Court Opinion

ID: 9454804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:59:42.817971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:19.078470
License: Public Domain

LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
In my view this court should confine itself at this time to an order remanding the record to the District Judge for amplification of the reasons for his determination against release.
Let me quickly add that the plan set forth in the majority opinion for limited day-time release seems to me a good one. It provides a sound structured program for release for a man who has only one incident of violence on his record; it keeps appellant occupied during the daytime hours and assures night limitations that seem likely to minimize a recurrence of an impulsive act of violence.
The plan would involve risk. But this is not decisive; for any release plan— however partial or limited — necessarily involves risk. Congress understood this very well, and only asked that the risks taken be not excessive, that the conditions be such as “to reasonably assure that [the person] will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community.”
The question, then, is assessment of the extent of risk. What troubles me here is that the District Judge thought the risk too great to constitute reasonable assurance against danger. Since the question is one of bail pending appeal, the ultimate determination is for this court. But of course this court will give great weight to the findings and judgment of the district judge in matters of bail.1 This is particularly appropriate since the question of danger involved in post-trial bail may be significantly and rightly influenced by knowledge of the details of the crime, and observation of demeanor of the defendant, *1155particularly where as here the defendant has given testimony.
There may be an offsetting consideration where the appellate court can discern that the papers demonstrate not merely appellant’s jurisdictional entitlement to consideration, because his claims are not frivolous, but also that his claims are so substantial as to undercut any presumption that might attach to the verdict and judgment as indicators that he is guilty of the violence charged in the case at bar. That is not asserted for the case before us. It is assumed, arguendo, that he did commit this one offense of violence, but it is concluded even so there is reasonable assurance against danger.
The question is close, especially since the case has already been before the court. But on balance, I would proceed at this time with another remand.
What troubles me is that the district judge in denying release did not elaborate on his reasons for concluding that the plan is not reasonable in the light of appellant’s potential danger to the community. Obviously the mere fact that a man commits a crime of violence in a completely voluntary and unstructured setting, with its openness and temptations, does not negative the prospect that a structured release will operate to produce a conformance to rules for the time of legal consideration. However, it may be that something about the proof or appellant’s demeanor at trial led the district judge to conclude that although the paper record shows only one crime of violence, it was his judgment that appellant was probably so hardened in his propensities that even limited day-time release under conditions was an unacceptable risk. As matters stand now, although we have a finding, we do not have the benefit of the judge’s reasoning in depth, and in view of the obvious merits — in general — of the plan under consideration, I would welcome such further enlightenment as to the ramifications of using it in the particular ease.

. See, e. g., United States v. Blyther, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 407 F.2d 1279, January 16, 1968; Weaver v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 405 F.2d 353 (1968).