Court Opinion

ID: 9494576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:40:39.474348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:28.655995
License: Public Domain

WILKINSON, Chief Judge,
concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc.
The panel majority opinion sets out at length my view of the proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367. See Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110 (4th Cir.2001). I do not intend to reiterate my position here. However, I do wish to state briefly my points of difference with my brother’s dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc in this case.
Some of the dissent’s objections are different from those expressed in the dissent from the panel majority opinion. See Ros-mer, 263 F.3d at 122-29 (Motz, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, there is a common denominator. Indeed, the two dissents bring to mind Yogi Berra’s immortal words: “It’s like deja vu all over again.” Like the earlier dissent’s reading of § 1367, this dissent’s textual analysis represents a thinly-veiled attack upon diversity jurisdiction. The opinion begins with policy, ends with policy, and sprinkles plenty of policy arguments in between. See post at 247-50 and 253. Because I do not believe that the text of § 1367 is consistent with the dissent’s policy concerns, and because I do not believe that the federal courts are empowered to employ policy arguments to trump the plain meaning of Congress’ words, I concur in the denial of rehearing en banc.
I.
The dissent’s approach rests in unadorned fashion upon two premises. The first is that diversity is a disfavored form of federal jurisdiction. And the second is that Rule 23 is a disfavored rule in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The dissent objects that the majority opinion “substantially expand[s] diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts.” Post at 247. It reiterates that “[b]y opening federal courts to virtually every class action involving state law, the panel opinion broadly expands federal jurisdiction in diversity cases.” Post at 248. It submits that the majority opinion’s reading of § 1367 “requires the court to put blinders on and thus ignore long-standing principles of federal jurisdiction and class action law.” Post at 248. In a similar vein, the panel majority ignores “whether Congress intended to preserve the traditional principles of jurisdiction.” Post at 249. The result the majority opinion reaches is “traumatic.” Post at 249.
Continuing its policy brief, the dissent observes that diversity jurisdiction “inherently ... comes into tension with the traditional division of judicial responsibility between the states and the federal government.” Post at 253. “And for that reason, and other more pragmatic ones,” it explains, “diversity jurisdiction has never been favored with aggressive expansion, either by Congress or the courts.” Post at 253. “Indeed,” it relates, “over the years, Congress has continually and without exception taken modest steps to limit the scope of diversity jurisdiction in this sensi*245tive area of federalism.” Post at 253. As if the real source of objection to the panel majority opinion were not already abundantly clear, the dissent cannot resist adding that the panel majority “lack[s] a sensitivity for this overarching policy in the federal structure,” and “not only amplifies manyfold the circumstances in which diversity jurisdiction is available, but also increases vastly the power of federal class actions, all at the expense of the states’ long-standing privilege to decide state-law cases in their own courts.” Post at 253. The panel majority decision is therefore “a momentous mistake.” Post at 253.
The consequences of the two candidly stated premises that animate these policy prescriptions are quite remarkable. We are being asked to arrogate unto ourselves, under the guise of interpretive maxims or otherwise, the authority to establish the parameters of our own jurisdiction. This is fundamentally at odds with the separation of powers and the constitutional scheme.
Whether we like it or not, Congress has long had the authority to set the bounds of federal jurisdiction. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 1. Congress has long had the authority to invest diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. And assuming the strict requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 can be satisfied, the resolution of class actions is likewise part of the accepted business of the federal judiciary.
II.
The text and statutory structure of § 1367 are straightforward. Section 1367(a) is a general grant of supplemental jurisdiction, stating that “in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” § 1367(a). Section 1367(b) contains a list of exceptions to the supplemental jurisdiction authority conferred by § 1367(a). Rule 23 is not among them.
The dissent advances a number of suggestions as to how we might accomplish the insertion of Rule 23 into § 1367(b)’s list of exceptions. These suggestions simply do not work. The dissent first argues that there was no “civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction” in this case, as required by § 1367. This is because the only “civil action” actually commenced was a class action, and “the class cannot be broken apart for purposes of creating original jurisdiction and then mended back together under the illusion that the class members who destroyed original jurisdiction can be converted to ‘supplemental’ members under § 1367.” Post at 250.
The problems with this objection are manifold. First, as the majority opinion states, see Rosmer, 263 F.3d at 116, the idea that a “civil action” in § 1367(a) means the entire class action and not just Rosmer’s claim renders virtually superfluous other language in the statute — in particular, the phrase “over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction.” § 1367(a). The language of § 1367(a) itself contemplates that a “civil action” refers to one claim in which original jurisdiction is proper. Id. The other claims that are “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction” are properly in federal court because of § 1367’s grant of supplemental jurisdiction. Id.
In addition, § 1367(b) contains an exception for Rule 20. And Rule 20 authorizes *246permissive joinder of parties at the beginning of an action, not just in an ongoing diversity action. Indeed, a plaintiff will usually join all Rule 20 defendants in the initial complaint rather than waiting to do so later. Thus, if the dissent were correct, there would be no need to except Rule 20 from the grant of supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367(a). Section 1367(a) itself would except Rule 20 from the statute’s conferral of supplemental jurisdiction.
The dissent next advances the novel argument that the supplemental claims of the unnamed class members are not part of the same constitutional case under United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), as required by § 1367(a). Post at 250. Rather, the dissent submits, the “absent class members’ claims are bundled with representative parties’ claims in order to facilitate adjudication.” Post at 250.
To my knowledge, this suggestion has not been advanced by any other judge or court. The dissent cites no specific authority to support it. Instead, it states that “all the jurisprudence of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions and of Article III of the Constitution” supports its view. Post at 250. What likely accounts for the dissent’s failure to reference case law or academic commentators is that its proposal leads inescapably to the conclusion that Rule 23 somehow runs afoul of the case or controversy requirement of Article III.
Indeed, the dissent states that “[tjhere is no constitutional requirement prohibiting two constitutional cases from being adjudicated simultaneously, and the simultaneous prosecution of similar claims for judicial efficiency is the justification for Rule 23(b)(3).” Post at 251. But I am at a loss to identify the doctrinal foundations for such a position. A class action is, by definition, one action' — i.e., one case or controversy. It certainly contains many claims by many plaintiffs. But the suggestion that each of those claims constitutes a separate constitutional case or controversy is quite misplaced. The traditional legal understanding is that a class action must satisfy the transactional test of Gibbs. See 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778 (1986) (citing cases holding that “an action can be brought under subdivision (b)(3) even though there is not a complete identity of facts relating to all class members, as long as a ‘common nucleus of operative facts’ is present, a test very similar to that used to determine the application of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction [under Gibbs ]”) (footnotes omitted). See also William A. Fletcher, “Common Nucleus of Operative Fact” and Defensive Seh-OJf: Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 Ind. L.J. 171, 174 (1998) (Symposium: A Reappraisal of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute: Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
The dissent claims that “the constitutionally distinct nature of the claims aggregated under Rule 23(b)(3) was the backbone of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zahn.” Post at 251 (referring to Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973)). But the Zahn Court never said anything to the effect that claims aggregated in a class action are “constitutionally distinct.” Indeed, Zahn does not so much as mention Gibbs. Thus, the word “backbone” is doing an awful lot of inferential work in that contention.
In addition, the dissent’s view of class actions is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921). Realizing that Ben-Hur strongly cuts against its contention that claims aggregated under Rule 23(b)(3) are “constitutionally dis-*247tinet,” the dissent suggests that Ben-Hur “likely would not apply to 23(b)(3) class actions.” Post at 251 n. 2. No authority of which I am aware supports this assertion. The dissent offers none. Again, I am at a loss to identify any doctrinal source for this argument.
Not only is there a lack of authority to support the dissent’s view of class actions, but its position also generates perverse implications from its own perspective. The dissent purports to desire to limit the scope of the class action device, accusing the panel majority in Rosmer of “in-creas[ing] vastly the power of federal class actions, all at the expense of the states’ long-standing privilege to decide state-law cases in their own courts.” Post at 253. But in freeing the claims of absent class members from the case or controversy requirement, the dissent opens the jurisdictional doors in federal class actions wide open. The dissent is the unwitting advocate of expanding the use of class actions in federal court.
The dissent’s next contention is that “Congress would never even have considered adding Rule 23 to the list” of § 1367(b)’s exceptions because “Rule 23 does not provide for the addition of parties and their claims.” Rather, “[a]ll parties and claims are already included as the underlying case over which the court must have jurisdiction.” Post at 252. But in so asserting, the dissent’s analysis proves no more persuasive than any argument that assumes its conclusion. Nothing supports the contention that “Rule 23 cannot be broken into an underlying claim and added claims,” Post at 252, except the fact that the dissent says so.
The dissent’s final plea is that we consult the legislative history. This argument has already been canvassed at length in Rosmer. See 263 F.3d at 117-18, 121-22. I see no reason to revisit it here. The suggestion that Congress could not possibly have meant what it said is self-evidently erroneous. The reason that Rule 23 is not included in § 1367(b)’s list of exceptions may very well have to do with the “judicial efficiency” concerns that the dissent concedes to be the virtue of the class action device. Post at 248. Congress provided for a single class action to be resolved in a single federal forum, assuming it satisfies Rule 23’s requirements and jurisdiction exists over the named plaintiffs claim. Congress has struck the balance between limiting diversity and enhancing efficiency, and it is not for us to undo it.
III.
I may well share the dissent’s policy predilections. What I absolutely do not share, however, is the view that our notions of federal jurisdiction trump those of the coordinate branch of government to which such questions are constitutionally entrusted. We are being called upon to express our policy preferences against diversity jurisdiction and against class actions by the bald amendment of a statute from the bench. We are being asked quite transparently to insert the words “Rule 23” into § 1367(b)’s list of exceptions where Congress has not included them. It is difficult to imagine a more obvious situation for the application of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Section 1367(b) includes Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24 among its list of exceptions. It does not include Rule 23. The federal judiciary is being invited to perform a legislative trick.