Court Opinion

ID: 9773623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:51:57.595121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:55.529969
License: Public Domain

TED Z. ROBERTSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion clearly articulates the references upon which it relies in issuing this writ of prohibition. It is abundantly clear that the majority has determined to issue the writ of prohibition in order to prevent what it perceives to be an action of the trial court which affirmatively appears to be outside of the trial court’s jurisdiction. The majority disregards the case precisely on point, New Birmingham Iron & Land Co. v. Blevins, 40 S.W. 829 (Tex.Civ.App. — 1897, writ ref’d) and relies instead upon what it considers to be analogous eases dealing with the dissolution of temporary injunctions.
The central issue is whether the receiver is dissolved as of the date of this court’s original announcement, or whether the receiver continues in force and effect until such time the mandate has been issued by this court, following the parties’ applications for writ of error to the Supreme Court. In my opinion, the receiver remains in force and effect until such time as this court issues its mandate to the trial court.
The cases cited by the majority rely upon the fact that since the appeal divests the trial court of all jurisdiction over the temporary injunction, and transfers that jurisdiction to the court of appeals, the court of appeals should have the same power as the trial court originally had. That is, the court of appeals should have the authority to enter whatever orders or decrees the trial court could have entered. The right to enter an injunction carries with it the correlative right to dissolve the injunction. In those instances in which the appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to dissolve the injunction, it is only natural that the court of appeals, as the court which has jurisdiction, should be legally authorized to dissolve the temporary injunction.
There is no absolute statutory right to supersede the operation of a temporary injunction. Rule 385 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that appeal from an order granting or refusing a temporary injunction shall not have the effect to suspend the order appealed from, unless it shall be so ordered by the court or judge entering the order. Id. at § 385(d).
Since a party has no absolute right to supersede the entry of a temporary injunction, and since the appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction, it is only logical that the court of appeals may enter such orders as the trial court could have entered. This includes, of course, the right to dissolve the temporary injunction notwithstanding a party’s desire to file an application for rehearing or writ of error. In my opinion, however, the appointment of a receiver is more analogous to a permanent injunction than it is to a temporary injunction.
*947As with a permanent injunction, the party wishing to complain of the appointment of a receiver may post a supersedeas bond and thereby suspend the operation of a trial court’s order appointing the receiver. The relator in this instance failed to file a super-sedeas bond. Since we denied the relator’s initial application for an injunction enjoining the trial court from entering further orders regarding the receiver, it is my opinion that the receiver remains in full force and effect until such time as the parties have had an opportunity to have their motions for writ of error decided by the Supreme Court, and until such time as we issue a mandate. In the words of the Supreme Court of California, a writ of prohibition “is not available where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” Bowles v. Superi- or Court of City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal.2d 574, 283 P.2d 704, 709 (1955).
I would deny the writ of prohibition.