Court Opinion

ID: 9893359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 18:03:45.357245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:59.571863
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

 NEW SUNDANCE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, LLP, an Arizona limited
     liability partnership; THE BEAR RIDGE RESORT LIMITED
       PARTNERSHIP, an Arizona limited liability partnership,
                           Plaintiffs/Appellees,

                                        v.

SEAN CUTLER and SHANNON CUTLER; and LYNN ELLSWORTH and
          ELAINE ELLSWORTH, Defendants/Appellants.

                             No. 1 CA-CV 22-0676
                               FILED 10-26-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
                        No. S0900CV201900483
              The Honorable Joseph Samuel Clark, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Hunter, Humphrey & Yavitz, PLC, Phoenix
By Isabel M. Humphrey
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Frazer, Ryan, Goldberg & Arnold, L.L.P., Phoenix
By Philip R. Rupprecht
Counsel for Defendants/Appellants
                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1             In this case involving competing quiet-title and easement
claims, Sean Cutler, Shannon Cutler, Lynn Ellsworth, and Elaine Ellsworth
(collectively, "Cutlers") appeal the superior court's grant of summary
judgment and award of attorney fees and costs to New Sundance Limited
Partnership, LLP and The Bear Ridge Resort Limited Partnership
(collectively, "New Sundance"). For the following reasons, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2            In 1996, Lynn and Elaine Ellsworth purchased Rogers Ranch,
which consisted of three parcels: Section 17, Section 18, and part of Section
19. At that time, State Route 277 ("SR 277") ran parallel to the ranch's
southern border, and a two-track ranch road ran along Section 17 and
Section 18's boundary line, perpendicular to SR 277 and crosswise to the
Apache Railway tracks.

¶3            In 1997 and 1998, the Ellsworths sold the southern portion of
Section 18 ("South Property") and Section 19 to Jerry and Bette Smith. In
2001, the Ellsworths sold Section 17 to a developer and granted an easement
on the west side of Section 17 to the Aztec Land and Cattle Company
("Aztec easement"). After the sale of Section 17, the Ellsworths continued
to use the ranch road to access the remaining northern portion of Section 18
("North Property"), which they owned with David and Sandra Decker.

¶4             In 2004, the Smiths sold the South Property to New Sundance.
Shortly after, New Sundance leased a portion of the South Property to the
Deckers to graze livestock. About 10 years later, the Ellsworths began to
construct a house on the North Property. In applying for a construction
permit, the Ellsworths stated that the Aztec easement was a right of access
to the North Property. A few years later, the Deckers transferred their
portion of the North Property to the Ellsworths.

¶5           In January 2019, the Ellsworths deeded a portion of the North
Property to Sean and Shannon Cutler, who also built a house and used the

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
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ranch road to access their land. By this time, the Ellsworths had moved,
graded, and widened the ranch road onto the South Property where it had
previously crossed over into Section 17 and connected to the North
Property's southern border, and eventually moved the ranch road to run
straight through the South Property to the North Property's southern
border, while the ranch road over Section 17 had fallen into disuse.

¶6             In May 2019, New Sundance sent the Cutlers a demand letter,
prohibiting access over the ranch road, and including two quitclaim deeds,
which the Cutlers refused to execute. Seven months later, New Sundance
sued the Cutlers, seeking to quiet title to the ranch road and claiming
trespass. The Cutlers counterclaimed, arguing they had an easement over
the ranch road by (1) prior use, (2) implied way of necessity, (3) estoppel,
(4) prescription, and (5) private way of necessity.

¶7           The court eventually granted New Sundance's motion for
summary judgment and awarded New Sundance attorney fees and costs.
The Cutlers timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§
12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(1).

                               DISCUSSION

I.     Easement Counterclaims.

¶8              We review an order granting summary judgment de novo,
Jackson v. Eagle KMC L.L.C., 245 Ariz. 544, 545, ¶ 7 (2019), and may affirm "if
it is correct for any reason apparent in the record," Forszt v. Rodriguez, 212
Ariz. 263, 265, ¶ 9 (App. 2006). We view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Andrews v. Blake,
205 Ariz. 236, 240, ¶ 12 (2003).

¶9            Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine dispute
of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating both the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact and
why summary judgment should be entered in its favor. Nat'l Bank of Ariz.
v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 14 (App. 2008). When the moving party
argues it is entitled to summary judgment because the non-moving party
lacks evidence to support its claim, the moving party must do more than
make bald assertions that the non-moving party has no evidence
supporting its claim. Id. at 118, ¶ 23. "[T]he burden then shifts to the
non-moving party to present sufficient evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine factual dispute as to a material fact." Id. at 119, ¶ 26.

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶10            The Cutlers argue that the superior court erred when it found
no genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment to New
Sundance. The Cutlers claimed an easement over the ranch road by (1)
estoppel, (2) prior use (implied easement of necessity), (3) prescription, (4)
private way of necessity, and (5) implied way of necessity, all of which the
superior court rejected. The Cutlers do not pursue the implied way of
necessity claim on appeal. As discussed below, for each easement claim,
the Cutlers failed to establish disputed facts as to an essential element of
their claims and the court did not err in granting New Sundance's motion
for summary judgment. See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 310 (1990)
(granting summary judgment to the moving party is appropriate when that
party shows that "no evidence existed to support an essential element of the
claim").

¶11           "An easement is a right to use the land of another for a specific
purpose." Scalia v. Green, 229 Ariz. 100, 102, ¶ 7 (App. 2011). "Easements
usually are created by express conveyance, typically by deed, but may come
into being less explicitly, by implication, or against the will of the owner of
the burdened estate, by prescription." Rogers v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Ariz., 233 Ariz. 262, 266, ¶ 10 (App. 2013).

       A.     Easement by Estoppel.

¶12            "In the absence of contrary precedent, Arizona courts look to
the Restatement." Paxson v. Glovitz, 203 Ariz. 63, 67, ¶ 21 n.3 (App. 2002).
A landowner is estopped to deny the existence of an easement when (1) the
landowner "permitted another to use that land under circumstances in
which it was reasonable to foresee that the user would substantially change
position believing that the permission would not be revoked," (2) "the user
did substantially change position in reasonable reliance on that belief," and
(3) "injustice can be avoided only by establishment" of an easement.
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.10(1) (2000). For a
"plaintiff to invoke an equitable estoppel, it must clearly show that there
was reliance upon the conduct and conversations of the defendants."
Vantex Land & Dev. Co. v. Schnepf, 82 Ariz. 54, 57 (1957); cf. Flying Diamond
Airpark, LLC v. Meienberg, 215 Ariz. 44, 50, ¶ 28 (App. 2007) (quoting City of
Tucson v. Whiteco Metrocom, Inc., 194 Ariz. 390, 396, ¶ 22 (App. 1999))
(equitable estoppel); Chewning v. Palmer, 133 Ariz. 136, 138 (1982)
(promissory estoppel).

¶13          The Cutlers argue that because New Sundance permitted
them to use the ranch road to show Section 18 to prospective buyers, they
"reasonably believe[d] that permission would not be revoked" and that they

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

"changed their position in reliance on the belief that [New Sundance's]
permission would not be revoked." Specifically, the Cutlers argue that they
frequently graded the ranch road, retained the North Property, later
purchased the Deckers' portion of the North Property, and "then built a
house in the belief that they had permission to use the [ranch road] and that
permission would not be revoked."

¶14           But the parties agree that the express permission to use the
ranch road was for the limited purpose of selling the property. Permission
for a limited purpose does not necessarily imply that permission would
continue once the Cutlers and Deckers managed to sell either the South
Property, the North Property, or all of Section 18. And aside from the
livestock grazing leases and permission to use the ranch road during
pre-litigation negotiations, the Cutlers do not provide evidence of other
permissions that would have extended the use of the ranch road beyond
the sale of the property. Instead, they only assert they "assume[d]" they
could use it based on prospective buyers' possible future rights of access
over the ranch road. Such an assumption was not reasonable. See Manicom
v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 236 Ariz. 153, 160, ¶ 28 (App. 2014) (rejecting equitable
estoppel claim where initial activities "were not necessarily inconsistent"
with later positions). Moreover, New Sundance was not obliged to protest
the Cutlers' home constructions or construction permits based on the
Cutlers' belief that it would give them an easement over New Sundance's
land. See Vantex Land & Dev. Co., 82 Ariz. at 58 (noting that defendant was
not obliged to protest plaintiff's application for a construction permit
"merely because plaintiff might have thought such permit, if allowed,
would give an easement over defendants' land").

¶15            The Cutlers also rely on Illustration Five from Restatement
(Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.10, arguing it is "particularly
illustrative" and shows that the Cutlers "could reasonably believe that
permission would not be revoked," absent "a clear admonition" that
permission to use the ranch road to sell the property did not include a right
of access. We need not decide whether Illustration Five is consistent with
Arizona precedent, e.g., Vantex Land & Dev. Co., 82 Ariz. at 58, because
Illustration Five is inapposite to the present case. The landowner in
Illustration Five knew that (1) the adjacent property was landlocked; (2) his
neighbor used the road to access the adjacent property; and (3) his neighbor
was building a house on the adjacent property because the landowner
"discussed the progress of the construction" with his neighbor on "several
occasions." Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.10 cmt. e, illus.
5 (2000). The Cutlers adduced no evidence to show that similar facts apply
in this case.

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶16         Thus, the Cutlers failed to establish that they were entitled to
an easement by estoppel over the ranch road, and we affirm summary
judgment on this claim.

       B.     Easement by Prior Use (Implied Easement of Necessity).

¶17            "An implied easement of necessity requires: (1) a single tract
of land arranged in a manner where one portion of the land derives a benefit
from the other; (2) unity of ownership; (3) severance of the land into two or
more parcels; (4) long, continued, obvious use of the subservient land, to a
degree which shows permanency—by the dominate land—prior to the
severance; and (5) the use of the claimed easement must be essential to the
beneficial enjoyment of the dominate land." Dabrowski v. Bartlett, 246 Ariz.
504, 513–14, ¶ 24 (App. 2019) (citing Porter v. Griffith, 25 Ariz. App. 300, 302
(1975)); cf. Koestel v. Buena Vista Pub. Serv. Corp., 138 Ariz. 578, 580 (App.
1984) (quoting Porter, 25 Ariz. App. at 302). As to the fifth element, the
necessity of the easement must exist at the time of conveyance. Pugh v. Cook,
153 Ariz. 246, 248 (App. 1987); Koestel, 138 Ariz. at 580 (noting an implied
easement arises only from an earlier land conveyance and represents "an
attempt to infer the intention of the parties" who meant to include "in the
conveyance whatever is necessary for its beneficial use and enjoyment").

¶18           The Cutlers argue that the court erred when it found that
there was no dispute of material fact to show that at the time the Cutlers
severed Section 18, the Cutlers had "a necessary use" to access the North
Property through the South Property. The Cutlers specifically argue that a
genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the ranch road was
essential to the North Property at the time of severance. We reject this
argument for two reasons.

¶19          First, the ranch road was not essential to the beneficial
enjoyment of the North Property at the time the Cutlers conveyed the South
Property to the Smiths because the Cutlers still owned Section 17, which
connected to SR 277. The Cutlers later landlocked the North Property only
when they conveyed Section 17 to a developer.

¶20           Second, New Sundance provided evidence from a surveyor,
who determined that the ranch road initially crossed over into Section 17
and was not completely moved onto Section 18 until sometime between
2012 and 2014, years after the original conveyance to the Smiths. The
Cutlers offered no contradictory evidence. Absent conflicting evidence, the
survey rebuts the Cutlers' argument that the ranch road through Section 18
was "essential" to the North Property at the time of severance. See Portonova

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                        Decision of the Court

v. Wilkinson, 128 Ariz. 501, 502 (1981) ("In the absence of controverting
affidavits, facts alleged by affidavits attached to a motion for summary
judgment may be considered true, and if appropriate, summary judgment
may be granted."). New Sundance also pointed to deposition excerpts from
Elaine Ellsworth, indicating a 2013 (or 2014) land survey revealed that the
ranch road crossed over into Section 17 just south of the Cutlers' property
line, which prompted Lynn Ellsworth to "straighten" out the ranch road
onto Section 18. Whether in 2013 or 2014, the ranch road did not connect
the South Property to the North Property through Section 18 until the
Cutlers moved that portion of the ranch road on Section 17 to Section 18.
Thus, the Cutlers failed to show that at the time of severance the ranch road
was essential to the beneficial enjoyment of the North Property. See Pugh,
153 Ariz. at 248 (finding that when a party has failed to show the
beneficial-enjoyment element, the entire easement claim fails). We
therefore affirm summary judgment on the Cutlers' prior use claim.

       C.     Easement by Prescription.

¶21            A party claiming an easement by prescription "must establish
that the land in question has actually and visibly been used for ten years,
that the use began and continued under a claim of right, and [that] the use
was hostile to the title of the true owner." Paxson, 203 Ariz. at 67, ¶ 22
(quoting Harambasic v. Owens, 186 Ariz. 159, 160 (App. 1996)); see Krencicki
v. Petersen, 22 Ariz. App. 1, 3 (1974) ("[E]asements by prescription are not
favored because of the losses or forfeiture of rights inflicted upon others.").
"[O]nce the party claiming the easement has shown that his or her use
during the statutory period was 'open, visible, continuous, and
unmolested,' Arizona law presumes that the use was under a claim of right
and not permissive." Spaulding v. Pouliot, 218 Ariz. 196, 201, ¶ 14 (App.
2008) (quoting Gusheroski v. Lewis, 64 Ariz. 192, 198 (1946)). The burden
then shifts to the property owner to show that the use was permissive. Id.
"If the use is permissive, it cannot ripen into an easement by prescription
because it is neither 'hostile' nor 'adverse' to the owner's title." Paxson, 203
Ariz. at 67, ¶ 22 (quoting Herzog v. Boykin, 148 Ariz. 131, 133 (App. 1985)).

¶22            Further, the "mere use of another's property is insufficient to
create ownership or prescriptive use without some additional act or
circumstance indicating that the use is not merely permissive but hostile to
the owner's rights."        Herzog, 148 Ariz. at 133 (citation omitted).
Additionally, it is insufficient "that the claim of right exists only in the mind
of the person claiming it. It must in some way be asserted in such manner
that the owner may know of the claim." LaRue v. Kosich, 66 Ariz. 299, 303
(1947) (citation and emphasis omitted). And where "implied permissive use

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                       Decision of the Court

of the land continue[s], through 'the neighborly indulgence of its owner,' it
could not ripen into a prescriptive use without 'a distinct and positive
assertion of a right hostile to the owner [being] brought home to him by
words or acts.'" Herzog, 148 Ariz. at 133 (quoting LaRue, 66 Ariz. at 306).

¶23            The Cutlers argue that New Sundance failed to show that the
use over the ranch road was permissive. But we must first determine
whether the Cutlers provided any evidence to show they used the ranch
road for the statutory period and that the use was open, visible, continuous,
and unmolested. See Spaulding, 218 Ariz. at 201, ¶ 14 (presuming
permissive use only after the land in question has been openly, visibly, and
continuously used for the statutory period).

¶24            The 10-year statutory period began sometime between 2012
and 2014 when the Cutlers moved a portion of the ranch road that
connected to the North Property and crossed over into Section 17 north of
the railroad tracks onto Section 18. The Cutlers note that "until at least
October 2012" the ranch road north of the railroad tracks "crossed over onto
[S]ection 17," citing to a declaration offered by New Sundance's
representative. New Sundance offered evidence that Elaine Ellsworth
admitted that the portion of the ranch road that crossed into Section 17 just
south of the Cutlers' property line was "straighten[ed]" out by Lynn
Ellsworth and moved onto Section 18 sometime after a 2013 (or 2014) survey
was completed. New Sundance also pointed to the survey, supra ¶ 20,
showing that the ranch road that crossed into Section 17 north of the
railroad tracks and connected to the North Property, was moved sometime
between 2012 and 2014. The Cutlers did not dispute this evidence and cite
to the same evidence in their opening brief. New Sundance sought to quiet
title to the ranch road in 2019. Thus, even if the Cutlers began using the
ranch road in that part of Section 18 in 2012, no reasonable juror could
conclude that the Cutlers met the 10-year statutory period, and their claim
as to that portion of the ranch road fails.

¶25           The remaining portion of the ranch road that ran south of the
railroad tracks was conveyed to the Smiths in 1998, and the Smiths then
conveyed that portion of Section 18 to The Bear Ridge Resort in 2004. The
parties do not dispute whether the Cutlers failed to show that they "actually
and visibly" used the remaining portion of the ranch road. Instead, the
Cutlers argue that New Sundance failed to show that the use over the ranch
road was permissive.

¶26          New Sundance provided a declaration from their
representative, indicating that he "granted Decker and Ellsworth

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                       Decision of the Court

permission to enter the New Sundance and Bear Ridge parcels to show the
property to any potential buyers, and verbally agreed to give them a
commission if they managed to sell it." New Sundance's representative also
indicated that the "first [he] heard that Lynn Ellsworth was claiming a right
to cross [their] property in Section 18 was June 2019." Here, the Cutlers
failed to establish prescriptive use for two reasons. First, New Sundance's
grant of permission to Lynn Ellsworth would preclude an easement by
prescription over the ranch road. Paxson, 203 Ariz. at 67, ¶ 22. Though the
Cutlers provided deposition excerpts from the representative, in opposition
to New Sundance's summary judgment motion, those excerpts indicate that
the Cutlers had permission to access the ranch road and the South Property
to show Section 18 to prospective buyers. Second, even though the Cutlers
eventually made "a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile" to New
Sundance in 2019, the representative had already granted permission to the
Cutlers to use the ranch road by that time. LaRue, 66 Ariz. at 306. Thus, the
Cutlers failed to establish a claim for an easement by prescription over the
remaining ranch road. We therefore affirm summary judgment on the
prescriptive use claim.

       D.     Private Way of Necessity.

¶27            The Cutlers alternatively argue they are entitled to a private
way of necessity over the ranch road. Arizona law permits a private
landowner to condemn and take lands of another when the land "is so
situated with respect to the land of another that it is necessary for its proper
use and enjoyment to have and maintain a private way of necessity." A.R.S.
§ 12-1202(A). The "landowner seeking to condemn a private way of
necessity over the lands of another must show a 'reasonable necessity' for
the taking." Tobias v. Dailey, 196 Ariz. 418, 420, ¶ 1 (App. 2000). To prove
"reasonable necessity," the landowner seeking condemnation must prove
that "they lack an adequate alternative outlet." Id. at ¶ 8. A private way of
necessity "comes into existence only if no other access exists by common
law implication." Bickel v. Hansen, 169 Ariz. 371, 375 (App. 1991)
(distinguishing an implied way of necessity from an implied easement of
necessity). An implied way of necessity is dependent on (1) "unity of
ownership of the dominant and servient estates," (2) "a severance thereof,"
(3) "no outlet" for the dominant estate, and (4) showing that "reasonable
necessity" for access existed at the time of severance. Id. at 374. A way of
necessity results from "the presumption that whenever a party conveys
property he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that
property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of the land
he still possesses." Id.

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

¶28            The Cutlers failed to establish that they lack an adequate
alternative outlet over Section 17, the conveyance of which caused the
North Property to become landlocked in the first instance. The Cutlers
argue that the North Property had adequate and legal access through the
ranch road at the time they conveyed Section 17 to the developer, and
accordingly, could not acquire an implied way of necessity over Section 17.
But the Cutlers assumed that they had the legal right to use the ranch road,
which they failed to prove, see supra ¶¶ 12–26, and abandoned their implied
way of necessity claim over Section 18. Conceding unity of title over the
North Property and Section 17 at the time they conveyed Section 17 to the
developer, and failing to prove legal access to the North Property at the
time of conveyance, other than over the ranch road, the Cutlers failed to
adequately rebut the inference that they were entitled to an implied way of
necessity over Section 17. See Dabrowski, 246 Ariz. at 514, ¶¶ 26–27 (defining
implied way of necessity). The Cutlers also argue that at the time they sold
Section 17, the developer "took an option on the northern portion of section
18 making the need for an easement, at that juncture, moot." But the Cutlers
fail to explain how the developer's option in the North Property provided
them legal access to the North Property, making an implied way of
necessity "moot." Thus, the court properly granted New Sundance's motion
for summary judgment as to the private way of necessity claim.

II.    Quiet Title and Trespass.

¶29            An action to quiet title to real property may be brought by
anyone having an interest in that property against any person claiming an
interest in the real property, which is adverse to the party seeking to quiet
title. A.R.S. § 12-1101(A).

¶30           New Sundance proved title to the South Property and that the
Cutlers used the ranch road despite not having an easement. Additionally,
the Cutlers "never claimed" title to the ranch road, and conceded that they
used the ranch road to deliver construction material and equipment to their
land and directed the construction workers to cut the gate lock leading to
the ranch road. Thus, no genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding
the easement claims and New Sundance is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III.   Attorney Fees and Costs.

¶31           We review an award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of
discretion. Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Hogue, 238 Ariz. 357, 369, ¶ 50 (App. 2015).

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                NEW SUNDANCE, et al. v. CUTLER, et al.
                       Decision of the Court

The Cutlers request that we reverse the court's award of attorney fees and
costs to New Sundance but have shown no reversible error.

¶32           New Sundance are entitled to attorney fees if they met the
requirements under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). Long v. Clark, 226 Ariz. 95, 96, ¶ 5
(App. 2010) (awarding attorney fees under a quiet title claim). New
Sundance met the statutory requirements: (1) they requested that the
Cutlers execute two quitclaim deeds in May 2019, at least 20 days before
bringing their action to quiet title to the ranch road; (2) they tendered five
dollars for each quitclaim deed; and (3) the Cutlers refused to execute the
quitclaim deeds. A.R.S. § 12-1103(B). The court did not abuse its discretion
in awarding New Sundance their reasonable attorney fees and costs.

¶33           Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. The
Cutlers are not the successful party on appeal, and we deny their request
for attorney fees. New Sundance request their attorney fees under A.R.S.
§ 12-1103(B), citing Lewis v. Pleasant Country, Ltd., 173 Ariz. 186, 195 (App.
1992). New Sundance met the requirements under A.R.S. § 12-1103(B), and
we award New Sundance their reasonable attorney fees upon compliance
with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.

                              CONCLUSION

¶34           For the above-stated reasons, we affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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