Court Opinion

ID: 9657736
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:36:14.150454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:47.847704
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in that portion of the opinion which holds that when there is a right to counsel which, as I understand, the State has conceded in this case, then, a defendant is entitled to at least some in camera procedure when his testimony about indigence may be self-incriminating. As a prerequisite, a defendant must first, however, “specifically establish that a real and appreciable danger of incrimination exists with respect to each question.” American State Bank of Dickinson v. Stoltz, 345 N.W.2d 365, 369 (N.D.1984).
My disagreement with the majority arises from the proper application of Stoltz to the facts at hand. I disagree that Gru-challa has established that he is automatically entitled to a full in camera proceeding on the issue of his alleged indigence. I agree, however, that on remand, he is entitled to show, in camera, as a threshold matter, why his right to self-incrimination generally is really and appreciably endangered. Stoltz. If he does meet this threshold requirement, there should follow, still in camera, individual questions relating to his alleged indigence and he should be called upon to explain why each question poses a “real and appreciable danger of incrimination.” If Gruchalla does not establish a real and appreciable danger, either generally or specifically, the in camera proceeding should be terminated.
I agree that this case should be remanded for further proceedings. I, therefore, specially concur.