Court Opinion

ID: 7189985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-24 16:55:52.417022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:16:09.791935
License: Public Domain

Morcan, J.,
dissenting. The prayer of the petition in this case is that an injunction may issue prohibiting and restraining the defendants, and each of them, their and each of their agents and attorneys from procuring or suing out any writ of seizure and sale, or other writ or order of seizure based on the mortgage which is recited in the petition, and from seizing thereunder the plantation which the plaintiff claims to own; and that they be injoined from asserting that they have any lien or mortgage on said property resulting from the act of mortgage aforesaid.
I do not think that a judge should have issued an injunction upon such a prayer. I understand that the courts of the State are open to all litigants who desire to assert their rights, and I do not understand, nor have I been informed, that there is any law in Louisiana which prevents a lawyer from bringing a suit for the protection of his clients’ interests. Here the door of justice is absolutely closed against the defendants, and their counsel’s lips are sealed.
*228I think it would have been time enough for the plaintiff to have defended himself when he was attacked. As well might a tenant be allowed to injoiu his landlord from collecting his rent, or the debtor of a promissory note injoin his creditor from suing him, or a furnisher of supplies which went to make a crop, from seizing the crop in order to secure his privilege.
Having issued the order, however, I think the judge should have maintained that portion of the exception filed by defendants, which specifically declared that the averments of the petition did not justify the issuing of the injunction which had been obtained, which exception I do not think was ever abandoned.
Coming to the merits, I think the case is equally clear for the defendants, in this, at least, that the injunction should have been dissolved. The Villerés (those I mean who are interested in this suit) had several creditors. They were divided into creditors with mortgage, of first and second rank, and chirographic creditors, and the mortgage creditors were also chirographic creditors. To pay their debts, which amounted to over $64,000, they owned two adjoining plantations. Their creditors, desiring to secure themselves, and to give to their debtors an opportunity of- acquitting themselves of their indebtedness, went before a notary public, on the fourteenth of December 1867, and accepted the proposition wkioh had been made to them, viz: that a delay of seven years be granted them, from the twelfth January 1867, in which they were to pay their debts, but without interest, in instalments of one-seventh yearly, for which they were to give, and clid give, their notes, secured by mortgage on their plantations. It was, however, expressly stipulated that the mortgage claims of Mrs. Manuel Crozat, and the succession of Mrs. Cesaire Olivier, amounting together to $18,597 12, which were already secured by mortgage on the aforesaid plantations, should remain the same, without annual reduction of the capital, but should bear interest at the rate of five per cent, per annum, payable annually, during the term of seven years. It was further agreed that in case of nonpayment of even one of the notes thus furnished by the Yillerés, their creditors were to have the right to sue for the reimbursement of the whole of their claims, and cause the property mortgaged to be sold in the manner following, to wit: one-fourth cash, and the balance at one, two and three years credit, with interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum from the day of sale until final payment, in notes secured by mortgage on the property so sold, and divided into coupons, in order to facilitate the settlement with each of said creditors. And Pierre Maspero, representing the succession of Mr. Cesaire Olivier, and Mrs. Manuel Crozat specially declared that, in order to facilitate *229the Villerés and Mrs. Bodin in discharging their indebtedness to their creditors, they consented and acquiesced in what had been done, and agreed to receive nothing during the seven years therein stipulated, in deduction of the principal due to them, under the express condition, however, that an annual interest of five per cent, upon the amount due them should be paid, and that nothing in the act should be so construed as to prejudice in any manner their rights, privileges, mortgages and actions resulting from the mortgage acts passed before Boudousquié, under which their rights as creditors were determined, which acts were to remain in full force and effect, without any derogation or innovation, except what had “ been hereinbefore stipulated in relation to the delays granted, and to the mode of sale in case of seizure,’ they reserving to themselves, in case of seizure and sale before the expiration of the said seven years, the right of availing themselves of their rank of first mortgage creditors.” Now it seems to me that the intent of this act, and the language in which the intention is expressed is not susceptible of two interpretations. In case their interest was not paid they might proceed under their rank of first mortgage creditors, but the sale was to take place under the delays granted, which were one, two and three years credit.
Now, this agreement between the parties, was a contract, binding equally upon all who had signed it, and was the law between them. Notwithstanding which Mrs. Crozat, on the twentieth December 1869, without having previously endeavored to have the contract annulled, and without notice to any of her co-creditors, applied for and obtained an order of seizure and sale against the property, the terms being cash. At the sale Eleitas became the purchaser. To these proceedings the defendant was not a party. In the answer filed, after the exception was overruled, it is averred that the illegal and improper practices by which the sale was made were well known to the plaintiff, and were a fraud upon defendant’s rights, and a violation of their common act, all of which it is alleged was known to Eleitas.
Now, it is established that Mr. Eleitas knew of the act by which the creditors of the Yillerés had agreed to the terms upon which their property should be sold in case they did not comply with their engagements. He consulted counsel upon the subject who only advised him that he could purchase with safety after having received the assurances of the counsel, who represented the subsequent mortgage creditors, that they would consent to the sale being made for cash.
That the entirely irreproachable counsel representing these creditors believed he was acting in behalf of the true interest of all parties concerned, and that he believed he was authorized to give the assurances he did, I do not for a moment question. But whether he was *230so authorized is another matter, and I think, from the record that he was mistaken. Under all the circumstances of the case it seems to me clear that the injunction should have been dissolved, and the defendants left free to pursue their rights in such form as the law authorizes. I therefore dissent from the opinion of the majority.