Court Opinion

ID: 9398786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-01 07:16:19.824458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:36.238587
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                 EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      EL PASO, TEXAS

 GILBERT ARCIDES,                                   §               No. 08-22-00046-CV

                                Appellant,          §                  Appeal from the

 v.                                                 §            143rd Judicial District Court

 RAUL ANGEL ROJAS AND DEEPWELL                      §             of Reeves County, Texas
 ENERGY SERVICES, LLC,
                                                    §             (TC# 20-01-23349-CVR)
                                Appellees.

                                           OPINION

                                          BACKGROUND

       This case involves a three-vehicle collision that occurred on Texas State Highway 17, about

fifteen miles south of Pecos, Texas. In two issues, Appellant (Arcides), challenges the jury’s

findings of his negligence. In Issue One, Arcides argues that because he owed no legal duty, the

trial court abused its discretion in submitting a question in the charge relating to his proportionate

responsibility. In Issue Two, Arcides maintains the jury’s findings of his negligence are legally

and factually insufficient. We affirm.

                                         Factual Background
           In November of 2019, Appellee, Raul Rojas (Rojas), was hauling a water tank for his

employer, Appellee, Deepwell Energy Services, LLC (Deepwell). 1 Rojas was driving southbound

on Texas State Highway 17 (Highway 17). Highway 17 is a two-way, one-lane highway with a

speed limit of 75 miles per hour. Driving several hundred feet ahead of Rojas was Carlos

Zamarripa (Zamarripa), who was also traveling southbound on Highway 17. 2 Arcides was

approaching in the northbound lane, driving on the other side of the road in the opposite direction

from Rojas and Zamarripa.

           As the three vehicles traveled in their respective directions, a sandstorm emerged. There

was no visibility, and winds of 60 to 70 miles per hour. All three drivers continued to drive, right

into the sandstorm. Once inside the sandstorm, Rojas slowed down to 41 miles per hour in the

southbound lane. Zamarripa slowed down and was traveling in the center of the southbound lane,

at a speed of 1 to 2 miles per hour—“near stopped.” Due to the lack of visibility, Rojas did not see

Zamarripa’s truck “near stopped” ahead of him. Rojas’s truck struck Zamarripa’s truck, then

Zamarripa’s truck crossed into the opposite lane, colliding into Arcides’s truck. At the time of

impact, Rojas was traveling 33 miles per hour, while Zamarripa was “near stopped” traveling at 1

mile per hour, and Arcides was traveling 3.6 miles per hour.

           However, at trial, Arcides testified he did not enter the sandstorm and instead, pulled over.

According to Arcides, at the time of the collision, he was parked on the side of Highway 17 to

avoid the oncoming storm. However, expert testimony revealed Arcides was not pulled over on

the side of the road. Accident reconstruction and data extracted from Arcides’s truck further

confirmed Arcides was not pulled over and had been driving on the highway at the time of impact.

1
    At trial, Deepwell stipulated Rojas was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
2
    Although Zamarripa was a party to the original suit as an intervenor, he is not a party to this appeal.

                                                             2
       During the charge conference, counsel for Arcides objected to the submission of Arcides

in Question One, which asked, “Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately

cause the occurrence in question?” Counsel for Arcides also objected to the inclusion of Arcides

in the percentage allocation of Arcides’s negligence in Question Two, arguing there was “no

evidence that a breach approximately caused the occurrence in question.” The trial court overruled

the objections and Questions One and Two were submitted to the jury.

       As to Question One, the jury answered in the affirmative for each of the three drivers,

finding the negligence of each of the drivers had proximately caused the occurrence in question.

As to Question Two, the jury found Rojas 50% negligent, Zamarripa 40% negligent, and Arcides

10% negligent. Based upon the jury’s verdict, the total awarded in favor of Arcides amounted to

$2,250,000.00 in damages, but was ultimately reduced to $1,252,300.90 by the jury’s finding of

proportional negligence.

                                     Procedural Background

       In January of 2020, Arcides filed suit against Rojas and Deepwell in the 143rd District

Court of Reeves County. His pleadings included claims of negligence and damages for personal

injuries resulting from the auto collision. A jury trial was held in October of 2021. After the jury

rendered its verdict, Arcides contested the jury’s findings of his negligence and proportionate

responsibility by filing a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with alternative motion

for new trial, which was denied by written order. This appeal followed.

                                          DISCUSSION

       In Issue One, Arcides maintains that because he did not owe a legal duty, the trial court

erred in its inclusion of Arcides in the percentage allocation of proportionate responsibility in

Question Two. In Issue Two, Arcides argues the jury’s findings as to his negligence and

                                                 3
apportionment are legally and factually insufficient. Arcides requests that this Court reverse the

trial court’s judgment, strike his percentage of fault, and reallocate his prior apportionment pro-

rata between Rojas and Zamarripa, or alternatively, grant a new trial.

       We begin with Issue Two because we find it dispositive of Issue One. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

                           LEGAL AND FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY

                                        Standard of Review

       When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue in which it did

not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate on appeal that no evidence exists to support the

adverse finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. Pena, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014). We

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and indulge every reasonable

inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005).

“Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the fact finder’s

finding.” Sanders Oil & Gas, Ltd. v. Big Lake Kay Constr., Inc., 554 S.W.3d 79, 93 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2018, no pet.). The ultimate test for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence at trial would

enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. E. Tex. Educ. Ins.

Ass’n v. Ramirez, 631 S.W.3d 908, 918 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, pet. denied).

       In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we must consider and weigh all of the

evidence, and may set aside the verdict only if the finding is so against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Jackson v. Williams Bros.

Constr. Co. Inc., 364 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied). Under

both a legal and factual sufficiency review, the jury, as fact finder, is the sole judge of the

                                                  4
credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Ramirez, 631 S.W.3d at 918.

Accordingly, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Id.

                                           Applicable Law

       A plaintiff asserting a negligence claim bears the burden of proving a legal duty, breach of

that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto,

Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004). The two elements of proximate cause are

cause in fact and foreseeability. Id.

       Under proportionate responsibility, the fact finder is entitled to proportion responsibility

according to the relative fault of the actors, thus allowing a plaintiff to recover while reducing that

recovery by the percentage for which the plaintiff was at fault. Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v. Romero,

456 S.W.3d 553, 559–60 (Tex. 2015).

       Section 33.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides:

       (a)     The trier of fact, as to each cause of action asserted, shall determine the
       percentage of responsibility, stated in whole numbers, for the following persons
       with respect to each person’s causing or contributing to cause in any way the harm
       for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by
       any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that
       violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combination of these:

               (1)     each claimant;
               (2)     each defendant;
               (3)     each settling person; and
               (4)     each responsible third party who has been designated under Section
               33.004.

       (b)   This section does not allow a submission to the jury of a question regarding
       conduct by any person without sufficient evidence to support the submission.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003. So long as the plaintiff’s own responsibility does

not exceed 50%, he is entitled to a recovery reduced by his responsibility percentage. Id. at §

33.001. The statute casts a wide net over conduct that may be considered in this determination,

                                                  5
including negligent acts or omissions, and any other conduct or activity that violates an applicable

legal standard. Romero, 456 S.W.3d at 560. In sum, a plaintiff’s contributory negligence should

be considered in the apportionment of responsibility. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 33.003(a).

                                             Analysis

       The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings in Questions

One and Two of the jury charge. Question One contemplated a negligence finding as to each of

the three drivers. Question Two requested that the jury assess the drivers’ comparative

responsibility. The following was submitted to the jury:

                                       QUESTION NO. 1

              Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the
       occurrence in question?

                         Answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ for each of the following:

                        a. Raul Angel Rojas                __________

                        b. Carlos Zamarripa                __________

                        c. Gilbert Arcides                 __________

             If you have answered ‘Yes’ to Question No. 1, for more than one of those
       named below, then answer the following question . . . .

               The percentage you find must total 100 percent. The percentages must be
       expressed in whole numbers. The percentage or responsibility attributable to any
       one named below is not necessarily measured by the number of acts or omissions
       found. The percentages attributable to any one need not be the same percentage
       attributed to that one in answering another question.

                                       QUESTION NO. 2

              For each person you found caused or contributed to cause the occurrence in
       question, find the percentage of responsibility attributable to each.

                                                 6
                           a. Raul Angel Rojas                    __________

                           b. Carlos Zamarripa                    __________

                           c. Gilbert Arcides                     __________

                                      TOTAL                        100%

        Here, the jury’s finding of Arcides’s negligence is supported by legally and factually

sufficient evidence. 3

             a. Arcides’s Duty and Breach

        Arcides maintains, he “had neither the duty nor the ability to actively monitor the opposite

roadway to see whether Mr. Rojas would ram Mr. Zamarripa and propel him into oncoming

traffic.” We disagree.

        Contributory negligence contemplates an injured person’s failure to use ordinary care

regarding his own safety. Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tex. 2000); see TEX. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.002(a)(1). Thus, Arcides, as a driver on a public highway, had a

duty to exercise ordinary care regarding his own safety. See Kroger Co., 23 S.W.3d at 351. Every

Texas motorist proceeding along a public roadway is under a duty, at all times, “to maintain a

proper lookout for his own safety, and may not proceed blindly and in disregard of dangers that

might reasonably be anticipated to exist.” De Winne v. Allen, 277 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. 1955);

Rohan v. Baker, 470 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

Accordingly, Arcides had a duty to maintain a proper lookout for his own safety. See De Winne,

277 S.W.2d at 98.

3
  Because Arcides does not dispute the fact that damages occurred, we do not discuss harm element of a negligence
claim below.

                                                       7
       The duty to maintain a proper lookout while driving encompasses the duty to observe, in a

careful and intelligent manner, traffic and the general circumstances in the vicinity. Carney v.

Roberts Inv. Co. Inc., 837 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ denied). Arcides himself

testified he saw a “big old sandstorm, a real huge sandstorm coming down the highway.” Arcides

testified he did not drive directly into the sandstorm, but instead, decided to pull over about a half

a mile before the sandstorm. However, data gathered from Arcides’s truck module, along with the

tire marks on the road, confirmed Arcides was not stopped and had been driving at the time of the

collision. Data from Arcides’s truck revealed he was traveling 18.8 miles per hour five seconds

before impact, and 3.6 miles per hour at impact. Other evidence, including Arcides’s own

admission to the investigating DPS Trooper on scene, further supported he had driven into, and

through, the same conditions as Rojas and Zamarripa, despite the lack of visibility. Accident

reconstruction and expert testimony confirmed this.

       Nevertheless, at trial, Arcides insisted he never entered the sandstorm and was not driving

at the time of impact.

       Opposing Counsel:       So no matter what the experts say, no matter what the
                               computer says, no matter what the police officers say, no
                               matter what the location of your vehicle says after the
                               accident shows, you’re telling the jury and it’s your
                               testimony that you never entered the dust storm, that you saw
                               it down the road, and you pulled over, and you sat there for
                               10 minutes in Park, and the dust storm came to you, correct?

       Arcides:                Yes, sir.

The jury was free to believe or disbelieve Arcides’s contention. See Ramirez, 631 S.W.3d at 918.

       Arcides’s counsel also argued during closing arguments that pulling over was the safest

decision to make given the circumstances. The jury was within its discretion to apply that standard

to all drivers on the highway, including Arcides. The jury was also free to believe or disbelieve

                                                  8
the expert testimony of Victor Longoria, a Texas Department of Public Safety Trooper and U.S.

Department of Transportation Officer and Auditor, who was hired to assess the causes of the

collision amongst noncompliance of the federal regulatory rules and the Texas Transportation

Code. Longoria testified that when conditions become severe due to visibility, such as in this case,

a driver’s “first priority” should be to reduce their speed, and if possible, pull off of the road

completely. Evidence at trial established that Arcides was driving through the sandstorm, and

seconds prior to impact, his speed dropped down to half seconds from 18.6, 18, 16.8, 15.4, 13.8,

12.5, 11.4, 9.5, 6, and ultimately 3.6 miles per hour at impact.

           Given the data extracted from Arcides’s truck, the jury could have found that Arcides

should have pulled over, or in the alternative, that Arcides was driving too fast. As the sole judge

of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony and the evidence, it

was within the jury’s discretion to conclude that all three drivers were negligent for different

reasons, and to different degrees. See id.

           We find the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to enable a reasonable and fair-

minded juror to conclude that at minimum, Arcides had a duty to maintain a proper lookout for his

own safety, and Arcides’s decision to continue driving through the sandstorm with zero visibility

constituted a breach of that duty.

               b. Proximate Cause

           Arcides maintains the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support a finding that

his actions proximately caused the crash.

           The two elements of proximate cause are cause in fact (or substantial factor), and

foreseeability. 4 Mason, 143 S.W.3d at 798. These elements cannot be satisfied by mere conjecture,

4
    We use the terms “cause in fact” and “substantial factor” interchangeably.

                                                           9
deduction, or speculation. Id. at 798–99. Cause in fact is established when the act or omission was

a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred.

Id. at 799. “Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have

anticipated the dangers that his negligent act created for others.” Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co.,

Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549–50 (Tex. 1985).

               1. Substantial Factor

       Arcides argues the sandstorm, his presence on the highway during the sandstorm, and his

“harmless” speed did not constitute a substantial factor in causing the accident or his injuries, but

rather merely furnished a condition for the collision. According to Arcides, “the only substantial

factor that gave rise to this crash was the propulsion of Mr. Zamarripa into oncoming traffic by

Mr. Rojas”—i.e., the collision was caused by Rojas rear-ending Zamarripa and propelling

Zamarripa’s truck into Arcides’s truck, which according to Arcides, was not foreseeable.

       When evaluating cause in fact, the test is “whether the negligent act or omission was a

substantial factor in bringing about injury, without which the harm would not have occurred.” Doe

v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dall., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995) (internal quotations

omitted). In other words, even if the occurrence would not have happened but for the defendant’s

conduct, the connection between the defendant and the plaintiff’s conduct may not be too

attenuated to constitute proximate cause. Id. Furthermore, it is well established that “more than

one act may be the proximate cause of the same injury.” Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70

S.W.3d 778, 784 (Tex. 2001).

       Appellees argue that Arcides’s continued presence on the highway, traveling with zero

visibility despite the approaching “wall of dirt,” and his failure to maintain a proper lookout and

take sufficient precautions regarding his own safety, constitutes a substantial factor. We agree.

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Arcides drove into, and through, a sandstorm despite having no visibility. Zamarripa’s truck

collided with Arcides’s truck while Arcides was traveling at speeds ranging from approximately

18 miles per hour to 3 miles an hour, through the sandstorm, causing his injuries. Even if the

collision and his resulting injuries would not have happened but for Appellees’ conduct, we cannot

conclude the connection between Appellees’ and Arcides’s conduct was too attenuated, especially

considering that “more than one act may be the proximate cause of the same injury.” Id.

Accordingly, we find the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to enable a reasonable and

fair-minded juror to conclude Arcides’s conduct was a substantial factor in the collision.

                2. Foreseeability

        To establish foreseeability, it is not necessary to show that the exact sequence of events

was foreseeable; rather, only the general danger must be foreseeable. Pitts v. Winkler Cnty., 351

S.W.3d 564, 573 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (quoting Cnty. of Cameron v. Brown, 80

S.W.3d 549, 556 (Tex. 2002)). The foreseeable danger here is that which comes with driving into

and through a sandstorm on a two-way, one-lane highway with no visibility. It is not merely the

foreseeable risk of “[o]ne truck rearending another and pushing it across the center stripe,” as

Arcides contends. Driving with reduced visibility is a dangerous condition, whether it is caused by

night, weather conditions, or both. State v. Gammill, 442 S.W.3d 538, 541–42 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2014, pet. ref’d).

        Arcides testified he had zero visibility, “couldn’t see nothing when the sandstorm came

through” and “couldn’t see the hood” of his truck. Motorists “may not proceed blindly and in

disregard of dangers that might reasonably be anticipated to exist.” Caterpillar Tractor Co. v.

Cropper, 767 S.W.2d 813, 815–16 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ withdrawn). The jury heard

testimony that the sandstorm could be detected by drivers from a distance; a Texas State Trooper

                                                11
testified it was “your typical sandstorm that you get in Pecos a lot of the times. They don’t come

out of nowhere. It’s very apparent they’re coming.” Other witnesses also testified the sandstorm

could be seen “from a long ways away” and was described as a “tremendous” “wall of dirt.”

       A person of ordinary intelligence would have anticipated the danger—the danger of driving

through a sandstorm with zero visibility on a two-way, one-lane highway that has a posted speed

limit of 75 miles per hour. Thus, we find the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to enable

a reasonable and fair-minded juror to conclude Archides’s injuries were a foreseeable result of his

conduct.

           c. Legal and Factual Sufficiency Conclusion

       In sum, we have found the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for the jury to

conclude Arcides had a duty to maintain a proper lookout for his own safety, and Arcides’s act of

driving through the sandstorm on a two-way, one-lane highway with zero visibility, constituted a

breach of that duty. We have further found the evidence was legally and factually sufficient for the

jury to conclude that Arcides’s conduct was a substantial factor, and the general dangers were

foreseeable and should have been reasonably anticipated by Arcides, thus establishing proximate

cause. Thus, the jury’s finding that Arcides’s negligence proximately caused the occurrence in

question is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence and is not against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence. See Sanders Oil & Gas, Ltd., 554 S.W.3d at 93; see also Ramirez,

631 S.W.3d at 918. As with our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the negligence

finding, we may only set aside the jury’s determination of proportionate responsibility if the

finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong

and unjust; we do not find that to be the case here, considering the jury found Arcides 10%

negligent. See Jackson, 364 S.W.3d at 325. The jury is afforded wide latitude in performing its

                                                 12
sworn duty to serve as fact finder in allocating responsibility for an accident pursuant to Section

33.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89

S.W.3d 643, 659 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied). Accordingly, the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings in Questions One and Two of the jury charge.

Issue Two is overruled.

                                  JURY CHARGE SUBMISSION

          In Issue One, Arcides maintains that because he did not owe a legal duty, the trial court

erred in requesting the jury to apportion Arcides’s responsibility in Question Two of the jury

charge.

                               Standard of Review and Applicable Law

          Rule 278 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial court to submit questions,

instructions, and definitions raised by the pleadings and evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278. This rule

provides a directive and requires trial courts to submit requested questions to the jury if the

pleadings and any evidence support them. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992). We

review the trial court’s submission of jury questions under an abuse of discretion standard. Rosell,

89 S.W.3d at 653. The trial court is afforded broad discretion in its submission of jury questions,

so long as the questions fairly place the disputed issues before the jury. Id. In determining whether

an alleged error in the jury charge is reversible, we must consider the pleadings, the evidence

presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety. Island Rec. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav.

Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986).

                                               Analysis

          To determine whether sufficient evidence supported submission of Question Two as to

Arcides, we must examine the record for evidence supporting Arcides’s negligence. See TEX. CIV.

                                                  13
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003. Arcides maintains that because he did not owe a legal duty,

the trial court erred in submitting a question as to his proportionate responsibility in the jury charge.

However, because we have already found that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to

support the jury’s finding as to Arcides’s negligence, it follows that the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in submitting Question Two as to his comparative responsibility. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(b) (“This section does not allow a submission to the jury of a question

regarding conduct by any person without sufficient evidence to support the submission.”). Issue

One is overruled.

                                           CONCLUSION

        For these reasons, we affirm.

                                                YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Chief Justice

May 30, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

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