Court Opinion

ID: 9796911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:08:02.811859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:43.723546
License: Public Domain

Justice EISMANN,
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part.
I concur in Parts I, II, III.B, III.C, and IV. I concur in the result in Part III.A.
Part III.A. of the majority opinion eviscerates the legislature’s power to “provide a proper system of appeals” under Article V, § 3, of the Idaho Constitution. This Court has previously recognized that the legislature’s power under this constitutional provision includes the right to determine whether appeals can be taken immediately from decisions that are not yet final.
In Evans State Bank v. Skeen, 30 Idaho 703, 167 P. 1165 (1917), this Court addressed the issue of whether an appeal could be taken directly from interlocutory orders appointing a receiver of mortgaged personal property, denying and overruling a motion to vacate and set aside the receivership, and authorizing and directing the sale of the property. This Court held that it could not because the legislature had not conferred a right to appeal such interlocutory orders pursuant to its power to “provide a proper system of appeals” under Article V, § 3, of the Idaho Constitution. In so holding, this Court stated:
The right to appeal, in this state, is conferred by legislative authority, and if it exists it must be found in the Constitution or statutes. It has been contended that all orders and decisions of district courts are made appealable by section 9, art. 5, of the Constitution, wherein it is provided that the Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to review, upon appeal, any decision of the district courts, or the judges thereof, but this section must be read and considered together with section 13 of the same article, directing that the Legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals. In the discharge of the duty imposed upon it by section 13, art. 5, of the Constitution, above mentioned, the Legislature, in section 4800, Rev.Codes, has provided:
“A judgment or order, in a civil action, except when expressly made final, may be reviewed as prescribed in this Code, and not otherwise.”
Section 4807, Rev.Codes, as amended by chapter 111, Sess. Laws 1911, p. 367, and by chapter 80, Sess. Laws 1915, p. 193, designate the judgments and orders of district courts from which appeals may be taken to this court, and they are: A final judgment in an action or special proceeding commenced in the court in which the same is rendered; a judgment rendered on appeal from an inferior court; a judgment rendered on an appeal from an order, decision, or action of a board of county commissioners; an order granting or refusing to grant a new trial; an order granting or dissolving an injunction; an order refusing to grant or dissolve an injunction; an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an attachment; an order granting or refusing to grant a change of place of trial; any special order made after final judgment; and an interlocutory judgment in actions *215for partition of real property. While other legislative enactments provide for appeals from the district courts to this court in certain cases, none of them apply to the question here under consideration.
30 Idaho at 704-05, 167 P. at 1165-66 (emphasis added). The reference in the first sentence of the above quotation to the “right to appeal” being conferred by legislative authority includes when the appeal may be taken. That was the sole issue in that case. If the legislature had no authority to grant a right to directly appeal an interlocutory order, it would not have been necessary to address whether it had granted the right to appeal the interlocutory orders at issue in the case.
In State ex rel. State Board of Medicine v. Smith, 80 Idaho 267, 328 P.2d 581 (1958), this Court again recognized that the legislature has the power to grant the right to an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order. In dismissing an appeal because the legislature had not granted a right to appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, this Court stated:
Section 13 of Article 5, in part provides: ‘ * * * but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeals, * * *.’ By the provisions of Chapter 2, Title 13, I.C., the legislature has provided, pursuant to the mandate of the constitution, a proper system of appeals from the district courts to the supreme court.
Where no direct appeal from an intermediate decision is provided by the legislature, such decision is reviewable only upon appeal from the final judgment. The failure of the legislature to provide for a direct appeal from such a decision, is not a denial of, or limitation upon, the jurisdiction of the supreme court to review such decision upon appeal. It is a recognition by the legislature of a truism inherent in a proper system of appeals; namely, to permit an appeal from all intermediate orders and decisions of the district courts would result in such vexatious and intolerable confusion and delay as to render impossible an orderly and expeditious administration of justice by the courts of the state.
80 Idaho at 269, 328 P.2d at 581-82 (emphasis added).
In Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, 494 P.2d 566 (1972), this Court held that an appeal could not be taken from an order denying summary judgment because the legislature had not provided for an appeal from such interlocutory order in the exercise of its power to provide a proper system of appeals. This Court concluded: “It is clear that the appeal attempted to be taken herein is not authorized by the legislature, which, in turn, is constitutionally authorized to prescribe a system of appeals in this state. The motion of the plaintiff is granted and the appeal by the defendant is dismissed.” 94 Idaho at 563, 494 P.2d at 567. DeBoard attempted to appeal the order denying his motion for summary judgment before a final judgment was entered in the case, not after.
In Oneida v. Oneida, 95 Idaho 105, 503 P.2d 305 (1972), this Court again recognized the legislative power to grant the right to appeal from an interlocutory order. The parties were all shareholders of Oneida, Inc. The central issue in the litigation was whether it was economically feasible to divide the assets of the corporation among the parties. After the district court ruled it was not, the plaintiffs appealed. A statute provided for an appeal from an interlocutory judgment in an action to partition real property, but not from an interlocutory judgment in an action to divide the assets of a corporation. This Court therefore dismissed the appeal because the legislature had not provided for an immediate appeal from the interlocutory order at issue. In so doing, this Court stated:
The appellants were seeking to partition the assets — both real and personal- — of the corporation known as Oneida, Inc. This is not an action ‘for partition of real property’ within the meaning of I.C. s 13-201. If any label may be applied, this is an action to dissolve and partition the assets of a corporation. While the legislature has provided for a direct appeal from an interlocutory judgment in an action for partition of real property, it has not provided, for a direct appeal from an intermediate decision in an action for partition of corporate assets. I.C. s 13-201. The district court’s order is an intermediate order reviewable only upon appeal from the final judgment.
*21695 Idaho at 108, 503 P.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
Ordinarily, the right to appeal is governed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. See Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 860, 55 P.3d 304, 314 (2002). That is because Idaho Code § 13-201 provides, “An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a district court in any civil action by such parties from such orders and judgments, and within such times and in such manner as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court.” In enacting that statute, however, the legislature did not and could not divest itself of its constitutional power to determine whether appeals can be taken immediately from decisions that are not yet final.
Since it is clear that the legislature has the constitutional power to provide for direct appeals from interlocutory orders, the issue is whether it has done so by the enactment of Idaho Code § 7-919. That statute provides:
(a) An appeal may be taken from:
(1) An order denying an application to compel arbitration made under section 7-919, Idaho Code;
(2) An order granting an application to stay arbitration made under section 7-902(b), Idaho Code;
(3) An order confirming or denying confirmation of an award;
(4) An order modifying or correcting an award;
(5) An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing; or
(6) A judgment or decree entered pursuant to the provisions of this act.
(b) The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.
When deciding whether the legislature intended to grant the right to direct appeals from the orders or judgments listed in subsections (1) through (6) of Idaho Code § 7-919(a), this Court “may also consider the reasonableness of proposed interpretations. ‘Constructions that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored.’ ” Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted).
Idaho Code § 7-919(a) means either that the aggrieved party has the right to an immediate appeal from the orders or judgments listed or that the party only has the right to appeal those orders or judgments after a final judgment is later entered in the lawsuit. As the majority concedes, “It does not make sense to force parties to an arbitration agreement to proceed through litigation only to discover later the matter should have been arbitrated.” Therefore, the reasonable construction is that the statute grants the right to appeal those orders or judgments directly, regardless of whether they are final or interlocutory.
The majority relies upon this Court’s construction of Idaho Code § 72-724 for the proposition that Idaho Code § 7-919(a) only grants a right to appeal the orders or judgments listed once a final judgment has been entered. There are material differences between the two statutes. Idaho Code § 72-724 provides, “An appeal may be made to the Supreme Court by such parties from such decisions and orders of the commission and within such times and in such manner as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court.” Unlike Section 7-919(a), it does not list the orders and/or judgments from which appeals may be taken. It simply refers to the rules of this Court. It permits an appeal “from such decisions and orders of the commission ... as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court.” Idaho Code § 7-919 does not contain any such limitation. There is no reference to the rules of this Court.
Subsection (b) of the statute provides, “The appeal shall be taken in the manner and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil action.” The word “manner” simply refers to the procedure for prosecuting the appeal. The phrase “to the same extent” simply refers to the scope of the appeal. The appellate court is to review it just as it would review an appeal from any order or judgment in a civil action.
Thus, I agree with the result that the order denying arbitration was appealable. In so holding, however, I would simply recognize the legislature’s constitutional power to provide for a direct appeal from interlocutory orders.
Chief Justice SCHROEDER concurs.