Court Opinion

ID: 9701844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:40:27.305064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:30.100339
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge
(dissenting):
The first issue is whether appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective. We may consider this issue, since appellate counsel is different from trial counsel. Commonwealth v. Dancer, 460 Pa. 95, 331 A.2d 435 (1975). We should not, however, decide it unless the record is plain; if it is not plain, we should remand for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Twiggs, 460 Pa. 105, 331 A.2d 440 (1975). Since here the record is not plain, we should remand.
Appellant filed a pro se motion to suppress. The Commonwealth replied by filing a request for a more specific motion. Appellant’s trial counsel, however, never filed a more specific motion. It is not plain from the record why he did not, which is to say, it does not appear that his failure to file a more specific motion “had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967).
The majority suggests that counsel “could very well have concluded that the best possible strategy would be to attempt at trial to raise doubt as to whether appellant was actually a participant in the robbery.” At 243 Pa.Super. 497-498, at 264. Granted. However, I do not see *501how failing to file a motion to suppress could effectuate this strategy.
The majority also suggests that “counsel could very well have determined that it would be futile to pursue the suppression issue.” At 243 Pa.Super. 497, at 264. It is not, however, clear to me why the majority thinks it would have been futile. The majority refers to appellant’s admissions to the police that he has taken part in the robbery. At trial appellant denied these admissions. It was therefore necessary for the jury to appraise appellant’s credibility. It seems at least possible that counsel would have been able to present appellant to the jury in a more favorable light, had he pressed and succeeded on the motion to suppress. Perhaps not. I submit, however, that there should be an evidentiary hearing to determine first, Whether the motion would have been futile, and second, if not, whether even if successful, it would have helped appellant.
The second issue is whether the sentence was designed to punish appellant for exercising his right to a jury trial. The majority says that “the remarks of the trial judge indicate that he based the sentence on the violent nature of the crime and the fact that appellant had shown no sense of remorse.” At 243 Pa.Super. 499-500, at 265. I agree that the judge’s remarks indicate that he did consider these factors. The question, however, is whether these are the only factors he considered, and it is plain that they are not. In discerning a person’s intention, one does not consider only Some of his remarks but all of them. This is particularly so when the person is a judge, who because he is a judge will be held to mean what he says. Cf. Commonwealth v. Oglesby, 438 Pa. 91, 263 A.2d 419 (1970) (judge says, “I could have decided it, perhaps, either way”; held, statement showed judge had reasonable doubt, and new trial awarded). Here, *502the judge said, in addition to the remarks the majority-quotes :
If you had pled guilty, perhaps you were involved, there is no question in my mind, but had you pled guilty it might have shown me the right side of your attitude about this, but you pled not guilty, fought it all the way, and the jury found you guilty, and I’m going to sentence you at this time.
Anyone hearing this would know that appellant was about to receive a stiffer sentence than he would have had he not “fought it all the way.” The ensuing sentence was therefore invalid. Commonwealth v. Staley, 229 Pa.Super. 322, 324 A.2d 393 (1974).
I agree with the majority, and share its desire, that appellant should receive a stiff sentence. However, we do no service to justice when from a desire to see a defendant get his just deserts, we ignore what common sense tells us is the plain meaning of what the trial judge, or a witness, or the legislature, has said. The law depends for its life on language; it can only be expressed in words. When we ignore the plain meaning of words, we ignore the law.
The judgment of sentence should be vacated, and the record remanded for an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel was ineffective.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion.