Court Opinion

ID: 9685602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:52:20.286071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:08.543885
License: Public Domain

Heffernan, J.
(dissenting). I believe that Officer Richey was denied the basic elements of due process and fair play in these proceedings. He objected to the last minute suspension of Rule 27, which provided that there be filed a written complaint “with specifications.” The objection to an eleventh hour change of rules, which permitted the commission to proceed without specifications, is clearly an objection to the sufficiency of the complaint and to its specificity. It is immaterial that the officer believed his right was based upon his employment contract. The fact remains that, just before the hearing, he was denied his reasonable expectation that he would be *587tried on detailed specifications. There is no evidence of a knowing and intentional waiver of his rights to due process.
The majority, moreover, misconstrues the meaning of State ex rel. Gudlin v. Civil Service Comm. (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 77, 133 N. W. 2d 799, if it implies that conduct unbecoming an officer is a sufficient statement of specifications. Gudlin does not so hold. It merely concludes that an employee may be discharged if such charge is proved. It in no way deals with the required specificity of charges. In fact, the Gudlin opinion recites the West Allis ordinances which require as a prerequisite to a charge of “conduct unbecoming an employee” that the appointing officer “specifically” set forth his complaint.
While the proof of facts may properly lead to discharge on grounds of “conduct unbecoming an officer,” that term is too vague to properly apprise one charged with the nature of the offense.
Two leading courts have pointed out the uncertainty of the phrase.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division) pointed out that the expression:
“. . . ‘conduct unbecoming an officer’ [when applied to a ground for removal of an officer is] a very elastic term, depending upon individual conceptions of what belongs to the office of a policeman.” People ex rel. Dougan v. Greene (1904), 97 App. Div. 404, 89 N. Y. Supp. 1067, 1068.
The Connecticut Supreme Court used similar language in Gaudette v. Board of Public Safety (1956), 20 Conn. Supp. 147, 151, 127 Atl. 2d 836.
While it may be conceded that a policeman may be discharged for “conduct unbecoming an officer,” a charge of such conduct must be supported by specifications sufficient to give notice of the nature of the conduct charged.
I believe the court misleads itself when it concludes that Officer Richey was properly informed of the de*588tails of the charges, merely because he had two conferences with the chief of police prior to the hearing.
Certainly this court would not sustain an insufficient complaint against an alleged criminal on the assertion of the prosecution that the defendant had been given the essential facts of the offense with which he was charged in an in camera, off-the-record conference without counsel.
This court has been adamant, and correctly so, in insisting on due process and fair play in criminal cases. Is a police officer, who has honorably served for twenty-two years, entitled to less?
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley and Mr. Justice Robert W. Hansen join in this dissent.