Court Opinion

ID: 9884025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:32:00.079754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:13.201272
License: Public Domain

CRIPPEN, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellants and respondents Parkers own a “pedestrian walkway” easement over a 10-foot strip at the south end of respondent Loraus’ lot. The trial court decided these easement owners are prohibited from “construction of any structure such as a dock.” I agree with the majority’s view that the easement owners are entitled to construct railings, steps, or other structures necessary to maintain reasonable use. I also agree with the decision of the majority to draw an exception for “watercraft transportable on foot” and certain other vehicles used on land. Appellants do not appear to demand any further extension of the right to take vehicles across the easement.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s prohibition against the construction or use of a dock. Appellants concede there should be no permission to construct more than one dock and that dock construction and usage depends upon a cooperative agreement between all the owners who enjoy the easement.
Believing that further trial court proceedings are mandated by established law, I respectfully dissent.
It must be assumed in a case such as this that the grantor of the easement “intended to permit a use of the easement which was reasonable under the circumstances” and that the grantee of the easement “expected to enjoy the use to the fullest extent consistent with its purpose.” Fames v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 226, 161 N.W.2d 297, 300 (1968) (footnote omitted). In Fames, the supreme court found “these general rules” require that the trial court resolve ambiguities by considering evidence on the effects of use of structures, the customs of area landowners to permit structures for non-lakeshore sites, and the prior patterns of conduct of the owners affected by use of the easement. Id. at 226, 161 N.W.2d at 300-01. Because answers to questions could not be made from the record in Fames, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case for further attention of the trial court.
Here the trial court failed to proceed on the Fames assumption by trying to identify “reasonable” uses. Instead, it identified a presumed scope of easement rights based on its construction of “pedestrian walkway.” The court found:
The words ‘pedestrian’ and ‘walkway’ refer to a use limited to people traversing the easement described on foot without allowance for construction of any structure such as a dock, and without allowance for the use of any vehicle in connection with said easement, be it a land or marine vehicle.
As to evidence on the meaning of easement language, the trial court found only:
[S]uch parol evidence as offered lacked sufficient credibility and weight so as to allow this Court to find that there was a mutual contract or agreement to encumber said Lot 4 with an easement to any greater extent than hereinabove stated [a reference to the trial court’s definitions of the easement language].
In other words, the trial court examined extrinsic evidence with the limited aim of identifying any agreement that would add to and enlarge an agreement it found to be unambiguous.
L agree with the majority that it was error to view the easement in this case as unambiguous. The conclusion of the majority is compelled by Fames. It follows, however, that we cannot affirm the trial court findings of fact.
A trial court finding “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Minn.R. *291Civ.P. 52.01. Applying this rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court has declared:
A finding of the trial court is not to be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, either upon a clear demonstration that it is without substantial evidentiary support or that it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.
Pettibone Minnesota Corp. v. Castle, 311 Minn. 513, 514, 247 N.W.2d 52, 53 (1976). The trial court’s findings were induced by an erroneous view of the law, its conclusion that the language of the easement agreement was unambiguous. The court examined extrinsic evidence only for the purpose of learning whether there was an agreement for greater easement rights than those it had defined. The law of the case required a different assumption, one that easement uses were to be as is “reasonable under the circumstances.” Farnes, 281 Minn. at 226, 161 N.W.2d at 300. The court made no findings on reasonable uses for the easement in this case and addressed none of the considerations delineated in Fames. Under the circumstances, we should remand for further findings. As in Fames, the evidence does not address several questions, and more evidence should be heard.
Trial court findings are needed to indicate the adverse effects, if any, of using a dock adjoining appellants’ easement. This finding should indicate the effects of boat storage connected with dock construction, but should also determine any adverse consequences of dock construction without boat mooring rights. Although appellants seek both dock construction and boat mooring rights, there is evidence that the dispute between the parties first arose shortly after one of the appellants sought to take children onto a dock then in place at the site, not for boating purposes, but so the children could fish. Moreover, the present decision permanently establishes rights connected with ownership of these lots, so that a decision against dock construction affects prospective owners who wish to use a dock solely for fishing or swimming purposes. It is significant that respondent testified she had no objection to fishing and swimming in the water adjoining appellants’ easement. Witness Lee testified that the owner at the time the parcels were platted anticipated the construction of a dock adjoining the easement.
The Fames case indicates attention should be given to identifiable area customs, if any, regarding the rights of non-lakeshore sites. In addition, the court should determine the importance of an agreement of respondent in 1985 that would permit on “a trial basis” the construction of a dock on the site by respondents Parkers, who owned one of the non-lakeshore sites. The license for that construction was granted “on the basis of the Licensee’s [the Parkers] ownership and possession of Lot 10, Block 1 [a nonlake-shore site].”