Court Opinion

ID: 9575374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:13:23.063457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:09.602146
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I concur in the judgment only of the reversal of the grant of summary judgment against appellant. I dissent to the majority’s failure to grant summary judgment for the appellant against appellee, Gold Bazaar. Appellant’s delivery of her ring to appellees and appellees’ acceptance of the ring as alleged in Count 1 of her verified petition constituted a bailment. See OCGA § 44-12-40; Davidson v. Ramsby, 133 Ga. App. 128, 131 (5) (210 SE2d 245) (1974). No disclaimer or abandonment by appellant of her negligent bailment theory of recovery is shown by the record. As bailees, appellees were under a duty to exercise care and diligence to protect appellant’s ring and to keep it safe. OCGA § 44-12-43. Once a bailor has proved loss or damage to property while it is under the control of the bailee, (i.e., the bailee’s failure to return the property or the return of property in a damaged condition), there is a presumption that the bailee was negligent. OCGA § 44-12-44. To rebut this evidentiary presumption the bailee must negate every inference of negligence on his part, as the presumption in itself is sufficient to support a verdict in favor of the bailor. Camp v. T. E. Cline, Inc., 141 Ga. App. 328, 329 (1) (233 SE2d 280) (1977); Red Cross Laundry v. Tuten, 31 Ga. App. 689 (2, 3) (121 SE 865) (1923).
In this case it is undisputed that the ring that appellant entrusted to appellee Gold Bazaar Retail, Inc. (Gold Bazaar) was not returned to her. Therefore the evidentiary presumption in her favor under OCGA § 44-12-44 applies and appellees were required to negate every inference of negligence on their part to sustain their motion for summary judgment. Camp, supra at 329 (1). Appellees submitted as evidence only the statement that the ring was stolen by third parties outside their control. No evidence was presented of the circumstances surrounding the theft, the safety precautions followed by appellees in the care of valuable property, or any other security measures taken by *315appellees. I find appellees’ evidence insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence and thus I would reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellees. OCGA § 44-12-44; Haynie v. A & H Camper Sales, 233 Ga. 654, 655 (212 SE2d 825) (1975).
The evidence requires not only that the grant of summary judgment to appellees be reversed but it also mandates that summary judgment be granted in favor of appellant against appellee Gold Bazaar on the issue of liability on her bailment claim, Count 1 of her complaint. Gold Bazaar admitted that it received the ring from appellant and that the ring was stolen while in its possession. By failing to present any evidence whatsoever regarding its diligence in safekeeping the ring (i.e., locking it in a safebox, limiting the people who had access to it, etc.), Gold Bazaar has utterly failed to rebut the evidentiary presumption that it was negligent. OCGA § 44-12-44. Because appellee Hyman denied receiving appellant’s ring there remains a question of fact whether a bailment was created as between appellant and Hyman. However, no such question of fact exists regarding Gold Bazaar. Therefore appellant is entitled to summary judgment against Gold Bazaar on the issue of liability on the bailment count of her complaint and I would reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for summary judgment as to that party. See United States Security Whse. v. Brooks, 115 Ga. App. 834, 835 (5) (156 SE2d 217) (1967).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Carley join in this dissent.