Court Opinion

ID: 9721810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:10:08.979299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:24.166632
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in divisions I, II, and IV of the court’s opinion and in the result. I do not agree with the new exception carved out of the “coming and going rule” by the majori*651ty in division III, however, and respectfully dissent from that division.
Long ago we adopted the general rule that the course of employment commences after the employee reaches the premises where his actual work is carried on. Otto v. Independent School District, 237 Iowa 991, 994, 23 N.W.2d 915, 918 (1946). In division III the majority sets out two exceptions to this general rule that have been recognized in many jurisdictions. I believe those exceptions, as well as the exception relied on in division IV, provide standards by which the scope of the exceptions may be reasonably measured. The exception established by the majority, however, does not provide such standards.
The exception established in division III provides coverage under chapter 85 when an employee sustains personal injuries which are “closely connected in time, location, and employee usage to the work premises.” The majority finds Mrs. Frost to have been within the “zone of protection” of chapter 85 because she fell in an area of concentrated employee traffic used by all employees entering and leaving the employer’s premises through the only door provided for their use. I dispute both the facts and the logic relied on by the majority.
I agree that only one door was normally available to employees for entering the work place. The door was on a public street, however, and it was accessible from several different directions and locations. In this regard this case is different from the cases in which there is only one available route to the employer’s premises, such as a dead end street, and the employee must encounter special hazards, such as a railroad crossing.
The principal basis for my objection, however, is that the exception established in division III does not provide ascertainable standards or guidelines for determining the scope of coverage of chapter 85. How close in time, how near in location, and how heavy the employee usage are questions that need to be answered. There are no objective criteria for determining where the zone of protection begins and where it ends. We must recognize that the workers’ compensation act is administered by and large by persons not formally trained in the law. If we are to expect these individuals to administer the law according to the will of the legislature, it is imperative that we provide them with reasonably specific standards to apply in contested case proceedings.
I would affirm the decision of the trial court solely on the basis of the exception articulated in division IV.
ALLBEE, J., joins this concurrence in part and dissent in part.