Court Opinion

ID: 9965871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 17:09:26.183243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:47.992431
License: Public Domain

J-S40031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: A.D., FATHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1074 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0003191-2017

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.D., A       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: A.D., FATHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1075 EDA 2023

            Appeal from the Decree Entered March 22, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000458-2020

 IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D., A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                     :
                                     :
 APPEAL OF: A.D., FATHER             :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :
                                     :   No. 1076 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered March 22, 2023
          In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
          Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0003192-2017
J-S40031-23

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.A.D., A              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: A.D., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 1077 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered March 22, 2023
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000457-2020

BEFORE:      NICHOLS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.:                                   FILED MAY 3, 2024

       Appellant, A.D. (“Father”), appeals from the March 22, 2023 decrees of

the trial court that terminated his parental rights to his children, A.J.D. and

A.M.A.D. (collectively, “Children”). Father also appeals from the March 22,

2023 trial court orders that changed the permanent placement goal for

Children to adoption. After careful review, we affirm.

       By way of background, the Department of Human Services of the City

of Philadelphia (“DHS”) received its first report, a general protective service

report,1 on September 26, 2017, alleging that Father had engaged in domestic
____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Pennsylvania law defines two types of reports received by county agencies.

A “general protective service report” is “[a] verbal or written statement to the
county agency from someone alleging that a child is in need of general
protective services[,]” with those services being designed to prevent the
potential for harm to a child who “[i]s without proper parental care or control,
subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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violence, physical abuse, and inappropriate discipline in the Children’s

household. See N.T., 4/18/18, at 37-39. At that point in time, A.J.D. was

three years old and A.M.A.D. was one year old. In addition to the Children,

five maternal half-siblings resided in this household with Father and B.S.

(“Mother”). DHS validated the report through one of the Children’s half-

siblings, who indicated that she was fearful of Father because, inter alia, he

beat her with a cord and broom.2 See id., at 38-40.

       Notwithstanding this report, evidence suggested that Father had moved

out of the same residence as Mother and the Children.3 See id., at 40 (DHS

investigator stating that she “was told that [Father] was not [living in the

home]”). Because of this apparent departure, DHS kept the Children in

Mother’s house and implemented Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”)

____________________________________________

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals.” 55 Pa. Code §
3490.223(i). In contrast, a “child protective report” is made by someone who
has “reasonable cause to suspect that a child has been abused.” 55 Pa. Code
§ 3490.11(a).

2 Throughout the course of its investigation, DHS also learned that Mother had

once tried to obtain a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) Act order against Father.
See N.T., 4/18/18, at 42. Although she never expressly admitted that she had
been abused, Mother implied that she was afraid of Father. See id., at 41.
Other women, too, have initiated PFA proceedings against Father. See id., at
44. Father also has a prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter of a former
paramour.

3 Father’s place of living remained unclear throughout sizable portions of the

proceedings, with Father’s attorney conveying to the court that he lived, at
various points, in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, as well as Philadelphia.

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services in the family’s home. See id., at 41 (remarking that there was no

“imminent need to remove the children” at the time).

      In October 2017, DHS received a second report, a child protective

report, primarily alleging that Father had punched one of the Children’s half-

siblings at some undefined point. See id., at 44-45. The half-sibling stated

that “she received a black eye from this [incident].” Id., at 46. Father denied

that he was physically abusive, see id., at 47 (Father also denying that he

was committing any domestic violence), but despite indicating that he was no

longer living with Mother, he did not provide an updated address. See id., at

49 (during the DHS investigation, Father was “just there, babysitting”).

Mother denied that there was any physical abuse occurring to any of her

children. See id., at 49. Eventually, after further investigation, DHS filed

dependency petitions for the Children. See id., at 48.

      In December 2017, there was a third report directed to DHS alleging

domestic violence. See id., at 55. However, when several of the Children’s

half-siblings were interviewed by DHS, other than providing vague intimations

of improper conduct, they were unwilling to speak about their home life. See,

e.g., id., at 56 (one of the half-siblings demeanor described as “[v]ery

guarded”), 59 (another of the half-siblings stating that although she did not

want to speak to DHS, “she felt it was best if the kids were removed from the

home[]”).

      Ultimately, on December 11, 2017, DHS obtained orders of protective

custody (“OPC”) for all seven children living with Mother due to domestic

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violence concerns. See id., at 59. Following a shelter care hearing, which

occurred several days after the issuance of the OPCs, the Children were

temporarily committed to DHS’s custody.4 See Shelter Care Order, 12/15/17,

at 1-2. At this juncture, Father and Mother’s visitation rights were also

suspended. See id., at 2.

       In January 2018, DHS received a fourth report, alleging that Father had

burned one of the Children’s half-siblings, two years old at the time, in a bath

some four years prior. See N.T., 4/18/18, at 60, 67. In response, Father

admitted that he left this half-sibling unsupervised, which led to burns on that

individual’s foot. See id., at 64. However, Father also indicated that instead

of going to seek medical treatment, the family treated the half-siblings’

wounds themselves. See id., at 65.

       On April 18, 2018, following a full hearing in which Mother and Father

were represented by counsel, the court adjudicated Children and their half-

siblings dependent and committed them to DHS’s custody. See Order of

Adjudication and Disposition, 4/18/18, at 1. Father was additionally referred

for a parenting capacity evaluation and domestic violence classes. See id., at

2. Father’s visitation rights were also suspended until he completed domestic

violence counseling. See id. It was at this point that Father obtained a single

case plan that indicated he should engage with the Children pursuant to the

____________________________________________

4 The Children resided in the same pre-adoptive foster home from December

2017 onward. See N.T., 4/18/18, at 77. The other minor half-siblings were
placed in kinship care. See id., at 62, 77.

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court order, avail himself of CUA services, and participate in domestic violence

counseling, parenting classes, and anger management classes. See id.

      Following these determinations, the court, in subsequent review

hearings, continued to find Children’s placement to be necessary and

appropriate, with DHS and CUA making reasonable efforts to finalize their

permanency plans. See, e.g., Permanency Review Order, 5/15/19.

      In October 2018, Father was granted line-of-sight and line-of-hearing

supervised visitation, but he never progressed beyond supervised contact.

Father’s last visit with the Children was in March 2019. See Permanency

Review Order, 10/29/18.

      Eventually, in December 2020, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily

terminate the parental rights of the Children’s Mother and Father and to

change the Children’s permanency goal to adoption. See Petition for Goal

Change to Adoption/Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. In May 2022, the

court held a hearing to address these concerns. By this point, the Children had

been in DHS’s care for fifty-three months. See N.T., 5/18/22, at 9. Father was

represented by counsel at this hearing, and Children were represented by legal

interests counsel and a guardian ad litem.

      Therein, it was established that DHS validated, through extensive

investigations, four separate reports of Father engaging in domestic violence

and inappropriate discipline against Mother and the Children’s half-siblings.

See e.g., at 11-13. Moreover, CUA indicated that Father had not maintained

contact with the agency, nor had he completed his domestic violence, anger

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management, or parenting single plan objectives. See id., at 28-29. A

representative of CUA opined that Father had not demonstrated the necessary

protective capacity to parent the Children and had not even seen them for

over two years. See id., at 29. Furthermore, in the opinion of the CUA case

manager, the Children did not look to Father for love or support, which

compelled a conclusion that they would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s

parental rights were terminated and the Children’s permanency goals were

changed to adoption. See id., at 31. The Children were reported to be very

happy in the foster home, and both Children looked to their foster mother for

their basic needs and support. See id., at 30.

       Ultimately, in March 2023, the trial court terminated Father’s parental

rights and changed the Children’s goal to adoption.5 Specifically, the court

found that DHS established, by clear and convincing evidence, that

termination was warranted under Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b)

of the Adoption Act. See 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). From the bench, the

court stated:

       [Father] had both constructive and actual knowledge of his
       [s]ingle [p]lan objectives. The fact is co[rrob]orated by [Father’s]
       attendance at his supervised visits. He did not comply. … He did
       not simply guess the correct date and time, and location to be
       present for these visits. He was made aware of the visitation
       information and [s]ingle [c]ase [p]lan objectives on multiple
       occasions in court by the presiding judge and … CUA.

       [The court was] not persuaded by his argument that his failure to
____________________________________________

5 The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children. Mother

did not appeal.

                                           -7-
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      comply with the [s]ingle [p]lan objectives and make any progress
      is anyone’s fault but his own.

N.T., 3/22/23, at 9-10.

      Father timely appealed these determinations and has complied with his

obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

      On appeal, Father raises seven issues for review, four challenging the

trial court’s involuntary termination of his parental rights to Children and three

contesting the court’s change of the Children’s permanency goal.

      In addressing his first four issues, we apply the following precepts:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only    upon    demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In the Interest of J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 11 (Pa. Super. 2020) (quoting In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013)).

      The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. See In the Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 522 (Pa. Super.

2021). The clear and convincing evidence standard is defined as “testimony

that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to

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come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts

in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).

       Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act. “Subsection (a) provides eleven enumerated grounds describing

particular conduct of a parent which would warrant involuntary termination[.]”

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021); see 23 Pa.C.S. §

2511(a)(1)-(11). If the trial court determines the petitioner established

grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a) by clear and convincing

evidence, the court then must proceed to assess the petition under subsection

(b), which focuses on the child’s needs and welfare. See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at

267.

       Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and subsection (b). However, this

Court may affirm the court’s decision to terminate if we agree with its

determination concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as

Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en

banc). We focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as

follows:

       (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
       be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
       grounds:

           (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
           six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
           either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
           parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
           parental duties.

                                       -9-
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                       *           *            *

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
      of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
      environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
      income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
      control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
      to subsection (a)(1), … the court shall not consider any efforts by
      the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are
      first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the
      petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

      To terminate a parent’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1), the

petitioner “must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing evidence

[that] [t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months

immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 363-64 (Pa.

2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

      With respect to a parent’s performance of parental duties under Section

2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has explained as follows:

      Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts
      long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a
      child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. Parental
      duties are carried out through affirmative actions and develop and
      maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive
      actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The
      performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert
      himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s
      life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable
      firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of

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      preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more
      suitable time to perform parental responsibilities.

In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 592 (Pa. 2021) (internal quotation

marks, brackets and internal citations omitted).

      A parent’s failure or refusal to perform parental duties “must be

analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (citation

omitted). Therefore, a court addressing a petition filed under Section

2511(a)(1) shall “examine the individual circumstances and any explanation

offered by the parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of

circumstances, clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination of

parental rights.” Id. at 593 (citation and brackets omitted). “Consideration of

the totality of the circumstances includes evaluation of the following: (1) the

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact

between the parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent

to reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that termination of

parental rights would have on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id.

While courts must not engage in a mechanical application of the terms of the

Adoption Act, the “most critical period for evaluation [under Section

2511(a)(1)] is six months immediately preceding the filing of the termination

petition.” Id. at 592.

      In its opinion, the court found that, given his lack of progress on his

single case plan and his complete absence from the Children’s lives, Father

unexplainably failed to perform his parental duties for a substantial amount of

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time:

        Father never argued that he complied with or achieved his [single
        case plan] objectives or had made efforts to do so. The entirety
        of Father’s argument was that he was never informed by CUA or
        anyone else of what his [single case plan] objectives were. … [The
        lower court] reviewed the certified court record for this matter and
        determined that Father was present in court for this matter on at
        least eight prior occasions between the years of 2017 and the
        termination hearing on May 18, 2022. He also attended two
        hearings by video conference during the COVID-19 pandemic. The
        court records indicate that a representative from CUA was present
        on at least five of these occasions. … Father had both actual and
        constructive knowledge of his [single case plan] objectives. …
        [Father] attended supervised visits at various points during the
        history of this case. The only way that Father would be aware that
        his visits were supervised and when and where they were to occur
        is if it was communicated to him by a representative of CUA.
        Father would have been informed of his [single case plan]
        objectives by both CUA and the presiding judge before whom he
        appeared at each of the court listings of this case.

Trial Court Opinion 7/11/23, at 7 (footnote omitted).

        Father’s single plan objectives were:

        [t]o avail himself for family stabilization, to engage in visits with
        [C]hildren per the court order, to make himself available to CUA
        services, to make himself available to sign all needed consents
        and releases, to participate in domestic violence counseling …, to
        participate in parenting classes and to participate in anger
        management classes.

N.T., 5/18/22, at 28. However, Father did not attend any of these classes or

programs. See id., at 29. Furthermore, Father’s last visit with the Children

was in March 2019. See id., at 29, 50. As stated, supra, the petition to

terminate Father’s parental rights was filed in December 2020.

        Other than baldly stating that he “never failed or refused to perform his

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parental duties,” Father’s Brief, at 14, Father’s only argument on appeal

pursuant to Section (a)(1) is that the CUA case manager’s testimony, which

established that Father “had not visited with the [C]hildren since March of

2019[,]” id.; see also N.T., 5/18/22, at 29, was “undocumented, hearsay

testimony of the caseworker[.]” Father’s Brief, at 14. In particular, Father

argues that the person who testified “had been assigned to the case … [for]

only two months” and “had no personal knowledge of [F]ather’s involvement

in visiting the children, or lack of involvement.” Id. However, a review of the

record establishes that Father raised no objection to the CUA case manager’s

testimony in this regard.6

       In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must
       make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of
       the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely object to
       a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.
       On appeal the Superior Court will not consider a claim which was
       not called to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error
       committed could have been corrected. ... [O]ne must object to
       errors, improprieties[,] or irregularities at the earliest possible
       stage of the adjudicatory process to afford the jurist hearing the
       case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and possibly avoid an
       unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.

In re S.C.B., 990 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Thompson v.

Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475-76 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted)). As

such, Father’s claim of hearsay, as a basis to contradict his abdication of

____________________________________________

6 Father did object to other portions of the CUA case manager’s testimony on

hearsay grounds, but not her testimony regarding Father’s last visitation with
Children in March 2019. See N.T., 5/18/22, at 11-13, 17-23, 31.

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parenting duties, is waived. Even if it were not, the trial court permitted the

CUA case manager to testify as to other information she had gleaned from her

review of the agency file under the business records exception to the rule

against hearsay, see Pa.R.E. 803(6); N.T., 5/18/22, at 18-21, and Father has

offered no explanation as to why her testimony concerning his lack of visitation

derived from the same source would not also be permitted. We further note

that there is nothing in the record that contradicts the case manager’s clear

testimony that Father had not seen Children for more than a year prior to the

filing of the termination petition and for more than three years as of the date

of the hearing. N.T., 5/18/22, at 29. Accordingly, there was clear and

convincing evidence that Father failed to perform his parental duties for a

period of well over six months, and the lower court did not abuse its discretion

or commit an error of law in concluding the same.

      Once a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination

pursuant to Section 2511(a), the court turns to Section 2511(b), which

requires it to “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and

emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “The

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to

include intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 267 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023). “Notably, courts should consider

the matter from the child’s perspective, placing her developmental, physical,

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and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” K.T., 296

A.3d at 1105.

      Beginning with In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme Court

has consistently mandated that any Section 2511(b) analysis “requires

consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” T.S.M.,

71 A.3d at 267. Specifically, “[c]ourts must determine whether the trauma

caused by breaking [the parent-child] bond is outweighed by the benefit of

moving the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). The

recognized threshold for this required bond inquiry is whether termination will

sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” causing the child to suffer

“‘extreme emotional consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” K.T.,

296 A.3d at 1109-10 (quoting E.M., 620 A.2d at 484). “However, in cases

where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is

reasonable to infer that no bond exists.” In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d

439, 445 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “Accordingly, the extent of the

bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of the

particular case.” Id. (citation omitted).

      “[A] court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and welfare analysis

must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from

severance of the parental bond.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. Our Supreme Court

has explained that the court should consider, as appropriate, the child’s need

for permanency and length of time in foster care, the child’s placement in a

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pre-adoptive home and whether there is a bond with the foster parents, and

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs. See id. Nonetheless, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors

that must be considered by a trial court in this context. Id., at 1113 n.28.

      At this issue, the court explained as follows:

      [The DHS representative] testified that she conducted two
      interviews of the [C]hildren[.] Both [C]hildren have been in the
      foster home for more than four years and refer to their caregiver
      as “mom.” Both [C]hildren move about the foster home freely and
      want to remain with their caregiver. They are bonded to each
      other and to their caregiver. [There was no testimony
      establishing] that there would be irreparable harm to the Children
      if they were permanently separated from Mother and Father. The
      testimony demonstrated that it was in the best interest of the
      Children to remain with their respective caregivers.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/11/23, at 8 (record citations omitted).

      Father’s brief contains no record citations supporting his proposition that

he and his children “have a strong emotional bond.” Father’s Brief, at 18.

However, there is ample evidence demonstrating the converse: a lack of

emotional bond. Father’s contact with the Children went from sparing to

nonexistent, and the Children do not ask for Father. See N.T., 5/18/22, at 51.

Moreover, testimony reflected that the Children would not be irreparably

harmed if Father’s parental rights were terminated. See id. Instead, the

Children “affectionately call [their foster mother, with whom they have been

placed since 2017,] mom mom.” Id., at 32, 51 (stating, further, that the

Children had a parent/child bond with their foster mother).

      There has been no error in the court’s determination that termination of

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Father’s parental rights best met the Children’s developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare. The Children, at the time of the termination

hearing, had been with their foster mother for over four years, “their most

formative years.” Id., at 32. Both Children indicated that “they wanted to

remain with their mom-mom.” Id., at 31. In the absence of any indicia of a

parental bond between Father and the Children, the record demonstrates,

instead, a strong parent-child bond existing between the Children and their

foster mother. At the time of the termination of parental rights hearing, the

Children had been with their foster mother for more than half of their lives.

The testimony also reflected that the Children were happy living with the foster

mother, receiving love, comfort, and stability in this environment. As a result

of Father’s years-long, complete absence in the Children’s lives, it was not an

abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that no bond existed between

him and the Children and therefore that the Children’s best interests were

served by terminating Father’s parental rights. We therefore discern no abuse

of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s involuntary termination of

Father’s parental rights to Children, and we affirm the lower court’s March 22,

2023 decrees.

      In Father’s fifth, sixth, and seventh issues in this appeal, he challenges

the change of Children’s permanent placement goal from reunification to

adoption. Given our decision to affirm the trial court’s termination decrees,

any challenge to the goal change orders is moot. See A.H., 247 A.3d at 446

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(“[T]he effect of our decision to affirm the [trial] court’s termination decree

necessarily renders moot the dependency court’s decision to change [a]

[c]hild’s goal to adoption.”); see also In the Interest of A.R., __ A.3d __,

__, 2023 PA Super 243, slip op. at 17 (Pa. Super. Nov. 28, 2023); In the

Interest of A.M., 256 A.3d 1263, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2021). We accordingly

also affirm the trial court’s goal change orders. A.R., __ A.3d at __, 2023 PA

Super 243, slip op. at 17; A.M., 256 A.3d at 1272-73.

      Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.

Date: 5/3/2024

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