Court Opinion

ID: 9808165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:29:25.696359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:36.566944
License: Public Domain

Montgomery, J.,
dissenting. The law in force up to the time of the adoption of The Code of Civil Procedure— August, 1869- — in respect to the right of sureties on guardian bonds to obstruct a recovery against them by the ward after a lapse of a statutory time, was in these words: “Any orphan or ward, coming to full age, and not calling on his guardian within three years thereafter for a full settlement of his guardianship, shall be forever barred as to the sureties on the bond of the guardian from all recovery thereon.” Chapter 65, section 4 (The Act of 1895), Revised Code. In Johnson v. Taylor, 8 N. C., 271, that section of the Revised Code was construed to require more than a mere demand for such settlement. Hall,, J., who wrote the opinion, said: “I think it is incumbent on the infant, after arriving at full age, not only to call for a full settlement, but to have a final adjustment of all accounts, matters and things with his guardian in three years, and either sue for any balance that may be due him, or notify the sureties to the guardian bond of the true situation in which he stands to the guardian.” The period prescribed for the commencement of a suit against the sureties on bonds of guardians, executors and administrators by the terms of The Code of Civil Procedure, section 34, subdiv. 6 (now subdiv. 6 of section 155 of The Code), is in these words: “An action against the sureties of any *191executor, administrator (collector), or guardian on tbe official bond of tbeir principal; within three years after the breach thereof complained of.” There is no similarity in the language of the two provisions of law above referred to; and the section of The Oode must have been intended to alter the statutory period in the Revised Oode as to the commencement of actions against the sureties on the bonds of executors, administrators and guardians. But what change was intended is not very clearly stated to our minds. The section of the Revised Oode was perfectly clear. The three years statute of limitations in all cases of breach of the bond began to run against the ward from the day he became twenty-one years of age as to the sureties. But what is meant by the words “Within three years after the breach thereof complained of” in The Oode section is not very clear to me, and I can find no decisions precisely on that point.
There are difficulties connected with this subject. The provisions of the bond of a guardian, as they are required to be by section 1574 of The Oode, are stated in terms most general. It is required that the bond must be conditioned that such guardian “shall faithfully execute the trust reposed in him as such, and- obey all lawful orders of the Clerk or Judge touching the guardianship of the estate committed to him.” Breaches of such a bond may be stated as, first, a failure to preserve and manage the ward’s property, including not only that which he has received into his possession but also that which he ought to have received; second, failure to properly care for and support the ward; third, to render an account of the balance to the proper court when required to do so and to the ward when of age; and fourth, to pay that balance to the ward when it is demanded by him. As to any breach of the bond which may occur during the minor-ority of the ward, and which breach may be alleged in a suit by a ward against his guardian after he becomes of age for *192a settlement of a balance due to him, as a breach complained of, the rule laid down in The Code is clear. As for example, if tbe allegation should be that an annual return by the guardian was false, or that the guardian had failed to collect money or to get possession of property belonging to the ward and which he could have collected or gotten possession of, then if the ward did not commence his suit against the sureties on the bond within three years after he became of age a plea of the statute of limitations set up by the sureties would be good, or, if there had been a final account filed by the guardian showing a balance due to the ward, and the ward had demanded the payment of that balance when he became of age, and the guardian had refused to pay it, then there would have been a breach of the bond and the ward be compelled to commence his action against the sureties on his bond within three years from the refusal, or the sureties might obstruct the recovery by pleading the three years statute of limitatations. But in the latter case the law now in force, subdiv. 6 of section 155 of The Code, does not require that the ward shall commence action within three years after his arrival at full age, but only within three years after the breach complained of. Suppose, then, that there had been no breach of the bond by the guardian during the minority of the ward, and that a final account had been filed which was true and satisfactory to the ward, and he should delay for a longer period than three years after the filing of the final account before demand of payment for the amount as due by the final account and refusal to pay the same, the refusal to pay would then be the breach of the bond, and from that time the ward could bring his action within the next three years against the sureties and they could not plead the statute of three years. The six years statute, however, from the filing of the final account by the guardian would obstruct a recovery by the ward for the *193reason tbat it would protect tbe guardian bimself when sued on bis official bond (section 154, subdiv. 2 of Tbe Code) ; and tbe Court would not permit a surety on tbe bond to be bound after the principal on the bond was released by law. Of course a guardian who bad returned no final account, or who bad returned one with an admitted balance against bimself in favor of tbe ward, would not be allowed to plead tbe statute of limitations.
And certainly be would not be allowed to bold in bis bands a fund which be bad admitted was due to bis ward because of a lapse of time, but tbe suit would have to be brought against him not on bis bond but as trustee. Woody v. Brooks, 102 N. C., 334. In tbe case before us tbe guardian never made any return to the Court during the minority of the plaintiffs — the wards. More than three years had elapsed after the youngest one of them had arrived at twenty-one years of age. Seven years after tbat time tbe defendant guardian made a report in the nature of a final account to tbe Superior Court in which there was an amount admitted to be due to the plaintiffs. They at once brought this action against the defendants, the guardian and the sureties on bis bond. His refusal to pay it, or not paying it whep tbe report was filed, was a breach of the bond; and while in the complaint the failure to make annual returns was stated, yet nowhere wras it alleged tbat they were tbe breaches of the bond complained of. On the other hand, the plaintiffs accepted the final returns as true and brought an action to recover tbe amount therein stated, and that was tbe breach complained of. It may be said tbat this view of the law, instead of lightening the burdens of securities and freeing them from stale demands has the opposite tendency and effect; but it is to be said tbat this Court cannot ’make tlio laws. Its duty is to construe them when its judgment is asked. I think there is no error.