Court Opinion

ID: 9760454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:55:44.074503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:12.459435
License: Public Domain

*63MANSFIELD, Judge,
dissents.
I disagree strongly with the majority’s disposition of appellant’s second point of error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to improper prosecutorial jury argument at the guilVinnocence stage. Appellant argues that the prosecutor “accus[ed] [defense] counsel of acting in bad faith and insincerity in representing [him], which [was] manifestly improper.”
The record reflects that, at the time for closing arguments at the guilt/innocence stage, the State waived its opening but reserved the right to close. Appellant’s counsel then made his closing argument, during which he accused the State of general incompetence in its evidence-gathering, of being “very sloppy” with “the facts,” and of being “very subject to making a mistake.” The prosecutor, apparently irritated, then began his closing argument, the relevant portion of which was as follows:
THE STATE: Ladies and gentlemen, it is not my job to wish the kind of case that I put on [for] you. I bring you the evidence that has been produced that indicates this man’s guilt. What I wish in this case is immaterial. May be material to this man [indicating toward the defendant]. The only thing that I wish is that justice is done in this case. I have taken a very sacred oath, in my opinion, to see that justice is done in every case I prosecute. It is your duty ... to see that justice is done in this case.

[Defense counsel] has no such oath, and what he wishes is that you turn a guilty man free. That’s what he wishes, and he can wish that because he doesn’t have the obligation to see that justice is done in this case.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I want to object. That’s striking at the defendant over the shoulders of his attorney.
THE COURT: Overruled.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I’d ask the Court to instruct the jury that I have just as sacred an oath to see that justice is done.
THE COURT: You do take an oath, but it does not have the wording that he’s talking about, Counsel.
THE STATE: His oath is to represent the interest of his client to his utmost within the bounds of the law. He’s done that. But, see, it's not important to seek truth and justice under his oath. It is mine.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I must object. That’s a mischaracterization of my oath. My oath does not say that I’m not supposed to be looking for truth and justice.
THE COURT: Overruled.
I do not concede that the prosecutor’s argument presented reversible error. But, although I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the prosecutor’s argument, we need not reverse the judgment of the trial court if we “determin[e] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.” Tex. R.App. Proc. 81(b)(2).
The purpose of Rule 81(b)(2) is, quite sensibly, to avoid setting aside convictions and punishments “for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (discussing identical federal harmless error test). Under the rule, the duty of the appellate court is to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the error, either alone or in context, contributed to the finding of guilt or to the assessment of punishment. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). In other words, the appellate court must determine whether the trial was an essentially fair one, in which there was little, if any, chance that the conviction and punishment were based on the error that occurred. Id. at 588. This determination is necessarily “one of judgment.” Id. at 585.
In carrying out this task, our primary focus should be on the probable impact of the error on the minds of average jurors. Castillo v. State, 810 S.W.2d 180, 185 (Tex.Crim. *64App.1990). The strength of the State’s case,1 the extent (if any) to which the error was emphasized, and the extent (if any) to which the error placed the defendant in a poorer light are all factors that may be logically relevant to consider in the assessment of the error’s impact on the jury. Moreno v. State, 858 S.W.2d 453, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Castillo v. State, 810 S.W.2d at 185; Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d at 587. In any given case, other factors may also be logically relevant. Finally, we have also held that the “source” of the error, the prosecutor’s subjective intent with respect to the error, and the possibility that declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it, are also relevant factors to consider, despite the lack of a textual basis in Rule 81(b)(2) for such factors. Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d at 587-588. See Higginbotham v. State, 807 S.W.2d 732, 739 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (Clinton, J., concurring).
Turning to the facts of the instant case, I have no difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s argument did not contribute to appellant’s conviction or punishment. My conclusion is based on several obvious factors. First, the State’s case during the guilt/innoeence stage was strong, if not actually overwhelming. Two witnesses positively identified appellant as one of the individuals who beat and kidnapped the victim from the parking lot of a Beaumont convenience store on November 9, 1992. One of those witnesses also testified that appellant told the victim that he was going to kill him.2 Finally, a third witness testified that she knew appellant and that he confessed to her sometime shortly after the victim’s body was found.
Second, the State’s case at the punishment stage was also strong. The State’s evidence established that appellant had been convicted previously, in Texas courts, of robbery (once) and aggravated robbery (twice). In addition, five witnesses testified that appellant had a bad reputation for being peaceable and law-abiding.
Third, the prosecutor’s statements that defense counsel “wished for a guilty man to go free” and had “no obligation to see that justice was done,” although inappropriate and unfortunate, did not place appellant in a poorer light in the context of the evidence presented at trial.
Fourth, the prosecutor’s statements were quickly followed by his admission that defense counsel had represented appellant “within the bounds of the law.” The prosecutor did not allege or imply that defense counsel had suborned perjury or had otherwise engaged in illegal tactics. Thus, the prosecutor’s statements did not amount to an impermissible attack on the defense’s case, to the extent that reversible error was committed.
Fifth, the prosecutor’s statements were not repeated or emphasized elsewhere in his lengthy closing argument.
Sixth, the trial court’s overruling of appellant’s objection, although erroneous, is not in itself dispositive in a harmless error analysis. See Orona v. State, 791 S.W.2d 125, 128-130 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
Seventh, I discern nothing in the record that would indicate that the prosecutor was deliberately attempting to taint the trial process. Rather, it seems only that the prosecutor was attempting to respond to the arguments of opposing counsel. For that same reason, I doubt that holding the prosecutor’s argument harmless would encourage the State to repeat such an argument with impunity in the future.
In summary, I conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor’s argument, though error, was not the type of error that, *65either alone or in context, mandates reversal under Rule 81(b)(2). There is little, if any, likelihood that the prosecutor’s argument changed the result of the trial. Accordingly, I dissent.

. The majority has completely ignored the strength of the State’s evidence, although that is the single most important factor in determining an error’s impact on the minds of average jurors. "The major consideration in applying the analysis of Harris v. State [790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989)] is generally whether the amount and nature of the untainted evidence permits a confident inference that the error did not influence the trier of fact.” G. Dix & R. Dawson, Texas Criminal Practice and Procedure § 43.441 at 349 (1995).

. The victim’s body was found on the early morning of November 10, 1992, about two blocks from the same convenience store. An autopsy confirmed that the causes of death were gunshot wounds to the victim’s head and neck.