Court Opinion

ID: 9574967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:07.967209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:34.510736
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
dissenting.
While I concur in Divisions 1, 2 and 4 of the majority opinion, I cannot agree with the analysis and holding in Division 3 of the opinion with regard to the propriety of the hypothetical question propounded to defendant’s expert. The expert was asked, “Now, let’s assume that an individual drank beer for awhile and then drank whiskey or some form of—other kind of ethyl alcohol. Are you able to *823establish with any precision the length of time it takes an average person to get to one nine when you’re mixing these things up?” (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff timely objected at trial to the hypothetical question on the basis that there was no evidence of any consumption of liquor by the plaintiff. My review of the record verifies that, indeed, there was no evidence from either party that the plaintiff consumed any alcoholic beverage other than beer on the day of the collision. Therefore, on its face, the hypothetical question is deficient in that it states facts not in evidence. The majority attempts to circumvent the well established requirement of the necessity that a hypothetical question be supported by and adjusted to the facts in evidence by pointing to the testimony that plaintiff was in a place where mixed drinks were available and by emphasizing the evidence “that his consumption of alcohol resulted in a blood-alcohol level of .19.” Based upon the possible “availability” to plaintiff of alcohol in a form other than beer combined with the blood-alcohol test—which, at best, can only support a finding that the level ascertained was produced by consumption of some type alcohol—the majority excuses the factual deficiencies in the hypothetical question by fantasizing that the question was “directed to the amount of beer or other alcohol that will produce a reading of .19 . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) What the majority implies is that because the hypothetical question included one or more facts which were in evidence, directly or indirectly, the propounder of the hypothetical question automatically had license to add assumptions not supported by the record. However, it is important to note that the question which this court now approves as to form and substance was not as the majority rationalizes, phrased in terms of an assumption based upon consumption of beer or other alcoholic beverage. The question specifically and unequivocally sought to elicit the expert’s opinion based upon an assumption that beer was mixed with whiskey or other form of “hard” alcohol.
The question was designed to present an indication that the plaintiff had consumed alcohol in a form other than beer. That such was the thrust of the question is evidenced by the answer of the expert given after the overruling of the objection: “It would depend on the degree of mixing. Mixed drinks do have a higher alcoholic content than beer, so that, of course, it takes fewer ounces of, say, eighty-six proof whiskey to get to the same leve[l] as it does beer, so you need—I would need more information as to the combination to give you any type of general—specific answers to how much whiskey versus beer. It could be in any proportion.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the content as well as the apparent intent of the hypothetical question, the absence of any evidence supporting *824consumption by plaintiff of anything other than beer, and the response of the expert to the hypothetical question, I believe that the trial court erred in failing to sustain the objection. See Ga. Power Co. v. Crutchfield, 125 Ga. App. 488 (188 SE2d 140) (1972). Because the alcoholic consumption of plaintiff was a crucial factor in the defendant’s case and in view of the plaintiffs dispute of the accuracy of the blood-alcohol test, I am convinced that the erroneous allowance of the improper hypothetical question was harmful and that reversal is required. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray, Judge Banke and Judge Pope join in this dissent.