Court Opinion

ID: 9964841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 22:07:40.482998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:44.265822
License: Public Domain

04/30/2024

                                          DA 21-0086
                                                                                           Case Number: DA 21-0086

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2024 MT 87

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

LUKE STROMMEN,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Valley, Cause No. DC 2018-32
                       Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Jason T. Holden, Katie R. Ranta, Faure Holden Attorneys at Law, P.C.,
                       Great Falls, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty,
                       Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Dylan Jensen, Valley County Attorney, Dan Guzynski, Special Deputy
                       County Attorney, Glasgow, Montana

                                                   Submitted on Briefs: February 8, 2023

                                                               Decided: April 30, 2024

Filed:

                                 ' ,-6.•--if
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Dirk Sandefur delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    Luke Strommen appeals his January 2021 judgment of conviction in the Montana

Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Valley County, on the offense of Sexual Intercourse

Without Consent (SIWC). We address the following dispositive issue:

      Whether the District Court erroneously allowed the State to present adverse expert
      testimony remotely via two-way video conferencing at trial?

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

                 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶2    In October 2018, the State formally charged Strommen with Sexual Abuse of

Children (child pornography) based on alleged possession of digital images of then

17-year-old S.B. engaged in sexual activity. Strommen and S.B. were previously engaged

in a year-long sexual relationship after meeting in 2014 while he was employed as a Valley

County Deputy Sheriff. He pled not guilty and trial was set for May 2019.

¶3    In December 2018, the State filed an Amended Information charging Strommen

with SIWC after then 23-year-old J.R. reported in November 2018 that she and Strommen

were engaged in an ongoing sexual relationship in 2009-11. J.R. alleged that the sexual

relationship began when she was babysitting Strommen’s children at age 14.            The

relationship continued until J.R. moved away at age 16. Strommen pled not guilty under

the Amended Information and trial was set on both charges for July 2019. Trial was later

reset for October 2019 on Strommen’s speedy trial waiver and unopposed motion for a

continuance. The charges were subsequently severed for separate trials with the child

                                            2
pornography charge maintained for trial in October 2019, and the SIWC charge set for trial

in March 2020.

¶4    In September 2019, in advance of the scheduled child pornography trial, the State

filed a Second Amended Information adding a third charge, Attempted Sexual Abuse of

Children, an additional or alternative child pornography charge. Strommen pled not guilty,

and the new charge was set for trial with the original child pornography charge in October

2019. In advance of trial, however, Strommen pled guilty to the original charge under a

written plea agreement in return for dismissal of the attempted child pornography charge,

and a particular State sentencing recommendation on the original charge. In February

2020, the District Court sentenced Strommen in accordance with the parties’ agreed

sentencing recommendation.

¶5    In advance of the SIWC trial set for March 2020, the State filed a “contingent

motion” on February 21, 2020, seeking leave to present the retained expert testimony of a

sexual assault behavioral psychologist (Dr. Sheri Vanino) remotely via two-way video

conferencing at trial. The motion asserted that the expert testimony was necessary to aid

jury understanding of the typical psychology of young sexual assault victims, and thus why

they typically do not contemporaneously report sexual assault. The motion explained that

Dr. Vanino: (1) lived and practiced in or about Denver, Colorado; (2) regularly conducted

weekly Tuesday night therapy sessions for parents of child sexual assault victims; and

(3) thus might “be unable to” travel to Montana to personally testify at the scheduled

March 9th trial “due to a scheduling conflict” with her regular Tuesday night therapy

sessions. The State asserted that it would be “impracticable” for Dr. Vanino to miss or

                                            3
reschedule her March 10th therapy session due to her coordination of her counseling of

child sexual assault victims and their parents. The motion asserted that the prosecutor was

still “actively working” to secure her personal presence at trial, but sought “contingent”

leave for her to testify remotely if necessary. At a pretrial conference on February 26,

2020, the prosecutor advised that he had since confirmed that Dr. Vanino had a definite

irreconcilable scheduling conflict with her regular Tuesday night therapy sessions. The

State therefore sought unqualified leave for her to testify via video conferencing remotely

from Colorado.

¶6     Strommen objected. He demanded that she testify, if at all, subject to personal

in-court cross-examination. He asserted that personal in-court cross-examination was

particularly essential given that the alleged victim in this case did not report the alleged

sexual intercourse until nine years later, thus implicating an issue as to her credibility as

the primary State’s witness. The prosecutor responded that “[h]aving a trial in Glasgow

obviously complicate[d] travel plans” and that it was thus “not practical” for Dr. Vanino to

travel to Montana for trial despite the State’s “best [efforts] to get her there personally.”

The District Court interjected sua sponte that “the schedule’s always going to get kinked

by the weather,” and thus “there’s no way to guarantee” Dr. Vanino’s personal presence at

the scheduled March trial “given the weather situations up” in Glasgow. The Court then

granted the State’s motion from the bench “for all the reasons noted by the State,” and the

“additional reasons . . . just articulated.” A corresponding written order followed on

March 5, 2020. However, the scheduled March 9th trial was subsequently continued until

                                             4
July 2020 based on an uncontested defense motion alleging newly-disclosed exculpatory

evidence.

¶7     In March 2020, the Governor of the State of Montana declared a state of emergency

in Montana due to the emergent Covid-19 pandemic. The Chief Justice of this Court

thereafter issued the first of several Judicial Branch and courtroom administration protocols

regarding the Covid-19 crisis. As pertinent here, the Judicial Branch guidelines pertained

to the scheduling and conduct of jury trials, jury administration procedures, use of video

and telephonic conferencing for scheduled hearings, and limitation of non-essential travel

for judicial branch employees.1 The travel guidelines applied exclusively to judicial branch

employees, however, and nothing in the courtroom administration guidelines authorized

remote video or teleconferencing testimony of State witnesses in criminal trials.

¶8     In May 2020, two months before the scheduled July 2020 trial, the District Court

notified the parties of its sua sponte intent to issue Covid-19 safety guidelines for the

conduct of Strommen’s trial.         In a subsequent May 20th order, the court issued

case-specific Covid-19 protocols including restrictions on public participation, modified

jury questionnaires, and granting “all witnesses” the option to testify remotely “via zoom

or other available video” conferencing platform.2

1
  Subsequent directives/orders regarding Covid followed on March 17th, 20th, and 27th,
April 27th, May 22nd, and December 21st, 2020; and, finally, on May 17, 2021
(https://wayback.archive-it.org/499/20230302044740//http://courts.mt.gov/).
2
 The record reflects that the court issued a similar order on May 13th, but of which, for reasons
unclear, the parties were not aware until email receipt of a back-dated duplicate on June 15, 2020.

                                                5
¶9     On June 1, 2020, Strommen moved for an indefinite trial postponement “until the

pandemic resolves” on the asserted grounds that the District Court’s blanket authorization

of remote witness testimony at trial would violate his right to “face-to-face” confrontation

of witnesses under U.S. Const. amend. VI and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. The State opposed

the motion on the asserted grounds that the prosecutor had experienced no “resistance” in

scheduling the personal presence of slated state witnesses, and was aware of only one

possible unconfirmed exception. The State thus asserted that it intended to have only one

witness testify remotely—Dr. Vanino as previously authorized by pre-Covid court order in

March 2020. On June 15th, the District Court denied Strommen’s continuance motion on

the stated ground that its previously specified Covid-19 safety procedures would not

infringe upon his trial rights.

¶10    At the final pretrial conference on June 24th, however, the District Court revisited

the question of Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony again, to wit:

       [Court]:     So Dr. Vanino’s situation is specifically what? I think the process is
                    going to be for any witness who requests a video appearance and
                    testimony is to, again, have an offer of proof as to why. . . . [W]hat’s
                    the specific reason for [Dr. Vanino’s] video testimony?

       [State]:     . . . The specifics of Dr. Vanino’s testimony is that she has a significant
                    conflict . . . unrelated to Covid. She has a parent group that she does
                    every Tuesday night. And if she doesn’t do her part, lots of children’s
                    parents—these are children that have been sexually abused. The
                    children’s group cannot go forward. . . . As the Court recalls, the last
                    trial was back in March before Covid, and this Court issued an
                    order . . . that allowed her to testi[fy] [remotely] . . . unrelated to Covid.

                    Now since we had [the District Court’s subsequent May 2020 Covid
                    trial protocol] order, . . . I have not circled back to Dr. Vanino to ask her
                    specifically if there’s been any Covid-related circumstances that make
                    it difficult for her to travel. I didn’t ask her that question because the

                                               6
                    Court had already allowed her video testimony . . . before the Covid
                    situation surfaced. . . . [H]er situation is she has a significant
                    commitment that she cannot get out of Tuesday night that would be right
                    in our case-in-chief that she can’t miss.

                    And she is an out-of-state witness; she lives in Denver, Colorado—or
                    the Denver area[] [a]nd it’s significant travel for her to get to Glasgow,
                    Montana, as well, I think that plays into it. And the Court granted our
                    motion back in March.

       [Court]:     [The March 2020 order] was before the Covid issue arose
                    and . . . before the last trial . . . in March . . . [which was] under our
                    general protocol . . . both with crime lab witnesses and other
                    experts . . . to accommodate [their] schedules[.]

                    I’m not at all excited about bringing someone through the Denver
                    airport, sitting on an airplane, and then bringing them up to Glasgow
                    under the Covid situation.          So even though I granted [the
                    motion] . . . with[out] the Covid overlay I would be extremely reluctant
                    to withdraw that order approving that testimony.

(Emphasis added.)

¶11    Strommen’s trial began on Monday, July 13, 2020, as scheduled. Pursuant to the

court’s prior pre-Covid authorization in March 2020, as reaffirmed at the June 24th pretrial

conference unrelated to any asserted Covid concern or justification, the State presented

Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony via video conferencing on Wednesday morning, July 15th.3

Aside from her acknowledged awareness of some general case-related facts, she gave

3
  The State attempted to present Dr. Vanino’s remote video testimony as its first witness on
Tuesday morning. However, because the audio-video transmission lagged and faded-out during
her direct examination, thus preventing the courtroom audience from “picking up everything she
[was] saying,” the State aborted and postponed her testimony until the following day in order to
resolve “those technical issues.” Some problem persisted the next day insofar that the State asked
Dr. Vanino to “slow down” because, “even though the connection is pretty good,” “it is more
challenging that you are not in person to hear at times.” In response to a related District Court
inquiry, Dr. Vanino said “usually I can . . . see the jury,” but under the remote arrangement, “I
can’t see the jury, which would be normal,” but otherwise, “the connection is really good.”

                                                7
non-case-specific testimony regarding typical behaviors of child sexual assault victims

regarding reporting and the criminal justice system, including the high incidence of their

failure to report such incidents until much later. She also testified to the general personality

traits and temperaments of sexual assault perpetrators, the dynamics of their relationships

with teenage victims, why teenagers are particularly at-risk for sexual abuse, how

perpetrators capitalize on their vulnerabilities/groom victims, reasons why teenage victims

participate in and are complicit in concealing sexual abuse, reasons why teenage victims

ultimately come forward and to whom, and the effects of memory and the passage of time

on teenage victim accounts of past sexual abuse.

¶12    On defense cross-examination, the following facts came out regarding the State’s

previously asserted justification for Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony:

       [Defense]: [W]hen we talked on the phone [in February], you were in Denver.

       [Doctor]:    Correct.

       [Defense]: And where are you today?

       [Doctor]:    I’m in Massachusetts . . . in Nantucket.

       [Defense]: . . . And yesterday was a Tuesday, correct?

       [Doctor]:    Correct.

       [Defense]: And you talked with [the prosecutor] about a parent group counselling
                  that you run on Tuesday evenings?

       [Doctor]:    Yes.

       [Defense]: Did you participate in that group yesterday?

       [Doctor]:    No, we’re not able to do in-person therapy due to Covid. . . . So those
                    services are on pause right now.

                                               8
       [Defense]: And you don’t hold that group via video?

       [Doctor]:   No.

       [Defense]: And you mentioned Covid, are you in quarantine?

       [Doctor]:   No, I’m not.

       [Defense]: So you could have been here today in person?

       [State]:    Objection, Your Honor. The court has expressly given her permission
                   to be [here] by video.

       [Court]:    The court has; there’s an order of the court, so we can proceed to other
                   issues, [counsel].

(Emphasis added.) During the midday recess, out of the presence of the jury, Strommen

moved for a mistrial based, inter alia, on the conflict between the State’s representations

to the court regarding Dr. Vanino’s inability to testify in-person due to the purported

scheduling conflict in Denver and her sworn testimony that morning. The prosecutor

responded:

       [State]:    I’ve had [Dr. Vanino] testify a few times. And I’ve always wanted her
                   to go before the victim and talk about general characteristics of sexual
                   abuse victims prior to the victim testifying. . . . [A]ll I’ve ever heard
                   from [her] about this [is] that she has this scheduling conflict, and she
                   will not miss it for anything, it goes on every week. When I have ever
                   made a representation to this court, it was a mindset that she always has
                   a Tuesday night scheduling conflict. It seems like there may have been
                   times that I could get her here earlier in the day Monday to testify or
                   earlier Tuesday, but it’s always been this time. So when we made that
                   representation back in March, pre-Covid, I’m quite sure she had that
                   meeting on Tuesday night. . . . It was our inability to get her
                   here . . . [t]hat prompted our motion because she would not miss this
                   Tuesday night thing with these parents who had children who are
                   sexually abused.

       [Court]:    . . . I understand but now we are in Covid . . . [a]nd she is in Nantucket.

                                             9
      [State]:    Yep, and she’s in Covid and she’s in Nantucket. . . . I—personally, I
                  don’t think that I was really aware where I was meeting her or where
                  she was going to come on TV. But anyways, I think the Court made a
                  lot of sense, I think it was this court, . . . do we really want to bring
                  someone through the Denver airport with Covid?

¶13   In denying Strommen’s motion for a mistrial, the court inquired of defense counsel:

      [Court]:    You don’t know when she went to Nantucket or how long she’s been in
                  Nantucket, right? . . . [O]r if she has family [t]here?

      [Defense]: Well, it appears from my research that she has a family home there and
                 she vacations there in July each year.

      [Court]:    Is it surprising to you that a lot of people who have vacation homes in
                  Montana are beginning to spend more time in Montana? . . . During the
                  Covid crisis, sometimes Montana vacation homes are a little more
                  attractive to people now, particularly when they are out of
                  large areas. Nantucket, in my estimation, is not as large as
                  Denver. . . . There’s about five million people or two million people in
                  Denver; my guess is Nantucket is very small. So my point is, that
                  there’s a lot of reasons that she could be there. We didn’t get into that.

      [Defense]: No.

      [Court]:    . . . We have a huge public health crisis. . . . I’m not going to run people
                  through however many airports it’s going to take to get them here when
                  I can do this. And historically, before Covid, I’ve done and I bet you’ve
                  seen . . . a crime lab witness on screen. . . . I’ve done a lot of them, and
                  I do a lot of them, even though I’m in Missoula, and the crime lab is in
                  Missoula. We have got to accommodate these folks, and so I allowed
                  that to be done.

                  I guess it’s a little surprising where she is, but I believe that we
                  accomplished what we needed by having a clear record made, an
                  opportunity for you to do your examination, and not any unnecessary
                  exposure to anyone in this courtroom with whatever might be picked up
                  between Nantucket and here. So for public safety reasons and, frankly,
                  trial administration, I think that a lot of judges in this state are using
                  Zoom for lots of different things. It’s very convenient, not only
                  for the witness, but sometimes for the attorneys. . . . So there’s a lot of
                  advantages to Zoom and . . . it’s a benefit to the legal system in Montana

                                            10
                    and to the jury system. . . . And from [Dr. Vanino’s] perspective she
                    could see you and hear you and [the prosecutor] as well. . . . [I]n this
                    particular witness, and this particular case, in this particular time, I think
                    we’re keeping everybody safe, and we’re getting this trial presented in
                    a very fair and open fashion.

(Emphasis added.)

¶14    At the close of the five-day trial, the jury found Strommen guilty of SIWC, and he

was ultimately sentenced to a 40-year prison term. Strommen timely appeals.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶15    Under our plenary review of lower court conclusions and applications of

constitutional law, we review alleged violations of the fundamental right of the criminally

accused to confront adverse witnesses under U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV, and Mont.

Const. art. II, § 24, de novo for correctness. State v. Mercier, 2021 MT 12, ¶¶ 11-12, 403

Mont. 34, 479 P.3d 967; State v. Stock, 2011 MT 131, ¶¶ 16-17, 361 Mont. 1, 256 P.3d

899; State v. Norquay, 2011 MT 34, ¶ 13, 359 Mont. 257, 248 P.3d 817.

                                        DISCUSSION

¶16    Whether the District Court erroneously allowed the State to present adverse expert
       testimony remotely via two-way video conferencing at trial?

¶17    As applied to the State through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

guarantees that the criminally “accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with

[adverse] witnesses.”4 U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV. The Sixth Amendment thus

4
 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965) (Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause applies to the States through Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).

                                               11
generally guarantees the criminally accused the “right to meet” adverse witnesses “face to

face” at trial. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-21, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802-03 (1988)

(noting “irreducible literal meaning” of Confrontation Clause—citation omitted);

Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3162-63 (1990) (Coy

“interpretation” derives from “literal text” of United States Constitution and “historical

roots” thereof). The Montana Constitution similarly guarantees that the criminally

“accused shall have the right . . . to meet [adverse] witnesses . . . face to face.” Mont.

Const. art. II, § 24. The purpose of the federal and state constitutional rights to personal,

in-court face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses is to:

       ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by
       subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
       proceeding[,] . . . [a purpose fulfilled by] guarantee[ing] the defendant a
       face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of
       fact . . . [which] is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.

Craig, 497 U.S. at 844-46, 110 S. Ct. at 3162-63 (quoting Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016, 108 S.

Ct. at 2801, inter alia—emphasis added). Accord Mercier, ¶ 16 (citing Craig, supra, and

Coy, 487 U.S. at 1019, 108 S. Ct. at 2801 (“[i]t is always more difficult to tell a lie about a

person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back’”—“[e]ven if a lie is told, it will often

be . . . less convincing[]”)).

¶18    Under the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24, the right to confront and

cross-examine adverse witnesses personally face-to-face generally applies to all

“testimonial” statements offered as evidence adverse to a criminally accused at trial.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 and 68-69, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 and 1374

(2004). Accord Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 357-58, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011).

                                              12
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24, a statement is

“testimonial” when the “primary purpose” of the declarant’s statement is to establish,

report, or prove relevant factual matters to aid in the “criminal prosecution” of another.

Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (distinguishing

“nontestimonial” statements, for example, as those made for the primary purpose of

“enabl[ing] police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”). See also Ohio v. Clark,

576 U.S. 237, 245-46 and 248-49, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180-82 (2015) (“primary purpose”

test determines whether subject statements are “testimonial” under Crawford); Crawford,

541 U.S. at 52-61, 124 S. Ct. at 1364-70 (noting various types of constitutionally

“testimonial” statements).5 The Sixth Amendment, and similar protection provided by

Mont. Const. art. II, § 24, thus bar prosecution evidence regarding “testimonial” statements

made without face-to-face confrontation except upon a showing either that (1) the declarant

is “unavailable” for trial and the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination

regarding that matter, or (2) the subject out-of-court statement not subject to face-to-face

cross-examination “would have been admissible in a criminal case at the time of the

founding.” Clark, 576 U.S. at 243 and 245-46, 135 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (citing Crawford,

541 U.S. at 56 n.6, 124 S. Ct. at 1367 (inter alia noting “dying declarations” as an example

5
  Thus, for example, “[t]he [Confrontation] Clause . . . does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Crawford, 541
U.S. at 59 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369. Accord Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 79, 132 S. Ct. 2221,
2240 (2012) (if trial court “did not rely on the statement in question for its truth, there is simply
no way around the proviso in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause applies only to out-of-court
statements that are used to establish the truth of the matter asserted”—citing Crawford, 541 U.S.
at 59 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1369, punctuation omitted).

                                                 13
of Framers-era exception to common law principle embodied in Sixth Amendment));6

Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357-59 and 370, 131 S. Ct. at 1155-56 and 1162 (“basic objective of

the Confrontation Clause . . . is to prevent the accused from being deprived of the

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about statements taken for use at trial”—

evidentiary hearsay rule standards “designed to identify some statements as reliable,

will be relevant” to “the primary purpose determination” but “court must [ultimately]

determine . . . [declarant’s] primary purpose . . . by objective[] evaluati[on] [of] the

statements and actions of the parties” under the totality of the circumstances); Crawford,

541 U.S. at 59 and 68-69, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 and 1374 (“Roberts notwithstanding7 . . . the

only indicium of reliability” of testimonial statements “sufficient to satisfy constitutional

demands is the one the [Sixth Amendment] actually prescribes: confrontation”); Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74-75, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (1980) (state burden to show declarant

unavailability under narrow circumstances when out-of-court statements not barred by

6
 “The Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did
not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. The text of the Sixth Amendment . . . is most naturally read as
a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions
established at the time of the founding. . . . [T]he common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility
of an absent witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54,
124 S. Ct. at 1365-66.
7
 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (1980) (out-of-court statements generally
admissible at trial under Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause only if government shows that
declarant is “unavailable” for trial and the statements bear adequate “indicia of reliability,” which
may “be inferred . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”—internal citation omitted), implicitly overruled by
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-69, 124 S. Ct. at 1371-74.

                                                 14
Sixth Amendment), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62-69,

124 S. Ct. at 1371-74.

¶19    However, the United States Supreme Court, and this Court following the Sixth

Amendment lead of the Supreme Court, have recognized a narrow “important public

policy” exception to the face-to-face confrontation requirement when an accused is

nonetheless afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at trial via modern video

conferencing technology.      See Craig, 497 U.S. at 844-59, 110 S. Ct. at 3162-71

(recognizing inter alia that “face-to-face confrontation forms the core of the values”

embedded in the Confrontation Clause but “must occasionally give way to considerations

of public policy and the necessities of the case”—punctuation and citations omitted);

Mercier, ¶¶ 15, 17-21, and 26-28 (applying Craig exception to two-way video

conferencing under Mont. Const. art. II, § 24); City of Missoula v. Duane, 2015 MT 232,

¶¶ 14-16 and 20-21, 380 Mont. 290, 355 P.3d 729 (recognizing and analyzing Craig

exception to two-way video conferencing under Mont. Const. art. II, § 24). Accordingly,

the trial testimony of a prosecution witness is admissible via two-way video conferencing

under the Craig exception upon an affirmative case-specific prosecutorial showing, and

corresponding trial court findings, that (1) the witness is “unavailable” for personal

face-to-face cross-examination in the courtroom, and (2) denial of such personal

face-to-face cross-examination is “necessary to further an important public policy” with

“the reliability of the testimony . . . otherwise assured.” Mercier, ¶¶ 15, 17-21, and 26-28;

Duane, ¶¶ 14-16 and 20-21; Craig, 497 U.S. at 847-50 and 855-59, 110 S. Ct. at 3164-66

and 3169-70. The first element of the Craig exception—witness unavailability—requires

                                             15
a case-specific prosecution showing and corresponding court finding “that the personal

presence of the witness is impossible or impracticable to secure due to” extraordinary

distance, expense, or health “considerations.” State v. Bailey, 2021 MT 157, ¶ 42, 404

Mont. 384, 489 P.3d 889 (quoting Duane, ¶ 25); State v. Walsh, 2023 MT 33, ¶¶ 9-11,

411 Mont. 244, 525 P.3d 343; Mercier, ¶¶ 19-20 and 26-28 (“face-to-face

confrontation . . . may be compromised . . . only upon a case-specific finding” that it is

“necessary to further an important public policy”—punctuation and citation omitted).

Implicit in the required showing under the first Craig exception element is an affirmative

showing of “a good-faith” prosecutorial “effort to obtain” the witness’s “presence at trial.”

See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75, 100 S. Ct. at 2543 (unavailability requirement for Sixth

Amendment confrontation exception—citation omitted); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,

724-25, 88 S. Ct. 1318, 1322 (1968); Norquay, ¶¶ 21-22 (citing State v. Hart, 2009 MT

268, ¶ 24, 352 Mont. 92, 214 P.3d 1273 (noting similar implicit requirement of M. R. Evid.

804(a)—citing Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25, 88 S. Ct. at 1322)). See also Crawford, 541

U.S. at 57, 124 S. Ct. at 1367-68 (citing Barber). The good-faith effort requirement does

not require the State to make a “futile” effort, such as when a witness has died, but may

require “affirmative measures” when there is a reasonable possibility, however remote, that

such effort “might” secure the declarant’s personal presence for trial. Roberts, 448 U.S. at

74-75, 100 S. Ct. at 2543. “The lengths to which the prosecution must go . . . is a question

of reasonableness” under the circumstances. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75, 100 S. Ct. at 2543

(citation omitted).    The “ultimate question” is thus whether the prosecution has

affirmatively shown that the witness is unavailable to personally testify at trial upon

                                             16
reasonable “good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75, 100

S. Ct. at 2543 (citation omitted).

¶20    Under the second Craig exception element, mere judicial economy or a generalized

assertion, showing, or finding of significant travel burden or logistical expense or

inconvenience is generally insufficient alone to constitute an important public policy

justification for dispensing with actual face-to-face confrontation. Mercier, ¶¶ 26-28;

State v. Martell, 2021 MT 318, ¶ 12, 406 Mont. 488, 500 P.3d 1233 (citing Mercier and

Bailey); Bailey, ¶ 42 (showing that witness not reasonably available for trial “does not

obviate” prosecutorial burden to further show “that dispensing with” personal in-court

confrontation and cross-examination is “necessary to further an important public policy”).

Even then, the second Craig exception element still requires “the hallmarks of

confrontation”: (1) the witness “must be under oath and understand the seriousness of his

or her testimony”; (2) the witness must be “subject to cross-examination”; and (3) the

remote audio-video technology platform must be of sufficient means and quality to allow

meaningful “assessment of the witness’s veracity by the factfinder.” Mercier, ¶¶ 17 and

21 (citing Duane, ¶ 15, and Craig, 497 U.S. at 857, 110 S. Ct. at 3170, inter alia). See also

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 and 68-69, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 and 1374 (“the only indicium of

reliability” of testimonial statements “sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is” as

“actually prescribe[d]” by the Sixth Amendment).

¶21    We have carefully guarded the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24,

rights of an accused to physical face-to-face confrontation at trial by holding the State and

trial courts to their respective burdens under the Craig exception. See, e.g., Walsh, ¶¶ 5

                                             17
and 9-11 (affirming allowance of remote video testimony of prosecution expert on

“substantive[] detailed findings about the health and logistical challenges involved in

attempting to bring” the witness “from Greece” due to 11,000-mile trip, 30-hour flight

time, “significant time in airports . . . for multiple layovers,” logistical difficulties imposed

by Covid-19 pandemic protocols, and heightened risk of Covid-19 contraction and

spreading health risks to witness, court personnel, and other witnesses posed by disregard

of national warnings to avoid air travel to and from Greece); Duane, ¶¶ 6, 21, and 25

(affirming allowance of remote video testimony of prosecution expert upon “compelling

showing” and court finding that “extraordinary [city] expense” and “significant [witness]

burden” made bringing veterinarian witness from California for “three separate

[misdemeanor] trials” regarding the same subject matter “impossible or impracticable”).

See also Mercier, ¶ 20 (emphasizing unique factual circumstances at issue in Duane). We

have thus rejected lesser showings, assertions, and findings in order to protect the

fundamental Montana and U.S. constitutional right to personal face-to-face courtroom

cross-examination from diminution in the face of ever-advancing video conferencing

technology. See, e.g., Martell, ¶¶ 3, 13, 15, and 27 (state assertion that requiring witness

to travel from Washington for “only a few minutes [of] testimony” would be “overly

burdensome” and “unnecessarily expensive” insufficient to justify non-harmless denial of

defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation); Bailey, ¶¶ 11, 43-45, and 49 (allowance of

remote video testimony of State Crime Lab toxicologist not harmless error where only

asserted justification was that “requiring” full-day “travel [to and] from Missoula to Helena

for brief testimony would be impracticable due to distance, expense, and timing”—“vague

                                               18
and unverified claims of the burden” imposed upon state or witness insufficient for denial

of defendant’s right to physical face-to-face confrontation at trial); Mercier, ¶¶ 6, 19-20,

and 26-28 (rejecting state assertion that “pursuant to the public policy of judicial economy[]

it was unreasonable to incur significant travel expenses and inconveniences” of requiring

federal agent to travel from Colorado for what the state “deemed” as “purely foundational”

testimony regarding his forensic cell phone data extraction analysis and report findings).

¶22    On appeal, the State now relies solely on its assertion that Dr. Vanino’s remote video

testimony was justified in furtherance of “public health” and to protect courtroom staff and

trial participants from the risk of Covid-19 exposure. The problem is, however, the State

made no such assertion on any of the multiple occasions on which the issue arose below,

whether in support of its “contingent” February 21st motion, at the pre-Covid pretrial

conference on February 26th, the post-Covid pretrial conference on June 24th, or even in

opposition to Strommen’s mid-trial motion for mistrial. Rather, the State consistently

asserted below that Dr. Vanino’s remote video testimony was necessary due to an

irreconcilable scheduling conflict with her regularly scheduled Tuesday night private

practice therapy session in Denver. Even to that extent, the State asserted no particularized

reason, much less made an affirmative showing, as to why or on what basis it was

impossible or impractical for Dr. Vanino to alternatively reschedule her regularly

scheduled Tuesday night therapy session, conduct it by remote video conferencing from

Montana, or immediately fly to Montana thereafter to testify at some other time during the

                                             19
multi-day trial.8 Nor did the State seek leave to earlier depose her in Montana subject to

personal face-to-face cross-examination at another available time.9                 In response to

Strommen’s objection, the State generally asserted only that “having a trial in Glasgow

obviously complicated travel plans,” and it was “not practical” for her to travel to Montana

for trial despite the State’s “best” efforts “to get her there personally.” The District Court

thus initially granted the State’s motion and allowed Dr. Vanino to testify remotely “for all

the reasons [asserted] by the State” and because there was “no way to guarantee”

8
  The record manifests that trial started with jury selection on a Monday morning, and evidence
did not close until late Thursday.
9
  See § 46-15-201, MCA (authorizing pretrial material witness deposition on leave of court on
showing of witness unavailability for trial and necessity “to prevent a failure of justice”); Norquay,
¶¶ 15-28 (pretrial video deposition testimony of prosecution DNA expert under § 46-15-201,
MCA, upon showing of medical unavailability for trial admissible at trial without Confrontation
Clause violation where face-to-face confrontation and cross-examination afforded and video
recording afforded jury “opportunity to view the demeanor of the witness and [thereby] evaluate
her credibility”); Hart, ¶¶ 18-20 and 23-26 (pretrial video deposition testimony of uncooperative
witness admissible at trial without Confrontation Clause violation where witness fled jurisdiction
to avoid trial subpoena, later arrested out-of-state on material witness warrant under § 46-15-201,
MCA, subsequently deposed in Montana subject to face-to-face cross-examination, and disobeyed
subpoena for subsequent trial); Tooker v. State, 147 Mont. 207, 219-20, 410 P.2d 923, 929-30
(1966) (noting Confrontation Clause conformance of criminal deposition procedure authorized by
1889 Mont Const. art. III, §§ 16 and 17—citing Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S. Ct. 250
(1912), Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 472, 20 S. Ct. 993, 998 (1900), and Grove v. United
States, 3 F.2d 965 (4th Cir. 1925)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1938-39
(1970) (Confrontation Clause conformance of subsequent trial admission of prior “preliminary
hearing testimony” of no-longer-available prosecution witness because already subject to
face-to-face cross-examination under “circumstances closely approximating” personal in-court
testimony at trial); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240-44, 15 S. Ct. 337, 338-40 (1895)
(“primary object of” Confrontation Clause—to afford accused “personal examination and
cross-examination” and “compel[]” adverse witness to “stand face to face with the jury” for
witness demeanor and credibility assessment—“must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case” to allow admission on retrial of transcript of original
trial testimony of since-deceased prosecution witnesses—emphasis added).

                                                 20
Dr. Vanino’s personal presence “given the weather situations” in the Glasgow area in

March.

¶23    Nor did the State or District Court assert or rely on any Covid-based concern

regarding Dr. Vanino in the State’s opposition to and the court’s resulting June 15, 2020,

denial of Strommen’s confrontation-based motion for an indefinite trial continuance in

response to the court’s post-Covid grant of a blanket remote testimony option to all

witnesses. The State opposed, and the District Court denied, Strommen’s motion on the

stated grounds that Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony was previously authorized on

independent pre-Covid grounds, and that the State anticipated no Covid-related need for

remote testimony from any other witness. Even when questioned again by the District

Court at the June 24th pretrial conference less than a month before the July 2020 trial, the

State relied exclusively on its originally-asserted pre-Covid justification that Dr. Vanino

had a “significant conflict . . . unrelated to Covid,” and that the court previously authorized

her remote testimony on that ground. The District Court then exclusively stood on its

independent pre-Covid authorization, to wit:

       [though] I’m not at all excited about bringing someone . . . up to Glasgow under the
       Covid situation . . . I would be extremely reluctant to withdraw [my pre-Covid]
       order approving that testimony.

(Emphasis added.)

¶24    Eliminating any doubt, even in opposition to Strommen’s after-the-fact motion for

mistrial, the State still relied on its original non-Covid-related justification for Dr. Vanino’s

remote video testimony. Only as an afterthought did the prosecutor opportunistically

question rhetorically, “[b]ut anyways . . . do we really want to bring someone through the

                                               21
Denver airport with Covid?” (Emphasis added.) Belying that opportunistic rhetoric,

however, was the prosecutor’s concomitant disclosure that the primary State concern all

along was its tactical trial preference for “want[ing]” Dr. Vanino to testify immediately

“before the victim” so she could “talk [in advance] about [the] general characteristics of

sexual abuse victims prior to the victim testifying.” But for that tactical preference, the

prosecutor acknowledged that “there may have been times that [he] could get her [to

Montana to testify for other trials] earlier in the day Monday . . . or earlier Tuesday.”10

Similarly, despite some only generally stated after-the-fact equivocation regarding witness

travel during the Covid scare, the District Court’s stated rationale for denying Strommen’s

after-the-fact mistrial motion clearly manifests that the primary court justification for

allowing Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony was not Covid-related, but rather, its general

practice of accommodating expert witness convenience, to wit:

       [H]istorically, before Covid, I’ve done [that with] . . . crime lab witness[es].
       . . . I’ve done a lot of them . . . even though I’m in Missoula, and the crime
       lab is in Missoula. We have got to accommodate these folks, and so I allowed
       that to be done.

       I guess it’s a little surprising where [Dr. Vanino] is, but . . . we accomplished
       . . . [defense] [cross-]examination [without] any unnecessary exposure to
       anyone in this courtroom with whatever might be picked up between
       Nantucket and here. So for public safety reasons and, frankly, trial
       administration, I think that a lot of judges in this state are using Zoom for
       lots of different things. It’s very convenient, not only for the witness, but
       sometimes for the attorneys. . . . So there’s a lot of advantages to Zoom
       and . . . it’s a benefit to the legal system in Montana and to the jury system.

10
   Compare M. R. Evid. 611(a) (broad trial court discretion to reasonably administer and
“control . . . [the] order of interrogating witnesses” in furtherance of “the ascertainment of the
truth,” inter alia).

                                               22
(Emphasis added.)

¶25    In contrast to the qualifying justifications shown in Walsh and Duane, supra, and

similar to the inadequate justifications asserted in Martell, Bailey, and Mercier, supra, the

State failed to make an adequate case-specific showing, and the District Court failed to

make an adequate case-specific finding, that it would have been impossible or reasonably

impracticable for the State to secure Dr. Vanino’s testimony, or similar testimony from

another qualified expert, for personal in-court presentation at the originally scheduled

March 2020 trial due to an important public policy sufficiently weighty to overcome

Strommen’s federal and state constitutional rights to personal in-court cross-examination

of prosecution witnesses. Nor did the State or District Court respectively make any such

particularized case-specific showing or finding even in the ensuing midst of the burgeoning

Covid-19 crisis. To the contrary, even after March 2020 and prior to the rescheduled July

2020 trial, the State and the District Court continued to stand on the State’s asserted

pre-Covid scheduling conflict, as later revealed to be no more than a tactical witness

scheduling preference, and the consistently stated District Court concern regarding

prosecution expert witness convenience, as the primary pretrial justifications for

Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony.          Neither the prosecutor’s opportunistic rhetorical

afterthought referencing the Covid health scare in opposition to Strommen’s mistrial

motion in the wake of the startling discovery of facts undermining the State’s previously

asserted justification, nor the District Court’s partial after-the-fact equivocation, altered the

clear and unambiguous record manifestation of the non-Covid-related justifications

exclusively relied on respectively by both prior to the July 2020 trial. Even those respective

                                               23
after-the-fact equivocations of the prosecutor and court were belied by their respective

concomitantly stated primary justifications on the mistrial motion record—the State’s

tactical witness order preference and the Court’s accommodation of prosecution expert

convenience. The respective after-the-fact equivocations of the prosecutor and court were

further belied, moreover, by the facts that: (1) Dr. Vanino was no longer conducting the

Tuesday night therapy sessions put forth by the State as justification for why she could not

travel to Montana for trial; (2) she had instead, albeit to the surprise of the prosecutor and

court, traveled cross-country from Denver to Massachusetts in the midst of the Covid crisis

for reasons unknown;11 and (3) neither the State nor the court expressed any pretrial

concern regarding any Covid-related health risk posed by requiring the other slated in-state

and out-of-state prosecution witnesses and trial participants to travel to and from Glasgow

for trial in the midst of the Covid scare.12

¶26    The record clearly manifests that the asserted State justification for Dr. Vanino’s

remote video testimony was based exclusively on trial tactics and witness convenience

considerations inherently attendant with most relatively complex criminal trials,

particularly when the State has a tactical preference for an out-of-state expert to provide

11
   Pursuant to the State’s immediate objection, the District Court precluded defense counsel from
asking Dr. Vanino the reason why she was testifying remotely from her second home in Nantucket,
Massachusetts, rather than her place of primary residence and practice in Denver, Colorado,
whether due to personal recreational or Covid-risk reasons. The court later cited that mystery in
rejecting Strommen’s arguments in support of his mistrial motion.
12
   State’s witnesses required to travel to Glasgow for trial included the alleged victim J.R.
(Washington state), Janet Rodgers (Minnesota), Agent McDermott (Great Falls), and Kelsey
Remus (Hamilton). Also required to travel were the judge (Missoula), court reporter (Bozeman),
prosecutor (Helena), and defense counsel (Great Falls).

                                               24
non-case-specific testimony bolstering other prosecution witness testimony and evidence.

The resulting District Court justifications were then based in part on the State’s insufficient

justifications, and the court’s own sua sponte interjection of expert witness convenience

considerations and only generalized Covid-19 concerns. Thus, in stark contrast to the

qualifying justifications shown and found in Walsh and Duane, and similar to the patently

insufficient justifications asserted in Martell, Bailey, and Mercier, the grounds asserted by

the State and found by the District Court here were simply insufficient to satisfy the

requirements recognized in Mercier, Duane, Crawford, and Craig as justifications for

denying Strommen his fundamental constitutional right to face-to-face cross-examination

of all adverse witnesses under the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.

¶27    In tacit recognition of its tenuous primary position on appeal, the State alternatively

asserts that: (1) Dr. Vanino’s testimony was not constitutionally “testimonial” as required

to trigger Strommen’s right to in-court face-to-face confrontation; (2) that it was in any

event “impracticable” for the State to require her personal appearance because the burden

on her and/or the State substantially outweighed the evidentiary import to the State’s case

of her only secondary “opinion witness” testimony; and (3) the allowance of Dr. Vanino’s

remote video testimony was in any event harmless error. However, the State’s assertion,

for the first time on appeal, that Dr. Vanino’s contemplated testimony was non-essential or

of little import to the State’s case is strikingly inconsistent with its assertions below. As

manifest in its stated opposition to Strommen’s repeated objections, the State clearly

viewed Dr. Vanino’s contemplated testimony to be highly important to bolster the

credibility of the central prosecution witness here by providing a behavioral science

                                              25
explanation to aid the jury in understanding her failure to earlier-disclose the sexual

misconduct allegedly inflicted upon her by Strommen. Contrary to its assertion on appeal,

the State’s posture below thus manifests that it viewed Dr. Vanino’s only secondary

“opinion witness” testimony to be of such importance to justify depriving Strommen of the

right to personally confront and cross-examine her in the presence of the jury.

¶28    The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, like Mont. Const. art. II, § 24,

“contemplates [only] two classes of witnesses—those against the defendant and those

in . . . favor” of the defendant. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313-14,

129 S. Ct. 2527, 2533-34 (2009). Contrary to the State’s assertion, there is no “third

category of witnesses” under the Confrontation Clause, and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24, for

State’s witnesses that are “helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune from

confrontation.” Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313-14, 129 S. Ct. at 2533-34 (rejecting state

assertion that authors of “testimonial” lab reports offered as proof of the matters asserted

were “not subject to confrontation because they [were] not ‘accusatory’ witnesses, in that

they [did] not directly accuse [defendant] of wrongdoing”).          Accord Mercier, ¶ 27

(“nowhere in the text of the Confrontation Clause is there language limiting the type of

testimonial evidence to which the right to physical confrontation applies”—citing Clark,

¶ 22 (neither the nature of the witness nor the evidence which may be entered based upon

the witness’s testimony impacts the right to confront the witness)); Williams v. Illinois, 567

U.S. 50, 116-17, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2263 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (a “distinction

between those who make ‘inherently inculpatory’ statements and those who make other

statements that are merely ‘helpful to the prosecution’ has no foundation in the text of the

                                             26
[Sixth] Amendment,” is “contrary to history,” and “also makes little sense” because “[a]

statement that is not facially inculpatory may turn out to be highly probative of a

defendant’s guilt when considered with other evidence”—citing Melendez-Diaz). See also

Martell, ¶ 15; Bailey, ¶ 45. Here, Dr. Vanino was unquestionably a prosecution witness

“adverse” to Strommen for purposes of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and

similar protection guaranteed by Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. The primary and intended

purpose of her testimony was to aid the State in the prosecution of Strommen at trial by

providing not only a behavioral science basis to aid the jury in favorably assessing the

credibility of the central prosecution witness, but as additional expert testimony regarding

the typical psychology and practices of child sex abusers in support of the State’s other

evidence against him. Dr. Vanino’s testimony was unquestionably “testimonial” evidence

as defined in Clark, 576 U.S. at 245-46 and 248-49, 135 S. Ct. at 2180-81, and Davis, 547

U.S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74, and therefore subject to face-to-face confrontation as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. We hold that allowance

of Dr. Vanino’s remote video testimony violated Strommen’s fundamental Sixth

Amendment and Mont. Const. art. II, § 24, right to personal face-to-face confrontation of

adverse prosecution witnesses in the courtroom at trial.

¶29    Structural error “is typically of constitutional dimensions” and “undermines the

fairness of the entire trial proceeding.” State v. Van Kirk, 2001 MT 184, ¶¶ 38-39,

306 Mont. 215, 32 P.3d 735.         Structural error is thus “presumptively prejudicial

and . . . reversible.” Van Kirk, ¶¶ 38-39. Other types of trial errors that do not undermine

the fundamental fairness of the entire trial process are non-structural, and thus subject to

                                            27
comparative “qualitative assessment” of the “prejudicial impact” of the error in relation to

the untainted trial evidence. Van Kirk, ¶ 40. Non-structural trial error is thus harmless

“only if there is no reasonable probability that the erroneously admitted evidence

contributed to the conviction.” Van Kirk, ¶ 46. If other untainted evidence compellingly

proved the same fact as the tainted evidence, evidentiary error may often be harmless if

there is no reasonable probability that the tainted evidence influenced jury assessment of

the untainted evidence. See Van Kirk, ¶ 47. While we have not recognized any bright-line

rule, we have typically viewed denial or infringement of the Sixth Amendment and Mont.

Const. art. II, § 24, right to face-to-face cross-examination of adverse witnesses as

non-structural trial error. See, e.g., Mercier, ¶ 31 (supporting federal citations omitted);

Bailey, ¶ 46 (citing Mercier); Martell, ¶ 17 (citing Bailey (citing Mercier)); Coy, 487 U.S.

at 1021-22, 108 S. Ct. at 2803 (recognizing that “other types of violations of the

Confrontation Clause are subject” to “harmless-error analysis” and there is no apparent

“reason why denial of face-to-face confrontation should not be treated the same”).

¶30    However, “depending upon the circumstances,” even properly admitted expert

opinion testimony is often “highly prejudicial,” though nonetheless admissible under

M. R. Evid. 401-03 and 702-03, due to “the nature of expert testimony as authoritative

opinion given by a recognized expert in a specialized field of expertise beyond the common

knowledge and experience of lay jurors.” State v. Mills, 2018 MT 254, ¶ 41, 393 Mont.

121, 428 P.3d 834 (citation omitted). The obvious reason why is the tendency of people

who do not have expertise in a relevant field of specialized knowledge to rely on a

seemingly authoritative opinion of a qualified and credible person who does. Here, as

                                            28
noted supra, the intended purpose of Dr. Vanino’s expert testimony was to aid the State in

the prosecution of Strommen at trial by providing not only a behavioral science basis to

aid the jury in favorably assessing the credibility of the central prosecution witness, but

additional expert testimony regarding the typical psychology and practices of child sex

abusers to support its other evidence against him. Contrary to the State’s assertion on

appeal, Dr. Vanino’s testimony was highly relevant evidence against Strommen which the

State manifestly viewed, at least below, to be essential to his successful prosecution in a

classic he-said/she-said sex offense case. The State’s assertion of harmless error on appeal

is thus squarely contradicted by the record and its own conduct below. Under these

circumstances, the patently erroneous allowance of Dr. Vanino’s remote testimony in

violation of Strommen’s federal and state constitutional right to personal face-to-face

confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses at trial was not harmless under

our demanding Van Kirk standard for harmless error.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶31    We hold that, under the particular circumstances here, the denial of Strommen’s

right to personal in-court face-to-face confrontation of Dr. Vanino was reversible error in

violation of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and similar protection guaranteed

by Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. Strommen’s July 2020 SIWC conviction is therefore hereby

reversed and remanded for new trial.

                                                 /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

                                            29
We concur:

/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

Justice Jim Rice did not participate in the decision of this Opinion.

Justice Beth Baker, dissenting.

¶32    I disagree with the Court’s conclusion that Strommen’s confrontation rights were

violated when the District Court permitted Shari Vanino to testify at trial by two-way video

communication. Strommen raises several additional issues, none of which in my view

amount to reversible error. I accordingly would affirm his conviction and therefore dissent

from the Court’s decision to the contrary.

¶33    Under the two-prong Craig standard, for a court to allow an alternative to the

physical courtroom presence of a witness, there must be a case-specific finding that “denial

of physical face-to-face confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy.”

Mercier, ¶ 18. In addition, and not challenged here, “the reliability of the testimony must

be maintained by such hallmarks as the witness being placed under oath, testifying in the

view of the jury, and being subject to cross-examination.” Walsh, ¶ 10 (citing Craig, 497

U.S. at 846-47, 110 S. Ct. at 3164).

¶34    Reducing the spread of COVID-19 is a compelling policy interest. Roman Catholic

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam);

see also Stand Up Mont. v. Missoula Cty. Pub. Sch., 2022 MT 153, ¶ 20, 409 Mont. 330,

                                             30
514 P.3d 1062. We have found a court’s focus on COVID-19-related public health

concerns, including official governmental advisories against travel, to be an important

public policy justification under the Craig standard for using technology to present a

witness’s testimony. Walsh, ¶ 11. We upheld a remote appearance in Walsh, observing

that a witness’s long-distance travel during the height of the pandemic “could well have

placed herself, the court, the other witnesses, and the defendant into a heightened risk of

contracting COVID-19.” Walsh, ¶ 11. And we recently reaffirmed, “[n]o credible claim

can be made that protection of public health—including the protection of jurors, witnesses,

litigants, and court personnel—is not an important public policy.” State v. Mountain Chief,

2023 MT 147, ¶ 30, 413 Mont. 131, 533 P.3d 663.

¶35     Were it not for COVID-19, the Court’s analysis here would be correct. In my view,

however, the Opinion focuses too much on the State’s assertions in the trial court and not

on the District Court’s decision. What is at issue is whether the court’s ruling was justified

by a strong public policy interest—that the personal presence of the witness is

impracticable to secure due to such things as extraordinary health considerations. This trial

occurred in July 2020, during the worst of the pandemic when there were many unknowns

and vaccines were not available. During this time, the State of Montana was under a public

health emergency. Executive Order No. 2-2020 specifically provided that “proactively

implementing mitigation measures to slow the spread of the virus is in the best interests of

the State of Montana and its people[.]” Executive Order Declaring a State of Emergency

to Exist Within the State of Montana Related to the Communicable Disease COVID-19

Novel     Coronavirus,     Exec.     Order    No.     2-2020,     1    (Mar.    12,    2020)

                                             31
(https://perma.cc/57KB-SY3E). This Court likewise had taken measures to respond to the

public health emergency, instructing courts that, “[w]hile we must maintain our core

constitutional services, we are obligated to care for the health and safety of our employees

and the public we serve.” Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice, Montana

Supreme Court, to Montana District Court Judges et al., (March 17, 2020)

(https://perma.cc/59S2-DWXE).

¶36    A review of the record reveals that the District Court went to great lengths to follow

recommended protocols and to keep all trial participants safe. On May 13, 2020, the court

issued an Order Regarding Trial setting forth a number of specific provisions to

accommodate COVID-19 restrictions. The order directed a courtroom site survey by the

Valley County Department of Health and the Clerk of Court to determine how COVID-19

public health restrictions would allow for jury selection to be conducted, given

social-distancing requirements; required a case-specific jury questionnaire to be sent out to

cut down on voir dire and minimize contact with the potential jury panel; and directed that

out-of-state witnesses could testify via video or Zoom.1 The court followed with another

order a week later, adding a directive that all court personnel, “including the Clerk, Court

Reporter, Witnesses, Counsel and the Court will be required to wear personal protective

equipment (PPE) at all times in the courtroom and chambers[;]” reiterating that witnesses,

including the victim, would be given the option to testify via Zoom or other available video;

1
 The District Court later alluded to Montana’s requirement that out-of-state visitors to Montana
must quarantine for two weeks. See Directive Implementing Executive Orders 2-2020 and 3-2020
and Providing Mandatory Quarantine for Certain Travelers Arriving in Montana from Another
State or Country, 2 (Mar. 30, 2020) (https://perma.cc/Q89Q-P5RT).
                                              32
and precluding the attendance of observers in the Valley County Courtroom, noting that

there would be a video feed at an alternate location.

¶37       Strommen responded to these orders by moving to continue the trial until all

witnesses safely could appear in person, arguing that his right to confront witnesses in

person justified the continuance. The District Court’s order denying that motion recounted

that the trial had been continued four times already—each time on the Defendant’s

motion—and cited our decision in Duane to support its conclusion that two-way video

testimony would not violate Strommen’s confrontation rights.2 The court noted that it “is

not prohibiting witnesses from testifying in person” but leaving it “up to the witness to

determine if they have COVID-19 related symptoms,” commenting that the virus “is the

most pressing public health threat to confront the courts in over 100 years.” The court

explained:

          COVID-19 is a new disease and there is limited information regarding risk
          factors for severe disease. Based on currently available information and
          clinical expertise, older adults and people of any age who have serious
          underlying medical conditions might be at higher risk for severe illness from
          COVID-19. . . . If the witness is a person who fits the criteria for being
          “high-risk for severe illness from COVID-19,” the CDC recommends that
          person stay home. Additionally, the CDC notes that if your household
          includes one or more vulnerable individuals, then all household members
          should act as if they, themselves, are at higher risk.

                                               .    .   .

          The COVID-19 pandemic is a unique event which poses a unique set of
          challenges requiring extraordinary measures to protect the health and safety
          of the public, witnesses, court staff, and the Court itself. The Court is not
          closing the proceeding, but instead prohibiting the public’s physical presence

2
    We had not decided Mercier at the time of the District Court’s order.
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       during jury selection and providing a video feed at an alternate location to
       allow the public to view the proceedings in real time.

The order concluded:

       It is the Court’s position that the trial procedures adopted to the unique
       circumstances faced in the COVID pandemic protect the Defendant’s Sixth
       Amendment right to face [his] accusers, his right to a public trial, and his
       right to be present at all critical stages of the trial, as well as the public’s First
       Amendment right to observe the trial. The modified procedures protect the
       Court, court staff, the public and parties from risks posed by the pandemic.
       The Court reserves the right to adjust procedure as circumstances warrant.

¶38    When the issue of Vanino’s remote testimony again arose during the June 24, 2020

pretrial hearing, the District Court observed that its pre-COVID-19 order had been made

“under general protocol” the court had followed in other cases. The court then explained

that it would not reconsider its decision given the current circumstances:

       I’m not at all excited about bringing someone through the Denver airport,
       sitting on an airplane, and then bringing them up to Glasgow under the
       [COVID] situation. So even though I granted it under the usual practice of
       this Court, and I think many others, with the [COVID] overlay I would be
       extremely reluctant to withdraw that order approving that testimony.

The court went on to detail all the other protocols it had put into place to meet the moment

and ensure, to the greatest extent possible, public health and the safety of all those who

would be participating in the trial, while protecting the Defendant’s constitutional rights to

a fair and public trial and confrontation of witnesses.

¶39    Though other witnesses may not have chosen the District Court’s allowed option to

appear remotely, that does not undermine the reasons for not bringing an out-of-state

witness across the country. That Vanino was in Nantucket also does not seem particularly

relevant; first, many people were finding more remote places to isolate and choosing

                                                34
vacation homes if they had them; and second, the issue is not whether the State advised the

court of Vanino’s actual location but whether her remote appearance violated Strommen’s

constitutional rights in light of the public policy justifications for not requiring witnesses

to travel from out-of-state. Whether she would be coming from Denver or Boston is not

material. Permitting her testimony by two-way video served the important public policy

of protecting public health by preventing the spread of COVID-19. At the time the court

made its final order on the matter, it appropriately was concerned primarily with lessening

the risk of infection among the trial participants.

¶40    The trial court heeded its “obligat[ion] to care for the health and safety of our

employees and the public we serve.” Memorandum from Mike McGrath, Chief Justice,

Montana Supreme Court, to Montana District Court Judges et al. (Mar. 17, 2020). Under

the precedent we have established, COVID-19 concerns presented an important public

policy justification for permitting Vanino’s remote appearance at trial. See Walsh, ¶ 12;

Stand Up Mont., ¶ 20; Mountain Chief, ¶ 30. Strommen has not alleged that Craig’s

reliability factor was not met, and I would conclude that he has failed to show a deprivation

of his constitutional rights.

¶41    Strommen raises several additional challenges to his conviction, including that

Vanino improperly testified to statistical conclusions; that the District Court erred by

denying his request to depose a potential witness who could have undermined the victim’s

credibility; and that the prosecutor committed misconduct by discussing facts that had been

precluded by an order in limine and by commenting on Strommen’s silence. Finding

reversible error on the confrontation issue, the Court does not reach these arguments. I

                                              35
therefore need not discuss them for purposes of this Dissent, but I would conclude that

Strommen has not shown any reversible error. I would affirm his conviction.

                                                /S/ BETH BAKER

Chief Justice Mike McGrath joins in the dissenting Opinion of Justice Baker.

                                                /S/ MIKE McGRATH

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