Court Opinion

ID: 9960586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 17:00:29.115402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:39.042932
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
          _________________

                No. 20-2229
             _________________

         In re: TERRIL EDWARDS,
        a/k/a Tariq Raymond Edwards,
             a/k/a Terrell Howard,
                                 Petitioner
              ________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
   for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
   (D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00027-001)
  District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova
              ________________

            Argued: June 27, 2023

    Before: JORDAN, KRAUSE, and
 MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges.

            (Filed: April 16, 2024)
Lisa B. Freeland
Samuel G. Saylor [ARGUED]
Office of Federal Public Defender
1001 Liberty Avenue
Suite 1500
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
       Counsel for Petitioner

Jacqueline C. Romero
Robert A. Zauzmer [ARGUED]
Bernadette A. McKeon
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
       Counsel for Respondent
                        ___________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
                      ___________

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

       In 2010, the Supreme Court held that a second-in-time
application for a writ of habeas corpus is not considered second
or successive under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)—and thus is not
subject to more stringent statutory requirements—if it
challenges a new, intervening judgment. Magwood v.
Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 323–24 (2010). What exactly
constitutes a new, intervening judgment has since been the
subject of several cases across the circuits. This Court recently
addressed the meaning of “judgment” in Lesko v. Secretary
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 34 F.4th 211 (3d Cir.
2022). Now we address the meaning of “new” by answering

                               2
whether a First Step Act resentencing results in a new
judgment under Magwood. For the reasons discussed below,
we hold that it does not.

I.     BACKGROUND

        In January 2008, a grand jury returned an indictment
charging Terril Edwards with three counts: possession with
intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(a) (the “Drug
Trafficking Charge”), carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(the “First Firearm Charge”), and possession of a firearm by a
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (the “Second
Firearm Charge”). In September 2008, a jury found Edwards
guilty of each charge.

        Based on Edwards’s criminal history, the District Court
determined that, under 21 U.S.C. § 841, the statutory minimum
for the Drug Trafficking Charge was life imprisonment. In
February 2009, the District Court sentenced Edwards to (i) the
mandatory minimum of life imprisonment for the Drug
Trafficking Charge, (ii) five years, to be served consecutively,
for the First Firearm Charge, and (iii) 120 months, to be served
concurrently, for the Second Firearm Charge, resulting in “a
total term of mandatory life without release with five years
consecutive.” App. 541. Edwards appealed, and this Court
affirmed his conviction and sentence. In 2011, Edwards filed
a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct
a sentence by a person in federal custody (a “§ 2255 motion”),
which the District Court denied with prejudice in May 2012.

      In 2010, as part of its cocaine sentencing reform,
Congress passed sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of

                               3
2010 (the “Fair Sentencing Act”), which “reduced the statutory
penalties for crack cocaine offenses to produce an 18-to-1
crack-to-powder drug quantity ratio” instead of the previous
100-to-1 crack-to-powder drug ratio and “eliminated the
mandatory minimum sentence for simple possession of crack
cocaine.” U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Report to the Congress:
Impact of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, at 3 (2015); see also
Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 2–3, 124 Stat.
2372, 2372 (2010). In 2018, Congress passed the First Step
Act of 2018 (the “First Step Act”), which, in part, allowed
courts to resentence people with crack cocaine convictions as
if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act had been enacted
at the time they committed the covered offense. See First Step
Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).

       In April 2019, Edwards filed a motion for resentencing
under the First Step Act. The District Court granted the motion
and resentenced Edwards to 180 months for the Drug
Trafficking Charge, 60 months consecutive for the First
Firearm Charge, and 60 months concurrent for the Second
Firearm Charge, for a total of 240 months. 1 The District Court
entered an amended judgment reflecting Edwards’s new
sentence in June 2019.

       In 2019, the Supreme Court overturned extensive circuit
court precedent and held that under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and
924(a)(2), the government “must prove both that the defendant
knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to
the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a
firearm.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200

1
 We express no opinion on the appropriateness of the
amended sentence, which is not before us in this appeal.

                               4
(2019). Previously, circuit courts, including this Court, had
held that the scienter requirement in § 922(g) applied only to
the possession of the firearm and not to the membership in the
prohibited class. E.g., United States v. Boyd, 999 F.3d 171,
178 (3d Cir. 2021) (“[T]he District Court was following
established precedent when it interpreted this knowledge
requirement to apply only to gun possession.” (citing United
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 596 (3d Cir. 2012))). In other
words, before Rehaif and at the time of Edwards’s § 922(g)
conviction, the Government had to prove that Edwards was a
felon, but not that Edwards knew that he was a felon.

       In May 2020, Edwards filed a second § 2255 motion in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif. The District
Court transferred the petition 2 to this Court pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) and 1631 for this Court “to determine
whether the District Court may consider the successive
petition.” App. 26. We do so now.

II.   DISCUSSION 3

       Edwards’s petition requires us to address three
questions. First, we determine whether Edwards’s second-in-

2
   Although 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2255 refer to habeas
“application[s],” we follow the Supreme Court’s convention
and “use the word ‘petition’ interchangeably with the word
‘application[.]’” Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 324 n.1
(2010).
3
  This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether Edwards’s
petition is second or successive under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and
2255. And our review of that question is plenary. See, e.g.,

                              5
time § 2255 motion is a second or successive § 2255 motion.
We hold that Edwards’s second-in-time § 2255 motion is a
second or successive § 2255 motion because a First Step Act
resentencing is unrelated to the validity of the judgment it
amends and thus does not result in a new, intervening judgment
under Magwood. Second, we address whether Edwards has
satisfied the requirements of § 2255(h) such that the District
Court can consider his second or successive § 2255 motion.
We hold that Edwards has not satisfied the requirements of
§ 2255(h) because Rehaif did not announce a “new rule of
constitutional law” made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court. See In re Sampson, 954 F.3d
159, 161 (3d Cir. 2020). Third and finally, we consider
whether, if Edwards cannot proceed under § 2255, he can
challenge his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We hold that
the Supreme Court foreclosed this possibility in Jones v.
Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). As a result of this three-part
analysis, we must deny Edwards’s requests.

       A.     The Meaning of “New Judgment”

      Edwards argues that his 2019 resentencing resulted in a
new judgment under Magwood because the District Court
made a substantive change to his sentence. Therefore,
Edwards contends, because his second-in-time petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is the first to challenge this new

Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 819 F.3d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2016)
(“We exercise plenary review over whether subject-matter
jurisdiction exists.” (citing Tellado v. IndyMac Mortg. Servs.,
707 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2013))); DIRECTV Inc. v. Seijas,
508 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Our review of questions of
statutory interpretation is plenary.” (citing DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005))).

                               6
judgment, it is not a second or successive petition and need not
comply with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a) or 2255(h) to proceed. The
Government responds that Edwards’s 2019 First Step Act
resentencing did not result in a new judgment under Magwood
because the First Step Act did not invalidate Edwards’s
original judgment but, instead, merely allowed the District
Court to reduce his sentence “to account for the application of
the Fair Sentencing Act.” Br. for Respondent 23. Thus, the
Government contends, Edwards’s petition is a second or
successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus and must
comply with §§ 2244(a) and 2255(h) to proceed.

       The Great Writ, as the writ of habeas corpus is often
called, is “one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a
Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). While the
roots of the Great Writ trace back to Magna Carta, id. at 740–
41, the current iteration is a creature of statute codified in
Title 28 of the United States Code, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–
2255. Relevant to this appeal, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) amended Title 28 in
various ways to strictly limit second or successive petitions for
a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (“No
circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the
detention of a person pursuant to a judgment of a court of the
United States if it appears that the legality of such detention
has been determined by a judge or court of the United States
on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus, except as
provided in section 2255.”). For example, a prisoner detained
pursuant to a judgment of a federal court can only bring a
second or successive motion under § 2255 if that motion is
based on newly discovered evidence of innocence or a new rule

                               7
of constitutional law that the Supreme Court made retroactive
to cases on collateral review:

             A second or successive motion
             must be certified as provided in
             section 2244 by a panel of the
             appropriate court of appeals to
             contain—

                    (1) newly         discovered
                    evidence that, if proven and
                    viewed in light of the
                    evidence as a whole, would
                    be sufficient to establish by
                    clear    and      convincing
                    evidence that no reasonable
                    factfinder would have
                    found the movant guilty of
                    the offense; or

                    (2) a     new    rule   of
                    constitutional law, made
                    retroactive to cases on
                    collateral review by the
                    Supreme Court, that was
                    previously unavailable.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 4

4
  For petitioners detained pursuant to a judgment of a state
court, “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented

                              8
       The Supreme Court’s 2010 opinion in Magwood
addressed the meaning of the phrase “second or successive,”
which is the triggering condition for these more stringent
statutory requirements. In Magwood, the petitioner was
convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to death under
Alabama state law. 561 U.S. at 324. Shortly before his
scheduled execution, Magwood filed a federal habeas petition
challenging his conviction and sentence. See id. at 326. The
District Court rejected Magwood’s claims attacking his
conviction but agreed with Magwood’s claims attacking his
sentence and issued a conditional writ. Id. In response, the
Alabama court held a new sentencing proceeding and, in 1986,
sentenced Magwood to death for the second time. Id.
Magwood then filed another federal habeas petition
challenging his 1986 death sentence. Id. at 328. The Supreme

in a prior application shall be dismissed unless--(A) the
applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;
or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence;
and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. §
2244. In a case filed contemporaneously with this opinion, we
held that the term “second or successive” has the same meaning
regardless of whether the petitioner is in federal or state
custody. United States v. Hill, No. 19-3508, 2024 WL
1592188, at *5 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 2024).

                               9
Court “granted certiorari to determine whether Magwood’s
application challenging his 1986 death sentence, imposed as
part of resentencing in response to a conditional writ from the
District Court, [was] subject to the constraints that § 2244(b)
imposes on the review of ‘second or successive’ habeas
applications.” Id. at 330 (citing Magwood v. Culliver, 558 U.S.
1023 (2009)). The Supreme Court explained that the phrase
“second or successive” is a “term of art” that “does not simply
‘refe[r] to all § 2254 applications filed second or successively
in time.’” Id. at 332 (alteration in original) (first quoting Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000); and then quoting
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007)) (collecting
cases). Rather, “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be
interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged,” id. at
333; and when “there is a ‘new judgment intervening between
the two habeas petitions,’ an application challenging the
resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all,”
id. at 341–42 (quoting Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156
(2007)). Therefore, “Magwood’s first application challenging
his new sentence under the 1986 judgement [was] not ‘second
or successive’ under § 2244(b).” Id. at 342.

        Since Magwood, courts have been asked to clarify how
the Magwood holding applies in different scenarios. In Lesko,
for example, this Court considered whether a new sentence for
an undisturbed conviction creates a new judgment such that a
second-in-time habeas petition challenging the undisturbed
conviction is not second or successive. 34 F.4th at 222–27.
There, in 1981, a Pennsylvania jury convicted the petitioner of
first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Id. at 218.
Lesko’s first habeas petition succeeded as to his sentence, but
not his conviction, and the District Court issued a conditional
writ. See id. at 219. In 1995, another Pennsylvania jury

                                10
resentenced Lesko to death. Id. at 219, 221. In 2015, Lesko
filed a second habeas petition challenging both his 1981
conviction and his 1995 sentence. Id. at 222. This Court held
that Magwood compels the conclusion that “a prisoner who
receive[d] relief as to his sentence is not barred from raising,
in a second-in-time habeas petition, a challenge to an
undisturbed conviction.” Id. at 224. This is “[b]ecause both a
conviction and sentence are necessary to authorize a prisoner’s
confinement, and resentencing creates a new judgment
authorizing a prisoner’s continued confinement[.] [A] petition
challenging either component of that new judgment—be it
conviction or sentence—is not second or successive.” Id. at
224–25 (footnote omitted). 5

        Magwood and Lesko left open the question of whether
any change to a sentence creates a new judgment such that a
second-in-time habeas petition is not second or successive or
whether the change must meet some threshold. This matter of
first impression in our Circuit is presented here.

        While we are addressing a matter of first impression for
this Circuit, we are not writing on a blank slate. Instead, we
are interpreting a statute, AEDPA, that the Supreme Court has
informed us Congress passed to advance the principles of
finality, federalism, and comity. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
420, 436 (2000). The plain language of AEDPA advances

5
  Relatedly, in Romansky v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 933
F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2019), this Court held that when “some
but not all counts of conviction are disturbed on appeal or in
post-conviction proceedings, the defendant’s eventual
resentencing is [not] a new judgment as to the undisturbed
counts of conviction.”

                              11
these doctrines, in part, by imposing restrictions on second or
successive petitions, which in effect dramatically limit a
prisoner’s access to habeas relief. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533
U.S. 656, 661 (2001) (“AEDPA greatly restricts the power of
federal courts to award relief to state prisoners who file second
or successive habeas corpus applications.”). Section 2244,
which limits second or successive petitions except in a few,
narrow circumstances, was “intended to reduce the universe of
cases in which a habeas petition may go forward on a second
or successive petition.” In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591, 600 (3d
Cir. 1999). Generally, prisoners can only proceed with a
second or successive petition if they have made an initial
showing that their claim relies on either (1) a new rule of
constitutional law that the Supreme Court “made retroactive to
cases on collateral review[,]” or (2) newly discovered evidence
that “if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole”
would show that “no reasonable factfinder” would have found
the prisoner guilty. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(a)–(b), 2255(h).
The Supreme Court has confirmed that a “prisoner is entitled
to one fair opportunity to seek federal habeas relief from his
conviction. But he may not usually make a ‘second or
successive habeas corpus application.’” Banister v. Davis, 140
S. Ct. 1698, 1702 (2020) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)). Thus,
the text and purpose of the statute show that AEDPA’s bar on
second or successive petitions is meant to restrict most
prisoners to one opportunity to seek habeas relief, subject only
to narrow exceptions meant to protect those most likely to be
wrongfully detained.

       Further, we write in the shadow of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Magwood. Although Magwood did not expressly
define “new,” the Supreme Court focused on ADEPA’s use of
“the judgment” to determine the meaning of the phrase “second

                               12
or successive.” 561 U.S. at 331–33; see also 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244(a), 2254(a). In doing so, the Supreme Court looked to
its prior decision in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005),
and pointed out that a habeas petition “‘seeks invalidation (in
whole or in part) of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s
confinement.’ If his petition results in the district court’s
granting of the writ, ‘the State may seek a new judgment
(through a new trial or a new sentencing proceeding).’”
Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332 (quoting Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 83).
The Supreme Court therefore linked the possibility of a new
judgment to invalidation of the old one that authorized
confinement. And based on this connection, the Supreme
Court concluded that “the phrase ‘second or successive’ must
be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id. at
333.

        Thus, based on the text and purpose of the statute and
the implications that flow from the reasoning of Magwood, we
hold that a modified or amended judgment is a new judgment
under Magwood only if the prior judgment was invalid. This
rule gives prisoners “one fair opportunity” to challenge the
validity of the judgment pursuant to which they are in custody.
See Banister, 140 S. Ct. at 1702. If a prisoner previously
challenged a judgment that is found to be invalid, then he is
afforded a fresh opportunity to challenge the new judgment
that fills the void left by the invalid judgment without having
to make any additional showing. But if the prisoner’s previous
judgment was valid, changes to that valid judgment do not
result in a new judgment under Magwood. This interpretation
guards against any deficiencies in the new judgment, but it also
guards against undermining the purpose of AEDPA. An
interpretation that any change to a valid judgment, even if it
must be a substantive change, allows a prisoner to circumvent

                              13
the showing necessary to bring a second or successive petition
would unduly expand federal courts’ ability to revisit final
judgments, thereby undermining AEDPA’s goal of furthering
the principles of finality, federalism, and comity. 6

        A review of our sister circuits’ decisions considering
whether several different types of changes to a judgment create
a new judgment for Magwood purposes supports our rule. For
example, in Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th 735, 737–38 (11th
Cir. 2021), the Eleventh Circuit held that “a sentence reduction
under the First Step Act does not constitute a new judgment”
because it “does not affect the validity or lawfulness of the
underlying sentence. The First Step Act allows, as a matter of
legislative grace, district courts to exercise their discretion to
issue sentence reductions.” 7

6
    While the principles of federalism and comity are not
necessarily implicated in the § 2255 context, they are
implicated in the § 2254 context. And because the term
“second or successive” has the same meaning whether the
petitioner is in federal or state custody, see Hill, 2024 WL
1592188, at *5, the rule we state today is applicable in both the
§ 2254 and § 2255 contexts. Thus, each of the three doctrines
advanced by AEDPA are relevant to our analysis.
7
  The Eleventh Circuit grounded its reasoning in Telcy, in part,
on its conclusion that the First Step Act did not authorize courts
to conduct a plenary, de novo resentencing. 20 F.4th at 738.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion v. United States,
597 U.S. 481 (2022), however, called this conclusion into
question. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court explained that
“[i]t is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope

                               14
        In the same vein, the Ninth Circuit has held that
computation of a sentence does not result in a new judgment
because “[t]o create a new judgment, a change to a sentence
must be accompanied by the legal invalidation of the prior
judgment. The essential criterion is legal invalidation of the
prior judgment, not the imposition of a new sentence.” United
States v. Buenrostro, 895 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2018)
(collecting cases).

       Likewise, the Second and Eighth Circuits have held that
fixing a clerical or typographical error does not result in a new
judgment, Marmolejos v. United States, 789 F.3d 66, 67 (2d
Cir. 2015); United States v. Brown, 915 F.3d 1200, 1202 (8th
Cir. 2019). And several circuits have held that a proceeding
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) does not result in a new
judgment, e.g., United States v. Jones, 796 F.3d 483, 485–87
(5th Cir. 2015); Sherrod v. United States, 858 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 2017); Armstrong v. United States, 986 F.3d 1345,
1347 (11th Cir. 2021), because a § 3582(c)(2) resentencing has
no effect on the validity or finality of the judgment imposing
the sentence being reduced.

       Each of these cases arose under different
circumstances—a First Step Act sentence reduction, a
computation of sentence, a fix of a clerical error, and a
resentencing based on the Sentencing Commission
subsequently lowering the applicable sentencing range. But

of information that a district court may consider in deciding
whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district
court’s discretion to consider information is restrained.
Nothing in the First Step Act contains such a limitation.” Id.
at 486–87.

                               15
they all have one uniting factor: In each case where a court
held that the second-in-time petition was second or successive,
the prior judgment was not legally invalid. 8

        The inverse holds true, too. For example, at least half
of the circuit courts have concluded that an intervening
judgment is new when a successful collateral attack invalidated
the previous judgment. Johnson, 623 F.3d at 43; Lesko, 34
F.4th at 223–24; In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 140 (4th Cir. 2017);
King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 2015); Smith v.
Williams, 871 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2017); Insignares v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir.
2014). Relatedly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a California
“court’s recalculation and alteration of the number of time-
served or other similar credits award to a petitioner constitutes
a new judgment” because “under California law, only a
sentence that awards a prisoner all credits to which he is
entitled is a legally valid one.” 9 And Edwards has not pointed

8
   Our holding is also in line with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010).
There, the Supreme Court held that “a district court proceeding
under § 3582(c)(2) does not impose a new sentence in the usual
sense” and “the sentence-modification proceedings authorized
by § 3582(c)(2) are not constitutionally compelled . . . [as] §
3582(c)(2) represents a congressional act of lenity intended to
give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the
judgments reflected in the Guidelines.” Id. at 827–28.
9
   Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases) (“[A] state trial court’s alteration of the
number of presentence credits to which a prisoner is entitled
is a legally significant act: it replaces an invalid sentence with

                               16
us to any case holding that an intervening judgment is new
when the prior judgment was valid. Thus, a review of our sister
courts’ precedent supports our conclusion that whether a
judgment is considered new under Magwood turns on the
validity of the prior judgment.

       With that framework in mind, we turn to the question at
hand: Whether Edwards received a new judgment when the
District Court reduced his sentence under the First Step Act.
Section 404(b) of the First Step Act addresses the retroactive
application of the Fair Sentencing Act and states that “[a] court
that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose
a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372) were in
effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” 10

a valid one. In determining whether, after amending the
number of credits, there has been a new judgment ‘pursuant
to’ which a prisoner is ‘in custody’ under Magwood, the
answer under California law is yes: before the amendment,
the prisoner was not held in custody pursuant to a lawful
judgment of the state courts and was being held for a greater
number of days than was proper under California law. After
the amendment, however, there is a valid judgment pursuant
to which the prisoner is lawfully being held in custody and he
is being held for a lesser (and the correct) number of days.”
(citing Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332)).
10
   First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222. Section 404(a) of
the First Step Act defines a covered offense as “a violation of
a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was
committed before August 3, 2010.”

                               17
Section 404(c) clarifies that “[n]othing in [section 404] shall be
construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to
this section.”

       As this language shows, the availability of a First Step
Act resentencing is an act of pure legislative grace. And
Congress left it to the sole discretion of the sentencing court to
decide whether to reduce an eligible person’s sentence. See
Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 487 (“By its terms, however, the First
Step Act does not compel courts to exercise their discretion to
reduce any sentence . . .”). This discretion indicates that
Congress did not intend for the First Step Act to have any
impact on the validity of the judgment being amended. And
the plain language of the First Step Act does not require a
showing that the prior sentence was invalid. See First Step Act
§ 404(a)–(c), 132 Stat. 5222. Accordingly, the plain language
and structure of the First Step Act compel the conclusion that
regardless of whether a court decides to exercise its discretion
and resentence a prisoner under the First Step Act, the validity
of the judgment pursuant to which the prisoner is confined is
unaffected.

       This contrasts with, for example, a habeas petition by a
person in state custody, as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) requires the
petitioner to establish “that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
Similarly, to succeed on a § 2255 motion, the petitioner must
show he is in custody pursuant to a judgment that (1) “was
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States”; (2) the court was “without jurisdiction to impose”; (3)
was “otherwise subject to collateral attack”; or (4) included a
sentence that “was in excess of the maximum authorized by
law[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Both §§ 2254 and 2255 thus
require petitioners to show that their prior judgment was

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invalid. And, for the reasons explained above, it is the
invalidity of the prior judgment that makes an intervening
judgment “new” under Magwood. Because a First Step Act
resentencing is unrelated to the validity of the judgment that it
amends, it does not result in a new judgment under Magwood.
Therefore, Edwards’s current motion is second or successive
under § 2255 and must comply with the procedural
requirements of §§ 2254(a) and 2255(h).

       B.     Authorization Under § 2255(h)

       Edwards concedes that if his § 2255 motion is second
or successive, “§ 2255(h) would bar him from bringing his
claim.” Appellant Br. 67. We agree.

       To bring a second or successive § 2255 motion, a
petitioner must satisfy the gateway requirements of § 2255(h)
by showing that his petition is based on either:

              (1) newly discovered evidence
              that, if proven and viewed in light
              of the evidence as a whole, would
              be sufficient to establish by clear
              and convincing evidence that no
              reasonable factfinder would have
              found the movant guilty of the
              offense; or

              (2) a new rule of constitutional
              law, made retroactive to cases on
              collateral review by the Supreme
              Court, that was previously
              unavailable.

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28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).

       Edwards’s motion satisfies neither requirement.
Edwards makes no representation that any new evidence exists
that would satisfy § 2255(h)(1). And “Rehaif’s statutory
holding satisfied neither of § 2255(h)’s gateway conditions for
a second or successive § 2255 motion.” Jones, 599 U.S. at
470. Because Edwards’s second or successive § 2255 motion
does not meet the statutory requirements of § 2255(h), the
District Court may not consider it. Thus, we will not certify
his request to proceed with his second or successive motion.

       C.     28 U.S.C. § 2241

       Finally, Edwards argues that if his § 2255 motion is
considered second or successive, he can proceed under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. But the Supreme Court definitively foreclosed
this argument in Jones v. Hendrix, which addressed the exact
question Edwards presents here. There, the petitioner, Jones,
was convicted of two counts of unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon in violation of § 922(g)(1) and filed a § 2255
motion after his unsuccessful appeal. Jones, 599 U.S. at 470.
The § 2255 motion resulted in vacatur of one of the § 922(g)
convictions but no other relief. Id. After Rehaif, Jones filed a
second § 2255 motion, collaterally attacking his remaining §
922(g) conviction. Id. Jones conceded that his motion was
second or successive and that he did not satisfy either of
§ 2255(h)’s gateway conditions. See id. at 470. Accordingly,
Jones sought to use “§ 2255(e)’s ‘savings clause,’ which
provides that a federal prisoner may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under § 2241 if—and only if—§ 2255’s ‘remedy
by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.’” Id. at 471. Thus, the question presented in Jones
was “whether that limitation on second or successive motions

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makes § 2255 ‘inadequate or ineffective’ such that the prisoner
may proceed with his statutory claim under § 2241.” Id. at 470.
The Supreme Court held that it does not. Id.

        Edwards presents us almost the same scenario as Jones.
Edwards’s first-in-time § 2255 motion failed. He now seeks to
bring a second or successive petition to pursue a Rehaif claim
related to his § 922(g) conviction. The Supreme Court’s
holding in Jones requires the same outcome here. “[T]he
[§ 2255] remedy by motion is [not] inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of [Edwards’s] detention” merely because
he cannot satisfy the statutory prerequisites necessary to pursue
a second or successive § 2255 motion. Id. Thus, Edwards
cannot proceed under § 2241.

III.   CONCLUSION

      For the reasons discussed above, we will deny both
Edwards’s request to pursue a second or successive motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and his request to proceed under 28
U.S.C. § 2241.

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