Court Opinion

ID: 9917038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 15:07:37.692977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:56.988835
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Keith Stanley,                        :
                           Petitioner : No. 1234 C.D. 2022
                                      : Submitted: May 19, 2023
           v.                         :
                                      :
Department of Transportation          :
(Workers’ Compensation Appeal         :
Board),                               :
                          Respondent :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
                 HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
                 HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                              FILED: January 11, 2024

         Keith Stanley (Claimant) petitions for review of the October 12, 2022 order of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which affirmed the Workers’
Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) April 26, 2022 order granting the Department of
Transportation’s (Employer) Petition to Modify Compensation Benefits (Modification
Petition) filed under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).1 Claimant presents several
constitutional issues for this Court’s consideration. Upon review, we affirm.

1
    Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.
     I. Factual and Procedural Background
         On August 22, 2017, Claimant injured his back in the course and scope of his
employment. On September 13, 2017, Employer issued an Amended Notice of
Compensation Payable (NCP), acknowledging Claimant’s injury as a contusion to the
lower back area. As of August 24, 2017, Claimant began receiving temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits based on his average weekly wage.
          On October 3, 2019, after Claimant received TTD for over 104 weeks,
Employer requested the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (Bureau) designate a
physician to perform an Impairment Rating Evaluation (IRE) of Claimant. Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 136a. The Bureau designated Dr. Scott Naftulin (Dr. Naftulin) to
perform the evaluation. Id. On May 5, 2020, the Bureau issued a notice the IRE would
take place July 6, 2020. Id. Claimant did not attend the scheduled IRE and on July 7,
2020, Employer filed a Physical Examination Petition. On May 10, 2021, the WCJ
granted Employer’s Physical Examination Petition and ordered Claimant to attend an
IRE “to be scheduled by [Employer] upon request pursuant to the Act.” Id. at 140a.
         On June 7, 2021, Dr. Naftulin performed an IRE of Claimant and opined
Claimant’s full body impairment was 21%. Id. at 176a. Based on the results of the
IRE, Employer filed a Modification Petition seeking to change Claimant’s benefits
from TTD to temporary partial disability (TPD).
         The WCJ granted Employer’s Modification Petition, and on appeal, the Board
affirmed. Claimant now seeks review in this Court. Claimant raises several issues on
appeal, all of which challenge the constitutionality of Act 111.2 First, Claimant asserts
Act 111 is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. Next, he claims Act
111 should not apply to his injury, which occurred before Act 111’s enactment.

2
    Act of October 24, 2018, P.L. 714, No. 111 (Act 111).

                                                  2
Finally, Claimant argues Act 111 violates his vested right to be free of the IRE process,
a process Claimant believes is unconstitutional.
      II.      Discussion
            This Court reviews workers’ compensation orders for violations of the
petitioner’s constitutional rights, violations of agency practice and procedure, and other
errors of law. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704. Claimant does not argue the Board made any particular
error when it affirmed the WCJ’s decision and order.                       Instead, Claimant raises
constitutional issues. As the Board noted, “[a]ppellate review by the Board does not
include constitutional issues.” Bd. Op. at 3 (citing Ligonier Tavern, Inc. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeal Bd. (Walker), 714 A.2d 1008 (Pa. 1998)).
            After this Court, affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, declared the IRE
provision in former Section 306(a.2) of the Act, added by the Act of June 24, 1996,
P.L. 350, formerly 77 P.S. § 511.2, repealed by Act 111, an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority, the General Assembly enacted Act 111. Act 111 repealed the
unconstitutional IRE provision and replaced it with a new IRE provision, Section
306(a.3), 77 P.S, § 511.3.3 Since its enactment, Courts in Pennsylvania have addressed
and rejected many challenges to the constitutionality of Act 111.

3
    Section 306(a.3)(1) of the Act, added by Act 111, provides:

            When an employe has received total disability compensation pursuant to clause (a)
            for a period of one hundred and four weeks, unless otherwise agreed to, the employe
            shall be required to submit to a medical examination which shall be requested by
            the insurer within sixty days upon the expiration of the one hundred and four weeks
            to determine the degree of impairment due to the compensable injury, if any. The
            degree of impairment shall be determined based upon an evaluation by a physician
            who is licensed in this Commonwealth, who is certified by an American Board of
            Medical Specialties-approved board or its osteopathic equivalent and who is active
            in clinical practice for at least twenty hours per week, chosen by agreement of the
            parties, or as designated by the department, pursuant to the American Medical
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                      3
          Claimant’s first argument is that Act 111 is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority.        However, this       Court   in   Pennsylvania      AFL-CIO    v.
Commonwealth, 16 A.3d 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), concluded Act 111 is not an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority, which Claimant acknowledged in
his brief. See Claimant’s Br. at 16 n.1. In Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, we explained:

          The non-delegation doctrine does not prohibit the General Assembly from
          “adopting as its own a particular set of standards . . . .” [T]he General
          Assembly is exercising its legislative and policy making authority by
          deciding that it is those particular standards that will become the law of
          this Commonwealth. It is not delegating its authority to legislate. The
          General Assembly made a policy decision regarding the standards that
          will apply to IREs in the Commonwealth going forward.

Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 316 (emphasis added). Given the clear holding
in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO that Act 111 is not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority, we conclude the Act did not violate Claimant’s constitutional
rights.
          Claimant next asserts Act 111 should not apply to his injury, which occurred
before Act 111’s enactment. In Pierson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board
(Consol Pennsylvania Coal Company LLC), 252 A.3d 1169 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021), this
Court held Act 111 could apply to injuries occurring before its enactment. In Pierson,
we explained:

          While [the claimant], here, argues that he has a right to benefits as
          calculated at the time of injury, there are reasonable expectations under
          the Act that benefits may change. We acknowledge that a claimant retains
          a certain right to benefits until such time as he is found to be ineligible for

          Association “Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,” 6th edition
          (second printing April 2009).

77 P.S. § 511.3(1).

                                                4
      them. However, claimants, such as the one in the matter before us, did not
      automatically lose anything by the enactment of Act 111. Act 111 simply
      provided employers with the means to change a claimant’s disability
      status from total to partial by providing the requisite medical evidence that
      the claimant has a whole body impairment of less than 35%, after
      receiving 104 weeks of TTD benefits.

Pierson, 252 A.3d at 1179.
      Here, Claimant’s injury occurred in 2017, Act 111 became effective in 2018,
and Dr. Naftulin performed the IRE of Claimant in 2020. As in Pierson, Claimant’s
injury occurred before the enactment of Act 111. This Court held Act 111 and its IRE
provisions applied in Pierson. We conclude they also apply to Claimant in this case,
and there is no violation of Claimant’s constitutional rights.
      Lastly, Claimant argues Act 111 violates his vested right to be free of the IRE
process. A vested right is a right that “so completely and definitely belongs to a person
that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person’s consent.” Pierson, 252
A.3d at 1179 (citation omitted). It is “something more than a mere expectation based
upon an anticipated continuance of existing law.” Bible v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 696
A.2d 1149, 1155 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court struck former
Section 306(a.2) of the Act in its entirety, after finding the General Assembly
unconstitutionally delegated its lawmaking authority in violation of the non-delegation
doctrine of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Protz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Derry
Area Sch. Dist.), 161 A.3d 827 (Pa. 2017) (Protz II). The Supreme Court did not hold
the IRE process, itself, was unconstitutional.       Following Protz II, the General
Assembly repealed Section 306(a.2) of the Act and reestablished the IRE process by
replacing it with Section 306(a.3). As we explained in Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, “[t]he
General Assembly made a policy decision regarding the standards that will apply to
IREs in the Commonwealth going forward.” Pennsylvania AFL-CIO, 219 A.3d at 316.
The IRE provides employers with the means to change a claimant’s disability status

                                            5
based upon medical evidence. There is no vested right for an individual to be free of
the IRE process when receiving benefits under the Act. Claimant’s IRE was performed
pursuant to the standards then in effect and the process did not violate any vested or
constitutional right of Claimant.
      Claimant’s challenges to the constitutionality of Act 111 do not succeed, and we
affirm the Board.

                                              ______________________________
                                              STACY WALLACE, Judge

                                          6
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Keith Stanley,                        :
                           Petitioner : No. 1234 C.D. 2022
                                      :
           v.                         :
                                      :
Department of Transportation          :
(Workers’ Compensation Appeal         :
Board),                               :
                          Respondent :

                                  ORDER

      AND NOW, this 11th day of January 2024, the October 12, 2022 order of the
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

                                      ______________________________
                                      STACY WALLACE, Judge