Court Opinion

ID: 9819349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:23:19.666761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:55.433516
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Pursuant to its supervisory powers and managerial authority, the Supreme Court of Illinois has restricted the “absolute” right to dismissal. In Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d at 137, 535 N.E.2d at 865-66, the court stated: “[A]n ever increasing number of plaintiffs are using a section 2—1009 motion to avoid a potential decision on the ‘merits’ or to avoid an adverse ruling as opposed to using it to correct a procedural or technical defect. [Citations.] It has become clear that the allowance of an unrestricted right to dismiss and refile an action in the face of a potentially dispositive motion is not only increasing the burden on the already crowded dockets of our courts, but is also infringing on the authority of the judiciary to discharge its duties fairly and expeditiously.” In O’Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 112 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1327 (1986), the court stated that where a plaintiff, relying on sections 2—1009 and 13—217 (735 ILCS 5/13—217 (West 1994)) of the Code, files a motion to voluntarily dismiss while a Rule 103(b) (177 Ill. 2d R. 103(b)) motion is pending, the trial court must hear the Rule 103(b) motion on the merits prior to ruling on plaintiffs motion to dismiss under section 2—1009. In O’Connell, the court placed certain limitations on a plaintiffs right to nonsuit and, while doing so, held that where a statute conflicts with a rule of the supreme court in such a way that the statute unduly infringes upon the court’s constitutional authority to regulate the judicial system, the rule will control. O’Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 281, 492 N.E.2d at 1326. The court noted the plaintiffs rights to voluntarily dismiss and refile his complaint under section 13—217 are subject to the reasonable diligence standard of Rule 103(b). In Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d 63, 70, 506 N.E.2d 586, 590 (1987), the court again held there is no “absolute right” to voluntary dismissal under section 2—1009 when that section conflicts with supreme court rules. In Arnett v. J.D. Young, 269 Ill. App. 3d 858, 862, 646 N.E.2d 1265, 1268 (1995), the court stated “[n]othing is more critical than the administration of justice without delay, and central to discharging this function, the judiciary must be unimpeded in considering and rendering judgments on matters before it.” The rationale of O’Connell and Catlett is that the supreme court may not be thwarted in its constitutional mandate to render justice fairly and promptly by the manipulation of the statutory provisions relating to the dismissal and refiling of suits. Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 48, 521 N.E.2d 932, 935 (1988). In light of (1) the restrictions placed upon the “absolute right” to dismissal by decisions of the supreme court, (2) the conclusion in Catlett and O’Connell that there is no “absolute right” to voluntary dismissal under section 2—1009 when that section conflicts with a supreme court rule, and (3) the plain language of Rule 2.19(e) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e)) that “[a] party shall not be permitted to avoid compliance with discovery deadlines, orders or applicable rules by voluntarily dismissing a lawsuit,” it appears the Wright court’s determination that Rule 219(e) “permits a voluntary dismissal even when the dismissal is prompted by discovery sanctions” is unnecessarily broad. Wright, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 953, 686 N.E.2d at 1200. Although the rule may permit a voluntary dismissal, it does not require a court to allow the dismissal. Clearly, the rule was written to control the abuses discussed in Gibellina and to comply with that court’s suggestion that it was necessary to place restrictions on the right to voluntary dismissal. If a plaintiff is allowed the unfettered right to voluntarily dismiss, then the first part of Rule 219(e), “A party shall not be permitted to avoid compliance,” is effectively rendered a nullity. 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e). Here, unlike in Wright, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss. In Wright, the trial court allowed the motion to dismiss, and the court on appeal addressed the question of whether the rule prohibited voluntary dismissal. In this case, this court is being asked to determine if the rule gives the court the discretion to deny a motion to dismiss where discovery rules have been violated. Consistent with the language of Rule 219(e), it is within the sanctioning power of the court to deny plaintiffs a voluntary dismissal, when it is done to avoid discovery orders or sanctions. A review of the record in this case shows that plaintiffs had refused to comply with numerous discovery requests over the three-year period that the case had been pending, until a motion to compel had been filed on March 10, 1997. In addition, on March 24, 1997, the record shows plaintiffs failed to disclose expert witnesses in violation of court orders. On May 5, 1997, shortly before the motion to voluntarily dismiss was filed, the court entered an order barring the testimony of two of plaintiffs’ opinion witnesses because of plaintiffs’ failure to disclose them in a timely manner. The court, noting the file was “replete with instances of dilatory conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel,” also limited the testimony of two other opinion witnesses. At the time plaintiffs filed their motion for voluntary dismissal, the case had been pending for three years and was scheduled for trial in just a few months. Aside from attorney fees, the costs incurred by defendants were substantial. It was only after unfavorable rulings in regard to expert opinion witnesses that plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs did not provide a transcript or a bystander’s report of the hearing on the motion, and we must assume, therefore, the trial court acted correctly in denying the motion due to its determination that plaintiffs’ counsel had engaged in continued violations of discovery. I conclude the trial court had the discretion to deny the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss under the circumstances and did not abuse that discretion here. I would also affirm the trial court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment n.o.v. and the motion for new trial.