Court Opinion

ID: 9645495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:26:51.404699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:30.299186
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing
Appellee complains that this Court erred in considering points of error concerning the action of the trial court in finding that the shares of stock acquired by appellee from his wife constituted his separate property because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the gifts made by the wife through the instrumentality of a trustee. This argument is based on the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Domestic Relations.
By Article 2338-1 la the Harris County Court of Domestic Relations No. 4 is given jurisdiction concurrent with the District Courts of all divorce cases, including the adjudication of property rights and all other matters involving justiciable controversies between spouses. It was not given jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes as to property rights between husband and wife and third parties. Rose v. Hatten, 417 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1966).
Appellee seeks to bring this case under Rose v. Hatten by pointing out that appellant sued to set aside the instrument by which she, joined by her husband, conveyed the stock to Dee Brown Walker, Trustee, “in trust, for the sole and only purpose of conveying the same to Wilford J. Bohn.” Thereafter the trustee transferred the stock by instrument in writing to Bohn and caused the stock to be issued to him. Other shares of stock were transferred by Mrs. Bohn to her husband using the same device. The instruments contained warranties. It is appellee’s position that these instruments *172cannot be set aside unless the trustees were made parties, and that if they were made parties the Court of Domestic Relations would not have jurisdiction since there would be a controversy involving title to property between a husband and wife and third parties.
It is well settled that one who desires to create an express, private trust must give his trustee affirmative powers and duties. In the absence of such powers and duties the trust is passive or dry, and legal title, not merely an equitable interest, passes to the cestui que trust. There is respectable authority that the duty of executing a deed to a named cestui que trust is not such a duty as will prevent title from vesting immediately. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 2d Ed., § 206. See Moore v. City of Waco, 85 Tex. 206, 20 S.W. 61 (1892); Brown v. Harris, 7 Tex.Civ.App. 664, 27 S.W. 45 (1894); Clark v. Wisdom, 403 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Civ.App., Corpus Christi 1966).
In any event the trustee had transferred the stock in accordance with the trust instrument when this suit was instituted and the trust had terminated. The trustee never had any equitable interest in the stock. There could be no liability under the trustee's warranty since the trust was executed and there was no monetary consideration. Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 172 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.Civ.App., Galveston 1943), aff’d 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291.
It is our opinion that Dee Brown Walker was not a necessary party to this suit to set aside the instruments in question. The fact that the trustee was not made a party apparently did not bother the court in Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Com.App.1944, opinion adopted), a suit to set aside a trust agreement, nor the court in Caffey’s Ex’rs et al. v. Caffey, 12 Tex.Civ.App. 616, 35 S.W. 738 (1896). See also Golob v. Stone, 262 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana 1953).
The motions for rehearing are overruled.