Court Opinion

ID: 9950312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 19:01:03.30915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:36.240160
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13358    Document: 29-1     Date Filed: 03/13/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13358
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       SHELTON R. THOMAS,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       MACON SP WARDEN,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00437-CAP
                          ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13358

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Shelton Thomas, a prisoner at Georgia’s Macon State Prison
       proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his pe-
       tition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We granted a cer-
       tificate of appealability on the question of “[w]hether the district
       court erred in concluding that Thomas’s 28 U.S.C. § 2554 petition
       was unexhausted in its entirety, and, if so, whether the court
       abused its discretion in dismissing the § 2254 petition without prej-
       udice.” (11th Cir. dkt., doc. 13 at 2–3). Thomas argues that the
       district court erred in determining his grounds for relief were un-
       exhausted because: (1) all were presented to the Georgia Supreme
       Court at some point, even if the case in which some were raised
       was disposed of on other grounds; (2) the state waived exhaustion
       in state habeas proceedings; (3) his claims need not be exhausted
       because the state courts are unduly delayed in resolving them; and
       (4) even if some of his claims are unexhausted, the district court
       should have granted a stay and abeyance rather than dismissing his
       petition.
             We review the denial or grant of habeas corpus relief de
       novo. Pope v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 752 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir.
       2014). We also “review questions of law and mixed questions of
       law and fact de novo, while district court ﬁndings of fact are re-
       viewed for clear error.” Id. “Exhaustion presents a mixed question
       of law and fact.” Fox v. Kelso, 911 F.2d 563, 568 (11th Cir. 1990). In
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       22-13358                Opinion of the Court                          3

       the case of a mixed petition, asserting some exhausted and some
       unexhausted claims for habeas relief, whether to grant a stay and
       abeyance or dismiss is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Rhines v.
       Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 279 (2005). Abuse of discretion occurs where
       the district court applies an incorrect legal standard, follows incor-
       rect procedures, or makes a factual ﬁnding that is clearly erroneous.
       Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1137 (11th Cir. 2000).
              To be eligible for federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must
       have exhausted “the remedies available in the courts of the state,”
       unless such remedies are absent or ineﬀective. 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(b)(1). This means that “state prisoners must give the state
       courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
       invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate
       review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).
       Thus, “to properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must fairly pre-
       sent[] every issue raised in his federal petition to the state’s highest
       court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.” Mason v. Al-
       len, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).
              Under Georgia law, a state habeas petition may not be
       brought until the petitioner’s conviction is ﬁnal. Horton v. Wilkes,
       302 S.E.2d 94, 96 (Ga. 1983), disapproved of in part on other grounds
       by Stubbs v. Hall, 840 S.E.2d 407 (Ga. 2020). For Georgia law pur-
       poses, a conviction is not ﬁnal until no further direct appellate re-
       view is available. Stubbs v. Hall, 840 S.E.2d 407, 412 (Ga. 2020).
              Exhaustion is excused under absent or ineﬀective state pro-
       cess prongs “in the case of unreasonable, unexplained state delays
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       4                           Opinion of the Court                        22-13358

       in acting on the petitioner’s motion for state relief.” 28
       U.S.C.§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii); Cook v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 749
       F.2d 678, 679–80 (11th Cir. 1985). A delay of ﬁfteen months is suf-
       ﬁcient to raise the possibility that exhaustion should be excused be-
       cause state avenues towards relief are absent or ineﬀective. Rheuark
       v. Wade, 540 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1976) 1 (vacating and remand-
       ing “with instructions to determine if the delay in preparing a tran-
       script of Rheuark’s state trial has been justiﬁable. If not, the district
       court should proceed to the merits of appellant’s claim for habeas
       relief.”); see also Breazeale v. Bradley, 582 F.2d 5, 6 (5th Cir. 1978)
       (“Breazeale’s state habeas petition has been completely dormant
       for over one year, and the state has oﬀered us no reason for its tor-
       por. Under these circumstances, the unexplained delay requires us
       to say that the state remedy is ineﬀective.”). While 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(b) has been reorganized since caselaw established that delay
       can make state processes ineﬀective, the operative text regarding
       the absence or ineﬀectiveness of state corrective processes is iden-
       tical. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii), with 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(b) (1966).
             “When a federal habeas petition raises a claim that has not
       been exhausted in state proceedings, the district court ordinarily
       must either dismiss the petition . . . or grant a stay and abeyance to
       allow the petitioner to exhaust the unexhausted claim.” Ogle v.

       1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc), this

       Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth
       Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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       22-13358                  Opinion of the Court                              5

       Johnson, 488 F.3d 1364, 1370 (11th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).The
       Supreme Court has held that a district court abuses its discretion
       when it dismisses instead of staying “a mixed petition if the peti-
       tioner had good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted
       claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that
       the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.”
       Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. “[I]f . . . the court determines that stay and
       abeyance is inappropriate, the court should allow the petitioner to
       delete the unexhausted claims and to proceed with the exhausted
       claims if dismissal of the entire petition would unreasonably impair
       the petitioner’s right to obtain federal relief.” Id. The district court
       is required to consider the Rhines factors. See Thompson v. Sec’y for
       Dep’t of Corr., 425 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 2005).
              The district court erred in concluding that all of Thomas’s
       claims were unexhausted and dismissing his petition. First,
       Thomas may have exhausted a number of claims on direct appeal. 2
       He is not required to complete an additional round of state habeas
       review for any claim raised on direct appeal. Second, while
       Thomas’s remaining claims are unexhausted, there is an issue of
       whether delays in processing Thomas’s refiled state habeas (filed
       on December 17, 2021) might be deemed to excuse exhaustion. See
       Rheuark, 540 F.2d at 1283; Breazeale, 582 F.2d at 6. The delay since
       December 17, 2021, was not addressed by the district court and

       2 It is unclear whether Thomas raised the same claims in his second direct ap-

       peal because the record is incomplete. On remand, the district court should
       ascertain which claims have been exhausted.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13358

       should be addressed by the district court in the first instance. Third,
       even if exhaustion of Thomas’s remaining claims is required, the
       district court abused its discretion by failing to consider whether to
       stay (as opposed to dismissing without prejudice) and in failing to
       address the Rhines requirement with respect to a petitioner’s op-
       portunity to dismiss his unexhausted claims. See Rhines, 544 U.S.
       at 278; Thompson, 425 F.3d at 1366.
              For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
       is vacated and remanded to the district court for further proceed-
       ings not inconsistent with this opinion. 3
              VACATED AND REMANDED.

       3 Thomas’s Motion for the Court to Order the State to File Relevant Tran-

       scripts and Court Records is DENIED.