Court Opinion

ID: 9547477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:47:53.015855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:47.196475
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority reverses this conviction because it concludes that the defendant’s mother did not consent to the police entering her home. Based on that conclusion, defendant’s subsequent arrest is found to be illegal, and statements made after the arrest are found to be inadmissible. The majority also disagrees with the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances were present justifying the war-rantless arrest. I disagree on both points.
I.
My first point of departure from the reasoning of the majority lies in its refusal to follow the trial court’s conclusion that there was consent to enter the home.
The trial court addressed initially the issue of the mother’s voluntary consent after conducting a hearing. It properly reached its conclusion based upon the totality of the circumstances present. People v. Savage, 630 P.2d 1070 (Colo.1981). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Hence, its finding should be binding upon us on review. People v. Little, 198 Colo. 244, 598 P.2d 140 (1979); People v. Ellis, 189 Colo. 242, 539 P.2d 132 (1975); Capps v. People, 162 Colo. 323, 426 P.2d 189 (1967).
At the in camera hearing, a detective testified that he spoke with the defendant’s mother before entering the home in which defendant was found. He determined that she was a resident of the home, asked if the defendant was present, and informed her that there had been some trouble. She responded that she was not sure if defendant was in the home. When asked again if the defendant might be there the detective testified that “she said ‘no’ and she nodded her head in the affirmative manner, and then she moved her head to the left with her eyes, like it was kind of looking inside.” Because the mother said no but nodded affirmatively, the detective stated he “felt something was wrong in the house” because “she was telling us one thing and her body language was saying another.”
The officers who entered the home also testified that eventually the mother gave express consent for them to enter. The mother denied this.
The trial court’s finding, based on this conflicting testimony, is quoted at length in the majority opinion. The trial court clearly rejected the mother’s version, concluding that it could not “say that there was- a refusal by Mrs. Santisteven to allow the officers into the house,” and also that “there was not a denial of entry into her home.”
*1015The trial court explicitly stated that it was not making a finding whether the mother specifically invited the officers in by so many words, but restated that “there was no specific objection to the officers coming in.”
The majority infers from these findings that the court rejected the police officers’ testimony on the consent issue. In other words, because the trial court did not make a specific finding that the officers had or had not received an explicit verbal invitation to enter, the majority infers that the court was disbelieving all of the officers’ testimony on the consent issue. I cannot join in this leap in logic.
If the trial court’s findings contained no more than I have quoted above, the proper procedure would be to remand the cause for the trial court to enter a finding as to whether the officers were specifically told they could enter. However, there is more to the trial court’s finding on this issue. The court made “a finding that there was passive consent under all the circumstances of [the mother’s] conduct.” That finding of fact, resting on a proper evidentiary basis, should be binding on us on review.
In my view, the logical consequence of the majority’s rationale is to adopt a rule requiring that consent be formalized in the manner similar to the giving of Miranda warnings. This is not the law; rather, the court is to consider the totality of the circumstances. People v. Savage, supra. Moreover, such a rule would ignore the emotionally charged atmosphere present in situations encountered by police officers like those present here.
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court’s finding of consent was within his province as the finder of fact, thus making the entry and subsequent arrest of the defendant lawful, and allowing for receipt into evidence of the inculpatory statements he made thereafter.
In the alternative, even if I were to be persuaded that the trial court’s finding is not specific enough, the proper remedy would be to remand the cause to the trial court with directions that it make specific findings and conclusions as to whether the officers’ testimony of actual consent to the entry was correct. See People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d 770 (Colo.1983).
II.
I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that there exists no evidentiary basis for the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances were present which justified the warrantless arrest of the defendant.
The record demonstrates that the police knew that a stabbing resulting in the death of one man and wounding of another had occurred in the early hours of the morning. The defendant was identified as the perpetrator. He fled the scene with the knife used in the crimes, and likely had bloodstained clothing. The police were told that his mother had been informed of the stabbing, and that he was in her home. According to the police, it would take up to two hours to obtain a warrant at that time of the morning. Knowing all of these facts, two detectives approached the home, and when uniformed supporting officers appeared and surrounded the home the detectives talked with the mother, and being justifiably concerned by the surrounding circumstances, entered, found, and arrested the defendant.
The totality of these circumstances, see People v. Henry, 195 Colo. 309, 578 P.2d 1041 (1978), constitutes an evidentiary foundation for the trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest existed. The entry into the home and subsequent arrest of the defendant were justified because the circumstances were indicative of possible renewed flight which could well lead to possible injury to the officers or others.
With respect to the latter point, the testimony of one detective about his conclusions and feeling when conversing with the defendant’s mother is critical. He said that she
“obviously knew that he [defendant] was there and within earshot, and that meant to me he was hiding someplace. *1016And the way she was acting she was trying to back out of it, you know, any action that might happen, the line of fire, so to speak.”
And, the officer explained that the situation “made the hair stand up on the back of my neck.”
Similarly, the circumstances showed the need for prompt police action to impede defendant’s destruction or hiding of evidence — the murder weapon and the bloody clothing. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980).
The trial court’s conclusion that exigent circumstances were present has an ample evidentiary foundation, and therefore is binding on review. People v. Romero, 42 Colo.App. 20, 593 P.2d 365 (1978). However, if the majority feels the trial court did not adequately state its reasons for finding exigent circumstances, it would be more appropriate to remand for more specific findings and conclusions of the issue, than to reverse the conviction.
III.
I am also in disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981) requires the holding that the defendant’s statements should be suppressed. It is significant that, here, contrary to the situation in McCall, the police entered the home in good faith. Consequently, whatever disposition is made of the consent issue, I perceive no reversible error in the admission of defendant’s statements.
For all of these reasons, I would affirm the conviction.