Court Opinion

ID: 9646170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:50:41.171951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:34.806643
License: Public Domain

GRACI, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 I am always reluctant to disagree with my learned colleagues and hasten to join them when I am able to do so. Here, I fully agree with the majority’s disposition of Appellant’s sentencing claim, his after-discovered evidence claim, his sufficiency of the evidence claim, and his weight of the evidence claim and join the opinion which rejects all of them.
¶ 2 My view of the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002), is different from that of the majority, however. Therefore, I dissent from that portion of the opinion and would, instead, dismiss Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding suppression of his statement without prejudice to his right to seek relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 et seq.
¶ 3 I recognize, of course, that a hearing was conducted on this claim. The trial *?court, however, did not resolve it. In reaching its decision in Grant which rejected twenty-five years of precedent which required appellate courts to address ineffective assistance of counsel claims that were raised for the first time on direct appeal, the Supreme Court observed that by allowing claims of ineffectiveness to be raised and resolved for the first time on direct appeal “the trial court is eliminated from the process.” Id., 572 Pa. at 64-65, 818 A.2d at 736. The Supreme Court said it is the trial court “that had the opportunity to observe counsel’s performance firsthand and is therefore in the best position to make findings related to both the quality of trial counsel’s performance and the impact of any shortfalls in that representation.” Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 4 Even though I might agree that, on the record, it appears that counsel had a reasonable strategy in not challenging Appellant’s post-arrest statement and, therefore, was not ineffective, I believe that Grant dictates that we not address this claim. See Commonwealth v. Carmichael, 818 A.2d 508, 510 (Pa.Super.2003) (Bowes, J., concurring). Different from the majority, I am aware of no exception to the general Grant rule which allows consideration of ineffective assistance claims where we, as an appellate court, believe that there is an adequate record upon which we can assess an ineffectiveness claim. See Commonwealth v. Rosendary, 818 A.2d 526, 531-32 (Pa.Super.2003) (Graci, J., concurring). In my view, Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831 (2003), relied on by the majority, does not provide such an exception. As the Court explained in Bomar:
This appeal ... involves a circumstance not present in, or addressed by, Grant: appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were properly raised and preserved in the trial court. Following sentencing, trial counsel withdrew from the case and present counsel entered the matter and filed post-sentence motions on appellant’s behalf, raising, inter alia, the same claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness now raised in this Court. The trial court conducted hearings on the post-sentence motions on March 4 and April 20, 1999, at which appellant’s trial counsel testified. Moreover, the trial court addressed the ineffectiveness claims in its opinion. See Trial Court slip op. at 48-59.
Id., at -, 826 A.2d at 853 (emphasis added). The fact that the trial court resolved the ineffectiveness issues was obviously important to the Supreme Court in adopting this first exception to the general rule in Grant. The Court observed:
[T]here is a trial court opinion addressing the ineffectiveness claims raised on appeal. We observed in Grant that “the trial court is in the best position to review claims related to trial counsel’s error in the first instance as that is the court that observed first hand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance.” [572 Pa. at 66] 813 A.2d at 737. In contrast to the more common situation where ineffectiveness allegations are raised for the first time on appeal and the trial court is excluded from the review process, here, this Court has the benefit of the trial judge’s evaluation of trial counsel’s conduct in reviewing the claims, rendered close in time to the trial.
Id., at 854 (emphasis added). Here, though we have an evidentiary record, we do not have the benefit of the trial judge’s evaluation of trial counsel’s conduct which the Court in Bomar found to be critically important.9 Whether we address ineffec*1112tive assistance claims on direct appeal, Commonwealth v. Hudson, 820 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa.Super.2003), or on collateral review on appeal under the PCRA, Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa.Super.2001), we determine whether the trial or PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and whether its order is free of legal error. Here, because the trial court did not resolve the claim, we, as an appellate court,10 have nothing to review.
¶ 5 Accordingly, I join the majority in affirming Appellant’s judgment of sentence but would not reach his ineffectiveness claim under Grant.

. In Grant, the Court explained that "the prejudicial effect of trial counsel's chosen course *1112of action is determined more accurately after the trial and appellate courts have had the opportunity to review the alleged claims of error and if necessary, correct any trial court errors. It is only after this review that the full effect of counsel’s conduct can be placed in the context of the case.” Id.., at 66, 813 A.2d at 737. The trial court is clearly in the best position to evaluate any prejudicial impact occasioned by trial counsel’s actions or omissions and must do so in the context of the conduct of the entire trial in order to determine if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s actions or omissions, the result of the trial would have been different, the third prong of the ineffectiveness standard. When an appellate court attempts to assess constitutional prejudice in this context, we, of necessity, cannot have the same view, from a cold record, that the trial court has.

. I recognize, of course, that in reaching its decision, the Court in Bomar explained that, given the existence of an "extensive record below exploring why trial counsel proceeded in the manner that they did means that there is no danger of engaging in appellate fact-finding in the form of speculation concerning the strategy actually pursued by trial counsel” and that ”[i]n this circumstance, an appellate court may review trial counsel's strategy from the 'horse’s mouth,’ as it were, and not engage in after-the-fact guesswork.” Id., at 854 (emphasis added). While this language might signal that the appellate court could review trial counsel’s testimony concerning his or her strategy in the first instance, this language must be read in the context of the entire resolution of this issue and the importance that the Court placed on the existence of a trial court opinion and the benefit of the trial court’s evaluation of trial counsel's conduct in the first instance as that is the court that observed first hand counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Accordingly, I do not view this language as granting this or any other appellate court license to make factual determinations in the first instance.