Court Opinion

ID: 9470271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:01:16.115163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:49.008314
License: Public Domain

*1253HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
For the reasons stated in my original opinion in this matter,1 I dissent.
The District Court, on remand, concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct neither denied Simmons’ right to call a defense witness nor deprived him of a fair trial. I believe that the record from below makes it plain that these conclusions are clearly erroneous. Appellant here asserts, quite convincingly, that the prosecutor’s threats converted Johnson from a willing witness to a reluctant one;2 that the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that Simmons’ counsel intended to call Johnson as a witness at least until two days after the prosecutor threatened Johnson; that the record does not support a finding that Simmons’ counsel decided not to call Johnson because he thought Johnson might commit perjury;3 that the prosecutor’s conduct plainly interfered with Johnson’s free choice whether to testify; and that the claim that Johnson’s testimony would not have aided Simmons is impossible to resolve definitively and, in any event, is irrelevant to the disposition of this matter.4 In light of the record evidence in this case, and given our decision in United States v. Smith, see note 4 supra, this court must, at a minimum, reverse and remand for a new trial.5
To the extent that the majority’s conclusion rests on a finding that the prosecutor’s conduct did not deprive Simmons of a witness, my disagreement with it is based primarily on my reading of the facts of the case. I would only add that serious doubts concerning the factors motivating a witness’ decision not to testify should be resolved in favor of criminal defendants to protect the integrity of the judicial process. To the extent that the majority suggests that prosecutorial misconduct — including harassment of potential defense witnesses — will be condoned unless the defendant shows that he would have been acquitted but for the challenged behavior, it rests on questionable legal grounds. I find this contention, which is something akin to a warped rule of “harmless error,” to be quite extraordinary and totally at variance with existing constitutional principles. Even the majority previously has recognized that “[t]he right of a defendant to establish a defense by presenting his own witnesses is a fundamental element of due process of law.” United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 368 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (emphasis added).6 Where this right is infringed by the prosecutor or the court, “it cannot be *1254held that the jury would not have believed the [defense witness’] testimony or that the error is harmless.” United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, 228 (3d Cir.1976).7
To my mind, the result reached in this case is plainly at odds with the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. The decision of the District Court should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

. United States v. Simmons, 670 F.2d 365, 372 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Edwards, J., dissenting).

. The record evidence makes it clear that Johnson decided not to testify, and to invoke the Fifth Amendment, only after his confrontation with the prosecutor.

. The most that can be gleaned from the record is that, after Johnson decided not to testify, Simmons’ counsel was relieved of the decision whether to call Johnson as a witness.

. In United States v. Smith, 478 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir.1973), this court noted that “ ‘[a] prosecutor may impeach a witness in court but he may not intimidate him — in or out of court.’ ” Id. at 979 (quoting People v. Pena, 383 Mich. 402, 406, 175 N.W.2d 767, 768 (1970)). The court in Smith also rejected the suggestion that a prosecutor’s alleged good motives are a defense to prosecutorial misconduct: “If the prosecutor thought the witness should be advised of his rights then he should have suggested that the court explain them to [the witness]. The matter would then have been presented to [the witness] by the court without any threats or implication of retaliation.” 478 F.2d at 979.

. The considerable emphasis that the majority places on the fact that Johnson’s lawyer agreed to allow discussions between Johnson and the Assistant United States Attorney is, to say the least, puzzling. Although Johnson’s fírst attorney did tentatively consent to such an arrangement during the process of negotiating a plea, Transcript (“Tr.”) 119, 139, Johnson subsequently sought and received new counsel and refused to consummate the negotiated agreement, United States v. Simmons, Crim. No. 80-504, mem. op. at 3 (D.D.C. July 28, 1982); Tr. 128-29. As the majority implicitly concedes, the prosecutor had no right to summon Johnson and talk to him without his lawyer being present.

. See Clinton, The Right To Present A Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind.L.Rev. 711, 848-50 (1976).

. In Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (per curiam), the majority, despite the existence of what the dissent termed “apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt, offset only by a bare allegation of prejudice,” id. at 99, 93 S.Ct. at 354 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), saw no need to inquire into the potential value of the lost witness’ testimony to the defendant’s case. It concluded, rather, that “the judge’s threatening remarks, directed only at the single witness for the defense, effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus deprived the petitioner of due process of law .... ” Id. at 98, 93 S.Ct. at 353.