Court Opinion

ID: 9772957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:00.51834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.498797
License: Public Domain

Robert H. Dudley, Justice, concurring. I concur in the vote denying a rehearing but, if granted the authority by the court, I would modify the last paragraph of the opinion. Upon reconsideration, I find that that part of the opinion relating to suspension of sentences is incorrect. Prior to the Omnibus DWI Act of 1983 trial judges .had the authority to suspend imposition of any sentence, see Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1201 (Repl. 1977 and Supp. 1983) or to suspend execution of sentence. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2326 as re-enacted by § 43-2331 (Supp. 1983). The 1983 DWI Act does not expressly repeal the trial judge’s authority to use either of the above cited statutes. Instead, it only eliminates the trial judge’s authority to utilize the First Offender Expungement Act, an act which authorizes the expungement of convictions. See § 9 of the DWI Act, § 75-2509 and the Expungement Act, § 43-1231. Prior to the 1983 DWI Act there was a mandatory sentencing requirement in the DWI laws. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1029.2 (Repl. 1977). This mandatory sentencing requirement was specifically repealed in Section 19 of the 1983 Act. The new act has no similar statement mandating serving of sentences. Although Section 4(b) of the Omnibus Act, § 75-2504(b), provides that persons found guilty “shall be imprisoned”, this language does not by implication repeal the specific statutory authority of judges to suspend imposition or execution of sentences.