Court Opinion

ID: 9811713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:27:39.939717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:14.020506
License: Public Domain

BILL VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
Evidence of prior inconsistent statements of a witness who has testified may be offered to impeach that witness’s credibility. Tex.R. Evid. 613(a); See Flores v. State, 48 S.W.3d 397, 404 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. ref'd) (citing Ramirez v. State, 987 S.W.2d 938, 944 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.)). When the prior statement is not offered as primary evidence but to impeach the witness’ credibility, it is not hearsay. See Flores, 48 S.W.3d at 404. Thus, the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statements to impeach does not depend upon an exception to hearsay. See id.
*323However, as a predicate, Rule 618 directs that before a witness may be impeached she must be informed of the statement’s content, the time and place at which it was made, and the person to whom it was uttered. Id.; Tex.R. Evid. 613(a). If the witness unequivocally admits having made the statement, extrinsic evidence of the statement may not be admitted. Id.
Acosta testified for the State. Guiterrez testified for the defense about other matters. When she was asked about the Acosta’s prior statements, the State objected on the basis of hearsay. Because counsel did not urge admissibility under Rule 613(a), the objection was properly sustained.1 Later, in the context of counsel’s proffer of the substance of Guiterrez’ testimony, the context made it apparent that the statements were prior inconsistent statements. Although it is questionable whether the court ruled again, only replying “all right,” a ruling continuing to deny admissibility was correct because the Rule 613(a) predicate had not been laid. See Osteen v. State, 61 S.W.3d 90, 90-91 (Tex.App.-Waco 2001, no pet. h.). Thus, I agree that Bautista’s first issue should be overruled.
His second issue, however, has merit. Bautista testified that the sex was consensual. Acosta’s credibility was subject to impeachment because she had made statements to Guiterrez denying that a rape occurred and that her sex with Bautista was voluntary and consensual. Thus, on the issue of consent, a direct conflict in the testimony existed between Bautista and Acosta. Under the first Strickland prong, when counsel failed to inform the court that the impeaching statements were being offered under Rule 613(a) and when he failed to lay the predicate for admission of those prior inconsistent statements, his performance was deficient. Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (adopting the standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). I can conceive of no strategic reason for fading to advance the best defense available to Bau-tista. Turning to the second prong — that he must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different — the result is evident. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Considering that “a reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” one can easily imagine that, given the absence of any other direct evidence on the question of consent, a jury might have reached a different decision had it heard Acosta’s prior inconsistent statements that impeached Acosta’s testimony about the events. See id.
I agree with majority’s the “failure to testify” discussion.
Because counsel was ineffective when he failed to get Acosta’s prior inconsistent statements before the jury — statements that might have cast doubt on her credibility and pierced the heart of an element of the offense — I would reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial. Because the majority does otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

. If offered for the truth of the matter asserted, such an out-of-court statement is hearsay and inadmissible unless falling within some hearsay exception. STEVEN GOODE, OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, M. MICHAEL SHAR-LOT, TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 613.2 at 639 (2nd Ed.1993).