Court Opinion

ID: 9575192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:12:21.652187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:05.100365
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that there must be a retrial of the case sub judice.
In his second enumeration of error, appellant contends the trial court “erred in granting the State’s Motion in Limine preventing the Appellant from eliciting testimony from Polly Perry [Social Service Specialist One with the Macon County Family & Children’s Services] concerning a neighbor’s child sexually molesting S. F. [the victim], from eliciting testimony from Randy Ryals [Director of Counseling Associates, an affiliate of the Bradley Center, a private psychiatric hospital] about the effect of prior sexual molestation of S. F., in regards to the Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome and eliciting testimony from Dr. McDonald [an osteopath in private practice] as to the effects of the prior sexual molestation of S. F. in regards to his medical findings, Child Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, and inconsistent statements made by S. F. to him and the failure of the Trial Court to grant a new trial on these grounds.”
In its reversal of the trial court, the majority reasons that “appellant did not seek to introduce the evidence of prior molestations for either of those purposes [victim’s reputation for nonchastity or her preoccupation with sex], but rather to establish other possible causes for the behavioral symptoms exhibited by the child, which were described as typical of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and to explain the medical testimony regarding her injuries. . . . [T]he evidence regarding other possible causes of her behavior and injuries was necessary to prevent the jury from reaching the unwarranted conclusion that the only possible explanation for the medical findings and the existence of behavior consistent with the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome was that the victim had been molested by appellant. Moreover, a jury’s awareness that the victim had been molested previously could affect its judgment of the victim’s credibility, as the credibility of a five-year-old child’s report of an im*529proper touching must necessarily be greater if the child has had no occasion to learn about such behavior from prior incidents.”
In Decker v. State, 139 Ga. App. 707 (2), 708 (229 SE2d 520) (1976), (a child molestation case), this Court held that “[i]nquiry into the prosecutrix’ past sexual experiences are irrelevant to whether or not she was molested by this defendant.”
In my view, the majority, by its holding, will permit the introduction of evidence of the victim’s prior molestation by an indirect method, when this same evidence is prohibited from introduction by a direct method.
I would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.