Court Opinion

ID: 9755189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:29:23.950226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:21.692800
License: Public Domain

Clii'I’OKD, J.,
(concurring). I am in agreement with the result achieved by my colleagues but do not subscribe to the theory upon which the decision is based. It springs from the majority opinion in State v. Sweeney, 40 N. J. 359 *126(1963), which held defendant could be convicted of “operating” his automobile if there was evidence from which thé trial court could clearly infer that defendant intended to move the vehicle. I believe this amounts to a distortion of the meaning of “operate” and results in an unwarranted extension of N. J. S. A. 39:4-50 (a) so as significantly to erode the requirements for conviction under this gmisi-eriminal legislative enactment.
Justice Francis’s dissenting opinion in Sweeney properly interprets “operate” for purposes of this statute. He believed, as I do, that the act should be construed strictly in view of its penal character. His opinion contains a painstaking review of the legislative history, not undertaken -or even adverted to in any of the other opinions in either the Appellate Division or this Court in the -instant case or Sweeney. A tracing of that history leads to the ineluctable conclusion that an automobile is not being operated within the contemplation of the statute unless it is in motion on the roadway.
If the legislature wanted to create an offense of such broad boundaries as set out by the majorities in Sweeney and this case, then it could easily have said so in clear and unmistakable terms. While I am constrained to observe that the social policy implicit in the Court’s opinion strikes me as a wholesome and salutary one, I do not join in today’s' judicial reapproval thereof because it is not in keeping with my reading of the legislative intent.
There is something uncannily prophetic about Justice Francis’s apprehension of the effect of Sweeney, for he said:
“Under my colleagues’ view if an intoxicated person gets into an automobile, sits in the driver’s seat and starts tbe motor, be is guilty of operating tbe vehicle while under tbe influence of intoxicating liquor. Tbe mere act of making tbe motor run, even though tbe brake remains on and the gear shift in park position, is' sufficient to convict. Thus, a person under' the influence, who starts the motor to tahe advantage of the heater-on a cold night, or-perhaps to use the radio without running down the battery, while he waits for the appearance of someone else, or perhaps while'he'waits to recover his *127sobriety, or for other conceivable reasons, may be found guilty of operating the car. Such suggestions can be made the butt of much caustic or sardonic humor, but just as the public deserves protection against the drunken driver, no individual should be convicted as such a driver or operator unless he fits the description established by the Legislature.” 40 N. J. at 363 (emphasis supplied).
[I] t seems to me, on the whole record of the statute under consideration, that the legislative intent was to ban driving on the roadways of the State while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. A stationary vehicle is not being operated in the sense required for conviction; nor was the purpose of the act to make proof of an unexecuted intent to drive (operate) sufficient to convict of the offense specified therein.” 40 N. J. at 367 (emphasis supplied).
I would not let the result in. the ease sub judice turn on a determination as to whether the Sweeney test has been satisfied, particularly on an interpretation of the record below as to Daly’s “intent.” While he may have demonstrated an obvious need for a lesson in manners, civilized discourse, or, at the very least, diplomacy in dealing with a law enforcement official, he was not “operating” or “driving” his automobile inasmuch as it was not in motion, irrespective of his intent. Accordingly, I vote to affirm the Appellate Division’s reversal of the judgment of conviction.
I am authorized to indicate that Pashman, J., joins in this opinion.