Court Opinion

ID: 9959105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 17:01:17.476845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:27.647403
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8040     Document: 010111029863      Date Filed: 04/10/2024       Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          April 10, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  DAVID LEE SHULICK,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 23-8040
                                                    (D.C. No. 2:21-CV-00202-SWS)
  STATE OF WYOMING; WYOMING                                    (D. Wyo.)
  DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
  WYOMING DEPARTMENT
  OF ADMINISTRATION &
  INFORMATION -- HUMAN
  RESOURCES,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       David Lee Shulick appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

 judgment in favor of his former employer, the Wyoming Department of Corrections

 (WDOC), in his suit alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, hostile work

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8040    Document: 010111029863       Date Filed: 04/10/2024     Page: 2

 environment, and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the

 Rehabilitation Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                  I. BACKGROUND

       In 2014, the WDOC hired Mr. Shulick as a correctional officer at the

 Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP). In February 2019, Mr. Shulick requested

 reasonable accommodations for his medical conditions under the Americans with

 Disabilities Act (ADA). At that time, his disabilities were sufficiently

 accommodated by permanently moving him to the checkpoint post.

       In June 2019, Mr. Shulick applied for the correctional captain position at WSP.

 The hiring panel interviewed Mr. Shulick and three other candidates for the position,

 grading each candidate based on their responses to several interview questions.

 Mr. Shulick received the lowest score. None of the candidates were hired and the

 position was later reopened. Mr. Shulick reapplied but was not offered a second

 interview.

       On December 24, 2019, the on-duty Watch Commander, Lieutenant Brown,

 assigned Mr. Shulick to a different post. Mr. Shulick told him that he was

 permanently assigned to the checkpoint post. Major Hobson then directed Lieutenant

 Brown to assign Mr. Shulick to the checkpoint post going forward based on his

 reasonable accommodation.

       On January 2, 2020, Mr. Shulick was ordered to provide a urine sample for

 random drug testing. Mr. Shulick initially refused, asserting the drug test was

 retaliation for the incident on December 24, but he ultimately provided a urine

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 sample later that day. Mr. Shulick’s name was included on the randomized list sent

 by the WDOC’s Drug-Free Workplace Coordinator on December 17, 2019.

       On January 22, 2020, Captain McManis gave Mr. Shulick verbal counseling

 about his initial refusal to submit to the random drug test. This was noted on a

 counseling form in Mr. Shulick’s file. The next day, Mr. Shulick complained to

 Director Lampert about the counseling form and alleged ongoing harassment.

 Director Lampert assigned Deputy HR Manager Tripp and Deputy Warden Molden to

 investigate Mr. Shulick’s complaint. On March 18, based on the investigation,

 Director Lampert issued a grievance determination finding the counseling form was

 not based on retaliation and that Mr. Shulick’s harassment claim was unsubstantiated.

       On March 13, due to the COVID-19 outbreak, Warden Pacheco and Major

 Hobson issued guidance that high-volume-touch areas and surfaces be sanitized with

 a bleach solution that would be stored at the checkpoint post. Mr. Shulick

 complained that the bleach fumes were impacting his health. On March 16, Major

 Hobson revised the guidance so that the bleach solution was stored elsewhere and

 directed Mr. Shulick to report directly to the checkpoint post to limit his exposure to

 the fumes.

       On March 31 and April 14, Mr. Shulick emailed complaints to Director

 Lampert regarding a change in the policy for requesting restroom breaks at the

 checkpoint post. Warden Pacheco directed Major Hobson to ensure Mr. Shulick was

 receiving adequate breaks.

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       In April 2020, Lieutenant Brown completed Mr. Shulick’s annual performance

 evaluation, concluding that growth was necessary. The evaluation identified areas

 that needed improvement while also noting that overall, Mr. Shulick was a good

 officer who could be counted on to do his job.

       On April 9, Director Lampert emailed WDOC prison staff advising that cloth

 face masks would soon be issued to each employee and that the masks would be a

 required part of the uniform for all WDOC employees. On April 15, Lieutenant

 Brown gave Mr. Shulick two WDOC-issued masks and told him to put one on.

 Mr. Shulick refused. Later that day, he emailed Director Lampert about the incident

 and asked that he be allowed to wear a face shield instead of a mask.

       On April 16, Warden Pacheco wrote Mr. Shulick a letter requesting that he

 wear a mask in areas where two or more people were present and advising him that

 he needed to provide documentation regarding his medical condition to be considered

 for a possible accommodation under the ADA. When Mr. Shulick arrived at work

 that day, Captain Eversole gave him the letter and offered him the accommodation of

 holding the mask over his nose and mouth instead of wearing it. He refused, so

 Captain Eversole sent him home. On April 17, Mr. Shulick provided a doctor’s note

 that said he was unable to wear anything on his nose or mouth due to claustrophobia

 and chronic obstruction pulmonary disease.

       On April 20, Warden Pacheco gave Mr. Shulick a letter informing him that

 wearing a mask was an essential function of his job and that his inability to wear a

 mask meant that he was no longer qualified to work as a corrections officer with the

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 WDOC. The letter included a list of open WDOC positions and directed Mr. Shulick

 to respond in writing regarding the positions for which he was qualified. That day,

 Mr. Shulick was placed on paid administrative leave pending his choice of

 reassignment. On April 27, Warden Pacheco sent Mr. Shulick a follow-up letter that

 included three positions that allowed for remote work and would therefore

 accommodate his inability to wear a mask.

       On April 30, Warden Pacheco called Mr. Shulick regarding potential

 reassignment. Mr. Shulick insisted on a reasonable accommodation to remain in his

 position and asked several questions, which Warden Pacheco asked him to submit in

 writing. On May 11, Mr. Shulick submitted a list of questions. Warden Pacheco

 responded on May 13. His response included a list of four probation and parole

 positions, all of which allowed for remote work and had a higher pay range than

 corrections officer positions. The letter asked Mr. Shulick to review the positions

 and inform Warden Pacheco which position worked for him by May 20.

       Mr. Shulick responded on May 20, expressing that Warden Pacheco’s answers

 to his questions were unsatisfactory and doubling down on his desire for a reasonable

 accommodation instead of reassignment. He did not indicate whether any of the open

 WDOC positions would work for him. As a result, on May 22, Warden Pacheco sent

 Mr. Shulick an intent-to-dismiss letter, giving Mr. Shulick ten workdays to respond.

 On June 23, Director Lampert sent Mr. Shulick a final letter informing him that he

 was dismissed from his employment with the WDOC and that his period of paid

 administrative leave had ended.

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       Mr. Shulick sued the WDOC for: (1) discrimination based on a disability,

 (2) retaliation for his discrimination complaints, (3) creation of a hostile work

 environment, and (4) failure to accommodate a disability. The WDOC moved for

 summary judgment on all four claims. Mr. Shulick filed a short response, and the

 district court afforded him additional time to supplement his response. Mr. Shulick

 later moved for an extension of time to file his supplemental response. The district

 court found that he had not demonstrated good cause to extend the deadline for his

 supplemental response and denied the motion. Following a hearing, the district court

 granted summary judgment to the WDOC on all four claims and entered judgment

 against Mr. Shulick.

       He now appeals from the order denying his request for an extension and from

 the order granting the WDOC’s motion for summary judgment.1

                                   II. DISCUSSION

 A. Standard of Review

       “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable

 inferences and resolving all factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party.” Birch

 v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

 marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is

 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

       1
         Mr. Shulick represents himself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall
 v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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       “A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of

 fact could resolve the issue either way.” Throupe v. Univ. of Denver, 988 F.3d 1243,

 1250 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A fact is material if,

 under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit.”

 Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 573 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks

 omitted). A defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law “if the plaintiff fails

 to provide sufficient evidence supporting a necessary element of his claim.”

 Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1250.

 B. The Rehabilitation Act

       The Rehabilitation Act prohibits employers “from discriminating against an

 ‘otherwise qualified individual with a disability.’” Sanchez v. Vilsack, 695 F.3d

 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). The Rehabilitation Act

 incorporates the employment-discrimination standards in the ADA, see 29 U.S.C.

 § 794(d), so cases addressing ADA claims may inform our analysis, see Rivero v. Bd.

 of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 950 F.3d 754, 758 (10th Cir. 2020).

       Mr. Shulick presented only circumstantial evidence to oppose summary

 judgment on his discrimination and retaliation claims. Thus, we apply the three-part,

 burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

 802–04 (1973). See Williams v. FedEx Corp. Servs., 849 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir.

 2017). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of

 discrimination or retaliation. Hiatt v. Colo. Seminary, 858 F.3d 1307, 1316

 (10th Cir. 2017). “The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

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 nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action.” Id. (brackets and

 internal quotation marks omitted). If the employer makes that showing, the burden

 shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s proffered reason is a pretext

 for discrimination or retaliation. Id.

       1. Disability Discrimination

       To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Mr. Shulick must show:

       (1) he has a disability within the meaning of the [ADA]; (2) he was
       qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the
       essential job functions of the position he sought; and (3) his employer
       refused the promotion under circumstances which give rise to an
       inference the decision was based on his disability.

 Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

 omitted).

       Mr. Shulick claims the WDOC discriminated against him based on his

 disability by not hiring him for the captain position and by not reinterviewing him

 when he reapplied.

       The district court first determined Mr. Shulick’s claim failed because he did

 not provide any admissible evidence that his disability was a determining factor in

 the WDOC’s decision not to hire him or reinterview him for the captain position. On

 appeal, Mr. Shulick identifies no evidence undermining the district court’s analysis.

       Next, the court found that, even if Mr. Shulick had shown that the WDOC

 considered his disability in the hiring decision, the WDOC had provided legitimate,

 non-discriminatory business reasons for not hiring him as captain. In support, the

 court noted Mr. Shulick lacked supervisory experience and would have skipped over

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 the ranks of corporal, sergeant, and lieutenant if he were hired for the captain

 position and Warden Pacheco attested that he had never seen anyone be promoted

 from officer to captain. The court further noted Mr. Shulick received the lowest

 score from the interview panel and that it was uncommon for the WDOC to

 reinterview candidates.

       Finally, the district court determined Mr. Shulick had not shown that the

 WDOC’s decision not to promote him to captain was pretextual. In Mr. Shulick’s

 view, the WDOC never overcame the “inference that the low score was the result of

 discriminatory animus.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. But he fails to identify evidence

 permitting such an inference in the first place. He also contends that if supervisory

 experience was a prerequisite for the captain position, it was “pointless to even

 schedule him for an interview.” Id. But no one claimed that supervisory experience

 was required. And even though it was not required, nothing prevented the

 decisionmakers from taking it into account.

       After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court’s conclusions that:

 (1) Mr. Shulick failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination;

 (2) the WDOC provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not promoting or

 reinterviewing Mr. Shulick for the captain position; and (3) Mr. Shulick failed to

 show that the WDOC’s reasons were pretext for discrimination. Summary judgment

 was therefore appropriate.

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        2. Retaliation

        To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Mr. Shulick must show: (1) he

  engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) a reasonable employee would

  find the challenged action materially adverse, and (3) a causal connection exists

  between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. EEOC v. C.R. Eng.,

  Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1051 (10th Cir. 2011). “Acts that carry a significant risk of

  humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to future employment

  prospects” may be considered materially adverse actions, but “a mere inconvenience

  or an alteration of job responsibilities will not suffice.” Reinhardt v. Albuquerque

  Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation

  marks omitted).

        Mr. Shulick alleges several instances of retaliation for complaints he made

  with the WDOC, including: Lieutenant Brown’s attempt to reassign him from his

  accommodation post; the random drug test days after he refused the reassignment;

  Captain McManis giving him verbal counseling and placing a counseling form in his

  file about his initial refusal to submit to the random drug test; attempts by HR to

  reach him regarding his complaints when he was on leave; bleach being used and

  stored in his post during the COVID-19 outbreak; a change in the policy for

  requesting restroom breaks at the checkpoint post; Lieutenant Brown conducting his

  checks of the checkpoint post on foot; Lieutenant Nitschke’s review of his electronic

  logs; and a negative performance evaluation.

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        The district court concluded that none of the actions Mr. Shulick alleged were

  materially adverse. The court reasoned that Mr. Shulick was not reassigned,

  randomized drug testing is part of WDOC policy, and the list was issued several days

  prior to the reassignment incident. According to the WDOC HR Manager, the verbal

  counseling and related form were not considered formal discipline and Mr. Shulick

  was on intermittent leave when HR attempted to contact him as part of its

  investigation into his complaint. The court also found Mr. Shulick was never refused

  a restroom break. Moreover, the court reasoned that the use of bleach to clean a

  prison environment during the COVID-19 pandemic, post checks, and review of

  logbooks were merely alterations to Mr. Shulick’s job environment. Finally, the

  court noted that while Mr. Shulick’s performance evaluation indicated that growth

  was necessary, it also provided that he was a good officer who could be counted on to

  do his job.

        On appeal, Mr. Shulick points to no evidence that the alleged retaliatory

  instances harmed his job prospects or disadvantaged him in any way. Under these

  circumstances, we agree with the district court that no rational trier of fact could

  conclude Mr. Shulick suffered a materially adverse action.

        3. Hostile Work Environment

        To establish he was subjected to a hostile work environment, Mr. Shulick

  “must show that a rational jury could find that the workplace was permeated with

  discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or

  pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and create an abusive working

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  environment.” Williams, 849 F.3d at 897 (brackets and internal quotation marks

  omitted). He must also produce evidence from which a rational fact finder could

  conclude that the employer took the offensive actions because of his disability. Id. at

  898.

         The district court determined that no rational fact finder could conclude that

  any of the myriad instances Mr. Shulick alleged had altered the conditions of his

  employment. Mr. Shulick’s opening brief fails to challenge that determination and

  does not otherwise adequately pursue a hostile-work-environment claim.

  Accordingly, we decline to consider any argument against the district court’s

  treatment of that claim. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.

  2007) (“[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that are not raised, or are

  inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief.”).

         4. Failure to Accommodate

         To establish a prima facie failure-to-accommodate claim, Mr. Shulick must

  show: (1) he is disabled, (2) he is otherwise qualified, (3) he requested a plausibly

  reasonable accommodation, and (4) the WDOC refused to accommodate his

  disability. Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995, 1005 (10th Cir. 2020). An employee is

  “otherwise qualified” if he “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

  the essential functions of the employment position.” Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113,

  1121 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Essential functions” are

  the “fundamental job duties of the employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).

  “To facilitate the reasonable accommodation, the federal regulations implementing

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  the ADA envision an interactive process that requires participation by both parties.”

  C.R. Eng., Inc., 644 F.3d at 1049 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

        Mr. Shulick alleges the WDOC failed to accommodate his disability when it

  terminated his employment because he refused to wear a mask during the COVID-19

  pandemic. The district court determined the WDOC had established that the mask

  requirement was an essential function. Next, the court said the accommodation

  Mr. Shulick requested—not wearing a mask or only wearing a face shield—was

  facially unreasonable. Finally, the court found Mr. Shulick failed to show that the

  WDOC did not engage in the interactive process to identify potential reasonable

  accommodations.

        On appeal, Mr. Shulick argues the WDOC violated his right to reasonable

  accommodation by failing to engage in the interactive process. We disagree. After

  determining that Mr. Shulick was unable to perform an essential function of his job,

  the WDOC offered him numerous opportunities for reassignment. See Aubrey, 975

  F.3d at 1012 (If an employee is unable to perform an essential function of his job,

  “reassignment to a vacant position can be a reasonable accommodation and is

  particularly amenable to consideration during a genuine interactive process between

  the employee and employer.”). Like the district court, we conclude Mr. Shulick did

  not present evidence that the WDOC failed to engage in the interactive process to

  identify a reasonable accommodation. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

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  C. Motion for Extension

        “A schedule may be modified only for good cause or with the judge’s

  consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “In practice, this standard requires the movant to

  show the scheduling deadlines cannot be met despite the movant’s diligent efforts.”

  Gorsuch, Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir.

  2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review a district “court’s refusal to

  modify a scheduling order for abuse of discretion.” Id.

        Mr. Shulick argues the district court erred when it denied his motion for an

  extension of time to file his supplemental response. In support, he asserts the court

  “granted Appellees every extension requested but denied [him] the same

  consideration despite Appellee’s obvious advantages against a pro se plaintiff.”

  Aplt. Opening Br. at 50. In denying Mr. Shulick’s motion, the district court noted

  that it afforded him twenty-five days to respond to the WDOC’s summary judgment

  motion and found that he had not demonstrated good cause to further extend the

  deadline. On appeal, Mr. Shulick has not shown the district court abused its

  discretion. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Shulick’s motion.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

        We affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Bobby R. Baldock
                                             Circuit Judge

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