Court Opinion

ID: 9908754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 18:07:26.286267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:29.906622
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Choudri, 2023-Ohio-4476.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              MARION COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,
                                                          CASE NO. 9-22-70
       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

       v.

MARYUM CHOUDRI,                                           OPINION

       DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

                 Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
                                 General Division
                            Trial Court No. 22-CR-006

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                          Date of Decision: December 11, 2023

APPEARANCES:

        Kyle Phillips for Appellant

        Raymond A. Grogan, Jr. and Martha Schultes for Appellee
Case No. 9-22-70

MILLER, P.J.

           {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Maryum Choudri (“Choudri”), appeals her

conviction for trespass-in-a-habitation, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), following a

jury trial in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas. Choudri argues the trial

court erred in denying her Crim.R. 29 motion to dismiss; entering judgment against

her because the verdict was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence;

and permitting the State to advance an alleged “new theory” after the close of the

State’s case-in-chief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

           I.       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                    A.       Choudri’s Actions Concerning the Premises

           {¶2} Although she lived in New York, Choudri was the landlord for a house

located at 507 Silver Street in Marion, Ohio. William Brammer (“Brammer”) was

the tenant.1 In or around September of 2021, Brammer complained to Choudri that

the hot water tank at the house was broken. Choudri told Brammer to arrange for

someone to fix it and then she would wire money for the repair.

           {¶3} On December 29, 2021, after not hearing anything further from

Brammer and not receiving rent, Choudri decided to visit the rental property for the

first time. Although she was unsuccessful in notifying Brammer of her intended

visit, she left her home in New York and drove to the rental property in Marion,

1
    No lease agreement was entered into evidence at trial.

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Ohio. Significantly, Choudri made two separate entries into the house on that day.

Regarding the first entry, she gained admittance into the residence and spoke with

Brammer about the hot water tank. At some point thereafter, a physical altercation

ensued between Choudri and Brammer, after which she exited the house. The

details of the first entry—including whether Brammer had invited Choudri into the

house, why the physical altercation happened, whether Choudri touched or grabbed

Brammer, and whether she was thrown down the front porch stairs by Brammer—

involved disputed evidence at trial.

       {¶4} Before the second entry, Choudri called 911 multiple times. In

response to the 911 calls, Officer Dana Jagger of the Marion City Police Department

(“Officer Jagger”) came to the house. As Officer Jagger approached the house, she

saw Choudri on the front porch kicking the front door. As shown on Officer

Jagger’s bodycam video (which was played during the trial and admitted into

evidence as State’s Exhibit 1), Choudri told Officer Jagger she owned the house and

Brammer had thrown her down the porch stairs in front of the house. Officer Jagger

instructed Choudri to come to another location in the front yard so they could talk

outside the presence of Brammer (who came onto the porch once Officer Jagger

arrived). However, Choudri responded to Officer Jagger’s instruction by walking

back onto the porch saying, “I have to use the restroom, I’m gonna go in my home

and use that.” At that point, Brammer was standing in the doorway, blocking entry

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Case No. 9-22-70

to the house, and closing the door, all while repeatedly saying he did not want

Choudri to come into his house.

       {¶5} While Officer Jagger was continuously instructing Choudri to stop,

Choudri touched Brammer and pushed past him to get into the house. Upon entering

the house, Officer Jagger told Choudri she would be put into handcuffs, to which

Choudri responded, “Okay, fine.” After Choudri continued through the front room

of the house, she was stopped by Officer Jagger and a second police officer. A

struggle ensued, with the officers eventually bending Choudri over a table in the

front room to handcuff her. Once Choudri had been removed from the house by

other officers, Brammer told Officer Jagger on her bodycam video that Choudri was

a “slum landlord”; he refused to pay rent until she fixed the hot water; Choudri owns

the house but did not belong there and did not live there; Choudri had kicked his

front door and—while he pointed to the ground in the entranceway—she had just

damaged his phone; and, during the first entry, Choudri had physically thrown his

cat out of the house and punched him in the nose.

              B.     Indictment, Trial, Conviction, and Sentencing

       {¶6} On January 5, 2022, Choudri was indicted on three counts: (1)

Aggravated Burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(1); (2) Burglary in violation

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of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2); and (3) Obstructing Official Business in violation of R.C.

2921.31(A).2 Regarding Counts 1 and 2, the Indictment stated:

           Count One Aggravated Burglary – F1 § 2911.11(A)(1),
           2911.11(B)

           Defendant         Maryum Choudri

           Date of Offense            On or about December 29, 2021

           did, by force, stealth, or deception, trespass, as defined in section
           2911.21(A)(1) of the Revised Code, in an occupied structure or in a
           separately secured or separately occupied portion of an occupied
           structure, when Tina Frost [Brammer’s daughter] and William
           Brammer, a person other than the accomplice, was present, with
           purpose to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or
           separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense, to
           wit: Criminal Damaging, RC 2909.06(A)(1), and the offender
           inflicted, or attempted or threatened to inflict physical harm on
           William Brammer.

           Count Two Burglary – F2 § 2911.12(A)(2), 2911.12(D)

           Defendant         Maryum Choudri

           Date of Offense            On or about December 29, 2021

           did, by force, stealth, or deception, trespass in an occupied structure
           or in a separately secured or separately occupied portion of an
           occupied structure that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any
           person when any other person, not the accomplice of the offender
           was present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the
           habitation any criminal offense, to wit: Criminal Damaging, RC
           2909.06(A)(1).

(Indictment).

2
    Count 3 is not germane to this appeal.

                                                 -5-
Case No. 9-22-70

       {¶7} On January 27, 2022, the State supplied a bill of particulars at

Choudri’s request. Counts 1 and 2, the Bill of Particulars repeated the same

language as the Indictment, although the Bill of Particulars additionally identified

the location of the offenses as being at 507 Silver St., Marion, OH 43302. Also on

January 27, 2022, the State responded to Choudri’s request for discovery. As part

of its discovery response, the State delivered to Choudri four officer bodycam

videos, including the one from Officer Jagger that had recorded (among other

things) Officer Jagger’s arrival at the house, Officer Jagger’s discussion with

Choudri outside the house, Choudri’s second entry into the house, the removal of

Choudri from the house, and the discussion between Officer Jagger and Brammer.

On October 31, 2022, the State supplemented its response to Choudri’s request for

discovery, delivering to Choudri three recordings of the 911 calls.

       {¶8} It appears from the transcripts that the parties submitted proposed jury

instructions prior to trial. (See Oct. 17, 2022 Tr. at 5-6 (trial judge requesting the

parties submit proposed jury instructions two days prior to trial); Nov. 1, 2022 Tr.

at 369-70; Nov. 2, 2022 Tr. at 441-42). The parties did not want jury instructions

regarding a lesser-included offense for Count 1, but they both desired jury

instructions regarding a lesser-included offense of trespass-in-a-habitation for

Count 2. (Nov. 2, 2022 Tr. at 441-42).

       {¶9} The matter proceeded to a three-day jury trial starting on November

1, 2022. Both parties discussed Choudri’s second entry into the home during

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opening statements. Choudri’s counsel told the jury that: Brammer tried to keep

Choudri from walking back into the house; Choudri was trying to avoid Brammer

and get through the house so she could use the bathroom to urinate; Brammer

dropped his phone and it fell to the porch; and “[a]ll that’s gonna be in evidence for

you to see.” (Nov. 1, 2022 Tr. at 209). Choudri’s counsel also said the following

during opening statements: “At all points in time, Miss Choudri had privilege to be

there, had a duty to be there by law, because she’s the landlord that has to fix things,”

she “[n]ever trespassed on the property,” and she “never committed any criminal

offenses inside the property.” (Id. at 212-13).

       {¶10} The State called Brammer as a witness during its case-in-chief.

Regarding the first entry, he testified that Choudri knocked on the front door, he

opened it, and she shoved her way into the house. (Nov. 1, 2022 Tr. at 227-28).

According to Brammer, he did not invite her into the house. (Id.) Regarding the

second entry, Brammer testified that, after the police showed up, Choudri tried to

force her way back into the house. (Id. at 219). Brammer testified a “brawl” ensued

between Choudri and the police, and “[t]hat’s when she broke my phone.” (Id. at

219-21 and 240). He also testified that his front room was torn up—including a

table and chair being broken—when Choudri struggled with police officers. (Id. at

246-47).

       {¶11} Following the close of the State’s case-in-chief, but prior to Choudri’s

Rule 29 motion, the trial judge asked if Count 1 and Count 2 referred to one

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particular entry by Choudri into the house or to both entries. The State replied that

Count 1 applied to the first entry and Count 2 applied to the second entry. Choudri’s

counsel responded, “that’s not what the filed bill of particulars indicated at all” and

there was “no distinction” in the bill of particulars. (Nov. 1, 2022 Tr. at 371).

Counsel claimed the State was offering an “alternative theory” of its case. The trial

judge disagreed, finding the State was not prohibited from presenting its theory that

Count 1 applied to the first entry and Count 2 applied to the second entry.

       {¶12} Choudri then made a motion under Rule 29 for the entire case to be

dismissed, arguing there was no trespass because Choudri had a privilege to be in

the house. The trial court denied the motion. Following the close of Choudri’s case

and closing arguments, the trial judge gave the jury instructions, including

instructions on trespass-in-a-habitation as a lesser-included offense for Count 2, a

landlord’s statutory obligations as delineated in R.C. 5321.04(A), and privilege to

enter upon the property under certain circumstances. The jury found Choudri not

guilty of aggravated burglary, burglary, and obstructing official business. However,

the jury found Choudri guilty of the lesser-included offense of trespass-in-a-

habitation, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), a fourth-degree felony. The trial court

sentenced Choudri to 18 months of community control, subject to the general

supervision of the Adult Probation Department. This appeal followed.

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        II.      ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

        {¶13} Choudri filed her notice of appeal with the trial court on December

20, 2022. She raises three assignments of error for our review:

                                       First Assignment of Error

        The trial court erred when it failed to grant Defendant-Appellant
        Maryum Choudri’s Criminal Rule 29 motion to dismiss as the case
        presented by the State of Ohio was not supported by sufficient evidence.

                                      Second Assignment of Error

        The trial court erred when it entered judgment against Defendant-
        Appellant Maryum Choudri as the verdict was not supported by the
        manifest weight of the evidence.

                                      Third Assignment of Error

        The trial court erred to the substantial prejudice of Defendant-
        Appellant Maryum Choudri in permitting the State to advance a new
        theory not presented to Defendant-Appellant in the Indictment or Bill of
        Particulars after the close of the State’s Case in Chief.

        III.     DISCUSSION 3

                 A.       First Assignment of Error

        {¶14} In her first assignment of error, Choudri argues the trial court erred in

denying her Crim.R. 29 motion. She contends the State failed to present sufficient

evidence to support a conviction for trespass-to-a-habitation. According to Choudri,

due to her “non-delegable duty as a landlord, she held a valid privilege to be present

at the property to inspect and/or repair the issues with Mr. Brammer’s hot water

3
 Choudri clarified that her arguments on appeal are limited to Count Two for Burglary in violation of R.C.
2911.12(A)(2) (for which Choudri was not found guilty) and the lesser-included offense of trespass-in-a-
habitation in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B) (for which Choudri was found guilty).

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Case No. 9-22-70

heater,” and “the State failed to provide evidence sufficient to overcome Ms.

Choudri’s privilege to be present on the property for purposes of repairs that would

warrant a conviction for trespass” to a habitation. (Appellant’s Brief at 9, 15).

Through her argument, she implies that her being the landlord for the property also

granted her the privilege to use the bathroom.

                     i.      Standard of Review

       {¶15} “A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is governed by the same

standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported by sufficient

evidence.” State v. Tenace, 109 Ohio St.3d 255, 2006-Ohio-2417, ¶ 37, citing State

v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 553, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995) and State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A sufficiency challenge disputes

whether a party met its burden of production at trial. State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio

St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 26. “In reviewing a record for sufficiency, ‘[t]he

relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Tenace at ¶ 37, quoting State v.

Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

Thus, “[i]n assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not resolve evidentiary

conflicts or assess the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Jackson, 3d Dist. Allen No.

1-22-27, 2023-Ohio-2193, ¶ 26; see also Jenks at 279.

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Case No. 9-22-70

       {¶16} Under Crim.R. 29(A), “[t]he court on motion of a defendant or on its

own motion, after the evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a

judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment,

information, or complaint, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of

such offense or offenses.” The referenced “offenses charged in the indictment”

include lesser-included offenses. State v. Lytle, 49 Ohio St.3d 154, 157, 551 N.E.2d

950 (1990) (an indictment on a greater offense “necessarily and simultaneously

charges the defendant with lesser included offenses as well”).          Additionally,

“[w]hen an appellate court reviews a Crim.R. 29 motion, the motion should be

reviewed in the context of whether the evidence presented supported the offense for

which the defendant was convicted.” State v. Schellentrager, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 105652, 2017-Ohio-9275, ¶ 11.         Therefore, we must decide whether the

evidence presented would have allowed any rational trier of fact to find the essential

elements of trespass-in-a-habitation proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at ¶ 1-

2, 11 (where defendant-appellant was found not guilty of the greater offense but

guilty of the lesser-included offense, the issue on appeal was not whether the

evidence was sufficient following the state’s case to support a conviction for the

greater offense, but whether the trial court should have granted the motion for

acquittal with respect to the lesser-included offense).

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Case No. 9-22-70

                            ii.      Applicable Law

         {¶17} The statute prohibiting trespass-in-a-habitation states: “No person, by

force * * * shall trespass in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when

any person other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be

present.” R.C. 2911.12(B). Thus, unlike burglary, trespass-in-a-habitation does not

require the State to prove the defendant acted “with purpose to commit in the

habitation any criminal offense.” R.C. 2911.12(A)(2).4

         {¶18} Force is defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint

physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.”                                       R.C.

2901.01(A)(1). One way a person can commit a “trespass” is by “[k]nowingly

enter[ing] or remain[ing] on the land or premises of another,” “without privilege to

do so.” R.C. 2911.21(A)(1). And, “‘[p]rivilege’ means an immunity, license, or

right conferred by law, bestowed by express or implied grant, arising out of status,

position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(12).

         {¶19} A person’s privilege to enter or remain on the land or premises of

another can be revoked or terminated. State v. Bryant, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-21-25,

4
  Regarding the burglary charge, the applicable statute states: “No person, by force * * * shall * * * [t]respass
in an occupied structure * * * that is a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person
other than an accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present, with purpose to commit in the
habitation any criminal offense.” R.C. 2911.12(A)(2); see also R.C. 2911.21(F)(2) (definition of “land or
premises”). Here, the specific “criminal offense” alleged in Count 2 was criminal damaging. The statute
regarding criminal damaging provides that “[n]o person shall cause, or create a substantial risk of physical
harm to any property of another without the other person’s consent * * * [k]nowingly, by any means.” R.C.
2909.06(A)(1); see also R.C. 2901.22(B) (definition of “knowingly”). The judge instructed the jurors at trial
that the criminal offense at issue, for both Count 1 and Count 2, was “criminal damaging or disorderly
conduct.” (Nov. 3, 2022 Tr. at 602-04).

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Case No. 9-22-70

2022-Ohio-418, ¶ 9 (affirming conviction for criminal trespass).            “[W]hile a

person’s presence at the property may be initially lawful, it can, nonetheless, morph

into trespass if that privilege is revoked or terminated.” Id., citing State v. Petefish,

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 78, 2011-Ohio-6367, ¶ 22.

       {¶20} A landlord has various obligations, including to “[m]ake all repairs

and do whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and

habitable condition.” R.C. 5321.04(A)(2). However, another obligation is that,

“[e]xcept in the case of emergency or if it is impracticable to do so, [the landlord

shall] give the tenant reasonable notice of the landlord’s intent to enter and enter

only at reasonable times.” R.C. 5321.04(A)(8). “Twenty-four hours is presumed to

be a reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary.” Id.; see also

Spencer v. Blackmon, 22 Ohio Misc.2d 52, 53, 490 N.E.2d 943 (M.C. 1985) (any

“emergency” under the statute must be a “bona fide emergency”).

                      iii.   Analysis

       {¶21} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements for trespass-in-a-

habitation proven beyond a reasonable doubt against Choudri. Specifically, the

evidence in the State’s case-in-chief—including State’s Exhibit 1 (Officer Jagger’s

bodycam video)—showed that Choudri, by force, trespassed in a permanent or

temporary habitation of another person (Brammer’s home) when a person other than

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an accomplice was present (Brammer) and she knowingly entered the premises

(Brammer’s home) without privilege to do so. R.C. 2911.12(B).

         {¶22} As shown above, the focus of Choudri’s argument on appeal is the

assertion she held a valid privilege to go into the house and the State did not provide

sufficient evidence to overcome that privilege. We disagree with Choudri. Even

if we assume Choudri initially held a valid privilege to make the first entry into the

house (based on Choudri’s assertions that Brammer invited her into the house and/or

she was there as the landlord to inspect or repair the hot water tank), any such

privilege does not apply to the second entry. First, Brammer clearly revoked any

privileges he may have provided. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-418, at ¶ 9. Officer Jagger’s

bodycam video shows Brammer closing the door to the home and blocking the

entrance—all while repeatedly saying he did not want Choudri to come into the

house. Second, Officer Jagger’s bodycam video also shows Choudri’s stated

purpose for trying to reenter the home was because she had to use the restroom, not

because she was attempting to inspect or repair the hot water tank as the landlord.5

See State v. MacDonald, 9th Dist. Summit No. 14822, 1991 WL 35141, *2 (Mar. 6,

1991) (under the criminal trespass statute, a privilege to enter or remain on another’s

land or premises may be restricted to certain areas).

5
 Looking to the statute on which Choudri relies for her privilege argument, using the restroom in a house
you lease to someone else is not identified as a landlord’s privilege, as compared to, for example, making
“all repairs and do[ing] whatever is reasonably necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable
condition.” See R.C. 5321.04; see also R.C. 5321.05(A) (among the obligations of a tenant, listing “not
unreasonably withhold[ing] consent for the landlord to enter into the dwelling unit” for particular purposes
specified in the statute).

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       {¶23} Additionally, Choudri never provided Brammer with “reasonable

notice of [her] intent to enter” the house, as required by R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), and

she does not attempt to argue an exception to that requirement applied. The

“reasonable notice” requirement also demonstrates that a landlord does not have an

absolute right to enter the house whenever he or she wants. R.C. 5321.04(A)(8);

see also State v. Lilly, 87 Ohio St.3d 97, 102-03, 717 N.E.2d 322 (1999) (defendant-

husband could be found criminally liable for trespassing, despite having statutory

privilege to access his spouse’s dwelling); Petefish, 2011-Ohio-6367, at ¶ 22

(defendant criminally trespassed in his ex-spouse’s apartment where his daughter

lived, even though defendant was allowed to store property there and had

conditional privileges within the apartment, including sometimes being allowed to

sleep, shower, and eat there).

       {¶24} Choudri also cites R.C. 5321.04(B), which provides tenants with a

civil remedy for a landlord’s violating R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), and argues it was error

to find her guilty when “there exists adequate civil remedies for the purported

violation.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16). However, simply because Brammer may have

the ability to file a civil action against Choudri and recover financial damages for

her conduct does not necessarily preclude the State from bringing criminal charges

against Choudri for the same conduct. See, e.g., Phillips v. Rayburn, 113 Ohio

App.3d 374, 376, 680 N.E.2d 1279 (4th Dist.1996) (victim of aggravated assault

filed civil action for assault and battery against the perpetrator, after the perpetrator

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had been tried and convicted of aggravated assault); Jacobson v. Kaforey, 149 Ohio

St.3d 398, 2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 6 (R.C. 2307.60 authorizes a civil action for damages

caused by criminal acts, unless otherwise prohibited by law). To support her

argument, Choudri quotes from a Twelfth District opinion: “[c]riminal trespass

statutes do not afford a substitute for other adequate civil remedies for trespass.”

State v. Hohman, 14 Ohio App.3d 142, 143, 470 N.E.2d 162 (12th Dist.1983).

However, in addition to the fact Hohman did not involve any charge except criminal

trespass, that case is distinguishable because it arose from a criminal complaint filed

by a private citizen (not an indictment issued by a grand jury). Id. at 142. The

appellate court in Hohman found the State had failed to show proof beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant was without privilege to be at a nursing home

(the premises at issue) because evidence indicated several nursing home residents

had requested his presence there. Id. at 143. The quote relied on by Choudri was

dicta from the appellate court, used to express its disapproval for what it found “was

not an appropriate remedy for the situation presented.” Id.

       {¶25} Choudri’s first assignment of error is overruled.

              B.     Second Assignment of Error

       {¶26} In her second assignment of error, Choudri contends her conviction

for trespass-in-a-habitation was not supported by the manifest weight of the

evidence and, therefore, must be reversed. As with her sufficiency-of-the-evidence

argument addressed above, Choudri relies on the assertion that she had a valid

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Case No. 9-22-70

privilege to be present on the property as a landlord for the purpose of inspecting

and/or repairing the hot water tank, so she cannot be found guilty of the offense.

                       i.    Standard of Review

       {¶27} The “manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to

the state’s burden of persuasion.” Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-

4562, at ¶ 26. “To evaluate a claim that a jury verdict is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine whether in resolving

conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new trial.”

State v. Wilks, 154 Ohio St.3d 359, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing Thompkins, 78

Ohio St.3d at 387. Yet, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs

heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s

judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9,

quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.

                       ii.   Analysis

       {¶28} For the same reasons we rejected Choudri’s sufficiency-of-the-

evidence argument, we reject Choudri’s manifest-weight-of-the-evidence argument.

In short, the evidence (particularly State’s Exhibit 1—Officer Jager’s bodycam

video) establishes, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the offense and that

Choudri’s entry was not privileged to simply enter the residence for the purpose of

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Case No. 9-22-70

using the restroom. We do not find the jury clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that we must reverse the conviction and order a new

trial. Choudri’s second assignment of error is overruled.

              C.     Third Assignment of Error

       {¶29} In her third assignment of error, Choudri argues that, due to the

alleged lack of specificity in the Bill of Particulars, she was unaware until after the

close of the State’s case-in-chief that the charges in Count 2 arose from the second

entry into Brammer’s house.       Therefore, according to Choudri, she “was not

adequately informed regarding the nature and cause of the accusation against her

and was prejudiced by the lack of clarity and specificity within the Indictment and/or

the Bill of Particulars.” (Appellant’s Brief at 23).

                       i.    Applicable Law

       {¶30} “Even if the bill of particulars is insufficient in itself, the defendant

must show that lack of knowledge of certain facts required to be placed in the bill

of particulars prejudiced his ability to fairly defend himself.” State v. Donkers, 11th

Dist. Portage Nos. 2003 P 0135 and 2003 P 0136, 2007-Ohio-1557, ¶ 140, citing

State v. Chinn, 85 Ohio St.3d 548, 569, 709 N.E.2d 1166 (1999); see also State v.

Sellards, 17 Ohio St.3d 169, 172, 478 N.E.2d 781 (1985) (“inexactitude” in a bill of

particulars may be fatal “if the absence of specifics truly prejudices the accused’s

ability to fairly defend himself”).

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Case No. 9-22-70

       {¶31} Additionally, the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that

“[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the indictment, information, or

complaint (other than failure to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an

offense”) must be raised before trial. Crim.R. 12(C)(2). If not raised before trial,

then “our review of the alleged error must proceed under the plain error rule of

Crim.R. 52(B).” State v. Avery, 126 Ohio App.3d 36, 42, 709 N.E.2d 875 (3d Dist.

1998) (defendant-appellant alleged the bill of particulars was not specific enough to

alert him to the prosecution’s theory relating to one of the charges). Among other

requirements to qualify for plain-error relief, the appellant must establish that the

error affected the trial’s outcome. State v. Morgan, 153 Ohio St.3d 196, 2017-Ohio-

7565, ¶ 36. “Notice of plain error under CrimR. 52(B) is to be taken with the utmost

caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage

of justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three

of the syllabus.

                       ii.   Analysis

       {¶32} We will assume, without deciding, that the Bill of Particulars here was

insufficient. Specifically, we will assume the State needed to indicate in the Bill of

Particulars—whether by identifying the exact time of the offense or otherwise—that

Count 2 related to Choudri’s second entry. We still must determine if Choudri has

shown not knowing that fact prejudiced her ability to fairly defend herself. E.g.,

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Donkers, 2007-Ohio-1557, at ¶ 140; City of Mayfield Hts. v. Barry, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 95771, 2011-Ohio-2665, ¶ 45-46.

       {¶33} We first address Choudri’s assertion she was prejudiced because “the

lack of specificity in the Bill of Particulars allowed the State of Ohio to continue to

explore new theories of potential violations once others had not panned out in the

State’s case-in-chief.” (Appellant’s Brief at 23). This claim is mere speculation by

Choudri. To us, it is possible the State’s theory was simply one that Choudri’s

counsel failed to recognize until the trial court requested clarification prior to

hearing Choudri’s Crim.R. 29 motion. Choudri says Counts 1 and 2 had “identical

phrasing” and that “identifying ‘Criminal Damaging’ as the listed criminal offense

[in both counts] caused Ms. Choudri to believe both Counts were in reference to the

allegation regarding Mr. Brammer’s broken cell phone.” (Appellant’s Brief at 23).

However, there is no mention of a cell phone in either the Indictment or the Bill of

Particulars, and the two counts are not identical. For example, Count 1 (for

aggravated burglary) alleges that Choudri inflicted, or attempted or threatened to

inflict, physical harm on Brammer; Count 2 makes no such allegation.

       {¶34} Furthermore, based on Officer Jagger’s bodycam video, the language

regarding Count 2 in both the Indictment and the Bill of Particulars corresponded

with the second entry. Choudri was kicking the front door upon the officer’s arrival.

She ignored the officer’s instructions and pushed her way past Brammer into the

house where he was living. Brammer complains on the video that Choudri damaged

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Case No. 9-22-70

his cell phone as she entered the house the second time. Thus, Officer Jagger’s

bodycam video provided a basis to charge Choudri with burglary concerning the

second entry.

       {¶35} After receiving the Bill of Particulars and the bodycam videos,

Choudri could have, but did not, request another bill of particulars with more

specificity or file a motion asking the Court to compel the State to furnish a more

specific bill of particulars. See, e.g., Avery, 126 Ohio App.3d at 42 (“[t]he record

contains no motion filed by trial counsel objecting to the indictment or requesting a

more specific bill of particulars,” so, “[a]pparently, trial counsel was satisfied with

the information contained therein”). Additionally, when the defendant is made

aware during discovery of actions she is alleged to have committed that could

support the charge filed against her, she is not denied the opportunity to defend

against that charge and no prejudice results if she fails to complain about perceived

insufficient language in the bill of particulars. Id. at 44

       {¶36} Choudri also argues that, due to the alleged lack of clarity and

specificity within the Indictment and/or the Bill of Particulars, her counsel had

prepared for the trial under a singular entry theory. Therefore, according to Choudri,

she was prejudiced in the presentation of her defense because she was allegedly

“prohibited” from “eliciting testimony and evidence from the State’s witnesses on

a new two (2) separate entry theory” and “only questioned the State’s witnesses

under a singular entry theory.” (Appellant’s Brief at 23-24). However, Choudri

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does not explain how she was “prohibited” from eliciting testimony and evidence

from the State’s witnesses regarding the second entry. Nor does the record bear out

this claim. On the contrary, she recalled one of the State’s witnesses in her case-in-

chief. (See Nov. 2, 2022 Tr. at 343, 368, 482-83). Also, after discussing the second

entry during opening statements, her counsel very effectively cross-examined the

State’s witnesses during the State’s case-in-chief.

       {¶37} Additionally, the record indicates Choudri’s counsel was well-

prepared for the trial, including offering evidence and setting forth her defenses

from opening statements through the end of trial: Choudri always had a privilege

to be in the house, never trespassed, and never committed any criminal offenses

inside the property. Mayfield Hts., 2011-Ohio-2665, at ¶ 47 (defendant failed to

show he was prejudiced by the insufficient bill of particulars because the record

indicated defendant’s counsel was well-prepared for trial and offered witnesses to

defend against the charge). Choudri does not argue she would have made any other

defense to the charge of trespass-in-a-habitation had she known Count 2 related to

the second entry. City of Steubenville v. Whittaker, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 17 JE

0025, 2018-Ohio-4014, ¶ 31 (where appellant’s defense to an assault charge at trial

was that she was not present when the assault occurred, and defendant’s counsel

“had the means to find out” when the assault occurred, there was “no indication that

the lack of a bill of particulars actually prejudiced appellant”).

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       {¶38} Ultimately, although Choudri generally claims she was prejudiced by

an alleged lack of clarity and specificity, she “fails to show how knowledge of

certain facts omitted from the bill of particulars would have changed [her] defense.”

Mayfield Hts., 2011-Ohio-2665, at ¶ 47. We find no prejudice to Choudri resulting

from the language in the Indictment or Bill of Particulars. Therefore, Choudri’s

third assignment of error is overruled.

       IV.    CONCLUSION

       {¶39} For the foregoing reasons, Choudri’s assignments of error are

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the Marion County Court of

Common Pleas.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls

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