Court Opinion

ID: 9410569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 20:01:07.679109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.601451
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 SHARNENE JOHNSON,

         Plaintiff.
                v.                                       Civil Action No. 22-3167 (JEB)
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,

         Defendants.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       In 2021, a Metropolitan Police Department officer shot and killed DeAndre Johnson

while enforcing a civil protection order. Sharnene Johnson, his mother and the Personal

Representative of his estate, has sued the District of Columbia, Robert Contee (Chief of Police),

Juwan Jefferson (Involved Officer), and Unknown Officers A and B.

       The parties now dispute the proposed Protective Order, which Defendants have moved

the Court to approve. Specifically, Plaintiff contests certain confidentiality labels as well as

procedures surrounding the handling of confidential documents. Finding the Protective Order

reasonable, the Court will grant the Motion.

I.     Legal Standard

       Where a movant can show “good cause,” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)

permits courts to issue protective orders to guard against “annoyance, embarrassment,

oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Trial courts have “broad discretion . . . to decide when

a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.” Seattle Times Co. v.

Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). “[T]he ‘good cause’ standard . . . is a flexible one that

requires an individualized balancing of the many interests that may be present in a particular

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case.” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Ultimately,

though, the party requesting the protective order has the burden to establish that it should be

granted. See United States v. One Gulfstream G-V Jet Aircraft Displaying Tail No. VPCES, 304

F.R.D. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 2014); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 218, 221

(D.D.C. 2008). To satisfy such burden, the movant “must make a specific demonstration of facts

in support of the request as opposed to conclusory or speculative statements about the need for a

protective order and the harm which will be suffered without one.” Alexander v. FBI, 186

F.R.D. 71, 75 (D.D.C. 1998).

II.    Analysis

       As the underlying facts are not relevant for purposes of this Motion, the Court need not

recount them here. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on October 18, 2022. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.).

On May 3, 2023, the parties agreed that a protective order governing the exchange and use of

confidential information should be filed. See ECF No. 34 (Meet and Confer Statement). On

June 16, Defendants filed the instant Motion, which Plaintiff opposes in part. See ECF No. 36

(Mot. for Protective Order); ECF No. 37 (Opp.).

       While both sides agree on much of the Protective Order, Plaintiff objects to ten

provisions: ¶¶ 1.c, 1.d, 1.h, 4, 5, 14, 15, 20, 21, 28. See Mot. For Protective Order at 2. She

most strongly contests whether a confidentiality label should be put on the following categories:

“1.c. Non-public information such as information contained in investigative files; 1.d.

Unredacted body-worn camera footage;” and “1.h. Other non-public information that a

producing party reasonably and in good faith determines should be subject to the terms of this

Order because the disclosure could harm the interest of a child, or harm the [Office of the

Attorney General’s] ability to carry out its obligations under law or regulation.” ECF No. 36-1

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(Proposed Protective Order) at 2. Plaintiff also objects to ¶ 4, which allows parties to label

confidential materials as attorney’s-eyes only (AEO) during the litigation, and ¶ 28, which limits

the retention of such documents to 30 days following the conclusion of litigation. Id. at 3, 11.

The Court considers each in turn.

       A. Categories of Confidential Information (¶¶ 1.c, 1.d, 1.h)

       The Court begins with the categories of confidential information in ¶¶ 1.c, 1.d, and 1.h.

       As to the body-worn-camera (BWC) footage (¶ 1.d), which is at the heart of the dispute,

Defendants affirmatively argue that the Protective Order is necessary because the “BWC footage

contains names, faces, and other personally identifying information of civilian witnesses,

including minor children, as well as first responders including members of the Metropolitan

Police Department and D.C. Fire and Emergency Medical Services.” Mot. for Protective Order

at 4. While this appears reasonable on its face, Johnson rejoins that: (1) Defendants’ request runs

counter to D.C. regulations, (2) concerns about unredacted BWC footage are already remedied

by other elements of the Protective Order that Plaintiff has agreed to, and (3) Defendants have

not claimed a specific or serious enough injury for requesting a protective order for the

unredacted BWC footage.

       The Court can quickly dispense with Plaintiff’s first and second arguments. Her

quotation from the D.C. Municipal Regulations describes procedures under which “the

Department shall schedule a time for [certain] individuals to view a BWC recording” and does

not relate to the confidentiality label of an unredacted video in a civil proceeding. See D.C.

Mun. Reg. tit. 24, § 3902.5(a). This argument is thus irrelevant. Next, Plaintiff asserts that other

parts of the Protective Order already protect juvenile witnesses. See Proposed Protective Order

at 2 (categorizing “[i]nformation and documents involving minors” as confidential). While that

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may be true, the confidentiality label on the BWC footage covers much more ground than those

other provisions. It limits the ability of Johnson and others to use this footage in future cases

involving MPD, and it prevents them from keeping the footage beyond the duration of the

litigation. Id. at 11. Defendants’ proposed additional protections are sufficiently warranted by

the interests at stake.

        Plaintiff’s most substantive argument is that a specific or serious injury has not been

alleged. See Opp. at 3. For her position, she relies almost entirely on an unreported case from

the Eastern District of Michigan, in which a court denied the Government’s protective order even

when the safety of witnesses was implicated. See United States v. Stone, No. 10-20123, 2012

WL 137746, at *1, *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2012) (concerning disclosure of witness statements

and grand-jury transcripts); Opp. at 3–4. That case, while not binding in any event, also has

nothing to do with BWC footage.

        Courts in this district have held that protective orders are the “only way to avert the

possible harm to the victim and witnesses of having their names, faces, and other personally

identifying information released.” United States v. Dixon, 355 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2019);

see also United States v. Johnson, 314 F. Supp. 3d 248, 257 (D.D.C. 2014) (observing that

“body-worn camera footage is likely to contain sensitive information in which witnesses and

others depicted on the footage have a legitimate privacy interest.”); United States v. Kingsbury,

325 F. Supp. 3d 158, 160 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding specific “need to protect the privacy of

noncivilian witnesses (i.e., the police)”) (formatting altered). It is true that a court in this district

allowed parties to “retain the footage indefinitely” and “use the footage in other cases.” Johnson,

314 F. Supp. 3d at 258. The footage in that case, however, was already redacted, while in this

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case Plaintiff requests that unredacted BWC footage be produced without a confidentiality label.

Id. at 255.

        The Court concludes that the asserted interest in protecting juveniles and first responders

outweighs Plaintiff’s generalized interests in public disclosure and scrutiny, particularly given

that all parties in the case will have access to the full, unredacted footage for purposes of the

current litigation.

        As for ¶ 1.c (“Non-public information such as information contained in investigative

files”) and ¶ 1.h (“Other non-public information that a producing party reasonably and in good

faith determines should be subject to the terms of this Order”), Plaintiff does not specifically

articulate her concern with these provisions. Coupled with the Government’s reasons for the

proposed Protective Order, see Mot. for Protective Order at 3–5, the Court sees no reason not to

adopt them.

        B. Attorney’s-Eyes Only (¶ 4)

        Defendants have also requested a provision that would allow parties to designate an item

as AEO at any time, subject to the procedural framework for challenges delineated in the Motion

for Protective Order. Although Plaintiff opposes this request in principle, see Opp. at 5, nothing

has yet been designated as AEO. Her concerns are thus speculative at this point. If in the future

documents are so designated by Defendants that both parties cannot agree on, Plaintiff may

return to the Court to seek relief. For now, the Court will approve this provision.

        C. Handling of Confidential Information (¶ 28)

        The final dispute is whether Plaintiff can keep confidential material or whether she must

destroy it no more than 30 days after the termination of this action and any appeals. Johnson

asserts that this Protective Order would violate her attorney’s retention policy, which is in

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accordance with D.C. Bar and Ethics Rules. See Opp. at 6. She does not acknowledge,

however, that the D.C. Bar and Ethics Rules require the maintenance of case files, not documents

produced in discovery. Her true concern becomes more apparent in the following sentence: “[I]t

is important to maintain any discovery provided in this case for future proceedings involving Ms.

Johnson or any third parties.” Id. at 6. The Government correctly argues that discovery requests

should not be used to gather information for use in other proceedings. See Reply at 7 (quoting

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 352 n.17 (1978)). There is thus no good

reason to excise this standard provision.

       D. All Other Provisions

       Although she gestures at other objections, Plaintiff never specifically contests the

remaining provisions of the proposed Order. Since the Government provides a number of solid

reasons for these provisions in its Motion, see Mot. for Protective Order at 3–5, the Court will

approve ¶¶ 5, 14, 15, 20, 21.

III.   Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the entirety of the Motion for a Protective

Order. A contemporaneous Order so stating will issue this day.

                                                             /s/ James E. Boasberg
                                                             JAMES E. BOASBERG
                                                             Chief Judge
Date: July 21, 2023

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