Court Opinion

ID: 9665854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:58:19.359965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:19.589519
License: Public Domain

PRICE, Justice (Assigned),
dissenting.
The outcome of this appeal depends upon the interpretation of Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(d). It states, in pertinent part:
Discovery products not on file with the clerk may be used as summary judgment evidence if ... a notice containing specific references to the discovery ..., are filed and served on all parties together with a statement of intent to use the specified discovery as summary judgment proofs....
(Emphasis added.)
Appellants sued Western Casualty Life Insurance Co. (Western) asserting several state causes of action for Western’s failure to timely pay benefits under an insurance policy. Western moved for summary judgment claiming these state causes of action were preempted by ERISA.
For evidence to support this claim, Western filed its notice, pursuant to rule 166a(d), of intent, to rely upon answers to unfiled interrogatories and portions of unfiled deposition testimony. This notice did not include either the answers to the interrogatories or the excerpts from the depositions. It merely cited page numbers to the unfiled discovery. It also made no reference to any other instrument where this information could be found. A narrative recitation of this evidence was included in a memorandum of law submitted by Western to the trial court. The actual language was never offered.
The question to be resolved is whether Western’s proof, contained in the unfiled discovery, was properly before the court so the trial judge could consider it in rendering a decision. The majority, without citing any authority, says that it was. They hold that rule 166a(d) does not require the actual language from unfiled discovery to be submitted to the court. In line with this holding, they conclude that Western’s citations to pages in unfiled depositions and to references in un-filed interrogatories satisfied the notice requirement of rule 166a(d) and, thereby, properly placed the questioned evidence before the trial court.
We know that a trial judge must base a decision only on evidence legally before the court. In summary judgment proceeding, TexR.Civ.P. 166a(d) specifies the items the trial court may consider in arriving at a decision. The rule mandates that all such *620items be on file with the clerk before judgment; otherwise, they may not be considered. Id. This rule makes sense because if any of those items are not on file, they are not part of the summary judgment record and consequently not before the court. The trial court is not required to search sources outside the record to access information contained in unfiled items.
In subpart (d) of 166a, the rule does, however, make provisions for the court to access unfiled discovery. A notice containing specific references to the discovery must be filed with the clerk and served on all parties. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(d).
The majority inferentially defines “specific references” in the present case as cite references to page numbers only. If the majority is correct, and the actual evidence necessary for summary judgment consideration remains unfiled, how does the trial judge access this information to arrive at a proper decision? The majority never tells us. The fact is, there is no mechanism under rule 166a for the trial judge to access this information. That is why the actual language of the unfiled discovery needs to be included in the notice.
Here, however, it appears, although they do not make it clear, that the majority is claiming the memorandum Western filed setting out a summarized version of its proof was sufficient to put the appellants, as well as the trial court, on notice as to the actual evidence. I disagree. A memorandum is nothing more than an argument and is not a proper document to legitimately place evidence before a trial court.
The majority is attempting to characterize the memorandum as being similar to an appellate brief. This is likewise not true. Briefs are creatures of rule, regulated as to content and substance. See, e.g., Tex. R.App.P. 74. Memoranda are arguments, not regulated in any fashion.
Western’s rule 166a(d) notice does not reference the memorandum as the source of the questioned evidence. In fact, the memorandum does not recite the evidence, it only paraphrases it in narrative form. The memorandum was Western’s way of arguing its position before the trial court. It was not meant for any other purpose and certainly does not serve any.
In support of its holding, the majority cites no authority, and in a footnote misstates the holding in McConathy v. McConathy, 869 S.W.2d 341 (Tex.1994). The supreme court in McConathy stated:
Rule 166a(d) requires parties to provide a “statement of intent” to use unfiled discovery as summary judgment proof. This requirement is satisfied where the discovery is attached to a summary judgment motion or response and the motion or response clearly relies on the attached discovery as support.
Id. at 342 n. 2.
In E.B. Smith Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 850 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied), the nonmovant’s statement of intent to use un-filed discovery contained only citations to depositions and broad, conclusory statements about their content and effect. The court of appeals held that the statement did not comply with rule 166a(d); thus, the evidence was not properly before the trial court when it rendered summary judgment. Id. The court of appeals interpreted the term “specific references” to mean that the party relying on unfiled discovery “must show the court language from an unfiled deposition or other unfiled discovery document before the court rules on the summary judgment motion.” Id.
The majority holds that appellants waived their right to complain on appeal about Western’s failure to notice the actual language in the unfiled discovery. They claim the appellants should have objected in the trial court about Western’s inadequate notice so that the trial judge could require Western to correct its mistake. This holding makes no sense.
If the majority’s holding is wrong, and the actual language is required to be included in the notice, then Western’s evidence was never before the trial court. In spite of what the majority thinks, the failure to object to evidence not before the court does not place it before the court. So what do the appel*621lants waive by failing to complain in the trial court about Western’s inadequate notice?
Sufficiency of the evidence can always be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. R.App.P. 52(d). The law does not require an objection in the trial court to preserve error. Id, Because rule 166a(c) and (d) regarding summary judgment evidence specify the items the trial court can consider and how they are to be placed before the court, a party who fails to comply with their provisions should not be allowed the luxury of using evidence from outside sources if the opposing party fails to object.
In conclusion, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Western’s mere references to page numbers was sufficient either to put the appellants on notice of intent to use unfiled discovery or to place the specific proof before the court. I also disagree with the majority’s holding that the appellants waived their right to complain on appeal. This defies logic. Western had no evidence before the court to support its summary judgment claim and the case should be remanded to the trial court. I therefore respectfully dissent.