Court Opinion

ID: 9954937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:09:00.229353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:07.120320
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2578-21

COREY CAUTHEN,

          Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

          Respondent.

                   Submitted March 11, 2024 – Decided March 27, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.

                   On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
                   Community Affairs, Government Records Council,
                   GRC Complaint No. 2020-215.

                   Corey Cauthen, appellant pro se.

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent New Jersey Department of Corrections
                   (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General,
                   of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy Attorney
                   General, on the brief).
            Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
            respondent Government Records Council (Steven
            Michael Gleeson, Deputy Attorney General, on the
            statement in lieu of brief).

PER CURIAM

      Appellant Corey Cauthen appeals pro se from the November 9, 2021 final

agency decision of the Government Records Council ("GRC") affirming

respondent New Jersey Department of Corrections' ("DOC") denial of his Open

Public Records Act ("OPRA"), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, request for the log

books regarding Cauthen's attorney's visits from 2010 to 2011.             He also

challenges the GRC's February 14, 2022 denial of his motion for

reconsideration. We affirm.

      Cauthen attempted to confirm that his attorney did not visit him during a

certain time period. He requested the DOC produce copies of the "attorney visit

log book for . . . late 2010 [to] 2011 while [he] was housed at Northern State

Prison." In September 2020, the records custodian for the DOC denied the

request noting "a separate[] attorney log book is not maintained. Therefore, staff

would have to review all log book[s] . . . searching for the entries that correspond

to your attorney visits. This effort would substantially disrupt agency operations

as it would take an employee weeks to locate responsive entries if they exist."

Moreover, the DOC indicated that even if Cauthen was able to narrow his search

                                                                              A-2578-21
                                         2
to specific dates, the records would be exempt from disclosure pursuant to

N.J.A.C. 10A:22-2.3(a)(12) and (13).

      In October 2020, Cauthen challenged that decision before the GRC. On

November 9, 2021, the GRC issued a final decision adopting the findings of the

Executive Director. The GRC found the DOC properly denied access to the

records sought by Cauthen because the records were expressly exempt from

disclosure under OPRA pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:22-2.3(a)(12) and (13). On

February 14, 2022, the GRC denied Cauthen's motion for reconsideration

because it was filed out of time.

      Cauthen acknowledges that on February 4, 2023, he "received [the]

records critical to his initial OPRA request." He asserts the DOC's Social

Service Department provided a computer copy of his "inmate visitor list" for the

periods of time at issue. Despite receiving these records, he argues that because

this information was so readily available, we should grant his application to

settle the record. He asserts this will serve to: (1) compel the DOC to produce

records in its possession; (2) force the DOC to acknowledge the validity of the

records produced by its Social Service Department; and (3) refute the DOC's

own records.

                                                                           A-2578-21
                                       3
      The thrust of Cauthen's argument is that because the DOC was able to

readily access and produce the information at issue, it calls into question its

argument that the records were exempt under OPRA. He concedes his original

OPRA request was "inartfully drafted as it requested a copy of attorney visit log

book[s]," but he claims the DOC should have engaged in mediation to resolve

the issue.   He further argues the GRC improperly denied his motion for

reconsideration as untimely because the delays were caused by the COVID-19

pandemic.

      "We must accord substantial deference to the Council's interpretation of

the limits of the authority bestowed upon it by its own enabling statute." Ciesla

v. N.J. Dep't of Health & Sr. Services, 429 N.J. Super. 127, 148 (App. Div.

2012). We "will not overturn an agency's decision unless it violates express or

implied legislative policies, is based on factual findings that are not supported

by substantial credible evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable."

Fisher v. Div. of Law, 400 N.J. Super. 61, 70 (App. Div. 2008). Although an

agency's determination as to the applicability of OPRA is a legal conclusion

subject to de novo review, see O'Shea v. Township of West Milford, 410 N.J.

Super. 371, 379 (App Div. 2009), "under our deferential standard of review, we

give weight to the GRC's interpretation of OPRA." McGee v. Twp. of E.

                                                                            A-2578-21
                                        4
Amwell, 416 N.J. Super. 602, 616 (App. Div. 2010). "We do not, however,

simply rubber stamp the agency's decision." Bart v. City of Paterson Hous.

Auth., 403 N.J. Super. 609, 618 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Paff v. N.J. Dep't of

Lab., 392 N.J. Super. 334, 340 (App. Div. 2007)).

      "OPRA is designed to give members of the public 'ready access to

government records' unless the statute exempts them from disclosure." Rivera

v. Union Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 250 N.J. 124, 140-41 (2022) (quoting Burnett

v. Cnty. of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421 (2009)). The purpose of OPRA is "to

maximize public knowledge about public affairs in order to ensure an informed

citizenry and to minimize the evils inherent in a secluded process." N. Jersey

Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 229 N.J. 541, 555 (2017) (quoting Mason

v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51, 64 (2008)); see also Rivera, 250 N.J. at 141

(OPRA's "core concern is to promote transparency in government"). "The

public's right to disclosure, while broad, is not unlimited." Bozzi v. City of

Jersey City, 248 N.J. 274, 284 (2021). "OPRA contains twenty-three explicit

exemptions from disclosure." Ibid. "[I]f a document falls within one of these

categories, it is not a government record and not subject to disclosure pursuant

to OPRA." Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Rousseau, 417 N.J. Super. 341, 355

(App. Div. 2010).

                                                                          A-2578-21
                                       5
      We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the GRC's final

decision. We briefly add the following. That Cauthen was able to obtain similar

information through a different avenue does not mean the DOC improperly

denied his request. The GRC correctly determined the DOC was not required to

produce the "attorney visit [log book]." N.J.A.C. 10A:22-2.3(a)(12) provides

that "[r]ecords and/or content related to inmate . . . visit information" are not

government records subject to public access.       Similarly, N.J.A.C. 10A:22-

2.3(a)(13) exempts DOC "[l]og books" from the definition of public records.

Accordingly, we discern no reason to disturb the GRC's decision and conclude

it was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Lastly, the GRC properly

denied Cauthen's motion for reconsideration as untimely. Moreover, even if it

was filed in a timely manner, he did not establish a basis which would have

warranted the GRC to reconsider its decision.

      The GRC's decision is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the

record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). To the extent we have not addressed any

of Cauthen's remaining arguments, we find they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

                                                                           A-2578-21
                                       6