Court Opinion

ID: 9546176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:50.04614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:05.903906
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion correctly accepts the fact that the statute of limitations, without more, would bar appellant’s claim. The legislature has so provided:
“(a) No order or award for compensation involving an injury which is the result of a single brief occurrence rather than occurring over a substantial period of time, shall be made unless in addition to the reports of the injury, an application or claim for award is filed with the clerk of court in the county in which the injury occurred, within one (1) year after the day on which the injury occurred * * Section 27-12-503(a), W.S.1977.
Appellant recognized that she had suffered a compensable injury on December 14, 1981. The claim was not filed until April, 1983. See Baldwin v. Scullion, 50 Wyo. 508, 62 P.2d 531, 108 A.L.R. 304 (1936); Bemis v. Texaco, Wyo., 401 P.2d 708 (1965). The statutory time limit in which to file a claim had expired.
Nor does appellant’s situation afford to her the exception to the limitation period provided by the legislature:
“If an injured employee is mentally incompetent or a minor, or where death results from the injury if any of his dependents are mentally incompetent or minors, at the time when any right or privilege accrues under this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804], no limitation of time provided for in this act shall run so long as the incompetent or minor has no guardian.” Section 27-12-505, W.S. 1977.
Nonetheless, the majority opinion finds an exception to the statute of limitations in a waiver by the employer or an estoppel through the acts of the employer. With this, I disagree.
In the first place, I question the assumption that the employer was involved in any waiver or estoppel. Appellant does not contend for any fraudulent or intentionally deceptive action on the part of the employer. In her brief, appellant states, “ * * * we do not contend the Employee was deceived any more than negligently by Ann White * * Ann White was a Nurse Practitioner in the office of Dr. John Lunt, M.D., in Saratoga. Carbon County maintains an airplane ambulance for flights from Carbon County to Laramie, Denver, etc. Ann White and appellant worked part time on the ambulance EMT crew. Ann White was the supervisor of the crew. About thirty days before appellant suffered a ruptured eardrum on a flight of the airplane ambulance, the Town of Saratoga had taken over the operation of the airplane ambulance from the county. The day after her injury, appellant sought medical attention from Dr. Lunt, where she was treated by Ann White. It was Ann White’s statement that she did not believe worker’s compensation coverage existed for the injury because of the part-time nature of the employment which is the basis for the claimed estoppel or waiver against the Town of Saratoga.
Was Ann White speaking as a nurse for Dr. Lunt? Or was she speaking as a part-time employee supervisor of the EMT unit on Saratoga’s airplane ambulance? And, if the latter, did she have authority to waive the statute of limitations on behalf of Sara-toga or to act or speak on behalf of Sarato-ga in this matter so as to estop Saratoga from application of the statute of limitations? It is difficult to treat Ann White’s advice, given in the doctor’s office while treating appellant on behalf of the doctor, as being given on behalf of the Town of Saratoga under these circumstances.
“ * * * The doctrine of implied agency or ostensible authority applied to private parties or corporations is limited very much, so far as municipal corporations are concerned * * *.” S. Goldberg & Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids, 200 Iowa 139, 204 N.W. 216 (1925).
*1055The Iowa court pointed out that the extent of authority is a matter of record in statutes and ordinances for municipal matters and not known only to the principal and agent as is the ease with private parties.
The only reasonable appraisal of the situation is that appellant could not have relied on Ann White’s comments as those of the town. She should be charged with knowledge contained in the placard which is required to be posted by every employer, and which she is taken to have read. It notified her of the necessity of filing a timely claim. She should not be allowed to rely on advice received from another part-time employee, albeit a supervisor of a limited and special activity who was probably acting as a nurse for an attending physician at the time, for a waiver of the statute of limitations by the employer or to establish an estoppel against the employer to assert such statute.
Inasmuch as the privilege of the statute of limitations is personal, a waiver, in this instance, can only be by the Town of Sara-toga or someone empowered to act for it. Stryker v. Rasch, 57 Wyo. 34, 112 P.2d 570, 136 A.L.R. 770, reh. denied 113 P.2d 963 (1941). The power to act for a municipality in most respects is statutorily given to the governing body of the municipality. Section 15-1-103, W.S.1977. See §§ 15-2-201 and 15-2-202, W.S.1977, re restrictions on acceptance of claims by governing bodies of towns.
Finally, the advice given by Ann White pertained to a matter of law.
“The well-recognized rule is that a representation as to a matter of law will not ordinarily support an action for fraud or deceit, nor constitute an estoppel to rely upon the statute of limitations, the reason for the rule being that representations as to matters of law are ordinarily considered as expressions of opinion, and justifiable reliance cannot be had upon the mere opinion of another. * * * ” 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitations of Actions § 451, p. 913 (1970).
I would affirm.