Court Opinion

ID: 9862627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:35:40.4469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:05.313548
License: Public Domain

Judge WEFING
(temporarily assigned), dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I write separately because, although I agree with my colleague Justice Patterson that N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5b(l) recognizes that a trial judge, faced with crafting an appropriate sentence for a defendant who had previously been sentenced to an extended-term sentence for a completely separate conviction, possesses a residuum of judicial discretion to impose a second extended-term sentence *548upon that defendant, I also agree with my colleague Justice LaVecchia that under the factual complex presented to us, this defendant is entitled to be resentenced. I come to that conclusion, however, through a different route.
The only reason that this defendant was subjected to separate sentencing proceedings was that the initial trial judge granted his motion to sever certain counts of the indictment to avoid the risk of undue prejudice and was then, after conclusion of the first proceeding, fortuitously transferred to another division. If this matter had proceeded in the normal course, defendant would have been tried on all counts before the same trial judge before he was sentenced on any. The quantum of his aggregate sentence for all of his convictions would have been determined by one judge, who heard all of the proceedings. In that posture, he could not have received two extended-term sentences.
In my judgment, a defendant’s sentencing exposure should not be increased because of such a coalescence of events. Further, I cannot consider the potential for harm to be obviated because defendant’s second extended-term sentence was, legally, within the range of what could have been imposed if he had been sentenced at one final proceeding. The second sentencing court viewed the permissible range to span from five to ten years, rather than from three to five years. Defendant is entitled to be sentenced by a court that employs the correct range; it is of little solace to him that the same result could have been achieved by a different route.
For reversal in respect of defendant’s sentence on count lS/remandment—Chief Justice RABNER, and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ALBIN—4.
For dissent—Justices HOENS and PATTERSON—2.
For concurrence in part/dissent in part—Judge WEFING (temporarily assigned)—1.