Court Opinion

ID: 9384178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:46.089488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.152366
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60285   Document: 00516696764        Page: 1   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                         FILED
                                                                   March 31, 2023
                               No. 21-60285
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk

   Tesla, Incorporated,

                                                Petitioner Cross-Respondent,

   International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
   and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-
   CIO,

                                                                 Petitioner,

                                   versus

   National Labor Relations Board,

                                                Respondent Cross-Petitioner.

                    Petition for Review of an Order of the
                   National Board of Labor Relation Board
                    NLRB Order No. 370 NLRB No. 101

   Before Dennis, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         This case arises from a tense union campaign at Tesla’s electric
   vehicle manufacturing plant in Fremont, California. The United Auto
   Workers union (“UAW”) and three pro-union Tesla employees filed
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                                        No. 21-60285

   multiple charges with the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)
   alleging unfair labor practices against Tesla. An Administrative Law Judge
   (“ALJ”) found that Tesla had committed most of the alleged violations, and
   the NLRB issued an order largely affirming the ALJ. Both Tesla and the
   UAW filed petitions for review, and the NLRB filed a cross-application to
   enforce its order.
          Tesla and the UAW each challenge two of the NLRB’s findings
   through this appeal.1 Tesla first challenges the NLRB’s finding that Tesla
   CEO Elon Musk posted an unlawful threat on Twitter. In addition, Tesla
   objects to the NLRB’s conclusion that employee Richard Ortiz was
   unlawfully terminated. The UAW, on the other hand, appeals the NLRB’s
   finding that Tesla did not unlawfully solicit and promise to remedy
   grievances in response to a safety petition submitted by employees. The
   UAW also contends that the NLRB abused its discretion in not ordering a
   public notice-reading remedy. Yet the NLRB’s findings were supported by
   substantial evidence, and it did not abuse its broad remedial discretion in
   declining to issue a notice-reading remedy. We therefore DENY the
   petitions for review, and GRANT the NLRB’s cross-application to enforce
   its order.
                        I. Factual and Procedural Background
          Tesla, Inc. (“Tesla”) is a “technology and design corporation” with
   a car manufacturing facility in Fremont, California, where the alleged labor
   violations in this case occurred. In the summer of 2016, Tesla employee Jose
   Moran reached out to the International Union, United Automobile,
   Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO
   (“UAW” or “Union”) because he was interested in unionizing Tesla
   employees. As part of the unionization effort, the UAW created a Voluntary

          1
              On appeal, much of the NLRB’s order goes uncontested by either Tesla or the
   UAW.

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   Organizing Committee (“VOC”) of employees who acted as union
   organizers. Along with Moran and others, Richard Ortiz, Jonathan Galescu,
   and Michael Sanchez were VOC members. This appeal centers around three
   separate incidents relating to efforts to unionize Tesla employees, which are
   described below.
          A. Tesla’s Response to the Safety Petition
          As part of the UAW campaign at Tesla, employees who supported
   unionization engaged in leafletting, distributed union paraphernalia, and
   wore union jackets and shirts to work. Both Moran and Ortiz also spoke to
   California state legislators to advocate on behalf of pro-union legislation.
   Ortiz further requested safety records from the California Division of
   Occupational Safety and Health, and employees requested safety statistics
   from Tesla as well. In February 2017, Moran posted online an article
   describing safety conditions and wages at Tesla and advocating for
   unionization. The day after the article was posted online and gained
   attention, union supporters handed out leaflets and copies of the article to
   employees in the parking lot. The article prompted a companywide email
   response from Musk to all Tesla employees two weeks later.
          Between March and June 2017, VOC members (including Ortiz and
   Moran) distributed a petition regarding safety conditions at Tesla. On June
   6, Moran emailed Musk and Josh Hedges, a senior human resources director
   for production and supply chain at Tesla, the safety petition on behalf of the
   VOC. The email discussed the safety concerns in the petition and the belief
   that a union would be the best way to improve safety, and requested a written
   response from Tesla to Moran. Moran also hand-delivered a copy of the
   petition to Hedges.

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           On June 7, 2017, Musk and Gaby Toledano, Tesla’s “chief people
   officer,”2 met with Moran and another employee, Tony Vega, to discuss the
   safety petition. During the meeting, Moran and Vega shared their safety
   concerns and desire to unionize; Toledano invited them to attend Tesla’s
   weekly safety committee meeting to share their concerns. Musk added that if
   the safety committee meetings did not work out, “we’ll give you your
   union.” According to an email from Hedges, the safety committee meetings
   referenced during the June 7 meeting “are recurring and part of [Tesla’s]
   existing safety review process,” and are voluntary and open to “all
   employees.” About a week after the meeting, Musk, Toledano, and others
   discussed via email having union supporters join Tesla’s safety team full-time
   in order “to turn adversaries into those responsible for the problem,” and to
   transition some of the more vocal union organizers into salaried safety team
   positions so that they would be considered part of management and thus
   unable to advocate for unionization.
           B. Tesla’s Termination of Ortiz
           In September 2017, three Tesla employees—including Travis Pratt,
   who was not a union supporter—went to the California legislature at the be-
   hest of Tesla to testify at a public hearing against legislation supported by the
   UAW. Ortiz and others had gone to the legislature the previous month to
   advocate for the proposal. Ortiz did not attend the hearing and had difficultly
   accessing a video recording, so he sent a link to Moran and asked if Moran
   could open the video and if he knew who the three employees were. Using
   his personal phone, Moran watched the video, noted the names of the

           2
            As “chief people officer,” Toledano was in charge of overseeing day-to-day
   operations, as well as the environmental health and safety team; she reported directly to
   Musk.

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   employees, and used Tesla’s “Workday” program3 to search for the employ-
   ees’ names to verify that they were Tesla employees. Moran took screenshots
   of the Workday profiles of the three employees and sent them to Ortiz. The
   Workday profiles included a photo of each employee. At the time, Tesla had
   no policy prohibiting such use of Workday or otherwise restricting access to
   the program.
           Ortiz posted two of the screenshots—including a screenshot of Pratt’s
   profile—to a private “Tesla Employees for UAW Representation” Face-
   book page4 and included a comment that the pictured employees were “in
   Sacramento saying we are lying about how things are at Tesla.” Ortiz noted
   that Pratt said at the public hearing that his salary was $130,000, and com-
   mented, “[t]his just proves how much kissing ass and ratting on people get
   you at Tesla and the ones that do the real work get passed over.” Though the
   Facebook group was private, and Pratt was not a member, someone sent him
   the post. Pratt then sent Ortiz a message, objecting to the “name calling,”
   after which Ortiz quickly removed the post from Facebook.
           Pratt also sent a text message and a screenshot of the post to Hedges.
   Pratt’s text message said, referring to the testimony in Sacramento, “[l]ooks
   like we got under some people’s skin,” followed by a smiley face. Hedges
   asked whether the post was on Facebook, and Pratt responded, “Yea lol
   [laugh out loud] I’m pretty sure its on their fair future at Tesla thing.” Pratt

           3
              “Workday is a third-party HR software program that [Tesla] uses to
   electronically store and access employees’ personnel files. Employees can access Workday
   to, among other things, view and electronically sign documents.”
           4
             Employees interested in unionizing voted on a campaign slogan, “Driving a Fair
   Future at Tesla,” and the UAW created a public website and public Facebook group, “A
   Fair Future at Tesla,” in support of its campaign. Moran also created a private, not
   publicly-viewable Facebook group called “Tesla Employees for UAW Representation.”
   While the public group could be joined and viewed by anybody on Facebook, access to the
   private group was restricted and required approval from Moran or Ortiz.

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   also allegedly told Hedges by phone that he felt harassed and targeted be-
   cause of the Facebook post.5 After speaking with Pratt, Hedges submitted a
   complaint to Tesla’s employee-relations team and contacted Tesla investiga-
   tor Ricky Gecewich about the situation. A few days later, Gecewich inter-
   viewed Pratt, who repeated his story.
           Gecewich also interviewed Ortiz, who said he apologized and re-
   moved the post after Pratt contacted him. Gecewich then asked where the
   pictures came from and Ortiz said he could not remember, which he later
   admitted was a lie. Gecewich obtained logs of who had viewed Pratt’s Work-
   day profile and identified Moran. Gecewich met with Moran, who said he
   accessed Pratt’s Workday profile to confirm that he was a Tesla employee
   after seeing his testimony at the legislature. Moran told Gecewich that he
   needed to identify anti-union employees as part of the unionization cam-
   paign. He also told Gecewich he sent the screenshots to Ortiz. Gecewich met
   with Ortiz again, and Ortiz admitted that he had lied to protect Moran’s iden-
   tity.
           Gecewich wrote a report that recommended firing Ortiz for “admit-
   tedly lying,” and disciplining Moran “for accessing Workday for non-busi-
   ness related purposes.” The report said Moran claimed he was asked by a
   UAW representative to verify whether Pratt and others were Tesla employ-
   ees. The report also said that Moran had admitted to using Workday for other
   personal purposes in the past—for example, to compare his title to other em-
   ployees. Hedges agreed with Gecewich’s recommendations and chose
   Stephan Graminger, Tesla’s Director of Body Manufacturing, to be the ulti-
   mate decisionmaker as to Ortiz.

           5
           Pratt did not testify before the ALJ. Ortiz, Hedges, Moran, and Gecewich did.
   The ALJ found Moran credible, found Ortiz credible in part, and found Hedges and
   Gecewich not credible, giving reasons for each credibility finding.

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           Gecewich met with Graminger, along with Ortiz’s direct manager,
   Juan Martinez, and another HR official. Gecewich told Graminger that Ortiz
   had leaked personal information and lied during the investigation. Graminger
   did not make an immediate decision, but first asked his superior, Peter Hoch-
   holdinger, whether similar cases involving lying during an investigation had
   resulted in termination and was told that, according to personnel policy, lying
   resulted in termination. After receiving this information, Graminger ap-
   proved the decision to fire Ortiz.6 Ortiz’s employment at Tesla was termi-
   nated on October 18, 2017. Ortiz’s termination was not based on any specific
   HR policy.
           C. Elon Musk’s Twitter Activity
           Elon Musk maintains the Twitter handle “@elonmusk” as his
   personal account, and uses it to tweet7 about Tesla’s business decisions and
   plans, finances, production goals, personnel matters, and breaking news. On
   May 20, 2018, Musk tweeted:
           Nothing stopping Tesla team at our car plant from voting un-
           ion. Could do so tmrw if they wanted. But why pay union dues
           & give up stock options for nothing? Our safety record is 2X
           better than when plant was UAW & everybody already gets
           healthcare.
   Musk’s tweet was in response to another user, @dmatkins137, who asked
   Musk, in part, “How about unions?” Over the next few days, other users and
   Musk interacted on the same “thread”8 of tweets, as well as on an additional

           6
           The ALJ found Graminger to be a “more credible witness” than Hedges and
   Gecewich.
           7
             “[T]he social media platform Twitter allows its users to publish short messages,
   photographs, videos, and hyperlinks (all called ‘tweets’) to the general public. Other users
   may respond to or republish those tweets and engage in virtual dialogues with other users
   on the platform.” Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822, 823 (8th Cir. 2021).
           8
             When one looks at a tweet, “[a] comment thread appears below the original tweet
   and includes both the first-level replies (replies to the original tweet) and second-level
   replies (replies to the first-level replies).” Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ.

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   thread. In later tweets posted several days after the May 20 post, Musk stated
   that he believed that the “UAW does not have individual stock ownership as
   part of the compensation at any other company,” and as such, Tesla
   employees would lose stock options if they unionized because “UAW does
   that.” None of the Twitter users that Musk interacted with during these
   tweets were Tesla employees.
           On May 23, 2018, the UAW filed an unfair-labor-practice charge
   based on the May 20 tweet, alleging that the tweet was a threat to rescind
   stock options if employees unionized in violation Section 8(a)(1) of the
   National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).
           D. The Current Proceedings
           The UAW, Ortiz, and two other employees (Galescu and Sanchez)
   filed multiple unfair-labor-practice charges with the NLRB, and the NLRB’s
   General Counsel filed complaints against Tesla alleging violations of the
   NLRA. After a 13-day trial, the ALJ issued a recommended decision and
   order against Tesla on most of the alleged violations.
           Both Tesla and the UAW filed exceptions with the NLRB. A three-
   member panel of the NLRB reviewed the ALJ’s findings and issued a
   decision and order. The NLRB affirmed most of the ALJ’s findings,
   dismissed several allegations, and modified the order against Tesla
   accordingly. Both Tesla and the UAW filed petitions for review; the NLRB
   filed a cross-application to enforce its order.
                                    II. Legal Standards
           “Judicial review of NLRB decisions and orders is limited and
   deferential.” In-N-Out Burger, Inc. v. NLRB, 894 F.3d 707, 714 (5th Cir.

   v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019), vacated as moot, 141 S. Ct. 1220 (2021). Twitter
   threads thus “reflect multiple overlapping conversations among and across groups of users
   and are a large part of what makes Twitter a social media platform.” Id. (citation and
   quotation marks omitted).

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   2018). The NLRB’s factual findings are “conclusive” so long as they are
   “supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” 29
   U.S.C. § 160(e). “Substantial evidence is that which is relevant and sufficient
   for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more
   than a mere scintilla, and less than a preponderance.” IBEW, Loc. Unions 605
   & 985 v. NLRB, 973 F.3d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “The
   court may not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence, and
   should defer to the plausible inferences the Board draws from the evidence,
   even if the court might reach a contrary result were it deciding the case de
   novo.” Id. (cleaned up). “Only in the most rare and unusual cases will an
   appellate court conclude that a finding of fact made by the [NLRB] is not
   supported by substantial evidence.” Flex Frac Logistics, L.L.C. v. NLRB, 746
   F.3d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Merchs. Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 577
   F.2d 1011, 1014 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1978)).
          The NLRB’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Id. at 207.
   However, this court “accord[s] Chevron deference to the Board’s
   interpretations of ambiguous provisions of the NLRA,” and “will uphold the
   Board’s interpretations ‘so long as [they are] rational and consistent with the
   Act.’” IBEW, 973 F.3d at 457 (quoting D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d
   344, 349 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)). “In recognition of the Board’s
   primary responsibility for administering the Act and its expertise in labor
   relations, we give significant deference to the Board’s application of the law
   to the facts[.].” In-N-Out Burger, Inc, 894 F.3d at 714. The NLRB’s choice
   of remedy “must be upheld unless it can be shown that the board either
   abused its discretion or exceeded its statutory authority.” NLRB v. Kaiser
   Agric. Chem., 473 F.2d 374, 382 (5th Cir. 1973). “The close relationship
   between labor policy and choice of remedy, coupled with the board’s
   competence and expertise in the field of labor relations, dictate that the
   board’s judgment be given ‘special respect by reviewing courts.’” Id.
   (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969)).

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                                       III. Discussion
           Because the NLRB is entitled to summary enforcement of the
   uncontested portions9 of its order, we address only the four issues raised by
   Tesla and the UAW in this appeal. Remington Lodging & Hosp., L.L.C. v.
   NLRB., 847 F.3d 180, 186 n.24 (5th Cir. 2017) (challenges not raised in a
   petitioner’s opening brief are waived). First, Tesla argues that the NLRB
   erred in finding that Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s May 20, 2018, tweet that
   mentioned stock options constituted threatening employees with loss of
   benefits if they unionized in violation of the NLRA. Second, Tesla contends
   that the NLRB erred in concluding that Tesla violated the NLRA by firing
   Ortiz. Third, the UAW challenges the NLRB’s finding that Tesla did not
   violate the NLRA by soliciting and promising to remedy grievances during
   the June 7 meeting. Finally, the UAW argues that the NLRB abused its
   discretion in not ordering a notice-reading remedy. We address each of these
   issues in turn.
           A. Elon Musk’s Twitter Activity
           The ALJ found that Musk’s tweet10 violated Section 8(a)(1) because
   it could only be reasonably understood by employees as a threat to unilater-
   ally rescind stock options if employees unionized, rather than as a carefully

           9
             Specifically, the NLRB asserts that it is entitled to summary enforcement of its
   order pertaining to the following violations: (1) interfering with employee leafletting; (2)
   prohibiting employees from distributing union materials without approval/threatening
   them with discharge; (3) threatening that selecting the UAW would be futile; (4)
   prohibiting employees from communication with the media about their employment; (5)
   interrogating certain employees about union activity; (6) promulgating a rule restricting
   Workday use in response to Ortiz and Moran’s union activity; and (7) disciplining Moran
   for his union activity. We agree, and GRANT the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order in
   this regard.
           10
              As explained above, the tweet at issue stated “[n]othing stopping Tesla team at
   our car plant from voting union. Could do so tmrw if they wanted. But why pay union dues
   & give up stock options for nothing? Our safety record is 2X better than when plant was
   UAW & everybody already gets healthcare.”

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   phrased prediction, based on objective fact, of the likely consequences of un-
   ionization beyond Tesla’s control. The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s findings
   and ordered Musk to delete the tweet. Tesla argues that the tweet, especially
   when viewed in context, was not a threat and was instead protected by Sec-
   tion 8(c) of the NLRA and the First Amendment.
          Initially, the parties dispute the standard of review applicable to the
   NLRB’s factual findings. Tesla argues that the court should conduct a de
   novo, non-deferential review of the facts. Yet binding precedent requires us
   to apply the substantial evidence standard of review to factual findings as to
   whether a written statement is reasonably understood as a threat or tends to
   be coercive. See Gissel, 385 U.S. at 619–20 (referring to written materials);
   NLRB. v. Riley-Beaird, Inc., 681 F.2d 1083, 1086–87 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying
   substantial evidence standard of review to speech issue); NLRB. v. Man-
   gurian’s, Inc., 566 F.2d 463, 466–67 (5th Cir. 1978) (simultaneously analyzing
   employer’s argument that its statements were protected by NLRA Section
   8(c) and the First Amendment).
          “An unlawful threat is established under § 8(a)(1) [of the NLRA], if
   under the totality of the circumstances, an employee could reasonably con-
   clude that the employer is threatening economic reprisals if the employee
   supports the union.” NLRB v. Delta Gas., Inc., 840 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir.
   1988). “The test for determining ‘whether an employer has violated § 8(a)(1)
   is whether the employer’s questions, threats or statements tend to be coer-
   cive, not whether the employees are in fact coerced[.]’” Brown & Root, Inc.
   v. NLRB, 333 F.3d 628, 634 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting NLRB v. PNEU Electric,
   Inc., 309 F.3d 843, 850 (5th Cir. 2002)). Whether an employer is making an
   unlawful threat is measured objectively, from the perspective of an employee,
   and is not contingent on “either the motivation behind the remark or its ac-
   tual effect.” Miller Elec. Pump & Plumbing, 334 NLRB 824, 824 (2001); Brown
   & Root, Inc., 333 F.3d at 634 (stating that the test “is whether the employer’s
   questions, threats or statements tend to be coercive, not whether the employ-
   ees are in fact coerced”).

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          Section 8(c) of the NLRA states that “[t]he expressing of any views,
   argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof . . . shall not constitute or
   be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this sub-
   chapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise
   of benefit.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(c). To fall outside Section 8(a)(1), then, an em-
   ployer’s prediction of the effects of unionization “must be carefully phrased
   on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer’s belief as to demonstra-
   bly probable consequences beyond his control.” Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618. If the
   employer’s statement instead carries “any implication that an employer may
   or may not take action solely on his own initiative” in response to unioniza-
   tion, then it may be a “threat of retaliation.” Id. Thus, a statement implying
   that unionization will result in the loss of benefits, without some explanation
   or reference to the collective-bargaining process, economic necessity, or
   other objective facts, is a coercive threat, while such a statement is not a
   threat if made in the context, for example, of explaining that existing benefits
   may be traded away during the bargaining process. UNF W., Inc. v. NLRB,
   844 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2016).
          While the NLRA “implements the First Amendment” and demon-
   strates “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing la-
   bor and management,” that free debate is not without limits. Chamber of Com.
   of U.S. v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 67 (2008) (quoting Linn v. Plant Guard Work-
   ers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966)); see also Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618 (“[A]n employer
   is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about un-
   ionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the
   communications do not contain a ‘threat of reprisal or force or promise of
   benefit.’”).
          Tesla first argues that Musk’s May 20, 2018, tweet “was not threat-
   ening on its face” because the tweet started out by saying that there was
   “[n]othing stopping” employees from unionizing and it is a strain to charac-
   terize “give up stock options for nothing” as a threat, because, unlike the
   threat of plant closure, compensation is not within the employer’s unilateral

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   control once employees unionize and the parties engage in collective bargain-
   ing. However, because stock options are part of Tesla’s employees’ compen-
   sation, and nothing in the tweet suggested that Tesla would be forced to end
   stock options or that the UAW would be the cause of giving up stock options,
   substantial evidence supports the NLRB’s conclusion that the tweet is as an
   implied threat to end stock options as retaliation for unionization. Moreover,
   the statement in the tweet is materially similar to other statements that the
   NLRB and our court have found to be threats. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bama Co.,
   353 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1965) (supervisors threatened “unionization
   would probably result” in lost benefits); Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d
   100, 104 (5th Cir. 1963) (“if the Union came in, the current profit sharing
   plan would be discontinued”); Intermedics, Inc., 262 NLRB 1407 (1982), en-
   forced by NLRB v. Intermedics, Inc., 715 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1983) (“if the
   Company were to go union the employees would lose all their benefits”).
           Tesla next argues that the tweet was not a threat because it was
   grounded in the objective fact that UAW-represented employees at other
   companies supposedly do not have stock options. But the test is whether the
   tweet would have been reasonably understood by employees as a threat and
   therefore whether it tended to be coercive, not whether employees would
   have been able to independently verify that the tweet was based in objective
   fact. Brown & Root, 333 F.3d at 634. Moreover, the tweet itself did not include
   any objective facts that would lead a reasonable employee to conclude that
   the UAW, rather than Tesla, would be the cause of employees giving up stock
   options.
           Lastly, Tesla argues that the May 20, 2018, tweet is not a threat when
   placed within the context of the same Twitter thread as a whole, as well as a
   related Twitter thread, and a later press release.11 Tesla argues that the ALJ

           11
             As explained above, on May 22, 2018, two days after the initial tweet, Musk was
   asked by another Twitter user, in a reply to his initial May 20 tweet, “[a]re you threatening
   to take away benefits from unionized workers?”, to which he responded “No, UAW does

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   erred by not analyzing the tweet in the context of later tweets and communi-
   cations, which demonstrate that Musk believed the UAW would take away
   stock options and clarified that the original tweet was not a threat. First,
   Musk’s later tweets and publications were not “contemporaneous,” and
   thus cannot change whether the original tweet was a threat. UNF W., Inc.,
   844 F.3d at 458 (“contemporaneous or earlier contextual factors can influ-
   ence a statement’s reasonable import for the listener at the time that the
   statement was uttered” (citation omitted)). Second, although “additional
   comments can be made to clarify, expand, or otherwise alter the context and
   reasonable import” of the original tweet, the parties’ stipulated that “[i]t is
   not possible to know or determine if every individual that viewed the tweets
   by Elon Musk [on] May 20 also viewed the tweets by Elon Musk [from] May
   22 and 23,” id., and Tesla’s history of labor violations supports the NLRB’s
   finding that employees would understand Musk’s tweet as a threat to commit
   another violation by rescinding stock options as retaliation.
          Based on the foregoing, we DENY Tesla’s petition for review, and
   GRANT the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its order that
   Musk delete the tweet.
          B. Tesla’s Termination of Ortiz
          The ALJ determined that Tesla violated Section 8(a)(1) and (a)(3) of
   the NLRA by terminating Ortiz. First, the ALJ found that Ortiz and Moran
   were engaged in “protected concerted activity” when Moran sent the
   Workday profile screenshots to Ortiz, and further, that Ortiz reasonably
   understood that Gecewich was inquiring about those protected activities.
   Alternatively, the ALJ also analyzed the termination under the Wright Line

   that.” The next day, May 23, writing on a different Twitter thread, Musk tweeted “UAW
   does not have individual stock ownership as part of the compensation at any other
   company.”

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                                         No. 21-60285

   “mixed-motive” framework12 and found that union activity was a motivating
   factor in his discharge and that Tesla’s reason for the termination was
   pretextual.
           “[A]n employer violates section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
   discharging employees because of their union activity.” NLRB v. ADCO
   Elec. Inc., 6 F.3d 1110, 1116 (5th Cir. 1993). While an employer has a legitimate
   right to investigate “facially valid complaints of employee misconduct,
   including complaints of harassment,” the NLRA also protects an employee’s
   right to keep his or her union activities confidential, even if that means giving
   evasive or untruthful answers in response to an employer’s questions that an
   employee reasonably believes are inquiries into protected union activity.
   Fresenius Usa Mfg., Inc., 362 NLRB 1065, 1065 (2015); Paragon Sys., Inc. &
   Arthur J. Blake, 362 NLRB 1561, 1565 (2015). Accordingly, “an employer
   cannot avoid liability by pointing to evasive statements by an employee in
   response to questioning ‘inextricably involved’ with the employee’s
   protected conduct.” Cordua, 985 F.3d at 429.
           On appeal, Tesla maintains that the NLRB’s decision that Ortiz’s
   termination was an unfair labor practice is not supported by substantial
   evidence because he was fired for cause—lying during an investigation into
   workplace misconduct. Tesla argues that the NLRB failed at Wright Line step
   one to prove union animus, and that Ortiz was fired for a legitimate reason at
   step two—lying during an investigation into employee misconduct. Apart
   from the Wright Line framework, Tesla argues that the NLRA does not
   protect employees who lie during investigations into workplace misconduct.
   However, substantial evidence supports the NLRB’s determination that

           12
             When an employer gives a facially lawful reason for discharging an employee, the
   employer’s motivation is analyzed under the two-step Wright Line framework. Wright Line,
   A Div. of Wright Line, Inc., 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). “Under this framework, an employer’s
   termination of an employee violates Section 8(a)(1) if the employee’s protected conduct
   was a motivating factor in the decision to discharge the employee.” Cordua Restaurants,
   Inc. v. NLRB, 985 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2021).

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   Ortiz was fired for lying about protected union activity and not related to his
   job performance or Tesla’s legitimate business interests or workplace rules,
   and that union animus motivated—at least in part13—the complaint,
   investigation, and decision to terminate Ortiz.
           Indeed, the ALJ found that the shift in the focus of the investigation
   from the alleged harassment caused by the Facebook post to the identity of
   who accessed Workday was circumstantial evidence of union animus. The
   ALJ based this finding on other unfair labor practices established on the
   record, as well as the fact that the aim of Gecewich’s investigation was union
   activity since Gecewich knew the context within which the Facebook post
   and Workday use occurred, and the purpose of his questioning was to
   discover the identity of Ortiz’s fellow pro-union colleague, Moran—
   information that Tesla did not have a legitimate right to discover, considering
   that Tesla had no rule restricting use of Workday. The ALJ also identified
   errors in Gecewich’s report to Graminger, including an incorrect allegation
   that Ortiz publicly disclosed confidential employee information. The ALJ
   also found the initial complaint of harassment from Pratt to Hedges (and
   Hedges’s complaint to Gecewich) to be disingenuous given the content of
   Pratt’s text messages to Hedges.14
           Substantial evidence thus supported the finding that discriminatory
   animus motivated Tesla’s termination of Ortiz because Graminger relied on
   Gecewich’s         investigation    (initiated    by    Hedges’s    complaint)     and
   recommendation, and the ALJ plausibly found that union animus motivated
   the complaint, the investigation, and the decision to terminate Ortiz. Tesla
   has not presented a sufficient basis for displacing the NLRB’s finding of
   discriminatory intent, especially in light of this court’s special reluctance to

           13
             Motivation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and union animus need
   not be the sole motivating factor. Cordua, 985 F.3d at 429.
           14
                The NLRB affirmed the ALJ’s factual findings.

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   overturn factual findings of discriminatory motive or intent. See N.L.R.B. v.
   Brookwood Furniture, Div. of U.S. Indus., 701 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1983)
   (“a reviewing court may not lightly displace the Board’s factual finding of
   discriminatory intent”).
          For the above reasons, we DENY Tesla’s petition for review, and
   GRANT the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its order that
   Ortiz be reinstated with backpay.
          C. Tesla’s Response to the Safety Petition
          The ALJ found that, at the June 7, 2017, meeting regarding Moran’s
   safety petition, Tesla solicited grievances from Moran and Vega and
   implicitly promised to remedy those grievances, and in doing so, violated
   Section 8(a)(1). The NLRB, however, disagreed with the ALJ and did not
   adopt her findings on this alleged violation, instead finding no violation. In its
   petition for review, the UAW argues that the NLRB’s decision is not
   supported by substantial evidence.
          An employer violates Section 8(a)(1) if it solicits and promises to
   remedy employee grievances during a union campaign. NLRB v. Pope Maint.
   Corp., 573 F.2d 898, 905 (5th Cir. 1978). However, there is no violation unless
   the employer promises the benefit of remedying the grievance. See Riley-
   Beaird, Inc., 681 F.2d at 1086–87. When an employer begins a new policy of
   soliciting grievances in response to union activity, an inference can be made
   that there is an implied promise to resolve them, in violation of the NLRA.
   Capitol EMI Music, 311 NLRB 997, 1007 (1993); Reliance Elec. Co., 191 NLRB
   44, 46 (1971). However, no violation occurs if the employer merely maintains
   a past practice regarding employee grievances. Kingsboro Med. Grp., 270
   NLRB 962, 963 (1984).
          The NLRB found that Tesla neither solicited the grievances nor
   promised to remedy them, and thus did not violate the NLRA. The UAW
   challenges the NLRB’s conclusion based on the unusual nature of a meeting
   with the CEO of the company, and the emails between Musk, Toledano, and

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   others that discuss the idea of neutralizing union organizers like Moran by
   making them managers. The UAW also argues that the NLRB erred because
   Musk’s statements during the meeting constituted an unlawful request for a
   “second chance” before unionization, in violation of the NLRA.
          Contrary to the UAW’s contentions, however, the NLRB’s
   determinations are supported by substantial evidence. The NLRB found that
   Tesla did not unlawfully solicit the employees’ safety grievances because the
   June 7 meeting was prompted by the safety petition delivered by Moran the
   previous day, and because Musk’s statement that “we’ll give you your
   union” if the weekly safety committee meeting did not work out, did not
   convey an implied promise to remedy those concerns. Nat’l Micronetics, 277
   NLRB 993, 993 (1985) (vague statements that express general desire to do
   better do not rise to level of illegal promise); Noah’s New York Bagels, Inc.,
   324 NLRB 266, 267 (1997) (same). Moreover, Tesla had a pre-existing
   practice of holding safety committee meetings and inviting employees to
   attend, and there is no evidence that the safety committee meetings were
   created in response to the petition or the June 7 meeting. Kingsboro Med. Grp.,
   270 NLRB 962, 963 (1984) (“employer who has had a past policy and
   practice of soliciting employee grievances may continue such a policy and
   practice during a union’s organizational campaign”).
          Because the NLRB’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
   and its interpretation of the evidence is plausible, we DENY the UAW’s
   petition for review of this decision.
          D. The Notice-Reading Order
          The ALJ’s recommended decision and order included a notice-
   reading remedy requiring that an NLRB-provided notice be read aloud to
   Tesla employees at the Fremont facility either by Musk himself or by a NLRB
   employee with Musk present. The NLRB amended the ALJ’s remedy to
   remove the notice-reading requirement, determining that a notice-reading
   remedy was “neither necessary nor appropriate to remedy the violations”

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   because “the Board’s traditional remedies will suffice.” On appeal, the
   UAW argues that the NLRB abused its discretion in not ordering a notice
   reading.
          Section 10(c) of the NLRA confers broad remedial discretion upon the
   NLRB. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
   203, 216 (1964) (“The Board’s [remedial] power is a broad discretionary one,
   subject to limited judicial review.”). Nonetheless, public notice reading is an
   “extraordinary remedy.” UNF W., Inc., 844 F.3d at 463. The NLRB will
   order a notice-reading remedy “where the violations are so numerous and
   serious that the reading aloud of a notice is considered necessary to enable
   employees to exercise their Section 7 rights in an atmosphere free of
   coercion, or where the violations in a case are egregious.” U.S. Postal Serv.,
   339 NLRB 1162, 1163 (2003).
          The UAW argues that a notice-reading remedy is necessary because
   of the numerous unfair-labor practices found in this case, some involving the
   direct involvement of high-level management, including CEO Elon Musk.
   The UAW cites no authority mandating a notice reading to remedy repeated
   violations in the absence of intervening cease-and-desist orders. And, as
   Tesla emphasizes, the company at most continued to commit violations after
   having a complaint filed against it, not after being ordered to cease its
   conduct. Cf. UNF W., Inc., 844 F.3d at 463 (notice-reading remedy
   warranted because employer committed “second round” of violations after
   ALJ ordered it to cease “the same problematic conduct” in a previous case);
   Fallbrook Hosp. Corp., 360 NLRB 644, 658 (2014) (explaining that notice-
   reading remedy was warranted in earlier case that “involved multiple rounds
   of litigation, including a previous order to set aside an election”). Moreover,
   given the deferential standard of review and the “special respect” given to
   the NLRB’s choice of remedy in light of its policy expertise and its broad,
   discretionary remedial powers, we decline to disturb the NLRB’s order in
   this regard. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n.32; Kaiser Agric. Chem., 473 F.2d at
   382.

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         The UAW’s petition for review of the NLRB’s removal of the notice-
   reading remedy is DENIED.
                               IV. Conclusion
         For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petitions for review, and
   GRANT the NLRB’s cross-application to enforce its order.

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