Court Opinion

ID: 9743990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:37.896705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.032257
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
dissenting.
In granting Jordan Motors's motion to correct error, the trial judge presented Wedmore with a choice between repeating the trial or accepting a 95% remittitur of the jury's punitive damages award, while explaining little more than that the amount was "ridiculous." Although "[jJudges need not explain the obvious, even briefly," United States v. Beasley (1987), 7th Cir., 809 F.2d 1273, 1280, I cannot agree that the trial judge's explanation complied with Ind.Trial Rule 59(J)(7). As our supreme court has observed, "if the [trial] court overrides the jury in its special domain and substitutes its verdict for theirs without a clear showing that the ends of justice required it, it is likely that they did not." State v. White (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 995, 1000.
To grant a new trial subject to remittitur is permitted by TR. 59(J)(5). However, as explained in Wedge v. Lipps Indus., Inc. (1991), Ind.App., 575 N.E.2d 332, a trial judge so granting must indicate, per T.R. 59(J)(7), whether the nullified jury verdict was (a) against the weight of the evidence, (b) clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence, or (c) not supported by the evidence. Id. at 385. If the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, TR. 59(J)(7) requires the trial judge to enter special findings of fact enumerating the evidence for and against the verdict. If the verdict is clearly erroneous as contrary to, or not supported by the evidence, TR. 59(J)(7) requires special findings explaining why judgment was not entered on the evidence instead of granting new trial or new trial subject to remittitur.
The majority views this case as involving a verdict clearly erroneous as unsupported by the evidence and a sufficient, if but implicit, explanation why judgment was not entered on the evidence. I disagree with that on both points. In my view, notwithstanding the "unsupported by the evidence" terminology employed by the trial judge, the actual basis for voiding the jury's punitive damages award was that it was against the weight of the evidence. Second, the trial judge's writings did not amount to the mandatory enumeration of the evidence. Moreover, assuming for the sake of argument that the verdict was clearly erroneous as unsupported by the evidence, I do not see the mandatory explanation why judgment was not entered on the evidence.
The trial court's conclusion #6 was that the evidence did not support a punitive damages award of $400,000. But conclusion #5 was that the evidence supported some amount of punitive damages. As I see it, if the evidence supported some punitive damages, then there was some evidence to support any amount of punitive damages. Thus, it cannot be said the jury's award was unsupported by the evidence, because there was some evidence *1187supporting punitive damages. I would agree that "unsupported by the evidence" was the basis for upsetting the verdict if the trial judge had ruled that any punitive damages award would have been inappropriate. As it was, however, the trial judge disagreed only with the $400,000 figure, and did not say that only zero would have been correct. Therefore, given some evidence to support an award of punitive damages, reduction of the jury's punitive damages award must be classified as a reaction to a verdict deemed against the weight of the evidence, despite the use in conclusion #6 of the "unsupported" terminology.
Viewing the case in this light, T.R. 59(J)(7) requires that the evidence for and against the $400,000 be set out in special findings. The trial court did not do so.
The trial court did recognize that punitive damages calculus evaluates both the nature of the wrong and what amount would be large enough to punish, and make an example of, the defendant. See, e.g., Warren v. Wheeler (1991), Ind.App., 566 N.E.2d 1096, trans. denied. The "large enough to punish" variable obviously must reflect the defendant's affluence. However, of the findings quoted by the majority, op. at 1183, all but one relate to either compensatory damages, a non-issue here, or the nature of the wrong. Only #28, that Jordan's net worth was $742,645 for 1989, touches on the financially punishing aspect of punitive damages.
I cannot agree that the trial court's finding "net worth was $742,645" defines this defendant's wealth in sufficient detail to permit judging against the propriety of the punitive damages award. That solitary finding appears wholly inadequate against the record facts that the defendant's gross sales in 1988 and 1989 were respectively $302,140,753 and $193,152,810; that retained earnings in 1988 and 1989 were respectively $1,891,451 and $1,062,898; and that the defendant is the largest Ford franchise in the world based on total sales. I think those facts a necessary part of a T.R. 59(J)(7) enumeration of evidence for and against the jury's decision that $400,000 is the proper amount of punitive damages:
The purpose of authorizing the trial judge to grant a new trial, when the judge considers the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, is to erase the occasional unsupportable jury verdict. It is to supplant that which is irrational with something that is rational. An order of court can fulfill this extraordinary and extreme function only if it is based upon a complete analysis of the relevant facts and applicable law, and sets out on paper the constituent parts of that analysis. It is compliance with the arduous and time consuming requirements of the rule which provides assurance to the parties and the courts that the judge's evaluation of the evidence is better than the evaluation of the jury.
Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank (1976), 265 Ind. 457, 464-65, 358 N.E.2d 974, 978, reh'g denied.
I am not assured, despite the assertion the verdict was "ridiculous," that the trial court's evaluation of the evidence was superior to that of the jury. Moreover, even if I agreed that the grant of new trial subject to remittitur was motivated by thoughts that the verdict was unsupported by the evidence, rather than that it was against the weight of the evidence, I would still see non-compliance with T.R. 59(J)(7), because the trial court did not explain why judgment was not entered on the evidence. This case is to me indistinguishable from Blay v. Vogel (1989), Ind.App., 533 N.E.2d 172, trans. denied, which reversed a grant of new trial following a jury verdict for the defendant. The trial court's findings in Blay did not comply with TR. 59(J)(7), in that they did not enumerate the evidence opposing a key element of the plaintiff's case.
In sum, the trial judge here exercised the extraordinary thirteenth juror function to eviscerate the jury's punitive damages award, but without fully reciting the evidence for and against the award. The proper response to such non-compliance with T.R. 59(J)(7) is a remand for reinstatement of the verdict. See White, supra; Burell v. Riggs (1990), Ind.App., 557 N.E.2d 698, trans. denied. Alternatively, *1188the trial judge condemned the jury's verdict on no more than "a naked statement that it is erroneous," White, 474 N.E.2d at 1000, and so reinstatement of the verdict is warranted. I respectfully dissent.