Court Opinion

ID: 9706315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:39:48.900769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:21.470662
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: I concur with the majority’s decision that the parties to the collective-bargaining agreement explicitly waived the presence of attorneys at disciplinary hearings. Nevertheless, I submit this concurrence to underscore three points. First, I believe that our decision should be based upon our longstanding respect for collective-bargaining agreements. Second, we should note that this decision is limited to the facts in this particular case and that a different factual scenario may well present a sufficient claim to invoke the public policy exception to our general rule of deference to collective-bargaining agreements. Third, the trial judge in any collateral FELA proceeding must vigilantly exercise the gatekeeping role as noted by the majority. First, our courts afford great deference to the agreed-upon terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. Generally, courts will enforce a collective-bargaining agreement unless it contains specific terms that violate public policy. See United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-44, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286, 301-03, 108 S. Ct. 364, 373-74 (1987) (holding that appellate court erred in finding a public policy violation); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services, 173 Ill. 2d 299, 307 (1996) (stating that a court will not enforce a collective-bargaining agreement that contradicts public policy). Here, the law firm presents no adequate public policy exception claim. The public policy exception is narrow and invoked only when contravention of public policy is clearly demonstrated by the collective-bargaining agreement. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 173 Ill. 2d at 307. An applicable public policy concern must be explicit, well defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the law and legal precedent rather than general considerations of supposed public interest. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, District 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62-63, 148 L. Ed. 2d 354, 361, 121 S. Ct. 462, 467 (2000); American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. State of Illinois, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 261 (1988). Any public policy exception inquiry requires a fact-driven analysis. See American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 173 Ill. 2d at 311. Under certain circumstances, preservation of the attorney-client privilege and ethical considerations may require that a court alter or strike an agreement’s terms. See, e.g., Leoris v. Dicks, 150 Ill. App. 3d 350, 354 (1986) (finding that fee-splitting agreement violated public policy and was therefore unenforceable). The Callis firm suggested some concerns about the attorney-client relationship, but the law firm principally argued that we should void the agreement to protect the financial interests of the law firm. The Callis firm did not, however, present sufficient factual and legal arguments to raise a public policy exception in this case. Specifically, the law firm did not demonstrate that their absence from the disciplinary hearing would in effect cause irreparable harm to the attorney-client relationship or to the firm’s ability to represent Rush. As the majority notes, mere speculation that an injury may occur is insufficient to support a claim for injunctive relief. HCR Ltd. Partnership I v. Behrens, 226 Ill. App. 3d 666, 669-70 (1992). Additionally, the trial judge presiding over Rush’s FELA action may exercise great discretion in addressing discovery abuses. See 166 Ill. 2d R. 201. Any discovery abuses tending to impact upon the FELA attorney-client relationship must be carefully scrutinized by the trial judge. The trial judge must assure that the disciplinary hearing does not usurp the employee’s FELA rights. If the collective-bargaining agreement can exclude attorney representation, then the disciplinary hearing’s findings and conclusions should be limited to the collective-bargaining agreement’s purpose of determining the appropriate disciplinary measure, if any, and not to impinge upon the employee’s FELA rights. Finally, our decision does not mean, however, that an applicable public policy concern, including one based upon the attorney-client privilege or ethical considerations, could not arise under different facts.