Court Opinion

ID: 9827949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:57:32.081847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:40.068055
License: Public Domain

COBBS, J.
This suit was filed by Mel-
quíades Garcia, one of the appellees, in the district court of Webb county, Tex., on the 19th day of August, 1925, in the form of trespass to try title against appellants Pilar Garcia and wife, Pilar U. de Garcia, to recover certain real property located in the city of' Laredo, Webb county, Tex., constituting the homestead of appellants.
Appellants answered by general denial and a plea of not guilty, and in addition thereto, by way of cross-action, sued to recover of plaintiff the property in question on the ground that the deed from them to appellee Melquíades Garcia, dated November 17, 1910, under which the latter claimed title to the property was made without consideration for the benefit of appellants and with the understanding that the property would be recon-veyed to them by the grantee upon demand; and appellants further alleged that the deed was procured by appellee from them by fraudulent representation and asked that the deed be canceled, and that they recover of plaintiff the property in question, and that title to the same be quieted. Before the case came to trial, appellee Margarita Garcia de Arrieta, the only child of appellant Pilar Garcia by a former marriage, with leave of court intervened and alleged her right to recover her undivided one-half interest in the property on the ground that the property had been acquired by appellant Pilar Garcia during his first marriage and was the community property of her father, Pilar Garcia, and her mother, Genoveva Guitierrez- de Garcia, then deceased.
Appellants admitted the right of intervener to recover an undivided one-half interest in the property, and appellee Melquíades Garcia sought to have plea of intervention stricken out by a motion which was overruled, and ap-pellee Melquíades Garcia answered the plea of intervention by general denial and a plea of not guilty. To the cross-action of defend*259ants, appellee Melquíades Garcia answered by general denial and a plea of not guilty.
The ease was tried before a jury, and the court instructed the jury to return a verdict in favor of intervener for an undivided one-half interest in the property. The jury returned a verdict in favor of intervener for an undivided one-half interest in the property and against appellants on their cross-action. The verdict was received and judgment rendered in accordance therewith.
It will be seen that appellants do not question the judgment in so far as the intervener Margarita Garcia de Arrieta is concerned, but do so as to the other two appellees.
The controversy between Pilar Garcia and his wife against Garcia is that in this suit they seek, by way of cross answer, to recover of Melquíades Garcia, the title to the land in controversy, because the conveyance they made to him was obtained by false representations. In their cross-action the defendants alleged:
“Plaintiff, who is a brother of this defendant, approached him and informed him that he, plaintiff, had just learned from an attorney in the city of Laredo that the account of Landa & Sons had been placed in his hands for collection, and that said attorney had told plaintiff that he, said attorney, was immediately going to attach, levy upon, and sell said lot 9, in said block SI, to satisfy said claim, and plaintiff told defendant that this could be lawfully done under the laws of Texas, and also told this defendant that the only way to save said lot for defendant and family from such sale was for defendant and wife to convey said lot to plaintiff by deed, and that plaintiff would secretly hold the title to said property for this defendant and his said wife and thus prevent the said property from being subjected to the debt of the said Landa & Sons; that plaintiff further stated to this defendant at said time that said deed would not convey any title to plaintiff as no consideration was to be paid' by him to defendant therefor, and further that said deed would not be valid conveyance until it was recorded, but that by the plan outlined the said property would be in plaintiff’s name and placed beyond the said threatened attachment and levy, and that in any event plaintiff would hold the same for this defendant until said claim could be adjusted by defendant, and that he, plaintiff, would never claim said property as against defendant, but would reconvey the same to this defendant and wife.”
Among other things, Pilar Garcia testified as follows: '
“Melquíades told me that he was not going to record the deed if I had an understanding with Mr. Hamilton. Melquíades told me that if he would record the deed, that was to preserve the same for me, and then he would reeonvey it, make another one. He told me that if it was recorded, then the house was his, but then he could give another deed to me. He told me that if the deed was not recorded it would have no value. I believed that statement. If I had not believed that statement, I would not have executed the deed. My brother told me to extend or execute the deed, and we did not talk about the consideration; he told me to put $7,000, there, if that is called the consideration. My brother did not pay me any money at the time. I have absolutely never received any consideration for the execution of that deed at all. Neither has my wife received any.
“I believed that my homestead could be taken for this debt. I thought it could. I would not have executed this deed if I had not so thought.”
There are various allegations of fraud, but the foregoing reflects the issue of fraud, sufficient for this discussion.
The appellees discuss at length various supposed rules with reference to briefing, which appellants violated, which seem well taken. There is no index to the brief, nor list of authorities cited, as the rules require, nor does the brief contain any sufficient assignments of error.
In regard to the objection urged to the court’s general charge, we think it without merit, for it is clearly presented in a fair and full way and adequately stating all the issues in the case.
The proof clearly established intervener’s right and interest as being one-half of the entire community estate of her father and deceased mother. It was a legal title, acquired by inheritance, which under the law she had a lawful right to sue for and recover and she could not be deprived of that right, because the conveyance to her by her father,. shortly before this suit was instituted, was for one-fourth interest instead of a one-half interest. That was an obvious mistake and could not reduce what the law gave her. It required no conveyance whatever to fix her interest. Her interest in the community estate was fixed by law.
It was not error in the court to permit intervener to amend her pleading, pending the trial, so as to show that her real interest is one-half of the whole instead of one-fourth. This her father did not dispute, but acquiesced in. We think the evidence showed with sufficient conelusiveness what property of her deceased mother’s estate was used by her father in the purchase of the premises. Nor was it error to instruct a verdict for one-half of the improvements placed upon said premises after the second marriage. If not disputed, still they were sufficiently established by testimony.
The court did not err in permitting the in-tervener to introduce and read to the jury a deed executed by the defendants to her, bearing date the 21st day of June, 1927, and recorded on the 22d day of June, 1927, in which they purported to convey to her an un-' divided one-fourth of the premises in controversy, the objection being to the recitals therein as to her interest in said estate and the character of the funds that were used by her father in the purchase of said premises, because the same were hearsay and inadmissible against the plaintiff.
*260Another thing, this could not have affected ■Melquíades Garcia injuriously because hie knew precisely the interest of intervener, his niece, in her mother’s estate, and all the facts in regard to the matter. If it was error, certainly it was harmless.
We have carefully read and considered the propositions and assignments of all the parties and overrule the same. The case has been fairly tried and disposed of, and, as substantial justice has been administered, the judgment is affirmed.