Court Opinion

ID: 9834422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:34:34.978652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:14.958356
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees have presented to this court a motion for rehearing, challenging the statements in our former opinion to the effect that the testimony raised the issues of boundary; of encroachments by property owners on the street, which might result in the beginning corner of the Cass property being located farther north than what is now supposed to be that comer; and also tending to show that the Hoods and their vendee, Dr. Cass, had agreed that the south line of the Cass property should be where the old fence was located, and that the court should have submitted those issues to the jury.
After very careful and repeated examinations of the statement of facts, we have reached the conclusion that appellees’ contention on the points referred to is correct, and that part of our opinion is withdrawn; and we hold that no error was committed in refusing to submit those issues to the jury.
We are also ot the opinion that we fell into error in holding that the trial court should have given a requested instruction, placing a limitation upon the testimony of the witnesses Elbert Hood and Otto Zavisch. Appellees had pleaded title by the 10-year statute of limitation, and we are now of the opinion that the testimony of the witnesses referred to was admissible as tending to sustain that plea. However, we sustain appellants’ third assignment of error, and hold that the trial court should have given the following instruction, requested by them:
“If you find and believe from the evidence that Dr. Cass at any time after the purchase of said land by him as shown by his deed took the actual and 'visible possession of all of said land north of said partition fence and that he or his surviving ■ wife held it for a continuous period of 10 years in adverse and actual possession, and that during said time he did not recognize the right or ownership of any other person therein, then you are instructed that the first question propounded to you in the main charge should be answered in the affirmative.”
The court in the main charge instructed the jury, in general terms, as to the 10-year statute of limitation, and then, instead of requiring the jury to make a specific finding as to the different facts necessary to establish such limitation, submitted to them issue No. 1, as set out in our former opinion, which required the jury to find whether or not the plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred by the statute of 10-year limitation. While the course pursued by the trial court did not constitute affirmative error, appellants had. the right to have the issue of limitation, as raised by the pleadings and evidence, clearly, distinctly, and affirmatively submitted to the jury, with as much detail as the special charge contained. Railway v. Shieder, 88 Tex. 166, 30 S. W. 902, 28 L. R. A. 528; Railway Co. v. McGlamory, 89 Tex. 635, 35 S. W. 1048; Railway v. Rogers, 91 Tex. 52, 40 S. W. 956; Railway v. Patterson, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 255, 48 S. W. 747.
In the cases cited, the court, in general terms, charged on the law of contributory negligence, but in the McGlamory Case the Supreme Court said:
“But the charge of the court nowhere undertakes to apply the law to the evidence adduced in support of said special plea of contributory negligence. This being true, the correct rule is that defendants had the right to prepare and demand the giving of a charge requiring the jury to find whether the evidence established the existence of any specific group of facts which, if true, would in law establish such plea, and instructing them that if they found such group of facts to be established by the evidence to find for defendants, and this would be true if proper charges had been asked as to each of the several special pleas of contributory negligence presented by the record. Any other rule would .deprive litigants of their right to have the court explain to the jury the principles of law applicable to the very facts constituting a cause of action or defense, so that they may intelligently pass upon the various complicated issues frequently presented for their determination in one case under our practice.”
And in the Rogers Case, after approving the McGlamory Case, the court said:
“It is especially appropriate in this class of eases to submit to the jury the group of facts which it is claimed constitutes negligence of either party, and to instruct them what to do if they find the facts to be true, or not. Such a charge directs the minds of the jury to the very facts in issue, and invokes their judgment upon the evidence relative to that issue.”
In the case at bar, if the requested charge had been given, it would have directed the minds of the jury to the very facts in issue, and invoked their judgment upon the evidence relative to such issues. Counsel for appellees have urged two objections to the form of that charge, which are: Eirst, that it does not require a finding of cultivation, use, or enjoyment of property; and, second, that it does not require a finding of adverse possession for 10 years prior to the commencement of the suit.
We have reached the conclusion that it was not necessary in this case, as developed by the undisputed testimony, that the requested charge should require a finding in *941the two particulars referred to. We say this because the undisputed testimony shows that the Milam County Lumber Company, a tenant of Dr. Cass and Mrs. Cass, had been in possession of the strip of land in controversy for more than 10 years before the suit was brought, and that its possession was evidenced by the use of the land for the purpose of stacking lumber upon it. Such being the undisputed testimony concerning possession and use for more than 10 years, the only material question was whether or not such possession and use was adverse to the plaintiffs. Upon that issue there was sharp conflict in the testimony.
Appellants’ requested charge No. 6 was properly refused because it assumed that Dr. Cass purchased from the Hoods the strip of land in controversy; while the description given in the deed shows that such was not the fact, and that he and those claiming under him were not entitled to hold the strip in controversy, nor prevent its use as an alley, unless they had acquired such right by the 10-year statute of limitation. The charge referred to undertook to advise the jury as to the law of interruption of possession as applied to this case; and it will be proper for the trial court to give some such charge, if the objection referred to is omitted.
Upon the other points in the case, we adhere to the ruling made in our former opinion. But for the reasons stated, this motion, except as herein noted, is overruled.
Motion overruled.