Court Opinion

ID: 9747691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:27:56.186832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:25.646844
License: Public Domain

*438ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
In recognition of the dangers presented by organized crime and racketeering and the attendant danger of governmental corruption, the Legislature enacted the Immunity Act1 to assist law enforcement officials in their efforts to fight organized crime. The majority holds that the Immunity Act is inapplicable to proceedings before an indicting grand jury, and is inapplicable to investigations into bribery and extortion unless conspiracy to commit these crimes is alleged. There is no justification for such an interpretation of the Act; it serves only to obstruct prosecution of organized crime and. corruption.
Today’s decision denies the Attorney General the power to use the Immunity Act to obtain testimony necessary for the prosecution of two public officials accused of extortion. The prosecution began with the filing of a criminal complaint, in August 1972, charging that Warren Brady and Henry George, Bensalem Township supervisors, had committed “extortion, prohibited acts by public officers, and conspiracy.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that the two supervisors had extorted money and property from two construction contractors, Joseph D’Egidio and John Camerlengo, in return for subdivision-approvals and zoning changes. The conspiracy charges were dropped after a preliminary hearing, but the Commonwealth made out a prima facie case on the other charges. When these charges were presented before an indicting grand jury, D’Egidio and Camerlengo invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The Attorney General, pursuant to the Immunity Act, then petitioned the court of common pleas for an order immunizing the two witnesses and compelling them to testify.
The court of common pleas dismissed the petition, ruling that the proceeding was not within the scope of the *439Immunity Act because it involved an indicting, as opposed to an investigating grand jury. As an alternative holding, the court held that the Immunity Act was not applicable because the Commonwealth was no longer alleging a conspiracy. The Superior Court affirmed in a three judge per curiam opinion (Wright, P. J., and Spaulding, J., not participating). Commonwealth v. Brady, 228 Pa.Super. 233, 323 A.2d 866 (1974). Judge Cercone filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Judge Spaeth.
The majority today follows the interpretation of the Immunity Act adopted by the court of common pleas. I believe that such an unnecessarily restrictive interpretation is contrary to the text of the Immunity Act and inconsistent with the Legislature’s intention that the Immunity Act provide a means of obtaining testimony against organized crime and racketeering. I dissent.
I.
The Immunity Act Applies to Proceedings Before Indicting Grand Juries
The majority first decides that the Immunity Act may not be used to immunize witnesses called before an indicting grand jury. Section 1 of the Immunity Act provides that a witness may be ordered to testify:
“. . . in a proceeding relating to organized crime or racketeering before a court, grand jury or investigating body set up by legislative enactment or by order of the Governor . . ..”2
This provision, by its terms, applies to grand juries, and makes no distinction between investigating and indicting grand juries. The majority ignores the express language of this provision, however, and instead construes the title of the Immunity Act to limit its application to proceedings before investigating grand juries.
*440There is no justification for interpreting a statute solely on the basis of its title, without considering its text. The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides that “[t]he title and preamble of a statute may be considered in the construction thereof.” 3 Thus, reference to the title is permissible in order to interpret the text of a statute. The majority’s use of the title to reach a result at odds with the text of the statute is indefensible.
The majority’s interpretation also contravenes the purpose of the Immunity Act: to promote the prosecution of organized crime and racketeering. I cannot agree with the majority that the only purpose of the Immunity Act is investigation.4
Indeed, the Immunity Act applies “in a proceeding relating to organized crime dr racketeering before a court . . . .” 5 Ordinarily, courts are engaged in adjudication, not investigation. When the Act provides that a witness must “testify or . produce evidence” “before a court,” it is clear that the Act contemplates the use of this immunized testimony in criminal prosecution, not just investigation.6
. As defined, “organized crime” and “racketeering” refer to crimes which present a serious danger to the public welfare and which, by their very nature, excape prosecution if the Commonwealth is limited to ordinary law enforcement techniques.7 Immunity has long been recog*441nized as a useful tool for gathering evidence against such criminal activity. Thus, the purposes of the Act are not limited to the gathering of information for the further edification of the public about the threat of organized crime and racketeering. Rather, its purposes include prosecution.8
The majority asserts that “ . . . immunity statutes [are] designed to assist in the uncovering of criminal activity, as opposed to simply providing a means whereby sufficient information may be obtained for the prosecution and conviction of an individual offender.” If by this statement the majority means that immunity statutes were aimed only at discovering crimes, not at producing testimony for the prosecution of crime, the proposition is belied by the very source relied on by the majority. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1657 n. 14, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), points out that some of the earliest immunity legislation was enacted in order to obtain testimony at particular trials.
Thus, far from reaching the result specifically intended by the Legislature, the majority appears to have frustrated the purpose of the Legislature by preventing the use of immunity in the situation most clearly contemplat*442ed by the Legislature: in the prosecution of organized crime and racketeering.
Finally, the language of the title itself does not support the majority’s conclusion. The title reads:
“An Act authorizing courts of record to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution for or on account of any matter or thing concerning which they were ordered to testify in a proceeding before certain grand juries, investigating committees or commissions and courts of record; making the refusal to testify after such immunity criminal contempt and providing penalties.” 9
The majority reads the words “certain grand juries” to mean investigating grand juries, reasoning that the word certain cannot be surplusage. Although the Immunity Act does not apply to all grand juries, reference to the text of the statute itself makes clear that it applies to this proceeding. The limitations referred to by the word “certain” in the title are not those created by the majority. The Act provides that a grant of immunity may be given in “a proceeding relating to organized crime” and only when “the attorney general has established a need for the grant of immunity . . . .” 10 Thus the Act applies only to grand jury proceedings, like the proceedings in this case, which meet these conditions. Since the title does not refer to organized crime or racketeering, or the requirement that need for a grant of immunity be established, the most reasonable interpretation is that the word “certain” refers to these requirements. Moreover, the title itself refers to “investigating committees.” If the Legislature intended to limit the Act’s applicability to investigating grand juries, it would not have drafted the title to read “certain grand juries,” but would have *443used the words “investigating grand juries,” just as it used the words “investigating committees.” 11
The Legislature adopts the title of a statute as a convenient label for referring to the enactment. While the title may shed some light on legislative purpose, it is not intended to catalogue every situation in which the statute might apply, or to expressly limit its applicability.12 When the Legislature enacted the Immunity Act, it saw the need not just to investigate, but to eradicate, organized crime and racketeering. The majority’s use of the title to the Immunity Act to limit its applicability to investigating grand juries violates the most basic rule of statutory interpretation: “[T]he object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 13
*444II.
The Immunity Act Applies to Proceedings Relating to Bribery or Extortion
As an alternative holding, the majority decides that the Immunity Act cannot be invoked absent an allegation of conspiracy. Section I of the Act authorizes a grant of immunity “in a proceeding relating to organized crime or racketeering.” 14 Section 6 of the Act provides:
“As used in this act—
‘Organized crime’ and ‘racketeering’ shall include, but not be limited to, conspiracy to commit murder, bribery, or extortion, narcotic or dangerous drug violations, prostitution, usury, subornation of perjury and lottery, bookmaking or other forms of organized gambling.” 15
The majority reads the words “conspiracy to commit” in Section 6 to modify each of the substantive crimes listed. It reasons that only conspiracies to commit the crimes listed in Section 6 and conspiracies to commit similar crimes constitute “organized crime or racketeering.” Because the conspiracy charges against both Brady and George were withdrawn, the majority concludes that the grand jury proceeding did not relate to “organized crime or racketeeting” and holds that the court of common pleas was without authority to grant immunity.16 I cannot agree.
*445My disagreement with the majority’s interpretation is compelled by four factors: (1) the arrangement of the words of Section 6; (2) the nature of the problem which the Legislature addressed; (3) the broad language of the Act; and (4) a subsequent enactment of the Legislature defining the term “racketeering.”
A.
I reject the majority’s assertion that its construction of the Act follows naturally from the arrangement of the words in Section 6. On the contrary, a textual analysis of the section yields the conclusion that the words “conspiracy to commit” modify only the following word: “murder.” The arrangement of the words provides no indication that the phrase “conspiracy to commit” modifies every word that follows. It requires a strained construction to conclude that the eleven crimes listed, which are connected by four conjunctions, are all modified by the phrase “conspiracy to commit.” By contrast, the words “shall include,” are words which normally serve to alert the reader that a list follows. Thus, the natural arrangement of the words in Section 6 indicates that the list of crimes which constitute organized crime or racketeering begins after the words “shall include, but not be limited to,” and that “conspiracy to commit,” modifies only “murder.”
Moreover, the majority’s interpretation injects an ambiguity into Section 6. The crimes, or groups of crimes (e. g., “bribery or extortion”), listed in Section 6 are connected by the conjunction “and.” (i. e., “. . . subornation of perjury and lottery, bookmaking or other forms of organized gambling.”) When the phrase “conspiracy to commit” modifies two or more crimes connected by the conjunction “and,” this denotes a single conspiracy encompassing multiple objectives. For example, the words “conspiracy to commit murder and robbery” imply a single criminal scheme, having as its objectives *446both murder and robbery. If the phrase “conspiracy to commit” modifies all the crimes listed in Section 6, this would mean that a petition for a grant of immunity must allege a single conspiracy having the objectives of murder, prostitution, usury, subornation of perjury, and at least four other crimes. Although the majority does not claim that such a multifarious conspiracy need be alleged, this conclusion would apparently follow from the majority’s interpretation of the statute.
In short, the majority’s interpretation does not follow from a straightforward interpretation of the statute. The most plausible interpretation is that suggested by the Commonwealth: that the phrase “conspiracy to commit” modifies only the crime of “murder.” If anything, it is the majority’s interpretation, not the Commonwealth’s, that “vitiates the natural and nontechnical word arrangement employed by the legislature.”
B.
The conclusion that the phrase “conspiracy to commit” modifies only the crime of murder is supported by an examination of the nature of the crimes listed in Section 6 in light of the purposes of the Immunity Act. The Legislature specifically addressed itself to the problem of organized crime. Of the substantive crimes listed in Section 6 of the Act, only murder can be performed by an individual acting by himself. All of the others require two or more persons for the substantive violation to be consummated. A murder committed by an individual acting completely by himself is simply not a proper case to be investigated by the use of grants of immunity. The only person who could claim immunity with regard to the murder under investigation would be the killer. The Legislature intended to reach those crimes which are committed by at least two people and, commonly, by organized criminals. This includes conspiracy to commit murder, and the other substantive crimes listed that en*447able organized crime to exist and flourish: corruption of public officials, corruption of the means by which crime is fought, and the crimes which pay for it all — extortion, prostitution, gambling, and the drug trade. For this reason, I am of the view that the other listed crimes were intended by the Legislature to be included within “organized crime or racketeering,” not only conspiracies to commit these crimes.17
*448I find it particularly hard to believe that the Legislature did not intend the Immunity Act to apply in proceedings relating to “organized gambling.” Yet the construction adopted by the majority makes the statute applicable only to cases involving conspiracy to commit organized gambling. If gambling is organized, this implies the existence of a conspiracy. In effect, the majority's construction requires the Commonwealth to allege a conspiracy to enter into a conspiracy.
C.
The interpretation of the Act adopted by the majority fails to give effect to the broad language used by the Legislature in drafting the Immunity Act. It is apparent that the Legislature intended to sweep broadly with the Act. In Section 1, the Act provides that immunity may be granted in proceedings before courts, grand juries, legislative investigative bodies, and executive investigative bodies conducting inquiries “relating to organized crime or racketeering.” 18 The nature of this relation is in no way restricted. It may include the causes, operations, beginnings, effects or scope of organized .crime or racketeering. I cannot agree with the majority that the bribery of public officials, and extortion by public officials, do not “relate to” organized crime or racketeering in one or more of the ways enumerated above.
The majority also fails to give the proper effect to the language in Section 6 of the Act which defines organized crime and racketeering to include “but not be limited to” 19 the enumerated crimes. Again, the Legislature chose broad language seeking to avoid the possibility of a technical construction which would allow an aspect of organized crime, or a matter relating to organized crime, to escape scrutiny. The majority's narrow reading of *449the Immunity Act is contrary to the broad language of the Act itself.
D.
The Commonwealth’s interpretation of the Immunity Act is supported by other legislation dealing with organized crime and racketeering. The Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 20 was enacted to prevent those who procure wealth and influence through “racketeering activities” from utilizing that wealth and influence to obtain control over legitimate enterprises. As such it is clearly in “pari materia” with the Immunity Act; the two statutes both relate to the control of organized crime and racketeering.21 Since the Immunity Act and the Corrupt *450Organizations Act are in pari materia, we must construe the two statutes together.22 Since the two statutes have common objectives, and the Legislature anticipated that the Immunity Act would be used to aid enforcement of the Corrupt Organizations Act, it is both possible and desirable to construe the Immunity Act in light of the Corrupt Organizations Act.23
*451Subsection (h) of the Corrupt Organizations Act specifically enumerates those crimes which are included within the term “racketeering activity
“ ‘Racketeering activity’ means:
(i) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of this title:
Chapter 25 (relating to crime homicide)
Section 2706 (relating to terroristic threats)
Chapter 29 (relating to kidnapping)
Chapter 33 (relating to arson, etc.)
Chapter 37 (relating to robbery)
Chapter 39 (relating to theft and related offenses)
Section 4108 (relating to commercial bribery and breach of duty to act disinterestedly)
Section 4109 (relating to rigging publicly exhibited contest)
Chapter 47 (relating to bribery and corrupt influence)
Chapter 49 (relating to perjury and other falsification in official matters)
Section 5512 through 5514 (relating to gambling)
Chapter 59 (relating to public indecency)
(ii) any offense indictable under section 20(d) of the act of September 26, 1961 (P.L. 1664), known as ‘The Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act’ (relating to the sale and dispensing of narcotic drugs);
(iii) any conspiracy to commit any of the offenses set forth in subclauses (i) and (ii) of this clause; or
*452(iv) the collection of any money or other property in full or partial satisfaction of a debt which arose as the result of the lending of money or other property at a rate of interest exceeding 25% per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period, where not otherwise authorized by law. . . .”
Thus, the Corrupt Organizations Act, with its broad definition of racketeering activities, includes all of the listed crimes regardless whether a conspiracy is alleged. Because this Act and the Immunity Act should be construed together, this Court should not artificially restrict the definitions found in the Immunity Act.
To do otherwise creates an anomalous situation. The Corrupt Organizations Act contains an immunity provision which adopts by reference the Immunity Act and extends its application to civil proceedings when there is a pattern of “racketeering.” 24 There is no requirement *453that the Commonwealth allege a conspiracy to commit racketeering activity. As Judge Cercone stated in his dissenting opinion in the Superior Court:
“It therefore seems incongruous to suggest that the legislature sought to grant broader immunity powers to the Attorney General in civil proceedings where only a divestiture or injunction might be at stake; and where, because of the less severe sanction to be im*454posed upon the defendant, the ‘immunized’ witness would be more easily induced to commit perjury — or at least less motivated to tell the truth.”
Commonwealth v. Brady, 228 Pa.Super. 238, 238, 323 A. 2d 866, 869 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Cercone, J., joined by Spaeth, J.). The Legislature did not intend such an incongruous result.
These considerations leave no doubt that the Legislature intended the Immunity Act to apply to those substantive crimes which are listed in Section 6. These crimes include the crimes by which organized crime and racketeering profit, and the methods by which they evade prosecution. The corrupting influence of these crimes presents a serious threat to society, irrespective of whether a conspiracy is alleged. These crimes may escape prosecution if law enforcement officials cannot resort to the use of immunity, even when a conspiracy is not involved. I see no reason to depart from the position taken by this Court in In re Falone, 464 Pa. 42, 346 A.2d 9 (1975), that the Immunity Act is not limited to proceedings relating to conspiracies.25
III.
Immunity Leaves the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Inviolate
In support of its decision, the majority relies on the proposition that the Immunity Act must be narrowly construed to avoid infringement of fifth amendment rights. The simple answer to this proposition lies in the language of the fifth amendment: “no person *455shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S.Const, amend. V (emphasis added). The fifth amendment does not grant the right to refuse to testify against others. When immunity is granted, so that the testimony cannot be used against the witness in any criminal proceeding, the witness is not being compelled to testify against himself. The idea that the fifth amendment gives a witness a privilege to refuse to testify, even when immunity has been granted, was rejected by the Supreme Court in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972), and by this court in In re Falone, 464 Pa. 42, 346 A.2d 9 (1975). The grant of immunity offered to the witnesses in this proceeding would fully protect their fifth amendment rights.
As this Court reasoned in Falone:
“ [The] conclusion that the Act must receive a ‘strict construction’ is based on an erroneous view of immunity and the privilege against self-incrimination. It is incorrect that under the Act ‘a person can be compelled to give testimony against himself’ in the constitutional sense. When a witness receives a grant of immunity from prosecution that is at least as broad in scope and effect as the privilege against self-incrimination, his privilege is completely displaced because he has ‘complete protection from all the perils against which the [privilege] was designed to guard.’ [Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586, 12 S.Ct. 195, 206, 35 L.Ed. 1100 (1892); accord] Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 92 S.Ct. 1670, 32 L.Ed.2d 234 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 276, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 1915, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968) (dictum); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S.Ct. 497,
*456100 L.Ed. 511 (1956); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65-70, 26 S.Ct. 370, 375-77, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896); . . . Riccobene Appeal, 439 Pa. 404,
410, 268 A.2d 104, 108 (1970) (opinion announcing the judgment). A grant of immunity is sufficient to supplant the privilege if the witness is protected against use of the compelled testimony and all its fruits. Kastigar v. United States, supra. Immunity granted under the Act is ‘transactional’ immunity, Riccobene Appeal, supra, 439 Pa. at 412, 268 A.2d at 109, and thus is more extensive than necessary to displace the privilege.
As the Supreme Court stated in Kastigar v. United States, supra:
‘[The] sole concern [of the privilege against self-incrimination] is to afford protection against being “forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of ‘penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts.’ ” Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection. It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using thei compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness.’
406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1661 (footnote omitted). Accordingly, a witness who is compelled to testify under the Act is not testifying ‘against himself’ in the constitutional sense, because his testimony cannot result in the infliction of criminal penalties. Thus, it is not necessary to accord the Act a ‘strict construction’ for the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. We can perceive no reason why the Act should not ‘be liberally construed to effect [its] objects and to promote justice.’ Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c) (Supp.1974). Cf. United *457States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974).”
Id. at 47-48, 346 A.2d at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
The majority does not assert that the Immunity Act, as interpreted by the Commonwealth, would be unconstitutional. The federal immunity statute, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 6001 et seq. (Supp.1976), which was upheld in Kastigar v. United States, supra, contains neither of the restrictions imposed by the majority today. Thus, there is no constitutional limitation restricting the use of the immunity power to proceedings before investigating grand juries, or to proceedings relating to criminal conspiracies.
If a statute must be given a narrow construction to avoid infringement of constitutional rights, the restrictions imposed should be directly related to the statute’s asserted constitutional infirmity. See e. g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782 (1961). The restrictions imposed by the majority, however, bear no relation to the values protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.26
The majority refers to the “delicate balance created by the privilege,” and concludes that these two witnesses cannot be required to testify because the proceeding is *458not before an investigating grand jury and does not relate to a criminal conspiracy. If the majority means to imply that the privilege against self-incrimination provides less protection when investigating grand juries are involved, or conspiracies are alleged, its analysis undermines fifth amendment values.
It is the provision for immunity, not the arbitrary restrictions imposed by the majority, which enables a grand jury to compel testimony without infringing on fifth amendment rights. The privilege against self-incrimination has been fully protected by the grant of immunity. Since a grant of immunity protects against infringement on the privilege against self-incrimination, there is no reason not to give the Immunity Act the broad interpretation intended by the Legislature.27
IV.
Immunity is Essential to the Prosecution of Organized Crime and Racketeering
Law enforcement must be directed not only at crime in the streets, but also at crime in the halls and chambers of government. To allow those who gain wealth and power through racketeering and corruption to escape prosecution erodes public confidence in government, and breeds disrespect for the law. The very power and influence which makes these crimes so inimical to the public welfare, however, makes it difficult to obtain testimony against these crimes. With this in mind the Legislature passed the Immunity Act; immunity is an essential tool for the prosecution of such crimes. Therefore, justice is *459not served by unnecessarily restricting the ability of prosecutors to use the Immunity Act in order to produce testimony before an investigating or an indicting grand jury.
The scope of power granted to grand juries is necessarily broad. As Mr. Justice Powell recently stated for the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-18, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974):
“The scope of the grand jury’s powers reflects its special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person. The grand jury’s investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged.”
Accord, Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 523, 341 A.2d 896, 902 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083, 96 S.Ct. 873, 47 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976); see United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976) (plurality opinion); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3108, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1064 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972); Appeal of Freedman, 541 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Thus, the principle that the public has “the right to every man’s evidence” is particularly relevant to grand jury proceedings. United States v. Mandujano, supra; United States v. Nixon, supra; United States v. Dionisio, supra; Branzburg v. Hayes, supra; In re Falone, 464 Pa. 42, 346 A.2d 9 (1975). Of course a witness may be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. In such a case, the Commonwealth must determine whether *460the testimony is of sufficient import to its investigation to warrant a grant of immunity. The ability to grant immunity is an integral part of the grand jury’s power and essential to its proper function. As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Burger in Mandujano:
“[Fjederal statutes conferring immunity on witnesses in federal judicial proceedings, including grand jury investigations, are so familiar that they have become part of our ‘constitutional fabric.’ . . . Immunity is the Government’s ultimate tool for securing testimony that otherwise would be protected [Wjhen granted immunity, a witness once again owes the obligation imposed upon all citizens — the duty to give testimony — since immunity substitutes . for the privilege.”
425 U.S. at 575, 96 S.Ct. at 1776 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
The majority today prohibits the Commonwealth from using the Immunity Act to secure testimony before an indicting grand jury. Without such testimony, an indictment may not be obtained, and those engaged in organized crime and racketeering may escape prosecution. By its alternative holding, restricting the Immunity Act’s application to conspiracies, the majority also impedes the efforts of investigating grand juries to uncover crimes involving bribery, extortion, and other forms of racketeering and corruption.
The majority asserts that the Immunity Act must be narrowly construed because “. . .a grant of immunity authorizes and even encourages interrogation which would otherwise be prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.” As the majority recognizes, however, the privilege does not apply when there has been a grant of immunity, coextensive with that privilege. To reason that, because the grand jury’s inquiry would be limited if the privilege applied, it must be limited when the privilege does not apply, is nonsense.
*461The grant of immunity “displaces the danger” of self-incrimination by fully protecting the witness. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439, 76 S.Ct. 497, 507, 100 L.Ed. 511, 525 (1956); accord. United States v. Mandujano, supra at 575, 96 S.Ct. at 1776; 48 L.Ed.2d at 222; In re Falone, supra at 47, 346 A.2d at 12. At the same time, it is an important ingredient to the successful functioning of grand juries and to the successful prosecution of organized crime and racketeering. Given the importance placed by the Legislature on investigating and prosecuting organized crime and racketeering, it could not have intended to limit arbitrarily and irrationally the power to use this essential tool.
Accordingly, I cannot accept the majority’s arbitrary interpretation of the Immunity Act. Neither the Act nor the constitution limits the power to grant immunity to proceedings before investigating grand juries; there is no reason for this Court to do so. Likewise, I am satisfied that “organized crime or racketeering” is not limited to conspiracies to commit the substantive offenses listed in Section 6. As Judge Cercone stated in his dissenting opinion in the Superior Court:
“. . . I am convinced that a construction of the immunity act which requires the allegation of a conspiracy to commit extortion is not warranted because of the clear intention of the legislature to employ broad new powers to eliminate the evil of organized crime and racketeering, especially when the racketeering is carried out in violation of a public trust. In the typical case, such racketeering is merely one link in a pernicious chain which shackles honest men both private and public. This link must be broken if the legislature and the courts hope to prevent further erosion of the trust that the governed must have in their government. The legislature has determined, and I of course agree, that this is a condition that can no longer be tolerated.”
*462Commonwealth v. Brady, 228 Pa.Super. 233, 241, 323 A.2d 866, 870-71 (1974) (dissenting opinion of Cercone, J., joined by Spaeth, J.) (footnotes omitted).
The grand jury proceeding in this case relates to alleged extortion and prohibited acts by public officials. Extortion and official corruption constitute a malignancy which threatens the public welfare and the public’s confidence in government. Such crimes must be prosecuted, but it may be impossible to prosecute without resort to the immunity power.
Manifestly, this is the situation which the Legislature intended to reach when it adopted the Immunity Act. If the powers made available by the Immunity Act cannot be utilized, corrupt public officials can escape prosecution. The arbitrary limitations imposed by the majority are contrary to the language and the purpose of the Immunity Act.
I dissent.
O’BRIEN and POMEROY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of November 22, 1968, P.L. 1080 §§ 1 et seq., 19 P.S. §§ 640.1 et seq. (Supp.1976).

. Id. § 640.1.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339 § 3, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1924 (Supp.1976).

. The majority states that the Act “is primarily intended to assist in the investigation of organized crime and racketeering,” (emphasis deleted), but proceeds to interpret the statute as if investigation were its only purpose. Even if investigation is the statute’s primary purpose, there is no justification for interpreting the statute to frustrate its other purposes. A statute must be interpreted, if possible, so as to effectuate all of its purposes.

. 19 P.S. § 640.1 (Supp.1976).

. Id.

. “As used in this act—
‘Organized crime’ and ‘racketeering’ shall include, but not be limited to, conspiracy to commit murder, bribery or extortion, *441narcotic or dangerous drug violations, prostitution, usury, subornation of perjury and lottery, bookmaking or other forms of organized gambling.”
19 P.S. § 640.6 (Supp.1976).

. “When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 (Supp.1976). I believe that the language of the statute is explicit. The majority has manufactured an ambiguity by looking at the title instead of the statute itself. Since the majority’s construction of the statute does not follow from the explicit language of the statute, it should consider the legislative purpose of facilitating prosecution of organized crime before adopting its construction of the statute.

. 19 P.S. § 640.1, Annot. (Supp.1976).

. Id. § 640.1.

. It also appears from a reading of the title that the word certain is intended to modify the words “grand juries, investigating committees or commissions and courts of record,” not just the words “grand juries.” 19 P.S. § 640.1, Annot. (Supp.1976). If the word certain refers to the limitation to proceedings relating to organized crime, and modifies all of the bodies or tribunals listed in the title, then the title clearly reflects the provisions of the statute itself. If the word “certain” means “investigating,” however, as the majority asserts, the words “certain . . investigating committees” would mean “investigating ... investigating committees.” The word “certain” would be surplus-age.

. In United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 638 (1976), the Ninth Circuit rejected an argument that the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq. (Supp.1976), applies only to those engaged in large-scale “organized crime:”
“There is no doubt that Congress was concerned with organized crime in passing this amendment to the Hobbs Act. The official short title of the statute evidences this concern. But quite obviously Congress focused on some of the kinds of activities by which individuals and associations engaged in organized crime maintained their income or influence. The statute makes unlawful such activities no matter who engages therein.”
Id. at 363. (citation omitted).

. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921 (Supp.1976).

. 19 P.S. § 640.1 (Supp.1976).

. Id. § 640.6 (Supp.1976).

. Basing today’s decision on the fact that the conspiracy charges were withdrawn creates an absurd result. The original complaint charged conspiracy, and a grant of immunity therefore could have been given before the conspiracy charge was dropped. Indeed, immunity can be granted even before a complaint is filed. In In re Falone, 464 Pa. 42, 346 A.2d 9 (1975), the allegation of conspiracy was contained in the Attorney General’s petition for a grant of immunity, and the majority states that this was sufficient. Consequently, the request for immunity in this case is being denied merely because the request was filed at a later stage in the proceedings.

. The majority relies on a statement made by Representative Caputo on the House floor in support of its interpretation of the Immunity Act. This court has determined, however, that statements made on the floor of the House or Senate should not be relied on in formulating legislative intent. Commonwealth v. Alcoa Properties, Inc., 440 Pa. 42, 269 A.2d 748 (1970); Martin’s Estate, 365 Pa. 280, 74 A.2d 120 (1950); National Transit Co. v. Boardman, 328 Pa. 450, 197 A. 239 (1938). Moreover, such statements “• . . can be so ambiguous as to cause confusion rather than clarification.” Commonwealth v. Alcoa Properties, Inc., supra at 46, 269 A.2d at 749, a problem amply illustrated by the majority’s use of Representative Caputo’s statement.
Representative Caputo introduced a group of amendments, including the Immunity Act’s requirement that immunity be granted only “after a hearing in which the attorney general has established a need for the grant of immunity.” Pa.Leg.J. (House), at 1658 (1969); 19 P.S. § 640.1 (Supp.1976). This Court recognized the significance of this requirement in In re Falone, supra:
“The Legislature recognized that a grant of immunity is an extraordinary benefit conferred on the witness. The public interest is usually best served by prosecuting persons guilty of crime, but in certain limited circumstances the public interest may require the conferral of that benefit in return for disclosure of information in the witness’ possession. The Legislature was not satisfied to entrust the determination that those limited circumstances exist to law enforcement officials alone. Therefore, the Act provides that the Attorney General’s decision that immunization is necessary is subject to approval of the court.”
464 Pa. at 42, 346 A.2d at 9. Thus, when Representative Caputo stated that the amendments were to “provide certain safeguards to the citizens of this Commonwealth,” Pa.Leg.J. (House) at 1658 (1968), he probably was referring to the need to insure that criminals are not immunized from prosecution except when a court agrees with the Attorney General that it is more important to obtain their testimony. Both the limitation to proceedings relating to organized crime and racketeering, and the requirement that a need for the grant of immunity be established, are consistent with this interpretation.

. 19 P.S. § 640.6.

. Id. § 640.6.

. Act of December 8, 1970, P.L. 874 §§ 1 et seq., repealed and reenacted, Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482 § 1, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911 (1973).

. “Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(a) (Supp.1976).
The majority states that the Corrupt Organizations Act emphasizes civil remedies, but that is no reason to decide that the Corrupt Organizations Act and the Immunity Act are not in pari materia. Both deal with the same subject: organized crime and racketeering.
The majority’s statement that the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be diluted by a reference to a statute emphasizing noncriminal remedies and procedures reflects a complete misunderstanding of the privilege. “It ... is the danger of formal imposition of legal criminal liability against which the privilege protects.” J. McCormack, Evidence § 121 at 256 (2d ed. 1972). Thus, the availability of the privilege depends on the possibility that the witness may be subject to criminal prosecution; it does not depend on the particular proceeding before which the witness is called to testify. See id. §§ 135, 143. The distinction between a grand jury investigation and a civil proceeding pursuant to the Corrupt Organizations Act, relates only to the kind of proceeding in which the witness testifies, not to the possibility of any subsequent prosecution. To distinguish the provision for immunity made in the Corrupt Organizations Act because the Act emphasizes civil remedies is to make a distinction without a difference.
Moreover, the Corrupt Organizations Act is not limited to civil remedies. It defines criminal offenses which constitute felonies of the first degree, and apply independently of the Act’s civil remedies. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 911(b)-(c) (1973). These offenses all *450relate to organized crime and racketeering. Therefore, the Immunity Act should be construed together with the Corrupt Organizations Act so that the power to grant immunity is available when these crimes are prosecuted.

. “Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(b) (Supp.1976).
The majority simply ignores this provision of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972. Even if this provision did not exist, however, it would not follow, as the majority asserts, that it is improper to consider the Corrupt Organizations Act in construing the Immunity Act. The section of the Statutory Construction Act relied on by the majority provides:
“When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters:
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.”
Id. § 1921(c) (Supp.1976). The majority’s reliance on this provision is unfounded. First, since the Legislature’s intent may be determined by considering these factors “among other matters” it is clear that this list is not intended to be exclusive. Just because this subsection provides for consideration of prior legislation does not mean that subsequent legislation cannot be considered as well. Second, the Immunity Act is incorporated by reference in the Corrupt Organizations Act. Since that incorporation reflects the Legislature’s understanding of the Immunity Act, it can be thought of as a “Legislative interpretation” of the Immunity Act.

. As the majority points out, the Corrupt Organizations Act defines racketeering to include “criminal homicide,” 18 P.S. § 911(h)(l)(i) (1973), and the Immunity Act applies to “conspiracy to commit murder.” 19 P.S. § 640.6 (Supp.1976). This apparent contradiction, however, is no reason to ignore the Corrupt Organizations Act in construing the Immunity Act. The statutory Construction Act provides that “Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible, as one statute.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932(b) (Supp.1976). The better interpretation of this subsection, and of the Statutory Construction Act as a whole, is that if two *451statutes in pari materia cannot be treated as one statute for all purposes, they still should be treated together to the extent possible. The objective of statutory interpretation still should be to “effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” Id. § 1921(a) (Supp.1976). Thus, when two statutes deal with the same subject, they should be considered together so as to effectuate the purposes of both statutes.

. The majority asserts “that the legislature . . . confined the Immunity Act’s application solely to civil proceedings under the Corrupt Organizations Act . . . .” I cannot agree. Subsection (g) of the Corrupt Organizations Act provides:
“Whenever any individual refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to comply with a civil investigative demand issued pursuant to subsection (f) of this section or to testify or produce other information in any proceeding under subsection (d) of this section, the Attorney General may invoke the provisions of the act of November 22, 1968 (No. 333), entitled ‘An act authorizing courts of record to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution for or on account of any matter or thing concerning which they were ordered to testify in a proceeding before certain grand juries, investigating committees or commissions and courts of record; making the refusal to testify after such immunity criminal contempt and providing penalties,’ by presenting a petition pursuant to section 2 of that act: Provided, however, That the phrase ‘cause of action’ in section 3 of that act shall not refer to civil proceedings brought pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d) of this section.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(g) (1973) (footnotes omitted). Nowhere does subsection (g) say that the Immunity Act applies “only” to civil proceedings. A reasonable construction of subsection (g) is that it was intended to ensure that the Immunity Act extended to civil proceedings under the Corrupt Organizations Act, not that it was intended to limit the use of immunity in criminal proceedings. In enacting the Corrupt Organizations Act, the Legislature made it *453clear that it perceived organized crime as a serious threat to the Commonwealth. Subsection (a) of the Act provides:
The General Assembly finds that:
(1) organized crime is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread phenomenon which annually drains billions of dollars from the national economy by various patterns of unlawful conduct including the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption;
(2) organized crime exists on a large scale within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, engaging in the same patterns of unlawful conduct which characterize its activities nationally;
(3) the vast amounts of money and power accumulated by organized crime are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses operating within the Commonwealth, together with all of the techniques of violence, intimidation, and other forms of unlawful conduct through which such money and power are derived;
(4) in furtherance of such infiltration and corruption, organized crime utilizes and applies to its unlawful purposes laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania conferring and relating to the privilege of engaging in various types of business and designed to insure that such businesses are conducted in furtherance of the public interest and the general economic welfare of the Commonwealth;
(5) such infiltration and corruption provide an outlet for illegally obtained capital, harm innocent investors, entrepreneurs, merchants and consumers, interfere with free competition, and thereby constitute a substantial danger to the economic and general welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and
(6) in order to successfully resist and eliminate this situation, it is necessary to provide new remedies and procedures.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(a). Similar considerations also contributed to the enactment of the Immunity Act. Given these legislative purposes, this Court should not construe subsection (g) of the Corrupt Organizations Act as a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to use the Immunity Act in the prosecution of organized crime and racketeering. Certainly it is inappropriate to do so in this case, which does not involve a criminal prosecution under the Corrupt Organizations Act. By its unfortunate dictum, the majority has erected yet another barrier to the prosecution of individuals involved in organized crime and racketeering.

. In In re Falone, this Court stated: “Section 6 defines ‘organized crime or racketeering’ to include ‘bribery or extortion.’ ” 464 Pa. 42, 54, 346 A.2d 9, 16 (1975). In dissent, Mr. Justice Nix stated that the majority found “that conspiracy modified only the substantive crime of murder” and that the majority supported this finding by reasoning “that the legislature intended to grant immunity when the substantive crimes of bribery and narcotics offenses were committed.” Id. at 64, 346 A.2d at 21.

. If anything, the danger of the state intruding into the affairs of the individual is at its greatest in conspiracy prosecutions. As an inchoate crime requiring little or nothing in the way of an overt act, “conspiracy prescribes punishment for little more than state of mind.” Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. 189, 195 (1972).
Similarly, an investigating grand jury is much more likely to intrude into the affairs of the individual than an indicting grand jury because the scope of its inquiry is much less restricted. When testimony is presented before an indicting grand jury, it is for the purpose of determining whether there is a basis for indictment of a particular suspect against whom a criminal complaint has already been filed. When a witness is called before an investigating grand jury, on the other hand, he may be subjected to a much wider range of questioning, because the investigating grand jury is charged with uncovering possible criminal violations.

. In sharp contrast with the majority’s decision today is People v. Superior Court (Kaufman), 12 Cal.3d 421, 115 Cal.Rptr. 812, 525 P.2d 716 (1974). In that case, the California Supreme Court held that a court has the power to grant immunity despite the absence of any specific legislative authorization. Recognizing that the grant of immunity leaves the privilege against self-incrimination inviolate, the court authorized a grant of immunity where it would further enforcement of the state’s consumer protection laws.