Court Opinion

ID: 9911570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 15:03:28.306517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:04.721146
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

                            EURI JENKINS,
                              Appellant,

                                    v.

                         STATE OF FLORIDA,
                              Appellee.

                            No. 4D2022-1423

                          [December 20, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Kirk Charles Volker, Judge; L.T. Case No.
502017CF008721BXXXMB.

  Tim Bower Rodriguez of Tim Bower Rodriguez, P.A., Tampa, for
appellant.

  Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Luke Robert
Napodano, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for
appellee.

LEVINE, J.

   Appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of his wife and, on
appeal, argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal. Appellant alleges that the state failed to provide
competent substantial evidence of his guilt, arguing that the state’s only
evidence was based on inconsistent statements made by two witnesses—
appellant’s friend as well as the codefendant—who lied during the
investigation. We disagree and find that there was competent substantial
evidence of guilt based, in part, on the trial testimony of these two
witnesses who inculpated appellant in the crime. As such, we affirm.

   The testimony elicited by the state, through multiple witnesses,
established that a masked gunman, who was the codefendant, entered the
home of appellant and his wife in the middle of the night. The masked
gunman then shot the victim while she was sleeping.
   At trial, the codefendant testified to being the masked gunman who
shot the victim. The codefendant testified that appellant’s friend had
driven him to appellant’s house, where appellant offered the codefendant
$20,000 to kill the victim. The codefendant was in the friend’s car when
this conversation began. The codefendant visited appellant at his home
again before the shooting. At some point, the two discussed how to kill
the victim.

    Appellant’s friend testified that appellant said he was thinking of paying
someone $900,000 to $1 million to kill his wife. Appellant asked his friend
if he knew anyone who could shoot his wife. The friend introduced
appellant to the codefendant, who the friend had brought to appellant’s
house. The codefendant was in the friend’s car when appellant asked if
the friend knew anyone who could kill his wife. The friend testified that
appellant and the codefendant then began talking outside appellant’s
house about murdering the victim. The codefendant asked appellant how
much he would be willing to pay. While appellant and the codefendant
were speaking, the victim’s brother came outside the house. Appellant’s
friend testified that the masked gunman was the codefendant, and the
codefendant shot the victim.

   Both the codefendant and the friend, while testifying, admitted to lying
earlier in the investigation. The codefendant said he had lied earlier in the
investigation, but was now telling the truth at trial because he had entered
a plea agreement with the state. The codefendant pled guilty to second-
degree murder with a weapon. Appellant’s friend said he was initially
untruthful with the police during the investigation because he did not
want to be connected to the incident. The friend, who pled guilty to
manslaughter with a weapon, testified that it took a while for him to accept
responsibility for his actions, but the jury could believe his testimony now
because he believed the victim’s family “deserves justice.”

    The victim’s brother, who was present during the shooting, also
testified. The victim’s brother saw a conversation occur between appellant
and the codefendant at appellant’s house before the shooting. The brother
could not hear what they were saying because the codefendant was in the
friend’s car, and appellant was standing outside the car in the driveway.
Before the victim was shot, the victim’s brother had asked appellant if the
masked gunman was the man that came to appellant and the victim’s
house earlier in the day, referring to the codefendant. Appellant told the
victim’s brother that the masked gunman was not the codefendant,
because the codefendant had already gone home.

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    After the state rested, appellant moved for judgment of acquittal.
Appellant argued that the state had presented two “contradictory”
witnesses, the codefendant and the friend, who contradicted each other on
issues such as how much money appellant paid the codefendant. The
state responded that the witnesses’ testimony was consistent with respect
to the material facts of the case—that is, appellant asking for someone to
kill the victim, and promising money to have his wife murdered. The trial
court denied appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, noting that
although the two witnesses’ testimonies did conflict in part, the witnesses
also agreed on a number of material issues in the case. The trial court
stated that the jurors could rely on their own conclusions as to the
witnesses’ credibility. This appeal follows.

   “In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of
review applies.” Pagan v. State, 830 So. 2d 792, 803 (Fla. 2002). “A trial
court should not grant a motion for judgment of acquittal ‘unless the
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, fails to
establish a prima facie case of guilt.’” State v. Lee, 230 So. 3d 886, 888
(Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (citation omitted). “Generally, an appellate court will
not reverse a conviction which is supported by competent, substantial
evidence.” Pagan, 830 So. 2d at 803.

    Appellant argues that the only evidence of his guilt was the
“inconsistent statements” of the friend and the codefendant. Appellant
relies primarily on two cases: Moore v. State, 473 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA
1984), and Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007). Both Moore and
Baugh are distinguishable from the instant case.

    In Moore, the grand jury indicted the defendant based on two witnesses’
testimonies that identified the defendant as the murderer. 473 So. 2d at
686. The two witnesses then recanted their statements identifying the
defendant as the murderer in a later deposition. Id. Before the defendant’s
murder trial, the two witnesses were prosecuted for perjury and admitted
to lying before the grand jury. Id. at 686-87. In the defendant’s murder
trial, the state attempted to rely on the witnesses’ prior statements made
to the grand jury as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id. at
688. This court held that, while prior inconsistent statements are
admissible as substantive evidence, the prior inconsistent statements in
Moore, which were “admittedly perjured testimony,” standing alone did not
constitute sufficient competent evidence to support the appellant’s
conviction for second-degree murder. Id.

   In Baugh, a witness, an alleged victim of child sexual battery, “totally
repudiate[d] her out-of-court statements at trial.” 961 So. 2d at 200. The

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Florida Supreme Court reiterated that a prior inconsistent statement
standing alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction without corroborating
evidence. Id. The state attempted to present corroborating evidence of the
witnesses’ out-of-court statements pursuant to section 90.803(23), Florida
Statutes (2001), the hearsay exception for statements of a child victim, but
the evidence created only an inference that the defendant may have
committed the crime charged. Id. at 202. Thus, because the only direct
evidence of the defendant’s guilt presented at trial was prior inconsistent
statements recanted during in-court testimony, the defendant’s conviction
could not be sustained. Id. at 203, 205.

   Both cases are distinguishable from the instant case. In Moore and
Baugh, the incriminating statements were made before trial, not at trial.
In both cases, the prior incriminating statements were later recanted
either before or at trial. In the instant case, the witnesses made
statements implicating appellant at trial. Both appellant’s friend and the
codefendant testified that appellant had hired the codefendant for the
murder of the victim. Thus, the state was not relying at all on prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence of appellant’s guilt. The
state relied on the witnesses’ testimony at trial. Baugh is further
distinguishable because it relied on the hearsay exception for statements
of a child victim present in section 90.803(23), which allows “recanted
statements” to “sustain a sexual battery conviction ‘when other proper
corroborating evidence is admitted.’” 961 So. 2d at 204 (citation omitted).
Thus, Moore and Baugh are inapplicable to the instant case as presented
by appellant.

    Further, a witness’s statements at trial may still sustain a conviction
even if the witness admitted to previously lying during an investigation.
Smith v. State, 507 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In Smith, the
witness told several different stories to investigators, and the chief of police
testified that the witness “had obviously lied many times during the
investigation.” Id. at 789. The witness testified at trial, and admitted to
lying several times during the investigation, but maintained that his trial
testimony was true. Id. The witness’s testimony was “essentially
uncorroborated.” Id. Nevertheless, the court held that the “admitted
liar[’s]” uncorroborated testimony was still sufficient to support the
verdict. Id. at 790.

    Similarly, in the instant case, even though the witnesses admitted to
lying earlier in the investigation, they maintained that their trial testimony
was truthful. Even if the friend’s and the codefendant’s testimony was
uncorroborated, it can still be sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction.
However, in this case, the state did present corroborating evidence from

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the victim’s brother, who testified that the masked gunman looked like the
codefendant. The brother also testified that he saw appellant and the
codefendant speaking in the friend’s car.         The brother’s testimony
corroborated, in part, the codefendant’s and the friend’s testimony. Thus,
the trial court did not err by denying appellant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.

    Lastly, appellant argues that the friend and the codefendant “have no
credibility.” Clearly, “[t]he credibility of an accomplice and the weight to
be given his testimony is a matter for the jury.” Smith, 507 So. 2d at 790.
“Where there is contradictory, conflicting testimony, ‘the weight of the
evidence and the witnesses’ credibility are questions solely for the jury,’
and ‘the force of such conflicting testimony should not be determined on
a motion for judgment of acquittal.’” State v. Konegen, 18 So. 3d 697, 700
(Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (citation omitted). Thus, since this determination is
in the domain of the jury, and is not for us as judges to second guess, we
find no merit to appellant’s argument that the witnesses lacked credibility.

   We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
motion for judgment of acquittal because there was competent substantial
evidence supporting appellant’s conviction. As such, we affirm.

   Affirmed.

MAY and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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