Court Opinion

ID: 9729033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:25:02.411517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:52.276063
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. I dissent because no change of circumstances occurred to support the trial court’s reduction of child support. The order setting child support specifically states that the $1000 child support “amount is a deviation from the child support guidelines and is based upon the accustomed standard of living of the child and that husband has assets in addition to his monthly net income which has recently been approximately $4,800.” Appellee first requested that the court relieve him of his agreed child support obligation slightly over one month from the entry of the divorce decree setting the award. At that time, he claimed that he had not obtained the expected comparable employment nor was he receiving the unemployment benefits as expected. The trial court correctly denied that petition because the question was not whether the parties’ expectations were met, but whether the circumstances regarding income had changed. Testimony at trial established that appellee had at least $133,500 in one retirement account and assets from his deceased’s mother’s assets. He stated that he had liquidated other smaller retirement accounts, stocks, and some of this mother’s assets for his living expenses and some child support before he stopped paying it. His deposits from these assets and unemployment benefits totaled approximately $45,000 for that last year, and he asked the trial court to use that number as income. As the majority acknowledges, appellee asked that his child support be reduced because “he did not want to spend all of his retirement” to support his child. Appellant testified that to maintain the lifestyle to which their child was accustomed, she had taken funds from her savings account but not yet from her retirement account which totaled about $56,000. The majority finds that the “payor’s original obligation was set in excess of the child support chart based upon his expected acquisition of employment commensurate with his former income, with deviation upward for the child’s standard of living,” but that the expiration of appellee’s unemployment benefits was a material change in circumstances because the cessation of those benefits resulted in a decrease of $1000 per month income. No, the cessation of benefits did not result in a decrease of appellee’s income. Appellee was solely in control of how much, when, and in what manner his assets would be used to support himself and his son. Although diminution of earnings is a common ground for modification, a petition for modification will be denied if the change in financial condition is due to the fault, voluntary-wastage, or dissipation of one’s talents or assets. Reid v. Reid, 57 Ark.App. 289, 944 S.W.2d 559 (1997). See generally Pierce v. Pierce, 268 Ark. 864, 596 S.W.2d 364 (Ark.App.1980). Appellant chose what, how, and when to use his assets. On the one hand, the courts must not unduly interfere with the personal lives and career choices of individuals merely because they have been involved in a divorce. On the other hand, because there has been divorce, the courts are thrust into the middle of the parties’ personal lives in order to protect the interests of the minor children who are also unwilling participants in the divorce. Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988). In this case, child support was set in excess of the chart amount in order to maintain the child’s standard of living and was based upon the fact that appellee had assets to pay the support for the child and himself. A supporting spouse does not have total discretion in making decisions that affect the welfare of the family if the minor children have to suffer at the expense of those decisions. Grady, supra. The definition of income for child support purposes is intentionally broad to encompass the widest range of sources consistent with this state’s policy to interpret income broadly for the benefit of the child. Ford v. Ford, 347 Ark. 485, 65 S.W.3d 432 (2002). Because the child-support guidelines are remedial in nature, they must be broadly construed so as to effectuate the purpose sought to be accomplished by their drafters. Pannell v. Pannell, 64 Ark.App. 262, 981 S.W.2d 531 (1998). While courts have broad discretionary powers to modify child support provisions when such modification is in the best interest of the child, and no hard and fast rule can be established regarding specific changes in circumstances or the necessary degree of the changes, see Guffin v. Guffin, 5 Ark. App. 83, 632 S.W.2d 446 (1982) (overruled on other grounds), a change in circumstances must still be shown before a court can modify an order regarding child support, and the party seeking modification has the burden of showing a change in circumstances. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 299 Ark. 200, 771 S.W.2d 764 (1989); Ross v. Ross, 29 Ark.App. 64, 776 S.W.2d 834 (1989). The assumption is that the trial court correctly fixed the proper amount in the original divorce decree. Id. Furthermore, the liberality of the original allowances cannot afford grounds for modification. Hurley v. Hurley, 255 Ark 68, 498 S.W.2d 887 (1973). In this case, the trial court entered the child support award when appellee was unemployed and receiving no unemployment benefits. The only factual change from the time the decree was entered was that appellee no longer wanted to use his assets to support his son. A change in a payor’s desire, or lack thereof, to support a dependent child is not a proper basis to find a change of circumstances. The effect of the majority’s decision is to require the custodial parent to deplete her assets in order to maintain the minor child’s standard of living, or to reduce the lifestyle to which the child is accustomed. Nothing shows how the court-ordered shift of reduction of assets to the appellant or a reduction in lifestyle for the child is in the child’s best interest. No case law supports the proposition that a custodial parent must first deplete his or her assets before a noncustodial parent’s assets may be liquidated. Furthermore, the original order in this case specifically relied upon the noncustodial parent’s assets in setting the award of support. Accordingly, we should reverse.