Court Opinion

ID: 9387559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 14:10:19.045023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.300648
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 30

                  SUPREME COURT               OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:               2020AP2146

COMPLETE TITLE:         DEKK Property Development, LLC,
                                  Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                             v.
                        Wisconsin Department of Transportation,
                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                           REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                           Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 548, 971 N.W.2d 201
                                      (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:          April 18, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:          November 1, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:               Circuit
   COUNTY:              Kenosha
   JUDGE:               Anthony G. Milisauskas

JUSTICES:
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET and
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
concurring opinion.
NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea Roschke, Smitha Chintamaneni,
Adam S. Bazelon, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. There
was an oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz.

       For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument      by       Hannah   S.   Jurss,   assistant   attorney    general.
                                                                         2023 WI 30
                                                                 NOTICE
                                                   This opinion is subject to further
                                                   editing and modification.   The final
                                                   version will appear in the bound
                                                   volume of the official reports.
No.    2020AP2146
(L.C. No.   2019CV1226)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                             :            IN SUPREME COURT

DEKK Property Development, LLC,

            Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
                                                                      FILED
      v.                                                         APR 18, 2023

Wisconsin Department of Transportation,                             Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                 Clerk of Supreme Court

            Defendant-Appellant.

KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET and
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a
concurring opinion.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                       Modified,

and as modified, affirmed.

      ¶1    JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.         This controversy stems from a

driveway    closure——specifically,       the       Wisconsin      Department         of

Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK

Property    Development,     LLC's   (DEKK's)      property      to   State     Trunk

Highway (STH) 50.         DEKK is seeking compensation for the closure.

The case potentially raises two questions:               (1) whether DEKK may
seek compensation for the driveway closure in a "right-to-take"
                                                                No.     2020AP2146

action under Wis. Stat.           § 32.05(5)(2021-22),1 and (2) if so,

whether DOT must compensate DEKK for the closure.                   We hold that

DEKK may not bring its claim under § 32.05(5), and thus we do

not   reach    the   second    question.       Section 32.05(5)       provides    a

means to challenge DOT's right to take property described in a

jurisdictional       offer    issued   under   § 32.05(3),    and     here    DOT's

jurisdictional offer to DEKK did not describe any removal of

access to STH 50.            Therefore, the circuit court2 should have

granted    DOT's     summary    judgment     motion   and    dismissed       DEKK's

claim.     Because this procedural issue is dispositive, we do not

decide the question of whether DEKK might be owed compensation

had it challenged the driveway closure via a different avenue.

                                 I.    BACKGROUND

      ¶2      DEKK owns approximately four acres of property (the

Property) in Kenosha County near the southeast corner of STH 50

and County Highway (CTH) H.            The following is an aerial photo of

the Property.3       STH 50 runs east-west along the top of the photo,

and CTH H runs north-south on the left.               There is one driveway
from the Property to STH 50, which DOT seeks to close, and one

      1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.
      2The Honorable Anthony G. Milisauskas of the Kenosha County
Circuit Court presided.
      3This aerial photo is from an appraisal report DOT
commissioned before issuing an offer to purchase a portion of
DEKK's property that abuts CTH H. We have added labels for CTH
H and STH 50 to aid the reader in understanding the layout of
the Property.

                                         2
                                                                 No.     2020AP2146

driveway from the Property to CTH H, which will remain available

for use.

                                STH
                                50

                  CTH
                  H

       ¶3   In   1961,   the    former       owners   of   a   portion    of   the

property deeded to Kenosha County (acting as an agent for DOT)

"the    Right    of   Access,   including       all   existing,    future,      or

potential common law . . . rights of access" to STH 50, along

with a tract of land adjacent to STH 50.                   This tract included

the land on which the contested STH 50 driveway is located.                    The

deed included the following exception:

       Except there is reserved the right of access to said
       highway by means of one restricted driveway same to be

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    used only for barber shop purposes for the term of
    fifteen years from date of this conveyance and then to
    become   a   private   driveway   conforming   to  the
    regulations of the State Highway Commission.      Said
    driveway is to be constructed with its eastern limits
    along the east line of the owner's property line in
    conformance with State Highway Commission policy.
There is little information on any subsequent use or development

of the STH 50 driveway in the record.

    ¶4     In 2019, DOT sought to acquire another part of the

Property——a strip of land abutting CTH H——as part of a project

to improve STH 50.         After DOT decided to acquire the CTH H

parcel, it commissioned an appraisal of the parcel as required

by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a).        The appraisal report assessed the

CTH H parcel, and explained that DOT was not seeking to acquire

any access rights.     The report noted that the driveway between

the Property and STH 50 (located on a different part of the

Property than the CTH H parcel) would have to be closed.                   It

also noted that DOT would not compensate DEKK for the STH 50

driveway   because   the     commercial   building    that   the   driveway

formerly served had been demolished, and redevelopment of the

property   would   "likely    require    new   driveway   approvals   in   an

alternate location farther from the intersection."

    ¶5     After DOT provided the appraisal report to DEKK, DEKK

emailed DOT to ask about the lack of compensation for the STH 50

driveway closure.     A DOT real estate specialist explained that

"at the time of acquisition the current driveway will still

remain in place," and that any revocation of the access point

would be "non-compensable now because it has not happened yet,
and if it ever did, it would be through police power."

                                     4
                                                              No.     2020AP2146

      ¶6    DOT    then   issued   a   jurisdictional   offer    to   DEKK   as

required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3).           In the jurisdictional offer,

DOT offered to purchase the CTH H parcel for $272,100.                  It did

not offer to purchase any access rights, allocate compensation

for   any   loss    of    access   rights,   or   reference     any   driveway

closures.     The jurisdictional offer included a Transportation

Project Plat, which denoted the property interests DOT sought to

acquire.    We include the relevant portion of the Plat below:

The CTH H parcel is identified on the left side of the Property.

Arrows point to the part of the parcel DOT sought to purchase in

fee simple (indicated by diagonal lines), the part on which it

sought a temporary limited easement (indicated by dots), and the

part on which it sought a permanent limited easement (too small

                                        5
                                                                            No.    2020AP2146

to   be     visible   on    this     Plat).           DEKK    does    not   challenge      the

purchase of the land or easements.

       ¶7     After DOT issued the jurisdictional offer, DEKK filed

an action under Wis. Stat.                    § 32.05(5) in the Kenosha County

Circuit Court.          DEKK did not challenge the acquisition of the

CTH H parcel, but instead challenged "DOT's right to remove

DEKK's rights of access to STH 50."                     Both DOT and DEKK moved for

summary judgment.

       ¶8     Shortly      after     the      filing     of     the    summary      judgment

motions, but before the circuit court's decision, DOT sent a

letter to DEKK providing "official notice" that it "plan[ned] to

remove the existing driveway from State Highway 50 . . . during

an upcoming improvement project."                        The letter explained that

under       Wis.   Admin.     Code §          Trans     231.03(2),      the       number    of

driveways serving a property along a state trunk highway shall

be the "minimum" deemed necessary "for reasonable service to the

property without the undue impairment of safety, convenience,

and utility of the highway," and "[r]emoving unnecessary access
points . . . increases             the    mobility       of     the    highway      facility

while reducing the potential for crashes as vehicles enter and

leave the highway."             The letter further explained that DEKK

could contest the removal by submitting an objection letter to

DOT, and DOT would then send a "revocation letter" if either

DEKK      failed   to      respond       to    the     notice    or     DOT   upheld       its

revocation decision.            Because DEKK                 initiated this challenge

under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) prior to DOT sending the official
notice, the record is unclear as to whether DEKK took advantage
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                                                                    No.    2020AP2146

of   DOT's     administrative        review      process,     or     whether      DOT

subsequently sent a revocation letter.

     ¶9      After receiving the notice, DEKK filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order and injunction to prevent DOT from

closing the driveway.            The circuit court granted DEKK's motion

for the injunction along with its motion for summary judgment,

reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the

driveway and thus deserved compensation for its closure.                          The

court   further    determined      that   DEKK    properly    filed       its    claim

under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).              DOT appealed, and the court of

appeals    reversed,   reasoning         that    the   1961   transaction        only

reserved     the   right    to     use    the    driveway     subject       to    DOT

regulations, and DOT was within its rights to close the driveway

without compensation as an exercise of police power.                        Because

the court of appeals held for DOT on the merits, it did not

address DOT's alternative argument that § 32.05(5) was not the

proper procedural mechanism for DEKK's claim.                 We granted DEKK's

petition for review and now affirm the court of appeals on the
alternative procedural grounds.

                           II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

     ¶10     This case requires us to review the circuit court's

decision to grant summary judgment for DEKK and deny summary

judgment for DOT.      Summary judgment is appropriate when there is

no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.                  McKee Fam. I, LLC v. City of

Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶27, 374 Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.                         We
review summary judgment decisions independently.                   Id.
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                                                                       No.   2020AP2146

    ¶11     In   determining      whether    either      party    is    entitled     to

judgment as a matter of law, we must determine whether DEKK may

bring its claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).                   To do so, we must

interpret   and    apply    the    statute.         Statutory      interpretation

presents a question of law that we review independently.                       260 N.

12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶39, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808

N.W.2d 372.

                            III.    ANALYSIS
    ¶12     We   begin   our   analysis      with    a    brief   review      of    the

relevant principles and procedures that apply when DOT seeks to

acquire private property by eminent domain.                   We then turn to the

different means by which property owners may challenge or seek

compensation for DOT's actions.             Finally, we examine whether in

this case DEKK may bring its claim in a Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5)

right-to-take action.

    ¶13     When   DOT   determines     that    it       is   necessary      to    take

private property under its eminent domain authority, it must pay

just compensation.         U.S. Const. amend. V. ("nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.");

Wis. Const. art. I, § 13 ("The property of no person shall be

taken for public use without just compensation therefor.").                         But

not all state actions that affect private property result in a

compensable taking.        118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125,

¶32, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486.                Injuries to property that

result from a valid exercise of the state's police power are
generally not compensable.           Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13

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Wis. 2d 511, 514, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).                       Compensable eminent

domain    and     non-compensable        police     power    actions       "can      occur

contemporaneously," and DOT may exercise both its police power

and its eminent domain authority as part of the same highway

construction project.             118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30,

¶¶31-33.

       ¶14     When   DOT    exercises      its   eminent    domain       authority     to

obtain private land for transportation projects, it must follow

the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.05.                              Under that

statute, once DOT determines that it must acquire a piece of

property, it is required to seek an appraisal of the property,

provide the owner a copy of the appraisal report, and confer

with     the     owner,      if      reasonably      possible.            Wis.       Stat.

§ 32.05(2)(a).         DOT must then attempt to negotiate with the

owner    for    the   property.        § 32.05(2a).          If    negotiations        are

unsuccessful, DOT issues a jurisdictional offer to purchase the

property.       The jurisdictional offer describes the property and

the     compensation        being    offered      (among    other     requirements).
§ 32.05(3).       If the property owner rejects the offer, the owner

may file a "right-to-take" action under § 32.05(5) to contest

DOT's     right       to     take     the       property     "described         in    the

jurisdictional offer."            § 32.05(5).

       ¶15     Wisconsin     Stat.    § 32.05(5)      is    just    one    of     several

statutes that enable property owners to challenge DOT when DOT

undertakes       highway      construction        projects        affecting      private

                                            9
                                                                         No.    2020AP2146

property.4      See TFJ Nominee Tr. v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, ¶¶25-26,

244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57.                 The appropriate statute depends

on    the    facts   of   the    case    and    the   nature       of   the    challenged

governmental action.             These statutes are not interchangeable,

and "even if a highway construction project results in damages

that are compensable under a particular statute, those damages

cannot be recovered in a claim brought under the wrong statute."

118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶33.

       ¶16    Moreover, even when DOT undertakes different projects

that are part of the same overall highway construction project,

"that does not necessarily merge each project into one single

compensable act."         Id.    Importantly here, different projects are

not necessarily merged into a single compensable act even when

the projects affect the same property owner, or occur around the

same time.        For instance, in 118th Street Kenosha v. DOT, DOT

undertook      two    separate    actions       as    part    of   the   same     highway

improvement project: (1) relocating a highway, which eliminated

the    property      owner's    direct    access      to     the   highway,      and   (2)

       For instance, if an owner believes that DOT took a
       4

property right, but failed to properly condemn the property by
following the procedures set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.05, the
owner may file an action for inverse condemnation under Wis.
Stat. § 32.10.   See TFJ Nominee Tr. v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116,
¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57.      Additionally, if DOT
revokes a permit for a driveway to a state trunk highway, the
owner may challenge DOT's revocation under the procedures set
out in Wis. Stat. § 86.073, which include the right to appeal
DOT's final determination under the administrative review
procedures set out in Wis. Stat. ch. 227.           Wis. Stat.
§ 86.073(3); Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg).

                                           10
                                                      No.   2020AP2146

acquiring a temporary limited easement from the owner in order

to build a driveway to a private road that intersected with the

highway.    Id., ¶2.    The property owner sought damages under Wis.

Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the diminution in value to its property

caused by the relocation of the highway.     We held that the owner

could not do so under § 32.09(6g) because § 32.09(6g) provided a

means to seek damages resulting from the taking of an easement,

and the damages sought by the owner did not result from the

easement.   Id., ¶57.

    ¶17     Taking these principles together, we must determine

whether DEKK may seek damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) for

DOT's closure of the STH 50 driveway.         The statute reads in

pertinent part as follows:

    If an owner decides to contest the right of the
    condemnor to condemn the property described in the
    jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that
    the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, the
    owner may within 40 days from the date of personal
    service of the jurisdictional offer . . . commence an
    action in the circuit court of the county wherein the
    property   is    located,  naming   the   condemnor  as
    defendant.    Such action shall be the only manner in
    which any issue other than the amount of just
    compensation . . . may be raised pertaining to the
    condemnation    of   the  property   described  in  the
    jurisdictional offer . . . .    Nothing in this section
    shall be construed to limit in any respect the right
    to determine the necessity of taking as conferred by
    s. 32.07 nor to prevent the condemnor from proceeding
    with condemnation during the pendency of the action to
    contest the right to condemn.

Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).
    ¶18     Section 32.05(5) sets out a process by which DEKK may
"contest the right of the condemnor," here, DOT, "to condemn the

                                  11
                                                                               No.    2020AP2146

property described in the jurisdictional offer."                               Actions under

§ 32.05(5) are limited to issues "pertaining to the condemnation

of the property described in the jurisdictional offer."                                       Wis.

Stat. § 32.05(5); see Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶24,

291   Wis.    2d    80,     715    N.W.2d       213    (explaining          that     § 32.05(5)

permits owners to challenge the government's right to condemn

the   property      described        in     the       jurisdictional           offer).        Put

simply,      if    DEKK's    access        to    STH       50    is      "described      in   the

jurisdictional        offer,"       then        § 32.05(5)          would    be    the     proper

procedural mechanism by which DEKK could bring its claim.                                      If

not, then DEKK may not recover damages under that statute, and

its action should be dismissed.                      See 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359

Wis. 2d 30, ¶33.

      ¶19     We   therefore       turn     to       DOT's      jurisdictional        offer     to

determine     whether       it    describes          any     such     access      right.       The

jurisdictional       offer        states    that       DOT      "offers      to    purchase     a

parcel of real estate and/or rights therein in which [DEKK]

own[s] an interest as described on attached page, and within 60
days from the acceptance of this offer agrees to pay the sum of:

Two Hundred Seventy-Two Thousand One Hundred and 0/100 Dollars

(272,100.00)."        The attached page provides a legal description

of the CTH H parcel.               The parcel described does not touch the

STH 50 driveway that is in dispute here.                                  While the parcel

described does include the CTH H driveway, both DEKK and DOT

agree that DEKK retains access to CTH H via that driveway.                                    The

parcel      description          also     incorporates              by    reference        "[a]ny
interest or rights not listed above for said parcel but shown as
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                                                               No.    2020AP2146

required    on    [Transportation      Project     Plat   1310-10-22]."      Of

import here, the referenced Plat does not indicate that DOT was

seeking to remove any STH 50 access rights.5                  The Plat only

highlights       the   fee   simple,   permanent    limited   easement,     and

temporary limited easement that DOT sought to acquire, none of

which connect to the STH 50 driveway.

    ¶20     The rest of the jurisdictional offer similarly does

not describe the removal of any STH 50 access rights——instead,

it relates only to the taking of the CTH H parcel.                   The offer

allocates the bulk of its purchase price to "[l]oss of land,

including improvements and fixtures actually being                   acquired,"

and the rest to rounding and the easements DOT sought on the CTH

H parcel.     The offer allocates zero dollars to "Damages caused

by loss of existing rights of access," and it does not otherwise

mention any access rights.

    ¶21     If DEKK sought to challenge DOT's right to take the

CTH H parcel, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) would be the appropriate

means to do so.          However, § 32.05(5) is not the appropriate
means for determining the nature of DEKK's access rights to STH

50, whether those rights are being impeded, or whether any such

impediment is compensable.             See TFJ Nominee Tr., 244 Wis. 2d

242, ¶2.     Because the jurisdictional offer does not describe the

    5  The referenced Plat does show that DOT restricted access
to STH 50 in a 2003 project, but it does not indicate that DOT
is taking any access rights as part of the current project.

                                        13
                                                                           No.    2020AP2146

STH 50 driveway closure or any loss of access rights, DEKK may

not challenge the closure under § 32.05(5).

       ¶22       DEKK's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.                       DEKK

relies primarily on Waller v. American Transmission Company, in

which we held that property owners could raise an uneconomic

remnant claim in a Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)6 proceeding.                              2013 WI

77, ¶118, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764.                             But DEKK is not

raising an uneconomic remnant claim——that is, it does not argue

that       the   taking    of       the   CTH   H     parcel    leaves     its   remaining

property in "such size, shape or condition as to be of little

value or of substantially impaired economic viability."                                  See

Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3m) (defining "uneconomic remnant").                             Waller

does not stand for the broad proposition that a property owner

may challenge any DOT action under § 32.05(5).                             This proposed

expansion of Waller would run contrary to the plain language of

§ 32.05(5),        which       is    limited     to    issues       "pertaining    to    the

condemnation        of    the       property    described      in    the   jurisdictional

offer" (emphasis added).                   Here, DEKK does not challenge the
taking      of    the    CTH    H    parcel     described      in    the   jurisdictional

offer, or allege that the taking left it with an uneconomic

remnant, but instead challenges the closure of a driveway on a

different part of its Property.                      That the driveway closure and

       Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(5) provides a means for property
       6

owners to challenge the government's right to take property
under § 32.06, which sets out the condemnation procedures for
non-transportation-related takings.    The relevant language in
§ 32.06(5) is nearly identical to § 32.05(5).

                                                14
                                                                   No.     2020AP2146

the taking of the CTH H parcel may be part of a larger project

to improve STH 50 does not "merge each project into one single

compensable act."         See 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30,

¶33.    Consequently, DEKK may not pursue damages for the driveway

closure under § 32.05(5).

       ¶23    Because we decide the case on this narrow ground, we

need   not    decide    whether    DEKK    might     recover    damages    for     the

driveway closure through a different procedural avenue.                     See Md.

Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300,

786 N.W.2d 15.          ("Typically, an appellate court should decide

cases on the narrowest possible grounds.                     Issues that are not

dispositive need not be addressed." (citation omitted)).

                             IV.    CONCLUSION
       ¶24    DEKK may not recover damages for the closure of the

STH 50 driveway under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) because the access

rights that DEKK alleges it lost were distinct from the taking

described      in    DOT's   jurisdictional         offer.      Summary    judgment

should therefore be granted in DOT's favor.
       By    the    Court.—The    decision     of   the   court   of     appeals    is

modified, and as modified, affirmed.

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    ¶25       REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.         (concurring).

    To empower government excessively is to endanger the
    very rights government is constituted to secure.
Peter C. Myers, From Natural Rights to Human Rights——And Beyond

33 (2017).

    ¶26       The majority properly resolves this case on limited

procedural grounds; I agree that DEKK's claim for compensation

cannot   be    brought   under    Wis.   Stat.   § 32.05(5).      Instead   of

limiting its analysis to what it properly characterizes as a

dispositive procedural issue, the majority nevertheless makes

unnecessary, overly broad, and inaccurate statements about the

availability of compensation to property owners stemming from

the exercise of the state's police power.               I write separately

because the majority opinion could be misconstrued to undermine

constitutionally protected private property rights; I therefore

do not join it.

    ¶27       The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits

private property from being taken for public use without just

compensation.      U.S. Const. amend. V.         The Wisconsin Constitution

similarly provides that "[t]he property of no person shall be

taken for public use without just compensation therefor."                 Wis.

Const. art. I, § 13.             The majority jumps from reciting the

constitutional limits on the power of the government to take

private property, to asserting that "[i]njuries to property that

result from a valid exercise of the state's police power are

generally not compensable."         Majority op., ¶13.         Exceptions and
caveats abound but go unmentioned by the majority, leaving the

mistaken impression that the government may injure property and
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                                                              No.    2020AP2146.rgb

deny   compensation      to   the    affected    property    owner     merely   by

invoking its police power.           Of course this is not true and never

has been since the people established the government in order to

secure the people's rights:

       We assume that one of the uses of the convenient
       phrase "police power" is to justify those small
       diminutions of property rights which, although within
       the   letter   of    constitutional   protection,   are
       necessarily incident to the free play of the machinery
       of government.    It may be that the extent to which
       such diminutions are lawful without compensation is
       larger when the harm is inflicted only as incident to
       some general requirement of public welfare.        But,
       whether the last-mentioned element enters into the
       problem or not, the question is one of degree, and
       sooner or later we reach the point at which the
       constitution    applies     and     forbids    physical
       appropriation and legal restrictions alike, unless
       they are paid for.
Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496, 53 N.E. 910 (1899) (emphasis

added).

       ¶28   In   this   case,      we   need   not    determine    whether     the

Department of Transportation (DOT) exercised its police power

"to    justify . . . small       diminutions      of    property     rights"     or
instead reached the point of physically appropriating private

property or so restricting it as to trigger the constitutional

command for compensation to the property owner.               Chapters 32 and

86 of the Wisconsin Statutes outline various procedural avenues

for property owners to challenge the government's deprivation of

an asserted right of access and to seek compensation.                     In this

case, DEKK seeks compensation for DOT's alleged elimination of a

deeded right of access to STH 50.                As the majority explains,

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                                                                       No.    2020AP2146.rgb

Wis. Stat. § 32.05 is not the proper statute for seeking just

compensation.

      ¶29    The    majority       confuses          the    dispositive           procedural

issue,      ostensibly         rejecting    DEKK's          claim      because       "DOT's

jurisdictional offer to DEKK did not describe any removal of

access to STH 50."         Majority op., ¶1.               The majority's framing of

its holding suggests DOT could avoid paying just compensation by

simply   omitting        the    removal    of     access      to    STH      50    from    its

jurisdictional offer.            Of course the law would not countenance

such gamesmanship.             The court rejects DEKK's just compensation

claim against DOT because DEKK brought that claim under Wis.

Stat. § 32.05, which governs takings challenges initiated "for

any reason other than that the amount of compensation offered is

inadequate."        Wis.       Stat.   § 32.05(5)          (emphasis      added).         DEKK

purported in its complaint to seek only a "declaration that DOT

has no power or right under the police power to remove DEKK's

access   rights     to    STH    50[.]"         As    litigation       proceeded,         DEKK

altered its posture.            During the hearing on the parties' motions
for summary judgment, DEKK seemingly conceded DOT may possess

the   power    to     remove      its     northern         driveway       and     requested

compensation:

      What we are looking for here is not an order blocking
      the Department from closing the driveway. We are only
      asking for summary [judgment] which says, if the
      Department must close this driveway and can establish
      that they need to do so for public safety reasons,
      they can only do so by the payment of just
      compensation.
      ¶30    Before      this    court,    DEKK      again    frames      the      issue    in
terms of compensation:             "Can DOT remove a 'right of access,'
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contained       in    a     recorded       deed      made     in    an     eminent      domain

procedure, under the guise of an exercise of the police power,

without     prior         due      process       proceedings        and      without        just

compensation?"              A     claim    for       just     compensation         cannot     be

litigated under Wis. Stat. § 32.05, which prescribes procedural

rules the State must follow before condemning property.                                   Crown

Zellerbach Corp. v. Dep't of City Dev. Of City of Milwaukee, 47

Wis. 2d 142,         148,    177      N.W.2d 94      (1970).        Establishing,         among

other things, rules regarding due notice, actions to contest,

and acceptance of offers, this statute prescribes no criteria or

procedure for determining whether an offered award reflects the

fair value of a condemned property.                          See generally Wis. Stat.

§ 32.05.         Those      rules      are    located        in    Wis.    Stat.       § 32.09,

entitled "Rules governing determination of just compensation."

Pursuant    to       this       statute,     courts       must    adhere     to    procedures

adapted to accurately ascertain the value of property loss due

to condemnation.            Backus v. Waukesha Cnty., 2022 WI 55, ¶22, 402

Wis. 2d 764,         976        N.W.2d 492       (Rebecca         Grassl     Bradley,         J.,
concurring).         Section 32.09(8), for example, empowers the court

to require both the condemnor and the owner to "submit . . . a

statement       covering        the    respective         contentions"      on     a   host   of

factors    affecting            the   value    of     a     property.1           Section 32.09

    1   Those factors include:

          (a)    Highest and best use of the property.

          (b)    Applicable zoning.
                                                                                   (continued)
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procedures also ensure property owners receive the highest award

to which they are entitled.              Wis. Stat. § 32.09(2) (requiring

just    compensation        be   determined      "on      the        basis     of     [the

property's] most advantageous use but only such use as actually

affects the present market value.").                Property owners seeking

compensation       for   condemned    property     must      bring         their    claims

under § 32.09.

       ¶31   The court's disposition of DEKK's claim is narrowly

decided      on     procedural       grounds.          The      majority           opinion

unnecessarily       makes    broad    statements    about        the       government's

authority to exercise its police power without compensation to

adversely affected property owners.              This is a complex area of

          (c)     Designation of claimed comparable lands, sale
                  of which will be used in appraisal opinion
                  evidence.

          (d)     Severance damage, if any.

          (e)     Maps and pictures to be used.

          (f)     Costs of reproduction less            depreciation            and
                  rate of depreciation used.

          (g)     Statements of capitalization of income where
                  used as a factor in valuation, with supporting
                  data.

          (h)     Separate opinion as to fair market value,
                  including   before   and   after   value  where
                  applicable by not to exceed 3 appraisers.

          (i)     A recitation of all damages claimed by owner.

          (j)     Qualifications and         experience         of     witnesses
                  offered as experts.

Wis. Stat. § 32.09(8)(a)–(j).

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the law.    Generalized statements without proper attention to

legal nuances may inadvertently have profound implications for

private property owners.    Because the majority should have more

carefully   circumscribed   its   pronouncements,   I     respectfully

concur but do not join the majority opinion.

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