Court Opinion

ID: 9950754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 19:01:34.524639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:38.329145
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11262    Document: 34-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11262
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JOHN NATHAN HEMINGWAY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cr-00027-TJC-LLL-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11262      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 2 of 4

       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11262

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               John Nathan Hemingway appeals the district court’s impo-
       sition of thirteen standard, discretionary conditions of supervised
       release in its written judgment that it did not orally pronounce at
       his sentencing for drug and firearm possession crimes. He argues
       that this violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. He also
       argues that the district court failed to assess whether the conditions
       were reasonably related to achieving the goals of sentencing. The
       government concedes that Hemingway’s due process rights were
       violated. We agree. Therefore, we vacate Hemingway’s sentence
       as to the conditions of his supervised release and remand for resen-
       tencing; but we do not address Hemingway’s other argument.
               Generally, when a defendant fails to object to the conditions
       of his supervised release at sentencing, we review objections on ap-
       peal about those conditions for plain error. See United States v. Zinn,
       321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). But when a defendant had no
       opportunity to object at sentencing to discretionary conditions be-
       cause the conditions were included for the first time in the written
       judgment, we review the related issues de novo. See United States v.
       Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231, 1246 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023).
              We recently held that, to satisfy due process requirements,
       “a district court must pronounce at the defendant’s sentencing
       hearing any discretionary conditions of supervised release—that is,
       any condition of supervised release other than those mandatory
USCA11 Case: 23-11262      Document: 34-1       Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 3 of 4

       23-11262                Opinion of the Court                          3

       conditions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).” Id. at 1246. “A district
       court may easily satisfy this requirement by referencing a written
       list of supervised release conditions.” Id. For example, “the court
       may orally adopt the conditions of supervised release recom-
       mended in the defendant’s [presentence investigation report] or in
       a standing administrative order.” Id. This is because “[b]y referenc-
       ing at sentencing a written list, the court affords any defendant who
       is unfamiliar with the conditions the opportunity to inquire about
       and challenge them.” Id. But discretionary conditions of supervised
       release must be pronounced orally in some way. See id. at 1249.
              The district court failed to do that here. As the government
       concedes, the district court erred in imposing discretionary condi-
       tions of supervised release in its written judgment without orally
       pronouncing them. Therefore, we must vacate the conditions and
       remand for resentencing.
               Hemingway also argues that the district court failed to con-
       sider whether the conditions are reasonably related to the goals of
       sentencing. But we do not address this argument because “when a
       criminal sentence is vacated, it becomes void in its entirety; the sen-
       tence . . . has been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean.”
       United States v. Stinson, 97 F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal
       quotation marks omitted). On remand, the district court may “re-
       visit any rulings it made at the initial sentencing” and may address
       this purported issue at that time. United States v. Yost, 185 F.3d 1178,
       1181 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Rodriguez, 75 F.4th at 1250 n.10 (“Be-
       cause we conclude that Rodriguez was denied due process with
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                23-11262

       respect to these conditions and remand for resentencing, we do not
       address his argument that the district court failed to adequately ex-
       plain them.”).
             Accordingly, we VACATE Hemingway’s sentence as to the
       conditions of his supervised release and REMAND for limited re-
       sentencing on these conditions.