Court Opinion

ID: 9599788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:21:30.573061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:21.522370
License: Public Domain

CAMPBELL, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion for two reasons. First, they apply a statute never intended to cover circumstances such as the present. Second, the majority opinion incorrectly places the burden of proof on the defendant sheriff.
APPLICATION OF ORS 135.215
The majority stretches a statute intended to apply only to defendants bound over after a preliminary hearing to also encompass defendants committed upon an indictment returned by a grand jury. See ORS 135.070 to 135.225. Notwithstanding the fact that such equal treatment seems to make good sense, ORS 135.215 is simply not so broad in scope. It was not intended to reflect a broad legislative policy regarding the pretrial incarceration of all prisoners but only those committed following a preliminary hearing.
*439BURDEN OF PROOF
As a general rule, in a habeas corpus proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of proof and must establish his case by a preponderance of the evidence. Smallman v. Gladden, 206 Or 262, 269, 291 P2d 749 (1956). Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Or 409, 229 P2d 633, 230 P2d 770 (1951); See In re Application of Loundagin, 129 Or 652, 278 P 950 (1929).
In the case at bar, petitioner presented his claim with specific allegations and the defendant sheriff of Linn County filed a Return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The facts stated in the Return are, prima facie, presumed to be true and the burden of proof is on the petitioner or relator to show the contrary by allegation and proof. Thompson v. Sanders, 70 SW2d 1051, 334 Mo 1100 (1934). Where a prima facie case is made out by the return, the burden is on the petitioner to show that the imprisonment is illegal.” Teague v. Looney, 268 F2d 506, 508 (10th Cir 1959).
In his Return, the sheriff states that to comply with a court order from the U. S. District Court for Oregon, he is required to limit the number of inmates to 24, to separate violent inmates from non-violent inmates and to further segregate prisoners among the three cell blocks within the facility. He further states that on the day petitioner was transferred to the Clatsop County Jail, the Linn County facility had the maximum 24 prisoners, six of whom were charged with intentional homicide. The sheriff adds that in his segregation of prisoners he is further constrained by construction activities at the facility that began on June 19, 1985, and are expected to continue for 90 days. The sheriff states that the safety of inmates is a very real concern because one inmate was murdered by fellow inmates in November, 1984. The sheriff acknowledges that petitioner’s imprisonment in Clatsop County is inconvenient to petitioner’s attorney and potential visitors, but contends that the transfer was necessary to insure the personal safety of all inmates, including the petitioner, and the security of the facility as a whole. On the several occasions where there seemed to be opportunities to return petitioner to Linn County, the sheriff determined that, consistent with his legal obligations and his duty to provide safety and security, it was not feasible to return the prisoner.
*440In his Return, the sheriff clearly makes out a prima facie case for petitioner’s displacement from Linn County.
The burden now rests with the petitioner “to show the contrary by allegation and proof.” Simply submitting the daily logs of the Linn County Jail population which indicate that between June 3-18 there were 24 or less prisoners at the facility, does not address the critical issues of segregating violent inmates from non-violent, segregating the prisoners among the three cell blocks, or the impact of the construction activities on the segregation process. The burden which petitioner failed to meet was to prove “all facts necessary” to show that there was the proper “space” for him in this particular facility at this particular time.
ANSWER TO CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Petitioner contends that as a result of his continued imprisonment at the Clatsop County Jail he is being denied the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the state and federal constitutions. In Krummacher v. Gierloff, 290 Or 867, 872, 627 P2d 458 (1981), this court stated that the constitutional provisions for the right to counsel “call for an adequate performance by counsel of those functions of professional assistance which an accused person relies upon counsel to perform on his behalf.” This court further stated that although the standard of performance necessarily involved “a degree of subjectivity and ad hoc judgment” adequate assistance of counsel “requires that the lawyer do those things reasonably necessary to diligently and conscientiously advance the defense.” Id at 874. Nowhere do we state that in subjecting a lawyer’s performance to constitutional scrutiny we will consider the lawyer’s own personal inconvenience as the basis for the accused’s being denied his constitutional right to counsel. It is indeed unfortunate that the accused’s counsel must make a seven hour round-trip, eat meals away from home, “waste” her time while driving and be “exhausted” in the process. Granted, it would be easier for counsel if the accused were only a few blocks away, but (like lawyer inconvenience) ease of representation does not figure into the constitutional scrutiny of a lawyer’s performance.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the lawyer is inconvenienced by the geographic distance between herself *441and her client. Access to her client involves additional planning and extra time. However, as long as she does “those things reasonably necessary to diligently and conscientiously advance the defense,” the accused’s right to effective counsel is not jeopardized. The accused has a right to expect his lawyer to exercise professional skill and judgment. There is no concomitant constitutional guarantee regarding the ease or convenience with which her professional legal services shall be provided. It is error to turn lawyer inconvenience into deprivation of the accused’s constitutional right to effective counsel.
In challenging his confinement at the Clatsop County Jail, petitioner also invokes Article I, section 13, of the Oregon Constitution which provides that “no person arrested or confined in jail shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.” Petitioner claims he is being subjected to undue rigor by being moved from Linn County to a location where he is “physically and emotionally inaccessible” to his attorney, his family and his friends. In Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 625 P2d 123 (1981), this court stated that while historically the most obvious examples of rigorous practices were shackles, the ball and chain and brutal treatment or conditions, today “unnecessary rigor” is not to be equated only with beatings or other forms of physical brutality. It extends to “needlessly harsh, degrading or dehumanizing treatment of prisoners. Id at 622. In analyzing an “unnecessary rigor” claim this court stated that:
“Since it is ‘unnecessary’ rigor that is proscribed, the first question under this clause is whether a particular prison or police practice would be recognized as an abuse to the extent that it cannot be justified by necessity.” Id at 620.
I am unconvinced that this constitutes such an abuse within the meaning of Article I, section 13.
In his Return, the defendant sheriff amply justifies the practice of placing prisoners in other facilities with available space. By order of the U. S. District Court for Oregon, the sheriff must not only limit the prison population but he must also segregate violent and non-violent prisoners as well as regulate prisoners among three cell blocks within the facility. If a particular prisoner cannot be properly held at Linn County, the sheriff has no alternative but to locate space for that prisoner in another correctional facility. At the time *442petitioner needed to be placed, the sheriff was unable to locate space in a correctional facility in an adjoining county. Given these facts, there is no question that the sheriffs actions are justified by necessity. Using the “justified by necessity” test laid down by this court in Sterling, petitioner’s “unnecessary rigor” argument must fail.
Chief Justice Peterson joins in this dissent.