Court Opinion

ID: 9898611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 20:10:57.235822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:15.943198
License: Public Domain

J-S37032-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ELI ROSA                                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1769 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 8, 2021
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0000244-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2023

       Eli Rosa (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence imposed following his conviction of attempted murder (serious bodily

injury); aggravated assault (serious bodily injury); possession of a firearm

prohibited; firearms not to be carried without a license; carrying a firearm on

public streets in Philadelphia; and possession of an instrument of crime.1 We

affirm.

       As the trial court explained, this

       case stem[s] from the investigation, apprehension, and arrest, of
       Appellant, … for attempting to assassinate Michael Roberts
       [(Roberts or Mr. Roberts)] on August 8, 2020[,] by repeatedly
       shooting and striking him even as he had laid helplessly prone on
       the street within the 2800 block of North Marshall Street … [in]
       Philadelphia.

____________________________________________

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a), 2702(a)(1), 6105, 6106, 6108, 907.
J-S37032-23

      ….

      [Roberts] testified at trial that he had been exiting [a] grocery
      store near his home when his ex-girlfriend, Rosalie Sotomayor, or
      “Rosie,” had … driven up to him and asked him to help her buy
      drugs. [Roberts] had previously broken off his relationship with
      [] Rosie. Mr. Roberts had been aware that she also had a romantic
      relationship with the Appellant … and that Appellant had
      reportedly fathered at least one of Rosie’s two minor children.

      Mr. Roberts testified that after Rosie had called him and convinced
      him to take her to buy weed, she drove the Jeep further down the
      street and they purchased and smoked weed briefly before Rosie
      then asked him to purchase weed/PCP nearby. [Roberts] again
      agreed, and Rosie drove the Jeep[,] with [] Roberts as front
      passenger[,] to the 2800 block of North Marshall Street[,] where
      they parked and smoked one blunt. While parked[,] Mr. Roberts
      noticed a cold change of behavior of Rosie towards him as she
      furiously texted on her phone.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/23, at 2.

      Roberts then saw Appellant, “whom he had immediately recognized as

Rosie’s boyfriend and father of one of her two children[.]” Id. Appellant,

“with unique facial tattoos” and wearing a hoodie, walked towards the Jeep.

Id. at 2-3. Appellant stared at Roberts, then “looked upward to the sky before

calmly pulling out [a] gun and repeatedly firing at” Roberts. Id. at 3. The

trial court stated,

      [Roberts] alighted from the Jeep down the street to attempt to
      escape to no avail.

      Appellant relentlessly pursued and fired five (5) bullets from a
      9mm semi-automatic handgun.           Three bullets pierced and
      severely injured [Roberts’s] abdomen and back. Fortunately, the
      gun jammed, and the magazine broke in pieces and fell to the
      ground. [Appellant] in frustration then pistol whipped [Roberts]
      as he flailed on the ground. Before picking up the gun and broken
      magazine and running down the street, [Appellant] shouted, “I’m

                                      -2-
J-S37032-23

      going to down your bitch ass, pussy” and other muffled expletives
      as Mr. Roberts lay on the ground writhing in pain and bleeding
      profusely.

Id.

      Officers arrived at the scene and used their patrol vehicle to rush

Roberts to the hospital.

      As depicted in the responding officer’s body camera video, the
      victim begged for the officers not to let him die and yelled
      repeatedly that [Appellant] shot him. He told the officers that
      [Appellant] had lived over by Reese Street [in Philadelphia,] and
      had tattoos on his face and had worn a blue hoody.

Id. The parties stipulated to Roberts’s multiple injuries:

      The stipulated and authenticated records from Temple University
      Hospital reflected that [] Roberts’s significant injuries required
      surgeries to address the wounds to his left chest, left flank, right
      buttocks. In addition to surgeries, he had needed emergency
      heart massages, reinflation of [a] collapsed lung, removal of [his]
      spleen, appendix, and sections of his small intestines. Temple
      University Hospital medical records supported the reasonable
      conclusion that Mr. Roberts’s multiple wounds had been nearly
      fatal.

Id.

      At the shooting scene, officers had collected “[f]ive spent or fired

cartridge casings emanating from a 9mm firearm, three live bullets and a

broken off portion of the magazine.”         Id.    Officers further retrieved

surveillance video from the cameras of a nearby home:

      The retrieved surveillance video from the home camera not only
      portrayed the shooting but also captured the audio of the
      gunshots.    Although the videos corroborated the victim’s
      testimony concerning the method of shooting and the similar body
      type of Appellant and his described hoody, the facial features of
      the shooter were not visible. The videos portrayed the victim

                                     -3-
J-S37032-23

      frantically trying to run away and stumbling and crawling on the
      ground after being continuously fired upon and then struck
      physically by the single pursuer. It was clearly observable that
      the gun had jammed and broken apart before the shooter ran
      away in the opposite direction. The repeated shots are audible
      along with the shooter’s death threats as he stood over the prone
      and severely wounded victim in the street.

Id.

      On August 9, 2020, while in the hospital, Roberts identified Appellant as

his assailant from a photo array. Id. at 5. Roberts additionally told police

      he had been receiving taunting and threatening type of messages
      and attempted audio calls from [Appellant] to [Roberts’s]
      Facebook page and via his instant messaging. [Roberts] was
      frightened about retribution.     [Roberts] forwarded to the
      investigators screen shots of all messages from his phone just
      hours after awakening in the hospital….

Id.

      After Roberts identified Appellant, officers executed a search warrant at

Appellant’s last known address.

      [Appellant] was not apprehended and arrested under the open
      arrest warrant until approximately two months later, on October
      22, 2020 …. He repeatedly gave the false name of Miguel Ortiz
      until the officer stated that [Appellant] would be fingerprinted.
      The officer’s body cam video depicted Appellant’s attempts to
      evade identification.

Id.

      Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of the above charges. The

trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate prison term of 30-60 years.

Following reinstatement of his direct appeal rights through a timely Post

                                     -4-
J-S37032-23

Conviction Relief Act2 petition, Appellant filed the instant nunc pro tunc appeal.

Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

       1.    Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
       mistake of law in allowing unauthenticated Facebook posts and
       messages into evidence?

       2.    Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
       mistake of law in making specific comments about a baby in the
       back seat of the Jeep, where the prejudice resulting therefrom
       could not be cured by a post-objection instruction?

       3.     Did the trial court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
       mistake of law in denying defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial
       after the Commonwealth spoke about a prison phone call?

Appellant’s Brief at 6.

       Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly admitted

unauthenticated Facebook posts and messages at trial.            Id. at 17.   The

Facebook messages were “purportedly written by [Appellant] harassing the

victim, Mr. Roberts.”         Id.    Appellant asserts this evidence lacked the

authentication required by Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901.         Id. at 20.

Appellant claims, “the proponent of the evidence must introduce sufficient

evidence that the matter is what it purports to be.”          Id.   According to

Appellant,

       the proponent of social media evidence must present direct or
       circumstantial evidence that tends to corroborate the identity of
       the authority of the communication in question, such as testimony
       from the person who sent or received the communication, or
____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

                                           -5-
J-S37032-23

        contextual clues in the communication tending to reveal the
        identity of the sender.

Appellant’s Brief at 21 (citation omitted).     Appellant argues the trial court

improperly admitted this evidence, where there was “no showing that the

Facebook messages actually came from [Appellant].” Id. at 21-22.

        We review Appellant’s claim under the following standard:

        [D]ecisions on admissibility are within the sound discretion of the
        trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse
        of discretion or misapplication of law. In addition, for a ruling on
        evidence to constitute reversible error, it must have been harmful
        or prejudicial to the complaining party….

Commonwealth v. Talley, 236 A.3d 42, 55 (Pa. Super. 2020).

        Before examining the merits of Appellant’s issue, we examine whether

he preserved the issue for review. “[I]t is axiomatic that issues are preserved

when objections are made timely to the error or offense.” Commonwealth

v. Baumhammers, 960 A.2d 59, 73 (Pa. 2008). “In order to preserve an

issue     for   review,    a    party    must     make     a   timely,    specific

objection.” Commonwealth v. Duffy, 832 A.2d 1132, 1136 (Pa. Super.

2003); see also Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1) (providing that claim of error in the

admission or exclusion of evidence is preserved if “a party, on the record[,] …

makes a timely objection[] … and … states the specific ground, unless it was

apparent from the context”). If the appellant failed to preserve an issue by a

specific objection, the issue is waived. Commonwealth v. Stetler, 95 A.3d

864, 869 (Pa. Super. 2013).

                                        -6-
J-S37032-23

      At trial, the Commonwealth introduced Facebook posts in which the

victim, Roberts, was “tagged.” N.T., 10/1/21, at 94-97. Roberts testified that

he interpreted the posts as Appellant “kinda ridiculing me.” Id. at 96. One

post included the initials, “K.A.R.”, which Roberts interpreted as meaning

“[k]ill all rats.” Id. at 97. Roberts identified Appellant’s comment, “Ima [sic]

RAT!!MIKEE WITHTHE YOLA” as indicating Roberts was a “snitch.” Id. at 98.

Roberts identified other comments purportedly posted by Appellant. Id. at

99-100.   Roberts testified that prior to the shooting, Appellant had never

messaged him on Facebook. Id.

      Our review discloses that Appellant lodged no objection to the admission

of any exhibits or testimony regarding the Facebook messages and posts. See

id. at 94-103.     Consequently, Appellant failed to preserve this issue for

appellate review. See Stetler, 95 A.3d at 869; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(providing that an issue may not be raised for the first time on appeal).

Because the claim is waived, Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

      Appellant next challenges the trial court’s “prejudicial statement” at

trial. Appellant’s Brief at 9 (capitalization omitted). Appellant asserts that

Roberts testified there was a child car seat in the back seat of Rosie’s vehicle

at the time of the shooting.     Id. at 10.   Upon hearing this, the following

dialogue ensued:

      THE COURT: The baby was in the car?

      [Roberts]: The car seat.

                                     -7-
J-S37032-23

       THE COURT:     The baby was in the car seat at the time of the
       shooting?

       [Roberts]: Mm-hmm.

       [Defense counsel]: Did you tell the police that there was a baby
       in the car seat at the time of the shooting?

       [Roberts]: I’m not sure.

       [Defense counsel]: So when do you first see the baby in the car
       seat?

       [Roberts]: When I get the weed I go to get back in the car and
       try to put my seat back. I notice I can’t put it back all the way,
       so I’m like, What, you got laundry in here? I look back and I see
       a car seat. I’m like, holy shit, you had a baby, man. You mess
       with your baby pop now?

       THE COURT: She had the baby in the car seat?

       [Roberts]: The baby was in –

       THE COURT: In the car seat. Was the baby sleeping?

       [Roberts]: She said, that’s my son.

       THE COURT: Oh my lord. Okay, go ahead.

       [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, may I have a sidebar?

       THE COURT: Sure. I just have to take a deep breath.

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11 (emphasis added) (quoting N.T., 10/1/22, at 133-

35).

       Appellant argues that the judge’s comments, in open court, “were

statements capable of inducing prejudice in the mind of the jurors and capable

of influencing the outcome of the case.” Id. at 12. Appellant asserts that the

trial court thus deprived him of a fair trial. Id. at 13. According to Appellant,

                                      -8-
J-S37032-23

      the bell in this instance could not be “unrung” and the judge’s
      curative instruction could not remove the prejudice that had been
      instilled in the jury by the court’s comments.

Id. (capitalization modified).      Appellant claims the court’s prejudicial

statement could not be cured solely by its cautionary instruction. Id. at 9.

      Appellant appears to argue that the trial court erred by not declaring a

mistrial sua sponte. See id. Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 605(B)

provides, “When an event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial only

the defendant may move for a mistrial[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 605(B) (emphasis

added). Further,

      [a] trial court need only grant a mistrial where the alleged
      prejudicial event may reasonably be said to deprive the defendant
      of a fair and impartial trial. A motion for a mistrial is a matter
      addressed to the discretion of the court.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 502-03 (Pa. 1995) (citations

omitted).

      Our review of the record indicates that Appellant did not request a

mistrial. At sidebar, defense counsel objected to the trial court’s interjection.

N.T., 10/1/22, at 136-37.      The trial court agreed to issue a cautionary

instruction: “All right. I’ll say ignore my response.” Id. at 137. Defense

counsel responded, “Thank you.” Id. Because Appellant accepted the trial

court’s proposed cautionary instruction, he cannot claim - for the first time on

appeal - that a mistrial was required. See Commonwealth v. Cornelius,

180 A.3d 1256, 1262 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Appellant failed to make a

timely request for a mistrial, and this claim, accordingly, has been waived.”)

                                      -9-
J-S37032-23

(quoting Commonwealth v. McAndrews, 430 A.2d 1165, 1167 (Pa. 1981));

see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      We recognize a trial judge has “discretion to declare a mistrial sua

sponte upon the showing of manifest necessity[.]”         Commonwealth v.

Walker, 954 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (citation omitted).

In Walker, the defendant raised a claim of double jeopardy based on his prior

mistrial; this Court held that the mistrial was due to manifest necessity, and

thus affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss on

double jeopardy grounds. Id. at 1254. Appellant cites no applicable authority

to demonstrate that he was relieved of his duty to request a mistrial to

preserve this issue. Consequently, Appellant’s second issue merits no relief.

See Cornelius, 180 A.3d at 1262; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      Appellant lastly claims the trial court improperly denied his motion for a

mistrial based on the prosecutor’s reference to a “prison call” during closing

arguments.    Appellant’s Brief at 14.   Specifically, Appellant challenges the

following portion of the prosecutor’s closing argument:

      Now, besides Mr. Roberts identifying [Appellant] as the person
      who tried to kill him, we have [Appellant’s] own admissions. Let’s
      start with the prison call -- I’m sorry, let’s start with the phone
      call.

Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting N.T., 10/5/21, at 25). Appellant compares

the prosecutor’s remark to instances where a defendant appears for trial in

prison garb. Id. at 14-16. Appellant argues,

                                    - 10 -
J-S37032-23

      in the present situation, there was no need for the Commonwealth
      to reference [Appellant’s] incarceration, and, in fact, the parties
      had agreed beforehand that there would be no reference to prison
      during trial. See [N.T.], October 1, 2022[,] at pp. 88-89. As a
      result, the reference to [Appellant’s] incarceration deprived him
      of a fair trial as a matter of law.

Id. at 16.

      “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial, our standard

is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 67 A.3d 716, 728 (Pa.

2013).   Our Supreme Court has endorsed a two-part test to review the

propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks:        (1) whether the substance of the

remarks relate to the elements of the crimes charges, the evidence presented,

and constitute a fair and reasonable rebuttal to the defense’s arguments; and

(2) whether the unavoidable effect of the remarks was to prejudice the jury

against the defendant. Commonwealth v. Clancy, 192 A.3d 44, 62-63 (Pa.

2018). This Court has explained:

      A prosecutor is permitted to vigorously argue his case so long as
      his comments are supported by the evidence or constitute
      legitimate inferences arising from that evidence.

         In considering a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, our
         inquiry is centered on whether the defendant was deprived
         of a fair trial, not deprived of a perfect one. Thus, a
         prosecutor’s remarks do not constitute reversible error
         unless their unavoidable effect ... [was] to prejudice the
         jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward
         the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence
         objectively and render a true verdict.        Further, the
         allegedly improper remarks must be viewed in the context
         of the closing argument as a whole.

                                      - 11 -
J-S37032-23

Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1048 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).

     Our review reveals that the prosecutor’s closing argument spans almost

18 transcript pages.    N.T., 10/5/21, at 20-38 (prosecutor detailing the

evidence against Appellant as to each charge). Appellant challenges only two

words of the prosecutor’s closing argument: “prison call”. Id. at 25. The

prosecutor immediately corrected the improper reference, and continued with

argument. Id. at 25-38. Under these circumstances, the trial court explained,

            Pennsylvania’s appellate courts have sparingly barred retrial
     due to prosecutorial misconduct, and only for especially
     duplicitous behavior. An example of the extreme misconduct
     needed to bar retrial can be found in Commonwealth v.
     Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999). In that case, our
     Supreme Court barred retrial because the Commonwealth
     engaged in severe prosecutorial misconduct by consistently
     referring to evidence that the trial court had ruled inadmissible,
     continually defying the trial court’s rulings on objections, and
     repeatedly insisting that there was fingerprint evidence linking
     appellees to the crime when the prosecutor knew for a fact that
     no such evidence existed. See … Martorano, 741 A.2d [at] 1223
     ….

           Although not specified within the Statement of Errors, the
     single request of a mistrial that had been raised by defense
     counsel had occurred following the Commonwealth’s closing
     argument.     Contextually, during the closing argument, the
     prosecutor walked over to play the stipulated recording of
     [Appellant’s] telephone call to Rosie wherein he had essentially
     admitted to shooting [Roberts] and had asked Rosie to abscond
     with video evidence. As she traversed to the computer, [the
     prosecutor] remarked that she was going to play the “prison call”
     and then immediately corrected her words and said, “phone call.”
     No objection was raised by the defense at that time. (N.T.
     10/05/2021, p. 25).

                                    - 12 -
J-S37032-23

              Following closing arguments[,] however[,] defense counsel
       asked for side-bar conference and argued that the prosecutor’s
       single word remark had usurped his client’s presumption of
       innocence.     This Court denied the mistrial because the
       comment had been obviously inadvertent and corrected
       and because it would have been at least contextually
       obvious to any reasonable listener of the recorded
       telephone call conversations that the calls had occurred
       just after [Appellant] had been arrested and detained and
       therefore when he had still been in custody. Thus, the
       innocuous comment had no bearing whatsoever upon
       Appellant’s presumption of innocence. (N.T. 10/051/2021, p.
       39-42). Moreover, this [c]ourt offered to provide a curative
       instruction which the defense declined. Notably, the jury had also
       been reminded within the final instructions that counsels’
       arguments are not evidence and that they should not be treated
       as such.3 In summary, no prejudice occurred to warrant the
       extreme remedy of mistrial as requested. Appellant had received
       a fair trial.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/19/23, at 23-25 (emphasis and footnote added).

____________________________________________

3 The trial court instructed the jury:

       [I]t’s your recollection that controls here and yours alone. You’re
       not bound by my memory or by the memory of either counsel in
       their arguments to you. Nor are you to conclude that any
       evidence, which I call to your attention or which counsel has called
       to your attention, is the only evidence you should consider here.
       It is your responsibility to consider all the evidence that you
       believe to be material in deliberating upon your verdicts.

       Similarly, remember back in the beginning I told you, you know,
       if I ask a question, if counsel asks a question, our questions
       are not evidence. The answers to those questions provide the
       evidence for you to consider….

N.T., 10/5/21, at 46 (emphasis added). “A jury is presumed to follow
instructions the trial court provides[.]” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 289
A.3d 959, 1009 (Pa. 2023).

                                          - 13 -
J-S37032-23

      As the record and law support the trial court’s analysis, we discern no

abuse of discretion. The prosecutor’s single, isolated reference to a “prison

call,” viewed in context of the prosecutor’s entire argument, did not prejudice

Appellant or deprive him of a fair trial. See Luster, 71 A.3d at 1048. Thus,

Appellant’s third issue does not merit relief.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 11/14/2023

                                     - 14 -