Court Opinion

ID: 9401310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 18:04:00.833032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:51.942041
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/12/23 In re Gabriella H. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 IN RE GABRIELLA H. et al.,                                     B315796
 Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.                                            (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01554)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 CHASTITY B.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tara Newman, Judge. Affirmed in part and
conditionally affirmed in part with directions.
      Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Chastity B.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              ____________________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

      This consolidated appeal concerns three juvenile court
orders. First, Chastity B. appeals from an order under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26 terminating her parental
rights to her daughters, Gabriella H. and Gracie H.1 Chastity
argues the juvenile court erred in ruling the parental-benefit
exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), did not
apply. We affirm the court’s order because Chastity failed to
prove she maintained regular visitation and contact with her
daughters.
      Second, Chastity appeals from an order denying a petition
under section 388 seeking to modify a visitation order regarding
Gabriella and Gracie. Because Chastity makes no argument
regarding that order, we affirm it too.
      Finally, Chastity appeals from an order denying a petition
under section 388 regarding placement of her youngest child,
Ramon T., Jr. She argues the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services did not comply with the inquiry
and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) and related California law. The

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                               2
Department concedes, and we agree, it did not comply with ICWA
and related California law because it did not conduct an adequate
inquiry into Ramon, Jr.’s possible Indian ancestry or provide
adequate notice to the relevant tribe. Therefore, we conditionally
affirm the court’s order regarding Ramon, Jr. and direct the
juvenile court to ensure the Department complies with its duties
under ICWA and related California law.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    The Juvenile Court Declares Gabriella and Gracie
            Dependent Children, Terminates Chastity’s
            Reunification Services, and Schedules a Hearing
            Under Section 366.26
      Chastity previously appealed from juvenile court orders
denying certain section 388 petitions concerning Gabriella’s and
Gracie’s placement and a disposition order concerning Chastity’s
daughter, Hailey T., who is not the subject of these appeals. Our
previous opinion provided a detailed factual and procedural
background regarding the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings
and disposition orders concerning Gabriella and Gracie. (See
In re Gabriella H. (Aug. 12, 2022, B313276) [nonpub. opn.]
(Gabriella H. I).) As we explained, Chastity was at the time the
mother of four children: Isabella, Gabriella, Gracie, and Hailey,
ranging in age from 15 years old (Isabella) to two years old
(Hailey). Isabella’s father is not the father of Chastity’s other
children and he, like Isabella, is not a party to these proceedings.
Gabriella and Gracie’s father is Moises H.; Hailey’s father is
Ramon T. Since Chastity’s first appeal she had another child,

                                 3
Ramon, Jr., who is now 18 months old and whose father is also
Ramon.
      In March 2020 the juvenile court issued a removal order for
Gabriella, Gracie, and newborn Hailey and placed Gabriella and
Gracie with their paternal grandparents. At that time, Gabriella
and Gracie were six and four years old, respectively. Hailey was
placed with her father, but the Department later detained Hailey
from Ramon following his incarceration for a domestic violence
incident involving Chastity. In February 2021 the juvenile court
sustained a petition on behalf of Gabriella, Gracie, and Hailey
under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). In May 2021 the
juvenile court declared Gabriella, Gracie, and Hailey dependent
children of the court and removed them from their parents. On
December 10, 2021 the court terminated Chastity’s reunification
services regarding Gabriella, Gracie, and Hailey and scheduled a
permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. Throughout
Gabriella and Gracie’s placement with their paternal
grandparents, the children thrived and expressed their desire to
remain with their grandparents. The Department reported that
the paternal grandparents provided the girls a “safe, stable,
loving and nurturing home environment.”

      B.    Chastity Visits Gabriella and Gracie Inconsistently
      In March 2020, when the juvenile court issued the removal
order for Gabriella and Gracie, the court granted Chastity two,
two-hour monitored visits each week. In December 2020, the
Department reported that Chastity visited Gabriella and Gracie
only once every other week for two hours, or one-quarter of the
opportunities for visitation the court granted.

                                4
       Following the disposition hearing in May 2021 the juvenile
court increased Chastity’s weekly visitation to three, three-hour
visits. The Department did not finalize Chastity’s visitation
schedule until July 2021 because of difficulties caused by “the
animosity between [Chastity] and [the] paternal grandparents.”
At a visit monitored by the paternal grandfather in early October
2021, Chastity yelled at him about the girls’ backpacks, their
homework, and the food he provided. After that visit Gabriella
and Gracie’s paternal grandfather told the Department he did not
feel safe at visits without Department staff present, and the
juvenile court ordered future visits to take place at the
Department’s office.
       In October 2021 Chastity gave birth to Ramon, Jr. and was
hospitalized for several days. Between Chastity’s hospitalization
in late October and the end of November 2021, Chastity visited
with Gabriella and Gracie once. Between late 2021 and early
2022, Chastity’s visits with Gabriella and Gracie continued to be
“sporadic.”
       Beginning in February 2022, the Department changed
Chastity’s visits back to two, two-hour visits per week. From that
time, and leading up to the section 366.26 hearing in August
2022, Chastity’s visits with Gabriella and Gracie were more
consistent. Out of 24 visits (not including scheduled visits that
were canceled due to the children’s or Chastity’s illness), Chastity
canceled three visits and left one visit early.

                                 5
     C.      This Court Directs the Juvenile Court To Ensure the
             Department Complied with Its Duties Under ICWA
             and California Law
       As described in Gabriella H. I, supra, B313276, Hailey’s
paternal aunt Vanessa T. told a dependency investigator Hailey’s
paternal great-grandfather “came from the Yaqui tribe, but he
was not registered with the tribe.” Vanessa did not know the
paternal great-grandfather’s name and did not have additional
information about him, but she gave the investigator the name
and phone number of the paternal great-grandfather’s sister.
Vanessa also gave the investigator the names and birth dates
(but not birth years) of Hailey’s paternal grandfather (who was
deceased) and paternal grandmother, as well as the place where
the paternal grandfather died. The investigator called the sister
of Hailey’s paternal great-grandfather twice and left messages,
but the sister did not respond. The record did not indicate the
investigator attempted to contact Hailey’s paternal grandmother.
       The dependency investigator sent ICWA-030 notices on
behalf of Hailey to the Pascua Yaqui tribe and to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. The notices included the name and address of
Hailey’s father and the names (but not the (partial) dates or
places of birth) of Hailey’s paternal grandparents. The notices
also included an address in Los Angeles for Hailey’s paternal
grandmother, but no information about Vanessa or Hailey’s
paternal great-grandfather’s sister. The investigator also
contacted the Pascua Yaqui tribe by phone. On August 20, 2020
the Pascua Yaqui tribe notified the Department that Hailey,
Chastity, and Ramon were not members of the tribe and did not
have any pending applications for membership. Based on the

                                6
information the Department provided, the Pascua Yaqui tribe
concluded Hailey was not eligible for membership in the tribe.
      At Hailey’s May 27, 2021 disposition hearing the court
found there was no reason to know Hailey had Indian ancestry.
Chastity appealed, arguing the Department failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry into Hailey’s possible Indian ancestry and to
provide adequate notice to the Pascua Yaqui tribe. We agreed
and directed the juvenile court to ensure the Department
complied with its duties under ICWA and related California law.
(Gabriella H. I, supra, B313276.)

      D.     The Juvenile Court Finds There Was No Reason To
             Know Ramon, Jr. Had Indian Ancestry and Declares
             Him a Dependent Child of the Court
      Meanwhile, on February 1, 2022 the juvenile court
sustained a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d),
and (j), on behalf of Ramon, Jr., who had a positive toxicology for
marijuana at birth. The court also found, based on a notice from
the Pascua Yaqui tribe stating Ramon, Jr. was not eligible for
membership in the tribe, the court had no reason to know or
believe Ramon, Jr. was an Indian child. On March 1, 2022,
before our decision in Gabriella H. I, the juvenile court declared
Ramon, Jr. a dependent child of the court, removed him from
parental custody, and denied Chastity reunification services. The
court placed Ramon, Jr. in foster care.

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      E.      The Juvenile Court Terminates Chastity’s Parental
              Rights to Gabriella and Gracie and Denies Chastity’s
              Petition Under Section 388 To Modify Ramon, Jr.’s
              Placement
       At the August 30, 2022 section 366.26 hearing for Gabriella
and Gracie, counsel for the children asked the juvenile court to
terminate Chastity’s and Moises’s parental rights. Counsel for
the children acknowledged Chastity had “a connection” with
Gabriella and Gracie, but argued the benefits of permanence for
the children “far outweigh the benefit of any continuing
parent/child relationship.” Failing to terminate parental rights,
he continued, would result in “continued instability in their lives
[and] continued inconsistent visits with [Chastity].” Counsel for
Chastity asked the court to find the parental-benefit exception
applied and argued Chastity had “maintained consistent
visitation . . . for quite some time.” Counsel for the Department
acknowledged Chastity’s visits appeared to be “somewhat
consistent,” but argued the parental-benefit exception did not
apply because Chastity had not shown terminating her parental
rights would be detrimental to Gabriella and Gracie.
       The juvenile court found that Gabriella and Gracie were
adoptable and that the parental-benefit exception did not apply
because the benefit of the children’s permanency far outweighed
maintaining any connection with their parents. On the issue of
Chastity’s visitation, the court said “the visits that she does have
when she is present are generally positive, but there have [also
been] inconsistencies in her visitation.” The court also denied a
section 388 petition Chastity had filed on August 26, 2022 asking
the court to modify its previous order placing Ramon, Jr. with a
non-relative caregiver to place him with Chastity instead.

                                 8
      F.    Chastity Timely Appeals
      Chastity filed two timely notices of appeal from the three
orders on two dates (we consolidated the appeals). First,
Chastity appealed from the October 8, 2021 order regarding the
section 388 petition Chastity filed to modify her visitation with
Gabriella. Chastity makes no argument regarding that order.
Second, Chastity appealed from two August 30, 2022 orders, one
that terminated her parental rights over Gabriella and Gracie
and one that denied her section 388 petition asking the court to
change its order placing Ramon, Jr. with a non-relative
caregiver.2

                          DISCUSSION

      A.    The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling the
            Parental-benefit Exception Did Not Apply

              1.   Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       The purpose of a hearing under section 366.26 is “‘to select
and implement a permanent plan for the child’” after the juvenile
court has terminated reunification services. (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630 (Caden C.); see In re D.M. (2021)
71 Cal.App.5th 261, 268.) If the court determines “the child is
likely to be adopted,” the court must “terminate parental rights to
allow for adoption.” (Caden C., at p. 630; see § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1).) “But if the parent shows that termination would be

2      Moises did not oppose termination of his parental rights,
and neither he nor Ramon T. appealed from the orders addressed
in this appeal.

                                 9
detrimental to the child for at least one specifically enumerated
reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and
select another permanent plan.” (Caden C., at pp. 630-631; see
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), (4)(A).) One of those reasons, the
parental-benefit exception, requires the parent to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence (1) “the parent has regularly
visited with the child,” (2) “the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship,” and (3) “terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., at
p. 629; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); D.M., at p. 268.)
       “The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; accord, In re A.L.
(2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1151; see In re I.R. (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 201, 212 [“Regular visitation exists where the
parents visit consistently and to the extent permitted by court
orders.”].) “Visits and contact ‘continue[ ] or develop[ ] a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’
[Citation.] Courts should consider in that light whether parents
‘maintained regular visitation and contact with the child’
[citation] but certainly not to punish parents or reward them for
good behavior in visiting or maintaining contact—here, as
throughout, the focus is on the best interests of the child.”
(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1061, 1069-1070.) Thus, “the visitation element is to be
understood in light of the overall purpose of the beneficial
relationship exception.” (Eli B., at p. 1070.)
       A juvenile court decision that a parent has not satisfied his
or her burden to establish the parental-benefit exception applies

                                10
“may be based on any or all of the component determinations,”
including “whether the parent has maintained regular
visitation.” (In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646-647,
disapproved on another other ground in Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 637, fn. 6, 638, fn. 7.) Indeed, “a parent must
prove all three components of the beneficial relationship
exception,” and a “failure of proof on any one of them is fatal.”
(In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 303, 322, fn. 10; see
In re Eli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068 [where the father
did not meet his burden to prove he maintained regular
visitation, the reviewing court need not consider the other
elements of the parental-benefit exception].)
       We review the juvenile court’s ruling on the first element of
the parental-benefit exception for substantial evidence.
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; In re Eli B., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068.) In reviewing factual determinations
for substantial evidence, we do not “‘reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’” (Caden C., at p. 640.)

            2.     Chastity Failed To Show She Regularly Visited
                   Gabriella and Gracie
       Chastity argues she satisfied the first element of the
parental-benefit exception because the “overall evidence” showed
she regularly visited Gabriella and Gracie. She contends the
“relevant question is not whether there was some period of
inconsistent visitation, rather the question is whether the
visitation was consistent ‘overall.’” But that’s not the standard
the Supreme Court established in Caden C. The “relevant
question” is whether Chastity visited “‘consistently,’ taking into

                                11
account ‘the extent permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 632; accord, In re Eli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1069.)
       Chastity concedes she did not. She characterizes her
visitation as inconsistent from March 2020, when Gabriella and
Gracie were detained, until the disposition hearing in May 2021;
consistent from May 2021 to October 2021; inconsistent again
from October 2021 to January 2022; then consistent from
February 2022 until the section 366.26 hearing in August 2022.
Thus, even in Chastity’s view of the evidence, her visitation with
Gabriella and Gracie was inconsistent for approximately 18 of the
29 months between the girls’ detention and the section 366.26
hearing. It is hard to see how this level of visitation could be
characterized as consistent “overall”; a more apt description is
inconsistent overall, or simply, inconsistent. In any event, there
was ample evidence Chastity failed to maintain regular visitation
to the extent permitted by the juvenile court. (See In re M.M.
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 68 [visitation was inconsistent where
“the reports relied upon by the court thoroughly discussed the
infrequency of mother’s visits, and the many visits that had been
made available to her that she missed or canceled”], review
granted Oct. 12, 2022, No. S276099; In re Eli B., supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1070-1071 [father failed to show regular
visitation where his visitation “throughout the years-long
dependency proceeding was sporadic and also entailed significant
gaps”]; In re Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 647 [sporadic
visits in the first 18 months of the dependency proceedings,
coupled with more regular visits during the final six months
before the section 366.26 hearing, were not sufficient to show
regular visitation]; In re I.R., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 212

                                12
[“significant lapses in visits” showed the parent failed to
maintain regular visitation].)
       Neither of the two cases Chastity cites for the proposition
“overall” consistency is enough supports that position. First,
Chastity plucks the word “overall” from In re C.F. (2011)
193 Cal.App.4th 549, where the court held that, while the
mother’s visitation became “more consistent . . . as the section
366.26 hearing neared,” “overall her visitation was sporadic.” (Id.
at p. 554, italics added.) The court in C.F. continued: “Sporadic
visitation is insufficient to satisfy the first prong of the parent-
child relationship exception to adoption.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the
parent in C.F. took advantage of more than half of her permitted
visits, a stronger visitation record than Chastity’s, but still failed
to satisfy the first element of the parental-benefit exception.
       Second, Chastity cites In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15,
apparently because the court in that case acknowledged “the
prongs of the [parental-]benefit exception . . . naturally inform
and lead into each other. Whether a parent or parents’ regular
visitation and contact (the first prong) builds a relationship that
is beneficial to the child (the second prong) depends on the nature
and quality of the visits.” (Id. at p. 26.) Chastity seems to
suggest the juvenile court may apply the parental-benefit
exception on a sliding scale of visitation, with less consistency
required where the parental relationship is arguably more
beneficial to the child. As the court in In re G.H. explained in the
next sentence of its opinion, however, it is the consistency of a
parent’s visitation that develops “‘a significant, positive,
emotional attachment from child to parent.’” (Id. at pp. 26-27.)
Without regular visitation, a parent cannot show a beneficial
relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632 [regular

                                 13
visits and contact are necessary to continue or develop a
significant, positive, and emotional attachment between parent
and child]; In re Grace P. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 605, 614
[“evidence of the nature of the visits would be ineffective in
proving a beneficial parent-child relationship, where the parent
failed to maintain consistent and frequent contact with the
child”].) Because Chastity did not meet her burden to prove she
maintained regular visitation and contact with Gabriella and
Gracie, she has not shown the juvenile court erred in failing to
apply the parental-benefit exception to the termination of her
parental rights. We need not address her arguments the juvenile
court erred in analyzing the other factors of the parental-benefit
exception. (See In re Eli B., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 1068
[court need not address arguments regarding the second and
third elements of the parental-benefit exception if the parent fails
to prove the first element].)

      B.    The Department Did Not Comply with ICWA and
            Related California Law Regarding Ramon, Jr.
      Chastity contends the ICWA-030 notice submitted on
behalf of Ramon, Jr. included the same deficiencies we identified
with Hailey’s ICWA-030 notice.3 (See Gabriella H. I, supra,

3      Chastity argues we can consider whether the Department
complied with its duties under ICWA and California law in her
appeal from the juvenile court’s order denying her section 388
petition because “Ramon, Jr.’s continued foster care placement
was at issue.” In In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1 the Supreme
Court held an appellate court may review a juvenile court’s
compliance with ICWA in an appeal from any order that “was
necessarily premised on a current finding by the juvenile court

                                14
B313276.) The Department concedes, and we agree, the juvenile
court failed to ensure the Department fulfilled its obligation to
conduct an adequate inquiry under ICWA and related California
law regarding Ramon, Jr. We also accept the Department’s
concession that remand is appropriate to allow the Department to
conduct a proper inquiry and to allow the juvenile court to ensure
the Department conducts such an inquiry.

that it had no reason to know [a child] was an Indian child and
thus ICWA notice was not required.” (Id. at p. 10.) The
Department does not challenge Chastity’s position; there are no
published cases addressing whether a juvenile court’s order
denying a section 388 petition regarding placement is
“necessarily premised” on a finding that notice under ICWA was
not required. (See § 224.3, subd. (a) [requiring ICWA notice “for
hearings that may culminate in an order for foster care
placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, or adoptive placement”].) We do not express an
opinion on this issue.

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                         DISPOSITION

       The juvenile court’s October 8, 2021 order denying
Chastity’s section 388 petition and the court’s August 30, 2022
order terminating Chastity’s parental rights to Gabriella and
Gracie are affirmed. The juvenile court’s August 30, 2022 order
denying Chastity’s section 388 petition asking the court to change
its order placing Ramon, Jr. with a non-relative caregiver is
conditionally affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to ensure
the Department complies fully with the inquiry and notice
provisions of ICWA and related California law regarding
Ramon, Jr.

                                          SEGAL, J.

     We concur:

                  PERLUSS, P. J.

                  FEUER, J.

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