Court Opinion

ID: 9376397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-02 17:08:29.284055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:06.626163
License: Public Domain

J-S45008-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    NOEL BROWN                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1656 EDA 2022

                Appeal FROM the Order Entered May 20, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-64-CR-0000258-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                FILED MARCH 02, 2023

       Appellant, Noel Brown, appeals pro se from the order entered on June

15, 2022, dismissing as untimely his third petition pursuant to the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

       We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. Following a jury trial in 2016, Appellant was convicted of interference

with custody of children, dissemination of photos of child sex acts, corruption

of minors, furnishing liquor to minors, and trafficking in minors.1 On February

3, 2017, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 180 to

394 months of incarceration. We affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2904(a), 6312(c), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3011(b), and 6310.1(a),
respectively. This Court provided a more detailed recitation of the facts
pertaining to Appellant’s underlying convictions in an unpublished
memorandum filed on October 23, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Brown,
2017 WL 4772761, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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on October 23, 2017. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 2017 WL 4772761

(Pa.   Super.    2017)    (unpublished   memorandum),      reargument    denied

(November 22, 2017).        Thereafter, “Appellant untimely filed petitions for

allowance   of   appeal    to   our   Supreme   Court,   which   were   denied.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 2020 WL 1461011, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2020). On

October 25, 2018, Appellant filed his first PCRA petition. On July 1, 2019, the

PCRA court denied relief. Appellant appealed and, on March 24, 2020, this

Court dismissed the appeal because Appellant’s appellate brief was deficient.

See id.

       Relevant to the current appeal, on January 10, 2022, Appellant filed a

pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Commonwealth Court of

Pennsylvania, which was transferred to the Wayne County Court of Common

Pleas. On April 20, 2022, the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas entered

an order concluding that Appellant’s claims fell under the provisions of the

PCRA. Accordingly, the court dismissed Appellant’s filing as an untimely PCRA

petition.

       Appellant did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, on May 17, 2022,

Appellant filed a pro se motion for reconsideration with the PCRA court, which

the PCRA court denied by order entered on May 20, 2022. Technically, the

motion for reconsideration qualified as a third petition under the PCRA, raising

the same claims as Appellant’s second petition.      See Commonwealth v.

Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[A]ll motions filed after a

judgment of sentence is final are to be construed as PCRA petitions.”). After

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the PCRA court denied relief, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal on May

31, 2022. This timely appeal resulted. Appellant and the PCRA court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2

       Initially, we note that Appellant’s pro se brief does not conform to our

Rules of Appellate Procedure.         Most notably, Appellant fails to provide this

Court with the PCRA court’s order or opinion in question, a statement of both

the scope and standard of review, a statement of questions involved, a copy

of the statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) or an averment that no Rule 1925(b) statement was ordered. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2111.      We could dismiss Appellant’s pro se appeal on this basis

alone. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see also Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200

A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“Although this Court is willing to liberally

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special

benefit upon the appellant; to the contrary, any person choosing to represent

himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his

lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.”).

       Upon review, however, we conclude that the PCRA court lacked

jurisdiction to entertain Appellant’s PCRA petition. We previously stated:

       It is well-established that the timeliness of a PCRA petition is
       jurisdictional and that if the petition is untimely, courts lack
____________________________________________

2We note that while this appeal was pending, on June 9, 2022, Appellant filed
another PCRA petition, his fourth overall. The PCRA court denied relief by
order entered on June 15, 2022, Appellant appealed that decision, and we
address that appeal separately. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 1985 EDA
2022.

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      jurisdiction over the petition and cannot grant relief. The PCRA is
      intended to be the sole means of achieving post-conviction
      collateral relief. If an issue is cognizable under the PCRA, the
      issue must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be
      raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. In other words, a
      defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition
      or motion as a writ of habeas corpus. Moreover, regardless of
      how a petition is titled, courts are to treat a petition filed after a
      judgment of sentence becomes final as a PCRA petition if it
      requests relief contemplated by the PCRA.

Commonwealth v. Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d 986, 994–995 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). “On appeal from the

denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review is whether the findings of the

PCRA court are supported by the record and free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 833 A.2d 719, 723 (Pa. 2003).

      This Court dismissed Appellant’s direct appeal on March 24, 2020.

Appellant did not file a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence

became final on April 23, 2020, when the 30-day period for seeking review

expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“[A] judgment becomes final at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review.”). Thus, Appellant had one year

from the date that his judgment of sentence became final, or until April 23,

2021, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (“Any

petition under this subchapter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final....”).         Here,

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Appellant, on January 10, 2022, filed a writ of habeas corpus, raising claims

pertaining to his trial including, inter alia, issues surrounding witness

identification, his preliminary hearing and right to counsel at that proceeding,

jury selection, and the return of property. The PCRA is the sole means by

which     an   appellant   may     collaterally   challenge   his   conviction.

Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136 A.3d 493, 498 (Pa. 2016), citing 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).       As such, the PCRA court properly treated

Appellant’s contentions as claims under the PCRA and dismissed his filing as

an untimely PCRA petition on April 20, 2022.

        Appellant reasserted his untimely collateral claims in a motion for

reconsideration, which he filed on May 20, 2022.       We consider this to be

Appellant’s third PCRA petition. Because this filing was submitted after April

23, 2021, it was patently untimely under the PCRA. “If a PCRA petition is

untimely filed, the jurisdictional time-bar can only be overcome if the

petitioner alleges and proves one of the three statutory exceptions, as set

forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).” Fantauzzi, 275 A.3d at 996. “The three

narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time-bar are as follows: (1)

interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2)

newly[-]discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.”

Id. (citation omitted). Appellant does not cite the PCRA at all, let alone point

to one of the PCRA’s jurisdictional exceptions. “If a petitioner fails to invoke

a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar, courts are without jurisdiction to

review the petition and provide relief.” Id. at 997 (citation omitted). Without

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jurisdiction, the PCRA court properly dismissed Appellant’s claims.   For the

foregoing reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/2/2023

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