Court Opinion

ID: 9486273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:42:41.079398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:36.791081
License: Public Domain

PLAGE R, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I have no difficulty with the result reached in this case. Amoroso understood that the contract expressly contained a ‘Buy America’ provision. Amoroso also understood, despite the fact that the drafters had inserted the wrong version of the provision in the contract, what a ‘Buy America’ provision required in the context of a construction contract.1 That Bostrom, Amoroso’s subcon*1079tractor, failed to comply even after direct instructions from Amoroso is a problem between Amoroso and Bostrom, not between Amoroso and the Government. Whether viewed as a matter of contract interpretation in light of all the circumstances, or as one of promissory estoppel, Amoroso loses.
Unfortunately the opinion of the panel does not stop there; it provides an alternative explanation based on the so-called Christian doctrine. That cáse, G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 160 Ct.Cl. 1 (1963), aff'd on reh’g, 320 F.2d 345, 160 Ct.Cl. 58 (1963), had a unique set of facts, and the court fashioned a special remedy. Those facts are not presented in this ease, and there is no need to invoke a special remedy. There are well established doctrines available to a court for equitably adjusting the rights and duties of contracting parties. As a general proposition, these doctrines permit a court-to construe a contract in light of the behavior and presumed intent of the contracting parties. The so-called Christian doctrine is not among these recognized techniques, and should be limited to the special circumstances that called it forth, for three reasons.
First, unlike traditional contract doctrine's, the Christian doctrine is not tied to the intent of the parties. Although it admittedly provides less than certainty, judicial attention to the intent of the parties circumscribes the interpretation of contracts, and thereby provides contracting parties with a modicum of predictability. Instead, the Christian doctrine would have courts interpret cases by invoking an abstract notion of a “significant or deeply ingrained strand of public procurement policy” (see e.g. op. at 1076; G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418 at 426 (Ct.Cl.1963)), a standard that can be tied to anything or nothing, and is therefore inherently unpredictable.
The purpose of the Christian doctrine, furthermore, does not appear to be the resolution of disputes among parties to contracts, but rather the protection of the Legislative Branch from encroachment by the Executive Branch (see e.g. op. at 1076; G.L. Christian and Associates v. United States, 320 F.2d 345 at 351 (Ct.Cl.1963)). The Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), authorized by law and issued by the Executive Office of the President through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, are addressed to government agencies and intended to bring about some degree of internal consistency in agency procurement policies. That agencies occasionally misapply or fail to follow the FAR is a cause , for closer administrative supervision and a never-ending source of cases such as this. It seems unlikely, however, that such oecurranees will rise very often to the level of a challenge to the authority of Congress under Article I of the Constitution. Expanding the Christian doctrine to establish a general rule that we pick and choose among these regulations and the statutes that authorize them on the basis of the depth of their policy ‘ingrainedness’ is overkill, and will prove to be an exercise in verbal gymnastics at best.
Second, the Government when contracting with the private sector for goods and services enjoys the same contractual rights and remedies as do all others. In addition, by virtue of its dominant role in the marketplace, the Government routinely grants itself privileges — like the right to terminate a contract for the Government’s convenience without penalty — that are not available to other contracting parties, and indeed would rarely if ever be seen in an arms-length contract between private parties. I see no reason for gratuitously granting the Government an even more favored position in its contract activity, and one based on abstract notions of ‘public policy’; to do so' smacks more of autocratic rule than freedom of contract.
Third, the Christian doctrine in effect grants the Government authority, without liability, to change its mind post-performance about what a contract was intended to require on the grounds that some provision, which was omitted intentionally or negligently, would, if present, have granted the Government valuable contract rights. Given that power in the government, parties contracting *1080with the Government will in time factor in the additional cost of the risk of loss attributable to such possible governmental action. Absent predictable contract rights, the market will either refuse to participate, or, more likely, simply increase the price of participation. The Government may save some money in the short run under this principle of “I know my contract rights when I see them,” but in the long run the public who pay the costs will be the losers.
The Government is amply protected in a case such as this by traditional contract doctrines governing rights and remedies, and as the court correctly held, under those doctrines the Government wins. The discussion and extension of Christian to this case is neither necessary nor desirable; it should not be' taken as reflecting the unanimous view of the court.