Court Opinion

ID: 9659291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:38:04.760158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:05.866349
License: Public Domain

DAVID T. PROSSER, J.
¶ 92. (dissenting). The liberties secured by the United States Constitution must not be compromised in society's struggle to com*765bat illegal drugs. The "horrors of drug trafficking" are real and substantial, but "under our Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by government to cure this evil."1
¶ 93. Search warrants are an essential safeguard against government overreaching. They protect privacy in persons, houses, papers, and effects by requiring a neutral magistrate to make an independent determination of probable cause before authorizing a government search. Thus, the integrity of search warrants is vital, and it must not be impaired by government zeal to suppress drugs. Because this decision seriously undermines the foundation for search warrants in drug cases, I respectfully dissent.
I—
¶ 94. The State of Wisconsin petitioned the court to take this case to review several issues. The first issue was stated as follows: "In reviewing a search warrant affidavit, may the judge infer that evidence of drug dealing will be found at the suspect's residence when the affidavit provides facts identifying the suspect's residence and provides probable cause that the suspect is a drug dealer?"2 The State's brief sets forth an affirmative answer to this question with two arguments. First, the State contends that a judge may rely on the judge's personal experience to infer that evidence of drug dealing will be found at a suspected drug dealer's residence. Second, it argues that for drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where dealers live. Hence, probable cause that a person is a drug dealer *766provides probable cause to search the person's residence.
¶ 95. In justifying the issuance of the search warrant for Lance Ward's residence, Circuit Judge James Welker relied heavily on his own extensive experience in dealing with drug cases. The majority opinion dismisses his analysis by stating that: "The subjective experiences of the magistrate are not part of the probable cause determination." Majority op. at ¶ 26. This conclusion is consistent with prior decisions. In State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991), the court said: "In reviewing whether there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, we are confined to the record that was before the warrant-issuing judge."3 Allowing the personal experience of the magistrate to factor into the determination of whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant would mean that probable cause was subjective, varying from magistrate to magistrate. A magistrate's personal experience would be difficult for an appellate court to review, and subjective determinations of probable cause would destroy uniformity in the law.
¶ 96. On the other hand, by dismissing the State's first argument, the majority is forced to embrace a proposition allegedly grounded in universal experience: that suspected drug dealers are so likely to keep drugs in their homes that the government will always have probable cause to search their residences, absent evidence that a specific dealer keeps drugs elsewhere. This is precisely the position advocated by the *767State,4 and, for all practical purposes, it is the position adopted by this court.
¶ 97. In Section I of her dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Abrahamson admirably outlines her objection to the majority's ruling. I join in Section I of her dissent *768and commend as well the scholarly analysis of the court of appeals.5
I — i I — i
¶ 98. Our law strongly favors searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994). The warrant process not only places a neutral and detached magistrate between government intrusion and the people but also obligates government officials to demonstrate to that magistrate a substantial basis for their proposed intrusive conduct. In this process, neutral oversight is pointless if the magistrate merely rubberstamps an affidavit based on generalizations instead of particulars.
¶ 99. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), the Supreme Court spelled out the role of the neutral magistrate in the warrant process:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
The magistrate is entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances before the court in making the probable cause determination of whether there are "sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in *769the place to be searched." State v. Stark, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978).6
¶ 100. There is no dispute that a reviewing court will show great deference to the magistrate's decision. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969). However, deference to the magistrate "is not boundless." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984). A reviewing court will not defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not provide a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Id. at 915.
¶ 101. A magistrate considers many factors in passing upon an application for a warrant. The warrant itself must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized.7 Hence, the magistrate must review the particularity and find probable cause that the things sought are linked to criminal activity and will be found in the place to be searched.8 These factors may raise questions of scope.9 The totality of the circumstances in determining probable cause includes the "veracity" or reliability of persons supplying information, the "basis of knowl*770edge" of persons supplying information,10 and the freshness or staleness of the information provided.11
¶ 102. The "particularity and probable cause requirements" are the only protections a person has against a general search. State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 130, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990). Arguably, these requirements may be relaxed somewhat if the situation is truly urgent. For instance, in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978), the Supreme Court observed that the "pre-search proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of the understandable desire to act before the evidence disappears." In these circumstances, the magistrate may not have time to conduct an independent examination of the affiant and other witnesses. In the normal situation, however, the Court has found it reasonable to require the officer applying for a warrant to exercise reasonable professional judgment in preparing the affidavit. Motley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986).
¶ 103. The affidavit in this case raises several issues. The full text of the affidavit is printed as an appendix to this dissent.
A
¶ 104. The affidavit supporting a warrant should establish probable cause that the warrant describes the correct place to be searched. This affidavit provides probable cause that" 'Lance' who lives on Royce" was supplying marijuana to Derrell Vance. It also shows that Lance Ward owned property at 1663 Royce. It does not clearly establish, however, that the " 'Lance' who *771lives on Royce" and Lance Ward who owns property on Royce are one and the same person. Derrell Vance did not provide the last name or the street address of his supplier. He did not indicate whether "Lance" owned property on Royce, as opposed to renting property or staying with friends. The affidavit provides no basis for a reviewing court to determine the number of houses on Royce or whether there were other "Lances" living on Royce. Conversely, it does not show whether police diligently examined tax rolls, city directories, or other documentary evidence to ensure that Lance Ward was the only known "Lance" on Royce. If there were other "Lances" living on Royce, it would be a mockery of the Fourth Amendment to suggest that all their homes could be searched, and it would be deceitful not to disclose the existence of other "Lances" to the court. The possibility of other "Lances" could have been systematically eliminated or at least reduced but was not.
¶ 105. As a result, the critical information suggesting that the " 'Lance' who lives on Royce" was in fact Lance Ward, was the following paragraph in the affidavit:
2.) Your affiant further states he is familiar with the confidential files kept by the Beloit Police Department Special Operations Bureau and as a result knows that the Beloit Police Department has received four pieces of intelligence indicating that Lance Ward is a drug dealer.
¶ 106. The majority opinion wisely avoids any reliance on this paragraph in its discussion of the affidavit. The affidavit provides no evidence that the information in the paragraph is worthy of belief. The record does hot indicate whether the allegations against Ward are anonymous or come from specific *772individuals. It does not indicate the number of sources. It does not indicate that the sources are "reliable." It does not indicate their "basis of knowledge" or whether the pieces of intelligence are recent. In sum, the affidavit does not incorporate anything to demonstrate that the four pieces of intelligence represent credible evidence. This means that the affidavit did not show the magistrate that the police had the correct "Lance" and thus the correct house.
B
¶ 107. The Beloit police requested a premises warrant to search not only Lance Ward's house but also his "curtilage, outbuildings [a one car detached garage], and any and all vehicles pertaining to 1663 Royce on or near said premises." The resulting warrant authorized a search of Ward's body as well as the premises at 1663 Royce.
¶ 108. This court has approved premises warrants. They are discussed extensively in State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996). In Andrews, the court held "that police can search all items found on the premises that are plausible repositories for objects named in the search warrant, except those worn by or in the physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant." 201 Wis. 2d at 403. In State v. O'Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), we approved the search of a vehicle registered to the defendant that was located 200 feet away from the defendant's home, thereby enlarging the "premises." Here, the warrant authorized a search of virtually everything related to 1663 Royce. Considering the broad scope of the warrant, the affidavit supporting the warrant must have established some direct linkage between the things to be seized and the *773expansive premises to be searched. Otherwise, the warrant represented little more than a license for the government to ransack Ward's property in the hope of uncovering evidence of crime. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959).
C
¶ 109. Ward contends that the affidavit is "insufficient because it contains no statement creating a nexus between the items sought and Ward's residence on Royce." Majority op. at ¶ 27. The majority responds with a blizzard of inferences:
1) An informant alleges that Derrell Vance "sells pounds of marijuana." Vance is apprehended with approximately 7.3 pounds of marijuana. The court infers from the evidence that Vance is "a substantial dealer." Id. at ¶ 29.
2) "Vance identifies his supplier as Lance who lives on Royce. Vance supplies no other address or location. . . .[I]t can be inferred from this information that Vance obtained the marijuana from Lance where Lance lived, on Royce." (emphasis added) Id.
3) "Given the large quantity of drugs involved" and the allegation that "Lance" supplied Derrell Vance, the court infers that Lance "is an even bigger fish" than Vance and that there is a substantial basis "that illegal items will be found at the home of Lance Ward on Royce. The obvious and reasonable inference is that Lance dealt drugs from his home." Id. at ¶ 30.
¶ 110. The court should not infer that Derrell Vance "obtained the marijuana from Lance where Lance lived" because that inference is speculative. Vance was not quoted in the affidavit. He was paraphrased. He never spoke directly to the affiant. Whatever he said about Royce may have come in *774response to a question about where Lance could be found.
¶ 111. At the time the search warrant was sought, Derrell Vance was in custody and cooperating with the police. There is no explanation why authorities did not obtain answers to simple questions like: "If you don't know Lance's last name, can you describe what he looks like, his age, and where he lives? Have you ever been to his house? Did you see any drugs in his house? When you purchased drugs from Lance, did you take possession of the drugs at the house? If you didn't see drugs in the house or pick up drugs at the house, where did you take possession of the drugs? Did Lance ever indicate where he keeps his drugs? Do you know of anyone else who has bought drugs from Lance at his house or can place drugs in the house?"
¶ 112. If there were evidence in the affidavit that Derrell Vance had bought drugs at Lance's house, or seen drugs at Lance's house, or had good reason to believe that Lance kept drugs at his house, there would be little reason to question the sufficiency of the affidavit on this point. But the evidence is not there.
¶ 113. The Ward affidavit reveals that in Derrell Vance's case, a Crime Stopper claimed that Vance sold pounds of marijuana and that he or she "had seen marijuana in the house of Derrell Vance." Why is the same affidavit unable to assert point blank that Derrell Vance said he had seen marijuana in the house of Lance on Royce? The problem with the affidavit is not the reliability of what Vance said; the problem is the chasm left by what Vance did not say or what Vance told police that was omitted from the affidavit. Judges are not entitled to use their imaginations to fill in these gaps.
*775D
¶ 114. The majority opinion insists that the court is "not suggesting that when there is sufficient evidence to identify an individual as a drug dealer. . .that there is sufficient evidence to search the suspect's home." Majority op. at ¶ 36. It attempts to distinguish this case from the blanket rule advocated by the State on the basis that Lance Ward was a "high volume" drug dealer. Id. at ¶ ¶ 30, 36. The distinction is not persuasive.
¶ 115. There was probable cause to believe that " 'Lance' who lives on Royce" was a wholesale supplier of marijuana, and that he was "a bigger fish" than Derrell Vance. However, these reasonable conclusions do not provide a substantial basis for an inference that Ward "dealt drugs from his home.”
¶ 116. If we were to undertake a statistical sampling of drug dealers — large and small — and drug users, we might well find that majorities in each category keep drugs in their homes. Such information would not supply probable cause to search the homes of all the suspected drug dealers and drug users in the United States. More important, there is no evidence in this record that supports the proposition that a "large" drug dealer is more likely to keep drugs in the home than a small drug dealer. The affiant did not make such a claim.
E
¶ 117. Distinguishing this case from the broad rule advocated by the State relieves the majority of the burden of addressing a troublesome passage in United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 949 (5th Cir. 1982):
*776[T]he fact that there is probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime does not automatically give the police probable cause to search his house for evidence of that crime.
This passage is important because it was quoted with approval in State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d at 995.
¶ 118. The majority asserts that "our examination of the facts leads to the conclusion that the information presented to the warrant-issuing judge was sufficient for a reasonable person to logically infer that evidence would be found at Ward's home." Majority op. at ¶ 27. It concludes that "[t]he obvious and reasonable inference is that Lance dealt drugs from his home." Id. at ¶ 30.
¶ 119. What the majority fails to explain is how Lance Ward's situation is different from the situation of other drug dealers, so that the inference it draws is derived from the particular facts in this record. The majority admits that the inference "is not the only inference that can be drawn, but it is certainly a reasonable one. The test is not whether the inference drawn is the only reasonable inference. The test is whether the inference drawn is a reasonable one." Id.
¶ 120. Reasonable inferences were discussed recently in Belich v. Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 425, 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1999), in which the court said:
An elementary principle is that an inferred fact is a logical, factual conclusion drawn from basic facts or historical evidence. It is the probability that certain consequences can and do follow from basic events or conditions as dictated by logic and human experience.
*777The court noted that a reasonable inference is a conclusion arrived at by a process of reasoning. The "conclusion must be a rational and logical deduction from facts admitted or established by the evidence when such facts are viewed in the light of common knowledge or common experience." Id.
¶ 121. In Crowley v. Winans, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit equated "permissive inference" with "permissive presumption," explaining that such an inference permits "the factfinder to infer the elemental fact from proof by the state of the basic fact, but does not require the factfinder to reach that conclusion and does not shift the burden to the defendant." 920 F.2d 454, 456 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). A presumption thus complies with due process requirements if "there is a 'rational connection' between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is 'more likely than not to flow from' the former." Id. (quoting Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 165).
¶ 122. The key phrase for me is "more likely than not." The conclusion that Lance Ward "dealt drugs from his home" was not "more likely than not" to flow from his probable status as a dealer if one relied solely on information in the record. The majority concedes that its inference is not the only inference that could be drawn. In fact, the shrewd circuit judge did not draw that inference until he first factored in his own experience.
Ill
¶ 123. The affidavit in this case was deficient. It left too many unanswered questions. It did not establish probable cause. The affidavit was not presented to *778the court in the throes of some desperate emergency. Darrell Vance, the informant, was in police custody, offering to cooperate. Lance Ward, the target, had been suspected as a marijuana dealer over a period of time. When the warrant was eventually executed, Ward was at home, unarmed, watching television. There is no explanation in the record why the police could not have taken the time to prepare a proper affidavit.
¶ 124. The affidavit printed in the appendix should not serve as a model to law enforcement in Wisconsin. Expecting to get a warrant on the basis of this affidavit is like expecting to catch a big fish without baiting the hook. The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
¶ 125. I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and JUSTICE ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this dissent.
APPENDIX
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Douglas Anderson, being first duly sworn, on oath says that on the 4th day of December, 1996, in Rock County, in and upon certain premises in the City of Beloit, in Rock County, occupied by Lance Ward, and more particularly described as follows: 1663 Royce is green with white trim, two story, single family dwelling. 1663 Royce is the fourth house south of Summitt on the east side of Royce. 1663 Royce has a one car detached garage in the northeast side of the lot. Further to include curtilage, outbuildings and any and all vehicles pertaining to 1663 Royce on or near said premises, there are now located and concealed certain things, to-wit:
*779Marijuana and other controlled substances, scales, packaging materials, drug paraphernalia, drug ledgers, address/phone records, indicia of occupancy, opened or unopened financial documents relating to drug proceeds, U.S. currency, and any and all other instrumentalities, substances or documents which are in violation of Possession of Controlled Substance With Intent to Deliver-THC, contrary to Section 961.41(lm)(h)l of Wisconsin Statutes and prayed that a search warrant be issued to search said premises for said property.
The facts tending to establish the grounds for issuing a Search Warrant are as follows:
1.) On 11-27-96, your Affiant received a call from a Crime Stopper who stated that Derrell Vance sells pounds of marijuana. The Crime Stopper had seen marijuana in the house of Derrell Vance. On 11-29-96 a search warrant was executed and the following items were recovered:
3,311 grams of marijuana
$11,171.00 U.S.C.
.3 grams of crack cocaine
Lettermate digital scale
Postal scale
Rolling papers
Pipe
THC roaches
Indicia of occupancy for Derrell and Candy Vance
The Crime Stopper stated that Derrell Vance would order his marijuana and have it distributed in a day or two. Derrell Vance would re-order immediately *780or within a two week span. Derrell Vance would distribute one to two pounds to each of his dealers.
On 11-30-96 a family member of Derrell Vance contacted your Affiant. This family member was told by Derrell Vance that "Lance" was his supplier of marijuana. Derrell Vance needed someone to make contact with "Lance" in order to get him out of jail.
On 12-2-96, Derrell Vance contacted SLANT. Inspector Kreitzmann of SLANT, told your Affiant that Derrell Vance wanted to make a deal to get out of jail. Derrell Vance told SLANT that his supplier was "Lance” who lives on Royce. These admissions to SLANT by Derrell Vance were prior to Derrell Vance's court initial appearance.
The City of Beloit tax rolls shows 1663 Royce as property owned (sic) Lance R. Ward.
2.) Your affiant further states he is familiar with the confidential files kept by the Beloit Police Department Special Operations Bureau and as a result knows that the Beloit Police Department has received four pieces of intelligence indicating that Lance Ward is a drug dealer.
3.) Your affiant has been a police officer for 14 years and has participated in approximately 185 drug raids. Affiant has been actively involved in the area of Special Weapons and Tactics since 1984. Affiant is a State of Wisconsin Certified Instructor in the area of arrest and control procedures, both receiving and providing training. Affiant is an Instructor in the area of Hostage Rescue and High Risk Warrant Service, both receiving and providing training. Based on affiant's training, experience and associations with others in those fields, he is aware that persons involved in many illegál activities, including drug related crimes often arm themselves with weapons, including firearms and *781sometimes use those weapons against the police and others. These persons will also destroy or conceal evidence if given time. Affiant, based on the stated experience, training and association, is aware that a very important factor in controlling persons and in particular, during drug raids, is surprise and speed. Affiant is also aware that control reduces the likelihood of injury to all involved. Affiant is aware that announcement eliminates surprise and provides persons with a residence time to take actions that would require a reaction by officers. For these reasons affiant requests that a NO KNOCK search warrant be issued. Affiant, based on his training and experience with others in that field believes that where illegal drugs are sold by one person, they are purchased by others and are commonly carried on the persons of both. It is also true of locations where drug use takes place, persons commonly carry illegal drugs on their body.
Dated this 4th day of December, 1996.
WHEREFORE, the said Affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued to search such premises for the said property, and to bring the property, if found, and the person(s) in whose possession the property is found, before the Circuit Court for Rock County, to be dealt with according to law.
[Signature of Douglas Anderson]
[Subscription/Date]

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting, quoted with approval in the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist at 241).

 Petition for Review and Appendix at 1.

 The court cited State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 132, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990), and Bast v. State, 87 Wis. 2d 689, 692, 275 N.W.2d 682 (1979). See also State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 389, 395, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978).

 The following colloquy occurred during the oral argument of this case:
Chief Justice: Is your position, counsel. . .is the State's position that every time you have a drug dealer, that is, a charge of a drug dealer in the affidavit, that the inference can be made that there will be drugs in the home, in the residence, and therefore the search warrant can apply to the home?
Assistant Attorney General: . . .[I]f that's justified by experience, yes.
Chief Justice: Well, whose experience?
Assistant Attorney General: I think it could be the judge as well as the. . .it could be the judge or the police officer. If it's the police officer, he puts it in there and it's for the judge to review. If it's the judge it's going to have to be — the State's position is that's a legitimate consideration for the judge to use when drawing the inference based on the information that's in there.
Chief Justice: Well, suppose we have a brand new judge on the bench in Rock County and [he or she] comes from the civil practice and you got this kind of a warrant.... [A]nd the police searched the home. [I]s it the State's position then that that search had no probable cause?
Assistant Attorney General: No, I think it would have to be — in Fourth Amendment cases there's an objective standard applied.
Chief Justice: Well, that goes back to my question. . . .[I]s it your position that as an objective standard in all cases in which the affidavit says it's a drug dealer, you can search the home? It doesn't matter what the cop says in the affidavit or what the judge's past experience is because it's objective.
Assistant Attorney General: Well, yes, and that is the position that's been taken in several cases.
Chief Justice: That is.. .as a matter of law, there’s probable cause to search the home. Is that your position?
Assistant Attorney General: Yes.

State v. Ward, 222 Wis. 2d 311, 319-333, 588 N.W.2d 645 (1998).

 This language is quoted in State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 131-32, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990), and State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991).

 Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution; Wis. Stat. §968.12(1), (2).

State v. Benoit, 83 Wis. 2d 389, 394-95, 265 N.W.2d 298 (1978).

 United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1355 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987).

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

 State v. Ehnert, 160 Wis. 2d 464, 469-70, 466 N.W.2d 237 (1991).