Court Opinion

ID: 9490581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:48:00.44915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:11.216796
License: Public Domain

•FARRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur. I write separately to emphasize that I understand “specific intent,” as used in both this opinion and Twine, to include the mental states of knowledge and purpose.
The Twine court stated that section 876’s language required a level of culpability that exceeded “an objective standard of acceptable behavior (e.g., negligence, recklessness),” and therefore that section 876 defined a specific intent crime. United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir.1988). Thus, Twine holds that the specific intent requirement of section 876 includes those levels of culpability greater than negligence and recklessness, i.e. knowledge and purpose. See id.; Model Penal Code, § 2.02.
Further, section 876 prohibits “knowingly” mailing a communication containing a threat to injure. When.a statute prescribes a level of culpability, that mens rea requirement applies to all other material elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. Model Penal Code § 2.02(4); see United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994) (applying mental state adjacent to initial words to later clauses). “Knowingly” is the requisite level of culpability for the threat element of section 876, as Congress expressed no plainly contrary purpose.