Court Opinion

ID: 9781855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:01.921674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.597164
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part: T1 The only arguments presented by Claimant to avoid the application of the statute of limitations to his motion to reopen were: (1) "THE STATUTE LIMITING A CLAIMANTS TIME TO REOPEN A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM SHOULD EFFECT [sie ONLY THE RIGHT TO MONETARY BENEFITS, AND NOT THE RIGHT TO ADDITIONAL MEDICAL CARE" and (2) "THE RESPONDENTS [sie] VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL [sic] ESTOPPES [sic] THEM FROM ASSERTING THAT THE CLAIMANTS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MEDICAL CARE IS UNTIMELY." The majority opinion correctly rejects both of these arguments.
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
T1 The only arguments presented by Claimant to avoid the application of the statute of limitations to his motion to reopen were: (1) "THE STATUTE LIMITING A CLAIMANTS TIME TO REOPEN A WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIM SHOULD EFFECT [sie ONLY THE RIGHT TO MONETARY BENEFITS, AND NOT THE RIGHT TO ADDITIONAL MEDICAL CARE" and (2) "THE RESPONDENTS [sie] VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION OF MEDICAL [sic] ESTOPPES [sic] THEM FROM ASSERTING THAT THE CLAIMANTS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MEDICAL CARE IS UNTIMELY." The majority opinion correctly rejects both of these arguments.
12 Nevertheless, the majority opinion vacates the order of the Workers' Compensation Court because it concludes the limitation period provided by 85 O.S.Supp.1997 § 483(C) did not begin to run until September 17, 1996, the date on which the Workers' Compensation Court last filed an order directing Employer to pay certain medical expenses incurred by Claimant. Relying on Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, 16 P.3d 1120 (mandate issued January 24, 2001), the majority concludes that the September 17, 1996, filing was an order which substantially affected the range of monetary, medical or rehabilitative benefits available to Claimant under the workers' compensation law. I do not disagree with the general conclusion that Arrow Tool, if applied here, would mean that Claimant's request for additional medical treatment was not time-barred.
13 However, I would not reach the issue of when the § 48(C) period began to run, because Claimant did not argue that period began running at any time other than the date on which the Workers' Compensation Court filed its order awarding him benefits for permanent partial disability (PPD). The arguments contained in his brief, as outlined above, contend only that either the limitation period did not apply to mere requests for additional medical treatment or Employer was estopped to assert the running of the limitation period because it had voluntarily provided medical treatment after the date of the PPD order. Claimant never argues that the trial court selected the wrong commencement date from which to calculate when the statutory period expired.
T4 Except in very limited cireumstances, such as a public-law controversy, an appellate court may not consider issues not raised by the parties. Reddell v. Johnson, 1997 OK 86, 942 P.2d 200. I believe the majority opinion violates this fundamental principle of appellate review. I am unpersuaded by the majority's conclusion, contained in footnote 2 of its opinion, that Claimant raised this issue because "Claimant's [petition for review] and brief did, however, seek review of the three-judge panel's conclusion of law that 'the statutory period of time to reopen the claim for compensation filed herein had run'" Certainly this statement did indicate that Claimant believed that conclusion was wrong, but it is the rest of his brief, i.e., the propositions quoted above, which reveals the reasons he believed that conclusion was wrong.
15 The Oklahoma Supreme Court confronted a similar problem in Reed v. United States Hoffman Machinery Corporation, 1943 OK 416, 143 P.2d 809, 198 Okl. 370. The appellant1 assigned error to the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence and to a trial court decision sustaining a demurrer to his evidence. The Court refused to consider these allegations of error because the appellant had not explained why those actions were erroneous. The general language cited by the majority as justification for considering the issue upon which it bases its decision to vacate is no more specific than the assignments of error rejected in Reed. Because I believe the majority has abandoned a basic principle of appellate review which confines us to the issues raised by the parties, I respectfully dissent to the decision to vacate *377the order of the Workers' Compensation Court.

. Under the rules then in effect, the appealing party was actually called the "Plaintiff in Error."