Court Opinion

ID: 9954426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 14:00:43.896343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:20.025183
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11936    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 03/26/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11936
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JESSICA IVEY,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       CRESTWOOD MEDICAL CENTER,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-01053-CLS
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11936      Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 03/26/2024     Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11936

       Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jessica Ivey, an Asian woman, sued her employer,
       Crestwood Medical Center, alleging various forms of
       discrimination. She alleged (1) discriminatory discharge under 42
       U.S.C. § 1981; (2) racially hostile work environment under Title
       VII; (3) hostile work environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (4)
       retaliation under Title VII; and (5) retaliation under 42 U.S.C.
       § 1981.
              The district court granted summary judgment to Crestwood
       on all counts. The court found that Ivey had not established a
       prima facie case of racial discrimination because she had not
       identified a similarly situated employee who was treated more
       favorably. She also had not presented evidence sufficient to
       establish a case of hostile work environment because she only
       alleged one isolated racial remark. Finally, she did not establish a
       case of retaliation because she could not show causation between
       her protected activity and termination.
              We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
       judgment. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th
       Cir. 2010). We can affirm the district court’s judgment on “any
       basis supported by the record, regardless of whether the district
       court decided the case on that basis.” Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of
       Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019).
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       23-11936                Opinion of the Court                          3

                 On appeal, Ivey argues that the district court erred because,
       first, it erred in concluding that she failed to make a prima facie case
       of race discrimination. Next, she argues that she presented
       evidence of severe and pervasive discrimination due to her race.
       And third, she argues that she did show causation because a close
       temporal proximity existed between her protected activity and her
       termination. Alternatively, she argues that her drug screening was
       a materially adverse action taken in retaliation for her protected
       conduct. None of Ivey’s arguments are persuasive.
              First, Ivey’s claim of discriminatory discharge fails because,
       regardless of whether she made out a prima facie case of
       discrimination, she did not present any evidence that Crestwood’s
       race-neutral reason for her termination was pretextual. See
       McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973); Tynes v.
       Florida Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023). Crestwood
       tried to reach a compromise with Ivey; it emailed and called her
       multiple times, offered her other positions at the hospital with the
       same or higher pay, and yet she declined every offer. That refusal
       to return to a normal schedule was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
       reason to terminate Ivey’s employment with Crestwood, and Ivey
       has not presented any evidence to the contrary. She does not even
       argue in her brief that this explanation was pretextual, let alone that
       Crestwood’s proffered reason was both false and that the true
       reason was discriminatory. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509
       U.S. 502, 515 (1993). In short, Ivey has not shown that there is a
       genuine dispute that Crestwood terminated her employment on
       account of her race.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11936

               Second, Ivey’s claim of hostile work environment fails
       because she has not presented evidence that the alleged harassment
       she suffered was sufficiently severe or pervasive to support this
       kind of claim. A workplace is considered “hostile” when it is
       “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,”
       that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
       victim’s employment and create an abusive working
       environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)
       (quotations omitted). Even if offensive or racially derogatory,
       “sporadic and isolated” comments are not enough to create a
       hostile work environment. See McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370,
       1379 (11th Cir. 2008). Here, Ivey has only presented a single
       incident of an inappropriate comment about her race; her
       supervisor allegedly told her that the “China virus is from your
       people.” Other than that, she alleges that this supervisor told other
       nurses not to help her, told Ivey to “shut it,” scheduled Ivey’s lunch
       breaks, and slapped Ivey on the bottom once. These secondary
       allegations do not show a racial motive, nor do the allegations in
       combination rise to the level of severity required to plausibly
       demonstrate a hostile work environment.
              Third, Ivey’s retaliation claim fails because she did not show
       causation between her protected activity and any adverse
       employment action she suffered. To make out a prima facie case
       of retaliation, Ivey must show (1) “that she engaged in statutorily
       protected activity,” (2) “that she suffered an adverse action,” and
       (3) “that the adverse action was causally related to the protected
       activity.” Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Georgia, Inc., 967 F.3d 1121,
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       23-11936               Opinion of the Court                        5

       1134 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (quotations omitted). Although
       temporal proximity can be used to create a genuine issue of
       material fact as to the causation element of retaliation, “mere
       temporal proximity, without more, must be very close.” Thomas
       v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007)
       (quotation omitted). Here, Ivey’s protected activity took place on
       June 12, 2020, but Crestwood did not terminate her until
       September 3, 2020. That nearly-three-month gap is insufficient by
       itself to create a triable issue of fact about whether Crestwood
       terminated her because of her protected activity.
              Alternatively, Ivey argues that Crestwood retaliated against
       her by subjecting her to drug screening on the same day that she
       reminded decisionmakers of her discrimination complaint. An
       action is materially adverse if it “well might have dissuaded a
       reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
       discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.
       53, 68 (2006) (quotations omitted). It must be significant, not
       merely “petty slights or minor annoyances.” Id. Ivey’s drug test
       did not rise to the requisite significance to constitute a materially
       adverse employment action. Her drug test came back clean, she
       only missed three days of work, and she was fully compensated for
       that missed time. In short, she suffered no tangible harm, but the
       antiretaliation law only protects an individual “from retaliation
       that produces an injury or harm.” Id. at 67. And even if being
       subject to drug screening were an adverse employment action,
       Crestwood offered a legitimate reason for the drug test—Ivey’s
       colleagues reported erratic, unsafe, paranoid behavior, and
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       6                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11936

       evidence of drug miscounts. Ivey did not present any evidence that
       this explanation was false and that the true reason was retaliatory.
             The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.