Court Opinion

ID: 9582675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:30:09.323613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:11.298992
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, Miller and Snead, JJ.,
dissenting.
Buchanan, J.:
The majority opinion holds that the trial court correctly submitted *568to the jury the issue whether the signals at the crossing were adequate, and properly instructed the jury that the driver of the car was negligent as a matter of law. We. dissent from the proposition that the driver of the automobile was negligent as a matter of law. In our judgment the question of the driver’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury in this case, as it was in No. 4813, ante, and it was reversible error for the court to decide that question.
To hold that the driver was negligent as a matter of law is inconsistent with the holding that the negligence of the defendants was a question of fact to be decided by the jury. If as a matter of fact the warning signals were not adequate, they were so because they did not give adequate warning of the approaching train under the existing conditions; and if the driver was not adequately warned then he should not be held guilty of negligence as a matter of law for failing to see or hear an inadequate warning. While the negligence of the driver was not imputable to the plaintiff’s decedent, yet the instruction that the driver was negligent as a matter of law was bound to have affected the conclusion of the jury on the question of the negligence of the defendants, interrelated as the two questions were.
Not only were the two instructions inconsistent, but it was also wrong under the evidence to tell the jury that the driver of the automobile was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. As we pointed out in our dissent in No. 4813, this could be so only if reasonable men could not differ as to what was proved by the evidence and the reasonable inferences from the evidence. In our opinion the evidence, in this case, even more strongly than the evidence in No. 4813, makes the question of the negligence of the driver of the automobile, as well as the negligence of the Railway Company, one that should be decided by the jury and not by the court.
We shall not repeat here the discussion of the evidence in No. 4813. As stated in the majority opinion, the evidence in this case was the same as the evidence in that, with certain additions. We note the following features of the additional evidence in the present case not included in the majority opinion:
State Trooper Davis testified that the crossing was slightly higher than the roadway and in order to see the signals you have to look up instead of straight ahead. He said that the situation of the houses north of the crossing and west of the road required the motorist to come to a very slow speed to get a good view of eastbound trains, *569and in his seven years’ experience in patrolling this crossing he would approach it with extra caution at any time.
State Trooper Pace said he was familiar with the crossing and exercised more caution at it than at others because of its nature. He also pointed out that on the south side of the crossing there were open fields on each side of the road.
Leo, who stopped his car on the south side of the track, testified that he was a licensed airplane pilot. He said he jammed on his brakes the very moment he saw the signal light and stopped 20 or 25 feet from the crossing. He said that just one signal red fight was all that he saw and that it “was a rather small red light.” He said that the road was wet and the fog was dense at the crossing when he stopped and that the only thing he could see of the train as he approached was the headlight. He said that the automobile did not change its course or reduce its speed; that the train struck it on the right rear approximately at the gas tank and the car exploded.
Thus it is that in this case in addition to the evidence in No. 4813 we have these important facts with respect to the adequacy of the wigwag signal: (1) The Railway Company’s supervisor of signals, whose jurisdiction included this crossing, testified that the wigwag signals at the crossing were installed in 1941, fifteen years before this accident happened; that traffic had increased since then; that due to the amount of traffic and the more modern character of the installation (and hence the safer as the jury could conclude) he had recommended in 1954 and 1955 that automatic crossing gates and flashers be installed at this crossing; and (2) that the wigwag signal was the only sign or signal that apprised defendants’ witness Leo, who approached the crossing from the south, where there were no obstructions to his view, that he was near a railroad track and that a train was coming; that this wigwag signal was of such type that he was within 50 to 100 feet of the crossing before he saw it, and by jamming on his brakes the very moment he saw it he was able to stop at 20 to 25 feet from the crossing.
In the face of these facts, and from the evidence of the State Troopers, the police officers and others, as to the character of this crossing and how close it was necessary to be to it on that night even to see a burning automobile, it is beyond us to understand how it may properly be said that there was no negligence on the part of the Railway Company that had anything to do with this accident *570and that as a matter of law the sole cause of this accident was the negligence of the driver of the automobile.
The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence in this case that the driver of this automobile did not know this crossing was there; that he could not see the crossarm signal any sooner than did Trooper Davis, who had the aid of the lights from the burning automobile and other vehicles and still could not see it until he was within 50 feet of the crossing. The jury could conclude that the driver had no reason to look between the houses as he approached a crossing he did not know was there; that even if he saw the headlight through the fog after he passed the houses, he would not immediately realize it signaled the approach of a train on a track he had not seen. The jury could further conclude that if and when the driver saw the “rather small light” which was the only thing that caused the witness Leo to stop, he could have been closer to the crossing than the 50 to 100 feet from which Leo saw the crossing signal; or that his reflexes and reaction were not as quick as those of Leo, who had to “get on the brakes awfully quickly” and stopped within 20 or 25 feet of the tracks. If he was going 25 miles an hour, as the fireman thought when he saw his lights between the houses, it would have required more than the 59 feet specified by Code § 46-212.2 (now § 46.1-195, Acts 1958, ch. 541 at p. 732) for him to have stopped on the wet road with four passengers in the car. The jury could conclude that the first notice the driver had of the presence of the crossing and the approach of a train was from the crossing signal, which was inadequate to give him timely warning, and that if he had then tried to stop he might or might not have avoided the collision. He would not be responsible for a mistake of judgment and a failure to act with wisdom and promptness in the emergency if he was not at fault. Perlin v. Chappell, 198 Va. 861, 866, 96 S. E. 2d 805, 809; Ivory Storage Co. v. A.C.L.R. Co., 187 Va. 857, 873, 48 S. E. 2d 242, 251.
The fact that he got into a position of danger “is not conclusive evidence that he was there by his own negligence. He may have been there in consequence of the defendants’ negligence, and because he was misled by it.” Kimball & Fink v. Friend, 95 Va. 125, 138, 27 S. E. 901, 903; Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R. Co. v. Freeman, 192 Va. 400, 408, 64 S. E. 2d 732, 736.
We pointed out in our dissent in No. 4813 the error in the statement, appearing again in the majority opinion in the present *571case, that this driver was the only one of the operators of four automobiles approaching the crossing “who failed to heed the multiple warnings.” Leo was the only driver who stopped because of the signals. McCoy and Carey stopped because they saw the train on the crossing. Nobody testified as to when or why the Buick stopped.
It is our opinion that this case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial because of the error in instructing the jury that the driver was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.