Court Opinion

ID: 9388287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-20 15:08:05.277114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:19.571583
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

David G. Szymanski,                         :
                           Appellant        :
                                            :
           v.                               : No. 34 C.D. 2022
                                            : Submitted: December 30, 2022
Board of Supervisors of                     :
New London Township                         :

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE WALLACE                                         FILED: April 20, 2023

      David G. Szymanski (Szymanski) appeals from the Order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Chester County (Common Pleas) sustaining his appeal of the
December 3, 2020 Decision of the New London Township (Township) Board of
Supervisors (Board) and striking a condition imposed by the Board in its Final Minor
Subdivision Plan decision. On appeal, Szymanski argues that even though he
prevailed before Common Pleas, dictum in Common Pleas’ opinion placed a cloud
on the title to his real estate. As a result, he requests that this Court vacate the dictum
in Common Pleas’ opinion. Since Szymanski does not have standing, we dismiss
his appeal.
                                  I.     Background
      Common Pleas succinctly set forth the complex factual background and
procedural history of this matter as follows:
       David G. Szymanski is the owner of a farm of approximately 83
acres located [in] . . . New London Township, Chester County,
Pennsylvania . . . (the “Property”). In 2018, Mr. Szymanski submitted
to the Board an Application for Subdivision and Land Development and
Final Minor Subdivision Plan (the “First Application” or “First
Szymanski Plan”). The First Application sought to divide Mr.
Szymanski’s Property into two lots––Lot 2A, consisting of
approximately 11.28 acres with a proposed residence, attendant
driveway and storm water management area -- and Lot 2B, consisting
of approximately 72.1 acres, including approximately 28.3 residual
acres in New London Township and approximately 43.8 acres in
Franklin Township containing Mr. Szymanski’s residence and farm
structures. After obtaining necessary approvals from other agencies and
satisfactory reviews by the Chester County Planning Commission and
the Township Engineer, the Board issued a written decision on March
7, 2019, approving the First Application, subject to conditions (the
“First Decision”). One such condition was a requirement that the First
Szymanski Plan include a note restricting any further subdivision of
either parcel (the “First Condition”). . . .

      The basis for the imposed First Condition was a previous note
placed on the 2003 Final Minor Subdivision Plan submitted by then-
owner Alice J. Conner (the “Conner Plan”). The Conner Plan, which
predated Mr. Szymanski’s purchase of the Property, contained the
following language at Note 4:

      4) Further subdivision of Lot #1 and Lot #2 shall be deed
      restricted as follows: Lot #1 shall be restricted to a
      maximum of one additional lot. Lot #2 shall be restricted
      to a maximum of one additional agricultural lot.

      Specific language addressing these restrictions shall be
      included in subsequent deeds of conveyance for these
      properties.

     The following language appeared in the deed conveying Ms.
Conner’s interest in the Property to Mr. Szymanski:

      FUTURE   SUBDIVISION:  BUYER    AGREES
      PURSUANT TO SELLER’S DESIRE THAT BUYER
      WILL AGREE TO ONLY SUBDIVIDING HIS
      PORTION OF THE PROPERTY INTO TWO (2)

                                  2
                PARCELS BOTH OF WHICH SHALL REMAIN
                SUBJECT TO ACT 319[1] AFTER SETTLEMENT.

                By letter dated February 7, 2019, Mr. Szymanski expressly
         rejected the First Condition and requested that the Board
         unconditionally approve his First Application. It did not do so and on
         April 8, 2019, Mr. Szymanski filed a Notice of Appeal challenging the
         First Condition. Later, Mr. Szymanski withdrew his appeal.

                Two years later, on October 14, 2020, Mr. Szymanski filed
         another Application (the “Second Application”) and Final Minor
         Subdivision Plan (the “Second Szymanski Plan”). On November 11,
         2020, at a public meeting, the New London Township Planning
         Commission recommended approval of the Second Szymanski Plan,
         subject to placement of the following note on the Second Szymanski
         Plan (the “Second Condition”):

                12. This subdivision extinguishes the right to further
                subdivide by creating one new agricultural parcel on Lot
                #2 . . . as granted by the Final Subdivision Plan of Property
                Owned by Alice J. Conner dated 28 July 2003 last revised
                29 September 2003. Upon approval of this subdivision, the
                new Lots #2A and #2B will be deed restricted from further
                subdivision.

               By email dated November 13, 2020, Mr. Szymanski notified the
         Township that he would not agree to place the new Note 12 on the
         Second Szymanski Plan as proposed by the Planning Commission. By
         Decision dated December 3, 2020, the Board determined that if Mr.
         Szymanski did not submit a revised Final Subdivision Plan containing
         the new Note 12 within thirty (30) days, the Second Szymanski Plan
         was denied.

              On January 4, 2021, Mr. Szymanski appealed the December 3,
         2020 Decision of the Board.

Common Pleas Op., 12/6/21, at 1-3.
         Common Pleas, by order filed December 6, 2021, sustained Szymanski’s
appeal, striking the Second Condition as a requirement for approval of Szymanski’s

1
    Act of December 19, 1974, P.L. 973, as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 5490.1 – 5490.13

                                               3
Final Minor Subdivision Plan. Common Pleas Order, 12/6/21. Despite obtaining
the relief he requested, Szymanski appealed Common Pleas’ decision to this Court.
On appeal, Szymanski argues a portion of Common Pleas’ opinion, in which
Common Pleas determined the restrictions in Szymanski’s deed were “binding on
Mr. Szymanski and future property owners,” placed a cloud upon his title. See
generally Appellant’s Br. Accordingly, Szymanski believes he was aggrieved by
Common Pleas’ opinion. Id. The Board, however, argues that Szymanski, as the
prevailing party before Common Pleas, does not have standing to pursue this appeal.
                                  II.    Standing
      Rule 501 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that “any
party who is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal therefrom.” Pa.R.A.P.
501. “Whether a party has standing to appeal is determined on a case-by-case basis
and, if a person is determined aggrieved, he has standing.” Chiro-Med Rev. Co. v.
Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 908 A.2d 980, 984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citation
omitted). “As a general matter, the core concept of the doctrine of standing is that a
person who is not adversely affected in any way by the matter he seeks to challenge
is not ‘aggrieved’ and has no right to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge.”
In re T.J., 739 A.2d 478, 481 (Pa. 1999).
      Generally, “[a] prevailing party is not ‘aggrieved’ and therefore, does not have
standing to appeal an order that has been entered in his or her favor.” Ratti v.
Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 758 A.2d 695, 700 (Pa. Super. 2000). Where the
prevailing party receives an incomplete remedy, however, they are generally
permitted to appeal. See Chiro-Med, 908 A.2d 980, 985 (prevailing party permitted
to cross-appeal where “it did not receive all the relief it requested”); Marsh v.
Hanley, 856 A.2d 138 (Pa. Super. 2004) (appeal permitted where jury awarded wage

                                            4
loss damages but did not award damages for compensable bodily injuries);
Pittsburgh Constr. Co. v. Griffith, 834 A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. 2003) (prevailing party
permitted to cross-appeal where trial court did not award contractual interest).
      In essence, Szymanski filed a subdivision plan and requested approval from
the Board. When the Board determined it would not approve his plan unless he
added additional notations to the plan, Szymanski appealed and requested that
Common Pleas strike the Board’s requirement for additional notations. Common
Pleas sustained Szymanski’s appeal and struck the Board’s requirement for
additional notations. As a result, Szymanski was the prevailing party, and he
received all of the relief he requested from Common Pleas.
      Nevertheless, Szymanski believes he was aggrieved by a statement in
Common Pleas’ opinion, which Szymanski repeatedly calls dictum. See generally
Appellant’s Br. “Judicial dictum has been defined as ‘[a]n opinion by a court on a
question that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed
on by the court, but that is not essential to the decision.’” City of Lower Burrell v.
City of Lower Burrell Wage & Policy Comm., 795 A.2d 432, 437 n. 7 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2002) (citation omitted). “Dicta has no precedential value.” Id.
      We agree with Szymanski that Common Pleas’ statement that restrictions in
Szymanski’s deed were binding on Szymanski and future property owners was
judicial dictum. Common Pleas’ ultimate decision was that the Board’s imposition
of additional conditions was improper. Whether restrictions in Szymanski’s deed
were binding on Szymanski and future owners was not essential to that decision.
      We are not persuaded, however, by Szymanski’s arguments that Common
Pleas’ statement “has a confiscatory effect on [his] property.” See Appellant’s Br.
at 4, 5. Szymanski concedes Common Pleas’ statement was dictum, which means

                                          5
that it has no precedential value. As a result, Common Pleas’ statement does not
take anything from Szymanski, nor does it affect his ability to pursue any issues in
the future.
                                 III.   Conclusion
      Szymanski received a complete remedy in his appeal to Common Pleas, where
he was the prevailing party. In addition, Common Pleas’ statement that restrictions
in Szymanski’s deed were binding on Szymanski and future property owners did not
adversely     affect   Szymanski, because    he   concedes   this   statement   was
non-precedential dictum. Therefore, Szymanski is not an “aggrieved” party under
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501, and he lacks standing to appeal.
Accordingly, we dismiss Szymanski’s appeal.

                                             ______________________________
                                             STACY WALLACE, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon concurs in result only.

                                         6
               IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

David G. Szymanski,                     :
                          Appellant     :
                                        :
          v.                            : No. 34 C.D. 2022
                                        :
Board of Supervisors of                 :
New London Township                     :

                                      ORDER

     AND NOW, this 20th day of April 2023, the appeal of David G. Szymanski
from the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County’s order, docketed on December
6, 2021, is hereby DISMISSED.

                                        ______________________________
                                        STACY WALLACE, Judge