Court Opinion

ID: 9563223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:37:51.523832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:46.831492
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part):
I concur in the main opinion’s treatment of the issues involving the exclusion of the victim and the admission of evidence. However, I respectfully dissent from the main opin*1183ion’s treatment of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Because the record is inadequate to decide the question, State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993), prohibits us from reaching the merits of the claim. See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (appellate court is bound by prior decision of same court).
In Garrett, we held that we can entertain an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal “only if the record is adequate to permit a decision.” 849 P.2d at 580. We further held that a “trial record is adequate only if “we are not aware of any evidence or arguments which might be made that [are] not now before us.’” Id. (quoting State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)). Garrett claimed, among other things, that jury instructions presented by his trial attorney were erroneous. Because we could look to the record to determine the adequacy of the instructions given to the jury, we addressed the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. Id.
Garrett also claimed, however, that his trial attorney was ineffective in fading to object to the prosecution’s use of its peremptory challenges in a manner he claimed was racially motivated. Id. at 581; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89-92, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719-20, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (racially motivated peremptory strikes are unconstitutional). In analyzing this claim, we stated:
We do not know from the record before us whether the prosecution in fact had race-neutral reasons for removing the potential jurors because defense counsel did not object. Nor do we know for certain whether defense counsel’s failure to object to strikes was deficient performance or trial strategy. Defense counsel may have had [juror language deficiencies] in mind in not objecting to the prosecution’s removal of the two potential jurors. It is also conceivable that perceptions of inattentiveness or a lack of sympathy towards defendant — or' any myriad of intangible factors — could prompt competent defense counsel to forego asserting a Batson challenge. Given the presumption that defense counsel was acting properly, we must assume that defense counsel also wanted these potential jurors removed and therefore did not raise a Batson challenge as a matter of strategy. Any evidence to the contrary is simply not in the record before us. The record is therefore inadequate for us to find on direct appeal that counsel’s performance was objectively deficient.
Id.; see also Humphries, 818 P.2d at 1029 (generally ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim “cannot be raised on [direct] appeal because the trial record is insufficient to allow claim to be determined”).
The record in the present case is similarly deficient as to why defense counsel did not challenge juror Hodges. The main opinion acknowledges the inadequacy of the record. Nevertheless, in direct violation of Garrett and principles of stare decisis, the main opinion decides the merits of defendant’s claim. The main opinion, echoing Garrett, recognizes that
[o]ur review of counsel’s performance “is inherently hampered by our necessary reliance on only the lifeless transcript to assess the dynamic and highly judgmental process of jury selection.” Accordingly, we could only speculate as to what trial counsel was thinking when selecting a particular juror, or what effect that selection would play in counsel’s overall strategy or plan. Such speculation is manifestly inappropriate, given the strong presumption that counsel’s behavior was the product of trial strategy rather than ineptitude.
See main opinion, at 1179-1180 (citations omitted). The main opinion goes on to state that “[g]iven the fact that we are ill-equipped to determine what actually occurred, “we will not second-guess a trial attorney’s legitimate use of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy.’ ” Id. at 1180 (citations omitted). This is precisely the reasoning in Garrett. Because we are “ill-equipped” to decide what actually occurred at trial, we cannot address this issue on direct appeal.
Perhaps even more troubling than the failure to follow stare decisis is the effect the main opinion’s holding will have on defendants who may have legitimate ineffective assistance claims. The main opinion argues that, where the record on direct appeal is *1184silent, we can rely on the presumption that defense counsel was acting properly and conclusively decide that defense counsel was effective. As used by the main opinion, this presumption will operate to foreclose any opportunity in habeas corpus proceedings for a defendant ever to demonstrate the validity of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Because of the inadequacy of the record, we cannot decide defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal. Under Garrett and the principles of stare decisis, we should decline on direct appeal to reach the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the trial record is inadequate.