Court Opinion

ID: 9762868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:04.510789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.175302
License: Public Domain

DAVIDSON, Judge
This is an appeal from a misdemeanor conviction for driving, while intoxicated, a motor vehicle upon a public highway, with punishment assessed at a fine of $50 and three days’ confinement in jail.
We are met at the outset with the motion of the state to dismiss the appeal because of the absence of sentence by the trial court. It is the state’s contention that a sentence is now necessary in a misdemeanor case and that it has been so required since the effective date of Chap. 149, Acts of the Regular Session of the 55th Legislature, in 1957, amending Art. 768, C. C. P. Said act will be referred to, hereinafter, as the amendment of 1957.
That part of the act necessary to a determination of the question here presented is as follows:
“If a new trial is not granted, nor judgment arrested in felony and misdemeanor cases, the sentence shall be pronounced in the presence of the defendant . . . .”
*5The only material change in Art. 768, C. C. P., as it existed prior to the amendment is the insertion of the words: “and misdemeanor cases” following the word “felony.”
Appellant insists that the caption to the amendment of 1957 is not sufficient to warrant the conclusion that a sentence was thereafter made necessary in all misdemeanor cases.
The caption to the act reads as follows:
“An Act amending Article 768, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925, relating to credit for time spent in jail between arrest and sentence or pending appeal, so as to make its provisions applicable to misdemeanor cases; and declaring an emergency.”
The Constitution of this state, by Art. 3, Sec. 30, requires that no law shall be passed except by bill, while Sec. 35 of Art. 3 provides that no bill (except general appropriation bills) shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title.
A subject not expressed in the caption renders the act void as to that subject.
It will be noted that the above quoted caption is divided into two parts: The first is descriptive of the statute (Art. 768, C.C.P.) proposed to be amended, while the second gives notice of the amendment proposed, which was to make its provisions relating to credit for time spent in jail “applicable to misdemeanor cases.”
Nowhere therein is notice given or suggested that the law as it then existed with reference to the passage or sentence was to be changed, or that a sentence in misdemeanor cases was to be thereafter required.
The majority of this court feel that it is obvious that the caption to the amendment of 1957 did not authorize the enactment of legislation requiring that sentence be pronounced in misdemeanor cases.
Art. 3, Sec. 35, of our Constitution also provides that “if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act'shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed.
*6Inasmuch as the caption, or title, to the amendment of 1957 made no reference to or gave no notice of any intent, by the proposed legislation, to thereby make mandatory the passage of sentence in misdemeanors, such construction is expressly prohibited because no notice thereof was expressed or contained in the caption.
The conclusion is reached, therefore, that the amendment of 1957 did not require the pronouncement of a sentence in misdemeanor cases. As supporting this conclusion, see: Stum v. State, 151 Texas Cr. R. 436, 208 S.W. 2d 633; Walker v. State, 134 Texas Cr. R. 500, 116 S.W. 2d 1076; and Ex parte White, 82 Texas Cr. R. 85, 198 S.W. 583.
This brings us to a determination of the instant case upon its merits:
The record reflects much ill-feeling and political enmity between appellant and his counsel, on the one hand, and the sheriff and deputies, on the other.
At the outset of the trial, appellant sought to disqualify the sheriff and his deputies from in any way participating in the trial of the case. In his motion, appellant stated that “. . . because of personal and political reasons, the Sheriff of Waller County, Texas, and both of his deputies above named, are so prejudiced against this defendant as to be unable to properly perform their duties in connection with this case.”
Appellant sought to have a constable substitute for and perform in the trial of this case the duties ordinarily incumbent upon the sheriff, and he was permitted to offer evidence in support of his motion.
At the conclusion of that testimony, the motion was overruled, with the following statement:
“If the court believed that the sheriff for any reason would choose biased or prejudiced men against the defendant in the summoning of talesmen, the court would certainly find him to be disqualified or prejudiced, biased; but the court does not believe that even if all of the testimony given that would tend to disqualify the sheriff is true, as a practicable matter and in reality, that the sheriff would be disqualified. The court believes that the sheriff, whatever his views might be, will go out and select tales-men in keeping with his oath.
*7“It has been traditional that the sheriff and deputies wait on the court, and except that the court believes that the sheriff is disqualified to summon the talesmen because of prejudice or bias against the defendant, the court does not feel that an exception should be made to the tradition of the sheriff summoning the talesmen in county court and, accordingly, defendant’s motion is respectfully denied.”
The record further shows that during the trial it became necessary that additional talesmen be summoned. The trial court directed the sheriff to summon additional talesmen.
Appellant sought to have those talesmen discharged, for the reason set forth and shown in support of his motion to disqualify the sheriff.
The names of those composing the jury in this case are shown in the record. Nowhere is it shown, however, that any of those jurors were biased or prejudiced against the appellant or that there existed any fact evidencing their disqualification to serve as jurors.
Regardless of the feeling shown and the charges of prejudice on the part of the sheriff, the appellant was not and could not have been injured thereby if he had a trial before a fair and impartial jury.
So far as this record reflects, the jurors trying the case were fair and impartial and subject to no disqualifications.
There was a sharp issue under the testimony as to the appellant’s guilt. The testimony of the state’s witnesses which the jury accepted was sufficient to warrant the conviction.
No formal bills of exception appear.
The judgment is affirmed.