Court Opinion

ID: 9675083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:41:41.384592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.369912
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I conclude the reversible error committed here is the trial court’s failing to answer by a specific finding appellant’s defense of entrapment.
Entrapment, like justifiable self-defense or a complete alibi, if found credible by the fact-finder, can constitute a full defense to a criminal charge. Thus, it cannot be a technicality that can be ignored. The record is undisputed that the trial court did not specifically rule on entrapment and did not specifically address entrapment by name in its findings and judgment of guilty.
A criminal bench trial is different than a criminal trial to a jury. Juries are given a general verdict form showing on each count(s) that they can find the defendant guilty of that count(s), or not guilty of that count(s). They are rarely given special verdict forms to answer. One common exception, not at issue here, is where the evidence at trial suggests that the value of the stolen property could fall just above or just below the cutoff that differentiates felony theft from misdemeanor theft. See Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 3 (1994) (offense is felony theft where value of property stolen is more than $500). The jury might well be given a factual question to answer, such as: “Is the fair market value of the property worth $500 or more? Answer yes or no.”
When a defendant raises the affirmative defense of alibi or justifiable self-defense, or as here, entrapment, if there is a jury, the jury simply would have been asked to return the verdict form finding appellant guilty or the form finding appellant not guilty. They would not have been asked by a special verdict form whether they believed or disbelieved any particular defense the defendant put into evidence. But, bench criminal trials are just the opposite. Trial judges are required to make specific findings. Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 26.01, subdivision 2 (and its comments thereto), read in conjunction with Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 49.01(a), mandate that at a bench criminal trial, the court “shall in addition specifically find the essential facts in writing on the record.” That mandate can only not be followed when the party entitled to the specific finding waives the right to a fact finding on the issue omitted. Minn.R.Civ.P. 49.01(a).
Not only is there no waiver here by appellant of a specific finding of fact on the issue of entrapment, the record is clear appellant waived her right to trial by jury, agreed to submit to the court all of her case, including her evidence of entrapment, the ease was tried by consent of both parties on entrapment as one of the main issues, and appellant timely appealed, as soon as the judgment of conviction came down, the lack of a specific finding on entrapment. Here, the trial court did make certain findings, but omitted any specific reference to entrapment by name. State v. Grilli mandates that when a defendant waives a jury, the trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record following the hearing on the claim of entrapment. 304 Minn. 80, 95, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (1975).
It could be argued that since the trial court did render a verdict of guilty, that if it had made specific findings, and if it had *666made a specific conclusion on entrapment, it would have rejected that defense. But I suggest that in a criminal ease, it is dangerous for an appellate court to assume what a trial court was thinking, and what it “would have said if it said something.” Further, Grilli neither gives a trial court the right to omit specific findings on entrapment, nor gives us the right to assume they are not needed.
I believe the majority mishandles State v. Crist, 281 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn.1979). Although at a jury trial (when the defendants elects, under Grilli to go right to a jury and waive a pretrial hearing to the court on the issue), the defendant has to raise the issue of entrapment by a preponderance, the issue of entrapment is raised when sufficient facts are put forth to show that law enforcement originated the criminal intent. See Grilli 304 Minn. 80, 230 N.W.2d 445 at 451. On the other hand, the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime is, in effect, a “defense”, the state throws back at the defendant once entrapment is raised. I read Grilli to mean that the state handles predisposition (by proof beyond a reasonable doubt) once entrapment becomes an issue as opposed to the majority finding fault with appellant here for “failing to establish she was not predisposed to commit an act of prostitution.” But irrespective of the placement of burden of persuasion versus burden of production, it is clear that Grilli mandates that the one thing the trial court cannot do with an entrapment issue is to say nothing.
The majority, using Grilli states in effect that unless the defendant proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that law enforcement initiated criminal intent, the trial court need not even “consider” an entrapment defense. The majority quotes Grilli:
The burden is on the defendant to raise by a fair preponderance of the evidence the issue of entrapment for consideration by the court or jury, as he elects. Once such an issue is raised, the burden is on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged.
(Emphasis added). Id. (citing United States v. Mosley, 496 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5 Cir.1974)).
I suggest this is a misreading of Grilli. Grilli has to be read keeping in mind that the Grilli court was discussing bifurcated jury trials when entrapment was an issue, not a pure bench trial as we have here.
When a defendant elects her right to go straight to the jury on all issues, including the defense of entrapment, the defendant does have to raise, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the issue of entrapment. If she fails, the state has no obligation to rebut by showing predisposition, and the jury is not even instructed on the defense of entrapment. That is the issue the Grilli court, citing the Mosley court, was referring to.
To explain the phrase “consideration by the court”, it is helpful to walk through the phrase, keeping the Grilli pretrial election of a defendant in mind.
If a defendant elects to have the court hear the issue of entrapment prior to trial, the defendant has to raise entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence before the judge will even shift to the state the burden to produce evidence, to show by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was predisposition. If the defendant does not raise entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, the trial judge need go no further. He can state that the defendant has failed to sustain her burden, no counter evidence or rebuttal by the state is needed, and the issue will not go to the jury, but the trial judge has to so state. Put another way, the trial court cannot “not consider entrapment and not rule on it by name.” The trial court record has to at least show the trial court considered it, and rejected it.
Grilli speaks forcefully to the need for specific findings accepting or rejecting entrapment outright, or accepting it temporarily and sending it to the jury along with instructing the jury how the state can overcome it. What the majority has failed to do with its analysis of Grilli and Crist is to note that in both Grilli and Crist the trial court made specific findings up or down on the issue of entrapment. That is all that is lacking here. There is no “burden of proof’ on a defendant at a bench trial to come up to some imaginary threshold before the defen*667dant can even put in evidence. This appellant has, as all defendants have, an absolute constitutional right to plead not guilty, waive a jury, and submit evidence at a bench trial on whatever proof they have tending to support their plea. If a defendant’s presentation of evidence becomes far-fetched, immaterial, whatever, the trial court might start sustaining objections of irrelevant, immaterial, etc., etc. But at a minimum, the court has to so state, or in other words, issue a ruling that it has heard the evidence, considered it, and finding it irrelevant, strikes it from the record.
In this bench trial, there was no specific ruling throwing out appellant’s evidence on any grounds. The trial court heard her evidence, the state countered her evidence with their own evidence, and all that is left is for the trial court to rule. Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure, 26.01, subd. 2, and Gril-li, when entrapment is an issue, simply mandate that the trial court consider entrapment by name and make a specific ruling. The obligation to make that ruling is not permissive but is mandatory.
The following evidence from the record leads me to conclude that the trial court here should have at least, according to Grill% made specific findings and a specific conclusion of law on the defense of entrapment.
Two undercover officers intentionally went to a reputed house of prostitution where appellant worked. They were not walking by idly on their way to coffee when someone beckoned them over, and, to their surprise, they found out they were by the front door of a suspected bordello. They went there deliberately to see if “they could find crime.”
The first officer entered, learned the price of an hour’s “talk,” picked out a woman after it was suggested he choose someone, went into a bedroom with her, removed his clothes and removed the woman’s clothes. The record is clear the woman never told him to remove his clothes and her clothes; he did it on his own. She did ask him what he wanted to do. When the first officer mentioned that he was thinking about “maybe some sex” the woman got up and left, stating “we don’t do or talk about that here * * This first officer “struck out” and none of the conduct he observed led to any arrests. But the first officer’s conduct is relevant to set the stage for one of the age-old questions in the encounter between undercover officers and suspected prostitutes, namely “who asked who?”
The second officer, the one whose observations led to the arrest and thus this present appeal, next went into the house. He knew beforehand, from the experience of other vice officers, that street-wise prostitutes, always being subject to undercover busts, want suspected undercover agents to actively engage in sexual contact and penetration. Their belief is that real law enforcement won’t initiate sexual contact and penetration and “go all the way.” Thus, if the trick talks a good game, but seems reluctant to actually do any serious lovemaking, a red flag goes up for the knowledgeable streetwalker, and she keeps a wary eye on the customer. Thus, the game has developed for some time now between undercover agents and suspected prostitutes whereby the officers go as far as they can to convince the target prostitute that they are a genuine customer. This is done in hopes that she will commit to some magic buzz word, meaning “I will trade sex for money” and the arrest can be made at that point, and evidence gathered for court. How far the undercover officer goes becomes an individual determination as to how dedicated you are, and how much you get into your work.
With that background, the second officer went into the house and was met at the door by appellant. She told him the cost was $100 for an hour session with any girl of his choice. She did not state what a session meant nor did the officer ask. The officer chose appellant (no money ever did change hands). The two went to a room where the officer took off his clothes at appellant’s suggestion. She left for a short time, returned, and asked the officer to give her a massage. The officer removed her halter top and her shorts. She never asked him to take off her clothes. He just did it. The prosecution argues that somehow this is not evidence of entrapment, as the officer claims appellant assisted him in undressing her by lifting her arms and raising her hips. I suggest this could be evidence of entrapment, or could not *668be, depending on how the trial court sees all the evidence, the whole picture. But the point is, and remains, that pursuant to Grilli, the trial court must make specific findings and a specific legal conclusion whether entrapment was proven by the defendant and accepted, or whether it was not.
The officer asked appellant for a massage. She indicated she was not a licensed masseuse and thus would not give him a massage. Appellant suggested he massage her. The officer did not point out that he was also not a licensed masseuse. Instead, he massaged her stomach and her breasts. The officer then asked appellant to move to the center of the bed. The officer then asked her to spread her legs. When she did, the officer placed his hands between her legs and spread her legs yet further. The officer then moved his face toward appellant’s vaginal area. When he was within a few inches, the officer stopped and now arrested appellant for engaging in prostitution.
We are not reviewing the ease under our limited scope of appellate review as if there had been a specific finding of no entrapment, a factual determination, and the defendant appealed arguing insufficiency of evidence. Rather, we are reviewing appellant’s contention that on these facts, the trial court had to have at least made the specific finding mandated by Grilli as to whether entrapment was found or not found. I strongly conclude the trial court should have made that specific finding. Further I conclude from Grilli that its absence cannot be harmless error.
This case can be handled by a straightforward reverse and remand to the trial court to supplement its findings with a specific reference to, and acceptance or rejection of the defense of entrapment. No further testimony is needed, both sides have opened, closed and rested, and the record is complete. The trial court has already made partial findings and it would not be an imposition to supplement those findings and specifically cover entrapment. If the trial court should decide, upon reflection, to now enter a judgment of acquittal, the case is over. If the trial court specifically considers entrapment and then rejects it, it will re-enter a judgment of guilty, and the case would then be ripe for appeal, should appellant do so.
I dissent and would reverse and remand to the trial court for Grilli specific findings on entrapment.