Court Opinion

ID: 9669021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:37:13.430509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.430206
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 22. (concurring). The majority opinion astutely acknowledges that " 'the discipline of *682thought necessary for a court's reasoned determination of a sentence is fostered by the process of articulation of the factual bases for the judgment,'" majority at ¶ 11 (citation omitted), and declares that while we search the record for reasons to uphold a sentence, we must not "stuff the record with post-sentencing rationalizations that were clearly absent from the original sentencing decision," majority at ¶ 19 n.9. I wholeheartedly agree, and I join in most of the majority opinion.
¶ 23. I write separately, however, for two reasons: (1) to explain my disagreement with the majority's comment that "[t]he long length of Hall's sentence renders it meaningless," majority at ¶ 18; and (2) to again convey our concern that a single circuit court continues to ignore our many warnings and, as a result, repeatedly fails to perform its most fundamental duties.
I. A Meaningless Sentence?
¶ 24. The majority ably explains that the sentencing court erroneously exercised discretion. The majority goes too far, however, in declaring that "[t]he long length of Hall's sentence renders it meaningless." Majority at ¶ 18. Although, as the majority points out, Judge Gartzke expressed a similar view, see State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 119 Wis. 2d 414, 437, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1984) (Gartzke, P.J., concurring), and although Judge Martha Bablitch agreed with him, see id. at 438 (Bablitch, J., concurring), Judge Gartzke's comments must be considered in context.
¶ 25. In Curbello-Rodriguez, the court, with former Wisconsin Supreme Court Chief Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss, sitting as a reserve judge and writing the majority opinion, rejected a challenge to numerous consecutive and concurrent sentences — for three counts of first-degree sexual assault, six counts of *683first-degree sexual assault as party to the crime, and one count of abduction — totaling eighty years. See id. at 420. Concurring, Judge Gartzke correctly acknowledged, "Special circumstances .nevertheless exist when deciding whether sentences for multiple convictions should run concurrently or consecutively." Id. at 437 (Gartzke, J., concurring). He then went on to say, "One circumstance is longevity." M1
*684¶ 26. I agree. Longevity is a special circumstance a sentencing court should consider in determining whether sentences should be consecutive or concurrent. But the fact that the total time consumed by consecutive sentences exceeds a defendant's lifetime does not necessarily render the sentences "meaningless."
¶ 27. In sentencing, a court can properly express the community's outrage. A conscientious court can declare the separate significance of each crime, each victim, and each punishment. A compassionate court can respond to what may be each victim's need to see a strong and separate sentence delivered to the defendant.2 And for the most serious crimes, the victims and the community have every reason to expect that the defendant's punishment will be beyond full mathematical implementation. See Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a) ("court may impose as many sentences as there are convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence").
¶ 28. This is anything but "meaningless." For the most serious crimes, victims, their families, and the community do find real meaning — real justice and perhaps even some recovery — when those who shattered their lives are sentenced to longer terms than they can ever serve.
*685II. A Meaningless Sentencing!
¶ 29. Still, even if the sentence in this case, by-virtue of its length, may not have been meaningless, the sentencing, by virtue of its legal and logical deficiencies, was. Our deep concern about this single circuit court can be better understood by reviewing even a small selection of the countless occasions we have been called upon to review its conduct in criminal case proceedings.
¶ 30. In 1995, in State v. Haralson, No. 94-0124-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 1995), a case involving habitual criminality convictions for first-degree sexual assault, armed robbery, armed burglary, and bail jumping, we quoted Judge Wagner's ruling on an identification suppression motion and then commented:
We are concerned that the trial court's treatment of the identification motion is grossly inadequate for purposes of the appellate record. When explicating its ruling, the trial court should clearly discuss the relevant law and apply it to the facts of record. This procedure is not evident in the above ruling.
Id. at 5 n.l.
¶ 31. One week later, in State v. Hall-El, No. 94-0716-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. March 6, 1995), we summarily reversed the circuit court's denial of a request for resentencing. Again, we admonished Judge Wagner:
The trial judge to whom the postconviction motion was assigned decided the motion without a hearing. Although a trial court need not always hold a hearing on a postconviction motion, in this instance the trial court merely signed a form order, giving no indication that it had considered the merits of Hall-El's motion. The *686order simply denied Hall-El's motion because it presented "no new factors or other circumstances" that warranted sentence modification. As Hall-El points out in his brief-in-chief, he did not request sentence modification in his postconviction motion. Rather, he requested resentencing. Courts deciding postconviction motions should attempt to address the merits of the motions with some specificity for the benefit of defendants and to promote meaningful review of challenges to sentencing.
Id. at 7 n.3 (citation omitted).
¶ 32. • In 1997, in State v. Williams, No. 96-1584-CR, unpublished slip op., (Wis. Ct. App. April 8, 1997), we concluded that the court erroneously exercised sentencing discretion. In language strikingly similar to that which we use in the instant appeal, we declared that Judge Wagner's comments were "inadequate" and did "not show that the court engaged in a logical process of reasoning to reach [its sentencing] decision." Id. at 2. Independently searching the record, however, we were able to affirm. Still, to assure that Judge Wagner understood our serious concern about his conduct, the concurring opinion added:
The majority correctly declares that "the trial court's comments at sentencing were inadequate" and fail to reflect "a logical process of reasoning." Majority slip op. at 3. The majority also accurately identifies why, under the standard of review articulated in McCleary v. State, 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971), we affirm rather than remand for the trial court to conduct a proper sentencing. I write separately, however, to express and further explain the enormous frustration [of appellate courts] when, again and again, [they] have little choice but to affirm [a] trial court's sentencing *687[decisions despite [the trial court's] complete failure to provide [any] statement^ reflecting any "logical process of reasoning."
Over the years this court has received numerous appeals — and has more appeals pending — of sentences from only one trial judge who consistently couches his sentencing comments in nothing more than references to "the totality of the circumstances" and "factors the court must take into consideration." As the majority has reiterated, such comments do not satisfy legal requirements. Moreover, the frequency with which such appeals arrive — all containing virtually identical language — leaves little doubt that even if the judge actually has considered the individual circumstances of each case, he has completely failed to articulate a sentence that could convey reasoning to or inspire confidence from defendants and victims, their friends and families, and the public.
The fact that, under McCleary, this court steps in to search the record and compensate for the trial judge's failures is no consolation. This court, distant in time and place from the sentencing scene, cannot understand the facts, know the nuances, see and hear the defendants and victims, and feel the forces in the courtroom as only a trial judge can. This court cannot recapture the trial judge's unique opportunity to address the defendant, the victim, the friends and families, and the public to provide the moral and legal leadership — the justice — that sentencing, at its best, seeks to assure.
Additionally, although the trial court's brevity may save its resources in the short run, such brevity not only reduces confidence in the sentencing process, but also imposes substantial costs on the justice system as well. Postconviction motions to modify sentences drain *688resources of counsel and trial courts, and are but the prelude to countless appeals that otherwise would not be filed.
Thus, although it seems this court has little choice but again to affirm this trial judge's sentence, we would be little more than acquiescent "enablers" if we failed to admonish this trial judge with additional words of the supreme court in McCleary:
In all Anglo-American jurisprudence a principal obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for his actions. His decisions will not be understood by the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate courts unless the reasons for decisions can be examined. It is thus apparent that requisite to a prima facie valid sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence imposed.
Id. at 280-81, 182 N.W.2d at 521. Accordingly, I trust the trial court will understand that, once again, affir-mance of its bottom line does not connote approval of its process.
Id. at 4-5 (Schudson, J., concurring).
¶ 33. Later in 1997, in State v. Blunt, No. 96-3237-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 1997), a case involving a conviction for armed robbery while concealing identity, party to a crime, we reversed the denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Judge Wagner had failed to properly advise him of his rights at the guilty plea hearing. Id. at 6-7. At the oral argument before this court in that case, Assistant Attorney General Mary Bowman conceded Judge Wagner's error and, referring specifically to him, expressed her frustration over "the *689enormous amount of public resources that are . . . expended unnecessarily when ... a trial judge does not comply with SM-32 [prescribing the requirements for a guilty plea]." Transcript of Oral Argument in State v. Blunt, No. 96-3237-CR, Oct. 29, 1997. Ms. Bowman lamented that she had "approached the problem through the district attorneys ... in trying to find out what [they were] doing to try to keep [Judge Wagner] on track." Id.
¶ 34. In 1998, in State v. Murillo, No. 97-0184-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. April 28,1998), a case involving convictions for two counts of first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed, this court affirmed Judge Wagner's denial of the defendant's motion to withdraw his Alford plea, but only because the defendant had waived the issue he sought to raise on appeal. Believing that we should not apply waiver, I dissented and, in the process, provided Judge Wagner with yet one more reminder of this court's concern:
Because this court repeatedly has admonished Judge Wagner regarding his failure to provide adequate records on guilty pleas and other matters, and because his failures do substantial injustice, and because his failures result in countless appeals that otherwise would be unnecessary (indeed, it was Judge Wagner's Alford plea proceeding that the supreme court reversed in [State v. [George] Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996)]), invoking waiver to rescue yet two more of his clearly deficient proceedings (both the plea hearing and the post-plea hearing and decision) can only dis-serve the interests of justice. Invoking waiver to rescue this record undermines justice not only in this case, but also in countless others before Judge Wagner and any other judges who would take consolation from the thought of just how much this court can stomach.
Id. at 5. (Schudson, J., dissenting).
*690¶ 35. In 1999, in State v. [Virgil] Smith, No. 98-3106-CR-NM, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 13,1999), a case involving a conviction for escape, we summarily rejected a no-merit report in part because, we concluded, the record of Judge Wagner's guilty plea proceeding reflected "an arguably meritorious issue as to whether Smith's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary." Id. at 9. Judge Wagner had accepted Smith's pro se guilty plea despite: (1) never advising Smith of the maximum potential penalty; (2) accepting Smith's pro se guilty plea questionnaire even though it listed no penalties in the spaces provided for such entries; and (3) providing a plea colloquy that included the following:
THE COURT: You'll be waiving any possible defenses that you may have to the offense charged in the [c]riminal [cjomplaint, in other words, legal defenses and stuff.
THE DEFENDANT: Auh-huh.
THE COURT: That kind of stuff. You understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: That kind of stuff. All right. Nobody's made any promises or threats to you to get you to plead guilty to the offense. Right?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
Transcript of Proceedings, document 22, at page 9 (emphases added).
¶ 36. And finally, just as we were reviewing the challenge to the sentencing in the instant appeal, we also were facing yet one more of the many appeals of Judge Wagner's guilty plea proceedings. In State v. Logan, No. 01-1757-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. *691App. April 2, 2002), the defendant challenged his conviction for first-degree sexual assault of a child. We summarily reversed, concluding that, once again, Judge Wagner: (1) failed to provide a proper guilty plea proceeding, this time by neglecting to review the elements of the crime; and (2) failed to provide a required hearing to consider the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. See id. at ¶¶ 9-11.
¶ 37. Thus, for at least the seven years recounted in these decisions, judges of this district of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals have repeatedly reversed and admonished Judge Wagner and, apparently, the Attorney General's office has attempted to motivate corrective action.3 And yet, as we see this month, Judge Wagner still fails to provide a proper guilty plea proceeding on a charge of first-degree sexual assault of a *692child, and still fails to provide a minimally adequate explanation for the sentences he orders for armed robbery, armed burglary, and felony murder.
¶ 38. So where do we go from here? At oral argument in this appeal, we asked Assistant Attorney General Gregory M. Weber for his advice. Mr. Weber conceded the inadequacy of Judge Wagner's sentencing remarks. Specifically referring to Judge Wagner's apparent inability or unwillingness to correct his conduct, he expressed concern about what he termed a "fairly localized problem." See Oral Argument Tape in State v. Hall, No. 01-0808-CR, March 5, 2002. Mr. Weber recommended that we publish a powerful decision reiterating themes such as those addressed in the concurring opinion in Williams, repeated in this opinion. See ¶ 11, above.
¶ 39. Assistant Attorney General Weber said that he thought it would be particularly important to emphasize to circuit court judges that when their sentencing remarks are inadequate, their sentencings may not always be saved by postconviction decisions elaborating their reasoning and, even if their sentencings are salvaged for appellate purposes, the judges have surrendered an irreplaceable opportunity to speak to the offenders, the victims, their families, and the community. See id. We completely agree.
¶ 40. And so, once again, we try... in as measured a manner as we know. We remain hopeful that this single circuit court will correct its course and sail smoothly. More realistically, perhaps, we remain confident that all other courts will better navigate their vessels, having learned valuable lessons from the one court that keeps capsizing.

 Notably, however, Judge Gartzke was advocating for the adoption of ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 18-4.5(b), which limits a court's ability to impose consecutive sentences. Specifically, Judge Gartzke believed that a court " 'should be authorized to impose ... a [consecutive] sentence only after a finding that confinement for such a term is necessary in order to protect the public from further serious criminal conduct by the defendant....'" State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 119 Wis. 2d 414, 438, 351 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1984) (Gartzke, P.J., concurring) (citation omitted; alteration in original).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, has "repeatedly refused to accept guidelines or limitations on consecutive sentencing." State v. Paske, 163 Wis. 2d 52, 66, 471 N.W.2d 55 (1993); see also State v. LaTender, 86 Wis. 2d 410, 432, 273 N.W.2d 260 (1979); Cunningham v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 277, 284, 251 N.W.2d 65 (1977); Drinkwater v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 674, 684, 245 N.W.2d 664 (1976); Weatherall v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 22, 34, 242 N.W.2d 220 (1976).
In Paske, the Court noted:
The legislature has enacted sec. 973.15(2), Stats. (1987-88), giving the court discretion in imposing concurrent and consecutive sentences. Adopting a limitation on this statute ... would put us in the position of placing a restriction on something the legislature has already given the court wide discretion in doing. We adhere to our prior decisions which give deference to legislative enactment and judicial discretion, and therefore do not adopt any limitations on consecutive sentencing.
*684Paske, 163 Wis. 2d at 67-68.

 The legislature, in Wis. Stat. § 950.01, has emphatically declared that victims' rights should be "honored and protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors and judges in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants." Wis. Stat. § 950.01; see also Wis. Stat. § 950.04(lv)(m) (allowing victims to provide statements concerning sentencing, disposition or parole).

 Judge Ralph Adam Fine (who was on the panels in the Blunt, Murillo, and Virgil Smith cases, but not on the panels in the other five cases recounted here), however, has authorized me to say that he never joined in an opinion that "admonished" Judge Wagner as he, Judge Fine, reads that word in this concurring opinion.
Lest there be any concern that only the judges of this appellate district would find fault with Judge Wagner's conduct of the most basic guilty plea proceedings, I note that, on a rare occasion when an appeal from Judge Wagner's court came to District W h met the same fate.
In State v. Luedke, No. 00-2459-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App June 21, 2001), a case involving two felony charges of impersonating a peace officer, three District IV judges reversed Judge Wagner, concluding that he "did not adequately establish that [the defendant] had an awarenss of the essential elements of the crime." Id. at ¶ 7. The court explained that Judge Wagner had conducted critical portions of the plea colloquy in a "perfunctory" manner, thus failing to satisfy clearly established legal standards. See id.