Court Opinion

ID: 9754345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:56:02.970468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:03.937483
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
While recognizing that the claimant has the burden to prove his employee status, courts should not hasten to place claimants in the position of independent contractor when a reasonable view of the evidence warrants a finding that the injured person was an employee. Stevens v. Publishers Agency, 170 Pa.Superior Ct. 385, 85 A.2d 696 (1952). Although the parties here basically agree on the facts as found by the referee, they differ on the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts. *88Unlike the majority, I would agree with Johnson that a reasonable interpretation of the facts in this case demonstrates his employee status. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority indicates, the single most persuasive indicator of a claimant’s employee or independent contractor status lies in the control of the manner in which the work is accomplished. North Penn Transfer, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 61 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 469, 434 A.2d 228 (1981); Davidson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (DeLeon), 42 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 30, 399 A.2d 1193 (1979). It is the existence of the right to control which is critical, even when that right is not exercised.1 Northern Central Bank and Trust Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Kontz), 88 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 277, 489 A2d 274 (1985). Thus, the key consideration here is whether Courier, having authorized Johnson to deliver its papers, had the right to control or supervise the manner and method by which Johnson completed those deliveries; I believe it did.
Courier claims that Johnson was an independent contractor because he made his deliveries according to his own schedule and in whatever manner he chose, entirely free of Courier’s day to day supervision or control. I disagree with this assessment.2 Although it is true that Courier exerted little *89daily supervision over Johnson, I believe that this was due to lack of need rather than lack of capacity. Moreover, despite the absence of direct contact between Courier and Johnson, Courier actually exercised considerable control over Johnson’s work performance.
Indeed, the facts include many persuasive factors favoring Johnson’s employee status. First, it is noteworthy that Courier’s method of payment indicated Johnson’s continuing service, suggestive of an employer/employee relationship. Courier did not pay its carriers at intervals governed by job completion; rather, carriers were paid at regular time intervals, receiving a check every two weeks at the rate of $.05 per day for each paper delivered. Moreover, Courier billed their subscribers, who then paid Courier directly at a price fixed by Courier; the carriers were not involved in the financial dealings in any way and never handled any customer money.
Also indicative of an employment relationship is the fact that Courier specifically requested subscribers to contact the newspaper with any problems regarding delivery service. Courier would communicate any complaints to the carrier and advise carriers about any specific delivery instructions. Quite significantly, Courier offered a bonus of $1.00 every two weeks if a carrier provided good service to route customers and fined the carrier $.50 each time a subscriber failed to receive a newspaper, an amount ten times that paid to deliver the same paper. Thus, Courier demonstrated a marked interest in the details of the carrier’s industriousness, exerting control over a carrier’s performance in a manner which was reflected dramatically in the carrier’s compensation.
In addition, although Courier claimed that it did not fix Johnson’s working hours, I note that Johnson was expected to complete his route, delivering approximately 50 papers, within a very limited period of time. Courier brought the newspapers to the drop-off point at 2:45 p.m. each day, and Johnson picked up the papers after the school day ended at 3:00 p.m. Carriers were expected to have all their papers delivered by *906:00 p.m.; failure to satisfy this time requirement could result in dismissal. Thus, although Johnson could control the sequence of his deliveries within the required time frame, this was not a crucial indication of his independence. Because Courier delineated the route, supplied the names and locations of customers to the carriers and limited the amount of time in which they could make delivery, it is apparent that carriers would select the most efficient delivery sequence, a decision which hardly required individual thinking or special skill.3
I also believe that Courier’s failure to supply its carriers with uniforms or equipment does not work to Johnson’s disadvantage. None of Courier’s employees wore uniforms; in fact, by providing carriers with a route, newspapers, and a bag to carry those papers, Courier provided all the tools required for the job.
Courier makes much of the fact that Johnson could arrange for a substitute to make his deliveries without receiving prior approval from Courier or even informing Cornier of the substitution. Again, however, this “freedom” is illusory because it did not reduce Courier’s control over Johnson. No matter who was actually making the deliveries, Courier retained the ability to penalize Johnson for poor performance. Certainly, the $.50 per paper fine was adequate incentive to ensure that a carrier selected a responsible replacement. Indeed, because the need for such replacements were sporadic and often last minute, this arrangement was, in effect, the most practical way for Courier to retain control over its carriers. By contrast, when Johnson took over his sister’s route on a permanent basis, both he and his sister went to the newspaper’s office where a Courier employee interviewed Johnson and officially turned the route over to him, providing instruction regarding the duties and responsibilities expected of him.
*91Finally, I note that Courier had the freedom to terminate carriers without incurring liability for breach of contract. At the hearing before the referee, Jeff Gavazzi, Courier’s Promotions Director, testified:
Q. Now, the — if you decided that a carrier was unsatisfactory, are you aware of any restrictions on telling them — on discharging them?
A Uh, I can’t think of any restrictions; we’re very fair with that situation though.
Q. I’m not questioning your benevolence; what I’m saying is, I’m questioning your power. Did you have the power to tell any one of these carriers to go down the road, that you weren’t satisfied with them for some reason or another? A Yes.
Q. Okay. You had — you had no contractual — you had no
written contract with them that said that----
A No.
(R.R. at 138a.)
I acknowledge that this case is fact specific, with my conclusion hinging largely upon the control Courier exerted on carriers through its time restraints and its policy of performance-based reward and punishment. However, I also obtained guidance from other cases dealing with this issue. In Balinski et ux. v. Press Publishing Co. et al, 118 Pa.Superior Ct. 89, 179 A. 897 (1935), the claimant was a newsboy who purchased newspapers from the Pittsburgh Press District manager, which the claimant then resold to the public at large through his own energies and by his own methods, at a profit to himself. The court determined that under these circumstances, the newsboy was not an employee but an independent vendor.
The Balinski “newsboy” was later analogized to a claimant who worked as a distributor for the P-G Publishing Company’s daily newspapers in Rodgers v. P-G Publishing Co., 194 Pa.Superior Ct. 207, 166 A.2d 544 (1960). As in Balinski, the distributor in Rodgers purchased the newspapers; he could then determine what to charge for them on resale. Each day, *92after collecting the money from sales made, he turned over to the publishing company only the wholesale price of the papers he purchased, keeping the profits for himself. The court concluded that the distributor in Rodgers was an independent contractor, recognizing that in both Balinski and Rodgers, the claimants’ return or profit was variable, depending upon their own initiative and industry.
Unlike the distributor in Rodgers, Johnson can be distinguished easily from the “newsboy” in Balinski. Johnson does not purchase papers from Courier for resale, with entitlement to any profits. Instead, he receives a specific number of papers from Courier with instructions to deliver them to particular customers, customers who pay Courier directly for this service.
By comparison, Johnson’s situation more closely resembles that of the claimants in Stevens and Shields v. William Freihofer Baking Co., 147 Pa.Superior Ct. 455, 24 A.2d 54 (1942), both of which were distinguished by the court in Rodgers. In Stevens, the claimant worked selling magazines for Publishers Agency. In that case, the claimant did not purchase the magazines from the company, he had no control over the selling price, and the employer instructed him as to the streets where he was to work. The court determined that because the company retained the factors of control as to time, territory and manner of sales, the claimant was an employee rather than an independent contractor.
In Shields, the claimant was a distributor for a baking company. He did not purchase the baked goods which he delivered; rather, the company delivered its product to him and he was to sell and deliver the merchandise in his own truck along a particular route. At the end of each day, he turned in all the money received from the day’s cash sales, and once a week, he received a check from the company representing 20% of his weekly gross sales. On his route was one “authorized” charge account customer who, much like Courier’s subscribers, paid the company directly, although the ; claimant delivered the products to that customer and received *93a commission on those sales. With regard to this account, the court stated:
The “authorized” charge account throws considerable light on the question before us. It indicates quite clearly that the claimant was not selling that customer, at least, on his own account, entirely independent of the defendant company, but was acting for and on its behalf.
Shields, 147 Pa.Superior Ct. at 458, 24 A.2d at 56.
In Kontz, we confirmed that lack of daily supervision does not necessarily imply independent contractor status where the job does not require such supervision. In that case, we affirmed an employer-employee relationship in a situation where the claimant occasionally directed traffic in a bank’s parking lot on his day off from his regular employment. Although the bank exerted little or no control over the manner in which the claimant directed traffic and provided no job instruction or equipment, we concluded that claimant was a bank employee because, in fact, there was little need for actual control and supervision, and the bank exerted all the control necessary, given the fact that the job was simple and no special equipment was required.
Here too, Courier exerts all the control necessary for the type of job performed by Johnson. Johnson had no newspapers of his own; rather, he was told which customers should receive a newspaper and was given only enough papers to cover that number. If he did not deliver a paper, or delivered it in a condition or manner which did not please the customer, customers complained directly to the circulation office of the Courier, which was then free to reprimand the carrier or terminate him. Thus, Courier retained control over all essential aspects of Johnson’s work: time, territory and manner of performance.
The applicable principles for determining whether a claimant is an independent contractor or an employee are recognized by both Courier and Johnson; the difficulty arises in determining their applicability to the facts in this particular case. Admittedly, the case is close enough to give rise to *94honest differences; however, after a careful review of the record here, I find myself in disagreement with the conclusion reached by the referee, and affirmed by the WCAB and this court’s majority, that Johnson did not satisfy the burden imposed upon him. Instead, I believe that Courier had the right to control the manner of Johnson’s work performance, the key consideration in establishing an employer/employee relationship. Accordingly, I would conclude that the WCAB erred in determining that Johnson was an independent contractor and would reverse its dismissal of Johnson’s claim petition.
DOYLE and McGINLEY, JJ., join in this dissent.

. This distinction is of particular importance in two types of cases: (1) when a highly skilled or experienced workman appears to be doing his job without supervision or interference; or (2) when a person is performing a job that is so simple that no supervision or interference is required. Under an “exercise" test, both workers would appear to be uncontrolled; yet in each case, the employer may still have the ultimate right to dictate the method of performance if the occasion arose. Johnson contends that he falls into the second category, and I must agree. Under the facts presented, I believe it reasonable to infer that Courier retained the right to control a carrier's manner of delivery because Courier reserved the power to summarily discharge any carrier. Indeed, if Courier had desired to supervise every detail of the deliveries, a carrier's only alternatives would have been to comply, resign or face possible termination.

. Although I recognize that various aspects of Johnson's work do not support an employer/employee relationship, I do not feel that there exists the convincing accumulation of factors needed to signify Johnson’s independent contractor status. Rather, I consider other elements, *89going to the core of the employee/independent contractor determination, more compelling.

. In Hammermill, the court stated that if a claimant is left with little or no choice in the selection of the methods to be used to reach the result desired, he would not be an independent contractor but a mere servant or agent. That is precisely the situation here.