Court Opinion

ID: 9709601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:51:59.875038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:50.433054
License: Public Domain

HESTER, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the action of the majority in affirming the summary judgment as to Carolin Masonry, the employer of decedent. The liability of Carolin is controlled by the Workman’s Compensation Act.
However, I must respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority to the effect that appellee-Massaro was the statutory employer of decedent. It is admitted that decedent was not an employee of Massaro at the time he sustained his fatal injury. It is further admitted that Massaro did not provide Workman’s Compensation Coverage for decedent; that coverage was provided by decedent’s employer, Carolin Masonry.
Inasmuch as the 1974 amendments to the Workman’s Compensation Act provided that, in this situation, Massaro was not liable to employees of Carolin for the payment of Workman’s Compensation benefits, Massaro should not then be accorded the protection provided by the “statutory employer” fiction. Massaro was neither the employer nor the statutory employer of decedent. Said amendments provided as follows:
Section 302(a)
“A contractor who subcontracts all or any part of a contract and his insurer shall be liable for the payment of *215compensation to the employees of the subcontractor unless the subcontractor primarily liable for the payment of such compensation has secured its payment as provided for in this act. Any contractor or his insurer who shall become liable hereunder for such compensation may recover the amount thereof paid and any necessary expenses from the subcontractor primarily liable thereof.” (emphasis added).
Section 302(b)
“Any employer who permits the entry upon premises occupied by him or under his control of a laborer or an assistant hired by an employee or contractor, for the performance upon such premises of a part of such employer’s regular business entrusted to that employee or contractor, shall be liable for the payment of compensation to such laborer or assistant unless such hiring employee or contractor, if primarily liable for the payment of such compensation, has secured the payment thereof as provided for in this act. Any employer or his insurer who shall become liable hereunder for such compensation may recover the amount thereof paid and any necessary expenses from another person if the latter is primarily liable therefor.” (Emphasis added).
“For the purposes of this subsection (b) the term ‘contractor’ shall have the meaning ascribed in Section 105 of the Act.”
This language is clear and free of ambiguity, it cannot be disregarded. The legislative intent is clear. It mandates the conclusion that where the subcontractor has secured the payments of compensation, the general contractor does not become liable for the payment of compensation to the subcontractor’s employees. The majority contends that the foregoing amendments to section 302 of the Act did not amend Section 203, citing Capozzoli v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 352 Pa. 183, 42 A.2d 524 (1945). In so holding, the majority fails to effectuate the intent of the legislature in enacting the 1974 amendments. As was *216stated in Judge Shertz’ dissenting opinion in Cranshaw Const. v. Ghrist, 290 Pa.Super. 286, 300, 434 A.2d 756, 763:
In undertaking an analysis of sections 461 and 462, as amended, in the context of the entire Act, we must be mindful of certain well established principles of statutory construction. A statute must be construed and applied so as to ascertain and to effectuate the legislative intent and, whenever possible, must be read consistently so as to give effect to all it provisions. Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Tit. 1, § 1921(a) (Purdon Supp.1981-82); Commonwealth v. Hill, 481 Pa. 37, 391 A.2d 1303 (1978). If a statute contains irreconcilable provisions, special provisions shall prevail over general provisions and those last in order of date shall prevail over earlier provisions. Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. tit. 1, §§ 1933 & 1934 (Purdon Supp.1981-82). Words which are clear and free from all amiguity are not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing their spirit. Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. tit. 1, § 1921(b) (Purdon Supp. 1981-82). Finally, with specific reference to the Act, it is axiomatic that, since it was designed to benefit employees injured in work-related accidents, it should be liberally construed so as to achieve its remedial purpose. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Overmyer Mold Company, 473 Pa. 369, 374-75, 374 A.2d 689, 691 (1977); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Hartlieb, 465 Pa. 249, 348 A.2d 746 (1975); Billick v. Republic Steel Corp., 214 Pa.Super. 267, 257 A.2d 589 (1969).
The rules of statutory construction require, we repeat, that every statute be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. To find that appellee Massaro was appellant’s statutory employer would be in complete disregard of the 1974 amendments to the Act. It fails to give effect to the “unless clauses” in sections 302(a) and 302(b) as amended. As Judge Shertz further stated in his dissenting opinion in Cranshaw, supra, at pages 305-306 of 290 Pa.Superior Ct. and at page 765 of 434 A.2d:
Since 1974, however, the basis for the immunity has been eliminated since the amendments specifically provide that *217the general contractor is not liable, even in a reserve status, if the subcontractor has secured the requisite payment of compensation. In enacting these amendments, our Legislature has chosen to follow those jurisdictions which do not allow general contractors, who have no liability for workmen’s compensation, to escape common law liability as well. E.g., Merritt Chapman & Scott Corporation v. Fredin, 307 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.1962); Whiting v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 293 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.1961); Kozoidek v. Gearbulk Ltd., 471 F.Supp. 401 (D.Md.1979); Ryan v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 421 F.Supp. 794 (D.Vt.1976).
The result effected by the 1974 amendments is sound and eminently fair. As pointed out in Robinson, supra1, the pre-1974 immunity granted the general contractor was the benefit accorded to him for assuming the compensation burden, even if only on a reserve basis. Where, however, as under sections 461 and 462 and the instant facts, such a burden is never assumed, neither logic nor equity support a continued grant of immunity. To hold otherwise, as aptly pointed out by the trial court, is tantamount to putting a general contractor in the position of “having its cake and eating it, too” and constitutes unwarranted judicial legislation.
As was pointed out by Judge Hoffman some seven (7) years prior to the enactment of the 1974 amendments:
... very great care ... must be exercised before allowing an employer to avoid his liability at common law by asserting that he is a statutory employer. Section 52 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which was designed to extend benefits to workers, should not be causally converted into a shield behind which negligent employers may seek refuge.
Stipanovich v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 210 Pa.Super. 98, 106, 231 A.2d 894, 898 (1967). Since the enactment of the 1974 amendments, Judge Hoffman’s admonition is more germaine than ever.
*218In sum, decedent-appellant Bartley was an employee of Carolin Masonry Corporation. Carolin Masonry was a subcontractor of appellee Massaro Company. Carolin provided Workman’s Compensation coverage for Bartley. In view of this uncontradicted fact situation it was not possible for appellee Massaro to be liable for the payment of Workmen’s Compensation benefits to the decedent-appellant or his Estate. It would therefore follow that Massaro should not be accorded the fictitious defense of a “statutory employer.”
For the forementioned reasons, I dissent.

. Robinson v. Atlantic Elevator Co., 298 Pa. 549, 148 A. 847 (1930).