Court Opinion

ID: 9880839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 20:03:50.437943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:52.177094
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/28/23 P. v. Jones CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A164421
 v.
 ALBERT JONES,                                                          (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. 17CR004778)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         What began as a dispute between defendant Albert Jones and his
former friend Alexander Martinez over unpaid rent and stolen equipment
culminated in Jones’s conviction for the murder of Martinez. Along the way,
Jones opened multiple life insurance policies in Martinez’s name totaling well
over one million dollars, tracked Martinez’s whereabouts for many months,
hired someone to kill Martinez, and attempted to collect the insurance money
after Martinez’s murder.
         Following his arrest, Jones made several incriminating statements to
law enforcement that he claims were obtained in violation of his Miranda1
rights. Some of these statements were excluded at his first trial, which ended
in a hung jury. At his second trial, the court made the same evidentiary
rulings regarding Jones’s statements, with one exception—the court admitted

1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

                                                               1
the previously suppressed evidence of Jones’s statements that he had paid
someone to kill the victim. There were also salient differences in some
witness testimony. The second jury found Jones guilty of first degree murder
for financial gain.
      On appeal, Jones raises several claims: (1) the incriminating
statements were elicited following two full invocations of his Miranda rights;
(2) the incriminating statements were subject to selective invocations of his
Miranda rights; (3) the trial court had no reason to change its prior
evidentiary ruling; (4) the change in the evidentiary ruling was erroneous;
and (5) the prosecutor improperly commented on Jones’s refusal to answer
certain questions during closing argument. Finding no prejudicial error, we
affirm.
                                BACKGROUND
Murder of Alexander Martinez
      On April 10, 2016, at 10:30 p.m., Alameda County Sheriff’s Deputies
responded to a shooting at a music studio in Castro Valley. They found
Martinez lying on the ground in a pool of blood with a gunshot wound to the
head. Martinez was taken to the hospital and died a few hours later.
      Alameda County Sheriff’s Office Detective Joshua Armijo arrived at the
scene and spoke with the primary responding officers. He also interviewed
an eyewitness, B.T., at the Sheriff’s office on the night of the murder. In the
days following the murder, he interviewed Martinez’s girlfriend, as well as
two of Martinez’s friends who worked with him at the music studio. The
interviews did not generate any leads.
Police Investigation and Charge
      In February 2017, Detective Armijo received a call from the Hercules
Police Department about two individuals, M.P. and J.M., with information

                                         2
connecting Jones to the homicide. Based on their statements, Detective
Armijo obtained an arrest warrant for Jones and search warrants for M.P.’s
house in Pittsburg and Jones’s two houses in Hercules.
        The search warrants resulted in the discovery of “numerous pieces of
mail, life insurance policy mail, . . . as well as debit cards, credit cards,
bearing the name of Alexander Martinez, as well as the policies in the name
of Alexander Martinez.” Additional insurance policies in the name of
Martinez were identified during the course of the investigation. In total, five
life insurance policies amounting to well over one million dollars and all
listing M.P. as the beneficiary were uncovered.
        While the search warrants were being executed, Jones was arrested
and brought to the police station. After receiving a Miranda warning, Jones
made a series of incriminating statements and admissions, including: (1)
Jones wanted revenge because Martinez had disrespected him by failing to
pay the agreed upon rent and by stealing equipment from Jones’s house; (2)
Jones searched for Martinez for several months and then put a tracker on
Martinez’s car; (3) Jones initially just wanted to beat up Martinez but
decided it was more of a “two birds with one stone” situation, meaning he
could not only hurt Martinez but also use the insurance money to refinance
his house and to move forward with his life; (4) Jones paid someone to kill
Martinez; and (5) Jones saw his vacation as a “ ‘perfect’ ” time to execute his
plan.
        In January 2019, Jones was charged by information with murder for
financial gain. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(1).)
First Trial
        In advance of trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress the statements he
made to police on the night of his arrest. The trial court granted the motion

                                         3
in part and denied it in part, ruling that Jones did not make an unambiguous
and unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent. Nevertheless, the
court determined Jones had selectively invoked his right to remain silent by
declining to respond to questions regarding the following topics: (1) the
number of life insurance policies taken out; (2) the policy application process;
(3) how Jones found the shooter; (4) the price of the murder contract; (5) the
manner and means by which Jones communicated with the shooter; and (6)
whether Jones still owed money on the contract. Among the specific
statements suppressed was Jones’s statement that he paid someone to kill
Martinez.
      The first trial took place over six days in August 2021. The People
called law enforcement personnel, an insurance expert, and J.M. as
witnesses. The transcripts of B.T. and M.P.’s preliminary hearing testimony
were read to the jury as B.T. could not be located and M.P. had died.
Portions of Jones’s videotaped interview were also admitted and played for
the jury.
      After three days of deliberations, the jury deadlocked at 6-6 and the
trial court declared a mistrial.
Second Trial
      The second trial occurred over five days in November 2021. The jury
found Jones guilty of first degree murder and found true the special
allegation of murder for financial gain.
      The People filed a pretrial motion requesting the court “to reconsider”
its previous Miranda rulings. The People sought to introduce evidence that
Jones said he “was going to pay X amount of dollars for somebody to take care
of him,” which he clarified meant to shoot Martinez. The People argued this
“arrangement exchange” did not fall within the six categories the court

                                       4
previously determined Jones had selectively invoked his right to remain
silent. The trial court admitted the arrangement exchange, finding it was not
covered by the six categories over which Jones had selectively invoked his
right to remain silent. The remainder of its Miranda rulings were identical
to those made in the first trial.
      Evidence at Second Trial
      As before, law enforcement personnel, an insurance expert and various
witnesses testified. As in the first trial, evidence was introduced that
multiple insurance policies with an aggregate value of $1,350,000 had been
opened in Martinez’s name and all listed M.P. as the beneficiary. Also as
before, the jury watched portions of the video showing Jones’s questioning by
the detectives.
      Different from the first trial, B.T. testified in person, J.M. admitted she
misrepresented her interaction with the attacker to the police and lied at the
first trial when she said the attacker had asked about drugs, and video
excerpts of Jones’s questioning included the previously redacted statement
that Jones was going to pay someone to kill Martinez.
            B.T.
      B.T. testified in person at the retrial. B.T., a local musician, was with
Martinez at the time of the shooting. They were listening to music in the
parking lot of the studio in Martinez’s car when a man approached them
holding a gun. The man said, “don’t move” and told them to “[e]mpty your
pockets.” B.T. got on the ground and emptied his pockets but the man did not
take any of the items. Martinez initially hesitated but eventually complied
and also got on the ground. As Martinez attempted to pull out his wallet, the
man shot Martinez. The gunman threatened to kill B.T. if he moved. When
the shooter was no longer in sight, B.T. called 911.

                                       5
            J.M.
      J.M. testified she worked with Jones and M.P. in 2016 at a
transportation company in Concord. She lived with M.P. for several months
in an apartment in Concord they subleased from Jones. Jones had a sexual
relationship with both J.M. and M.P. during that time, which caused tension
between J.M. and M.P. In October 2016, J.M. and M.P. moved out of the
apartment and J.M. moved into a house in Hercules owned by Jones. At that
time, M.P. gave her a shoe box containing life insurance papers; J.M. brought
the papers with her to her new home in Hercules.
      Jones later told J.M. he had life insurance policies in Martinez’s name.
J.M. had never met Martinez and did not know him; Jones told her “Alex had
owed him money for rent and wouldn’t pay him” and had “robbed” Jones’s
house. Jones told J.M. “he had Alex murdered” when Jones was out of town;
Jones showed J.M. photos in his phone that established he was away at the
time of the murder.
      On February 10, 2017, J.M. was in the garage of the house in Hercules
when she was attacked by an unknown man. The man asked J.M. if Jones
was home and hit her with a piece of wood, causing her to need neck surgery.
The man also mentioned Martinez’s name. A few days later, J.M. spoke to
the police and explained the events leading up to her attack.
      On cross-examination, J.M. admitted that when she spoke to the police
at the hospital she did not mention the attacker had asked about Jones and
Martinez; she also admitted she lied at the first trial when she said the
attacker had asked about drugs. J.M. had not mentioned that the attacker
had asked about Jones and Martinez because she was afraid for her life.

                                       6
            M.P.
      As in the first trial, M.P.’s preliminary hearing testimony was read to
the jury.
      In 2015, M.P. worked with Jones and J.M. at a transportation company
and lived with Jones in an apartment in Concord. In 2016, Martinez moved
into the apartment and Jones moved out to live at his mother’s house. Jones
became upset with Martinez about an unpaid utility bill and because
Martinez had stolen property from Jones. Jones told M.P. “he was going to
hire someone” to kill Martinez; M.P. did not think Jones was serious. When
Jones told her he had put a tracker on Martinez’s car, M.P. was concerned for
Martinez, but she did not think Jones was going to kill Martinez. Jones
returned from vacation and told M.P. “it was done,” which she later realized
meant “he had him killed.”
      After Martinez was killed, Jones showed M.P. paperwork with her
name on it and explained she was “the beneficiary of Alex Martinez.” Jones
“wanted [M.P.] to call these life insurance companies” and he coached her on
what to say when she called. Jones took M.P. to a lawyer and told her to say
she was Martinez’s fiancée. M.P. signed several documents before a notary.
M.P. did what Jones told her because she was afraid for herself and her
family as Jones had threatened her daughter and her grandson.
                                 DISCUSSION
I.    Trial Court Properly Admitted Jones’s Statements
      Jones argues that evidence of his statements should have been
suppressed because he completely invoked his right to remain silent on two
separate occasions, both of which were ignored. In the alternative, to the
extent the trial court determined he had selectively invoked his right to
remain silent, he contends the trial court should have suppressed more of his

                                       7
statements because the selective invocation occurred earlier than the point
selected by the trial court.
      A.    Relevant Proceedings
      The videotape and the corresponding transcript of the questioning2
show the following:
      Detective Armijo and his partner questioned Jones for approximately
six hours in a calm and conversational atmosphere.3 During this lengthy
interview, Jones was not handcuffed and was repeatedly offered and provided
water and food.
      At the outset, Detective Armijo advised Jones of his Miranda rights;
Jones said he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the detectives.
Jones first met Martinez when Martinez was 15 or 16 years old. Jones had
mentored Martinez and they had remained friends. At some point, Jones
rented part of his house to Martinez, and Martinez owed him seven months of
rent at $900 per month. After Jones gave Martinez a 30-day notice to vacate
the apartment, followed by an additional 60 days, Martinez moved out and
Jones changed the locks. Jones and Martinez did not speak after Martinez
moved out. Jones learned about Martinez’s murder after he returned from a
vacation in Cabo San Lucas.

2 On our own motion, we augmented the record on appeal with the video

recording and corresponding transcript. We have reviewed the entire video
and corresponding transcript.

3 Jones asserts the detectives became “confrontational” and had “clearly lost

their patience” several hours into the interview. While the detectives were
certainly persistent in their questioning, nothing in the record demonstrates
that they ever became confrontational or otherwise expressed any
impatience. As seen in the video, the detectives sat patiently, sometimes for
several minutes at a time, as they waited for Jones to respond to their
questions. In any event, Jones does not challenge the voluntariness of his
statements.

                                       8
      After a couple of hours, the detectives4 told Jones his account did not
make sense. They urged Jones to tell the truth so as to not appear unfeeling,
cold, calculating, and evil. Jones said little while the detectives implored him
to tell his side of the story. Eventually, Jones said, “I’ve just done so much
for [Martinez] over these years, and he just kept screwing me over, kept
screwing me over. Okay, that’s fine. Then when he moved into my house he
tried to punk me and stuff like that by not paying and it didn’t rub off right,
of course. How can somebody that you’ve helped, and mentored, and stuff
like that just be disrespectful? He had come back and apologized, so then
everything was fine, and then he disrespected me again on top of that not
paying and everything. Then when he didn’t move and he tried to punk me
to pay for his deposit, his moving expenses, and things of that nature, and
then after I changed the locks he came back to the house and robbed me. I
had all my tools out there and stuff like that, so just insult to injury.”
      Jones continued, “They came back and robbed thousands of dollars of
tools that I had that I was working on the house. For what reason? He
already got over on me not paying on the rent [¶] . . . [¶] Just over and over
people keep screwing me over when you’re trying to be a good person.” “For a
while, it was like he was like my brother type of thing. For him just to rob
me after being disrespectful just was the last straw, I guess. That’s all I
want [to] say. You guys can go home to your wives and stuff like that.”
(Italics added.) According to Jones, this is the first time he completely
invoked his Miranda right to remain silent. The detective said, “My wife
probably prefers when I’m at work. I’ve been married going on 19 years now,
so she’s probably pretty happy when I’m gone, staying away from her for a

4 At times, it is unclear from the video and transcript which detective is

speaking.

                                         9
while.” Jones said, “My thinking, just . . . What was I thinking? I should be
smarter than this. I am smarter than this.” A little later, Jones added, “I
think I just had enough of just, like I said before, people just screwing me
over, and screwing me over, and screwing me over. Me trying to be the good
person. They always say, ‘Walk away.’ They always say, ‘Be the bigger,
better person.’ There’s [sic] only so many times you can do that.”
      Approximately 19 times during the multi-hour interview, by either
saying skip or words with similar import, Jones said he wanted to not
respond to certain questions regarding the insurance policies, the shooter’s
identity, and how Jones contacted and paid him. For example, when asked
about the number of policies he opened and if they were difficult to open,
Jones replied, “I’d rather skip that” and “I’d rather skip that too.” When the
detective asked how Jones contacted the shooter, Jones replied, “That, I’d
rather skip.” Questions about the cost of the murder contract and if money
was still owed were met with, “Skip that one” and “Skip.” When asked if he
had any help opening the policies, Jones said, “I’d rather skip that for now.”
After indicating several more times that he would like to “skip” (or words to
similar effect) the questions being posed, the detective asked, “Is there
anything else you want to get off your chest right now?” Jones replied, “No,
that’s it.” (Italics added.) Jones asserts this is the second time he completely
invoked his right to remain silent.
      After a food break, Jones continued to insist he did not know who the
shooter was and said he wanted to skip or not answer questions about the
shooter’s identity. The detective asked, “Do you think you’d ever answer it?”
Jones replied, “Nah.” This is the point where the trial court found Jones had
selectively invoked his right to remain silent as to the shooter’s identity.

                                       10
      Jones went on to say, “It’s my fault [¶] . . . [¶] I just overreacted.” Jones
also said, “it’s going to be hard enough to survive once I get in [to prison], but
if they see that I’ve been talking, it’s going to be even harder to survive . . . [¶]
So it’s more about survival right now . . . [¶] [F]or survival I’d rather just not
say anything.”
      Jones said he initially wanted to find Martinez, beat him up, and take
back his property. After months of looking for Martinez, Jones’s anger grew,
and he decided to kill “two birds with one stone.” When the detective asked
for clarification, Jones said, “Revenge, and if everything worked out right [¶]
. . . [¶] I was going to use [the insurance policy] money to start moving
forward.” Eventually, Jones found Martinez’s car and put a tracker on it.
Jones kept asking different people if they knew anyone who he could hire to
kill someone. Finally, he found “somebody that knows somebody, that knows
somebody, that knows somebody type of thing . . . They don’t know me, I don’t
know them.” The detective asked, “what was the arrangement that was
made?” Jones replied, “I was going to pay X amount for somebody to take care
of him [¶] . . . [¶] To shoot him . [¶] . . . Alexander Martinez.” When asked if
he had a specific date set, Jones replied, “Not originally, but when the
vacation opportunity came up, I was like, “ ‘That would be perfect.’ ”
      Jones later met with an assistant district attorney and district attorney
inspector who confirmed he had received his Miranda rights from the
detectives. Jones voluntarily spoke with the district attorney after receiving
another Miranda advisement. In this conversation, Jones said that in the
“10 to 15 years” he had known Martinez, “all the little stuff . . . just added
up.” And things “went over” following the September 2015 robbery. Jones
admitted that during the “months” he searched for Martinez his “anger

                                         11
grew[.]” Jones further admitted that Martinez was killed in April, which he
had “thought . . . would be a good time” because he would be in Mexico.
      B.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Under California law, issues relating to the suppression of statements
made during a custodial interrogation are reviewed under federal
constitutional standards. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 416–417
(Flores).) To protect suspects’ Miranda rights, before questioning begins
“individuals in custody must be advised of their right to remain silent, that
anything they say may be used as evidence against them, and that they have
the right to the presence of an attorney, whether retained or appointed.
[Citation.] But a suspect can waive these rights and agree to speak with law
enforcement.” (Flores, at p. 417.) A suspect’s waiver of his right to remain
silent may be selective; he may rule out certain topics or affirmatively limit
the scope of subjects he is willing to discuss. (See Michigan v. Mosely (1975)
423 U.S. 96, 104–106 (Mosely) [no Miranda violation where officer honored
suspect’s refusal to discuss robberies when, following a break, a different
officer questioned defendant about a different crime after giving new
Miranda warning].)
      Here, Jones waived his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview as
there was no invocation of his rights. “In order to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege after it has been waived, and in order to halt police
questioning after it has begun, the suspect ‘must unambiguously’ assert his
right to silence or counsel. [Citation.] It is not enough for a reasonable police
officer to understand that the suspect might be invoking his rights.
[Citation.] Faced with an ambiguous or equivocal statement, law
enforcement officers are not required under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436,

                                       12
either to ask clarifying questions or to cease questioning altogether.” (People
v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 535 (Stitely).)
      In reviewing a trial court’s Miranda ruling, we accept the court’s
resolution of disputed facts and inferences and its evaluations of credibility, if
supported by substantial evidence, and we independently determine, from
the undisputed facts and facts properly found by the trial court, whether the
challenged statement was illegally obtained. (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1111, 1125.)
      C.    Analysis
      Jones contends he fully invoked his right to remain silent on two
occasions. Initially when he told the detectives, “That’s all I want to say.
You guys can go home to your wives and stuff like that.” And then again
when he responded to the question “Is there anything else you want to get off
your chest right now?” by stating, “No, that’s it.” Alternately, Jones claims
any selective invocation happened earlier than the point selected by the trial
court. We reject each claim.
            1.     Jones’s First Purported Invocation
      Jones’s first statement (“That’s all I want to say. You guys can go home
to your wives and stuff like that”) came after he explained why he was angry
with Martinez. Jones said he felt Martinez had “disrespected” and “punked”
him by failing to pay rent and stealing his tools. When the detective said,
“Take me through it, man,” Jones replied, “I’ll just leave it at that, man.”
Jones then described himself as a “good person” who tried to help people but
people kept “screwing [him] over.” The penultimate statement was, “For him
just to rob me after being disrespectful just was the last straw, I guess.”
      We conclude that Jones’s following remark about it being “all I wanted
to say” and that the detectives could go home to their wives was not an

                                        13
unambiguous, unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent. The
context of the statements suggests that after taking the detective through the
situation of how he had been taken advantage of by Martinez and others,
Jones had nothing more to say. Equally ambiguous was the “[y]ou guys can
go to your wives” reference. By this statement, Jones could have been
expressing his desire to change the subject or his unhappiness with the
situation he was in.
      Case law supports the determination that Jones’s statements were
ambiguous. For example, in People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d 780, 785, after
admitting he shot the victim and in response to an inquiry for more detail,
the defendant asked, “ ‘Do I gotta still tell you after I admit it?’ ” was not
deemed an invocation. (Id. at p. 784.) In another California Supreme Court
case, a defendant who said, “ ‘That’s all I have to say’ ” and “ ‘That’s all I
want to tell you,’ ” did not invoke his right to remain silent; it was a
reasonable inference that what the defendant was saying was, “That’s my
story, and I’ll stick with it.” (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 496, 516.)
      Similarly, depending on the context, long periods of silence, or
statements indicating uncertainty, reluctance, or frustration have not been
deemed unambiguous invocations. (Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) 560 U.S.
370, 382 [long period of silence was not an invocation]; see also Stitely, supra,
35 Cal.4th at p. 535 [“I think it’s about time for me to stop talking” signaled
frustration but was not a request to stop questioning]; People v. Ashmus
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 970 [“ ‘I ain’t saying no more’ ” was an attempt to alter
the course of questioning, not stop it altogether]; People v. Silva (1988) 45
Cal.3d 604, 629–630 [defendant’s statement that he really did not want to
talk about whether he was driving the truck deemed a selective invocation
that did not require cessation of the questioning altogether]; People v. Krebs

                                        14
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 313 [request to be put in holding cell to think deemed
merely a request for a break in questioning]; People v. Jennings (1988) 46
Cal.3d 963, 977–978 [“ ‘I’m not going to talk’ ” and “ ‘I’m not saying shit to you
no more’ ” reflected momentary frustration]; People v. Vance (2010) 188
Cal.App.4th 1182, 1210–1211 [defendant’s statements that he did not have a
story and did not want to talk about it were not unequivocal invocations].)
      The same is true here. Jones’s statements did not clearly convey that
he wanted to end the interview. Rather, they were ambiguous statements
suggesting “That’s all I have to say about being disrespected. End of story.”
They were also akin to statements saying, “That’s my story and I’m sticking
with it.” Nothing in the statements suggested to a reasonable listener that
Jones wanted to end the questioning.
      This interpretation is bolstered by the context in which Jones made the
statement. Moments before the statement Jones claims was an invocation,
he said “I’ll just leave it at that”. Rather than leaving it at that, he
continued, unprompted, to share his thoughts. And immediately after Jones
made the statement that the detectives could go home to their wives,
Detective Armijo responded, “My wife probably prefers when I’m at work.
I’ve been married going on 19 years now, so she’s probably pretty happy when
I’m gone, staying away from her for a while.” These comments about
Detective Armijo’s personal life did not constitute questions or statements
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. (People v. Gamache
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 387–388 (Gamache) [small talk permitted].) Then,
without any question pending, Jones offered, “My thinking, just . . . What
was I thinking? I should be smarter than this. I am smarter than this.”
When determining whether an invocation occurred, the language used must
be considered in context as even language that is unambiguous on its face

                                        15
may be equivocal in context. (People v. Henderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1013,
1023.) Here, the context confirms that Jones was not unequivocally
requesting an end to the interrogation.
            2.     Jones’s Second Purported Invocation
      Just before a food break, the detective asked Jones, “Is there anything
else you want to get off your chest right now?” Jones replied, “No, that’s it.”
Jones contends this response was a complete invocation of his right to remain
silent. Jones claims the “conversation clearly seemed over,” when he and the
detective made small talk about getting food and the detective’s dog. Jones’s
unspoken belief about the direction of the conversation is not the test for
determining whether he invoked his right to remain silent. Jones needed to
unambiguously assert his right to remain silent, which he did not do as
nothing in the ensuing small talk suggests that Jones wanted to stop the
interview. (Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 535; Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at pp. 387-388.)
            3.     Timing of Selective Invocation
      The trial court found Jones selectively invoked his right to remain
silent and stop questioning regarding the shooter, the specifics of the murder
contract, and the insurance policies when, after 19 instances of saying skip or
words to that effect, and approximately 4.5 hours into the interview, he said,
“in this situation, I’m just not going to say anything” and then responded
“Nah” when asked, “Do you think you’d ever answer it?” Jones contends the
selective invocation happened “much earlier” than the point selected by the
trial court. He does not specify the exact time but claims, “[a]t a minimum,”
all of his statements made after Detective Armijo acknowledged he knew
Jones did “not ‘want to talk about who actually shot Alex or how much you

                                       16
paid to have it done’ ” should have been suppressed; this exchange occurred
about 4 hours into the interview. Again, we disagree.
      In Mosley, the high court held “the admissibility of statements obtained
after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under
Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously
honored.’ ” (Mosely, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104.) Police tactics that “fail[] to
honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by
refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting in
repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind”
are inconsistent with Miranda. (Mosely, at pp. 105–106.)
      Here, the detectives asked Jones about three main topics: (1) the
shooter, including the shooter’s identity, and how Jones found and
communicated with the shooter; (2) the price of the murder contract,
including if there was an outstanding balance; and (3) the insurance policies,
specifically the number of policies taken out and the policy application
process. Each time Jones responded with “skip” or a similar response
indicating he did not want to answer the question posed. Individually, these
responses were ambiguous as they could have signaled Jones’s desire to
return to the topics at a later point or his desire to avoid those topics while
remaining open to talk about other things.
      Recognizing the analytical difficulty in determining precisely when
Jones’s desire to cut off questioning on these topics occurred, the trial court
considered the cumulative impact of Jones’s words and conduct and
concluded Jones objectively manifested his desire to stop questioning when
he said, “in this situation, I’m just not going to say anything” and then
responded “Nah” when asked, “Do you think you’d ever answer it?” The court
found that, after repeatedly responding with ambiguous statements like

                                        17
“skip”, “skip for now”, or “I’d rather not say” when questioned about the
shooter, the specifics of the murder contract, or the insurance policies, Jones’s
definitive response that he was not ever going to answer questions about
these topics was an unambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent.
(See Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 535.)
      Notwithstanding Jones’s argument that the selective invocation
occurred earlier in the interview, whether reviewed independently or for
substantial evidence, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding Jones
selectively invoked his right to remain silent at the time he definitively said
he was never going to answer questions about the shooter, the specifics of the
murder contract, or the insurance policies.
            4.     Conclusion
      In sum, the trial court did not err in denying in part and granting in
part Jones’s motion to suppress and by admitting evidence of his statements
following his arrest.
II.   Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting the Arrangement
      Exchange at the Second Trial

      Jones contends the trial court improperly “reconsidered” its Miranda
rulings from the first trial. He further claims that, on the merits, the trial
court erred in concluding the arrangement exchange did not fall within the
topics of his selective invocation.
      A.    Trial Court Properly Considered the Motion
      Jones contends the trial court had “no reason . . . to reconsider” its prior
evidentiary rulings excluding the arrangement exchange. Preliminarily, the
“reconsideration” label is somewhat of a misnomer. The People made a new
motion in a new trial following a mistrial, as such, the case is not a “ ‘do
over,’ ” but rather a “ ‘never done.’ ” (People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th

                                        18
981, 992 (Riva). As such, all orders from the first trial are deemed vacated.
(People v. Sons (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 90, 99.)
      Citing Riva, Jones argues that, in the absence of any changed
circumstances, the trial court had no basis to revise its prior rulings. (See
Riva, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992–993.) Riva does little to advance
Jones’s claim. Riva involved a new judge in a new trial following a mistrial;
that new judge overruled the previous judge’s Miranda ruling in the prior
trial. (Id. at p. 985.) Riva explained the new judge had authority to make a
new ruling, provided the defendant was given notice and an opportunity to be
heard, and the revised ruling was not arbitrary or made without reason. (Id.
at p. 992.)
      Here, the same judge presided over both trials. Hence, the dangers of a
new judge arbitrarily reversing a prior judge’s ruling are not implicated. (Cf.
Riva, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992–993.) Also, the record reflects the
change in the Miranda ruling afforded due process to Jones and was the
product of thoughtful deliberation. The trial court read and considered
extensive supplemental briefing, heard oral argument, and issued a
comprehensive written order setting forth the reasons for its ruling. The trial
court acted well within its inherent authority when it revised its Miranda
ruling in the second trial.
      B.      Admission of the Arrangement Exchange Did Not Violate
              Jones’s Selective Invocation of his Miranda Rights

      Jones claims the trial court should have excluded the arrangement
exchange because it pertained to the topics on which he selectively invoked
his Miranda rights.
      As discussed ante, the trial court determined Jones validly invoked his
right to remain silent on the following topics: (1) the number of life insurance
policies taken out; (2) the policy application process; (3) how he initially found

                                       19
the shooter; (4) the manner and means by which he communicated with the
shooter; (5) the price of the murder contract; and (6) whether he still owed
money on the contract. At the first trial, based on these topics, the trial court
suppressed 17 interview excerpts, which included the arrangement exchange.
      As noted, the court admitted the arrangement exchange at the second
trial, which was as follows:
      Detective:         What was the arrangement that was made?
      Detective:         We’ve already talked about it, man.
      Jones:             Yeah.
      Detective:         So it’s not like it’s something new.
      Jones:             What was the question again? Sorry.
      Detective:         I said, what was the arrangement that was made?
                         What were you going to do for what to be done?
      Jones:             I was going to pay X amount of dollars for somebody
                         to take care of him.
      Detective:         What do you mean take care of?
      Jones:             To shoot him.
      Detective:         So there’s no confusion, to shoot who?
      Jones:             Alexander Martinez.
Jones insists the detective’s question—“what was the arrangement”—clearly
pertained to the shooter, which was one of the topics he did not want to
discuss.
      Although it is clear Jones did not want to identify the shooter out of
concern for his personal safety, the challenged questions did not directly
implicate the topics on which he selectively invoked his right to remain
silent—they did not seek insurance policy information, the identity of the
shooter, how they communicated, or the specifics about the contract.

                                         20
Similarly, Jones’s answer—“I was going to pay X amount of dollars for
somebody to take care of him”—did not reveal anything about the shooter’s
identity or the cost of the murder contract.
      Questions before and after the arrangement exchange support the
conclusion that the challenged questions did not violate the scope of Jones’s
selective invocation: “I know you don’t want to talk about who actually shot
Alex or how much you paid to have it done”; “Without naming no names, how
did the money get to him?; “Since I know you don’t want to talk about how
you got in touch with this guy or any of that stuff, I respect you. Although I
wish you would tell me.” These statements reflect the detectives were aware
of Jones’s concern about being labelled a snitch. The open-ended questions
regarding “What was the arrangement that was made” did not violate Jones’s
selective invocation of his right to remain silent.
      C.    Any Error Was Harmless

      Finally, we conclude any error in admitting the arrangement exchange
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499
U.S. 279, 307–310; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.) To be
sure, an important difference between the first and second trials was the
admission of the arrangement exchange. (See People v. Diaz (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 362, 385 [reviewing court may consider as one factor in
determining prejudice that prior juries had hung absent the alleged error].)
However, we cannot presume this difference resulted in prejudicial error. As
Justice Corrigan explained in her concurring opinion in In re Richards (2016)
63 Cal.4th 291, 316, “it is very difficult to read any significance into the fact
that [another jury] hung in this case. Juries fail to agree for a variety of
reasons and the rules of evidence prohibit inquiry into the jurors’ subjective
reasoning process. (Evid. Code § 1150, subd. (a).) . . . [T]he disagreement

                                        21
may be driven as much by the personality of a juror, a uniquely held world
view, or even some friction during deliberations, as by any weakness in the
underlying case. The point is that, in most cases, a reviewing court, writing
at a great remove from trial proceedings, may seldom know why a jury did
not reach consensus. Such is the case here.”
      The evidence of Jones’s guilt was formidable even without the
arrangement exchange. J.M. testified that Jones told her “Alex had owed
him money for rent and wouldn’t pay him” and had “robbed” Jones’s house.
Jones told J.M. “he had Alex murdered” when Jones was out of town; Jones
even showed J.M. photos in his phone that established he was away at the
time of the murder. M.P. also testified that Jones became upset with
Martinez about unpaid bills and the fact Martinez had stolen property from
Jones. Jones told M.P. “he was going to hire somebody” to kill Martinez.
Jones used a tracker to locate Martinez so that he could be killed. When
Jones returned from vacation he told M.P. “it was done,” which she later
realized meant that Jones had Martinez killed.
      Even before mention of the arrangement exchange, Jones made a series
of incriminating statements about feeling disrespected by Martinez and
needing to take revenge. He described the robbery as “the last straw”. He
admitted he put a tracker on Martinez’s car and that initially he only wanted
to beat him up. Eventually, as his anger grew, he decided it was more of a
“two birds with one stone” situation, where he could get revenge and use the
“money [from the insurance policies] to start moving forward” with his life.
      Jones also made numerous incriminating statements when he spoke
with the district attorney after he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Jones said in the “10 to 15 years” he had known Martinez, “all the little stuff
. . . just added up.” And things “went over” following the September 2015

                                      22
robbery. Jones admitted that during the “months” he searched for Martinez
his “anger grew[.]” Jones further admitted that Martinez had been killed in
April, which he had “thought . . . would be a good time” because he (Jones)
would be in Mexico.
       On the record before us, we conclude any error in admitting evidence of
the arrangement exchange was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.   Prosecutor’s Comments on Jones’s Silence Were Harmless
       The prosecutor made several remarks during closing argument about
Jones’s refusal to talk about the identity of the shooter and the cost of the
murder contract: “[t]he only thing Mr. Jones does not want to talk about
during the interview is the identity of the shooter”; “on a portion of the video
where Detective Armijo is discussing the way to find out who the shooter is,
Mr. Jones declares he doesn’t want to talk about that”; “Mr. Jones does not
want to assist Detective Armijo in locating who shot Alexander Martinez”;
and “When the police asked him, is there any money still owed on the
contract? He said, ‘I don’t’ want to talk about that, skip that.’ ” Jones
contends this constituted misconduct as the prosecutor commented on his
silence after he selectively invoked his Miranda rights. (Doyle v. Ohio (1976)
426 U.S. 610 (Doyle).
       A question of forfeiture is immediately apparent as Jones did not object
to the prosecutor’s argument on Doyle error grounds or otherwise raise a
prosecutorial misconduct claim. (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 202
[an objection is required to preserve Doyle error for appellate review]; People
v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 577 [preservation of prosecutorial misconduct
claim on appeal required timely objection and request for admonition].)
Jones acknowledges the omission but claims his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.

                                       23
      Doyle holds the prosecution may not, consistent with due process and
fundamental fairness, use post arrest silence following Miranda warnings to
impeach a defendant’s testimony at trial. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617–
618.) The principles of Doyle apply even where, as here, a defendant does not
take the stand in his own defense because “ ‘[a] defendant is entitled to rely
on the assurance . . . that his silence will not be used against him.’
[Citation.]” (People v. Hollinquest (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1557.)
      Citing People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, the Attorney
General asserts that Doyle does not protect against prosecutorial use of a
defendant’s refusal to answer selected questions after waiving Miranda
rights and electing to speak to law enforcement authorities. The Hurd court
stated: “A defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once a
defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her
refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent
any indication that such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights . . . .
[Defendant] was not induced by the Miranda warning to remain silent . . . .
[¶] . . . We do not think Doyle was meant to preclude the prosecutor from
commenting on highly relevant evidence bearing on [defendant’s] credibility,
including [defendant’s] refusal to provide critical details, when he had
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent.” (Hurd at pp. 1093–1094,
italics added.)
      As our Supreme Court observed in People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 118, whether Doyle precludes the use of partial silence to
the extent that the defendant relied on a Miranda warning in refusing to
answer specific questions is open for debate. Here, the challenged comments
clearly were based on topics that Jones had selectively invoked his right to
remain silent. However, we need not resolve the open question of whether

                                       24
the prosecutor could comment on Jones’s refusal to identify the shooter and to
discuss the murder contract without violating Doyle, because any such error
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the considerable
evidence of Jones’s guilt (described ante). The lack of prejudice stemming
from the assumed error is fatal to Jones’s claim that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the challenged
comments.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                       25
                                 _________________________
                                 Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A164421/People v. Jones

                            26