Court Opinion

ID: 9757375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:37:30.826473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:48.588454
License: Public Domain

WILNER, Judge.
Just after 7:00 on the morning of April 10, 1985, a man brandishing a handgun and wearing a three-quarter length gray coat, white tennis shoes, and a ski mask robbed three women and a child standing at a bus stop in Baltimore City. *629He took a purse from each of the women and a school bag from the child. During the course of the robbery, a shot was fired. One of the victims—Mary Henderson—followed the robber as he made his escape and reported seeing him heading toward Swann Avenue, changing his clothes as he ran.
Police officers responded promptly. From the information obtained from the victims and from an anonymous call, several of them went looking for the assailant in the Uplands Apartment development, located on Swann Avenue about a block from the bus stop. Officer Wagner observed appellant emerging from the building at 405 Swann Avenue dressed in a blue-gray suit and carrying a gray jacket in one hand and a shopping bag in the other. Appellant walked away from the officer, at an increasingly brisk pace. When he got to a corner, he dropped the shopping bag and ran behind one of the buildings. Officer Wagner saw appellant cross Swann Avenue and go into the building at 400 Swann Avenue; he relayed that information by police radio to Officer Brown, who was also on the scene searching for the robber.
Officer Brown saw appellant go into 400 Swann Avenue carrying a gray coat; he followed him in and brought him back outside. Officer Garrity then arrived with the victims. Inside the shopping bag, picked up by Officer Wagner, were three purses, which the women, respectively, identified as their own, a ski mask, a glove, and a handgun containing five live rounds and one spent cartridge. Several of the victims identified the gray coat taken from appellant as looking like the coat worn by the robber. Also inside the shopping bag was a black vinyl case containing certain papers belonging to appellant.
None of the victims was able to identify appellant as the masked robber. Although the shopping bag certainly was full of incriminating evidence, appellant, directly disputing Officer Wagner’s testimony, contended that he never had the shopping bag. He claimed that he was on his way to the Westside Skill Center, that he had stopped at 400 Swann *630Avenue to meet one Karen Lucas, a fellow student at that center, and that his school papers allegedly found inside the shopping bag, had been in his coat pocket.
As a result of this incident, the State’s Attorney filed four criminal informations against appellant (Nos. 28514739-28514742), each charging him with the following eight offenses:
Count 1—Robbery with a deadly weapon;
Count 2—Attempted robbery with a deadly weapon;
Count 3—Robbery;
Count 4—Assault with intent to rob;
Count 5—Assault;
Count 6—Theft of less than $300;
Count 7—Use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence; and
Count 8—Unlawful carrying of a handgun.
Appellant was first brought to trial on all of these charges in November, 1985. He was convicted on all four counts of robbery with a deadly weapon (Count 1 of each information) and apparently on Counts 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of each information as well. It is not clear what happened to Counts 2 and 4, except that there is no indication (and appellant makes no contention) that he was acquitted on those counts at that time.
On February 22, 1986, the court granted appellant’s motion for new trial on all counts set forth in the four informations.1 He was brought to trial again in June, 1986; on that occasion, the jury was unable to reach a verdict on any of the counts, and so a mistrial was declared.
Appellant’s third trial took place in August, 1986. Precisely what occurred at that trial is not altogether clear from the record before us—a matter we shall discuss in more detail later. It appears, however, that only five counts were submitted to the jury—the four flagship counts *631of robbery with a deadly weapon and one count of use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. The jury acquitted of the latter offense2 but, once again, was unable to agree on Count 1.
Undaunted by its three false starts, and now down to only one count in each information, the State decided to try again. Prior to his fourth trial, appellant moved to dismiss Count 1 (of each information) on the related grounds of double jeopardy and collateral estoppel. His argument centered solely on the effect of his acquittal on Count 8. He posited that the only deadly weapon indicated by the evidence was a handgun, that his acquittal on Count 8 sufficed as a finding that he had not used a handgun, and that, ergo, a fact necessary to his prosecution on Count 1 had been decided in his favor and could not be re-litigated. That conclusion, he urged, was mandated by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
The court denied his motion, whereupon he was brought to trial for the fourth time on Count 1 of each information. He was convicted on all four charges, given substantial sentences, and appeals. He raises six issues, to which, nostra sponte, we have added a seventh. In the end, we shall affirm.
(1), (2)
Double Jeopardy/Collateral Estoppel
In the “Statement Of The Case” section of his brief, appellant informed us that, at his third trial, the court *632disposed of Counts 2 through 7 of each information by granting “judgments of acquittal” as to them. The State did not challenge that assertion in its brief, and indeed the docket entries for the third trial clearly indicate that disposition.3 Aware that Count 3 of each information charged simple robbery, a necessary included element in robbery with a deadly weapon, we questioned whether, in light of that disposition, retrial on Count 1 might be precluded under Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986). Given the generally dismal state of the record,4 however, we directed the parties to address that issue and, if necessary, to supplement the record in order to address it.
In response to that order, the State filed certain excerpts from the transcript of proceedings at the third trial, which we have accepted as a supplement to the record. Md.Rule 1027.
At the conclusion of the State’s case at the third trial, defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, arguing briefly that the State had failed to show “that the evidence seized was in possession of my client and that he is, in fact, the robber that’s involved in this case.” The motion was denied. At the end of the entire case, counsel renewed the “motion for judgment of acquittal at this time for the same *633reasons____” Without responding to the motion, the court asked the prosecutor which counts he was pressing; he replied that he wanted “the four armed robbery counts and the four handgun counts to go to the jury.” The judge then said that it was her practice in multiple robbery cases to send only one handgun count to the jury, as she was not inclined to give consecutive sentences if there were multiple convictions on that count. The prosecutor indicated no objection to that approach. The colloquy then concluded thusly:
“THE COURT: Now, do you [defense counsel] have any argument as to the first and eighth counts?
MS. JULIAN: No, your Honor. I’ll submit on the record on the motion.
THE COURT: All right. Well, it will go to the jury as to each of the indictments [sic, informations] on the first and eighth counts although I will only require one verdict as to the eighth.”
From this, it is clear that the docket entry for August 11 is indeed in error. The court never entered a judgment of acquittal as to Counts 2 through 7, and it certainly never ruled, or even suggested, that the evidence presented by the State was legally insufficient with respect to those counts. It is apparent that the State simply decided not to press those middle counts, as in Bynum v. State, 277 Md. 703, 357 A.2d 339, cert. denied 429 U.S. 899, 97 S.Ct. 264, 50 L.Ed.2d 183 (1976). The predicate for the Court’s ruling in Wright v. State, supra, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157—a finding by the trial court of evidentiary insufficiency on a lesser included offense—is missing here. On the more complete record, therefore, we find no merit to the issue that appeared to be very real from the record as we received it.
Appellant’s double jeopardy/collateral estoppel argument, as we observed, rests on the implication he draws from his acquittal on Count 8. In Powers v. State, 285 Md. 269, 401 A.2d 1031, cert. denied 444 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 288, 62 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), the Court of Appeals, after reviewing *634what it regarded as the relevant pronouncements of the Supreme Court, concluded that
“the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies after a jury, at a single trial, acquits on one count of a multicount indictment and is unable to agree upon a verdict on a related count of the same indictment involving a common issue of ultimate fact, which if found in favor of an accused would establish his innocence on both counts.”
Id., at 288, 401 A.2d 1031. (Emphasis added.)
As initially pointed out in Ashe v. Swenson, supra, 397 U.S. at 444, 90 S.Ct. at 1194, and as reiterated in Powers and later in Wooten-Bey v. State, 308 Md. 534, 544, 520 A.2d 1090 (1987), collateral estoppel in criminal cases “is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality.” Quoting from Ashe, the Wooten-Bey Court held that the reviewing court must “examine the record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration.” Id.
Appellant has not given us much of an opportunity to do that, for no part of the proceedings of the third trial, save the few pages of transcript dealing with the disposition of Counts 2-7, furnished by the State in response to our order, has been included in the record. We don’t know, other than in a general way, what evidence was presented to that third jury; nor do we know what instructions were given or what argument was made to the jury.
Appellant’s position is very simple and direct: “[T]he use of a deadly weapon is a necessary element for conviction under Article 27, Section 488. Here the Appellant was found not guilty of the use of the handgun in the third trial. The only State theory of the case was that a handgun was involved.”
*635The State has a somewhat more conjectural view. It notes, on the one hand, that the robber wore a mask, that none of the victims were able to identify appellant, and that he was dressed differently when apprehended than was the robber at the time of the robbery; on the other hand, it stresses that he was in possession of the gun and the fruits of the crime shortly before his apprehension. From this, the State posits that the third jury may have concluded that appellant was not the actual robber (or wielder of the handgun) but may have entertained some feeling, short of unanimity, that he was an accomplice of or receiver for the actual robber, who escaped. That possibility, it argues, is not irrational under the evidence, and it would explain the acquittal on Count 8 and the inability to agree on Count 1. Indeed, the State notes that, at one point, defense counsel entertained the same notion based, apparently, on her conversation with some of the jurors on the third jury. At sentencing in this proceeding, she stated to the court:
“[I] made a note and I remember going over that prior to this trial. Some of the jurors were saying that they could not agree, they could not say he was the actual gunman because the man’s face was covered but they felt ... [interruption by court] he was somehow involved. So I believe they had a theory there was more than one person involved and some way or another he came across the bag but was not the gunman.”
In the absence of a more complete record of the third trial, which appears to have been available and which was appellant’s duty to produce, it is impossible for us to make an objective analysis of which view is sounder.5 But that is not really the test. The test framed in Ashe, Powers, and *636Wooten-Bey is “whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict,” as the State suggests, or other than as appellant suggests. Notwithstanding the trial judge’s thoughts, from what is before us, we believe that the jury could have done so. With or without an accomplice instruction, members of the third jury could rationally have believed that appellant was criminally involved but was not the actual gunman. If that were the basis of its verdict on Count 8, the acquittal would not necessarily involve “a common issue of ultimate fact, which if found in favor of [appellant] would establish his innocence on both counts.”
(3)
Partiality Of The Trial Judge
Appellant complains that the trial judge, Judge Bothe, “harangued defense counsel from day one, aided the able prosecutor whenever possible and presided in a totally narrow minded fashion, denying Appellant a fair and impartial trial.” More particularly, he asserts that the judge “made short shrift of Appellant’s- collateral estoppel argument,” that she “breezed through” a motion to stay to allow him to file an immediate appeal from the denial of his motion to dismiss, that she failed to “formally rule” on a motion to recuse herself, that she attempted to “assist the State” in its examination of Officer Brown, that she “went out of her way to rehabilitate the impeached officer,” that she “commenced arguing ... with defense counsel” and “went into a diatribe with counsel which was somewhat unintelligible,” that she interrupted questioning by defense counsel, that her “predisposition” was “overwhelmingly against” appellant, and that “[h]er attitude was hostile.”
These are, of course, very serious charges which, if true, would require a reversal. To determine whether, and to what extent, they are true, we have read nearly the entire transcript of the proceeding. Several conclusions emerge.
Appellant’s statements that Judge Bothe “made short shrift” of his collateral estoppel argument and “breezed through” his motion for stay are wholly unfounded. Judge *637Bothe said that she had read the written motion to dismiss and some of the cases cited; she listened to counsel’s argument but made clear that she simply did not agree with it. Counsel continued to press a point that the judge, on several occasions, said she found unpersuasive. The colloquy pertaining to that motion extended over 21 pages of transcript. As to the motion for stay, Judge Bothe noted that, with the three previous trials, the case had dragged on for over a year, and she could see no good reason to delay the ultimate resolution of appellant’s guilt or innocence any longer. Her concluding statement, which appellate counsel seems to take wholly out of context, was:
“Let the record reflect I read your cases. I read your memorandum. I read Pulley, and I cannot understand why the defendant is so reluctant to bring this case to finality. It’s really a travesty that it has had to go on for so long without resolution. Let’s hope this time a conclusion can be reached.” 6
Appellant did, as he claims, then ask Judge Bothe to recuse herself
“because of the manner in which the case is proceeding and has proceeded so far, the anger expressed at counsel while trying to put the motion on the record, the fact that he does not feel like he will get a fair trial, having had the case heard in this court before.”
The court made no direct ruling on this motion; the judge simply ignored it and went on to other business. That, of course, was not only discourteous, but improper; appellant was entitled to a response. It is clear, however, that the motion was implicitly overruled, for Judge Bothe certainly did not recuse herself, and appellant never pressed for a response. On the merits, we find no basis at that point for a recusal. Neither the loss of pretrial motions nor the fact *638that Judge Bothe had presided at the third trial would be sufficient grounds to require recusal; and, although we cannot discern voice inflections or mannerisms from a transcript, we can find nothing in the written record to demonstrate anger on the part of the judge.
The major thrust of appellant’s argument goes to the judge’s intervention in the questioning of certain witnesses and to arguments that took place between Judge Bothe and defense counsel. A good bit of this took place during counsel’s cross-examination of Officer Brown, when counsel attempted to point out and examine the officer with respect to perceived inconsistencies between his current testimony and testimony given at the earlier trials.
Judge Bothe did indeed step in at several points to clarify questions posed by counsel or to give the witness an opportunity to explain or clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Some of these intrusions were in response to objections by the prosecutor to particular questions or to the form of the cross-examination; some were sua sponte but to which no immediate objection by appellant was made; some were wholly unnecessary and served only to provoke an argument with defense counsel.
In Belt v. State, 48 Md.App. 669, 678, 429 A.2d 300, cert. denied 291 Md. 771 (1981), we cautioned that:
“The trial judge’s role is that of an impartial arbitrator and that appearance is not generally compatible with an inquisitorial role. It is the better practice for a trial judge to inject himself [or herself] as little as possible in a jury case ... because of the inordinate influence that may emanate from his [or her] position if jurors interpret his [or her] questions as indicative of his [or her] opinion.”
When a judge interjects himself or herself into a case to any significant extent, as, despite prior admonitions from this Court, Judge Bothe seems wont to do {see McMillian v. State, 65 Md.App. 21, 499 A.2d 192 (1985)), he or she invites this kind of argument and risks not only a reversal of the *639conviction but embarrassing censure as well. See Md.Rule 1231 (Md.Code of Judicial Conduct), Canon 3A.
The major confrontation between Judge Bothe and defense counsel came, as we indicated, during cross-examination of Officer Brown, the arresting officer. Most of it arose from an attempt by counsel to show that some of the details mentioned by the witness in his current testimony had not been mentioned by him in testimony given at earlier trials. It was not clear, however, that the witness had ever been asked about those details at the prior trials; counsel did not show the witness the transcript of his earlier testimony or call his attention to specific questions and answers but simply challenged him for including some details for the first time. The court felt that was improper; counsel persisted; and an argument ensued.
Having considered the record as a whole and viewing the judge’s interruptions and comments complained about in context, we conclude, as we did in McMillian v. State, supra, 65 Md.App. 21, 27, 499 A.2d 192, that “while the court should certainly have exercised greater restraint, the remarks were not tantamount to reversible error.”
(4)
Suppression Of Officer Wagner’s Testimony
Just before the actual commencement of trial, defense counsel moved in limine to suppress the entire testimony of Officer Wagner on the ground that he had committed perjury. This, in turn, was based on the assertion that, at appellant’s second trial, Officer Wagner testified that he had observed appellant exit the building carrying the shopping bag, whereas at the third trial he said only that he saw appellant holding the bag and placing it down.
Our first response to appellant’s complaint is that it was not preserved for appellate review. No objection was made to Officer Wagner’s testimony at trial and no motion was made to strike it on this or any other ground. A pretrial motion in limine alone does not suffice to preserve an objection to evidence. See Offutt v. State, 44 Md.App. *640670, 677, 410 A.2d 611 (1980); Eiler v. State, 63 Md.App. 439, 445-46, 492 A.2d 1320 (1985).
Even if the objection had been preserved, we would have found it utterly without merit. How the alleged inconsistency constitutes perjury was a mystery to Judge Bothe and it is a mystery to us. While there may have been some inconsistency in the testimony given at the various trials, a point that was forcefully brought to the jury’s attention by defense counsel, there was no evidence of perjury, and certainly no conviction of perjury, which is the necessary predicate for exclusion. See Md.Code Ann.Cts. & Jud.Proc. art., § 9-104: “A person convicted of perjury may not testify.” (Emphasis added.)
(5)
Miranda
Officer Brown arrested appellant. He eventually filled out a report known as an arrestee data sheet containing certain information he received from appellant. The information, Brown said, is routinely asked; it includes the defendant’s name, address, and date of birth. Brown said that appellant, whose name is Avery V. Ferrell, gave him the name James Edward Ferrell.
Appellant now claims that this “arrestee information” was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), presumably meaning that adequate warnings were not given to him before this information was sought. Although appellant has failed to supply us with any factual foundation for that assertion, even if it were true there would be no error. As we held in Grimes v. State, 44 Md.App. 580, 586, 409 A.2d 767 (1980), rev’d on other grounds 290 Md. 236, 429 A.2d 228 (1981): “Until the Court of Appeals directs us otherwise, we shall adhere to the view that routine questions seeking a person’s name and address are not proscribed by Miranda, and if the person answers such questions, his answers are not rendered inadmissible by the exclusionary rule announced in *641Miranda.” (Footnote omitted.) Cf Mills v. State, 278 Md. 262, 275, 363 A.2d 491 (1976).
(6)
Self-Incrimination
Appellant was represented by counsel at all four of his trials. Defense counsel in this case had represented him at his third trial and, although the record is not altogether clear on this, possibly at his first and second trials as well. Appellant had elected to testify in his own defense at one or more (perhaps all) of his earlier trials.
At the conclusion of the State’s case, following the denial of appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, this colloquy occurred:
“[THE COURT:] As to the defendant’s testifying or remaining silent, he has been advised of those rights very thoroughly I think, so I don’t know that we need to formally do them again. You are aware of your rights in that regard, Mr. Ferrell. Is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: (Nodding affirmatively)
THE COURT: That you can testify or remain silent.
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: I don’t think we need to review those.”
Subsequently, without any further comment, counsel called appellant to testify. Appellant now claims he was not adequately informed of his right to remain silent. We find no basis for that assertion. See Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 73 (1963); State v. McKenzie, 17 Md.App. 563, 303 A.2d 406 (1973).
(7)
Request for Bench Trial
Appellant, who had elected a jury trial at his three prior trials, contends that, on this occasion, he twice requested a court trial and that the court erred in denying him one. This is an incomplete and misleading statement of what occurred.
*642Upon resolution of the various preliminary motions, this colloquy ensued:
“THE COURT: Do you want a Court trial or a jury trial, Mr. Ferrell?
THE DEFENDANT: Right now?
THE COURT: Right now, because we are proceeding with the trial right now.
Do you want a Court trial or a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: I want a Court trial.
MS. JULIAN: Just a second. May I consult with my client?
(A discussion was held off the record between defense counsel and the defendant.)
THE COURT: Do you want to be tried by a judge, without a jury?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: You want a jury trial; don’t you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.'
THE COURT: Then you will have a jury trial, and I will preside over it.
MS. JULIAN: Your Honor, I was not finished.
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, can I say something?
THE COURT: Go back to the trial table.”
The court thereupon directed the prosecutor to call the case, following which it recognized defense counsel:
“THE COURT: Ms. Julian?
MS. JULIAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Elizabeth Julian, Assistant Public Defender, on behalf of Mr. Ferrell.
THE COURT: Mr. Ferrell is praying a jury trial?
MS. JULIAN: Yes, we are requesting a jury trial.
THE COURT: Would you swear the jury, please?
THE CLERK: Members of the jury panel, please stand and raise your right hand.
THE DEFENDANT: I am not praying no jury trial.
*643(The prospective jurors were sworn on their voir dire.)”
Thereafter, the court conducted extensive voir dire, both sides moved to strike or excuse various prospective jurors, a jury was ultimately selected, and the jurors were sworn. Not another word was said about a court trial; at no time did either counsel or appellant express any dissatisfaction with the fact that the case would be tried by a jury. It is clear to us, notwithstanding appellant’s ambiguous blurt, “I am not praying no jury trial,” that, after discussion with his attorney, he elected a jury trial.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED; APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.

. In a separate (fifth) information, appellant was charged with assault with intent to murder. The jury acquitted him of that charge.

. From everything that followed, it is apparent that the handgun count submitted to the jury in the third trial was actually Count 7 of the information—use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence—and not Count 8, charging unlawful carrying of a handgun. The parties have consistently referred to the acquittal as Count 8, however. The original information contained nine counts. At some point, Count 6, charging theft, was struck and the ensuing Counts 7, 8, and 9 were renumbered as Counts 6, 7, and 8, respectively. The “use of a handgun” charge, originally Count 8, became Count 7. In order to maintain consistency with the statements and arguments in the briefs, we shall refer to the handgun charge submitted to the jury at the third trial as Count 8.

. The entry for August 11, 1986, states: "As to each [information], oral motion for judgment of acquittal heard and denied as to the 1st and 8th Counts and granted as to the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th Counts. Bothe, J."

. Just by way of example, we observe that (1) the original docket entries were not included, (2) several critical State’s exhibits are omitted, (3) the court reporter who recorded the proceedings of November 17 showed the case being tried before Judge Hubbard when in fact it was tried before Judge Bothe, and (4) two quite different exhibits are shown as admitted as State’s Exhibit 2, neither of whifch are included in the record. We note further that, in clear derogation of the requirements set forth in The Maryland Court Reporters’ Manual, published by the Administrative Office of the Courts, the transcripts of the fourth trial do not contain a table of contents showing "all exhibits and where they are marked for identification and received in evidence." Id., Subject: Appeal Transcript of Proceedings, p. 2. Indeed, the transcript for November 17 has no table of contents at all.

. The trial judge seemingly rejected that notion when suggested by defense counsel, stating that “[n]o one ever proposed more than one individual committed this crime. I don’t even believe I instructed them on participation in the last trial because there’s never been any indication that more than one person had a handgun, used a handgun, committed the four armed robberies____” She expressed the belief that the jury "was totally ignorant of its responsibilities as jurors.”

. The "travesty” referred to by Judge Bothe was the delay in resolution. In his brief, counsel accuses the judge of stating that “the case was a ‘travesty’ to that point.” (Emphasis added.) That is a flat-out misstatement.