Court Opinion

ID: 9913143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 22:01:44.755119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:29.834943
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/26/23 P. v. Aramburo CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E079469

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FWV025155)

 CARLOS ARAMBURO,                                                        OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Jon D. Ferguson,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Defendant and Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Amann, and Susan

E. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                                   I.

                                        INTRODUCTION

      Carlos Aramburo appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for resentencing
                                    1
under Penal Code section 1172.6. We affirm.

                                                   II.

                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Carlos Yuman owned a used car dealership located in El Monte, in Los Angeles

County. On April 22, 2002, Yuman was meeting with two customers, Allen and

Kathleen Salas, in an office at the dealership. Juan Mingucha, an employee, was waiting
                                                         2
outside. Defendants [Aramburo and Jorge D. Ituarte ] approached the office, pushed

Mingucha into the office, and entered. Aramburo pulled a semiautomatic gun from his

waistband, cocked it, and pointed it at Mingucha. While Ituarte rummaged through a

desk and knocked things over, Aramburo demanded money from the Salases and told

Ituarte to get Yuman’s wallet, which he did. Yuman and the Salases each turned over

money to [Aramburo and Ituarte]. Aramburo demanded money from Mingucha, but he

had no money. [Aramburo and Ituarte] also took two briefcases from the office and a

watch from Yuman.

      Two days later, [Aramburo and Ituarte] approached Maria Ester Espinoza

DeMoreno and Enrique Orosco in the parking lot of a Smart & Final store in Ontario, in

      1
          All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      2
          Ituarte is not a party to this appeal.

                                                   2
San Bernardino County. DeMoreno and Orosco were placing groceries into their Dodge

Durango. Aramburo demanded the keys to the Durango. When Orosco did not turn over

the keys immediately, Aramburo pulled a semiautomatic gun from his waistband and told

Orosco, ‘I’m going to shoot you.’ DeMoreno gave the keys to Aramburo, who passed

them to Ituarte. Ituarte got into the driver’s seat and began to drive away. Aramburo

caught up with Ituarte in the parking lot and got into the passenger seat. Ituarte then

drove away. The incident was promptly reported to a 911 operator.

       Shortly afterward, Ontario Police Officer James Trousas, who was driving in a

marked police car, spotted the Durango and a chase ensued. Ituarte drove the Durango

through a red light onto a freeway, where he reached speeds up to 100 miles per hour

while swerving through traffic. Leaving the freeway, he entered an intersection against a

red light and collided with a red pickup truck [about 2 minutes and 45 seconds after the

pursuit began]. Lindy Garcia, a passenger in the truck, died approximately 17 hours later

as a result of injuries from the collision.

       Aramburo was apprehended and taken into custody at the scene of the collision.

Ituarte ran from the scene but was apprehended a short distance away by a police officer.

While handcuffed, Ituarte resisted efforts by officers to place him in a police car.

       During a search of the Durango, police found a semiautomatic gun and some of

DeMoreno’s jewelry in the seat of the car. Prior to defendants’ taking of the Durango,

the jewelry had been inside two bags in the glove compartment. Other jewelry belonging

to DeMoreno, which had been in the car, was found in each of the defendants’ pockets.

                                              3
Yuman’s watch and a traffic citation that had been in one of Yuman’s briefcases were

also found on Aramburo after his arrest. Aramburo admitted the carjacking, possession

of the gun, taking the jewelry, stealing the traffic citation, and being in the Durango.

       A jury convicted Aramburo of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), carjacking (§ 215, subd.

(a)), robbery (§ 211), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd.

(b)), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and evading a police officer causing death (Veh.

Code, § 2800.3). Aramburo was sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 37 years and 10

months, and we affirmed his convictions and sentence in 2006.

       In 2019, Aramburo petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.95, which is

now section 1172.6. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Senate Bill No.

1437, which enacted section 1170.95, was unconstitutional. (People v. Aramburo (June

30, 2020, E073366) [nonpub. opn.].) We reversed and remanded with directions to

consider the petition on the merits. (Ibid.)

       On remand, the trial court issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an

evidentiary hearing. After holding the hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding

that defendant was a major participant who had acted with reckless indifference for

human life during the commission of the offenses.

                                               4
                                              III.

                                        DISCUSSION

       Aramburo contends the trial court erroneously denied his petition because (1) he

played a “limited and attenuated role” in the car chase and resulting accident, and (2) the

court failed to consider his youth in determining whether he acted with reckless

indifference to human life. We conclude the trial court properly found that Aramburo

was not entitled to resentencing relief under section 1172.6, even considering his youth.

       A. Governing Law

       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “‘to amend

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying

felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10

Cal.5th 830, 846-847 (Gentile); see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature

accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189.

       Senate Bill No. 1437 amended section 189 so that “[d]efendants who were neither

actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they

were ‘major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to

human life[.]’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong), citing § 189,

subd. (e)(3).) The Legislature amended section 188 to provide that, when the felony-

murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of murder can only be convicted

                                               5
where he acted “with malice aforethought,” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a

person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see

Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 842-843.)

       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek

retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11

Cal.5th 952, 959; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “[T]he process begins with the

filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met

[citations], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or

attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January

1, 2019’ . . . .” (Strong, supra, at p. 708.) “When the trial court receives a petition

containing the necessary declaration and other required information, the court must

evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for

relief.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid., citing § 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the defendant makes a prima

facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and

hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether relief should be granted. (§ 1172.6,

subds. (c), (d)(3).)

       At the evidentiary hearing, the court may consider evidence “previously admitted

at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,” including witness

testimony. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The petitioner and the People may also offer new or

                                               6
additional evidence. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); see Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 853-

854.) “‘A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder,

attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to

sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements

attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the

remaining charges.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 709; accord, People v. Lewis,

supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960.) Section 1172.6 “relief is unavailable if the defendant was

either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a major participant in the

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life . . . .’” (Strong,

supra, at p. 710.)

       Under the amended felony-murder rule, a defendant who was not the actual killer

and did not act with the intent to kill can only be liable for murder if he or she was a

major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human

life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708, citing § 189, subd. (e)(3).) Because “‘[t]he

standard under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) for holding . . . a defendant liable for

felony murder is the same as the standard for finding a special circumstance under section

190.2[, subdivision] (d),’” “death penalty cases interpreting section 190.2, subdivision

(d), including People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016)

63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), are controlling here.” (People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87

Cal.App.5th 112, 123 (Guiffreda).)

                                               7
       Considerations that “may play a role in determining whether a defendant’s

culpability is sufficient” for a finding he or she was a major participant under section

190.2, subdivision (d), include: “What role did the defendant have in planning the

criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in

supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular

dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of

the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position

to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a

particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?”

(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted; see People v. Mitchell (2022) 81

Cal.App.5th 575, 591; Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 124-125.)

       To determine whether a defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life

under section 190.2, subdivision (d), courts consider, among other factors, the following

seven questions: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the

felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically

present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the

victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony

and the victims? What was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s

propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the

defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?” (In re Scoggins

                                              8
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins); see Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623; see

Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 124-125.)

       “Reckless indifference to human life has a subjective and an objective element.

[Citation.] As to the subjective element, ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly

involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and he or

she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death his or her actions create.’

[Citations.] As to the objective element, ‘“[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature

and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the

circumstances known to him [or her], its disregard involves a gross deviation from the

standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.”’”

(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)

       The requirements for finding major participation and reckless indifference to

human life “‘significantly overlap . . . in general, for the greater the defendant’s

participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference

to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615; see People v. Owens (2022) 78

Cal.App.5th 1015, 1023.) “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is anyone

one of them necessarily sufficient.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803; see Clark, supra,

at p. 618.) Courts analyze the totality of circumstances (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.

677) to determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life or

was a major participant. (See People v. Owens, supra, at p. 1023.)

                                              9
       B. Standard of Review

       On appeal from an order denying a petition under section 1172.6, we review the

trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Richardson (2022) 79

Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090.) We “‘“examine the entire record in the light most favorable to

the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that

is reasonable, credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of fact in

finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.”’ [Citation.] Our job on

review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the petition. While the trial

judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and

make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is

to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to

support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Clements

(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298; see Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 124-125.)

“‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences

drawn from that evidence.’” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57.)

       C. Analysis

       We first address Aramburo’s suggestion that the carjacking and subsequent car

chase that resulted in a fatal crash are distinct events for which he bears different liability.

Aramburo emphasizes that it was Ituarte’s reckless driving that killed Garcia and that, as

a passenger, his ability to control Ituarte’s behavior was “quite limited if not non-existent

under the circumstances.” Aramburo thus contends his culpability for Garcia’s death is

                                              10
“sharply attenuated.”

       We disagree. Robbery is not confined to the act of unlawfully taking another’s

property. (People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177, 205.) The crime remains ongoing

until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety. (Ibid.) This means that “[a]

robber has not reached a place of temporary safety while an immediate and active pursuit

to recover the property is in progress.” (Ibid.) Under a corollary doctrine known as the

escape rule, a “‘killing committed by a robber during his or her flight from the scene of

the crime, and before reaching a place of temporary safety, comes within section 189.’”

(People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 341.) Even if the killing is unintentional,

“‘[f]elony-murder liability continues throughout the flight of a perpetrator from the scene

of a robbery until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary safety because the robbery

and the accidental death, in such a case, are parts of a “continuous transaction.”’” (Id. at

p. 345.) As a result, several courts have upheld felony-murder convictions in cases where

the defendant accidentally killed someone while fleeing the scene and before reaching a

place of temporary safety. (See, e.g., People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 991-

992; People v. Thongvilay (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 71, 79-80; People v. Johnson (1992) 5

Cal.App.4th 552, 561-562.) A nonkiller may also be liable for the killing under the

escape rule. (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187.)

       In other words, the robbery/carjacking, car chase, and fatal car crash were all part

of one continuous transaction. (See People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94, 113,

274 [burglary and murder were part of same continuous transaction for purposes of

                                             11
felony-murder because defendant had not yet reached a place of temporary safety after

fleeing burglary scene].) Although Ituarte was the person who actually killed Garcia with

his reckless driving, under the felony-murder rule, as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437,

Aramburo remains liable for felony-murder under Senate Bill No. 1437 if he was a major

participant and acted with reckless disregard during the robbery, which remained ongoing

at the time of the crash. We therefore must consider Aramburo’s conduct during the

entire sequence of events that culminated in Garcia’s death to decide whether he remains

liable for murder after Senate Bill No. 1437.

       Applying the factors identified by Banks, and viewing the totality of the

circumstances (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677), we conclude substantial evidence

supports the trial court’s finding that Aramburo was a major participant in the robbery.

       First, there was evidence Aramburo was involved in planning the carjacking which

led to the fatal collision. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Aramburo demanded the

car keys from the carjacking victims at gunpoint then gave them to Ituarte before getting

into the passenger seat of the car. Aramburo admitted that he and Ituarte robbed several

people at a used car dealership two days before the carjacking, which suggests that they

planned the carjacking in the interim.

       Second, Aramburo had a role in supplying or using a lethal weapon. (Banks,

supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Aramburo used the gun to carjack the victims, including

racking the gun and telling the victims, “‘I’m going to shoot you.’”

       As for the third factor, Aramburo’s awareness of the dangers posed by the

                                            12
carjacking and the weapons used, the People argue it weighs against him because he told

the investigating officer that he knew he could be charged for murder if the victim of the

collision died, as she later did. But this does not necessarily show that Aramburo was

aware of the dangers that his conduct during the carjacking posed.

       Fourth, Aramburo was present at both the carjacking and the scene of the killing.

(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) He played a “particular role” in the robbery given

that he obtained the keys to the car from the victims at gunpoint and handed them to

Ituarte before getting in the car. And during the chase, Aramburo did not tell Ituarte to

stop when they were speeding away from police because they were already “f—ked” and

“the whole thing [was] screwed up.”

       The fifth factor—what the defendant did after lethal force was used—neither

favors nor disfavors Aramburo because police apprehended him immediately after the

collision, leaving him no chance to flee or aid the victim.

       Given that three of the five Banks factors support a finding that Aramburo was a

major participant in the robbery, the trial court properly found that he was a major

participant. This case is unlike Scoggins and Clark in which the defendants were

unarmed, not present at the scene, and did not know their accomplices were armed or, as

in Clark, the defendants did not know the accomplice was carrying a loaded gun. (See

Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 677-678; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 613.) Instead,

Aramburo was involved in the planning of the robbery, he used a gun during the

carjacking to threaten the victims, and he was present at all relevant times. (Banks,

                                             13
supra, 61 Cal.4th p. 803.) His “participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a

grave risk of death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered ‘major,’”

which is the “ultimate question” to be answered in the major-participant analysis.

(Banks, supra, at p. 803.)

       We next conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that

Aramburo acted with reckless indifference under five of the seven Clark factors. First,

Aramburo knew that a gun would be used given that he used one while committing the

robbery and carjacking and threatened the victims with it. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at

pp. 616-617; In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Second, Aramburo was the only

one who used a gun in the planned, intentional carjacking. (See People v. Keel (2022) 84

Cal.App.5th 546, 560, 562 [the fact that robbery was “unplanned, spontaneous, and

short” showed petitioner did not act with reckless disregard for human life].) Third,

Aramburo was present at the time of both the carjacking and the resulting fatal collision,

and “[p]resence at the scene of the murder is a particularly important aspect of the

reckless indifference inquiry.” (People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 148.)

Fourth, Aramburo had the opportunity to restrain the crime. He could have withheld the

car keys from Ituarte or fled on foot. After getting in the car, Aramburo could have told

Ituarte to slow down or stop the car, or to otherwise drive more carefully. Aramburo,
                                     3
however, did none of these things.

       3
         When asked whether he told Ituarte to stop, Aramburo replied, “[W]ell dude,
wow we’re f—ked you know what I mean.” The officer then asked, “So basically you
told him you’re f—ked, there’s a cop behind you and he had the lights on and the siren.”
                                                                  [footnote continued on next page]

                                             14
       Finally, the seventh Clark factor, the efforts Aramburo made to minimize the risk

of violence during the felony, weighs against him. Aramburo held the carjacking victims

at gunpoint, racked his gun, and said, “I’m going to shoot you.” Aramburo could have

minimized the risk of violence (to himself and others) by fleeing on foot, but he chose to

get into the car with Ituarte. There is no evidence that, once in the car, Aramburo did

anything to lessen the grave risk of death Ituarte posed by driving the car upwards of 100

miles per hour while weaving through traffic and running red lights, such as telling

Ituarte to slow down, stop, or surrender. Because there is no evidence that Aramburo

made any efforts to reduce the risk of violence at any point, this factor does not support

reversal.

       However, the fifth factor, the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators

of the felony and the victims, weighs in Aramburo’s favor given that the carjacking and

chase lasted only a few minutes. (See People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003,

1015-1016 [“[C]rimes of longer duration present greater risk of violence and therefore

evince more reckless indifference.”]; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th 667, at 681 [no reckless

indifference when “entire interaction lasted between a few seconds and three to five

minutes”].) The sixth factor, Aramburo’s knowledge of Ituarte’s propensity for violence

or the likelihood of using lethal force, also weighs in Aramburo’s favor. Although he and

Ituarte committed an armed robbery two days before the armed carjacking, nothing in the

record shows that either of them “had ever participated in shootings, murder, or

Aramburo explained, “No, he told me you know, know I was with him man, but what I’m
supposed to do.”

                                             15
attempted murder.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 810-811.) Nor is there evidence that

Aramburo knew Ituarte might use lethal force during either offense. (Clark, supra, 63

Cal.4th at p. 621.) “The paucity of evidence that [Ituarte] had a propensity to commit

violent acts, as well as the lack of evidence that [Aramburo] was aware of any such

propensity, undermines the notion that [Aramburo] acted with reckless indifference to

human life.” (People v. Keel, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 561.)

       In short, five of the Clark factors weigh against Aramburo while two weigh in his

favor. Although Aramburo might not have been able to prevent the collision as Ituarte’s

passenger, the totality of his conduct during the robbery/carjacking and flight

demonstrated a conscious disregard for the grave risk of death that his actions created.

Substantial evidence thus supports the trial court’s finding that Aramburo was a major

participant in a felony resulting in death and acted with reckless indifference to human

life during the commission of the felony. (See People v. Bascomb (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th

1090 [“The defendants who have shown their culpability was too slight under Banks and

Clark ‘are those who were not wielding guns themselves and also not present for the

shooting (either because they were acting as getaway drivers or because they were

involved in the planning of the crime only).’ [Citation.]”].)

       Aramburo nonetheless argues that the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to

consider his youth when denying his petition. The People concede, and we agree, that the

trial court should have considered his youth as a factor in deciding whether he acted with

reckless indifference to human life. (See In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453-

                                            16
454.) It is unclear from the record whether the trial court failed to do so. But even if the

court did fail to consider Aramburo’s youth, any error was harmless because it is not

reasonably probable that he would have obtained a more favorable result had the court

considered his youth.

       To begin with, a petitioner’s youth is a relevant factor in the reckless indifference

analysis, but it is not dispositive. (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470.) For

the reasons outlined above, the Clark factors strongly supported the trial court’s finding

that Aramburo acted with reckless indifference to human life.

       More to the point, Aramburo presented no evidence that, because of his youth, he

failed to appreciate the grave risk to others posed by committing an armed carjacking and

then fleeing in the car. (Cf. People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 991 [that the

defendant “was influenced by peer pressure” and “‘was afraid’” of the consequences if he

did not aid the shooter “may well have affected his calculation of the risk of death posed

by using the firearm in the carjacking”].) There is likewise no evidence in the record that

Aramburo failed to appreciate the inherent risks posed by Ituarte’s exceedingly

dangerous driving, which Aramburo never tried to stop or minimize. Every 17 year old

understands the obvious danger that driving 100 miles per hour while weaving through

traffic and running red lights poses. (Cf. People v. Mitchell, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p.

595 [“every 18 year old understands bullet wounds require attention”].) In fact, when an

investigating officer told Aramburo shortly after the crash that he could be charged with

murder if Garcia died (as she later did), he said, “Yeah I know.” This suggests that,

                                             17
despite being 17 years old, Aramburo recognized the gravity of his actions, not that he

“lacked ‘“the experience, perspective, and judgment”’ to adequately appreciate the risk of

death posed by his criminal activities.” (In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.)

       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court properly denied Aramburo’s

section 1172.6 petition.

                                           IV.

                                     DISPOSITION

       The trial court’s order denying Aramburo’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                              CODRINGTON
                                                                                           J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                           P. J.

RAPHAEL
                              J.

                                            18