Court Opinion

ID: 9830959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:39:40.474661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:53.488487
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In plaintiff’s motion for rehearing he challenges an expression used-by us in the original opinion, wherein we undertook to give a brief résumé of his pleadings and said: “That at the time of said conveyance (from defendant to plaintiff,, sought to be cancelled) Felts did not have-title or possession, but he had previously conveyed the Bell County property to Sam and William Townsend, by general warranty deed, on November 23rd, 1900, and that the Townsends then and there -took possession of said land and have since that time been in possession of same. That plaintiff had no knowledge of said conveyance, and was an innocent purchaser for value.”
Plaintiff contends that he did not allege that “he was an innocent purchaser for value.” He in fact did not use those words in the amended pleading upon which the case was tried. His language in this respect was: “Plaintiff alleges and shows to-the court that at the time the said deed (from defendant to plaintiff) was executed and delivered to him, and the consideration paid, that superior and paramount title to said land was and had been, for nearly thirty-five years, in William Townsend and Samuel Townsend, the said defendant having conveyed the said land to said William Townsend and Samuel Townsend by his. warranty deed, duly executed on the 23rd day of November, A. D. 1900, which deed now appears of record in Vol. 431, page *690194, Records of Deeds of Bell County, Texas * * *.
“Plaintiff respectfully shows that he had no knowledge or notice of such superior and paramount title at the time of the execution and delivery of said deed * *
The undisputed evidence showed that these allegations were true. The Townsend deed was not of record and plaintiff had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, of its existence, and that he paid a valuable consideration for the conveyance by defendant. From all this we summarized the allegations by saying plaintiff alleged that he “was an innocent purchaser for value.”
The terms, “innocent purchaser for value”, and “bona fide purchaser”, are synonymous. The expressions are used interchangeably and mean the same thing, insofar as this case is concerned. A bona fide purchaser, as described in 43 Tex.Jur., p. 620, sect. 365, is “one who buys real estate in good faith, for a valuable consideration, and without actual or constructive notice of an outstanding equity or an adverse interest or title.” See, also, the many authorities cited by that text.
We abbreviated the allegations in the interest of time and space. We think we did no violence to plaintiff’s allegations, since they alleged all the elements embraced within the meaning of innocent purchaser. Plaintiff has dwelt at length upon this point in his motion, and we feel that in fairness to his contention, this much should be said.
Plaintiff insists that we have viewed this appeal from an erroneous conception of the real merits of his case, in that we have held the outstanding deed to the Townsends, which was not recorded and of which he had no knowledge or notice, would not defeat his title taken from defendant at the time of the conveyance to him, but that if he could recover at all it must be upon proof and a finding that'defendant’s title had been taken away by limitation prior to the time they made their trade. He says, in fact, the prescription title has no place in the case and the sub-’ mission of that issue to the jury was unimportant, and therefore the manner in which it was submitted was immaterial. With this we cannot agree. In addition to the reasons set out in our original opinion as to why that issue • was improperly prepared and submitted, this further reason is apparent. The conveyance from defendant to plaintiff was made on February 4th, 1927; the case was tried on March 7th, 1938. The inquiry made by the issue was, had the Townsends controlled, used, occupied and enjoyed the Bell County land since 1900? The form of the inquiry covered all time up to the date of the trial. The answer was in the affirmative. This answer could have been true, and the period of occupancy could have been more than ten years, even though it had. continued only since the date of the conveyance on February 4th, 1927, to the date of the trial. Such an adverse possession would not, in any event, have been chargeable to defendant.
We have carefully studied all the assignments of error presented by plaintiff in his motion, and believe they are without merit. With these explanations, we believe the motion should be overruled, and it is so ordered.