Court Opinion

ID: 9760263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:45:00.035263+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.916896
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

The majority here fails to reach the essential question whether there is- a constitutionally-protected right to privacy for private, consensual, sexual activity. Upon a constitutionally-mandated, independent appraisal of the record, the majority finds as a fact that the conduct of both petitioners, Neville and Kelly, occurred in places not sufficiently private to be afforded a constitutional right to privacy, if such a right exists.
Upon my constitutionally-mandated, independent appraisal of the record, I find as a fact that the sexual activity of both Neville and Kelly occurred in a private place.1 In my view, there is a constitutionally-protected right to privacy for private, consensual, sexual activity.2 Thus, I would hold that Maryland Code (1957, 1976 Repl. Vol., 1980 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 554, which makes such *387sexual activity a crime, is unconstitutional as applied here. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
As long ago as 1891, the United States Supreme Court recognized the existence of a common law right to personal privacy in Union Pacific Railway Company v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 1001 (1891). There Mr. Justice Gray said:
"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
In 1928, Mr. Justice Brandéis indicated that the right to privacy might be constitutionally protected. In a dissenting opinion, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928), he said:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 1681-82 (1965), the Supreme Court held that there is a constitutionally-protected right to privacy. Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly mention the right to privacy, Mr. Justice Douglas, stating that "the right of privacy [is] older than the Bill of Rights,” explained:
*388"Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house’ in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.’ ”
While the Supreme Court in other cases has held that the right to privacy includes the right to make personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, abortion, family, and education, that Court has not defined the full scope of that right. In Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2018 n.5 (1977), the Supreme Court said:
"'[T]he Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults,’ n.17, infra, and we do not purport to answer that question now.”
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the "Supreme Court’s decision in Carey makes plain that the Court considers it to be an open question whether the right of privacy applies to all ... 'adult sexual relations.’ ”3
*389In Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87, 85 S. Ct. at 1682, the Supreme Court held that the distribution of contraceptives to married persons could not be prohibited. Inherent in the Supreme Court’s determination that married persons have a right to make decisions with respect to the consequence of sexual encounters was the recognition that married persons have the right to have such encounters. Thus, the Supreme Court established that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes the intimacies associated with the marital relationship.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55, 92 S. Ct. 1029, 1038-39 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons could not be prohibited. There the Court said:
"It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted *390governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453, 92 S. Ct. at 1038 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Supreme Court made it clear that the right to make decisions with respect to the consequence of sexual encounters, and necessarily to have such encounters, was not limited to married persons. Accordingly, the Supreme Court established that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes the intimacies associated with a personal relationship between unmarried persons.
In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249-50 (1969), the Supreme Court held that the possession of obscene matter within the privácy of a person’s home could not be prohibited. There, the Court acknowledged that a person has
"the right to read or observe what he pleases — the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.” Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565, 89 S. Ct. at 1248 (emphasis added).
Thus, the Supreme Court suggested that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes the right to seek sexual gratification by viewing obscene material in the privacy of one’s home.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n.13, 93 S. Ct. 2628, 2640 n.13 (1973), the Supreme Court recognized:
"The protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia is restricted to a place, the home. In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Such protected privacy extends to the doctor’s office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved.” (Emphasis added) (citation omitted).
*391Thus, the Supreme Court reiterated that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes the intimacies occurring in private that are associated with personal relationships.
All of these cases lead to the conclusion that an unmarried person’s decision to seek sexual gratification, even from deviant conduct, and to indulge in acts of sexual intimacy is included within the constitutionally-protected right to privacy. Indeed, this Court, itself, has previously recognized that the Supreme Court has established that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes intimate relationships. Montgomery County, Md. v. Walsh, 274 Md. 502, 513, 336 A.2d 97, 105 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901, 96 S. Ct. 1091 (1976); Doe v. Commander, Wheaton Police Dept., 273 Md. 262, 272, 329 A.2d 35, 41-42 (1974).
At least one Justice of the Supreme Court has indicated that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy may include private, consensual, sexual activities. Thus, in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 132 n.10, 93 S. Ct. 390, 404 n.10 (1972), Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting, has said:
"... I have serious doubts whether the State may constitutionally assert an interest in regulating any sexual act between consenting adults.”
Courts in other jurisdictions have held that the right to privacy includes private, consensual, sexual activities. In State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 359 (Iowa 1976), an accused male was convicted under a sodomy statute of performing fellatio with a female in a farm house. The Iowa Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, stating:
"We hold section 705.1 in its present form is unconstitutional as an invasion of fundamental rights, such as the personal right of privacy, to the extent it attempts to regulate through use of criminal penalty consensual sodomitical practices performed in private by adult persons of the opposite sex.”
*392In People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 483, 415 N.E.2d 936, 937-38, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948 (1980), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981), an accused male was convicted under a consensual sodomy statute of committing acts of deviate sexual intercourse with a 17-year-old male at the accused’s home. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held the statute unconstitutional, stating:
"Thus it is seen that the concept of personal freedom includes a broad and unclassified group of values and activities related generally to individual repose, sanctuary and autonomy and the individual’s right to develop his personal existence in the manner he or she sees fit. Personal sexual conduct is a fundamental right, protected by the right to privacy because of the transcendental importance of sex to the human condition, the intimacy of the conduct, and its relationship to a person’s right to control his or her own body. The right is broad enough to include sexual acts between non-married persons and intimate consensual homosexual conduct.
It has been said that 'privacy in the conventional sense (being left alone without anyone observing) is a generally accepted prerequisite to human sexual intercourse and the protection of sexual activity seems to be an important aspect of the constitutional right to privacy cases.’ The right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy is fundamental.” Onofre, 72 App. Div. 2d 268, 270-71, 424 N.Y.S.2d 566, 568 (1980) (citations omitted).
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the right to privacy is
"a right of independence in making certain kinds of important decisions, with a concomitant right to conduct oneself in accordance with those decisions, undeterred by governmental restraint....”
*393That Court concluded:
"Because the statutes are broad enough to reach noncommercial, cloistered personal sexual conduct of consenting adults ... we agree with defendants’ contention that it violates ... their right of privacy. . . Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at, 485, 415 N.E.2d at 938, 939, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
In State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 203, 381 A.2d 333, 334 (1977), an accused male was convicted under a fornication statute of fornicating with two women in a deserted parking lot. The Supreme Court of New Jersey held the statute unconstitutional, stating:
"We conclude that the conduct statutorily defined as fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental personal choice. Thus, the statute infringes upon the right of privacy. Although persons may differ as to the propriety and morality of such conduct and while we certainly do not condone its particular manifestations in this case, such a decision is necessarily encompassed in the concept of personal autonomy which our Constitution seeks to safeguard.” Saunders, 75 N.J. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 339.
None of these courts has found a compelling state interest that would justify state regulation of private, consensual, sexual activity. More particularly, factors such as protecting the institution of marriage, upholding public morality by preventing illicit sex, preventing an increase in illegitimate children, preventing venereal disease, and preventing physical harm have been rejected as a sufficient basis for state regulation. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d at 359; Saunders, 75 N.J. at 217-20, 381 A.2d at 341-43; Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 487-92, 415 N.E.2d at 940-42, 434 N.Y.S. 2d at 951-53.
The underlying rationale for this conclusion was stated in Saunders, 75 N.J. at 217-19, 381 A.2d at 341-42, as follows:
*394"Perhaps the strongest reason favoring the law is its supposed relationship to the furtherance of the State’s salutary goal of preventing venereal disease. We do not question the State’s compelling interest in preventing the spread of such diseases. Nor do we dispute the power of the State to regulate activities which may adversely affect the public health. However, we do not believe that the instant enactment is properly designed with that end in mind. First, while we recognize that the statute would substantially eliminate venereal diseases if it could successfully deter people from engaging in the prohibited activity, we doubt its ability to achieve that result. The risk of contracting venereal disease is surely as great a deterrent to illicit sex as the maximum penalty under this act: a fine of $50 and/or imprisonment in jail for six months. As the Court found in Carey, absent highly coercive measures, it is extremely doubtful that people will be deterred from engaging in such natural activities. The Court there rejected the assertion that the threat of an unwanted pregnancy would deter persons from engaging in extramarital sexual activities. We conclude that the same is true for the possibility of being prosecuted under the fornication statute.
Furthermore, if the State’s interest in the instant statute is that it is helpful in preventing venereal disease, we conclude that it is counter-productive. To the extent that any successful program to combat venereal disease must depend upon affected persons coming forward for treatment, the present statute operates as a deterrent to such voluntary participation. The fear of being prosecuted for the 'crime’ of fornication can only deter people from seeking such necessary treatment.
We similarly fail to comprehend how the State’s interest in preventing the propagation of *395illegitimate children will be measurably advanced by the instant law. If the unavailability of contraceptives is not likely to deter people from engaging in illicit sexual activities, it follows that the fear of unwanted pregnancies will be equally ineffective.
The last two reasons offered by the State as compelling justifications for the enactment —■ that it protects the marital relationship and the public morals by preventing illicit sex — offer little additional support for the law. Whether or not abstention is likely to induce persons to marry, this statute can in no way be considered a permissible means of fostering what may otherwise be a socially beneficial institution. If we were to hold that the State could attempt to coerce people into marriage, we would undermine the very independent choice which lies at the core of the right of privacy. We do not doubt the beneficent qualities of marriage, both for individuals as well as for society as a whole. Yet, we can only reiterate that decisions such as whether to marry are of a highly personal nature; they neither lend themselves to official coercion or sanction, nor fall within the regulatory power of those who are elected to govern.” (Citations omitted).
A similar rationale was expressed in Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952, as follows:
"In sum, there has been no showing of any threat, either to participants or the public in general, in consequence of the voluntary engagement by adults in private, discreet, sodomous conduct. Absent is the factor of commercialization with the attendant evils commonly attached to the retailing of sexual pleasures; absent the elements of force or of involvement of minors which might constitute compulsion of unwilling participants or of those too young to make an informed choice, and absent too *396intrusion on the sensibilities of members of the public, many of whom would be offended by being exposed to the intimacies of others. Personal feelings of distaste for the conduct sought to be proscribed by section 130.38 of the Penal Law and even disapproval by a majority of the populace, if that disapproval were to be assumed, may not substitute for the required demonstration of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of important personal. decision protected under the right of privacy drawn from the United States Constitution — areas, the number and definition of which have steadily grown but, as the Supreme Court has observed, the outer limits of which it has not yet marked.”
The conclusion that States do not have a compelling interest in regulating private, consensual, sexual activity is further supported by the fact that Legislatures in at least 22 jurisdictions have decriminalized such activity between adults in private. See Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 Hastings L.J., 799, 950-51 (1979). In addition, the American Law Institute Model Penal Code adopts the view that private, consensual, sexual activity should not ordinarily be subject to criminal sanction. Model Penal Code § 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See Model Penal Code § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
I am persuaded that the constitutionally-protected right to privacy includes the fundamental right to decide to engage and then to engage in private, consensual, sexual activity. I am further persuaded that there is no compelling State interest that justifies State regulation of such activity. To the extent that Art. 27, § 554 in its present form regulates private, consensual, sexual activity, it unjustifiably interferes with a fundamental personal right. Accordingly, I would hold it unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual, sexual activity.
*397I do not agree with the majority that "the private nature of particular conduct in a given location for constitutional right of privacy purposes is a matter of degree determined by all of the circumstances.” In my view, the majority here establishes a new standard for determining whether a given intimate act is to be afforded constitutional protection. In essence, it determines that the nature of the conduct and the degree of privacy of the location are both factors to be taken into account and that the more intimate the conduct, the greater the degree of privacy required to afford constitutional protection to a given intimate act. None of the cases relied upon by the majority articulates or utilizes the standard that the majority has designed.
In my view, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to engage, as do my colleagues, in a series of judgmental evaluations as to which of an infinite variety of intimate acts requires a lesser or greater degree of privacy in order to be afforded constitutional protection. Because any intimate act between consenting persons is to be afforded constitutional protection if it occurs in a private place, the nature of the intimate act is immaterial. Rather, the appropriate standard for determining whether a given intimate act should be afforded constitutional protection is whether the persons engaging in that act, irrespective of its nature, have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location in which the act is being performed.
Upon my constitutionally-mandated, independent appraisal of the record, I find as a fact that the sexual activity of both Neville and Kelly occurred in a private place. I agree with the majority that Neville and Kelly "chose for the intimate sexual activity a place which was out of doors, which was in a well populated community, and which was equally as accessible to any member of the public as it was to [Neville or Kelly].” There are other factors, however, that, in my view, must be taken into account in determining whether the place in which the sexual activity occurred was public or private.
In Neville’s case, the record shows that the site selected was a secluded spot located some distance away from the *398activity associated with an existing commercial center. The site itself consisted of a very small clearing in a heavily wooded area overgrown with waist-high sticker bushes. Although the clearing was only 10 to 15 feet away from the railroad tracks, it was at an elevation approximately four feet higher than the tracks so that the view from the tracks into the clearing was impeded. The record further shows that while Neville and the female involved were in the clearing, two men from the rescue mission, walking down the tracks from the commercial center, came "within 15 feet” of the clearing. Yet there is nothing in the record to show that these people observed any of the sexual activity occurring in the clearing. Finally, the record shows that only one person, the police officer who made the arrest, observed the sexual activity. He testified that before Neville and the female involved entered the clearing, he had anticipated the place to which they might be going and had hidden himself in some nearby underbrush in order to witness the ensuing sexual activity.
All of these facts indicate that it was highly unlikely that any passerby or casual observer could or would observe any sexual activity occurring within the clearing and that the site was, therefore, a private and not a public place.4 Thus, Neville’s choice of the site for the purpose of engaging undiscovered and undisturbed in intimate sexual activity was supported by a reasonable expectation of privacy.
*399In Kelly’s case, the record shows that the site selected was a "secluded spot, far off the beaten path” located between one-fourth and one-half mile from the nearest paved road, one-fourth mile from the Rod and Gun Club, and one-half block through a wooded area to the nearest home. The site itself consisted of the area surrounding a rusted-out shed on an abandoned missile site that was not visible from either the road or the home. The record further shows that while Kelly, Holden, and the female involved were at the shed, children from the nearby home were searching the grounds of the Rod and Gun Club for a mislaid wallet. Yet there is nothing in the record to show that these children observed any sexual activity occurring at the shed. Finally, the record shows that there were no eyewitnesses to the sexual activity. Indeed, in closing argument, the State conceded that the site was a private, not a public place, when it said:
"And as is the nature of the crime, where the crime takes place, it takes place in an isolated area, where there is little likelihood of being detected or seen.”
All of these facts indicate that it was highly unlikely that any passerby or casual observer could or would observe any sexual activity occurring within the site and that the site was, therefore, a private and not a public place. Thus, Kelly’s choice of the site for the purpose of engaging undiscovered and undisturbed in intimate sexual activity was supported by a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Here there was evidence to show that Neville and Kelly engaged in private, consensual, sexual activity. The State *400failed to show that factors such as protection of individuals, especially children, control of venereal disease, maintenance of a citizenry that can function well in society, preservation of heterosexual marriage, and guarding the public morality constitute compelling State interests that justify State regulation of such activity. Indeed, the conclusion that Maryland does not have a compelling interest in regulating private, consensual, sexual activity is supported by the fact that in 1976 in § 464A the Legislature established that a person is not guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree (perverted practice) if he engages in such activity with the consent of a person 14 years and older.5
Under these circumstances, Art. 27, § 554 which regulates private, consensual, sexual activity unjustifiably interfered with the fundamental personal rights of Neville and Kelly. Therefore, I would hold it unconstitutional as applied to the private, consensual, sexual activity here. Accordingly, I would reverse.

. In Kelly’s case, the State does not contend that Kelly did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy despite the presence of a third party (Holden). Therefore, this question need not be considered here.

. Hereinafter, throughout this dissenting opinion, the term "consensual, sexual activity” refers to consensual, sexual activity engaged in by persons who have capacity to give legally valid consent.
In Kelly’s case, the State does not contend that the female involved, who was aged 16, lacked capacity to give legally valid consent to sexual activity. Therefore, this question need not be considered here.

. I recognize that in Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901, 96 S. Ct. 1489-90 (1976), the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a *389judgment of the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia that upheld the constitutionality of Virginia’s sodomy statute as applied to private, sexual activity between consenting males. While the summary affirmance was an adjudication on the merits of the question presented, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 2289 (1975), I do not consider it to be binding. The Supreme Court itself has indicated that a summary affirmance affirms the judgment only and not the reasoning of the Court, and, therefore, that "the Court has not hestitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have established.” Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392, 95 S. Ct. 533, 541 (1975) (Burger C.J., concurring). See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176-77, 97 S. Ct. 2238, 2240-41 (1977).
It is important to note that the Carey case, which explicitly states that the question whether the Constitution prohibits state statutes that regulate private, consensual, sexual activity, was decided subsequent to Doe. In addition, it is important to note that on 18 May 1981 the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 101 S. Ct. 2323 (1981). In Onofre, the New York Court of Appeals held a consensual sodomy statute unconstitutional as applied to private, consensual, sexual activity because it unjustifiably interfered with the constitutionally-protected right to privacy.

. In my view, the trial court implicitly found that the site was a private, not a public place. In Messina v. State, 212 Md. 602, 605, 130 A.2d 578, 579-80 (1957), this Court stated:
" 'Indecent exposure in a public place in such a manner that the act is seen or is likely to be seen by casual observers is an offense at common law ***. Ordinarily, *** the place where the exposure is made must be public. What constitutes a public place within the meaning of this offense depends on the circumstances of the case. The place where the offense is committed is a public one if the exposure be such that it is likely to be seen by a number of casual observers***.’ ” Quoting 67 C.J.S., Obscenity § 5 (1955) (emphasis added).
Here, the trial court’s acquittal, by definition, had to be premised upon a finding that the site was not likely to be seen by casual observers, and, therefore, was private. Indeed, the trial court further found that the site was private despite the fact that there was an eyewitness because that *399eyewitness was "required to virtually stalk the Defendant” and "was not a 'casual observer.’ ” I agree with the trial court’s finding that the site was a private place.
The majority concludes that Neville’s acquittal of indecent exposure does not establish that the intimate act occurred in a place sufficiently private to be afforded constitutitional protection. In essence, the majority concludes that a place sufficiently private for performance of an act of indecent exposure is not sufficiently private for performance of an act of fellatio. The record is devoid of any factual, empirical, statistical, or psychological data to support that conclusion. The circumstances here graphically illustrate the unnecessary difficulties inherent in the application of the majority’s standard that requires a judgmental evaluation of the relative intimacy of given sexual acts, frequently in the absence of any supporting data.

. Art. 27, § 464A provides in pertinent part:
"(a) ... A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person:
(1) ... without the consent of the other person....
(3) Under 14 years of age and the person performing the sexual act is four or more years older than the victim.”
Art. 27, § 461 (e) provides in pertinent part:
"'Sexual act’ means cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse, but does not include vaginal intercourse.”
Because cunnilingus, fellatio, analingus, or anal intercourse all involve perverted practices, a person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree only if the person engages in a nonconsensual, perverted practice.