Court Opinion

ID: 73548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-26 08:11:22+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:04.920658
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                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

                           -------------------------------------------              FILED
                                        No. 97-6998                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                          ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                                                                               03/11/99
                           --------------------------------------------
                            D. C. Docket No. 95-A-1035-N                   THOMAS K. KAHN
                                                                                CLERK

ROBERT LEE TARVER, JR.,

                                                              Petitioner-Appellant,

     versus

JOE S. HOPPER, Commissioner,
Alabama Department of Corrections,
BILL PRYOR, The Attorney General of
the State of Alabama,

                                                              Respondents-Appellees.

                 ----------------------------------------------------------------

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama

                 ----------------------------------------------------------------
                                     (March 11, 1999)

Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and COX, Circuit Judges.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:
   Robert Lee Tarver, Jr., using 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenges his death sentence.            We

affirm the district court’s denial of relief.

                BACKGROUND

   Tarver,     in   1985,   was   convicted      of

murdering Hugh Kite, the owner of Kite’s

Store.   The   State   proved     at   trial   that

Tarver shot Kite three times behind the

store and stole Kite’s wallet. See Tarver v.

                        2
State, 500 So.2d 1232, 1235-36, 1239-41 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1986).

   The    district   court   found     that,   in

preparation for Tarver’s trial, Tarver’s

lawyers    “made     a   deliberate    strategic

decision to concentrate on preparing for

the guilt phase of the Petitioner’s trial

based on his assessment of the likelihood of

an acquittal [and] that the trial counsel

dedicated      substantial            time     to

interviewing         numerous     community

members and relatives of the Petitioner,
                         3
not    only    in    an    attempt     to   discover

evidence of the Petitioner’s innocence, but

also in an attempt to prepare for the

sentencing phase.” The district court added

“that there was substantial overlap in the

trial counsel’s preparation for the guilt

and sentencing phases of the trial.”

     The parties continue to dispute whether,

at    the     time    of    Tarver’s    trial,    the

prosecution         had    an   agreement        with

Tarver’s       associate,       Richardson,      for

favorable      treatment        in     return    for
                            4
Richardson’s testimony.               The state courts

and the district court rejected Tarver’s

claim(s) based on this alleged agreement.

   The    jury      found          Tarver      guilty     and

recommended          life   without         parole.        The

Alabama trial court judge overrode the

jury’s    recommendation                 and     sentenced

Tarver to death.

   In     1986,    the   Supreme          Court       decided

Batson     v.     Kentucky,        476    U.S.   79     (1986).

About a month after the Supreme Court

decided   Batson,        the       Alabama       Court      of
                               5
Criminal    Appeals       affirmed   Tarver’s

sentence and conviction on direct appeal.

Tarver’s   petition   for    rehearing   was

denied, and the Alabama Supreme Court

denied relief. Four days after the Alabama

Supreme Court denied Tarver’s petition

for rehearing, the United States Supreme

Court decided Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S.

314 (1987), making Batson retroactive to

all cases on direct appeal when Batson was

decided.

                      6
   Later, Tarver sought state collateral

relief under Temporary Rule 20 (now, Rule

32)    of    the   Alabama       Rules   of    Criminal

Procedure and raised, for the first time, a

Batson claim. After taking testimony, the

Rule 20 judge rejected this claim and others,

but he set aside Tarver’s death sentence,

ruling       that    Tarver’s            counsel   was

ineffective during the penalty phase.               The

Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the

case    to    the   trial       court    for   written

findings of fact and conclusions of law.
                            7
The trial court then said that, but for the

procedural bar to the Batson claim, he also

would find a Batson violation in Tarver’s

trial. The trial court repeated its decision

on the ineffectiveness of Tarver’s counsel.

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

reversed   the     ineffectiveness    decision,

however, and ordered the trial court to

reinstate the death penalty. The Alabama

Supreme    Court    and    the   United   States

Supreme Court later denied discretionary

review.
                       8
   In 1995, Tarver filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus in federal district

court.      The    case     was    referred   to    a

Magistrate         Judge.         The    Magistrate

recommended denying Tarver’s petition,

and the District Judge agreed.

                   DISCUSSION

   On appeal, Tarver advances his Batson

claim,    raises   ineffective      assistance     of

counsel    claims,     and      argues    that     the
                            9
prosecution breached its duty under Giglio

v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). We will

address each of Tarver’s claims separately,

giving   facts   found        by   state   trial    and

appellate    courts      a         presumption           of

correctness,     as   required       by    28   U.S.C.    §

2254(d).    See Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d

1273, 1277 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998).

A.   The Batson Claim

                         10
      We review de novo Tarver’s claim that

his    Batson         claim     is     not    procedurally

defaulted.     See Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206,

210    (11th   Cir.    1993).        Tarver     makes   two

arguments why we should hear his Batson

claim.     First, he says the federalism and

comity concerns embodied by our respect

for state procedural default rules do not

apply in this context because Alabama

courts    could       review         Tarver’s   claim   for

plain error and because Alabama’s Rule 20

                                11
courts     had   an    opportunity       to   review

Tarver’s Batson claim.

   “[T]he mere existence of a ‘plain error’

rule   does      not   preclude    a     finding    of

procedural       default,”    however.     Julius   v.

Johnson, 840 F.2d 1533, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988).

Likewise, state post-conviction proceedings

do not preclude a finding of procedural

default.    Tarver’s argument would allow

federal review of procedurally defaulted

claims in every state with state post-

conviction       proceedings.       This   result   is
                             12
clearly against our precedent and practice.

See Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1311 (11th

Cir. 1998) (we cannot review procedurally-

defaulted claims absent a showing of “cause

and prejudice” or “actual innocence”).

   Second, Tarver says we should decide his

Batson claim because Alabama has not

consistently applied the procedural default

rule on Batson claims.         He relies on our

statement in Cochran v. Herring, 43 F.3d

1404, 1409 (11th Cir. 1995):   “Alabama courts

have not consistently applied a procedural
                        13
bar     to    Batson        claims   in    cases   like

Cochran’s.”      We think, however, that “cases

like    Cochran’s”     are        cases   where     the

defendant (like Cochran) made a Swain

                        1
objection at trial.          Cochran distinguished

Tarver, 629 So.2d at 18-19, on this ground.

See Cochran, 43 F.3d at 1409.             The Cochran

court’s       later   statement       that    Tarver

    1
       Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965),
was the predecessor to Batson.             To prove
a Swain violation, a defendant had to
show a systematic exclusion of blacks
from juries over time.            See id. at 223;
Love v. Jones, 923 F.2d 816, 819-20 (11th
Cir. 1991).
                             14
“suggest[s]” that the Alabama procedural

default   rule   is   applied     inconsistently

cannot sustain the weight Tarver places

upon it, in the light of the panel’s explicit

statement that “Alabama courts have not

consistently applied a procedural bar to

Batson claims asserted in state collateral

petitions where the defendant had raised a

Swain     objection   at     trial.”   Id.   More

important, the Cochran court was not

faced with a case where no Swain objection

was made at trial; and, therefore, they
                        15
could make no binding decision about such

a case. See New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe

County, 985 F.2d 1488, 1500 (11th Cir. 1993)

(Edmondson,       J.,   concurring),     cited    with

approval in Combs v. Plantation Patterns,

106 F.3d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir. 1997).

    We cannot say that Alabama courts

have been inconsistent in applying the

procedural     default     rule    to    cases,   like

Tarver’s, that is, where no Swain objection

was made at trial. Tarver cites to no case

(and   we   can    find    none)    in    which    an
                          16
Alabama court ignored the procedural bar

and decided a Batson claim when no Swain

                                     2
objection was made at trial.             Batson

claims   not   raised   at   trial   have   been

procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Ross v. State,

581 So.2d 495, 496 (Ala. 1991) (citing cases);

   2
    Tarver cites Watkins v. State, 632
So.2d 555 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), and cases
cited by Watkins, to say that “Alabama
courts have not strictly or consistently
applied the procedural default rule to
Batson claims.”    The pertinent cases are
distinguishable because they all involved
Batson claims raised on direct appeal,
and most involved plain error review.
                        17
Bonner v. State, 564 So.2d 99, 99 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1990).

   We also reject Tarver’s argument that

his case is like Morrison v. Jones, 952 F.

Supp. 729 (M.D. Ala. 1996), and Floyd v. State,

571 So.2d 1234 (Ala. 1990).   The petitioners

in Morrison and Floyd both raised Swain

objections at trial, dropped the claim on

appeal, but got a review on the merits of

their   Batson      claim.    Tarver   argues,

according to Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.

527 (1986), that the appellate defaults in
                        18
Morrison and Floyd are indistinguishable

from his default “at the trial level.”       But

Alabama can pick its own procedural rules

and has done so here.       For some reason

(like the chance for trial courts to cure

errors in the first instance) Alabama has

chosen to allow Swain claims defaulted on

appeal, but not those defaulted at trial, to

proceed to collateral review on the merits

if the case was on direct appeal when

Batson   was     decided.   Smith     does   not

command     --   as   Tarver   says    it    does
                       19
command -- that Alabama treat its trial

and appellate defaults the same.            Smith

requires that we treat trial and appellate

defaults equally, if Alabama does so.         We

cannot require Alabama to treat trial

and     appellate   defaults   the   same   when

                                       3
Alabama has not chosen to do so.

    3
     Tarver’s argument that Griffith v.
Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), allows him to
raise his Batson claim in post-
conviction proceedings is foreclosed by
Pitts v. Cook, 923 F.2d 1568, 1571 & n.3 (11th
Cir. 1991).   We decline his invitation to
“revisit” Pitts.
                        20
B.   The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Claims

     We       review    Tarver’s             ineffective

assistance of counsel claims de novo.                 See

Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th

Cir. 1998).

     Tarver argues that his trial counsel was

constitutionally ineffective for failing to

raise a Batson-type objection at trial. We

have      said,   however,        that   a   lawyer   who

failed to make a Batson challenge before
                             21
Batson     did   not    provide     ineffective

assistance of counsel.       See Pitts, 923 F.2d

at 1574; see also Poole v. United States, 832

F.2d 561, 565 (11th Cir. 1987).

   Tarver says three facts distinguish his

case from Pitts and Poole, but we disagree.

First, Tarver says his trial counsel knew of

“the systematic use by the prosecutor of

[per]emptories to exclude blacks from the

jury.”   Our examination of the record,

however, shows that Tarver’s trial counsel

never     said   that    blacks   were   struck
                        22
“routinely” because of their race alone.

During        state        collateral   proceedings,

Tarver’s      trial   counsel’s    testimony       was

that “on occasion,” when he had been a

prosecutor,           he     had    struck     black

                                               4
veniremembers based on race alone.

    4
     These facts distinguish Tarver’s case
from Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350 (11th
Cir. 1995).   In Jackson, the petitioner
introduced “overwhelming” evidence of a
Swain violation, including the
prosecutor’s testimony that there was
widespread and systematic misuse of
peremptory challenges by the state.           Id.
at 1359-60.
                             23
   Second, Tarver says his trial counsel

could   give   no   tactical   reason   for   his

failure to object to the discriminatory use

of peremptory challenges.       This argument

misses the point:     to be effective, Tarver’s

lawyer did not need a reason because he

was not obligated to have anticipated the

Batson decision.       See Pitts, 923 F.2d at

1573.    Tarver might complain that his

lawyer was unimaginative, but a lack of

creativity does not constitute ineffective

assistance.    See id. at 1574.   Futility also
                        24
justifies Tarver’s lawyer’s refusal to object

because no evidence in this case would have

                                  5
supported a Swain violation:          the only

valid objection available at that time. See

Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1152 (11th Cir.

1987); see also Reece v. United States, 119 F.3d

1462, 1465 (11th Cir. 1997) (lawyer’s failure to

   5
    For reasons explained elsewhere, we
are unpersuaded by the anecdotal
evidence of two defense lawyers (who had
practiced in Russell County) about the use
of Batson-type challenges and by the
practice of one prosecutor who struck
jurors for race alone “on occasion,” as
evidence of a Swain violation.
                       25
challenge kind of methamphetamine for

sentencing     was   not    prejudicial      when

evidence shows court used correct kind of

methamphetamine).

   Third, Tarver presents the testimony of

two   lawyers     that     lawyers      in    the

community were at the pertinent time

routinely raising Batson-type objections

at trial.   The Rule 20 court in this case,

however, found that making a Batson-type

challenge   before   Batson    was   “not     the

normal      generalized    practice.”        And,
                      26
Alabama courts have said that failure to

make a Batson challenge before Batson is

not ineffective. See Horsley v. State, 527

So.2d 1355, 1357-58 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).

     Tarver       says    his     trial      lawyer    was

constitutionally ineffective by failing to

prepare      adequately         for    the   sentencing

phase.    Tarver says his trial counsel should

have devoted more time to preparation

and      should    have      presented        additional

witnesses in the penalty phase of the trial.

We    think,      however,      that    Tarver’s      trial
                             27
lawyer provided the assistance of counsel

required by the Constitution.

   Tarver’s trial lawyer testified that he

consulted with a lawyer at the Southern

Poverty Law Center about how to proceed

with   Tarver’s     case        and   concluded    that

focusing    on     Tarver’s       acquittal   of    the

capital offense was the best approach to

defending Tarver.          He met with Tarver

almost     daily   from         the   time    he   was

appointed until the trial. And he testified

                           28
that   either   he,   his    co-counsel,    or   an

investigator interviewed every witness

Tarver    thought     would     be   helpful      as

mitigation witnesses, including Tarver’s

mother,    grandmother,          aunt,      cousin,

girlfriends,    former        employers,         and

members    of   the   community.           Tarver’s

lawyer said he presented every witness he

thought would be helpful. Tarver’s lawyer did

present the testimony of Tarver’s Uncle.

Tarver’s uncle said they were like brothers,

                        29
that Tarver was no troublemaker, and had

                      6
no criminal “bent.”            Tarver’s lawyer also

presented    an   expert         to   testify   about

Tarver’s successful polygraph test result, a

test in which Tarver denied killing Kite.

   Tarver’s     lawyer’s         preparation     for

sentencing was, at least, within the broad

range of reasonable performance we have

recognized in other cases. See, e.g., Waters

v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1995)

   6
    This testimony was substantially
refuted by Tarver’s criminal record.
                          30
(en   banc)     (holding        no   ineffectiveness

shown under the circumstances and saying

we “have held counsel’s performance to be

constitutionally        sufficient         when   no

mitigating        evidence            at    all   was

introduced”).    Dobbs v. Kemp, 790 F.2d 1499

(11th Cir. 1986) (no ineffective assistance

for   failure      to      present         mitigating

evidence because counsel feared damaging

counter evidence); Stanley v. Zant, 697

F.2d 955 (11th Cir. 1983) (no ineffective

                           31
assistance for talking only to defendant

and defendant’s mother and presenting

no   mitigating     evidence).      Tarver’s

lawyer’s effectiveness at the sentencing

stage is strongly evidenced by the jury’s

decision to recommend not death, but life

without parole.   We think Tarver’s trial

lawyer’s efforts toward sentencing are

constitutionally adequate.    See Burger v.

Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114, 3126 (1987) (lawyer not

required to investigate and present all

                      32
available     mitigating       evidence     to    be

reasonable).

      Tarver relies on the fact that Tarver’s

lawyer only spent four hours on Tarver’s

case     between       the    conviction         and

sentencing to argue that Tarver’s lawyer

did    not   adequately       prepare     for    the

sentencing stage.       Like the district court,

we believe this argument is “inaccurate

and misleading,” because of the overlap in

preparation      for    the    sentencing        and

                         33
guilt/innocence stages of the trial.             For

example, Tarver’s lawyer’s meeting with

the potential witnesses took place before

sentencing.

   The record shows that Tarver’s lawyer

tried to create sufficient residual doubt

about   Tarver’s    guilt      during   trial    and

sentencing    to   add,    in    reality,   another

mitigating factor to the jury’s sentencing

deliberations.      That        the   creation    of

lingering doubt was part of the strategy of

                          34
Tarver’s       lawyer    is    evidenced    by   the

polygraph          examiner’s     testimony      at

sentencing and Tarver’s lawyer’s closing

sentencing          argument.      The    polygraph

examiner testified that Tarver did not lie

when asked, in different ways, if he killed

               7
Hugh   Kite.         During    Tarver’s    lawyer’s

   7
    At the time of Tarver’s trial, how a
sentencing jury might consider residual
doubt about the defendant’s guilt had not
been directly addressed by Alabama
courts.   At any rate, Tarver’s lawyer was
not unreasonable to believe that the use
of evidence and argument linked to
lingering doubt was sound strategy.
Tarver’s trial judge accepted that
                          35
closing   argument      at   the   sentencing

hearing he said repeatedly that he did not

want to “challenge the verdict.”      But he --

without drawing objection -- added:

   I   would   hope   that   the   evidence

   presented both in the case-in-chief

   last week and anything that you

Tarver’s lawyer could present the
polygraph test results to the jury at
sentencing.
   The jury recommended against death.
Although in Alabama the judge is the
ultimate sentencer, the jury’s
recommendation must be considered; and
having the jury on the side of life is
bound to help a defendant some.
                       36
   have heard today might be sufficient

   to raise in your mind at least a

   shadow   of    a    doubt   about   the

   defendant’s guilt, and if that doubt

   exists in your mind, I would pray

   that you would resolve it in favor

   of the defendant.

   A   lawyer’s   time      and   effort     in

preparing to defend his client in the guilt

phase of a capital case continues to count

                       37
at      the   sentencing            phase.       Creating

lingering doubt has been recognized as an

effective strategy for avoiding the death

penalty.         We have written about it.               See,

e.g., Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 855-56

(11th     Cir.     1989).           In       addition,     a

comprehensive study on the opinions of

jurors in capital cases concluded:

          “Residual         doubt”        over      the

     defendant’s            guilt    is   the    most

     powerful        “mitigating”            fact.--[The

                               38
  study] suggests that the best thing a

  capital      defendant     can    do   to

  improve his chances of receiving a

  life sentence has nothing to do with

  mitigating         evidence      strictly

  speaking.     The best thing he can do,

  all else being equal, is to raise doubt

  about his guilt.

Stephen   P.   Garvey,     Aggravation    and

Mitigation in Capital Cases:         What do

                      39
Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1563

(1998) (footnotes omitted); see William S.

Geimer     &    Jonathan           Amsterdam,      Why

Jurors Vote Life or Death:                Operative

Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases,

15   Am.   J.   Crim.   L.    1,   28   (1988)   (“[t]he

existence of some degree of doubt about the

guilt of the accused was the most often

recurring explanatory factor in the life

recommendation cases studied.”); see also

Jennifer Treadway, Note, ‘Residual Doubt’

                         40
in Capital Sentencing:      No Doubt it is an

Appropriate Mitigating Factor, 43 Case W.

Res. L. Rev. 215 (1992).    Furthermore, the

American Law Institute, in a proposed

model penal code, similarly recognized the

importance       of   residual      doubt    in

sentencing by including residual doubt as a

mitigating circumstance.       So, the efforts

of   Tarver’s   lawyer,    during   trial   and

sentencing, to create doubt about Tarver’s

guilt may not only have represented an

                      41
adequate performance, but evidenced the

most effective performance in defense to

the death penalty.

   We   are   also   unpersuaded     by   the

admission     (during     state    collateral

proceedings) of Tarver’s lawyer that he had

not prepared adequately for sentencing.

See Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 960

(11th Cir. 1992) (admissions of deficient

performance are not significant).         As

noted by the Rule 20 court and the District

                     42
Court, Tarver’s lawyer’s decision to focus

on       an   acquittal     at      the   expense        of

sentencing       was   “a        deliberate       decision.”

State v. Tarver, 629 So.2d 14, 21 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1993) (quoting Tarver’s lawyer).                   The

decision to focus on acquittal of capital

                                              8
murder was not unreasonable.                        Despite

     8
      Tarver was indicted for committing
one capital offense:             a murder during a
robbery in the first degree, in violation
of Ala. Code. § 13A-5-40(a)(2).           To prove this
crime, the state had to prove two lesser
included offenses: murder, see id. § 13A-6-
2(a)(1), and robbery in the first degree,
see id. § 13A-8-41.   The jury could acquit on
murder or robbery in the first degree
                            43
overwhelming evidence that Tarver or his

associate, Richardson, actually killed Hugh

Kite, very little evidence made Tarver a

better candidate than Richardson to be

found to be the actual killer. See Tarver v.

and still convict Tarver of the
remaining lesser offense.      Tarver’s
lawyer tried to convince the jury that
Richardson, not Tarver, was the actual
killer.   If believed, Tarver would have been
acquitted of murder and, therefore,
murder during a robbery in the first
degree.    Tarver’s jury was told they had to
find that Tarver committed the killing.
They were not instructed that Tarver
could be found guilty if Richardson
committed the killing.
                       44
State, 500 So.2d 1232, 1235-41 (Ala. Crim.

App.   1986)   (describing     evidence   against

Tarver); see also Stewart, 877 F.2d at 855-

56     (lawyer’s     decision    to   focus   on

innocence, even when evidence of guilt

was great, rather than other forms of

mitigation         did   not     make     counsel

constitutionally ineffective).

C.   The Giglio Claim

                         45
    Tarver argues that, when he was tried,

a   plea   agreement     existed    between   his

associate, Richardson, and the prosecution.

The government’s failure to disclose that

agreement, says Tarver, violates Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).       Giglio

requires the government to disclose an

agreement between a witness and the

government       that   might   motivate      the

witness     to   testify.     See    Brown     v.

Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464-65 (11th Cir.

                        46
1986).    The district court found that no

agreement existed when Tarver was tried.

    Richardson’s       attorney,      Loftin,     has

testified   on   his    understanding        of   the

alleged   agreement:          “if   Mr.   Richardson

testified against Mr. Tarver . . . he would

receive some consideration for that in

that he would get a reduced sentence from

the standpoint of not pleading to murder

or capital murder.”

                         47
   In    contrast,    Davis,     the    district

attorney who prosecuted Richardson and

Tarver, testified that he told Loftin only

this: “any cooperation [Richardson] gave us

and if he told the truth in this matter

would be taken into consideration.” Davis

added   that    he   did   not    “reach     an

understanding with Mr. Loftin regarding

a favorable disposition of Mr. Richardson’s

indictment      in    exchange         for   his

testimony.”    In his own mind said Davis,

                      48
he believed that Richardson would not be

tried for capital murder if Richardson

testified for the prosecution; but he did not

say that to Loftin. Loftin could not recall

when he and Davis specifically agreed that

Richardson would plead guilty to robbery, but

Davis was certain the plea agreement was

decided after Tarver’s trial.

   We accept the district court’s finding --

because it is not clearly erroneous -- that

whatever exchange may have taken place

                     49
between Loftin and Davis did not ripen

into a sufficiently definite agreement

before Tarver’s trial: no disclosure under

Giglio was required.    We have said:

   The [Giglio] rule does not address nor

   require the disclosure of all factors

   which may motivate a witness to

   cooperate.      The simple belief by a

   defense    attorney       that   his   client

   may   be   in   a   better   position     to

   negotiate a reduced penalty should he

                        50
    testify against a codefendant is

    not    an    agreement             within      the

    purview of Giglio.

Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1555 (11th

Cir. 1994) (alternate holding).             We have,

however, recognized that a promise in this

context is not “a word of art that must be

specifically      employed.”              Brown          v.

Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1464-65 (11th Cir.

1986).    And,   “[e]ven        mere    ‘advice’    by   a

                           51
prosecutor       concerning            the   future

prosecution of a key government witness

may fall into the category of discoverable

evidence.”    Haber v. Wainwright, 756 F.2d

1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1985).

   But not everything said to a witness

or to his lawyer must be disclosed.             For

example, a promise to “speak a word” on

the witness’s behalf does not need to be

disclosed.   See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d

877,   884    (11th   Cir.    1985).    Likewise,   a

                         52
prosecutor’s statement that he would “take

care” of the witness does not need to be

disclosed.   See Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d

784, 797-98 (11th Cir. 1991).       Some promises,

agreements,      or   understandings            do   not

need to be disclosed, because they are too

ambiguous,    or    too   loose     or    are   of   too

marginal     a   benefit       to   the   witness     to

count.

   The   district     court’s       finding     of   no

“agreement or understanding . . . between

                          53
the District Attorney and Richardson or

Richardson’s     attorney”   is   not   clearly

             9
erroneous.          Compare       Spaziano   v.

Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1032 (11th Cir. 1994)

(standard of review) with United States v.

Cain, 587 F.2d 678, 680 (5th Cir. 1979)

(existence of plea agreement is a factual

issue).   Loftin said that he only told his

client, Richardson, that “if he would testify

. . . it would be beneficial to him with

    9
     We note that the state court also
denied relief to Tarver on his Giglio
claim in state collateral proceedings.
                      54
respect to reducing the charge.” And Davis

testified     unequivocally        at    the   Rule    20

hearing that no “arrangement or deal”

existed. He testified only that Richardson’s

testimony        would        be        “taken        into

consideration,” and such a statement is

too preliminary and ambiguous to demand

disclosure.    See Depree, 946 F.2d at 797

(promise to “take care” of witness does not

require disclosure).

                         55
   Richardson testified at trial that he

was not promised a deal. We think Loftin

and   his   client   were     merely    trying    to

cooperate in hopes of improving their

bargaining      position       later.         Giglio,

therefore,    required    no    disclosure.      See

Alderman, 22 F.3d at 1555.

   If Loftin really believed an agreement

existed with the district attorney, then his

client committed perjury by testifying

that no agreement existed; and Loftin

                         56
would   have   been   required   to   call   upon

Richardson to correct his testimony or

withdraw from representation.            Loftin

said he did not advise his client to change

his testimony nor did Loftin withdraw

from representation.

                       57
   For the reasons we have discussed, we

conclude   that   Tarver’s   claims    were

properly rejected by the district court.

   AFFIRMED.

                     58