Court Opinion

ID: 9622209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:13:34.4851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:14.468380
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction that enjoined appellant and the Consolidated Government of Columbus-Muscogee County from enforcing against appellees the state licensing law governing residential and general contractors. The trial court found it was “highly likely” that the local licenses issued by the consolidated government and held by appellees were valuable property interests protected by constitutional due process requirements; that appellees were not given notice of their right to apply for an “exam-less” state license; and that appellees had suffered immediate and irreparable damages as a result. Inasmuch as “[t]he granting and continuing of injunctions shall always rest in the sound discretion of the judge, according to the circumstances of each case” (OCGA § 9-5-8), and an appellate court will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its “wide discretion . . . unless a manifest abuse of that discretion is shown” (Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson, 258 Ga. 455 (1) (369 SE2d 736) (1988)), I believe the trial court’s preliminary injunction should remain in place until the underlying legal issues are resolved. As the majority notes, “the sole purpose for granting interlocutory injunctions is to preserve the status quo of the parties pending a final adjudication of the case.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bailey v. Buck, 266 Ga. 405 (1) (467 SE2d 554) (1996).
The major issue for determination in appellees’ complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and their claim for monetary damages is their entitlement to notice that they could apply to be exempt from the testing requirement of the new state-wide licensing program. See OCGA §§ 43-41-8 (a), 43-41-17 (c). The state-wide legislation, initially enacted in 2004 but, through a series of amendments, not effective until July 1, 2008,7 requires any entity wishing *820to work as a residential or general contractor in Georgia as of that date to pass an exam and receive a state-issued license. However, a contractor in business in Georgia who is a Georgia resident and who holds a valid license issued by a local government following the contractor’s passing of an exam “substantially similar to the state examination” could apply, within a certain period of time, for an exam-less state license. OCGA § 43-41-8 (a) (1). The General Assembly’s 2007 amendment to the state licensing legislation pushed back the effective date of the licensing requirement (from January 1, 2008 to July 1, 2008), changed the time within which an application for an exam-less license could be made (formerly January 1 - December 31, 2006, now January 1, 2006 - June 30, 2007), and required certain local governments,8 including the consolidated government, to post the licensing requirements and their effective dates. OCGA §§ 43-41-8 (a), 43-41-14 (b), and 43-41-17 (c) (2008). The 2007 amendments went into effect May 29, 2007, and gave locally-licensed contractors one month, until June 30, 2007, to apply for an exam-less state license. Several of the appellees, contractors who have local licenses from the consolidated government, testified at the hearing on the request for an injunction and the trial court found they would have been eligible to apply for an exam-less license. Yet none did because none was given notice of the opportunity to apply for exam-less state licenses.
Furthermore, prior to the enactment of the state licensing legislation on July 1, 2004, the consolidated government had required local contractors to obtain a locally-issued license in order to do contracting work in Columbus-Muscogee County. In light of the long-time existence of the consolidated government’s licensing program, the consolidated government was entitled statutorily to implement and enforce its local licensing requirements if, in the sole judgment of the state licensing board, the requirements for issuance of the local license were “at least as strict and stringent... as those for the issuance of a corresponding state-wide license. . . .” OCGA § 43-41-17 (c) (2) (A). This statutory language echoes the language of OCGA § 43-41-8 (a) (1) (one with a locally-issued license *821is eligible for an exam-less state license if he/she had to pass a local exam “substantially similar to the state examination . . However, prior to the effective date of the state-wide licensing requirement, the state licensing board did not make a decision whether the exam required to receive a license from the consolidated government was “substantially similar to the state examination (OCGA § 43-41-8 (a) (1)) or “at least as strict and stringent... as those for the issuance of a corresponding state-wide license. . . .” OCGA § 43-41-17 (c) (2) (A). As found by the trial court, it was not until after the expiration of the period to apply for the exam-less exemption that the state licensing board determined whether the consolidated government’s licensing program met the statutory requirements.
Decided March 25, 2010.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, Janet B. Wray, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Reagan W. Dean, Scarlett Elliott, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Waldrep, Mullin & Callahan, Neal J. Callahan, Marchetti & Lomax, Robert R. Lomax, for appellees.
Because appellees were not notified of their ability to apply for and receive an exam-less license and because appellees are no longer able to work in their field since they do not have state-issued licenses, though they hold locally-issued licenses, I believe the trial court acted appropriately when it maintained the status quo by staying enforcement of the state licensing scheme against appellees and giving appellees the opportunity to apply for and receive the exam-less state licenses for which they qualify. Inasmuch as the facts of this case do not reflect a manifest abuse of the trial court’s wide discretion with regard to the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, I would uphold the trial court’s exercise of its discretion. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse that judgment.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Thompson join this dissent.

 The General Assembly’s 2004 enactment of the state-wide licensing scheme for residential and general contractors initially had an effective date of two years following a line item appropriation of funds (Ga. L. 2004, p. 786, § 2), and licensed contractors who wished to apply for the exam-less exemption could do so for a six-month period which began one year after the effective date of the chapter. Ga. L. 2004, p. 809. In 2005, the General Assembly amended the legislation by removing the funding contingency and providing for an effective date of July 1, 2007, and for a six-month period during which applications for an exam-less exemption could be made, starting six months after the effective date of the legislation, i.e., *820January 1 - June 30, 2006. In 2006, the General Assembly pushed back the effective date of the licensing requirement to January 1, 2008, and authorized exam-less exemption applications to be filed from January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2006. Ga. L. 2006, p. 272, § 2 (Ex. Session). In 2007, the Legislature changed the effective date of the licensing requirement to July 1, 2008, and authorized exam-less applications to be filed for 18 months, from January 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007. Ga. L. 2007, p. 669, § 9. The 2007 amendment also required the posting of the licensing requirements and their effective dates by local governments which issued building or other permits for construction work to be done by a licensed residential or general contractors.

 Those local governments that issued building or other permits for construction work to be done by a licensed residential or general contractors.