Court Opinion

ID: 9709618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:52:12.285378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.543316
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING PRESIDING JUSTICE EGAN delivered the opinion of the court:  In the petition for rehearing the city argues that we should hold that the failure to comply with the time requirements of the ordinance is not jurisdictional. In support of that argument the city maintains that our holding will have a crippling effect on its ability to properly enforce licensing laws. The city has conjured up several examples of ordinance violators being possibly excused from appropriate sanctions. We have two brief answers to the city’s arguments. In Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Comm’n (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 377, 247 N.E.2d 901, the License Appeal Commission was required by statute to render a decision within 20 days of the filing of an appeal. The supreme court said that this language was mandatory. The supreme court could not have been more clear on the effect on jurisdiction by failure to comply with a mandatory duty: “The language of the statutory time limitation is mandatory, and while the consequence of loss of jurisdiction for noncompliance is not explicitly stated, the legislative purpose is unmistakable when the amendment is read in the light of the decisions which immediately preceded its enactment. We hold, therefore, that by its failure to render a decision within the period limited by the statute, the License Appeal Commission lost jurisdiction to affirm the order of the Local Liquor Control Commissioner.” 42 Ill. 2d at 383-84. The two cases cited by the city are Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 230, 166 N.E.2d 574, and Latin Social Club, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 798, 370 N.E.2d 109. Those cases are not in point because in each of those cases the court construed the time restrictions imposed to be directory. With respect to the city’s argument that our holding will impose a severe administrative burden on the city’s licensing machinery, we have a simple answer: Change the ordinance. That is precisely what was done after Cummings v. Daley was decided. McNAMARA and RAKOWSKI, JJ., concur.