Court Opinion

ID: 9754622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:08:07.173975+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:55.945462
License: Public Domain

Justice EAKIN,
Dissenting.
I dissent because I believe Commonwealth v. Chester, 586 Pa. 468, 895 A.2d 520 (2006) controls this matter.
Under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., all petitions, including second or subsequent petitions, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the statutory exceptions applies. Chester, at 522 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Yarris, 557 Pa. 12, 731 A.2d 581 (1999)). The PCRA’s time-bar is jurisdictional in nature. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 638, 641 (1998). Appellant argues this Court should consider his PCRA petition under the exception to the one-year time limitation in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). This subsection requires a petitioner to prove the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Chester recognized “for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), information is not ‘unknown’ to a PCRA petitioner when the information was a matter of public record.” Chester, at 523 (citing Commonwealth v. Lark, 560 Pa. 487, 746 A.2d 585, 588 n. 4 (2000); Commonwealth v. Whitney, 572 Pa. 468, 817 A.2d 473, 478 (2003)). Under Chester, it is clear information that is a matter of public record — like the dismissal of an appeal — is not “unknown” to a PCRA petitioner. Therefore, appellant cannot meet § 9545(b)(1)(ii).
Because the time-bar is jurisdictional, and this PCRA petition is clearly time-barred, I respectfully dissent.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.