Upon due consideration, we deny Appellees’ request for damages.

                                             Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Countiss, and Rivas-Molloy.

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