Court Opinion

ID: 2963726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:14:19.10487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:29.405468
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                                     
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1193

                            RICARDO CALERO-COLON, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                       ISMAEL BETANCOURT-LEBRON, ETC., ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                   [Hon. Daniel R. Dominguez, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                        Selya,

                                    Cyr and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                                     
                                 ____________________

             Jose  A. Pagan Nieves, with  whom Elisa A.  Fumero Perez, Jose A.
             _____________________             ______________________  _______
        Pagan Nieves Law Offices and Nector  Robles Abraham were on brief  for
        ________________________     ______________________
        appellants.
             Lorraine  J. Riefkohl,  Assistant  Solicitor  General, with  whom
             _____________________
        Carlos  Lugo-Fiol,  Solicitor  General, and  Jacqueline  Novas-Debien,
        _________________                            ________________________
        Deputy Solicitor General, were on brief for appellees.

                                                     
                                 ____________________

                                   October 17, 1995
                                                     
                                 ____________________

                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.   Ricardo  Calero-Col n ("Calero")
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          and  Eric Robles-Abraham  ("Robles") challenge  a district  court

          ruling dismissing  their civil rights  action under  42 U.S.C.   

          1983  for failure  to  state a  claim  upon which  relief  may be

          granted.   See Fed. R. Civ.  P. 12(b)(6).  As  the district court
                     ___

          incorrectly  concluded  that their  claims  were time-barred,  we

          vacate the judgments and remand for further proceedings. 

                                          I
                                          I

                                     BACKGROUND1
                                     BACKGROUND
                                     __________

                    On  February 9,  1993,  Calero  commenced  this  action

          against  various police  officers of  the Commonwealth  of Puerto

          Rico  and their confidential informants.  Robles followed suit on

          November 2, 1993, and the cases  were consolidated.  At the heart

          of  both  complaints  are  allegations  that Jos   Crespo-Guill n

          ("Crespo")    an undercover  Puerto Rico police officer     and a

          confidential informant named Rosa, persuaded certain Commonwealth

          authorities to provide front money for undercover drug buys which

          never  were intended to take place.  The complaints asserted that

          Crespo and Rosa falsely identified appellants as the "sellers" in

          two  concocted  undercover  drug  buys,  thereby  causing  arrest

          warrants to issue against each.  Calero was arrested on August 1,

          1990, and Robles  on March  20, 1992, for  allegedly selling  one

          ounce of cocaine to Crespo.  On July 1, 1992,  Calero was acquit-
                              
          ____________________

               1Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are reviewed under the rubric that
          all reasonable inferences from well-pleaded facts are to be drawn
          in  appellants' favor.  P rez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guill n, 25 F.3d 40,
                                  __________    ______________
          42 (1st Cir. 1994). 

                                          2

          ted; Robles was acquitted on July 2, 1993.  

                    Although  both  Calero  and  Robles   maintained  their

          innocence  from  the moment  of  their  respective arrests,  each

          claims that he  did not know  the true nature  and extent of  the

          scheme that led to the arrest  until after he had been acquitted.

          In  all events,  within  months of  their respective  acquittals,

          Calero and  Robles initiated lawsuits alleging  violations of the

          Fourth and  Fourteenth Amendments to the  United States Constitu-

          tion  and violations of Puerto Rico law.  Shortly thereafter, the

          appellees moved to  dismiss on  the ground that  the claims  were

          time-barred. 

                    The district court  deemed appellants' claims analogous

          to  the common law torts  of false arrest  and malicious prosecu-

          tion.  It found that the one-year limitation borrowed from Puerto

          Rico  law  barred their  respective  false  arrest claims,  which

          accrued at the  dates of arrest.2  Although the  court ruled that

          their "malicious prosecution"  type claims were not  time-barred,

          it  held them  not actionable  under section  1983, whether  on a

          substantive or procedural  due process theory.   See Albright  v.
                                                           ___ ________

          Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807  (1994) (refusing to recognize substantive
          ______

          due  process right  to  be free  from  prosecution not  based  on

                              
          ____________________

               2See  Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992),
                ___  ________    ______
          aff'd on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994); Johnson v. Johnson
          ______________________                         _______    _______
          County Comm'n. Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th Cir. 1991); Rose v.
          __________________                                        ____
          Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 1989); McCune v. City of Grand
          ______                                    ______    _____________
          Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907  (6th Cir. 1988); Davis v. Harvey,  789
          ______                                      _____    ______
          F.2d 1332, 1333  n.1 (9th Cir.  1986); Singleton v.  City of  New
                                                 _________     ____________
          York,  632 F.2d 185, 191  (2d Cir. 1980),  cert. denied, 450 U.S.
          ____                                       _____ ______
          920 (1981).

                                          3

          probable  cause); P rez-Ruiz,  25  F.3d at  43 (commonwealth  law
                            __________

          affords  adequate  post-deprivation  remedy  for  "procedural due

          process" type "malicious prosecution" claims).  As no trialworthy

          federal claims remained, the pendent commonwealth law claims were

          dismissed without  prejudice pursuant to 28  U.S.C.   1367(c)(3).

          See Figuera Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645, 650 (1st Cir. 1990).  
          ___ ____________    _______

                                          II
                                          II

                                     DISCUSSION3
                                     DISCUSSION
                                     __________

          A.  Applicable Limitation Period
          A.  Applicable Limitation Period
              ____________________________

                    Section 1983 creates "a  species of tort liability" for

          redressing deprivations  of federal constitutional rights.   Heck
                                                                       ____

          v.  Humphrey,  114 S.  Ct.  2364,  2370  (1994) (quoting  Memphis
              ________                                              _______

          Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986)).  The
          ____________________    ________

          limitation period governing personal injury actions under the law

          of  the forum state is  borrowed for application  to section 1983

          claims.  Wilson v.  Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80  (1985); Guzman-
                   ______     ______                                _______

          Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994).   The one-
          ______    ___________

          year limitation period prescribed in Article 1868(2) of the Civil

          Code  of Puerto Rico,  P.R. Laws Ann. tit.  31,   5298(2) (1991),

          governs these section 1983 claims. 

          B.  Accrual Rules Governing Section 1983 Claims
          B.  Accrual Rules Governing Section 1983 Claims
              ___________________________________________

                    The question  before us is  whether appellants  brought

          their section  1983 claims within the  applicable one-year period

                              
          ____________________

               3We  review Rule  12(b)(6)  dismissals de  novo.   Clarke v.
                                                      __  ____    ______
          Kentucky Fried  Chicken of Cal.,  Inc., 57 F.3d  21, 22 n.1  (1st
          ______________________________________
          Cir. 1995).  

                                          4

          prescribed by Puerto  Rico law.  The dispute  focuses on when the

          one  year began  to run;  in other  words, when  their respective

          causes of  action accrued.   Federal law provides  the applicable

          accrual rule.  Guzman-Rivera, 29 F.3d at 4-5.  
                         _____________

                    Section 1983 claims accrue when the plaintiff "knows or

          has  reason to  know of  the  injury which  is the  basis of  the

          action."  Street v. Vose, 936 F.3d 38, 40 (1st  Cir. 1992) (quot-
                    ______    ____

          ing  Torres v. Superintendent of  Police, 893 F.2d  404, 407 (1st
               ______    _________________________

          Cir. 1990)).  For purposes of determining when a claimant knew or

          had  reason to know of the alleged  injury, we look to the common

          law cause of action most  closely analogous to the constitutional

          right at stake.   Heck, 114 S. Ct.  at 2371.  As the  elements in
                            ____

          any  species of section 1983 "tort" are ordained by its constitu-

          tional prototype, we first identify the particular constitutional

          right  allegedly infringed.  See  Albright v. Oliver,  114 S. Ct.
                                       ___  ________    ______

          807, 811 (1994).  

                    These  complaints specifically  state that  Puerto Rico

          police officers arrested Calero and  Robles pursuant to a warrant

          predicated  on false  allegations  by  Crespo  and Rosa.    Thus,

          appellants' section  1983 claims  directly  implicate both  their

          Fourth  Amendment right to be free  from any unreasonable seizure

          of  their persons, see Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502-03
                             ___ ______    ________

          (3d  Cir. 1993)  (discussing Fourth  Amendment standards  in case

          involving arrest  based on warrant), and  their Fourteenth Amend-

          ment  right  to be  free  from criminal  prosecution  without due

                                          5

          process of law.4  

                              
          ____________________

               4Appellants have not appealed from the district court ruling
          dismissing  their Fourteenth Amendment claims.  See supra, pp. 3-
                                                          ___ _____
          4.

                                          6

                    The district  court found the Fourteenth  Amendment due

          process claims  more closely analogous  to the tort  of malicious

          prosecution, but  that the  Fourth Amendment claims  more closely

          resembled  the  common law  tort of  false  arrest.   Even though

          malicious  prosecution5  and  false  arrest6  may  seem  distinct

          enough in abstract definition, however, in a wrongful arrest case

             particularly an arrest  conducted pursuant to a  warrant based
             ____________ __ ______  _________ ________ __ _  _______ _____

          on  false allegations     the  lines between  the two  may become
          __  _____ ___________

          blurred.   In  the present  case, we  believe appellants'  Fourth

          Amendment  claims more  closely resemble the  common law  tort of

          malicious prosecution as well.7  

                    The  Supreme Court has noted that  the common law cause

          of action for malicious prosecution, unlike false arrest, permits

                              
          ____________________

               5Generally speaking, in order to state a cause of action for
          malicious prosecution, a claimant  must allege: (1) the commence-
          _________ ___________
          ment or continuation  of a criminal  proceeding by the  defendant
          against  the plaintiff; (2) the termination  of the proceeding in
          favor  of the accused; (3) the  absence of probable cause for the
          criminal proceeding; and (4) actual malice.  Landrigan v. City of
                                                       _________    _______
          Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 745 n.6 (1st Cir. 1980). 
          _______

               6Typically, the elements of a false arrest claim are said to
                                             _____ ______
          be that: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff; (2)
          the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement; (3) the plaintiff
          did  not consent to the confinement; and (4) the defendant had no
          privilege to cause the confinement.  See Restatement  (Second) Of
                                               ___
          Torts    35, 118 cmt.  b (1965).  Neither actual malice  nor lack
          of probable cause is an element of false arrest. 

               7Although  there is no  substantive due process  right to be
          free from  malicious prosecution, see P rez-Ruiz, 25  F.3d at 42,
                                            ___ __________
          the Supreme  Court has held  that a "malicious  prosecution" type
          claim may be actionable  under the Fourth Amendment in  a section
          1983  action.  Albright, 114 S.  Ct. at 813.   See also Malley v.
                         ________                        ___ ____ ______
          Briggs,  475  U.S. 335  (1986)  (discussing  liability of  police
          ______
          officer  who  allegedly  applied  for  arrest  warrants,  without
          probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment).  

                                          7

          damages  for confinement pursuant to legal process.  Heck, 114 S.
                                                               ____

          Ct. at 2371.   The interest at stake  in a malicious  prosecution

          claim  is the  right  to be  free  from deprivations  of  liberty

          interests caused  by  unjustifiable criminal  charges and  proce-

          dures.  In contrast, false arrests  infringe upon the right to be

          free from  restraints on bodily  movement.8  The  remedies avail-

          able  in the two tort  actions mirror the  different interests at

          stake.    Damages for  false arrest  are  restricted to  the time

          period between  the initial detention  and the issuance  of legal

          process, whereas the  tort of malicious prosecution  contemplates

          general  damages  as well  as  compensation  for any  arrest  and

          imprisonment preceding  the termination of  the criminal proceed-

          ing.  Id.   
                ___

                    The  critical  inquiry  that   distinguishes  malicious

          prosecution from false arrest  in the present context is  whether

          the arrests  were made pursuant to  a warrant.  Singer  v. Fulton
                                                          ______     ______

          County Sheriff, No. 94-9093, 1995 WL 470283, at *5  (2d Cir. Aug.
          ______________

          9, 1995).   As a general  rule, an unlawful arrest  pursuant to a

          warrant will be more closely analogous  to the common law tort of

          malicious prosecution.    An  arrest  warrant  constitutes  legal

          process, and it is the tort of malicious prosecution that permits

          damages  for confinement pursuant to legal process.  On the other

          hand, wrongful warrantless arrests typically resemble the tort of

          false arrest.  Id.  
                         ___
                              
          ____________________

               8For a cogent  discussion of  the two torts  in the  section
          1983 context, see  Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff,  No. 94-9093,
                             ______    _____________________
          1995 WL 470283 (2d Cir. Aug. 9, 1995). 

                                          8

                    For the foregoing reasons, we hold that    for purposes

          of determining  the appropriate accrual  rule    both  the Fourth

          and Fourteenth Amendment claims  more closely resemble the common

          law tort  of  malicious prosecution.   Consequently,  appellants'

          section 1983 claims did not accrue until  their respective crimi-

          nal prosecutions ended in acquittals.  Heck, 114 S.  Ct. at 2371;
                                                 ____

          Guzman-Rivera, 29 F.3d at 5.  
          _____________

                    All  that remains is to apply the accrual rule.  Calero

          was acquitted on July 1, 1992.  Well within the  one-year limita-

          tion    on February 9, 1993     he commenced the present  action.

          Similarly, Robles was acquitted on July 2, 1993, and brought suit

          on  November 2, 1993.   Thus, their  section 1983 claims  are not

          time-barred. 

                                         III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    In  sum, reference  to  common law  tort principles  is

          appropriate in identifying  the most suitable rule of accrual for

          application  to section 1983  claims, always bearing  in mind the

          legislative aims which Congress sought to advance by establishing

          a  federal  forum for  redressing deprivations  of constitutional

          rights.   Cf. Wyatt v. Cole, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1831 (1992) (noting
                    __  _____    ____

          that  common law  immunities  are not  necessarily applicable  to

          section  1983 claims).   Accordingly,  the essential  elements of

          actionable section 1983 claims derive first and foremost from the

          Constitution itself,  not necessarily  from the  analogous common

          law  tort.   See Graham  v. Connor,  490 U.S. 386,  394-97 (1989)
                       ___ ______     ______

                                          9

          (analyzing  excessive force  claim under  Fourth Amendment  stan-

          dards).  Consequently, on remand Calero and Robles must establish

          that their  respective Fourth  Amendment rights were  violated by

          one  or more appellees.   See, e.g., Lippay,  996 F.2d at 1502-03
                                    ___  ____  ______

          (discussing  one theory  of  liability for  violating the  Fourth

          Amendment).

                    The district court judgments  are vacated, and the case
                    ___ ________ _____ _________  ___ _______  ___ ___ ____

          is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
          __ ________ ___ _______ ___________ __________ ____ ____ ________

          Costs are awarded to appellants.  
          _____ ___ _______ __ __________

                            - Concurring Opinion Follows -

                                          10

                    LYNCH, Circuit  Judge, concurring.  I  write separately
                    LYNCH, Circuit  Judge, concurring
                           __________________________

          to stress my understanding that  in Fourth Amendment claims under

            1983 arising out of a warrantless arrest the statute of limita-

          tions  may typically, but does  not necessarily, begin  to run at
                                              ___________

          the time of arrest.

                    There  may be circumstances in which plaintiffs neither

          knew, nor  had reason to know,  at the time  of their warrantless

          arrests that they had suffered a constitutional injury and so the

          statute  would  not begin  to run  upon  arrest.   Similarly, the

          arrest may  lead to  a chain  of events  leading  to a  different

          characterization of  the entire  constitutional injury, and  so a

          different accrual date.  See Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d  649,
                                       ________    _______

          654-55 (10th Cir. 1990).  That the common law of false arrest has

          often  been interpreted to establish that the common law cause of

          action accrues upon the  arrest1 does not answer the  question of

          the  accrual date  for    1983 actions.    The Supreme  Court  in

          Albright v. Oliver,  114 S.  Ct. 807 (1994),  and earlier  cases,
          ________    ______

          see,  e.g., Graham  v.  Connor, 490  U.S.  386, 395  (1989),  has
          ___   ____  ______      ______

          instructed  federal  courts to  look to  the  true nature  of the

          constitutional claims being asserted, rejecting labels.  

                    As Judge Cyr's very  thoughtful opinion states:  "[t]he

          essential elements of actionable section 1983 claims derive first

          and foremost  from the Constitution itself,  not necessarily from

          the analogous common law tort."    Accordingly, the law does not,

                              
          ____________________

               1But see Justice Ginsburg's  views in her concurring opinion
          in Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 814-817 (1994).  
             ________    ______

                                          11

          I believe, bind the  accrual date for the constitutional  tort in

          warrantless  arrests inevitably  and  invariably to  the date  of

          arrest.  The  case of a warrantless arrest is  not before us, and

          no more now need be said.

                                          12