Court Opinion

ID: 9707906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:24:25.958696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:39.187625
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, specially concurring: While I concur with the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s tendered instruction upon the issue of voluntary manslaughter and that the cause must be reversed and remanded for a new trial, I agree with the reasoning of Mr. Justice Green that it is unnecessary to decide whether there was a violation of defendant’s right to a public trial under the sixth amendment. In addition, the record discloses that the issue was neither presented to the trial court, nor preserved in the post-trial motions, but is first raised upon appeal. Again the record discloses that the defendant was not, in fact, deprived of a public trial, because it is apparent that the general members of the public were present throughout the trial. While the cited Richmond Newspapers, Inc. has developed the rights of the public and press to be present at trials upon the authority of the first amendment, the rationale of such decision does not provide a new and additional right to defendant by reason of such amendment. Neither does it appear that there was such deprivation of a right to a public trial as to constitute plain error. While Justice Green and I agree that upon a new trial the issue of defendant’s refused murder instruction shall probably again be present and should be reviewed, I would hold that there was no error. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in giving Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 25.05 (IPI No. 25.05) defining the prosecution’s burden of proof upon the charge of murder because it failed to require that the prosecution negate beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that defendant acted under sudden passion resulting through serious provocation and, (2) that defendant believed that the circumstances justified the force used. Suggesting a constitutional question, the opinion cites Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975), 421 U.S. 684, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 95 S. Ct. 1881, and Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 97 S. Ct. 2319. The challenged instruction, which is stated in full in the majority opinion, is neither in the language form nor substance which are found in the cited cases. Neither the Mullaney nor the Patterson opinion states the verbatim instructions used. Mullaney summarizes the given instruction as follows: “The jury was further instructed, however, that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, malice aforethought was to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation.” (Emphasis added.) 421 U.S. 684, 686, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 512, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1883. The Mullaney opinion emphasized that it was bound by the determination of the Maine Supreme Court that murder and manslaughter “are not distinct crimes but, rather, different degrees of the single generic offense of felonious homicide.” 421 U.S. 684, 688, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 513, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1884. The Maine court further stated: “[T]hat for more than a century it repeatedly had held that the prosecution could rest on a presumption of implied malice aforethought and require the defendant to prove that he had acted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter.” (Emphasis added.) (421 U.S. 684, 688, 44 L. Ed. 2d 508, 513, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 1884.) Upon such circumstances, the United States Supreme Court held that there was an unconstitutional placing of a burden of proof upon the defendant. In Patterson, a New York statute provided that the elements of murder included causing a death plus the intent to cause death, and that an affirmative defense could be raised if defendant: “ ‘acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.’ ” 432 U.S. 197, 198, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 285, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2321. New York defined a further offense of manslaughter as the intentional killing of another “ ‘under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.’ ” 432 U.S. 197,199, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 285, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2321. That defendant raised the affirmative defense that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance. The opinion summarizes the jury instruction: “The jury was further instructed, consistently with the New York law, that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was told that if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had intentionally killed Northrup but that appellant had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find appellant guilty of manslaughter instead of murder.” (Emphasis added.) 432 U.S. 197, 200, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 286, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2322. The trial court had also instructed the jury, apparently at a time prior to the quoted summary, that it was always the prosecution’s burden to prove defendant’s guilt, and to prove that he intended to kill beyond a reasonable doubt. The New York Court of Appeals determined that there was no shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove any fact essential to the offense charged since the affirmative defense raised bears no direct relationship to any element of murder. Patterson determined that the affirmative defense constitutes “a separate issue on which the defendant is required to carry the burden of persuasion” and continued: “If the State nevertheless chooses to recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment, we think the State may assure itself that the fact has been established with reasonable certainty. To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, # ” (432 U.S. 197, 207, 209, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 290, 291, 97 S. Ct. 2319, 2325, 2326.) Upon such record, the United States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of due process. I do not believe that the cited authorities can be fairly stated to support a determination that the given instruction IPI Criminal No. 25.05, regarding the prosecution’s burden of proof, was error requiring reversal. There was no overt statement placing any burden upon defendant as in Mullaney and Patterson. The IPI Criminal cautionary instructions provided for the presumption of innocence, the continuing requirement that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that defendant is not required to prove his innocence. In addition, the challenged instruction requires that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “Third: that the defendant was not justified in using the force which he used.” Section 9 — 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 9 — 2) defines the offenses of voluntary manslaughter as a person (a) who kills an individual without “lawful justification” if he acts under intense passion resulting from serious provocation, and (b) an intentional or knowing killing is done with the belief that the circumstances would justify or exonerate the act under section 7 of the Code. In People v. Lockett (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 546, 554-55, 413 N.E.2d 378, 383, it is stated: “Prior to the 1961 revision of the Code, cases of voluntary manslaughter referred only to situations where the killing was the result of a sudden and intense provocation. The unreasonable-use-of-force element was first enacted in 1961.” In People v. Goolsby (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 832, 388 N.E.2d 894, appeal denied (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 614, it is pointed out that the respective statutory forms of voluntary manslaughter define two different offenses with differing mental elements which cannot be present at the same time. Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, pars. 7 — 1 through 7 — 14) defines the several circumstances in which the use of force is deemed justified or exonerated. Section 7 — 14 states that acts which would justify or exonerate the defendant constitute an affirmative defense. By definition, voluntary manslaughter in the context of provocation as in paragraph 9 — 2(a) is a killing without legal justification. The definition negates a theory that the provocation offense may be styled an affirmative defense to murder. In People v. Coleman (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1026, 407 N.E.2d 832, 837, it was contended that “that legal justification of provocation” should reduce the offense of aggravated battery to simple battery. The opinion states: “Indeed, article 7 of the Criminal Code specifically delineates those defenses which justify or exonerate the use of force. Provocation is not included in this section. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, pars. 7 — 1 through 7 — 14.)” It is held that where there is evidence of self-defense, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense. (People v. Graves (1978), 61 Ill. App. 3d 732, 378 N.E.2d 293.) In People v. Sunquist (1977), 55 Ill. App. 3d 263, 370 N.E.2d 864, appeal denied (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 600, it was held that where such defense is presented, the instruction IPI Criminal No. 25.05 is the proper issue instruction. (See also People v. Wright (1975), 32 Ill. App. 3d 736, 336 N.E.2d 18; and People v. Pernell (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 664, 391 N.E.2d 85.) That instruction was given here, including the specific requirement that the prosecution must prove that defendant was not justified in using the force which was used. No case has been cited which holds that provocation, as defined in section 9 — 2(a) is an affirmative defense which must be negated by the prosecution and that the jury must be so instructed. I have found no such reference. Assuming, arguendo, that provocation in the context of section 9 — 2(a) in fact justifies or exonerates the charge of murder, that portion of IPI Criminal No. 25.05 requiring that the prosecution must prove that defendant was not justified in using the force used, that instruction should suffice to correctly state the prosecution’s burden of proof just as when there is an issue of self-defense. In such context, there is no shifting of a burden of proof to defendant.