Court Opinion

ID: 9534428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:39:28.824295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:30:37.284661
License: Public Domain

*213MARTONE, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not believe that A.R.S. § 13-604(K) supports the court’s conclusion that the release eligibility conditions of § 18-604 control over the release eligibility conditions of § 13-3408(D). Our statutory scheme distinguishes between terms of imprisonment and release eligibility. A.R.S. § 13-701(0 provides1 terms of imprisonment for felonies for a first offense except as provided in § 13-604. Section 13-604 provides for enhanced terms of imprisonment for dangerous and repetitive offenders. Section 13-604(K), upon which the majority relies, provides that the “penalties prescribed by this section,” that is, the enhanced penalties, are substituted for those otherwise authorized by law, only if the prior conviction or the dangerous nature of the felony is alleged in the indictment or information. Thus, even if an offense otherwise would qualify as a dangerous nature offense, or a repetitive offense, the enhanced penalties of § 13-604 do not apply unless specifically charged by the prosecutor. All this means, then, is that the term of imprisonment for a felony is determined by § 13-701, unless § 13-604 applies and the prosecutor so charges the case.
Section 13-604(K) does not state that the penalties under § 13-604 control over penalties elsewhere, but only that the penalties under § 13-604 apply if, and only if, the case is charged as a repetitive or dangerous offense case. It is § 13-701(C) that provides for terms of imprisonment “[ejxcept as provided in § 13-604.” Thus, § 13-604(K) contains words of description not words of limitation. We are left, then, with an apparent conflict between statutes that § 13-604(K) does not solve.
Let us turn to parole eligibility. Section 13-604(K) has nothing to do with parole eligibility. Parole eligibility, generally, is not even found in Title 13, the Criminal Code. We look to Title 31 and Title 41 for parole eligibility. A.R.S. § 31-412(A) provides the criterion for release on parole, “if the applicant has reached his earliest parole eligibility date pursuant to § 41-1604.06, subsection D.” And, under § 41-1604.06(D) “the prisoner’s earliest parole eligibility occurs when the prisoner has served one-half of his sentence unless such prisoner is sentenced according to any provisions of law which prohibit the release on any basis until serving not less than two-thirds of the sentence imposed by the court, the sentence imposed by the court or any other mandatory minimum term, in which case the prisoner must have served the sentence required by law.” In short, one must serve one-half the sentence unless some other sentencing statute requires otherwise.
We turn to § 13-604(D). It provides for parole eligibility after two-thirds of the sentence has been served. But § 13-604(D) is a general statute calculated to lengthen the otherwise applicable one-half time to two-thirds time. It was not intended to shorten to two-thirds time offenses that already came with flat time upon conviction.
A.R.S. § 13-3408(D) is a more specific statute applicable only to drug offenses and requires the entire sentence to be served. Unlike A.R.S. § 13-701(C), which only applies to “a first offense,” § 13-3408(D) applies to any person who is convicted of selling a dangerous drug. On its face, it applies whether the person has been convicted the first time, the second time, or the tenth time. Thus, as here, if one is convicted of selling drugs with two prior felony convictions, the following would apply. To determine the term of imprisonment, one goes to § 13-701(C) and concludes that because it is not a “first offense,” § 13-604 applies. For terms of imprisonment, one would therefore look to § 13-604(D). As to parole eligibility, one looks to § 41-1604.06(D) which then refers to § 13-3408(D) which on its face, unlike § 13-701(C), is not limited to first offenders. In the end, § 13-3408(D) requires the entire term to be served whether it is a first offense or a multiple offense.
This is how I read these statutes. In my view, this reading is not only accurate, but it is supported by common sense. I simply do not believe that the legislature would have required flat time for a first offense drug offender, but allow for less than flat time for a multiple drug offender.
*214The majority says that it believes “that the anomalous result with which the Behl court was concerned will rarely occur.” Ante, at 211, 914 P.2d at 1303. But it has occurred in State v. Lambson, CR-95-0139-PR, which we consolidated for oral argument with this case. There, the court of appeals relied upon its Tarango decision to conclude that a dangerous sex offender was eligible to be released earlier than a nondangerous sex offender. Under A.R.S. § 13-1406(B), one who commits sexual assault must serve flat time. Because Lambson’s sexual assault was charged as a dangerous offense, he was sentenced under § 13-604(G). Under the majority’s reading of the statute, Lambson became eligible for parole upon serving two-thirds of his eight year sentence. This is sooner than he would have been released had he been sentenced on a nondangerous basis.
The language of § 13-604(K) is language of description not language of limitation. Section 13-604(K) merely requires the filing of a charging document before § 13-604 applies. We should resort to parole eligibility statutes to find the appropriate release eligibility dates. The specific statute will control over the general. Admittedly, Arizona’s sentencing scheme is enormously complex and glitches can, and do, occur. One need only look at the sentencing blotter produced by our own administrative office to see that sentencing in Arizona looks like matrix theory in abstract algebra. Nevertheless, I agree with the opinion of the court of appeals in State v. Behl, 160 Ariz. 527, 529, 774 P.2d 831, 833 (App.1989), that “the legislature did not intend this absurd result. We have a duty to harmonize the statutes to the extent possible so that both will be operative.” I therefore respectfully dissent.

. I refer to the statutes in existence at the time this case arose.