Court Opinion

ID: 9792704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:34:54.858096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:44.744860
License: Public Domain

MACY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur. However, I write to clarify one point about which, in my view, we have been somewhat inattentive in our prior opinions.
The final issue addressed by the majority opinion considers a defense which is generically classified as “assumption of risk.” The majority opinion states: “Actually, this instruction was in the form of use with knowledge of the danger, which is assumption of the risk.” It would be accurate to say: “Use with knowledge of danger is a subcategory of a generic doctrine known more generally as assumption of risk.”
Of course, because of the advent of comparative negligence, the defense, in pure negligence cases, once known precisely as “assumption of risk” has gone by the wayside. Wyo.Stat. § 1-1-109 (1988); Brittain v. Booth, 601 P.2d 532 (Wyo.1979). I would prefer to see this Court discard use of the generic expression “assumption of risk”:
It has been a subject of much controversy, and has been surrounded by much confusion, because “assumption of risk” has been used by the courts in several different senses, which traditionally have been lumped together under the one name, often without realizing that any differences exist.
W. Page Keeton et al„ Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 68 at 480 (5th ed. 1984). See also Annotation, Effect of Adoption of Comparative Negligence Rules on Assumption of Risk, 16 A.L.R.4th 700 (1982).
Because of the controversy and confusion which surround this “doctrine,” it is my belief that we would work a notable service for the Wyoming Bar and a significant advancement for the jurisprudence of this state if we were to limit our discussion to the specific category of defense under scrutiny. In this case, that is “use with knowledge of danger.”