Court Opinion

ID: 9486603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:54:00.135206+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:49.526595
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion, but I write separately to address a recent development in the Seventh Circuit. In United States v. Daddato, 996 F.2d 903 (7th Cir.1993), the court addressed the same issue that is presently before us, namely the issue of whether the government is entitled to restitution of drug buy money spent investigating a criminal defendant, as a condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583. The court recognized that the VWPA does not authorize restitution for buy money, but found that § 3583 provides a basis for such restitution that is not found in the VWPA:
The statute governing supervised release empowers the sentencing judge to impose as a condition of such release any condition authorized as a discretionary condition of probation plus “any other condition it considers to be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Obviously the language is broad enough to encompass the requirement that the defendant make good the government’s “buy money”.
996 F.2d at 904. The court admitted that returning buy money to the government is not “classic restitution” in that the government, far from being a victim, eagerly tendered the money so that the defendant would incriminate himself. Id. at 905. Rather, the court regarded the return of the government’s buy money as a condition of release akin to requiring community service — “for the benefit of the community but not necessarily for the benefit of the victims of his crime.” Id.1
Thus the Daddato court focussed on the catch-all phrase in § 3583(d) — “and any other condition [the court] considers to be appropriate.” It apparently overlooked, however, the fact that this catch-all phrase is expressly limited by subsections (d)(1), (2), and (3).2 Under § 3583(d)(2) in particular, a *113sentencing judge can only order additional “appropriate” conditions of supervised release that “involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” for the purposes of: (1) affording adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (2) protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (3) providing the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.3
Ordering a criminal defendant, as a condition of supervised release, to repay the government’s buy money or other investigating costs, deprives the defendant of liberty during the period of supervised release, yet does not advance any of these three purposes; such an order neither deters criminal conduct, nor does it protect the public from further crimes, nor does it provide any educational, vocational, medical, or correctional benefit to the defendant. Indeed, such a deprivation of liberty during the supervised release period could actually encourage the defendant to commit further crimes as a means of repaying such an onerous financial burden.
For this reason, I reject the reasoning of Daddato, and emphasize that a trial court can no more order the repayment of the government’s buy money under the catch-all phrase of § 3583(d) than it could under the VWPA.

. The Daddato court stated that Hughey was "overruled” by the 1990 amendments to the VWPA. Id. I disagree. The legislative history of the 1990 amendments does not so much as mention Hughey. H.R.Rep. No. 681, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6583. The 1990 amendments did expand the definition of "victim” for the purposes of awarding restitution, see § 3663(a)(2), and limited the effect of Hughey where the amount of restitution is expressly agreed to in a plea agreement, see § 3663(a)(3), but the basic rule of Hughey still survives intact. Indeed, the rule is somewhat fortified, insofar as Congress has addressed the issue since Hughey was decided, and has chosen to change the rule so little,

. Section 3583(d) provides, in pertinent part:
The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent that such condition—
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D);
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the pur-
*113poses set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a);
any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other condition it considers to be appropriate.
Section 3553(a) provides, in pertinent part:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
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(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.

. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D) (quoted supra note 2).