Court Opinion

ID: 9606465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:58.518111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.664431
License: Public Domain

Judge Phillips
dissenting.
Since plaintiff’s dismissed claims —all the claims in the case, as defendant asserted none and none have been finally litigated— could have been conveniently revived immediately by simply filing a new action, as the order permitted, it is surprising that plaintiff did not do that rather than pursue this appeal with all the delay, expense, inconvenience and risk that it entails. Nevertheless, in my opinion the court erred in entering the order and in declining to set it aside for two reasons: First, the order is a nullity on its face because it undertakes to do two fatally inconsistent things — keep in effect a prior order for alimony pendente lite while dismissing the litigation in which the order was entered. 49 C.J.S. Judgments Sec. 48, p. Ill (1947). Second, the court had no basis for sanctioning plaintiff at all, much less by dismissing her case, though it had ample grounds for sanctioning both lawyers for not attending the calendar call. Both the order and the majority opinion are apparently based upon the notion that the efficient administration of our civil trial courts requires that each plaintiff attempt to try his case at the earliest opportunity and to keep on *572doing so until the case is finally concluded. This is a false notion. Untried domestic cases that have no pressing issues requiring trial are no burden to the courts and the longer they remain quiescent the better it is for the courts, parties, and the public alike for reasons that are both obvious and incontestable. This action is essentially for divorce from bed and board and alimony, as the other claims involving the property rights of the parties cannot be adjudicated until an absolute divorce, not yet sought, is entered. In the case plaintiff had a consent alimony pendente lite order based upon a stipulation that established defendant’s marital fault, plaintiff’s right to alimony, and the amount to be paid; and so far as the record shows the order had served, and was serving, her and the defendant just as well as would a final order following trial. For the order had been in effect twenty-two months and the record contains no indication that during that time either party had become dissatisfied with it or had an issue that required the further attention of the court. In that setting plaintiff had no reason to either press for a trial or to suppose that the court expected her to do so, and the court’s implicit action and holding to the contrary was without rational basis.