Court Opinion

ID: 9554572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:07:09.417447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:34.218164
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0842
                               Filed August 9, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BOOKER DEON McKINNEY,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Christopher L. Bruns,

Judge.

      Booker McKinney appeals the sentence and restitution obligations imposed

following his guilty plea. AFFIRMED.

      Fred Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Carr, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

       After Booker McKinney pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault by

strangulation causing bodily injury, a class “D” felony in violation of Iowa Code

section 708.2A(5) (2021), the district court sentenced him to serve a prison term

not to exceed five years and to pay restitution in the form of court costs and $60 of

court-appointed attorney fees. McKinney appeals. He argues the district court

failed to give a detailed list of reasons for imposing the prison sentence and the

court erred by ordering category “B” restitution without determining McKinney’s

reasonable ability to pay.    See Iowa Code § 910.1(2) (defining category “B”

restitution).

       Starting with the sentencing issue, we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal

despite McKinney’s guilty plea because he challenges the sentence rather than

the plea itself and therefore has good cause to appeal. See id. § 814.6(1)(a)(3)

(requiring a defendant who pleads guilty to an offense other than a class “A” felony

to show good cause before having the right to appeal); State v Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that good cause exists to appeal from a

conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges his or her

sentence rather than the guilty plea.”).

       McKinney contends the district court failed to give sufficiently detailed

reasons for the sentence imposed.          We review sentencing challenges for

correction of errors at law. State v. McCalley, 972 N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 2022).

Although our rules of criminal procedure require the district court to state reasons

for selecting a particular sentence, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)(d), the reasons

don’t need to be detailed. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). So
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long as it is sufficient to allow appellate review, even a cursory explanation suffices.

Id. Here, the district court gave this explanation for the sentence:

       I’ve looked at the maximum opportunity to rehabilitate Mr. McKinney.
       I’ve looked at the need to protect the community from further
       offenses by Mr. McKinney and others. I’ve considered the nature of
       this offense. I’ve considered Mr. McKinney’s previous record of
       convictions. I’ve considered Mr. McKinney’s age, education,
       employment and family circumstances.
               I’ve looked at the recommendation of the [presentence
       investigation report (PSI)]. Again, that is tempered somewhat by the
       portions of the PSI I’ve had to disavow reliance on. I’ve looked at the
       county attorney’s arguments and recommendation. I’ve considered
       the defense attorney’s arguments or recommendation.
               I do not have a victim here making a victim impact statement.
       I’ve looked at whether this is a case where restitution could make up
       for the crime. It is not necessarily such a case.
               [Discussion about a sentencing no-contact order, with the
       decision made not to enter such an order.]
               . . . [H]aving considered the sentencing factors I referenced, I
       sentence the defendant to be confined for an indeterminate term not
       to exceed five years.

While this explanation for the sentencing decision is to some extent terse and

succinct, it is detailed enough to provide us with a basis for review. As a result, it

is sufficiently detailed to withstand McKinney’s challenge. See State v. Thacker,

862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (reiterating that a terse and succinct statement

of reasons is sufficient “so long as the brevity of the court’s statement does not

prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion” (quoting

State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989))).             We decline to grant

McKinney’s request to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

       As for the restitution issue, the record shows McKinney did not request a

reasonable-ability-to-pay determination and file the required affidavit by the time

of the sentencing hearing. See Iowa Code § 910.2A(2). As such, McKinney

waived his ability to directly challenge his reasonable-ability-to-pay determination
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at sentencing. See id. § 910.2A(2)(b) (“Failure to furnish a completed financial

affidavit waives any claim regarding the offender’s reasonable ability to pay.”). To

the extent McKinney seeks to challenge the events that transpired regarding his

request for a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination after sentencing, we are

without jurisdiction to address his challenges. Those events consist of McKinney

filing a request for such a determination after the sentencing order was issued. In

response, the district court issued an order stating it construed McKinney’s filing

as a petition under Iowa Code section 910.7 and set a hearing on the petition.

McKinney failed to appear for the hearing, so the court issued an order confirming

the original amount of category “B” restitution. If McKinney were trying to appeal

from that order, he cannot do so, as “[a]ppellate review of a district court ruling

under [section 910.7] shall be by writ of certiorari.” Id. § 910.7(5). And, while we

have the authority to treat a notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari, see

Iowa R. App. P. 6.108, McKinney has not filed anything seeking review of the

court’s order ruling on his request for a reasonable-ability-to-pay determination

under section 910.7. The notice of appeal filed to initiate this appeal states only

that McKinney is challenging the sentencing order.          As there is no appellate

proceeding before us from the post-sentencing restitution order, we are without

jurisdiction to address any arguments McKinney may be making about it.

       AFFIRMED.