Court Opinion

ID: 9747213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:03:38.253303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:21.290743
License: Public Domain

Amestoy, C.J.,
dissenting. Today’s decision not only undercuts the general supervisory authority that Vermont law bestows upon local selectboards to operate and maintain town highways, but also requires the Warren Selectboard in this case to choose between plowing a road widely recognized as unsafe for winter travel or reclassifying the road as a class 4 highway even though it serves as one of the principal routes over the spine of the Green Mountains during three seasons of the year. Because I believe that Vermont law grants local selectboards discretion in how to classify and maintain town highways, and does not compel the choice imposed by the majority, I dissent.
Many Vermonters are familiar with the steep, twisting road that wends its way over Lincoln Gap between Warren and Lincoln. While serving local town residents and visitors as a scenic route over the Green Mountains for most of the year, the road becomes treacherous after the first snows fall, and thus has been closed every winter for more than fifty years.* Not desiring to endanger its plow operators or the driving public, and unwilling to incur the significant expense of trying to keep open a road not suitable for winter travel, the Warren Selectboard declined to plow an upper section of the road to allow plaintiff year-round access to his uninhabited land.
The majority ignores the selectboard’s reasonable decision and its general supervisory authority over town highways, instead relying on scant legislative history to conclude that the Legislature intended to make it a ministerial duty for towns to plow the entire length of each and every class 2 and 3 town highway within their jurisdiction. In my judgment, the majority’s opinion undermines the statutory framework that allows local selectboards, with state oversight, to make discretionary decisions over such matters.
As the majority states, plaintiff cannot prevail merely by showing that the Warren Selectboard abused its discretion. Rather, to obtain' a writ of mandamus, he must demonstrate that the selectboard had no *179discretion to decide not to plow the entire length of the Lincoln Gap Road or that its failure to plow the road was an arbitrary abuse of power. Plaintiff cannot make such a showing, given the status of Vermont law. “Town highways shall be under the general supervision and control of the selectmen of the town where the roads are located.” 19 V.S.A. § 303. Town selectboards “shall have the authority to . . . see that town highways and bridges are properly laid out, constructed, maintained, altered, widened, vacated, discontinued and operated, when the safety of the public requires, in accordance with the provisions of this title.” See 19 V.S.A. § 304(a)(1) (emphasis added).
The majority disregards the underlined phrase, stating that neither its source nor meaning can be divined. But we must assume that the phrase has some meaning, and if it has any meaning at all, the enumerated statutory duties cannot be characterized as ministerial in nature. Even absent the underlined phrase, the cited provisions grant authority and impose duties that, by their very nature, require discretionary decisions. Certainly, the provisions do not encompass the type of ministerial duties that could be compelled by mandamus. See Vermont State Employees’ Ass’n v. Vermont Criminal Justice Training Council, 167 Vt. 191, 195, 704 A.2d 769, 771 (1997) (purpose of mandamus is to require public officer or body to perform simple and definite ministerial task, and thus ordinarily is not available to compel discretionary decisions). Rather than being sensitive to, and minimizing any encroachment on, the broad authority that the Legislature has given to local selectboards over town roads, see Hansen v. Town of Charleston, 157 Vt. 329, 335, 597 A.2d 321, 324 (1991), the majority acknowledges the discretion of selectboards to determine the means of discharging their statutory duties, but then prohibits the Warren Selectboard’s exercise of that discretion by characterizing the selectboard’s choice of means as a refusal to exercise responsibility.
In seeking a writ of mandamus, plaintiff relies primarily on statutory provisions requiring towns to “keep its class 1, 2 and 3 highways and bridges, in good and sufficient repair during all seasons of the year,” 19 V.S.A. § 310(a), and setting minimum standards for class 3 highways, including that they be “negotiable under normal conditions all seasons of the year by a standard manufactured pleasure car” and have “sufficient width capable to provide winter maintenance.” See 19 V.S.A. § 302(a)(3)(B). As the majority points out, however, these statutes are ambiguous with respect to the issue *180before us — whether all sections of roads designated as class 2 town highways must be plowed through the winter. The majority’s opinion also correctly notes, in attempting to resolve this ambiguity by reviewing the history of state funding statutes, that historically towns could decide not to plow state aid highways notwithstanding their obligation to keep such highways in good repair during all seasons of the year. As the majority states, the Legislature apparently accepted the notion that a highway could be in good repair even if its full length was not plowed through the winter.
I agree with the majority’s analysis up to this point. But I am not persuaded that a single phrase in a brief comment made by one legislator at a public hearing on the 1973 act establishing the road classification system demonstrates that the Legislature intended to require towns henceforth to plow the full length of every class 2 and 3 town highway. If anything, the legislative history relied upon by the majority demonstrates precisely the opposite — that the Legislature intended no such “fundamental change.” 170 Vt. at 173, 744 A.2d at 427.
The transcript of the January 25, 1973 hearing that the majority relies upon reveals that the Commission on an Integrated Highway System sought to prevent towns from obtaining state funds for “maintaining” many miles of obviously untraveled and impassable “roads” claimed as town highways. See Hearing on S. 37 and H. 132 before the Senate Highways and Bridges Committee and the House Highways Committee, January 25, 1973, at 3. The Commission discussed and rejected various proposals for addressing the problem, including “a provision that state aid be allowed only for highways that are plowed and thus usable for 12 months of the year.” Id. Ultimately, as the majority notes, the Commission was persuaded that the simplest and most effective solution would be to require the involvement of state officials in the certification of eligible roads. See id. at 4.
During the hearing, in response to the statement of the bill’s sponsor that people will have to decide which town roads “are to be accepted as traveled roads,” Senator O’Brien, the chairman of the Senate Highways and Bridges Committee, made the following comments:
Excuse me just a moment, I wonder if everybody here understands just what you mean by this; they’re going to lose money on these roads that are not even traveled.
*181Heretofore, you know that some of the towns have been asking and receiving money for roads that are not passable, not even with a jeep. That has got to be cut out; they’re not roads at all, you know. And the towns that are getting the money, some other town is losing money. So unless we give the money to the town that if their roads are passable year round.

Id.

The majority construes these comments, specifically the last three words of the nonsensical final sentence, as demonstrating that the Legislature intended the “fundamental change” of conditioning state funding on towns plowing town highways and thus keeping them “passable year round.” 170 Vt. at 173, 744 A.2d at 427. In my view, the comments merely reflect the Committee’s concern over towns claiming state funds for impassable byways that were not really roads at all. The comments cannot reasonably be construed to suggest an intent to require the plowing of town highways or to alter the previous understanding that the statutory duty to repair is independent of any duty to plow. Indeed, as noted, the Commission explicitly rejected a proposal that would have conditioned state funding on towns plowing town highways.
In short, the majority’s analysis of the legislative history of 19 V.S.A. § 302 does not support its decision. Nor is the majority’s decision supported by its examination of the history of 19 V.S.A. § 310, the statute requiring towns to keep roads in good repair during all seasons. Citing three mid-nineteenth century cases in which towns were sued for damages for not keeping roads in good repair, the majority concludes that the duty to “repair” has historically been viewed broadly enough to include the duty to remove snow to keep roads passable in the winter. See 170 Vt. at 174-75, 744 A.2d at 428. This conclusion conflicts with the majority’s earlier acknowledgement that historically the statutory duty of towns to keep roads in good repair was independent of any duty to plow the roads.
The majority suggests that if towns are unwilling or unable to fulfill their ministerial duty to plow the entire length of every class 2 and 3 town highway, then they must reclassify the unplowed roads as class 4 highways. This reasoning fails to take into account the current statutory scheme, which gives towns the discretion to supervise and control the classification and maintenance of their town highways, subject to state review. “The selectmen, with the approval of the agency, shall determine which highways are to be class 2 highways.” *18219 V.S.A. § 302(a)(2). On an annual basis, town selectboards are required to report to the agency of transportation their plans for the maintenance and construction of all highways under their control. See 19 V.S.A. § 306(j). “[A] representative of the agency may measure and inspect the class 1, 2 and 3 town highways in each town to verify the accuracy of the records on file with the agency.” 19 V.S.A. § 305(a). If any highway or portion of a highway does not meet the standards for its assigned class, the agency must notify the town, which then has one year either to reclassify the road or restore the highway or portion of the highway to the accepted standard. See id. If the town fails to do so, the agency “shall deduct the affected mileage from that assigned to the town for the particular class of the road in question.” Id.
The Lincoln Gap Road has been closed during the winter every year for more than fifty years. Even assuming the Town of Warren were willing and able to incur the significant expense of keeping it plowed, the road is apparently too treacherous in the winter to be kept open. Yet, during most of the year, the road is a primary route over the spine of the Green Mountains. Given these circumstances, the Warren Selectboard has reasonably exercised its discretion in designating the road as a class 2 highway. Presumably the agency of transportation is aware of, and has approved, the Town’s designation of the Lincoln Gap Road as a class 2 highway, knowing that the upper section of the road is closed in the winter. If closing the upper portion of the Lincoln Gap Road in the winter so obviously undermines the class 2 “standard of negotiability,” 170 Vt. at 177, 744 A.2d at 430, why has the state apparently allowed the road’s class 2 designation to stand, notwithstanding its statutory right to object?
The answer is obvious. Rather than requiring towns, as a ministerial act, to plow every foot of every class 2 and 3 highway under their jurisdiction, the Legislature has given local selectboards discretionary control over the classification and maintenance of their town highways, but has made that control subject to the state’s right to intervene and withhold state funds when the selectboards abuse the discretion bestowed upon them. Because the Town acted reasonably in this case, the state apparently chose not to intervene.
Today’s decision implies that if any section of any road is closed in the winter for safety or other reasons, that road can be designated only as a class 4 highway. A quick scan of Vermont’s official state map reveals the existence of several class 2 and 3 town highways that are closed in the winter. The Kelley Stand Road between Stratton and *183Arlington and the Hazens Notch Road between Montgomery and Lowell are two examples of class 2 highways that are closed in the winter. I have no doubt that these roads, like the Lincoln Gap Road and Smuggler’s Notch, are closed for good reason, most likely to protect the driving public. I do not believe that towns should be faced with the choice of either plowing the entire length of every class 2 and 3 highway, or designating those roads as class 4 highways even when their use in seasons other than winter supports a class 2 or 3 designation. More importantly, I do not believe that the Legislature intended such a result.
The majority notes that the dispute that instigated the instant action concerned a portion of the Lincoln Gap Road that had previously been plowed. But, as the majority acknowledges, the posture of the case has resulted in a general pronouncement on the duty of towns to plow class 2 and 3 highways. I am concerned with the scope of the majority’s holding, not the scope of the initial dispute that led to that holding. Accordingly, I dissent.

Contrary to the majority’s statement, the record does show that the Lincoln Gap Road has not been plowed for fifty years. The minutes taken from the September 10, 1996 meeting of the Warren Selectboard reveal that the members of the board indicated that it had been the policy of the Town for fifty years not to plow the upper portion of the Lincoln Gap Road.