Court Opinion

ID: 9717415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:03:01.704733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.128674
License: Public Domain

GARTZKE, P.J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s analysis and result. I would affirm.
Probable cause is a question of mixed fact and law. State v. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d 247, 261-62 n. 6, 311 N.W.2d 243, 250 (Ct. App. 1981). The trial court concluded that probable cause had not been established because it could not find that defendant probably intended to burn the building, the felony charged, rather than the contents of the closet, an uncharged felony.1 Secs. 943. 02(1) (a) and 943.03, Stats.
If the historical facts are undisputed, the existence of probable cause is a question of law which an appellate court may independently determine. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d at 262, 311 N.W.2d at 250. Historical facts differ from factual inferences. An historical fact is an observable event or condition. An inferred fact cannot be observed but is believed to be an event or condition which exists as a consequence of other established facts.
Sometimes only one factual inference can be reasonably drawn from the established facts. If that is true, drawing the factual inference is a matter of law. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d at 256, 311 N.W.2d at 247. Under those circumstances, if all other relevant facts are undisputed, the existence of probable cause is a question of law.
If, however, multiple reasonable factual inferences can be drawn from the historical facts, an appellate court must accept the inference chosen by the trial court. Drogsvold, 104 Wis. 2d at 256, 311 N.W.2d at 247. The *494appellate court must then decide whether probable cause exists on the basis of the inferred fact and the historical facts.
The judge conducting the preliminary examination had to decide whether probable cause existed as to one element of the charged felony: “intentionally” damaging a building. Sec. 943.02(1) (a), Stats. The existence of the building and the damage to it are observable historical facts and are undisputed, but the defendant’s intent can never be observed. Intent or state of mind must be inferred from other facts.
Whether defendant probably intended to burn the building or only the property in the closet is a choice between factual inferences as to which reasonable persons can disagree. The judge inferred the defendant’s intent was to bum his roommate’s personal property. Under these circumstances we must accept the inference chosen by the judge, whether or not we would have chosen the other inference. Applying the factual inference chosen by the judge, probable cause does not exist as to the charged felony.
The majority, however, would compel the magistrate faced with various possible inferences to apply a mandatory presumption rather than choosing among the inferences. The majority would not allow the magistrate to decide which factual inference is most likely true and whether the defendant probably committed a felony on the basis of that inference and other facts. If any of the possible inferences supports a finding that the defendant probably committed the felony the majority would require the magistrate immediately to draw the legal conclusion of probable cause without choosing between various factual inferences.
The majority’s approach is the antithesis, in my view, of the purpose behind sec. 970.03(1), Stats.: to determine “if there is probable cause to believe a felony has been *495committed by the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The imposition of mandatory presumptions on the fact-finder has been voided since Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
In State v. Fouse, 114 Wis. 2d 29, 337 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1983), we sustained a magistrate’s conclusion that probable cause had been established. We recognized that the magistrate’s function is to determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a felony has been committed by the accused. We held that where the magistrate drew one factual inference regarding an element of the crime based on the defendant’s mental state, and that inference was not the only inference which could have been drawn, “it is not the function of the reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the reasonable conclusions of the committing magistrate.” Fouse, 114 Wis. 2d at 34-35, 337 N.W.2d at 840. Fouse was correctly decided. We should apply it here.

 The judge held that the state also failed to establish probable cause as to felony arson to property under sec. 943.03, Stats., because no evidence of the value of the property was introduced.