Court Opinion

ID: 9881144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 19:04:14.780904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.621480
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 P. v. Araujo CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084058
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                           (Kern Super. Ct. No. BF181629A)
                    v.

 MARTIN PARRA ARAUJO,                                                                     OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,
Judge.
         Kevin Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Louis M. Vasquez, and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Defendant Martin Parra Araujo was convicted by a jury of one count of attempted
murder and one count of infliction of corporal injury on a fellow parent. The jury also
found true the enhancements that defendant had personally used a deadly weapon and
had personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI) in circumstances involving domestic
violence. The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of seven years to life plus six
years. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the court’s sentences on the infliction of
corporal injury offense and on the GBI enhancements violate Senate Bill No. 567’s
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (“Senate Bill 567”) recent changes to Penal Code sections 1170
and 1170.1;1 and (2) the court erred by not exercising its informed discretion under
Senate Bill No. 81’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (“Senate Bill 81”) recent changes to
section 1385 with respect to the GBI and weapon enhancements; (3) the sentences were
unauthorized for failure to comply with sections 1170, 1170.1, and 1385, which excuses
any possible forfeiture; and (4) if forfeiture is found, defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to properly object under sections 1170, 1170.1, and 1385. We affirm.
                           PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On December 7, 2020, the Kern County District Attorney filed an information
charging defendant with: attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 1); inflicting
corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon the mother of the offender’s
children (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2); and child endangerment (§ 273a, subd. (a);
count 3). For count 1, the information alleged that defendant acted willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation (§ 189). For all counts, the information alleged enhancements for
personally inflicting GBI in circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7,
subd. (e)) and personally using a deadly or dangerous weapon, to wit a knife (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)).

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

                                             2.
       On January 27, 2022, a jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 2. With
respect to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that defendant acted with
deliberation and premeditation. For counts 1 and 2, the jury found true the enhancements
that defendant personally inflicted GBI in circumstances involving domestic violence and
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon. The jury was unable to reach a verdict
with respect to count 3, and the trial court declared a mistrial.
       On March 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant on count 1 to a total term
of seven years to life, plus a determinate term of six years (one-year for the personal use
of a deadly or dangerous weapon enhancement and the five-year upper term for the GBI
enhancement). The court sentenced defendant to a total of 10 years on count 2 (the four-
year upper term for infliction of corporal injury, the one-year personal use of deadly or
dangerous weapon enhancement, and the five-year upper term for the GBI enhancement).
The sentence on count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654. Count 3 was dismissed on
motion by the People.
       On March 16, 2022, defendant filed his notice of appeal.
                               FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       Defendant and A.S. lived together, had been dating for over 20 years, and had four
children together. Defendant and A.S. were having difficulties in their relationship.
Defendant could not work due to medical conditions, and A.S. worked as an agricultural
laborer. Defendant would get jealous that male coworkers would give A.S. a ride to the
fields. On one occasion, in May 2020, defendant threatened A.S. with a knife not to
accept a ride to work. After this incident, defendant agreed to leave the house, but he
never moved out.
       On the night of June 28, 2020, defendant, A.S., their adult daughter M.S., and their
minor daughter J.S. were at home. A.S. and defendant had not talked the entire day, and
the prior day defendant had asked A.S. to forgive him for the May 2020 incident.
Defendant was lying on the sofa in the living room; A.S. was watching mass on her cell

                                              3.
phone in the living room in front of the sofa; M.S. was in the kitchen; and J.S. was in the
shower. Defendant asked M.S. to get his glucose meter for him. After M.S. left to get
the device, defendant got up, grabbed A.S. by the hair, pulled her backwards, and put a
knife to her throat. A.S. yelled, “[N]o!” Defendant released A.S., but then grabbed her
right hand and began cutting one of A.S.’s fingers. A.S. ran into the bathroom where J.S.
was taking a shower, and defendant chased after her. Defendant went into the bathroom
and began stabbing A.S. M.S. called 911. Defendant stabbed A.S. seven times,
including on her legs, abdomen, and heart. Defendant was calm while he was stabbing
A.S. A.S. was asking defendant why he was doing this, and defendant replied because of
all the times that A.S. had “betrayed” him. J.S. got out of the shower and was trying to
pull defendant away from A.S. J.S. got a cut on her arm while pushing defendant.2 M.S.
pulled J.S. away and put her in a bedroom and then pulled defendant away from A.S.
M.S. closed the bathroom door. M.S. and defendant were outside the bathroom, and
defendant unsuccessfully attempted to reenter the bathroom. Defendant eventually
started walking towards the living room. Defendant said, apparently to A.S. through the
closed door, “I told you this was going to happen. This is all your fault.” Defendant then
cut himself in the throat and collapsed. The police and paramedics arrived shortly
thereafter. A.S. was taken to the hospital, underwent surgeries for her wounds, and was
eventually discharged on July 5, 2020.
                                      SENTENCING
       On February 28, 2022, the People filed a sentencing brief in which it discussed
Senate Bill 567, but not Senate Bill 81. The People’s brief argued that the jury
necessarily found aggravated circumstances based on the nature of the conviction.
Specifically, the People argued that the aggravating circumstances found in the Rules of
Court, rules 4.421(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(8) applied.

       2 The cut on J.S.’s arm was “small.” J.S. cleaned the cut and did not seek medical
attention.

                                              4.
       On March 14, 2022, the trial court sentenced defendant. At sentencing, defense
counsel submitted the matter without comment, which we take as defense counsel
accepting and supporting the recommendations of the probation report. The probation
report had recommended the lower term sentences for the GBI enhancements and the
corporal injury offense. A.S., M.S., and a third daughter (Y.S.) of defendant and A.S.
then gave statements. After noting that it had considered the People’s sentencing brief
and stating that it had “thought long and hard about the appropriate sentence …
considering the new sentencing guidelines,” the court explained its sentencing rationale
as follows:

               “The appropriate sentence in this case is one that considers the
       totality of the circumstances involved throughout the course of this
       conduct, and in circumstances in mitigation, the Court agrees with the
       probation department that the defendant has no prior record of criminal
       conduct, which is a mitigating circumstance that must be considered
       heavily.

               In considering the circumstances in aggravation, the Court is going
       to find, even though Probation did not indicate any, that the crime in this
       case, specifically related to Count 1, did involve great violence, with a high
       degree of cruelty.

               For those reasons, the Court has considered what is necessary for a
       conviction involving attempted murder and recognizes that the conduct
       attributable to the defendant went well above and beyond what would
       otherwise be established for purposes of a conviction, and on that basis and
       on balance, considering all of the defendant’s conduct relating to Count 1
       and Count 2, the Court is going to find that the upper term is appropriate
       where applicable in considering determinate sentencing schemes.”
       After asking defense counsel if there was anything further, defense counsel did not
object to the sentence imposed but did state that he had spoken to defendant about
appealing.

                                             5.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Senate Bill 567
       A.     Parties’ Arguments
       Defendant argues that the court imposed upper term sentences for count 2 and the
GBI enhancements based on one aggravated factor concededly found by the jury, i.e., the
defendant personally inflicted GBI and thus, acted with great violence, and one
aggravating factor that was not found by the jury, i.e., the offense involved a high degree
of cruelty. Defendant argues that it cannot be determined whether a jury would have
found “a high degree of cruelty” beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also argues that
it is further unclear how the court would have exercised its discretion given the
presumption in favor of the middle term and in light of the single aggravating factor that
was necessarily found true by the jury. Therefore, defendant argues that the sentence
must be vacated, and the case remanded.
       The People respond that defendant forfeited this claim because defense counsel
made no objections at sentencing.3 Alternatively, the People argue that any error was
harmless. The jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted
with great violence because the jury already found that he repeatedly stabbed A.S. and
inflicted GBI. There is also no reasonable probability that the jury would not have found
that defendant acted with a high degree of cruelty. Alternatively, the court’s rationale
shows that there is no reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a lesser
sentence if it only considered the great violence aggravating factor.
       We agree with the People that there is no reversible error.

       3 “[A]n appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching questions that
have not been preserved for review by a party.” (People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207,
1215.) Assuming that the People’s forfeiture argument is correct, we choose to exercise
our discretion and will address the merits of defendant’s argument. (People v. Williams
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 520;
People v. Bradford (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1411.)

                                             6.
       B.     Legal Standards
              1.     Senate Bill 567
       Effective January 1, 2022, through Senate Bill 567 and pursuant to section 1170,
“when a sentencing court chooses a term from a statutory triad, the chosen term shall not
exceed the middle term, unless the facts supporting the aggravating circumstances are
(1) established by the defendant’s stipulation to them, (2) proven to a jury (or to a court,
if a jury is waived) beyond a reasonable doubt, or (3) based on prior convictions
evidenced by a certified record of conviction.” (People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th
37, 44; see § 1170, subd. (b).) “Section 1170.1 likewise now provides that the court may
impose the upper term for an enhancement ‘only when there are circumstances in
aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle
term, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.’ ” (People v. Butler (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 953, 958, review
granted Mar. 28, 2023, S279633; § 1170.1, subd. (d)(2).)
              2.     Harmless Error
       If a trial court fails to follow section 1170, subdivision (b), or section 1170.1,
subdivision (d), our court has articulated two possible standards of review.
                     a.      The Dunn Standard
       In People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, review granted October 12, 2022,
S275655 (Dunn), a three-question framework was established. First, we determine:
“(1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found one aggravating
circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have found any remaining aggravating circumstance(s)
true beyond a reasonable doubt. If all aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial
court would have been proved to the respective standards, any error was harmless.” (Id.
at pp. 409–410, fn. omitted.) If the answer to question (1)(b) is “no,” then we determine

                                              7.
“(2) whether there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a
sentence other than the upper term in light of the aggravating circumstances provable
from the record as determined in the prior steps. If the answer is no, the error was
harmless. If the answer is yes, the reviewing court vacates the sentence and remands for
resentencing .…” (Id. at p. 410.) Under the Dunn framework, the “reasonable
probability” standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 is incorporated into
questions (1)(b) and (2). (Dunn, at pp. 407, 409–410).
                     b.       The Falcon Standard
       People v. Falcon (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 911, review granted September 13, 2023,
S281242 (Falcon) took a different approach than the three-question framework of Dunn.
Falcon concluded that resentencing for a section 1170, subdivision (b) or section 1170.1,
subdivision (d) error is “unwarranted only if two requirements are met: (1) the upper
term sentence remains legally valid under federal and state law, and (2) there is a clear
indication the trial court would have imposed the upper term sentences had it been aware
of its circumscribed discretion under the newly amended sentencing law.” (Falcon, at
p. 921; see also id. at pp. 938, 951.) Instead of Watson, Falcon question number (2)
adopted the “clear indication” standard of People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354.
(Falcon, at p. 921.) Of note, Falcon repeatedly emphasized the appropriateness of the
Gutierrez standard in the context of a retroactive application of Senate Bill 567. (Falcon,
at pp. 921, 924, 926–927, 933–934, 938, 941, 943, 949–951.) In fact, Falcon expressly
stated its two-question standard applied to retroactive applications of Senate Bill 567.
(Falcon, at pp. 921 [“We … hold that upon retroactive application of Senate Bill 567 to
upper term sentences imposed [§ 1170], resentencing is unwarranted only if two
requirements are met …”], 951 [“In sum, whether resentencing of an upper term sentence
is the appropriate remedy on retroactive application of amended section 1170(b) involves
two relevant questions.”].)

                                             8.
        There is no tension between Falcon and Dunn with respect to Dunn
question (1)(a). There is, however, tension with respect to Dunn question (2) and Falcon
question (2). With respect to these two disparate questions, we believe that the Watson
reasonable probability standard in Dunn question (2) is the appropriate question in this
case.
                      c.     Direct Application of Senate Bill 567
        This case does not involve the retroactive application of Senate Bill 567 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.). The sentence was imposed in March 2022, three months after the
amendments to Senate Bill 567 came into effect. By the express terms of Falcon, its two-
question test applies in retroactive applications.4 (Falcon, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 921, 951.) Further, the prosecutor highlighted Senate Bill 567 in a sentencing
memorandum, and the trial court stated that it had considered the appropriate sentence “in
light of the new sentencing guidelines.” The court was clearly aware of Senate Bill 567’s
amendments and was attempting to impose a sentence consistent with those amendments.
If we were to reverse the trial court, we would be remanding for the court to apply the
same laws that it already applied in March 2022. (Cf. People v. McDaniels (2018)
22 Cal.App.5th 420, 426 [“When a trial court has abused its discretion in choosing
among available sentencing options, such as by relying on an improper sentencing factor,
a reviewing court must still affirm unless ‘the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.’ (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) In these situations, the trial court has
revealed which sentencing choice it prefers, and the reviewing court must decide whether
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court’s lawful exercise of discretion on
remand will lead it to make a different choice.”].) Finally, Falcon itself recognized that

        4 We recognize that Dunn involved a retroactive application of Senate Bill 567.
(Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) However, Dunn did not limit itself to
retroactive applications of Senate Bill 567 and, because we conclude that the Watson
standard is applicable, it is useful to point out Falcon’s express limitation.

                                               9.
Watson has application when there has not been an intervening change in the sentencing
laws:

                “The harmless error test under Watson has indeed been applied in
        cases where a sentencing court considered improper sentencing factors.
        (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492; see also [People v.] Avalos
        [1984] 37 Cal.3d [216,] 233 [improper dual use of facts].) But, in those
        cases, the underlying sentencing scheme had not changed in the interim.
        The sentencing court revealed its sentencing choice under a particular
        sentencing scheme, and the reviewing court decided whether there was a
        reasonable probability the court’s lawful exercise of its discretion on
        remand would lead it to make a different choice under the same sentencing
        framework.” (Falcon, at p. 950, fn. omitted.)
        Falcon’s recognition of Watson’s application is consistent with the California
Supreme Court, which has held that if a “trial court has given both proper and improper
reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known
that some of its reasons were improper.” (People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 492; see
In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 715.) In sum, because this is not a retroactive
application case and the court would not be applying a law that changed in the interim,
and because Dunn question (2) incorporates the Watson reasonable probability standard
consistent with Price, we find that Dunn question (2) is the appropriate standard for
harmless error in this case.5
        C.     Analysis
        The trial court justified imposition of the upper term for the GBI enhancements
and the corporal injury offense because the crimes involved “great violence, with a high
degree of cruelty.”6 This is an invocation of California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1),

        5 Because this case does not involve the retroactive application of Senate Bill 567,
we need not resolve any other tensions between Dunn and Falcon.
      6 The parties both view the trial court as relying on “great violence” and “high
degree of cruelty” as two independent considerations, even though they are both found
under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1). That is, the parties view the court as

                                             10.
which reads: “The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1).)
       Defendant expressly concedes, both in his opening brief and his reply, that the jury
necessarily found or would have found that he committed attempted murder with “great
violence” because it found the GBI enhancement to be true. The uncontradicted (and in
many respects corroborated) trial testimony of A.S. demonstrated that defendant placed a
knife to A.S.’s throat, grabbed her hand and began cutting her finger, pursued her into the
bathroom as she fled, forced his way into the bathroom, stabbed her seven times
throughout her body (including in her heart), and only stopped because of the physical
intervention of M.S. and J.S. Given the jury’s true finding on the GBI enhancement,
A.S.’s testimony, and defendant’s express concession, we conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that count 1 was
committed with “great violence” for purposes of California Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1). Therefore, because the “great violence” aggravating factor is adequately
supported, we answer Dunn question (1)(a) and Falcon question (1) with respect to the
“great violence” aggravating factor in the affirmative. (Falcon, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 921, 951; Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410.)
       With respect to the “high degree of cruelty” factor, there is no dispute that the jury
was not asked to find this factor beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike the “great violence”
factor, defendant does not concede that this circumstance is adequately supported. For
purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that this aggravating factor was

essentially citing rule 4.421(a)(1) twice. We cannot say that the parties’ interpretation of
the record is unreasonable. “[T]he use of the disjunctive ‘or’ makes clear that the rule
may be satisfied by cruel, vicious or callous acts other than those involving great
violence, great bodily harm, or threat of great bodily harm.” (People v. Duran (1982)
130 Cal.App.3d 987, 990.) Therefore, we will also view the court’s statement as
identifying two separate considerations under rule 4.421(a)(1).

                                             11.
not adequately supported under state and federal law. Under both Dunn and Falcon, this
assumption leads us to question (2) of the Dunn harmless error analysis. As discussed
above, the harmless error analysis to be applied in this case is the Watson standard.
       At sentencing, the court explained that it had thought “long and hard” about the
sentence to be imposed under “the new sentencing guidelines” and considered the totality
of the circumstances. The court also heard and considered the negative statements of
A.S., M.S., and Y.S. at the sentencing hearing. Further, the court gave great weight to the
mitigating factor that defendant had no prior criminal record. However, the court was
clearly impressed by the nature of the crimes committed. The court made the “great
violence” finding apart from/contrary to the recommendations of the probation report,
which did not identify any factors in aggravation. The “great violence” finding was also
made to the exclusion of two other aggravating factors (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
4.21(a)(2) and (a)(8)) that had been urged by the prosecutor in the sentencing
memorandum. No one disputes the propriety of this finding in relation to defendant’s
conduct towards A.S. After finding aggravating factors, the court explained that it
believed that defendant’s conduct “went well above and beyond what would otherwise be
established for purposes of a conviction .…” That is, the court believed that defendant’s
conduct significantly exceeded what would otherwise be necessary to sustain a
conviction. The court’s observation relates to defendant’s conduct in general during the
offenses and was made in relation to the elements of the offenses charged. It does not
appear that this observation would change simply by eliminating the descriptor “high
degree of cruelty” since the observation would continue to be based on defendant’s
conduct as described by witnesses and as depicted in exhibits (all of which were seen and
heard by the court), and the observation would remain consistent with the “great
violence” finding alone. We cannot conclude that the court’s observation would be
different if the court had found only “great violence” and had not found a “high degree of
cruelty.”

                                            12.
       A single aggravating circumstance is sufficient to impose an upper term sentence.
(People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 813.) The trial court was therefore permitted to
impose an upper term sentence based on the “great violence” finding alone. Given the
court’s observations and findings (particularly the “well above and beyond” observation),
we conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the court would have imposed a
sentence lower than the five-year upper term for the GBI enhancements or the four-year
upper term on the corporal injury offense if the court had only identified “great violence”
and not identified a “high degree of cruelty.” Therefore, any section 1170 or 1170.1 error
was harmless. (See People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 492; Dunn, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409–410; see also In re F.M., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 715.)
II.    Senate Bill 81
       A.     Parties’ Arguments
       Defendant argues that even though section 1385, subdivision (c)(3)(B), applied at
the sentencing, the record does not reflect that the trial court exercised its informed
discretion under this law. There is no indication in the record that the court understood
the scope of its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c), and neither counsel raised
section1385, subdivision (c), at oral argument or in briefing. Thus, it is necessary to
remand this matter for the court to affirmatively and expressly exercise its discretion
under section 1385, subdivision (c).
       The People argue that defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object to any
errors regarding section 1385, subdivision (c).7 Alternatively, the People argue in part
that the record fails to show that the trial court did not follow 1385, subdivision (c).

       7 Assuming that the People’s forfeiture argument is correct, we again choose to
exercise our discretion and will address the merits of defendant’s argument. (People v.
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161, fn. 6; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th
at p. 520; People v. Bradford, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1411.)

                                             13.
Therefore, it should be presumed that the trial court followed the law and made any
necessary findings.
       We agree with the People.
       B.     Legal Standards
              1.       Section 1385, subdivision (c)
       Through Senate Bill 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), and as of January 1, 2022,
California law provides that a trial court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by
any initiative statute.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1); People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th
287, 295; People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1093–1094, review granted
Apr. 12, 2023, S278894.) In exercising its discretion under subdivision (c)(1), a trial
court “shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant” to
prove one of nine enumerated mitigating circumstances. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v.
Mendoza, at pp. 295–296; People v. Ortiz, at pp. 1093–1094.) “Proof of the presence of
one or more of these [mitigating] circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v Mendoza, at p. 299; People v. Ortiz, at
pp. 1093–1094.) The term “endanger public safety” is statutorily defined as “a likelihood
that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2); People v. Mendoza, at pp. 295–296; People v.
Ortiz, at pp. 1093–1094.) There is no requirement for the trial court to consider particular
factors in determining whether dismissal would endanger public safety. (People v.
Mendoza, at p. 299.)
              2.       General Appellate Presumptions
       “Absent evidence to the contrary, [appellate courts] presume that the trial court
knew the law and followed it.” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042; see
People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; People v. Martinez (2017)

                                             14.
10 Cal.App.5th 686, 728.) Moreover, appellate courts “presume that a judgment or order
of the trial court is correct, and ‘ “[a]ll intendments and presumptions are indulged to
support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown.” ’ ” (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666, quoting Denham v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; see People v. Martinez,
at p. 728.) “Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a
reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or
order.” (People v. Stowell, at p. 1114; see In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499.)
       C.     Analysis
       Defendant does not argue that the trial court was required to strike an
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c), or that the court could not have
imposed a sentence for both the weapon and GBI enhancements. Rather, defendant
requests that we presume that the court was unaware of Senate Bill 81/section 1385,
subdivision (c), simply because no party raised the law and the court never cited to it or
made express findings under it. However, section 1385, subdivision (c), contains no
express requirement that a trial court articulate any findings or rulings, be it the striking
of, or the refusal to strike, an enhancement. (§ 1385, subd. (c); cf. id., subd. (a) and In re
Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [noting the express findings requirement of § 1385,
subd. (a) if a strike is dismissed].) Therefore, in the face of a silent record like this one,
and in the absence of an affirmative duty to make express findings, we presume that the
court knew about section 1385, subdivision (c), had an adequate basis for any section
1385, subdivision (c) findings, and that the findings were correct. (See In re Julian R.,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 498–499; People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 666;
People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1114; Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564; People v. Martinez, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 728.)
None of defendant’s arguments to the contrary are sufficient to rebut these established

                                              15.
appellate presumptions. Thus, defendant has failed to show error with respect to section
1385, subdivision (c).
III.   Unauthorized Sentence and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       We read defendant’s arguments regarding an unauthorized sentence and
ineffective assistance of counsel as arguments made in the event that we find forfeiture.
(E.g. People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 946, 962 [“The unauthorized sentence doctrine
is designed to provide relief from forfeiture for ‘obvious legal errors at sentencing that
are correctable without referring to factual findings in the record or remanding for further
findings.’ [Citation.] It applies when the trial court has imposed a sentence that ‘could
not lawfully be imposed under any circumstances in the particular case.’ ”].) However,
we are not enforcing the forfeiture doctrine in this case. As discussed above, we have
exercised our discretion to address the merits of defendant’s Senate Bill 567 and Senate
Bill 81 claims.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                             16.