Court Opinion

ID: 9463894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:19:29.430911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:03.732278
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the result and in the majority opinion except for Part II, which relates to denial of access to the presentence report on Leos. The precise issue for decision is whether, under Brady, the Jencks Act, or Rule 16, appellants were entitled to discovery of this presentence report, compiled by and in the possession of the probation officer.
Part II states that Brady, the Jencks Act and Rule 16 are “directed toward evidence in the hands of the prosecutor that the term “United States” in the Jencks Act “mean[s] the prosecutorial division of the government” and that “ ‘a statement . . in the possession of the United States’ can only be read to mean a statement in the hands of the federal prosecutor and that under Rule 16 “the government” means the prosecution. I assume that these statements are not intended to depart from established and more precisely stated standards. In U. S. v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40 (CA3, 1976), the court, in holding that a presentence report was not discoverable under the Jencks Act, said: “In speaking of statements ‘in the possession of the United States’, we understand the statute to require production only of statements possessed by the prosecutorial arm of the federal government.” 537 F.2d at 61. The court went on to note that the “prosecution” includes investigatory agencies as well as U. S. Attorneys when it said, “Hence, such statements possessed by, for example, the F.B.I. or a United States Attorney must be turned over to the defense on proper motion.” Id. Moreover, the two cases relied on by the Third Circuit in Dansker, Augenblick v. U. S., 377 F.2d 586, 597-98, 180 Ct.Cl. 131 (1967), rev’d on other grounds 393 U.S. 348, 89 S.Ct. 528, 21 L.Ed.2d 537 (1969), and U. S. v. Erlichman, 389 F.Supp. 95, 96 (D.D.C., 1974), both specifically point out that the Jencks Act contemplates disclosure by all executive investigatory agencies.
In the context of Rule 16 there are equally strong indications that “government” means more than just the prosecutor. In U. S. v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 439 F.2d 642, 650 (1971), the court, speaking in terms of the Jencks Act, Rule 16 and Brady, said:
The fact that it was the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and not the United States Attorney’s office, which had possession of the tape in these cases does not render it any less discoverable. The duty of disclosure affects not only the prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative agencies. Rule 16 and the Jencks Act refer, respectively, to evidence gathered by “the government” and by “the United States,” not simply that held by the prosecution.
Id. at 650.
There is Fifth Circuit law as well. In U. S. v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (CA5, 1973), the appellants-defendants were accused of bribing a postal employee. Before trial, the defendants, pursuant to Rule 16, moved for production of the employee’s personnel file, citing Brady as authority. The district court denied production, saying that the Post Office Department was not an “arm of the prosecution.” We rejected the district court’s position. Speaking in terms of a Brady duty to disclose, this court said that the government could not escape its obligation to supply evidence by compartmentalizing the Justice Department and the Post Office Department, and by claiming that the former organization did not have access to the requested materials merely because they were in the possession of the latter organization. 475 F.2d at 57.
In my judgment most of Part II is arguably dicta, certainly broader than necessary for the decision, and a source of future misunderstanding when read in the light of established jurisprudence.