Court Opinion

ID: 9491224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:07:26.592622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:35.669288
License: Public Domain

COWEN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I join in Part II.B of the majority’s opinion, which establishes the hourly rate for court-appointed attorneys in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania during the time.period at issue in this case. Nonetheless, I am constrained to dissent from Part II.A of the majority opinion since I believe that attorney’s fees and costs associated with the preparation and litigation of a fee application are not recoverable under the PLRA because they are not “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the *202plaintiffs rights_” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(l)(A). I would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment in all respects.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides that in federal civil rights actions “the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” Although this statute does not explicitly authorize the recovery of attorney’s fees for time spent in preparing and litigating a fee petition, we have consistently held that such fees are recoverable under section 1988 and other similar fee-shifting provisions. See, e.g., Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. AT & T Bell Labs., 842 F.2d 1436, 1455 (3d Cir.1988) (Clean Water Act); David v. City of Scranton, 633 F.2d 676, 677 (3d Cir.1980) (Section 1988); Prandini v. Nat’l Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir.1978) (Title VII). In Prandini, we reasoned that such an award was justified because
the time expended by attorneys in obtaining a reasonable fee is justifiably included in the attorneys fee application, and in the court’s fee award. If an attorney is required to expend time litigating his fee claim, yet may not be compensated for that time, the attorney’s effective rate for all the hours expended on the case will be correspondingly decreased. Recognizing this fact, attorneys may become wary about taking Title VII cases, civil rights eases, or other eases for which attorney’s fees are statutorily authorized. Such a result would not comport with the purpose behind most statutory fee authorizations, Viz, the encouragement of attorneys to represent indigent clients and to act as private attorneys general in vindicating congressional policies.
585 F.2d at 53 (citations omitted).
However, the broad language of section 1988 must now be read in conjunction with the PLRA, which took effect on April 26, 1996. Consequently, in prisoner civil rights cases, attorney’s fees “shall not be awarded, except to the extent that ... the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiffs rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title....” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(l)(A).
Contrary to the majority’s holding, I believe that the attorney’s fees and costs associated with preparing and litigating a fee petition are not “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiffs rights protected by a statute.... ” Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that attorney-fee determinations are “collateral to the main cause of action and uniquely separable from the cause of action to be proved at trial.” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 277, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) (“[W]e think it indisputable that a claim for attorney’s fees is not part of the merits of the action to which the fees pertain. Such an award does not remedy the injury giving rise to the action_”); White v. New Hampshire Dep’t. of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451-52, 102 S.Ct. 1162, 71 L.Ed.2d 325 (1982) (“Nor can attorney’s fees fairly be characterized as an element of ‘relief indistinguishable from other elements. Unlike other judicial relief, the attorney’s fees allowed under § 1988 are not compensation for the injury giving rise to the action.”). Thus, when Congress distinguished in the PLRA between work on the merits and work on fees, it was following a path already well-marked by the courts. Work on a fee petition is not work done “in proving an actual violation of ... rights” within the meaning of section 1997e(d)(l)(A), and the district court was correct to disallow any such fees. I must respectfully dissent on this issue.