Court Opinion

ID: 9727743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:49:23.186297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:42.368551
License: Public Domain

HANSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I conclude that defendant Ingram’s contentions on appeal that the trial court committed error in denying his motion to disclose the identity of *844the informant and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction are without merit. I would affirm the judgment of conviction.1
In the case at bench defendant Ingram was charged and convicted of possession of heroin, not sale of heroin.
“ 1 “Unlawful possession of narcotics is established by proof (1) that the accused exercised dominion or control over the contraband, (2) that he had knowledge of its presence, and (3) that the accused had knowledge that the material was a narcotic.” (People v. Groom, 60 Cal.2d 694, 696 [36 Cal.Rptr. 327, 388 P.2d 359].)’ (People v. Showers, 68 Cal.2d 639, §42-643 [68 Cal.Rptr. 459, 440 P.2d 939]; People v. Redrick, 55 Cal.2d 282, 285 [10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255]; People v. Gorg, 45 Cal.2d 776, 780 [291 P.2d 469].) ‘These elements may be established by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. (People v. Groom, supra [60 Cal.2d 694] at pp. 696-697; People v. Villanueva, supra [220 Cal.App.2d 443] at p. 450.) . . . Constructive possession is sufficient and possession by any person when the defendant has an immediate right to exercise dominion and control over the narcotic will support a conviction. (People v. Toms, 163 Cal.App.2d 123, 128 [329 P.2d 90].)’ [Citation.]” (People v. White (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 390, 394-395 [89 Cal.Rptr. 761].)
“Exclusive possession of the premises is not required, nor is physical possession of the narcotic. [Citations.] Although proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession [citation], possession may be imputed where the contraband is found in a location which is subject to joint dominion and control of the accused and another. [Citations.]” (People v. Kanos (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 642, 652 [92 Cal.Rptr. 614].)
*845Here, the informant merely pointed the finger at codefendant Evans and the apartment from which the contraband was recovered, did not participate in the criminal act with which defendant was later charged (possession of heroin), and therefore was not a material witness on the issue of guilt. (See People v. Shipstead (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 58, 74 [96 Cal.Rptr. 513]; People v. Rupar (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 292, 300 [53 Cal.Rptr. 70]; People v. Ortiz (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 572, 580 [25 Cal.Rptr. 431].) The informant was only used as a lead to information upon which an independent investigation was commenced that independently led to and verified the presence of the heroin and his-identity need not be disclosed. (See People v. Martin (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 121, 128 [82 Cal.Rptr. 414]; People v. Williams (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 653, 661 [63 Cal.Rptr. 501].)
In my view the trial court properly concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the informant could give evidence on any of the three requisite elements necessary to establish proof of unlawful possession of narcotics as listed in People v. White, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 390. I fail to see the reasonable evidentiary significance of whether or not defendant Ingram was the other black man present in the apartment the previous day or evening before the search when his codefendant Evans sold some heroin to the informant. If defendant Ingram was present, it would add strength to the prosecution’s case. If the black man was a person other than defendant Ingram, it could have been another customer or friend of codefendant Evans and adds nothing of value as to any of the requisite elements required to establish proof of possession of the heroin at the time of the search and arrest on May 12, 1976.
In People v. Lamb (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 378 [101 Cal.Rptr. 25], an informant had told police of narcotics sales taking place at a particular residence. The informant described one of the alleged sellers as a “Welo” Lamb. The defendant’s name was Leonard Lamb. The defendant contended that, had the informant been available for interrogation, it might have developed that the sales were by someone other than the defendant. {Id,, at pp. 381-382.) The court noted that “[t]he most that the informer could have done for defendant would have been to cast doubt on the defendant’s status as a seller. . . .” {Id., at p. 382.) The court reduced the judgment to possession of a controlled substance and affirmed it as so modified. {Id., at pp. 382-383.)
I further conclude the totality of the evidence, direct and indirect, is overwhelming that defendant Ingram had more than the opportunity of access to the narcotics found in the apartment and in fact exercised joint *846dominion and control over the heroin with codefendant Evans, had knowledge of its presence and narcotic nature and, therefore, was in possession of the narcotic. (People v. Kanos, supra, 14 Cal.App.3d 642.) He was present in the apartment when the officers arrived to investigate. Codefendant Evans, who was in a nightgown, admitted that he lived in the apartment and stated he shared it with defendant Ingram. Defendant Ingram’s statements to the officers “Why did you come to our place?” and “ We are moving pretty soon” (italics added), coupled with the fact that he was in his underwear when the police arrived and the testimony of witnesses Dinatale and Dobbin, resident security guards at the apartment, that both defendants lived in apartment 107, all constitute substantial evidence that defendant Ingram shared the apartment with codefendant Evans and that they both exercised joint dominion and control over the entire premises and the contents therein, including the seized contraband, some of which was in plain view in the kitchen sink.
Furthermore, in my view, the defense testimony that defendant Ingram kept clothes at his father’s house and stayed only part time in the apartment where the contraband was found and where he also kept clothes, if true, does not exonerate him from the offense of which he was charged and convicted. Here, the sharing of the apartment timewise and spacewise under the totality of the evidence was sufficient to constitute if not actual possession at least “constructive possession” which is sufficient. (People v. White, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 390.)
Officer Kington’s testimony that both defendants had track marks on their arms coupled with defendant Ingram’s admission that he had used narcotics in the past, the track marks on his arms at the time of his arrest and his past convictions of sale of narcotics constitute substantial evidence that he had knowledge of the narcotic character of the material. (See People v. Ford (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 149, 156 [126 Cal.Rptr. 396].) The “mere possession of a narcotic constitutes substantial evidence that the possessor of the narcotic knew of its nature. [Citation.]” (People v. Gordon (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 454, 460 [89 Cal.Rptr. 214]; Peoples. White, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d 390, 396.)
Finally, suffice it to say that in my view the reliance of defendant Ingram and the majority opinion on People v. Coleman (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 287 [139 Cal.Rptr. 908], which emanated from this court (to which I dissented) is clearly distinguishable and not dispositive of the case at bench.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 14, 1979.

 This case is apparently moot for all practical purposes except for the standing conviction.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 12(a), I ordered up the original superior court file including probation reports.
The record reflects that on November 22, 1976, at time of sentencing of defendant Ingram in the instant case proceedings were suspended and he was granted formal probation for a period of 5 years with terms and conditions including that he spend the first 365 days in local custody. He was given credit for 180 days spent in custody and allowed to spend the balance of 185 days as an in-patient in the House of Uhuru residential program.
His probation report shows that he was 29 years old at the time and had “several youth authority commitments and a state prison commitment for sale of heroin.”
Defendant Ingram violated probation in the instant case, having been arrested on March 11, 1977, and March 20, 1977, for being under the influence of a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11550. His probation was revoked on May 31, 1977, and he was sentenced to 365 days in the county jail less credit for time spent in the House of Uhuru residential program and time spent in custody and probation was terminated.