Court Opinion

ID: 9567793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:49.935641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:40.409959
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur but am troubled, in connection with Division 2, about the misinformation given by the officer which apparently contributed to the defendant’s decision to make a confession. There is no evidence that the officer knew the information was erroneous. In fact, the officer did not know at that time what charges would be placed against defendant. Apparently she was merely guessing about the possible sentence defendant might face. Whether deliberate or not, however, the focus is on its effect on defendant’s confession. Did it render it involuntary?
The law answers in the negative. In Moore v. State, 230 Ga. 839 (199 SE2d 243) (1973), the police officers interrogating the defendant falsely told him that they had recovered the murder weapon. The defendant contended that his confession was inadmissible as it was made in response to the officers’ fraudulent statement. The Court held that “ ‘[t]he employment of any artifice, deception, or fraud to obtain a confession does not render it inadmissible, if the means employed are not calculated to procure an untrue statement. Accordingly, the fact that a confession was procured by the employment of falsehood by a police officer, detective, or other person does not alone exclude it, where not calculated to do other than elicit the truth . . . .’ [Cit.]” Id. at 840. This holding was affirmed in subsequent cases, including Jacobs v. State, 133 Ga. App. 812 (212 SE2d 468) (1975), and McLeod v. State, 170 Ga. App. 415 (317 SE2d 253) (1984).
The trial court was thus authorized to conclude that the belief *519that a life sentence could be imposed on defendant for his deeds did not constitute either the “hope of benefit” or the “fear of injury” to be derived from confessing which renders a confession involuntary. OCGA § 24-3-50.
Decided November 19, 1993
Reconsideration dismissed December 20, 1993.
Watson & Bott, Albert L. Watson III, for appellant.
Ralph L. Van Pelt, Jr., District Attorney, Mary Jane P. Melton, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U. S. 264 (79 SC 1173, 3 LE2d 1217) (1959), which held that it was a denial of due process for the state knowingly to allow the jury to consider false testimony, without correction, as a basis for finding guilt.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith joins in this special concurrence.