Court Opinion

ID: 9794732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:10:43.066127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:40.092701
License: Public Domain

WADE, Justice
(Dissenting).
I dissent: In my opinion the pleadings shown by the record present issues of fact which if decided in favor of the deceased’s parents would clearly indicate that neither such agreement nor the decree of the probate court are void as against public policy, but constitute a reasonable restriction under the circumstances claimed which we should hold valid.
I call attention to a statement by Justice Holmes sometimes quoted by Mr. Justice Crockett:
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than that it was so laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the ground upon which it was laid down has vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.” 1
I also think that this court should use caution in adopting either a new or old rule which under the facts shown has the effect of avoiding a contract which has been adopted by a court decree where the facts show a reasonable basis for such contract.
I agree with the following statements taken from the Annotation relied upon by the prevailing opinion in 42 A.L.R.2d 1255:
“ * * * that the restraint is good if reasonable, or if to continue merely for a 'limited’ or a ‘particular’ time, ifc >{i %
Also in 42 A.L.R.2d 1258, where it is said:
“There seems to be nothing in the basic decisions (looking as well to *436contract cases generally, as to those falling within this annotation because dealing specifically with the question of the validity of express restraints) which, rightly understood, would deny validity to a suitably limited provision restraining alienation of a fee where imposed in reasonable protection of some interest in the premises retained by a conveyor or in any way vested in someone other than the person restrained. In fact there are various cases which by ruling or language, or on their facts or by fair implication, support this position, though not always by clear segregation of the question or well-articulated doctrine. It is quite evident that the occasional inclination, even outside of Indiana and Kentucky, to uphold certain limited restraints as being 'reasonable’ is in large measure traceable to instances in which the restraints were reasonably needed and were imposed in protection of interests in the premises retained or vested in some person other than the conveyee or general owner * * *»
Also in 42 A.L.R.2d page 1305, it is further stated:
“Restraining provisions suitably limited in reasonable protection of some interest in the premises retained by a conveyor or vested in one other than the person restrained are frequently regarded as valid.”
The foregoing quotations are in accord with our holding in Kamas State Bank v. Bourgeois.2
Here we have an unusual fact situation. The appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, had no interest in the land in question. The deceased was purchasing such land under a contract in his name only, on which a balance of more than $7,000 was still owing. There was also in effect on the life of the deceased, with his parents as beneficiaries, life insurance policies of about $20,000. A dispute arose between his widow and his parents as to who owned these life insurance policies. This dispute was settled by an agreement whereby the parents agreed to pay to balance owing on the real estate contract of approximately $8,000, but the entire sum was not to exceed $9,000. This agreement ended with the following provision:
“Subject to the provisions that said property may not be conveyed away by the distributees hereunder without the consent of Meredith Page and Maurine S. Page until such time as Ane Kir-stine Page shall have reached the age of 21 years or until one year after Ane Kirstine Page shall marry, whichever is sooner.”
*437This agreement was approved by the probate court and made a part of the decree of distribution. By her complaint the mother seeks to avoid the effect of that agreement because she was unable to keep the property up. She further claimed that deceased’s parents offered to buy the property for $10,000, whereas it was actually worth more than $20,000. She claimed that such an offer constitutes a consent to the sale. The deceased’s parents, appellants here, deny that they made any such offer to purchase the property. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a summary judgment thereby vitiating this contract and the provision of the decree of distribution. It held that such restrictions on alienation is void on its face and subject to collateral attack. I am of the opinion that the decree of distribution is not subject to collateral attack and may not be attacked directly after the expiration of six years without any appeal or complaint thereon.
Of course, if on a trial of the facts the trial court were to conclude that the appellants, decedent’s parents, did in fact consent to the sale by the widow as she claims, but thereafter attempted to require that the sale be made to them for $10,000 only, then such a restraint would be void and contrary to the agreement and public policy.
But under the facts as claimed by the appellants, there being nothing in the agreement which indicates that the restrictions were imposed to benefit the appellants, deceased’s parents, but all the restrictions seem to indicate a purpose and intention to protect the granddaughter of the appellants, if on a trial of the issues of fact presented the court were to find that such were the facts I think the restriction would under such facts not be unreasonable or void, and that the court should grant a rehearing to determine those facts.
Here the evidence indicates that the mother and grandparents negotiated a settlement. Under this settlement as negotiated the deceased’s parents advanced for the protection of their son’s widow and daughter some $9,000 to purchase the farm and pay other debts. I think that such an agreement made for the purpose and with the intent of protecting the granddaughter’s interest in the property is not unreasonable. So I would send the case back for a trial of these issues.

. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard Law Rev. 457, 469, as quoted in Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915.

. Kamas State Bank of Bougeois, 14 Utah 2d 188, 380 P.2d 931.