Court Opinion

ID: 9481743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:30:09.828023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:32.691864
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Exactly four years to the day after Zoe-con fired William McClure, McClure brought suit against his erstwhile employer, alleging that Zoecon had terminated him in order to forestall his receipt of medical and disability benefits, a violation of ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.1 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas summarily dismissed the suit as time-barred by the two-year Texas statute of limitations applicable to wrongful discharge and employment discrimination claims, prompting the instant appeal. We believe the district court applied the proper Texas limitations statute and thus affirm.
I
The facts in this case are few, largely undisputed, and not of great relevance. Sometime around April 27, 1984, McClure received and accepted a written offer of employment from Zoecon. McClure assumed his duties on May 8 of that same *778year; shortly thereafter, he was transferred from Zoecon’s “residue group” to its “quality control lab,” apparently on account of personality clashes that he had had with the residue group supervisor.
If McClure’s allegations are true, these personality clashes proved costly. He contends that in February of 1985 he was exposed to pesticides while working in the laboratory; he further contends that he later learned through a physician that this exposure had caused him harm. Furthermore, on May 15, 1985, Zoecon fired McClure, a termination he argues “was pretextual and not based on job performance but was for the purpose of preventing ... or interfering with the attainment of rights under [Zoecon’s] health care, welfare and life insurance plans.”
On May 15, 1989, McClure filed his original complaint against Zoecon, which was amended on June 9, 1989, to include his wife as a party plaintiff. By motion filed February 22, 1990, Zoecon asked for summary judgment on the grounds that the McClures’ action was time-barred. The district court concurred and, on May 21, 1990, entered judgment accordingly. This timely appeal ensued.
II
We are asked to decide a narrow if novel issue. The parties agree that, since ERISA provides no statute of limitations for § 510 actions, the McClures’ § 510 claim is subject to the Texas limitations statute that governs the Texas action most analogous to a § 510 claim.2 Henson-El v. Rodgers, 923 F.2d 51 (5th Cir.1991); Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 606 (5th Cir.1988); Wood v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 643 F.2d 339, 342 (5th Cir.1981). The litigants part company only with respect to the proper characterization of a § 510 claim. Zoecon — as well as the court below — thinks a § 510 suit most similar to a wrongful discharge or employment discrimination claim and, consequently, subject to the two-year prescription period Texas applies to such claims. See Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.003 (Vernon 1986). The McClures, on the other hand, urge a different characterization — that of a contract claim — and accordingly ask that their § 510 action be measured against the four-year Texas limitations statute that governs suits sounding in contract. See Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 16.004 (Vernon 1986).
As suggested above, we have yet to decide the proper characterization of a § 510 action for limitations purposes. Other courts have considered this question, however, and nearly all have construed § 510 claims as wrongful discharge or employment discrimination claims. See Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 843-46 (3rd Cir.), cert. den., 484 U.S. 979, 108 S.Ct. 495, 98 L.Ed.2d 492 (1987); Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corporation, 912 F.2d 1197 (10th Cir.1990); Young v. Martin Marietta Corp., 701 F.Supp. 567, 569 (E.D.La.1988); Gladich v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 703 F.Supp. 1331, 1333 (N.D.Ill.1989); Corkery v. Super X Drugs Corp., 602 F.Supp. 42 (M.D.Fla.1985). Today we follow their lead. In fact, we would be pressed to do otherwise, given that § 510 by its terms proscribes specified acts of “discharge” and “discrimination,” and given the specific allegations in the McClures’ complaint.
Our research has uncovered but two cases taking a contrary view of § 510 actions,3 neither of which persuades us. In *779Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1267 (8th Cir.1990), the Eighth Circuit subjected a § 510 claim to a six-year state limitations period ordinarily reserved for contract actions. It did so without analysis, however, allocating only one sentence to the issue of which limitations statute properly applied.4 Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that the characterization question was ever a point of contention in Heideman; the parties may well have agreed — albeit mistakenly — that a § 510 suit most resembles a contract claim. Although the same cannot be said of Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237 (11th Cir.1989), which devotes considerable attention to the § 510 typification problem, it suffers from faults of its own. In Clark, the Eleventh Circuit began by looking to the purpose of ERISA, which it assayed as the provision of “adequate retirement income to persons who have spent their careers in a productive capacity.” Clark, 865 F.2d at 1242. From this, the court concluded that ERISA was concerned solely about “economic rights” (rather than “individual or personal rights”) and that, therefore, a § 510 action is “founded on contract.” Id. However, in analyzing § 510, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider whether a wrongful discharge characterization would be most fitting; instead, it chose the plaintiffs’ contract analogue over the personal injury analogue urged by the defendant.5 What is more, the court’s decision to classify § 510 on the basis of Congress’s purpose in passing the entirety of ERISA — as opposed to its purpose in passing § 510 particularly — seems overly broad and thus improperly focused. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (characterizing § 1983 actions as personal injury claims because of the purpose underlying § 1983); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (characterizing § 1981 actions with reference to Congress’s goals in passing that section); Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989) (characterizing claims under § 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act in reliance on purpose behind § 101(a)(2)). Even if it were proper to ascribe to § 510 a solely “economic” purpose, it by no means follows that § 510 claims are contractual; after all, the law recognizes several economic yet non-contractual causes of action, among them claims of wrongful discharge and employment discrimination. And finally, Clark’s categorization § 510 suits is dicta, seeing as the court ultimately forewent a contract limitations statute in favor of a statute governing “actions to enforce statutory rights,” which in the court’s eyes “much more narrowly ... contemplate[d] the [plaintiffs’ § 510 claim].... ” Clark, 865 F.2d at 1242.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.

. § 510 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this chapter or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. The provisions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.

. The practice of borrowing statutes of limitations from state law admits of a "closely circumscribed exception." Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 625, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). That exception, however, applies only “when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.” DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2294, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983). Seeing no such federal rule, we today apply a state statute.

. The McClures cite several cases where ERISA actions have been characterized as contract claims. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 713 F.2d 247, 252 (7th Cir.1983); Fogerty v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 850 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir.1988). Without fail, however, these cases involve an ERISA participant or beneficiary’s *779§ 502(a)(1)(B) suit "to recover benefits due to [him] under the plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). While perhaps well-decided, these cases have no bearing on our characterization of the McClures’ § 510 claim.

. "The limitations period covering contracts is six years, Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-109 (Repl. 1980), and thus, as the District Court ruled, the ERISA claim is time-barred.” Heideman, 904 F.2d at 1267. The district court opinion is equally bereft of analysis. Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 710 F.Supp. 711 (W.D.Mo.1989).

. In passing, the court did consider an employment discrimination characterization, rejecting it on the ground that “appellants’ claims do not allege any discriminatory action.... ” Id. at 1241.