Court Opinion

ID: 9608155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:07:07.919644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:44.137462
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Chief Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. I do not entirely agree with Division 1 of the majority. OCGA § 9-11-42, as part of the Civil Practice Act, governs the combining of separate cases for the court proceedings. It does not allow the procedure utilized in the court below because all parties did not consent. There is no other authority for the court to take the action it did, because the Georgia statute, unlike its federal counterpart, severely limits the trial court’s authority to control the conduct of hearings and trials. It would make good sense as a matter of economics and efficiency, and it would achieve the end which the Georgia Constitution mandates as the guiding principle of court rules. Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I of the Ga. Const, of 1983. The values to be served by permitting a greater amount of latitude to the trial court are articulated in Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, Vol. 9, Ch. 7, §§ 2381, 2382 (1995), and Wright, Law of Federal Courts, § 97 (5th ed. 1994). Since the legislature has set the policy for this case management technique, however, trial courts are bound to observe it. See Douglas County v. Abercrombie, 226 Ga. 39 (172 SE2d 419) (1970); Banks v. State, 124 Ga. 15, 17 (5) (52 SE 74) (1905). By adding unanimous consent as a caveat to the implementation of innovative mechanics for trying cases conjoined in significant ways, the legislature has deposited the power in the parties and not in the trial judge.
I do not agree that the harmless error rule applies. It is not incumbent on the litigant, whose statutory right to withhold consent was violated by conducting a joint proceeding anyway, to prove that it prejudiced his presentation of his case or the jury’s consideration of it.
2. I concur in Divisions 2, 4 (a), 4 (b), 5 (a), 5 (b), 6, 7, 8, and 9.
3. With respect to Division 3 (a), the jury charge, the jury should instead simply be instructed that it is not to be concerned about the disposition of punitive damages, if awarded, and that the question of who ultimately is to receive any punitive damages awarded should not influence its consideration of this issue.
4. With respect to Division 3 (b), I agree with Judge Ruffin that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s award of punitive damages and that the issue of punitive damages may be presented to the jury upon retrial.