Court Opinion

ID: 9685027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:21:22.138977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.899446
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Presiding Judge.
These appeals are from convictions for engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring to commit the offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, to-wit: marihuana of more than four ounces under the provisions of Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 71.02(a)(5). The punishment assessed appellant Nichols was three (3) years’ imprisonment and a $600 fine. Appellant Dugan’s punishment was assessed at six (6) years’ imprisonment and a $600 fine.
On original submission the convictions were affirmed in a panel opinion. We granted a rehearing to consider the questions raised by the motion for rehearing.
Appellant urges that caption of the bill adding to the Penal Code Title 11, Chapter 71 violates Article III, § 35 of the Texas Constitution and the act is void insofar as it is used to charge offenses involving controlled substances.
Article III, § 35 of the State Constitution provides:
“Sec. 35. No bill ... shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed.”
The caption of Senate Bill No. 151, Acts, 1977, 65th Leg., ch. 346, p. 922, adding to the Penal Code Title 11, Chapter 71 states:
“An act relating to a definition of ‘combination’ and ‘conspires to commit’ in relation to organized crime and to the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity; creating certain offenses; providing penalties and venue for prosecution; providing testimonial immunity; excluding certain defenses; providing a defense by renunciation; amending the Penal Code to add Title 11, Organized Crime; adding Article. 13.21 to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965, as amended; and declaring an emergency.”
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 71.02, enacted as part of said Chapter 71, provides in part:
“(a) A person commits an offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination; he commits or conspires to commit one or more of the following:
“(1) murder, capital murder, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, burglary, theft, aggravated kidnapping, kidnapping, aggravated assault, or forgery;
“(2) any felony gambling offense;
“(3) promotion of prostitution; aggravated promotion of prostitution, or compelling prostitution;
“(4) unlawful manufacture, transportation, repair, or sale of firearms or prohibited weapons;
“(5) unlawful manufacture, delivery, dispensation, or distribution of a controlled substance or dangerous drug, or unlawful possession of a controlled substance, or dangerous drug through for*773gery, fraud, misrepresentation, or deception .... ”
Appellants were indicted under § 71.-02(a)(5).1
In speaking of said Article III, § 35, this court, in White v. State, 440 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1969), wrote:
“The reason underlying this constitutional requirement is to advise the Legislature and the people of the nature of each particular bill so as to prevent the insertion of obnoxious clauses which might otherwise be engrafted on it and become law. Fraud and deception are rendered less likely if the caption or title of an act, which is often the only part of the bill read by busy members of the Legislature, fully apprises the members of the contents of the bill itself .... ”
Shannon v. Rogers, 159 Tex. 29, 314 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Tex.1958), notes the mandatory provisions of the constitutional provision requires the caption of every bill must give all interested persons “a ready and reasonably accurate means of knowledge of the contents of bills without their having to read the full text.”
Appellant argues that the caption here involved failed to indicate in any manner that the Texas Controlled Substances Act (Article 4476-15, V.A.C.S.) was affected by the bill. Appellant contends that there was created for the first time a violation of the Texas Penal Code that incorporated portions of the Controlled Substances Act. We do not have here a bill that amends or changed the Controlled Substances Act. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 71.02(a)(5), creates an offense or offenses within the framework of the Penal Code by mere reference to offenses in the Controlled Substances Act. The Controlled Substances Act was not affected.
Other statutes outside the Penal Code may be looked to in ascertaining the definition of an offense and to give meaning to language that appears in criminal statutes. South v. State, 72 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 162 S.W. 510, 512 (Tex.Cr.App.1913); Carter v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 457, 116 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Tex.Cr.App.1937).
The caption of said Senate Bill 151 of the 65th Legislative Session did not run afoul of Article III, § 35 of the State Constitution. The caption was not required to give notice of what laws it did not affect, amend, change, etc.
Appellants’ contention is overruled.
Next appellants claim the indictment is fundamentally defective for failing to allege an offense because there is no Penal Code offense of “unlawful delivery of a controlled substance.” They argue the court was without jurisdiction to hear their pleas of guilty. Ex parte County, 577 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Appellants base their contentions on the premise that V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 1.03, makes only the provisions of Title 1, 2 and 3 of the Penal Code applicable to offenses outside the Penal Code,2 and since the statute in question [§ 71.02(a)(5)] is found in Title 11 of the Penal Code that it cannot apply to offenses in the Texas Controlled Substances Act.
Appellant relies upon Moore v. State, 545 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and Baker v. State, 547 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). In Moore it was held the general attempt provisions of the Penal Code [§ 15.01] found in Title 4 were not applicable to the Controlled Substances Act. In addition to other historical significances, it was observed that the Controlled Substances Act was enacted without a general attempt provision and became effective four months prior to the current Penal Code. In Baker it was held that the general conspiracy provision of the Penal Code [§ 15.02] found in *774Title 4 did not apply to the Controlled Substances Act. See also Ex parte Russell, 561 S.W.2d 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Dubry v. State, 582 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
The general criminal attempt provisions of § 15.01 and the general conspiracy provision of § 15.02 of the Penal Code do not create offenses in and of themselves. In Moore and Baker efforts were made to prosecute for an attempt to commit or a conspiracy to commit offenses found in the Controlled Substances Act utilizing §§ 15.-01 or 15.02 of the Penal Code because the Controlled Substances Act did not have similar provisions.
In the instant case prosecution is brought under § 71.02(a)(5) of the Penal Code. The offense is there defined and the penalty is contained in the Penal Code. The offense is complete within the Penal Code. Prosecution in the instant case was not dependent upon the utilization of a separate provision of the Controlled Substances Act to make the offense under the Penal Code complete. This is not to say that there is no need to refer to the Controlled Substances Act in ascertaining the definition of the offense under the Penal Code and to give meaning to the language found in the Penal Code statute. Such reference is entirely permissible, South v. State, supra, and Carter v. State, supra, without rendering the statute incomplete within the framework of the Penal Code.
We overrule appellants’ contention that the indictment is fundamentally defective because it did not charge an offense against the laws of Texas.
Appellants additionally argue the indictment is fundamentally defective for failing to state an offense because marihuana is not a “controlled substance” as that term is used in Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 71.02(a)(5).
The indictment alleged in part the appellants did “conspire to commit the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, to wit: marihuana .... ”
Appellants note that on original submission the panel held that references in § 71.02(a)(5) to terms including “a controlled substance are necessarily references to those offenses as defined in the Controlled Substances Act and the Dangerous Drug Act.”
Appellant argues that “a controlled substance” as used in the indictment must follow the definitions in the Controlled Substances Act. In Article 4476-15, § 1.02(5), V.A.C.S., it is stated:
“ ‘Controlled substance’ means a drug, substance, or immediate precursor listed in Schedules I through V and Penalty Groups 1 through 4 of this Act.”
Appellants cite Henderson v. State, 560 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), for the proposition that a “controlled substance” requires that the substance be listed in both a “schedule” and a “penalty group.” Appellants’ reliance upon Henderson is misplaced. Henderson held that a conviction for possession of diazepam had to be reversed because, although diazepam was listed in a “schedule,” there was no penalty for possession of diazepam. See also Riddle v. State, 560 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Henderson did not hold that a controlled substance must be listed in both a schedule and a penalty group.
In Hodges v. State, 604 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), a panel of this court wrote:
“Elsewhere appellant argues that the definition of controlled substance in Sec. 1.02(5) requires a substance be listed in both a penalty group and a schedule before it is a controlled substance. * * * we think the plain language of Secs. 1.02(5), 2.01, 2.04(a) and 4.02(a) indicates that any substance in any penalty group or any schedule is a controlled substance. Only the criminal and regulatory consequences depend on the penalty group or schedule in which the substance is listed. The ground of error is overruled.” (Emphasis in original.)
Marihuana is defined in Article 4476-15, § 1.02(17), and is currently found in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act. (Article 4476-15, § 2.03(d)(13). The penal*775ties for the unlawful possession of marihuana are set forth in Article 4476-15, § 4.051, V.A.C.S.
We hold that marihuana is a controlled substance for the purpose of Y.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 71.02(a)(5).
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
CAMPBELL, J., not participating.

. The indictment is set out in full in the panel opinion on original submission.

. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 1.03(b), states:
“The provisions of Titles 1, 2, and 3 of this code apply to offenses defined by other laws, unless the statute defining the offense provides otherwise; however, the punishment affixed to an offense defined outside this code shall be applicable unless the punishment is classified in accordance with this code.”