Court Opinion

ID: 9391118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-30 07:11:40.673489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:39.526635
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 27, 2023.

                                      In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                              NO. 14-21-00736-CR

                    CHARLES EARL MARTIN, Appellant

                                        V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 21st District Court
                         Washington County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 19041

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Charles Earl Martin appeals his conviction for second degree
felony assault of a family/household member. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§
12.42(a); 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A).    In four issues, Appellant contends (1) the
evidence is insufficient to prove that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
caused Complainant bodily injury, and that he is the same person who had been
convicted of a prior assault offense against a member of his family or household;
and (2) the trial court erroneously admitted several pieces of evidence. We affirm.
                                   BACKGROUND

      Appellant was indicted for third degree felony assault of a household
member or a person with whom Appellant has or has been in a dating relationship,
with a prior conviction for assault of a family or household member pursuant to
Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). The indictment contained a
punishment enhancement paragraph alleging two additional prior convictions for
“the felony offense Assault Family/Household Member w/Prev Conv” and “the
felony offense of Assault Family Violence Enhanced.” A three-day trial was held
in December 2021.

      At trial, Complainant testified that Appellant had been living in her trailer
together with her kids and dad. She testified that she had known Appellant for
about ten years. They had been friends at first and eventually began an on-again-
off-again dating relationship. Complainant stated that she had called 9-1-1 in
September 2019 to ask for police assistance because she and Appellant had “a
disagreement or something like that.” Because Complainant was a reluctant and
somewhat uncooperative witness, she at first testified that she could not remember
if she sustained injuries during the argument. When the State showed her several
photos, she acknowledged that the photos were taken by police during the
investigation and “fairly and accurately represent what [she] looked like the night
that the police came and responded” to her 9-1-1 call.            The photos show
Complainant having a bloody lip and “dry blood all around [her] mouth” as well as
redness on her chest. She stated she could not remember if she had been struck in
the mouth by Appellant or what she had told the police that night.

      After Complainant refreshed her memory by reading the statement she wrote
at the time the police came to her home, she testified that she told the officers that
Appellant “held me down and big faced me with his hands (indicating).”

                                          2
Complainant made “a motion in front of [he]r face” to show what she meant by
“big faced” and added: “I guess when somebody, you know, push you out the way
that way.” She also testified that she and Appellant were in “a tussle” which
started over gas money in the bedroom. She stated the altercation “started off [by]
pushing each other,” but she unequivocally stated that Appellant “gave the first
strike” to her face.   According to Complainant, her 15-year-old son tried to
separate her and Appellant. Complainant admitted that during the altercation,
Appellant caused her bloody lip and the redness on her chest. She affirmed that
she is “absolutely sure that” Appellant “caused that” redness.

      Following Complainant’s testimony, the State published an audiotape of
Complainant’s 9-1-1 call. Complainant can be heard asking for police to be sent to
her home because her boyfriend, Appellant, “was pushing on me and fighting on
me.” Complainant stated that she and Appellant had an argument over gas money.
When her son tried to pull Appellant off her, Appellant pushed her son.
Complainant stated that Appellant drove off in a car “not even a minute — two
minute[s] ago.”

      Officer Alex Saenz of the Brenham Police Department testified that he drove
to Complainant’s home on September 25, 2019, to assist with an incoming
domestic disturbance call. When he arrived at the scene, he observed Complainant
and her teenage son outside. Officer Saenz testified that Complainant had a bloody
lip and “the injuries on [Complainant] appear[ed] consistent with her allegations of
what had happened.” He recognized the photos of Complainant admitted at trial
and confirmed that the injuries visible on the photos “were consistent with some
type of an assault.” He testified that her “bloody lip and some redness around her
neck and chest area” are injuries “consistent with an assault.” He also testified that
Complainant had complained she had been punched in the chest and it was his

                                          3
“testimony that [Complainant] . . . was hit in the face in the lips.”

      The police located Appellant quickly and Officer Saenz interviewed him
about 30 to 45 minutes after the alleged assault occurred. Appellant admitted to
Officer Saenz that he and Complainant had an argument over gas money, that
Complainant’s son tried to intervene in the argument, and that Appellant “plac[ed]
his hands on [Complainant] to hold her down.” But Appellant denied striking
Complainant in the face.

      Officer Saenz also testified that, “as part of [his] investigation[,] . . . there
[is] a database that law enforcement has access to both throughout the state or
nationwide that helps provide law enforcement with different identifying
information of individuals, whether it be their name, date of birth, things like that.”
He testified that, in addition to the name and date of birth, the database contains
individuals’ identifying information like “any government-issued IDs, such as
driver’s licenses or just ID cards. If they have an FBI number, that’ll be entered,
Social Security numbers, if they have any identifying marks such as tattoos, scars,
any aliases.” He stated that he ran Appellant’s “name through that nationwide or
statewide database” which showed Appellant’s “official date of birth,” his “full
name” as Charles Earl Martin, and his State ID number (TX06392940); “[h]is
height was listed as 6'1,” and “[h]is weight was listed at 235” pounds.

      Defense counsel called Appellant’s sister as a witness but only elicited
testimony that she had known Complainant for 15 to 20 years and that she had seen
Complainant become upset on “a couple” occasions. The defense also called
Complainant’s teenage son to the stand, but he refused to answer any questions.

      After hearing the evidence presented, the jury found Appellant guilty of the
third degree felony “offense of ASSAULT FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD MEMBER
WITH PREVIOUS CONVICTION, as alleged in the indictment.”                    Appellant
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elected to have the trial court assess his punishment. During the punishment phase,
the State offered and the trial court admitted documents relating to Appellant’s
criminal history, including several charging documents, plea paperwork, judgments
granting/revoking probation, and judgments of conviction for prior offenses
Appellant committed between 2000 and 2021. Appellant did not present any
mitigating evidence. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 years’ confinement.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                     ANALYSIS

      On appeal, Appellant challenges in four issues the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction and the admission of numerous pieces of
evidence. We begin by addressing Appellant’s sufficiency challenges.

I.    Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his first and second issues, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient
to prove that he (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Complainant
bodily injury; and (2) is the same person who had been convicted of a prior assault
offense against a member of his family or household.

       A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Ramjattansingh v. State,
548 S.W.3d 540, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “‘This familiar standard gives full
play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts.’” Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                             5
2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Therefore, the jury is the sole judge of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be assigned to their testimonies, and
we do not usurp this role by substituting our judgment for that of the jury.
Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).                 When
considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must keep in mind that a jury
may choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of the evidence presented.
Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.

      “Our review of ‘all of the evidence’ includes evidence that was properly and
improperly admitted.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing a
defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient to establish
guilt. Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). While the
factfinder may not base its decision on mere speculation or unsupported inferences,
it may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at
655. The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, and therefore a jury’s
verdict is not irrational, if “the inferences necessary to establish guilt are
reasonable based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in
the light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. at 655-56 (quoting Wise v. State, 364
S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). When the record supports contradicting
inferences, we must presume the factfinder resolved any such conflicts in favor of
the verdict and defer to that determination, even if not explicitly stated in the
record. See id. at 656; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622; Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d
341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

      We assess a sufficiency challenge against the elements of the charged crime.
See Ramjattansingh, 548 S.W.3d at 546. The Court of Criminal Appeals “set forth
the modern Texas standard” for ascertaining what the elements of the charged

                                         6
crime are in Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en
banc). Id. To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the elements of the crime as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case to the evidence
adduced at trial. See Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014);
Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.

      As applicable in this case, Appellant was charged with felony assault
causing bodily injury, which was elevated from a Class A misdemeanor to a third
degree felony based on (1) Complainant being a member of Appellant’s household
or a person with whom Appellant has or has had a dating relationship; and (2)
Appellant’s prior conviction for assault against a member of his family or
household.    See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A).             Section
22.01(b)(2) provides that a person commits a third degree felony if he:           (1)
commits bodily injury assault against “a person whose relationship to or
association with the defendant is described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or
71.005, Family Code” — meaning a family member, a member of the defendant’s
household, or a person with whom the defendant has or has had a dating
relationship; and (2) the State proves that the defendant has a previous conviction
for one of several enumerated types of offenses, including assaultive offenses,
against a person with whom the defendant has or has had a dating relationship, a
family member, or a member of the defendant’s household. Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A).
Because Appellant has not challenged whether Complainant was a member of his
household, a family member, or a person with whom he had a dating relationship,
we do not address that statutory element in our analysis below.

       B.    Bodily Injury

      In his first issue, Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove that

                                         7
he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused Complainant bodily injury
because she testified that (1) “Appellant had ‘big faced’ her,” but she did not
“clearly describe in words what that phrase actually meant, and/or whether being
‘big faced’ amounted to an assault;” and (2) Appellant caused redness on her chest
and her bloody lip, but the State failed to inquire how “Appellant caused those
conditions to occur, and whether that cause amounted to an assault.”

      The Penal Code defines bodily injury as physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition. Id. § 1.07(a)(8). This definition is purposefully
broad and seems to encompass even relatively minor physical contacts so long as
they constitute more than mere offensive touching. Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785,
786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); see also Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512,
524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to
establish bodily injury.” Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012).

      Further, a factfinder may infer that a victim actually suffered physical pain,
and no witness — including the victim — need testify that the victim felt pain.
Coleman v. State, 631 S.W.3d 744, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021,
pet. ref’d); see also Aguilar v. State, 263 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d); Arzaga v. State, 86 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2002, no pet.).    A factfinder is “free to ‘use common sense and apply
common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in the ordinary affairs of
life when giving effect to the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the
evidence.’” Aguilar, 263 S.W.3d at 434 (quoting Taylor v. State, 71 S.W.3d 792,
795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)). Thus, a “fact finder may infer that
a victim actually felt or suffered physical pain because people of common
intelligence understand pain and some of the natural causes of it.” Garcia, 367

                                         8
S.W.3d. at 688. This includes inferring physical pain from an altercation itself
even without direct evidence. Coleman, 631 S.W.3d at 751; Aguilar, 263 S.W.3d
at 434.

      Although Complainant was a reluctant witness, she nonetheless testified that
she and Appellant were in “a tussle” during which she sustained a bloody lip and
redness on her chest. She testified that Appellant “held me down and big faced me
with his hands (indicating).”       To show what she meant by “big faced,”
Complainant made “a motion in front of [he]r face” and stated: “I guess when
somebody, you know, push you out the way that way.” She testified that the
altercation “started off [by] pushing each other,” but she unequivocally stated that
Appellant “gave the first strike” to her face. Complainant admitted that during the
altercation, Appellant caused her bloody lip and the redness on her chest. She
affirmed that she was “absolutely sure that” Appellant “caused that” redness.

      The jury also saw photos taken by police after the altercation which showed
Complainant having a bloody lip, “dry blood all around [her] mouth,” and redness
on her chest.    Complainant confirmed that the photos “fairly and accurately
represent what [she] looked like the night that the police came and responded” to
her 9-1-1 call. Further, the jury heard the audiotape of Complainant’s 9-1-1 call, in
which she can be heard asking for police to be sent to her home because her
boyfriend, Appellant, “was pushing on me and fighting on me.”

      Officer Saenz also testified that, when he saw Complainant after the
altercation, she had a bloody lip and “the injuries on [her] appear[ed] consistent
with her allegations of what had happened.” He testified that her “bloody lip and
some redness around her neck and chest area” are injuries “consistent with an
assault.” He also stated that Complainant had complained she had been punched in
the chest and it was his “testimony that [Complainant] . . . was hit in the face in the

                                          9
lips.”

         Based on the evidence in the record and considering that the jury was the
sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and was free to apply common
knowledge and life experience when giving effect to the evidence and inferences
that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we conclude the jury reasonably
could have determined that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
caused Complainant bodily injury by hitting her in the face and punching her in the
chest.

         Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s first issue.

         C.    Prior Conviction

         In his second issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove
that he is the same person who had been convicted of a prior assault offense
against a member of his family or household “as described in the initial charging
paragraph of the Indictment.”

         As we stated above, a person commits a third degree felony assault if he: (1)
commits bodily injury assault against a person with whom the defendant has or has
had a dating relationship, a family member, or a member of the defendant’s
household; and (2) the State proves that the defendant has a previous conviction for
one of several offenses, including assaultive offenses, against a family member, a
member of the defendant’s household, or a person with whom the defendant has or
has had a dating relationship. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A).

         To establish that a defendant has been convicted of a prior offense, the State
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a prior conviction exists and the
defendant is linked to that conviction. Henry v. State, 509 S.W.3d 915, 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016); Flowers v. State, 220 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).

                                           10
No specific document or mode of proof is required to establish these two elements.
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Nor is there a “best
evidence” rule in Texas that requires a prior conviction be proven with any
document, much less any specific document. Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921. Any
type of evidence, documentary or testimonial, may suffice. See id. at 922.

       Although the State may establish the existence of a prior conviction by
admitting certified copies of the judgment, they are not normally sufficient
standing alone to link the defendant to the prior conviction, even if the name on the
judgment and sentence matched that of the defendant in trial. See Beck v. State,
719 S.W.2d 205, 209-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); Paschall v. State, 285
S.W.3d 166, 174-75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Henry, 509
S.W.3d at 919. Thus, the State has the burden of proving the link by putting forth
independent evidence showing that the defendant is the same person named in the
previous convictions. See Beck, 719 S.W.2d at 210; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at
920.

       Typically, this link is proven by admitting certified copies of a judgment and
sentence and authenticated copies of the Texas Department of Corrections records,
including fingerprints, supported by expert testimony identifying the prints as
identical to known prints of the defendant. Paschall, 285 S.W.3d at 174-75; see
Littles v. State, 726 S.W.2d 26, 31-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc, op. on
reh’g). While this may be the preferred and most convenient way to establish a
prior conviction and link it to the defendant, the State may prove these elements in
a number of different ways, including the defendant’s admission or stipulation or
testimony by a person who was present when the defendant was convicted of the
specified crime and can identify the defendant as that person. See Henry, 509
S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 921-22. Acceptable evidence also includes

                                         11
documentary proof which contains sufficient information to establish that a prior
conviction exists and the defendant’s identity as the person convicted, such as a
record that contains photographs or a detailed physical description of a named
person and the accused was present in court for the factfinder to compare his
appearance with that person described in the record. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at
918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 922; Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31-32; see also Dorsett v.
State, 396 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).

      Regardless of the type of evidentiary puzzle pieces the State offers to prove
the existence of a prior conviction and its link to a defendant, the factfinder
determines if these pieces fit together sufficiently to complete the puzzle. Flowers,
220 S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. The factfinder considers
the totality of the admitted evidence to determine whether there was a previous
conviction and whether the defendant was the person convicted. Flowers, 220
S.W.3d at 923; see also Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 919. “If these two elements can be
found beyond a reasonable doubt, then the various pieces used to complete the
puzzle are necessarily legally sufficient to prove a prior conviction.” Flowers, 220
S.W.3d at 923.

       Here, the State alleged in its indictment that Appellant had a prior
conviction for family violence assault from January 23, 2012, in the 272nd District
Court of Brazos County, Texas, in cause number 12-00282-CRF-272. The State
introduced and the trial court admitted without objection State’s exhibit 22, which
is a certified copy of a judgment of conviction for family violence assault against
Charles Martin in cause number 12-00282-CRF-272 from the 272nd District Court
of Brazos County signed on January 23, 2012. Appellant contends that State’s
exhibit 22 constitutes insufficient evidence to prove he had a prior conviction for
family violence assault as required for a third degree felony offense in this case

                                         12
because the State (1) failed to connect Appellant to the judgment “by the
customary use of an expert fingerprint analyst, even though there does appear to be
legible fingerprints on two separate pages associated with the document;” and (2)
attempted to link Appellant to the judgment by referencing a state identification
number (“State ID”) when the State ID which appears on the judgment “has not
itself been proven to be connected to Appellant.” We disagree.

      At trial, Officer Saenz testified that law enforcement has access to a state or
nationwide database “that helps provide law enforcement with different identifying
information of individuals,” such as their name, date of birth, government-issued
IDs, FBI number (if they have one), Social Security number as well as “any
identifying marks such as tattoos, scars, any aliases.”      He stated that he ran
Appellant’s “name through that nationwide or statewide database” which identified
Appellant’s “official date of birth” as “8/21/1980” and his “full name” as Charles
Earl Martin. Appellant also had the following State ID: TX06392940. Officer
Saenz testified that the database further identified Appellant by his height and
weight; “[h]is height was listed as 6'1,” and “[h]is weight was listed at 235”
pounds.    The jury had the opportunity to observe Appellant during trial to
determine whether Appellant matched the height and weight listed in the database
for him.

      State’s exhibit 22 — the certified copy of the January 23, 2012 judgment of
conviction for family violence assault in cause number 12-00282-CRF-272 from
the 272nd District Court of Brazoria County — identifies Appellant on the first
page by the name Charles Martin and by State ID TX06392940. This is the same
number that Officer Saenz found searching the database for Appellant’s identifiers.
The third page of the document, styled the State of Texas v. Charles Earl Martin in
cause number 12-00282-CRF-272 in the 272nd District Court of Brazoria County,

                                         13
contains a right thumbprint and the signature of Charles Martin.            Further,
Appellant’s indictment in this case identifies him by his date of birth of August 21,
1980, and his full name Charles Earl Martin, which are identical to the identifiers
Officer Saenz found for Appellant in the state/nationwide database.

      Based on Appellant’s specific State ID, name, date of birth, and personal
descriptors, we find that the totality of the State’s evidence shows Appellant was
linked to the prior conviction for family violence assault of January 23, 2012 in
cause number 12-00282-CRF-272 as alleged in the indictment. See Ex Parte
Warren, 353 S.W.3d 490, 494-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (finding sufficient link
that defendant was convicted of prior offenses; stating that “[m]ost importantly,
both documents contain the same FBI number,” which “is a ‘unique identifier’ that
cannot be assigned to another person and is reliable in identifying an individual in
criminal investigations”); Gonzales v. State, Nos. 05-19-00719-CR, 05-19-00724-
CR, 05-19-00726-CR, 05-19-00727-CR, 05-19-00731-CR, 05-19-00733-CR, 05-
19-00734-CR, 05-19-00750-CR, 2020 WL 1672554, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Apr. 6, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Harvey testified
that the SID number assigned to a person is ‘very unique.’ Harvey’s testimony and
the exhibits from appellant’s other convictions showed appellant’s State ID
number was TX06364381, and the judgment and sentence in State’s Exhibit 17
states the State ID number for the person convicted in that case was TX06364381.
This was sufficient evidence to link appellant to the judgment and sentence in
State’s Exhibit 17.”); see also Dorsett, 396 S.W.2d at 116 (finding sufficient
evidence to link defendant to prior conviction when jury had the opportunity to
observe defendant and determine by comparison with the description in the record
— date of birth, race, hair and eye color, weight, and height — whether he is the
same person previously convicted); but see Schroeder v. State, Nos. 13-13-00379-

                                         14
CR & 13-13-00380-CR, 2015 WL 1632309, at *9-10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
Apr. 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding evidence
is insufficient to link defendant to the convictions in her name because none of the
documents in the exhibits contained any identifying characteristics that match
those of defendant other than her first and last name); Hensley v. State, No. 02-13-
00190-CR, 2014 WL 1999307, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 15, 2014, no
pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding evidence is
insufficient to link defendant to the convictions in the exhibits because the exhibits
contained no “identifiable information, such as photographs, fingerprints, or a
physical description, that could be used to link Hensley to the judgments”).

      Therefore, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish
that Appellant previously had been convicted of family violence assault. We
overrule Appellant’s second issue.

II.   Admission of Evidence

      In his third and fourth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by
(1) allowing the State to introduce several judgments and other related documents
in the punishment phase of trial; and (2) admitting an audiotape of a 9-1-1 call
during the guilt-innocence phase of trial over Appellant’s hearsay objection.

      A.     Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Colone v. State, 573 S.W.3d 249, 263-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019);
Gutierrez v. State, 585 S.W.3d 599, 615 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019,
no pet.). If the trial court’s ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement,
we should not disturb the ruling. Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). We will uphold the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the

                                         15
record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Willover v. State,
70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Roderick v. State, 494 S.W.3d 868,
874 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

       B.     Extraneous Offenses

       Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court erred by allowing the
State to introduce several judgments and other related documents in the
punishment phase “purporting to show that Appellant committed prior extraneous
offenses, without the State proving that Appellant was the same person named in
said documents.”

              1.      Error

       Appellant complains that the trial court admitted State’s exhibits 21, 24, 26,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, and 43, which represent documentary
evidence of charging documents, plea paperwork, judgments granting and revoking
community supervision, and several judgments of conviction for offenses
Appellant committed between 2000 and 2020. Appellant claims that he objected to
the admission of “these exhibits on the basis that a finger-print match by the
fingerprint analyst, Officer Neuendorff, could not be confirmed,” and the State
offered no other evidence linking him to the documents.1

       During the punishment phase, the State may offer evidence as to any matter
the trial court deems relevant to sentencing, including evidence of an extraneous
offense or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have been
committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1).                  Evidence is relevant to

       1
         Officer Neuendorff testified as a fingerprint analysis expert. He also took Appellant’s
fingerprints during the punishment phase of trial. The card with Appellant’s fingerprints was
admitted without objection as State’s exhibit 41.

                                              16
sentencing if the evidence is “helpful to the [factfinder] in determining the
appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case.” Rodriguez v.
State, 203 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      The State admits that “in order for the exhibits offered by the state to be
relevant to sentencing, they must be sufficiently linked to Appellant.” Therefore,
we turn to determining whether the numerous exhibits admitted by the trial court
are sufficiently linked to Appellant. We find that the authorities we discussed in
our analysis of issue two are equally applicable to the resolution of Appellant’s
third issue. Accordingly, acceptable evidence to link Appellant to the State’s
exhibits includes documentary proof, such as a record that contains photographs or
a detailed physical description of a named person and the accused was present in
court for the factfinder to compare his appearance with that person described in the
record. See Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918; Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 922; Littles, 726
S.W.2d at 31-32; Dorsett, 396 S.W.2d at 116. Acceptable evidence may also
include defendant’s specific state identification number. See Ex Parte Warren, 353
S.W.3d at 494-95; Gonzales, 2020 WL 1672554, at *3.

      We begin with State’s exhibit 21, which contains an October 2, 2006
judgment from Brazos County for family violence assault granting Appellant
community supervision in cause number 06-03946-CRM-CCL2 together with
accompanying community supervision paperwork. The documents are linked to
Appellant by his full name, specific State ID TX06392940, and signature which
matches the signature on the fingerprint card Appellant signed when his
fingerprints were taken during the punishment phase of trial and admitted without
objection as State’s exhibit 41 (hereinafter, the “fingerprint card”).

      State’s exhibit 24 contains charging documents (complaint and information)
filed in Brazos County in cause number 06-03946-CRM-CCL2 on August 2, 2006,

                                          17
for the same family violence assault offense as in State’s exhibit 21.                      The
documents are linked to Appellant by his full name, date of birth, height, weight,
race, sex, hair color, and eye color.

      State’s exhibit 26 contains Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”)
records for Appellant, consisting of Appellant’s mug shots, an April 2, 2015
judgment of conviction for family violence assault with a previous conviction from
Washington County in cause number 16,554, and an April 2, 2015 judgment of
conviction for “assault family violence enhanced” from Washington County in
cause number 16,855. Appellant is linked to the documents by his full name,
specific State ID TX06392940, and photographs. Additionally, the two judgments
in State’s exhibit 26 are the exact same judgments contained in State’s exhibits 27
and 28, which were admitted without objection2 and reflect Appellant’s full name
and specific State ID TX06392940.

      State’s exhibit 29 contains charging documents (complaint and information)
filed in Brazos County in cause number 20-00012-CRM on January 2, 2020, for an
unlawful restraint that occurred in December 2019. Appellant is linked to the
documents by his full name, date of birth, height, weight, race, sex, hair color, and
eye color.

      State’s exhibit 30 is a March 1, 2021 judgment and sentence in cause
number 20-00012-CRM from Brazos County for unlawful restraint that occurred in
December 2019. Appellant is linked to the document by his name and through
State’s exhibit 29 which contains Appellant’s name, the same cause number and
court, and the date of the unlawful restraint offense.

      State’s exhibit 31 is a March 5, 2020 indictment from Brazos County in
      2
          Appellant does not challenge admission of State’s exhibits 27 and 28 on appeal.

                                                18
cause number 20-01065-CRF-361 against Appellant for family violence assault
with a previous conviction for family violence assault enhanced to a second degree
felony because of a prior conviction for family violence assault. Appellant is
linked to the document by his name, specific State ID TX06392940, date of birth,
height, weight, race, sex, eye color, and hair color.

      State’s exhibit 32 is a March 2, 2021 judgment of conviction from Brazos
County in cause number 20-01065-CRF-361 against Appellant for the second
degree felony offense of family violence assault with a previous conviction and an
agreement to a lifetime protective order. It shows that the trial court assessed a
seven-year sentence against Appellant in the same county and cause number as in
State’s exhibit 31. Appellant is linked to the document by his name and specific
State ID TX06392940. Moreover, Appellant admitted during his closing argument
that he was “currently serving a sentence from Brazos County for an amount of
seven years.”

      State’s exhibit 42 is a May 23, 2013 indictment against Appellant for the
third degree felony offense of family violence assault with a previous conviction
from Washington County in cause number 16,554. Appellant is linked to the
document by his full name, date of birth, sex, and race. This exhibit is also
connected to the April 2, 2015 judgment of conviction for family violence assault
with a previous conviction from Washington County in cause number 16,554,
which was admitted without objection as State’s exhibit 27 and reflects Appellant’s
full name and specific State ID TX06392940.

      State’s exhibit 43 is a February 13, 2014 indictment against Appellant for
the third degree felony offense of “assault family violence enhanced” from
Washington County in cause number 16,855. Appellant is linked to the document
by his full name, date of birth, sex, and race. The exhibit is also connected to the

                                          19
April 2, 2015 judgment of conviction for “assault family violence enhanced” from
Washington County in cause number 16,855, which was admitted without
objection as State’s exhibit 28 and reflects Appellant’s full name and specific State
ID TX06392940.

      Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, we find that the documents in State’s
exhibits 21, 24, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, and 43 are linked to
Appellant “proving that Appellant was the same person named in said documents”
because they contained sufficient identifiers, like Appellant’s specific State ID,
name, date of birth, and personal descriptors, for the trial court to consider. See
Henry, 509 S.W.3d at 918 (State may establish a prior conviction and link it to
defendant by documentary proof, such as a record that contains photographs or a
detailed physical description of a named person and the accused was present in
court for the factfinder to compare his appearance with that person described in the
record); Flowers, 220 S.W.3d at 922 (same); Littles, 726 S.W.2d at 31-32 (same);
Dorsett, 396 S.W.2d at 116 (same); Ex Parte Warren, 353 S.W.3d at 494-95
(finding sufficient link that defendant was convicted of prior offenses because
“both documents contain the same FBI number,” which is considered a person’s
unique identifier); Gonzales, 2020 WL 1672554, at *3 (finding sufficient link that
defendant was convicted of prior offense because exhibits from defendant’s other
convictions showed his unique State ID). Therefore, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting State’s exhibits 21, 24, 26, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, and 43.

      However, it is questionable whether State’s exhibits 33, 36, 37, and 38 are
sufficiently linked to Appellant to prove that he is the same person named in the
documents contained in these exhibits.         State’s exhibit 33 contains charging
documents filed against Appellant for deadly conduct in Washington County in

                                          20
cause number 00-77 on February 15, 2000. It also contains an April 6, 2000
judgment of conviction for the reduced charge of a class C misdemeanor assault
associated with the charge from Washington County in cause number 00-87.

      State’s exhibit 36 contains charging documents filed against Appellant for
possession of a prohibited weapon (a switchblade) in Washington County in cause
number 07-277 as well as plea paperwork, a judgment and sentence of community
supervision for the possession of a prohibited weapon charge, a motion to revoke
probation, and a revocation order.

      State’s exhibit 37 contains charging documents filed in Washington County
in cause number 08-664 against Appellant for assault on August 18, 2008. It also
contains a motion to dismiss the charged offense because the offense was “taken
into consideration under Texas Penal Code 12.45 in [cause number] 08-728.”

      State’s exhibit 38 contains charging documents filed against Appellant for
possession of a dangerous drug in Washington County in cause number 08-728 on
September 2, 2008.     It also contains plea paperwork and a March 25, 2009
judgment of conviction against Appellant for the charged offense in cause number
08-728.

      The documents in these exhibits show only Appellant’s name and signature;
there are no other identifiers or descriptors linking Appellant to the documents.
We have not found, and the State has not cited, any authorities that have stated that
a document showing only a defendant’s name and signature is sufficient to support
finding a link. But assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting State’s exhibits 33, 36, 37, and 38, we conclude that
Appellant was not harmed by the alleged trial court error as we discuss below.

             2.    Harm

                                         21
      We review the erroneous admission of evidence for non-constitutional error
and reverse only if the appellant shows the erroneous admission affected his
substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253,
280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Rodriguez v. State, 546 S.W.3d 843, 864-65
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). A substantial right is affected
when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
factfinder’s verdict. Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 280; see also Torres v. State, 424
S.W.3d 245, 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). But if the
improperly admitted evidence did not influence the factfinder or had but a slight
effect upon its deliberations, such non-constitutional error is harmless. Coble, 330
S.W.3d at 280; Torres, 424 S.W.3d at 260.

      In performing this analysis, we examine the entire record and calculate, as
much as possible, the probable impact of the error upon the rest of the evidence.
Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 280; Torres, 424 S.W.3d at 260. We consider any testimony
or physical evidence admitted for the factfinder’s consideration, the nature of the
evidence supporting the factfinder’s decision, the character of the alleged error,
and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case.
Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

      Appellant argues he was harmed by the admission of State’s exhibits 21, 24,
26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, and 43 because the trial court (1)
sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement “which is the maximum amount
allowed by law within the punishment range of a second degree felony;” and (2)
stacked his sentence with that of another sentence he was serving from an
unrelated conviction, and a “stacked sentence is rarely pronounced.”           After
reviewing the record, we conclude that any error in the admission of State’s
exhibits did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights.

                                          22
      Here, only four of the fourteen challenged exhibits were not properly
admitted — exhibits 33, 36, 37, and 38 — which contain a 2008 dismissed assault
charge and judgments of conviction for assault in 2000, possession of a deadly
weapon in 2007, and possession of a dangerous drug in 2008.

      In contrast, the other ten exhibits Appellant challenged were properly
admitted and relevant to the assessment of Appellant’s punishment. These exhibits
included several charging documents and judgments of conviction for family
violence assault in 2006, family violence assault with a previous conviction in
2015, family violence assault enhanced in 2015, unlawful restraint in 2021, and
second degree felony family violence assault with a previous conviction and an
agreement to a protective order in 2021. These properly admitted exhibits were
especially relevant for the trial court to consider in sentencing Appellant in this
case because they showed Appellant’s numerous charges and convictions for
family violence assault.

      Further, the trial court admitted State’s exhibits 25, 27, 28, 34, 35, and 40
without objection into evidence.          These exhibits contained, among other
documents, two 2002 judgments of convictions for criminal trespass (exhibits 34 &
35), a 2018 judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance
(exhibit 40), a 2012 indictment for family violence assault with a previous
conviction (exhibit 25), family violence assault with a previous conviction in 2015
(exhibit 27), and family violence assault enhanced in 2015 (exhibit 28).3

      Additionally, no witness testified on Appellant’s behalf nor was there any
mitigating or redeeming evidence offered by Appellant.            Although Appellant
claims that a “stacked sentence is rarely pronounced,” he cites no authority to

      3
         State’s exhibits 27 and 28 contain the same judgments of conviction admitted and
enclosed in exhibit 26.

                                           23
support the veracity of his assertion. The trial court easily could have seen a
pattern of criminal behavior spanning over two decades, but even more
importantly, the trial court could have considered the numerous family violence
assault convictions.

      Based on our examination of the entire record, including the testimonies of
Complainant and Officer Saenz, the lack of any mitigating or favorable evidence,
the numerous properly admitted and unchallenged exhibits showing a lengthy
criminal history and several convictions for the same offense as the one the jury
found Appellant guilty of in this case, we cannot conclude that the admission of
State’s exhibits 33, 36, 37, and 38 had a substantial and injurious effect on the trial
court’s decision in assessing Appellant’s punishment or had any more than a slight
effect on it. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s third issue.

      C.     Hearsay

      In his fourth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted
an audiotape of Complainant’s 9-1-1 call. In that regard, Appellant argues that the
audiotape constitutes inadmissible hearsay because it does not fall within the
excited utterance or present sense exceptions as “[t]here was no indication from the
tone of [Complainant]’s voice on the recording that [she] was in any significant
distress or emotionally affected state at the time of the call . . . [n]or was the call
contemporaneous with the alleged event.”

      Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Tex. R. Evid. 801(d). In order for hearsay to be admissible, it must fit into an
exception provided by a statute or the Rules of Evidence. Zuliani v. State, 97
S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see Tex. R. Evid. 802. Rule 803(1)
provides an exception for a present sense impression, and Rule 803(2) provides an
                                          24
exception for an excited utterance. Tex. R. Evid. 803(1), (2).

      A present sense impression is a statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
immediately thereafter. Id. 803(1). Under this exception, “the contemporaneity of
the statement with the event that it describes eliminates all danger of faulty
memory and virtually all danger of insincerity.” Fischer v. State, 252 S.W.3d 375,
379 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The exception “is predicated on the notion that ‘the
utterance is a reflex product of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by
retrospective mental processes.’” Id. at 381. The risk of falsehood is minimized
because the statement is instinctive and not deliberate. See id. at 381.

      There is no bright-line rule as to when a lapse of time becomes too long for a
statement to be considered “immediately after” a declarant perceived the event.
Valmana v. State, 605 S.W.3d 490, 507-08 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. ref’d);
Castillo v. State, 517 S.W.3d 363, 378 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, pet. ref’d); see
also Kubin v. State, 868 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993,
pet. ref’d). The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that for a statement to
fall under the present sense impression exception, it must have been made “before
any thoughts of litigation have crystallized” and “without any reflection, thought
process, or motive to fabricate or exaggerate.” Fischer, 252 S.W.3d at 379.

      Here, Complainant called 9-1-1 to ask for police to be sent to her home
because her boyfriend, Appellant, “was pushing on me and fighting on me.”
Complainant stated that Appellant had driven off “not even a minute — two
minute[s] ago.” This evidence supports a finding that Complainant made her
statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher immediately after the assault happened.
Appellant also acknowledged in his brief that the recording was “made shortly
after the event.”

                                          25
      We conclude that the trial court reasonably could have determined that
Complainant’s call occurred immediately after the assault and that there was little
opportunity for Complainant to make a calculated misstatement of the event that
occurred so that the contemporaneous requirement of rule 803(1) was met. See
Kubin, 868 S.W.2d at 396-97 (finding that declarant’s statement made within four
to six minutes after the event met the contemporaneous requirement of rule 803(1)
and that trial court acted within its discretion admitting the statement as a present
sense impression); Harris v. State, 736 S.W.2d 166, 167 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1987, no pet.) (finding that the passage of 30 minutes was not too long
to qualify the declarant’s statement as a present sense impression). Therefore, it
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit the audiotape as a present
sense impression of Complainant.

      Appellant also contends that the audiotape was not admissible as an excited
utterance because it does not show that Complainant “was in any significant
distress or emotionally affected state at the time of the call” and, thus, she was not
excited at the time she made the statements.           However, because we have
determined that the audiotape was admissible as a present sense impression, we
need not address Appellant’s argument that the audiotape was inadmissible as an
excited utterance. We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Appellant’s four issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

                                         26
                                      /s/    Meagan Hassan
                                             Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

                                        27