Court Opinion

ID: 9745813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:32:49.099661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.758706
License: Public Domain

WOODS (Fred), J., Dissenting.
In part II of its opinion, the majority holds that a prior felony conviction of conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics is not a valid prior, within the meaning of Health and Safety Code section1 11370.2, if suffered in federal court. I disagree.
The majority’s reasoning begins and ends with the language of section 11370.2. Because that language specifies only 11 California code sections as qualifying “prior felony conviction” sections, and the subject federal conviction is not, of course, a conviction of one of those sections, therefore the federal conviction is not a section 11370.2 prior.
I suggest a deeper analysis is called for.
Penal Code section 668 provides: “Every person who has been convicted in any other state, government, country, or jurisdiction of an offense for which, if committed within this state, such person could have been punished under the laws of this state by imprisonment in a state prison, is punishable for any subsequent crime committed within this state in the manner prescribed by law and to the same extent as if such prior conviction had taken place in a court of this state.” (Italics added.)
*780The emphasized language makes clear that for enhancement purposes, a “foreign” prior felony (so long as it would also have been a California felony) is identical to a California prior felony.2
In 1985, when the Legislature enacted section 11370.2, California law provided that, for enhancement purposes, “foreign” felony priors and California felony priors were identical. (Pen. Code, § 668; see fn. 2, ante) The Legislature is presumed to know its own laws and “we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute ‘with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness’.” (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 899 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420]; see also People v. Davis (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 760 [212 Cal.Rptr. 673].)
“The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. But ‘[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ Thus, ‘[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ ” (People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 898-899. Internal citations and quotations omitted.)
The Legislature’s intent in passing section 11370.2 is clear. The section was part of a bill which amended section 11351 and added sections 11370.2, 11370.4, and 11379.8 (Stats. 1985, ch. 1398, p. 4948). Section 1 of the bill states: “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting Sections 3 and 4 of this act to punish more severely those persons who are in the regular business of trafficking in, or production of, narcotics and those persons who deal in large quantities of narcotics as opposed to individuals who have a less serious, occasional, or relatively minor role in this activity.”
This intent to “more severely” punish repeat narcotic traffickers is also reflected by the double punishment provision of section 11370.2 (“. . . in addition to any other punishment authorized by law . . . .” See People v. Powell (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 438, 441-442 [281 Cal.Rptr. 568]).
In my view it “would result in absurd consequences” (People v. Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 898) to exempt federal and other country (e.g., *781Columbia) narcotic trafficking convictions from section 11370.2 enhanced punishment. It is those very felony convictions which “persons who deal in large quantities of narcotics” are likely to have sustained.
Moreover, as our Supreme Court has stated: “In the absence of limitation, a reference to ‘prior felony convictions’ is deemed to include any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1038-1039 [264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627].) Section 11370.2’s use of “prior felony conviction” is absent any limitation.
In my view, the subject prior felony conviction is valid within the meaning of section 11370.2. The trial court, therefore, was required to impose a consecutive three-year term or, if it determined that there were circumstances in mitigation (Pen. Code, § 1170.1, subd. (b)), strike the allegation. I would vacate the concurrent three-year sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for this limited resentencing.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 16, 1993. Baxter, J., and George, 1, were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

Statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Health and Safety Code.

Before amended in 1976, Penal Code section 668 applied only to Penal Code sections 644, 666, and 667. As part of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, the section was amended to delete “in Sections 644, 666, and 667” and substitute “by law.” (Deering’s Ann. Pen. Codes (1983 ed.) § 668, p. 245.)