Court Opinion

ID: 9576887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:29:51.153985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:42.133161
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I concur as to Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, but dissent with regard to Division 3 because I cannot go along with the majority’s holding that the trial court’s unauthorized jury charge could not have reasonably caused the jury to convict defendant of *159committing aggravated assault in a manner not alleged in the indictment, i.e., with an offensive weapon rather than with intent to rob.
In addition to instructing the jury as to aggravated assault with intent to rob as charged in the indictment, the trial court charged that aggravated assault is committed when a person commits an assault with an “instrument which when used offensively against a person is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” Defendant contends this additional charge requires reversal. I am constrained to agree.
It is error to instruct the jury that an offense may be committed in more than one manner where only one manner is alleged in the indictment and no remedial instructions are given to limit the jury’s consideration to that particular manner. Dukes v. State, 265 Ga. 422, 423 (457 SE2d 556). See Griffin v. State, 214 Ga. App. 813, 815 (2) (449 SE2d 341). In the case sub judice, the trial court not only failed to give remedial instructions limiting the jury’s consideration to the charge describing the elements of the indicted offense, the trial court emphasized its overly broad aggravated assault charge by prefacing it with the general (and inaccurate) direction to the jury that, “[i]n count two of the indictment this defendant is charged with the offense of aggravated assault.” These deficiencies, however, require reversal only if there is a reasonable possibility that the jury may have convicted defendant of committing the crime charged in a way not alleged in the indictment. See Perguson v. State, 221 Ga. App. 212, 213 (1) (470 SE2d 909); Green v. State, 221 Ga. App. 694 (2) (472 SE2d 457). This requires an examination of the evidence supporting the crimes charged.
While the evidence adduced at trial reveals that defendant and an accomplice used a “stun gun” to rob the assistant manager at defendant’s former place of employment, the victim testified that, after seizing the loot, the robbers “stunned ... or shocked [him] down the leg maybe four times on their way out.” This proof not only authorizes defendant’s conviction for armed robbery, but also authorizes a finding that the armed robbery was complete when the robbers assaulted the victim by stunning or shocking the victim with a stun gun.2 Glass v. State, 199 Ga. App. 530, 532 (2) (405 SE2d 522). Accordingly, believing it likely that the jury convicted defendant of aggravated assault with an offensive weapon rather than with intent *160to rob (as indicted), I would reverse defendant’s aggravated assault with intent to rob conviction.
Neither the majority’s holding nor the fact that defendant mercilessly “stunned ... or shocked” the victim with a stun gun cures the irreparable fact that the State indicted defendant for the wrong offense. Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob must, sooner or later, be reversed because the facts supporting defendant’s armed robbery conviction also support his conviction for aggravated assault with intent to rob. Such a merger of offenses requires reversal when, as in the case sub judice, a defendant is sentenced separately for the merged offense. Redding v. State, 193 Ga. App. 50, 52 (4) (386 SE2d 907).
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this dissent.

 Contrary to the majority, I believe the victim’s testimony that the robbers “stunned ... or shocked” him with a stun gun would authorize a finding that such a device was used against the victim as an offensive weapon. While the majority’s “common sense” analysis regarding this issue may indicate that a stun gun did not seriously injure or permanently harm the victim, the majority’s analysis does not exempt the likely prospect that the jury resolved the issue against defendant and in favor of the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction. See Butts v. State, 153 Ga. App. 464 (265 SE2d 370), and cits.