Court Opinion

ID: 9799247
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 06:56:28.595678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:53.372163
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 39. concurring. I joined Titchenal v. Dexter, primarily because I agree with this part of the rationale:
*203Given the complex social and practical ramifications of expanding the classes of persons entitled to assert parental rights by seeking custody or visitation, the Legislature is better equipped to deal with the problem. Deference to the Legislature is particularly appropriate in this arena because the laws pertaining to parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact have been developed over time solely through legislative enactment or judicial construction of legislative enactments.
166 Vt. 373, 385, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (1997) (citations omitted). Thus, I agree with the majority opinion’s reliance on this aspect of the Titckenal reasoning. At the same time, I recognize that Titchenal was decided in 1997, over seventeen years ago. We revisited related issues eight years ago in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, 180 Vt. 441, 912 A.2d 951. In addressing the rights of a civil-union partner with respect to a child whose birth was the result of the partners’ planned artificial insemination, we noted that “the Legislature has not dealt directly with new reproductive technologies and the families that result from those technologies.” Id. ¶ 52. We “expressed], as many other courts have, a preference for legislative action, . . . but [concluded that,] in the absence of that action, we must protect the best interests of the child.” Id.
¶ 40. I admit that I find it more difficult to favor legislative action over judicial action in the face of years of legislative inaction. I can think of no subject that is in greater need of legislative action than this one — defining who may be considered a parent for purposes of determining parental rights and responsibilities and parent-child contact. While I am voting with the majority in this case, our responsibility to protect the best interests of the child will become only more challenging as the changing nature of families presents circumstances that are well outside the contemplation of our now archaic and inadequate statutes. I recognize that there may come a tipping point where judicial action to define rights and responsibilities beyond those of biological parents and marital partners becomes unavoidable. I would rather that the Legislature act before we see that day.
¶ 41. In theory, the Legislature addressed the subject, at least as of 1984, when the Parentage Proceedings Act was adopted. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 301-306. As we pointed out in Miller-Jenkins, how*204ever, that very limited statute was enacted primarily to facilitate the establishment of child-support obligations and their collection. See 2006 VT 78, ¶ 44 (“We have examined the legislative history of the statute and can find no indication that it was intended to govern the rights of parentage of children born through artificial insemination or to same-sex partners, or to do anything other than provide a speedy recovery of child support”). Except in a wholly perfunctory manner, the Act failed to address parental rights and responsibilities, or rights and responsibilities of others with respect to children beyond its child support purpose.
¶ 42. The Legislature has not adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, 9B U.L.A. 386 (2001), which would have addressed issues beyond child support. Nor has the Legislature adopted the Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2001), as amended in 2002. The more recent versions are important because they particularly address a child of assisted reproduction and gestational agreements, as well as some of the other issues that have arisen as the result of changing family structures. In addition to the approach taken by the Uniform Parentage Act, other courts, including one of the out-of-state decisions cited by the majority, Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010), have analyzed statutes from other jurisdictions that address precisely the issues presented here. See id. at 193-94.
¶ 43. My purpose in noting various legislative alternatives is not to endorse any of them, but instead to point out that models exist for a thorough airing of the issues and alternatives. I do not suggest that drafting and enacting such legislation will be easy. Undeniably, it would involve complex and difficult policy choices based on an in-depth understanding of the composition of present-day and future families. It is for this very reason that I urge the Legislature to act, and to act with some urgency so that an archaic legal system does not create uncertainty for families and children and inflict real harm on them.