Court Opinion

ID: 9460072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:40:02.218501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:27.623760
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
In this appeal from an order denying a writ of habeas corpus without an evi-dentiary hearing a state prisoner contends that his guilty plea was induced by the representation of his attorneys that in his Pennsylvania degree of guilt hearing the court would consider evidence of diminished responsibility. As the majority opinion makes clear, if such a representation was made by his attorneys, it was a misstatement of the then governing Pennsylvania law. Commonwealth v. Weinstein, 442 Pa. 70, 274 A.2d 182, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 92 S.Ct. 148, 30 L.Ed.2d 83 (1971); Commonwealth v. Rightnour, 435 Pa. 104, 253 A.2d 644 (1969) (per curiam) ; Commonwealth v. Phelan, 427 Pa. 265, 234 A.2d 540 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 920 (1968); Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 421 Pa. 311, 218 A.2d 561 (1966). The fact that such advice anticipated the result in Commonwealth v. McCusker, 448 Pa. 382, 292 A.2d 286 (1972), which overruled the Ahearn prohibition against consideration of such evidence in a degree of guilt hearing, is irrelevant for present purposes. The issue is the effect of such a misstatement of the then applicable law on the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
The majority opinion also makes clear that the state court record would not support a finding by the habeas corpus court that the alleged misstatement of the law did not take place. See 28 U.S. C. § 2254(d) (1), (3), (6). As Judge Van Dusen puts it:
“They might have told Booker that he had an unquestioned right to present his evidence, or they might have told him only that they thought they had a reasonable chance of persuading the Pennsylvania courts to admit such evidence.”
Thus, if the outside-the-record misstatement of the law took place and bears upon the voluntariness of the guilty plea, an evidentiary hearing should have been held in the habeas corpus court. *235Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (per curiam); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Davis v. Yeager, 453 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1971).
The majority opinion overcomes this difficulty, however, by assuming as true that the petitioner’s attorneys represented to him that in the degree of guilt hearing the court would receive and consider evidence of diminished responsibility. It suggests that the degree of guilt hearing court did receive such evidence, and rejected the defense on the merits. As the majority puts it:
“The court reached a result unfavorable to Booker not because it failed to consider his defense, but rather because it did not accept the contention that the evidence established that relator had such diminished responsibility that it negated the intent required for first degree murder.”
Here, the issue is fudged by an ambiguity. Does this mean that, contrary to Weinstein, Rightnour, Phelan and Ahearn, the degree of guilt hearing court considered evidence of diminished responsibility to be relevant on degree of guilt, and ruled that the evidence established no such diminished responsibility? Or does it mean that the court received such evidence in the nature of an offer of proof, but rejected it on the merits as irrelevant to degree of guilt, as required by Weinstein, Rightnour, Phelan, and Ahearn? If the latter, then accepting petitioner’s factual representations, there was still a material misstatement of the law, and the effect of that misstatement on his guilty plea still would have to be determined. Only if the state court record adequately establishes that the degree of guilt hearing court considered the tendered evidence of diminished responsibility in determining degree of guilt would the misstatement of Pennsylvania law become, as the majority opinion suggests, inoperative.
I have read the same state record. It does not establish that the degree of guilt hearing court considered evidence of diminished responsibility in determining degree of guilt.
The defense offered the testimony of Albert Levitt, Chief Psychologist (tr. 74-93), and of Dr. C. Fred Hering III, Director of the Psychiatric Division, Philadelphia Common Pleas Court (tr. 93-107) in an effort to establish that petitioner was psychotic at the time he made a confession, eighteen hours after the homicide. The evidence of these witnesses was considered only for the weight to be given to the confession, (tr. 107). The defense also offered the testimony of Dr. Louis C. Alikakos, who examined petitioner on two occasions prior to the degree of guilt hearing. Alikakos gave his opinion:
“He lost control of the situation and had the irresistible impulse to kill his wife.” (tr. 133-34).
This testimony established that the degree of guilt hearing court received evidence of diminished responsibility. During Alikakos’ cross-examination, however, the court made clear that it considered the Ahearn rule to be controlling. E.g.:
“By Judge Lagakos:
Q. But wouldn’t any person who kills his wife and then attempts to kill the child, in your opinion, then be psy-chiatrieally defective to a point where you would state that in your judgment he was unable to tell the difference between right and wrong, and, therefore, was insane — any person ?
******
A. I would think this would depend on a number of variables, the amount of premeditation involved in it, the kinds of stressful situations involved. I wouldn’t say that the answer to your question would be no, Your Honor. I don’t believe that every person who does this kind of an act in every different type of situation is insane.
* * * * * *
*236Q. And as a result of what he told you and solely what he told you, you concluded that at the time of the incident, about ten months previously, he was psychiatrically — what is the expression you used?
A. That he had an irresistible impulse. (tr. 150-51).
******
By Judge Nix:
Q. In other words, you are saying that there is no question in your mind he knew the nature and quality of the act when he discharged these arrows toward her person?
A. I would hesitate to say that I am sure that he knew the nature and quality of his act. I think that would be an extremely difficult thing to determine after the fact not having had the opportunity to examine him at the time that this happened. He may not have known the full nature of the act that he was committing. I can’t say that he did or that he did not at this point.
By Judge Lagakos:
Q. How can you say that he was psychiatrically imbalanced to a point where I think you testified that in essence did not know — .
Judge Nix: No, that he had no irresistible impulse.
By Judge Lagakos:
Q. —irresistible impulse ?
A. I am saying that he had a diminished ability to recognize what he was doing and to control what he was doing, to control the impulses that he had, which is different than knowing right from wrong.
Judge Nix: I didn’t ask you that. I merely said that he knew the significance of his act, did he not ?
Judge Lagakos: The quality.
Judge Nix: I am not asking you to determine whether he could make a moral judgment at this particular point, just knew the effect of taking a bow and arrow and shooting five arrows into the person of a living human being.
The Witness: I misunderstood your original question. I think he did know the fact that the arrow would kill her if that is what you are asking, Your Honor.
Judge Nix: Yes.
The Witness: I believe he did know that.” (tr. 154-55).
When Dr. Alikakos’ report and that of Dr. Strauss were offered in evidence the Commonwealth objected:
“Mr. Czap: Your Honor, I take it that these reports are being offered by the defendants and subject to my objection as to how they were used? The Commonwealth makes no issue about the fact that Dr. Strauss is not here.
Judge Nix: Would you explain the nature and quality of your objection? Are you objecting to their being admitted at this point ?
Mr. Czap: No, I object only to their relevancy and to their use — that their use be limited to that part of the case where it is proper for Your Honor to consider it.” (tr. 158).
When the Court finally ruled on the renewed offer of these reports (tr. 270), this occurred:
“Judge Nix: Any objection, Mr. Czap?
Mr. Czap: No objection to the point that Dr. Alikakos being limited to the extent his testimony was permitted.
Judge Nix: Certainly. The offer is accepted.” (tr. 270-71).
As I read the transcript the Commonwealth objected to consideration of Dr. Alikakos’ testimony or reports on degree of guilt, but had no objection to consideration of either on sentencing, and the reports were admitted' subject to that objection.
As the majority opinion points out, defense counsel did attempt to argue that diminished responsibility bore upon degree of guilt. But it is hardly a fair representation of the transcript to sug*237gest that the court considered the argument to be relevant on that issue. From the quotation of Judge Nix set forth in footnote 15 of the majority opinion, this opening sentence has been omitted.
“Judge Nix: I think you are wasting time discussing it. . . .” (tr. 327).
On the next page this appears:
“Mr. Della Porta: . . [W]e do have Dr. Alikakos; we do have Dr. Strauss who will say at that time of the act, he was under this irresistible impulse at that time his ability had been diminished to know right from wrong.
JUDGE LAGAKOS: Mr. Della
Porta, are you seriously suggesting to the Court that there exists in this case facts which constitute sufficient recognized legal provocation on his part at that moment?
* * * * * *
MR. DELLA PORTA: All that we need is that the mind was deprived of his reasoning powers. And if we take hold of all the circumstances before this happened — .
JUDGE NIX: That is not enough.” (tr. 328-29).
The record contains no statement by any one of the three judges, either while evidence was being taken, or during the closing arguments, or at the time they announced their first degree finding (tr. 347-48) that they ever considered the diminished responsibility evidence to be relevant in determining degree of guilt. The only statements in the record indicate that they considered themselves bound by the Ahearn rule.
The Pennsylvania courts which have considered the petitioner’s case did not discover that the degree of guilt court had considered the diminished responsibility defense.1 The district court did not discover that the degree of guilt court had considered the diminished responsibility defense.2 The state court record discloses that it was considered only to the extent that it was rejected as irrelevant. Thus, we are squarely presented with the issue whether the petitioner’s guilty plea was induced by a misstatement by counsel that evidence of diminished responsibility would be taken into consideration in determining degree of guilt. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Townsend v. Sain, supra, mandate an ev-. identiary hearing on that issue. I would reverse and remand for such a hearing.

. The Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act court held that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), precluded inquiry beyond the on-the-record colloquy at the guilty plea. The law is otherwise. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (per curiam) ; Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972) ; United States ex rel. Davis v. Yeager, 453 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1971).

. The district court merely approved the findings of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Hearing Act court.