Court Opinion

ID: 9925957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 16:02:23.079131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.439687
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-4009     Document: 010110988447      Date Filed: 01/23/2024   Page: 1
                                                                            FILED
                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                          Tenth Circuit

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 23, 2024
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       Clerk of Court
                          _______________________________________

  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

         Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                         No. 23-4009

  ELITE IT PARTNERS, INC., a Utah
  corporation, d/b/a Elite IT Home;
  JAMES MICHAEL MARTINOS,
  individually and as an officer of
  Elite IT Partners, Inc.,

         Defendants - Appellants.

                     ___________________________________________

        APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
                   (D.C. No. 2:19-CV-00125-RJS)
                 _________________________________________

 Caleb Kruckenberg, Pacific Legal Foundation, (John F. Kerkhoff, Pacific
 Legal Foundation, with him on the briefs), Arlington, VA, for Defendants-
 Appellants.

 Michael D. Bergman, Federal Trade Commission (Anisha S. Dasgupta,
 General Counsel, and Mariel Goetz, Acting Director of Litigation, with
 him on the briefs), Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                      __________________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
               ___________________________________________
Appellate Case: 23-4009   Document: 010110988447    Date Filed: 01/23/2024   Page: 2

 BACHARACH, Circuit Judge.
              ___________________________________________

       This appeal grew out of the Federal Trade Commission’s suit against

 Mr. James Martinos and Elite IT Partners. In the suit, the FTC alleged a

 fraudulent scheme to sell unnecessary services. The parties settled the suit

 by stipulating to a judgment that

             provided equitable monetary relief under § 13(b) of the Federal
              Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) and

             waived future challenges.

       Roughly a year after entry of the stipulated judgment, the Supreme

 Court held in AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC that § 13(b) doesn’t

 allow equitable monetary relief. 593 U.S. 67, 75–78 (2021). The new

 interpretation of § 13(b) led the defendants to request vacatur of the

 stipulated judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). 1 The

 district court denied the motion, reasoning that

             the change in case law had arisen in a factually unrelated case
              and

             the defendants hadn’t presented other circumstances warranting
              vacatur.

       The defendants appeal, and we address two issues:

       1.     Waiver: The defendants agreed to waive their right to
              challenge or contest the stipulated judgment. Does this waiver

 1
       The defendants also invoked Rule 60(b)(5), but they don’t address
 this rule in the appeal.

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              prohibit the defendants from arguing that the stipulated
              judgment was invalid? We answer yes.

       2.     Change in case law: The defendants moved to vacate the
              stipulated judgment based on a change in the case law. We’ve
              allowed vacatur of the judgment for a change in case law only
              when the change arose in a factually related case. Here the
              change in case law took place in an unrelated case. Despite the
              absence of a relationship, can the defendants base vacatur on a
              change in the case law? We answer no.

 1.    The defendants waived the right to collaterally challenge the
       stipulated judgment.

       The stipulated judgment provides that the defendants “waive[d] all

 rights to . . . challenge or contest the validity of this Order.” Appellants’

 App’x at 120. 2 We must consider

             whether to consider the waiver clause and

             whether the clause applies to the defendants’ appellate
              arguments.

 We answer yes to both questions.

 2
       In the stipulated judgment, the defendants also agreed “not [to] seek
 the return of any assets.” Appellants’ App’x at 126. In the motion to
 vacate, however, the defendants seek return of the money already collected
 under the judgment. The FTC argues that the defendants waived this
 request by agreeing not to seek return of funds. We need not address this
 argument because the defendants more broadly waived the right to
 challenge or contest the validity of the stipulated judgment.

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       a.     We should consider the waiver clause as an alternative basis
              to affirm.

       The district court didn’t address the waiver clause. But we can affirm

 on any ground adequately supported by the record. Elkins v. Comfort, 392

 F.3d 1159, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004). In deciding whether to consider

 affirmance on a different ground, we address

             whether the issue was briefed in district court and on appeal,

             whether the issue is legal or factual, and

             whether the record is adequately developed.

 Id. These factors support consideration.

       First, the parties briefed the impact of the waiver clause both in

 district court and on appeal. 3

 3
       The waiver clause prevents the defendants from contesting or
 challenging the validity of the stipulated judgment. See p. 3, above. This
 clause could potentially cover either

             the filing of a motion to vacate in district court or

             an appeal from the denial of vacatur.

 The briefing in district court addressed the waiver that applied there: the
 filing of a motion to vacate. We are addressing the applicability of the
 waiver clause to an appeal from the denial of that motion. Until this
 appeal, the parties and district court had no reason to address the
 applicability of the waiver clause to an appeal from the district court’s
 ruling.

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       Second, the questions are legal, not factual. For example, the

 defendants characterize the district court’s reliance on a “categorical bar”

 as a legal error. Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4. 4

       Third, we consider whether the record is adequately developed. See

 p. 4, above. Here the parties rely solely on the language in the stipulated

 judgment rather than on any extrinsic evidence. So the record appears

 adequately developed.

       Because each factor supports consideration, we address the

 applicability of the waiver clause.

       b.     The waiver clause covers the defendants’ appellate
              arguments.

       The defendants waived their appellate arguments because these

 arguments “challenge or contest the validity of” the stipulated judgment.

 For example, the defendants argue that AMG shows that the stipulated

 judgment was never valid:

             “The judgment at issue is unlawful.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at
              1.

             “AMG recognized that the original judgment was illegal when it
              was issued.” Id. at 9 (subheading).

 4
       The defendants elsewhere argue that the issue turns on interpretation
 of a settlement agreement. But the language appears in an unambiguous
 judgment (rather than a typical settlement agreement), so interpretation
 involves a question of law. See United States v. DAS Corp., 18 F.4th 1032,
 1040 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he interpretation of a judgment presents a
 question of law.”).

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             “And that judgment came only because the FTC sought to
              exercise a power it never had.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 5.

             “The FTC didn’t have the power to demand and then obtain
              disgorgement.” Id. at 44.

             “All parties agree that the Federal Trade Commission’s $13.5
              million judgment against Appellants, James Martinos and his
              company, Elite IT Partners, Inc., should never have been
              issued.” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 1.

             “This wasn’t merely a bad bargain, it was an illegal agreement,
              and one the court lacked the authority to accept.” Id. at 8
              (emphasis in original).

       The defendants present four arguments to sidestep the waiver clause:

       1.     The defendants aren’t contesting the validity of the stipulated
              judgment under the case law that existed earlier.

       2.     The parties entered the stipulated judgment based on a
              misunderstanding of the law.

       3.     The district court could modify the stipulated judgment, and
              the federal rules provide broad equitable power to vacate the
              judgment.

       4.     Rule 60(b)(6) allows reopening of “final agreements, no matter
              what they say, when certain conditions are present.”
              Appellants’ Reply Br. at 5.

 These arguments are unpersuasive.

       First, the defendants acknowledge that the stipulated judgment was

 valid under earlier case law. But the defendants argue that the Supreme

 Court’s subsequent opinion in AMG rendered the stipulated judgment

 invalid from the outset. See pp. 5–6, above. In this argument, the

                                        6
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 defendants are challenging or contesting the validity of the stipulated

 judgment.

       Second, the defendants contend that the parties based the stipulation

 on a misunderstanding of the law. This argument rests on unproven

 assumptions. When the parties entered the stipulation, a circuit split

 existed on the availability of equitable monetary relief under § 13(b). The

 Seventh Circuit had held that § 13(b) didn’t allow equitable monetary

 relief. FTC v. Credit Bur. Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 786 (7th Cir. 2019).

 Seven circuits had said the opposite. FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654

 F.3d 359, 365 (2d Cir. 2011); FTC v. Ross, 743 F.3d 886, 890–92 (4th Cir.

 2014); FTC v. Sw. Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 717–20 (5th Cir. 1982);

 FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir.

 1991); FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2016);

 FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 n.6 (10th Cir. 2005);

 FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 470 (11th Cir. 1996).

       The circuit split had led to the filing of a certiorari petition before

 the defendants entered the stipulation. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, AMG

 Cap. Mgt., LLC v. FTC, No. 19-508 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2019). The petition

 itself underscored the circuit split, id. at 11–15, so the defendants could

 have foreseen a change in the case law. See United States v. Rodgers, 466

 U.S. 475, 484 (1984) (stating that a change in the law is foreseeable when

 a circuit split exists on statutory construction). Given that possibility, we

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 have no way of knowing whether the defendants expected a change in the

 case law. At a minimum, however, the pending request for certiorari

 signaled a possible change in the interpretation of § 13(b).

       Third, the defendants point out that the district court had the power

 to vacate the judgment because

             the court retained jurisdiction and

             the federal rules provided equitable authority to vacate an
              order.

 But the defendants don’t explain how retention of jurisdiction or equitable

 authority would prevent a waiver. 5

       Though a court might enjoy broad jurisdiction and equitable power, a

 party can waive rights that the court could otherwise protect. For example,

 courts can entertain appeals or collateral challenges to federal convictions.

 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (appeals), § 2255 (collateral challenges). But parties can

 waive their rights to

             appeal final orders, United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1329
              (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam), or

             collaterally challenge federal convictions, United States v.
              Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2001).

 5
       The defendants’ argument consists solely of two sentences: “More
 importantly, the Order recognized that it could be modified by the district
 court—the very last provision said ‘that th[e] Court retains jurisdiction of
 this matter for purposes of construction, modification, and enforcement of
 this Order.’ That language covers the situation here.” Appellants’ Reply
 Br. at 5 (quoting Appellants’ App’x at 134).
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 In the same way, a party can freely waive the right to invoke the court’s

 jurisdiction or equitable authority. See Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680,

 703 (10th Cir. 2020) (stating that a settlement agreement can constitute a

 free choice undermining the right to seek vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6)).

       Fourth, the defendants assert that Rule 60(b) allows vacatur

 regardless of any contrary agreements. For this assertion, the defendants

 supply no authority.

                                      * * *

       We conclude that the waiver clause applies because the defendants’

 appellate arguments challenge or contest the validity of the stipulated

 judgment.

 2.    The district court didn’t erroneously apply a “categorical bar.”

       Given the importance of the underlying issue, we address the merits

 to explain that the defendants would not have prevailed even if they hadn’t

 waived their appellate arguments.

       The defendants argue that the district court erroneously applied a

 “categorical bar” to relief under Rule 60(b)(6). For this argument, the

 defendants try to squeeze the district court’s ruling into our opinion in

 Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680 (10th Cir. 2020). 6 But Johnson doesn’t

 apply.

 6
      The defendants repeatedly purport to quote Johnson for the
 “explan[ation] that a district court’s ‘application of categorical rule’ in a
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          a.   The defendants present two different arguments to analogize
               our case to Johnson.

          In Johnson, the district court denied relief on the ground that Rule

  60(b)(6) categorically disallows vacatur on claims for damages. Id. at 701–

  02. We reversed, reasoning that the district court couldn’t categorically

  disallow vacatur on damage claims. Id. at 702–03. Based on Johnson, the

  defendants argue that the district court erred by relying on a “categorical

  bar.”

          But the defendants are inconsistent in what they regard as the

  “categorical bar.” They sometimes argue that the district court erroneously

  applied a “categorical bar” by improperly limiting vacatur when a party

  relies on a change in the case law in a factually unrelated case:

              “Relevant here, the [district] court held that Rule 60(b)(6) is
               categorically barred based on a change in the law for factually
               ‘unrelated cases.’” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 13.

              “Instead, the court adopted a categorical rule that unrelated
               cases can never win a Rule 60(b)(6) motion based on a change
               in the law.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original).

  Rule 60(b)(6) analysis is per se abuse of discretion.” Appellants’ Opening
  Br. at 15, 17, 31, 32, 33; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4, 16. But Johnson never
  used the term categorical rule. The Court instead cited a First Circuit
  opinion that had used the terms categorical rule and categorical bar.
  Ungar v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 81–87 (1st Cir. 2010).

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  Other times, the defendants argue that the district court erred by

  categorically declining to consider the pertinent equitable considerations 7:

             “The district court was wrong to categorically bar Mr. Martinos
              and [his company] from even the equitable considerations at
              play in Rule 60(b)(6).” Appellants’ Reply Br. at 9.

             “In other words, the district court adopted a categorical rule
              that Rule 60 could apply only if a case has a factual
              relationship with AMG. . . . Instead, courts must consider a
              range of equitable factors to determine whether a judgment
              should be reopened when a change in the law occurs.”
              Appellants’ Opening Br. at 6.

             “Yet the district court adopted a categorical rule barring relief
              for almost any litigant. Instead of hewing to Rule 60’s
              equitable lineage by considering all circumstances here, the
              court focused on only one: Whether [this case] was a ‘related
              case’ to AMG. It ignored any other factor—finality, comity,
              injustice, hardship, diligence—to rule that only a single type of
              case can earn Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at
              22–23 (emphasis in original). 8

        Under either characterization of the defendants’ argument, it would

  fail. The first characterization of the argument fails because the district

  court correctly interpreted our case law: The defendants relied almost

  7
        At oral argument, the court asked defense counsel to clarify the
  “categorical bar” argument. Counsel again presented both forms of the
  argument.
  8
        The defendants sometimes blend the arguments, characterizing the
  categorical bar as a refusal to consider the equities or a change in the law
  in unrelated cases: “Yet the district court never considered the equities.
  Instead, it adopted a categorical rule that ‘a post-judgment change in the
  law only justifies 60(b)(6) relief when it arises in a related case.’”
  Appellants’ Reply Br. at 2 (quoting Appellants’ App’x at 288).

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  solely on a change in the case law under AMG, and that change couldn’t

  justify vacatur because the cases aren’t factually related. The second

  characterization of the argument fails because the district court didn’t

  disregard the defendants’ other equitable arguments.

        b.    The change in case law does not support vacatur.

        The first characterization of the argument fails because a change in

  case law doesn’t support vacatur when the cases are unrelated.

        We review the denial of a motion to vacate for an abuse of

  discretion. Kile v. United States, 915 F.3d 682, 688 (10th Cir. 2019). “The

  denial of a 60(b)(6) motion will be reversed only if we find a complete

  absence of a reasonable basis and are certain that the decision is wrong.”

  Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 701 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v.

  Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007)). This certainty

  could arise when the district court errs legally, and the defendants are

  urging a legal error based on the change in case law.

        But the defendants’ argument clashes with our precedent, for we held

  in 1958 that a change in case law doesn’t justify vacatur under Rule

  60(b)(6). Collins v. City of Wichita, 254 F.2d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1958).

  Granted, our 1958 holding could

             expose parties to different legal rules in related cases or

             prevent a court from correcting a ruling before it becomes
              final.

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  We have thus acknowledged two situations in which inflexibility could

  create anomalies:

        1.     when the change in case law takes place in a factually related
               case or

        2.     when the change precedes issuance of a final order.

        The first anomaly could arise when the change in case law arises

  between decisions in related cases. For example, assume that two suits

  sprout from a car accident and the state supreme court clarifies state law

  during a gap between the suits. A refusal to consider the state supreme

  court’s clarification of the law could create inconsistent outcomes in two

  suits involving the same car accident.

        We addressed this possibility in Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720

  (10th Cir. 1975) (en banc). There a car accident led to two suits: one was

  filed in state court, the other in federal court. Id. at 721–22. State law was

  to govern in both cases. The federal case ended with judgment for the

  defendant, but then the state supreme court changed its case law to favor

  the plaintiffs. Id. The change in case law led the plaintiffs to seek vacatur

  under Rule 60(b)(6). We concluded that relief was justified to ensure

  consistency in the treatment of cases “arising out of the same transaction

  or occurrence.” Id. at 723. In doing so, we distinguished our 1958

  precedent because “there the decisional change [had come] in an unrelated

  case.” Id.

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        We’ve also acknowledged the anomaly of disallowing vacatur when

  the earlier ruling hasn’t become final. District courts generally retain

  power to revise rulings before entering a judgment. See Dietz v. Bouldin,

  579 U.S. 40, 46 (2016) (“[T]he Court has recognized that a district court

  ordinarily has the power to modify or rescind its orders at any point prior

  to a final judgment in a civil case.”). Revision of such rulings doesn’t

  affect finality because the case remains ongoing. For example, before a

  final order, a district court can rely on a new opinion to vacate a prior

  order under Rule 60(b)(6). Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

  Smith, 888 F.2d 696, 697–98, 702 (10th Cir. 1989). 9 And in direct appeals,

  we generally apply new opinions when we issue the decision. E.g., Wilson

  v. Al McCord Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 1478 (10th Cir. 1988) (new state

  9
        The FTC argues that we decided Adams while the case was still open.
  The defendants criticize this characterization on the ground that we
  recognized a party’s right to seek relief under Rule 60(b)(6) after dismissal
  of a cross-appeal. We agree with the FTC because the defendants’
  observation bears no relevance to the difference between Adams and our
  case. There the appeal took place while the parties were disputing the
  scope of an upcoming arbitration. Id. at 697–98. The district court had not
  ruled on any of the claims or entered a final order.

        Given the district court’s unquestioned power to modify or vacate
  rulings before they become final, we’ve said in an unpublished opinion that
  Adams doesn’t cast doubt on our 1958 precedent for Rule 60(b)(6) motions
  filed after entry of a judgment. Sproull v. Union Tex. Prods. Corp., No. 90-
  6286, 1991 WL 184098, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 18, 1991) (unpublished). We
  agree with this explanation for the difference between Adams and our 1958
  precedent.

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  appellate opinion); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39

  F.3d 1482, 1491 n.9 (10th Cir. 1994) (new Supreme Court opinion).

        These anomalies don’t exist here. The defendants weren’t involved in

  the events giving rise to AMG, and the district court had entered a final

  judgment before the defendants moved for vacatur. In fact, more than two

  years passed between the district court’s approval of the stipulated

  judgment and the defendants’ request for vacatur. In the absence of these

  anomalies, we have explained that our precedents disallow vacatur based

  on a change in the case law from an unrelated case: “Absent a post-

  judgment change in the law in a factually related case . . . a change in the

  law or in the judicial view of an established rule of law does not justify

  relief under Rule 60(b)(6).” Johnston v. Cigna Corp.14 F.3d 486, 497 (10th

  Cir. 1993) (quoting Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th

  Cir. 1991)) (cleaned up).

        The defendants apparently characterize this language as dicta, but

  it’s not. This language appears in our consideration of the plaintiffs’

  reliance on a change in the case law. Id. There we disallowed vacatur

  because the change hadn’t arisen “out of a Pierce-type factually-related

  incident.” Id. The quoted language was thus integral to our holding. See

  Rohrbaugh v. Celotex Corp., 53 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir. 1995)

  (rejecting a party’s characterization of a prior panel’s statements as dicta,

  reasoning that they had been essential to the decision).

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        The defendants also suggest that the Supreme Court has overruled

  our 1958 precedent. For this suggestion, the defendants cite Agostini v.

  Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239 (1997). There the Supreme Court addressed a

  different rule (Rule 60(b)(5)). Id. at 238–39. In its discussion, the Court

  noted that “intervening developments in the law by themselves rarely

  constitute the extraordinary circumstances required for relief under Rule

  60(b)(6).” Id. at 239. The defendants don’t explain how this passage

  undercuts our precedents limiting the availability of vacatur under Rule

  60(b)(6) based on new Supreme Court opinions. Indeed, after the Supreme

  Court decided Agostini, the Fourth Circuit held that AMG’s abrogation of

  the circuit’s prior case law didn’t justify vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6):

              “It is hardly extraordinary” when the Supreme Court
        arrives “at a different interpretation” of a particular issue than
        lower courts after a case is no longer pending.

        . . . .

              Here, the Supreme Court’s novel position in AMG is not
        sufficiently extraordinary to justify vacatur under the Rule 60(b)
        catch-all. A conclusion that such a circumstance justifies vacatur
        would effectively eviscerate finality interests and open the
        floodgates to newly meritorious Rule 60(b)(6) motions each time
        the law changes.

  FTC v. Ross, 74 F.4th 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gonzalez v.

  Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005) and citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 239),

  cert. pet. filed (U.S. Oct. 18, 2023) (No. 23-405).

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        Our precedents remain good law unless the Supreme Court has

  “indisputably and pellucidly” abrogated them. Vincent v. Garland, 80 F.4th

  1197, 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 2023), cert. pet. filed (U.S. Dec. 26, 2023)

  (No. 23-683). Agostini doesn’t indisputably and pellucidly abrogate our

  case law. Under that case law, new Supreme Court opinions can sometimes

  support vacatur under Rule 60(b)(6). See pp. 13–14, above. For example,

  new Supreme Court opinions might support vacatur when the district court

  hadn’t issued a final judgment. See p. 14, above. But these circumstances

  aren’t present here.

        c.    The district court didn’t disregard the defendants’ other
              arguments for vacatur.

        The defendants contend that the district court disregarded their other

  arguments. We disagree. The defendants did make other arguments, but

  those arguments depended on the Supreme Court’s new opinion in AMG.

        The defendants point to their arguments that

             the stipulated judgment created an unfair burden,

             the FTC lacked any interest in retaining the judgment,

             AMG’s holding merited special consideration, and

             the facts warranted an exception to finality.

        In making these arguments in district court, the defendants didn’t say

  why they regarded the stipulated judgment as unfair. Granted, they

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  repeatedly characterized the judgment as illegal; but the alleged illegality

  stemmed from the change in case law. See pp. 5–6, above.

        The defendants also denied that the FTC had an interest in retaining

  the judgment because “Congress did not authorize the agency” to seek

  equitable monetary relief. Appellants’ App’x at 182. So this argument also

  appeared to rest on a change in the case law. 10

        In addition, the defendants point to the importance of AMG and the

  role of Rule 60(b)(6) in creating an exception to finality. These arguments

  rest again on the change in case law.

        The district court could thus reasonably regard these arguments as

  part of the defendants’ reliance on a change in the case law. However the

  arguments were characterized, the court didn’t overlook them. The court

  instead explained that these arguments hadn’t constituted “a legal or

  factual basis” to vacate the stipulated judgment. Appellants’ App’x at 290.

  Given this explanation, we conclude that the district court didn’t ignore the

  defendants’ equitable arguments.

  10
        The defendants’ appeal briefs also appear to challenge the FTC’s
  interest in the judgment based on its illegality: “The Supreme Court in
  AMG already clarified that Congress did not grant the FTC the power to
  obtain drastic equitable monetary penalties. And agencies have no interest
  in defending illegal actions.” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 41 (emphasis in
  original) (citation omitted).
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  3.    Conclusion

        For two separate reasons, we affirm the denial of the defendants’

  motion to vacate the stipulated judgment.

        First, the defendants’ appellate arguments trigger the waiver clause

  by challenging or contesting the validity of the stipulated judgment.

        Second, the Supreme Court’s issuance of AMG bears no factual

  relationship to our case. So AMG doesn’t warrant vacatur under Rule

  60(b)(6).

        We thus conclude that (1) the defendants waived their appellate

  arguments and (2) the district court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying

  vacatur.

                                        19
Appellate Case: 23-4009     Document: 010110988447          Date Filed: 01/23/2024     Page: 20

  No. 23-4009, Federal Trade Commission v. Elite IT Partners, Inc. et al.
  BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, concurring.

         I join in affirming the district court’s denial of defendants’ Rule 60(b)(6) motion

  to vacate the stipulated judgment. The Majority Opinion clearly explains in Section 1 of

  the Opinion that the waiver clause set forth in the stipulated judgment applies here to bar

  defendants’ appellate arguments. I would rest our affirmance on waiver and would not

  proceed to address the merits.

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