Court Opinion

ID: 9585362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:59:41.584928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:25.458060
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I am of the opinion that under the pleadings and the evidence a declaratory judgment in this case is not authorized.
American Liberty Insurance Company brought an action for declaratory judgment against Partricia Ditmyer, Frank Ditmyer, Herman A. Henderson, and John Dollar Moree, which insofar as here material, alleges as follows: '
“4. Plaintiff issued its policy of automobile liability insurance *523number CA 246359 to John Dollar Moree covering a 1960 Chevrolet pickup truck belonging to said insured, which policy was in full force and effect on February 20, 1965, at the time of the occurrence hereinafter alleged.
“5. On February 20, 1965, said 1960 Chevrolet pickup truck was involved in a collision with a 1964 Corvair automobile owned by the defendant Frank Ditmyer and driven by the defendant Patricia Ditmyer, said truck being driven at the time of the collision by the defendant Herman A. Henderson.
“6. As a result of said collision, suits have been filed by the defendant Patricia Ditmyer and the defendant Frank Ditmyer against the defendant Herman A. Henderson in the Superior Court of Dougherty County, Georgia, being cases numbers 2121 and 2122 respectively. Copies of said suits are attached hereto and designated as Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’.
“7. Said insurance policy contains a so-called ‘omnibus clause’ under the terms of which plaintiff agreed to pay all sums which any person driving the said truck with the permission of the defendant John Dollar Moree may become liable to pay as a result of his negligence.
“8. Said policy also imposes upon the plaintiff the obligation to defend any suits filed against any person as the result of any collision involving said 1960 pickup truck while being driven by said person with the permission of the named insured, John Dollar Moree.
“9. The defendants Patricia Ditmyer and Frank Ditmyer are claiming and contending that the defendant Herman A. Henderson was at the time of the collision involved in said suits driving with the permission of John Dollar Moree, and said defendants will attempt to enforce any judgment obtained by them against Herman A. Henderson against the plaintiff under the terms of said omnibus clause.
“10. Plaintiff contends on the other hand that said Herman A: Henderson was at the time of the collision driving said truck without, permission or authority of John Dollar Moree, and in violation of his instructions, and that plaintiff is not liable to defend the said defendant, Herman A. Henderson, under the terms of said policy against said suits; and further that plaintiff *524is not liable to pay any damages which may be recovered by Patricia Ditmyer and Frank Ditmyer in said cases against Herman A. Henderson.
“11. Plaintiff shows that by reason of the facts hereinbefore alleged, an actual controversy exists between plaintiff and the defendants as to coverage under said policy, and plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of this court as to the rights and liabilities of the respective parties under this policy under the circumstances in this case.
“12. Plaintiff further shows that in order to preserve the status of this matter pending adjudication of the questions involved herein, it is necessary for the court to enjoin the plaintiffs Patricia Ditmyer and Frank Ditmyer from further prosecuting their suits against Herman A. Henderson in the Superior Court of Dougherty County, Georgia, until a final determination of the rights of the plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action.
“13. In order to prevent the two actions pending in the Superior Court of Dougherty County, Georgia, from becoming in default, petitioner has taken nonwaiver agreements from John Dollar Moree and Herman A. Henderson, and has filed defenses to said actions in the superior court under said nonwaiver agreements. Copies of said nonwaiver agreements are attached hereto and marked Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively.
“Wherefore plaintiff prays:
“(1) For a declaratory judgment declaring the rights and liabilities of all of the parties under the policy of automobile liability insurance herein described;
“(2) For a judgment declaring whether any insurance coverage is afforded by said policy with respect to this collision and these suits;
“ (3) For a judgment declaring whether plaintiff is obligated under said policy to defend the said pending actions on behalf of Herman Henderson;
“(4) For a judgment declaring whether plaintiff is obligated under said policy to pay any judgment recovered by Patricia Ditmyer and Frank Ditmyer against Herman A. Henderson in said suits.
“(5) That the plaintiffs Patricia Ditmyer and Frank Dit*525myer be restrained and enjoined from further prosecuting their suits in the Superior Court of Dougherty County, Georgia, until a final determination of the rights of the parties in this declaratory judgment action;
“(6) For such other and further relief as the court may deem meet and proper;
“(7) That process issue against each of the defendants in terms of the law.”
A reading of this petition discloses that it is far too defective to set forth a cause of action for declaratory judgment. It is alleged that plaintiffs in the tort action “will attempt to enforce any judgment obtained” in that action against the insurer (the plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action) and that there is a disagreement as to the facts between the insurer and such plaintiffs. If there is a justiciable controversy existing between any of the parties, this is the only one set out. The allegation in Paragraph 11 that “by reason of the facts herein-before alleged an actual controversy exists between plaintiff [the insurer] and the defendants as to coverage under said policy” is a mere conclusion of the pleader, insofar as it refers to all the defendants in the declaratory judgment action, as there is no allegation as to any dispute or controversy between the plaintiffs and the insured defendant or the driver defendant “hereinbefore alleged,” or for that matter thereafter alleged. It is not alleged that anyone has demanded or suggested that the insurer defend the tort action, or that there is anyone contending that it should. It is not alleged that the facts are uncertain. It is not alleged that the insurer is uncertain of its rights, nor does it allege that the adjudication of the plaintiff insurer’s rights is necessary in order to relieve such plaintiff of taking any further undirected action incident to its rights, which action without direction would jeopardize its interest. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 490 (2) (117 SE2d 336); State Hwy. Dept, v. Ga. S. & F. R. Co., 216 Ga. 547, 548 (2) (117 SE2d 897); Dunn v. Campbell, 219 Ga. 412, 415 (134 SE2d 20); Milton Frank Allen Publications v. Ga. Assn, of Petroleum Retailers, 219 Ga. 665, 670 (la) (135 SE2d 330); American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston v. Aderholt, 114 Ga. App. 508 (151 SE2d 833). See *526also Jacobs v. Ga. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 114 Ga. App. 296 (2) (151 SE2d 187) following U. S. Cas. Co. v. Ga. 8. & F. R. Co., 95 Ga. App. 100, 103 (97 SE2d 185).
“The Act of the General Assembly (Ga. L. 1959, p. 236) amending Code § 110-1101 [Sec. 1 of the Declaratory Judgment Act; Ga. L. 1945, p. 137], providing ‘Relief by declaratory judgment shall be available notwithstanding the fact that the complaining party has any other adequate legal or equitable remedy or remedies’ does not mean that a declaratory judgment will lie to have just any justiciable controversy decided. The ruling by the Supreme Court in McCallum v. Quarles, 214 Ga. 192 (104 SE2d 105) brings this matter to a clear and unequivocal conclusion.” Reliance Ins. Co. v. Brooks Lumber Co., 101 Ga. App. 620, 621 (115 SE2d 271). It is apparent from the allegations in the petition and the authorities above cited that the petition does not set forth a cause of action for declaratory judgment. Proof of the allegations therefore does not authorize a declaratory judgment, although such proof may prevent a nonsuit.
A general demurrer was filed to the petition, but it does not appear that any action was taken thereon. Merely because all of the parties to a declaratory judgment action are agreeable to the entering of a judgment declaring the rights of the parties is entirely immaterial, as the allegations and proof do not authorize the court to grant such a judgment. If consent of the parties was all that was necessary we would not need declaratory judgment statutes. For these reasons, I must dissent from the ruling of the majority granting the declaratory relief.
I am authorized to state that Judge Deen concurs in this dissent.