Court Opinion

ID: 9522023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:05.087334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:13.691510
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Issues I, II, III and V. As to Issue IV, I dissent.
Ordinarily, recoverable damages to real estate may be measured by diminished fair rental value or by diminished fair market value but not by both, for to do so would result in double recovery. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 84b, at 929 (1966), 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 402, at 488 (1988). Here the trial court awarded $5,000 for decreased fair market value not attributable to the flooding but rather attributable to the publicity concerning the situation. In addition, the court awarded $150 per month representing a decrease in fair rental value during the period of time the property was affected by the flooding. These awards were apparently not intended to be duplica-tive or in conflict; nor do I view them to be so. When damage to real estate is temporary, although continuing, as with the obstruction of the watercourse here, the proper measure of damages is the fair rental value for the period of the obstruction and the impairment of use. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 84, at 926 (1966); 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 408, at 492 (1988). When damage is fixed, as with the structural damage to the house, the proper measure is the diminution of fair market value, or the cost of restoration. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 84a, at 921-924 (1966) 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 401, at 485-486 (1988). Therefore, in the particular case before us, both measures of damages are appropriate with respect to the separate elements of the damage. I nevertheless consider the damage award to be in error.
The majority disallows rental value as an appropriate measure of damages solely because Lalens did not lose total use of the property nor did they contemplate renting the premises. In this, I believe my colleagues err. The measure of damages is appropriate even though the use and enjoyment is diminished rather than destroyed. See Indiana State Highway Commission v. Pappas (1976) 2d Dist., 169 Ind.App. 611, 349 N.E.2d 808, trans. denied, 266 Ind. 49, 360 N.E.2d 1. Furthermore, a landowner may recover fair rental value for interference with the use of the property even though he did not have or contemplate a valid rental arrangement with another person. See Wallace v. Rogier (1979) 1st Dist., 182 Ind.App. 303, 395 N.E.2d 297. More to the point is Dunn v. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Railway Co. (1917) 63 Ind.App. 553, 114 N.E. 888. There, the railroad obstructed a watercourse causing overflow over Dunn's land. The decision makes no mention of any landlord-tenant relationship in existence or contemplated. However, the court held:
"Appellant was permitted to show the damages to his lots by proving the loss to the rental value thereof. We think the trial court adopted the proper rule for ascertaining appellant's damages." 63 Ind.App. at 560, 114 N.E. 888.
I do not view the $5,000 amount awarded for the adverse effect of the publicity and notoriety as duplicative of an appropriate fair rental value measure of damages for the simple reason that damages for ad*1205verse publicity is not the same as damages correctly assessed for a lessening of value. For this very reason, however, the $5,000 damage award is erroneous. Diminution of value is the measure for injury which is temporary and may be cured. Therefore, where, as here, the flooding has been or will be remedied, no reasonable prospective purchaser could properly consider past publicity with regard to present value. For this reason, the notoriety or publicity factor is an inappropriate consideration. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 413 (1988).
As stated in Delano v. Smith (1910) 206 Mass. 365, 92 N.E. 500, 501:
"On principle it follows that mere injury to the reputation of real estate or the supposed diminution of its value resting on whimisical or sentimental grounds or arising from dictates of custom or taste do not constitute waste. These considerations have nothing to do with material substance, but depend upon evanescent or intangible preferences or prejudices.
To the same effect is Johnson v. Farwell (1831) 7 Me. 370, 375-376, 22 6Am.Dec. 203.
1 would reverse and remand for a reassessment of damages consistent with this opinion and in the light of the evidence now of record in the cause.