Court Opinion

ID: 9640124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:57:55.956237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:26.874261
License: Public Domain

CHANDLER, Chancellor,
with whom STEELE, Justice, joins concurring.
I join in and agree with the ultimate judgment to affirm in Chief Justice Veas-ey’s Opinion for the Court. Nevertheless, I respectfully disagree with the analysis by the majority in two areas of the Opinion— Part III.B. and Part XV.
For reasons I briefly set forth below (as well as those raised in Justice Steele’s concurrence, with which I fully agree and in which I also join), I do not agree with the majority’s determination that the trial court erred when it (1) admitted Lyons’ testimony about the lie detector test, and (2) limited the scope of Capano’s allocution.

1. Lyons’ Lie Detector Testimony

As do most jurisdictions, Delaware has a long-standing, and quite proper, prohibition against admission of the results of lie detector tests. Such a prohibition is warranted because the results of a lie detector examination are inherently unreliable, and their apparent scientific nature has the potential to mislead jurors into giving the results undue weight. Admission of results of lie detector tests, therefore, may constitute reversible error.559
The testimony in this case concerning a potential lie detector test, however, is quite different. Here, there was no evidence presented to the jury that a lie detector test was ever administered to Gerry Capano, let alone what the results of such a test might have been. Rather, the testimony in this case indicated that Gerry believed that he was subject to a he detector test. This was offered to explain to the jury why Gerry changed his statement to investigators in the case. As the trial judge properly instructed the jury, in his limiting instruction, this evidence was provided to them so that they could perform their most basic function: evaluation of the reliability of evidence from which they could draw conclusions of fact. Given the trial judge’s adequate and explicit limiting instruction, and given the nature of the evidence presented, this is not a case in which the unduly persuasive value of the results of a pseudo-scientific he detector test tainted the jury’s deliberations. Because the majority appears to impose unnecessarily restrictive standards on the admission of relevant testimony that happens to include the words “he detector,” I cannot join in the majority’s finding of error. I do join in the majority’s ultimate conclusion that any error (had there been one) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Likewise, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting Lyons’ testimony because it amounted to a “subtle and indi*682rect version of vouching for Gerry’s credibility.”560 Relying upon Graves v. State,561 the majority views Lyons’ admonitions to Gerry “to make full disclosure” and Gerry’s possible exposure to a lie detector test, together with Lyons’ status as an experienced lawyer and former federal prosecutor, as the subtle equivalent of Lyons’ vouching for Gerry’s truthfulness in his disclosures to federal prosecutors. I confess that the majority’s rationale is too subtle for me to grasp.
First, Lyons never testified explicitly, or implicitly, that he thought Gerry was being truthful, either before or after Gerry changed his story with the prosecutors. Second, none of the “reputational boasting” that occurred in Graves occurred here. Third, I think the majority has confused two distinct concepts. It is unproblematic for a jury to be provided information that may assist them in assessing the credibility of a witness. That is what occurred here. Lyons explained how he urged Gerry to “not hold anything back.” The jury was entitled to consider that fact in its effort to assess whether Gerry was, at trial, telling the whole truth and whether the story he told to federal agents was the whole truth. What the majority then finds troubling is that Lyons’ testimony might have been persuasive, that is, that the jury could have found that his advice had actually caused Gerry to have spoken truthfully to federal agents. But that conclusion is also unproblematic. The jury quite properly could consider whether a witness’s testimony had changed because that witness had been advised to not hold anything back. Similarly, the jury quite properly could consider testimony that a witness’s story had changed because the witness had been warned that he faced perjury charges if he did not testify fully about what had happened. I find nothing problematic about a jury having the right to consider and assess whether information of this kind is helpful in determining whether a particular witness is credible or not.
The majority finds it “implicit in Lyons’ testimony that Lyons believed his own admonitions to have been effective ... [and] [t]hus a subtle and indirect version of vouching for Gerry’s credibility.”562 If I found such vouching were “implicit” (or explicit) in Lyons’ testimony, I also would be concerned. The danger then would be that the jury would evaluate Gerry’s credibility not on the facts (including, permissibly, the fact of Lyons’ admonitions) but rather based on Lyons’ presumably expert opinion (that he, Lyons, believed Gerry had followed his advice), thus impermissi-bly abdicating the jury’s role as fact finder. The problem, in my view, with the majority opinion is that I see no such implicit vouching. The majority conflates legitimate factual testimony (“I told Gerry to make full disclosure”) with illegitimate opining (“I am sure he did make full disclosure”). Nothing in the record indicates that the latter belief or opinion was expressed to the jury, either implicitly or explicitly.
In my opinion, it is not necessarily problematic for a lawyer to testify as a fact witness in the manner that occurred here. In this day and age, I think it highly unlikely that jurors would accord greater weight to a lawyer’s testimony than to anyone else’s, and certainly nothing in this bizarre case, where a lawyer was on trial for murder, would lead a juror to think that lawyers are trusted professionals to whom deference is owed.563 In any event, *683even if it was error to admit Lyons’ testimony, I agree that it was harmless error.

2. Capano’s Allocution

The majority has decided that the trial court committed error in restricting Capa-no’s right of allocution. While I agree that any error in this context would have been harmless, I am forced to concur separately because I conclude that there was no error at trial.
As this Court recognized recently in Shelton v. State,564 allocution, at present, serves two purposes for a convicted murderer: it permits him to ask for mercy and to attempt to impress a jury with his feelings of remorse.565 The Shelton Court, purporting to rely on Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(c) and 11 Del C. § 4209(c)(2), found that it was error for the trial court to limit a defendant, during an allocution not subject to cross-examination, from arguing that the jury had made factual errors leading erroneously to a finding of guilt. In my opinion, however, nothing in the Superior Court Rule or the death penalty statute mandates that a defendant be permitted to attack collaterally a jury verdict in this manner. To allow a defendant to recast disputed facts in a way favorable to him, after the jury has already reached its verdict, goes beyond the legitimate evocation of mercy and communication of remorse and also attempts to cause the jury to doubt its own verdict in a way that is not subject to cross-examination or other effective correction by the prosecution. In short, such a proceeding is likely to produce confusion and other mischief. To the extent the majority concludes that Shelton requires that Capano should have been allowed to present again a factual theory which the jury had rejected, as evidenced by its conviction, it is my opinion that Shelton itself is in error and should be overruled. Therefore, on the allocution issue, I respectfully concur in the result, but I do not join in that aspect of the Opinion finding that the trial court’s limitations on allocution constituted error.
APPENDIX A
Cases Decided Under 11 Del. C. § 4209
As Amended in 1991 by 68 Del. Laws Ch. 189 **
Name: Meri-Ya C. Baker
Criminal ID: 90011925DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 860,1992,1993 WL 557951, Holland, J. (Dee. 30,1993)
Name: Tyreek D. Brown
Criminal ID: 9705011492
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 314,1998,1999 WL 485174, Hartnett, J. (Mar. 1,1999)
Name: Justin L. Burrell
Criminal ID: 9805012046
County: Kent
*684APPENDIX A
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 766 A.2d 19 (2000)
Name: Luis G. Cabrera
Criminal ID: 9703012700
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 747 A.2d 543 (2000)
Name: James B. Clark, Jr.
Criminal ID: 9406003237
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 672 A.2d 1004 (1996)
Name: Charles M. Cohen
Criminal ID: 90001577DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken
Name: James T. Crowe, Jr.
Criminal ID: 9508008979
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 333,1997,1998 WL 736389, Walsh, J. (Oct. 8,1998)
Name: David F. Dawson
Criminal ID: 88K00413DI
County: New Castle (venue changed)
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 637 A.2d 57 (1994)
Name: Curtis Demby
Criminal ID: 9412011308
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 744 A.2d 976 (2000)
Name: Byron S. Dickerson
Criminal ID: 90011926DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 353,1992,1993 WL 541913, Veasey, C.J. (Dec. 21,1993)
Name: Cornelius E. Ferguson
Criminal ID: 91009926DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 642 A.2d 772 (1994)
Name: Donald Flagg
Criminal ID: 9804019233
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken
Name: Robert A. Gattis
Criminal ID: 90004576DI
*685APPENDIX A
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 637 A.2d 808 (1994)
Name: Arthur Govan
Criminal ID: 92010166DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 363,1993,1995 WL 48359, Walsh, J. (Jan. 30,1995)
Name: Robert W. Jackson, III
Criminal ID: 92003717
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 684 A.2d 745 (1996)
Name: Mark A. Kirk
Criminal ID: 9612002650
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 532,1997,1999 WL 415802, Berger, J. (Apr. 29,1999)
Name: David J. Lawrie
Criminal ID: 92K03617DI
County: Kent
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 643 A.2d 1336 (1994)
Name: Thomas M. Magner
Criminal ID: 9509007746
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 224,1997,1998 WL 666726, Walsh, J. (July 29,1998)
Name: Frank W. Moore, Jr.
Criminal ID: 92S03679DI
County: Sussex
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 214,1993,1994 WL 202289, Holland, J. (May 9,1994)
Name: Jack F. Outten
Criminal ID: 92000786DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 650 A.2d 1291 (1994)
Name: James W. Perez
Criminal ID: 93001659
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 207,1993, Moore, J. (Feb. 3,1994)
Name: James Allen Red Dog
Criminal ID: 91001754DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 616 A.2d 298 (1992)
Jose Rodriguez Name:
*686APPENDIX A
Criminal ID: 93001668DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment .
Decision on appeal: No. 466,1993,1994 WL 679731, Walsh, J. (Nov. 29,1994)
Name: Reginald N. Sanders
Criminal ID: 91010161DI
County: New Castle (venue changed)
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 586 A.2d 117 (1990)
Name: Nelson W. Shelton
Criminal ID: 92000788DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 652 A.2d 1 (1995)
Name: Steven W. Shelton
Criminal ID: 92000787DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 650 A.2d 1291 (1994)
Name: Donald J. Simmons
Criminal ID: 92000305DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken
Name: Brian David Steckel
Criminal ID: 9409002147
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 711 A.2d 5 (1998)
Name: Willie G. Sullivan
Criminal ID: 92K00055
County: Kent
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 636 A.2d 931 (1994)
Name: Antonio L. Taylor
Criminal ID: 9404018838
County: Kent
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 685 A.2d 349 (1996)
Name: Charles H. Trowbridge
Criminal ID: 91K03044DI
County: Kent
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No. 234,1995,1996 WL 145788, Veasey, C.J. (Mar. 4,1996)
Name: John E. Watson
Criminal ID: 91008490DI
County: New Castle
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: No direct appeal taken
*687APPENDIX A
Name: Dwayne Weeks
Criminal ID: 92010167
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 653 A.2d 266 (1995)
Name: Roy R. Williamson
Criminal ID: 93S02210DI
County: Sussex
Sentence: Life Imprisonment
Decision on appeal: 669 A.2d 95 (1995)
Name: Jermaine M. Wright
Criminal ID: 91004136
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 671 A.2d 1353 (1996)
Name: Craig A. Zebroski
Criminal ID: 9604017809
County: New Castle
Sentence: Death
Decision on appeal: 715 A.2d 75 (1998)

. See Foraker v. State, Del. Supr., 394 A.2d 208 (1978).

. Supra at 595.

. Del. Supr., No. 144, 1993, 1994 WL 416533, Walsh, J. (Aug. 1, 1994) (ORDER).

. Supra at 595 (emphasis added).

.See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 805 (1998).

. Del. Supr., 744 A.2d 465 (2000).

. See Shelton, 744 A.2d at 492.

 The universe of cases prior to 1991 is set forth in appendices to prior opinions by this Court, and those appendices are incorporated herein by reference. See, e.g., Lawrie v. State, Del.Supr., 643 A.2d 1336, 1352-56 (1994).