Court Opinion

ID: 9399764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 14:09:41.875101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.228909
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of Chester County Outdoor,         :
LLC from the Decision of the East         :
Pikeland Township Zoning Hearing          :
Board Dated March 23, 2016                :   No. 1142 C.D. 2021
                                          :   Argued: November 15, 2022
Appeal of: East Pikeland Township         :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE DUMAS                                                 FILED: June 6, 2023

             East Pikeland Township (Township) appeals from the order of the
Chester County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) in favor of Chester County
Outdoor, LLC (Outdoor), following this Court’s remand. Township primarily
challenges the trial court’s reasoning in permitting Outdoor to erect the billboard at
issue. We affirm.
                                I. BACKGROUND
             Because we write for the parties, we presume they are familiar with the
extensive litigation of this case, which began in 2011. See generally Chester Cnty.
Outdoor, LLC v. Bd. of Supervisors of E. Pikeland Twp., 123 A.3d 806, 807 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2015) (Outdoor I); Appeal of Chester Cnty. Outdoor, LLC, 167 A.3d 280,
282 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (Outdoor II). Briefly, Outdoor is a billboard company and
leases property in Township on Route 23, which is near the intersection of Route
724. Outdoor has been trying to build a billboard on the property since 2011.
             Outdoor contended that Township’s zoning ordinance (Ordinance)
improperly excluded billboards. Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 282. Township and
Township’s Zoning Hearing Board (Board) agreed. Id. at 282-83 (noting that
Outdoor “was the successful challenger” of the Ordinance). Nevertheless, Township
denied Outdoor’s request for site-specific relief. Id. at 284.1 The trial court affirmed,
and Outdoor appealed to the Outdoor II Court. Id.
                The Outdoor II Court granted relief to Outdoor, reasoning that the trial
court failed to comply with the appropriate legal framework for resolving whether
Outdoor was entitled to site-specific relief. Id. at 289-91. The Outdoor II Court
remanded to have the trial court “conduct a de novo review of the evidence presented
before the” Board and, if necessary, hold additional evidentiary hearings. Id.
                Following several evidentiary hearings, the trial court granted Outdoor
site-specific relief. Very simply, the trial court rejected Outdoor’s original proposed
billboard but accepted Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard as site-specific relief.2
Township timely appealed and timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement.3
                                             II. ISSUES
                Township raises three issues, which we have combined into two for

        1
           An appellant that successfully challenges a zoning ordinance as unconstitutional is
“permitted to develop their property as proposed, subject to certain reasonable restrictions,
regardless of how that land is currently zoned.” Fernley v. Bd. of Supervisors of Schuylkill Twp.,
502 A.2d 585, 589 (Pa. 1985). “[T]he governing body must permit the challenging landowner to
develop his land as proposed in the ‘plans and other materials’ submitted with the challenge,
provided, of course, that what is submitted is reasonable, and not injurious to the public health,
safety, [and] welfare.” Id. at 590 (citation omitted). In other words, “the successful challenger
will still be required to abide by all of the reasonable building requirements, density restrictions,
safety measures, sewage regulations, and water requirements, as well as all other reasonable
zoning, building, subdivision and other regulations generally applicable to the class of use or
construction proposed by the landowner.” Id. (citation omitted).
         2
           We discuss Outdoor II and the trial court’s decisions in further detail below.
         3
           The trial court’s final order did not indicate that a motion for post-trial relief is required.
See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(i)(2). The Outdoor II Court also did not indicate that remand was for a
“partial new trial.” See Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(i)(1).

                                                    2
disposition.     First, Township alleges that because Outdoor’s revised proposed
billboard did not comply with unchallenged, preexisting zoning restrictions, i.e.,
“ground sign” provisions, the trial court erred by granting site-specific relief to
Outdoor. Twp.’s Br. at 2. Relatedly, Township contends the trial court improperly
required Township to prove “that the unchallenged provisions of the . . . Ordinance
were not exclusionary.” Id. at 2-3, 22. Second, Township argues that it proved that
Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard was contrary to the health, safety, and welfare
of the public. Id. at 3.
                                       III. DISCUSSION4
               A. Whether Outdoor Was Entitled to Site-Specific Relief
               Before summarizing Township’s argument in support of its first issue,
we discuss Outdoor II and the trial court’s decisions.                      Township apparently
misapprehended the trial court’s decisions, which led to its puzzling argument, infra,
that the trial court “held” that Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard violated the
Ordinance’s “ground sign” provisions. Because the trial court’s actual holding was
more nuanced—it held that Outdoor’s original proposed billboard violated the
Ordinance’s “ground sign” provisions, but those provisions were not material to
regulating billboards—Township’s argument rests on a false premise.
              1. Outdoor II and the Trial Court’s July 10, 2020 Decision
               The Outdoor II Court established a post-remand framework to resolve
Outdoor’s request for site-specific relief, i.e., both Outdoor’s original and revised
proposed billboards.         Simply, Township was required to prove that Outdoor’s
original (1) “proposed billboard is incompatible with any of the Ordinance’s

       4
          Because the trial court heard additional testimony and evidence in resolving whether to
grant site-specific relief, we review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion or an error
of law. Sowich v. Zoning Hr’g Bd. of Brown Twp., 214 A.3d 775, 783 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

                                                  3
unchallenged, pre-existing, and generally applicable provisions”; or (2) “proposed
billboard is contrary to the . . . health, safety, and welfare” of the public; or (3) both.
Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 290-91 (summarizing Fernley, and In re Bartkowski Inv. Grp.,
Inc., 106 A.3d 230 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (Bartkowski), which, in turn, relied on the
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC)).5 The Outdoor II Court held
that if Township met its burden for Outdoor’s original proposed billboard, then “the
trial court must consider alternative sites and/or alternative configurations for the
proposed billboard and fashion some form of site-specific relief,” i.e., Outdoor’s
revised proposed billboard. Id. The trial court would then review the revised
proposed billboard under the above three-prong framework. See id.
               On remand, the trial court initially held that Township met its burden of
proving that Outdoor’s original proposed billboard violated several of the
Ordinance’s “ground sign” provisions. Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 5-7.6 The court

       5
          Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202. The Bartkowski Court
explained that the General Assembly’s “paramount concern” was “to provide a successful
challenger with some measure of [site-specific] relief.” Bartkowski, 106 A.3d at 249. “That
paramount concern, however, may be limited by the coexistence of legitimate health, safety, and
welfare concerns, and in certain cases a review of reasonable standards set forth in pertinent zoning
and land use provisions that may be applicable to a particular use at a particular location.” Id. In
other words, the successful challenger’s site-specific relief must still comply with unchallenged
provisions, to the extent such provisions are material, i.e., applicable. See id.
        6
          Accord Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 5 (stating that “Township met its burden of demonstrating
that the [original] proposed billboard fails to comply with the extant provisions of the . . .
Ordinance” (cleaned up)). Specifically, the trial court held that Outdoor’s original proposed
billboard violated, inter alia, Sections 1902.12 and 1903.2.A of the Ordinance, i.e., selected
unchallenged “ground sign” provisions. Id. at 6-7; see Hr’g Ex. A-2, at XIX-4 to -5. Section
1902.12 of the Ordinance states in relevant part regarding “prohibited signs”: “The following signs,
because their inherent characteristics could threaten the health, safety or welfare of persons in the
Township, are unlawful and prohibited: . . . Any sign, or any portion thereof, which extends above
the roofline of any building or is attached or mounted or painted on a roof.” Section 1902.12; see
Hr’g Ex. A-2, at XIX-4. Section 1903.2.A governs “ground signs”:

                                                 4
held, however, that those unchallenged “ground sign” provisions were not material
to regulating billboards. Id. at 7.7 The court explained that Township did not prove
that the “ground sign” provisions did not exclude all billboards, i.e., such provisions
permitted billboards. Id. at 8-9. For example, Township did not prove that a
billboard could still “convey a commercial message” if limited to an area of 30
square feet or less, i.e., a “ground sign” provision at Section 1903.2.A of the
Ordinance. Id.
               The trial court next examined whether the original “proposed billboard
[was] contrary to the . . . health, safety, and welfare” of the public. See Outdoor II,
167 A.3d at 290-91. The court held that Outdoor’s original proposed billboard posed

       2. Ground Sign - Any sign erected on an independent structure so that the structure
       is the main support of the sign or erected directly on the ground surface or any sign
       which is not supported by any part of a building.

       Ground Sign, Small - A ground sign, fifteen (15) square feet or less in size and
       having a height to the highest portion of the sign of no more than eight (8) feet.

       Ground Sign, Large - A ground sign having an area thirty (30) square feet or less in
       size and having a height to the highest portion of the sign of no more than fifteen
       (15) feet. Large ground signs may be used on residential developments with twenty
       (20) or more dwelling units or in the [identified] zoning districts.

           A. One (1) ground sign is permitted per road frontage on premises where there
           is no directory sign.

Section 1903.2.A; see Hr’g Ex. A-2, at XIX-5.
        7
          Accord Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 290-91 (explaining that the trial court must grant site-
specific relief unless “Township meets its burden of proving the materiality of certain
unchallenged, pre-existing, and generally applicable provisions of the Ordinance and that
[Outdoor’s] proposed billboard is incompatible with such provisions. When applying these
unchallenged, pre-existing, and generally applicable provisions to [Outdoor’s] billboard proposal,
however, the trial court must be mindful to not apply provisions relating to on-premises signs in a
manner that would exclude all billboards or limit the trial court’s discretion in fashioning site-
specific relief to [Outdoor]”).

                                                5
“a risk to the health, safety[,] and welfare of the public.” Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at
10. Accordingly, the court stated it must consider alternative sites or configurations
in order to fashion court-mandated site-specific relief for Outdoor, i.e., Outdoor’s
revised proposed billboard. Id.; see also Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 291.
               Outdoor proposed a revised billboard in anticipation of the trial court’s
mandate to fashion site-specific relief. The trial court held several evidentiary
hearings at which it considered Outdoor’s revised billboard proposal, the proposed
alternative location, and traffic safety. See, e.g., Notes of Testimony (N.T.) Hr’g,
12/18/20.8 We discuss the trial court’s subsequent September 14, 2021 opinion, infra,
as it is not necessary to resolve Township’s first issue other than to note that the court
did not hold that Outdoor’s revised billboard proposal violated any “ground sign”
provisions. See generally Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21.
                 2. Township’s Flawed Site-Specific Relief Argument
               On appeal, Township argues that the trial court held that the revised
proposed billboard violates the Ordinance’s “ground sign” provisions. Twp.’s Br. at
19-20 (referencing the trial court’s July 2020 findings, which were directed to

       8
         In 2013, testimony was adduced regarding the billboard’s impact on traffic safety on the
then-existing Route 23. But in 2018-19, Route 23 was improved—very simply, it was safer than
the 2013 Route 23. Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21, at 6-7. We add that the billboard will be turned off
between midnight and 6:00 a.m. N.T. Hr’g, 11/21/19, at 48.
        Following the hearings, the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. In relevant part, Township contended that the revised proposed billboard did not comply with
the unchallenged “ground sign” provisions. Twp.’s Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of
Law, 8/6/21, at 1, 29. Township, however, did not argue that the provisions were material. See
generally id. Rather, Township suggested that because the revised proposed billboard violated the
“ground sign” provisions, e.g., exceeded 30 square feet, the trial court should deny Outdoor’s
proposed site-specific relief. Id. at 29, 31. In contrast, Outdoor reiterated the trial court’s prior
ruling that Township failed to prove the materiality of the “ground sign” provisions to the original
proposed billboard. Outdoor’s Proposed Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, 8/6/21, at 7. By
extension, the “ground sign” provisions could not apply to the revised proposed billboard. See id.

                                                 6
Outdoor’s original proposed billboard).9 In Township’s view, the Outdoor II Court
held that the trial court must deny relief if Township proved the materiality of the
“ground sign” provisions to billboards. Id. at 20. Township contends that it “met its
burden,” and the trial court erred in granting relief to Outdoor. Id. at 20-21.
Township concludes that because the revised proposed billboard is an impermissible
“ground sign” under the Ordinance, Township reasons the trial court should have
denied site-specific relief. Id. at 19 & n.3. Relatedly, Township also argues that
Outdoor was required to prove that the “ground sign” provisions “would effectively
exclude all billboards in . . . Township or would limit the trial court’s discretion in
fashioning site-specific relief.” Id. at 22 (cleaned up). In Township’s view, the trial
court erred by shifting the burden to Township. Id. For these reasons, Township
concludes that the trial court erred in granting site-specific relief. Id. at 24.10
                                          3. Discussion
               Under Section 1006-A of the Municipalities Planning Code, the trial
court has “broad discretionary powers” to grant site-specific relief to an aggrieved

       9
          See Twp.’s Br. at 19 (asserting “the trial court also properly held[] the proposed billboard
does not satisfy a number of the restrictions imposed by the unchallenged [ground sign]
provisions” (cleaned up)), 19 n.3 (acknowledging that the trial court’s July 2020 opinion addressed
Outdoor’s original billboard proposal but suggesting the holding applied to Outdoor’s revised
billboard proposal). Because the trial court did not have Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard
before it in July 2020, it could not rule on whether the revised proposed billboard violated any
“ground sign” provisions. Regardless, as set forth above, the trial court explicitly held that the
original proposed billboard violated the “ground sign” provisions but that the provisions were
immaterial to regulating billboards. Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 7. But see Twp.’s Br. at 19.
        10
           Outdoor counters by reiterating the trial court’s holding, which was that the “ground sign
provisions are not material to the billboard because they were never intended to regulate
billboards.” Outdoor’s Br. at 12 (cleaned up), 15. Outdoor thus rejects any suggestion that it had
to challenge the “ground sign” provisions. See id. at 15-16. Outdoor also contends that Township
misapprehends the burden of proof for granting site-specific relief. Id. at 18. In Outdoor’s view,
no requirement exists to establish the “ground sign” provisions effectively excluded billboards
because the trial court’s only task was to grant site-specific relief. Id.

                                                  7
party. 53 P.S. § 11006-A; Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 290 (citation omitted). The trial
court must provide site-specific relief to a successful challenger subject to two
conditions. Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 290. First, the trial court’s relief “may be limited
by the coexistence of legitimate health, safety, and welfare concerns.” Id. (citation
omitted). Second, the relief may be limited by reasonable “zoning and land use
provisions that may be applicable to a particular use at a particular location.” Id.
(citation omitted). In other words, “a successful challenger’s request for site-specific
relief must be granted unless the municipality can establish the materiality of pre-
existing and generally applicable zoning provisions and that the proposed [billboard]
is incompatible with such provisions.” Id. (emphases added).11 If the trial court
denies the requested site-specific relief, then the “trial court must consider whether
alternative relief can and should be made available,” i.e., another opportunity for
“site-specific” relief. Id. at 291. Finally, a trial court must strictly comply with a
remand order and cannot consider issues outside the scope of the remand order.

       11
           Section 1006-A of the MPC does not explicitly identify the party carrying the burden of
proof, or the burden of proof itself, in resolving site-specific relief. When a statute is silent about
the burden of proof, we note that generally the burden “may be placed on the party who must prove
the existence of a fact rather than on the party who must prove its non-existence.” Barrett v. Otis
Elevator Co., 246 A.2d 668, 673 (Pa. 1968). Further, absent statutory language to the contrary, we
presume the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Navarra, 185 A.3d 342,
354 (Pa. Super. 2018). A “preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest evidentiary standard,
is tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.” W. Chester Univ. of Pa. v. Schackner, 124 A.3d
382, 393 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). A party satisfies “its burden of proof with evidence that is substantial
and legally credible, not with mere suspicion or by only a scintilla of evidence.” Elk Mountain Ski
Resort, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tietz, deceased), 114 A.3d 27, 34 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
(cleaned up) (Elk). In any event, the Outdoor II Court imposed the burden of proof on Township.
        Generally, an appellant contending that it met its burden of proof must cite to the record
where such evidence may be found. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d); see also Diamond v. Chulay, 811 F. Supp.
1321, 1335 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Courts typically cannot act as counsel and search the record for
supporting authorities, as “[t]o do so places the Court in the conflicting roles of advocate and
neutral arbiter.” Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 371 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). Here,
Township did not cite to the record where such evidence was presented to the trial court.

                                                  8
Marshall v. Commonwealth, 197 A.3d 294, 306 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
               Instantly, Township apparently misunderstood Outdoor II and the trial
court’s subsequent decisions. Otherwise, we cannot discern why Township would
argue that the trial court held that the revised proposed billboard violated the
Ordinance’s “ground sign” provisions. See Twp.’s Br. at 19-20. The trial court never
made any such holding. See generally Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21. Rather, the court held
that Outdoor’s original proposed billboard violated the Ordinance’s “ground sign”
provisions but that Township failed to prove the provisions’ materiality. See Trial
Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 6-7.12
               To the extent that Township argues that it “met its burden” of proving
materiality, Township did not explain how the trial court erred. Township failed to
identify substantial and legally credible evidence that the “ground sign” provisions
were material to regulating billboards. See Elk, 114 A.3d at 34; see generally
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d). Regardless, Township certainly was not aggrieved by any error
involving materiality, because the trial court rejected Outdoor’s original proposed
billboard on a different basis, i.e., it was found to be a danger to the public health,
safety, and welfare. See Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 10.
               To the degree that Township asserts that Outdoor had the burden of
proving the “ground sign” provisions effectively excluded all billboards, nothing in
the Outdoor II Court’s decision placed any such burden on Outdoor. See Outdoor

       12
          Because the trial court agreed that the “ground sign” provisions improperly excluded all
billboards generally, that holding would necessarily apply to the discrete revised proposed
billboard. Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 7; see also Bienert v. Bienert, 168 A.3d 248, 254 (Pa. Super.
2017). Further, even if the trial court’s September 14, 2021 decision could be construed as holding
that Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard violated the “ground sign” provisions, that holding
would contravene the Outdoor II Court’s mandate that such provisions cannot be applied “in a
manner that would exclude all billboards.” Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 291. In other words, the
provisions are not material. See id.

                                                9
II, 167 A.3d at 290 (placing burden on municipality). Township cannot impose a
burden that Outdoor II did not. See Marshall, 197 A.3d at 306.13 For these reasons,
Township is due no relief as its argument rests on an apparent misreading of Outdoor
II and the trial court’s decisions.
            B. Whether the Revised Proposed Billboard Was Dangerous
               Before summarizing Township’s argument in support of its next issue,
we discuss the trial court’s September 14, 2021 decision. The trial court found, inter
alia, that Route 23 “underwent significant roadway improvements” in 2018,
including a new center turn lane and a “realignment of the intersection” with Route
724. Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21, at 3. The court further found that the realignment, in
conjunction with the revised proposed billboard’s new location, ensured that the
billboard was not obstructing the line-of-sight of the intersection’s traffic signals.
Id. Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard, the trial court stated, was more than 150
feet away from any residence and would not project any light into any nearby
residence. Id. at 3-4. As for traffic safety, the trial court acknowledged that before
2018, accidents were higher than average for the intersection at issue, but that after
2018, accidents significantly decreased. Id. at 4-5.
               For these reasons, the trial court held that Township failed to prove that
Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard would still negatively impact the health, safety,
and welfare of the public. Id. at 6. The court also held that because Township’s
traffic safety evidence predated the 2018 roadway improvements, such evidence did

       13
           If Township believed it was aggrieved by the Outdoor II Court’s burden-shifting, then it
should have identified that issue as a basis for granting Township’s petition for allowance of appeal
from Outdoor II. Appeal of Chester Cnty. Outdoor, LLC (Pa., No. 588 MAL 2017, Aug. 28, 2017),
at 2-3. We add that it is difficult to reconcile Township’s argument, which imposes a condition for
relief on Outdoor, with (1) the Outdoor II Court’s directive that Outdoor receive site-specific relief,
and (2) the trial court’s July 2020 ruling that Township failed to establish the materiality of such
provisions as applied to billboards. See Outdoor II, 167 A.3d at 291; Trial Ct. Op., 7/10/20, at 7-9.

                                                 10
not prove the billboard posed an unacceptable public safety hazard. Id. at 6-7. The
court gave little weight to Township’s pre-2018 traffic safety data because accidents
declined after the 2018 improvement. Id. The court acknowledged Township’s
testimonial evidence that distractions cause 15% of traffic accidents and that there
was no way to determine the impact, if any, of a billboard on the number of traffic
accidents. Id. at 7. In sum, the court held that Township failed to prove that
Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard posed a risk to the health, safety, and welfare
of the public. Id. Having summarized the trial court’s reasoning, we next address
Township’s argument for its last issue.
               In support of its last issue, Township contends that Outdoor’s revised
proposed billboard was contrary to the health, safety, and welfare of the public for
two reasons. Twp.’s Br. at 24. First, Township essentially claims that the trial court’s
findings that the revised proposed billboard poses no “unacceptable traffic risk” are
“not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 25-28. Township summarizes
evidence that it construes as proving that the revised proposed billboard poses a
public hazard. See id. Second, Township argues that because the revised proposed
billboard is “inconsistent with the aesthetic standards” of the zoning district, the trial
court “abused its discretion.” Id. at 28-29. Specifically, Township argues that the
trial court should have addressed the “aesthetic impact” of the revised proposed
billboard “shining day and night on neighboring residents and businesses.” Id. at
29.14

        14
           Outdoor counters that Township’s concern about residents having a partial view of the
billboard did not establish a public safety issue. Outdoor’s Br. at 21. Outdoor also challenges
Township’s traffic safety evidence as stale because the roadway was subsequently improved. Id.
at 21-23. Outdoor points out that Township’s own witness testified that the improved roadway was
safer. Id. at 22. Outdoor underscores that Township failed to support its argument with any record
citations. Id.; accord Pa.R.A.P. 2119(d).

                                               11
             “When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a civil case
. . . , an appellate court, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, must determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to enable the factfinder to find that all the elements of
the causes of action were established by a preponderance of the evidence.” Samuel-
Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 34 (Pa. 2011); see generally Schackner,
124 A.3d at 393. A preponderance of the evidence is met with substantial and legally
credible evidence. Elk, 114 A.3d at 34. The trial court, as factfinder, must resolve
any conflicting evidence. Lewis v. Lewis, 234 A.3d 706, 713-14 (Pa. Super. 2020).
             Instantly, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing, and each party
presented witnesses and evidence as to whether the revised proposed billboard
would negatively impact public safety, health, and welfare. See generally N.T.,
12/18/20, 4/7/21, 5/17/21. Although Township baldly claimed that certain findings of
fact “are not supported by substantial evidence,” Township did not identify any
particular findings of fact and how the record did not support those findings. See
generally Twp.’s Br. at 25-28; Elk, 114 A.3d at 34. Regardless, after viewing the
record in the light most favorable to Outdoor, it does not appear the trial court erred.
See Samuel-Bassett, 34 A.3d at 34; see also Lewis, 234 A.3d at 713-14. The trial
court’s findings of fact cited to the record, including testimony that the billboard was
not in the line-of-sight of the traffic signals, the improved road was safer, and the
billboard would not illuminate any nearby residence, which addresses Township’s
“aesthetic” challenge. See Trial Ct. Op., 9/14/21, at 2-5.
                                 IV. CONCLUSION
             For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s September 14, 2021 order.
Township had the burden of proving the materiality of the “ground sign” provisions

                                          12
for both Outdoor’s original and revised proposed billboards in order for the trial
court to deny site-specific relief to Outdoor. Township improperly believed that the
trial court held that Outdoor’s revised proposed billboard violated the “ground sign”
provisions. The trial court actually held that Outdoor’s original proposed billboard
violated the “ground sign” provisions, but any violation was academic because
Township failed to prove the materiality of such “ground sign” provisions. Further,
substantial evidence supported the trial court’s holding that the revised proposed
billboard posed minimal danger to the public. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                              LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

                                         13
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appeal of Chester County Outdoor,     :
LLC from the Decision of the East     :
Pikeland Township Zoning Hearing      :
Board Dated March 23, 2016            :   No. 1142 C.D. 2021
                                      :
Appeal of: East Pikeland Township     :

                                    ORDER

            AND NOW, this 6th day of June, 2023, we AFFIRM the order entered
on September 14, 2021, by the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County.

                              LORI A. DUMAS, Judge