Court Opinion

ID: 9396870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 21:00:22.242222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.679609
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4524

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        WILLIAM THOMAS BAILEY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (4:20-cr-00056-BO-1)

        Submitted: April 25, 2023                                         Decided: May 22, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F.
        Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney,
        Lisa K. Labresh, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               William Thomas Bailey pled guilty to manufacturing or producing child

        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e), and distributing child pornography,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). The district court sentenced Bailey to 500

        months’ imprisonment and imposed a lifetime term of supervised release. On appeal,

        Bailey argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and that the district court plainly

        erred in imposing special conditions of supervised release because it did not explain why

        it was imposing the conditions. While we vacate the special conditions of supervised

        release, we affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects.

               Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy during

        which it must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the

        rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the

        maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The

        court also must ensure that the plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or

        promises not contained in the plea agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and that a factual

        basis supports the plea, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).

               Because Bailey did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the adequacy of

        the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir.

        2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an

        error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the

        error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

        United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

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        omitted). “In the Rule 11 context, this inquiry means that [Bailey] must demonstrate a

        reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” United

        States v. Sanya, 774 F.3d 812, 816 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “Although the reasonable probability standard is a demanding one, a defendant need not

        prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been

        different.” United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). Rather, “a defendant must satisfy the judgment of the reviewing

        court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is sufficient to

        undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 192-93 (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               Although the district court’s Rule 11 colloquy had several omissions, we conclude

        that Bailey has not established that he would not have pled guilty but for the court’s errors

        and omissions. Much of the omitted information was contained in the plea agreement, and

        a Rule 11 error is not prejudicial when the neglected information is included in the

        defendant’s plea agreement. See United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 394-95 (4th Cir.

        2002). Because the errors did not “fatally infect the” proceedings to the extent that they

        undermined its “fundamental fairness,” we decline to apply the cumulative error doctrine.

        See United States v. Runyon, 707 F.3d 475, 520 (4th Cir. 2013).

               The Government contends that Bailey’s challenge to the terms of supervised release

        is barred by the waiver of appellate rights in his plea agreement. When the Government

        seeks to enforce an appeal waiver, we will uphold the waiver if the record establishes that

        (1) the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal, and (2) the issues

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        raised on appeal fall within the waiver’s scope. United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243

        (4th Cir. 2021). “Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive his

        right of appeal must be evaluated by reference to the totality of the circumstances.” United

        States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        A waiver is generally valid “if a district court questions a defendant regarding the waiver

        of appellate rights during the Rule 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant

        understood the full significance of the waiver.” United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532,

        537 (4th Cir. 2012).

               The district court did not strictly comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). Rather

        than fully review the terms of the appellate waiver with Bailey, the district court informed

        Bailey that he was pleading guilty and, as part of that process, “waive[d his] right to

        appeal.” (J.A. 20). * This was the only mention of the appellate waiver during the plea

        hearing and the court did not ask whether Bailey understood the significance of the waiver.

        Although a district court’s failure to strictly comply with its obligation under Rule

        11(b)(1)(N) to ensure that a defendant understands the terms of his appeal waiver provision

        “will not alone render an appellate waiver unenforceable, a waiver is not knowingly or

        voluntarily made if the district court fails to specifically question the defendant concerning

        the waiver provision . . . and the record indicates that the defendant did not otherwise

        understand the full significance of the waiver.” Manigan, 592 F.3d at 627 (cleaned up).

        And the context here is critical—the district court’s failure to fully comply with Rule

               *
                   “J.A.” refers to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties.

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        11(b)(1)(N) was one of nearly a dozen errors and omissions during the plea colloquy.

        While we are confident that these other errors did not prejudice Bailey, the district court’s

        failure to advise Bailey of the appellate waiver was prejudicial. Accordingly, we decline

        to apply the waiver in this case.

               Turning to the special conditions of supervised release, because Bailey did not

        object to the conditions at sentencing, our review is for plain error. United States v.

        McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 2020). “[A]s with other parts of a sentence, the

        district court must adequately explain any special conditions of supervised release.” United

        States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 178 (4th Cir. 2020). “Unless a district court explains why

        particular special conditions are being imposed, we have no basis for determining whether

        they are reasonably related to [the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)] factors.” McMiller, 954 F.3d at

        676 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “there may be instances when a special

        condition is so unobtrusive, or the reason for it so self-evident and unassailable, that

        remand will be unnecessary.” Id. at 677.

               It is important that the district court imposed a lifetime term of supervised release.

        “A defendant’s right to know why he faces special conditions that will forever modify the

        course of his life is substantial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court

        failed to explain why it imposed the 20 special conditions, many of which are extremely

        onerous. “[W]hen a court’s explanation for such special conditions is so lacking that it

        deprives the defendant of meaningful appellate review, that error necessarily affects the

        defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. Although the special conditions were contained in the

        presentence report (PSR), and Bailey did not object to the PSR, we have vacated special

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        conditions on plain-error review when the district court imposed “special conditions set

        forth in the recommended conditions of supervision” without any explanation. United

        States v. Ross, 912 F.3d 740, 746 (4th Cir. 2019).

               Therefore, we vacate the special conditions of supervised release as procedurally

        unreasonable “and remand to the district court for further explanation.” McMiller, 954

        F.3d at 677. We affirm the district court’s judgment in all other respects. We dispense

        with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                      AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                         VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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