Court Opinion

ID: 9555973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:11:58.361544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:55.717998
License: Public Domain

J-A16033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 PIZZA ZONE, LLC, AND PIZZA ZONE          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 II, LLC                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
                    Appellants            :
                                          :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :   No. 1172 MDA 2022
 CATALINA PARTNERS, L.P.,                 :
 COLONIAL PARK MALL REALTY                :
 HOLDING, LLC, AND KOHAN RETAIL           :
 INVESTMENT GROUP                         :

           Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 4, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Civil Division at No(s):
                            2020-CV-07541-CV

BEFORE:     PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:              FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

      In this commercial lease matter, Pizza Zone, LLC, and Pizza Zone II, LLC

(collectively, Appellant) appeal from the judgment entered in the Dauphin

County Court of Common Pleas, following a non-jury trial and post-trial

motions, in favor of Colonial Park Mall Realty Holding, LLC (Appellee).

Appellant avers the trial court erred in: (1) denying relief on its claim that

Appellee improperly converted restaurant equipment, inventory, and other

property; (2) improperly weighing a lay witness’ testimony with respect to the

value of restaurant equipment; (3) awarding accelerated rent to Appellee, as

it resulted in double recovery, where Appellee took repossession of the subject

premises and has leased it to a new tenant; (4) denying punitive damages for
J-A16033-23

Appellee’s use of distraint to justify the conversion of property; (5) denying

Appellant the return of its security deposit; and (6) awarding Appellee

attorneys’ fees. With respect to conversion, we determine the court erred in

denying relief on Appellant’s claim, and thus reverse that portion of the

judgment and remand for calculation of the value of the converted property.

On the issue of accelerated rent, the trial court agrees it was error to award

this to Appellee. We reverse this verdict, however, on the ground Appellee

waived it for failing to present any supporting evidence or argument at trial.

In light of the foregoing, we vacate the award of attorneys’ fees to Appellee

and remand for reconsideration.            We deny relief on the remaining two

issues — distraint and the return of the security deposit. We thus vacate the

judgment in part, reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further

proceedings.

                                I. Underlying Facts

       The trial court summarized the underlying facts as follows:

       [O]n May 20, 2016, [Appellee’s predecessor in interest] entered
       into a ten-year Lease with [Appellant] and its principal [Mohamed]
       Elbayoumy, to lease commercial space within the Colonial Park
       Mall for the operation of a pizzeria.[1] The Lease was personally

____________________________________________

1 Appellant entered into the lease with Catalina Partners, L.P., who, in
November of 2017, sold its interest to Appellee. See Trial Ct. Op., 11/10/22,
at 1. Nevertheless, Appellant’s 2020 counseled complaint named Catalina
Partners, L.P. as a defendant. The complaint also named Kohan Retail
Investment Group as a defendant; it was dismissed from the action at trial.
Id. at 2 n.2.

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     guaranteed by Elbayoumy. The initial rent was $1,667.67 per
     month with a scheduled increase in July 2018. . . .

         As scheduled, [Appellant’s] rent increased in July of 2018 to
     $2,500 per month.       [However, Appellant] continued to pay
     $1,666.67 over the next fourteen months, through August 2019,
     resulting in an alleged rental payment deficit of $11,526.62.
     [Additionally, f]rom September 2019 through April of 2020,
     [Appellant] allegedly failed to pay rent due in the total amount of
     $20,000.

          [Appellee claimed that o]n April 17, 2020, it provided a
     written Default Notice to Elbayoumy[,] informing him that
     [Appellant] was in default for failing to [pay] $31,652.62 in rent.
     [Appellee] demanded that all amounts due be paid in full
     immediately[, and if not, Appellee] would seek any remedy
     available under the Lease, including eviction.

Trial Ct. Op. at 1-2 (paragraph break added).

     Appellant did not cure the default, and Appellee filed a complaint on July

14, 2020,

     asserting one count against [Appellant] for breach of the Lease
     and one count against Elbayoumy for breach of his Guaranty.
     [Appellee] alleged that as a result of defaults under the Lease and
     Guaranty Agreement, [it] exercised its right under the Lease to
     peaceably reenter and recover possession of the premises.

          [Appellee] sought $251,834.02 in damages jointly against
     [Appellant] and Elbayoumy, . . . including $44,334.02 for past-
     due rent, interest and fees, and $207,500.00 for accelerated rent
     for the entire unexpired balance of the Lease term. [Appellee]
     also [sought] reasonable costs[ and attorneys’ fees[.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 2 (paragraph break added).

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       On September 27, 2020, Appellant filed a complaint against Appellee,2

acknowledging “it made a number of late payments due to poor business,” but

alleging Appellee’s representative had “told Elbayoumy that because business

was poor at the mall, [Appellant] should continue paying the lower amount.”

Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Appellant denied Appellee provided any written notice of

default, and averred a breach of the lease by Appellee’s

       preventing it from accessing the property, and effectively
       terminating the Lease prior to its expiration without providing
       notice. [Appellant] sought $5,000 per month in lost income for
       these breaches and the return of its $3,333.34 security deposit.

              [Secondly, Appellant] asserted a claim for conversion of all
       [its] restaurant equipment and personal property that had been
       left on the property following the Lease termination. [Appellant
       claimed] damages [of $80,000] for the value of converted
       restaurant equipment and personal property[, and] an additional
       $10,000 for the value of ingredients and food stock allegedly
       disposed by [Appellee.       Appellant] also sought costs and
       attorneys’ fees.

Id. at 3 (paragraph break added). For ease of discussion, we will refer to all

of the alleged converted property together as the “restaurant equipment.”

                                  II. Trial Evidence

       The trial court consolidated the two actions and this matter proceeded

to a two-day non-jury trial on August 30 and September 30, 2021. We review

____________________________________________

2 As discussed above, Appellant named additional defendants.          See n.1,
supra.

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the trial evidence, thoroughly summarized by the trial court. See Trial Ct. Op.

at 3-11.

      First, as Appellant does not presently challenge the award of unpaid rent

against it, we briefly recount the following evidence.         Sherease Riley, who

became Appellee’s mall property manager in May of 2020, testified that from

July of 2018 to August of 2019, Appellant paid $1,667.67 monthly, although

the rent amount was $2,500. Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4. Beginning in December

2018, the rental payments “became sporadic,” and the last rental payment

was made in February 2020. Id. Nevertheless, Riley admitted she had no

evidence Appellant was informed, before April of 2020, that it was not paying

enough rent. Id.

      Meanwhile,   Elbayoumy    testified   that   in   July    of   2018,   a   mall

representative told him he could “keep paying the lower rent,” although

Elbayoumy could not recall this person’s name, “had never met him in

person[,] and . . . had no written documentation confirming the alleged

agreement.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. Nevertheless, Elbayoumy acknowledged he

missed the October 2019 and February 2020 rent payments, and that after

the mall closed for the COVID-19 pandemic, “he was no longer able to pay

rent because he had no business income[.]” Id.

      Riley, the mall property manager, testified that on April 17, 2020, then-

property manager Nikki Fry provided Elbayoumy with a notice of default, via

email to mohamed250001@hotmail.com. Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Riley was copied

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on this email. Id. The subject line was “RE: Default Notice,” and attached to

the email was the notice itself, which stated:

       You are hereby given notice of default under your license
       agreement effective June 2016 . . . .

       You have failed to pay timely rent per your lease
       agreement, with charges totaling $31,652.62.

       These charges must be paid in full immediately in order to cure
       the default. If payment is not made[,] or other arrangements
       [with Appellee not made, then Appellee] will be free to exercise
       any and all remedies available to it under the lease and the laws
       of this state, including . . . commencement of eviction
       proceedings. Please also note that under the terms of your lease
       and the applicable law, [Appellee] may be able to collect from you
       not only this amount, but interest, collection costs and attorney’s
       fees if this matter is not satisfactorily resolved immediately.

       If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact
       the      undersigned      immediately     by       email     at
       nikkilzy@colonialparkmall.com.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (emphases added), quoting Trial Exh. D-5 (letter

attachment).

       Riley testified that the following day, April 18, 2020, Elbayoumy replied

to the email, with his email message “appear[ing] in the same email chain.”3

Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Elbayoumy, however, denied he received the April 17th

email, yet admitted he sent an email to Fry on April 18th, and verified his

____________________________________________

3 Riley also produced a read-receipt of the April 17th “RE: Default Notice
Letter,” which reflected “it was read/opened by someone with access to
Elbayoumy’s email address on June 1, 2020[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 5, citing N.T.,
9/30/21, at 41-42.

                                           -6-
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email address was mohamed250001@hotmail.com.                Id. at 8.        Riley

summarized that Elbayoumy’s reply stated:

       [H]e was not sure what [Appellee] expected him to do because
       [Appellant] was not open for business, had no income, and had
       “lost everything.” [N.T. 9/30/21 at 46-47.] He also claimed . . .
       he should be entitled to a discount for March and April rent. . . .

Id. at 5 (some record citations omitted). Meanwhile, Fry informed Appellee’s

representatives she had conversations about unpaid rent with Elbayoumy,

who at times became “angry” or “aggressive.” Id. at 4, 6. At trial, Elbayoumy

denied he was aggressive. Id. at 8.

       With respect to Appellant’s conversion claim, we review the following.

Riley testified that on June 18, 2020 (two months after the default notice),

she emailed Elbayoumy, informing him: (1) Appellant “would not be allowed

to return to its space and that the locks had been changed[;]” (2) Appellee

would pack “anything in the store that does not belong to the mall” and

schedule time the following week for Elbayoumy to pick it up at the security

office; and (3) he could contact the mall office with any questions. 4 Trial Ct.

Op. at 6 (record citations omitted).

           Riley later helped box up Elbayoumy’s/[Appellant’s]
       belongings and they were placed in the security office. [N.T.,
       9/30/21, at 41, 77. Riley was] aware that Elbayoumy called
       someone associated with [the] Mall seeking . . . the return of some
       specific items including a cell phone and other personal property.
____________________________________________

4 In this same email, Riley stated the rent arrears were now $34,166.63, and

noted that “multiple” attempts by her, Fry, and another person “to set up a
repayment plan [with Elbayoumy] had been unsuccessful.” Trial Ct. Op. at 6.

                                           -7-
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         [Id. at 44.] Riley recalled that those items were then gathered
         up and brought back to the mall offices. [Id.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Riley was later informed “by the head security officer that

[E]lbayoumy picked up the boxed items.” Id. at 7. Riley was not aware of

any additional list, email, or letter from Elbayoumy concerning restaurant

equipment he believed he was entitled to. Id. at 6.

         Elbayoumy denied he received this June 18, 2020, email from Riley, and

indeed that he ever “had any contact with Riley at any time[.]” Trial Ct. Op.

at 9, citing N.T., 8/30/21, at 37. Instead, Elbayoumy testified, he emailed Fry

(the prior property manager) and “repeatedly called the mall” concerning the

status of the mall’s reopening, but received no response. Trial Ct. Op. at 8,

citing N.T., 8/30/21, at 20-21. He learned the mall would reopen on June

19th, and “kept calling so he could ready his store[,] but was told by security

they would not allow him in his store.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8, citing N.T., 8/30/21,

at 23.

         Additionally, Elbayoumy testified that on June 18, 2020 (the same day

as Riley’s email), he emailed Appellee’s representative, Sharon Edwards,

stating, inter alia,

         he had observed people in his store on his store security camera.
         [N.T., 8/30/21, at 25.] He claimed that he had not been informed
         . . . there was a new tenant on the premises. He [stated] the new
         tenant, Pizza Anela, which was owned by [his] former . . .
         employee, was using his restaurant equipment.

             Elbayoumy returned to the property on the day the mall
         reopened (June 19, 2020) in order to open his business but . . .
         the locks had been changed.       [N.T., 8/30/21, at 38-39.]

                                       -8-
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      Elbayoumy testified that he was never informed why he was
      locked out and never informed about a new tenant replacing
      [Appellant.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9 (some record citations omitted).

      Elbayoumy also

      broadly claimed that he was never allowed to retrieve his . . .
      restaurant equipment and personal items. [N.T. 8/30/21 at 26.]
      He agreed, however, that he never returned to his store after . . .
      he tried to reopen it on June 19, 2020, . . . never contacted . . .
      Mall representatives . . . to get his property back from his shop
      and . . . never provided . . . any list of any items he sought to
      retrieve. [Id. at 37-38, 40. Elbayoumy] also testified that he
      never contacted the new tenant (his former employee) . . . to
      inquire about his restaurant equipment. [Id. at 40-41, 52.] He
      claimed that he never sought to retrieve his store equipment and
      property because he believed he would be going back and opening
      his business and had no idea why he was not allowed there. [Id.
      at 38.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 9.

      With respect to the value of the restaurant equipment, Elbayoumy

testified he purchased most of it from the prior tenant on May 20, 2016, the

date Appellant commenced its tenancy.       Trial Ct. Op. at 9-10, citing N.T.,

8/30/21, at 9-10. Appellant produced a bill of sale for $25,000, for equipment

including “a pizza oven, mixer, slicer, walk-in freezer, walk-in cooler, pizza

table, steam table, ice machine, sink, tables and pizza tools.” Trial Ct. Op. at

10. Elbayoumy testified he later bought additional restaurant equipment for

$12,214.60 and $7,900, respectively, although he acknowledged on the

second day of trial some of these figures were mistaken, and requested the

court to consider the corrected figures. Id.

                                     -9-
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           Even though he allegedly paid approximately $46,000 for his
      restaurant equipment (less the items he later agreed should be
      excluded), Elbayoumy claimed the value was much higher
      because he had purchased the items at discount. [N.T., 8/30/21,
      at 28.] Elbayoumy testified that it would cost him about $80,000
      to buy used replacement restaurant equipment[. Id. at 32.] He
      later admitted, however, that he had no idea the value he could
      expect to obtain if he were to sell the original restaurant
      equipment (bought for $25,000). [Id. at 36.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 10. Finally, Elbayoumy testified the leftover frozen food items,

which he valued at $10,000, were “still good and usable by the new tenant.”

Id. at 10. However, “he admitted he had not itemized them nor had any

invoices reflecting their cost or existence.” Id.

      Appellee presented the testimony of Donald Barlup, who had been in

the business of buying and selling restaurant equipment for 38 years. Trial

Ct. Op. at 10. Barlup had sold, at Elbayoumy’s request, some of its equipment

on consignment. Barlup

      offered his opinion as to the value of individual items of
      equipment[, and] calculated the total value of all items identified
      to be $18,830.60.[ ] [N.T., 9/30/21, at 81-88.] Barlup declined
      to provide an opinion as to the value of the [Appellant’s] point-of-
      sale system, air conditioner, and paper products or foods, because
      he did not deal in those items. [Id. at 89.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 11.

      As stated above, the testimony was taken on August 30 and September

30, 2021. The trial court directed both parties to file proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law, and they complied.

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                   III. Initial Verdict & Post Trial Motions

       On February 3, 2022, the trial court issued an initial verdict. It: (1)

found Appellant defaulted under the terms of the lease for nonpayment of

rent, and accordingly awarded Appellee $31,652.62 for rent due; and (2)

found Appellee improperly converted some of Appellant’s equipment, and

awarded Appellant $17,239.63.           Order, 2/3/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated).   We

note the court did not award accelerated rent to Appellee. Additionally, the

court denied counsel fees to either party, reasoning they both prevailed on

their claims.5 Id. at 2.

       Both parties filed post-trial motions. On July 21, 2020, the trial court

issued two orders — the first of which denied Appellant any relief. The second

order granted relief to Appellee.         It continued to award it $31,652.62 for

unpaid rent, and additionally awarded accelerated rent on the balance of the

lease, in the amount of $212,500, along with prejudgment interest. The court

also reversed its verdict on Appellant’s claim of conversion, now awarding it

no damages or relief. Finally, the court awarded Appellee attorneys’ fees and

costs in the amount of $33,450.78. Order, 7/21/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

____________________________________________

5 On February 15, 2022, the trial court issued an “Amended Order and
Verdict,” which set forth the same findings and judgment, but further noted
the two parties’ actions had been consolidated.

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       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

                     IV. Statement of Questions Involved

       Appellant presents the following six issues for our review:6

       1. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion in its Order dated July 21, 2022 by awarding no
       damages to [Appellant] when such a decision is against the weight
       of the evidence, such evidence showing that the restaurant
       equipment, ingredients, food stock, or inventory had some
       value?[ ]

       2. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion in accepting the testimony of Mr. Barlup as to the
       value of the converted property when he was not admitted as an
       expert in restaurant equipment valuations nor intimately familiar
       with all of the items and equipment located at the leased Property?

       3. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion by failing to consider [Appellee’s] egregious and
       unconstitutional use of distraint to justify the conversion of
       personal property?

       4. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion by failing to consider the value of the security deposit
       of $3,334.34 or applying it to the judgment?

       5. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion by awarding accelerated rent when the Mall took
       clear possession, and re-leased the space immediately after taking
       possession from [Appellant]?

       6. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law and/or abused
       its discretion in its by awarding the Mall attorney’s fees and costs?

____________________________________________

6 We have reordered the issues for ease of review.

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Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

                            V. Standard of Review

      At this juncture, we note the relevant standards of review:

      Our appellate role in cases arising from non[-]jury trial verdicts is
      to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
      by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
      error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
      judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
      verdict of the jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
      favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
      only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
      in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
      However, [where] the issue . . . concerns a question of law, our
      scope of review is plenary.

      The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a
      non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is
      the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly
      applied the law to the facts of the case.

      [Moreover, t]he trial court, as the finder of fact, is free to believe
      all, part or none of the evidence presented. Issues of credibility
      and conflicts in evidence are for the trial court to resolve; this
      Court is not permitted to reexamine the weight and credibility
      determination or substitute our judgment for that of the fact
      finder.

Davis v. Borough of Montrose, 194 A.3d 597, 605 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted). Furthermore,

      [w]e review a trial court’s ruling on a post-trial motion challenging
      the weight of the evidence for an abuse of discretion. A party is
      entitled to a new trial based on the “weight of the evidence where
      the verdict is so contrary to the evidence it shocks one’s sense of
      justice. [A party] is not entitled to a new trial where the evidence
      is conflicting and the finder of fact could have decided either way.”

Brown v. Halpern, 202 A.3d 687, 703 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted).

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                  VI. Conversion of Restaurant Equipment

       First, Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that no conversion

occurred because it (Appellant) did not demand return of the contested

restaurant equipment.7 Appellant maintains that on June 24, 2020 — within

days of Appellee’s email to Appellant that it was now locked out8 — Appellant’s

counsel sent a letter to Appellee demanding access to the property so that

Elbayoumy could recover personal and business property. Appellant’s Brief at

14-15.    Appellant concludes the denial of damages, for conversion, was

against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 14. For the following reasons, we

reverse the trial court’s verdict on the conversion claim and remand for further

proceedings.

       This Court has explained:

       Conversion is defined as the deprivation of another’s right of
       property in, or use or possession of, a chattel, or other
       interference therewith, without the owner’s consent and without
       lawful justification. When such an act occurs, the plaintiff may
       bring suit if he had an immediate right to possession of the chattel
       at the time it was converted.

____________________________________________

7 We reiterate the trial court initially found Appellee converted Appellant’s
property and awarded Appellant $17,239.63 in damages. However, the court
reversed on post-trial motions, finding Appellant failed to prove any
conversion. Trial Ct. Op. at 14.

8 Appellant characterized this email from Appellee — that it had changed
Appellant’s locks — as sent on June 14, 2020. Appellant’s Brief at 14.
However, Riley testified she sent the email on June 18th. N.T., 9/30/21, at
42.

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Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C. v. Rudinski, Orso & Lynch, 231 A.3d 923,

925 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Conversion may be committed by:

      (a) Acquiring possession of the goods, with an intent to assert a
      right to them which is in fact adverse to that of the owner[;] (b)
      Transferring the goods in a manner which deprives the owner of
      control[;] (c) Unreasonably withholding possession from one who
      has the right to it[; or] (d) Seriously damaging or misusing the
      chattel in defiance of the owner’s rights. Prosser, Torts, § 15 (2d
      ed. 1955).

Norriton E. Realty Corp. v. Cent.-Penn Nat’l Bank, 254 A.2d 637, 638

(Pa. 1969) (quotation marks omitted).

      With respect to a tenant’s property that remains on leased premises,

this Court has stated:

      As a general rule, a tenant does not forfeit or lose title to his
      personal property by neglecting to remove it from the leased
      premises after the termination of the lease. This is so even if the
      tenant fails to remove his personalty within a reasonable time
      after the expiration of the lease. 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and
      Tenant, § 1014. Any retention, use or disposal of the tenant’s
      property by the landlord, or any other exercise of dominion over
      it to the exclusion of the rights of the tenant, constitutes a
      conversion of the tenant’s property by the landlord. Id. . . .

Bednar v. Marino, 646 A.2d 573, 577-78 (Pa. Super. 1994). “It is well-

established that a lessor cannot infer abandonment of a lessee’s personal

property that remains at the leased premises following the tenant’s

departure.”   Hoyt v. Christoforou, 692 A.2d 217, 222 (Pa. Super. 1997)

(citing above passage in Bednar).

      We further consider: “Although the exercise of control over the chattel

must be intentional, the tort of conversion does not rest on proof of specific

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intent to commit a wrong.” McKeeman v. Corestates Bank, N.A., 751 A.2d

655, 659 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2000), citing Norriton East Realty Corp., 254 A.2d

at 638.

      Finally, we note:

      [C]ontract interpretation is a question of law, [and] this Court is
      not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of
      review . . . is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of
      our review is plenary as the appellate court may review the entire
      record in making its decision. However, we are bound by the trial
      court’s credibility determinations.

Ruby v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 50 A.3d 128, 132 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citation omitted).

      We now review the trial court’s reasoning for finding Appellant failed to

establish conversion. The court relied on the following statement in Norriton

E. Realty Corp.:

      “A defendant who has come rightfully into possession in the
      first instance, as for example by a bailment, becomes a converter
      when he refuses to deliver on demand. Since there has been no
      wrongful taking or disposal of the property, demand and refusal
      are necessary to complete the tort.”

Norriton E. Realty Corp., 254 A.2d at 63915 (emphasis added); see Trial

Ct. Op. at. The trial court extrapolated that when a party rightfully comes to

possess property, the other party, who is claiming conversion, must show

there was a demand for the return of property and then a refusal. See Trial

Ct. Op. at 15.

      The trial court then considered a provision in the parties’ lease, that in

the event of Appellant’s default, Appellee could “peaceably reenter and

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recover possession of the Premises and occupy or permit the occupancy

of the whole or any part thereof.” Lease Agreement, 5/20/16 (Lease) at §

13.02(a)(ii) (emphasis added); see Trial Ct. Op. at 15. The court interpreted

the term, “the Premises,” in the above provision, to “includ[e] the restaurant

equipment and other personal items[.]” Id. Thus, the court reasoned: (1)

because Appellant defaulted on the lease, Appellee rightfully came into

possession of not only the leased space but also the restaurant equipment;

and (2) to establish conversion pursuant to the above statement in Norriton

E. Realty Corp., Appellant was required to show it demanded return of the

property and Appellee subsequently refused. Id. at 15-16.

      First, we agree that under the lease terms, if Appellant defaulted,

Appellee had the right to “reenter and recover possession of the Premises.”

See Lease at § 13.02(a)(ii) (emphasis added). However, we disagree with

the trial court’s interpretation that the phrase, “the Premises,” included

restaurant equipment, inventory, and other business or personal property.

We note the lease did not include any definitions section. However, the lease’s

first paragraph refers to the term, the “Premises,” as follows: Appellee was

leasing to Appellant “approximately [779] square feet of ground floor area

(the ‘Premises’).” Lease at § 1.01 (emphasis added). There was no mention

the “Premises” would include restaurant equipment or other property located

within the leased space, and certainly not property acquired by Appellant

following the commencement of the lease. Thus, we construe the term the

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“Premises” to mean only the 779 square feet of empty space, exclusive of

any restaurant equipment, or business or personal property. See Ruby, 50

A.3d at 132 (this Court is not bound by trial court’s interpretation of a

contract). Accordingly, we disagree with the trial court’s finding that Appellee

came to rightfully possess the restaurant equipment.

       Nevertheless, we next consider whether the trial court erred in

concluding Appellant’s failure to demand return of the restaurant equipment

thwarted his claim of conversion. The court found: (1) Elbayoumy was not

credible in testifying “he was never allowed to retrieve” the restaurant

equipment and personal items; (2) Appellee had explicitly advised Appellant

everything would “be boxed up” and it would schedule time for Elbayoumy “to

retrieve items from its store [but he] never responded[;]” and (3) “Elbayoumy

offered no specific testimony or evidence . . . of any attempts . . . to retrieve

his restaurant equipment and other items[.]” Trial Ct. Op. at 16.

       Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that his counsel did send a

demand letter on June 24, 2020.9 Appellee points out, we note correctly, that

Appellant has not provided any citation to the place in the record where

evidence about this letter was presented. See Appellee’s Brief at 6. The list

of trial exhibits does not include such a letter. See N.T., 8/30/21, at 2; N.T.,

____________________________________________

9 We note Appellant does not argue, as we have determined above, that the

trial court erred in finding Appellee came to rightfully possess the restaurant
equipment. See Appellant’s Brief at 14-15.

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9/30/21, at 2.   The trial court’s thorough, nine-page recitation of the trial

evidence did not refer to such a letter. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-11.

      Nevertheless, the case authority set forth above does not require

Appellant to have made a demand for the return of its property, where, again,

Appellee did not come to rightfully possess the property. Instead, all that is

required was Appellee’s exercise or dominion over the property to the

exclusion of Appellant’s rights. See Norriton E. Realty Corp., 254 A.2d at

638 (conversion may be committed by: (1) acquiring possession of the goods,

with intent to assert a right to them that is adverse to that of the owner; (2)

transferring the goods in a manner which deprives the owner of control; or

(3) unreasonably withholding possession from one who has the right to it);

Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C., 231 A.3d at 925 (conversion is the

deprivation of another’s right to, use of, or possession of property, without

the owner’s consent and without lawful justification, and when such an act

occurs, the plaintiff may bring suit if he had an immediate right to possession);

McKeeman, 751 A.2d at 659 n.3 (“conversion does not rest on proof of

specific intent to commit a wrong.”).

      Appellee did not claim at trial Appellant lost its rights to the restaurant

equipment.    Instead, Appellee emphasized it offered to “box up” or pack

presumably smaller items, and Elbayoumy in fact retrieved these items, but

did not demand return of the restaurant equipment or any other larger

property. Nevertheless, we note Appellee’s June 18, 2020, email was sent

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while the mall was closed for the COVID-19 pandemic, and informed

Elbayoumy the locks had already been changed and Appellant was not

permitted to return to its space.    See Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 9.    Furthermore,

Elbayoumy gave undisputed testimony that by June 18th, he had “observed

people in his store on his security camera” and saw a former employee “using

his restaurant equipment.” See id. at 8-9.

      The overall evidence, even if credited in Appellee’s favor, supported a

finding that Appellee deprived Appellant of its rights, use, or possession of its

restaurant equipment, inventory, and other personal and business property.

See Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C., 231 A.3d at 925.              Appellant’s mere

neglect to remove the restaurant equipment after termination of the lease,

even after “a reasonable time” had passed, did not result in forfeiture of the

property. See Bednar, 646 A.2d at 577-78. In light of all the foregoing, we

determine the trial court erred in denying relief and damages on Appellant’s

conversion claim. We thus reverse the judgment in favor of Appellee on the

conversion claim.

      As to the proper amount of damages, we note the trial court’s initial

verdict awarded Appellant $17,239.63 “for the value of the converted

property.” Order, 2/3/22, at 2. There was no discussion, however, of what

items were converted nor their values. In the absence of any discussion of

how the court calculated this sum, we decline to simply reinstate this amount.

Instead, we remand for the trial court to: review the evidence and testimony

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presented at trial, along with the parties’ arguments; itemize the particular

kitchen equipment, inventory, food stock, business and personal property, and

any other items converted by Appellee; and determine the proper value of

each converted item.10 See Lynch v. Bridges & Co., Inc., 96, 678 A.2d

414, 416 (Pa. Super. 1996) (“The trial judge, siting as fact finder has broad

discretion to determine damages in conversion cases[;]” “[T]he fact-finder

may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant

data, and in such circumstances may act on probable and inferential, as well

as upon direct and positive, proof.”).             The court may also consider the

relevance, if any, of the current use of the property — for example, whether

Appellee has conveyed to a new tenant the purported right to use or purchase

the property, or whether Appellee’s new lease with a tenant included use of

the converted restaurant equipment and if so, the added value thereof to

Appellee. The court may also consider, upon proper argument by the parties,

whether Appellant is entitled to, or desires, return of the property, and the

effect of such return on the amount of damages. Finally, the court may direct

the parties to file briefs, or conduct oral argument, or undertake other action

necessary to this determination.

____________________________________________

10 The trial court may also consider whether non-movable fixtures were
converted. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 81 (testimony of Barlup that the kitchen
hood is “attached to the wall”). We offer no opinion on this question.

                                          - 21 -
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                  VII. Value of Alleged Converted Property

       In its second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the testimony of

Appellee’s witness, Barlup, as to the value of the restaurant equipment

allegedly converted by Appellee. Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant points out

that while the trial court and Appellee’s counsel made a brief reference to the

possibility of Barlup testifying as an expert,11 Appellee did not, in fact, present

Barlup as an expert.       Id. at 11-12, citing N.T., 9/30/21, at 77 (discussed

infra).     Nevertheless, Appellant contends, the trial court improperly

“elevated” Barlup’s testimony to that of an expert, and he (Appellant) was

“unfair[ly] surprise[d]” by this expert testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 9, 13.

       In light of our remand for the trial court to weigh all the trial evidence

presented and determine the proper amount of damages for conversion, we

conclude no further review of this issue is necessary. See Printed Image of

York, Inc. v. Mifflin Press, Ltd., 133 A.3d 55, 59 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“An

issue before a court is moot ‘when a determination is sought on a matter

____________________________________________

11 We note Barlup initially testified he sold some of Appellant’s equipment on

consignment, listing the sold items and correlating prices. N.T., 9/30/21, at
25-28. Appellant declined to conduct any cross-examination. Id. at 30. After
another witness testified, the trial court asked whether Barlup was still
available to testify, and Appellee’s counsel responded he was. Id. at 77. The
trial court then commented, “Wouldn’t he be an expert?,” and Appellee’s
counsel stated, “I believe he would be an expert.” Id. However, upon
recalling Barlup to testify, Appellee again did not present him as an expert
witness. Id. at 79.

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which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing

controversy.’”) (citation omitted).

                            VIII. Distraint of Property

       Next, Appellant contends Appellee “previously” argued it was “allowed

to distrain [Appellant’s] property based on 68 P.S. § 250.302” of the Landlord

and Tenant Act of 1951.12          Appellant’s Brief at 15.   Appellant points out,

however, this statute was found unconstitutional in Smith v. Coyne, 722 A.2d

1022 (Pa. 1999), and thus argues the trial court erred in “failing to consider

[Appellee’] egregious and unconstitutional use of distraint to justify the

conversion of personal property.” Appellant’s Brief at 15.

       Appellee responds Appellant has “not in any way explain[ed] how any

alleged exercise of distraint . . . informed the Trial Court’s overall adjustment

of the parties’ respective financial positions.” Appellee’s Brief at 7. We agree.

Appellant does not provide any explanation for Appellee’s “previous[ ]”

reliance on distraint and, saliently, does not explain when or how the trial

court ruled or granted relief on the theory of distraint. See Appellant’s Brief

at 15-16. Our review of the trial court’s opinion reveals no mention of it.

____________________________________________

12 68 P.S. §§ 250.101-250.602.  See 68 P.S. § 250.302 (“A landlord or such
agent may also, in the manner above provided, distrain personal property
located on the premises but only that belonging to the tenant, for arrears of
rent due on any lease which has ended and terminated, if such distress is
made during the continuance of the landlord’s title or interest in the
property.”).

                                          - 23 -
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Instead, the trial court reviewed in detail the issue of conversion. See Trial

Ct. Op. at 14-18. In the absence of any discussion by Appellant of when or

how the trial court considered distraint, much less granted relief on it, we

conclude this vague claim does not merit relief.          See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)

(argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are

deemed pertinent”).

                 IX. Denial of Return of Security Deposit

      In its fourth issue, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in failing to

award the return of its security deposit, in the amount of $3,334.34. The trial

court suggests this issue is waived, for Appellant’s failure to present any

evidence at trial, and raising it for the first time in the post-trial motion. Trial

Ct. Op. at 19. Appellant responds the issue was not waived because the lease,

“which speaks for itself,” was presented as an exhibit at trial, and counsel’s

opening statement stated it was seeking return of the security deposit.

Appellant’s Brief at 16-17. We agree this issue is waived.

      First, we note the lease: was printed in small type; spanned 20 pages

(excluding the signature pages); was apportioned into 20 major articles, each

further divided with subheadings; and comprised at least 137 paragraphs. We

disagree with Appellant’s contention, which is not supported by citation to any

law, that the mere presentation of this particular, lengthy lease at trial

encompassed an actionable claim for the return of its security deposit. See

Appellant’s Brief at 17.   Appellant’s reliance on in its opening statement

                                      - 24 -
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does not cure its failure to present evidence on this issue.13 Accordingly, the

issue is waived and no relief is due. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised

in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.”); Gustine Uniontown Assocs., Ltd. v. Anthony Crane Rental,

Inc., 892 A.2d 830, 835 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“The appellate rules direct that

an issue must be raised in the trial court in order to provide that court with

the opportunity to consider the issue, rule upon it correctly, and obviate the

need for appeal.”).

                  X. Award of Accelerated Rent to Appellee

       In its fifth issue, Appellant avers the trial court erred in awarding

Appellee accelerated rent in the amount of $212,500. Appellant maintains

that because Appellee took repossession of the premises, the accelerated rent

award resulted in an improper double recovery. Appellant’s Brief at 18.

       In its opinion, the trial court agrees it was an improper double

recovery.14 Trial Ct. Op. at 20-21, citing Ferrick v. Bianchini, 69 A.3d 642,

____________________________________________

13 Appellant’s opening statement, spanning three pages, was relatively brief.

The sole reference to the security deposit was in sum: “[Appellant is] seeking
damages in the amount of $80,000 for . . . all the equipment [it] has, plus
$10,000 for the disposed food that was frozen and was still good which [it]
never got back, plus the unreturned security deposit of [$3,333.34],
and the cost of this action, attorney’s fees, and other such relief as the Court
may deem reasonable.” N.T., 8/30/21, at 6 (emphasis added).

14 On appeal, Appellee acknowledges that in a confession for judgment, “a
landlord may not both confess judgment for possession and seek accelerated
rent.” Appellee’s Brief at 9. However, it argues, if a “full trial” has been
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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656 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“If the landlord terminates the lease and evicts the

tenant before the acceleration clause is enforced, the landlord cannot recover

rent for the post-eviction period.”); Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci, 662 A.2d

1092, 1100 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (landlord may cumulate remedies

provided in the lease, but he may not avail himself of double remedies; he

can eject the tenant and enter judgment for the rent accrued when the tenant

was evicted, but cannot recover both the possession and the rent for the

balance of the term). We reverse the court’s verdict on this issue on other

grounds — that Appellee waived its claim for failure to pursue it at trial.

       We note Appellee’s complaint: (1) averred that under Section 13.02(f)

of the lease, it was entitled to accelerate future rent payments; and (2)

demanded $207,500 for accelerated rent for the entire unexpired balance of

the lease term.15 Appellee’s Complaint, 7/14/20, at 3-4. At trial, however,

____________________________________________

conducted, a landlord may take both possession and accelerated rent,
provided the latter is subject to credit for any rent received from a successor
tenant. Id. Appellee then contends that here: (1) Appellant failed to present
evidence of “what, if any, rent had been received by Appellee[ ] following” the
repossession; (2) “[t]his was a failure of Appellant[ ] to develop a mitigating
defense[;]” and (3) the award of accelerated rent should be affirmed. See
id. at 9-10. In light of our disposition, we do not reach the merits of the trial
court’s or the parties’ arguments on appeal.

15 Subsection 13.02(f) of the lease provides that upon default by Appellant,

Appellee “shall have the right to accelerate the whole or any part of the [rent]
for the entire unexpired balance of the Lease Term[.]” Lease at § 13.02(f).
Furthermore, Subsection 13.02(b) provides that upon Appellant’s default,
Appellant “shall be liable for . . . all rent through the remainder of the Lease
Term[.]” Lease at § 13.02(b).

                                          - 26 -
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neither the parties nor the trial court addressed the lease provisions regarding

rent acceleration.     Saliently, Appellee presented no argument or evidence

regarding accelerated rent, such as the number of months remaining on the

lease term or a calculation of the total amount that would have been due.16

Although Appellee’s post-trial proposed findings of fact and conclusions of

law sought accelerated rent of $212,500, its sole evidentiary support was

Appellant’s trial Exhibit 1 — which was the lease itself — and its own Exhibit

3 (entitled “Pizza Zone Reconciliation”).17 Appellee’s Proposed Findings of Fact

& Conclusions of Law, 11/1/21, at 10.              However, at trial, Appellee’s own

counsel accurately described Exhibit 3 as a spreadsheet listing the late or

unpaid rent amounts between January 1, 2018, and of April 1, 2020 — which

we note was $31,652.62. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 34-35; Appellee’s Exhibit 3.

The exhibit makes no mention of the future rent that would be due thereafter,

____________________________________________

16 We note there was one reference at trial to “accelerated rent,” but it was

made by the trial court and appeared to be a misstatement. The court
addressed Riley during her testimony: “Did you find any person named Mike
that would have had the authority to . . . tell the [Elbabyoumy] that he didn't
have to pay the accelerated rate?” See N.T., 9/30/21, at 40 (emphasis
added). However, the surrounding questions and responses concerned about
the increase of the rent amount, from $1,666.67 to $2,500 as of July of 2018.
See id. at 37-41; see also id. at 41 (trial court asking whether “Mike Kohan
[had] the authority to tell [Elbayoumy about] his rent escalation”). There
was no discussion about the amount of post-breach rent due or accelerated
rent.

17 See N.T., 9/30/21, at 3 (Index to Exhibits).

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over the remaining, unexpired lease term. Nothing in the exhibit supported

Appellee’s claim for $212,500 in accelerated rent.

       We thus conclude that in the absence of any evidence or argument

presented at trial in support of its claim for accelerated rent, the trial court

erred in awarding accelerated rent to Appellee. Accordingly, we reverse this

award.

                  XI. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Appellee

       In Appellant’s sixth and final issue, it avers the trial court erred in

awarding Appellee attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $33,450.78.

Appellant’s sole supporting argument is that Appellee did not admit evidence

of its attorneys fees into the record at trial.18 Appellant’s Brief at 18.

       In its initial verdict, which found in favor of Appellee on unpaid rent but

in favor of Appellant on conversion, the trial court denied both parties

attorneys’ fees on the ground “each party prevailed on their claim.” Order,

2/3/22. In support of its amended verdict which did award attorneys’ fees to

Appellee, the trial court cited the lease provision that a “prevailing party in . .

. litigation shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney’s fees . . . from

the other party.”     Trial Ct. Op. at 21.

____________________________________________

18 In its opinion, the trial court noted Appellee asserted “[i]n its Proposed
Findings of fact and Conclusions of Law” that it incurred $15,795 in attorneys’
fees, $16,900 in “additional fees,” and $755.78 “in out-of-pocket costs.” Trial
Ct. Op. at 21.

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      As both this Court and the trial court have now determined Appellant is

entitled to relief on the accelerated rent claim, and this Court has further

reversed the denial of relief to Appellant on its conversion claim, we hereby

vacate the award of attorneys’ fees to Appellee. On remand, the trial court

shall consider anew whether each party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, in

conjunction with the other issues remanded for further review.

                              XII. Conclusion

      In sum, we: (1) reverse the judgment in favor of Appellee on Appellant’s

claim of conversion, and remand for the trial court to determine the proper

amount of damages in favor of Appellant; (2) reverse the $244,152.62 award

of accelerated rent to Appellee, on the ground Appellee failed to present any

relevant evidence or argument at trial; (3) vacate the $33,450.78 award of

attorneys’ fees to Appellee, and remand for reconsideration of whether either

party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, and if so, in what amounts; and (4) deny

relief on Appellant’s remaining issues. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment

in part, reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

                                    - 29 -
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     Judgment vacated in part, reversed in part, and affirmed in part. Case

remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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