Court Opinion

ID: 9471488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:33:29.929124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:25.856027
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I would decline to enforce the Board’s order. When this case was last here we declined enforcement because the Board held it was sufficient if petitioner should have known that Wittbrodt was acting on behalf of other employees when he filed his complaint with MiOSHA. We remanded for a finding of whether Mr. Causley in fact knew that Wittbrodt acted on behalf of others. Instead of any finding regarding that fact, we have only the Board’s conclusion that it is “reasonable to infer” that Mr. Causley knew Wittbrodt was acting on be*324half of other employees in addition to himself. Had there been no evidence from which to draw such an inference the action would not have previously been remanded but rather enforcement would have been denied.
If we did not have the Board’s prior stance on presuming knowledge followed by its attempt to apply a “should have known” standard, I would not attach as much significance to the Board’s choice of words and perhaps would be willing to agree with the majority that the Board has actually found Mr. Causley’s knowledge. However, in view of the history of this case, it appears to me that the Board is continuing to require something less than a factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence of knowledge of concerted activity.
Accordingly, I dissent.