Court Opinion

ID: 9512839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:27:08.712493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:37.190326
License: Public Domain

*192■ Justice Jefferson,
concurring.
In each of these cases, the landowners have asserted that the condemnors failed to satisfy the unable-to-agree requirement prior to filing suit. I agree with them. I also agree with the Court that the requirement is not jurisdictional and that, when the condemnor has not shown an inability to agree, the case should be abated for a reasonable time until the condemnor makes an offer to purchase the property. Under the unique circumstances of these cases, however, abatement would serve no purpose. Accordingly, I join parts I through III of the Court’s opinion and its judgments.
I
The “Unable to Agree” Requirement
The Property Code provides that, before a condemnation suit is filed, the condem-nor must be “unable to agree with the owner of the property on the amount of damages,” and the condemnor must specifically plead that inability in its petition. TEX. PROP.CODE § 21.012. This requirement was intended “to forestall litigation and to prevent needless appeals to the courts when the matter may have been settled by negotiations between the parties.” County of Nueces v. Rankin, 303 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1957, no writ).
In each of the cases we review today, the condemnors’ pre-suit offers included a “FINAL OFFER RIGHT OF WAY AGREEMENT” for “a Natural Gas Pipeline.” The offers, made “in an effort to avoid further expense or litigation,” concluded: “If you elect to reject this offer, [the condemnor] may institute a condemnation suit in [a designated court], to acquire the rights described in the Right of Way Agreement.” (Emphasis added.) The landowners were told that, unless they executed the Right of Way Agreements, the condemnors would petition to condemn the rights those agreements described. But the rights described in the Agreements included provisions that, in fact, the condemnors did not seek to condemn. The Right of Way Agreements sought, for example, the right to transport not just natural gas, but “any other liquids, gases or substances which can be transported through a pipeline.” They also sought to obligate the landowners “to warrant and defend title to the easement.”
In one of the eases before us, Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 65 S.W.3d 791, the court of appeals initially held that San Jacinto failed to satisfy the unable-to-agree requirement before filing a condemnation petition. In an opinion by Justice O’Connor,1 the court wrote:
San Jacinto should have first made an offer only for the rights that were outlined in the board of directors resolution. That offer would have been bona fide. If San Jacinto wanted additional rights, it could have then offered more money for those rights. San Jacinto skipped the first step. It never negotiated for the rights it ultimately sought to condemn. Accordingly, San Jacinto presented no evidence that its offer was in good faith or that negotiations would have been futile.
Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., Nos. 1-99-691-CV, 1-99-959-CV, 1-99-1359-CV, 1-99-1360-CV, 2000 WL 1056416 (TexApp. — Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2000) (opinion withdrawn Dec. 13, 2001); see also Cusack Ranch Corp. v. *193MidTexas Pipeline Co., 71 S.W.3d 395, 399 (agreeing that method outlined in initial Hubenak decision is the “better approach for the condemnor,” although declining to require such an approach).
Similarly, in MidTexas Pipeline Co. v. Demehl, the court of appeals held — correctly, in my opinion — that MidTexas failed to satisfy the unable-to-agree requirement because it did not make an offer encompassing only those rights it could seek to condemn:
[T]he legislative intent for [the bona fide attempt to agree] requirement was to avoid the necessity of litigation if the parties could reach an agreement on the purchase price of the property to be condemned.... We believe that the Legislature, by making this requirement as a prerequisite to condemnation, intended bona fide negotiations for the property to be condemned, not a negotiation that included other properties or rights beyond the condemnation. At no point does the evidence show in the present case that MidTexas made an offer including only those rights that it was authorized to acquire through a condemnation proceeding. Offers to purchase property that included the property to be condemned but going beyond that in acquiring additional rights or properties is not enough to satisfy a good faith negotiation.
71 S.W.3d at 858. On rehearing, the court added:
This opinion does not say and does not imply the condemnor cannot make offers for and purchase property and rights which it cannot acquire by condemnation proceedings. However, such an offer should be made separate and apart from the offer made as a prerequisite by law to condemnation. This does not mean the property to be condemned cannot be a part of the separate offer, as long as the owner is given the opportunity to sell at a specific price only that property subject to condemnation.
Furthermore, a threat or pretense of condemnation made by the condemnor on land or for rights not subject to condemnation and made in order to obtain additional property or rights constitutes a wrongful act and an abuse of the right of eminent domain.
Id. at 861. The court of appeals adopted this same approach in Wright I and Wright II. 141 S.W.3d 208, 2002 WL 264833 (No. 02-0321 in this Court); 141 S.W.3d 211, 2002 WL 32626070 (No. 02-0326 in this Court).
The initial Hubenak decision, Demehl, Wright I, and Wright II comport with earlier caselaw suggesting that condem-nors must make offers only for property rights they intend to or are able to condemn. In City of Houston v. Derby, the court noted that the condemnor “had to first allege, and then during the proceedings prove, that it had failed to agree with the appellees on the value of their land to be taken.” 215 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, writ ref d) (emphasis added). This Court, by assigning City of Houston a “writ refused” notation, adopted the court of civil appeals’ judgment and reasoning as its own. See Texas Utils. Elec. Co. v. Timmons, 947 S.W.2d 191, 199 (Tex.1997). In State v. Hipp & Dowd, the court of appeals noted that “[i]n the context of eminent domain proceedings, the offer must not be arbitrary and capricious; rather, it must be based on a reasonably thorough investigation and honest assessment of the amount of just compensation due the landowner as a result of the taking.” 832 S.W.2d 71, 78 (Tex.App. — Austin 1992) (emphasis added), writ denied as to Hipp and rev’d sub nom. on other grounds as to Dowd, State v. Dowd, 867 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.1993). In *194Ryan v. State, the court required precon-demnation negotiations “as to the amount of damages which would be sustained by him as a result of the condemnation.” 21 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1929, no writ) (emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar approach. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, before a condemnor can assert “inability to agree,” it must have made an offer only for the property sought to be condemned. See Dzur v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 257 Ind. 674, 278 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1972) (holding that landowner’s rejection of offer to purchase 200 foot easement did not demonstrate inability to agree, because 150 foot easement was the largest that could be condemned). The court held:
“An effort to purchase the property sought to be acquired is a condition precedent to the right to maintain an action to condemn. There can be no compliance with this requirement unless the subject of negotiation is clear to both parties, since a meeting of the minds is essential to the existence of a valid contract. If a [condemnor] makes an offer to acquire a particular property, or a specific part thereof, which offer is rejected by the owner of the utility, and if the [condemnor] then undertakes to condemn other or different property than that which it has offered to purchase, it cannot be said that an effort was made to purchase that which it sought to condemn.
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It is conceivable that if the offer to purchase had related to the property which is the subject of the condemnation proceeding, the offer might have been accepted, in which event this litigation would not have been necessary.”
Id. at 566 (quoting Ind. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Flora, 218 Ind. 208, 31 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ind.1941)) (citations omitted); see also 6 Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 24.14[1], at 24-234-35 (3d ed. 2004) (“If the condemnor, after making an offer to acquire a particular property or a specific part thereof, undertook to condemn other and different property or a quantum thereof than it offered to purchase, there was no effort to purchase for the land taken to satisfy the negotiation requirement. Similarly, if the condemnor’s offer includes additional properties that it cannot acquire through condemnation proceedings, it has not satisfied the good faith negotiation requirement.”).
Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a railroad’s offer to purchase three parcels of land, when the railroad could legally condemn only a smaller, one-hundred-foot strip of land, was not an offer sufficient to satisfy the requirements for instituting a condemnation proceeding:
If, then, the petitioner has not power to condemn all the land described in the petition, can these proceedings be maintained for so much as is within the hundred-feet strip? A single consideration shows that the proceedings must stand or fall in toto. Before applying to the justice for commissioners, the company must have been unable to agree with the owner for the purchase of the land required. The petition avers that the company could not agree with the owners as to the price of all the lands demanded; but it by no means follows that a bargain could not have been made for the sale of the hundred-feet strip. The owners are entitled to have an opportunity for such a contract presented before their land can be taken by condemnation. Hence the entire proceeding is illegal.
State v. The Hudson Terminal Ry. Co., 46 N.J.L. 289, 294 (N.J.1884); see also Prairie View Tel. Co. v. Cherry County, 179 *195Neb. 382, 138 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Neb.1965) (holding that county did not make good faith attempt to agree because the landowners “were never offered a definite proposal as to the exact right-of-way to be acquired, and consequently were never in a position to make an absolute acceptance thereof’).
The Court today concludes that the con-demnors satisfied the unable-to-agree requirement, pointing to “the fact that none of the landowners accepted any offer.” But it is improper to equate rejection of an offer that comprehends rights greater than those sought to be condemned with refusal to sell only those property rights that could be or were sought to be condemned. Indeed, the Court pays little heed to the Legislature’s requirement that the parties be unable to agree on the amount of damages, holding that “[t]he condemnors have established that they made offers to each of the landowners before filing condemnation proceedings. Those offers were rejected or ignored by the landowners. That is enough to satisfy section 21.012’s requirements that the parties were ‘unable to agree.’ ” 141 S.W.3d at 191.
Under the standard adopted by the Court today, a condemnor’s offer for any property rights — including, as in this case, those it does not seek to condemn — would satisfy the unable-to-agree requirement. Rather than discouraging litigation, the Court’s standard may foment it. In these cases, despite the fact that the condemnor was authorized and sought to condemn only a natural gas pipeline, all of the final offers provided that the condemnor would receive the right to transport “oil, petroleum products, or any other liquids, gases or substances which can be transported through a pipeline.” It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which a landowner would have accepted an offer for a natural gas pipeline but would not consent to a pipeline carrying some other substance (say, for example, radioactive material — a practice that is not unheard of). See, e.g., Tribe Opposes Utah Pipeline for Uranium Tailings Slurry, Reno Gazette-Journal, Apr. 1, 2002 (detailing the Utes’ opposition to construction of a pipeline to carry radioactive uranium tailings).
The Court contends that I “provide[ ] no authority” for “such a broad construction” and suggests preemptively (though the issue is not before us) that the language would in fact be construed more narrowly. But the condemnors’ words could hardly be clearer; it is difficult to imagine language broader than “any other liquids, gases or substances which can be transported through a pipeline.” (Emphasis added.). Moreover, I disagree that, because a natural gas pipeline was included within the offer for a pipeline to transport any substance, the condemnors have satisfied the statutory requirements. One court of appeals has rejected this “greater includes the lesser theory”:
[I]f this were the law, it would allow the condemnor to make an offer on a 500-acre tract of land that had been in the landowner’s family for five generations, that contained the home of the landowner, numerous improvements made by the landowner, and other properties unconnected with the condemnation when the area sought to be condemned involved only a small strip in the corner of the property. The condemnor could then, under that theory, say that the negotiated offer required under the statute had been made. Such an offer would in no way have any connection with the property to be condemned, and certainly the Legislature could not have intended for such an offer, even though the greater included the lesser, to be considered a good faith negotiation in an attempt to purchase the property to be condemned.
*196Eminent domain proceeding [sic] can be simplified by simply following the statute and the legislative intent by making an offer only for the property to be condemned.
Demehl, 71 S.W.3d at 861.
I agree with the Demehl court I would hold that, under the statute, the condem-nors must make a single pre-suit offer encompassing only those property rights they will seek to acquire through condemnation. This requirement is neither burdensome nor complex. It comports with the statutory mandate that condemnors demonstrate inability-to-agree and with our obligation to construe the statute in favor of the landowner and against the condemnor.2 Burch v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex.1975). Absent this minimal showing, the condemnors cannot show at the time the condemnation petition is filed that the parties are unable to agree on the amount of damages or that further negotiations would be futile. Moreover, this approach provides a bright-line rule that gives landowners a chance to assess the value of rights the condemnor is entitled to condemn. Of course, condem-nors would not be precluded from negotiating for additional rights. If these additional rights were combined with the rights to be condemned in a single offer for a lump sum payment, however, the condemnors would not be in compliance with the statute because they could not demonstrate, at the time the petition is filed, an inability to agree on the amount of damages.
I disagree with the proposition that “inclusion of intangible property rights” makes such a requirement impracticable. 141 S.W.3d 191. To begin with, the con-demnor controls its pleading and is uniquely suited to include the same items it sought pre-suit. In addition, the Court’s statement that a condemnor “might not” be able to compel a landowner to warrant title implies that the opposite “might” be true. I simply do not see how a condemning authority could ever force the landowner “to warrant and defend title to the easement.” Defense of title, a valuable commodity in itself, was intermixed with the physical property interest in the con-demnors’ offers. For that reason, the landowners were never given a pre-suit standalone offer on damages for property the condemnor ultimately sought to condemn.
II
Disposition
Given my approach in these cases, it is fair to ask why I concur rather than dissent. Today, the Court correctly observes that nothing in the statute makes compliance a jurisdictional predicate to suit, and the Legislature has not imposed a specific penalty when condemnors do not make separate offers for only those rights they will seek to condemn. Instead, the Court concludes that abatement is an appropriate remedy if a condemnor has not satisfied the unable-to-agree requirement prior to filing suit. In the cases before us, however, remanding the cases so that they could be abated until the unable-to-agree requirement is satisfied would be futile. At this stage of the proceedings, it is clear that the parties are unable to agree on damages for the property sought to be condemned. It would be pointless to invalidate the condemnations on technical *197grounds and remand these eases for abatement so that the condemnors could prove an inability to agree on damages.
Examining the condemnation procedure may clarify matters. The condemnor must file a petition, “statfing] that the entity and the property owner are unable to agree on the damages.” Tex. Prop.Code 21.012. If a condemnor alleges an “inability to agree” without ever having made an offer, the condemnor and its attorney could face sanctions. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 13. After the petition is filed, the judge appoints three disinterested commissioners to hear the case. Tex. Prop.Code § 21.014(a). Notice of the hearing is sent to the landowner, and the hearing is set for “the earliest practical time.” Id. § 21.015-16. If the landowner wishes to appear and present evidence, he or she may do so. If that occurs, it is clear that the parties are unable to agree on damages for the property sought to be condemned. Alternatively, the landowner can do nothing, and the commissioners will hear the case and enter their findings. At that point, if the landowner agrees with the commissioners’ decision, he or she can accept the award, and the landowner is appropriately compensated for the taking. If the landowner or the condemnor is dissatisfied, either can file objections. Id. § 21.018. At that time, the landowner may assert that the condemnor has not engaged in negotiations designed to obtain an agreement as to damages. In that event, the trial court must abate the ease and require the con-demnor to make an offer for the property it seeks to condemn.
In these cases, even though the condem-nors’ presuit offers were improper, it was apparent that the parties were unable to agree on damages for the property to be condemned after the commissioners entered their award. The landowners objected and the condemnors did not. Remanding the case at this stage, so that the trial court can abate the proceedings until a proper offer is made, would serve no purpose. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (declining to order abatement when doing so would be “a futile act”); Moore Landry L.L.P. v. Hirsch & Westheimer, P.C., 126 S.W.3d 536, 542 (TexApp. — Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Accordingly, under the unique circumstances of these cases, and in light of the rule announced by the Court today, the Court’s disposition of these cases is proper.
Conclusion
I would hold, contrary to the Court’s opinion, that the condemnors in these consolidated cases did not establish an inability to agree before they filed suit. It is clear, however, that the landowners and condemnors came to a point of disagreement before true litigation commenced because the condemnors “accepted,” and the landowners rejected, the commissioners’ awards. Under these circumstances, the statutory requirement was met, albeit at a date later than that contemplated by the Legislature. I reiterate, however, that the simplest and cheapest solution to this problem is for the condemnor to comply with the statute and make an offer for the property it seeks to condemn, before filing a condemnation petition.
Accordingly, I join parts I through III of the Court’s opinion and the Court’s judgments.

. After Justice O’Connor's retirement, the court granted the motion for rehearing and withdrew this opinion, deciding that the con-demnors had satisfied the unable-to-agree requirement. 65 S.W.3d at 801.

. In fact, the Court seems to apply a contrary presumption, placing the burden on the con-demnors to produce "evidence of the value of the three matters about which they now complain or evidence that the owners would have accepted the offers if those matters had been omitted from the offers.” 141 S.W.3d at 189.