Court Opinion

ID: 9707170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:04:27.88399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:27.447831
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that all fees paid by adopters must promote the child’s welfare. For this reason, the majority may well be correct in holding *460that a sliding scale of fees should be proscribed. A schedule of fees based solely on the adopters’ income does not establish any correlation with the actual services flowing to the child. Therefore, absent legislative or appropriate administrative approval of such a fee, judicial proscription is proper.
Nevertheless, for the following reasons, I believe Superi- or Court properly remanded these cases to the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas (Orphans’ Court) to make specific factual findings in each case. First, I believe there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the general conclusions of the Orphans’ Court in these cases. Second, while I agree with the majority that all fees paid by the adopters must promote the child’s welfare, I disagree with the majority’s per se rule requiring a direct benefit to the child. I believe the distinction between direct and indirect will at best prove elusive and will probably lead to anomalous results. So-called indirect benefits under certain circumstances promote the needs and welfare of the child and may at times be essential to its well-being.
I
I share the majority’s concern that helpless infants not be bartered or sold like commodities in our society, but I find these records to be equivocal.
The Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910, enacted October 15, 1980 and effective January 1, 1981, mandates that the Orphans’ Court appoint counsel to represent the child in a contested involuntary termination proceeding and authorizes the appointment of counsel or a guardian ad litem at any time for a child who has not reached the age of 18 years. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a).1 Prior to the filing of a *461Petition for Adoption, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2701 and 2702, the Act requires two reports: a report of intention to adopt, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531 and 2532, to be filed by the person intending to adopt a child within thirty days after receiving custody of the child, and a report of the intermediary, §§ 2533 and 2534, to be filed by the intermediary who arranged the adoption within six months after the report of intention. Both of these reports require itemized accounting of moneys and consideration paid or to be paid to the intermediary, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531(b)(4), or to any other person by reason of the adoption placement, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2533(b)(8). Section 2535 then requires the Orphans’ Court to cause an investigation to be made covering all pertinent information regarding the child’s eligibility for adoption and the suitability of the placement. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2535. Thus, the Orphans’ Court has full authority to investigate the entire placement process and the expenditures involved.
In these six adoption cases, each presented by the same attorney and involving the same unlicensed intermediary employed by an unlicensed agency,2 the Orphans’ Court appears, not wholly without foundation, to have had concerns as to the propriety of the expenses paid by the adopting parents. The individual opinions of the Orphans’ Court articulate that Court’s serious concerns about misleading practices and statements on the part of the adopters and the intermediary, slip op. In re: Adoption of Baby Girl D, Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, Orphans’ Court Division, No. 282 of 1982, at 2-4. At the request of counsel following one of the hearings on voluntary relinquishment in November, 1982, the Orphans’ Court filed an order in limine setting forth guidelines for allowable *462charges to be paid by the adopters in all six of these cases prior to the court’s issuance of final orders of adoption. These guidelines prohibit the intermediary agency from imposing on adopters charges for the natural mother’s room and board or travel expenses, charges for counseling and non-birth-related medical expenses. Id. at 8-12.3
The majority justifies on two grounds the Orphans’ Court’s holding that any expenses paid by the adopters that do not directly benefit the child must be proscribed. The first assumes that if the adopters are allowed to pay for any other expenses, intermediaries, such as Family Planning,4 will place children with the wealthiest couples seeking adoption without considering other factors which affect that couple’s fitness as parents as compared to others seeking children for adoption.5 Out of concern that wealth may become the only consideration, the majority reasons that the needs and welfare of children in general, not the particular children here involved, will be promoted, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2902, by not placing them in homes on the basis of proposed adopters’ means. From these premis*463es, it concludes that all charges for costs not directly related to the birth and adoption itself should be precluded in all cases. Even if we accept the premise and its resultant policy as sound, the court’s authority to propound general rules is limited to matters of procedure. Const, of PA. art. V. § 10(c). In matters of substance, the court’s authority extends only to case by case adjudication.
The majority further justifies its action by assuming that any service provided by the adopters to the natural mother will unduly and improperly influence her in her decision on whether to relinquish her parental rights. From this premise the majority concludes that the buying and selling of children can be prevented by not allowing the adopters who will receive the child to finance any of the expenses other than reasonable, unreimbursed lying-in expenses, counsel fees for the adoption proceeding and the costs of the proceedings. Maj. op. at 454-455.
In these six cases the fees paid by the adopting parents that have been prohibited by the Orphans’ Court and affirmed by the majority include fees for counseling both the natural mother6 and the adopting couple, expenses for room and board for the natural mother, and all medical expenses not directly related to the delivery of the child.
Facts to support the assumptions the majority makes are difficult to gather within the context of this judicial record, which contains conflicting testimony combined from sepa*464rate cases. The record lacks evidence to support an identical result in all six cases on all proscribed items. Because of the equivocal nature of the record, the majority’s analysis appears to be based more on disputable theories than proven facts and would be more appropriately left to a legislative or administrative body. Judicial action, on the other hand, requires an analysis of each proscribed item of reported expense on the basis of the evidence produced in connection with each child. To accomplish this task, I believe it is apparent that Superior Court correctly remanded these records to the Orphans’ Court for a case by case determination and to supplement the record as may be necessary.
II
From the language of the majority’s opinion, I fear its per se rule that all fees paid by the adopting couple must directly benefit the child will preclude consideration of the unique circumstances that develop with each adoption. Under the text of its opinion, if the natural mother were afflicted with a life threatening illness that could also kill the child she carries, the adopters could not come to her aid because the natural mother would directly benefit from the treatment. Maj. op. at 456-457 n. 5. This would be the case even if all of the evidence clearly indicated that she intended to relinquish her parental rights to that particular adopting couple. It is difficult to understand how the needs and welfare of the child are promoted under such circumstances. On the other hand, if the adopters were financing the natural mother’s face lift, there would be no benefit to the child, and there would be a legitimate concern that financing this operation was a form of consideration for the baby.
It is for this reason that courts have traditionally examined the propriety of fees for adoptions on a case by case basis. As our Superior Court noted in a recent examination of the propriety of certain fees in adoption proceedings:
*465A contract wherein a mother of a child agrees to adoption of her child by another in consideration of a monetary consideration to herself is void as against public policy. See Savannah Bank and Trust Co. v. Hanley, 208 Ga. 34, 65 S.E.2d 26 [1951]. Where the monetary consideration is to flow to the child such a contract is not void as against public policy. See Savannah Bank and Trust Co. v. Wolff, 191 Ga. 111, 11 S.E.2d 766.
Gorden v. Cutler, 324 Pa.Superior Ct. 35, 53, 471 A.2d 449, 458 (1983) (quoting Downs v. Wortman, 228 Ga. 315, 315, 185 S.E.2d 387, 388 (1971)). The Superior Court further noted that while there is little Pennsylvania precedent on point, what can be derived from those cases is:
that a contractual agreement ‘benefitting a child’ will not ipso facto be categorized as against public policy without first looking at the facts of the particular case. Such an approach is not only laudable, but it is consistent with those courts which have been confronted with the validity of contractual agreements that provide for the payment of pre-natal care in adoption cases. See Anno., Right of Natural Parent to Withdraw Valid Consent to Adoption of Child, 74 A.L.R.3d 421, § 18; Anno., What Constitutes Undue Influence in Obtaining a Parents [sic] Consent to Adoption of Child, 50 A.L.R.3d 918, § 4.
Gorden v. Cutler, Id., 324 Pa.Superior Ct. at 51-52, 471 A.2d 457 (emphasis added).
In Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30 A. 129 (1894), a grandfather offered his daughter-in-law $20,000, and her son $10,000 when he reached maturity, “if she would permit him to take her son and educate him, the boy to make his home with him until he was of age, she to have the privilege of visiting her child when she desired, and to have him at her home whenever convenient.” Id., 164 Pa. at 270, 30 A. at 129. This Court reasoned that if the agreement had been between strangers, and the natural parent was trying to relieve herself of all maternal obligations, then the agree*466ment would have been against public policy. Id., 164 Pa. at 272-73, 30 A. at 130. This Court held, however, that because this was a “family compact” and intended to promote the welfare of the child, it was not against public policy. Id., 164 Pa. at 273-74, 30 A. 130. Although distinguishable, this case does clearly illustrate that a fee paid by the adopting parents may be solely for the purpose of inducing the natural mother to consent to the adoption in one case, or for the welfare of both. See also Barwin v. Reidy, 62 N.M. 183, 307 P.2d 175 (1957) (the court must look to the circumstances of a particular case to determine whether to revoke an adoption because of fees paid to the natural parents).
Pennsylvania’s Adoption Act, to my mind, requires a case by case analysis by the Orphans’ Courts. In recent amendments, the legislature has not proscribed any particular fees. Instead, it has left the matter to the Orphans’ Courts to decide only whether they were excessive in the context of particular cases. Section 2533(c) of the Adoption Act, which was added in 1982, provides:
Appropriate relief. — The court may provide appropriate relief where it finds that the moneys or consideration reported or reportable pursuant to subsection (b)(8) are excessive.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2533(c). As noted supra at page 3, the Adoption Act requires the adopting parties to provide a report of their payments to the intermediary, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531, and the intermediary to provide:
An itemized accounting of moneys and consideration paid or to be paid to or received by the intermediary or to or by any other person or persons to the knowledge of the intermediary by reason of the adoption placement.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2533(b)(8). Therefore, under the Adoption Act, the Orphans’ Court can and should determine whether any particular fee is excessive. The Act does not seem to me to authorize the Orphans’ Court to rule in or out whole servic*467es or charges in order to determine excessiveness. Rather, it must look at the circumstances involved in each particular proceeding. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 27 Pa.D. & C.3d 584 (1983) (in applying the Act the Orphans’ Court reduced a $5,000 attorney fee, where the facts indicated the adoption proceeding was routine).
Ill
The economic realities of shrinking government aid for social services cannot be ignored. And, as appellant admits, it is becoming more difficult for conventional adoption agencies to meet their financial needs through donations.7 If the only way that an adoption agency can provide services that promote the needs and welfare of the child is to charge the adopting parents, it should be permitted as long as there is no real evidence that it is encouraging the buying or selling of babies.
Because of these problems, I, like Superior Court, would vacate the Orphans’ Court’s order and remand all six cases to that Court with instructions to hold further hearings consistent with this opinion. In this way the Orphans’ Court could determine whether the fees paid by the adopting parents promoted the child’s welfare under the circumstances. Under this standard some fees, such as lying-in expenses, would clearly benefit the child, while others, such as the sliding scale fee, would provide no benefit to the child at all. This analysis, however, would provide more flexibility to the Orphans’ Court to look at all the circumstances when dealing with fees for less conclusive services such as room and board.
ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ., join this opinion.

. This Section of the Adoption Act was amended by the Act of June 23, 1982, P.L.617, to read as follows:
(a) General rule. — The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who *461has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child and the adopting parent or parents.

. Family Health Council of Western Pennsylvania, Inc., t/d/b/a Family Infertility and Adoption Center and Family Planning Council of Western Pennsylvania received a license from the Department of Welfare on January 13, 1983. Reproduced Record at 231-233a.

. While the Orphans' Court also prohibited fees paid for advertising, the majority concluded that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to conclude that advertising fees were improperly charged to adopters. Maj. op. 459.

. It appears from the record that all parties, as well as the Orphans’ Court, assumed that the nominal intermediary, Elizabeth Cessna, acted as an agent of Family Planning within the scope of her authority. Id. at 2. Therefore, we will hereinafter treat Family Planning as the actual intermediary.

. It should be noted that the 1982 amendments to the Adoption Act permit the court to charge the costs attendant to an adoption proceeding to the county.
(b) Payment of costs. — The court, in its discretion, may order all or part of the costs attendant to a proceeding under this part to be paid by the county wherein the case is heard, the adopting parents or apportioned to both, provided that if the adopting parents shall be ordered to bear all or a portion of the costs of this part that:
(1) the court may direct that the payment of the fees or a portion thereof may be paid by a court ordered schedule of payments extending beyond the date of the involuntary termination hearing; and
(2) the fee shall not exceed $150.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(b).

. The Adoption Act as amended in 1982 clearly supports the concept of counseling for natural parents but does not mandate it:
(a) List of counselors. — Any hospital or other facility providing maternity care shall provide a list of available counselors and counseling services compiled pursuant to subsection (b) to maternity patients who are known to be considering relinquishment or termination of parental rights pursuant to this part.
(b) Compilation of list. — The court shall compile a list of qualified counselors and counseling services (including adoption agencies) which are available to counsel natural parents who are contemplating relinquishment or termination of parental rights pursuant to this part. Such list shall be made available upon request to any agency, intermediary, hospital or other facility providing maternity care.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2505.

. It should be noted that Children’s Home of Pittsburgh supports the position of Family Planning. Children’s Home of Pittsburgh has been in existence for over forty years, but as appellant admits, it is having difficulty financing adoptions through traditional methods. Appellants' Reply Brief, at 5-6.