Court Opinion

ID: 9732978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:48:12.912835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.839255
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). My Brother’s opinion makes clear the reason for the difficulties in this case. Here, we have a witness by the name of Hazel Burns. Sometime before the trial of this action, Hazel Burns had given a deposition which was favorable to the position of the plaintiff upon the question of the extent of the intoxication of one Hileman on the night of an alleged violation of the dramshop law.
At the trial of the cause, Hazel Burns told her story quite differently, this time minimizing the *19decedent’s drinking on the night in question. Plaintiff’s attorney proceeded to refer to the deposition of Mrs. Burns in the course of his examination of her in the presence of the jury. The procedure was objected to. Plaintiff’s counsel sought to have Mrs. Burns declared an adverse or hostile witness. The trial court refused to do so. Ruling that the plaintiff’s counsel was using the deposition to impeach his own witness, the trial court sustained the objection of the defendant.
My Brother has cited the case of Lightfoot v. The People (1868), 16 Mich 507. He tells us that Light-foot shows the right way to cross-examine a witness with reference to the latter’s deposition. He apprehends that the same rule applies to the use of a deposition when the object is refreshment of the memory of a previously deposed witness. That suggestion is at odds with all of the authority we are able to find.
Lightfoot involved cross-examination and the use of a deposition for the purpose of impeaching a witness. Thus, Mr. Justice Campbell in writing in Lightfoot says:
“On the contrary, the deposition relied on to establish a contradiction by the witness is original evidence for the party against whom he is sworn, and should be read in the case as independent testimony. The only occasion for bringing it to the attention of the witness at all, is where the party impeaching him desires to follow up the production, and reading in evidence of the deposition by a further cross-examination concerning the discrepancies and their causes.” Lightfoot v. The People, supra, p 513.
Obviously, where a deposition is properly used to impeach a witness the deposition is admissible in evidence for that purpose. Being admissible in *20evidence, it can and should he read to the jury. But, in this case of Hileman, we are not talking about impeaching a witness.
The rule remains valid in Michigan that a party in a civil action vouches for the credibility of his own witnesses and may not impeach them by showing the jury that such witnesses have made prior contradictory statements. The process of refreshing a witness’ recollection by use of his prior deposition is not, as my Brother seems to suggest, a little bit of impeachment, or an exception to the impeachment rule. The authorities are uniform, that when a prior deposition is used to refresh a witness’ recollection, that deposition may be shown to the witness, or if he cannot read, the deposition may be read to him, but out of the hearing of the jury. 58 Am Jur, Witnesses, § 599, p 335. Also, 58 Am Jur, Witnesses, § 596, p 333, § 607, p 337.
“It is only when the memory needs assistance that recourse may be had to the use of memoranda or other aids for such purpose. If the witness has an independent recollection of the facts inquired about, it is improper to permit him to inspect any writing or memorandum whatsoever as an aid to recollection. It is always necessary, therefore, in the absence of circumstances already appearing of record, to lay a foundation for the use of a memorandum for refreshment of memory. It must be made to appear, as a condition precedent, that the memory of the witness needs stimulating. But after such foundation is laid or appears, there is still considerable doubt as to precisely the proper method to be employed. It can only be said that there is no fixed and invariable rule of thumb, and that the manner of using memoranda for refreshment of memory is left largely to the discretion of the trial court. One of the modes adopted is for the witness to inspect the document, and, with memory quick*21ened by the suggestions it contains, to speak then without the aid of the writing. In other words, he should then testify as though the circumstance of refreshing his memory had not occurred. When the memoranda are numerous it has been held not to be error for the court to refuse to require the witness to lay the books aside after examining them and before testifying. If the witness cannot read and write, the proper practice is not to read the memoranda to him in the presence of the jury, but to allow him to retire with counsel on each side and to have the memoranda read in his presence without comment. It has been held that a witness, either on direct or cross-examination, may be compelled to inspect a writing if there is reason to believe that thereby this memory may be refreshed.” 5 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence (2d ed), § 2382, pp 4681, 4682.
The very section, quoted from the earlier edition of Jones (5 Jones, Blue Book of Evidence, [Bancroft-Whitney edition of 1914], headed “§ 883 [886]”), continuing from where my Brother Black left off, provides, pp 331, 332:
“The question sometimes arises whether memoranda, used to refresh the memory, are themselves to be admitted in evidence. Of course, the memoranda under discussion in this chapter must not he confused with such writings as hoohs of account which, on grounds elsewhere discussed, are competent as evidence, when properly verified. When the witness, after examining the memorandum, finds his memory so refreshed that he can testify from recollection, independently of the memorandum, there is no reason or necessity for the introduction of the paper or writing itself; and it is not admissible. In such case, the jury have no knowledge of the contents of the paper, unless opposing counsel call for such contents on cross-examination. Of course, the cross-examiner has the right to inspect *22and use the document in order that he may test the candor and credibility of the witness and to show that it could not properly refresh his memory. It is almost needless to add that a statement prepared by the witness cannot be used as evidence of the facts therein set forth. Thus in a personal injury action, a statement by the doctor of the condition of the plaintiff at the time of his attendance, referred to in his deposition as an accurate description of the matters therein set forth, was inadmissible as evidence.”
The fifth edition of Jones on Evidence, volume 4, § 971, p 1827, states as follows:
“A question as to the manner of using memoranda of this character is to be determined at the discretion of the court. If the writings are numerous, it is not error for the court to refuse to require the witness to lay the books aside, after examining them, before testifying. If the witness cannot read and write, the proper practice is not to read the memoranda to him in the presence of the jury, but to allow him to retire with counsel for the parties and have the memoranda read in his presence without comment.”
Some discussion of the Michigan cases cited by my Brother is in order. Higdon v. Kelley (1954), 339 Mich 209, is a case in which the trial court permitted, over the objection of the defendant, interrogation of a witness in regard to a former statement made by him. The report of this case does not show whether the interrogation of the witness upon his prior statement was made in the presence of the jury, though a fair reading of the case would suggest that this was probably the fact. The Court relied upon a number of Michigan cases, many of which were criminal cases. It was admitted in Higdon that the people in a criminal prosecution, *23being obliged to call all res gestae witnesses, are permitted to impeach them.
“It is recognized that in this State in criminal cases the people may impeach res gestae witnesses whom they are obliged to call. CL 1948, § 767.40a (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 28.980 [1]) and People v. Elco [1903], 131 Mich 519, 523. It is to be noted that in People v. Nankervis, supra, [(1951), 330 Mich 17] the prior statements were used to refresh the memory of a witness and such was held not to amount to impeachment.” Higdon v. Kelley (1954), 339 Mich 209, p 219.
McGee v. Baumgartner (1899), 121 Mich 287, relied on in Higdon, was a case in which the defendant sought and was permitted some measure of impeachment of his own witness. The defendant lost the case and appealed, and McGee therefore only stands for the proposition that the defendant could not complain, the Court saying at page 292: “We think the court went far enough to permit defendant to attack the credibility of his own witness.” People v. Johnson (1915), 186 Mich 516, was a criminal case and is inapposite.
Bresch v. Wolf (1928), 243 Mich 638, refers to confronting a witness with his former affidavit for the purpose of refreshing his recollection. The report does not demonstrate the manner in which the confrontation was made and does not therefore stand for the proposition that the prior affidavit can be read to the witness in the presence of the jury.
Michigan cases to the proposition that a party may not use a prior statement to impeach the credibility of his own witness are Farthing v. Hepinstall (1928), 243 Mich 380, and Westphal v. St. Joseph & B. H. S. R. Co. (1903), 134 Mich 239.
*24Wigmore in his work on Evidence, volume 3 (1970 rev), § 763, p 141, states:
“It follows from the nature of the purpose for which the paper is used (§ 758 supra) that it is in no strict sense evidence. In this respect it differs from a record of past recollection (§ 754 supra). Nevertheless, though the witness’ party may not present it as evidence, the same reason of precaution which allows the opponent to examine it (§ 762 supra) allows the opponent to call the jury’s attention to its features, and also allows the jurymen, if they please, to examine it for the same end. In short, the opponent, hut not the offering party, has a right to have the jury see it:
“Ellenborough, L.C.J., in Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty 124, 125 (1810): It is not the memorandum that is the evidence, but the recollection of the witness.
“Gurney, B., in Gregory v. Teverner, 6 Car. & P. 280, 281 (1833): The memorandum itself is not evidence, and particular entries only are used by the witness to refresh his memory * * * . The defendant’s counsel may cross-examine on the entries already referred to, and the jury may also see those entries if they wish to do so.
“Endicott, J., in Commonwealth v. Jeffs, 132 Mass 5, 6 (1882): The opposite party is entitled to cross-examine the witness in regard to it; and it may be shown to the jury, not for the purpose of establishing the facts therein contained, but for the purpose of showing that it could not properly refresh the memory of the witness.
“That the offering party has not the right to treat it as evidence, by reading it or showing it or handing it to the jury, is well established. That the opponent may do this, or that the jury may of its own motion demand it, is equally conceded.”
82 ALR2d 512, § 23, states the general rule as follows:
*25* in the case of reviving a present recollection, the memorandum may not be laid in evidence as a part of the direct examination, since it is the recollection, not the memorandum, which is the evidence.”
Cited there, is Battle Creek Food Co. v. Kirkland (1941), 298 Mich 515.
Caldwell v. Bowen (1890), 80 Mich 382, points out that a witness may refresh his recollection from a writing which is not in evidence, but that if after reading the writing, he cannot testify from a refreshed recollection, the writing is not per se admissible.
Koehler v. Abey (1911), 168 Mich 113, 119, provides as follows:
“The ultimate fact sought to be proved was that an order to guard the planer had been made. The witness testified, in substance, that, with or without the aid of the memorandum, he had no present recollection of the fact.
“If he had testified that the writing refreshed his recollection, so that he had a present recollection of the fact sought to be established, the writing would not have been admissible as further substantive evidence of the fact. In such a case it is the testimony of the witness, the recollection, which is evidence, not the document or writing used to refresh recollection.”
Grusiecki v. Jaglay (1932), 260 Mich 9, 12, holds:
“Defendant alleges error in the court refusing to admit in evidence checks which a witness testified refreshed her recollection. The fact that they refreshed her recollection rendered them inadmissible.”
State v. Legg (1906), 59 W Va 315 (53 SE 545), contains rather a thorough discussion of the dis*26tinction between present recollection refreshed and past recollection recorded, and it is said on page 322:
“The witness, in proceeding to testify from a present or existing recollection, may be unable to do so by unaided mental effort. But by resort to some memorandum or writing his memory may be so stimulated and refreshed as to enable him to recollect the fact, and where this is so, it is not proper to introduce the writing in evidence, or read it in the presence of the jury, because it forms no part of the testimony, being used only for the purpose of aiding the mental effort of the witness to recollect the particular transaction. ‘But since, in Lord Ellenborough’s words, “It is not the memorandum that is the evidence, but the recollection of the witness,” the party whose witness uses it has no right to have it read or handed to the jury; it is only the opponent who wishes to do this in case he wishes to cast doubt on the reality of the refreshment of memory.’ 1 Greenleaf on Ev., (16th Ed.), section 439c.”
In this case of Hileman, there was no basis whatever to use the deposition of Hazel Burns for the purpose of refreshing her recollection. The witness never admitted to any failure of memory and therefore there was no occasion to use her prior deposition as a means of refreshing an errant memory. Consider the following quote from the direct examination of witness Hazel Burns:
“Q. Now, about how many people were in the Bar that evening when you got there?
“A. Well, I have tried to visualize over and over. There are only a half-dozen that I can recall faces and names besides Gordie and myself and the two people behind the Bar.
*27“Q. Those are the ones that you can remember by faces and names, but besides that, about how many more people were there?
“A. Seated at the Bar?
“Q. No, in the Bar, in the Bar altogether.
“A. I’d say there were ten, approximately ten people, maybe a couple more, maybe a couple less, including the two people behind the Bar and Gordie and myself.
“Q. As many as fifteen or twenty possibly?
“A. No, there were more like eight, ten or twelve. Twelve at the very most. Ten or twelve.
“Q. Do you recall being asked this same question back on October 28 in my office ?
“A. Yes, sir, I do.
“Q. Do you remember how many people you thought were in the Bar that day?
“A. I believe I stated about the same amount, ten or twelve people.
“Q. Could you have said fifteen?
“A. It’s possible but like I say, it’s more like ten or twelve people. People come and go in the course of a couple of hours you know. I wasn’t sitting there waiting to see who came and went.”
In the quoted testimony, the examining attorney without objection suggested to the witness that she had previously stated there were 15 people in the bar. In spite of this suggestion, she continued to insist that only 10 or 12 people were in the bar. Certainly, it could not be said that her memory was refreshed. There is a still more important question here. Even if we were to say, contrary to the previous authority in Michigan, that a party to a civil action may impeach his own witness, and applied thereto the Lightfoot rules with respect to impeachment, there still would be no occasion for the jury to conclude that the version given by the witness in the prior statement constituted the truth. Evidence *28of a prior inconsistent statement, when admissible for the proposition of impeaching the credibility of a witness, does not constitute substantive evidence of the matters contained in the prior statement. Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, when received to impeach the credibility of a witness, is admissible and not hearsay, because it is received for the purpose of proving that the prior statement was made and not for the purpose of proving the truth of the prior statement.
It is clear from the examination of Hazel Burns that counsel was not only attempting to impeach the witness under the guise of refreshing her recollection, he was moreover attempting to place before the jury as substantive evidence, the statements contained in her prior deposition. Note the following:
“Q. Do you recall this question: ‘Any idea how many he drank’ and an interjection by Mr. Baun— ‘How many what’, ‘Q. Of these drinks that he drank? A. I can’t say how many in the course of two-and-a-half hours. He had several. Q. Now— A. He was drinking all the time we were there. I do know that. As far as counting how many, I couldn’t tell.’ Was that question asked to you and did you make that answer?
“A. Yes, it was and I remember answering you.
“Q. So he was drinking all the time you were there (Emphasis added.)
The examiner, after reading the question and answer from the deposition, elicits from the witness a statement that she recalled the questions and answers. Without any further questioning, the lawyer then concludes that he has proven the truth of the matter contained in the deposition. The lawyer says, “so he was drinking all the time you were there.” Under no possible theory, could it be said that there was at this juncture any evidence prop*29erly before the jury from which the jury could conclude that “he was drinking all the time you were there.” Even if the Burns’ deposition were admissible to impeach the credibility of the witness Burns, the only thing that could be said at this juncture was that the jury had been shown that Mrs. Burns once said that “he was drinking all the time we were there.”
In summary, then, I would hold (1) that a party in a civil action may not impeach his own witness, even if that witness appears hostile or changes his testimony; (2) that unless a witness needs to have his memory refreshed, there is no occasion to show him his former testimony; (3) that a witness who needs to have his memory refreshed may be shown his former testimony, or it may be read to him out of the presence of the jury.
Finally, I would hold that it was not error in this case for the court to sustain the objection of the defendant to the use of the deposition of witness Burns by way of reading it in the presence of the jury.
I would affirm.
T. G. Kavanagh, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.