Court Opinion

ID: 9689182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:23:10.137165+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:45.832481
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 29. (dissenting). This case is before us on review of a summary judgment. I dissent because I conclude that the record on Dr. Levin's motion for summary judgment shows that there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.08 (1995-96). This is not a case in which the summary judgment record allows for but one reasonable conclusion such that a court can resolve the issue as a matter of law. I conclude, therefore, as did the court of appeals, that a jury must determine when the Claypools discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, Mrs. Claypool's injury.
¶ 30. This action was filed on October 14, 1993, roughly four and one-half years after the alleged negligent conduct of Dr. Levin. Dr. Levin treated Mrs. Claypool between March 6 and April 19, 1989. For the Claypools' claim to survive Dr. Levin's statute of limi*304tations defense, the Claypools must show that they did not discover, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should they have discovered, the cause of Mrs. Clay-pool's injury before October 14, 1992.
¶ 31. The Claypools1 contend that they did not have reason to know of the cause of Mrs. Claypool's injury until an attorney opined in the summer of 1993 that they had a cause of action against Dr. Levin. It is uncontested that the Claypools filed this action within one year of that attorney's report and within five years of the alleged negligent acts. Dr. Levin contends that the Claypools discovered or should have discovered the injury in April 1989, when they asked their first attorney to advise them whether they had a cause of action against Dr. Levin.
¶ 32. The majority opinion concludes that the Claypools discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, Mrs. Claypool's injury at some point in March or early April of 1989. Thus the majority opinion concludes that an action for malpractice was time-barred.
¶ 33. I agree with the approach of the court of appeals which framed the inquiry as whether the Clay-pools exercised reasonable diligence to discover the cause of Mrs. Claypool's injury if they did not discover the cause until the summer of 1993. See also Awve v. Physicians Ins. Co, 181 Wis. 2d 815, 819, 512 N.W.2d 216 (Ct. App. 1994). Although a jury might find that the Claypools should have discovered the cause of the injury in March or early April 1989, I conclude that the summary judgment record demonstrates that a jury *305might reasonably find that the Claypools did not discover the cause of the injury until the summer of 1993 and that they exercised reasonable diligence in doing so.
I.
¶ 34. I first address the law relating to the discovery rule. Under Wis. Stat. § 893.55(l)(b) a plaintiff has one year to commence an action from the time that the plaintiff discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, "not only the fact of injury but also that the injury was probably caused by the defendant's conduct." Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 411, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). It is settled that whether a plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to discover the cause of injury is ordinarily a fact issue for the jury to resolve. See, e.g., Goff v. Seldera, 202 Wis. 2d 601, 613, 550 N.W.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1996). Only when the summary judgment record allows for but one reasonable conclusion about when a plaintiff discovered the injury and its cause may the court resolve the issue as a matter of law. Goff, 202 Wis. 2d at 613 and n.8; see also Awve, 181 Wis. 2d at 823.
¶ 35. I agree with the majority opinion that once discovered an injury cannot be "undiscovered." I do not, however, understand the court of appeals to have suggested otherwise. The court of appeals simply held that regardless of what the Claypools suspected or understood at the time they first contacted Attorney Goldstein, the Claypools may have exercised reasonable diligence in continuing to explore the cause of the injury given that they were advised by their attorney that they had no cause of action against Dr. Levin. Claypool v. Levin, 195 Wis. 2d 535, 551, 536 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1995).
*306¶ 36. The court of appeals' phrase "not necessarily locked in time" could be understood to suggest that a plaintiff might "undiscover" what he or she had previously discovered. Yet, in context, it is evident that the court of appeals intended to restate the unremarkable proposition that the advice one receives from those to whom one entrusts the investigation of a possible cause of action is relevant to whether a subsequent delay in discovering the cause of the injury is an exercise of reasonable diligence. This point has long been recognized.
¶ 37. In Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 403-04, the plaintiff "believed, suspected, or had a hunch" a short time after having a new furnace installed that the furnace was causing her physical distress and she promptly began to solicit professional advice. Nonetheless, because doctors and other professionals initially told her that her injury was not caused by the furnace, the court held that her cause of action against the furnace company did not accrue until she received a subsequent report from a doctor that the furnace indeed was the cause of her injury.
¶ 38. Subsequent cases have not disturbed this holding of Borello. In Clark v. Erdmann, 161 Wis. 2d 428, 448, 468 N.W.2d 18 (1991), relied on in the majority opinion, the court explicitly distinguished Borello on these grounds: "[U]nlike the plaintiff in Borello, Clark was never told by medical experts that her injury was not caused by what she ultimately determined to be its cause." I agree with the court of appeals, therefore, that "in this important regard Borello [rather than Clark] corresponds more exactly to the instant case." Claypool, 195 Wis. 2d at 550.
¶ 39. I see no basis for the majority opinion's unsupported conclusion that based on Clark and *307Kempfer v. Evers, 133 Wis. 2d 415, 395 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1986), discovery occurs "regardless of whether [the plaintiff] has been given a misleading legal opinion." Majority op. at 301. Rather, I would adopt the analysis of the court of appeals which is more consistent with Borello.
II.
¶ 40. I turn now to the facts set forth in the record and the reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. An appellate court reviews a grant or denial of summary judgment independently, applying the methodology of Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 802.08. "On summary judgment the court does not decide the issue of fact; it decides whether there is a genuine issue of fact.... Doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact should be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment." Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).
¶ 41. Although the majority opinion states the proper methodology of review, I believe it fails to apply that methodology. The majority opinion ignores the competing factual inferences presented in this record. Two sets of competing factual inferences require determination by a fact finder.
¶ 42. First, the summary judgment record suggests that the Claypools may not have had reason to believe that Mrs. Claypool's blindness was caused by Dr. Levin's conduct. According to Mrs. Claypool's deposition testimony, and Attorney Goldstein's notes of his conversation with the Claypools, Mrs. Claypool's blindness began before she first entered the hospital.2 A jury *308might find it reasonable for the Claypools not to have known until 1993 whether her blindness was caused by disease or by malpractice.
¶ 43. Second, it is uncontested that the Claypools contacted their family attorney soon after Mrs. Clay-pool's treatment by Dr. Levin and that Attorney Goldstein told the Claypools they did not have a cause of action against Dr. Levin. The summary judgment materials do not resolve the time at which Attorney Goldstein provided this report.3 I agree with the court of appeals that "the uncertainty surrounding the nature and timing of the communication between Gold-stein and the Claypools leaves the issue of the Claypools' reasonable diligence appropriate for a jury's determination." Claypool, 195 Wis. 2d at 553.
¶ 44. The record leaves open competing inferences with regard to when the Claypools, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the cause of Mrs. Claypool's blindness. I believe the majority improperly assumes the role of fact finder and resolves the competing factual inferences presented in the summary judgment record. The majority opinion acknowledges that the record on summary judgment is insufficient to resolve several significant questions. Majority op. at 302. The issue *309then is whether the competing factual inferences which can be drawn from the insufficient record raise a genuine issue of material fact. I conclude that they do and that the competing factual inferences cannot be resolved as a matter of law.
¶ 45. I would affirm the court of appeals and remand the cause for a jury's determination of whether the Claypools exercised reasonable diligence when they did not discover the cause of the alleged injury until the summer of 1993.
¶ 46. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
¶ 47. I am authorized to state that Justice Janine P. Geske joins this opinion.

 Although the testimony is conflicting, Mrs. Claypool testified in her deposition as follows: "I suppose I wasn't seeing when *308they took me to the hospital." R. 16 at 13. When asked if she saw Dr. Levin at the hospital, Mrs. Claypool responded that she did not: "Because I couldn't see." R. 16 at 13-14.
Attorney Goldstein's notes for the morning of Mrs. Clay-pool's admission to the hospital include the following: "Took her to Columbia Hospital 1:30 AM — Couldn't see anything — Admitted to hospital." R. 14 at 13.

 Mr. Claypool testified in his deposition that he did not remember when he was given this information by Attorney Goldstein but that it was not in 1992.