Court Opinion

ID: 9944607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:01:03.123441+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:01.244697
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 26 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KALAMICE K. PIGGEE,                             No.    22-55770

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                2:17-cv-07384-FLA-SK
 v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ, Warden,                          MEMORANDUM*

                Respondent-Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
               Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted February 6, 2024
                               Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

      Kalamice Piggee, a state criminal defendant, appeals the district court’s denial

of his habeas corpus petition. Piggee alleges that his federal due process rights were

violated when, after a prior determination that Piggee had been restored to

competence to stand trial, the state trial court did not grant Piggee’s subsequent

request for a competency hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). We review a district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief de

novo and its factual findings for clear error. Carrera v. Ayers, 699 F.3d 1104, 1106

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). On habeas review, we review the state court’s “last

reasoned decision.” Dyer v. Hornbeck, 706 F.3d 1134, 1147 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).

      Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), a federal court can grant a habeas petition under two circumstances:

first, if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or second, if the state court’s decision

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Neither occurred.

      1.     The California Court of Appeal’s decision was neither contrary to, nor

an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

Only Supreme Court precedent can be used to establish “clearly established law.”

Id. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), established that a competency hearing is

required “[w]here evidence raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence

to stand trial ….” Id. at 385 (citation omitted). We have interpreted this guidance

to require a competency hearing “at any time” substantial evidence puts the

defendant’s competence in doubt. de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 980 (9th

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Cir. 1976) (en banc) (quoting Moore v. United States, 464 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir.

1972) (per curiam)).

      Piggee argues that the California Court of Appeal imposed two requirements

contrary to clearly established law. First, he claims it applied People v. Jones, 811

P.2d 757 (Cal. 1991), in a manner inconsistent with Pate by creating a requirement

that an expert submit a report about competency before a trial court can declare a

doubt as to competency. But Piggee did not raise this argument in his petition nor

before the district court. So this argument is forfeited. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d

770, 777 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002).

      Second, Piggee claims the California Court of Appeal violated clearly

established law by placing the burden on Piggee to show incompetence, contrary to

Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975). Under Drope, “a trial court must always

be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable

to meet the standards of competence to stand trial.” Id. at 181. And under Pate,

“[w]here the evidence before the trial court raises a ‘bona fide doubt’ as to a

defendant’s competence to stand trial, the judge on his own motion must conduct a

competency hearing.” Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 568 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting

Pate, 383 U.S. at 385). But the Court of Appeal’s holding that Piggee failed to

establish a bona fide doubt as to his incompetence did not relieve the trial court of

its burden to remain “alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would render

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the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial,” Drope, 420

U.S. at 181, because the only evidence presented to the trial court in September 2014

came from Piggee’s counsel due to Piggee’s absence from court. So the decision

was not “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent.

      2.     The California Court of Appeal’s denial of Piggee’s due process claim

was not an unreasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2) nor an

unreasonable application of clearly established law under § 2254(d)(1).          See

Andrews v. Davis, 944 F.3d 1092, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining “the same

standard of unreasonableness under § 2254(d)(1) applies under § 2254(d)(2)”). To

be competent to stand trial, a defendant must “have (1) a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him, and (2) sufficient present ability to

consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Stanley

v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011).

      The central question is whether a “bona fide doubt” existed as to Piggee’s

competence when Piggee’s counsel asserted a doubt as to his competency in

September 2014. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 385 (citation omitted). To show a “bona

fide doubt,” a defendant must show “substantial evidence” of incompetence. Davis

v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Relevant

evidence includes “a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any

prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860

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(citations omitted). While the Supreme Court has never spoken on what evidence is

required for a competency hearing after a prior determination on competence to

stand trial, our case law is “persuasive” when evaluating whether a state court

“unreasonabl[y] appli[ed]” Supreme Court precedent. Davis, 384 at 638 (citation

omitted). We have previously declared a competency hearing is necessary after a

prior determination on competence when the evidence before the trial court

constitutes “substantial evidence” that “would have raised a bona fide doubt in a

reasonable trial judge that [the defendant] was no longer able to ‘consult with his

lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.’” Maxwell v. Roe, 606

F.3d 561, 576 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402

(1960)).

      After Piggee’s competency was restored in July 2012, Piggee made several

sophisticated legal motions. And while Piggee behaved oddly, the trial judge

attributed Piggee’s behavior to tactics designed to manipulate the court. Although

Piggee’s counsel raised a doubt as to Piggee’s competence on September 3, 2014,

based on his apparent inability to communicate with counsel, the trial judge

concluded that nothing had changed in Piggee’s behavior, and that he was just

putting on a “show.” And notwithstanding the September 15 report of Dr. Sara

Hough, who opined that Piggee was incompetent and not fully compliant with his

psychotropic medication regime, we cannot say that the evidence before the trial

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court raised a bona fide doubt as to Piggee’s competence “beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” See Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020). The

California Court of Appeal reviewed the record and agreed that record supported the

trial court’s determination that “substantial evidence” to doubt Piggee’s competency

did not exist.   Also weighing in favor of the California Court of Appeal’s

determination is that the trial judge subsequently received a report from Dr. Phani

Tumu that was consistent with the trial judge’s interpretation of Piggee’s behavior.

Dr. Tumu concluded not only that Piggee was competent but also that Piggee was

exaggerating his symptoms. Although reasonable minds may differ as to whether

the evidence before the trial court amounted to substantial evidence giving rise to a

bona fide doubt as to Piggee’s competency, we “may not characterize these state-

court factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [we] would have

reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S.

305, 313–14 (2015) (alteration in original). So the district court properly concluded

that the denial of Piggee’s claim was not unreasonable under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

      AFFIRMED.

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