Court Opinion

ID: 9713692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:20:17.559294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.002939
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: As the majority concludes, “(T)he compensation provision in the Vehicle Code clearly is available for sentencing purposes on a conviction for possession of a stolen motor vehicle.” 298 111. App. 3d at 931. The preprinted form probation order at issue reads in pertinent part: “Make Restitution to James Jones in the amount of $500.” The majority vacates this portion of the order because the word “Restitution” should have read “Compensation.” This is truly a distinction without a difference. I also believe that this issue has been waived in the present case. All of the cases cited by the majority on the issue of waiver were decided before our supreme court’s decision in People v. Reed, 177 Ill. 2d 389 (1997), requiring that sentencing issues be raised in the trial court in order to preserve those issues for appellate review. As pointed out in Reed, requiring a written postsentencing motion allows the trial court the opportunity to review a defendant’s contention of sentencing error and gives the appellate court the benefit of the trial court’s reasoned judgment in those issues. Here, the defense raised no objection in the trial court to the sufficiency of the evidence as to the amount of monetary loss suffered by the victim, nor did the defense object to being ordered to pay “restitution” as opposed to “compensation.” If the majority believes that there is insufficient evidence in the record as to the issue of damages, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for a further hearing. People v. Sharp, 185 Ill. App. 3d 340, 349 (1989). Of course, such a remandment would not be necessary had the defense filed the required written postsentencing motion. Such motions have been required even when the defendant is challenging only a fine or restitution. People v. Fontana, 251 Ill. App. 3d 694, 704 (1993), citing People v. Albert, 243 Ill. App. 3d 23 (1993). Finally, the majority cites People v. Abraham, 257 Ill. App. 3d 587 (1993), for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to elect to be sentenced under the law as it existed at the time of the offense or under the law at the time of sentencing. The law in effect at the time of Abraham’s sentencing was significantly more severe (possible prison sentence of 5 to 30 years) than at the time she committed the aggravated battery (possible prison sentence of 3 to 7 years). While I do not question that the defendant in the case sub judice could have elected to be sentenced under the version of section 5 — 5—6 in effect at the time he was sentenced, he did not make such an election. The majority made the election for him more than a year after his sentencing hearing. Even if the majority were correct in its holding that the use of the word “restitution” rather than “compensation” is plain error and therefore defendant’s failure to file a written postsentencing motion is not a waiver, defendant’s failure to object to the amount of the damages owed or to elect to be sentenced under the newest version of section 5 — 5—6 requires that this case be remanded to the trial court on these issues. In sum, I believe the sentencing issues which were raised for the first time on appeal have been waived. If they have not been waived, then the use of the word “restitution” rather than “compensation” is harmless error if it is error at all. If both of these positions are rejected, the sentencing issue as to damages to be paid to the victim should be remanded to the trial court for determination. Therefore, I dissent.