Court Opinion

ID: 9939951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 15:09:39.003256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:42:09.164069
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3754-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RODNEY F. BATES, a/k/a
RODNEY F. BATES, JR.,

          Defendant-Appellant.

                   Argued November 28, 2023 – Decided February 13, 2024

                   Before Judges Gooden Brown and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 15-12-3508.

                   Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, Designated Counsel, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                   Defender, attorney; Kayla Elizabeth Rowe, on the
                   brief).

                   Maura Murphy Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued
                   the cause for appellant (Grace C. MacAuley, Camden
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura Murphy Sullivan,
                   of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Rodney F. Bates appeals from a July 8, 2022 order denying his

first petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without a hearing.        Having

reviewed the record and defendant's arguments in light of the applicable law, we

affirm.

                                        I.

      We glean the following facts from our prior opinion on defendant's direct

appeal, State v. Bates, No. A-0373-17 (App. Div. June 10, 2019) (slip op. at 6-

12), and from our review of the record. Defendant's elderly mother lived in

Somerdale with her daughter, who was defendant's sister; and her

granddaughter, who was defendant's niece. Defendant's mother had deeded the

home to his sister in July 2004, and his sister and niece cared for his mother.

      Defendant was not permitted to enter the home unless his sister was

present, and had to make an appointment to do so. He was allowed to use the

detached garage, where he stored some of his belongings. The niece described

him as, among other things, "a little bit of a bully to everybody in the family

including [his mother]." She also testified that defendant never came to the

home when she was alone with his mother, because the niece felt uncomfortable

around him. She explained she usually kept the doors locked to keep defendant

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out, because when he came in, he would refuse to leave or display a "bully kind

of mentality." She also said defendant had previously locked her out of the

house.

      On the morning of September 10, 2015, defendant's sister was not home

and his niece was caring for his mother. As the niece ran out of the house to

take out the trash, defendant pulled up in his mother's Cadillac and began to

ridicule her. He got out of the car and started "gunning" for the door, which she

had left unlocked. She pleaded with him not to go in the house, because he was

not allowed in, but he did so anyway. She ran behind him and grabbed the

doorknob. Defendant reached for the slide lock but she "ripped" open the door

and stood in between him and the door so that he would not lock her out of the

house. Defendant pushed his body into hers, which propelled her against the

door, shattering the glass. He picked up a piece of triangular-shaped glass and

held it near her.

      Defendant and his niece then struggled, during which he grabbed a fistful

of her hair at the top of her head, causing clumps of her hair to come out. The

niece fell to the ground, and he jumped on top of her and pinned her down with

his hands. She cried and screamed, and eventually stood up. She was able to

get into the house, retrieve her cell phone, and call 9-1-1.

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      Defendant re-entered the house and went to his mother's room, where the

niece heard him attempting to blame her for the broken door. As the niece was

speaking to the 9-1-1 dispatcher, defendant returned and grabbed her by the

neck, pinned her against the wall, and punched her in the face twice. His mother

then came out of her room using her walker.

      The niece called 9-1-1 again, having been disconnected from the first call,

and defendant left. Recordings of the two 9-1-1 telephone calls were played for

the jury. In the first call, the niece told the dispatcher: "My uncle just broke

into the house. We were just wrestling outside. He broke the glass. . . . He's

coming after me right now. . . . He just punched me." During the second call,

she said defendant had her "pinned under the chair pounding [her] in the face."

In the second call, in response to the dispatcher's question, "what's going on

there," the niece responded: "I have an abusive, crazy uncle who stops by from

time to time. Today he decided to break the glass [on] my grandmother's porch,

break in and then proceeded to punch me in the face and pull my hair."

      At trial, the State presented the jury with photographs including the

shattered door, clumps of the niece's hair and her two black eyes.

      Defendant testified to a different version of events. He said he was

unaware of any understanding among his mother, sister, and niece that he was

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not allowed to enter the house unless his sister was present. According to him,

the opposite was true; his mother wanted him there. He said he had no idea his

mother had deeded the home to his sister until he saw the deed a couple of days

before trial when he and his attorney were reviewing discovery.

       Turning to the events of September 10, 2015, defendant said he drove to

his mother's home that morning to visit her. He drove into the driveway, passed

his niece, who was taking out the trash, and walked toward the door. He thought

he heard his niece say something but told her he did not have time and continued

to walk toward the door. Defendant said as he began to open the door to enter

the home to see his mother, his niece came from behind him, slipped under his

arm, and got between him and the door. According to defendant, her hair got

caught in the latch and lock and she thought he was pulling it. She stomped on

his foot three times and broke his toe. In pain, he lifted his foot, and she pushed

him to the ground. As he lay on the ground he watched his niece rip her hair out

from the lock, screaming "ouch" as she did so. She then tried to kick him again.

       Defendant had to hop into the house to see his mother, because his foot

was severely injured. He told his mother his niece was starting something and

asked his mother to come out of her room and intercede, and his mother came

out.

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      It appeared to him that his niece was getting a knife out of a kitchen

drawer, so he told his mother he was leaving and he left, wanting to get away

from his attacker. Defendant repeated that he had gone to the home for no other

reason than to visit his mother. He explained that he lives in Florida during the

winter, and when summer is over, he returns there. He knew his mother's health

was failing and wanted to visit her before returning to Florida for the winter.

      During cross-examination defendant was confronted with photographs of

his niece's injuries, which he denied inflicting. He said the photographs of her

face looked "like all smeared makeup." As to her other injuries, he testified, "I

feel as though she inflicted them upon herself by attacking me from behind and

putting her head in a position where her hair was caught and the way she ripped

her hair out." Defendant claimed he never touched her, insisting he was "not

responsible for her actions. She was the aggressor, not [him]."

      The jury rejected defendant's version of the events and convicted him of

second-degree burglary of his sister's home and third-degree aggravated assault

on his niece. At sentencing, the court merged the aggravated assault into the

burglary and sentenced defendant to a ten-year custodial term subject to the No

Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.        We affirmed the conviction but

remanded to the trial court to correct the judgment of conviction to reflect the

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burglary as it was charged in the indictment, which was a third-degree offense,

and for resentencing on that count. On remand, the court resentenced defendant

to a five-year custodial term with a two-and-a-half-year parole ineligibility

period.

       Defendant again appealed to the excessive sentence oral argument panel,

which remanded the matter again for resentencing to afford defendant the

opportunity to speak at sentencing. After a denied motion for release, which we

affirmed, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition in September 2019, but withdrew

it; counsel filed a certification and brief in March 2022.

       In his petition, defendant argued his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to do the following: properly investigate and ensure that

all Brady1 materials were received, object to or investigate the origin of a

photograph depicting the victim with two black eyes, verify the DNA found on

the niece's pants was defendant's, investigate and cross-examine defendant's

mother's caregiver, interview and question the ambulance driver prior to her

testimony, and object to the admission of the 9-1-1 calls.

       The PCR judge issued an oral decision on the record, discussed more fully

below, denying defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing because he

1
    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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                                        7
"failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for

any of the errors raised in [his] petition." The court did not find "counsel

committed such cumulative errors as to render the defendant's trial unfair or

deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel," and denied defendant's

request for an evidentiary hearing.

                                      II.

      Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

            POINT I.

            THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WITH
            RESPECT TO THE UNPRODUCED SMITH REPORT
            THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN RESOLVED WITH
            LIMITED PCR DISCOVERY AND AT AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

            POINT II.

            THE PCR COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD AN
            EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO ANSWER ITS
            QUESTIONS ABOUT [DEFENDANT'S] PRO SE
            CLAIM THAT COUNSEL FAILED TO HAVE THE
            BLOOD TESTED.

            POINT III.

            THE PCR COURT FAILED TO ANALYZE
            [DEFENDANT'S] ARGUMENT THAT HAD THE
            JURY KNOWN HE WAS INJURED IN THE MELEE,
            IT WOULD HAVE CHANGED THE OUTCOME OF
            THE TRIAL.

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                                       8
      We are unpersuaded by defendant's contentions.

                                       III.

      We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of

Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). The de novo standard also applies to

mixed questions of law and fact. Ibid. Where an evidentiary hearing has not

been held, we "conduct a de novo review of both the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the PCR court . . . ." Id. at 421.

      To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105

N.J. 42, 58 (1987), by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Gaitan, 209

N.J. 339, 350 (2012). First, a defendant must show that "counsel's performance

was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This requires demonstrating that

"counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. The Constitution

requires "reasonably effective assistance," so an attorney's performance may not

be attacked unless they did not act "within the range of competence demanded

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                                        9
of attorneys in criminal cases" and instead "fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Id. at 687-88.

      When assessing the first Strickland prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's

performance must be highly deferential," and "every effort [must] be made to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. "Merely because a trial

strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 161

N.J. 233, 251 (1999) (citing State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 357 (1989)). Thus, a

reviewing court "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[,]" and "the

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the

challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101

(1955)). Further, the court must not focus on the defendant's dissatisfaction with

"counsel's exercise of judgment during the trial . . . while ignoring the totality

of counsel's performance in the context of the State's evidence of [the]

defendant's guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006).

      For the second prong of the Strickland test, "the defendant must show that

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687. This means

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                                       10
"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable." Ibid.

      "[I]n order to establish a prima facie claim, a petitioner must do more than

make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel."

State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (1999). "[R]ather, the defendant

'must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard

performance.'" State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014) (citations omitted)

(quoting State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013)). Where a "court perceives

that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of whether

the defendant is entitled to [PCR] . . . or that the defendant's allegations are too

vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing . . . then an

evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

(1997) (citations omitted); see R. 3:22-10(e)(1)-(2).

      Guided by these standards, we find the PCR court did not err in denying

defendant's petition. We address defendant's arguments in turn.

      First, defendant argued his counsel was ineffective because he failed to

properly investigate and ensure that all Brady materials were received.

Specifically, defendant claimed an Officer Smith wrote a report containing

exculpatory information, which defendant first learned about during his direct

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appeal. According to defendant, the report stated the glass from his mother's

door had broken outward instead of inward; thus, defendant believed this

information would exculpate him of the burglary charge.

      The record reflects that the discovery request for the report was discussed

during a pretrial conference on October 11, 2016. Defendant's counsel asked

for any "statements" made by Officer Smith, because his investigators reached

out to the officer and he was "not providing any statement," nor was there "any

indication there [was] an original statement." The judge asked for clarification,

since in her experience, she had never seen a police officer provide a "statement"

in a criminal matter, rather, an officer may write a report. Defense counsel

agreed that he meant to ask for any police report authored by Officer Smith. The

assistant prosecutor responded that his detective had called the Somerdale

records clerk twice to determine whether there were any reports from Officer

Smith, and informed the court "[t]hey do not exist; there's nothing." The court

concluded that there was no report, to which defendant responded, "Yes, Your

Honor. Thank you for that information."

      We agree with the PCR judge's finding there was no need to conduct

discovery because defendant did not produce any evidence of a report written

by Officer Smith. Defendant referenced the pretrial memorandum included in

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the State's appendix on direct appeal, which lists the report as "needed

discovery." Defendant interpreted this notation to mean that a report existed.

However, as the PCR judge found, the pretrial memorandum catalogued

discovery that had been requested, but did not confirm the existence of the

report.

      Moreover, defendant did not demonstrate counsel failed to adequately

investigate the issue in his defense. During the pretrial conference, the State

confirmed on the record that it had investigated the request and determined there

was no report. The court accepted that representation, and defense counsel's

reliance on that representation did not fall below the standards of objective

reasonableness.

      Defendant's claim that the report was exculpatory is also dubious. The

jurors were shown photographs of the door and were charged with making the

determination of which witnesses were credible.        The niece testified that

defendant was already in the doorway of the house when she put herself in

between him and the door so he could not lock her out. She said defendant then

shoved her into the door, which ended up "smashing." She testified, "The glass

was everywhere including where my bare feet were. I remember looking down

and seeing shards of glass but [thought] I'm not giving up my ground, I'm not

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                                      13
getting locked out of the house in this drizzle rain in my pajamas, that's not

going to happen." Because the testimony and evidence at trial were consistent

with there being glass on the outside of the house, a report confirming that fact

would not have been exculpatory.

      Second, defendant argues the PCR judge erred by not conducting an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant asked his counsel to test the

blood on the victim's clothing. As reflected in the record, defendant did not

provide any proof that he raised the issue with trial counsel nor any evidence in

the form of affidavits or certifications that any blood present on the niece's pants

would have been favorable to him. The PCR judge found:

            Evidence and testimony were presented to the jury that
            the defendant and the victim struggled with one another
            during a physical altercation.        Specifically, the
            defendant testified that during the altercation [he]
            sustained injuries.

            The presence of the defendant's blood does not change
            the fact that the parties physically struggled and the
            defendant was injured, facts that the jury already knew.
            Assuming that the defendant actually did request the
            DNA testing, trial counsel's decision to forego
            requesting DNA testing of the blood was not
            unreasonable.

      For the reasons articulated by the PCR judge, we agree that a hearing was

not warranted.

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                                        14
      Lastly, defendant argues the PCR judge did not address his contention that

his trial counsel failed to adequately present his injuries to the jury, whi ch may

have resulted in a different outcome. We disagree. In outlining the issues raised

by defendant, the PCR judge stated, "Additionally, the defendant asserts that if

the jury knew he was also injured the outcome of the trial would have been

different. The defendant does not offer any additional facts, assertions or law

to support this claim." In his discussion of the DNA, the PCR judge noted

defendant testified about his injuries, which the trial transcript reflects:

             My niece came up behind me. When I opened the door
             with my right hand she slipped under my arm and got
             in between me and the door. Her hair got caught in the
             latch and lock and she thought I was pulling her hair
             and she stomped on my foot three times, broke my toe.
             I picked my foot up in pain and I was pushed to the
             ground. And I skinned my elbow on the way down, hurt
             my hip, and I later found out that I broke my—or she
             broke my toe, causing all the rest of the injuries
             including the broken toe.

Defendant's petition did not point to any injury he sustained that was not

presented to the jury through his own testimony. While he claimed counsel

perhaps should have retained an expert to examine the extent of his nerve

damage, he did not demonstrate that counsel's performance in this regard was so

deficient that it prejudiced the outcome of the trial.

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      Because defendant failed to meet either prong of Strickland on any of his

claims, the PCR judge did not err in denying a hearing.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

      Affirmed.

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