Court Opinion

ID: 9847978
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:10:49.37384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:52.680868
License: Public Domain

UHLENHOPP, Justice
(dissenting).
I think this case is governed by the plain language of rule 700-1.23 of the Iowa Administrative Code. That rule states:
All listing agreements shall be in writing, properly identifying the property and containing all of the terms and conditions under which the property is to be sold, including the price, the commission to be paid, the signatures of all parties concerned and a definite expiration date. It shall contain no provision requiring a party signing a listing to notify the broker of his intention to cancel the listing after such definite expiration date.
(Emphasis added.)
In construing administrative rules we apply the principles applicable to the construction of statutes. This means we give effect to all the language in the rule, and we give the language its usual and ordinary meaning unless the context indicates otherwise. Pottawattamie County v. Iowa Department of Environmental Quality, 272 N.W.2d 448, 454 (Iowa 1978); Mallory v. Paradise, 173 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Iowa 1969).
*808I. As to the clause in the rule that a listing shall be “in writing ... containing ... the signatures of all parties concerned”, this listing contained only the signatures of the realtor and “Harold C. Baughman” — although three owners existed. The word “concerned” means “affected” or “interested”, and “all” in this context means “everybody”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1969). As owners, Mrs. Baughman and the corporation were affected and interested parties. The plain wording of the rule requires that the writing contain their signatures, but it does not; the signature “Harold C. Baugh-man” cannot be stretched to be three signatures. Whether Harold C. Baughman could have signed the other two signatures (assuming he had authority) need not be decided; no one affixed their signatures.
This is not the rare case in which a property, owned by several persons, is listed by only one of them; the realtor and the lister intend that those two are the only parties to the listing; and if the realtor finds a buyer the lister alone is liable for the commission and is liable whether or not the owners sell. See McHugh v. Johnson, 268 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1978). No necessity exists to say what effect rule 700-1.23 has on those cases. In this case Mr. Baugh-man is claimed to have acted for all three owners, but the signatures of two of them are not on the listing. If the principle of McHugh is extended to this kind of case, the requirement of the signatures of all parties concerned will be pretty well nullified in multiple owner situations. The realtor and one of the owners can sign the listing and the other owners can be shown by parol to be listers notwithstanding the requirement that the writing contain the signatures.
II. As to the clause that a listing shall be “in writing, properly identifying the property”, the listing here stated:
787 acres M/L 90% tillable. A top Davis Co. farm. 3 houses, 5 barns. 2 Harvestores 25 X 65 & 20 X 50-12,000 bu. grain. Cattle feeding set up with feed house & auger. 120' bunk. 50,000 bu. grain storage with drying floors & blowers. 20 h.p. 2 blowers on 48 ft. 7 ring. 1 blower on 36 ft. 8 ring bin. Good machine shed 54 X 72'. Good modern 2 story house. Good heating system, hot water heat. Rural water. AH outside fences good. This farm is in a high state of fertility.
In addition, the listing provided details about the main house and garage such as size, number of rooms, and heating system.
What did the real estate commission intend by the words, “in writing, properly identifying the property”? The general statute of frauds on sales of real estate is not analogous. It merely states that only written evidence is competent in the case of contracts “for the creation or transfer of any interest in lands, except leases for a term not exceeding one year.” Iowa Code § 622.32(3) (1979). A clause relating to identification of the land is not to be found in that statute; such requirement as exists regarding identification has been added by judicial gloss.
The decisions cited by the majority are not analogous for the same reason: they do not involve statutes or rules containing the express requirement of a “writing, properly identifying the property”. Needham v. Abbott Kinney Co., 217 Cal. 72, 76, 17 P.2d 109, 110 (1932) (involved pre-1931 statute which provided as to listings: “the following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his agent; ... 6. An agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or a commission; ...” Civ.Code of Calif. § 1624(6) (1906).); Shields & Co. v. Green, 100 Idaho 879, 882, 606 P.2d 983, 986 (1980) (involved section 9-508 of Idaho Code: “No contract for the payment of any sum of money or thing of value, as and for a commission or reward for the finding or procuring by one person of a purchaser of real estate of another shall be valid unless the same shall be in writing, signed by the owner of such real estate, or his legal, appointed and duly *809qualified representative.”); Gantt v. Harper, 86 Mont. 69, 74, 281 P. 915, 916-17 (1929) (involved listing in the form of an option and contract for sale of real estate under Montana general statute of frauds: “Every contract for the leasing for a longer term than one year, or for the sale of any lands or interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing, and be subscribed by the parties by whom the lease or sale is to be made.” See Ryan v. Davis, 5 Mont. 505, 510, 6 P. 339, 341 (1885).); Henderson v. Lemke, 60 Or. 363, 366, 119 P. 482, 483 (1911) (involved the following clause of the general statute of frauds: “8. An- agreement entered into subsequent to the taking effect of this act, authorizing or employing an agent or broker to sell or purchase real estate for compensation or a commission.”); Pickett v. Bishop, 148 Tex. 207, 209-10, 223 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (1949) (involved statute prohibiting action on listing “ ‘unless the promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some person by him therewith lawfully authorized.’ ”); Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 156-58, 158 P.2d 134, 138-39 (1945) (involved statute providing “ ‘Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation’ shall be void, unless some ‘note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged.’ ”).
Rule 700-1.23, however, is explicit. As to the property listed, the rule contains three express requirements. First, the property must be identified in writing: “in writing, properly identifying the property”. The identification must thus stand or fall on what is in the written listing. Nor is the question determinative as to whether the parties themselves know what property is listed; under the rule, again the question is whether the writing contains the identification. The test is thus objective: the contents of the writing, not the contents of the individuals’ minds.
The second requirement is a writing “identifying” the property. Although the parties may be claimed to know the property, the listing must identify it. To identify is “to establish the identity of”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1969).
The third requirement is a writing “properly” identifying the property. Properly means “in a proper manner: as a: in a fit manner: suitably b: strictly in accordance with fact: correctly”. Id.
While I do not think the writing need describe the property with the punctilio of a deed, I do believe the present listing is entirely inadequate as a “writing, properly identifying the property”.
III. By drafting rule 700-1.23 as it did, the real estate commission probably hoped to reduce the number of disputes and lawsuits between realtors and property owners as to whether a listing was made, what property was listed, who made the listing, and what the terms of the listing were. A loose construction of the rule will not further the commission’s aim of tightening up listings. If with experience the commission perceives that it has written the rule too strictly, the commission rather than this court should be the body to relax the requirements, by redrafting. I would affirm the judgment on the ground that the listing does not meet the signatures and identification requirements of the rule and is therefore unenforceable under Milholin v. Vo-rhies, 320 N.W.2d 552 (Iowa 1982).
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and McGIVERIN, J., join in this dissent.