Court Opinion

ID: 9551092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:47:36.400437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:03.077840
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, J.,
with whom DOOLIN, V.C.J., HODGES and ALMA WILSON, JJ., join, dissenting.
I
THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE JUVENILE CODE IS TO INSURE ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE CARE FOR EVERY CHILD. THE PUBLIC LAW VERSUS PRIVATE LAW DISTINCTION DOES NOT BAR PRIVATE SUITS UNDER 10 O.S.Supp. 1983 § 1130(A)(2)
I must dissent from the majority opinion because it attempts to establish an unreasonable tension between state and private law based on a strained construction of the statutes of the State of Oklahoma. The Juvenile Code was enacted to protect the best interest of the children of this state, to provide adequate and appropriate care,1 and to shield them not only from lack of the necessities of life, but also from abuse of their bodies, mind, and psyche. To the extent that the state has an interest in its children-citizens, public law is involved. However, the majority, in a refusal to follow the precedent of Mullins v. Mullins, 606 P.2d 573 (Okla.1980), raises the spectre that the Code, 10 O.S.Supp.1983 § 1130(A)(2), is applicable only to state actions. The majority opinion spawns a public-private right dichotomy holding that § 1130 cannot be used by parents to terminate parental rights, and that 10 O.S.1981 § 60.6 provides the exclusive private parental remedy.
This will be news to the Legislature. There could be no stronger statement of legislative intent that all sections of Title 10 are to be construed cumulatively than its most recent amendments. Under the umbrella of House Bill, No. 1308, the Legislature combined, amended, and codified 10 O.S.1981 § 60.5, 60.6 and 10 O.S.1981 § 1131. The amendments provide that parental consent is not required under § 60.6 if parental rights have been terminated pursuant to § 1130 and 1131. The amendment to § 1131 provides that in a proceeding to terminate parental rights if parental consent is not required under 60.6, the parent is deemed to be without parental rights. Section E of 10 O.S.1981 § 1131, as amended, permits waiver of notice pursuant to the provisions of § 1131 and 60.6 of this title. By requiring notice to putative fathers of children born out of wedlock the *1118Legislature recognized a possible constitutional problem, and moved to grant the fathers of children born out of wedlock the same procedural due process afforded to fathers of children born in wedlock.2
The Title of the Act, H.B. 1308 states: “AN ACT RELATING TO CHILDREN; AMENDING 10 O.S.1981, SECTIONS 60.5, 60.6 and 1131; PROVIDING FOR THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF CERTAIN PERSONS; MODIFYING THE LIST OF PERSONS WHO ARE REQUIRED TO CONSENT TO AN ADOPTION; MODIFYING LIST OF PERSONS FROM WHOM CONSENT TO ADOPT IS NOT REQUIRED; PROVIDING FOR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF CERTAIN PERSONS; REQUIRING CERTAIN PETITIONS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS; REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING SPECIFYING PERSONS ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE NOTICE; SPECIFYING CONTENTS OF NOTICE; PROVIDING FOR ORDERS OF THE COURT; PROVIDING FOR CERTAIN DUTIES OF COURT CLERKS; ESTABLISHING THE PATERNITY REGISTRY; PROVIDING FOR CERTAIN DUTIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES; REQUIRING PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION; REQUIRING CERTAIN REPORTS; PROVIDING FOR CONFIDENTIALITY; PROVIDING FOR CODIFICATION; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE.”
The Oklahoma Constitution requires the title of every act of the Legislature to embrace one clearly expressed subject. The purpose of this provision is to prevent joinder of diverse or unconnected subjects in the same act.3 Legislation amending sections of general law must operate on the same matters which logically and legally could have been included originally.4 These amendments imply merely a change of provisions of the Act on the same subject contained in the original sections.
Termination of parental rights did not exist at common law. Statutory involuntary termination proceedings are in derogation of the common law and must be construed liberally. The fact that statutes abrogating the common law are to be construed liberally and harmoniously within the bounds of legislative objectives is the cornerstone of the majority opinion. I agree with this principle. What I do not agree with is the majority’s failure to recognize controlling precedent or patent legislative intent as expressed in the title of H.B. 1308, and as codified in previous enactments.5
The Act, at the time the father’s parental rights were terminated, provided that a legitimate minor child could not be adopted without parental consent pursuant to 10 O.S.1981 § 60.6, unless the parent was a drunkard, had been judicially deprived of custody in a divorce proceeding, judicially *1119determined to have been cruel or neglectful of the child, or wilfully failed to contribute to the child’s support.6 If these exceptions existed, termination of parental rights under 10 O.S. Supp. 1983 § 1130 was unnecessary.7 Thus, the converse must be implied, if a parent could not meet the exceptions under § 60.6 to seek adoption without consent then he/she must seek termination under § 1130. The basic requisites of termination without consent have been somewhat standardized by the 1985 amendments. Consent is not required if the parent’s rights have been terminated by § 1130 and § 1131, or if the parent willfully failed to contribute to the support of the child, nor is consent required if a determination has been made that an unwed father’s consent is unnecessary.
However, the majority asserts that § 1130 is an action which can be brought exclusively by the state because of a state-private law distinction. In essence, the distillate of the majority opinion is that parental rights may not be terminated by private parties unless an adoption follows. This is contra to fundamental constitutional law because it establishes an impermissible classification of children and parents, and violates both the Okla. Const, art. 5, § 59 and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 A distinction is made between children born out of wedlock, children who do not have a parent to fill the shoes of the missing component of the traditional nuclear family, and those who have a substitute parent ready to shoulder the burden of motherhood/fatherhood. Unfortunately, the fabric of the nuclear family has become frayed, and single parent families in many instances are the rule, not the exception to the rule. Neither the constitution of the State of Oklahoma nor the United States Constitution tolerate governmental imposition of preference in patterns of family living.9 Courts must be sensitive to the different norms which operate within our pluralistic society.
If we adopt the statutory application urged by the majority, the following scenario will occur. A parent who wilfully fails to pay child support for over a year may have his/her parental rights terminated under § 60.6 if there is an adoptive parent waiting in the wings. But, without adoption, the same parent, wilfully refusing to pay child support, may not have his/her parental rights terminated unless the district attorney brings the action under § 1130. This taints termination proceedings with at least the appearance of possible criminality; it subjects the district attorney’s office to an enormous financial burden; and it requires hiring additional staff to process what basically are domestic matters. At a time when the fat in government should be trimmed, this statutory construction is imprudent as well as unconstitutional.
Apparently, the public-private law i.e. state-private dichotomy was first recognized in Hunter v. Duncan, 288 P.2d 388, (Okla.1955). However, in Hunter, the court used the distinction solely to explain *1120the differences in emphasis required in dependent and neglected child adjudication proceedings where the state’s interest is that of parens patriae, to that of custody proceedings after divorce, involving personal rights of the parents and the children. The result of the state/public v. private interest discussed in Hunter does not substantiate that § 1130(A)(2) can only be instituted by state action. The teaching of Hunter is that there is a shifting emphasis in each case based on whether the parent or the state brings the action.
The Juvenile Code was enacted to serve the public by protecting children regardless of the initiator of the action. One cannot conclude that because the Juvenile Code is a public act, as are most statutes, the actions under it can be instituted only by the state. At the time of this proceeding the public v. private distinction was important only in the context of the due process notice difference between state initiated proceedings and privately instituted proceedings. Moreover, the difference in notice requirements did not serve to bar the initiation of § 1130 by either the state or private parties — it merely related to the procedural requirements of bringing the action. Under the newly amended procedures, notice for both state and private initiated proceedings follow the same procedure insofar as notice to fathers of children born out of wedlock is concerned.
The issue regarding institution of suit is analogous to the decision in Williams v. Williams, No. 61,121 (not for publication) and Yarborough v. Yarborough, 708 P.2d 1100 (Okla.1985) also decided today.10 In Yarborough, this Court was concerned with the provision of 10 O.S.Supp.1982 § 1109(C) which purports to render exclusive authority to the District Attorney to prosecute actions under the Juvenile Code. Section 110911 has also been amended to provide an attorney for a child or the parents if termination of parental rights is a possibility. The Legislature has elected to prohibit the district attorney from serving as counsel for the child. I disagree with the Yarborough rationale that the mother lacked standing to implement § 1109(C), and find that there are practical and compelling reasons which permit parents to prosecute abandonment actions under § 1130. Parents left without the right to institute abandonment actions under § 1130 would be faced with relying on the discretion of public authorities. Parents are closer to the familial situation than the state, and can serve just as importantly and efficiently in safeguarding their own and the state’s interest in the children.
The most compelling reason for recognition of private use of § 1130 is the cross-pollination which is present in a clear reading of the provisions of 10 O.S.Supp.1983 § 1130 and 10 O.S.1981 § 60.6. These sections are not to be enforced separately— they must be enforced cumulatively. Title 10 O.S.Supp.1983 § 1130 delineates several circumstances under which parental rights may be terminated. The provisions of § 1130 do not mean that the state alone *1121can institute an abandonment action or an action to terminate parental rights. On the contrary, 10 O.S.Supp. 1983 § 1130 A(l) allows a minor parent to terminate parental rights.12 Section 1130(A)(1) specifically refers to § 60 in conjunction with § 1130 terminations. Under § 60.6(3)(a) there is an explicit saving clause which integrates § 1130.13 Although it is not necessary to terminate parental rights under § 1130 if the conditions required under § 60.6 are met, this does not prevent § 1130 termi--nations from being used as a basis for adoption without consent under § 60.6. The statutes specific cross references belie the conclusion that they are to be construed separately, that is, § 1130 only in state instituted proceedings and § 60.6 only in private proceedings.
The best interest of the child standard arises statutorily under § 1130 and has, as a result of the cumulative effect of § 1130 and 60.6, been cross referenced to be used in adoption and custody proceedings. The removal of § 1130 from private interparen-tal termination proceedings could mean that the best interest standard which is articulated solely in § 1130 could not be used in anything except § 1130 proceedings brought by the state. Obviously, this would violate legislative intent.
In Wade v. Brown, 516 P.2d 526 (Okla.1973) the court examined the cumulative use of 10 O.S.1971 §§ 1130, 1131, 1134 and § 60.6. The Court held, acknowledging a fundamental rule of statutory construction, that § 60.6 permits combining an action to adopt with an action to terminate parental rights. The Court also found no violation of due process because the Code provided notice and opportunity to be heard before an adoption without consent.14
*1122II
MULLINS V. MULLINS PERMITS PRIVATE UTILIZATION OF 10 O.S.1981 § 1130
In Mullins v. Mullins, 606 P.2d 573 (Okla.1980),15 a unanimous Court allowed a mother to initiate a proceeding to terminate the parental rights of the father under 10 O.S.Supp.1977 § 1130(A)(4), because the father wilfully failed to contribute to the support of the child. The Court said:
“... The statute clearly provides that, even if a child is declared delinquent, in need of supervision, or deprived, parental rights are not necessarily terminated, and that parental rights may expressly be terminated for wilful refusal to contribute to the children’s support in accordance with a court order to do so. This is in conformity with the obvious intent of the statute. A child may be receiving excellent care from the custodial parent, while the noncustodial parent refuses to obey a court order to contribute to the child’s support. It would be ludicrous and perhaps impossible to require a determination of deprivation or delinquency under these circumstances, and the irresponsible parent would not only be able to escape his responsibilities, but continue to enjoy the , benefits of parenthood, including visitation, rights of inheritance and rights to the children’s earnings. Such a result would not only be inequitable and unconscionable, it would violate the statute.”
The procedural posture of Mullins bears no relationship to its stature as controlling precedent here. The Mullins court was undivided, and the fact that an opinion did not arise from an adversary proceeding is insignificant. Its release for publication by the Supreme Court was a clear signal to the bench and bar that the Mullins doctrine controlled the relationship between § 60.6 and § 1130.16
Cardinal rules of statutory construction require that the language of the statutes be considered to ascertain legislative intent, and that different legislative enactments be construed cumulatively and harmoniously. This Court may not read exceptions into the statutes which were not made by the legislature.17 In McCain v. State Election Board, 144 Okla. 85, 289 P. 759, 762 (1930) the Court held that because the Legislature had been in session for two terms since the statute had been construed, and at no time had seen fit to change the law, the Legislature had approved and ratified the construction given to the statute by the courts.18 Since Mullins was promulgated, there have been five legislative sessions in which its teaching has been approved. The legislature had an opportunity to amend § 1130 in 1981, and again in 1983, and 1985 when it amended other portions of the Act without changing the applicable provision of § 1130. In Lek*1123an v. P & L Fire Protection Co., 609 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Okla.1980), the Court held:
“... Legislative familiarity with extant judicial construction of statutes in the process of being amended is presumed. Unless a contrary intent clearly appears or is plainly expressed, the terms of amendatory acts which retain the same, or not substantially dissimilar, portions of provisions formerly in force will be accorded the construction identical to that placed upon them by preexisting case law ...” (Emphasis supplied).
Section 60.6, as amended, deletes habitual drunkenness and judicial deprivation of custody as grounds for adoption without consent, restricts lack of consent to parents whose rights have been terminated pursuant to 1130 and 1131 of this “title of this Act”, and to certain instances where the child is born out of wedlock. This is an explicit and concrete recognition by the Legislature of the Mullins doctrine.
The majoritys’ argument would have some validity if the statutes had not been interpreted in Mullins and Wade, and if the legislature had not acquiesced and recently even more strongly endorsed, the application of § 60.6 and § 1130 in these cases. The dissenter’s position in this case is squarely within permissable legislative boundaries. The refusal of the majority to follow stare decisis is not.19 This Court consistently has allowed parents to terminate parental rights under § 1130 and has signaled private parties as well as the state that the Juvenile Code controls public and private termination proceedings. To recant now ignores controlling precedent, and creates chaos in the orderly administration of justice. Failure to consider jointly § 1130 and § 60.6 violates extant constitutional law, obvious legislative intent, and requires that Wade and Mullins be overruled — I am not willing to countenance any of these.

. The purpose which is contained in 10 O.S. Supp.1984 § 1129 provides in pertinent part:
"... 1. That the care and custody and discipline of the child shall approximate, as nearly as may be, that which should be given by its parents, and that as far as practicable, any delinquent child shall not be treated as a criminal.
2. That the public policy of this state is to assure adequate and appropriate care and treatment for any child, to allow for the use of the least restrictive method of treatment consistent with the treatment needs of the child and, in the case of delinquents, the protection of the public, to provide orderly and reliable procedures for the placement of a child alleged to be a child in need of treatment and to protect the rights of any child placed out of his home pursuant to law.”

. Evans, "Independent Adoptions; In Whose Best Interest?’’, 53 O.BJ. 1805, 1808 (1982).

. See Okla. Const, art. 5 § 57;
"Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes; and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length: Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the law as may not be expressed in title thereof."

. State ex rel Okla. State Highway Comm’n v. Horn, 187 Okla. 605, 105 P.2d 234, 238 (1940); March Bros. Const. Co. v. Cupp, 177 Okla. 102, 57 P.2d 852, 856 (Okla.1936).

. Title 12 O.S.1981 § 2 provides:
"The common law, as modified by constitutional and statutory law, judicial decisions and the condition and wants of the people, shall remain in force in aid of the general statutes of Oklahoma; but the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof, shall be strictly construed, shall not be applicable to any general statute of Oklahoma; but all such statutes shall be liberally construed to promote their object.”

.The exceptions are provided in pertinent part in 10 O.S.1981 § 60.6:
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, nor a child born out of wedlock without the consent of its mother, if living, except that consent is not necessary from a father or mother:
1. Adjudged to be an habitual drunkard; or
2. Who has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child by any court of competent jurisdiction, including a court which has jurisdiction of a divorce action involving said parent, on account of cruelty to or neglect of the child; or
3. Who, for a period of twelve (12) months next preceding the filing of a petition for adoption of a child, has willfully failed, refused or neglected to contribute to the support of such child: ...”

. See note 8, infra.

. See Wilson v. Foster, 595 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Okla.1979)
"Both under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as under the provisions of Art. 5, § 59, Okl. Con., dichotomizing of parents which results from affording them different modes of trial at the adjudicatory stage of the deprived-status proceeding is impermissible....”

. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 508, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1940, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977).

. In Williams v. Williams, the majority sua sponte, on a issue uncontested by the litigants interjected this issue.

. The amended statutes, 10 O.S.Supp.1984 § 1109, provides in part:
"... B. If the parents, guardian, or other legal custodian of the child requests an attorney and is found to be without sufficient financial means, counsel shall be appointed by the court if the child is being proceeded against as a deprived child, a child in need of supervision, or a child in need of treatment, or if termination of parental rights is a possible remedy, provided that the court may appoint counsel without such request, if it deems representation by counsel necessary to protect the interest of the parents, guardian or other legal custodian. Where necessary to protect the interests of the child the court shall appoint a separate attorney for the child regardless of any attempted waiver by the parent or other legal custodian of the child of the right of the child to be represented by counsel. Provided, that in any case where the child is alleged to be deprived and the court has not otherwise appointed a person to be guardian ad litem, the district attorney shall be deemed to be guardian ad litem for the child and shall protect the interest of the child.
C. The district attorney shall prepare and prosecute any case or proceeding within the purview of Chapter 51 of this title.”

. Title 10 O.S.Supp.1983 § 1130(A)(1) provides in pertinent part:
"A. The finding that a child is delinquent, in need of supervision or deprived shall not deprive the parents of the child of their parental rights, but a court may terminate the rights of a parent to a child in the following situations: 1. Upon a written consent of a parent, including a parent who is a minor, acknowledged as provided in paragraph (5) of Section 60.5 of this title, who desires to terminate his parental rights; provided that the court finds that such termination is in the best interests of the child; or ...”

. The savings clause is contained in 10 O.S. 1981 § 60.6 which states in part:
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, nor a child born out of wedlock, without the consent of its mother, if living, except that consent is not necessary from a father or mother: ...
3. Who, for a period of twelve (12) months next preceding the filing of a petition for adoption of a child, has willfully failed, refused or neglected to contribute to the support of such child: ...
b. according to such parent’s financial ability to contribute to such child's support if no provision for support is provided in a decree of divorce or an order of modification subsequent thereto; and where any of the above conditions exist it shall not be necessary to terminate parental rights under Section 1130 of this title prior to the adoption of said child. Provided that any decree of adoption heretofore entered by any court of appropriate jurisdiction within the State of Oklahoma wherein termination of parental rights, as prescribed in Section 1130 of this title, was not obtained shall not be invalid on the ground that such termination of parental rights was not obtained."
This statute was amended in 1985 by H.B. 1308 to provide in part:
"A child under eighteen (18) years of age cannot be adopted without the consent of its parents, if living, except that consent is not required from ...
2. A parent who, for a period of twelve (12) months immediately preceding the filing of a petition for adoption of a child, has willfully failed, refused, or neglected to contribute to the support of such child: ... b. according to such parent’s financial ability to contribute to such child’s support if no provision for support is provided in a decree of divorce or an order of modification, subsequent thereto; or and where any of the above conditions exist it shall not be necessary to terminate parental rights under Section 1130 of this title prior to the adoption of said child. Provided that any decree of adoption heretofore entered by any court of appropriate jurisdiction within the State of Oklahoma wherein termination of parental rights, as prescribed in Section 1130 of this title, was not obtained shall not be invalid on the ground that such termination of parental rights was not obtained; or ...”

.Notice before adoption proceedings are provided in pertinent part in 10 O.S.Supp.1983 § 60.7:
"... Prior to a hearing on the application, notice shall be given the parent whose con*1122sent is alleged to be unnecessary. The notice of the application shall contain the name of each child for whom application for adoption is made, the date for hearing on the application, and the reason that said child is eligible for adoption without the consent of said parent ... The publication shall not be less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date of the hearing...."

.This is also a requirement before a court may terminate a parents rights under § 1130. Notice requirements are provided in 10 O.S.1981 § 1131:
"A parent shall be given actual notice of any hearing to terminate his parental rights. The notice shall indicate the relief requested, and the hearing shall not be held until at least ten (10) days after the receipt of such notice, except with the consent of the parent, if known.”

. See 12 O.S.Supp.1983 Ch. 15, App. 1, Rule 1.200.

. Hughes Drilling Co. v. Morgan, 648 P.2d 32, 35 (Okla.1982). Wade v. Brown, 516 P.2d 526, 529 (Okla.1973).

. McCain v. State Election Board, 144 Okla. 85, 289 P. 759, 762 (1930).
"(2.3) The Legislature has been in session for two terms since this construction was placed upon said statute, and at no time saw fit to change the law as construed by the state election board."

. See H.B. No. 1308, 7 Okla.Sess.Laws 1521 (1985).