Court Opinion

ID: 9945325
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:46.212713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.711209
License: Public Domain

J-S27034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ANDRES RODRIGUEZ                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 50 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 16, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0005086-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                    FILED: FEBRUARY 27, 2024

       Andres Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after the trial court convicted him of driving under the influence

(“DUI”),1 driving while operating privilege is suspended, and careless driving.2

We affirm.

       In August 2018, West Reading Police Officer Brandon Breitenstein

(“Officer Breitenstein) was dispatched to the scene of a one-vehicle accident.

See N.T., 8/16/22, at 4, 10, 18. At the scene, Officer Breitenstein observed

a white Lincoln SUV had crossed from the westbound lane to the eastbound

____________________________________________

1 The Commonwealth charge Rodriguez with five counts of DUI, see 75
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), and (d)(2). The trial court
convicted Rodriguez on all counts but sentenced him only on count three,
pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1)(i).

2 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1543(a) and 3714(a).
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lane, jumped the curb and struck a wall and a light pole. See id. at 4-5. The

vehicle sustained extensive damage to the driver’s side, the airbags had

deployed, and the driver’s side windows were smashed. See id. at 5.

       Rodriguez was standing next to the car,3 and had a cut over his right

eye, consistent with hitting the car’s window.           See id. at 6.    Officer

Breitenstein observed Rodriguez appeared intoxicated, he had “bloodshot

glassy eyes and slurred speech.           He was staggering as he walked, nearly

falling over.” Id. at 10. Rodriguez explained he had been drinking at a bar

with family members, and he “crashed.” Id. at 6-8. Rodriguez was not from

the area and was unable to give any information about the location or name

of the bar, except that it was in the City of Reading. See id. at 6-8. An

ambulance took Rodriguez to the hospital. See id. at 11, 20-21.

       At the hospital, Officer Breitenstein read the Pennsylvania Department

of Transportation DL-26 chemical test warnings form to Rodriguez, who

consented to a blood test.           See id. at 11-12.     Rodriguez told Officer

Breitenstein he had imbibed too much alcohol and smoked marijuana. See

id. at 15-16.        Blood testing showed Rodriguez had a blood alcohol

concentration (“BAC”) of .121% and the presence of marijuana and its

metabolite. See Commonwealth’s Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3. At the time of the

____________________________________________

3 Rodriguez was not the registered owner of the car.       See N.T., 8/16/22, at
20.

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accident, Rodriguez’s driver’s license was suspended. See Commonwealth’s

Exhibit No. 5.

       Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Rodriguez of the above

offenses. The court sentenced Rodriguez to seventy-two hours to six months

in county jail. Rodriguez filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court

denied. The instant, timely appeal followed.4

       On appeal, Rodriguez raises three issues for our review:

       1. Did the court err when it admitted Rodriguez’s extrajudicial
          statement when the corpus delicti of [DUI], driving while
          operating privileges are suspended, and careless driving, had
          not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence or when
          it considered [Rodriguez’s] extrajudicial statement when the
          corpus delicti of [DUI], driving while operating privileges were
          suspended or revoked, and careless driving had not been
          proven beyond a reasonable doubt?

       2. Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to establish
          the verdicts for [DUI], driving while operating privileges were
          suspended or revoked, and careless driving when there was no
          evidence presented to show that [Rodriguez] was driving?

       3. Were the verdicts for [DUI], driving while operating privileges
          are suspended, and careless driving, against the weight of the
          evidence?

Rodriguez’s Brief at 8-9 (numeration added, paragraph formatting altered).

       In his first issue, Rodriguez argues the Commonwealth failed to establish

the corpus delicti for DUI, driving while operating privilege is suspended, and

careless driving. See Rodriguez’s Brief at 17-26.

____________________________________________

4 Rodriguez and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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       Our standard of review for a challenge pursuant to the corpus delicti rule

is well-settled.

       The corpus delicti rule is designed to guard against the hasty and
       unguarded character which is often attached to confessions and
       admissions and the consequent danger of a conviction where no
       crime has in fact been committed. The corpus delicti rule is a rule
       of evidence. Our standard of review on appeals challenging an
       evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a determination of
       whether the trial court abused its discretion. The corpus delicti
       rule places the burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime
       has [] occurred before a confession or admission of the accused
       connecting him to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delicti
       is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or
       injury has occurred [because] of the criminal conduct of someone.
       The criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is
       not a component of the rule. . . . The corpus delicti may be
       established by circumstantial evidence. Establishing the corpus
       delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step process. The first step
       concerns the trial judge’s admission of the accused’s
       statements[,] and the second step concerns the fact finder’s
       consideration of those statements. [F]or the statement to be
       admitted, the Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti by a
       preponderance of the evidence. [F]or the statement to be
       considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must establish
       the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410–11 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(quotation marks and citation omitted; emphases omitted).

       “Before introducing an extra-judicial admission, the Commonwealth is

not required to prove the existence of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Rather, it is enough for the Commonwealth to prove that the injury or loss is

more    consistent   with   a   crime   having    been   committed     than      not.”

Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639, 652 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citations

omitted). Moreover,

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     the Commonwealth need not affirmatively exclude the possibility
     of an accident [] to establish the corpus delicti. . . . [T]he injury
     or loss need not be tangible. Rather, [] to establish the corpus
     delicti of the crime of driving while intoxicated, the
     Commonwealth need only show that someone operated a motor
     vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

Commonwealth v. Kasunic, 620 A.2d 525, 529 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations

omitted).

            In addition, an exception to the rule of corpus delicti exists,
     which is commonly referred to as the “closely related crimes
     exception.” Pursuant to this exception, inculpatory statements
     may be admissible as to all crimes charged even though the
     Commonwealth’s independent evidence is able to establish the
     corpus delicti of only one. For the exception to apply, the
     relationship between the crimes charged must be sufficiently close
     [to] ensure that the purpose underlying the corpus delicti rule is
     not violated.

                  The purpose behind the corpus delicti rule is the
            ultimate consideration in determining whether two
            crimes are closely related [to] implicate the exception.
            Where the relationship between the crimes to which
            the defendant has confessed is close and the policy
            underlying the corpus delicti rule—to avoid
            convictions for crimes that did not occur—is not
            violated, the exception renders the confession
            admissible for all closely related crimes.

            Thus, where the Commonwealth establishes the corpus
     delicti of one crime, an appellant’s inculpatory statements may be
     admissible as evidence for all crimes which are closely related.
     Whether the crimes are sufficiently close to justify invoking the
     exception must be determined on a case[-]by[-]case basis.

Commonwealth v. Herb, 852 A.2d 356, 363-64 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations

and emphasis omitted). With respect to the determination of whether the

crimes are closely related, the fact the offenses may be different grades is

inconsequential. See Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820, 825-26

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(Pa. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Taylor,

831 A.2d 587, 595-96 (Pa. 2003).

       Rodriguez contends the Commonwealth failed to establish the crimes

occurred before Rodriguez admitted he crashed. See id. at 22. Rodriguez

maintains while the Commonwealth established a crash occurred, it did not

show Rodriguez was driving, or under the influence of drugs or alcohol. See

id. at 23-24.

       The trial court rejected Rodriguez’s corpus delicti argument, finding it

properly admitted Rodriguez’s statements “based upon a totality of the

circumstances. Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 6. We agree.

       Here, the record showed Officer Breitenstein was dispatched, at 2:30 in

the morning, to the scene of a single-car accident. See N.T., 8/16/22, at 4,

10, 18.     Officer Breitenstein observed the vehicle had crossed from the

westbound lane to the eastbound lane, jumped the curb, and struck a wall

and a pole. See id. at 4-5. The car had extensive damage to the driver’s

side. See id. at 5. Rodriguez was standing next to the car, his eyes were

glassy and bloodshot, his speech slurred, and he staggered as he walked.5

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth introduced Rodriguez’s statement that he “crashed”
before it elicited Officer Breitenstein’s testimony about the visible signs of
intoxication. However, this Court has held the fact an “appellant’s admissions
were introduced before the corpus delicti was completely satisfied is
immaterial, as the Commonwealth ultimately fulfilled that burden.”
Commonwealth v. Friend, 717 A.2d 568, 572 (Pa. Super. 1998) (citation
omitted).

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See id. at 6-8, 10. Rodriguez had a cut over his right eye consistent with the

damage to the car. See id. Officer Breitenstein testified he did not encounter

anyone else at the scene who was involved in the accident and his examination

of the passenger side of the car did not suggest a passenger had been in the

vehicle.   See id.   At the time of the accident, Rodriguez’s license was

suspended; laboratory testing revealed a BAC of .121%, and the presence of

marijuana and its metabolite. See Commonwealth’s Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, and

5.

      Based on our review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in rejecting Rodriguez’s corpus delicti claim.    The circumstantial evidence

presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the offense of DUI had occurred, where Officer

Breitenstein testified as to his observations of: (1) a visibly and significantly

intoxicated person, (2) with injuries, (3) who was found, in the middle of the

night, next to a vehicle that had crashed into a wall and pole. Further, the

circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth, as well as all

reasonable inferences derived therefrom, was sufficient to demonstrate,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the offenses of DUI and careless driving had

been committed. See Commonwealth v. Young, 904 A.2d 947, 956-57 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (holding Commonwealth established the corpus delicti for

careless driving beyond a reasonable doubt, where evidence showed the

intoxicated defendant was standing next to a crashed vehicle, with the keys

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in his pocket); Friend, 717 A.2d at 570-72 (holding the Commonwealth

satisfied the corpus delicti for DUI where the evidence showed there was a

one-car accident in the middle of the night; the skid marks showed the car

crossed lanes and crashed into a guardrail; the defendant was the only person

on the scene who had been involved in the accident; the defendant was

injured; he was the owner of the car; and he displayed visible signs of

intoxication); see also Kasunic, 620 A.2d at 529 (rejecting defendant’s

corpus delicti claim in a DUI case where the police officer testified he found

the defendant lying next to his crashed truck, on a freezing night, no one else

was present, and the defendant appeared intoxicated).

      Further, we conclude the DUI offenses share a sufficiently close

relationship with the offense of driving while operating privilege is suspended.

The offenses were all part of one continuing incident. See Taylor, 831 A.2d

at 596 (concluding crimes shared sufficiently close relationship because “there

was one continuing incident occurring at roughly the same time, and the victim

of each crime . . . was the same”); Herb, 852 A.2d at 364-65 (“the summary

offenses of double-parking . . . and driving on a DUI-related license suspension

. . . are sufficiently close under the facts as they exist in this case to implicate

the ‘closely related crimes exception’ to the corpus delicti rule.”). Rodriguez’s

statements “and [the] independent evidence presented by the Commonwealth

are sufficient to overcome the danger of a conviction where no crime was in

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fact committed.” Taylor, 831 A.2d at 596. Rodriguez’s first issue does not

merit relief.

      In his second issue, Rodriguez contends the evidence was insufficient to

sustain his convictions for DUI, driving with a suspended license, and careless

driving. See Rodriguez’s Brief at 26-29.

      Because evidentiary sufficiency is a question of law, the standard of

review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth

v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013). When considering a challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence:

      [W]e evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict
      winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
      inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be
      deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each
      material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof
      by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
      Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
      certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved
      by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
      that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
      the combined circumstances.

            The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
      wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the
      evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is
      circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence
      coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom
      overcomes the presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may
      not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder; thus, so
      long as the evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable
      to the Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of
      a defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant's
      convictions will be upheld.

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Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). Importantly, the trier of fact while

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.             See

Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 873 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).

      75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 provides in relevant part:

      (a) General impairment.--

         (1) An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing
         a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is
         rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in
         actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

                                      ****

      (b) High rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, operate
      or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after
      imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol
      concentration in the individual's blood or breath is at least 0.10%
      but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has
      driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the
      movement of the vehicle.

                                        ****

      (d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive,
      operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
      vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

         (1)   There is in the individual’s blood any amount of a:

            (i) Schedule I controlled substance, as defined in the
            act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The
            Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act;

                                    ****

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            (iii) metabolite of a substance under subparagraph (i)
            or (ii).

         (2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
         combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the
         individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual
         physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(a)(1), (b), (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(iii), (d)(2) (footnote

omitted).   A person is guilty of driving while operating privileges are

suspended or revoked if he, “drives a motor vehicle on any highway or

trafficway of this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension,

revocation or cancellation of the operating privilege and before the operating

privilege has been restored[.]” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a). A person is guilty of

careless driving if he “drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of

persons or property.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3714(a). Careless disregard “implies

less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary negligence or the

mere absence of care under the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Ford,

141 A.3d 547, 556 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

      Here, Rodriguez’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based

on his rejected claim the Commonwealth did not satisfy the corpus delicti

requirement. Rodriguez argues, because of this, the trial court should not

have considered Rodriguez’s statements he had been drinking too much, had

smoked marijuana, and had crashed the car. However, as discussed above,

Rodriguez’s corpus delicti claim lacks merit.   Moreover, we note Rodriguez

stipulated to the results of his blood test and did not contest his license was

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suspended at the time of the incident. See Commonwealth Exhibits Nos. 4

and 5.

      Moreover, the evidence delineated above, in combination with the blood

tests results, Rodriguez’s certified driver history, and his statements at the

scene and at the hospital, are more than sufficient to sustain his DUI, driving

with a suspended license, and careless driving convictions.         Rodriguez’s

argument to the contrary disregards our standard of review by viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to himself. See Franklin, 69 A.3d 722.

Rodriguez’s argument is speculative, and he asks us to substitute our findings

of fact for that of the trial court, which is again contrary to our standard of

review. See id. at 722-23; Orr, 38 A.3d at 873. The finder of fact could

reasonably infer from the testimony and documentary evidence that

Rodriguez drove carelessly, while under suspension, and after drinking alcohol

and smoking marijuana, causing him to crash his car.       Rodriguez’s second

issue does not merit relief.

      In his third issue, Rodriguez challenges the weight of the evidence.

Rodriguez’s Brief at 29-31.

      Our standard of review for a weight of the evidence claim is well-settled.

      The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie
      in ensuring that the trial court’s decision has record support.
      Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial
      court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

                                    ****

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              A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
       against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
       of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
       mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
       facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
       role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the
       facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
       them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
       justice.

                                         ****

             An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
       a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
       review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight
       claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
       question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
       evidence.

Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(quotation marks and citations omitted).           To prevail on a weight of the

evidence challenge, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain

that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court. See Commonwealth

v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).

       Rodriguez claims the verdict shocks the conscience because there was

no direct evidence he was driving, and the only evidence presented at trial

was that he was injured and went to the hospital. See id. at 31. He further

contends his statements at the scene were unreliable because of his head

injury6 and his intoxication. See id.

____________________________________________

6 The only testimony with respect to Rodriguez’s injury was that he had a cut

over his right eye, which was repaired at the hospital. N.T., 8/16/22, at 6,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       The trial court considered Rodriguez’s weight claim and determined it

lacked merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/4/23, at 7-8. We discern no abuse

of discretion by the trial court in reaching its determination the verdict did not

shock its conscience. The Commonwealth presented direct and circumstantial

evidence that Rodriguez had been drinking, drove his car while his license was

suspended, and crashed it. That the trial court, siting as finder of fact, chose

to believe the testimony provided by Officer Breitenstein was entirely within

its province. Rodriguez essentially requests we re-weigh the evidence and

assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial. This we cannot do,

as it is a task that is beyond our scope of review. The trial court, as finder of

fact, had the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and evidence

presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (stating that “[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its

judgment for that of the finder of fact”).             Although Rodriguez challenged

Officer Breitenstein’s testimony regarding the incident, he did not present

independent exculpatory evidence that would contradict the verdict, nor did

he so undermine the Commonwealth’s evidence as to render it completely

unbelievable. Ultimately, the trial court found the direct and circumstantial

evidence     demonstrated       Rodriguez      drove    the   car   while   intoxicated.

____________________________________________

11, 20. Rodriguez does not point to any medical or testimonial evidence that
he suffered a head injury which would have rendered his statements
unreliable. See Rodriguez’s Brief at 31.

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Accordingly, we decline to disturb the trial court’s rejection of Rodriguez’s

challenge to the weight of the evidence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/27/2024

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