Court Opinion

ID: 9379222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 00:00:31.24482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.501044
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30416     Document: 00516676319         Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/14/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                          March 14, 2023
                                  No. 22-30416                            Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk

   David Anthony Newbold; Briana Caroline Stockett;
   Deanna Nicole Smith,

                                                           Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                      versus

   Kinder Morgan SNG Operator, L.L.C.; Southern
   Natural Gas Company, L.L.C.,

                                                        Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 3:21-cv-929

   Before Wiener, Stewart, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:
          Two years after an unfortunate single-boat accident, one of the boat’s
   two occupants died as a result of his injuries. The boat in which he was a
   passenger had struck a warning sign that was totally submerged at the time of
   the allision between the boat and sign. His estate and survivors sued the
   companies responsible for the sign in question. The district court granted
   summary judgment to the Defendants on the ground that the incident
   occurred on water governed by Louisiana law rather than federal. The parties
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   agree that if Louisiana law governs, the claims are barred. At issue in this
   appeal is whether or not the allision occurred in “navigable” waters such that
   federal law governs. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the allision
   occurred on non-navigable waters and thus AFFIRM the decision of the
   district court.
                                Factual Background
          On April 16, 2020, John Andrew Newbold and his nephew Jason
   Rodgers went fishing in the D’Arbonne Wildlife Refuge. As they were
   making their way back to the boat launch after a largely unsuccessful day,
   Newbold and Rodgers noticed a clear channel of water off to one side and
   decided to make one last go at fishing for the day. They turned into the swath
   and Rodgers, who was operating the boat, accelerated down the center. The
   boat then struck a submerged object and Newbold, who was sitting on a bench
   in the front of the boat, was ejected. Newbold hit his head on the boat’s
   propeller, which left two large gashes on the left side of his head. Roughly
   two years later, Newbold died of those injuries.
          It was later determined that the clear swath of water was atop a right-
   of-way granted to the Southern Natural Gas Company for two natural gas
   pipelines. Those pipelines, which are operated by Kinder Morgan, 1 cross
   Bayou D’Arbonne. The rights-of-way are mowed regularly and the land
   above which the allision occurred had been dry roughly 67 percent of the time
   in the past 30 years, according to an expert report prepared on behalf of the
   Defendants. The submerged item which the boat struck is believed to have
   been a sign warning boaters not to anchor or dredge above the pipeline. The
   sign was subsequently replaced after it was damaged by a hurricane, but at

          1
           Collectively, Kinder Morgan and Southern Natural Gas will be referred to as
   “Defendants.”

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   the time of the allision the sign was roughly 15 feet high. According to the
   Defendants’ expert report, due to seasonal flooding, the sign has been
   submerged for roughly seven percent of the time across the past 30 years.
                                   Procedural History
          Through a curator, 2 Newbold, joined by his children (collectively,
   “Plaintiffs”), filed a petition for damages against Kinder Morgan and
   Southern Natural Gas in Louisiana state court. The Defendants then
   removed to the Western District of Louisiana under diversity jurisdiction.
   After roughly a year of litigation in the district court, the Defendants filed a
   motion for summary judgment in which they sought dismissal on the grounds
   that Louisiana’s Recreational Use Statute (“RUS”) provided them
   immunity from tort liability on the uncontested facts. The Plaintiffs conceded
   that, if applicable, the RUS would bar recovery. They submitted, however,
   that “the location of the allision was navigable in fact and in law.” Finding
   no material issue of fact on this issue, the district court held that the location
   was not navigable and thus granted summary judgment to the Defendants.
   This appeal followed.
                                  Standard of Review
          “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
   reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135,
   142 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Crawford v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 234 F.3d 899,
   902 (5th Cir. 2000)). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the

          2
              At the time the petition was filed and removed, Newbold was alive but
   incapacitated. As has been noted, Newbold passed away during the pendency of litigation.
   His children, who were already in the suit, carried the suit forward and amended it to
   include a survival action.

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   movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
   movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                    Discussion
          “It is well established that the Commerce Clause of the United States
   Constitution gives the federal government a ‘dominant servitude’ over the
   navigable waters of the United States.” Parm, 513 F.3d at 142-43 (quoting
   United States v. Cherokee Nat. of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 704 (1987)). Congress
   has exercised that power in part to declare that “[t]he creation of any
   obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress[] to the navigable
   capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited.” 33 U.S.C. §
   403. Louisiana law, however, provides that “[a]n owner, lessee, or occupant
   of premises owes no duty of care to keep such premises safe … for … fishing
   … or boating or to give warning of any hazardous conditions … whether the
   hazardous condition … is one normally encountered … or one created by the
   placement of structures.” La. Rev. Stat. § 9:2791. Louisiana courts have
   noted, however, that “an injury which occurs on a navigable waterway … is
   not subject to a defense under” this statute. Buras v. United Gas Pipeline Co.,
   598 So. 2d 397, 400 (La. Ct. App. 1992). As such, the parties agree that if the
   injury occurred in navigable water, summary judgment was unwarranted; if,
   conversely, the injury occurred in non-navigable water, summary judgment
   is appropriate.
          We have elsewhere noted that “[t]he navigational servitude does not
   burden land that is only submerged when the river floods.” Parm, 513 F.3d at
   143. The location of the allision is on such land. Any flood waters on land
   unburdened by the navigational servitude are by definition not navigable for
   purposes of federal law and summary judgment would therefore be
   appropriate. However, the Plaintiffs posit three independent grounds by

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   which they suggest an exception to this general rule may be found. Each are
   addressed in turn.
   I. Whether, due to rights procured by the Army Corps of Engineers, the
   navigational servitude for the Refuge is 65 feet above mean sea level.
          The first ground on which the Plaintiffs claim that the allision took
   place on navigable water is that the “navigational servitude” for the Refuge
   is alleged to be 65 feet above the mean sea level (“MSL”). The allision is
   claimed to have occurred at 55 feet above MSL. As part of the
   Comprehensive Conservation Plan for the Refuge, the Army Corps of
   Engineers “has the right to permanently flood those lands lying below 65 feet
   above MSL and to flood on a seasonal basis any land lying between 65 feet
   above MSL and 70 feet above MSL.” As such, Plaintiffs assert that the
   navigational servitude for the land of the Refuge is now 65 feet above MSL.
   At no point do the Plaintiffs assert that the Corps has, in fact, permanently
   flooded the Refuge, though the Comprehensive Conservation Plan notes that
   seasonal flooding may reach as high as 70 feet above MSL at times (a rise
   which the Plaintiffs attribute to the Corps’ work). In response, the
   Defendants contend simply that “[t]he right to flood a national wildlife
   refuge, and not doing so, does not create navigable waters where none exist.”
          Any water burdened by the navigational servitude is by definition
   navigable, and federal law would therefore apply. “The so-called navigational
   servitude extends ‘laterally to the entire water surface and bed of a navigable
   waterway, which includes all the land and waters below the ordinary high
   water mark.’ A river’s ordinary high water mark is set at ‘the line of the shore
   established by the fluctuations of water.’” Parm, 513 F.3d at 143 (quoting 33
   C.F.R. § 329.11(a)) (internal citation omitted). In other words, the
   navigational servitude relates to actualities – “the waters below the ordinary
   high water mark,” “the line of the shore,” and so forth, id. – rather than

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   potentialities. Should the Corps permanently flood the Refuge, the water
   there would likely be navigable. But as the parties agree that the Corps has
   not in fact permanently flooded the refuge, the water may not be said to be
   navigable under this theory.
   II. Whether the allision occurred below the ordinary high-water mark of
   the Bayou D’Arbonne.
          The district court reasoned that the location of the allision is below
   the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou D’Arbonne because “[t]he area
   … is dry 67% of the time.” What’s more, the district court suggested that
   “[t]he fact that the area has vegetation at all shows it is outside of the
   navigable waters of Bayou D’Arbonne.” This latter ground, the Plaintiffs
   suggest, “defies over a century of jurisprudence and is inconsistent with the
   tests established by the Corps, and state and federal courts.” Instead,
   Plaintiffs submit that the ordinary high-water mark “is found at the line
   below which the water is so consistently present that it changes the soil and
   destroys the terrestrial vegetation and agricultural value of the land.” The
   channel in which the allision occurred, an expert employed by the Plaintiffs
   concluded, is a “semi-permanently flooded” area which “is not … suitable
   for agriculture, grazing, or growing and harvesting desirable or marketable
   hardwood timber.” Thus, Plaintiffs submit, the location of the allision is
   below the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou.
          Any water below the ordinary high-water mark of a navigable
   waterbody is navigable. “A river’s ordinary high water mark is set at ‘the line
   of the shore established by the fluctuations of water.’ It is ascertained by
   ‘physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank;
   ... changes in the character of the soil; destruction of terrestrial vegetation; ...
   or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the
   surrounding areas.’” Parm, 513 F.3d at 143 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 329.11(a))

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   (internal citation omitted). None of these characteristics – clear banks,
   changes in soil, destruction of vegetation and so on – is dispositive in itself.
   Instead, they are markers which direct courts to the type of characteristics
   worth evaluating: namely, “physical characteristics” which “consider the
   characteristics of the surrounding areas.” A vegetation-based test may not be
   useful, for example, in a desert area in which vegetation is scarce; likewise, a
   vegetation-based test may be difficult to apply in a swampy area in which
   vegetation coincides with standing water. The D’Arbonne National Wildlife
   Refuge, in which the relevant location sits, is “17,421 acres of deep overflow
   swamp, bottomland hardwood forest, and mixed pine/hardwood uplands”
   which is held by the United States for the “conservation, maintenance, and
   management of wildlife, resources thereof, and its habitat thereon.”
          Plaintiffs suggest that we follow the test laid out in Borough of Ford City
   v. United States, in which the Third Circuit held that the ordinary high-water
   mark should be determined by finding “the land upon which the waters have
   visibly asserted their dominion, the value of which for agricultural purposes
   has been destroyed.” 345 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir. 1965). “[T]he vegetation
   test for a navigable stream’s ordinary high-water mark means not that within
   such line all vegetation has been destroyed by the water covering the soil but
   that the soil has been covered by water for sufficient periods of time to
   destroy its value for agricultural purposes.” Id. As noted in that very case,
   however: “The vegetation test is useful where there is no clear, natural line
   impressed on the bank. If there is a clear line, as shown by erosion, and other
   easily recognized characteristics such as shelving, change in the character of
   the soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, and litter, it determines the line
   of ordinary high-water.” Id. at 648.
          Here, the location of the allision is on land that is dry 67 percent of the
   time, where vegetation is not destroyed and the land is not bare, as evidenced
   by the need to mow it with some regularity. More significantly, the Bayou

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   D’Arbonne does have an “unvegetated channel” which is some 597 feet wide
   at the location where the boat split off to fish near the sign. The sign was
   located 58 feet away from the unvegetated channel. The unvegetated channel
   is a neat, natural line by which the ordinary high-water mark may be
   established. Within the channel, there is no vegetation; outside of it, there is.
          In United States v. Harrell, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a definition
   of the navigational servitude that would have extended it “laterally over the
   entire area covered by the ordinary high waters of the stream, including
   tributaries that might not otherwise be considered navigable and areas
   adjacent to the low water channel that revert to a swampy or even a dry condition
   as the waters recede.” 926 F.2d 1036, 1043 (11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in
   original opinion). The court there called the proposed definition “ludicrous”
   and cited favorably the district court’s assertion that such a definition
   “would recognize no horizontal limits to the bed of a navigable river in those
   areas where the banks are relatively low and flat.” Id. (internal quotation
   marks and citation omitted). That language applies equally here. The
   unvegetated channel establishes the ordinary high-water mark of the Bayou;
   water outside of that channel is not navigable.
   III. Whether the location is navigable in fact.
          Alternatively, the Plaintiffs suggest that “there is a question of
   material fact as to whether the location of allision is susceptible of being used
   in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce.” To be clear, there is
   no allegation that the channel is currently being used for commercial
   purposes; the nearest evidence of that is that the boat in which Mr. Newbold
   was a passenger was able to traverse the channel, but “[n]either navigation
   nor commerce encompass recreational fishing.” Parm, 513 F.3d at 143
   (citations omitted). Instead, the Plaintiffs suggest that the channel has the
   potential to be used for commerce, and that it may be used either presently or

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   in the future for commerce in manners as yet apparently unknown to either
   the Plaintiffs or the court. As possible evidence for this, Plaintiffs note that
   the very placement of the sign suggests that the Defendants “expected water
   levels to be frequently high enough for boats to regularly travel through the
   area.” 3
           In 1870, the Supreme Court declared that the term “navigable” refers
   to “every stream or body of water, susceptible of being made, in its natural
   condition, a highway for commerce, even though that trade be nothing more
   than the floating of lumber in rafts or logs.” The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 560
   (1870). The Supreme Court has also made clear that “[t]he extent of existing
   commerce is not the test” for navigability. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64,
   82 (1931). Instead, while “[t]he evidence of the actual use of streams, and
   especially of extensive and continued use for commercial purposes may be
   most persuasive, … where conditions … explain the infrequency or limited
   nature of such use, the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may
   still be satisfactorily proved.” Id. As a later Supreme Court decision
   summarized, “lack of commercial traffic [is not] a bar to a conclusion of
   navigability where personal or private use by boats demonstrates the
   availability of the stream for the simpler types of commercial navigation.”
   United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940) (citing
   Utah, 283 U.S. at 82).
           Finally, “[n]avigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed
   because the water course is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions or
   portages; nor need the navigation be open at all seasons of the year, or at all

           3
             At oral argument, Defendants’ counsel suggested that the sign was not intended
   for boaters traversing the seasonally-flooded right-of-way but was instead designed to warn
   boaters on the Bayou D’Arbonne itself not to anchor over the pipeline. Given the posture
   of the case, we assume as correct Appellant’s position on the matter.

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   stages of the water.” Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113,
   122 (1921). “Indeed, there are but few of our fresh-water rivers which did not
   originally present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted navigation. … the
   vital and essential point is whether the natural navigation of the river is such
   that it affords a channel for useful commerce. If this be so the river is
   navigable in fact.” The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 443 (1874).
          The Plaintiffs here fail to present even slight evidence concerning a
   commercial purpose for the channel in question. The closest they get is
   noting that the presence of the sign evinces expected boat traffic in the
   channel. The forms of evidence which convinced the Supreme Court that
   particular bodies of water are navigable are illustrative as to why this is
   insufficient. The Supreme Court has found navigability in fact on the basis
   of: (1) accounts of “large interstate commerce” involving “vessels from
   seventy to one hundred feet in length, with twelve feet beam, [which] drew
   when loaded two to two and one-half feet of water,” The Montello, 87 U.S. at
   441, (2) evidence that a channel had previously been used to support the fur
   trade, Econ. Light & Power Co., 256 U.S. at 117, (3) evidence that a relevant
   section of the Colorado river had been used for “a large number of
   enterprises, with boats of various sorts, including rowboats, flatboats,
   steamboats, motorboats, barges and scows, some being used for exploration,
   some for pleasure, some to carry passengers and supplies, and others in
   connection with prospecting, surveying, and mining operations,” Utah, 283
   U.S. at 82, and (4) evidence of “two keelboats operating in 1881, eight in
   1882, and eight together with a small steamboat in 1883 .… [which] carried
   iron ore and pig iron, as well as produce and merchandise,” Appalachian
   Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. at 411–12. No evidence of the sort exists here. If
   the channel in question, in its ordinary condition, has potential commercial
   value such that it may be called “navigable,” Plaintiffs have not carried their
   burden to “satisfactorily prove[]” as much. See Utah, 283 U.S. at 82. Thus,

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   the water in which the allision occurred was not navigable and summary
   judgment was proper.
                                Conclusion
         The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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