Court Opinion

ID: 9387612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 17:01:00.558111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.733437
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                            APR 18 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MIGUEL MIRANDA-SANTANA, AKA                      No.   20-70471
Miguel Santana Miranda,
                                                 Agency No. A205-466-951
              Petitioner,

 v.                                              MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted April 14, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,***
District Judge.

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
      Miguel Miranda-Santana petitions for review of a final order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision

denying his application for cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent

residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We deny the petition for review.

      1. The BIA applied the correct legal standards and did not ignore relevant

evidence. The BIA’s analysis of the hardships Miranda-Santana’s children would

face upon their father’s removal was plainly forward looking, see Figueroa v.

Mukasey, 543 F.3d 487, 497 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Abebe

v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), and considered the hardship

factors cumulatively, see In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467, 472 (BIA

2002) (en banc). Nothing in the record overcomes our presumption that the BIA

considered all relevant evidence. See Szonyi v. Barr, 942 F.3d 874, 897 (9th Cir.

2019).

      2. Miranda-Santana does not “specifically and distinctly” argue that the BIA

improperly applied the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard in

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) to the established facts of his case and therefore forfeits any such

claim. Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Miranda-Santana’s briefing argues that we would have jurisdiction over such a

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claim, but does not address the merits of the hardship question. That is, Miranda

Santana does not explain why the established facts of his case amount to

exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative upon removal.

      PETITION DENIED.

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