Court Opinion

ID: 9710067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:01:11.300803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:53.918678
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. While there is no basic dispute as to the facts alleged in the pleadings in this cause, the source of my dissent is the misapprehension by the majority of the nature of plaintiff’s complaint. The majority characterizes the damages allegation as “[t]he complaint merely alleges that plaintiff suffered economic loss in Illinois” and proceeds on the basis of R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied, Programs Corp. (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360, to conclude that this mere economic loss is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on our courts when the alleged tortious acts occurred outside the State. (See 213 Ill. App. 3d at 995.) Plaintiff’s complaint, however, states a cause of action in tortious interference with a contractual relationship as opposed to a breach of contract and alleges damages as a direct and proximate result of the tortious actions that occurred outside the State of Illinois. R.W. Sawant did not involve a tortious interference with a contractual relationship cause of action and is therefore distinguishable. Green v. Advance Ross Electronics Corp. (1981), 86 Ill. 2d 431, 427 N.E.2d 1203, cited in R.W. Sawant, is also distinguishable from the present case as it too was not a tortious interference case. In Green, the plaintiff argued that Illinois could assert long-arm jurisdiction since the economic consequences of the conduct which took place outside of Illinois were felt in Illinois; the Texas operations which incurred the economic loss were funded from assets in Illinois. Our supreme court, however, considered this consequence of the out-of-State activities too remote to support the contention that tortious acts complained of were committed in Illinois, noting: “But the consequences upon which defendants rely are too remote from the misconduct of Green, Sr. [counterdefendant], to support the conclusion that the tortious acts complained of were committed in Illinois. The situs of the last event whose happening was necessary to hold Green, Sr., liable was in Texas. It was there that the alleged improper severance payment was made and the misappropriation and conversion of the labor of corporate employees and use of corporate premises occurred. It was also the place where the alleged improper expenses were charged and the legal retainer agreement entered into. The tortious acts, if any, and the losses or injury were complete when they occurred in Texas. That, therefore, was the place of the wrongs; their commission cannot reasonably or justifiably be transferred to Illinois by the rationale that their consequence reduced the amount of corporate assets in this State.” 86 Ill. 2d at 438, 427 N.E.2d at 1207. In the present case, however, plaintiffs allege a contractual relationship entered into in Illinois with the last act necessary to complete a cause of action, the injury, occurring in Illinois. Under those circumstances, this is not a mere economic loss case, but rather, a tort action, the last act of which occurred in Illinois, and properly subject to our long-arm statute. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Cory. (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 432,176 N.E.2d 761. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the circuit court of Madison County and remand this cause for further proceedings.