Court Opinion

ID: 9461803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:25:05.90463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:16.436400
License: Public Domain

PELL, Circuit Judge
"(dissenting).
Count Three of the indictment charged that Casimir Staszcuk “did obstruct, delay and affect commerce” . . . “by means of extortion” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The statute which was the basis of the indictment reads in pertinent part: “Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion .” The evidence adduced by the Government at the trial showed affirmatively that Staszcuk did not obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by the transactions charged in Count Three. Nevertheless, he was convicted on this Count . and now a majority of this court, although conceding that the Count Three activity had no effect whatsoever on interstate commerce, have affirmed the conviction. I respectfully dissent from the result reached and while concurring in the dissenting opinion of Judge Sprecher, because of what I regard as a substantially incorrect extension of federal jurisdiction into a localized crime, I feel impelled to add the following comments.
The net effect of the majority decision is to construe the statute to read: “Whoever in any way or degree potentially obstructs, delays, or affects commerce, even though he does not actually obstruct, delay, or affect commerce . .”
The majority despite its scholarly consideration of what it deems Congress probably intended as the scope of its exercise of constitutional power to regulate commerce, ignores that which Congress did in fact enact. In the recent case of Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975), the Supreme Court referred to the “axiom that words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary meaning in the absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary.” The ordinary meanings of the jurisdictional words, “obstruct, delay, *63and affect,” as detailed in dictionaries of the English language all appear to import the concept of accomplishment, a fait accompli rather than a fait potentiel.1 I do not find persuasive reasons for ignoring the ordinary, the plain and explicit, meanings of these key words by equating the breach of trust of a public official which has no actual effect upon commerce and which does not delay or obstruct commerce, as reprehensible as that misconduct may be, with the widespread racketeering at which Congress intended to direct its enactment. I do not read the history quite as does the majority. It seems rather clear to me that Congress was not so much interested in removing artificial restraints on the free flow of goods as it was in striking down an evil which “had become very serious, and the local authorities either would not, or could not, check . . .” United States v. Local 807, 118 F.2d 684, 687-688 (2d Cir. 1941). That the Hobbs Act which was aimed at a specific evil, is sufficiently broad to catch in its net other extortionists whose nefarious activities do in fact affect commerce does not signify to me an intention on the part of Congress, even if Congress has the constitutional power which is not at all clear, to extend the exercise of legislative power to local activities which have no effect whatsoever on interstate commerce. The determination of whether to prosecute federally what is essentially a local crime when it has some minimal connection with interstate commerce is a matter of prosecutorial policy with which the courts do not ordinarily concern themselves. We are, however, not dealing with a question of prosecutorial policy but rather prosecutorial power which I deem to be lacking.
The portion of the statute which would reach nearest to the applicability point here is “affect commerce.” That phrase is not a stranger to other legislation, thus, in the National Labor Relations Act we find the Board being empowered “to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
The use of the word “affect” in the analogous NLRA situation and recognition that Congress intended to indicate the fullest employment of its commerce power authority is discussed in the en banc opinion in National Labor Relations Board v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F.2d 829, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693, 62 S.Ct. 364, 86 L.Ed. 554:
“The National Labor Relations Act uses what have been described as words of art to indicate the fullest employment of this Congressional authority. The selection of the word ‘affect’ is of recent origin. Although it appears in the language of some of the earlier Supreme Court opinions, it only found its way into relatively new legislation, and so is not present in such statutes as the Federal Trade Commission, the old Employers’ Liability Act, and the Sherman Act. They qualify interstate commerce with such words as ‘in’, ‘engage in’ or ‘restraint’, whereas such modern statutes as the National Labor Relations Act, the Bituminous Coal Act, and the new Employers’ Liability Act, prefer the more vehement ‘affect’. That the word has the widest conceivable scope is apparent both from its dictionary definition and its judicial interpretation. The dictionary says: ‘To act upon; produce an effect on; touch’, and the cases are equally unanimous in emphasizing this inclusive character and so hold it to mean ‘acting upon’, ‘working a change in’ or ‘concerning’.” (Footnotes omitted.)
That there must be some effect on commerce even though small would appear to be the underlying premise of the Supreme Court’s position on the National *64Labor Relations Act, and I am unaware of any basis for differentiating the Hobbs Act.
“The power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and extends to all such commerce be it great or small. Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra [187 U.S. 617, 619, 23 S.Ct. 214, 47 L.Ed. 333], The exercise of Congressional power under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 — 7, 15 note, the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730, the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq., or the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, has never been thought to be constitutionally restricted because in any particular case the volume of the commerce affected may be small. The amount of the commerce regulated is of special significance only to the extent that Congress may be taken to have excluded commerce of small volume from the operation of its regulatory measure by express provision' or fair implication.
“The language of the National Labor Relations Act seems to make it plain that Congress has set no restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Board to be determined or fixed exclusively by reference to the volume of interstate commerce involved. Section 2(6) defines commerce as ‘trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States,’ without reference to its volume, and declares in subsection (7) that ‘The term “affecting commerce” means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.’ Section 10(a) confers on the Board authority ‘to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158) affecting commerce.’
“The Act on its face thus evidences the intention of Congress to exercise whatever power is constitutionally given to it to regulate commerce by the adoption of measures for the prevention or control of certain specified acts — unfair labor practices — which provoke or tend to provoke strikes or labor disturbances affecting interstate commerce. Given the other needful conditions, commerce may be affected in the same manner and to the same extent in proportion to its volume, whether it be great or small. Examining the Act in the light of its purpose and of the circumstances in which it must be applied we can perceive no basis for inferring any intention of Congress to make the operation of the Act depend on any particular volume of commerce affected more than that to which courts would apply the maxim de minimis.” National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-607, 59 S.Ct. 668, 671-672, 83 L.Ed. 1014 (1939).2
Here the question is not great or small; it is, putting it very simply, some or none. In the language of Fainblatt, I can perceive no basis for inferring an *65intention of Congress to make the operation of the Hobbs Act independent of any effect whatsoever on interstate commerce. Since the ordinary meaning of the words used would indicate that Congress had no such intention, it is, of course, unnecessary to reach the constitutional question of whether Congress would have the power to reach beyond the boundary imposed by a complete lack of any commerce nexus.
The Government in arguing that potential effect on interstate commerce is sufficient relies on United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944, 88 S.Ct. 1028, 19 L.Ed.2d 1132; United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 745; United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021, 90 S.Ct. 1262, 25 L.Ed.2d 530 (1970); Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856, 75 S.Ct. 81, 99 L.Ed. 675, and United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070, 92 S.Ct. 1518, 31 L.Ed.2d 802.
While language in these cases might suggest potential effect was sufficient, the language does not appear to have been necessary to the courts’ holdings, although, of course, for the reasons I have indicated herein, to the extent that it was necessary to a holding I believe it incorrect. In Pranno, the defendants told the victim that a building permit would not be issued unless the victim paid them $20,000. Apparently some building material from other states had already been brought into Illinois at the time of the extortion. This court held that there was sufficient connection with interstate commerce. “Withholding the building permit would delay construction and the beginning of production. The interstate movement of building materials, raw materials, and finished goods would be correspondingly delayed.
The statute seems to be read as not only prohibiting the obstruction of commerce by extortion, but also prohibiting extortion by any threat, the carrying out of which would obstruct commerce.” 385 F.2d at 389. The extortion money was paid so that the interstate movement of the goods, in fact, continued.
In Hyde, the defendants, including the Attorney General of Alabama, conspired to extort payments from life insurance companies and small loan companies. On appeal, the defendants argued that some of the companies were not engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the extortion. The Fifth Circuit held that the Hobbs Act nevertheless applied: “The companies were formed, and registration for a stock sale was sought, with a stated purpose of going into the activities that support a finding of interstate commerce. Neither the statute nor the Constitution requires that the company be engaged in an interstate transaction at the moment of the extortion to support federal jurisdiction.” 448 F.2d at 836. All of the companies did eventually engage in interstate commerce.
In Tropiano, the defendants, who were engaged in the rubbish collection business, threatened other persons who were involved in the same business with violence if they did not stop soliciting business in the city in which the defendants operated. The victim eventually agreed not to solicit any of the defendants’ customers or any further business in the city. At the time of the threats, the victim employed trucks and containers which were manufactured in another state. The Second Circuit held that there was sufficient connection with interstate commerce for the Hobbs Act: “[The victim’s] surrender of his right to solicit additional customers in Milford automatically limited his future orders for receptacles for new customers and the trucks required to serve such customers.” 418 F.2d at 1076.
In Hulahan, the defendant, a representative of a local labor union, attempted to extort and extorted money from three construction companies by threats of labor trouble. Two of the companies were dependent, for the continuation of the work undertaken by them, upon *66equipment, materials, and supplies from other states. The third company was working on the construction of runways at the St. Louis Municipal Airport. The Eighth Circuit held that there was sufficient connection with interstate commerce for the purposes of the Hobbs Act since the companies were dependent upon interstate commerce for materials, etc. or were engaged in constructing facilities to serve interstate commerce.
In Augello, the Second Circuit held there was sufficient nexus with interstate commerce since the depletion of the victim’s resources, due to the extortion payments, affected the victim’s purchase of goods from interstate commerce. The evidence indicated that the victim purchased supplies from another state at the time of the extortion.
In sum, this court is squarely holding in a case, really of first impression, that the Hobbs Act has eliminated the necessity of actual effect on interstate commerce so long as it reasonably appeared at the time of the extortion that there would be such effect. I cannot agree that Congress intended such an extension.3
Although I did approve of and concur in the opinion of the panel of this court when the case was first heard, since the matter has been before the court for reconsideration via the en banc route, I have reexamined the matter of the voir dire on the basis of the record and in the light of Judge Swygert’s dissenting opinion. I am persuaded that the curtailment of sufficient opportunity to determine a proper basis for the selection of a jury was substantial enough to deny the appellant a fair trial. I therefore join in the dissent of Judge Swygert.

. For example from Webster’s Third International Dictionary: affect — “to produce an effect ... to produce a material influence upon or alteration in”; delay — “to put off . to stop, detain or hinder for a time to cause to be slower”; obstruct —“to block up . to be or come in the way of . .to cut off from sight.”

. The de minimis concept, which by definition would seem to require some effect and which would likewise appear to preclude a jurisdictional basis of no effect at all, was given consideration by this court in the case of Community Currency Exchange, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 471 F.2d 39, 41-42 (7th Cir. 1972):
“It is true, however, as the company urges here, that the Board’s broad jurisdiction is limited by the de minimis doctrine. The de minimis concept, as enunciated in NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607, 59 S.Ct. 668, 83 L.Ed. 1014 (1939), operates to deny federal jurisdiction where a business’s effect on commerce is so negligible that for jurisdictional purposes the enterprise is considered purely local. Although the' concept is not susceptible to a mechanical application based upon a business volume formula, the Third Circuit has held that ‘de minimis in the law has always been taken to mean trifles — matters of few dollars or less.’ NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1941). We adopted that reasoning in NLRB v. Aurora City Lines, Inc., 299 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1962). We do not deem the exchanges’ effect on commerce trifling, either from the standpoint of dollar amount or business impact.”

. While perhaps not dispositive of the legal issue presented by Count Three, two collateral policy reasons suggest themselves for the view of the lack of necessity for straining to find that Congress did extend itself to the extent that the majority opinion finds it did.
(1) In a period of constant study of the problems presented by the overload of cases in the federal courts, and the suggested elimination of some types of jurisdiction, e. g., diversity cases, a limitation on the sweep of jurisdictional claims into local cases might be pertinent for consideration.
(2) The Hobbs Act defendant is quite frequently guilty of other federal violations as to which there is no question. Most frequently it is found for understandable reasons that the amount received has not been reported on income tax returns, thereby presenting a tax evasion case. Also, the Hobbs Act defendant may not have confined himself to one act of extortion but may have engaged in several other such acts as to which there was no question of effect on commerce. This aspect, of course, is not persuasive if the prosecutorial effort is to demonstrate by “throwing the book” that the defendant is guilty of multiple crimes.