Court Opinion

ID: 9382919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 06:09:09.478464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.457395
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed March 23, 2023

                                    S   In the
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-20-00154-CR
                                No. 05-20-00155-CR

                   CHARLES TURNER GLOVER, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1
                             Dallas County, Texas
              Trial Court Cause Nos. F18-55030-H & F18-55032-H

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      A jury convicted Charles Turner Glover of aggravated assault and unlawful

possession of a firearm, enhanced by prior felony convictions. The jury assessed

punishment at thirty years’ imprisonment in the aggravated assault case and twenty-

five years’ imprisonment in the unlawful possession of a firearm case.

      Mr. Glover contends (1) the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion

to suppress the fruits of a warrantless search of his car and (2) the judgments in each

case should be modified to reflect the correct deadly weapon statute. We affirm the
trial court’s judgments as modified in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 47.4.

Background

       The trial court held a pretrial hearing outside the jury’s presence on Mr.

Glover’s motion to suppress. Charles Schultz testified that at about 4 p.m. on June

15, 2018, he was on duty as a Dallas police officer. He and his partner, Officer

Stewart, responded to a dispatch about a shooting and a suspect fleeing the scene in

a brown Chrysler 300. The dispatcher provided a partial license plate number.

       As the two officers headed to the scene in a marked police car, they saw the

Chrysler heading in the opposite direction. There was one occupant, a male driver.

The officers followed the car but did not initiate a traffic stop. As the officers rounded

a corner onto a side street, they saw the Chrysler parked in the street illegally with

the driver’s-side door open. The driver, later identified as Mr. Glover, was running

away from the car. Officer Stewart pursued him into the alley and Officer Schultz

ran down the street looking to obstruct paths from the alley.

       After Officer Schultz lost sight of his partner and Mr. Glover, he “retreated

back to the vehicle to secure it” because “we believed it to be the suspect vehicle

involved in this shooting.” Officer Schultz started “looking in the vehicle” because

“[i]n order for us to tow a vehicle per [Dallas Police Department] policy, we need to

do an inventory search that authorizes us to go through the main compartment, any

kind of trunk space, just so that we can inventory everything that was in it prior to

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moving it.” He also stated “[w]e had an unknown variable of if he was going to circle

around.” Officer Schultz testified he found a gun in the car’s trunk.

      The trial court denied Mr. Glover’s motion to suppress and stated it found the

car “was abandoned at the time” and Mr. Glover lacked standing to challenge the

search.

      During trial before the jury, Officer Schultz testified regarding the above-

described search. The gun he found was admitted into evidence and the State

presented testimony tying it to other evidence recovered.

      Broderick Mosley testified that at the time of the shooting, he was at a tire

shop next to the convenience store where the shooting took place. He testified he

heard Mr. Glover say “I’ll kill you,” then heard “a pop.” Mr. Glover got into a car

and drove off. Mr. Mosley approached the convenience store and saw “a guy laying

on the floor bleeding.” He called 911 and reported the car’s license plate number.

Video footage from the convenience store’s surveillance cameras was admitted into

evidence without objection and published to the jury.

      Mr. Glover testified he was a convicted felon at the time of the shooting and

had been released from parole or confinement for a felony within the previous five

years. On that morning, he drove his Chrysler 300 to the convenience store to use

the ATM. The complainant, an acquaintance, asked him for a ride to pick up some

belongings and got into his car. They made several stops, including picking up a bag

of the complainant’s belongings, which Mr. Glover let him put in the trunk. When

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they stopped at a service station, the complainant retrieved his bag from the trunk,

returned to the car, and took out a gun. Mr. Glover told him to put the gun back in

the bag and he did so. At some point, the gun was returned to the trunk. Then the

complainant and Mr. Glover “just went riding.” Mr. Glover stated the complainant

became upset with him when he remarked on the complainant’s personal

relationships and “[t]hat’s when we got into the altercation.”

      Mr. Glover testified that as they approached the convenience store to pick up

another acquaintance, the complainant “just hit me upside the head.” Mr. Glover

“tried to hit him” but had his seat belt on. The complainant jumped out of the car

and “ran around by the trunk.” Mr. Glover “was in fear he was gone try to get the

gun out” and “didn’t want him to get it before I did.” Mr. Glover pulled a knife from

his pocket and told the complainant “don’t make me kill you.” The complainant “got

away from the back of the car,” then went inside the store for several minutes. At

that point, Mr. Glover took the gun from the trunk and ran to the door of the store.

Through a crack in the door, he told the complainant to pay back the money the

complainant owed him and he would give back the complainant’s gun and other

belongings. The complainant pushed the door open, knocking out several of Mr.

Glover’s teeth. Mr. Glover backed up and the complainant “bum-rushed” him and

tried to tackle him. The complainant “kept hitting at the gun,” then “grabbed the top

barrel of the gun.” Mr. Glover testified “that’s when I pulled back like this here, and

that’s when it went off.” The complainant fell to the sidewalk and Mr. Glover

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“panicked and left.” He testified that though he does not deny he shot the

complainant, he did so in self-defense.

      On cross-examination, Mr. Glover stated he knew there was a gun in his car

and he “actually put [his] own hands on that firearm.” He testified that after the gun

discharged, he “[t]hrowed it in the trunk.” Additionally, the State asked, “There was

no gun involved until you walked towards the victim with the firearm. Is that

correct?” Mr. Glover responded, “Yes.”

Analysis

      A person commits aggravated assault if he uses or exhibits a deadly weapon

during the commission of an assault. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2); see also id.

§ 22.01(a) (defining assault as intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily

injury to another). A person who has been convicted of a felony commits an offense

if he possesses a firearm before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement

or parole for the felony conviction or, after that period, at any location other than the

premises at which he lives. Id. § 46.04; see also id. § 1.07(a)(39) (defining

“possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management”).

      Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) states,

      If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals constitutional error that
      is subject to harmless error review, the court of appeals must reverse a
      judgment of conviction or punishment unless the court determines
      beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the
      conviction or punishment.

                                          –5–
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a). Thus, our inquiry regarding uncured constitutional error is

whether “there was a reasonable possibility that the error . . . moved the jury from a

state of non-persuasion to one of persuasion” on the relevant issue. Wesbrook v. State,

29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We consider several non-exclusive

factors, including the error’s nature, whether the State emphasized the error, the

error’s probable implications, the weight the jury would likely give the error in its

deliberations, and the presence of “overwhelming evidence.” Snowden v. State, 353

S.W.3d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “The State has the burden, as beneficiary

of the error, to prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Haggard

v. State, 612 S.W.3d 318, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020).

      In his first and second issues, Mr. Glover contends the trial court

(1) “erroneously denied Glover’s motion to suppress because the State failed to meet

its burden to show a lawful inventory [search] and because the search was not a valid

search incident to arrest” and (2) abused its discretion by “finding that Glover’s

vehicle was abandoned property.” He asserts violation of his rights under the Fourth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Texas

Constitution.

      The State argues, among other things, that the gun and the evidence derived

from it did not contribute to Mr. Glover’s convictions because (1) “[t]he aggravated-

assault case was not about linking Appellant to the crime with the firearm found in

the Chrysler, it was about self-defense, a justification of admitted conduct,” and

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(2) “the unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm case did not hinge on the firearm seized

from the Chrysler,” as Mr. Glover testified he “possessed a gun” at the convenience

store.

         Because we agree with the State that any erroneous admission of evidence

pertaining to the search in question does not warrant reversal, we need not address

the search’s propriety. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The record shows the nature of the

alleged error was the admission of the gun’s location when found and evidence

showing Mr. Glover had possessed and fired it. After the State addressed those facts

in its case-in-chief, Mr. Glover testified that while in an altercation with the

complainant at the convenience store, he took the complainant’s gun out of the

Chrysler 300’s trunk, approached the complainant with the gun, shot him during a

struggle, then threw the gun back in the trunk and fled. In light of that unchallenged

evidence and Mr. Glover’s self-defense focus, the complained-of evidence was of

minimal consequence. See Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825; Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at

120. “In short, the precise error in this case, in our view, did not move the jury from

a state of non-persuasion to a state of persuasion on any material issue in the case;

nor is it reasonably likely to have caused such prejudice as to distract the jury or

divert it from its proper fact-finding role.” Snowden, 353 S.W.3d at 825. On this

record, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not

contribute to Mr. Glover’s above-described convictions or punishment. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.2(a).

                                         –7–
      In his third issue, Mr. Glover contends that though the trial court’s judgments

in both cases “correctly reflect the court’s finding that he ‘used or exhibited a deadly

weapon . . . during the commission of the felony offense,’” the judgments improperly

“identif[y] the attendant statutory provision as “TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

42.12, § 3g.” He asserts that because “[t]he statutory provision related to the court’s

entry of an affirmative deadly weapon finding is now codified in article 42A.054(c),”

the judgments should be modified to reflect the correct provision. The State agrees.

      This Court has the power to modify judgments to make the record speak the

truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. Bigley v. State, 865

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d); TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b). The trial court’s deadly

weapon finding refers to a repealed section of the code of criminal procedure. See

Jessie v. State, No. 05-20-00995-CR, 2022 WL 1164657, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Apr. 20, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Thus, we modify

the trial court’s judgments to contain a statutory citation to “Tex. Code Crim. Pro.

art. 42A.054(c)” instead of article 42.12, § 3g.

                                          –8–
We affirm the trial court’s judgments as modified.

                                          /Cory L. Carlyle/
                                          CORY L. CARLYLE
                                          JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
200154F.U05

                                       –9–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

CHARLES TURNER GLOVER,                         On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                      Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. F18-55030-H.
No. 05-20-00154-CR           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
                                               Justices Goldstein and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                   participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED to contain a statutory citation to “Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art.
42A.054(c)” regarding the deadly weapon finding, instead of code of criminal
procedure article 42.12, § 3g.
      As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered March 23, 2023

                                        –10–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

CHARLES TURNER GLOVER,                         On Appeal from the Criminal District
Appellant                                      Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. F18-55032-H.
No. 05-20-00155-CR           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
                                               Justices Goldstein and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                   participating.

      Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED to contain a statutory citation to “Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art.
42A.054(c)” regarding the deadly weapon finding, instead of code of criminal
procedure article 42.12, § 3g.
      As MODIFIED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered March 23, 2023

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