Court Opinion

ID: 9746464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:17:33.768033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:50.707957
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION

Justice EAKIN.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the language of the MVFRL clearly determined this question, which obviously is not addressed by the statute itself. I believe the majority’s decision produces a result contrary to both the legislative intent of the MVFRL and the canons of statutory construction. While the meaning of the words in § 1705 might appear unambiguous when each subsection is plucked from the statute and read in isolation, statutes are not to be interpreted in such a manner. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep’t of Transportation v. Taylor, 576 Pa. 622, 841 A.2d 108, 118 (2004) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (“in accomplishing our goal of ascertaining legislative intent, we do not interpret the words of a statute in isolation from each other, but rather, in the context in which they appear”); O’Rourke v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 566 Pa. 161, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (2001) (“we should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but must read them with reference to the context in which they appear”); Consulting Engineers Council v. State Architects Licensure Bd., 522 Pa. 204, 560 A.2d 1375, 1377 (1989) (appellant’s argument fails as it is premised upon excerpting one subsection from context in which it appears— effect of one subsection can only be understood in relation to provisions in rest of section); Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 508 Pa. 576, 499 A.2d 294, 299 (1985) (“A cardinal rule of statutory construction is *217that we must give terms in a statute the meaning dictated by the context in which they are used”); Pennsylvania Social Services Local 668 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 481 Pa. 81, 392 A.2d 256, 258-59 (1978) (provisions of statutes should be construed with reference to similar matter and should not be read in vacuum).
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the same persons or things, and statutes or parts of statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if possible. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1932. Courts are required, if possible, to give effect to each provision or subsection of the statute. Id., § 1921(a). I believe the majority looks at the statute through an overly narrow lens, and by doing so it overlooks the ambiguity that arises when each provision of this statute is given effect. The words of § 1705 lack clarity when its parts are read in pari materia, and since the goal of judicial interpretation of this void in the statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent,1 we are required to ascertain that intent and to interpret the statute in a manner consistent therewith.
In her concurring and dissenting opinion in this matter, Judge Bowes noted the circumstances under which the 1990 amendments to the MVFRL—which pronounced the full tort and limited tort options—were enacted. Judge Bowes cited spiraling auto insurance costs and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists as the foremost reasons for the 1990 amendments to the MVFRL. Holland v. Marcy, 817 A.2d 1082, 1096 n. 7 (Pa.Super.2002) (Bowes, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Johnson and Lally-Green, JJ.) (citing Ronca, J.R.; Sloane, L.A.; Lutz, D.L.; Shollenberger, T.A.; and Mundy, J.F.2001 at §§ 1.1, 1.2. Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Insurance: An Analysis of the Financial Responsibility Law, Second Edition (2001 Revision)). Judge Bowes noted the legislature enacted the 1990 amendments to the MVFRL to deal with the high costs of auto insurance and to make auto insurance affordable for uninsured motorists by establishing limited tort benefits, which could be purchased at *218lower premiums. Id., at 1096 n. 7. Because the legislature’s goal was to ensure there would be no excuse for driving without some form of insurance, the MVFRL should be construed to avoid rewarding motorists who intentionally neglect to purchase insurance. Id., at 1096 (citing McClung v. Breneman, 700 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super.1997)). I believe the reasoning espoused by Judge Bowes in this matter is the proper course:
Pursuant to the MVFRL, only a “named insured” under an insurance policy can choose a tort option. By indicating that an uninsured automobile owner is considered to “have chosen” the limited tort option, the legislature intended the uninsured vehicle owner to be treated like a named insured under an insurance policy. When read in pari materia, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1705(a)(5) and § 1705(d) support such an interpretation of the MVFRL.... Clearly, this language evinces an intent by the legislature to create the legal fiction of an insurance policy where the uninsured owner of a vehicle stands in the shoes of a named insured.
Id., at 1094-95 (footnote omitted).
An uninsured parent who is deemed to have chosen the limited tort alternative pursuant to § 1705(a)(5) must be treated the same as a “named insured” on a limited tort insurance policy. Therefore, pursuant to § 1705(b)(2), the limited tort option also applies to the minor children of the “named insured.” I would reverse the determination of the Superior Court and remand for findings as to whether Joel Holland sustained permanent serious disfigurement permitting recovery under the limited tort option.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.

. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).