Court Opinion

ID: 9730359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:10:05.834682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.682742
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
Insanity Instructions
The trial having been conducted before the California Supreme Court adopted the American Law Institute test for insanity in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333 [149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318], the jury was instructed and the experts questioned under the then applicable criteria *683of the M’Naughten test. Since the court in Drew specifically provided that their decision was to apply retroactively to all “cases not yet final in which the defendant has pled not guilty by reason of insanity” (22 Cal.3d at p. 348), the ALI test is applicable to this case.
The differences between the M’Naughten test for insanity, which has been applied in the courts of California since 1864 (People v. Francis C. Coffman (1864) 24 Cal. 230, 235) and the ALI test is primarily that the ALI test adds to the cognitive element of M’Naughten (whether the defendant knew or understood the quality and nature of his act or knew that it was wrong) an additional volitional factor. The ALI test asks whether the defendant as a result of mental disease or defect lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Because the trial was conducted under the M’Naughten test, I would hold that appellant did not have a trial on his insanity plea and accordingly reverse the conviction and remand the case to the trial court for a trial on the issue of appellant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
This is not the first case to reach the appellate courts in the procedural posture of appellant’s case. Research has revealed six other cases that were tried before Drew, but which were not yet final at the time that decision was rendered. Of these six, three cases were remanded back to the trial court for a trial on the insanity plea, and three affirmed the convictions. All six, however, approached the question of the prejudice to a defendant having been tried under the now incorrect M’Naughten test on the basis of whether the error was prejudicial under California Constitution, article VI, section 13, i.e., whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached in the absence of error. I reject this approach for the following reasons:
The three cases to affirm convictions in spite of the erroneous use of the M’Naughten test are People v. Wagoner (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 605 [152 Cal.Rptr. 639]; People v. Stewart (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 992 [153 Cal.Rptr. 242] and People v. Wischemann (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 162 [156 Cal.Rptr. 386], In People v. Wagoner the court was faced with an insanity plea based upon voluntary intoxication with heroin. The court examined the record to “determine if there is a reasonable probability” that a jury instructed as to the ALI test would have found appellant not guilty by reason of insanity (89 Cal.App.3d at p. 613). However, finding that the rule of People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 575-576 [111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875], “that a mental disorder produced by voluntary intoxication *684is only a complete defense to a general intent crime if the disorder extends beyond the period of intoxication” (89 Cal.App.3d at p. 614) is unaltered by the adoption of the ALI test, the Wagoner court found that the failure of appellant’s intoxication to result in insanity that outlasted the intoxicated state (“settled insanity”), deprived him entirely of the insanity defense to the general intent crime charged (furnishing heroin to a minor). Therefore, the court concluded that a different result would not have obtained under the ALI test and affirmed the conviction.
Likewise, in People v. Stewart, supra, 89 Cal.App.3d 992, the court found that since “(t)he entire psychiatric testimony concluded that appellant was suffering from a passive-aggressive personality disorder,” appellant had failed to meet either the cognitive or the volitional prongs of the ALI test. The court therefore concluded “. . . that it is not reasonably probable that if the ALI test were employed that appellant would have been declared insane. (Cal. Const, art. VI, § 13.)” Hence, both Wagoner and Stewart presented situations where the courts could say as a matter of law that the defendants could not be found insane under the ALI test; each defendant lacked the basic foundation to an insanity defense under both M’Naughten and ALI, a mental disease or defect. Wagoner’s voluntary intoxication did not result in “settled insanity”; Stewart’s personality disorder fell short of a mental disease or defect that would interfere with his ability to appreciate or control his actions.
The third case, however, People v. Wischemann, supra, 94 Cal.App.3d 162, presents a rather different factual situation. In that case, the experts were sharply divided on the defendant’s sanity. One psychiatrist characterized the defendant’s mental state as both psychotic and schizophrenic. The other doctor rejected both diagnoses, and said that the defendant was merely depressed. The court nonetheless concluded, “[g]iven the totality of circumstances, we see no reasonable possibility that additional proceedings could adduce any new evidence that would convince a jury that defendant’s intellectual capacity was so affected by mental illness that he was unable to prevent himself from engaging in these robberies [citations].” (94 Cal.App.3d 162, 169.) The problem with this approach is that it necessitates a weighing of expert and lay witness testimony against what a new avenue of inquiry might reveal. The court specifically noted that witnesses to the four robberies with which defendant was charged failed to detect any bizarre behavior and that the defendant had no past history of mental illness. Further, the court pointed out that “[djespite the extensive and wide ranging testimony of *685defendant’s psychiatric and emotional state, no mention was made of delusions, hallucinations, brain damage or uncontrollable impulses or rages that would negate defendant’s will and impel him to commit armed robberies.” (94 Cal.App.3d at p. 170.) However, this kind of speculation as to what testimony might have been adduced had the psychiatrists been directly asked to consider whether the defendant could control his behavior or how defense counsel might have conducted the defense differently had the trial been conducted under the ALI test is inimical to the appellate process.
The three cases that reversed the convictions of the defendants and remanded the cases to the trial courts used the same “reasonably probable more favorable result” test. (In Re Ramon M. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 419, 431 [149 Cal.Rptr. 387, 584 P.2d 524]; People v. Sargent (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 148, 153 [150 Cal.Rptr. 113]; People v. Phillips (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 356, 365-367 [153 Cal.Rptr. 359].) The most recent of these cases, People v. Phillips, supra, although apparently feeling itself bound to the prejudicial error test, expressed its concern over the state of the record on appeal. The court said, “While the jury decided appellant had the cognitive ability to know the nature and quality of the act and that it was wrong, we are left to speculate as to what might be the finding if the evidence were presented and the juiy instructed under the more expansive volitional concept of the ALI test. There is substantial evidence that appellant lacked volitional capacity under the ALI definition of sanity. [j[] In summary, the issue of volition and ability of appellant to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law under the ALI rule, as distinguished from knowledge of the nature and wrongfulness of appellant’s conduct, was not considered in witness interrogation or instructions because of the understandable reliance of the court and counsel on the then applicable M’Naghten rule.” It is my opinion that the Phillips court should have stopped there, and simply remanded the case so that the appellant could have a trial on his insanity plea. However, the court went on to conclude that “[t]here is substantial evidence that appellant lacked capacity to conform his conduct to legal requirements,” making it “reasonably probable that if the ALI test were employed that appellant would have been declared insane, and therefore the failure to so instruct was prejudicial. (Cal. Const, art. VI, § 13.)” (90 Cal.App.3d at pp. 366-367.)
When an appellate court is faced with conflicting evidence on an issue as basic as the sanity or insanity of a defendant, a more principled approach when a new standard has been adopted would be to simply *686remand the case for trial on the insanity plea on the basis that because of the erroneous application of legal standard, the defendant did not get a trial on the issue. This would avoid different results in very similar cases, as in Phillips and Wischemann, where each court recognized that there was conflicting evidence from the experts, but reached different conclusions as to the import of that evidence upon a theretofore unconsidered legal criteria. Rather, cases like these should be approached like the jury instruction cases, which deal with the concept that “a defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence; that an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser included offense [or defense] constitutes a denial of that right; and that such error cannot be cured by weighing the evidence and finding it not reasonably probable that a correctly instructed jury would have [reached a result more favorable to the defendant].” (People v. Sedeño (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 720 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], citing People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]; see also People v. Stewart (1976) 16 Cal.3d 133 [127 Cal.Rptr. 117, 544 P.2d 1317]. The fundamental importance of this concept was stressed in People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 532 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390], in which the court held that an erroneous failure to give an instruction on an affirmative defense relied upon by the defendant, constituting a denial of his right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence, “is in itself a miscarriage of justice . . .” After all, what is the defendant’s right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence but a right to a trial. Unless we reverse appellant’s conviction and remand his case to the trial court, he would be deprived of having the jury determine every material issue of his case, and thereby of having a trial on his insanity plea.
In another context, the California Supreme Court has decried any attempt by appellate courts to speculate on matters upon which the record is silent. In People v. Spencer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 158 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715], the court was faced with the effect of the change in law occasioned by the Escobedo case. A confession obtained from defendant Spencer in violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rule was admitted at trial, which took place prior to Escobedo. Ordinarily, on appeal, this would have been regarded as reversible error per se. However, the prosecution argued that the error was harmless, since the defendant had subsequently fully admitted guilt while on the stand. The Supreme Court had then to decide whether the subsequent confession in court was impelled by the previously admitted extrajudicial confession. The court held that since the prosecution had failed to show “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the *687causative link between the two confessions was broken (a burden placed upon the prosecution by Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]), the conviction was reversed. The court pointed out “. . . the prosecution urges us to speculate upon the defendant’s motives for testifying and to infer, from a record which leaves the issue completely unexplored, that his decision to confess in court did not emanate from the erroneous receipt in evidence of his extrajudicial statement of guilt. We cannot posit so important a determination on so conjectural a base.” (66 Cal.2d at p. 168.)
In the instant case, the record amply discloses that the psychiatrists were in conflict regarding appellant’s mental condition. While Doctor Crahan testified that appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic, Doctor Lambert did not diagnose appellant’s condition in those terms. Rather, he testified that appellant was suffering from a mental abnormality that he characterized as a borderline state and that, in his opinion, appellant was acting out a fantasy related in some way to his attempt to withdraw funds from the same bank in 1972. Doctor Patterson, on the other hand, testified that he felt that appellant had the capacity to understand the nature and quality of his act and the consequences. However, none of these physicians were asked whether appellant could control his behavior. Absent this line of questioning and jury instructions governing the ALI test, appellant was deprived of a trial on his insanity plea. I do not feel compelled to speculate as to what the outcome may be when the case is remanded. It is enough that appellant would, for the first time, be receiving a trial on his insanity plea under the now applicable standard. To this he is entitled. Surely public policy considerations preponderate in favor of courts taking every possible precaution in singling out those individuals who are not criminally responsible for their acts and who would not benefit from the punishment by incarceration due to their present inability to control their aberrant behavior. Such imprisonment can only be highly detrimental, as it withholds treatment that otherwise might produce rehabilitation. (See Wade v. United States (9th Cir. 1970) 426 F.2d 64, 66-67.)
I would reverse the judgment of sanity and remand for a retrial on that issue.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 21, 1979. Stephens, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied September 26, 1979.