Court Opinion

ID: 9951563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 14:11:51.637088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:44.629731
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued March 14, 2024

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00237-CR
                           ———————————
              SALVADOR JIMENEZ CORONADO, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 482nd District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1664386

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury found appellant, Salvador Jimenez Coronado, guilty of the felony

offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child1 and assessed his punishment at

confinement for fifteen years. In three issues, appellant contends that the trial

1
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.021(a), (e).
court lacked jurisdiction and the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for

directed verdict and admitting certain evidence.

      We affirm.

                                   Background

      The complainant, A.C., testified that as a child he lived with his mother (the

“complainant’s mother”), his three sisters—R.C., L.C., and V.C.—and appellant,

an adult male, in an apartment in Harris County, Texas. Appellant was not the

complainant’s biological father.    Appellant moved in with the complainant’s

family when the complainant was in the third grade. The complainant’s mother

worked a lot when he was a child, so he did not see her that often. According to

the complainant, his mother left for work around 6:00 a.m.          She would also

sometimes work in the evenings or overnight.

      As to his sisters, the complainant explained that R.C. was about four years

older than he was, and she was “pretty much the maternal figure.” L.C. was close

in age to the complainant, and V.C. was five years younger than the complainant.

V.C. was about one year old when appellant moved in with the complainant’s

family, and for most of her childhood, she did not know that appellant was not her

biological father.

      Regarding the apartment where the family lived, the complainant testified

that the complainant’s mother and appellant slept in the primary bedroom. The

                                         2
complainant’s sisters slept in the second bedroom in the apartment, and the

complainant slept in the living room on the couch.

      Appellant worked as a painter, and he worked while the children were at

school.   Appellant would return to the apartment after work either with the

complainant’s mother or by himself. Most evenings, appellant was alone with the

complainant and the complainant’s sisters in the apartment, and appellant would

usually stay in his room during that time with the door locked.          When the

complainant went to bed at night, typically appellant was the only adult at home.

      The complainant further testified that one day, when he was in the third

grade, he and L.C. got off the school bus after school and a man approached them

and masturbated in front of them. They went home and told R.C. about the

incident, and R.C. told the complainant’s mother and appellant. The next day, the

complainant and appellant were alone in the family’s apartment, and appellant

called the complainant to come into appellant’s bedroom. Appellant then asked the

complainant about the masturbation incident. Appellant was laying down on the

bed in his room and masturbating under the bed covers while he spoke to the

complainant. The complainant told appellant that he saw the man’s “private area.”

Appellant then asked the complainant, “Did it look like this?,” and showed the

complainant his erect penis. The complainant felt scared and shocked and did not

“know what was going on.” The complainant asked appellant why he was asking

                                         3
questions about the masturbation incident, but appellant did not have a good

answer.       Appellant then told the complainant to leave the bedroom.       The

complainant did not tell anyone about what had happened because he “didn’t know

what to do at that point.” And he felt like his mother was “serious” about her

relationship with appellant because she brought him to live in the apartment with

the family.

      After the above-described incident, appellant began to find “any excuse to

make [the complainant] go to [appellant’s] room” whenever the complainant was

home alone.2 Appellant would yell to the complainant from his bedroom and ask

the complainant to bring him a drink. The complainant would do what appellant

asked because when he did not, appellant would tell the complainant’s mother that

the complainant was being disrespectful. Each time the complainant went into

appellant’s bedroom, appellant would bring up the masturbation incident again and

ask the complainant “[s]o [was] there anything that you wanted to do to that guy.”

The complainant felt pressured into “saying yes” and that he did want “to do

something to th[e] guy.” Appellant told the complainant that he might like to

“touch” a penis and he would not “know unless [he] tr[ied].” Appellant told the

complainant to touch appellant’s penis, and the complainant complied.

2
      The complainant noted that anytime he was alone in appellant’s bedroom,
      appellant told him to close the door and lock it.

                                        4
      The complainant further testified that one night, when he was still in the

third grade, appellant called for the complainant, who was in the living room, and

told him to come into appellant’s bedroom. When the complainant entered the

room, appellant was watching the television and masturbating under the bed

covers. Appellant wanted to talk about the masturbation incident again, and he

asked the complainant “[i]s there something that you want to do.”             The

complainant responded, “I don’t know. Is there something that you need me to

do?” Appellant told the complainant that he could touch appellant’s penis and he

would not get in trouble. The complainant gave in and “started . . . masturbating

[appellant].” Appellant gave the complainant instructions on what to do.

      At the time, the complainant’s sisters were asleep in their bedroom and the

complainant’s mother was at work.       The complainant felt that he had to do

whatever appellant told him to do because if he did not appellant would “find a

way to get [the complainant] punished.” And the complainant felt that he would

get in trouble if he did not touch appellant’s penis. The complainant stopped

masturbating appellant and left appellant’s bedroom when the complainant’s

mother called appellant and told him that she was on her way home from work.

Appellant told the complainant to pretend that he was asleep in the living room

when the complainant’s mother got home.

                                        5
       The next morning, the complainant asked his mother if appellant had told

her anything about the day before, and the complainant’s mother said no. The

complainant thought that appellant “would tell her,” and that if he had not, then it

meant that what had happened was not a big deal. The complainant was also

worried about getting into trouble, and appellant had told the complainant not to

tell his mother or sisters.

       The complainant further explained that appellant continued having the

complainant masturbate appellant frequently, and it would usually happen at

nighttime.3 The complainant explained that appellant made him feel guilty about

what was happening and that it was the complainant’s own fault or that the

complainant “wanted it.” Appellant told the complainant, “This is what you asked

for,” and if the complainant said something about what was happening, it would

“cause [the complainant’s] family to . . . go in[to] turmoil”—his sisters would be

separated, and the complainant’s mother would be deported.4 Appellant stopped

3
       The complainant estimated that the sexual interactions with appellant happened
       about five times a month. They occurred until the complainant was in the eighth
       grade, and then started again when the complainant was in high school.
4
       At one point, when the complainant was in the fourth grade, he spoke to R.C.
       about what had been happening to him. R.C. had asked the complainant why
       appellant “ke[pt] telling [him] to go into [appellant’s] room,” and the complainant
       said it was because appellant would tell him to “do things with him.” The
       complainant explained to R.C. what appellant had been asking him to do. R.C.
       told the complainant that the same thing had been happening to her. R.C. also
       stated that she had told their grandmother about what had been happening to her,
       and the grandmother had spoken with the complainant’s mother. Because the
                                            6
short of threatening to physically harm the complainant though or the

complainant’s family.

      According to the complainant, during the summer between the third and

fourth grades, appellant would try to “get [the complainant] alone” in the

apartment during the day. Sometimes, the complainant’s mother would go to

church and appellant would tell the complainant to “stay home” or he would

suggest that the complainant’s mother take just the complainant’s sisters to church.

Appellant would also take the complainant to work with him, and if they were

alone, appellant would “make [the complainant] touch” appellant’s penis and

masturbate appellant. Eventually, the complainant told his mother that he did not

want to go to work with appellant anymore.

      Further, when the complainant was in the fourth grade, appellant told the

complainant to put his mouth on appellant’s penis, and the complainant complied.

Appellant then pushed the complainant’s head down.            Appellant rubbed the

complainant’s bare bottom while this occurred.5 Appellant also had pornography

playing on the television in his bedroom. Appellant ejaculated in front of the

complainant. The complainant’s mother was at work when this incident occurred.

      complainant’s mother did not believe R.C., R.C. told the complainant that no one
      would believe them if they said anything to another adult.
5
      The complainant also explained that appellant would put his finger in the
      complainant’s anus when the complainant was masturbating appellant or engaging
      in oral sex.

                                          7
      As to another incident, the complainant explained that when he was about

ten or eleven years old, appellant lined the complainant and the complainant’s

sisters up in the living room and asked them if they knew “what a pussy [was]?”

When the complainant asked if he “ha[d] one,” appellant got mad and took the

complainant and R.C. into the bathroom in the apartment. Appellant made R.C.

take down her pants and underwear and instructed her to get in a certain position.

He then told the complainant, “This is what a pussy is.” Appellant also put his

fingers inside R.C.’s vagina and told the complainant, “[H]ere’s where you will put

your penis.” R.C. was crying and in pain. Appellant then told R.C. to pull her

pants up, and they all left the bathroom.

      On another occasion, when the complainant was roughly the same age,

appellant called the complainant to come into his bedroom. R.C. was already in

the room, and appellant was masturbating under the bed covers. Appellant told the

complainant to take off his clothes, and the complainant took off his pants and

underwear. Appellant told R.C. to do the same thing. Appellant then put his

fingers in R.C.’s vagina and instructed the complainant to make his penis “hard.”

Appellant made R.C. turn around, and instructed the complainant to start having

                                            8
sexual intercourse with R.C. When R.C. started bleeding, she ran out of the room,

and the complainant followed her out.6

      When the complainant was in the seventh grade and about thirteen years old,

his family and appellant moved to a house in a different area of Harris County. In

the house, the complainant had his own bedroom, the complainant’s sisters shared

a bedroom, and appellant and the complainant’s mother shared a bedroom.

Around that time, appellant was “laid off from work,” and he did not have a steady

job. When the complainant would get home from school, he and his sisters were

often alone in the house with appellant.

      On one occasion after the move, appellant started masturbating in front of

the complainant while they were in the primary bedroom. Appellant then told the

complainant to put his mouth on appellant’s penis, and the complainant complied.

According to the complainant, appellant “just had a way of just . . . making [him]

do it.” While in the new house, the sexual interactions between appellant and the

complainant happened frequently.

      Additionally, when the complainant was about fifteen years old,7 appellant

told him to put on a pair of the complainant’s mother’s underwear. Appellant was

6
      The complainant also testified that once, when he was in the fifth grade, appellant
      asked him to take photographs of the complainant’s sisters when they were in the
      shower. The complainant said no and told appellant that he did not “want
      [appellant] touching or hurting [his] sisters.”

                                           9
playing pornography on the television in his bedroom, and he had the complainant

stand in front of the television and squat down. Appellant masturbated while

watching the complainant do this. Appellant then had the complainant come near

him and asked the complainant if he “wanted to do it,” meaning to let appellant

penetrate his anus. Appellant moved the underwear the complainant was wearing

to the side, and appellant’s penis made contact with the complainant’s anus. The

complainant felt really scared and told appellant, “I’m not going to do it.”

Appellant got mad at him and said, “Get the fuck out of here.” (Internal quotations

omitted.) According to the complainant, appellant did not penetrate his anus, but

“rub[bed] his penis on [the complainant’s] anal area.”

      The complainant further testified that when he was about sixteen years old,

appellant and the complainant “got in a physical argument.” The complainant was

upset that appellant was not working and told appellant, “Dude, what are you

doing? Like, you’re just here wasting space, wasting time, and you can’t even get

a job.” Appellant got very angry and started choking the complainant. The

complainant’s mother separated them. That day, appellant and the complainant’s

mother separated, and appellant left the house.8

7
      The complainant also testified that one night, when the complainant was about
      fifteen years old, appellant put his mouth on the complainant’s penis.
8
      The complainant noted that appellant and the complainant’s mother stayed in
      contact for years after the physical altercation.

                                         10
      At some point, after the complainant had graduated from high school, L.C.

told the complainant’s mother about what appellant had done to her.             The

complainant also told his mother what had happened between appellant and him,

but he did not give his mother all the details because he felt like she did not “want

[the] details.” After telling his mother, the complainant went to speak to law

enforcement officers.

      R.C. testified that the complainant, L.C., and V.C. are her siblings and she is

the oldest. R.C. was three years older than L.C. and four years older than the

complainant. R.C. and her siblings had the same biological father, but he stopped

being involved in their lives when R.C. was ten years old. After her biological

father left, R.C. lived with her siblings and the complainant’s mother in an

apartment in Harris County.       Eventually, R.C.’s mother started dating, and

appellant moved in with their family in 2003. Appellant made sure to tell the

complainant that he was not the complainant’s father and that he did not want the

complainant to call him “dad.”

      According to R.C., when appellant first moved into the family’s apartment,

he slept in the primary bedroom with the complainant’s mother and V.C., while

R.C., the complainant, and L.C. slept in the second bedroom. Sometimes though,

the complainant would sleep in the living room. After about a year, R.C., L.C.,

                                         11
and V.C. began sharing a bedroom, and the complainant slept in the living room on

the couch.

      During the time appellant lived with the family, the complainant’s mother

worked overnight, and R.C. was not usually awake when the complainant’s mother

would return home from work. When the complainant’s mother was gone in the

evenings, appellant was in the home alone with R.C. and her siblings.9 Appellant

would usually stay in his bedroom, and he required the children to knock before

entering the bedroom.

      R.C. testified that when the complainant was a child, he would get in trouble

with appellant for “the smallest things.” One time, when R.C. was with the

complainant’s mother, L.C., and V.C. at the grocery store, the complainant went

outside the apartment without permission. When he returned, appellant put him in

a cold shower and said, “This is what you get for not listening and for not asking

for permission.”   The complainant was the only child who was punished by

appellant.10 R.C. further explained that while appellant was living in her home, she

saw the complainant go into appellant’s bedroom “[a] few times,” but she did not

know why the complainant was inside the bedroom.
9
      R.C. noted that appellant was a painter, and he did not work consistently. He
      would only take on “small gigs.”
10
      R.C. noted that as the complainant got older, he never wanted to be at home, and
      he would sign up for extracurricular activities so that he could stay longer at
      school. She also testified as to one occasion where appellant put the complainant
      in a closet for misbehaving.

                                          12
      R.C. also testified that on one occasion, when R.C. was about eleven or

twelve years old and the complainant was seven or eight years old, appellant was

alone with R.C. and her siblings in the apartment. While R.C. and her siblings

were watching a movie, appellant came out of his bedroom and sat in the recliner

with a blanket on top of him. Appellant then told R.C., the complainant, and L.C.

to “get up,” and he asked the complainant if he “had a pussy.” Appellant then

touched the complainant’s penis over the complainant’s clothing in front of R.C.

and L.C.    Appellant told the complainant to pull down his pants and show

appellant his penis, and the complainant complied. Appellant also told L.C. and

R.C. to pull down their pants, and they complied.         Appellant said to the

complainant, “These are pussies. You don’t have this.” R.C. then pulled up her

pants and told her siblings to do the same and to go to their bedroom. R.C. told

appellant that “what he was doing wasn’t right.”         R.C. did not tell the

complainant’s mother about what had happened though because she was “in

disbelief” and “in shock.”

      As to another incident, R.C. explained that when she was twelve years old,

appellant called the complainant and R.C. to come to the bathroom. Appellant

made the complainant lay on the floor without his pants or underwear on, and

appellant told R.C. to sit on top of the complainant’s penis without her pants or

underwear on. Appellant then asked R.C. if the complainant’s penis was “inside

                                       13
[her].” According to R.C., the complainant’s penis penetrated her vagina, and the

complainant was crying. Appellant just stared at them. Afterward, R.C. ran to her

bedroom. She did not tell the complainant’s mother about what had happened

because she was scared of getting into trouble. Two days after the incident,

appellant “called [R.C.] over to his room and . . . told [her] that [she] better not say

nothing” because there “were going to be a lot of consequences,” like her siblings

would be separated, the complainant’s mother would go to jail, and R.C. would get

deported.

       R.C. noted that a similar incident happened a second time in the bathroom

about a month or two after the first bathroom incident, but that time R.C. was

bleeding from her menstrual cycle, and she and the complainant were scared. R.C.

explained that the complainant’s penis penetrated her vagina during the second

incident as well. R.C. did not tell the complainant’s mother or another adult

because she was scared and felt disgusted.

       R.C. further testified that when she was about twelve or thirteen years old,

appellant called her to come into his bedroom and told her to shut the door behind

her.   Appellant was watching pornography on the television, covered with

blankets, and masturbating on the bed. Appellant pulled the blankets off, and he

was naked. He told R.C. to touch his penis and then grabbed her hand and held it

on his penis so that she would cause him to ejaculate. After appellant ejaculated,

                                          14
he told R.C. to leave the room and to not say anything. The complainant’s mother

was at work when this happened, and R.C. did not tell her what happened because

she was scared.

      R.C. noted that appellant made her “masturbate him” multiple times,11 and

when that happened, appellant would also penetrate R.C.’s vagina with his fingers.

Appellant also put his mouth on R.C.’s vagina,12 and he made R.C. perform oral

sex on him. The first time that happened, R.C. was about fifteen years old, and she

had gone to the store with appellant. Appellant parked their minivan in the parking

lot, and appellant went to the back seat. He told R.C. to come back there with him,

and he took off his pants and his underwear.          Appellant asked R.C. if she

“want[ed] to try something new.” Appellant grabbed R.C.’s head and pushed it

down to his penis. He kept his hand on the back of R.C.’s head the whole time,

until she started to throw up.

      R.C. further explained that when she was fourteen years old, she started

sleeping with a pocketknife under her pillow because she felt like she needed to

protect herself from appellant. One night she made herself go to bed earlier than

usual because she thought “that would prevent [anything] from happening.” But
11
      R.C. estimated that appellant made her masturbate him about once a week. It was
      happening “on a normal basis.”
12
      During her testimony, R.C. described the incidents where appellant put his mouth
      on her vagina. And she testified that appellant had also rubbed his penis against
      her vagina for five to ten minutes. He stopped when he ejaculated. That occurred
      a handful of times according to R.C.

                                          15
appellant came into her bedroom and whispered her name and told her “to come.”

When R.C. “looked away,” appellant “grabbed [her] by the shoulder” and “pulled

[her] shirt.” R.C. then looked at appellant and “pulled out the knife and . . . told

him . . . to leave [her] alone.” Appellant “went pale,” “[h]is eyes widened,” and he

walked out of the room.13 After the knife incident, appellant stopped “messing

with” her for about a year, until she was fifteen years old. Appellant then started

calling her into his bedroom again and engaging in the same sexual behavior as

before.

      When R.C. was seventeen years old, she told appellant that she was not

going to engage in anymore sexual encounters with him, and she ran away from

home.14 When R.C. was about twenty years old, the complainant’s mother and

appellant broke up. However, there were times where appellant would still stay at

the complainant’s mother’s home for a few days.

13
      L.C. testified that she shared a bed with R.C., and R.C. always made L.C. sleep on
      the inside of the bed, closest to the wall. This meant that R.C. slept on the outside
      edge of the bed. One night, L.C. “felt a presence inside [the] [bed]room,” and she
      could hear appellant walking across the floor. L.C. heard appellant say to R.C.,
      “Let me see, let me see.” R.C. told appellant, “No, leave me alone.” R.C. then
      “pull[ed] out the knife she had under her pillow,” and appellant “got afraid.” He
      went back to his bedroom. L.C. thought that R.C. slept with a pocketknife “most
      of the nights.”
14
      R.C. noted that she had run away twice when she was younger because of what
      appellant had been doing to her. And when she was about thirteen or fourteen
      years old, she told her grandmother that appellant had been touching her, but
      nothing really happened. That made her not want to talk about what appellant had
      done “ever again.”

                                           16
      In total, R.C. estimated that appellant had sexually abused her for six or

seven years. She believed that the abuse stopped when she was about seventeen

years old.

      L.C. testified that R.C., the complainant, and V.C. were her siblings. R.C.

was the eldest, and the complainant and V.C. were younger than her, although she

and the complainant were close in age. According to L.C., appellant was her

stepfather.15 He “came into [her] life” when she was about seven or eight years old

and moved into the apartment where L.C.’s family was living in Harris County.16

      Appellant and the complainant’s mother shared a bedroom in the apartment,

and in the beginning, R.C., the complainant, and L.C. shared a bedroom. V.C. was

still little when appellant moved in, and she slept in the complainant’s mother’s

room. But appellant told the complainant’s mother that “girls [should] sleep with

girls.” So, the complainant began sleeping on the couch in the living room, and

V.C. began sharing a bedroom with R.C. and L.C.

      As to appellant’s behavior while he lived with L.C.’s family, L.C. explained

that appellant would say things like “girls go with girls and guys . . . go with guys,”
15
      L.C. explained that her biological father had been “arrested and deported.” L.C.’s
      biological father was abusive toward the complainant’s mother, and on one
      occasion he “tried to kill [the complainant] in front of” L.C. Because of the
      trauma she experienced in her life, L.C. explained that she generally “kept”
      traumatic things to herself.
16
      According to L.C., when appellant moved in with her family, V.C. was about two
      years old, and V.C. believed, during her childhood, that appellant was her
      biological father. L.C. testified that eventually, appellant “touched” V.C.

                                          17
which meant that there were times when the complainant would stay behind at the

apartment with appellant, while the complainant’s mother, R.C., L.C., and V.C.

went places. L.C. recalled that when the girls would return home, the complainant

was often not in the apartment because he would “run away.” On one occasion,

L.C. went to the grocery store with the complainant’s mother, R.C., and V.C., and

when they returned home, appellant was outside screaming the complainant’s

name. L.C. went to find the complainant at a friend’s house, and the complainant

refused to come home.17

      Further, L.C. testified that when appellant was in the apartment, he was

always locked in the complainant’s mother’s bedroom. And appellant made the

children knock on the bedroom door before they could enter the room. According

to L.C., there were periods of time where the children would be alone in the

apartment with appellant because the complainant’s mother worked mostly at

night.18

      As to her interactions with appellant, L.C. recalled that one time, when she

was about eight or nine years old, she was taking a bath in the bathroom in her

family’s apartment, with the shower curtain closed.         Appellant came into the
17
      L.C. additionally noted that the complainant tried to stay away from the apartment
      as much as possible; he was involved in many extracurricular activities at school.
      She also explained that the complainant had a hiding spot in the apartment, but
      L.C. never knew what the complainant was hiding from.
18
      L.C. testified that the complainant’s mother would leave for work at about
      5:00 p.m.

                                          18
bathroom “very quietly.” Appellant pulled down his pants and sat on the toilet.

He then peeked into the bathtub, where L.C. was “hunched into . . . a little ball”

because she did not want him to see her naked. He asked L.C. what she was doing.

He then told her to “[s]tand up.” When L.C. asked why, appellant responded: “I

want to see how you look, and just turn around.” Appellant threatened that if L.C.

did not comply with his request, he would tell the complainant’s mother and “tell

CPS,” which L.C. thought mean that she would be separated from her siblings.

L.C. complied, and her breasts, vagina, and bottom were exposed. Appellant also

asked L.C., if she “want[ed] to see [him],” and L.C. told appellant, “No, I don’t

want to see you.” Appellant then closed the shower curtain, stood up, pulled up his

pants, and left the bathroom.    L.C. stated that she did not tell anyone about

happened because her response to experiencing trauma was to “hide in [her] little

spot in [her] room.”

      L.C. also testified that when she was about nine or ten years old, her family

and appellant went on a vacation to New Orleans, Louisiana, and they stayed with

L.C.’s aunt and uncle in a townhouse. While there, L.C., V.C., the complainant’s

mother, and appellant all slept in the same bed. While napping, L.C. felt “a

sensation with the sheets . . . going up and down, like the breeze.” L.C. woke up,

and appellant was masturbating under the bed covers. Because V.C. was sleeping

between L.C. and appellant, L.C. moved V.C. away from appellant because she did

                                        19
not want appellant to “hurt” V.C. or “do something to [V.C.] while she was still

asleep.” L.C. laid there facing away from appellant. Appellant then turned L.C.

around, while he was masturbating and started touching L.C.’s vagina under her

underwear. Appellant told L.C., “[D]on’t let nobody touch you right here. Only

me.” Appellant continued touching L.C.’s vagina until he heard footsteps on the

stairs. He then immediately turned around, put his back toward L.C., and stopped

masturbating. When the complainant’s mother opened the door to the bedroom,

she asked if anyone was hungry, and appellant got up. L.C. stayed in the room

with V.C. L.C. did not say anything to anyone at the time, but after the family

returned from New Orleans, L.C. told R.C. about what had happened. L.C. did not

tell an adult though because she was scared that no one would believe her.

      L.C. further explained that after she and the complainant graduated from

high school, appellant and the complainant’s mother broke up due to appellant’s

cheating, and appellant “officially [moved] out of” the family’s home. Appellant

then dated another woman, who also had younger children. L.C. noted that there

were still times when appellant would stay with the complainant’s mother after

they had broken up. L.C. did not like the fact that the complainant’s mother was

“trying to get [appellant] to come back.” L.C. was upset that appellant had made

the complainant’s mother “cry,” but not about appellant’s cheating because she

was “pretty okay with [appellant] leaving.”

                                        20
      According to L.C., after she had her own child as a young adult, she visited

the complainant’s mother, and appellant was staying at the home. While L.C.

changed her daughter’s diaper, she felt that appellant was looking at her daughter’s

vagina, and it reminded her of “the way he [had] looked at” L.C. L.C. stopped

visiting the complainant’s mother after that because she did not want the

complainant’s mother to have appellant in her life.

      When she was twenty-three years old, L.C. told her aunt about what

appellant had done to her, and her aunt believed her.         L.C.’s aunt told the

complainant’s mother, but the complainant’s mother did not believe L.C. at first;

she doubted L.C. A few days after L.C. made the disclosure, the complainant’s

mother called L.C. and told her, “Let’s go to the police.” L.C. went to speak with

law enforcement officers along with the complainant, the complainant’s mother,

and V.C.

      V.C. testified that appellant was her stepfather. He came into her life when

she was about two or three years old, and he raised her. V.C. considered appellant

to be her father, and she did not learn that appellant was not her biological father

until she was about seven or eight years old.

      V.C. further explained that she was the youngest child in her family. The

complainant was six years older, L.C. was seven years older, and R.C. was ten

                                         21
years older than she was. V.C. described R.C. as “[t]he one that t[ook] care of [the

siblings] a lot of the time,” and L.C. was “like a second mother” to V.C.

      As to her relationship with appellant, V.C. stated that growing up she “was

daddy’s little girl.” She had a close relationship with appellant, and he was always

nice and loving toward her. Appellant “was everything to” V.C.

      In comparison, appellant always treated the complainant like “he was . . . a

bother.” “[A] lot of the time, . . . [appellant] would just treat [the complainant] like

crap,” and appellant “made it seem like it was an inconvenience [to] hav[e] [the

complainant] around.”      The complainant would frequently “disappear[] off to

friends’ houses.” According to V.C., R.C. and the complainant’s mother would

often fight about appellant and that would cause R.C. to run away from home. As

to L.C., she kept her distance from appellant.

      While appellant lived with V.C.’s family, appellant shared a bedroom with

the complainant’s mother. V.C. would sometimes sleep in the same bedroom as

her sisters, but she would also sleep in the bedroom with the complainant’s mother

and appellant.    The complainant slept in the living room most of the time.

According to V.C., while growing up, there were times where appellant was home

alone with her and her siblings, without the complainant’s mother being present.

And whenever appellant was at home, he was mostly in his bedroom. V.C. had to

knock on the door before she could enter appellant’s bedroom. V.C. never saw

                                          22
appellant doing anything with the complainant, R.C., or L.C. in the bedroom. The

few times that appellant was in the living room, instead of his bedroom, it was just

V.C. and him watching television together because V.C.’s siblings would choose to

go to their room.

      As to appellant’s sexual interactions with V.C., V.C. testified that when she

was about seven or eight years old, she lived in an apartment in Harris County.

One day, V.C. was laying in her bedroom.          The complainant’s mother told

appellant to go lay down with V.C. because V.C. did not like to sleep alone and the

complainant’s mother had to leave the home. Appellant laid down with V.C. and

grabbed her shorts, asking “[W]hat is this.” V.C. told appellant, “Those are my

shorts.” Appellant then grabbed V.C.’s underwear and asked, “What is this.”

Next, appellant “went under [her] underwear” and “grabbed” V.C.’s vagina, asking

“What is this.” V.C. “stayed quiet” because she did not know how to respond.

Appellant grabbed V.C.’s vagina for about a minute, and then appellant got up and

walked out of the room. V.C. went to sleep.

      A couple of days later, V.C. told R.C. and L.C. about what had happened.

R.C. “got mad” and told V.C., “Don’t ever let him touch you like that because he’s

not even your real dad.” L.C. then got mad at R.C., and told R.C., “She’s not

                                        23
supposed to know that yet.” R.C. also told V.C. that “no one[] [was] going to

believe” her.19 V.C. believed R.C.

      Later, when V.C. was about seventeen years old, L.C. disclosed what

appellant had done to her, and L.C. also reminded V.C. that appellant had touched

her too. At the time, appellant was “trying to come back into [V.C.’s] life and

[L.C.] didn’t see that as okay.” And L.C. did not want appellant around V.C. or

their family. At first, V.C. was mad at L.C. because V.C. thought that L.C. just did

not want her to have a relationship with her “dad.” But V.C.’s memory came back

in “bits and pieces,” and V.C. told her therapist about appellant touching her

vagina. V.C.’s therapist told her that blocking out that memory “from [her] head”

was “pretty much a normal trauma response.” After her therapy session, V.C. went

to the police station, with the complainant’s mother and L.C., to disclose what had

happened to her.

      Finally, V.C. testified that appellant and the complainant’s mother ended

their relationship when V.C. was about thirteen years old. The complainant’s

mother caught appellant cheating, and appellant “left to be with” his girlfriend.

      Houston Police Department Officer D. Yoon testified that he was in charge

of investigating the sexual abuse claims that L.C. had made against appellant. L.C.

19
      About a year later, R.C. told V.C. that appellant “would go into [R.C.’s] bedroom
      and that one time she took out a knife because he was going to go ahead and be
      touching on her.”

                                          24
alleged that appellant had touched her vagina “under the blankets” when they were

sharing a bed in Louisiana. L.C. explained that she had been laying in a bed with

V.C., and she moved V.C. away from appellant. Appellant began touching L.C.

over her clothes, but under the bed covers. Appellant then progressed to touching

L.C.’s vagina under her clothes. L.C. also described to Yoon the incident when

appellant “c[ame] into the bathroom when[] she was taking a shower,” “forc[ed]

[L.C.] to expose herself to him,” and offered to show L.C. his penis.

       Officer Yoon further testified that during his investigation, he spoke to the

complainant, R.C., and V.C. as well. According to Yoon, the complainant alleged

that “a series of events of sexual assault [occurred] starting at a young age leading

into   adulthood”    and   that   the   sexual    abuse   “escalat[ed]   once    [the

complainant] . . . reached middle school.”       For instance, appellant made the

complainant “masturbate hi[m],” and appellant showed the complainant his penis.

Appellant also had the complainant perform oral sex on him. The sexual abuse

began when the complainant was in elementary school, and the complainant

“outlined abuse that stretched all the way from when[] he was a very small child all

the way until he was about [nineteen] years old.” The complainant and R.C. also

told Yoon that appellant had “forced them to have incestuous sex” at least once.

As to that instance, appellant made the complainant lay on the bathroom floor and

made R.C. get on top of the complainant. R.C. also told Yoon that appellant made

                                         25
her “masturbate” him when she was a teenager. And R.C. described appellant

forcing R.C. to perform oral sex on him, and appellant touching her vagina. When

R.C. spoke to Yoon, she detailed “a long span of sexual abuse that she suffered” at

the hands of appellant.

      As to V.C., Officer Yoon testified that V.C. did not know anyone else other

than appellant as her father. And while in therapy, V.C. realized that she had

blocked a memory of appellant touching her vagina. Appellant touched V.C. on

top of her clothing and asked, “What are these.” Appellant then touched V.C. on

top of her underwear and asked V.C., “What is this.” When appellant touched

V.C.’s vagina under her underwear, he asked, “What is this.”

      When Officer Yoon spoke to the complainant’s mother and the children’s

grandmother, both admitted that they did not initially believe the children about the

sexual abuse. But then they “came around” and believed the children.

      Officer Yoon also noted that he spoke to appellant during his investigation,

and appellant said that “everyone else was jealous of the relationship he had with

[V.C.] and they were out to get him.” Appellant said that none of the children,

other than L.C., “would have any reason to say anything bad about him.”

Appellant denied the allegations against him.

                                         26
      Appellant testified that he met the complainant’s mother in 2004 or 2005,

and the complainant’s mother had four children—R.C., L.C., the complainant, and

V.C. R.C. was about ten years old when appellant met her.

      When appellant lived with the complainant’s mother, everyone in the home

would get up about 6:30 a.m. Appellant would get ready for work and leave the

home in the morning. The complainant’s mother would stay in the home during

the day. When appellant would arrive home around 6:00 p.m., the complainant’s

mother would still be at home, and the children would be home from school. The

complainant’s mother would leave the home to go to work around 5:30 p.m. or

6:00 p.m., and she would return home about 10:00 p.m. or 11:00 p.m. Appellant

would be alone with the children at home for about four or five hours in the

evenings, and he had “access to all of the [children] when the [complainant’s

mother] was gone.” During that time, the children would play outside until it

“beg[an] getting dark.”20 Appellant would then get the children to come inside and

have dinner. The children would watch television and play games, while appellant

was in his bedroom. Appellant stated that the door to his bedroom was not locked,

and the door would be “slightly open or open” while he watched television. The

children would stay up late in the living room, and they went to bed on their own.

The children would be asleep before the complainant’s mother got home from
20
      According to appellant, the children were always together when they left to go
      outside and when they came back inside.

                                        27
work. Appellant did note that there were times that the children would come into

his bedroom individually when the complainant’s mother was not in the home, but

appellant was “[n]ot often” alone in his bedroom with the complainant.

      As to the allegations against him, appellant denied having anal sex with the

complainant, and he denied making the complainant perform oral sex on him.

Appellant stated that he never had a “homosexual relationship” with the

complainant.21 And he denied that he was ever left alone with the complainant in

the home when the complainant’s mother and siblings went to church.

      Further, appellant denied touching R.C.’s vagina, “rub[bing] [his] penis on

her vagina,” and forcing R.C. to perform oral sex on him.22 And appellant denied

ever touching L.C. inappropriately or fondling L.C. during a trip to Louisiana.23

He also stated that the children slept together in a bedroom during that trip, but he

slept in the living room of the house where the family was staying. He was never

in a bedroom alone with L.C. and V.C. Additionally, appellant denied touching

V.C. He stated that he went to a therapy session with V.C., and the therapist

explained that V.C. had anxiety because he “had left [V.C.’s] life.” To appellant,

V.C. was his daughter, and it made him feel “[v]ery badly” that she had made

21
      Appellant also denied that the complainant ever ran away to a friend’s house.
22
      Appellant admitted that he would take R.C. to the store with him, and he drove a
      minivan at times.
23
      Appellant admitted that he met L.C.’s child when the child was about eighteen
      months old.

                                          28
allegations against him. Appellant never punished V.C. because “[s]he was the

baby” in the family.

      Appellant also testified that his relationship with the complainant’s mother

ended because she found out that appellant was cheating on her with another

woman. The children hated the other woman and were angry with appellant for

cheating on the complainant’s mother and abandoning V.C. L.C., in particular, felt

that appellant was not taking V.C.’s feelings into account after appellant moved on

with the other woman, and she threatened appellant that he was “going to get it

from [her].” The complainant had also threatened appellant because appellant was

in a relationship with the other woman. Appellant admitted that the first time he

had ever mentioned the children threatening him was during his testimony at trial.

                                    Jurisdiction

      In his second issue, appellant argues that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over his case because “the indictment failed to state an offense.”

      “A trial court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case consists of the power of the

court over the subject matter of the case, coupled with personal jurisdiction over

the accused.” Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(internal quotations omitted). “The presentment of a valid indictment vests the

district court with jurisdiction of the cause.” Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. V,

§ 12(b). Even if an indictment has a substantive defect, it is sufficient to confer

                                          29
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction under the Texas Constitution if it:

(1) “charge[s] a person” and (2) “charge[s] the commission of an offense.”

Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 898, 901 (“An indictment can be defective, but still be an

indictment that vests the court with jurisdiction.”); see also Teal v. State, 230

S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (for indictment to be constitutionally

valid, and thus confer jurisdiction on trial court, it need only allege that person

committed offense). An indictment must be “clear enough to give a[] [defendant]

adequate notice” of the charge against him and to enable the trial court, appellate

court, and defendant to “identify what penal-code provision is alleged and whether

that penal-code provision is one that vests jurisdiction in the trial court.” Jenkins,

592 S.W.3d at 901 (internal quotation marks omitted); Kirkpatrick v. State, 279

S.W.3d 324, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Whether an indictment is sufficient to

confer jurisdiction presents a question of law, which we determine de novo. Leone

v. State, 508 S.W.3d 346, 347 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d).

      Appellant asserts that the indictment in this case failed to “charge the

commission of an offense.”24 To resolve this issue, we look to the indictment “as a

24
      Appellant does not assert that the indictment failed to “charge a person.” See
      Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Indeed, the
      indictment listed appellant’s full name, race, date of birth, gender, address, and
      county identification number; it bore the title: “The State of Texas vs. Salvador
      Jimenez Coronado,” and it alleged that “Salvador Jimenez Coronado, hereinafter
      styled the Defendant” committed the charged offense. See id. at 901–02; Thetford
      v. State, No. 02-18-00488-CR, 2021 WL 278913, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
                                          30
whole.” Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 903. In other words, we must determine if the

“face of the charging instrument [was] clear enough to give [the defendant]

adequate notice of the charge against him.”         Id. at 901 (internal quotations

omitted). “[I]n order for a defect to render the instrument a non-indictment, the

defect must make it impossible for the defendant to know with what offenses he

had been charged.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). If the allegations in the

indictment are clear enough for the defendant to identify the offense alleged, then

the instrument is sufficient to confer jurisdiction, regardless of whether an element

of the offense is absent. See Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 180.

      A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if

(1) the person, (2) who is seventeen years old or older at the time of the

commission of each of the acts, (3) commits a series of two or more acts of sexual

abuse (4) during a period of thirty or more days, and (5) at the time of the

commission of each of the acts the victim is younger than fourteen years old. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b); see also Hines v. State, 551 S.W.3d 771, 781–82

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.). An “act of sexual abuse” means an act

that violates one or more specified penal code sections, including an act

      Jan. 28, 2021) (mem. op., not designated for publication), rev’d in part on other
      grounds, No. PD-0258-21, 2021 WL 2674484, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 30,
      2021) (not designated for publication).

                                          31
constituting indecency with a child,25 sexual assault,26 aggravated sexual assault,27

and sexual performance by a child.28 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(c)

(internal quotations omitted).

      Here, the indictment listed, as the charge against appellant: “FELONY

CHARGE: Sexual Abuse of a Child – Continuous” and alleged that appellant,

      on or about September 1, 2007, continuing through October 30, 2010,
      did then and there unlawfully, during a period of time of thirty or
      more days in duration, commit at least two acts of sexual abuse
      against a child younger than fourteen years of age, including an act
      constituting the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child,
      committed against [the complainant] on or about September 1, 2007,
      and an act constituting the offense of sexual assault of a child,
      committed against [the complainant] on or about October 30, 2010,
      and [appellant] was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the
      commission of each of those acts.[29]

      When reviewing the indictment as a whole and comparing it to Texas Penal

Code section 21.01(b), the allegations in the indictment are clear enough for

appellant to identify the offense alleged and would have given appellant adequate

notice of the charge against him. See Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 901; Teal, 230

S.W.3d at 180; see also Perry v. State, No. 06-21-00076-CR, 2022 WL 1159539,

25
      See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1).
26
      See id. § 22.011.
27
      See id. § 22.021.
28
      See id. § 43.25.
29
      The original indictment contained different alleged dates for the commission of
      the alleged offense. The original indictment was amended, without objection, to
      reflect the dates listed above.

                                         32
at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 12, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (where indictment’s heading stated, “CHARGE: ASSAULT FAMILY

OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER W/PREV. CONV” and “THIRD DEGREE

FELONY,” penal code section was clearly ascertainable by district court and

defendant). Thus, we hold that the indictment was sufficient to vest the trial court

with subject-matter jurisdiction.30

      We overrule appellant’s second issue.

                                   Directed Verdict

      In his first issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his

motion for directed verdict because the indictment did not allege a proper

underlying offense to support the alleged offense of continuous sexual abuse of a

young child.

30
      To the extent that appellant’s second issue can be construed as a complaint that the
      indictment in this case contained a defect, we note that a defendant cannot
      complain on appeal of any defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in an
      indictment if he did not object to the defect, error, or irregularity before trial. See
      TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b). Here, appellant did not raise his
      complaint in the trial court that the indictment “fail[ed] to describe an offense”
      because sexual assault of a child “for a person under [fourteen] years of age is not
      an offense and it is one of the elements of the alleged “[c]ontinuous [s]exual
      [a]buse of a [c]hild indictment.” See Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d 330, 338–40
      (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“The lack of a valid predicate offense . . . amounted to a
      substantive defect in the charging instrument, not the lack of an indictment
      altogether. Appellant did not object to th[e] defect prior to trial, so she cannot
      complain about it now.”); see also Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 182 (Tex. Crim.
      App. 2007) (unobjected-to indictment which failed to allege of two elements
      necessary to establish offense of felony grade nevertheless served to vest
      subject-matter jurisdiction in district court).

                                            33
      A person commits the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a young child if

(1) the person, (2) who is seventeen years old or older at the time of the

commission of each of the acts, (3) commits a series of two or more acts of sexual

abuse (4) during a period of thirty or more days, and (5) at the time of the

commission of each of the acts the victim is younger than fourteen years old. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02(b); see also Hines, 551 S.W.3d at 781–82. As stated

above, the indictment in this case alleged that appellant,

      on or about September 1, 2007, continuing through October 30, 2010,
      did then and there unlawfully, during a period of time of thirty or
      more days in duration, commit at least two acts of sexual abuse
      against a child younger than fourteen years of age, including an act
      constituting the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child,
      committed against [the complainant] on or about September 1, 2007,
      and an act constituting the offense of sexual assault of a child,
      committed against [the complainant] on or about October 30, 2010,
      and [appellant] was at least seventeen years of age at the time of the
      commission of each of those acts.

(Emphasis added.)

      Appellant argues that the indictment failed to properly allege one of the acts

of sexual abuse because the offense of “sexual assault of a child younger than

[fourteen years old]” does not exist and “[t]he jury was forced to deliberate on a

[c]ontinuous [sexual abuse of a young child] allegation that was not correctly

pled.” And because of all of this, the trial court erred in denying his motion for

directed verdict. But at trial, appellant did not move for a directed verdict based on

the argument he now raises in his briefing.        Thus, he has not preserved for
                                          34
appellate review his complaint that the trial court erred in denying his motion for

directed verdict. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541,

547 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (holding where defendant’s trial objection “does not

comport with” issue he raises on appeal, he has not preserved issue for review);

Moody v. State, No. 13-08-00212-CR, 2009 WL 2605904, at *4 n.3 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 26, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding defendant did not preserve complaint trial court erred in

denying motion for directed verdict where argument on appeal did not comport to

argument made in trial court); Burnham v. State, 821 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 1991, no pet.) (same); see also White v. State, 458 S.W.3d 188, 191 n.6

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (considering whether basis for defendant’s

motion for directed verdict comported with point of error raised in appellate court).

      Further, to the extent that appellant’s first issue can be read, not as a

complaint about the trial court’s denial of his motion for directed verdict, but

simply as a complaint that the indictment in this case was defective, appellant did

not object to any defect, error, or irregularity of form or substance in the

indictment before the date that trial on the merits commenced. Thus, he waived his

right to complain about the purported defect in the indictment on appeal. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b); Jenkins, 592 S.W.3d at 902; Duron v. State,

915 S.W.2d 920, 921–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995) (defendant

                                         35
waived complaint on appeal that indictment “did not allege an offense” because

defendant did not object before date trial began), aff’d, 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997); see also Williams v. State, 356 S.W.3d 508, 519 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (defendant did not preserve his argument that

indictment did not allege essential elements of offense, where defendant failed to

object before trial).

       Based on the foregoing, we hold that appellant has not preserved for

appellate review his complaint about the denial of his motion for directed verdict

or his complaint about the indictment raised in his first issue.

       We overrule appellant’s first issue.

                               Admission of Evidence

       In his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting

V.C.’s testimony that appellant “had touched her on and underneath her underwear

when she was seven or eight” years old because the testimony was unreliable and

“its probative value was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.”

       A trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse

of discretion. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);

Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A trial court

abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without reference to any

guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.

                                          36
Crim. App. 1990). A trial court’s decision to admit evidence will be upheld if it is

“within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844,

848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 102 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996) (internal quotations omitted). A trial court’s ruling on the admission of

extraneous offense evidence is generally within the zone of reasonable

disagreement “if the evidence shows that 1) an extraneous transaction is relevant to

a material, non-propensity issue, and 2) the probative value of that evidence is not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury.” De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). We will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if it is correct on any

theory of law applicable to that ruling, even if the trial court gives the wrong

reason for the right ruling. Id.

      “An extraneous offense is any act of misconduct, whether resulting in

prosecution or not, which is not shown in the charging instrument and which was

shown to have been committed by the accused.” Martinez v. State, 190 S.W.3d

254, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (internal quotations

omitted). Generally, Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of

extraneous offense evidence to prove a person’s character or to show that the

person acted in conformity with that character. See TEX. R. EVID. 404(b). But

when a defendant is being prosecuted for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of

                                         37
a young child, evidence that the defendant has committed one or more of the

enumerated sexual offenses against a child, including the offense of indecency

with a child, sexual assault of a child, or aggravated sexual assault of a child,31

“may be admitted . . . for any bearing the evidence has on relevant matters,

including the character of the defendant and acts performed in conformity with the

character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37, § 2; see

also Jeansonne v. State, 624 S.W.3d 78, 94–95 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2021, no pet.) (“Essentially, article 38.37 is an evidentiary rule applicable to

certain types of sexual abuse cases . . . that supersedes the application of Texas

Rule of Evidence 404(b), and makes admissible certain extraneous offense

evidence that [r]ule 404(b) does not.”); Belcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 840, 844

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2015, no pet.) (article 38.37, section 2(b) allows admission of

evidence that defendant had previously committed certain sexual offenses against

non-victims of charged offense).

      But even if extraneous offense evidence is admissible under Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 38.37, a trial court has a nondiscretionary obligation to

weigh the probative value of the evidence against any unfair prejudice of its

31
      See Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 330 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d)
      (“Article 38.37, [s]ection 2(b) allows for the admission of evidence that the
      defendant has committed a separate offense of a sexual nature against a child; the
      ‘child victim’ of the separate offense need not be the victim of the offense for
      which the defendant is currently on trial.”).

                                          38
admission when, as here, a defendant objects to the admission of extraneous

offense evidence based on Texas Rule of Evidence 403.               Allen v. State,

01-13-00784-CR, 2015 WL 5076288, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug.

27, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Martines v. State,

371 S.W.3d 232, 246–47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). When

conducting a rule 403 analysis, a trial court must balance the probative force of and

the proponent’s need for the evidence against (1) any tendency of the evidence to

suggest a decision on an improper basis, (2) any tendency of the evidence to

confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (3) any tendency of the evidence

to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate the

probative force of the evidence, and (4) the likelihood that presentation of the

evidence will amount to undue delay. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637,

641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Gorman v. State, No. 01-18-00316-CR, 2019 WL

610739, *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).    A rule 403 analysis favors the admissibility of

relevant evidence, and a trial court’s conclusion that the danger of unfair prejudice

does not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value is entitled to

deference. See Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

                                         39
      Appellant complains about the admission of V.C.’s testimony at trial,

asserting that it was unreliable and “more prejudicial than . . . probative.” Here,

we will presume, for purposes of this opinion, that the trial court erred in admitting

V.C.’s testimony, but we must still perform a harm analysis to determine if the trial

court’s purported error requires reversal of the trial court’s judgment.

      The erroneous admission of evidence constitutes non-constitutional error.

Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Solomon v. State, 49

S.W.3d 356, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).            Non-constitutional error requires

reversal only if it affects the substantial rights of the defendant. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 44.2(b); Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). A

defendant’s substantial rights are affected “when the error had a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” King v. State, 953

S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).           We will not overturn a criminal

conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record, we have fair

assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect.

Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 93–94.

      We review the entire record to determine the effect or influence of the

wrongfully admitted evidence on the jury’s decision. Id.; Motilla v. State, 78

S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In assessing the likelihood that the

jury’s decision was improperly influenced, we consider the testimony and physical

                                          40
evidence, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the

alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in

the case. Barshaw, 342 S.W.3d at 94; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56. The weight

of evidence of the defendant’s guilt is also relevant in conducting the harm

analysis. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also

Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–60. And we may consider closing statements and voir

dire, jury instructions, the State’s theory, any defensive theories, and whether the

State emphasized the alleged error. Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355–56; Hankins v.

State, 180 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref’d).

      Here, the complainant testified in graphic detail about appellant’s pattern of

sexual abuse.   The complainant explained to the jury how appellant sexually

abused him on numerous occasions and in numerous ways over many years. The

testimony of the complainant alone was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction

for the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child.32 See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 38.07; Martines, 371 S.W.3d at 240; see also Martinez v. State,

No. 10-16-00397-CR, 2018 WL 2142742, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco May 9, 2018,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding error in admission of

complained-of extraneous offense evidence did not affect defendant’s substantial

32
      Although appellant was charged with the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a
      young child, the jury found appellant guilty of the lesser-included offense of
      aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Price v. State, 413 S.W.3d 158, 163
      (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 434 S.W.3d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

                                         41
rights, where complainant “specifically [testified] about the sexual assaults

perpetrated by” defendant).

      Additionally, although appellant complains about the admission of V.C.’s

testimony that appellant “grabbed” her vagina once, he does not complain about

the admission of R.C.’s and L.C.’s testimony which detailed numerous other

extraneous offenses committed by appellant. R.C., for instance, provided graphic

details as to the many instances, over many years, of sexual abuse that appellant

perpetrated against her, including forcing R.C. to pull down her pants to show her

vagina, forcing R.C. and the complainant to engage in sexual intercourse, forcing

R.C. to masturbate appellant, forcing R.C. to perform oral sex on appellant, and

penetrating R.C.’s vagina with his fingers on multiple occasions.         And L.C.

testified that appellant forced her to expose her breasts, vagina, and bottom to him,

and that he touched her vagina while he was masturbating. Further, L.C. testified,

without objection, that appellant had “touched” V.C. as well. See Duncan v. State,

95 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (“Any error

in admitting evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere

without objection.”).

      Even though the State, during its closing argument, referenced V.C.’s

testimony, it also referenced the testimony that the jury heard from the

complainant, R.C., and L.C., about which appellant does not complain. And we

                                         42
cannot say that the State overly emphasized V.C.’s testimony in its closing

argument. See, e.g., Tipton v. State, No. 10-03-00385-CR, 2005 WL 241229, at *2

(Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 2, 2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding erroneous admission of extraneous offense evidence was

harmless even though State referred to extraneous offense in its closing argument).

      Finally, the trial court’s instructions to the jury addressed and limited the

jury’s use and consideration of any extraneous offense evidence admitted during

the guilt phase of trial, which can minimize any harm resulting from the admission

of the complained-of testimony.33 See Transue v. State, No. 02-22-00155-CR,

2023 WL 5114302, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 10, 2023, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (“[A]n instruction [in the jury charge]

regarding extraneous offense evidence can minimize any harm resulting

from . . . admitting the evidence of the [extraneous] offense.”); Wishert v. State,

654 S.W.3d 317, 334 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet. ref’d) (holding any potential

harm in admission of extraneous-offense evidence was mitigated by trial court’s

limiting instruction in jury charge); Martinez, 2018 WL 2142742, at *8 (holding

error in admission of complained-of extraneous offense evidence did not affect

defendant’s substantial rights, where trial court instructed jury it could only

33
      During closing argument, the trial court also instructed the jury, “[Y]ou will
      follow the charge. The charge has the law in it that you have to follow. What the
      attorneys tell you at this juncture may or may not be the law. You’re bound by
      what the charge says the law is.”

                                          43
consider complained-of extraneous offense evidence if jurors believed beyond

reasonable doubt that defendant committed act). We generally presume that the

jury followed the limiting instruction of the trial court. See Thrift v. State, 176

S.W.3d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      After examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the

alleged erroneous admission of V.C.’s testimony did not influence the jury or had

but a slight effect. Accordingly, we hold that appellant was not harmed by the

admission of V.C.’s testimony.

      We overrule appellant’s third issue.

                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                Julie Countiss
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Hightower and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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