Court Opinion

ID: 9852259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:27:23.344697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.739987
License: Public Domain

DAVID R. LESLIE, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I am of the opinion that appellant raised a genuine issue of material fact which requires a trial of this defamation claim, including a jury determination on the issue of actual malice. Further, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded appellant provided no evidence of actual malice and raised no “material issue of fact which if resolved in his favor would show actual malice.”
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the nonmov-ing party, the movant has clearly sustained his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 484, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1955); Louwagie v. Witco Chemical Corp., 378 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). “All doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party.” Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn.1981).
It has been well settled under Minn.R. Civ.P. 56.03 that
[although summary judgment is intended to secure a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition, it is not intended as a substitute for trial where there are fact issues to be determined. Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 70 N.W.2d 351 (1955). The inquiry of the trial court in its consideration of a motion for summary judgment is whether or not any genuine issues of material fact exist, not how such issues should be resolved. Hinrichs v. Farmers Cooperative Grain & Seed Association, 333 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Minn.1983).
Vacura v. Haar’s Equipment, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn.1985) (emphasis added). Summary judgment is improper unless the pleadings, depositions, answers to *906interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minn.R.Civ.P. 56.03; Abdallah, Inc. v. Martin, 242 Minn. 416, 65 N.W.2d 641 (1954).
Neither the respondent, the trial court, nor the majority opinion here have demonstrated that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to actual malice. Rather, they have attempted to resolve the fact issues raised by appellant; this is improper in a summary judgment context.
A public official cannot recover damages for a defamatory statement relating to his official conduct unless he can prove the statement “was made with ‘actual malice’ —that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280-81, 84 S.Ct. 710, 726, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court independently examined the evidence in the record, which included a full trial, verdict, and judgment entered in favor of a defamation plaintiff. Id. at 284-86, 84 S.Ct. at 728. The Court concluded that the “proof presented to show actual malice” lacked the “ convincing clarity” required under the constitutional standard and thus could not sustain the judgment. Id. at 285-86, 84 S.Ct. at 728-29 (emphasis added).
More recently, the Supreme Court held that “at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages” the decision whether to submit a given factual dispute to a jury “must be guided by the substantive evidentiary standards that apply to the case.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As there is dispute here over an issue of material fact — actual malice — and this is a New York Times case, we must ask the following question on summary judgment in order to adhere to the Anderson rule:
[Wjhether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not.
Id. at 255-56, 106 S.Ct. at 2513-14 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).1
Although the trial court did not expressly cite the Anderson case, it was argued by the parties and the court discussed the clear and convincing evidence standard. Regardless of the trial court’s approach, the issue of actual malice in a summary judgment context must be discussed within the framework of Anderson, New York Times, and other decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. Even taking into account the clear and convincing burden of proof, a burden which the plaintiff must meet to show actual malice at trial, I would hold that a genuine issue *907of material fact exists here. Respondents failed to meet their “initial responsibility” of demonstrating the absence of a material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
It should be noted that Connelly’s name was not mentioned in the FBI memorandum which the trial court found the reporters obtained. The reporters found Connelly’s name through researching condemnation records. Respondents then grouped Connelly together with three other condemnation commissioners who were reported in the article to have conflicts. Whatever information the reporters obtained regarding conflicts or problems in the condemnation process in general, or conflicts the other three commissioners may have had, is not relevant here. Rather, the truth of the article with respect to Connelly is relevant. Contrary to the implication of the article, and as the trial court found,
Connelly had never been a Commissioner when property in which he had a direct financial interest was condemned. Con-nelly never served as a Commissioner on any property in which one of his relatives had a financial interest.
Thus, a genuine issue of material fact was raised that statements in the article were of a defamatory nature and the trial court properly denied summary judgment on that issue.
The next step is to consider the actual malice issue. Evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication, “despite the publisher’s awareness of probable falsity,” is essential to recovery in public official defamation cases. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1990, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967)).
There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates actual malice.

Id.

Respondents argued that they made a detailed investigation, used reliable sources, interviewed Connelly and others, carefully considered whether to publish the article, and thus a jury could not find, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondents entertained serious doubts as to the truth of their article with respect to Con-nelly. The trial court, citing St. Amant, agreed, concluding Connelly “has not provided any evidence which would permit the inference that [respondents] in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication.”
As Justice Black stated, concurring in New York Times, malice is an “elusive, abstract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove.” New York Times, 376 U.S. at 293, 84 S.Ct. at 733; Mahnke v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 338, 160 N.W.2d 1, 8 (1968). Although findings by the trial court are not required under either the state or the federal rule 56, they are preferred. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. Here, the trial court issued a legal memorandum with the summary judgment, but did not specifically discuss or apply the law of actual malice to the central evidence in this case: Connelly's conversation with the attorney general and his subsequent relation of that conversation to reporter Short. Respondents also failed to meet their initial burden of showing that this evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Connelly, did not raise a material issue of fact. See Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir.1970) (“all inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment”).
The headline of respondents’ article was “Land Sale Conflicts Uncovered.” In fact, if the deposition testimony is to be believed, Connelly himself “uncovered” the only potential conflict contained in the article when he asked the attorney general about it. The attorney general indicated it was not a conflict for Connelly to partic*908ipate in condemnation proceedings where one of Connelly’s business partners had an interest in the subject land.
Although Connelly gave respondents this explanation of his conduct, respondents apparently ignored it, both in the investigation and in the publication of the article. Clearly, this information should have caused respondents to entertain serious doubts about the truth of the publication with respect to Connelly.
The evidence that, as far as the attorney general was concerned, Connelly did not have a conflict and that respondents chose not to report this information, at least raises a genuine issue of material fact that respondents published the article with reckless disregard for the truth, demonstrating actual malice. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325.
“[R]ecklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt” the veracity or accuracy of a source. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, — U.S. —, —, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. Here, there was no FBI informant or third party alleging that Connelly had a conflict. The only source respondents relied on were condemnation records. There is nothing in the record to indicate that these documents define what a legal or ethical conflict of interest is, or that Con-nelly’s reported conduct violated Dakota County condemnation procedures. Nor is there any evidence that respondents consulted any source as to what the law of Minnesota provides on that issue. In short, respondents have presented no evidence to show support for their conclusion that Connelly’s participation in the condemnation proceedings described in the article was in fact a conflict of interest. Yet their article made this conclusion, contrary to the only information respondents acquired on that specific issue: the statements of Connelly and the attorney general. Respondents clearly failed to investigate or report that information. The purposeful avoidance of the truth will show actual malice. See Harte-Hanks, — U.S. at —, 109 S.Ct. at 2698.
I am not persuaded by the majority’s post hoc assertion that because Connelly stood to benefit, he was in fact engaged in a conflict. No law is cited for this proposition. If the majority is referring to an ethical rather than a legal conflict of interest, the issue becomes more clouded. However, if an ethical conflict was claimed in the article, the recklessness of respondents in failing to report or investigate appellant’s and the attorney general’s statements denying unethical conduct would constitute actual malice.
I am compelled to make two additional comments. First, I believe this court to be in error in using prior or subsequent conduct to support a summary judgment, particularly when we have no way of judging the probative value of such conduct. Plaintiff, in a trial, should be afforded the opportunity to explain such conduct before the court and/or the jury passes on its relevancy. Second, the majority’s recognition that respondents were “perhaps” negligent is an interesting concession. Whether the failure to interview Robards as well as other shortcomings alleged by the plaintiff constitute mere negligence should, in my opinion, be determined by the jury only after all the facts have been presented.
Finally, this dissent does not attempt to predict whether Connelly would prevail in a trial of this matter, as the majority makes clear a public figure defamation plaintiff has an extremely difficult burden of proof. Indeed, the result may be the same. Our chief concern at the summary judgment stage should be whether he gets his day in court. At this point, I am not persuaded that he has had his day in court.
As a genuine issue of material fact exists here, even looking through the Anderson prism of the clear and convincing evidence standard, I would reverse and remand for a trial.

. Like Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in New York Times, I have difficulty applying the Anderson rule. In a vigorous dissent in Anderson, he stated:
I simply cannot square the direction [of Anderson at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510] that the judge "is not himself to weigh the evidence” with the direction [at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513] that the judge also bear in mind the "quantum” of proof required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient "caliber or quantity” to meet that "quantum." I would have thought that a determination of the "caliber and quantity," i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light of the "quantum,” i.e., amount "required,” could only be performed by weighing the evidence.
If in fact, this is what the Court would, under today’s decision, require of district courts, then I am fearful that this new rule— for this surely would be a brand new procedure — will transform what is meant to provide an expedited "summary” procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits.
Anderson at 266-67, 106 S.Ct. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Thus, the Anderson rule should be applied with caution, in order to prevent courts from, in fact, weighing the evidence on summary judgment and resolving fact questions which should be resplved by a jury. If the Anderson rule is improperly applied, the "constitutionally enshrined role of the jury," and the “usefulness of the summary judgment procedure" will be eroded. Id. at 268, 106 S.Ct. at 2520.