Court Opinion

ID: 9831119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:49:35.773795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:31.266959
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[3] On motion for rehearing appellant insists strenuously that the opinion in this case imposes upon attorneys duties entirely too onerous, and that it would require of them, in the exercise of proper diligence, to keep-track, by daily inquiry of the clerk, of important papers filed in the case. If this be the effect of the opinion, it is clearly wrong; ánd if we thought that it was susceptible of *842such construction, it would be promptly withdrawn, and this motion granted. It is not necessary here to restate the facts as they • were made to appear to the trial court in the motion for a continuance.' We may say here that, as the depositions were not found until after the notice for continuance had been overruled, the case tried, and the court adjourned, there is no way that we know of by which this fact could be incorporated in the record or considered by us on this appeal. The order of the judge, made in vacation, directing the depositions, together with the fact with regard to their having been found, to be incorporated in the record, was made without authority. It is not an order of the court.
[4] But, aside from this, counsel for appellant, in this motion for a rehearing, show that in fact the notary who took these depositions advised them by a letter of date November 12, 1910, which was the day the 'depositions were taken, and which letter was promptly received by them, that the depositions had been taken, and had been that day mailed to the clerk. The letter, which is appended to the motion, also states that copies of the answers are inclosed. This puts an entirely different aspect upon the question of the diligence of counsel. Having been advised that the depositions had been taken and returned, and having copies of the answiers, counsel for appellant could safely assume that they were on file with-the papers of the case, and their failure to inquire for them, in these circumstances, until they-, were needed on the trial, was the exercise of proper diligence. Certainly an attorney, who has once informed himself that depositions have been taken and filed, has a right to assume that they will be safely kept by the clerk, and is not required by subsequent inquiry to keep himself informed whether the papers have been lost or mislaid, unless there be some special circumstance, not present in this ease, to call for such inquiry. Now this is the case made by the motion for rehearing. Appellants had a copy of the .answers, and therefore did not need to cause the depositions to be opened until needed at the trial, unless there was some informality in their taking and return, which could only be discovered by inspection. But no such thing appears to be present here.
[5] But can these facts, now shown for the first time, avail appellants? We are called upon to pass upon the action of the trial court. The appellee is required to respond to such errors as are assigned, upon the record as presented. If the trial court erred In overruling the application for continuance, a new trial should be granted. But how can we say that the trial court erred, unless such error is shown by the record in that court. The case presented by the application for continuance is shown by the opinion. No reference is made to the fact that appellant’s counsel had been advised by the notary on November 12th that the depositions had been taken and returned, and that a copy of the answers had been then sent to them; but, on the contrary, the application has attached to it the telegram received from the notary on May 8th, when the case was on call, in reply to a telegram from counsel to the notary, making inquiry as to whether the depositions had ever been taken and returned. It is stated in the motion filed May 12, 1911, that “defendant has reason to believe and does believe that the depositions of said witnesses were taken on the 12th day of November, 1910, at Clifton, Ariz., and duly returned into this court.” There is attached to the motion the following telegrams:
“May 8, 1911.
“To T. B. Inglis, Clifton, Ariz.: Did you return depositions to Lufkin, Texas, in case Joe Wilroy v. Continental Lumber & Tie Company. Attorneys there report they have not been received. Case on call. Please answer immediately.”
“Tour wire received depositions in case of Wilroy versus Continental Company mailed to Lufkin, Texas, as you instructed have duplicate on file if you want it.
“T. B. Inglis.”
There is no reference in the application to the most important fact, as showing diligence on the part of appellant’s counsel, that they were relying upon the information conveyed to them by the letter of November 12, 1910, that depositions had been taken and returned, and a copy of the answers then received by them. There was sufficient time from the date of the telegrams of May 8, 1911, to the date of the application, May 12, 1911, for the notary to have sent to appellant’s counsel the copy of the answers which he then advised them he had.
It was a reasonable conclusion — in fact, the only reasonable conclusion — to be drawn from the facts stated in the application for continuance that after mailing the interrogatories and commission to the notary, about November 12, 1919, appellant made no further inquiry even to learn whether the interrogatories had been received by the notary, or whether they had been taken and returned, until six months later, when the case was actually on call for trial. This is the case presented to the trial court, and to this court, by the record on submission, and by the briefs. The actual facts, as presented by the motion for rehearing, may — in fact they do, in our opinion — exonerate appellant’s counsel from any charge of negligence, or want of diligence, in their failure to sooner learn of the loss of the depositions in the clerk’s office. But these facts are presented for the first time on this motion for rehearing. How can we say that, in the light of these facts, the trial court erred in overruling the application for continuance, or that *843this court erred in its former holding? It is not fair to the trial court, nor to appellee. If these facts had been properly urged in ■■the motion for continuance, we must assume that the continuance would have been granted, which would have resulted in a delay of six months in the trial. Is it fair to appel-lee that he should be made to bear the additional burden of a furthér delay of 18 months, occasioned by the failure of appellant to set up these facts, now urged, in the application for continuance? We think not. We have gone into this matter at what may appear to be unnecessary length, in view of the entirely erroneous construction placed upon our opinion by counsel for appellant.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.