Court Opinion

ID: 9615590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:38:42.06367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:49.389033
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
concurring only in affirming the conviction.
As I noted in State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (# 14771) (June 22, 1984), proportionality in death sentencing as once mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States, would be a dead issue other than for the fact that it is required by our Idaho statutory law which is a byproduct of those remarkable decisions of the High Court which served to destroy what in Idaho had been a fair and constitutional system of capital sentencing. It is not easy to rationalize the sentence which was here imposed, as compared to the sentence in State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982), both at the hands of the same district judge, who had before him defendants convicted of senseless and callous murders. Nor is it readily discerned that there is proportionality in the sentence meted out to McKinney, as compared to the lesser sentence awarded Dovey Small, also convicted of the same murder. The State of Idaho agrees, and in her case, 107 Idaho 504, 690 P.2d 1336 (# 14701), in this Court, argues that she, too, should be handed the death sentence.
*187The defendant’s main premise in this case is the injustice of the sentence. A jury, in all likelihood, would have imposed like sentences, and in that manner, not only would the requirements of the Idaho Constitution have been fulfilled, but there would be a return to the only semblance of proportionality which is realistically attainable. I point to that which Justice Black-mun, writing for the High Court in Spaziano v. Florida, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340(1984), pointed out:
“Petitioner’s primary argument is that the laws and practice in most of the States indicate a nearly unanimous recognition that juries, not judges, are better equipped to make reliable capital-sentencing decisions and that a jury’s decision for life should be inviolate. The reason for that recognition, petitioner urges, is that the nature of the decision whether a defendant should live or die sets capital sentencing apart and requires that a jury have the ultimate word. Noncapital sentences are imposed for various reasons, including rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence. In contrast, the primary justification for the death penalty is retribution. As has been recognized, ‘the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.’ [Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, at 184 [96 S.Ct. 2909, at 2930, 49 L.Ed.2d 859] (1976)]. The imposition of the death penalty, in other words, is an expression of community outrage. Since the jury serves as the voice of the community, the jury is in the best position to decide whether a particular crime is so heinous that the community’s response must be death. If the answer is no, that decision should be final.” (at---, 104 S.Ct. at 3163)
In footnote 8 of that opinion he adds that “we have no particular quarrel with the proposition that juries, perhaps, are more capable of making the life-or-death decision in a capital case...,” and in footnote 9 categorizes Idaho as being among the four states where “the court alone imposes the sentence.” If but one more member of this Court would remember a justice’s sworn obligation to uphold the Constitution of the state of Idaho, that number would be reduced to three. See, dissenting opinion of Bistline, J., and Huntley, J., in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983).