Court Opinion

ID: 9583376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:38:03.466503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:59.188992
License: Public Domain

NAKAYAMA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority opinion except as to part II.A.2. Because I believe that it is consistent with legislative intent to impose a mandatory term of imprisonment for individuals convicted of a felony in which a firearm was used, I would affirm the circuit court’s denial of Appellant’s petition filed pursuant to Hawai'i Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 40.
The majority opines that the legislative history does not provide a clear indication as to whether “accomplice liability” applies to HRS § 706-660.l(l).1 Majority at 1147. I agree that, on its face, HRS § 706-660.1(1) does not impose enhanced sentencing on those convicted of accomplice liability; however, in viewing the legislature’s intent of enhancing mandatory sentences in an effort to confront the “steadily increasing use of firearms in the commission of criminal activities,” Majority note 8, I would hold that imposing enhanced sentences to those convicted of accomplice liability would be in accordance with the legislature’s stated policy of frustrating the growing trend of crimes involving firearms. Accordingly, I would hold that the sentencing court did not err in sentencing Appellant to a minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to HRS § 706-660.1(1).
The majority concluded that, because there is no “definitive legislative history to the contrary,” those convicted of accomplice liability should not be subjected to enhanced sentencing. I respectfully disagree.
The legislature’s intent in enacting statutes that would deter the use of firearms in the commission of crimes is evidenced by HRS § 702-221(2)(e),2 which, in combination with HRS § 708-840(l)(b),3 permits an accomplice to be charged with robbery in the first degree, even though the accomplice was not armed with a dangerous instrument. This is consistent with the legislative history that firmly demonstrates the legislature’s desire to reduce the growing number of crimes involving firearms. The absence of a statute imposing enhanced sentences on those convicted of accomplice liability should not prevent this court from following the legislature’s pattern of creating barriers to thwart the increasing threat of criminals using firearms while engaged in the commission of a felony. Subjecting accomplices to enhanced sentencing, under the same criteria as those individuals in actual possession of a firearm, would be consistent with legislative intent. Accordingly, I would hold that, imposing enhanced sentences on those convicted of accomplice liability, is consistent with, and not contrary to, the legislature’s policy of discouraging crimes involving firearms.
In reaching its holding, the majority searches for guidance from other jurisdictions, and primarily relies on Dailey v. State, 675 P.2d 657 (Alaska App.1984). However, I would hold that State v. Alexander, 184 N.J.Super. 615, 446 A.2d 1257 (Law Div.1981), a case examined by Dailey, is more appropriate for our jurisdiction. In Alexander, the court held that an unarmed accomplice was subject to a mandatory term where a firearm was used or possessed during the commission of a crime. The court based its decision on the legislature’s intent “to increase the penalties and, therefore, deter commission of serious crimes when accompanied by the use of firearms.” Thus, even though New Jersey did not have a statute imposing enhanced sentences on those convicted of accomplice liability, the Alexander court followed the legislature’s policy of enacting statutes to deter crimes involving firearms, and, consequently, imposed enhanced sentencing on accomplices.
The decisions in accord with Alexander include: Battle v. United States, 515 A.2d 1120 (D.C.1986) (unarmed defendant convicted of aiding and abetting armed person was subject to receiving enhanced sentence); State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979) (unarmed aider and abettor was subject to receiving enhanced sentence); Gammel v. *338State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976) (unarmed accomplice was subject to receiving enhanced sentence); State v. McKim, 98 Wash.2d 111, 653 P.2d 1040 (1982) (unarmed defendant was subject to receiving enhanced sentence if state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew other person was armed with a deadly weapon; circumstantial evidence was admissible to establish such proof); People v. Stevens, 32 Cal.App.2d 666, 90 P.2d 595 (1939).
I would hold that this court should interpret the statute to allow for enhanced sentencing in offenses involving accomplice liability,

. See Majority note 7.

. See Majority note 9.

. See Majority note 2.