Court Opinion

ID: 9625615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:45:58.841685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:12.047418
License: Public Domain

Opinion
WRIGHT, C. J.
Petitioner, Bertram S. Griggs, as Superintendent of the California Institution for Men at Chino (hereinafter Chino), seeks a writ of mandate to compel the respondent court to quash orders to show cause and to dismiss proceedings in each of three matters wherein the real parties in interest, while inmates at Chino, made applications for habeas corpus relief,  At issue is the territorial limitation on the jurisdiction of superior courts to entertain petitions for and to grant relief in habeas corpus matters. We hold that such limitations as may have existed prior to 1966 were eliminated by constitutional revision in that year. (Const., art. VI, § 10, adopted Nov. 8, 1966.) We accordingly deny the petition for the writ of mandate.
Each of the real parties in interest was an inmate at Chino when his petition was filed with respondent court in the county wherein Chino is *344located.1 However, each had been transferred in the normal course of prison administration to a penal institution outside the county at the time the order to show cause issued. Petitioner herein thereupon moved in each of the habeas corpus proceedings to quash the order to show cause on the ground that the inmate was no longer confined in the county. Each of the inmates moved in the respondent court for the transfer of his cause to the superior court of the particular county in which he was then confined. The respondent court denied in each case the motion to quash but did not rule on the motions to transfer.
At this juncture the alternative writ issued herein and the respondent court has taken no further action. It appears, however, that real party in interest Ramirez has filed in respondent court a notice of motion to dismiss his petition for the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the petition is moot and that real party in interest Hedberg has filed á notice of motion to dismiss his petition for the writ on the ground that he no longer desires the relief originally sought. Such real parties in interest thus disclaim any continuing interest in the relief initially sought and, inferentially, in these proceedings.  The third real party in interest, Cisneros, concedes that respondent court lacked jurisdiction to issue the order to show cause but contends that it retained jurisdiction to transfer the matter and should be required to do so.2
Prior to the 1966 constitutional revision of article VI it was recognized that a superior court had power to issue a writ of habeas corpus only on a petition by or on behalf of a person in custody within the same county. {People v. Clinton (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 284, 287 [52 Cal.Rptr. 221].) The 1966 revision eliminated the former express limitation on the power of superior courts to act only within “their respective counties” (Const., art. VI, § 5, as amended Nov. 6, 1928, repealed Nov. 8, 1966; see Carrara v. Superior Court (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 823 [248 P.2d 954]), and imposed no express limitation on the current power of the courts to exercise “original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings.”3 The constitutional history thus provides *345persuasive support for the proposition that the former territorial limitation was eliminated by the 1966 constitutional revision.
Petitioner urges that we have interpreted the current constitutional provision to give it a meaning consistent with the established rule prior to the 1966 revision. It appears, however, that he relies on decisions in which territorial jurisdiction was not an issue. Thus in In re Crow (1971) 4 Cal.3d 613 [94 Cal.Rptr. 254, 483 P.2d 1206], the issue presented was the validity of a final order in litigated habeas corpus proceedings had in the superior court of the county where the petitioner was an inmate. The order set aside a judgment obtained in another superior court on the ground that the sentencing procedures had denied petitioner a speedy trial. We upheld the validity of the order setting aside the judgment, giving it a res judicata effect. (Id., at p. 623.) We noted for future guidance, however, that although a court in which the petition is filed has jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings it should nevertheless, after ascertaining that the petition states a prima facie case for relief, transfer the matter to the superior court wherein the proceedings under attack had been litigated as that court is better situated to entertain the attack. (Id, at p. 624.) Any language appearing in our dicta discussions which implies a continuing territorial limitation on habeas corpus jurisdiction was neither intended nor necessaiy to our conclusions therein.
Nor may any similar implication be drawn from In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89 [98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819] [wherein we stated that an inmate seeking relief pursuant to People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89 (89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993) “may” file a petition for the writ of habeas corpus with the superior court of territorial jurisdiction which petition should then be transferred to the original sentencing court (see also People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, fn. 2)], from In re Montgomery (1970) 2 Cal.3d 863, 868-869, fn. 4 [87 Cal.Rptr. 695, 471 P.2d 15] [wherein we fashioned a similar procedural formula in the case of an inmate seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to Barber v. Page (1968) 390 U.S. 719 (20 L.Ed.2d 255, 88 S.Ct. 1318)] or from In re Caffey (1968) 68 Cal.2d 762, 765, fn. 3 [69 Cal.Rptr. 93, 441 P.2d 933] [wherein we noted the general rule that a petition stating a prima facie case for habeas corpus relief may properly be filed in the county of an inmate’s *346confinement but that such court should then transfer the cause to the court which rendered the judgment for a determination on the merits (see also In re Haro (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1021, 1025-1026 [80 Cal.Rptr. 588, 458 P.2d 500])].
Courts of Appeal decisions which rely on the established rule prior to the 1966 constitutional revision without considering the effect thereof likewise do not aid petitioner. (See People v. Brady (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 81, 88, fn. 1 [105 Cal.Rptr. 280]; In re Rinegold (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 723, 725, fn. 1 [92 Cal.Rptr. 18]; People v. Gonzalez (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 163, 166 [86 Cal.Rptr. 512]; People v. Buccheri (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 842, 845 [83 Cal.Rptr. 221].) Petitioner also relies on Penal Code section 1508 but that section, insofar as is here pertinent, provides only that a “writ of habeas corpus issued by a superior court or a judge thereof may be made returnable before the issuing judge or his court,” and does not purport to deal with a territorial limitation on the power to entertain the writ.
We are obligated, of course, to accord reasonable meaning to a revision of any constitutional provision. When the revision, however, results in the elimination of language which had been construed to impose a territorial limitation on the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction, the only inference reasonably permissible is that the people of the state intended to eliminate not only the language but also the limitation which, without the language, has no other basis for continued life. (See In re Michael E. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 183, 189 [123 Cal.Rptr. 103, 538 P.2d 231].) We conclude, accordingly, that there is now no territorial limitation on the power of a superior court to entertain a petition for habeas corpus relief.4
Our conclusion that a territorial limitation on the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction no longer exists does not mean that this court *347cannot provide rules of judicial procedure to be followed by superior courts in the exercise of that unlimited jurisdiction. We have already provided such rules (e.g., In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89; In re Montgomery, supra, 2 Cal.3d 863, 868-869, fn. 4; In re Caffey, supra, 68 Cal.2d 762, 765, fn. 3), to which we continue to adhere.  Although any superior court has jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that it should do so in all instances. As a general rule the court wherein the petition is presented must, if the petitioner has otherwise complied with pertinent rules, file the petition and determine whether it states a prima facie case for relief.5 If it does not, the petition should be denied. (In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300 [209 P.2d 793].) If the petition states a prima facie case for relief, then the court must determine whether it will hear the matter on the merits. If the challenge is to a particular judgment or sentence, the petition should be transferred to the court which rendered judgment if that court is a different court from the court wherein the petition was filed, in accordance with directions contained in our earlier decisions heretofore noted. If the challenge is to conditions of the inmate’s confinement, then the petition should be transferred to the superior court of the county wherein the inmate is confined if that court is a different court from the court wherein the petition was filed.
There will be, of course, petitions filed in which the relief sought does not fall within either of the above categories. We do not attempt herein to state a general rule or all-inclusive specific rules which direct the proper procedural disposition in each instance. We note, however, that unless there is substantial reason for transferring a petition it should be entertained and resolved in the court where filed. In the case of real party in interest Cisneros, for example, a claim is made that Department of Corrections’ records erroneously reflect a prior conviction which precludes Cisneros from assignment to a work camp. No reason appears why such issue cannot be as efficiently resolved by respondent court as by any other court, and in that case the petition should be heard and resolved by the respondent. That court should nevertheless not be precluded from transferring the petition should it appear, inter alia, that an evidentiaiy hearing is necessary and that the persons who will participate therein are more efficiently available to another court or that such other court is better situated to conduct a hearing.
*348The alternative writ is discharged and the petition for a peremptory writ is denied. The respondent court is directed to proceed in accordance with the views expressed herein.
Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., concurred.

We do not here critically examine or dispose of the merits of the inmates’ contentions other than to note that the claims are not frivolous and that the respondent court duly issued its order to show cause in each case.

The parties to a judicial proceeding cannot, either jointly or severally, effectively stipulate or concede that the court either has or lacks jurisdiction to act in the particular matter. (See Schlyen v. Schlyen (1954) 43 Cal.2d 361, 375-376 [273 P.2d 897].)

‘'Prior to the amendment, article VI, section 5, provided in pertinent part: “. . . [Superior courts . . . shall have power to issue writs of. . . habeas corpus on petition by *345or on behalf of any person in actual custody, in their respective counties.”
In the revision of 1966, the pertinent provisions of article VI, section 5, were incorporated in article VI, section 10, which now provides in part: “The Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings....”

Although not a factor which enters into our considerations herein, we comment briefly on petitioner’s contention that practical considerations in the administration of habeas corpus relief as claimed by inmates throughout the state prison system compel a territorial limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction. We are unable to conclude, contrary to petitioner's contention, that such a rule would save the state significant funds which would otherwise be used in providing travel for a petitioner, as few habeas corpus proceedings require evidentiary hearings or the production of the petitioner in a particular court. Petitions which challenge judgments are to be heard, as we hereinafter provide, by the court wherein judgment was rendered and generally can be resolved on the record whether there is or is not a territorial limitation on jurisdiction. Petitions which challenge prison conditions are. as hereinafter appears, to be heard by the court in the county where the prison is 'located for obvious practical reasons and not because of any inherent restriction on jurisdiction.

Note the exception in In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78, 88-89, footnote 9, to which we continue to adhere.