Court Opinion

ID: 9832358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:51:08.523273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.971317
License: Public Domain

On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees urge that we were in error in holding that under section 6(a) of the act (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. gt. art. 7065a — 6(a) the comptroller was “authorized to require a proportionately less bond when in his judgment returns might properly be allowed for a shorter period than the calendar month”; the contention being that the comptroller is given no discretion to require a smaller bond than $1,000. The portion of the act in question reads:
“Provided that the Comptroller shall have the authority at his discretion to permit any distributor to make reports and payments at shorter intervals than one (1) month, and in such eases to permit bonds based on the shorter intervals.”
The language, “and in such eases to permit bonds based on the shorter intervals,” can, we think, be given no other meaning than that it permits a proportionate reduction in the amount of the bond, which would necessarily apply to and reduce the minimum below $1,000 in a proper ease. “Based on the shorter intervals” necessarily implies a just proportion; and to be just alike in all cases it would necessarily authorize reduction below the minimum in those eases where the minimum would be ample security to the state for the calendar month.
We are clear in the view, however, that the validity of the bond provision is not' dependent upon this proviso, whatever be its proper construction. The proviso .is but a further evidence of legislative solicitude directed toward making the act as little onerous as possible, consistent with proper security to the state in the collection of its revenues.
We are indebted to appellees’ counsel for two additional citations supporting our holding sustaining the power of the state- to exact a bond to secure an excise tax as a condition precedent to engaging in a business: Mason v. Rollins, 2 Biss. 99, 16 Fed. Cas. page 1061, No. 9,252, and U. S. v. Mathoit, 1 Sawy. 142, 26 Fed. Cas. page 1197, No. 15,740. These decisions are by Federal District Courts rendered in 1869 and 1870, respectively. They are eoncededly directly in point. The Rollins Case so clearly and concisely states the principles involved and their proper application, that we quote the following excerpts from the.opinion:
“Under the constitution, congress has power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excise, and also the authority to make all laws necessary and proper to carry that power into effect. It may be admitted that 'in doing this congress cannot violate any rights secured by other provisions of the constitution, but, excepting this restriction, the *1106power is absolute. There is, as will be seen, power to collect the taxes, and that implies the use of all proper and necessary means to make the collection effectual. Property cannot be subject to unreasonable seizures, nor the house or person of a citizen subject to unreasonable searches; nor can he be deprived of his property without due process of law.
“As to the first special ground of complaint, requiring a bond as a condition precedent to the commencement of the business of rectifying or distilling: The right of congress to collect the tax being undoubted, everything that is produced by a distiller or rectifier may be subject by law to the tax. Congress has the right to render the collection of the tax due upon that business or product effectual, and if it is seen that the character of the business is such that irresponsible parties may engage in it, under the direction of capitalists who are in the background, and who thus seek to avoid the proper responsibility which belongs to them, and in this way to render it uncertain that the tax due upon the product shall be made available to the government, there can be no doubt, I think, that, as a means of accomplishing that result, congress may require a bond of the person who proposes to engage in that kind of business. The question must always be, whether, under the circumstances of the case, it is a reasonable condition, and I cannot say that it is not in this case.”
The other points in the motion are sufficiently elaborated in our original opinion.
Overruled.
The motion is overruled.