Court Opinion

ID: 9867441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 16:09:50.30837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:24.970980
License: Public Domain

J-S19030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DORIAN KAY PRICE                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1269 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 15, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-67-CR-0003791-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

       Dorian Kay Price appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

following her guilty plea to theft by failure to make required disposition of

funds received.1 Price’s sentence included an order of restitution. She argues

that the court illegally ordered her to sell a vehicle that she bought with

proceeds of her crime and to pay the money she obtained from the sale toward

her restitution. We affirm.

       Price pleaded guilty to having used money and sold property belonging

to her elderly mother, who was in assisted living, for her own purposes. The

trial court accurately summarized the facts as follows:

       On August 10, 2018, the Springettsbury Township Police
       Department received a report from one Diane Gee alleging theft.
       Ms. Gee is a resident of an assisted living facility, Brunswick at
       Longstown, and suffers from dementia. It was reported that Ms.
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3927(a).
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     Gee’s daughter, Dorian Price, the [appellant], had “sold all of [Ms.
     Gee’s] jewelry and her home and had moved to Texas with the
     proceeds.” It was noted that [Price] became Ms. Gee’s power of
     attorney on February 28, 2017.

     In December of 2018, the affiant [of the affidavit of probable
     cause] met with York County Area Agency on Aging case worker
     Patricia White. Ms. White indicated that Ms. Gee had an
     outstanding balance for several month’s rent at Brunswick at
     Longstown. It was additionally indicated that [Price] had opened
     joint bank accounts and credit lines in Ms. Gee and [Price’s]
     names, without Ms. Gee’s consent. Ms. White provided . . .
     documentation regarding a PSECU member account in Ms. Gee’s
     name, with [Price] listed as a joint owner. It was further provided
     that [Price] had independently opened a PNC account with Ms.
     Gee and herself being listed as joint owners.

     [Price] had been using portions of Ms. Gee’s personal funds to
     support [Price’s] lifestyle and personal expenses. It was noted that
     Ms. Gee’s primary sources of income are a pension plan and social
     security payments. Records indicated that [Price] had very little
     income to contribute to either account.

     It was determined that [Price] accrued a total of $20,164.94
     against a credit line that was associated with Ms. Gee’s PSECU
     account between January 1, 2017, and December 19, 2018. It was
     apparent to the affiant that, based upon the frequency and nature
     of the expenditures listed, including online purchases, cigarettes,
     travel, food, and other expenses, that the accrual of debt could
     not have been attributed to supporting the well[-]being of Ms.
     Gee. A transaction that was particularly of note . . . was an
     electronic deposit of $47,410.00 into the PSECU checking account
     on April 20, 2017. The deposit was directly connected to the online
     sale of Ms. Gee’s bullion/coin through Nationwide Coin and Bullion
     Reserve. [Price] indicated that she did in fact sell Ms. Gee’s coin,
     as well as Ms. Gee’s residence.

     With regards to the PSECU account, [Price] had diminished the
     account balance on a monthly basis. It was alleged that [Price]
     strategically deposited/transferred funds from secondary accounts
     to satisfy expenditures, only to export the funds later. A deposit
     of $47,181.84 had been electronically deposited in the joint PNC
     account on April 26, 2018, and was immediately transferred out
     of the account to a PNC account, which was held solely in [Price’s]

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      name. [Ms. Gee’s] residence was sold on April 26, 2018 by [Price]
      acting as Ms. Gee’s agent.

                                      ***

      In addition to using Ms. Gee’s funds for her personal funds, [Price]
      also provided funds to her daughter on at least three different
      occasions. . . . These payments to [Price’s daughter] were used to
      pay off student loan debt and an outstanding automobile loan.

      [Price] further indicated that she maintained financial accounts for
      Ms. Gee and assisted with paying Ms. Gee’s bills. It was then
      admitted that [Price] had used some of the funds to purchase
      items for herself. It was then indicated that [Price] had received
      roughly $47,000 for Ms. Gee’s residence and that the funds were
      deposited into the joint PNC bank account. Further, [Price] alleged
      that she made a $13,000.00 payment to Brunswick at Longstown
      in an attempt to satisfy the delinquent rent for her mother. [Price]
      had used the remaining proceeds of the sale of her mother’s
      residence to purchase items such as groceries on Amazon.com.
      [Price] agreed that she should not have used Ms. Gee’s funds for
      her personal use and stated, “I know I need to make it right, I
      have known that for a while.”

Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed 11/4/22, at 1-5 (citations omitted).

      The trial court sentenced Price to serve 60 months of probation and to

pay $100,000 in restitution. Id. at 5. Price timely appealed. At issue in this

appeal is the court’s order directing Price to sell a 2014 Jeep Compass that

she purchased with funds stolen from Ms. Gee within 30 days of sentencing

and to use the proceeds to pay a lump sum portion of the restitution. Id.

      Price raises the following issue:

      Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence when it
      ordered Ms. Price to sell her vehicle and apply the proceeds
      towards her restitution where there is no statutory authority that
      would empower the court to order Ms. Price to sell her personal
      property?

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Price’s Br. at 4.

       Price argues that there is no statutory authority that allows a court to

order a defendant to sell a specific piece of personal property to pay

restitution. Id. at 10. She maintains that the restitution statute limits payment

to the return of the property of the victim or payments in cash or cash

equivalent. Id. at 11. Price argues that the Jeep, while purchased with the

money of the victim, was not the property of the victim and “[f]orcing [] Price

to sell her vehicle is not a return of the victim’s property or a payment in cash

or its equivalent.” Id. at 11-12, 13. In her view, the court crafted an illegal

sentence when it ordered her to sell the vehicle. Id. at 14-15.

       Price’s   argument      goes    to   the   legality   of   her   sentence.2   See

Commonwealth v. Oree, 911 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa.Super. 2006). “The

determination as to whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence is a

question of law; [our] standard of review in cases dealing with questions of

law is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 771 (Pa.Super.

2018) (citation omitted).

       Restitution is authorized by Section 1106 of the Crimes Code. That

section defines restitution as “[t]he return of the property of the victim or

payments in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to an order of the court.”

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(h). It further provides:

____________________________________________

2 Price has abandoned her challenge to discretionary aspects of her sentence.

See Price’s Br. at 11 n.2.

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      (2) At the time of sentencing the court shall specify the amount
      and method of restitution. In determining the amount and method
      of restitution, the court:

         (i) Shall consider the extent of injury suffered by the victim,
         the victim’s request for restitution as presented to the
         district attorney in accordance with paragraph (4) and such
         other matters as it deems appropriate.

         (ii) May order restitution in a lump sum, by monthly
         installments, or according to such other schedule as it
         deems just.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(2)(i)-(ii).

      Section 1106 is intended “to provide the victim with [the] fullest

compensation for his losses incurred as a direct result of the defendant’s

criminal conduct[.]” Commonwealth v. Burwell, 58 A.3d 790, 794

(Pa.Super. 2012); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(1)(i).

      Contrary to Price’s argument, the restitution that was ordered by the

trial court is authorized by statute. Section 1106(c)(2) plainly states that the

court shall determine the “method of restitution.” Here, the court specified the

means by which Price is to pay restitution, namely with the proceeds from the

sale of property bought with the stolen funds. The court also outlined a time

in which she is to complete the sale and apply the proceeds as a lump sum

payment. In fashioning such a sentence, the court properly considered the

fact the victim’s assets were used to fund the purchase and the victim had a

right to recover what was stolen from her by Price. Accordingly, we find no

error by the trial court.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/26/2023

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