Court Opinion

ID: 9538590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:38:01.145564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:59.557666
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for an order discharging Ms. Kahlsdorf from probation. The trial court’s initial order of restitution was illegal and beyond its authority when imposing probation under W.S. 7-13-203 (“old 203”). The court’s subsequent orders were tainted by this original error. Ms. Kahls-dorf has already served the five-year maximum probationary period under “old 203.” Accordingly, she should be discharged from probation.
Appellant did not brief the issue of whether restitution could be ordered pursuant to the “old 203” probation. However, this court should exercise its general supervisory power to correct an error which, though not briefed by appellant, would result in “an unmistakable and unconscionable miscarriage of justice.” Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Wyo.1979); W.R.Cr.P. 49(b).

“Old 203” or “Old 301”

After Ms. Kahlsdorf pled guilty, the trial court had two probation options under Wyoming Statutes. It could either defer the entry of a judgment of conviction under W.S. 7-13-203 (1977) (“old 203”)1 or it *1197could enter a judgment of conviction and suspend the imposition or execution of sentence under W.S. 7-13-801 (1977) (“old 301”).2 The court’s order stated as follows:
The judgment and sentence of the Court should be delayed pursuant to Sections 7-13-301 and 7-13-203, W.S.1977.
* * * * * *
[T]he imposition of this sentence is suspended and delayed pursuant to Sections 7-13-301 and 7-13-203, W.S.1977, based on the conditions hereinafter set forth.
Because the trial court’s order is ambiguous, this court is faced with the initial question of whether the trial court granted probation under “old 203” or “old 301.” The trial court may grant probation under “old 203” only in the absence of entry of a judgment of conviction.
In this case, no judgment of conviction was made in the trial court’s order. Instead, the order stated that the judgment and sentence of the court would be delayed. Additionally, the court incorporated language from “old 203” elsewhere in its order.3 I conclude that the trial court granted probation under “old 203.” Cf. King v. State, 720 P.2d 465, 469 (Wyo.1986) (ambiguity resolved in favor of “203” based on court’s intent.)

Restitution Under “Old 203”

The next question is whether the trial court could order restitution after placing appellant on probation under “old 203.” This court has stated that under “old 203” (and in its subsequent incarnation as “new 301”), deferral-probation takes place in the prosecutorial phase, not in the adjudicatory-sentence phase, of a criminal prosecution. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 412 (Wyo.1990). In other words, under “old 203,” the court does not enter a judgment against the defendant, but lets him or her go free, under probation. No judgment is made which can form the basis for sentencing.
Probation without judgment is inconsistent with the restitution statutes in place when the court’s order was entered against appellant. W.S. 6-10-110 (Cum.Supp.1984), amended and renumbered as W.S. 7-9-102 (June 1987 Repl.), provided the authority for the court to order restitution:
In addition to any other punishment prescribed by law, and except as otherwise provided by W.S. 6-3-702(e), the court may, upon conviction for any misdemeanor or felony, order a defendant to pay restitution to each victim as prescribed under W.S. 7-13-109. (emphasis added).
W.S. 7-13-109 (Cum.Supp.1984), amended and renumbered as W.S. 7-9-103(a) (June 1987 Repl.), provided the procedural mechanism:
At the time of sentencing a defendant for any misdemeanor or felony conviction, if the court desires to require restitution, the court shall fix a reasonable amount as restitution owed to each victim for pecuniary damages resulting *1198from the defendant’s criminal activity, and shall include its determination as a special finding in the judgment of conviction. (emphasis added)
Under these two statutes, as I read them, restitution may not be ordered unless judgment of conviction is entered. Searching further in the statutes, I locate W.S. 7-13-308 (Cum.Supp.1984), which states:
If the sentencing court orders suspended imposition of sentence, suspended sentence or probation, the court shall consider as a condition that the defendant in cooperation with the probation and parole officer assigned to the defendant promptly prepare a plan of restitution including the name and address of each victim, the amount of restitution determined to be owed to each victim pursuant to W.S. 7-13-109 and a schedule of restitution payments, (emphasis added)
The word “probation” in this statute could be read to include “old 203” probation before judgment. However, the statute includes reference to W.S. 7-13-109, which allows restitution only where there is conviction. Additionally, the court ordering restitution is referred to as the “sentencing court.”
Finally, I turn to W.S, 6-3-704(b) (June 1983 Repl.), which allows the court to order restitution for bad checks in case of “deferred prosecution or probation.” The legislature’s specific reference to “deferred prosecution” here suggests that it intentionally excluded deferred prosecution elsewhere by failure to make reference to it in the other restitution statutes.
Taken as a whole, the statutory scheme for restitution convinces me that the legislature made no provision for payment of restitution in the absence of a judgment of conviction. Furthermore, under our precedents, Wyoming courts have no inherent authority to order restitution in the absence of statute. See Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 247-48 (Wyo.1984); Barnes v. State, 670 P.2d 302, 303-04 (Wyo.1983); Phillips v. State, 553 P.2d 1037, 1041-42 (Wyo.1976).
For the above reasons, I conclude that the trial court’s order of restitution: under W.S. 7-13-203 (1977), was illegal and should be reversed. Since the subsequent revocations depended on this illegal order, they should also be reversed. Ms. Kahls-dorf served the five-year maximum probationary period available under “old 203.” At the close of that period, on April 18, 1990, an order should have been entered discharging her from probation.

. W.S. 7-13-203 (1977), states in pertinent part as follows:
If any person is found guilty of or pleads guilty to any felony except murder, sexual assault in the first or second degree or arson of a dwelling house or other human habitation in the actual occupancy of a human being, the court shall ascertain whether the offense of which the accused is guilty is his first offense * * *. If the court is satisfied that he was a person of good reputation before the commission of the offense charged and had never before been convicted of any felony, and that if permitted to go at large would not again violate the law, the court may in its discretion * * * delay passing sentence and then parole the person * * *. The court, if satisfied at the time of appearance, that the person has demeaned himself in a law-abiding manner and lived a worthy, respectable life, may by an order of record, continue parole for the period of five (5) years, at the expiration of which the court shall enter an order finally discharging the person * * *. At any time before the final discharge of the person that the court believes that the paroled person has attempted to leave the state or failed to comply with the terms of his parole the court shall cause a warrant to issue for the apprehension and arrest of the person and require him to be brought before the court. The court shall inquire into his conduct since his parole, and if satisfied from the inquiry that the person has violated the terms of his parole and recognizance, the court may impose sentence upon the verdict or plea against him in the manner and to the same extent as though the passing of sentence had not been delayed and the person had not been paroled or permitted to go at large, (emphasis added).
The reference to "parole” in this statute actually means probation. See Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 n. 6 (Wyo.1979).
*1197The current version of this statute, which differs in some respects from "old 203,” is found at W.S. 7-13-301 (June 1987 Repl.). For a detailed discussion of how "old 203” became the current 7-13-301, and how "old 301” became the current 7-13-302, see Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 410-12 (Wyo.1990).

. W.S. 7-13-301 (1977), whose current version is found at W.S. 7-13-302 (June 1987 Repl.), reads as follows:
After conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may suspend trial and place such defendant on probation.

. [I]f at any time during the period of the Defendant’s probation and before the final discharge of the Defendant, the Court believes that she has failed to comply with the terms of her probation, the Court shall cause a warrant to be issued for the apprehension and arrest of the Defendant, Ann Kahlsdorf, requiring her to again be brought before the Court, where the court shall impose a sentence upon the plea of Guilty in this matter in the manner and to the same extent as if the passing of sentence on Defendant had not been delayed and Defendant had not been paroled and permitted to go at large.