Court Opinion

ID: 9385405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 17:02:44.577365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.363412
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
               CALIFORNIA

               MICHAEL G. et al.,
                   Petitioners,
                        v.
    THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,
                   Respondent;
  ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY et al.,
             Real Parties in Interest.

                          S271809

          Fourth Appellate District, Division Three
                         G060407

               Orange County Superior Court
                        19DP1381

                        April 6, 2023

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Groban,
Jenkins, and Evans concurred.
             MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                            S271809

              Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

      Under California’s child dependency law, when a child is
removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court ordinarily
must order reunification services to help the parent address the
conditions that led to the child’s removal.           Reasonable
reunification services must be offered to qualifying parents for
a minimum period of six or 12 months, depending on the age of
the child, and generally may be extended for up to a maximum
total period of 18 months. This statutory timeline is designed to
achieve a delicate balance between families’ interests in
reunifying and children’s interests in avoiding protracted
uncertainty about who will care for them.
        The question in this case is whether a juvenile court is
automatically required to grant a further extension of services
if it finds that reasonable services were not provided during the
12- to 18-month extension period. Under the governing
statutes, the answer is no. Once a child has been out of the
parent’s custody for 18 months, the law ordinarily requires the
court to proceed to set a hearing to determine a permanent plan
for the child’s care. A parent who has not received reasonable
services may seek an extension of services beyond 18 months,
but such extensions are not automatic: In addition to ensuring
other statutory conditions are met, the juvenile court must
consider the child’s interests in deciding whether the extension,
and consequent delay to the child’s permanent placement, is
warranted. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.22, subd. (b), 352.)

                               1
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

     We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which
reached the same conclusion.
                                  I.
      This case arises from dependency proceedings involving
the minor A.G. At the start of the proceedings, A.G. was 14
years old and living in the care of her father (Father).1 In a
dependency petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, the Orange County Social Services Agency (Agency)
alleged that Father suffered from unresolved mental health
issues that sometimes manifested in violent behavior. After
determining that Father’s delusions and paranoia put A.G. at
risk of serious harm, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction
over A.G. and ordered that she be removed from Father’s
custody. The court directed the Agency to provide Father with
reunification services and mandated a psychological evaluation.
      At the six-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father
had received his case plan several months earlier but had yet to
sign the plan or engage in the recommended services, which
included parenting classes and individual counseling. Father
also resisted completing a psychological evaluation. Father
attempted to keep in touch with A.G. via periodic phone calls,
but she was reluctant to communicate until he received mental
health services. Given this information, the juvenile court found
that Father had been offered reasonable services but had made
minimal progress in mitigating the circumstances that had led
to the juvenile court’s intervention. The court concluded that

1
      A.G.’s mother participated in the juvenile court
proceedings, but she is not involved in the proceedings in this
court. We therefore limit our description of the facts to those
involving Father.

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                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

returning A.G. to Father “would create [a] substantial risk of
detriment to [her] safety, protection, or physical or emotional
well-being” and continued the case. (See Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1).)
      At the 12-month hearing, the Agency reported that Father
had made moderate progress since the last hearing: He had
signed the case plan, begun individual counseling, and
completed parenting classes. He had also completed his
psychological evaluation. The Agency reported that Father was
eager to increase communication with A.G., and the parties
established a schedule for regular phone calls. While the Agency
believed returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a
substantial risk of detriment to her well-being, it recommended
continuing the case to the 18-month review because “there [wa]s
a substantial probability that the child w[ould] be returned to
the physical custody of her parent” by then. (See Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.21, subds. (f), (g)(1).) The court agreed to the
extension, finding that the Agency had provided reasonable
services to Father and that Father had now made moderate
progress in alleviating the causes leading to A.G.’s removal.
      At the 18-month hearing, however, the Agency reported
that returning A.G. to Father’s custody still presented a
substantial risk of detriment to her well-being. The Agency
noted that Father was not returning calls from his social worker
and had abruptly moved out of state without advance notice.
Father had also informed his psychological evaluator that he
would not consent to continued mental health services because
they interfered with his religious beliefs.        The Agency
recommended that the court end reunification efforts and
schedule a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 (section 366.26) so that A.G.

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                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

could be permanently placed with her older brother and adult
family friend, with whom she had been staying since she was
removed from Father’s custody.
      Father contested the Agency’s recommendation. He
argued that he had completed all aspects of his case plan,
including his psychological evaluation, but the social worker
assigned to his case had not obtained or reviewed his evaluation
report in a timely fashion, facilitated visitation with A.G., or
contacted him about further mental health services. Father
asked the court to find that the Agency had not offered or
provided reasonable reunification services during the most
recent extension period, exercise its discretion to continue the
case and to extend reunification services, and wait to set a
section 366.26 hearing where A.G.’s permanent placement
would be decided.
      The court found that while the Agency had provided
reasonable services for the first 12 months of reunification, it
had not provided reasonable services in the period between the
12- and 18-month hearings. The court was, in particular,
troubled by the Agency’s failure to timely consider the report of
Father’s psychological evaluation, once Father had finally
consented to participate, and to offer Father appropriate mental
health support. But while the court acknowledged that it could
exercise discretion to continue the case and order more services,
it declined to do so. Given Father’s inconsistent visitation with
A.G. and uneven progress over the past 18 months in addressing
the causes that led to A.G.’s removal, the court found that
additional services would neither be in A.G.’s best interests nor
reasonably likely to lead to reunification. The court ended
reunification services and scheduled a section 366.26 hearing.

                                  4
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

      Father filed a writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s
decision to terminate reunification services. He argued that he
was entitled to an extension, given the court’s determination
that the services provided in the 12- to 18-month extension
period were not reasonable. The Court of Appeal denied the
petition. (Michael G. v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
1133, 1138 (Michael G.).) The Court of Appeal concluded that
the juvenile court was not statutorily required to grant an
extension of services. On the contrary, Welfare and Institutions
Code section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), which governs the
conduct of the 18-month hearing, instructs that the juvenile
court must set a permanency planning hearing if the child is not
returned to the parent’s custody at the 18-month hearing,
regardless of whether reasonable services were provided in the
most recent review period. (Michael G., at p. 1143.) The Court
of Appeal further held that the juvenile court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a discretionary extension of services under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 352 (section 352), given
Father’s “lack of consistent and regular contact and visitation,”
“lack of significant and consistent progress in the prior 18
months in resolving the problems that led to [A.G.]’s removal,”
and a “lack of evidence that [he] had demonstrated the capacity
or the ability to complete the components of the case plan.”
(Michael G., at p. 1145.)
     As the Court of Appeal observed, some appellate courts
have expressed uncertainty about the proper course of action
when a court determines at the 18-month hearing that the
parent did not receive reasonable reunification services during
the 12- to 18-month extension period. (Michael G., supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 1143; see In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1,
21 [collecting cases]; T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21

                                  5
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Cal.App.5th 1229, 1251–1252 (T.J.); see also J.C. v. Superior
Court (June 28, 2017, G054816) [nonpub. opn.], review den. Aug.
23, 2017, S243357 (stmt. of Liu, J.).) We granted review to
address the issue.2
                                 II.
                                 A.
      The purpose of California’s dependency law is “to provide
maximum safety and protection for children who are currently
being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being
neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children
who are at risk of that harm.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.2, subd.
(a).) In its effort to achieve this overarching goal, the law
balances a number of vital interests: children’s interests in safe
and stable homes; parents’ interests in raising their children;
families’ shared interests in each other’s companionship; and
the state’s interest in protecting society’s most vulnerable

2
      After the Court of Appeal decided Michael G., supra, 69
Cal.App.5th 1133, the trial court held a permanency planning
hearing under section 366.26, at which it set a permanent plan
of legal guardianship for A.G. and ended dependency
proceedings. The trial court did not, however, terminate
parental rights, finding a “compelling reason for determining
that termination would be detrimental to the child” under
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(iv).
      According to the Agency, “[n]o appeal has been taken from
that October 2021 order, and it has thus become final,”
rendering this case “factually moot.” We nonetheless exercise
our “discretion to retain the case and decide it as one presenting
issues of public importance, capable of repetition, yet tending to
evade review.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 629, fn.
3.)

                                  6
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

members. (See, e.g., In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 625;
In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919; In re Marilyn H.
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.)
      Dependency proceedings span up to four stages:
jurisdiction, disposition, reunification, and permanency. (See In
re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 391; In re Ethan C. (2012)
54 Cal.4th 610, 624–626.) At the jurisdictional stage, the
juvenile court determines whether to declare a child a
dependent of the court because the child is suffering, or at risk
of suffering, significant harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) At
the dispositional stage, the court decides if the child can be
returned to, or must be removed from, a parent’s custody.3
(Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 315, 319.) During the reunification stage,
qualifying parents are offered services to address the causes
that led to the loss of custody. (Id., § 361.5, subd. (a).) Finally,
if the child cannot be safely returned to the parent within a
statutorily specified timeframe, the juvenile court proceeds to
the permanency stage, where it either terminates parental
rights and places the child up for adoption or it selects another
permanent plan, such as placement with a guardian or in long-
term foster care. (§ 366.26.) Throughout the proceedings, the
juvenile court is instructed to pay careful attention to the well-
being of the child, the efforts of the parent, and the services
provided by the state to ensure that cases proceed to this final
stage only when necessary. (See Cynthia D. v. Superior Court
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 253 (Cynthia D.).)

3
      Throughout this opinion, we use “parent” as a shorthand
for “parent or guardian.” (See In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622,
627, fn. 4.)

                                  7
                  MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                   Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

      This case concerns the reunification stage. When a child
has been removed from a parent’s custody, the court ordinarily
must order child welfare services designed to facilitate the
reunification of the family. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5,
subd. (a), 362, subds. (c), (d); see, e.g., Tonya M. v. Superior
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843 (Tonya M.).)4 Such services
may, depending on the case, include evaluations and
assessments, counseling, parent education, substance abuse
treatment and testing, and other forms of assistance.
“ ‘Reunification services,’ ” we have explained, “ ‘implement “the
law’s strong preference for maintaining the family relationships
if at all possible.” ’ ” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217,
1228.) This is because “services enable [parents] to demonstrate
parental fitness and so regain custody of their dependent
children.” (Ibid.)
      To balance the interest in family preservation with the
child’s interest in the prompt resolution of her custody status
and long-term placement, the dependency law establishes a
detailed timeline for reunification. For qualifying parents, the
minimum length of reunification services depends on the age of
the child at the time of removal. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5,
subd. (a)(1).) Parents of children under three are presumptively
eligible for at least six months of reunification services. (See id.,
subd. (a)(1)(B).)      Parents of children three or older are
presumptively eligible for at least 12 months of services. (See

4
      A narrow set of exceptions permit (and sometimes require)
bypassing reunification services for certain parents, depending
on the circumstances of the case. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5,
subd. (b); see, e.g., In re Christopher L. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1063,
1078.)

                                   8
                  MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                   Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

id., subd. (a)(1)(A).)5 Reunification services are ordinarily
provided for a maximum of 18 months after a child has been
removed from parental custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5,
subd. (a); see Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
       During the reunification stage, the juvenile court must
hold periodic review hearings to evaluate the status of
reunification efforts and appropriate next steps. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.21.) These review hearings ordinarily take place at
six-month intervals. At each review hearing, a court evaluates,
among other things, the adequacy of the reunification services
offered or provided and the extent of the parent’s progress. If,
at the six- or 12-month status review hearing, the court finds
that there is a substantial probability the child may be returned
to her parent within six months, or that reasonable services
were not provided to the parent, the court extends reunification
services for an additional six months rather than proceed to the
final stage of dependency proceedings, permanency planning.
(Id., §§ 361.5, 366.21, subds. (e)(3) [for children under three],
(g)(1), (2), (4) [for children ages three and over]; Tonya M., supra,
42 Cal.4th at pp. 843, 845–846 [describing the timeline for
reunification services and review hearings].) The court may
schedule the section 366.26 permanency planning hearing “only
if” it finds “there is clear and convincing evidence that
reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parents
or legal guardians.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(4).)
In other words, at the six- and 12-month status hearings, the

5
       Parents of a sibling group that includes at least one child
under three may be subject to a shorter presumptive timeline
under specified conditions. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5, subd.
(a)(1)(C).)

                                   9
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

court must find that the parent has been provided or offered
reasonable reunification services before the court can proceed to
set a hearing to decide whether to terminate parental rights and
select a permanent plan for the child.6
     The statutory provisions governing the 18-month review
hearing differ, however. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.22, subd. (a).)
At one time, the provision governing the 18-month review
hearing, like the provision governing the six- and 12-month
hearings, had expressly conditioned setting the permanency
planning hearing on a determination that reasonable services
had been offered or provided:
      “If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the
      18-month hearing and the court determines that
      reasonable services have been offered or provided to the
      parent or guardian, the court shall develop a permanent
      plan.” (Stats. 1988, ch. 1075, § 5, p. 3471.)
      But in 1991, the Legislature amended that language,
deleting the conjunctive “and,” and separating the directive to
develop a permanent plan from the requirement to determine
whether reasonable services have been offered or provided:

6
       Although the statute does not define “reasonable services,”
the Courts of Appeal have generally held that, to support a
finding that services were reasonable, “the record should show
that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to
the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those
problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents
during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable
efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved
difficult . . . .” (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414,
italics omitted.) The Agency here does not challenge the
juvenile court’s conclusion that it failed to provide reasonable
services, and we express no view on the subject.

                                 10
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

     “If the minor is not returned to a parent or guardian at the
     18-month hearing, the court shall develop a permanent
     plan. . . . The court shall determine whether reasonable
     services have been offered or provided to the parent or
     guardian.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 4, p. 3647.)
      At the same time, the Legislature amended a different
provision, section 366.26, which governs the conduct of the
permanency planning hearing, to prohibit the termination of
parental rights if, “at each and every hearing at which the court
was required to consider reasonable efforts or services, the court
has found that reasonable efforts were not made or that
reasonable services were not offered or provided.” (Stats. 1991,
ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842
[shortening “each and every hearing” in this provision to “each
hearing”; currently codified as § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A)].)
      Nearly two decades later, the Legislature again amended
Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22 (section 366.22) to
establish a narrow exception allowing certain parents who have
faced specified barriers to reunification, such as recent
incarceration, to receive an extension of services at the
18-month hearing if the court determines, among other things,
that reasonable services had not been provided and that
extending services is in the best interests of the child. (Stats.
2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3440–3441 [currently codified as § 366.22,
subd. (b)].)
                                 B.
      The juvenile court in this case concluded at both the six-
and 12-month hearings that Father had received reasonable
reunification services. The court extended services past the
applicable statutory minimum period of 12 months after finding

                                 11
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

a substantial probability that the child would be returned to
parental custody within the next six months. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).) But at the 18-month review
hearing, the court found that the reunification services provided
in the immediately preceding 12- to 18-month extension period
were not reasonable. Father now argues that the court was
therefore required to extend services — and delay permanency
planning — for another six months. We conclude that while the
dependency law does not categorically forbid courts from
extending services past 18 months, neither does it require them
to do so in every case in which they find reasonable services were
not offered in the most recent review period. Rather, once a
child has already been out of the parent’s custody for 18 months,
the law vests the juvenile court with responsibility for
determining how to proceed after considering the circumstances
of the case and the best interests of the child.
    The provision governing the 18-month review, as
amended, currently reads:

     “Unless the conditions in subdivision (b) are met and the
     child is not returned to a parent or legal guardian at the
     [18-month] hearing, the court shall order that a hearing
     be held pursuant to Section 366.26 in order to determine
     whether adoption, . . . tribal customary adoption,
     guardianship, or continued placement in foster care is the
     most appropriate plan for the child. . . . The hearing shall
     be held no later than 120 days from the date of the [18-
     month] hearing. The court shall also order termination of
     reunification services to the parent or legal guardian. . . .
     The court shall determine by clear and convincing
     evidence whether reasonable services have been offered or

                                 12
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

      provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.22, subd.
      (a)(3).)
      As both sides acknowledge, this provision imposes no
express requirement that reunification services be extended
beyond 18 months if the services offered or provided in the 12-
to 18-month period were not reasonable. On the contrary, to
promote the prompt resolution of the child’s custody status and
her permanent and stable placement, the law sets a
presumptive 18-month limit on reunification services. As we
have elsewhere explained, the time limit reflects a considered
legislative choice: “[I]n order to prevent children from spending
their lives in the uncertainty of foster care, there must be a
limitation on the length of time a child has to wait for a parent
to become adequate.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 308.) If the child has already been out of the parent’s custody
for 18 months and still cannot be safely returned, the statute
instructs that the court ordinarily must proceed to schedule a
permanency planning hearing under section 366.26, at which
the court decides whether to terminate parental rights and place
the child for adoption or else select another permanent plan.
(§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15 [“ ‘Shall’ is
mandatory and ‘may’ is permissive”].)
      Section 366.22 does set out an exception to this general
rule. As added by the 2008 amendments and since modified by
subsequent amendments, section 366.22, subdivision (b)
authorizes a further extension after 18 months for three
narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced specified
obstacles to reunification: (1) a parent making progress “in a
court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program”;
(2) “a parent who was either a minor parent or a nonminor
dependent parent at the time of the initial hearing”; and (3) “a

                                 13
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

parent       recently     discharged      from      incarceration,
institutionalization, or the custody of the United States
Department of Homeland Security.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b), added
by Stats. 2008, ch. 482, § 3, pp. 3440–3441 and amended by
Stats. 2010, ch. 559, § 18 [adding requirement that substance
abuse treatment programs be “court-ordered” and “residential”];
Stats. 2012, ch. 845, § 12 [adding exception for United States
Department of Homeland Security custody]; Stats. 2015,
ch. 284, § 2 [adding exception for minor or dependent parents];
Stats. 2015, ch. 425, § 11.5 [same].) But even for parents falling
within this narrow exception, an extension is not automatic.
The parent must be making “significant and consistent
progress” either in the substance abuse treatment program, if
applicable, or in establishing a safe home for the child.
(§ 366.22, subd. (b).) Further, the court must decide (1) that
extending services would be in the “best interests of the child,”
and (2) either that there is a “substantial probability” that the
child will be returned to the parent’s custody and safely
maintained in the home during the extension period, or that
“reasonable services have not been provided to the parent.”
(Ibid.) If these conditions are not met, then the usual timeline
set forth in section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3) governs.
      The plain text thus answers the question before us.
Unlike the statutory provisions governing the six- and 12-month
hearings, the statutory provision governing the 18-month
hearing contains no provision requiring the court to extend
services if it concludes that reasonable services have not been
offered or provided. (Compare § 366.22 [governing the 18-month
hearing] with Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subds. (e)(3), (g)
[governing the six- and 12-month hearings].) Rather, as a
general rule, once a child has been out of a parent’s custody for

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                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18 months, the court must proceed to set a hearing to select a
permanent plan for the child. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) The
statute does create an exception for the narrow subset of parents
defined in section 366.22, subdivision (b). (Earl L. v. Superior
Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504 (Earl L.); San Joaquin
Human Services Agency v. Superior Court (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 215, 224; In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 564–
565; N.M. v. Superior Court (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 796, 805–807
(N.M.); In re D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 761, fn. 18;
Michael G., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1142.) But even for that
narrow subset of parents, subdivision (b) instructs that the court
is not required to grant an automatic extension based on the
inadequacy of reunification services; the court must also
consider whether the further extension is in the best interests
of the child.
      The legislative history reinforces this straightforward
reading of the text. As already explained above, in 1991, the
Legislature amended the dependency law to separate the
juvenile court’s obligation to determine the reasonableness of
services from its decision to set a permanency planning hearing.
The history indicates this was a deliberate choice. As the
Legislative Counsel’s Digest explained of the proposed
amendment: “This bill would require a court to determine
whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to the
parent or guardian but would delete that requirement as a
precondition for developing a permanent plan.”            (Legis.
Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 475, 4 Stats. 1991 (1991–1992 Reg.
Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 352.)
      Notably, at the same time, the Legislature amended
section 366.26 to prohibit the termination of parental rights at
the permanency planning hearing if, “at each and every hearing

                                 15
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

at which the court was required to consider reasonable efforts or
services, the court has found that . . . reasonable services were
not offered or provided.” (Stats. 1991, ch. 820, § 5, p. 3649; see
Stats. 2005, ch. 634, § 2, p. 4842 [shortening “each and every
hearing” in this provision to “each hearing”; currently codified
as § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A)].) Courts have interpreted this
provision to “preclude[] termination of parental rights
when . . . the department has failed to offer or provide
reasonable reunification services to a parent throughout the
reunification period.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60
Cal.App.4th 996, 1016 (Mark N.), italics added; accord, In re
T.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1172.)              This latter
amendment reinforces the conclusions to be drawn from the
first: The Legislature presumably would not have thought it
necessary to create this safeguard for the conduct of section
366.26 permanency planning hearings if a court were always
required to find reasonable services had been offered or
provided — including in the extension period preceding the
18-month review — before the permanency planning hearing
could even be set.
      In sum, we can safely conclude that the statute means
what it says. Though a court at the 18-month review hearing
must determine whether reasonable services have been offered
or provided to the parent, an affirmative answer is not a
statutory prerequisite to setting the permanency planning
hearing. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3); see Mark N., supra, 60

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                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

Cal.App.4th at p. 1016, fn. 9; N.M., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
p. 807.)7
      Father acknowledges the text of section 366.22,
subdivision (a)(3) is clear. But he argues that it is in tension
with a separate provision also governing the conduct of the
18-month review hearing, Welfare and Institutions Code section
361.5 (section 361.5), subdivision (a)(4)(A). He focuses on the
following language:

7
       Though the legislative history does not explain why the
Legislature continued to require juvenile courts to determine
the reasonableness of services, the parties and amici curiae
suggest the answer lies primarily in federal law. Under the
federal statute that prompted the creation of the modern
California dependency system, an agency can lose federal
funding if it fails to make reasonable efforts to reunify the
family. (See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(15)(B), 672(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)(ii);
45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(b) (2023); see also Cynthia D., supra, 5
Cal.4th at pp. 246–247 [discussing federal origins of state
scheme]; In re D.C.D. (2014) 629 Pa. 325, 347–348 [105 A.3d 662,
675–676] [discussing federal funding scheme].)
       Additionally, a court’s determination regarding the
provision of reasonable services at the 18-month review directly
affects its authority under other parts of the California
dependency scheme. As explained above, under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(2)(A), a court at the permanency planning
hearing may not terminate parental rights and place the child
for adoption if it finds that reasonable services were never
provided throughout the reunification period. (Mark N., supra,
60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) And as we will explain at greater
length in part II.C., post, whether reasonable services were
offered or provided in the period preceding the 18-month review
is relevant to the court’s exercise of its discretionary authority
to continue “any hearing” under section 352, notwithstanding
otherwise applicable statutory time limits.

                                 17
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

     “The court shall extend the time period [up to 24
     months after the loss of custody] only if it finds that
     it is in the child’s best interest to have the time
     period extended and that there is a substantial
     probability that the child will be returned to the
     physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian
     who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22
     within the extended time period, or that reasonable
     services have not been provided to the parent or
     guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A), italics added.)
      Focusing on that same language, some Courts of Appeal
have concluded that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A)
authorizes the extension of services at the 18-month hearing in
any case in which reasonable services have not been provided.
(In re M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 23; T.J., supra, 21
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1255–1256.)       Father, drawing on this
reasoning, contends that section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A)’s
instructions about extensions conflict with the instructions in
section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3). He argues that the conflict
should be resolved in favor of the more lenient approach.
      Father’s argument is based on a misreading of section
361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A). That provision does not, in fact,
generally authorize an extension of reunification services after
18 months whenever a court determines that reasonable
services have not been provided. A fuller rendition of the
provision provides important context for the language on which
Father relies:

     “Notwithstanding     paragraph    (3)   [governing
     extensions after 12 months], court-ordered services
     may be extended up to a maximum time period not

                                18
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

     to exceed 24 months after the date the child was
     originally removed from physical custody of the
     child’s parent or guardian if it is shown, at the
     hearing held pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section
     366.22, that the permanent plan for the child is that
     the child will be returned and safely maintained in
     the home within the extended time period. The
     court shall extend the time period only if it finds that
     it is in the child’s best interest to have the time
     period extended and that there is a substantial
     probability that the child will be returned to the
     physical custody of the child’s parent or guardian
     who is described in subdivision (b) of Section 366.22
     within the extended time period, or that reasonable
     services have not been provided to the parent or
     guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(4)(A), italics added.)
      As the italicized text makes clear, section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(4)(A) applies only “at the hearing held pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 366.22” — which, as we have
already explained, takes place only if the parent fits into one of
three narrowly defined categories of parents who have faced
specified obstacles to reunification, such as recent incarceration
or institutionalization.8 There is, therefore, no conflict between

8
      Although In re M.F. misinterpreted section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(4)(A) to apply more broadly than it does, the
issue before that court concerned the denial of reasonable
services before the 12-month review hearing, not the 18-month
review. (In re M.F., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 20.) T.J., supra,
21 Cal.App.5th 1229, on which In re M.F. had relied for its
interpretation of section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A), likewise

                                 19
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

section 361.5, subdivision (a)(4)(A) and section 366.22,
subdivision (a)(3). On the contrary, the two provisions reflect
the same rule: They both authorize extensions for parents in
one of three narrow categories, and they both identify the same
considerations to determine whether a six-month extension is
warranted, including whether the extension is in the best
interests of the child. For Father and other parents who do not
fall within one of those three categories, section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(4)(A) does not apply.
                                 C.
       Although the governing provisions do not offer automatic
relief to parents who have not received reasonable services in
the period immediately preceding the 18-month review, neither
do they leave parents without any possible remedy. We have
already discussed the statutory remedy for the three narrow

involved a different issue. There, the parent was never offered
or provided reasonable reunification services at any point
during the first 18 months after the child was first removed from
parental custody. (T.J., at pp. 1249–1251, 1256–1257; accord,
In re M.S. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 568, 595 [citing section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(4)(A) and T.J., supra, in a case involving the
remedy available to parents who had never received
reunification services].)
      Each case deals with an issue different from the one we
confront here, and largely for reasons explained at greater
length below (see pt. II.C., post [discussing the court’s extension
authority under § 352]), their mistaken reading of section 361.5,
subdivision (a)(4)(A) does not call into question their ultimate
holdings. We therefore disapprove In re M.F., supra, 32
Cal.App.5th 1, T.J. v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th
1229 and In re M.S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th 568 only to the
extent that their reasoning reflects a different understanding of
that statutory provision than that set forth in this opinion.

                                 20
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

categories of parents identified in section 366.22, subdivision
(b). But in addition to the remedy made available under that
provision, California courts have also long recognized an
“ ‘emergency escape valve’ ” under section 352, a general
provision governing continuances in dependency cases. (In re
D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762; see § 352.) As the Courts
of Appeal have held, this section 352 escape valve is available to
all parents in exceptional situations in which the court
determines that extending services and continuing reunification
efforts beyond 18 months is not contrary to the child’s interests.
       Section 352 provides that courts may “continue any
hearing” under the dependency law “beyond the time limit
within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held”
(§ 352, subd. (a)(1)), provided there is “good cause” (id., subd.
(a)(2)) and a continuance would not be “contrary to the interest
of the minor” (id., subd. (a)(1)). In evaluating the minor’s
interest, the court “shall give substantial weight to a minor’s
need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need
to provide children with stable environments, and the damage
to a minor of prolonged temporary placements.” (Ibid.)
       By its terms, the statutory discretion to continue “any
hearing” under section 352 extends to the section 366.26
permanency planning hearing. (§ 352, subd. (a)(1); e.g., In re
Michael R. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 687, 694 [“section 352 [was
enacted] so a party could continue the section 366.26 hearing”];
Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016 [“section
352 . . . authorizes a continuance of any hearing upon a showing
of good cause”]; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1779
[“[section 352] indicates . . . that the court has discretion upon a
showing of good cause to continue juvenile dependency hearings
beyond the statutory time limits”].) In the past, California

                                 21
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

courts have found good cause in a number of cases where
“ ‘extraordinary circumstances’ ” justified an extension and
doing so was consistent with the child’s best interests. (In re
D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762.)          “Extraordinary
circumstances exist when ‘inadequate services’ are offered by
the child welfare agency or ‘an external force over which [the
parent has] no control’ prevented the parent from completing a
case plan.” (Ibid.) Examples include cases where a parent never
receives reunification services or a reunification plan over the
18-month reunification period (see Mark N., at p. 1017; In re
Dino E., at p. 1778); the parent was hospitalized for most of the
reunification period but demonstrated an “impeccable record of
visitation and efforts to comply with the reunification plan” (In
re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1777–1778; see id.
at pp. 1798–1799); or the parent sought a continuance to
complete a program required by the reunification plan that was
otherwise impossible to finish in time (In re Michael R., at
p. 695).9
     The harder question is whether the authority to continue
a permanency planning hearing also includes the authority to

9
      A court’s use of its discretionary authority under section
352 may be particularly appropriate in cases where a parent has
never received reasonable services during the reunification
stage. Under section 366.22, subdivision (a)(3), a juvenile court
may proceed to a section 366.26 hearing even if reasonable
services were never provided, but under section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(2)(A), this deficiency would prevent the court
from terminating parental rights and placing the child for
adoption. In such cases, California courts have recognized the
availability of relief under section 352 to extend the review
period and order an additional six months of reunification
services. (See, e.g., Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.)

                                 22
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

extend reunification services in the meantime, notwithstanding
the usually applicable 18-month time limit on services. (See
§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3)(A) [“court-ordered services may be extended
up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the
date the child was originally removed from physical custody of
the child’s parent or guardian”].) For decades, every Court of
Appeal to address this issue has assumed that the answer is yes.
(See, e.g., Denny H. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1501, 1510–1511; Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1016–
1017; In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1778–1780; In
re Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1798–1799; In re
J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 564.)10 We now confirm that the
assumption is correct. The power to continue the permanency
planning hearing implies a power to continue reunification
efforts. Section 352 makes clear that, despite the law’s precise
timeline for dependency proceedings, the “ ‘ “Legislature never
intended a strict enforcement” ’ of these statutory limits to
‘ “override all other concerns[,] including preservation of the

10
      Some Court of Appeal opinions contain language stating
that services can be extended beyond 18 months only if the
conditions in section 366.22, subdivision (b) are met. (E.g., San
Joaquin Human Services Agency v. Superior Court, supra, 227
Cal.App.4th at pp. 222–223; N.M., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 805–806.) But these courts did not address whether a trial
court has the discretion under section 352 to extend the timeline
notwithstanding the statutory deadlines. (See In re J.E., supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 566 [“The appellate court [in San Joaquin]
did not consider, however, whether the trial court had discretion
under section 352 to continue the 18-month review hearing and
extend reunification services up to 24 months upon a showing of
good cause”].) The parties cite no case, and we are aware of
none, in which a court has held that a juvenile court lacks such
discretion.

                                 23
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

family when appropriate.” ’ ” (In re D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th
at p. 762, quoting In re M.S., supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at pp. 594–
595.) Nor did it intend to strip the trial court of any flexibility
to adjust the default timelines when doing so may be required
to remedy a critical defect in the process or address other
unanticipated obstacles to family reunification. (In re D.N., at
p. 762; see also In re M.S., at p. 595 [explaining that this
conclusion also finds support in principles of due process, which
safeguard parents’ rights “in the care, companionship, and
custody” of their children].)
      This flexibility applies to the timeline for reunification
services just as it applies to the timeline for selecting a
permanent plan. Under the statutory scheme, the two are
inextricably intertwined: The very purpose of the reunification
stage is to facilitate services that promote the preservation of
the family before the court must finally determine whether the
family can, in fact, be preserved. Considering the terms and
intended operation of the dependency system, we consider it
unlikely that the Legislature would have given courts the
discretion to delay the selection of a permanent plan where, for
example, reasonable services have not been provided, without
also giving courts the corresponding discretion to order
additional reunification services in the meantime. The Agency
here agrees that courts have such authority. The Courts of
Appeal are uniformly in accord. And although the Legislature
has amended the dependency statutes many times since courts
first recognized the availability of this “ ‘emergency escape
valve’ ” under section 352 (In re D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at
p. 762), the Legislature has never acted to curtail courts’
authority to grant discretionary extensions in exceptional
situations. We therefore confirm that while an extension of

                                 24
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

services is not required under the statute, the juvenile court
does have the discretion under section 352 to continue a section
366.26 permanency planning hearing — and in the meantime,
to extend reunification services past the 18-month mark — in
extraordinary cases. Before granting the extension, however,
the court must determine that the extension, and the resulting
delay to the child’s permanent placement, is not contrary to the
child’s interests.11
      In sum, a parent who is denied reasonable services
between the 12- and 18-month hearings is not statutorily
entitled to an automatic extension of services at the 18-month
review. This means the juvenile court may set the section
366.26 permanency planning hearing — and terminate services
and perhaps also parental rights — even if it determines that
the parent did not receive reasonable reunification services in
the immediately preceding 12- to 18-month review period.
Parents falling into one of the statutory categories set out in
section 366.22, subdivision (b) may seek an extension under that
section; before granting the extension, the court must be
satisfied that the pertinent statutory conditions are met,
including the condition that a further extension be in the best
interests of the child. Parents who do not fall under section
366.22, subdivision (b) may seek a discretionary continuance of
the section 366.26 hearing and an extension of reunification
services under section 352. In determining whether to grant

11
      We disapprove In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th
1205, 1212–1214 to the extent that it relied on section 366.22,
subdivision (a) for a court’s discretionary authority to order an
extension of services at the 18-month review hearing. That
provision, by its terms, contains no generally applicable
authority for seeking such extensions.

                                 25
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

relief, the juvenile court must consider whether there are
exceptional circumstances constituting good cause for the
continuance and whether the continuance would be contrary to
the child’s interests.
                                 D.
      Father argues that constitutional concerns should prompt
us to read the statutory scheme differently. He contends that
when a court has already determined that reunification services
should be extended until the 18-month review because there is
a substantial probability of reunification — as it did in his
case — the failure to provide reasonable reunification services
necessarily undermines the accuracy and fairness of any
subsequent decision to abandon reunification and proceed to a
section 366.26 hearing. According to Father, parents also have
a constitutional right to their child’s “ ‘companionship, care,
custody, and management,’ ” and a court must be satisfied that
reasonable services were provided before continuing to a
hearing where those rights may be terminated. Due process
therefore requires reading into the statutory scheme a provision
requiring an extension of services when a court finds at the
18-month review that reasonable services were not provided
during the immediately preceding review period.
       Father’s constitutional avoidance argument is unavailing.
Although we ordinarily construe statutes to avoid serious
constitutional problems, we do so only when such a reading is
fairly possible. (E.g., People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354,
1373 [“the canon [of constitutional avoidance] ‘is qualified by the
proposition that “avoidance of a difficulty will not be pressed to
the point of disingenuous evasion” ’ ”].) Here, Father offers no
plausible interpretation of the statutory text that would

                                 26
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                 Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

authorize us to craft the sort of automatic extension provision
he seeks. We cannot, as Father asks, rewrite the statute
“merely to eliminate a potential constitutional conflict.”
(Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826.)
      More fundamentally, however, Father fails to establish
that the statute as written raises significant constitutional
concerns. In enacting the dependency statutes, the Legislature
sought to achieve a careful balance between family reunification
on the one hand and permanency for the child on the other. (See
In re Matthew C., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 400; In re Marilyn H.,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 308.) Under this scheme, the balance tips
towards permanency as the time since removal increases. (See
Tonya M., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 845 [“The effect of these
shifting standards is to make services during [the 6-, 12-, and
18-month periods] first presumed, then possible, then
disfavored”]; accord, Cynthia D., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 256
[describing shifting goals of the dependency scheme at different
stages of the proceedings].) Consistent with that general
approach, the Legislature has chosen to mandate an extension
of the reunification period if reasonable services have not been
provided during earlier periods, but decided not to include a
comparable mandatory extension provision after the child has
been out of her parent’s custody for a prolonged period of time.
Instead, by establishing a presumptive maximum reunification
period of 18 months and giving courts the discretion to extend
services beyond that point in extraordinary circumstances, the
statutory scheme allows courts to make case-specific
determinations about how best to promote the interests of the
child while protecting against the erroneous deprivation of
parental rights.

                                27
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

      At least when reasonable services have already been
provided for at least 12 months, as they were here, the failure to
provide reasonable services during the 12- to 18-month
extension period does not necessarily or unavoidably undermine
the accuracy or fairness of the trial court’s eventual decisions
regarding a permanent plan. Here, the juvenile court found
services deficient because of the social worker’s unexplained
delay in reviewing Father’s psychological evaluation;
nevertheless, it concluded that extending services for another
six months would be fruitless, as Father had not maintained
consistent and regular contact with A.G., had not made
significant progress in resolving the issues that led to the loss of
custody, and had not demonstrated the capacity to complete the
components of his case plan.12           (Michael G., supra, 69
Cal.App.5th at p. 1140, fn. 2; cf. In re J.E., supra, 3 Cal.App.5th
at p. 567 [noting instance where the deficiencies in services
related to the “ ‘core issue’ ” preventing reunification].) Where
the available evidence reliably demonstrates that further
reunification services would be unlikely to succeed, due process
does not require that a court delay permanency for the child.
(See Earl L., supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505 [“It defies
common sense to continue reunification efforts for a parent who
has made minimal efforts throughout a case”].) Where, by
contrast, deprivation of reasonable services does impede the
juvenile court’s ability to properly evaluate the prospects for
family reunification, the trial court has an emergency escape
valve: the discretionary authority under section 352 to continue

12
      Father does not challenge any of these findings on appeal,
nor does he argue that the trial court abused its discretion in
concluding that a further extension would not be in A.G.’s best
interests.

                                 28
                 MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

a permanency planning hearing and extend reunification
services in exceptional circumstances.
       Father emphasizes that the possibility of a discretionary
extension of services under section 352 is not equivalent to a
mandatory, automatic extension. Under section 352, a party
must affirmatively request a continuance and demonstrate
“good cause,” and the trial court must give “substantial weight”
to the interests of the minor.         (§ 352, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)
Additionally, whether to grant a continuance is a decision
reviewed for abuse of discretion, a deferential standard. (See
Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1047.) But
although Father argues otherwise, we are unpersuaded that
these are an unreasonable set of conditions to place on the grant
of further extensions when a child has already spent 18 months
out of her parent’s custody. As this court has previously
explained, “[s]ignificant safeguards have been built into the
current dependency scheme.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th
at p. 307; see id. at pp. 307–308.) As particularly relevant here,
a parent has the right to the assistance of competent counsel in
requesting and making the case for an extension of time. (Welf.
& Inst. Code, §§ 317, 317.5.) The failure to provide reasonable
services can constitute good cause (see, e.g., In re D.N., supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 762), and indeed, neither the juvenile court
nor the Court of Appeal suggested that Father could not
demonstrate good cause here based on the Agency’s failure to
provide reasonable services between the 12- and 18-month
hearings (see Michael G., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1145). The
juvenile court cannot terminate parental rights if a parent never
receives reasonable services. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(2)(A);
Mark N., supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1016.) And should the
juvenile court ultimately decide to terminate parental rights,

                                 29
                MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
                  Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

the parent also has the right to appeal the order — again, with
the assistance of counsel — if the parent believes the defects in
the reunification process undermined the accuracy or fairness of
the court’s determination. (§ 366.26, subd. (i)(1).) In sum, even
though the statutory scheme may not offer automatic extensions
beyond the 18-month mark, the statutory scheme provides
adequate safeguards against the risk of the erroneous
deprivation of parental rights.
      To be clear: Nothing in our holding should be read to
condone the Agency’s failure in this case. The Agency should
have provided Father reasonable services at every period in the
reunification stage. The possibility of family reunification
depends on the joint efforts of social services agencies and
parents. By not providing reasonable services between the
12- and 18-month hearings, the Agency failed to uphold its end
of the bargain.
      But as the Legislature rightly recognized, any possible
remedy for the deficiencies in the Agency’s services would affect
more than just the parent’s interest; it would also affect the
child’s interest in a timely, safe, and stable placement. The
Legislature struck a balance between these vital interests by
setting a presumptive 18-month limit on reunification efforts,
subject to extension in certain exceptional cases only if, among
other statutory requirements, a court determines that the
extension, and resulting delay, is not contrary to the child’s
interests. While that scheme is not the only conceivable way to
balance the interests at stake, it is a constitutionally
permissible one.

                                 30
              MICHAEL G. v. SUPERIOR COURT
               Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

                             III.
    The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.

                                                    KRUGER, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.

                              31
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who
argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Michael G. v. Superior Court
__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted (published) XX 69 Cal.App.5th 1133
Review Granted (unpublished)
Rehearing Granted
__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S271809
Date Filed: April 6, 2023
__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior
County: Orange
Judge: Antony C. Ufland
__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Martin Schwarz, Public Defender, Seth Bank, Assistant Public
Defender, and Brian Okamoto, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioner.

Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Dominika Campbell and Dennis
Smeal for California Dependency Trial Counsel as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen, Aurelio Torre,
Deborah B. Morse and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Real
Party in Interest Orange County Social Services Agency.

Jennifer B. Henning; and Samantha Stonework-Hand, Deputy County
Counsel (Alameda), for California State Association of Counties as
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest Orange County
Social Services Agency.
Law Office of Harold LaFlamme and Hannah Gardner for Real Party
in Interest A.G.

Kristin Hallak and Leslie Starr Heimov for Children’s Law Center of
California, Children’s Legal Services of San Diego and Dependency
Legal Services as Amici Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for
publication with opinion):

Brian Okamoto
Deputy Public Defender
341 City Drive South, Suite 307
Orange, CA 92868
(657) 251-6718

Aurelio Torre
Deputy County Counsel
400 West Civic Center Drive West, Suite 202
Santa Ana, CA 92701
(714) 352-1351

Samantha Stonework-Hand
Deputy County Counsel
1221 Oak Street, Suite 450
Oakland, CA 94612
(510) 272-6718