Court Opinion

ID: 9895165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-05 07:10:46.583608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:33.280708
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed October 31, 2023.

                                     In The

                    Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                             NO. 14-22-00571-CV

        REGINA ANN VARKEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE
      REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF ANIL C. VARKEY,
        DECEASED AND AGELINA GINA VARKEY, Appellants
                                       V.

     MEMORIAL HERMANN HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A MEMORIAL
          HERMANN SOUTHEAST HOSPITAL, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 11th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. 2019-11347

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellants, Regina Ann Varkey and Agelina Gina Varkey, (the “Varkeys”),
appeal the trial court’s interlocutory order granting appellee’s Memorial Hermann
Health System d/b/a Memorial Hermann Southeast Hospital’s (the “Hospital”)
Chapter 74 motion to dismiss for failure to timely serve expert reports. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.014(a)(9), 74.351(a), (b). We affirm.
                   I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       The Varkeys originally filed their wrongful death action on July 2, 2018 (the
First Suit) asserting health care liability claims for the death of Anil Varkey against
various health care providers.        The Hospital filed its answer on July 27, 2018,
which no party disputes triggered the Varkey’s 120-day deadline to serve the
Hospital with the expert reports required under Chapter 74. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 74.351(a).           On November 21, 2018, 117 days later, the Varkeys
voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Hospital.

       On February 14, 2019, the Varkeys refiled suit (the Second Suit), asserting
health care liability claims against the Hospital based on the same events that
served the basis of the First Suit. In the Second Suit, the Varkeys purported to
include the expert reports required under Chapter 74, (i.e., the pleading is titled
“Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Request for Rule 194 Disclosures and Cpt 74 Expert
Reports of Madison Chollett, BSN, RN and Dr. John Darren Clark, M.D.,
SFHM”). 1 At the time of filing, the Varkeys requested that the District Clerk issue
service of the new lawsuit and expert reports by certified mail.2

       On February 26, 2019, the Harris County District Clerk issued the citation
for the Second Suit.          The poor-quality image in our record indicates that a
package may have been postmarked and addressed the same day to the person the
Varkeys alleged to be the registered agent of the Hospital. The record indicates the
package contained the citation, petition and expert reports and was returned to the

       1
          Although the Second Suit is entitled “Plaintiffs’ Original Petition, Requests for Rule
194 disclosures and CPT.74 Expert Reports of Madison Chollett, BSN, RN and Dr. John Darren
Clark, M.D., SFHM,” no expert reports appear to have been attached to the Second Suit in the
clerk’s record.
       2
        Although expert reports of Chollett and Clark were apparently not attached to the filing
of the Second Suit, we assume, without deciding, that the expert reports were included in
package that the Varkeys requested to the served on the Hospital.

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Clerk as undeliverable.

      Nothing in the record indicates the Varkeys made any other attempt to serve
the Hospital with the reports.

      The Hospital answered the Second Suit and subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to serve the required Chapter 74 expert report and curriculum
vitae. In its motion the Hospital argued that the 120-day period for the Varkeys to
serve the Hospital with expert reports had expired and that the Varkeys had not yet
served the report. In response, the Varkeys argued among other points, that tolling
applied to freeze the running of the 120-day period following their dismissal, that
they had properly served the reports when refiling suit by requesting that the Clerk
serve the Hospital at its registered agent’s address by certified mail, and that the
Hospital’s failure to receive those reports—returned as undeliverable—owed to the
Hospital’s fault in failing to “designate and continuously maintain ... a registered
office ... where process may be personally served on the entity's registered agent.”

      On October 3, 2019, the trial court signed an interlocutory order dismissing
the Varkeys’ health care liability claims against the Hospital.

                              II. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS

      In their sole issue on appeal, the Varkeys contend that the trial court erred in
granting the Hospital’s motion to dismiss and argue that service of the report was
timely. In their brief they assert:

      The certified mail return receipt requested mailing that was sent by
      the United States Postal Service to the Appellee was postmarked on
      February 26, 2019 bearing receipt number 7018 1830 0001 4423 2495
      (69-108) and the certified parcel was quickly returned back to the
      Harris County District Clerk and filed among the official papers of the
      court’s file on March 8, 2019 at 10:00am. Although, the Appellee’s
      Registered Agent did not accept the certified parcel that contained the
      expert reports, the Appellants can prove beyond a reasonable doubt
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      and to a moral certainty that they complied with Rule 21a and Chapter
      74.351 on February 26, 2019.
      Thus, on appeal the Varkeys contend that service of Chollett’s and Clark’s
expert reports was accomplished by mail on February 26, 2019, and that such
service was timely.

      Although typically we review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss
under section 74.351 under an abuse of discretion standard, in an appeal such as
this—where we consider whether the Hospital was timely served with the expert
reports in accordance with section 74.351(a) and the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure, a legal question, we apply a de novo standard of review. Am.
Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001);
Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Callas, 497 S.W.3d 58, 62 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Nexion Health at Beechnut, Inc. v. Paul,
335 S.W.3d 716, 718 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).

      Section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Section
74.351) requires a health care liability claimant, not later than the 120th day after
the filing of the defendant’s original answer, to serve “one or more expert reports,
with a curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report for each… health care
provider against whom a liability claim is asserted.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
§ 74.351(a); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Joplin, 525 S.W.3d 772,
778 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Failure to serve an
expert report by the statutory deadline requires mandatory dismissal. See Zanchi v.
Lane, 408 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2013). When a healthcare liability claimant
nonsuits a claim governed by Chapter 74 before the expiration of the statutory
deadline to serve an expert report and subsequently refiles the claim against the
same defendant, the expert-report period is tolled between the date nonsuit was
taken and the date the new lawsuit is filed. CHCA Woman's Hosp., L.P. v. Lidji,
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403 S.W.3d 228, 234 (Tex. 2013).3

       While the parties dispute some facts—whether the expert reports were
attached to the Petition, whether the Hospital evaded service, whether either the
trial court’s belated order granting partial dismissal of the First Suit prevented
tolling from beginning, or whether the Hospital was ever served with any report—
none are consequential to our analysis. The determinative facts are as follows:

       At the time of their voluntary dismissal of the First Suit against the
       Hospital, the Varkey’s 120-day deadline to serve the Hospital expert
       reports was tolled indefinitely on Day 117.
       Varkeys refiled their health care liability claims lawsuit against the
       Hospital on February 14, 2019.
       The Varkeys thus had three days to “serve” the Hospital with the
       expert reports.
       At the time of refiling, the Varkeys requested and paid the Harris
       County District Clerk the requisite fees for issuance of citation and for
       the Hospital (and other Defendants) be served by certified mail with
       return receipt.
       Tolling ceased and the expert-report deadline resumed, counting
       forward such that, February 15 became Day 118, February 16 became
       Day 119, and February 17 became Day 120.
       Thus, any attempts to serve the expert reports on or after February 18, 2019
were untimely. Rule 21a provides for four methods of service of every pleading,
plea, motion or other form of request, other than citation: (1) by delivery; (2) by

3
  We have applied the tolling principles in Lidji to renewed health care liability claims filed
against parties previously dismissed from a health care liability claim lawsuit that remained
pending with other defendants during the tolling period. Poreddy v. De Solis, No. 14-22-00306-
CV, 2023 WL 5379732, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 22, 2023, no pet.
h.)(Spain, J., concurring)(applying Lidji’s tolling rule applicable to nonsuits to a voluntary partial
dismissal, completely dismissing claims against a party but not all parties). Like in Poreddy, the
parties have treated the original dismissal of their claims (on November 21, 2018) as a Rule 162
“non-suit”.

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certified or registered mail; (3) by telephonic document transfer; or (4) by such
other manner as the court in its discretion may direct. See Breiten v. Shatery, 365
S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex.App.—El Paso, no pet.). The Varkeys argue that they
served the expert reports by requesting citation of the Second Suit and reports by
certified mail on Feb. 14. However, Rule 21a defines when service is complete:
“Service by mail . . . shall be complete upon deposit of the document, postpaid and
properly addressed, in the mail . . .” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a(b)(1). Even assuming that
the clerk’s office (a) sent the certified mail to the correct address for the Hospital
and (b) that expert reports were included in the package of materials mailed to the
Hospital, service was still not “completed” by Feb. 17. The clerk’s office did not
create the citation and the package was not postmarked until Feb. 26, well past the
three-day deadline.

      The Varkeys could have completed service of the expert reports within the
three-day window by any of the methods listed in Rule 21a by hand delivery, mail
or fax. They used none of these options. The Varkeys provide no legal support for
the proposition that the expert reports were timely “served” on the Hospital by
requesting citation and service on Feb. 14 or by the fact that the clerk’s office
deposited the Second Suit package in the mail on Feb. 26.

      With no valid factual contention to support a legal basis for reversing the
trial court’s order, we cannot sustain the Varkeys argument. Accordingly, we
overrule the Varkey’s sole issue.

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                                 III. CONCLUSION

       Having overruled the sole issue presented for review, we affirm the order of
the trial court.

                                      /s/       Randy Wilson
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Spain, and Wilson.

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