Court Opinion

ID: 9954137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 18:10:53.238762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:51.354422
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Dismukes v. Ashtabula Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 2024-Ohio-1111.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               ASHTABULA COUNTY

DANIEL DISMUKES, et al.,                               CASE NO. 2023-A-0042

                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,
                                                       Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                         Court of Common Pleas

ASHTABULA COUNTY
CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, et al.,                       Trial Court No. 2022 CV 00647

                 Defendants-Appellants.

                                              OPINION

                                 Decided: March 25, 2024
                 Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded

Christopher M. Newcomb, 213 Washington Street, Conneaut, OH 44030 (For Plaintiffs-
Appellees).

Kenneth E. Smith and Michael P. Quinlan, Mansour Gavin LPA, North Point Tower, 1001
Lakeside Avenue, Suite 1400, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Defendants-Appellants).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Appellants, the Ashtabula County Children Services Board, Michael

Chicarell, Tania Burnett, and Salina Brown appeal the judgment of the Ashtabula County

Court of Common Pleas, denying their Joint Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of

immunity. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

        {¶2}     On November 1, 2022, appellees, Daniel and Kristy Dismukes along with

their adopted child, Z.D., filed a Complaint for Damages and Violations of the Ohio

Administrative Code against the appellants. The Complaint was based on the appellees’
removal of Z.D. from the Dismukes’ custody. On August 19, 2021, the Akron Children’s

Hospital reported to ACCSB concerns regarding Z.D.’s welfare as a result of Daniel and

Kristy not administering the anticonvulsant/seizure medicine Topamax to Z.D.            The

Complaint further alleged that, on August 25, 2021, Z.D. was forcibly removed from Daniel

and Kristy’s custody without cause. ACCSB sought temporary custody of Z.D. on the

grounds of neglect and dependency. The legal proceedings involving Z.D. were not

concluded until November 3, 2021, when ACCSB dismissed its Complaint for Temporary

Custody.

      {¶3}    The Dismukes’ Complaint raised the following claims against the

appellants:

                    12.    On August 24, 2021, Caseworker [Chicarell] met with
              Parents and specifically alleged medical neglect occurring by
              Parents even when Parents indicated the Child had seen his
              endocrinologist in July of 2021 and pediatrician in March of 2021,
              both doctors of which evaluated the Child, and were aware of the
              concerns of the Parents [regarding Topamax], and were both
              mandatory report[er]s if the Parents were being wrongful in any way,
              and made no such reports regarding Parents, and viewed the Child
              as happy and improving at the time, contrary to the false reporting by
              Hospital, Caseworker and ACCSB.

              ***

                                  FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
                                 (Civil Malicious Prosecution)

              ***

                      74. Defendants, jointly and severally, maliciously instituted
              proceedings against Plaintiffs and lacked probable cause for the
              filing of the August 26, 2021 Verified Complaint for Temporary
              Custody.

                     75. The prior proceedings were terminated in favor of Plaintiffs
              as it was ultimately dismissed by ACCSB.

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
                  76. Plaintiffs’ person and civil liberties were improperly and
            egregiously seized during the [course] of these proceedings.

            ***

                               SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
                                  (General Negligence)

            ***

                  79. Defendants, jointly and severally, owed Plaintiffs a duty of
            care in reporting, second opinions and follow-up discussions
            concerning the health and safety of the Child, and most importantly,
            owed a duty to Plaintiffs to conduct themselves professionally.

                  80. Defendants breached the duty of care required to Plaintiffs
            and were the proximate cause of Plaintiffs’ harm.

            ***

                               FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
                                  (Invasion of Privacy)

            ***

                    87. Defendants, jointly and severally, wrongfully intruded into
            the private activities, medical information, and lives of Plaintiffs by
            failing to adhere to their concerns for the Child’s well-being, and
            ongoing medical issues with Topamax and the ketogenic diet.

                  88. Such intrusion caused mental suffering and anguish as
            the special needs and severely impaired Child was physically
            removed from the Parents’ household, using police to effectuate the
            same, while the Child was not properly clothed, and while the other
            minor children of the household had to watch in horror.

                   89. Such intrusion was shameful and humiliating for persons
            of ordinary sensibilities and entirely preventable by Defendants.

            ***

                                FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
                               (Loss [of] Filial Consortium)

            ***

                                           3

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                   92. Defendants, jointly and severally, utterly denied the
            Parents’ ability to maintain a parent-child relationship, including but
            not limited to affection, companionship, solace, comfort, and general
            care, as well as caused general mental anguish to all members of
            Parents’ household.

                  93. Defendants made continual delayed attempts to reunite
            the Child with the Parents, made false reports to outside state
            agencies about Parents and attempted to deny Parents’ access to
            medical information of the Child.

                    94. The Child was forced into two (2) separate foster care
            situations for almost four (4) months until ultimate dismissal of the
            matter by ACCSB.

            ***

                                 SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
              (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress/Reckless and/or
                       Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)

            ***

                    97. Defendants, jointly and severally, intentionally, recklessly
            and/or negligently caused emotional distress to Plaintiffs and knew
            or should have known that its actions of forcibly removing a special
            needs Child from his known and appropriate caring Parents would
            result in serious emotional distress.

                    98. Defendants’ conduct was so extreme and outrageous as
            it provided Parents less than 24 hours after its initial meeting with
            Parents and indicating to Parents that it was taking the least
            restrictive action by simply removing the Child forcibly.

                  99. Defendants’ conduct was intolerable in a civilized
            community and caused mental distress and anguish on Plaintiffs
            wherein no reasonable person should or could endure the same.

            ***

                             SEVENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
                 (Violations of Ohio Administrative Code 5101:2 – Ohio
                Department of Job & Family Services, Division of Social
                                       Services)

            ***
                                           4

Case No. 2023-A-0042
                      102. ACCSB violated the several requirements under the
               Ohio Administrative Code Section 5101:2 regarding the appropriate
               intake procedures, ongoing services, alternative response
               procedures, reporting procedures, removal of children, placement
               setting requirements, and assessments.

               ***

                      104. ACCSB under all claims of relief described herein,
               breached its duties required under the * * * provisions and sections
               of the Ohio Administrative Code.

       {¶4}    On December 20, 2022, the appellants filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Civil Rule 12(B)(6). Appellants argued that the allegations raised in the seven

claims identified above “all relate to Ashtabula County Defendants’ quasi-judicial

functions and [the] harm incurred as a result of the judicial custody proceedings,” and,

therefore, “Ashtabula County Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity as to each of

Plaintiffs’ claims.” The appellants argued, “[i]n the alternative, even if Ashtabula County

Defendants were not entitled to absolute immunity for each of Plaintiffs’ claims, they are

entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to R.C. § 2744.”

       {¶5}    On July 19, 2023, the trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss, ruling as

follows: “Any fair reading of the Plaintiff’s Complaint infers that the Plaintiff contends that

the ACCSB and its agents and employees[’] acts were manifestly outside the scope of

their employment and/or official responsibilities, or were done with malicious purpose, in

bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. As such, if the Plaintiff would be able to

establish that the Defendants[’] conduct rose to that level, [then] pursuant to the terms of

ORC 2744.03(A)[(6)] the conduct would be excepted from the grant of immunity set forth

in that section.”

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
      {¶6}   On August 3, 2023, the appellants filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, they

raise the following assignments of error:

             [1.] Whether the Trial Court erred when it failed to make a ruling on
             Appellants’ entitlement to absolute immunity when considering
             Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss.

             [2.] Whether the Trial Court erred in denying political subdivision
             immunity under R.C. § 2744 to Appellants in its ruling denying
             Appellants’ Motion to Dismiss.

The assignments of error will be considered jointly.

      {¶7}   Preliminarily, the appellants argue that the trial court’s judgment must be

dismissed because the trial court did not analyze the issue of whether they were entitled

to absolute immunity. The failure to expressly analyze the issue of absolute immunity in

the context of a motion to dismiss is not error. The Supreme Court of Ohio has held:

“When a court dismisses a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it makes no factual

findings beyond its legal conclusion that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Thus, the court does not assume the role of factfinder and has no

duty to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law.” State ex rel. Drake v. Athens Cty.

Bd. of Elections, 39 Ohio St.3d 40, 41, 528 N.E.2d 1253 (1988). We see no reason why

the same should not apply when a court denies a motion to dismiss inasmuch as no other

findings are required beyond the legal conclusion that the complaint does state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, we will

presume the trial court rejected the appellants’ absolute immunity argument when it

denied the motion to dismiss. Olmsted Falls v. Bowman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94000,

2010-Ohio-5767, ¶ 13 (“we must presume that when ruling on the motion [to dismiss], the

court considered the selective enforcement argument but found no merit to it”).

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
       {¶8}   In regard to motions to dismiss, the Supreme Court of Ohio holds:

              A Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
              claim upon which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of a
              complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs.,
              65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). In order for a trial
              court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it “must appear
              beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set
              of facts entitling [her] to recovery.” O’Brien v. Univ. Community
              Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975),
              syllabus (following Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2
              L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); see also LeRoy v. Allen, Yurasek & Merklin, 114
              Ohio St.3d 323, 2007-Ohio-3608, 872 N.E.2d 254, ¶ 14. Reviewing
              courts must accept the material allegations in the complaint as true,
              Maitland v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ohio St.3d 463, 2004-Ohio-5717,
              816 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 11, and construe the allegations and all
              reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving
              party, Kenty v. Transamerica Premium Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 415,
              418, 650 N.E.2d 863 (1995).

Doe v. Greenville City Schools, 171 Ohio St.3d 763, 2022-Ohio-4618, 220 N.E.3d 763, ¶

8. “Appellate review of a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R.

12(B)(6) is de novo.” Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156,

2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12.

       {¶9}   The appellants claim that, “[i]n Ohio,” caseworkers are entitled to absolute

immunity based upon the sort of allegations raised in the Complaint. In support of this

claim, the appellants cite to several federal cases from the Sixth Circuit and a district court

case from Ohio: Bauch v. Richland Cty. Children Servs., 733 Fed.Appx. 292 (6th

Cir.2018); Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716 (6th

Cir.2011); Rippy ex rel. Rippy v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.2001); Holloway v.

Brush, 220 F.3d 767 (6th Cir.2000); and McIntosh v. Butler Cty. Children’s Servs. Bd.,

S.D.Ohio No. 1:09-cv-274, 2011 WL 6091764. We note that all of these cases involved

claims for damages based on the deprivation of constitutional rights by state actors

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, i.e., they were Section 1983 actions. None of

these cases stand for the proposition that caseworkers in Ohio are entitled to absolute

immunity for the sort of state law claims raised by the Dismukes. In a case not cited by

the appellants, Scharbrough v. S. Cen. Ohio Job & Family Servs., S.D.Ohio No. 2:20-cv-

4527, 2021 WL 2314848, the district court acknowledged that “[t]he Supreme Court of

Ohio has yet to determine the parameters of immunity for caseworkers and has not

addressed the availability of quasi-judicial immunity for these actors.” Id. at *11. Thus, a

federal court confronting the issue of whether caseworkers are entitled to absolute

immunity against state law claims “must predict how the state’s highest court would

resolve the matter.” Id.

       {¶10} We begin our analysis by considering the substance and scope of the

doctrine of “absolute immunity,” otherwise known as absolute quasi-judicial immunity.

       {¶11} The common law doctrine of “absolute immunity” provides for “the immunity

of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, * *

* even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it ‘is not for the

protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose

interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with

independence and without fear of consequences.’” (Citation omitted.) Pierson v. Ray,

386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The same absolute immunity

is accorded to prosecutors “based upon the same considerations that underlie the

common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their

duties,” i.e., “harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the

prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public

trust.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-423, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).

       {¶12} The absolute immunity enjoyed by prosecutors does not apply to all actions

performed by a prosecutor:

              Absolute prosecutorial immunity is justified “only for actions that are
              connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for
              every litigation-inducing conduct.” Burns [v. Reed], 500 U.S. [478,]
              at 494, 111 S.Ct. 1934[, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991)]. “Prosecutors are
              entitled to absolute immunity for conduct ‘intimately associated with
              the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
              U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Prosecutors
              are not absolutely immune when they perform administrative,
              investigative, or other functions; for example, when they give legal
              advice to the police, hold a press conference, or fabricate evidence.
              Ibid. “[T]he actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely
              because they are performed by a prosecutor. Qualified immunity
              represents the norm …. The question, then, is whether the
              prosecutors have carried their burden of establishing that they were
              functioning as ‘advocates’” when they performed the actions
              complained of. Buckley [v. Fitzsimmons], 509 U.S. [259,] at 273-74,
              113 S.Ct. 2606[, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993)] (emphasis added). The
              Supreme Court has extended absolute immunity to prosecutors only
              where their challenged acts were performed while serving as an
              advocate in legal proceedings. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125,
              118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).

Holloway, 220 F.3d at 774-775.

       {¶13} In the context of Section 1983 actions, the Sixth Circuit has further extended

this absolute quasi-judicial immunity to social workers and caseworkers. “[U]nder certain

circumstances, social workers are entitled to absolute immunity.” Holloway at 774. “The

scope of this immunity is akin to the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity, * * *, which

applies to conduct ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’”

(Citation omitted.) Pittman, 640 F.3d at 724. “By analogy, social workers are absolutely

immune only when they are acting in capacity as legal advocates–initiating court actions

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
or testifying under oath–not when they are performing administrative, investigative, or

other functions.” Holloway at 775. “The analytical key * * * is advocacy–whether the

actions in question are those of an advocate.” Id.1

        {¶14} We next consider whether caseworkers in Ohio are entitled to absolute

immunity akin to the immunity granted to caseworkers in federal actions.

        {¶15} In Brodie v. Summit Cty. Children Servs. Bd., 51 Ohio St.3d 112, 554 N.E.2d

1301 (1990), suit was brought against a children services board for, inter alia, negligently

failing or refusing to investigate reports of child abuse and negligently failing or refusing

to file dependency and neglect proceedings. Id. at 113. The appellants urged the Ohio

Supreme Court “to adopt the federal standards of absolute immunity accorded to

departments of welfare or children services bureaus,” where it was “generally alleged that

[plaintiffs] had been deprived of due process of law by a state agency, specifically

departments of welfare or children services bureaus, in that the agency failed to provide

children with adequate protection against abuse or neglect, or the agency exceeded its

powers.” Id. at 115. The court “decline[d] to adopt the doctrine of absolute immunity as

applied in Section 1983 cases against a political subdivision claiming deprivation of due

process of law.” The court found the federal authorities “inapposite, as the cause of action

filed by Brodie is based on negligence and misfeasance for which there was no absolute

1. It has been observed that the United States “Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether
social workers can gain absolute immunity from suit for actions functionally analogous to a prosecutor’s
duties.” Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1191, fn. 6 (10th Cir.2014). Dissenting from the denial of a
petition for writ of certiorari, Justice Thomas remarked, “it is not clear to me that the functional analysis of
the Sixth Circuit is correct,” and “I am not convinced that social workers, who often are involved in civil
family welfare proceedings, can ever function as prosecutors for purposes of § 1983 immunity analysis.”
Hoffman v. Harris, 511 U.S. 1060, 114 S.Ct. 1631, 1633, 128 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
See also Mabes v. McFeeley, S.D.Ind. No. 1:21-cv-02062-JRS-MKK, 2023 WL 8878427, *4 (“[t]he analogy
between criminal prosecution and DCS proceedings is imperfect, not least because so much of a DCS
intervention is done administratively, with minimal procedural protections for the accused”).
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Case No. 2023-A-0042
immunity under Ohio law at the time the cause accrued.” Id. at 116. Instead, the court

applied the doctrine of good faith qualified immunity to the conduct of the children services

board. Id.

       {¶16} Although similar in some respects, we do not find Brodie controlling. The

absolute immunity considered by the supreme court in Brodie was not based on the

common law doctrine of judicial immunity, but rather a sovereign immunity which

protected “officials whose special functions are of constitutional status requiring complete

protection from suit.” Id. at 115. The analytical key was not whether the official was acting

in the capacity of advocate but whether the official was acting in a discretionary or

ministerial capacity. “The test for whether immunity attaches is based upon the nature

and scope of the discretion and responsibilities of the public official whose acts are the

basis of the alleged liability.” Id. Moreover, in the present case, the Dismukes’ claims

are based on negligent or intentionally tortious conduct in the course of investigating

alleged abuse, rather than the failure to investigate. In other words, the absolute immunity

urged by the appellants in the present case would not have applied to the children

services board in Brodie even if it had been adopted.

       {¶17} The only appellate court decision addressing the issue of which this Court

is aware is Maternal Grandmother v. Hamilton Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2020-

Ohio-1580, 154 N.E.3d 225 (1st Dist.), rev’d on other grounds 167 Ohio St.3d 390, 2021-

Ohio-4096, 193 N.E.3d 536. Maternal Grandmother was an action for wrongful death

and survivorship brought on behalf of the estate of a child who died in the custody of her

parents. Id. at ¶ 1. Without question, the First District stated that, “[w]hen a caseworker

provides information to a juvenile court for the purposes of assisting the juvenile court in

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
making a child-custody decision, the conduct is entitled to immunity.” Id. at ¶ 20. The

court then described the circumstances in which immunity applied as set forth in the

Holloway and Pittman decisions cited above. The court held that immunity barred “the

appellants[’] claim that the caseworkers breached their duty ‘in the context of the reports

and information that the County and individual caseworkers provided to the juvenile court

that resulted in the juvenile court ordering G.B.’s return to her mother.’” Id. at ¶ 19.

“Because the statements made to the juvenile court by the caseworkers had been made

while acting in their capacity as legal advocates, they are entitled to absolute immunity.”

Id. at ¶ 20. The court did not apply absolute immunity to other claims raised by the

complaint, such as “the caseworkers failed to report abuse” and “the caseworkers failed

to perform an adequate investigation.” Id. at ¶ 24.

       {¶18} In Scharbrough, the district court, endeavoring to predict how the Ohio

Supreme Court would resolve the matter concluded as follows: “Given that Ohio’s

jurisprudence for prosecutorial immunity follows the Sixth Circuit approach, and the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Pittman is an extension of its prosecutorial immunity doctrine, this

Court will employ the functional approach to the caseworkers’ claims for absolute

common law immunity.” Scharbrough, 2021 WL 2314848, at *11. The district court’s

characterization of Ohio jurisprudence’s approach to prosecutorial immunity is accurate.

See Willitzer v. McCloud, 6 Ohio St.3d 447, 449, 453 N.E.2d 693 (1983) (“[i]n determining

whether the prosecutor’s acts are quasi-judicial as opposed to investigative or

administrative, the [federal] courts have applied a functional analysis of his activities,

rather than simply stating that he is a prosecutor whose status entitles him to absolute

immunity”); Elliott v. Ohio Dept. of Ins., 88 Ohio App.3d 1, 8-9, 623 N.E.2d 87 (10th

                                            12

Case No. 2023-A-0042
Dist.1993) (“[f]or purposes of this case, we will assume Ohio law to be the same as federal

law [regarding prosecutorial immunity]”); Henderson v. Euclid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

101149, 2015-Ohio-15, ¶ 28 (“[i]n accordance with the foregoing [federal precedents], * *

* the trial court properly held that the prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity”).

       {¶19} Given the soundness of the Scharbrough court’s analysis, the fact that

Brodie was decided before Holloway and Pittman and was based on different legal

premises, as well as to avoid conflict with Maternal Grandmother, this Court finds it

appropriate that the appellants herein are entitled to immunity akin to that enjoyed by

prosecutors inasmuch as they are alleged to have engaged in conduct that is the

functional equivalent of legal advocacy.

       {¶20} As applied to the Dismukes’ Complaint, in the context of a motion to dismiss

based on the pleadings, immunity only applies to the claim for malicious civil prosecution

as that claim is based solely on the institution of legal proceedings against the Dismukes,

a quintessential act of legal advocacy. Presutto v. Hull, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 17CA011218,

2018-Ohio-3103, ¶ 7 (“Courts have held that the immunity of prosecutors extends to

allegations of malicious prosecution”); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d

128. With respect to the Dismukes’ other claims – negligence, invasion of privacy, loss

of consortium, infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the administrative code –

it is not possible at this stage of the litigation to determine whether the immunity granted

to caseworkers precludes the Dismukes from the possibility of recovery. Again, it is worth

emphasizing the nature and the limitations of that immunity:

              Opening a case as an investigation with [job and family services] is
              very different than initiating a case in juvenile court. One of these
              activities–the initiation of a juvenile court case–would entitle the [job
              and family services] Defendants involved to absolute immunity
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Case No. 2023-A-0042
              because they are acting in their role as legal advocates. Opening
              internal [job and family services] investigations against Plaintiffs on
              insufficient or false information, however, falls into the category of
              investigatory functions. When individuals perform such functions,
              they are entitled to qualified immunity, at best. Holloway, 220 F.3d
              at 775. Even if investigation results in a court proceeding, it will not
              automatically be retroactively shielded by that proceeding. See
              Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993) (“A prosecutor
              may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute
              immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested, …
              that work may be retrospectively described as ‘preparation’ for a
              possible trial[.]”). * * * Additionally, caseworkers are not entitled to
              absolute immunity when executing a court order because they are
              “acting in a police capacity rather than as legal advocates.” Brent v.
              Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 685 (6th Cir.2018)
              (quoting Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.,
              724 F.3d 687, 694 (6th Cir.2014)).

Scharbrough at *10-11.

       {¶21} The appellants also contend that the trial court erred by denying their Motion

to Dismiss based on political subdivision immunity. The appellants initially and correctly

argue that the trial court erred by denying the Children Services Board the benefit of

immunity based on the alleged acts or omissions of its employee-appellants, Chicarell,

Burnett, and Brown.

       {¶22} “Ohio law generally provides political subdivisions and their employees with

immunity from lawsuits and liability.” Maternal Grandmother, 167 Ohio St.3d 390, 2021-

Ohio-4096, 193 N.E.3d 536, at ¶ 7, citing R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) (“a political subdivision is

not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property

allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the

political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function”) and R.C.

2744.03(B)(6) (“the employee is immune from liability”). The “operation of a job and family

services department or agency” is a statutorily defined governmental function. R.C.

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
2744.01(C)(2)(m); Rankin v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 118 Ohio

St.3d 392, 2008-Ohio-2567, 889 N.E.2d 521, ¶ 16; M.F. v. Perry Cty. Children Servs., 5th

Dist. Perry Nos. 19-CA-0003 and 19-CA-0004, 2019-Ohio-5435, ¶ 30; Masek v. Gehring,

11th Dist. Geauga No. 2004-G-2569, 2005-Ohio-3900, ¶ 22.

       {¶23} The immunity granted by R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) to a political subdivision

engaged in a governmental function is subject to five exceptions, set forth in R.C.

2744.02(B), none of which have any apparent relevance to the allegations of the

Dismukes’ Complaint.       Rankin at syllabus (“[a] political subdivision is not liable for

damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused

by any act or omission in connection with its operation of a public children services agency

except as provided in R.C. 2744.02(B)”). The Rankin case, in which suit was brought

against a county department of children and family services and its employees for failure

to protect a child committed to their temporary custody against sexual abuse, is

illustrative: “R.C. 2744.02(B) lists five exceptions to the general denial of liability; however,

none of the exceptions applies to these facts. The injuries in this case did not involve the

operation of a motor vehicle (R.C. 2744.02(B)(1)), a proprietary function (R.C.

2744.02(B)(2)), public roads (R.C. 2744.02(B)(3)); physical defects of a building (R.C.

2744.02(B)(4)), or a duty expressly imposed on appellants by statute (R.C.

2744.02(B)(5)). As a result, the general denial of liability granted in R.C. 2744.02(A)

applies to the department [of job and family services] * * *.” Rankin at ¶ 29.

       {¶24} The foregoing analysis applies to the appellant, Children Services Board,

but not the Board’s employee-appellants, Chicarell, Burnett, and Brown.              Cramer v.

Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 17 (“[f]or the

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Case No. 2023-A-0042
individual employees of political subdivisions, the analysis of immunity differs”). An

employee of a political subdivision loses the benefit of immunity when his or her “acts or

omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment or official

responsibilities;” his or her “acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith,

or in a wanton or reckless manner;” or “[c]ivil liability is expressly imposed upon the

employee by a section of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a)-(c); Rankin at ¶ 36.

       {¶25} The trial court in the present case denied the appellants’ Motion to Dismiss

on the basis of political subdivision immunity on the grounds that they had failed to

demonstrate, on the face of the Complaint, that the Dismukes could not prove that “the

ACCSB and its agents and employees[’] acts were manifestly outside the scope of their

employment and/or official responsibilities, or were done with malicious purpose, in bad

faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” For the reasons demonstrated above, this is

insufficient to remove the Children Services Board’s immunity. With respect to Chicarell,

Burnett, and Brown, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim.            Maternal

Grandmother, 167 Ohio St.3d 390, 2021-Ohio-4096, 193 N.E.3d 536, at ¶ 7 (“Ohio law

permits plaintiffs to sue and hold liable employees of a political subdivision if the

employees’ acts or omissions in the course and scope of their employment were wanton

or reckless”).

       {¶26} The appellants argue that “[t]he Complaint itself never alleges that Chicarell,

Burnett, or Brown acted outside the scope of their employment/official capacities or that

they acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.” Appellants’ Brief

at 13. We disagree. The Dismukes’ Complaint, as quoted above, alleges conduct by the

“Defendants, jointly and severally,” constituting negligence, invasion of privacy, loss of

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consortium, infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the administrative code. In

the body of the Complaint, some acts are attributed to the employees individually

(Chicarell as “Caseworker,” Burnett as “Director,” and Brown as “Supervisor”), while other

acts are ascribed to “the ACCSB” generally. For the purpose of stating valid claims for

relief, the Dismukes’ pleading is sufficient.

       {¶27} The Maternal Grandmother case is illustrative.        The court of appeals

affirmed the grant of judgment on the pleadings because “[t]he amended complaint [did]

not specify how the conduct of the caseworkers constituted willful misconduct,” “wanton

misconduct,” “reckless misconduct,” or “bad faith.” Maternal Grandmother, 2020-Ohio-

1580, 154 N.E.3d 225, at ¶ 32. “[M]erely saying that they had acted in one of those ways

(the amended complaint cannot even identify which) is insufficient.” Id.

       {¶28} The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that the amended complaint

“did all that was required at the pleading stage by putting the caseworkers on notice of

the claims against them and raising the possibility that the exception to their statutory

immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) might apply.” Maternal Grandmother, 167 Ohio

St.3d 390, 2021-Ohio-4096, 193 N.E.3d 536, at ¶ 15. The court explained:

              Ohio is a notice-pleading state. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Horn, 142
              Ohio St.3d 416, 2015-Ohio-1484, 31 N.E.3d 637, ¶ 13. This means
              that outside of a few specific circumstances, such as claims involving
              fraud or mistake, see Civ.R. 9(B), a party will not be expected to
              plead a claim with particularity. Rather, “a short and plain statement
              of the claim” will typically do. Civ.R. 8(A).

              In this context, i.e., a case in which 2 government employee’s [sic]
              allegedly wanton or reckless behavior is at issue, these general
              pleading rules still apply.       See Civ.R. 9(B) (“Malice, intent,
              knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
              generally”). Accordingly, we hold that when a complaint invokes the
              exception to a government employee’s immunity under R.C.
              2744.03(A)(6)(b), notice pleading suffices and the plaintiff may not
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               be held to a heightened pleading standard or expected to plead the
               factual circumstances surrounding an allegation of wanton or
               reckless behavior with particularity. Accord Parmertor v. Chardon
               Local Schools, 2016-Ohio-761, 47 N.E.3d 942, ¶ 49-51 (11th Dist.);
               Thompson v. Buckeye Joint Vocational School Dist., 2016-Ohio-
               2804, 55 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.); see also York v. Ohio State Hwy.
               Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).

Id. at ¶ 10-11. See also Rankin, 118 Ohio St.3d 392, 2008-Ohio-2567, 889 N.E.2d 521,

at ¶ 38 (reversing a grant of summary judgment as to whether caseworkers acted

recklessly where “[t]he record before us is incomplete as to whether genuine issues of

material fact exist regarding [the caseworkers’] alleged reckless conduct,” it was

appropriate “to remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings regarding what

involvement, if any, [they] had in the supervised visit”).

         {¶29} To the extent indicated above, the appellants’ assignments of error are with

merit.

         {¶30} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part.        All

appellants are entitled to judgment with respect to the Dismukes’ claim for malicious

prosecution.     Appellant, Ashtabula County Children Services Board, is entitled to

judgment with respect to the remainder of the claims in the Complaint. This matter is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.         Costs to be taxed

between the parties equally.

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.

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