Court Opinion

ID: 9836887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:23.099658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.156139
License: Public Domain

Judge GIERKE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of communicating indecent language to a 17-year-old Japanese girl, in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 934. The military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 2 months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. In accordance with a pretrial agreement, the convening authority approved the sentence but suspended the reduction in grade below E-4 for 12 months. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion.
Our Court granted review of the following issue:
WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF “FUTURE RISK” EVIDENCE DURING PRESENTENCING WAS HARMLESS, WHERE THE IMPROPER *260HEARSAY TESTIMONY WENT DIRECTLY TO REHABILITATIVE POTENTIAL AND APPELLANT RECEIVED A PUNITIVE DISCHARGE.
For the reasons set out below, we affirm.

Factual Background

Appellant wrote a sexually suggestive letter to a 17-year-old Japanese girl who had lived with him and his wife for one month as an exchange student. In the letter, appellant told the girl that, while she was living in appellant’s house, he used to lie on her bed and masturbate while smelling her soiled panties. He told her that he had a pair of her panties with him and that he used them when he masturbated and thought of making love to her. He asked her to mail him another pair of soiled panties and a nude photograph. He offered to send her a nude photograph of himself. He described in detail his fantasy of having sexual intercourse with her.
After the Japanese girl reported the incident to the Foundation for International Understanding, her sponsoring organization, the matter was referred to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). Appellant was interviewed by an NCIS agent and admitted taking a pair of the girl’s panties while she was living with appellant’s family. He admitted sending the girl the sexually explicit letter. He also admitted writing a second letter that was much more sexually explicit. He had not yet mailed the second letter when he was interviewed by NCIS agents. The second letter describes in detail how appellant fantasized engaging in sexual intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus with the girl.
The NCIS searched appellant’s berthing and work areas aboard his ship and seized the second letter and a pair of the girl’s panties. The NCIS agents then searched appellant’s house and seized some pornographic materials from appellant’s computer. They interviewed appellant again, and he admitted downloading pornographic materials from the Internet. The military judge received this statement in evidence over defense objection. The prosecution conceded that it was not unlawful for appellant to possess the materials, and thus it argued that possession of the pornography was not “uncharged misconduct.” The military judge stated that he would not consider appellant’s possession of pornography as “uncharged misconduct.” Regarding the second letter, he said, “I will consider it, but not as uncharged misconduct. I think, obviously, uncharged misconduct has the potential of unfairness because the factfinder may punish for that, but I’m not punishing — I will not consider this in punishing, but certainly I think it’s something that I think I should review. I think it has some relevance here.”
At the time of his court-martial, appellant had almost 16 years of honorable service, including service in a combat zone, and was a First Class Petty Officer (E-6). In May of 1989, 1% years before this incident, appellant was convicted in a civilian court of 6 counts of indecent exposure. After this civilian conviction, a therapist diagnosed him as “not at risk to reoffend” and gave him “an excellent prognosis for successful completion of treatment.” He was recommended for retention in the Navy, conditioned on successful completion of a sex-offender treatment program.
During his sentencing hearing, the Government presented testimony from a social worker. She testified that appellant’s prognosis for rehabilitation was “guarded” and “questionable.” In explaining the basis for her conclusion, she mentioned, over defense objection, that another therapist had concluded that appellant was “predatory in nature.” The military judge overruled the defense hearsay objection on the ground that the basis for the social worker’s conclusion was admissible under the medical-records or the business-record exception. Sec Mil.R.Evid. 803(4) and 803(6), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.).* The social worker also testified that following his civilian conviction for indecent exposure, appellant had failed to “re-initiate treatment” after he was transferred from Washington State.
*261In his unsworn statement, appellant explained that he did not reinitiate therapy after his reassignment because his wife was no longer employed, CHAMPUS would not pay for therapy, and he could not afford to pay for it. He stated that the therapy cost $100 an hour.

Discussion

Appellant now asserts that admission of improper hearsay evidence violated the Sixth Amendment and was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Final Brief at 4. The Government concedes that the prosecution improperly used the social worker’s testimony to smuggle hearsay into the sentencing proceeding and that the error was constitutional in nature. The Government argues, however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the nature of the misconduct, appellant’s civilian conviction, and the admissible portions of the social worker’s testimony. Answer to Final Brief at 5-7.
Mil.R.Evid. 705 permits an expert to offer an opinion “without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the military judge requires otherwise.” The rule further provides: “The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.” In this case, the underlying diagnosis of appellant’s predatory nature was disclosed on direct examination, not cross-examination.
In United States v. Neeley, 25 MJ 105, 106-07 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 710, 98 L.Ed.2d 660 (1988), this Court addressed “the problem of smuggling hearsay ... under the guise of’ showing the underlying basis for expert testimony. The Court opined that Mil.R.Evid. 403 is the appropriate vehicle for weighing the probative value of showing the basis for expert opinion against the likelihood of unfair prejudice.
In United States v. Harris, 46 MJ 221, 225 (1997), this Court said, “Where eliciting the basis for an expert opinion will place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the court members, the military judge should apply the balancing test under Mil.R.Evid. 403 to determine if the prejudicial impact of the inadmissible evidence outweighs the probative value of showing the basis for the expert opinion.”
In United States v. Schap, 49 MJ 317, 325-26 (1998), this Court said that “Mil.R.Evid. 403 is a judge’s tool for preventing a party from unfairly smuggling hearsay, either as a ‘basis’ for an expert’s opinion or under the various hearsay exceptions.” We also said: “Ultimately, the military judge retains considerable discretion in deciding when the prejudice is too great to permit admission of the proffered evidence.”
Evidence of the depths of an accused’s sexual problems is a proper matter for consideration on sentencing. See United States v. Ciulla, 32 MJ 186 (CMA), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 857, 112 S.Ct. 172, 116 L.Ed.2d 135 (1991); United States v. Mullens, 29 MJ 398, 400 (CMA 1990). Likewise, evidence of future dangerousness is a proper matter under RCM 1001(b)(5), Manual, supra. United States v. Williams, 41 MJ 134,137-39 (CMA 1994).
In appellant’s case, the court below held that the military judge erred, and the Government conceded that the prosecution committed constitutional error by smuggling hearsay into the sentencing proceeding. Thus, the lower court’s conclusion that the military judge erred is the law of the case. See United States v. Grooters, 39 MJ 269, 272-73 (CMA 1994).
In United States v. Bins, 43 MJ 79, 86 (1995), this Court set out the test for harmlessness when improper evidence is received: whether the evidence may reasonably have had an effect on the decision. If it did not, then the Court may conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both sides have characterized this case as a harmless-error case instead of a sentence-reassessment case. We agree. Our standard of review for harmless error is de novo. See Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) (whether constitutional error was harmless is question of law). See also 2 Childress & Davis, Federal Standards of Review § 7.03 at 7-10 (3d ed,1999)(cfe novo review of constitutional *262harmless error). Cf. United States v. Davis, 48 MJ 494, 495 (1998) (sentence reassessment reviewed for abuse of discretion or obvious miscarriage of justice).
In view of the minimal period of confinement adjudged, we focus on the question whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the military judge would not have imposed a bad-conduct discharge if the social worker had not mentioned another therapist’s opinion that appellant was “predatory in nature.” We conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that appellant would not have received a bad-conduct discharge, even if the evidence of appellant’s diagnosis as “predatory” had been excluded. We arrive at this conclusion after considering the following:
(1) Appellant’s almost 16 years of honorable service, including service in a combat zone;
(2) His previous conviction for 6 counts of indecent exposure;
(3) His prognosis for rehabilitation after his civilian conviction;
(4) The nature of appellant’s misconduct involving graphic sexual overtures to a young foreign exchange student;
(5) His preparations to send another even more offensive letter to the girl; and
(6) The admissible portions of the social worker’s testimony at this court-martial, setting out her prognosis for rehabilitation as “guarded” and “questionable.”
Despite his many years of honorable service, appellant was a repeat offender. He had been given an opportunity to salvage his Navy career in 1989, but he put his career at risk by committing the offense at issue in this case. He was no longer a good candidate for rehabilitation. The social worker’s improper reference to his predatory nature pales in comparison to his record of sexual misconduct and the seriousness of his offense. Having concluded that there is no reasonable likelihood that the military judge’s error affected the sentence, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Decision

The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

 All Manual provisions are cited to the version applicable at trial. The 1998 version is unchanged, unless otherwise indicated.