Court Opinion

ID: 9754012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:38:32.832565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:46.596404
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

In my view, under the plain language of the Maryland Public Defender Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol. & 1981 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27A, §§ 1-14, the petitioner Utt was entitled to representation by the Office of the Public Defender at the Governor’s extradition hearing. Therefore, consistent with this Court’s policy against deciding constitutional issues unnecessarily,* 1 *I would not reach the question of whether Utt had a constitutional right to counsel at the hearing.
The Public Defender Act, Art. 27A, § 4, sets forth the duty of the Public Defender’s Office to provide legal representation. The pertinent provisions of § 4 are as follows:
*290"§ 4. Duty to provide legal representation.
(a) It shall be the primary duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for any indigent defendant, eligible for services under this article. Legal representation may be provided by the Public Defender, or, subject to the supervision of the Public Defender, by his deputy, by district public defenders, by assistant public defenders, or by panel attorneys as hereinafter provided for.
(b) Legal representation shall be provided indigent defendants in the following proceedings:
(1) In any criminal or juvenile proceeding constitutionally requiring the presence of counsel prior to presentment before a commissioner or judge.
(2) Criminal or juvenile proceedings, where the defendant is charged with a serious crime, before the District Court of Maryland, the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City, the various circuit courts within the State of Maryland, and the Court of Special Appeals.
(3) Postconviction proceedings under Article 27, Annotated Code of Maryland.
(4) Any other proceeding where possible incarceration pursuant to a judicial commitment of individuals in institutions of a public or private nature may result.
* * *
(d) Representation by the Office of the Public Defender or by an attorney appointed by the Office of the Public Defender, shall extend to all stages in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial, and appeal, if any, and shall continue until the final disposition of the cause, or until the assigned attor*291ney is relieved by the Public Defender or by order of the court in which the cause is pending.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is obvious that, by this statute, the Legislature intended to provide for legal representation of indigents in a broad range of cases. This statutory right to counsel clearly extends beyond the limits of the constitutional right to counsel. Those cases in which there is a constitutional right to counsel represent only one of the four categories of proceedings in which the Public Defender must furnish legal representation to indigents. Moreover, § 4 (d) underscores the extensive statutory right of representation. Instead of being limited to "critical stages” of "prosecutions,” § 4 (d) mandates that the representation by the Public Defender’s Office "shall extend to all stages in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation,” etc. (Emphasis supplied.)
The specific statutory provision involved in this case is § 4 (b) (4), which requires the Public Defender to furnish representation for indigents in "[a]ny other proceeding where possible incarceration pursuant to a judicial commitment... may result.” The majority correctly states that the meaning of this provision "must be determined by the principles of statutory construction,” that in interpreting a statutory provision "the Court considers language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary signification,” and that there is no need to look elsewhere to ascertain legislative intent "if no ambiguity or obscurity exists in the statutory language.” In other words, as Judge Smith emphasized for the Court in Vallario v. State Roads Comm’n, 290 Md. 2, 7-8, 426 A.2d 1384, 1386 (1981), when "[w]e have ... a clear and unambiguous statute,” effect must be given to "the plain meaning of [the] statute” regardless of what the controlling legal principle would otherwise be. In the present case, after initially professing adherence to this principle of statutory construction, the majority proceeds to ignore it.
The majority "read[s|” § 4 (b) (4) "in this case as being applicable to a judicial commitment in the State of Maryland as a direct outgrowth of a proceeding at which there is to be *292representation.” By this, the majority appears to mean that the "proceeding” under § 4 (b) (4) must itself involve or conclude with a judicial commitment. However, this is not what the statutory language says. Section 4 (b) (4) embraces any proceeding which may result in possible incarceration pursuant to a judicial commitment. Under the plain meaning of the words in the statute, the "judicial commitment” need not take place in the "proceeding” as long as "incarceration pursuant to a judicial commitment” may be a "result” of the proceeding. Under the Maryland Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Code (1957,1978 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, §§ 22, 23, and 25, if the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he is to issue a warrant of arrest and the demanded person is to be arrested under the warrant. However, before the arrested person may be delivered to the demanding state, he must first be taken before a judge of a Maryland court of record. At that judicial proceeding, he is informed of certain matters, including his right to "test the legality of his arrest,” and allowed a reasonable time to apply for a writ of habeas corpus.2 *293Certainly, the required proceeding before the judge, resulting from the Governor’s issuance of a warrant, will in the majority of cases conclude in a "judicial commitment.” In most instances, the consequence of the court proceeding, which in turn resulted from the Governor’s proceeding, will be that the defendant is incarcerated in this state until his arrival in the demanding state. And once he is in the demanding state, there will likely be further judicial proceedings ending with additional incarceration.
Under the scheme of the Criminal Extradition Act, a hearing before the Governor is a "proceeding” which may result in incarceration pursuant to a judicial commitment, and thus it is a "proceeding” encompassed by the plain language of § 4 (b) (4). Furthermore, by referring to any proceeding where possible incarceration in public or private institutions may result, the Legislature clearly indicated that § 4 (b) (4) could encompass a broad and diverse group of cases. The majority’s very limited view of § 4 (b) (4) ignores this legislative intent.
At oral argument before us, the attorney for the State virtually conceded that the plain language of § 4 (b) (4) is broad enough to cover an extradition hearing before the Governor, pointing out: "We [the State] have a problem with the literal language of the Public Defender Statute.” Furthermore, the attorney for the State acknowledged that an attorney can be effective at the Governor’s hearing and that "the Governor’s decision goes a long way in deciding whether there shall be incarceration.” Finally, the State conceded that, as a matter of policy, the demanded person who can afford to retain his own attorney is entitled to be represented by that attorney at the Governor’s hearing.
*294Also during the oral argument before this Court, the assistant public defender now representing the petitioner stated, on behalf of the Office of Public Defender, that the Office is willing and able to represent indigents at the Governor’s extradition hearings. Furthermore, it was represented that the Public Defender’s Office would not need a new "unit” or any additional attorneys to perform this task.
In light of the policy reflected in the Public Defender Act, the value of counsel’s service at an extradition hearing and the conclusive effect of the decision if the Governor can be persuaded to refuse extradition, the policy permitting paid counsel to represent demanded persons, and the position taken in this Court by the Public Defender’s Office, it is difficult to understand why the majority strains to circumvent the literal language of the statute and hold that indigents are not entitled to public defender representation at the Governor’s extradition hearings.
Judge Davidson has authorized me to state that she concurs with the views expressed herein.

. See, e.g., Avara v. Baltimore News American, 292 Md. 543, 554, n. 7, 440 A.2d 368, 373, n. 7 (1982); Employ. Sec. v. Balto. Lutheran H. S., 291 Md. 750, 754, n. 2, 436 A.2d 481, 484, n. 2 (1981); Town of Forest Heights v. Frank, 291 Md. 331, 336, 435 A.2d 425, 428 (1981); Simms v. State, 288 Md. 712, 725, 421 A.2d 957 (1980).

. Art. 41, §§ 22, 23 and 25, provide:
"§ 22. Issue of Governor’s warrant of arrest; its recitals.
If the Governor decides that the demand should be complied with, he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the State seal, and be directed to any peace officer or other person whom he may think fit to entrust with the execution thereof. The warrant must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance.”
"§ 23. Manner and place of execution.
Such warrant shall authorize the peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any time and any place where he may be found within the State and to command the aid of all peace officers or other persons in the execution of the warrant, and to deliver the accused, subject to the provisions of this subtitle to the duly authorized agent of the demanding state.”
"§ 25. Rights of accused person; application for writ of habeas corpus; appeal from denial.
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall be first taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this State, who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel; and if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of *293such court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, notice thereof, and of the time and place of hearing thereon, shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the county or the City of Baltimore in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody, and to the said agent of the demanding state. If the application for a writ of habeas corpus after an extradition hearing only, is denied by the trial court, the denial may be appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.”