Court Opinion

ID: 9752146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:39:18.980605+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:08.435035
License: Public Domain

YEAGLEY, Associate Judge
(dissenting) :
Since, in my view, the trial court correctly admitted the now disputed evidence, I must dissent. Secondly, even if one should conclude otherwise, the appellant has not preserved an objection to its admissibility.
The events leading to appellant’s arrest began when certain unexplained mileage was noted on the odometer of an agency automobile. Consequently the car was put under surveillance and on the evening of September 25th was discovered missing after hours. The following morning the appellant was seen as he returned the car to the garage. Appellant admitted, on being apprehended, that he did not have authority to use the vehicle but said he had been forced to use it because his own agency automobile was running low on fuel.
At the conclusion of the government’s opening statement, which referred to the foregoing circumstances, defense counsel stated he would object if evidence relating to the prior misuse of the vehicle was presented “in a manner which the jury can assume there were other crimes committed and that the car was taken unauthorized.” The government countered that “the jury is entitled to hear the background as to why the car was placed under surveillance .” The court indicated it was part of the case and it would admit the evidence, but it would not admit evidence that would be confusing. During the trial when official reports regarding the daily utilization of the cars were offered in evidence the defense objected only to certain extraneous data appearing in them. Once the material was removed defense counsel said, “I have no objection”. Indeed, the *482defense had no grounds for an objection to such records. Although they might have presented a basis for investigation they did not constitute evidence of a crime. Neither do I find that an objection was made later when testimony was offered and admitted regarding the unexplained overnight mileage found on the odometers of some cars. Again counsel quite likely failed to object for the very good reason that it did not constitute evidence of a crime and was otherwise relevant. The fact that the defense found no basis for objecting to the admissibility of this evidence is borne out by its motion for a new trial which did not question its relevance.
The unusual nature of these events warranted the trial court allowing the prosecution to explain the reasons why security officials were paying particular attention to the automobile appellant was later accused of misusing. Proof of the prior misuse of the vehicle was necessary to place the appellant’s arrest in the context of its surrounding events. It was proper background data and part of the res gestae, even though the defendant later in the trial admitted in his testimony to using the car on other occasions.
Even assuming that such limited evidence showed that defendant committed other crimes, it was nonetheless admissible. The courts have recognized innumerable exceptions to the rule that excludes evidence of other crimes and have uniformly upheld the use of such evidence where it was offered for some relevant purpose such as to show a continuing plan or scheme, or to show intent, or that the event was not accidental, or as part of the res gestae to fill out the background of the crime by proving the immediate context of related happenings near in time and place.1 When relevant, the evidence may be admitted in the discretion of the trial judge, if he finds its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1958), rev’d on other grounds, 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960).
The majority opinion relies on the general rule of exclusion.2 However, the instances of exceptions to the general rule of exclusion are so numerous that the exception seems to have become the rule.3 Consequently, the Third Circuit has rephrased the rule as follows: “Evidence of other offenses may be received if relevant for any purpose other than to show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.” United States v. Stir one, supra (emphasis added). That court observed further that “the range of relevancy ... is almost infinite”, citing McCormick on Evidence § 127 (1954). See also United States v. Prince, 264 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1959). The evidence in the instant case being relevant background was properly admitted as part of the res gestae,4
In one case relied on in the majority opinion, the court after stating the general rule found the evidence was relevant and affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the evidence was admissible as an exception to the.rule. Robinson v. United States, D.C.App., 317 A.2d 508, 513 (1974). In another, the evidence was ruled as properly admitted as to motive when elicted from the defendant on cross-examination. United *483States v. Bobbitt, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 224, 450 F.2d 685 (1971). Two other cases cited by the majority involved the admissibility, in each instance, of the details of a second and independent holdup committed by the defendant. Such evidence being inflammatory is not comparable to the circumstances here where the disputed evidence was merely that one of the cars was accumulating unexplained overnight mileage. This evidence was not only not inflammatory but was relevant to explain why the use of the car was being watched. The government is permitted to place the circumstances of a crime in context with background information and is not required to present its case in a vacuum.
In a decision in this jurisdiction where the prosecution was allowed to introduce hearsay testimony that there had been a series of holdups previously at the same service station it was held that reversal was not warranted where there had been no objection to the testimony of the other crimes and the evidence was relevant to explain the reason for a stakeout. George v. United States, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 200, 125 F.2d 559, 562 (1942).
Our predecessor court said of the general rule: “But there are exceptions, and the evidence is admissible when the acts are so blended or connected with the one on trial that the proof of one incidentally involves the other, or they explain the circumstances of the offenses charged, or tend1 to logically prove any element of the offense.” McDonald v. United States, D.C.Mun.App., 183 A.2d 396, 397 (1962). To a similar effect are United States v. Bobbitt, supra; United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Turner, 423 F.2d 481 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967, 90 S.Ct. 2183, 26 L.Ed.2d 552 (1970); United States v. Restrepo, 417 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1969).
Even if, as the majority contends, the evidence was excludable, the appellant neither objected to its admission nor did he ask for a cautionary instruction. Trial errors must be objected to at the time they occur if they are to be considered on appeal. Adams v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 232, 234 (1973); Wooten v. United States, D.C.App., 285 A.2d 308, 309 n.3 (1971); Bunter v. United States, D.C.App., 245 A.2d 839, 841 (1968). The power of this court to notice unobjected to trial defects is discretionary and is limited to those affecting substantial rights. It has long been held in this jurisdiction that “ ‘[ajbsent a clear showing of prejudice, we are not disposed to notice alleged errors which are raised for the first time on appeal.’ ” Hill v. United States, D.C.App., 280 A.2d 925, 926 (1971) (citation omitted). See Adams v. United States, supra at 234.
It seems clear the the trial court did not err, nor were the “substantial rights” of the appellant affected by any alleged error. Accordingly I respectfully dissent.

. McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 447-51 (2d ed. 1972, listing ten exceptions but noting it is an incomplete list). See also 2 J. Wig-more, Evidence § 301 et seg., §§ 310, 324, 338 and 341 (3d ed. 1940), and cases cited therein.

. Although the majority opinion criticizes the admission of the evidence as constituting evidence of a crime, it complains on the other hand that the prosecution failed to connect the prior misuses of the vehicle to appellant.

. See authorities in note 1, supra.

. Id.; Price v. District of Columbia, D.C.Mun.App., 54 A.2d 142 (1947). See also Arizona v. Villavicencio, 95 Ariz. 199, 388 P.2d 245 (1964), calling it “the complete story principle” rather than res gestae.