Court Opinion

ID: 9550392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:56.038622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:29.433374
License: Public Domain

STOWERS, Justice, dissenting. In line with the reasons I espoused in Miller v. New Mexico Department of Transportation, 106 N.M. 253, 256, 741 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1987) (Stowers, J., dissenting), I must dissent in this case. In Miller the majority held that issuing a permit for an oversized vehicle constituted the maintenance of a highway so as to fall within the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity in Section 41-4-ll(A) of the Tort Claims Act, Sections 41-4-1 to -29 (Repl.Pamp.1986). In this case, the majority opinion holds that a dog bite is within the purview of the operation or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings so as to come within the waiver of immunity in Section 41-4-6. Once again, as in the Miller case, to ask the question— does a dog bite constitute the operation or maintenance of any building? — is to answer it, and the answer must be no. In the instant case, the majority opinion clearly ignores the legislative intent of the Tort Claims Act and the clear meaning of the language contained therein. In New Mexico, governmental immunity exists except with respect to eight classes of activities which are specifically set out as exemptions in the Tort Claims Act, Sections 41-4-5 to -12. The legislative declaration embodied within Section 41-4-2(A) states: “[I]t is declared to be the public policy of New Mexico that governmental entities and public employees shall only be liable within the limitations of the Tort Claims Act * * In addition, Section 41-4-4 states that governmental entities and public employees, while acting within the scope of their duties, shall be immune from liability for any tort except as waived by the Act. The public policy declaration of Section 41-4-2, and the immunities provision of Section 41-4-4, taken together, require that a plaintiffs cause of action must fit within one of the exceptions to the immunity granted to governmental entities and public employees. Only if immunity has been waived may the particular agency that caused the harm be held liable for the negligent act or omission of the public employee. Castillo claims that the waiver of immunity in Section 41-4-6 should apply in this case to allow a cause of action against the County of Santa Fe Housing Authority. That section waives immunity for injuries “caused by the negligence of public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation or maintenance of any building, public park, machinery, equipment or furnishings.” (emphasis added). As correctly interpreted in Wittkowski v. State, 103 N.M. 526, 530, 710 P.2d 93, 97 (Ct.App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 446, 708 P.2d 1047 (1985), overruled on other grounds, Silva v. State, 106 N.M. 472, 745 P.2d 380 (1987), this section covers injuries which have occurred as a result of a physical defect in the building. In interpreting a statute, the words used will be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless the contrary is apparent. See Methola v. County of Eddy, 95 N.M. 329, 333, 622 P.2d 234, 238 (1980). Thus, I must agree with the holding of the court of appeals that, according to the plain meaning of Section 41-4-6, it is not within the contemplation of that section to include in the “operation or maintenance of any building [or] public park” the enforcement of animal control statutes. To hold otherwise would expand the “operation or maintenance of any building” exception far beyond its purpose and intent and do violence to the will of the legislature. Today’s decision overextends the waiver of immunity provision in 41-4-6 to include a cause of action never contemplated therein, and, it comes close to transforming the county housing authority into an insurer for injuries caused by domesticated animals who might roam the public areas. In essence, it constitutes judicial legislation, which we have stated repeatedly we will not do. For these reasons, I dissent. SCARBOROUGH, C.J., joins in dissent.