Court Opinion

ID: 9571319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:48.887802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:17.875993
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
For all the reasons stated in my dissent in State v. Hansen, Iowa, 203 N.W.2d 216, 223-225, and the additional reasons set out infra, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
In Hansen, Instruction 14, was Iowa Uniform Instruction 520.8. Instruction 11 here is identical with this added paragraph :
“You are instructed that despite the permissible inference from the blood test, the burden remains at all times upon the State to establish each and every element of the crime and the crime itself beyond a reasonable doubt and the burden remains at all times upon the *584State to go forward with the proof of all matters in issue in the case. There is no burden upon the Defendant in a criminal case.”
The majority in the five to four opinion in Hansen interpreted the instruction as putting the burden of proof to disprove an element of the charged crime on defendant. The added paragraph here clearly eliminates such an interpretation.
In State v. Jiles, 258 Iowa 1324, 1338, 142 N.W.2d 451, 460, we say: “These words (inference or presumption) may, in the mind of the scholar, involve some fine legalistic distinctions, but to the average person their meaning is neither so veiled nor uncertain as to require a definition. (Citations).”
Having this knowledge and the addition to the uniform instruction before them I am unable to agree the jury was led to believe a burden of producing rebuttal evidence was put on defendant. The majority gives appeal counsel the benefit of a hypercritical analysis of Instruction 11.
We have repeatedly said:
“* * *. It is probably true that no instruction or charge to a jury has ever been drawn with such perfect clearness and precision that an ingenious lawyer in the seclusion and quiet of his office with a dictionary at his elbow cannot extract therefrom some legal heresy of more or less startling character. The real test of the meaning and effect of an instruction for the purpose of review by an appellate court ought to be, and we think is, the idea which the language objected to is fairly calculated to convey to the minds of jurors drawn from the ordinary walks of life; and the fact that upon a minute technical or hypercritical analysis some other interpretation can be placed thereon may be disregarded. * * *.” Law v. Bryant Asphaltic Paving Co., 175 Iowa 747, 753, 157 N.W. 175, 177, 178, 7 A.L.R. 1189; Skalla v. Daeges, 234 Iowa 1260, 1270, 15 N.W.2d 638, 643; Hicks v. Goodman, 248 Iowa 1184, 1189, 85 N.W.2d 6, 8; Leaders v. Dreher, Iowa, 169 N.W.2d 570, 575.
I would affirm.
UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ., join this dissent.