Court Opinion

ID: 9571283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:29.341654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:47.291545
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WHITING,
with whom JUSTICE STEPHENSON and JUSTICE HASSELL join, dissenting.
I cannot agree that the trial court correctly excluded all of the questions intended for the 16 prospective jurors who said they had acquired pretrial information about the offense. A trial court’s assessment of prospective jurors’ potential for bias is presumptively correct, Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984); Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 124, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987), absent manifest error, Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031-32 n.7; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Pope, 234 Va. at 124, 360 S.E.2d at 358. In this case, however, I believe there was “manifest error” in refusing to permit any of the questions necessary to establish a factual and objective basis for assessing juror impartiality.
The record discloses an unusual amount of pretrial publicity. The charge involved the alleged capital murder of a local resident by a convict who was serving a part of his sentence for first degree murder as a member of a road gang. After this murder, county officials and local citizens publicly expressed surprise, outrage, and fear for the safety of local residents upon discovery that prisoners like Mu’Min, who had been convicted of violent crimes, were permitted to work in such close contact with the public. When the prospective jurors were assembled, 16 of them responded affirmatively to the question of whether they had “acquired any information from the news media or from any other source” regarding the offense. The trial court then asked:
Would the information that you heard, received, or read from whatever source, would that information affect your impartiality in this case?
*454Is there anyone that would say what you’ve read, seen, heard, or whatever information you may have acquired from whatever the source would affect your impartiality so that you could not be impartial?
In view of everything that you’ve seen, heard, or read, or any information from whatever source that you’ve acquired in this case, is there anyone who believes that you could not become a Juror, enter the Jury box with an open mind and wait until the entire case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion or a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused?
Only one prospective juror responded to these inquiries; the balance remained silent. That prospective juror was excused for cause when he said he could not be impartial.
Because of the trial court’s ruling, we do not know what the prospective jurors had read or heard about the case before trial. We do know, however, that the following information regarding the accused, not a part of the evidence at the guilt phase of trial, was published in the local papers:
1. His suspected assault upon a fellow prisoner, resulting in a broken nose.
2. His citation for 23 prison violations and his rejection for parole on six previous applications.
3. His 1973 conviction for the murder and robbery of a Grayson County cab driver, with some details of the crime and a statement from the Grayson County prosecutor that the death penalty was not available when the accused was convicted.
4. His juvenile record in New York and Virginia.
5. His alleged commission of a burglary and engagement in “Peeping Tom” activities while a prisoner. Also, there were indications that a rape may also have been involved in the commission of this murder.
An accused has statutory and constitutional rights to trial by an impartial jury. I do not believe that defense counsel was afforded a meaningful voir dire examination of prospective jurors, as mandated by Code § 8.01-358. The majority disposes of this contention in a footnote (n.3) by relying upon LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, where we said that “[a] party has no right, statutory or *455otherwise, to propound any question he wishes, or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum.” 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653. Nothing in the record in the present case, however, suggests that defense counsel sought to “propound any question he wishe[d], or to extend voir dire questioning ad infinitum.”
Code § 8.01-358 mandates that “counsel for either party shall have the right to examine under oath any person who is called as a juror . . . and shall have the right to ask such person ... directly any relevant question to ascertain whether he ... is sensible of any bias or prejudice.” The section further provides that “[a] juror, knowing anything relative to a fact in issue, shall disclose the same in open court.” Code § 8.01-358. Moreover, as we said in LeVasseur, “[t]he court must afford a party a full and fair opportunity to ascertain whether prospective jurors ‘stand indifferent in the cause.’ ” 225 Va. at 581, 304 S.E.2d at 653.
In enacting Code § 8.01-358, the General Assembly intended to provide counsel a meaningful voir dire examination. Clearly, questions pertaining to what a prospective juror had seen, read, or heard about the case are “relevant ... to ascertain whether he ... is sensible of any bias or prejudice.” Therefore, the court violated Mu’Min’s statutory right to trial by an impartial jury.
Additionally, “[ujnder the Federal and State Constitutions, U.S. Const, amends. VI and XIV; Va. Const, art. 1, § 8, an accused has a right to trial by an ‘impartial jury.’ ” Wm. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 658, 283 S.E.2d 212, 215 (1981). As illustrated by the majority opinion, 239 Va. at 443-44, we frequently apply federal decisions construing the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury in construing this same right under art. 1, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution. See also, Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 251, 372 S.E.2d 759, 766 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3261 (1989).
An accused’s right to trial by an impartial jury is violated if jurors are impanelled after an inadequate voir dire examination. See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). If the examination is inadequate, the accused’s right is prejudiced in two respects; he is unable to exercise effectively his right of challenge, United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 368 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), and the trial court is unable to assess fairly the prospective jurors’ impartiality. United States v. Davis, 583 F.2d 190, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1978).
*456Thus, when there has been unusual pretrial publicity in a criminal case, the Supreme Court has said that there must be “fair support in the record for the state courts’ conclusion that the jurors . . . would be impartial.” Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038. Moreover, where prospective jurors have indicated that they were exposed to pretrial publicity in response to questions similar to those posed in this case, we have warned: “[T]he proof that [a prospective juror] is impartial and fair, should come from him and not be based on his mere assent to persuasive suggestions.” Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300, 227 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In other words, “in the absence of an examination designed to elicit answers which provide an objective basis for the court’s evaluation, ‘merely going through the form of obtaining jurors’ assurances of impartiality is insufficient ....’” Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 638 (9th Cir. 1968) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In at least two of our cases involving pretrial publicity, we have said that a trial court should have rejected such subjective assurances. Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 977, 266 S.E.2d 87, 91 (1980); Breeden, 217 Va. at 298-300, 227 S.E.2d at 736-37. “[H]owever willing the juror might be to trust himself, the law will not trust him.” Breeden, 217 Va. at 298, 227 S.E.2d at 735 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, whether a juror can impartially render a verdict “should not be [based] on that juror’s [subjective] assessment of self-righteousness without something more.” Silverthorne, 400 F.2d at 639. Instead, a trial court must objectively and independently assess each prospective juror’s state of mind.
When a juror is exposed to potentially prejudicial pretrial publicity, it is necessary to determine whether the juror can lay aside any impression or opinion due to the exposure. The juror is poorly placed to make a determination as to his own impartiality. Instead, the trial court should make this determination.
Jordan v. Lippman, 763 F.2d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). “The issue of who is, or is not, a competent juror is one for the trial court to decide,” Justus, 220 Va. at 976, 266 S.E.2d at 91, not the juror himself.
*457Furthermore, I believe the questions in this case were deficient in that the prospective jurors could simply remain silent as an implied indication of a lack of bias or prejudice. This gave the trial court no effective opportunity to assess the demeanor of each prospective juror in disclaiming bias. Moreover, even if the court had required an express affirmation of each prospective juror, such an affirmation would have required an admission of bias or prejudice before the assembled panel. “No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to the [accused], but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one’s fellows is often its father.” Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728.
Apparently, we have never addressed the necessity of such questions at voir dire, where panel members have been exposed to unusual pretrial publicity. However, we have ample precedent for such questions. In Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), the trial court sought a description of what was actually remembered by those prospective jurors who had been subjected to pretrial publicity. There, we sustained the trial court’s objective findings regarding the impartiality of those prospective jurors, who we noted had remembered few of the details of such publicity. Id. at 717, 204 S.E.2d at 420. Although not the subject of our discussion, an inspection of the appendices in the following cases indicates that “content” questions were likewise asked of prospective jurors exposed to pretrial publicity. Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 372 S.E.2d 759 (1988); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 304 S.E.2d 644 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984); Bassett v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 284 S.E.2d 844 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 938 (1982); Justus, 220 Va. 971, 266 S.E.2d 87; Breeden, 217 Va. 297, 227 S.E.2d 734; Greenfield, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414.
The questions proffered by the accused,1 and refused by the court, were clearly designed to provide a factual and objective basis for assessing the potential for bias.2 Some prospective jurors *458may honestly have felt that the publicity had not affected their impartiality; however, a disclosure of what was actually remembered could lead an impartial observer to conclude that there was a bias of which the potential juror was unaware, as in Justus and Breeden. “Voir dire examination serves to protect [the right to a fair trial] by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough Power Equipment v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).
I believe that the majority’s citation of United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), for the proposition that the opportunity to ask “content questions” is “not a matter of right,” misconstrues the essence of that holding. The Haldeman Court explicitly agreed that a certain ABA Standard “mandate [d] an inquiry into the sources and intensity of a venireman’s exposure to pretrial publicity, not an inquiry into his recollection of the content of that publicity.” Id. at 69 (emphasis added). Moreover, emphasizing that the voir dire in that defendant’s case permitted counsel to determine the nature and intensity of the exposure to pretrial publicity, the Court stated:
We agree that it would have been reversible error for the Court to accept jurors simply because they said they would be fair .... In this case, however, the Court had before it and acted on not only the jurors’ subjective assurances but also objective information relating how closely they had followed Watergate and their sources of information.
Id. at 67 n.51 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In addition, Haldeman distinguished Dellinger and Silverthorne, two cases involving constitutionally inadequate voir dire, on the ground that the trial courts in those cases failed to permit any questions concerning the source and intensity of exposure to pretrial publicity. See id. at 69.
As in Dellinger and Silverthorne, the trial court in this case rejected all voir dire questions aimed at determining the source and intensity of exposure to pretrial publicity, as well as “content” questions. In my view, it was not necessarily error to preclude some or even all of the “content” questions; however, the trial *459court’s conduct of voir dire was constitutionally inadequate, even under Haldeman, in its blanket refusal to permit any questions aimed at determining the sources and intensity of exposure to pretrial publicity (e.g., where did you hear about this case; how many times did you hear about it; and when did you hear about it).
In my opinion, under the circumstances of this case, the refusal to permit any questions regarding the source and intensity of knowledge regarding pretrial publicity violated the accused’s statutory and constitutional right to trial by an impartial jury. Although I agree with the majority opinion in all other respects, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial at which appropriate voir dire questions should be asked.

 The tenor of the proffered questions was: What have you seen, read or heard about this case; from whom did you get this information; when and where did you get this information; have you discussed this case with anyone; with whom; when and where; what did you discuss; if an opinion had been formed, what is it; has anyone expressed an opinion about this case to you; who; what; when; and where?

 Without necessarily approving each of the proffered questions, if the trial court permits no questions regarding the source and extent of exposure to pretrial publicity, and, therefore, content questions are necessary, at minimum, I believe each prospective juror subjected to pretrial publicity should have been asked what information he recalled and *458when it was received. Moreover, the risk of “tainting” the other prospective jurors could have been minimized by excluding the others from the courtroom during each examination, or by examining them in smaller groups, as the court did.