Court Opinion

ID: 9749337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:34:23.77489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:46.762238
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s certification limiting a court’s judicial notice under KRE 201(b)(2), as the fact in issue in this case was clearly one “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” i.e., the manufacturer’s manual, which states, “[djuring [the observation] period the subject shall not have oral or nasal intake of substances which will affect the test.” CMI, Inc., Intoxilyzer 5000EN Breath Analysis Instrument Operator’s Manual (Kentucky Model) 12 (2000). Moreover, a prior decision establishes that a “burp” constitutes an “oral or nasal intake of substances which will affect the test.” See Eldridge v. Commonwealth, 68 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ky.App.2001) (“Belching and regurgitating may contaminate the mouth with alcohol volumes from the stomach, and this is a rational basis for re-administering the observation period.”).
District Judge Armstrong has been doing this work for many years as a prosecutor and a judge and few would argue about the accuracy of his decision, especially in light of the fact that the trial lasted two days and involved evidence of the necessity of a twenty-minute observation period pri- or to the administration of the test. Yet, by this decision today, we deprive him and other trial judges of the ability to utilize their professional knowledge — “capable of [an] accurate and [a] ready determination” — in the determination of matters rightly before them. See KRE 201(b)(2). In effect, we are overmanaging our decision maker in a matter that had nothing to do with “fairness” — but now does! Thus, I must dissent.