Court Opinion

ID: 9833814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:03:09.080153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:07.025093
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees in their motion for rehearing enter a remittitur of so much of their judgment as is based on a daily wage rate in excess of $2.50 per day — the lowest wages paid any truck drivers in Iraan or vicinity so far as the evidence shows, and pray for judgment for the balance. This would reduce the total recovery to $2,804.34. Ap-pellees. also call our attention to the following evidence of the witness Glenwood Fluitt:
“Q. Do you know of any one particular truck driver that worked substantially the whole of that year? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. For whom was he working? A. For the Ohio Oil Company.”
They direct our attention to this evidence and ask a reversal of our holding that there was no evidence to justify the finding that an employee of the same class as decedent (who was a truck driver) worked substantially the whole of the year preceding November Í5, 1935, in similar employment in the same place that decedent worked, and that the average daily wage of such employee was $4. Our finding was based upon a statement in appellant’s brief that certain quoted evidence contrary to appellees’ contention was all that was introduced upon the subject. The finding was made in pursuance of that portion of rule 31 for the government of Courts of Civil Appeals relating to statements made in briefs by litigants, which reads as follows: “If the statement from the record thus made is not distinctly challenged by the opposing party, it may be accepted by the court as correct.”
However, that the record may be .complete for further review, if the same be sought, and because in the argument the effect of said evidence was mentioned, and because there was evidence that truck drivers were paid $115 per month, we now withdraw that ruling, and h'old that a judgment in the amount established by ap-' pellees’ remittitur should be affirmed, were it not for other reversible error which will now be noted.
In our original opinion we refrained from commenting upon the alleged lack of evidence to sustain the finding that decedent’s death resulted from an accidental injury sustained in the course of his employment. This we did because we believed and held that the trial court erred in excluding the brief filed by appellant before *365the Industrial Accident Board. Upon more mature deliberation and after considering. the appellant’s motion for rehearing and the written argument of amicus curiae, a majority of the court have concluded that said brief was not admissible as an admission by adoption. The former holding is, therefore, withdrawn and the opinion therein expressed stands merely as the individual veiw of the writer. Appellees’ cross-assignment of error is overruled.
We hold that the evidence does not show that decedent Jeff Greenhaw, in the course of his employment, sustained accidental bodily injuries resulting in his death. Taken most strongly for appellees, the testimony shows: That decedent was' employed by Blumentritt, the insured, as a truck driver — the insured being engaged in the business of transporting freight by truck; upon November 15th or 16th, the date upon which, under appellees’ theory, decedent was supposed to have sustained his injuries, he reported for work early in the morning, and was in apparently strong bodily health; on that day, in the course of his employment, he made a trip from' Iraan to Rankin early in the mqrning; about 2:30 p. m. to all appearances he was strong and uninjured, and was engaged in driving the truck; about November 15th or 16th, 1935, there was a refrigerator in insured’s warehouse, and this refrigerator was subsequently delivered to some place; it was decedent’s duty, not only to drive the truck, but to load and unload the freight, and appellees’ theory is that he sustained a strain in lifting this refrigerator or some other heavy box. No witness testified to seeing him lift such refrigerator, and there is no evidence that if he did so it caused his injury, unless it be inferred from the fact that at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon when he left his employer’s warehouse he was limping, whereas, he had not limped at the beginning of the day or at about 2:30 p. m. It is not shown that he was engaged in his work at the warehouse during the whole of the afternoon^ Had it been shown that 'he sustained the injury performing some duty for his employer, there would have been suffidient evidence upon which to base a finding that the injury so received resulted ultimately in his death. The evidence introduced, however, merely raises a surmise. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Herring, Tex.Com.App., 280 S.W. 740; Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n v. Mints, Tex.Civ.App., 10 S.W.2d 220; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Duhon, Tex.Civ.App., 40 S.W.2d 198.
Since the statement contained in the 'brief filed before the Industrial Accident •Board may not be introduced in evidence in the event of a new trial, the record makes it appear that the case has been fully developed.
Except as herein indicated appellees’ motion for rehearing is overruled. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, and judgment in favor of appellees is reversed, and judgment is herein rendered in favor of appellant.