Court Opinion

ID: 9915928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 01:00:37.656008+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:58.927969
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30112      Document: 00517025287           Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/08/2024

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                      FILED
                                                                              January 8, 2024
                                    No. 23-30112                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                      Clerk

   In re In the Matter of the Complaint of N&W Marine
   Towing, L.L.C., as Owner of M/V Nicholas, its engines,
   tackle, appurtenances, furniture, etc., for
   Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability

   Trey Wooley,

                                             Plaintiff—Appellee—Cross Appellant,

                                         versus

   N&W Marine Towing, L.L.C., as Owner of M/V NICHOLAS, its
   engines, tackle, appurtenances, furniture, etc., praying for exoneration from or
   limitation or liability,

                                            Petitioner—Appellant—Cross Appellee,

                                         versus

   Royal Caribbean Cruises, Limited,

                                                                          Defendant,

   ______________________________
Case: 23-30112     Document: 00517025287          Page: 2    Date Filed: 01/08/2024

   Trey Wooley,

                                             Plaintiff—Appellee—Cross Appellant,

                                       versus

   N&W Marine Towing, L.L.C.; Nicholas M/V; Ascot
   National Specialty Insurance Company; Starr
   Indemnity & Liability Company,

                               Defendants—Appellants—Cross Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                   USDC Nos. 2:20-CV-2390, 2:21-CV-150
                  ______________________________

                 ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          Because no member of the panel or judge in regular active service
   requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc, see Fed. R. App.
   P. 35; 5th Cir. R. 35, the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED. Our
   prior panel opinion, 83 F.4th 329 (5th Cir. 2023), is WITHDRAWN, and
   the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED therefor:
          Trey Wooley filed a state court action against N&W Marine Towing
   (N&W) and others based on injuries Wooley suffered while serving as a
   deckhand on the Mississippi River. Wooley did so despite a district court
   stay order entered pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851, see 46

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                                       No. 23-30112

   U.S.C. § 30511(c).1 One of the other defendants removed the case, citing
   federal diversity and admiralty jurisdiction. Weighing Wooley’s motion to
   remand, the district court determined that N&W was improperly joined,
   dismissed N&W on that basis, and then, considering the properly joined
   parties, concluded that it had diversity jurisdiction and denied remand.
          As they did before the district court, the parties on appeal contest
   whether this case belongs in state or federal court. N&W contends that,
   regardless of whether it was nondiverse from Wooley, and even if it was
   improperly joined in Wooley’s state court lawsuit, Wooley’s claims against
   N&W should remain in federal court because they arise under that court’s
   admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Wooley cross-appeals, taking the
   opposite tack. For the following reasons, we conclude that the district court
   properly dismissed N&W from this action, retained the case, and then,
   because no other defendants remained, dismissed the case itself.
                                            I.
          We detailed much of this case’s voyage in the court’s prior opinion,
   In re N&W Marine Towing, LLC, 31 F.4th 968 (5th Cir. 2022) (Wooley I). We
   repeat relevant facts and procedural history as necessary.
          On August 31, 2020, N&W filed in federal district court a verified
   complaint in limitation, Case No. 2:20-cv-2390 (the Limitation Action),

          _____________________
          1
              Effective December 23, 2022, code sections of the Limitation Act were
   renumbered. 46 U.S.C. § 30505 was renumbered as 46 U.S.C. § 30523, and 46 U.S.C.
   § 30511 was renumbered as 46 U.S.C. § 30529. For consistency in this case, we use the
   prior statutory section numbers; the relevant statutory text did not change.

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                                            No. 23-30112

   pursuant to the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 (Limitation Act)2 and Rule
   F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.3
           The Limitation Act provides that once a shipowner brings a limitation
   action “all claims and proceedings against the owner related to the matter in
   question shall cease.” 46 U.S.C. § 30511(c); see Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp.
   R. F(3) (similar). The court where such an action is filed “stays all related
   claims against the shipowner pending in any forum,” and all claimants must
   “timely assert their claims in the limitation court.” Magnolia Marine Transp.
   Co. v. Laplace Towing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992).
           The complaint filed in N&W’s Limitation Action alleged that on
   February 29, 2020, the M/V Nicholas, which is owned by N&W, was towing
   six barges up the Mississippi River when the wake of a cruise ship, the Majesty
   of the Seas, caused one of the Nicholas’s face wires to break. While the
   Nicholas headed towards the riverbank, another face wire broke. The M/V
   Assault and its crew came to aid the Nicholas in mending the face wires, at
   which time a deckhand on the Assault, Trey Wooley, injured his hand.

           _____________________
           2
             The Limitation Act allows shipowners to “bring a civil action in a district court
   of the United States for limitation of liability.” 46 U.S.C. § 30511(a). The law permits
   shipowners to limit their liability to “the value of the vessel and pending freight” for a
   variety of “claim[s], debt[s], and liabilit[ies]” that might arise from vessels’ activities so
   long as the incident giving rise to liability occurred “without the privity or knowledge of
   the owner.” 46 U.S.C. § 30505(a)–(b); see Wooley I, 31 F.4th at 970–71 (collecting cases).
           3
               In pertinent part, Rule F reads:
           Upon compliance by the owner with the requirements of subdivision (1) of
           this rule all claims and proceedings against the owner or the owner’s
           property with respect to the matter in question shall cease. On application
           of the plaintiff the court shall enjoin the further prosecution of any action
           or proceeding against the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property with respect
           to any claim subject to limitation in the action.
   Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. F(3).

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          In September 2020, the district court issued the following Stay Order
   in accordance with § 30511(c) and Rule F:
          The commencement or further prosecution of any action or
          proceeding against [N&W], their sureties, their underwriters
          and insurers, or any of their property with respect to any claims
          for which [N&W] seek[s] limitation of liability herein,
          including any claim arising out of or incident to or connected
          with personal injury, loss or damage allegedly caused, arising
          out of, or resulting from incidents which occurred on the
          Mississippi River at approximately mile marker 86-87 on
          February 29, 2020, as described in the [Limitation Action]
          Complaint, be and the same is hereby stayed and restrained
          until the hearing and determination of this proceeding.

   Wooley, Turn Services (Wooley’s employer), and Royal Caribbean Cruises
   (RCC) (owner of the Majesty of the Seas) all filed claims against N&W in the
   Limitation Action. N&W filed counterclaims against Turn Services and
   RCC.
          On January 8, 2021, the Stay Order in effect, Wooley filed a Petition
   for Damages in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, Case No. 2:21-cv-150 (the State
   Court Petition). Wooley named N&W, the Nicholas, RCC, the Majesty of the
   Seas, and several insurance companies as defendants. Wooley asserted that
   the state court had jurisdiction pursuant to the saving to suitors clause, see 28
   U.S.C. § 1333(1),4 and alleged that (1) Turn Services was the Jones Act
   employer of Wooley while Wooley worked on the Assault; (2) N&W, the

          _____________________
          4
              28 U.S.C. § 1333 provides, in relevant part:
          The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
          of the States, of:
          (1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in
          all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.

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                                     No. 23-30112

   Nicholas, and RCC negligently caused the accident injuring Wooley; and
   (3) N&W and RCC were liable to Wooley under “general maritime law
   and/or maintaining unseaworthy vessels.”
          RCC removed the State Court Petition to federal district court,
   asserting diversity jurisdiction and, in the alternative, “admiralty tort
   jurisdiction” pursuant to § 1333(1). The district court consolidated the now-
   removed State Court Petition with the Limitation Action. Wooley moved to
   bifurcate, which the district court denied. Wooley also moved to remand.
          On August 8, 2021, before the district court had ruled on his motion
   to remand, Wooley moved to stay the Limitation Action and lift the
   injunction against proceeding in state court. Wooley stipulated that he would
   not seek to enforce any judgment in excess of the value determined in the
   Limitation Action in accordance with § 30511 and Rule F. Wooley further
   stipulated that the federal court “ha[d] exclusive jurisdiction and authority
   to determine all issues relevant to [N&W’s] claim for limitation of liability.”
          On August 27, 2021, the district court determined that these
   stipulations “adequately protect[ed] N&W’s absolute right to limit its
   liability in the federal forum,” and it granted Wooley’s motion to stay the
   Limitation Action, allowing him to proceed with the prosecution of his
   saving-to-suitors claims.    N&W filed an interlocutory appeal, and we
   affirmed, noting that “our precedents require district courts hearing
   limitation actions to lift a stay against proceedings in other forums when a
   claimant makes the appropriate stipulations.” Wooley I, 31 F.4th at 974
   (citing Odeco Oil & Gas Co., Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th
   Cir. 1996), In re Two “R” Drilling Co. Inc., 943 F.2d 576, 578 (5th Cir. 1991),
   and In re Tetra Applied Techs. L P, 362 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2004)). Because
   we agreed Wooley’s stipulations passed muster, we concluded that the
   district court did not abuse its discretion.

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             On February 15, 2023, nearly two years after Wooley filed his motion
   to remand, the district court denied it. The court found that “Wooley
   blatantly violated [its] Stay Order” by naming N&W in the State Court
   Petition, and therefore N&W was “improperly joined.” As a result, the
   district court dismissed N&W from the case. Even though Wooley and
   N&W were each a citizen of Louisiana, and thus nondiverse, the court
   determined that the “state court suit ha[d] no legal effect as to N&W,” and
   “removal was proper because there was complete diversity between Wooley
   and the properly joined State Court defendants.”5
             After dismissing N&W from the case, no claims remained live in the
   State Court Petition because Wooley had previously settled his claims against
   the other defendants. Therefore, the district court severed Wooley’s State
   Court Petition from the Limitation Action and dismissed it without
   prejudice. The district court retained jurisdiction over the Limitation Action
   but stayed and administratively closed it to allow Wooley to pursue any viable
   claims against N&W in Louisiana state court pursuant to the saving to suitors
   clause.
             N&W and Wooley both appeal. Seeking to remain in federal court,
   N&W raises several issues, namely whether: (1) a case is removable if it
   contains “general maritime law claims” filed in violation of the district
   court’s stay order; (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying
   Wooley’s motion to remand; (3) the district court erred in dismissing N&W
   and the State Court Petition after lifting the Stay Order; and (4) admiralty
   jurisdiction provides an independent basis for removal after the 2011

             _____________________
             5
             Even though RCC initially removed the case based on diversity or, alternatively,
   admiralty jurisdiction, the district court appeared to make no finding as to admiralty tort
   jurisdiction.

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                                          No. 23-30112

   amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.6 On cross-appeal, Wooley contends that
   the outcome of the case was correct, but if this court were to determine that
   N&W was properly joined, then Wooley contends the district court erred in
   denying his motion to remand.
                                               II.
           We review the district court’s finding of improper joinder de novo.
   Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2013) (collecting
   cases). Once a court determines that a nondiverse defendant is improperly
   joined, that party must be dismissed from the case. Int’l Energy Ventures
   Mgmt. LLC v. United Energy Group Ltd., 818 F.3d 193, 209 (5th Cir. 2016).
   Thus, we review whether dismissal of N&W was proper in concert with our
   review of improper joinder.
           Similarly, we review the district court’s denial of Wooley’s motion to
   remand and whether the district court should have exercised jurisdiction over
   his claims against N&W de novo. Flores v. Garland, 72 F.4th 85, 88 (5th Cir.
   2023); Allen v. Walmart Stores, L.L.C., 907 F.3d 170, 182 (5th Cir. 2018).
   “To determine whether jurisdiction is present for removal, we consider the
   claims in the state court petition as they existed at the time of removal.”
   Manguno v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.
   2002) (citing Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256, 264 (5th
   Cir. 1995)).

           _____________________
           6
             N&W frequently uses some form of the phrase “abuse of discretion” in framing
   the issues. This is not always correct; for instance, as N&W notes in its briefing, we review
   a denial of a motion to remand de novo, not for abuse of discretion.

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                                           No. 23-30112

                                                A.
           The district court found that Wooley improperly joined N&W in the
   State Court Petition in violation of its Stay Order and denied Wooley’s
   motion to remand as a result. The court did not err in doing so.
           “When an action has been brought under [the Limitation Act] and the
   [vessel] owner has complied with [§ 30511](b), all claims and proceedings
   against the owner related to the matter in question shall cease.” 46 U.S.C.
   § 30511(c). Here, once N&W filed the Limitation Action, all other actions
   against N&W related to Wooley’s claims were precluded by § 30511(c).
   Wooley thus improperly sued N&W in the State Court Petition when he
   proceeded in derogation of the Limitation Act and, relatedly, Rule F and the
   district court’s Stay Order. N&W agrees that it was improperly joined, that
   its “citizenship should be ignored for purposes of determining diversity of
   citizenship,” and that RCC was a properly joined defendant. In fact, N&W
   concedes that at the time of removal “there was no possibility of recovery by
   Mr. Wooley from N&W due to the District Court’s Limitation Stay
   Order[.]”7 Because N&W does not contest the district court’s finding that

           _____________________
           7
              N&W somewhat backtracks on this argument, later stating that “naming
   defendants directly contrary to the federal court’s Limitation Stay [] does not pretermit the
   possibility of recovery, possible recovery is only delayed.” This latter position is untenable
   because, as N&W itself states, “the district court must examine the plaintiff’s possibility
   of recovery against the defendant at the time of removal.” See Turner v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 33
   F.4th 214, 215 (5th Cir. 2022) (“When a case is removed from state court to federal court
   and the plaintiff seeks to have the case remanded, we evaluate the complaint at the time of
   removal.”) (citing Bonin v. Sabine River Auth. Of La., 961 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 2020));
   accord Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723. At the time of removal, the Stay Order was in effect, and
   under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) analysis, the state court claims against
   N&W therefore failed.

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                                         No. 23-30112

   it was improperly joined, we need not relitigate the issue.8 Further, this
   (correct) concession largely controls this case.
           We begin with improper joinder in diversity cases. Once a court
   determines that a nondiverse defendant was improperly joined, that
   defendant’s citizenship may not be considered for purposes of diversity
   jurisdiction, and that defendant must be dismissed without prejudice. Int’l
   Energy Ventures Mgmt., 818 F.3d at 209. The district court correctly followed
   that course: Determining that N&W had been improperly joined, the court
   considered only the citizenship of the properly joined State Court Petition
   defendants. As they were diverse from Wooley, removal based on diversity
   jurisdiction was permitted, and N&W was properly dismissed without
   prejudice.
           The district court did not address Article III admiralty jurisdiction,
   which RCC also invoked to support removal of the State Court Petition, but
   the result is the same for N&W. As discussed, N&W was improperly joined
   because Wooley’s proceeding against it via the State Court Petition was
   barred by operation of the Limitation Act and the district court’s Stay Order

           _____________________
           8
              Our agreement with the district court that N&W was improperly joined is based
   on a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. See Ticer v. Imperium Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 1040, 1046 (5th Cir.
   2021) (To determine whether a defendant was improperly joined, courts conduct a “[Rule]
   12(b)(6)-type analysis, ‘looking initially at the allegations of the complaint to determine
   whether the complaint states a claim under state law against the in-state defendant.’”
   (quoting Smallwood v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc))).
   The district court analogized this case to bankruptcy cases to support its conclusion that
   N&W was improperly joined in contravention of the Stay Order. To the extent that the
   district court reached beyond our precedent, the reach was unwarranted: Applying a Rule
   12(b)(6) analysis, Wooley could not state any claim outside the Limitation Action against
   N&W by operation of § 30511(c), Rule F, and the Stay Order, leaving a state court no
   choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against N&W. See Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., 818
   F.3d at 209 (If “a court determines that a nondiverse party has been improperly joined to
   defeat diversity, that party must be dismissed without prejudice.”).

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   issued pursuant to the statute and Rule F. N&W invoked—and the district
   court exercised—the federal court’s admiralty jurisdiction when it filed the
   Limitation Action. More on admiralty jurisdiction later. For purposes of
   Wooley’s motion to remand, what matters is that at the time RCC removed
   the State Court Petition, there existed no viable claims against N&W outside
   of the Limitation Action, admiralty or otherwise. The district court properly
   dismissed N&W from the State Court Petition and then denied remand.
                                         B.
          Notwithstanding N&W’s agreement that it was improperly joined,
   such that no viable claims existed against N&W at the time of removal, N&W
   casts several arguments as to why the district court erred in dismissing it from
   the case, dismissing the case, and denying N&W immediate passage to
   federal court. None are availing.
          First, N&W contends that Wooley’s State Court Petition, once
   removed, should remain in federal court because Wooley did not “anchor his
   case in state court by requesting a jury or asserting a Jones Act claim against
   his employer, Turn Services.” N&W cites Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc.,
   713 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2013), to support this contention. In Barker, this court
   noted that the “‘saving to suitors’ clause under general maritime law ‘does
   not guarantee [plaintiffs] a nonfederal forum, or limit the right of defendants
   to remove such actions to federal court where there exists some basis for
   federal jurisdiction other than admiralty.” 713 F.3d at 220 (alterations and
   emphasis in original) (quoting Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87
   F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1996)). N&W seizes on this statement to posit that
   even if a plaintiff invokes the saving to suitors clause in a state court action,

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   that does not prevent removal of the action to federal court under admiralty
   jurisdiction.9
           Whatever the removability of a state action brought pursuant the
   saving to suitors clause, a question we need not answer in today’s case,
   N&W’s argument runs aground because N&W offers no authority for a
   district court’s maintaining claims in federal court against an improperly
   joined party, despite improper joinder. Put differently, the conundrum in
   this case arises not from a question of jurisdiction—the district court
   properly denied Wooley’s motion to remand the State Court Petition because
   it had jurisdiction, after all—but because Wooley proceeded out of order,
   flouting the Limitation Act and the Stay Order in the Limitation Action.
   Wooley attempted to elect his “choice of remedies” against N&W under the
   saving to suitors clause first, and then eight months later, after RCC had

           _____________________
           9
             Barker also states that “maritime cases which are brought in state court” “are
   exempt from removal by the ‘saving-to-suitors’ clause of [§ 1333(1)] . . . and therefore may
   only be removed when original jurisdiction is based on another jurisdictional grant, such as
   diversity of citizenship.” Id. at 219 (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
   354, 377–79 (1959); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991)). Since Barker, our court
   has acknowledged the lack of clarity on this point, particularly considering Congress’s 2011
   amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441:
           [W]hether the saving-to-suitors clause of the federal maritime statute
           prohibits removal of general maritime claims absent an independent basis
           for federal jurisdiction in light of Congress’s December 2011 amendment
           to the federal removal statute—is not clear. The vast majority of district
           courts considering this question have maintained that such lawsuits are not
           removable . . . . However, because there is no binding precedent from this
           circuit, see Riverside Constr. Co., Inc. v. Entergy Miss., Inc., 626 [F. App’x]
           443, 447 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has not yet
           spoken directly on this issue”), there remains a consequential number of
           district courts that have held to the contrary.
   Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Private Limited, 882 F.3d 96, 100 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (citations omitted). While N&W and amici urge this court to clarify this question en banc,
   as discussed above the line, it is not necessary for us to do so in the context of this case.

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   removed the State Court Petition, belatedly sought to lift the Stay Order in
   the Limitation Action. See Wooley I, 31 F.4th at 971 (discussing “tension
   between the Limitation Act and the savings to suitors clause” and the
   stipulations necessary for a separate “state court action to proceed” (quoting
   Odeco Oil & Gas, 74 F.3d at 674)). As the district court correctly concluded,
   this meant that, regardless of whether Wooley asserted a Jones Act claim, or
   any other, he could not proceed against N&W either at the time he filed the
   State Court Petition or when RCC removed it because there were no viable
   claims against N&W outside the Limitation Action. And N&W offers no
   authority to support the notion that Wooley’s belated stipulations in the
   Limitation Action cured that defect. Cf. Cavallini, 44 F.3d at 264–65
   (“[T]he rationale for determining removal jurisdiction on the basis of claims
   in the state court complaint as it exists at the time of removal is obvious”;
   moreover, “after a fraudulent joinder removal, a plaintiff may [not] amend
   the complaint in order to state a claim against the nondiverse defendant, and
   thus divest the federal court of jurisdiction”).10
           Distilled down, N&W’s other arguments for remaining in federal
   court veer off course for the same reason. For instance, N&W contends that
   once the district court determined removal was proper as to RCC under
   diversity jurisdiction, the court should have exercised jurisdiction over the
   claims against N&W as well. This argument flies in the face of our precedent
   that, once “a court determines that a nondiverse party has been improperly
   joined to defeat diversity, that party must be dismissed without prejudice.”
   Int’l Energy Ventures Mgmt., 818 F.3d at 209.

           _____________________
           10
              Another complicating factor in this case is that the district court’s ruling on
   Wooley’s motion to remand came two years after Wooley filed the motion and a year-and-
   a-half after the court granted his motion for relief from the Stay Order, which allowed
   claims against N&W to proceed—just not in the prematurely-filed State Court Petition.

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           Our holding in Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 2016) (en
   banc), is instructive. In Flagg, a patient alleged that his toe surgery was
   unsuccessful and filed a complaint in Louisiana state court against his doctor
   and the medical center, as well as the manufacturers of the toe implant. 819
   F.3d at 134–35. The manufacturers removed the case based on diversity
   jurisdiction. Id. at 135. They asserted they were completely diverse from the
   patient and that the medical defendants, who were not diverse, were
   improperly joined because the patient had failed to exhaust malpractice
   claims administratively prior to filing the state court petition, as required by
   Louisiana state law. Id. We agreed, holding that the patient’s failure to
   exhaust his claims against the medical defendants meant those claims would
   fail under a Rule 12(b)(6)-type analysis. Id. at 138. Thus, those defendants
   were improperly joined, and the “state court would have been required to
   dismiss [them] from the case.” Id.
           The same logic obtains here. As discussed previously, the Louisiana
   state court would have had no choice but to dismiss Wooley’s claims against
   N&W by operation of § 30511(c), Rule F, and the district court’s Stay Order.
   And while N&W offers authority for the proposition that “[o]nce the court
   establishes jurisdiction exists, it has a duty to exercise that jurisdiction,”
   N&W nowhere explains, much less cites support for, how the district court
   could extend jurisdiction over Wooley’s claims against N&W despite its
   conclusion that N&W was not a proper party to the State Court Petition.11
   This argument sinks of its own weight.

           _____________________
           11
              N&W argues that because complete diversity existed when RCC removed the
   State Court Petition in view of N&W’s improper joinder, the district court was allowed to
   exercise jurisdiction over N&W’s claims as well. N&W cites to Richey v. Walmart Stores,
   Inc., 390 F. App’x. 375 (5th Cir. 2010), where this court affirmed a district court’s denial
   of remand. Richey is easily distinguishable. There, Richey sued Walmart in state court and

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           N&W next lodges several arguments that Wooley’s claims had an
   independent basis for federal jurisdiction aside from diversity jurisdiction.
   None provides safe harbor. First, N&W argues, somewhat convolutedly,
   that once the district court determined removal was proper, Wooley’s
   “general maritime claim against N&W” could act as a jurisdictional hook.
   N&W similarly argues that the 2011 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441
   “made a substantive change in removal jurisdiction over maritime cases”
   and, specifically, that changes to § 1441(b) “may provide an alternative basis
   for removal and retention of th[is] case in federal court.” N&W contends
   that because Wooley named the Nicholas in the State Court Petition and
   because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over in rem admiralty
   actions, the entire case should have remained in federal court.
           To the extent N&W argues that federal courts’ admiralty jurisdiction
   dictates that claims asserted pursuant to the saving to suitors clause are
   removable based on admiralty jurisdiction alone, N&W prematurely offers an
   answer to the wrong question, as Wooley has yet to assert any cognizable
   claims against N&W pursuant to § 1333(1). To the extent N&W’s arguments
   are of a theme with its contention that so long as the district court had
   jurisdiction over some party, then the district court could extend that

           _____________________
   Walmart removed. At the time of removal, there was complete diversity. After, Richey
   attempted to file an amended complaint naming Walmart Stores Texas LLC as a co-
   defendant, and Richey moved to remand, arguing that she and Walmart Stores Texas LLC
   were nondiverse. We emphasized that courts must examine “whether diversity ‘existed at
   the time of removal.’” Id. at 378 (quoting Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 686
   (5th Cir. 2000). And “subsequently added defendants cannot divest the district court of
   the original jurisdiction it had at the time of removal.” Id. at 378 n.2. Here, N&W was
   improperly joined in the State Court Petition from the outset.

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                                          No. 23-30112

   jurisdiction even to an improperly joined one, they run into the shoals of our
   improper joinder precedent as well.12
           Finally, N&W argues that the district court abused its discretion by
   dismissing the case because dismissal is countenanced by neither Rule F nor
   the “analogous Fifth Circuit Bankruptcy decisions.” N&W asserts that
   under the terms of Rule F(3), a district court may not dismiss a state court
   lawsuit once it is properly removed, and a stay order is no longer in effect—
   essentially, that Rule F permits a court merely to “pause” other proceedings
   pending a Limitation Act stay. This line of reasoning misapprehends the
   rationale supporting dismissal of the State Court Petition: The district court
   did not conclude that the State Court Petition was without legal effect from
   its filing; instead, the court determined that Wooley’s action was “‘void and
   without legal effect’ as to N&W . . . .” Given that determination, because all
   the other defendants had been dismissed from the State Court Petition, no
   case remained before the district court. To accept N&W’s argument would
   be to conclude that the district court should have retained jurisdiction over a
   case with no defendants, all to resurrect the claims against an improperly
   joined one. This cannot be so.13

           _____________________
           12
               N&W seeks to analogize to Williams v. M/V Sonora, 985 F.2d 808, 812 (5th Cir.
   1993). In Williams, a case was removed from Texas state court pursuant to the Foreign
   Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), because a defendant, Pemex,
   qualified as a “foreign sovereign.” 985 F.2d at 810. When Pemex was eventually
   dismissed, plaintiffs argued that the case should have been remanded because the only
   other basis for federal jurisdiction was admiralty law, and pursuant to the saving to suitors
   clause, “admiralty claims . . . are non-removable.” Id. at 812. The district court declined
   to remand, and we affirmed, noting that though the case would not have been removable in
   the first instance without FSIA jurisdiction, at the time of removal Pemex was a proper
   party. Id. Here, by contrast, N&W was not a proper party at the time of removal.
           13
             N&W’s analogies to bankruptcy proceedings, which are governed by bankruptcy
   rules, are unpersuasive for the same reasons as its attempted reading of Rule F. We
   therefore decline to address them further.

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                                    No. 23-30112

                                        III.
          In his cross appeal, Wooley asserts that the district court erred in
   denying his motion to remand. Wooley makes three arguments. We need
   not plumb the depths of these contentions, but we will briefly discuss why
   each fails.
          First, he contends that N&W was not improperly joined and there was
   a lack of complete diversity at the time of removal. For the reasons stated
   above, we disagree with Wooley and find that the district court did not err in
   determining N&W was improperly joined.
          Next, Wooley asserts that the State Court Petition was not removable
   pursuant to the saving to suitors clause because N&W failed to “identify an
   independent basis [for] federal subject matter jurisdiction (other than
   admiralty).” Regardless of the merits of Wooley’s argument on this point, it
   seeks to answer the wrong question in this case. As thoroughly addressed
   already, at the time of removal, no valid claims could be asserted against N&W
   in a forum other than the Limitation Action; because Wooley had “blatantly
   violated [the district court’s] Stay Order” by naming N&W in the State
   Court Petition, N&W was not a proper party, whatever the underpinning for
   federal jurisdiction. Besides, the “‘saving to suitors’ clause under general
   maritime law ‘does not guarantee [plaintiffs] a nonfederal forum,” Barker,
   713 F.3d at 220, though that is an issue for another day.
          Finally, Wooley contends the district court lost jurisdiction after it
   lifted the Stay Order, and therefore the district court should have granted its
   motion to remand. This point is mooted by our conclusion that N&W was
   improperly joined, and thus properly dismissed, and by the subsequent
   dismissal of the remaining defendants from the State Court Petition.

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                                  No. 23-30112

                                     IV.
          N&W was improperly joined as a defendant in the State Court
   Petition. When RCC removed the case to federal court, the district court
   therefore properly disregarded N&W’s citizenship and dismissed it from the
   case. The court likewise properly denied Wooley’s motion to remand. And
   once N&W was dismissed, leaving no defendants in the case, the district
   court properly severed and dismissed without prejudice the State Court
   Petition.
                                                               AFFIRMED.

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