Court Opinion

ID: 9406225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 14:05:58.365261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:27.875252
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2022-CA-0029-MR

FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE,
BLUEGRASS LODGE #4                                 APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE KIMBERLY N. BUNNELL, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 21-CI-01972

LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT; AMANDA
MAYS BLEDSOE; CHUCK
ELLINGER II; DAVID KLOIBER;
FRED BROWN; HANNAH LEGRIS;
JAMES BROWN; JENNIFER
REYNOLDS; JOSH MCCURN;
KATHY PLOMIN; LINDA GORTON;
LIZ SHEEHANN; PRESTON
WORLEY; RICHARD MOLONEY;
STEVE KAY; SUSAN LAMB; AND
WHITNEY BAXTER                                     APPELLEES

                          OPINION
              AFFIRMING, IN PART, REVERSING,
                 IN PART, AND REMANDING

                        ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, CETRULO, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: The Fraternal Order of Police, Bluegrass Lodge #4 (FOP)

appeals the Fayette Circuit Court order dismissing its four-count amended

complaint against Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government et al. (LFUCG)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under CR1 12.02.

                FOP does not appeal the dismissal of the individual defendants the

circuit court concluded enjoyed qualified immunity. Therefore, we affirm the

order to the extent that it dismisses FOP’s claims against the individual defendants.

                However, we conclude that FOP did state claims against LFUCG

upon which relief can be granted. We reverse the order dismissing those claims

and remand for additional proceedings.

                                         BACKGROUND

                On June 24, 2021, LFUCG enacted a “no-knock ordinance” banning

the use of no-knock warrants2 in Fayette County, requiring Lexington Police

Department (“LPD”) officers to knock and announce their presence before

executing any search warrant on a private residence. The ordinance was enacted

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
  A no-knock warrant is a judicial process authorizing a police officer to enter premises without
prior announcement of his presence or authority for reasons including officer and public safety.
See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394-95, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615
(1997). No-knock warrant service makes possible “the avoidance of life-threatening resistance
by occupants of the premises . . . .” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596, 126 S. Ct. 2159,
2166, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2006).

                                               -2-
amid a national debate on the propriety of no-knock warrants, which arose after

Breonna Taylor was fatally shot in her home by Louisville police officers

executing a no-knock search warrant on March 13, 2020.3

                Approximately one year later, the Kentucky General Assembly passed

a bill limiting the use of no-knock warrants. See 2021 Ky. Acts ch. 202 (S.B. 4)

(eff. Apr. 9, 2021). Among other things, Senate Bill 4 amends KRS4 Chapter 455,

implementing specific limitations on the issuance of no-knock warrants by

Kentucky courts and the execution of said warrants. See KRS 455.180-455.200.

                On May 4, 2021, LFUCG proposed the ordinance to ban no-knock

warrants in Lexington. The purpose of the proposed ordinance was to protect “not

only our residents in Lexington but also officers going forward.” LFUCG’s May

4, 2021, Planning and Public Safety Committee – Virtual Meeting at 1:17:35-

1:18:28.

                On May 13, 2021, the FOP emailed Mayor Linda Gorton demanding

that LFUCG engage in collective bargaining with the FOP about whether enacting

the ordinance affected LPD officers’ working conditions. LFUCG responded that

it was not obligated to bargain over the legislative decision of whether to enact the

3
 On June 11, 2020, Louisville Mayor Greg Fisher signed into law an ordinance known as
“Breonna’s Law,” banning the use of no-knock warrants in Louisville. LOUISVILLE, KY,
ORDINANCE NO. 0-213-20 (2020).
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -3-
ordinance. Although LFUCG offered to meet and confer with the FOP to discuss

the ordinance, the FOP declined. On June 24, 2021, LFUCG passed the

Ordinance.5 The following day the mayor signed it into law.

                 On June 30, 2021, before the Ordinance became effective, FOP

pursued a different course, initiating the CBA’s grievance procedure which says:

“[a]ny controversy between L.F.U.C.G. and [FOP] concerning the meaning and

application of any provisions of this Agreement shall be adjusted in the manner”

5
    As codified in the Code, the Ordinance provides:

         Sec. 23-51. - No-knock warrants.

             (a) For purposes of this section, “no-knock warrant” means any arrest or search
                 warrant issued by a judge and executed upon a premises that does not require
                 those executing the warrant to knock and announce themselves and their purpose
                 prior to executing the warrant.

             (b) No police officer of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government Division of
                 Police shall seek or execute no-knock warrant [sic] at any location within
                 Lexington-Fayette County.

             (c) Any Lexington police officer charged with execution of a warrant upon any
                 premises in order to gain entry shall:

                   (1) Physically knock on an entry door to the premises in a manner and
                       duration reasonably expected to be heard by the occupants;

                   (2) Clearly and verbally announce, in a manner reasonably expected to be
                       heard by the occupants, as law enforcement having a warrant; and

                   (3) Absent exigent circumstances, wait a reasonable amount of time after
                       knocking and announcing before entering the premises.

             (d) All Lexington Police Officers present in the initial entry and securing of the scene
                 of a warrant shall be equipped with and activate a body worn camera.

LFUCG ORD. NO. 056-2021, § 1 (6-24-21).

                                                 -4-
described in the CBA. (CBA, Art. 11, Sec. 1.) This provision is consistent with

the Act, which says “urban-county governments . . . are prohibited from . . .

[r]efusing to bargain collectively in good faith[,]” which includes the duty “to

negotiate any question arising under any agreement[.]” KRS 67A.6904(1)(e), (3).

             On the same day FOP initiated the grievance procedure, it also filed a

complaint in Fayette Circuit Court seeking a declaratory judgment that LFUCG

was obligated by the Act to bargain collectively with FOP both before unilaterally

prohibiting FOP’s members from utilizing no-knock warrants and after the

decision reached fruition. FOP sought to have the circuit court declare the

Ordinance violated the “home rule” statute, KRS 82.082, KY. CONST. § 156b, and

KRS 67A.070. FOP also asked for injunctive relief while the collective bargaining

process ran its course.

             LFUCG responded that it had no duty to bargain the effects of the

Ordinance on LPD Officers collectively. FOP responded, amending its complaint

to allege LFUCG breached the CBAs both by its unilateral decision to ban no-

knock warrants without collective bargaining and by refusing to participate in the

CBA grievance procedure to resolve the “controversy . . . concerning the meaning

and application” of the CBA’s “other conditions of employment” provisions.

                                         -5-
             Notwithstanding these allegations of fact, the circuit court granted

LFUCG’s motion under CR 12.02 to dismiss FOP’s complaint for failure to state

any claim upon which relief can be granted. The FOP timely appealed.

             On appeal, the FOP argues that in failing to engage in collective

bargaining, LFUCG violated: (1) KRS 67A.6902(1) in enacting the Ordinance; (2)

the same statute in failing to bargain over the effects of the Ordinance; (3) the CBA

in enacting the Ordinance and ignoring the grievance; and (4) KRS 455.180 et seq.

Additionally, the FOP argues it has standing because it suffered a concrete injury

when LFUCG disregarded its statutory bargaining right.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted

is a question of law. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010). Appellate

review is “de novo, affording no deference to the trial court.” Id. “[T]he pleadings

should be liberally construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, all

allegations being taken as true.” Morgan v. Bird, 289 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. App.

2009).

                                     ANALYSIS

             Relevant to deciding whether FOP’s complaint states any claim upon

which relief can be granted, certain averments of fact therein must be taken as true.

                                          -6-
They say:

   • “The No-Knock Ordinance seriously endangers the health and safety of
     LPD Officers.” (Amended Complaint, ¶53.)

   • “The No-Knock Ordinance prohibits LPD Officers from seeking a lawful
     no-knock warrant, even when they objectively establish probable cause that
     requiring law enforcement to knock and announce their presence would
     increase the danger to officers involved in executing the warrant.” (Id.
     ¶54.)

   • “The No-Knock Ordinance exposes LPD Officers to possible discipline for
     insubordination if they disregard a lawful warrant because of the ‘knock and
     announce’ policy.” (Id. ¶62.)

   • “[FOP] timely requested an arbitration panel from the Federal Mediation
     and Conciliation Service.” (Id. ¶73.)

   • “The parties dispute whether the No-Knock Ordinance implicates and
     affects conditions of employment and mandatory subjects of collective
     bargaining.” (Id. ¶89.)

   • “The Parties dispute whether they must engage in collective bargaining over
     the No-Knock Ordinance.” (Id. ¶90.)

   • “LPD Officers now suffer an immediate and irreparable loss of bargaining
     control over their health and safety.” (Id. ¶118.)

   • “LPD Officers now suffer an immediate and irreparable loss of bargaining
     control over their discipline system.” (Id. ¶119.)

   • “LPD Officers now face an enhanced risk of serious physical injury and
     death caused by the No-Knock Ordinance.” (Id. ¶120.)

             The order dismissing does not begin by examining the sufficiency of

the allegations and whether they state a claim. Instead, it starts by focusing on

LFUCG’s “home rule” powers and its authority to enact local legislation on

                                         -7-
matters of public policy. Despite FOP’s allegations and argument to the contrary,6

the court presumed “[t]he soundness of the Ordinance as a matter of public policy

is not at issue.” (R. 454.)

              The circuit court’s touchstone of local government’s power to enact

ordinances it declares as public policy or as being in pursuit of a public purpose,

coupled with a legal conclusion LFUCG was freed thereby from contractual and

statutory duties, is reflected early in its order when it finds FOP lacks “standing to

challenge the constitutional validity of the No-Knock Ordinance.” (R. 453,

footnote 2.) This ruling appears intended to apply to all four counts. We will

address standing as to each count.

         A. Count 1: FOP’s breach-of-contract claim

              We hold that FOP has statutory standing to pursue its breach of

contract claim. KRS 67A.6908(3) (“Suits for violation of agreements between an

urban-county government and a labor organization representing police officers . . .

6
  FOP challenged LFUCG’s assertion in its motion to dismiss that “‘elected officials cannot be
required to bargain’ policy decisions.” FOP argued that such a “position radically undercuts
KRS Chapter 67A” and empowers municipal governments to “subvert the CBAs” simply by
using an ordinance to make unilateral changes to public employees’ working conditions.
(Response by Plaintiff [to] Renewed Motion to Dismiss, pp. 14-15.) FOP repeats the argument
before this Court. (Appellant’s brief, p. 5.)

                                              -8-
may be brought by the parties to the agreement in the Circuit Court of the urban-

county government.”).7

                The FOP alleges the CBAs created LFUCG’s duty to bargain

collectively, and it also alleges LFUCG breached that duty. The injury, as the

circuit court said, is that FOP “was denied the ability to bargain[.]” (R. 453,

footnote 2.) Of course, whether there was a breach remains, even now, an

unresolved question of fact for a jury, assuming the answer cannot be resolved by

motion practice under CR 56 or otherwise. A.A. By & Through Lewis v. Shutts,

516 S.W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. App. 2017) (“breach question is generally a fact issue

for a jury”).

                The order dismissing does not indicate that FOP’s Count 1 fails to

allege all elements of a contract breach claim. We, too, conclude that Count 1

alleges facts which, if proven, justify relief.

                However, the circuit court dismissed Count 1 for different reasons

than FOP’s failure to state a claim. Passing over the discussion of the allegations

of duty and breach, the circuit court said, “LFUCG did not violate Article 1 of the

CBA by enacting the No-Knock Ordinance.” (R. 460.) The circuit court found

that LFUCG did not commit a breach – generally a question of fact for the jury.

7
  Although Kentucky provides for an administrative process to cure a government’s failure to
bargain, KRS 67A.6906, the General Assembly carved out this unique direct route to the court
system, KRS 67A.6908(3).

                                            -9-
             Because the claim was dismissed on the pleadings, the circuit court’s

ruling of no breach cannot be based on factfinding; it must be based on the circuit

court’s legal conclusions. FOP’s arguments challenge the circuit court’s

conclusions. We do not reach the merits of the circuit court’s conclusions given

that we are reversing and remanding to allow the parties to flesh out the merits of

the arguments and, after doing so, allow the circuit court to rule accordingly. The

parties must have ample opportunity to explore discovery if desired and then

present their arguments to the circuit on what constitutes conditions of

employment, effects of employment, “home rule,” administrative versus legislative

action, whether the Ordinance disturbs a comprehensive scheme of legislation, and

whether injunctive relief is warranted.

       B.    Count 2: FOP’s Declaration of Rights under KRS 67A.6901 et seq.

             The circuit court did not expressly rule that FOP failed to state a claim

for a declaration of its rights under KRS 67A.6901 et seq. However, the order says

it “addresses all claims of all parties,” and that language subsumes Count 2. (R.

462.) We conclude that FOP’s Count 2 did not fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Therefore, we reverse the order dismissing Count 2.

             Count 2 is the vehicle, and KRS Chapter 418 is the authority by which

FOP “appl[ies] for and [seeks to] secure a declaration of [its] right” under the Act

legislating collective bargaining. KRS 418.040 (“In any action in a court of record

                                          -10-
of this Commonwealth having general jurisdiction . . . the plaintiff may ask for a

declaration of rights . . . and the court may make a binding declaration of rights

. . . .”). FOP sought from the circuit court the relief the General Assembly

expressly authorized the circuit court to grant, as stated in KRS 418.055 and KRS

418.070. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 96, 97.)

             To the extent the circuit court’s ruling that FOP lacks standing applies

to Count 2, we reverse that ruling. FOP has statutory standing to bring the claims

stated in Count 2, and as just summarized.

             We agree with FOP that, absent proof of its clear and convincing

waiver of the right to collectively bargain with LFUCG over this subject,

LFUCG’s argument will not justify dismissing either Count 1 or Count 2. And at

this stage of the litigation, proof sufficient to satisfy the standard for a waiver

stated in Greathouse v. Shreve, 891 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Ky. 1995), is not a part of

the circuit court’s analysis.

             LFUCG argues FOP’s waiver of rights in two other places. First is

the implication that waiver can be found in FOP’s refusal of LFUCG’s invitation to

“meet and confer.” LFUCG’s invitation was meaningless because it was

accompanied by LFUCG’s express denial of its obligation to bargain collectively.

             Second, LFUCG cites KenAmerican Resources, Inc. v. Potter

Grandchildren, LLC, for the idea that “filing this action in the Fayette Circuit

                                          -11-
Court was a clear and irrefutable renouncement of the arbitration provision.” 916

F. Supp. 2d 799, 801 (E.D. Ky. 2013) (quoted in Appellees’ brief, p. 22). This

case is distinguishable by its facts and the law.

             The burden of proof is upon the person relying upon
             waiver. Waiver requires proof of a “knowing and
             voluntary surrender or relinquishment of a known right.”
             Because this is a right with both constitutional and
             statutory underpinnings, proof of waiver must be clear
             and convincing. As such, while no formal or written
             waiver is required, statements and supporting
             circumstances must be equivalent to an express waiver to
             meet the burden of proof. Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky.,
             891 S.W.2d 387, 391 (1995).

Pangallo v. Kentucky Law Enf’t Council, 106 S.W.3d 474, 479 (Ky. App. 2003).

We examined these pleadings carefully, including the CBAs incorporated in the

complaint and amended complaint. There is nothing that supports LFUCG’s claim

of waiver.

             A close reading of the order dismissing reveals it does not dismiss

Count 2 for failing to state a claim. It could be interpreted as the circuit court

having adjudicated the claim in favor of LFUCG.

             On its face, Count 2 states a claim upon which relief can be granted.

When reviewing denials of claims for declaratory judgment, “[t]he appellate court

in its consideration of the case, shall not be confined to errors alleged or apparent

in the record. When, in its opinion, further pleadings or proof is necessary to a

final and correct decision of the matters involved, or that should be involved, it

                                         -12-
shall remand the case for that purpose . . . .” KRS 418.065. Because the

Declaratory Judgment Act is “to be liberally interpreted and administered[,]” KRS

418.080, we believe it appropriate to follow the mandate of KRS 418.065.

Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of Count 2 and remand for further proceedings.

      C.     Count 3: FOP’s Declaration of Rights under KY. CONST. § 156b,
             KRS 82.082, and KRS 67A.070.

             The circuit court dismissed this claim by granting LFUCG’s motion

under CR 12.02(f) for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Count 3 alleges FOP’s right to challenge the Ordinance as void under the law of

“home rule.” We conclude that the allegations do state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. However, as with Count 2, it is this Court’s opinion that “further

pleadings or proof is necessary to a final and correct decision of the matters

involved, or that should be involved,” and we “shall remand the case for that

purpose” with the following observation. KRS 418.065.

             Under “home rule,” LFUCG is empowered to “enact and enforce

within their territorial limits such tax, licensing, police, sanitary and other

ordinances not in conflict with the Constitution and general statutes . . . .” KRS

67A.070(1). However, “ordinances shall be deemed to conflict with general

statutes of this state . . . (a) [w]hen the ordinance authorizes that which is expressly

prohibited by a general statute; or (b) [w]hen there is a comprehensive scheme of

legislation on the same subject embodied in a general statute.” KRS 67A.070(2).

                                          -13-
                FOP is not arguing for reversal of the circuit court’s dismissal of

Count 3 because Senate Bill 4 expressly prohibits the Ordinance. Rather, FOP

argues that the Ordinance disturbs a comprehensive scheme of legislation.

                FOP claims Kentucky laws, including Senate Bill 4, “left no room for

local regulation[,]” (Appellant’s brief, p. 25), and argues the “General Assembly

has enacted a broad and detailed scheme regulating[,]” in this case, no-knock

warrants. Whitehead v. Est. of Bravard, 719 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Ky. 1986).

                Senate Bill 4 does not “merely amend[] KRS 455, which concerns

‘miscellaneous criminal practice provisions.’” (R. 456.) It is more comprehensive.

Senate Bill 4 also amended KRS 523.020 (relating to perjury in procuring a

warrant not requiring notice) and created a new rule of evidence, KRE8 410A,

making inadmissible the fruits of a search under a warrant that does not comply

with KRS 455.180.

                Furthermore, in addition to Senate Bill 4, KRS 95.019(1) says, “all

members of the police force in urban-county governments . . . shall possess all of

the common law and statutory powers of constables and sheriffs.” KRS 95.019(1).

The General Assembly did not abolish the power of all Kentucky sheriffs to utilize

no-knock warrants, and LFUCG lacks the authority to do so. This seems to create

8
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

                                           -14-
a conflict between the Ordinance and KRS 95.019 that may affect the analysis of

“home rule” as the authority for the Ordinance.

             Granted, “[t]he simple fact that the state has made certain regulations

does not prohibit local government from establishing additional requirements so

long as there is no conflict between them.” Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food &

Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745, 750

(Ky. 2004). LFUCG argues it has concurrent authority under “home rule” to enact

the Ordinance. FOP cites Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage for the

proposition that “[t]he true test of the concurrent authority of the state and local

government to regulate a particular area is the absence of conflict.” Id.

             We have carefully considered LFUCG’s argument that the laws can

be harmonized and see a glaring flaw in its presentation. LFUCG argues Senate

Bill 4 does not “establish a comprehensive system of state regulation that excludes

any local regulation [because] ‘[w]hen the legislature seeks to expressly preempt

entire fields of local regulation and ordinance, it does so by clear and unmistakable

language.’” (Appellees’ brief, p. 25 (quoting Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food &

Beverage Ass’n, 131 S.W.3d at 752).) This inappropriately blends the measure of

conflicting legislative schemes set out in KRS 67A.070(2)(a) and (b). In plainer

terms, LFUCG is saying implied preemption by a conflicting comprehensive

scheme of state law under KRS 67A.070(2)(b) requires the same express

                                         -15-
prohibition as required by KRS 67A.070(2)(a) for preemption to be found. If that

were true, implied preemption would not exist but be swallowed up by a rule

recognizing only express prohibitions against local legislation.

             Again, the circuit court appears to have adjudicated the merits of

FOP’s Count 3. (R. 455-56.) For this and the other reasons stated, we must

reverse the dismissal of Count 3 and remand for further consideration.

      D.     Count 4: FOP’s claim for injunctive relief.

             The circuit court failed to rule on the merits of FOP’s Count 4, a claim

for injunctive relief. This is understandable, given the court’s dismissal of Counts

1 through 3. Because we are reinstating those claims, we are remanding FOP’s

claim in Count 4 for further consideration.

                                 CONCLUSION

             For the reasons stated, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, and

remand, the Fayette Circuit Court’s December 8, 2021 Order dismissing the

Amended Complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -16-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
FOR APPELLANT:
                             Jason P Renzelmann
Scott A. Crosbie             Jennifer L. Bame
Nicholas A. Oleson           Louisville, Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky
                             Alexander L Ewing
                             West Chester, Ohio

                             Keith Horn
                             Lexington, Kentucky

                             ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                             APPELLEES:

                             Jason P Renzelmann
                             Jennifer L. Bame
                             Louisville, Kentucky

                           -17-