Court Opinion

ID: 9929807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 10:10:50.430143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:57:36.854318
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________

           No. 02-23-00019-CR
      ___________________________

EDWARD MICHAEL PAUTENIS, Appellant

                      V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS

   On Appeal from the 355th District Court
           Hood County, Texas
         Trial Court No. CR14699

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Edward Michael Pautenis appeals the trial court’s judgments

convicting him of murder and tampering with physical evidence. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. §§ 19.02(b), 37.09(a). On appeal, Pautenis argues in two issues that the trial

court erred by (1) overruling Pautenis’s motion to suppress certain recorded

statements that he made after purportedly invoking his right to counsel during a

custodial interrogation and (2) admitting evidence that was derived from these

custodial statements. We affirm.

                                   I. BACKGROUND

      On October 22, 2019, James Luckie, an investigator for the Hood County

Sheriff’s Office, responded to a call requesting a welfare check for Pautenis’s wife,

Jennifer. A co-worker had requested the welfare check after Jennifer had failed to

show up to work for “a couple of days.” Upon arriving at the Pautenises’ residence in

Granbury, Luckie found no one at home and saw no obvious signs of foul play.

Luckie tried to call Pautenis and Jennifer but was unable to contact either of them.

Later that day, Pautenis returned Luckie’s call and told him that Jennifer had left with

another man. He explained that he and Jennifer had an open marriage and that it was

not unusual for her to go off with other men for long periods of time.

      Shortly thereafter, Luckie started getting phone calls from Jennifer’s family

members in Florida. They were concerned because Jennifer had not been active on

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social media for several days, which was highly unusual for her. Based on the family

members’ concerns, Luckie began a missing person investigation.

      On October 25, 2019, Luckie returned to the Pautenises’ house, and Pautenis

gave him a detailed account of the night that Jennifer had supposedly left with

another man. While there, Luckie noticed a white Dodge van parked out front.

      The Hood County Sheriff’s Office requested that the Texas Rangers assist with

the investigation, and in early November 2019, Ranger Don Stoner interviewed

Pautenis, who stated that he had nothing to do with Jennifer’s disappearance and

vehemently denied killing her. After Stoner’s interview, fellow Ranger Danny Briley

was assigned to the investigation.

      On November 14, 2019, Luckie and fellow officers returned to the Pautenises’

residence and—with Pautenis’s consent—conducted a search with the aid of a

cadaver dog. During the search, Luckie noticed that the white Dodge van that he had

seen on his previous visit was not at the house. When Luckie asked Pautenis where

the van was, he told him that it was in a storage facility in Fort Worth, but Pautenis

refused to disclose the name of the storage facility because “it was his personal

business.”

      Shortly thereafter, Luckie received a tip from some of Jennifer’s family

members that the van had been located at a business in Florida where Pautenis had

previously worked before moving to Texas. On November 15, 2019, Luckie and

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another investigator traveled to Florida to retrieve the van. After a search, blood was

found on the weather stripping around the van’s back hatch.

      On December 4, 2019, Ranger Briley arrested Pautenis for tampering with

evidence because he had moved the van from Hood County to Florida. After taking

Pautenis into custody, Briley interviewed him.1 Prior to beginning the interview,

Pautenis was provided with water, and his handcuffs were moved to the front of his

body to help him feel more comfortable. The officers also procured him a lunch so

that he would not be hungry. At the start of the interview, Briley read Pautenis his

Miranda rights,2 and Pautenis stated that he understood them.

      At one point during the interview, while discussing the blood evidence found

in the van, Pautenis stated,

      I don’t know where else I’m supposed to go at this point. I mean, I’d
      like to talk to a lawyer or something, but I don’t even know if that will
      do anything for me in this. It’s just . . . I just . . . I don’t understand a lot
      of this if you can understand that.
Briley then paused for several seconds before asking his next question. Pautenis

answered, causing the interview to proceed. As the interview continued, Pautenis

ultimately admitted to killing Jennifer and agreed to show Briley where he had

disposed of her body.

      1
        The entire interview was recorded, and the recording was admitted as an
exhibit at Pautenis’s trial.
      2
       See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).

                                             4
       After the interview, Pautenis took Briley to the rural area in which he had

disposed of Jennifer’s remains. Following a search, officers found a skull with what

appeared to be a bullet hole in it, as well as other bones. DNA testing confirmed that

these bones and the blood found in the Dodge van’s weather stripping almost

certainly came from Jennifer.

       Pautenis also took officers to a separate location where he had disposed of the

weapons that he had used to kill Jennifer. After a canine-assisted search, officers

recovered a .25 caliber pistol and two black barrels for a small .22 caliber rifle.

       Pautenis was indicted for murder and tampering with evidence. Before trial,

Pautenis filed a motion to suppress the statements that he had made to Briley during

his December 4, 2019 custodial interview. At the hearing on his motion to suppress,

Pautenis argued that his statement during the interview that, “I’d like to talk to a

lawyer or something, but I don’t even know if that will do anything for me in this,”

constituted an unambiguous request for counsel, and therefore, any statements that he

made afterward—including his statements admitting to killing Jennifer and directing

officers to where he had disposed of her remains and the murder weapons—were

inadmissible. When questioned at the hearing, Pautenis repeatedly testified that when

he stated that “[he’d] like to talk to a lawyer or something,” he was asking for a lawyer.

Ranger Briley, who has a great deal of experience in interrogating murder suspects,

testified that he believed that Pautenis had understood and voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights during the interview. According to Briley, Pautenis’s statement was not

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an unambiguous request for an attorney because Pautenis “was not clear with

what . . . he wanted to happen,” making his statement open to interpretation. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Pautenis’s motion to suppress.3

      Despite the denial of his motion to suppress, Pautenis pleaded not guilty.4

After the presentation of evidence, a jury found Pautenis guilty on both counts and

assessed his punishment at life in prison and a $10,000 fine on the murder count and

10 years in prison and a $10,000 fine on the tampering-with-evidence count. This

appeal followed.

                                   II. DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Pautenis’s Motion to Suppress

      In his first issue, Pautenis asserts that he unambiguously invoked his right to

counsel during his custodial interrogation and that, therefore, the trial court erred by

denying his motion to suppress. We disagree.

      1. Standard of Review

      We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress evidence. State v. Martinez, 570 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

      3
        Because Pautenis’s motion to suppress raised a question as to the
voluntariness of certain statements he made during his custodial interrogation, the
trial court made findings of fact regarding whether the statements were “made under
voluntary conditions” as required by the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6.
      4
       At trial, Pautenis unsuccessfully argued that he had killed Jennifer in self-
defense.

                                           6
Because the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses’ credibility

and the weight to be given their testimony, Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007), we defer almost totally to a trial court’s rulings on questions of

historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on evaluating

credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact questions

that do not turn on credibility and demeanor, Martinez, 570 S.W.3d at 281. Whether a

statement was made voluntarily is an application-of-law-to-fact question that we

review in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. State v. Lujan, 634 S.W.3d

862, 865–66 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

         When, as here, the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine

whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

ruling, supports those findings. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013). Regardless of whether the motion was granted or denied, the prevailing party

must be afforded the “strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” See State v. Garcia–Cantu, 253

S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). But we review the trial court’s legal ruling

de novo unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also

dispositive of the legal ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

                                            7
          2. Custodial Statements and the Invocation of the Right to Counsel

          Article 38.22, Section 3(a)(2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

prohibits the admission of any oral statement made by an accused during custodial

interrogation unless certain conditions are met. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

38.22, § 3(a)(2). As relevant here, the accused must be warned of his Miranda rights

“prior to the statement” and must “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily” waive

these rights. Id. “The required order is to warn first, waive second, and confess

third.”     Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 865.    The State has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence not only that the accused was advised of his rights but

also that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them. See Joseph v. State,

309 S.W.3d 20, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Only “warned and waived” custodial

statements are admissible in evidence. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 171 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008).

          To qualify as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a waiver must satisfy two

distinct requirements: “[i]t must be ‘the product of a free and deliberate choice rather

than intimidation, coercion, or deception,’” and it must be “made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of

the decision to abandon it.” Lujan, 634 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting Berghuis v. Thompkins,

560 U.S. 370, 382–83, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010)). “Only if the ‘totality of the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and

the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda

                                            8
rights have been waived.” Joseph, 309 S.W.3d at 25 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.

412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986)). “The ‘totality-of-the-circumstances approach’

requires the consideration of ‘all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,’

including the defendant’s experience, background, and conduct.” Id. (quoting Fare v.

Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S. Ct. 2560, 2572 (1979)).

      When a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, interrogation

must cease until counsel has been provided or the suspect initiates further

communication with the police. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 339 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). “This secondary Miranda right is ‘designed to prevent police from badgering a

defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights[.]’” State v. Munoz, No.

08-16-00023-CR, 2018 WL 1517006, at *9 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 28, 2018, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (quoting Davis v. U.S., 512 U.S. 452, 458, 114

S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994)).

      To trigger law enforcement’s duty to terminate the interrogation, a suspect’s

request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 381, 130

S. Ct. at 2259 (quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355); Davis, 313 S.W.3d at

339. Thus, “the mere mention of the word ‘attorney’ or ‘lawyer,’ without more, does

not automatically invoke the right to counsel.” Munoz, 2018 WL 1517006, at *9

(citing State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). The police are

not required to attempt to clarify a suspect’s ambiguous references to counsel. Davis,

313 S.W.3d at 339 (citing Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62, 114 S. Ct. at 2356).

                                           9
      “Whether a statement referring to a lawyer constitutes a clear request for

counsel depends on the statement itself and the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the statement.” Id. (citing Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892). Although there are

no “magical words” required to invoke a suspect’s right to counsel, at a minimum, the

suspect must “express a definite desire to speak to someone, and that person be an

attorney.” Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Russell

v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). In assessing a suspect’s

statement, we apply an objective test: did the suspect “articulate his desire to have

counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the

circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”

Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355; accord Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339 (quoting

Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892–93).

      3. Pautenis Did Not Invoke His Right to Counsel

      Pautenis complains that his statements admitting to killing Jennifer and

directing law enforcement to the locations of both her remains and the murder

weapons were inadmissible because Ranger Briley failed to honor Pautenis’s request

for an attorney. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 38.21, 38.22, § 3(a)(2); Jones v.

State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Specifically, he claims that his

statement, “I’d like to talk to a lawyer or something, but I don’t even know if that

would do anything for me in this,” constituted an unambiguous invocation of his right

to counsel and that Ranger Briley failed to honor that invocation. We disagree.

                                          10
       In Davis v. U.S., the Supreme Court, applying the objective test set forth above,

held that the statement, “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer,” was not sufficiently clear to

invoke the right to counsel. 512 U.S. at 462, 114 S. Ct. at 2357. Applying this same

standard, courts have held that the following statements were ambiguous and

therefore insufficient to invoke the right to counsel:

       • “I might want to talk to an attorney”;

       • “I think I need a lawyer”;

       • “Do you think I need an attorney here?”; or

       • “I can’t afford a lawyer[,] but is there any[]way I can get one?”

In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted). On the other hand,

courts have held that a suspect invoked his right to counsel by stating:

       • [That] he did not “want to make a statement at this time without a
         lawyer”;

       • “Uh, yeah. I’d like to do that” in response to a question whether he
         understood his right to counsel;

       • “Maybe I should talk to an attorney by the name of William Evans”
         and proffering that attorney’s business card;

       • “Can I get an attorney right now, man?”; or

       • “I’d just as soon have an attorney ‘cause, you know—[y’all] say
         there’s been a shooting.”
Id. at 326 (citations omitted).

       Pautenis’s statement falls into the ambiguous category. Cf. Clark v. Murphy, 331

F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that suspect’s statement, “I think I would like

                                           11
to talk to a lawyer,” was ambiguous). Even if Pautenis’s words, “I’d like to talk to a

lawyer or something”—taken by themselves—could be considered sufficiently clear

to invoke the right to counsel, see Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 352 (explaining that to

invoke the right to counsel, a suspect must, at a minimum, express the desire to speak

to someone and that person must be an attorney), these words were not spoken in

isolation. The second part of his statement, “but I don’t even know if that would do

anything for me in this,” blurs the meaning and renders his statement ambiguous. Cf.

Vieira v. State, No. 08-16-00100-CR, 2018 WL 3084155, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso

June 22, 2018, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (concluding that although “the

simple declarative statement, ‘It’s time to talk to a lawyer’ would leave little room for

doubt that a suspect had invoked the right to counsel,” the suspect’s statement, “I am

thinking it’s time to talk to a lawyer, I guess,” was ambiguous because the additional

words that the suspect used “express[ed] some manner of equivocation”). Taken in

its entirety, Pautenis’s statement could still be interpreted as a request for counsel, but

it could also reasonably—and perhaps best—be understood as the mere verbalization

of Pautenis’s thoughts assessing his situation and contemplating the possible benefits

of speaking to an attorney.5 Because Pautenis’s statement is fairly susceptible to more

than one meaning, a reasonable police officer would not necessarily understand it to

      5
        Indeed, Ranger Briles testified that he thought that Pautenis’s statement
indicated that he was probably “pondering . . . where he was” and the possible
benefits of speaking to an attorney.

                                            12
be a request for an attorney. Therefore, it fails the objective test.6 See Davis, 512 U.S.

at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355; accord Davis, 313 S.W.3d at 339.

      Having determined that Pautenis did not invoke his right to counsel, we

conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Pautenis’s motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we overrule Pautenis’s first issue.

B. The Fruit-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Doctrine Does Not Apply

      In his second issue, Pautenis argues that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence derived from the statements that Pautenis made after purportedly invoking

his right to counsel because such evidence constitutes “fruit of the poisonous tree.”

See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 487–88, 83 S. Ct. 407, 415–18 (1963)

(explaining “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 38.23(a) (prohibiting evidence obtained in violation of a constitutional right from

being admitted against accused in trial of criminal case). But because Pautenis did not

invoke his constitutional right to counsel, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine

does not apply. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442–43, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2508

(1984) (explaining that the purpose of fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is to “deter

      6
        Pautenis argues that his statement is similar to the statement, “I think I want a
lawyer,” which the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed “was a clear and unequivocal
assertion” of the appellant’s right to counsel in Jones v. State. 742 S.W.2d 398, 405–06
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987). However, because Jones was decided before Davis v. U.S., the
Court of Criminal Appeals did not apply the Supreme Court’s objective test in
assessing the sufficiency of the suspect’s statement. Thus, even if we were to agree
with Pautenis regarding the similarity of the two statements, it would not necessarily
follow that his statement passes Davis’s objective test.

                                            13
police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections”). Therefore, we

overrule Pautenis’s second issue.

                                    III. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled both of Pautenis’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

                                                      /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                      Bonnie Sudderth
                                                      Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 25, 2024

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