Court Opinion

ID: 9683684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:35:13.200217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.635182
License: Public Domain

*138on appellant’s motion for rehearing.
MORRISON, Judge.
After submission of appellant’s motion for rehearing, we have again reviewed the entire record and will attempt to discuss the case in the order in which the same was presented to us at such time.
Bill of Exceptions No. 12 is leveled at the failure of the trial court to permit appellant to offer character witnesses’ testimony as to his good reputation for truth and veracity.
The state, in making out its case, proved by two peace officers that upon their arrival at the scene of the homicide appellant made to them a statement as to his reason for having committed the same. When defendant took the stand, he denied having made such a statement to the officers and assigned another reason for having fired the fatal shot. Appellant claims this to be a sufficient predicate for the introduction of testimony supporting his reputation for truth and veracity and relies heavily upon Stillwell v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. Rep. 338, 283 S.W. 840. In that case the state had made out its case in chief; appellant had testified; had been cross-examined; and in rebuttal the state offered a confession containing statements inconsistent with appellant’s testimony. Following this, appellant offered witnesses to support his reputation for truth and veracity. These, the trial court refused to hear. Judge Lattimore pointed out that by virtue of the order of the above procedure, the state having made the issue as to the contradictory statements of appellant, he was therefor impeached and the testimony as to his reputation for truth and veracity should have been heard. The court went further in that case and discussed White v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 567, 62 S.W. 575, approving the holding therein.
In the White case the state introduced against the accused, as part of its case in chief, statements made by him with reference to the crime. He took the stand and swore to the contrary. He then sought to bolster his testimony by that of other witnesses.x In differentiating between the Stillwell and White cases, the court said:
“Thé clear distinction is that in such case the state offers no contradictory statements to those made by appellant, but proves as original testimony his declarations and statements, and that he cannot thereafter put his character in evidence by testifying *139in his behalf to facts contradictory to those offered by the state.” (104 Tex. Crim. R. 338, 283 SW 843.)
To sustain appellant’s contention would be to authorize every defendant to bolster his defense with witnesses as to his reputation for truth and veracity by the simple expedient of disagreeing with the state’s version of the case. The defendant himself may not create the contradiction or impeachment and profit thereby.
Bill of Exceptions No. 11 complains that the trial court limited the time for oral argument to two hours to the side. This, appellent claims, was an abuse of his discretion. With this we cannot agree. Appellant’s counsel was notified by the court before he began speaking that he would be limited to two hours. We feel that this is ample time and that appellant’s counsel should have organized his discussion so as to present it within such time.
Bills of Exception, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, complain of the cross-examination of certain witnesses concerning written statements which they had made to investigating officers shortly after the homicide, the introduction into evidence thereof and permitting the jury to take such statements with them into the jury room during the course of their deliberations.
It will be noted that appellant offered such witnesses, but he takes the position here that only such portions of their statements as conflicted with their testimony given on the trial were admissible. This, we think, is academic. We know of no rule that is violated and can conceive of no injury done appellant when the state, in attempting to impeach defendant’s witness, in part corroborates them. We feel that the jury had a much better opportunity to test the credibility of the witnesses by hearing them testify and then reading complete statements made by them shortly after the commission of the offense. This is predicated, of course, upon the existence of a conflict between the two expressions of the witness. This we find to exist in the case at bar.
The only serious question presented is that reflected by Bills of Exception, Nos. 2, 3 and 4. These bills are leveled at the admission in evidence of two statements made by appellant to and in the presence of the arresting officers. Appellant, in his objections and in his bills, irrevocably links them together as one and must be bound thereby. The first statement was made *140by appellant over the telephone just as the first officer came in the room to the effect that he had just killed his wife by shooting her. This was information unknown to the officer at that time. All the officer knew at the time he walked in the room was that a shooting had taken place at that address. Appellant’s objection to this statement and the one that followed was that they constituted a confession of appellant and had not been reduced to writing as required by statute. The statement above set forth was admissible as against the objection leveled. The officers could not have had appellant under arrest until after they heard this statement because they did not know who they wanted to arrest.
After appellant hung up the telephone receiver, he answered certain questions propounded to him by the officers and volunteered certain information as to his reason for killing his wife and the identity of the weapon used.
Having seen fit to link the two statements together, one of which was clearly admissible, and having leveled only one objection to the two, we must hold, in line with many decisions of this court, that the bill shows no reversible error.
Remaining convinced that this cause was properly decided in our original opinion, appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.