Court Opinion

ID: 9694760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:54:07.549963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:05.208097
License: Public Domain

HARTEN, Judge
(concurring specially).
Since I differ with the court only as to the purpose of the remand, I write separately.
I wholly agree with the court that the forfeiture of instrumentalities or proceeds does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Because there are valid existing civil judgments that accommodate the state’s claim that the forfeited property represents proceeds of past illegal drug sales, I would hold that double jeopardy does not bar criminal prosecution and reverse and remand for trial rather than for an evidentia-ry hearing.
The key question is whether the forfeited property constituted proceeds. The summary judgments, which Rosenfeld did not contest, indicated that the property was for-feitable under the drug forfeiture statutes, Minn.Stat. §§ 609.531-.5318 (1992 and Supp. 1993). The court has chosen to remand for an evidentiary hearing to allow the district court to decide the classification of the forfeited property.1 No such hearing is necessary, however, in light of the evidentiary environment established within the forfeiture statutes,
Money and precious jewelry found in proximity to drugs or drug paraphernalia, and conveyances containing drugs, are presumed forfeitable in a judicial forfeiture proceeding; “[a] claimant of the property bears the burden to rebut this presumption.” Minn.Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 1 (Supp.1993) (such property presumed subject to administrative forfeiture under this section); Minn.Stat. § 609.531, subd. 6a (Supp.1993) (in judicial forfeiture proceeding, state has the benefit of *925the presumption of section 609.5314). Because Rosenfeld did not contest the summary judgments, this presumption, unrebutted, became itself probative, and enabled the district court to enter forfeiture judgments in favor of the state. See Kath v. Kath, 238 Minn. 120, 124, 55 N.W.2d 691, 693-94 (1952) (presumption dictates decision in absence of evidence to the contrary).
Rosenfeld argues that the forfeitures should not be treated as forfeitures of proceeds because the actual basis for the forfeitures was the proximity of the forfeited property to the drugs seized. This argument, however, skips a step in the analysis. The forfeiture statutes provide that “associated property,” records, proceeds, and the drugs themselves are subject to forfeiture under section 609.5311. Minn.Stat. § 609.5311, subds. 1, 2, 4 (1992). Property found in proximity to drugs is presumed subject to administrative forfeiture under section 609.5314. But because Rosenfeld filed timely petitions for judicial determination of the forfeitures, the forfeiture proceeding was transformed from administrative under section 609.5314 into judicial under section 609.531, subdivision 6a. See Minn.Stat. § 609.5314, subd. 3(c) (if the claimant makes a timely demand for judicial determination, the state must conduct the forfeiture under section 609.531, subdivision 6a). Subdivision 6a of section 609.531 allows the state to use the proximity presumption in a judicial forfeiture. Property in proximity is presumed to be subject to forfeiture — i.e., it is presumed to be “associated property” or records or proceeds.
The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption. To do so, the defendant must put forth facts showing that the property was not forfeitable, that is, that the forfeited property was not “associated property,” was not records, and was not proceeds. The defendant must rebut the presumption as to each rational basis for forfeiture. And if the defendant fails to meet this burden, the forfeited property is presumed to be forfeitable under all applicable bases. Here, because Rosenfeld did not attempt to show otherwise, the forfeited property was presumed to be both “associated property” and proceeds.2
Had Rosenfeld rebutted the presumption, the state would then have been required to prove particularly that the property was proceeds or that the property represented “associated property.” But because Rosenfeld did not contest the summary judgments and thereby failed to rebut the presumption, the state did not offer such proof.3 The burden shifted to Rosenfeld to rebut the forfeitability presumption and force the state to come forward with evidence showing the factual basis for the forfeiture. Rosenfeld chose not to undertake that burden. Consequently, Rosenfeld must live with the unrebutted presumption and the state’s associated characterization of the property as proceeds of prior drug sales, the forfeiture of which does not constitute punishment for purposes of double jeopardy.

. The court's remand for an evidentiary hearing is problematic. The court advances no authority for ordering an evidentiary hearing in the district court criminal division to consider the forfeiture of property notwithstanding the established un-appealed judgments currently existent in the civil division of that same court. These judgments have already adjudicated forfeiture in associated actions between the same parties concerning the same property. The basis for these judgments cannot be overlooked.

. The state does not contend, nor is it rational to suggest, that the forfeited property was records.

. The better practice, of course, would have been for the state to supplement the presumption by submitting more than minimal evidence of the basis for the forfeitures under section 609.5311 in support of summary judgment. Had that been done, an evidentiary hearing upon remand would likely not have been thought necessary.