Court Opinion

ID: 9905748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 01:09:42.993934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.515935
License: Public Domain

11/29/2023
               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT JACKSON
                              September 13, 2023 Session

           CHRISTINA N. LEWIS v. WALTER FLETCHER, ET AL.

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Weakley County
                    No. 2015-CV-18 Clayburn Peeples, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. W2022-00939-COA-R3-CV
                       ___________________________________

This appeal arises out of an incident where the plaintiff fell off a staircase and sustained
injuries. The plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants, who owned the building,
alleging negligence and negligence per se based on a violation of a building code. The
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff appealed. We
affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN
STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Charles L. Holliday, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Christina N. Lewis.

Albert G. McLean, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellees, Walter Fletcher, James Shore,
Susan Lowery, Anna Hopla, Tammy Hazlewood, individually and d/b/a Martin Primary
Care Properties.

                                        OPINION

                        I.     FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        In September 2014, Christina N. Lewis descended a set of stairs at the entrance of a
building leased by her employer, CareAll HomeCare Services (“CareAll”), and fell from
the stairway. The stairway had a railing on one side but not on the side where she fell. She
allegedly sustained serious and permanent injuries from the fall and required surgery for
those injuries. In September 2015, Ms. Lewis filed a complaint against Walter Fletcher,
James Shore, Susan Lowery, Anna Hopla, and Tammy Hazlewood, individually and doing
business as Martin Primary Care Properties (collectively “MPCP”), the owners of the
building and the property. Ms. Lewis alleged both common law negligence and negligence
per se. In the complaint, she stated that the stairway did not conform to the “1998 edition”
of the Standard Building Code, which she described as the construction code applicable
statewide during the building’s construction in 1993, and which required the stairway to
be equipped with handrails on both sides. MPCP subsequently filed an answer admitting
that it was the owner of the building but denying liability.

        In October 2021, MPCP moved for summary judgment and dismissal of Ms.
Lewis’s complaint based on two grounds: (1) Tennessee’s rule of non-liability of a landlord
for injury to a tenant or the tenant’s employee arising from a condition of the property of
which the owner and tenant have co-extensive knowledge prior to the accident, and (2)
comparative fault by Ms. Lewis that was at least 50% based on the undisputed facts. In
support of its motion, MPCP submitted a memorandum of law, a statement of undisputed
facts, and an affidavit of one of the defendants, Tammy Hazlewood. Ms. Hazlewood was
the managing partner and custodian of the business records for the partnership. She stated
that the building was constructed in 1993, and CareAll had been in sole possession of the
property from December 1993 through the date of Ms. Lewis’s fall. The building passed
inspection by the City of Martin prior to CareAll’s occupancy. MPCP had acquired the
property from the original owner in 2008 and had entered into several lease agreements
with CareAll. She further stated that at no time prior to the accident did the City of Martin
or CareAll give MPCP notice that the stairway was not acceptable, constituted a dangerous
condition, or violated any building code or regulation.

       Ms. Lewis responded to the motion for summary judgment, clarifying that there was
a typographical error in the complaint and that the complaint should have alleged a
violation of the 1988 edition of the Standard Building Code instead of 1998. Ms. Lewis
also submitted a response to the statement of undisputed facts and alleged additional
material facts creating a genuine issue for trial. To support these facts, Ms. Lewis
submitted a declaration from David Johnson, a professional engineer, stating that the lack
of the handrail violated section 1112.5.3 of the 1988 Standard Building Code, which, he
said, had been adopted by Tennessee and was in effect at the time of the building’s
construction. Mr. Johnson also declared that “[t]he Standard Building Code imposes
various duties on property owners for the benefit of those who are invited onto their
property.”

         In June 2022, the trial court entered an order granting MPCP’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court found that the issue of comparative fault presented an issue of
fact for a jury, but that MPCP was entitled to summary judgment based on the rule of non-
liability of a landlord to its tenant or third parties when the landlord and tenant have co-
extensive knowledge of the condition of the property, relying on Lethcoe v. Holden, 31
S.W.3d 254 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). The trial court certified its order as final pursuant to
Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Ms. Lewis subsequently appealed.
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                                II.    ISSUES PRESENTED

       Ms. Lewis presents the following issue for review on appeal, which we have slightly
restated:

       1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Ms. Lewis’s
          negligence per se claim based on this Court’s holding in Lethcoe v. Holden.

MPCP presents the following issues, which we have slightly restated:

       1. Whether the trial court was correct in granting MPCP summary judgment based
          on the undisputed facts and the Tennessee rule of landlord non-liability to a
          tenant and its employee for injury from an alleged dangerous condition on the
          property in existence at the time of making the lease and of which the tenant, its
          employee, and the landlord had co-extensive knowledge prior to the injury;
              a. Whether an alleged construction code violation in 1993 by the builder of
                 the commercial building in question in and of itself constitutes negligence
                 per se in the absence of any statute, code, or ordinance pled or otherwise
                 established in the record by Ms. Lewis that expressly imposes on MPCP
                 any duty to correct such construction violation or to refrain from leasing
                 the building;
              b. Whether Ms. Lewis’s claim of negligence per se against MPCP
                 constitutes an exception to the common law rule of non-liability of a
                 landlord for an injury by a tenant’s employee from a dangerous condition
                 on the property when the tenant, its employee, and the landlord had co-
                 extensive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition prior to the
                 employee’s injury;
       2. Whether the trial court erred in not granting MPCP summary judgment on the
          alternative ground that Ms. Lewis’s fault was at least 50% based on the
          undisputed facts of this case that establish the open and obvious nature of the
          alleged dangerous conditions.

For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

                              III.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       A trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law,
and therefore, on appeal, the standard of review is de novo without a presumption of
correctness. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sevier Cnty. Electric Sys., 666 S.W.3d 401,
411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477
S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015); Dick Broad. Co. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395
S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013)). This standard of review requires a fresh determination of
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whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been
satisfied. Rye, 395 S.W.3d at 250 (citing Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453,
471 (Tenn. 2012)). A trial court may grant summary judgment when “the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Further, when a party
moving for summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof, “the moving party may
satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence
at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or
defense.” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 887 (Tenn. 2019)
(quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264).

                                         IV.      DISCUSSION

                                         A. Summary Judgment

       In premises liability cases involving a leased premises, this Court has stated,
“[g]enerally, a landlord is not liable to a tenant or a third party for harm caused by a
dangerous condition on the leased premises.” Lethcoe, 31 S.W.3d at 256. This general rule
of nonliability, however, is subject to several exceptions. Id.

        One exception applies if the following facts are shown: (1) the dangerous
        condition was in existence at the time the lease was executed; (2) the landlord
        knew or should have known of the dangerous condition; and (3) the tenant did
        not know of the condition, and could not have learned about it through the
        exercise of reasonable care.

Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, “[a]s a natural corollary of this exception, when a
landlord and a tenant have co-extensive knowledge of the dangerous condition, the landlord
is not liable to the tenant, or the tenant’s employees, for injuries sustained as a result of the
dangerous condition.”1 Id.

       The trial court found that Ms. Lewis, CareAll, and MPCP all had co-extensive
knowledge of the steps and the fact that there was only one handrail. Ms. Lewis does not
dispute that there was co-extensive knowledge, and consequently, she does not raise any

1
  We have also noted three additional exceptions that the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized: (1)
when the landlord causes a dangerous condition by failure to make repairs or by negligence in performing
repairs, (2) when there are dangerous conditions on portions of property over which the landlord has
retained control, and (3) when there are dangerous conditions on property leased for purposes involving the
admission of the public. Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2083711, at *6
(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2004).

                                                   -4-
issue on appeal as to the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her common-law
negligence claim. Instead, Ms. Lewis’s central argument is that the co-extensive
knowledge rule in Lethcoe does not apply to her negligence per se claim and that there is
an exception to the rule of nonliability of a landlord to its tenant and third parties for
negligence per se claims. Ms. Lewis primarily points to Smith v. Owen, 841 S.W.2d 828
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), for the proposition that a landlord may be liable to a tenant or third
party for negligence per se. Ms. Lewis further argues that the General Assembly has
decided to impose various duties on property owners through promulgation of building
safety standards and has thus created an exception to the landlord non-liability rule for
negligence per se claims based on violations of a building code.

        In Smith, the parents of a child who received a severe electric shock from defects in
the wiring of a home filed suit against their landlord based on negligence per se. Smith,
841 S.W.2d at 829. The trial court found the landlord liable, concluding that the injury
resulted from a violation of the Standard Housing Code, which was adopted by the City of
Cookeville and expressly prohibited the renting of a dwelling for living purposes without
a prior inspection to determine that its condition met the standards of the code. Id. at 830.
On appeal, the landlord argued that Tennessee courts have declined to find liability where
a defendant has neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the violation and is not
otherwise negligent. Id. at 831. We agreed that the landlord “did not have notice of the
unsafe condition of the electrical outlet.” Id. “However,” we explained, “this is
immaterial, because negligence per se liability turns on constructive notice of the duty
imposed by the statute or ordinance, not of the non-complying condition itself.” Id. Stated
differently, negligence per se liability was not dependent on the landlord’s actual or
constructive notice of the non-complying condition itself. Id. We affirmed the trial court’s
judgment of liability on the basis of negligence per se because the landlord had constructive
knowledge of the duty to inspect the premises as the housing code imposed a duty on a
landlord not to lease a building until it complied with the requirements of the housing code.
Id. at 833.

       In Denton v. Hahn, this Court specifically discussed the four most common
exceptions to the doctrine of caveat lessee, in addition to this Court’s decision in Smith v.
Owen:

       As a practical matter, the scope of the doctrine of caveat lessee, especially as
       it applies to residential leases, has been substantially narrowed by judicially
       recognized exceptions to the doctrine and by legislatively enacted
       limitations. The four most common of these exceptions have been
       recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court. The first exception involves
       dangerous conditions on the premises existing at the time of the lease when
       the landlord has actual or constructive notice of the condition and the tenant
       does not. The second exception involves dangerous conditions caused either
       by the landlord’s failure to make repairs it has a duty to make or the
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       landlord’s negligence in performing repairs, regardless of whether it had a
       duty to make the repairs. The third exception involves the dangerous
       conditions on portions of property over which the landlord has retained
       control. The fourth exception involves dangerous conditions on property
       leased for purposes involving the admission of the public.

       In addition to these exceptions, state and local legislative bodies have shifted
       liability for dangerous conditions on leased property from the tenant to the
       landlord. This court has imposed liability on a landlord for a dangerous
       condition existing when a lease was signed based on a city housing
       ordinance that imposed on landlords a duty not to lease a dwelling until the
       dwelling complied with the requirements of the housing code. Smith v. Owen,
       841 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Likewise, the Tennessee General
       Assembly has imposed on landlords in Davidson County and other parts of
       the state, the obligations to comply with the requirements of the building and
       housing codes affecting health and safety, to make all repairs necessary to
       put and keep the premises in fit and habitable condition, and to keep all
       common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition. Tenn. Code Ann.
       § 66-28-304(a)(1)-(3) (1993).

       Despite these legislative and judicial inroads into the caveat lessee doctrine,
       property owners are not liable for all dangerous conditions on leased
       property. They are not, for example, liable for dangerous conditions caused
       or created by a tenant on the portion of the premises under the tenant's
       exclusive control. Likewise, they are not liable for injuries caused by
       dangerous conditions on portions of the premises over which they retain
       control when they did not have actual or constructive notice of the condition
       within sufficient time to repair the condition or to provide warnings of the
       condition to others. Basily v. Rain, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 879, 883-84 (Tenn. Ct.
       App. 2000).

Denton v. Hahn, No. M2003-00342-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2083711, at *6 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the Denton Court appears to recognize Smith
v. Owen as a more limited “judicial inroad” into the caveat lessee doctrine.

       The holding of Smith v. Owen has also been narrowly applied. This Court provided
a particularly instructive discussion of it in Pittenger v. Ruby Tuesday, Inc., No. M2006-
00266-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 935713, at *2-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2007). In that
case, plaintiffs filed a negligence per se action against a restaurant for injuries the patron
received to his ankle while attempting to open the restaurant door for his wife. Id. at *1.
They cited alleged violations of the applicable building code. Id. The trial court found the
doctrine of negligence per se was inapplicable because the building code imposed a duty
on the builder of the premises not the occupant. Id. On appeal, we considered whether the
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trial court erred in finding that “the building code did not impose an obligation on
Defendant and thus the doctrine of negligence per se was inapplicable.” Id. at *4. The
defendant argued that there was no authority stating that lessees or occupants of a
commercial building were legally responsible for the restrictions contained in the building
code. Id. We recognized that “Tennessee courts have applied the doctrine of negligence
per se in limited situations involving violations of the building code,” and we cited Smith
v. Owen as one example. Id. However, we noted that in such cases, “the building code
placed an express restriction on defendant or defendant’s particular use of a building.” Id.
at *5. (emphasis added). In the Pittinger case, there was no such “express restriction” on
the defendant or the defendant’s use. Id. The plaintiff failed to show that the provisions
of the Code that the defendant allegedly violated expressly applied to the defendant as a
lessee or occupant of a commercial building. Id. Moreover, the plaintiffs “failed to point
the Court to any authority which states that lessees or occupants of a commercial building
are legally responsible in general for the obligations contained in the building code.” Id.
Instead, it appeared to this Court that “if the building code were applicable, the provisions
would impose a general duty on the builder of the restaurant instead of the occupant of the
premises.” Id. In sum, because the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendant violated
a statutory duty, the trial court properly dismissed their negligence per se claim. Id. The
same is true here. Ms. Lewis simply cited a section of a building code without establishing
that it imposed a duty on MPCP. See also Chase, Jr. v. Physiotherapy Assocs., Inc., No.
02A01-9607-CV-00171, 1997 WL 572935, at *3-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 1997) (“Chase
relies on Smith v. Owen, 841 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn.App.1992), in which the defendant’s
liability was predicated on negligence per se because the building code adopted by the City
of Cookeville expressly prohibited the renting of a dwelling for living purposes without a
prior inspection to ascertain that its condition met certain standards specified in that code.
. . . In the instant case, the complaint does not set forth a provision similar to the provision
in Smith.”)

       Here, Ms. Lewis does not point to any similar building code provision that imposes
a duty on a subsequent owner of a commercial building to inspect the building and bring it
in compliance with the code before leasing it to a tenant. Rather, she alleges a violation of
section 1112.5.3 of the 1988 Standard Building Code, which simply states that “[s]tairways
44 inches wide or greater shall be equipped with handrails at least on both sides.”2
Therefore, we do not conclude that our holding in Smith entitles Ms. Lewis to relief here.

        2
          We note that, on appeal, Ms. Lewis cites Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-120-102(a), which
provides that it is unlawful to “[m]aintain, occupy, or use a building or structure or part of any building or
structure that has been erected or altered in violation of any rule duly promulgated as provided in this
chapter.” However, Ms. Lewis did not cite to this statute in the trial court. Therefore, she has waived this
argument based on this statute. See Tidwell v. Burkes, No. M2015-01270-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3771553,
at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 8, 2016) (“Any issue not raised in the trial court is considered waived in the
appellate court.”) (quoting King v. Sevier Cnty. Election Comm’n, 282 S.W.3d 37, 41 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2008)).
                                                    -7-
        Having rejected Ms. Lewis’s argument on appeal that she was entitled to relief
pursuant to our holding in Smith, we affirm the trial court’s order granting MPCP’s motion
for summary judgment. Because we are affirming the trial court’s order, MPCP’s second
issue is pretermitted.

                                   V.     CONCLUSION

       For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Costs of
this appeal are taxed to the appellant, Christina N. Lewis, for which execution may issue if
necessary.

                                                 _________________________________
                                                 CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

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