Court Opinion

ID: 9363742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 16:00:31.414975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:33.822539
License: Public Domain

21-6295
     Dong v. Garland
                                                                                       BIA
                                                                               A098 713 548
                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1          At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
 3   City of New York, on the 17th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 7               RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 8               MYRNA PÉREZ,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   _____________________________________
11
12   MEI DONG,
13                Petitioner,
14
15                v.                                                   21-6295
16                                                                     NAC
17   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
18   ATTORNEY GENERAL,
19               Respondent.
20   _____________________________________
21
22   FOR PETITIONER:                  Gang Zhou, New York, NY.
1    FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
2                                      General; Nancy E. Friedman, Assistant Director;
3                                      Robert D. Tennyson, Trial Attorney, Office of
4                                      Immigration Litigation, United States Department of
5                                      Justice, Washington, DC.
6
7          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

8    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

9    DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

10         Petitioner Mei Dong, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China, seeks

11   review of a May 10, 2021 decision of the BIA, which denied her motion to reopen. In re

12   Mei Dong, No. A098 713 548 (B.I.A. May 10, 2021). We assume the parties’ familiarity

13   with the underlying facts and procedural history, to which we refer only as necessary to

14   explain our decision.

15         In her motion to reopen, which was filed in April 2020, Dong asserted that

16   conditions in China had worsened for Christians and family members of activists for the

17   China Democracy Party (“CDP”), and that these changes excused the untimely filing of

18   her motion and demonstrated her prima facie eligibility for asylum based on her practice

19   of Christianity and her husband’s membership in the CDP in the United States. See

20   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)–(ii) (setting 90-day deadline for motion to reopen, unless

21   reopening is sought to apply for asylum and the motion “is based on changed country

22   conditions arising in the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been

23   ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have been

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1    discovered or presented at the previous proceeding”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)–(3) (same).

2    In support of her motion to reopen, Dong attached nearly one-hundred pages of evidence

3    regarding China’s recent campaign to “sinicize” religion and to suppress political

4    dissidents since President Xi Jinping’s rise to power, as well as evidence regarding Dong’s

5    2012 conversion to Christianity and Chinese officials’ determination that Dong and her

6    husband could not inherit property on account of her husband’s membership in the CDP.

7    The Government did not oppose Dong’s motion to reopen.

8           In May 2021, the BIA denied Dong’s motion to reopen as untimely, finding that

9    Dong failed to show changed conditions in China excusing the 90-day filing deadline for

10   reopening. While the BIA acknowledged that Dong had “submitted evidence indicating

11   persistent government restrictions on Christian religious practices in China,” the BIA

12   concluded that Dong had not established “that this evidence shows a marked increase in

13   the mistreatment of Christians, such that there are changed country conditions in China.”

14   In re Mei Dong, A098 713 548, at 2 (B.I.A. May 10, 2021) (citing Pet. Mot., Ex. B(f), (h), at

15   117–18, 137–44). Instead, the BIA found that Dong’s 2012 conversion to Christianity

16   constituted a change in her personal circumstances that did not excuse her untimely

17   filing. As for Dong’s husband’s membership in the CDP, the BIA acknowledged that

18   Dong had “submitted evidence indicating that China has consistently targeted political

19   dissidents and their families,” but concluded that Dong had not shown “significantly

20   worsening conditions” for returning spouses of CDP members. Id. at 5 (citing Pet. Mot.,

                                                  3
1    Ex. B(c)–(d), at 64–73). The BIA further found that Chinese officials’ determination that

2    Dong and her husband could not inherit property on account of her husband’s

3    membership in the CDP merely constituted changed personal circumstances.

4    Alternatively, the BIA denied Dong’s motion to reopen because she failed to establish her

5    prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention

6    Against Torture (“CAT”).

7          In June 2021, Dong filed the instant petition for review. In her petition, Dong

8    principally argues that the BIA disregarded the evidence of materially worsening

9    conditions in China, noting, for example, that the BIA’s analysis of Dong’s evidence

10   regarding the treatment of Christians in China consisted of a single sentence. Dong also

11   argued that the BIA erred in concluding, in summary fashion, that she had not established

12   her prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT relief. In its

13   response brief, the Government acknowledges that the BIA “did not specifically discuss

14   the evidence she presented in support of her motion, instead providing general

15   characterizations of that evidence and references to parts of the record.” Resp. Br. at 2.

16   The Government maintains, however, that “remand is not strictly necessary” because

17   Dong did not present any evidence from 2006 (the time of her initial hearing) that would

18   permit the BIA “to compare country conditions” between now and her 2006 hearing. Id.

19         We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion and any

20   findings regarding changed country conditions for substantial evidence. See Jian Hui

                                                 4
1    Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2008). “An abuse of discretion may be

2    found in those circumstances where the [BIA]’s decision provides no rational

3    explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies, is devoid of any reasoning,

4    or contains only summary or conclusory statements.” Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

5    265 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). “While the BIA need not expressly

6    parse or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered by

7    the petitioner, it still must address a petitioner’s primary evidence, particularly when that

8    evidence is credible and points toward a conclusion contrary to that reached by the BIA.”

9    Tanusantoso v. Barr, 962 F.3d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citation

10   omitted).

11          Here, we conclude that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Dong’s motion to

12   reopen without sufficiently evaluating Dong’s evidence regarding changed country

13   conditions. As noted above, Dong submitted nearly one-hundred pages of evidence

14   regarding changed conditions in China. For example, Dong submitted the following

15   evidence regarding the persecution of Christians in China: (1) a 2019 report by the United

16   States Commission on International Religious Freedom discussing the Chinese

17   Communist Party’s increasing hostility toward religion — including Protestant

18   Christians — after certain revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs took effect in

19   February 2018, which “effectively banned ‘unauthorized’ religious teachings and

20   required religious groups to report any online activity” (Pet. Mot., Ex. B(g), at 124, 126,

                                                  5
1    128–29); (2) a 2019 report by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

2    discussing President Xi’s recent campaign to “sinicize” religion, as reflected by the

3    regulatory changes discussed above, leading to a nearly eight-fold increase in instances

4    of official persecution of Chinese Protestants from 1,265 in 2017 to 10,000 in 2018, and

5    which some observers have characterized as the worst escalation of religious persecution

6    in China since the Cultural Revolution (Pet. Mot., Ex. B(h), at 134, 140–42); and (3) a 2018

7    report from the Chinese Human Rights Defenders discussing the Chinese government’s

8    ban on Bible sales online, demolition of church buildings, and disruption of religious

9    practices in many Christian communities (Pet. Mot., Ex. B(f), at 117); see also id., Ex. B(i),

10   at 147–48 (recounting that some provincial officials removed all Christian symbols from

11   buildings, restricted children from entering churches, and banned the teaching of hymns

12   to children at home). As for evidence of China’s suppression of political dissidents,

13   Dong submitted, inter alia: (1) a 2018 article discussing increasing arrests and

14   disappearances of critics of the Chinse government (Pet. Mot., Ex. B(d), at 67–83); and (2)

15   a 2018 report from the Chinese Human Rights Defenders, discussed above, which claims

16   that, “[u]nder [President Xi’s rule], China’s authoritarian one-party political system has

17   become the most draconian and invasive since the 1980s” (Pet. Mot., Ex. B(f), at 108).

18          As the Government acknowledges, the BIA failed to meaningfully evaluate such

19   evidence, and merely referenced a few pages of the evidence, after which it concluded

20   that Dong had not shown materially worsening conditions in China. See Resp. Br. at 10

                                                   6
1    (“[T]he Board did not closely parse the record or specifically discuss the documents Ms.

2    Dong provided in support of her motion; rather it only referenced specific pages of the

3    presented motion. Indeed, Ms. Dong, in her opening brief to this Court, cites multiple

4    statements in the country conditions evidence she provided with her motion indicating

5    that China engages in repression of non-state religious activities and of political

6    dissidents.”). The BIA abused its discretion by not conducting a more fulsome analysis

7    of the evidence.

8              The Government argues that remand is not necessary because Dong “offered no

9    evidence dating to around 2006, when she was previously in removal proceedings.” Id.

10   at 11. We reject this argument, however, because the evidence discussed above clearly

11   traces the worsening conditions in China to recent changes made under President Xi’s

12   rule, including the 2018 revisions to the Regulations on Religious Affairs.

13             Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA erred in presenting only a cursory analysis

14   of the evidence in denying Dong’s motion to reopen. On remand, the BIA must give full

15   consideration to Dong’s evidence before deciding whether Dong has established changed

16   country conditions. And, to the extent that the BIA concludes that Dong has sufficiently

17   shown such changed conditions, the BIA should more fully assess whether Dong has

18   presented a prima facie case of eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

19   relief.

20

                                                   7
1         For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Dong’s petition for review, VACATE the

2   BIA’s decision, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

3                                   FOR THE COURT:
4                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
5                                   Clerk of Court

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