Court Opinion

ID: 9838718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-07 17:05:16.667477+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:44.092921
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/7/23 P. v. Corrales CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079612

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. RIF107511)

 JOSE LEDEZMA CORRALES,                                                  OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. William S. Lebov, Judge.

(Retired judge of the Yolo Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI,

§ 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.

         Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina, Lynne

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G. McGinnis, and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and

Respondent.

       Defendant and appellant Jose Ledezma Corrales is serving a sentence of seven

years to life, along with a 20-year enhancement, after a jury convicted him of

premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code1, §§ 187, 664, 12022.53, subd. (c)). In this

appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his section 1172.6 petition2 to

vacate his conviction. As explained post, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition

because defendant failed to demonstrate he was convicted under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine and was thus ineligible for relief.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In 2006, defendant appealed his conviction in the underlying criminal matter,

which this Court affirmed. (People v. Ramirez (Aug. 10, 2006, E037613) [nonpub.

opn.].) The opinion in Ramirez established the following relevant facts.

       In 2002, defendant was a member of the “Cuatro Flats” street gang. While

defendant and other Cuatro Flats members were congregated on a street in the Mira Loma

area, a rival gang member drove by the group playing loud music and laughing in their

direction. The group took offense to this and, in a car driven by defendant, pursued the

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

       2 As relevant, effective January 2019, section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95),
permitted persons previously “convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine” to petition the sentencing court to vacate their attempted
murder conviction, where certain conditions have been met. (Former § 1170.95.)
(Stats. 2022, ch. 551, § 2.)

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rival gang member. The resulting chase culminated with one Cuatro Flats member

shooting into the rival gang member’s car, narrowly missing the car’s occupants.

(Ramirez, supra, E037613 at *3-6.)

       At trial, the jury was instructed that defendant, was “accused [] of having

committed the crime of attempted murder”; and that to find him guilty, it needed to

determine “[a] direct but ineffectual act was done by one person towards killing another

human being; and [¶] [] [t]he person committing the act harbored express malice

aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being.” The jury

was further instructed that, for the attempted murder to be “willful, deliberate, and

premeditated,” it must have been “preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent

to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been

formed upon pre-existing reflection.” Instructions concerning the “natural and probable

consequences” doctrine were withdrawn and not given to the jury.

       In 2022, defendant filed the instant section 1172.6 petition, asserting that his

conviction was eligible for relief. For support, he alleged (1) the criminal complaint

brought against him “allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . . attempted

murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine”; (2) he was “convicted of

murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or [he] accepted a plea offer

in lieu of a trial”; and (3) he could not presently be convicted of such crime due to

“changes made to [sections] 188 and 189.”

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       Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant stated a

prima facie case for relief. At the hearing, defendant, through counsel, asserted that the

petition demonstrated he was convicted of attempted murder under the requisite natural

and probable consequences doctrine, because the facts in the underlying criminal

proceedings indicated he was merely “the driver” during the 2002 car chase, not the

actual “shooter.” The People argued that the conviction could not be vacated because the

“jury was not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” and because

“[a]iding and abetting d[id] not necessarily require [defendant] to be a shooter.” The trial

court subsequently entered an order denying defendant’s petition, and defendant timely

appealed.

                                          DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his petition because he

made a prima facie showing under section 1172.6. Specifically, he asserts the

instructions the jury was given concerning the definition of attempted murder “permit

[an] inference” he was convicted under an “invalid theory of liability”; and that the

absence of instructions concerning the natural and probable consequences doctrine was

not dispositive. In response, the People assert that the trial court properly denied

defendant’s petition, because the absence of jury instructions concerning the natural and

probable consequences doctrine conclusively foreclosed any possibility the conviction

was eligible for section 1172.6 relief.

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       We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima

facie stage. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251 (Williams).) To make

a prima facie showing, the petitioner must offer facts that, if assumed true, demonstrate

an entitlement to relief. (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1261

[explaining prima facie standard in relation to § 1172.6 petition].) While a petitioner is

not required to definitively prove his case at the prima facie stage, vaguely phrased legal

conclusions do not suffice. (People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 657-658

(Patton) [affirming denial of § 1172.6 petition where, inter alia, petitioner failed to offer

explicit evidence he was convicted under requisite theory of culpability].)

       To be entitled to relief under section 1172.6, a petitioner must demonstrate that

their conviction was based upon an enumerated theory of culpability. (People v. Coley

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548 (Coley).) Indeed, by its terms, section 1172.6 permits a

trial court to vacate murder convictions that were based “under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person.”3

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) In contrast, relief for attempted murder is only permitted where the

conviction is based “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.;

accord Coley, at p. 548.) Thus, petitioners seeking to vacate their attempted murder

convictions must allege facts that, if accepted as true, demonstrate they were convicted

under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v.

       3 The natural and probable consequences doctrine is a theory of culpability that
applies when a defendant’s confederate commits an offense other than the target crime.
(People v. Mejia (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 586, 628.)

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Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 993.) In determining whether a petitioner has

demonstrated a prima facie case, a court need not adopt the petitioner’s allegations as true

where “ ‘readily ascertainable facts,’ ” including, as relevant, those found in jury

instructions, evince ineligibility. (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.)

       Here, the trial court properly denied the petition because the record conclusively

demonstrated defendant was not convicted under the requisite theory of culpability.

(Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 657-658; Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548

[court not required to grant resentencing as to attempted murder conviction where record

did not demonstrate petitioner was convicted under invalid theory of culpability].)

Specifically, it was undisputed that the jury convicted defendant of premeditated

attempted murder after being instructed such crime required a “clear, deliberate intent to

kill,” and that the natural and probable consequences instruction was not given. These

facts vitiate any possibility defendant was convicted under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine and are thus fatal to his petition. (Williams, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th

at pp. 1255-1256 [explaining that, when read as a whole, record of jury instructions

conclusively demonstrated petitioner was not convicted under, inter alia, natural and

probable consequences doctrine]; accord Coley, at p. 548.)

       Additionally, upon close examination of the record, defendant provided no

concrete allegations, which might otherwise indicate the jury was aware of and convicted

him under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Indeed, the petition’s only

reference to his conviction was that he was “convicted of murder, attempted murder, or

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manslaughter”; and his arguments in the trial court were limited to his belief that he was

convicted without having any intent to commit the attempted murder, because he was

only “the driver” in the underlying car chase. Assuming all these facts as true however,

they do not satisfy defendant’s prima facie burden, as they constitute uncertain and

legally conclusory allegations, which do not clearly and unequivocally speak to the

specific theory of culpability under which defendant was convicted. (Williams, supra, 86

Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255-1256 [rejecting arguments petitioner was convicted under

enumerated theory of culpability where jury instructions foreclosed such possibility]; cf.

People v. Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 628.)

       Finally, defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal—i.e., that the trial court was

foreclosed from dismissing his petition because he alleged a possibility “the jury

instructions could give rise to a conviction on an imputed malice theory” and that the trial

court engaged in improper factfinding—are unavailing. Initially, as we have previously

indicated, unlike murder convictions, relief for attempted murder convictions under

section 1172.6 is expressly limited to those made under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine, not broadly for any unspecified imputed malice theory. (Coley,

supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548.) Further, we disagree that the trial court engaged in

impermissible factfinding or was otherwise precluded from dismissing the petition under

the facts here. (Patton, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 657-658 [court did not engage in

improper factfinding where underlying facts were uncontroverted].) As discussed above,

the record definitively precluded defendant from relief, and, in light thereof, the trial

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court was not required to adopt his version of factually unsupported possibilities. (People

v. Soto, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 1055.)

                                      DISPOSITION

       Accordingly, we affirm.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                        MILLER
                                                                                         J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                       Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
                                 J.

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