Court Opinion

ID: 9673818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:53.365859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.297989
License: Public Domain

Danhof, P. J.
(dissenting in part, concurring in part). Judge Holbrook has accurately stated the facts in his opinion and I concur in his affirmance of the trial court’s decision granting defendants’ motion for judgment of no cause of action on count two. Count one of the complaint in the instant case is labeled nuisance, and count three alleges ordinary negligence. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to counts one and three, and for the reasons hereinafter stated this decision should be affirmed.
Count one is labeled nuisance. However, a court may look behind the label to correctly determine the nature of the allegation. Young v Groenendal, 382 Mich 456, 462; 169 NW2d 920 (1969). Count one alleges certain failures by the defendants in their maintenance of the lake which proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. Such failures do not constitute a nuisance as they relate to plaintiffs injuries, but father may be deemed to be allegations of negligence. See Williams v Primary School District No 3, Green Township, 3 Mich App 468; 142 NW2d 894 (1966).
The Supreme Court in Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 394 Mich 459, 460; 231 NW2d 653 *423(1975), accepted the Court of Appeals construction of MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485 in Thomas v Consumers Power Co, 58 Mich App 486; 228 NW2d 786 (1975). In discussing the above statute, the Court of Appeals there said, 58 Mich App 486, 492:
"[T]his statute does not change the common-law duty of owners and occupiers of property owed to those who come upon such property as mere licensees, as were the plaintiffs in this case. The act is merely a codification of tort principles which are universally recognized in common-law jurisdictions.
" 'A licensee, as distinguished from an invitee, is one who enters another’s land because a personal benefit will be derived by so doing; and while there his presence is merely tolerated.’ Cox v Hayes, 34 Mich App 527; 192 NW2d 68 (1971).
"The act in question has the undoubted purpose of furthering recreational activities in Michigan by making certain areas available for such purposes while clearly restating the common-law liability of owners to those who come gratuitously upon their land. Under these circumstances and to carry out the undoubted intention of the Legislature, it would seem the statute should be liberally construed. Courts should lean toward that construction which will give the statute force and validity, not to that construction which would nullify it. Thomas Canning Co v Southern Pacific Co, 219 Mich 388, 400; 189 NW 210 (1922), Pigorsh v Fahner, 386 Mich 508, 514; 194 NW2d 343 (1972). The statute neither restricts nor adds to the common-law rights of the plaintiffs.”
Where not otherwise immune, a city has been held liable as an individual possessor of land under the duties imposed by the common-law. See for example Carlisi v City of Marysville, 373 Mich 198; 128 NW2d 477 (1964). The Legislature intended to codify the common-law liabilities of the owners of land. Cities could be held liable as owners of land under the common law. Therefore, the Legislature *424intended to include cities among the class of owners of land when it enacted MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485.
The Legislature may validly enact two statutes that deal with the same class or which have a similar purpose. Detroit v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 374 Mich 543; 132 NW2d 660 (1965). One statute should not be read so strictly as to defeat the main purpose of the other statute. Detroit v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, supra, at 560. Further, Klopfenstein v Rohlfing, 356 Mich 197, 202; 96 NW2d 782 (1959) stated:
" 'It is a familiar rule of construction that it will not be presumed that the Legislature intended to do a useless thing and that if possible every part of a statute must be given effect.’ ”
As applicable here, the latter portion of the rule should state that if possible each statute must be given effect.
Based upon the aforementioned principles, the enactment of MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), which gives immunity from ordinary negligence to all governmental agencies, should not be interpreted to exclude cities from the specific immunity from ordinary negligence given all landowners under MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485. The two statutes are not in conflict. Rather, each seeks to protect a certain class from liability for ordinary negligence. As long as a city possesses the characteristics of the class the Legislature sought to protect, the city is entitled to immunity under either statute. Where a city cannot invoke immunity under MCLA 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), it still deserves protection as a landowner under MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485. It is precisely this latter situation that reinforces the rule that it will *425not be presumed the Legislature intended to do a useless thing.
The plaintiffs have alleged for the first time that MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485 is unconstitutional for a number of reasons. This Court does not consider such allegations when raised for the first time on appeal, however, this issue has. been decided adversely to the plaintiffs in Thomas v Consumers Power Co, supra.
The defendant City of Lansing is immune from the plaintiffs’ suit under counts one and three: As lessees, the other defendants are also immune under the clear wording of MCLA 300.201; MSA 13.1485.
Affirmed, costs to the defendants.