Court Opinion

ID: 9787153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:11:33.573343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:52.772598
License: Public Domain

Justice RICE,
dissenting:
The majority holds that in this case, the statements made by the defendant on November 26 and November 29 were involuntary and therefore were properly suppressed by the trial court under the Fifth Amendment. Because I believe that the defendant's statement given on November 29 was made voluntarily, I cannot join the majority opinion. In my view, the record does not support the trial court's determination that the defendant's confession on November 29 was an involuntary product of a threat by the police. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A. Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment prohibits admission of a defendant's involuntary statement. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made the statement voluntarily in order for a challenged statement to be admitted. People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 211 (Colo.1998); People v. Gennings, 808 P.2d 839, 843 (Colo.1991). In doing so, the prosecution must demonstrate that coercive government conduct did not play a significant role in inducing a defendant's confession. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-67, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986); Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211; Breidenbach, 875 P.2d 879, 891 (Colo.1994); Gennings, 808 P.2d at 843.
A challenged statement may be suppressed as involuntary under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine if the statement is made as a result of a constitutional violation. People v. Lewis, 975 P.2d 160, 170 (Colo.1999); People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174, 1180 (Colo.1992). Attenuation is an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Lewis, 975 P.2d at 170; Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1180; People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 590-91 (Colo.1981). The attenuation exception allows the admission of evidence when the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Lewis, 975 P.2d at 170.
We have previously held that any alleged illegal taint may be purged by demonstrating the voluntariness of a later confession. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 892; Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1180. The ultimate test of volun-tariness is whether the individual's will has been overborne. Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211; *1228People v. Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo.1990). Generally, when determining whether a defendant's statements were voluntary, a trial court must consider the totality of the cireumstances, including the following factors: (1) whether the defendant was in custody or was free to leave and aware of his situation; (2) whether Miranda warnings were given prior to any interrogation and whether the defendant understood and waived his Miranda rights; (3) whether the challenged statement was made during the course of an interrogation or instead was volunteered; (4) whether any overt or implied threat or promise was directed to the defendant; (5) the method and style employed by the interrogator; and (6) the defendant's mental and physical condition immediately prior to and during the interrogation, as well as his educational background, employment status, and prior experience with law enforcement and the criminal justice system. Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211; Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 891; Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844.
Three particular factors must be considered in conjunction with these general factors when determining whether a defendant's statements are sufficiently voluntary as to dissipate any alleged illegal taint: (1) the time between statements; (2) the change in place of interrogations; and (8) the change in identity of the interrogators. Breidenbach, 875 P.2d at 892; Thomas, 839 P.2d at 1181. We have further recognized that the presence of intervening cireumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are also relevant under this inquiry. Lewis, 975 P.2d at 173.
B. The November 29th Interview
In light of these principles, my review of the trial court's findings and the balance of the record in this case persuades me that the defendant's November 29 confession was made voluntarily and was therefore sufficiently attenuated from any alleged illegal taint as to warrant admission. Thus, I disagree with the majority's determination that the defendant's November 29 statement was induced by an alleged ongoing threat by the police that had begun several days earlier. I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proving attenuation under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Applying the relevant factors discussed above, I conclude that the trial court's factual findings and the balance of the record unmistakably demonstrate that the defendant's November 29 confession was made voluntarily.
The record makes clear that at the time of the defendant's November 29 confession, he was not in custody, he was told that he was free to leave, and that his statement was volunteered, rather than made during the course of an interrogation. Indeed, even the majority acknowledges that, "Medina went to the police station both times on his own; each time the police said he was free to leave at any time." Maj. Op. at 1224. Moreover, the trial court's findings demonstrate the deliberateness with which the defendant made his November 29 statement. The trial court found that the day after the November 26 interview, the defendant had left a message with the detective's voice-mail service, requesting to speak with him again. The record indicates that the detective returned the defendant's phone call and that the defendant told the detective at that time that he wanted to speak to him specifically about his previous statement. Finally, the trial court found that on November 29, the defendant had his father drive him to the Lakewood Police Department. Thus, the record indicates that the defendant's November 29 confession was made after he deliberately scheduled a second interview two days in advance.
Indeed, the defendant's November 29 confession occurred three full days after the first allegedly coercive interview.1 During the intervening time between the defendant's first interview and his later confession, the defendant was not in custody and was allowed to return home. There, he had the opportunity *1229to discuss his situation with family members and friends, or to contact an attorney. In fact, the trial court found that during the intervening time frame, the defendant's father had tried to persuade the defendant not to confess. Moreover, the record indicates no continued threats by the police between the November 26 interview and the defendant's November 29 confession.2
Furthermore, the conditions present during the defendant's November 29 confession indicate no coercion. First, according to the trial court, the location of the interview was changed from the interview room used on November 26 to an open cafeteria at the defendant's request. Finally, in contrast to the trial court's findings that the defendant was depressed, tired, and had cried during the November 26 interview, the trial court made no findings as to any deterioration of the defendant's mental state immediately pri- or to or during his November 29 interview. Nor, as the majority acknowledges, does a review of the audiotape recording of the short November 29 interview indicate any police coercion or involuntariness on the part of the defendant. Maj. Op. at 1224 ("Were the record restricted to the November 26 videotape and the November 29 audiotape, we might have concluded that both interviews were voluntary.").
I therefore conclude that neither the trial court's findings, nor a review of the balance of the record demonstrate that the defendant's November 29 statement was made involuntarily.3 There is no indication in the record that the defendant's will had been overborne prior to making his November 29 statement. See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211; Mendoza-Rodriguez, 790 P.2d at 816. Instead, the record clearly demonstrates that the defendant, of his own free will, contacted the detective, prearranged a meeting, chose the meeting place (the open cafeteria), and voluntarily made his confession. I would therefore reverse the trial court's order suppressing the defendant's confession. See Valdez, 969 P.2d at 211 (holding that an ultimate conclusion of constitutional law that is inconsistent or unsupported by evidentiary findings is subject to correction by a reviewing court); Gennings, 808 P.2d at 844 (same); People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732-33 (Colo.1987) (same).
C. Conclusion
In summary, I find that the prosecution met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's November 29 confession was made voluntarily and was therefore a product of his own free will. Thus, I find that the defendant's confession was sufficiently attenuated from any alleged coercive police action to have dissipated any resulting taint. Accordingly, 1 would reverse the trial court's order suppressing the defendant's November 29 confession and therefore respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice COATS join in this dissent.

. Although temporal proximity is generally the least determinative factor, here the significant lapse between the police's allegedly coercive acts and the defendant's confession allowed for intervening circumstances that support the voluntariness of Defendant's statement. See Lewis, 975 P.2d at 174.

. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that "nothing occurred that relieved or removed the taint of the illegality," based on the trial court's finding that, "The officer had done nothing in the interim to reassure Defendant that he would be able to see his child or that he would not review criminal charges against Defendant's wife." Maj. Op. at 1227, 1221. Nothing in the relevant caselaw requires such reassurance by the police to dissipate the taint of previously illegal action. Instead, the presence of other intervening circumstances such as those described above suffice to dissipate the taint of any illegal police action.

. Indeed, the trial court did not subject its findings concerning the November 29 interview to a voluntariness analysis under the relevant factors but instead determined only that, "even though a reasonable person in Defendant's position would have considered himself free to leave the interview, the Court finds coercive governmental conduct of a psychological or mental nature that played a significant role in inducing Defendant's statements of November 29, 2000." (R. vol.I, p. 132). However, in concluding that the defendant's November 26 statements were made under coercion, the trial court engaged in an extensive factor-by-factor voluntariness analysis, focusing on its findings concerning the events surrounding the November 26 interview.