Court Opinion

ID: 9957290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 00:00:44.072948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.550580
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10936       Document: 192-1          Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/03/2024

         United States Court of Appeals
              for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                               ____________                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                 No. 23-10936                                 April 3, 2024
                               ____________                                 Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                 Clerk
Travis Wayne Eubanks, a voter of Bexar County, Texas; Lindsey
Gremont, a voter of Travis County, Texas; Kristen Plaisance, a
voter of Montgomery County, Texas; Jason Scott Buster, a voter of
Bexar County, Texas; Alexandra Campo, a voter of Williamson County,
Texas; James L. Clark, a voter of Hays County, Texas; Juan Carlos
Arias, a voter and candidate of Harris County, Texas; Jose Christine
Silvester, a voter of Comal County, Texas; Tommie Dickinson, a
voter of Atascosa County, Texas; Robert James Brooks, Jr., a voter of
Travis County, Texas; Alana S. Phillips, a voter of Denton County,
Texas; Amber Cloy, a voter of Tarrant County, Texas; Sheron
Jennifer Lipper, a voter of Dallas County, Texas; Lynn
Davenport, a voter and candidate of Dallas County, Texas; Lester
Rand,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellants,

Anne Stone; Allyson Raskin,

                                                                     Appellants,

                                     versus

Jane Nelson, Texas Secretary of State; John B. Scott, in his
individual capacity and in his official capacity as the Texas Secretary of State;
Jose “Joe” A. Esparza, in his individual capacity and in his official
capacity as Deputy Secretary of State; Ruth R. Hughs, in her individual
capacity and in her official capacity as 113 Texas Secretary of State; Keith
Ingram, in his individual and official capacity as the Director of the Elections
Division; Jacquelyn Callanen, Bexar County Elections Administrator;
Nelson Wolff, Bexar County Judge and head of the Bexar County
Case: 23-10936    Document: 192-1     Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/03/2024

Elections Commission; Rebeca Clay-Flores, Bexar County
Commissioner; Justin Rodriguez, Bexar County Commissioner;
Marialyn Barnard, Bexar County Commissioner; Tommy
Calvert, Bexar County Commissioner; Bobbie Koepp, Comal County
clerk; Frank Phillips, Denton County Elections Administrator; Andy
Eads, Denton County Judge; Ryan Williams, Denton County
Commissioner; Ron Marchant, Denton County Commissioner; Bobbie
J. Mitchell, Denton County Commissioner; Dianne Edmondson,
Denton County Commissioner; Lina Hidalgo, Harris County Judge;
Rodney Ellis, Harris County Commissioner; Adrian Garcia, Harris
County Commissioner; Tom S. Ramsey, Harris County Commissioner;
Isabel Longoria, Harris County Elections Administrator; Jennifer
Doinoff, Hays County Elections Administrator; Ruben Becerra, Hays
County Commissioner’s Court Judge; Debbie Ingalsbe, Hays County
Commissioner Court; Mark Jones, Hays County Commissioner Court;
Lon Shell, Hays County Commissioner Court; Walt Smith, Hays
County Commissioner Court; Ron Massingill, Hood County Judge and
head of the Hood County Elections Commission; Michele Carew,
Elections Administrator of Hood County; Pat Deen, Parker County Judge
and head of Parker County Elections Commission; Crickett Miller,
Elections Administrator of Parker County; George Conley, Parker
County Commissioner; Craig Peacock, Parker County Commissioner;
Larry Walden, Parker County Commissioner; Steve Dugan, Parker
County Commissioner; Heider Garcia, Tarrant County Elections
Administrator; R. Jack Cagle, Harris County Commissioner; Roy
Charles Brooks, Tarrant County Commissioner; Devan Allen,
Tarrant County Commissioner; Gary Fickes, Tarrant County
Commissioner; Andrew Steven Brown, Travis County Judge; Dana
Debeauvoir, Former Travis County Clerk; Rebecca Guerrero,
Travis County Clerk; Bill Gravell, Williamson County Judge;
Christopher Davis, Williamson County Elections Administrator;
Terry Cook, Williamson County Commissioner; Cynthia Long,
Williamson County Commissioner; Valerie Covey, Williamson County
Commissioner; Ross Boles, Williamson County Commissioner; Suzie
Harvey, Montgomery County Elections Administrator; Robert C.
Walker, Montgomery County Commissioner; Charlie Riley,
Montgomery County Commissioner; James Noack, Montgomery County
Commissioner; James Metts, Montgomery County Commissioner; J. D.
Johnson, Tarrant County Commissioner; Susan Fletcher, Collin

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Case: 23-10936           Document: 192-1         Page: 3      Date Filed: 04/03/2024

County Commissioner; Darrell Hale, Collin County Commissioner;
Chris Hill, Collin County Judge; Cheryl Williams, Collin County
Commissioner; Duncan Webb, Collin County Commissioner; Bruce
Sherbet, Collin County Elections Administrator; Mark Keough,
Montgomery County Judge; Sarah Eckhardt, Former Travis County
Judge, Current State Senator D-14; B. Glen Whitley, Tarrant County
Judge; Cynthia Jaqua, Comal County Elections Coordinator;
Clifford Tatum,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:22-CV-576
                   ______________________________

Before Smith, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       A large group of pro se Plaintiffs sued dozens of state and county
officials in Texas challenging the use of electronic voting machines. The
district court dismissed on the basis that Plaintiffs lack standing. For the
reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.1
                                    I.    Background
       Over twenty pro se Plaintiffs collectively sued over sixty Defendants,
all of whom are state and county officials in Texas. Plaintiffs characterize
their 163-page lawsuit as “a civil rights action for declaratory and injunctive
relief to prohibit the use of electronic voting equipment and systems
(machines) in the State of Texas.” They seek an order requiring the use of

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
       1
           Because we affirm the dismissal for lack of standing, we need not address
Plaintiffs’ additional arguments.

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                                       No. 23-10936

“hand-marked paper ballots that can be cast with anonymity . . . and hand-
counted by residents of the state of Texas . . . instead of with machines.”
       Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and (6). The district court accepted the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent the magistrate judge
recommended dismissal for lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1). But the
district court sustained Plaintiffs’ objection to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation of a dismissal with prejudice and instead dismissed the
lawsuit without prejudice. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                          II.     Standard of Review
       We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, applying the same
standards as the district court. LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir.
2005). “When a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is filed in
conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, [we] consider the Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming
v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). On a Rule
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden
of proving that jurisdiction exists. Id.
                                III.      Discussion
       “Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to
certain ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 408 (2013). “One element of the case-or-controversy requirement
is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to sue.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). To establish standing, Plaintiffs
“must show (i) that [they] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused
by the defendant[s]; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by
judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021).

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                                           No. 23-10936

        Plaintiffs contend that they have individually “experienced their own
unique injury as a result of the noncompliant, uncertified electronic voting
equipment and systems.”2 In a section of their second amended complaint
titled “Standing,” Plaintiffs list two injuries that allegedly confer standing.
The first injury is “that their votes were not counted as intended and
diluted.” The second is that “the release of combined private and personal
information to [the Department of Homeland Security] and CIS Security3
and their third-party partners, that appears in Texas’ voter data; has been
and will continue to be released.”
        We addressed a substantially similar pro se challenge to electronic
voting systems in Lutostanski v. Brown, 88 F.4th 582 (5th Cir. 2023)
(summarizing plaintiffs’ alleged injuries as: “(A) their votes were
‘illegalized’ by the defendants and not counted, and (B) their personal
information was unlawfully disclosed”). We held that “[n]either injury is
sufficient for Article III standing.” Id. at 586.
        Like the plaintiffs in Lutostanski, Plaintiffs here do not allege that their
votes have or will be treated differently from other votes, but that all voters
across the state who use electronic voting machines are at risk of having their
votes not counted as intended. Id. (concluding that a substantially similar
alleged injury does not confer standing). Such an injury does not confer
standing because a plaintiff who raises only a “generally available grievance
about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in
        _____________________
        2
           Plaintiff Travis Wayne Eubanks, who filed a separate appellate brief, addresses
standing only minimally. To the extent his standing arguments differ from the other
Plaintiffs’ standing arguments, they were neither presented to the district court nor
included in the second amended complaint, so we need not consider them. See Collins v.
Dall. Leadership Found., 77 F.4th 327, 330 n.2 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[E]ven a pro se appellant
cannot raise new theories for relief for the first time on appeal.” (italics omitted)).
        3
            Plaintiffs do not further identify this entity.

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                                  No. 23-10936

proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does
not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437,
439 (2007) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). Nor does Plaintiffs’ allegation
that the electronic voting machines at issue are illegal. See id. at 442 (stating
that broad allegations that the law “has not been followed” are “precisely
the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of the
government that we have refused to countenance in the past”); Lutostanski,
88 F.4th at 586 (quoting same).
       Plaintiffs’ second theory of standing, which stems from the alleged
disclosure of their personal information, fares no better. The “Standing”
section of their second amended complaint states:
       Plaintiffs have information and belief that the release of
       combined private and personal information to [the Department
       of Homeland Security] and CIS Security and their third-party
       partners, that appears in Texas’ voter data; has been and will
       continue to be released. Exposing Plaintiffs to intimidation or
       harassment for merely exercising their right to vote, and will
       cause apprehension in their exercise of First Amendment
       rights including the right to vote and freedom of association.
       Plaintiffs believe that the release of their private and personal
       combination of information make them easy to identify and
       thus susceptible to harassment.
Like Plaintiffs’ first alleged injury, this alleged injury constitutes an
“undifferentiated, generalized grievance” that is not particular to them. See
Lance, 549 U.S. at 442. It is also too “speculative” to provide a basis for
standing. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409; cf. Lutostanski, 88 F.4th 587. The
Supreme Court has “repeatedly reiterated that threatened injury must be
certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and that allegations of possible

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                                       No. 23-10936

future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (internal quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted).
        Finally, Plaintiffs argue that because several Plaintiffs ran for office
and one is currently holding office, they have standing on that basis. The
district court rejected this theory of standing because allegations of
candidate-specific injuries “appear[] nowhere” in Plaintiffs’ second
amended complaint. On appeal, Plaintiffs do not explain how the district
court erred on this point, cite to allegations in their second amended
complaint to refute the district court’s conclusion, or direct us to any relevant
caselaw to support their position. We therefore hold that Plaintiffs have
forfeited this argument by failing to adequately brief it. See Rollins v. Home
Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 n.1 (5th Cir. 2021) (explaining the numerous
ways a party can forfeit an argument by failing to adequately brief it, including
“failure to address the district court’s analysis and explain how it erred,”
“failure to offer record citations,” and “failure to offer any supporting
argument or citation to authority” (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); see also Hotze v. Hudspeth, 16 F.4th 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 2021)
(holding plaintiffs forfeited candidate-standing argument by failing to
meaningfully brief it).4

        _____________________
        4
          “Although we liberally construe briefs of pro se litigants and apply less stringent
standards to parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel, pro se parties
must still brief the issues and reasonably comply with the standards of [Federal] Rule [of
Appellate Procedure] 28.” Grant v. Ceullar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

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                                 No. 23-10936

                           IV.      Conclusion
      In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate standing. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing the lawsuit without
prejudice.

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