Court Opinion

ID: 9380118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 14:04:12.25768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.155968
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2022-CA-0930-ME

KENNETH SCOTT HIGGINS                                                 APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE LIBBY G. MESSER, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 22-D-00469-001

ELLIE SCORSONE-STOVALL                                                  APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Kenneth Higgins appeals from the Fayette Family Court’s

entry of an interpersonal protective order (IPO). We affirm.

                                     FACTS

            Appellee, Ellie Scorsone-Stovall (Ellie), filed a petition for an order of

protection against her next-door neighbor, Appellant, Kenneth Higgins (Kenneth)

in April 2022. Ellie alleged Kenneth had been on her front porch three times on
April 18 – each time looking into the security camera, leaving flowers, and

recording oral messages addressing her by name. One message stated he would

always love her unconditionally. Another message stated: “I accept rejection . . .

salutations.” The last message was inaudible according to the petition, but Ellie

later testified he muttered something about protection in the last message.

             The petition also alleged Kenneth sent her Facebook messages in

early March 2022. The first message was: “Aren’t you one of these females?”

The second message was: “First you smile, then you frown, then you shrug at me

. . . what do you mean?”

             The petition further alleged Kenneth tried to break into her home at

midnight the previous December. Ellie claimed that his behavior amounted to

stalking, and she alluded to him having a “long history of mental health issues with

us and other neighbors on our street.” She stated she was scared she “might be

hurt, raped or even killed.”

             The family court entered a temporary IPO which, inter alia, forbade

Kenneth from going within 500 feet of Ellie’s home. Kenneth attended a hearing

with his counsel a few weeks later. At this hearing, counsel mentioned Kenneth

had schizophrenia and had previously been living with his parents but was unable

to return home due to the 500-foot restriction.

                                         -2-
            At the scheduled final hearing, the family court noted Kenneth was

not present. His counsel stated Kenneth was in a psychiatric hospital. The family

court inquired into whether Kenneth had been involuntarily committed or had

voluntarily entered treatment and when he might be released. Upon his counsel’s

suggestion, Kenneth’s parents entered the courtroom to answer the court’s

questions about these matters.

            Kenneth’s parents stated he was not committed but had voluntarily

entered the hospital a few days beforehand. They believed he would probably be

released in a few days but did not know exactly when. His mother also

volunteered that they did not know where he was for a few days and had to file a

missing person report before finding out Kenneth was in the hospital.

            The family court judge stated she did not think the hearing could go

forward in Kenneth’s absence, since he was hospitalized and unable to be there.

She also noted concerns about his mental health were mentioned in the petition.

            Ellie’s counsel objected to delaying the proceedings. The family

court judge expressed concerns that any order entered in Kenneth’s absence would

be invalid and might violate due process. She indicated she viewed Kenneth’s

absence as not being of his own volition or choice.

            Kenneth’s counsel interjected that his “clients” also wanted to go

forward with the hearing. He acknowledged that his ability to communicate with

                                        -3-
Kenneth was limited. And he stated that even when he was able to talk to

Kenneth, “it doesn’t register.”

             Kenneth’s counsel said he did not plan to have Kenneth testify, after

previously stating he did not believe the testimony would be insightful due to

“significant mental defects.” The family court asked whether Kenneth’s counsel

would be able to effectively advocate for all of Kenneth’s legal interests and be

comfortable acting as his guardian ad litem. Counsel indicated he could do so.

             The court decided to go forward with the hearing. It noted Kenneth’s

counsel was present, counsel did not plan on having Kenneth testify, counsel had

communicated with his client to the extent possible, and counsel said he was able

to advocate for all of Kenneth’s legal interests and rights. The family court then

heard testimony from Ellie, her parents, and Kenneth’s parents followed by closing

argument by counsel. Ellie’s testimony offered context about the allegations in her

petition.

             Kenneth’s parents testified, inter alia, about his mental health history.

And they testified the 500-foot restriction resulted in their son being barred from

their home, so he had to move to an apartment – where they were unable to keep

track of him. They testified they believed they could better offer assistance and

supervision over Kenneth at their home.

                                          -4-
             Ellie and her counsel questioned whether Kenneth’s parents could

prevent him from going on Ellie’s family’s property or contacting her if he

returned home. They pointed to Kenneth’s parents’ testimony that they were not

aware at the time of his apparent attempt to enter Ellie’s house at midnight in

December and his returning to her home three times in one day in April to leave

flowers and messages.

             The family court asked Kenneth’s parents whether a mental health

petition had ever been filed concerning Kenneth. They testified that one had been

previously filed, resulting in his being hospitalized for a time. But they also

testified there was no current mental health petition pending.

             Kenneth’s counsel argued against the issuance of an IPO. But if the

family court decided to issue an IPO, counsel argued that Kenneth should be

allowed to move home with appropriate restrictions to offer protection to Ellie.

             At the close of the hearing, the family court orally stated it would

enter an IPO restraining Kenneth from going within 500 feet of Ellie’s home

address for one year and entered a written order with findings. Kenneth filed a

timely appeal. Further facts will be discussed as necessary to resolve the issues

raised upon appeal.

                                         -5-
                                    ANALYSIS

             Kenneth, via new counsel, asserts palpable, structural error in the

family court’s conducting the hearing while he was not present and without a

formal determination of his competency. He claims the family court’s actions

resulted in violations of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Sections 1, 2, 11, and 14 of the Kentucky Constitution. He also argues the IPO

must be reversed as based on conduct not constituting stalking.

I. No Palpable Error in Conducting Hearing While Appellant Not Present
and Without a Formal Establishment of His Competence Under Facts Here

             Kenneth argues that the family court erred in holding the IPO hearing

when he was not present due to hospitalization for mental health care and in the

court’s “failing to establish” his competence. He concedes that these alleged errors

were not “explicitly preserved” and requests that this Court review for palpable

error if “there is any error in preservation.” We construe this as a request to review

unpreserved issues for palpable error.

             Although Kenneth’s appellate counsel notes an apparent lack of case

law directly on point, he argues that a family court should be required to cancel or

postpone an IPO hearing when a respondent is receiving mental health care. He

further contends that Kenneth’s competence should have been formally established

before an IPO was issued against him.

                                         -6-
                We conclude the issues are unpreserved since there was no request for

a continuance and no objection to the family court conducting the hearing at the

scheduled date and time. In fact, counsel for both parties requested the hearing

proceed despite the family court’s reluctance to do so in Kenneth’s absence. And

Kenneth’s counsel did not assert at that time that Kenneth was not competent or

request further proceedings to resolve issues about his competency before

proceeding with the IPO hearing. In short, Kenneth’s counsel did not raise any

arguments about incompetency to the family court nor did the family court have an

opportunity to rule on their merits, so these issues are not properly preserved. See,

e.g., Curty v. Norton Healthcare, Inc., 561 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Ky. App. 2018)

(purpose of requiring preservation statements is to ensure that issues on appeal

were properly presented to the trial court and that trial court had opportunity to rule

on these issues; lack of preservation can affect the standard of review employed).

                Since these alleged errors are unpreserved and since Kenneth has

requested palpable error review, we review these matters under CR1 61.02.2 CR

61.02 provides that an appellate court may review insufficiently preserved issues

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
 Compare Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26, cited in Appellant’s brief at page
5 to request review for palpable error.

                                            -7-
for palpable error affecting a party’s substantial rights and grant relief if manifest

injustice results from the error.

             Kenneth argues that any waiver of his right to a full evidentiary

hearing before the IPO was entered would have to be clear and knowing. See

generally Clark v. Parrett, 559 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Ky. App. 2018). And he points

out he was not at the hearing to observe the proceedings, assist in his defense, or

offer testimony. Therefore, he argues, he was denied due process, citing Hawkins

v. Jones, 555 S.W.3d 459, 462 (Ky. App. 2018).

             Clearly, the family court conducted a full evidentiary hearing with

extensive witness testimony presented on behalf of both parties – albeit in

Kenneth’s absence. His counsel was present and indicated Kenneth and/or his

parents wished to proceed to resolve the matter despite the family court’s

reluctance to proceed in his absence.

              So, these facts are very different from Hawkins, in which neither the

then-incarcerated respondent nor the respondent’s attorney attended the final DVO

hearing. And little to no evidence was presented at either of the two hearings in

Hawkins. Id. at 461. In contrast to Hawkins, Kenneth’s attorney was present and

offered evidence and argument on his behalf in a lengthy evidentiary hearing.

             Furthermore, conducting an IPO hearing in the respondent’s absence

may not violate due process where the respondent received notice of the hearing

                                          -8-
but voluntarily chose not to attend.3 Kenneth had indisputably received notice of

this hearing and had voluntarily chosen to enter treatment shortly before the

scheduled hearing. Although no one explicitly argued so at the hearing, an

argument could have been made that Kenneth – an adult who had not been

adjudicated incompetent or of unsound mind – was voluntarily absent and chose to

enter treatment a few days prior to the scheduled hearing to avoid the proceedings.

              We recognize that parties in proceedings on petitions for protective

orders are entitled to some basic due process rights such as a meaningful

opportunity to be heard and present evidence. See generally Wright v. Wright, 181

S.W.3d 49, 53 (Ky. App. 2005). But IPO proceedings are not criminal

prosecutions; they are, in fact, civil actions. Parish v. Petter, 608 S.W.3d 638, 641

(Ky. App. 2020). See also Smith v. Doe, 627 S.W.3d 903, 912 (Ky. 2021) (“An

IPO is an order of civil protection and an entry of an IPO against a minor does not

equate to a conviction of a public offense.”).

3
  See Johnson v. Goodrich, No. 2020-CA-0163-ME, 2021 WL 3435447, at *2-3 (Ky. App. Aug.
6, 2021) (affirming denial of CR 60.02 relief despite a party’s absence from underlying DVO
proceedings due to incarceration because the party made no efforts to be present at the DVO
hearing such as filing a motion for transport or to be heard telephonically despite being given
notice of the hearing and distinguishing case from Hawkins v. Jones). We recognize such
unpublished opinions are not binding authority. See Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure
(RAP) 41(A) (effective January 1, 2023). See also former CR 76.28(4)(c) (in effect when this
case was briefed in 2022). However, there appear to be no published cases directly on point
regarding the effects of any voluntary absence of a party from an IPO hearing.

                                              -9-
                Therefore, constitutional provisions pertaining only to criminal

proceedings – including Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution – are not

applicable in this context. And a trial court’s duties are different in civil cases than

in criminal cases. In civil cases (unlike criminal cases), Kentucky precedent

indicates a trial court is under no duty to take unrequested action to protect parties

who have not formally been adjudicated incompetent. Goff v. Walker By and

Through Field, 809 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Ky. 1991). As our Supreme Court

explained:

                       Civil Rule 17.03 requires that a trial court appoint
                a guardian ad litem to defend a defendant of unsound
                mind if the defendant's guardian or committee is
                unwilling or unable to act. Straney v. Straney, Ky., 481
                S.W.2d 292 (1972) holds that the words “unsound mind”
                as used in CR 17.03 are technical words which mean a
                person who has been so adjudicated. The Court of
                Appeals held that while it may have been obvious that
                Thomas Goff was incompetent to aid in his defense, CR
                17.03 did not apply. The fact that Goff was adjudicated
                incompetent six months after trial was considered to be
                of no consequence. The Court of Appeals interpretation
                of CR 17.03 in Straney, supra, is clear and correct.

                       The initiation of incompetency proceedings in the
                district court is pursuant to K.R.S.[4] 387.500. Detailed
                standards and procedures are enumerated in the statute to
                protect the individual to be adjudicated. The letters from
                the two physicians fall far short of the legal adjudication
                of incompetency required by a jury pursuant to statute.
                The potential for abuse in declaring someone
                incompetent in any manner short of the statutory

4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -10-
            requirements is obvious. In this case, the appellees argue
            that the failure to begin incompetency proceedings until
            after trial was a trial strategy on the part of the Goffs in
            order to provide a basis for an appeal.

                   A trial court in a criminal case has a duty to
            conduct a competency hearing upon reasonable belief
            that a criminal defendant is incompetent to stand
            trial. RCr 8.06. Such an inquiry is prior to trial. There is
            no comparable civil rule.

                  If there is a need to adopt a competency
            determination by the trial judge prior to any trial, it
            should be addressed by a new civil rule outlining the
            procedure and the safeguards for all parties in detail.

            ....

                   It is the holding of this Court that the trial judge in
            a civil case, in the absence of a legal adjudication of
            incompetency, has no duty to take steps on his own to
            protect the interests of any defendant other than as
            provided in existing CR 17.03. A party to the litigation
            believing he or she is adversely affected by the apparent
            but unadjudicated incompetence of another party should
            seek relief as the rules provide when a witness is absent
            or unavailable.

Id. See also Smith v. Flynn, 390 S.W.3d 157, 159-60 (Ky. App. 2012); CR 17.03;

CR 25.02; KRS 387.500.

            Despite the concerns noted in Goff, no rule of civil procedure has

since been adopted which addresses pre-trial competency determinations in civil

cases. And no civil rule has been adopted which is similar to RCr 8.06. As the

Supreme Court recognized in Goff, RCr 8.06 does not apply to civil proceedings.

                                         -11-
Neither does KRS 504.100 – cited on page 1 of Kenneth’s reply brief – which is

part of the Kentucky penal code pertaining to criminal prosecutions. Furthermore,

precedent cited by Kenneth to support the proposition that trying an incompetent

person violates due process was a criminal case. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S.

162, 95 S. Ct. 896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975). So, this precedent more specifically

indicates that trying an incompetent person for a criminal offense violates due

process.

             The proceedings here were clearly civil in nature and there was no

clear indication that Kenneth was totally incompetent despite his diagnoses of

schizophrenia or being on the autism spectrum. Further, there was no evidence in

the record that Kenneth was adjudicated incompetent or had a guardian or

committee appointed for him. Also, Kenneth had indisputably recently driven a

car (and thus presumably had a current driver’s license) and he had graduated from

college several years beforehand. So, despite any degree of partial disability, there

was no clear indication of total incompetency. See KRS 387.500(1) and (2)

(recognizing there are different degrees of disability and declaring: “Persons who

are only partially disabled must be legally protected without a determination of

total incompetency and without the attendant deprivation of civil and legal rights

that such a determination requires.”).

                                         -12-
             In sum, there was no duty for the family court to sua sponte order a

competency hearing. Nor has Kenneth cited any authority establishing that the

family court was obligated to deny the requests of counsel for both parties to

proceed with the hearing. And clearly the family court attempted to be fair to both

parties.

             In addition to inquiring about the reasons for Kenneth’s absence and

whether a mental health petition was pending, the family court encouraged the

parties to discuss whether alternate provisions, such as allowing him to be at his

parents’ house but only in the presence of a parent, might suffice. After Ellie

explained how she would still feel unsafe given Kenneth’s going onto her family’s

property unbeknownst to his parents in both December and April, the family court

ultimately decided to retain the 500-foot restriction from her home. But the court

also ordered a mental health assessment for Kenneth, limited the duration of the

IPO to one year rather than the requested three years, and stated an intent to review

the case frequently to see whether mental health providers might recommend steps

to permit Kenneth’s return home while also offering safety and peace of mind to

Ellie.

             The family court’s issuance of the IPO undeniably affected Kenneth’s

substantial rights as it placed restrictions on where he was allowed to go. But any

error did not result in a manifest injustice under the facts of this case. Given the

                                         -13-
reasoning expressed in Goff, the family court was not required to take further

unrequested action to protect Kenneth in the absence of an adjudication or even a

clear allegation of incompetency.

             Though Kenneth now argues the family court should have taken

different steps, which trial counsel did not request at that time, the family court’s

actions were not “shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable” given these facts. Any

unpreserved error did not result in manifest injustice. See Summe v. Gronotte, 357

S.W.3d 211, 216 (Ky. App. 2011). And though we decline to address whether

there might be any reversible error had the issues been properly preserved, there is

no reason to reverse for any unpreserved error in the family court’s proceeding in

Kenneth’s absence without an unrequested competency hearing or continuance

under the facts and circumstances here.

II. No Reversible Error in Finding Stalking with Implicit Threat Occurred

             Next, Kenneth argues the family court erred in concluding that his

actions constituted stalking under the IPO statutes. As Kenneth’s counsel argued

to the family court that Kenneth’s actions did not amount to stalking under the IPO

statutes, this issue is preserved for review. We review the family court’s factual

findings on this issue for clear error and its decision to enter an IPO for abuse of

discretion. See Gomez v. Gomez, 254 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Ky. App. 2008) (DVO

                                          -14-
appeal). See also Smith, 627 S.W.3d at 908 (noting statutes governing IPO and

DVO proceedings are interpreted similarly).

             Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Halloway v. Simmons, 532

S.W.3d 158, 161 (Ky. App. 2017). Questions of statutory interpretation and

application are questions of law subject to non-deferential de novo review.

Adamson v. Adamson, 635 S.W.3d 72, 77 (Ky. 2021).

             IPO proceedings are governed by statutes in KRS Chapter 456, which

refer to statutes defining stalking crimes in KRS Chapter 508. “Following a

hearing ordered under KRS 456.040, if a court finds by a preponderance of the

evidence that dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or stalking has occurred

and may again occur, the court may issue an interpersonal protective order . . . .”

KRS 456.060(1). According to KRS 456.010(8), “‘Stalking’ refers to conduct

prohibited as stalking under KRS 508.140 or 508.150, or a criminal attempt,

conspiracy, facilitation, or solicitation to commit the crime of stalking[.]”

             KRS 508.140(1)(a) defines the crime of stalking in the first degree as

including conduct consisting of intentionally stalking another person and making

an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to put the other person in reasonable

fear of sexual contact, serious physical injury, or death. KRS 508.150 defines the

crime of stalking in the second degree as including conduct consisting of

intentionally stalking another person and making an explicit or implicit threat with

                                         -15-
intent to put the other person in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury,

or death.

             KRS 508.130(1) defines stalking for purposes of KRS 508.130 to

KRS 508.150 as follows:

             (a) To “stalk” means to engage in an intentional course of
                 conduct:

                    1. Directed at a specific person or persons;

                    2. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, or
                       harasses the person or persons; and

                    3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.

             (b) The course of conduct shall be that which would
                 cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental
                 distress.

A course of conduct consists of two or more acts “evidencing a continuity of

purpose.” KRS 508.130(2).

             Construing these statutes together, this Court has set forth the

petitioner’s burden of proof for obtaining an IPO for stalking as follows:

             To summarize, for an individual to be granted an IPO for
             stalking, he or she must at a minimum prove by a
             preponderance of the evidence that, an individual
             intentionally engaged in two or more acts directed at the
             victim that seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or
             harassed the victim, that served no legitimate purpose,
             and would have caused a reasonable person to suffer
             substantial mental distress, and that these acts may occur
             again. KRS 508.130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the
             individual must prove that there was an implicit or

                                         -16-
              explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in
              reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or
              death. KRS 508.150.

Halloway, 532 S.W.3d at 162.

              Kenneth argues there is insufficient evidence that his actions were

intentional due to his mental health issues. But though his parents testified to his

diagnoses and his history of mental illness, he had not been adjudged incompetent

and he does not point to any evidence that his actions were not intentional.

Generally, a person presumably intends “the logical and probable consequences of

his conduct[.]” Saint Joseph Healthcare, Inc. v. Thomas, 487 S.W.3d 864, 871

(Ky. 2016).

              Kenneth also argues his words and actions were not threatening. We

agree there appears to be no evidence of explicit verbal threats based on our review

of the language used by Kenneth in his recorded oral messages and Facebook

messages. But the family court orally stated a finding on the record that there was

an implicit threat of sexual contact in Kenneth’s “comments and texts” (apparently

referring to messages left on the security system and Facebook messages which

Ellie saw on her phone).

              Kenneth cites for our consideration an unpublished case in which a

protective order was reversed based on some similar conduct not amounting to

stalking with threats. But that case is not binding authority. RAP 41(A); former

                                          -17-
CR 76.28(4)(c). Furthermore, unlike here, the respondent in that case did not go to

the petitioner’s home after she made clear that contact was unwanted, but instead

spoke to the petitioner at public places in addition to sending unwanted though not

explicitly threatening text and email messages.5

               Ellie contends that this case is more akin to a reported case in which

an IPO for stalking was affirmed based partly on evidence of the respondent’s

unwanted entries into the petitioner’s home in addition to other facts. See Calhoun

v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Ky. App. 2017). In the present case, there is no

evidence of Kenneth having actually gone into Ellie’s home. But there is certainly

evidence of his apparently attempting to enter her home wholly uninvited and then

repeatedly coming onto her front porch later despite being told by others to stay off

Ellie’s family’s property and leave her alone.

               Ellie admitted to not having spoken or otherwise directly

communicated with Kenneth for around five years. So, obviously she had not

directly told him any contact was unwanted. However, there was evidence that

5
 See Martin v. Connelly, No. 2018-CA-001728-ME, 2019 WL 6998651, at *1 (Ky. App. Dec.
20, 2019) (“The communication at issue in this action involves relatively benign social
encounters in public places and emails and texts that, while undesired, were not implicitly or
overtly threatening.”). See also id. at *6 (“[T]he parties’ face-to-face encounters were all in
public places . . . . There was no evidence that Martin attempted to isolate Connelly during these
encounters, that he followed her out of the events, or that he ever tried to contact her at her home
or work. His contact with Connelly was limited to a series of brief encounters in public and to
email and text messages.”).

                                               -18-
Ellie’s and Kenneth’s parents communicated about Ellie being scared after the

December incident and wanting to be left alone and that Kenneth’s parents and

police told Kenneth to stay off Ellie’s family’s property and leave her alone.

Leaving aside any hearsay or similar concerns (which were not preserved by

objection), there was evidence which indicated Ellie’s not desiring contact with

Kenneth had been conveyed to him – albeit not directly from Ellie.

             Kenneth argues that his actions were akin to that of a college student

unsuccessfully trying to get a date with another student by sending flowers and

Facebook messages and receiving no response. But that argument ignores other

evidence such as that of his apparent attempt to enter her home (uninvited) at

midnight. Ellie testified to the security system videorecording showing Kenneth

opening the storm door and “jiggling the handle to get in” and then punching in

numbers in the keypad. In sum, we cannot say that the evidence, as a whole,

compels a finding that his actions were simply the unwanted but non-threatening

gifts and communications of a person professing unrequited affection.

             Similarly, in both Calhoun and the instant case, there was evidence of

the respondent continuing to try to contact the petitioner after the petitioner made

clear – albeit indirectly here – that any contact was unwanted. See id. However,

the facts in Calhoun are somewhat different as there was also evidence that the

respondent damaged the petitioner’s car tire so she could not leave.

                                         -19-
             We affirmed the IPO in Calhoun, determining that the statutory

requirements for issuing an IPO for stalking were met. We specifically held that

the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of implicit threat of physical injury

or death by damaging her car. Id. Although we did not expressly state so in

Calhoun, surely the respondent’s unauthorized entries into the petitioner’s home

could also support an inference of an implicit threat of death, physical injury, or

sexual contact. And here, the evidence of an apparent attempt to enter Ellie’s

home at midnight could also support an inference of an implicit threat of death,

physical injury, or sexual contact.

             Furthermore, the family court’s oral finding of an implicit threat was

supported by the family court’s written findings of fact – which explain how the

combination of his actions implicitly conveyed a threat placing Ellie in reasonable

fear for her safety:

             -Last December [Kenneth] went to [Ellie’s] front door in
             the middle of the night and tried to get in. [Ellie’s]
             family told his [Kenneth’s] parents immediately and
             called the police. [Kenneth’s] father testified he and the
             police told [Kenneth] not to go back over to [Ellie’s]
             house.

             -Then in April, [Kenneth] came to her house on three
             occasions in one day leaving flowers and talking to her
             security camera every time and telling he loved her and
             has always loved her, would be her protector etc. He
             looked directly at the camera every time like he was
             talking directly to her, in addition to mumbling to

                                         -20-
himself. He brought two different bouquets of flowers
and then left her a gold rose on third trip to the door.

-He has also messaged her on Facebook Messenger.
They are not friends and [she] has never accepted his
requests but [she] can see the messages he sends her.
They appear sexual in nature and imply that [Kenneth]
has been at least watching [Ellie] and imagining some
kind of interaction or relationship between them.

-Due to this [Ellie] is afraid to leave her house to walk to
her car or go outside. When her parents are home, she
has to call neighbors to watch her walk to her car etc.
This week when his car returned to the house next door
she was so afraid she locked herself in her home and
called the police.

[Kenneth] diagnosed [sic] with schizo effective [sic]
disorder and on the autism spectrum. He has completed
high school and college. He is currently living in an
apartment. He has frequently gone missing from his
parents [sic] care requiring missing persons reports and
golden alerts and they have not communicated with
[Ellie] or her family about that to give them a heads up.
Sometimes [Kenneth] has “episodes” both on [and] off
his medication. His parents have had to place a tracker
on his car to ensure they know his whereabouts.

-Parents testified they believed that if he stayed on his
meds they could control his behavior and [it] would be
safe for him to live in the home; however, the repeated
incidents with regard to [Ellie] while on his medication,
and the multiple times they have had to call police when
he has gone missing, makes it clear they can not.

       Court finds that [Kenneth] engaged in a pattern of
behavior that placed [Ellie] in reasonable fear for her
personal safety and served no legitimate purpose. Court
further finds that given [Kenneth’s] mental health
concerns, his apparent fixation with [Ellie], and his

                            -21-
              families [sic] inability to prevent or stop the contact the
              Court finds further acts of stalking may occur and an
              Order is necessary to protect [Ellie].

              Essentially, though the language employed by Kenneth in messages is

not explicitly threatening, the family court found an implicit threat based on the

context in which the messages were made and non-verbal events such as the

apparent attempt to enter Ellie’s home uninvited at midnight. Furthermore, these

findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, including Ellie’s testimony.

              Ellie testified that she and Kenneth were next door neighbors but

otherwise had no relationship and had not even spoken for around five years. She

also testified that Kenneth had threatened a neighbor about five years ago.

Kenneth’s mother testified to remembering him having feelings for a neighbor and

some sort of trouble ensuing which the families worked out without going to court

though Kenneth’s parents did not recall him making any threats.6

              Ellie testified that Kenneth’s apparent attempt to enter her house in

December through punching numbers in the security pad occurred around

6
  Parties’ parents’ testimony about Kenneth’s alleged prior communications with or feelings
toward the neighbor might pose hearsay concerns. See generally Kentucky Rules of Evidence
(KRE) 802 et seq. However, no issues about hearsay were raised on appeal and neither party has
drawn our attention to any objections to this testimony on hearsay or other grounds.

                                            -22-
midnight. Also, she testified he had mumbled something in his recorded messages

in April about “protection” – which she construed as referring to birth control.7

She testified that she believed Kenneth was making a request for sexual contact in

asking whether she was one of “those females” in a Facebook message. And she

testified that his message inquiring about the meaning of her smiling, frowning,

and shrugging scared her because she believed it indicated he was watching her

somehow though she could not see him at the time. There was also testimony

about their houses being located in such a way that perhaps Kenneth could have

seen into a window in her house from his house.

               Though there may be some question whether language about “one of

those females” referred to sexual activity on an objective rather than subjective

basis, the family court’s finding an implicit threat was made is not clearly

erroneous. Regardless of the lack of direct explicit threat in Kenneth’s language,

evidence of his apparent attempt to enter Ellie’s home uninvited at midnight and

his returning there three times months later, despite being told not to do so, could

support an inference of implicit threat. Similarly, his message recounting

7
  We are aware that Kenneth’s trial attorney and his mother believed there was an alternate
explanation for the mention of “protection” – that Kenneth perceived that Ellie’s visiting friends
(strangers to him) posed a threat to her and that he was offering to provide protection to her from
this perceived threat. Nonetheless, the Ellie’s testimony about hearing Kenneth mumble
something about protection in a recorded message and perceiving this to possibly refer to birth
control was some evidence supporting an implicit threat of sexual contact.

                                               -23-
observing Ellie smiling, frowning, and shrugging, which might suggest that he was

watching her, could also support an inference of implicit threat.

             While perhaps another fact-finder might not construe these words and

actions as implicitly threatening, we must defer to the family court’s assessment of

the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses despite any conflicts in

the evidence. And we can only disturb its factual findings if not supported by

substantial evidence. See Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003); CR

52.01. See also Gomez, 254 S.W.3d at 842.

             There was substantial evidence supporting the family court’s finding

of stalking, with implicit threats, which might occur again. Furthermore, we

discern no abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law in the family court’s

concluding the requirements of KRS 456.060 were met and deciding to issue the

IPO.

             Further arguments raised in the parties’ briefs which are not addressed

herein lack merit or relevancy to our resolution of this appeal.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Fayette Family Court’s

judgment.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -24-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

John Gerhart Landon       Christopher A. Spedding
Lexington, Kentucky       Lexington, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT             ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:            FOR APPELLEE:

John Gerhart Landon       Christopher A. Spedding
Lexington, Kentucky       Lexington, Kentucky

                        -25-