Court Opinion

ID: 9781466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:39:13.284553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:26.795342
License: Public Domain

GARBARINO, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 27 The defendant was originally charged in Maricopa County Cause Number CR 2000-014594 with one count of DUI while his driver’s license was suspended and one count of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more within two hours of driving *175while his driver’s license was suspended. Following the trial court’s grant of his motion to suppress on the ground that the medical assistant was not qualified to draw blood under A.R.S. § 28-1388(A), the State moved to dismiss the charges without prejudice. The trial court granted the State’s motion and the resulting order of dismissal was never appealed.
¶ 28 Approximately seven months later, Olcavage was decided. 200 Ariz. at 582, 30 P.3d at 649. The thrust of that decision was to validate the status of the medical assistant drawing the defendant’s blood as one qualified to draw blood within the meaning of A.R.S. § 28-1388(A). Id. at 588, 30 P.3d at 655. Olcavage clearly made the trial court’s first suppression ruling incorrect.
¶ 29 Following Olcavage, the State re-filed the charges. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment, arguing that the judge was bound by the ruling in the first case, Maricopa County Cause Number CR 2000-014594.
¶ 30 The first issue is whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded the trial judge from reconsidering the suppression order entered in Maricopa County Cause Number CR 2000-014594. It must be remembered that the State never appealed the order of suppression following their motion to dismiss.
¶ 31 The defendant relies upon Nahee, 155 Ariz. at 115, 745 P.2d at 173, for the proposition that because the State failed to timely appeal the suppression ruling, it became the “law of the case.” In Nahee, a police officer with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, armed with a tribal warrant, arrested the defendant on the Yavapai Indian Reservation for a crime that had been committed off of the reservation. Id. at 115, 745 P.2d at 173. The police officer transported the defendant to Clarkdale and turned him over to the Clarkdale police. Id. Section 6.35 of the Yavapai Apache Code required the officers to return the defendant to the “Tribal Court for release to off-reservation authorities.” Id. (emphasis in original). The officers failed to comply with this section of the code. Id. When the defendant was brought before the Yavapai County Superior Court, the court dismissed the State’s case against the defendant for lack of jurisdiction. Id. In doing so, the court did not rule on any substantive issues. The State failed to timely appeal. Id.
¶32 Subsequently, the defendant submitted to the jurisdiction of the superior court. Id. Upon submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant filed a motion to suppress. Id. In his motion, the defendant argued that based upon the court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, he had been illegally arrested and the physical evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest should be suppressed. Id. The court granted the motion and the State dismissed the ease without prejudice and appealed. Id.
¶ 33 On appeal, this Court explained that although the trial court erroneously dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, the ruling was the “law of the case” because the State failed to timely appeal. Id. at 115 n. 2, 745 P.2d at 173 n. 2. Although this explanation appears to be dicta, it was necessary because had jurisdiction been proper, the defendant’s motion to suppress would have failed without further analysis. See id. at 115, 745 P.2d at 173.
¶ 34 The facts in Nahee are consistent with those in the present case. Here, the State moved to dismiss the case without prejudice so that it could appeal the trial court’s suppression ruling. The State, however, did not appeal. When this Court decided Olcavage, there were no charges pending against the defendant. The time for appeal had expired. Therefore, the case was not pending at the time that the law was clarified.8
¶ 35 Once there has been a ruling adverse to the State and the case is dismissed, if the State then fails to appeal, the ruling becomes the “law of the case.” The State cannot sit back, wait for the law to change, and then reinstate the charges. If the State believes that the trial judge erred or that the existing *176law was erroneous, it must protect its position by timely filing an appeal.
¶36 The State argues that even if the blood evidence was improperly admitted, the defendant was acquitted of Count 2 (BAC of 0.10 or more) and the evidence was not relevant to Count 1 (driving while impaired to the slightest degree). I disagree.
¶ 37 Reversal is warranted when inadmissible evidence is put before the jury and it results in prejudice to a defendant. See Celaya, 135 Ariz. at 256, 660 P.2d at 857. A defendant is prejudiced if it appears “reasonably possible” that the inadmissible evidence “might have materially influenced the jury.” Id.
¶ 38 Here, the State was not able to prove that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within two hours of driving while his driver’s license was suspended, as alleged in Count 2. The jury, however, found the defendant guilty of Count 1, which alleged that the defendant had been driving while impaired to the slightest degree while his driver’s license was suspended. The admission of blood evidence reflecting the defendant’s ingestion of alcohol was highly relevant to the allegation that the defendant was impaired to the slightest degree. Although the State was not able to prove that the defendant had a BAC of 0.10 or more within two hours of driving, the evidence strongly suggests that the defendant had alcohol in his blood. The jury could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was impaired to the slightest degree because he had ingested alcohol as reflected by the blood test. The admission of the blood evidence prejudiced the defendant.
¶ 39 I would reverse the defendant’s conviction and sentence.

. Although the first action was dismissed, the doctrine of "law of the case” applies because the State reindicted the defendant on the same charges that arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the original indictment. See, e.g., Nahee, 155 Ariz. at 115, 745 P.2d at 173.