Court Opinion

ID: 9775303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:53:33.05002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.808293
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on appeal from the decision of the Circuit Court of Cole County refusing to enjoin the respondent, Secretary of State, from placing proposed Constitutional Amendment No. 5 (hereinafter referred to as “Amendment No. 5”) on the November 4, 1980, election ballot. The present posture of the case results from a series of events and court challenges which began with the filing of the initiative petitions for this amendment with the secretary of state on July 4, 1980.1
The parties assert that we have jurisdiction by virtue of § 126.071, RSMo 1978.2 Our jurisdiction to entertain this case comes from the fact that the constitutional validity of the amendment before us is under challenge. Mo.Const. art. V, § 3, as amended August 3, 1976.3
We take judicial notice of the fact that on November 4, 1980, Amendment No. 5 was approved by the people of Missouri by *9a vote of 1,002,935 to 807,187. We also take note of the fact that S.B. 192, repealing and reenacting § 52.420, RSMo 1978, designed for the primary purpose of creating a court test of one of the provisions of Amendment No. 5, has already been passed by the 81st General Assembly and signed into law by the Governor.4
There is a serious question as to whether there is an appealable final judgment in this case, or if there is, whether the same may have been mooted by the election thereby converting this into a declaratory judgment, in effect, originated in this Court. Because of our prior discretionary denial of appellants’ petition for mandamus (see note 1, para. 11 supra) “without prejudice to subsequent litigation of issues not mooted by the election” and our refusal for reason of time constraints to expedite the hearing on appeal in this matter (see note 1, paras. 17 and 18 supra) and, because of the general interest in and the pressing need for determination of the issues presented, we have resolved all doubts in favor of proceeding with the case. We will not decline to rule upon the constitutionality of the amendment as our sister state Michigan, whose Headlee Amendment is the model for Amendment No. 5, has done on two occasions since its adoption, by reason of “factual and jurisdictional void.” In re Request for Advisory Opinion of Constitutionality of 1979 PA 57, 407 Mich. 60, 62, 281 N.W.2d 322, 324 (1979) and In re Request for Advisory Opinion of Constitutionality of 1979 PA 57, 407 Mich. 506, 508, 286 N.W.2d 686 (1980).5
Questions were raised during argument as to whether certain procedural objections bad been waived by reason of the fact that the election was held prior to this hearing. For the same reasons that we choose to proceed with this appeal we also state that no issues raised by appellants will be deemed waived, although some matters objected to prior to election may be judged by a different standard following the election.
We acknowledge that this posture of the case tends to leave the issues less clearly defined than we might otherwise prefer, but there is no misunderstanding of the basic issues before us.
The fundamental and basic issues here involved are:
1. Were there procedural defects in the initiative petition for Amendment No. 5 which would have justified enjoining its being placed on the ballot prior to election, or which would now justify our invalidating the election because of such defects?
2. Is Amendment No. 5 a validly adopted constitutional amendment?
We first examine the applicable provisions of the Missouri Constitution and the implementing statutes.
Article I, § 1, provides:
That all political power is vested in and derived from the people; that all government of right originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.
(Emphasis added.)
Article I, § 3, provides:
That the people of this state have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate the internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness, provided such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.
(Emphasis added.)
Article XII, § 2(b), provides in part: *10All amendments proposed by the general assembly or by the initiative shall be submitted to the electors for their approval or rejection by official ballot title as may be provided by law.... No such proposed amendment shall contain more than one amended and revised article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith. ...
(Emphasis added.)
Article III, § 49, provides:
The people reserve power to propose and enact or reject laws and amendments to the constitution by the initiative, independent of the general assembly, and also reserve power to approve or reject by referendum any act of the general assembly, except as hereinafter provided.
(Emphasis added.)
Article III, § 50, provides in part:
Petitions for constitutional amendments shall not contain more than one amended and revised article of this constitution, or one new article which shall not contain more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith, and the enacting clause thereof shall be ‘Be it resolved by the people of the state of Missouri that the Constitution be amended
(Emphasis added.)
Article III, § 51, provides in part:
The initiative shall not be used for the appropriation of money other than of new revenues created and provided for thereby....
Chapter 126, which contains the implementing statutes, sets forth the main procedural requirements which requirements for the sake of brevity are summarized.
1. Section 126.031, prescribes the form and format of the petition. See also Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 50.
2. Each petition shall contain signatures from only one congressional district. Section 126.041.
3. Each petition must contain a full text copy of the amendment. Section 126.041; Mo.Const. art. Ill, § 50.
4. Petitions must be signed by eight percent of voters in each of two-thirds of the congressional district. Section 126.051; Mo. Const, art. Ill, § 50.
5. Section 126.061 prescribes the form of the circulator’s oath.
6. Section 126.081 provides for the attorney general to formulate the official “ballot title” which is to be voted upon in the election. See Mo.Const. art. XII, § 2(b).
7. Section 126.151 states qualifications for signers, with penalties. See Mo.Const. art. Ill, § 50.
8. Two sections make provision for court tests of the legal sufficiency of initiative petitions. Section 126.071 provides that if the secretary of state refuses to certify or file petitions, the sponsors may go to the Circuit Court of Cole County for mandamus to compel certification and filing. It is also provided that upon showing that any petition is not legally sufficient, the court may enjoin the certification and printing upon the ballot of . the amendment. Provision is made for the expediting of appeals.
Section 126.081.5 provides that any citizen dissatisfied with any official ballot title or fiscal note may appeal to the Circuit Court of Cole County by petition within 10 days after its preparation by the attorney general.
It is clear that the framers of our Constitution intended that the Constitution be a permanent and abiding instrument allocating and defining the powers of our government.
In State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910), this Court stated:
Constitutional provisions and amendments to the Constitution relate to the fundamental law and certain fixed first principles upon which government is founded.... The purpose of constitutional provisions and amendments to the Constitution is to prescribe the permanent framework and a uniform system of government, and to assign to the different departments thereof their respective *11powers and duties.... “The very term ‘constitution’ implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, ...”
230 Mo. at 433, 130 S.W. at 694, quoting, Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118, 36 P. 424, 426 (1894) (emphasis added).
It is equally clear that the framers of our Constitution recognized the inherent right of the people to amend their Constitution when in Article I, § 1, they stated, “That all political power is vested in and derived from the people ...” and in Article I, § 3, “That the people ... have the inherent, sole and exclusive right ... to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government...” and in Article III, § 49, that “The people reserve power to propose and enact . .. amendments to the constitution by the initiative.... ”
Inherent in the power of the people to “alter”, “amend”, or “abolish” their Constitution is the power and right to amend wisely or unwisely.
Our power to judge the wisdom of the people in adopting Amendment No. 5 was most clearly and succinctly stated by this court in 1896 in the case of Edwards v. Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 33 S.W. 1130 (banc 1896), when this Court stated:
The power — or, rather, the want of power — in the courts to review the policy or wisdom of constitutional amendments is thus expressed by Mr. Justice Brewer6 (then of the supreme court of Kansas) in Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 709. ‘But questions of policy are not questions for the courts. They are wrought and fought out in the legislature, and before the people. Here the single question is one of power. We make no laws, we change no constitutions, we inaugurate no policy. When the legislature enacts a law, the only question which we can decide is whether the limitations of the constitution have been infringed upon. When a constitutional amendment has been submitted, the single inquiry for us is whether it has received the sanction of popular approval, in the manner prescribed by law. So that, whatever may be the individual opinions of the justices of this court as to the wisdom or folly of any law or constitutional amendment, and notwithstanding the right which, as individual citizens, we may exercise, with all other citizens, in expressing, through the ballot box, our personal approval or disapproval of proposed constitutional changes, as a court our single inquiry is, have constitutional requirements been observed, and limits of power been regarded? We have no veto.’
132 Mo. at 434, 33 S.W. at 1133, quoting, Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kan. 700, 706 (1881) (footnote added). See also Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 539, 121 S.W.2d 737, 744 (banc 1938).
Ours is the task of weighing and balancing two contradictory and competing concepts — the need for a stable, permanent organic law versus the inherent right of the people to alter or change that organic law— and to make the final determination as to whether or not this constitutional amendment has been validly adopted by the people. State ex rel. Board of Fund Commissioners v. Holman, 296 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Mo. banc 1956); Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 263, 165 S.W.2d 657, 659-60 (banc 1942); Gabbert v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 Mo. 84, 97-98, 70 S.W. 891, 894 (banc 1902); Edwards v. Lesueur, supra, 132 Mo. at 432-35, 33 S.W. at 1133; State v. McBride, 4 Mo. 303, 306-08 (1836).
Both the Missouri Constitution and the implementing statutes indicate that the drafters of both were aware of and sought to resolve these competing concepts of permanency of the Constitution versus the right of the people to make amendments thereto. Both attempted to set up safeguard procedures relating to the initiative process. All of these procedural safeguards are designed either, (1) to promote an informed understanding by the people of the probable effects of the proposed amendment, or (2) to prevent a self-serving faction from imposing its will upon the people without their full realization of the effects *12of the amendment. The procedural safeguards are all designed to assure that the desirability of the proposed amendment may be best judged by the people in the voting booth.
It is of interest to note that at no place in either the Missouri Constitution or in the implementing statutes is any court granted the power to enjoin an amendment from being placed on the ballot upon the ground that it would be unconstitutional if passed and adopted by the voters. Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 264, 165 S.W.2d 657, 660 (banc 1942). It is also with some interest that we note that we have not been presented with nor have we found a Missouri case where a constitutional amendment has actually been set aside following its adoption by the people.
Since the amendment has already been adopted and the people have demonstrated their will, this Court’s duty is not to seek to condemn the amendment, but to seek to uphold it if possible. Gabbert v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 Mo. 84, 70 S.W. 891, 895 (banc 1902). See 16 Am. Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 56.
It is in this background that we are called upon to examine both the procedures followed by the proponents of Amendment No. 5 in getting it on the ballot and to examine the substantive content of the amendment in order to answer the ultimate question of whether or not Amendment No. 5 constitutes a valid amendment to the Missouri Constitution.
I
Appellants, both before and following the election, have objected to the form or format of the petitions upon the ground that they contained extraneous matters such as graphs and statements constituting advertising and bally-hoo in favor of adoption of the amendment. Other than for the extraneous advertising, the general format of the petitions appears to be in substantial compliance with the requirements of Mo.Const. art. Ill, § 50, and §§ 126.031 and 126.061.
We do not condone either deviation or variation from, or addition to either the requirements of the Constitution and implementing statutes or the statutory forms suggested therein and we would caution those who would use the initiative in the future against indulging in similar practices of including extraneous materials. We do not believe, however, that in this case the Missouri citizenry, accustomed as they are to seeing and reading advertising, were either so confused or were so prejudiced by the advertising graphs and statements, as to justify our invalidating the amendment and overriding the will of the people as expressed by their adoption of the amendment.
II
Appellants have denominated as substantive their objection that the petitions encompass more than a single subject and have denominated as procedural,7 their objection that the title upon the petitions did not fairly state the subject of the amendment.
Mo.Const. art. Ill, § 50, provides the safeguard against petitions containing “more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith.” (Emphasis added.) Section 126.081 sets forth the procedures for the secretary of state to request the attorney general to prepare and draft the ballot title and subsection 5 of the same statute authorizes anyone “dissatisfied” with the title to resort to the courts. Ei*13ther of these matters is reviewable by the courts prior to election. We address these issues together because the scope or breadth of Amendment No. 5 and the fairness of the title which describes the scope or breadth of the amendment are so interrelated.
Generally stated, the central purpose of Amendment No. 5 is to limit taxes by establishing tax and revenue limits and expenditure limits for the state and other political subdivisions which may not be exceeded without voter approval. Amendment No. 5 is popularly described as “the tax and spending lid” amendment, words which also reflect its central purpose. To accomplish the central purpose, the amendment authorizes certain formulas for establishing the limits and provides a method for the repayment of taxes collected in excess of the limit. The amendment further seeks to prohibit the state from avoiding the defined limit or limits by the shifting of governmental responsibilities or the shifting of responsibility for payment for either existing or newly created governmental responsibilities. Provision is made for emergencies. Provision is made in section 23 of the amendment to give taxpayers and political subdivisions standing to enforce the amendment in the courts.8
The official ballot title prepared by the attorney general provided:
Limits state taxes except for yearly adjustments based on total incomes of persons in Missouri or emergencies; prohibits local tax or fee increases without popular vote. Prohibits state expansion of local responsibility without state funding. No savings or costs to the state or local governments can be determined because of the definitions, formula provisions and the exceptions allowed in the proposal.
The title which appeared on the petitions states as follows:
An Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Missouri amending Article X of the Constitution relating to taxation, including but not limited to, limitations on taxation and governmental expenditures and the effectuation of such purpose.
Both the official title and the petition title appear on all notices required to be published by the secretary of state. The official ballot title was never questioned pursuant to § 126.081.
Article XII § 2(b) of the Constitution states that “No such proposed amend*14ment shall contain ... more than one subject and matters properly connected therewith.” (emphasis added). We are unable to perceive how it can be successfully argued that any of the sections of the amendment are not “properly connected” with the central or primary purpose of the amendment to limit taxes and governmental expenditures. So long as the state has the unlimited power to authorize political subdivisions to assume governmental responsibilities and to tax to pay therefor, there could be no effective limitation on total taxes and spending within the state. We cannot say that those sections relating to political subdivisions deal with separate subjects. They are subjects not only properly, but vitally connected with the central or primary purpose of the amendment to control taxes and expenditures. The same is true of provisions relating to the repayment of excess revenues collected and provisions relating to standing in court to enforce the act. All of these items are properly connected to the single controlling purpose of the amendment: to limit taxes and governmental expenditures within the state of Missouri. In Marsh v. Bartlett, supra, it was argued that “control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of bird, fish, game, forestry and all wildlife resources of the State” as provided for in Mo.Const. art. IV, § 40(a), involved- several different subjects. We found no difficulty in holding that all of these matters were “properly connected” with the central purpose of “conservation” thereby making possible the creation of the Missouri Department of Conservation as we know it today. We find it no more difficult to say that all sections of Amendent No. 5 are “properly connected” with its central purpose of limiting taxes and governmental expenditures within Missouri.
Likewise, an examination of the title of the petitions before us and the provisions of the amendment disclose that the title does give adequate notice of the subject of the amendment.
In Union Electric v. Kirkpatrick, 606 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. banc 1980), we held that: [i]f the title gives adequate notice, the requirement is satisfied. However, even a liberal construction as to the adequacy thereof requires that the ‘subject of the act’ be evident with a sufficient clearness to give notice of the intent and purpose thereof to those interested or affected by the proposal. It is not required that the title set out ‘details’ of the contents of the proposal, [citations omitted]. More recently, it was said that: ‘The ability of the voters to get before their fellow voters issues they deem significant should not be thwarted in preference for technical formalities.’ United Labor Committee of Missouri v. Kirkpatrick, 572 S.W.2d 449, 454 (Mo. banc 1978).
606 S.W.2d at 660, (emphasis in original).
In the case before us, the voter is made aware the petition deals with taxation and limits thereon, as well as on government spending and the carrying out of such purposes, and, as we have said earlier, there is no complaint about the ballot title, on which the electorate actually voted, and which likewise makes it plain the proposed amendment pertains to limitation of taxes and governmental expenditures in Missouri. There is, therefore, no basis for invalidating the amendment on these grounds.
Ill
Appellants next contend that the initiative petition did not list all the constitutional provisions being changed by the proposed amendment. This procedural requirement originated in State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (banc 1910). In the Halliburton opinion, Judge Fox writing for the Court stated,
If [an amendment is] submitted through the initiative, manifestly that provision as contained in the initiative and referendum amendment that ‘the petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed’ must be complied with. In other words, if it is truly an amendment to the Constitution, the full text of the amendment and what provision of the Constitution it undertakes to amend must be embraced in the petition.
*15230 Mo. at 436-37, 130 S.W. at 695, (emphasis added).
In Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (banc 1942), this Court interpreted the Halliburton requirement as follows:
We have just indicated the views that existing constitutional provisions may be amended or repealed by implication through an initiative amendment. But in any case such repeals are not favored, and there must be irreconcilable repugnance between the two.... All the more should this be true when such re-pugnancy must be pointed out in the abstract, and not in a pending controversy based on facts. Time alone can ferret out all the consequential and remote conflicts between statutes or constitutional provisions in all their implications. We therefore think the requirement in the Halliburton case, that the proposed amendment disclose the constitutional provisions it seeks to change, refers only to cognate provisions which are in direct conflict — as were the ones in that case.
350 Mo. at 269, 165 S.W.2d at 663.
Moore does not require the makers of an initiative petition to “ferret out” and to list all the provisions which could possibly or by implication be modified by the proposed amendment. It only requires them to list provisions which would be in direct°conflict. This is a reasonable requirement because it would succeed in substantially bringing out the effect of the proposed amendment without placing an excessive burden on those seeking change by way of the initiative. Any amendment dealing with tax limitations is bound to have widespread effects, because money affects every aspect of state and local government. That does not mean an initiative petition must descend to the level of detail advocated by appellants. To make such a requirement would tend to stifle the constitutional initiative process. It is sufficient if the petition points out “cognate provisions which are in direct conflict.” The Missouri Constitution does not require, as did the Michigan Constitution referred to in the Moore case, that along with the full text of the amendment there should be published “ ‘any existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby.’ ” 350 Mo. at 270, 165 S.W.2d at 664. There is no such requirement for our initiative provisions. That is not necessary in order to give the prospective signer a fair realization of what he is being asked to sign. He is interested in the broad aspects of the proposed amendment, not the minute details.
Appellants cite various constitutional provisions that will be changed or affected by the amendment. Nowhere do they allege, and nowhere do we see, any provisions not listed on the petitions that are in direct conflict with or are irreconcilably repugnant to the Constitution. Following the reasoning in Moore, we must rule against appellants on this point.
IV
Appellants contend that Amendment No. 5 violates the constitutional prohibition that “The initiative shall not be used for the appropriation of money. ...” Mo. Const. art. Ill, § 51. The specific section of the amendment complained of is found in section 21.
Section 21. The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the costs of any existing activity or service required of counties and other political subdivisions....
(Emphasis added.)
It is argued that this in effect appropriates money in advance. The key word is “proportion.” The state shall not reduce its “proportion” of the cost of the activity. Nothing precludes the state from either abolishing or reducing the activity or service, so long as the state does not reduce its proportionate share as between itself and the political subdivision. It is the retaining of the proportions which prevents the avoidance of the expenditure limits by the shifting of the responsibility for payments. We find no merit in the allegation that Amendment No. 5 appropriates in contravention of the Constitution.
*16V
Appellants contend that Amendment No. 5 is invalid because it is in actuality a legislative act and not a constitutional amendment, citing State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (banc 1910). In Halliburton this Court held that constitutional amendments are by their nature a part of the permanent law of this state. The proposed initiative measure in Halliburton purported to redistrict senatorial districts for a period of time ending in 1920. On its face this initiative measure was to operate for a finite period of time. Because the initiative measure was temporary it was not a part of the permanent law of this state “and should not be submitted under the false cognomen of an amendment.” Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526, 535, 121 S.W.2d 737, 741 (banc 1938). In the instant case, the language of Amendment No. 5 does not establish any temporal limits for its operation. Rather, the provisions of the amendment are such that they may become a permanent part of the law of Missouri.
VI
The “inherent, sole and exclusive right” of the people to amend “alter and abolish their constitution and form of government” is expressly made subject to the provisions that “such change be not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” Mo. Const, art. I, § 3.
It is neither alleged nor argued in this proceeding that Amendment No. 5 violates or is repugnant to the United States Constitution. We therefore are not required and do not choose to examine or rule on this issue.9
We conclude that there was substantial compliance with the provisions of the Constitution and the implementing statutes in the placing of Amendment No. 5 on the ballot where it was approved by the people, thereby becoming a validly adopted amendment to the Constitution of Missouri. The judgment of the circuit court denying appellants request that the secretary of state be enjoined from placing Amendment No. 5 on the ballot is affirmed.
BARDGETT, C. J., and DONNELLY, SEILER, WELLIVER and HIGGINS, JJ., concur.
RENDLEN, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of MORGAN, J.
MORGAN, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion filed and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of RENDLEN, J.

.Chronologically the events and court challenges may be described as follows:
1. July 4, 1980 — the initiative petitions were filed with secretary of state.
2. September 3, 1980 — secretary of state announced the measure would not be on the November 4, 1980, ballot because of withdrawal of 1178 signatures in the 6th congressional district.
3. September 5, 1980 — mandamus action commenced by Missouri Farm Bureau, et al. v. Kirkpatrick, to require secretary of state to replace the 6th congressional district signatures on the petitions.
4. September 9, 1980 — alternative writ of mandamus issued.
5. September 11, 1980 — Sixth District Committee for Reasonable Taxation, Inc. seeks leave to intervene in Missouri Farm Bureau case.
6. September 15, 1980 — Sixth District Committee files brief in Missouri Farm Bureau case.
7. September 16, 1980 — oral argument in Missouri Farm Bureau case.
8. September 17, 1980 — secretary of state certified this and three other constitutional amendments to be submitted to the voters.
9. September 19, 1980 — Missouri Farm Bureau case decided, Mo., 603 S.W.2d 947, making alternative writ peremptory and ordering respondent to replace signatures. Motion of Sixth District Committee to intervene denied.
10. September 24, 1980 — present appellants, as plaintiffs, file petition- in this Court for writ of mandamus compelling secretary of state to remove measure from the ballot (Case No. 62514).
11. September 29, 1980 — court enters order denying petition for writ of mandamus in case No. 62514 “without prejudice to subsequent litigation of issues not mooted by the election.”
12. October 1, 1980 — appellants file the present action in Circuit Court of Cole County.
13. October 7, 1980 — leave granted present intervenors to intervene in Cole County action.
14. October 9, 1980 — respondent files answer in Cole County case. Trial court denies petition for injunction.
15. October 10, 1980 — plaintiffs in case No. 62514 file motion for clarification of this Court’s order of September 29, 1980.
16. October 10, 1980 — motion for clarification in case No. 62514 denied.
17. October 17, 1980 — notice of appeal in Cole County case filed in this Court. Motion for clarification filed in this court in Missouri Farm Bureau case. Motion for expedited appeal filed in this case.
18. October 20, 1980 — motion for clarification in Missouri Farm Bureau case overruled. Motion for expedited hearing of this appeal overruled.
19. January 29, 1981 — appeal in present case argued in this Court.

. All references to ch. 125 or ch. 126 are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1978. S.S.S.B. 658, Laws of Mo. 1980, p. 284, has repealed these chapters and replaced them with ch. 116, RSMo Cum.Supp.1980.

. Our order of September 29, 1980, together with our subsequent orders (see note 1, paras. 11, et seq. supra) in our opinion obligates our prompt hearing of this appeal. See also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Davis, 488 S.W.2d 193, 196, (Mo. banc 1972), where we said, “by reason of the general interest and importance of the other questions in the case and need for adjudication at this level, that we will retain and decide the case....”

. S.B. 192, 81st General Assembly, repeals and reenacts § 52.420 by raising the salary of county collectors of second class counties by $100 per year. Both S.J.R. No. 1, 81st General Assembly, and H.C.S. for H.J.R. No. 21, 81st General Assembly, if passed, would in effect submit to the voters the repeal of Amendment No. 5, and the adoption of amendments to the Constitution in lieu thereof.

. The Michigan court, in unpublished opinions, also refused to rule on the constitutionality of the amendment before the election. Hampton v. Governor, No. 62138 (Mich. Oct. 24, 1978); Ferency v. Secretary of State, No. 61984 (Mich. Sept. 11, 1978).

. Justice David J. Brewer, United States Supreme Court 1890-1910.

. In Moore v. Brown, 350 Mo. 256, 165 S.W.2d 657 (banc 1942) indicates that an alleged defect is substantive if it relates to a requirement applicable to all constitutional amendments whether initiated by convention, legislative resolution or by initiative petitions. The requirement that any amendment be limited to a single subject matter and the requirement that any amendment be contained within a single article were therefore substantive in nature. 350 Mo. at 267, 165 S.W.2d at 662. Objections to procedural defects are normally waived if not raised prior to election, State v. Burns, 351 Mo. 163, 174, 172 S.W.2d 259, 265 (1943), objection to substantive defects are not. Since no procedural objections are here being treated as waived the distinction is of no special significance.

. Standing focuses on a party’s “ ‘persona! stake in the outcome of the controversy.’ ” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1364, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), quoting, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Standing is an aspect of justiciability which focuses on the party rather than the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. S3, 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1952, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
Subject matter jurisdiction is a different matter, as pointed out earlier herein. It is present if “a complaint states a case belonging to a general class over which the authority of the court extends.... ” Coming Truck & Radiator Serv. v. Inc., 542 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo. App.1976). A provision conferring standing does not confer subject matter jurisdiction when the latter does not otherwise exist. An individual who is the victim of a breach of contract has standing to bring suit for damages resulting therefrom, but that does not mean he can commence his action in this Court. Our jurisdiction is set forth in Mo.Const. art. V, §§ 3 and 4, which do not extend to suits to enforce the provisions of Mo.Const. art. X.
Therefore, we note that despite § 23 of the amendment, this Court has no original jurisdiction of suits which seek to enforce the provisions of the amendment. The provision purporting to place jurisdiction of such suits in this Court is not essential to the efficacy of the amendment. If eliminated the remainder is still complete in itself and sufficient to accomplish the purpose for which it was adopted. It is not a provision without which the voters would not have adopted the amendment and without which the amendment would be incomplete and unworkable. Labor’s Educational & Political Club-Independent v. Danforth, 561 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Mo. banc 1978); State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75 (banc 1951). In short, the provision, which is ineffectual with respect to suits being filed in this Court for the reasons earlier stated, is severable. See State ex rel. State Hwy. Comm. v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 742, 751, 19 S.W.2d 642, 645 (banc 1929). Neither dissenting opinion takes issue with the fact that the provision is clearly severable. We note further that Mo.Const. art. V, § 14, already gives the circuit courts “original jurisdiction over all cases and matters, civil and criminal.”

. In oral argument there was brief discussion of the fact that some have urged that section 18(b) relating to repayment of excess revenues hereafter collected might be violative of the equal protection and due process provisions of the U. S. Constitution. The argument is that the taxes or revenues would, for the most part, be taken from the masses (the poor) and returned to the rich who pay the income tax. We are unable to perceive how such a legal issue could arise prior to the existence of such an excess. Even then, evidence would be required to establish the degree of any alleged inequity and the reasonableness of the classification would have to be resolved.