Court Opinion

ID: 9901351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 18:00:21.217322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.484445
License: Public Domain

20-2951
Jones et al. v. Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc. et al.

                                        In the
                           United States Court of Appeals
                               for the Second Circuit

                                 August Term, 2021

                                     No. 20-2951

BRENDA JONES, AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID HORTMAN,
 JILL HORTMAN MORRIS, AS CO-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOHN DAVID
                              HORTMAN,

                                                                      Plaintiffs-Appellants,

  ADALIA LEE REDD, INDIVIDUALLY AND CO-ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
      STEVEN BURTON REDD, DEZARAY REDD, INDIVIDUALLY, JAZLYN REDD,
INDIVIDUALLY AND CO-ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF STEVEN BURTON REDD,
                       TRYSTYN REDD, INDIVIDUALLY,

                                                     Consolidated-Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                           v.

     GOODRICH PUMP & ENGINE CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC., ROLLS-ROYCE CORP.,

                                                    Consolidated-Defendants-Appellees,

  L-3 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, L-3 COMMUNICATIONS HOLDINGS, INC.,

                                                              Consolidated-Defendants,
GOODRICH CORPORATION, ROLLS-ROYCE NORTH AMERICA, INC., MD HELICOPTERS,
INC., L3 COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, LP, ALLISON ENGINE COMPANY,
                            INC., BOEING CO.,

                                                                        Defendants.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the District of Connecticut
                                No. 12-cv-1297

            (Argued February 23, 2022; Decided November 21, 2023)

Before:     LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, KEARSE and LEE, Circuit Judges.

       Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal from an order of the United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut (Eginton, J.) granting summary judgment
against them on the grounds that their state law tort claims are barred by implied
field preemption flowing from the Federal Aviation Act. Plaintiffs-Appellants
argue that the Federal Aviation Act’s preempted field does not include military
aircrafts like the one to which their suit pertains. Applying ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation, we agree. We therefore VACATE AND REMAND.

                                             TEJINDER SINGH, Goldstein & Russel,
                                             P.C., Bethesda, Maryland (Ronald
                                             L.M. Goldman, Timothy A. Loranger,
                                             Crawford Appleby, Baum Hedlund
                                             Aristei & Goldman, PC, Los Angeles,
                                             California, Arthur Alan Wolk, The
                                             Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia,
                                             Pennsylvania, John J. Gagliano,
                                             Gagliano Law Offices, Philadelphia,
                                             Pennsylvania, on the brief), for
                                             Plaintiffs-Appellants.

                                             JOHN W. CERRETA (James H. Rotondo,
                                             Andraya P. Brunau, Day Pitney LLP,
                                         2
    Hartford, Connecticut, Thomas R.
    Pantino, Fitzpatrick & Hunt, Pagano
    Aubert, LLP, New York, New York,
    on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee
    Goodrich Pump & Engine Control
    Systems, Inc.

    J. DENNY SHUPE (Robert J. Williams,
    Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis
    LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
    Steven E. Arnold, SA Law, P.C.,
    Boston, Massachusetts, on the brief), for
    Defendant-Appellee         Rolls-Royce
    Corporation.

    Jeffrey     R.     White,  American
    Association for Justice, Washington,
    D.C.; Justin T. Green, Anthony
    Tarricone, Joseph P. Musacchio,
    Kreindler & Kreindler LLP, New
    York, NY, for American Association for
    Justice, amicus curiae in support of
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.

    Allison M. Zieve, Adina H.
    Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation
    Group, Washington D.C., for Public
    Citizen, amicus curiae in support of
    Plaintiffs-Appellants.

    Jonathan M. Hoffman, MB Law
    Group LLP, Portland, OR, for Product
    Liability Advisory Council, amicus
    curiae in support of Defendants-
    Appellees.

3
                                           Lauren L. Haertlein, General Aviation
                                           Manufacturers Association, Inc.,
                                           Washington, D.C., for General Aviation
                                           Manufacturers Association, Inc., and
                                           National Association of Manufacturers,
                                           amici curiae in support of Defendants-
                                           Appellees.

                                           Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy
                                           Assistant Attorney General, Mark B.
                                           Stern, Lindsey Powell, Ben Lewis,
                                           Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil
                                           Division, Department of Justice,
                                           Washington, D.C., for the United
                                           States, amicus curiae in support of
                                           neither party.

      EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judge:

      After two United States Army pilots tragically perished in a helicopter

crash, their surviving family members sued various companies responsible for the

making of the helicopter. The family members alleged that manufacturing and/or

defective operating instructions and warnings caused the pilots’ deaths. The

companies countered that the family members’ asserted state law claims were

barred by a number of preemption doctrines.

      The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the companies,

finding that there was implied field preemption under the Federal Aviation Act

(the “FAAct” or “Act”). The district court held that the family members’ claims

                                       4
were preempted under this Court’s case law stating that Congress intended for the

FAAct “to occupy the entire field of aviation safety,” Jones v. Goodrich Corp., 422 F.

Supp. 3d 518, 521, 525–26 (D. Conn. 2019) (Eginton, J.) (citing Goodspeed Airport

LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir.

2011)). Although the family members argued that the FAAct could not preempt

their claims because the Act applies only to civil aircrafts—and the helicopter that

crashed here was a military aircraft—the district court rejected that argument,

reasoning that, even though the FAAct “exempt[s] government military aircrafts

from [FAAct] standards,” this “does not constrain the clear congressional intent to

occupy the entire field of aviation safety.” Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525.

      We disagree. Field preemption is always a matter of congressional intent,

and we think Congress’s removal of military aircrafts from the FAAct’s reach

indicates that it did not wish to include them in the FAAct’s preempted field.

Rather, Congress intended for the Department of Defense (“DoD”) to have

autonomy over their own aircrafts. While it is possible that the family members’

claims may be barred by the military contractor defense, another preemption

doctrine, see generally Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)—this

determination requires a fact-intensive analysis to be handled by the district court

                                          5
in the first instance. Finally, aside from any issues of preemption by the military

contractor defense, the family members offered sufficient evidence under Georgia

law for their strict liability manufacturing defect claim to survive summary

judgment.

      Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND

for further proceedings.

                               I. BACKGROUND

      On August 8, 2011, United States Army Captain John David Hortman and

Chief Warrant Officer Steven Redd were piloting a military helicopter in

connection with a training exercise at Fort Benning, Georgia. The helicopter

crashed, killing them both.

      Approximately 36 seconds before the crash, the helicopter’s Full Authority

Digital Electronic Control (“FADEC”), 1 the engine module that controls the flow

of fuel to the engine, detected an anomaly that caused it to disable its normal mode

of automatic operation. Instead, the FADEC entered fixed mode, in which it

1 While FADEC is the term consistently used for the system in question, the parties
reference the full name as both Full Authority Digital Electronic Control and Full
Authority Digital Engine Control.

                                         6
provides the engine with fuel at the same rate it had at the moment it left automatic

mode.

      For a pilot, a FADEC entering fixed mode signals an emergency.              In

response, the pilot must switch the FADEC out of fixed mode into its manual

mode, which requires properly timing when to make the switch, waiting for the

FADEC to switch over, and then piloting the helicopter while using a lever

mechanism to regulate the flow of fuel. Unfortunately, Captain Hortman and

Chief Redd were unable to regain control of the helicopter in time.

      Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Appellants”), surviving family members of Captain

Hortman and Chief Redd, sued the engine manufacturers—Rolls-Royce

Corporation (“Rolls-Royce”) and Goodrich Pump & Engine Control Systems, Inc.

(“Goodrich”)—collectively, Consolidated Defendants-Appellees (“Appellees”),

among other defendants not party to this appeal, because the FADEC at issue was

developed by Goodrich in collaboration with Rolls-Royce.

      Appellants allege that the fatal helicopter crash resulted from defects in the

FADEC’s design and manufacture. First, they contend that one of the FADEC’s

components, its potentiometer, failed in a manner indicating that it was

defectively manufactured, and that, once the potentiometer failed, no pilots could

                                         7
have recovered the helicopter to avert the crash at issue in this case. Second,

Appellants argue that the engine’s maintenance manual was defectively designed

because it failed to identify the potentiometer as a part to be investigated when the

FADEC enters fixed mode. Indeed, two weeks prior to the crash that killed

Captain Hortman and Chief Redd, the same helicopter had a FADEC issue, but

Army engineers did not check the potentiometer because they followed the

manual’s troubleshooting steps. As a result, the helicopter was put back into

service.

      Contesting Appellants’ theories of liability, Rolls-Royce and Goodrich

argued, in relevant part, that the helicopter engine in question—including its

FADEC—was manufactured and designed to meet specifications the Army

required in a contract. Among other things, the Army contract required Rolls-

Royce to obtain a type certification from the Federal Aviation Administration (the

“FAA”) for the helicopter’s engine. “[T]ype certification” is “[t]he first stage of the

FAA compliance review” that a manufacturer must complete “before marketing”

certain types of aircrafts and aircraft parts. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao

Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 805 (1984). The FAA is to “issue

a type certificate” once it finds that the aircraft or aircraft part “is properly

                                          8
designed and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and

minimum standards prescribed under” other parts of the FAAct and its

implementing regulations.      49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1); see also 14 C.F.R. § 21.21

(discussing type certification requirements). And, under the Army contract, the

helicopter’s engine maintenance manual also had to be provided to the FAA for

certification.

       After the parties completed summary judgment briefing, the district court

sua sponte requested briefing on whether this Court’s cases on FAAct implied field

preemption applied to Appellants’ claims. The district court subsequently held

that Appellants’ claims were preempted because “[t]he Second Circuit has found

clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation safety.” Jones, 422

F. Supp. at 521 (citing Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands &

Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 210 (2d Cir. 2011)). The court reasoned that,

because Goodrich and Rolls-Royce had obtained the “type certificate,” this meant

that the engine “met federal certification standards,” and thus that using state tort

“law rules for aircraft components would interfere with the uniform requirements

established by the federal government.” Id. at 523–24. In reaching its holding, the

district court rejected Appellants’ arguments that the FAAct does not apply to “the

                                         9
military helicopter at issue in this case,” because “[t]he decision to exempt

government military aircraft from FAA standards in certain contexts does not

constrain the clear congressional intent to occupy the entire field of aviation

safety.” Id. at 524–25.

      The district court further held that Appellants’ manufacturing defect claims

failed on the merits. The court reasoned that Appellants failed to provide evidence

that the potentiometer was defective at the time it was manufactured, and further

that applicable state law relieved Goodrich and Rolls-Royce from liability because

the potentiometer “was supplied by [a] third-party vendor.” Id. at 525.

      Appellants timely appealed.

      After hearing oral argument, we subsequently called for the views of the

FAA and the DoD on whether the FAAct’s preemption of the field of aviation

safety included the military helicopter at issue here. 2d Cir. 20-2951, ECF Nos. 199,

200. The United States filed a responsive amicus curiae brief on February 8, 2023.

Id. at ECF No. 221. Appellants and Appellees filed responsive briefs on March 7,

2023. Id. at ECF Nos. 226, 227.

                                         10
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary

judgment and drawing all reasonable inferences in [their] favor.” M.A. ex rel. H.R.

v. Rockland Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 53 F.4th 29, 35 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. at 35–36 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And

“[w]e review de novo a district court’s application of preemption principles.” Glover

v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 6 F.4th 229, 236 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Goodspeed Airport, 634

F.3d at 209 n.3).

                                III. DISCUSSION

A. FAAct Field Preemption

      Previously, “we have held that the FAAct impliedly preempts the entire

‘field of air safety.’” Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 74 (2d

Cir. 2019) (quoting Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 210–212). “Accordingly, ‘state

laws that conflict with the FAAct or sufficiently interfere with federal regulation

of air safety are preempted.’” Id. (alteration marks omitted) (quoting Fawemimo v.

Am. Airlines, Inc., 751 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)).
                                         11
      Determining whether implied FAAct field preemption applies in any

particular case thus requires a “twofold” inquiry: First, a reviewing court must

determine whether a challenged state law falls within the “field of air safety” as

established by the FAAct, and second, it must determine whether “the state

regulation sufficiently interferes with federal regulation [such] that it should be

deemed pre-empted.” Goodspeed Airport, 634 F.3d at 211 (alteration marks omitted)

(quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 107 (1992)). At bottom,

this calls for an assessment of congressional intent. See Goodspeed, 634 F.3d at 211–

12 (“In occupying the field of air safety, Congress did not intend to preempt the

operation of state statutes and regulations like the ones at issue here” that required

a local airport to “obtain a permit before removing the trees in question” from its

property.); see also Tweed-New Haven Airport Auth., 930 F.3d at 74 (state statute

regulating runway was preempted because “[i]f every state were free to control

the lengths of runways within its boundaries, th[e] Congressional objective” of “a

uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation in the field of air safety” “could

never be achieved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      A review of the FAAct shows that Congress did not intend for military

aircrafts to fall within the FAAct’s preempted “field of air safety.” The FAAct vests

                                         12
the FAA with authority to “promote safe flight of civil aircraft.”         49 U.S.C.

§ 44701(a) (emphasis added). The term “civil aircraft” is key, as Congress drew a

distinction between “civil aircraft,” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(16), and what it deemed

“public aircraft,” § 40102(a)(41). Under the FAAct, a “civil aircraft” is defined as

any “aircraft except a public aircraft.”      § 40102(a)(16).   A “public aircraft,”

meanwhile, includes “[a]n aircraft owned or operated by the armed forces.”

§ 40102(a)(41)(E). Thus, the FAAct explicitly removes aircrafts owned or operated

by the armed forces from its purview. Further, in giving the FAA authority to

“issue a type certificate,” Congress provided that these certifications would be

available for aircrafts or aircraft engines that “meet[] the regulations and minimum

standards prescribed under section 44701(a) of this title,” which again only speaks

to handling the safety “of civil aircraft.” See §§ 44704(a)(1); 44701(a). Accordingly,

by repeatedly distinguishing between civil and public aircrafts as it did, and by

only creating a system for regulating the former, it appears that Congress did not

intend for the military helicopter at issue here to fall within the preempted field

created by the FAAct.

      Instead, the logical conclusion is that Congress meant for the DoD and the

Army to have authority over their own aircrafts. For one thing, Congress provided

                                         13
that “[s]ubject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense .

. . the Secretary of the Army is responsible for . . . all affairs of the Department of

the Army, including . . . [t]he construction, outfitting, and repair of military

equipment.” 10 U.S.C. § 7013(b)(11). For another, as the United States points out

in its amicus brief, the DoD and the Army have robust regulations and policies for

managing the safety of their aircrafts. DoD policy provides that “[a]ll aircraft and

air systems owned, leased, operated, used, designed, or modified by DoD must

have completed an airworthiness assessment,” performed by a department

airworthiness authority, so as to provide personnel “the appropriate level of safety

of flight and risk management adapted to DoD-unique mission requirements.”

DoD Directive 5030.61, DoD Airworthiness Policy § 3(a), Enclosure 3 § 1(a) (May

24, 2013). Army regulations make explicit the DoD’s authority, as they state that

an Army airworthiness release, an Army-specific certification, is “[r]equired prior

to the operation of a new aircraft system, subsystem, [or] component.” Army Reg.

70-62 § 3-1(a)(2).

      Faced with the FAAct’s carveout for military aircrafts, Goodrich and Rolls-

Royce argue that implied field preemption bars Appellants’ claims anyway

because “the Army required FAA certification of the [engine] and FADEC” as part

                                          14
of an Army contract. Rolls-Royce Br. at 41; see Goodrich Br. at 43 (“[T]he . . .

[e]ngine did receive a type certificate from the FAA as required by the Army in the

parties’ contract.”). We disagree, as this argument disregards the key component

of the inquiry, which is congressional intent. “Implied [field] preemption arises

when . . . Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy a field

exclusively.” Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Cuomo, 520 F.3d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 2008)

(internal quotation and alteration marks omitted). As the United States rightly

observes, “[t]he scope of the [FAAct]’s field-preemption is not extended by a

contract provision that provides for FAA type certification as part of [a] military

assessment,” because “[t]he requirement results from the Army’s decision,” rather

than from some Act of Congress. United States Amicus Br. at 15. In other words,

the Army’s ad-hoc contract negotiations cannot extend the scope of the field

Congress intended to occupy with the FAAct. To be sure, there are times when

“contract terms have preemptive force,” but those situations result because

“federal statutes” explicitly state that specific “contractual terms” are to have

preemptive force. Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U.S. 87, 98 (2017)

(expounding on a statute providing that certain “contract terms have preemptive

force only as they ‘relate to the nature, provision, or extent of coverage or benefits

                                          15
(including payments with respect to benefits),’” and citing similar statutes

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8902(m)(1))). Here, nothing in the FAAct suggests Congress

meant for government contract negotiations to extend the field that the FAAct

preempts.

      Accordingly, FAAct implied field preemption does not apply in instances

where a military aircraft is the subject of dispute.

B. Conflict Preemption and the Military Contractor Defense

      Goodrich and Rolls-Royce also argue that we may affirm the district court

via two other preemption doctrines: (1) conflict preemption and/or (2) the military

contractor defense.

      “Conflict preemption exists when a state law actually conflicts with federal

law, in other words, where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment

of Congress’s intent.” Tweed, 930 F.3d at 75 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted).   But as with field preemption, conflict preemption only results if we

“find that Congress intended to preempt state law.” In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl

Ether (MTBE) Prod. Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65, 96 (2d Cir. 2013). We determine if this

is the case by “applying standard tools of statutory construction” to assess whether

“the challenged state law falls within the scope of Congress’s intent to preempt.”

Id. at 96–97.
                                          16
      We cannot find conflict preemption here for the reasons already explained

with regard to field preemption—there is no indication that Congress meant for

the FAAct to regulate military aircrafts. The FAA itself has come to this same

conclusion, as it has announced that “[a]ircraft operated by the military are by

statute public-use aircraft and are not subject to the civil regulatory requirements

for certification.” FAA, Advisory Circular No. 20-169, Guidance for Certification of

Military and Special Mission Modifications and Equipment for Commercial Derivative

Aircraft (CDA) 6 (Sept. 30, 2010).

      By contrast, while the military contractor defense may be applicable to this

case, whether and how it applies is a fact-specific question that we will leave for

development in the district court on remand. See Jusino v. Fed'n of Cath. Tchrs., Inc.,

54 F.4th 95, 105 (2d Cir. 2022) (“[W]hile we may be free to affirm on any ground

that finds support in the record, even if it was not the ground upon which the

district court relied, we have made clear that we prefer not to speculate in the first

instance as to issues not passed upon below.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

      Under the military contractor defense, “[l]iability for design defects in

military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law . . . when (1) the

United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment

                                          17
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States

about the dangers in the use of the equipment.” Badilla v. Midwest Air Traffic

Control Serv., Inc., 8 F.4th 105, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512).

      Appellants contend that the Army did not approve “reasonably precise

specifications for the FADEC,” Reply Br. at 27, which, if correct, would bar

application of the military contractor defense, see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab.

Litig., 517 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2008) (explaining that the military contractor defense

is available where inter alia “[t]he government . . . independently and meaningfully

reviews the specifications such that the government remains the agent of decision”

(internal quotation and alteration marks omitted)). To the contrary, Goodrich

argues that the Army was “heavily involved in all phases of the FADEC’s design

and development,” Goodrich Br. at 6, and that “[t]he Army was aware of the risks

of its chosen configuration for the . . . FADEC,” id. at 11. Notably, the government

views the military contractor defense as providing the proper framework for

assessing plaintiffs’ claims but takes no position as to questions of fact that will

permit the ultimate disposition of the claims. See United States Amicus Br. at 18,

20. As such, we leave questions as to these competing factual accounts for

resolution in the district court in the first instance.

                                           18
C. Appellants’ Manufacturing Defect Claims

       Finally, we agree with Appellants that the district court erred in finding

that Appellants’ manufacturing defect claims failed for lack of evidence, even if

not barred by FAAct implied field preemption. 2 Applying Georgia law, the

district court determined that, because Appellants relied only on “post-accident

testing” of the potentiometer, they failed to adduce necessary evidence as to

whether the potentiometer was defective “at the time of assembly, as required for

a manufacturing defect claim.” Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525. The court also

believed that, because the potentiometer was supplied by a “third-party vendor,”

the Appellees could not be responsible for its manufacturing defects. Id. The court

erred on both of these points.

      The district court misapprehended Georgia law in discounting the post-

accident testing. “Because a product may be destroyed as a result of an incident,

circumstantial evidence is particularly appropriate in product liability cases to

show the manufacturing defect.” Rose v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 229 Ga. App. 848, 851

(1997) (discussing cases where circumstantial evidence was ruled admissible to

2We leave it to the district court to decide on remand whether the military contractor
defense is applicable to the manufacturing defect claim.
                                         19
show defects); see Folsom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 174 Ga. App. 46, 46 (1985) (finding

a triable issue with regard to strict liability based on post-accident testing). Here,

Appellants’ post-accident testing suggests that, had the potentiometer been

properly manufactured, it would not have failed the way it did, especially not so

soon into its service life. Appellants’ expert testified that the potentiometer was

the most likely cause of the FADEC error that led to the crash. Further, both

Goodrich and Rolls-Royce presented materials to the Army in which they

identified potentiometers as a common cause of multiple prior helicopter engine

failures. Under a proper reading of Georgia law, this would be sufficient for

Appellants to proceed to a jury on a claim of strict products liability.

      Additionally, although the district court is correct that Georgia law does not

provide for “strict liability” for “entities that had no real role in the creation of

products,” Buchan v. Lawrence Metal Prod., Inc., 270 Ga. App. 517, 520–21 (2004), it

erred in determining that this was the case here. The district court found that

Appellees could not be liable because they themselves did not manufacture the

FADEC’s allegedly defective potentiometer, but merely assembled it into the

FADEC. See Jones, 422 F. Supp. 3d at 525. However, Georgia law holds that “an

entity which assembles component parts and sells them as a single product under

                                         20
its trade name is a ‘manufacturer’” for products liability purposes. Tyler v. PepsiCo,

Inc., 198 Ga. App. 223, 226 (1990) (quoting Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 141 Ga.

App. 175, 178 (1977), superseded on other grounds by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-

11.1. (1987)); accord Williams v. Pac. Cycle, Inc., 661 F. App’x 716, 718 (11th Cir. 2016)

(summary order) (“Georgia courts have made clear that” strict liability

manufacturing defect claims are available against “‘actual manufacturers—those

entities that have an active role in the production, design, or assembly of products

and placing them in the stream of commerce.’” (quoting Alltrade, Inc. v. McDonald,

213 Ga. App. 758, 760 (1994))); Pfeil v. Mike’s Golf Carts, LLC, No. 5:13–CV–434

(CAR), 2015 WL 5342398, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2015) (denying summary

judgment where there was “evidence [the company] took component parts

manufactured by other entities . . . and assembled them to create” the allegedly

defective product). Appellants adduced evidence that Goodrich manufactured

the FADEC and that Rolls-Royce assembled the engine.

      Moreover, in invoking the military contractor defense, Goodrich and Rolls-

Royce attest that they themselves “had an active role in the production” and

“design” of the FADEC so as to qualify them as manufacturers. See Buchan, 270

                                           21
Ga. App. at 521. Accordingly, Appellees do not have a third-party vendor defense

available against a strict liability manufacturing defect claim.

      We refrain from resolving whether Appellants’ negligence theory of

manufacturing defect may proceed. While “evidence” of “an inherent defect”

does not necessarily “demonstrate that the defect was the result of any

negligence,” Owens v. Gen. Motors Corp., 272 Ga. App. 842, 848 (2005), here, no

party has called to our attention any evidence in the record that would substantiate

or defeat Appellants’ negligence charge.         Given that the parties did not

meaningfully brief Georgia negligence law on appeal, we will leave it to the district

court to resolve whether this or any other theory of liability—save for strict

liability for the manufacturing defect in the potentiometer—may proceed to trial.

See Jusino, 54 F.4th at 105.

                               IV.   CONCLUSION

      The FAAct’s preemption of the field of civilian aircraft safety does not

extend to the military aircraft at issue here. And Appellants have adduced

sufficient evidence to proceed to trial at least on their strict liability theory of

manufacturing defect, assuming Appellees are not entitled to summary judgment

on their military contractor defense. Accordingly, we VACATE and REMAND

                                         22
for the district court to determine the applicability of the military contractor

defense and for further analysis consistent with this opinion.

                                        23