Court Opinion

ID: 9561486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:10:25.601929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:50.049714
License: Public Domain

Justice VOLLACK
dissenting:
The majority finds that the trial court committed “confrontation error” which requires reversal of the defendant's, Leonard Merritt’s (Merritt), conviction. Maj. op. at 170. I disagree. We granted certiorari to "determine two issues: whether the standard of review in Confrontation Clause cases is harmless error, and “[w]hether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow cross-examination of the prosecution’s two essential witnesses on their being granted [use] immunity to testify.” Because the scope of cross-examination lies within the trial court’s sound discretion, this case is appropriately reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. A careful review of the record reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Since we are called on to evaluate the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this case, we need not determine what standard of error analysis applies to Confrontation Clause arguments. Were I to adopt the majority’s reasoning, however, I conclude that the trial court’s error, if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
We are required to determine whether the trial court’s decision to exclude use immunity from the scope of cross-examination amounts to an abuse of discretion in this case. Witness use immunity is governed by section 13-90-118, 6A C.R.S. (1987), which provides that, whenever a witness refuses to testify in a proceeding on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination, the court may compel the *172witness to testify. § 13-90-118(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987). The witness may not refuse to comply with the order. However, no testimony compelled under the order may be used against that witness in any criminal case.1 Id. Evaluating whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the grant of use immunity from cross-examination requires an examination of the record of the trial court’s rulings.
As a result of events occurring on September 4, 1988, Richard Adams (Adams), Jeffrey Emery (Emery), Dennis Phenis (Phenis), and Merritt were charged with various offenses. Adams and Emery were charged in juvenile court. Phenis and Merritt were charged as eodefendants in district court. Prior to Phenis’ and Merritt’s trial, the People of the State of Colorado (the People) endorsed twenty-nine witnesses, including Adams and Emery.
On April 21, 1989, the trial court held a motions hearing wherein counsel for Merritt presented a motion for disclosure of impeaching information. Counsel for Merritt informed the court that “Adams had two bike thefts, criminal mischief, a theft, [and] two assault cases.” Counsel for Merritt sought to discover the dispositions of the various charges, and the disposition of any prior charges against both Adams and Emery. Counsel for Merritt argued that the status of the pending charges against Adams and Emery would be relevant to show possible bias on their parts. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for disclosure of impeaching information.
On June 13, 1989 (the date set for trial), the People informed the court that Adams and Emery would assert Fifth Amendment rights when called to testify and asked the court to give both Adams and Emery use immunity under section 13-90-118.2 The trial court asked the People if they intended to drop the charges against Adams and Emery. The People responded in the negative. Counsel for Merritt argued that the People’s request should be denied because it was an “eleventh hour filing.”
The People also requested that the trial court issue an order preventing the defendants from introducing the fact of the pending charges against Adams and Emery. Counsel for Merritt argued that the fact of the pending charges goes directly to Adams’ and Emery’s motive or bias in testifying in the present case. Counsel for Merritt argued that Adams and Emery “have a definitive interest when they take the stand to tell one version of the story because they are going to — because they are being prosecuted in another case.” The trial court agreed that “there is a definitive motive here.” The trial court concluded that, if it elected to grant the witnesses use immunity, then, in the interest of fairness, it would allow defense counsel to inquire as to the charges pending against both Adams and Emery in their juvenile cases.
After the trial court’s ruling, counsel for Phenis asked the trial court whether Adams and Emery could be cross-examined on the grant of use immunity. The trial court again ruled that cross-examination on the existing juvenile proceedings reflected the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court stated that “[t]he issue of the [Fifth] [A]mendment right and their assertion and the [use] immunity that may be granted by the Court is a legal issue that is not a matter of province of the jury.” The trial court ruled that Adams and Emery could be cross-examined on their pending juvenile charges, but not on the grant of use immunity.
During trial, counsel for Merritt again argued to the trial court that the scope of cross-examination should include the grant of use immunity. The trial’ court again ruled that counsel for Merritt could 'ask Adams and Emery whether there were any *173charges pending against them stemming from the present case, but questions as to the grant of use immunity could not be asked.
On direct examination, Adams testified that he had been declared a juvenile delinquent. He testified that he had been in some trouble with the law and had just been sentenced to serve two years in the Department of Institutions. Adams testified that he hit Busto up to ten times, and that neither Phenis nor Merritt struck Bus-to.
On cross-examination, counsel for Phenis asked Adams whether he thought the People would do something for him in exchange for his testimony. Adams responded that he was not sure. Adams testified that he was presently in custody for. another case, and had to complete a two-year sentence. Adams testified that he lied when he stated that Brian “Devitt” set him up to get the marijuana plant. Adams also agreed that he tells people what he thinks they want to hear. Adams testified that he lied in a statement he gave to Investigator Boatright. Counsel for Merritt asked Adams on what charge he had received the two-year sentence. Adams responded that he was not sure, and the People objected to the question. The trial court sustained the People’s objection, and counsel for Merritt said nothing further.
The People called Emery, who testified that he was arrested as a result of the events and that the charges against him were still pending. Emery also testified that he had not been offered anything for his testimony. On cross-examination, Emery admitted telling lies to two investigating officers in this case. Emery testified that he never asked Busto to go outside and smoke marijuana. Emery admitted that he knew that Busto was innocent when he informed Phenis and Merritt in the station wagon that “Brian” must still be at work at the 7-11 store.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Merritt guilty of second degree kidnapping, menacing with a deadly weapon, and third degree assault. Merritt appealed his convictions, and, in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals affirmed.
II.
The majority concludes that the trial court committed reversible error in this case because Merritt was not allowed to “cross-examine fully” Adams and Emery. Application of the abuse of discretion standard reveals that the trial court’s ruling excluding the grant of use immunity from the scope of cross-examination does not amount to a clear abuse of discretion in this case. Rather than apply an abuse of discretion standard, however, the majority evaluates whether harmless error governs the instant case. Maj. op. at 166-67. The majority subsequently applies a harmless error test and concludes that the trial court’s “confrontation error” is not harmless. Maj. op. at 167-70. I disagree. Under harmless error analysis, I find that the error, if any, in this case is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A.
The United States Constitution, as the majority notes, guarantees defendants a right to effective cross-examination.3 Maj. op. at 166 (relying on Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); People v. Thurman, 787 P.2d 646, 651 (Colo.1990)). Defendants are not, as the majority also notes, entitled to unlimited cross-examination or to cross-examination that is actually effective. Maj. op. at 166; see People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 833 (Colo.1982) (“[A]n accused’s right to confront and to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute and may be limited ‘to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.’ ”).
*174Accordingly, this court has stated that “ ‘[t]he extent of cross-examination with respect to an appropriate subject of inquiry is within the sound discretion of the trial court.’ ” Thurman, 787 P.2d at 652 (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931)); Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945, 960 (Colo. 1988) (“Since the constitutional right of confrontation necessarily depends upon the particular circumstances of a particular criminal proceeding, we have stated that such determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”); People v. Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d 231, 243 (Colo. 1984); People v. Raffaelli, 647 P.2d 230 (Colo.1982). “A reviewing court called upon to address a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.” Thurman, 787 P.2d at 655 (relying on People v. District Court, 664 P.2d 247, 252 (Colo.1983)). “Unless the restriction of cross-examination is so severe as to constitute [a] denial of that right, the extent to which the cross-examination should be allowed rests within the trial court’s discretion.” Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 234 (relying on Carsell v. Edwards, 165 Colo. 335, 439 P.2d 33 (1968)); see People v. Loscutoff, 661 P.2d 274, 277 (Colo.1983) (quoting Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 234); see also People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1009 (Colo.1984) (relying on People v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 1369 (Colo.1983), in emphasizing the trial court’s broad discretion to rule on cross-examination matters).
In Thurman, Kogan, Rubanowitz, Raffaelli, and Loscutoff, this court evaluated whether particular trial court rulings regarding the scope of cross-examination constituted a clear abuse of discretion. Thurman, 787 P.2d at 645-55; Kogan, 756 P.2d at 960-61; Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d at 243-44; Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 234; Loscutoff, 661 P.2d at 274. We have noted that rulings that exclude from the scope of cross-examination testimony which would be inadmissible or immaterial do not constitute an abuse of discretion. Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d at 243. In Kogan, for example, we noted that “[djangers exist in too readily admitting extrinsic evidence relating to bias.” Kogan, 756 P.2d at 960. We therein concluded that, “[sjince the constitutional right of confrontation necessarily depends upon the particular circumstances of a particular criminal proceeding, we have stated that such determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. Applying an abuse of discretion standard, we concluded in Rubanowitz that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that a defendant could not question a witness, who had been granted use immunity, about possible penalties for charges which could have been filed against that witness. Rubanowitz, 688 P.2d at 243-44.
The majority finds the trial court’s ruling prevented Merritt from eliciting testimony that would show bias. The majority bases this finding on the fact that “the trial court did not permit Merritt to counter” a number of reasonable, but false, inferences raised by Adams’ and Emery’s testimony, and the circumstances surrounding that testimony, which bore on those two witnesses’ credibility. Maj. op. at 167. Drawing inferences, however, is not warranted in a case such as the present where we are called upon to ascertain whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
In the present case, counsel for Merritt argued that the existence of pending charges against Adams and Emery went directly to the issue of bias. The trial court ruled prior to trial that Adams and Emery could be cross-examined as to any pending charges stemming from the events at issue. Counsel for Merritt successfully argued a motion for disclosure of impeaching information with respect to Adams and Emery, and was permitted to discover their prior criminal histories.
During trial, both Adams and Emery admitted to telling lies about the facts in this case. Adams testified that he was presently in custody and was serving a two-year sentence. Counsel for Merritt could have but did not direct queries to Adams regarding his prior charges. The trial court excluded queries directed toward the grant of use immunity, finding that cross-examination regarding existing juvenile proceed*175ings would reflect the credibility of the witness. In so ruling, the trial court was apprised of the fact that exercise of Fifth Amendment rights and grants of use immunity are not matters that come within the province of the jury.
Under these facts, counsel for Merritt had an adequate opportunity to effectively impugn the credibility of Adams and Emery, and to establish their bias. By ruling that Merritt was only prohibited from directing queries on the grant of use immunity, the trial court did not so severely restrict Merritt’s constitutional right of confrontation as to constitute a denial of that right. See Raffaelli, 647 P.2d at 234; Loscutoff, 661 P.2d at 277. I do not find that the trial court’s ruling amounts to a clear abuse of discretion in this case.
B.
The majority concludes that the trial court committed “confrontation error” which was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Maj. op. at 170. I disagree. In its harmless error analysis, the majority contends that the People “miss[ ] the point” by arguing that the jury had enough evidence to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Maj. op. at 170. Conversely, the majority finds that, “[wjithout the testimony of Adams and Emery,” the defense and prosecution theories are equally “likely.” Maj. op. at 169. The majority’s analysis does not focus on the fact that only one specific point — the grant of use immunity — was excluded from the scope of cross-examination. Thus, we need not evaluate what the outcome of trial would have been in the complete absence of the boys’ testimony; we must only consider whether the outcome of the trial was affected by the exclusion of the grant of use immunity from the scope of cross-examination.
Under harmless error analysis, appellate courts “must examine the facts of the case to determine whether the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Topping v. People, 793 P.2d 1168, 1172 (Colo.1990). Such analysis requires this court to examine the record on appeal. We are not required to speculate or draw inferences. The record reveals that counsel for Merritt argued that the fact of pending charges against Adams and Emery went directly to their bias. The trial court agreed, and permitted inquiry into the pending charges on cross-examination. The trial court also permitted Merritt to discover Adams’ and Emery’s prior juvenile records. The trial court found that inquiry into the grant of use immunity would impermissibly bring Fifth Amendment concerns before the jury. Under the facts of this case, I conclude that the trial court’s ruling did not affect the outcome of this case.
I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court’s ruling denying Merritt the opportunity to direct questions to the grant of use immunity denied Merritt his right to effective cross-examination on these facts. I dissent and would affirm the defendant’s convictions.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice ROVIRA and Justice ERICKSON join in this dissent.

. Testimony compelled under § 13-90-118, 6A C.R.S. (1987), may be used against witnesses only in prosecutions for perjury or false statements.

. On June 13, the People filed a request for an order to compel the testimony of Adams, on the ground that Adams would exercise his right against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. On the same day that the People’s motion was filed, the trial court issued an order pursuant to § 13-90-118 granting Adams use immunity.

. The Colorado Constitution also guarantees ac-cuseds the right to be confronted with the witnesses against them, which includes the right of cross-examination. People v. Thurman, 787 P.2d 646, 651 (Colo.1990). However, I limit my discussion to the United States Constitution as the majority bases its analysis on the right secured thereunder. See maj. op. at 165-66.