Court Opinion

ID: 9954929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 14:08:52.072079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:06.577439
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                       State v. Kalil Cooper (A-35-22) (087742)

Argued September 27, 2023 -- Decided March 27, 2024

NORIEGA, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

       In this appeal, the Court reviews defendant Kalil Cooper’s conviction for
promoting organized street crime, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, and determines
whether the statute contains within it, as a predicate offense, the crime of conspiracy
to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS).

       Defendant was arrested following a wiretap investigation into the activities of
a local gang. Defendant was individually charged with twelve separate counts,
including two counts of racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering, in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, and one count of promoting organized street crime in
violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30 (count four). The promoting count charged that
defendant “purposefully conspire[d] with others . . . to commit a continuing series of
crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the provisions of
N.J.S.A. 2C:4l-l, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30.”

        During the jury charge conference, defendant objected to count four of the
indictment, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1’s “pattern of racketeering activity,” was
not a predicate offense of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30. The trial court agreed, but instead of
striking that count, it amended the indictment by incorporating offenses relevant to
the racketeering charge as predicate offenses to count four’s promoting charge. The
trial court reasoned that defendant was on notice of those offenses based on their
inclusion elsewhere in the indictment and that these offenses were also predicate
offenses of the promoting statute. Thus, as to count four, the trial court instructed
the jury in part that the State must prove “[t]hat the purpose of the conspiracy was to
commit the crime of conspiracy to commit murder and/or aggravated assault and/or
conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance.” (emphases added).

      The jury returned guilty verdicts on four counts, including the promoting
charge. According to the verdict sheet, the jury found defendant guilty of
conspiracy to distribute CDS as the predicate offense of promoting. At sentencing,
defendant unsuccessfully renewed his challenge to count four and the jury charge.

                                           1
The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court granted defendant’s petition for
certification. 253 N.J. 404 (2023).

HELD: Conspiracy to distribute CDS is not an enumerated predicate offense of the
promoting statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, and defendant’s conviction for a crime that
does not exist must be vacated.

1. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) provides in relevant part that “[a] person promotes
organized street crime if he conspires with others . . . to commit any crime specified
in” one of several enumerated chapters of Title 2C of the New Jersey statutes or one
of the additional statutes listed from chapters 34 and 39 of Title 2C. To prove
“promoting,” the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused conspired
to commit at least one offense on that specific list of predicate offenses.
Conspicuously absent from that list is the substantive offense of conspiracy pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. The offense of conspiracy is not listed as a predicate offense
itself, nor is it specified within any of the enumerated chapters as a predicate offense
of the promoting statute. The jury instruction in this case thus erroneously departed
from the list of permissible predicate offenses in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) and
erroneously opened to the jury the possibility of convicting defendant for conspiracy
to conspire to distribute CDS, a crime that does not exist because conspiracy to
distribute CDS is not a predicate offense under the promoting statute. (pp.13-15)

2. If the party contesting the jury instruction fails to object to it at trial, the standard
on appeal is one of plain error; if the party objects, the review is for harmless error.
Defendant raised an objection to the now-challenged jury instruction at various
points leading up to, during, and through the end of the trial. The issue was properly
preserved, thus the Court reviews for harmless error. (pp. 15-19)

3. Defendant was convicted and sentenced based upon a charge that does not exist
within the criminal code. Such a result is not harmless, but rather unjust. The jury’s
verdict, premised upon the instructions provided by the trial court, is legally invalid.
Because defendant was not on notice of any other proper predicate offense for the
promoting statute under count four of the indictment, the jury’s verdict on that count
is vacated without a remand. The Court does not reach the question as to whether a
double inchoate crime may exist within New Jersey’s criminal code. (pp. 19-20)

       REVERSED. The jury’s verdict on the promoting count is VACATED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE join in JUSTICE
NORIEGA’s opinion.

                                             2
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-35 September Term 2022
                       087742

                 State of New Jersey,

                Plaintiff-Respondent,

                          v.

         Kalil Cooper, a/k/a Kalil M. Cooper
                 and Khalil Cooper,

                Defendant-Appellant.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division.

      Argued                       Decided
 September 27, 2023             March 27, 2024

Stephen W. Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender,
attorney; Stephen W. Kirsch, on the briefs).

Appellant filed a supplemental brief on his own behalf.

Milton S. Leibowitz, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
cause for respondent (William A. Daniel, Union County
Prosecutor, attorney; Milton S. Leibowitz, of counsel and
on the briefs, and Michele C. Buckley, Assistant
Prosecutor, on the briefs).

Jennifer O. Farina argued the cause for amicus curiae
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey
(McCarter & English, attorneys; Jennifer O. Farina, of
counsel and on the brief).

                          1
           JUSTICE NORIEGA delivered the opinion of the Court.

      This Court is called upon to review defendant Kalil Cooper’s conviction

for promoting organized street crime, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, and to

determine whether the statute contains within it, as a predicate offense, the

crime of conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS),

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5.

      Defendant was charged in a twenty-eight-count indictment, alongside

several co-defendants. Individually, defendant was charged in twelve separate

counts, three of which are relevant to this appeal: two counts of racketeering

and conspiracy to commit racketeering, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, and

one count of promoting organized street crime in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-

30 (promoting). The promoting count charged that defendant “purposefully

conspire[d] with others . . . to commit a continuing series of crimes which

constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the provisions of N.J.S.A.

2C:4l-l, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30.”

      During the jury charge conference, defendant objected to count four of

the indictment, arguing that N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1’s “pattern of racketeering

activity,” was not a predicate offense of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30. The trial court

agreed, but instead of striking that count, it amended the indictment by

                                        2
incorporating offenses relevant to count three’s racketeering charge as

predicate offenses to count four’s promoting charge. The trial court reasoned

that defendant was on notice of those offenses based on their inclusion

elsewhere in the indictment and, critical here, that these offenses were also

predicate offenses of the promoting statute pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s interpretation of the statute.

      For the reasons set forth below, we hold that decision was incorrect.

Conspiracy to distribute CDS is not an enumerated predicate offense of the

promoting statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30. We therefore reverse the Appellate

Division’s judgment and vacate defendant’s conviction on count four.

                                        I.

      Defendant was arrested at the end of a month-long wiretap investigation

into the activities of a local gang believed to operate in Elizabeth, known as

the Grape Street Crips. Defendant was targeted in the investigation as one of

the possible “leaders” of the organization. The investigation produced

hundreds of hours of phone call recordings, along with text messages, in

addition to evidence from police witnesses, all supporting the theory that the

targets of the investigation were operating as a gang. As it pertained to

defendant, the investigation revealed numerous calls between defendant and

                                        3
others regarding the alleged purchase and sale of heroin and cocaine, usually

discussed in code.

      A Union County grand jury returned a twenty-eight-count indictment

against all defendants. Defendant was charged with twelve counts including

first-degree racketeering and conspiracy to commit racketeering N.J.S.A.

2C:41-2(c) and (d) (counts one and three, respectively); first-degree promoting

organized street crime, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a) (count four); second-degree

conspiracy as a leader of organized crime; first-degree conspiracy to commit

murder; third-degree aggravated assault; and numerous drug and weapons

offenses.

      Count four of the indictment charged defendant with promoting

organized street crime by

            purposefully conspir[ing] with others as an organizer,
            supervisor, manager or financier to commit a
            continuing series of crimes which constitute a pattern
            of racketeering activity under the provisions of
            N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1, contrary to the provisions of N.J.S.A.
            2C:33-30.

      At trial, the State produced a police officer who testified to seeing a

hand-to-hand drug transaction that had been arranged on a phone call police

intercepted during their surveillance. The State also presented evidence from

the search of defendant’s home, where an assortment of items commonly

                                        4
associated with the sale of narcotics was recovered, as well as plastic bags

containing heroin residue and a plastic bag containing 3.806 grams of cocaine.

      The trial court held a jury charge conference on February 25, 2019. The

court provided the parties with advance copies of the proposed jury

instructions and offered defendant an opportunity to note objections to the jury

charge that had been raised in earlier off-the-record discussions. Relevant to

this matter, defendant objected to the jury instructions concerning count four

of the indictment -- first-degree promoting organized street crime. Defendant

argued that the language of the indictment departed from the statute and that

the jury charge reflected that error.

      The court agreed with defendant’s objection, and the State conceded that

the inclusion of “pattern of racketeering activity” in the indictment was legally

incorrect. The court attempted to remove any confusion for the jury and

comply with the statute. It looked elsewhere in the indictment and found that

in count three the State alleged three crimes that were examples of a “pattern

of racketeering activity”; the court held that those alleged offenses were also

suitable enumerated predicate offenses of promoting pursuant to N.J.S.A.

2C:33-30. Although the charges in count three were referred to as a group, the

actual charges that would be listed in the jury charge were not mentioned by

name on the record at that time.

                                        5
Regarding count four, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

      The relevant section of our statute reads in pertinent
      part . . . that:

      A person promotes organized street crime if he
      conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor or
      manager or financier to commit the certain crimes
      including conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated
      assault and conspiracy to distribute a controlled
      dangerous substance.

      In order to convict the defendant of this charge, the
      State must prove each of the following elements beyond
      a reasonable doubt:

         1. That defendant purposely conspired with two or
         more persons.

         2. That the purpose of the conspiracy was to commit
         the crime of conspiracy to commit murder and/or
         aggravated assault and/or conspiracy to distribute a
         controlled dangerous substance.

         3. That within that conspiracy, defendant was
         financier, organizer, supervisor or manager.

      The first element that the State must prove beyond a
      reasonable doubt is that the defendant purposely
      conspired with two or more persons.

      I previously charged you on conspiracy.

      The second element the State must prove beyond a
      reasonable doubt is that the purpose of the conspiracy
      was to commit the crime of conspiracy to commit
      murder and/or aggravated assault and/or conspiracy to
      distribute a controlled dangerous substance, which
      must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                  6
            In this case the State alleges that defendant conspired
            to commit the crimes of conspiracy to commit murder
            and/or aggravated assault and/or conspiracy to
            distribute a controlled substance. The State must prove
            beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant conspired to
            commit one of these crimes. You must unanimously
            agree about the crime or crimes defendant conspired to
            commit . . . .

            [(emphases added).]

In a previous charge, the court instructed the jury on conspiracy as follows:

            A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or
            persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of
            promoting or facilitating its commission he:

               1. Agrees with such other person or persons that
               they or one or more of them will engage in conduct
               which constitutes such crime or an attempt or
               solicitation to commit such crime; or

               2. Agrees to aid such other person or persons in the
               planning or commission of such crime or of an
               attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.

The court also noted that conspiracy “is a crime in itself separate and distinct”

from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy. That is, “a defendant may

be found guilty of the crime of conspiracy regardless of whether that defendant

is guilty or not guilty of the” underlying crime.

      The jury returned guilty verdicts on four counts: second-degree

promoting, simple assault, and two drug offenses. The jury acquitted

defendant of all other charges. As to the promoting charge, the verdict sheet

                                        7
instructed the jury that if they found defendant guilty of promoting, they were

to continue to decide upon which predicate offense they were basing their

decision. According to the jury verdict sheet, the jury found defendant not

guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, not guilty of aggravated assault, but

guilty of conspiracy to distribute CDS as a predicate offense of promoting.

      At sentencing, defendant moved for a new trial, renewing his challenge

to count four of the indictment and the jury charge. Defendant again argued

that it was improper to combine the racketeering statute with the promoting

statute in that count. Defendant contended that the promoting statute

contained specific enumerated predicate crimes, of which N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1

was not one. Defendant also claimed that N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(g) -- leader of

organized crime -- is not part of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30. 1

      The trial court denied the motion, relying on its earlier ruling that

defendant was on notice of the three predicate offenses because of their

inclusion in other counts of the indictment. The court was satisfied that “the

jury did find beyond a reasonable doubt the predicate offense” of “conspiracy

1
  N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2(g) is a subsection of the conspiracy statute which defines a
leader of organized crime as a person who purposefully conspires with others as an
organizer, supervisor, manager, or financier to commit a continuing series of
crimes which constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under the provisions of
N.J.S. 2C:41-1. Nowhere in this statute is there any reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-
30.
                                          8
to distribute CDS, which is consistent with the remainder of the verdict.”

Finding no manifest denial of justice, the court denied defendant’s motion and

proceeded to sentence him.

      Defendant received a six-year term of imprisonment with a three-year

period of parole ineligibility on count twenty-three (conspiracy to distribute

CDS), concurrent to a five-year term of imprisonment on count eleven

(possession of CDS), and concurrent to a six-month period of incarceration on

count seven (simple assault). The court also sentenced defendant to ten years’

imprisonment with a five-year period of parole ineligibility on count four

(promoting), to be served consecutive to counts twenty-three, seven, and

eleven, resulting in an aggregate sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment with

an eight-year parole disqualifier.

      Defendant appealed his conviction of the promoting offense. In an

unpublished decision, the Appellate Division agreed that count four was

legally incorrect but concluded, like the trial court, that defendant was on

notice of the other offenses the State alleged elsewhere in the indictment, such

as various drug offenses, aggravated assault, and conspiracy to commit

murder. The Appellate Division therefore found defendant was unable to

demonstrate he was prejudiced because he was fully able to provide a defense

as to each offense. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant’s conviction of

                                        9
promoting, ultimately concluding that N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30 specifically prohibits

“conspiracy to commit a wide range of chapters and wide range of offenses,

including conspiracy to distribute CDS.” (emphasis added).

      We granted defendant’s petition for certification. 253 N.J. 404 (2023).

We also granted leave to appear as amicus curiae to the Association of

Criminal Defense Lawyers of New Jersey (ACDL).

                                       II.

      Defendant asks this Court to reverse his conviction of promoting under

count four of the indictment, arguing that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a

predicate offense of promoting, and the trial court should not have instructed

the jury as such. First, defendant contends that conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2, is

not listed as a predicate offense in the promoting statute, and that New Jersey

courts have repeatedly found that when a statute enumerates predicate crimes,

that list is deemed to be exclusive. Second, defendant underscores that

“promoting” under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, is a conspiracy offense itself.

Defendant thus reasons that to include a conspiracy offense as a predicate

offense to promoting would require the notion of a conspiracy to conspire,

which is not a recognized offense under New Jersey criminal law.

      The ACDL likewise argues that a plain reading of the promoting statute

establishes that conspiracy, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 is not an enumerated

                                       10
offense and that the Court should reject the “double inchoate crime” of

conspiracy to conspire.

      The State argues that defendant’s conviction should be affirmed because

any error in the jury instruction was incapable of producing an unjust result.

Conceding that conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a predicate offense under

the promoting statute, the State asserts that any reference to conspiracy was

harmless. According to the State, the jury instructions did not expand

defendant’s culpability nor diminish proofs that the State needed to establish

defendant’s guilt. The State thus argues that, even though conspiracy pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 is not listed as an enumerated offense in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30,

it is encompassed within the meaning of the statute. The State relies on the

Appellate Division’s finding that the promoting statute includes conspiracy to

distribute CDS and thus the trial court properly instructed the jury.

      The State contends, in essence, that the conspiracy referenced in the

promoting statute is ongoing and continues throughout the underlying offense,

such that the mention of another conspiracy is superfluous or a “stutter” but

not meaningful. The State also contends that defendant failed to preserve this

issue by not fully articulating the argument raised on appeal and that the Court

should review this issue under the plain error standard.

                                       11
                                       III.

      The trial court’s ruling that conspiracy to distribute CDS contrary to

N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5 is a predicate offense of promoting

under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30 is a legal determination that we review de novo,

without deference to the trial court or Appellate Division’s interpretive legal

conclusions. See Fowler v. Akzo Nobel Chems. Inc., 251 N.J. 300, 323

(2022); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995).

      In reviewing N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30, we “ascribe[] to the statutory words

their ordinary meaning and significance and read[] them in context with

related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” W.S. v.

Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 518 (2023) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477,

492 (2005)). If the language is clear, the Court need not look beyond the text

to determine its meaning. Ibid. “Statutes must be read in their entirety,” with

“‘each part or section . . . construed in connection with every other part or

section to provide a harmonious whole.’” Id. at 519 (quoting In re Civ.

Commitment of W.W., 245 N.J. 438, 449 (2021)). The “[C]ourt may neither

rewrite a plainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the

Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain

language.” Ibid. (quoting O’Connell v. State, 171 N.J. 484, 488 (2002)). And

                                       12
when “the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place yet excluded

it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.” Alan J. Cornblatt,

P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 234 (1998).

                                       A.

      With those principles in mind, we first consider whether the jury charge

departed impermissibly from the plain language of the promoting statute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a), which provides as follows:

            A person promotes organized street crime if he
            conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor,
            financier or manager to commit any crime specified in
            chapters 11 through 18, 20, 33, 35, or 37 of Title 2C of
            the New Jersey Statutes; N.J.S.A. 2C:34-1; N.J.S.A.
            2C:39-3; N.J.SA. 2C:39-4; section 1 [N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
            4.1]; N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5; or N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9.

      The promoting statute sets forth a conspiracy offense. A person may be

guilty of the offense only if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that

such a person has conspired with others to promote organized street crime, in

the capacity of an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager, with the goal of

committing any of the specified predicate offenses. Thus, to prove

“promoting,” the State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt the accused

conspired to commit at least one offense on the list of predicate offenses. Ibid.

That list includes any offenses from Chapters 11 through 18 of the Criminal

Code (homicide, assault, kidnapping, sex offenses, robbery, bias offenses,

                                       13
arson, burglary); any offenses from Chapters 20 (theft), 33 (riot, disorderly

conduct, related offenses), 35 (controlled dangerous substances), and 37

(gambling offenses) of the Code; and a specific offense or offenses within

Chapters 34 (public indecency) and 39 (firearms, other dangerous weapons

offenses) of the Code, to the exclusion of the other offenses within Chapters

34 and 39.

      Conspicuously absent from the list of predicate offenses is the

substantive offense of conspiracy pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2. The offense of

conspiracy is not listed as a predicate offense itself, nor is it specified within

any of the enumerated chapters as a predicate offense of the promoting statute.

The jury instruction in this case thus erroneously departed from the list of

permissible predicate offenses in N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30(a).

      The State argues that the additional “conspiracy” language was merely

superfluous and did not amplify the meaning of the charge or the jury

instruction -- essentially “a stutter in which the word . . . conspiracy was

repeated twice, rather than once.” Moreover, the State argues, because

promoting is a conspiratorial offense any additional mention of conspiracy

regarding a predicate simply refers to the ongoing nature of the conspiracy.

      That argument fails because the State asks that we presume the jury

skipped over or ignored relevant, synonymous words in the jury instruction.

                                         14
“A charge is a road map to guide the jury, and without an appropriate charge a

jury can take a wrong turn in its deliberations . . . . [T]he court must explain

the controlling legal principles and the questions the jury is to decide.” Das v.

Thani, 171 N.J. 518, 527 (2002) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting

State v. Martin, 119 N.J. 2, 15 (1990)). One of the foundations of our jury

system is the presumption that jurors listen to and are guided by the court’s

instructions as they judge the facts of a case to determine guilt. State v. Bey,

112 N.J. 45, 82 (1988) (recognizing “the general presumption that jurors act in

good faith and seek to comply with the court’s instructions”). Words that

inform a juror’s understanding of the elements of an offense cannot be

meaningless. Here, the court’s words -- that the State must prove “[t]hat the

purpose of the conspiracy was to commit the crime of conspiracy to commit

murder and/or aggravated assault and/or conspiracy to distribute a controlled

dangerous substance” (emphases added) -- erroneously opened to the jury the

possibility of convicting defendant for conspiracy to conspire to distribute

CDS, a crime that does not exist because conspiracy to distribute CDS is not a

predicate offense under the promoting statute.

                                        B.

      We now must consider the consequences of that error. “The proper

standards of review of jury instructions are well-settled: if the party contesting

                                        15
the instruction fails to object to it at trial, the standard on appeal is one of plain

error; if the party objects, the review is for harmless error.” Willner v.

Vertical Reality, Inc., 235 N.J. 65, 80 (2018). To show that an error was not

harmless, the proponent of the objection must establish “some degree of

possibility that [the error] led to an unjust result.” State v. Baum, 224 N.J.

147, 159 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lazo, 209 N.J. 9, 26

(2012)). “The possibility must be real, one sufficient to raise a reasonable

doubt as to whether [the error] led the jury to a verdict it otherwise might not

have reached.” Ibid. (quoting Lazo, 209 N.J. at 26).

      “[A]ppropriate and proper [jury instructions] are essential for a fair

trial.” Baum, 224 N.J. at 158-59 (quoting State v. Reddish, 181 N.J. 553, 613

(2004)); accord State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287 (1981). A trial court has an

“independent duty . . . to ensure that the jurors receive accurate instructions on

the law as it pertains to the facts and issues of each case, irrespective of the

particular language suggested by either party.” Reddish, 181 N.J. at 613.

Indeed, so critical are these instructions that failures to provide accurate

instructions on material issues “are presumed to be reversible error.” State v.

Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997); State v. McKinney, 223 N.J. 475, 495 (2015)

(“[E]rroneous instructions on material points are presumed to possess the

                                          16
capacity to unfairly prejudice the defendant.” (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting State v. Bunch, 180 N.J. 534, 541-42 (2004))).

      “[C]learly erroneous instructions usually are considered ‘poor candidates

for rehabilitation under the harmless error philosophy.’” State v. Feaster, 156

N.J. 1, 45 (1998) (quoting State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 522 (1994)). But a

party who fails to properly object to an infirm jury instruction leaves the court

constrained to review for plain error, whereby even a confirmed error may be

reversed only if it is “clearly capable of producing an unjust result.” State v.

Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320-21 (2017) (quoting R. 2:10-2).

      Preserving an issue for appeal pursuant to Rule 1:7-2 requires that “‘a

party . . . make known to the court specifically the action which the party

desires the court to take or the party’s objection to the action taken and the

grounds therefor.’ Such an objection may be offered ‘in open court, in the

absence of the jury.’” Willner, 235 N.J. at 79 (quoting R. 1:7-2).

      Here, the State argues that defendant failed to preserve the challenge to

count four and that the court’s instruction should therefore not be reversed

because it did not constitute plain error. We consider each argument in turn.

                                        1.

      In his initial objection at the jury charge conference defendant raised the

irregularity in count four where “pattern of racketeering activity” under the

                                        17
provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 was incorrectly listed as a predicate offense for

a conviction of promoting contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-30. The trial court

amended the indictment over defendant’s objection, under its authority found

in Rule 3:7-4. The court replaced the language “pattern of racketeering

activity” in count four with the substantive charges that were listed in count

three of the indictment as the predicate offenses for “pattern of racketeering

activity” under N.J.S.A. 2C:41-2(d), namely: conspiracy to commit murder,

aggravated assault, and conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.

Essentially, the court determined that the same offenses that could serve as the

predicates to a racketeering charge served as the predicates to a promoting

charge, notwithstanding the separate list of predicate offenses within the

promoting charge itself.

      During the motion for a new trial argued prior to sentencing, defendant

once again objected to the jury charges and argued that the error began in the

indictment, where defendant was “mischarged,” and that defendant was

prejudiced when the court amended the indictment. Although an objection

alone does not adequately preserve an issue for appeal under Rule 1:7-2,

defendant did more than merely voice a general objection. Defendant clearly

raised an objection to the now-challenged jury instruction at various points

leading up to, during, and through the end of the trial. Our law does not

                                       18
require that objections be precisely identical to the issues raised on appeal to

avoid plain error review. See State v. Ramirez, 462 N.J. Super. 1, 18 (App.

Div. 2019) (finding harmless error applicable because the defendants

“repeatedly objected to the charge, albeit not precisely on the grounds . . .

enunciated” on appeal), rev’d on other grounds, 246 N.J. 61 (2021).

      Based on the objections raised, and defendant’s attempts to alert the

court regarding the inconsistency between the indictment and the relevant

statute, we hold that the issue was properly preserved. We therefore review

the matter for harmless error.

                                         2.

      Errors that have the capacity to affect material issues in the “jury’s

deliberation are presumed to be reversible in criminal prosecutions.” Jordan,

147 N.J. at 422; State v. Warren, 104 N.J. 571, 579 (1986). We have

previously held that jury instructions in criminal trials are critical, as

someone’s liberty is at stake. State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 289 (1981). An

error cannot be harmless if there is “some degree of possibility that [the error]

led to an unjust result.” Lazo, 209 N.J. at 26 (alteration in original) (quoting

State v. R.B., 183 N.J. 308, 330 (2005)).

      Here, as the jury’s verdict sheet plainly reveals, defendant was convicted

and sentenced based upon a charge that does not exist within our criminal

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code. Such a result is not harmless, but rather unjust. The jury abided by its

oath and discharged its responsibility faithfully by finding defendant guilty of

conspiring as a financier, organizer, supervisor, or manager, to enter a

conspiracy to distribute CDS, based on the jury instructions provided. But,

because no such crime exists, the jury’s verdict, premised upon the instructions

provided by the trial court, is legally invalid. This, we find, is a manifest

injustice. Defendant’s sentence cannot be based upon a nonexistent crime.

                                       IV.

      For those reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division.

The jury acquitted defendant of the remaining two predicate offenses. Because

defendant was not on notice of any other proper predicate offense for the

promoting statute under count four of the indictment, the jury’s verdict on that

count is vacated without a remand. 2 The Court does not reach the question

raised by defendant and amicus ACDL as to whether a double inchoate crime

may exist within New Jersey’s criminal code.

      CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE join in JUSTICE NORIEGA’s
opinion.

2
  According to representations by counsel, defendant has been released from
prison. To the extent he may continue to be subject to any restrictions arising
from his conviction on count four, we vacate those restrictions.
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