Court Opinion

ID: 9644644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:01:19.217158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:16.255004
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
with whom LIPEZ, J., joins, dissenting.
I agree with the Court’s conclusion that 1 M.R.S.A. § 71(12) (1989) by its terms does not operate to render M.R.Civ.P. 6(a) applicable to the computation of time pursuant to 24-A M.R.S.A. § 2915 (1990). Nevertheless, I must respectfully dissent. In Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Concord Group Ins. Co., 623 A.2d 163 (Me.1993), we applied by analogy the method of calculating time described in Rule 6(a). Because the Legislature did not prescribe the method, we deemed it appropriate to look to Rule 6(a) so as to exclude the day of presumed receipt, January 1, from the statutory period. By parity of reasoning, I would apply Rule 6(a) in this case to exclude Sunday as the last day of the period. The fact that the Legislature did not include this statutory period in section 71 did not prevent our use of 6(a) in Valley Forge and it should not do so here. In each case the use of the 6(a) analogy is justified by the same principle — providing an insured with a meaningful ten days to avoid cancellation of the policy or obtain a new policy. That principle is faithful to the protective purpose of the statute. By its enactment of section 2915 the Legislature modified the contractual right of the *885insurer to cancel an automobile insurance policy. The method of calculating time described in Rule 6(a) simply offers a sensible way of applying the Legislature’s protective statute.