Court Opinion

ID: 9384157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-01 00:00:28.036164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:51.019510
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60184         Document: 00516697112             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/31/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                           March 31, 2023
                                        No. 22-60184
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Christopher Wade,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 4:19-CR-153-1

   Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Defendant Christopher Wade pled guilty to being a felon in possession
   of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). His criminal history included
   a prior state conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
   Wade’s presentence report included this conviction as one of the three
   predicate offenses required to support an enhancement under the Armed
   Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”). Wade objected, arguing that his

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60184        Document: 00516697112         Page: 2   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                     No. 22-60184

   conviction was not a predicate offense under the ACCA. The district court
   overruled Wade’s objection and imposed a sentence of 96 months of
   incarceration followed by five years of supervised release. Wade now appeals.
            In particular, Wade contends that his prior felony conviction cannot
   qualify as a “serious drug offense” because it does not “necessarily entail”
   the conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (i.e., manufacturing,
   distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a
   controlled substance). However, we need not decide this issue because any
   potential error committed by the district court was harmless. See United
   States v. Redmond, 965 F.3d 416, 420–21 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.
   Ct. 1411 (2021).
            If the incorrect guidelines range is used, there are two ways to
   demonstrate harmless error. United States v. Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d 409,
   411 (5th Cir. 2017). “One is to show that the district court considered both
   ranges (the one now found incorrect and the one now deemed correct) and
   explained that it would give the same sentence either way.” Id. The other is
   for the proponent of the sentence to make a convincing showing “(1) that the
   district court would have imposed the same sentence had it not made the
   error, and (2) that it would have done so for the same reasons it gave at the
   prior sentencing.” United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir.
   2010).
            The government has met its burden under the first test. In this case,
   the record shows that the district court was well aware of the different
   guidelines ranges proposed by the parties and repeatedly stated that it would
   nonetheless impose the same sentence regardless of whether it was correct
   about the ACCA enhancement. Specifically, the district court explained that
   its sentence was based on several factors, including Wade’s extensive

                                          2
Case: 22-60184      Document: 00516697112          Page: 3   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                    No. 22-60184

   criminal history, his family background, his ongoing mental health issues, and
   his history of drug use.
          In light of the foregoing, we are satisfied that the district court
   considered both potential guidelines ranges and was determined to impose
   the same sentence regardless. Therefore, any error was harmless. See
   Guzman-Rendon, 864 F.3d at 411. AFFIRMED.

                                         3
Case: 22-60184      Document: 00516697112             Page: 4   Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                     No. 22-60184

   James E. Graves, Jr., Circuit Judge, concurring:
          I join the majority opinion in full. However, I write separately to
   explain   why     Wade’s      conviction    for     conspiracy   to   distribute
   methamphetamine should not qualify as a predicate offense under the Armed
   Career Criminals Act (“ACCA”).
          The ACCA imposes a mandatory 15-year term of imprisonment for
   any person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm who
   previously was convicted of three violent felonies, serious drug offenses, or a
   combination of both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA, in turn, defines
   “serious drug offense” to cover “an offense under State law, involving
   manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
   distribute, a controlled substance” if the offense has a maximum punishment
   of ten or more years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).
          As relevant here, the scope of “serious drug offense” turns on the
   meaning of the term “involving” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This
   definition was recently clarified by the Supreme Court. In Shular v. United
   States, the Court held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) “requires only that the state
   offense involve the conduct specified in the federal statute; it does not require
   that the state offense match certain generic offenses.”140 S. Ct. 779, 782
   (2020). In other words, the state offense’s elements must “necessarily
   entail” one of the types of conduct identified in the ACCA (i.e.,
   manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or
   distribute, a controlled substance). Id. at 785.
          This interpretation narrowed the broad definition this circuit and
   others had previously applied by requiring more than a mere connection to
   manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute a
   controlled substance. See, e.g., United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 365-66
   (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[t]he expansiveness of the word ‘involving’

                                           4
Case: 22-60184      Document: 00516697112          Page: 5    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                    No. 22-60184

   supports that Congress was bringing into the statute’s reach those who
   intentionally enter the highly dangerous drug distribution world”); United
   States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 113-114 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]nvolving has
   expansive connotations . . . encompassing . . . offenses that are related to or
   connected     with    [distributing,   manufacturing,     or    possessing.]”).
   Consequently, this suggests that some crimes may involve controlled
   substances yet nonetheless fall outside the term “serious drug offense” as
   defined in the ACCA. Given the stringency of the ACCA’s mandatory
   minimum requirements, it makes sense that Congress did not intend in the
   ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” to include conduct with only
   a tenuous connection to drug trafficking.
          Notwithstanding this change, this court has observed that the Su-
   preme Court did more than narrow the definition of “involving.” In United
   States v. Prentice, we described how Shular “broaden[ed] the understanding
   of ‘a serious drug offense’ by focusing on the underlying conduct.” 956 F.3d
   295, 299–300 (5th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in the original). When assessing a
   “serious drug offense,” we stated that the emphasis is on whether the of-
   fense’s elements “necessarily encompass [] conduct that is a part of a process
   of distribution,” as opposed to whether they coincide with elements of a ge-
   neric offense. Prentice, 956 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added). “[T]he proper
   question,” therefore, “is whether [the defendant’s] state conviction in-
   volved conduct amounting to distribution of illegal drugs.” Id.
          With this background in mind, in my view, Mississippi’s conspiracy
   to distribute methamphetamine offense does not qualify as a “serious drug
   offense.” Under Mississippi law, conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
   occurs when two or more persons agree to distribute methamphetamine. See
   Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-1 (conspiracy); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-
   139(b)(1) (possession with intent to transfer); see also Henderson v. State, 323
   So. 3d 1020, 1027 (Miss. 2021). Nothing more is required. “Mississippi,

                                          5
Case: 22-60184      Document: 00516697112           Page: 6    Date Filed: 03/31/2023

                                     No. 22-60184

   unlike many other jurisdictions, does not require proof of an overt act in
   furtherance of the agreement to establish a conspiracy.” Peoples v. State, 501
   So. 2d 424, 428 (Miss. 1987). Rather, the agreement itself is a completed
   criminal offense. Id. “And the conspiracy is a separate and distinct crime
   from the substantive offense that is the object of the conspiracy.” Ellis v.
   State, 326 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1976).
          Looking at the statutes of conviction, it is clear that this offense falls
   outside the ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense,” as it does not
   necessarily entail conduct that “is a part of a process of distribution.” See
   Prentice, 956 F.3d at 300. The conduct of manufacturing, distributing, or
   possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute is neither inherent nor
   required for a conviction under Mississippi law. Contrarily, the State
   routinely prosecutes and convicts defendants for conspiring even if they have
   only made an agreement. See, e.g., Berry v. State, 996 So. 2d 782, 789 (Miss.
   2008) (“The State only had to prove that two or more persons agreed to
   commit    a   crime.”).    Because     a   mere    agreement     to   distribute
   methamphetamine does not amount to manufacturing, distributing, or
   possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance,
   Wade’s conviction does not qualify as a “serious drug offense” under the
   ACCA.

                                          6