Court Opinion

ID: 9635193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:41:01.617348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:21.231462
License: Public Domain

Prescott, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion.
The advertisement of sale, which omitted any mention of the absence of access by land to the tracts here in question, seems insufficient. The trustee, acting as the arm of the equity court, has made a contract with a purchaser at a judicial sale for the sale of real estate, which has no access to it except by air, water or across land of third parties; and now, in effect, that contract is being specifically enforced, though the purchaser made seasonable objection to the ratification of the sale upon learning of this non-access.
The rule of caveat emptor has no application to a judicial *546sale until it has been finally ratified. Byrd v. Day, 138 Md. 442, 445, 114 A. 486. The reason for this rule is obvious. Bidders at judicial sales do not desire to incur the expense of having titles searched, unless they are the successful bidder. The advertisement in the instant case made absolutely no mention of the fact that there was no right of way to either parcel of land here involved except by air or water, although the calls in parcel 3 make such references as “letter A, on plot, * * * also being the northwest corner of William H. Robbins’ land and the northwest corner of Howard E. Wrotens land.” (Italics added.) In spite of the fact that the purchaser excepted to the ratification of the sale when he learned that he would have no access to it except by boat or air,1 this Court, in equity, requires that he consummate two purchases which will be of little use to him.
A sale made by a trustee acting for the court is very different from that of a conventional trustee. “* * * the court is the vendor, acting for and in behalf of all parties interested. The contract of sale is a transaction between the court as vendor, and the purchaser; and the contract is never regarded as consummated until it has received the sanction of the court. Before ratification the transaction is merely an offer to purchase, but which has not been accepted. * * * The trustee is the mere hand, agent or officer of the court, acting as an attorney under a special delegated authority. * * * A trustee appointed by decree is not the trustee of the parties to the case, but the trustee of the court.” Miller, Equity Procedure, Sections 486, 487.
Thus, it is seen that the equity court, by its agent, had advertised property for sale to which there was no right of way (except by air or water) without mentioning the fact of non-access, though its desirability as a ducking shore had been pointed out. The purchaser, when he bid at the sale, made an offer to purchase, but asked to be relieved of his offer upon *547learning of this lack of access by land. The court, however, in effect said, “No, the court is going to accept your offer and hold you to the bargain, notwithstanding the fact that you did not know there was no customary access to the property.”
It would seem that what the court should be interested in is seeing that the property was properly put upon the market so as to protect all of the parties—including the purchaser— i.e., to see that the parties to the partition suit have their property properly and fairly advertised, and that there is no omission in the advertisement that misleads or prejudices the purchaser.
The majority opinion correctly states the rule “that complete accuracy is not required in an advertisement (of a judicial sale)” and the sale will not be set aside without “showing that an omission misled anyone, or had a prejudicial effect(Italics added.) This is the very crux of the appellant’s case.
The cases and textbooks are full of instances where relief has been given because of omission by trustees acting for and in behalf of courts of equity. As early as the case of Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill 256, 276, 277, this Court said, “Before the ratification * * * all objections to a sale are open for consideration, and the sale will be set aside upon the proof of error, mistake, misunderstanding or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of the sale. Before ratification, the sale must appear to be in all respects fair and proper, or it cannot receive the sanction of the Court.” (Italics added.) In Kauffman v. Walker, 9 Md. 229, 240, this Court again said that “where the court can see that injustice will be inflicted by the ratification of a sale upon a party not in default, by reason of the carelessness or omission of its own officer, it should interfere to prevent it.” See also, 30A Am. Jur. Judicial Sales, Section 58; Freeman, Void Judicial Sales, p. 163; 8 Thompson, Real Property (Perm. Ed.), Section 4585; Hammond v. Cailleaud, 111 Cal. 206, 219, 43 P. 607.
The case of Hunting v. Walter, 33 Md. 60, is quite similar in principle to the case at bar. There, the purchaser made his bid under the mistaken belief that he was buying property subject only to a ground rent mentioned in the advertisement *548of sale. This Court, in releasing the purchaser, said, “It would be a great wrong to hold a purchaser, who became such through a mistake, and in ignorance of the liabilities, he was incurring, to a strict compliance, unless some rule of law required it.”
I think that when the purchaser learned of the non-access and requested the court to release him from his offer, by filing seasonable exceptions to the ratification of the sales, this relief should properly have been granted to him.
Chief Judge Bruñe has authorized me to say that he concurs in this dissent.

. In this case, the two parcels are about 8 miles apart by air. If the purchaser uses one parcel for ducking purposes, he will be required to keep two boats—one small one to get out of a little river and a larger one to cross the waters of the Bay. I think it was stated at argument a distance of some eight miles.