Court Opinion

ID: 9767328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:16:45.225028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:30.604317
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Calvert,
joined by Justices Smedley, Garwood
and Griffin, dissenting.
I dissent.
The conclusion reached by the majority is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority as evidenced by the decisions in those states in which the question has been decided under applicable common law rules. Atlantic Const. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C. 365, 53 S.E. 2d 165; Barr et al v. City Council of Augusta (three cases), 206 Ga. 750, 753 and 756; 58 S.E. *1102d 820, 825; City of Lexington v. Jones, 289 Ky. 719, 160 S.W. 2d 19; Davisworth v. City of Lexington, 311 Ky. 606, 224 S.W. 2d 649; City of Phoenix et al v. Kasun et al, 54 Ariz. 470, 97 Pac. 2d 210, 127 A.L.R. 84. Typical of the reasoning of all the courts is the language of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the Davisworth case. The City of Lexington had for years permitted non-resident suburban citizens to connect with the city sewer system without charge. In 1935 the City enacted an ordinance levying a charge for non-resident use which ordinance was upheld in the Jones case, supra, and in 1948 another ordinance was passed increasing the non-resident use charges from a range of from $4.20 to $9.00 per year to a range of from $25.00 to $200.00 per year. The validity of the ordinance was attacked on the ground that it was discriminatory against non-residents. The Court said:
“Appproaching the heart of our particular problem, we may ask: Where the City has permitted non-residents to use its sewer system for a number of years, may it require them to discontinue such use? The query is answered by posing a counter-question: Why not? The City’s essential duties are owed to its inhabitants. Non-residents have no lawful claim upon any city service. Any use of city facilities by non-residents is wholly permissive (in the absence of contract or estoppel) and not based upon legal right. In this case Lexington has done no more than acquiesce in what would be, without its permission, a trespass upon its property by appellants and those similarly situated. The latter became mere licensees, and acquired no prerogative claim to a continuance of such license. It follows that the City’s consent could be withdrawn at will. * * * If then, the City may discontinue the service altogether, it clearly may fix in its own discretion the charges to be paid by those who wish its continuance.”
The only case found in support of the common law view expressed in the opinion of the majority is the Alabama case of City of Montgomery v. Greene, 180 Ala. 322, 60 So. 900, later appeal, 187 Ala. 196, 65 So. 783, quoted from at length therein. It will be noted also from the quotation that the Alabama court held that a city could not refuse its water service to non-inhabitants, a holding clearly contrary to all authority found on the subject.
The only other authorities cited by the majority, opinion in support of its statement that “the limits of a municipal corporation, of themselves, do not furnish a reasonable basis for rate *111differentiation” are the Texas case of Dallas Power & Light Company v. Carrington, the Kentucky case of Louisville and Jefferson County Metropolitan Dist. v. J. E. Seagram & Sons and the annotation in 4 A.L.R. 2d 596. None of these authorities can afford the majority of this court any comfort.
The Carrington case by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals cannot be regarded as of any precedential value because it involved a private utility and the application of statutes applicable only to private utilities, it was decided by a divided court, a writ of error was granted by the Supreme Court, indicating, if anything, disapproval of the majority opinion, and the writ of error and the entire suit was thereafter by agreement of the parties dismissed by the Supreme Court thereby causing its status to be the same as if it had never been filed. It has never since been cited as authority on the point here in issue by any court of this state or of any other state so far as I have been able to discover.
It is somewhat difficult to follow the reasoning of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in the J. E. Seagram & Sons case. There were rate factors involved other than mere corporate lines and the Court sent the case back for trial for the fixing of a rate for non-residents based upon these factors. The court nevertheless cited the case of the City of Lexington v. Jones, supra, with approval, and in the course of its opinion said: “If the basis for the differential (in rates between resident and non-residents of the City of Louisville) in this case were merely geographical or residential, the legal consequences would be different. The real basis is the use and enjoyment of property by one class who owns it and another class who do not.” (emphasis ours.) Moreover, the Davisworth case cited in the first paragraph of this opinion is a later case by the Kentucky court and if there is any conflict the opinion in the Davisworth case is the latest and controlling expression of the Kentucky court.
The annotation in 4 A.L.R. 2d 595-612 is more an annotation of decisions of state regulatory agencies than of courts, but even so, an examination will reflect that a majority of those decisions and the conclusions of the annotator support the common law rule advocated in this dissent. At the beginning of the annotation (bottom of page 596) we find this general rule: “The great majority of the cases found upon this point support the rule that public utilities may generally discriminate, in respect to rates, between consumers within and those outside *112the municipalities served.” A host of cases and decisions of regulatory agencies from nineteen states are cited in support of this rule. With particular reference to a municipally owned waterworks, the annotator says (top page 599) : “A municipally owned waterworks system supplying water without its corporate limits may, generally, charge more for that service than is charged users of the water service who reside within the corporate limits.”
More important, the majority conclusion is directly contrary to the plain provisions of the controlling statutes, Article 1108, Section 3, Y.A.C.S. What is now Article 1108 was first enacted in 1909. But neither the original act, nor the 1935 amendment, nor a subsequent amendment in 1937, imposed any dfwty on a city to extend its water or sewer lines outside the city limits or to sell its water or sewer services to non-residents. Article 1108 is not mandatory; it is permissive in character.
As applied to the question now before us the language of paragraph 3 of Article 1108 has never been interpreted by our courts, no doubt because it is too plain and unambiguous to require interpretation. When the statute declares that a city may permit non-residents to connect with its water and sewer lines and facilities “under such terms or conditions as may appear to be for the best interests of such town or city” it can mean nothing more nor less than exactly what it says. Article 10 of our statutes directs that words used in statutes shall be given their ordinary signification. The ordinary signification of the word “terms” in the context of this statute, which contemplates the furnishing of services for pay, certainly embraces the idea of connection charges and rates to be paid.
The citizens of North Texarkana do not occupy the same relationship toward the City of Texarkana as do its own citizens. “The primary purpose of a municipal corporation is to contribute towards the welfare, health, happiness and public interest of the inhabitants of such city, and not to further the interest of those residing outside of its limits.” City of Sweetwater v. Hamner, Tex. Civ. App., 259 S.W. 191, 195. The City of Texarkana owes to its own citizens a duty to see that their health and welfare are protected through the continuing availability of water and sewer lines and facilities. It owes no such duty to the citizens of North Texarkana. It may furnish water and sewer services and facilities to residents of North Texarkana so long and only so long as the residents of that munici*113pality contract for such services and the authorities of that municipality permit; but being under no duty to furnish in the first instance it may discontinue such services, on reasonable notice, with or without cause. Being entitled to discontinue the services according to its want, it follows that the City can continue them on its own terms and conditions. This was its common law right. It is now its statutory right.
The majority opinion does not hold that the City of Texarkana could not withdraw the water and sewer service it furnishes the non-residents; it assumes that it could .The opinion does not hold that the ordinance, or the statute, we take it is unconstitutional; it assumes that it is constitutional. It does not hold that Article 1108, Section 3, does not give the city power to rates; it assumes that it does. It seems, therefore, that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is affirmed in the face of the plain wording of the statute for two reasons, as follows: (1) “Assuming that” Section 3 of Article 1108 “gives the power to fix rates, the granting of such power, without express authority to fix pursuant thereto shall be, if not reasonable, at least not discriminatory”; and (2) that although a city may fix such rates for non-residents as its discretion directs when it first decides to offer them its utility services, once a rate is fixed “a rate status bewten the city and its outside customers is thereby established and the city cannot thereafter arbitrarily change the rate so as to discriminate, or further discriminate, between them and customers residing in the city.” Aside from being wholly inconsistent with each other, the second reason inferring that rates fixed at the beginning of outside service may be arbitrary and discriminatory and the first reason specifically saying that they may not be, both reasons are at once unrealistic and contrary to persuasive authority.
The first reason is unrealistic because it is hardly thinkable that the legislature would by express language authorize cities “to fix unreasonably discriminatory rates” for their non-resident customers. Moreover, the legislature made the authority about as broad as it could be made when it conferred on cities absolute discretion to charge such rates “as may appear for the best interest” of the cities. The conclusion of the majority that the language of the statute is not sufficiently broad to authorize the City of Texarkana to charge higher rates to non-residents is contrary to a decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in the case of Childs v. City of Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296, 34 L.R.A. NS 542 and contrary to a decision of the *114Supreme Court of Colorado in the case of City of Englewood v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 290, 229 Pac. 2d 667, the two latter decisions involving construction of statutes highly similar to the Texas statute. The South Carolina statute authorized cities to furnish water to non-residents “upon such terms, rates and charges” as might be agreed upon “when in the judgment of said city council it is for the best interest of the municipality so to do.” In a suit involving the right of the City of Columbia to charge non-residents higher rates than were charged to residents, the court said: “Thus the making of the contract and the terms, rates, and charges are left entirely to the discretion of municipal authorities, and the interest of the municipality is the sole factor to be considered in deciding whether the contract shall be made, and if so, on what terms, and for what period * * *.” The Colorado statute authorized cities and towns to supply water to consumers outside their corporate limits “and to collect therefore such charges and upon such conditions and limitations as said towns and cities may impose by ordinance.” In a rate suit between residents of the City of Englewood against the City of Denver from whose water system plaintiffs obtained their water, the court said that the City of Denver was “not under public duty to furnish water to Englewood at any kind of rates or to furnish water at all.” The trial court’s judgment dismissing the suit was affirmed.
The second reason given is unrealistic in that its necessary consequence will be to cause cities and towns to charge nonresidents exorbitantly high rates when they are first given service so that an unsatisfactory “rate status” will not arise to plague them in the future. The “rate status” solution of the majority is wholly out of keeping with a part of the record before us. It may be a sufficient basis for the ruling of the majority on that part of the ordinance fixing water rates but it will not do at all as a basis for the ruling on that part of the ordinance fixing sewer rates and charges. The City of Texarkana has owned and operated its sewer lines and disposal plant for many years. The only evidence in the record as to rates charged non-residents when sewer service was first offered them is the testimony of the plaintiff Ross Perot who was permitted to connect with the Texarkana sewer system some twenty-five years ago and who was charged eighteen dollars per year for the service at a time when residents of Texarkana paid nothing. Thus the rate status established when the service was first offered to non-residents was based on a charge to non-residents *115eighteen times as great as that made to residents. The sewer charges to non-residents in the ordinance here under attack is only twice as great as the charge to residents. Clearly then the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction against collection of the sewer charges on the ground that they arbitrarily and discriminatorily depart from a fixed “rate status.”
I have not been able to find any support in recorded decisions for the “rate status” theory. On the contrary it has been rejected in a great many of the decisions heretofore cited in this opinion. True, the contention has not heretofore been based upon the theory that a rate status was created from which the city could not arbitrarily depart; but the same theory has been presented to the courts in at least two ways, viz: (1) that an ordinance establishing a given rate for non-residents was a contract with the non-residents which the city was not at liberty to breach; and (2) that the city was estopped to raise rates to non-residents where they had laid pipe and connected with the city water or sewer systems in reliance upon a lower rate fixed by ordinance. There is no essential distinction between these contentions and the “rate status” theory.
The majority fear that to construe the statute so as to uphold the ordinance here “would return us to the primitive state of development in utility control when rates were dtermined by friendship and political power or pressure.” I doubt that such a consequence is reasonably to be expected, but it is not enough to defeat the plain wording of the statute to 'say that it may lead to unjust or unsound results. It is our duty to enforce the statute as written, leaving to the legislature the right and the duty to effect a change if a change is needed. Simmons et al v. Arnim et al, 110 Texas 309, 220 S.W. 66, 70; Texas Highway Commission v. El Paso Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 149 Texas 457, 234 S.W. 2d 857, 863; Col-Tex. Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 150 Texas 340, 240 S.W. 2d 747.
The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed and the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Opinion delivered February 6, 1952.