Court Opinion

ID: 9965477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 16:04:45.597204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.092156
License: Public Domain

IN THE

      Indiana Supreme Court
                 Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CR-150
                                                                                   FILED
                         Dustin A. Lane,
                                                                              May 02 2024, 10:10 am

                                                                                   CLERK
                      Appellant (Defendant below)                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                                                    and Tax Court

                                   –v–

                         State of Indiana,
                        Appellee (Plaintiff below)

           Argued: November 8, 2023 | Decided: May 2, 2024

               Appeal from the Lawrence Superior Court
                         No. 47D01-2201-CM-113
                 The Honorable John M. Plummer, Judge

        On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                            No. 22A-CR-2276

                        Opinion by Justice Goff
             Chief Justice Rush and Justice Slaughter concur.
Justice Molter dissents with separate opinion in which Justice Massa joins.
Goff, Justice.

   Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) permits reviewing courts to revise a
criminal sentence that is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and the character of the offender.” The defendant in this case
received an aggregate sentence of more than eight years for ten
misdemeanors he committed by sending letters from prison to his former
partner, while serving time after a domestic battery and in violation of a
no-contact order. Generally, we encourage Indiana trial courts to use the
full range of rehabilitation options when sentencing defendants for
misdemeanors and low-level felonies. However, we defer to a trial court’s
decision that a lengthy sentence of incarceration for such offenses is
necessary to protect victims and the community from an offender with a
history of violence. Such deference is due here and, accordingly, we affirm
the sentence.

Facts and Procedural History
   Dustin Lane was convicted in 2019 of Level 6 felony domestic battery
resulting in moderate bodily injury to his ex-wife, A.N., who had suffered
years of domestic and emotional abuse at Lane’s hands. 1 Lane’s criminal
record also includes a Level B felony for dealing methamphetamine; Class
D felonies for sexual misconduct with a minor, maintaining a common
nuisance, and criminal recklessness; a Level 5 felony for criminal
confinement resulting in bodily injury; and a Level 6 felony for possession
of methamphetamine. 2

   As a result of Lane’s domestic-battery conviction, the trial court
sentenced him to a term in the Department of Correction (or DOC) and
entered a no-contact order prohibiting him from contacting A.N. directly

1   See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(3) (2016).
2See, respectively, I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(1) (2006); I.C. § 35-42-4-9(b) (1998); I.C. § 35-48-4-13(b)(2)
(2001); I.C. § 35-42-2-2(c)(2) (2003); I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(C) (2013); I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a) (2014).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024                                   Page 2 of 18
or indirectly.3 Despite these measures, Lane sent a series of letters to A.N.
from prison between March 2020 and September 2021. A.N. initially sent
several letters to Lane in response but eventually stopped responding. The
content of these written communications often involved family matters,
with Lane giving input on raising their children and asking that their
daughter take driving lessons and pick him up on his day of release. The
emotional tone of Lane’s letters oscillated, conveying sometimes love,
apologies, commitment, forgiveness, and promises of reform, but other
times criticism and accusations of abuse. These letters, A.N. later testified,
were part of a “cycle” of “manipulation tactics” that she had “seen
through the years of the domestic abuse.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. This history of
abuse included Lane threatening to kill A.N. and her family.

   Several months after Lane’s last letter, A.N. reported his violations of
the no-contact order to the police. The State, in response, charged Lane
with ten counts of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy—one count
for each of ten letters he sent to A.N. (although there are fourteen letters in
the record).4 Lane pled guilty to all counts without a plea agreement. The
trial court—though not required to—identified Lane’s history of violent
criminal behavior as an aggravating factor and his acceptance of
responsibility as a mitigating factor. It then sentenced Lane to ten 300-day
sentences, each to run consecutively for an aggregate 3,000-day, fully
executed, sentence. 5 Because Lane admitted to violating his domestic-
battery probation by committing his new offenses, the trial court revoked
the 730 days of Lane’s suspended sentence in that case, which Lane must
serve consecutively to the 3,000-day sentence. Lane is serving the
misdemeanor sentence in the DOC pursuant to a request from the county
sheriff under Indiana Code section 35-38-3-3(b)(3)(A).

3   See I.C. § 35-38-1-30 (2008).
4   See I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(12) (2019).
5Each of the ten sentences fell below the one-year maximum for a single count. See I.C. § 35-
50-3-2 (1977).

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   Lane received permission to file a belated appeal, then challenged his
3,000-day sentence, claiming it was inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offenses and his character. In a published opinion, a majority of the
Court of Appeals panel agreed. Lane v. State, 211 N.E.3d 551, 553 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2023). Despite finding nothing in Lane’s character to warrant relief,
the majority deemed the sentence inappropriate considering the nature of
his offenses. Id. at 554. Lane’s letters were “nonthreatening and primarily
revolved around” the children, the majority explained, adding that A.N.
encouraged a dialogue by responding to Lane’s letters and that she failed
to report Lane’s violations of the no-contact order until several months
after his last letter. Id. at 555. Characterizing the sentence as “an outlier
that simply cannot stand,” the court remanded with instructions to
impose fully concurrent sentences for an aggregate 300-day term. Id. at
556.

   In a sixteen-page dissent, Judge Kenworthy disagreed with the
majority’s assessment of the offenses, noting Lane’s “relentless” violence
and intimidation towards A.N. and the cycle of manipulation perpetuated
by the letters. Id. at 556–57. In Judge Kenworthy’s view, the majority
focused too much on A.N.’s conduct without appreciating “the protective
effect of a no-contact order in these emotionally fraught scenarios.” Id. at
560.

  We now grant transfer, thus vacating the opinion of the Court of
Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

Standard of Review
   The core principles of 7(B) review are well settled. We recognize
sentencing as “principally a discretionary function in which the trial
court’s judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State,
895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). This deference prevails “‘unless
overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature
of the offense’ and ‘the defendant’s character.’” Oberhansley v. State, 208
N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111,
122 (Ind. 2015)). Our role is primarily to “leaven the outliers” and identify

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024           Page 4 of 18
“guiding principles” for sentencers, rather than to achieve the “perceived
‘correct’ result” in each case. Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. As such, we
“focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—
consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on
any individual count.” Id. Ultimately, we rely on our “collective judgment
as to the balance” of all the relevant considerations involved, which
include “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the
damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a
given case.” Id. at 1224, 1226.

Discussion and Decision
   Article Seven, Section Four of the Indiana Constitution grants this
Court the power “to review and revise the sentence imposed” in all
criminal appeals. 6 This authority, as implemented through Appellate Rule
7(B), allows an appellate court, “after due consideration of the trial court’s
decision,” to find “that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and the character of the offender.”

   Our Rule 7(B) jurisprudence reflects a continuing effort to define the
proper role for appellate sentence review within Indiana’s criminal-justice
system. In Serino v. State, we noted that judicial discretion to deviate from
a standard sentence based on aggravating or mitigating factors produced
“widely varying sentences for similar crimes.” 798 N.E.2d 852, 854 (Ind.
2003). Accordingly, we cast Rule 7(B) as a “chance to review the matter in
a climate more distant from local clamor” and work toward a goal of
“similar sentences” for “perpetrators committing the same acts who have
the same backgrounds.” Id. at 854, 856–57. And, in Cardwell, we likewise
envisioned Rule 7(B) as a tool to address “perceived unfairness” between
sentences in a system that, unlike the federal sentencing guidelines, did
not proceed by the “mechanical application of an array of factors.” 895

6The Indiana Court of Appeals exercises similar authority in criminal cases, “to the extent
provided by rule.” Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6.

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N.E.2d at 1223. Today, we advance our 7(B) jurisprudence by setting
sentence review in the context of the policies and sentencing options that
emerged from recent reforms to Indiana’s criminal-justice system.

   This opinion proceeds in three stages. First, we set out the broad policy
context of sentence review, explaining the range of options trial courts
have for sentencing a misdemeanor or low-level felony offender. Second,
we clarify that defendants may argue that their sentences are
inappropriate based on either the nature of their offenses or their
character alone. Finally, we evaluate Lane’s sentence and decline to find it
inappropriate, considering his violent criminal history and the risk he
poses of perpetuating the cycle of domestic abuse against A.N.

I. Trial courts have a broad range of options for
   sentencing low-level offenders in light of the
   danger they may pose to the community.
   We begin Part I by summarizing the recent reforms to Indiana’s
criminal-justice system. For sentence-review purposes, we draw two
principal conclusions from these reforms: First, sentencing courts should
consider the full range of available options, including community-based
rehabilitation programs, for defendants who commit low-level offenses
but pose little continuing danger to others. Second, to ensure public
safety, courts should consider extended jail sentences for low-level
offenders with a history of violence who pose a continuing threat to
others. Consequently, we will defer to a trial court’s considered
assessment that a person is too dangerous to receive anything but a
lengthy executed sentence.

   A. Indiana’s reformed criminal-justice system
      distinguishes between offenders the community is
      “mad at” and those the community is “afraid of.”
  In 2014, when much of the nation was moving in the same direction,
Indiana undertook major criminal-justice reforms. The motivations were

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024          Page 6 of 18
varied but significantly driven by the cost of mass incarceration. See Drew
Kirages, Note, Reentry Reform in Indiana: HEA 1006 and Its (Much Too
Narrow) Focus on Prison Overcrowding, 49 Ind. L. Rev. 209, 209 (2015).
Indeed, from 2000 to 2010, Indiana’s spending on prisons had risen by
seventy-six percent, as the number of people incarcerated had grown by
forty-one percent. Hon. Randall T. Shepard, The Great Recession as a
Catalyst for More Effective Sentencing, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 146, 146 (2010).

   The increase in inmate numbers came largely from imprisoning drug
offenders. Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern
States: Origins and Trends, 47 Val. U. L. Rev. 709, 729, 733 (2013). Prisons
are an expensive proposition that became unsustainable as millions of
Americans became addicted to opioids. By the 2010s, more than eighty
percent of the nation’s prisoners had substance-use disorders. Leo
Beletsky, et al., Fatal Re-Entry: Legal and Programmatic Opportunities to Curb
Opioid Overdose Among Individuals Newly Released from Incarceration, 7 Ne.
U. L.J. 149, 151 (2015). Simple possession of less than three grams of
opioids—potently addictive drugs mass-produced and over-prescribed at
unprecedented levels—was punishable by up to three years in the DOC.
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6(a) (2006); I.C. § 35-48-2-4(b) (2013); I.C. § 35-50-2-7(a)
(2013); James G. Hodge, et al., Exploring Legal and Policy Responses to
Opioids: America's Worst Public Health Emergency, 70 S.C. L. Rev. 481, 485–
90 (2019). 7

   In Indiana, the General Assembly saw the writing on the wall and took
action. The 2014 reforms, largely embodied in House Enrolled Act 1006
(HEA 1006), 8 aimed to “reduce crime by promoting the use of evidence
based best practices for rehabilitation of offenders in a community
setting.” I.C. § 35-32-1-1(5) (2014). The flipside of this coin was to “keep
dangerous offenders in prison by avoiding the use of scarce prison space
for nonviolent offenders.” I.C. § 35-32-1-1(6).

7Simple possession of up to five grams of opioids today carries a maximum of two and a half
years. I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a) (2014); I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) (2019).
8   Pub. L. No. 168-2014, 2014 Ind. Acts 2030.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024                        Page 7 of 18
   HEA 1006 and subsequent reform measures restructured sentencing,
tied probation funding to the development of evidence-based programs
for reducing recidivism, and required the detention of most Level 6 felony
offenders in local county jails rather than the DOC. Kirages, supra, at 218–
19, 222. The reforms also resulted in more graduated penalties for drug
offenses, depending on the quantity of drugs involved and the presence or
absence of enhancing circumstances, such as possession of a firearm. Joel
M. Schumm, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure, 48
Ind. L. Rev. 1241, 1242–43 (2015).

   On the ground, these changes meant that most low-level felons,
including those who possessed opioids, were no longer eligible for
placement in the DOC. See I.C. § 35-38-3-3(d) (2015). 9 Instead, they would
serve community-based sentences—whether in the county jail, on
probation, or under the supervision of a problem-solving court with
medically assisted treatment and connection to peer-support groups.10

   Beyond the response to drug offenses, our criminal-justice overhaul
resulted in deinstitutionalization and community-based sentencing for
most other low-level felons, including some who had been violent.
Persons convicted of various offenses—e.g., strangulation, stalking, and
domestic battery with a prior conviction or in the presence of a child—
were also now, for the most part, ineligible for placement in the DOC. I.C.
§ 35-42-2-9(b) (2014); I.C. § 35-45-10-5(a); I.C. §§ 35-42-2-1.3(b)(1), (2).
These offenders instead became the responsibility of their local criminal-
justice systems.

9Under a 2022 amendment, low-level felons are eligible for direct commitment to the DOC,
although discretion lies with the trial court. Pub. L. No. 45-2022, § 9, 2022 Ind. Acts 393, 402–
03 (codified at I.C. § 35-38-3-3(c) (2022)).
10At last count, Indiana boasts fifty adult drug courts, twenty-eight veterans’ courts, and
twenty-one family-recovery courts. Ind. Crim. Justice Inst. & Justice Reinv. Advisory Council,
Annual Evaluation: Indiana’s Criminal Code Reform 7 (2023), https://www.in.gov/cji/grant-
opportunities/files/1006-Report-2023.pdf [https://perma.cc/F8AP-JF26]. The Justice
Reinvestment Advisory Council (JRAC) was created in 2015 to assist communities with
developing best practices and obtaining grants for recidivism-reduction programs. See I.C. §
33-38-9.5-3 (2021).

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    In considering sentences imposed on such offenders, policymakers
described Indiana’s “smart-on-crime” reforms with a phrase that captured
its two contrasting faces: separating “‘the people we’re mad at from the
people we’re afraid of.’” Dewees v. State, 180 N.E.3d 261, 266 (Ind. 2022)
(quoting Tom Davies, Ind. House Panel Backs Sentencing Laws Overhaul,
Dubois County Herald (Jan. 17, 2013) (in turn quoting Rep. Greg
Steuerwald)). Indeed, many serious offenses involving violence, sex, and
drug-dealing received more severe penalties after the overhaul than they
had before. See Schumm, supra, at 1241–42 (explaining that the actual time
served could increase for murder and those felonies classified at Levels 1,
3, and 5).

   The dichotomy between “mad at” and “afraid of” has helped local
justice professionals understand the need to prioritize the use of a
community’s most expensive and scarce resource—jail beds—for people
who present credible and continuing threats to public safety. But the
overriding message remained the promotion of public safety.

   B. Trial courts should consider the full range of sentencing
      options for offenders who pose a continuing danger to
      the community.
   The distinction between offenders the community is “mad at” or
“afraid of” influences our approach to sentence review, including the
review of lower-level offenses.

   Most crimes are, like the offenses at issue here, misdemeanors or low-
level felonies. In 2023, 70.9 percent of new felony filings were for Level 6
felonies. Ind. Crim. Justice Inst. & Justice Reinv. Advisory Council,
Annual Evaluation: Indiana’s Criminal Code Reform 17 (2023),
https://www.in.gov/cji/grant-opportunities/files/1006-Report-2023.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8AP-JF26] (Annual Evaluation). Because persons
convicted of these crimes will often serve out their sentences at the local
level (rather than at the DOC), a trial judge must usually rely on local
resources. The county jail, the probation department, the community-
corrections office, the community mental-health center, problem-solving

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courts, and no-contact orders make up the primary tools available for trial
courts to craft a community-based sentence. Any one tool, or some
combination, may be an appropriate sentencing option in a particular
case. Knowing which tools, or combination of tools, to employ is a skill
that our trial judges must develop—and have developed—to ensure
public safety and public trust. Our respect for the trial courts’ local
knowledge, skill, familiarity with their own cases, and primary role as
sentencers remains paramount.

  At the same time, we have a responsibility to ensure a degree of
uniformity. Across our state, ninety-one county-based systems 11 operate
on the criminal-justice frontlines relatively independent of each other. But
trial judges in each county impose sentences for the same classes of crime,
within the same penalty ranges, and with opportunities to develop the
same community-based programs outside of jail. These programs are even
more important to use wisely, considering the expense and difficulty of
holding offenders in county jails. The latter are “not intended to be ‘small
prisons,’” yet many operate beyond their capacity. Bre Robinson, Note,
Who Are We Afraid of? Indiana's Criminal Reform and How It Fails to Address
Those with Mental Illness and Substance Use Disorder, 54 Ind. L. Rev. 635,
640–42 (2021); see also Annual Evaluation, supra, at 53–54. We thus expect
the trial courts in each county to take advantage of the full range of
options for dealing with offenders who are not destined for DOC custody.
Cf. Kellams v. State, 198 N.E.3d 375, 376 (Ind. 2022) (Rush, C.J., dissenting
from denial of transfer) (noting the “justice-by-geography anomaly” that
some counties still lack problem-solving courts).

  One of the most important tasks for a trial judge is to determine which
low-level offenders are not good candidates for community corrections or
problem-solving courts. Our standard of review offers deference to a trial
court’s considered decision on this score, as on all sentencing matters. Of
course, our criminal code does not require a trial judge to use the same

11Ohio and Switzerland Counties operate largely as one system, sharing a judge, a jail, and
other critical personnel and infrastructure.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024                         Page 10 of 18
degree of formality in imposing a penalty for a misdemeanor as for a
felony. See I.C. § 35-38-1-1.3 (2014) (requiring courts to issue statements
only in felony cases when explaining any deviation from the advisory
sentence). Still, it is important for a reviewing court to consider all the
facts that confronted the sentencing judge. After all, the General Assembly
intends trial judges to enjoy “maximum discretion to impose sentences
based on a consideration of all the circumstances related to the offense.”
I.C. § 35-32-1-1(7). When determining whether a misdemeanant’s lengthy
sentence of imprisonment may be inappropriate, we find it helpful when
trial courts, as here, explain their sentencing considerations in some detail
on the record.

   Given the context and general principles described above, we can
properly frame the issue that lay before the trial judge in this case: How
does a judge craft an appropriate sentence when a repeat misdemeanor
offender has been undeterred by DOC placement, has demonstrated
unwillingness to comply with a no-contact order, has threatened before to
kill the victim and her family, and has a history of violent offenses? In
such a case, it might well be appropriate to craft a sentence that
incapacitates the offender from harming others for as long as possible.
And it would behoove us to defer to a trial court’s sound discretion in
imposing such a sentence on a dangerous, violent offender.

II. A defendant may seek to show that their sentence
    is inappropriate in light of either the nature of
    their offense or their character.
   Before returning to the facts of Lane’s appeal, we lay out one additional
clarification of our standard of review in 7(B) claims.

   In Connor v. State, the Court of Appeals explained that the two prongs
of Appellate Rule 7(B)—the nature of the offense and the character of the
offender—are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in
determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2016). Reviewing courts “must consider” both factors, but the
defendant need not “necessarily prove” that the sentence is inappropriate

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on both counts. Id. at 219. Revision may be warranted “where only one of
the prongs weighs heavily in favor” of the defendant. Id. By contrast, the
panel in Davis v. State held that both “conditions” must be satisfied. 173
N.E.3d 700, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).

   We adopt the Connor court’s understanding as a faithful expression of
the flexibility of our 7(B) case-law. See, e.g., State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d
1185, 1195 (Ind. 2020) (calling the claimant’s crimes “horrific” yet granting
relief based on his youth and “positive steps toward rehabilitation” before
conviction); Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind. 2018) (granting
relief to a defendant who, despite the “serious” drug offenses involved,
had “dedicated her time” and resources to “helping others who suffer
from addiction”); Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 494 (Ind. 2015) (deciding
that the nature of the claimant’s offenses “far outweigh[ed] his otherwise
favorable character”); Carpenter v. State, 950 N.E.2d 719, 721 (Ind. 2011)
(taking the “adverse character of the offender and the unaggravated
nature of the offense as a whole” in granting relief).

   As the Connor court appreciated, “7(B) review is a holistic approach.”
58 N.E.3d at 219. We assess a sentence in light of the whole picture before
us. Allowing a strong showing on one prong to outweigh a weak showing
on the other promotes the ideal of “similar sentences” for “perpetrators
committing the same acts who have the same backgrounds.” See Serino,
798 N.E.2d at 854. We reiterate, however, that, to the extent the evidence
on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong
must be all the stronger to justify relief. See Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 220.

III. The sentence here was not inappropriate.
   The principles announced above inform our evaluation of Lane’s 3,000-
day sentence, which we ultimately affirm. In short, Lane’s crimes and
character indicate that he poses a continuing danger of restarting a cycle
of physical and emotional abuse towards A.N. We defer to the trial court’s
decision that a lengthy term of imprisonment was warranted for the safety
of A.N. and the community.

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   We begin with Lane’s character. Unfortunately, his record of seven
felony convictions demonstrates a highly concerning disregard for the law
and a risk to the public. His varied rap sheet includes a sex crime, drug
dealing, and domestic violence against A.N. Moreover, Lane committed
his invasions of privacy while in prison, indicating an ongoing and
stubborn willingness to break the law. At the sentencing hearing, A.N.
laid out a history of intimidation and violence—a history that includes a
threat to kill A.N. and her family, and Lane giving his own mother a
concussion as his daughter watched. Because the evidence of Lane’s
character is so unfavorable, only a highly persuasive claim based on the
nature of his offenses could render his sentence inappropriate.

   A considerable amount of evidence was placed before the trial court
concerning the nature of the offenses. First, we consider the letters
themselves, then the context in which they were written.

   We acknowledge that a letter is not the most intrusive way of violating
a no-contact order. We note, too, that Lane’s letters were not openly
threatening and often discussed run-of-the-mill family matters. However,
the series of letters also contained a noticeable oscillation in tone. They
began with the aspiration to be released on Valentine’s Day, assurances
that Lane would take “full responsibility” towards the children, several
apologies, and a realization that “[w]e’re all God’s creatures.” Ex., pp. 9,
11. But concerning remarks started to creep in over time, with Lane
reminding A.N. that he was “not going anywhere,” telling her he hoped
she could “find it within” herself “to make it as peaceful as can be,” and
asking her not to keep the children from him out of anger or resentment.
Id. at 12, 14, 15. Eventually, Lane openly criticized A.N., telling her that
he’d “forgiven” her “for everything besides the bad mouthing” him “in
front of the kids” and referring to her as “an emotionally and
psychologically abusive person and when drunk, physical.” Id. at 15–16.
The later letters then expressed love for others and gratitude to A.N. Id. at
16–17.

  A.N. testified to the context of these letters at the sentencing hearing.
She explained that, after being “entangled” with Lane for eighteen years,
she was facing her “biggest battle” with him. Tr. Vol. II, p. 41. Lane had in

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024          Page 13 of 18
the past attacked her, told her he would always be watching her, and
twisted words from the Bible to suit himself. While Lane had been looking
ahead to release from prison, he knew he would have “nowhere to go.” Id.
at 41. The letters set out “his expectations of how things would be” once
he got out, including what A.N. “needed to be doing,” making her feel
like everything was her “fault.” Id. She described Lane as “his family’s
dictator.” Id. at 42. She feared “the same exact cycle” repeating “again and
again.” Id. at 44.

  The trial court carefully parsed the facts and circumstances before
determining that Lane’s offenses might be an exercise in regaining control
over A.N. In the trial court’s own words, what appeared superficially to
be “very ‘nice talking’” in Lane’s letters could have been an effort “to lure
the victim back in.” Id. at 56. On the other hand, the trial court allowed
A.N.’s responses to Lane’s letters to alleviate his blame somewhat.
Overall, however, the length of Lane’s sentence indicates to us that the
trial court deemed him to be a person whom the community may justly be
“afraid of.”

   We agree with that assessment. As the State argued at the sentencing
hearing, Lane’s conduct is consistent with aspects of the “Power and
Control Wheel,” a representation of common, yet somewhat
counterintuitive, patterns of domestic abuse developed by researchers at
the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project. See Debra Pogrund Stark &
Jessica Choplin, Seeing the Wrecking Ball in Motion: Ex Parte Protection
Orders and the Realities of Domestic Violence, 32 Wis. J. L. Gender & Soc’y 13,
24–25 (2017). Even more so, Lane’s conduct aligns with the often-observed
“Cycle of Violence.” See id. at 25. Typically, as abusers increase their
control over their victims, the latter “develop feelings of love and loyalty,”
as well as “extreme dependence,” towards them. Id. at 26. Once physical
violence begins, the abuser uses emotional abuse “calculated to demean
the targets,” leading them to “question themselves” and “wonder if they
were to blame for their partner’s statements and actions.” Id. After each
violent incident, the abuser follows up with a “‘honeymoon’ period” of
“apologies and promises.” Id. Critically, even after victims achieve the
difficult task of getting away, abusers “do not stop trying to control” their
victims, but try to get them back by “promising to change” or coercing a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024           Page 14 of 18
return to the relationship. Id. It takes an average of seven attempts to
successfully leave a domestic abuser. Id. Victims suffer the “quandary” of
not knowing whether it is safer to stay or to go as abusers typically
threaten their victims—even threatening to kill them and their children.
Id. at 27.

   Understood in light of the cycle of violence, the apologies, promises,
criticism, and blame-shifting in Lane’s letters demonstrate his intent to
reestablish his control of A.N.’s life. The no-contact order was supposed to
make this impossible. As Judge Kenworthy explained in her dissent in this
case, Lane’s strategy initially worked in terms of getting A.N. to re-engage
with him. Lane, 211 N.E.3d at 560. But A.N. managed to break the cycle.
Much is at stake in ensuring that it never restarts. In A.N.’s words, “I fear
that if he gets out, not only will someone get hurt, but it could possibly be
much worse.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 43.

   The trial court was faced, then, with sentencing Lane on offenses
committed by a habitually violent, repeat felon, while serving a prison
sentence, against the same victim whom he had been imprisoned for
battering, in contravention of a no-contact order issued by the same
sentencing judge to prevent the continuation of his violence and abuse.
Because the current offenses were misdemeanors, the trial court did not
have the option of lengthy concurrent sentences. The trial court settled
instead on less-than-maximum sentences for each of the ten letters
charged, which could lawfully run consecutively without regard to
whether they constituted a “single episode” of criminal conduct (which
we doubt in any case). See Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2022)
(focusing the “single episode” analysis on “the simultaneous and
contemporaneous nature of the crimes, if any”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); Dunn v. State, 900 N.E.2d 1291, 1292 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that a former version of code section 35-50-1-2(c), the
“single episode” statute, did not limit consecutive misdemeanor-only
sentences). Given the options before the trial court to protect A.N. and
others, it was not inappropriate to impose the sentence here, thereby
incapacitating Lane from perpetuating the cycle of violence and abuse.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024          Page 15 of 18
   In coming to this conclusion, we note the contrasts between this case
and another, Livingston v. State, which is emblematic of our 7(B)
jurisprudence.

   In Livingston, the defendant was charged with two Class A felony
counts of dealing methamphetamine and various possession offenses, as
well as with being a habitual substance offender. 113 N.E.3d at 612. While
out on bond, the defendant lived in the Bliss House substance-abuse
recovery home before moving into its transitional house. Id. She became
chair of Bliss House’s alumni community and served on the Bliss House
committee. Id. at 612–13. She started both a business and a recovery home
for women. Id. at 613. She voluntarily placed herself in a community-
corrections program and tested negative on all her random drug screens.
Id. She eventually pled guilty as charged. Id. At the sentencing hearing,
she presented supportive testimony from her arresting officer and a
community-corrections manager. Id. Nevertheless, the trial court imposed
a thirty-year sentence. Id. For our part, we recognized that this was an
“exceptional case,” that the defendant had committed no offenses since
her arrest, and that she had “dedicated her time to becoming a productive
member of her community and helping others who suffer from
addiction.” Id. at 614. We revised the sentence to the mandatory minimum
twenty-three years and directed the remaining time to be served in
community corrections. Id.

   Unlike the defendant in Livingston, Lane has continued to commit
offenses even while in prison, rather than demonstrating he is becoming a
productive and law-abiding citizen. The evidence suggests that he may
revert to an established pattern of domestic abuse. Lane does not present
an “exceptional case” calling for revision of the trial court’s sentence.

   Finally, we are aware that such a long aggregate sentence for
misdemeanors as Lane’s is uncommon. We are conscious, too, that the
proposal and adoption in 1970 of our constitutional review-and-revise
power was inspired by the “‘efficacious’” use made of the revising power
by the English Court of Criminal Appeals. McCullough v. State, 900 N.E.2d
745, 748 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Text of the ABA Model State Judicial Article,
reprinted in 47 J. Am. Judicature Soc'y 6, 9 (June 1963)); see also Hon.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024        Page 16 of 18
Randall T. Shepard, Robust Appellate Review of Sentences: Just How British Is
Indiana?, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 671, 672 (2009). As the Indiana Public Defender
Council (IPDC) explains in its informative amicus brief, the English court
at that time recognized the principle that concurrent sentences were
required in the case of “a series of related and similar offences committed
closely together in time.” IPDC Amicus Br. at 7 (quoting D.A. Thomas,
Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development of Sentencing Policy: The
English Experience, 20 Ala. L. Rev. 193, 202–03 (1968)). Furthermore, the
English court indicated that “completely separate offenses” should not be
punished “far in excess” of the appropriate sentence for the most serious
individual offense. Id. (quoting same).

   Admittedly, Lane’s sentence does not follow these principles—
although we note that Lane was neither convicted for every letter he sent
nor sentenced to the maximum available on each conviction. At any rate,
we decline to adopt hard-and-fast directives under Rule 7(B) for sentences
on multiple offenses. As we have explained, the essence of today’s
criminal-justice system in Indiana is to distinguish dangerous, violent
offenders from the rest and to provide for sentences that reflect all the
pertinent circumstances. We assess an aggregate sentence against the
myriad factors appearing in the individual case. See Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d
at 1224.

   Here, Lane committed repeated, similar offenses. But that is not all. The
offenses reflected his longstanding pattern of domestic abuse and he failed
to stop committing crimes against the same victim despite imprisonment.
Sometimes, as in this case, there is good justification for a sentence that
looks at first glance like an outlier.

Conclusion
  The trial court carefully considered all the circumstances and
determined that Lane’s crimes and character warranted a lengthy
aggregate sentence for his repeated misdemeanors. The sentence is
consistent with the aim of Indiana’s criminal-justice system to separate
dangerous, violent offenders from the community to protect public safety.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024          Page 17 of 18
We defer to the trial court’s assessment of the options before it in this case
and, accordingly, affirm the sentence.

Rush, C.J., and Slaughter, J., concur.
Molter, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Massa, J., joins.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Daniel A. Dixon
Lawrence County Public Defender Agency
Bedford, Indiana

ATTORNE YS FOR APPEL LE E
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Steven J. Hosler
Ellen H. Meilaender
Angela Sanchez
Office of the Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

AMICUS C URI AE INDI ANA P UBL IC DE F ENDE R C OUNC I L
Bernice Corley, Executive Director
Suzy St. John, Staff Attorney
Indiana Public Defender Council
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CR-150 | May 2, 2024           Page 18 of 18
Molter, J., dissenting.

   I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to decline any Appellate
Rule 7(B) relief. Leading up to Part III, the Court’s opinion eloquently
explains Rule 7(B)’s constitutional grounding, history, and guiding
principles. And Part III helpfully identifies guideposts for misdemeanor
sentencing: (1) related and similar misdemeanor offenses committed close
in time generally warrant concurrent rather than consecutive sentences,
and (2) separate misdemeanor offenses generally should not be punished
far in excess of the appropriate sentence for the most serious individual
offense. I agree with much of that discussion, but on balance, the
considerations the Court outlines compel revising the sentence here.

  To be sure, Lane’s character does not warrant any revision, but the
nature of his offense does. As Part III acknowledges, “a letter is not the
most intrusive way of violating a no‐contact order,” “Lane’s letters were
not openly threatening and often discussed run‐of‐the‐mill family
matters,” and “such a long aggregate sentence for misdemeanors as
Lane’s is uncommon.” Ante, at 13, 16.

    By any measure, Lane’s sentence is an extreme outlier. For the
underlying Level 6 felony battery that led to the no‐contact order, Lane
received a two‐year suspended sentence (plus one year of probation). So
his 3,000‐day executed sentence for sending nonthreatening letters is more
than four times longer than his suspended sentence for battery. That is on
top of the trial court revoking the suspended sentence and requiring that
it be executed.

   If instead of sending nonthreatening letters, Lane had committed
battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, his maximum sentence would
be two and a half years with an advisory sentence of one year. Ind. Code
§ 35‐42‐2‐1.3(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7) (battery provisions); id. § 35‐50‐2‐7(b)
(Level 6 felony sentencing). And as the Court of Appeals’ majority opinion
explained, the sentence here is much longer than other sentences that
panel recently approved for more egregious conduct, including aiding the
rape of a child and Level 6 felony domestic violence resulting in injury.
Lane v. State, 211 N.E.3d 551, 556 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). The State

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concedes it is unaware of any sentences in other cases reflecting that
Lane’s sentence is not an outlier.

   Nevertheless, the Court concludes no relief is warranted because the
trial court’s sentence was a carefully considered one, and Lane’s letters
present the risks reflected in the Power and Control Wheel. Those are
certainly compelling reasons not to reduce Lane’s sentence too far. But the
nature of the offense still warrants appellate relief to “leaven” the outlier
sentence. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).

   Mindful that for sentencing there is no one “right answer in any given
case,” I would revise Lane’s sentence for sending the nonthreatening
letters at least to the extent the sentence would not exceed the two‐and‐a‐
half‐year maximum sentence for battery resulting in moderate bodily
injury. State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1197 (Ind. 2020) (quotations
omitted).

Massa, J., joins.

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