Court Opinion

ID: 9832332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:49:40.728615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.737581
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
We have again carefully reviewed the record in this case, and the prayer and the motion for rehearing is refused.
We find that in the original application for the writ of injunction the plaintiff prayed “for an immediate and peremptory and mandatory writ of injunction against the defendants * * * restraining them and each of them from in any way and at all times prior to thé 3rd day of June, A. D., 1929, engaging *341in the business of funeral directing, embalming, etc.”
The petition was presented to the district judge, who indorsed thereon his fiat as follows : “The foregoing petition for injunction toeing considered, it is ordered that the Clerk of the District Court of Childress County, Texas, issue a writ of injunction in all things as prayed for in the petition upon the petitioner executing to the adverse party a bond with two or more good and sufficient sureties in the sum of $1,000.00, conditioned as the law requires.” This fiat is indorsed on July 8th, which is the date upon which the petition was filed with the clerk.
A motion to dissolve was filed and heard on July IS, 1929. No evidence was introduced at any time, and on July 18th the court, acting upon the application and the sworn answer, dissolved the injunction theretofore granted in so far as it required the defendants to deliver to Willis all records and books showing sales and accounts and lists of names of the former patrons of Clyde E. Owen and his wife, and the court also held that the motion to dissolve and the sworn answer were insufficient to authorize the dissolution of the injunction as it pertained to other matters.
The general rule is that a mandatory •injunction should not toe ordered before a final hearing and to execute the judgment. International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Anderson County (Tex. Civ. App.) 150 S. W. 239, affirmed by the Supreme Court, 106 Tex. 60, 156 S. W. 499. Therefore the injunction granted, in so far as it is mandatory in its provisions, should not have been issued, because no answer had been filed and no evidence introduced.
The plaintiff prayed as quoted above, and further prayed that upon final hearing the judgment be made perpetual. The fiat of the judge grants the injunction in all things as prayed for in the petition. In this particular the injunction was void. The fiat, having been written upon presentation of the petition and before answer filed and without hearing any testimony, is only a restraining order. There was no prayer for a restraining order, and the court had no authority to grant it. Under the general equity practice, only such relief, will be granted as is specifically prayed for. Judge Boyce said in Hoskins et al. v. Cauble (Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W. 629, it seems to be the general rule that an injunction will not be granted unless specifically prayed for, citing numerous authorities. In Ft. Worth Acid Works et al. v. City of Ft. Worth (Tex. Civ. App.) 248 S. W. 822, 824, Judge Buck said: “It will be noted that there is no special prayer for a temporary restraining order, and, under the authorities cited, the absence of a special prayer for temporary restraint would make the petition insufficient to sustain an order and judgment for a temporary injunction.”
See, also, Miller v. Miller (Tex. Civ. App.) 294 S. W. 694; City of Jacksonville v. Devereux (Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S. W. 572; Jacksonville Independent School Dist. v. Devereux (Tex. Civ. App.) 286 S. W. 573; City Council of the City of Ft. Worth v. Ft. Worth Associated Master Plumbers & Heating Contractors (Tex. Civ. App.) 8 S.W.(2d) 730; Riggins v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 154, 71 S. W. 15.
A perpetual injunction can only be ordered upon final decree. Ex parte Zuccaro, 106 Tex. 197, 163 S. W. 579, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 121; Ex parte Mussett, 106 Tex. 200, 163 S. W. 580; James v. E. Weinstein & Sons (Tex. Com. App.) 12 S.W.(2d) 959; Ex parte Rains, 113 Tex. 428, 257 S. W. 217.
If the fiat of the district judge be considered as a restraining order only, it was granted without a specific prayer for such relief. If it be considered as a temporary injunction, it is void in so far as it is mandatory in its provisions, and should have been dissolved upon the coming in of the answer which swore away the equities of the bill when no testimony was heard tending to sustain the allegations in' the bill. If it is to be construed as a perpetual injunction, which is prayed for, it is void because there has been no final hearing; so in either event we think the injunction has been improperly granted, and it is dissolved, and the judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the cause re-' nianded for further proceedings.