Court Opinion

ID: 9637761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:19:11.265961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:00.262804
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
dissenting.
The instant case is Judith Hersbey’s appeal from the order, entered April 16, 1991, granting Ninety-Five Associates’ motion for summary judgment.1 This action stems from a sexual assault perpetrated by an unknown assailant on appellant while she was employed by appellees’ hotel. Ninety-Five Associates’ first summary judgment motion, claiming that appellant’s common law action against them was barred by the Workmen’s Compensation statute, was denied by Judge Anthony Semeraro on June 20, 1990. Thereafter, the case was transferred to Judge J.K. Barclay Surrick, who upon motion of Ninety-Five Associates, reconsidered and granted the motion for summary judgment on April 16, 1991. Finding that the grant of summary judgment was improper in this case, I dissent from the majority’s disposition.
This action developed from the following factual scenario. On April 9, 1987, at approximately 6:40 a.m., Ms. Hershey was working as a night auditor at a Howard Johnson Hotel owned and operated by appellees. Her responsibilities included adding up daily receipts and counting money. As she was standing behind the desk counting money from the cash drawer, the assailant leaped over the counter, grabbed Ms. Hershey by her hair, placed a razor at her throat, and *164dragged her into a back office. The assailant struck appellant repeatedly and attempted to remove her clothing. Ms. Hershey was ultimately able to escape the assailant. However, before fleeing the scene the assailant removed money from the cash register. Appellant neither knew nor had ever before seen her assailant at the time of the attack.
Appellant argues that the attack was motivated by personal animus toward her, which removes this incident from the scope of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 1 et seq., and entitles her to a private cause of action against appellees. Appellant’s argument for a private cause of action is also based on her allegation of appellees’ negligence, which resulted in her assailant’s opportunity for attack. On the other hand, appellees argue that the attack was prompted by the assailant’s intention to rob the hotel, that it occurred in the course of Ms. Hershey’s employment, and therefore worker’s compensation is the exclusive remedy.
The benchmark for review of summary judgment actions is that summary judgment is properly granted only where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A.; Marks v. Tasman, 527 Pa. 132, 136-138, 589 A.2d 205, 207 (1991). The record is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the non-mover. Id. In the case at bar, I find that there is a genuine issue of material fact relating to the attacker’s motivation; I cannot conclude from the pleadings herein that Ms. Hershey’s cause of action is barred by the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Appellant’s amended complaint states that:
5. On or about April 9,1987, Plaintiff, Judith Hershey, was working as a clerk for Defendant at the Howard Johnson executive hotel. At approximately 6:45 a.m. on *165April 9, 1987, an unidentified male jumped over the counter in the hotel section of the Howard Johnson executive Hotel and he then proceeded to strike Plaintiff and force her into a back office where he attempted to rape and/or otherwise sexually assault Plaintiff.
6. The injury to Judith Hershey resulted from the acts of an unidentified male which was personal to her and, a result of the personal animosity of her assailant and, said actions did not result from the relationship of her employment.
7. At the time of the aforesaid attack, Plaintiff, Judith Hershey was alone on the first floor of the aforesaid building and the doors to said area were unlocked and open to the public at the instructions of defendant, Blair Mahoney, individually and on behalf of Ninety-Five Associates.
******
9. Defendants knew or should have known that a prior attack occurred at the Hotel on or about February 12, 1987 and that other crimes had taken place on the premises in the period leading up to April 9, 1987.
(Emphasis added.)
In addition, it is not disputed that appellant was employed by appellees on the date the attack occurred. Both parties’ versions of the facts as set forth in their respective briefs are substantially alike; thus, there appears to be no dispute concerning the events of that day. The contention between the parties centers around the interpretation of the statutory provisions regarding injuries caused by a third party in the workplace. Initially, we note that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is ordinarily the exclusive means of compensation for injuries sustained in the workplace. Based on a “trade-off” theory, the Act provides certain compensation in return for the employer’s immunity from suit by employees. 77 P.S. §§ 481(a), 1403; Brooks v. Marriott Corp., 361 Pa.Super. 350, 353, 522 A.2d 618, 619-620 (1987). However, this blanket immunity is subject to exceptions mandated by *166the Pennsylvania legislature, one of which is the genesis of the instant controversy.
Specifically, 77 P.S. § 411, defines “Injury,” “personal injury,” and “injury arising in the course of employment:”
(1) ... [T]he term ‘injury arising in the course of his employment’ as used in this article shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe or because of his employment; but shall include all other injuries sustained while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the employer.
(Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, we have held that
[a]n employee is permitted to maintain a common law cause of action against his employer whenever his or her injury is the result of an attack or assault by a third person or fellow employee for reasons that are personal to the attacker and not connected with the victim’s employment. To fit within this exception, the third party’s or fellow employee’s act must have been motivated by his animosity against the injured employee. If the third party would have attacked a different person in the same position as the injured employee, the attack falls outside the “third party attack” exception.
Vosburg v. Connolly, 405 Pa.Super. 121, 126-127, 591 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1991), citing Brooks v. Marriott Corp., 361 Pa.Super. 350, 355-356, 522 A.2d 618, 621 (1987). See also Dolan v. Linton’s Lunch, 397 Pa. 114, 152 A.2d 887 (1959).
Pursuant to our case and statutory law on third-party injuries, I find that there exists a genuine issue of fact concerning the applicability of the Workmen’s Compensation Act to this case. Clearly, robbery is related to a business entity’s business purpose, and would bar a private cause of action by an employee. Such a simple analysis, however, is inappropriate under the circumstances of this case.
*167There was evidence on the record which supports appellant’s allegation that the attack was unrelated to appellant’s employee status or the hotel’s business purpose. Appellant testified at her deposition that when the assailant leaped over the counter, the cash drawer containing two to three hundred dollars was open and in plain view. (Deposition Transcript at 26.) Rather than robbing the hotel of the money clearly available to him at that moment, the assailant grabbed appellant by her hair and put a razor to her throat. He proceeded then to drag her, away from the desk and the money, to back offices, where he punched appellant’s face and threw her against office furniture. The assailant continued beating appellant while he was removing her clothing. Eventually, the assailant was distracted by a noise and pulled appellant back toward the front desk. Once there, he knocked appellant to the floor and kicked her face. When appellant finally had an opportunity to escape, the assailant followed her, grabbing a handful of her hair. (D.T. at 29-31.) While in her presence, the assailant never took money from the open cash drawer. Only after the assault was over did appellant have any notice of a robbery. (D.T. at 31.)
I find that appellant’s allegations and the inferences which may be drawn from them fairly set forth a cause of action under the third-party exception of 77 Pa.C.S. § 411(1). I would reverse the grant of summary judgment entered by the lower court.