Court Opinion

ID: 9402300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 16:14:38.482052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.932644
License: Public Domain

J-A12008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: L.S.C.-P., A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: H.C.-O., FATHER                 :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 3135 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Decree Entered November 22, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at
                        No(s): CP-51-AP-0000074-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                  FILED JUNE 15, 2023

       Appellant, H.C.-O., (“Father”) appeals from the November 22, 2022

decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that

terminated his parental rights to his dependent child, L.S.C.-P., a female child

born June 2019, (“the child”) pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act,

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938. We affirm.

       The record demonstrates that, on February 12, 2021, the Philadelphia

Department of Human Services - Children and Youth Division (“DHS”) filed a

petition for involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). DHS filed an amended

petition pursuant to the same provisions on March 23, 2022.1 Jason Ross
____________________________________________

1 Both the original and amended petitions requested termination of the
parental rights of R.D.P., the biological mother of the child, (“Mother”)
J-A12008-23

Kleinman, Esquire (“Attorney Kleinman”) was appointed as guardian ad litem

to represent the legal and best interests of the child. Jay Steven Stillman,

Esquire (“Attorney Stillman”) was appointed to represent Father, and Michael

John Graves, Jr., Esquire (“Attorney Graves”) was appointed to represent

Mother. DHS was represented by Erin Maloney, Esquire (“Attorney Maloney”),

an attorney with the Philadelphia Solicitor’s Office. On August 9, 2022, and

November 22, 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing on the termination

petition and the petition for goal change, in which the aforementioned counsel

participated.2 N.T., 11/22/22, at 5. Father attended both hearings.3

____________________________________________

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).           On
November 22, 2022, in a separate decree, the trial court terminated Mother’s
parental rights to the child. Mother did not participate in the instant appeal.

2 An evidentiary hearing on the petition for involuntary termination of parental
rights was continued several times after the trial court determined that
continuances were “best suited to the protection and physical, mental[,] and
moral welfare of the child.” Trial Court Order, 5/11/21; see also Trial Court
Order, 8/11/21; Trial Court Order, 12/8/21; Trial Court Order 2/23/22.

A final continuance was granted on February 23, 2022, to afford DHS an
opportunity to file an amended petition for involuntary termination of parental
rights. The amended petition included averments that Mother’s and Father’s
last known addresses were the same residence, as well as a revised Exhibit A
(statement of facts). Compare Amended Petition for Involuntary Termination
of Parental Rights, 3/23/22, at ¶¶3-4, Exhibit A, with Petition for Involuntary
Termination of Parental Rights, 2/12/21, at ¶¶3-4, Exhibit A.

3 The record reveals that Mother joined the August 9, 2022 hearing after it
began, N.T., 8/9/22, at 30, and left the proceeding before it concluded, Id. at
89. Mother did not attend the November 22, 2022 hearing. N.T., 11/22/22,
at 3-5.

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       On November 22, 2022, the trial court found that DHS met its burden

of proof under Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) of the

Adoption Act, and subsequently terminated Father’s parental rights to the

child. The trial court also granted DHS’s request to change the permanent

placement goal to one of adoption with regard to the child.          This appeal

followed.4

       Father raises the following issues for our review:

       1.     Whether the trial court erred in terminating [Father’s]
              parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§ ]2511(a)(1), the
              evidence having been insufficient to establish [Father]
              evidenced a settled purpose of [relinquishing his] parental
              claim, or having refused or failed to perform parental
              duties[?]

       2.     Whether the [] evidence was sufficient to establish that
              [Father] refused or failed to perform parental duties, caused
              [the child] to be without essential parental care, that
              conditions having led to placement [] continued to exist, or
              finally that any of above could not have been remedied
              []under [] 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§§ ]2511(a)(2), 2511(a)(5), and
              2511(a)(8)[?]

       3.     Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that
              termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
              and welfare of the [child] under 23 Pa.C.S.[A. § ]2511(b)[?]

       4.     Moreover, under [S]ections 2511(a)(1), 2511(a)(2),
              2511(a)(5), 2511(a)(8), and 2511(b), whether the
              termination of [Father’s] parental rights pursuant to the

____________________________________________

4 Father filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant
to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a)(2)(i), along with his
notice of appeal on December 14, 2022. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on January 11, 2023.

                                           -3-
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            aforemention[ed] is contrary to the [] weight of the
            evidence[?]

Father’s Brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization and footnote omitted).

      Father’s issues, in toto, challenge the trial court’s termination of his

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511 of the Adoption Act.        In matters

involving termination of parental rights, our standard of review is well-settled.

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
      2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
      review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or
      abused its discretion.” Id. “A decision may be reversed for an
      abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill[-]will.” Id.
      The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
      because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827.
      We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
      often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
      multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa.
      2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (original brackets omitted). “[T]he

trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and

is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in

the evidence.” In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). “If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re B.J.Z.,

207 A.3d 914, 921 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

                                      -4-
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      The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis of the grounds for

termination followed by an assessment of the needs and welfare of the child.

      Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the [trial]
      court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
      parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
      The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
      for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the [trial]
      court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination
      of his or her parental rights does the [trial] court engage in the
      second     part   of     the     analysis    pursuant    to    Section
      2511(b)[ - ]determination of the needs and welfare of the child
      under the standard of best interests of the child. One major
      aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
      status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close
      attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing
      any such bond.

B.J.Z., 207 A.3d at 921 (citation omitted).        We have defined clear and

convincing evidence as that which is “so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable the trier[-]of[-]fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d

1108, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).       A child has a right to a

stable, safe, and healthy environment in which to grow, and the “child's life

simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the

ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 9

(Pa. Super. 2009).

                                      -5-
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      Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to the child

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8). Section 2511(a)

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

              § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

      (a)   General rule. - The rights of a parent in regard to a child
            may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
            following grounds:

         (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
         six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
         either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
         parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform
         parental duties.

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
         neglect[,] or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
         without essential parental care, control[,] or subsistence
         necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
         conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect[,] or
         refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

                                      ...

         (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
         for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
         to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
         the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
         a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
         reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
         the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         child within a reasonable period of time[,] and termination
         of the parental rights would best serve the needs and
         welfare of the child.

                                      ...

         (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
         by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
         agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
         removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
         removal or placement of the child continue to exist[,] and

                                      -6-
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         termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
         and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8).

      Once the trial court determines that involuntary termination of parental

rights is warranted under Section 2511(a), the trial court is required to engage

in an analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b) to determine whether termination

is in the best interests of the child. Section 2511(b) states,

              § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

                                      ...

      (b) Other considerations. - The court in terminating the
      rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
      developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
      child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
      basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
      furnishings, income, clothing[,] and medical care if found to be
      beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
      filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
      consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
      described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving
      of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The analysis under Section 2511(b)

      focuses on whether termination of parental rights would best
      serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
      welfare of the child. As this Court has explained, [Section]
      2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and the
      term “bond” is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
      however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
      between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
      our analysis. While a parent's emotional bond with his or her child
      is a major aspect of the [Section] 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
      it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
      [trial] court when determining what is in the best interest of the
      child.

                                     -7-
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         In addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
         emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also
         consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security,
         and stability the child might have with the foster parent.
         Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court should
         consider the importance of continuity of relationships and
         whether any existing parent-child bond can be severed
         without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation

and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 183 A.3d 979 (Pa. 2018). A

trial court may rely on a caseworker or social worker to determine the status

of and nature of a parent-child bond. J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 944 (holding, a trial

court “is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding

evaluation be performed by an expert” (citation omitted)); see also In re

C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding, a trial court must

“discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond” (citation

omitted)).

      It is well-established that this Court need only agree with the trial court

as to any one section of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order

to affirm an order or decree involuntarily terminating parental rights. C.D.R.,

111 A.3d at 1215, relying on In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).          Our review of the

certified record confirms that DHS introduced clear and convincing evidence

in support of termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b).

      To terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the

                                      -8-
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     child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more
     from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the
     removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)
     termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
     welfare of the child.        23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Section
     2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to remedy
     the conditions that led to the children's removal by the [trial]
     court. Once the 12-month period has been established, the [trial]
     court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
     child's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good
     faith efforts of [DHS] supplied over a realistic time period.
     Termination under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the [trial]
     court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to
     remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the
     availability or efficacy of [DHS] services.

In re C.B., 230 A.3d 341, 348 (Pa. Super. 2020) (case citations, quotation

marks and original brackets omitted), appeal denied, 234 A.3d 410 (Pa.

2020). “Under Section 2511(a)(8), in determining whether the conditions that

led to removal and placement continue to exist, the relevant inquiry in this

regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied

and[,] thus[,] whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the

time of the hearing.” C.B., 230 A.3d at 348-349 (citation, original quotation

marks, and original brackets omitted).

     With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to
     Sections 2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:

        Initially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the
        parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section
        2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8)
        explicitly requires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare
        of the child” prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which
        focuses on the “developmental, physical[,] and emotional
        needs and welfare of the child.” Thus, the analysis under
        Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in
        addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a

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          [trial] court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
          termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section
          2511(a), does a [trial] court engage in the second part of
          the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of
          the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
          best interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Section
          2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the
          “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
          the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to
          addressing the “needs and welfare” of the child, as
          proscribed by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in
          that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching
          Section 2511(b).

Id. at 349 (citation, original brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).

       In the case sub judice, the trial court explained its reasons for

terminating Father’s parental rights to the child pursuant to Sections

2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b) as follows:5

       By way of background, [the child] has been in care for 40 months.
       The termination petition in this case was filed in February []
       202[1], and an amended [termination petition was filed] in March
       [] 2022. . . .

       With regards to [Section] 2511(a)(1), [i]n the six months
       preceding the filing of [the termination] petition, the [trial] court
       [found] that both [Mother and Father] failed to perform parental
       duties. Prior to commencing Family School[6] in February [] 2022,
       [Mother and Father] did not have in-person visits with the child,
       did not make inquiries into the child’s well-being, did not meet any
____________________________________________

5 Although our decision to affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights
rests upon Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b), we shall incorporate the
entirety of the trial court’s findings pertaining to all of the provisions in Section
2511(a) because of the substantial overlap between these statutory provisions
and the elements of Section 2511(a)(8).

6 “Family School” is a learning environment in which a parent is observed
interacting with his or her child while a coach is present to give instruction to
the parent on how to care for the child. N.T., 8/9/22, at 52-53.

                                          - 10 -
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     of the child’s daily needs, did not make any attempts to do so,
     and[,] in fact, failed to perform parental duties, and that was
     established by clear and convincing evidence by the witnesses
     presented by [DHS.]

     With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(2), [w]ith regard to [Mother,]
     this case [arose] because of [Mother’s] drug and alcohol issues.
     [Mother] has made no attempts throughout [] this case to avail
     herself of the necessary measures to alleviate the drug and alcohol
     concerns.

     With regard to [Father], the [trial] court understands [Father’s]
     arguments regarding the evidence. [Father’s] counsel[ is] correct
     that [Exhibit] DHS 7 [is comprised of] still photo[graphs] of video.
     Regardless of the dates of the video [and the still photographs
     marked as Exhibit] DHS 7, there is no contradiction that [Mother]
     is depicted in the photo[graphs,] which are taken this year, after
     May [] 2022, and throughout the summer, showing [Mother] in
     the vicinity of [Father’s] home.

     Furthermore, there was clear and convincing testimony by
     witnesses that, during two pop-up visits at [Father’s] home,
     [Mother’s] coat and hat, which she has been [observed] wearing
     in court – and it was a distinctive [style] of hat that she has
     [worn] – were present in [Father’s] home.

     On another occasion, it was believed that [Mother] may have been
     in the bathroom of [Father’s] home [during a pop-up visit]. The
     [trial] court did not find [Father’s] testimony credible as to the
     explanation of the person [in the bathroom of his home] or the
     objects [observed] in his home.

     In addition, there was testimony that witnesses saw [Mother]
     waiting outside the courthouse on dates of different hearings.
     Father’s counsel questioned why on earth would he do this
     because he has a daughter. It would not be shocking to the [trial]
     court [if Father] still [harbored] feelings for [Mother.]

     So, despite the creative arguments made by [Father’s] counsel,
     the [trial] court finds that [Father] has not demonstrated an ability
     to care for [the] child. Father has not progressed beyond Family
     School.

     In the document introduced by [Father’s] counsel as Father’s
     Exhibit 8, it is indicated that [Father] has made some progress[.
     Nevertheless,] it was reported by [Father’s Family School] teacher

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     that [Father requires] prompting when it comes to managing
     undesirable behaviors [of the child], using positive strategies
     toward discipline, during the sessions.

     Father has not completed Family School successfully, and has not
     demonstrated an ability to extend beyond the supervised Family
     School setting. That does not mean that [the trial] court thinks
     [Father] poses a specific safety threat to [the child].

     But [Father] has not [demonstrated], through his counsel or by
     any evidence, that he has the ability to care for [the child] and to
     keep [the child] safe.

     With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(5), [i]t has been 40 months.
     Virtually the entire life of [the child], she has been in care.
     [Mother and Father] have been afforded more than a reasonable
     amount of time to demonstrate their ability to care for the child.
     Again, this does not mean that [Father] does not love his child,
     but this child has been in care for well more than six months. It
     has been 40 months.

     And despite the arguments by [Father’s] counsel, it is [the trial]
     court’s job to do, at all times, what is in the best interest of the
     child, and [the trial court hopes] that [Father] can realize that.
     We need to prioritize what is best for [the child] – what would be
     best for her to have permanency, and not to languish in the court
     system, in a dependency proceeding.

     40 months. [T]hat is more than three years. This is one of the
     longest cases that [has remained] open with a child. [Mother and
     Father] have been afforded every opportunity. [The trial court
     does] not fault [Father] for [Mother’s] addictions, but [Father] has
     not demonstrated an ability to care for [the child] independently.

     If [Father] had availed himself sooner to take additional steps, we
     might not be here, but for whatever reasons, that has not
     happened and there were safety threats.

     With regard to [Section] 2511(a)(8), [a]gain, it has been
     40 months. [DHS] met its burden by clear and convincing
     evidence as to this element as well, that more than 12
     months [] elapsed since the removal of the child.

     The conditions which led to the removal, which related to
     [Mother’s] drug and alcohol usage, have not been
     alleviated,  and   [Father]    has  not   independently

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      demonstrated an ability to care for this child, and has not
      progressed beyond [] supervised Family School visits with
      the child.

      And termination would allow this child to be freed for
      adoption and to have permanency in her life, which is in the
      child’s best interest. Father’s counsel is correct that [DHS]
      met its burden under [Section] 2511(a), as well as
      [Section] 2511(b), and [DHS] has done so by clear and
      convincing evidence.

      [Section] 2511(b) relates to the parent-child bond. . . .
      Father has a relationship with the child. The child knows
      who her father is, but does not look to [this bond as a
      parent-child] relationship. [The child] does not look to
      [Father] to meet [] her daily needs or her emotional needs.

      [The child] does not look to [Father] to [meet her] needs[,
      as in a typical] parent-child relationship. Simply knowing
      her father and enjoying time together does not establish
      the existence of a parent-child bond. For these reasons,
      [DHS] has met its burden of proof.

      ...

      With regards to [DHS’s] request to change the goal, [DHS] met
      its burden to show that it would be in the child’s best interest to
      change the goal to adoption. This child has been in a loving home
      since – virtually all of [her] life.

      The child[ has] been provided with appropriate interactions in this
      home, and with the love and care that a child looks to a parent to
      meet for all of this child’s life, and the 40 months that the child
      has been in care.

N.T., 11/22/22, at 110-117 (emphasis added; extraneous capitalization

omitted).

      A review of the record demonstrates that the child was placed in the

care and custody of DHS upon her discharge from the hospital in July 2019

because the child tested positive for illegal substances at birth due to Mother’s

illegal drug use during pregnancy. N.T., 8/9/22, at 11. The child was not

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placed with Father because he still maintained contact with Mother and there

was a concern that Mother was still abusing drugs.       Id. at 31.   The child

continued to be in placement when DHS filed a petition for involuntary

termination of parental rights on February 12, 2021. Thus, at the time the

termination petition was filed, the child had been removed from Father’s

parental care for more than 12 months. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); see also

C.B., 230 A.3d at 348.

        In addition to concerns about Mother’s continued substance abuse and

Father’s continued contact with Mother, other factors which necessitated

placement included mental health issues, lack of parenting skills, and social

isolation and limited social and family support. See Exhibit DHS 3 (Initial CUA

Single Case Plan, 8/12/19, at 7). With a goal of reunification, Father’s single

case plan objectives included, inter alia, participating in supervised visits,

attending and completing Family School, providing proof of housing and

employment, and having no contact with Mother. Id. at 9; see also N.T.,

8/9/22, at 29. The trial court ordered DHS vis-à-vis its community umbrella

agency,7 to conduct weekly “pop-up” visits of Father’s residence to ensure
____________________________________________

7   A “community umbrella agency” (“CUA”) is described as:

        community-based agencies that are responsible for the provision
        of direct case management services to families in their designated
        region. The CUAs ensure that local solutions and resources are
        more accessible to children and families.           They develop
        connections to formal and informal neighborhood networks that
        can strengthen and stabilize families. In addition, they are

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that Father is not in contact with Mother. Trial Court Order, 8/21/19; see

also Trial Court Order, 10/23/19; Trial Court Order, 8/11/19; Trial Court

Order, 12/8/21; Trial Court Order, 2/23/22; N.T., 8/9/22, at 31-33.

       A CUA case manager testified that Father started Family School on

February 16, 2022, but as of the August 9, 2022 termination hearing, has not

completed Family School. N.T., 8/9/22, at 42. The case manager further

stated that, while Father’s home is appropriate for reunification, the child has

not been returned to Father because of continuing concerns Father still

maintains contact with Mother. Id. at 43. The case manager explained that

Father has not provided information regarding plans for the child’s care while

he would be at work, i.e. daycare, if reunification occurred, and the case

manager believes the child would be left with Mother while Father is at work.

Id. When asked how the case manager would “rate” Father’s compliance with

meeting the objectives of his single care plan, the case manager responded,

“substantial” but agreed that “the barrier to reunification would be [Father’s]

ongoing contact with [Mother.]” Id. at 44.

       The case manager observed that, “[d]uring one pop-up visit [to Father’s

residence], there was a jacket and hat on [Father’s] couch, and someone

possibly hiding in a bathroom.” Id. at 37. During a subsequent visit with
____________________________________________

       responsible for recruitment and retention of foster and adoptive
       parents in the neighborhoods where children live.

https://bethanna.org/about/community-umbrella-agency/           (last    visited
6/6/23).

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Mother, the case manager observed Mother “in the same hat that [the case

manager previously] saw on [Father’s] couch.” Id. During another pop-up

visit to Father’s residence, the case manager observed Mother and Father

enter Father’s house and when the case manager knocked on the door of

Father’s house immediately thereafter, no one answered the door. Id. The

notes contained in DHS’s supervisory conference logs,8 as well as several

photographs depicting, inter alia, Mother entering Father’s residence, confirm

that Father continues to maintain contact with Mother.          See Supervisory

Conference Log, 9/25/19 (stating, “[o]n one pop-up visit[, Mother] was at

[Father’s] home but [Father] was not there”); see also Supervisory

Conference Log, 11/25/19 (noting that, “[r]eports have been made that [the

kinship parent observed Father] dropping [Mother off] to appointments”);

Supervisory Conference Log, 4/17/20 (stating, “[kinship parent reported

Mother and Father] are living together again along with [Mother’s] son, his

girlfriend, and their child”); Supervisory Conference Log, 7/16/20 (stating,

“[Mother’s son] has written a letter and sent pictures requesting that [the

child] not be able to return home to her [biological] parents. [Son] believes

the [biological] parents are not fit and will not be able to care for [the child]

if she were to go back home.            Mother is now living with [Father] at his

home.”); Supervisory Conference Log, 11/20/20 (stating, “[t]here is a

____________________________________________

8The supervisory conference logs were admitted, collectively, as Exhibit DHS
4. N.T., 8/9/22, at 16.

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concern that [Mother] is still residing with [Father]”); Supervisory Conference

Log, 3/17/21 (stating, “Mother is still staying with [Father] at his home even

though both have denied it. Mother was recently seen at [Father’s] home and

said she recently just stopped by.”); Supervisory Conference Log, 8/24/21

(stating, “Mother is still believed to be staying with [Father] even though she

is not supposed to. [Father] still claims [Mother] does not live with him and

[that she] has no access [to his residence]. Father was told to change his

locks if [Mother] has a key.”); Exhibit DHS 7; N.T., 8/9/22, at 76-81.

      Father testified that Mother’s son, the son’s girlfriend, and their child

lived with Father as recently as 18 months ago, which would be February

2021. N.T., 8/9/22, at 88-89. Father conceded that Mother came to visit the

son at Father’s residence and would sometimes stay overnight. Id. Father

stated that Mother’s son had a key to the residence but that Father ultimately

made the son, his girlfriend, and their child leave the residence. Id. at 92-93.

Father further conceded that Exhibit DHS 7 is comprised of several

photographs showing Mother entering Father’s residence, but Father states

that he was not home at the time, which suggests that Mother retained

independent access to Father’s residence. Id. at 96. The photographs which

comprise Exhibit DHS 7 were captured on July 7, 2022. See Exhibit DHS 7.

      Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record supports,

that the conditions which led to the removal and placement of the child

continued to exist despite the reasonable good faith efforts by DHS.         23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8); see also C.B., 230 A.3d at 348. Father was required

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to attend and complete Family School in order to develop parenting skills. As

the trial court noted, as of the November 22, 2022 termination hearing, Father

still attended Family School and had not progressed beyond supervised visits

with the child.   N.T., 11/22/22, at 116.       Moreover, as part of Father’s

reunification objectives, he was ordered to have no further contact with

Mother.   Despite this requirement, Father permitted Mother’s son, and his

family, to reside at Father’s residence, which, in turn, involved Mother having

continued contact with Father. Photographs depict Mother in the vicinity of

Father’s residence or demonstrate that Mother retained access to Father’s

residence when Father is at work, even after her son no longer resided at

Father’s residence and as recently as the summer of 2022. N.T., 11/22/22,

at 112.   Finally, as the trial court noted, during pop-up visits to Father’s

residence, Mother’s personal items were found in the residence and Mother

was observed entering the residence. Id.

      We also concur with the trial court, and the record supports, that

termination of Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of the child, as analyzed under Section 2511(a)(8). The child, as noted by the

trial court, is in need of parental care and a safe environment in which to grow.

Father has not completed Family School and has not independently

demonstrated the ability to provide parental care to the child.       Moreover,

Father’s continuing contact with Mother demonstrates Father’s inability to

provide a safe environment for the child. A child’s life, and the need for love,

comfort, security, and stability, should not be held in abeyance while a parent

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summons the abilities and desire to overcome the obstacles which prevent

reunification. See I.J., 972 A.2d at 9.

      In examining the effects termination of Father’s parental rights would

have on the child, as well as the best interest of the child pursuant to Section

2511(b), the trial court considered the safety needs of the child, including a

drug-free home, as well as the child’s needs for permanency and parental

care, including love, security, discipline, and comfort.    N.T., 11/22/22, at

110-117. Furthermore, the trial court considered the bond between Father

and the child, noting that the child knew Father and enjoyed spending time

with him, but the child did not look upon Father as a parent in a parent-child

relationship and did not look to Father to meet her daily or emotional needs.

Id. at 116-117. Upon review, we concur with the trial court, and the record

supports, that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of

the child pursuant to Section 2511(b). The CUA case manager testified that,

in her opinion, a parent-child relationship did not exist between the child and

Father. N.T., 8/9/22, at 45. The child, the case manager stated, did not look

to Father to fulfill her daily needs, and the case manager did not believe Father

would be able to provide for the child’s medical needs, including her asthmatic

condition, due to his work schedule and lack of plans for daycare. Id. at 45,

48. The case manager also explained that the child did not ask to see Father,

and Father did not financially support the child or send her cards, letters, or

gifts. Id. at 45. A teacher at the Family School stated that a relationship

existed between the child and Father in that the child recognizes Father as

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someone she knows and is familiar with, but that relationship did not equate

to a parent-child relationship, which the teacher described as one in which the

child is comfortable with the person and feels nurtured by the person.9 N.T.,

11/22/22, at 57-58. The teacher agreed that it would take several months

for a parent-child relationship to develop between Father and the child. Id.

at 56-57. When asked if the child would suffer if Father’s parental rights were

terminated, the teacher responded that she did not think the child would suffer

because the child, at this time, does not understand what Father’s relationship

is with her and, if that relationship ended, the child would not “feel a void right

now.” Id. at 62-63. The teacher expressed that the kinship parents have a

stronger relationship with the child and that, in her opinion, the kinship

parents would be able to better redirect the child’s behavior and provide better

structure for the child. Id. at 60.

       For these reasons, we concur with the trial court, and the record

supports, that DHS has proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds

for termination of Father’s parental rights exist under Section 2511(a)(8) and

(b). Consequently, we discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the

decree terminating Father’s parental rights to the child.

____________________________________________

9 The teacher testified that, in her opinion, Father appears “very nurturing
with [the child]” and that he is “trying to develop a relationship with [the
child.]” N.T., 11/22/22, at 56. A “best interests of the child” analysis under
Section 2511(b), however, focuses on the needs and welfare of the child from
the child’s perspective, and does not take into account the behavior of the
parent. C.B., 230 A.3d at 349.

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     Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/15/2023

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