Court Opinion

ID: 9614399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:25:05.969084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:07.444126
License: Public Domain

QUINN, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the amendment here constituted a matter of substance, not form, in that it added an element that was essential to the crime of second degree assault as defined in section 18-3-203(l)(c), 8 C.R.S. (1978), and without which that particular crime would not have *791been alleged. Because Crim.P. 7(e) permits a substantive amendment to the information to be made only prior to trial and because the substantive amendment in this case was made after the trial had already commenced, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction for second degree assault.
The majority turns its decision on the fact that the pretrial version of the charge, viewed in the context of the circumstances surrounding the pretrial proceedings in the case, sufficiently advised the defendant of the nature of the offense alleged against him. See maj.op.. at 786-787. This contextual approach, however, undercuts the fundamental requirement that a criminal charge must meet established constitutional and jurisdictional requirements on the basis of the charge itself. A criminal charge, to be sufficient, must advise the defendant “of the charge he is facing so that he can adequately defend himself and be protected from further prosecution for the same offense.” People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 484, 615 P.2d 726, 728 (1980).
In determining whether a criminal accusation meets this standard of specificity, we have looked to the language of the accusation to determine whether all the essential elements of the crime were properly included within the charge. See People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269 (Colo.1983); Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726; Martinez v. People, 163 Colo. 503, 431 P.2d 765 (1967); Fehringer v. People, 59 Colo. 3, 147 P. 361 (1915). The failure to allege an element that is essential to constitute a crime deprives a court of jurisdiction over the subject matter. E.g., Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 615 P.2d 726; People v. Garner, 187 Colo. 294, 530 P.2d 496 (1975); Rowse v. District Court, 180 Colo. 44, 502 P.2d 422 (1972). By a parity of reasoning, any amendment which adds an element that is indispensable to charge a crime in the first instance is clearly a matter of substance and not merely one of form. See People v. Moody, 674 P.2d 366 (Colo.1984) (allegation regarding particular time theft occurred is an essential element of the crime of theft of rental property and therefore a matter of substance, not form); Gomez v. People, 162 Colo. 77, 424 P.2d 387 (1967) (failure of burglary information to include the particular felony intended to be committed by breaking,and entering into building was a matter of substance, not form). This same principle applies to an amendment that results in elevating to a felony an accusation that is arguably sufficient to allege, at best, a misdemeanor. People v. Johnson, 644 P.2d 34 (Colo.App.1980), aff'd sub nom. Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d 262 (1982) (affirmed on other grounds) (amendment elevating charge from third degree to second degree assault was one of substance).
Section 18-3-203(l)(c), 8 C.R.S. (1978), defines the crime of assault in the second degree as follows:
(1) A person commits the crime of as- * sault in the second degree if:
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(c) With intent to prevent one whom he knows, or should know, to be a peace officer or fireman from performing a lawful duty, he intentionally causes bodily injury to any person.
(emphasis added). It is clear from examining the statutory language that one of the essential elements of the offense of second degree assault as proscribed by section 18-3-203(l)(c) is the intent to prevent a peace officer “from performing a lawful duty.” The information prior to the amendment read as follows:
[O]n or about the 5th day of May, 1979, at the said County of Weld, State of Colorado, ROBERT CERVANTES, with intent to prevent Joseph Tymkowych, whom he knew and reasonably should have known to be a peace officer, did unlawfully, feloniously, and intentionally cause bodily injury to Joseph Tymkow-ych.
At best, this charge accused the defendant of “unlawfully, feloniously, and intentionally [causing] bodily injury to Joseph Tym-kowych” and as such, failed to include all of the essential elements of any type of second degree assault defined in section *79218-3-203, 8 C.R.S. (1978).1 When the benefit of all doubt is given to the charging language, one might possibly be able to conclude that the defendant had been charged with the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree, which is defined as knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to another person. § 18-3-204, 8 C.R.S. (1978).2 Even though the court originally may have had jurisdiction over the crime of assault in the third degree on the basis of the inartfully drawn charge, the amendment subsequent to the commencement of trial resulted in a new, more serious offense being charged and, in that respect, was clearly substantive in character.
The court’s resolution of this issue, in my view, distorts the purpose of Rule 7(e) by forcing that rule into the service of salvaging a felony charge that was substantively infirm due to slipshod pleading. I cannot reconcile the majority’s holding in this case with the long-standing requirement of properly informing an accused of all the essential elements of a criminal charge pri- or to the commencement of trial.
I would reverse the conviction for second degree assault and remand the case to the district court with directions to enter a conviction for assault in the third degree.

. The various types of assault in the second degree as proscribed by section 18-3-203(1), 8 C.R.S. (1978 & 1985 Supp.), are: with intent to cause serious bodily injury to another person and causing such injury; with intent to cause bodily injury to another person and causing or attempting to cause such injury by means of a deadly weapon; with intent to prevent one whom the offender knows, or should know, to be a peace officer or fireman from performing a lawful duty, and intentionally causing bodily injury to any person; recklessly causing bodily injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon; for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, intentionally causing stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug or other preparation capable of producing harm; while lawfully confined or in custody, violently applying physical force against the person of a peace officer or fireman engaged in the performance of his duties or violently applying physical force against a person engaged in the performance of duties under contract with a detention facility, and the offender knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a peace officer, a fireman or a person under contract with a detention facility; and with intent to cause bodily injury to another person and causing serious bodily injury to that person or another.

. In concluding that the pretrial version of the charge alleged the misdemeanor of assault in the third degree, one must specifically rely on section 18-1-503(3), 8 C.R.S. (1978), which recognizes that the element of acting recklessly is established if a person acts intentionally and that the element of acting knowingly is established if a person acts knowingly or intentionally. One must also ignore that part of the charge alleging that the defendant acted "feloniously.” The term "feloniously" is generally employed in charging a felony "for the purpose of denoting the intent with which the act is charged to have been done.” Cohen v. People, 7 Colo. 274, 275, 3 P. 385, 386 (1884). Because the defendant has conceded in his brief that the pretrial version of the information sufficiently charged third degree assault, I am willing to accept that concession for purposes of this case.