Court Opinion

ID: 9687179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:17:56.24188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.708181
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with part i of the majority opinion but disagree with part ii. I would remand for the development of a record on the question whether Livingston County was in fact required to operate a sanitary landfill to comply with the provisions of the Solid Waste Management Act.
The majority holds that while § 24 of the swma1 requires that the county provide for the removal of solid waste, it does not require that the county do so by operating a sanitary landfill. Because the majority finds that the operation of a sanitary landfill is not a required activity, it concludes that necessary expenditures made by the county to assure the continued operation of the Livingston County sanitary landfill are not within the ambit of the Headlee Amendment2 and therefore need not be reimbursed by the state.
The question whether the county was required *655to continue operation of its sanitary landfill to meet its statutory obligation to remove solid waste was resolved by partial summary judgment in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims judge was persuaded that continued operation of the sanitary landfill was required by controlling decisions of the Court of Appeals. See Delta Co v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 118 Mich App 458; 325 NW2d 455 (1982), lv den 414 Mich 954 (1982); South Haven Twp v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 132 Mich App 222; 346 NW2d 923 (1984), remanded for reconsideration 425 Mich 854 (1986).3 Since that question was resolved in favor of Livingston County as a matter of law, the county was not called upon to offer evidence to show that the only way it could realistically meet its statutory obligation to remove solid waste was through the continued operation of its sanitary landfill facility.
The trial proceeded on the assumption that the county was obliged to continue operation of its sanitary landfill. Evidence was introduced solely on the question whether § 24 of the swma imposed new requirements or merely particularized the standards of preexisting requirements contained in the swma’s precursor, the garbage and refuse disposal act, MCL 325.291 et seq.; MSA 14.435(1) et seq. The Court of Claims concluded that the swma did impose new requirements and, on the basis of the Headlee Amendment, ordered the state to *656reimburse the county for the costs incurred to satisfy the new requirements.
The Court of Appeals, relying on its earlier decisions in Delta Co and South Haven Twp, affirmed the conclusion of the Court of Claims that Livingston County was required to operate its sanitary landfill to satisfy its obligations under § 24 of the swma and affirmed the order of reimbursement.
I agree with the majority that § 24 of the swma, in requiring that the county assure that waste finds its way from the point of generation to a licensed waste disposal area, does not require that the county operate its own waste disposal facility. The statutory obligation set . forth in § 24 might be met by the operation of a privately owned facility located in Livingston County or a publicly or privately owned facility located in another county. The record does not show whether Livingston County could reasonably meet its statutory obligation by pursuing an alternative to the continued operation of its sanitary landfill.
The Court of Claims agreed with Livingston County, on the authority of Delta Co and South Haven Twp, that the county was required to continue to operate its sanitary landfill as a matter of law. The county therefore cannot be faulted for failing to offer evidence that it had no alternative but to continue to own and operate the existing facility. Livingston County should not be barred from presenting evidence or argument on an issue that was regarded at trial as settled as a matter of law.
It might appear, on the remand that I would order, that no private entity could be found to operate a facility in Livingston County at commercially feasible rates and that facilities in neighbor*657ing counties would refuse, on economic or other grounds, to dispose of Livingston County’s waste. If that should be the case, then it might appear that the county’s statutory obligation could only be met —as a matter of fact — by the continued operation of this sanitary landfill. The Headlee Amendment then might require reimbursement by the state if the Court of Claims did not err in concluding that Livingston County’s expenditures were made to meet new requirements imposed by the swma.4
I would remand to the Court of Claims for development of a record on the question of the viability of alternatives to Livingston County’s continued operation of its own sanitary landfill facility._

 Section 24 of the Solid Waste Management Act provides:
A municipality or county shall assure that all solid waste is removed from the site of generation, frequently enough to protect the public health, and are [sic] delivered to licensed solid waste disposal areas, except waste which is permitted by state law or rules promulgated by the department, to be disposed of at the site of generation. [MCL 299.424; MSA 13.29(24).]

 The Headlee Amendment in relevant part provides:
The state is hereby prohibited from reducing the state financed proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of units of Local Government by state law. A new activity or service or an increase in the level of any activity or service beyond that required by existing law *655shall not be required by the legislature or any state agency of units of Local Government, unless a state appropriation is made and disbursed to pay the unit of Local Government for any necessary increased costs. The provision of this section shall not apply to costs incurred pursuant to Article VI, Section 18. [Const 1963, art 9, § 29.]

 The majority discusses these decisions at length. Ante, pp 649-652.

 See n 2.