Court Opinion

ID: 9692282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:54.082631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.920707
License: Public Domain

Brown, C. J., and CuHrie and Gordon, JJ.
(dissenting). Millay was permitted over objection to testify as to Russell’s speed. The trial court treated the relationship of Millay and Russell as a head-on approach by Russell from the opposite direction. In the majority opinion it is also assumed that the two vehicles were facing in opposite directions. This court has often said that an estimate of speed has little or no probative value under such circumstances. Maccaux v. Princl (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 44, 48, 87 N. W. *338(2d) 772; Fessler v. Northwestern National Casualty Co. (1953), 265 Wis. 14, 60 N. W. (2d) 387; Dahinden v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co. (1919), 169 Wis. 1, 171 N. W. 669.
The majority opinion points out that such testimony was held admissible in Albrecht v. Tradewell (1955), 271 Wis. 303, 311, 73 N. W. (2d) 408. However, the Albrecht Case did not overrule the earlier decisions in express terms, although the Fessler Case was distinguished.
In our opinion, it is quite impossible to estimate the speed of a vehicle which is approaching head on from the opposite direction. Indeed it is extremely difficult even to determine whether such a vehicle is stopped or traveling away from one. If the witness is in a position SO' that he has a degree of angle with reference to a vehicle which is approaching generally from the opposite direction, his testimony as to such vehicle’s speed may have value. However, when the approach is directly head on, we consider it proper for the trial judge, upon objection, to conclude that an estimate of the speed is unworthy of admission into evidence.
We are also not convinced that the trial court abused its discretion in assigning the grounds of improper argument as a basis for its having granted a new trial in the interest of justice. We can appreciate why the majority do not regard the arguments of counsel as having been so improper as to warrant a new trial. The segments of the arguments which are recited are not particularly offensive; however, the text of the arguments is not before us. Without the benefit of the exact language used, we are disinclined to find that the trial judge erred in his conclusion that the arguments “tended to inflame the jury.”
The majority opinion in effect finds that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on the ground of improper argument because of “the absence of an expres*339sion by the court that in its opinion the verdict was higher than it would have been in the absence of these remarks.” Since the only issue submitted to the jury concerned damages, the trial court’s very act of directing a new trial in the interest of justice, because of improper argument of counsel, necessarily implied that the jury’s answer to the damage question was affected by the improper argument. If this were not so, then the trial court would not have determined that a new trial was required in the interest of justice.
In the trial court’s memorandum opinion on motions after verdict the court stated:
“It is not necessary to relate in detail the complete nature of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, except to say that the sum of $10,000 awarded for personal injuries is high. The question presents itself as to whether or not, under the circumstances herein involved, the court has the power to determine the reasonable amount of plaintiff’s damages, or of having a new trial on the issue of damages.”
The memorandum opinion then quoted Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 78, 102 N. W. (2d) 393, and stated that the trial court was precluded under the rule of the Powers Case from granting plaintiff the option of remitting the excess damages or of having a new trial when the court had committed error. This is further evidence that the court considered that the improper argument affected the jury’s award of damages.
We therefore conclude that the trial judge was justified in granting a new trial, and his order should be affirmed.