Court Opinion

ID: 9716197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:30:29.095428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:42.906413
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREEN, dissenting: The majority correctly holds that the classification created by the policy of selective enforcement against suspected prostitutes is not a suspect classification requiring strict scrutiny but one subject to the rational-basis test. A difficult question arises as to whether the rational basis must apply to the relationship between the enforcement policy and the law being enforced as the majority holds or between the enforcement policy and a legitimate governmental policy. A highly respected text discusses this question and indicates that the courts have not focused sharply upon the question. (2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure sec. 13.4, at 197 (1984).) I conclude that the better rule is to merely require the relationship between the selective policy and legitimate governmental policy to have a rational basis. Here, I would affirm. In regard to selective prosecutions not subject to a direct-scrutiny test, LaFave and Israel state in part: “Yet another important issue regarding the meaning of the ‘rational relationship’ test in this context concerns the subject matter against which the classification must appear to be rational. That is, is it sufficient ‘that the classification bear a rational relationship to a permissible governmental purpose,’ or must the classification be ‘rationally related to the purposes of the criminal law under which the defendant is charged’? More particularly, is it permissible to select out a person for prosecution under a particular law because of an unprovable belief that this individual is guilty of other criminal conduct? Though the propriety of such a charging policy has been vigorously debated by the commentators, the courts have given little attention to the question of whether such a policy is vulnerable on equal protection grounds. It would seem, however, that the extent of vulnerability depends upon the nature of the statute under which the prosecution is brought. Consider, for example, United States v. Sacco [(9th Cir. 1970), 428 F.2d 264], where the defendant objected that he was singled out, ‘based on his suspected role in organized crime,’ for investigation and prosecution under the alien registration laws. That this was the basis of selection was not disputed, yet the court unhesitantly held that it ‘cannot be said that that standard for selection is not rationally related to the purposes of *** the alien registration laws.’ In other words, it is quite rational, considering the purposes underlying the alien registration statute, to focus upon those aliens suspected not to be law-abiding. One might well doubt whether the result would be the same were Sacco singled out on the same basis for prosecution under a generally nonenforced criminal adultery statute; there is nothing relating to the policies underlying that law which would explain a focus upon those suspected of organized crime. Yet, authority is to be found which would seemingly produce the same result on those facts. Illustrative in People v. Mantel [(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976), 88 Misc. 2d 439, 388 N.Y.S.2d 565], where a task force of fire, safety and health inspectors made intensive and frequent inspections only of ‘sex related’ businesses in the Times Square area after more traditional efforts to curb vice in that vicinity had failed. Stating the test as being ‘whether a particular classification bears a rational relationship to the broad purposes of the criminal law,’ the court upheld the practice. Whether the court would have reached the same result under the Sacco approach is problematical.” (Emphasis in original.) 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure sec. 13.4, at 197-98 (1984). Neither Wayte nor Cleburne speaks to the question of whether the rational basis must be applied to the relationship between the selective policy and the offense to which it is being applied. In Wayte, the court held that a selective policy of prosecuting only those suspected violators of Selective Service registration requirements who had reported the violations themselves or had been reported by others met constitutional muster. No issue was raised as to whether a rational relationship between the offense being selectively prosecuted and legitimate governmental interest would suffice. In Cleburne, the issue was whether an ordinance which prohibited operation of a group home for mentally retarded in a particular area was unconstitutional as applied to the owners of a site, because of the lack of rational relationship between the ordinance and the legitimate governmental interests of the municipality. The invalidation of the selective enforcement policy here will be of little impact, but the precedent being established will have substantial impact. It will prohibit selective enforcement focusing on those thought to be guilty of organized crime when the selective enforcement involves an offense unrelated to the criminal conspiracies of which the accused are suspected. No cases adopting the view of the majority have been called to my attention, and the cited text indicates that few if any of such decisions by a court of review exist. I recognize that LaFave and Israel indicate that little authority exists in support of a theory that the rational relationship need exist only between the offense being selectively prosecuted and legitimate governmental interest, and I respect their conclusion that such a relationship is insufficient to justify selective prosecution. However, when the classification upon which the selective policy is based is not suspect within equal protection concepts and there is a legitimate governmental interest served by the prosecution, I do not deem one prosecuted upon a showing of probable cause to be unduly prejudiced by the prosecution. Such, a prosecution should not be constitutionally impermissible. The legitimate governmental interest in deterring prostitution justified the instant policy of selective prosecution.