Court Opinion

ID: 9710912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:20:21.586066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.786883
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Obviously, Baker has ability, competence and qualifications to perform admirably the tasks of a teacher. If I were elected to be a member of the school board at Minot, I would vote to forgive him for violating the rule, and I would do that also for violators who have less ability, competence and qualifications, and then I would ask that the Board rewrite its rules so as to distinguish between rules that, when violated, are considered grounds for dismissal or nonrenewal and those that are merely advisory.
But I am not an elected Board member and my judgment has nothing to do with this case. I am not even a voter at Minot so I cannot even vote in the next election against Board members with whom I disagree.
Decisions of school boards are not appeal-able but, even in cases that have come to this Court where the review is pursuant to a statute making the administrative determination appealable, we have repeatedly said that courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the administrator. See, for example, § 28-32-21, NDCC, and cases annotated thereunder.
In Bank of Hamilton v. State Banking Bd., 236 N.W.2d 921, 925 (N.D.1976), we said that: “This court, however, has indicated its reluctance to substitute its own judgment for that of qualified experts in matters entrusted to administrative agencies.” And, in Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D.1974), we held, in syllabus 3:
“Our review of the facts on appeal from a district court order reviewing an administrative order is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of fact of the administrative agency.”
Admittedly, the Minot School Board does not come within the scope of the Administrative Agencies Practice Act (Chapter 28-32, NDCC), such as the State Banking Board in Bank of Hamilton and the State Highway Commissioner in Agnew. However, Banking Board determinations and Highway Commissioner determinations are specifically made appealable by statute, while School Board determinations, under § 15-47-38(5), NDCC, are not appealable but “ * * * if made in good faith shall be final and binding on all parties.”
The majority opinion treats the case as if it were an appeal and, in fact, calls it an appéal. The complaint filed by Baker prayed for an injunction or, in the alternative, for damages of $20,000.00.
Baker did not prove that the Board did not act in good faith but in fact admitted that he violated the rule and that the rule was a good rule. The trial court specifically found “that the school board followed the procedure outlined by law in arriving at its decision not to renew the Plaintiffs contract.” Baker seems to suggest that the Board should have used other sanctions against him. Other sanctions would have to have been provided for in the contract and apparently weren’t.
In seeking the injunctive remedy, Baker knew that he needed to allege that there was no adequate remedy at law — and he did so. Quite obviously, he also knew that he was not entitled to the injunction under either Chapters 32-05 or 32-06, NDCC, so *453he asked for damages, which then acknowledged the existence of an adequate remedy at law.
It is simply a misinterpretation of the record to conclude, as the majority has, that the Board failed to give serious consideration to the effect nonrenewal will have on Baker’s professional stature and reputation.
Four Board members testified: (1) Huwe, a college instructor and former teacher in the elementary and secondary level, said that he took into account various factors for and against Baker and “ * * * weighed very heavily many qualities that I felt spoke for the candidate, and I weighed also the violation * * *.” He voted for non-renewal.
(2) Reardon, a dentist, testified that he took into account factors “for” and “against.” He voted for nonrenewal.
(3) Summers, a businessman and president of the Board, testified that he was a personal friend of Baker and said his decision was made in good faith and upon the basis of the material brought by the administrators and other witnesses. He voted for nonrenewal after the vote was tied two-to-two.
(4) Berning, a lawyer, testified that he weighed considerations “for” and “against” and had difficulty arriving at his decision. He voted against nonrenewal.
None of the four Board members who testified were cross-examined. The record does not disclose why the fifth Board member did not testify. How the determination can be labeled “frivolous and arbitrary” is beyond me. The testimony was not incredible in any respect. See Tri-County Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Elkin, 224 N.W.2d 785 (N.D.1974), where we indicated that decisions have a rational basis when supported by probative evidence. Rational decisions are not frivolous nor arbitrary. See, also, the recent South Dakota ruling in Mortweet v. Ethan Bd. of Ed., Davison Cty., 241 N.W.2d 580 (S.D.1976), and the recent definitions of “arbitrary” and “frivolous” in Words and Phrases, Volumes 3A and 17A.
The majority decision in this case establishes a precedent that we will find difficult in the future and, in effect, overrules numerous decisions involving scope of review of administrative decisions, and opens the door wide to abuses of the injunctive remedy. This case illustrates the principle that hard cases make bad law.
The judgment should be reversed.