Court Opinion

ID: 9743472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:34:13.770549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:41.511824
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
A reading of nothing more than the judgment, both as originally entered and as *845modified, reveals plain error 1 in the trial court’s judgment. It is the duty of this Court to correct such error.2 As noted by the Majority Opinion, landlord-Langdon was awarded possession of the leased premises, damages (approximately $1,000), and possession of all of the tenants-Schulers’ personal property. Langdon was to sell personal property sufficient to satisfy the damages, and pursuant to the modified judgment, then return the remaining property to the Schulers.3 That judgment is in clear contravention of the law, violates the rights of the Schulers, and is a pernicious perversion of landlord-tenant and debtor-creditor law. For these reasons, I must dissent.
The Schulers wrongfully failed to pay their rent for a period in excess of two months and Langdon properly initiated an action for possession and damages. See, Ind.Code §§ 32-7-3-1 to -12 (1976). If required, the court
“shall issue a writ, directed to some constable of the county, commanding him to deliver said premises to said plaintiff, by removing the defendant and his goods therefrom, or otherwise, so that the plaintiff have complete possession thereof, and also to levy such damages and costs, of the goods of said defendant as might be done by virtue of a writ of fieri facias.”
IC 32-7-3-6. This statute clearly provides that the sheriff, and not the landlord, is to remove the tenant and the tenant’s personal property, and if necessary, levy against the tenant’s personal property.4
The Legislature specifically provided that the sheriff levy against the personal property “as might be done by virtue of a writ of fieri facias.” Id. Fieri facias:
*846“Means that you cause to be made. In practice, a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to levy and make the amount of a judgment from the goods and chattels of the judgment debtor.”
Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 754 (1968). The Legislature specifically pronounced that it is the duty of the sheriff, and not the landlord, to levy upon the personal property of the tenant.
The sheriff’s levy upon the tenant’s personal property is controlled by Ind.Code §§' 34-1-36-1 to -12 (1976). Those statutes provide that it is the sheriff’s duty to sell the property, id. at -1, the types of property upon which the sheriff may levy, id. at -2 to -7, that the tenant (debtor) may select that property which shall first be levied upon and the priority of levy if not designated or insufficient, id. at -9 to -12.
The statutes IC 34-1-37-1 to -12 also control the sheriff’s levy of execution and sale requiring the appraisement of the personal property. IC 34-1-37-1 is particularly important, providing that:
“No property shall be sold on any execution or order of sale issued out of any court for less than two-thirds of the appraised cash value thereof, exclusive of liens and encumbrances, except where otherwise provided by law.”
See also, Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 69. IC 34-1-37-2 also provides that:
“The sheriff, immediately upon levying an execution, shall proceed to ascertain the cash value of the property levied upon.”
These statutes provide that each piece of personal property levied upon is to be listed, appraised and a cash value determined. Id. at -3 to -7.
These provisions were obviously intended by the Legislature to protect the individual debtor (tenant). The above statutes make sure the sheriff controls the sale of the property rather than some interested creditor or landlord. These statutes assure that the property is appraised at a fair value and not sold for less than two-thirds of that value. And finally, these statutes provide that the debtor (tenant) determines- which property is to be sold first and which property will be preserved. Some of the evils these statutes are aimed at preventing are readily apparent in the present case.
The Schulers introduced evidence that the value of the personal property obtained by Langdon pursuant to the erroneous court order was $13,444. Langdon held the Schulers’ property for nearly two months to satisfy his $1,000 judgment. During that period, Langdon’s activities with regard to that property were without check. Lang-don obtained the Schulers’ property but there was no accounting as to what property was actually possessed by Langdon. Langdon stored and sold the property in a piecemeal fashion without any outside check for the procedure of his sales, for the valuation of the property to be sold, which items of property were actually sold, or to whom such items were sold. And there clearly was no check on Langdon to assure that the items of personal property were sold for a fair value, or even at the statutory two-thirds of their fair value.5 And *847finally, although Langdon assures us that he allowed the Schulers to pick up their remaining property at the end of the two month period,6 there was again no check upon Langdon over which property was returned and which was sold or otherwise disposed.
In short, the Schulers and their property were completely at the mercy of Langdon. The judgment and Langdon’s subsequent actions pursuant thereto created a truly inequitous situation. Not only was the judgment and Langdon’s actions clearly against the laws of this State, but that judgment worked a very real and tangible injustice upon the Schulers. Such travesty of justice should not and can not go uncorrected by this Court.

. “ ‘Plain Error’ is the civil law counterpart of fundamental error. It could just as well be called fundamental or clear error (footnote omitted)
Bagni, Giddings & Stroud, 4A Indiana Practice-Appellate Procedure § 17, p. 38 (1979).

. Although the appellants failed to allege or argue this error, that failure does not prevent this Court from appellate review. As eloquently stated in John’s Cash Furniture Stores v. Mitchell (1955), 126 Ind.App. 231, 125 N.E.2d 827, reh. denied, 126 Ind.App. 231, 127 N.E.2d 128:
“While we are not required to search for errors not made manifest in the record as it is presented to us, we are not so restricted that we must close our eyes to that which is clearly before us. If we were limited entirely to the argument of counsel in reaching our decisions, to the exclusion of our own observation, we would many times permit gross injustice to prevail, and our oath to discharge our duties honestly and impartially would be a fruitless, futile and hypocritical gesture.”
126 Ind.App. at 238, 125 N.E.2d at 830. Accord, Sanford v. State (1971), 255 Ind. 542, 265 N.E.2d 701; Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields (1970), 254 Ind. 219, 259 N.E.2d 651, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 930, 91 S.Ct. 187, 27 L.Ed.2d 190; Bruggner v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind.App. 183, 210 N.E.2d 439; Johnson v. State (1964), 136 Ind.App. 528, 202 N.E.2d 895 (Concurring opinion, J. Hunter); Franklin v. Hunt (1961), 132 Ind.App. 575, 178 N.E.2d 464.

. The November 7, 1980 judgment of the trial court held, in part:
“Court directs plaintiff to maintain possession of that property and defendnats [sic] are to contact the plaintiff on or before November 17, 1980 in order to retreive [sic] their property. If not [sic] contact is made, the Court will consider the property abandoned and give plaintiff permission to sell whatever property he can and apply that amount towards judgment and have the non-saleable property dumped.”
The trial court modified that judgment on December 23, 1980, to read in pertinent part:
“The monetary judgment awarded plaintiff on November 7, 1980, is proper. However, the judgment awarding plaintiff possession of any property defendants left on the leased premises is modified to allow plaintiff to execute only against defendant’s property sufficient to satisfy the monetary judgment.”

.“At common law, and apart from statute or agreement providing otherwise, a landlord has no lien on the personal property of his tenant merely by reason of the relationship.”
Highland Realty, Inc. v. Indianapolis Morris Plan, Corp. (1964), 136 Ind.App. 208, 216, 199 N.E.2d 110, 114. See also, 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant § 675 (1970); 18 I.L.E. Landlord & Tenant § 331 (1959); 3A Thompson on Real Property § 1304 (1981 Repl.). There are no statutory landlord liens on the personal property of a tenant except in one limited circumstance. See, Ind.Code § 32-7-1-18 (1976) (allowing a lien upon the tenant’s crops where the tenant has agreed to pay as rent a part of the crop raised upon the leased premises). Therefore, there is no lien upon the personal property of the tenant on which the landlord may foreclose.

. The following testimony by Langdon is illustrative:
“Q. What did you do with [the Schulers’ personal property]?
“A. [Langdon] Sold some to satisfy the debt.”

“Q. How much of the property is left?
“A. Well, I couldn’t really tell you.”

“Q. Who did you sell the stuff to?
“A. Different individuals.
“Q. Well how did you go about selling it?
“A. I just wanted to sell it to satisfy the money that was owed to me.”

“Q. How much money did you realize from the sale of this property?
“A. I don’t really know.
“Q. You are a businessman, you are pretty good with figures. You have no idea how much money you sold this property for?
“A. I would have to look at my list of what’s left.
“Q. What is left?
“A. The kids [s/c] toys, clothes.”

“Q. What else is left besides the kids [sic] clothes, toys, and athletic equipment?
“A. I would have to inventory it. I can’t tell you right now.
*847“Q. Is there furniture available?
“A. I would have to look it over. I can’t tell you what’s available.
“Q. Well, where is [sic ] these items?
“A. In storage.
“Q. Where?
“A. In one of my buildings.
“Q. Well, where? In a house, in a warehouse?
“A. It is in a garage.”
******
“Q. Everything you took out of this house is now in this garage?
“A. Not necessarily.
“Q. Well, where is everything else?
“A. In other storage.
“Q. Well, where is the other storage?
“A. I don’t understand this, ah. ..
“Q. We want to know where their property is, Mr. Langdon. You took their property.
“A. I satisfied, I satisfied a debt owed to me.
“Q. You’ve got their property right now, don’t you?
“A. Yes.
“Q. You’ve got it in storage somewhere?
“A. Less what I sold, ah huh.”
* ⅝: * * * *
“Q. You can’t give an accounting to the Court then except in very vague terms of what happened to this property?
“A. As I said some of it has been sold to satisfy some of the obligation owed me.
“Q. Here is a list of the property. Can you go through that and tell us what you sold?
“A. Looks like their twenty dollar ($20.00) chest of drawers.
“Q. So that ....
“A. Living room outfit has been sold. Bicycle’s been sold.
“Q. Chest of drawers, bicycle are the only two (2) items that were sold on that list?
“A. And the living room outfit. And I imagine miscellaneous three (3) or four (4) other items.
“Q. In other words, you have everything else?
“A. I’d say that’s right — I don’t know, I didn’t look at it that close.”
Record, pp. 112-117.

. Affidavit by Langdon, Record, p. 46.