Court Opinion

ID: 9783436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:45:40.898654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:23.568390
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT,
Justice, concurring on rehearing.
I agree with the conscientious majority’s holding that Appellant cannot be required to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. I, nevertheless, remain concerned that the record before us does not describe the four discrete acts alleged in the indictment with sufficient specificity to prevent future prosecution and potential double jeopardy violations. My concern is based on the fact that when the State pleads that a sexual offense against a child occurred “on or about” a specific date, the State may prove any such offense that occurred within the stat*156ute of limitations but before the return of the indictment.1 Unless the State is required to elect specific offenses, or unless the State is judicially estopped from prosecuting Appellant for any offense that could fall within the conduct described in the indictment and that occurred within the statute of limitations but before the date the indictment was returned, then there is no way for a judge, an accused, a counsel- or, an attorney, or a polygrapher to know whether the questions that the majority requires Appellant to answer involve offenses that the State is judicially estopped from pursuing.
I agree that the State is judicially es-topped from compelling participation in any condition of community supervision that would provide a link to his criminal prosecution for any offense other than the injury-to-a-child offense to which Appellant pled guilty. I also agree that the State is judicially estopped from prosecuting Appellant for the sexual offenses alleged in the indictment. Unfortunately, I have no idea how anyone will know which sexual acts those are. Because the law permits such temporal vagueness in pleading sexual offenses against children, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for anyone to determine whether Appellant is being required to answer questions concerning offenses for which the State could prosecute him as opposed to offenses which the State is judicially estopped from pursuing.
Because of these concerns that I have voiced, I concur in the thoughtful opinion of the majority.

. Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).