Court Opinion

ID: 9374850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 15:05:37.233862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.656199
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-1072-MR

STEVE HACKWORTH                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE GEORGE W. DAVIS, III, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CR-00178

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Steve Hackworth appeals the Final Judgment and Sentence of

Imprisonment rendered by the Boyd Circuit Court on September 7, 2021,

sentencing him to nine-years’ incarceration following a jury trial. We affirm.

            Hackworth was convicted by a jury of three counts of sexual abuse,

first degree. The jury recommended a sentence of three years on each count to run

consecutively for a total of nine-years’ incarceration. Hackworth’s appeal is
limited only to the jury instructions in the penalty phase of the trial.1 Specifically,

he asserts the jury was improperly instructed as to concurrent and consecutive

sentencing. For the reasons stated, we disagree with this argument.

              We begin by noting that Hackworth’s argument on appeal is

unpreserved. The Commonwealth and Hackworth tendered proposed jury

instructions, and at no time during the trial did Hackworth object to the instructions

ultimately submitted to the jury. Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)

9.54(2); Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 346 (Ky. 2013). Our review

is therefore limited to palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26. “Appellate courts

review[ ] unpreserved claims of error on direct appeal only for palpable error. To

prevail, one must show that the error resulted in manifest injustice.” Ford v.

Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). RCr 10.26 states that, “[a] palpable error which affects the substantial

rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for a new trial or by an

appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for

review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest

injustice has resulted from the error.”

1
 Steve Hackworth was convicted on three counts of sexual abuse in the first degree and
conspiring to tamper with physical evidence. He was acquitted of being a persistent felon in the
second degree. The underlying facts of those crimes are not relevant to the disposition of this
appeal.

                                               -2-
             When a defendant is convicted of more than two offenses, the jury

should be advised that some of the offenses may be run concurrently, and some

may be run consecutively. Stoker v. Commonwealth, 828 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Ky.

1992). Hackworth argues the jury was not made aware that it could run some of

the sentences consecutively and some concurrently. However, the language that

Hackworth complains was not presented to the jury was, in fact, presented in the

jury instructions. In the instant action, Penalty Phase Instruction No. 4 stated:

             You will further recommend in your verdict whether any
             or all of the punishments you fix for the Defendant under
             Counts 1, 2, and 3 should be served concurrently (at the
             same time) or consecutively (one to begin after the
             completion of the other).

             Penalty Phase Form Verdict No. 4 stated:

             CHECK AND COMPLETE ONLY ONE OF THE
             FOLLOWING:

             _______ We recommend that the punishments fixed
             under Counts 1, 2, and 3 be served concurrently (at the
             same time).

             _______ We recommend that the punishments fixed
             under Counts 1, 2, and 3 be served consecutively (one
             after another) for a total of _____ years.

(Emphasis added.)

             The jury selected the second option, indicating each of the three-year

sentences was to run consecutively with the others for a total of nine-years’

incarceration.

                                         -3-
            We agree with the Commonwealth that Stoker is distinguishable from

the case at bar. In Stoker, the jury recommended the sentences of the co-

defendants run consecutively and the trial court followed the jury’s

recommendation. The jury was not instructed that some sentences could run

concurrently and some consecutively. First, the error in Stoker was preserved.

Second, Stoker involved two defendants accused of horrific abuse and a murder

lingering in the background during the trial. In ruling the defendants’ sentences

should run concurrently, the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that the facts

and circumstances in Stoker were unique. To wit:

             [I]f the sentences are run concurrently the result will still
             be severe, 50 years for Ronald Stoker (which he received
             on each rape charge) and 30 years for Sheila Davis
             (which she received on each sodomy charge), with
             minimum parole eligibility under the violent offender
             statute, KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 439.3401, of
             50% of the sentence imposed, 25 years and 15 years,
             respectively.

                    We recognize that technically it was the trial court,
             not the jury, that imposed consecutive sentences on all
             counts. But we also recognize that this was done in
             conformity with the jury’s verdict and the practical
             difficulty in doing otherwise in the face of the jury’s
             recommendation, given the highly inflammatory
             circumstances generated by a combination of factors
             including the inflammatory nature of the offenses and the
             murder conviction in the background. This was no
             ordinary case. These same circumstances also make it
             patently unreasonable to burden the trial court with the
             responsibility to decide once again which sentences
             should run consecutively and which concurrently, and to

                                          -4-
            do so fairly with the full weight of the knowledge of the
            jury’s recommendation sitting on his shoulders.

                    The only other course available in present
            circumstances would be to set aside the sentencing phase
            of the trial entirely and to remand for a complete new
            trial of the sentencing phase. This is both an inadequate
            solution and a waste of judicial resources, and we decline
            this course of action.

                   In the situation presented, the only appropriate way
            to correct the sentencing error generating from the
            erroneous instructions for guidance is to look to the
            language of KRS 532.110(2), which provides:

                   “If the court does not specify the manner in
                   which a sentence imposed by it is to run, the
                   sentence shall run concurrently with any
                   other sentence which the defendant must
                   serve.”

Stoker, 828 S.W.2d at 627-28.

            Jury instructions must be read as a whole. Bills v. Commonwealth,

851 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Ky. 1993) (internal citations omitted). Further, juries are

presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial court. Matheney v.

Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Ky. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

Although Kentucky Revised Statutes 532.055(2) requires the jury recommend

whether the sentences run concurrently or consecutively, the jury’s sentencing

recommendation is just that – a recommendation – and not binding on the trial

court. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commonwealth, 50 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Ky. 2001);

Commonwealth v. Pelfrey, 998 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1999); Nichols v.

                                        -5-
Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Ky. 1992). When read as a whole, we

discern no manifest injustice in the instructions submitted to the jury. Nor do we

discern manifest injustice in the trial court’s decision to follow the jury’s

sentencing recommendation.

             Accordingly, the judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Karen Shuff Maurer                         Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Melissa A. Pile
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

                                          -6-