Court Opinion

ID: 9957820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:11:40.24906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:48.295124
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lloyd, 2024-Ohio-1297.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                          :
                                                        :
       Appellee                                         :   C.A. No. 29918
                                                        :
 v.                                                     :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03514
                                                        :
 BRIAN LLOYD                                            :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                        :   Court)
       Appellant                                        :
                                                        :

                                                  ...........

                                                  OPINION

                                            Rendered on April 5, 2024

                                                  ...........

MARY ADELINE R. LEWIS, Attorney for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by NATHAN B. VANDERHORST, Attorney for Appellee

                                                .............

EPLEY, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Brian Lloyd appeals from his conviction in the Montgomery County Court of

Common Pleas for trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be

present, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B), a fourth-degree felony. He claims that the trial

court considered improper information in imposing an 18-month sentence.                 For the

following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
                                                                                          -2-

                             I. Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} In January 2023, Lloyd was indicted for trespass in a habitation when a

person is present or likely to be present, a fourth-degree felony, and attempted trespass

in a habitation, a fifth-degree felony. Lloyd was served with the indictment on March 23,

2023.    Lloyd appeared on March 28, 2023, for arraignment, during which the court

entered a not guilty plea on his behalf and released him on a conditional own

recognizance bond.

        {¶ 3} Lloyd failed to appear for a scheduling conference, and the trial court issued

a capias for his arrest and set his bond as no bond. Lloyd was arrested on July 27, 2023.

        {¶ 4} Five days later, Lloyd entered a guilty plea to trespass in a habitation. In

return, the State dismissed the attempted trespass in a habitation charge. The trial court

accepted the plea and scheduled sentencing for August 30, 2023.              It again set a

conditional own recognizance bond. However, Lloyd failed to appear for his presentence

investigation, and he was arrested on August 21, 2023. Sentencing was rescheduled to

September 6, 2023.

        {¶ 5} At sentencing, defense counsel noted that there had been an agreement to

community control sanctions, but she acknowledged that the court had informed Lloyd

that “there was a condition to that and he’s clearly in violation of that condition.” Counsel

emphasized that Lloyd was a drug addict and had been most of his life, that Lloyd had

been in and out of both jail and prison, which “hasn’t done a thing for him, or the system.”

Defense counsel argued that “society maybe deserves him trying to get help,” that he had
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been screened for a treatment program, and that he would be a candidate. Noting that

Lloyd was 39 years old and the case involved a non-violent, low-level felony, defense

counsel asked for the court to consider a treatment program.

       {¶ 6} Lloyd similarly told the court that he had been in and out of jail and prison,

that he had been dealing with this case since 2022, and that he wanted to “get [the case]

over with any way we can.” He acknowledged that he had absconded but asked to be

released. He indicated that he wanted a chance to “get myself in order” and maybe

treatment, if possible.

       {¶ 7} Prior to imposing sentence, the court told Lloyd:

              Okay. First of all, I’m going to make a couple of statements for the

       record. I think it’s important. I think it’s important that you, your lawyer

       certainly understands it.   I think it’s important that the people in the

       audience understand it. Everybody sitting in that box understands it and

       the Court of Appeals certainly understands it. I don’t say these things to

       beat you up. * * * That’s not why I’m saying them. Okay? I’m saying them

       because I’m obligated to deal in reality and to deal with the facts in a

       particular case.

              In your case, in this case alone, you failed to appear in late May, on

       May 24th, your bond was revoked and I had to have you arrested.

       Ultimately you entered a plea on the 2nd of August.        Again you were

       released, and again you absconded. Okay.

              You’ve acknowledged that you are a drug addict. I think that’s –
                                                                                       -4-

      that’s to your credit and I know some things about drug addiction. I don’t

      think I’m an expert on it. Judges that claim to be experts on it are fools.

      We’re lawyers and judges. We are not social scientists; we are not drug

      counselors; we are not folks that treat that.

             But the fact of the matter is, from the time that you go into

      programming on average it takes, if you ever reach sobriety, and you

      haven’t, if you ever reach sobriety it’s approximately four years to get there

      and it’s approximately eight relapses before you get there, if you don’t

      manage to kill yourself in the meantime. Okay.

             In your case, you have a documented record of adult misdemeanor

      convictions dating from May of 2002 until August of 2021. You have felony

      convictions. You have 15 of them dating from April of 2002 until January

      of 2020 and you have served 11 prison terms.

             Suffice to say that at this point, particularly given that you’ve

      continued to abscond, I am most certainly not going to release you from

      custody. I am most certainly not going to put you on community control,

      and we’re going to resolve this matter in a way that, frankly, I think I have

      no alternative.

Sentencing Tr., 6-8.

      {¶ 8} The trial court then imposed 18 months in prison. It stated that, in arriving

at its sentence, it had “considered the principles and the overriding purposes of

sentencing set out in the Code, including avoiding unnecessary burden upon the
                                                                                            -5-

government, the seriousness and recidivism factors of the Code, the sentencing dictates

of 2929.1319 and any other sentencing requirements imposed upon the Court by the Ohio

legislature.” The court ordered Lloyd to pay $30 to the Victim’s Compensation Fund but

waived all other costs.

       {¶ 9} Lloyd appeals from his conviction. In his sole assignment of error, he claims

that the trial court erred in considering factors outside of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12

when sentencing him to the maximum sentence for a fourth-degree felony.

                            II. Review of Lloyd’s Sentencing

       {¶ 10} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the

authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its

reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-

Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 11} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of

review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-

Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,

reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing,

only if it “clearly and convincingly” finds either (1) that the record does not support certain

specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Huffman,

2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6.

       {¶ 12} “A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory range

for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of felony

sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.”
                                                                                          -6-

(Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99 N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 13} R.C. 2929.11 requires trial courts to be guided by the overriding purposes

of felony sentencing. Those purposes are threefold: “to protect the public from future

crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective

rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines

accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local

government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). “[A] sentencing court may place such weight

on each of the purposes as the circumstances of the case require.” State v. Bittner, 12th

Dist. Warren No. CA2019-01-001, 2019-Ohio-3834, ¶ 18.

       {¶ 14} R.C. 2929.12(B) sets forth nine factors indicating that an offender’s conduct

is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense; R.C. 2929.12(C) sets forth

four factors indicating that an offender’s conduct is less serious than conduct normally

constituting the offense. R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) each lists five factors that trial courts

are to consider regarding the offender’s likelihood of committing future crimes. For each

of these categories, the trial court may also consider “any other relevant factors.” Finally,

R.C. 2929.12(F) requires the sentencing court to consider the offender’s military service

record, if any, and whether the defendant has a condition traceable to that service that

contributed to the commission of the offense.

       {¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not

provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view

that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State

v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. Accordingly,
                                                                                        -7-

“[w]hen reviewing felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors

in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, we do not analyze whether those sentences are

unsupported by the record.” (Emphasis added.) State v. McDaniel, 2d Dist. Darke No.

2020-CA-3, 2021-Ohio-1519, ¶ 11, citing State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.

28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18; Jones at ¶ 26-29.

       {¶ 16} However, Jones does not preclude claims that a sentence was imposed

based on impermissible considerations, namely considerations that fall outside of R.C.

2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198

N.E.3d 68 (trial court impermissibly increased the defendant’s sentence following his

angry, profanity-laced in-court tirade after the announcement of his sentence.) “[W]hen

a trial court imposes a sentence based on factors or considerations that are extraneous

to those that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that sentence is contrary to

law.” Id. at ¶ 22.

       {¶ 17} In this case, Lloyd’s 18-month sentence was within the sentencing range

for his offense, a felony of the fourth degree. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(4). Due to Lloyd’s

criminal history and violations of the conditions of bond, the court had the discretion to

impose a prison sentence for his offense. R.C. 2929.13(B). The record further reflects

that the trial court complied with its sentencing obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.

2929.12.

       {¶ 18} Lloyd argues, however, that the trial court impermissibly considered factors

outside of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 at sentencing. He points to the trial court’s

comment about it taking four years and eight relapses, on average, before a person
                                                                                       -8-

achieves lasting sobriety. Lloyd asserts that the trial court, in essence, assumed that

“because [he] was a drug addict it would take him multiple relapses, and presumably

violations of any community control sanction, for him to make any sort of recovery and

sobriety.” Lloyd contends that this assumption was unsubstantiated and went against

the rehabilitative purpose of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11(A).

      {¶ 19} We disagree with Lloyd that the trial court’s statement went beyond the

considerations and factors of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.            The trial court’s

comments regarding the average course of drug rehabilitation were made in response to

Lloyd’s and his attorney’s requests that he be provided drug treatment as part of

community control sanctions. Lloyd acknowledged at the sentencing hearing that he

was a drug addict and was on drugs when the offense occurred. The PSI reflects that

Lloyd had previously participated in chemical dependency treatment in 2002 (MonDay

Program), 2013 (Cincinnati VOA), 2014 (Talbert House), and 2022 (MedMark Treatment

Center). The court’s statements appear to be a recognition that the path to sobriety

typically is a long and difficult process and perhaps that some degree of relapse and

recidivism was to be expected.

      {¶ 20} The court then highlighted Lloyd’s extensive adult criminal history, which

began in 2002 when Lloyd was 18 years old. It noted that Lloyd, who was 39 years old

at sentencing, had numerous (16) adult misdemeanor convictions, had 15 felony

convictions between April 2002 and January 2020, and had served 11 prison terms.

Considering Lloyd’s criminal history along with his absconding twice during this case, the

trial court concluded that Lloyd was not amenable to community control sanctions and
                                                                                      -9-

that a prison sentence was warranted. Reviewed in context, the trial court’s comments

did not reflect that the court considered impermissible factors in determining whether a

prison sentence was appropriate.

      {¶ 21} Lloyd’s assignment of error is overruled.

                                     III. Conclusion

      {¶ 22} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.

                                    .............

TUCKER, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.