Court Opinion

ID: 9733402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:06:22.667737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.008153
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree with much of what is written in the majority opinion. I am, however, concerned about the conclusion that there are genuine issues of material fact present which preclude summary judgment and require a reversal and remand for trial.
I believe we must assume that the Legislature intended something more than ordinary negligence when it enacted Section 53-08-05, N.D.C.C., permitting actions for “willful or malicious” failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity as an exception to Section 53-08-02, N.D.C.C. Section 53-08-02 provides that an owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity on such premises to persons entering for such purposes.
I agree that negligence actions generally are not appropriate cases for summary judgment, but, as a result of legislative enactment, this is no ordinary negligence action. Furthermore, we have previously affirmed summary judgment in a negligence action when no genuine issue as to a material fact remained. See, e.g., Weiss v. Bellomy, 278 N.W.2d 119 (N.D.1979).
It appears to me that if we were to apply the usual definitions of “willful or malicious” to this matter, we would necessarily have to conclude that there is nothing in the record to reflect that Cass County Electric acted “willfully” or “maliciously,” as those terms are usually understood, to cause the death of Milton Stokka, and thus there is no issue of material fact. The standard for willful conduct apparently established in Van Ornum v. Otter Tail *917Power Company, 210 N.W.2d 188 (N.D.1973), quoted in the majority opinion, and reiterated in Hart v. Kern, 268 N.W.2d 136 (N.D.1978), is a more lenient standard than that applied in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Tranby v. Brodock, 348 N.W.2d 458, 461 (S.D.1984), in which the court stated: “Willful and wanton misconduct means something more than negligence. It describes conduct which transcends negligence and is different in kind and characteristics. It is conduct which partakes to some appreciable extent, though not entirely, of the nature of a deliberate and intentional wrong_ Willful and wanton misconduct demonstrates an affirmative, reckless state of mind or deliberate recklessness on the part of the defendant.”
The Legislature is presumed to know the less-stringent definition of “willful” adopted by this court in Van Ornum. See, e.g., Horst v. Guy, 219 N.W.2d 153 (N.D.1974). I must therefore reluctantly agree that under such definition there are, as noted in the majority opinion, issues of material fact which make summary judgment improper. Were it not for the less-stringent definition of “willful” adopted by this court in Van Ornum, I would vote to affirm the trial court.