Court Opinion

ID: 9858951
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 17:46:42.053285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:58:43.125467
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe that NDCC § 39-06-42(1) is inapplicable to a person whose driver’s license is suspended under NDCC ch. 39-16.1.
*855The majority concludes that the language of NDCC § 39-06-42(1) is clear and unambiguous on its face but then spends several pages interpreting it. A statute is ambiguous when it is susceptible of different, yet reasonable, meanings. State v. Silkman, 317 N.W.2d 124 (N.D.1982); Apple Creek Township v. City of Bismarck, 271 N.W.2d 583 (N.D.1978). I believe that the State and the defendant each posit a different, yet reasonable meaning of the “except as provided” language of NDCC § 39-06-42(1), thus making the statute ambiguous. I would therefore resort to the statute’s legislative history to ascertain the legislative intent. See NDCC § 1-02-39; Ladish Malting Co. v. Stutsman County, Etc., 351 N.W.2d 712, 719 (N.D.1984).
The majority dismisses as unhelpful the legislative history. To the contrary, the legislative history sheds enough light to convince me that a person whose driver's license is suspended for failure to provide proof of financial responsibility under NDCC ch. 39-16.1 may not be convicted for driving under revocation under NDCC § 39-06-42.
NDCC § 39-06-42 was amended in 1975 by Senate Bill No. 2039 with the addition of the language “[ejxcept as provided in chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1 and section 39-06.1-11.” S.B. 2039, 45th Legislature, 1975. The Senate Judiciary Minutes of February 3, 1975 state that Senate Bill No. 2039 “amends or repeals all sections which presently define crimes or provide criminal penalties for offenses defined in other sections.” The minutes include the explanation of John Graham, Legislative Council staff, that the bill repealed outdated sections of the Code or sections already covered in the new Criminal Code, eliminated repetition, and “consolidate[d] crime sections that dealt with the same problem.”
The objective of Senate Bill 2039 was to eliminate repetition and consolidate sections “that dealt with the same problem.” Yet, the penalty provisions of chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1 were not consolidated with § 39-06-42 as one might expect if indeed the former sections were viewed as dealing with the same problem as the latter, and if § 39-06-42 is, as the majority concludes, a general penalty section. Instead, the legislature amended § 39-06-42 to except from its coverage chapters 39-16, 39-16.1 and § 39-06.1-11. This indicates to me that the legislature intended to preserve chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1 as separate and distinct from § 39-06-42.
Further, it is presumed that the legislature does not perform idle acts. See Keyes v. Amundson, 343 N.W.2d 78, 83 (N.D.1983). Therefore, if one concludes, as the majority does, that NDCC § 39-06-42 is a general penalty section encompassing violations of chapters 39-16 and 39-16.1, why did the legislature provide and preserve a separate penalty section for NDCC ch. 39-16.1 in § 39-16.1-21, and for NDCC ch. 39-16 in § 39-16-30?
The majority attaches significance to the fact that the penalties for driving under suspension under NDCC §§ 39-06-42 and 39-16.1-21 are presently the same. However, from the time of their enactment until amended in 1975, the penalties of the two sections differed.1 Compare 1935 S.L., ch. 175, § 15; 1943 R.C. § 39-0620; 1943 R.C. § 39-0642 (1957 Supp.) with 1939 S.L., ch. 167, § 35; 1943 R.C. § 39-1454, 1943 R.C. § 39-1630 (1957 Supp.); 1967 S.L., ch. 313, § 2. Therefore, historically, the legislature intended NDCC § 39-06-42 and NDCC § 39-16.1-21 to function independently. This suggests that the legislature intended violations of chapter 39-16.1 be governed by the separate penalty provision of § 39-16.1-21, not § 39-06-42.
The benefit of any doubt in the meaning of a criminal statute should inure to a favorable construction for the defendant, not the State. State v. Hogie, 424 N.W.2d *856630, 635 (N.D.1988); City of Bismarck v. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d 337, 338 (N.D.1988). If a defendant is charged under an inapplicable statute, his conviction must be reversed. See Luster v. State, 746 P.2d 1159 (Okla.Cr.App.1987); People v. Pringle, 151 Cal.App.3d 854, 199 Cal.Rptr. 27 (1984); State v. Trujillo, 106 N.M. 616, 747 P.2d 262 (1987); Walmsley v. State, 35 Md.App. 148, 370 A.2d 107 (1977); State v. Sonderleiter, 251 Iowa 106, 99 N.W.2d 393 (1959) (reversed conviction under state’s financial responsibility statute where defendant’s license was revoked following DUI conviction under operator’s license chapter; penalties under both statutes were the same). Cf. State v. Hogie, supra (affirmed dismissal of information improperly charging auto theft as a class B felony instead of a class C felony).
I am puzzled by the majority’s apparent concern that reversing the conviction would let Grenz go scot-free because of double jeopardy. I am unaware of any precedent that says we construe a statute so as to ensure affirmance of a conviction. I really do not believe that the majority suggests that a construction which reverses a conviction is a ludicrous or absurd result. Whether or not double jeopardy prevents retrial is irrelevant.
In light of the ambiguity of NDCC § 39-06-42(1), its legislative history, and the rules of statutory construction, I would hold that one violating NDCC ch. 39-16.1 may not be convicted of a violation of NDCC § 39-06-42.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
MESCHKE, J., CONCURS.

. When enacted in 1935 as 1935 S.L., ch. 175, § 15, NDCC § 39-06-42 provided that a violation was a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year or by a fine of not over $500, or by both fine and imprisonment. See 1913 Comp.Laws § 9205. When enacted in 1939 as 1939 S.L., ch. 167, § 35, NDCC § 39-16.1-21 provided a penalty of imprisonment for not less than seven days or more than six months, and in addition a fine of not more than $500.