Court Opinion

ID: 9840620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:05:29.316203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:11.319912
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23 In re J.M. CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

                                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 In re J.M., a Person Coming Under the                                D081937
 Juvenile Court Law.
 ___________________________________
                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. J521007)
 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND
 HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

           Plaintiff and Respondent

           v.

 L.M. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants,

         APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marissa A. Bejarano, Judge. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
         Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, L.M.
         Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant, C.M.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Eliza Molk, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency)
filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300,
subdivision (c) on behalf of then 10-year-old J.M. based on J.M.’s aggressive
behavior and the parents’ unwillingness to provide mental health treatment.
Although court-appointed counsel represented Mother, she filed numerous
motions in propria persona. In March 2023, Mother filed a request asking to
represent herself. At a hearing on April 11, 2023, the juvenile court found
J.M.’s proceedings would be significantly delayed if it granted Mother’s
request for self-representation. Mother appeals from this order and C.M.
(Father) joins her arguments.2 We affirm.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.

2      Mother filed three notices of appeal. The first, filed in propria persona,
is from the March 16, 2023, order and several other orders made by the
juvenile court. The second, filed by Mother’s trial counsel, challenged the
order denying Mother’s request for self-representation and several other
orders. Mother filed a third notice of appeal, in propria persona, also
challenging the order denying her request for self-representation. Mother’s
opening brief is limited to the order denying her request for self-
representation. Accordingly, we treat the appeal from the other orders listed
in her notices of appeal as forfeited and do not consider them. (In re Adrian
L. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 342, 344, fn. 1 [although notice of appeal included
appeal from order denying section 388 petition, parent forfeited any claim of
error where opening brief presented no argument on that issue].)
       Father filed an opening brief joining Mother’s arguments. The Agency
submits we lack jurisdiction to consider Father’s appeal because he did not
include the April 11, 2023, hearing or the juvenile court’s order denying
Mother’s request for self-representation in his notice of appeal. While we
must liberally construe a notice of appeal (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
70, 75; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.405(a)(3), this policy does not apply where
the notice of appeal “ ‘is so specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment
or order not mentioned at all.’ ” (In re J.F., at p. 76.) Here, Father’s notice of
appeal does not mention the April 11, 2023, hearing or the juvenile court’s
order denying Mother’s request for self-representation. We cannot liberally

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              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
      On March 28, 2022,4 Father called the police after J.M. assaulted him
and Mother in the family vehicle. J.M. was hospitalized on a section 5150
hold. After J.M.’s hospitalization, the Agency detained J.M. in a foster home
because J.M. did not wish to have contact with either parent. On April 12,
the Agency filed the petition on J.M.’s behalf and the detention hearing took
place on April 13 and 14. On April 13, the juvenile court appointed counsel
for the parents and J.M., took temporary emergency jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and
continued the matter for one day.
      The following day, Mother expressed her belief that Missouri was
J.M.’s home state under the UCCJEA and both parents claimed Native
American ancestry. The court continued emergency jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA and endorsed a request by the Agency that the parents provide the
Agency with information for relatives who may have information about their
Native American heritage. It also ordered the parents to create a timeline
from and after the time Missouri issued custody orders until the filing of
J.M.’s petition. The court suspended visits between J.M. and the parents,
ordered voluntary services for the parents, found J.M.’s petition met prima
facie requirements, and ordered J.M. detained from parental custody.

construe Father’s notice to apply to a different, omitted order. (Ibid.)
Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s appeal.

3    Because our discussion addresses Mother’s conduct during this
dependency proceeding, in the interest of brevity, we omit mention of her
conduct here and instead provide an outline of the proceedings leading to
Mother’s request for self-representation.

4     Undesignated date references are to 2022.

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      At the May 5 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Mother claimed her
father lived on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan and she was registered
with the Chippewa and Choctaw tribes. The juvenile court again ordered the
parents to provide a timeline addressing where the family lived during the
six months preceding the dependency action. At the continued
jurisdiction/disposition hearing on May 23, Mother was not present. The
Agency indicated it never received a timeline from the parents with Mother’s
counsel representing that Mother had provided the information to the Agency
on “numerous occasions.” Based on its inquiry with two other states, the
juvenile court determined California was J.M.’s home state and retained
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
      At the contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on October 21, the
juvenile court declared J.M. a dependent and scheduled a disposition hearing.
At the contested disposition hearing on November 10, the court confirmed its
receipt of Mother’s five motions and a motion from Mother’s counsel to
appoint new counsel. The court conducted a hearing under People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, granted Mother’s motion to withdraw her counsel, and
continued the hearing to appoint new counsel. The juvenile court appointed
Mother new counsel at a special hearing on November 16.
      At a pretrial status conference in early February 2023, Mother’s new
counsel asked to set aside the court’s true finding due to inadequate
representation by Mother’s former counsel. She set several dispositional
issues for trial, and asked the court to remove social worker Miller from the
case. At a pretrial status conference in late February 2023, the juvenile court
denied Mother’s requests to set aside the true finding and to remove Miller
from the case.

                                          4
      At the March 16, 2023, contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court
removed J.M. from parental custody, ordered that J.M. be placed in a short-
term residential therapeutic program or foster home, found the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply without prejudice, and ordered
reunification services for the parents. On March 27, 2023, Mother filed a
request that the juvenile court relieve her appointed counsel and allow her to
represent herself. On April 11, 2023, the court denied Mother’s request for
self-representation finding while Mother was not disruptive, granting her
request would cause significant delays. The court noted Mother “has not
complied with all of the court’s orders since the outset of this case” and
“repeatedly attempted to file her own motions with this court, which this
court has then provided and turned over to counsel in order to allow counsel
to determine how to legally proceed in this case and in order to prevent
further delays.”
                                 DISCUSSION
      Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it denied her request for
self-representation, arguing her motions caused no delay, she displayed the
ability to understand the proceedings, and her failure to follow court orders
related to the ICWA and the UCCJEA were not solely her fault and did not
impact the proceedings. She claims the juvenile court erroneously relied on
In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914 and that the matter is more analogous
to In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074 (Angel W.). As we will explain,
substantial evidence supports the court’s findings, which in turn fully
justifies the refusal to permit Mother to represent herself.
      While there is no constitutional right to self-representation in
dependency proceedings, a parent has a statutory right to self-representation

                                        5
under section 317.5 (Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1082–1084.) A
parent’s right to self-representation, however, must be balanced against the
rights of other parties, such as the child’s right to prompt resolution of his or
her custody status. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 925.) “[T]he
juvenile court has discretion to deny the request for self-representation when
it is reasonably probable that granting the request would impair the child’s
right to a prompt resolution of custody status or unduly disrupt the
proceedings. A parent’s disruptive behavior may be sufficient to deny a
request for self-representation, but it is not necessary. If it is reasonably
probable that granting a parent’s request for self-representation will lead to
undue delay in the proceedings that would impair the child’s right to a
prompt resolution of custody, the juvenile court has discretion to deny the
request regardless whether the parent has ever behaved disruptively.” (Id. at
pp. 925–926.)
      As a preliminary matter, we reject Mother’s argument that this matter
is analogous to Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1074. In Angel W. the
juvenile court denied the parent’s request to represent herself, citing
concerns the parent might disrupt the courtroom proceedings. (Id. at
p. 1084.) The appellate court acknowledged the validity of this concern but
cautioned that “[t]he possibility of disruption or delay . . . exists to some
degree with virtually all pro se litigants and the mere possibility alone is not
a sufficient ground to deny self-representation.” (Id. at p. 1085.) In In re
A.M., the reviewing court was not confronted with a disruptive parent but
with a parent who had sought multiple continuances of a contested

5      Section 317, subdivision (b) requires appointment of counsel for an
indigent parent or guardian in a juvenile dependency case “unless the court
finds that the parent or guardian has made a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel as provided in this section.”

                                         6
jurisdiction/disposition hearing when he first sought to represent himself. (In
re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 920.) As the In re A.M. court explained,
Angel W. considered the scope of a juvenile court’s discretion to deny a
parent’s request for self-representation only in the context of a potentially
disruptive parent. (In re A.M., at p. 924.)
      Unlike the parent in Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, the juvenile
court found Mother did not disrupt the proceedings. Accordingly, Mother’s
reliance on Angel W. is misplaced. Rather, the juvenile court anticipated that
granting Mother’s request for self-representation would cause significant
delays. Substantial evidence supports this conclusion.
      Mother filed her request for self-representation on March 27, 2023,
nearly one year after initiation of the dependency proceedings. At that time,
the 12-month review hearing was not scheduled until September 11, 2023,
over seven months later. As the juvenile court impliedly recognized, even
with counsel, Mother’s general behavior caused part of the delay in these
proceedings. As we will detail, Mother’s conduct throughout the proceedings
revealed she was not equipped to represent herself and allowing her to do so
would likely result in undue delay in the proceedings.
      First, Mother failed to comply with the court’s orders related to
resolving ICWA and UCCJEA issues. At the outset of this proceeding Mother
claimed the State of Missouri had granted her custody of J.M., creating an
issue whether the State of California had jurisdiction. Thus, at the April 14
continued detention hearing, the court maintained emergency predicate
jurisdiction and ordered the parents to create a timeline from and after the
time Missouri issued custody orders until the filing of J.M.’s petition. The
parents failed to do so which required the court at the May 5
jurisdiction/disposition hearing to again ask them to provide a timeline

                                        7
addressing where the family lived during the six months preceding the
dependency action. This lack of information required the court to continue
the hearing for UCCJEA and case plan purposes.
      At the continued jurisdiction/disposition hearing on May 23, Mother did
not appear. Mother’s counsel expressed concern about proceeding “without
the Court first providing us with the fact that we are able to actually proceed
pursuant to the UCCJEA.” The court noted on the record its communications
with judicial officers in other jurisdictions and expressed the belief it had
jurisdiction. When counsel for the Agency reminded the court that it had
twice ordered the parents to provide information about where the family
resided during the six months preceding the filing of J.M.’s petition, Mother’s
counsel replied, “According to the mother, she’s provided that to the Agency
on numerous occasions.” The court stated it had reviewed all the emails
Mother sent to the Agency and it did not locate an outline of where Mother
had resided for the last six months. Two social workers informed counsel for
the Agency that Mother never provided this information. After Father
provided an address where J.M. had been living in Missouri before the
dependency proceeding, the court made a finding that it had jurisdiction over
the matter because it had already contacted a judicial officer from that
location who denied jurisdiction over the child. Mother’s failure to comply
with the court’s order to provide a timeline resulted in a one month delay in
resolving this jurisdictional issue.
      The court encountered similar problems obtaining information from
Mother regarding the ICWA. At the April 14 continued detention hearing
Mother claimed Choctaw and Chippewa ancestry and the court ordered her to
fill out the appropriate ICWA documents. At the May 5 hearing, Mother
claimed she was registered with the Chippewa and Choctaw tribes and her

                                        8
father lived on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan and was on “the high
council.” When the court attempted to conduct ICWA inquiry with her,
Mother was nonresponsive and complained about “20 different people e-
mailing me asking me for the same information over and over again.” The
court ordered Mother to complete the ICWA-030 form. When the court asked
Mother to stop interrupting, she hung up.
      At the May 23 hearing, the Agency represented it was working on
converting the ICWA-030 form into plain text for Mother based on her visual
impairment. At the July 18 hearing, Mother’s counsel stated Mother had not
yet received the ICWA-030 form in an accessible format and Mother could not
fill out the form until that occurred. Counsel for the Agency replied that
Mother was provided the ICWA-030 form in plain text format and informed
her counsel that if further accommodation was necessary the Agency could
review the form over the phone with Mother but Mother refused to speak to
the social worker. When the court questioned whether plain text format
comported with the ADA, counsel for the Agency represented it did and noted
“Mother receives emails in plain texts, including reports, and she responds to
every email very quickly.”6 The court again ordered Mother to complete the
ICWA-030 form and stated an Agency social worker was available to assist
her. As of the writing of the July 18 addendum report, Mother had still not
completed the ICWA-030 form. At the July 18, pretrial status conference the
court ordered the parents’ counsel to assist with the ICWA inquiry and

6     Mother’s ability to read documents in plain text format is documented
in the record. For example, the social worker sent Mother responses received
from the tribes in plain text format via email with Mother responding eight
minutes later claiming, among other things, her identity had been changed in
federal court, her registration with her tribe was sealed by the court, and her
father was on the tribal high council but failing to provide his name or how to
reach him.

                                       9
complete the ICWA-030 form. There is no ICWA-030 form in the record,
suggesting even Mother’s counsel had no success in resolving this
outstanding issue. Ultimately, the Agency received responses from 15
Cherokee, Choctaw or Chippewa tribes denying any tribal affiliation. At the
March 16, 2023, hearing the court found without prejudice the ICWA did not
apply.
      Mother’s unwillingness to comply with court orders was not isolated to
issues pertaining to the ICWA and the UCCJEA. On November 16, the
juvenile court denied the parents’ request for unsupervised contact.
Although Mother did not appear for this hearing, she was aware of the denial
because she filed a pro per motion the following day attempting to appeal it.
At a hearing on February 7, 2023, the juvenile court reminded Mother not to
discuss the case or expansion of visitation with J.M. during their supervised
visits because this caused behavioral issues and setbacks for J.M. However,
in an email sent to the social worker, her counsel, and others the following
week, Mother falsely told J.M. the court had ordered overnight and 60 day
visits as part of the reunification plan.
      In addition to failing to comply with court orders, Mother proved to be
an inaccurate historian. At the outset of the proceeding, a physician
informed the Agency that Mother initially stated J.M. was born in Missouri
but then said she moved back to California just before J.M. was born. Later
in the proceeding, Mother informed J.M.’s case manager that J.M. had
cardiac issues but the Agency previously had J.M. undergo two cardiology
evaluations which ruled out any cardiac issues. Mother also reported that
J.M. previously used insulin which J.M. denied. The social worker expressed
concern that the parents have refused to provide J.M.’s full medical history or
provide signed releases to ensure J.M.’s medical needs were met.

                                        10
      Mother also consistently exhibited difficulty working with the Agency
and the court. At the continued detention hearing on April 14, Mother
appeared telephonically. Toward the end of the hearing, the juvenile court
allowed her to make a brief statement. Mother did so, claiming the Agency
was using the dependency proceeding “as a means of retaliation for a civil
rights complaint and federal lawsuits that I have pending against the
County.” She claimed discrimination, she was a professional social worker
who did not need parenting classes, and had no history of violence or mental
illness. When the court interrupted Mother, she responded, “You are
preventing me from speaking. I feel like you are preventing me from having
due process. I have nothing else to say. You interrupted me. I would like to
finish my statement, but if you will not allow it, that’s fine. I will have
judicial review in U.S. District Court.” Mother then hung up.
      From April 15 to May 5, Mother sent “at least” 50 emails, totaling
approximately 200 pages, to social worker Miller. Among other things, her
emails accused the Agency of removing J.M. under false pretenses, expressed
her belief the Agency violated her rights, and informing Miller she had
lawsuits pending against the Agency. For example, on April 22 Miller sent
the parents an email requesting basic information, such as their current
address, prior addresses, extended family information, whether they suffered
from any disabilities, where they would like J.M. placed, and their
willingness to participate in services. Mother responded about 90 minutes
later, claiming she was advised by her federal attorney “ ‘not to answer most
of those questions as they are an invasion of my privacy and the charges
against me or unfounded I believe that the child protective services
procedures are being used to conduct an investigation that San Diego

                                        11
[H]ealth and [H]uman [S]ervices would not otherwise be able to complete
because I have a pending federal lawsuit against your agency.’ ”
      On May 12, Mother participated in a child and family team (CFT)
meeting telephonically. She initially participated, but then expressed
frustration and disconnected stating the meeting was taking too long and her
phone was about to die. When the social worker asked Mother to participate
in a subsequent meeting, she responded via email with anger and
accusations. She declined to participate in another CFT meeting, stating, “I
will not be participating in any more meetings with you I made that clear on
[sic] the letter to you and your supervisor yesterday no more verbal
communication in any form for any reason outside of court which is
documented by a court reporter.”
      Finally, Mother filed numerous motions or ex parte requests in pro per
despite being represented by counsel. On June 6, Mother filed a motion
claiming violation of the UCCJEA and asking the court “to reverse its rulings
on this matter and to reverse the change in custody jurisdiction and return
her child immediately.” On November 9, Mother filed two motions in pro per
“for injunction to stop Lynette Miller and San Diego Health & Human
Services from imposing stipulations outside of the court order or using the
child visitation to barter and force services on parents” and for appointment
of new counsel and to appeal the court’s findings made on October 21. On
November 10, Mother filed another motion in pro per for appointment of new
counsel and to appeal the court’s findings made on October 21. Mother,
either alone or with Father, then filed an additional 14 motions or ex parte
requests from November 2022 to March 2023.
      Before denying Mother’s request for self-representation the court
explained it turned over the motions Mother filed in pro per to Mother’s

                                      12
counsel to determine how to legally proceed and prevent further delays. Our
review of these motions and Mother’s emails showed long and rambling
communications addressing tangential issues or issues with institutions and
agencies unrelated to the case. “A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of
future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133.) Here, the
juvenile court could have reasonably concluded Mother would continue to file
motions and ex parte requests that lacked focused and cogent arguments and
the absence of counsel to review future filings would result in delays while
the court reviewed them. The court could have also reasonably concluded
Mother’s general inability to work with the Agency would be amplified if
Mother represented herself and lead to significant delays in resolving the
dependency proceeding. Because the record contains substantial evidence
that, to a reasonable probability, granting Mother’s request for self-
representation would impair J.M.’s right to a prompt resolution of custody
status, we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion when it
denied Mother’s request. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925–926.)

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                               DISPOSITION
     The April 11, 2023, order denying Mother’s request to represent herself is
affirmed. Father’s appeal is dismissed.

                                                                 CASTILLO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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