Court Opinion

ID: 9959704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 15:02:14.266018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:45.654523
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 12, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0385
                                _________________________

  Ex parte The Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United
  Methodist Church, Inc., and the General Council on Finance
      and Administration of the United Methodist Church

                      PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                          (In re: Harvest Church-Dothan

                                                  v.

 The Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist
      Church, Inc., and the General Council on Finance &
   Administration of the United Methodist Church d/b/a The
                   United Methodist Church)
SC-2023-0385

                 (Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-86)

COOK, Justice.

     This case involves a dispute over church property. Harvest Church-

Dothan ("Harvest") is, or was at one time, a member church of the

Alabama-West Florida Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.

("the AWFC"). Harvest brought this action against the AWFC and the

"General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist

Church d/b/a The United Methodist Church" ("the GCFA") in the

Houston Circuit Court.

     Harvest sought a judgment declaring that the AWFC and the GCFA

lack any legally cognizable interest in real or personal property held by

Harvest ("the local church property") as well as injunctive relief

preventing the AWFC and the GCFA from interfering with Harvest's use,

ownership, or control of the local church property.

     The AWFC and the GCFA moved to dismiss the action, arguing,

among other things, that the trial court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which is

grounded in the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of

the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. That doctrine

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prohibits civil courts from adjudicating disputes concerning spiritual or

ecclesiastical matters. The AWFC and the GCFA additionally argued

that the GCFA was an improper party to the action and that the trial

court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied the

motion to dismiss. The AWFC and the GCFA now petition this Court for

a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dismiss the underlying

action.

     "A petitioner carries a heavy burden in securing mandamus relief."

Ex parte Gray, 308 So. 3d 4, 10 (Ala. 2020). After careful review, and for

the reasons explained below, we conclude that the AWFC and the GCFA

have not met their burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to have

the complaint against them dismissed. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

In doing so, we express no view on the merits of Harvest's action. Instead,

this action will continue in the trial court for further proceedings.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     Since its founding in 1996, Harvest has been a member of the

AWFC. The AWFC is a regional body of the United Methodist Church

("the UMC") and has certain supervisory responsibilities over member

churches within its region. The governing instrument of the UMC is its

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Book of Discipline.

     Initially, Harvest held public services at a Dothan middle school.

Harvest, however, soon began searching for land on which it could

construct a new church building, and it sought financial support from the

AWFC.

     In 1999, Harvest identified a suitable parcel of land for the building

site ("the land") and took steps to acquire the land. Although the full

extent of the AWFC's financial contributions to Harvest's purchase and

development of the land is unclear, it is undisputed that Harvest received

an initial grant of approximately $25,000 from the AWFC for the land

purchase.

     On June 30, 1999, legal title to the land was conveyed by deed to

three named individuals described as the "Trustees of Harvest United

Methodist Church." (Emphasis added.)

     Paragraph 2501 of the Book of Discipline provides that "[a]ll

properties of United Methodist local churches … are held, in trust, for

the benefit of the entire denomination, and ownership and usage of

church property is subject to the Discipline." (Emphasis added.)

Paragraph 2503.1 of the Book of Discipline specifically requires that

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every deed of property to a local church include the following trust clause:

           "In trust, that said premises shall be used, kept, and
     maintained as a place of divine worship of the United
     Methodist ministry and members of The United Methodist
     Church; subject to the Discipline, usage, and ministerial
     appointments of said Church as from time to time authorized
     and declared by the General Conference and by the annual
     conference within whose bounds the said premises are
     situated. This provision is solely for the benefit of the grantee,
     and the grantor reserves no right or interest in said premises."

(Emphasis omitted.)

     The deed at issue in this case included no such clause. However,

Paragraph 2503.6 of the Book of Discipline further provides that the

absence of a trust clause in a deed does not absolve a local church of "the

responsibility to hold all of its property in trust for The United Methodist

Church" if the deed conveys property to "a local church or church agency

(or the board of trustees of either) of The United Methodist Church or

any predecessor to The United Methodist Church."1

     1Harvest does not dispute that it was a member of the AWFC and

the UMC at the time the land was conveyed to the "Trustees of Harvest
United Methodist Church." Harvest, however, does argue that it "has
never agreed to accept the UMC trust clause, never executed any trust
instrument, and never agreed to be bound by the UMC's administrative
manual." Answer at p. 3. Further, Harvest argues that, since 2008, it has
repeatedly informed the AWFC that the deed to the land does not contain
the trust clause required by the Book of Discipline. Harvest additionally

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     Notably, paragraph 2506.1 of the Book of Discipline states, in

relevant part, that "[a]ll provisions of the Discipline relating to property,

both real and personal, and relating to the formation and operation of

any corporation, and relating to mergers are conditioned upon their being

in conformity with the local laws, and in the event of conflict therewith

the local laws shall prevail …." (Emphasis added.)

     Construction of a new church building on the land began sometime

in 2002. On September 21, 2003, the new church building was

consecrated in the name of "Harvest Church United Methodist" at a

service presided over by the AWFC bishop and district superintendent.

     In 2004, Harvest incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the

former Alabama Nonprofit Corporation Act, former § 10-3A-1 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975, which has been recodified as the Alabama Nonprofit

Corporation Law, § 10A-3-1.01 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Paragraph 2506.2

of the Book of Discipline requires local churches to include the following

in their corporate documents:

           "a) identification of the sponsoring church agency or
     agencies ('sponsor(s)') to which it relates and the relationship
     of the corporation to its sponsor(s),

contends that there is no such thing as an "implied trust" under Alabama
law -- outside of a constructive trust created as an equitable remedy.

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           "b) recognition that its corporate powers are subject to
      the Discipline to the same extent as its sponsor(s), and

           "c) recognition that the corporation's powers cannot
      exceed those given by the Discipline to its sponsor(s)."

Paragraph 2506.3 further requires that the corporate documents of the

local church "include a reference to the [trust] provisions of ¶ 2501."

Harvest's articles of incorporation did not satisfy the above-mentioned

requirements. Instead, Harvest's articles of incorporation stated that

"[t]he Church sitting and acting in a duly called and held business

meeting shall be the final authority in all of its affairs," and that "title of

all property shall be vested in the name of the Church."

      In 2019, after years of disagreement over issues of human sexuality,

the UMC's General Conference -- the UMC's supreme legislative body --

held a special session and passed a plan for congregations that wished to

leave the UMC for "reasons of conscience" regarding the issues of human

sexuality. The UMC's General Conference added paragraph 2553 to the

Book of Discipline, which provided a "gracious exit" for congregations

that wished to disaffiliate from the UMC over issues related to human

sexuality. Specifically, paragraph 2553 allowed congregations to exit

with property if the disaffiliating congregations met certain financial and

                                      7
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procedural obligations. 2

        On November 10, 2022, Harvest sued the AWFC and the GCFA in

the trial court. In its complaint, Harvest acknowledged the possibility

that Harvest's congregation "may or may not vote to cease its affiliation

with the UMC denomination in the near future." Harvest further

explained that, before its congregation made its decision, it wanted a

judicial declaration that "it alone owns and controls all real and personal

property titled in the name of, or held by, [Harvest]."

        More specifically, the complaint asserted a claim requesting the

following:

        "A declaration recognizing that [Harvest] alone is the
        absolute, full, exclusive, fee simple owner of all real or
        personal property that is owned by [Harvest], held for
        [Harvest], or titled in its name; further, that the UMC and the
        [AWFC] have no right to or interest in any of the real or
        personal property so owned by [Harvest]; and further, that
        neither the UMC nor the [AWFC] has any trust, equitable, or
        beneficial interest in any of the real or personal property so
        owned by [Harvest]. [Harvest] requests that the judgment be
        accompanied by permanent injunctive relief protecting and
        enforcing the declaratory judgment of the [the trial court]."

The complaint also sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a

        2Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline expired on December 31,

2023.

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preliminary injunction "prohibiting the UMC or the [AWFC] from taking

any action that would directly or indirectly interfere with [Harvest's] use,

ownership, or control of [the local church] property." Finally, the

complaint sought

     "[a]ll other general and equitable relief to which [Harvest]
     may be entitled, including a judgment that, in the event of any
     determination that the UMC has any interest in the Land,
     that [Harvest] is entitled to compensation and/or an unjust
     enrichment award for the improvements made to the Land at
     [Harvest's] expense."

     Harvest's action was subsequently stayed by agreement of the

parties pending the outcome of Harvest's congregation's vote to sever its

affiliation with the UMC.

     In January 2023, Harvest's congregation voted overwhelmingly to

cease its affiliation with the UMC. Harvest, however, acknowledged that

the vote was not in accordance with paragraph 2553 of the Book of

Discipline and that its disaffiliation is not consistent with the

disaffiliation process required by the AWFC and the UMC.3

     3In relevant part, the agreed stay order provided as follows:

     "If within 120 days [Harvest] votes to sever its affiliation with
     the UMC and [the AWFC], and such disaffiliation is not
     consistent with the disaffiliation process required by the
     AWFC and [the] UMC, [Harvest] shall thereafter have seven

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     In February 2023, the AWFC and the GCFA moved to dismiss

Harvest's complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6),

Ala. R. Civ. P., primarily arguing that the trial court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction over the action based on the ecclesiastical abstention

doctrine, which prohibits civil courts from adjudicating disputes

concerning spiritual or ecclesiastical matters. The AWFC and the GCFA

additionally argued that the GCFA was an improper party to the action

and that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. After the trial

court denied their motion to dismiss, the AWFC and the GCFA petitioned

this Court for a writ of mandamus, and we ordered answers and briefs.

                            Standard of Review

     Matters of subject-matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo.

DuBose v. Weaver, 68 So. 3d 814, 821 (Ala. 2011). Ex parte Chandler, 910

So. 2d 763, 765 (Ala. 2005). A court ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ.

P., motion to dismiss " ' "may consider documents outside the pleadings

     days to request that its pending TRO application be reset for
     hearing."

The materials before this Court do not indicate whether Harvest
requested that its TRO application be reset for a hearing within the
seven-day period specified above.

                                     10
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to assure itself that it has jurisdiction." ' " Ex parte Safeway Ins. Co. of

Alabama, Inc., 990 So. 2d 344, 349 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Lindsey v. United

States, 448 F. Supp. 2d 37, 43 (D.D.C. 2006), quoting in turn Al-Owhali

v. Ashcroft, 279 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2003)). "The question of

subject-matter jurisdiction is reviewable by a petition for a writ of

mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 888 So. 2d 478, 480 (Ala.

2003).

     Further, "[a] petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper vehicle

by which to challenge the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction." Ex parte Merches, 151 So. 3d 1075, 1078 (Ala. 2014) (citing

Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 519,

525 (Ala. 2003)). Our review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss

for lack of personal jurisdiction is de novo. Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So.2d

620, 623 (Ala. 2002).

     In reviewing a mandamus petition, this Court considers " 'only

those facts before the trial court.' " Ex parte Ford Motor Credit Co., 772

So. 2d 437, 442 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Ex parte Baker, 459 So. 2d 873, 876

(Ala. 1984)). Moreover, a petitioner must meet the exacting standard

required for mandamus relief:

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           "Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be
     issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the
     petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
     respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
     the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
     jurisdiction of the court."

Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995). Thus, on a

mandamus petition, "[t]he burden of establishing a clear legal right to

the relief sought rests with the petitioner." Ex parte Metropolitan Prop.

& Cas. Ins. Co., 974 So. 2d 967, 972 (Ala. 2007).

                               Discussion

     In their mandamus petition, the AWFC and the GCFA raise two

arguments challenging the trial court's order denying their motion to

dismiss. First, they contend that the trial court should have concluded

that the First Amendment barred the trial court's exercise of subject-

matter jurisdiction over Harvest's action. Second, they argue that the

trial court should have dismissed the claim against the GCFA for lack of

personal jurisdiction. We address each argument in turn.

                     I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

     The primary issue before this Court is whether the AWFC and the

GCFA are entitled to a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to

dismiss Harvest's action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

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     Harvest    argues    that    its        "complaint   presents   a   single,

straightforward, secular legal question: whether [Harvest] has full

control of [the local church] property or whether the [local church]

property is instead subject to a valid trust in favor of a third party, the

UMC." Answer at p. 11. It emphasizes that the recorded deed to the land

is a legal instrument and that Alabama civil courts have jurisdiction to

construe the meaning of that deed. Further, Harvest emphasizes that

this Court has adopted the "neutral principles of law," not the

"hierarchical deference," approach to adjudicating church-property

disputes. According to Harvest,

           "[d]espite the [AWFC and the GCFA's] suggestion, there
     is no real debate about how Alabama courts resolve church
     property disputes. In fact, it has been nearly 50 years since an
     Alabama court resolved a church property dispute the way
     that the [AWFC and GCFA are] requesting (by declining
     jurisdiction, declaring the denomination the default winner,
     and kicking the local church out of court)."

Answer at p. 14.

     Harvest insists that adjudicating the claim in this case will not

require the trial court to resolve any religious questions. Harvest notes

that "[n]owhere in [its] complaint is there any request that [Harvest] be

allowed to 'leave' the UMC," Answer at p. 11, and it insists that the claim

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presented in its complaint should be "considered separately from any

threatened counterclaim or non-legal defense [the AWFC and the GCFA]

may assert." Answer at p. 12. According to Harvest, its complaint

involves an ordinary property dispute and requests ordinary relief,

including a judicial declaration "recognizing that [Harvest] alone is the

absolute, full, exclusive, fee simple owner of all real or personal property

that is owned by [Harvest], held for [Harvest], or titled in its name." It

further argues that any "trust" that may (or may not) have been created

in favor of the AWFC or the GCFA would be a trust governed by Alabama

law. Thus, Harvest urges that its claim should be analyzed using "neutral

principles of law" and that the trial court can properly exercise subject-

matter jurisdiction over this action.

     In their petition, the AWFC and the GCFA strongly disagree and

argue that the underlying dispute in this case really concerns whether

Harvest can disaffiliate from the UMC without satisfying the

disaffiliation requirements set forth in Paragraph 2553 of the Book of

Discipline. According to them, to "decide the issues raised by Harvest,"

the trial court will be required to impermissibly interpret various

ecclesiastical provisions of the Book of Discipline as well as "address

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Harvest's improper attempt to disaffiliate from the UMC …." Petition at

p. 17.

         The AWFC and the GCFA contend that the question of Harvest's

disaffiliation from the UMC is an ecclesiastical issue within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts and that the "neutral principles of

law" approach to resolving church-property disputes consequently does

not apply in this case.

         The AWFC and the GCFA further warn that, should the action

proceed, they "could file counterclaims and assert defenses based on the

Discipline and church doctrine." Petition at p. 29 (emphasis added). For

instance, they suggest that the conduct of the parties and certain

provisions of the Book of Discipline gave rise to a trust in favor of the

AWFC. They further insist that the trial court will need to reference, or

even interpret, provisions of the Book of Discipline to determine whether

Harvest can disaffiliate without following paragraph 2553 of the Book of

Discipline. For these reasons, the AWFC and the GCFA urge that "[i]t is

ecclesiastical law, not state law, that created and governs the trust in

this case" and contend that the First Amendment prohibits the trial

court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction over Harvest's action.

                                     15
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Petition at p. 27.

      At a general level, it is undisputed that the Establishment Clause

and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibit civil

courts from adjudicating ecclesiastical issues. See Taylor v. Paradise

Missionary Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979, 986 (Ala. 2017); Murphy v.

Green, 794 So. 2d 325, 330 (Ala. 2000). However, this Court has

repeatedly "recognized the right and duty of civil courts to exercise

jurisdiction to protect the temporalities of the church, such as where civil

rights or rights of property are involved." Williams v. Jones, 258 Ala. 59,

61, 61 So. 2d 101, 102 (1952). Thus, it is undisputed that civil courts do

have jurisdiction to resolve church-property disputes. See Abyssinia

Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So. 2d 746, 748 (Ala. 1976)

("[T]here is jurisdiction to resolve questions of civil or property rights."

(citing Williams)).

      To determine whether the trial court's exercise of subject-matter

jurisdiction is proper here, we must examine in detail the controlling law

and then discuss whether, considering that law, the AWFC and the

GCFA's arguments warrant mandamus relief in this case.

     A. Evolution of Federal Constitutional Law: Neutral Principles v.
                           Hierarchical Deference

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     Although states may adopt " 'any one of various approaches for

settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration

of doctrinal matters,' " Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting

Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at

Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)), the

United   States   Supreme      Court    has   specifically   recognized   two

constitutionally permissible approaches to adjudicating church-property

disputes -- the "hierarchical deference" approach and the "neutral

principles of law" approach.

     Under the "hierarchical deference" approach enunciated in the

United States Supreme Court's 1872 decision in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S.

(13 Wall.) 679, 727-28 (1872), civil courts must defer to the decision of the

highest judicatory body of a hierarchical church in resolving property

disputes between a local congregation and the denomination. 4 In the

century that followed, the "hierarchical deference" approach was the

     4Although Watson was decided without express reference to the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court constitutionalized the principle
set forth in Watson in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian
Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952).

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favored approach for resolving church-property disputes. See Jeffrey B.

Hassler, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal

Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating

Intradenominational Strife, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 399, 410 (2008).

     In 1979, however, the United States Supreme Court, in Jones v.

Wolf, expressly approved of a second approach to adjudicating church-

property disputes -- the "neutral principles of law" approach. 5 In Jones,

the Supreme Court reviewed a case arising out of a property dispute

between members of a local Presbyterian church in Georgia and the

National Presbyterian Church. The Jones Court endorsed Georgia's

"neutral principles of law" approach to resolving church-property

disputes, noting that "[t]he primary advantages of the neutral-principles

approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible

     5The   "neutral principles of law" approach was first mentioned
approvingly by the United States Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church
in United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). In that case, the Supreme Court noted that
"there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property
disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which
property is awarded." 393 U.S. at 449. A year later, the Supreme Court
upheld a Maryland court's application of the "neutral principles of law"
approach to a church-property dispute. Maryland & Virginia Eldership
of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367
(1970).

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enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity."

443 U.S. at 603.

     The United States Supreme Court explained that, under the

"neutral principles of law" approach, civil courts examine "the language

of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes

governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the

constitution of the [denominational] church concerning the ownership

and control of church property" to determine whether there is any basis

for a trust in favor of the denominational church. Id. The Jones Court

noted that the approach permits "civil court[s] to examine certain

religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust

in favor of the [denominational] church" but cautioned that "civil court[s]

must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular

terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the

document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust." 443

U.S. at 604.

     According to the United States Supreme Court, however, if

interpreting the property provisions of religious documents "would

require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court

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must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative

ecclesiastical body." Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for United

States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976)). Thus, under

the "neutral principles of law" approach, if the church-property litigation

turns on the resolution of a dispute over religious doctrine or practice,

civil courts are prohibited from resolving the underlying religious

controversy and must accept the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical

tribunal of a hierarchical church as "binding on them, in their application

to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them." Serbian E.

Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added).

     Although the Jones Court commended the "neutral principles of

law" approach, it made clear that states were free to " 'adopt any one of

various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it

involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and

liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.' " Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting

Maryland & Virginia Eldership of Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368

(Brennan, J., concurring)).

      B. Alabama Adopts "Neutral Principles of Law" Approach and
                 Adjudicates Church-Property Disputes

     Following Jones, this Court, in Trinity Presbyterian Church of

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Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1979), reaffirmed "the

right of civil courts to decide disputes concerning church property," id. at

865, and expressly adopted the "neutral principles of law" approach to

adjudicating church-property disputes. Id. at 866.

     A few years after Tankersley, this Court addressed another church-

property dispute, and again affirmed that Alabama civil courts have

jurisdiction to resolve such disputes. Harris v. Apostolic Overcoming Holy

Church of God, Inc., 457 So. 2d 385, 387 (Ala. 1984). This Court further

stated that civil courts "must use 'neutral principles of law' in

adjudicating church property cases, Tankersley, supra, at 866, and [that]

proper subjects of consideration in this adjudication include the deeds,

state statutes governing the holding of church property, the local church's

charter, and the [denominational] church's constitution. Jones, supra."

Id.; see also African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in Am., Inc. v. Zion

Hill Methodist Church, Inc., 534 So. 2d 224, 225 (Ala. 1988).

     Over a decade later, in Haney's Chapel United Methodist Church

v. United Methodist Church, 716 So. 2d 1156 (Ala. 1998) ("Haney's

Chapel"), a plurality of this Court reiterated that "Alabama courts have

adopted the 'neutral principles of law' approach … and will consider, in

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purely secular terms, the language of the deeds, the charter of the local

church, any applicable state statutes, and any relevant provisions

contained in the discipline of the national church" in resolving church-

property disputes. Id. at 1158; see also Murphy, 794 So. 2d at 330 ("[T]he

courts still have jurisdiction to decide cases concerning questions of civil

or property rights …. The issue of who holds title to church property …

is not ecclesiastical in nature."); Central Alabama Conf. of the African

Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in Am. v. Crum, 746 So. 2d 1013, 1015

(Ala. Civ. App. 1999) ("[T]he courts can resolve disputes concerning civil

or property rights.").

     In 2003, this Court reviewed two additional disputes over church

property. See Ex parte Central Alabama Conf., African Methodist

Episcopal Zion Church in Am., 860 So. 2d 865 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte

African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So. 2d 870 (Ala. 2003). In

both of those cases, this Court stated that trial courts should "follow the

'neutral-principles-of-law' approach and examine the deeds, the Book of

Discipline, and other extrinsic evidence" to resolve the disputes. Ex parte

Central Alabama Conf., 860 So. 2d at 869; see Ex parte African Methodist

Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So. 2d at 874.

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      Under this Court's well-established precedent, then, civil courts can

properly exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate church-related disputes as

long as those disputes can be resolved (1) based on "neutral principles of

law" and (2) without resolving a religious controversy (that is, an issue of

" 'religious practice or doctrine' "). Ex parte African Methodist Episcopal

Zion Church, 860 So. 2d at 872 (quoting Crum, 746 So. 2d at 1015)

(emphasis added). However, the fact that a civil court must review " 'the

language of the deeds, the charter of the local church, any applicable

state statutes, and any relevant provisions in the discipline of the

national church' " does not transform a controversy over church property

into a dispute over issues of " 'religious practice or doctrine.' " Id. at 872-

73 (quoting Crum, 746 So. 2d at 1015 (emphasis added); see also Jones,

443 U.S. at 604 (holding that the First Amendment permits a state to

resolve church-property disputes by examining "certain religious

documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor

of the [denominational] church"); Presbyterian Church in the United

States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.

440, 449 (1969) ("Hull") ("Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of

religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church

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property.").

     For the reasons explained below, the AWFC and the GCFA have

not shown that either of these two requirements for the proper exercise

of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be met in this case.

               C. Whether This Dispute Is a Property Dispute

     The argument advanced by the AWFC and the GCFA suffers from

at least three foundational flaws. First, the AWFC and the GCFA's claim

that this is a church dispute over ecclesiastical, rather than property,

issues is premised on the erroneous assertion that "Harvest wants the

[trial] court to create a new disaffiliation process just for Harvest

contrary to church law." Petition at p. 16.

     As we noted at the outset of this opinion, the AWFC and the GCFA

bear a heavy burden as petitioners for the writ of mandamus. See Ex

parte Gray, 308 So. 3d at 10. The AWFC and the GCFA's petition,

however, contains only general and conclusory allegations that Harvest

"is seeking a judicial declaration absolving [it] from violating church

law," Petition at p. 9, and that Harvest has asked the trial court to "create

a disaffiliation process for Harvest that is contrary to the Discipline."

Petition at p. 29. The AWFC and the GCFA point to no evidence that

                                     24
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supports these assertions.

     Importantly, the submissions to this Court undercut the AWFC and

the GCFA's characterization of Harvest's claim. Harvest's complaint does

not seek judicial review of the disaffiliation procedure set forth in the

Book of Discipline or otherwise ask the trial court to judicially declare

that Harvest's vote to sever its affiliation with the UMC was consistent

with the Book of Discipline's requirements. 6 Indeed, the prayer for relief

in Harvest's complaint makes no reference to disaffiliation, and there is

no evidence that Harvest intends to seek to disaffiliate pursuant to

Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline.

     Instead, the complaint asks that the trial court (1) to recognize that

Harvest "alone is the absolute, full, exclusive, fee simple owner of all real

or personal property that is owned by [Harvest], held for [Harvest], or

titled in its name," (2) to declare that the UMC and the AWFC do not

have "any trust, equitable, or beneficial interest in any of the real or

personal property so owned by [Harvest]," and (3) to prohibit the AWFC

     6In  fact, the submissions before this Court reflect that Harvest
expressly acknowledged that it did not conduct its congregational vote to
leave the UMC in accordance with Paragraph 2553 of the Book of
Discipline.

                                     25
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and the UMC from "taking any action that would directly or indirectly

interfere with [Harvest's] use, ownership, or control" of the local church

property.

     Accordingly, Harvest's claim, on the face of the complaint, pertains

solely to the ownership and control of the local church property -- an issue

that civil courts generally can resolve by applying "neutral principles of

law." See Haney's Chapel, 716 So. 2d at 1158 (plurality opinion) ("[W]e

note that civil courts have general authority to resolve church property

disputes."); 7 see also Murphy, 794 So. 2d at 330 ("The issue of who holds

     7We note that, at oral argument, counsel for the AWFC and the

GCFA attempted to distinguish Haney's Chapel (which involved virtually
identical facts) because it was a plurality decision. This Court in Haney's
Chapel first recognized that "civil courts have general authority to
resolve church property disputes" and that "Alabama courts have
adopted the 'neutral principles of law' approach" to adjudicating church-
property disputes. 716 So. 2d at 1158. Then, applying that approach, it
reversed the trial court's judgment on the merits (that is, it reversed the
trial court's judgment declaring the UMC to be the equitable owner of the
local church property at issue in that case after concluding that the
evidence in that case indicated that the grantors of the local church
property had "intended to convey the property to the trustees of the local
church and to exclude the involvement and control of the [UMC]").
Haney's Chapel, 716 So. 2d at 1160. Further, the reasoning in Haney's
Chapel is completely consistent with our other caselaw discussed above.
For these reasons, although the plurality decision in Haney's Chapel is
not binding authority, it does offer strong persuasive authority for the
trial court's exercise of subject-matter jurisdiction in this case.

                                    26
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title to church property is a civil matter and is not ecclesiastical in

nature.").

     Second, the AWFC and the GCFA's argument that the trial court

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Harvest's action is premised on the

unsubstantiated assertion that adjudicating Harvest's claim will force

the trial court to impermissibly inquire into matters of ecclesiastical

concern. According to the AWFC and the GCFA, even if Harvest's claim

concerns a civil dispute over property ownership, the trial court

nevertheless lacks jurisdiction over Harvest's property claim because,

they say, that claim cannot be decided without "intrud[ing] into

constitutionally dangerous ecclesiastical territory." Petition at p. 21. In

their petition, the AWFC and the GCFA broadly allege that "Harvest's

attempted disaffiliation will be a central issue in this dispute," Petition

at p. 8, and that the trial court "will be required to interpret and apply

multiple parts of the Discipline related to church polity, procedure, and

governance …." Petition at p. 17.

     Once again, however, the conclusory assertions in the AWFC and

the GCFA's petition are insufficient to support their claim that the issues

raised in Harvest's complaint cannot be resolved without impermissibly

                                    27
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deciding matters of religious doctrine and practice. The AWFC and the

GCFA never actually explain why adjudicating Harvest's property claim

under Alabama law would require the interpretation and application of

any ecclesiastical provisions of the Book of Discipline or "deep

examination into … issues involving an understanding of the

disaffiliation rules, process, and procedures." Petition at p. 20. See

McRaney v. North Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc.,

966 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that church's objection that it

"may have 'valid religious reason[s]' for its action" did not deprive the

trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and noting that, "[w]ere such a

broad statement alone sufficient to warrant dismissal at this stage, …

religious entities could effectively immunize themselves from judicial

review of claims brought against them").

     As discussed above, under the "neutral principles of law" approach,

the trial court should consider, in purely secular terms, "the language of

the deeds, the charter of the local church, any applicable state statutes,

and any relevant provisions contained in the discipline of the national

church" to resolve the current property dispute. See Ex parte African

Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, 860 So. 2d at 872-73; Ex parte Central

                                   28
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Alabama Conf., 860 So. 2d at 869; Haney's Chapel, 716 So. 2d at 1158

(plurality opinion); Harris, 457 So. 2d at 387.

     Although the "neutral principles of law" approach contemplates

that "there may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the

constitution of the [denominational] church incorporates religious

concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property," so that

interpreting "the instruments of ownership would require the civil court

to resolve a religious controversy," Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, the AWFC and

the GCFA have not demonstrated (1) that, under Alabama law, the

disaffiliation provisions of the Book of Discipline are relevant to

Harvest's property claim or (2) that interpreting the language of the deed,

the relevant property provisions of the Book of Discipline, or any other

extrinsic evidence would require the trial court to impermissibly decide

any religious issues. See Murphy, 794 So. 2d at 330 ("Because the

resolution of these issues requires a court merely to review church

records and incorporation documents, without delving into spiritual

matters, there is no constitutional bar to a court's hearing this case.").

      D. Why the Cited Caselaw Does Not Support a Lack of Subject-
                            Matter Jurisdiction

     Finally, the AWFC and the GCFA cite no relevant authority for the

                                    29
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proposition that the "matters before the [trial court] are predominantly

ecclesiastical in nature," Petition at p. 15, and their argument that the

trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action reflects a

fundamental misunderstanding of our controlling precedents.

     In their mandamus petition, the AWFC and the GCFA cite Our

Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. ____, 140 S. Ct.

2049 (2020), Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.

EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012), Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United

States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976), Kedroff v. St.

Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344

U.S. 94 (1952), and Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872), for

the broad proposition that the First Amendment insulates ecclesiastical

issues from judicial review and protects religious institutions from state

interference in matters of faith, doctrine, and church governance.

     The AWFC and the GCFA, however, do not (1) explain why this

general principle of law applies to the specific set of facts in this case or

(2) discuss whether the foregoing cases involve an analogous set of

circumstances. Crucially, the facts presently before this Court are readily

distinguishable from those in the cases cited by the AWFC and the GCFA.

                                     30
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     For instance, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United

States and Canada, the issue of who controlled the property of the

American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church

hinged on whether the respondent was the true bishop of the American-

Canadian Diocese. 8 The United States Supreme Court held that, because

(1) "the sole power to appoint and remove Bishops of the [Serbian Eastern

Orthodox] Church resides in its highest ranking organs," 426 U.S. at 715,

and (2) the highest ecclesiastical authority of the Serbian Eastern

Orthodox Church had removed the respondent as bishop of the American-

Canadian Diocese, civil courts were required to accept the incidental

effects of that ecclesiastical decision as binding on them. 426 U.S. at 720.

Here, in contrast, the AWFC and the GCFA have not shown that, under

Alabama law, resolving the property dispute in this case hinges on the

resolution of any ecclesiastical decision or issue.

     In their mandamus petition, the AWFC and the GCFA also cite

African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church in America, Inc. v. Zion Hill

Methodist Church, Inc., 534 So. 2d 224 (Ala. 1988) ("Zion Hill"), and

     8Under Illinois law, the bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese

was the principal officer of the property-holding church corporations in
that case. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 709.

                                     31
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United Methodist Church v. St. Louis Crossing Independent Methodist

Church, 150 Ind. App. 574, 276 N.E.2d 916 (1971) ("St. Louis Crossing"),

for the narrower proposition that Harvest's property claim cannot be

resolved based on "neutral principles of law." Neither case, however,

concerns a civil court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In Zion Hill, a

national religious denomination appealed from a judgment based on a

jury's verdict finding that the local church, and not the national religious

denomination, owned the church property at issue. 534 So. 2d at 224.

Although this Court concluded that the jury's verdict in favor of the local

church was contrary to the evidence, it did not hold that the trial court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the action or that the claim could

not be analyzed using "neutral principles of law." Id. at 228. In fact, this

Court expressly applied the "neutral principles of law" approach in

concluding that the national religious denomination was the equitable

owner of the church property in that case. Id. at 225. Similarly, in St.

Louis Crossing, an Indiana state court expressly applied the "neutral

principles of law" approach to determine that an implied trust applied to

the property in question. See St. Louis Crossing, 150 Ind. App. at 585,

276 N.E.2d at 923 ("[I]t seems clear that substantial evidence exists

                                    32
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which, according to neutral principles of law, establishes that an implied

trust in favor of the appellants was intended by the local church and that

it was in fact established." (emphasis added)).

     Further, by arguing that ecclesiastical, rather than civil, law

governs whether a valid trust in favor of the UMC exists in this case, the

AWFC and the GCFA have also misread -- and misapplied -- the many

federal and Alabama decisions that have consistently held that civil

courts must decide disputes concerning church property by "looking at

so-called 'neutral principles of law' and not resolv[ing] the underlying

controversies over religious doctrine." Tankersley, 374 So. 2d at 866

(citing Hull, 393 U.S. at 449); see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.

     The AWFC and the GCFA have not cited a single Alabama case

holding that the First Amendment bars a trial court from adjudicating a

church-related dispute over real property by "consider[ing], in purely

secular terms, the language of the deed[], the charter of the local church,

any applicable state statutes, and any relevant provisions contained in

the discipline of the national church." Haney's Chapel, 716 So. 2d at 1158

                                    33
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(plurality opinion). 9 Accordingly, the AWFC and the GCFA are not

entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to dismiss

Harvest's action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

                       II. Personal Jurisdiction

     9In   their notice of supplemental authority, the AWFC and the
GCFA additionally cite Oklahoma Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, Inc. v. Timmons, 538 P.3d 163 (2023) ("Timmons I"),
and Oklahoma Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc.
v. Timmons, 538 P.3d 170 (2023) ("Timmons II"). These cases do not
involve property claims and instead involve claims about how the actual
disaffiliation process works. The AWFC and the GCFA do not explain
how the facts in the foregoing cases are analogous to the facts in the
present case. Significantly, the local churches in Timmons I and
Timmons II both chose to disaffiliate pursuant to the procedure set forth
in Paragraph 2553 of the Book of Discipline. When the local churches
became dissatisfied with the UMC's administration of that procedure,
they asked a trial court for injunctive relief directing the UMC to "call a
special Annual Conference … to vote on whether to approve [the local
church's] disaffiliation agreement," Timmons I, 538 P.3d at 167, and to
allow the local church to "hold a church conference vote on disaffiliation
before" a specified date. Timmons II, 538 P.3d at 174. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court concluded that, by interpreting ecclesiastical provisions
of the Book of Discipline and fashioning a remedy contrary to the
ecclesiastical provisions in the Book of Discipline, the trial courts in
Timmons I and Timmons II "exercised judicial power unauthorized by
law." Timmons I, 538 P.3d at 170; see Timmons II, 538 P.3d at 176. Here,
in contrast, Harvest has not sought to disaffiliate pursuant to Paragraph
2553 of the Book of Discipline and has not asked the trial court (1) to
enjoin the UMC's administration of the disaffiliation process or (2) to
force the UMC to ecclesiastically recognize its disaffiliation. Thus,
Timmons I and Timmons II also do not stand for the proposition that the
trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Harvest's property claim
in this case.

                                    34
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     In their mandamus petition, the AWFC and the GCFA additionally

challenge the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the

GCFA. The AWFC and the GCFA claim that Harvest, by naming the

"General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist

Church d/b/a The United Methodist Church," has named an improper

party as a defendant, warranting dismissal of Harvest's claim against the

GCFA for lack of personal jurisdiction. According to them,

     "[b]ecause 'The United Methodist Church' is not an entity
     with legal capacity, no United Methodist entity, [the] GCFA
     included, can 'do business as' the UMC. Because Harvest
     cannot name the denomination, a nonjural entity, as
     defendant, it attempts to use [the] GCFA as a proxy. Harvest
     cites ¶2509 of the Discipline, but that section actually opposes
     this effort.

           " '¶2509. Instituting and Defending Civil Action --
           Because of the nature of The United Methodist
           Church (¶141), no individual or affiliated church
           body or unit, nor any official thereof, may
           commence or participate in any suit or proceeding
           in the name of or on behalf of The United
           Methodist Church, excepting, however, the
           following:

           " '1. The General Council on Finance and
           Administration or any person or church unit
           served with legal process in the name of The
           United Methodist Church may appear for the
           purpose of presenting to the court the nonjural
           nature of The United Methodist Church and to
           raise issues of lack of jurisdiction of the court, lack

                                     35
SC-2023-0385

           of capacity of such individual or unit to be served
           with process, and related constitutional issues in
           defense of denominational interests.'

     "[The] GCFA is not the UMC, and when served in the name of
     the UMC, [the] GCFA may only make appearance to explain
     the nonjural nature of the UMC. Any other action by [the]
     GCFA would be inconsistent with denominational polity."

Petition at pp. 31-32 (bold typeface omitted). The AWFC and the GCFA

contend that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over the GCFA

because, they say, pursuant to the foregoing provision of the Book of

Discipline, the GCFA is prohibited from representing the UMC in these

circumstances and is not, therefore, a proper defendant.10

     In response, Harvest notes that although the GCFA "labels its

objection as jurisdictional, [it] cites no authority relating to personal

jurisdiction and does not contest its contacts with Alabama." Answer at

p. 27. Harvest further explains that the GCFA is named as a defendant

because the Book of Discipline's trust clause names the UMC, and not

     10To the extent that the AWFC and the GCFA intended to argue a

legal doctrine other than personal jurisdiction to support their claim that
the GCFA is "not a proper defendant," Petition at p. 33, they have failed
to cite any relevant legal authority. And, they have also failed to provide
any legal argument suggesting that this Court could address such an
unnamed legal doctrine on mandamus review.

                                    36
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the AWFC, as the beneficiary of that trust. According to Harvest,

pursuant to paragraph 807 of the Book of Discipline,11 "the GCFA is not

only the legal entity that is explicitly appointed as the UMC's agent to

receive any assets conveyed to the 'the UMC' in trust, but it is also the

entity charged with protecting the legal rights of the denomination."

Answer at p. 28. Harvest therefore contends that the GCFA is

indisputably a proper party.

     Although the AWFC and the GCFA characterize their arguments

as a challenge to the trial court's personal jurisdiction over the GCFA,

     11In relevant part, paragraph 807.1 of the Book of Discipline
provides as follows:

     "The [GCFA] shall have the following additional fiscal
     responsibilities:

     "1. To receive, collect, and hold in trust for the benefit of The
     United Methodist Church, its general funds, or its general
     agencies any and all donations, bequests, and devises of any
     kind, real or personal, that may be given, devised,
     bequeathed, or conveyed to The United Methodist Church as
     such …."

Additionally, paragraph 807.9 of the Book of Discipline further provides
that the GCFA is charged with taking "all necessary legal steps to
safeguard and protect the interests and rights of the denomination … and
to make provisions for legal counsel where necessary to protect the
interests and rights of the denomination."

                                    37
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their claim that the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction is not grounded

in any allegations of insufficient minimum contacts or defective service

of process.12 The AWFC and the GCFA also cite no relevant authority for

the proposition that the trial court should dismiss the claim against the

GCFA for lack of personal jurisdiction. As previously noted, a petitioner

for the writ of mandamus "carries a heavy burden in securing mandamus

relief." Ex parte Gray, 308 So. 3d at 10. Here, the AWFC and the GCFA

have not met their burden of demonstrating that the trial court's exercise

of personal jurisdiction over the GCFA is improper.

                                Conclusion

     For the reasons discussed above, we deny the AWFC and the

GCFA's petition for the writ of mandamus.

     PETITION DENIED.

     Bryan and Mitchell, JJ., and McCool,* Special Justice, concur.

     12Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., allows service of process

     "outside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in
     this state when the person or entity has such contacts with
     this state that the prosecution of the action against the person
     or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution
     of this state or the Constitution of the United States."

     *Judge Chris McCool of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
and Judge Christy O. Edwards of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

                                    38
SC-2023-0385

     Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.

     Sellers, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

     Edwards,* Special Justice, concurs in the result.

     Shaw, Wise, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., recuse themselves.

were appointed on November 16, 2023, to serve as Special Justices in
regard to this petition for a writ of mandamus.

                                    39
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PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

     I agree with the main opinion that the Alabama-West Florida

Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the AWFC"), and the

General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist

Church ("the GCFA") ("the petitioners") have failed to demonstrate that

they are entitled to have the underlying case dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction and to have the GCFA dismissed for lack of personal

jurisdiction. As the main opinion explains, the precedents on the specific

issue of church-property disputes cut against the petitioners. In

particular, when a deed grants the property to the local church and not

the hierarchical church, it appears to me that the appellate courts of this

State have always sided with the local church. See, e.g., Haney's Chapel

United Methodist Church v. United Methodist Church, 716 So. 2d 1156,

1160 (Ala. 1998) (plurality opinion); African Methodist Episcopal Church

v. St. Paul Methodist Church of Selmont, 362 So. 2d 868, 874 (Ala. 1978);

Central Alabama Conf. of the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church

in Am. v. Crum, 746 So. 2d 1013, 1017 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). In this case,

the deed clearly gives the property to the trustees of Harvest Church-

Dothan ("Harvest"), not to the United Methodist Church ("the UMC").

                                    40
SC-2023-0385

Consequently, I agree that the petitioners have failed to demonstrate

that they have a clear legal right to the relief sought.

      All we had to do to resolve this case is examine whether, under our

existing precedents, the petitioners had a clear legal right to have the

case dismissed. Parts I.C., I.D., and II of the "Discussion" section of the

main opinion accurately apply our precedents and answer that question

in the negative. Because I believe those parts of the opinion are correct,

I concur with them in full. The analysis could have and should have

stopped there.

      But in reaching this conclusion, the main opinion says much more

than is necessary. In attempting to resolve our sometimes confusing

jurisprudence concerning church disputes, the main opinion reasons that

"civil courts can properly exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate church-

related disputes as long as those disputes can be resolved (1) based on

'neutral principles of law' and (2) without resolving a religious

controversy (that is, an issue of ' "religious practice or doctrine" ')." ___ So.

3d at ____. I find this test similar to the Lemon test, which "ambitiously

attempted to find a grand unifying theory of the Establishment Clause,

[while in later decisions the United States Supreme Court took] a more

                                       41
SC-2023-0385

modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand." American

Legion v. American Humanist Ass'n, 588 U.S. 29, 60 (2019) (discussing

the shortcomings of the test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.

602 (1971)). In the same way, I believe that the majority's test for

determining whether we have jurisdiction in every church-dispute case

is an ambitious attempt to find a grand unifying theory instead of

focusing on the particular type of case at hand, which is what our more

recent precedents have done.

     While I believe that the main opinion accurately applies our

precedents on the limited issue of church-property disputes, I believe that

it goes too far in announcing a grand unifying theory applicable to all

church-dispute cases that will unfortunately result in a loss of religious

liberty. Furthermore, the main opinion implies that the basis for the

limits on the jurisdiction of the courts is found only in the First

Amendment to the United States Constitution, which I do not believe is

accurate. Because I would have answered only the limited question

presented to us, I cannot join the main opinion in full.

                 I. The Procedural Posture of This Case

                                    42
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     The procedural posture of this case makes it an exceptionally bad

candidate for overhauling our church-dispute jurisprudence. First, no

party has asked us to depart from our precedents as they currently stand.

Generally, this Court is "not inclined to abandon precedent without a

specific invitation to do so." Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant,

L.L.C., 949 So. 3d 893, 898 (Ala. 2006). Because our precedents

concerning church-property disputes were a major obstacle for the

petitioners in this case, they had a strong incentive to ask us to revisit

them, but they did not do so. Overhauling our precedents ex mero motu,

and therefore without the benefit of adversarial testing, is typically an

extraordinary and often jurisprudentially detrimental move.

     The main opinion's sweeping ambition is even more improper

considering that we are addressing legal issues arising from a limited,

interlocutory petition for a writ of mandamus, not a direct, full-throated

appeal. Mandamus review "has essentially been limited to well

recognized situations where there is a clear legal right in the petitioner

to the order sought." Ex parte U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 148 So. 3d 1060,

1064 (Ala. 2014). If a petitioner fails to meet this burden, then he will not

receive the relief sought. See Ex parte Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 333 So. 3d 925,

                                     43
SC-2023-0385

926-27 (Ala. 2020). In this case, the main opinion correctly holds that

petitioners have not met their burden and therefore refuses to give them

the relief they seek. But if the petitioners did not even get the relief

requested in this case, then why should we go even further and overhaul

how we address all church-dispute cases?13

     Because the main opinion discusses a matter not presented by the

parties and not essential to the judgment, the grand unifying theory

presented therein is, I believe, mere obiter dictum. Ex parte Williams,

838 So. 2d 1028, 1031 (Ala. 2002) ("obiter dictum is, by definition, not

essential to the judgment of the court which states the dictum"). But as

this Court's experience shows, dicta often creates unnecessary confusion.

See Diemert v. City of Mobile, 474 So. 2d 663, 665 (Ala. 1985) ("this Court,

in dicta, attempted to clear up this confusion, but unfortunately failed to

do so"); see also Ex parte Courtyard Citiflats, LLC, 191 So. 3d 787, 797

(Ala. 2015) (Murdock, J., dissenting) (arguing that dicta from a previous

decision "laid the groundwork for what I consider to be much confusion");

Hughes Devs., Inc. v. Montgomery, 903 So. 2d 94, 102-03 (Ala. 2004)

     13I particularly regret that, in an opinion trying to do too much with

our church-dispute jurisprudence, four of our Court's members are
recused and unable to participate or provide insight and counsel.

                                    44
SC-2023-0385

(Houston, J., concurring specially) (admitting that dicta he wrote in a

prior decision caused confusion).

         II. Restatement of Our Church-Dispute Jurisprudence

     Since the main opinion has introduced a new grand unifying theory

of church-dispute cases that is not supported by our precedents, I feel

compelled to restate what we have actually held in these kinds of cases.

In my view, there are three classes of church-dispute cases. The first

involves purely ecclesiastical questions;14 nobody disagrees that we have

no jurisdiction over such cases. The second involves purely civil

questions; nobody disagrees that we do have jurisdiction over such cases.

But the third involves mixed questions, where the ecclesiastical and the

civil questions are intertwined. In my view, most cases fall into the third

category.

     14Our     decisions sometimes say "spiritual or ecclesiastical"
questions; at other times, they lump both categories of questions together
as simply "spiritual" questions. Compare Taylor v. Paradise Missionary
Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979, 986 (Ala. 2017) (using the term
" 'spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs' ") (citations omitted) with Murphy v.
Green, 794 So. 2d 325, 330 (Ala. 2000) (using the term "spiritual
matters"). For simplicity's sake, the term "ecclesiastical" in this special
writing encompasses both "spiritual" and "ecclesiastical" unless
otherwise noted.

                                     45
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     Failing to recognize the third category of church-dispute cases can

lead to an artificial binary, which produces overly simplistic analysis that

inevitably leads to inconsistent results. For instance, a church's firing its

pastor is an ecclesiastical matter, St. John Baptist Church, Inc. v.

Howard, 211 So. 3d 804, 810 (Ala. 2016), except when it is a civil matter,

In re Galilee Baptist Church, 279 Ala. 393, 397, 186 So. 2d 102, 107

(1966). A church's expelling members is an ecclesiastical matter, Lott v.

Eastern Shore Christian Ctr., 908 So. 2d 922, 930-31 (Ala. 2005), except

when it's a civil matter, Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon,

340 So. 2d 746, 748 (Ala. 1976). Church procedure is an ecclesiastical

matter, Taylor v. Paradise Missionary Baptist Church, 242 So. 3d 979,

995-96 (Ala. 2017), except when it is a civil matter, Yates v. El Bethel

Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d 331, 346-47 (Ala. 2002). In nearly

every case that this Court has addressed, one side has framed the issue

as an ecclesiastical matter, while the other side has framed it as a civil

matter. The parties in this case are no exception. See Petition at 15 ("The

matters before the Court are predominantly ecclesiastical in nature and

should be determined in accordance with the Discipline and church

law."); Answer at 5 ("Despite the [petitioners'] position, the underlying

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claim at issue is a pure property dispute and not an 'ecclesiastical'

matter.").

     If we are left with only the ecclesiastical/civil dichotomy to decide

these cases, then success may turn not on the merits of the case, but on

which lawyer was better at framing the issue. Such an approach cannot

do justice to religious freedom. Churches are entitled to know "before they

act the standard to which they will be held, rather than be compelled to

guess about the outcome of Supreme Court peek-a-boo." United States v.

Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 574 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

     In recent years, both this Court and the United States Supreme

Court have moved away from classifying church-dispute matters as

purely civil disputes, taking a more refined approach to understand them

as ecclesiastical or at least mixed. See, e.g., Taylor, 242 So. 3d at 995

(holding that recent precedents from the United States Supreme Court

and the Alabama Supreme Court "signaled a modification in those

authorities recognizing the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court

to determine whether church procedure or law had been followed in

church proceedings in which a church decides an ecclesiastical matter").

Lott, 908 So. 2d at 930-31 (holding that an "allegedly intractable

                                    47
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disagreement over 'rights of access [to] and copying [of] Church records' "

was insufficient to involve a court in the " 'fundamental ecclesiastical

concern' " of " 'determining who is and who is not a church member' ")

(citation omitted)). As the portion of Taylor quoted above demonstrates,

our jurisprudence has been shifting indeed. Consequently, we must

carefully examine the boundaries of our jurisdiction, noting that our

trend has been to more closely consider the true nature of the church

disputes that come before us, and often discerning them to be

ecclesiastical rather than civil when they are intertwined. 15

     Having reviewed the arc of this Court's and the United States

Supreme Court's church-dispute precedents, I offer a summary

restatement of such jurisprudence to better divide that which belongs to

the church and that which belongs to the civil government.

     15Continuing with the analogy to developments in the United States

Supreme Court's Establishment Clause precedents, the Supreme Court
moved from the Lemon test to an issue-by-issue test (American Legion)
to the history test (Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 535-
36 (2022)). In the same way, if Alabama's church-dispute jurisprudence
is moving toward a cardinal rule that sets the stage for most church-
dispute cases, I believe it is moving toward considering the true nature
of the dispute and holding that we have no jurisdiction if it is
ecclesiastical. See infra (listing the three classes of cases and providing
citations).

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     First, the following matters are left completely up to the jurisdiction

of the church:

  1. Matters of doctrine or faith. Lott v. Eastern Shore Christian Ctr.,

     908 So. 2d 922, 928 (Ala. 2005); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral

     of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952);

     Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1872).

  2. Who is or who is not a church member, including expulsion or

     excommunication of members. Lott, 908 So. 2d at 928, 930; Mount

     Olive Baptist Church v. Williams, 529 So. 2d 972, 973 (Ala. 1988);

     Caples v. Nazareth Church of Hopewell Ass'n, 245 Ala. 656, 660, 18

     So. 2d 383, 386 (1944); Gewin v. Mt. Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166

     Ala. 345, 349, 51 So. 947, 948 (1909); Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala.

     234, 242-43, 32 So. 575, 578 (1902); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at

     730, 733.

  3. Ordinary acts of church discipline. Lott, 908 So. 2d at 928; Watson,

     80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730, 733.

  4. The hiring and firing of ministers. Taylor, 242 So. 3d at 983; Lott,

     908 So. 2d at 930; Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &

     Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 186 (2012).

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  5. Matters of church government or procedure. Lott, 908 So. 2d at 929-

     30; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116; Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730.

     Second, a civil court could have jurisdiction over the following

matters:

  1. Property rights, especially when a local church leaves a

     denomination or when there is a church split and competing

     factions are fighting over the property. Trinity Presbyterian Church

     of Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861, 865 (Ala. 1979); Jones

     v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Mitchell v. Church of Christ at

     Mt. Olive, 221 Ala. 315, 318, 128 So. 781, 783 (1930); Watson, 80

     U.S. (13 Wall.) at 730.

  2. Financial rights (such as salary, emoluments, and related matters

     based on contracts and disconnected from spiritual matters). St.

     Union Baptist Church, Inc. v. Howard, 211 So. 3d 804, 812 (Ala.

     2016); State ex rel. McNeill v. Bibb St. Church, 84 Ala. 23, 33, 4 So.

     40, 40 (1888).

  3. Crimes and torts. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 733; Yates v. El

     Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d 331, 368 (Ala. 2002)

     (Moore, C.J., dissenting).

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     Third, and perhaps most importantly, a civil court likely does not

have jurisdiction in mixed cases if the underlying dispute is ecclesiastical

in nature. For instance, in property or financial cases, we have held that

civil courts do not have jurisdiction if the underlying dispute is

ecclesiastical in nature. Taylor, 242 So. 3d at 995; Mount Olive Primitive

Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 674, 42 So. 2d 617, 618 (1949).

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has warned that "the First

Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in

resolving church property disputes." Presbyterian Church in the United

States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.

440, 449 (1969) (emphasis added). Likewise, if a tort action (such as a

defamation action) arises out of an ecclesiastical affair -- the hiring and

firing of ministers, ordinary acts of church discipline, or the expulsion of

members, for instance -- then the court probably does not have

jurisdiction. Ex parte Bole, 103 So. 3d 40, 72 (Ala. 2012). It stands to

reason that if the courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over civil cases

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when the underlying issue is ecclesiastical, then they may lack subject-

matter jurisdiction in the criminal context, too. 16

     The foregoing demonstrates that church-dispute cases involving

purely civil affairs rarely arise. On the contrary, cases that appear to be

civil in nature are often ecclesiastical. For that reason, courts should be

reluctant to " 'assume jurisdiction' " in church cases. Taylor, 242 So. 3d at

986 (citation omitted). Even if it appears that courts have jurisdiction,

they should proceed with extreme caution, because they "navigate a

veritable minefield whenever they involve themselves in church

matters." Ex parte Board of Trustees/Directors and/or Deacons of Old

Elam Baptist Church, 983 So. 2d 1079, 1097 (Ala. 2007) (Parker, J.,

concurring specially).

     The main opinion paints a different picture, as if one side of the

field is laced with mines and the other is not, neatly divided by a bright

picket fence between the two. See ___ So. 3d at ____ (positing that "civil

     16Some   churches during COVID certainly thought so. See, e.g.,
Christ, Not Caesar, Is the Head of the Church: A Biblical Case for the
Church's Duty to Remain Open, Grace Community Church (July 24,
2020) (arguing that the State had no jurisdiction to order the church to
stop assembling for worship) (at the time of this decision, this article
could be located at: [https://www.gracechurch.org/news/posts/1988]).

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courts can properly exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate church-related

disputes as long as those disputes can be resolved (1) based on 'neutral

principles of law' and (2) without resolving a religious controversy (that

is, an issue of ' "religious practice or doctrine" ')"). In contrast, I believe

the entire field is laced with mines with no easy signage inviting safe

entry. It is an area fraught with danger, and we should usually stay out.

               III. The Specific Issue of Property Disputes

      Although I object strongly to the main opinion's proposed grand and

sweeping theory of church-dispute jurisprudence, I agree that, on the

limited issue of property disputes, our precedents come down on the side

of Harvest, not the petitioners. At the very least, the petitioners fail to

demonstrate that they have a clear legal right to have the case dismissed.

Accordingly, I concur with Parts I.C. and I.D. of the "Discussion" section

of the main opinion.

      As the main opinion accurately explains, both the precedents of this

Court and of the United States Supreme Court have long held that civil

courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate property disputes as long as doing

so does not require resolving ecclesiastical questions. When the only

question in a church-dispute case is who owns the real property, the

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analysis is often more straightforward than it is in determining other

types of cases, such as whether someone is a church member or whether

church procedure was followed. See Part II, supra, of this special writing.

     I must confess that I have reservations about how we decide such

cases. The United States Supreme Court has suggested two ways of

resolving such disputes: the hierarchical approach, in which the courts

defer to whatever the denomination decides, and the neutral-principles-

of-law approach, in which the courts examine deeds and other documents

in secular terms to determine who gets the property. See Jones v. Wolf,

443 U.S. 595 (1979) (discussing the neutral-principles-of-law approach);

Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872) (discussing the

hierarchical approach). Alabama adopted the neutral-principles-of-law

approach in 1979 and has followed it since. Trinity Presbyterian Church

of Montgomery v. Tankersley, 374 So. 2d 861 (Ala. 1979).

     Both approaches have problems. The hierarchical approach has the

intrinsic appeal of deference to the church, but it presumes that the

hierarchical church is the true church. See, e.g., Adam J. MacLeod, Group

Ownership and the Ends of Legal Fictions, 13 Faulkner U.L. Rev. 1, 14

(2021) (noting that the framing of a hierarchical-deference issue in a

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Texas case opened the door to inviting the court to decide: "Who is the

'Church'?"); Mark A. Hicks, The Art of Ecclesiastical War: Using the

Legal System to Resolve Church Disputes, 6 Liberty U.L. Rev. 531, 543

(2012) (noting Justice Rehnquist's concerns that deferring too much to

hierarchical organizations could cause Establishment Clause problems);

Jeffrey B. Hassler, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for

Legal Resolution of Church Property Disputes in a Time of Escalating

Intradenominational Strife, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 399, 429-30 (2008) ("The

general effect of adopting an approach that always leads to the victory of

the general church in any such dispute at least raises questions about

whether that approach tends toward an impermissible establishment of

religion."). In other words, when a congregation essentially claims that it

is not leaving its denomination but that its denomination left it, deferring

to the hierarchical church presumes that it is the "true church." What

civil court has the authority (not to mention the capacity) to determine

which faction is the "true church"?

     On the other hand, the neutral-principles-of-law approach risks

letting civil courts determine what religious documents mean. As Justice

Mendheim wrote in a recent special concurrence,

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     "the neutral-principles-of-law approach hinges on what
     sources a court decides to consider in reaching a decision.
     Does it consider a church's constitution, membership rolls, the
     minutes of church-committee meetings, a hierarchical
     church's book of discipline, and other church-generated
     documents or does it just consider 'legal' documents such as
     articles of incorporation, contracts, and deeds?"

Sails v. Weeks, [Ms. SC-2023-0158, Apr. 5, 2024] ___ So. 3d ____, ____

(Ala. 2024) (Mendheim, J., concurring specially). Other justices and

commentators have flagged similar concerns. See Burns Church, Inc. v.

Alabama Dist. Council of Assemblies of God, Inc., 168 So. 3d 1188, 1195

(Ala. 2014) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the courts lacked

jurisdiction to resolve church-property disputes when they were "based

upon disparate interpretations of church governing documents"); Hicks,

The Art of Ecclesiastical War, supra, at 557-58 (calling for clarification of

the neutral-principles-of-law approach on the issue of where religious

matters end and neutral principles of law begin); Hassler, A Multitude of

Sins?, supra, at 430-44 (discussing the subtypes of neutral principles of

law and their strengths and weaknesses).17

     17Some scholars have suggested resolving church disputes through

alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), in which a mutually agreed-upon
arbitrator who understands the religious issues has the authority to
make the final decision. See Hicks, The Art of Ecclesiastical War, supra,
at 553-56, 60-62 (arguing that ADR should be attempted before lawsuits

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     Despite my reservations about the neutral-principles-of-law

approach, no party in this case has asked us to reconsider our precedents.

Because there is not a clear alternative, I will follow our precedents and

apply them to this matter. See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *70

("The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be

followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust."); Gamble v. United States, 587

U.S. 678, 720 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Although precedent does

not supersede the original meaning of a legal text, it may remain relevant

when it is not demonstrably erroneous."); Jay Mitchell, Textualism in

Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1116 (2023) (noting that the Alabama

Supreme Court "tends to adhere more closely to Justice Thomas's

approach to stare decisis"). Moreover, we are not being called to

determine in this case whether Harvest is still a part of the UMC,

whether Harvest may disaffiliate from the UMC, or whether church

in accordance with Matthew 18:15-17 and 1 Corinthians 6:1-8 and that
including an ADR clause in church documents would prevent the courts
from adjudicating the dispute); Hassler, A Multitude of Sins?, supra, at
452-53 (listing several high-profile examples of ADR in church disputes
and also drawing on 1 Corinthians 6:1-8). However, if the parties cannot
mutually agree upon ADR, then the courts have no authority to force
them to do so.

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procedure has been followed. Therefore, I believe we may apply neutral

principles of law to the limited issues presented to us.

     As explained in the introduction to this special writing, I believe

that our precedents addressing property disputes in church cases come

down on Harvest's side, not the petitioners'. In particular, the trend in

our cases is for the court to enforce the deed. See Haney's Chapel, 716 So.

2d at 1160; St. Paul Methodist Church of Selmont, 362 So. 2d at 874;

Crum, 746 So. 2d at 1017. The main opinion follows our well-established

principles and rightly observes that the petitioners' arguments to the

contrary are unavailing. Thus, I join the main opinion as to this limited

issue.

               IV. The Basis for Our Limited Jurisdiction

     Finally, I am concerned about an additional, but imprecise,

implication of the main opinion's holding: that our jurisdictional

limitations are grounded only in the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution. But as Justice Mendheim recently observed, "for

roughly the first 150 years of this country's jurisprudence, the First

Amendment was not the inflection point for discussing the judiciary's role

in settling church disputes." Sails, ___ So. 3d at ____ (Mendheim, J.,

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concurring specially). Though the United States Supreme Court decided

its first church-dispute case in 1872, it was not until 1969 -- nearly 100

years later -- that it finally invoked the First Amendment as a basis for

limiting the civil courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate church disputes. Id. at

___. This Court likewise did not invoke the First Amendment in church-

dispute cases until 1969, even though it had been holding that civil courts

lack jurisdiction to adjudicate church disputes since at least 1902. Id. at

___. While I agree that the First Amendment provides an additional

reason why we lack jurisdiction over many church-dispute cases, the

historical records suggests that there must be a deeper reason why we

have no jurisdiction over such cases.

     Alabama's church-state jurisdictional separation has developed not

in a vacuum, but from a rich American heritage of religious liberty that

arose during the founding era based on the belief that church and civil

government serve different roles under God. At the time of the American

founding, the sentiment was growing among our people that the civil

government had no jurisdiction over the church. Thomas Jefferson's and

James Madison's efforts to free the church from the civil government in

Virginia helped set the stage for religious freedom at the federal level and

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the eventual disestablishment of government-run churches among the

states.

     Jefferson's and Madison's efforts reflected the People's growing

belief that church and state had different roles (and therefore different

jurisdictions) under God. Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious

Freedom began:

     "Almighty God hath created the mind free, and manifested his
     Supreme will that free it shall remain, by making it altogether
     insusceptible of restraint: That all attempts to influence it by
     temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil
     incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
     meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the holy
     author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind,
     yet chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in
     his Almighty power to do, but to extend it by its influence on
     reason alone."

Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (June 12,

1779), in 5 The Founders' Constitution 77 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph

Lerner, eds., 1987) ("The Founders' Constitution"). Jefferson recognized

that it was not in God's will for the civil government to enforce religious

orthodoxy through the power of the sword. Jefferson's position was

consistent with Protestant minorities like Baptists, Presbyterians,

Lutherans, and Quakers, who objected to the Episcopalian establishment

in Virginia. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical

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Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409,

1422-24 (1990) ("Origins and Historical Understanding"). While

Jefferson himself did not identify as a member of one of those Protestant

minorities, he and his Protestant-minority allies shared a common belief

that God did not give the civil government jurisdiction to determine and

enforce religious orthodoxy and that, therefore, the church should be free

from government control. See id. at 1437-41.

     James Madison also shared this view. He began his Memorial and

Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments as follows:

     "Because we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth,
     'that Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the
     manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and
     conviction, not by force or violence.' … The Religion then of
     every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
     every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as
     these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
     right. It is unalienable, because the opinions of men,
     depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own
     minds cannot follow the dictates of other men: It is
     unalienable also, because what is here a right towards men,
     is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to
     render to the Creator such homage and such only as he
     believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent, both
     in order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of
     Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member
     of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the
     Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society,
     who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do
     it with a reservation of his duty to the General Authority;

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     much more must every man who becomes a member of any
     particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance
     to the Universal Sovereign. We maintain therefore that in
     matters of Religion, no mans [sic] right is abridged by the
     institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt
     from its cognizance."

James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious

Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 5 The Founders' Constitution 82. Like

Jefferson before him, Madison's basis for jurisdictional separation of

church and state was based on the belief that God was real and therefore

our duties to Him outrank our duties to the State. Therefore, as Professor

Michael McConnell has noted, "Madison advocated a jurisdictional

division between religion and government based on the demands of

religion rather than solely on the interests of society." McConnell, Origins

and Historical Understanding at 1453.

     When Alabama became a state several decades later in 1819, it

followed the lead of Jefferson, Madison, and the People who supported

their view. The new Alabama Constitution declined to establish a state-

run church. Instead, it contained five religious-freedom provisions that

guaranteed the church's freedom from state interference. Art. I, §§ 3-7,

Ala. Const. 1819. Every Alabama Constitution since then has contained

similar guarantees that the church may govern itself free from state

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interference. See Art. I, §§ 3-3.02, Ala. Const. 2022; Art. I, §§ 3-3.02, Ala.

Const. 1901; Art. I, § 4, Ala. Const. 1875; Art. I, §§ 4-5, Ala. Const. 1868;

Art. I, §§ 3-4, Ala. Const. 1865; Art. I, §§ 3-7, Ala. Const. 1861.

     The text of the Alabama Constitution demonstrates that the People

of this state agreed -- and still agree -- with the view that the church and

the state have different jurisdictions under God. Article I, § 3, of the

Alabama Constitution of 1819 provided: "No person within this State

shall, upon any pretence, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of

worshiping God in the manner most agreeable to his own conscience ...."

The People ratifying the Alabama Constitution of 1819 presumed that

there is a God, and therefore the right to worship Him according to the

dictates of one's conscience cannot be taken away. This logic fits perfectly

with Jefferson and Madison's view of religious liberty. Our current

Constitution still acknowledges that God exists, 18 that our rights come

from Him, 19 and that "[e]very person shall be at liberty to worship God

     18The preamble of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 invokes "the

favor and guidance of Almighty God" in establishing and ordaining the
Constitution of this State.

     19Art. I, § 1, Ala. Const. 2022.

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according to the dictates of his or her own conscience." 20 Just as the

People of our State did at its founding, the State still recognizes that,

under God, it must respect the jurisdiction of the church.

                               V. Conclusion

     The petitioners asked this Court for a writ of mandamus ordering

the trial court to dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

and for lack of personal jurisdiction over the GCFA. The main opinion

holds in Parts I.C. and I.D. of the "Discussion" section that the petitioners

have failed to demonstrate that they have a clear legal right to the relief

they seek under our church-property precedents, and it holds in Part II

of the "Discussion" section that the GCFA has failed to demonstrate that

it has a clear legal right to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Those parts of the opinion are sufficient to answer the questions before

us. Accordingly, I concur in those parts of the main opinion and, based

solely on the analysis contained in those parts, I concur in the result to

deny the mandamus petition.

     But the main opinion goes much further than that, purporting to

overhaul our entire church-dispute jurisprudence in what is, I believe,

     20Art. I, § 3.02, Ala. Const. 2022.

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dicta. If, in the future, this Court adopts that dicta, I fear that the

ambitious and ahistorical approach to resolving church-dispute cases set

out in the main opinion will prove unworkable in practice. This Court

may come to that realization eventually, just as the United States

Supreme Court eventually did with the Lemon test. See Kennedy v.

Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 534 (2022) ("the 'shortcomings'

associated with this 'ambitiou[s],' abstract, and ahistorical approach to

the Establishment Clause became so 'apparent' " that the Court

"abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot" (citation omitted)).

My fear is that, in the meantime, churches will face tremendous

uncertainty in litigation, especially if their autonomy is tied to what the

United States Supreme Court has said about the First Amendment. For

these reasons, I do not join Parts I.A. and I.B. of the "Discussion" section

of the main opinion. While our precedents provided a narrow path

through the minefield in this case, today's decision should not be taken

as a sign that the minefield is generally safe to cross.

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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result).

     I concur with the main opinion that the Alabama-West Florida

Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc. ("the AWFC"), and the

General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist

Church ("the GCFA") failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to have the

underlying action dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based

on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine or for lack of personal

jurisdiction over the GCFA.

     I offer the following observations regarding the subject-matter-

jurisdiction issue. In this case, Harvest Church-Dothan ("Harvest")

claims sole ownership of local church property based on the deed titled in

its name, yet the United Methodist Church's Book of Discipline ("the

Discipline") requires that local church property be held in trust for the

benefit of the entire denomination, i.e., The United Methodist Church

("the UMC"). To this end, the Discipline requires that local churches

include a specific trust clause in their deeds and that they reference that

trust clause in their organizational documents. The AWFC and the GCFA

claim that the conflict presented regarding ownership of the local church

property cannot be resolved under neutral principles of law. However, in

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my opinion, once Harvest used the civil legal system to file its deed and

organizational documents, it consented to have secular law applied to its

filings and, thus, opened the door to have any property dispute resolved

pursuant to neutral principles of law. If the question presented in this

case involved a vote on theological matters or the approval of a doctrinal

test for membership, the trial court would have no jurisdiction. I also

posit an inverse scenario. What if, before Harvest commenced the

underlying action, the AWFC or the GCFA discovered that Harvest had

failed to comply with the trust provisions of the Discipline and demanded

that Harvest amend its deed and organizational documents to reflect that

the local church property was held in trust for the benefit of the UMC,

but to no avail? Under such a scenario, the AWFC and the GCFA, being

ecclesiastical entities, would have no means in and of themselves to

amend the secular documents of Harvest; nor does it appear that they

could legally force Harvest to do so. Rather, the AWFC and the GCFA

would necessarily have to rely on our civil legal system to achieve their

desired outcome. Indeed, only civil courts can interpret and enforce the

terms of deeds and organizational documents. In any dispute regarding

the ownership of real property, only civil courts can analyze the actions

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of an organization to confirm that the laws were properly followed, that

the organization's actions were duly authorized, and that a public filing

accurately reflects the exercise of such authority. In this case, the AWFC

and the GCFA have not demonstrated a clear legal right to have the

underlying property dispute dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction based on the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.

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