Court Opinion

ID: 9496464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:27:27.023115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:35.877619
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Adams’s girlfriend consented to the search of Adams’s residence. As the majority notes, a third party may consent to a search. United States v. Wright, 971 F.2d 176, 180 (8th Cir.1992). This is a factual determination, which we review for clear error. United States v. Tirado, 313 F.3d 437, 439 (8th Cir.2002). Thus, we will “affirm the trial court’s decision unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it evolves from an erroneous conception of the applicable law, or we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made after having considered the entire record.” United States v. Wallraff, 705 F.2d 980, 987 (8th Cir.1983) (citation omitted). Having thoroughly reviewed the record, I cannot say that the district court committed clear error.
Consent is “voluntary if it was ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,’ ... rather than ‘the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.’” United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). When determining whether or not the consent was coerced, the majority relies heavily on the fact that Adams’s girlfriend led police through the house. While that fact favors a finding of consent, it is not the only factor we consider when determining whether or not a search is voluntary. Rather, the “determination depends upon the totality of the circumstances in a particular case, including ‘both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.’ ” Id. at 380-81 (citing Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041).
When evaluating the voluntariness of a person’s consent, we consider the following: (1) the person’s age; (2) the person’s general intelligence and education; (3) whether the person was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs when consenting; (4) whether the person consented after being informed of their right to withhold consent or of their Miranda rights; (5) whether, because the person had been previously arrested, the person was aware of the protections afforded to her, as a suspected criminal of the legal system. Id. at 381 (citations omitted).
Likewise, when we consider the environment in which the consent was given, we pay particular attention to whether the person who consented:
(1) was detained and questioned for a long or short time; (2) was threatened, physically intimidated, or punished by the police; (3) relied upon promises or misrepresentations made by the police; (4) was in custody or under arrest when *1173the consent was given; (5) was in a public or a secluded place; or (6) either objected to the search or stood by silently while the search occurred.
Id. (citations omitted). Again, when applying these factors, no single fact-like the fact that Adams’s girlfriend led police through the house-is determinative. Chaidez, 906 F.2d at 380. After considering all of the factors, I believe that the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous.
First, although the evidence shows Adams’s girlfriend was an adult, was not under the influence of any drug, and was of sufficient mental capacity to consent, there is no evidence that she was ever informed of her right to withhold her consent. Id. (noting that if police do not inform a party of the right to refuse, it “is a significant, [although] not determinative[]factor cutting against a finding of voluntariness”). Moreover, there is nothing to indicate that Adams’s girlfriend had a criminal background or prior experience with searches. Thus, it is at best questionable whether she understood the ramifications of a residential police search.
This is especially pertinent when one considers the environment under which she allegedly consented. She was secluded inside of Adams’s house and surrounded by several police officers. These same officers had just interrogated and arrested Adams and informed her that they arrested Adams because “he didn’t want [them] to search” the house. According to Adams’s girlfriend, the detective then suggested that “it would be easy for” her if she “would consent for him to search the house.” While it is true Adams’s girlfriend was not under arrest when she led police through the house, the environment-including Officer Puckett’s misrepresentations and implicit threats-could have led a reasonable person to believe she had to consent to the search in order to avoid arrest.
Moreover, the trial judge based his determination largely on the fact that he credited Adams’s girlfriend’s testimony and discounted Officer Puckett’s testimony. The majority, though, has essentially disregarded the trial court’s credibility determination. Credibility determinations are not the province of appellate courts. Instead, the trial judge is given substantial deference to weigh such testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 984 F.2d 943, 948 (8th Cir.1993) (“When a finding of fact is based on determinations of credibility, this court must pay even greater deference to the district court’s findings.”) (citation omitted).
Thus, I cannot say that the trial judge’s determination on this issue was clearly erroneous. As a result, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that it was clear error to suppress the evidence seized after the search of Adams’s residence. In all other respects, however, I concur with the majority’s well-reasoned opinion.