Court Opinion

ID: 9890808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 15:09:30.388807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:24.800702
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued October 12, 2023

                                      In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                          First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-23-00297-CV
                            ———————————
    IN THE INTEREST OF N.L.S. AND E.J.C. A/K/A E.J.C., CHILDREN

                    On Appeal from the 300th District Court
                           Brazoria County, Texas
                        Trial Court Case No. 114085-F

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this accelerated appeal,1 appellant, mother, challenges the trial court’s

order, entered after a bench trial, terminating her parental rights to her minor

children, N.L.S. and E.J.C., also known as E.J.C. (collectively, the “children”), and

awarding appellee, the Department of Family and Protective Services (“DFPS”),

1
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4.
sole managing conservatorship of the children. Appellant, father, challenges the trial

court’s order, entered after a bench trial, terminating his parental rights to his minor

child, N.L.S.2 In three issues, mother contends that the trial court erred in appointing

DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children and the evidence is legally

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she knowingly

placed, or knowingly allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings

which endangered their physical or emotional well-being,3 she engaged, or

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that

endangered their physical or emotional well-being,4 she failed to comply with the

provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her

to obtain the return of the children,5 and termination of her parental rights was in the

best interest of the children.6 In two issues, father contends that the evidence is

legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that father

engaged, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with persons who engaged, in conduct that

2
      N.L.S. was seven-years old and E.C.J. was one-year old at the time the trial court
      signed its order terminating mother’s and father’s parental rights. The trial court
      also terminated the parental rights of E.C.J.’s father, but he is not a party to this
      appeal.
3
      See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
4
      See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
5
      See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
6
      See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

                                            2
endangered his physical or emotional well-being7 and termination of his parental

rights was in the best interest of N.L.S.8

      We affirm in part and reverse and render in part.

                                     Background

      On January 6, 2023, DFPS filed a second amended petition seeking

termination of mother’s parental rights to the children, termination of father’s

parental rights to N.L.S., and managing conservatorship of the children.9

      Officer Bilbrey

      At trial, Holiday Lakes Police Department (“HLPD”) Officer P. Bilbrey

testified that, while engaging in a welfare check on August 16, 2021, she went to a

trailer home located in Holiday Lakes, Texas at about 5:20 p.m. Bilbrey did not see

any cars in the driveway of the home. When Bilbrey knocked on the front door,

7
      See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
8
      See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Although in his prayer in his appellant’s brief, father
      requests “reversal of the trial court’s appointment of . . . DFPS [as] permanent
      managing conservator[]” of N.L.S., father has not challenged or raised an issue in
      his briefing related to the portion of the trial court’s order awarding DFPS sole
      managing conservatorship of N.L.S. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) (requiring
      appellant’s brief to concisely state all issues presented for review), 38.1(i) (brief
      must contain clear and concise argument for contentions made, with appropriate
      citations to authorities and to record); Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–
      56 (Tex. 2001) (failure to raise issue on appeal waives error). Thus, to the extent
      that father seeks to challenge the trial court’s appointment of DFPS as the sole
      managing conservator of N.L.S., we hold that the issue is waived due to inadequate
      briefing.
9
      DFPS also sought termination of the parental rights of E.J.C.’s father.

                                             3
N.L.S. answered.10 Bilbrey asked N.L.S. if mother was home, and N.L.S. told her

that he was “home alone,” “mother [was] not [t]here,” and he had her cellular

telephone. (Internal quotations omitted.) When Bilbrey asked N.L.S. if he knew

where mother had gone, he said “[n]o.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Because

N.L.S.’s answers to her questions were concerning, Bilbrey entered the home and

yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police Department.” (Internal quotations omitted.) No one

responded. Bilbrey then shouted several more times. She also banged on the

bedroom door in the home, which was locked, and yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police

Department. Is anybody home?” (Internal quotations omitted.) No one responded.

Bilbrey estimated that she was inside the home for about five to ten minutes

knocking on doors and yelling, but she never received a reply.

      According to Officer Bilbrey, she stayed at the trailer home with N.L.S. for

about fifteen to thirty minutes. While there, she had concerns about the condition of

the home. Ultimately, around 5:45 p.m. Bilbrey and N.L.S. left the home together,

and she brought him to the HLPD station with her. During the entire time that

Bilbrey was at N.L.S.’s home on August 16, 2021, no adult was present with N.L.S.

      Officer Bilbrey explained that the HLPD station was about three blocks away

from the trailer home where she found N.L.S. Neither mother nor father came

looking for N.L.S. while he was at the HLPD station. At about 7:00 p.m., another

10
      N.L.S. was five-years old at the time.

                                               4
law enforcement officer went back to the trailer home. Law enforcement officers

finally found mother around 7:45 p.m., and mother came to the HLPD station around

8:00 p.m. Around 10:00 p.m., Bilbrey went back to the trailer home to pick up

E.J.C., who was an infant.11 Another adult, “Frankie,” was at the home with E.J.C.,

and she put together a bag for E.J.C. Both Frankie and Bilbrey looked around the

home for formula for E.J.C., but they could only find enough formula in the home

to make one two-ounce bottle. Although Frankie gave Bilbrey a car seat for E.J.C.,

it was “[d]irty.” Frankie did not give Bilbrey any clothes that fit E.J.C. Frankie told

Bilbrey that she had been gone from the home all day.

      Officer Bilbrey further testified that when she spoke to mother at the HLPD

station, mother told her that she had been sleeping in the bedroom when Bilbrey first

came to the trailer home around 5:20 p.m. But, at trial, Bilbrey explained that when

she was at the trailer home on August 16, 2021, she had tried to open the door to the

bedroom, and the door was locked. Bilbrey noted that she did a “cop knock” on the

bedroom door loudly, and she did not hear a response from anyone on the other side

of the bedroom door, where mother was purportedly sleeping.

      Officer Newberry

      Former HLPD Officer M. Newberry testified that on August 16, 2021, she

performed a welfare check, along with her then-partner, Officer Bilbrey, at a trailer

11
      E.J.C. was two-months old at the time.

                                          5
home located in Holiday Lakes. Upon arrival at the trailer home around 5:20 p.m.,

Bilbrey knocked on the front door, and N.L.S. answered. The officers asked N.L.S.

if he was home alone, and he said “yes” and that “nobody was home.” (Internal

quotations omitted.) Bilbrey then entered the home to determine whether any other

person was present. Bilbrey knocked loudly and yelled loudly while inside the trailer

home. In Newberry’s opinion, if someone was home, she “would have known [that

Bilbrey] was in the house.” Bilbrey tried to open the bedroom door in the trailer

home but could not do so because it was locked. Bilbrey did not find anyone else in

the home other than N.L.S. Newberry then made a call to DFPS. DFPS told the law

enforcement officers to bring N.L.S. back to the HLPD station with them, which

they did. Newberry estimated that she and Bilbrey were at the trailer home for about

thirty to forty-five minutes with N.L.S. before they took N.L.S. to the HLPD station.

After Newberry dropped Bilbrey and N.L.S. off at the HLPD station, she went to

buy food for N.L.S. and brought it back to him.

      Officer Newberry further testified that at some point while N.L.S. was at the

HLPD station, DFPS investigator Heather Mendoza arrived. And at about 7:00 p.m.,

Newberry went back to the trailer home to see if anyone was there. At the trailer

home, Newberry pounded on the door and yelled, but no one answered. There were

no cars in the driveway.

                                         6
        At 7:24 p.m., law enforcement officers received a message from a neighbor

stating that there was a car in the trailer home’s driveway, and Officer Newberry

returned to the trailer home at about 7:36 p.m., along with Officer Bilbrey.

Newberry knocked on the front door of the home, and a woman, “Frankie,”

answered. Newberry identified herself and said that she was looking for mother.

Frankie indicated that mother was inside the home. Bilbrey then spoke with mother

and asked mother if she knew where N.L.S. was. Mother responded that N.L.S. was

“out playing at a friend’s house,” and then Bilbrey told mother that N.L.S. was at

the HLPD station. Mother indicated to Bilbrey that the last time she had seen N.L.S.

was “a few hours” before the officers’ arrival. The officers then requested that

mother come to the HLPD station, which was a few blocks away from the trailer

home.

        According to Officer Newberry, she and Officer Bilbrey arrived back at the

HLPD station at about 7:45 p.m., but mother did not show up. Thus, at about

8:00 p.m., Newberry went back to the trailer home to find mother. Newberry found

mother “fiddling with something on the front porch, [and] kind of going in and out”

of the home. Mother and Frankie were talking. Newberry told mother that “she

needed to come now,” and she did not leave the home until mother followed her

back to the HLPD station.

                                         7
      HLPD Incident Report

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a HLPD incident report

related to the events on August 16, 2021. It lists mother as the “[s]uspect/[o]ffender”

and the offense as abandoning or endangering a child.12

      Officer Newberry states in the “[n]arrative[]” portion of the incident report

that she and Officer Bilbrey received a telephone call from a Holiday Lakes resident

about a five-year old child, N.L.S., who had been at the resident’s home for the past

few days. N.L.S. had been spending all day at her home with “no parent coming by

to check on him.” The resident reported that N.L.S. had arrived at her home each

day dirty, hungry, with no shoes, and in the same clothes. On August 16, 2021,

N.L.S. showed up at the resident’s home at about 8:00 a.m., with a fish tank and

some other belongings in his hands. He asked the resident if he could move in with

her because “his mom [had] kicked him out of [h]is home.” N.L.S., “with tears in

his eyes,” told the resident that he had been kicked out of his home “because he was

trying to fill his fish tank up.” When the resident had to leave her home later that

day, she told N.L.S. that he needed to go home until she returned. But when she

drove by N.L.S.’s home, she saw N.L.S. sitting on the front porch of his home

holding his fish tank. The resident decided to report the incident to the HLPD.

12
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041.

                                          8
      According to Officer Newberry, she and Officer Bilbrey told the resident that

they would go by N.L.S.’s home and perform a welfare check and see who else was

at the home. Newberry and Bilbrey arrived at N.L.S.’s home, located in Holiday

Lakes, at about 5:20 p.m. Newberry noticed “a lot of garbage and shoes and many

more random objects all over the front yard and porch area of the home.” And when

Newberry and Bilbrey went to the front door of the home, “there was a very strong

smell of ammonia,” which concerned the officers. Although the screen door to the

home was closed, the main front door to the home was open. Bilbrey knocked on

the door, and N.L.S. came and opened the screen door for the officers. When the

officers asked N.L.S. if anyone was home with him, he replied, “No, my mom is not

home right now, but I have her cell[ular] [tele]phone.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

Newberry and Bilbrey then yelled into the home, “Holiday Lakes Police

Department, is anyone in the home?” (Internal quotations omitted.) And N.L.S.

kept repeating that “no one was [t]here.” After Bilbrey entered the home, she

“looked in the rooms to confirm that no one was there.”

      Officer Newberry further explained that the bedroom door in the home was

locked, so Officer Bilbrey knocked on the door and yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police is

anyone home?” But no one responded. Bilbrey and N.L.S. sat on the front porch of

the home, while Newberry stepped away to call DFPS. Newberry was instructed to

bring N.L.S to the HLPD station with the officers. At about 5:44 p.m., Newberry

                                          9
and Bilbrey left the home with N.L.S. and brought N.L.S. to the HLPD station, where

they arrived at 5:47 p.m. Newberry left Bilbrey and N.L.S. at the station and went

to pick up food for N.L.S. because he stated that he was hungry and that he had not

eaten anything that day. Newberry returned to the HLPD station with food, and a

DFPS investigator Mendoza arrived at the station at about 6:30 p.m.

      The narrative portion of the incident report further notes that at about

7:00 p.m., Officer Newberry returned to N.L.S.’s home “to see if anyone showed up

looking for him,” but no one was there. Newberry then went back to the HLPD

station, and at 7:24 p.m., law enforcement officers “received a message that a gray

[car had been] seen in the driveway of [the] home.” This prompted Newberry and

Officer Bilbrey to return to the home, and when they did, they saw a gray car parked

in the driveway. The officers approached the home and knocked on the front door.

A woman, who identified herself as “Frankie,” answered the door, and the officers

asked Frankie if mother was home. Frankie got mother out of a room in the home

and told her that “the cops [were] [t]here for [her].” Mother then came out to the

front porch holding an infant in her arms. Newberry asked mother if she knew where

N.L.S. was, and mother responded that he was “[d]own the road at a friend’s house.”

(Internal quotations omitted.) Newberry asked mother when she last saw N.L.S.,

and she stated that she had seen him that morning, but she was not sure of the exact

time. Mother also told Newberry that she had been at the home all day. Newberry

                                        10
then told mother that N.L.S. was at the HLPD station, he was speaking to a “social

worker,” and mother needed to come to the station. Mother replied that she would

meet the law enforcement officers at the station.

      According to Officer Newberry, she and Officer Bilbrey arrived back at the

HLPD station at about 7:45 p.m. They told the DFPS worker that mother was on

her way to the station. When mother had not arrived at HPLD station by 8:00 p.m.,

Newberry went back to N.L.S.’s home and found mother outside. Newberry told

mother that she needed to come to the HLPD station right then and that Newberry

would follow her to the station to make sure that mother “got there ok.” When

mother arrived at the HLPD station, she spoke with DFPS investigator Mendoza.

After Mendoza spoke with mother, she informed Newberry and Bilbrey that

mother’s infant would need to be removed from the home. At about 9:56 p.m.,

Bilbrey arrived at N.L.S.’s home to pick up E.J.C., who was two-months old at the

time. At about 11:05 p.m., Mendoza took the children “into legal [DFPS] custody.”

      Attached to the HLPD incident report is a voluntary statement from the

Holiday Lakes resident who contacted law enforcement officers about N.L.S. on

August 16, 2021. In her voluntary statement, the resident states that N.L.S. was

five-years old and had been at her home “all day” for the past four days. She was

concerned about N.L.S. because he had been at her house “so often [and] for so long

[and] . . . mother never came around.” The resident had “never met” mother.

                                         11
      Further, on August 16, 2021, N.L.S. came to the resident’s home at 8:00 a.m.

and asked her “if he could live with [her] because . . . mother [had] kicked him out

because he was filling up his fish tank.”13 N.L.S. “got teary eyed,” and the resident

let him into her house and fed him. At about 2:00 p.m., the resident told N.L.S. “to

go home,” but he came back less than fifteen minutes later and said that mother had

“kicked him out again.” Later, when the resident had to leave her home, she asked

N.L.S. if she could “drop[] him off at home” and he told her that “he was going to

get a spanking from” mother. When the resident drove by N.L.S.’s home at about

5:00 p.m., she saw him sitting on the front porch. The resident noted that on August

16, 2021, N.L.S. was wearing shoes, but on the other days that he was at her home,

he showed up barefoot, hungry, and wearing the same clothes.

      DFPS Investigator Mendoza

      Heather Mendoza, a former DFPS investigator, testified that she went to the

HLPD station on August 16, 2021 in response to a call involving allegations of

negligent supervision of N.L.S. According to Mendoza, one of mother’s neighbors

had called law enforcement officers because she believed that N.L.S. was home

13
      Mother, during her testimony, acknowledged that N.L.S. had a fish tank but stated
      that he did not have a fish in the tank. Further, according to mother, she sent N.L.S.
      down to the neighbor’s home on the morning of August 16, 2021 so that he could
      get his shoes, which he had left there. Mother denied kicking N.L.S. out of the
      house.

                                            12
alone. Law enforcement officers then went out to N.L.S.’s home and did not find

any adults in the home with N.L.S.

       Mendoza explained that she arrived at the HLPD station around 6:00 p.m. or

6:30 p.m. and she spoke to N.L.S. According to Mendoza, she was at the HLPD

station for several hours before mother arrived. When Mendoza eventually spoke to

mother at the HLPD station, she expressed DFPS’s concern that N.L.S. “had been

left unattended for several hours” when he was only five-years old. Mendoza told

mother that it appeared that mother was not able to provide adequate supervision for

N.L.S. Mother reported to Mendoza that she had been living in her home in Holiday

Lakes for only a few weeks.

       Mother also told Mendoza that she had woken up early on the morning of

August 16, 2021 with E.J.C. Between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., N.L.S. went “to go

play with some friends.” Mother laid down to take a nap with E.J.C. sometime

between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., and she stayed asleep until law enforcement

officers found her after 7:00 p.m. According to mother, she was at home asleep

when law enforcement officers came by around 5:00 p.m. on August 16, 2021.

Mother stated that “Frankie” “had been in the home,” but “she had [gone] to town

to pay a bill.”

                                        13
      As to E.J.C., Mendoza noted that the child was “very thin” and had “a severe

diaper rash.” Mother told Mendoza that she had “purchased ointment to be us[ed]”

for the diaper rash.

      According to Mendoza, DFPS was concerned about possible narcotics-use by

mother, and mother participated in narcotics-use testing on August 20, 2021, shortly

after the children were removed from her care. Mother disclosed to Mendoza that

she had used methamphetamines in the past. But mother stated that she had stopped

using narcotics “cold turkey.”

      Mendoza also testified that N.L.S. and E.J.C. were ultimately removed from

mother’s care on August 16, 2021 because they were “both of a vulnerable age” and

were “not able to self-protect or even understand if they were in harm’s way.” And

DFPS “believed [that mother] lacked the ability to supervise [the] children properly

at th[e] time.” Mother reported to Mendoza that father was incarcerated, but she did

not know where. Mother confirmed that father was in fact N.L.S.’s biological father.

      DFPS Caseworker West

      DFPS caseworker Trisha West testified that the children were placed together

in the same foster home, but the foster home was not an adoptive home. The children

appeared to be bonded to one another. West described N.L.S. as having “a lot of

energy” and personality.

                                        14
      As to mother, West stated that she had created a Family Service Plan (“FSP”)

for mother in September 2021, after the children were removed from mother’s care.

Mother’s FSP instructed her to complete the requirements of her FSP by August 31,

2022. According to West, mother’s FSP required her to participate in individual

therapy and random narcotics-use testing. Mother was also required to attend all

court hearings and permanency planning meetings as well as supervised weekly

visitation with the children. And she was required to remain “drug and alcohol free”

and complete a psychological evaluation and follow any recommendations from the

evaluation. Mother was also supposed to participate in substance-abuse counseling,

complete a “drug and alcohol assessment,” and maintain a safe and stable home.

      West explained that mother completed her psychological evaluation and a

“drug and alcohol assessment” in September 2021. Mother attended thirteen out of

the fifteen required substance-abuse-counseling sessions, but mother stopped

attending substance-abuse counseling in July 2022 about six months before trial.14

Mother failed to complete her substance-abuse counseling, and she did not give West

a certificate of compliance showing that she had successfully completed

substance-abuse counseling. West further testified that mother attended some

individual therapy sessions—about nine—but she stopped attending individual

14
      Trial in this case took place in February 2023.

                                           15
therapy in September 2022. Mother did not give West a certificate of completion

showing that she had successfully completed individual therapy.

      As to narcotics-use testing, West testified that mother was required to

participate in random narcotics-use testing whenever it was requested by DFPS.

Usually, DFPS asked mother to submit to narcotics-use testing twice a month, but

mother rarely participated.      According to West, mother submitted to one

narcotics-use test during the entire pendency of the case. Mother would sometimes

tell West that she was going to go get tested but would then fail to do so. Mother

had been asked to submit to twenty-four narcotics-use tests during the pendency of

the case.15

      As to mother living situation, West testified that when the children entered

DFPS’s care, mother was living in a trailer home with “Frankie.” Then, after the

children were removed from mother’s care, mother and E.J.C.’s father16 moved into

15
      West stated that, during the pendency of the case, mother told West that she had
      been submitting to the required narcotics-use tests but “they had her name and
      information wrong in the system,” which was why West “could not pull [anything]
      up” showing that mother had been submitted to testing. To fix that situation, West,
      over the course of several months, tried to meet mother at a narcotics-use testing
      facility to “rectify th[e] situation.” West was finally able to meet mother at a
      narcotics-use testing facility in July 2022, and “[t]he facility [told West] that
      [mother’s] information was correct in the system, and they confirmed that she had
      not been [tested] since August . . . 2021.”
16
      West testified that E.J.C.’s father was given an FSP, which required him to, among
      other things, maintain a safe and stable home, participate in random narcotics-use
      testing, complete a psychological evaluation, and attend all supervised visitation
      with E.J.C. and all court hearings and permanency planning meetings. E.J.C.’s
      father did not maintain safe and stable home throughout the pendency of the case or
                                          16
a home together. After that, mother “went to jail,” and once she was released, mother

“mov[ed] from friend to friend.”17 Then, mother began living with E.J.C.’s father

and his mother. But, at the time of trial, mother was living in a one-bedroom

apartment with E.J.C.’s father. West stated that she had made attempts to visit

mother in her various homes throughout the pendency of the case, but she had not

been able to do so. As to mother’s most recent home, West stated that she had “made

a couple of appointments” with mother to see the apartment that mother was living

in with E.J.C.’s father, but the appointments “fell through.”

      West further stated that mother had attended most of her weekly supervised

visits with the children, and she had been “mostly compliant” with that requirement

of her FSP. Mother brought food and toys to the visits, and she sometimes brought

clothing. Mother engaged with the children at her visits; she played with them and

did not act inappropriately. Mother did not attend visits with the children while she

was “in jail.” West acknowledged that the children “adore[d]” mother.

      According to West, mother had also attended court hearings and participated

in “group conference meetings” with DFPS, as required by her FSP. Although

mother provided West with the name of one potential placement for the children,

      submit to any narcotics-use testing. E.J.C.’s father failed to complete most, if not
      all, of the requirements of his FSP. West also noted that E.J.C.’s father was arrested
      during the pendency of the case on “a theft charge.”
17
      According to West, mother told her that “she was living from place to place with
      friends.”

                                            17
West left “multiple messages for” the placement, but she “never heard back.” West

asked mother at least seven or eight times for the name of a potential placement for

the children.

         West also testified that mother was arrested during the pendency of the case

and was in “jail” from April 29, 2022 until June 4, 2022. At the time of trial, mother

was “on probation.”

         As to mother’s employment, West explained that mother told her that she

“worked cleaning beach houses,” but she was “paid cash.” Mother never provided

West any documentation to show that she was employed.

         As to why West believed that termination of mother’s parental rights to the

children was appropriate, West testified that she was concerned about mother’s

ability to provide a safe and stable home for the children and about mother’s

narcotics use. West also expressed concern that mother had not completed the

requirements of her FSP, and it appeared that she was living with E.J.C.’s father.

Mother’s living arrangement with E.J.C.’s father concerned West because he had

not completed the requirements of his FSP and he had not participated in any

narcotics-use testing, so DFPS had no way of knowing whether E.J.C.’s father was

sober.

         As to father, West testified that she created a FSP for father in September

2021, but it did not contain any requirements for father to complete. According to

                                          18
West, at the time N.L.S. entered DFPS’s care, father was incarcerated, and he had

remained incarcerated during the pendency of the case. Father was set to be released

from confinement in 2025. West visited father while he was incarcerated, and he

gave her the names of his sister and his girlfriend as potential placements for N.L.S.,

but he did not have contact information for either of them. According to West, father

was not a suitable placement for N.L.S. at the time of trial because he was

incarcerated.

      West also testified that when she visited father while he was incarcerated, he

told her that mother was “not a good mother” and “she was never home.” And in

the past, when they briefly lived together for two months in 2018, father had been

“the one taking care of” N.L.S.

      Dr. Stadler

      Dr. Jenny Stadler, a clinical psychologist who conducted mother’s

psychological evaluation, testified that she met with mother on October 9, 2021 for

about three hours. Mother told Dr. Stadler that N.L.S. had been taken from her home

by law enforcement while she was asleep in the home with E.J.C., who was about

two-months old at the time. Mother indicated that she was exhausted because she

had been awake the night before with E.J.C. According to mother, she laid down

about 4:30 p.m. or 5:00 p.m., and she was asleep in the bedroom of the home when

law enforcement officers performed the welfare check. Mother responded that

                                          19
N.L.S. “had been spending time with the neighborhood children” on the day that law

enforcement officers came to her home. Mother and the children had only been

living in the neighborhood for about a week before the incident on August 16, 2021.

      Mother also told Dr. Stadler that she had taken a narcotics-use test and had

“failed it for meth, methamphetamines, and methadone.” Additionally, mother

referenced a text message she had sent “about selling drugs” because “she was

confused” and “didn’t think that offering to sell [m]ethadone was illegal.” Mother

told Dr. Stadler that in the past she had used marijuana, methamphetamine, cocaine,

alcohol, and ecstasy.    According to mother, she began using marijuana and

methamphetamines when she was twelve years old. She started drinking alcohol at

fourteen or fifteen years old, and she used “acid once in [ninth] grade.” Mother used

opioids when she was about twenty-five or twenty-six years old. Mother denied

using “[a]ny substances” at the time of her meeting with Dr. Stadler.

      When Dr. Stadler asked mother whether she had ever been involved in a

physical altercation, mother said that she had been involved in physical altercations

as a kid and as an adult. The last physical altercation mother had was with the

girlfriend or ex-girlfriend of E.J.C.’s father. Mother did not tell Dr. Stadler when

the physical altercation took place. Mother also indicated that she was involved in

another physical alteration in 2014.

                                         20
      Mother

      Mother testified that N.L.S. and E.J.C. were her children. Mother explained

that on August 16, 2021, the date the children were removed from her care, mother

was in the bedroom in her trailer home asleep with E.J.C., who was two-months old

at the time. According to mother, she and E.J.C. went to sleep about 4:30 p.m. And

when law enforcement officers knocked on the door of the home on August 16, 2021,

she did not hear them because she was in the bedroom with the door shut. Mother

stated that she had been “up all night” with the children and she was exhausted.

According to mother, the door to her bedroom was not locked. Mother woke up

about 7:00 p.m. or 7:30 p.m., when “Frankie” told her that law enforcement officers

wanted to speak with her.

      When mother spoke to law enforcement officers on August 16, 2021, she told

them that N.L.S. was playing at a neighbor’s house because she assumed that was

where he was because he was not in the house. At trial, mother acknowledged that

she had not met the parents of the children N.L.S. had been playing with in the

neighborhood, and she would not watch N.L.S. when he went to go play with other

kids. However, according to mother, N.L.S. was not allowed to go outside of the

trailer home without telling mother, and he had to stay in the yard unless he asked

to leave. Yet mother agreed that it was possible for N.L.S. to leave the trailer house

                                         21
on his own. Mother stated that she did not kick N.L.S. out of the house on August

16, 2021.

      As to her housing at the time of trial, mother explained that she lived in a

one-bedroom apartment at the Cranbrook Apartment complex with E.J.C.’s father.

She had been living there since July 7, 2022. According to mother, E.J.C.’s father

went “back and forth between” her apartment and the apartment that his mother was

living in, which was in the same apartment complex. Mother further testified that

the mother of E.J.C.’s father was being evicted from her apartment, so E.J.C.’s father

would then stay with mother. However, she noted that E.J.C.’s father “said that if it

was a problem [for] him being in [mother’s home] due to the case,” then “he would

go elsewhere.” Mother stated that there was “no lease” for her apartment, and

E.J.C.’s father “d[id] the maintenance” for the apartment complex. Because E.J.C.’s

father “d[id] the maintenance,” mother did not have to pay rent for the apartment,

but she was responsible for paying for electricity. According to mother, she was not

in a relationship with E.J.C.’s father, but she did not feel that he was a danger to the

children. Mother last saw E.J.C.’s father about two weeks before trial.

      Mother acknowledged that, during the pendency of the case, she had four

different residences.   After the children were removed from her care, mother

continued living at the trailer home in Holiday Lakes for about a month. Mother

stated that the trailer home had a porch, a living room, a kitchen, a bedroom, and a

                                          22
bathroom. Mother did not own the trailer home but was renting it. According to

mother, she had food and clothes in the home for the children as well as diapers for

E.J.C.

         Mother next moved into a friend’s home until July 7, 2022. She did not have

a lease at that time, but she paid rent. Mother then moved to the Cranbrook

Apartment complex after that. She had lived in two different apartments in that

complex since July 7, 2022. Mother also noted that after she was released from jail,

but before an apartment was available at the Cranbrook Apartment complex, she

stayed with “two different friends.”

         According to mother, DFPS caseworker West had requested to see the places

where mother had been living during the pendency of the case.                 Although

appointments were set up a couple of times, they ended up being canceled either by

West or mother. West had not seen mother’s current apartment, but she had asked

to see it.

         As to her employment status, mother testified that at the time of trial she did

not have a job. She had worked at a cleaning service from February 2022 until

January 2023.

         Mother also testified that she received an FSP from DFPS and DFPS

caseworker West went over the FSP with her. Mother stated that she participated in

the substance-abuse assessment, as required by her FSP, and she participated in

                                            23
substance-abuse counseling from September 2021 until April 2022, when she “went

to jail.” After being released, she reengaged in substance-abuse counseling for about

two months, but she did not receive a certificate of completion for substance-abuse

counseling. Mother noted that she had not received a certificate of completion from

individual therapy.

      Mother further explained that during the pendency of the case, she was

required to participate in narcotics-use testing, according to her FSP. Mother agreed

that she had been requested to submit to narcotics-use testing about twenty-four

times during the case. According to mother, she had participated in narcotics-use

testing four or five times, and one of those times was at the beginning of the case

after the children were removed from her care. Mother also stated that she submitted

to narcotics-use testing after she was released from jail around June 2022. And

although mother testified that she participated in other narcotics-use testing between

August 2021 and June 2022, but she could not recall when she had done so.

However, mother acknowledged that she had been asked to submit to narcotics-use

testing in January 2023, December 2022, November 2022, and October 2022 and

she did not participate in testing when requested.

      According to mother, at the time of trial, she did not have a “substance abuse

issue,” and she was not using narcotics when the children were removed from her

care on August 16, 2021. Although mother did acknowledge that her narcotics-use

                                         24
test from August 20, 2021 showed that she tested positive for amphetamines,

methamphetamines, and methadone, but she stated that she had not used narcotics

since January 26, 2015.

      Additionally, at trial, mother acknowledged that she had a criminal history

from “before [the children] w[ere] born.” According to mother, she was convicted

of four counts of the offense of forgery of a financial instrument in 2012. And during

the pendency of this case, she had pleaded guilty to the offense of attempted

abandonment or endangerment of a child, related to N.L.S.18 At the time of trial,

mother was on community supervision related to the offense of attempted

abandonment or endangerment of a child.

      As to the children, mother noted that N.L.S. called E.J.C.’s father “dad.” And

when the children were removed from mother’s care, E.J.C. was not sick and was

not underweight. Mother explained that N.L.S. was not yet in school at the time the

children were removed from her care because N.L.S. had “missed the cutoff” date

to start kindergarten the previous year based on his birthday. Before E.J.C. was born,

mother would make N.L.S. breakfast, and N.L.S. would help her make lunch and

dinner. And every other weekend, she would try to go somewhere and do something

special with N.L.S.

18
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.01 (criminal attempt), 22.041 (offense of
      abandoning or endangering child).

                                         25
      Mother also testified that she had attended visits with the children during the

pendency of the case. At visits, she would play games with them or bring arts and

crafts to do or toys. She was never reprimanded by DFPS for bringing the children

inappropriate food or for ignoring the children during visits. Mother admitted that

she had missed a recent visit with the children.

      Mother stated that she was requesting that the children be returned to her care.

She stated that she could provide them with food and a home. She could meet their

medical needs. She wanted the children to graduate high school and go to college,

and she wanted them to be happy, healthy, and succeed at anything that they wanted

to do. Mother did not believe that she had neglected the children. Mother admitted

that she did not have a support system if the children were returned to her care.

      Mother’s FSP

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of mother’s FSP from September

2021. The FSP lists “[f]amily [r]eunification” as DFPS’s primary permanency goal

as well as “[f]amily [r]elative/[f]ictive [k]in [c]onservatorship” as a concurrent

permanency goal. As to “hopes and dreams” for the children, the FSP states “[f]or

the children to have a safe and stable home environment free of abuse and neglect.”

      As to N.L.S., the FSP states that he was a healthy child. He had just started

kindergarten at the time the FSP was created, and he was doing well in school.

N.L.S. had not had any behavioral or emotional issues since entering DFPS’s care.

                                         26
N.L.S. appeared to have a close relationship with mother and “Frankie,” who had

lived with him. N.L.S. also “fit[] in well with his foster family” and had a “positive

relationship[] with his foster parents.” N.L.S got along well with other children.

      As to E.J.C., the FSP states that she was healthy, but she was under weight for

her age. At the time the FSP was created, she appeared to be “developmentally on

target.” E.J.C. was “an infant with no behavioral issues.” She appeared to be bonded

with mother. She was comfortable in her placement with her foster parents.

      As to mother, the FSP states that mother reported that she “work[ed] as a home

health provider for an elderly individual with health issues.” Mother relied on the

mother of E.J.C.’s father and “Frankie,” who was a cousin of E.J.C.’s father, for

support, although mother reported that Frankie was moving away. Mother did not

report any issues with her cognitive abilities or any mental health diagnoses. She

stated that she had “anger issues” as a teenager, and she had “dealt with depression

when she lost a pregnancy in 2008.” Mother acknowledged that she had used muscle

relaxers and pain pills in 2008, after her pregnancy loss. Mother also reported that

she had used methamphetamines in the past, but according to mother, she had not

used narcotics since January 2015 when she found out that she was pregnant with

N.L.S. Mother reported that she was “arrested for assault in the past but the charges

were dropped.” N.L.S. reported that mother and E.J.C.’s father would “fight with

their hands.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

                                         27
      In discussing what concerns that mother needed to address, the FSP notes that

N.L.S. lacked supervision while in mother’s care, and mother had tested positive for

methamphetamines, amphetamines, and methadone shortly after the children were

removed for her care. According to the FSP, mother had allowed N.L.S. to wander

his neighborhood “for days at a time,” which demonstrated that she had “issues with

parenting skills.”

      Mother’s FSP required her to remain free of alcohol and narcotics and

maintain a safe and stable home that was free from criminal activity, domestic

violence, alcohol and narcotics, and abuse and neglect. Mother’s home needed to

have fully functioning electricity, water, and gas as well as be child friendly and free

of any safety hazards. If mother’s home had other individuals living in it, those

persons needed to not have a history with DFPS, a history of narcotics use, or a

criminal history involving certain offenses. Mother needed to notify the DFPS

caseworker within forty-eight hours of any changes to her home address or telephone

number, and she was required to allow DFPS to make announced and unannounced

visits to her home.

      Further, mother was to complete a psychological evaluation and

substance-abuse assessment and follow any recommendations. Mother was also

required to engage in individual therapy and follow any recommendations made by

the therapist regarding further treatment. And mother was required to submit to

                                          28
random narcotics-use testing.19 Additionally, she needed to attend all court hearings

and permanency planning meetings, and she was required to attend all supervised

visits with the children.

       Narcotics-Use Testing Records

       The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of mother’s narcotics-use testing

results. The testing results show that on August 20, 2021, mother, by urinalysis,

tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and methadone. Also, on

August 20, 2021, mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine by

hair-follicle testing.

       Father

       Father testified that he was N.L.S.’s biological father. He participated in DNA

testing during the pendency of the case and the results showed that he was N.L.S.’s

biological father.20 Father was requesting that the trial court adjudicate him as the

father of N.L.S.

       Father further testified that, at the time of trial, he was incarcerated and living

in the McConnell Unit in Beeville, Texas. Father had been in confined since May

19
       Mother’s FSP informed her that if she failed to report to a required narcotics-use
       test, the test would be deemed a positive testing result.
20
       The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a DNA Test Report showing that
       father was N.L.S.’s biological father. The report was signed on December 5,
       2022—less than three months before trial began. The trial court also admitted into
       evidence a copy of a DNA Test Report showing that E.J.C.’s father was not N.L.S.’s
       biological father. That report was signed on July 25, 2022.

                                           29
11, 2020 following his arrest. In February 2021, father was convicted of the offenses

of felon in possession of a firearm,21 possession of a prohibited weapon,22 evading

arrest or detention,23 assault of a family member,24 and possession of a controlled

substance, namely methamphetamine.25 Father “signed . . . a five-year plea” bargain

agreement related to those offenses. Father’s discharge date is in May 2025.26 At

the time of trial, he did not have a possible placement for N.L.S., and he could not

provide a safe and stable home for N.L.S. because he was incarcerated.

      Father also explained that in August 2021, when N.L.S. was removed from

mother’s care, he was incarcerated. Father’s last interaction with N.L.S. occurred

when N.L.S. was about three years old. Father noted that he was also incarcerated

when N.L.S. was born, so he did not “have much of a relationship with him.” But,

according to father, N.L.S. knew who he was, and he had visited N.L.S. “[q]uite a

few times.” Father acknowledged that he did not know what grade N.L.S. was in at

21
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04.
22
      See id. § 46.05.
23
      See id. § 38.04.
24
      See id. § 22.01. Mother was not the complainant of this offense.
25
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115. As to the
      possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, father stated that his counsel at the
      time told him that there “was residue in a pipe” that was “in the back bed of [father’s]
      truck.”
26
      Father stated that he had a parole hearing scheduled for March 2023, and he had
      “support letters . . . from the sheriff” because he was “a trustee” with the sheriff’s
      department and worked as a welder.

                                             30
school, did not know his favorite school subject, his favorite color, or his favorite

food. He did not know “a whole lot about” N.L.S.

      Father also testified that he was arrested for the offense of “theft of a

firearm”27 in 2007, and he pleaded guilty to the offense. He was then placed on

community supervision. In 2009, he was convicted of the offense of assault 28 and

received “time served in county jail.” Further, in 2013, he was convicted of the

offenses of evading arrest or detention29 and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.30

And in 2014, father pleaded guilty to the offense of burglary.31 In 2015, he pleaded

guilty to the offense of “credit card abuse.”32

      As to his FSP, father testified that he received it, but it did not require him to

do anything. DFPS had “dropped off [some] packets” for him about two months

before trial began and he was “working on them,” but they were not required by his

FSP. When father met with the DFPS caseworker while incarcerated, he asked her

“for things that [he] could do.” The caseworker then sent him a “packet of parenting

papers and stuff to fill out,” and he had been “working on” that. Father was also

27
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03.
28
      See id. § 22.01.
29
      See id. § 38.04.
30
      See id. § 31.07.
31
      See id. § 30.02.
32
      See id. § 32.31.

                                          31
attending GED classes, and he testified that would be starting narcotics anonymous

classes. And he worked with the sheriff’s department as a welder seven days a week.

Father had asked DFPS about “doing video visits” with N.L.S. while he was

incarcerated, but he had not received a response from DFPS. Father had not had any

conduct issues while he had been incarcerated.

      As to his relationship with mother, father stated that he and mother had a

relationship in 2015 and 2019,33 but they did not live together during those times.

When father first met mother, mother lived with a friend in “nice house” with four

or five bedrooms. Father and mother were only “together” for “[a] few months” in

2015. Mother and N.L.S. then lived with father for a couple of months in 2018

before mother chose to move with N.L.S. to Angleton, Texas. After the move, father

visited N.L.S. on the weekends. Mother’s new home was clean. Father believed

that he last saw N.L.S. in 2019.

      Father further testified that when he and mother lived together with N.L.S.,

mother was a good parent. She made N.L.S. dinner and gave him baths. She took

good care of N.L.S., and he was “in good health.” Mother took N.L.S. to doctor

appointments. Mother did not “lose track” of N.L.S. or fail to take care of him. She

was attentive to his needs, and father did not see anything that would cause him to

be concerned about mother’s parental abilities. Father and mother both took care of

33
      Father stated that from 2017 to 2019, he and mother “talked.”

                                          32
N.L.S. while they lived together, although father noted that he was working as a

mechanic at the time. When mother and N.L.S. moved out, father did not have any

concerns about mother parenting N.L.S. He did not think that she would be

neglectful or endanger the child. Father did not know that mother had a history with

DFPS when he let N.L.S. live with mother.

      Father also noted that he and mother did not use narcotics together and he had

never assaulted mother. Father did not know that mother used narcotics. Father

stated that he had not provided financial support for N.L.S. since the child’s birth.

According to father, he had never spoken with DFPS caseworker West about

mother’s parental abilities.

      Related to N.L.S. being removed from mother’s care, father stated that mother

told him that “she was in the [bed]room [of the home] asleep whenever [N.L.S.]

answered the door” and saw law enforcement officers. Father was concerned that

N.L.S. was in the care of DFPS. Father also noted that he did not believe it was a

good idea to leave a child home alone. Father had never been inside the trailer home

where N.L.S. was living at the time he was removed from mother’s care.

      Before father’s most recent incarceration, he had been living in a home in

Bandera, Texas with his ex-girlfriend.

                                         33
      Father’s FSP

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of father’s FSP from September

2021. As for the permanency goal for N.L.S., it lists “[f]amily [r]eunification” or

“[f]amily [r]elative/[f]ictive [k]in [c]onservatorship.” It lists the “hopes and dreams”

for N.L.S. as “a safe and stable home environment free from abuse and neglect.”

      As to N.L.S., it states that there were no health concerns, and he had no

physical disability. N.L.S. was physically, cognitively, and emotionally on target

for his age. N.L.S. was in kindergarten at the time and was able to understand the

information that he was being taught. He had minimal behavioral issues. N.L.S.

appeared to be bonded with his foster parents and comfortable in his placement.

Although N.L.S. was “close” to mother, he did not have a relationship with father.

      As to father, the FSP states that he was incarcerated and had a criminal history.

But his physical health was unknown, whether he had any struggles with his

cognitive or developmental abilities was unknown, and his mental health history was

unknown. The FSP does not list any requirements for father to complete to ensure

the return on N.L.S., other than to contact DFPS upon his release from confinement.

      Father’s Criminal History

      The trial court admitted into evidence of a copy of an indictment, dated June

20, 2019, which alleged that father, on or about May 14, 2019, “intentionally or

knowingly possess[ed] a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group One (1),

                                          34
namely, methamphetamine[,] and the amount of said controlled substance was, by

aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilutants, less than one (1) gram.”34

The indictment further alleged that, previously, on or about December 13, 2013,

father, in cause number 13CR2189, in the 10th District Court of Galveston County,

Texas, was convicted of the felony offense of evading arrest or detention with a

vehicle,35 and in cause number 13CR2190, in the 10th District Court of Galveston

County, father was convicted of the felony offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle.36

Further, on or about February 10, 2014, father, in cause number 67200, in the 23rd

District Court of Brazoria County, Texas, was convicted of the felony offense of

burglary.37 And father, on or about May 7, 2015, in cause number 15-DCR-068775,

in the 400th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, was convicted of the felony

offense of credit card abuse.38

      The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of father’s plea agreement

related to the May 14, 2019 possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, which

shows that in exchange for father’s plea of guilty, the State waived the alleged

34
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115.
35
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04.
36
      See id. § 31.07.
37
      See id. § 30.02.
38
      See id. § 32.31.

                                         35
enhancements and agreed to recommend that father’s punishment be assessed at 645

days confinement.

      A judgment of conviction, signed on July 15, 2022, related to the May 14,

2019 possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, a copy of which the trial court

admitted into evidence, shows that father pleaded guilty to the offense, and the trial

court, in accord with the agreed punishment recommendation from the State,

assessed father’s punishment at confinement for 645 days. Father received a jail

time credit of 631 days.

      Additionally, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of an indictment,

alleging that father, on or about November 26, 2011, “intentionally or knowingly

enter[ed] a building not then open to the public, owned by [the complainant], without

the effective consent of [the complainant], and therein attempted to commit or

committed theft.”39      Other documents40 admitted into evidence show that father,

with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the

offense of burglary, and the trial court deferred adjudication of father’s guilt and

placed him on community supervision for three years. The State, alleging that father

had violated the conditions of his community supervision, subsequently moved to

39
      See id. § 30.02.
40
      These documents include copies of an order of deferred adjudication signed on June
      21, 2012, a “State Jail Felony Deferred Adjudication Supervision Order,” setting
      the conditions of father’s community supervision, and a plea agreement between
      father and the State related to the burglary offense.

                                          36
adjudicate father’s guilt.41 Father then signed a plea agreement related to the State’s

motion to adjudicate his guilt, in which he agreed to plead true to certain allegations

in the State’s motion, in exchange for the State recommending that punishment be

assessed at confinement for eight months. A copy of the judgment adjudicating

guilt, which the trial court admitted into evidence, shows that in February 2014, the

trial court found the allegations true and assessed father’s punishment at

confinement for eight months, to run concurrently. Father received a jail time credit

of 182 days.

      Further, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy an information, alleging

that father, on July 10, 2009, “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily

injury to another, namely, [the second complainant], a person with whom [appellant]

ha[d] . . . a dating relationship, by head butting [the second complainant] on her

forehead with his head and making her fall to the ground” and father “intentionally,

knowingly or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [the second complainant], a person

with whom [he] ha[d] . . . a dating relationship by choking her on the neck with his

hand.”42 A copy of the judgment, which the trial court admitted into evidence, states

that father pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of assault, and the trial court

41
      A copy of the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, which was filed on August 12,
      2013, was admitted into evidence at trial.
42
      See id. § 22.01. The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of the complaint
      related to the assault offense.

                                           37
assessed father’s punishment at confinement for three days in the county jail and a

fine of $300. Father received a “jail time credit” of fourteen days. The trial court

entered a finding that father had committed family violence.

      The trial court also admitted into evidence a copy of an indictment, alleging

that father, on or about November 6, 2007, “intentionally or knowingly, unlawfully

appropriate[d] by acquiring or exercising control over property, namely, a firearm

owned by [the third complainant],” “without the effective consent of [the third]

[c]omplainant and with intent to deprive the [third] [c]omplainant of said

property.”43 A copy of father’s plea agreement, which was admitted into evidence,

shows that father agreed to plead guilty to the misdemeanor offense of theft of a

firearm, in exchange for the State recommending that his punishment be assessed at

confinement for 100 days in the county jail. The trial court admitted into evidence

a copy of a judgment, signed on December 5, 2008, showing that father pleaded

guilty to the misdemeanor offense of theft of a firearm and the trial court, in accord

with the agreed punishment recommendation from the State, assessed father’s

punishment at confinement in the county jail for 100 days. Father received a jail

time credit of 111 days.

43
      See id. § 31.03.

                                         38
      Guardian Ad Litem for Children

      Claudia Sullivan, the guardian ad litem for the children, testified that she

believed that the parental rights of mother and father should be terminated. As to

mother, Sullivan stated that mother’s parental rights to the children should be

terminated because she failed to comply with her FSP and failed to participate in

required narcotics-use testing during the pendency of the case. According to

Sullivan, mother only participated in two out of twenty-four required narcotics-use

tests, and she tested positive for methamphetamine. Sullivan also noted that mother,

at the time of trial, was “on probation” related to a misdemeanor offense, and she

was living with E.J.C.’s father44 “on an on-and-off basis,” which contributed to

Sullivan’s recommendation that mother’s parental rights to the children be

terminated.

      As to father, Sullivan testified that he had not “had any interaction with”

N.L.S. Although father was incarcerated, he “still ha[d] the ability to write [N.L.S.],

to send little notes or to even make arrangements to have some type of

communication . . . with him.” Sullivan was concerned about father’s criminal

history and that N.L.S. had “no emotional connection” to father. N.L.S believed that

E.J.C.’s father was his father.

44
      Sullivan noted that E.J.C.’s father had not completed any requirements of his FSP.

                                          39
      Sullivan further testified that it was in the children’s best interest to have a

safe and stable home. And the conduct of mother and father had “subjected the

children to a life of uncertainty and instability that[] [was] endangering their physical

and emotional well-being.” The children would be harmed by being “in a state of

flux” should they be returned to the care of mother or father because either parent

could be “going to . . . jail one day or the next.”

      Sullivan also explained that E.J.C. was young, and “[t]he only people she[]

[had] ever known in her life that ha[d] given her stability [were her] foster parents,”

and she referred to them as “her parents.” E.J.C. was “very well-settled in” her foster

parents’ household. As to N.L.S., Sullivan noted that his fears about being placed

with mother were “magnified after he ha[d] been at a visit” with mother. However,

she testified that N.L.S. was also bonded with mother and that mother had visited

N.L.S. on a weekly basis throughout the pendency of the case, except for when she

was “in jail.”

      According to Sullivan, “a family [had been] identified that [were] willing to

adopt [the children]” and that family “want[ed] to be made the placement[] for [the

children].” They had known the children for more than a year, and they would “have

the [children’s current foster] parents . . . close by, as they [were] all a tight-knit

family.” A background check had been performed related to the family interested

in adopting the children. And Sullivan had spoken to the family about their hopes

                                           40
and dreams for the children, which factored into Sullivan’s decision to recommend

termination of the parental rights of mother and father.

                                  Standard of Review

       A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and management” of

her children is a constitutional interest “far more precious than any property right.”

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59 (1982) (internal quotations omitted). The

United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “the interest of [a] parent[] in the

care, custody, and control of [her] children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the

fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 65 (2000). Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court has concluded that “[t]his

natural parental right” is “essential,” “a basic civil right of man,” and “far more

precious than property rights.” Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)

(internal quotations omitted). Consequently, “[w]e strictly construe involuntary

termination statutes in favor of the parent.” In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex.

2012).

       Because termination of parental rights is “complete, final, irrevocable and

divests for all time that natural right . . . , the evidence in support of termination must

be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.”

Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree

of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction

                                            41
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 101.007; see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). Because the

standard of proof is “clear and convincing evidence,” the Texas Supreme Court has

held that the traditional legal and factual standards of review are inadequate. In re

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264–68.

      In conducting a legal-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the finding, is such that the fact finder could reasonably have formed a firm belief

or conviction about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore the burden of proof.

Id. at 266. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, we

“must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a

reasonable factfinder could do so,” and we “should disregard all evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” In

re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (internal quotations omitted). However,

this does not mean that we must disregard all evidence that does not support the

finding. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because of the heightened standard, we

must also be mindful of any undisputed evidence contrary to the finding and consider

that evidence in our analysis. Id. If we determine that no reasonable trier of fact

could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, we

                                          42
must hold the evidence to be legally insufficient and render judgment in favor of the

parent. Id.

      In conducting a factual-sufficiency review in a termination-of-parental-rights

case, we must determine whether, considering the entire record, including evidence

both supporting and contradicting the finding, a fact finder reasonably could have

formed a firm conviction or belief about the truth of the matter on which DFPS bore

the burden of proof. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We should

consider whether the disputed evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could

not have resolved the disputed evidence in favor of its finding. In re J.F.C., 96

S.W.3d at 266. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then

the evidence is factually insufficient.” In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex.

2006) (internal quotations omitted).

                    Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights

      In her first and second issues, mother argues that the trial court erred in

terminating her parental rights to the children because the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she knowingly placed,

or knowingly allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which

endangered their physical or emotional well-being, she engaged, or knowingly

                                          43
placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their

physical or emotional well-being, she failed to comply with the provisions of a court

order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return

of the children, and termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the

children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). In her

third issue, mother argues that the trial court erred in appointing DFPS as the sole

managing conservator of the children because a parent should be named the

children’s managing conservator where the evidence does not show that the

appointment would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional

development.

      In order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS must establish, by

clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated in

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of parental rights is

in the best interest of the children. See id. § 161.001(b). Both elements must be

established, and termination may not be based solely on the best interest of the

children as determined by the trier of fact. See id.; Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.

Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). Notably though, “[o]nly one predicate

finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to support a judgment of

termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child[ren’s] best

interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003).

                                          44
A.    Endangerment

      In a portion of her first issue, mother argues that the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings that she knowingly placed,

or knowingly allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which

endangered their physical or emotional well-being or she engaged, or knowingly

placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their

physical or emotional well-being because there was “no evidence that mother used

narcotics in the presence of the children” or that narcotics were “accessible to the

children”; there were not “issues with the [trailer] home” where the children were

living; there was no evidence “that E.J.C. was endangered by . . . mother”; the

children were healthy and developmentally on target at the time they were removed

from mother’s care; the only evidence presented as to narcotics use were the results

of one narcotics-use test and mother’s failure to submit to narcotics-use testing; and

mother was only convicted of a misdemeanor offense during the pendency of the

case. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      A trial court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds

by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has “knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed the child[ren] to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed]

the[ir] physical or emotional well-being.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). A trial court may

also order termination of the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and

                                          45
convincing evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the[ir]

physical or emotional well-being.” Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Because the evidence

related to Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) are interrelated, we

consolidate our examination. See In re L.M.N., No. 01-18-00413-CV, 2018 WL

5831672, at *12 n.38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 8, 2018, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 126 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no

pet.).

         Both Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) require proof of

endangerment. To “endanger” means to expose the children to loss or injury or to

jeopardize their emotional or physical health. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312

S.W.3d 608, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). The children

are endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger that the parent

is aware of but consciously disregards. J.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., 511 S.W.3d 145, 159 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.); In re S.M.L., 171

S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Endangerment

encompasses “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of

a less-than-ideal family environment.” Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. However, it is not

                                         46
necessary that the endangering conduct be directed at the children or that the children

actually suffer injury. Id.

      While Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) both focus on

endangerment, they differ regarding the source of the physical or emotional

endangerment to the children. See In re B.S.T., 977 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). For instance, Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(D) focuses on the children’s surroundings and environment and

requires a showing that the environment in which the children were placed

endangered their physical or emotional health. Doyle v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &

Regulatory Servs., 16 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied); see

also In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.);

In re S.M.L., 171 S.W.3d at 477. “Environment” refers to the acceptability of the

children’s living conditions as well as the conduct of a parent or other person in the

home because the conduct of a parent or other person can create an environment that

endangers the children’s physical or emotional well-being. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d

351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (internal quotations

omitted); see also In re I.L.L., No. 14-09-00693-CV, 2010 WL 4217083, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re B.R., 822

S.W.2d 103, 106 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991, writ denied) (“It is illogical to reason that

inappropriate, debauching, unlawful, or unnatural conduct of persons who live in the

                                          47
home of a child, or with whom a child is compelled to associate on a regular basis

in his home, are not inherently a part of the ‘conditions and surroundings’ of

th[e] . . . home . . . .”). Thus, although Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D)

focuses on the children’s living environment, parental conduct may produce an

endangering environment. See In re J.H., No. 01-22-00629-CV, 2023 WL 2169952,

at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      The relevant time frame for establishing that a parent knowingly placed, or

allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered their

physical or emotional well-being is prior to the children’s removal. In re O.R.F.,

417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied); In re J.R., 171

S.W.3d 558, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A fact finder

may infer from a parent’s past conduct endangering the well-being of the children

that similar conduct will recur in the future. A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective

Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 712 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.); see also In re D.S.,

333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (trier of fact may measure

parent’s future conduct by his past conduct). Notably, DFPS does not need to

establish that a parent intended to endanger the children to support termination based

on endangerment. In re J.H., 2023 WL 2169952, at *13. Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(D) permits termination based upon a single act or omission. Jordan

v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).

                                         48
      Under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), the relevant inquiry is

whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the children’s physical or

emotional well-being was the direct result of a parent’s conduct, including acts,

omissions, or failures to act. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; see also In re S.M.L.,

171 S.W.3d at 477. It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger

the children to support termination of the parent-child relationship. See In re M.C.,

917 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. 1996).              However, termination under section

161.001(b)(1)(E) requires “more than a single act or omission; . . . a voluntary,

deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent” is required. In re K.P.,

498 S.W.3d 157, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); see also

In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. The specific danger to the children’s well-being

may be inferred from parental misconduct standing alone, even if the conduct is not

directed at the children and they suffer no actual injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at

533; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

Courts may consider parental conduct that did not occur in the children’s presence.

In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.);

Walker, 312 S.W.3d at 617.

      Officer Bilbrey testified that on August 16, 2021, she went to mother’s trailer

home about 5:20 p.m. in response to a call for a welfare check. Bilbrey did not see

any cars in the driveway of the home, and when she knocked on the front door,

                                         49
N.L.S., who was five years old at the time, answered. Bilbrey asked N.L.S. if mother

was home, and N.L.S. told her that he was “home alone” and “mother [was] not

[t]here.” N.L.S. also told Bilbrey that he did not know where mother was. Bilbrey

then entered the home and yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police Department,” but no one

responded. (Internal quotations omitted.) Bilbrey continued shouting and banged

on the bedroom door in the home, which was locked. As she banged on the bedroom

door, she yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police Department. Is anybody home?” (Internal

quotations omitted.) No one responded. Bilbrey was in N.L.S.’s home for five to

ten minutes knocking on doors and yelling, but she never received a reply.

      According to Officer Bilbrey, she stayed at the trailer home with N.L.S. for

about fifteen to thirty minutes. Around 5:45 p.m., she left the home with N.L.S.,

and brought him to the HLPD station, which was about three blocks away from the

trailer home. During the entire time that Bilbrey was at the trailer home on August

16, 2021, no adult was present with N.L.S.

      Officer Bilbrey further explained that mother did not come looking for N.L.S.

at the HLPD station. Around 7:00 p.m., another law enforcement officer went back

to the trailer home. Mother was finally located around 7:45 p.m., and mother arrived

at the HLPD station around 8:00 p.m. that night. Although mother told Bilbrey that

she had been sleeping in the bedroom when Bilbrey first came to the trailer home

around 5:20 p.m. that day, Bilbrey testified that the door to the bedroom was locked

                                        50
and she did a “cop knock” on the bedroom door loudly. She did not hear a response

from anyone on the other side of the bedroom door, where mother was purportedly

sleeping.

      Additionally, Officer Bilbrey testified that she went back to the trailer home

around 10:00 p.m. to pick up E.J.C., who was two-months old at the time. Another

adult, “Frankie,” was at the home with E.J.C. Frankie and Bilbrey both looked

around the home for formula for E.J.C., but they could only find enough formula to

make one two-ounce bottle. And although Frankie gave Bilbrey a car seat for E.J.C.,

it was “[d]irty.” Frankie did not give Bilbrey any clothes that fit E.J.C., and Frankie

told Bilbrey that she had been gone from the home all day.

      Officer Newberry testified that on August 16, 2021, she went to mother’s

trailer home around 5:20 p.m. to perform a welfare check with Officer Bilbrey.

When they arrived at the home, Bilbrey knocked on the front door, and N.L.S.

answered. N.L.S. told the officers that he was home alone and that “nobody was

home” with him. (Internal quotations omitted.) Bilbrey then entered the home to

determine whether any other person was present. Bilbrey knocked loudly and yelled

loudly while inside the trailer home. In Newberry’s opinion, if someone was home,

she “would have known [that Bilbrey] was in the house.” Bilbrey tried to open the

bedroom door in the trailer home, but it was locked. Bilbrey did not find anyone

else in the home other than N.L.S. Newberry estimated that she and Bilbrey were at

                                          51
the trailer home for about thirty to forty-five minutes before they left and brought

N.L.S. to the HLPD station. Newberry bought food for N.L.S. to eat at the station.

        Officer Newberry further testified that around 7:00 p.m. that night, she went

back to the trailer home to see if anyone was there, but there were still no cars in the

driveway. At the trailer home, Newberry pounded on the door and yelled, but no

one answered.

        At 7:24 p.m., law enforcement officers received a message from a neighbor

stating that there was a car in the trailer home’s driveway, and Officer Newberry

returned to the trailer home at about 7:36 p.m., along with Officer Bilbrey.

Newberry knocked on the front door of the home, and a woman, “Frankie,”

answered. Newberry identified herself and said that she was looking for mother.

Frankie indicated that mother was inside the home. Bilbrey then spoke with mother

and asked mother if she knew where N.L.S. was. Mother responded that N.L.S. was

“out playing at a friend’s house,” and then Bilbrey told mother that N.L.S. was at

the HLPD station. Mother indicated to Bilbrey that the last time she had seen N.L.S.

was “a few hours” before the officers’ arrival. Bilbrey and Newberry then requested

that mother come to the HLPD station, which was a few blocks away from the trailer

home.

        According to Officer Newberry, she and Officer Bilbrey arrived back at the

HLPD station at about 7:45 p.m., but mother did not show up. Thus, at about

                                          52
8:00 p.m., Newberry went back to the trailer home to find mother. Newberry found

mother “fiddling with something on the front porch, [and] kind of going in and out”

of the trailer home. Mother and Frankie were talking. Newberry told mother that

“she needed to come now,” and she did not leave the home until mother followed

her back to the HLPD station.

      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a HLPD incident report

related to the events on August 16, 2021. It lists mother as the “[s]uspect/[o]ffender”

and the offense as abandoning or endangering a child.45 The “[n]arrative[]” portion

of the incident report states that Officer Newberry and Officer Bilbrey received a

telephone call from a Holiday Lakes resident about a five-year old child, N.L.S.,

who had been at her home for the past few days. N.L.S. had been spending all day

at the resident’s home with “no parent coming by to check on him.” The resident

reported that N.L.S. had arrived at her home each day dirty, hungry, with no shoes,

and in the same clothes. On August 16, 2021, N.L.S. showed up at the resident’s

home at about 8:00 a.m., with a fish tank and some other belongings in his hands.

He asked the resident if he could move in with her because “his mom [had] kicked

him out of [h]is home.” N.L.S., “with tears in his eyes,” told the resident that he had

been kicked out of his home “because he was trying to fill his fish tank up.” When

the resident had to leave her home later that day, she told N.L.S. that he needed to

45
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041.

                                          53
go home until she returned. As she drove by N.L.S.’s home, she saw N.L.S. sitting

on the front porch of his home holding his fish tank. The resident decided to report

the incident to the HLPD.

      The narrative portion of the incident report further states that Officer

Newberry and Officer Bilbrey told the resident that they would go by N.L.S.’s home

and perform a welfare check and see who else was at the home. Newberry and

Bilbrey arrived at the home, located in Holiday Lakes, at about 5:20 p.m. Newberry

noticed “a lot of garbage and shoes and many more random objects all over the front

yard and porch area of the home.” And when Newberry and Bilbrey went to the

front door of the home, “there was a very strong smell of ammonia,” which was

concerning to the officers. Although the screen door was closed, the main front door

to the home was open. Bilbrey knocked on the door, and N.L.S. came and opened

the screen door for the officers. When the officers asked N.L.S. if anyone was home

with him, he replied, “No, my mom is not home right now, but I have her cell[ular]

[tele]phone.” (Internal quotations omitted.) Newberry and Bilbrey then yelled into

the home, “Holiday Lakes Police Department, is anyone in the home?” (Internal

quotations omitted.) And N.L.S. kept repeating that “no one was [t]here.” After

Bilbrey entered the home, she “looked in the rooms to confirm that no one was

there.”

                                        54
      Additionally, the incident report notes that the bedroom door in the home was

locked, so Officer Bilbrey knocked on the door and yelled, “Holiday Lakes Police is

anyone home?” But no one responded. Bilbrey and N.L.S. then sat on the front

porch of the home, and Officer Newberry stepped away to call DFPS. Newberry

was instructed to bring N.L.S to the HLPD station with the officers. At about

5:44 p.m., Newberry and Bilbrey left the home with N.L.S. and brought N.L.S. to

the HLPD station, where they arrived at 5:47 p.m. Newberry left Bilbrey and N.L.S.

at the station and went to pick up food for N.L.S. because he stated that he was

hungry and that he had not eaten anything that day.

      The incident report additionally notes that at about 7:00 p.m., Officer

Newberry returned to N.L.S.’s home “to see if anyone showed up looking for him,”

but no one was there. Newberry then went back to the HLPD station, and at

7:24 p.m., law enforcement officers “received a message that a gray [car had been]

seen in the driveway of [the] home.” This prompted Newberry and Officer Bilbrey

to return to the home, and when they did, they saw a gray car parked in the driveway.

The officers approached the home and knocked on the front door. A woman, who

identified herself as “Frankie,” answered the door, and the officers asked Frankie if

mother was home. Frankie got mother out of a room in the home, telling her that

“the cops [were] [t]here for [her].” Mother came out to the front porch holding an

infant in her arms. Newberry asked mother if she knew where N.L.S. was, and

                                         55
mother responded that he was “[d]own the road at a friend’s house.” (Internal

quotations omitted.) Newberry asked mother when she last saw N.L.S., and she

stated that she had seen him that morning, but she was not sure of the exact time.

Mother also told Newberry that she had been at the home all day. Newberry then

told mother that N.L.S. was at the HLPD station, he was speaking to a “social

worker,” and mother needed to come to the station. Mother replied that she would

meet the officers at the station.

      Officer Newberry and Officer Bilbrey arrived back at the HLPD station at

about 7:45 p.m. When mother had not arrived at the HPLD station by 8:00 p.m.,

Newberry went back to the home and found mother outside. Newberry told mother

that she needed to come to the HLPD station right then and that Newberry would

follow her to the station to make sure that mother “got there ok.”

      Attached to the HLPD incident report is a voluntary statement from the

Holiday Lakes resident who contacted law enforcement officers about N.L.S. on

August 16, 2021. In her voluntary statement, the resident states that N.L.S. was

five-years old and had been at her home “all day” for the past four days. She was

concerned about N.L.S. because he had been at her house “so often [and] for so long

[and] . . . mother never came around.” The resident had “never met” mother.

      According to the resident, on August 16, 2021, N.L.S. came to the resident’s

home at 8:00 a.m. and asked her “if he could live with [her] because . . . mother [had]

                                          56
kicked him out because he was filling up his fish tank.”46 N.L.S. “got teary eyed,”

and the resident let him into her house and fed him. At about 2:00 p.m., the resident

told N.L.S. “to go home,” but he came back less than fifteen minutes later and said

that mother had “kicked him out again.” Later, when the resident had to leave her

home, she asked N.L.S. if she could “drop[] him off at home” and he told her that

“he was going to get a spanking from” mother. When the resident drove by N.L.S.’s

home at about 5:00 p.m., she saw him sitting on the front porch. The resident noted

that on August 16, 2021, N.L.S. was wearing shoes, but on the other days that he

was at her home, he showed up barefoot, hungry, and wearing the same clothes.

      A parent’s failure to properly supervise her young child endangers the child’s

physical or emotional well-being. See In re A.O., No. 02-21-00376-CV, 2022 WL

1257384, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 28, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(parent’s failure to supervise her child created dangerous condition for child); In re

J.H., No. 07-21-00059-CV, 2021 WL 2693284, at *3 n.4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June

30, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re A.K.T., No. 01-18-00647-CV, 2018 WL

6423381, at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.). And evidence that a parent has failed to supervise her young child supports the

46
      Mother, during her testimony, acknowledged that N.L.S. had a fish tank but stated
      that he did not have a fish in the tank. Further, according to mother, she sent N.L.S.
      down to the neighbor’s home on the morning of August 16, 2021 so that he could
      get his shoes, which he had left there. Mother denied kicking N.L.S. out of the
      house.

                                            57
trial court’s finding that the parent “knowingly placed or knowingly allowed [her]

child to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger[ed] [his] physical or

emotional well-being” or that the parent “engaged in conduct . . . which

endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child.”47 See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); see also In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269–70; In

re I.F., No. 01-22-00375-CV, 2022 WL 16640627, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Nov. 3, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence legally and factually

sufficient to support trial court’s finding that parent knowingly placed or knowingly

allowed her child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered her

physical or emotional well-being where parent left child unsupervised in hotel

room); In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308, at *17–20 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence

legally and factually sufficient to support trial court’s finding parent engaged in

conduct that endangered child’s physical and emotional well-being where child

outside wandering around without parent).

      Further, parental neglect of a child can be as dangerous to the well-being of

the child as direct physical abuse. See In re A.K.T., 2018 WL 6423381, at *14. And

47
      Although there is no evidence that mother failed to properly supervise E.J.C., a fact
      finder can infer from the neglect of one child that the physical and emotional
      well-being of the other children in the home were also jeopardized. See In re S.G.S.,
      130 S.W.3d 223, 238 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.).

                                           58
neglect by a parent of a child’s physical needs can support a finding of

endangerment. See In re R.H., No. 06-20-00083-CV, 2021 WL 1704264, at *9 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana Apr. 30, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see also In re M.C., 917

S.W.2d at 270 (neglect of children’s physical needs can be just as dangerous to

well-being of children as direct physical abuse). As discussed above, the evidence

presented at trial showed that N.L.S., in the days before he was removed from

mother’s care, was seen on multiple occasions hungry, barefoot, in the same clothes,

and without supervision. Further, as to E.J.C., on the day she was removed from

mother’s care, she appeared underweight and there was a limited amount of formula

for E.J.C. in mother’s home and no appropriate clothing for that child.48 See In re

A.N., No. 02-14-00206-CV, 2014 WL 5791573, at *19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Nov. 6, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (record contained evidence of neglect where

children asked strangers for food and did not wear shoes); see also In re L.W., No.

02-18-00107-CV, 2018 WL 3385694, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12, 2018,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent’s failure to provide food for children constituted

voluntary conduct that endangered children).

      Additionally, we note that this Court has previously stated that illegal

narcotics use and its effect on an individual’s ability to parent may constitute an

48
      A fact finder can infer from the neglect of one child that the physical and emotional
      well-being of the other children in the home were also jeopardized. See id.

                                           59
endangering course of conduct. See In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426–27 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). And we have concluded that illegal

narcotics use by a parent may support termination under Texas Family Code section

161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). See In re L.W., No. 01-18-01025-CV, 2019 WL 1523124,

at *15–16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(“[I]llegal narcotics use by a [parent] supports the conclusion that the children’s

surroundings endangered their physical or emotional well-being.”); Walker, 312

S.W.3d at 617–18; see also In re E.L.C., No. 05-20-00373-CV, 2020 WL 5494415,

at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t

of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 190 S.W.3d 189, 195–96 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). Further, evidence that a parent continued to use illegal

drugs even though the parent knew her parental rights were in jeopardy is conduct

showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, which by its

nature, endangers a child’s well-being. See In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 263

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied); Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, no pet.).

      DFPS investigator Mendoza and DFPS caseworker West both testified that

DFPS was concerned about possible narcotics-use by mother during the pendency

of the case. According to Mendoza, mother had admitted that she had used

                                          60
methamphetamines in the past.            And Dr. Stadler, who conducted mother’s

psychological evaluation, testified that mother admitted that she had used marijuana,

methamphetamine, cocaine, alcohol, and ecstasy in the past. Mother told Dr. Stadler

that she began using marijuana and methamphetamines when she was twelve years

old. She started drinking alcohol when she was fourteen or fifteen years old, and

she used “acid once in [ninth] grade.” Mother used opioids when she was about

twenty-five or twenty-six years old.49

       Although at trial mother denied having a “substance abuse issue” and stated

that she had not used narcotics since January 26, 2015, she also acknowledged that

her narcotics-use testing results from August 20, 2021 showed that she tested

positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and methadone days after the

children were removed from her care. A copy of mother’s narcotics-use testing

results from August 20, 2021, which was admitted into evidence at trial, show that

mother tested positive by urinalysis for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and

methadone. And mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine by

hair-follicle testing.50

49
       Mother’s FSP states that mother reported that she had previously used muscle
       relaxers and pain pills in 2008, and mother reported using methamphetamines in the
       past.
50
       Mother’s FSP similarly notes that mother tested positive for methamphetamines,
       amphetamines, and methadone after the children were removed from her care.

                                           61
      DFPS caseworker West and mother both agreed that mother had been asked

to submit to twenty-four narcotics-use tests during the pendency of the case, and

mother failed to participate in virtually all of the requested narcotics-use tests.51 See

In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.) (fact

finder could reasonably infer parent’s failure to complete scheduled narcotics-use

screenings indicated she avoided testing because she had used narcotics); see also

In re A.K.T., 2018 WL 6423381, at *13 (considering parent failed to submit to

narcotics-use testing on numerous occasions during course of case when holding

evidence legally and factually sufficient to support finding parent engaged in

conduct that endangered child’s physical and emotional well-being).               Further,

mother failed to complete substance-abuse counseling, which she was required to do

under her FSP, and she stopped attending substance-abuse counseling about six

months before trial.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings,

we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

mother knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed the children to remain, in

conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional well-being

or she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in

51
      Mother’s FSP required mother to remain free of alcohol and narcotics during the
      pendency of the case. And mother’s FSP informed her that if she failed to submit
      to a required narcotics-use test, the test would be deemed a positive testing result.

                                           62
conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). And, viewing the evidence in a neutral light,

we conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or

conviction that mother knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed the children to

remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical or emotional

well-being or she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with persons who

engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      Further, we conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed

evidence in favor of finding that mother knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed

the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered their

physical or emotional well-being or she engaged, or knowingly placed the children

with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional

well-being. And any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact finder could

not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that mother knowingly

placed, or knowingly allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings

which endangered their physical or emotional well-being or she engaged, or

knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged, in conduct that

endangered their physical or emotional well-being.

                                         63
      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s findings that mother knowingly placed, or knowingly

allowed the children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered their

physical or emotional well-being or she engaged, or knowingly placed the children

with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional

well-being. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

      We overrule a portion of mother’s first issue.

      Having held that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the

trial court’s findings that mother knowingly placed, or knowingly allowed the

children to remain, in conditions or surroundings which endangered their physical

or emotional well-being or she engaged, or knowingly placed the children with

persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional

well-being, we need not address the remaining portion of mother’s first issue in

which she asserted that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support

the trial court’s finding that she failed to comply with the provisions of a court order

that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the

children. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362 (only

one predicate finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) necessary to

support judgment of termination); In re M.A.J., 612 S.W.3d 398, 408 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. denied); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                          64
B.    Best Interest of Children

      In her second issue, mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights

was in the best interest of the children because the children were young and bonded

with mother, mother visited the children weekly during the pendency of the case,

mother explained “some of the ways in which she cared and parented each child,”

E.J.C.’s father would stop living with mother if the children were returned to her

care, there was no evidence that mother’s relationship with the children was

inappropriate, DFPS “offered no evidence of either child at their current placement,”

mother’s failure to complete the requirements of her FSP was not determinative, and

“the record . . . d[id] not show that mother did not meet the children’s physical and

emotional needs while they were previously in her care.”

      The best-interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children. See In re

M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *20; In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2011, no pet.). It is presumed that the prompt and permanent placement of

the children in a safe environment is in their best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.307(a); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d at 383.

      There is also a strong presumption that the children’s best interest is served

by maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Thus, we strictly scrutinize termination

                                           65
proceedings in favor of the parent. See In re M.A.A., 2021 WL 1134308, at *20; In

re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.).

      In determining whether the termination of mother’s parental rights was in the

best interest of the children, we may consider several factors, including: (1) the

desires of the children; (2) the current and future physical and emotional needs of

the children; (3) the current and future emotional and physical danger to the children;

(4) the parental abilities of the parties seeking custody; (5) whether programs are

available to assist those parties; (6) plans for the children by the parties seeking

custody; (7) the stability of the proposed placement; (8) the parent’s acts or

omissions that may indicate that the parent-child relationship is not proper; and

(9) any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.52 See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d

367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976); In re L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. We may also consider the

statutory factors set forth in Texas Family Code section 263.307. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 263.307; In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018); In re

C.A.G., No. 01-11-01094-CV, 2012 WL 2922544, at *6 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] June 12, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      We note that the above listed factors are not exhaustive, and there is no

requirement that DFPS prove all factors as a condition precedent to the termination

of parental rights. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re C.L.C., 119 S.W.3d

52
      We noted that much of the evidence discussed below applies to multiple factors.

                                          66
382, 399 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“[T]he best interest of the child does not

require proof of any unique set of factors nor limit proof to any specific factors.”).

The absence of evidence about some of the factors does not preclude a fact finder

from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the

children’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d 101,

122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). In some cases, undisputed

evidence of only one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination

is in the children’s best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; see also In re

J. G. S., 574 S.W.3d at 122.

      The same evidence of acts and omissions used to establish grounds for

termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) may also be relevant to

determining the best interest of the children. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re

L.M., 104 S.W.3d at 647. The trial court is given wide latitude in determining the

best interest of the children. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982);

see also Cuellar v. Flores, 238 S.W.2d 991, 992 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no

writ) (trial court “faces the parties and the witnesses, observes their demeanor and

personality, and feels the forces, powers, and influences that cannot be discerned by

merely reading the record”).

                                          67
      1.     Children’s Desires

      When mother’s parental rights were terminated, N.L.S. was seven-and-a-half

years old and E.J.C. was almost twenty-two months old. Neither child directly

expressed a desire as to whether he or she wish to be returned to mother’s care or

remain in their current placement.

      When there is no specific evidence of the children’s desires or the children are

too young to express those desires, a fact finder may consider evidence that the

children are bonded with their foster family and receive good care in their current

placement. See In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *18; In re L.M.N., 2018 WL

5831672, at *20.

      Sullivan, the guardian ad litem for the children, testified that because of

E.J.C.’s young age, the children’s foster parents were “[t]he only people she[] [had]

ever known in her life that ha[d] given her stability.” E.J.C. referred to the children’s

foster parents as “her parents,” and according to Sullivan, E.J.C. was “very

well-settled in” the foster parents’ home. Sullivan noted that N.L.S. had expressed

some fear about being returned to mother’s care.

      Further, mother’s FSP states that while in the care of his foster parents, N.L.S.

was doing well in school and had not had any behavioral or emotional issues. N.L.S.

“fit[] in well with his foster family” and had a “positive relationship[] with his foster

                                           68
parents.”    As to E.J.C., mother’s FSP notes that she was comfortable in her

placement with her foster parents.

       However, Sullivan also acknowledged that N.L.S. was bonded with mother

and mother had visited N.L.S. on a weekly basis throughout the pendency of the

case, except for when she was “in jail.” And mother’s FSP states that E.J.C.

appeared to be bonded with mother. Further, DFPS caseworker West agreed that

mother had attended most of her weekly supervised visits with the children and

mother did not act inappropriately at visits. Mother brought food and sometimes

clothing to the visits, and mother engaged with the children at her visits. West

acknowledged that the children “adore[d]” mother.

       Although “[a] child’s love for [his] natural parent is an important

consideration in the best interest determination,” “[e]ven where a child is attached

to a parent, . . . [a] child’s desire to be returned to the parent [is] not . . . dispositive

of the best interest analysis,” especially “if the parent has engaged in conduct

dangerous to the child’s well-being.” In re M.S.L., No. 14-14-00382-CV, 2014 WL

5148157, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.);

see also In re K.S.O.B., No. 01-18-00860-CV, 2019 WL 1246348, at *19 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (even though children

appeared happy to see parent at visits, that was not dispositive of best-interest

analysis).

                                             69
      2.     Current and Future Physical and Emotional Danger

             a.    Criminal Conduct and Violence

      A parent’s criminal history is relevant in analyzing the present and future

emotional and physical danger to a child and whether a parent can provide a safe and

stable home for her child. See In re D.J.G., No. 01-22-00870-CV, 2023 WL

3513143, at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.);

see also In re J.S.B., Nos. 01-17-00480-CV, 01-17-00481-CV, 01-17-00484-CV,

2017 WL 6520437, at *18–19 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 21, 2017, pet.

denied) (mem. op.); In re T.L.S., No. 01-12-00434-CV, 2012 WL 6213515, at *6

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (evidence of

parent’s criminal history may support trial court’s finding termination of parental

rights in children’s best interest). And “[a]s a general rule, conduct that subjects a

child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional

well-being of [the] child.” In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 739. Further, parental violence

is relevant when considering the best interest of the child. See In re D.J.G., 2023

WL 3513143, at *19.

      Mother testified that she was previously convicted of four counts of the

offense of forgery of a financial instrument in 2012. And she acknowledged that

during the pendency of the case, she had pleaded guilty to the offense of attempted

abandonment or endangerment of a child, related to her failure to properly supervise

                                         70
N.L.S. in August 2021—which was the impetus for the children being removed from

her care.53 At the time of trial, mother stated that she was on community supervision

related to the offense of attempted abandonment or endangerment of a child.

According to mother’s FSP, mother had been “arrested for assault in the past but the

charges were dropped.”

      DFPS caseworker West explained that during the pendency of the case,

mother was in “jail” from April 29, 2022 until June 4, 2022. And according to West,

at the time of trial, mother was “on probation.” Mother missed visitations with the

children when she was “in jail.”

      As to whether mother had ever engaged in physical altercations with others,

Dr. Stadler, who conducted mother’s psychological evaluation, explained that

mother reported that she had been involved in physical altercations as a child and as

an adult. Her last physical altercation was with the girlfriend or ex-girlfriend of

E.J.C.’s father. Mother also indicated that she was involved in another physical

altercation in 2014. According to mother’s FSP, N.L.S. reported to DFPS that

mother and E.J.C.’s father would “fight with their hands.” (Internal quotations

omitted.) See In re J.B.M., No. 04-18-00717-CV, 2019 WL 1139858, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Mar. 13, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Domestic violence and

53
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.01 (criminal attempt), 22.041 (offense of
      abandoning or endangering child).

                                         71
a propensity for violence may be considered evidence of endangerment, even if the

endangering acts did not occur in the children’s presence, were not directed at the

children, or did not cause actual injury to the children.”); In re A.V.M., No.

13-12-00684-CV, 2013 WL 1932887, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

May 9, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“It is self[-]evident that parents perpetrating

violence towards certain members of the family threaten the emotional development

and well-being of any child.”); Schaban-Maurer v. Maurer-Schaban, 238 S.W.3d

815, 824 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“[T]rial courts [have] relied on

evidence of past violence as an indicator of future behavior in parental termination

and child custody cases.”).

             b.     Narcotics Use

      Illegal narcotics use by a parent may constitute evidence of current and future

danger to a child. See In re D.J.G., 2023 WL 3513143, at *23; In re O.J.P., No.

01-21-00163-CV, 2021 WL 4269175, at *19–21 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Sept. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering evidence of parent’s narcotics use

in determining current and future danger to child); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d

336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (stating “a parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her

ability to parent may qualify as an endangering course of conduct”); In re S.R.H.,

No. 01-15-0714-CV, 2016 WL 430462, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

Feb. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (parent’s past narcotics use is indicative of

                                          72
instability in home environment); Cervantes-Peterson, 221 S.W.3d at 254–55

(illegal narcotics use while parental rights are in jeopardy may be considered

endangering course of conduct critical to finding that termination is in child’s best

interest).

       DFPS investigator Mendoza and DFPS caseworker West both testified that

DFPS was concerned about possible narcotics-use by mother during the pendency

of the case. According to Mendoza, mother had admitted that she had used

methamphetamines in the past.          And Dr. Stadler, who conducted mother’s

psychological evaluation, testified that mother admitted that she had used marijuana,

methamphetamine, cocaine, alcohol, and ecstasy in the past. Mother told Dr. Stadler

that she began using marijuana and methamphetamines when she was twelve years

old. She started drinking alcohol when she was fourteen or fifteen years old, and

she used “acid once in [ninth] grade.” Mother used opioids when she was about

twenty-five or twenty-six years old.54

       Although at trial mother denied having a “substance abuse issue” and stated

that she had not used narcotics since January 26, 2015, she also acknowledged that

her narcotics-use testing results from August 20, 2021 showed that she tested

positive for amphetamines, methamphetamines, and methadone only days after the

54
       Mother’s FSP also states that mother reported that she had used muscle relaxers and
       pain pills in 2008, and mother reported using methamphetamines in the past.

                                           73
children were removed from her care. A copy of mother’s narcotics-use testing

results from August 20, 2021, which was admitted into evidence at trial, show that

mother tested positive by urinalysis for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and

methadone, and mother tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine by

hair-follicle testing.55

       DFPS caseworker West and mother both agreed that mother had been asked

to submit to twenty-four narcotics-use tests during the pendency of the case, and

mother failed to participate in virtually all of the requested narcotics-use tests.56 See

In re W.E.C., 110 S.W.3d at 239 (fact finder could reasonably infer parent’s failure

to complete scheduled narcotics-use screenings indicated she avoided testing

because she had used narcotics); see also In re T.L.S., 2012 WL 6213515, at *6

(considering evidence of parent’s refusal to take court-ordered narcotics-use test in

determining best interest of child).            Further, mother failed to complete

substance-abuse counseling, which she was required to do under her FSP, and she

stopped attending substance-abuse counseling about six months before trial. See In

re D.J.G., 2023 WL 3513143, at *24 (considering parent had not completed all

55
       Mother’s FSP similarly notes that mother tested positive for methamphetamines,
       amphetamines, and methadone after the children were removed for her care.
56
       Mother’s FSP required mother to remain free of alcohol and narcotics during the
       pendency of the case. And mother’s FSP informed her that if she failed to report to
       a required narcotics-use test, the test would be deemed a positive testing result.

                                           74
requirements of his FSP related to his substance abuse issues in determining best

interest of child).

       3.     Current and Future Physical and Emotional Needs, Parental
              Abilities, Plans for Children, and Stability of Proposed Placement

              a.      Children’s Needs

       There is nothing in the trial record to establish that the children’s physical and

emotional needs differ in any respect to those of other children their ages. See In re

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 808 (noting no evidence that children’s needs differed from

other children). However, a child needs a safe and stable home. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 263.307(a) (prompt and permanent placement of child in safe

environment presumed to be in child’s best interest); In re G.M.G., 444 S.W.3d 46,

60 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (parent who lacks ability to

provide child with safe and stable home is unable to provide for child’s emotional

and physical needs). And a child’s basic needs include food, shelter, and clothing.

See In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 288 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).

       DFPS caseworker West testified that when the children entered DFPS’s care,

mother was living in a trailer home with “Frankie.”57 As to the condition of the

trailer home, the HLPD incident report from August 16, 2021—the date the children

were removed from mother’s care—states that the law enforcement officers who

57
       “Frankie” is purportedly a cousin of E.J.C.’s father who has since moved away.

                                           75
went to the trailer home noticed “a lot of garbage and shoes and many more random

objects all over the front yard and porch area of the home.” And “there was a very

strong smell of ammonia” coming from the home. Further, Officer Bilbrey testified

that at the trailer home, she and Frankie, who was living in the home and caring for

E.J.C. on the night of August 16, 2021, could not find enough formula for E.J.C. and

Frankie was unable to provide appropriate clothing for E.J.C.

      Additionally, the HLPD incident report states that after law enforcement

officers removed N.L.S. from mother’s home, one of them went to get him food

because he stated that he was hungry and had not eaten anything that day. And the

Holiday Lakes resident, who contacted law enforcement officers about N.L.S.,

explained that he had been at her home “all day” for the four days prior to August

16, 2021 and he showed up each day hungry, wearing the same clothes, and barefoot.

      DFPS caseworker West also testified that after the children were removed

from mother’s care, mother and E.J.C.’s father moved into a home together. After

that, mother “went to jail,” and once she was released, mother “mov[ed] from friend

to friend.” Then, mother began living with E.J.C.’s father and his mother. But, at

the time of trial, mother was living in a one-bedroom apartment with E.J.C.’s father.

      Mother similarly explained that during the pendency of the case, she had

multiple different residences. After the children were removed from her care,

mother continued living at the trailer home for about a month. Mother did not own

                                         76
the trailer home but was renting it. Mother then moved into a friend’s home until

July 7, 2022. She did not have a lease while living at a friend’s home, but she paid

rent. Mother next moved to the Cranbrook Apartment complex. She had lived in

two different apartments in that complex since July 7, 2022. Mother also noted that

after she was released from jail, but before an apartment was available at the

Cranbrook Apartment complex, she stayed with “two different friends.”

      As to her housing situation at the time of trial, mother explained that she lived

in a one-bedroom apartment at the Cranbrook Apartment complex with E.J.C.’s

father. According to mother, E.J.C.’s father went “back and forth between” her

apartment and the apartment where his mother was living, which was in the same

apartment complex. However, mother stated that because the mother of E.J.C.’s

father was being evicted from her apartment, E.J.C.’s father would then stay with

her. But she noted that E.J.C.’s father “said that if it was a problem [for] him being

in [mother’s home] due to the case,” then “he would go elsewhere.” According to

mother, she had “no lease” for her apartment. And because E.J.C.’s father “d[id] the

maintenance” for the apartment complex, mother did not have to pay rent for the

apartment, but she is responsible for paying for electricity.58 Mother claimed that

58
      Mother testified that at the time of trial she did not have a job. According to mother,
      she had previously worked at a cleaning service from February 2022 until January
      2023. But West noted that mother had never given her any documentation to show
      that she was employed. See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308,
      at *30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.)
                                            77
she was not in a relationship with E.J.C.’s father at the time of trial, but she stated

that he was not a danger to the children. Mother last saw E.J.C.’s father about two

weeks before trial.

      It is clear from the record that DFPS was concerned about mother’s living

arrangement with E.J.C.’s father because he had failed to complete, most, if not all,

of the requirements of his FSP, he did not maintain a safe and stable home during

the pendency of the case or submit to any narcotics-use testing, and he was arrested

during the pendency of the case on “a theft charge.” E.J.C.’s father also did not

appear at trial even though his parental rights to E.J.C. were subject to termination.

See In re L.W., 2019 WL 1523124, at *13 (“A parent endangers her children by

accepting the endangering conduct of other people.”). Mother admitted that she did

not have a support system if the children were returned to her care.

             b.       Mother’s Supervision

      Officer Bilbrey and Officer Newberry testified that on August 16, 2021,

N.L.S. was found home alone around 5:20 p.m. Hours later, when law enforcement

officers located mother, she reported to officers that N.L.S. was “out playing at a

      (considering parent had difficulty maintaining stable employment in analyzing
      parental abilities and stability of proposed placement for children); see also In re
      G.R., No. 07-16-00277-CV, 2016 WL 6242829, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct.
      25, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting parent unable to maintain steady employment
      or housing throughout termination case in considering stability of potential
      placement with parent).

                                           78
friend’s house,” when he was actually at the HLPD station. Mother indicated to

Bilbrey that she had not seen N.L.S. for “a few hours.”

      A HLPD incident report related to the events of August 16, 2021, a copy of

which was admitted into evidence, lists mother as the “[s]uspect/[o]ffender” and the

offense as abandoning or endangering a child.59 The “[n]arrative[]” portion of the

incident report states that Officer Newberry and Officer Bilbrey received a telephone

call from a Holiday Lakes resident about a five-year old child, N.L.S., who had been

at her home for the past few days. N.L.S. had been spending all day at her home

with “no parent coming by to check on him.” The resident reported that N.L.S. had

arrived at her home each day dirty, hungry, with no shoes, and in the same clothes.

On August 16, 2021, N.L.S. showed up at the resident’s home at about 8:00 a.m.,

with a fish tank and some other belongings in his hands. He asked the resident if he

could move in with her because “his mom [had] kicked him out of [h]is home.”

N.L.S., “with tears in his eyes,” told the resident that he had been kicked out of his

home “because he was trying to fill his fish tank up.” When the resident had to leave

her home later that day, she told N.L.S. that he needed to go home until she returned.

But when she drove by N.L.S.’s home, she saw N.L.S. sitting on the front porch of

his home holding his fish tank.

59
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041.

                                         79
      The incident report further states that when Officer Newberry and Officer

Bilbrey went to N.L.S.’s home on August 16, 2021 around 5:20 p.m., the screen door

was closed, but the main front door to the home was open. After Bilbrey knocked,

N.L.S. came and opened the screen door for the officers and told them that mother

was “not home right now.” (Internal quotations omitted). After Bilbrey entered the

home, she “looked in the rooms to confirm that no one was there,” and N.L.S. kept

repeating that “no one was [t]here.” The law enforcement officers were not able to

find anyone else in the home other than N.L.S. When Newberry located mother,

several hours later, mother told Newberry that she had last seen N.L.S. that morning,

but she was not sure of the exact time.

      In the voluntary statement from the Holiday Lakes resident who contacted law

enforcement officers about N.L.S., the resident states that N.L.S. was five-years old

and had been at her home “all day” for the past four days. She was concerned about

N.L.S. because he had been at her house “so often [and] for so long [and] . . . mother

never came around.” The resident had “never met” mother. On August 16, 2021,

N.L.S. came to the resident’s home at 8:00 a.m. and asked her “if he could live with

[her] because . . . mother [had] kicked him out because he was filling up his fish

tank.”60 N.L.S. “got teary eyed,” and the resident let him into her house and fed him.

60
      Mother, during her testimony, acknowledged that N.L.S. had a fish tank but stated
      that he did not have a fish in the tank. Further, according to mother, she sent N.L.S.
      down to the neighbor’s home on the morning of August 16, 2021 so that he could
                                            80
At about 2:00 p.m., the resident told N.L.S. “to go home,” but he came back less

than fifteen minutes later and said that mother had “kicked him out again.” Later,

when the resident had to leave her home, she asked N.L.S. if she could “drop[] him

off at home” and he told her that “he was going to get a spanking from” mother.

When the resident drove by N.L.S.’s home at about 5:00 p.m., she saw him sitting

on the front porch. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(b)(12)(C) (in determining

whether parent willing and able to provide child with safe environment, considering

whether parent demonstrates adequate parenting skills, such as “supervision

consistent with the child’s safety”); In re A.J.B., No. 10-18-00274-CV, 2018 WL

6684808, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Dec. 19, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[Y]oung

children are particularly vulnerable if left in the custody of a parent who is unable or

unwilling to protect them or attend to their needs because they have no ability to

protect themselves.”); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 886 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2006, no pet.) (parent’s inability to provide adequate care for child, lack of parenting

skills, and poor judgment may be considered when looking at child’s best interest);

In re C.M.W., No. 01-02-00474-CV, 2003 WL 579794, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Feb. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.) (children’s basic needs include

appropriate supervision).

      get his shoes, which he had left there. Mother denied kicking N.L.S. out of the
      house.

                                          81
             c.     Mother’s Acts or Omissions

      A parent’s failure to comply with her FSP supports a finding that termination

of her parental rights is in the best interest of the children. See In re J.S.B., 2017

WL 6520437, at *22; In re E.A.F., 424 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). Here, in her briefing, mother does not dispute that she did

not complete the requirements of her FSP. Further, DFPS caseworker West testified

that mother did not complete substance-abuse counseling, did not complete

individual therapy, and failed to submit to the required narcotics-use testing.

Mother, during her testimony, acknowledged that she had received her FSP, but she

did not complete the required substance-abuse counseling or individual therapy.

And she failed to participate in all the required narcotics-use testing. See In re E.S.S.,

No. 05-23-00031-CV, 2023 WL 4782682, at *13 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 27, 2023,

no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (parent’s failure “to engage in the programs ordered in the

[FSP] supports the trial court’s best-interest finding”); In re M.L.H., No.

04-21-00408-CV, 2022 WL 526501, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 23, 2022,

pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support

trial court’s best-interest finding where parent “engaged in her service plan, [but]

failed to successfully complete it”).

             d.     Current Placement

                                           82
      DFPS caseworker West explained that the children were placed together in

the same foster home, although it was not an adoptive home. The children were

bonded to one another. Further, Sullivan, the guardian ad litem for the children,

testified that E.J.C. was “very well settled-in” her foster parents’ household. And

because E.J.C. was young, “[t]he only people she[] [had] ever known in her life that

ha[d] given her stability [were her] foster parents.” She referred to her foster parents

as “her parents.”

      Mother’s FSP notes that N.L.S. was a healthy child, who was doing well in

school. N.L.S. “fit[] in well with his foster family” and had a “positive relationship[]

with his foster parents.” It also states that E.J.C. was comfortable in her placement

with her foster parents. Yet, it appears undisputed that the children’s current

placement is not an adoptive placement.

      Sullivan did testify that “a family [had been] identified that [were] willing to

adopt [the children]” and that family “want[ed] to be made the placement[] for [the

children,” but she did not provide much detail. She noted that a background check

had been performed related to the family interested in adopting the children and the

family had known the children for more than a year. Further, the potential adoptive

placement would “have the [children’s current foster] parents . . . close by, as they

[were] all a tight-knit family.”

                                          83
      To the extent that the evidence presented at trial indicates that the children’s

current placement with their foster parents is not a permanent placement, we note

that “[a] lack of . . . definitive plans for [the] permanent placement and adoption” of

the children at the time of trial is not dispositive of the best-interest analysis. See In

re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; see also In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that

termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we

conclude that a reasonable fact finder could have formed a firm belief or conviction

that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

See id. We further conclude that the trial court could have reconciled any disputed

evidence in favor of finding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in the

children’s best interest, or any disputed evidence was not so significant that a fact

finder could not have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that termination

is in the best interest of the children. See id.

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that termination of mother’s parental rights was in

the best interest of the children. See id.

      We overrule mother’s second issue.

                                             84
C.    Managing Conservatorship

      In her third issue, mother argues that the trial court erred in appointing DFPS

as the children’s sole managing conservator because there was a rebuttable

presumption “that a parent w[ould] be named [the children’s] managing conservator

unless the [trial] court f[ound] that such [an] appointment would not be in the

child[ren’s] best interest” as it “would significantly impair the child[ren’s] physical

health or emotional development.” (Internal quotations omitted.)

      The Texas Family Code provides that “[i]f the court terminates the

parent-child relationship with respect to both parents or to the only living parent, the

court shall appoint a suitable, competent adult, [DFPS], or a licensed child-placing

agency as managing conservator of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.207(a);

see also In re S.M.G., No. 01-17-00056-CV, 2017 WL 2806332, at *8 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] June 29, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“When the parents’

parental rights have been terminated, [Texas] Family Code section 161.207 governs

the appointment of a managing conservator.”). Generally, we review a trial court’s

conservatorship determination for an abuse of discretion. In re J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d

611, 616 (Tex. 2007).

      Importantly, an order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the

parent of all legal rights and duties with respect to her children. TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.206(b); In re A.L.J., No. 01-19-00251-CV, 2019 WL 4615826, at *9

                                          85
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). A parent with

no legal rights with respect to her children lacks standing to attack the portion of the

trial court’s order appointing DFPS as the sole managing conservator of the children.

See In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9.

      Here, we have overruled mother’s complaint that the trial court erred in

terminating her parental rights to the children. See In re J.H., 2023 WL 2169952, at

*27; see also In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (“Once we overrule a parent’s

challenge to the termination order, the trial court’s appointment of [DFPS] as sole

managing conservator may be considered a ‘consequence of the termination’ . . . .”);

In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 359 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13,

2014, pet. denied) (“A trial court does not abuse its discretion in appointing [DFPS]

as conservator of the children where the evidence is sufficient to support termination

of parental rights.”); Quiroz v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No.

01-08-00548-CV, 2009 WL 961935, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 9,

2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (refusing to address parent’s complaint evidence

insufficient to support DFPS’s appointment as sole managing conservator where

evidence sufficient to support termination of parent’s rights). Thus, the trial court’s

order terminating mother’s parental rights divested her of her legal rights and duties

to the children. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(b); In re J.H., 2023 WL

2169952, at *27; see also In re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (“Because we have

                                          86
overruled [parent’s] challenge to the portion of the trial court’s order terminating her

parental rights, the order has divested [her] of her legal rights and duties related to

[the children].”).

      Having no legal rights with respect to the children, we hold that mother lacks

standing to challenge the portion of the trial court’s order appointing DFPS as sole

managing conservator of the children. See In re J.H., 2023 WL 2169952, at *27; In

re A.L.J., 2019 WL 4615826, at *9 (“[Parent] d[id] not have standing to challenge

the portion of the order appointing [DFPS] as permanent managing conservator of

the children because any alleged error could not injuriously affect her rights.”).

      We overrule mother’s third issue.

                     Termination of Father’s Parental Rights

      In his first issue, father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his

parental rights to N.L.S. because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the trial court’s finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with

persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional

well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). In his second issue,

father argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights to N.L.S.

because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s

finding that termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interest of N.L.S.

See id. § 161.001(b)(2).

                                          87
      As stated above, in order to terminate the parent-child relationship, DFPS

must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, one or more of the acts or

omissions enumerated in Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1) and that

termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. See id. § 161.001(b).

Both elements must be established, and termination may not be based solely on the

best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact. Id.; Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at

533. “Only one predicate finding under section 161.001[(b)](1) is necessary to

support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in

the child’s best interest.” In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362.

      In a portion of his first issue, father argues that the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that he engaged, or knowingly placed

N.L.S. with persons who engaged, in conduct that endangered N.L.S.’s physical or

emotional well-being because incarceration alone will not support the termination

of parental rights and the evidence showed that father did not have “any knowledge

of the reasons that [N.L.S.] w[as] removed/picked up by” DFPS, father believed that

N.L.S was “in good health and in good hands with” mother, and “many of the

convictions that were brought up at trial occurred years before [N.L.S.] was born

and even before [father] knew that he was even the possible father of [N.L.S.]” See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

                                           88
      A trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear

and convincing evidence that the parent has “engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endanger[ed] the

physical or emotional well-being of the child.”           Id.   Within this context,

endangerment encompasses “more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the

possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment.” Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at

533. Instead, “endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize

their emotional or physical health. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Walker,

312 S.W.3d at 616.

      We must look at a parent’s conduct standing alone, including his actions and

omissions. In re J.W., 152 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

It is not necessary to establish that a parent intended to endanger the child. See In

re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at *14. But termination of parental rights under Texas

Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires “more than a single act or omission;

a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is required.”

In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; see also In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at *14.

The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be inferred from parental

misconduct, even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no

actual injury. See Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at

*14; In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d at 738. Courts may consider parental conduct that did

                                          89
not occur in the child’s presence, including conduct before the child’s birth. In re

L.M.N., 2018 WL 5831672, at *14; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d at 426.

      At trial, DFPS relied on father’s history of incarceration to establish that father

engaged, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with persons who engaged, in conduct that

endangered N.L.S.’s physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(E).

      Father testified that, at the time of trial, he was incarcerated, and he was

incarcerated when N.L.S. was removed from mother’s care in August 2021.

According to father, in February 2021, he was convicted of the offenses of felon in

possession of a firearm,61 possession of a prohibited weapon,62 evading arrest or

detention,63 assault of a family member,64 and possession of a controlled substance,65

61
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04.
62
      See id. § 46.05.
63
      See id. § 38.04.
64
      See id. § 22.01. Mother was not the complainant of this offense.
65
      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related to the
      possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense as well as a judgment of conviction
      showing that father pleaded guilty to the offense, and the trial court, in accord with
      the agreed punishment recommendation from the State, assessed father’s
      punishment at confinement for 645 days. Father received a jail time credit of 631
      days.

                                            90
namely methamphetamine.66 Father “signed . . . a five-year plea” bargain agreement

related to those offenses. Father’s discharge date is in May 2025.67

      Father also noted that he was incarcerated when N.L.S. was born. As to his

criminal history, father explained that in 2007, he was arrested for the offense of

“theft of a firearm,”68 and he pleaded guilty to the offense.69 In 2009, he was

convicted of the offense of assault70 and received “time served in county jail.”71

Further, in 2013, he was convicted of the offenses of evading arrest or detention72

66
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(6), 481.115. As to the
      possession-of-a-controlled-substance offense, father stated that his counsel at the
      time told him that there “was residue in a pipe” that was “in the back bed of [father’s]
      truck.” Notably, there is no evidence that N.L.S. was in father’s care when he was
      in possession of a controlled substance or that father used narcotics in the presence
      of N.L.S.
67
      Father stated that he had a parole hearing scheduled for March 2023, and he had
      “support letters . . . from the sheriff” because he was “a trustee” with the sheriff’s
      department and worked as a welder.
68
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03.
69
      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment related to the
      misdemeanor theft offense as well as a copy of a judgment, signed on December 5,
      2008 and showing that father pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of theft of
      a firearm and the trial court assessed father’s punishment at confinement in the
      county jail for 100 days. Father received a jail time credit of 111 days.
70
      See id. § 22.01. Father did not know mother at the time he was convicted of this
      offense, and mother was not the complainant of the offense.
71
      The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the information related to the
      misdemeanor assault offense and a copy of the judgment, stating that father pleaded
      guilty to the misdemeanor offense of assault and the trial court assessed his
      punishment at confinement for three days in the county jail. Father received a jail
      time credit of fourteen days.
72
      See id. § 38.04.

                                             91
and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.73 And in 2014, father pleaded guilty to the

offense of burglary.74 In 2015, he pleaded guilty to the offense of “credit card

abuse.”75

      The fact that a parent is incarcerated, standing alone, does not constitute

engaging in conduct that endangers the emotional or physical well-being of a child,

although it may be a fact to consider on the issue of endangerment. See In re D.W.,

Nos. 01-13-00880-CV, 01-13-00883-CV, 01-13-00884-CV, 2014 WL 1494290, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 11, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re

M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); Walker v. Dep’t

of Fam. & Protective Servs., 251 S.W.3d 563, 565 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006, no pet.); see also In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 316 (Tex. 2021) (“[M]ere

imprisonment—past        or     present—[does        not]    conclusively       constitute[]

endangerment . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)). Instead, the State “must show

73
      See id. § 31.07.
74
      See id. § 30.02. The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of the indictment
      related to the burglary offense and other documents admitted into evidence show
      that father, with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, pleaded
      guilty to the offense of burglary of a building and the trial court deferred
      adjudication of father’s guilt and placed him on community supervision for three
      years. After the State filed a motion to adjudicate father’s guilt, father pleaded true
      to certain allegations in the State’s motion in exchange for the State recommending
      that punishment be assessed at confinement for eight months. A copy of the
      judgment adjudicating guilt shows that the trial court assessed father’s punishment
      at confinement for eight months and father received a “jail time credit” of 182 days.
75
      See id. § 32.31.

                                            92
that the incarceration [of the parent] is part of a course of conduct that is endangering

the child[].” In re D.W., 2014 WL 1494290, at *6 (internal quotations omitted).

Importantly, termination of parental rights should not become an additional

punishment for the commission of a criminal offense. See In re A.E.G., No.

12-11-00307-CV, 2012 WL 4502085, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 28, 2012, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Imprisonment can be used only as a factor to consider on the issue

of endangerment; otherwise, the termination of parental rights could become an

additional punishment automatically imposed along with imprisonment for almost

any crime.”); In re E.S.S., 131 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no

pet.); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 805 (rejecting proposition that any offense

committed by parent that could lead to imprisonment or confinement would establish

endangerment to children).

      Here, DFPS did not present clear and convincing evidence that N.L.S.’s

physical or emotional well-being was endangered by father’s criminal conduct or

incarceration.76 See In re A.A., No. 06-14-00060-CV, 2014 WL 5421027, at *3 (Tex.

76
      DFPS asserts, in its briefing, that the facts of this case are the same facts as in our
      previous decision in In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
      2010, no pet.) because the father in In re V.V. was incarcerated at the time of his
      child’s birth, at the time the child entered DFPS’s care, and at the time the trial court
      terminated the father’s parental rights to the child. Although we held in In re V.V.
      that the evidence was legally sufficient to support “a termination finding based on
      endangerment,” that case is factually distinguishable from the instant case. See id.
      at 553–57. Of note, in In re V.V., the father, only days before trial, assaulted the
      child’s mother, which was documented by photographic evidence. See id. 552–54.
      And the actions of both parents led to the child being in the care of DFPS since birth.
                                             93
App.—Texarkana Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining “the relevant

inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the children’s emotional

or physical well-being was the direct result of [parent’s] conduct”); Ruiz v. Tex.

Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 212 S.W.3d 804, 818 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (DFPS must present evidence “that the endangerment of the

child’s physical or emotional well[-]being was the direct result of the parent’s

conduct”); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803–05 (recognizing it was DFPS’s

burden to show “how the offense was part of a voluntary course of conduct” that

endangered children and holding evidence legally insufficient to support termination

under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E)); In re L.C.L., 599 S.W.3d 79,

84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“A plain language reading of

the statute requires a causal connection between [parent’s conduct] and the alleged

endangerment.”).

      When N.L.S. was removed from mother’s care, father was incarcerated, and

there was no evidence presented at trial that N.L.S. entered DFPS’s care because of

father’s acts or omissions.77 See Walker, 251 S.W.3d at 565–66 (holding evidence

      See id. at 553–54 (noting that “[a]n infant who is not looked after by either of her
      parents, as this one was not, undeniably is in serious danger of physical and
      emotional injury”).
77
      We note that father’s FSP, which was created by DFPS, did not list any requirements
      for father to complete to ensure the return of N.L.S., other than to contact DFPS
      upon his release from confinement. For instance, it did not require father to
      participate in individual therapy, substance-abuse counseling, or parenting classes.

                                           94
legally insufficient to support finding that parent engaged in conduct or knowingly

placed children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical

or emotional well-being where father was incarcerated at time children were

removed from mother’s care); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d 420, 431–32 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) (noting “[t]here must be evidence of endangerment to

the child’s physical or emotional well-being as the direct result of the parent’s

conduct” and holding evidence legally insufficient to support trial court’s finding

that parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who engaged

in conduct that endangered child’s physical or emotional well-being even though

parent was incarcerated); see also In re A.S., No. 09-21-00142-CV, 2021 WL

5113817, at *6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 4, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(“Endangerment arises when a parent’s conduct jeopardizes the child’s emotional or

physical health.”).

      Although father has been twice convicted of the offense of assault in the past,

there was little detail as to those offenses introduced at trial—other than that they

did not involve mother or N.L.S.—and DFPS did not introduce any evidence of a

danger of violence to N.L.S. because of father’s convictions. See M.A.R. v. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 14-23-00094-CV, 2023 WL 5045687, at *7–8 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence

legally insufficient to support trial court’s finding that parent engaged in conduct or

                                          95
knowingly placed child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered

child’s physical or emotional well-being, although parent had criminal record and

previous assault conviction); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 804–05 (“We

agree that an offense occurring before a [parent’s] children are born can be a relevant

factor in establishing an endangering course of conduct, . . . but [DFPS] bears the

burden of introducing evidence concerning the offense and establishing that the

offense was part of a voluntary course of conduct that endangered the children’s

well-being.”). The same can be said about father’s conviction for the offense of

possession of a controlled substance; DFPS did not introduce any evidence that

N.L.S. was endangered by this criminal conduct by father.78 See M.A.R., 2023 WL

5045687, at *7–8 (holding evidence legally insufficient to support trial court’s

finding that parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who

engaged in conduct that endangered child’s physical or emotional well-being

although parent tested positive for marijuana during pendency of case and had

convictions for possession of marijuana in past because DFPS did not establish “[a]

causal link between his usage of marijuana and any alleged endangerment”); Ruiz,

212 S.W.3d at 818 (holding evidence legally insufficient to support trial court’s

78
      Additionally, to the extent that DFPS relies on criminal conduct committed by father
      in the distant past, DFPS did not show a present or future danger to N.L.S. because
      of those prior criminal convictions. See Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387, 391
      (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, no writ).

                                           96
finding parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who

engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of child

where evidence of parent’s narcotics use was limited and no evidence was presented

showing parent used narcotics while caring for child or in child’s presence); In re

D.J.J., 178 S.W.3d 424, 429–30 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (although

parent was arrested and later imprisoned on “three drug possession charges,” holding

evidence legally insufficient to support trial court’s finding that parent engaged in

conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who engaged in conduct which

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of child because “there [was] no

evidence that [parent’s] conduct in taking the methamphetamines that resulted in his

arrest and imprisonment endangered [child’s] physical or emotional well[-]being”);

In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied) (“[T]here

must be evidence of endangerment to the child’s physical or emotional well-being

as the direct result of the parent’s conduct.” (emphasis omitted)).

      Here, DFPS did not establish by clear and convincing evidence a causal link

between father’s criminal conduct and any alleged endangerment to N.L.S. See In

re R.H., No. 01-14-00874-CV, 2015 WL 4594557, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] July 28, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The relevant inquiry is whether evidence

exists that the parent’s conduct—including acts, omissions, and failures to act—

directly endangered the child’s physical [or emotional] well-being.”); In re V.S.R.K.,

                                          97
No. 2-08-047-CV, 2009 WL 736751, at *7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 19, 2009,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (although parent had two prior convictions for evading arrest

and was incarcerated at time of trial, explaining DFPS had failed to show “how the

endangerment was the ‘direct result of’ [parent’s] conduct”).

      Additionally, there is no evidence that father knew that N.L.S. would be

endangered while in the care of mother. Father testified that he and mother were

only in a relationship in 2015 for a few months and they just “talked” from 2017 to

2019, but they never lived together during those times. When father first met mother,

she lived with a friend in a “nice house” with four or five bedrooms. While mother

and N.L.S. lived with father for a couple of months in 2018, mother was a good

parent to N.L.S. She made N.L.S. dinner, gave him baths, and took him to doctors’

appointments. Mother did not “lose track” of N.L.S. or fail to take care of him. She

was attentive to his needs, and father did not see anything that would cause him to

be concerned about mother’s parental abilities. When mother and N.L.S. moved to

another city, father did not have any concerns about mother parenting N.L.S. He did

not think that she would be neglectful or endanger the child. Father did not know

that mother had a history with DFPS when he let N.L.S. live with mother. After

mother and N.L.S. decided to move, father went to visit N.L.S. on weekends.

Mother’s new home was clean. According to father, he did not know that mother

used narcotics and he and mother never used narcotics together. See Walker, 251

                                         98
S.W.3d at 566 (holding evidence legally insufficient to support trial court’s finding

that parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed child with persons who engaged

in conduct that endangered child’s physical or emotional well-being where evidence

only showed parent was incarcerated and other parent’s actions led to child’s

removal); In re K.W., 138 S.W.3d at 431–32 (holding evidence legally insufficient

to support trial court’s finding that parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed

child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered child’s physical or

emotional well-being where incarcerated parent did not know of other parent’s

narcotics use or about abuse occurring in other parent’s home).

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding,

we conclude that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief or conviction

that father engaged, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with persons who engaged, in

conduct that endangered N.L.S.’s physical or emotional well-being. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E); see also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20–21

(Tex. 1985) (courts are required to strictly construe involuntary termination statutes

in favor of parent).

      Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the

trial court’s finding that father engaged, or knowingly placed N.L.S. with persons

                                         99
who engaged, in conduct that endangered N.L.S.’s physical or emotional

well-being.79 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

       We sustain a portion of father’s first issue.80

                                       Conclusion

       We affirm the portion of the trial court’s order terminating the parental rights

of mother. We reverse the portion of the trial court’s order terminating the parental

rights of father, and we render judgment denying the petition for termination of

father’s parental rights to N.L.S. Because father did not challenge the portion of the

trial court’s order naming DFPS the sole managing conservator of N.L.S., we affirm

that portion of the trial court’s order.

79
       DFPS must support its allegations against a parent by clear and convincing
       evidence; a preponderance of evidence or conjecture is not enough. See In re
       E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 809–10 (Tex. 2012) (“Due process commands that courts
       apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in parental rights termination
       cases.”); In re T.S., No. 01-22-00054-CV, 2022 WL 4474277, at *28 (Tex. App.—
       Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Given the weighty
       constitutional interests of the parent involved in a termination-of-parental-rights
       proceeding, the interests of the child involved, and the effect that the placement of
       the child will have on numerous lives, it is imperative, and consistent with the high
       evidentiary standard of proof applicable to these cases, that DFPS fully develop the
       evidence at trial. See In re T.S., 2022 WL 4474277, at *28. Only then can the
       appellate record be commensurate with the magnitude and finality of a termination
       decision. See id.; see also In re B.D.A., 546 S.W.3d 346, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston
       [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (Massengale, J., dissenting on rehearing) (“The law
       sets a high evidentiary bar for termination of parental rights. We do not alleviate
       the plight of Texas . . . children by lowering that bar and perpetuating diminished
       judicial expectations of the proof that must be presented by [DFPS].”).
80
       Due to our disposition, we need not address the remaining portion of father’s first
       issue or father’s second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                            100
                                            Julie Countiss
                                            Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

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