Court Opinion

ID: 9416543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 19:49:11.758256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:29.378701
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice DANIEL.
From the opinion just delivered I must declare my dissent. In the settlement of the discreditable controversy between the parties to this cause, I take no part. If I did, I should probably say that it is a case without merits, either in the plaintiff or in the defendants, and that in such a case they should be dismissed by courts of justice to settle their dispute by some standard which is cognate to the transaction in which they have been engaged.
My participation in this case has reference to a far different and more important ingredient involved in the opinion just announced, namely, the power of this court to adjudicate this cause consistently, with a just obedience to that authority from which, and from which alone, their being and their every power are derived.
Having in former instances, and particularly in the case of the Rundle v. Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, endeavored to expose the utter want of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States over c.auses in which corporations shall be parties *339either as plaintiffs or defendants, I hold it to be unnecessary in this place to repeat or to enlarge upon the positions maintained in the case above mentioned, as they are presented in 14 Howard, 95'. Indeed, from any real necessity for enforcing the general fundamental proposition contended for by me in the case of Bundle and the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, namely, that under the second section of the third article of the Constitution, citizens only, that is to say men, material, social, moral, sentient beings, must be parties, in order to give jurisdiction to the federal courts, I am wholly relieved by the virtual, obvious, and inevitable concessions, comprised in the attempt now essayed, to carry the provision of the Constitution beyond either its philological, technical, political, or vulgar acceptation. For in no one step in the progress of this attempt, is it denied that a corporation is not and cannot be a citizen, nor that a citizen does not mean a corporation, nor that the assertion of a power by an individual outside of the corporation, and interfering with and controlling its organization and functions, (whatever might be the degree of interest owned by that individual in the corporation,) would be incompatible with the existence of the corporaté body itself. Nothing of this kind is attempted. But an effort is made to escape from the effect of these concessions, by assumptions which leave them in all their force, and show that such concessions and assumptions cannot exist in harmony with each other. .
Thus it has been insisted that a corporation, created by a State, can have no being or faculties beyond the limits of that State; and if its president and officers reside within that State such a conjuncture will meet and satisfy the predicament laid down by the Constitution.
The want of integrity, in this argument, is exposed by the following questions:
1. Does the restriction- of the corporate body within particular geographical limits, or the residence of its officers within those limits, render it less a corporation, or alter its nature and legal character in any degree ?
2. Does the restriction of the corporate faculties within given bounds, necessarily or by any reasonable presumption, imply that the interest of its stockholders, either in its property or its acts, is confined to the same limits ? If it does, then a change of residence by officers, agents, or stockholders, or a transfer of a portion of the interests of the latter, would, destroy the qualification of citizenship depending upon locality. If it. would not have this effect, then this anomalous citizen may possess the rights of both plaintiff’and defendant, nay, by a sort of plural being or ubiquity, may be a citizen of every State in the Union, *340may even be a State and a citizen of the same State at -the same time.
Again it has been said, that the Constitution has reference merely to the interests of those who may. have access to the federal courts; and that provided those interests can be traced, or .presumed to have existence in persons lesiding in different States, it cannot be required that those by whom such interests are legally held and controlled, or represented, should be alleged or proved to be citizens, or should appear in that character as parties upon the record. In reply t.o this proposition it may be asked, upon what principle any one cari be admitted into a court of justice apart from the interest he may possess in the matter in controversy; and whether it is not that interest alone and the position he holds in relation thereto, which can give him access to any court ? But, again, the language of the Constitution refers expressly and conclusively to the civil or political character of the party litigant, and constitutes that character the test of his capacity to sue or be sued in • the courts of the United States.
In «strict accordance with this doctrine has been'the interpretation of the Constitution from the early, and what may in some sense be called the cotemporaneous interpretation of that instrument, an interpretation handed down in an unbroken series of decisions, until crossed and disturbed by the anomalous ruling in the case of Letson v. The Louisville Railroad Company.
Beginning with the case of Bingham v. Cabot, in the 3d of Dallas, 382, and running through the cases of Turner v. The Bank of North America, 4 Dallas, 8; Turner’s Admr. v. Enrille, Ib. 7; Mossman v. Higginson, Ib. 12; Abercrombie v. Dupuis, 1 Cranch, 343; Wood v. Wagnon, 2 Ib. 1; Capron v. Van Noorden, 2 Ib. 126; Strawbridge v. Curtis, 3 Ib. 267; The Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Ib. 61; Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 5 Ib. 303; The Corporation of New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91; Sullivan v. The Fulton Steamboat Company, 6 Wheat. 450 — the doctrine is ruled and reiterated, that in order to maintain an action in the courts of the United States, under the clause in question,’ not only must the parties be citizens of different States, but that this character must be averred explicitly, and must appear upon the record, and .cannot be inferred from residence or locality, however expressly stated, and that the failure to make the required averment will be fatal to the jurisdiction of a federal court, either original or appellate; and. is- not cured by the want of a plea or of a formal exception in any other form. But the decisions have not stopped at this point; they have ruled that to come' within the meaning of the Constitution, the eause of action *341must have existed ab origine between citizens of different States, and that the article in question cannot be evaded by a transfer of rights which, by their primitive and intrinsic character, were not cognizable in the courts of the United States as between citizens of different States. See Turner v. The Bank of North America, already cited, and the cases of Montalet v. Murray, 4 Cranch, 46; and Gibson v. Chew, 16 Peters, 315. It is remarkable to perceive how perfectly the case of Turner v. The Bank of North'America covers that now under consideration, and how strongly and emphatically it rebukes the effort to claim by indirect ■ and violent construction, powers for the federal courts which not only have never been delegated to them, nor implied by'the silence of the Constitution, but still more powers assumed in defiance of its express inhibition. In the case last mentioned, the plaintiffs w'ere well described as citizens of Pennsylvania, suing Turner and others, who were properly described as citizens of North Carolina, upon a promissory note made by the .defendants, and payable to Biddle and Company, and which, by assignment, became the property of the plaintiffs. Biddle & Co. were not otherwise described than as “ using trade and partnership ” at Philadelphia or North Carolina. Upon an exception upon argument, taken for the first time in this court, Ellsworth, Chief Justice, pronounced its decision in these words: “A Circuit Court is one of limited jurisdiction, and has cognizance not of causes generally, but only of a few specially circumstanced, amounting to a small proportion of the cases which an unlimited jurisdiction would embrace. And' the fair presumption is, (not as with regard to a- court' of general jurisdiction, that a cause is within its jurisdiction unless the contrary appears, but rather) that a cause is without its jurisdiction till the contrary appears.
This renders it necessary, inasmuch as the proceedings of no court can be valid farther than its jurisdiction appears or can be presumed, to set.forth upon the record óf a circuit court, the facts or circumstances which give it jurisdiction, either expressly or in such manner as to render them certain by legal intendment. Amongst those circumstances it is necessary, where the defendant appears to be a citizen of one State, to show that the plaintiff is a citizen of some other State, or an alien; or if, as in the present case, the suit be upon a promissory note by an assignee, to show that the original promisee is so, for by a special provision of the statute it is his description as well as that of the assignee, which effectuates the jurisdiction; but here the description given of the promisee only is, that he used trade at Philadelphia or North Carolina; which, taldng either place for that where he used trade, contains no averment that *342he was a citizen of a State other than that of North Carolina, or an- alien, nor any thing which by legal intendment can amount to such ah averment.” Let it be remembered, that the statute alluded to by Chief Justice Ellsworth is nothing more nor less than an assertion in terms of the second section of the third article of the Constitution; and it may’ then be asked, what becomes of this awkward attempt to force upon both the Constitution and statute a construction which the just meaning of both absolutely repels ? Every one must be sensible that the seat of a man’s business, of his daily pursuits and occupations, must probably, if not necessarily, be the place of his residence; yet here we find it expressly ruled, that such a commorancy by no just legal intendment any more than by express language, constitutes him a citizen of that community or State in which he may happen to be then residing or transacting his business; moreover, it is familiar to every lawyer or other person conversant with history, that during the periods of greatest jealousy and strictness of the English polity, aliens -were, permitted, for the convenience and advancement of commerce, to reside within the realm and to rent and occupy real property; but it never was pretended that such permission or residence clothed them with the character or with a single right pertaining to a British subject.
Nor has the doctrine ruled by the cases just cited been applied to proceedings at law alone, in which a peculiar strictness or an adherence to what may seem to partake of form is adhered to. The overruling authority of the Constitution has been regarded by this court as equally extending itself to equitable as to legal rights and proceedings in the courts of the United States. Thus in the case of Course v. Stead in 4 Dallas, 22. That was a suit in equity in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Georgia, in which it was deemed necessary to make a new party by a supplemental bill. This last bill recited the original bill, and all the orders which had been made in the cause, but omitted to allege the citizenship .ui the newly made defendant. In this case, when brought here by appeal from the court below, this court say, in reference to the omission to aver the citizenship of the new party, “it is unnecessary to form or to déliver any opinion upon the merits of this cause; let the decree of the Circuit Court be, reversed.” The case of Jackson v. Ashton, in 8 Peters, 148, is still more in point. This also was a suit in equity. The caption of the bill was in these words: “ Thomas Jackson and .others, citizens of the State of Virginia v. The Rev. William E. Ashton, a citizen of Pennsylvania.” What said this court by its organ, Marshall, Chief Justice, upon this state of the case ? “ The title or cap*343tion of the bill is no part of the bill, and does not -remove the objection of the defects in the pleadings. The bill and proceédings should state the citizenship of the parties to give the court jurisdiction.” In these last decisions must be perceived the most emphatic refutation of this newly assumed version of the Constitution, which affirms. that, although by the language of that instrument citizenship and neither residence nor property, but citizenship, the civil and political relation or status independently of either, is explicitly demanded, yet this requisition is fully satisfied by the presumption of a beneficiary interest in property apart either from possession or right of possession or from any legal estfte or title makes the interest thu§ inferred equivalent with citizenship of the person to whom interest is thus strangely imputed. Perhaps the most singular circumstance attending the interpolation of this new doctrine is the effort made to sustain it upon the rule stare decisis. After the numerous and direct authorities before cited, showing the inapplicability to this case of this • rule, it would have been thought a priori that the very last aid to be invoked in its support would be the maxim stare decisis. For this new class of citizen corporations, incongruous as it must appear to,every legal definition or conception, is not less incongruous nor less novel to the relation claimed for it, or rather for its total want of relation to the settled adjudications of this court. It is strictly a new creation, an alien and an intruder, and is at war with almost all that has gone before it; and can trace its being no farther back than the case of Letsou v. The Louisville Railroad Company.
The principle stare decisis, 'adopted by the courts in order to give stability to private rights, and to prevent the mischiefs incident to mutations for light and insufficient causes, is doubtless a wholesome rule of decision when derived from legitimate and competent authority, and when limited to the necessity which shall have demanded its application ;■ but, like every other rule, must be fruitful of ill when it shall be wrested to the suppression of reason or duty, or to the arbitrary maintenance of injustice, of palpable error, or of absurdity. Such an application of this rule must be necessarily to rivet upon justice, upon social improvement and happiness, the fetters of ignorance, of wrong, and usurpation. It is a rule which, whenever applied, should be derived from a sound discretion, a discretion having its origin in the regular- and legitimate powers of those who assert it. It can never be appealed to in derogation or’ for the destruction of the supreme authority, of that authority which created and-which holds in subordination the agents whose functions it has defined, and bounded, by .clear and plainly-marked limits. *344Wherever the. Constitution commands, discretion terminates. Considerations of policy or convenience, if ever appealed to, I had almost said if ever imagined in derogation of its mandate, become an offence. Beyond the Constitution or. the powers it invests, every act must be a violation of duty, an usurpation.
There cannot be a more striking example than is instanced by the case before us, of the mischiefs that must follow from disregarding the language, the plain words, or what may be termed the body, the corpus, of the Constitution, to ramble in pursuit of some ignis fatuus of construction or implication, called its spirit or its intention, — a spirit not unfrequently about as veracious, and as closely conndbted with the Constitution, as are the spirits of the dead with the revolving tables and chairs which, by a fashionable metempsychosis of the day, they are said to animate.
The second section of the third article of the Constitution prescribes citizenship as an indispensable’requisite for obtaining admission- to the courts of the United States — prescribes it in ' language too plain for misapprehension. This court, in the case of Deveaux and the Bank of the United States, yielded obedience; professedly at any rate, to the constitutional mandate : for they asserted -the indispensable requisite of citizenship; but in an unhappy attempt to reconcile that obedience with an unwarranted claim to power, they utterly demolished the legal rights, . nay, the very existence of one of the parties to the controversy; .thereby taking from that party all standing or capacity to appear in any court. This was ignis' fatuus, No. 1. This was succeeded by the case of Letson v. The Cincinnati and Louisville Railroad Company, in which, by a species of judicial resurrection, this party (the corporation) was deterré, raised up again, but was not restored to the full possession of life and vigor, or to the use of all his members and. faculties, nor even allowed the privilege of his original name; but semianimate, and in virtue of some rite of judicial baptism, though “ curtailed of his natural dimensions,” he is rendered equal to a release from the thraldom of constitutional restriction, and made competent at any rate to the power of commanding the action of the . federal courts. This is ignis fatuus', No. 2. Next in order is the case of Marshall v. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. This is-indeed the chef d’oeuvre amongst the experiments to command the action of the spirit in defiance of the body of the Constitution.
It is compelled, from the negation of that-instrument, by some necromantic influence', potent as that by which, as we read, the resisting Pythia was constrained to yield her vaticinations of an occult -futurity. For in this case is manifésted the most en*345tire disregard of any and every qualification, political, civil, or local. This company is not described as a citizen or resident of any State; nor as having for its members the citizens of any State; nor as a quasi citizen ; nor as having any of' the rights of a citizen; nor as residing or being located in any State, or in .any other place. No intimation of its “whereabout” is alluded to. ■ It is said to have been incorporated by the State of Maryland; but whether the State of Maryland had authority to fix its locality or ever directed that locality, and whether that be in the moon or in terra incognita, is nowhere disclosed. It is said that because this company was incorporated by the Legislature of Maryland, we may conjecture, and are bound to conjecture, that it is situated in Maryland, and must possess all the qualifications appertaining to a citizen of Maryland to sue or be sued in the courts of the United States; and this inference we are called upon to deduce, in opposition to the pleadings, the.proofs, and the argunients, all of which demonstrate, that this corporation claims to extend its property, its powers, and operations, and of course its locality, over a portion of the State of Virginia, and that it was in reference to its rights and operations within the latter State, that the present controversy had its origin.
Thus does it appear to me that this court has been led on from dark to' darker, until at present it is environed and is beaconed onward by varying and deceptive gleams, calculated to end in a deeper and more dense obscurity. In dread of the precipices to which they would conduct me, I -am unwilling to trust myself to these rambling lights; and if I cannot háve reflected upon my steps the bright and cheering day-spring of . the Constitution, I feel bound nevertheless to remit no effort to halt in what, to my apprehension, is the path that terminates in ruin. And in considering the tendencies and the results of this progress, there is nothing which seems to me more calculated to hasten themfthan is the too evidently prevailing disposition to trench upon the barrier which, in the creation by the several-States of the federal government, they designed to draw around and protect their sovereign authority and their social and private rights; and to regard and treat with affected derision every effort to arrest any hostile approach, either indirectly or openly,' to the consecrated precincts of that barrier. It is indeed a sad symptom of the downward progress of political morals, when any appeal to the Constitution shall fail to “ give us pause,” and to suggest the necessity for solemn reflection. Still more fearful is the prevalence of the disposition, either in or out of office, to meet the'honest or scrupulous devotion to its commands with'a sneer, as folly unsuited to the times, and condemned by that *346new-born wisdom which measures the Constitution c_.iy by its own superior and infallible standard of policy and convenience. By the disciples of this new morality, it seems to be thought that the mandates or axioms. of the Constitution, when found, obstructing the way to power, and when they cannot be overstepped by truth or logic, may be conveniently turned and shunned under the denomination of abstractions or refinements; and the loyal supporters of those mandates may be borne down under the reproach of a narrow prejudice or fanaticism incapable of perceiving through the letter, and, in contradiction of the language of the charter, its true spirit and intent; and as being wholly behind the sagacity and requirements of the age.
We cannot, however, resist the disposition to ask of those whose expanded and more pervading view can peneirate beyond th'e palpable form of the charter, what it is they mean to convey by the term abstraction, which is found so well adapted to their purposes ? We would, with becoming modesty, inquire whether every axiom or precept, either in politics or ethics, or in any other science, is not an abstraction ? Whether truth itself, whether justice or common honesty is not an abstraction ? And we \yould farther ask .those who so deal with what they call abstractions, whether they design to assail all general precepts and definitions as incapable of becoming the fixed and fundamental basis of rights or of duties. The philosophy of these expositions may easily embrace the rejection of the decalogue itself, and might be particularly effectual in reference to that injunction which forbids the coveting of all that appertains • to our neighbor. The Constitution itself is nothing more than an enumeration of general abstract rules, promuiged by the several States, for the guidance and control of their creature or agent, the federal government, which for their exclusive benefit they were about to call into being. Apart from these abstract rules the federal government can have no functions and no existence. All its attributes are strictly derivative, and anv and. every attempt to transcend.the foundations (those proscribed abstractions) on which its existence depends, is an attempt at anarchy, violence, and usurpation., Amongst the most dangerous means, perhaps, of accomplishing this usurpation, because its application is nojseless whilst it is persevering, is the habitual interference, for reasons entirely insufficient, by the federal authorities with the. governments of the several States; and this too most commonly under the strange (Í had almost called it the preposterous) pretext of guarding the people of the States against their' own governments, constituted of, and administered by, their own fellow-citizens, bound to them by the sympathies arising from a community or identity of interests, *347from intimate intercourse, and selected by and responsible to themselves. Or it may be said, under the excuse of protecting the people óf the States against themselves, converting the federal government in reference to the States into one grand commission, “ De lunático inquirendo.” The effect of this practice is to reduce the people of the States and their governments under an habitual subserviency to federal power; and gives to the latter what ever has been and ever must be, the result of intervention by a foreign, a powerful, and interested mediator, the lion’s share in. every division. For myself I would never hunt with the lion. I would anxiously avoid his path; and as far as possible keep him from my own; always bearing in mind the pregnant reply told in the Apologue as having been made to his gracious invitation to visit him in his lair; that although in the path that conducted to its entrance, innumerable, footprints were to be seen, yet in the same path there could be discerned Nulla vestigia relrorsnm.” The vortex of federal incroachment is of a capacity ample enough for the engulfing and retention of-every power; and inevitably must a catastrophe like this ensue, so long as a justification of power, however obtained, and the end of every hope of escape or redemption can, to the sickening and desponding sense, in the iron rule of' stare decisis, be proclaimed. A rule which says to us, “ The abuse has been already put in practice; it has, by practice merely, become sanctified; and may therefore be repeated at pleasure.” The promulgation of a doctrine like this does indeed cut off all hope of redress, of escape, or of redemption, unless one. may be looked for, however remote, in a single remedy — that sharp remedy to be applied by the true original sovereignty abiding with the States of this Union, namely, a reorganization of existing institutions, Such as shall give assurance that if in their definition and announcement their rights can, by their appointed agents, be esteemed as “abstractions mérely, 'yet in the concrete, that is, in the exercise and enjoyment, these rights are real- and substantive, and may neither be impaired nor denied.
My opinion is, that this cause should have been dismissed by the Circuit Court for want of jurisdiction, and should now be remanded to that court with instruction for its dismission.