Court Opinion

ID: 8889623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 22:53:49.857933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:07.956996
License: Public Domain

B OREM AN, Senior Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I am in agreement with the result reached by Judge Craven in that portion of his opinion which holds that Albe-marle Paper Company has failed to show a business relationship between the racially biased tests administered to pro--spective employees, and its personnel requirements. However, from that portion of his opinion reversing the district court’s refusal to award back pay, I must respectfully dissent.
The appellants advance multiple theories in their effort to persuade this court to modify the relief granted below to include an award of back pay. The two arguments approved and adopted by Judge Craven are: first, the equation of § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), with § 706(k) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), which provides for an award of attorney’s fees in the discretion of the court and under which the federal courts have held attorney’s fees are to be awarded as of course,1 in the absence of “special circumstancesand second, that failure to grant back pay was an abuse of discretion under Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791 (4 Cir. 1971).
In Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4 Cir. 1971), this court, over my strenuous objections stated in dissent, extended the holding of the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402-403, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968), that attorney’s fees should ordinarily be granted in *143suits under Title II of the Act,2 to include suits under Title VII as well. A study of the relevant sections and the reasoning behind the Newman and Lea decisions reveals the fallacy of a comparison between the provision for attorney’s fees and for back pay.
The pertinent provisions with respect to the allowance of attorney’s fees under Title II and Title VII are virtually identical, and each was considered by Congress as sufficiently significant to be expressed in an individual subsection.3 However, the grant of authority to award back pay is found in a completely different subsection of Title VII, the congressional separation of these two provisions indicating an intent to treat them independently. Furthermore, the subsection in which the provision for back pay is found generally sets out the equitable remedies which the district court may utilize in fashioning relief should the complaining party prevail, indicating no congressional intent to give an award of back pay any greater presumption of appropriateness than its companion remedies.4
More significant, however, is the reason for which the district courts’ discretion was found to be limited with respect to the award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties plaintiff. In bringing an action against an employer (or manager of a public accommodation under Title II) for discrimination in the operation of his business, the plaintiff is more than a private party litigant; he acts as a “private attorney-general” in vindicating the interests of the public, and it is this advancement of the commonweal that is the basis for allowing attorney’s fees as of course.5 Such a public purpose is not present in the more delicate task of fashioning the appropriate equitable relief to fit the peculiar fact pattern of each case, and the monetary award is intended to redress purely private inequities.6
I must conclude, therefore, that the award of back pay, unlike the grant of attorney’s fees, is an element of affirmative relief which has been entrusted to the more general discretion of the district courts.7
Judge Craven’s opinion also apparently adopts the view that this court’s decision in Robinson v. Lorillard, supra stands for the proposition that under facts similar to those in Robinson, it would be an abuse of the district court's discretion to deny a request for back pay. Such a construction misinterprets the holding in Robinson and the proper *144scope of appellate review of discretionary decisions. The burden of persuasion falls on the party attempting to show an abuse of discretion and not on the successful party below.8 In Robinson the holding of this court was that the appellant company failed to show, under the factual situation before the district court, that it was an abuse of discretion to award back pay, not that back pay was mandated under those circumstances. The term “discretion”9 denotes that more than one acceptable alternative is available and the choice of the most appropriate is properly left in the hands of the district courts which are more intimately involved with the ambiance of the cases and the merits of each position than are the Courts of Appeal.10
“ ‘We must keep in mind that the discretion is to be exercised by the district court and not by a court of review. This court should not substitute its discretion for that of the district court.’ ” (Emphasis supplied by Larson.) Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 167, 170 (8 Cir. 1961).
The first reason assigned by the district court for its refusal to award back pay — that there was no evidence of bad faith noncompliance with the Act as evidenced by the active recruitment of Negroes into the company’s training program for certain skilled lines of progression as early as 1964, the company-initiated merger of some lines of progression to increase advancement opportunities and good faith attempts to validate its testing procedures — 11 is not sufficiently compelling, in and of itself, to support a denial of back pay. In Robinson this court made clear that the remedy of back pay is not in the nature of a punishment but is an equitable measure to restore those discriminated against to their proper economic position had the complained of actions not occurred.12 This is not to say, however, that the good faith of the company may never be taken into account in considering and determining the proper relief to be granted.13 Should there exist equitable factors of which the district court may properly take cognizance, and which are supportive of a decision to deny back pay, then innocence and good faith efforts on the part of the employer may be factors to be weighed in the balancing of equities.
Some insight into the proper application of that equitable balancing power may be gained from an examination of the third argument advanced by the ap*145pellants, a comparison of § 706(g) with § 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). In the case of Phelps Dodge v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941), which was decided under § 10(c), the Labor Board had ordered reinstatement of a discriminatorily discharged employee together with a full award of back pay, although the employee had not earned wages during the period of his lay-off. In remanding to the Board for modification in light of the principle of mitigation of damages, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he advantages of a simple rule must be balanced against the importance of taking fair account, in a civilized legal system, of every socially desirable factor in the final judgment. The Board, we believe, overestimates administrative difficulties and underestimates its administrative resourcefulness. Here again we must avoid the rigidities of an either-or-rule. The remedy of back pay, it must be remembered, is entrusted to the Board’s discretion; it is not mechanically compelled by the Act. And in applying its authority over back pay orders, the Board has not used stereotyped formulas but has availed itself of the freedom given it by Congress to attain just results in diverse, complicated situations. (313 U.S. at 198, 61 S.Ct. at 854.)
The primary factor given by the district court in the instant case was prejudice to the interests of the company arising from representations made by the appellants in their status as plaintiffs below. During the early stages of this case, the company moved for Summary Judgment and in replying to that motion,14 the plaintiffs set out the limits of the relief sought:
It is important to understand the exact nature of the class relief sought by plaintiffs. No money damages are sought for any member of the class not before the court, nor is specific relief in the way of job changes, promotions or the like being sought for any member of the class not before the court. The only relief sought for the class as a whole is that defendants be enjoined from treating the class as a separate group and discriminating against the class as a whole in the future. ...
[T]he matter of specific individual relief for other class members is not before this Court.
Judge Craven in the majority opinion erroneously characterizes the prayer for back pay as merely a tardy request, when as illustrated above, it in fact was a reversal of express representations made three and one-half years prior to the request for additional relief.15 This situation is plainly distinguishable from Robinson, in which the oral representation by counsel for the plaintiffs that no monetary relief was sought was made at pre-trial conference. The prejudice to Albemarle stemmed not from a failure of defenses, with which this court was concerned in Robinson, but from the unconscionably long delay between the express disclaimer and the unindicated, abrupt reversal of position.
Rule 54(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the federal courts “shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings,” but this is not the ordinary case of a mere failure to request a specific form of relief ; here there was an express and formal disclaimer of intention to seek that particular remedy. An opposng party should be permitted to rely on such a statement, and to the extent that in relying thereon he has acted to his detri*146ment,16 Rule 54(c) does not mandate the grant of the contested award.17
More importantly, Rule 54(c) is merely the vehicle by which the party is to obtain the “relief to which he is entitled.” The relief and the entitlement thereto are to be determined by the district court under § 706(g), and Rule 54(c) cannot compel the grant of relief which is within the discretion of the district court. The court below did not base its refusal to award back pay on the failure to request such relief pursuant to Rule 8(a), F.R.Civ.P., but by virtue of its discretionary powers under § 706(g); the source of the claim of authority for granting the award sought is the very source relied upon by the court below to deny the request.
I do not find it possible to say that the reasons assigned by the district court in support of its decision not to award back pay show an abuse of discretion, and I would therefore affirm the decision below. Under the circumstances here I would not be willing, in any event, to go beyond a direction to the district court to investigate the propriety of awarding back pay with respect to those named plaintiffs actually before the court since the representations of the appellants in their Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment explicitly indicate an intent to seek affirmative, individual monetary relief only for themselves, a relatively small group, and for no others.

. Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4 Cir. 1971).

. Accord, Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239, 242 (4 Cir. 1968).

. Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) :
(b) In any action commenced pursuant to this subehapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) :
(k) In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the samo as a private person.

. The authorities generally deal with injunctive relief as within the discretion of the district courts. E. g. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1202 (7 Cir. 1971).

. Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4 Cir. 1971). See, Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32 (5 Cir. 1968). Developments in the Law — Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1904, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1254 (1971).

. See, Austin v. Reynolds Metals, 327 F.Supp. 1145, 1153 (E.D.Va.1970).

. E. g., Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9 Cir. 1972); LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 460 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5 Cir. 1972): United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4 Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5 Cir. 1969). Developments in the Law — Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1109, 1265 (1971).

. LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 460 F.2d 1228, 1229 (5 Cir. 1972).

. The Supreme Court has defined “discretion” as follows:
The term “discretion” denotes the absence of a hard and fast rule. . When invoked as a guide to judicial action it means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.
Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 247, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931).

. United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800, 804 (4 Cir. 1970) :
The government has urged us to remand with directions to enter specific injunctive relief. After careful consideration we have concluded to deny this request. The fashioning of effective une! appropriate injunctive relief depends in part on the discretion of the district court. The function of the courts of appeal is to review the relief which the district court grants in light of finding's and the supporting record and to determine if there has been an abuse of discretion.

. In 1963 the company discontinued the use of the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test, which is regarded to be racially biased (See Cooper and Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 Harv.L.Kev. 1598, 1641 n. 16 (1969)) in favor of Wonderlic A & B tests.

. 444 F.2d 791 at 802, 804.

. See, Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 1002, 1006-1007 (9 Cir. 1972).

. The answer was filed on November 22, 1966.

. The request was first communicated to the company on June 4, 1970.

. Illustrations of the detriment arising from the reliance of the defendants upon the express disclaimer by the plaintiffs of their intention to seek back pay for members of the class generally, were argued before the district court at pretrial conferences: (1) The extensive period of time taken for prosecution of the suit exposed the defendants to the unexpected hazard of a potentially enormous award, unavailable for consideration during their continued efforts to arrive at a settlement, and which threatened the financial viability of the defendant paper mill. (2) During the hiatus with respect to the back pay claim, the paper mill was sold by the defendant Ethyl Corp. to the defendant Iloerner-Waldorf Corp., with the transfer agreement taking express notice of the pend-ency of suit, a strong indication of the impact the status of that suit had upon the deliberations of the principals. (3) The inordinately long delay tended to preclude the defendants from adequately preparing a defense to individual claims, due to the impossibility or impracticality of deposing witnesses and claimants nearly five years after the occurrences of events of which plaintiffs complain.

. Rental Development Corp. v. Lavery, 304 F.2d 839, 842 (9 Cir. 1962).