Court Opinion

ID: 9692126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:43:26.254964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:30.794081
License: Public Domain

ROBERT L. BROWN, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result but write separately to express why I believe the circuit judge had jurisdiction of this matter. As the majority notes, the general rule subscribed to by this court is that once a valid judgment is put into execution, the circuit judge is without jurisdiction to modify or amend it. See, e.g., Gavin v. State, 354 Ark. 425, 125 S.W.3d 189 (2003). In my opinion, what separates this case from the general rule is the fact that the judgment was conditioned on Green’s trial court testimony and that condition was not satisfied. In People v. Collins, 45 Cal.App.4th 849, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 367 (1996), which involved a similar fact situation and issue, the California Court of Appeals concluded: The relevant question is not whether the trial court had jurisdiction to reconsider the sentence imposed but, rather, whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider a motion to vacate a judgment that was specifically conditioned upon the validity of a plea bargain agreement which, in turn, was expressly conditioned upon defendant’s truthfulness. 112M at 374. Likewise, in the instant case, the relevant question is not whether the circuit judge has jurisdiction to modify or amend a valid sentence once imposed. Rather, the question is whether a circuit judge has jurisdiction to vacate a conditional judgment, and, specifically, one that is conditioned upon the parties’ future compliance with the terms of a plea agreement, when that condition is not met. Here, Green’s judgment was conditioned upon the terms of his plea agreement with the State, which, in turn, was conditioned upon Green fully cooperating with the State and testifying against his father, Billy Green. When Green failed to abide by the terms of his plea agreement, the condition supporting his judgment failed, and the judgment became invalid. Because of this, the circuit judge did not violate the general rule that a valid judgment once executed may not be amended. Two additional points support what I consider to be an exception to the general rule. The rationale and policy behind the general rule is that a circuit judge’s attempt to extend a defendant’s sentence, after a sentence is put into execution, implicates double jeopardy considerations, see Emerson v. Boyles, 170 Ark. 621, 280 S.W. 1005 (1926), while an attempt to reduce a defendant’s sentence, once put into execution, infringes upon the clemency power of the executive branch, see Coones v. State, 280 Ark. 321, 657 S.W.2d 553 (1983). In the case before us, the circuit judge is not attempting either to extend or reduce [1sGreen’s punishment, but rather he is ruling on the validity of his conditional judgment, where the condition has not been satisfied. Under these facts, the rationale behind the general rule is not implicated. Additionally, as the majority notes, under the terms of a plea agreement, both the defendant and the State bargain for and receive a benefit. The reciprocal nature of plea agreements mandates that each party have the right to enforce the agreement when deprived of the benefit of their bargain. See Collins, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d at 374. Were a circuit judge unable to hold a party to the terms of its plea bargain, this would undermine the entire judicial process regarding plea agreements. In this connection, it is axiomatic that courts have inherent authority to protect the integrity of the judicial process. See U.S. v. Britt, 917 F.2d 353, 355 n. 2 (8th Cir.1990); Valley v. Phillips County Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 183 S.W.3d 557 (2004). For these reasons, I believe the circuit judge had subject-matter jurisdiction of this matter, and I would affirm.