Court Opinion

ID: 9460330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:47:29.387257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:34.635801
License: Public Domain

MULLIGAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The issue before us is whether an alien who obtains entry into this country by falsely claiming United States citizenship, can qualify as “an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry,” within the meaning of Section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C § 1251(f). An alien “otherwise admissible” is shielded from deportation despite his fraudulent entry if “he is the spouse, parent, or a child of a United States citizen.” Mr. and Mrs. Reid, the petitioners here, are admittedly aliens and citizens of British Honduras. They did enter the United States at Chula Vista, California, falsely posing as American citizens. They have since become the parents of two sons who were born here and are citizens of the United States. There is no contention and indeed no evidence that they were not “otherwise admissible at the time of entry.” They therefore literally fulfill the requirements of the statute, and yet the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has ordered their deportation and has persuaded a majority of this court to dismiss the petition to review the order. I do not agree and must dissent.
INS has taken the position that the protection of the statute is extended only to those aliens who present themselves as aliens with fraudulent visas. Otherwise, we are advised, the elaborate system of visa issuance might be eroded. The difficulty with this position, which has been adopted by the majority, is of course that the statute makes no such distinction and the only other court to face the identical question has ruled that there is no such distinction. Lee Fook Chuey v. INS, 439 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1971).1 The statute is not limited to *261fraudulent visa-bearers but in so many words applies to those persons who have “procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation.” (emphasis added).
Although the language of the statute is clear, the majority opinion, which apparently concedes that the Reids are literally within its protection, seeks to avoid the provision, invoking the shades of Learned Hand for the general proposition that it is somewhat dangerous to read the language of a statute literally. It is at least equally dangerous to take Learned Hand literally, without examining the problems of construction involved in the case he was deciding.2 Even the quoted excerpt from Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944), indicates that Judge Hand was referring to an “unforeseen situation,” not contemplated by the draftsmen of the statute. He still observed that the words employed are “by far the most decisive evidence” of the intent of the authors.
I cannot possibly imagine, in any event, that it was unforeseen that an alien might seek to gain entry to the United States by posing as a citizen. The alien can secure admission fraudulently either with a visa procured by misrepresentation or by falsely posing as an American citizen. The latter alternative could not realistically have been overlooked by the Congress and the language of the statute covers both situations.
In support of the position of INS, the majority argues that the Supreme Court “apparently” had the Hand principles of statutory construction in mind when it refused to apply Section 241(f) literally in INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 87 S.Ct. 473, 17 L.Ed.2d 318 (1966). If the Court had the Hand “principles” in mind in that case, it concealed that fact from all but the clairvoyant. The Court made no secret of its approach to the statute when it decided that an alien who misrepresented his status for the purpose of evading quantitative quota restrictions, was nonetheless entitled to the protection of Section 241(f). The Court eschewed a literal interpretation which would have been fatal to the alien’s case because it found that the major purpose of the statute was humanitarian — the preservation of family ties and the family unit. The Court also stated that a statute mandating deportation must be construed in favor of the alien :
Even if there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien. As this Court has held, even where a punitive section is being construed :
“We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile, Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 68 S.Ct. 10, 92 L.Ed. 17. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.” Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433.
See also Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-643, 74 S.Ct. 822, 98 L.Ed. *2621000. The 1957 Act was not a punitive statute, and § 7 of that Act, now codified as § 241(f), in particular was designed to accomplish a humanitarian result. We conclude that to give meaning to the statute in the light of its humanitarian purpose of preventing the breaking up of families composed in part at least of American citizens, the conflict between the circuits must be resolved in favor of the aliens, and that the Errico, 9 Cir., 349 F.2d 541, decision must be affirmed and the Scott, 2 Cir. 350 F.2d 279, decision reversed.
385 U.S. at 225, 87 S.Ct. at 480.
In sum, the canons of construction applied by the Supreme Court in Errico are not conjectural but are explicit and support the position of the Reids here. I submit that the statute is clear and that no construction is necessary at all. In Errico, the Supreme Court avoided a literal reading of Section 241(f) because it would thwart the humanitarian purposes of the statute.3 Here, a literal reading of the statute concededly supports the position of the Reids and fully comports with the humanitarian purposes of the legislation. I therefore fail to understand how Errico now compels a construction which would contort the plain language of the statute and thwart its humanitarian purposes.
The majority opinion appeals to the legislative history of Section 241(f) for support of the thesis that the congressional intent was not to waive the essential substantive or procedural steps to which an alien must submit in order to obtain a visa. Of course, legislative history is “a legitimate aid to the interpretation of a statute where its language is doubtful or obscure .... But when taking the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the court, extraneous aid like this can not control the interpretation.” Wisconsin R. R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 257 U.S. 563, 589, 42 S.Ct. 232, 237-238, 66 L.Ed. 371 (1922) (citation deleted); accord, Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1314 (2d Cir. 1973).
I find the language lucid but in any event I find nothing in the legislative history to support the suggested dichotomy. Section 241(f) by its terms applies to aliens who have “procured entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation.” This is the clause the majority has excised from the statute. The term “entry” into the United States is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). “The term ‘entry’ means any coming of an alien into the United States . .” (emphasis added). This definition does not say visa-bearing alien; it says any coming of an alien. The Reids’ entry is within the statute and there is no ambiguity compelling resort to legislative history.
Moreover, the historical excursion in my view is fruitless. I have found nothing in the available legislative history to support the proposition now sought to be advanced by the majority. Even the emphasized language of Senator East-land’s statement set forth in the majori*263ty opinion refers to fraudulent misrepresentations in connection with visa applications or admission into the United States. Aside from the total silence with respect to any design to reserve the protection of the statute to visa-bearing aliens, there is language in the legislative history which the Supreme Court referred to in Errico4 indicating that the principal beneficiaries of the law were Mexican nationals who were able to avoid border restrictions. If the Congress had in mind the so-called “wet back”, entrants, then it is difficult to comprehend that it intended only visa-carrying entrants.5 In short, I see no evidence of any congressional intent at odds with the clear language of the statute. As Judge Friendly observed about the majority position in his dissenting opinion in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 491 (2d Cir. 1960): “[T]he voice so audible to them is silent to me.”
Aside from this, I cannot accept the argument that the Reids here, by the “brazen” statement that they were citizens of the United States, thus frustrated the screening processes of INS. If they are this porous, then the solution is a tightened security and not the mutilation of Section 241(f).
The argument of the majority that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a) supports the position that Congress intended to limit the benefits of Section 241(f) only to those aliens who admitted alienage, is not persuasive. While Section 1225(a) does not mandate the interrogation of returning United States citizens, the section does provide in part that “any immigration officer . . . shall have power to administer oaths and to take and consider evidence of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States . . . . ” (emphasis added). See also United States ex rel. Lapides v. Watkins, 165 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1948). Moreover, the pertinent INS regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 235.-1(b), provides:
U.S. citizens. A person claiming U.S. citizenship must establish that fact to the examining immigration of*264ficer’s satisfaction and must present a U.S. passport if such passport is required under the provisions of 22 CFR Part 53. If such an applicant for admission fails to satisfy the examining immigration officer that he is a U.S. citizen, he shall thereafter be inspected as an alien, (emphasis added).
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a); Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law & Procedure § 3.2 (1973).
It is also significant that 8 U.S.C. §. 1361 cited by the majority as part of the screening process permitting the detention of aliens and casting upon them the burden of proving admissibility is not limited to visa applicants. It provides:
Whenever any person makes application for a visa or any other document required for entry, or makes, application for admission, or otherwise attempts to enter the United States, the burden of proof shall be upon such person .... (emphasis added).
In short, INS is not helpless in the face of a claim by an alien that he is a United States citizen. If he is suspected of being an alien, he must be inspected as an alien. I fail to see how recourse to Sections 1225(a) or 1361 advances the position of the majority by a jot or a tittle.6 The blunder7 of the constable here results, in effect, in the deportation of the petitioners as well as their native-born American sons.
I indeed agree that an alien who applies for a visa in advance of his entry into the United States is more readily investigated than one who poses as an American citizen at the point of entry. But this point is not raised in the legislative history and is not mentioned in the statute.8 The administrative inconvenience to INS in making a post hoc investigation' of the Reids’ qualitative admissibility is rile minimis, in my view, in contrast to what the dismissal of this petition accomplishes.
Mr. and Mrs. Reid are both gainfully employed in this country, have never been arrested since arriving and belong to no subversive organizations. There is no hint or suggestion that they are or have been qualitatively deficient in any of the categories mentioned by the majority. They have, moreover, become the parents of two native-born American boys who, by reason of their infancy (now ages 2 and 4), have no alternative but involuntary exile. The sins of the father are now literally visited upon the sons. I had thought that this was what the statute was designed to avoid.
At his deportation hearing, the petitioner Reid was asked if he had any*265thing to say before the proceedings were closed. His answer was:
I have got something to say, but I don’t know whether it’s going to make any difference. On the back of the form you say to show reason why you should not be deported. We have plenty reason why we shouldn’t be deported. For one we have two kids and if we are deported we ain’t got no home to go back to. Everything we had was abandoned. Taking two kids back there like sending two kids to die from malnutrition.
Even if the statute were ambiguous, I think it should be construed in favor of the Reids and their infant native-born sons. Where they are literally' within its protection, as the majority admits, recourse to a supposed principle-of construction which makes clear language suspect is neither convincing nor persuasive. I believe there is “plenty reason” to set aside the order of deportation and I emphatically dissent from the holding of the majority.

. I do not overlook Bufalino v. INS, 473 F.2d 728 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928, 93 S.Ct. 2751, 37 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973), cited by the majority for the proposition that the Tlm-d Circuit has held that Section 241(f) is inapplicable to an alien’s reentry into the United States on a false claim of citizenship. Judge McLaughlin’s opinion, containing the language relied upon, expressed his view only. The separate concurring opinion of Judge Adams, concurred in by Judge Van Dusen, dismissed the petition for review there on other grounds and specifically found it unnecessary to determine the applicability of Section 241(f). See 473 F.2d at 739 n. 4.

. We must read statutes “literally” just as we must so read the opinions of courts. We do it everyday. It is only when a literal reading would lead to some absurdity or gro-tesquerie that we are free to do otherwise. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 70, 106-107 (1819). Otherwise, of course, we would be anticipating Orwell by exactly a decade, and could sympathize with More’s Utopians, who would have no lawyers amongst them since they considered it our profession to disguise matters.

. In addition, the Court stated that “the administrative authorities have consistently held that § 241(f) waives any deportation charge that results directly from the misrepresentation regardless of the section of the statute under which the charge was brought- . . . . ” 385 U.S. at 217, 87 S.Ct. at 476. In support of this statement the Court cited the opinion of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Y-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 143 (1959).
In Matter of Y-, the Board held that Section 7 of the 1957 Act required termination of the deportation proceedings where the alien had entered this country by misrepresenting himself as an American citizen and the ground for deportation was entry without inspection. In Matter of K-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 585 (1962), the Board reached a similar result under Section 241(f). The Board adhered to this position following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brrico, Matter of Lee, 13 I. & N. Dec. 214 (1967), but the Attorney General, overruling the Board, ordered Lee deported, 13 I. & N. Dec. 214, 218 (1969). The Ninth Circuit, however, did not find the Attorney General’s opinion persuasive and reversed. Lee Fook Chuey v. INS, 439 F.2d 244 (1971).

. The Supreme Court stated :
The only specific reference to the part of § 7 that deals with close relatives of United States citizens or residents is in the House Committee Report, and it says only that most of the persons eligible for relief would be
“Mexican nationals, who, during the time when border-control operations suffered from regrettable laxity, were able to enter the United States, establish a family in this country, and were subsequently found to reside in the United States illegally.” H.R.Rep.No.1199, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 11.
Without doubt most of the aliens who had obtained entry into the United States by illegal means were Mexicans, because it has always been far easier to avoid border restrictions when entering from Mexico than when entering from countries that do not have a common land border with the United States. There is nothing in the Committee Report to indicate that relief under the section was intended to be restricted to Mexicans, however. Neither does it follow that, because Mexicans are not subject to quota restrictions, therefore nationals of countries that do have a quota must be within the quota to obtain relief. 385 U.S. 223-224, 87 S.Ct. 479-480.

. Since Errico, surreptitious entrants have been held not to be within Section 241(f). However, Monarrez-Monarrez v. INS, 472 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1972), and Gambino v. INS, 419 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905, 90 S.Ct. 2195, 26 L.Ed.2d 559 (1970), cited by the majority as “functionally” similar to the circumstances of this case and inconsistent with Lee Fooh Ghuey, are readily distinguishable. Gambino involved a “stowaway,” which this court considered to be a special type of alien, and moreover, at the time of his entry (1921) Gambino was excludable as a stowaway. Judge Smith termed the part of the legislative history relating to Mexicans as “ambiguous.” The INS in its brief here employs the same adjective. In any event, the courts have disregarded it since it does conflict with the language of the statute. Accordingly, in Monarrez-Monarrez, a surreptitious entry (concealment in an auto trunk) was not considered by the court to be entry gained by “fraud or misrepresentation,” and on this basis the court distinguished Lee Fooh Ghuey.

. The quarantine inspection provided for in 42 C.F.R. §§ 71.136 to 71.141 and referred to in the majority opinion is applicable to persons entering the United States and is not limited to aliens. Even 42 C.F.R. Part 34 providing for medical examination of aliens applies to all aliens not simply visa applicants.

. The precise nature of the fraud employed here at entry is not clear. The Reids represent that “[a]t the time of their entry each of them, in response to a question from the Immigration Officer on duty, indicated that he was an American citizen, either by an affirmative answer or by - remaining silent.” The INS has not challenged this representation.

. Ben Huie v. INS, 349 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1965), relied upon by the majority involves 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2) which in substance authorizes the deportation of aliens who enter the United States without inspection. The alien there apparently did not qualify under Section 241(f) which is in issue here. The Ninth Circuit’s later opinion in Lee Fook Chuey makes the proper distinction. 439 F.2d at 249. See also Cabuco-Flores v. INS, 477 F.2d 108, 110-111 (9th Cir. 1973), which indicates that Section 241(f) is determinative. Goon Mee Heung v. INS, 380 F.2d 236 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975, 88 S.Ct. 479, 19 L.Ed.2d 470 (1967), also relied upon in the majority opinion, involves a request for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 and again does not mention Section 241(f) which is in issue here. The distinction between deportation which involves humanitarian considerations and adjustment of status or naturalization was made by this court in Yik Shuen Eng v. INS, 464 F.2d 1265, 1267-1268 (2d Cir. 1972).