Court Opinion

ID: 9914109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 17:02:55.031386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:19.236519
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Dec 29 2023, 9:25 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Janet Lynn Thompson                                       Theodore E. Rokita
Hoover Hull Turner LLP                                    Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Catherine E. Brizzi
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Brandon Lee Kendall,                                      December 29, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-CR-1473
        v.                                                Appeal from the Greene Superior
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Dena A. Martin,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          28D01-2208-F6-150

                                 Opinion by Judge Brown
                              Judges Tavitas and Foley concur.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 20
[1]   Brandon Lee Kendall appeals his conviction for identity deception as a level 6

      felony. He raises three issues which we revise and restate as:

        I.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting an
              unredacted arrest warrant;

       II.    Whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; and

      III.    Whether the identity deception statute violated the Proportionality
              Clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.

      We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   On July 27, 2022, Linton City Patrolman Davis Aerne received a dispatch to

      investigate a call. After arriving in the area, a bystander flagged down

      Patrolman Aerne and directed him across the highway. Patrolman Aerne

      “drove up there” and located the suspect, matching the description he had been

      given, walking on the side of the road. Transcript Volume II at 182.

[3]   Patrolman Aerne approached the suspect and informed him that “someone

      called” him in and reported he was “stealing a bunch of stuff.” State’s Exhibit 1

      at 0:30-0:36. Kendall stated that the item was at his house, he would return it,

      and it belonged to his friend who died. Kendall told Patrolman Aerne that his

      name was Tyler Cliver and his date of birth was August 3, 1988. He also

      provided an address, said that was his address, and began walking away from

      the scene.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023      Page 2 of 20
[4]   Patrolman Aerne ran the name Tyler Cliver and discovered that the date of

      birth did not match. He then ran the date of birth Kendall had given him,

      which populated some results, looked at the photograph attached to the name

      Brandon Kendall, and determined the suspect was Kendall. Patrolman Aerne

      ran Kendall through the Indiana BMV and determined that he had an arrest

      warrant for escape as a level 5 felony.

[5]   On August 4, 2022, the State charged Kendall with identity deception as a level

      6 felony. Specifically, the State alleged that Kendall, “with the intent to defraud

      or harm another person, did knowingly or intentionally use the identifying

      information to profess to be another person, to-wit: Tyler Cliver, contrary to the

      form of the statutes in such cases made and provided by I.C. 35-43-5-3.5(a) . . .

      .” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 40. The State also alleged that Kendall

      was an habitual offender.

[6]   On March 11, 2023, Kendall filed a motion to dismiss and argued that, “the

      facts in this case . . . do not constitute the offense of identity deception” and the

      identity deception statute as being applied to him violates the Proportionality

      Clause. Id. at 46. On March 15, 2023, the court held a hearing and denied the

      motion on March 20, 2023.

[7]   On March 26, 2023, Kendall filed a motion in limine to exclude any testimony

      or evidence related to the body cam footage, his past arrests and convictions,

      pending and unrelated criminal charges, and arrest warrants. On April 3, 2023,

      the court held a hearing. After argument, the court stated:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023       Page 3 of 20
               As far as the 404(B) arguments, the court’s going to allow the
               warrants to come in, but I am going [to] ask that those be
               redacted so it doesn’t show what the offense is that the, the
               warrants are for. So, redact those, show that, you can show that
               they’re felony warrants, but not show the specific charge. I’m
               going to show that the, the body cam will be allowed in and I’m
               just going to ask, instruct the State not to embellish the . . .
               allegations that are contained within the body cam and . . . what
               they were actually out there for. So, try not to use the word
               burglary or don’t use the word burglary.

      Transcript Volume II at 62. Later the court stated: “Take out the escape.” Id.

      at 67.

[8]   On April 4, 2023, the court held a jury trial. Kendall’s counsel renewed the

      motion to dismiss, which the court denied. During Patrolman Aerne’s

      testimony, the prosecutor asked him to describe the dispatch and his resulting

      actions. Kendall’s counsel objected and the court stated: “If you’re offering it

      for the course of conduct by the officer, the court will allow it.” Id. at 181.

      Patrolman Aerne stated: “I was called to an area in reference a [sic] male in

      subject in Abel’s backyards.” Id.

[9]   Kendall’s counsel objected to the admission of a certified copy of the arrest

      warrant for escape and argued that the warrant should not “come in at all” and

      that, if the court were to allow discussion about the warrant, “it should be

      limited to that just [sic] and advisement that there was a[n] arrest warrant

      without physically putting in the document.” Id. at 189. She also argued that,

      if the document were admitted, then “at least the nature of the charge should be

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023        Page 4 of 20
       stricken . . . and redacted . . . .” Id. The prosecutor argued in part that Kendall

       knew there was a warrant and “that was his motive.” Id. at 190. The court

       stated that “because this is a specific intent statute . . . I am showing that . . . the

       State does have . . . that burden on that element.” Id. at 191. It also stated:

               I also had considered if you redact, because I had originally
               thought we redact the name of that, but again the State’s argued
               that the course of conduct based upon what it is, but I think that
               that adds to so much speculation of the jury. Because, I mean, . .
               . you’ve got a six-letter word there and if you mark it out it
               causes the jury to speculate, I don’t that [sic] jurors know the
               difference between a level 1 and a level 5. That could say
               murder. And, and you’ve redacted it. So, I think that it’s, I think
               is more appropriate to have it in there so that, that it is not
               confusing to the jury and it doesn’t lend to any additional
               speculation that, that we don’t want.

       Id. at 192.

[10]   The court admitted the arrest warrant which stated in part: “You are hereby

       commanded to arrest Brandon Kendall . . . to answer the State of Indiana on a

       charge of Escape, a Level 5 Felony . . . .” Exhibits Volume IV at 27. The court

       also admitted the body camera footage with the interaction between Patrolman

       Aerne and Kendall.

[11]   After the State rested, Kendall’s counsel moved for a directed verdict. The

       court denied the motion. The jury found Kendall guilty of identity deception as

       a level 6 felony, and Kendall admitted to being an habitual offender. The court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023         Page 5 of 20
       sentenced Kendall to two years and enhanced the sentence by four years for his

       status as an habitual offender.

       Discussion

       I.

[12]   The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the

       arrest warrant. Kendall argues the prejudicial effect of allowing the jury to

       know that he had a warrant for escape substantially outweighed any probative

       value and should not have been allowed. He contends that the use of the

       escape charge on the warrant to link his alleged previous escape to his conduct

       in this case was prohibited by Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b).

[13]   Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or

       other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on

       a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Rule

       404(b)(2) provides: “This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such

       as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

       absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

[14]   The standard for assessing the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence is: (1) the

       court must determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is

       relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the

       charged act; and (2) the court must balance the probative value of the evidence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023     Page 6 of 20
       against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 403. 1 Boone v. State,

       728 N.E.2d 135, 137-138 (Ind. 2000), reh’g denied. The purpose of the rule is to

       prevent the jury from making the “forbidden inference” that a defendant is

       guilty of the charged offense on the basis of other misconduct. Hicks v. State,

       690 N.E.2d 215, 218-219 (Ind. 1997). The trial court has wide latitude in

       weighing the probative value of the evidence against the possible prejudice of its

       admission. Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1235 (Ind. 2000). If evidence has

       some purpose besides behavior in conformity with a character trait and the

       balancing test is favorable, the trial court can elect to admit the evidence.

       Boone, 728 N.E.2d at 138. For instance, evidence which shows the defendant’s

       motive or plan may be admissible. See Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b)(2).

[15]   In addition, Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) provides:

                No error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
                omitted by the trial court or by any of the parties is ground for
                granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in
                light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not
                to affect the substantial rights of the parties.

[16]   The Indiana Supreme Court recently held:

                When an appellate court must determine whether a non-
                constitutional error is harmless, Rule 66(A)’s “probable impact
                test” controls. Under this test, the party seeking relief bears the

       1
        Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides: “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
       substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
       misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                             Page 7 of 20
               burden of demonstrating how, in light of all the evidence in the
               case, the error’s probable impact undermines confidence in the
               outcome of the proceeding below. See Mason v. State, 689 N.E.2d
               1233, 1236-1237 (Ind. 1997); [Edward W. Najam, Jr. & Jonathan
               B. Warner, Indiana’s Probable-Impact Test for Reversible Error, 55
               Ind. L. Rev. 27,] 50-51 [(2022)]. Importantly, this is not a review
               for the sufficiency of the remaining evidence; it is a review of
               what was presented to the trier of fact compared to what should
               have been presented. And when conducting that review, we
               consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded
               evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence
               in the case. See Tunstall v. Manning, 124 N.E.3d 1193, 1200 (Ind.
               2019). Ultimately, the error’s probable impact is sufficiently
               minor when—considering the entire record—our confidence in
               the outcome is not undermined.

       Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023), reh’g denied, cert. pending.

[17]   The record reveals that the State introduced the arrest warrant to show

       Kendall’s motive. We cannot say that State’s Exhibit 2 was not relevant or that

       the probative value of the exhibit was substantially outweighed by the danger of

       unfair prejudice. Further, the probable impact of any error in admitting the

       arrest warrant, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as

       not to affect Kendall’s substantial rights. Reversal is not required on this basis.

       II.

[18]   The next issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Kendall’s

       conviction for identity deception as a level 6 felony. Kendall argues that the

       statute requires that he profess to be another person and the State presented no

       evidence that Tyler Cliver was an actual person. He asserts the State must

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023       Page 8 of 20
       establish that he used the identifying information of “a real person, natural or

       juridical” and cites Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 2007), and Duncan v.

       State, 23 N.E.3d 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Appellant’s Brief at 9.

[19]   In Brown v. State, Richard Carlos Brown, pretending to work for a radio station,

       telephoned at least three adult men and falsely informed them of a radio contest

       in which they could each win a new car or cash if they would drive from their

       places of employment to a particular address (which happened to be Brown’s

       residence), enter and remove all of their clothes, and exchange them for a T-

       shirt. 868 N.E.2d at 466. Each of the men appeared at Brown’s home, and two

       of the men satisfied the fictitious contest requirements but received no prize. Id.

       Each man contacted the radio station and discovered that it had no such

       employee and was not sponsoring any such contest. Id. Brown was convicted

       on three counts of identity deception as class D felonies. Id.

[20]   On appeal, Brown argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish the

       elements of the identity deception charges because there was no evidence that

       he used the identifying information of a particular individual. Id. at 469. Each

       of the three counts of identity deception charged that Brown “did knowingly

       use the identifying information of another person, namely Radio Now (93.1),

       without the other person’s consent and with the intent to harm or defraud

       another person, . . . and/or profess to be another person, that is: an agent of

       Radio Now (93.1).” Id. At that time, Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a) provided:

               [A] person who knowingly or intentionally . . . uses the
               identifying information of another person:
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023     Page 9 of 20
                  (1) without the other person’s consent; and

                  (2) with intent to:

                           (A) harm or defraud another person;

                           (B) . . .; or

                           (C) profess to be another person;

                  commits identity deception, a Class D felony.

       Id.

[21]   The Court held:

                  For the purposes of this provision, and as relevant to the charged
                  offense, the phrase “identifying information” is specifically
                  defined to mean “information that identifies an individual,
                  including an individual’s . . . name, address, date of birth, place of
                  employment, employer identification number, mother’s maiden
                  name, Social Security number, or any identification number
                  issued by a governmental entity . . .” Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(h)
                  (2004) (emphasis added) (current version at Ind. Code § 35-43-5-
                  1(i)). The word “individual” is commonly understood to refer to
                  a single human being,[ 2] in contrast to “person,” which can mean
                  either an individual human being or a corporation or other legal
                  entity.[ 3]

       2
           The Court included a footnote here which stated:
                  See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 656 (2d ed. 1985) (defining the noun “individual”
                  to mean: “A single human being considered separately from a group or from society.”);
                  Random House College Dictionary 678 (Rev. ed. 1984) (defining the noun “individual” to
                  mean: “a single human being, as distinguished from a group.”)
       Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 469 n.5.
       3
           The Court included a footnote here which stated:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                           Page 10 of 20
        In addressing a claim of insufficient evidence, an appellate court
        considers only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences
        supporting the judgment to assess whether a reasonable trier of
        fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
        doubt. Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1277 (Ind. 2002).
        Applying this standard, the trial evidence establishes that the
        defendant spoke to three people about the phony contest, each
        time identifying himself as a representative of the radio station, a
        corporation. And with at least one of the people, the defendant
        claimed to be “Scott Ross,” a representative of the radio station.
        But this was a fictitious name created by the defendant and did
        not coincide with any real person.

        When construing a penal statute, ambiguous language must be
        construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.
        Merritt v. State, 829 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ind. 2005). Applying the
        phrase “identifying information” as defined by the statute, the
        charge against the defendant required the State to prove that the
        defendant used an individual’s name, address, date of birth, or
        other identifiers, to commit the charged crime. While there was
        evidence that the defendant used information identifying the
        corporate radio station without its consent, there was no
        evidence that he used the name, address, date of birth, or other
        identifiers of any existing human being in perpetrating his hoax.

        Because the evidence does not establish that the defendant
        committed the offense by using information specifically
        identifying another individual human being, the evidence is

        See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 925 (2d ed. 1985) (in part defining the noun
        “person” to mean: “A human being or organization with legal rights and duties.”);
        Random House College Dictionary 990 (Rev. ed. 1984) (in part defining the noun “person”
        to mean: “a human being, a group of human beings, a corporation, an estate, or other legal
        entity recognized by law as having rights and duties.”)
Brown, 868 N.E.2d at 470 n.6.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                        Page 11 of 20
               insufficient to prove all of the elements of the charged crimes of
               identity deception.

       Id. at 469-470.

[22]   In Duncan v. State, Christopher Duncan identified himself as George F. Walker

       during a traffic stop. 23 N.E.2d at 808. He later identified himself as “George

       Walker, Jr.” and gave a date of birth of April 6, 1967, during the book-in

       procedure. Id. Duncan was convicted of identity deception as a class D felony.

       Id. at 809.

[23]   On appeal, Duncan argued that the State presented insufficient evidence to

       support his conviction. Id. at 812. This Court observed:

               In order to convict Duncan of identity deception as charged, the
               State was required to prove that Duncan

               knowingly or intentionally obtain[ed] . . . or use[d] the
               identifying information of another person, including the
               identifying information of a person who is deceased:

               (1) without the other person’s consent; and

               (2) with intent to . . .

               (C) profess to be another person[.]

       Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5). The Court observed that “Identifying

       information” was defined in relevant part as “information that identifies a

       person, including a person’s . . . name, address, date of birth, place of

       employment, employer identification number, mother’s maiden name, Social

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023        Page 12 of 20
Security number, or any identification number issued by a governmental

entity[.]” Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(i)). We discussed Brown and held:

        Shortly after our Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. State, the
        General Assembly amended the definition of “identifying
        information” to replace the word “individual” with the word
        “person.” I.C. § 35-43-5-1. It seems likely to us that the
        legislature did so in response to Brown, and for the specific
        purpose of bringing corporations and other legal entities within
        the statute’s ambit. See Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d at 469-70
        (explaining that person may refer to “either an individual human
        being or a corporation or other legal entity” (footnote omitted)).
        But we do not believe that this alters our Supreme Court’s
        holding that in order to support an identity deception conviction,
        the State must establish that the defendant used the identifying
        information of a real person, whether natural or juridical.
        Indeed, the plain language of the identity deception statute
        requires the knowing or intentional use of the identifying
        information “of another person.” I.C. § 35-43-5-3.5. As our
        Supreme Court explained in Brown, the identity deception statute
        does not criminalize the use of a fictitious name.

        The State does not dispute that there was no evidence presented
        that George Frederick Walker was a real person. Instead, the
        State argues that it was not necessary for the State to present such
        evidence. Specifically, relying on subsection I.C. § 35-43-5-
        3.5(d), which provides that “it is not a defense in a prosecution
        under [the identity deception statute] that no person was harmed
        or defrauded”, the State argues that the legislature did not intend
        to limit convictions only to cases in which an individual was
        actually harmed. We do not disagree with the State’s assertion,
        but it does not alter our conclusion. While the statute clearly
        does not require actual harm to any person, it does require the
        use of an actual person’s identifying information. We also note
        that this language was part of the statute at the time our Supreme

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023     Page 13 of 20
        Court decided Brown, and the court apparently did not interpret it
        in the manner urged by the State.

        The State argues further that Duncan’s conduct in giving a false
        name should be criminalized because it “ran the risk of impeding
        the police investigation and the State’s prosecution” and the
        “practice of obstructing the course of justice is one which society
        has an interest in stemming.” Appellee’s Brief at 21. This may be
        true, but it is not our prerogative as an appellate court to identify
        and criminalize undesirable behavior; such policy decisions are
        reserved for the legislative branch of our state government. This
        court is bound by the language of the statute as written and our
        Supreme Court’s precedent. Moreover, we note that the identity
        deception statute is found in article 43 of Indiana’s criminal code,
        which is titled “Offenses Against Property.” It is therefore
        apparent to us that the identity deception statute is directed
        toward potential fraud and property crimes and not false
        reporting or obstruction of justice. Whether Duncan’s conduct
        might have been chargeable under another statute is not an issue
        before us.

        In this case, Duncan used the name George Frederick Walker,
        George Walker, Jr., and/or George F. Walker, and gave a birth
        date of April 6, 1967. The state presented no evidence to
        establish that this information “coincide[d] with any real
        person.” See Brown v. State, 868 N.E.2d at 470. In other words,
        the State presented no evidence to support a conclusion that
        Duncan knowingly or intentionally used the identifying
        information of “another person.” I.C. § 35-43-5-3.5.
        Accordingly, the State presented insufficient evidence to support
        Duncan’s identity deception conviction. We therefore reverse
        that portion of the trial court’s judgment and remand with
        instructions to vacate the identity deception conviction and the
        sentence imposed thereon.

Id. at 813-814.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023      Page 14 of 20
[24]   The legislature amended Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a) effective July 1, 2021,

       which now provides that “a person who, with intent to harm or defraud another

       person, knowingly or intentionally obtains, possesses, transfers, or uses

       identifying information to profess to be another person, commits identity deception,

       a Level 6 felony.” 4 (Emphasis added). The legislature amended Ind. Code §

       35-43-5-1(i) effective July 1, 2021, such that the statute now provides in part:

                 “Identifying information” means information, genuine or
                 fabricated, that identifies or purports to identify a person, including:

                         (1) a name, address, date of birth, place of employment,
                         employer identification number, mother’s maiden name,
                         Social Security number, or any identification number
                         issued by a governmental entity;

                         (2) unique biometric data, including a fingerprint, voice
                         print, or retina or iris image . . . .

       (Emphases added). Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-234(a) provides that “‘person’ means

       a human being, corporation, limited liability company, partnership,

       unincorporated association, or governmental entity.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-

       160 defines a “Human being” as “an individual who has been born and is

       alive.”

[25]   An examination of the words added by the legislature to Ind. Code § 35-43-5-

       1(i) reveals that the word “genuine” is generally defined as “[a]ctually

       4
        Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(d) provides: “It is not a defense in a prosecution under subsection (a) or (b) that no
       person was harmed or defrauded.”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                             Page 15 of 20
       possessing the alleged or apparent attribute or character,” and “[n]ot spurious

       or counterfeit; authentic.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 735 (4th ed.

       2006). “Genuine” is also defined as “authentic or real; having the quality of

       what a given thing purports to be or to have” and “free of forgery or

       counterfeiting.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (10th ed. 2014). The word

       “fabricate” is generally defined as “[t]o make; create” and “[t]o concoct in order

       to deceive: fabricated an excuse.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 632 (4th

       ed. 2006). “Fabricate” is also defined as “[t]o invent, forge, or devise falsely”

       and “[t]o fabricate a story is to create a plausible version of events that is

       advantageous to the person relating those events. The term is softer than lie.”

       BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (10th ed. 2014). “Fabricated evidence” is

       defined generally as “[f]alse or deceitful evidence that is unlawfully created,

       usu. after the relevant event, in an attempt to achieve or avoid liability or

       conviction.” Id. at 675. The word “purport” is generally defined as “[t]o have

       or present the often false appearance of being or intending; profess.”

       AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1423 (4th ed. 2006). “Purport” is also

       defined as “[t]o profess or claim, esp. falsely; to seem to be.” BLACK’S LAW

       DICTIONARY 1431 (10th ed. 2014).

[26]   We note that, prior to the amendment effective July 1, 2021, Ind. Code § 35-43-

       5-1(i) provided in part:

               “Identifying information” means information that identifies a
               person, including a person’s:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023      Page 16 of 20
                 (1) name, address, date of birth, place of employment,
                 employer identification number, mother’s maiden name,
                 Social Security number, or any identification number
                 issued by a governmental entity;

                 (2) unique biometric data, including the person’s fingerprint,
                 voice print, or retina or iris image . . . .

(Emphasis added). We note that the italicized language above was deleted by

the July 1, 2021 amendment, see Pub. L. No. 174-2021 (eff. July 1, 2021), which

indicates that the legislature intended to no longer require that the name be

related to a real person. Based upon the amendment to Ind. Code § 35-43-5-

3.5(a), which criminalized the use of identifying information “to profess to be

another person” and the amendment to Ind. Code § 35-43-5-1(i) defining

identifying information as “information, genuine or fabricated, that identifies or

purports to identify a person,” we cannot say that the current version of the

statute requires that the identifying information must coincide with any real

person or an existing human being. Even assuming that the current version of

the statute requires that the identifying information coincide with a real person,

we note that, when asked what he discovered when he ran the name Tyler

Cliver, Patrolman Aerne answered: “That the date of birth did not match.”

Transcript Volume II at 202. The reasonable inference is that Patrolman Aerne

found a real person named Tyler Cliver. 5 Based upon the record, we conclude

5
  We note that Kendall’s argument is limited to whether the statute requires that he use the identifying
information of a real person and he does not further develop an argument that he did not intend to harm or
defraud another person.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023                          Page 17 of 20
       the State presented evidence of a probative nature from which a reasonable trier

       of fact could find Kendall guilty of identity deception as a level 6 felony.

       III.

[27]   The next issue is whether the identity deception statute violated the

       Proportionality Clause of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution.

       Kendall argues that the crime of identity deception under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-

       3.5, as applied to him, violates the Proportionality Clause of Article 1, Section

       16 of the Indiana Constitution. He asserts that he was convicted of identity

       deception as a level 6 felony and that his conduct of giving a false name to a

       police officer could also support a prosecution for false informing as a class B

       misdemeanor pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d)(1). He contends that there

       are no additional facts present here that warrant prosecuting his conduct under

       the identity deception statute versus the false informing statute.

[28]   Article 1, Section 16 provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the

       nature of the offense.” It is violated only when the criminal penalty is not

       graduated and proportioned to the nature of the offense. Knapp v. State, 9

       N.E.3d 1274, 1289 (Ind. 2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1091, 135 S. Ct. 978

       (2015). Though we “cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely

       because it seems too severe,” Article 1, Section 16 requires us to review whether

       a sentence is not only within statutory parameters, but also constitutional as

       applied to the particular defendant. Id. at 1290. “A sentence violates the

       Proportionality Clause when ‘offenses with identical elements [are] given

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023    Page 18 of 20
       different sentences.’” Johnson v. State, 103 N.E.3d 704, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)

       (quoting Poling v. State, 853 N.E.2d 1270, 1276-1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g

       denied), trans. denied.

[29]   Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3 governs the offense of false reporting or informing and

       provided at the time of the offense:

               (d) A person who:

                        (1) gives:

                                 (A) a false report of the commission of a crime; or

                                 (B) false information to a law enforcement officer
                                 that relates to the commission of a crime;

               knowing the report or information to be false;

                                                     *****

               commits false informing, a Class B misdemeanor.

[30]   Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a) provides that “a person who, with intent to harm or

       defraud another person, knowingly or intentionally obtains, possesses, transfers, or

       uses identifying information to profess to be another person, commits identity

       deception, a Level 6 felony.” (Emphases added). Thus, the statute governing

       identity deception includes elements not contained in the statute governing false

       informing. Accordingly, we conclude that the crime of false informing, which

       requires no such intent or use of identifying information, is distinguishable from

       the crime of identity deception. We do not find a violation of Article 1, Section

       16.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023           Page 19 of 20
[31]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[32]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1473 | December 29, 2023   Page 20 of 20