Court Opinion

ID: 9494791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:47:04.446671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:37.756168
License: Public Domain

BERZON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Although the majority’s statutory construction is certainly plausible, I believe that, on balance, another interpretation is more faithful to the statutory language and structure as a whole, and results in a more sensible overall statutory scheme. I therefore respectfully dissent.
1. I note at the outset that there are serious practical problems with cutting off the tolling period with the final state appeal. Where there is no petition for cer-tiorari filed, it works fine. But here, as the majority recognizes, there arguably was a timely petition for certiorari filed, with this court.
Leaving aside whether that petition was a proper one, let us suppose that it was, and that we granted it and set the case for hearing. According to the majority opinion, if we then did not decide the case on the merits within one year of the Guam Supreme Court decision, White would have had to file a separate habeas petition in federal district court. Thus, the same claims would be pending in two federal courts at once. The same would be the case in the more usual situation, where a petition for certiorari from the denial of an State application for post-conviction relief by the highest State court is pending before the United States Supreme Court, or is granted and the case is pending on the merits. In that situation as well, the majority could be requiring a petitioner to have two petitions pending in federal courts, one in the Supreme Court and one in federal district court. I suppose the federal district court could just suspend proceedings, but one wonders why Congress would want matters to pi-oceed this way.
Turning to the statutory language, it is far from clear to me that Congress did. The statute surely tolls only where there is a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review.” But the question is not whether White’s application fits this description — it does, with the twist that it was really an application for territorial review — but whether that application could still be “pending” once the state courts are finished with it.
I believe that it can. That is, while the application is one for State post-conviction relief, just as state criminal proceedings can raise federal issues reviewable in the United States Supreme Court, so can state habeas proceedings. A state criminal proceeding, I would think, is still “pending” even though the state courts are finished with it, until any petition filed is finally decided. Similarly, if there is a certiorari petition pending to review the validity of the state’s denial of such an application for state post-conviction review, the application is still “pending” — that is, not finally decided. The application does not thereby stop being a state habeas proceeding or turn into a federal rather than a state application; it is just not finally decided yet.
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001), does not suggest a different interpretation of § 2244(d)(2). That case based its holding that a federal habeas petition does not toll the limitations period on the ground “that an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post-conviction or other collateral review' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).” Id. at 2129. But an application for state habeas review, as opposed to an application for federal habeas review, is “an application for State post-conviction review or other collateral review,” regardless of *927whether that application is being considered on appeal by a state supreme court or by the United State Supreme Court on certiorari. Thus, unlike the reading of § 2244(d)(2) rejected in Duncan, the interpretation I suggest gives full meaning to the word “State,” but recognizes that the United States Supreme Court — and, in these unique circumstances, this court— can consider state (or territorial) cases when they raise federal issues. Otherwise, what is the United States Supreme Court hearing when it considers a state habeas petition on certiorari? Not an application for federal post-conviction or other collateral review. Only 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides for such plenary review, and while Supreme Court judges can entertain initial habeas petitions (see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)), that is not what they are doing when they consider a federal question under their certiorari jurisdiction in a case that originated in state court.
This reading is confirmed by 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b), the special limitations period for capital cases in “opt-in” states. Under that statute, the limitations period expressly leaves out the period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari after state court direct review is over, a different rule than applies under § 2244(d). 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(1), see Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir.2001). The tolling period, 28 U.S.C. § 2263(b)(2), in turn, includes, first, the time period between the filing of a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court until its disposition and, second, the period “from the date on which the first petition for post-conviction review or other collateral relief until the final State court disposition of such petition.”
The language in § 2263(b)(2) concerning tolling for state habeas petitions differs from that contained in § 2244(d)(2), which omits the phrase “until the final State court disposition of such petition.” As Duncan noted in interpreting § 2244(d)(2): “It is well settled that where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion and exclusion.” Id. at 2124 (internal quotations omitted). Congress’ decision to include the language “until the final State court disposition of such petition” in § 2263(b)(2), but to omit it in § 2244(d)(2), indicates that Congress intended the tolling period to end with “the final State court disposition” in situations controlled by § 2263(b)(2), but to continue for as long as the application “is pending” in situations controlled by § 2244(d)(2).
That § 2263(b)(2) does end tolling once the State court is finished leads, I recognize, to all the confusion I discuss above regarding petitions pending in two places at once. Still, as to that section it is certain that Congress so intended, presumably to avoid the traditional long delays in imposing the death penalty and also, perhaps, because the “opt-in” rules provide for appointment of counsel for state habeas; lawyers, unlike unrepresented prisoners, can be expected to know about double-filing rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261. That there is no such clear language in § 2244(d)(2) but only the “pending” reference suggests that a difference was intended, just as a difference was clearly intended with regard to the beginning date for the statute of limitations between § 2244(d)(2) and § 2263(b)(2).
The current case, indeed, illustrates that a state habeas petition is still “pending” when a prisoner files a petition for a writ of certiorari. Under Guam Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(c), the filing of a writ of certiorari to the Ninth Circuit or the United States Supreme Court automatically *928prevents- the Guam Supreme Court from issuing its mandate for the prisoner’s territorial habeas petition. In other words, Guam’s rule explicitly recognizes the unavoidable fact that a habeas petition filed in its courts is not final and in that sense remains pending — “awaiting decision”, see Black’s Law Dictionary, 1154 (7th ed.1999) — until the prisoner has lost the ability to have a higher court review it.
Additionally, the thinking of other circuits is not as conclusive on the interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) as the opinion suggests. The Third Circuit decided, albeit with no analysis, that when a state prisoner files a writ of certiorari following the denial of a petition for state habeas relief, the statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2). Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir.1999); see also Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 318 n. 4 (3d Cir.2001) (distinguishing Morris on the ground that Nara could have, but did not, file a petition for certiorari). The Seventh Circuit has also exhibited a willingness to give effect to the word “pending” in § 2244(d)(2). In Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 490 (7th Cir.2000), it considered whether the time in which a state prisoner could have, but did not, file a writ of certiorari following the denial of a petition for state habeas relief tolls the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2). It held that this time did not toll the statute of limitations, stating that “a petition for certiorari that is not actually filed cannot reasonably be considered ‘pending.’ ” Id. at 492. It then explicitly left open the issue of whether a properly filed petition for certiorari would toll the statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2).
As Gutierrez suggests, it is possible that the answer to whether a case is “pending” could differ depending upon whether the petition for writ of certiorari has yet been filed or not. But certainly where it has— and the majority in this case proceeds on the premise that even if there was a petition filed in this court, that would not matter — I cannot see why the “application for State post-conviction or other collateral review” is not still “pending.”
2. There is one other matter on which I differ with the majority. Footnote 4 of the majority opinion reaches a question we need not address, in an area in which Ninth Circuit law is confusing.
Whether or not the Supreme Court of Guam’s decision became final before or after the entry of the mandate on January 26, 1999, does not matter to the outcome of this case. White did not file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus until March 13, 2000, more than a year later. So his petition would have been time-barred even if he was right about the January 26 date.
Footnote 4 nonetheless cites to Wixom for the proposition that the decision of the state appellate court, rather than the entry of the mandate, signals the conclusion of review. Wixom is relevant precedent, but our decision in Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973 (9th Cir.2001), may speak more directly to the issue at hand. While Wix-om considered § 2244(d)(1), Bunney considered § 2244(d)(2). Bunney held that according to California Rules of Court, a decision by the California Supreme Court does not become final until 30 days after filing and is subject to further action during that time. Id. at 974. Rule 28(c) of Guam Rules of Appellate Procedures states that the Supreme Court shall issue its mandate, “when a case is finally determined,” indicating that a Guam Supreme Court decision is subject to further action during the time between when an opinion is rendered and the mandate is issued.
It appears to me that it may well be Bunney that should govern here. The two cases interpreted different parts of the habeas statute. Section 2244(d)(1)(A), at issue in Wixom, specifically states that, *929under certain circumstances, the statute of limitations period begins on “the date on which the judgement became final by the conclusion of direct review,” while § 2244(d)(2), at issue here and in Bunney, states that the limitations period is tolled while an application for state collateral review “is pending.”
I see no reason to reach the question of whether it is Wixorrt or Bunney that governs here, as the answer to the question does not matter.