Court Opinion

ID: 9961851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-20 00:00:38.384137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:03.539334
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20084           Document: 73-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/19/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                     FILED
                                                                               April 19, 2024
                                   No. 23-20084                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                 Summary Calendar                                  Clerk
                                 ____________

United States of America,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                         versus

Kasavion Dickson,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CR-11-1
                  ______________________________

Before Barksdale, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Kasavion Dickson was sentenced, inter alia, to 157-months’
imprisonment and five years of supervised release, based on his pleading
guilty to: aiding and abetting interference with commerce by robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and, brandishing and discharging a firearm

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-20084         Document: 73-1      Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/19/2024

                                  No. 23-20084

during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
       Dickson contends the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) by
imposing supervised-release conditions mandating Dickson: provide the
probation officer with requested financial information, and not incur new
credit charges or open additional lines of credit without the probation
officer’s approval. Dickson maintains the conditions: are inconsistent with
the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements; lack any reasonable
relationship to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors; and deprive him
of more liberty than necessary to serve those factors.           See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(d)(1)–(3) (outlining requirements for conditions); Guideline
§ 5D1.3(d) (outlining “special” conditions that “are recommended in the
circumstances described and, in addition, may otherwise be appropriate in
particular cases” (emphasis added)).
       “Abuse-of-discretion review typically applies to conditions of
supervised release, but plain-error review applies if the defendant fails to
object in the district court.” United States v. Scott, 821 F.3d 562, 570 (5th
Cir. 2016).    The parties contest whether Dickson preserved his two
contentions adequately.
       At sentencing, Dickson asked the court to consider removing the new-
credit condition because no restitution had been ordered.            That brief
“objection” was “insufficient to notify the . . . court of a § 3583(d) challenge
[to the new-credit condition] so that the . . . court [could] correct itself and
. . . obviate the need for our review”. United States v. Caravayo, 809 F.3d
269, 273 n.1 (5th Cir. 2015) (second and third alterations in original) (citation
omitted). Dickson’s request also did not alert the court to any error involving
the separate financial-information condition. See United States v. Hernandez-
Montes, 831 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he basis for objection

                                       2
Case: 23-20084        Document: 73-1       Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/19/2024

                                 No. 23-20084

presented below [must give] the district court the opportunity to address the
gravamen of the argument presented on appeal”. (second alteration in
original) (citation omitted)).     Accordingly, review of the challenged
conditions is only for plain error. See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 272–73.
       Under that standard, Dickson must show a forfeited plain error (clear-
or-obvious error, rather than one subject to reasonable dispute) that affected
his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If
he makes that showing, we have the discretion to correct the reversible plain
error, but generally should do so only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”. Id. (citation omitted).
       Although “the district court’s stated reasoning [for imposing the
conditions] was scant, we independently review the record for sufficient
evidence to support” the conditions. United States v. Bree, 927 F.3d 856, 860
(5th Cir. 2019); see also United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855, 861 (5th Cir.
2017) (“We can nonetheless uphold them if the justification can be inferred
from the record.”).
       Both conditions are reasonably related to several of the listed 18
U.S.C. § 3553 factors, particularly the nature of Dickson’s offense (robbery)
and his history, including burglary and using counterfeit bills. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1); United States v. Weatherton, 567 F.3d 149, 152–54 (5th Cir.
2009) (rejecting defendant’s special-conditions contention under plain-error
review). The conditions are also reasonably related to protecting the public
and deterring criminal conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); United
States v. Vega, No. 13-40681, 2014 WL 10937081, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 15,
2014) (permitting financial-information condition in drug-dealing context
because it allows the probation officer “to detect if [defendant] begins to
obtain funds illegally, thereby deterring further criminal conduct and
protecting the public”).

                                       3
Case: 23-20084       Document: 73-1       Page: 4    Date Filed: 04/19/2024

                                 No. 23-20084

       Further, the conditions are not more restrictive than necessary
because the financial-access condition applies only to requested financial
information, and the new-credit condition allows Dickson to incur new credit
charges or open additional lines of credit with the approval of the probation
officer. See Vega, 2014 WL 10937081, at *2; cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 558
F.3d 408, 416 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding the “restriction is not absolute”
where the probation officer could consent to the activity).
       Finally, the conditions are not inconsistent with the Guidelines’
policy statement. See Guideline § 5D1.3(d) (outlining “special” conditions
that “may otherwise be appropriate in particular cases” (emphasis added)).
       In sum, Dickson has not shown the requisite clear-or-obvious error.
See Caravayo, 809 F.3d at 272–73.
       AFFIRMED.

                                      4