Court Opinion

ID: 9473100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:19:11.411908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:19.011115
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Chief Judge,
dissenting in part, and concurring in part, with whom JOHNSON, HATCHETT and CLARK, Circuit Judges, join as to the dissent on the Giglio issue *:
At the merits trial Evans, who had been incarcerated with McCleskey, testified that McCleskey admitted to him that he shot the policeman and acknowledged that he wore makeup to disguise himself during the robbery. Evans also testified that he had pending against him a [federal] escape charge, that he had not asked the prosecutor to “fix” this charge, and that the prosecutor had not promised him anything to testify.
At the state habeas hearing the following transpired:
The Court: Mr. Evans, let me ask you a question. At the time that you testified in Mr. McCleskey’s trial, had you been promised anything in exchange for your testimony?
The witness: No, I wasn’t. I wasn’t promised nothing about — I wasn’t promised nothing by the D.A. But the Detective told me that he would — he said he was going to do it himself, speak a word for me. That was what the Detective told me.
By Mr. Stroup:
Q: The Detective told you that he would speak a word for you?
A: Yeah.
Q: That was Detective Dorsey?
A: Yeah.
State Habeas Transcript at 122.
The district court granted habeas relief to McCleskey under Giglio v. U.S., 405 *907U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). At the threshold the district court pointed out that Giglio applies not only to “traditional deals” made by the prosecutor in exchange for testimony but also to “any promises or understandings made by any member of the prosecutorial team, which includes police investigators.” 580 F.Supp. at 380. The court then made these subsidiary findings: (1) that Evans’s testimony was highly damaging; (2) that “the jury was clearly left with the impression that Evans was unconcerned about any charges which were pending against him and that no promises had been made which would affect his credibility,” id. at 381; (3) that at petitioner’s state habeas hearings Evans testified “that one of the detectives investigating the case had promised to speak to federal authorities on his behalf,” id.; (4) that the escape charges pending against Evans were dropped subsequent to McCleskey’s trial.
The en banc court seems to me to err on several grounds. It blurs the proper application of Giglio by focusing sharply on the word “promise.” The proper inquiry is not limited to formal contracts, unilateral or bilateral, or words of contract law, but “to ensure that the jury knew the facts that might motivate a witness in giving testimony.” Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1467 (11th Cir.1983). Giglio reaches the informal understanding as well as the formal. The point is, even if the dealings are informal, can the witness reasonably view the government’s undertaking as offering him a benefit and can a juror knowing of it reasonably view it as motivating the witness in giving testimony? The verbal undertaking made in this instance by an investigating state officer, who is a member of the prosecution team, that he will “put in a word for him” on his pending federal charge was an undertaking that a jury was entitled to know about.
Second, the en banc court finds the benefit too marginal. Of course, the possible benefit to a potential witness can be so minimal that a court could find as a matter of law no Giglio violation occurred. A trivial offer is not enough. The subject matter of the offer to Evans was substantial, or at least a jury was entitled to consider it so. After McCleskey was tried and convicted, the federal charge was dropped.
Third, the court concludes there was no reasonable likelihood that Evans’s testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Co-defendant Wright was the only eyewitness. He was an accomplice, thus his testimony, unless corroborated, was insufficient to establish that McCleskey was the trigger-man. The en banc court recognizes this problem but avoids it by holding that Wright’s testimony was corroborated by “McCleskey’s own confession.” This could refer to either of two admissions of guilt by McCleskey. He “confessed” to Wright, but Wright’s testimony on this subject could not be used to corroborate Wright’s otherwise insufficient accomplice testimony. Testimony of an accomplice cannot be corroborated by the accomplice’s own testimony. The other “confession” was made to Evans and testified to by Evans. Thus Evans is not a minor or incidental witness. Evans’ testimony, describing what McCles-key “confessed” to him, is the corroboration for the testimony of the only eyewitness, Wright. And that eyewitness gave the only direct evidence that McCleskey killed the officer.
The district court properly granted the writ on Giglio grounds. Its judgment should be affirmed.

 I dissent on only the Giglio issue. I concur in Judge Roney's opinion on all other issues.