Court Opinion

ID: 9563118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:37:02.557831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:44.316022
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s holding that the applicable statute of limitations “is not tolled until all appeals have been exhausted.”
The majority concedes that “[i]f a party was forced to take truly inconsistent positions and ‘more good than harm would result from [the] departure,’ then we might be inclined to re-examine Wettanen.” (Alteration in original) (citation omitted).1 Here Beesley *1284was forced to take “truly inconsistent positions” and thus I am led to the conclusion that in the particular circumstances of this case the statute of limitations was tolled until Beesley’s appeal of the underlying action was finally resolved.
First, this court has taken the position that although the defense of the statute of limitations is a legitimate one, it is generally disfavored. Lee Houston & Assocs., Ltd. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 854-55 (Alaska 1991); Jenkins v. Daniels, 751 P.2d 19, 22 (Alaska 1988). We have also observed that “[w]here two constructions as to the limitations period are possible, the courts prefer the one which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981).
Second, our jurisprudence has de-empha-sized the traditional policies advanced in support of statutes of limitations, namely, fairness to the defendant (notice), concern that witness memories will fade over time, avoidance of witness unavailability, and the avoidance of loss of evidence in general. Adoption of the discovery rule, for example, undermined most of these policies since some claimants do not discover their injuries until many years after the applicable period of limitations.2
Third, Van Doren had actual notice early on, as did his errors and omissions insurance carrier, of his alleged legal malpractice in representing Beesley against Mukluk and Crowley.3 Depositions were taken and Van Doren had the opportunity to perpetuate testimony.
Fourth, although I agree that the applicable statute of limitations commences when a party discovers or reasonably should have discovered his or her cause of action and suffers actual damages, here the statute of limitations should be tolled for the reasons advanced by Beesley in his briefing to this court. I find particularly compelling Bees-ley’s argument — not raised, briefed, or addressed in Wettanen — that the majority’s rule would force him to assert inconsistent positions in the underlying litigation against Mukluk and Crowley and in the legal malpractice action against Van Doren. In this regard I disagree with the majority’s statement that “[w]e are not persuaded that Bees-ley’s positions in the underlying and malpractice eases are inconsistent.”
While litigating the underlying action, Beesley disclaimed the existence of an accord and satisfaction. Had Beesley brought a legal malpractice action against Van Doren during this time, he would have taken the *1285inconsistent position that Van Doren’s alleged negligence gave rise to an accord and satisfaction.4
Fifth, I am not persuaded that Wettanen must be overruled to reach the holding that the statute of limitations is tolled when the claimant is appealing in the underlying action, and as a consequence is required to advance inconsistent positions in the underlying litigation and in the malpractice action. As noted previously the arguments raised in Beesley’s instant appeal were not raised in the Wettanen appeal. Further, even if Wet-tanen must be overruled, under the governing principles of stare decisis, I conclude that there is no persuasive bar to modification of Wettanen for the purpose of fashioning a tolling exception.
We will overrule one of our prior decisions only when we are
“ ‘clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent’.... ” A decision may prove to be originally erroneous if the rule announced proves to be unworkable in practice. Additionally, a prior decision may be abandoned because of “changed conditions” if “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application....”
Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
The strength of stare decisis’ command for respect for precedent varies depending upon the precedent involved. Wettanen, in my view, illustrates a type of decision in which the command is not particularly compelling. Wettanen was decided without the benefit of a clear adversarial presentation of the “exhaustion of appeals” doctrine, or any adversarial presentation of the inconsistent positions rationale. Justice Souter has remarked that a precedent that “was not subject to ‘full-dress argument’ prior to its announcement ... is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and argument.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2247, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This principle recognizes that “[s]ound judicial decisionmaking requires ‘both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense’ of the issues in dispute.” Id.
Sixth, I note that Shaw v. State, Department of Administration, Public Defender Agency, 816 P.2d 1358 (Alaska 1991), which was decided after Wettanen, undercuts Wet-tanen ⅛ reliance on Hunt v. Bittman, 482 F.Supp. 1017 (D.D.C.1980), aff'd, 652 F.2d 196 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860, 102 S.Ct. 315, 70 L.Ed.2d 158 (1981). Despite all the traditional rationales advanced in support of statutes of limitations, we held in Shaw that in a legal malpractice action arising out of a criminal proceeding the statute of limitations for filing legal malpractice claims must be tolled until the criminal defendant obtains post-conviction relief. 816 P.2d at 1360. In reaching this conclusion, we noted the uniqueness of criminal proceedings:
By adopting the date that post-conviction relief is obtained as the trigger to the statute of limitations, we establish a bright line test which should significantly assist courts in the resolution of statute of limitations issues.
... Also of concern is the attorney who, in the course of defending against a malpractice action, might produce privileged or other evidence in his or her defense that might hurt a criminal defendant with a *1286legitimate basis for post-conviction relief. Finally, we note the desirability of allowing a criminal defendant with a valid post-conviction relief claim to pursue that remedy without the distraction of also filing a legal malpractice claim.
Id. at 1361 (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing, I would adopt the exhaustion of appeals tolling rule in the particular circumstances of this case.5 In the words of Justice Mosk,
To force malpractice plaintiffs to file their actions before they know the outcome of the case upon which their claim is based does not promote judicial economy. The status of the malpractice claim is uncertain until the appeal in the underlying case is resolved, because if it is ultimately decided in the client’s favor the malpractice suit may well become moot for lack of damages.
Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal.4th 606, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 550, 828 P.2d 691, 704 (Mosk, J., dissenting), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 658, 121 L.Ed.2d 584 (1992).

. Note, the precise question certified to this court by the federal court:
In a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff claims that the attorney’s negligent representation of the plaintiff in a prior case resulted in the creation of a new defense for the defendant in the prior case, and that plaintiff could not initiate an action against the attorney prior to final resolution of the prior case because to do so would require plaintiff to asset [sic] a position that would be directly and *1284materially adverse to plaintiff's claims against defendant in the prior case, when does plaintiff's right of action against the attorney accrue for purposes of commencing the applicable period of limitation?

. Under Racine, 806 P.2d at 855, and Pedersen v. Flannery, 863 P.2d 856, 857 (Alaska 1993), the applicable statute of limitations is six years. Here Beesley filed his legal malpractice claim against Van Doren within one year after the expiration of the six-year limitations period, assuming that no tolling occurred.

. Van Doren concedes as much. He acknowledges that in December 1983 Van Doren's replacement, Paul Davis, wrote Van Doren the following:
I have recently reviewed the enclosed state Supreme Court case, Atlas Van Lines, Inc. v. Jack Buster, et al, Op. No. 276 — December 9, 1983, and believe that an accord and satisfaction based upon the negotiations of the checks in combination with the letters that were written to your, now my, clients may raise a legitimate issue of accord and satisfaction that we are going to have to deal with.
He also admits that in March of 1984 Davis wrote Van Doren demanding an explanation of why he advised the truckers to cash the checks, stating "that your determination to cash the checks has greatly imperiled the drivers [sic] chance to seek the correct compensation that they are owed by Mukluk.” In this same communication Davis advised Van Doren to "notify [his] errors and omissions carrier of [the] situation immediately...." (Emphasis added).
Van Doren also concedes that
[o]n October 8, 1984, Davis wrote to Van Doren’s attorney, George Hayes, that "[i]t is our belief, based upon the statements that were made by Mr. Van Doren in his deposition, along with those statements made to his (now my) clients, Mr. Van Doren engaged in an act of malpractice when he advised the clients and caused their checks to be cashed.” Davis requested financial and legal assistance in filing appeal bonds, meeting appeal costs and preparing the necessary briefs. Davis concluded "But for Mr. Van Doren’s negligence, the Summary Judgment Motion would not have been granted, making an appeal unnecessary."
(Citations omitted) (alteration in original).

. The majority’s opinion forces an attorney and client to take into account strategic considerations that would play no role under other rules. Suppose that a client sues for legal malpractice while the underlying suit is proceeding. Soon thereafter, the malpractice court enters summary judgment against the client, and the client appeals. The client's new attorney might decide that making the best argument in the malpractice action might result in an admission or ruling that would undermine the viability of the underlying suit. If the underlying suit seems more important, the attorney might decline to make the argument, even when the actions proceed in different courts.

. See, e.g., Bonanno v. Potthoff, 527 F.Supp. 561, 565 (N.D.Ill.1981) (applying Illinois law); Amfac Distrib. Co. v. Miller, 138 Ariz. 152, 673 P.2d 792, 794 (1983); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Lane, 565 So.2d 1323, 1326 (Fla.1990); Neylan v. Moser, 400 N.W.2d 538, 542 (Iowa 1987); United States Nat'l Bank v. Davies, 274 Or. 663, 548 P.2d 966, 970 (1976); Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Tex.1991).