Court Opinion

ID: 9591686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:06:44.640549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:10.889136
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Cureton, Judge:
Appellant, Gibson petitions this court for a rehearing of his case upon the grounds that this court overlooked controlling precedent in the cases of Matthews v. Porter, 329 S. C. 620, 124 S. E. (2d) 321 (1962) and Woody v. South Carolina Power Co., 202 S. C. 73, 24 S. E. (2d) 121 (1943).
In Matthews v. Porter, Porter was involved in an automobile accident with Singletary. After the collision, Porter’s and Singletary’s cars completely blocked a lane of the highway. The Respondent then came upon the scene, stopped and offered her assistance to a physician at the scene who was administering first aid to Porter’s wife. While beside the physician, Mrs. Matthews was struck by an automobile driven by McKnight. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Porter’s motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict.
On the surface, the facts of Matthews v. Porter mirror the facts of this case. A crucial difference exists, however. The injured plaintiff in Matthews brought witnesses before the court whose testimony establishes an unbroken chain of causation from the negligent act of the defendant to the plaintiff’s injuries. The second driver in the initial collision testified that Porter, the defendant, negligently caused the collision which brought about the blocked highway. The driver who struck the plaintiff as she attempted to render assistance testified that Porter’s blocking of the highway without warning caused him to strike the plaintiff.
In contrast, there is no evidence in this case that Edwards struck Gibson because the highway was blocked, or because warning devices failed to warn him of the highway’s condition. In fact, the evidence suggests that Gross’ car blocked only one lane of a four lane highway. In short Gibson failed to *199establish that his injuries were proximately caused by Gross’ negligence.
Likewise, we view the Woody case as consistent with our ruling herein. There, a truck driver struck a utility pole carrying power lines. The power lines sagged and one became hooked under Appellant Woody’s car shortly thereafter. When Woody attempted to leave his car to untangle the line, his dog jumped out of the car. As its front feet touched the ground, a part of the dog came in contact with Woody who had one foot on the running board of the car. He was injured by electric shock. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the Power Company. The intervening negligence of the truck driver, like the intervening negligence of Gibson and Edwards herein was found to be the proximate cause of Woody’s injuries.
We find the language of Horton v. Greyhound Corp., 241 S. C. 430, 128 S. E. (2d) 776 (1962) apposite:
“It is incumbent upon the plaintiff, in the absence of direct evidence, to show the existence of such circumstances as would justify the inference that the injury [...] was due to the wrongful act of the defendant, and not leave the question to mere speculation or conjecture.” Leek v. New South Express Lines, 192 S. C. 527, 7 S. E. (2d) 459 .... However, where the only reasonable inference from the evidence is that there has been a failure of proof as to a material element of plaintiff’s cause of action, it becomes the duty of the court to resolve th.i issue against the party having the burden of proof. ...
Id. 128 S. E. (2d) at 780.
For the reasons given, we deny the appellant Gibson’s petition for a rehearing.
Let this Order be reported with the opinion of the Court in this case.
Petition for rehearing denied.
Shaw and Goolsby, JJ., concur.