Court Opinion

ID: 9897312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:01.206025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.346598
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                      Aug 17 2023, 8:54 am

                                                                          CLERK
                                                                      Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                           and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew J. McGovern                                        Theodore E. Rokita
Fishers, Indiana                                           Attorney General of Indiana

                                                           Megan M. Smith
                                                           Kyle M. Hunter
                                                           Deputy Attorneys General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kenneth R. Kirby, III,                                     August 17, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2917
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Vanderburgh
                                                           Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           82C01-2206-F4-3467

                                 Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                            Judges Bailey and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                           Page 1 of 27
      Case Summary
[1]   Kenneth Kirby, III, appeals his conviction for arson, a Level 4 felony. Kirby

      argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

      dismiss; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony

      regarding the substance of a surveillance camera video recording that was not

      offered into evidence; and (3) the State presented insufficient evidence to

      support Kirby’s conviction. We find Kirby’s arguments without merit and,

      accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Kirby raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying
                       Kirby’s motion to dismiss.

              II.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
                       testimony regarding the substance of a surveillance camera
                       video recording that was not offered into evidence.

              III.     Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support
                       Kirby’s conviction.

      Facts
[3]   Kirby has a younger sister, Lindsey Kirby, and a younger brother, Brandon

      Kirby. In 2022, Lindsey lived in a house in Evansville, and Brandon lived in a

      house nearby.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023         Page 2 of 27
[4]   On June 19, 2022, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Lindsey contacted 911 and

      reported that Kirby was breaking into her house and threatening to burn it

      down. Lindsay stated, “[I] know that it is [Kirby], [] he’s on the other line with

      me and now he’s at my house.” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. She further stated that “[w]e

      drove past[,] and I [saw] him out there”; that Kirby “had no shirt on and [was]

      wearing shorts”; and that Brandon was trying to stop Kirby from burning the

      house down. Id. at 112-13. Shortly thereafter, Lindsey contacted 911 again and

      reported that her neighbors informed her that her house was “smoking.” Id. at

      113.

[5]   The Evansville Fire Department quickly responded to the fire. District Chief

      Eric Eifert arrived at the scene and observed a “well-developed” fire in the

      house’s backyard. Id. at 119. A small garage in the yard was consumed in

      flames and causing fire damage to the house, a neighboring business, and the

      power lines. Chief Eifert believed that the fire was “accelerated in some way . .

      . .” Id. at 120.

[6]   Meanwhile, Evansville Police Department Officer Allison Farmer was

      dispatched to the scene to investigate a report of disorderly conduct alleged

      against Kirby. Evansville Police Department Detectives Christopher Jones and

      Joseph Mayer arrived as well. Detective Mayer determined that the fire was “a

      result of human action,” specifically “open flame to ignitable fluid” in the

      garage. Id. at 193. Detective Mayer further determined that the “ignition fuel

      was . . . gasoline.” Id. at 190. Kirby was arrested at Brandon’s house later that

      afternoon.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023      Page 3 of 27
[7]   After the fire was extinguished and power was restored, Lindsey invited the

      detectives inside the house to show them a video recorded by her backyard

      surveillance cameras (“the video”). The video depicted two white men in the

      backyard, one of whom was shirtless, wearing blue jean shorts and white shoes,

      and carrying a “red container in his hand.” Id. at 181. The shirtless man

      entered the garage with the red container and then exited without the container.

      As he exited the garage, smoke and flames began to emanate therefrom.

[8]   The detectives requested a copy of the video; however, Lindsey informed them

      that she had a previous engagement and needed to leave. The detectives

      arranged for Lindsey to call them later that evening. Lindsey neither called the

      detectives nor answered their subsequent phone calls. The detectives later

      obtained a search warrant to seize the DVR; however, the DVR was gone when

      they arrived, and it was never found.

[9]   On the evening of the fire, Brandon’s wife, Amber, consented to a search of her

      and Brandon’s home. Law enforcement located a pair of blue jean shorts that

      matched those worn by the shirtless individual in the video. Additionally, next

      to the shorts, law enforcement located a pair of white shoes that had “an odor

      of gasoline coming from them.” Id. at 161. Laboratory testing identified

      gasoline on the shoes.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023    Page 4 of 27
[10]   On June 22, 2022, the State charged Kirby with Count I: arson, a Level 4

       felony; and Count II: criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor; and alleged

       that Kirby was an habitual offender. 1

[11]   The trial court held a jury trial on October 5, 2022. The State called Officer

       Farmer, and the following exchange took place:

                  Prosecutor: Ma’am, what is RMS?

                  Witness:          RMS is a system that we use through our computers
                                    that stores people’s data. If you’ve ever had any
                                    sort of citation, involvement in an incident,
                                    anything like that, whatever information that was
                                    implemented into that report is added to that system
                                    and any officer can pull it up by just your first and
                                    last name.

                  Prosecutor: Are you sometimes able to find a photo of an
                              individual?

                  Witness.          Yes. If somebody has been booked into
                                    Vanderburgh County Jail or has a CCW or
                                    anything [w]here they’re imaged in, you can pull up
                                    their picture by running their name. . . .

                  Prosecutor: Okay. What does CCW stand for?

                  Witness:          Conceal carry weapon license.

                  Prosecutor: [W]ere you able to see a name for a Kenneth Kirby?

       1
           On October 5, 2022, the State moved to dismiss Count II, which the trial court granted.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                           Page 5 of 27
               Witness:          Yes, sir.

       Ex. Vol. IV pp. 9-10.

[12]   Defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the State implied that

       Kirby had a criminal record “by saying that [Officer Farmer] was able to look

       up [Kirby’s] photograph through the RMS system.” Id. at 10. The prosecutor

       responded:

               It’s clear from [Officer Farmer’s] testimony that you can be on
               RMS for issues that do not involve a criminal history. She said
               infractions, such as tickets or a concealed carry. Where we are
               going with this line of questioning, is that when she arrives to the
               scene, she sees an individual matching the photo that she saw,
               that she looked up for this disorderly conduct run. She looks in
               RMS, because this disorderly conduct run is alleged to involve
               Kenneth Kirby.

       Id. at 11. The prosecutor added that any improper inference regarding Kirby’s

       criminal history could be cured by: (1) asking Officer Farmer to clarify via

       testimony as to whether an individual might be included in the RMS “without

       any kind of criminal history,” id. at 12; and (2) an instruction from the trial

       court to disregard any prejudicial inference regarding Kirby’s criminal history.

[13]   The trial court found that Officer Farmer’s testimony implied that Kirby had a

       criminal history and granted the motion for mistrial. The trial court reset the

       jury trial for October 10, 2022.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023        Page 6 of 27
[14]   On October 6, 2022, Kirby filed a motion to dismiss the arson charge. The

       motion alleged that the prosecutor’s questions regarding the RMS were

       “intended to elicit responses which would goad the defendant’s counsel into

       moving for a mistrial, with the intent to cause termination of the trial” and that,

       as a result, retrial was barred. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 65. On October 7,

       2022, Kirby filed a motion to suppress evidence regarding the shoes on which

       gasoline was identified. 2

[15]   The trial court held hearings on the motion to dismiss and motion to suppress

       evidence on October 10, 2022, before the jury trial commenced. At the

       dismissal hearing, the prosecutor denied intending to cause a mistrial and

       explained that he was “human,” “make[s] mistakes,” and “could have asked a

       better question . . . .” Tr. Vol. II p. 77. The trial court found the prosecutor’s

       explanation credible and denied the motion to dismiss.

[16]   At the suppression hearing, Amber testified that Kirby came to Brandon’s

       house “often” and that it would not be “unexpected” to find Kirby’s clothing in

       her house. Id. at 97. Detective Jones testified that Amber informed him that

       the shorts were Brandon’s but that Kirby and Brandon “share[d] clothes from

       time to time” and that “the shoes were [Kirby’s].” Id. at 85. The trial court

       denied the motion to suppress.

       2
         Kirby argued that the shoes were illegally seized because “no valid consent was given for the arrest and/or
       search and seizure.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 71. The motion to suppress was later denied, and Kirby
       does not appeal the denial of that motion.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                               Page 7 of 27
[17]   The trial court then commenced the second jury trial. Neither Lindsey,

       Brandon, Amber, nor Officer Farmer testified. The trial court admitted

       Lindsay’s 911 calls over Kirby’s hearsay objection. Additionally, because the

       State never located the DVR, the State did not offer the video into evidence.

       Instead, the State sought to introduce the testimony of Detectives Jones and

       Mayer regarding their observations from the video. Kirby objected to the

       detectives’ testimony pursuant to the “silent witness theory” on the grounds

       that the detectives did not lay a proper foundation for the authenticity of the

       video. Id. at 153. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the

       detectives’ testimony.

[18]   The jury found Kirby guilty of arson, a Level 4 felony. Kirby subsequently

       admitted to being an habitual offender. The trial court entered judgment of

       conviction and sentenced Kirby to ten years, enhanced by seven years for the

       habitual offender finding, for a total sentence of seventeen years in the

       Department of Correction. Kirby now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kirby’s motion to
       dismiss

[19]   Kirby first argues that, after the first trial resulted in a mistrial, the trial court

       abused its discretion by denying Kirby’s motion to dismiss the arson charge.

       We are unpersuaded.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023             Page 8 of 27
[20]   The “double jeopardy” clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person

       shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or

       limb.” U.S. Const. amend 5. This clause restricts the government’s ability to

       try a criminal defendant twice for the same offense. Farris v. State, 753 N.E.2d

       641, 645-46 (Ind. 2001). Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, however,

       that a defendant’s motion for mistrial constitutes “‘a deliberate election on his

       part to forgo’” his right to be free from a second trial. Id. at 645-46 (quoting

       United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 2195 (1978)).

[21]   There is a narrow exception to this rule, and when it applies the defendant

       cannot be tried a second time regardless of the fact that the defendant requested

       a mistrial in the first trial. This exception applies only when the government’s

       “‘conduct in question’” was “‘intended to goad the defendant into moving for a

       mistrial.’” Id. at 646 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676, 102 S. Ct.

       2083, 2088 (1982)). The subjective intent of the prosecutor is the “dispositive

       issue.” Id.

[22]   This exception is codified in Indiana Code Section 35-41-4-3, which provides in

       relevant part:

               (a) A prosecution is barred if there was a former prosecution of
               the defendant based on the same facts and for commission of the
               same offense and if:

                                                      *****

                        (2) the former prosecution was terminated after the jury
                        was impaneled and sworn or, in a trial by the court
                        without a jury, after the first witness was sworn, unless (i)
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023              Page 9 of 27
                        the defendant consented to the termination or waived, by
                        motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the
                        termination, (ii) it was physically impossible to proceed
                        with the trial in conformity with law, (iii) there was a legal
                        defect in the proceedings that would make any judgment
                        entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law, (iv)
                        prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, made it
                        impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to
                        either the defendant or the state, (v) the jury was unable to
                        agree on a verdict, or (vi) false statements of a juror on
                        voir dire prevented a fair trial.

               (b) If the prosecuting authority brought about any of the
               circumstances in subdivisions (a)(2)(i) through (a)(2)(vi) of this
               section, with intent to cause termination of the trial, another
               prosecution is barred.

       (Emphasis added).

[23]   We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of

       discretion. Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 576 (Ind. 1996). Our Supreme

       Court has clarified, however, that a trial court’s determination of prosecutorial

       intent, while not “conclusive,” is “‘very persuasive’” and is reviewed for clear

       error. Farris, 753 N.E.2d at 646 (quoting Butler v. State, 724 N.E.2d 600, 604

       (Ind. 2000)).

[24]   Here, in the first jury trial, the prosecutor asked Officer Farmer whether she saw

       Kirby in the RMS while responding to an allegation of disorderly conduct

       against Kirby, and Officer Farmer testified that she did. Kirby then moved for a

       mistrial and argued that Officer Farmer’s testimony implied that Kirby had a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023          Page 10 of 27
       criminal record. The prosecutor explained that a person might be listed in the

       RMS for reasons unrelated to his or her criminal record and that the purpose of

       his question was not to cause a mistrial but to show that Officer Farmer

       identified Kirby at the scene of the fire. Cf. Butler, 724 N.E.2d at 604 n.5

       (affirming denial of motion to dismiss when the State “offer[ed] a plausible

       explanation for its actions”); Noble v. State, 734 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss when State’s trial strategy

       was “misguided” but did not “provide evidence that the State intended to force

       [the defendant] to move for a mistrial”), trans. denied.

[25]   Additionally, the prosecutor admitted that he could have better phrased his

       question and asked the court for a curative instruction in lieu of a mistrial. The

       trial court ordered a mistrial and set the second trial for five days later.

[26]   Kirby argues that the prosecutor was “a highly experienced prosecutor who has

       tried multiple cases [and] would understand the danger of asking an open-ended

       question about whether a defendant was listed in a system which records an

       individual’s interactions with law enforcement.” Appellant’s Br. p. 17. In

       denying the motion to dismiss, however, the trial court implicitly found that the

       prosecutor did not intend to cause a mistrial, and we see no reason to disagree.

       We cannot say that the trial court’s finding regarding the prosecutor’s intent

       was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion by denying Kirby’s motion to dismiss.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023        Page 11 of 27
       II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony
       regarding the substance of the video

[27]   Kirby next argues that, pursuant to the silent witness theory, the trial court

       abused its discretion by admitting the testimony of Detectives Jones and Mayer

       regarding their observations from the video. We first find that the silent witness

       theory applies here even though the video was not offered into evidence. We

       further find that the State laid a sufficient foundation for the detectives’

       testimony and that, as a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

       admitting that testimony.

       A. Evidence Rule 901(b)(9)—The Silent Witness Theory

[28]   The foundation required for the admission of a photograph or video offered as

       “substantive evidence” differs from the foundation required for the admission of

       a photograph or video offered as “demonstrative evidence.” Knapp v. State, 9

       N.E.3d 1274, 1282 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Smith v. State, 491 N.E.2d 193, 196

       (Ind. 1986)). Evidence offered for substantive purposes acts as a “silent

       witness[] as to what activity is being depicted” whereas evidence offered for

       demonstrative purposes is merely an “‘aid[] that assist[s]” in a human witness’s

       testimony.’” Id. (quoting Smith, 491 N.E.2d at 195-96). The silent witness

       theory is often invoked when a proponent seeks to introduce photographic or

       video evidence for the purpose of depicting certain events and no human

       witness testifies regarding their first-hand observations of those same events.

       See, e.g., McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561 (Ind. 2018) (surveillance video);

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023        Page 12 of 27
       McFall v. State, 71 N.E.3d 383, 388 (Ind. 2017) (cell phone video recordings and

       photographs where cell phone owner did not testify).

[29]   The silent witness theory is an application of Evidence Rule 901. See McFall, 71

       N.E.3d at 388. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides that, “[t]o satisfy the

       requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent

       must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the

       proponent claims it is.” Pursuant to Evidence Rule 901(b)(9), “[i]n order to

       authenticate videos or photographs using the silent-witness theory, there must

       be evidence describing the process or system that produced the videos or

       photographs and showing that the process or system produced an accurate

       result.” McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (citing Ind. Evid. R. 901(b)(9)). 3

[30]   The silent witness theory requires a proponent of substantive evidence to lay a

       stronger foundation regarding the evidence’s authenticity than if the proponent

       were offering the evidence merely for demonstrative purposes. See Knapp, 9

       N.E.3d at 1282 (explaining that, when a photograph is offered for

       demonstrative purposes, testimony that the photograph “‘accurately depict[s]

       the scene or occurrence as it appeared at the time in question’” is an “adequate

       foundation” but that when the photograph is offered for substantive purposes,

       such testimony will often be inadequate on its own because the testifying

       3
         Evidence Rule 901(b)(9) provides, “Evidence About a Process or System. Evidence describing a process or
       system and showing that it produces an accurate result.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                              Page 13 of 27
       witness “‘was not necessarily there to observe the scene on that day’” (quoting

       Smith, 491 N.E.2d at 195-96)).

[31]   The burden is “‘rather strict.’” McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (quoting 13 Robert L.

       Miller, Jr., INDIANA PRACTICE, INDIANA EVIDENCE § 901.209 (4th ed. 2016)).

       Our courts have explained:

               [T]he proponent must show that the photograph or video was not
               altered in any significant respect, and the date the photograph or
               video was taken must be established when relevant. [13 Miller at
               § 901.209]; see also Wise v. State, 26 N.E.3d 137, 141 (Ind. Ct.
               App. 2015) (noting that when automatic cameras are involved,
               “there should be evidence as to how and when the camera was
               loaded, how frequently the camera was activated, when the
               photographs were taken, and the processing and changing of
               custody of the film after its removal from the camera[]”
               (quotation omitted)), trans. denied. If a foundational requirement
               is missing, then the surrounding circumstances can be used.

       Id.

[32]   Though our courts have declined to “‘lay down extensive, absolute foundation

       requirements,’” Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279, 298 (Ind. 1988) (quoting

       Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979)), ultimately, the

       proponent must convince the trial court of the silent witness evidence’s

       “competency and authenticity to relative certainty,” McCallister, 91 N.E.3d at

       562; cf. McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388 (silent witness theory “requires only that the

       process or system be described in such a way as to allow the trier of fact to find

       that it is more likely than not that the system produced an accurate result”).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023      Page 14 of 27
       We review the admission of silent witness evidence for an abuse of the trial

       court’s discretion. Id. at 561.

[33]   The State argues that the silent witness theory is inapplicable here because the

       video was not offered into evidence.4 Kirby, meanwhile, urges us to apply the

       silent witness theory’s heightened foundation requirements regardless of that

       fact. He argues that, “without the heightened foundational requirements, there

       are no assurances that the video was accurate, not altered, or even that it

       recorded the crime in question.” Appellant’s Br. p. 20.

[34]   Here, the detectives testified regarding their observations from a video that was

       a silent witness to the arson. We find no practical difference between admitting

       the video itself and admitting the video’s substance indirectly through this

       testimony. Accordingly, we are persuaded that the silent witness theory’s

       4
        The State also argues that the detectives’ testimony was admissible under the best evidence rule. Evidence
       Rule 1002 provides, in relevant part, “[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to
       prove its content unless these rules or a statute provides otherwise.” Pursuant to Evidence Rule 1004:
             An original is not required and other evidence of the content of a writing, recording, or
             photograph is admissible if:
                (a) all originals are lost or destroyed, and not by the proponent acting in bad faith;
                (b) an original cannot be obtained by any available judicial process;
                (c) the party against whom the original would be offered had control of the original; was at
                that time put on notice, by pleadings or otherwise, that the original would be a subject of
                proof at the trial or hearing; and fails to produce it at the trial or hearing; or
                (d) the writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling issue.
       The State argues that, because the video was lost through no fault of the State, the detectives were
       permitted to testify regarding their observations from the video notwithstanding the fact that the video
       was not offered into evidence. Even if we assume, without deciding, that the State is correct, the fact
       that the detectives’ testimony might be admissible under the best evidence rule does not necessarily
       mean that testimony could not be rendered inadmissible based on other evidentiary rules, here,
       Evidence Rule 901(b)(9).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                                 Page 15 of 27
       foundation requirements are applicable when, as here: (1) witnesses testified

       regarding the substance of a video; (2) the video recorded events that the

       witnesses themselves did not observe first-hand; and (3) the video was not

       offered into evidence. Several opinions of this Court and one case outside our

       jurisdiction inform our decision.

[35]   The State relies on Pritchard v. State, 810 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), to

       argue that a silent witness foundation was not required. In that case, the

       defendant was charged with battery of his cellmate. Id. at 760. At trial,

       witnesses testified regarding their observations from a jail surveillance

       recording, although the recording itself had been “purged” and was not offered

       into evidence. Id. The defendant challenged the witnesses’ testimony under the

       silent witness theory. Id. at 761 n.3. On appeal, a panel of this Court held in a

       short footnote that the silent witness theory was inapplicable because the

       recording itself was not admitted into evidence. Id. The panel further held that

       the witnesses could testify regarding their observations from the recording

       because those observations were “within their personal knowledge.” Id. (citing

       Evid. R. 602).

[36]   Since Pritchard, several decisions from this Court have suggested that Pritchard’s

       holding—that the silent witness theory is inapplicable when the silent witness

       evidence itself is not admitted—is incorrect. In Wise v. State, the defendant,

       Wise, was charged with rape and several counts of criminal deviate conduct for

       having sexual intercourse with his then-wife, M.B., after “sneak[ing] Xanax”

       into her beverages. 26 N.E.3d 137, 139-140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023         Page 16 of 27
       Wise recorded several of these instances on his cell phone, which M.B.

       discovered. Id. at 139. “Not knowing how to retain videos directly from the

       phone, M.B. played the videos on Wise’s phone and recorded the playback with

       a second handheld camcorder.” Id. at 139-140.

[37]   At trial, the State offered the second-hand recordings into evidence but not the

       original recordings from Wise’s cell phone, which had been lost. Id. at 142.

       The trial court admitted the second-hand recordings over Wise’s silent-witness-

       theory objection. Id. at 140, 142. On appeal, the panel recognized that the

       silent witness theory was “not an especially neat fit,” but nonetheless found that

       the theory “provide[d] an adequate framework” for the case. Id. at 142. The

       panel held that the State laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the

       second-hand recordings based on the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 142-43.

[38]   More recently, in Stott v. State, 174 N.E.3d 236, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), the

       defendant, Stott, was charged with several offenses stemming from a car chase

       that resulted in Stott crashing a vehicle and fleeing from police. At trial, “the

       only direct evidence” identifying Stott as the driver was photographs taken by

       law enforcement of a recording captured by a McDonald’s building security

       cameras on the day of the car crash. Id. at 244. The photographs showed Stott

       wearing the same “all denim” clothing that the previously-unidentified driver

       had worn earlier that day. Id. at 239-240. The State did not offer into evidence

       the McDonald’s recording itself, but rather offered the still photographs in lieu

       thereof. The trial court admitted the photographs of the surveillance footage

       over Stott’s silent-witness-theory objection. Id. at 244.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023      Page 17 of 27
[39]   On appeal, the State argued that the silent witness theory was inapplicable

       because the surveillance footage was not offered into evidence. Id. at 245.

       Nonetheless, a panel of this Court held that the silent witness theory applied,

       stating:

               Though we acknowledge the logic in the State’s argument,
               accepting its position would require us to ignore the reality of
               what [the police officer]’s photographs intend to portray: people
               inside a McDonald’s restaurant at a specific time on a specific
               day. And the State used those photographs as substantive
               evidence to identify Stott as the man wearing an all-denim outfit
               on the day of the incident. What matters for foundational
               purposes is that no testifying witness was inside the McDonald’s
               to observe the scene the photographs depict. The same is true of
               the actual surveillance footage; it captured a scene that no
               testifying witness was there to observe. Therefore, in this
               context, we see no practical difference between photographs of
               the footage and still-images extracted from the footage—both
               depict a scene that was not observed by any testifying witnesses.
               We refuse to elevate form over substance and in turn conclude
               that the silent-witness theory provides an adequate framework for
               evaluating the photographs’ admissibility.

       Id. In so holding, the panel found Wise persuasive and disagreed with Pritchard.

       See id. at 245 n.8, 245-46.

[40]   We also find persuasive Commonwealth v. Connolly, 78 N.E.3d 116 (Mass. App.

       Ct. 2017), cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Davis, 168 N.E.3d 294, 311

       (Mass. 2021), a case that confronted facts similar to Pritchard but reached a

       different result. In that case, the defendant, Connolly, was charged with assault

       and battery for shoving a woman in an apartment building. Id. at 118-119. At

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023     Page 18 of 27
       trial, a police officer testified regarding what he saw on footage recorded by the

       apartment building’s security cameras; however, the recording had been lost

       through no fault of the Commonwealth. Id. On appeal, though the Court did

       not mention the silent witness theory by name, the Court “reject[ed] the

       premise that the unavailability of the video relieved the Commonwealth of any

       obligation to establish, as a condition of admissibility, that what [the testifying

       officer] watched was a fair and accurate depiction of the events in question.”

       Id. at 122. The Court observed,

               Of course, had the video been available at trial, the
               Commonwealth would have had to authenticate it before it could
               be admitted. . . . But because the video was lost, the
               Commonwealth offered [the officer]’s testimony as secondary
               evidence of its contents. It logically follows that, in order for this
               secondary evidence to be admissible, the Commonwealth had to
               lay enough foundation to allow a reasonable jury to conclude
               that the primary evidence, the video the officer watched, was in
               fact what he represented it to be.

       Id. at 122-23 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[41]   Here, although the video was not offered into evidence, like the secondary

       evidence in Stott and Connolly, the detectives’ testimony relied on a silent

       witness to events that no testifying witness observed first-hand. The silent

       witness theory’s heightened foundation requirements would have certainly been

       triggered had the video itself been admitted into evidence, and we see no reason

       why the fact that the video was not admitted relieves the State of the burden of

       proving the video’s reliability under the silent witness theory.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023         Page 19 of 27
[42]   Indeed, the silent witness theory’s foundation requirements are even more

       appropriate in this case where, in contrast to Wise and Stott, the secondary

       evidence offered by the State is not merely a partial duplicate of the original

       silent witness evidence, but rather pure testimony of the detectives’ observations

       from the video. In Bergner, 397 N.E.2d 1017, when this Court first adopted the

       silent witness theory as a matter of Indiana law, we cautioned that silent

       witness evidence presents “the potential for distortive and misrepresentative

       images. . . .” In a case such as this, where the silent witness evidence is never

       itself admitted, those same concerns are still present and to a greater extent.

       The video is never available for the fact-finder to see and evaluate.

[43]   Moreover, it will be a tall order for even the most seasoned trial attorney to

       effectively cross examine a testifying witness’s account of evidence that is not

       admitted into evidence. That task is even more onerous where, as here, neither

       Defense counsel nor any witness other than the detectives ever saw the video.

       Thus, laying a strong foundation for the video’s reliability is all the more

       necessary.

[44]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the silent witness theory’s heightened

       foundation requirements apply in the instant case, and we disagree with

       Pritchard’s holding to the contrary. We turn now to whether the State laid a

       sufficient foundation for the detectives’ testimony and conclude that the State

       has met that burden.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023      Page 20 of 27
       B. The State laid a sufficient foundation for the detectives’ testimony

[45]   As we have explained, the silent witness theory requires the proponent to lay a

       foundation for the evidence’s reliability pursuant to Evidence Rule 901(b)(9).

       Our chief concerns are the accuracy of the evidence and whether that evidence

       has been “altered in any significant respect.” McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388. Our

       courts have declined to “lay down extensive, absolute foundation

       requirements” for silent witness evidence, Kindred, 524 N.E.2d 298, and we

       may look to the “surrounding circumstances” to assure ourselves that a proper

       foundation has been laid, McFall, 71 N.E.3d at 388.

[46]   Here, Detective Jones testified outside the presence of the jury5 to the following:

       three cameras were attached to the back of the house and faced the backyard.

       On the same day as the fire, after power was restored to the house, Lindsay

       invited Detectives Jones and Mayer into the house to show them the video.

       The video was stored on a DVR hard drive, which the detectives observed in

       Lindsay’s bedroom. In the detectives’ presence, Lindsay “pulled up” the video

       on a monitor connected to the DVR, Tr. Vol. II p. 142, and Detective Jones

       subsequently took over “operating” the DVR, id. at. 144. The video depicted

       two men, including a shirtless man wearing blue jean shorts and white shoes

       who appeared to the set the garage aflame.

       5
           Detective Jones later testified to many of the same facts in the presence of the jury.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023                          Page 21 of 27
[47]   We are persuaded that the State laid a sufficient foundation for the detectives to

       testify regarding their observations from the video. Detective Jones testified

       regarding the placement of the cameras as well as how and where the video was

       stored. Little time elapsed between the recording of the arson and the

       detectives’ viewing of the video, and the power was cut off during that

       intervening period. It is, thus, unlikely that the video was, or could have been,

       altered during this time period. Cf. Connolly, 78 N.E.3d at 124 (holding the

       Commonwealth failed to lay a sufficient foundation for police officer’s

       testimony regarding security camera footage that was not offered into evidence

       when the officer did not testify regarding the date and time of the video or the

       place shown in it, the surveillance procedures of the apartment building, the

       “placement of the cameras and the nature of the equipment,” the circumstances

       under which the officer was shown the video over one month after the incident,

       or how the video was stored during the time between its recording and the

       officer’s viewing of it).

[48]   Additionally, the video’s depiction of the arson was corroborated by other

       evidence: Lindsay’s 911 call placed Kirby and Brandon at the house, and

       Lindsay described Kirby as shirtless and wearing shorts. On the same day as

       the fire, law enforcement recovered jean shorts and white shoes on which

       gasoline was identified from Brandon’s house. Finally, at the suppression

       hearing, Amber testified that Kirby often came over to Brandon’s house and

       that it would not be unusual to find Kirby’s clothing there, and Detective Jones

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023       Page 22 of 27
       testified that Brandon and Kirby shared clothing and that the white shoes

       belonged to Kirby.

[49]   Kirby points out that Detective Jones admitted that he did not know “the way

       the DVR operates,” Tr. Vol. II p. 148, and that Detective Mayer testified that

       the timestamp on the video was “not accurate,” id. at 180. We cannot say,

       however, that these deficiencies are fatal. Today, home security cameras are

       widely accessible to the public and are not technically complicated to the

       average user. A lack of understanding regarding the inner mechanics of a home

       security DVR system does not necessarily render the footage stored therein

       unreliable. That is especially the case where, as here, Detective Jones

       understood that the video was stored on the DVR, and, indeed, observed the

       video being pulled up from the DVR hard drive. Further, as to the inaccuracy

       of the time stamp, it is not unheard of for a security camera’s internal clock to

       be inaccurate. Given that the video depicted the ignition of the very same

       garage that was burned to the ground on the day in question, we also do not

       think that the inaccuracy of the time stamp renders the video unreliable. Cf.

       Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1181 (Ind. 2022) (inaccuracy of surveillance

       video’s time stamp did not render the evidence against the defendant

       insufficient when “the rest of the web of facts” supported the jury’s verdict).

[50]   We find that the State laid a sufficient foundation for the detectives’ testimony

       regarding their observations from the video. Accordingly, we cannot say that

       the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the detectives’ testimony.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023       Page 23 of 27
       III. Sufficient evidence supports Kirby’s conviction

[51]   Lastly, Kirby challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

       conviction for arson. We find the evidence sufficient.

[52]   Sufficiency of evidence claims “warrant a deferential standard, in which we

       neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Powell v. State, 151

       N.E.3d 256, 262 (Ind. 2020) (citing Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1242 (Ind.

       1994)). “When there are conflicts in the evidence, the jury must resolve them.”

       Young, 198 N.E.3d at 1176. We consider only the evidence supporting the

       judgment and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Powell, 151

       N.E.3d at 262 (citing Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert.

       denied). “We will affirm a conviction if there is substantial evidence of

       probative value that would lead a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the

       defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 263. We affirm the

       conviction “unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the

       crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the

       evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is

       sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the

       verdict.” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting

       Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[53]   Here, Kirby was charged with and convicted of arson, a Level 4 felony,

       pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-43-1-1(a), which provides in relevant part:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023       Page 24 of 27
               A person who, by means of fire, explosive, or destructive device,
               knowingly or intentionally damages:

                                                          *****

                        (3) property of another person without the other person’s
                        consent if the pecuniary loss is at least five thousand
                        dollars ($5,000);

                                                          *****

               commits arson, a Level 4 felony.

[54]   Kirby challenges only his identity as the arsonist. He argues that the only

       evidence identifying Kirby as the arsonist was Lindsey’s hearsay statements

       during the 911 call, which, he claims, are unreliable and do not constitute

       present sense impressions excepted from the rule against hearsay. See Evid. R.

       803(1) (defining a present sense impression as “[a] statement describing or

       explaining an event, condition or transaction, made while or immediately after

       the declarant perceived it”). Kirby further argues that, pursuant to our holding

       in Jackson v. State, “[h]earsay evidence, standing alone and not clothed with

       indicia of reliability associated with the exceptions which may render it

       admissible, is not sufficient evidence of probative value to sustain a conviction.”

       485 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), trans. denied.

[55]   First, Kirby does not argue that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence

       hearsay statements made during the 911 call, and any challenge to that

       evidence, therefore, is waived. Waiver notwithstanding, we are persuaded that

       Lindsey’s statement during the 911 call that she drove by and saw that Kirby

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023          Page 25 of 27
       was shirtless, wearing shorts, and at her house constitutes a present sense

       impression. Ind. Evid. R. 803(1); see Jones v. State, 780 N.E.2d 373, 377 (Ind.

       2002) (holding that victim’s statement that the man driving by was her landlord

       constituted a present sense impression).

[56]   As for Lindsay’s statement that Kirby was threatening to burn her house down,

       Kirby was “on the other line” with Lindsay when Lindsay called 911, and

       Lindsay reported that Kirby was “stating he’s breaking in or he’s going to burn

       my house down.” Tr. Vol. II p. 112. We have hearsay within hearsay

       here. “Hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if

       each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.”

       Ind. Evid. R. 805. The statement is not excluded as inadmissible hearsay if, at

       each level, a hearsay exception allows for the admission. Lindsay’s statement

       to the 911 operator was an excited utterance. Ind. Evid. R. 803(2). Moreover,

       Kirby’s statement to Lindsay, which Lindsay repeated to the 911 operator, is a

       statement offered by the State against the defendant and not considered hearsay

       pursuant to Evidence Rule 801(d)(2). See Ind. Evid. R. 801(d)(2) (defining

       statements made by an opposing party and offered against that party as not

       hearsay); Banks v. State, 761 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ind. 2002) (“A party’s own

       statement offered against that party is not hearsay.”).

[57]   Additionally, we find Jackson’s holding inapplicable here. In Jackson, we

       observed that hearsay statements were “the only evidence” supporting

       Jackson’s conviction. 485 N.E.2d at 146. Here, however, Lindsey’s statements

       were corroborated by other evidence. In the 911 call, Lindsey reported that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023     Page 26 of 27
       Kirby threatened to burn her house down and that Brandon was trying to stop

       Kirby. She further reported that she drove past her house and saw Kirby at her

       house shirtless and wearing shorts. Detectives Jones and Mayer testified that

       Lindsey’s cameras recorded two white men in her backyard, one of whom was

       shirtless, wearing shorts and white shoes, and who appeared to set the garage

       aflame. Kirby was arrested later that day at Brandon’s house, where law

       enforcement recovered a pair of shorts and shoes matching those worn by the

       shirtless man in the video, and laboratory testing identified gasoline on the

       shoes. The evidence against Kirby, therefore, did not consist solely of hearsay

       evidence, and the jury could have reasonably inferred that the shirtless man

       who set fire to the garage was Kirby. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient

       evidence to support Kirby’s conviction.

       Conclusion
[58]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kirby’s motion to

       dismiss, nor did it abuse its discretion by admitting the detectives’ testimony

       regarding their observations from the video. Additionally, the State presented

       sufficient evidence to support Kirby’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

[59]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2917 | August 17, 2023     Page 27 of 27