Court Opinion

ID: 9946706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 06:05:41.182912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:40.213199
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    February 29, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 365408
                                                                    Chippewa Circuit Court
MICAH HENRY RICKERD,                                                LC No. 2021-005500-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by leave granted1 his guilty-plea convictions for child sexually abusive
activity, MCL 750.145c(2), and lying to a peace officer, MCL 750.479c(2)(c). The trial court
sentenced defendant to 3 to 20 years’ imprisonment for his child sexually abusive activity
conviction and 1 to 2 years’ imprisonment for his lying to a peace officer conviction. We affirm
defendant’s convictions and sentences, but for the reasons stated in this opinion, we remand to the
trial court to correct defendant’s sentencing guidelines calculation and for amendment of his
judgment of sentence consistent with this opinion.

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In August 2021, defendant used a mobile dating application to message someone he
believed was 14 years old, engaged in sexual conversation, and arranged to meet for sexual
purposes. Defendant set a time and place to meet the individual and drove to that location. When
defendant arrived, law enforcement officers arrested him. Defendant then realized the individual
with whom he spoke on the mobile application was a police officer and not a 14-year-old.

1
 People v Rickerd, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals entered April 27, 2023 (Docket No.
365408).

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        The prosecution charged defendant with accosting, enticing, or soliciting a child for an
immoral purpose, MCL 750.145a, child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2), and two
counts of using a computer to commit a crime, MCL 752.796, MCL 752.797(3)(d), and MCL
752.797(3)(f). In September 2021, the prosecution extended a plea offer to defendant which
included a sentencing agreement of “36 months on the minimum pursuant to People v Killebrew.”2
The offer provided that the prosecution would agree to dismiss all counts except for the child
sexually abusive activity charge and defendant would agree to plead guilty to an added count of
lying to a peace officer, MCL 750.479c(2)(c), and agree to forfeit his vehicle. Defendant accepted
the plea agreement in April 2022.

        At defendant’s plea hearing, the prosecution outlined the plea agreement to the court and
stated that “there’s a binding sentence agreement of 36 months, . . . .” Defense counsel responded:

                [Defense Counsel]: In addition to that, [there is] Killebrew, where
         [defendant] would be capped at 36 months. So that would be his complete
         understanding.

                 The Court: Right. That’s what [the prosecution]—[the prosecution] did say
         that. So it’s a guilty plea to count three and an added count five with a forfeiture
         of a vehicle and a 36-month minimum sentence. Is that correct?

                 [Defense Counsel]: Well, I just want to be clear; the way I explained that
         to my client is the 36 months—yes, 36 months minimum, but the court would not
         exceed that per the agreement. He can get 36 months. That’s how he understands
         the plea.

                [The Prosecution]: Yeah.

                The Court: Right.

               [The Prosecution]: Thirty-six months is the sentence agreement for the
         minimum.

                The Court: Right, that’s correct.

                [Defense Counsel]: Thank you. Thank you.

        Once defendant was sworn in, the trial court stated that defendant appeared before the court
to plead guilty to Count 3 pertaining to sexually abusive material of a child and noted that the
charged offense required registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act.3 The court asked
defendant, “There’s a binding sentencing agreement of 36 months at the time of sentencing . . . .
Is that your understanding of the plea?” Defendant responded, “Yes, your honor.” The court
inquired whether defendant understood that by accepting the two guilty pleas he would be giving

2
    People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189; 330 NW2d 834 (1983).
3
    Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq.

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up several constitutional rights which the court listed. Defendant affirmed that he understood and
that he willingly, knowingly, and voluntarily waived those rights. Defense counsel affirmed that
the trial court stated the plea agreement correctly. Defendant denied that anyone promised him
anything outside the plea agreement and denied that anyone threatened him to get him to plead
guilty. He affirmed that he pleaded guilty to the two offenses because he believed himself guilty
of those offenses. Defendant admitted the factual bases for the offenses. The prosecution and
defense counsel agreed that the court complied with the requirements set forth in MCR 6.302. The
trial court, therefore, advised defendant that it was satisfied and would accept his two guilty pleas
and stated that defendant would return “for imposition of the 36 months . . . .”

        At the sentencing hearing, the trial court asked defendant if he reviewed the Presentence
Investigation Report (PSIR) prepared by the Department of Corrections and whether it comported
with the plea agreement that he entered into including the sentencing agreement. Defendant
affirmed that he had. The court asked the prosecution and defense counsel if they reviewed the
PSIR. Both affirmed that they had. On the child sexually abusive activity conviction, the court
assessed defendant 15 points for Offense Variable (OV) 10 and 5 points for OV 12. The guidelines
scoring calculated the minimum sentencing guidelines range for that conviction at 30 to 50 months.

        Defense counsel provided allocution on defendant’s behalf and noted that the offense
required a 25-year sex registry,4 which counsel described as disproportionate and unfair. Defense
counsel stated that defendant took responsibility and did not desire to withdraw his plea and
understood that he was going to prison for a minimum of three years. The prosecution responded
by describing aspects of defendant’s conduct in seeking to have sexual relations with a 14-year-
old boy. The prosecution asked the trial court to follow the agreement for defendant to serve a
prison term of three years. Defendant added that he felt sincerely sorry for his actions. Defense
counsel asserted that there had not been a 14-year-old boy and that the case involved no victim.
The trial court said that it intended to follow the plea agreement. The court stated that “it was a
voluntary and knowing plea, and I will accept the plea as outlined as directed through the
sentencing agreement as well.” The court sentenced defendant to 3 years to 20 years with credit
for 19 days for his conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2). The court directed defendant to
comply with DNA testing and pay a crime victim assessment fee and court costs and advised him
of his appellate rights.

                     II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii)

        Defendant first argues MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is unconstitutional because it incentivizes
trial courts to convict defendants and impose costs against them, thus undermining a defendant’s
due-process rights. We disagree.

        To preserve an issue challenging the constitutionality of a statute, a defendant must first
raise the issue in the trial court. See People v Sands, 261 Mich App 158, 160; 680 NW2d 500

4
  In so doing, defense counsel referenced the 25-year statutory period of sex-offender registration
required under SORA, MCL 28.725(12), for Tier-II offenders. Under MCL 28.722(t)(iii),
violation of MCL 750.145c(2) is a Tier-II offense.

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(2004). Here, defendant failed to challenge the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) below.
We review unpreserved issues for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. See People
v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “[T]he defendant bears the burden to show
that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error
prejudiced substantial rights, i.e., the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.”
People v Cameron, 291 Mich App 599, 618; 806 NW2d 371 (2011).

       Regarding the imposition of costs after a defendant enters a guilty plea, MCL
769.1k(1)(b)(iii) provides:

               (b) The court may impose any or all of the following:

                                               * * *

               (iii) Until May 1, 2024, any cost reasonably related to the actual costs
       incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the
       particular case, including, but not limited to, the following:

               (A) Salaries and benefits for relevant court personnel.

               (B) Goods and services necessary for the operation of the court.

              (C) Necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of court
       buildings and facilities.

       We “presume statutes to be constitutional unless their unconstitutionality is clearly
apparent and, if possible, the statute is to be construed as constitutional. The burden is on the party
challenging the statute’s constitutionality to prove its invalidity.” People v GR, 331 Mich App 58,
68; 951 NW2d 76 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, defendant argues that no
judge in any case can be presumed to be impartial and that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is facially
unconstitutional. To prevail on a challenge to a statute’s facial constitutionality, the challenging
party must demonstrate that “no circumstances exist under which it would be valid.” Sands, 261
Mich App at 161.

        In People v Johnson, 336 Mich App 688, 692; 971 NW2d 692 (2021), this Court
specifically addressed the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii). This Court held that the
defendant’s due-process rights were not violated because, although the courts may benefit from “a
portion of the revenue generated by court assessments,” they do not have actual control over the
administration of the revenue. Id. at 702. Specifically, a “trial court judge does not have unfettered
discretion with respect to the amount of costs to impose under [MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii)] because
the costs imposed must be reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without
separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case.” Id. at 700 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). Further, there must also be “a factual basis demonstrating that the imposed costs
are reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court.” Id. at 701 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). This Court concluded that the statute “does not provide the trial court with
the authority to increase costs imposed on criminal defendants as a means for generating more
revenue.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court rejected the defendant’s

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argument that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) undermined his due-process rights. Id. at 701. We are bound
by Johnson which established that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is not facially unconstitutional regarding
a defendant’s due-process rights. Therefore, defendant’s argument fails.

        Defendant also argues that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is unconstitutional because it violates
the constitutional separation-of-powers requirement by preventing trial courts from remaining
neutral and impartial. We disagree. In Johnson, this Court considered and rejected this same
argument. This Court concluded that, even though MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) generates revenue,
“nothing in the plain language of the statute directs the flow of money or creates a funding system
for the trial courts.” Id. at 704-705 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant’s
constitutional claim on this ground, therefore, similarly fails.

                                     III. PLEA AGREEMENT

        Defendant argues that he was not sentenced in accord with his plea agreement and claims
entitlement to specific performance of the agreement or resentencing to a 36-month cap on his
sentence. We disagree.

        “In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, it must be raised before and considered
by the trial court.” People v Solloway, 316 Mich App 174, 197; 891 NW2d 255 (2016). Defendant
did not raise the issue in the trial court so it is unpreserved. We review unpreserved issues for
plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763.

        “A trial court is not bound by any sentencing agreement negotiated between a defendant
and the prosecution.” People v Nixten, 183 Mich App 95, 97; 454 NW2d 160 (1990). However,
“once a trial court accepts a plea which was induced by such an agreement, the terms of that
agreement must be fulfilled.” Id. If the agreement is then breached, “a reviewing court has
discretion to choose between vacating the plea or ordering specific performance.” Id.

        In this case, the prosecution extended a plea offer to defendant that included a sentencing
agreement of “36 months on the minimum pursuant to People v Killebrew.” At the plea hearing,
defense counsel initially indicated confusion regarding the terms of the agreement. The record
reflects that the prosecution, defense counsel, and the trial court discussed the matter to clarify the
terms of the sentencing agreement. At the conclusion of that discussion, the parties and the trial
court were of the same understanding that, for his two guilty pleas, the trial court would impose
upon defendant a minimum 36-month prison term for his conviction of violating MCL
750.145c(2). We are not persuaded that, after the trial court clarified the sentencing agreement’s
terms and the parties agreed to those terms, defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to
the 36-month minimum sentence. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to any relief.

                                             IV. OV 10

       Defendant argues the trial court erred by incorrectly scoring OV 10 when determining
defendant’s sentencing guidelines for his child sexually abusive activity conviction. We agree.

       A sentencing issue is preserved for appeal if it is raised at the sentencing hearing. See
People v Chelmicki, 305 Mich App 58, 68; 850 NW2d 612 (2014); see also MCR 6.429(C) (stating

                                                 -5-
a challenge to the scoring of the sentencing guidelines can also be preserved “in a proper motion
for sentencing, or in a proper motion to remand filed in the court of appeals”). In this case,
defendant did not challenge the scoring of OV 10 during sentencing, in a motion for resentencing,
or in a motion to remand filed with this Court. Therefore, this claim is not preserved for appeal
and is reviewed for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at
763.

        OV 10 concerns the exploitation of a vulnerable victim. See MCL 777.40. Fifteen points
are assessed if “[p]redatory conduct was involved” in the exploitation of the victim. MCL
777.40(1)(a). However, “regardless of an offender’s subjective intent, if no vulnerable victim was
in fact placed in jeopardy or exploited by an offender’s actions, OV 10 does not apply.” People v
Russell, 281 Mich App 610, 615; 760 NW2d 841 (2008).

         In Russell, the defendant messaged an individual online who he believed was a 14-year-
old girl named “Kelly.” Id. at 612. However, “Kelly” was actually an adult special agent working
for the Attorney General. Id. The defendant sent “Kelly” nude photographs of himself and
engaged in “explicit sexual conversations.” Id. The defendant then agreed to meet with “Kelly”
in person to engage in sexual activity. Id. The defendant was arrested upon arriving at the meeting
location. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that OV 10 was scored incorrectly because no actual
underage individual was involved in the case, and therefore, no vulnerable victim was exploited.
Id. at 613. This Court agreed and concluded that “points should be assessed under OV 10 only
when it is readily apparent that a victim was vulnerable, i.e., was susceptible to injury, physical
restraint, persuasion, or temptation.” Id. at 615 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus,
because the defendant communicated with an adult special agent and not a real 14-year-old girl,
no “vulnerable victim” was actually jeopardized. Id. This Court concluded that no points could
be assessed for OV 10 under such circumstances. Id.

        The facts in this case are substantially similar to those of Russell. Even though defendant
subjectively believed he communicated with a 14-year-old boy, in actuality, defendant messaged
explicit sexual content to an adult law enforcement agent. As in Russell, defendant’s conduct did
not place any real vulnerable victim in jeopardy. Therefore, the trial court incorrectly assessed
defendant points for OV 10.

       In People v Smith, 319 Mich App 1, 6-7; 900 NW2d 108 (2017), this Court recently
explained:

       In People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276, 285; 505 NW2d 208 (1993), the Michigan
       Supreme Court explained that when a defendant pleads guilty with knowledge of
       the sentence that will be imposed, the defendant’s plea demonstrates that he or she
       agrees that the sentence is proportionate to the offense and the offender. In People
       v Wiley, 472 Mich 153, 154; 693 NW2d 800 (2005), our Supreme Court expanded
       on this rule and indicated that a defendant may enter into a valid plea agreement for
       a sentence exceeding the sentencing guidelines range. The Court explained, “[A]
       defendant waives appellate review of a sentence that exceeds the guidelines by
       understandingly and voluntarily entering into a plea agreement to accept that
       specific sentence.” Id. Nevertheless, the court explained that a trial court must

                                                -6-
       complete the SIR and determine the appropriate sentencing guidelines range “so
       that it is clear that the agreed-upon sentence constitutes a departure.” Id. at 154 n 1.

               In People v Price, 477 Mich 1, 3-4; 723 NW2d 201 (2006), the defendant
       pleaded guilty to a charge of bank robbery, MCL 750.531, pursuant to a Cobbs
       agreement that provided for a minimum sentence within the appropriate sentencing
       guidelines range. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to a minimum
       sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment, which was within the sentencing guidelines
       range as calculated by the court. Id. The defendant subsequently moved for
       resentencing, claiming that the guidelines were incorrectly calculated and that the
       correct sentencing guidelines range was 5 to 21 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 4.
       Our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court incorrectly scored Prior Record
       Variable (PRV) 1 and Offense Variable (OV) 13, and that the guidelines range
       should have been 5 to 21 months’ imprisonment. Id. at 4-5. Therefore, the
       defendant’s sentence was not within the appropriate guidelines range. Id. at 5.
       Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. Id.
       The Court differentiated Price from Wiley and determined that the defendant did
       not waive his objection to the scoring of the guidelines because “the court and
       defendant did not reach an agreement for a specific sentence.” Id. at 3 n. 1. Instead,
       the Court explained, the “defendant generally agreed to a sentence within the
       guidelines range however the trial court ultimately calculated it.” Id.

        This case is akin to Wiley in that defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to a specific
sentence for his conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2). Therefore, he waived appellate review
of that specific sentence by understandingly and voluntarily entering into a plea agreement to
accept that specific sentence. Nevertheless, defendant is entitled to have his sentencing guidelines
range properly calculated. Smith, 319 Mich App at 6.

        For his conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2) (a Class B offense), after properly
assessing 0 points for OV 10, defendant’s total OV score would be adjusted down to 5 points.
Defendant’s uncontested Prior Record Variable (PRV) score of 12 and a total OV score of 5 points
would place defendant within the cell of the Class B sentencing grid for OV Level I. See MCL
777.63. This would reduce defendant’s minimum sentence guidelines range from 30 to 50 months
to 24 to 40 months. See MCL 777.63.5 Accordingly, defendant is entitled to have the trial court
perform a ministerial correction of the guidelines minimum sentence range calculation for his
conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2). We remand for that limited purpose. Defendant,
however, is not entitled to resentencing.

                                   V. SORA REGISTRATION

        Defendant argues that he is not subject to registration under SORA because the trial court
did not follow statutory procedures regarding the registration requirements. We disagree. Because

5
 The 36-month sentence was within the corrected sentence guidelines range, so the scoring error
did not affect substantial rights.

                                                 -7-
this issue is unpreserved, we review for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. See
Carines, 460 Mich at 763.

         SORA establishes specific procedures that must be followed after a defendant is convicted
of a listed offense. See MCL 28.724(1). MCL 28.724(5), in relevant part provides:

       an individual convicted of a listed offense in this state after October 1, 1995 . . .
       shall register before sentencing, . . . for that listed offense or that other felony. The
       probation agent . . . shall give the individual the registration form after the
       individual is convicted, explain the duty to register and accept the completed
       registration for processing under section 6. The court shall not impose sentence . . .
       until it determines that the individual’s registration was forwarded to the
       department as required under section 6.

MCL 28.726, provides:

               (1) The officer, court, or agency registering an individual or receiving or
       accepting a registration under section 4 or receiving notice under section 5(1) shall
       provide the individual with a copy of the registration or notification at the time of
       registration or notice.

              (2) The officer, court, or agency registering an individual or receiving or
       accepting a registration under section 4 or notified of an address change under
       section 5(1) shall forward the registration or notification to the department in a
       manner prescribed by the department immediately after registration or notification.

MCR 6.427(9) requires that a judgment must contain the conditions incident to the sentence.

         In People v Nunez, 342 Mich App 322, 325; 994 NW2d 824 (2022), the defendant was not
given a SORA registration form after he entered his plea, the judge did not discuss the defendant’s
SORA registration during sentencing, and the judgment of sentence did not reference SORA.
After the defendant was later released from jail, a prosecuting attorney mailed him a letter stating
that he must register under SORA. Id. at 325-326. The defendant registered himself as instructed.
Id. at 326. The defendant then moved to enforce the judgment of sentence, which the trial court
denied. Id. at 327. On appeal, the defendant argued that, because the trial court failed to follow
several procedural requirements regarding his SORA registration, he was entitled to be removed
from the sex-offender registry. Id. at 327-328. The Court first noted that “SORA requirements
constitute punishment,” specifically resembling those punishments of “shame and parole.” Id. at
333. This Court stated that, “[b]ecause SORA is a punitive collateral consequence of the
conviction of certain crimes, a defendant must be informed of its imposition before entering a
guilty plea.” Id. at 334. Likewise, “the registration requirement must be included in the judgment
of sentence.” Id. This Court stated that “the failure of the trial court to adhere to the statutory-
notice requirement and to include SORA registration in the judgment of sentence prevents any
belated application of SORA to [the defendant].” Id. The Nunez Court concluded that, because
the trial court failed to adhere to both of these statutory requirements, “[the defendant] had no duty
to register absent the district court’s compliance with these requirements.” Id. at 335.

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        In this case, defendant pleaded guilty to child sexually abusive activity in violation of MCL
750.145c(2), a listed offense under MCL 28.722(t)(iii) that requires SORA registration. At the
outset of defendant’s plea hearing on June 28, 2022, the trial court noted that the then-pending
charged offenses included a Tier-III offense under SORA. The parties and the trial court did not
engage in discussion regarding SORA and proceeded to discuss the plea agreement’s terms and
defendant’s knowing and voluntary waiver of rights, and his pleading guilty to the two offenses
set forth in the plea agreement. The trial court accepted defendant’s plea and informed defendant
that he must return for sentencing several weeks later. Defendant’s PSIR indicates that, in that
interim period between his plea and his sentencing, defendant completed his SORA registration
on August 11, 2022.

        At defendant’s sentencing hearing on September 27, 2022, defense counsel raised SORA
registration in passing, objecting only on the ground that it seemed disproportionate and unfair.
Defense counsel, however, declared that defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea and
awaited sentencing. The trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentences for defendant’s
convictions. The record indicates that the trial court entered a judgment of sentence on September
27, 2022, then entered an amended judgment of sentence on October 28, 2022, and again entered
an amended judgment of sentence on November 8, 2022. None of the judgments of sentence stated
that SORA registration was a condition incident to defendant’s sentence.

        The record in this case indicated that it is distinguishable from Nunez. The only similarity
is that the trial court failed to state in the judgment of sentence that SORA registration was a
condition incident to defendant’s sentence. In all respects, the record indicates that the trial court
complied with the procedures required by SORA. The record indicates that defendant, his counsel,
and the trial court knew of defendant’s SORA registration requirement. Moreover, the record
reflects that defendant fulfilled that obligation by registering over a month before his sentencing.
Nunez does not permit the conclusion that the failure to state in the judgment of sentence that
SORA registration was a condition incident to defendant’s sentence voids defendant’s SORA
registration or his statutory duty to comply with SORA registration requirements. Accordingly,
we are not persuaded that defendant is entitled to such relief. Nevertheless, we remand to the trial
court to amend defendant’s judgment of sentence so that it states along with his sentences for his
convictions and his forfeiture of his vehicle that SORA registration was a condition incident to
defendant’s sentence.

      We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences, but for the reasons stated in this opinion,
we remand to the trial court to correct defendant’s sentencing guidelines calculation and for
amendment of his judgment of sentence consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                              /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                              /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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