Court Opinion

ID: 9915517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 17:00:52.614348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:58.145297
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-7019     Document: 010110978895         Date Filed: 01/05/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             January 5, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                           No. 23-7019
                                                    (D.C. Nos. 6:20-CV-00007-RAW &
  RYAN EDWARD OFFINEER,                                  6:18-CR-00050-RAW-1)
                                                               (E.D. Okla.)
        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Ryan Edward Offineer, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability

 (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion collaterally challenging his

 sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (an appeal may not be

 taken from a final order denying relief under § 2255 unless the movant obtains a COA).

 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.

                                              I.

        Offineer pleaded guilty to Possession of Certain Material Involving Sexual

 Exploitation of Minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). In the plea agreement,

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 Offineer admitted that, between June 2013 and March 7, 2018, he “purchased,

 downloaded[,] and possessed thousands of images and videos of minors engaging in

 sexually explicit conduct from a members-only internet website.” R. Vol. III at 31

 (sealed). He also agreed that his conduct satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisites for

 conviction. Id. (acts in E.D. Okla.; material had been transported in interstate

 commerce).

        In his plea agreement, Offineer “waive[d] the right to directly appeal the

 conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and/or 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).”

 R. Vol. III at 33 (sealed). Offineer also “waive[d] the right to collaterally attack the

 conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, except for claims based on

 ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. (sealed).

        The district court accepted Offineer’s plea and sentenced him to 120 months of

 imprisonment followed by a 15-year term of supervised release. Offineer moved for

 relief from his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, requesting a revised sentence of

 60 months of imprisonment followed by 20 years of supervised release. The district

 court declined Offineer’s § 2255 motion and declined to issue a COA. Offineer filed a

 Notice of Appeal and now seeks a COA in this Court.

        Offineer raises several issues in his brief. First, Offineer argues that the district

 court deprived him of his First Amendment right to “redress of grievances” by declining

 his § 2255 motion. Offineer also claims that he was denied his right of access to the

 courts because he did not have access to a law library during his time in the Muskogee

 County Jail. In addition, Offineer raises several arguments that we construe as ineffective

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 assistance of counsel claims, including: that his counsel was ineffective for relying on

 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), during the suppression hearing; that his counsel

 was ineffective for failing to investigate claims made by a law enforcement officer in the

 officer’s affidavit in support of the government’s response to the motion to suppress; that

 his counsel was ineffective for generally not arguing well enough, according to Offineer;

 that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the magistrate’s report and

 recommendation regarding the suppression motion and failing to inform Offineer about

 his right to object to it; that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing properly under

 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) about other sentences people received for the same crime; and

 that his counsel was ineffective because he “coached” Offineer to recite certain

 statements at the Change of Plea Hearing and “threat[ened] . . . [him with] a longer

 sentence if he did not.” Aplt. Br. at 18. Finally, Offineer contends that the district court

 made two errors related to his counsel’s ineffectiveness. Offineer complains that the

 district court’s order “lacks the fairness, reasonableness, and [] leniency that should be

 given to pro se litigants” by not taking seriously his § 2255 motion’s complaints about

 the plea deal his counsel negotiated for him, see id. at 13; and that the district court

 incorrectly deemed Offineer’s counsel’s failure to object to the Presentence Investigation

 Report (“PSR”) not to be ineffective assistance of counsel, which Offineer claims

 amounted to rubber-stamping.

        We first address whether each issue may be raised in this case and then address

 those issues that may.

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                                              II.

                                              a.

        To obtain a COA, a criminal defendant must make “a substantial showing of the

 denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Whether to grant a COA is a

 “threshold question [that] should be decided without ‘full consideration of the factual or

 legal bases adduced in support of the claims.’” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017)

 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 222, 336 (2003)). To meet this threshold, the

 applicant must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter,

 agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

 presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.

 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (cleaned up). “In evaluating whether an applicant

 has satisfied this burden, we undertake a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration

 of the legal framework applicable to each of the claims.” United States v. Parker,

 720 F.3d 781, 785 (10th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). Offineer is a pro se movant, so we

 construe his briefing liberally but do not act as his advocate. See United States v.

 Griffith, 928 F.3d 855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux

 & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)).

                                              b.

        We must first determine whether Offineer waived his right to appeal the issues he

 asserts. To determine whether a criminal defendant has waived his post-conviction or

 appellate rights in an enforceable plea agreement, we consider “(1) whether the disputed

 appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant

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 knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the

 waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315,

 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). We review “plea agreements and appeal waivers in

 light of the defendant’s reasonable understanding at the time of the guilty plea[] and

 strictly construe[] the scope of an appellate waiver in favor of the defendant.” United

 States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1291 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).1

        The substantive claims Offineer raised in his § 2255 motion fall within the scope

 of his waiver of post-conviction rights. In his plea agreement, Offineer agreed to

 “waive[] the right to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

 § 2255, except for claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” R. Vol. III at 33

 (sealed). Therefore, those of Offineer’s original § 2255 claims that can reasonably be

 construed as ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not subject to the post-

 conviction waiver. However, the other claims Offineer raised in his § 2255 motion are

 plainly substantive claims, not allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, and

 therefore these other claims fall within the scope of Offineer’s post-conviction waiver.

 Neither Offineer’s First Amendment claim about “redress of grievances” nor his claim

 about his denial of access to a law library relate to ineffective assistance of counsel.

        1
          While the Hahn factors speak in terms of a waiver of appellate rights, we
 likewise apply them to waivers of the right to collaterally attack a conviction and
 sentence pursuant to § 2255. See Parker, 720 F.3d at 787 (“Applying the Hahn factors,
 the district judge concluded Parker’s collateral attack waiver is enforceable . . . . We see
 no reason to quarrel with the judge’s detailed analysis of the issue and see no basis upon
 which to debate the propriety of his decision.”).
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 Accordingly, they clearly fall within the scope of the post-conviction waiver in Offineer’s

 plea agreement.

        Offineer also knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal these issues.

 “When determining whether a waiver of appellate rights is knowing and voluntary, we

 especially look to two factors”: first, “whether the language of the plea agreement states

 that the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and voluntarily”; and second,

 whether the district court administered “an adequate Federal Rule of Criminal

 Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (citations omitted). Both factors

 indicate that Offineer’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. During Offineer’s change-

 of-plea hearing, the government noted that the parties had agreed to the standard waiver

 of appellate and post-conviction rights; and Offineer affirmed that he understood the

 terms of the plea agreement. The plea agreement does not use technical or complex

 language. It was straightforward, and Offineer initialed every page—including the page

 with the post-conviction waiver’s terms. The district court also fulfilled its obligations

 under Rule 11. Offineer’s waiver was thus knowing and voluntary.

        Nor would enforcing Offineer’s waiver result in a miscarriage of justice.

 “[E]nforcement of an appellate waiver does not result in a miscarriage of justice unless

 enforcement would result in one of [] four situations”: (1) “the district court relied on an

 impermissible factor such as race”; (2) “ineffective assistance of counsel in connection

 with the negotiation of the waiver renders the waiver invalid”; (3) “the sentence exceeds

 the statutory maximum”; or (4) “the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Hahn, 359 F.3d

 at 1327 (citations omitted). Offineer agreed to a standard waiver of post-conviction

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 rights that is always used in the Eastern District of Oklahoma, and Offineer makes no

 argument that the negotiation of the waiver was itself a product of ineffective counsel.

 The post-conviction waiver was not based on any impermissible factor, the sentence was

 below the statutory maximum, and there is no indication of ineffective assistance of

 counsel in connection with the waiver itself. Moreover, the waiver is not “otherwise

 unlawful” under our precedent because Offineer identifies no error that seriously affects

 the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Hahn, 359 F.3d

 at 1327 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)). Thus, a miscarriage of

 justice will not result from the enforcement of Offineer’s waiver. The district court

 correctly dismissed as waived Offineer’s substantive claims challenging the alleged

 denial of his rights to “redress of grievances” and to access a law library.

                                               c.

        We construe several of Offineer’s claims to be ineffective assistance of counsel

 claims, and therefore outside the scope of his waiver. Nevertheless, none of his claims

 warrants a COA because no reasonable jurist could debate whether Offineer’s counsel

 met the minimum level of competence required by our precedents. “The two-prong test

 established in Strickland v. Washington . . . determines whether a defendant’s counsel

 was ineffective. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a defendant must show both that

 his counsel’s performance was substandard and that he was prejudiced by that

 substandard performance.” Osborn v. Shillinger, 997 F.2d 1324, 1328 (10th Cir. 1993)

 (citing, inter alia, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984)). A criminal

 defendant can satisfy the test’s first prong by showing that counsel performed below the

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 level expected from a reasonably competent attorney in criminal cases. See Strickland,

 466 U.S. at 688–89. However, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s

 conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance . . . .” Id.

 at 689. “[R]egardless of counsel[’s] performance, failure to show prejudice defeats [an]

 ineffectiveness claim.” Osborn, 997 F.2d at 1328 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

 To meet the test’s second prong, Offineer “must show that there is a reasonable

 probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

 would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

 undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

                                              1.

        Offineer’s claims about ineffective assistance related to the suppression hearing

 fail. Even though the court found Riley distinguishable, it was objectively reasonable for

 Offineer’s counsel to rely upon a relatively recent Supreme Court case involving similar

 issues. Accordingly, Offineer cannot satisfy Strickland on that ground.

        Nor can we fault Offineer’s counsel’s alleged failure to investigate claims made in

 a Special Agent’s affidavit. “We assess a decision not to investigate for ‘reasonableness’

 under the circumstances, ‘applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

 judgments.’” Newmiller v. Raemisch, 877 F.3d 1178, 1198 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting

 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Ultimately, “‘what investigation decisions are reasonable

 depends critically’ on ‘information supplied by the defendant.’” Id. (quoting Strickland,

 466 U.S. at 691). Offineer identifies no information that he provided his counsel to

 prompt further investigation of the Special Agent’s affidavit, so we therefore defer to

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 Offineer’s counsel’s judgment and conclude that counsel’s decision regarding further

 investigation was reasonable.

        Lastly, Offineer argues broadly against counsel’s effectiveness at the suppression

 hearing. We do not credit ineffective-assistance claims that are “impermissibly vague,”

 because, among other reasons, “conclusory allegations . . . do not satisfy Strickland’s

 prejudice inquiry.” United States v. Pena, 566 F. App’x 645, 650 (10th Cir. 2014)

 (unpublished) (citing Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211, 1234 (10th Cir. 2007)).

                                              2.

        Offineer next challenges as ineffective assistance his counsel’s failure to object to

 the magistrate’s report and recommendation on the suppression of evidence. Offineer’s

 arguments fail under Strickland because his counsel’s failure to object to the report and

 recommendation was objectively reasonable. The report and recommendation held that

 “[t]he warrant in this case authorized the search for and seizure of evidence capable of

 being stored on a laptop computer . . . so the executing officers needed no further

 authorization to search the Defendant’s computer.” R. Vol. I at 88. Counsel reasonably

 believed that any objection would have been futile under our current precedents. We

 agree that any objection on these facts would have been meritless. See United States v.

 Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092 (10th Cir. 2009). And as we have held in the past,

 “[r]easonable jurists could not debate” that “counsel was not ineffective for failing to

 make meritless objections.” Pacheco v. Habti, 62 F.4th 1233, 1247 (10th Cir.), cert.

 denied, 143 S. Ct. 2672 (2023). Therefore, Offineer cannot demonstrate ineffective

 assistance of counsel on this issue.

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                                                 3.

         Offineer also makes three ineffective assistance claims related to his sentencing.

  First, he argues that his counsel was ineffective for not arguing properly under 18 U.S.C.

  § 3553(a)(6) that he should have received a lesser sentence because of other sentences

  people received for the same crime. Offineer also argues that his counsel was ineffective

  because he “coached” Offineer to recite certain statements at the Change of Plea Hearing

  and “threat[ened] . . . [him with] a longer sentence if he did not,” see Aplt. Br. at 18.

  Finally, Offineer complains that his counsel failed to object to the PSR, and that the

  district court allegedly rubber-stamped that failure.

         Offineer cannot satisfy either prong of Strickland for these claims. Because

  Offineer agreed to a certain sentence in his plea agreement, it was objectively reasonable

  for his counsel not to mount a collateral attack on the sentence during Offineer’s change-

  of-plea hearing. It was objectively reasonable for Offineer’s counsel to explain to him

  what was required at his hearing, and to explain the likely results if he did not comply.

  And it was objectively reasonable not to object to a PSR, when any objection would have

  been futile. Nor can Offineer show any prejudice: he bargained for a sentence; and he

  got what he bargained for. Accordingly, these ineffective assistance claims fail.

                                                 4.

         Offineer also makes an ineffective assistance claim directed toward actions of the

  district court. In particular, he claims that the district court’s order “lacks the fairness,

  reasonableness, and [] leniency that should be given to pro se litigants” by not taking

  seriously enough his § 2255 motion’s complaints about the plea deal his counsel

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  negotiated for him instead of going to trial. See Aplt. Br. at 13. We liberally construe

  this as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim about the actual deal that Offineer’s

  counsel negotiated for him. Offineer got half the maximum potential sentence for this

  crime and agreed to the deal in a signed writing. He was free to reject the plea deal. But

  he accepted it. Negotiating a plea deal for half the maximum sentence is well within

  objectively reasonable performance of counsel.

                                                   ***

            Based on the claims that can reasonably be construed as ineffective assistance of

  counsel claims, Offineer has not shown that he had ineffective assistance of counsel.2

  Most choices by counsel are entitled to a “virtually unchallengeable presumption of

  reasonableness” under our precedents. Newmiller, 877 F.3d at 1197. Offineer’s

  counsel’s strategic choices are entitled to that presumption here; and in any event,

  Offineer cannot show prejudice. The issues presented by Offineer were not “adequate to

  deserve encouragement to proceed further,” and reasonable jurists could not debate

  otherwise. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Therefore, like the district court, we deny a COA.

  See id.

            2
           To the extent that Offineer has any remaining claims for ineffective assistance of
  counsel, they are subsumed within the broad claims discussed above and similarly fail.
  Offineer’s defense counsel performed as a reasonable attorney would throughout this
  case. The evidence against Offineer and case law were clear, and he admitted to the
  relevant facts in accepting the plea agreement. The sentence he received was reasonable,
  and he agreed to it in writing. Offineer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail, and
  his other claims were waived by the plea agreement.
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                                       III.

        We DENY a COA and DISMISS this matter.

                                         Entered for the Court

                                         Allison H. Eid
                                         Circuit Judge

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