Court Opinion

ID: 9474316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:53:57.098351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:01.139482
License: Public Domain

*174ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority holds that appellant John Graham submitted sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference that his dismissal was motivated by age discrimination, and that the district court therefore erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Because I believe that a finding of age discrimination could not reasonably be based upon the record presented here, I respectfully dissent.
I.
My disagreement with the majority is not over the appropriate standard of review. I agree that summary judgment may be granted only when no genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir.1984), and that we must view all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. EEOC v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 81 (3d Cir.1984). I agree also, that the grant of summary judgment may be affirmed only if the evidence, so viewed, would support a judgment for the moving party as a matter of law. Koshatka v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir.1985).
In this appeal, Graham produced evidence that, at age 53, he was dismissed by his employer and replaced by a younger man. This evidence concededly was sufficient to make out a prima facie case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1982). See Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d Cir.1984); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.1983). However, when defendant Leopold Company proffered a legitimate reason for having discharged appellant, the legal presumption that Graham’s dismissal was motivated by age discrimination was dispelled. See Texas Community Department of Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n. 10, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 179 (3d Cir.1985). At that point, it was incumbent upon Graham to meet his ultimate burden of proving that the explanation for his termination articulated by Leopold was pretextual, and that his dismissal was motivated by consideration of his age. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Bellissimo, 764 F.2d at 180.
The evidence of record shows that Graham was discharged by his employer during the course of a reorganization of the company brought about by serious business reverses, and that he was replaced by James Green. Green, at age 41 was also within the age group protected by the ADEA. The only other evidence proffered that might give rise to an inference of age discrimination was Graham’s deposition testimony regarding alleged comments made to him by George Goyak, Leopold’s operations manager, when Goyak informed appellant that he was being terminated. Goyak purportedly advised Graham to retain a lawyer and “fight this.” He also, according to appellant, remarked that Graham was in the age bracket protected by the ADEA.
Assuming that this testimony is accurate, as we must, see Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038, 97 S.Ct. 732, 50 L.Ed.2d 748 (1977), I do not believe that, in light of the other undisputed evidence in the record, it is sufficient to support a reasonable inference that Graham’s discharge was motivated by age discrimination. As the majority notes, see Majority at 172 n. 5, Goyak himself was principally responsible for the selection of Graham as the supervisory employee to be dismissed. App. at 133, 166. It is hardly rational to assume that Goyak’s remarks were meant to imply that Goyak himself had recommended that Graham be terminated because of his age, and thus in violation of the law. Indeed, Goyak testified without contradiction that the decision to discharge Graham was based upon a review and a *175comparison of the supervisory employees’ records. App. at 188-90. Robert Lyons, the acting president of Leopold, also testified that Graham had been chosen for dismissal solely because his record compared unfavorably to those of the other supervisory employees. App. at 133,147. On this record, I believe that the inference that Graham’s termination was tainted by consideration of his age is impermissible.
II.
Graham’s loss of his job at Leopold, where he had been employed for over 23 years, naturally evokes sympathy. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that when a company falls upon hard times — as it is clear that Leopold did — it frequently must reorganize or risk financial collapse. Unfortunately, such restructuring usually entails the laying-off of employees, some of whom may have been devoted workers for many years. As distressing as this prospect may be, the ultimate survival of the company may depend upon its making such decisions. It is not the role of a federal court to stand in the way of a struggling business’ legitimate efforts to rally and move forward. See Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d at 1398 (Adams, J., dissenting).
This is not to suggest that such a company is free to violate federal statutes barring discrimination in employment. I merely state that, in my view, the record presented here does not reasonably support an inference that the decision to terminate Graham was caused by anything but economically motivated efforts at reorganization. If courts strain to find snippets of evidence to support highly questionable inferences of discriminatory conduct they not only will unduly hobble necessary restructuring by hard-pressed industries, but eventually cause Congress to reconsider the controlling legislation.
I would affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment for the defendant.