Court Opinion

ID: 9402933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-19 15:08:17.590966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:03.512226
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued June 15, 2023.

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00490-CV
                           ———————————
                      FREDERICK WRIGHT, Appellant
                                        V.
              RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 11th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2013-47739

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Frederick Wright contends the trial court erred in vacating its June

21, 2021 order reinstating the case following dismissal for want of prosecution. We

affirm.
                                    Background

      On August 14, 2013, Wright filed a whistleblower lawsuit against the

Railroad Commission of Texas (the Commission). This appeal concerns the trial

court’s dismissal of Wright’s lawsuit for want of prosecution, its later

reinstatement of the case, and its order vacating that reinstatement.

      The case was first dismissed for want of prosecution on January 18, 2018.

Wright filed a “Motion for Reinstatement of Case” on February 16, 2018, asking

the court to reinstate and abate the matter until a related federal court case was

resolved. The trial court granted Wright’s motion, as well as a second

reinstatement motion filed on March 10, 2020, but dismissed the case again for

want of prosecution on October 23, 2020. That same day, Wright filed a third

motion for reinstatement. The trial court did not take any action on the third

motion. He then filed a fourth motion for reinstatement on May 24, 2021. On June

21, 2021, the trial court granted Wright’s motion and reinstated the case.

      On May 19, 2022, the Commission filed a motion to vacate the June 21,

2021 order, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the case

because its plenary power had expired. The trial court entered an order vacating the

reinstatement on June 7, 2022. Wright appeals.

                                          2
                                     Discussion

      Wright’s main contention on appeal is that the trial court had jurisdiction to

reinstate the case when it entered its June 21, 2021 order. Wright also argues that

the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on his third reinstatement motion.

We consider Wright’s jurisdictional arguments first. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks &

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004); Waite v. Woodard, Hall &

Primm, P.C., 137 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

A.    Standard of Review

      “Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s power to decide a case.”

City of Hous. v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (internal quotations

omitted). Subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. Alfonso v. Skadden,

251 S.W.3d 52, 55 (Tex. 2008). Because the question of jurisdiction is a legal

question, we apply a de novo standard of review. Hoff v. Nueces Cnty., 153 S.W.3d

45, 48 (Tex. 2004); Alwazzan v. Alwazzan, 596 S.W.3d 789, 802 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

B.    Applicable Law

      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a governs reinstatements following

dismissal for want of prosecution. The rule states, in pertinent part:

             3. Reinstatement. A motion to reinstate shall set forth
             the grounds therefor and be verified by the movant or his
             attorney. It shall be filed with the clerk within 30 days
             after the order of dismissal is signed or within the period

                                           3
            provided by Rule 306a[1]. A copy of the motion to
            reinstate shall be served on each attorney of record and
            each party not represented by an attorney whose address
            is shown on the docket or in the papers on file. The clerk
            shall deliver a copy of the motion to the judge, who shall
            set a hearing on the motion as soon as practicable. The
            court shall notify all parties or their attorneys of record of
            the date, time and place of the hearing.

                                         ...

            In the event for any reason a motion for reinstatement is
            not decided by signed written order within seventy-five
            days after the judgment is signed . . . the motion shall be
            deemed overruled by operation of law. If a motion to
            reinstate is timely filed by any party, the trial court,
            regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has
            plenary power to reinstate the case until 30 days after all
            such timely filed motions are overruled, either by a
            written and signed order or by operation of law,
            whichever occurs first.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3).

C.    The October 23, 2020 Motion to Reinstate

      Wright filed his third motion for reinstatement on October 23, 2020—the

same day the trial court dismissed the case. Thus, Wright’s motion was timely. See

id. (requiring reinstatement motions to be filed “within 30 days after the order of

dismissal is signed”). However, Wright’s motion was not verified in accordance

1
      Rule 306a, entitled “Periods to Run from Signing of Judgment,” addresses
      situations where, among other things, parties do not receive notice of judgment or
      when judgments nunc pro tunc are signed. The rule does not apply to the
      circumstances here.

                                           4
with Rule 165a(3).2 See id. (requiring reinstatement motions to be “verified by the

movant or his attorney”). In the absence of a timely filed, verified motion to

reinstate, a trial court’s plenary power expires thirty days after dismissal of the

case.3 See McConnell v. May, 800 S.W.2d 194, 194 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding);

Butts v. Capitol City Nursing Home, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tex. 1986);

Dardari v. Tex. Com. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 961 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.). “An unverified motion to reinstate does not

2
      On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether the motion was verified. Wright
      attached his notarized affidavit, titled “Verified/Sworn Statement of Appeal,” to
      his motion. The only substantive portion of the affidavit states as follows: “Mr.
      Wright filed his Brief with the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Appealing the
      ARB’s Final Order on US DOL ALJ Case No. 2015-SDW-001, on January 13,
      2020.”

      The affidavit makes no mention of the motion to reinstate; in fact, the affidavit is
      dated March 9, 2020, and thus predates the motion by several months. Moreover,
      the affidavit fails to describe what transpired in the federal court case from March
      to October 2020. The basis of Wright’s motion to reinstate was that the federal
      court case was still pending, but the affidavit does not include any facts supporting
      this contention. Therefore, the affidavit is not a proper substitute for Rule 165a’s
      verification requirements. See Young v. Di Ferrante, 553 S.W.3d 125, 128–130
      (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (noting that although courts
      “recognize substitutes [to Rule 165a’s verification requirement] when they serve
      as the functional equivalent of a verification,” not all verification attempts suffice);
      Johnson v. Sepulveda, 178 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
      2005, no pet.) (concluding that motion to reinstate was unverified where attached
      affidavit “addresse[d] only appellant’s indigence and [did] not reference the
      attached motion to reinstate”; further, affidavit was “virtually identical” to one
      attached to recusal motion).
3
      Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after the October 23, 2020
      dismissal order, Wright’s fourth reinstatement motion, filed on May 24, 2021, was
      a nullity.
                                             5
extend the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction.” Owen v. Hodge, 874 S.W.2d 301, 303

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ).

      Consequently, because Wright filed an unverified motion to reinstate, the

trial court's plenary power in this matter expired on November 22, 2020—thirty

days after the order of dismissal.4 Since the trial court lost jurisdiction long before

issuing the restatement order on June 21, 2021, that order was void. See Walker v.

Harrison, 597 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding) (“[T]he time limits

provided in rule 165a are mandatory and jurisdictional and . . . orders of

reinstatement entered after their expiration are void”); In re Valliance Bank, 422

S.W.3d 722, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, orig. proceeding) (“Because the

trial court signed the order of reinstatement after its plenary power had expired, we

hold that the order of reinstatement is void and of no legal effect.”); In re Boglia,

L.L.C., No. 01-11-00891-CV, 2011 WL 13385443, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Dec. 22, 2011, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“A reinstatement order

rendered after the expiration of the trial court’s plenary power is void.”). The trial

court thus correctly vacated the void order. See Alfonso, 251 S.W.3d at 55 (holding
4
      Even if Wright’s motion was properly verified, the trial court would have lost
      jurisdiction on February 5, 2021, over three months before its June 21, 2021 order.
      Rule 165a provides that a reinstatement motion is deemed overruled by operation
      of law if not decided within 75 days, and thereafter, a court retains plenary power
      to reinstate the case “until 30 days after all such timely motions are overruled,
      either by a written and signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs
      first.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3); see also Emerald Oaks Hotel/Conf. Ctr., Inc. v.
      Zardenetta, 776 S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
      (discussing same).
                                           6
that “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be raised at any

time”); see also Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 801–803 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (holding that where trial court’s

original order was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it retained plenary

power to sign later judgment; trial court “has no discretion to refuse to set aside a

void judgment, but has the duty to do so at any time that such matter is brought to

its attention”).

D.     The Supreme Court’s Emergency Orders

       Wright contends that the trial court’s power to rule on the motion to reinstate

was extended by the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders regarding the

Covid-19 state of disaster, because these orders allow courts to modify or suspend

deadlines. However, numerous courts, including this one, have rejected such an

argument. As we recently explained in In re Romero, No. 01-21-00629-CV, 2022

WL 23939 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 4, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.), the language in the Supreme Court’s emergency orders

              giving a court the power to modify or suspend “deadlines
              and procedures” presupposes a pre-existing power or
              authority over the case or the proceedings. A court may
              extend a deadline or alter a procedure that would
              otherwise be part of the court proceedings. It does not
              suggest that a court can create jurisdiction for itself
              where the jurisdiction would otherwise be absent or that a
              judge could create authority to preside over proceedings
              over which the judge would otherwise be barred from
              presiding.

                                          7
2022 WL 23939, at *2 n.4 (quoting In re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d 361, 364

(Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (orig. proceeding)); see also Quariab v. El Khalili, No. 05-

20-00979-CV, 2021 WL 960646, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 15, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that because trial court had lost jurisdiction over case, it

could not avail itself of supreme court’s emergency orders to reinstate case and

noting that “the language in the emergency orders . . . ‘does not suggest that a court

can create jurisdiction for itself where the jurisdiction would otherwise be

absent[.]’”) (quoting In re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d at 364). Here, because the

trial court had already lost jurisdiction at the time of the June 21, 2021 order, it

could not use the emergency orders to create jurisdiction where it no longer

existed. See In re State ex rel. Ogg, 618 S.W.3d at 364. We therefore overrule

Wright’s jurisdictional arguments.

E.    Failure to Hold Hearing on Wright’s Motion

      Wright also complains that the trial court should have held a hearing on his

October 23, 2020 motion to reinstate. Where a motion to reinstate is timely filed

and properly verified following a dismissal of a suit for want of prosecution, an

oral hearing is required under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a. Thordson v.

City of Hous., 815 S.W.2d 550, 550 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam); Johnson, 178

S.W.3d at 119. Here, however, Wright did not properly verify his motion. Thus,

Wright did not invoke Rule 165a and its hearing requirements. See Johnson, 178

                                          8
S.W.3d at 119 (holding that where movant’s motion for reinstatement was not

properly verified, trial court did not err in failing to hold hearing on motion).

      Further, the record does not reflect that Wright ever requested a hearing on

his motion. Instead, his motion states that “[t]he Submission of this Motion has

been set for Monday November 9, 2020 at 9:00 AM at 201 Caroline St, Houston,

Tx 77002, in the Courtroom of this Court.” There is no indication in the record that

Wright raised the issue of a hearing with the trial court before the time for ruling

on the motion expired.

      We have noted that “the movant in a motion to reinstate has the burden of

procuring a setting within the time allowed for reinstatement.”5 Nasa I Bus. Ctr. v.

Amer. Nat’l Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988,

writ denied) (citing Calaway v. Gardner, 525 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (“If such a request [for a hearing] had been

made and called to the judge’s attention, and if the judge had failed to set the case

within the time limit, such failure would have been erroneous and reviewable.”)).

We have also stated, in the context of a movant’s failure to request a hearing on his
5
      One unpublished decision from this Court holds that a movant is not required to
      request a hearing on a motion to reinstate. See Johnson v. Patrick, No. 01-90-
      00922-CV, 1992 WL 23627, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 13, 1992,
      no pet.) (not designated for publication). However, the Johnson opinion is silent as
      to whether the motion at issue was verified. In fact, the motion in Johnson was not
      styled as a motion for reinstatement. Id. at *1. Rather, the court construed the pro
      se appellant’s “Motion For A Rehearing On The Trial Setting Or Motion For New
      Trial” as such. Id. We therefore find Johnson distinguishable from the present
      case.
                                           9
motion to reinstate, that “[a] party may not lead a trial court into error and then

complain about it on appeal.” Kelly v. Cunningham, 848 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ); see also Johnson, 178 S.W.3d at 119

(holding trial court did not err in failing to conduct hearing on unverified motion to

reinstate where movant did not request hearing); Rainbow Home Health, Inc. v.

Schmidt, 76 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (same);

Cabrera v. Cedarapids Inc., 834 S.W.2d 615, 618 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d) (same).

      Here, because there is nothing in the record to suggest that Wright timely

complained to the trial court about not getting a hearing, and because his motion

was not verified in accordance with Rule 165a, we do not find error in the trial

court’s decision not to conduct a hearing on Wright’s motion. We overrule

Wright’s issues.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the order of the trial court.

                                                    Amparo Guerra
                                                    Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.

                                         10