Court Opinion

ID: 9763441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:45:17.039951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:43.247421
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s resolution of point of error four. In point of error four, the appellant argues the trial court erred for refusing to submit an article 38.-231 charge.
The appellant contends he was entitled to an article 38.23 charge because there was a fact issue about the reason for the stop that led to his arrest. The officers testified they stopped the defendant because his license plate was not visible. The appellant testified his license plate was visible because it was propped up by a Kleenex box in the back window. See Reynolds v. State, 848 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (when the defendant testified he was not speeding, it created a fact issue regarding the legality of the stop). Thus, the appellant argues, he raised a fact question about the legality of the stop and whether the evidence seized as a result of that stop was obtained in violation of article 38.23.
Before trial, the appellant made a motion to suppress evidence seized by the officers, which the trial court denied. At the charge conference, the appellant asked for an article 38.23 charge. The full exchange between the appellant’s counsel and the trial court is set out in the majority’s opinion, slip op. at 5. Here are parts of that exchange:
I request the following charge be given to the jury. “If you find from the evidence presented that the stop of the vehicle in which defendant was driving on or about November 1, 1991, was done so without reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred, then you will find, you can find that the evidence obtained as a result of that stop is inadmissible as evidence against the defendant in the guilt or innocence, in determining his guilt or innocence. And you may choose not to use such evidence in your deliberations in making your determination as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” That would be my charge, something similar.
The trial court asked the defense counsel, “It is or it isn’t.” To this, the defense counsel simply responded, “I want a charge on 38.23.” The court denied the request.
Article 38.23(a) provides in part:
In any ease where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
(Emphasis added.)
In Turner v. State, 726 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), the Court of Criminal Appeals held the review of an erroneous jury charge can be predicated upon a timely and specific objection to the trial court *518thht there is error in the charge. See Tex. Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp.1993) (“Before said charge is read to the jury, the defendant or his counsel ... shall present his objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection.”) In this case, the appellant made a specific objection and a specific request for the instruction as set out in article 38.23. I would hold the appellant’s objection was timely and specific. I would hold either of the appellant’s requests — the request the appellant dictated into the record or the request for the article 38.23 charge — was sufficient to preserve the error.
First, the majority dismisses the 38.23 charge the appellant dictated into the record because it was an “erroneous variant of an article 38.23 instruction.” The majority does not disclose why the charge was an “erroneous variant,” or how the appellant could have asked for a correct version. If the instruction is erroneous, the appellant in this case, defendants in later cases, and I would like to know why. As a court, we publish our opinions to instruct on the law. We should specifically identify the error in this article 38.23 request so the next defendant who asks for the instruction may make a proper request.2
Next, the majority dismisses the specific request for the article 38.23 charge (“I want a charge on 38.23”) because it was “buried in the discussion of the incorrect charge he dictated.” Not so. The defense counsel’s request was in direct response to a question from the court about the language in the requested instruction. Thus, it was hardly “buried in the discussion.” I would hold that when an instruction is provided by statute, as here, the request for the instruction by name of the statute is sufficient to properly request the instruction.
Last, the majority dismisses the specific request for the article 38.23 charge because the trial court told defense counsel that it would consider the oral request as if it were written. The majority states the “appellant cannot dictate an incorrect variant of article 38.23 charge and later insist that ‘that charge’ was a request for a charge under article 38.23.” The majority’s opinion suggests, but does not come right out and say so, that the trial court permitted the defense lawyer to reduce to writing the oral request, and then denied it. That is not what happened. The trial court merely considered the request that it had already overruled as if it had been made in writing. The majority’s opinion suggests the issue is resolved by the defense lawyer’s reliance on the first request. That is misleading.
If we held the trial court erred in refusing the instruction, the next question would be whether the error caused the appellant harm. Even a defendant claiming fundamental error in his jury charge must show how he was harmed by such error. Almanza v. State, 724 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Pierini v. State, 804 S.W.2d 258, 260 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d). If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the. trial court, then reversal is required if the error is “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant,” which means no more than there must be some harm to the accused from the error. Almanza, 724 S.W.2d at 806. An error which has been properly preserved by objection will call for reversal if the error is not harmless. Id.
If the jury believed the appellant’s version, that the license plate was visible, it could find the stop was not justifiable, and the evidence was not admissible. By this argument, the appellant has shown “some harm.” Black v. State, 491 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex.Crim.App.1973) (the defendant was entitled to the article 38.23 charge, but waived the error because he did not re*519quest a proper charge).3
I would sustain point of error four.

. Tex.Code Crim.P.Ann. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp.1993).

. I have looked high and low in the criminal treatises for a charge on article 38.23 and cannot find one. Some of the treatises I have searched are: P. McClung, Jury Charges for Texas Criminal Practice (1993); M. McCormick and T. Blackwell, Texas Criminal Forms and Trial Manual (Texas Practice 1985); M. Teague, Texas Criminal Practice Guide (1992). In Black v. State, 491 S.W.2d 428, 431 n. 1 (Tex.Crim.App.1973), the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the defendant's article 38.23 instruction, but did not state what the correct instruction would have been.

. I note that in Reynolds, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case to the court of appeals for the court to decide if the refusal to submit the instruction was harmful, after finding a fact question. I do not understand how we could decide it was anything but harmful to refuse to submit an instruction after the court decides there was a fact issue for the jury. Reynolds, 848 S.W.2d at 149. I respectfully suggest the Court of Criminal Appeals was in error in reversing for a harm analysis after finding a fact issue for the jury.