Court Opinion

ID: 9496297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:22:40.325251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:28.805467
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Circuit Judge.
This case arises out of an April 1996 Northwest Airlines (Northwest) inter-pleader of the United States and Mary Taylor (Mary) to determine whether the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or Mary has priority and is entitled to the benefits of three Northwest sponsored employee benefits plans. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled generally for the IRS and against Mary, finding Mary’s right to the plans under a *949Texas domestic relations order (DRO) was subject to a prior federal tax lien. We disagree and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
As is often the case, the sequence of events is critical. Francis Taylor (Francis) worked as a pilot for Northwest from 1966 to 1994. During his employment, Francis participated in a retirement plan, a stock plan, and a savings plan administered by Northwest under ERISA.1 Francis retired from Northwest in September 1994, at which time he filed in a Texas state court for divorce from Mary, his wife of more than thirty years. The following month, in October 1994, a tax court concluded that Francis had not filed tax returns from 1981 through 1985. On May 1, 1995, the IRS assessed deficiencies totaling approximately $984,310 (including penalties and interest) for those tax years. On July 28, 1995, the Texas court entered a divorce decree and approved a marital settlement agreement. The agreement provided that “to settle all obligations of the marriage,” Mary would receive a 90 percent interest in Francis’s Northwest employee benefits proceeds (plan proceeds). Also in July, the court entered a purported qualified domestic relations order (QDRO), directing the plan administrator to distribute Mary’s interest in the plan proceeds directly to her. The Texas court, in the July order, retained jurisdiction to amend or reform the order as necessary to conform with plan requirements and qualify as a QDRO.
In October 1995, Northwest informed Mary and Francis that the July DRO did not qualify as a QDRO. In December 1995, the IRS filed a hen against the plan proceeds in Texas, where Francis claimed he resided at the time of the divorce, and where the DRO issued. In October 1996, the IRS filed another lien in Minnesota, where the plans were administered. Meanwhile, Mary and Francis attempted to correct the DRO’s identified deficiencies. Among other things, the order: (1) did not specify the period to which it applied; (2) did not address how to treat amounts accrued, but had not yet been credited to the account; and (3) would have required Northwest to make an extra payment. Twice the Texas court, at Mary’s request, reformed the DRO to address Northwest’s concerns. Northwest finally pronounced the DRO a QDRO in January 1997.
The district court dismissed Northwest from the interpleader action, and the IRS and Mary were left to determine who was entitled to the plan proceeds. The IRS claimed its interest in the plan proceeds was first in time, while Mary argued her interest had priority because she was both a “judgment hen creditor” and a “purchaser” under 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a),2 a statute that in certain situations requires the IRS to file notice of its lien to obtain priority.
The district court concluded Mary was neither a purchaser nor a judgment hen creditor under section 6323(a). Specifically, the court determined Mary was not a purchaser because her consideration was not “adequate and full,” as defined in 26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(f)(3) (2001) (consideration must have reasonable relationship *950to true value of interest in acquired property). Further, the district court found Mary was not a judgment lien creditor because there was no evidence she had perfected her lien by executing the judgment as required under Texas law. Because Mary was not entitled to the protections of section 6323, the district court held the IRS tax liens assessed on May 1, 1995, became effective against Mary as of that date and were first in time and entitled to priority.
On appeal, Mary argues: (1) the Texas divorce court had exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute; thus, there was no federal question and the interpleader action was not proper; (2) under Texas community property law, Mary had substantial property rights in the plan proceeds even before the divorce; (3) she was a purchaser under section 6323(a); and (4) she was a judgment hen creditor under section 6323(a).
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Mayberry v. United States, 151 F.3d 855, 858 (8th Cir.1998). Initially, we reject Mary’s first two arguments: (1) federal jurisdiction does exist, see 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (civil action may be brought by fiduciary to enjoin violations of ERISA plan, or to obtain appropriate equitable relief); and (2) Texas community property law does not vest her with an interest in the plan proceeds. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (ERISA supersedes state law insofar as such law relates to ERISAgoverned plans); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 138 L.Ed.2d 45 (1997) (QDRO provisions define scope of nonparticipant spouse’s community property interest in pension plans).
We turn next to whether Mary became a judgment lien creditor under section 6323(a) within sufficient time to have priority over the IRS.3 An IRS lien attaches automatically on the date a penalty is assessed, 26 U.S.C. § 6322 (lien arises at time of assessment), and is enforceable as of that date against creditors except any “purchaser,” “holder of security interest,” “mechanic’s lienor,” or “judgment lien creditor,” within the meaning of section 6323(a). If the creditor falls into one of these categories, then the IRS must provide adequate notice to establish the priority of its hen. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a); Rodeck v. United States, 697 F.Supp. 1508, 1511 (D.Minn.1988) (as to § 6323(a) creditors, tax lien will have priority only if notice has been filed in accordance with § 6323(f)).
A Treasury Regulation defines “judgment lien creditor” as follows:
... a person who has obtained a valid judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a judgment for the recovery of a certain sum of money, a judgment lien creditor is a person who has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A judgment lien is not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established. Accordingly, a judgment lien does not include an attachment or garnishment hen until the hen has ripened into judgment, even though under local law the hen of *951the judgment relates back to an earlier date.
If under local law levy or seizure is necessary before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on personal property, then a judgment hen under such local law is not perfected until levy or seizure of the personal property involved.
26 C.F.R. § 301.6323(h)-l(g).
A state law created hen’s priority depends on when it attaches and becomes choate, and federal law will determine when the hen has acquired sufficient substance and becomes so perfected as to defeat a later federal tax hen. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88, 83 S.Ct. 1651, 10 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). Liens are perfected, under the federal rule, when there is nothing more to be done to have a choate hen, that is, “when the identity of the lienowner, the property subject to the hen, and the amount of the hen are established.” Id. at 89, 83 S.Ct. 1651 (citations omitted). Here, Mary obtained a valid judgment from a Texas divorce court for 90 percent of Francis’s plan proceeds creating an exclusive property interest in the plan proceeds for Mary. On the date the Texas court granted the DRO, Mary’s identity was clear, the subject property was identified, and the amount (90 percent) was fixed.
Mary was not required to comply with any state law requirements for purposes of estabhshing hen priority over the IRS’s interest in the plan proceeds. ERISA provides a mechanism for enforcing QDROs, and this mechanism supersedes any contrary state law. See U.S. Constitution art. VI, cl. 2, Heart of Am. Grain Inspection Serv., Inc. v. Mo. Dep’t of Agrie., 123 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir.1997) (under Supremacy Clause, federal laws are supreme law of land and may preempt state law); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (agencies may elucidate, through regulations, specific provisions of statutes that agencies administer). Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) provides for ahenation of pension plan benefits in accordance with a QDRO, and gives plan administrators or courts eighteen months to determine whether a DRO qualifies as a QDRO, directing the plan administrator to segregate the amounts in question during that period. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H).4
In this case, Northwest determined, within eighteen months of the date the first payment would have been made under the DRO, that the DRO, as modified, was a QDRO. Thus, Mary satisfied ERISA’s requirements for alienating pension plan proceeds. Requiring Mary to satisfy state law perfection requirements would conflict with ERISA’s policy of ensuring that plan sponsors are subject to a uniform body of law. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff 532 U.S. 141, 148, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (principal goal of ERISA is to establish uniform scheme with standard procedures; uniformity is impossible if plans are subject to different legal obligations in different states); Minnesota Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 267 F.3d 807, 810-11 (8th Cir.2001) (ERISA’s goal is to minimize administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting state directives, and to prevent *952potential for conflicts in substantive law requiring tailoring of plans to peculiarities of multiple local laws), cert. denied. 535 U.S. 1096, 122 S.Ct. 2292, 152 L.Ed.2d 1051 (2002); Compagnoni, 162 F.Supp.2d at 710 (imposing state law perfection requirements would create choice-of-law difficulties, frustrating objective of ensuring uniformity of ERISA administration).
We further conclude that Mary’s interest in the plan proceeds relates back to the date of the initial DRO. See Nelson v. Rametter, 322 F.3d 541, 544 (8th Cir.2003) (“A person awarded a lump-sum distribution from an ERISA plan pursuant to a divorce decree has a direct interest in plan funds while the plan reviews the DRO to determine whether it constitutes a QDRO.”); Gendreau v. Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir.1997) (wife’s interest in pension plans was established at time of divorce decree; husband’s interest was concomitantly limited at that time, or subject to being limited at any time wife obtained QDRO, much like property owner’s rights may be subject to divestment by contingent interest); Compagnoni, 162 F.Supp.2d at 711-12 (wife had possessory interest in benefits once first DRO bad been entered although interest was unenforceable until QDRO was obtained); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (any determination made within eighteen months of the order, or modification of the order, will be applied prospectively). Mary had eighteen months pursuant to section 1056(d)(3)(H)(ii) to qualify her DRO, and “[i]f within the 18-month period ... the order (or modification thereof) is determined to be a qualified domestic relations order the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts ... to the person ....” (Emphasis added). The plan administrator, by plan procedures, cannot shorten this eighteen month qualification period.
Because the DRO preceded the IRS’s notice of tax lien, and Northwest determined within the requisite eighteen months that the DRO qualified as a QDRO, see 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(v) (computation of time), Mary was a judgment lien creditor with priority as of July 1995, when the DRO was entered. She is thus entitled to the plan proceeds free of the IRS lien.
One other related issue should be addressed regarding the finality of the July 1995 Texas DRO. The Texas judge signed an order prepared and approved by the parties which stated:
The Court retains jurisdiction to amend this Order so that it will constitute a qualified domestic relations order under the Plan even though all other matters incident to this action or proceeding have been fully and finally adjudicated. If the Plan determines at any time that changes in the law, the administration of the Plan, or any other circumstances make it impossible to calculate the portion of a distribution awarded to Alternative Payee by this Order and so notifies the parties, either or both parties shall immediately petition the Court for reformation of this Order.
The intent of the July 1995 DRO, to qualify under the applicable Northwest plans, is clear. The parties and the court recognized the order may need changes to qualify. Northwest did require certain changes to qualify. Mary asked the Texas court twice to reform the DRO before Northwest accepted the DRO as a QDRO. This process is anticipated by the law, which provides for segregation of the funds by the plan administrator for up to eighteen months to qualify the DRO as a QDRO. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H). Our holdings in Nelson and here, recognizing the DRO establishes a “direct interest in plan *953funds,” and upon qualification, the interest relates back to the initial DRO date, further the statutory scheme to protect employee retirement benefits for beneficiaries of the plans, including divorced spouses.
As a legal matter, when the DRO issued, Francis was no longer the owner of 90 percent of the Northwest ERISA plans. Mary was awarded this share as part of the divorce. Mary, the property, and the amount were identified clearly, only the details of qualification remained to transform the DRO into a QDRO.
III. CONCLUSION
Since we conclude Mary was a judgment lien creditor, we do not address whether she was also a purchaser under section 6323(a). Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment with regard to Mary Taylor, and remand with instructions to enter judgment in conformity with this opinion.

. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).

. 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) states: "Purchasers, holders of security interests, mechanic’s lien-ors, and judgment lien creditors. The lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien creditor until notice thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary [of the Treasury].”

. The IRS has authority to proceed against Francis’s interest in any ERISA plan benefits and "is not constrained by ERISA's anti-alienation provision." In re McIntyre, 222 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir.2000). After the DRO, Francis effectively no longer has any ownership interest in Mary’s 90 percent share of the Northwest ERISA plans.

. pension benefit plans are distinguishable from welfare benefit plans, which do not provide an enforcement mechanism. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 831-33, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Compagnoni, 162 F.Supp.2d 702, 709-10 (S.D.Tex.2001).