Court Opinion

ID: 9597006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:54:57.269277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:25.207901
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
The plaintiff claims that Salt Lake County had sufficient notice of the matter immediately after the accident occurred and also claims that the county is estopped to assert the defense of failure to file timely because of misinformation given which caused the claim to be filed with the State Highway Department.
I realize that my dissent in the case of Gallegos v. Midvale 1 is not the law of this state. While I do not recede from my views therein expressed, nevertheless I would bow to the law as stated in that case and concur in the instant matter were it not for the fact that Salt Lake County had notice of the accident. A deputy sheriff was notified immediately after the accident and made a complete examination and reported the result of his findings to the *161county. A deputy county attorney also was summoned to the scene and made a full examination and report. In addition, the attorney for the minor plaintiff called the Highway Department of Salt Lake County and was erroneously told that the section of the road in question was maintained by the Utah State Highway Department. This false information caused a claim to he filed with the State of Utah instead of with Salt Lake County. Upon learning the truth of the matter, to wit, that Salt Lake County maintained the section of the road in question, the four-year-old plaintiff promptly had a guardian ad litem appointed and filed the present action.
In the case of Rice v. Granite School District2 an adult plaintiff was by the adjuster for the defendant’s insurance carrier led to believe that her claim would be settled. After the time for filing her complaint had expired, she was informed that there could be no settlement because of her failure to file her complaint in time and that the claim was barred as a matter of law. She then filed a complaint, and the trial court dismissed the action, as was done in the instant case. The majority of this court reversed the dismissal order in the Rice case, saying:
Where the delay in commencing an action is induced by the conduct of the defendant, or his privies, or an insurance adjuster acting in his behalf, it cannot be availed of by any of them as a defense.
One cannot justly or equitably lull an adversary into a false sense of security thereby subjecting his claim to the bar of limitations, and then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense to the action when brought. Acts or conduct which wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable adjustment of his claim will be made may create an estop-pel against pleading the Statute of Limitations.
If a grown woman can assert estoppel against a school district, I am unable to see why this four-year-old plaintiff should not equally be entitled to show that his delay •in filing a timely claim was due to a misrepresentation made by the employees of Salt Lake County.
The statute says, “A claim against a political subdivision shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within ninety days . . . ”3 Certainly sufficient notice was timely given to Salt Lake County, and there is no reason why a written notice would have been of any further use to the county.
The purpose of requiring notice to be given was properly stated in the Gallegos case, supra, as follows: “This alerts the *162public authorities so that a proper and timely investigation of the claim can be made . . . ”
Salt Lake County claims that there can he no estoppel because the employee who gave the erroneous information about the maintenance of the highway was not identified. That is no reason to cause this case to be dismissed. The plaintiff was not requested to name him, and by the ruling of the court was not permitted to call him as a witness.
For the foregoing reasons, I think the infant plaintiff should have his day in court.
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of ELLETT, J.

. Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972).

. 23 Utah 2d 22, 28, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).

. Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953 (Replacement Volume 7A),