Court Opinion

ID: 9444572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:05:25.208931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:55.276115
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
1. Judge HAND finds that the sole evidence before the grand jury was hearsay. Accordingly, we do not have a case where, in addition to hearsay, there was other evidence of an unimpeachable character. Judge HAND holds that, nevertheless, the indictment cannot be questioned. This leaves me in some doubt.
I entirely agree that the hearsay rule is undesirable. I think it would be well if the rule were revised so that, at a trial, the question of its admissibility would be left to the discretion of the trial judge. But, although courts may make desirable modifications of many of the exclusionary evidence rules, I think that the hearsay rule is so well established and so highly cherished by the Bar and the judiciary generally, that very deep inroads on that particular rule should be left to the legislature.1
Here we have a grand jury returning an indictment on the basis of no evidence which, over the objection of defendant, could properly be received at a trial. Of course, at the trial such evidence would be admissible, and a proper basis for verdict and judgment, if the defendant did not then object. But, until he waives its inadmissibility by failure to object, it is incompetent; and, of course, he is in no position to object to evidence presented to a grand jury. Consequently, I have very serious misgivings about concurring in a conclusion that a grand jury may indict solely on the basis of evidence that would not support a verdict after trial.2 However, because of *680my esteem for Judge HAND’S wisdom, I reluctantly concur, with the hope that the Supreme Court will review our decision and consider the question.
2. We have often held in cases cited by Judge HAND — among them some in which I have joined or indeed written the opinions — that, as Judge HAND puts it, “the prosecution makes out a sufficient case to go to the jury, if the evidence wculd have been enough in a civil action”. We have also held—United States v. Valenti, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 362, 364 — that the jury need not apply the reasonafcle-doubt criterion “to each chain of the proof,” and that this test “operates on the whole ease, and not on separate bits of evidence each of which need not be so proven”. Other courts have held otherwise, or have used expressions, with varying degrees of emphasis, at varis.nee with ours.3 And very recently 1he Supreme Court, in a “net worth” case like this, admonished us that the prosecution “must still prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical certainty.” Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137. Although, then, I concur in Judge HAND’S opinion, I think it desirable that the Supreme Court consider the application of that ruling here.

. Hoffman v. Palmer, 2 Cir., 129 F.2d 976, 987; Slifka v. Johnson, 2 Cir., 161 F.2d 467, 470.

. See, e. g., United States v. Kilpatrick, D.C., 16 F. 765, 772; United States v. Rubin, D.C., 218 F. 245, 248 (quoting Mr. Justice Field); United States v. Bollos, D.C., 209 F. 682; Brady v. United States, 8 Cir., 24 F.2d 405, 407-408, 59 A.L.R. 563; Nanfito v. United States, 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 376, 378.

. See, e. g., Nanfito v. United States, 8 Cir., 20 F.2d 376, 379; Egan v. United State, 52 App.D.C. 384, 287 F. 958, 967; United States v. Morley, 7 Cir., 99 F.2d 683, 685; United States v. Dried Fruit Association of California, D.C.N.D.Cal., 4 F.R.D. 1, 5; State v. Gutheil, 98 Utah 205, 98 P.2d 943, 944; People v. Kovacevich, 19 Cal.App.2d 335, 65 P.2d 807, 809; State v. Newman, 127 Conn. 398, 17 A. 2d 774, 775. See, also, numerous expressions that a trial court must direct a verdict for the defendant if the substantial evidence is as consistent with the defendant’s innocence as with his guilt, Parnell v. United States, 10 Cir., 64 F.2d 324, 329; United States v. Matsinger, 3 Cir., 191 F.2d 1014, 1016; Candler v. United States, 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 424, 426; Isbell v. United States, 8 Cir., 227 F. 788, 792; or that a trial court must direct a verdict for the defendant unless the evidence excludes every other hypothesis but that of guilt, Isbell v. United States, supra; United States v. Maghinang, D.C. Del. 111 F.Supp. 760, 761-762; Paul v. United States, 3 Cir., 79 F.2d 561, 563; United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers’ Association, D.C.D.C., 90 F.Supp. 681. Cf. United States v. Feinberg, 2 Cir., 140 F.2d 592, 154 A.D.R. 272; United States v. Valenti, 2 Cir., 134 F.2d 362.