Court Opinion

ID: 9458719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:00:06.337762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:52.339505
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
We are asked in this appeal to determine whether appellant may maintain a class action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Rules 23 and 57 of the Fed. R.Civ.P. and §§ 2201 and 2202 of Title 28 U.S.C. Appellant Spriggs, who was a defendant in a criminal action in the *389United States District Court, initiated this declaratory judgment proceeding seeking a determination of a number of legal questions affecting himself and all other persons similarly situated, who had been ordered to attend police lineups in the District of Columbia. The District Court granted a Government motion to dismiss and appellant appealed to this court. We have considered the issues raised by appellant and accordingly affirm the dismissal by the District Court.
I. Facts
On October 10, 1969, appellant filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking in-junctive relief and declaratory judgment. Appellant sought a temporary restraining order to stay a police lineup which he was ordered to appear in on October 14, 1969. He also sought declaratory relief relative to his rights regarding involvement in that same lineup. Judge McGuire refused to stay the lineup and directed appellant to appear as ordered by the United States Magistrate. At the time that the Magistrate ordered appellant’s appearance in connection with an alleged robbery, appellant had not yet been charged with any crime. Following Judge McGuire’s ruling on October 14, 1969 — the day on which the lineup was scheduled — appellant filed an appeal in this court and requested us to stay the lineup. The court requested the United States Attorney’s Office to reschedule appellant’s appearance for October 16, 1969, in order for the court to hear oral argument and to make a determination concerning the stay. Oral argument was held and we denied appellant’s request for a stay. See Spriggs v. Wilson, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 419 F.2d 759 (1969).
Despite our order appellant was never required to appear in a lineup since the complaining witness was not present at the Robbery Squad as requested. However, appellant was charged by a nine-count indictment in Cr. No. 1985-69 with robberies on July 4, July 23, and July 29. .Counts 4, 5, and 6 were dismissed by Government motion on February 10, 1970, after the District Court suppressed all of the Government’s identification testimony as to the July 23 robbery. On the same date the Government also dismissed counts 7, 8, and 9 pertaining to the July 29 robbery as identification testimony relating to that charge was also suppressed. Only the first three counts of the indictment— alleging the July 4 robbery — remained and appellant was found not guilty on these-three counts by a jury on April 24, 1970.;
Subsequently, on December 12, 1969, appellant filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment with reference to lineup procedures. The Government filed a motion to dismiss alleging that regardless of the situation existing when the original complaint was filed the case was moot since appellant “has not been, and will not be, required to comply with the challenged [lineup] order . . . ” (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss). Appellant filed an opposition to the Government motion and, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., denominated the case a class action. The Government claimed that the class action could not be maintained since appellant was not a member of the class which he claimed to represent (i. e., those directed or threatened to be directed to appear in police lineups).
Judge Bryant heard argument on the motion to dismiss on June 24, 1970. The judge showed concern at this hearing over the propriety of appellant’s use of a civil suit for declaratory judgment when appellant could challenge the lineup procedure in his criminal ease by making a motion to suppress. Appellant filed a supplemental memorandum on June 29, 1970, in which he admitted “that there are appropriate objections to lineup procedures capable of being raised in criminal prosecution.” Appellant further argued that this did not create a situation which, would foreclose declaratory relief. In addition, appellant asserted that a de*390claratory judgment class action could be maintained even after “the individual demands of the class leader have been fully satisfied.”
Judge Bryant granted appellee’s motion to dismiss on July 6, 1970, relying mainly on our decision in United States v. Allen, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 84, 408 F.2d 1287 (1969). He held that if the lineup identification resulted in an indictment “the proper place to resolve the substantive issues raised in this complaint would be in a motion to suppress” and that “[t]he use of the extraordinary remedy of declaratory relief and injunction is inappropriate in this case.” Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that Judge Bryant had “misconceived the nature of declaratory relief and ha[d] misread the pleadings since plaintiff is not presently asking for an injunction.” On July 31, 1970, the court issued an order and memorandum in which it stated that “the court misunderstood the nature and extent of plaintiff’s prayer for relief.” The court then ruled:
Declaratory relief should be granted when the court in its discretion finds it appropriate. Public Service Commission [of Utah] v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241-243 [73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291] (1952). In the circumstances of this case, a motion to suppress in a criminal prosecution will adequately safeguard the rights of persons charged with crime, and will lead to a determination as to the constitutionality of the procedures employed by the Government to which plaintiff objects.
II. Class Action
As appellant has designated his suit a class action, we must determine, as the threshold question, whether the requisite elements of a class action are present. There are four initial requirements which must be met in bringing a class action. Rule 23(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. reads as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Implicit in this initial formula is membership in the class which one claims to represent. Without a common bond between the parties there can be no class. In the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Appellant’s Motion to Certify Case as a Class Action, appellant requested the District Court to determine that Mr. Spriggs was suing “for all persons similarly situated, i. e., all suspects in criminal cases in the District of Columbia who have been required in the past or who will be ordered in the future to appear in lineups conducted by defendants.” After examining the factual posture of this case, however, it is clear that Mr. Spriggs is not a member of the class he purports to represent. Appellant simply has not been required to appear in a lineup, and at least with reference to the July 23 robbery the Government has filed an affidavit stating that he will not be required to make a lineup appearance. One who represents a class must be a member of that class. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32-33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962).
III. Declaratory Judgment
Without questioning the soundness of Judge Bryant’s appraisal of the potential of this type of case as being amenable to adjudication by a motion to suppress, we nevertheless are required to determine whether appellant’s claims require consideration of his right to a declaratory judgment. Appellant’s amended complaint in praying for declaratory relief asked that the court rule that a United States Magistrate may not order a “defendant” to appear in a police lineup “for a crime with which he has never been *391charged,” that the Government must, in connection with such a lineup furnish specific “modus operandi” material, must disclose to defense counsel all prior descriptions of suspects given police by-witnesses, must furnish names and addresses of witnesses who appear at lineups, and must provide for court reporters’ transcripts of lineup proceedings. It is obvious then that a complete factual record of an actual lineup procedure must be before this court after full opportunity in the District Court for testimony, examination and cross-examination, before we may determine the legal principles and precedents which govern the factual situations. Our problem then is to determine whether in this case, in which no criminal charges are pending against appellant, he nevertheless has status to challenge in the abstract the procedures which he alleges are followed in police identification lineups. By casting his complaint in the form of a declaratory judgment action, appellant argues that this court is required to grant the “relief” which he seeks.
Declaratory judgment actions are a relatively new procedure in American jurisprudence, see 3 W. Barron and A. Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1261 et seq., but already the essential elements involved are defined and explained.
The Constitution limits the exercise of the judicial power to “cases” and “controversies.” . . . [T]he Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934 in its limitation to “eases of actual controversy,” manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional sense. The word “actual” in one of emphasis rather than definition. . . . A “controversy” in this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determination. Osborn [President, etc., of Bank of] v. United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 819 [16 L.Ed. 204]. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or a dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character ; from one that is academic or moot. United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 [40 S.Ct. 448, 449, 64 L.Ed. 808]. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. South Spring [Hill] Gold [Mining] Co. v. Amador [Mede-an] Gold [Mining] Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301 [12 S.Ct. 921, 36 L.Ed. 721]; Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 [42 S.Ct. 274, 275, 66 L.Ed. 499]; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487-488 [43 S.Ct. 597, 601, 67 L.Ed. 1078]. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. See Muskrat v. United States [219 U.S. 346, 31 S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 246] . . . ; Texas v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 258 U.S. 158, 162 [42 S.Ct. 261, 262, 66 L.Ed. 531]; New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 339, 340 [46 S.Ct. 122, 125, 70 L.Ed. 289]; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 [47 S.Ct. 282, 71 L.Ed. 541]; New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S. 488, 490 [47 S.Ct. 661, 71 L.Ed. 1164]; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 277 U.S. 274, 289, 290 [48 S.Ct. 507, 509, 72 L.Ed. 880]; Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 463, 464 [51 S.Ct. 522, 529, 75 L.Ed. 1154]; Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U.S. 286, 291 [54 S.Ct. 399, 401, 78 L.Ed. 793]; United States v. West Virginia, 295 U.S. 463, 474, 475 [55 S.Ct. 789, 79 L.Ed. 1546]; Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324 [56 S.Ct. 466, 472, 80 L.Ed. 688], Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not require the award of process or the payment of damages. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis R. *392Co. v. Wallace, [288 U.S. 249,] at page 263 [53 S.Ct. 345, 348, 77 L.Ed. 730]; Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 576, 577 [46 S.Ct. 425, 426, 70 L.Ed. 738]; Fidelity National Bank [& Trust Co. of Kansas City] v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 132 [47 S.Ct. 511, 514, 71 L.Ed. 959]; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner [of Internal Revenue], [279 U.S. 716,] at page 725 [49 S.Ct. 499, 502, 73 L.Ed. 918].
Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937).
We are admonished that “[o]f course the federal courts will not grant declaratory relief in instances where the record does not disclose an ‘actual controversy.’ ” Evers, et al. v. Dwyer, et al., 358 U.S. 202, 203, 79 S.Ct. 178, 179, 3 L.Ed.2d 222 (1958) citing Public Service Commission of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 73 S.Ct. 236, 97 L.Ed. 291 (1952). Similarly we are instructed that
[T]he difference between an abstract question and a “controversy” contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a controversy. Basically the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal and Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273, 61 S.Ct. 510, 512, 85 L.Ed. 826 (1941). The phrase “a specific live grievance” is used by the Supreme Court in outlining specific elements necessary for declaratory judgment action in Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 110, 89 S.Ct. 956, 22 L.Ed.2d 113 (1969).
Applying these standards to our present record, and noting that this appellant is not charged with any crime, is not ordered or required to appear in any police lineup, and, insofar as I know, has never appeared in such a lineup I conclude that the present action is not a proper one for declaratory relief. This appellant has no “adverse legal interest” to that of our appellees. I am unable to find in the record any factual situation upon which we could afford any relief to appellant — in short there is no action which this court could take which would in any way affect any right or obligation of the appellant. It follows then that there is herein no “ ‘definite and concrete’ controversy which touches the legal relations of [the] parties having adverse legal interests.” There is no “real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief of a conclusive character,” nor can I perceive a “specific live grievance” between the parties. Rather, I conclude the record would require us to render “an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts” which pronouncements would be beyond and outside of both our jurisdiction and authority.