Court Opinion

ID: 9405598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 20:04:24.492456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.907692
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SHAKIMA KELLY,                          )
                                        )
           Appellant                    )
                                        )
      v.                                )   C.A. No. K22A-11-003 SKR
                                        )
FELTON AUTOMOTIVE GROUP &               )
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE                  )
APPEAL BOARD,                           )
                                        )
           Appellees.                   )

                                    ORDER

                             Submitted: April 4, 2023
                              Decided: June 27, 2023

  Upon Consideration of Appellant’s Appeal of the Decision of the Unemployment
                    Insurance Appeal Board, AFFIRMED.

Shakima Kelly, Appellant, pro se.

Tasha M. Stevens-Gueh, Esquire, Andrew & Stevens-Gueh, LLC, 115 S. Bedford
Street, Georgetown, DE 19947, Attorney for Appellee Felton Automotive Group.

Victoria Groff, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 820 N.
French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for Appellee, Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board.

Victoria Counihan, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 820 N.
French Street, Wilmington, DE 19801, Attorney for the Delaware Division of
Unemployment Insurance, a statutory party-in-interest.

RENNIE, J.
                                  I.     INTRODUCTION

       Claimant-Appellant Shakima Kelly (“Claimant”) appeals a decision of the

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”), which found that Claimant

is not eligible to receive unemployment benefits, effective from the week ending

May 23, 2022. Upon consideration of the arguments, submissions of the parties, and

the record in this case, the Board’s decision is upheld.

                   II.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       1.     Claimant was employed by Felton Automotive Group, LLC

(“Employer”) from May 2020.1 On May 9, 2022, Claimant informed Employer that

she needed to take FMLA (Family and Medical Leave Act) stress leave.2 On May

12, 2022, Claimant felt sick at work and was admitted to the hospital.3 That same

day, Employer sent an email to Claimant, which included FMLA documents and

information about short-term disability.4

       2.     Although Claimant was released to return to work on May 16, 2022,5

Claimant did not return to work.6 Instead, on May 22, 2022, Claimant applied for

unemployment insurance benefits.7 The next day, she left a voicemail indicating

1
  R. 82.
2
  R. 85.
3
  R. 86.
4
  R. 87.
5
  R. 84. Claimant testified during the hearing before the Appeals Referee that she was released
from the hospital and was told that she could return to work on May 16, 2022. Id.
6
  R. 87.
7
  R. 180.
                                              2
that she would come to the Employer’s parking lot to retrieve her FMLA paperwork

from the receptionist. 8 In response to the voicemail, Cindy Landis, Employer’s

Comptroller, called Claimant.9 It is disputed whether Claimant was fired during the

phone conversation. Claimant claims that she was fired, while Employer claims that

the conversation was strictly related to the FMLA paperwork. 10 Regardless,

Claimant submitted the FMLA documents following the phone conversation. 11

Thereafter, Landis sent an email to Claimant—approving Claimant’s FMLA request

from May 23, 2022 to August 15, 2022—to which Claimant did not respond. 12

Employer also sent its FMLA approval by priority mail, which Claimant received

on June 4, 2022.13 Claimant started to work for another employer in the second

week of June 2022.14

       3.     On June 10, 2022, after reviewing Claimant’s application for

unemployment benefits, the Claims Deputy found that she was ineligible for the

benefits. Claimant then appealed. The Appeals Referee reversed the decision and

found that the Claimant was eligible for the benefits. Employer, thereafter, appealed

the Referee’s decision to the Board.

8
  R. 95.
9
  R. 95–96.
10
   Compare Claimant’s Opening Br., at 3–4, and R. 97–98, with Employer’s Answering Br., at 3.
11
   R. 117, 164.
12
   R. 170.
13
   R. 120, 171.
14
   R. 44.
                                              3
       4.      After hearing arguments from both parties, the Board, on October 18,

2022, reversed the Referee’s decision and found that Claimant was ineligible to

receive unemployment benefits. 15 The Board specifically found that, although

Claimant was unemployed as defined under 19 Del. C. § 3302(17), Claimant was

not qualified for the receipt of unemployment benefits. The Board explained that

Claimant’s unemployment was caused by her inability to work due to medical

reasons, and thus she is disqualified under the parameters of 19 Del. C.§ 3314(8).16

       5.      On November 4, 2022, Claimant timely appealed the Board’s decision

to this Court. On February 3, 2023, Claimant filed her opening brief. On February

27, 2023, Employer filed its answering brief. On March 9, 2023, Claimant filed her

reply brief.

                              III.   PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

       6.      Claimant argues that she was terminated and, thus, not employed during

the week ending May 23, 2022.17 Claimant further contends that her termination

preceded her FMLA approval, and hence, the Board erred when it took FMLA into

consideration in determining that she was disqualified from unemployment

benefits. 18 Further, she contends that, even if the Board is correct that she was

15
   R. 13–14.
16
   Id.
17
   Claimant’s Opening Br., at 3–4.
18
   Id. at 3–6.
                                           4
disqualified from unemployment benefits due to her inability to work, the

disqualification ended once she became “able and willing” to work, as she construes

19 Del. C. § 3314(8).19

       7.         Employer agrees that Claimant was statutorily unemployed during the

week ending May 23, 2022. 20 Employer, however, posits that Claimant is still

disqualified from receiving the benefits under 19 Del. C. § 3314(8), because her

unemployment resulted from her medical inability to work and, she failed to present

evidence from a doctor showing that she was able to resume work without any

restrictions.21

                               IV.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       8.     On appeal from the Board, this Court’s role is limited to determining

whether substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s decision and to examine

the Board’s findings and conclusions for legal error. 22 “Substantial evidence” is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.”23 “It is not the appellate court’s role to weigh the evidence, determine

19
   Id.
20
   Employer’s Answering Br., at 7.
21
   Id. at 8–9.
22
   Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Martin, 431 A.2d 1265 (Del. 1981); 19 Del. C. § 3323(a) (“In
any judicial proceeding under this section, the findings of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive,
and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of law.”).
23
   Dean v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 2014 WL 1228647, at *1 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2014) (quotation
omitted).
                                               5
credibility questions or make its own factual findings, but merely to decide if the

evidence is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings.”24

                                       V.      DISCUSSION

       9.      Under 19 Del. C. § 3302(17), a claimant may be considered

unemployed if she performs no services for which wages are payable or if she works

less than normal full-time hours.25 Applying § 3302(17), the Board correctly found

that Claimant was not employed during the week ending May 23, 2022, because she

failed to perform any services for Employer.26

       10.     Moreover, pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(8), 27 an individual is

disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits when the unemployment is

because of her inability to work. 28 “An employee is considered unable to work

within the meaning of the statute when [she] is restricted from performing [her]

24
   McManus v. Christina Serv. Co., 1997 WL 127953, at *1 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 1997).
25
   “Unemployment” exists and an individual is “unemployed” in any week during which the
individual performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to the individual,
or in any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to the individual with respect to
such week are less than the individual’s weekly benefit amount plus whichever is the greater of
$10 or 50% of the individual’s weekly benefit amount. 19 Del. C. § 3302(17); see also Husband
v. Env't Design, LLC, 2012 WL 1413595, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 3, 2012) (finding that 19 Del. C.
§ 3302(17) provides that “an employee may be eligible for unemployment benefits when he is
working fewer hours than he normally works.”).
26
   R. 13.
27
   19 Del. C. § 3314(8) (“If it shall be determined by the Department that total or partial
unemployment is due to the individual's inability to work. Such disqualification to terminate when
the individual becomes able to work and available for work as determined by a doctor's certificate
and meets all other requirements under this title.”).
28
   Dean v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 2014 WL 1228647, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 25, 2014).
                                                6
normal job duties by [her] doctor due to a physical condition.”29 “[T]o be considered

as ‘able and available for work,’ Claimant must present documentation or testimony

from her doctor indicating that she is released to go back to work without

restriction.”30 Claimant’s failure to provide any such documentation or testimony

from a doctor precludes her ability to prevail on this appeal.

       11.    The Board correctly found that Claimant was disqualified from

receiving unemployment benefits at the time of her application, because she was

restricted from performing her job duties due to her medical condition. This was

evidenced by her request for FMLA.31 Claimant did not present any evidence from

her doctor to the Board that she was able and available to work. Accordingly, the

Court finds that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free

from legal errors.

       IT IS SO ORDERED that the Board’s Decision is AFFIRMED.

                                                         _____________________
                                                         Sheldon K. Rennie, Judge

29
   Brown v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2011 WL 863310, at *2 (Del. Super. Feb. 3, 2011).
30
   See Jackson–Mills v. Carter Racing Stables, 2012 WL 3025860, at *2 (Del. Super. July 25,
2012) (emphasis in original).
31
   Neither the Board nor the Court considers FMLA as evidence of employment. Rather, the Board
considered Claimant’s FMLA request as evidence of her medical condition, and the Court agrees.
See R. 13–14.
                                              7