Court Opinion

ID: 9748237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:57:00.877105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:33.400671
License: Public Domain

RIDGELY, Justice,
concurring, with whom HOLLAND, Justice, joins:
I concur with the Majority in the reversal of Harris’ Tampering with Physical Evidence conviction, but do so on a narrower basis. Section 1269(2) criminalizes the suppression of physical evidence by four alternative means. They are: a) concealment, b) alteration, c) destruction, or d) by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person.41 The Indictment in this case charged Harris with Tampering with Physical Evidence by one means — by an “act of destruction.” An “act of destruction” was a material allegation which the State was required to prove.42 With no instruction requested by the State on the lesser included offense of Attempted Tampering with Physical Evidence, the only possible verdicts were guilty or not guilty of the offense charged.43
At trial, the State did not prove that physical evidence was suppressed by an act of destruction. Instead, the prosecutor argued for conviction under a concealment theory, stating “[Harris] was trying to conceal it, to swallow, so it could never be used against him.” This argument acknowledged, consistent with the evidence, that when Harris placed the physical evidence into his mouth, he did not destroy either the baggie or its contents. Without proof of an act of destruction, Harris could not be convicted of the offense charged. Harris’ motion for a judgment of acquittal on that offense should have been granted.
The Majority goes farther than necessary to decide this appeal and adopts the rationale of the New Jersey Superior Court in State v. Fuqua44 to hold that, for possessory offenses, Section 1269 “applies only to completed crimes” because that rationale “comports with our statutory scheme, precedent, and fair public policy.” Neither the Delaware statutory scheme nor our precedent supports the adoption of the Fuqua rationale. And although it may or may not be fair public policy, that is a determination for the General Assembly to make.
When interpreting a statute, our role is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.45 “In the absence of any ambiguity, the language of the statute must be regarded as conclusive of the General Assembly’s intent.”46 “Under Delaware law, a statute is ambiguous if: first, it is reasonably susceptible to *1146different conclusions or interpretations; or second, a literal interpretation of the words of the statute would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that could not have been intended by the legislature.” 47
Contraband can satisfy the General Assembly’s definition of physical evidence. “ ‘Physical evidence’ means any article, object, document, record or other thing of physical substance which is or is about to be produced or used as evidence in an official proceeding.”48 Whether a defendant has completed a possessory offense is irrelevant to the application of this definition. There need not be an actual official proceeding pending provided an official proceeding could readily have been contemplated under the circumstances of the case.49
Although the General Assembly could certainly provide an exception to Section 1269 for possessory crimes, it did not do so in the text of Section 1269. Also, there is no exception in 11 Del. C. § 531 which proscribes an attempt to violate Section 1269.50 As a matter of law, Attempted Tampering with Physical Evidence is a lesser included offense of Section 1269.51 Thus, where a defendant believes that certain physical evidence (contraband or not) is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective one, and he takes a substantial step towards committing the crime of tampering with physical evidence, with the intent of preventing its production or use, he is guilty of Attempted Tampering with Physical Evidence. A substantial step is “an act or omission which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s intention to commit the crime which the defendant is charged with attempting.”52
Nor is there an ambiguity in Section 1269 that supports limiting its application. A literal interpretation of the words of the statute does not lead to an absurd or unreasonable result that could not have been intended by our legislature. As the Majority has recognized, Tampering with Physical Evidence is itself a “serious crime.”53 The General Assembly proscribed tampering with physical evidence because “[pjhysical evidence is accorded great weight by triers of fact, so the dangers of a miscarriage of justice are multiplied when such evidence is fabricated or concealed.”54 The rationale of this statu*1147tory scheme has more force, not less, when a defendant tampers with critical physical evidence such as contraband by attempting to destroy it.
I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s focus on whether the police have control or constructive control over the contraband to transform the “item” into “evidence.” In my view, the appropriate inquiry involves three elements which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that on or about the date specified in the Indictment, the defendant suppressed physical evidence by an act of concealment, alteration, or destruction, or by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person;
Second, that the defendant did so believing that such physical evidence was about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding; and
Third, that the defendant did so intending to prevent such production or use.55
Our precedents have not focused on whether a completed possessory offense was involved. In Pennewell v. State we distinguished the cases of Fletcher v. State,56 Hardy v. State57 Anderson v. State58 and Hunter v. State59 simply because “[e]ach of these fact patterns involved efforts to hide, or prevent discovery of, the evidence.”60 In Pennewell, we vacated the tampering with physical evidence conviction and held that the defendant dropping his drugs to the ground “did not amount to concealment because he did not attempt to hide the drugs or prevent their discovery. Rather, the defendant abandoned the drugs.”61 Abandonment is not criminalized by § 1269. Concealment with the requisite mens rea is criminalized, and, in Hardy, we upheld the tampering with physical evidence conviction when the defendant concealed contraband in his possession by placing it in his mouth.62 Swallowing or destroying drugs in one’s possession can also constitute a violation of § 1269.63
*1148Finally, although it may or may not be “fair public policy” to limit the application of Section 1269 to possessory crimes which are completed, we have traditionally held that such a determination is for the General Assembly to make, not this Court.64
Turning to Harris’ conviction on the charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance within 300 feet of a church, I agree with the Majority that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of the LIDAR distance measurement. The evidence was sufficient to enable a jury to find Harris guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

. 11 Del. C. § 1269 provides in relevant part: A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when:
(2) Believing that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, and intending to prevent its production or use, the person suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or destruction, or by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person.

. See Keller v. State, 425 A.2d 152, 155 (Del.1981).

. Delaware follows the party autonomy rule which requires that “[t]he trial judge should not give an instruction on an uncharged lesser offense if neither side requests such an instruction because to do so would ‘interfere with the trial strategies of the parties.’ ” State v. Brower, 971 A.2d 102, 107 (Del.2009) (quoting State v. Cox, 851 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Del.2003)).

. State v. Fuqua, 303 N.J.Super. 40, 696 A.2d 44 (A.D., 1997).

. Ross v. State, 990 A.2d 424, 2010 WL 625829 (Del. Feb. 23, 2010).

. State v. Cooper, 575 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Del.1990).

. Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Del.2007).

. 11 Del. C. § 1274(2).

. See, e.g., People v. Nicholas, 70 A.D.2d 804, 417 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1979) (“The moving of a body prior to an official proceeding being begun constituted tampering with physical evidence” because "a prospective official proceeding could readily be contemplated.”).

. 11 Del. C. § 531 provides:
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person:
(1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believes them to be; or
(2) Intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime by the person.

. See 11 Del. C. § 206(b)(2) (“A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense is so included when ... [i]t consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included there....”).

. 11 Del. C. § 532.

. Commentary, Delaware Criminal Code § 1269 (1973) at 378.

. Id. Other offenses relating to judicial proceedings which are proscribed as felonies regardless of whether predicate criminal con*1147duct is a misdemeanor include: Bribing a witness, 11 Del. C. § 1261, Tampering with a witness, 11 Del. C. § 1263, and Bribing a juror, 11 Del. C. § 1264.

. See New York State Unified Court System, Tampering with Physical Evidence, http:// www.courts.state.ny.us/cji/2-PenalLaw/215/ 215-40(2).pdf (last visited 4/1/10). In Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351, 355 (Del.1996), we recognized that the Delaware Criminal Code is primarily based upon the New York Penal Code and the Model Penal Code.

. 2005 WL 646841 (Del. Mar. 16, 2005).

. 2007 WL 2696719 (Del. May 18, 2007).

. 2004 WL 744188 (Del. Apr. 5, 2004).

. 815 A.2d 730 (Del.2002).

. 977 A.2d 800, 802 (Del.2009).

. Id. at 801.

. Unlike this case, the Indictment in Hardy charged the defendant with Tampering with Physical Evidence by “an act of concealment alteration or destruction.” (emphasis added).

. See, e.g., State v. Mendez, 345 N.J.Super. 498, 785 A.2d 945, 954 (A.D.2001) (holding a bag of suspected cocaine outside the window of a moving car during a police chase, allowing the substance to dissipate into the air is akin to "swallowing or flushing drugs down a toilet” and supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence); Lewis v. State, 56 S.W.3d 617 (Tex.Ct.App.) (swallowing of contraband during a traffic stop supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence); State v. Logan, 973 S.W.2d 279 (Tenn.Crim.App.1998) (placing bags containing cocaine in a toilet supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence); Commonwealth v. Morales, 447 Pa.Super. 491, 669 A.2d 1003 (1996) (swallowing contraband after a policeman identified himself and ordered the defendant to "put your hand on *1148your head” supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence); Commonwealth v. Govens, 429 Pa.Super. 464, 632 A.2d 1316 (1993) (flushing cocaine down a toilet after police announced their presence supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence); Frayer v. People, 684 P.2d 927 (Colo.1984) (breaking a bottle of narcotic cough syrup during a struggle with police and in violation of the police order to “stop” supports a conviction for Tampering with Physical Evidence).

. In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del.1993).