Court Opinion

ID: 9727331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:31:09.09892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.373878
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
The appeal of Neal Ruetz will not be heard. He was convicted of First Degree Murder. On June 3, 1971, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. On June 5, 1971, he walked away from the LaGrange County Jail through an open garage door. He was captured and returned to the LaGrange County Jail on September 27, 1971. On August 2, 1971, during the absence of his client from custody, Neal Ruetz’s lawyer filed a lengthy and timely motion to correct errors. On September 30, 1971, after Neal Ruetz had been returned to the Sheriff’s custody in LaGrange County, the trial judge held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to correct errors, heard oral arguments, overruled the motion to correct errors and further ordered as follows:
“Court now finds that the defendant was sentenced on June 3, 1971; that his counsel filed a motion to correct errors on August 2, 1971; that from June 5, 1971, until September 27, 1971, the defendant was a fugitive from justice; and that the defendant having been a fugitive from justice during the statutory period for filing motion to correct errors in this cause he has waived his right to appeal, and his request for an appeal is now denied by the court.”
*358This record does not show that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional and statutory right to appeal. This record shows that Neal Ruetz escaped from jail after being sentenced. The record does not disclose that he had any knowledge that the effect of breaking jail would be to forfeit his appeal rights. The majority is in error in inferring this waiver of a fundamental right from a silent record. This waiver flows from the belief of the majority that to find a forfeiture here is good “law” and not from the fact of a conscious choice by Neal Ruetz to relinquish his right to appeal. Johnson v. Zerbst (1937), 304 U. S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461.
In addition, the majority mistakenly considers the case of Irvin v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 384, 139 N. E. 2d 898, to be controlling here. The obvious distinguishing feature in this case is that here the defendant was back in court at the time the trial court ruled on the motion to correct errors. His presence in court on that day satisfies the only arguably valid reason for the rule applied in Irvin, such reason being that it would be a futile or useless act to review such a case since the court would be powerless to enforce its determination. Since this defendant was back in court on the day his motion to correct errors was ruled on, that ruling of the trial court could be enforced and this Court’s subsequent determination on appeal could be enforced.
What is particularly alarming about the majority view of this case, is that it erases the only semi-reasonable basis for the rule: namely, the nonenforceability of the determination made by the reviewing court, and leaves the rule supported by a single, unsupportable and specious ground, namely, that by escaping the defendant has demonstrated his defiance of the court’s authority and law. If Neal Ruetz is guilty of the crime of breaking jail he may be lawfully convicted and punished for that offense. If he is guilty of contempt of court he may be convicted of that and punished. But this Court has no power to declare him to be defiant of the court’s authority and law, *359and to place him outside the protections offered every citizen by our Constitution to due process and equal protection of the law.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits just that:
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (Emphasis added.)
The spirit of this provision of our Constitution is that no man in our society is so despicable, so evil, so corrupt, so depraved, that he may be imprisoned without due process of law. By closing this Court’s doors to Neal Ruetz’s appeal this Court will have sanctioned his imprisonment without affording him one of the most fundamental aspects of due process — his right to appeal.
In his motion to correct errors he alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding; that evidence was admitted in violation of rights guaranteed him by the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and that he was unlawfully denied discovery rights. Many other errors are alleged. These allegations of error will remain nothing but unanswered questions. The appeal of Neal Ruetz will not be heard. I dissent.
Note. — Reported in 281 N. E. 2d 106.