Court Opinion

ID: 9891131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 16:10:15.075632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:10.768282
License: Public Domain

J-A12035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  FATEEN GROCE                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 412 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 3, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0002098-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 17, 2023

       Fateen Groce appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following

his convictions for rape of an unconscious person, sexual assault, and indecent

assault.1 He contends his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations

and argues a Confrontation Clause violation. He also challenges the sufficiency

of evidence supporting the finding that he is a sexually violent predator (SVP).

We affirm.

       The victim called 911 in July 2002 to report a sexual assault. When

police interviewed her, she told them that she was staying in the one-bedroom

apartment of a friend, Kim Hadley, for a few months until they got an

apartment together. The victim slept on the sofa, while Hadley used the

bedroom. See Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations, Ex. A,

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(a)(3), 3124.1, and 3126(a)(1), respectively.
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Investigation Interview Record, 7/31/02, at 1 (unpaginated). Hadley had

“passed out drunk” before the victim went to sleep. The victim told police that

when she awoke in the morning, her vagina was wet and “smelled like sex.”

Id. However, she did not remember having sex or anyone touching her

because she had taken Tylenol PM and was “knocked out.” Id. She said she

had had a male visitor, but he went home before she went to sleep at around

2:00 AM or 2:30 AM. Id. The victim stated she had left the apartment door

unlocked, although the outside door leading to the apartments was locked.

Id. The front door also leads to two other apartments. Id. at 2. The victim

told Philadelphia police that one of those apartments was occupied by an older

man, while she believed a woman and her children lived in the other

apartment with one of the children’s fathers. Id.2

       When the victim woke up in the morning, Groce was in bed in Hadley’s

room, and the apartment door had been locked. Id. Groce had not been in

the apartment when the victim went to sleep. Id. Hadley told the victim that

Groce had keys to the apartment and had arrived around 4:00 AM, and that

she had locked the apartment door after he arrived. Id. According to a police

incident report, the victim told police that she believed “that she was raped

by unk[nown] person[.]” Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations,

Ex. C, Complaint or Incident Report, 7/31/02, at 1 (unpaginated).
____________________________________________

2 But see Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations, Ex. D,
Investigation Report, 8/5/02, at 1 (unpaginated) (“She stated that the other
apartments are occupied by women and children with the exception of an
elderly male that lives in the other 1st floor apartment.”).

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      Police officers took the victim to the hospital where a rape kit was

collected. Id. at 1; Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations, Ex.

D, Investigation Report, 8/5/02, at 1 (unpaginated). Police conducted criminal

history checks and found that Hadley had no prior record. Groce had five prior

arrests for narcotics, theft, and simple assault. See id. at 2. Police submitted

the rape kit for testing, which produced positive test results for sperm. See

Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations, Ex. E, Criminalistics

Laboratory Report, 8/16/02, at 1 (unpaginated). No DNA testing was

performed, and police did not interview Hadley or Groce at that time.

      The victim’s rape kit was not subjected to DNA testing until 14 years

later, in 2016, when Philadelphia received a grant and submitted a backlog of

rape kits to private laboratories. See N.T. Trial, 12/2/2020, at 188. The

victim’s kit was sent to Bode Cellmark Forensics (“Bode Lab”), which produced

a report dated July 2016 containing a DNA profile. Philadelphia police uploaded

the DNA profile to the local Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database

and sent the profile to the Pennsylvania State Police. In November 2017, the

State Police informed Philadelphia that the DNA profile had matched Groce’s

DNA profile in the state CODIS database. Philadelphia police obtained a buccal

swab from Groce that produced a DNA profile consistent with that obtained

from the rape kit.

      In January 2018, Police interviewed Hadley. She told them that she and

Groce were asleep in her room on the morning in question. See Motion to

Dismiss Pursuant to Statute of Limitations, Ex. B, Investigation Interview

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Record, 1/31/18, at 2 (unpaginated). The bedroom door flew open, and police

officers told her and Groce to get out of bed. According to Hadley, the victim

pointed at Groce and said, “That bastard raped me.” Id. at 2. On February 1,

2018, the Commonwealth charged Groce.

      Groce moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the statute of

limitations had run. The Commonwealth countered that a statutory exception

for genetic identification evidence applied. That exception applies where

evidence of certain offenses – including offenses with which Groce was

charged – contains DNA that “is subsequently used to identify an otherwise

unidentified individual as the perpetrator of the offense.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5552(c.1). In such cases, the prosecution for such offenses may begin either

within the statute of limitations provided for the offenses or one year after the

individual’s identity is determined, whichever is later. Id. Groce maintained

that the exception did not apply to him because he was not an “otherwise

unidentified individual.” He argued that this was so because police had

identified him as a suspect during the investigation in 2002. The trial court

denied Groce’s motion.

      Groce also filed a motion to suppress all forensic evidence including the

2016 Bode Lab Report. See N.T. Motion Volume 1, 1/10/20, at 21. Groce

argued that the report was inadmissible and pursuant to the Confrontation

Clause, the Commonwealth could only admit the report if they called the

analyst who conducted the report. Id. at 21-23. The court denied Groce’s

motion. See N.T. Motion Volume 1, 1/10/20.

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       At Groce’s bench trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of

David Hawkins, a forensic scientist at the Philadelphia Police Department’s

DNA Laboratory.3 He testified that he had conducted a full technical review of

the Bode Lab’s documentation to determine that all the laboratory work was

done according to standard operating procedures and that the DNA profile

listed in the 2016 Bode Lab Report was the same information that he observed

in the raw data. See N.T. Trial at 162-78. According to the trial court,

       [a]fter Hawkin’s technical review was completed, Brian Pfleegor,
       the forensic scientist who manages the PPD DNA Laboratory’s local
       Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database, uploaded the
       male DNA profile from the 2016 Bode Lab Report to the CODIS
       database and sent the information to the Pennsylvania State
       Police. See [N.T. Trial] at 185, 188-91. Eventually, the
       Pennsylvania State Police notified Pfleegor that the DNA profile
       uploaded in this case matched with [Groce’s] DNA profile in
       CODIS. See id. at 188-89, 192. Pfleegor generated a CODIS
       Convicted Offender Match Report dated November 10, 2017, that
       reflected this information. See id. at 189-90; Exhibit C
       (hereinafter 2017 CODIS Report). At that point, Philadelphia
       police obtained a buccal swab from [Groce] that both parties
       stipulated had been placed on a property receipt numbered
       3341824 that was dated February 2, 2018. See N.T. Trial at 191,
       195-96, 201; Exhibit C-8.

       Finally, an DNA Laboratory Report dated March 28, 2018, and
       signed by Lynn Haimowitz concluded that the DNA profile
       observed in [Groce’s] buccal swab was consistent with the DNA
       profile detected in the sample from [the victim’s] cervical swab;
       “[e]xcluding an identical twin, Fateem Groce is the source of the
       DNA detected in these samples.” See Exhibit C-10 (hereinafter
       2018 DNA Lab Report).

____________________________________________

3 Groce objected to the Commonwealth calling Hawkins as a witness, raising

the same Confrontation Clause argument as he made in his motion to
suppress. See N.T. Trial, 12/2/20, at 148.

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Trial Court Opinion, filed 7/20/22, at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).

      The court found Groce guilty of the above-referenced offenses. The

Commonwealth then moved to have him declared a Sexually Violent Predator.

The court conducted an SVP hearing at sentencing, and the Commonwealth

presented the testimony of a licensed psychologist, Dr. Cristine Dudley, who

had evaluated Groce for the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board. The

Commonwealth also introduced into evidence Dr. Dudley’s expert report. Dr.

Dudley testified that she did not interview Groce because he had declined to

be interviewed. See N.T. Sentencing Hearing, 11/3/21, at 13. However, she

maintained that this did not inhibit her assessment. Id.

      Dr. Dudley testified that she concluded that Groce was an SVP after

considering several factors, including, but not limited to, the facts surrounding

the case, Groce’s criminal history, and any mental illness, disability, or

abnormality from which Groce suffered. Id. at 15-20. Dr. Dudley stated that

Groce had previously been diagnosed with “personality disorder not otherwise

specified" during a mental health evaluation, and she found he met the criteria

for antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 20. She based her diagnosis on

Groce’s “pervasive disregard for and violation of the rights of others since he

was 12. His criminal versatility, his arresting conviction record and misconduct

charges incurred while incarcerated.” Id. She stated that the diagnosis was

also based on Groce “having several different alias[es], not admitting to

sexually assaulting [the victim] despite knowing her or seeing her distressed

the day that she discovered that she had been sexually violated.” Id. at 20-

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21. She testified that though Groce had not been convicted of any sex crimes

since 2002, “he has displayed personal violence” consistent with antisocial

personality disorder. Id. at 40, 41.

      Dr. Dudley also stated that she found Groce’s actions were predatory.

Id. at 24. She explained that “he went into where the victim was located and

sexually assaulted [the victim], despite seeing that she was unconscious . . .

for the sole purpose of meeting his sexual needs without regard to her health

and well-being.” Id.

      Dr. Dudley also found Groce likely to re-offend:

      Mr. Groce has engaged in illegal behavior since he was 12 years
      old, if not earlier. He has had multiple arrests and convictions as
      an adult, and it is evident that Mr. Groce has a wanton disregard
      for the rules of society and the rights of others, and he will engage
      in sexual behaviors with people against their will when having the
      opportunity to meet his own needs.

Id. at 22.

      The court found Groce was an SVP and sentenced him to five to 10 years

in prison. Groce filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the

evidence. The court denied the motion, and this timely appeal followed.

      Groce argues the following issues:

         I.    Where the accuser provided police with [Groce’s]
               name as the assailant on the day of the alleged crime,
               does the five-year applicable statute of limitations bar
               the filing the criminal complaint on the current
               charges fifteen years later, thereby requiring a
               dismissal?

         II.   Was there a violation of Mr. Groce’s Confrontation
               Clause rights pursuant to the Federal and State

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                Constitutions where inadmissible testimonial forensic
                reports were used to establish an essential element of
                the offenses – identity – and were the only proof of
                that element?

         III.   Was the evidence insufficient to find by clear and
                convincing proof that Mr. Groce is a sexually violent
                predator?

Groce’s Br. at 4 (answers of trial court omitted).

      Groce     maintains   that   the    statute   of   limitations   barred   the

Commonwealth from prosecuting him. He argues that Section 5552(c.1) does

not apply here because he was not an “otherwise unidentified individual.” See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c.1). He states that at trial, the victim testified that she

told police that Groce was the perpetrator on the day of the incident. He

asserts that Hadley testified that the victim barged into her room and said,

“[T]hat bastard raped me, pointing her finger at [Groce].” Groce’s Br. at 18,

19 (citing N.T. Trial, at 116).

      Noting that Section 5552(c.1) does not define an “otherwise unidentified

individual,” Groce maintains that the plain meaning of the words precludes

their application to him. He argues that a person is not “unidentified” if “their

identity is known to the police and the police possess probable cause or more

to investigate or charge that person with a crime.” Id. at 25. Groce argues

that “[i]n every possible way” he was “‘identified’ as the suspect to police”

such that Section 5552(c.1) is inapplicable. Id. at 27.

      Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Our standard of review is

de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Giulian,

141 A.3d 1262, 1266 (Pa. 2016). Our task in conducting statutory construction

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is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §

1921(a). “A statute’s plain language generally provides the best indication of

legislative intent.” Giulian, 141 A.3d at 1267. “In construing the language,

however, and giving it effect, we should not interpret statutory words in

isolation, but must read them with reference to the context in which they

appear.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Words and

phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to

their common and approved usage[.]” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). We may

examine dictionary definitions when determining the ordinary meaning of

words and phrases. See Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298, 307 (Pa.

2022). In ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly, we presume that

it “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution],] or

unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(1); see Mercury Trucking, Inc. v. Pa.

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 55 A.3d 1056, 1068 (Pa. 2012).

      The statute at issue, Section 5552(c.1), provides:

         Genetic identification evidence.--Notwithstanding any
         provision of law to the contrary, if evidence of a
         misdemeanor sexual offense set forth in subsection (c)(3)
         or (3.1) or a felony offense is obtained containing human
         deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which is subsequently used to
         identify an otherwise unidentified individual as the
         perpetrator of the offense, the prosecution of the offense
         may be commenced within the period of limitations provided
         for the offense or one year after the identity of the individual
         is determined, whichever is later.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c.1).

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      Merriam-Webster defines “unidentified” as “not having a known or

established    identity.”    Unidentified,    Merriam-Webster       Dictionary,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unidentified              (accessed

9/20/23). Similarly, Brittanica Dictionary defines “unidentified” as “not known

or        identified.”       Unidentified,        Brittanica       Dictionary,

https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/unidentified (accessed 9/20/23).

      We read Section 5552(c.1) as applying where DNA evidence has been

used to identify a person otherwise “not having a known or established

identity” as the perpetrator of the offense. Groce’s suggested reading – that

“unidentified” means only persons whose identities are unknown to police – is

absurd and unreasonable. Employing that definition would result in the

extension being inapplicable to many people whom authorities had no basis

to suspect but whose names they nonetheless knew. Cf. Commonwealth v.

Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 194(Pa. 2005) (choosing alternative construction of

mandatory sentencing provision to avoid absurd incongruity with graduated

sentencing scheme).

      Groce was “an otherwise unidentified individual as the perpetrator of the

offense.” The Commonwealth first obtained DNA evidence identifying the

perpetrator of the victim’s rape in 2017. Although the police knew of Groce in

2002, the record does not show that he was identified at that time as the

perpetrator of the victim’s rape. The victim did not identify Groce as her

attacker when she gave her statement to the police in 2002. In fact, according

to her statement, she did not remember anyone touching her body. See

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Defense Exhibit 1. Although Hadley testified at trial that the victim had

accused Groce in 2002, the record shows that the Commonwealth did not

know this information until Hadley gave her statement in 2018, after the

Commonwealth had filed charges against Groce. See N.T. Trial, at 119

(Hadley agreeing that she did not give a statement to police until January

2018). The record refutes Groce’s claim that he was not an “unidentified

individual as the perpetrator of the offense.”

      Next, Groce alleges that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated

when the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to admit the Bode Lab Report

into evidence. He directs our attention to Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d

520 (Pa. 2013), stating that forensic reports are testimonial. Groce’s Br. at

28. As such he maintains there is “no question” as to whether the report was

testimonial in nature. Id. at 31. He notes Hawkins was not an employee of

Bode and was not “involved either directly or as a supervisor in the analysis

or preparation of the report.” Id. at 30. Because the Commonwealth did not

have the analyst of the report testify, Groce argues that the court violated his

right to confrontation and this error was not harmless.

      A claim that an appellant’s right to confront a witness under the

Confrontation Clause of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions is a

question of law. See Commonwealth v. Yohe, 39 A.3d 381, 384 (Pa.Super.

2012). Our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Id.

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      The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . .” U.S.

Const. amend. VI; see also Commonwealth v. Geiger, 944 A.2d 85, 97 n.6

(Pa.Super. 2008) (“Pennsylvania’s Constitution affords the same protection as

its federal counterpart with regard to the Confrontation Clause”). This right to

confrontation “applies to witnesses against the accused – in other words,

those who bear testimony. Testimony, in turn, is typically a solemn declaration

or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (cleaned up). The

confrontation right extends to forensic or scientific reports that are testimonial

in nature. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 185 A.3d 316, 319 n.3 (Pa. 2018).

      Even assuming purely for purposes of argument that there was a

Confrontation Clause violation here, the admission of the 2016 Bode Lab

Report was at most harmless error. Harmless error analysis applies to claims

of Confrontation Clause violations, and we may raise harmless error sua

sponte. See id. at 330; Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 540 (Pa.

2022).

      An error is harmless where:

      (1) it did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de
      minimis; or

      (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
      other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
      erroneously admitted evidence; or

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      (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt
      was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was
      so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
      contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Green, 162 A.3d 509, 519 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc)

(emphasis omitted).

      Here, we find the third category applies: any confrontation error was

harmless because the “properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence” of

Groce’s guilt was overwhelming and any prejudicial effect of the claimed error

was so insignificant that it could not have contributed to the verdict. The

victim’s rape kit tested positive for sperm and Groce was the only male in the

apartment while she was sleeping. The victim also testified that she did not

remember having sex with anyone when she went to sleep that night. Most

damning, according to the DNA recovered from the buccal swab, which was

not submitted to Bode Lab, excluding an identical twin, Groce was the source

of the DNA recovered from the victim’s rape kit.

      Groce’s final claim challenges the court’s acceptance of Dr. Dudley’s

conclusion that Groce qualified as an SVP. He claims that Dr. Dudley’s

assessment was based on “fallible and minimal information that did not

comport with the record.” Groce’s Br. at 43. He challenges Dr. Dudley’s

diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder on the ground that such a diagnosis

was not reflected in Groce’s prior mental health evaluation. Groce also

maintains that Dr. Dudley’s conclusion ignored many of the factors to be

considered during an SVP assessment.

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      “We will reverse a trial court’s determination of SVP status only if the

Commonwealth has not presented clear and convincing evidence that each

element of the statute has been satisfied.” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 991

A.2d 935, 942 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). We view the evidence of

record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See id.

      A sexually violent predator is defined as:

          A person who has been convicted of a sexually violent
         offense set forth in Section 9795.1 (relating to registration)
         and who is determined to be a sexually violent predator
         under 9795.4 (relating to assessments) due to a mental
         abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person
         likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses.

Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 84 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted). The evidence must also show that the defendant’s conduct was

predatory. See id. “The salient inquiry to be made by the trial court is the

identification of the impetus behind the commission of the crime and the

extent to which the offender is likely to reoffend.” Commonwealth v.

Morgan, 16 A.3d 1165, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Fuentes, 991 A.2d

at 943) (emphasis omitted). However, a likelihood of re-offense is not required

for an SVP designation. See id. at 1169, 1173.

      While Groce claims that Dr. Dudley ignored many of the factors of

consideration for an SVP assessment, he fails to specify the factors she

allegedly ignored. Our review of the record shows that Dr. Dudley thoroughly

testified regarding the evidence or lack thereof for each factor. See N.T.

Sentencing Hearing, 15-21. She also testified that based on Groce’s antisocial

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personality diagnosis, Groce has a mental abnormality that makes it likely that

he will re-offend. She explained that Groce has engaged in criminal activity

since the age of 12, had multiple arrests and convictions as an adult, and had

a “wonton disregard for the rules of society and the rights of others[.]” Id. at

22. In line with his antisocial personality traits, Dr. Dudley concluded that

Groce “will engage in sexual behaviors with people against their will when

having the opportunity to meet his own needs.” Id. To the extent Groce

maintains that her diagnosis was improper because it allegedly did not

comport with his prior mental health assessment, any such inconsistency goes

to the weight and not the sufficiency of the evidence. It is not so grave an

inconsistency as to render the evidence less than clear and convincing. Viewed

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and considering the

Commonwealth’s burden, the evidence supporting the SVP determination was

sufficient.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Date: 10/17/2023

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