Court Opinion

ID: 9689391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:29:53.594454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:47.563565
License: Public Domain

Bandstra, J.
(concurring). I concur in the opinion of the panel and write separately only to point out that we are not here addressing whether the holding of Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99; 521 NW2d 488 (1994), applies to the statute at issue in this case. In Dedes, the majority and dissenting justices disagreed over the meaning of “the proximate cause” in the statute creating governmental immunity from tort liability, MCL 691.1407(2)(c); MSA 3.996(107)(2)(c). Dedes, supra at 104. The majority concluded that use of the article “the” did not indicate that the Legislature intended that the government would be immune from tort liability unless an employee’s gross negligence was the sole proximate cause of injury or damage but, instead, concluded that liability could be imposed if a government employee’s gross negligence was one of a number of proximate causes of injury or damage. *26The majority came to this conclusion largely as a result of the legislative history of the statute under consideration. Id. at 113-119. Because we have today concluded that Keith Hagerman’s back injury did not proximately cause his death, we have not had to consider the meaning of “the proximate cause” in the relevant section of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.375(2); MSA 17.237(375)(2), or consider whether the legislative history of this section would require a result similar to that reached by the majority in Dedes.