Court Opinion

ID: 9782351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:24:20.948305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:50.831624
License: Public Domain

LEHMAN, Justice,
dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, joins.
[T 17] I must respectfully dissent.
[118] The majority finds the order of restitution in this matter constitutes an illegal sentence. The basis of the majority's finding appears to be that the majority does not agree that the "pecuniary damages" in this case can be something other than the pickup's readily ascertainable fair market value at the time of theft, The majority thus concludes that the amount of restitution ordered by the district court is not reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, the majority has substituted its own determination of reasonable restitution for that of the district court.
[119] As the majority stated, our review of an order of restitution "is confined to a search for procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion." ¶ 9 (citing Brown v. State, 2003 WY 72, ¶ 9-70 P.3d 238, ¶ 9 (Wyo. *11862003)). When considering an abuse of discretion, we must determine whether the district court could reasonably conclude as it did. Herrera v. State, 2003 WY 25, ¶ 10, 64 P.3d 724 ¶ 10 (Wyo.2003). We look to see whether the district court exercised sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Brown, ¶ 9. Specifically, the applicable statutes require us to determine whether the damages awarded could have been recovered in a civil action arising out of the same facts or events. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-103(b); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-101(iii); Alcaraz v. State, 2002 WY 57, ¶¶ 14-15, 44 P3d 68, ¶¶ 14-15 (Wyo.2002) (holding that a portion but not all of the cost of video surveillance equipment could be allocated to the defendant charged with felony larceny).
[120] The oral pronouncements from the bench as well as the restitution order indicate that the district court was cognizant of this requirement and sought to ascertain the damages accordingly. Indeed, I find that the amount of restitution ordered in this case falls within the confines of what could have been recovered in a civil trial. Therefore, we must not substitute our judgment of reasonable restitution for that of the district court. I believe the district court could reasonably conclude as it did and did so without acting arbitrarily or capriciously, and I would therefore uphold the district court's restitution order.
[T21] As was the cage in Alcaraz, neither party suggests a civil cause of action which could arise out of the same facts. Alcaraz, at ¶ 8. Similarly, however, an applicable civil cause of action would be conversion. Conversion is a distinet act of dominion wrongfully executed over one's property in denial of his right or inconsistent with it. Id. The proper measure of damages in a conversion case can include various components. For instance, in a conversion case involving a road grader, the plaintiff was awarded the return of his road grader, $10,000 to repair the engine, $400 to replace the cutting edge and batteries, $900 for tire replacement, $4,600 for the cost of attempted recovery of the grader, and $67,500 for the loss of use of his grader. Cross v. Berg Lumber Co., 7 P.3d 922, 931 (Wyo.2000). As can be seen, the plaintiff was given back his road grader and also awarded an allowance to repair his grader.
[122] We have further indicated that the injured party should receive full compensation for his actual losses whether it is by repair to the property or some other measure. Alcaraz, at ¶ 8; In conversion cases, damages are generally the sum of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for all actual losses or injuries sustained as a natural and proximate result of the defendant's wrong. Alcaraz, at ¶ 8. Indeed, special damages may be recovered in an action for conversion for any injury proximately resulting from the conversion. Id. The question then becomes the valuation of the injured party's actual damages.
[123] In making this determination, I consider what we have said regarding both restitution and civil damages in general. The purpose of an order of restitution is to compensate the victim for his loss. In describing this purpose we have said.:
The goal in awarding damages is to make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure an injury in terms of money. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 26 (1988). This occurs when the victim is in the same financial position he would have been in had the wrong not been committed. Id. We have said, "In computing damages, 'the primary objective [is] to determine the amount of loss, applying whatever rule is best situated to that purpose." " Cross, 7 P.3d at 933 (quoting O's Gold Seed Company v. United Agri-Products Financial Services, Inc., 761 P.2d 673, 676 (Wyo.1988)).
Alcaraz at ¶ 15.
[124] As can be seen by the above quote, the determination of restitution based on the amount of loss is not an exact science. Rather, this determination can be reached through the application of different rules. The appropriate measurement will vary depending on the cireumstances, We have stated, "liln cases where property is destroyed, the proper damage amount is the item's market value at the time it was de*1187stroyed. The retail market value is used when the victim intends to replace the property." Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 226 (Wyo.1997) (citation omitted).
[125] In various civil actions we have also recognized the varying measures of damages. We have said, "[the measure of damages to property which can be repaired and substantially restored to its former condition is the reasonable cost of repair or restoration." Kirby Bldg. Sys. v. Mineral Explorations Co., 704 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Wyo.1985) (quoting South Cheyenne Water & Sewer Dist. v. Stundon, 483 P.2d 240, 243 (Wyo.1971)). Additionally,
In Meredith GMC, Inc. v. Garner, 78 Wyo. 396, 328 P.2d 371, 378-374 (1958), we discussed the issue of how damages to a motor vehicle which is not totally destroyed are to be calculated. Surveying Wyoming precedent and various scholarly works, we concluded that damages could be calculated by using either the cost-of-repairs method or the decrease-in-market-value method. We indicated that the choice between these two methods should be determined "as the occasion may require." Id., 328 P.2d at 374.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Langdon, 624 P.2d 240, 242 (Wyo.1981). It thus appears that the method for determining the damages varies depending on the cireumstances, and there is no absolute rule. Therefore, the district court should be given wide latitude in making such a determination.
[T26] In this instance, the district court held a hearing regarding restitution. The testimony was specific and detailed relating to the damages incurred and the work and parts it would take to restore the pickup. While this testimony came mostly from the victim, "where an owner has sufficient knowledge to establish the value of his own property, he may properly serve as a witness." Brown, 110. The victim in this case is a certified automobile mechanic and thus situated to have knowledge of these values. The trial court clearly considered the testimony regarding the value of the damage incurred to the victim's pickup and the cost of needed repairs. The district court offset this amount with a eredit for the parts that the vietim could sell because they would not be needed or they were duplicate parts. The trial court additionally ordered that Bush's obligation be joint and several with Sparby's ordered restitution to assure that the victim would not receive a windfall.
[127] A review of the testimony and the thorough considerations of the district court clearly indicates to me that the restitution order was not an illegal order. The amount of restitution fixed by the trial court was supported by evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for estimating the loss and was an amount that could be awarded in a civil suit. See Brown, T9. The majority bases much of its reasoning on the district court's mention of a unique and special value to the victim. My review of the testimony and the order indicates that this does not appear to be a significant basis of the district court's determination. It appears to me that the district court was not compensating the victim for this "subjective sense of value." Rather, it appears the district court simply sought to allow the victim to be made whole through the repair of his truck. Considering the circumstances, such a determination is reasonable.
[128] Perhaps the definition of what is reasonable will differ from one person to another, but under no cireumstances can that difference alone form the basis of an abuse of discretion. In this case, the majority simply did not agree with the district court's method of calculating reasonable damages. However, this does not mean the district court abused its discretion and it certainly does not mean that there was an illegal sentence. As long as the district court's determination was reasonable and in an amount that could be awarded in a civil action it is not arbitrary or capricious and should be upheld.