Court Opinion

ID: 9642035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:46:29.517019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:42.296407
License: Public Domain

Melvin, J.,

concurring:

I agree that the motion for summary judgment was erroneously granted by the court below. I reach that result, however, by a somewhat different route.
The defendant’s motion for summary judgment alleged two alternative grounds for granting the motion:
1. “That there is no genuine issue as to any material facts in regard to the issue of defendant’s malice, and that therefore the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. In support of this allegation the motion alleged that in a deposition in which he was questioned by appellee’s counsel, appellant “was unable to cite a single fact which would support” the allegation of his declaration that appellee “made the false, malicious and defamatory statements contained in the aforesaid letter with knowledge that these were false____”
2. “That there is no genuine issue as to any material fact in regard to the issue of absolute privilege, and that therefore, the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law”. (Emphasis added).
*56As to the first ground, it is clear from the plaintiff’s deposition that the questions posed to him by the defendant’s counsel assumed that the allegedly defamatory portions of the letter of September 30,1977, contained in the second and third paragraphs of the letter, were statements of fact and not expressions of opinion. The defendant-appellee argued below and now on appeal that because the plaintiff-appellant testified in his deposition that he had no facts to support his allegation, made in his declaration, that the defendant-appellee “knew when he made those statements that they were false” (emphasis supplied), he was therefore entitled to summary judgment. The appellee argues, in effect, that unless his opponent can prove knowing falsity, he loses. This argument overlooks the complete definition of actual malice that must be proved in a defamation action by a public figure. To prove that a defamatory false statement was made with “actual malice” the public figure plaintiff must prove that the statement was made either “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”. (Emphasis added) New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279-280. Thus, proving knowing falsity is not an indispensable element of the proof of actual malice. The plaintiff-appellant also alleged in his declaration, alternatively, that the statements were made “in reckless disregard for the truth”.
The plaintiff was not obliged to prove his entire case before trial. The fact that pre-trial discovery proceedings may show that he is unable to say that when the appellee made the allegedly defamatory statements he (appellee) knew them to be false, does not mean that for that reason alone the appellee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
As to the second ground urged for granting the motion for summary judgment, the appellee alternatively argues that the allegedly defamatory portions of the letter are merely expressions of opinion and “are characterizable as 'fair comment’ on the conduct of a public official, and as such merit a constitutional qualified privilege”. Citing Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514, 343 A. 2d 251 (1975), cert. denied (1976), (“Opinions based on false facts are protected if the publisher *57was not guilty of actual malice with regard to these supportive facts”, id. at 531-532), the appellee asserts, without discussion, that “even if one assumes that the brief summary of facts in paragraph 1 of the appellee’s letter are false”, the appellant has failed in his burden “to adduce evidence on the malice issue sufficient to overcome the Motion for Summary Judgment”.
In Kapiloff, supra, at 533, Judge Orth, speaking for the Court, said:
“.. . Where the statements, however, are actual expressions of opinion, based upon stated or readily known facts, their objective truth or falsity depends on the veracity of these underlying facts. Therefore, any determinations with regard to falsity or the presence of actual malice must look to the stated or known facts which form the basis for the opinion____”
It would seem to follow, therefore, that, viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant (against whom the motion was filed), if the facts that purport to support an expression of opinion are false, there arises at least an inference that these statements of fact, made by one who had first hand knowledge of the entire incident, were made with either knowing falsity or reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. As already noted, the appellant was not required to prove his entire case before trial, and at the summary judgment stage is entitled, as the party against whom the motion was filed, to all inferences favorable to his cause. Merchants Mtg. Co. v. Lubow, 275 Md. 208, 339 A. 2d 664 (1975); Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md. App. 121, 318 A. 2d 850 (1974).
For the above reasons, I agree that the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.