Court Opinion

ID: 9900514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:54.772329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.098615
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                Before
                    HOLIFIELD, HACKEL, and DALY
                       Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                              Appellee

                                     v.

                   Cody B. WATLINGTON
       Machinist Mate (Nuclear) Third Class (E-4), U.S. Navy
                            Appellant

                             No. 202200076

                        _________________________

                          Decided: 6 October 2023

    Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

                              Military Judges:
                        Eric A. Catto (arraignment)
                         Kimberly J. Kelly (trial)

 Sentence adjudged 2 December 2021 by a general court-martial con-
 vened at Naval Station Mayport, Florida, consisting of officer and en-
 listed members. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: confinement for
 two years and a bad-conduct discharge.

                              For Appellant:
                  Lieutenant Aiden J. Stark, JAGC, USN

                              For Appellee:
                Lieutenant Michael A. Tuosto, JAGC, USN
               Lieutenant Colonel James A. Burkart, USMC
             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

   Chief Judge HOLIFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
   Senior Judge HACKEL and Judge DALY joined.

                           _________________________

         This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
              may be cited as persuasive authority under
               NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                           _________________________

HOLIFIELD, Chief Judge:
    A panel of officer and enlisted members convicted Appellant, contrary to
his pleas, of one specification of involuntary manslaughter by culpable negli-
gence in violation of Article 119, Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ], for
negligently shooting a fellow Sailor in the chest resulting in his death. 1 Appel-
lant was also found guilty of negligent homicide in violation of Article 134,
UCMJ, for the same acts. 2 The military judge conditionally dismissed Appel-
lant’s negligent homicide conviction and Appellant was sentenced only for in-
voluntary manslaughter.
    Appellant asserts eight assignments of error [AOEs] which we reorder as
follows: (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
guilty findings; (2) trial counsel was disqualified because he was an accuser;
(3) Director, Naval Reactors engaged in unlawful command influence [UCI]
when he forwarded the charges to a subordinate commander and said he would
fund the trial; (4) trial counsel committed prosecutorial misconduct; (5) the
military judge abused her discretion by denying Appellant’s requested instruc-
tion on the issue of culpable negligence; (6) the military judge abused her dis-
cretion by allowing the victim’s brother to make an unsworn victim impact
statement; (7) a bad-conduct discharge was inappropriately severe; and (8) Ap-
pellant was entitled to a unanimous verdict. We find no prejudicial error and
affirm. 3

   1 10 U.S.C. § 919.

   2 10 U.S.C. § 934.

   3 We have reviewed Appellant’s fifth, sixth, and eighth AOEs and find them to be

without merit. United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987).

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

                                 I. BACKGROUND

    1. The Shooting
    Appellant and Machinist Mate (Nuclear) Third Class [MMN3] Hotel were
friends who lived together with four other Sailors in Charleston, South Caro-
lina, where they attended nuclear power school. 4 Many of these Sailors, includ-
ing Appellant and MMN3 Hotel, owned and were experienced with firearms.
    On the evening of 7 April 2020, Appellant was handling a Beretta APX
pistol that he had recently purchased. He removed the loaded magazine, then
repeatedly pulled back the slide and released it. After doing this several times,
Appellant inserted a loaded magazine, laid the gun on the living room table,
and walked away.
    Appellant had recently learned there were two ways to field strip the
Beretta APX. 5 Either method first involves removing the magazine and clear-
ing the chamber of any ammunition. For the Beretta APX, one then (1) retracts
the slide slightly, (2) presses the striker deactivation button on the right side
of the firearm (resulting in a click indicating that the striker has been re-
leased), and (3) presses the takedown lever on the right side of the weapon and
rotates the lever down 90 degrees, at which point the slide can be removed from
the frame. 6 The second method of field stripping the Beretta APX is similar,
but instead of pressing the striker deactivation button, one pulls the trigger
before rotating the takedown lever and removing the slide. 7
    Intending to demonstrate this second method to MMN3 Hotel, Appellant
picked up his firearm from where he had left it a few minutes before and at-
tempted to remove the slide using the trigger-pull method. Appellant did not
remove the magazine before doing so, nor did he clear the chamber. Appellant
stood over MMN3 Hotel with the plan on removing the slide and letting it drop
into his friend’s lap.

    4 All names in this opinion, other than those of Appellant, the judges, and counsel,

are pseudonyms.
    5 Field stripping is separating the slide and its components from the frame of the

firearm in order to clean and maintain it. R. at 755.
    6 R. at 755-56.

    7 R. at 756.

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

    When his initial attempt to remove the slide did not work, Appellant racked
the slide—chambering a round—and again attempted to remove the slide us-
ing the trigger-pull method. He did this while pointing the gun at his friend.
This time, when he pulled the trigger, he fired a bullet into MMN3 Hotel’s
chest, killing him.

   2. The Preferral and Referral Process 8
    In August 2020, Legalman First Class [LN1] Foxtrot was assigned to Re-
gion Legal Service Office Southeast [RLSO SE]. Following normal practice, one
of RLSO SE’s trial counsel asked LN1 Foxtrot if he was willing to review the
investigation and prefer the proposed charges if he agreed there was probable
cause to support them. When LN1 Foxtrot agreed, he was given a “proposed
charge sheet” and “written materials” regarding the case. 9 These materials in-
cluded “a preliminary investigation, . . . a 70-page Naval Criminal Investiga-
tive Service [NCIS] Report of Investigation [ROI], including a police report and
summaries of interviews of [Appellant] and witnesses to the shooting.” 10
    After reviewing the evidence, LN1 Foxtrot told the trial counsel that, un-
less there was any other evidence to review, he was ready to prefer charges. 11
He then preferred the charges on 31 August 2020.
   During a subsequent Article 39(a), UCMJ, hearing, LN1 Foxtrot testified
that, “[a]t the time of preferral, [he] understood his obligations as accuser [in-
cluded] reviewing the proposed charge sheet and the supporting evidence and
deciding whether or not the proposed charges were supported by probable
cause. He erroneously understood probable cause to mean proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.” 12 He also “understood that he could refuse to prefer the pro-
posed charges if not supported by probable cause and felt comfortable in doing

   8 The description of events in this section are taken from the military judge’s find-

ings of fact in her ruling denying the Defense’s motion to disqualify trial counsel and
motion to dismiss for improper preferral, forwarding and referral. App. Ex. IX. We
adopt these findings of fact as they accurately reflect the record.
   9 App. Ex. IX, at 2. The proposed charge sheet included charges under Articles 118,

UCMJ (murder while engaging in an act inherently dangerous to another) and 119,
UCMJ (involuntary manslaughter – culpable negligence). 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 919.
   10 App. Ex. IX, at 2.

   11 Although he received photographs of the crime scene and victim, as well as vid-

eos of the summarized interviews, LN1 Foxtrot opted not to review them.
   12 App. Ex. IX, at 2.

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

so if necessary.” 13 In fact, he had previously refused to prefer charges in an-
other RLSO SE case due to insufficient evidence.
    A preliminary hearing officer [PHO], appointed by the commanding officer
of Naval Nuclear Power Training Unit [NNPTU], conducted an Article 32,
UCMJ, hearing. The PHO found no probable cause for the charged offenses
and recommended against referring the charges to a court-martial. The
NNPTU commanding officer dismissed without prejudice the Article 118,
UCMJ, charge, but disagreed with the PHO regarding the Article 119, UCMJ,
charge. Accordingly, the NNPTU commanding officer forwarded the latter
charge to Commander, Military Personnel Detachment, Office of Naval Reac-
tors, Department of Energy [Naval Reactors], the general court-martial con-
vening authority in NNPTU’s chain of command, recommending referral to a
general court-martial.
    Naval Reactors declined to exercise its convening authority, instead defer-
ring to Commander, Navy Region Southeast [CNRSE]. The NNPTU then for-
warded the Article 119, UCMJ, charge to CNRSE, stating in its forwarding
letter that the evidence also supported the lesser included offense of negligent
homicide.
    The CNRSE staff judge advocate [SJA] advised CNRSE that he should dis-
miss the charge and specification under Article 119, UCMJ, prefer, instead, a
charge of negligent homicide under Article 134, and order a new preliminary
hearing. When CNRSE indicated his concurrence in his SJA’s proposed course
of action, a paralegal at CNRSE advised RLSO SE trial counsel of CNRSE’s
decision to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge and to have preferred
a negligent homicide charge.
    Trial counsel again approached LN1 Foxtrot, telling him, “We are looking
to re-prefer this case under a standard of negligent homicide vice murder and
involuntary manslaughter.” 14 LN1 Foxtrot had no knowledge of the procedural
history of the case. He was not aware of why the Government was seeking to
re-prefer or what had happened to the original charge sheet, nor did he know
of the PHO’s recommendation or CNRSE’s guidance.
    Relying on his previous, August 2020, review of the evidence, LN1 Foxtrot
did not review any additional evidence before preferring a charge of negligent
homicide on 10 December 2020. Again, LN1 Foxtrot knew he was free to de-
cline to prefer any charge.

   13 Id.

   14 Id. at 4.

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

   At a second preliminary hearing, the same PHO reviewed the same evi-
dence, plus a Navy Times article and a video entitled “Beretta APX 9mm Dis-
assembly Video.” This time the PHO found probable cause for the negligent
homicide charge under Article 134, UCMJ. But the PHO also opined that
CNRSE was disqualified to act as convening authority in this case, as he had
become an accuser when his desires regarding charges were passed to the trial
counsel. Based on this, CNRSE returned the case to Naval Reactors without a
recommendation as to disposition.
    On 10 February 2021, Naval Reactors forwarded the case without recom-
mendation to Commander, Navy Region Mid-Atlantic [CNRMA] for disposi-
tion. Naval Reactors, “in his role as commander atop [Appellant’s] chain of
command, agreed to fund any court-martial should CNRMA choose to convene
a court-martial.” 15 Trial counsel was unaware the matter had been sent to
CNRMA until after the latter accepted the case.
    Trial counsel met with CNRMA’s SJA on 9 March 2021 and recommended
that the Article 118 and Article 119 charges be re-preferred and referred to
court-martial along with the Article 134 charge. Receiving the SJA‘s concur-
rence regarding the Articles 119 and 134 offenses, trial counsel approached
LN1 Foxtrot a third time. Again, LN1 Foxtrot was unaware of the case’s pro-
cedural history, including the change in convening authority, the reasons why
re-preferral was being sought, the results of either preliminary hearing, or any
guidance from CNRMA. And, again, LN1 Foxtrot did not review any evidence,
relying instead on his August 2020 review of the evidence to find probable
cause. On 16 March 2021, LN1 Foxtrot preferred an Article 119 charge identi-
cal to the previous Article 119 charge.
   The CNRMA SJA presented her commander with the preferred charges
along with a recommendation that he refer both charges to a general court-
martial. Based upon this advice and a review of both PHO reports and their
enclosures, CNRMA referred both the Article 119 and Article 134 charges to a
single general court-martial on 30 March 2021.

   3. The Trial
    Appellant’s trial occurred from 29 November to 2 December 2021. After
presentation of the Government’s case, the Defense moved for a finding of not
guilty pursuant to Rule for Courts-Martial [R.C.M.] 917. The military judge

   15 Id. at 6.

                                       6
              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

denied the motion and the Defense rested without presenting a case. After ar-
gument, during which no objections were made, the court closed for delibera-
tions. The members subsequently returned a finding of guilty to both charges.
    Additional facts necessary to resolving the AOEs are provided below.

                                    II. DISCUSSION

A. The Evidence is Legally and Factually Sufficient to Support the
Guilty Findings.
    Appellant asserts that the evidence at trial was legally and factually insuf-
ficient to support findings of guilty for negligent homicide and involuntary
manslaughter. Specifically, Appellant—focusing on the differences between an
M9 Beretta and a Beretta APX—claims “there is no evidence of any culpable
disregard of foreseeable consequences on [Appellant’s] part.” 16 We review such
questions de novo. 17
     To determine legal sufficiency, we ask whether, “considering the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable fact-finder could
have found all the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” 18 In conduct-
ing this analysis, we must “draw every reasonable inference from the evidence
of record in favor of the prosecution.” 19 In doing so, we are mindful that
“[f]indings may be based on direct or circumstantial evidence.” 20
   In evaluating factual sufficiency, we determine “whether, after weighing
the evidence in the record of trial and making allowances for not having per-
sonally observed the witnesses, [we] are . . . convinced of [Appellant’s] guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” 21 In conducting this unique appellate function, we
take “a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,” applying “neither a presumption

    16 Appellant’s Brief at 19.

    17 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ; United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F.

2002).
    18 United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 324 (C.M.A. 1987) (citing Jackson v. Vir-

ginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
    19 United States v. Gutierrez, 74 M.J. 61, 65 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
    20 United States v. Long, 81 M.J. 362, 368 (C.A.A.F. 2021).

    21 Turner, 25 M.J. at 325.

                                           7
             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

of innocence nor a presumption of guilt” to “make [our] own independent de-
termination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof of each required ele-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt.” 22 Proof beyond a “[r]easonable doubt, how-
ever, does not mean the evidence must be free from conflict.” 23

   1. Involuntary Manslaughter
   Appellant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by culpable negli-
gence in violation of Article 119, UCMJ, for killing MMN3 Hotel by shooting
him in the chest with a firearm.
    For Appellant to be found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by culpable
negligence, the Government had to prove: (1) that MMN3 Hotel was dead; (2)
that Appellant unlawfully killed MMN3 Hotel by shooting him in the chest
with a firearm; and (3) that Appellant’s act of shooting MMN3 Hotel was the
result of culpable negligence. 24 Negligence is “conduct that ‘involves the crea-
tion of substantial and unjustifiable risk of which the person should be aware
in view of all the circumstances.’” 25 The President has defined “culpable negli-
gence” as:
       a degree of negligence greater than simple negligence. It is a
       negligent act or omission accompanied by a culpable disregard
       for the foreseeable consequences to others of that act or omis-
       sion. Thus the basis of a charge of involuntary manslaughter
       may be a negligent act or omission which, when viewed in the
       light of human experience, might foreseeably result in the death
       of another, even though death would not necessarily be a natural
       and probable consequence of the act or omission. Acts which may
       amount to culpable negligence include negligently conducting
       target practice so that the bullets go in the direction of an inhab-
       ited house within range; pointing a pistol in jest at another and
       pulling the trigger, believing, but without taking reasonable pre-

   22 Washington, 57 M.J. at 399.

   23 United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 557 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2006).

   24 MCM, pt. IV, para. 57.b.(2).

   25 United States v. Oxendine, 55 M.J. 323, 325 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (quoting United

States v. Brown, 22 M.J. 448, 450 (C.M.A. 1986)) (emphasis in original).

                                          8
             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

       cautions to ascertain, that it would not be dangerous; and care-
       lessly leaving poisons or dangerous drugs where they may en-
       danger life. 26
“The test for foreseeability is ‘whether a reasonable person, in view of all the
circumstances, would have realized the substantial and unjustifiable danger
created by his acts.’” 27
    There is no debate regarding the first two elements of this offense: MMN3
Hotel is dead and Appellant unlawfully killed him by shooting him in the chest
with a firearm. What Appellant challenges is whether the evidence was legally
and factually sufficient to prove culpable negligence. He argues that the evi-
dence does not demonstrate that he intentionally disregarded a foreseeable
consequence of his actions. In essence, Appellant attempts to impose a subjec-
tive intentionality element where none exists. As just explained, the test is not
whether Appellant specifically chose to disregard the substantial and unjusti-
fiable danger created by his acts, but whether a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would realize the danger.
    In arguing for a subjective standard, Appellant relies on United States v.
White: “Mere lack of foresight, stupidity, irresponsibility, thoughtlessness, or-
dinary carelessness, however serious the consequences may happen to be, do
not constitute ‘culpable negligence,’ but for culpable negligence there must ex-
ist in the mind of accused, at the time of act or omission, a consciousness of
probable consequences of the act and a wanton disregard for them.” 28 But this
language from a 1953 case does not reflect the current state of the law.
     Our Superior Court has since held that, for a charge of negligent homicide,
“it is not necessary that appellant foresaw a fatal outcome.” 29 It is enough that
“a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances”—here, that Appellant
placed a loaded magazine in the Beretta APX before setting it down; that Ap-
pellant picked it up minutes later to field strip it; that Appellant intended the
slide to fall into his friend’s lap when he did so; that Appellant pointed the
weapon at his friend when he racked the slide, chambered a round, and pulled

   26 MCM, pt. IV, para. 57.c.(2)(a)(i).

   27 Oxendine, 55 M.J. at 325 (quoting United States v. Henderson, 23 M.J. 77, 80

(C.M.A. 1986)).
   28 United States v. White, 7 C.M.R. 448, 451 (NBR 1953) (quoting People v. Carlson,

176 Misc 230, 26 NYS (2nd) 1003, 1004; CM ETO 15346, Fondren.).
   29 Henderson, 23 M.J. at 79.

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

the trigger—would have recognized the “substantial and unjustifiable danger”
created by Appellant’s actions. 30
    Appellant makes much of the fact that the M9 Beretta, with which he was
more familiar, has an external safety lever and disassembles differently from
the APX, which has no such external safety lever. Rather than see this distinc-
tion as supporting his claim of legal and factual insufficiency, we add Appel-
lant’s relative unfamiliarity with the Beretta APX to those “circumstances” as-
sumed known by a reasonable person in assessing the “substantial and unjus-
tifiable danger”—further supports a finding of culpable negligence.
    Based on the undisputed facts before us, we conclude a reasonable fact
finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s acts con-
stituted culpable negligence. And, like the members in this court-martial, we
are convinced of Appellant’s culpable negligence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, we find the evidence here legally and factually sufficient.

   2. Negligent Homicide
    Appellant also claims that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support the finding of guilty for negligent homicide. As explained above, the
military judge conditionally dismissed the negligent homicide charge and Ap-
pellant was only sentenced for the involuntary manslaughter charge. Because
we affirm Appellant’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter, Appellant’s
claim is moot. Nevertheless, we have reviewed the evidence in this case and
are confident that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the
finding of guilt for negligent homicide.

B. Trial Counsel did not become an Accuser
    Appellant asserts that trial counsel was disqualified from prosecuting this
case under R.C.M. 502(d)(3). He argues that, since Petty Officer Foxtrot did
not review the evidence again before signing the second and third charge
sheets, he must have signed them simply because trial counsel directed him to.
By directing Petty Officer Foxtrot to prefer the charges, Appellant claims, the
trial counsel became a nominal accuser.

   30 Id. at 79-80. Cf. United States v. Weller, 2012 CCA LEXIS 154, *9 (N-M Ct. Crim.

App. 2012) (“We are convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that the appellant, disre-
garding years of prior training and basic common sense, pointed his loaded M9 at LCpl
RM and pulled the trigger, seriously wounding his fellow Marine. The appellant's ac-
tions clearly entail a culpable disregard for the foreseeable consequences to others of
that act.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                          10
             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

    According to R.C.M. 502(d)(3), “No person shall act as trial counsel or as-
sistant trial counsel . . . in any case in which that person is or has been . . .
[t]he accuser.” “The term ‘accuser’ means a person who signs and swears to
charges, any person who directs that charges nominally be signed and sworn
to by another, and any other person who has an interest other than an official
interest in the prosecution of the accused.” 31 Whether someone is an accuser is
a question of law we review de novo. 32
    Petty Officer Foxtrot testified that he reviewed the evidence before prefer-
ring the charges on the initial charge sheet and relied on his memory of that
initial review when he preferred the others. He further testified that he under-
stood his responsibilities as a potential accuser and that he was free to decline
to prefer charges. In each instance he was otherwise unaware of the case’s pro-
cedural history, having no knowledge of the PHO’s recommendations, the rea-
sons why re-preferral was sought, or any convening authority or SJA’s wishes.
This, combined with the fact that the record contains no evidence that trial
counsel directed Petty Officer Foxtrot to nominally sign the charge sheets, con-
vinces us that Appellant’s argument lacks merit.

C. Director, Naval Reactors did not commit Unlawful Command Influ-
ence
    We review allegations of UCI de novo, accepting a military judge’s findings
of fact unless clearly erroneous. 33
    Our superior Court has long held that UCI is the “mortal enemy of military
justice.” 34 The prohibition against UCI stems from Article 37(a), UCMJ, which
provides: “No person subject to [the UCMJ] may attempt to coerce or, by any
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial . . . or any member
thereof.” 35 According to Article 37(a)(5)(B), UCMJ, “No superior convening au-
thority or officer may direct a subordinate convening authority or officer to
make a particular disposition in a specific case or otherwise substitute the dis-
cretion of such authority or such officer for that of the subordinate convening
authority or officer.”

   31 Art. 1(9), UCMJ.

   32 United States v. Ashby, 68 M.J. 108, 129 (C.A.A.F. 2009).

   33 United States v. Barry, 78 M.J. 70, 77 (C.A.A.F. 2018).

   34 United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).

   35 10 U.S.C. § 837.

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

    Yet, even when the prohibition against UCI is violated, “[n]o finding or sen-
tence of a court-martial may be held incorrect on the ground of a violation of
this section unless the violation materially prejudices the substantial rights of
the accused.” 36
    The Defense has the initial burden of raising the issue of UCI. 37 “The initial
burden of showing potential [UCI] is low, but is more than mere allegation or
speculation.” 38 The evidentiary standard is “some evidence.” 39 At trial, “the ac-
cused must show facts which, if true, constitute [UCI], and that the alleged
[UCI] has a logical connection to the court-martial, in terms of its potential to
cause unfairness in the proceedings.” 40 But “prejudice is not presumed until
the defense produces evidence of proximate causation between the acts consti-
tuting [UCI] and the outcome of the court-martial.” 41 “For an accused to be
entitled to appellate action on his case, the unlawful influence must be the
proximate cause of the unfairness of his court-martial.” 42
    “Once the issue is raised at the trial level, the burden shifts to the Govern-
ment, which may either show that there was no UCI or show that the UCI will
not affect the proceedings.” 43 The burden of disproving the existence of UCI or
proving that it will not affect the proceeding does not shift until the Defense
meets the burden of production. If the Defense meets that burden, a presump-
tion of prejudice is created. 44 To overcome this presumption, a reviewing court
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the UCI had no prejudicial
effect on the court-martial. 45

    36 Art. 37(c), UCMJ.

    37 Barry, 78 M.J. at 77 (internal citations omitted).

    38 United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 423 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (internal citations omit-

ted).
    39 United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999).

    40 Id.

    41 Id.

    42 United States v. Reynolds, 40 M.J. 198, 202 (C.A.A.F. 1994).

    43 Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150 (additional citation omitted).

    44 United States v. Douglas, 68 MJ 349, 354 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citing Biagase, 50 M.J.

at 150).
    45 Id.

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             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

    Appellant claims the military judge “refused to rule on the [UCI] matter . .
. because it was not ‘properly raised before the court.’” 46 This is a disturbingly
misleading abridgement of the judge’s statement. In her ruling on the De-
fense’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Improper Preferral, Forwarding, and
Referral, the military judge actually wrote:
           “At the Article 39a [sic],the Defense mentioned (cursorily in
       some instances) for the first time the following arguments: . . .
       Naval Reactors in essence committed unlawful command influ-
       ence (although the defense did not use those words) by offering
       to pay the cost of any court-martial convened by CNRMA . . . .
       There is no evidence whatsoever to support any of these allega-
       tions, nor were they properly raised before the court.” 47
    Thus, not only did the military judge acknowledge that the Defense had
raised the issue of UCI, but she also found that Appellant failed his initial
burden of showing “some evidence of facts, which if true, constitute [UCI].” 48
    Appellant argues that the military judge “found as fact that Naval Reactors
forwarded the case to CNRMA and ‘agreed to fund any court-martial.’” 49 He
then cites this as some evidence of UCI, claiming it was an indication to
CNRMA of what Naval Reactors expected the former to do. But, again, this is
a misleading truncation of the military judge’s finding. She actually found that
“Naval Reactors forwarded the case to [CNRMA] for disposition and without
recommendation” and “agreed to fund any court-martial should CNRMA
choose to convene a court-martial.” 50 This finding of fact is clearly supported by
the evidence.
    We agree with the military judge that there simply is no evidence in the
record that Naval Reactors intended to or did influence CNRMA’s referral de-
cision. Accordingly, we find Appellant failed to meet the low threshold for rais-
ing the issue at trial. As the issue of UCI was not adequately raised by the
Defense, no analysis of burden shifting or material prejudice was (or is now)
required.

   46 Appellant’s Brief at 40.

   47 App. Ex. IX, at 19 n.4 (emphasis added).

   48 United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   49 Appellant’s Brief at 12.

   50 App. Ex. IX, at 6 (emphasis added).

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

D. Trial Counsel did not Commit Prosecutorial Misconduct
   Appellant asserts that trial counsel committed prosecutorial misconduct
when he: (1) preferred charges without probable cause; (2) participated in the
court-martial despite being an accuser; (3) misled the military judge at the
R.C.M. 917 motion; and (4) misled the members in closing and rebuttal argu-
ments.
    Prosecutorial misconduct occurs when a prosecutor “oversteps the bounds
of that propriety and fairness which should characterize the conduct of such
an officer in the prosecution of a criminal offense.” 51 It is “defined as action or
inaction by a prosecutor in violation of some legal norm or standard, e.g., a
constitutional provision, a statute, a Manual rule, or an applicable professional
ethics canon.” 52
   We review prosecutorial misconduct and improper argument de novo. 53
When properly objected to at trial, we review for prejudicial error to an appel-
lant’s substantial rights. 54 “Challenged argument is reviewed not based on
‘words in isolation, but on the argument viewed in context,’ and ‘within the
context of the entire court-martial.’” 55
    If no objection is made, “we hold the appellant has forfeited his right to
appeal and we review for plain error.” 56 “The plain error doctrine is invoked to
rectify those errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public repu-
tation of judicial proceedings. As a consequence, it is to be used sparingly,
solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise
result.” 57 “Under plain error review, Appellant bears the burden of demonstrat-
ing that: ‘(1) there was error, (2) the error was clear and obvious, and (3) the

    51 United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 178 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (quoting Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935)).
    52 United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (citing Berger, 295 U.S. at

88)).
    53 United States v. Andrews, 77 M.J. 393, 398 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citing United States

v. Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2017)).
    54 Id. (citing   Fletcher, 62 M.J. at 179); United States v. Voorhees, 79 M.J. 5, 9
(C.A.A.F. 2019).
    55 United States v. Causey, 82 M.J. 574, 581 (N-M Ct. Crim. App. 2022) (citing

United States v. Baer, 53 M.J. 235, 238 (C.A.A.F. 2000)).
    56 Id.

    57 United States v. Fisher, 21 M.J. 327, 328-29 (C.M.A. 1986).

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              United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                              Opinion of the Court

error materially prejudiced a substantial right of the accused.’” 58 “Thus, [when
reviewing claims of improper argument] we must determine: (1) whether trial
counsel’s arguments amounted to clear, obvious error; and (2) if so, whether
there was a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different.” 59
   As explained above, we find that trial counsel was not an accuser in this
case and Appellant’s argument on that point fails. We turn, then, to his re-
maining claims of prosecutorial misconduct.

        a. Pursuing charges without probable cause 60
   While Appellant did preserve the issue of whether or not trial counsel was
an accuser by raising it at trial, he did not argue that trial counsel was dis-
qualified on the basis of pursuing charges not supported by probable cause. We
therefore review this claim for plain error.
    Appellant’s argument appears to be based, first, on his claim that the evi-
dence is legally and factually insufficient (which we find meritless), and, sec-
ond, on the PHO’s initial finding of no probable cause for the involuntary man-
slaughter charge. But there were two preliminary hearings in this case. At the
first, the PHO found no probable cause to support murder and involuntary
manslaughter charges. At the second, the same PHO found probable cause to
support a negligent homicide charge. The convening authority subsequently
referred both the negligent homicide charge and the involuntary manslaughter
charge to a general court-martial.
   Appellant fails to show how the evidence reviewed by Petty Officer Foxtrot
was insufficient to support his conclusion that probable cause existed to sup-
port the charges. 61 We find that Appellant has not demonstrated that there
was error, much less that such error was plain or obvious.

    58 United States v. Cueto, 82 M.J. 323, 334 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (quoting United States

v. Jones, 78 M.J. 37, 44 (C.A.A.F. 2018)).
    59 Voorhees, 79 M.J. at 9 (internal citation and quotation omitted).

    60 Appellant uses the term “preferring charges.” But, as we have found that trial

counsel was not a nominal accuser and, therefore, was not the person who preferred
the charges, we will use “pursuing charges.”
    61 LN1 Foxtrot, based on an erroneous understanding of the preferral standard,

actually found that the evidence proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt—a sig-
nificantly higher bar.

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             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

       b. Trial counsel did not mislead the military judge
   Appellant claims that trial counsel misled the military judge during argu-
ment on the R.C.M. 917 motion to dismiss the involuntary manslaughter
charge. Trial counsel argued:
           Just in meeting the burden of some evidence in this particu-
       lar motion, the government would rest on Prosecution Exhibit 6
       where Petty Officer Watlington states, you know, in several dif-
       ferent ways that he placed a magazine in his—in a Beretta APX,
       walked up to the—walked up to Petty Officer [Hotel], pulled the
       trigger. At one point after he pulled the trigger, it didn’t work
       the way he originally thought. In fact, he says that he reflected
       on this and thought it was weird, that after that he racked it,
       pulled the trigger again, it fired. 62
Appellant claims that trial counsel’s statement implies that he (Appellant)
knew he was operating a Beretta APX rather than an M9—a critical distinction
in his view. Because Appellant did not object to trial counsel’s argument at
trial we review for plain error.
    Contrary to Appellant’s claim, the critical information here is not that the
gun in question was a Beretta APX or an M9, rather it is the fact that Appellant
inserted a loaded magazine into the gun, then attempted to disassemble the
firearm while pointing it at Petty Officer Hotel without first ensuring it was
not loaded. Moreover, after his initial attempt to remove the slide failed, he
racked the weapon with the loaded magazine inserted, then again attempted
to remove the slide by pulling the trigger while pointing the gun at Petty Of-
ficer Hotel.
    Nothing in the military judge’s ruling denying Appellant’s R.C.M. 917 mo-
tion indicates that the distinction between an APX and M9 was relevant to her
analysis. Rather, the military judge highlighted that Appellant admitted dur-
ing his interview immediately following the shooting that he had put the
loaded magazine back in the gun, then, without being sure the gun was not
loaded, he attempted to disassemble the weapon using a technique that re-
quired pulling the trigger. 63
   Moreover, trial counsel’s statement was factually true. Appellant did insert
the magazine into his Beretta APX. Trial counsel’s argument was not that Ap-

   62 R. at 776.

   63 R. at 777.

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             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

pellant knew it was or was not an APX, but simply that he inserted the maga-
zine into the weapon he held. In short, trial counsel’s statements were not mis-
leading. Appellant has failed to show that trial counsel’s argument constitutes
plain error.
    Finally, Appellant argues that the trial counsel committed misconduct by
making an argument to the military judge that contradicted trial counsel’s
closing argument to the members. Specifically, Appellant claims that trial
counsel’s statement that “’[Appellant] ‘state[d] . . . that he placed a magazine
in his—in a Beretta APX’ . . . conflicted with his closing arguments that [Ap-
pellant] did not know he handled a Beretta APX.” 64 Rather than show incon-
sistency or contradiction on the trial counsel’s part, however, this argument
reveals Appellant’s misstatement of the record. During his argument, trial
counsel actually said, “Now we know [Appellant] knows about guns generally.
The problem is he didn’t know about this gun specifically, the Beretta APX.” 65
This is quite different from saying “Appellant did not know he handled a
Beretta APX.” There is no contradiction between trial counsel’s statements to
the military judge and his argument to the members. So, again, there is no
error, let alone plain or obvious error.

       c. Trial counsel did not mislead the members
     Appellant also claims that trial counsel misled the members when he ar-
gued during closing that “the design of this Beretta—this particular Beretta …
it fires like every other gun.” 66 Because Appellant did not object to trial coun-
sel’s argument at trial, we review for plain error.
     Again, Appellant’s argument relies on an unfounded emphasis on the dis-
tinction between the design of the Beretta M9 and the Beretta APX. Contrary
to Appellant’s framing of trial counsel’s statement, the point made during clos-
ing argument was about Appellant’s act of racking the gun and pulling the
trigger without first ensuring it was not loaded. Specifically, trial counsel told
the members: “[H]ere’s the basic gist of what’s important about the design of
this Beretta—this particular Beretta. Is that if you put a loaded magazine in
it and then rack it and then pull the trigger, it fires like every other gun, like
it’s supposed to. You have to unload it. You always do that before messing with
a gun.” 67 Nothing in trial counsel’s argument can be understood to mean that

   64 Appellant’s Brief at 32 (quoting R. at 846, 849).

   65 R. at 846.

   66 Appellant’s Brief at 25 (quoting R. at 869) (emphasis Appellant’s).

   67 R. at 869.

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             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

the distinction between the M9 and the APX was critical to a finding of culpa-
ble negligence. Again, trial counsel’s argument was factually accurate and not
misleading. Appellant thus fails to show that trial counsel’s argument consti-
tutes plain error.

E. Appellant’s Sentence is not Inappropriately Severe.
    Appellant asserts that the portion of his sentence imposing a bad-conduct
discharge is inappropriately severe. We review sentence appropriateness de
novo. 68
    This Court may only affirm “the sentence, or such part or amount of the
sentence, as the Court finds correct in law and fact and determines, on the
basis of the entire record, should be approved.” 69 In exercising this function,
we seek to ensure that “justice is done and that the accused gets the punish-
ment he deserves.” 70 The review requires an “individualized consideration of
the particular accused on the basis of the nature and seriousness of the offense
and the character of the offender.” 71 We have significant discretion in deter-
mining sentence appropriateness, but may not engage in acts of clemency. 72
    A court-martial shall impose punishment that is sufficient, but not greater
than necessary, to promote discipline and to maintain good order and disci-
pline. 73 Among other factors, the sentence needs to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the of-
fense, promote adequate deterrence of misconduct, protect others from further
crimes by the accused, and rehabilitate the accused. 74
   There is no disagreement that this is a truly tragic case. A Sailor is dead.
Another Sailor must live with the knowledge that his actions caused that
death. But, while Appellant clearly did not intend to shoot and kill his friend,

   68 United States v. Lane, 64 M.J. 1, 2 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

   69 Article 66(d)(1), UCMJ.

   70 United States v. Healy, 26 M.J. 394, 395 (C.M.A. 1988).

   71 United States v. Snelling, 14 M.J. 267, 268 (C.M.A. 1982) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
   72 United States v. Nerad, 69 M.J. 138, 146 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

   73 R.C.M. 1002(f).

   74 R.C.M. 1002(f)(3)(A)-(F).

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             United States v. Watlington, NMCCA No. 202200076
                             Opinion of the Court

the fact is, through his own culpable negligence, he is solely responsible for
MMN3 Hotel’s death. 75
    Weighing all the evidence, we find that Appellant’s sentence was adjudged
with individualized consideration based on both the nature and seriousness of
Appellant’s offenses and character. After reviewing the record as a whole, we
find the sentence to be correct in law and not inappropriately severe. Further-
more, it appropriately reflects the matters in extenuation, mitigation, and ag-
gravation presented, and it should be approved.

                                III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and
that no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights oc-
curred. 76
   The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                                  FOR THE COURT:

                                  MARK K. JAMISON
                                  Clerk of Court

   75 Appellant himself best summarizes the incident: “This is why you don’t f*** with

guns.” App. Ex. XLVIII, at 7.
   76 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ.

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