Court Opinion

ID: 9569198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:23.254314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:18.982081
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that there was no prejudicial error in defendant’s trial. I cannot join in what I consider unwarranted speculation in the majority opinion.
The majority says: “One might be able to infer that the defendant had a good reputation from Bishop Jones’ testimony that he had not heard anything bad about the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The majority simply states that if Bishop Jones’ relationship with defendant was such that he would have heard if defendant’s character were bad, then his never having heard it discussed is evidence of “good reputation.” The majority repeats its speculation that “[e]ven if the defendant properly introduced evidence of his good character” (emphasis added) in this way, then it was not error because he failed to preserve it by not requesting the “good character” instruction in writing. The majority states *241its speculation yet a third time when it “[a]ssum[es], arguendo, that the defendant put on evidence of his good character by the testimony of Bishop Jones.”
Based on such speculation, the majority adopts, for the first time in this state, the rule that if a character witness’ relationship with the defendant is such that he would likely have heard defendant’s character (actually reputation) discussed if it were bad, the fact that he never heard it discussed is evidence of good reputation. See Brandis on North Carolina Evidence § 110 (1982). If this rule is to be adopted by this Court, it should be done in an appropriate case and not upon mere speculation about what the evidence might have shown.
I cannot join in such speculation, and I believe it is improper for the majority to do so. I find it particularly inappropriate in this case. Bishop E. W. Jones, who described his occupation as “Minister of Religion, and Contractor by trade,” said that he had known the defendant for three or four years and that during the early part of 1985, he and defendant worked together on a job for another company. Bishop Jones testified that he went out to work on his own and that defendant came to work for him in May or June of 1985 (the first rape took place on 5 May 1985, and the second rape on 15 June 1985) and worked for him “a few weeks before this happened.” Bishop Jones described the way in which he had known defendant as a “working relationship.” The record is devoid of any indication that they shared any church or religious relationship or that they were friends or even that they lived in close proximity to one another. There is simply nothing in the record to show that Bishop Jones’ relationship with defendant was such that he would likely have heard the defendant’s character discussed if it were bad. Thus, the fact that he had never heard it discussed would be no evidence whatever of “good character.”
I also take exception to another aspect of the majority opinion. It has long been the law of this state that a defendant may not be cross-examined as to whether he has been “charged” with a crime. The majority, without citation to authority, extends this rule to a character witness for the defendant, whose testimony of “good character” is limited, in effect, to his testimony that he has “never heard anything bad about” the defendant. In many such *242cases, as here, the witness would readily admit hearing of charges having been filed against the defendant. In the unique situation where the defendant’s “good character” is sought to be established by the fact that the witness has not heard anything bad about him, such testimony should be admissible because it simply goes to show the jury that the character witness was not being entirely truthful.
In this case, the first question of the district attorney was entirely proper:
Q. All right, sir. Now, you’ve stated you know the character and reputation of Mr. Martin. Did you know that he had been selling drugs in the jail?
(Emphasis added.) Following objection by defense counsel, the district attorney repeated the question but, probably inadvertently, used the term “charged with”:
Q. Did you know that he had been charged with selling drugs in the jail?
(Emphasis added.) Even assuming that the change of words was intentional, it would not be error in the context of the circumstances here. The majority, though finding error, finds the error not to be prejudicial because other evidence of defendant’s use and growing of marijuana was admitted. This is simply not a proper case in which to extend the rule against cross-examination of a defendant as to “charges” filed against him to a character witness whose testimony is limited to never having heard anything bad about the defendant.
The majority seems to adopt two major principles of the law of evidence, both new to this state, neither of which it finds to be prejudicial under the facts presented by this case. I consider the purported adoption of both pure dictum.
Justices Mitchell and Whichard join in this concurring opinion.