Court Opinion

ID: 9949089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:03:02.879644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.763456
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 In re Gomez on Habeas Corpus CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

In re GILBERT GOMEZ                                            B320346

         on                                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. NA072648)
         Habeas corpus.

      ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for habeas corpus.
Tomson T. Ong, Judge. Petition granted.
      Jonathan E. Demson for Petitioner.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie
C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
                     I.    INTRODUCTION

      In 2008, a jury found petitioner Gilbert Gomez guilty of
first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1, and found a
criminal street gang sentencing enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(C)) to be true. The trial court sentenced petitioner to 25
years to life and a prior panel of this court affirmed the conviction
(as well as the convictions of codefendants Benjamin Gonzalez,
Spencer Bazan, and Gerson Bazan) with modifications not
relevant to this proceeding. (People v. Gonzalez et al.
(Feb. 10, 2010, B211559) [nonpub. opn.].)
       Petitioner now challenges his first degree murder
conviction in light of the California Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu). We grant the
petition.

               II.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

      The following factual background is taken from People v.
Gonzalez et al., supra, B2115592:

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise stated.

2      On our own motion, we take judicial notice of that prior
nonpublished opinion as well as the record in that appeal. We
also take judicial notice of the subsequent opinions, People v.
Gonzalez et al. (Nov. 30, 2020, B300650) [nonpub. opn.] and
People v. Gonzalez et al. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 869, as well as
their appellate records. Accordingly, we deny as moot petitioner’s
request for judicial notice of certain portions of the appellate

                                 2
       “On November 20, 2006, 14-year-old Geovonie Taylor was
living with his cousins, Michael and Norman Cox, who were 16
and 18 years old. After school that day, Taylor met the Cox
brothers at a friend’s house. It was nighttime when they left the
friend’s house and decided to walk home. None of them was
armed. They walked down Anaheim Street and began to turn
down Gundry Avenue, near a construction site. There were three
Hispanic males across the street, along with two Hispanic
females. Taylor heard the males call out repeatedly, ‘Eastside
Longos,’ ‘fuck [racial slur],’ ‘F Insane,’3 and ‘F 20.’ Taylor knew
that Eastside Longos, the 20’s, and Insane were all gangs. He
understood them to be making gang threats. Taylor was wearing
his school uniform, which included a burgundy colored shirt.
Norman wore red and blue sweat pants, a black long-sleeved
shirt, and a red and white baseball cap with ‘Big Baby’ on it.4
       “Taylor and the Cox brothers continued to walk, but they
could not continue down Anaheim because their path was blocked
by the construction site gates—so they turned left onto Gundry.
As they did so, the Hispanic males ran across the street toward
them, calling out gang names, ‘F [racial slur]’ and ‘Eastside

record in case number B300650. We previously granted
petitioner’s request for judicial notice of certain portions of the
record in case number B211559.

3     “Detective Malcolm Evans of the City of Long Beach Police
Department testified that ‘Baby Insane is a clique of the Insane
Crips criminal street gang.’ The gang is reputed to be violent.

4      “Members of Baby Insane typically have ‘BIG,’ ‘BABY,’ or
‘B’ on their red hats.

                                  3
Longos.’ There appeared to be five males in all. The Hispanic
males asked where they were from, which Taylor understood as
asking for their gang affiliation.5 Neither Taylor nor the Cox
brothers responded. In the meantime, the Hispanic males
surrounded them as they tried to back away. One of the Hispanic
males approached them, while making a gang threat; another
reached for something from his back, near his hip. Norman
pushed Taylor and Michael back and faced the Hispanic males,
who surrounded him.
       “One of the Hispanic males ran up to Norman and ‘socked
him in the head.’ Norman tried to escape, but slipped and fell.
While Norman was on the ground, the Hispanic males repeatedly
kicked and punched Norman all over his body. Norman curled up
and tried to fend off the blows. Taylor was too afraid to help his
cousin. When another of the male Hispanics approached, Taylor
and Michael said they ‘did not bang,’ and they were left alone.
Taylor heard Norman say, ‘Please don’t stab me.’ There were
four Hispanic males around Norman at the time. Although
Taylor did not see any of the attackers holding a weapon, he saw
one of them making stabbing motions at the time Norman cried
out. Norman did not fight back; he was not armed. The Hispanic
males ran away when Taylor yelled and ran toward them.
       “Taylor saw Norman was bleeding from his mouth, so he
ran to the park where a dance was going on and asked for help.
The paramedics and police arrived approximately 15 minutes
later. Norman had suffered eight stab wounds, including a fatal

5     “Detective Evans testified that the question ‘where are you
from’ can mean a challenge to identify one’s gang affiliation or a
challenge to fight.

                                4
wound to the left side of his chest that penetrated the lung.
Other wounds appeared to be defensive in nature. The stabbing
instrument that was used had one blunt edge and one sharp
edge. It could not be determined whether there were multiple
instruments used. At trial, Taylor identified Gonzalez and
Gerson as attackers. From a photographic six-pack lineup,
Taylor identified Gonzalez as the one who stomped on Norman
and punched his ribs. At the preliminary hearing, Taylor
identified Gonzalez, along with Spencer and Gerson. He was not
sure about his identification of [petitioner].
      “Seleta Castillo lived on Hoffman Avenue, a block away
from Gundry. That night, she was walking home from work
along Gundry. At the intersection of Gundry and Anaheim, she
saw four or five male Hispanics . . . and two female Hispanics
across the street. . . . As Castillo walked home, she saw some
African-American males walking down Anaheim. Defendants
called out their gang affiliation and told the African-Americans
they were not supposed to be there—it was not their ‘turf.’ They
repeatedly demanded to know what the African-Americans were
doing in their neighborhood. Gonzalez called out, ‘[racial slur].’
The African-Americans did not respond.
      “Defendants approached the African-Americans, who were
turning down Gundry. Norman said, ‘I don’t want no problems’
and put his hands up. There was nothing in his hands.
Defendants surrounded him and passed a weapon amongst
themselves. Defendants began to strike and kick Norman. They
continued to beat Norman after he had fallen to the ground.
Afterwards, they ran away to Hoffman Avenue. . . .
      “[¶] . . . [¶]

                                5
       “[Eva] Ramirez saw the stabbing incident. That morning,
she [and others] visited Spencer. Toward the end of the day,
Gomez and Gonzalez joined them. It was dark outside when they
all left together to go to the nearby park. They walked back on
Gundry. A young female Ramirez did not know came up and
spoke with [petitioner]. A young male named Marcos joined them
too; Gerson was not present. Three African-Americans were
walking across the street from them. She heard them say
something. At some point, she heard someone twice yell, ‘This is
Insane Crips,’ which she understood as a gang challenge. She
looked over and saw an African-American male wearing a red
hat, which she believed was a gang color. Gonzalez, [petitioner],
Spencer, and Marcos ran across the street to confront the
African-Americans. She heard one of them swear at the African-
Americans; she also heard one of them say Eastside Longos.
Gonzalez, [petitioner], and Spencer fought one of the African-
Americans. Ramirez did not see them use any weapon. Marcos
did not take part; he was standing with the two African-
Americans who were not fighting. Gonzalez, [petitioner], and
Spencer ran back across the street, leaving the victim on the
ground, before running back to the apartment complex on
Hoffman.
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “. . . Detective [Malcolm] Evans interviewed Spencer on the
day of his arrest. After advising Spencer of his Miranda rights,6
Spencer waived those rights and agreed to speak to the detective.
Initially, Spencer denied any knowledge of Norman’s stabbing.
The audiotape of the interview was played to the jury, subject to

6     “Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

                                6
the instruction that the evidence was admissible solely against
Spencer. In his statement, Spencer admitted stabbing the victim,
but explained that he did it in self-defense. . . .
      “Officer Miguel Rosales testified that Gonzalez had
admitted being a member of a ‘tag banger crew’ called ‘NKS,’ or
‘Nip Killing Squad.’ His gang moniker was ‘C-Note.’ Officer
Rosales understood that Gonzalez had subsequently been
‘jumped into’ the Eastside Longos, which was a full-fledged
criminal street gang. [Petitioner] had admitted to membership in
the Eastside Longos. Both Spencer and Gerson had admitted
being members of the Eastside Longos. The stabbing scene was
inside Eastside Longos territory. Baby Insane, a violent clique of
the Insane Crip gang, claim all of Long Beach as their territory
and are enemies of the Eastside Longos. The hat worn by
Norman is consistent with Baby Insane membership.7
       “[¶] . . . [¶]
       “After listening to a hypothetical set of facts consistent with
the prosecution case, Detective [Hector] Gutierrez opined that
Norman’s stabbing would have been committed to benefit the
Eastside Longos. The Eastside Longos ‘have problems with
African-Americans.’ The Eastside Longos often commit violent
crimes, and their reputation within the gang is enhanced by
doing so. Further, commission of violent offenses serves as a
warning to rivals and to community members. The former will be
less likely to attack Eastside Longos and the latter will be less

7    “Detective Carlos Grimaldo testified that [petitioner]
admitted Eastside Longo membership, as did Spencer. If a
person yells out, ‘This is Baby Insane’ in the streets, it is likely to
be meant as a gang challenge.

                                   7
likely to report Eastside Longos for committing crimes. Within
the gang’s culture, it is understood that those who ‘snitch’ against
gang members will suffer violent retribution. Civilians, as well
as gang members, understand this. As a result, many witnesses
are afraid to testify against gang members, which inures to the
benefit of the gang, allowing its members to commit crimes with
impunity.
       “If an African-American male wearing a red cap with ‘Big
Baby’ on it yelled out ‘This is Baby Insane,’ it would be
understood as a gang challenge from a gang with a reputation for
violence.” (People v. Gonzalez et al., supra, B211559.)

             III.   PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      The trial court instructed the jury on (1) direct aiding and
abetting8; and (2) the natural and probable consequences
doctrine9.

8     The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.01, which
provided, in relevant part, that:
      “A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when
he or she:
      “[1.] With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, and
      “[2.] With the intent or purpose of committing or
encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime, and
      “[3.] By act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or
instigates the commission of the crime . . . .”

9     The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.02, which
provided, in relevant part, that:

                                 8
       During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that
petitioner was guilty of first degree murder. She urged the jury
to find that although only Spencer was the actual stabber,
petitioner and his codefendants were “[n]ot only . . . . guilty of
assault or the beating of [Norman], they are guilty of whatever
happens afterwards if it was the natural and probable
consequence. Clearly, it is a natural [and] probable consequence,
if you have four people all from the same gang all running across
the street passing around a weapon, kicking, beating this guy
knowing he is outnumbered. It is a clear and probable

      “One who aids and abets another in the commission of a
crime is not only guilty of that crime, but is also guilty of any
other crime committed by a principal which is a natural and
probable consequence of the crime originally aided and abetted.
      “In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of
murder you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that:
      “1.    The crime of assault was committed;
      “2.    That the defendant aided and abetted that crime;
      “3.    That a co-principal in that crime committed the crime
of assault; and
      “4.    The crime of murder was a natural and probable
consequence of the commission of the crime of assault.
      In determining whether a consequence is ‘natural and
probable’ you must apply an objective test, based not on what the
defendant actually intended, but on what a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence would have expected likely to occur. The
issue is to be decided in light of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident. A ‘natural’ consequence is one which is
within the normal range of outcomes that may be reasonably
expected to occur if nothing unusual has intervened. ‘Probable’
means likely to happen.”

                                9
consequence that someone is going to stab him. Someone is going
to try to kill him.”
       As discussed above, the jury found petitioner guilty of first
degree murder.
       On May 16, 2022, petitioner filed the instant petition for
writ of habeas corpus, arguing that because the record did not
show whether the jury relied on a direct aider and abettor or
natural and probable consequences theory of liability, he was
entitled to have his first degree murder conviction reversed under
Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155.10
       On January 20, 2023, we denied the petition, finding that
petitioner had failed to establish that the trial court’s instruction
on the natural and probable consequences doctrine was not
harmless error.
       On May 31, 2023, the California Supreme Court
transferred the cause to us with directions to vacate the January
20, 2023, order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus and
reconsider the petition in light of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th
562 (Lopez).
       We vacated our January 20, 2023, order, and following
supplemental briefing from the parties, again denied the petition
on July 20, 2023.
       On September 27, 2023, our Supreme Court granted review
and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to
issue an order to show cause why the relief requested in the
petition should not be granted. We issued an order to show cause
on October 4, 2023, and now grant the petition.

10   Petitioner filed an earlier petition for habeas corpus raising
Chiu error in the superior court on August 25, 2021.

                                 10
                       IV.   DISCUSSION

A.    Timeliness

       Before we consider the merits of the petition, we address
the Attorney General’s contention that the petition should be
denied as untimely. Habeas petitions must be filed without
“‘substantial delay.’” (In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal.4th 770, 779.)
“Substantial delay is measured from the time the petitioner or
his or her counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the
information offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for
the claim.” (Id. at p. 780.) Courts will consider the claim on its
merits despite a substantial delay if there is a showing of good
cause. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 460.)
       Here, petitioner first filed a petition asserting an error
pursuant to Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, on August 25, 2021, that
is, seven years after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Chiu. At the time the opinion in Chiu was filed, petitioner was
incarcerated and without legal counsel.
       Petitioner remained unrepresented by counsel until
February 19, 2019, when the trial court, in connection with
petitioner’s motion for resentencing under section 1172.6,
appointed counsel for him. On July 5, 2019, the court summarily
denied the section 1172.6 motion. Appointed counsel pursued
petitioner’s motion on appeal. And, on November 30, 2020, we
reversed the court’s summary denial and remanded the matter to
the trial court for further proceedings. (People v. Gonzalez et al.,
supra, B300650.) The remittitur issued in February 2021, and
seven months later, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that his conviction must be reversed under Chiu.

                                11
       Based on the procedural history of this case, we decline to
hold that petitioner forfeited his petition on the grounds that he
engaged in substantial delay. (See In re Mitchell (1968) 68 Cal.2d
258, 263 [“sufficient justification for petitioner’s delay in seeking
collateral relief is to be found in his ignorance of law and legal
procedures”]; In re Spears (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1208
[“petitioner has adequately explained this delay as attributable to
his lack of capacity to represent himself [citation] and the
scarcity of channels through which legal assistance is available to
indigent prisoners”].)

B.    Instructional Error Not Harmless

       In Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, the California Supreme
Court concluded that a first degree premeditated and deliberate
murder conviction for an aider and abettor cannot be based on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a matter of
law. (Id. at p. 167.) “First degree murder, like second degree
murder, is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought, but has the additional elements of willfulness,
premeditation, and deliberation, which trigger a heightened
penalty. [Citation.] That mental state is uniquely subjective and
personal. It requires more than a showing of intent to kill; the
killer must act deliberately, carefully weighing the considerations
for and against a choice to kill before he or she completes the acts
that caused the death. [Citations.] . . . [T]he connection between
the defendant’s culpability and the perpetrator’s premeditative
state is too attenuated to impose aider and abettor liability for
first degree murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine . . . .” (Id. at p. 166.)

                                 12
       For a defendant to be guilty of murder as a direct aider and
abettor, “the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or
encouraged the commission of the murder with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and with the intent or
purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating its
commission. [Citation.] . . . An aider and abettor who knowingly
and intentionally assists a confederate to kill someone could be
found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent. Such an
aider and abettor, then, acts with the mens rea required for first
degree murder.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)
       Where “a jury is instructed on alternate theories of
liability, one legally valid and one legally invalid, a federal
constitutional error has occurred. The defendant has been
deprived of his or her right to ‘a jury properly instructed in the
relevant law.’ [Citations.] The error therefore requires reversal
unless we determine the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.]” (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 580.)
       In determining harmlessness, “[a] reviewing court must
determine whether any rational jury would have found the
defendant guilty based on a valid theory if the jury had been
properly instructed. ‘The reviewing court examines what the jury
necessarily did find and asks whether it would be impossible, on
the evidence, for the jury to find that without also finding the
missing fact as well.’ [Citation.] In other words, if ‘“[n]o
reasonable jury that made all of these findings could have failed
to find”’ the facts necessary to support a valid theory, the
alternative-theory error was harmless. [Citation.]” (Lopez,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 584–585.)

                                13
      The Attorney General does not dispute that the trial court
instructed the jury on a legally invalid theory, but contends the
instructional error was harmless. According to the Attorney
General, the jury’s true finding on the gang enhancement
demonstrates that it necessarily found petitioner shared with
Spencer an intent to kill. At the time of petitioner’s trial in 2008,
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1) provided for additional
punishment for any “person who is convicted of a felony
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members . . . .”
Application of the enhancement did not require that “‘the
evidence establish specific crimes the defendant intended to
assist his fellow gang members in committing.’” (People v.
Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 66.) Moreover, the court instructed
the jury that: “The essential elements of this allegation are:
1. The crime charged was committed for the benefit of, at the
direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang; and
2. This crime was committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.”
Thus, the jury’s true finding did not necessarily indicate that the
jury also found petitioner knowingly and intentionally aided and
abetted the commission of the murder or that he acted with
premeditation and deliberation.
      The Attorney General also contends that there was no
evidence that “the non-stabbers, including petitioner, harbored a
mental state that was different or less than Spencer’s . . . .” He
argues that the evidence petitioner acted with deliberation and
premeditation was overwhelming: he engaged in a coordinated
attack with his codefendants, all the codefendants knew that a

                                 14
weapon was present, and all the codefendants acted with a
motive to commit murder to promote their gang.
       We agree with the Attorney General that a reasonable jury,
based on this evidence, could have found petitioner guilty of first
degree murder as a direct aider and abettor. But that is not the
question before us. Instead, we must determine whether, based
on the evidence at trial, it would have been impossible for a
reasonable jury to find petitioner guilty of first degree murder
without also finding that he committed the murder as a direct
aider and abettor. (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 568.)
       There was no evidence any of the defendants knew Norman
or that they had discussed a plan for the confrontation. And,
although the defendants acted as a coordinated group in
surrounding and beating Norman, such coordination supports a
finding that all the defendants intended to assault Norman, but
not necessarily that they intended to kill him. (See People v.
Underwood (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 303, 315–316.) As to the
evidence that some of the defendants passed around a knife
shortly before the beating, even if a reasonable jury could
therefore conclude that petitioner knew about the knife
immediately before the stabbing, such a conclusion does not
require a further finding that petitioner intended to aid and abet
Spencer in using the knife to kill Norman. Indeed, there was no
evidence that petitioner encouraged Spencer to stab Norman
during the assault. Nor does the evidence that was presented at
trial require a finding that petitioner acted with premeditation
and deliberation. Here, Spencer stabbed Norman suddenly while
the other defendants were in the midst of the beating, and the
defendants ran off quickly thereafter. The Attorney General

                                15
therefore has failed to meet his burden of showing that the error
was harmless. (Lopez, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 584–585.)

                        V.   DISPOSITION

       The petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted. The first
degree murder conviction is vacated, and the matter is remanded
to the trial court to permit the People to either retry petitioner on
a first degree murder charge or accept a reduction of the
conviction to second degree murder.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                       KIM, J.

We concur:

             MOOR, Acting P. J.

             LEE, J.

     Judge of the San Bernardino Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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