Court Opinion

ID: 9625607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:45:46.971555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:11.931842
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
For the following reasons, I dissent: The issue in this matter is whether under Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.1953, a subcontractor is a third person “not in the same empoyment,” with an employee of a general contractor. The majority opinion relies on Adamson v. Okland Construction Company1 and Smith v. Alfred Brown Company2 and holds them applicable in the instant fact situation. In both these cases, a general contractor was held to be the statutory employer under Section 35-1^42(2) of the employees of a subcontractor and therefore not within the exception set forth in Section 35-1-62 — distinguishable situations.
The language of Section 35-1-42 clearly shows the legislative intent. The initial sentence provides:
The following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of this title:
Title is the key word here. Thus the definitions of Section 42 insofar as a “statutory employer” is involved is to be applied to the entire act. In contrast, subsection 2 provides those who are to be deemed “statutory employees” are made so only for the purposes of that section. Section is here the key word. The pertinent provisions of subsection 2 are:
Where any employer procures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision or control, and such work is a part or process in the trade or business of the employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees of such original employer. . . .
The legislature specifically has expressed an intention that its definition of a statutory employer remain constant throughout the Workmen’s Compensation Act. In contrast, its definition of who are statutory employees is expressly confined to those provisions wherein the responsibility flowing to them from the statutory employer is set forth.
The definition of a third person “not in the same employment” is not the subject of 35-1-42(2). The concept of “all persons in the same employment” does not include subcontractor!, and their employees, on the same project; thus they are not immune as co-employees of an employee of a general contractor.3
The legislature in enacting Section 35-1-42 was not concerned with third-party tort liability; its purpose was to establish a general statutory definition of an employer, to assure that a general contractor would guarantee compensation for the employees of a subcontractor. Where a statute such as Section 35 — 1—42 makes the general contractor the employer for purposes of the compensation statute certainly he should enjoy the regular immunity of an employer from third-party suit when the facts are such that he could be made liable for compensation. The majority of courts have so held.4
. . . the overall responsibility of the general contractor for getting subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for compensation if he does not, should be sufficient to remove him from the category of “third party.” He is under a continuing potential liability; he has thus assumed a burden in exchange for which 'he might well be entitled to *900immunity from damage suits, regardless of whether on the facts of a particular case actual liability exists. This burden may also be translated into financial terms. . . . The general contractor, by insisting that the subcontractor carry compensation insurance, imposes a cost on the subcontractor which the subcontractor will pass on to the contractor in his charges under the subcontract.5
When the positions are reversed, and an employee of the general contractor, or the general contractor himself as sub-rogee sues the subcontractor in negligence, the great majority of jurisdictions have held that the subcontractor is a third party amenable to suit. The reason for the difference in result is forthright: the general contractor has a statutory liability to the subcontractor’s employee, actual or potential, while the subcontractor has no comparable statutory liability to the general contractor’s employee.6
Frohlick Crane Service, Inc. v. Mack 7 is factually similar to the instant action. There, an employee of the general contractor sued the subcontractor for negligence. The trial court dismissed the action on the ground that plaintiff was suing his co-employee, and such suit was not permissible under a statute which permits an employee to bring an action against a person “not in the same employ.” The ruling of the trial court was predicated on a statute which provided that an employer, who contracts part of his work to a subcontractor, is deemed to be the employer of the subcontractor and his employees for Workmen’s Compensation purposes.
The Supreme Court of Colorado stated that to treat the two parties as co-employees would he exalting form over substance, for statutory interpretation must be governed by legislative intent. The purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act was to afford compensation for work-related injuries, regardless of fault. The employer, in return for his responsibility under the act is granted immunity for common-law claims, but the act does not shield third-party tort feasors. To prevent an employer from avoiding responsibility under the act by contracting his work to an uninsured contractor, the statute provides that a subcontractor and his employees are deemed to be the employees of such an employer. These provisions do not indicate a legislative intention that a subcontractor should be free of responsibility for his own negligence. The court held, in accordance with the great weight of authority, that subcontractors are subject to suit by employees of the general contractor.
A valuable common-law right should not be deemed destroyed by a statute, except by explicit language. The instant action is not a case where the claimant’s right to compensation is dependent upon labeling the general contractor as a statutory employer.
The proper interpretation of the phrase “not in the same employment” (35-1-62), in the absence of a true employer-employee relationship, renders a subcontractor a third party not immune to a common-law negligence action by an employee of the general contractor.
This cause should be reversed, and remanded for trial on its merits.
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views 'expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Maughan.

. 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973).

. 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972).

. 2 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, Section 72.20, pp. 14 44 to 14-46.

. Id., Section 72.31 p. 14r-47.

. Id., Section 72.31, pp. 14-55 to 14-56.

. Id., Section 72.32, pp. 14-66 to 14-68.

.Colo., 510 P.2d 891 (1973).