Court Opinion

ID: 9670281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:18:10.686784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:03.581008
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from the majority opinion for two reasons. First, it affirms a circuit court decision which was prejudicially contaminated with erroneous factual findings. Second, it wholly ignores the settled law of this state.
FACTS
V.M. is the natural mother of minor children K.C., A.B., Jr., A.B., R.M., and H.M. L.C. is the natural father of only K.C. Mother’s parental rights were terminated as to all the children. Father’s parental rights were terminated as to K.C. Mother did not appeal. Therefore, this case singularly involves Father’s appeal regarding termination of parental rights to his daughter, K.C.
Mother, bom September 7, 1959, and Father, bom June 14, 1957, were married on June 16, 1978, approximately two months after K.C.’s birth on April 21, 1978. They were divorced in Montana during March 1979 and Mother was awarded custody of K.C. Father was ordered to pay monthly child support of $100. Soon after the divorce, Father left Montana and journeyed to Hettinger, North Dakota, where he lived with his mother, F.C., and his older brother W.C. D.C., Father’s other brother, lived nearby.
In the first two months following his divorce, Father met his support obligations and paid $100, monthly, to the Clerk of the specified Montana court. No additional child support payments were forwarded until 1984, when South Dakota Department of Social Services pursued Father and collected $800. Father claims his lack of payment resulted from his failure to find work, and lack of knowledge regarding Mother’s whereabouts. It should be recalled, however, that Father was required to make child support payments to the Montana court clerk and not to Mother directly. Father remained in Hettinger for approximately one year, moved to Bismarck, worked sporadically there, and returned to Hettinger in the Spring of 1982. In July 1984, Father, his mother, and two brothers moved to St. Anthony, North Dakota, where they presently reside.
Mother, following the March 1979 divorce, moved to Lemmon, South Dakota, where she married A.B., Sr. on December 6, 1979, some four days after the birth of their son, A.B., Jr. This union produced another son, A.B., on December 24, 1980.
Mother experienced repeated problems parenting her children. She had constant contact with the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS) and in August 1981, she was relieved of custody of the children due to an alleged abuse of A.B., Jr., and the neglect of K.C. and A.B. In August 1984, Mother regained custody of her children. Mother and A.B., Sr. were divorced on February 7, 1985. The following day, Mother gave birth to twin boys, R.M. and H.M.
On August 8, 1985, a dependency and neglect petition was filed against Mother. All five children were placed in the custody of DSS. Removal of the children stemmed in large part from sexual abuse of K.C., in April 1985, by Mother’s live-in boyfriend, J.S., in Mother’s presence. A related incident also came to light; that being an alleged improper “touching” of K.C. by her maternal great grandfather in 1984. The Petition also alleged that the children were dependent and neglected as to their natural fathers, L.C. and A.B., Sr.
An Adjudicatory Hearing was held on August 22, 1985, whereat Father notified the court that he wanted custody of K.C. On March 27, 1986, at the Dispositional Hearing, Father again voiced his desire to obtain custody of his daughter. The court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, but upon being advised that Father did not fully understand the proceedings and wished to be represented by counsel, *622the court appointed counsel for Father. A new dispositional hearing was ordered held to specifically address Father’s parental rights. To better address K.C.’s possible placement with Father, a court-ordered Home Study was made of Father’s St. Anthony residence. Colored photographs of this home are in evidence and reflect a modest home with a clean yard and a very orderly personal appearance within the home. Pictures of the kitchen area and the innards of this home reflect good housekeeping by the grandmother, who also has a very close and loving relationship with this little girl. To characterize this home as a “hillbilly shack” and as a “junkyard” does not square with the colored photographs in the record. During argument, to which there was no objection, counsel for the Father argued that a well had been drilled and that there was now water in the house. One of the brothers lives in another trailer home and apparently not in the home where the child could conceivably live in the future, per argument before this Court.
Social Worker Addie Ternes noted in her Home Study Report that Father, his two older brothers, and their mother inhabited the family’s St. Anthony residence. While all family members were cooperative, Social Worker Ternes doubted that they were financially and emotionally capable of meeting K.C.’s needs. Neither L.C. nor his brothers had steady jobs and the only constant source of income was F.C.’s (Father’s mother) monthly Social Security check of $340. Father and his brothers worked as carpenters when they could find jobs and reportedly brought home a combined monthly income of approximately $1,000. Father said he wanted K.C. to live with him, because he loved her, and wanted freedom to raise her as he chose. Father admitted to past marijuana use but claimed no current usage of illegal narcotics. A characterization of his attitude towards marijuana, found in the majority opinion, is just that — a characterization. In the Summary portion of her Home Study Report, Social Worker Ternes wrote: “The court may want to consider foster care for [K.C.] for a specified period of time to allow [Father] a trial period to tangibly demonstrate his intent to prepare [K.C.’s] presence in his life.” Social Worker Ternes never recommended his parental rights be terminated.
At the June 3, 1986 Dispositional Hearing, Social Worker Barbara Stoick, who had constant contact with Mother and her children, testified that Father, through the years, expressed minimal interest in K.C. and recommended against him being given custody of his daughter and recommended that Father’s parental rights be terminated. However, she also admitted that her office never initiated contact with Father regarding K.C., never actually worked with Father, and at no time attempted to place K.C. with Father. Social Worker Stoick did report that Father occasionally telephoned to inquire about court hearing dates. She further noted that Father resided in North Dakota and was therefore beyond the jurisdiction of South Dakota DSS. She also noted that Father had never previously attempted to obtain custody of K.C.1 An Order dated June 27, 1986, terminated Father’s parental rights as to K.C. It appears from the record that the trial court did not interview the children nor do they appear to have been seen by the court. Father appeals.
ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDINGS
Finding of Fact 14 states: “That Respondent [Father] made no attempt to take custody or visit or protect his daughter at that time [when he became aware that H.K. (K.C.’s maternal great grandfather) had allegedly sexually molested K.C.].” The settled record does not support this finding and the majority opinion selectively neglects to mention that when Mother notified him of this allegation, Father recommended she inform the authorities.
*623Finding of Fact 18 states: “That Respondent [Father] had knowledge of the sexual molestation [of K.C.] which was committed by [J.S. (Mother’s live-in paramour)] at that time.” Yet, an independent review of the record reveals that no evidence exists to support this finding. On the contrary, the record indicates that Father was unaware of the alleged sexual abuse until after the children were removed from Mother’s custody in August 1985. The majority opinion camouflages this obvious error by augmenting the circuit court’s findings with its own dubious interpretation. Indeed, State’s own brief, in attempting to lessen the effect of the lower court’s clearly erroneous finding, implies that Father may have had knowledge because he “had regular contact with [Mother].” State’s Brief, at 24. Even State, strenuously arguing in favor of termination, could not muster the creative skills necessary to conjure such a questionable interpretation as adopted by the majority. Likewise, the circuit court erred in Finding of Fact 23 wherein it stated: “That Respondent [Father] ... has paid no child support ... with the exception of some $300.00 back in 1979_” Clearly, the record reflects that Father paid an additional $800 in 1984 when pursued by the State of South Dakota.
As the record is devoid of any evidence supporting the above findings of fact, they are clearly erroneous and should be set aside. See In re S.D. 402 N.W.2d 346, 351 (S.D.1987); In re T.H., 396 N.W.2d 145, 148 (S.D.1986); In re B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91, 97 (S.D.1979). Additionally, these erroneous findings go directly to Father’s fitness as a parent, are prejudicial error, and therefore reversible error. A circuit court, laboring under the misconception that a Father would take no action to rescue his young daughter from sexual abuse, would be remiss if it allowed that child to be placed in Father’s custody. I submit that the integrity of the decision reached by the circuit court in this case was irreparably fouled by these erroneous factual findings. A preordained decision is not a just legal decision and should be reversed. I remain mindful that, generally, siblings should be kept together. See Andersen v. Andersen, 399 N.W.2d 363, 365 (S.D.1987); In re G.H., 390 N.W.2d 54, 57-58 (S.D.1986). However, retention of a single sibling home should never provide the sole basis for termination of parental rights. In this case, we are concerned with termination of Father’s parental rights to one child. Whether or not Father eventually retains custody, his parental rights should not be terminated for the singular reason of maintaining a common sibling home. Additionally, Social Worker Stoick testified as to the practical difficulties of placing all five children in one home and she noted circumstances may mandate that the children be separated.
IGNORES SETTLED LAW OF THIS STATE
Father may not have been a model parent, but the settled record indicates that this parent-child relationship may have flourished if given proper, legally mandated encouragement. The settled record is devoid of evidence indicating that Father ever abused K.C., has a criminal record, or is an individual of serious undesirable and dangerous qualities. Clearly, Mother’s nomadic lifestyle made it difficult for Father to regularly visit with his daughter and one can understand Father’s reluctance to seek custody at an earlier date for fear he would endanger his former wife’s custody chances and engender a Mother-siblings split.2 Equally reflected by the record is Father’s genuine concern for K.C. as evidenced via his gifts to her and his tenacious legal struggle to prevent permanent severance of parental ties. Further reflected by the record is the positive relationship existing between K.C. and Father and Father’s family.
*624“It is important to bear in mind that [a] parent[], natural or adoptive, ha[s] a fundamental right to [his or her] children,” In re N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 137 (S.D.1978), which the circuit court must balance “with the State’s compulsion in protecting that child’s best interests.” S.D., 402 N.W.2d at 352. See G.H., 390 N.W.2d at 57-58; In re S.M., 384 N.W.2d 670, 674 (S.D.1986); In re P.M., 299 N.W.2d 803, 807 (S.D.1980). While the prevailing consideration is always the best interests and welfare of the child, parental rights may not be terminated unless “proffered State services are unaccepted or unsuccessful.” S.D., 402 N.W.2d at 352. See S.M., 384 N.W.2d at 674 (citing N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d at 140; In re R.Z.F., 284 N.W.2d 879, 882 (S.D.1979)); In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d 361, 364 (S.D.1985); In re S.S., 334 N.W.2d 59, 61-62 (S.D.1983). “[T]he fundamental nature of parents rights to their children mandates at least a reasonable effort to aid them in retaining their offspring....” T.H., 396 N.W.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
I am troubled that the trial court did not view the adjudicatory phase and disposi-tional phase of this action in a different light. And this Court now seems to make the same judgment. The dispositional phase is to look to the future, while the adjudicatory phase looks to past actions. P.M., 299 N.W.2d at 807. After the child was declared to be dependent and neglected, the least restrictive alternative should have come into play to include services to remedy the situation. For some reason, a myopic viewpoint of the adjudicatory hearing and facts is relied upon.
Of crucial and decisive importance to this case is that State made absolutely no effort to reunite Father with K.C. In fact, Social Worker Barbara Stoick testified that her office never initiated contact with Father regarding K.C., never actually worked with Father, at no time attempted to place K.C. with Father, and admitted that it was Father who telephoned her office to inquire about court hearing dates. Neither did DSS make available to Father information geared to improve his parenting skills, employment situation or living situation, even though it was those deficiencies upon which termination of parental rights was sought.
Parental rights should not be terminated when a parent was not given an opportunity to improve. Common sense and the settled law of this state forbid it. In the current case, the circuit court acted too hastily in terminating Father’s parental rights.3 Unfortunately, the majority opinion magnifies the error by erecting new law, on a shaky set of facts, and ignoring the settled law of this state. Termination of Father’s parental rights is not in K.C.’s best interests nor does it reinforce the concept, long adhered to by this Court, that parents possess a fundamental right to their children.
A less restrictive alternative existed: namely, that L.C. receive counseling which would center on (a) financial responsibilities of raising a child; (b) the special emotional needs of a sexually abused and generally neglected child, such as K.C. might require; (c) any potential drug problem that he may have possessed in his immediate past. After a reasonable period of time, if L.C. improved his parental skills, another determination could be made con-*625ceming placement of K.C. with him. In the meantime, until he received this counseling, and he received absolutely no help whatsoever from the DSS, the alternatives found in my footnote three were available to the trial judge. Lastly, this little girl has a fondness for her Father and I note, inter alia, that he made her a cradle for her dolly. He is poor but he loves his little girl and he should not be forever estopped from having an association with her. As it was written in Santosky v. Kramer, cited in the majority opinion, 455 U.S. at 753-54, 102 S.Ct. at 1395: “When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” (Footnote omitted.) Even the State’s expert, assigned to this case, admitted a total breakdown by the DSS in attempting to help this Father. This action is contrary to our holding in In re L.A., 334 N.W.2d 62 (S.D.1983). The United States Supreme Court in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237 (1960), expressed: “In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” (Footnote omitted.) Lawyers and judges have come to recognize this principle as being the “least restrictive alternative.” I cannot join the majority opinion, as that principle has not been followed in this decision.

. Father testified he never sought custody because (1) he did not wish to lessen Mother’s custody chances; and (2) he was hoping it would be possible for K.C. to remain with her Mother and siblings.

. The majority opinion seems to punish Father for Mother’s neglect when he was incapable of controlling or realistically preventing a situation of neglect occurring in the Mother’s home. See comparable factual situation in B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91 (S.D.1979), where this Court determined that the trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights was clearly erroneous.

. In view of a total failure on the part of the State of South Dakota to offer assistance to this Father or to help him improve his parenting skills, I quote from SDCL 26-8-35, which sets forth the various alternatives that are available to a trial judge:
When a child has been adjudicated to be neglected or dependent, the court shall enter a decree of disposition. When the decree does not terminate parental rights, it shall include one or more of the following provisions which the court finds appropriate:
(1)The court may place the child in the legal custody of one or both parents, a guardian, or relative or other suitable person, with or without protective supervision, under such conditions as the court may impose;
(2) The court may place legal custody in the department of social services or a child placement agency for placement in a foster home or other child care facility; or
(3) The court may order that the child be examined or treated by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist, or that he receive other special care, and may place the child in a hospital or other suitable facility for such purposes.