Court Opinion

ID: 9486073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:37:14.283555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:30.986753
License: Public Domain

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The court persuasively explains why Cup-pett has not carried his burden of showing that the West Virginia conviction is invalid under Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 268, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), and I join its opinion. Although this means that Cup-pett is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, two other routes leading to the same destination are worth exploring.
I
Cuppett did not ask the court that imposed his sentence in Indiana to examine the validity of the West Virginia conviction. The only issue he raised on appeal was the sufficiency of the evidence. Cuppett v. State, 448 N.E.2d 298 (Ind.1983). So he has forfeited any opportunity to contest his sentence as an habitual offender unless he can establish cause for, and prejudice from, the default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). He attempted to do so by arguing that his lawyer rendered constitutionally inadequate assistance, a shortcoming that establishes “cause.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). The state’s court of first instance rejected this contention, ruling that a reasonably competent lawyer would have accepted the force of the West Virginia conviction because of the notation in the record that Cuppett “did not desire counsel appointed by this Court”. The Court of Appeals of Indiana likewise concluded that competent counsel could have decided against challenging the West Virginia conviction, explaining: “Cuppett’s 1962 order indicates that he was aware of his right to representation. Consequently, the record was regular on its face, and an objection would have been unavailing.” Cuppett v. State, 502 N.E.2d 503 (Ind.App.1986) (Table). The court relied on Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 864-65 (Ind.1985), which held that a conviction accompanied by a record showing that the defendant declined an opportunity to have counsel’s aid may be used to support sentencing as an habitual offender. Cuppett’s lawyer in this court scarcely mentions the need to show “cause” via ineffective assistance, no doubt understanding that his client’s best chance lies in the hope that we will o’erleap this obstacle in order to resolve an interesting legal question. Current counsel deserves credit for a nice try, but the state courts got this subject exactly right.
To show that his lawyer at sentencing was constitutionally deficient, Cuppett must establish that he performed well below the norm of competence in the profession, and that this caused prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Assistance may be deficient, in the sense that counsel erred, without being constitutionally ineffective. Even the best lawyer slips up from time to time. With the benefit of hindsight, judges see how many a lawyer could have acted differently. On the spot, with limited time to explore options, counsel must do the best they can. Only “errors so serious that the counsel was not functioning as *1143the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” establish deficient performance. Ibid.
The materials at hand during Cuppett’s sentencing in Indiana would not have seemed a promising vein for counsel to mine. The West Virginia judgment was regular in all respects — rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and meeting Indiana’s standards for enhancement. Anyone seeking to attack such a judgment has a steep hill to climb. Indeed, it remains unclear whether it is possible to surmount the challenge. Burgett suggests that the answer is yes, but a later case, Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980), holds that in certain instances even uncounseled convictions may be used as the foundation for a recidivist conviction. See also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (counsel not essential for misdemeanor convictions); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); United States v. Nichols, 979 F.2d 402, 414-18 (6th Cir.1992) (uncounseled misdemeanor conviction may be used to enhance a sentence for a later crime); United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1993) (same). Cf. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 96 S.Ct. 1281, 47 L.Ed.2d 556 (1976). But cf. Baldosar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980). More recently still the Supreme Court reserved the question whether, and under what circumstances, “States must allow recidivism defendants to challenge prior guilty pleas”. Parke v. Raley, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Cuppett’s 1962 conviction was based on a guilty plea.
To get anywhere, Cuppett’s lawyer would have had to persuade the sentencing judge in Indiana that the kind of claim he seeks to present may be maintained, and that Cup-pett’s situation is closer to Burgett than to Lewis. It is hard to fault counsel for directing his energies elsewhere. We do not assess the competence of lawyers by whether they can navigate between seemingly opposed decisions of the Supreme Court and argue, successfully, for one side of a question that years later the Court identified as a tough subject in need of mulling over.
If counsel could have persuaded the judge to look behind the face of the West Virginia judgment, he would have encountered the notation in the record that Cuppett “did not desire counsel appointed by this Court to represent” him. That makes this case harder than Burgett. Because one seeking to upset a judgment bears the burden, Cuppett would have had to persuade the sentencing judge that this notation did not connote an offer of counsel at no expense. Yet “appointed” suggests such an offer. To avoid the force of this implication, counsel would have had to research the law and the practice of West Virginia, trying to ascertain what “appointed” meant there in 1962 — and, if this word is insolubly ambiguous, whether the judge before whom Cuppett was standing would have appointed counsel for someone in Cuppett’s shoes. Under Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 62 S.Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595 (1942), which established the rules that preceded Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), counsel had to be appointed whenever the facts or law were too complex for the defendant to handle unassisted. Judges did not appoint lawyers automatically, but neither could they leave all defendants to fend for themselves. How complex was the charge laid against Cuppett? What would a judge in West Virginia have done? More than a decade after Cuppett’s sentencing in Indiana, members of this court are debating that question. That they are doing so, and finding the answer elusive, speaks directly to the “performance” component of Strickland. We do not call a lawyer incompetent for failing to address on the spot a subject that perplexes 11 judges with a platoon of law clerks. And it is worth pointing out once again that we have no reason to believe that in 1962 in West Virginia the word “appointed” meant anything other than what it means to us today: “at public expense”, or at least “at no cost to the litigant.” Cf. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203-04, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2879-80, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989). Thus there is good reason to believe that West Virginia offered Cuppett the free lawyer that Gideon requires.
Then there is the “prejudice” component of Strickland. A majority of this court believes *1144that the West Virginia conviction is invulnerable, so there could be no prejudice. Once again, however, we need not decide the merits to reach this conclusion. “Prejudice” is a more demanding standard than but-for causation. “The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel’s unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2582, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). “[A]n analysis focussing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, —U.S.—,—, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
Cuppett has at least three felony convictions preceding the crime he committed in Indiana. (The prosecution proved three; we do not know whether- more could have been adduced had the court decided to disregard the West Virginia conviction.) Disregard the West Virginia conviction for now. Is it “fundamentally unfair” to give an enhanced sentence to a criminal with two prior felonies? The enhancement in Indiana is 30 years, but some federal laws treat defendants even more harshly: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) adds up to 20 years per prior conviction. See Deal v. United States, — U.S.—, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993). Indiana enhances the sentence only if two of the prior convictions were imposed on different occasions; if Cup-pett knocks out the West Virginia conviction the other two, imposed at the same time in Illinois, would not suffice for purposes of Indiana law. Yet the writ of habeas corpus is not a device to enforce state law. E.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, — U.S. — — —, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2117-18, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993); Estelle v. McGuire, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). “Prejudice” under Strickland means fundamental unfairness, not a violation of state law. So far as the Constitution is concerned, enhancement on the basis of two prior felonies that were consolidated for trial and sentencing is not “fundamentally unfair”; Deal disposes of any such contention. Indeed, so far as the Constitution is concerned, states may enhance sentences for prior conduct that did not result in conviction. Suppose Indiana were to treat a voluntary confession as equivalent to a conviction. Voluntariness does not depend on the presence of a lawyer. Courts regularly use uncounseled confessions taken in police stations; solemn guilty pleas in open court are more reliable. Cuppett has never contended that his guilty plea was involuntary; indeed, he has never denied that he committed the offense to which he pleaded guilty. So Indiana is back to three prior felonies, securely ascertained.1
Cuppett had a lawyer at trial and sentencing in Indiana. The procedure was adversarial, and none of counsel’s omissions “so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect.” Thus Cuppett cannot escape forfeiture, and his quest for a writ of habeas corpus fails without regard to the validity of the 1962 conviction.
II
If Cuppett can establish cause and prejudice, the next question is not whether the 1962 West Virginia conviction complies with Gideon. It is whether Cuppett is entitled to contest that conviction by a derivative collateral attack.
After Gideon was decided in 1963, Cuppett could have asked the courts of West Virginia to set aside his sentence, which he was still serving. See State ex rel. May v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 155, 139 S.E.2d 177 (1964). He did not. Instead he waited until after his conviction in Indiana had become final to ask both the courts of Indiana and now the federal courts to treat the Indiana sentence as deriv*1145atively invalid, because its length is influenced by the West Virginia conviction. If Cuppett had objected at sentencing to the use of the West Virginia conviction, then according to Burgett the court would have had to decide whether that conviction appears to comply with Gideon. Notice the qualifications: “at sentencing”; “appears to comply.” Burgett dealt with a claim timely raised and pursued on appeal, and it addressed only a challenge to the face of the former conviction. To get relief now, Cup-pett must ask us to extend Burgett — to look beneath the surface of the judgment, and to do this on collateral attack once removed rather than direct review. Other courts have declined to follow such a path. E.g., United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 701 (6th Cir.1992). In deciding whether to permit this derivative collateral attack, we must consider the difference between direct and collateral review, a difference that is increasingly important in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. E.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, — U.S.—, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
Burgett was decided during a period in which a majority of the Justices believed that review is unending — that waiver of the right to continuing collateral attack is all but impossible (only “deliberate bypass” would do) and that courts should reexamine judgments whenever necessary to ensure that no residue of error is allowed to remain. Those days are gone, and the defining decisions of that era have been overruled. E.g., Coleman v. Thompson, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), overruling Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, — U.S. —, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992), overruling Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). The last extension of Burgett came in 1971, when four Justices in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), stated that a judge must decide whether a conviction complies with Gideon before permitting its use in impeaching the defendant. Loper was decided without a majority opinion (a fifth Justice concurred in the judgment), and Chief Justice Burger wrote in dissent, 405 U.S. at 494, 92 S.Ct. at 1025: “If Burgett does, indeed, mean what the plurality opinion reads into it, we should overrule that decision without delay. As Mr. Justice Harlan, for himself, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice White, observed [dissenting in Burgett ], ‘We do not sit as a court of errors and appeals in state eases_’ 389 U.S., at 120 [88 S.Ct. at 264].” Burgett was severely limited in Lewis, which held that an uncoun-seled conviction may be used to prohibit the possession of a firearm, and therefore may be the basis of conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Lewis means that convictions said to be invalid under Gideon are not automatically improper bases for judicial action. Within the last year the Supreme Court relied on Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Loper, 405 U.S. at 500-01, 92 S.Ct. at 1027-28 (joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun & Powell, JJ.), ignoring the plurality’s contrary view. Parke, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 524. While the Supreme Court retrenches, we should not push forward.
Indirect collateral review of judgments in the course of sentencing for other crimes creates substantial difficulties for the court. The record of the prior conviction will be elsewhere, often in another state that has no continuing interest in defending its judgment. Inquiring into the validity of such convictions bogs down the trial or sentencing at hand. Delay and distractions might be the lesser of the available evils if prior convictions were the only permissible basis for enhanced punishment. But when imposing sentence judges may consider acts that did not lead to a conviction. E.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986). The Sentencing Guidelines contain elaborate rules about “relevant conduct” that counts against the defendant; almost none of this conduct will be the subject of a conviction. Indeed, a judge may take account of prior criminal conduct even though a jury has acquitted the defendant of charges based on these crimes. E.g., United States v. Masters, 978 F.2d 281, 285-86 (7th Cir.1992); United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332-34 (7th Cir.1990). Stationhouse confessions without the assistance of counsel are good grounds on which to enhance a *1146sentence, even though confessions standing alone do not support convictions. Once we see that acts proved beyond a reasonable doubt after a full-dress trial are not the only acceptable grounds for enhancement, it looks very odd to invest substantial resources determining whether a particular conviction offered in sentencing indeed meets the standards developed for full-dress litigation. Why should a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea (that is, on a confession in open court) be less legitimate, as a ground for enhancement, than a stationhouse confession?
The Sentencing Guidelines suggest an approach that avoids turning sentencing into a mass collateral attack on all prior convictions, and thus preserves both finality and expeditious adjudication while assuring defendants ample opportunity to protect their rights: a judge may use a conviction to increase a sentence unless that conviction has previously been held invalid. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 Application Note 6 (amendment 353, effective November 1, 1990). The note reads:
Sentences resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted. Also, sentences resulting from convictions that a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid are not to be counted. Nonetheless, the criminal conduct underlying any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history score may be considered pursuant to § 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
In other words, a conviction “counts” unless reversed or otherwise held invalid prior to the sentencing — but even if a judgment does not count as a conviction, the sentencing court is free to consider the conduct that led to the conviction. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), presaged this approach. A district judge had enhanced a sentence because of three prior convictions. Later the rendering courts vacated two of these convictions in light of Gideon. In Tucker the Court concluded that resentencing was in order because the prior convictions had disappeared — but the Court did not declare that on resentencing the judge was to put the prior criminal episodes out of mind. Instead it explained that the judge must rethink the sentence with knowledge that the prior convictions had been set aside. 404 U.S. at 448, 92 S.Ct. at 592.
Defendants have ample reason to challenge their convictions on direct appeal, or collaterally while serving their sentences. The Sentencing Commission’s approach relies on this incentive. Serious challenges are likely to be brought, and resolved, before the sentencing for a later offense. Convicts who wait too long can try coram nobis, which is available in the federal courts and many states.2 This is what happened in Tucker: the defendant obtained writs of error coram nobis from the courts in which he had been convicted, and these writs justified resentencing on the new charge. See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988). Any convicted person has ample opportunities to obtain review. Requiring defendants to use these opportunities, rather than tarry and then launch indirect collateral attacks during sentencing for some other offense, has significant benefits. It sends *1147persons to the rendering courts, which have the records necessary to determine whether a conviction is valid or not. It requires them to act promptly, while the information necessary to determine validity is available (and while reprosecution is possible, at least in theory, if the conviction is flawed). It simplifies the sentencing process. It winnows claims, excluding those made only because the defendant hopes that the sentencing judge will discard the conviction rather than undertake the labor of determining its Validity-
Honoring judgments that remain outstanding after full opportunity for direct and collateral review does not dishonor the constitutional claims the defendant wishes to make. It simply establishes rules for presenting these claims to the right court, and in a timely fashion. Respecting judgments is the norm in our legal culture: the full faith and credit clause and common law principles of res judicata combine to make respect for judgments the rule. During this century courts began to readjudicate issues that were, or could have been, presented to the rendering court. E.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969 (1915); Whaley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 62 S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed. 1302 (1942); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). This development depends on a federal statute, not on constitutional right. See also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441, 463-69 (1963). No statute expressly authorizes the form of derivative collateral attack that Cup-pett wants to wage.
Three courts of appeals have concluded that the Guidelines’ limit on collateral challenges during sentencing is consistent with both statute and Constitution. United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1360-63 (4th Cir.1993); United States v. Elliott, 992 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Roman, 989 F.2d 1117 (11th Cir.1993) (in banc). Accord, United States v. Isaacs, 1993 WL 210537, at *2-7, 1993 U.S.App. LEXIS 14892, at *5-20 (1st Cir. June 22, 1993) (unpublished opinion). We observed in Lowery v. McCaugh-try, 954 F.2d 422, 423-24 (7th Cir.1992), that the full faith and credit clause supports this approach and may require it. Custis, Elliott, and Roman, citing a background note to Application Note 6, allow that Burgett may require sentencing courts to entertain arguments based on Gideon, but all three courts strictly limit the exception.3 E.g., Roman, 989 F.2d at 1120: “We believe that the kinds of cases that can be included in the ‘presumptively void’ category are small in number and are perhaps limited to uncounseled convictions.” Chief Judge Tjoflat, concurring in Roman, 989 F.2d at 1126-29, concluded that the Burgett exception is no longer necessary, in light of the adequate alternative means to set aside invalid convictions. The majority in Roman reserved judgment on this position. Id. at 1120 n. 5. I find it compelling.
One court has gone loudly the other way. United States v. Vea-Gonzales, 986 F.2d 321, 327 (9th Cir.1993), held Application Note 6 unconstitutional, stating: “the Constitution requires that defendants be given the opportunity to collaterally attack prior convictions which will be used against them at sentencing.” The Constitution requires this? Article I § 9 cl. 2 of the Constitution preserves the Great Writ “unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require” suspension, but the writ so preserved is the one known in eighteenth-century England — principally the pre-trial contest to the custodian’s power to hold a person, the device that prevents arbitrary detention without trial. Ex parte Bollman & Swartwout, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 2 L.Ed. 554 (1807); *1148Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 18 L.Ed. 816 (1868); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886). The power thus enshrined does not include the ability to reexamine judgments rendered by courts possessing jurisdiction. Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 39 (1822); see also Dallin H. Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States — 1776-1865, 32 U.Chi.L.Rev. 243, 244-45 (1965). Collateral review of judgments accordingly is subject to control by Congress, and judges are not obliged to deploy their existing power to the maximum possible extent. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). Brown v. Allen did not suggest that the Constitution of its own force creates a right to relitigate— that res judicata, although the object of special solicitude in the full faith and credit clause, violates the basic charter of government. Cf. Withrow v. Williams, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (a prudential judgment, not a statutory or constitutional command, leads to the vindication of Miranda claims on collateral review).
The idea that the Constitution requires a sentencing judge to reexamine other courts’ judgments is preposterous. The ninth circuit cited no support other than Burgett, which as I have stressed does not deal with collateral review of the sentence. Post-judgment attack depends on statutory authority, which is hard to find. Cuppett wants to attack the validity of a conviction after serving his sentence, yet Congress authorizes review only while the custody continues. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). Someone objecting to the use by state A of a conviction rendered by state B, after custody on state B’s conviction has ended, is seeking a form of coram nobis, a common law rather than statutory remedy, and one confined to the court that rendered the judgment. Lowery v. McCaughtry, 954 F.2d at 423 (discussing the history of that writ). Current custody that is longer because of the prior conviction satisfies the jurisdictional component of § 2254, but it does not compel the court to grant relief.
Indiana is not bound by the Sentencing Guidelines, and neither are we in this proceeding under § 2254. Still, the model the Sentencing Commission has devised is a sound accommodation of the competing interests. The alternative, expanding Burgett after the overruling of the cases that inspired Burgett’s outlook on the scope of collateral review, is unjustified. Cuppett had both incentive and opportunity to challenge the West Virginia judgment before he committed his crime in Indiana. Having bypassed his best opportunities, he has forfeited any entitlement to our review.

. One reason why states prefer convictions to confessions is that the former are easy to prove; but if Cuppett is right, convictions may be as contestable as confessions. Another reason why states treat convictions as special is that they provide notice that increased penalties will fol-Iow. Cf. United States v. Ruffin, 997 F.2d 343 (7th Cir.1993). Even convictions obtained without an offer of appointed counsel serve this notice function — which is why Lewis permits un-counseled convictions to be the basis of felon-in-possession prosecutions.

. Cuppett began this route to challenge his 1962 West Virginia judgment. In 1984, after his Indiana sentence, he asked the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, which rendered the judgment, to appoint counsel for him so that he could challenge it. Bypassing the question whether counsel is available at public expense to wage a collateral attack, the circuit court denied this motion on the merits, remarking that "to allow [the judgment] to be reopened would mean that finality would never attach to a criminal action in this jurisdiction.” This appears to be an assertion that West Virginia has abolished the writ of error coram nobis. Cuppett did not pursue the matter. What would have happened had he done so is an interesting question. Like federal courts, West Virginia has abolished coram nobis in civil cases. See W.Va.RXiv.P. 60(b); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), holds that in federal courts the writ remains available in criminal cases, but West Virginia has neither embraced nor rejected Morgan. The subject has not come up in a reported West Virginia decision during the last 50 years. One district court has surmised that West Virginia will follow Morgan, see Miller v. Boles, 248 F.Supp. 49 (N.D.W.Va.1965), but the state’s Supreme Court has never had an opportunity to decide either way.

. Three other courts of appeals have concluded that Application Note 6 does not mean what it says, and that courts retain discretion to consider indirect collateral attacks on convictions that were not held invalid prior to the imposition of the new sentence. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.1992); United States v. Brown, 991 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1992). The Chairman of the Sentencing Commission, in his judicial capacity, has disagreed with these opinions. United States v. Byrd, 995 F.2d 536 (4th Cir.1993) (Wilkins, J.). Today’s case does not depend on the right understanding of Application Note 6, to which I refer only as the source of a distinction that may inform the exercise of our power under § 2254.