Court Opinion

ID: 9897233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:01.994427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.011156
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Nov 02 2023, 8:44 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Zachary J. Stock                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Zachary J. Stock, Attorney at Law, P.C.                   Attorney General of Indiana
Carmel, Indiana
                                                          Samuel Dayton
                                                          Megan M. Smith
                                                          Nicole D. Wiggins
                                                          Deputy Attorneys General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Marques D. Hardiman,                                      November 2, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2993
        v.                                                Appeal from the Hendricks Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Daniel F. Zielinski
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          32C01-2105-MR-1

                              Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                       Judges Weissmann and Kenworthy concur.

Tavitas, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                           Page 1 of 22
      Case Summary
[1]   Following a jury trial, Marques Hardiman was convicted of murder, a felony,

      and attempted robbery, a Level 5 felony. Hardiman appeals and claims that:

      (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of text messages

      exchanged between Hardiman and his accomplice regarding a previously

      planned robbery; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the

      jury on the availability of the defense of self-defense. We disagree and,

      accordingly, affirm.

      Issues
[2]   Hardiman presents two issues for our review:

              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
                       evidence under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b)—text
                       messages exchanged between Hardiman and his
                       accomplice regarding a previously planned robbery.

              II.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion in instructing
                       the jury on the availability of the defense of self-defense,
                       and, if so, whether it was harmless error.

      Facts
[3]   On May 2, 2021, then eighteen-year-old Hardiman sent a text message to his

      friend, Christian Edmon, in which he asked if Edmon could “front” him some

      marijuana, i.e., give Hardiman marijuana with a promise of payment later. Ex.

      Vol. V p. 102. Edmon told Hardiman that he could not do so and indicated

      that he needed to “re up,” i.e., purchase additional marijuana himself. Id.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023            Page 2 of 22
      Hardiman then arranged to buy the drug from Emanuel Fonville the next day.

      Hardiman then sent Edmon a text message stating that he “gotta L on a QP,” 1

      meaning that Hardiman had identified a potential victim from which he could

      rob a quarter pound of marijuana. 2 Id. When Edmon asked Hardiman for

      more details, Hardiman replied that the person who had the marijuana was

      “some black n**ga on my snap,[ 3]” and that they planned to meet at 4:30 p.m.

      in Brownsburg. Id. at 104.

[4]   On the afternoon of May 3, 2021, Fonville and his girlfriend, Giovanna Hines,

      drove to a Kroger parking lot to meet Hardiman. A Chrysler pulled up next to

      Fonville’s car. Hardiman exited the Chrysler and got in the back seat of

      Fonville’s car. Hardiman asked to see the marijuana. Fonville showed him the

      marijuana and asked to see Hardiman’s money. Hardiman then exited

      Fonville’s car and returned to the Chrysler. Edmon, who had been driving the

      Chrysler, and Hardiman both exited the Chrysler; Edmon was wearing a ski

      mask. Hardiman and Edmon got into the back seat of Fonville’s car; Hardiman

      sat behind Hines in the passenger side of the car, and Edmon sat behind

      Fonville on the driver’s side. Hardiman asked if the marijuana was the agreed-

      to amount, and Fonville weighed the marijuana on a scale. When Fonville

      1
        Unless otherwise indicated, we quote the text messages verbatim, including spelling and grammatical
      errors.
      2
        Testimony at trial indicated that “L” referred to a “lick,” meaning a robbery. Tr. Vol. IV p. 49.
      Brownsburg Police Captain Jennifer Barrett testified that “QP” refers to a quarter pound, i.e., four ounces.
      Id. at 141.
      3
          “Snap” refers to the social media app Snapchat. See Tr. Vol. IV p. 50.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                              Page 3 of 22
      said, “it’s all there,” Hardiman grabbed the marijuana. Tr. Vol. II p. 192.

      Fonville also grabbed the marijuana, and the two struggled over control of the

      marijuana. As they struggled, Hardiman pulled out a handgun and shot

      Fonville in the chest.

[5]   After Hardiman shot Fonville, Hardiman and Edmon exited Fonville’s car, got

      back into the Chrysler, and drove away. Brooks Vossler, who happened to be

      eating his lunch in the Kroger parking lot at the time, heard the shooting and

      observed a Chrysler drive away from the scene. Vossler jotted down the license

      plate number of the Chrysler. Vossler then went to Fonville’s aid. Hines dialed

      911 and hid the marijuana in the trunk of Fonville’s car. Fonville was

      transported by ambulance to the hospital, where he died as a result of the

      gunshot wound. The police found no guns or other weapons in Fonville’s car.

      They did, however, find Fonville’s marijuana, which Hines had hidden in the

      car.

[6]   That same day of the shooting, Hardiman deleted his Snapchat account, and he

      either deleted or deactivated his other social media accounts. Later that

      evening, Edmon sent Hardiman a link to a news story about the shooting.

      Hardiman responded, “[d]amn.” Ex. Vol. V p. 106. Hardiman in turn sent the

      link to his girlfriend. Hardiman also sent Edmon a link about a “first time

      doing a drill [i.e., a robbery] with your homie.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 76. Hardiman

      disassembled the handgun and disposed of the pieces in various, different

      locations.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023     Page 4 of 22
[7]   With the license plate number and the information provided by Hines, the

      police soon identified Hardiman as a suspect. On May 6, 2021, Brownsburg

      Police Department Captain Jennifer Barrett interviewed Hardiman. Hardiman

      admitted that he planned to buy marijuana from Fonville, but he claimed that

      Fonville reached for a gun and demanded money. Only then, Hardiman

      claimed, did he pull out his gun and shoot Fonville.

[8]   The State charged Hardiman with Count I, murder; Count II, felony murder;

      and Count III, attempted robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 2

      felony. The State also alleged that Hardiman used a firearm during the

      commission of the murder.

[9]   A four-day jury trial commenced on October 25, 2022. At trial, the State

      offered into evidence State’s Exhibit 73, which was a printout of text messages

      exchanged between Hardiman and Edmon on March 15, 2021. These

      messages indicate that Hardiman and Edmon had planned a robbery on March

      15, 2021, which was similar to the plans the two made before robbing Fonville.

      Specifically, Hardiman sent a message to Edmon stating, “Gotta lick onna qp

      of some za[ 4] on dis n**ga I jus added on snap he a white boy.” Ex. Vol. V p.

      88. Edmon asked if the person Hardiman was referring to had a “pipe,”

      meaning a gun. Id. at 89. Hardiman stated, “Ion think so. . . . He don’t post

      it.” Id. at 90. After further discussion about the planned target, Edmon

      4
          “Za” is a reference to marijuana. Tr. Vol. IV p. 67.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023    Page 5 of 22
       messaged Hardiman, “Think of a plan rn[ 5] though.” Id. at 94. Hardiman later

       told Edmon, “When u up pipe imma hop out open the back door and pull em

       out . . . [a]nd take the gas.[ 6]” Id. at 95.

[10]   Hardiman objected to the admission of these March 2021 messages, arguing

       that they were unduly prejudicial, were evidence of prior bad acts, and were

       inadmissible hearsay. The State argued that the messages were admissible as

       evidence of a contrary intent to rebut Hardiman’s claim of self-defense and to

       show motive. The trial court overruled Hardiman’s objections, concluding:

                  The part I was concerned about is[,] for evidence of a crime,
                  wrong or other act [to] be admissible[,] the court must decide if
                  the evidence is relevant to a material fact, to a matter at issue
                  other than the Defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act.
                  The principal risk of unfair prejudice presented by uncharged
                  misconduct evidence [is] that the jury will infer that the
                  Defendant was a bad man who should have been punished for
                  his other uncharged misdeeds. That was the concern I had.
                  Balancing everything out, [] I think the State has shown that it is
                  offering this evidence for reasons other than the Defendant’s
                  propensity to commit the charged act. It’s a very close call but
                  when the law says basically again that the risk of unfair
                  prejudice, confusion and waste of time must substantially
                  outweigh the legitimate probative value. I don’t think that’s been
                  met.

       5
         “Rn” is an abbreviation for “right now.” See United States v. Spencer, 2023 WL 5091827, at *4 (2d Cir. Aug.
       9, 2023); Munoz v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 247, 250 (2020) (both noting that “rn” is an abbreviation
       for “right now”).
       6
           “Gas” is also a reference to marijuana. Tr. Vol. II p. 201.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                              Page 6 of 22
       Tr. Vol. IV p. 62. The trial court then admitted the March 2021 messages into

       evidence.

[11]   Before the case was submitted to the jury, Hardiman tendered an instruction on

       self-defense that provided in relevant part:

               A person is not justified in using force if:

                   (1) the person is committing a crime, and there is an
                   immediate causal connection between the crime and the
                   confrontation . . . .

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 223.

[12]   The State’s proposed self-defense instruction stated in relevant part:

               [A] person may not use force if:

               he is committing a crime that is directly and immediately
               connected to the confrontation[.] In other words, for the
               defendant to lose the right of self-defense, the jury must find that,
               but for the Defendant’s commission of a separate crime, the
               confrontation resulting in injury to Emmanuel Fonville would
               not have occurred . . . .

       Id. at 216 (emphasis added).

[13]   The trial court’s instruction on self-defense included language from both

       proposed instructions and provided in relevant part:

               [A] person may not use force if he is committing a crime and
               there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and
               the confrontation. In other words, for the Defendant to lose the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023        Page 7 of 22
               right of self-defense the jury must find that but for the
               Defendant’s commission of a separate crime, the confrontation
               resulting in injury to Emanuel Fonville would not have occurred.
               ...

       Tr. Vol. IV p. 170 (emphases added). Hardiman objected to the trial court’s

       instruction, which the trial court overruled.

[14]   The jury found Hardiman guilty as charged and found that Hardiman used a

       firearm during the commission of the murder. On November 14, 2022, the trial

       court held a sentencing hearing at which it entered judgment of conviction on

       the count of murder but “vacate[d]” the felony murder conviction due to double

       jeopardy concerns. Id. at 244. The trial court also entered judgment of

       conviction on the attempted robbery count as a Level 5 felony. The trial court

       sentenced Hardiman to an executed term of fifty years on the murder

       conviction, which was enhanced by ten years for the use of a firearm, and a

       consecutive term of three years on the attempted robbery conviction.

       Hardiman now appeals. 7

       7
        On October 17, 2023,we held oral argument in this case at the Black Box Theater at Hammond Central
       High School in Hammond, Indiana. We extend our thanks to the faculty and staff of the school for their
       hospitality. We also thank the students from both Hammond Central High School and Hammond Morton
       High School who attended the oral argument for their thought-provoking questions after the argument.
       Lastly, we thank counsel for both parties for the quality of their arguments and for remaining after the
       argument to answer the students’ questions.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                          Page 8 of 22
       Discussion and Decision
       I. Admission of Text Messages

[15]   Hardiman first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into

       evidence the text messages he and Edmon exchanged on March 15, 2021, forty-

       nine days before the instant shooting. We review challenges to the admission

       of evidence for an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Combs v. State, 168

       N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021), cert. denied. We will reverse only where the

       decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and

       the error affects a party’s substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-

       60 (Ind. 2013). “The effect of an error on a party’s substantial rights turns on

       the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all

       the other evidence at trial.” Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010).

[16]   On appeal, Hardiman claims that the March 2021 messages were inadmissible

       evidence of prior bad acts under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). This rule

       provides that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to

       prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the

       person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). Such

       evidence may be admitted, however, “for another purpose, such as proving

       motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of

       mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).

[17]   Evidence Rule 404(b) is designed to prevent the jury from making the

       “forbidden inference” that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023       Page 9 of 22
       Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013). As our Supreme Court

       stated in Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Ind. 2003), the purpose behind

       Evidence Rule 404(b) is to “prevent[] the State from punishing people for their

       character, and evidence of extrinsic offenses poses the danger that the jury will

       convict the defendant because . . . he has a tendency to commit other crimes.”

       (internal quotation omitted).

[18]   “The effect of Rule 404(b) is that evidence is excluded only when it is

       introduced to prove the forbidden inference of demonstrating the defendant’s

       propensity to commit the charged crime.” Laird v. State, 103 N.E.3d 1171, 1177

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2008)), trans. denied. When evidence is introduced for another purpose—such

       as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

       absence of mistake, or lack of accident—the trial court:

               First . . . must determine that the evidence of other crimes,
               wrongs, or acts is relevant to a matter at issue other than the
               defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act. Second, the
               court must determine that the proponent has sufficient proof that
               the person who allegedly committed the act did, in fact, commit
               the act. And third, the court must balance the probative value of
               the evidence against its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.

       D.R.C. v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009) (citations and internal

       quotations omitted).

[19]   Hardiman argues that, here, the State offered the text messages to prove the

       forbidden inference—that he had talked about a robbery previously and was,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023       Page 10 of 22
       therefore, more likely to have committed the robbery alleged here. The State

       argues that the messages were offered for another purpose, specifically, to rebut

       Hardiman’s claim of self-defense and show his motive and intent. We agree

       with the State.

[20]   Intent is always at issue in a criminal trial. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564,

       571 (Ind. 2019) (citing Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 797 (Ind. 1993)). “To

       allow other-bad-acts evidence to prove intent when a defendant merely denies

       involvement in a crime would often produce the ‘forbidden inference’—a result

       at odds with Rule 404(b)’s overarching purpose.” Id. at 569 (citing Wickizer,

       626 N.E.2d at 797, 799). Thus, “Rule 404(b)’s intent exception is available

       only ‘when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability

       and affirmatively presents a claim of particular contrary intent.’” Id. (quoting

       Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 799). The State must have “reliable assurance” that the

       defendant will affirmatively contest the issue of intent before the intent

       exception will apply. Id. (quoting Wickizer, 626 N.E.2d at 799). Accordingly,

       the intent exception “becomes available when a defendant’s claim of contrary

       intent is alleged in the ‘opening statement, by cross-examination of the State’s

       witnesses, or by presentation of his own case-in-chief.’” Id. (quoting Wickizer,

       626 N.E.2d at 799).

[21]   Here, Hardiman alleged a contrary intent—self-defense—in his opening

       statement. See Tr. Vol. II p. 138 (“This case is about self-defense. Marques

       Hardiman was acting in self-defense. And you will hear that he shot one time

       to defend himself.”). A claim of self-defense is a claim of contrary intent. Evans

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023      Page 11 of 22
       v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ind. 2000); Davis v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1203,

       1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. When a defendant claims self-defense,

       the State may use the defendant’s prior misconduct to disprove that the victim

       was the first aggressor. Embry v. State, 923 N.E.2d 1, 9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (citing Evans, 727 N.E.2d at 1080).

[22]   The State did not introduce Hardiman’s March 2021 messages to show that he

       was of poor character and was, therefore, more likely to have acted in

       accordance with his character on a particular occasion. Instead, the State

       introduced the messages to show that Hardiman had the intent to commit

       robbery when he met Fonville and did not act in self-defense.

[23]   In support of his argument, Hardiman claims that the prosecutor noted the

       similarity between the March 2021 planned robbery and the May 3, 2021

       robbery during which Hardiman shot Fonville. The prosecuting attorney,

       however, stressed in the State’s closing argument that the March 2021 messages

       were evidence of Hardiman’s intent on the day of the robbery. 8

       8
           The relevant portions of the State’s closing argument follow:

                So, let’s talk about what the Defendant intended. What was his plan. The plan between
                Edmon and the Defendant, does this look familiar? We know what the Defendant was
                intending to do when he met with, a male on May 3 with Emanuel Fonville. On the May 3
                text, or May 5, excuse me, March 15 text messages the Defendant writes this. [Prosecutor reads
                the March 2021 messages]. That statement was written by the Defendant. It’s clear what his
                intent was on May 3. There was never going to be a sale of marijuana. [Prosecutor reads the
                May 2021 messages]. Look familiar? The language look familiar? [Prosecutor reads from the
                May 2021 messages]. Contained in those text messages is the plan, is the intent to rob Emanuel
                Fonville. That’s the Defendant’s intent. . . . March 15 text messages, May 3 actions. The
                Defendant’s intent and plan was robbery.
       Tr. Vol. IV pp. 180-81 (emphases added).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                            Page 12 of 22
[24]   Hardiman also argues that, before the evidence of his prior text messages could

       be introduced under the intent exception to Evidence Rule 404(b), the State had

       to prove that Hardiman followed through with his plan to commit the prior

       robbery. In support of this argument, Hardiman cites D.R.C., supra. As noted

       above, our Supreme Court in D.R.C. stated that, before a trial court may admit

       evidence of other bad acts for “other purposes,” the court “must determine that

       the proponent has sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed the

       act did, in fact, commit the act.” D.R.C., 908 N.E.2d at 223. Hardiman argues

       that the text messages were inadmissible because there was no proof that either

       he or Edmon carried out their planned robbery in March 2021. Hardiman

       misreads D.R.C.

[25]   The D.R.C. court did not hold that the defendant must have completed the

       crime before the prior act may be admitted as evidence of intent. Instead, it

       held that the State must prove that it was, in fact, the defendant who did the

       prior “act.” Here, the act at issue in the March 2021 text messages was not a

       completed robbery, but the planning of the robbery itself. In fact, the State never

       argued that Hardiman and Edmon completed the planned robbery in March

       2021. And there is no dispute that the March 2021 messages were exchanged

       between Hardiman and Edmon.

[26]   The facts of D.R.C. are also readily distinguishable. In D.R.C., the trial court

       admitted evidence suggesting that the defendant’s daughter had been molested

       to show the defendant’s motive to murder her, but the State offered no evidence

       that the defendant was the one who molested her. Therefore, the evidence

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023      Page 13 of 22
       suggesting that the defendant had molested his daughter was not properly

       admitted for “another purpose” under Evidence Rule 404(b). D.R.C., 908 at

       224.

[27]   Similarly, in Corbett v. State, 179 N.E.3d 475, 489-90 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), the

       trial court admitted evidence of three other attempted home invasions that had

       occurred in the area where the defendant had committed a home invasion. On

       appeal, Corbett argued that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule

       404(b). “The State’s theory appear[ed] to be that Corbett committed the attack

       on the [victims in the present case], so he must have committed the other

       attempted home invasions, and those other attempts explain his motive to enter

       the [victims]’ home that night.” Id. at 489-90. We rejected this “circular

       reasoning” and held that the evidence of the other attempted home invasions

       “could be relevant to motive—it could explain why Corbett attacked a family

       he seemingly had no connection to. But this is only relevant if he committed

       those other home invasions, and there is no evidence in the record that he did.”

       Id. at 490.

[28]   Here, however, Hardiman exchanged the text messages with Edmon in March

       2021. And these messages detailed a plan to rob a person in a way almost

       identical to how Hardiman and Edmon robbed Fonville. The text messages

       were therefore admissible to show Hardiman’s intent and to rebut his theory of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023    Page 14 of 22
       self-defense.9 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion by admitting the March 2021 messages into evidence to rebut

       Hardiman’s claim of self-defense. 10

       II. Self-Defense Instruction

[29]   Hardiman also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the

       jury regarding the defense of self-defense. As we explained in Paul v. State:

                The trial court has broad discretion as to how to instruct the jury,
                and we generally review that discretion only for abuse. To
                determine whether a jury instruction was properly refused, we
                consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the
                law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support
                giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the
                instruction was covered by other instructions that were given. In
                doing so, we consider the instructions as a whole and in reference
                to each other and do not reverse the trial court for an abuse of
                discretion unless the instructions as a whole mislead the jury as
                to the law in the case.

       9
         Hardiman makes no argument that the evidence was unduly prejudicial under Evidence Rule 403. Even if
       he did, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the probative value of the March 2021
       text messages was not substantially outweighed by any concern of undue prejudice.
       10
          In his reply brief, Hardiman cites Gillespie v. State, 832 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). In Gillespie the
       defendant stabbed and killed the victim during a fight. The State presented evidence that on the night of the
       stabbing, the defendant had been drinking alcohol, was angry, and had threatened other people. The State
       argued this evidence was admissible to show Gillespie's “state of mind.” Id. at 1117. On appeal, a panel of
       this Court held that this evidence was irrelevant to whether the defendant had a reasonable belief that his
       own use of force was necessary to prevent serious injury to himself. Id. In contrast, the evidence at issue
       here—Hardiman’s planning of an almost identical robbery just weeks prior to the robbery of Fonville—was
       highly relevant of Hardiman’s intent, i.e., whether he merely planned to purchase marijuana or whether he
       intended to rob Fonville.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                               Page 15 of 22
       189 N.E.3d 1146, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citations and internal quotations

       omitted), trans. denied.

[30]   Here, the trial court instructed the jury that:

               [A] person may not use force if he is committing a crime and
               there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and
               the confrontation. In other words, for the Defendant to lose the
               right of self-defense the jury must find that but for the
               Defendant’s commission of a separate crime, the confrontation
               resulting in injury to Emanuel Fonville would not have
               occurred[.]

       Tr. Vol. IV p. 170 (emphases added). Hardiman claims that this instruction

       was an incorrect statement of the law under our Supreme Court’s holding in

       Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301 (Ind. 2020).

[31]   Before addressing Gammons, we first consider the case that Gammons cited—

       Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 2001). In that case, the defendant shot and

       killed his girlfriend after accusing her of stealing his money. Mayes testified

       that his girlfriend reached for her purse, which he claimed caused him to fear

       that she was reaching for a gun. This, he claimed, is why he drew his own gun

       and shot her five times. At trial, the trial court instructed the jury on Mayes’s

       claim of self-defense using the language from the self-defense statute: “[a]

       person is not justified in using force if . . . [h]e is committing, or is escaping

       after the commission[ ] of[,] a crime.” Id. at 392 (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2)

       (brackets in original).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023        Page 16 of 22
[32]   On appeal, our Supreme Court noted that “[a] literal application of the

       contemporaneous crime exception would nullify claims for self-defense in a

       variety of circumstances and produce absurd results in the process.” Id. at 393

       The Mayes Court cited with approval the opinion of this Court in Harvey v. State,

       652 N.E.2d 876 (Ind. Ct. App.1995), in which the defendant fatally shot the

       victim with an unlicensed firearm and claimed self-defense. The trial court in

       Harvey instructed the jury that a person carrying a handgun without a license

       could not avail himself of the defense of self-defense. The Harvey Court noted

       that:

               If [the contemporaneous crime exception to the self-defense
               statute] is to be taken literally, then no person may claim self
               defense if that person at the time he acts is coincidentally
               committing some criminal offense. For example, possession of a
               marijuana cigarette or the failure to have filed one’s income tax
               returns could deny one the defense no matter how egregious, or
               unrelated, the circumstances that prompted the action. Read as a
               whole, the statute refutes such a construction.

       652 N.E.2d at 877 (quoted in Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 393-94). The Mayes Court

       agreed with this statement and observed that other jurisdictions had reached the

       same conclusion. Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 393 (citing Oregon v. Doris, 51 Or. 136,

       94 P. 44, 53 (Or.1908); South Carolina v. Leaks, 103 S.E. 549, 551 (S.C. 1920);

       West Virginia v. Foley, 35 S.E.2d 854, 861 (W.Va. 1945)).

[33]   Accordingly, our Supreme Court in Mayes concluded that “because a defendant

       is committing a crime at the time he is allegedly defending himself is not

       sufficient standing alone to deprive the defendant of the defense of self-

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023     Page 17 of 22
       defense.” Id. at 394. “Rather, there must be an immediate causal connection

       between the crime and the confrontation. Stated differently, the evidence must

       show that but for the defendant committing a crime, the confrontation

       resulting in injury to the victim would not have occurred.” Id. Notably, Justice

       Boehm concurred in result but was “concerned that this ‘but for’ test is too

       broad.” Id. at 396. Justice Boehm wrote:

               There are many situations where ‘but for the defendant
               committing a crime, the confrontation resulting in injury to the
               victim would not have occurred,’ but where the defense of self-
               defense should be available. For example, take a situation
               similar to the one referred to in the majority opinion in State v.
               Leaks, 103 S.E. 549, 551 (1920). The defendant is illegally
               gambling and a fight erupts because the victim believes the
               defendant is cheating. This leads to the victim’s death. Under
               these circumstances, the defendant should be free to claim self-
               defense. Similarly, if the victim attempts to take marijuana from
               the defendant and it leads to an altercation and the victim’s
               death, self-defense should be available. In either case, the
               majority’s “but for” test may be thought to be satisfied, and, if so,
               the defendant would be precluded from raising self-defense. In
               general, commission of a non-violent crime with no inherently
               predictable violent outcome should not negate the defense of self-
               defense.

       Id. at 396-97.

[34]   In Gammons, our Supreme Court revisited the question of when self-defense is

       available to a person committing a crime. The Court noted that it had held in

       Mayes that “‘there must be immediate causal connection between the crime and

       the confrontation.’” Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 304 (quoting Mayes, 744 N.E.2d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023       Page 18 of 22
at 393) (emphasis in original). The trial court in Gammons, however, had

instructed the jury that the defendant could not claim self-defense “if he was

‘committing a crime that [wa]s directly and immediately related to the

confrontation.’” Id. (alterations and emphasis in original). This, the Court

held, was improper, writing:

         By requiring that the crime and confrontation just be joined or
         linked, neither “connected” nor “related” suggest the element of
         causation demanded by Mayes. Justice Boehm’s concurrence in
         Mayes presaged this diminution of the standard, warning that the
         Court—by rephrasing that “the evidence must show that but for
         the defendant committing a crime, the confrontation resulting in
         injury to the victim would not have occurred”—left open
         circumstances where a “defendant should be free to claim self-
         defense.” Mayes, 744 N.E.2d at 394 (majority opinion)
         (emphasis added), 396 (Boehm, J., concurring). We now concur
         with Justice Boehm: “this ‘but for’ test is too broad.”[ 11] Id. at
         396. Read literally, this formulation could foreclose the defense
         in an instance where a defendant’s crime was tenuously
         connected with the confrontation, like the defense being
         unavailable to a defendant who “is illegally gambling and a fight
         erupts because the victim believes the defendant is cheating[,
         leading] to the victim’s death.” Id. at 396-97 (citing State v. Leaks,
         114 S.C. 257, 103 S.E. 549, 551 (1920)). Since this “but for” test
         can impede the defense in the same unjust and absurd ways as a
         literal reading of the statute, we reject that rephrasing and
         reiterate that self-defense is barred only when there is “an

11
   The Gammons Court referred to the instruction in Mayes as a “but for” test. The language in the instruction
at issue in Gammons, however, did not use the term “but for,” and instead instructed the jury that “‘a person
may not use force if,’ among other things, ‘he is committing a crime that is directly and immediately related
to the confrontation.’” Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 303 (record citation omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023                            Page 19 of 22
               immediate causal connection between the crime and the
               confrontation.” Id. at 394 (majority opinion).

       Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 304-05 (emphases added).

[35]   Here, the trial court’s instruction includes the proper language from Gammons:

       “a person may not use force if he is committing a crime and there is an

       immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation.” Tr.

       Vol. IV p. 170. But it also contains the improper “but for” language

       disapproved of in Gammons: “for the Defendant to lose the right of self-defense

       the jury must find that but for the Defendant’s commission of a separate crime,

       the confrontation resulting in injury to Emanuel Fonville would not have

       occurred.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 170.

[36]   Hardiman claims that the inclusion of the “immediate causal connection”

       language in the instruction does not cure the improper “but for” language;

       instead, he claims, it equates the “immediate causal connection” language with

       the “but for language.” That is, he claims that the instruction essentially defines

       an “immediate causal connection” as being the same as finding that “but for”

       his commission of a crime, the confrontation would not have happened.

[37]   The inclusion of the “but for” language contained in the trial court’s instruction

       was improper, as that language has been disapproved of by our Supreme Court

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023    Page 20 of 22
in Gammons. 12 Yet the trial court’s instruction also properly informed the jury

that, before Hardiman lost his right to self-defense, there must have been an

immediate causal connection between his crime and the confrontation that led

to his shooting Fonville, which is precisely what our Supreme Court held in

Gammons. 13 We conclude that this instruction was incorrect. See Gammons, 148

N.E.3d at 304-05. Ultimately, however, the self-defense instruction was

harmless error in this case. If we find a challenged instruction to be erroneous,

we presume that the error affected the verdict and will reverse the defendant’s

conviction unless “the verdict would have been the same under a proper

instruction.” Gammons, 148 N.E.3d at 303.

12
   Prior to 2021, the pattern jury instruction on self-defense did not include the “but for” language
disapproved in Gammons. See Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. No. 10.0300 (4th. ed., Release No. 19A, Feb.
2020) (stating in relevant part that “a person may not use force if: . . . (he/she is committing a crime that is
directly and immediately connected to the (confrontation) (use a descriptive term based on evidence)”). It
was not until after Gammons disapproved the “but for” language that, inexplicably, the “but for” language
appeared in the pattern jury instruction. See Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Ins. No. 10.0300 (4th ed., Release No.
20A, Feb. 2021) (stating in relevant part that “a person may not use force if: . . . (he/she is committing a
crime that is directly and immediately connected to the (confrontation) (use a descriptive term based on
evidence). In other words, for the defendant to lose the right of self-defense, the jury must find that, but for
the Defendant’s commission of a separate crime, the confrontation resulting in injury to [victim’s name]
would not have occurred.”). The comment to the instruction stated: “‘Immediate causal connection’ is a
term of art and should not be paraphrased for fear of reversal. See Gammons v. State 148 N.E.3d 301 (Ind.
2020). The ‘but for’ section from the previous comments paragraph has been expressly added to emphasize
this point.” Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. No. 10.0300, cmt. (4th Ed., Release No 20A, Feb. 2021). This
language persisted in the pattern instruction update issued at the end of 2021. See id. (4th ed., Release No.
21A, Dec. 2021). Fortunately, the current version of the pattern instruction has corrected this error and
properly tracks the language in Gammons: “a person may not use force if . . . (he/she is committing a crime
and there is an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation (use a descriptive term
based on evidence).” Ind. Pattern Crim. Jury Inst. No. 10.0300 (4th ed., Release No. 22A, Jan. 2023).
13
  During the State’s closing argument, when the prosecutor argued that “you cannot avail yourself of self-
defense when you’re committing a crime,” he quickly noted that the instruction required there be an
“immediate causal connection between a crime and a complication [sic]. I would submit to you that all the
evidence suggests there’s immediate . . . causal connection.” Tr. Vol. IV p 176.

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[38]   Here, the evidence was overwhelming that Hardiman and Edmon planned to

       meet with Fonville to rob him, not that Hardiman merely planned to purchase

       marijuana from Fonville. Hardiman admitted to shooting Fonville, and there

       was no evidence corroborating Hardiman’s claim that Fonville was armed.

       Hardiman also fled the scene and did not seek medical help for Fonville.

       Hardiman deleted his social media accounts immediately after the shooting;

       Hardiman disposed of the weapon he used to shoot Fonville; and Hardiman

       sent Edmon a link about robbing someone with a friend for the first time. We,

       therefore, conclude that the jury’s verdict would have been the same under a

       proper instruction.

       Conclusion
[39]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence under

       Evidence Rule 404(b) of text messages between Hardiman and Edmon

       concerning a robbery they planned in March 2021 because such evidence was

       admissible to show Hardiman’s intent to rob Fonville and rebut Hardiman’s

       claim of self-defense. Further, although the trial court’s instruction regarding

       the availability of self-defense contained the disapproved “but for” language,

       the error in instructing the jury was harmless given the overwhelming evidence

       of Hardiman’s guilt. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[40]   Affirmed.

       Weissmann, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2993 | November 2, 2023    Page 22 of 22