Court Opinion

ID: 9443073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:10:18.485999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:21.952913
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
If my differences with my erring brothers went no deeper than a disagreement as to the application to the facts of the established rules in Texas governing the compensability of off the premises injuries, — if, in short, their error were a mere mental aberration, I should let them go their erring ways in peace, while, sorrowful but silent, I went my own, wrapped in the ineffable impeccability of my own unerring rectitude, trusting to time and reflection to call them to repentance.
Since, however, my differences strike far deeper, go, in fact, to the very structure of the law itself, I feel constrained to lift my voice in protest so as to point out to them and posterity the wherein and why of their erring. A brief statement will suffice to set the stage for the demonstration of my point.
We are all agreed that the controlling rule of law in this case is that of the statute itself. Art. 8309, Sec. 1, Subd. 4, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat., provides as follows:
“The term ‘injury sustained in the course of employment/ as used in this law * * * shall include all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employé while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere.”
We are also agreed that this provision has been consistently construed and applied by the Texas courts to deny coverage to employees going to or from work even though the trip was for a meal during the working day. American Indemnity Co. v. Dinkins, Tex.Civ.App., 211 S.W. 949; Smith v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192; Banks v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 660; London Guaranty & Accident Co. v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 290 S.W. 774.
In the case of Smith v. Texas Employers’ Insurance Association, 129 Tex. 573, 105 S.W.2d 192, 194, the Supreme Court denied coverage to an employee, subject to call by his employer at all times, injured on a public highway while on the way back to work from his evening meal, and stated in part its opinion as follows: “It appears to be the settled rule that even though the contract of employment contemplates that the employee, while engaged generally in the performance of his duties, may be subjected to the perils and hazards of the streets and highways, nevertheless in order that an injury resulting from the risks of the streets may be compensable, the employee, at the time of the injury, must be actually engaged in the performance of some particular duty of his employment, or must be upon some substantial mission of his employer in the course of his employment, which subjects him to such perils. * * * We are unable to see how it can be said that the deceased employee in this instance occupied a position in any sense different from the ordinary employee who is injured while returning from his meals, in his own conveyance, to the place of his employment. The fact that he may still have been within the hours of his employment, or the fact that he zvas subject to call while at his home, is not controlling. These conditions may have been sufficient to bring the accident within the ‘course of the employment,’ but they could not in any manner change the situation with reference to the risks which were directly responsible for the injury. As above stated, it was undisputedly shown that if the deceased was on his way to the office for any purpose connected zvith his employment, such service was to be performed up*886on the premises, and not upon the streets. This circumstance brings the oase in principal squarely under the decision in the Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Palmer, supra (Tex.Civ.App. 286 S.W. 283, writ ref.), where it was held that the injury in question did not come within the compensation law. It is true in practically all cases that the employee who goes to his home for his meals is perforce his contract subject to call to return to his place of employment when he has finished his meal.” Emphasis supplied.
Similarly in the case of Banks v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co., Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 660, coverage was denied to an employee injured while crossing a thoroughfare in front of the premises while on his way to a restaurant across the street for lunch even though the employee was given only thirty minutes for lunch and showed that he had been delayed several minutes of this time by his employer before the injury.
Also, in the case of London Guaranty and Accident Company v. Smith, Tex.Civ. App., 290 S.W. 774, it was held that a saleslady required by her employer to work on Saturday night until 9 o’clock and instructed on the Saturday night in question to go to her supper early and return in order to assist the employer in buying some goods was not injured in the course of her employment though injured while going to supper pursuant to those instructions.
This entire field of compensation law has received interesting reviews and summations in two recent cases by the Texas courts, Jasper v. Texas Employers Insurance Association, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 646 and American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Steel, Tex.Civ.App., 229 S.W.2d 386, 388. In the last named case coverage was denied an employee injured while on the way home by a metal shaving which had attached to his hair during his work, and, in the opinion by Judge Speer, the court stated in part as follows:
“It is the settled doctrine in this state that where an injury occurs at a time not within a contractual exception, employees may not recover compensation for injuries received while going to and from the place where they are to perform labor for the employer. Naturally this general rule does not apply to employees whose duties involve traveling over the country nor to those who are sent by their superiors on missions for the employer to places other than where they ordinarily work. None of these exceptions to the general rule exist in this case.
“In view, of the specific definition of compensable injuries set out by our laws, as hereinabove quoted, construction by cotirts of compensation laws in those jurisdictions where such definitions do not exist is not helpful to us.” (Emphasis supplied.)
We are agreed, too, that injuries received by employees off the premises do not originate in or arise out of their employment unless occurring within recognized restricted or exceptional circumstances, and that street or “off the premises” injuries are not compensable unless they are within recognized exceptions.
I had thought, until I read their opinions, that we were all agreed that these exceptions are four in number and that for “off the premises” injuries in Texas to be compensable, they must fall within one of these four exceptions.
The first of these exceptions (a) is where the employer furnishes the conveyance. This familiar exception, exemplified by Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Inge, 146 Tex. 347, 208 S.W.2d 867, with all deference to Judge Strum’s contrary view, is not applicable directly or by analogy, there being no evidence that the employee in this case had anything to do with, or made any proffers to decedent as to his means of transportation.
The second (b) is where an employee is performing a mission for the employer off the premises. This exception would be applicable here if, as contended by appellee in her reply brief, the decedent was returning home for his meals, not by permission but under the orders and direction of the employer. Set out in the note1 is the *887statement appellee’s counsel made in his reply brief, showing his complete recognition of the fact that if the employee was going home by permission and not by compulsion, there would be no liability. A typical case of this kind is Knipe v. Texas Employers Ins. Association, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 274.
The third (c) is where employees are subject in the doing of their work to street risks. Typical cases under this exception are Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Monroe, Tex.Civ.App., 216 S.W.2d 659 and Jones v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W.2d 286.
The fourth (d) covers employees injured on “access” required by the employment. A typical case is Lumberman’s Reciprocal Ass’n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402, and Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Anderson, Tex.Civ.App., 125 S.W.2d 674. This exception is completely without application here because the injuries did not occur at, or in connection with, any established “access” route.
Until the majority opinion was written in this case, no court, in the opinions I have found dealing with Texas cases, has held that a person employed and paid by the week receives compensable injuries while going to and from his meals with the permission of his employer, merely because the employer tells him, as was testified by appellee.2 that he could come home and get his meals, and he would be on company time and on the payroll.
As I understand their views, my associates agree with me that the statement attributed to the employer about going home to meals was permissive, and, therefore, when the employee went home it was because he wanted, and not because he was ordered, to.
They disagree with appellee’s counsel, that the statement was mandatory, and that, therefore the deceased “was not exercising *888a privilege to return to his home and eat”. But for the language in the statement that he would be on the payroll and on company time, they would agree with me that this permission to go home would not constitute an exception to the general rule, indeed would bring the case directly within it.
They agree with me that he was not, they disagree with appellee’s counsel that he was, “directed to run to the place where he lived * * * and return in haste to the plant if j{í íjí i>
They agree with me that he was not, they disagree with appellee’s counsel that it was, “his employer’s choice that the food should be eaten in the place where Wetherell lived, not Wetherell’s choice. It was at the direction of Wetherell’s employer that Wetherell performed his work in this manner.”
Thus disagreeing entirely with appellee’s counsel, a seasoned Texas lawyer with wide experience in compensation suits, that, unless these statements were mandatory directions and not merely stated permissions, there could be no recovery, my associates have created an additional exception to the Texas law. This is one making injuries received while the employee is off the premises with the permission of his employer, going to and from meals, compensable if and when, in discussing the terms of the employment with him, the employer states that “he will be employed on a weekly basis, and when he goes to and from his meals he will be on the payroll and on company time.”
With great deference, this holding is directly in the teeth of the leading Texas case on the subject, Smith v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n, quoted from at length, supra, and particularly these quotations from it: “ * * * nevertheless in order that an injury resulting from the risks of the streets may be compensable, the employee, at the time of the injury, must be actually engaged in the performance of some particular duty of his employment, or must be upon some substantial mission of his employer in the course of his employment, which subjects him to such perils. * * * ” and, still quoting, with only the substitution of “I am” for “we are”: “I am unable to see how it can be said that the deceased employee in this instance occupied a position in any sense different from the ordinary employee who is injured while returning from his meals, in 'his own conveyance, to the place of his employment. The fact that he may still have been within the hours of his employment, or the fact that 'he was subject to call while at his home, is not controlling.”
If this case states the law in Texas, and not even appellee’s counsel disputes it, I believe that my associates have fallen into the error of attributing to the words, “he would be on company time”, and “he would be on the payroll when he went home to his meals”, a legal significance which they do not have and thereby have created a fifth exception to the general principle that recovery for injuries received off the premises and upon the streets, are not compensable.
As the Supreme Court said, in Smith v. Texas Employers Ins. Association, supra, so I say here: “It was undisputedly shown that if the deceased was on his way to the office for any purpose connected with his. employment, such service was to he performed upon the premises, and not upon the streets. This circumstance brings the case in principle squarely under the decision in the Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Palmer, supra (Texas Civ.App. 286, S.W. 283, writ ref.), where it was held that the injury in question did not come within the compensation law. It is true in practically all cases that the employee who goes to his home for his meals is perforce his contract subject to call to return to his place of employment when he has finished his meal!” Believing that the decision of my brothers engrafts an inadmissible exception upon the Texas Workmen’s Compensation Law, and that the law should be otherwise declared and the judgment reversed, I respectfully dissent from its affirmance.
Rehearing Denied; Hutcheson,' Chief Judge, dissenting.

. “Thomas W. Wetherell was actively engaged m the execution of his employer's business, in the manner, at the time, and at the place of his employer’s direction. *887The deceased was not exercising a privilege to return to his home and eat. He was performing a necessary part of his activities during the continuous, unbroken, thirty-one and one-half hour employment period. It is inhuman to believe that any employer would contemplate requiring a seventy year old man to remain alert and active in the protection of a valuable property for thirty-oñe and one-half hours without food. Indeed, the evidence is conclusive that no such requirement was ever in the mind of Thomas W. Wetherell or his employer. He was directed to run to the place where he lived, in the small hours of Sunday morning, at the midpoint of his unbroken employment period, gobble a hasty breakfast, snatch up a supply of cold food sufficient to stay him for the balance of his employment period, and return in haste to A. J. Schill’s plant, where he then remained for the period of Sunday, Sunday night, and Monday morning. His pay continued during this time, and the fact that it was a weekly stipend does not detract from the fact that it continued during the brief time he was directed to be away from the plant eating. He is not in the same position as an employee on a weekly wage who is struck down while returning home at the end of a day’s work or a week’s work. Thomas W. Wetherell was not ‘going home’. His employer might have chosen to provide cooking facilities or at least, position or place to eat in the plant, or it might have chosen to order Mr. Wetherell to eat in a nearby restaurant, boarding house, or cafe. It did none of these things, although it recognized that in order to procure his services and to avail itself of the benefits of his services over a thirty-one and one-half hour work period, it would be necessary to provide him with food somehow. It was his employer’s choice that the food should be eaten in the place where Wetherell lived, not Wetherell’s choice. It was at the direction of his employer that Wetherell performed his work in this manner.” (Emphasis supplied.)

. “The bookkeeper told him in my presence, and Mrs. Mary Link’s presence, or Grandma Linck’s presence, that he would go to work at 4 o’clock in the evening, that is during the week, and on Saturday he would go to work at 12 o’clock and be off on Monday morning at 7:30, and I asked him about his meals, and he told me, told both of us, he would be on company time, and he would be on the payroll, but that he could come home and get his meals any time during Sunday, and he could come home Sunday morning and get a hot breakfast.” “ * * * no one didn’t relieve him, because the bookkeeper said no one would have to relieve him. He said to just close it up and go home and get his meals, and it ¿would be all right until he came back."