Court Opinion

ID: 9588345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:33:15.148508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.373786
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). The -wisdom used by judges construing criminal statutes often changes from judge to judge and from court to court. This thought has been true throughout judicial history, and it will continue in the decades that lie ahead. Some judges desire to act in a legislative capacity. Some are strict traditionalists. Some are scholars. Some are humanists. Each may have a different sense of justice. If the public and the news media were familiar with this concept, it would lend dignity to the courts instead of criticism. Garcia was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, to-wit: heroin, under § 54 — 7-13, N.M.S.A. 1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2). This section did not mention the term “narcotic” drug. It was amended by the Laws of 1971, ch. 245, § 6 [§ 54-7-13, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2, Supp.)], to insert the word “narcotic” before the word “drug” in two places, and inserted the words “in possession of a narcotic drug” for “possession thereof.” The date of the offense committed by Garcia was July 15, 1970, when the previous section was in effect. Section 54-7-13, supra, prior to amendment, is set forth in the majority opinion. Section 54-7-1, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 8, pt. 2) reads as follows: It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his control, sell, prescribe, administer, dispense or compound any narcotic drug except as authorized or provided in this act. [Emphasis added.] Garcia was not charged under this statute. Why not? It is plain and unambiguous. The New Mexico Narcotic Drug Statute, as originally enacted in 1935, was adopted from the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act. Section 54-7-49, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. '8, pt, 2); Martinez v. Cox, 75 N.M. 417, 405 P.2d 659 (1965). However, the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act contained no provision comparable to § 54-7-13, supra. State v. Ortiz, 78 N.M. 507, 433 P.2d 92 (Ct.App.1967). Prior to the 1971 amendment, § 54-7-13, supra, was not applicable to Garcia, and did not state a narcotic drug offense. Stripped of the exceptions, the statute read: Whoever, ... is found in possession thereof, . . . shall be punished as hereinafter provided. As amended in 1971, stripped of exceptions, the statute now reads: Whoever, ... is found in possession of a narcotic drug shall be punished as hereinafter provided. The issue is: Does this court have the power to substitute the phrase “in possession of a narcotic drug,” for “in possession thereof,” to make possession of “narcotic” drug a crime under § 54-7-13? The answer is “no.” Vukovich v. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co., 40 N.M. 374, 60 P.2d 356 (1936); State v. Ortiz, supra; State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 189 P. 2d 993 (1948); De Graftenreid v. Strong, 28 N.M. 91, 206 P. 694 (1922); State v. Dennis, 80 N.M. 262, 454 P.2d 276 (Ct.App.1969). The legislature recognized this fact and amended the statute itself. The Supreme Court of the United States said that our problem is to construe what the legislature has written because it ex-presses its purpose in words. “It is for us to ascertain — neither to add nor subtract, neither to delete nor to distort.” ' 62 Cases More or Less, Each containing Six Jars of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 71 S. Ct. 515, 92 L.Ed 566 (U.S.N.M.1951). “This would be judicial legislation.” Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199 (1957). We cannot read language into a statute which is otherwise of plain meaning and import. Griffith v. Humble, 46 N.M. 113, 122 P.2d 134 (1942). Garci'a did not raise the issue in the trial court nor in this court. But where the statute does not state a narcotic drug crime, and Garcia cannot he found guilty, then this court, on its own motion, may determine the issue in the interest of justice or under the doctrine of jurisdiction and fundamental error. Mitchell v. Allison, 54 N.M. 56, 213 P.2d 231 (1949); State v. Williams, 50 N.M. 28, 168 P.2d 850 (1946); State v. Walsh, 81 N.M. 65, 463 P.2d 41 (Ct.App.1969); State v. McNeece, 82 N.M. 345, 481 P.2d 707 (Ct.App.1971). In State v. Ortiz, supra, the state requested this court to insert in § 54-7-13, supra, the words “duly licensed” before the word “manufacturer.” This court refused to do so. The legislature in 1968 amended the section and inserted “licensed pursuant to section 54-7-4 NMSA 1953.” Under the 1971 amendment, the legislature itself recognized the invalidity of § 54 — 7-13 and inserted the word “narcotic,” and “possession of a narcotic drug.” We are not required to go further because the adoption of a statutory amendment is evidence of an intention of the legislature to change the provision of the original law. Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 69, 463 P.2d 45 (Ct.App.1969), affirmed, 81 N.M. 348, 367 P.2d 14 (1969). The power to define crimes is a legislative function. State v. Allen, 77 N.M. 433, 423 P.2d 867 (1967). The majority opinion states that there is an ambiguity in § 54-7-13, supra, and construction is required. It quotes from State v. Ortiz, supra, but it omits the following language: If there be any ambiguity or doubt concerning the meaning of a criminal statute, it will be construed against the State which enacted it and in favor of the accused. State v. Couch, 52 N.M. 127, 193 P.2d 405 (1948). State v. Couch speaks in stronger language : Since the state makes the laws they should be construed most strongly against it and in favor of the prisoner if they are ambiguous. [Emphasis added.] The majority opinion has construed the statute most favorably to the state and against Garcia. From Couch to Ortiz to Garcia, the rule of statutory construction rode on a merry-go-round. This is a good illustration of how principles change, 1948-1971, from judge to judge and from court to court. I refrain from discussing the matter of search and seizure. To me, the motion of Garcia to suppress the heroin should have been sustained. Garcia was not guilty of the offense charged under § 54-7-13, supra, and should be discharged.