Court Opinion

ID: 9733018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:49:41.054899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:37.499684
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in the affirmance of the convictions of second degree burglary but dissent on the convictions for malicious destruction of property for failure of the indictment to state an offense.
On the federal side it was recognized long ago that it was unreasonable, if not archaic, to center the offense of malicious destruction of property on the value of the *346property injured rather than on the amount of the damage done to the property. In 1948, Congress amended the United States Code counterpart statute to effect this result. The federal statute originally read:
Whoever . . . shall willfully injure or commit any depredation against, any property of the United States shall be punished as follows: If the value of such property exceeds the sum of $50, by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $50, by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment in a jail for not more than one year, or both. Value, as used in this section, shall mean market value or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which ever shall be the greater. 18 U.S.C. § 82 (1940). (Emphasis added.)
As amended to conform with modern reality, the statute in pertinent part now reads:
Whoever willfully injures or commits any depredation against any property of the United States, . . . shall be punished as follows: If the damage to such property exceeds the sum of $100, by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both; if the damage to such property does not exceed the sum of $100, by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). (Emphasis added.)
Thus the current federal statute now keys the offense, and the severity of it, to the damage done to the property — as did the indictment in the instant case.
It seems to me that here the disparity between the indictment and the statute is to a degree not permitting a court reasonably to construe it as the majority does. While the indictment would charge an offense under a statute reading as we agree it should read, it does not do so under the statute as it now stands in its antiquated form. But this is a matter for the legislature and not the court. I find the stretch too far for judicial construction.