Court Opinion

ID: 9569412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:36.881395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:57:21.999522
License: Public Domain

*563McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that this court is bound by Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 708 (300 SE2d 668), where the Supreme Court “construed OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4) narrowly, to mean almost literally what it said, [i.e., the officer is required to inform a defendant at the time of arrest of his rights to an independent chemical analysis to determine the amount of alcohol or drugs present in his blood.]” Vandiver v. State, 207 Ga. App. 836, 837 (1) (429 SE2d 318).
OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he arresting officer at the time of arrest shall advise the person arrested of his rights to a chemical test or tests according to this Code section.” “ ‘[T]his (directive) cannot be interpreted to mean sometime in the future. One cannot make an intelligent choice to submit to a chemical test without the knowledge of the right to have an independent test made in order to contest the validity of the state’s test.’ [Garrett v. Department of Public Safety, 237 Ga. 413 (2), 415 (228 SE2d 812).] The legislature has recognized that, in most instances, the only time at which this advice will be meaningful is at the time of physical arrest. [Only] certain limited situations . . . exist where advising the accused at the moment of physical arrest would not enable the accused to make an intelligent choice concerning the state’s request and his right to undergo an independent test.” Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 707, supra.
The evidence in the case sub judice shows that the scene of the arrest was calm and orderly and that defendant was calm and cooperative, complying with the arresting officer’s directions. Further, the arresting officer testified that she did not advise defendant of his right to an independent test at the time of arrest because “she did not have the new Implied Consent Warning card with her at the time.” Finally, defendant was not advised of his right to an independent test until after he was restrained at police headquarters and ready to ventilate the State’s intoximeter machine. It is my view, that these facts do not present one of the limited circumstances where advising a defendant at the moment of physical arrest would not enable him to make an intelligent choice concerning the State’s request for a breath test and defendant’s right to undergo an independent test. See Perano v. State, 250 Ga. 704, 707, supra. On the contrary, it is my view that the arresting officer’s reason for not advising defendant of his right to an independent test as required by OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (4) is inexcusable; that the delay in advising defendant of his right to an independent test impaired defendant’s ability to make an informed choice regarding submission to a State-administered breath test and that the results of any independent test defendant may have elected would have been diminished by the time any such test was given, thus impairing the only reliable means defendant had of challenging the *564State-administered breath test. See Hopper v. State, 175 Ga. App. 358 (1), 360 (333 SE2d 201).
Decided November 2, 1993
Reconsideration denied December 10, 1993
Reconsideration dismissed December 20, 1993
A. Blair Dorminey, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., Solicitor, Deborah W. Espy, Oliver C. Murray, Jr., Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Judge Cooper joins in this dissent.