Court Opinion

ID: 9810652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:55:22.112803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:08.060445
License: Public Domain

Clark, 0. J.,
dissenting: The evidence in this case was such that if believed the jury could not have found a verdict other than guilty, as the opinion-in-chief intimates. When the officers went up to the defendant’s house they found the defendant and two others running out of the shop building 50 yards from defendant’s house. His son ran back and they found him smashing bottles on the side of the house. These bottles were filled with whiskey. When the officers approached he jumped out of the window and ran with his arms full of bottles which he threw on the ground to break them. He also had bottles in his pockets. The officers continued the search and found 18 to 20 gallons of liquor concealed on the defendant’s premises behind the shop. They also found *740in tbe barn, which was nearer the house than the shop, some jars, one of which had liquor in it. In the shop there were found bottles covered up and hid. The ground nearby had been hollowed out into a trench and a plank put over it; that is, the ground had been turned back and a hollow place thus made, and in it were found other bottles of whiskey. Just above the shop the officers found a keg lying beside a stump with a few briars over it that contained about 15 gallons. At the defendant’s sawmill, about 200 yards from the house, they also found 2 large empty kegs which had whiskey in them, and two 5 gallon demijohns in which there had been liquor, and tracks appearing to have been made the night before.
On this evidence the jury could not do otherwise than convict the defendant. There were several exceptions, but the distinguished counsel for the defendant frankly stated that the only ground on which he could ask for a new trial was the following: On examination of witnesses by the State as to the defendant’s general character, the sheriff testified that the general reputation of the defendant was that he was a liquor handler. To this the defendant objected, but did not except. The deputy sheriff, J. E. Dixon, testified that he was deputy sheriff in that' community, that he knew M. L. Beam’s reputation, but knew “nothing against him except that he dealt in whiskey. That is his reputation.” To this there was no objection or exception. "When asked if he knew any one who had bought liquor from the defendant, he stated that J. P. Hambright had, who was present. Hambright being put on the stand, testified that he lived a little over two miles from the defendant, and that he got liquor there one time from him and paid him $1. That was about 8 years ago. The record stated that the defendant objected to that testimony ■ and excepted. On the argument here the Attorney-General filed a letter from the solicitor that this was not excepted to; that the case was not settled by the judge, but by the prisoner’s counsel and himself, and he had signed it inadvertent to the statement therein that exception was made, but that in fact no exception has been entered. The case was not settled by the judge, and as the defendant’s counsel stated that as a matter of fact the exception was taken, the Court must take it to be correct. S. v. Chaffin, 325 N. C., 665. The defendant’s counsel contends strenuously‘that such testimony was error, but it was error only because too remote and irrelevant, and tended to prove nothing.
It has long been settled by this and all other courts that an error is not sufficient to grant a new trial when it is apparent that it could not have contributed to the verdict.
The evidence is so complete and overwhelming that the defendant was largely engaged in the continuous violation of the statute that it could not possibly have affected the result that the witness stated that he had *741bought a quart of liquor from tbe defendant 8 years before. Tbe sheriff had just testified that he knew the reputation of the defendant, and that he was a handler of liquor, and the deputy sheriff had testified to the same. To neither of these statements was any exception taken. The fact that Hambright stated that he had gotten a quart of liquor from the defendant some 8 years before in no conceivable way could have affected the verdict upon the evidence above stated. It was incompetent and irrelevant because too remote. Its admission was harmless, for if he had testified that he had bought no liquor from the defendant it could not have procured his acquittal in face of the overwhelming proof, and( the fact that he had bought a quart 8 years before could not have added in any way to the force of the uncontradicted testimony of defendant’s guilt.
If the witness had been asked and stated that the defendant was born in that county, or that he was over fifty years of age, or any other similar matter, it would have been equally incompetent and would have had no more effect upon the verdict than the statement that the witness had bought a quart of liquor from the defendant 8 years before. The admission of such testimony as that would not have vitiated the verdict, neither should this evidence of a matter equally irrelevant and harmless.
The prohibition law was enacted in this State upon a referendum to the people 15 years ago, and has been in full force here ever since. So convinced were the people of the whole country that the traffic in liquor was to the public detriment that an amendment to the Constitution of the United States was adopted by both houses of Congress and ratified by 46 out of the 48 states of this Union. A law which has been so solemnly enacted after so long a discussion, and which so clearly expresses the will of the people, should be enforced in an effective manner. The sole function of the courts is to so construe and. execute the law that it may effectuate the remedy desired.
It is universally known that the beneficial result of the statute has been demonstrated not only by the reduction in the volume of crime; in the increased efficiency of a sober population, but billions of dollars worth of real estate once devoted to drinking purposes is paying a larger return under its new uses. The great decrease in the number arrested for drunkenness and other misdemeanors and in the population of the jails and workhouses; the fewer'demands made for relief to charitable organizations; the smaller number of alcoholic patients entered in public hospitals, and a thousand other results demonstrate the wisdom of this enactment which has been placed by so overwhelming a majority in the organic law. Indeed, but for this act the operation of automobiles would not be feasible. The universal popularity of prohibition among retail tradesmen, who have profited from increased business in furnish*742ing the necessities of existence to those formerly deprived of them, is further testimony as to the advantages of the statute.
Every consideration, therefore, requires a frank enforcement of the law when the evidence plainly requires it, and that no mere formal error which cannot affect the result should be permitted to nullify a serious trial for such crime in violation of the fundamental law of the land.
When there occurs an error in the trial which it is apparent could not have affected the result, it has been uniformly held by this and all other courts that it will be disregarded. “Where a case is tried in substantial accordance with law, technical errors not prejudicial do not entitle the losing party to a reversal.” Alexander v. Savings Bank, 155 N. C., 124; Hulse v. Brantley, 110 N. C., 134.
“Technical errors will be considered harmless where a reversal would not result in a different verdict.” McKeel v. Holloman, 163 N. C., 132. Where all the essential facts upon which the result depends have been passed upon by the jury, the appellate court will not for formal error grant a new trial. Rich v. Morisey, 149 N. C., 37.
“Error to warrant reversal must be prejudicial.” Penland v. Barnard, 146 N. C., 378; Ratliff v. Huntly, 27 N. C., 545; Butts v. Screws, 95 N. C., 215; Hosiery Mills v. Cotton Mills, 140 N. C., 458; Harvell v. Lumber Co., 154 N. C., 258; Holt v. Wellons, 163 N. C., 124; Steeley v. Lumber Co., 165 N. C., 27; Brogden v. Gibson, ibid., 16.
“Error alone is not sufficient to reverse, hut there must be harm to the party who excepts, and if it appears there is none, his exception fails.” Carter v. R. R., 165 N. C., 249; Young v. Mfg. Co., 151 N. C., 272; Barker v. Ins. Co., 163 N. C., 175.
“It is well settled that the Supreme Court will not review a ruling of its own, or of the court below, which does not injuriously affect the complaining party, even if the ruling was erroneous.” Nissen v. Mining Co., 104 N. C., 309.
Indeed, the decisions in this Court are uniform and numerous, and based upon the sound principle that the object of a trial is the ascertainment of the truth of the issue, which in this case was whether the party-charged was guilty of dealing in spirituous liquors contrary to law, and on this question there can be no two opinions upon this evidence.
The decisions in other courts are uniform to the same effect. In S. v. Hessenius, 165 Iowa, 415, it was held that the admission of irrele^ vant and incompetent testimony, which could not affect the result and which should have been excluded as immaterial, does not justify a new trial.
In S. v. Chaman, 40 Utah, 549, it was held that the Court, on appeal, will give judgment without regard to defects not affecting substantial rights.
*743In Woody v. State, 10 Okla. Cr., 322, it was beld: “Where tbe legal evidence in a case conclusively shows that a defendant is guilty, and where the jury could not rationally arrive at any other conclusion, ordinary errors committed by the trial court in the introduction or rejection of evidence are immaterial, and will not justify a reversal.” In that case the court laid down the principle which should govern in all such trials as follows: “Where it is clearly proved that a defendant is guilty as charged, a conviction should not be reversed unless it affirmatively appears from the record that the defendant was deprived ‘of some substantial right, to his injury, upon the trial.”
In S. v. Pruett, 22 N. M., 223, it is held: “The admission of an item of evidence which is immaterial, and which technically is inadmissible, where it in no way reflects upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant cannot be prejudicial to him, and is not sufficient cause to reverse a judgment.”
In S. v. Gardner, 96 Minn., 318, it is held: “Errors in ruling on evidence which do not result in prejudice to the accused, and which can in no reasonable way affect the result of the trial, are not sufficient basis for granting a new trial in criminal prosecution,” citing S. v. Nelson, 91 Minn., 141, and other cases.
In People v. Owen, 154 Mich., 571, the principle which should obtain is thus laid down: “A conviction should not be reversed for error in admitting testimony where a verdict of guilty should have been rendered without its admission.” That is exactly the case here.
The universal principle which should obtain is thus laid down as indisputable law in Hoge v. People, 117 Ill., 36: “Where the Court-can see from the record that the evidence is so overwhelming against' the defendant, tried for a criminal offense, that had the jury been instructed correctly they must still have found against him, it will not reverse a judgment of conviction for a mere error of instruction. For the same reason a conviction should not be reversed for admitting testimony without which it is perfectly evident that a verdict of guilty should have been rendered.”
This states the uniform ruling of all the courts on this matter, and is entirely applicable to this case where the evidence admitted could not possibly have reversed the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and that in a matter of violation of a nation-wide and constitutional provision, which the defendant, beyond all possible question, was proven to have been habitually engaged in violating.
The above cases and principles are especially applicable here, for it must be remembered that the testimony objected to was pertinent except for the fact that it was too remote and .had no probative effect. Otherwise it'was perfectly competent.
*744Even in tbe last two volumes of our Reports there are no less than 9 eases enforcing this wholesome doctrine that an error will not justify a reversal unless it appears that it may have affected the result: Rankin v. Oates, 183 N. C., 520; Ledford v. Lumber Co., ibid., 616; Newton v. Newton, 182 N. C., 55; Jordan v. Motor Lines, ibid., 561; Fellows v. Dowd, ibid., 777; S. v. Jones, ibid., 787; and especially in point is In re Edens, 182 N. C., 400, in which Stacy, JJ says: “Verdicts and judgments are not to be set aside for harmless error, or for mere error and no more. To accomplish this result it must be made to appear not only that the ruling was erroneous, but that it was material and prejudicial, amounting to a denial of some substantial right,” citing Cotton Mills v. Hosiery Mills, 181 N. C., 33; Burris v. Litaker, ibid., 376; S. v. Smith, 164 N. C., 476, and Cauble v. Express Co., 182 N. C., 448.
In this last case Walker, J., p. 450, lays down the sound principle in unmistakable language, as follows: “When the aid of this Court is invoked to grant a new trial, the motion for the same will be carefully weighed by us, and will be denied unless the merits are made clearly to appear. Courts do not lightly grant reversals, or set aside verdicts, upon grounds which show the alleged error to be harmless, or where the appellant could have sustained no injury from it.’ There should be, at least, something like a practical treatment of the motion to reverse, and it should not be granted except to subserve the real ends of substantial justice. The motion should be meritorious and not based upon merely trivial errors committed manifestly without prejudice. Reasons for attaching great importance to small and innocuous deviations from correct principles have long ceased to have that effect and have become obsolete. The law will not now do a vain and useless thing. The foundation of an application for a new trial is the allegation of injustice and the motion is for relief. Unless, therefore, some wrong has been suffered, there is nothing to be relieved against. The injury must be positive and tangible, not theoretical merely. For instance, the simple fact of defeat is injurious, for it wounds the feelings, but this alone is not sufficient ground for a new trial. It does not necessarily involve loss of any kind, and without loss, or the probability of loss, there can be no new trial. The complaining party asks for redress, for the restoration of rights which have first been infringed and then taken away. There must be, then, a probability of repairing the injury, otherwise the interference of the Court would be but nugatory. There must be a reasonable prospect of placing the party who asks for a new trial in a better position than the one which he occupies by the verdict.” For this valuable and clear reasoning there is cited numerous authorities, and to which the author of the opinion adds this: “Surely - when this rule, which is both sensible and just, is applied to the facts in hand *745there is nothing to be gained by granting 'a new trial for the reason stated by the defendant, and it would, practically considered, be nnwise to do so, as a motion, so far as it relates to this ground upon which it is based, is without any genuine merit.” This applies to the present case, for upon the same evidence, when the cause is tried again, with the omission of this evidence as to the purchase of a quart of liquor 8 years before, the admission of which is the only error relied on, the result could not be changed.
In S. v. Hairston, 182 N. C., 851, it was held that the error in the exclusion of testimony is not ground for a new trial when it appears that it was harmless. To same purport in 181 N. C. are Cotton Mills v. Hosiery Mills, 181 N. C., 33; Smith v. Allen, ibid., 56; Cotton v. Fisheries, ibid., 151, and other cases.
When we consider the importance of enforcement of this law, which has been placed in the Constitution, it is doubly necessary that new trials shall not he granted when it is apparent that the error complained of, when not repeated on a new trial, would not change the result.
The defendant has been twice convicted — before the recorder’s court and on appeal in the Superior Court. There is nothing that requires that he should have still another trial.