Court Opinion

ID: 9528169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:37:59.220152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:56.593331
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting): **
It is my opinion that if the proceedings in the district court, the jury verdict, and the judgment are accorded the presumptions of verity they are entitled to, there is not a sufficient showing of error prejudicial to the plaintiff to justify upsetting the judgment.
It should be kept in mind that in the selection of jurors, sometimes involving considerable numbers in order to choose a suitable panel, there often arise some twilight areas in which the trial judge must exercise his judgment as to whether prospective jurors evidence the qualifications to be fair, honest and impartial; and the practicalities of such situations are that the trial judge must have considerable latitude of judgment in making that determination.
The main opinion correctly states that “in selecting a panel of jurors ..., some deference must be accorded the discretion of the trial judge.” And further, that the juror in question, Mrs. Eddins, “expressed a desire and ability to remain fair and impartial once all of the evidence was presented ...” It seems to me that if the stated rule is applied, the matter of her qualification was within the discretion of the trial court. Moreover, after the proceedings of choosing the jury had been completed, the jury was sworn and the trial proceeded for nine days without any further complaint or motions attacking the composition of the jury.
The main opinion also correctly observes that in Swan v. Lamb, Utah, 584 P.2d 814, this Court recognized that the “similar locality” rule is but a specialized application of the standard of conduct so universally imposed by the law, requiring the degree of care which the ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would observe under the same or similar circumstances. It is plainly apparent from the record that it was the “similar locality” rule which was applied throughout the trial. Mr. Charles Dyson admitted that he did not have specific knowledge of practices in Salt Lake City, but stated that there was a standard of practice among perfusion technicians throughout the country (it hardly needs to be stated that Salt Lake City is included therein) and he described the standard procedure followed in maintaining an adequate blood-flow rate and the necessity that that rate, body temperature and blood pressure be monitored at certain intervals during the operation. He further testified that the flow rate present during the plaintiff’s operation was the lowest minimum standard. In considering the question as to whether any error prejudicial to the plaintiff occurred, it is also to be observed that, in addition to the testimony of Mr. Dyson, Dr. Charles P. Bailey testified on plaintiff’s behalf on that subject.
*541The trial court’s instructions were consistent with the “similar locality” concept. He told the jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
. .. that the defendant did not exercise such care and diligence in his treatment and operations upon the plaintiff, as was ordinarily exercised by skilled physicians and surgeons doing the same type of medical work and specialty in this or similar locality at the time ....
Further, that:
The standard of care by which the doctor is to. be judged by you is that degree of learning, care, skill and treatment ordinarily possessed and used by other thoracic and cardio-vascular surgeons in good standing in this or a similar locality in 1972.
Several other instructions were to the effect that a physician and surgeon has a duty to possess “that degree of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons of good standing practicing in the same locality or similar locality.” Likewise, with respect to the skill of a specialist, the jury was instructed that he was held to the same degree of learning and skill of other specialists “in the same or similar localities.”
Plaintiff assigns error in the trial court’s sustaining of objections to examination concerning certain medical texts. In cross-examining the defendant, the plaintiff’s counsel had attempted without success to elicit authentication concerning such texts. In the examination of Dr. Bailey, the plaintiff’s counsel again sought to elicit authentication of the texts. Defendant’s counsel interposed a multifaceted objection, to which plaintiff’s counsel responded:
Your Honor, these are foundation questions. I propose to have the book authenticated by this doctor so that if it is necessary and appropriate at a later time it may be used for cross-examination of other witnesses.
(All emphasis herein is added.)
The court sustained the objection. With respect thereto, I make these observations: As the main opinion indicates, the recital of statements in medical books and treatises is not competent to prove the truth of such statements.1 But, I have no doubt that under appropriate circumstances, a witness may be questioned concerning standard texts in order to demonstrate his knowledge and expertise, nor that they may be used for cross-examination of experts to test their knowledge or to contradict or discredit them.2
Learned discussions as to the admissibility of evidence such as are advocated by appellant for reversal are duly appreciated because they are instructive.3 But this Court’s purpose on review should be to determine whether any error has occurred in the trial which has prevented either party from having a full and fair opportunity to present his side of the case, so there is a reasonable likelihood that an injustice resulted in that there may have been a different result. In applying that rule, the plaintiff’s assignment of error in sustaining the objection under scrutiny here should be judged in the light of the circumstances in which it occurred.
I would see no impropriety in the plaintiff’s questioning Dr. Bailey about the texts (within reasonable limits) for the purpose of showing his qualifications in being familiar with them. However, plaintiff’s counsel indicated that the purpose of questioning him was to use the text later in cross-examination of the defendant, and that is the basis to which the objection was sustained. The *542defendant had already admitted that he did not know anything about them, but he stated that, due to the rapidly changing developments in the area of cardio-vascular surgery, his information as to new trends came mainly from monthly periodicals and not textbooks. I do not see how any further useful purpose could be served by confronting a witness with a text which he had never read, nor recognized as any authority, nor relied on in formulating his opinion.4 It would seem that whatever discreditation of the defendant that could be achieved had been done by showing that he was utterly ignorant and uninformed about them. The only other purpose I can see in pursuing the stated purpose of cross-examining the defendant about the text would have been to use that indirect method to get their content in evidence. This even the plaintiff does not contend would be permissible.
In the absence of angels, our system of justice is carried on by mere mortals, with all of our faults and frailties and differences in points of view. Due to the multiplicity of factors involved, it would be almost impossible to complete such a trial without some things occurring which counsel, if he loses the case, can blame as. causing the loss.
No one should expect a perfect trial. What the parties are entitled to is a full and fair opportunity to present their respective contentions to a court and jury and have their disputes resolved. When that is accomplished, in the interest of fairness to both sides, and of respecting and supporting the integrity of judicial proceedings, the jury verdict and judgment should be regarded as final, and accorded the presumptions of verity. Consistent with that purpose, it is established by our rules,5 and by our decisional law, that a judgment should not be overturned merely because there may have been some errors or irregularities, but only if they are of sufficient gravity that there is a reasonable likelihood that an injustice has resulted and that in their absence there may have been a different result.6
I willingly agree that the issue here confronted, as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment overturned and have a new trial, is not so unmistakably clear as to be without doubt. Nevertheless, any such doubts should be resolved in favor of the validity of the judgment. In doing so, on the basis of what has been said herein, I am not persuaded that the plaintiff has sustained his burden of showing prejudicial error to justify overturning it.
HALL, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CROCKETT, J.

 CROCKETT, J., wrote his dissenting opinion before his retirement.

. Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392 P.2d 317 (1964); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz.App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972).

. Hope v. Arrowhead and Puntas Waters, Inc., 174 Cal.App.2d 222, 344 P.2d 428 (1959); Dab-roe v. Rhodes Co., supra, note 6, 392 P.2d at 321; Dilts v. Baker, Colo.App., 477 P.2d 800 (1970).

.This is said with due deference and appreciation for the scholarly discussion in the main opinion and without necessarily disagreeing with the doctrine espoused therein if applied under appropriate circumstances where the issue might be critical to the justice of the cause.

. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, sec. 574(1); Ross v. Colorado Nat’l. Bank of Denver, 170 Colo. 436, 463 P.2d 882 (1970); Purcell v. Zimbelman, supra, 18 Ariz.App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 note 6.

. See Rule 61, U.R.C.P.; Rowley v. Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209 (1971).

. Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah 2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961).