Court Opinion

ID: 9424429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:11:36.91072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:50.284458
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
dissenting.*
I am quite unable to join the opinions of Mr. Justice Black announcing the judgments of the Court in these cases. It is my view that the Constitution does not require a State to admit to practice a lawyer who believes in violence and intends to implement that belief in his practice of law and advice to clients. I also believe that the State may ask an applicant preliminary questions that will permit further investigation and reasoned, articulated judgment as to whether the applicant will or will not advise lawless conduct as a practicing lawyer.
Arizona has no intention of barring applicants based on belief alone. This my Brother Blackmun makes quite clear. Its inquiries were designed to ascertain whether an applicant expects actively to support illegal violence or espouses an activist role in implementing that idea.
Ohio takes much the same approach, and in my view both States are right. If, as a preface to further questions, New York may ask whether an applicant is a knowing member of the Communist Party, although that fact alone would not be ground for exclusion, see Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, post, p. 154, Arizona and Ohio may ask about simple membership for the same justifiable reason. And if investigation reveals the applicant to be actively furthering the illegal *11activities of any group or to be without comprehension that advising lawless conduct is incompatible with professional standards, the State should be able to deny admission to the Bar.
As Mr. Justice Black’s opinions hasten to assure us, a State may assure itself of an applicant’s “qualities of character” and educational qualifications. Accordingly, it would be entitled to make an assessment of his “honesty” and refuse to license him if firmly convinced by his responses or other record evidence that he would not conform to the standards of integrity expected of the members of the Bar. Neither should it be required to admit to practice a person who believes in violent conduct to achieve social, political, or other ends and who is currently and actively supporting such activities or who expects to do so in the course of advising clients in his professional role. I thus see no constitutional basis for forbidding the asking of perfectly relevant questions designed to ascertain whether an applicant considers it the proper role of the lawyer, as practitioner, to advise and advocate violence as a means for settling disputes or achieving social or political ends. I therefore dissent from the judgments in both of these cases.

 [This opinion applies also to No. 18, In re Stolar, post, p. 23.]