Court Opinion

ID: 9706638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:48:27.037349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.115671
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, C.J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the general analysis of the Court, and with the result the Court reaches in People v Bewersdorf. With regard to the result in People v Johnson, however, I respectfully dissent. It is clear, from our perspective at this stage of the litigation, that defendant Johnson simply has no valid prior felony conviction. The prior felony conviction on which the Court of Appeals relied in reinstating Johnson’s habitual felony offender charge is the 1985 ubal-3 conviction. That conviction was itself elevated to felony status on the basis of Johnson’s 1978 and 1981 misdemeanor convictions. The circuit court upheld the validity of the 1981 conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. The circuit court found the 1978 conviction procedurally invalid, however, and the people declined to appeal that ruling.1 It is thus conceded, for purposes of our decision, that the 1978 conviction is invalid. One of the two supporting legs of the felony status of the 1985 conviction has therefore been knocked out. While the 1985 conviction remains valid as a prior misdemeanor, it is now clear that it should never have been elevated to felony status.
At the outset, I think it clear that Johnson’s collateral challenge to the felony status of the 1985 conviction is perfectly cognizable under the principles of Baldasar v Illinois, 446 US 222; 100 S *76Ct 1585; 64 L Ed 2d 169 (1980), and People v Crawford, 417 Mich 607; 339 NW2d 630 (1983).2 While the challenge might, in a certain sense, be described as "twice-removed,” since Johnson is indirectly challenging the validity of the 1978 conviction by way of its effect on the felony status of the 1985 conviction, I do not believe this has any bearing on the relevant controlling principles.3 The people have not contested the propriety of Johnson’s collateral challenge to the 1978 conviction as such; indeed, his challenge succeeded on the merits in that regard, and the people have acquiesced in that result. Nor have the people contested the propriety (as opposed to the merits) of Johnson’s challenges to the 1981 conviction as such and to the inherent procedural validity (even as a misdemeanor) of the 1985 conviction, although Johnson has not, of course, prevailed on the merits with regard to the latter two challenges.
Given all this, it would seem odd if Johnson were deemed legally incapable of challenging the improper effect of the invalid 1978 conviction on the felony status (as opposed to the inherent pro*77cedural validity) of the 1985 conviction. Such a challenge is no moré temporally remote and no less judicially manageable than any routine collateral challenge. Most important, permitting such a challenge serves the very same interests of fundamental justice served by collateral challenges in general.
The Court does not address this issue; rather, it simply notes the limited scope of our grant of leave to appeal in this case, which did not encompass "[Johnson’s] collateral attacks on his prior convictions.” Ante, p 63; see also 435 Mich 880 (1990) (order granting leave to appeal in Johnson).4 This is understandable, and I cannot fault the Court for its strict adherence to our grant order. I note, however, that we "may, at any time, in addition to [our] general powers: . . . permit the reasons or grounds of appeal to be amended or new grounds to be added . . . .” MCR 7.316(A)(3). I would exercise this power in this case, for at least two reasons. First, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, Johnson’s claim involves rather convoluted historical and procedural complexities, and the nature and merits of the claim were not fully apparent to me when the limited grant order was entered. Second, and most important, it would be a grave injustice to this particular defendant to subject him to habitual felony offender liability when, in fact, he has no valid prior felony. John*78son’s claim is substantively meritorious, and this may, realistically speaking, be his last chance for relief.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in People v Johnson insofar as it reinstates the habitual felony offender charge.5
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.

 The circuit court also found procedurally invalid the 1985 conviction itself. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed. The Court of Appeals did not address the validity of the felony status of the 1985 conviction. See n 4.

 Johnson’s challenge is certainly timely in the sense required by Crawford — that is, that it "must be made before a defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted.” Id. at 613-614. This case is on interlocutory appeal and has not yet resulted in a guilty plea or conviction. Johnson’s failure to raise the validity of the 1978 conviction before the 1986 conviction became final, or to appeal the 1985 conviction on that basis, does, of course, preclude him from challenging the 1985 conviction in its own right on that basis. But Johnson is not challenging the 1985 conviction itself in this case; rather, he is challenging the use of the 1985 conviction to subject him to habitual felony offender liability in this case. As we noted in Crawford, "the question here is not whether the conviction is subject to collateral attack as an alternative to direct appeal, . . . but whether the defective conviction may be used in supplemental proceedings when the repercussions to the defendant of his failure to appeal may yet be felt.” Id. at 614, n 14.

 Any collateral challenge is already, by its very nature, "once-removed.”

 While Johnson raised the collateral challenge under discussion in his application for leave to appeal to this Court, the Court of Appeals did not address the challenge, apparently because Johnson did not raise it at that level in response to the people’s appeal. This default (if such it was) is excusable in my view because, while Johnson cross appealed the circuit court’s judgment upholding the validity of the 1981 conviction, the circuit court’s suppression of both the 1978 and 1985 convictions as procedurally invalid rendered moot any issue regarding the effect of the 1978 conviction on the felony status of the 1985 conviction. Johnson evidently did not anticipate that the Court of Appeals might ultimately uphold the procedural validity of both the 1981 and 1985 convictions.

 I agree that the Court of Appeals judgment should be affirmed insofar as it reinstates the ouil-3 felony charge.