Court Opinion

ID: 9635055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:34:19.371435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:16.619001
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Chief Justice.
This case arises from medical complications ensuing from breast lift surgery. The Appellant, Sharon Jo Ann Harrison filed a medical negligence claim against Dr. George Valentini who performed the lift surgery and administered follow-up care. The trial court dismissed the action *523as time-barred and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary review to consider whether the continuing treatment Appellant received from Appel-lee tolled the applicable statute of limitations, rendering her claim timely. Our close examination of the doctrine and its rationale convinces us to answer in the affirmative.1 We therefore reverse and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Ms. Harrison, who had previously received breast implants, underwent breast lift surgery on October 2, 1997. She began experiencing complications within a couple of weeks. Specifically, she experienced drainage from her breasts and skin deterioration, ultimately resulting in the loss of her left nipple and numbness in her right nipple. Dr. Valentini made several subsequent unsuccessful attempts to replace her nipple and to correct additional disfigurement resulting from the 1997 surgery. Appellant remained in Dr. Valenti-ni’s care for nearly three years. During this time she had initial consultations with three other doctors to explore additional treatment options, but each told her to give the healing process more time or suggested that she remain in Dr. Valentini’s care. She continued primary treatment with Dr. Valentini until April 11, 2000.
On November 16, 2000, more than three years after the 1997 surgery, but within one year of Harrison’s last appointment with Dr. Valentini, suit was filed. After preliminary discovery, Dr. Valentini moved for summary judgment on two grounds: 1) that Ms. Harrison’s action should be barred by the applicable statute of limitations and 2) that Ms. Harrison failed to offer adequate expert testimony that Dr. Valentini’s treatment deviated from the requisite standard of care. The trial court granted summary judgment in Dr. Valenti-ni’s favor, holding that Ms. Harrison’s cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Neither court reached the issue of the sufficiency of the expert testimony on the standard of care issue.
On her appeal to this Court, Ms. Harrison contends that the statute of limitations should have been tolled because Dr. Valen-tini obstructed her from filing suit, and/or that this Court should recognize the continuous course of treatment rule. As there is little evidence of obstruction, we need not address the issue. Rather, the fact of Appellant’s continuing treatment by Dr. Valentini will be our decisional basis.
Generally, a medical negligence lawsuit must be brought within one year of the date the cause of action accrues or is discovered.2 This rule, which is codified in KRS 413.140(2), establishes the time that the action accrues if an injury is not immediately discoverable.3 It establishes the date of accrual as the date that the injury is or, with reasonable care, should have been discovered.4
Applying the rule in medical malpractice cases can be confusing because *524“injury” is a term of art in the law.5 Undesirable results of medical treatment do not constitute compensable injury.6 Rather, such injury is defined as “the invasion of any legally protected interest of another.” 7 Thus, “[legal] injury in the medical malpractice context refers to the actual wrongdoing, or the malpractice itself.”8
Accordingly, under the discovery rule, actual or constructive knowledge of the medical negligence triggers the commencement of the statute of limitations.9 This is problematic because often the patient cannot know whether the undesirable outcome is simply an unfortunate result of proficient medical care or whether it is the consequence of substandard treatment. Thus, a patient is left to speculate about the cause of the problem.
Moreover, neither the discovery rule nor KRS 413.190 affords the physician and patient an opportunity to significantly cooperate with each other to improve the initial results or mitigate the damages caused by the poor treatment. Rather the patient is required to file suit immediately to avoid the risk of his suit being time-barred.10 Such a requirement operates to undermine rather than bolster the relationship of trust and confidence that a patient should be able to have with his or her physician.11
Ms. Harrison suggests that the continuous course of treatment doctrine can eliminate these concerns. Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations is tolled as long as the patient is under the continuing care of the physician for the injury caused by the negligent act or omission.12
This court has previously held that the continuous representation rule in legal malpractice cases coalesces with the legislative intent inherent in the enactment of the discovery rule. In Alagia, Day, Trautwein & Smith v. Broadbent,13 this Court elaborated on the underlying principles for the continuous representation rule:
[W]e believe it [the continuous representation rule] reflects the intent of the general assembly with its enactment of the discovery rule. Moreover, we perceive a practical advantage in the continuous representation rule. In a proper case, a negligent attorney may be able to correct or mitigate the harm if there is time and opportunity and if the parties choose such a course. Without it, the client has no alternative but to terminate the relationship, perhaps prematurely, and institute litigation.
These sound principles are equally persuasive in the context of medical malpractice.
The rationale for the continuous treatment exception rests on a number of doctrinal assumptions. Thus it is posited that the trust and confidence that marks the physician-patient relationship puts the patient at a disadvantage to question the doctor’s techniques, and gives the patient the right to rely upon the doctor’s professional skill without the necessity of interrupting a continuing course of treatment by instituting suit. This exception not only provides the patient with the opportunity to seek *525corrective treatment from the doctor, but also gives the physician a reasonable chance to identify and correct errors made at an earlier stage of treatment.14
Though this Court has never squarely addressed the continuous course of treatment doctrine, we have implicitly expressed our approval of the doctrine’s rationale through discourse concerning the discovery rule in the medical malpractice arena. Specifically, in Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc.,15 we stated:
One who possesses no medical knowledge should not be held responsible for discovering an injury based on the wrongful act of a physician. The nature of the tort and the character of the injury usually require reliance on what the patient is told by the physician or surgeon. The fiduciary relationship between the parties grants a patient the right to rely on the physician’s knowledge and skill.
It is entirely logical that the patient’s right of reliance extends throughout his treatment with the physician. While treatment continues, the patient’s ability to make an informed judgment as to negligent treatment is impaired. Under such circumstances, it can scarcely be said that discovery has occurred. Accordingly, a continuing course of treatment has the effect of preventing discovery of a character necessary to commence the running of the statute of limitations.16
This rule should be limited, however, by a requirement of patient good faith. Inherent in the doctrine is the expectation that the patient and physician harbor a genuine desire to improve the patient’s condition. No benefits will inure to a patient who feigns a desire to continue treatment for the purpose of obtaining more time to “shop around” for another physician to corroborate the malpractice or for a lawyer to file suit. Claims of patient bad faith shall be heard and determined by the trial court and subject to appellate review for abuse of discretion. However, where a patient relies, in good faith, on his physician’s advice and treatment or, knowing that the physician has rendered poor treatment, but continues treatment in an effort to allow the physician to correct any consequences of the poor treatment, the continuous course of treatment doctrine operates to toll the statute of limitations until the treatment terminates at which time running of the statute begins.
Applying the foregoing rule in the instant case, we hold that Ms. Harrison’s suit against Dr. Valentini was timely filed. She filed suit on November 16, 2000, well within one year of her discontinuance of treatment with Dr. Valentini.
As the trial court and Court of Appeals did not address whether an issue of fact was presented by the testimony of Ms. Harrison’s expert witness, we will not review that issue here. Rather, the case will be remanded to the trial court for further consistent proceedings.
JOHNSTONE, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ„ concur.
ROACH, J., dissents by separate opinion in which COOPER and GRAVES, JJ., join.

. See, e.g., Lane v. Lane, 295 Ark. 671, 752 S.W.2d 25 (Ark.1988); Borgia v. City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319, 187 N.E.2d 777 (1962); Horton v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 344 N.C. 133, 472 S.E.2d 778 (1996); Ishler v. Miller, 56 Ohio St.2d 447, 384 N.E.2d 296 (Oh.1978); Hotelling v. Walther, 169 Or. 559, 130 P.2d 944 (1942); Farley v. Goode, 219 Va. 969, 252 S.E.2d 594 (1979); Metzger v. Kalke, 709 P.2d 414 (Wyo.1985).

. KRS 413.140(l)(e).

. Wiseman v. Alliant Hospitals, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 709 (Ky.2000).

. Hackworth v. Hart, 474 S.W.2d 377 (Ky.1971).

. Wiseman, 37 S.W.3d 709.

. Id.

. Id. at 712.

. Id. at 712.

. Id.

. Watkins v. Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1985).

. See Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791.

. Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511 (Iowa 1995).

.882 S.W.2d 121 (Ky.1994).

. Watkins v. Fromm, 108 A.D.2d 233, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768, 772 (1985).

. 37 S.W.3d 709, 712-13 (Ky.2000) (quoting Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 325 S.E.2d 469 (1985)).

. Watkins, 108 A.D.2d 233, 488 N.Y.S.2d 768.