Court Opinion

ID: 9819484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:13.853703+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:03.311674
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Because I believe the improper remarks of plaintiffs counsel during voir dire and opening statements constitute reversible error, I respectfully dissent. Although the majority appropriately concludes that plaintiff’s counsel’s statements were improper, it does not find those statements constitute reversible error. In my judgment, these statements were highly prejudicial and, due to their repetition, deprived defendant of the fair trial to which he was entitled. Courts have consistently held that counsel commits reversible error when he suggests that there was information he wished the jurors to know but could not present to them, thus implying that the opposing party somehow denied the jury the opportunity to consider that information. Crutchfield, 414 Ill. at 214, 111 N.E.2d at 144; Skelton, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 582, 573 N.E.2d at 1334; L.D. Brinkman & Co. Midwest, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 394 N.E.2d at 1229; see also Cancio v. White, 297 Ill. App. 3d 422, 431, 697 N.E.2d 749, 755 (1998) (counsel’s improper argument or misconduct may be a sufficient basis for a new trial). In this case, the comments of plaintiffs counsel during voir dire and opening statements implied that by admitting liability, defendant was restricting plaintiffs ability to present evidence to the jury. Counsel’s comments, which invited the jurors to speculate regarding the nature of the evidence they were denied the opportunity to hear, were prejudicial, improper, and wholly avoidable. I agree with defendant that plaintiffs counsel’s repetition of essentially the same question three times during voir dire, over defendant’s objections, reinforced the inference that defendant was attempting to prevent the jury from hearing evidence. See Geisberger v. Quincy, 3 Ill. App. 3d 437, 441, 278 N.E.2d 404, 406 (1972) (“the continued effort to introduce immaterial evidence requiring opponent to make innumerable objections creates in the juror’s mind an impression that an objecting party is attempting to conceal evidence”). The situation this case presents is akin to that in criminal cases where a prosecutor makes comments about evidence that the trial court specifically suppressed or excluded. The supreme court has held that a prosecutor exceeds the bounds of permissible argument when he suggests that evidence of guilt existed which the jury could not hear because of its inadmissibility. People v. Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d 487, 497, 455 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (1983); see People v. Ray, 126 Ill. App. 3d 656, 661, 467 N.E.2d 1078, 1082-83 (1984) (prosecutor committed reversible error when he told the jury in closing that “I have all of this that says” the defendant bed, and “I wish I could give you my file as you sit there to go back in there, but I’m not allowed to because that is the law”). Such comments are highly prejudicial. As the supreme court noted in Emerson, 97 Ill. 2d at 497, 455 N.E.2d at 45, “an insinuation which leaves the jury to speculate may be more prejudicial than erroneously admitted specific proof.” Similarly, in this case, plaintiffs counsel’s insinuation that defendant’s admission of liability prevented the jury from hearing evidence left the jury to speculate about the nature of that evidence and was extremely prejudicial. I recognize that the trial court sustained defendant’s objection to plaintiffs counsel’s comment during opening statement. However, the court did not — as it should have — instruct the jury to disregard the remark. In addition, the evidence connecting many of plaintiff’s injuries to the November 2, 1996, accident was not overwhelming, and the jury may well have returned a different verdict had counsel not made the improper comments during voir dire and opening statements. See Crutchfield, 414 Ill. at 214, 111 N.E.2d at 144 (judgments may be reversed because of prejudicial comments by counsel “even though the trial court sustained objections to such statements, rebuked counsel!,] and directed the jury to disregard the statements”). Under these circumstances, I conclude that counsel’s comments prejudiced defendant and denied him a fair trial. The majority mentions that plaintiffs counsel’s improper statements were made in voir dire and near the very beginning of plaintiff s opening statement, implying that because these improprieties occurred at the beginning of the jury trial, their prejudicial effect may have dissipated by the time the case was over and the jury began its deliberations. However, this was a one-day jury trial; thus, the improper statements would still be fresh in the jury’s mind as it considered the case. Further, given that this was a one-day jury trial and addressed only the issue of damages, this court should hesitate to accept a verdict which lacks our full confidence because of the improper behavior of the prevailing attorney. The majority’s conclusion, reducing the jury’s damage award but affirming the judgment, still awards plaintiff over $829,000. Surely, we ought to insist upon a repeat of this one-day jury trial so that before a multi-hundred-thousand-dollar judgment is imposed on defendant, we can be confident that he received a fair trial. On this record, that confidence does not exist.