Court Opinion

ID: 9717083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:57:35.60513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.106625
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, dissenting: In this case, a member of the jury that found the defendant guilty of murder knew the mother of one of the victims. They both attended the same church. I would hold that the defendant was deprived of the right to trial by an impartial jury, and I would reverse his conviction. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that the defendant had the burden of either showing that he was prejudiced by Mrs. Trigleth’s jury service (111 Ill. 2d at 404), or “that the relationship between the juror and the victim’s mother was of such a character that a presumption of prejudice would arise therefrom.” 111 Ill. 2d at 404. The majority suggests that to establish this prejudice the defendant “could have subpoenaed the juror and others to testify at the hearing on his motion for a new trial” or “[defense] counsel could have attached an affidavit from Mrs. Trigleth stating whether she was actually acquainted with the victim’s mother and, if so, the extent of that relationship.” 111 Ill. 2d at 403. The defendant did attach the affidavit of Mr. Torres, one of the jurors, to his written motion for a new trial. The information in the affidavit tended to establish that Mrs. Trigleth “knew” and “attended church” with the victim’s mother and that Mrs. Trigleth had made up her mind to find the defendant guilty without conferring with her fellow jurors. This affidavit in my opinion raised a presumption of prejudice. The majority’s second suggestion, that defense counsel should have attached an affidavit of Mrs. Trigleth stating whether she was acquainted with the victim’s mother and the extent of the relationship, is unrealistic. It is highly unlikely that a woman who has been named by defense counsel as possibly tainting a murder trial, because she did not properly reveal to the trial judge that she knew the victim’s mother, would now cooperate with defense counsel and sign such an affidavit. The majority engages in speculation regarding Mrs. Trigleth’s relationship with the victim’s mother. The majority states: “Likewise, Mrs. Trigleth’s failure to realize that Marilyn Green’s mother was the same woman who went to her church could easily be explained by the fact that she did not know the woman’s name. Also, the fact that Mrs. Trigleth did not realize that she attended the same church until after the trial had begun would make it appear unlikely that she had a close relationship with the victim’s mother. We note that Mrs. Trigleth never stated she actually knew the victim’s mother.” 111 Ill. 2d at 405. The majority could have speculated to the contrary. It could just as easily be true that Mrs. Trigleth realized that she knew the victim’s mother and went to church with her and that she chose to remain on the jury to make sure that the defendant would get “proper punishment.” Of course, all of this is speculation, but what is not speculation is the fact that the defendant’s life is now hanging in the balance. It may be true that Mrs. Trigleth never stated that she “knew” the victim’s mother, but that was because the trial judge never asked her that question or any other specific questions which he should have asked to determine whether any possible prejudice existed. It seems to me that a substantial question had been raised as to this juror’s possible partiality and the trial judge should have pursued it further. In my dissent in People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 237, I quoted from the case of People v. Cole (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401, wherein this court stated: “The right to a trial by an impartial tribunal is so basic that a violation of the right requires a reversal. (Chapman v. California [(1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824]; Tumey v. Ohio [(1927), 273 U.S. 510, 71 L. Ed. 749, 47 S. Ct. 437].) The right to a jury trial guarantees to one accused of a crime a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. Turner v. Louisiana [(1965), 379 U.S. 466, 471-72, 13 L. Ed. 2d 424, 428, 85 S. Ct. 546, 549].” 54 Ill. 2d 401, 411. In summary, I believe the defendant was denied his right to trial by a panel of impartial jurors when one of the jurors knew and attended church with, the mother of one of the victims, and therefore I believe the majority should have reversed the defendant’s conviction. It is for the above-enumerated reasons that I respectfully dissent. GOLDENHERSH and SIMON, JJ., join in this dissent.