Court Opinion

ID: 9562772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:33:40.79397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:31.018712
License: Public Domain

CARDINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion of this court recognizes that the first degree murder conviction of Charles Murry cannot be upheld unless the doctrine of “transferred intent” applies. Thus, the court, in its opinion, states:
“The circumstances in this case illustrate a classic example of transferred intent. *213Here appellant killed Craig Bernatchy when he intended to kill John Carter.” 1
The problem with this statement is that there is simply no evidence at all that appellant, Charles Murry, intended to kill John Carter when the gun fired. It is suggested that when he was informed that he had just shot Craig Bernatchy and replied, “No, I didn’t shoot Craig,” it was an admission that he thought he had shot John Carter. But appellant’s testimony in context was that he did not remember shooting the gun and, therefore, did not think he had shot Craig or anyone else. Thus, Charles Murry testified:
“Q. Did you run to the van?
“A. Evidently, I did.
“Q. What happened next?
“A. The next thing I knew Leroy was telling me that I had shot Craig.
“Q. Do you remember fighting with your wife?
“A. No, I don’t.
* * ⅜ * *
“Q. Well, do you remember pushing your wife away onto the ground and running around the van?
“A. No, I don’t. I remember running into Leroy. The next thing I remember I ran into Leroy.
“Q. Okay. Do you remember shooting that gun?
“A. No, I don’t.
“Q. The next thing you remember you ran into Leroy?
“A. Yes, I did.
“Q. What happened?
“A. Well, when I ran into Leroy — Leroy was standing there. He told me I had shot Craig and I told him, no, I hadn’t and he said, yes, you did and he said Craig’s laying down there on the ground, and I gave Leroy the shotgun and he threw it away.”
The court notes the excessive drinking by all participants which may explain appellant’s lack of recall. This court, in its opinion, also notes that the police officers said that appellant, immediately after the shooting, stated that Craig Bernatchy grabbed the gun and it discharged. Neither appellant’s testimony that he did not recall shooting the gun nor his alleged statement that the gun discharged when Bernatchy grabbed it is evidence that he thought he was shooting at Carter. Finally, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Craig Bernatchy and Leroy Hibbs went outside at Mrs. Murry’s request to calm down her husband. Mrs. Murry, Ber-natchy, and Hibbs were outside with appellant for two or three minutes before the shooting occurred. The only fair inference from these facts is that appellant knew who was present outside the bar; surely it cannot be inferred from these facts that appellant believed John Carter was present at that time.
In a California case similar to this case, the defendant, Mrs. Steward, after premeditating and deliberating, stabbed her roommate, Mrs. Hosford. Although the knife struck home, Mrs. Hosford escaped the premises with non-fatal wounds. When the police investigated the next day, they found the defendant’s daughter, Carol, stabbed to death in her bed. The court held that neither the defendant’s intent nor her premeditation could be transferred from Mrs. Hosford to Carol under the doctrine of transferred intent. This was because there was no evidence that the defendant intended Mrs. Hosford as the victim when she stabbed Carol. The intent and premeditation could have been transferred, according to the court, only if “appellant had lunged at Mrs. Hosford with the knife and had stabbed Carol inadvertently when Mrs. Hosford stepped aside, * * * but * * * the record is barren of such evidence.” The court affirmed Mrs. Steward’s conviction of *214first degree murder only because there was sufficient independent evidence showing that Mrs. Steward intentionally stabbed her daughter with premeditation. People v. Steward, 156 Cal.App.2d 177, 318 P.2d 806 (1957).
The jury should not have been instructed on the doctrine of transferred intent. “An instruction should not be given if it is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or if it is not based on some theory logically derived from some part of the evidence.” Patterson v. State, Wyo., 682 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1984). Without utilizing the doctrine of “transferred intent,” there is simply no evidence that appellant shot and killed his friend, Craig Bernatchy, with premeditated malice. The killing may have been accidental or in a sudden heat of passion which would be manslaughter. We should, therefore, reduce or set aside appellant’s conviction unless we can conclude that the jury based its verdict on evidence of premeditation unrelated to the theory of transferred intent.
PREMEDITATION
The only other basis for finding that appellant premeditated Bernatchy’s death is so poorly supported by the evidence that it cannot save this conviction. This is especially true if a correct legal definition of premeditation is applied to the facts of this case.
Premeditation is defined negatively by the court in the majority opinion as a thought process that does not involve a set period of time. The court seems to be saying that a defendant can premeditate instantaneously, in the same time that it takes him to form the intent to act. The problem with this approach is that it leads courts and juries to the conclusion that premeditation is nothing more than intent. This, in turn, blurs the distinction between first and second degree murder, a distinction the legislature has based entirely on the difference between premeditation and intent.2
“[T]he classical and traditional Wyoming statutory first degree murder language and its meaning [are] fairly well settled.” T. Lauer, Goodbye 3-Card Monte: The Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19 Land & Water L.Rev. 107, 121 (1984).
“ ‘It requires that there should be time and opportunity for deliberate thought, and that after the mind has conceived the thought of taking life, the thought is meditated upon and a deliberate determination formed to do the act. This being done, it makes no difference how soon afterwards the fatal resolve is carried into execution. There need be no specific period of time between the formation of the intention in the mind to kill and the killing so long as there was some time for deliberation.’ ” Cloman v. State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 410, 418 (1978), citing State v. Riggle, 76 Wyo. 1, 298 P.2d 349, 367 (1956).
It is clear from our statement in Cloman that the key aspect of “premeditated malice” is not the absence of time as the majority suggests, but instead the opportunity for deliberative thought.3 Without *215this opportunity for deliberation, there can be no premeditated malice and no first degree murder.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF PREMEDITATION
Generally, three categories of evidence can show premeditation:
“(1) facts about how and what the defendant did prior to the actual killing which show he was engaged in activity directed toward the killing, that is, planning activity; (2) facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and conduct with the victim from which motive may be inferred; and (3) facts about the nature of the killing from which it may be inferred that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design.” W. La-Fave & A. Scott, supra at 564.
The uncontroverted facts of this case say to me that under instructions correctly stating the law, appellant’s conviction would have been for the crime of manslaughter, i.e. a killing upon a sudden heat of passion or involuntarily in the commission of some unlawful act.4
The uncontroverted facts follow: Appellant is a black man married to a white woman. Gillette, Wyoming is in a major area of oil drilling and production activity. Many of its residents are oil rig hands, roughnecks, drillers, tool pushers, or employed in related occupations. The evening that this incident occurred, appellant, a musician, was at the Watering Hole # 3 Bar in Gillette awaiting a telephone call and visiting his friend, Craig Bernatchy, who was bartending. “Fats” Carter noticed appellant because he was “black” and because he had a “plume” in his hat and testified: “Q. So, what did you do when you noticed these things?
“A. Oh, I don’t know — I decided I’d have his plume, I guess.”
The cocktail waitress stated:
“I heard * * * John D. [Carter] calling Chuck [Murry] a f — king nigger.”
Appellant’s wife, Shirley Ann Murry, testified:
“They wanted the feather in his hat. He said you can’t have my feather; I told you the next time I play Deadwood I’ll get you one. They said you’re lying. Chuck said, yes, I will.
* * * * * *
“They said what is it with you mother-f — king niggers and your white feathers and your white broads. Then, I looked up and Chuck turned around, and he said she isn’t a broad; that’s my wife, and he said why don’t you just leave us alone.
H¡ # # # # #
“Q. Now, you and Chuck are leaving. What happened then?
*216“A. * * * Chuck stuck out his hand like he wanted to shake hands with Carter and he said, hey, man, no hard feelings; I’ll still get you a feather. About that time, J.D. took a punch at him and hit him and Chuck fell and almost knocked me over * * *.
******
“His mouth was bleeding. I handed him his glasses and he put them on. He said nobody’s hitting me.
******
“He kept saying nobody does that, nobody does that. He was looking at me but he wasn’t seeing me, and I got scared.”
Appellant, Charles Murry, testified:
“Q. Okay. You try to avoid confrontations along that issue [regarding his race]?
******
“A. I learned that you accept it and just throw things off. Certain things you hear and some you don’t hear, you just look over them.
******
“Q. Do you recall anything else that happened with John Carter?
“A. Well, when I was leaving — that’s after Craig [Bernatchy] and I got through talking. Craig had called me in the liquor department and I was coming out, John D. was standing in the hallway and I was coming by, and he said you get away from me, you dirty nigger, I don’t like f — king niggers. I said, hey, man, I don’t either and I walked on by. He just kept it up.
******
“Q. Now, what happened?
“A. You know, when I was leaving and I was talking with Jeff LeBeau — I was talking to Jeff and Carter cut in, and I told him, hey, man, it’s all over — you know, I’m leaving — you know, just like that. He said something else and I turned around and told him, man, it’s over with — which I’ve done so many times before — and that’s when he sucker-punched me.
“Q. Where did you get hit?
“A. In the nose.”
The manner in which the shooting occurred does not imply premeditation. Appellant was extremely drunk and upset. He had been the subject of extreme abuse and racial slurs. His actions thereafter were irrational. According to Leroy Hibbs, the only eyewitness to the event, appellant struggled with his wife and pushed her to the ground just prior to the shooting. While I agree that premeditation is usually a jury question, in this case I do not believe the evidence, under proper instructions on the law and taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could establish premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. It is quite likely that the jury improperly applied the doctrine of transferred intent to reach its decision that appellant premeditated the killing of Craig Bernatchy.
RELIEF FOR APPELLANT
When the element of premeditation has not been proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal of the conviction is not always required. We can sometimes reduce the conviction to second degree murder or manslaughter without a new trial. Goodman v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 400, 414 (1977). Such a remedy would not be proper in this case, however, because it is likely that the jury relied upon the doctrine of transferred intent to conclude that the shooting was intentional. Transfer of the intent element was no more justified in this case than was transfer of the premeditation element. It is impossible to tell if the jury reached its general verdict by transferring the intent to shoot Carter to intent to shoot Bernatchy. If the “transferred intent” instruction had not been given to the jury, I would propose that we reduce appellant’s conviction to manslaughter. Having given this instruction, however, I am convinced that appellant’s conviction should be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial so the jury can, under proper instructions of law, pass upon *217the premeditation and intent issues without the smokescreen created by the transferred intent rule.

. The classic case of transferred intent involves "bad aim." For example, “where A aims at B with a murderous intent to kill, but because of a bad aim he hits and kills C, A is uniformly held guilty of the murder of C. And if A aims at B with a first-degree-murder state of mind, he commits first degree murder as to C, by the majority view.” W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, 252 (1972).

. At the time appellant was charged, first degree murder was defined by § 6-4-101(a), W.S.1977 as a purposeful homicide undertaken with premeditated malice. Second degree murder was a purposeful and malicious homicide but without premeditation. Section 6-4-104, W.S.1977.
"It is often said that premeditation and deliberation require only a ‘brief moment of thought' or a ‘matter of seconds,’ and convictions for first degree murder have frequently been affirmed where such short periods of time were involved. The better view, however, is that to ‘speak of premeditation and deliberation which are instantaneous, or which take no appreciable time, * * * destroys the statutory distinction between first
and second degree murder,' and * * * this view is growing in popularity.” (Footnotes omitted.) W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law, 563 (1972). See also People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, 975 (1964); State v. Shirley, 60 Wash.2d 277, 373 P.2d 777 (1962).

. "Those who first employed [the word premeditated] in this type of first-degree murder statute undoubtedly had in mind a malicious scheme thought out well in advance of the fatal act itself. And unless we are willing to ignore the plain meaning of words we are forced to recognize that a fatal act might be intentional and yet entirely too hasty to be *215deliberate and premeditated. The notion that a fully-formed intent is always deliberate and premeditated, no matter how short the time between the first thought of the matter and the execution of the plan, is preposterous. And yet some of the courts have taken just such a position. * * * In line with this suggestion it has been said that one may be guilty of murder in the first degree although the intent to commit such homicide is ‘formed by the accused immediately before the act is actually committed,’ or ‘at the very moment the fatal shot was fired.’
“The sound interpretation of such a statute is that a killing is deliberate and premeditated if, and only if, it results from real and substantial reflection. It is not sufficient that the idea be fully formed and acted upon; it must be pondered over and weighed in the mind." R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law, 131— 132 (3rd ed. 1982). See also W. LaFave and A. Scott, supra at 563-564; People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 795, 40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959, 976 (1964), citing People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7 (1945) (‘‘‘The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection.'" (Emphasis added.))

. The manslaughter statute in effect at the time of this incident, § 6-4-107, W.S.1977, provided: “Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful act, except as provided in W.S. 31-5-1117, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than twenty (20) years.”