Court Opinion

ID: 9540702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:59.509426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:12.400687
License: Public Domain

GOOLSBY, J.
(dissenting):
I would affirm the judgment below and for that reason I write separately.
1. Covert maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence due to what Covert claims was a defective warrant and in applying a good faith exception to a statutory warrant requirement.
On September 26, 2002, Greenville Detective Timothy Conroy, after being sworn by a magistrate to tell the truth, applied to the magistrate for a warrant authorizing the search of Covert’s residence. The affidavit Conroy submitted in *209support of his application for a search warrant provided a description of the premises to be searched and the property sought. His application also incorporated an attached one-page, second affidavit that presented the facts on which he set forth probable cause for issuance of the search warrant. - The date of September 26, 2002, and the signatures of Conroy and the magistrate appear on the affidavit and its attachment.
Later, at Covert’s trial, Conroy testified in camera the magistrate reviewed his affidavit and issued the search warrant. Conroy also testified he and other officers, with the affidavit and search warrant in hand, immediately executed the search warrant at Covert’s residence. An officer other than Conroy signed the return on September 27, 2002; however, the search warrant, which the magistrate signed, bears the date of the following day, i.e., September 28, 2002.
Covert moved to suppress the evidence seized from his residence pursuant to the search warrant, pointing to evidence that the search occurred prior to the date that appears on the search warrant and claiming the magistrate failed to sign the warrant prior to its execution. The trial court, however, upheld the search, basing its holding, as noted above and as Judge Short’s opinion more fully discusses, on a good faith exception.3
Unlike Judge Short and the trial court, I see no need to address the question of whether a good faith exception should be applied in an instance where the issuing magistrate’s signature reflects a date later than those appearing on the affidavit and the return. Another ground appearing in the record supports the judgment of the trial court.4
*210The validity of the search warrant did not depend either upon a date appearing above the magistrate’s signature nor upon there being a signature of the issuing judicial officer. Nothing in the statute governing the issuance of search warrants in South Carolina, S.C.Code Ann. § 17-13-140 (2003),5 as Judge Short himself acknowledges, “specifically require[s] that the [search] warrant be signed.” Moreover, nothing in the statute requires it to be dated, for that matter.
Here, the magistrate either wrote an incorrect date on the warrant when she signed it or failed to sign the warrant when she issued it, but then signed and dated the warrant after the officer returned it. At most, the omission of the date and signature or of the date when a magistrate issues a search warrant, without more, constitutes a ministerial defect that does not affect its validity.6 And as this court has held, a *211ministerial error will not invalidate an otherwise valid search warrant under section 17-13-140.7
I add one final note regarding the search warrant. Covert does not argue the search warrant otherwise failed to meet either constitutional8 or statutory standards. He does not *212contend the magistrate did not issue the search warrant, she lacked probable cause to issue it, or she did not intend to issue it.
2. Covert argues the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a mistrial when the lawyer for Covert’s codefendant, Charles Henderson, made an apparently factually incorrect statement regarding Covert during closing argument.
In his closing argument, Henderson’s counsel attacked the credibility of Donald Myers and Roger Harris, both of whom testified about buying cocaine from Covert and Henderson. Counsel pointed to Myers’s statements to the police and said the first time Myers implicated Henderson was after Myers received a free “get out of jail card.” Counsel followed this assertion with the remark that “[ajccording to Mr. Covert[,] he confirmed that Roger [Harris] ... had been buying cocaine from him for two years” and that Myers’s statement didn’t “mention Mr. Henderson in a conspiracy with him.” Covert objected, arguing this undermined Covert’s credibility because counsel had mentioned Henderson’s involvement and counsel’s statement created the impression in the jury’s mind that Covert had been dishonest with the police when he gave his statement to them following his arrest. Covert’s criminal involvement with Henderson had earlier been redacted from Covert’s published statement to the police.
Covert refused an offer by the trial judge for a curative instruction and insisted on a mistrial.
The question of whether to grant or deny a motion for mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court9 whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law.10
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this instance. The reference to Covert was an isolated one and was not directed to Covert’s guilt, but to the veracity of Myers. Moreover, evidence as to Covert’s guilt in the context of the entire record was overwhelming, particularly since he admit*213ted to selling cocaine both before and after September 26, 2002.11
3. Covert further contends the trial court erred in not sustaining his objection to the closing argument of the solicitor.
After counsel for Covert offered a general objection to the solicitor’s closing argument, the trial court effectively sustained the objection, saying, “Yes, sir. I think you need to move on to the facts of the case.” Covert neither moved to strike the objectionable portion of the solicitor’s argument nor moved for a curative instruction or mistrial. Having gotten what he asked for, Covert cannot complain now.12
4. Covert also complains about the special verdict forms and copies of the trafficking statute given by the trial court to the jury in connection with its charge on the offense of trafficking. The forms contained no statements regarding the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. He claims these written materials had the effect of suggesting a guilty verdict to the jury.
Covert suffered no prejudice. Indeed, the trial court’s oral jury instructions, which Covert did not challenge, removed any possible prejudice Covert may have suffered on account of the use by the jury of the forms and copies of the trafficking statute.13 Moreover, the trial court made it abundantly clear *214to the jury that a “not guilty” verdict was one of the possible verdicts it could return with regard to each charge, notwithstanding the special verdict form did not have the words “not guilty” printed upon it. As for the copy of the trafficking statute given each juror, it merely provided additional information regarding an offense with which Covert was charged and served to aid the jury in reaching a proper verdict.
5. Regarding Covert’s argument that a cumulative effect of errors requires a reversal of his conviction, the issue is not preserved for appeal, even assuming the presence of “errors.” The issue was neither raised to nor ruled on by the trial court.14 In any case, the purported errors, which Covert says involve the closing arguments and the written materials given the jury, are insufficient to warrant a new trial when weighed against the evidence of Covert’s guilt, particularly when his statement to the police is considered.
I would affirm.

. The trial court, over Covert's objection, later admitted as a court exhibit the search warrant log maintained by the magistrate; however, the trial court did not change its earlier ruling regarding the sufficiency of the search warrant.

. See State v. Arnold, 319 S.C. 256, 460 S.E.2d 403 (Ct.App.1995) (holding Rule 220(c), SCACR, allows the court of appeals to affirm on any ground appearing in the record); see also I’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000) (holding under Rules 208(b)(2) and 220(c), SCACR, a respondent, as a prevailing party in the trial court, may raise on appeal any additional reasons the appellate court should affirm the trial court regardless of whether the reasons *210were presented to or ruled on by the trial court, provided the respondent's additional sustaining grounds appear in the record on appeal).

. Section 17-13-140 provides in relevant part as follows:
Any magistrate ... having jurisdiction over the area where the property sought is located, may issue a search warrant to search for and seize ... any ... drugs .. ’. possessed ... in violation of any of the laws of this State....
A warrant issued hereunder shall be issued only upon affidavit sworn to before the magistrate ... establishing the grounds for the warrant. If the magistrate ... is satisfied that the grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying the property and naming or describing the person or place to be searched.

. See State v. Smith, 562 N.E.2d 428 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (noting the search warrant statute contained no explicit requirement that the issuing magistrate sign a search warrant in order to validate it and holding the failure of the issuing judge to sign a search warrant did not invalidate the warrant when the magistrate found probable cause and intended to issue it; the court concluded the addition of a signature was a ministerial task); Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, 405 Mass. 86, 539 N.E.2d 514 (1989) (holding a failure of a judge to sign a warrant was a ministerial error that did not invalidate the warrant in the absence of a constitutional or statutory requirement that the issuing judge, without exception, sign a search warrant); see also Yuma County Attorney v. McGuire, 109 Ariz. 471, 512 P.2d 14, 15-16 (1973) (stating even where the statute required a magistrate's signature, “[wjarrants and the affidavits on which they are based must be read in a common-sense way rather than technically” and holding a magistrate's inadvertent failure to sign a search warrant was an oversight that did not invalidate the *211warrant where the judge signed the affidavit in support of the warrant and considered the existence of probable cause and thus intended by his action to give legal effect to the issuance of the warrant); People v. Superior Court, 75 Cal.App.3d 76, 141 Cal.Rptr. 917 (1977) (holding a magistrate’s inadvertent failure to sign a search warrant did not require suppression of evidence seized pursuant thereto); State v. Spaulding, 239 Kan. 439, 720 P.2d 1047 (1986) (holding where a judge made findings of probable cause and intentionally issued a search warrant, the warrant was not void because the issuing judge failed to sign it where the warrant was executed and returned to the same judge and filed on the same date it was issued); State v. Andries, 297 N.W.2d 124 (Minn.1980) (stating the requirement that an issuing judge sign a search warrant is a purely ministerial task); cf. S.C. Op. Atty. Gen. 295 (1977) (advising, per the attorney general, that only judicial officers may sign a search warrant).
The Arizona, California, and Minnesota statutes, respectively Ariz. Rev.Stat. § 13-1441 (now renumbered as § 13-3911), Cal.Penal Code § 1523, and Minn.Stat. Ann. §§ 626.05 and 626.11, expressly require a search warrant to be signed. Yet, the appellate courts of these three states found the lack of a signature to be ministerial in nature. Other courts, however, hold a failure to sign a warrant invalidates the warrant and renders its issuance a nullity where the statutes expressly require a signature by a judicial officer. See, e.g., Kelley v. State, 55 Ala.App. 402, 316 So.2d 233 (Crim.App.1975) (discussing a statute defining a search warrant as "an order in writing in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate”); Martin v. State, 344 So.2d 248, 249 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1976) (noting the statute contained language stating that the magistrate shall "issue a search warrant signed by him”).

. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 361 S.C. 73, 602 S.E.2d 786 (Ct.App.2004) (holding a failure to observe the requirement that search warrants be executed and a return made within ten days after the date of the warrant does not invalidate the search); State v. Mollison, 319 S.C. 41, 459 S.E.2d 88 (Ct.App.1995) (stating the failure to list on the return all the items seized or to make the return within ten days is a ministerial error that does not invalidate the search).

. Article 1, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution, which mirrors the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, contains no signature and dating requirement. S.C. Const. art. 1, § 10. It requires only that the warrant issue "upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to be seized, and the information to be obtained.” Id.

. State v. Dawkins, 297 S.C. 386, 377 S.E.2d 298 (1989).

. State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 530 S.E.2d 626 (2000).

. See State v. Hamilton, 344 S.C. 344, 543 S.E.2d 586 (Ct.App.2001) (noting an appellate court will review an alleged error in the context of the entire record and may affirm under a harmless error analysis where there is overwhelming evidence of guilt), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005).

. See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 18, 482 S.E.2d 760, 766 (1997) (holding the alleged impropriety of the solicitor's closing argument was not preserved for review where the trial court sustained an objection by defense counsel, but counsel did not move to strike or request a curative instruction); State v. McFadden, 318 S.C. 404, 458 S.E.2d 61 (Ct.App.1995) (noting no error was preserved for review where the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to testimony and counsel made no further motion to strike the testimony).

. See State v. Myers, 344 S.C. 532, 544 S.E.2d 851 (Cl.App.2001) (concluding the jury's use of a special verdict form did not prevent the jury from finding the defendant not guilty in light of the trial court’s instructions).

. State v. Adams, 354 S.C. 361, 380, 580 S.E.2d 785, 795 (Ct.App.2003) ("Arguments not raised to or ruled upon by the trial court are not preserved for appellate review.”).