Court Opinion

ID: 9693234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:31:28.488812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:30.219033
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
The question for determination here is the validity of a notice of appeal in the following form, from orders of a town council in connection with a special assessment for street improvements:
“In the DistriCt Court of Iowa in and for Woodbury County
Joseph HaRRington,
Ignatius Harrington and Theresa Harrington,
Plaintiffs, NotiCe of Appeal
vs.
Town of Salix, Iowa,
Defendant.
“You are Hereby Notified that the plaintiffs [naming them] * * * do hereby appeal from the action of the Town Council of Salix, Iowa in overruling objections of these plaintiffs * * * and in making, levying and confirming the assessments against said property for the installation of concrete curb and gutter # * * in Salix, Iowa * * * in the following amounts: [designating the properties and respective amounts].
“You are Further Notified that the petition of the said plaintiffs will be on file”, etc.
The notice was dated and signed by plaintiffs’ attorneys. It was served upon J. R. Downing, mayor of Salix. Defendant, Town of Salix, appeared specially, alleging the court had no jurisdiction, for that “the Notice of Appeal was not directed or addressed to the Town of Salix, Iowa, as required by section *1361391.89”, Code of Iowa, 1954, which recites, in part: “Said appeal must be perfected: 1. By serving upon the mayor or clerk, * * *, a written notice of appeal, * * *, directed to the defendant, * & * »
The district court sustained defendant’s special appearance. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold the order of the district court was correct.
Fuller v. Town of Rolfe, 226 Iowa 604, 605, 606, 284 N.W. 455, involved the same statutory provision and a notice of appeal in caption and in form similar to the notice in the ease at bar.
The Rolfe ease makes reference to some confusion as to how notices of appeal in proceedings of this sort should be directed, points out that this arose under former statutes and states that under the present provisions of the Code there seems no necessity for confusion or uncertainty. The notice of appeal held invalid in the Rolfe case was directed, “ ‘To F. E. Grant as Clerk of the Incorporated Town of Rolfe, Iowa.’ ” He was a proper representative of the city to be served with the notice and accepted service of it.
The decision states: “Appellant further argues that because the notice is directed to Grant, as clerk, there was manifest the intent to carry notice beyond the clerk himself and was thereby directed to the town as defendant, as required by the statute. * =» * rp^g language of the statute is explicit. It requires that the notice shall be ‘directed to the defendant.’ This, the notice before us does not do.”
In the case at bar the notice contained no “direction” of any kind. Obviously, it would not be less defective than the Rolfe notice.
In Barton v. Waterloo, 218 Iowa 495, 496, 498, 255 N.W. 700, 701, an action for damages, the original notice, similarly captioned, was directed to Charles MacKay, City Clerk. The decision states: “It is apparent from a reading of the notice that it is not addressed to the city of Waterloo.” Our cases uniformly hold that unless the notice is addressed to the defendant it is not sufficient. This holding was followed in Columbian Hog & Cattle Powder Co. v. Studer, 8 N.W.2d 592, not reported in Iowa Reports.
*1362Appellants cite Steele v. Murry, 80 Iowa 336, 45 N.W. 1030, and Lundy v. Ames, 201 Iowa 186, 206 N.W. 954. Neither cited case was based upon a statute requiring that the notice be directed to the defendant. The Steele case held a notice of tax deed to the occupant of the land insufficient because not addressed to him. In Lundy a notice of appeal directed to, The City of Ames, Iowa, was held valid. Neither decision supports appellants’ contentions.
Appellants cite also Plano Mfg. Co. v. Kaufert, 86 Minn. 13, 89 N.W. 1124, which interprets the language of a Minnesota statute. Of course, that would not require the overruling of decisions of this court interpreting differently such language in an Iowa statute. Moreover, it appears the difference is due to stricter construction, by this court, of the language of the Iowa statute. See Woodard v. Iowa City, 212 Iowa 326, 329, 232 N.W. 806; Van Meter v. Tipton, 178 Iowa 1201, 1202, 159 N.W. 171.
The order of the district court is affirmed. — Affirmed.
Hats, C. J., and Bliss, Garfield, SMith, Thompson, Larson, an[l Peterson, JJ., concur.
Wennerstrum, J., dissents.