Court Opinion

ID: 2964652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:28:58.279087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:59.171431
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-1870
                                 WALTER F. BIGGINS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
             THE HAZEN PAPER COMPANY, ROBERT HAZEN and THOMAS N. HAZEN,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
       No. 96-1871
                                 WALTER F. BIGGINS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellee,
                                         v.
             THE HAZEN PAPER COMPANY, ROBERT HAZEN and THOMAS N. HAZEN,
                               Defendants, Appellants.
                                ____________________
                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Boudin, Circuit Judge
                     Campbell and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                ____________________
            Maurice
                   M. Cahillane with whom John J. Egan and Egan, Flanagan and
       Cohen, P.C. were on briefs for plaintiff.
            Robert B. Gordon with whom John H. Mason and Ropes & Gray were on
       briefs for defendants.
                                ____________________
                                   April 18, 1997
                                ____________________

                 BOUDIN, 
                        Circuit 
                               Judge
                                    . 
                                       
                                       This Flying Dutchman of a case has
            returned to us after a first trial, a panel decision, Supreme
            Court  review, a  further panel  decision, an  en banc  order
            directing  a further trial  on one count,  and then a  second
            trial, followed now by the instant appeal.  We hope that this
            opinion will  bring the matter  to a close,  for a decade  of
            litigation about a single, narrow event is enough.
                                         I.
                 The case  began  in February  1988 when  Walter  Biggins
            brought suit in district  court against his former  employer,
            Hazen 
                 Paper 
                       Company, and its two principals, Robert Hazen, the
            president, and his cousin, Thomas Hazen, the treasurer.   The
            company 
                   is 
                      a 
                        small but successful maker of specialty papers of
            various 
                   kinds.  Biggins joined the company in 1977, at age 52,
            and 
               served 
                      as its technical director for about nine years.  He
            had no written employment contract.
                 During his employ,  Biggins developed a superior  water-
            based paper coating  that increased the company's sales.   He
            sought a  larger  salary, was  given  a small  increase,  but
            remained unsatisfied and sought a further increase.   Biggins
            later  claimed that  in 1984  Thomas Hazen  had promised  him
            company stock instead of a further raise; Thomas Hazen denied
            making any such promise.
                 Biggins, during  his  employ by  the company,  was  also
            involved 
                    in 
                       two different ventures with his sons.  When Thomas
                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            Hazen learned of this, he sought a confidentiality  agreement
            from Biggins, limiting his outside activities during, and for
            a 
             limited 
                     time 
                         after, 
                                his employment with the company.  Biggins
            refused to sign, except in exchange for the stock he said had
            been promised.  He  was discharged in June 1986--a few  weeks
            before  his  rights under  the  company  pension  plan  would
            otherwise have vested.
                 Biggins then  sued  the company  and the  Hazen  cousins
            (collectively "the Hazens") in an eight-count complaint.  The
            first two counts charged  the Hazens with age  discrimination
            under the  ADEA and  interference with  pension rights  under
            ERISA.1  The remaining claims, of limited importance to  this
            appeal (except  for the  contract claim),  were for  wrongful
            deprivation 
                       of 
                         property, 
                                   wrongful discharge, fraud, conversion,
            breach of contract and  violation of the Massachusetts  Civil
            Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, SS 11H and 11I.
                 In 
                   substance, Biggins claimed under the first two counts,
            respectively,
                         that he had been fired on account of his age--he
            was 
               replaced 
                        with a younger man--and to prevent the vesting of
            his 
               pension. 
                         
                        In 
                           additional counts, he also sought the value of
            the 
               stock 
                    allegedly 
                              promised by Thomas Hazen and the benefit of
            the 
               paper-coating formula and method, which Biggins claimed to
            own. 
                 
                 The 
                    gravamen 
                             of 
                                the remaining counts was that he had been
              
              
               
                
                 
                  
                   
                    
                     
                     1ADEA 
                          is 
                             the 
                                 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
            U.S.C. S  621, et seq. and  ERISA is the Employee  Retirement
            Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq.
                                         -3-
                                         -3-

            wrongfully 
                      discharged in violation of various rights protected
            under state law.
                 In  its verdict,  the  jury  largely  accepted  Biggins'
            position, apart from  his claim to ownership of the  formula,
            which it rejected.  On  the ADEA claim, the jury awarded  him
            around $560,000; the ERISA award was $100,000, later adjusted
            downward to  $93,000 on  appeal.   The  fraud award  for  the
            allegedly 
                     promised stock was about $315,000.  Biggins was also
            awarded just  under $267,000  for discharge  in violation  of
            contract.   On two other  counts, only  nominal damages  were
            awarded.
                 Because the jury found  that the age discrimination  was
            willful, the award on the ADEA count would normally have been
            doubled, 
                    see
                        
                       29 
                          U.S.C. 
                                 S 
                                   626(b), but the district court granted
            judgment  n.o.v. in  favor  of the  Hazens  on the  issue  of
            willfulness. 
                         In other respects, the district court upheld the
            jury verdict against various post-trial motions.  We  reserve
            for later discussion the issue of attorney's fees, which  the
            district court also addressed.
                 On appeal, a  panel of this court affirmed the  district
            court 
                 with 
                     several 
                             exceptions.  Biggins v. Hazen Paper Co., 953
            F.2d 
                1405 
                     (1st Cir. 1992).  Two are pertinent here: first, the
            panel found  that the evidence  on the  ADEA count  supported
            damages 
                   (before 
                          doubling) of only about $420,000, but the panel
            also 
                reinstated 
                          the 
                              willfulness finding and doubled the reduced
                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            award to about $840,000.  Id. at 1416.  Second, the panel set
            aside the  contract  claim  verdict for  lack  of  sufficient
            evidence to establish a contract.  Id. at 1421-24.    
                 The 
                    Supreme 
                            Court then granted certiorari and vacated the
            panel 
                 decision on the ADEA count.  Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
            507 U.S. 604 (1993).  The Court held that the panel had  been
            mistaken in relying  upon the ERISA  violation to supply  the
            wrongful motive for the ADEA violation; it said that pensions
            might 
                 often 
                       correlate with age but a firing to prevent pension
            vesting 
                   did 
                       not itself amount to a firing based upon age.  Id.
            at 611-13.
                 The  Supreme Court  remanded the  case to  the panel  to
            reconsider 
                      whether the jury had sufficient evidence to find an
            ADEA violation once the ERISA violation was put to one  side.
            507 U.S. at 614.  On remand, the original panel  reconsidered
            the 
               ADEA 
                    claim.  In a second opinion in October 1993, it ruled
            that 
                even 
                     disregarding the ERISA violation, enough evidence of
            age  discrimination remained  to  sustain the  ADEA  verdict,
            reduced and then doubled as before.
                 The 
                    Hazens 
                           then petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing
            inter 
                 alia 
                      that the panel had misconstrued a pertinent Supreme
            Court decision issued shortly after its remand in this  case,
            Hicks  v. St. Mary's  Honor Center, 113  S. Ct. 2742  (1993).
            After soliciting memoranda,  the en banc  court in June  1994
            ordered a  new trial on the  ADEA count, concluding that  the
                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            verdict 
                   on 
                      this 
                          count 
                                had been contaminated by the same mistake
            that had led the  Supreme Court to vacate the original  panel
            decision.
                 Biggins  unsuccessfully   sought  rehearing   and   then
            petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that the  en
            banc court had  no power to  order a new  trial and that  the
            decision to do so violated the Supreme Court's mandate.   The
            Supreme 
                   Court 
                        denied 
                               cert
                                   iorari.  In re Biggins, 115 S. Ct. 614
            (1994). 
                    
                    In 
                       April 1996, the district court held a new two-week
            jury 
                trial 
                      on the ADEA count.  The jury returned a verdict for
            the Hazens.  
                 After 
                      various 
                             post-trial 
                                        motions, Biggins filed the appeal
            now 
               before 
                      us; a cross-appeal was filed by the Hazens relating
            only 
                to 
                   attorney's fees.  We begin with the attacks by Biggins
            upon the  en banc court's  remand for a  new trial, and  then
            address his claims of error in the second trial.   Attorney's
            fees 
                issues, 
                        raised 
                              by 
                                 the Hazens' cross-appeal, are considered
            at the close. 
                                         II.
                 Biggins' challenge to the en banc order requiring a  new
            trial 
                 is, 
                    strictly 
                             speaking, addressed to the wrong bench.  The
            arguments  that  the remand  was  unlawful  or  unsound  were
            presented to the en  banc court in a petition for  rehearing,
            rejected 
                    there, 
                           and 
                              then 
                                   presented in a petition for certiorari
            which the Supreme Court denied.  It is not open to the panel,
                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            in 
              the 
                  normal 
                        case, 
                              to 
                                 reconsider issues decided earlier in the
            same 
                case 
                     by 
                        the en banc court.  See United States v. DeJesus,
            752 F.2d 640, 642-43 (1st Cir. 1985).
                 Nevertheless, it may be helpful to explain why  Biggins'
            arguments  relating to  authority of  the en  banc court  are
            mistaken. 
                      
                     His 
                         constitutional argument amounts to this:  first,
            the  Seventh  Amendment  prohibits  any  federal  court  from
            reexamining jury findings "otherwise . . . than according  to
            the 
               rules 
                     of 
                        common law"; and second, in Biggins' view, the en
            banc court's new trial order overturned the jury findings  of
            age  discrimination--without   any  identified  legal   error
            committed by the district court.
                 This 
                     last 
                         qualification 
                                       is critical.  Where there is legal
            error, appeals courts often overturn jury verdicts, and order
            new 
               trials 
                      or even dismissal.  This occurs, for example, where
            evidence 
                    has 
                       been 
                            wrongly admitted, or where an instruction was
            mistaken,  or  even  where the  evidence  did  not  permit  a
            reasonable jury to reach the verdict rendered.  See 9A Wright
            & 
             Miller, 
                     Fed
                        eral Practice and Procedure S 2540 (2d ed. 1995);
            11 
              Wright, 
                      Miller 
                            & 
                              Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure S 2805
            (2d ed. 1995).
                 The 
                    en 
                       banc 
                            court did find prejudicial legal error in the
            conduct 
                   of 
                      the 
                         original 
                                  trial.  The court's appraisal, as noted
            earlier, was that the jury was potentially misled by the same
            error that the  Supreme Court identified  in the first  panel
                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            decision, namely, a belief that the wrongful motive  (pension
            interference) that gave rise to an ERISA violation by  itself
            constituted 
                       wrongful motive under ADEA.  Whether or not the en
            banc
                
                court's 
                        assessment of prejudice was invincibly supported,
            the 
               en 
                  banc 
                       court was free under the Seventh Amendment to make
            that judgment.2
                 Biggins' 
                         other challenge to the en banc court's authority
            is also wide of  the mark.  He  argues that when the  Supreme
            Court 
                 remanded the case to this court, it precluded this court
            from taking  any action other than  an up-or-down vote as  to
            whether enough evidence remained to support the ADEA verdict.
            Therefore, says Biggins,  the en banc court has violated  the
            Supreme Court's mandate.   
                 Of course, a higher  court's mandate must be  respected,
            Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939),  but
            the issue here is the scope of the mandate.  Where as  here a
            judgment is vacated and the matter remanded, Hazen Paper Co.,
            507 U.S. at 617, the lower court must undo the judgment  just
            vacated and  cannot normally revisit  a legal issue  actually
            decided 
                   by 
                      the reviewing court.  But after that, the situation
            is less rigid than Biggins assumes.
                      2The concern did not come out of the blue.  Biggins
            had relied in  his complaint upon the deprivation of  pension
            benefits 
                    as 
                       an act of age discrimination and had made the same
            argument on appeal.
                                         -8-
                                         -8-

                 On remand, courts are often confronted with issues  that
            were never considered by the remanding court.  And
                           the   mandate  of   an  appellate   court
                 forecloses  the  lower  court  from   reconsidering
                 matters  determined  in  the  appellate  court,  it
                 `leaves 
                        to 
                           the [lower] court any issue not expressly
                 or 
                   impliedly 
                             disposed of on appeal.'  Stevens v. F/V
                 Bonnie Doon, 731 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
            Nguyen v. United States, 792 F.2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir. 1986).
                        ing, mandates require respect for what the higher
                 although
            Broadly 
                   speak
            court decided, not for what it did not decide.3      
                 Here, the en banc court concluded that the contamination
            of the ADEA verdict required a new trial, even assuming  that
            the remaining evidence might otherwise support a verdict  for
            Biggins on  that claim.  Whether  this judgment was right  or
            wrong--and we cannot revisit it--the contamination issue  had
            certainly not been addressed in the Supreme Court's  opinion.
            And when Biggins made his mandate argument on certiorari, the
            Supreme Court denied the petition.
                                        III.
                 The 
                    next 
                         claim of error presents the most difficult issue
            in the case.  Prior to the start of the second trial, motions
            in 
              limine 
                     were filed by both sides.  One such motion, filed by
            Biggins, 
                    invoked collateral estoppel and asked that the Hazens
                         3See also Rogers v.  Hill, 289 U.S. 582,  587-88
            (1933)(absent
                         a contrary direction, a district court on remand
            can 
               permit 
                      the 
                         plaintiff 
                                   to 'file additional pleadings, vary or
            expand the issues . . . ."); Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d
            1307, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1988); Alter Fin Corp. v. Citizens  &
            Southern Int'l Bank, 817 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1987).
                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            be barred from relitigating issues decided in the first trial
            on counts other  than the ADEA claim.  Specifically,  Biggins
            asked that the Hazens  be precluded at trial from showing  or
            arguing (and we quote):
                 --   that 
                          the 
                              plaintiff was not fired, but left
                      work voluntarily,
                 --   and/or  that  the  plaintiff  was   fired
                      because he was a disloyal employee,
                 --   and/or that  the  plaintiff's  disloyalty
                      created a  need  for  the  defendants  to
                      dictate  that   he  sign  a   restrictive
                      agreement.
                 In a  second in limine  motion, Biggins  asked that  the
            Hazens also be precluded from showing or arguing that Biggins
            was seeking additional compensation when, in Spring 1986,  he
            conditioned his signing  of the confidentiality agreement  on
            being given stock.  Biggins claimed that the first trial  had
            determined 
                      that 
                           he 
                             had 
                                 been promised the stock in 1984 and that
            the 
               company 
                       had been found liable for fraud in withholding the
            stock.
                 The district judge rejected both in limine motions after
            an 
              oral 
                   hearing, expressing some doubt but concluding that the
            en 
              banc 
                   court had intended a full new trial on the ADEA count.
            The 
               judge 
                     said (and Biggins readily agreed) that it could make
            the new  trial an empty  gesture if the  jury were told  that
            Biggins 
                   was 
                       an 
                         innocent 
                                  victim who had been fired by the Hazens
            as  part of  an effort  to defraud  Biggins.   The court  did
            instruct  the jury that  Biggins had been  fired and had  not
            resigned.
                                        -10-
                                        -10-

                 Collateral estoppel, now often called issue  preclusion,
            prevents a party  from relitigating at a second trial  issues
            determined between  the  same  parties by  an  earlier  final
            judgment--sub
                        ject to various limitations.  Lundborg v. Phoenix
            Leasing, Inc., 91 F.3d 265, 271 (1st Cir. 1996);  Restatement
            (Second) of Judgments S 27 (1982).  But the limitations  have
            been slowly diluted  over time and most are irrelevant  here.
            Nor do the Hazens dispute  that the jury verdict in favor  of
            Biggins at the  first trial is now  final except on the  ADEA
            count.
                 The 
                    Hazens' 
                            main argument against collateral estoppel has
            been 
                that 
                     the "issues" in the two cases were different because
            nothing in the first trial validly determined that the Hazens
            had 
               been 
                    motivated by age in firing Biggins (since the Supreme
            Court had vacated this claim).   This won't wash.  True,  age
            motivation is usually the ultimate issue under the ADEA;  but
            collateral estoppel is no longer limited to ultimate  issues:
            necessary intermediate findings can  now be used to  preclude
            relitigation.
                          Grella v. Salem Five Cent Savings Bank, 42 F.3d
            26, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1994); Restatement (Second), Judgments  S
            27, comment j. (1982).
                 Often 
                      it 
                         is 
                           very 
                                difficult to prove that the initial trial
            necessarily decided an intermediate issue.  But in this  case
            the special verdict  form and reasonable inference  indicates
            that several "facts"  were determined by  the jury on  counts
                                        -11-
                                        -11-

            other 
                 than 
                      ADEA: 
                           (1) 
                               that Biggins was fired, (2) that the stock
            had been promised to him, and  (3) that (in the words of  the
            verdict form) "defendants wrongfully discharged plaintiff  in
            order to deprive plaintiff of the promised stock compensation
            . . . ."
                 At 
                   the 
                       new 
                          trial, 
                                 the 
                                     jury was instructed that Biggins had
            been  fired, so that is out of  the case.  But on the  second
            issue Biggins says  that the Hazens relitigated the issue  of
            whether 
                   they 
                       had 
                           promised him stock, and that appears to be the
            case.   A  good  argument can  be  made that  under  standard
            collateral estoppel doctrine, the Hazens should not have been
            allowed 
                   to 
                      relitigate the issue whether "in fact" Thomas Hazen
            had promised the stock  to Biggins, a point about which  both
            Biggins and Hazen told largely inconsistent stories.
                 Yet 
                    if 
                       there 
                            was 
                                error, 
                                       we regard it as harmless.  Whether
            the stock was  promised has little relevance to the  question
            whether the  Hazens engaged in  age discrimination when  they
            fired Biggins.   Biggins argues that the Hazens purported  to
            fire him  because  he  refused to  sign  the  confidentiality
            agreement 
                     and 
                        therefore
                                  
                                  the stock promise was relevant, Biggins
            having 
                  offered 
                          to 
                            sign 
                                 in exchange for the promised stock.  But
            Biggins' 
                    refusal to sign does not vanish as a plausible motive
            for the  Hazens,  regardless  of whether  stock  was  wrongly
            withheld.
                                        -12-
                                        -12-

                 Obviously  the Hazens  wanted to  relitigate the  stock-
            promise issue, and Biggins to foreclose relitigation, because
            the Hazens look  worse--from the standpoint of  character--if
            they were welshing on a promise and Biggins looks worse if he
            were making  new  demands.   But  character evidence  is  not
            normally admissible  to show conformity  therewith.  Fed.  R.
            Evid. 
                 404(a).  Thus, the permissible use of the evidence about
            the promise  was very limited  so far as  the ADEA claim  was
            concerned; properly used,  it added  useful context,  nothing
            more.
                 Turning to the third "fact" in issue, we reject Biggins'
            claim  that the jury  should have been  told that the  Hazens
            fraudulently discharged Biggins  to deprive  him of  promised
            stock. 
                   
                   How 
                      such 
                           an 
                              instruction would be understood is unclear:
            the Hazens say that (by supplying a different motive) it cuts
            against Biggins'  current  claim that  he was  discharged  on
            account 
                   of 
                      age; 
                          on 
                             the 
                                 other hand, Biggins would obviously have
            liked the  new jury to hear  the terms "fraud" and  "wrongful
            discharge" as a dual motive.
                 The 
                    problem 
                            the 
                               jury 
                                    confronted on retrial was to sort out
            any age discrimination motive in the tangle of other possible
            motivations,  including  perceived  disloyalty,  compensation
            quarrels, and the like.  We think that it would badly distort
            matters to tell the jury  that in carrying out this task,  it
            must accept that the Hazens' motivation in firing Biggins was
                                        -13-
                                        -13-

            wrongful or fraudulent.   The glare from such an  instruction
            would distort any effort to distinguish shadows or shades  in
            the Hazens' actual motivation.  See Fed. R. Evid. 403.4
                 In 
                   sum, 
                        there was no prejudicial error in this challenged
            refusal 
                   to 
                      apply collateral estoppel.  We thus need not decide
            whether, even on  the opposite assumption, it would make  any
            sense to reverse here.   After all, the issues have now  been
            relitigated, collateral estoppel  is a  doctrine of  judicial
            economy, 
                    and 
                        one 
                           might 
                                 wonder whether--assuming no other error-
            -such 
                 an 
                    objective would be served by a third trial.  Cf. Lama
            v. Borras,  16 F.3d 473,  476 n.5 (1st  Cir. 1994) (court  of
            appeals 
                   will 
                        not 
                           review 
                                  denial of summary judgment motion after
            a full trial and an adverse jury verdict).
                                         IV.
                 In addition to the two large claims of error--the attack
            on 
              the 
                  en 
                    banc 
                         order 
                               and 
                                   the collateral estoppel claim--Biggins
            makes  six shorter claims  of trial error  and also seeks  to
            resurrect the contract claim found insufficient by the  first
            panel opinion.   Only the contract claim  and one of the  six
            claimed 
                   trial errors require any discussion; the other alleged
            errors 
                  are 
                      fairly 
                            raised 
                                   but are answered by the Hazens and are
            of no general interest.
                     4Biggins also argues that the second jury should  have
          been told that at the prior  trial, Biggins had been found to  be
          loyal.  There is no indication from the special verdict that  the
          first jury made a generic finding of "loyalty."
                                        -14-
                                        -14-

                 Biggins' 
                         strongest 
                                  claim 
                                        of error, which we do address, is
            that 
                the 
                    district court on retrial erred by excluding evidence
            of 
              his 
                  pension 
                         status 
                                and the Hazens' effort to deprive Biggins
            of  his unvested  pension  plan  benefits  upon  termination.
            Biggins 
                   says 
                       that 
                            without this information, the jury was misled
            by the  Hazens' effort  at the  second trial  to portray  the
            company 
                   as 
                      a 
                       generous 
                                employer willing to provide such benefits
            for Biggins.
                 The 
                    Hazens 
                           argue 
                                that 
                                     the attempted pension termination is
            irrelevant: 
                       they 
                           say 
                               that Biggins can collect only once for the
            wrongful  termination  of his  pension,  and  this  loss  was
            compensated 
                       by the earlier award on the ERISA count.  But that
            is  beside the point:   facts underlying  one claim could  be
            pertinent to  a different  claim, regardless  of whether  the
            former 
                  claim 
                        had been satisfied.  Still, the Hazens also argue
            that 
                in 
                   this 
                        instance the Supreme Court expressly decided that
            interference with pension vesting is not age discrimination.
                 Actually, 
                          the Supreme Court reserved the possibility that
            pension  evidence might  occasionally be  relevant where  the
            employer is shown consciously  to equate pension status  with
            age, Hazen Paper  Co., 507 U.S. at  612-613; but that is  not
            Biggins' argument here.  Rather, what Biggins wanted the jury
            to infer from  the pension interference  finding is that  the
            Hazens are  not as nice as they claim to be.  Again, this  is
            largely 
                   forbidden character evidence, although the trial court
                                        -15-
                                        -15-

            has some latitude since  the evidence can also be treated  as
            context.
                 Still,  in regard  to  age discrimination,  the  Hazens'
            generosity vel  non  is at  best  marginally relevant.    The
            district  court had every  reason to worry,  in light of  the
            Supreme Court and en banc decisions, that undue attention  to
            pension termination would prompt yet another reversal.   Even
            if 
              some 
                   narrow 
                         path 
                              could have been followed--e.g., by limiting
            instructions--the district court was within its discretion in
            declining to do so.   See United States v. Houlihan, 92  F.3d
            1297 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 963 (1997).
                 Biggins' other claim relates to his post-verdict motion.
            Following the second trial, Biggins filed a motion to  reopen
            the adverse judgment on the contract claim, relying upon Fed.
            R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which permits the court to undo a  final
            judgment.    His  claim was  that  a  recent  state  decision
            undermined 
                      the 
                         panel's 
                                 earlier rejection of the contract claim.
            The district court denied the motion.
                 To understand this Rule 60(b) claim, one must return  to
            the 
               original 
                       proceedings.  In the first trial, the jury awarded
            Biggins 
                   about 
                        $267,000 
                                 on his breach of contract claim; Biggins
            claimed that the  company's "employee  handbook" comprised  a
            contract  under  Jackson  v.  Action  for  Boston   Community
            Development, Inc.,  525  N.E.2d 411  (Mass. 1988),  and  that
            protections it afforded against discharge had been denied  to
                                        -16-
                                        -16-

            him.   Jackson had  held that "on  proper proof, a  personnel
            manual can be shown to form the basis of [such] an express or
            implied contract."  525 N.E.2d at 414.  
                 On the first  appeal, the panel  set aside the  contract
            claim award.  The panel noted that there was no evidence that
            the  handbook  had  been  incorporated  into  a  contract  by
            negotiation or that either Biggins or the company had treated
            the handbook as a contract  between them.  953 F.2d at  1423.
            The 
               panel 
                     held that a judgment n.o.v. should have been granted
            and 
               vacated 
                       the 
                          award. 
                                  
                                  That disposition, like the several jury
            awards to  Biggins that were  not further  challenged by  the
            Hazens, became final.
                 In the  Rule 60(b) motion,  Biggins argued  that a  more
            recent decision of the state's highest court, O'Brien v.  New
            England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 664 N.E.2d 843  (Mass.
            1996), conflicts  with the panel's  earlier treatment of  the
            contract 
                    issue in 1992.  We agree that the panel's disposition
            of the contract  claim might have been different had  O'Brien
            been 
                decided 
                        earlier: 
                                 
                                 its tone and language are more favorable
            to such  recoveries than Jackson.   While there is no  direct
            contradiction, O'Brien is  a gradual  extension of  precedent
            (Jackson
                    
                    was 
                       itself 
                              an 
                                 extension of an earlier case) typical of
            common-law jurisprudence.  
                 Yet the case law is  very hostile to using a mistake  of
            state 
                 law, 
                      still less a change in state common law, as grounds
                                        -17-
                                        -17-

            for a motion to reopen a final judgment under Rule  60(b)(6).
              though                               cf. Polites v.  United
            States
                 , 
                   364 
                       U.S. 426, 433 (1960), there is good sense--as well
            as much precedent--to make this the rarest of possibilities.5
            Al       the door is not quite closed, 
            Decisions constantly  are  being  made by  judges  which,  if
            reassessed in light of later precedent, might have been  made
            differently; but a final judgment normally ends the quarrel.
                 Indeed, the common  law could not safely develop if  the
            latest 
                  evolution in doctrine became the standard for measuring
            previously 
                      resolved 
                              claims.  The finality of judgments protects
            against 
                   this 
                        kind of retroactive lawmaking.  Admittedly, there
            is some arbitrariness  (e.g., "new law"  is applied in  cases
            still 
                 on 
                    direct 
                          appeal); 
                                   but, by the same token, Jackson itself
            had not been decided  when the Hazens first handed out  their
            employee handbook.
                 Biggins says that the abuse of discretion standard under
            Rule 60(b) should not shield the district court in this case,
            since  that  court may  have  thought  itself  disabled  from
            reconsidering the panel's holding on the contract award.  But
            absent extraordinary circumstances, we would think it dubious
            practice 
                    to 
                       reopen a final judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) solely
            because of later precedent pointing in a different direction.
              
              
               
                
                 
                  
                   
                    
                     
                     5Se
                        e, e.g., Batta v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 66 F.3d
            743, 
                750 
                    (5th 
                        Cir. 
                             1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1851 (1996);
            Overbee v. Van Waters &  Rogers, 765 F.2d 578, 580 (6th  Cir.
            1985); 
                  Seese
                        
                       v. 
                          Volkswage
                                   nwerk A.G., 679 F.2d 336, 337 (3d Cir.
            1982).
                                        -18-
                                        -18-

            The fact that a different  claim in this case is still  alive
            does not comprise an extraordinary circumstance.
                 The Hazens' cross-appeal is a challenge to the  district
            court's award of  attorney's fees.  To understand the  issues
            requires 
                    us 
                       to retrace several steps, beginning again with the
            first  trial.  After  that trial, the  district court in  two
            stages 
                  awarded Biggins a total of about $207,000 in fees (plus
            costs), reflecting Biggins' success on both the ADEA and  the
            ERISA claims. 
                 Attorney's 
                           fees 
                               are 
                                   mandatory for the successful plaintiff
            under the ADEA and  permissible under ERISA, see 29 U.S.C.  S
            626(b); 
                   29 
                      U.S.C. S 1140; as to the latter, the district court
            exercised its discretion in favor of an award.  No such  fees
            were available  for the  common-law claims  on which  Biggins
            recovered substantial damages, namely, fraud and discharge in
            violation of contract.  The award for the two federal  claims
            was based upon straight time and upon hourly rates not now in
            issue.
                 After   the   first   panel   opinion,   Biggins--having
            successfully defended his  verdicts on both federal  claims--
            sought an additional  award of attorney's fees and costs  for
            appellate work.   In March  1992, the  panel awarded  Biggins
            additional fees of  just under $72,000.   There followed  the
            Supreme Court remand of  the ADEA claim and the second  panel
                                        -19-
                                        -19-

            opinion where Biggins, again successful on that claim, sought
            further attorney's fees in November 1993.
                 However, 
                         in 
                            June 1994, the en banc court vacated the ADEA
            award, ordering a new trial.  In a companion order, the panel
            declined 
                    to 
                       award any additional fees for the first appeal, as
            sought by Biggins,  and said that  the remainder of  Biggins'
            application for additional fees had been rendered moot by the
            en banc order.  The case then returned to the district  court
            where the new trial occurred in April 1996.  
                 After 
                      the 
                          second 
                                trial, 
                                       Biggins sought to execute judgment
            on 
              the 
                  prior 
                        awards of attorney's fees (just over $207,000 for
            the 
               first 
                     trial 
                          and 
                              almost  $72,000 for the first appeal).  The
            Hazens, by contrast, moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5)  to
            reopen the  judgment and reduce  the previously awarded  fees
            because 
                   Biggins was no longer the prevailing party on the ADEA
            claim. 
                   
                   In 
                     July 
                          1996, 
                                the district court resolved the matter in
            a detailed memorandum, pointing  out that he was  "intimately
            familiar" with the case.
                 The district judge  agreed with the Hazens that the  fee
            award resulting  from the first  trial should be  reexamined,
            since 
                 one 
                     predicate (the ADEA award) had now been undone.  See
            Mother 
                  Goose 
                       Nursery 
                               Schools, Inc. v. Sendak, 770 F.2d 668, 676
            (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986).  But the
            district judge  disagreed  with  the Hazens  that  a  drastic
            reduction was warranted.   He concluded that subtracting  the
                                        -20-
                                        -20-

            ADEA claim from the first trial would not have  substantially
            reduced 
                   the 
                       amount of time needed to prepare and try the ERISA
            claim on which Biggins had conclusively prevailed.  He  ruled
            that  a 20  percent reduction  was warranted  and awarded  80
            percent of the original $207,000 figure to cover the original
            trial.
                 The 
                    district 
                             court declined to alter the panel's award of
            almost $72,000 for the first appeal; that appeal, it will  be
            remembered, had resulted in affirmance of the ADEA and  ERISA
            awards, 
                   but 
                       the 
                          ADEA 
                               award had later been undone.  The district
            court 
                 said 
                      that this court had likely considered the matter of
            a 
             reduction 
                       when it remanded for a new trial, and in any case,
            that award was the court of appeals' business.
                 Accordingly, 
                             the 
                                district court entered a revised judgment
            covering 
                    the 
                        entire attorney's fees award in both courts.  The
            total is about $237,700, apart  from costs.  It is from  this
            judgment that the  Hazens have now cross-appealed,  objecting
            both 
                to 
                   the 
                      modesty 
                              of 
                                 the 20 percent reduction in the district
            court fee and the refusal to reduce at all the amount awarded
            by this court for appellate work.
                 The district  judge's refusal to  order more  than a  20
            percent reduction is easily sustained.  Most of this case has
            focused throughout on a central event, Biggins' firing, in an
            effort  to  appraise  the  Hazens'  reason  or  reasons;  but
            motivation had to be discerned through examination of several
                                        -21-
                                        -21-

            controversies
                         that had enveloped the parties and led up to the
            firing, including Biggins' other ventures and claim to  stock
            ownership.
                 A 
                  trial 
                        of 
                           the firing and related background events would
            have been  quite extensive,  and probably  pretty similar  in
            contour, even  if Biggins  had brought  only one  of the  two
            federal 
                   claims. 
                            
                           Indeed, 
                                   the second trial was nominally limited
            to  the  ADEA  claim,  but  its  duration  and  breadth  were
            considerable.   The commonality  of issues  has already  been
            noted, in the Hazens' favor, sustaining their evidence as  to
            background matters in the second trial.
                 In 
                   all 
                       events, 
                              the 
                                  Hazens make no effort to show in detail
            that 
                the 
                    20 
                      percent 
                              reduction understates the time savings from
            (hypothetically) eliminating the  ADEA claim  from the  first
            trial.  Instead, they rely mainly upon doctrine, namely, that
            where 
                 a plaintiff has  achieved only  partial or  limited
                 success, 
                         the 
                             product of hours reasonably expended on
                 the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly
                 rate may be an  excessive amount. . . . even  where
                 the plaintiff's claims were interrelated . . . .  
            Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983).  
                 We 
                   say 
                       "mainly" 
                               because 
                                       the Hazens also try to make use of
            Biggins' earlier attempt, in resisting a remand, to  minimize
            the importance of the ERISA claim in the first trial.  It  is
            true 
                that 
                     Biggins called the claim little more than "a blip on
            the screen" but, of course, the en banc court disagreed  with
                                        -22-
                                        -22-

            him.  Catching up counsel on past rhetoric is sometimes fair,
            but 
               not 
                   in 
                      the present situation where the  blip  argument was
            so clearly unsuccessful exaggeration.
                 This  brings us  back  to Hensley.    Of course,  it  is
            sometimes 
                     appropriate 
                                to 
                                   discount for failed or non-compensable
            claims 
                  where 
                        they 
                            cannot 
                                   be neatly segregated from a successful
            compensable one.  But  the district court did discount by  20
            percent for the failed  ADEA claim; and it took the  original
            $207,000 
                    award as already reduced to account for time spent on
            state claims that would not have been needed for the  federal
            claims.  The former adjustment is obvious; and if the  latter
            assumption is an error, the Hazens have not shown it.
                 Finally, 
                         we 
                            come 
                                to 
                                   the 
                                       district court's refusal to reduce
            the award of almost $72,000 made by this court for the  first
            appeal. 
                    
                    Biggins 
                           says 
                                that this award is no longer open because
            the Hazens did  not ask for  a reduction at  the time of  the
            remand; 
                   the 
                       Hazens say, we think with some justification, that
            such a reduction request would have been premature since  the
            possibility remained that Biggins would still prevail on  the
            ADEA claim at the second trial.
                 But this  court is not  inclined to  reopen its  earlier
            $72,000 award.  In theory, the Hazens have a claim that  time
            spent on  the first  appeal  as to  the ADEA  issue--among  a
            considerable number of other issues--ought to be  subtracted.
            But 
               one 
                   may 
                      doubt, 
                             at 
                                least here, whether much discernable cost
                                        -23-
                                        -23-

            is added  by writing  more pages  in an  appellate brief,  to
            address one more issue with which counsel is already familiar
            after an extensive trial.  
                 In 
                   refusing 
                            to 
                              reopen 
                                     the earlier award, we also take into
            account two  other factors: that  the original panel  earlier
            refused 
                   to 
                     enlarge 
                             Biggins' award, despite his offer of further
            time 
                records, and that this panel has no intention of making a
            further  award to  Biggins  for time  he  has just  spent  in
            defending 
                     his 
                        attorney's 
                                   fee judgment (although it too could be
            the 
               subject 
                       of an award in this court's discretion).  From our
            standpoint, this case is now over.
                 Affirmed.
                                        -24-
                                        -24-