Court Opinion

ID: 9943477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:04:24.782047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.132053
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Feb 23 2024, 8:37 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Yvette M. LaPlante                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Evansville, Indiana                                        Indiana Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           Justin F. Roebel
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Oscar Contreras Zamilpa,                                   February 23, 2024
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-CR-1309
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Vanderburgh
                                                           Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           82D03-2202-F3-001011

                                   Opinion by Judge May
                                Judges Bailey and Felix concur.

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                           Page 1 of 22
[1]   Oscar Contreras Zamilpa appeals his convictions of Level 3 felony rape, 1 Level

      5 felony criminal confinement, 2 and three counts of Level 6 felony sexual

      battery. 3 Zamilpa presents two issues for appeal, which we revise, reorder, and

      restate as:

                 1. Whether the trial court violated Zamilpa’s protection against

                 substantive double jeopardy by entering convictions of:

                          1.1 both rape and criminal confinement, and

                          1.2 three counts of sexual battery; and

                 2. Whether Zamilpa’s sentence is inappropriate given the nature of his

                 offenses and his character.

      We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   Zamilpa and C.M. were both residents of an assisted living facility in

      Evansville, Indiana. They lived in separate apartments on the facility’s third

      floor, and they would occasionally spend time together in a lobby located at the

      end of the hallway. On February 18, 2022, C.M. told Zamilpa that she was

      1
          Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a) (2014).
      2
          Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1) (2019).
      3
          Ind. Code § 35-42-4-8(a) (2014).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024         Page 2 of 22
      replacing a loveseat in her apartment with a new sofa, and she offered her old

      loveseat to Zamilpa. Zamilpa said that he did not think he had enough room in

      his apartment, but he invited C.M. to his apartment for her to see if there was

      enough room for the loveseat.

[3]   After C.M. entered Zamilpa’s apartment, Zamilpa closed his apartment door

      and shoved C.M. against the wall. Zamilpa took C.M.’s walker and “slung” it

      into another room. (Tr. Vol. II at 79.) Zamilpa pulled C.M.’s hair and licked

      her neck. He also took off her top and bra and started “sucking tight” or

      “biting” her breasts. (Id.) In addition, Zamilpa pulled down C.M.’s pants.

      C.M. fought him and “kept saying please stop it. Leave me alone! I don’t want

      you doing this. Please leave me alone.” (Id.) However, Zamilpa continued

      assaulting C.M. He took his penis out of his pants and tried to insert it into

      C.M.’s vagina. Zamilpa scratched C.M.’s vagina with his fingernails while

      trying to insert his penis into her vagina. The assault stopped when another

      resident knocked on Zamilpa’s apartment door. Zamilpa answered the door,

      and the woman told Zamilpa that she had soup for him in her apartment.

      Zamilpa and C.M. exited Zamilpa’s apartment shortly thereafter. Zamilpa left

      to eat his soup, and C.M. sat down in the lobby. Other residents stopped and

      talked with C.M. while she was sitting in the lobby, and she told them about the

      incident with Zamilpa.

[4]   Someone reported the incident using an anonymous tipline, and Officer Jacob

      Hassler of the Evansville Police Department went to the assisted living facility

      to investigate. Officer Hassler spoke with C.M. and advised her to go to the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024    Page 3 of 22
      hospital. At the hospital, a nurse performed a sexual assault examination on

      C.M. The nurse observed bruises on C.M.’s breasts and abrasions in C.M.’s

      vaginal area. The nurse also collected DNA samples from C.M. during the

      examination, and the samples revealed the presence of Zamilpa’s DNA on

      C.M.’s left breast, right breast, and neck. The external genital swabs of C.M.’s

      vagina indicated the possible presence of male DNA, but the quantity was

      insufficient to determine whether the DNA belonged to Zamilpa. Detective

      Robert Waller interviewed Zamilpa at the police station, and Zamilpa denied

      having sexual contact with C.M. Detective Waller noticed during the interview

      that Zamilpa’s fingernails were freshly cut.

[5]   On February 23, 2022, the State charged Zamilpa with Level 3 felony

      attempted rape, Level 5 felony criminal confinement, and three counts of Level

      6 felony sexual battery. On February 17, 2023, the State amended the charging

      information to change the Level 3 felony charge from attempted rape to rape.

      The trial court then held a jury trial beginning on April 13, 2023. During the

      State’s opening statement, the deputy prosecutor explained the charges to the

      jury:

              Rape, it’s where he put his finger inside her vagina . . . I have
              him charged with Criminal Confinement for keeping her against
              the wall so she can’t leave. I have him charged with three counts
              of Sexual Battery. One for her left breast, one for right breast,
              and one for where he tried to insert his penis into her vagina.

      (Id. at 26.) The State presented surveillance footage from the hallway of the

      assisted living community that showed C.M. entered Zamilpa’s apartment at

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024   Page 4 of 22
      approximately 5:02 p.m. on February 18, 2022, and the woman knocked on

      Zamilpa’s door to tell him about the soup at approximately 5:09 p.m. The jury

      returned a verdict finding Zamilpa guilty as charged, and the trial court entered

      a judgment of conviction on each count.

[6]   The trial court held Zamilpa’s sentencing hearing on May 12, 2023. C.M.

      testified at the sentencing hearing that after Zamilpa assaulted her, she began

      “having a fear of being out in the open around other people[.]” (Id. at 143.)

      C.M. also testified that prior to the assault, she and another resident had “told

      the office about [Zamilpa] grabbing at our legs and . . . our heinies and

      everything like that” but the assisted living facility did not act on their

      complaints. (Id. at 145.) The trial court found C.M.’s advanced age and

      infirmity and Zamilpa’s criminal record to be aggravating factors. The trial

      court also commented that “[t]he nature and circumstances of the offense are

      aggravating” and noted that C.M.’s wounds “were still bleeding five hours after

      the assault[.]” (Id. at 158.) The trial court did not find any mitigating factors.

      The trial court sentenced Zamilpa to a term of twelve years for his Level 3

      felony rape conviction, four years for his Level 5 felony criminal confinement

      conviction, and two years for each of his three Level 6 felony sexual battery

      convictions. The trial court ordered Zamilpa to serve all the sentences

      concurrently, for an aggregate term of twelve years.

      Discussion and Decision

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024         Page 5 of 22
      1. Double Jeopardy
[7]   Zamilpa asserts the trial court violated his protection against substantive double

      jeopardy by, first, entering convictions of both criminal confinement and rape,

      and second, by entering convictions of three counts of sexual battery. We

      review such challenges de novo. Hessler v. State, 213 N.E.3d 511, 524 (Ind. Ct.

      App. 2023), trans. denied.

      1.1 Convictions of Criminal Confinement and Rape

[8]   Both the Indiana Constitution4 and the United States Constitution 5 prohibit

      double jeopardy. Initially, this protection served only as a procedural bar to a

      subsequent prosecution for the same offense following an acquittal or

      conviction, but “[o]ver time, the protection evolved beyond the procedural

      context to embody a substantive bar to multiple convictions or punishments for

      the same offense in a single trial.” Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 235 (Ind.

      2020). In Wadle, our Indiana Supreme Court announced a new framework for

      analyzing substantive double jeopardy challenges when the defendant’s

      criminal conduct implicates multiple criminal statutes. Id. The Court

      explained:

                 This framework, which applies when a defendant’s single act or
                 transaction implicates multiple criminal statutes (rather than a

      4
          “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 14.
      5
       “No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” U.S.
      Const. amend. V.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                                Page 6 of 22
                single statute), consists of a two-part inquiry: First, a court must
                determine, under our included-offense statutes, whether one
                charged offense encompasses another charged offense. Second, a
                court must look at the underlying facts—as alleged in the
                information and as adduced at trial—to determine whether the
                charged offenses are the “same.” If the facts show two separate
                and distinct crimes, there’s no violation of substantive double
                jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition, “included” in the
                other. But if the facts show only a single continuous crime, and
                one statutory offense is included in the other, then the
                presumption is that the legislation intends for alternative (rather
                than cumulative) sanctions. The State can rebut this
                presumption only by showing that the statute—either in express
                terms or by unmistakable implication—clearly permits multiple
                punishment.

      Id. (emphasis in original).

[9]   With the Wadle framework in mind, our first step in analyzing Zamilpa’s

      challenge to the trial court’s entry of judgments of conviction for both rape and

      criminal confinement is to determine whether the crime of rape encompasses

      criminal confinement. Here, the statute prohibiting rape, in relevant part,

      states:

                a person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse
                with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another
                person to perform or submit to other sexual conduct (as defined
                in IC 35-31.5-2-221.5) when:

                (1) the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat of
                force;

                                                  *****

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024        Page 7 of 22
               commits rape, a Level 3 felony.

       Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1. Indiana Code section 35-31.5-2-221.5 states: “‘Other

       sexual conduct’ means an act involving: (1) a sex organ of one (1) person and

       the mouth or anus of another person; or (2) the penetration of the sex organ or

       anus of a person by an object.” The statute outlawing criminal confinement

       provides: “A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person

       without the other person’s consent commits criminal confinement.” Ind. Code

       § 35-42-3-3(a). The offense is a Level 5 felony if “it results in bodily injury to a

       person other than the confining person[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(C).

       Neither statute clearly permits multiple punishment.

[10]   We look to “the included offense statutes to determine whether one offense is

       included in the other, either inherently or as charged.” Hendricks v. State, 162

       N.E.3d 1123, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Indiana

       Code section 35-38-1-6 states: “Whenever . . . a defendant is charged with an

       offense and an included offense in separate counts; and . . . the defendant is

       found guilty of both counts; judgment and sentence may not be entered against

       the defendant for the included offense.” Our legislature has defined an included

       offense as an offense that:

               (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less
               than all the material elements required to establish the
               commission of the offense charged;

               (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an
               offense otherwise included therein; or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024       Page 8 of 22
               (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less
               serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or
               public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to
               establish its commission.

       Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168.

[11]   It is the first category of included offense that is relevant to this case. While the

       rape statute does not explicitly recite confinement as an element of the offense,

       the act of forcible rape necessarily entails some degree of confinement. See

       Griffin v. State, 583 N.E.2d 191, 194-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“If a person is

       forcibly raped, or raped by the threat of force—the element of force—whether

       actual, threatened, or constructive, constitutes the crime of confinement defined

       as a substantial interference with a person’s liberty.”), reh’g denied. We held in

       Stover v. State that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the

       defendant’s conviction of criminal confinement when the State failed to prove

       the defendant confined the victim beyond what was inherent in the act of rape.

       621 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). Conversely, in Parks v. State, we

       held the defendant’s convictions of both rape and criminal confinement did not

       run afoul of Indiana Code section 35-38-1-6 because the defendant confined the

       victim beyond what was necessary to effectuate the rape. 734 N.E.2d 694, 701

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Thus, the offense of criminal confinement

       may constitute an included offense of rape. If Zamilpa’s acts of criminal

       confinement and rape were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness

       of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction,” then

       entering convictions of both offenses constitutes double jeopardy. Wadle, 151

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024          Page 9 of 22
       N.E.3d at 249. “If the facts show two separate and distinct crimes, there’s no

       violation of substantive double jeopardy, even if one offense is, by definition,

       ‘included’ in the other.” Id.

[12]   The State urges us to confine our analysis of whether the crimes of criminal

       confinement and rape constitute separate and distinct crimes to the charging

       information, and the State argues “there is nothing in the charging information

       suggesting that the same force was used to commit criminal confinement and

       rape.” (Appellee’s Br. at 14.) However, there is also nothing in the charging

       information differentiating the force used to commit criminal confinement from

       the force used to commit rape. The trial court recited the charging information

       in its preliminary jury instructions:

               The Information in Count 1, omitting the formal parts, reads as
               follows:

               In Vanderburgh County, State of Indiana, on or about February
               18, 2022, Oscar Contreras Zamilpa did knowingly or
               intentionally have other sexual conduct with [C.M.]; when such
               person was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force.

               The Information in Count 2, omitting the formal parts, reads as
               follows:

               In Vanderburgh County, State of Indiana, on or about February
               18, 2022, Oscar Contreras Zamilpa did knowingly or
               intentionally confine [C.M.] without the consent of [C.M.], said
               act resulting in bodily injury to [C.M.].

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024     Page 10 of 22
       (App. Vol. II at 60.) We cannot determine from the charging information

       whether the two offenses are separate and distinct. Therefore, we must look at

       how the State presented the charges at trial and the facts adduced at trial to

       determine whether the offenses are the same. See, e.g., Thurman v. State, 158

       N.E.3d 372, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (noting the charging information did not

       indicate that the facts underlying three charges were different and looking at the

       State’s closing argument and the facts adduced at trial to determine whether the

       offenses were separate and distinct crimes).

[13]   The only time the deputy prosecutor directly addressed the evidence underlying

       the criminal confinement charge was during the State’s opening statement when

       he stated: “I have him charged with Criminal Confinement for keeping her

       against the wall so she can’t leave.” (Tr. Vol. II at 26.) Based on this comment,

       Zamilpa argues that “the act of holding C.M. against the wall was part of one

       singular act that constituted the rape.” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.) The State

       counters that despite the deputy prosecutor’s minimal explanation, the facts

       adduced at trial still support both convictions because Zamilpa’s act of pinning

       C.M. against the wall “extended for a period far beyond what was necessary to

       commit rape because [Zamilpa] also held C.M. in place against the wall as he

       battered her breasts and licked her neck.” (Appellee’s Br. at 16.)

[14]   However, we cannot confidently say that the jury parsed the facts in the same

       sort of highly technical manner the State advances on appeal. The pre-Wadle

       actual evidence test required us to evaluate the evidence from the jury’s

       perspective. Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216, 1222 (Ind. 2015). We considered

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024    Page 11 of 22
       the charging information, the arguments of counsel, the jury instructions, and

       any other factors that may have guided the jury’s determination. Id. Our

       objective was to ensure there was no “reasonable possibility that the evidentiary

       facts used by the factfinder to establish the essential elements of an offense for

       which the defendant was convicted or acquitted may also have been used to

       establish all the essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Id. If the

       State did not present the facts in a way that forced the jury to distinguish

       between the two crimes before declaring the defendant guilty of both, we would

       not uphold both convictions. See, e.g., id. at 1223 (holding defendant’s

       convictions of both criminal confinement and battery constituted double

       jeopardy when “at trial the State failed to specifically allege and communicate

       to the jury what different evidence supported what charge” and there was a

       reasonable possibility that the jury based the battery conviction and the criminal

       confinement conviction on one continuous assault).

[15]   More recently, we have interpreted the second step of the Wadle analysis to

       require both that the State present the crimes as separate and distinct to the jury

       and that the facts show that the two crimes are separate and distinct. In Phillips

       v. State, the trial court entered convictions of both possession of

       methamphetamine and dealing in methamphetamine, and we vacated the

       defendant’s possession of methamphetamine conviction because the

       methamphetamine the State alleged the defendant possessed was the same

       methamphetamine the State charged him with dealing. 174 N.E.3d 635, 647

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). We noted “the State specifically advised the jury during

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024     Page 12 of 22
closing statements that ‘[i]f you’re dealing you’re in possession’ when

describing the evidence of the two offenses.” Id.                   Likewise, in Harris v. State,

we vacated the defendant’s pointing a firearm conviction when the State stated

in its closing argument that it was relying on the defendant’s single act of

pointing a handgun at the victim to support convictions of both pointing a

firearm and intimidation with a deadly weapon. 186 N.E.3d 604, 612 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2022). Because neither the charging information nor the way the State

presented the charges to the jury differentiated between the force Zamilpa used

in raping C.M. and the additional degree of force meant to support the criminal

confinement conviction, we hold the trial court erred in entering convictions of

both rape and criminal confinement. See, e.g., D.M. v. State, 222 N.E.3d 404,

410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding juvenile court’s true findings of both

possession of a firearm on school property and dangerous possession of a

firearm violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because both findings

were premised on the defendant possessing the same firearm on the same day

and during the same period). We affirm Zamilpa’s rape conviction but reverse

his criminal confinement conviction. See Demby v. State, 203 N.E.3d 1035, 1046

(Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (“Where a defendant is found guilty of both the greater

offense and the lesser-included offense, the proper procedure is to vacate the

conviction for the lesser-included offense and enter a judgment of conviction

and sentence only upon the greater offense.”), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                    Page 13 of 22
       1.2 Three Convictions of Sexual Battery

[16]   Zamilpa’s second substantive double jeopardy challenge concerns the trial

       court’s entry of three convictions of sexual battery. He asserts he “was

       punished thrice for the same conduct” and “the acts were so compressed in

       time, place, singleness of purpose and continuity of action as to constitute a

       single transaction.” (Appellant’s Br. at 8.)

[17]   On the same day that our Indiana Supreme Court decided Wadle, it also laid

       out the framework for deciding substantive double jeopardy claims “when a

       single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute and results in multiple

       injuries.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020). The Court decreed

       that such substantive double jeopardy claims should be analyzed using a two-

       step inquiry:

               First, we review the text of the statute itself. If the statute,
               whether expressly or by judicial construction, indicates a unit of
               prosecution, then we follow the legislature’s guidance and our
               analysis is complete. But if the statute is ambiguous, then we
               proceed to the second step of our analysis.

               Under this second step, a court must determine whether the
               facts—as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at
               trial—indicate a single offense or whether they indicate
               distinguishable offenses. To answer this question, we ask
               whether the defendant’s actions are so compressed in terms of
               time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to
               constitute a single transaction. If the defendant’s criminal acts
               are sufficiently distinct, then multiple convictions may stand; but
               if those acts are continuous and indistinguishable, a court may

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024     Page 14 of 22
                  impose only a single conviction. Any doubt counsels against
                  turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.

       Id. at 264-65 (internal footnote, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

[18]   With respect to the first step of the inquiry, the Court proclaimed that when a

       statute does not expressly indicate a unit of prosecution, “whether a single

       criminal statute permits multiple punishments for multiple victims” depends

       upon whether the statute is conduct-based or result-based. Id. at 265. The

       Court explained that “under a conduct-based statute, a single discrete incident

       can be the basis for only one conviction, no matter how many individuals are

       harmed.” Id. at 266 (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, under a

       result-based statute, “where several deaths or injuries occur in the course of a

       single incident, the prohibited offense has been perpetrated several times over.

       The separate victims represent different offenses because conduct has been

       directed at each particular victim.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks

       omitted).

[19]   Both parties direct us to the Powell analysis to decide Zamilpa’s second

       substantive double jeopardy claim. The State contends the sexual battery

       statute 6 is a result-based statute, and therefore the first step of the Powell analysis

       6
           Indiana Code section 35-42-4-8(a) defines Level 6 felony sexual battery, in relevant part, as:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                                Page 15 of 22
       is dispositive. However, we do not see this case as fitting neatly in the Powell

       box. See Jones v. State, 159 N.E.3d 55, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (J. Vaidik

       concurring) (observing that neither the Wadle test nor the Powell test applied

       neatly to the defendant’s circumstances), trans. denied.

[20]   “[H]ow [a] result-based statute applies when there is a single victim who

       suffered multiple, substantially similar injuries because of multiple instances of

       the same act is ambiguous.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 560 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2021). In Madden, we faced the question of whether the trial court erred

       by entering two aggravated battery convictions when the defendant threw two

       pots of hot water at a single victim. Id. at 560. Even though we held the

       aggravated battery statute was a result-based statute, we still proceeded to the

       second step of the Powell test and analyzed whether the two instances of the

       defendant throwing hot water on the victim were part of the same continuous

       transaction. Id. Likewise, we look to see whether Zamilpa’s three sexual

       batteries of C.M. were part of the same continuous transaction.

               A person who, with intent to arouse or satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or the
               sexual desires of another person:

                        (1) touches another person when that person is:

                                 (A) compelled to submit to the touching by force or the imminent
                                 threat of force[.]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                           Page 16 of 22
[21]   The State contends that “each time [Zamilpa] battered C.M. supports a separate

       sexual battery claim.” (Appellee’s Br. at 10.) As the State explained in its

       opening statement, it charged Zamilpa with a count of sexual battery for each

       sexual touch: “I have him charged with three counts of Sexual Battery. One for

       her left breast, one for her right breast, and one for where he tried to insert his

       penis into her vagina.” (Tr. Vol. II at 26.) However, the State’s argument is

       analogous to the argument our Indiana Supreme Court expressly rejected in

       Powell that “each pull of [the defendant’s] trigger amounted to ‘separate acts’

       designed to kill each person in [the target] car.” 151 N.E.3d at 269 (citing with

       approval Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (observing

       that a defendant who discharges fifty rounds in “one burst” of an automatic

       weapon at a single victim should not be charged with and convicted of fifty

       attempted murders)).

[22]   The three sexual touches occurred during the same assault in the same

       apartment and the objective of each was to satisfy Zamilpa’s own sexual

       desires. Thus, they were part of the same continuous transaction, and the trial

       court should have entered only one conviction of sexual battery. 7 Cf. Madden,

       162 N.E.3d at 560 (holding defendant’s two acts of throwing hot water on the

       7
         We also find it problematic that the trial court entered convictions of both rape and sexual battery of C.M.’s
       vagina because both were based on Zamilpa’s finger touching C.M.’s vagina. While the acts of touching
       C.M.’s breasts were separate and distinct from his act of raping C.M. by inserting his finger into her vagina,
       his act of touching C.M.’s vagina was not separate and distinct from his act of inserting his finger into it. See,
       e.g., D.M., 222 N.E.3d at 410 (holding juvenile’s delinquency adjudications constituted double jeopardy
       because the facts underlying both charges constituted a single transaction). Accordingly, one of the sexual
       battery convictions that the trial court should vacate is the count that alleged Zamilpa battered C.M.’s vagina.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024                               Page 17 of 22
       same victim did not constitute a single transaction when the two acts “did not

       occur at the same time, in the same place, and did not share a purpose”).

       Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s entry of multiple convictions of sexual

       battery and remand with instructions for the trial court to vacate two of the

       three convictions. See, e.g., Starks v. State, 210 N.E.3d 818, 823 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2023) (reversing conviction that violated Indiana’s prohibition on double

       jeopardy and instructing the trial court to vacate the conviction).

       2. Inappropriate Sentence
[23]   Zamilpa also contends his aggregate twelve-year sentence is inappropriate given

       the nature of his offenses and his character. Our standard of review regarding

       such claims is well-settled:

               Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) gives us the authority to revise a
               sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
               and the character of the offender. Our review is deferential to the
               trial court’s decision, and our goal is to determine whether the
               appellant’s sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other
               sentence would be more appropriate.

       George v. State, 141 N.E.3d 68, 73-74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations

       omitted), trans. denied. We may look at any factors appearing in the record

       when assessing the nature of the offense and character of the offender. Boling v.

       State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The defendant bears the

       burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Hubbert v. State, 163

       N.E.3d 958, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024      Page 18 of 22
[24]   “Our analysis of the nature of the offense requires us to look at the nature,

       extent, heinousness, and brutality of the offense.” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d

       656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained,

       “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense

       (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality)” may lead to a

       downward revision of the defendant’s sentence. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d

       111, 122 (Ind. 2015). When we evaluate whether a sentence is inappropriate

       given the nature of the offense, we first look to the advisory sentence.

       Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d

       218 (Ind. 2007). A person convicted of a Level 3 felony “shall be imprisoned

       for a fixed term of between three (3) and sixteen (16) years, with the advisory

       sentence being nine (9) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b). A person convicted of

       a Level 5 felony “shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and

       six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-

       50-2-6(b). A person convicted of a Level 6 felony “shall be imprisoned for a

       fixed term of between six (6) months and two and one-half (2 ½) years, with the

       advisory sentence being one (1) year.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7.

[25]   The trial court sentenced Zamilpa to a term above the advisory sentence but

       below the maximum sentence for each crime – twelve years for Level 3 felony

       rape, four years for Level 5 felony criminal confinement, and two years for

       Level 6 felony sexual battery. The trial court ordered Zamilpa to serve all the

       sentences concurrently. Therefore, even though we held above that two of

       Zamilpa’s three sexual battery convictions and his criminal confinement

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024      Page 19 of 22
       conviction should be vacated, Zamilpa’s aggregate sentence remains twelve

       years, and we consider whether twelve years is inappropriate for convictions of

       Level 3 felony rape and one count of Level 6 felony sexual battery.

[26]   Zamilpa asserts that his act of inserting his finger into C.M.’s vagina was “the

       bare minimum to constitute the crime of rape.” (Appellant’s Br. at 17.)

       However, this characterization vastly oversimplifies the brutality of Zamilpa’s

       crimes. Zamilpa lured C.M. into his apartment on false pretenses and shut the

       door after she entered. He took advantage of her lack of mobility by throwing

       her walker into another room. Zamilpa also continued to attack C.M. after she

       pleaded with him to stop and attempted to push him off her. He bruised her

       breasts, and he scratched her vagina with his fingernails while trying to insert

       his penis into it. The scratches caused C.M. severe pain, and the scratches were

       still bleeding when C.M. visited the hospital hours later. The nature of

       Zamilpa’s crimes does not merit a lesser sentence. See, e.g., Gale v. State, 882

       N.E.2d 808, 820 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding the nature of the defendant’s

       offense did not merit a lesser sentence when the defendant continued raping an

       unconscious woman after being told to stop by bystanders and the rape resulted

       in numerous bruises and abrasions).

[27]   We next turn to Zamilpa’s character. Zamilpa argues his sentence is

       inappropriate given his advanced age, his physical infirmities, and his self-

       reported mental health issues. However, a lengthy prison sentence is not

       necessarily inappropriate simply because the defendant is elderly and in poor

       health. See Garner v. State, 7 N.E.3d 1012, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024    Page 20 of 22
       that “[w]hile we recognize that [the defendant’s] age and infirmities are

       relevant,” the defendant’s sixty-year sentence was not inappropriate). In

       addition, “[w]hen considering the character of the offender, one relevant fact is

       the defendant’s criminal history.” Johnson v. State, 986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2013). “Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a

       defendant’s character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020). The pre-sentence investigation report indicates Zamilpa was convicted

       of making a terroristic threat in California in 1997, and Zamilpa self-reported a

       second conviction involving an unspecified felony in California in 1979. Even

       though these past convictions are substantially removed in time from Zamilpa’s

       current offenses, they still reflect poorly on his character. Thus, we cannot say

       Zamilpa’s aggregate twelve-year sentence is inappropriate. See, e.g., Gale, 882

       N.E.2d at 821 (holding defendant’s sentence was not inappropriate given his

       criminal history).

       Conclusion
[28]   We affirm Zamilpa’s convictions of rape and one count of sexual battery.

       However, we reverse his criminal confinement conviction and two of his sexual

       battery convictions because those additional convictions violated Zamilpa’s

       right to be free of double jeopardy. Therefore, we remand with instructions for

       the trial court to vacate those three convictions.

[29]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024   Page 21 of 22
Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1309 | February 23, 2024   Page 22 of 22