Court Opinion

ID: 9949144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 22:03:23.867448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:27:18.798915
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/20/24; certified for publication 3/8/24 (order attached)

              COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

                                   STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                                 D080671
 CALIFORNIA,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
         v.                                                 00046134-CU-MC-CTL)

 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC, et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

        APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
        Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theane D. Evangelis, Jeremy S. Smith,
Daniel M. Rubin and Ryan Azad for Defendants and Appellants.
        Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael E. Elisofon, Emily C. Kalanithi, Rachel A. Foodman, Joseph
M. Lake and Bree B. Baccaglini, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      Zovio, Inc. (Zovio) and Ashford University, LLC, a California limited
liability company (together with Zovio, defendants) are the former owners
and operators of an online university. Following a bench trial, the trial court
found that for more than a decade, defendants violated the unfair competition

law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, 1 § 17200 et seq.) and false advertising law
(FAL) (§ 17500 et seq.) by making false and misleading statements to
prospective students. The court determined defendants committed 1,243,099
UCL and FAL violations and imposed $22,375,782 in civil penalties.
      Defendants do not challenge the trial court’s liability determination.
Instead, their appeal is focused on obtaining a reduction in the $22,375,782
penalty award. They make the following contentions: (1) the penalty should
be reduced because the court included in the penalty count violations
occurring outside the FAL’s statute of limitations; (2) the court erred in the
manner in which it calculated the number of violations; (3) the penalty
should be reduced to avoid violating extraterritoriality principles; (4) the
penalty should be reduced because it does not bear a reasonable relationship
to the harm proven at trial; and (5) the penalty should be reduced because it
is excessive given defendants’ financial condition.
      We agree with defendants’ first contention and conclude the trial court
inadvertently penalized defendants for expired FAL violations. Although
defendants ask us to reduce the penalty by $939,279, we conclude this
overstates the extent of the error. We shall reduce the judgment by $933,453.

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Business and
Professions Code.

                                        2
We are unpersuaded by defendants’ remaining claims of error. Accordingly,
we affirm the judgment as modified.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                                       I.

                             Ashford University 2
      Zovio is an education technology services company that provides
student enrollment services to higher education institutions. Until December
2020, Zovio, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Ashford University, LLC,
also owned and operated Ashford University.
      Ashford University was founded in 2005, when Zovio, which had never
offered any degree programs, purchased a small campus-based religious
university located in Iowa. Zovio needed this university’s accreditation
because only students attending accredited institutions are eligible for
federal financial aid. Zovio renamed the school Ashford University (Ashford)
and transformed it into an enormous online institution that was marketed as
a traditional university. In December 2020, a California entity affiliated with
the University of Arizona acquired Ashford and rebranded it as the
University of Arizona Global Campus (UAGC).
      A typical bachelor’s degree from Ashford cost between $40,000 and
$60,000. At its peak, Ashford had more than 80,000 students and generated
hundreds of millions of dollars annually, the vast majority from taxpayer-

2     Our factual summary is derived principally from the trial court’s
statement of decision, the accuracy of which has not been challenged in this
appeal. (See Rael v. Davis (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1617 [where
defendants do not contend the trial court’s factual findings are unsupported
by substantial evidence, the facts set forth in the statement of decision are
accepted as true].)

                                       3
funded sources such as Title IV loans, income-based grants, and G.I. Bill
funds.
      The students who enrolled at Ashford were described by Ashford’s
former presidents as leading “complex” and “difficult lives.” Based on Zovio’s
own assessments from 2009 through 2020, Ashford students were typically
older than traditional college students with an average age of 35 to 37, and of

low income (between 55 and 76 percent received Pell Grants 3). Around half
of Ashford students identified as minorities. Only a quarter of Ashford
students graduated, and many defaulted on their student loans.
      Former presidents of Ashford recognized that the vulnerability of its
student population “heighten[ed]” the need for accurate college advising.
Even so, defendants created a high-pressure admissions department whose
“north star” was enrollment numbers rather than truthful advising.
Defendants enrolled students in Ashford primarily through the use of sales
people—whom Ashford referred to as “admissions counselors”—trained to
build trust and rapport with prospective students.
      Admissions counselors were expected to call hundreds of leads every
day. Managers would threaten to fire those who failed to enroll enough
students in Ashford, warning that “ ‘[s]omeone can fill your chair’ ” if
counselors did not meet their numbers. Defendants’ admissions counselors
described the work environment as permeated by fear and as a place where
“closing the sale” was prioritized above providing prospective students with
accurate information. One of Ashford’s former presidents received emails
warning that fear was “abundant” in the admissions department and

3     A Pell Grant is a subsidy the U.S. federal government provides through
participating institutions for students with exceptional financial need who
have not earned their first bachelor's degree or who are enrolled in certain
post-baccalaureate programs.
                                        4
enrollment numbers were seen as the “end-all-be-all.” Defendants’ own
employee exit surveys further confirmed that employees experienced the
admissions department as a “boiler room” driven by fear of not enrolling
enough students. In this environment, admissions counselors succumbed to
the pressure and made deceptive statements to prospective students in order
to boost their enrollment numbers and keep their jobs.
                                       II.
                            The Enforcement Action
      In November 2017, the Attorney General filed an enforcement action
against defendants on behalf of the People of the State of California. In the
operative complaint, the People alleged defendants had violated the UCL and
FAL by making myriad misrepresentations to prospective Ashford students
regarding the costs of attending Ashford, the availability of financial aid, the
ability of Ashford programs to prepare students for careers in certain
professions, and the likelihood that academic credits would transfer into and
out of Ashford. They also alleged that defendants had employed unfair,
unlawful, and fraudulent billing and collections practices in violation of the
FAL and UCL. They sought injunctive relief, restitution, and civil penalties
of $2,500 for each UCL violation and $2,500 for each FAL violation.
      Effective February 6, 2013, the parties executed an agreement tolling
all time-related defenses, including defenses based on the statute of
limitations. The UCL has a four-year statute of limitations (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17208), and the FAL has a three-year statute of limitations (Code
Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (h)). Thus, the earliest that defendants could be held
liable for UCL violations was February 6, 2009, and the earliest they could be
held liable for FAL violations was February 6, 2010.

                                        5
                                        III.
                       Trial and Statement of Decision
      From November 2021 until December 2021, the trial court held a bench
trial during which it heard in-court testimony of 23 witnesses, considered
designated deposition testimony of another 17 witnesses, and admitted 1,514
exhibits in evidence. On March 3, 2022, after receiving proposed statements
of decision from both sides, the trial court issued an extremely detailed,
49-page statement of decision finding defendants liable for making over one
million misleading calls in violation of the UCL and FAL.
      The trial court found defendants created a high-pressure, fear-based
culture in the Ashford admissions department—a fact known to defendants’
executives— which prioritized enrollment numbers over providing accurate
information. As a result, admissions counselors made misrepresentations to
students on matters critical to students’ decision-making. The court
explained that each category of misrepresentation was supported by four
types of evidence: (1) the testimony of nine student victims who experienced
the misrepresentations and relied on them in deciding to enroll at Ashford;
(2) the testimony of former Ashford employees who explained how the
pressure to meet enrollment numbers, instructions from managers, and other
guidance led them to deceive students in order to promote enrollment; (3) the
testimony of Dr. Jerome Lucido, an expert in college admissions with over 40
years of experience setting industry standards for college advising and
leading the admissions, financial aid, and registrar departments of four
major universities; and (4) internal company documents and testimony of
witnesses affiliated with defendants.

                                         6
A.    The Misrepresentations
      The trial court described the topics on which admissions counselors
made misrepresentations as well as the associated supporting evidence in
great detail. There were nine such topics.
      1.    Falsely promising prospective students that Ashford degrees
            qualified students for teaching careers.
      First, the trial court found defendants falsely promised prospective
students they could use an Ashford degree to become a teacher. In fact,
Ashford degrees did not qualify graduates for teaching positions that require
licensure. Students deceived into enrolling at Ashford had to invest
significant additional time and money in a state-approved teaching program.
      For example, Alison T. testified she enrolled at Ashford because her
admissions counselor assured her Ashford was part of an “interstate
agreement” pursuant to which her degree would “carry over” to Pennsylvania
so long as she completed her student teaching and passed state teaching
exams. Only after graduating did she discover this was not the case, and she
would need to complete a substantial number of additional credits before she
could begin student teaching. Crystal E. testified she was misled into
enrolling at Ashford, and withdrawing from a degree program at a different
school that would have led to teacher licensure, because she was told
Ashford’s program was equivalent to the one she was attending. Only after
graduating did she discover this was not the case and her Ashford education
did not qualify her to take the state teaching exam.
      The trial court found the testimony of these witnesses was corroborated
by Dr. Lucido’s call analysis (summarized below), which identified 10 calls
with at least one “teaching misrepresentation.” It further found that had
defendants not misled prospective students to believe their Ashford degrees

                                      7
would lead to licensure, they could have attended a school with a “two-in-one”
four-year bachelor’s degree program that is also state-approved for teaching.
      2.       Misleading prospective students that Ashford degrees qualified
               them for “helping careers.”
      Second, defendants routinely misled students about their ability to use
an Ashford degree to become nurses, social workers, and drug and alcohol
counselors (“helping careers”), professions that also require state licensure or
certification. Although Ashford degrees are not state-approved for any of
these helping careers, defendants repeatedly deceived prospective students
by telling them Ashford was “perfect” or “geared for” students with such
aspirations.
      For example, Roberta P. testified her admissions counselor told her a
master’s degree in psychology would allow her to work in occupations like
counseling and therapy, which caused her to reasonably believe her Ashford
degree would meet the requirements for a therapy license. Only after
graduating with $40,000 in student loans did she discover Ashford’s program
was not state-approved and she would have to complete a separate program
in order to achieve her career goals. Similarly, Pamela R.’s admissions
counselor told her she would have “no problem” becoming a certified
substance abuse counselor with an Ashford degree. She learned one week
before graduation this was not the case, and her degree did not meet any of
the necessary requirements. Dr. Lucido identified seven calls with similar
misrepresentations directed at the helping careers.
      3.       Misleading prospective students about financial aid.
      Third, defendants misled students about the amount of financial aid
they would receive and the costs that aid would cover. Dr. Lucido identified
46 calls with misrepresentations in this category.

                                         8
      The trial court summarized student and former employee testimony
confirming such statements were likely to deceive. Loren E. testified her
admissions counselor promised that financial aid would cover the costs of her
degree. She discovered this promise was false when she reached her lifetime
loan limit before graduating and was forced to drop out, leaving her with
“massive debt but no degree.” Jasmine C. (who was also told, falsely, that
her Ashford degree would allow her to be a nurse) described a similar
experience. Other witnesses testified that Ashford’s admissions counselors
made false representations about the likely availability of Pell Grants.
      The trial court found that making unsupported representations about
financial aid and out-of-pocket costs was misleading. Seventy-five percent of
students who ultimately received financial aid did not receive their financial
aid award letter until after enrollment; one-third of students did not receive
their award letter until after the point when they became liable to pay
tuition. The court concluded that statements in this category were deceptive
and the evidence demonstrated defendants “plainly recognized that it was
misleading for admissions counselors to predict aid awards or out-of-pocket
costs.”
      4.    Downplaying future debt.
      Fourth, admissions counselors misled students by downplaying future
debt. For example, counselors deceptively quoted students’ future loan
payments at a small fraction of their potential size. Dr. Lucido identified four
calls in this category, and testified they were misleading because admissions
counselors cannot know what a student’s loan payments will be or how much
debt a student will take on.

                                       9
      5.    Misstating federal financial aid rules.
      Fifth, defendants misled students about the rules and requirements
governing federal financial aid despite knowing it was deceptive to misstate
financial aid rules. Dr. Lucido identified eight calls with such
misrepresentations.
      6.    Misleading prospective students on the feasibility of “doubling up”
            on class credits.
      Sixth, defendants misled students about the feasibility of taking two
classes simultaneously (or “doubling up”) rather than one class at a time,
which was the standard. Doubling up can generate significant out-of-pocket
costs due to financial aid limits. Defendants knew it was misleading to tell
students about doubling up on classes without also disclosing the additional
costs. Even so, 30 calls were identified by Dr. Lucido as containing this type
of misrepresentation.
      7.    Understating costs of attendance.
      Seventh, defendants misled students about the cost of an Ashford
degree in several ways: by leading students to believe their only cost would
be tuition, when in fact they would incur significant additional expenses for
books and fees; by quoting costs that did not match the academic catalog (e.g.,
understating the cost of a degree program); by inaccurately comparing
Ashford’s price with that of other schools (e.g., by saying U.C. Berkeley is
more expensive than Ashford, when Ashford costs more for the same number
of credits); and by quoting students the cost of an academic year, which was
misleading because an Ashford bachelor’s degree is divided into five
“academic years” rather than the traditional four years.
      Former student Alison T., for example, testified an admissions
counselor told her the cost of Ashford was around $10,000 per academic year,
leading her to reasonably believe her degree would cost around $40,000,

                                       10
when in fact it cost more than $50,000. Dr. Lucido identified a total of 33
calls with misrepresentations in this category.
      8.     Misrepresenting the pace and time commitment for completion.
      Eighth, defendants misrepresented the pace and time commitment for
completing an Ashford degree by mischaracterizing its bachelor’s degree
program as akin to traditional four-year programs. In fact, whereas students
at traditional schools earn 30 credits between September and May, allowing
them to finish a 120-credit degree in four years, a typical Ashford student
must take classes for 50 weeks per year (with no summer break) in order to
earn the same 30 credits. Dr. Lucido identified a total of 29 calls in which
admissions counselors made these sorts of misrepresentations.
      9.    Misleading prospective students on the ability to transfer credits.
      Ninth, defendants misled students about the ability to transfer credits
in and out of Ashford. Transfer credits matter because they can reduce the
time and cost of a degree. And yet admissions counselors “routinely” made
inaccurate promises that students’ prior credits, or life experience, would
transfer. For example, Jessica O.’s admissions counselor told her at least half
of her prior credits would transfer into Ashford “no matter what.” Only after
completing her first class did she learn less than one-third of her prior credits
had transferred, extending the time required to complete her degree.
      The trial court found the testimony of students like Jessica “mirror[ed]”
39 calls identified by Dr. Lucido as containing at least one misrepresentation
about students’ ability to transfer credits to Ashford. Lucido identified four
additional calls in which defendants gave students misleading assurance
their Ashford credits would transfer elsewhere. Although defendants knew it
was misleading to promise or imply credits would transfer, former Ashford

                                       11
employees testified that misrepresentations “like the ones Dr. Lucido
identified” were routinely made and even encouraged by managers.
B.    Defendants’ Knowledge of Deception
      Next, the trial court found defendants were “well aware of the
deception pervading their admissions department,” and had “amassed an
extensive paper trail documenting the same misrepresentations identified by
Dr. Lucido.” Greg Regan, the People’s forensic accounting expert, analyzed
defendants’ scorecard data (documents defendants’ compliance department
used to assess calls between employees and students) and determined
admissions counselors made relevant non-compliant statements in 20.5
percent of scorecards. A compliance director responsible for admissions call
monitoring observed in a 2010 email there were “areas where the level of
negligence is astonishing.” And from 2012 to 2014, defendants received
“mystery shopper reports” documenting specific misrepresentations about
financial aid and transfer credits. Although these reports revealed
systematic deception in admissions, defendants did not take the findings
seriously. Instead, they discontinued the mystery shopper program. Finally,
executives received “troubling complaints” directly from students but failed to
take appropriate action.
      The trial court further found that defendants tended to promote, rather
than meaningfully discipline, repeat offenders, illustrating their “knowledge
and acceptance, even approval, of misrepresentations.” Defendants promoted
substantial numbers of admissions counselors who made relevant non-
compliant statements in at least half of their monitored calls. These
promotion decisions encouraged noncompliance in line-level admissions
employees.

                                      12
C.    Calculation of UCL and FAL Violations
      After determining that defendants were liable under the UCL and FAL
for admissions counselors’ misrepresentations because defendants had the
right to control their activities, and after rejecting defenses not at issue here,
the trial court turned to the question of civil penalties. Citing People v. Morse
(1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 259 (Morse), the court found it appropriate to count
each deceptive telephone call made by defendants as a separate violation. To
quantify the number of deceptive calls, the trial court relied on the expert
testimony of Dr. Lucido and Dr. Bernard Siskin, a statistician, both of whom
the court found to be credible.
      1.    California Calls 2009–2012
      Between 2013 and 2020, there were 1,573,400 phone calls between
defendants and California students. To determine the number of deceptive
calls within this population, Dr. Siskin drew a random sample of 2,234 calls.
Siskin determined there were 561 admissions calls discussing at least one
relevant topic within this sample. Next, the 561 relevant calls were sent to
Dr. Lucido, who reviewed them in context, highlighted any
misrepresentations and assigned each misrepresentation a category code, and
determined 126 (22 percent) of the relevant calls contained at least one
misrepresentation. From these results, Siskin determined the total number
of misleading calls to California students during this period was 88,742.
      Defendants did not produce phone calls for the 46-month period
spanning from March 2009 through December 2012. Dr. Siskin therefore
assumed that during this period, defendants made calls to California
students at the same average monthly volumes, and with the same
percentage of misrepresentations, reflected in his random sample. Based on
Siskin’s calculations, the trial court concluded defendants made 46,386

                                        13
misleading calls to California students from March 2009 through December
2012.
        2.    Total Misleading Calls Nationwide 2009–2012
        Defendants retained and produced only California calls. However,
relying on testimony of Dr. Siskin, the trial court determined the number of
misleading calls nationwide and set forth the relevant calculations in an
appendix attached to the statement of decision. Based on these calculations,
the court concluded the total number of misleading calls placed by defendants
from March 2009 through April 2020 was 1,243,099.
D.      Civil Penalties
        To decide the appropriate amount of civil penalties, the trial court
considered the statutory penalty factors listed in the UCL and FAL (see
§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536 [“the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the
number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time
over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth”]) and
determined that $22,375,782 in civil penalties was reasonable and supported
by the evidence. The court declined to order an injunction or award
restitution. It also ruled the People had not proven their separate claim that
Zovio engaged in illegal debt collection practices.
                                        IV.
                          Defendants’ Motion for New Trial
        In April 2022, defendants filed a motion for new trial or to vacate
judgment on the ground the civil penalty award was excessive and
unsustainable under the statutory UCL and FAL factors, violated the state
and federal constitutional prohibitions on excessive fines, and was affected by
an assortment of errors. After a hearing, the trial court issued a minute

                                        14
order denying the motion on May 13. Defendants filed a timely notice of

appeal. 4
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
                        Defendants’ Briefing Violations
      Before we analyze the merits of defendants’ challenges, we first must
address the factual background section of defendants’ opening brief, which
violates several principles governing the content of appellate briefs.
A.    Defendants’ Factual Recital Is Slanted and Unduly Argumentative
      The first flaw relates to the manner in which defendants have
presented the relevant facts. Defendants’ factual recital is a one-sided
narrative that highlights favorable testimony while ignoring or downplaying
the trial court’s adverse factual findings. Defendants state, for example, that
Ashford “sought to be a ‘place of opportunity’ ” for disadvantaged students,
downplaying that the court found Ashford deceived those same
students. They emphasize their executives’ testimony that admissions
counselors’ role was to “ ‘help’ ” and “ ‘educate,’ ” ignoring that the court found
defendants’ admissions counselors were sales people who were pressured to

4     Defendants’ notice of appeal identified the statement of decision and
minute order denying their new trial motion as the appealed orders. “ ‘The
general rule is that a statement or memorandum of decision is not
appealable.’ ” (Morgan v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
892, 904.) However, reviewing courts have discretion to treat a statement of
decision as appealable when it “ ‘is signed and filed and does, in fact,
constitute the court’s final decision on the merits.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court’s
statement of decision has all of these attributes, so we will exercise our
discretion to treat it as a final, appealable judgment. An order denying a
motion for new trial is not independently appealable, but may be reviewed on
appeal from the underlying judgment. (Walker v. Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2005) 35 Cal.4th 15, 18.)

                                        15
persuade prospective students to enroll. They seek to minimize the
consequences of their illegal actions by pointing to what they seem to regard
as favorable details from student victims’ testimony, such as that one victim
is not making payments toward her Ashford student loan debt (which they
appear to view as relevant to the scope of her economic losses).
      California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) provides that an
appellant’s opening brief shall “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts.”
And the leading California appellate practice guide gives this
instruction: “Before addressing the legal issues, your brief should accurately
and fairly state the critical facts (including the evidence), free of bias; and
likewise as to the applicable law.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice
Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 9:27, p. 9-8, italics
added; accord In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507,
1531; Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
1155, 1166 (Hjelm).)
      In some procedural scenarios, appellate courts will view the facts and
evidence in the light most favorable to the appellant. (See Eisenberg et al.,
Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023)
¶ 9:145, p. 9-43 [listing judgment of dismissal after sustention of demurrer,
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, judgment NOV or nonsuit as
scenarios in which reviewing court views allegations or evidence in light most
favorable to appellant].) This is not one of them. Defendants have
challenged the penalty as a misapplication of law to underlying facts. They
have not disputed the correctness of the factual findings in the statement of
decision. Although our review of the trial court’s application of law to fact is
independent, we defer to the court’s underlying factual findings and “accept
as true all evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence tending

                                        16
to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and decision[.]”
(Adhav v. Midway Rent A Car, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 954, 969 (Adhav);
see PR/JSM Rivara LLC v. Community Redevelopment Agency (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486 (PR/JSM) [trial court’s unchallenged factual findings
presumed correct on appeal].)
      Defendants’ factual narrative ignores these principles by presenting the
facts and evidence in the light most favorable to themselves. Citing Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246, defendants contend that because
they have not challenged the existence of substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s factual findings, they have appropriately “limit[ed] [their]
discussion to the evidence necessary to understand the case and the legal
issues raised on appeal.” We disagree. Defendants have not set forth all
“evidence necessary to understand the case”; they have “ ‘reargue[d] the
“facts” as [they] would have them[.]’ ” (Hjelm, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1166.) And Nwosu, which involved an appellant’s violation of the briefing
standards that apply on substantial evidence review, does not give
defendants free reign to use their factual recital to present a slanted
narrative simply because their appeal involves a different standard of
review.
      We disapprove of the distorted narrative defendants have presented
here. And while defendants deny that they have raised a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to the trial court’s factual findings, we observe that any
such challenge has also been forfeited due to their briefing violation. (See
Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 [factual presentation that
cites and discusses only evidence in appellant’s favor while ignoring facts and
evidence favoring respondent “waives the contention that the evidence is
insufficient to support the judgment”].)

                                        17
B.    Factual Assertions Based on Matters Outside Scope of Appellate Review
      The next set of briefing deficiencies have to do with defendants’ factual
assertions, and more specifically with their failure to properly ground those
assertions on matters of record.
      First, defendants’ brief is peppered with factual statements, such as
that Zovio is now dissolved, or that it suffered the “financial death penalty.”
Although conveyed as if they are facts, these statements are not followed by a
citation to the record or any supporting evidence. We disregard all such
unsourced factual assertions. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);
Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276, 281, fn. 5
[“appellate courts may ‘ “disregard any factual contention not supported by a
proper citation to the record” ’ ”].)
      Second, some of defendants’ statements of fact (such as that Zovio’s
financial position “worsened” after trial) are based on exhibits submitted in
support of a post-trial motion they filed to obtain relief from the appeal bond
requirement. “ ‘ “It has long been the general rule and understanding that
‘an appeal reviews the correctness of [an order] as of the time of its rendition,
upon a record of matters which were before the trial court for its
consideration.’ ” ’ ” (Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1307 (Glassman).) The cited exhibits were not before the
court when it awarded the civil penalties or when it ruled on the merits of
defendants’ new trial motion in which they challenged the amount of the
penalties. “It would undermine basic principles of appellate review to include
within the scope of our review matters” that were not “offer[ed] to the trial
court in the first instance in making the ruling now challenged on appeal.”
(Ibid.) As a result, we disregard these exhibits as well as the facts derived
from them.

                                        18
      Third, defendants’ opening brief includes a narrative of events intended
to convey the financial “[r]uin” (boldface omitted) Zovio purportedly suffered
as a result of the judgment. All of the facts in this section are derived from
materials outside the scope of our review. Some are taken from exhibits filed
in support of defendants’ bond motion and are extraneous for the reasons just
discussed. (Glassman, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1307.) Most are based on
SEC filings published on the internet. As support, Zovio cites web addresses
where the filings can be accessed directly. By referring us to such internet
publications, defendants violate the rule against citing matters outside the
record. (See Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 450, fn. 5
[“publications that are not a part of the trial record cannot be considered on
appeal”].) We disregard defendants’ citations to materials published on the

internet as well as the facts they purportedly contain. 5

5     In a footnote, defendants ask us to take judicial notice of an SEC filing
(Zovio’s 2021 10-K form) and the facts within it pursuant to Evidence Code
section 452, subdivision (h). Rather than submit the document itself, they
have provided us a web address where it can be accessed. We deny the
request for judicial notice for the following reasons. Defendants’ request does
not comply with rule 8.252(a) of the California Rules of Court, which states
that in order to obtain judicial notice by a reviewing court “a party must
serve and file a separate motion with a proposed order” and a copy of the
matter to be judicially noticed. (Kao v. Joy Holiday (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th
199, 204, fn. 3 [denying request for judicial notice for failure to comply with
this rule].) Further, “[a]n appellate court may properly decline to take
judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459 of a matter which
should have been presented to the trial court for its consideration in the first
instance” (Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325–326) and
“ ‘may decline to take judicial notice of matters not relevant to dispositive
issues on appeal’ ” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 657, 687, fn. 10). Defendants do not establish the referenced
SEC filing was provided to the trial court in the first instance, nor have they
                                       19
      In their reply brief, defendants try to validate their reliance on such
extraneous matters by claiming post-trial evidence may be considered when
reviewing the constitutionality of a penalty. This claim, which is based on
Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Co. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 363, 376–377,
lacks merit. In Nickerson, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial
court issued a postverdict award of attorney fees that represented an element
of the plaintiff’s damages pursuant to a rule established in Brandt v.
Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813. (Nickerson, at pp. 369–370.) The
question was whether these Brandt fees could be added to the jury’s
compensatory damages award when calculating the ratio of punitive damages
to compensatory damages. (Id. at pp. 372–373.) Our high court held they
could, reasoning “it is not clear why judicial review should be more
constrained where, as here, the parties have agreed to submit an element of
the plaintiff’s harm to the trial court for resolution.” (Id. at p. 376.) As this
description of Nickerson makes clear, its holding has no application to the
circumstances before us. No postverdict award was issued in this case, and
the usual rules of procedure were not altered by stipulation. Accordingly,
Nickerson does not allow defendants to subvert the rule that a reviewing
court considers only the evidence that was before the trial court when it made
the rulings challenged on appeal.
      And while defendants try to persuade us to consider their new factual
assertions by claiming they are “undisputed,” we disagree with this
characterization. No stipulation has been offered to establish the truth of
any of the facts they derive from materials outside the record. Moreover, the
People characterize defendants’ facts as “untested” and “unsupported” and

tendered an argument affirmatively demonstrating that the information they
derive from it is relevant to dispositive issues on appeal.

                                        20
ask us to disregard them. This is sufficient to convey that the new matters
are not accepted as true by the People and they are, therefore, disputed. (See
also fn. 5, post.) Nor do defendants show that any of the circumstances that
sometimes support consideration of postjudgment developments exist here.
(See Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813 [observing
that courts of review consider postjudgment events “when legislative changes
have occurred subsequent to a judgment,” “when subsequent events have
caused issues to become moot,” or to avoid repetitive litigation of issues].)
Therefore, we rely solely upon the evidence that was before the trial court

when it rendered the decisions challenged on appeal. 6 (See Haworth v.
Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 379, fn. 2.)
                                       II.
                               Principles of Law
A.    Unfair Competition Law
      “California’s [UCL] defines ‘unfair competition’ to mean and include
‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair,
deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act prohibited by [the
false advertising law (§ 17500 et seq.)].’ ” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27
Cal.4th 939, 949.) “The UCL’s purpose is to protect both consumers and
competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods

6      We also note in their response brief, the People point out that after the
trial court reduced defendants’ appeal bond from $33 million to $7 million,
defendants voluntarily paid the entire $22.4 million civil penalty award, as
evidenced by a copy of a July 2022 acknowledgement of satisfaction of
judgment that defendants elected to include in their appellants’ appendix.
Because the satisfaction of judgment was not before the trial court when it
issued the challenged rulings, it is outside the scope of our review and we do
not rely on it.

                                       21
and services.” (Ibid.; see Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180 (Cel-Tech) [the UCL “has
as a major purpose ‘the preservation of fair business competition’ ”].)
      The scope of the UCL’s substantive provisions is broad. “ ‘By
proscribing “any unlawful” business practice, “section 17200 ‘borrows’
violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices” that the
unfair competition law makes independently actionable.’ ” (Abbott
Laboratories v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 642, 651‒652 (Abbott Labs).)
Relevant here, “the UCL specifically provides that any practice that violates
the FAL is also prohibited by the UCL.” (Nationwide Biweekly
Administration, Inc. v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 279, 305
(Nationwide).) “ ‘[T]he section was intentionally framed in its broad,
sweeping language, precisely to enable judicial tribunals to deal with the
innumerable “ ‘new schemes which the fertility of man’s invention would
contrive.’ ” ’ ” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 181.)
      “To that end, the Legislature has created a scheme of overlapping
enforcement authority. Section 17204 provides that actions for relief under
the UCL may be prosecuted ‘by the Attorney General or a district attorney or
by a county counsel authorized by agreement with the district attorney in
actions involving violation of a county ordinance, or by a city attorney of a
city having a population in excess of 750,000, or by a city attorney in a city
and county or, with the consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor
in a city having a full-time city prosecutor in the name of the people of the
State of California upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of a
board, officer, person, corporation, or association, or by a person who has
suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.’ ” (Abbott Labs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 652.)

                                        22
      The relief afforded by the UCL is “equitable in nature; damages cannot
be recovered.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th
1134, 1144.) Private litigants and public prosecutors are authorized to seek
restitution or an injunction. (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co.
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 177 [restitution]; People v. Superior Court (Jayhill
Corp.) (1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 286 (Jayhill) [restitution]; In re Tobacco II Cases
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 319 [injunction].) However, the UCL “does not
mandate restitutionary or injunctive relief [even] when an unfair business
practice has been shown.” (Cortez, at p. 180, quoting § 17203.)
      Public prosecutors, including the Attorney General, “ ‘have an
additional tool to enforce the state’s consumer protection laws: civil
penalties. “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in
unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two
thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be
assessed and recovered in a civil action brought in the name of the people of
the State of California by the Attorney General” ’ or other specified public
prosecutors.” (People v. Johnson & Johnson (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 295, 317
(Johnson & Johnson); § 17206, subd. (a).) Unlike the other forms of relief
available under the UCL, “[c]ivil penalties ‘are mandatory once a violation of
[the UCL] is established, and a penalty must be imposed for each violation.’ ”
(Johnson & Johnson, at p. 317.)
B.    False Advertising Law
      “The FAL ‘broadly prohibit[s] false or misleading advertising, declaring
that it is unlawful for any person or business to make or distribute any
statement to induce the public to enter into a transaction “which is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” ’ ” (Johnson & Johnson, supra,

                                       23
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.) Like the UCL, the FAL is “ ‘intended to preserve
fair competition and protect consumers from market distortions.’ ” (Kwikset
Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 331.)
      Also like the UCL, “ ‘the governing substantive standard of the FAL—
prohibiting advertising that is “untrue or misleading” [citation]—is set forth
in broad and open-ended language that is intended to permit a court of equity
to reach any novel or creative scheme of false or misleading advertising that
a deceptive business may devise.’ ” (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 317–318, quoting Nationwide, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 308.)
“ ‘[T]he FAL prohibits “ ‘not only advertising which is false, but also
advertising which[,] although true, is either actually misleading or which has
a capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.’ [Citation.]
Thus, to state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law,
based on false advertising or promotional practices, ‘it is necessary only to
show that “members of the public are likely to be deceived.” ’ ” ’ ” (Johnson &
Johnson, at p. 318, quoting Nationwide, at p. 309.)
      Other aspects of the FAL also mirror the UCL. Like the UCL, “FAL
actions may be brought by the Attorney General, designated public
prosecutors, or ‘any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money
or property’ as a result of a violation of the FAL.” (Johnson & Johnson,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 318, citing § 17535.) Further, “[t]he remedies and
penalties provided for in the UCL and FAL generally are cumulative to each
other and to remedies and penalties available under other laws.” (Johnson &
Johnson, at p. 318, citing §§ 17205, 17534.5.)
      As with the UCL, “the Attorney General and other public prosecutors
may seek civil penalties not to exceed $2,500 for each violation of the FAL.”
(Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 318, citing § 17536,

                                       24
subd. (a).) Because the penalties available under each statute are
cumulative, “conduct that violates both the UCL and FAL can result in
separate penalties of up to $2,500 for each UCL violation and for each FAL
violation.” (Johnson & Johnson, at p. 318, citing §§ 17205, 17534.5; see
People v. Toomey (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 1, 22 (Toomey) [by authorizing
cumulative penalties, §§ 17205 and 17534.5 evince a legislative intent to
“allow . . . double fines”].) And “[t]he duty to impose a penalty for each
violation is mandatory.” (People v. First Federal Credit Corp. (2002) 104
Cal.App.4th 721, 728 (First Federal).)
      The provisions of the UCL and FAL that govern the determination of
civil penalties are identical. Both statutes provide: “The court shall impose a
civil penalty for each violation of this chapter. In assessing the amount of the
civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of the relevant
circumstances presented by any of the parties to the case, including, but not
limited to, the following: the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the
number of violations, the persistence of the misconduct, the length of time
over which the misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s
misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net worth.” (§§ 17206,
subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b).) As this text makes clear, “ ‘[t]he amount of the
penalty depends in the first instance on the number of violations
committed.’ ” (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 352, quoting
People ex rel. Kennedy v. Beaumont Investment, Ltd. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
102, 127 (Beaumont).) And because “[t]he UCL and FAL do not specify what
constitutes a single violation, . . . courts must decide what amounts to a
violation on a case-by-case basis.” (Johnson & Johnson, at p. 352, citing
Beaumont, at p. 128.)

                                         25
                                      III.
 The Judgment Must be Reduced to Eliminate Penalties Imposed for Expired
                                FAL Violations
      Defendants’ first contention is that the judgment must be reduced to
correct an error in the trial court’s penalty calculations. They contend the
court erroneously included in its violation count FAL violations committed
outside the applicable statute of limitations. We agree.
      As noted above, the parties entered a tolling agreement that became
effective February 6, 2013. The FAL has a three-year statute of limitations
(Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (h)). Thus, the earliest date defendants could
be held liable for FAL violations was February 6, 2010. (See Johnson &
Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 310, fn. 3 [under tolling agreement with
effective date of October 17, 2012, the earliest date the defendant could be
held liable for FAL violations was October 17, 2009].)
      Although we start from the presumption that a trial court decision is
correct, this presumption yields if error is “ ‘affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 (Denham).) Here, we are
persuaded the trial court inadvertently included stale FAL violations in its
violation count. The court found “a total of 1,243,099 misleading calls,” each
of which violated the UCL and FAL. On the one hand, early in the statement
of decision, the court did acknowledge the limitations period applicable to
each statute. On the other hand, the appendix attached to the statement of
decision shows the court’s total penalty count included calls reaching back to
March 1, 2009. In assessing penalties, the court did not state that it excluded
from its calculation FAL violations committed before February 6, 2010. And
the total penalty was $22,375,782, which works out to $18 per misleading
call, or $9 for each statutory violation. Although the court did not explain

                                      26
how it calculated the total penalty, defendants point out that if one assumes
the penalty excluded the expired FAL violations, then the per-violation
amount becomes an unlikely sum calculated down to the millionth of one
cent.
         For these reasons, we are persuaded the trial court erred. Defendants
have asked us to reduce the judgment by $939,279, but their calculation
assumes 11.25 excess months of FAL violations. This overstates the error,
because there was not a full quarter month of FAL violations (i.e., seven out
of 28 days in February) beyond the 11 months inadvertently included by the
court.
         Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating error, and they have not
established the judgment contains a full 11.25 excess months of FAL
violations. (See Denham, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564 [where error is not
affirmatively shown, judgment will be affirmed].) Defendants have not

provided us with a copy of the tolling agreement. 7 However, according to the
statement of decision, the agreement had an effective date of February 6,
2013. In Johnson & Johnson, we interpreted a tolling agreement with an
effective date of October 17, 2012, as making October 17, 2009 the earliest
date FAL violations were actionable. (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 310, fn. 3.) Applying that reasoning here, the earliest date
FAL violations were actionable under the tolling agreement was February 6,
2010. Thus, only the FAL violations from March 1, 2009 through February 5,
2010 (11.18 months rather than 11.25 months) must be eliminated from the
judgment.

7    The record on appeal includes a 2017 amendment to the tolling
agreement, but not the original agreement.

                                        27
      According to the court’s findings, there were 426,734 misleading calls
between March 1, 2009 and December 31, 2012, which works out to an
average of 9,277 misleading calls per month during this period. This, in turn,
leads to the conclusion the FAL violation count includes 103,717 excess calls
(11.18 times 9,277) which, when multiplied by $9 per call, equals $933,453.
We will reduce the judgment by this amount.
                                        IV.
 The Trial Court Did Not Err in the Methods by Which It Counted UCL and
                                 FAL Violations
      Next, defendants raise two arguments challenging the trial court’s
counting of violations of the UCL and FAL: the first based on the court’s
reliance on experts who used statistical methods to extrapolate the total
number of misleading calls, and the second based on the court’s decision to
count each misleading call as a separate violation.
      “The UCL and FAL do not specify what constitutes a single violation, so
courts must decide what amounts to a violation on a case-by-case basis.”
(Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 352.) The trial court’s
imposition of civil penalties is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)
      “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the
deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling
under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of
the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi
v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fn. omitted (Haraguchi).)
Here, defendants argue only that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in assessing penalties. Their position is that the court thereby
abused its discretion because “ ‘[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the

                                        28
particular law being applied.’ ” (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393 (Horsford).) Thus, we
consider whether defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that
the trial court committed any of the legal errors they identify. (See
Haraguchi, at pp. 711–712 [degree of deference accorded must be guided by
the “aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review”].)
A.    There Was No “Impermissible Trial by Formula”
      First, defendants argue the trial court erred by tallying violations using
an “impermissible trial by formula,” a procedure they imply was held in
Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1 (Duran) to violate due
process. They observe that the trial court found 1,243,099 violations by
extrapolating from a “set of just 126 calls.” They suggest this deprived them
of an opportunity to litigate their defenses, because “[w]hether any particular
statement was misleading is a highly individualized inquiry that should have
been evaluated in the context of the specific coursework and degree
programs, financial aid and debt issues, and professional aspirations under
discussion (not to mention the follow-up calls made and written materials
provided to the same prospective students that were never considered).” We
are not persuaded.
      In essence, defendants’ argument is that the trial court erred as a
matter of law by relying on statistical evidence to determine the number of
violations, because to do so is to conduct an “impermissible trial by formula”
prohibited in Duran. (See Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 393 [“ ‘[t]he
scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied’ ”].)
Defendants’ argument falls well short of its goal, however, because Duran
contains no such holding. The phrase “trial by formula” appears once within
the Duran opinion, and only within the title of a law review article cited by

                                        29
the Duran court. (See Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 42, citing Lahav, The
Case for “Trial by Formula” (2012) 90 Tex. Law Rev. 571, 630.) Thus, rather
than accurately reflecting the holding of Duran, the phrase is not even dicta.
      What Duran did disapprove was the adoption by a trial court of a
“seriously flawed” trial plan in a wage and hour class action based on alleged
misclassification of employees as exempt from overtime requirements.
(Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 33.) The trial court in Duran devised a
statistical sampling plan, “without following a valid statistical model
developed by experts,” for use in the liability phase of the bench trial. (Id. at
pp. 12, 33, italics added.) The court “jettison[ed] all statistically grounded
criticism of the sampling plan the court itself created” and then “adamantly
adhered to [its] methodology, rejecting substantial expert criticism” (id. at
p. 49), including the opinions of the plaintiffs’ statistics expert and the
defense statistics expert (id. at pp. 22–23). The court also “adamantly
refused to admit relevant evidence . . . outside the sample group.” (Id. at
p. 33.) Our high court reversed the judgment, explaining that “[a] trial plan
that relies on statistical sampling must be developed with expert input and
must afford the defendant an opportunity to impeach the model or otherwise
show its liability is reduced.” (Id. at p. 13.)
      Defendants’ assertion that the use of statistical evidence to determine
aggregate liability constitutes an “impermissible trial by formula,” or
constitutes legal error per se, thus finds no footing in Duran. Instead, the
converse is true. The Duran court observed that “representative testimony
and sampling may sometimes be appropriate tools.” (Duran, supra, 59
Cal.4th at p. 35.) Other authorities are in accord. “Representative
testimony, surveys, and statistical analysis all are available as tools to render
manageable determinations of the extent of liability.” (Brinker Restaurant

                                         30
Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1054 (conc. opn. of Werdegar,
J.), citing, inter alia, Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
715, 749–755 [upholding as consistent with due process the use of surveys
and statistical analysis to measure a defendant’s aggregate liability]; see
People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1249–1251 [endorsing
trial court’s calculation of the number of false print and television
advertisements in violation of UCL and FAL based on percentage of gross
circulation figures for advertisements and Nielsen ratings for television
advertisements].)
      Defendants neither argue nor establish that errors like those that
occurred in Duran were committed by the trial court here. Far from creating
its own statistical sampling plan, the trial court in this case relied on the
People’s experts Dr. Lucido (a subject matter expert in college admissions)
and Dr. Siskin (a statistician). The court found both of these experts’
testimony credible. Over the course of more than three pages of its statement
of decision, the court recited the particulars of these experts’ opinions and
methods. In considering and ultimately adopting the People’s experts’
methodology, the court expressly stated it was adhering to the following
guidance from Duran: “If sampling is used to estimate the extent of a party’s
liability, care must be taken to ensure that the methodology produces reliable
results. With input from the parties’ experts, the court must determine that
a chosen sample size is statistically appropriate and capable of producing
valid results within a reasonable margin of error.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th
at p. 42.)
      As for defendants’ remaining arguments, while they assert the court
“extrapolat[ed] from a set of just 126 calls,” they do not develop this assertion
into a cognizable argument that the extrapolation resulted in a statistically

                                       31
unreliable result as a matter of law. Similarly, defendants’ contention that
“[w]hether any particular statement was misleading . . . should have been
evaluated in the context of the specific coursework and degree programs,
financial aid and debt issues, and professional aspirations under discussion”
is offered as a bare assertion without any citation to supporting legal
authority or evidence in the record. Because defendants fail to develop these
points further or cite authority in support of them, they are forfeited on
appeal. (Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen)
[“When legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a
particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without
consideration. . . . We are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to
supply arguments for the litigants.”]; Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required to examine
undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.”].)
      Further, defendants’ claim about what “should” have been done at trial
begs the question: who should have done it? Under Duran, defendants had
the procedural right to present to the trial court any of the factual
contentions they now raise. But they do not argue they were deprived of this
opportunity. Instead, they seek to have us reverse the trial court’s decision
based on facts of which we are not independently aware (the importance of
considering “specific coursework and degree programs,” for example) and for
which they have provided no support. For the reasons we have already
identified, we decline to do so.
      In their reply brief, defendants argue for the first time on appeal that
“Johnson & Johnson underscores the . . . error” committed by the trial court
here. We disagree. In the passage of Johnson & Johnson on which they rely,
this court upheld defendant Ethicon’s substantial evidence challenge to the

                                       32
trial court’s finding that oral marketing communications by Ethicon’s sales
representatives were likely to deceive doctors. (Johnson & Johnson, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 340–342.) We reached that conclusion based on our
inability to locate record support showing the content of any of Ethicon’s oral
marketing communications. (See id. at pp. 329 [applying substantial
evidence standard of review], 341 [explaining the lack of evidentiary support
for trial court’s finding].) Here, defendants did not raise in their opening
brief a substantial evidence challenge to the trial court’s factual findings (nor
have they done so in their reply brief). Any such challenge has therefore been
forfeited. (Tisher v. California Horse Racing Board (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
349, 361 (Tisher) [holding that the “failure to raise an issue in the[ ] opening
brief waives the issue on appeal].) Further, our holding in Johnson &
Johnson was expressly limited to the determination “there was insufficient
evidence in this case regarding the substance of Ethicon’s oral marketing
communications.” (Johnson & Johnson, at p. 342.) Johnson & Johnson thus
does not stand for the proposition that the number of oral communications
violating the UCL and FAL can never be aggregated by using statistical
methods developed by experts.
B.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Counting Each
      Misleading Call as a Separate Statutory Violation
      Next, defendants contend the trial court erred by counting each
deceptive phone call placed by an admissions counselor as a separate
violation of the UCL and FAL. Relying primarily on Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d
283, Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 1, and People v. Superior Court (Olson)
(1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181 (Olson), defendants contend other courts have
generally calculated violations “on a ‘per victim’ basis rather than a ‘per
[mis]representation’ one.” Pointing to trial testimony of two former Ashford
employees, defendants assert that admissions counselors spoke to each victim

                                       33
on average “a ‘half-dozen’ times.” Defendants argue we should therefore
“divide the number of violations found below by six” and reduce the judgment
accordingly.
      The People respond that California courts have “rejected the
‘contention that the number of violations must always be calculated on a “per
victim” rather than a “per act” basis.’ ” (See Beaumont, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th at p. 129.) They argue the trial court’s approach in this case was
valid and consistent with a per-advertisement methodology used in Morse,
supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pages 272 to 274 and Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at page 355. They also contend the trial record does not support
the six-calls-per-victim average defendants rely on in seeking a reduced
judgment.
      We agree with the People the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
counting each misleading call as a separate violation. Defendants’ argument
questions the trial court’s application of law to the facts. Such a decision “is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at
pp. 711–712.)
      First, defendants fail to show that the trial court acted outside the
scope of its discretion by counting each misleading call as a separate violation
of the UCL and FAL. No statutory authority prohibited it from doing so,
because “[t]he UCL and FAL do not specify what constitutes a single
violation.” (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 352.) In arguing
that violations should have been counted on a per-victim basis, defendants
rely in part on Jayhill, supra, 9 Cal.3d 283, a case involving
misrepresentations by door-to-door encyclopedia sellers. There, our high
court said, “we believe the Legislature intended that the number of violations
is to be determined by the number of persons to whom the

                                       34
misrepresentations were made, and not by the number of separately
identifiable misrepresentations involved.” (Id. at p. 289.)
      But in subsequent decisions courts have limited Jayhill to its facts.
“ ‘[I]t is unlikely that Jayhill intended to establish a test for determining the
number of violations applicable to all situations.’ ” (Beaumont, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th at p. 129 [citing cases].) It is now accepted that “determining
what qualifies as a single violation ‘depends on the type of violation involved,
the number of victims and the repetition of the conduct constituting the
violation—in brief, the circumstances of the case.’ ” (Ibid.; see Nationwide,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 314 [stating that in FAL cases trial courts have
“equitable authority . . . in determining . . . the number of violations for which
a defendant may properly be held responsible”]; Johnson & Johnson, supra,
77 Cal.App.5th at p. 352 [“courts must decide what amounts to a violation on
a case-by-case basis”].) Thus, no legal authority required the trial court to
count violations on a per-victim rather than a per-communication basis.
      Second, defendants fail to persuade us the trial court’s decision to count
each misleading call as a violation was arbitrary under the facts of this case.
Each phone call in the violation count was found to contain at least one
deceptive statement. The court did not act outside the scope of its authority
by considering each deceptive sales call to be a separate statutory violation,
because this approach has already been endorsed. (See e.g., Jayhill, supra, 9
Cal.3d at p. 289.) Defendants’ challenge to the violation count assumes there
were deceptive calls included in the violation count that were made to the
same student. As the People observe, the violations were calculated using a
statistical sample, and defendants fail to establish the sample included
repeat encounters.

                                       35
      Third, even if we were to assume the violation count does include
repetitive deceptive calls to the same student, we would find no abuse of
discretion. In Morse, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at pages 272 to 274, the Court of
Appeal rejected a contention that it was an abuse of discretion to base an
award of FAL penalties “ ‘on the number of solicitations mailed, rather than
the number of people who received and read the solicitations, or who
responded to the solicitations.’ ” The defendant was an attorney who mailed
false and misleading solicitations to homeowners offering assistance in filing
homestead declarations. The appellate court explained the mailers were
“highly individualized solicitations” that included information specific to the
recipient that the defendant obtained from public records. (Id. at pp. 273‒
274.) The court concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances, it is reasonable
to assume that the Legislature contemplated a penalty for each direct
mailing.” (Id. at p. 274.)
      In Johnson & Johnson, the trial court counted each IFU (instruction for
use) and marketing communication that contained a false or misleading
statement as a separate violation of the UCL and FAL. (Johnson & Johnson,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 353.) On appeal, defendant Ethicon argued the
trial court abused its discretion by “adopting a per-communication
methodology to calculate the total number of violations.” (Ibid.) Rejecting
this argument, we explained the deceptive statements “were substantively
targeted to well-defined groups of people.” (Id. at p. 355.) The IFUs were
specifically directed to doctors considering whether to implant Ethicon’s
device or preparing to do so, and the marketing communications “were
explicitly written to appeal to those same doctors[.]” (Ibid.) Further, the
IFUs and marketing communications “were sent, displayed, or made
available only to those same limited audiences, not the broader general

                                       36
public.” (Ibid.) “Given the highly targeted nature of Ethicon’s
communications,” we concluded the trial court “reasonably found each IFU
and marketing communication represented a gain or opportunity to gain for
Ethicon.” (Ibid.)
      Morse and Johnson & Johnson support the conclusion the trial court
was within its rights to consider each deceptive phone call a separate
violation of the UCL and FAL, even if we assume the violation count includes
repeat encounters. Each phone call was an oral marketing communication
comparable to the individual mailers in Morse and the IFUs and marketing
communications in Johnson & Johnson. The court’s findings support the
inference the communications addressed the personal financial, career, and
educational concerns of individuals who were contemplating enrolling in
Ashford. Moreover, the court’s findings demonstrate the admissions
counselors who delivered the communications were under pressure to
increase enrollment numbers. The “highly individualized” (Morse, supra, 21
Cal.App.4th at p. 273) and “highly targeted” (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 355) nature of the communications, together with the
pressure placed on admissions counselors, support counting each deceptive
call as a separate violation. Although defendants argue that it was not clear
in Morse or Johnson & Johnson whether the same communications reached
the same person, the reasoning of Johnson & Johnson nevertheless supports
counting repeat communications as separate violations, on the theory each
successive deceptive encounter “represent[s] a gain or opportunity to gain for
[defendants].” (Johnson & Johnson, at p. 355.)
      Nor do the other cases cited by defendants persuade us the trial court
abused its discretion by counting each misleading call as a separate violation.
Although in Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at page 23, the appellate court

                                      37
endorsed the trial court’s use of a “ ‘per victim’ ” basis to calculate violations,
finding it “manifestly reasonable in the case of telephone solicitations,” the
court did not discuss or reject other approaches. (Agnew v. State Bd. of
Equalization (1999) 21 Cal.4th 310, 332 [“ ‘It is axiomatic . . . that a decision
does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court.’ ”].) And while
defendants cite Olson, supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at page 196 as an example of a
case in which the Attorney General argued for a per-victim approach, the
prior argument of a party in another case has no bearing on our decision in
this case.
                                         V.
       The Trial Court Did Not Violate Principles of Extraterritoriality
      Defendants next challenge the civil penalty on the ground it violates
principles of “extraterritoriality” to the extent it encompasses statements
that caused harm outside California.
      Based on the factual finding that defendants’ misconduct “emanated
from California” for the vast majority of the statutory period, the trial court
included in its violation count all deceptive calls placed by defendants
nationwide, both to residents of California and to residents of other states.
The court stated that by doing so it was following “the well-established rule
that the UCL extends to conduct that emanates from California even if
victims reside out of state.” Explaining its determination that defendants’
conduct “emanated from California” and therefore fell within this rule, the
court cited evidence that defendants were headquartered in San Diego, and
Ashford’s former presidents, admissions counselors, and the majority of
admissions employees worked in San Diego. Although defendants moved
their headquarters to Arizona in 2019, many of their top executives remained

                                        38
in San Diego, and defendants continued to employ admissions counselors and
compliance staff in San Diego.
      Defendants do not dispute the trial court’s finding that their
“misconduct emanated from California.” Instead, they assert their “decision
to communicate alleged misrepresentations from California does not justify
applying the UCL to nonresident call recipients when their harm (if any)
occurred only out of state.” They argue that including such calls to
nonresidents in the violation count violated principles of extraterritoriality.
      Questions of law and the application of law to undisputed facts are
subject to de novo review. (People v. Superior Court (Sahlolbei) (2017)
3 Cal.5th 230, 234; Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5
Cal.5th 898, 912.) Although our standard of review is de novo, defendants
bear the burden of demonstrating error. (Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School
Dist. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 113, 139, fn. 8 (Lawndale Elementary); Denny v.
Arntz (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 914, 920 (Denny).) As we explain, they fail to
meet that burden here.
      Section 17500, which defines the conduct prohibited by the FAL, makes
it illegal to make or disseminate deceptive statements “from this state.” (See
§ 17500 [providing it is unlawful for a business or any of its employees “to
make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated from this state . . .
any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or
misleading” (italics added)].) Under section 17200, unfair competition within
the meaning of the UCL means and includes “any act prohibited by” section
17500. (See § 17200 [unfair competition shall mean and include “any act
prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 17500) of Part 3 of
Division 7 of the Business and Professions Code”].)

                                       39
      Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224 (Wershba)
(cited by the trial court in the statement of decision) was a class action under
the UCL against a computer company (Apple) for discontinuing free technical
support it had promised customers in brochures advertising and
accompanying its products. (Id. at pp. 230–231, disapproved on other
grounds in Hernandez v. Restoration Hardware (2018) 4 Cal.5th 260, 269.)
The Wershba court ruled that the UCL could constitutionally be applied to
the claims of nonresident class members because Apple was a California
corporation with its principal place of business in California, substantial
numbers of class members were located in California, and the brochures at
issue were prepared in and distributed from California. (Id. at pp. 241–242.)
In doing so, it relied in part on section 17500, which it said “expressly applies
to claims by out-of-state class members deceived by representations
‘disseminated from’ the state of California.” (Wershba, at p. 242.)
      The Wershba court also relied on Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.
(1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605 (Clothesrigger), another case the trial court cited
in support of its finding the UCL extends to defendants’ conduct that
emanates from California even if victims reside out of state. In Clothesrigger,
the court found sufficient contacts with California such that California law
could constitutionally be applied to fraud and unfair business practices
claims of nonresident class members where the defendant did business in
California, its principal offices were in California, a significant number of
class members were California residents, and the employees and agents who
prepared the misleading literature at issue did so in California.
(Clothesrigger, at p. 613; Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241–242; see
Wershba, at p. 242 [“ ‘Thus the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations

                                       40
forming the basis of the claim of every [class member] nationwide emanated
from California.’ ” (Italics added.)].)
      Defendants do not cite section 17500 or challenge the scope of conduct
it proscribes as exceeding the Legislature’s territorial jurisdiction. They also
do not argue that the trial court acted outside the scope of its statutory
authority under sections 17200 and 17500 by ruling that misleading
statements emanating from California violated the UCL and FAL. Nor do
they contend that Wershba or Clothesrigger were wrongly decided. And, as
we have mentioned, they also do not challenge the trial court’s factual finding
that their deceptive conduct “emanated from California.” Any such claims
have therefore been forfeited. (Tisher, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 361
[holding that the “failure to raise an issue in the[ ] opening brief waives the
issue on appeal].)
      Instead, defendants offer a series of assertions intended to demonstrate
that the trial court violated principles of extraterritoriality by penalizing
them for their deceptive calls to non-California residents. Their first
argument is based on “due process concerns.” They cite State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408 (State Farm) for
the proposition that a state does not “have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside
of the State’s jurisdiction.” (See State Farm, at p. 421.) Next, they cite Philip
Morris USA v. Williams (2007) 549 U.S. 346 for the proposition that “the
Constitution’s Due Process clause forbids a State to use a punitive damages
award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or
those whom they directly represent.” (See Philip Morris, at p. 353.) Finally,
they contend that “[t]hose same due process concerns are implicated here,
where the Attorney General represents the citizens of this State, not others.”

                                          41
They cite sections 17206, subdivision (a), and 17536, subdivision (a), in
support of this last contention.
      Defendants’ first argument is underdeveloped and ultimately
unpersuasive. Although we do not disagree with the proposition for which
defendants quote State Farm, they fail to show it has any application here.
Defendants have not challenged the court’s factual finding that their
misleading statements emanated from California, a finding that tracks the
language of section 17500. (See § 17500 [providing it is unlawful for a
business or any of its employees “to make or disseminate or cause to be made
or disseminated from this state . . . any statement . . . which is untrue or
misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care
should be known, to be untrue or misleading” (italics added)].) Accordingly,
they have not established that their misconduct was “committed outside
[California’s] jurisdiction.” (See State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 421.)
      As for defendants’ reliance on Philip Morris, that case’s prohibition
against using punitive damages to punish a defendant for injuries it inflicts
on nonparties does not apply in this context. This is an action to enforce the
UCL and FAL brought by a public prosecutor, not a private lawsuit brought
by an injured plaintiff seeking recovery of damages. Harm is not an element
of an action for civil penalties under the UCL and FAL. (See §§ 17206,
subd. (a), 17536, subd. (a); Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 317–318; People v. Dollar Rent-A-Car Sys. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 119,
131.) A court may impose civil penalties under these statutes “without
individualized proof of reliance, deception and injury if it is convinced that
such a remedy is necessary to deter [the defendant’s] unfair practice.”
(Dollar Rent-A-Car, at p. 131, italics added.) The penalty in this case was

                                       42
imposed to punish defendants for violating the UCL and FAL, not for injuring
nonresidents (or nonparties).
      And defendants’ assertion about the Attorney General’s representation
of citizens of this state appears to reflect a misunderstanding of the Attorney
General’s role in an action for civil penalties under the UCL and FAL. In
support of their assertion, defendants cite sections 17206, subdivision (a), and
17536, subdivision (a), which provide that civil penalties may be recovered in
civil actions brought by the Attorney General “in the name of the people of the
State of California.” (Italics added.) Although defendants do not explain
their reasoning, they seem to interpret the italicized text to mean the
Attorney General acts as a representative of California victims in such
actions. This is incorrect. When the Attorney General initiates an action
asserting violations of the UCL and FAL, he does so under his constitutional
authority as the chief law enforcement officer of the state. (See Cal. Const.,
art. V, § 13; People v. Eubanks (1996) 14 Cal.4th 580, 589 [“The public
prosecutor ‘ “is the representative not of any ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty.” ’ ”]; Abbott Labs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 659 [“The UCL
does not undermine the Attorney General’s constitutional role as California’s
chief law enforcement officer.”].) “ ‘[I]n the absence of any legislative
restriction, [the Attorney General] has the power to file any civil action or
proceeding directly involving the rights and interests of the state, or which he
deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation
of order, and the protection of public rights and interest.’ ” (D’Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 14–15.)
      To the extent defendants perceive a legislative restriction on the
Attorney General’s authority in the statutory text stating that civil penalties
shall be recovered in an action “brought in the name of the people of the State

                                        43
of California” (§§ 17206, subd. (a), 17536, subd. (a)), this, too, is incorrect.
Under Government Code section 100, “[t]he sovereignty of the state resides in
the people thereof, . . . all writs and processes shall issue in their name.”
(Gov. Code, § 100, subd. (a).) This statute further specifies that “[t]he style of
all process shall be ‘The People of the State of California,’ and all
prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority.” (Gov.
Code, § 100, subd. (b).) In enacting Business and Professions Code sections
17206 and 17536, the Legislature was presumably aware of these procedural
conventions. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [“the Legislature
is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the
time legislation is enacted”].) Thus, by specifying in sections 17206,
subdivision (a), and 17536, subdivision (a), that actions for civil penalties
shall be brought “in the name of the people of the State of California,” the
Legislature did not signal an intent to limit the Attorney General’s authority
to prosecute violations of the UCL or FAL to cases involving false or
misleading statements directed at California residents.
      Next, defendants rely on People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1253, in which we reversed a sanction award that
was based on a company’s national advertising budget. However, the
sanction in that case was based on breach of a consent decree with a limited
geographic scope. (See id. at pp. 1261, 1283–1284 [defendant violated
consent decree and settlement agreement by targeting tobacco advertising “to
youth within California”].) This case does not help defendants.
      In defendants’ remaining arguments, they appear in part to conflate
the location where prohibited conduct occurred with the location where the
resulting harm occurred. Within the same paragraph of their opening brief,
for example, they first frame the issue raised by their appeal as “whether the

                                         44
State [can] collect penalties for conduct occurring outside its borders”; two
sentences later, they characterize the same issue as “whether the State can
collect penalties for harm that occurred outside its borders.” (Original italics
omitted; our italics added.) But defendants do not squarely contend, much
less present a developed argument, that their misconduct occurred outside
our state’s borders. Their failure to present a developed argument on this
point, as opposed to a general assertion, forfeits any such claim of error.
(See People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [deeming waived a
defendant’s argument on appeal that merely “makes a general assertion,
unsupported by specific argument”]; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150
[rejecting due process claim because other than a brief mention of the
argument, appellant failed to expand on the issue].)
      And defendants’ assertion that the presumption against
extraterritoriality prohibits recovery of penalties for harm occurring outside
the state is simply incorrect. “The presumption against extraterritoriality is
one against an intent to encompass conduct occurring in a foreign jurisdiction
in the prohibitions and remedies of a domestic statute.” (Diamond
Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1059,
fn. 20.) In Diamond Multimedia, the defendants allegedly made fraudulent
statements and omissions in California that induced nonresidents to make
out-of-state purchases of securities. The issue was whether, when conduct
violating Corporations Code section 25400 is committed in California,
nonresidents who purchase their stock out of state may recover damages
under Corporations Code section 25500. (Diamond Multimedia, at pp. 1040–
1041.) Rejecting an argument that permitting nonresidents to recover
damages for such purchases would run afoul of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, our high court explained because Corporations Code

                                       45
sections 25400 and 25500 “provide[d] a remedy for a wrongful act committed
in California,” there was no potential “for a ‘clash’ between California law
and that of any other state or of the United States.” (Diamond Multimedia,
at p. 1059, fn. 20.) The same reasoning applies here and leads to the
conclusion that the presumption of extraterritoriality is not implicated by
permitting the recovery of civil penalties for harm occurring outside
California where, as here, the conduct violating the relevant law was
committed in California.
      Next, defendants appear to fault the trial court for relying on Wershba
and Clothesrigger because they are “about choice-of-law principles.” Their
argument overlooks that Wershba and Clothesrigger were based on choice-of-
law and constitutional principles. (See Wershba, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 241–244; Clothesrigger, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d at pp. 612–616.) But even
if we were to assume that defendants are correct and Wershba and
Clothesrigger are only choice-of-law cases, this would not matter since a court
cannot hold the UCL instead of another state’s law governs the claims of out-
of-state residents aggrieved by a California defendant’s deceptive statements
unless the UCL does, in fact, apply to such claims.
      Finally, defendants contend that Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51
Cal.4th 1191 (Sullivan) “reinforces that the Attorney General cannot recover
penalties for students located outside of California.” Sullivan does not assist
defendants. In Sullivan, the California Supreme Court held the UCL did not
apply to a California employer’s asserted failure to comply with the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.) by paying
nonresident employees for overtime worked in other states. (Sullivan, at
pp. 1206–1209.) The problem in Sullivan was that there was no evidence the
employer’s conduct that violated federal overtime laws was committed in

                                       46
California. The only conduct committed inside California was the employer’s
misclassification of the nonresident workers, but adopting an erroneous
classification policy was not unlawful “in the abstract.” (Sullivan, at p. 1208.)
What was unlawful was the failure to pay overtime when due, but the record
did not establish where payment occurred. (Ibid.) The Court held that under
these circumstances, the UCL did not apply.
      Sullivan’s holding is not apposite here because the underlying
violations in this case arose under the FAL, not the FLSA, and this case does
not involve a lack of evidence defendants committed the misconduct violative
of the FAL inside California. In their reply brief, defendants contend their
development of policies for admissions counselors and “decision to
communicate alleged misrepresentations from California” were “abstract,”
just like the employer’s classification decision in Sullivan. They claim the
harm to out-of-state residents in this case “was akin to the out-of-state failure
to pay in Sullivan.” But their attempt to analogize this case to Sullivan falls
short, because it ignores that the trial court in this case found the actual law
violations occurred in this state, a factual finding defendants have not
challenged. (See Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1208, fn. 10 [distinguishing
Wershba and Clothesrigger as cases in which “the unlawful conduct that
formed the basis of the out-of-state plaintiffs’ claims . . . , and that justified
the application of California law to resolve those claims, occurred in
California”].)
      For all these reasons, defendants fail to persuade us that the trial court
violated principles of extraterritoriality by awarding penalties based on their
deceptive statements to non-residents of California.

                                         47
                                       VI.
                          The Penalty Is Not Excessive
       Defendants’ last challenge is that the penalty violated the prohibitions
against excessive fines and grossly disproportionate punishments embraced
by the excessive fines and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution, as well as the corresponding provisions of the California
Constitution. (See U.S. Const., 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7,
17.)
       The California Supreme Court has held that appellate courts need not
separately analyze whether a penalty is constitutionally excessive and
whether it violates due process. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 707, 728 (Reynolds).) In Reynolds, the court
examined the constitutionality of an award of civil penalties using a multi-
factor test borrowed from United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321
(Bajakajian), a seminal Eighth Amendment case. Under this test, whether a
penalty is unconstitutionally excessive depends on “four considerations: (1)
the defendant’s culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the
penalty; (3) the penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s
ability to pay.” (Reynolds, at p. 728, citing Bajakajian, at pp. 337‒338.)
       Here, defendants directly challenge only the second and fourth
Reynolds factors. They argue, first, that the penalty should be reduced
because it is not reasonably related to the harm proven at trial, and second,
that it should be reduced because it is excessive given Zovio’s financial
condition. We analyze defendants’ arguments with respect to these factors
and then summarize our conclusions with respect to the remaining factors.

                                       48
A.    Standard of Review
      In reviewing the excessiveness of a penalty, “ ‘we accept the trial court’s
factual findings unless clearly erroneous and determine de novo whether the
fine is excessive.’ ” (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 359; see
City and County of San Francisco v. Sainez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1313
(Sainez) [“our review of the ruling on the constitutional question is
independent judgment, or de novo [citation], but with deference to underlying
factual findings, which we review for substantial evidence, viewing the record
in the light most favorable to the ruling”].) Because the factual findings in
the statement of decision are unchallenged on appeal, we presume they are
correct. (Adhav, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 969; PR/JSM, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 [trial court’s unchallenged factual findings presumed
correct on appeal].)
      Defendants contend certain factual findings were omitted from the
statement of decision. Specifically, they contend the trial court failed to
explain how the penalty was based on the victims’ harm, and that it made no
findings with respect to their ability to pay.
      In the ordinary course, trial courts are not required to provide written
findings of fact after a bench trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) Where factual
findings are not expressly made, under the doctrine of implied findings an
appellate court will fill in the gap by presuming the missing finding was
decided in favor of the prevailing party. (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990)
51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) The implied finding is then reviewed under the
substantial evidence standard. (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc.
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 60 (Fladeboe).)
      Sections 632 and 634 of the Code of Civil Procedure set forth actions a
party can take to avoid the doctrine of implied findings. These statutes

                                       49
“describe a two-step process for avoiding implied factual findings. First, a
party must request a statement of decision pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 632. [Citation.] Second, if the trial court issues a
statement of decision, a party claiming omissions or ambiguities in the
factual findings must bring the omissions or ambiguities to the trial court’s
attention.” (Fladeboe, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 59.) An appellant who
fails to follow these rules and thereafter complains on appeal that there are
factual findings missing from the statement of decision will find itself subject
to the doctrine of implied findings. (Id. at pp. 59–60.)
      We first consider defendants’ claim that the trial court failed to explain
how the penalty was based on the evidence of the victims’ harm. According to
defendants, not only were such findings omitted from the statement of
decision, but we also cannot infer the assertedly missing findings. They
contend they succeeded in avoiding the doctrine of implied findings because
they complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 634 by filing a motion for
new trial in which they objected that the degree of harm shown to have been
experienced by the victims was not in proportion with the penalty, rendering
the penalty unconstitutionally excessive. We disagree. Defendants did not
file a request for statement of decision as required by Code of Civil Procedure
section 632. And in their new trial motion, defendants argued, in part, that
the penalty should be reduced because it was not sufficiently related to the
trial evidence of harm. They did not suggest they desired any additional
factual findings on harm or object that the statement of decision omitted
findings on this issue. This is not compliance with Code of Civil Procedure
section 634. (Tyler v. Norton (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 717, 725–726.)
Accordingly, “[b]ecause defendants do not show that express findings on [this]
factor[ was] legally required or requested for inclusion in the statement of

                                       50
decision, we are free to follow our usual appellate course and imply . . .
findings to support the ruling.” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.)
      As mentioned, defendants also assert that the trial court made “no
findings” regarding their ability to pay the penalty. Once again, they contend

the assertedly missing findings 8 cannot be inferred in favor of the judgment
because they complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 634 by raising the
omission in their new trial motion. Again, we disagree. Defendants did not
request findings on Zovio’s ability to pay the penalty in their new trial
motion. Rather, they argued that the trial court failed to make findings on
Zovio’s net worth and that this omission required it to vacate the judgment
and reconsider its decision. But even if we were to treat this as sufficient to
satisfy Code of Civil Procedure section 634 with respect to the full gamut of
financial facts relevant to defendants’ ability to pay, avoiding the doctrine of
implied findings is a two-step process. Defendants ignore the first step—
filing a request that identifies the controverted issues to be included in the
statement of decision (see Code Civ. Proc., § 632)—and they do not argue they

8      We also disagree that the statement of decision is devoid of findings
with respect to Zovio’s financial condition or reflects a failure to consider
Zovio’s finances in setting the amount of civil penalties. A statement of
decision must disclose the “factual and legal basis for [the trial court’s]
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial[.]” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 632.) It need not discuss every subsidiary issue. (Wolfe v. Lipsy
(1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 633, 643, disapproved on other grounds in Droeger v.
Friedman, Sloan & Ross (1991) 54 Cal.3d 26, 36–39.) The failure to make an
express finding on a material issue is harmless when the missing finding may
reasonably be found to be implicit in other findings. (See, e.g., Rojas v.
Mitchell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1450 (Rojas); Wolfe, at pp. 643–644.) As
we discuss below, the court made findings with respect to Zovio’s financial
state. Implicit in these findings is a determination Zovio had the ability to
pay the penalty.

                                       51
should be excused from complying with this requirement. We are not

obligated to develop defendants’ arguments for them. 9 (See Benach v.
County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“It is not our place to
construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness.”].)
      In any event, the impact of the doctrine of implied findings with respect
to the ability to pay factor is mitigated “by the relative absence at trial of
disputed issues of fact.” (LSREF2 Clover Property 4, LLC v. Festival Retail
Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1076 (LSREF2).) As we shall discuss,
the trial evidence relevant to Zovio’s financial state consisted of the testimony
of a single witness as well as several SEC filings. The individual data points
established by this evidence are undisputed. And “[w]e review legal
conclusions from an established set of facts independently.” (Ibid.)
B.    Consideration of the Reynolds Factors Does Not Demonstrate the
      Penalty Is Excessive
      1.    Contrary to Defendants’ Arguments, the Penalty Is Not
            Insufficiently Related to Victims’ Harm
      Defendants argue the penalty does not bear a reasonable relationship
to the trial evidence of the harm caused by their deceptions. Referring to the
People’s request for $222,119 in restitution on behalf of the nine testifying

9      Defendants do not contend the trial court committed reversible
procedural error by purportedly failing to make express findings on harm or
ability to pay. (See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1114, 1116
[erroneous failure to comply with statutory requirements pertaining to
issuance of a statement of decision subject to harmless error review].)
Accordingly, any such claim has been forfeited. (Scheenstra v. California
Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 403 [“fundamental rule of appellate
review is that the appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error”];
Tisher, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 361 [the “failure to raise an issue in the[ ]
opening brief waives the issue on appeal”].)

                                        52
student victims, they assert that no harm was established at trial other than
these victims’ economic losses. They further contend the penalty should not
be permitted to exceed the four-to-one ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages typically authorized in punitive damages cases. Therefore,
since the People only proved defendants’ misconduct caused $222,119 in
“actual harm,” the penalty must be reduced to $888,476—a “harm” to penalty
ratio of one to four.
      We are not persuaded. Defendants’ claim that the penalty must not
exceed a single-digit ratio of the monetary loss proven at trial relies on BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996) 517 U.S. 559 (Gore) and progeny (e.g.,
State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 425). Gore established three guideposts for
courts to consider when determining whether an award of punitive damages
violates the federal due process clause: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award [expressed as
a ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages]; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases. (Gore, at pp. 575–585.) For a number of
reasons, we disagree that the Gore test applies in this context.
      First, in Reynolds, our Supreme Court expressly adopted the
Bajakajian test to analyze the constitutionality of a civil penalty. (Reynolds,
supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 728.) “On federal questions, intermediate appellate
courts in California must follow the decisions of the California Supreme
Court, unless the United States Supreme Court has decided the same
question differently.” (Correia v. NB Baker Electric, Inc. (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 602, 619, citing Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) And the United States Supreme Court “has not

                                       53
suggested that the Gore guideposts should extend to constitutional review of
statutory damage awards.” (Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum
(1st Cir. 2013) 719 F.3d 67, 70 (Sony BMG).)
      Second, as the People observe, other appellate courts have found it
inappropriate to use tests formulated for punitive damage awards to assess
the proportionality of a civil penalty. (See People ex rel. Bill Lockyer v.
Fremont Life Ins. Co. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 508, 520 (Fremont) [declining to
apply Gore guideposts to assess the constitutionality of a civil penalty
because the Gore guideposts “address the propriety of a punitive damage
award, not a civil penalty”]; First Federal, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 731–
732 [declining to apply to a civil penalty award the holding of Adams v.
Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 108–109 (Murakami) requiring evidence of a
defendant’s financial condition to be presented by a plaintiff in a punitive
damages case].) As the First Federal court observed, there are fundamental
differences between statutory penalties and punitive damages that make it
illogical to analyze an award of statutory penalties using tests formulated to
evaluate the disproportionality of a punitive damage award. (First Federal,
at p. 732.) For example, “civil penalties under the [UCL and FAL] are only
imposed in actions brought by public law enforcement officials, not by private
litigants.” (Ibid.) And the concern about juror passion or prejudice affecting
a punitive damage award “is absent in UCL cases because there is no right to
a jury trial in such cases. [Citation.] Runaway jury verdicts cannot occur
when there is no jury to inflame.” (Id. at pp. 732–733.)
      Also, unlike a punitive damages case, in an action for civil penalties
under the UCL and FAL, the People do not have to prove victims suffered
actual damages. (Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d at p. 23.) Only the
violation of the statute is necessary to justify civil penalties. (Ibid.) And both

                                        54
the UCL and FAL provide, “The court shall impose a civil penalty for each
violation of this chapter.” (§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b), italics
added.) If a violation is proven, it is error for the court not to impose
penalties. (People v. Custom Craft Carpets (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 676, 686.)
Tethering the constitutionality of such civil penalties to the amount of actual
damages proven at trial makes little sense given that the court is required to
assess penalties even in a case with no established damages. (See Sony
BMG, supra, 719 F.3d at pp. 70–71 [explaining that applying the second Gore
guidepost “cannot logically apply to an award of statutory damages under the
Copyright Act[ because it] requires a comparison between the award and the
harm to the plaintiff, but a plaintiff seeking statutory damages under the
Copyright Act need not prove actual damages”].) These differences make the
Gore guideposts a poor fit for assessing the disproportionality of a civil
penalty. (See Sony BMG, at p. 70 [declining to apply the Gore guideposts to
an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act; observing that “[t]he
concerns regarding fair notice to the parties of the range of possible punitive
damage awards, which underpin Gore, are simply not present in a statutory
damages case where the statute itself provides [fair] notice of the scope of the
potential award”].)
      Moreover, courts analyzing the constitutionality of a civil penalty have
not required a quantified sum of victim damages akin to a jury’s
compensatory damages award in order to uphold the penalty as not excessive.
In Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 295, for example, in
determining that defendant Ethicon’s misleading statements and omissions
in medical device instructions caused “severe harm,” we reasoned in part that
“Ethicon harmed all consumers by depriving their doctors of material
information necessary to counsel patients and forcing patients to make

                                        55
potentially life-altering decisions about their health and well-being based on
this same false or incomplete information.” (Id. at pp. 360, 361 [analyzing
excessiveness of a $302 million civil penalty according to the Reynolds
factors].) We further reasoned that “an especially unlucky subset of patients
experienced more severe harm.” (Id. at p. 360.) We did not scrutinize the
record for evidence of the monetary value of the harm caused by Ethicon’s
unlawful conduct.
      And in People v. Braum (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 342, $6 million in civil
penalties was imposed against a landlord who violated a city’s zoning code by
leasing properties for use as medical marijuana dispensaries. In deciding the
penalties were not excessive, the court reasoned the landlord “increased the
risk of the harm the City was endeavoring to enjoin and abate” by allowing
unpermitted uses to continue on the leased properties, and that the
landlord’s failure to comply with the city’s requests “dictated that the amount
of penalties necessary to achieve the City’s legitimate enforcement goals
would be substantial.” (Id. at p. 362.) The court did not identify any
particular expenses or losses caused by the landlord’s conduct or limit itself
to considering only such harm.
      For all of these reasons, we decline to apply the second Gore guidepost
here, or to restrict our consideration of the harm caused by defendants’
conduct to losses that were quantified at trial.
      Setting aside defendants’ misplaced reliance on Gore, we do not
otherwise find the harm disproportionate to the penalty. In considering this
question, we presume the facts set forth in the statement of decision are
correct. (See PR/JSM, supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486 [trial court’s
unchallenged factual findings presumed correct on appeal].) Further, as
discussed above, because defendants have not demonstrated full compliance

                                       56
with Code of Civil Procedure sections 632 and 634, “we are free to follow our
usual appellate course and imply [any omitted factual] findings to support
the ruling.” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.)
      We start by rejecting defendants’ position that the only harm
established at trial was the $222,119 in economic losses suffered by their
victims. Consistent with the reasoning of cases like Johnson & Johnson and
Braum, in addition to the monetary losses the nine testifying victims were
proven to have suffered, we also consider the noneconomic harm caused by
defendants’ deceptions.
      The statement of decision contains factual findings relevant to
nonmonetary harm. The trial court expressly credited Dr. Lucido’s expert
testimony and gave it “significant weight.” Lucido testified the choice of
whether and where to go to college is a “momentous decision” that “sets
[forth] the trajectory for [students’] lives and their family” and often
represents “the biggest cost of anything [students] purchase, other than
perhaps a home.” When admissions counselors do not give students
information “accurately and faithfully,” students “can make a choice that is
not in their best educational interest, and that ultimately might result in a
cost that they didn’t expect or inability to achieve their goal.” The court also
found defendants enrolled students with “ ‘complex’ and ‘difficult lives,’ which
‘heightens’ the need for accurate college advising.” It further found that “[a]
typical Ashford bachelor’s degree . . . cost[s] between $40,000 and $60,000
during the statutory period” yet “[o]nly a quarter of Ashford students
graduate [citations], and many default on their student loans[.]” The court
credited the testimony of the nine student victims, each of whom described
how their admission counselors’ misrepresentations led them to make
decisions that frustrated their goals, deprived them of years of lost time, cost

                                       57
them financially, and had other detrimental consequences. And the deceptive
statements to which these victims succumbed were not isolated instances:
the court found “significant similarities between the deception identified by
Dr. Lucido in the phone calls and the stories of the testifying victims.”
       In their reply brief, defendants assert that any nonmonetary harm
suffered by victims cannot be considered because there was no expert
evidence “regarding the monetary value that ought to be assigned to the
evidence of nonmonetary harm.” But they offer only this bare assertion, and
they make it without any supporting legal authority. Accordingly, the
argument is forfeited. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [“When legal
argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, we
may treat the point as forfeited and pass it without consideration. . . . We are
not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the
litigants.”].)
       Defendants also try to minimize the harm caused by admissions
counselors’ misrepresentations by presenting a one-sided version of the
evidence that understates the effects of their illegal conduct. They assert, for
example, that Alison T.—the aspiring teacher who spent over $50,000 on her
Ashford education degree after she was falsely told it would carry over to
Pennsylvania—was able to more than double her prior salary after

graduating by working as a phlebotomist. 10 Yet they ignore Alison’s
testimony that she was “[o]verwhelmed” by her student loan balance of

10    Alison initially worked for a private school after graduating from
Ashford, but soon lost that job when the school closed and could not find
another one without a teaching license, forcing her to pursue a different
career. Although she testified her salary at this school was $22,000, double
her prior salary of $11,000, defendants fail to cite evidence she was employed
there long enough to make up for the cost of her Ashford degree.

                                       58
$59,000 and found it “devastating” to have gone so far into debt “for a degree
[she’s] not using.” Moreover, Alison testified she did not need a bachelor’s
degree to work as a phlebotomist, which means the salary increase she
obtained by changing career paths cannot be credited to her Ashford degree.
      Defendants also state that another former student, Rene W., suffered
no cognizable losses because while her classes cost $4,500, “her loans were
forgiven before she made any payments to Ashford.” We have reviewed
Rene’s testimony and find defendants’ summary to be highly misleading.
Rene (a single mother whose children “were on free and reduced lunch”)
testified she enrolled in Ashford after her admissions counselor said her prior
college credits would transfer and she would have no out-of-pocket costs
because everything would be covered by financial aid. She trusted the
information her admissions counselor provided and enrolled after he “calmed
all [her] fears and made [her] feel safe.” After completing three classes, she
learned her admissions counselor had enrolled her in the wrong degree
program. She realized she had not received financial aid after Ashford sent
her a bill showing she owed over $4,500 for the classes she had completed.
      Nothing in the excerpts of testimony cited by defendants shows Rene
received loans or that any such loans were forgiven. To the contrary, Rene
testified she had not yet paid Ashford “any of the balance that they say [she]
owe[s]” because she “believe[s] that financial aid was granted” and “feel[s] like
[she was] completely taken advantage of.” (Italics added.) In their reply brief,
defendants transform the meaning of this testimony by selectively quoting
Rene as saying she “did not ‘pa[y] Ashford any of the balance’ because
‘financial aid was granted.’ ” (Italics added.)
      Similarly, defendants highlight evidence Ashford forgave another
victim, Loren E., a $3,900 payment she owed. But they ignore that the trial

                                       59
court found Loren “reached her lifetime loan limit” before graduating, leaving
her with “massive debt but no degree,” and that her student ledger showed
she took out more than $20,000 in student loans.
      Defendants’ reliance on evidence that favors them, rather than the
judgment, is contrary to the principles that guide our review (Sainez, supra,
77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313; Adhav, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 969), and their
record mischaracterizations undermine their credibility and detract
significantly from the persuasiveness of their arguments.
      The parties dispute whether the harm suffered by the nine students
who testified at trial can be extrapolated to the full population of Ashford
victims. We need not resolve this issue. Even if we assume the trial court
could not properly draw such an inference, the court still could reasonably
conclude the harmful consequences these students experienced showed the
seriousness of admissions counselors’ misrepresentations. Further, the court
could reasonably find defendants harmed all students by providing them
deceptive and misleading information about the financial consequences of
pursuing a degree at Ashford, ability to transfer credits into and out of
Ashford, pace of Ashford coursework, and career prospects upon graduating,
all of which was information material to “potentially life-altering decisions.”
(See Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 360.) That the
misconduct was directed at a vulnerable population with a heightened need
for accurate advising supports the conclusion this harm was substantial.
      We find the penalty imposed to be reasonably related to the substantial
harm caused by defendants’ deceptive conduct. The total assessment works
out to just $9 per violation, a conservative, even lenient, punishment
considering the nature of the deceptions perpetrated and risks created by
each misleading call. Toomey, supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 1, a case involving

                                       60
undisclosed restrictions on the use of coupons sold as part of gambling
packages, is one of the few cases in which such a minimal penalty was
imposed. (See id. at pp. 7–8.) There, the court imposed a penalty of $1 per
violation for each of 150,000 violations of the UCL and FAL, for a total fine of
$150,000. (Id. at p. 23.) And yet the deceptions in this case were material to
decisions far more significant and potentially life-altering than whether to
buy gambling coupons.
      We conclude that defendants’ misleading and untrue statements were
substantially harmful and that the penalty imposed is reasonably related to
this harm. This factor weighs strongly against a finding of excessiveness.
      2.     Defendants Fail to Demonstrate Zovio’s Inability to Pay the
             Penalty
      Defendants also contend the penalty is excessive given Zovio’s financial

condition. 11 They claim the trial court made “no findings” relative to Zovio’s
ability to pay. They assert that Zovio had “nearly $70 million in liabilities,
. . . just ‘$31.6 million in unrestricted cash,’ ” and an “operating . . . ‘loss of
around $18 million’ ” in September 2021, and that Zovio’s net worth in

December 2020 was only $6.05 million. 12 They cite a series of punitive
damages cases for the propositions that “severe penalties” are in
“contravention of due process of law” (St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams

11    In advancing their ability-to-pay challenge, defendants make factual
assertions based on an exhibit filed in support of their motion for relief from
the bond requirement. As we have discussed, we disregard facts derived from
materials that were not before the trial court when it issued its statement of
decision or considered the merits of defendants’ new trial motion. (See
Glassman, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 1307 [matters not before trial court
when it ruled on the orders challenged on appeal may not be considered].)

12    The trial took place in November and December of 2021.

                                          61
(1919) 251 U.S. 63, 64–65) and the goal of punitive damages “is to deter, not
to destroy” (Murakami, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 112). But they primarily rely
on an older punitive damages case, Storage Services v. Oosterbaan (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 498, 515 (Storage Services), in which the court observed that
“punitive damages awards are generally not allowed to exceed 10 percent of
the defendant’s net worth.” On the strength of Storage Services, defendants
claim the penalty must be reduced to $605,000, because this figure represents
10 percent of Zovio’s asserted net worth of $6.05 million.
      Defendants’ arguments include the passing assertion that the trial
court made “no findings” relative to Zovio’s ability to pay. As noted, we
disagree with this characterization of the court’s statement of decision. (See
fn. 7, ante.) To explain why, we provide some additional background.
      The trial evidence of Zovio’s financial state consisted of the testimony of
one defense witness, Jim Smith, Jr., Ashford’s former senior vice president of
finance and the current CFO of UAGC, as well as several SEC filings. Smith
testified that as of the quarter ending September 2021, Zovio had
approximately $31.6 million of unrestricted cash and equivalents, current
liabilities of approximately $70 million, year-to-date revenues of $200 million,
and had reported an operating loss of around $18 million for the nine months
ending September 30, 2021. He also admitted on cross-examination that in
September 2020, before Zovio sold Ashford to UAGC, Zovio had cash and cash
equivalents of $86 million, and that as of the time of trial Zovio was currently
providing enrollment services to UAGC and was receiving payments from
UAGC.
      Details of Zovio’s 2020 sale of Ashford to UAGC were set forth in an
SEC filing (an August 2020 8-K form) admitted as an exhibit at trial. This
exhibit showed that Zovio had entered into a purchase agreement with

                                       62
UAGC pursuant to which Zovio had agreed to pay a total of $54 million in
cash to UAGC, and to transfer Ashford to UAGC, in exchange for
consideration of $1. In return, Zovio would provide enrollment services to
UAGC, and UAGC would pay Zovio fees equal to its direct costs ($10 million
to $25 million annually), as well as a fluctuating percentage of 15.5 to 19.5
percent of UAGC’s tuition and fees revenue, with the percentage subject to
increase or decrease if UAGC’s tuition and fee revenue fell below or exceeded
$440 million.
      In closing arguments to the trial court, the People asked the court to
impose a $75 million penalty. Defense counsel argued a penalty of this size
“would realistically ruin this company.” He did not attempt to quantify
Zovio’s net worth, but he argued that defendants’ “assets, liabilities, and net
worth . . . , as you heard from Jim Smith” were such that Zovio could not pay
a $75 million penalty.
      In its statement of decision, the trial court did not explicitly address
defendants’ contention that Smith’s testimony supported the conclusion Zovio
would be “ruin[ed]” by a multimillion dollar civil penalty. However, the
findings the court did make can reasonably be interpreted as a rejection of
this claim, at least as it pertained to a penalty in the reduced amount
ultimately imposed. (See e.g., Rojas, supra, 50 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450
[assertedly omitted findings “may reasonably be found to be implicit in other
findings”].) In determining the amount of the penalty, the court first listed
all of the statutory penalty factors, including “the defendant’s assets,
liabilities, and net worth” (§§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b)), and stated it
“considered the factors” as well as “the entire record” (italics added) and
decided that $22,375,782 in statutory penalties is “reasonable and supported
by the evidence.”

                                        63
      Although the trial court did not detail all of the relevant evidence in
this segment of the statement of decision, it did so elsewhere. Early in its
decision, the court found “Ashford has generated hundreds of millions of
dollars for Zovio annually” (a fact it derived from Zovio’s form 10-K SEC
filings from 2010 through 2020). It also observed that “[i]n December
2020 . . . . [i]n exchange for paying $54 million to ‘sell’ Ashford to UAGC,
Zovio will now receive 15.5-19.5% of UAGC’s tuition revenue for the next 7-15
years. (Ex. 735.0002-3.)” The only relevance of these facts and evidence was
to the financial factors in the civil penalties provisions of the UCL and FAL.
(See §§ 17206, subd. (b), 17536, subd. (b) [“the defendant’s assets, liabilities,
and net worth”].) Moreover, these provisions do not require the court to
consider every financial factor, but only those the court finds relevant. (See
Fremont, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 [trial courts assessing the amount
of civil penalties under §§ 17206, subd. (b), and 17536, subd. (b), must
consider “among other factors and if relevant, ‘the defendant’s assets,
liabilities, and net worth’ ”].) Inferably, the court included this financial
information in its written decision because it found the information relevant
and supportive of the penalty it imposed.
      For these reasons, we disagree that the statement of decision lacks

findings relevant to Zovio’s ability to pay the penalty. 13 Further, at the
hearing on defendants’ new trial motion, the trial court confirmed it had
“look[ed] at the whole record” and had relied on the terms of the 2020
transaction, including that Zovio had agreed to pay UAGC over $50 million to
sell Ashford in return for a future income stream, in setting the amount of

13     As discussed above (see fn. 8, ante), defendants do not argue the trial
court committed procedural error by supposedly omitting findings on Zovio’s
ability to pay the penalty.

                                        64
the penalty. By denying the motion, the court implicitly found the penalty
did not exceed Zovio’s ability to pay.
      On appeal, defendants fail to establish that the trial court reached the
wrong conclusion. As we have discussed, because the facts are undisputed,
we determine de novo whether they demonstrate Zovio’s inability to pay.
(See LSREF2, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076 [“We review legal conclusions
arising from an established set of facts independently.”].) Although our
review is independent, defendants bear the burden of demonstrating error.
(Lawndale Elementary, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 139, fn. 8; Denny, supra,
55 Cal.App.5th at p. 920.) Once again, we are not persuaded by their
arguments.
      First, defendants rely heavily, if not exclusively, on the 10-percent-of-
net-worth benchmark identified in Storage Services, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at
page 515. But Storage Services is an older punitive damages case, and after
it was decided, our high court expressly declined to adopt net worth as the
standard for determining a defendant’s ability to pay. (See Murakami, supra,
54 Cal.3d at p. 116, fn. 7 [“Defendant in this case contends the best measure
of his ability to pay is his net worth. . . . We decline at present, however, to
prescribe any rigid standard for measuring a defendant’s ability to pay.”].)
Further, courts reviewing the constitutionality of punitive damage awards
have agreed “ ‘[n]et worth’ is subject to easy manipulation and . . . should not
be the only permissible standard.” (Lara v. Cadag (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
1061, 1065, fn. 3; accord Zaxis Wireless Communications v. Motor Sound
Corp. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 577, 580–582 [affirming a punitive damages
award of $300,000, although the defendant had a negative net worth of $6.3
million]; Bankhead v. ArvinMeritor, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 68, 79–84
[affirming punitive damages award of $4.5 million against a claim it was

                                         65
grossly disproportionate to defendant’s negative net worth of $1.023 billion].)
The viability of the 10-percent-of-net-worth benchmark adopted in punitive
damages cases like Storage Services has been questioned, in part due to
concern that net worth can be an untrustworthy standard. (See Bankhead, at
pp. 80‒84.)
      And in the civil penalties context, courts have similarly declined to look
at only select metrics when determining the constitutionality of a penalty. In
Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at page 1320, the court rejected an invitation
to adopt such a narrow approach. There, landlords who were penalized for
code violations in one of their several buildings argued the court should
consider only their equity or rental proceeds from the affected building when
deciding whether the penalty was excessive. (Id. at pp. 1319–1320.) The
court declined the invitation, explaining that “[l]imiting the penalty to a
certain proportional share of the equity (market value minus the purchase
price or remaining debt) in one property could mask the fact that the equity
had served as security or a down payment for other properties.” (Ibid.) It
would also create “[a] second and related problem,” namely “inviting
defendants to use manipulative financing.” (Id. at p. 1320.) These problems
could “artificially insulate a defendant from penalties and remove all effective
deterrence.” (Ibid.) The Sainez court instead concluded that “consideration
of a defendant’s overall financial status is proper.” (Ibid., citing People ex rel.
Van de Kamp v. Cappuccio, Inc. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 750, 765 [proper to
consider defendant’s “financial condition,” including salary and annual gross
income, in due process review of penalty].)
      For these reasons, we are not persuaded to use a 10-percent-of-net-
worth benchmark, or to rely exclusively on Zovio’s net worth, in determining

                                        66
whether the penalty is excessive. Instead, we will consider Zovio’s overall
financial status.
      Here, the trial court relied in part on the terms of Zovio’s 2020 sale of
Ashford in determining the penalty was not excessive. We agree it is
reasonable to consider this transaction. If a defendant could obtain reduced
penalties by strategically structuring the sale of its affected business so as to
transfer existing assets from the present to the future, this “could artificially
insulate [the] defendant from penalties.” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1320.)
      According to Smith, in September 2020, before Ashford was sold, Zovio
had $86 million in unrestricted cash and cash equivalents. The penalty
imposed by the court ($22,375,782) represents 26 percent of Zovio’s
unrestricted cash in September 2020. Also, the trial court found Ashford
earned Zovio “hundreds of millions of dollars . . . annually.” The penalty
constitutes roughly 11 percent of $200 million, the lowest number that can
properly be described as “hundreds of millions.” In Sainez, the court
compared the landlords’ penalty with two years of rent because they accrued
almost two years’ worth of code violations. (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1317.) If we take that approach here and compare the penalty with 11
years of Zovio’s income from Ashford to reflect that defendants were found to
have violated the UCL and FAL over the course of 11 years (from March 2009
to April 2020), the resulting comparison is just one percent.
      As we have mentioned, on appeal defendants have taken the position
their net worth in December 2020 was $6.05 million. They have calculated
this net worth figure in a footnote of their opening brief on appeal based on
information in a consolidated balance sheet in Zovio’s SEC form 10-K for the
fiscal year ending December 31, 2020. The balance sheet reflects that as of

                                       67
December 2020, Zovio had “[t]otal current assets” of $76,833,000 and “[t]otal
current liabilities” of $70,783,000. Zovio informs us that the difference in

these amounts is $6.05 million, which they then offer as their net worth. 14
But the same balance sheet also shows that at that same point in time, Zovio
had “[t]otal assets” of $161,306,000 and “[t]otal liabilities” of $102,089,000.
Defendants fail to acknowledge these figures, which calculate to a total net
worth of $59.22 million, and which better represent Zovio’s overall financial
state since they take into account all of its assets and liabilities. The penalty
is 37.8 percent of this more comprehensive net worth figure.
      The rest of the financial metrics relied on by defendants relate to
Zovio’s financial state in September 2021, shortly before the trial. Citing
Smith’s testimony, they emphasize that Zovio had “nearly $70 million in
liabilities, . . . just ‘$31.6 million of unrestricted cash,’ ” and an “operating
. . . ‘loss of around $18 million.’ ” But they ignore that Smith also testified
Zovio had year-to-date revenues of $200 million and total assets of over $157
million at that same point in time, and that it had begun receiving payments
from UAGC.

14     We solicited supplemental briefing from the parties as to whether
defendants preserved for appeal their position that Zovio’s net worth in
December 2020 was $6.05 million, and that this figure rendered the penalty
award unconstitutional. After considering the parties’ briefs, we conclude
defendants failed to assert or develop this issue in the trial court.
Defendants identify no instance in which they directed the court’s attention
to this information or argued it was relevant to the amount of the penalty,
whether during the trial or in their motion for new trial. Accordingly, this
position has been forfeited. (See Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
1120, 1127 [“A party who fails to alert the trial court to an issue that has
been left unresolved forfeits the right to raise that issue on appeal.”].) In any
event, as we discuss, it also lacks merit.

                                         68
      And while the penalty constitutes substantially more than half of
Zovio’s $31.6 million in unrestricted cash in September 2021, here we have to
consider that the reason Zovio’s cash resources were limited at that time was
because it had recently transferred both Ashford and $54 million in cash to
UAGC in exchange for $1 and a stream of future income. In other words, it
had recently, and voluntarily, depleted its assets. According to the terms of
the transaction set forth in the SEC filing relied on by the court, the agreed
income was anticipated to be substantially remunerative, $10 million to
$25 million in fees representing Zovio’s direct costs plus between 15.5 and
19.5 percent of UAGC’s revenue, depending on whether UAGC’s revenue
exceeded or fell below $440 million. Thus, while Zovio had just divested itself
of significant assets, it also stood to receive significant future income from its
deal with UAGC. If we were to consider only Zovio’s current assets and
liabilities but not its anticipated income stream, this would “artificially
insulate [defendants] from penalties.” (Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1320.) And while Smith stated Zovio had recently reported $200 million in
third-quarter revenues and a $18 million third-quarter operating loss, his
summary ended there; he was not asked about Zovio’s projected 2021
performance, and defendants did not introduce evidence indicating Zovio
anticipated financial difficulties or would be unable to withstand a judgment
far less than the $75 million requested by the People.
      We believe that when considered as a whole the foregoing figures
adequately demonstrate Zovio’s ability to pay the penalty. In Sainez, the
court upheld against a due process challenge a penalty that represented 28.4
percent of the defendants’ net worth and 120 percent of rents due for the two-
year period of defendants’ civil violations. (See Sainez, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1319.) In ruling the penalty also was not an excessive fine, the court

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noted that “[a] net worth of about $500,000 has been held enough ability to
pay a penalty of $353,000.” (Id. at p. 1322, citing U.S. v. Lippert (8th Cir.
1998) 148 F.3d 974, 976, 978.) As a percentage of Zovio’s net worth, the
penalty is somewhat greater than the net worth percentage in Sainez, but it
is substantially less than the net worth ratio in Lippert (which equates to
70.6 percent). And whereas in Sainez the penalty represented 120 percent of
the landlords’ biennial rents, here the penalty represents a far smaller share
of Zovio’s gross income, particularly if one considers the 11 years in which it
received hundreds of millions of dollars annually through its operation of
Ashford while violating the UCL and FAL. Although it had sold Ashford by
the time of trial, Zovio was continuing to earn income at this same pace (i.e.,
over $200 million annually), and the evidence showed it had bargained to
receive tens of millions in revenue per year, years into the future, through its
transaction with UAGC.
         Defendants point to Johnson & Johnson, in which this court affirmed a
civil penalty of $302 million, which represented less than one half of one
percent of Johnson & Johnson’s net worth. (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 361.) However, our conclusion in that case that this net
worth ratio showed the company had “ample ability to pay” the penalty (ibid.)
does not compel the conclusion a higher net worth ratio is excessive as to
Zovio.
         For these reasons, defendants fail to persuade us the penalty exceeds
Zovio’s ability to pay, or that they are entitled to a reduced penalty of
$605,000. To the contrary, after considering Zovio’s financial status overall,
we conclude that the trial evidence sufficiently established its ability to pay
the $22,375,782 penalty imposed by the court. The fact that we will be

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reducing the penalty by almost $1 million further supports this conclusion.
Accordingly, this factor also weighs against a finding of excessiveness.
C.    Consideration of All Four Reynolds Factors Leads Us to Conclude the
      Penalty Not Excessive
      So far, we have determined that both the second and fourth Reynolds
factors weigh against a finding of excessiveness. (See Reynolds, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 728 [the excessiveness factors are “(1) the defendant’s
culpability; (2) the relationship between the harm and the penalty; (3) the
penalties imposed in similar statutes; and (4) the defendant’s ability to
pay”].) This leaves the first and third factors, defendants’ culpability and
penalties imposed in similar statutes.
      As for culpability, defendants assert that the trial court found their
overall level of culpability to be “modest.” We disagree with their
assessment. The court never used this adjective, and any conclusion the
court viewed defendants as having only modest culpability is belied by its
express findings. In explaining why it opted to impose the penalty it did, the
court stated that defendants “made false and misleading statements to
students over a substantial period of time,” a circumstance it plainly
considered aggravating. Separately, it also found defendants “knew of
misleading statements,” “made scant ‘effort to discourage’ ” them, and “did
not refuse to accept the benefits of enrollment based on misrepresentations.”
      Although the trial court also found there were mitigating factors—
defendants’ creation of a compliance program, the work of a third-party
monitor who oversaw a 2014 compliance program between defendants and
the state of Iowa, and a consent order entered by defendants in 2016—
inferably it did not find them so weighty as to warrant a punishment lesser
than the one it imposed.

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      The trial court’s other express findings shed light on its reasoning. The
three listed mitigating circumstances corresponded to affirmative defenses
which defendants raised and the court rejected. Explaining why the
existence of defendants’ compliance program did not establish their good faith
defense, the court found “it is clear that [d]efendants did not take serious
action to prevent or remedy the extensive deception their compliance
program identified” and that defendants “[d]id [n]ot [d]emonstrate [g]ood
[f]aith” (boldface omitted). The court also found, in connection with
defendants’ defense based on opinions of a monitor who oversaw an Iowa
compliance program, that the monitorship “lasted only from May 2014 to May
2017 . . . whereas this case ranges from 2009 to 2021”; the monitor’s finding
of “no ‘pattern or practice’ of misrepresentations” was contradicted by the
People’s evidence; and the monitor “did not investigate the same range of
misrepresentations that the People have proven in this case.” As for the 2016
consent order, which was entered as part of defendants’ settlement with the
federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the court deemed it
irrelevant to liability because it “involved alleged violations of federal law
relating to private loans that Zovio made to students which are not at issue
in this case,” although it did find that a budgeting tool implemented pursuant
to the consent order walked students through “at least some” financial
information. Inferably, the court found the actions defendants took (or were
forced to take) to address conduct underlying a subset of their offenses
insufficient to address the full scope of defendants’ wrongs.
      Thus, the trial court’s findings do not compel the conclusion defendants’
overall culpability was only modest. Theirs were not mere technical
violations of law. (Cf. Bajakajian, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 337‒338
[defendant’s crime, failure to report transportation of currency, carried a

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minimal level of culpability where it was “solely a reporting offense”].)
Instead, the nature of defendants’ misrepresentations, the overwhelming
number of violations, and the length of time over which they were committed,
all indicate a serious level of culpability that was not substantially
diminished by the mitigators the court identified. We conclude that this
factor weighs against a finding of excessiveness.
      As for the final Reynolds factor, the penalties imposed in similar
statutes, the parties identify no other statutes that sanction comparable
misconduct. However, the penalty imposed works out to $9 per violation,
orders of magnitude below the statutory maximum of $2,500 prescribed by
the UCL and FAL (§§ 17206, subd. (a), 17536, subd. (a)), and less than one
third of $75 million in penalties the Attorney General requested, all of which
weighs heavily against a finding of excessiveness.
      Although all of the Reynolds factors need not point in the same
direction (Johnson & Johnson, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 361), in this case
they do. We therefore conclude the penalty is not excessive or grossly
disproportionate.
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified as follows: the civil penalties awarded to the
People are reduced from $22,375,782 to $21,442,329. The judgment as

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modified is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)

                                                                        DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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Filed 3/8/24
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                   D080671
 CALIFORNIA,

         Plaintiff and Respondent,            (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
                                              00046134-CU-MC-CTL)
         v.

 ASHFORD UNIVERSITY, LLC, et al.,             ORDER CERTIFYING
                                              OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
         Defendants and Appellants.

THE COURT:
       The opinion in this case filed February 20, 2024 was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the requests pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication are GRANTED.
       IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
      ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.

                                                          DATO, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties

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