Court Opinion

ID: 9400201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 17:01:14.735958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.960833
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-13867    Document: 35-1      Date Filed: 06/07/2023   Page: 1 of 20

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit
                           ____________________

                                 No. 20-13867
                           ____________________

        YOLANDA DUNCAN,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        CITY OF SANDY SPRINGS,
        OFFICER RYAN GEHRICKE,
        in his individual capacity,
        OFFICER JOHN DOE,
        in his individual capacity,
        JASON DWAIN ANDERSON,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.
                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-01129-MLB
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       20-13867

        Before WILSON and LAGOA, Circuit Judges, and MARTINEZ,* District
        Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
                Yolanda Duncan appeals from the district court’s dismissal
        of her amended complaint against the City of Sandy Springs, Of-
        ﬁcer Ryan Gehricke, and Jason Anderson for failure to state a claim
        under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accepting all alle-
        gations in Duncan’s complaint and taking all inferences in her fa-
        vor—as we must—we conclude that Duncan has pleaded suﬃcient
        facts to state a plausible claim for false arrest and malicious prose-
        cution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Duncan has also pleaded suﬃcient
        facts to show that Leach is not entitled to qualiﬁed immunity at this
        stage of the litigation.
            I.      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
              March 13, 2017, began as a normal day for Yolanda Duncan.
        She drove to a LA Fitness gym location, parked her car in the gym’s
        parking lot, and went inside the gym to workout. Things took an

        *Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge for the Southern
        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
        1 Because the procedural posture of this case involves a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
        we must accept the allegations of plaintiff’s amended complaint as true. See
        Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc), abrogated
        in part by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561–63 (2007). The facts
        set forth in this section of the opinion therefore are taken from the amended
        complaint and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
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        20-13867               Opinion of the Court                        3

        unexpected turn when a Sandy Springs police oﬃcer approached
        her leaving the gym.
              After ﬁnishing her workout, Duncan exited the gym and be-
        gan walking towards her case when Oﬃcer Gehricke confronted
        her and asked her if she was Yolanda Duncan. After Duncan con-
        ﬁrmed her identity and identiﬁed her vehicle, Oﬃcer Gericke ac-
        cused her of scratching another car in the parking lot. But Duncan
        knew this could not be true—she speciﬁcally remembered her sur-
        roundings and not hitting another car while she parked (and, in fact,
        an expert investigation by Duncan’s insurance carrier later con-
        cluded she had not caused the accident). Unbeknownst to Duncan,
        while she was in the gym, Jason Anderson had enlisted Oﬃcer
        Gehricke to help him track down the driver that allegedly stuck his
        unattended car in the LA Fitness parking lot. He had apparently
        taken a photograph of the cars in contact and provided Oﬃcer
        Gehricke with a license plate number. Running the plate revealed
        Duncan as the owner of the striking car.
               Duncan tried to have a civil discussion and explain to both
        men that she did not think she hit anyone’s car, but Oﬃcer
        Gehricke quickly became irate. He screamed at Duncan and ex-
        pressed his displeasure at her denying fault. Bystanders who were
        disturbed by the Oﬃcer’s behavior and tried to intervene were re-
        buﬀed. Duncan continued to vehemently deny that she was in any
        accident or that she damaged Anderson’s car in any way.
               Oﬃcer Gehricke eventually asked to see Duncan’s driver’s
        license. While she denies refusing his request, she wondered—
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       20-13867

        having already provided her name and identifying her vehicle, and
        knowing Oﬃcer Gehricke had already run her license plate—what
        purpose producing her license could possibly serve. It is not clear
        from the complaint whether she ever produced her license, alt-
        hough Oﬃcer Gehricke claims she did not.
                As tensions escalated, Oﬃcer Gehricke threated criminal ac-
        tion, exclaiming, “Please don’t make this criminal! It’s civil right
        now!” Soon after, he walked to his patrol car to radio an unknown
        oﬃcer (“Oﬃcer Doe”) for permission to arrest her. With this of-
        ﬁcer’s blessing, Oﬃcer Gehricke arrested Duncan on charges of hit-
        and-run, see O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270, and obstruction, see id. § 16-10-
        24(a), for failing to produce her driver’s license. 2 Warrants were
        subsequently issued for both charges.
               Those familiar with Georgia law may ﬁnd these charges sur-
        prising. For one, the hit-and-run law Duncan supposedly violated
        only applies to the striking of attended vehicles. But Anderson re-
        ported that his car was struck unoccupied in the parking lot. More-
        over, as to the obstruction charge, there is no state law that requires
        individuals not presently driving to produce their license at the re-
        quest of an oﬃcer, and no law that allows oﬃcers to request as
        much. Cf. id. § 40-6-271 (delineating the duty upon a driver of a

        2 The arrest did not go smoothly. Oﬃcer Gehricke injured Duncan so severely
        that the county jail refused to accept her, and she was transported to the hos-
        pital with injuries to her back, neck, and hip. Duncan denies resisting arrest in
        any way. However, Duncan does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of
        her § 1983 excessive force claim.
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        20-13867               Opinion of the Court                       5

        vehicle striking an unattended vehicle). Duncan had to hire an at-
        torney and appear before the Sandy Springs Municipal Court fol-
        lowing her arrest.
                Based on the foregoing facts, the ﬁrst amended complaint
        included six counts: federal § 1983 claims against Oﬃcers Gehricke
        and Doe for unlawful seizure, malicious prosecution, excessive
        force, and First Amendment retaliation; a state law malicious pros-
        ecution claim against Gehricke, Doe, and Anderson; and municipal
        liability claims against the City itself.
               The City of Sandy Springs and Oﬃcer Gehricke together
        ﬁled a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint. An-
        derson did the same.
               The district court granted both motions and dismissed the
        complaint. It concluded that Duncan’s federal unlawful seizure
        and malicious prosecution claims failed because Oﬃcer Gehricke
        had probable cause to arrest her. Her state law malicious prosecu-
        tion claim failed for the same reason. Her federal excessive force
        claim failed because her allegations were conclusory. Her First
        Amendment retaliation claim failed because Oﬃcer Gehricke had
        probable cause to arrest her and, even if he did not, he would not
        have violated any clearly established right. Finally, her claims
        against the City of Sandy Springs failed because she had not alleged
        an underlying tort or constitutional violation. The district court
        also noted that the City has sovereign immunity. Duncan appeals
        all except the dismissal of her § 1983 excessive force claim.
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    20-13867

               In its deliberation, the district court considered a photo-
        graph attached to the motion to dismiss ﬁled by Sandy Springs and
        Oﬃcer Gehricke, which showed two black cars in contact. The dis-
        trict court claimed that its consideration of the photograph was
        proper because it matched Duncan’s own description and it was
        “central” to her complaint.
               This appeal ensued.
                       II.       STANDARD OF REVIEW
               “We review de novo the district court’s grant of a Rule
        12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, accepting the
        complaint’s allegations as true and construing them in the light
        most favorable to the plaintiﬀ.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d
        1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Cinotto v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
        674 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)).
                Further, we review de novo a district court’s denial of quali-
        ﬁed immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918
        F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir. 2019). Like the district court, we accept
        all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reason-
        able inferences in the plaintiﬀ’s favor. Id. When a qualiﬁed immun-
        ity defense is denied at the motion to dismiss stage, “appellate re-
        view is ‘limited to the four corners of the complaint,’” Corbitt v.
        Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v.
        Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)), which “must
        contain suﬃcient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
        for relief that is plausible on its face,” Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d 1313,
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        20-13867                   Opinion of the Court                                 7

        1319 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
        (2009)).
                                  III.        ANALYSIS
                 Cabining our review to the four corners of Duncan’s com-
        plaint, taking all its allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable
        inferences in favor of Duncan, we conclude that Duncan has stated
        a plausible claim that Oﬃcer Gehricke lacked probable cause to ar-
        rest or prosecute her.3 “[P]robable cause requires that ‘the facts and
        circumstances within the oﬃcer’s knowledge, of which he or she has
        reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to
        believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect has commit-
        ted . . . an oﬀense.’” Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1231
        n.11 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435
        (11th Cir. 1998)), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Aguirre, 965
        F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020)
                          A. The Qualified Immunity Standard
                Qualified immunity protects government officials “from lia-
        bility for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
        clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

        3 Duncan’s   false arrest and malicious prosecution claims implicate slightly dif-
        ferent standards. A false arrest claim requires a plaintiff to show that there was
        no probable cause to arrest him for “any crime.” Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d
        1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020). A malicious prosecution claim requires a plaintiff
        to show that there was no probable cause for one or more of the charged of-
        fenses. See id. at 1157, 1165. These differences, however, do not matter at this
        procedural point in the case.
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 20-13867

        reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555
        U.S. 223, 231–32 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
        818 (1982)). “While the defense of qualified immunity is typically
        addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be, as it
        was in this case, raised and considered on a motion to dismiss.” St.
        George, 285 F.3d at 1337.
               To assert a qualified immunity defense, a government offi-
        cial must first establish that he was acting within his discretionary
        authority at the time of the challenged conduct. Mercado v. City of
        Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir. 2005). Because there is no
        dispute Officer Gehricke was acting within his discretionary au-
        thority, the burden shifts to Duncan to show that: (1) Officer
        Gehricke “violated a constitutional right”; and (2) the “right was
        clearly established at the time of the incident.” Id. To meet her
        burden at this stage in the litigation, Duncan’s complaint must
        plausibly allege that Officer Gehricke did not have probable cause
        to arrest her. See Carter v. Butts County, 821 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th
        Cir. 2016) (“By now it is well established that ‘[a] warrantless arrest
        without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and forms
        a basis for a section 1983 claim.’” (quoting Ortega v. Christian, 85
        F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996))).
                The presence of probable cause will defeat § 1983 claims for
        unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution, as well as claims for
        malicious prosecution brought under Georgia law. See Wood v. Kes-
        ler, 323 F.3d 872, 878 (11th Cir. 2003) (“An arrest does not violate
        the Fourth Amendment if a police officer has probable cause for
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        20-13867                Opinion of the Court                         9

        the arrest.”); Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir.
        2010) (“[T]he existence of probable cause defeats a § 1983 malicious
        prosecution claim.”); Holmes v. Achor Ctr., Inc., 531 S.E.2d 773, 775
        (2000) (“The existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to
        a claim of malicious prosecution [brought under O.C.G.A. § 51–7–
        40].”). Duncan’s First Amendment retaliation claim also turns on
        probable cause. See DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277,
        1297 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he presence of probable cause will . . .
        generally defeat a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim for an
        underlying retaliatory arrest . . . .”).
                “While an officer who arrests an individual without proba-
        ble cause violates the Fourth Amendment,” Skop v. City of Atlanta,
        485 F.3d 1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007), an officer needs only “argua-
        ble” probable cause to invoke qualified immunity, Grider, 618 F.3d
        at 1257. “Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement
        officials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge suffi-
        cient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed
        or was committing a crime.” Skop, 485 F.3d at 1137 (quoting United
        States v. Floyd, 281 F.3d 1346, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002)). Arguable prob-
        able cause exists where “reasonable officers in the same circum-
        stances and possessing the same knowledge as the [d]efendant
        could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest the plain-
        tiff.” Id. (emphasis removed) (quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188,
        1195 (11th Cir. 2002)).
                        B. Probable Cause to Arrest Duncan
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                   20-13867

               The district court dismissed Duncan’s § 1983 claims for un-
        law seizure and malicious prosecution because it concluded Officer
        Gehricke had probable cause—or, at least, arguable probable
        cause—to arrest her and was thus protected from suit by qualified
        immunity. The district court dismissed Duncan’s state law mali-
        cious prosecution claim because it found Gehricke had actual prob-
        able cause for arrest. Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as
        true and construing them in the light most favorable to Duncan,
        these determinations were in error.
               For purposes of unlawful seizure, the “validity of an arrest
        does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time
        of the arrest.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla.,
        956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir.1992). Thus, the district court
        considered the original charges for her arrest—hit-and-run under
        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270 and obstruction under O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24)—
        as well as O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271, titled “Duty upon striking unat-
        tended vehicle,” which appears to have been later added to Dun-
        can’s charges.
                Turning ﬁrst to Georgia’s hit-and-run law, O.C.G.A. § 40-6-
        270 applies to “[t]he driver of any vehicle involved in an accident
        resulting . . . in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any
        person.” Id. § 40-6-270(a) (emphasis added). Oﬃcer Gehricke could
        not have had even arguable probable cause to arrest Duncan under
        this statute where it was undisputed that Anderson’s car was unat-
        tended when it was allegedly struck in the parking lot.
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        20-13867               Opinion of the Court                       11

                Next, Georgia’s obstruction statute reads, in relevant part:
        “[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any
        law enforcement oﬃcer . . . in the lawful discharge of his or her
        oﬃcial duties shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. § 16-10-24(a).
        There is no Georgia law that required Duncan to produce a driver’s
        license under the circumstances of this case. Cf. id. § 40-5-29(a)–
        (b)(1) (requiring a licensee to carry his license while operating a
        motor vehicle and to display his or her license upon the demand of
        a law enforcement oﬃcer). However, the district court determined
        that Duncan’s “refusal to show her license provided probable cause
        to believe she had obstructed [Oﬃcer Gehricke’s] investigation,”
        citing our decision in Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.
        2004). But that case was decided on summary judgment with the
        beneﬁt of video evidence that the defendant, in addition to refusing
        to retrieve the documents requested by the oﬃcer, “acted in a con-
        frontational and agitated manner, paced back and forth, and re-
        peatedly yelled at [the oﬃcer].” Id. at 1276–77. That case is clearly
        distinguishable. The facts alleged in the complaint, taken in the
        light most favorable to Duncan, do not permit ﬁnding that Oﬃcer
        Gehricke had even arguable probable cause to arrest Duncan for
        obstruction for failure to display her license.
               Finally, Georgia law requires “[t]he driver of any vehicle
        which collides with any vehicle which is unattended” to “immedi-
        ately stop” and, “then and there,”
              either locate and notify the operator or owner of such
              vehicle of the name and address of the driver and
              owner of the vehicle striking the unattended vehicle
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                20-13867

              or shall leave in a conspicuous place on the vehicle
              struck a written notice giving the name and address
              of the driver and the owner of the vehicle doing the
              striking.
        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271(a). The district court found that Oﬃcer
        Gehricke had probable cause to arrest Duncan for violating
        O.C.G.A. § 40-6-271 for refusing to show her license and failing to
        notify Anderson about striking his car. It relied on Souder v. State,
        687 S.E.2d 594 (2009), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals con-
        cluded probable cause existed where,
              the evidence established that prior to arresting
              Souder, the oﬃcer had obtained information from a
              witness that Souder had engaged in a “hit-and-run”
              incident by striking an unattended parked vehicle.
              This information authorized the oﬃcer to arrest
              Souder for failing to comply with his duty upon strik-
              ing an unattended vehicle.
        Id. at 598. Because Souder was on appeal from a denial of a motion
        for new trial, the Georgia court had to uphold the trial court’s ﬁnd-
        ings so long as there was “any evidence to support them.” Id. at
        597. The trial court’s “ﬁndings of fact and credibility determina-
        tions [had to] be accepted unless clearly erroneous,” and the evi-
        dence had to be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s
        verdict. Id.
               At this procedural stage, the error in the district court’s
        probable cause ﬁnding comes down to this: we are reviewing a mo-
        tion to dismiss. Duncan does not know—and cannot possibly
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        20-13867                Opinion of the Court                         13

        know without the beneﬁt of discovery—what happened before Of-
        ﬁcer Gehricke approached her. We do not know what Anderson
        told or showed Oﬃcer Gehricke or whether Oﬃcer Gehricke con-
        ducted any kind of investigation. We do not even know the iden-
        tity of the oﬃcer who gave Gehricke permission to arrest Duncan,
        let alone what was discussed during their exchange. Thus, it is not
        yet possible to determine whether probable cause—or even argua-
        ble probable cause—existed in this case.
               For these reasons, we hold that the dismissal of the § 1983
        unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution and state law malicious
        prosecution claims against Oﬃcers Gehricke and Doe was im-
        proper at this stage in the litigation. Gehricke may, of course, raise
        this qualiﬁed immunity defense again. But as the case stands at the
        motion-to-dismiss stage, we conclude that the district court erred
        in ﬁnding that Oﬃcer Gehricke and Oﬃcer Doe were entitled to
        qualiﬁed immunity.
                           C. First Amendment Retaliation
               Like § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest and malicious prose-
        cution, the presence of probable cause will generally defeat a § 1983
        First Amendment retaliation claim for an underlying retaliatory ar-
        rest. See DeMartini, 942 F.3d at 1297. But see Lozman v. City of Riviera
        Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2018); Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct.
        1715, 1722 (2019). The district court dismissed Duncan’s § 1983
        First Amendment retaliation claim because it concluded Officer
        Gehricke had probable cause to arrest her and that she did not
        properly allege facts to support she fit the narrow exception
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                       20-13867

        articulated in Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722. 4 Because we have con-
        cluded the district court’s probable cause determination was in er-
        ror, and because it is undisputed that Officer Gehricke was acting
        within the scope of his discretionary authority, the burden is on
        Duncan to establish that Officer Gehricke violated her First
        Amendment rights and that those rights were clearly established.
        Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1156.
               To show Oﬃcer Gehricke retaliated against her in violation
        of the First Amendment, Duncan must plausibly allege: (1) her
        speech was constitutionally protected; (2) “the defendant’s retalia-
        tory conduct adversely aﬀected the protected speech”; and (3)
        “there is a causal connection between the retaliatory actions and
        the adverse eﬀect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,
        1250 (11th Cir. 2005). Regarding prong two, there is no doubt that
        an arrest in “retaliation against private citizens for exercising their
        First Amendment rights [is] actionable.” Id. at 1255. Regarding
        prong three, we reverse the district court’s probable cause

        4 In2019, the Supreme Court held that although probable cause will generally
        defeat a retaliatory arrest claim, there is a narrow exception “for circumstances
        where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their
        discretion not to do so.” Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1726–27. Nieves “clearly estab-
        lished” for the first time that an arrest made with probable cause could none-
        theless subject an officer to liability for First Amendment retaliation. Dun-
        can’s complaint alleged that if Officer Gehricke had probable cause to arrest
        her, such probable cause could not bar her claim because she fits the narrow
        Nieves exception. But Duncan was arrested in 2017, before the Nieves decision,
        and the law thus was not clearly established. Therefore, if the Officers had
        probable cause to arrest her, it would bar her retaliatory arrest claim.
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        20-13867                Opinion of the Court                         15

        determination and take Duncan’s allegation that Oﬃcer Gehricke
        arrested her for “steadfastly protesting her innocence, truthfully ex-
        plaining to the oﬃcer what actually happened, and disputing [the]
        oﬃcer’s version of events,” as true. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.
        250, 256 (2006) (“[W]hen nonretaliatory grounds are in fact insuﬃ-
        cient to provoke the adverse consequences . . . retaliation is subject
        to recovery as the but-for cause of oﬃcial action oﬀending the Con-
        stitution.”).
                Turning to prong one, “the First Amendment protects a sig-
        niﬁcant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police
        oﬃcers.” City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (striking
        down as unconstitutional an ordinance that prohibited speech that
        “in any manner . . . interrupt[s]” an oﬃcer). Individuals are free
        “verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risk-
        ing arrest.” Id. at 462–63. “Speech is often provocative and chal-
        lenging. . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or
        punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present
        danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public in-
        convenience, annoyance, or unrest” Id. (alterations in original)
        (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). There are sev-
        eral narrow categories of unprotected speech, but mere verbal crit-
        icism or challenge of a police oﬃcer—as was alleged by Duncan—
        is not one of them. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)
        (true threats); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (child pornog-
        raphy); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (privacy);
        Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Corp., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (intellec-
        tual property); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity);
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  20-13867

        N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation); Chap-
        linksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (ﬁghting words);
        Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (incitement).
               The right to be free from retaliation for such speech is
        clearly established. See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1722 (“If an oﬃcial takes
        adverse action against someone based on that forbidden motive,
        and ‘non-retaliatory grounds are in fact insuﬃcient to provoke the
        adverse consequences,’ the injured person may generally seek re-
        lief by bringing a First Amendment claim.” (quoting Hartman, 547
        U.S. at 256 (2006)). Thus, we reverse the district court’s dismissal
        of Duncan’s First Amendment retaliation claim.
              D. State Law Malicious Prosecution Against Anderson
                Duncan sued Anderson under Georgia’s malicious prosecu-
        tion statute, which reads, “A criminal prosecution which is carried
        on maliciously and without any probable cause and which causes
        damage to the person prosecuted shall give him a cause of action.”
        O.C.G.A. § 51-7-40. The elements of a malicious prosecution claim
        are: “(1) prosecution for a criminal oﬀense; (2) the prosecution in-
        stigated under a valid warrant, accusation, or summons; (3) termi-
        nation of the prosecution in favor of the plaintiﬀ; (4) malice; (5)
        want of probable cause; and (6) damage to the plaintiﬀ.” Jackson v.
        Kmart Corp., 851 F. Supp. 469, 472 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (quoting Medoc
        Corp. v. Keel, 305 S.E.2d 134, 136 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983)).
              Under Georgia law, where a reporting defendant (here, An-
        derson) “merely states what he believes, leaving the decision to
        prosecute entirely to the uncontrolled discretion of the oﬃcer, or
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        20-13867                Opinion of the Court                        17

        if the oﬃcer makes an independent investigation, or prosecutes for
        an oﬀense other than the one charged by the defendant, the latter
        is not regarded as having instigated the proceedings.” Id. (quoting
        Melton v. LaCalamito, 282 S.E.2d 393, 396 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)). But
        if he was “the determining factor in inducing the oﬃcer’s decision,
        or . . . gave information which he knew to be false and so unduly
        inﬂuenced the authorities, he may be held liable.” Id. (quoting Mel-
        ton, 282 S.E.2d at 396). Here, even viewing the facts alleged in the
        complaint in the light most favorable to Duncan, Anderson cannot
        be said to have been the “determining factor” in Oﬃcer Gehricke’s
        decision to arrest her or to have “unduly inﬂuenced” him to do so.
        Even if Anderson falsely reported—as Duncan claims—that she
        scratched his car, Oﬃcer Gehricke’s decision to arrest arose from
        his own interactions with Duncan and after talking to another of-
        ﬁcer. Thus, we aﬃrm dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim
        against Anderson.
                                E. Municipal Liability
                Duncan’s complaint alleged that the City of Sandy Springs
        has municipal liability under the theories of (1) respondeat superior
        for its oﬃcers’ violations of state law and (2) the Monell v. Dep’t of
        Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), doctrine for failure to train and be-
        cause there was a decision by a ﬁnal policy maker to arrest Duncan
        or similarly situated individuals. The district court dismissed Dun-
        can’s Monell claim because she did not allege a constitutional viola-
        tion. It dismissed her respondeat superior claim because she failed
        to alleged an underlying tort, and regardless, the City has sovereign
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                   20-13867

        immunity. While we reverse as to the underlying constitutional
        and tort claims against the oﬃcers, we aﬃrm dismissal of her
        claims against the City because she has failed to plausibly allege a
        cause of action.
                Beginning with the state law claim of malicious prosecution,
        Georgia law provides that “[a] municipal corporation shall not be
        liable for the torts of policemen or other oﬃcers engaged in the
        discharge of the duties imposed on them by law.” O.C.G.A. § 36-
        33-3. In her brief to this Court, Duncan did not contest the district
        court’s conclusion that the City has sovereign immunity. She has
        waived the issue by failing to argue it on appeal. See McGinnis v. In-
        gram Equip. Co., 918 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A party nor-
        mally waives its right to argue issues not raised in its initial brief.”).
                Duncan also appeals the district court’s dismissal of her fed-
        eral municipal liability claims. Municipalities like the City may
        only be held liable under § 1983 if “action pursuant to oﬃcial mu-
        nicipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Monell,
        436 U.S. at 691. Thus, a municipality can be held liable “on the basis
        of ratiﬁcation when a subordinate public oﬃcial makes an uncon-
        stitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by
        someone who does have ﬁnal policymaking authority.” Hoeﬂing v.
        City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mat-
        thews v. Columbia County, 294 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir.2002). Lia-
        bility can also be based on “a practice or custom that is so pervasive,
        as to be the functional equivalent of a policy adopted by the ﬁnal
        policymaker.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342–43
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        20-13867               Opinion of the Court                        19

        (11th Cir. 1994). A plaintiﬀ may establish a policy or custom exists
        by showing a “persistent and wide-spread practice” and the govern-
        ment’s actual or constructive knowledge of that practice. Depew v.
        City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). Generally,
        “random acts or isolated incidents are insuﬃcient to establish a cus-
        tom or policy.” Id.
               For this cause of action, Duncan’s complaint merely states,
        “The City is also liable under the Monell doctrine due to its failure
        to provide proper training and because there was a decision by a
        ﬁnal a ﬁnal policy maker to arrest Ms. Duncan or conduct arrests
        in cases such as Ms. Duncan’s.” Even viewing the facts alleged in
        the ﬁrst amended complaint in the light most favorable to Duncan,
        her conclusory allegations fail to plausibly allege the police depart-
        ment had a pattern of arresting and prosecuting people without
        probable cause, or that there was any decision by a ﬁnal policy-
        maker. See generally Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61–62 & n.7
        (2011); Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade County, 856 F.3d 795, 820
        (11th Cir. 2017). For these reasons, we aﬃrm dismissal of Duncan’s
        claims against the City.
                               IV.    CONCLUSION
               Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in dis-
        missing Duncan’s § 1983 claims against the oﬃcers for unlawful ar-
        rest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation and
        her state law malicious prosecution claim by making impermissible
        factual determinations at the motion to dismiss stage. We reverse
        and remand the dismissals on those claims for further proceedings
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        20                   Opinion of the Court              20-13867

        consistent with this opinion. We aﬃrm, however, dismissal of the
        malicious prosecution claim against Anderson and dismissal of
        Duncan’s claims against the City.
                AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED AND REMANDED in
        part.