Court Opinion

ID: 9639751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:46:58.028416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:21.477205
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On rehearing, Rancho Guadalupe urges that since no request for findings of fact or conclusions of law was made, then this Court erred in concluding that there was an agreed judgment. The dissenting opinion pointed out, when no findings of fact are requested, we must uphold the trial court’s decision if it can be upheld on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Seaman v. Seaman, 425 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex.1968). The dissenting opinion cites the case of Brawley v. Bowen, 387 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.1965), to show that findings of fact and conclusions of law are proper for hearings on motions for new trial. The Brawley case was written in 1965. At that time, the language of Rule 296 required the filing of a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made within ten days from the rendition of final judgment or order overruling the motion for new trial. Subsequently, the language of Rule 296 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was amended, and the present rule makes no reference to an order overruling a motion for new trial. Under the present rule, a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law must be made within ten days after the final judgment is signed. This will likely exclude the opportunity to make such a request after a hearing on the motion for a new trial because the hearing on the motion would probably be conducted after the time has expired for filing such a request.
Even if findings of fact and conclusions of law were allowed for a hearing on the motion for new trial, the basic rule creating presumptions in the absence of *603findings of fact and conclusions of law applies only to controverted facts. As the Court stated in Brawley, there is a presumption that the trial court found all controverted facts in support of its judgment. The only evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for new trial was offered by the Johnsons. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the Johnsons’ attorney approved the judgment without the consent or knowledge of the Johnsons.
It is a thing of wonder that the dissenter can cite the evidence in his opinion and yet at the same time challenge its existence. In the original opinion, our statement related to undisputed evidence was as follows: “At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the Johnsons presented undisputed evidence (1) that they had not authorized their attorney to settle or to enter into a compromise agreement and (2) that he signed and approved the judgment (S) without their knowledge.”
The uncontroverted evidence supporting each statement is as follows:
(1) “that they had not authorized their attorney to settle or to enter into a compromise agreement....”
Testimony of Fletcher J. Johnson:
Q Did you ever give him authority of any kind to settle or enter into any agreement?
A No, sir.
Testimony of Issac D. Johnson:
Q Did you authorize Mr. McLain [the Johnsons’ attorney] to act in your behalf in entering a Judgment that affected your rights in this lawsuit?
A No, sir.
(2) “that he [the Johnsons’ attorney] signed and approved the judgment. ...”
Testimony of Issac D. Johnson:
Q Did Mr. McLain tell you that he had in fact signed and approved that Judgment in your behalf?
A He told me that he had.
Q Was that — had you authorized him or known anything about it?
A No, sir. I told him he had absolutely no authority to do any such thing.
(3)“without their knowledge.”
Testimony of Issac D. Johnson:
Q Did you have any notice whatsoever that this matter would be heard or that a Judgment would be presented or the contents of that Judgment?
A No, sir.
Testimony from Fletcher J. Johnson:
Q Did he ever tell you that a proposed Judgment or settlement agreement—
A No, sir.
Q —was being discussed?
A No, sir.
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Q Did you ever receive any correspondence from him or anybody else that a settlement was going to be discussed?
A No, sir.
This evidence is undisputed. There is no evidence to the contrary.
Rancho Guadalupe urges in its motion for rehearing that the judgment was merely approved and that this was not tantamount to being an agreed judgment. An agreed judgment means essentially the same thing as a judgment by consent. A judgment by consent is a judgment in which the terms are settled and agreed to by the parties and which is entered of record by authorization of the court. Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 123 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.Comm’n App.1939, opinion adopted).
Civil litigation is by its nature an adversary proceeding. When an attorney in such a proceeding approves such a judgment prior to the trial “as to form and substance” and does not show up for the trial, an inference is created that the judgment as to his clients and the opposing party is an agreed or consent judgment. The record shows that that is what occurred in this case. There would not be such an inference if the judgment had been signed after the trial and had been approved as to form only.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.