Court Opinion

ID: 9552836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:18:07.528392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:10.676851
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The certification process which brings this issue to this court is permissive rather than mandatory. In re Elliott, 74 Wn.2d 600, 446 P.2d 347 *442(1968). However, since we have certified the subject issue, I will endeavor to answer the certified question.
I do not agree with the majority's holding that "assumption of the risk" is a damage-reducing factor in South v. A. B. Chance Company, Supreme Court cause No. 48136-9.
At the time the cause of action in the subject case arose, the assumption of risk defense did not apply to products liability cases either for the purpose of establishing liability or as a factor to reduce damages. This is unlike ordinary negligence cases wherein assumption of risk has traditionally been applied both to the issues of liability and damages. Therefore, I dissent.
The majority cites the recently enacted products liability law, section 8 of chapter 27, Laws of 1981, as mandating that comparative negligence is a damage-reducing device rather them a bar to recovery. This may be true for cases arising after the effective date of this law, but the provisions of this law just recently became effective. Therefore, the majority erred in applying its provisions to this case.
The very recent case of Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wn.2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980), sets out the current Washington law in this complex and ever-changing tort area. In holding that Washington's comparative negligence statute does not apply to causes of action for strict product liability, Justice Dolliver noted that our form of strict liability is based on a no-fault concept. Seay, at 323. See also Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wn.2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978); Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wn.2d 149, 155, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wn.2d 145, 147-49, 542 P.2d 774 (1975); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
The Seay court essentially found the concept of fault underlying comparative negligence, which focuses on the conduct of an individual, to be incompatible with the concept of strict liability, which focuses on the nature of the product and the consumer's reasonable expectation with regard to that product. Seay, at 322. While Seay was not an *443assumption of risk case, the basic reasoning is equally applicable in cases involving assumption of risk defenses. If the concept of fault has no place in strict liability cases, fault as embodied in the assumption of risk defense is as inappropriate as comparative negligence.
The heavy burden of proof of assumption of risk in products liability cases suggests the difficulties of combining concepts of negligence and strict liability. Washington law requires proof that the plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a known danger to show assumption of risk. Berry v. Coleman Sys. Co., 23 Wn. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365 (1979); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn.2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969). The burden of proving assumption of risk under this test is rarely met in products liability cases in Washington.
The assumption of risk defense is a fault concept and should not be applied in no-fault products liability cases. I find the Seay case persuasive and controlling. For that reason, I must dissent.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Dore, J.