Court Opinion

ID: 9825625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:48:43.385132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:13.524848
License: Public Domain

On'Rehearing. McHaney, J. Counsel for appellee call our'attention to a partial misstatement of fact in our original opinion, wherein we said that “the introduction of the former decrees of the chancery court and said deed without objection amounted to a plea of res judicata which should have been sustained in bar of the action,” when, as a matter of fact, objection was interposed to the introduction of said deed only. We think this oversight unimportant'as the introduction of the former decrees of the chancery court alone amounted to a plea of res judicata. Said deed was introduced in the former case and the chancery court, on September 7,1937, rendered a decree finding aUd holding that on December 5, 1929, appellee and her husband executed their warranty deed with relinquishment of dower in and to the undivided 5/6 interest and also the life estate of her husband in and to the remaining 1/6 interest of his former deceased wife in and to the very same lands here involved to the Chronisters for a consideration of $3,000. Said decree dismissed the complaint of Dora Robertson and other named plaintiffs “for want of equity and that all the claim or right, title, or interest of every kind or character made by said above plaintiffs, or owned or held by them prior hereto be quieted in the defendants - . . . and that said interest be divested out of the said above named plaintiffs and vested in the defendants . . .” That decree was affirmed in Robertson v. Chronister, 196 Ark. 141, 116 S. W. 2d 1048, from which we quoted in the original opinion. The language of the decree above quoted barred appellee of every possible interest she might have had in said land, including dower, and was res judicata of this action for dower. But counsel for appellee insist that such is not the effect of said decree, because incidentally the court decreed reformation of some of the descriptions in said deed of December 5, 1929, and that a widow’s right of dower cannot be taken away in a conveyance, where the descriptions in the deed are reformed in a subsequent suit. The cases of Morris v. Covey, 104 Ark. 226, 148 S. W. 257, and Adcox v. James, 168 Ark. 842, 271 S. W. 980, among others, are cited to support the contention. These are cases where it was sought by reformation to enlarge the wife’s relinquishment of dower as contained in the instrument executed by her. For instance, in the case of Adcox v. James, the latter sought reformation of a deed ■by Adcox and wife to him conveying part of a royalty reserved in an oil and gas lease, and described as “an undivided one-sixteenth (1/16) portion of their interest,” etc. It was contended that Adcox intended to convey one-half of his one-eighth royalty which would be one-sixteenth of the total production, instead of one-sixteenth of one-eighth of the total production which would be 1/128 thereof. The chancery court granted the relief prayed as to both Adcox and his wife who joined in the conveyance and relinquished her dower. This court affirmed as to Adcox, but reversed as to his wife’s relinquishment of dower, holding that the royalty deed could not be reformed as to her, as the wife can relinquish dower only as provided by statute, § 1834 of Pope’s Digest, as amended by Act 27 of 1939. 'So, in Morris v. Covey, supra, there was involved the right to reform an instrument so as to enlarge the wife’s relinquishment of dower, and it was held that it could not be done. In the case at bar there was no attempt to enlarge appellee’s relinquishment of dower by reformation, but only to reform indefinite descriptions and to make definite and certain what lands she intended to relinquish dower in. Several of the tracts in the deed were described as “part” or “N. part” or “S. part” of certain calls and they were reformed with descriptions by metes and bounds, and we do not understand there is any question about the correctness thereof, or that they enlarged the grant made in the deed of conveyance. Petition for rehearing denied.