Court Opinion

ID: 9702015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:49:37.691736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:32.257867
License: Public Domain

*639DEL SOLE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I join the analysis of the Majority in concluding that the trial court correctly decided the April 15, 1990 note is not a valid codicil. Therefore, I agree with the disposition affirming the decree of distribution.
However, I dissent from that portion of the Opinion which concludes Charles Fleigle, Jr. does not have standing to bring this appeal. The Majority’s statement of the law that, “merely by virtue of his or her official capacity, an executor cannot appeal from a decree of distribution entered by the court ... so long as that decree does not surcharge the executor.” (Majority Opinion at page 635), does not apply to the situation before us.
Charles Fleigle, Jr. has an interest in the determination of the legal question on the validity of the April 15, 1990 note by virtue of his status as the sole beneficiary of his father’s estate. I believe the correct statement of the law in regard to his standing is found in In re Estate of Hain, 464 Pa. 349, 346 A.2d 774 (1975), where our Supreme Court held:
Appellants were not adversely affected by the decree of the orphans’ court in their capacity as executors. However, they were directly affected, and are “parties aggrieved,” in their capacity as residuary trustees under this will and, ... in [wife’s] individual capacity as a spouse who has elected to take against the will. When a party has erroneously challenged an order or decree of the orphans’ court as executor but properly could have proceeded in some other capacity, the party is entitled to retain the benefit of the appeal in the proper capacity, (citations omitted) Although appellants may lack standing to appeal in their capacity as executors, they do have standing in their other capacities. We must therefore reach the merits of the appeal, (emphasis added).
464 Pa. at 353, 346 A.2d at 776.
Given that Charles Fliegle, Jr. was the person to whom the estate would pass had the determination of the legal question surrounding the purported codicil be resolved differently, I *640conclude he has standing as a party aggrieved to maintain this appeal.
KELLY, J., joins.