Court Opinion

ID: 9533203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:29:25.918113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:56.897538
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority that plaintiff was not an employee of defendant Shanty Creek at the time of injury as defined under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.1 The magistrate did not err in determining that a contract of hire existed under subsection 161(l)(b) of the act, given the circumstances of this case. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this matter for reinstatement of the worker’s compensation benefits that the magistrate awarded.
The factual findings of a magistrate must be affirmed if they are supported by competent, material, *580and substantial evidence on the whole record. Const 1963, art 6, § 28, and MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). “Substantial evidence” in this context “means such evidence, considering the whole record, as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to justify the conclusion.” MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). In the instant case, the magistrate made specific findings of fact and correctly applied general principles of contract law. He concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff and Shanty Creek Management was an employment relationship, within the meaning of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act.
Defendant argues that, since there was “no actual explicit contract” between plaintiff and Shanty Creek Management, a contract for hire did not exist. However, subsection 161(l)(b) does not require an “actual explicit contract.” To the contrary, the Legislature specifically has provided that persons will be recognized as employees in the private sector if they act in the service of another “under any contract of hire, express or implied,” (Emphasis added.)2
*581The magistrate concluded that a contract did exist in this case. The dispositive question is did he err? Whether a contract of hire may be inferred from the conduct, language, or other pertinent circumstances of a relationship is a question of fact, if facts are in dispute. See Chaffee v Stenger, 361 Mich 57; 104 NW2d 805 (1960), Holcomb v Bullock, 353 Mich 514; 91 NW2d 869 (1958), and Erickson v Goodell Oil Co, Inc, 384 Mich 207; 180 NW2d 798 (1970).3 See also 5 Corbin, Contracts (rev ed), § 24.30, p 326. In the instant case, facts and legitimate inferences were in dispute, and the magistrate resolved them, concluding that a contract of hire existed. As the magistrate’s determination that a contract of hire arose was based upon competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, I would hold that he did not err.
The magistrate emphasized the advantages to the ski resort of having the nsps weekend patrol, and the corollary commitment that the patrollers were required to make. He noted that, while on duty, patrol members wearing distinctive NSPS jackets enforced safety regulations and aided accident victims. He observed that the weekend patrollers were assigned to specific areas and were not free to ski where and *582when they wished. They were required to be in place when each ski day began and ended, depending on their assignments. Weekend patrollers also had to furnish their own fully stocked first-aid kits, although Shanty Creek Management replaced the items in the kits as they were used.
The magistrate assessed the gain to Shanty Creek Management. Of particular significance was his finding that the corporation would have had to hire professional patrollers on the weekends at Schuss Mountain, were it not for the NSPS patrol. He emphasized that the weekday patrol and the weekend patrol performed the same function and tasks.
The magistrate also highlighted the benefits that the plaintiff and other ski patrollers received in exchange for their weekend services.4 Patrol members enjoyed skiing privileges for themselves and their families, could take advantage of reduced prices for meals and some equipment, and were given coupons for free beverages. Although the remuneration to patrollers varied, depending on how often they used the ski passes and other benefits, it was not de minimis with regard to this plaintiff, in any event. Primarily on the basis of the cost of a daily ski pass in 1990 (approximately $28 or $29), the magistrate cal*583culated the plaintiffs weekly ski-patrol income at $89.5
As the Court of Appeals observed, both the president of Shanty Creek Management and its director of skiing testified that Schuss Mountain would not operate without some form of ski patrol. In addition, Mr. Mikko testified that there was no difference between the duties of the professional weekday patroller-employees and the weekend patrollers. He, the plaintiff, and others also confirmed the benefits provided to members of the weekend patrol and the services that they were required to render in exchange.
Therefore, I would hold that the WCAC exceeded its authority. It substituted its view of the facts and its assessment of the contract question for the findings and conclusion of the magistrate. Const 1963, art 6, § 28, and MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3).
The majority concludes that the “of hire” element was not satisfied in this case. It finds that the benefits did not represent the real, palpable, and substantial consideration a reasonable person would accept in exchange for forgoing the right to bring a tort action. I disagree. How will future courts be able to decide whether the privileges a worker received were “substantial” enough to induce a reasonable person to for*584feit his common-law rights against his “employer”? How many reasonable persons would be enticed to sign away their rights to obtain a potentially large damage award for the remuneration , of the legal minimum wage? The majority’s test, although poetically phrased, is too ambiguous to be useful.
The majority also concludes that the Legislature contemplated classes of individuals in positions similar to plaintiff’s and consciously decided against including them within the definition of “employee” under the wdca. I disagree. The version of subsection 161(l)(a) in effect at the time of plaintiff’s injury did specifically limit the types of volunteers who are to be considered “employees.” However, it explicitly applied only to public employees and should not be read to limit the effect of subsection 161(l)(b).
The defendants and amicus curiae caution that the award of worker’s compensation benefits in this case would have a chilling effect on the use of volunteers in Michigan and perhaps elsewhere.6 I disagree and believe that their forecast misconstrues the foundation for such an award.
Many persons in our society donate services with no expectation of payment other than incidental reimbursement or reward. I would not hold that they are employees under the wdca merely because they receive some sort of tangible benefit, be it food, beverage, or even skiing privileges. Rather, I would simply reaffirm the principle that persons who agree to provide services in exchange for meaningful compen*585sation will not be denied coverage solely on the basis of their titles. Those labeled “volunteers”7 or who are members of a volunteer organization,8 even where the compensation is other than monetary, should not be denied benefits automatically. Nor should an employer refuse coverage on the ground that the worker might have performed the services gratuitously had the employer not provided or promised compensation.9
Finally, the majority incorrectly links the inquiries in subsections 161(l)(b) and 161(l)(d). Subsection 161(l)(d) was not inserted into the statute to modify the inquiry under subsection 161(l)(b); rather, it was included in order to cover certain persons who do not fall under the definition contained in subsection 161(l)(b). In particular, subsection 161(l)(d) deals with persons more properly classified as “independent contractors” rather than “employees.”
After hearing the testimony and argument of counsel, the magistrate properly held that plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, a private for-profit corpo*586ration, under a contract of hire. The magistrate did not employ incorrect legal reasoning, and his findings of fact were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Accordingly, I would remand this matter to the WCAC to reinstate the benefits awarded by the magistrate, and to address the remaining issues not decided in its initial opinion.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 MCL 418.101 et seq.; MSA 17.237(101) et seq.

 In explaining why most worker’s compensation acts require a contract of hire, Professor Larson observed:
Compensation law, however, is a mutual arrangement between the employer and employee under which both give up and gain certain things. Since the rights to be adjusted are reciprocal rights between employer and employee, it is not only logical but mandatory to resort to the agreement between them to discover their relationship.
Merely as a practical matter, it would be impossible to calculate compensation benefits for a purely gratuitous worker, since benefits are ordinarily calculated on the basis of earnings. [3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 47.10, pp 8-304 to 8-310.]

 Historically, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have had difficulty deciding whether the existence of an employment relationship is a factual question, a legal question, or a mix of the two. Compare Erickson, supra at 212, and Chaffee, supra at 60, with Higgins v Monroe Evening News, 404 Mich 1, 19; 272 NW2d 537 (1978). See also Nezdropa v Wayne Co, 152 Mich App 451, 466; 394 NW2d 440 (1986). At times the answer involves the intent of the parties and necessarily turns on what weight to give differing testimony and other evidence, as in this case. Under those circumstances, we should not substitute our judgment for that of the magistrate in deciding whether the parties had a mutual arrangement to “give up and gain certain things.” 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 47.10, pp 8-304 to 8-310.

 As the Court of Appeals correctly noted in the instant case, compensation need not be in the form of money to qualify an employee for coverage under the wdca. Betts v Ann Arbor Public Schools, 403 Mich 507, 515; 271 NW2d 498 (1978). See also 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 47.00, p 8-301, in which the author notes that “payment may be found in anything of value.” In Betts, the plaintiff received no monetary benefit whatsoever. This Court still found the arrangement to have the earmarks of a commercial relationship. Id. at 515.

 The plaintiff had argued that his weekly income from ski patrolling was $206.50. This included skiing passes for himself and his two daughters, as well as beverages and meal discounts. The magistrate rejected this calculation on the basis that the record did not indicate that the two daughters skied every weekend. The magistrate did observe that he had no data on which to attach a wage related to discounts on equipment purchased at the pro shop. However, contrary to the majority’s assertion, this does not substantiate a conclusion that these discounts were a mere “gratuity” of nominal cost to the resort. As anyone who has purchased ski equipment would agree, such a “gratuity” can amount to a substantial sum of money, depending on the quality of the equipment.

 Amicus curiae reports that more than 33,000 persons presently volunteer their services in hospitals throughout Michigan. The defendants estimate that volunteers annually provide nearly 15 billion hours of service in the United States, at a value of $150 billion.

 In this regard, I note that Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1576, defines a “volunteer” as one who gives services “without any express or implied promise of remuneration.”

 Indeed, the record in the instant case reveals that the weekday ski patroller at Schuss Mountain was in exactly that situation. She was a member of the nsps because of certain training and skills and, with regard to the same training and skills, she was also an employee of Shanty Creek Management. The fact that her remuneration was a monetary wage under an express contract does not answer the question whether plaintiff was an employee as well. It is relevant but not determinative that plaintiff worked under an implied contract and for remuneration other than wages.

 The defendants and amicus curiae have cited numerous decisions in which courts have rejected the “employee” claims of persons who have donated their services to a business or organization. I note that, in most instances, unlike the present case, the alleged employer was a governmental or other nonprofit entity.