Court Opinion

ID: 9542887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:39:55.26646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:10.148118
License: Public Domain

GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority in this case. Although the majority cites several of the cases I will cite in this dissenting opinion, I feel the majority has put a strained and erroneous interpretation upon those cases and has rationalized a change in the law which has the potential for depriving citizens of this State of their constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
Indiana Code § 34-4-80-2 purports to allow a plaintiff to seek punitive damages from the defendant even though the defendant is subject to criminal prosecution for the same act or omission which gave rise to the civil action. The trial court granted McGinnis's "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" and stated, in a written opinion, that Eddy could not recover punitive damages. Judge Yoder correctly points out that in Taber v. Hutson (1854), 5 Ind. 322, and in many cases thereafter, the Supreme Court of Indiana has consistently held that it is a violation of the Indiana Constitution and the Constitution of the United States to subject a person to double jeopardy. See Constitution of Indiana, art. 1, § 14; United States Constitution, amendment V.
Appellant attempts to rely in part on a law review article appearing at 20 Ind.L.J. 123, (1945) in which the author takes issue with Judge Davidson's opinion in Taber and claims the opinion does not follow the weight of authority and is hard to understand. However, I find Judge Davidson's opinion completely lucid and in tune with *742constitutional concepts notwithstanding some authorities to the contrary.
Appellant is correct that Judge Davidson did not declare punitive damages to be unconstitutional. In fact, he expressly held to the contrary. He pointed out, however, that in a situation where the offender may be punished by criminal sanction he cannot also be subject to punitive damage in a civil action because of the constitutional prohibition against twice being placed in jeopardy.
Appellant cites the case of State ex rel. Beedle v. Schoonover (1893), 135 Ind. 526, 35 N.E. 119, and claims it holds that the allowing of punitive damages in a civil action is not unconstitutional. As Judge Yo-der pointed out in his opinion in this case, the Beedle case holds that when the statute involved provides for specific or limited sum recovery, it may be allowed. In this regard, Beedle cites State ex rel. Scobey v. Stevens, et al. (1885), 103 Ind. 55, 2 N.E. 214. In Scobey, Chief Justice Mitchell, in a well-written opinion, reviews Indiana law on this subject and also reviews cases from other jurisdictions which hold to the contrary, and concludes that it is in fact a violation of the constitution for either the courts or the legislature to allow punitive damages arising from the same acts for which the offender may be criminally prosecuted. -
In the Scobey case, the wrongdoer was accused of offering a bribe, which was defined as a misdemeanor in the statute. The statute further provided that either the person offering the bribe or the person taking the bribe could in addition to the fine "be liable on his official bond to the party injured for five times the illegal fees charged, demanded, or taken, and the same may be recovered, with costs, in the cireuit court." Id. at 56, 2 N.E. at 215. Chief Justice Mitchell correctly pointed out that such a provision is not in fact a provision for punitive damages but is the fixing of compensation on the bond of a public officer for injuries sustained by a tortious act. Id. at 65, 2 N.E. at 220.
Chief Justice Mitchell's opinion is more lengthy and more in detail in its explanation but is in total accord with the opinion in Taber, supra.
I would hold that Ind.Code § 34-4-80-2 is in violation of the Indiana Constitution, art. 1, § 14 and affirm the trial court.
PIVARNIK, J., concurs.