Court Opinion

ID: 9897313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:02.100095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:17.648157
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   Aug 15 2023, 8:33 am

                                                                                       CLERK
                                                                                   Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                        and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Scott H. Duerring                                          Theodore E. Rokita
      South Bend, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
                                                                 Sierra A. Murray
                                                                 Deputy Attorney General
                                                                 Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Aidan C. Burkins,                                          August 15, 2023
      Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 22A-CR-1867
              v.
                                                                 Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
                                                                 Court
      State of Indiana,
                                                                 The Honorable Michael A.
      Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Christofeno, Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 20C01-2008-MR-4

                                      Opinion by Judge Bradford
                                  Judges Crone and Kenworthy concur.

      Bradford, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   After a night of drinking and illegal drug use, the then twenty-year-old Aidan

      Burkins shot and killed his friend Thomas Campion and shot and injured his
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023                            Page 1 of 21
      friend Gregory Clark. Additionally, a stray bullet went through the outer wall

      of a nearby home and struck the pillow of an occupant as he was sleeping. The

      State charged Burkins with murder, Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 6

      felony criminal recklessness, and Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession.

      Burkins pled guilty to marijuana possession, a jury found him guilty of the

      remaining charges, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety-five years of

      incarceration. Burkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in (1)

      admitting evidence regarding his use of psilocybin mushrooms the night of the

      shooting and in denying his mistrial motion based on the same evidence; (2)

      refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of Campion’s membership in the

      Aryan Brotherhood; (3) allowing the State to question him on whether he had

      acted knowingly, intentionally, and with reckless disregard; and (4) admitting

      testimony that he had been on a power trip and had made remarks that he

      wanted to kill someone and go to jail. Burkins also contends that the

      prosecutor committed misconduct by mentioning facts not in evidence during

      closing and that his sentence is inappropriately harsh. Because we conclude

      that none of Burkins’s arguments have merit, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Burkins met Campion and Clark at work, and they would often spend time

      with one another outside of work, which continued after they no longer worked

      together. Burkins began dating Hope Koontz in March of 2019. In February of

      2020, Burkins and Koontz moved in together at Meadows Trailer Park in

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 2 of 21
      Nappanee, which was a heavily-populated neighborhood with other residences

      located nearby.

[3]   On June 5, 2020, Clark and Burkins made plans for the evening, and Burkins

      drove to Clark’s home where they smoked marijuana and drank beer. Clark

      and Burkins decided to visit Campion, and Burkins left his car at Clark’s home

      while Clark drove them to Campion’s home, where he lived with Emilee

      Malkowski and their two young daughters. The group watched Campion’s

      daughters play and drank beer, ingested psilocybin mushrooms, and smoked

      marijuana.

[4]   Later that evening, the group ran out of beer and decided to get more.

      Campion drove Clark and Burkins to a liquor store, but it was closed when they

      arrived, so they drove to Clark’s apartment to smoke a concentrated form of

      THC referred to as a “dab[.]” Tr. Vol. III p. 25. Burkins, Campion, and Clark

      each had one dab. When the group unsuccessfully tried again to purchase beer,

      Burkins invited Campion and Clark to his house; he said, “We could just go

      back to my house and get some beer. We don’t have to keep going.” Tr. Vol.

      III p. 27.

[5]   Meanwhile, starting at around 11:00 p.m., Burkins had texted Koontz several

      times to come pick him up, only to have withdrawn each request soon

      thereafter. Just before 11:40 p.m., Burkins again texted Koontz to pick him up

      and told her that it was “Nothing bad they f[*****] up[,]” and she agreed to

      come pick him up. Ex. Vol. p. 60. Burkins told Campion and Clark that he

      was going home, and that Koontz was going to pick him up from Clark’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 3 of 21
      house. Campion and Clark brought Burkins to Clark’s home, where Koontz

      was waiting. Campion parked behind Koontz’s vehicle and Burkins got out of

      Campion’s car and into Koontz’s vehicle. When he entered Koontz’s vehicle,

      Burkins was acting “erratic” and “frantic[.]” Tr. Vol. IV p. 68. Koontz told

      Campion that she had to work the next day and told Campion to move his car.

      Campion got back into his vehicle and drove away.

[6]   Koontz and Burkins began to drive home, but Burkins instructed her to go back

      to Clark’s because he wanted to drive his own vehicle home. Meanwhile, Clark

      and Campion wanted to continue to hang out with one another and wanted to

      obtain the beer from Burkins’s home. Campion pulled into Burkins’s driveway,

      still intending to get the beer from Burkins. Burkins was standing on the porch.

      Campion and Clark exited the vehicle. Neither Campion nor Clark was armed

      with a weapon, and Burkins was aware that neither had a weapon. Campion

      took a couple steps forward. Clark saw that Burkins was holding a gun as

      Burkins walked down the front porch steps. When Burkins stood at the bottom

      of the porch steps, he “pulled the gun up,” and said, “If you take another step,

      I’ll shoot.” Tr. Vol. III pp. 42, 72. Campion responded, “You’re not gonna

      really shoot me. Are you really going to shoot me?” Tr. Vol. III p. 43. Burkins

      reiterated his warning. After Campion stopped approximately five to six feet

      away from Burkins and said, “Wow, you’re actually about to shoot me,”

      Burkins shot him three times, killing him. Tr. Vol. III p. 43. Burkins looked at

      Clark and shot at him three times, hitting him twice. Clark turned and ran into

      the woods located behind Burkins’s home, having been shot in the hand and in

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023     Page 4 of 21
      his right side at the bottom of his rib cage. Adam Easterday, who lived nearby

      and had been awakened by the gunfire, discovered that a bullet had passed

      through the outer wall of his home and had hit his pillow.

[7]   Law-enforcement officers interviewed Burkins on June 6 and June 17, 2020.

      During a police interview, he stated that “[a] gun is like picking a fight” and

      “[n]o one is invincible to a gun[.]” Tr. Vol. V p. 246. Before Burkins left police

      custody on June 6, a blood draw was conducted. Campion’s clothing was

      tested for gunpowder residue and other chemicals, but none were found,

      meaning that the muzzle of Burkins’s gun had been more than three feet from

      Campion when it was fired.

[8]   On August 24, 2020, the State charged Burkins with murder, Level 1 felony

      attempted murder, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, and Class B

      misdemeanor marijuana possession. On June 27, 2022, Burkins pled guilty to

      marijuana possession and his jury trial began on the remaining charges.

      Burkins’s theory at trial was that he had acted in self-defense. Prior to the

      presentation of evidence, Burkins objected to the introduction of testimony

      from Clark about the use of psilocybin mushrooms on the basis that Burkins’s

      drug use constituted a prior bad act. The trial court overruled the objection and

      reasoned that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) as

      relevant to Burkins’s intent. Burkins requested a continuing objection to

      evidence of mushroom consumption, which the trial court granted.

[9]   Clark admitted during direct examination to having consumed alcohol,

      marijuana, and mushrooms the night of Campion’s death and indicated that

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023       Page 5 of 21
       Campion and Burkins had done the same. On cross-examination, Burkins

       elicited additional testimony about all three men having consumed marijuana

       and mushrooms. Moreover, Burkins elicited testimony about Campion’s

       affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood, a white-supremacist gang, including

       Campion’s tattoos that indicated affiliation. The State also elicited testimony

       about Campion’s affiliation with the gang, and Clark indicated that Campion’s

       involvement had ended ten to fifteen years ago.

[10]   After the State had presented its case-in-chief, Burkins moved for a mistrial

       based on the admission of testimony regarding Burkins’s use of mushrooms.

       The trial court denied the motion and reaffirmed its prior ruling that the

       evidence was admissible because it was relevant to the question of Burkins’s

       intent and, additionally, that it was relevant to the relationship between

       Campion, Clark, and Burkins.

[11]   Burkins testified during his case-in-chief and stated that he had consumed

       marijuana, mushrooms, and beer the night of the shooting. Burkins also

       testified to Campion’s affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood. Burkins testified

       that, the night of the shooting, Campion had shown him a tattoo indicating

       affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood and told him that “[i]f you mess with

       one of us, you get the rest of us.” Tr. Vol. V p. 179.

[12]   During cross-examination of Burkins, the State asked him twice if he had (1)

       knowingly killed Campion, (2) shot Clark with the specific intent to kill him,

       and (3) knowingly performed an act that created a substantial risk of bodily

       injury while armed with a deadly weapon when he had fired the bullet that hit

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 6 of 21
       the Easterday home. Burkins did not object to the first and third of these

       questions, objected to the second on the basis that it had been asked and

       answered, and objected to the fourth on the basis that it violated Evidence Rule

       704, which prohibits a witness from testifying to an opinion on an ultimate

       issue in the case, specifically intent. The trial court overruled Burkins’s

       objections to the questions.

[13]   During his redirect examination, Burkins asked to introduce evidence that he

       could face retaliation from the Aryan Brotherhood to rebut testimony that

       Campion was no longer affiliated with the group. The trial court denied that

       request. As an offer of proof, Burkins stated that evidence would have shown

       that, days after the shooting, he had been contacted by law enforcement and

       told that Campion’s father had told police that the Aryan Brotherhood was

       coming into town, and that officers had advised Burkins and Koontz to leave

       the area for their own safety. The State responded that anything that happened

       after the shooting was not relevant to Burkins’s intent at the time of the

       shooting; it was a collateral matter that would mislead the jury and be

       extremely prejudicial. The trial court reaffirmed its denial on the ground that

       the information was hearsay and not relevant.

[14]   Prior to the State’s case-in-rebuttal, Burkins objected to anticipated testimony

       by Clark that he had been on a power trip, wanted to kill someone, and wanted

       to go to jail on the ground that it was impermissible character evidence. The

       State recalled Clark, who testified that he believed Burkins had been on a power

       trip due to things he had said to Clark over the month prior to the shooting.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023          Page 7 of 21
       The jury asked what Clark had meant by a “power trip[.]” Tr. Vol. V p. 239.

       Burkins objected on the basis that the question called for a narrative answer that

       would introduce inadmissible evidence. The trial court overruled the objection.

       Clark responded that he believed Burkins had been on a power trip because he

       had said multiple times that he was ready to go to jail and was ready to kill

       someone.

[15]   During the defense’s closing argument, defense counsel stated that a toxicology

       screen had been conducted on Burkins. Defense counsel asked the jury,

       “Wouldn’t you like to know what they were, in order to determine whether or

       not it had anything to do with this case, if she’s gonna stand up here and argue

       impairment or anything to do with these drugs?” Tr. Vol. VI pp. 30–31.

       Defense counsel also stated, “And they decide, ‘Nope. You don’t get to see

       that evidence.’” Tr. Vol. VI p. 31. Additionally, defense counsel stated that the

       State would say Burkins was “[‘]high on drugs’” but “we know that’s not true.”

       Tr. Vol. VI p. 37.

[16]   During the State’s rebuttal to Burkins’s closing, the prosecutor stated that

       Burkins wanted the jury to think that the State was hiding things by not

       submitting the blood-test results, but that it could not introduce irrelevant

       evidence. The prosecutor said the blood test had been conducted six hours after

       the shooting and that it would be irresponsible to submit the results because

       they were not reflective of what had happened six hours before. Burkins

       objected on the ground that there was no evidence presented about how long

       drugs remained in a person’s system and that the State was arguing facts not in

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023       Page 8 of 21
       evidence. The State responded that Burkins had opened the door and that it

       was asking the jury to rely on its logic. After overruling Burkins’s objection, the

       trial court admonished the jury that it was to determine what the evidence

       shows and that it would be instructed not to make findings based on evidence

       that did not exist because it would be speculation.

[17]   The jury found Burkins guilty of murder, attempted murder, and criminal

       recklessness. At sentencing, the trial court identified, as aggravating

       circumstances, (1) Burkins’s illegal consumption of alcohol; (2) his weekly

       marijuana use; (3) his use of cocaine and psilocybin mushrooms; (4) his weekly

       recreational use of Adderall; (5) the use of a firearm in the commission of the

       offenses; (6) that he had shot both victims multiple times; (7) that both victims

       had been unarmed and he had known that they were; and (8) the harm, injury,

       or loss had been greater than the elements of the offenses. The trial court

       identified, as mitigating circumstances, (1) Burkins’s and defense counsel’s

       statements, (2) the fact that he had been twenty years old at the time the

       offenses were committed and twenty-two years old at the time of sentencing, (3)

       his lack of prior convictions, (4) his substance-abuse issues, and (5) the fact that

       the Indiana Risk Assessment Score had placed him in the low-risk-to-reoffend

       category. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed

       the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Burkins to ninety-five years of

       incarceration.

       Discussion and Decision

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023        Page 9 of 21
       I.      Evidentiary Challenges
[18]   Burkins makes four evidentiary challenges, namely, that the trial court abused

       its discretion in (1) admitting evidence of other bad acts by Burkins, (2) refusing

       to allow Burkins to introduce evidence that Campion had still been affiliated

       with the Aryan Brotherhood at the time of his death, (3) admitting evidence

       regarding Burkins’s opinions on whether he had acted knowingly or

       intentionally or in reckless disregard, and (4) admitting evidence that Burkins

       had been on a “power trip” and had mentioned that he wanted to kill someone

       and go to jail. A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of

       evidence. Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). We

       will reverse a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence only when it

       constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs only

       where the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts

       and circumstances and the error affects the party’s substantial rights. Clark v.

       State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013).

       A.      Other Bad Acts
[19]   Burkins argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of

       illegal alcohol and drug use by Burkins and by denying his motion for mistrial

       due to the admission of such evidence. As an initial matter, Burkins did not

       preserve this claim for appellate review as it relates to anything other than his

       use of psilocybin mushrooms. To preserve a claim of trial court error, an

       objection must be made with the specific ground or grounds on which the

       objection is based. Mullins v. State, 646 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. 1995). Because

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023         Page 10 of 21
       Burkins did not object to the admission of evidence of alcohol or marijuana use

       below, he has waived those claims for appellate review.

[20]   That said, we conclude that the mushroom evidence was properly admitted

       under Evidence Rule 404(b). Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits “[e]vidence of

       a crime, wrong, or other act […] to prove a person’s character in order to show

       that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the

       character.” “This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,” however,

       “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

       identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). To be

       admissible for another purpose, the evidence must be relevant, and the

       probative value must outweigh the prejudicial effect. Fairbanks v. State, 119

       N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019).

[21]   As mentioned, the record contains ample evidence that Burkins, Campion, and

       Clark had ingested alcohol and illegal drugs throughout the evening. The

       shooting had occurred at approximately 12:10 a.m. About one hour previously,

       Burkins had admitted in a text message to Koontz that he had been “ducked

       up[,]” which he explained at trial was an attempt to communicate that he had

       been “f[*****] up[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 26; Tr. Vol. V p. 92. Although Burkins points

       to evidence that he had not been intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at

       the time of the shooting, that evidence is directly contradicted by his own

       messages to Koontz and by the evidence of alcohol and drug use throughout the

       evening.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023     Page 11 of 21
[22]   We need not address the State’s argument that evidence of Burkins’s mushroom

       consumption is relevant to his intent because the evidence was relevant to the

       nature of the relationship between Burkins, Campion, and Clark. The nature of

       the relationship was disputed at trial, with Burkins claiming that he had not

       been good friends with Campion, while Malkowski and Clark testified that

       Campion and Burkins had been like family. See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215,

       222 (Ind. 1997) (noting that prior bad acts are usually admissible to show the

       relationship between a defendant and the victim). Evidence that Burkins had

       consumed illegal drugs with Campion could certainly support a reasonable

       inference that Burkins had known Campion well enough to accurately interpret

       his actions as non-threatening before he shot him, which would undercut his

       claim of self-defense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting

       evidence that Burkins had ingested psilocybin mushrooms or in denying his

       mistrial motion.1

       1
         Because we have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of
       Burkins’s mushroom consumption, it follows that the trial court also did not abuse its discretion in denying
       his mistrial motion based on the same evidence.
              “A mistrial is an extreme remedy invoked only when no other curative measure can rectify the
              situation.” Hollowell v. State, 707 N.E.2d 1014, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We review a trial
              court's denial of a motion for mistrial only for an abuse of discretion, and its decision is afforded
              great deference on appeal because the trial court is in the best position to assess all of the
              circumstances and their impact on the jury. Mickens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 927, 929 (Ind. 2001).
              A mistrial is appropriate only where the questioned conduct is so prejudicial and inflammatory
              that the defendant was placed in a position of grave peril to which he should not have been
              subjected. Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (Ind. 2008).
       Smith v. State, 140 N.E.3d 363, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023                                 Page 12 of 21
       B.      Evidence of Campion’s Affiliation with the Aryan
               Brotherhood
[23]   Burkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to admit

       evidence that Campion’s father had called the police and told them that the

       Aryan Brotherhood gang was going to come into town and that the police had

       advised Burkins to leave town for his safety. Even if the trial court abused its

       discretion by excluding the testimony, however, the exclusion would be

       harmless because evidence tending to show that Campion was still involved in

       the Aryan Brotherhood had already been entered into evidence. “Where the

       wrongfully excluded testimony is merely cumulative of other evidence

       presented, its exclusion is harmless error.” Sylvester v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1126,

       1130 (Ind. 1998). The jury had already heard testimony from several witnesses

       that Campion had been affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood. Moreover,

       although Clark and Malkowski testified that Campion had distanced himself

       from the gang, Burkins testified that Campion had told him the night of his

       death that he was still involved with the Aryan Brotherhood and that “[i]f you

       mess with one of us, you get the rest of us.” Tr. Vol. V p. 74. Because the jury

       had already been presented with evidence that Campion was still active in the

       Aryan Brotherhood, the trial court’s exclusion of other evidence to that effect,

       even if erroneous, can only be considered harmless.

       C.      Burkins’s Testimony Regarding his Intent
[24]   During cross-examination of Burkins, the State asked, “So you would agree

       that on the early morning hours of June 6 of 2020, you knowingly killed

       Thomas Campion.” Tr. Vol. V p. 124. Burkins did not object to this question.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 13 of 21
       Shortly thereafter, the State asked, “You knowingly killed Thomas Campion,

       didn’t you?” Tr. Vol. V p. 124. Burkins objected on the ground that the

       question had been asked and answered. The trial court overruled the objection.

       The State also asked, “You would agree that, acting with the specific intent to

       kill Greg Clark, you fired a handgun at Greg Clark, which was a step toward

       killing him. Correct?” Tr. Vol. V pp. 128–29. Burkins did not object to this

       question.

[25]   The State also asked Burkins, “You would agree that you knowingly performed

       an act that created a substantial risk of bodily injury while armed with a deadly

       weapon when you fired your gun in the trailer park that hit the Easterday

       home?” Tr. Vol. V pp. 129–30. Burkins objected on the ground that the

       question went to an ultimate issue reserved for the jury and that the question

       was essentially asking Burkins to give an opinion about whether he was guilty

       of criminal recklessness. The trial court overruled the objection. Burkins now

       challenges these questions under Evidence Rule 704, which prohibits a witness

       from testifying to an opinion on an ultimate issue in the case, specifically intent.

       Evid. R. 704(b).

[26]   As an initial matter, Burkins has waived his appellate challenges to the first

       three questions for failing to properly object to them. Burkins did not object to

       the first and third questions on any basis. “[A] contemporaneous objection is

       generally required to preserve an issue for appeal.” Rembusch v. State, 836

       N.E.2d 979, 982 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. “The purpose of such a rule

       is to promote a fair trial by precluding a party from sitting idly by and appearing

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 14 of 21
       to assent to an offer of evidence or ruling by the court only to cry foul when the

       outcome goes against him.” Id. at 983. As for the second question, not only

       was it essentially the same as the first, Burkins did not object to it on the same

       ground he raises on appeal, objecting below on the basis that it had already

       been asked and answered while claiming on appeal that its admission violated

       Evidence Rule 704. It is well-settled that “[a] defendant may not raise one

       ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on appeal.” Small v.

       State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000). For failing to make proper objections to

       the first three questions, any challenges to them are waived for appellate review.

[27]   This leaves us with the fourth question, which regarded Burkins’s intent to

       commit criminal recklessness. We conclude that Burkins’s reliance on

       Evidence Rule 704 is misplaced. Quite simply, the State was asking Burkins

       what his state of mind was when he fired the shots, the answer to which

       question, while concerning an ultimate issue, was not his opinion but, rather, a

       statement of fact on a contested issue. Put another way, when Burkins

       responded that he had not knowingly shot at another home, he was not offering

       an opinion on his state of mind, he was testifying to it as a fact. Because the

       State’s question did not seek Burkins’s opinion, his reliance on Evidence Rule

       704 is unavailing.

       D.      Evidence that Burkins Had Been on a Power Trip
[28]   Burkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence

       that Burkins had been on a power trip because he had said that he was ready to

       kill someone and go to jail, arguing that this evidence is evidence of other bad

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023       Page 15 of 21
       acts, which, pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b), is inadmissible. We have little

       hesitation in concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this

       regard. Simply put, this evidence is outside the scope of Evidence Rule 404(b)

       because these statements relate to Burkins’s feelings, and feelings are not a bad

       act. “To state what one is feeling, as opposed to a direct threat to the victim, is

       not a ‘bad act’ as such.” Hicks, 690 N.E.2d at 221 n.11. Clark’s testimony

       regarding Burkins’s wish to kill someone and go to jail, because they are not

       bad acts, is not rendered inadmissible by Evidence Rule 404(b).

       II. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[29]   Burkins contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing by

       mentioning a toxicology report prepared following his blood draw of June 6,

       2020. To find prosecutorial misconduct, a court must consider “(1) whether

       misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) ‘whether the misconduct, under all of the

       circumstances, placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he or

       she would not have been subjected otherwise.’” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663,

       667 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cooper v. State, 854 N.E.2d 831, 835 (Ind. 2006)).

       “‘Whether a prosecutor’s argument constitutes misconduct is measured by

       reference to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The gravity of

       peril is measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the

       jury’s decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct.’” Id.

       (quoting Cooper, 854 N.E.2d at 835)). However, “[a] prosecutor has the duty to

       present a persuasive final argument and thus placing a defendant in grave peril,

       by itself, is not misconduct.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023       Page 16 of 21
[30]   Here, because defense counsel mentioned the toxicology report first in

       Burkins’s closing, the prosecutor was merely responding and, consequently, did

       not commit any misconduct. “Prosecutors are entitled to respond to allegations

       and inferences raised by the defense even if the prosecutor’s response would

       otherwise be objectionable.” Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1118 (Ind.

       2004). During closing, defense counsel had strongly implied that the State was

       withholding evidence from the jury in bad faith and misrepresenting the

       evidence, stating that the report was received and asking, “Wouldn’t you like to

       know what [the results] were, in order to determine whether or not it had

       anything to do with this case, if [the prosecutor is] gonna stand up here and

       argue impairment or anything to do with these drugs?” Tr. Vol. VI pp. 30–31.

       Defense counsel further stated, “And they decide, ‘Nope. You don’t get to see

       that evidence.’” Tr. Vol. VI p. 31. Additionally, defense counsel said that the

       State would say Burkins was “[‘]high on drugs’” but “we know that’s not true.”

       Tr. Vol. VI p. 37. In response, the prosecutor explained that she could not in

       good faith present the report because Burkins’s blood had been drawn six hours

       after the shooting and that it would be irresponsible to submit the results that

       did not accurately reflect Burkins’s condition at the time of the shooting. In

       short, the State was merely responding to the assertions of defense counsel and

       committed no misconduct. See Dumas, 803 N.E.2d at 1118.

       III. Appropriateness of Sentence
[31]   Burkins contends that his ninety-five-year sentence is inappropriately harsh.

       “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if after due

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023      Page 17 of 21
       consideration of the trial court’s decision, the court finds that the sentence is

       inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the

       offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). A reviewing court will give “substantial

       deference” and “due consideration to the trial court’s decision.” Knapp v. State,

       9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). Whether the reviewing court regards a

       sentence as inappropriate turns on a “sense of the culpability of the defendant,

       the severity of the crime[s], the damage done to others, and myriad other

       factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219,

       1224 (Ind. 2008). “The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt

       to leaven the outliers” and not to achieve a perceived “correct” result. Id. at

       1225. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is

       inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). To carry

       this burden, Burkins must provide “compelling evidence portraying in a positive

       light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and

       lack of brutality) and [his] character (such as substantial virtuous traits or

       persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122

       (Ind. 2015); Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind. 2007).

[32]   Burkins was convicted of murder, Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 6

       felony criminal recklessness, and Class B misdemeanor possession of

       marijuana. The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years,

       with an advisory sentence of fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). The

       sentencing range for a Level 1 felony is twenty to fifty years, with an advisory

       sentence of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(b). The sentencing range for a

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       Level 6 felony is six months to two-and-a-half years, with an advisory sentence

       of one year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). A person who commits a Class B

       misdemeanor may be imprisoned for not more than 180 days. Ind. Code § 35-

       50-3-3. Burkins’s maximum exposure was therefore 118 years of incarceration,

       out of which he was sentenced to ninety-five.

[33]   We conclude that neither the nature of Burkins’s offenses nor his character

       warrant a revision of his sentence. “The nature of the offense is found in the

       details and circumstances surrounding the offense and the defendant’s

       participation therein.” Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2018), trans. denied. Burkins chose to spend the night with two of his close

       friends illegally consuming alcohol, marijuana, a dab, and psilocybin

       mushrooms. When the group ran out of beer and could not find a location to

       purchase more, Burkins invited Campion and Clark to his home where he had a

       case or two of beer. When Campion and Clark arrived at Burkins’s home to get

       the beer, Burkins stood on his porch with a gun, did not explain his actions or

       retreat to the safety of his home, and shot multiple times at the unarmed

       Campion and Clark. See Flowers v. State, 154 N.E.3d 854, 873 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020) (concluding that defendant’s eighty-five-year sentence for murder was not

       inappropriate, in part, because the shooting victim was unarmed). The

       shooting occurred in a heavily-populated residential area, and another bullet hit

       Easterday’s home. See Simms v. State, 791 N.E.2d 225, 234 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003) (noting that the defendant firing a gun “in a residential area whereby

       innocent bystanders could have been injured or killed is a valid aggravating

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1867 | August 15, 2023     Page 19 of 21
       circumstance and goes to the nature of the offense”). To summarize, after

       engaging in a night of illegal activities, Burkins killed the unarmed Campion,

       attempted to kill the unarmed Clark, and endangered others nearby, including

       children. Burkins’s offenses were senseless and avoidable, and their nature does

       not warrant a sentence reduction.

[34]   Burkins’s character also does not render his sentence inappropriate. “A

       defendant’s life and conduct are illustrative of his or her character.” Morris, 114

       N.E.3d at 539. Burkins was looking for a reason to shoot and kill someone and

       believed that a gun made him powerful, as demonstrated by photographs he

       took of himself holding a handgun, which he captioned “Jesus can’t save you

       b[****]” and “F[***] you say b[****.]” Ex. Vol. pp. 94, 95. A defendant’s

       criminal history is also reflective of his character. Rutherford v. State, 866

       N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Though Burkins did not have prior

       convictions, his criminal record now contains some of the most serious crimes

       possible. Moreover, Burkins has a long history of disregarding the law and

       consuming substances illegally, including alcohol, marijuana, cocaine,

       Adderall, and psilocybin mushrooms, many of which he consumed on the night

       of the shooting. Burkins continued to use illegal substances even after receiving

       treatment for substance abuse in 2018 and 2019. See Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d

       977, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that a trial court does not abuse its

       discretion by declining to find substance abuse issues mitigating when they are

       known and “little or nothing to treat” those issues is done), trans. denied.

       Burkins has bragged about egregiously violating traffic laws, as shown by a

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       photograph he took which depicts him driving at 117 miles per hour with the

       caption “Zoom zoom[.]” Ex. Vol. p. 93.

[35]   Burkins also has had prior contacts with the criminal justice system involving

       allegations that were similar in nature to the instant crimes, i.e., they involved

       substance abuse and violence. Burkins has previously been charged with

       possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia, as well as domestic

       battery and intimidation in a case which was resolved with a pretrial diversion

       agreement. See Rutherford, 866 N.E.2d at 874 (“[A] record of arrests […] is

       appropriate to consider such a record as a poor reflection on the defendant’s

       character, because it may reveal that he or she has not been deterred even after

       having been subjected to the police authority of the State.”). Burkins’s prior

       contacts with the criminal justice system clearly did not deter him from

       committing extremely serious crimes, which resulted in the death of one person

       and could very well have resulted in the deaths of others. Burkins has failed to

       persuade us that the nature of his offenses and his character justify a more

       lenient sentence.

[36]   We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

       Crone, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

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