Court Opinion

ID: 9718304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:20:43.542887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:58.298144
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell,
On January 13, 1969, the defendant, Wallace Culbreath, was to be tried by a jury for the murder of Ernest McNeil. As the case was being readied for actual trial in the courtroom, defendant, while represented by Court-appointed counsel, stated his intention to plead guilty to the murder. Defendant was interrogated by both his counsel and the trial Judge with respect to his awareness of the consequences of the entry of the guilty plea, and thereafter he entered a guilty plea.
After hearing the testimony in the case for the purpose of establishing the degree of guilt, the trial Judge concluded that the defendant was guilty of second-degree murder and ordered a pre-sentence investigation. *24Several months later, but before sentence had been imposed, defendant petitioned the Court for leave to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court dismissed his petition and subsequently sentenced defendant to from six to twelve years, and also imposed a fine of $1,000. From this judgment of sentence, defendant took this appeal.
Defendant first contends that the trial Court erred in denying his petition for leave to withdraw his guilty plea, because (1) it was made before sentence was imposed, (2) defendant was under a misapprehension as to the sentence he would receive, and (3) the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a murder.
In Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A. 2d 773, the Court said (page 538) : “In Commonwealth v. Frye, 433 Pa. 473, 252 A. 2d 580, the Court affirmed a conviction of murder, and said (page 481) : ‘It is hornbook law that the test of the sufficiency of the evidence—irrespective of whether it is direct or circumstantialj or both—is whether, accepting as true all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom, upon which if believed the jury could properly have based its verdict, it is sufficient in law to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime or crimes of which he has been convicted. Commonwealth v. Finnie, 415 Pa. 166, 202 A. 2d 85; Commonwealth v. Burns, 409 Pa. 619, 634, 187 A. 2d 552; Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A. 2d 861; Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 248 A. 2d 301 (1968)’ ” See also, Commonwealth v. Terenda, 433 Pa. 519, 252 A. 2d 635; Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 428 Pa. 188, 236 A. 2d 768; Commonwealth v. Tabb, 417 Pa. 13, 16, 207 A. 2d 884.
Considering the evidence together with all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the trial Judge could have found from the evidence the following facts.
*25On the evening of July 1,1968, defendant and Ernest McNeil were engaged in an animated conversation in a taproom known as Andy’s Bar in the City of Chester. The proprietor, hoping to avoid trouble in his bar, asked them to leave. They did leave; the victim walked out the door first, and was followed by defendant, a few feet behind. Defendant had his right hand in the side pocket of his trousers. Shortly after the door closed, patrons of the bar heard what sounded to them like gunshots. The victim (McNeil) was found in the vicinity of the bar dying from bullet wounds which entered his body from the back. Defendant’s landlady testified that later that evening defendant told her he had shot a man because “the man was bothering him” Defendant did not testify. A psychiatrist called in defendant’s behalf testified that the drinking of almost a fifth of liquor on the day of the shooting, as defendant claimed he did, coupled with his epilepsy and diabetes, would have caused amnesia.
From this evidence, defendant contends (1) that the evidence was not adequate to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he commited a murder, and (2) that since he does not remember what happened at the time of the shooting, a loss of memory which he further contends was corroborated by his psychiatrist, he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. We disagree.
This Court has stated many times that a person may be convicted of murder on circumstantial evidence alone. Very recently, in Commonwealth v. Slavik, 437 Pa. 354, 261 A. 2d 583, the Court stated (page 358) : “In Commonwealth v. Hart, 403 Pa., supra, this Court, quoting from Commonwealth v. Kravitz, 400 Pa. 198, 161 A. 2d 861, said (pages 654-655) : ‘ “ ‘... “ ‘It is clearly settled that a man may be convicted on circumstantial evidence alone, and a criminal intent may be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which are of such a *26nature as to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt: [citing 10 recent cases].’ ” ’ ”
“ ‘If the law were otherwise it would be impossible in many cases where there were no eyewitnesses, to convict a criminal. It is rare that a criminal ever discloses in advance or sends a telegram expressing his criminal intentions.’ ”
In our opinion, a jury or trier of fact could have properly concluded from the evidence hereinabove summarized that the defendant murdered Ernest McNeil. Moreover, “ ‘A plea of guilty, knowingly made, constitutes an admission of guilt and is a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses.’ Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 597, 229 A. 2d 922, 924 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Foeman v. Maroney, 420 Pa. 486, 218 A. 2d 230 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A. 2d 528 (1964).” Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 617, 235 A. 2d 347.
Defendant further contends that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that he was mistaken with respect to its consequences. At his arraignment, which was held immediately before the time scheduled for his actual trial, defendant pleaded not guilty to indictments charging him with murder, violations of the Firearms Act and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, all arising out of the shooting of McNeil. Following his arraignment but before a trial jury was selected, the assistant district attorney requested a meeting with the trial Judge in his chambers. The Judge asked whether the defendant should be present, but the defense attorney stated that would not be necessary. The assistant district attorney and the defense attorney thereupon met with the trial Judge in his chambers. The record does not disclose what discussions took place at that conference, but when the attorneys returned to the courtroom defendant’s attorney stated openly to the Court that the defendant *27wished to change his plea and enter a plea of guilty generally to the crime of murder, which he did.
Defendant contends that he was under the impression that his attorney and the assistant district attorney had made a bargain and had agreed that he would receive a maximum sentence of two years if he would plead guilty. He asserts further that since the discussions between the attorneys took place in the presence of the trial Judge, the trial Judge had in effect acquiesced in the bargain. Moreover, defendant’s counsel suggests that he may have misled the defendant into believing that “the probabilities” were good that the trial Judge would follow the recommendations of both attorneys. Whatever the probabilities were, our review of the part of the record which dealt with the examination of the defendant by both his trial counsel and the trial Judge makes it abundantly clear that defendant knew that no promises had been made by the Court, and that the Court was not bound by any of the discussions that had taken place. Defendant’s brief specifically states that the sentencing Judge did not “participate” in the discussion of a two-year maximum sentence.
At the time of the sentence, the assistant distinct attorney did make a recommendation for a maximum sentence of two years. On the other hand, the examination of defendant by his attorney and the trial Judge at the time of the entry of the guilty plea shows that the various possible sentences were explained to him, and that he was advised of his right to a jury trial and his right to appeal from the verdict of the jury, and that no promises or representations had been made either as to the degree of guilt the Judge might find or as to the sentence which he might impose. Moreover, the psychiatrist, who was in the courtroom at the time of the entry of the guilty plea, testified that in his opinion defendant was competent at that time to understand *28the questions which had been asked of him and the nature and extent of his act.
This is clearly not a so-called “silent record” case. Moreover, we are convinced from the record that the defendant fully understood the nature of the crime with which he was charged and his rights, and the possible sentences which could be imposed and the consequences of his guilty plea, and that his sole reason for attempting to have it withdrawn is his disappointment in the length of sentence imposed. As this Court said in Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa. 48, 195 A. 2d 338 (page 56) : “The fact that in the finding of the Court as to the degree of defendant’s guilt and the sentence imposed, the expectations or hopes of appellant and her counsel were not realised is not the hind of cmistake or misapprehension’ which in the interest of Justice, justifies the withdrawal of a plea of guilty.”*
The grant or refusal of an application for leave to withdraw a plea of guilty is a matter of judicial discretion and it will not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the lower Court’s decision. Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A. 2d 521; Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 413 Pa., supra, at page 54 (and eight cases cited therein). Cf. Commonwealth v. Metz, 425 Pa. 188, 228 A. 2d 729; Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 274, 234 A. 2d 540. The Court gives detailed examples, in Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa., supra, and Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa., supra, of cases in which the withdrawal of a plea of guilty is properly allowed. Cf. also, Commonwealth v. Servey, 434 Pa. 433, 437, 256 A. 2d 469.
We find no abuse of discretion or error of law.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jones concurs in the result.

Italics in Commonwealth v. Kirkland.