Court Opinion

ID: 9624672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:13:07.041107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:52.334421
License: Public Domain

Carrico, J.,
dissenting
I dissent. I believe the defendant’s act of publicly wearing a vest fashioned from the actual flag of the United States was a violation of Code § 18.1-425 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
I think it necessary to make clear that there are no constitutional questions involved in this case. The defendant conceded, in the trial court, the constitutionality of Code § 18.1-425, and he has made no claim that the statute has been unconstitutionally applied to him. So my decision, like the majority’s, is based solely upon the factual aspect of the case.
Th'e majority holds, without so saying, that the statute in question is malum in se rather than malum prohibitum. I agree with that. Thus, for the conviction to be sustained, it must appear not only that the defendant committed some act which cast contempt upon the flag but also that he intended the flag should thereby be debased. The majority appears to concede that the defendant’s act of wearing the flag-vest did cast contempt upon the flag, but it reverses be*590cause the necessary intent to defile fails to appear from the record. I disagree with that.
The flag is defiled by any act which dishonors it. When the act is one which by its very nature dishonors the flag or is one which any reasonable person would consider a dishonor,1 the intent to defile should be presumed. This is based simply upon the established principle of law that a person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.
Here, the defendant knew before he wore the vest that “this [was] the United States flag.” He also knew that the flag had been previously mutilated by being cut up and sewn into a vest. And he knew that “it was kinda wrong” to wear the vest.
I think any reasonable person would consider it an act of dishonor to wear publicly a vest fashioned from the flag of the United States, knowing that the garment had been a flag which had been previously mutilated by being cut up and sewn into a common article of clothing. To commit such an act under these circumstances is to intend to defile the flag. So I find the necessary contemptuous intent on the part of the defendant to be sufficiently supplied by the combination of his act and his knowledge.
The case of People v. Convgill, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970), supports affirmance of the conviction of the defendant here. In that case, the accused was convicted of violating a flag statute similar to ours for publicly wearing a vest made from a flag. It is true that the accused admitted that he had caused the flag to be cut up and sewn into a vest. But it was the public wearing of the vest that formed the basis of affirmance of the conviction, the California court stating:
“. . . It is not necessary to determine whether the mutilation stopped with the cutting and sewing in private or whether the entire act of cutting, sewing and wearing were so intertwined as to be one act, at least part of which was done publicly. In any event, we feel the evidence amply supports the implied finding of the trial court that defendant’s acts defiled the flag.” 78 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
I would affirm.
I’Anson, J., joins in this dissent.

 People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 123, 257 N.E.2d 30, 35, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 852-53 (1970), aff’d. by equally divided court, 401 U.S. 531 (1971).