Court Opinion

ID: 9678086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:10:16.623625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.536199
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
CATHERINE STONE, Justice,
joined by ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice.
The panel opinion in this case stands for the proposition that sexual assault of a *7child is not the type of disturbing event which supports a presumption that the child victim sustained or will sustain mental anguish. The opinion is based on a misapplication of Texas law and ultimately places on the child victim a heightened burden of proof. With great respect for my colleagues, but with disappointment that I could not disavow them of their views, I dissent from the majority’s denial of Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing En Banc.
The facts of this case are disturbing, but minimizing the facts with an overly discreet description does not change the reality of what actually happened. The reality is that a nine-year-old boy experiencing his first adventure of summer camp was sexually assaulted by his camp counselor. When A.A. awoke in the night screaming and distressed by a bad dream, his camp counselor, Kenneth Trimble, came to A.A.’s bed and climbed in bed with him. A.A. was dressed in loose-fitting boxers and a t-shirt. Cf. YMCA of San Antonio v. Adams, No. 04-04-00931-CV, 2006 WL 1895291, at *1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio July 12, 2006, no pet. h.) (describing Trimble and A.A. as “fully clothed”). Trimble ultimately admitted that he sexually molested A.A. by getting on top of A.A. and “dry humping” him. The only time A.A. acknowledged the event, he told his parents that Trimble began bumping him in the bed and bumped him so hard that he thought he was going to fall off the bed. There is no question that this conduct constitutes “sexually inappropriate contact,” id., but it is more aptly described as sexual assault. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp.2006).
The panel opinion concludes the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain the jury’s award of damages for future mental anguish; in so doing the panel’s analysis falls short. The starting point for the analysis is, in my opinion, a determination of whether to apply the long-recognized legal principle that some events are so “particularly upsetting or disturbing” that mental suffering is presumed to flow from such events. See Parkway v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex.1995). As the Parkway opinion illustrates, this principle was recognized even when the law generally did not favor recovery of mental anguish damages. Id. “Once the particularly disturbing events were proved by reference to objective phenomena or conditions, the law generally allowed the claimant’s mental suffering to be presumed to flow from such events.” Id. The court noted that assault is one of the oldest examples of this category of cases. Id.
In the instant case there is objective proof of the particularly disturbing event; Trimble confessed to the assault and A.A. acknowledged on one occasion that the assault took place. A.A.’s mental anguish damages flow from the assault — the classic type of event giving rise to presumed mental suffering. It is the nature of the disturbing event itself that “assures that the claimants will suffer mental injury.” Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex.1986). In Moore the court held that the parents who filed suit for the wrongful death of their adult child were entitled to have the issue of mental anguish damages submitted to the jury “on the basis of the emotional impact suggested by the circumstances surrounding their loss.” Id. at 686 (quoting with approval Connell v. Steel Haulers, Inc., 455 F.2d 688, 691 (8th Cir.1972)).
In the instant case, however, the panel first reviews the testimony of the expert and lay witnesses and concludes that this evidence at best supports damages for past mental anguish, but amounts to no more than mere speculation as to future mental anguish. The court concludes there was no *8“testimony that there is a reasonable probability A.A. will suffer from compensable mental anguish in the future.” YMCA, 2006 WL 1895291, at *3. That, however, is not a burden of proof placed upon a plaintiff who has suffered from a “particularly upsetting or disturbing event.” Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 442. In Parkway the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the level of proof required for recovery of mental anguish damages, noting the necessity of evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of the mental anguish. Importantly, however, the court stopped short “of requiring this type of evidence in all cases in which mental anguish damages are sought-” Id. at 444. The court reaffirmed the concept of presumed mental anguish in certain cases involving disturbing or shocking injuries, noting that such cases generally involved “qualifying events [that] have demonstrated a threat to one’s physical safety_” Id. at 445. Sexual assault, especially of a child, surely falls within the ambit of a “particularly upsetting or disturbing event;” an event involving a “threat to one’s physical safety.” Id.
Accordingly, I believe the first error of the panel is its failure to analyze the case from the perspective of the disturbing event without reference to specific testimony of mental anguish. Under the presumption, mental anguish damages are presumed and recoverable. Evidence of the event provides the basis for recovery. It is society’s understanding of the natural consequences that flow from the event that provides the jury with a basis for awarding mental anguish damages. See Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 686.
In addition to the panel’s failure to properly apply the presumption of mental anguish damages, the panel erroneously concludes that there must be an award for past mental anguish damages in order for there to be compensable future mental anguish damages. This conclusion is based in part on the belief that the reported cases addressing the presumption of mental anguish damages “refer to an inference of past mental anguish.” YMCA 2006 WL 1895291, at *3. A review of the cited cases does not support this conclusion. Indeed, one of the cases does not even involve a recovery for future mental anguish damages, so there is no reference, implied or otherwise, to a required connection between past and future mental anguish damages. See SunBridge Healthcare Corp. v. Penny, 160 S.W.3d 230 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
Even if expert testimony were needed to justify an award of mental anguish damages, more than sufficient evidence was presented by Ann Burgess, Professor of Psychiatric Nursing at Boston College. Dr. Burgess holds a Ph.D. in Nursing Science and is a leading national expert on the traumatic effects of sexual abuse sustained by children. Dr. Burgess was not retained by the plaintiffs to diagnose or to treat A.A. and she specifically did not interview A.A. because he had provided only a very limited disclosure of what had happened to him and he did not appear ready to discuss the matter in detail. Dr. Burgess’ testimony focused on: (1) the YMCA’s conduct in hiring and retaining Kenneth Trimble as a camp counselor; and (2) the effects of sexual abuse on children and how A.A.’s conduct comported with frequently-observed responses of sexually abused children. As the trial court noted, Dr. Burgess was “going to talk about what ... this child abuse has meant to [A.A.].”
Dr. Burgess’ testimony regarding the effects of the sexual abuse incident was based on her review of the depositions of A.A. and his parents; a letter A.A. wrote to Kenneth Trimble at his mother’s suggestion so that he could express his feel*9ings about the incident; A.A.’s school and medical records; Trimble’s statement and tape-recorded confession; and other documents regarding Trimble’s pattern of sexual abuse. Based on this information, as well as on her expertise and more than 40 years experience in psychiatric nursing, Burgess testified she was not surprised that A.A. denied that he had been sexually assaulted. Burgess explained that children, particularly boys, have anxiety about sexual abuse and do not want others to know that they have been abused. For this reason, parents, and specifically A.A.’s parents, should not force their children to participate in therapy. Burgess noted that if A.A.’s parents forced him into therapy before he is ready to discuss the abuse it would recreate the dynamics that A.A. experienced when he was under the control of Trimble. She also stated that A.A.’s denial of the abuse is a common coping mechanism known as denial. A.A.’s denial was particularly evident in his use of an analogy in which he likened his experience with Trimble to a book that should be kept in a vault. Burgess testified that the analogy reveals that A.A. knows what happened, but he is not ready to talk about it; he has the experience in a vault where it is presently under his control. Similarly, the letter A.A. wrote to Trimble indicated denial as a method of coping with the trauma of what had happened to him.
Burgess also testified that one of the effects of sexual abuse is that the child is robbed of the natural progressive development of normal sexuality with their peers; the loss of such innocence was evident in A.A.’s letter to Trimble. Another effect of such abuse can be poor performance in school, as experienced by A.A. in math. In that particular class, Burgess noted that the math teacher, a male, was reportedly inappropriate in class by snapping girls’ bras and slapping boys on their backsides. Burgess opined that A.A.’s failure in this class was brought about in part by A.A.’s phobic anxiety — the math teacher produced fear in A.A. and reminded him of what had happened with Trimble.
Dr. Burgess testified that the effects of sexual abuse do not simply “go away.” The only way to make them go away therapeutically is to provide “enough treatment with a person to ... process what has happened, so that the [victim] can consciously file it away as a memory....” It is not uncommon for sexually abused children to repress the related hurt and emotions for many years until a triggering event produces an enormous reaction. She specifically cited to the experience of men in their 40s beginning to recall being abused by clergy when they were young boys. The important fact noted by Dr. Burgess, however, is that the ill effects of the abuse cannot simply go away, the experience must be processed in some fashion when the victim is ready to do so.
Dr. Burgess’ testimony provided the jury with support for mental anguish damages. Her testimony, coupled with the testimony of A.A.’s parents and grandfather about the range of A.A.’s conduct— from shutting down in silence, to violent outbursts, to visceral sobbing — presented a record from which the jury could have found damages for mental anguish damages. The jury did award damages for future mental anguish, but it did not do so for mental anguish suffered in the past. However, the jury’s failure to award damages for past mental anguish is not, as the panel opinion states, an implicit rejection of “the proposition that mental anguish is a natural consequence of the event or. injury that A.A. endured.” YMCA, 2006 WL 1895291, at *4. Rather, the jury could have determined from Dr. Burgess’ testimony that A.A. is currently coping with the trauma of the assault by denial, but that at some point in the future he will face dark *10days when the vault is opened and the “book” of his experience is once again opened. Quite simply, the jury had evidence before it from which it could conclude that A.A. is not yet in need of or ready for therapy, but the day will come when he both needs and desires treatment, and then he will begin to process the trauma of the assault.
The panel opinion fails to properly apply the presumption of mental anguish that arises from the disturbing event of sexual assault of a child. The opinion also places an improper burden of proof on the child and ignores testimony that in fact supports the jury’s award of damages. Therefore, I dissent.