Court Opinion

ID: 9410410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 06:06:41.095615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:57.627060
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     July 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359830
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
SUSANNE MARIE MURPHY,                                                LC No. 2018-000270-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and MURRAY and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right her bench trial conviction for assault with a dangerous
weapon, MCL 750.82 (“felonious assault”). Defendant was sentenced to 270 days in jail for the
felonious assault conviction. We affirm.

        This case arises out of the assault of the victim, Alexandria Glidewell, with a knife by
defendant following a verbal altercation during a party. The victim attended a party at the home
of Joseph Brazowski in Eastpointe. When the victim and her boyfriend first arrived at
approximately 8:00 p.m., Joseph, defendant, and two additional men were present. Approximately
an hour into the party, a verbal altercation ensued between defendant and the victim; the victim
was positioned inside the screened porch of the residence, while defendant was located just outside
of the screened porch in the front yard.

        The victim went to the screened porch because she wanted to retrieve her iced tea, and after
spotting defendant, the victim accused defendant of having sex in the bathroom with one of the
men attending the party. Both parties were alone at the time, and defendant and the victim had not
met prior to this incident. The victim testified that “[defendant] called me a b***h and then I
called her a wh**e. She called me a c**t and that’s when I called her a homey hopper and that’s
when she had pulled out the knife.” Following the exchange of derogatory language, defendant
proceeded to pull out a knife from her coat pocket, which the victim described as “kind of like fast.
It was in her pocket, her, she put her hand in her pocket while we were exchanging the words, and
it was like, I don’t know, she just like flung it out of her hand.”

                                                -1-
         The victim initially testified that she was approximately three inches from the porch screen,
and the knife was two inches away from the victim. However, the victim later asserted that there
was a span of two feet between each party and the porch screen. Defendant did not approach the
victim with the knife; instead, defendant was standing with the knife in her hand directed towards
the victim, but the knife did not touch the screen. The victim was particularly concerned at the
possibility of being stabbed because the knife was positioned near her stomach, and the victim was
10 weeks pregnant. The victim “freaked out and [she] ran inside the house to tell [her] boyfriend
at the time[,]” because she was afraid she “was gonna lose her child if [defendant] actually stabbed
[her].”

        After the victim informed Joseph of what transpired, Joseph purportedly ordered defendant
to leave the house. Five to 10 minutes later, the victim proceeded to step outside to look for the
police, who had been contacted. As the victim was walking down the steps of the residence, she
observed defendant next to her, and defendant subsequently grabbed the victim by her hair. The
two then “tumbled around” for a few minutes until the officers arrived. The officers subsequently
arrested defendant.

       The sole issue on appeal is whether defendant’s conviction should be vacated because
there was insufficient evidence to establish an assault, an essential element of a felonious assault
conviction.

        We review de novo defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, People v
Byczek, 337 Mich App 173, 182; 976 NW2d 7 (2021), considering the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to discern whether any trier of fact could find the essential elements
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Robinson, 475 Mich 1, 5; 715
NW2d 44 (2006). “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom may
constitute proof of the elements of the crime.” People v Head, 323 Mich App 526, 532; 917 NW2d
752 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “With regard to an actor’s intent, because of
the difficulties inherent in proving an actor’s state of mind, minimal circumstantial evidence is
sufficient.” People v McKewen, 326 Mich App 342, 347 n 1; 926 NW2d 888 (2018) (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        The crime of felonious assault is addressed in MCL 750.82, which provides, in pertinent
part, that “a person who assaults another person with a . . . knife, . . . or other dangerous weapon
without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is guilty of a
felony . . . .” The elements of a felonious assault are “ ‘(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon,
and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate
battery.’ ” People v Nix, 301 Mich App 195, 205; 836 NW2d 224 (2013), quoting People v Avant,
235 Mich App 499, 505; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). “An assault may be established by showing either
an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension
of receiving an immediate battery.” People v Starks, 473 Mich 227, 234; 701 NW2d 136 (2005).
Battery has been defined as “an intentional, unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of the
person of another, or of something closely connected with the person.” Id. (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

        The evidence was sufficient to find that an assault occurred. At trial, the victim testified
that defendant, following a heated verbal exchange, proceeded to point a knife towards the victim’s

                                                 -2-
stomach while the two parties were separated by the porch screen. The victim asserted that she
“freaked out and [she] ran inside the house to tell [her] boyfriend at the time[,]” because she was
afraid she “was gonna lose her child if [defendant] actually stabbed [her].” The trial court
subsequently determined that “[t]he production of a knife and whatever motion towards a pregnant
woman close to her abdomen where the child is obviously creates an understandable fear of
sustaining serious, serious injury.” While defendant is correct that the victim never stated that
defendant lurched forward with the knife in her hand, or made any sort of stabbing or slashing
motion, this Court has held that a rational trier of fact may infer from a defendant’s display of a
dangerous weapon that he or she intended to cause the fear of an immediate battery. See Avant,
235 Mich App at 505-506 (holding that testimony that the defendant “pointed an assault weapon”
at the victim’s face when the victim was robbed was “sufficient for a reasonable factfinder to find
that the elements of felonious assault . . . were established beyond a reasonable doubt”).

        To this point, the trial court noted, when it denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict,
the following:

        Yes, there was a screen between the Defendant and the victim, but the victim clearly
        testified that she apprehended an immediate battery. Objectively, the knife wasn’t
        held in a downward position, wasn’t held away, it was pointed at the victim at a
        distance, whether it be, the closest, according to the testimony, is five inches, three
        inches on one side, two inches on the other of the screen, it’d be five inches.
        Furthest apart would be two feet for one person, two feet for another person, that’s
        four feet, with the knife being pointed with only a screen door between.

Consequently, the court did not focus on any purported movement of defendant with the knife
towards the victim; rather, the trial court highlighted that the visibly intoxicated defendant aimed
the knife in the victim’s direction while separated by a porch screen, and the victim subsequently
retreated back into the residence out of fear. Moreover, while defendant asserts that there was no
evidence presented regarding an injury suffered by the victim and that defendant herself sustained
bruises to her left eye, left cheek, and arms, no actual injury is required to demonstrate that a victim
was “in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” Starks, 473 Mich at 234.

         To the extent defendant argues that the victim’s testimony lacked credibility because she
failed to provide a consistent narrative regarding the distance between herself and defendant during
the initial interaction, “ ‘[q]uestions of credibility are left to the trier of fact and will not be resolved
anew by this Court.’ ” People v Kissner, 292 Mich App 526, 534; 808 NW2d 522 (2011), quoting
Avant, 235 Mich App at 506. Furthermore, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, all
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution, People v Kenny, 332 Mich
App 394, 403; 956 NW2d 562 (2020) (citation omitted). Whether defendant and the victim were
separated by two to three inches or two feet, the trial court correctly opined that “if it were
plexiglass or something solid, maybe that would make it not reasonable that a person would
apprehend an immediate battery with a solid barrier between.” However, only a porch screen
separated the two parties.

        Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable trier of
fact could have found from the evidence that defendant brandished a knife and placed the victim

                                                    -3-
in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery, which satisfies the elements of felonious
assault.

       Affirmed.

                                                         /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                         /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                         /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

                                             -4-