Court Opinion

ID: 9791958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:00.37516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.727292
License: Public Domain

*12VOSS, Judge,
dissenting.
The state used Ms. Kinnaird as its expert to enable it to restate the victim’s allegations and to assure the jury that the victim was telling the truth. The use of an expert in this way is clearly condemned in State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986). The state also introduced testimony regarding defendant’s prior bad acts in an effort to show defendant’s emotional propensity to commit child molestation. The state in introducing this evidence did not comply with State v. Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d 1061 (1977), therefore the evidence of prior bad acts was inadmissible to show emotional propensity. As I conclude from a review of the remaining evidence that the errors are not harmless, I dissent.
There can be no dispute that the state presented Ms. Kinnaird as an expert in sexual abuse cases. The state laid the necessary foundation referring to Ms. Kinnaird’s degree in clinical social work and her receipt of an A.C.S.W. Further, the state referred to Ms. Kinnaird as “the expert here.”
It is proper to use experts such as Ms. Kinnaird in sexual abuse cases in limited circumstances. The supreme court in Lindsey described such use:
The trial judge has discretion to allow such expert testimony where it may assist the jury in deciding a contested issue, including issues pertaining to accuracy or credibility of a witness’ recollection or testimony. (Citation omitted.) The trial judge may exercise this discretion where there is a reasonable basis to believe that the jury will benefit from the assistance of expert testimony that explains recognized principles of social or behavioral science which the jury may apply to determine issues in the case.
149 Ariz. at 473, 720 P.2d. at 74. The court acknowledged that it cannot be assumed that the average juror is familiar with the behavioral characteristics of victims of child molesting and that knowledge of such characteristics may well aid the jury in weighing the testimony of the victim. Id. 149 Ariz. at 473-74, 720 P.2d at 74-5. The court went on to state that the purpose of allowing behavioral evidence is to give the jury information which it may use in weighing the evidence; it is not to tell the jury who is correct. Id.
What occurred and was condemned in Lindsey is what occurred here. In Lindsey, the expert stated that “most people in the field feel that it’s a very small proportion [of incest victims] that lie.” Id. Here, Ms. Kinnaird stated: “Well, basically professionally it’s been found that most frequently children who do report sexual abuse are being abused.” She further testified: “However it’s an expert’s job to find out which ones are doing that [falsely accusing] and which ones aren’t and that’s my job ... and I think probably because it’s more open and talked about there are children that possibly could cry wolf but generally speaking, you know, it’s true.”
Here, the defendant took the stand and denied the victim’s allegations of sexual abuse. As the victim testified to the contrary, credibility was the issue. Although Ms. Kinnaird did not expressly state that the victim was telling the truth, she lumped the victim into a class of molested children who generally are telling the truth. Ms. Kinnaird’s testimony is exactly of the type condemned in Lindsey — she gave her opinion about the truthfulness of the victim’s testimony. In condemning any testimony which “quantifies the probabilities of the credibility of another witness”, the supreme court in Lindsey advised: “Nor should such experts be allowed to give opinions with respect to the accuracy, reliability or truthfulness of witnesses of the type under consideration.”
The majority concedes that the cited testimony “violates the dictates” of Lindsey, but finds the error harmless. I feel I must emphasize the clarity and forcefulness of the Lindsey holding. It is necessary, because to take such a clear violation and ignore it as harmless error in anything other than the most compelling factual case leads to the demise of the protection afforded. The testimony here is less than compelling. Here, as in Lindsey, “guilt or innocence ... inherently turned on the question of the [victim’s] credibility____”
*13Id. 149 Ariz. at 477, 720 P.2d at 77. After so concluding, the supreme court in Lindsey stated that permitting testimony on truthfulness in this context was so prejudicial that it “cannot be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted even in absence of the error.” Id. (Emphasis added.) After reviewing the evidence remaining in this case, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury here would have convicted without Ms. Kinnaird’s advice to the jurors on how to decide the case. See State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 383, 728 P.2d 248, 253 (1986) (improper to admit expert testimony that children rarely lie about sexual abuse).
Contributing to my conclusion that this case should be reversed is the admission of the testimony of AB. In Treadaway, 116 Ariz. 163, 568 P.2d. 1061, the supreme court confirmed the emotional propensity exception. To qualify, the court required a foundational showing that the other bad acts involved sexual aberration, similarity, and nearness in time. Id. 116 Ariz. at 166, 568 P.2d at 1064. Admission of other bad acts testimony which does not satisfy these requirements is error unless expert testimony shows that the prior bad act shows a continuing emotional propensity. Here, similarity is clearly a problem. The acts themselves are different as well as any conclusions that may be drawn about predisposition or sexual aberration. The victim in the present case was seven years old when the physical contacts started, she lived with the defendant and there was no sexual intercourse. In contrast, AB testified that at age 15, she and her cousin met the defendant at 3:30 or 4:00 A.M. in the parking lot of the Nevada Club located in the Bullhead City — Laughlin area. After sharing “a line” and an alcoholic drink with the defendant, the defendant offered to take AB and a friend home. AB testified that the defendant did not take her and her cousin directly home. He took them down a dirt road, parked, pulled a gun, pointed it at them and told them to take their clothes off or he would “blow their heads off.” AB stated that she and her cousin disrobed. The defendant looked them over, chose AB and raped her. As the prior bad act involving AB does not satisfy Treadaway, expert testimony was necessary. Since none was provided, the admission of the testimony was error.
Furthermore, the premise of the emotional propensity exception is balancing relevancy and prejudice. The ideal is strong relevancy rendering prejudice merely con-, sequential. Here, the rape at gun-point had, at best, minimum relevancy while the prejudice was overwhelming.
The Treadaway and Lindsey errors combine here to require a new trial.