Court Opinion

ID: 9785605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:13:59.191581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:30.416441
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.,
Concurring.—I agree with parts I and II of the majority opinion, and part HI to the extent it concludes that the jury was presented with a legally inadequate theory.
Here, as set forth in the majority opinion, the People proceeded on two theories regarding the charge of possessing hydriodic acid precursors with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11383, subd. (c)(2), Stats. 1995, ch. 571, § 1, p. 4418; maj. opn., ante, at p. 1224.) They argued defendant was “liable as a direct peipetrator because he possessed the precursors and personally intended to manufacture methamphetamine.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1224.) In the alternative, the People argued defendant was “liable as an aider and abettor because he possessed the precursors with the intent to sell them to another person to be used in manufacturing methamphetamine.” (Ibid.) “During closing argument, the prosecution argued, over [defendant’s] objection, that aiding and abetting liability required proof only that [defendant] possessed the hydriodic acid precursors with the knowledge that someone else would use them to manufacture methamphetamine. The trial court prevented defense counsel from arguing that liability for aiding and abetting required proof of a completed attempt or offense, and denied a proposed special instruction on this point, ruling that ‘[t]here’s no need for a completed crime under the statute.’ Instead, in accordance with the prosecution’s theory of the case, the court gave CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01, standard instructions on aiding and abetting.” (Ibid,) The jury convicted defendant, as relevant here, of violating Health and Safety Code former section 11383, subdivision (c)(2). (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1224.)
In Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46 [116 L.Ed.2d 371, 112 S.Ct. 466], the high court “drew a distinction between a mistake about the law, which is subject to the rule generally requiring reversal, and a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence, which does not require reversal when another valid basis for conviction exists.” (People v. *1236Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1125 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45] (Guiton).) As the high court stated, “Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law—whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence.” (Griffin, at p. 59.) In Guiton, this court adopted the Griffin rule, which provides that “reversal is not required whenever a valid ground for the verdict remains, absent an affirmative indication in the record that the verdict actually did rest on the inadequate ground,” as state law for factually inadequate theories, and retained the rule of People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], which generally requires reversal “absent a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground,” for legally inadequate theories. (Guiton, at pp. 1125, 1128-1129.)
Here, the jury was permitted to find defendant guilty of a violation of Health and Safety Code former section 11383, subdivision (c)(2) on an aiding and abetting theory in the absence of any proof of the completed crime of either possession with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine or the actual manufacture of methamphetamine by a second party, and the “People eschewed any attempt theory.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1227.) The jury is ill-equipped to know that aiding and abetting liability cannot exist under these circumstances, and hence this theory was legally, not factually, inadequate.
While there may be some evidence of defendant’s intent to personally manufacture methamphetamine, which was a proper legal and factual theory in this case, the presence of the legally inadequate theory means that “the Green rule requiring reversal applies, absent a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground.” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) The majority properly concludes that there can be no direct violation of Health and Safety Code former section 11383, subdivision (c)(2) if one possesses hydriodic acid precursors with the intent someone else use them in manufacturing methamphetamine, and that the record does not demonstrate the jury actually relied on the theory defendant possessed the *1237precursors with the intent to personally manufacture methamphetamine. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1227-1234.) Hence, the error is prejudicial under either the Chapman or Watson standard of review. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].)
Moreno, J., concurred.