Court Opinion

ID: 9942279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 18:12:36.057665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:53.465871
License: Public Domain

J-S47043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  TARIQ MAHMUD                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 23 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 29, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-23-CR-0007123-2013

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                       FILED FEBRUARY 20, 2024

       Appellant, Tariq Mahmud, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County dismissing his first petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§

9541-9546. We affirm.

        In our non-precedential decision affirming judgment of sentence, this

Court summarized the underlying facts of the Appellant’s case:

       Appellant's conviction arises from the killing of Jason McClay at a
       Rite Aid store in the City of Chester, where McClay was a manager.
       The Commonwealth alleged the following.             In August and
       September 2013, Appellant was employed as loss prevention
       agent at the Rite Aid store. Appellant, Ashaniere White, and
       Christopher Parks planned to rob the Rite Aid store. Appellant told
       White and Parks about how much money was kept in the store's
       safe, who was working, and about blind spots in the store's video
       surveillance system. Appellant warned them not to try to rob the

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S47043-23

     store when McClay was working, because he was a former marine
     who would fight back.

     On August 19, 2013, White and Parks robbed the Rite Aid store
     when McClay was not on duty. On August 26 and September 4,
     2013, White and Parks again attempted to rob the store, but
     abandoned those plans when employees recognized White.

     Appellant, White, and Parks thereafter sought the assistance of
     new people to rob the store, and they brought David Wiggins into
     their planning. Wiggins wanted another individual, Rita Pultro, to
     participate as well. The group planned a robbery for September
     18, 2013, but postponed it until September 19, 2013.

     On September 19, 2013, McClay worked the day shift at the Rite
     Aid store and stayed for the evening shift due to the unavailability
     of another manager, Serita Cottman. Appellant called out from
     work that day. At approximately 9:45 p.m., an employee saw a
     white female, later identified as Pultro, and a black male, later
     identified as Wiggins, enter the store. Pultro retrieved a light bulb
     and took it to the counter. When the employee told her the
     amount due, Pultro complained that it was too expensive, placed
     the item back on the shelf, and asked to see the manager. McClay
     went back to the aisle, and he and Pultro began discussing
     lightbulbs. Wiggins then grabbed McClay and told him to take him
     to the safe. Wiggins and McClay began wrestling. Pultro shot
     McClay at close range at the base of his neck and killed him.
     Wiggins and Pultro fled from the store and left the scene in a
     vehicle driven by Parks.

     The investigation into the shooting revealed that Wiggins left a
     palm print in the Rite Aid store.      Investigators obtained a
     photograph of Wiggins and showed it to two employees, and they
     both identified Wiggins as one of the robbers. Wiggins was
     arrested on September 21, 2013, and admitted his role in the
     robbery. Pultro was arrested on September 22, 2013. Appellant
     was interviewed by police on September 22, 2013, and turned
     over his cell phone that day. Appellant was arrested on October
     2, 2013. Parks and White were also arrested. Parks and White
     subsequently entered guilty pleas to third-degree murder in
     exchange for their cooperation, and the Commonwealth dropped
     the charges of second-degree murder against them.

                                     -2-
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       Appellant, Pultro, and Wiggins proceeded to a joint jury trial for
       the September 19, 2013, robbery and killing of McClay. Parks and
       White testified against them. The Commonwealth also introduced
       numerous text messages between the parties. The jury found
       Appellant guilty of second-degree murder, robbery, and
       conspiracy. The trial court sentenced Appellant to life
       imprisonment on May 1, 2015.

Commonwealth v. Mahmud, No. 1589 EDA 2015, at **1–2 (Pa. Super.

2017) (non-precedential decision).

       Appellant filed a counseled direct appeal, and this Court affirmed

judgment of sentence.        Id.    Subsequently, by order of July 30, 2019, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s counseled petition of

allowance of appeal. See No. 97 MAL 2019.

       On October 25, 2019, Appellant filed pro se a timely first PCRA petition

asserting seven issues alleging ineffective assistance of prior counsel. 1 The
____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s pro se petition raised seven claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel (verbatim):

       1. Trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing motion to
          suppress the evidence of prior robberies, that was granted.
       2. Failure to call alibi witnesses.
       3. Failure to file a motion to sever the trial or a motion for change
          of venue.
       4. Failure to investigate the camera footage of the interrogation
          room at the Chester Police Station
       5. Counsel was ineffective for giving apellent [sic] bad advice not
          to take the stand in his own defense.
       6. Appellant’s counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue
          that the trial court erred when it denied the defense motion to
          strike prospective juror number “56” for cause since that
          panelist’s wife was the victim of a similar crime and he could
          not state with certainty that he could be fair and impartial.
       7. Trial counsel errors cumulatively together prejudiced
          petitioner.

                                           -3-
J-S47043-23

PCRA court appointed counsel, who on September 20, 2022, filed an

application to withdraw his appearance pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and an accompanying “no-merit” letter

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988)

addressing in turn the seven issues raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition and

finding each issue to be devoid of merit. See PCRA Counsel’s No-Merit Letter,

9/20/22, at 3-8.

      On September 23, 2022, the PCRA Court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 “Notice

of Intent to Dismiss” Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing along with a

separate order granting PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. Appellant filed a

pro se response on October 18, 2022, in the form of a “Motion for Extension

of Time” requesting five additional days in which to file a response to the PCRA

court’s Rule 907 Notice to Dismiss. On October 19, 2022, The PCRA court

granted Appellant’s pro se motion for an extension of time and set a date of

November 18, 2022, by which Appellant’s response would be due.

      On October 21, 2022, Appellant filed a 27-page pro se response in which

he offered argument in support of his ineffectiveness issues. On November

29, 2022, upon consideration of Appellant’s PCRA petition, appointed counsel’s

Finley letter, and Appellant’s response to the Finley Letter and the Rule 907

Notice to Dismiss, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition. On

December 21, 2022, Appellant filed simultaneously both his motion for

reconsideration and his notice of appeal. The Court entered an order on the

denying the motion for reconsideration and a second order directing Appellant

                                     -4-
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to file a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal.

     Appellant has raised and briefed the following issues for this Court’s

consideration:

     1. PCRA Court erred when it dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA,
        claiming that it was meritless and untimely.

     2. PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue [Appellant’s]
        pro se issue; namely that trial counsel was ineffective for
        withdrawing the motion to suppress the evidence of
        [Appellant’s] alleged prior bad acts pursuant to Pennsylvania
        Rules of Evidence.

     3. PCRA Counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue [Appellant’s]
        pro se issue; namely that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
        to prepare [Appellant] to take the stand in his own defense.

     4. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue [Appellant’s]
        pro se issue; namely that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
        to file a motion to sever the trial.

     5. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue [Appellant’s]
        pro se issue; namely that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
        to call impeaching witnesses.

     6. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue [Appellant’s]
        pro se issue; namely that appellate counsel was ineffective for
        failing to raise the issue that Trial Court erred in denying trial
        counsel’s motion to strike juror 56 for cause.

     7. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that
        trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to voir dire
        concerning juror 56’s (and others) possible bias being
        conducted in private without [Appellant] (or anyone other than
        counsel, the Court, and the Commonwealth) being present.

     8. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that
        trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert to

                                     -5-
J-S47043-23

         testify regarding the complications with retrieving the deleted
         texts with erroneous dates and times.

      9. PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the
         cumulative effect of these incidences of ineffective assistance.

Brief of Appellant, at 6-7.

      Our standard of review for challenges to the denial and dismissal of

petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA is well-settled.

      We must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are
      supported by the record and whether the court's legal conclusions
      are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court and the
      evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable to the
      prevailing party. The PCRA court's credibility determinations,
      when supported by the record, are binding; however, this [C]ourt
      applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court's legal
      conclusions. We must keep in mind that the petitioner has the
      burden of persuading this Court that the PCRA court erred and
      that such error requires relief. Finally, this Court may affirm a valid
      judgment or order for any reason appearing of record.

Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

      Moreover,

      [t]o be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must establish, by a
      preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence
      resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42
      Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2). These errors include a constitutional
      violation or ineffectiveness of counsel, which “so undermined the
      truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place.” Id. Additionally, [an]
      appellant must show his claims have not been previously litigated
      or waived, and “the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during
      trial ... or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any
      rational strategic or tactical decision by counsel.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
      9543(a)(3), (a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if “the highest
      appellate court in which [appellant] could have had review as a
      matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue.” 42

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      Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9544(a)(2). An issue is waived if appellant “could
      have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, ... on appeal
      or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
      9544(b).

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (some citation

omitted).

      Appellant first contests the PCRA court’s erroneous statement in its Rule

907 Notice to Dismiss characterizing Appellant’s first PCRA petition as

“untimely.” Both the PCRA court and the Commonwealth acknowledged this

mistake prior to the PCRA court’s ultimate determination that Appellant’s PCRA

petition was otherwise without merit. Accordingly, this issue affords Appellant

no relief.

      In Appellant’s second through sixth issues, he presents layered

ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserting that PCRA counsel failed to

develop the pro se claims of trial counsel’s deficient stewardship he raised in

his pro se petition. Initially, we review whether Appellant timely raised his

layered ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Our jurisprudence is clear

that a PCRA petitioner must raise claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA

counsel at the first opportunity to do so, even when on appeal, or waive the

claim. Commonwealth v. Spady, 2023 WL 2923091 *1, *3 (Pa. Super. April

13, 2023) (unpublished memorandum), citing Commonwealth v. Parrish,

273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (holding a petitioner must raise a claim of

PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity, which may present as

early as the Rule 1925(b) statement, lest petitioner waive such claim by failure

to do so).    Because Appellant raised his layered claims at the earliest

                                       -7-
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opportunity, namely, in his Rule 1925(b) statement, we proceed to review his

claims on the merits.

      When raising a layered claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must

first assert that trial counsel was ineffective in some way and that appellate

or PCRA counsel was also ineffective for not raising the issue at the first

opportunity.   We have held that when “determining a layered claim of

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

counsel. If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be

deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Commonwealth

v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      “[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the appellant] bears the burden

of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa.

2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (Pa. 2008).

To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must establish:

      (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
      basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3)
      [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such
      that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
      proceeding would have been different absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 373-374 (Pa. 2011), citing

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).

      A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
      accurate, could establish cause for relief. See Commonwealth v.
      Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005) (“if a petitioner raises
      allegations, which, even if accepted as true, do not establish the

                                     -8-
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      underlying claim ..., he or she will have failed to establish the
      arguable merit prong related to the claim”). Whether the facts
      rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.
      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel's decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

      Appellant’s second issue assails PCRA counsel for failing to claim that

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by withdrawing a pretrial motion

objecting to the Commonwealth’s Pa.R.E. 404(b) notice seeking to admit

evidence of Appellant’s involvement in three other robberies of the same Rite

Aid within 30 days before the murder that occurred on September 19th.

Initially, when trial counsel’s motion gained the trial court’s favorable ruling

precluding the admission of such other bad acts evidence in the joint trial, the

Commonwealth indicated to trial counsel that it would seek to sever

Appellant’s murder trial from the co-defendants’ trial and file three additional

substantive charges of robbery along with a conspiracy charge against him for

each robbery count. N.T., 1/20/15, at 12.

                                      -9-
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      Trial   counsel   consulted   with   Appellant   about   his   options   and

recommended that he avoid the separate trial on four felony counts, including

a count of felony murder, and opt instead for the joint trial on a single count

of felony murder, albeit where he would withdraw his objection to the other

bad acts evidence showing his connection to the previous robberies of the Rite

Aid. At the pretrial hearing of January 20, 2015, defense counsel updated the

trial court on Appellant’s decision on the question of severance:

      [Defense Counsel]: Okay, after lengthy discussions with my
      client yesterday at the prison wherein we discussed the benefits
      pros and cons of both scenarios, Your Honor, at this point it is our
      intention to withdraw the 404-B or have this Court reverse the
      404-B order if you will have this matter proceed to a jury trial with
      the co-Defendants on Tuesday. And it is my understanding that
      regardless of what happens in this trial, the Commonwealth will
      not charge Mr. Mahmud or at least those are the preliminary
      discussions that we had with those other three robberies, is that
      correct?

      [Prosecutor]:            Yes.

      ...

      Trial Court:                  If your client is now withdrawing his
      objection to the motion based on the representation from the
      Commonwealth that if you withdraw that they will not seek to try
      your client on the robbery cases, correct?

      Defense Counsel:                That is correct, there are three
      other robbery cases.

      Trial Court:                And so, in fact you are now asking
      me to I guess reconsider my decision on the 404-B motion Orally
      I would think, and you have no objection to me granting the
      [Commonwealth’s] 404-B motion, correct?

                                      - 10 -
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      Defense Counsel:                Correct, and if I just may amplify
      the record a little bit more with –

      Trial Court:            Is that correct, [prosecutor]?

      Prosecutor:        Yes, Your Honor.     I mean in essence the
      Commonwealth puts a Defendant on notice that they intend to
      admit evidence and then it is Defense Counsel’s responsibility to
      either object and I think [Defense Counsel] did object through the
      memorandum. I guess in essence what he is saying is he is
      withdrawing the objecting and if the [trial court] wants to enter
      an order granting the Commonwealth’s notice I am satisfied with
      that.

      ...

      Defense Counsel:         . . . [If] the court granted the [defense]
      motion and was going to preclude the Commonwealth from
      introducing evidence of the involvement allegedly in these other
      three robberies, [the Commonwealth] would sever the case. We
      would then have a trial where the potential exists that those three
      robberies would be tried together with the Rite Aid case, the felony
      homicide case due to the similarity and course of conduct that the
      Commonwealth would allege there would be justification for those
      charges to be tried together. In that case the jury would of course
      hear the evidence of those robberies because those charges would
      be before the jury on trial in addition to the homicide case. The
      only way that wouldn’t occur is if the Court refused to try those
      charges jointly. It is my humble opinion that given the alleged
      similarities that it would be difficult for the defense to obtain a
      severance on those charges.

      ....

N.T., 1/20/15, at 5-7.

      The trial court directed trial counsel to colloquy Appellant about the

decision to withdraw the successful motion blocking the Commonwealth’s use

of other bad act evidence. In the colloquy, Appellant indicated he had listened

to and understood the discussion that had just taken place in open court,

                                     - 11 -
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confirmed trial counsel and he had spent several hours the day before

discussing their options in this regard, and informed the trial court that he

understood his options and was in agreement with trial counsel that a joint

trial with the evidence coming in as 404-B evidence to show motive or

common plan—not guilt—was preferable to undergoing severance and a

separate trial where he would face not only the murder charge but also three

substantive charges of robbery along with an accompanying charge of

conspiracy on each robbery charge that would expose him to a potential,

additional sentence of 60 years’ incarceration. N.T. at 9-12.                   The

Commonwealth agreed it would not file separate charges on the robberies if

Appellant remained a co-defendant in the joint trial where the robberies would

be admissible solely as Rule 404-B evidence showing a common plan and

motive. N.T. at 13.

         The trial court finalized the colloquy by asking Appellant if he understood

that he was “avoiding a potential sentence of 60 years on those three

robberies by agreeing to this,” that he was “receiving a substantial benefit by

agreeing to this. . . .” N.T. at 13. Appellant answered in the affirmative. N.T.

at 13.

         The record establishes that trial counsel had a reasonable basis for his

decision to recommend that Appellant remain in the joint trial rather than opt

for severance and a separate trial where he would still face the felony murder

charge as well as three additional charges of robbery and conspiracy exposing

                                        - 12 -
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him to an additional 60 years’ incarceration. Accordingly, we discern no merit

to Appellant’s second issue.

       In Appellant’s third issue, he contends PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to pursue a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare

Appellant to testify in his own defense. The crux of Appellant’s claim is that

counsel had advised him that the “mastermind” of the robbery conspiracy, co-

defendant David Wiggins, would testify that while Appellant initially had

conspired to commit a robbery of the Rite Aid, he had abandoned the

conspiracy before the robbery took place.          Because trial counsel had not

prepared Appellant to testify, and Appellant therefore was unprepared to do

so, the jury had no way to know that he had abandoned his conspiracy with

the co-defendants.2 This advice, Appellant concludes, was unreasonable and

prejudicial, as it “vitiated a knowing and intelligent decision for Petitioner to

testify on his own behalf. See Commonwealth v. Breisch, 719 A.2d 352,

355 (Pa. Super. 1998).

       The Commonwealth responds that this claim is belied by the record,

wherein during a full colloquy of Appellant conducted by counsel, Appellant
____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth aptly responds that the      notes of trial testimony show
the jury heard evidence that Appellant directly communicated his
abandonment to his codefendants. See N.T. 2/10/15, at 25, 29, 31-33. The
Commonwealth continues, “To support the theory of abandonment, trial
counsel relied on a text message from the Appellant to [Co-defendant] White
on September 18th, the night before McClay’s murder, in conjunction with
perceived inconsistencies between White’s trial testimony and other evidence
in the record. Therefore, there was evidence of record through which trial
counsel could and did argue that the Appellant abandoned the conspiracy.”
Brief of Appellant at 18.

                                          - 13 -
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indicated that he did not want to testify. PCRA counsel cited to this record in

his No-Merit Letter:

      [Trial] Counsel did a full colloquy of his client regarding whether
      or not he wanted to testify. During this Colloquy, [trial counsel]
      inquired, “So, you’re making a decision that you have an absolute
      right to testify. However, you are giving that right up to testify.
      Is that what I’m hearing from you? Is that correct? And
      [Appellant] responded, “I don’t want to testify.” [N.T.,2/9/15, at
      226]. Counsel further confirmed that [Appellant was not forced
      or threatened into this decision and that it was of his own free will.
      [N.T., 2/9/15, at 227.] Clearly, [Appellant] was aware of his right
      to testify and willingly gave up that right. This claim has no merit.

No Merit Letter, 9/20/22, at 4-5. The PCRA Court, moreover, echoed PCRA

counsel’s observations. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/23/23, at 5-6.

      It is well-settled that “to sustain a claim that counsel was ineffective for

failing to advise the appellant of his rights [to testify], the appellant must

demonstrate either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that

counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a knowing and

intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.” Commonwealth v. Nieves,

746 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Pa. 2000).

      Our review of the record reveals Appellant received a full colloquy in

open court in which he expressly acknowledged that after full discussion with

counsel about his right to testify, he was satisfied with counsel’s advice against

testifying, and he verified that the decision against testifying was his own.

Accordingly, we reject his meritless, layered claim of ineffectiveness asserting

interference with his right to testify.

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      Appellant’s fourth issue is related to his second, as it is premised on the

argument that trial counsel ineffectively failed to file a motion to sever his trial

from that of the two co-defendants who had not pleaded guilty.              At the

criminal trial, evidence established that Appellant was not present in the Rite

Aid at the time codefendants Wiggins and Pultro entered to commit the

robbery. Wiggins’ defense was that he conspired to commit the robbery but

did not possess the specific intent to kill. N.T., 2/10/15, at 54-88. Pultro

denied knowledge that a gun would be used and argued that Wiggins

unilaterally shot and killed Mr. McClay.

      Herein, Appellant focuses his argument solely on the purported

prejudice stemming from “overwhelming” inculpatory video and photographic

evidence depicting codefendants Wiggins and Pultro’s execution of the robbery

and shooting of Mr. McCray. Appellant maintains that it was difficult for the

jury to separate Appellant from such highly probative evidence of Wiggins’

and Pultro’s guilt, even though the jury also heard evidence of Appellant’s

absence from the Rite Aid coupled with evidence of text messages suggesting

Appellant had abandoned the plan. Brief of Appellant at 20-22; N.T., 11/1/13,

at 208-213.      Nevertheless, because we have already determined that a

reasonable basis existed to support trial counsel’s decision to forgo a motion

to sever, Appellant may not prevail on this layered ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.

      Appellant’s fifth issue charges PCRA counsel with ineffectively failing to

pursue the issue in Appellant’s pro se petition alleging that trial counsel was

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ineffective for failing to call an alibi witnesses. “Counsel has a general duty

to undertake reasonable investigations or make reasonable decisions that

render particular investigations unnecessary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson,

966 A.2d 523, 535 (Pa. 2009).       “The duty to investigate, of course, may

include a duty to interview certain potential witnesses; and a prejudicial failure

to fulfill this duty, unless pursuant to a reasonable strategic decision, may lead

to a finding of ineffective assistance.” Id. at 535-36. Further, when raising

a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a potential witness, petitioner

must establish that,

      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 209 A.3d 992, 998 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

      For purposes of this appeal, Appellant asserts that trial counsel failed to

call impeaching witnesses, which differs from the designation alibi witnesses

used in his PCRA petition. Indeed, in discerning no merit to the claim as raised

in the pro se PCRA petition, PCRA counsel observed in his no-merit letter,

      In this case, there is no evidence to support that [trial] counsel
      was aware or should have been aware of any possible alibi
      witness, or that there was any alibi witness willing and available
      to testify at trial. Further, even if one of the defendant’s listed
      witnesses had testified to his whereabouts, it was never alleged
      that defendant was actually present at the robbery. Therefore,

                                      - 16 -
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      this testimony would not have aided in establishing the defense.
      This claim has no merit.

PCRA counsel’s No Merit Letter, 9/20/22, 5-6.

      Even if we were to credit Appellant’s pro se petition with alerting PCRA

counsel that an “impeaching”, rather than an “alibi” witness was available, the

petition alleged only that his named witness, Danielle Maurry, was willing to

testify Appellant was at her mother’s home on the day Wiggins and Pultro

committed the armed robbery of the Rite Aid. Again, the Commonwealth’s

case implicating Appellant in the crime did not depend on evidence of his

whereabouts proximate to and during the time of the robbery. Accordingly,

because the absence of Ms. Maurry’s testimony was not so prejudicial to have

denied Appellant a fair trial, counsel’s failure to call Ms. Maurry as a witness

did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.

      Appellant’s sixth and seventh issues involve the voir dire of proposed

Juror 56. In his sixth issue, Appellant asserts PCRA counsel ineffectively failed

to challenge direct appeal counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s

erroneous denial of trial counsel’s requested “for cause” strike of Juror 56,

which caused trial counsel to use one of Appellant’s peremptory strikes on

Juror 56.    In his seventh issue, Appellant asserts the related layered

ineffectiveness claim assailing trial counsel’s failure to object to the individual

voir dire of Juror 56 that took place outside of Appellant’s personal presence

when the trial judge conducted it in the “robing room” adjacent to the

courtroom where Appellant and his co-defendants remained.

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        A criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury is explicitly granted by

Article 1, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth Amendment

of the United States Constitution. Our Supreme Court has long stated that

“the purpose of voir dire is to empanel a fair and impartial jury, not to empanel

a jury sympathetic to positions or beliefs of either party.” Commonwealth

v. Paolello, 665 A.2d 439, 451 (Pa. 1995). As the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court explained in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 305 A.2d 5 (Pa.1973):

        the purpose of the voir dire examination is to disclose
        qualifications or lack of qualifications of a juror and in particular
        to determine whether a juror has formed a fixed opinion as to the
        accused's guilt or innocence. The law recognizes that it would be
        unrealistic to expect jurors to be free from all prejudices, a failing
        common to all human beings. We can only attempt to have them
        put aside those prejudices in the performance of their duty, the
        determination of guilt or innocence. We therefore do not expect a
        tabula rosa but merely a mind sufficiently conscious of its sworn
        responsibility and willing to attempt to reach a decision solely on
        the facts presented, assiduously avoiding the influences of
        irrelevant factors.

Id. at 8.

        With these concepts in mind, we further observe that how voir dire will

be conducted is left to the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v.

Moore, 756 A.2d 64, 65 (Pa. Super. 2000). However, “a complete denial of

the right to an examination of jurors to show bias or prejudice is a palpable

abuse     of   discretion   and   entitles   the   defendant   to   a   new      trial.”

Commonwealth v. Holland, 444 A.2d 1179, 1180 (Pa. Super. 1982)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Foster, 293 A.2d 94 (Pa.Super.1972)).

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      Decisions of the trial judge concerning voir dire, therefore, will not be

reversed in the absence of palpable error. Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902

A.2d 419, 424 (Pa. 2006). An abuse of discretion is more than just an error

in judgment and, on appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused

its discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised was

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 7, 12 (Pa. Super. 2002).

      Appellant’s sixth issue relies on a layered ineffectiveness claim attacking

counsels’ collective failure to challenge the trial court’s allegedly erroneous

denial of a requested “for cause” strike of Prospective Juror 56 that led trial

counsel to use a peremptory strike to remove him.            Courts have found

reversible error where a party was forced to use a peremptory strike to strike

a juror that should have been stricken for cause. See Commonwealth v.

Penn, 132 A.3d 498, 505 (Pa. Super. 2016).

      Here, Prospective Juror 56 responded that if chosen as a juror he

“probably” would, or “thinks he can”, be fair and impartial despite having read

a newspaper article about the Rite Aid robbery two years earlier and having

experienced the challenges attendant to his wife’s being robbed at gunpoint

in her place of employment 25 years earlier. Further questioning by counsel

and the trial court elicited from the prospective juror responses that he had

no doubt that he could be fair and impartial and that he was sure he could

apply the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard in his deliberations as a

juror. N.T., 1/28/15, at 280-88.

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        Nevertheless, trial counsel moved to strike Prospective Juror 56 for

cause due to the “equivocation” and “hesitation” in his responses, but the trial

court denied the motion, prompting one of the defense counsel—the record

does not reflect which one—to use a peremptory strike on Juror 56. Id.

        On the same record, this Court sitting en banc in Commonwealth v.

Wiggins, 1688 EDA 2015, 2019 WL 3251645, at *6 (Pa. Super. 2019) (non-

precedential decision) appeal denied 223 A.3d 659 (Pa. 2020), rejected the

same challenge raised by codefendant Wiggins in his appeal.3 Specifically, we

concluded that “we give great deference to the trial court's observations of

Prospective Juror 56, and find that the trial court did not palpably abuse its

discretion by refusing to exclude Prospective Juror 56 for cause.” Id. at *6

Accordingly, we discern no arguable merit to the ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on the trial court’s refusal to strike Prospective Juror 56

for cause.

        As noted above, Appellant’s seventh issue couches within a layered

ineffectiveness claim a challenge to his voir dire of Prospective Juror 56 taking

place outside of his presence. The United States Supreme Court “has explicitly

affirmed that voir dire is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, during

which     the   defendant      has    a   constitutional   right   to   be   present.”

Commonwealth v. Hunsberger, 58 A.3d 32, 37 (Pa. 2012) (citing Gomez

v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989)). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A)
____________________________________________

3 See Wiggins at **1-4, which provides an extensive reproduction of the
relevant notes of testimony of the voir dire of Prospective Juror 56.

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(“The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial including the

impaneling of the jury[.]”). “However, like the [Supreme Court of the United

States, our Supreme] Court has recognized that the right to be present in the

courtroom during one's [non-capital] trial is not absolute.” Hunsberger, 58

A.3d at 38. For example, a “defendant's presence in chambers and at sidebar

is not required where he is represented by counsel.”          Id. at 38 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Boyle, 447 A.2d 250 (Pa. 1982)).

      The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hunsberger recognized “that a

defendant's right to participate in voir dire may be satisfied through

procedures that both ensure the defendant's right to choose and be tried by a

fair and impartial jury, yet make accommodations for trial court efficiency and

safety, and the comfort protection, and respect for the jury pool.”

Hunsberger, 58 A.3d at 40.

      Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim complains specifically of the individual

voir dire of Prospective Juror 56 taking place in the robing room instead of in

the adjacent courtroom where he and his codefendants remained.              At the

outset of this individual voir dire, the trial court advised counsel as follows:

      THE COURT:         First of all, I just want to say that if at any time
                         any of the defense attorneys need to take a
                         break to go out and to consult with their
                         respective client, I would certainly give you a
                         break to do that, but if I don’t hear that you
                         want to, I’m going to assume that you do not
                         need to consult with your client.             Okay.
                         Everybody – I think I got three heads nodding.

      [Appellant’s Trial Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor. It’s fair enough.

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N.T. of Voir Dire, 1/28/15, at 43.

       As the excerpt shows, the trial court implemented a voir dire procedure

that allowed consultation between counsel and Appellant in the adjacent

courtroom to occur “at any time” during voir dire. In this regard, we find the

effect of the trial court’s voir dire arrangement was much like that in

Hunsberger, which involved individual voir dire that was conducted between

only the trial judge and counsel at sidebar and outside the range of the

defendant/appellant’s Hunsberger’s hearing. While the record in Hunsberger

showed the defendant/appellant communicated with counsel about the voir

dire despite his inability to hear the ongoing procedure, the present record

similarly establishes that counsel and Appellant retained the option to consult

during the voir dire of Prospective Juror 56.       Accordingly, discerning no

deprivation of Appellant’s right to participate in the jury selection process, we

find no merit to Appellant’s seventh issue.4

____________________________________________

4 Furthermore, Appellant fails to demonstrate either merit or prejudice in his

additional Issue #7 argument charging trial counsel with ineffectively using a
peremptory strike on Prospective Juror 56, as he does not contend, inter alia,
that he would have retained Juror 56 and preserved the peremptory strike,
nor does he claim that the jury chosen was incompetent or biased against
him. Accordingly, this argument is meritless. See Commonwealth v.
Herring, No. 796 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 8525140, at *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec.
8, 2023) (non-precedential decision) (holding constitutional challenge to trial
court’s conducting jury selection in defendant’s absence was “meritless”;
defendant identified no aspect of voir dire to which he would have objected,
nor did he indicate how the jury chosen was incompetent or unfair against
him).

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      In Appellant’s eighth issue, he argues that PCRA counsel was ineffective

for not alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain an expert to

testify that testimony offered by Delaware County Detective Edmond Pisani of

the Criminal Investigation Unit/Computer Forensic Unit of the Delaware

County District Attorney’s Office regarding the dates of text messages entered

into evidence “could have [been] (and most likely were) erroneous.”

      Both the PCRA Court and the Commonwealth dismiss this issue as

waived for Appellant’s failure to include it in his PCRA petition, but, as we

discussed supra, claims of ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel may be

raised “at the first opportunity, even if on appeal.” Spady, supra; Parrish,

supra. In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021) our

Supreme Court not only emphasized the need to preserve a petitioner's right

to effective PCRA counsel but also reaffirmed our Supreme Court's preference

for evidentiary hearings in PCRA matters, and explained:

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel's
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel's stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

Id. at 402 (citations and footnote omitted and formatting altered).

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      Here, however, because Appellant’s argument on this issue does not

advance beyond a bald, speculative allegation that the incriminating text

messages admitted into evidence “could have been” erroneous, it merits no

relief, as we find it waived. Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072

(Pa. Super. 2017) (“the failure to properly develop a claim renders an issue

waived.”).

      Appellant’s final issue maintains that PCRA counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise the issue of the cumulative prejudicial effect of the purported

incidences of ineffective assistance of counsel.   While no number of failed

ineffectiveness claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so

individually, when the failure of individual claims is grounded in lack of

prejudice, the cumulative prejudice from those individual claims may properly

be assessed. Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 161 (Pa. 2012).

Here, after reviewing Appellant’s failed claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel and identifying just one that was denied for its lack of prejudice, we

conclude that the claims in the aggregate do not prejudice him.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 2/20/2024

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