Court Opinion

ID: 9961670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 15:04:08.17565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:19.072869
License: Public Domain

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                        STATE OF FLORIDA
                       _____________________________

                             Case No. 6D23-1787
                        Lower Tribunal No. 20-CF-1350
                       _____________________________

                               THOMAS HARGROVE,

                                    Appellant,

                                         v.
                                STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                     Appellee.
                       _____________________________

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Osceola County.
                          Mikaela Nix-Walker, Judge.

                                  April 19, 2024

MIZE, J.

      Appellant, Thomas Hargrove (“Hargrove”), appeals his convictions and

sentences for: (1) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (2) fleeing or

attempting to elude a law enforcement officer; (3) armed trespass on property other

than a structure or conveyance; and (4) driving with a suspended license. Hargrove

asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied Hargrove’s motion to suppress

the evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his bag; and (2) denied

Hargrove’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of armed trespass. We
affirm the trial court’s ruling on the motion for judgment of acquittal without

discussion. We write to address the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress,

which we also affirm.

                        Background and Procedural History

      On the day of Hargrove’s arrest, at around 4:45 a.m., the Osceola County

Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff’s Office”) investigated a possible burglary. Sheriff’s

Office deputies set up a perimeter in the relevant area to look for burglary suspects

and to contain the suspects to a particular area. The suspects were believed to be a

man and two women. Deputy Benjamin Garrison (“Garrison”) was stationed at one

of the perimeter checkpoints and stopped every car that came through to see if the

occupants matched the description of the suspected burglars. Hargrove, who was

driving a black Kia Forte, approached Garrison’s checkpoint, and Garrison stopped

him.1 Garrison asked Hargrove for his identification. As Hargrove reached toward

his pocket, Garrison stepped back to look in the rear passenger area of the car

because he saw a female passenger. When Garrison stepped back, Hargrove rapidly

accelerated the car and sped away from the checkpoint without permission.

      After Hargrove left Garrison’s checkpoint, Hargrove’s movements were

recorded by a Sheriff’s Office aviation unit helicopter camera. Hargrove fled from

      1
         Hargrove filed two other motions to suppress asserting that this stop was
illegal, both of which the trial court denied. Hargrove did not appeal those rulings.
                                            2
the checkpoint into a residential neighborhood, stopped and exited his vehicle, and

then proceeded on foot onto a residential property where he jumped over a fence and

entered the backseat of an automobile that was in the backyard of the property. As

shown on the video from the helicopter camera, Hargrove had a strapped bag with

him when he entered the vehicle.

      Deputy Javier Cruz (“Cruz”) and another deputy (who was deceased by the

time of trial) were assisting in the investigation and were directed to the backyard of

the residence by the Sheriff’s Office aviation unit, where they found two vehicles.

The deputies found Hargrove lying in the back seat of one of the two vehicles. Cruz

ordered Hargrove out of the vehicle and arrested him. When Hargrove exited the

vehicle, he did not have the bag that the aviation unit witnessed him take into the

vehicle.

      After Hargrove’s arrest, Deputy Jacob Beekman (“Beekman”) was directed to

the residence where Hargrove was arrested. Beekman spoke to the homeowner,

Johanna Ortiz Melendez (“Ortiz”). Beekman confirmed that Ortiz owned the vehicle

in which Hargrove was found and that Ortiz did not give Hargrove permission to be

on her property. Beekman told Ortiz that there may have been property left in the

vehicle.2 After Beekman spoke with Ortiz, Beekman searched the backseat of the

      2
        Ortiz gave Beekman consent to search the vehicle. The State did not argue
below or on appeal that Ortiz’s consent for Beekman to search the vehicle constituted
valid third-party consent that allowed Beekman to search the bag.
                                          3
vehicle and discovered a black strap bag stuffed into the seat cover on the back of

the passenger seat. Beekman asked Ortiz if the bag belonged to her, and she

confirmed that it did not. Beekman searched the inside of the bag and found, among

other things, the handgun that Hargrove was later convicted of possessing. The

Sheriff’s Office did not obtain a warrant to search Hargrove’s bag before Beekman

searched it.

      Ortiz testified below that she did not know Hargrove and did not give him

permission to be in her backyard or to enter her vehicle. Ortiz testified that the bag

and the handgun that were found in her vehicle did not belong to her, she had never

seen them before, and she did not know why they would have been in her vehicle on

the day of Hargrove’s arrest. Ortiz had not given permission to anyone to store either

the bag or the handgun in her vehicle.

      The State filed an Information charging Hargrove with the crimes of which he

was convicted in the trial court.3 Prior to the trial, Hargrove filed the motion to

suppress at issue in this appeal. In the motion, Hargrove argued that the warrantless

search of his bag was not a valid search incident to arrest and that, therefore, the

search was illegal. In response, the State argued that the search of the bag was proper

because Hargrove abandoned the bag when he hid it in Ortiz’s vehicle and, therefore,

      3
        The Information also charged Hargrove with possession of heroin and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Those charges were nolle prossed before the trial.
                                        4
Hargrove had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag under the Fourth

Amendment. The trial court ruled that Hargrove abandoned his interest in the bag

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, on that basis, denied the motion to

suppress. The case proceeded to trial and Hargrove was found guilty of all charges.

In this appeal, Hargrove argues that the trial court erred by finding that Hargrove

abandoned his bag such that he no longer maintained a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the bag for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

                                       Analysis

I.    Standard of Review

      “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court

clothed with a presumption of correctness and the court must interpret the evidence

and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most

favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Doorbal v. State, 837 So. 2d 940,

952 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1996)).

“Accordingly, the appellate courts defer to the trial court’s factual findings so long

as the findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Rodriguez v.

State, 187 So. 3d 841, 845 (Fla. 2015) (quoting State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502,

506 (Fla. 2011) (internal quotations omitted)). However, we review “de novo the

mixed questions of law and fact that arise in the application of the historical facts to

the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Wyche v. State, 987 So. 2d 23, 25 (Fla.

                                           5
2008); see also Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001). In this case, the

pertinent facts are undisputed. Thus, our review is purely de novo. See Everett v.

State, 893 So. 2d 1278, 1283 (Fla. 2004).

II.   Standing Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
      Constitution4

      “To invoke the Fourth Amendment, a criminal defendant must establish

standing by demonstrating a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched

or the item seized.” Strachan v. State, 199 So. 3d 1022, 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)

(quoting Peraza v. State, 69 So. 3d 338, 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (internal

quotations omitted)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978)

(“[C]apacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a

      4
         Below and on appeal, Hargrove also invoked Article 1, Section 12 of the
Florida Constitution. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 12 of the Florida Constitution both guarantee citizens the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Article 1, Section 12 contains a
conformity clause mandating that the right guaranteed therein must be construed in
conformity with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See Smallwood v. State, 113 So. 3d
724, 730 (Fla. 2013). Therefore, the analysis of Hargrove’s argument concerning
Article 1, Section 12 is identical to the analysis under the Fourth Amendment. “In
considering the relevant case law, we are required to adhere to the interpretations of
the United States Supreme Court, but are not bound to follow the decisions of other
federal courts.” Harris v. State, 238 So. 3d 396, 399 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (quoting
State v. Markus, 211 So. 3d 894, 902 (Fla. 2017) (internal quotations omitted)). “If
no U.S. Supreme Court precedent is factually or legally on point, we may review
Florida state precedent, as well as other state and federal decisions for guidance on
a search and seizure issue.” Id. (quoting Markus, 211 So. 3d at 902 (internal
quotations omitted)).
                                           6
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the

protection of the Fourth Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the

invaded place.” (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967))).

      Under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] legitimate expectation of privacy consists

of both a subjective expectation and an objectively reasonable expectation, as

determined by societal standards.” Strachan, 199 So. 3d at 1024 (quoting Peraza,

69 So. 3d at 340 (internal quotations omitted)); see also Twilegar v. State, 42 So. 3d

177, 193 (Fla. 2010); McClelland v. State, 255 So. 3d 929, 932 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018);

State v. Butler, 1 So. 3d 242, 246-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Brown v. State, 152 So.

3d 619, 623-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (“A search violates an individual’s Fourth

Amendment rights only if: (1) a defendant demonstrates that he or she had an actual,

subjective expectation of privacy in the property searched; and (2) a defendant

establishes that society would recognize that subjective expectation as objectively

reasonable.”).

      Thus, the first question in Fourth Amendment standing analysis “is whether

the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of

privacy. . . .” Butler, 1 So. 3d at 246–47 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,

740 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).       “By failing to have a subjective

expectation of privacy, a defendant can be without standing before the

reasonableness analysis even begins.” Strachan, 199 So. 3d at 1024. “The second

                                          7
question is whether the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that

society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Butler, 1 So. 3d at 247 (quoting

Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (internal quotations omitted)); see also Brown, 152 So. 3d at

623–24.

III.   Abandonment

       A person who voluntarily abandons property lacks standing to challenge its

search and seizure. See State v. Fosmire, 135 So. 3d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014);

Davis v. State, 226 So. 3d 318, 320 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017); Mori v. State, 662 So. 2d

431, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); State v. Daniels, 576 So. 2d 819, 823 (Fla. 4th DCA

1991); K.W. v. State, 183 So. 3d 1123, 1129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015). This is so because

a person who abandons property no longer maintains a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the property after the person has abandoned it. See Maxwell v. State, 443

So. 2d 967, 969 (Fla. 1983); State v. Terzado, 513 So. 2d 741, 742 (Fla. 3d DCA

1987) (“If [defendant] abandoned his car, he lost his reasonable expectation of

privacy in it, and may not claim a violation of his fourth amendment rights.”). For

this same reason, no unreasonable search occurs under the Fourth Amendment when

the police search property that has been abandoned by a suspect. See Twilegar, 42

So. 3d at 193 (“No search occurs when police retrieve property voluntarily

abandoned by a suspect in an area where the latter has no reasonable expectation of

privacy.” (quoting State v. Lampley, 817 So. 2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)

                                         8
(quoting State v. Milligan, 411 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)))). No warrant

is required for police to search abandoned property. Caraballo v. State, 39 So. 3d

1234, 1245 (Fla. 2010) (“[P]olice may conduct a search without a warrant if . . . the

individual has abandoned his or her interest in the property in question.” (quoting

Peterka v. State, 890 So. 2d 219, 243 (Fla. 2004))); see also State v. Milewski, 194

So. 3d 376, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[A]bandoned property is not subject to Fourth

Amendment protection.” (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58 (1924))).

      Importantly, abandonment for purposes of the Fourth Amendment is distinct

from abandonment under property law. United States v. Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 307

(3d Cir. 2012); Lampley, 817 So. 2d at 991 (“In contrast to property law, which

defines the often subtle nuances of ownership, courts treat the concept of

‘abandonment’ differently in the context of search and seizure law.”).

      The distinction between abandonment in the property-law sense and
      abandonment in the constitutional sense is critical to a proper analysis
      of the issue. In the law of property, the question . . . is whether the
      owner has voluntarily, intentionally, and unconditionally relinquished
      his interest in the property so that another, having acquired possession,
      may successfully assert his superior interest. In the law of search and
      seizure, however, the question is whether the defendant has, in
      discarding the property, relinquished his reasonable expectation of
      privacy so that its seizure and search is reasonable within the limits of
      the Fourth Amendment. In essence, what is abandoned is not
      necessarily the defendant’s property, but his reasonable expectation of
      privacy therein.

State v. Kennon, 652 So. 2d 396, 398 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (quoting City of St. Paul

v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370-71 (Minn. 1975) (internal alterations and citations
                                         9
omitted)); see also State v. Teltser, 300 S.E.2d 554, 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (“The

issue is not abandonment in the strict property-right sense, but whether the person

prejudiced by the search had voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise

relinquished his interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain

a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.”

(quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1973))). “In some

cases, of course, the property will be abandoned in the property sense as well.” Kelly

v. State, 536 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (citing Abel v. United States,

362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960)).

      For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, “the test for abandonment is whether

a defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest

in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation

of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” Caraballo, 39 So. 3d at 1245

(quoting Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 476 n.4 (Fla. 2006) (internal alterations

omitted)); see also Twilegar, 42 So. 3d at 193. This is an objective determination,

based on a totality of the circumstances. See Kelly, 536 So. 2d at 1114 (citing United

States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1981)).

      Some of our sister courts have stated that “[w]hether property has been

‘abandoned’ for search and seizure purposes is viewed primarily as a question of

intent, to be inferred from the words and actions of the parties and other

                                          10
circumstances surrounding the purported abandonment.” Kennon, 652 So. 2d at 397

(quoting Kelly, 536 So. 2d at 1114); see also Milewski, 194 So. 3d at 379. This

language is misleading, and we reject its use because it implies a defendant’s

subjective intent plays a dominant role in an objective analysis.5 Neither the Florida

Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court has ever described the test for

abandonment in this manner; we determine whether abandonment occurred

objectively. See Caraballo, 39 So. 3d at 1245 (“[T]he test for abandonment is

whether a defendant voluntarily discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his

interest in the property in question so that he could no longer retain a reasonable

expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of the search.” (emphasis added));

Kelly, 536 So. 2d at 1114; O’Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1982) (“[T]he test to be applied in determining whether a person has

      5
         Some federal circuit courts have used similar language. See e.g. Friedman
v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Ferebee, 957
F.3d 406, 413 (4th Cir. 2020). Despite using language concerning “intent,” other
federal courts have made clear that abandonment is determined using an objective
test. See Kendall, 655 F.2d at 201; Harrison, 689 F.3d at 306-07; United States v.
Small, 944 F.3d 490, 502 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Porter, 66 F.4th 1223,
1226 (10th Cir. 2023); United States v. Hernandez, 7 F.3d 944, 947 (10th Cir. 1993).
Likewise in Kelly, the First District used language concerning intent but nonetheless
made clear that the test it applied was an objective one. Kelly, 536 So. 2d at 1114.
Thus, the difference in language does not necessarily imply that the courts that have
used this language intended to set forth a subjective test. We note the difference in
language only to clarify that despite language in some Florida and federal cases that
could be interpreted as setting forth a test that depends on the subjective intent of the
defendant, it is in fact an objective test.
                                            11
abandoned property is an objective one—the words used, the conduct exhibited, and

other objective facts such as where and for what length of time the property is

relinquished and the condition of the property.”); United States v. Crumble, 878 F.3d

656, 659-60 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Abandonment, however, does not turn on [the

defendant’s] subjective intent, but rather the objective facts available to the

investigating officers.” (citing United States v. Nowak, 825 F.3d 946, 948 (8th Cir.

2016))); United States v. Tugwell, 125 F.3d 600, 602 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Whether an

abandonment has occurred is determined on the basis of the objective facts available

to the investigating officers, not on the basis of the owner’s subjective intent.”);

United States v. Rem, 984 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The test for abandonment

is whether an individual has retained any reasonable expectation of privacy in the

object. This determination is to be made by objective standards.” (quoting United

States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1983))).

      Thus, to determine whether property was abandoned, we focus on whether the

defendant retained an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject

property at the time of a search, not whether the defendant subjectively intended to

abandon the property.6

      6
        Of course, if the evidence in a particular case established that a defendant
lacked an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in property that was alleged to be
abandoned, that could also serve as a separate basis to find that the first prong of
Fourth Amendment standing analysis was not satisfied and that, therefore, the
defendant lacked standing to contest the search under the Fourth Amendment.
                                         12
IV.   Hargrove’s Motion to Suppress

      In this case, Hargrove left his bag on a residential property that he had no legal

right to enter and in a vehicle that he had no legal right to enter.7 Therefore,

Hargrove left the bag in a place where he could not legally retrieve it. See § 810.08,

Fla. Stat. (2000) (making it a second-degree misdemeanor to enter an unoccupied

conveyance without authorization). Moreover, he left the bag under the control of a

third party, Ortiz, whom he did not know or have any control over and in a place

which gave that third party the ability and legal right to seize the bag, open it, and

examine its contents. As the owner of the vehicle in which the bag was left and the

property on which the vehicle was located, Ortiz had the legal right to seize and

examine any property that was left within her vehicle without her permission.

      Simply put, it was not objectively reasonable for Hargrove to expect the

contents of the bag to remain private when he placed the bag in a place from which

he could not legally retrieve it and in the possession and control of another person

who then had the legal right to disclose the contents of the bag to whomever she

pleased, including law enforcement or anyone else. See Teltser, 300 S.E.2d at 556

      7
        Since Hargrove hid the bag in the vehicle before he was arrested by law
enforcement, it is also clear that the bag was not seized from Hargrove by law
enforcement as part of their arrest of Hargrove. Rather, Hargrove abandoned the
bag prior to being arrested and seized by law enforcement. The fact that Hargrove
was fleeing from and attempting to avoid arrest by law enforcement at the time he
abandoned the bag does not affect this analysis. See Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256,
1258 (Fla. 1993) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)).
                                         13
(“When one voluntarily puts property under the control of another, he must be

viewed as having relinquished any prior legitimate expectation of privacy with

regard to that property, as it becomes subject to public exposure upon the whim of

the other person.” (quoting State v. Jordan, 252 S.E.2d 857, 859 (N.C. Ct. App.

1979))); see also Lampley, 817 So. 2d at 990 (holding that defendant had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in property that he placed in the wheel well of a

truck left in a parking lot in a public place); Kennon, 652 So. 2d at 399 (holding that

defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in property that she placed under

the wheel of a vehicle in a public area that could be accessed by third parties). By

placing the bag in a place from which he could not legally retrieve it and under the

control of a third party who had the right to seize the bag and announce the contents

of the bag to the world, Hargrove abandoned any reasonable expectation of privacy

in the bag and its contents. Accordingly, Hargrove lacks standing to contest law

enforcement’s subsequent search of the bag, the bag was not subject to Fourth

Amendment protection, and the Sheriff’s Office was not required to obtain a warrant

to search the bag.

                                     Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly denied Hargrove’s motion

to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his bag.

      AFFIRMED.

                                          14
TRAVER, C.J., and WOZNIAK, J., concur.

Howard L. “Rex” Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Clayton R. Kaeiser, Special
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Roberts J. Bradford, Jr.,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
          AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED

                                    15