Court Opinion

ID: 9586594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:13:06.176952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:44.110188
License: Public Domain

Pope, Judge,
dissenting.
I conclude that all of defendant Houck’s comments were constitutionally protected. I do not agree that any of Houck’s comments can reasonably be considered actionable as fighting words or as threats sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under the “fighting words” exception to First Amendment protection, for a comment to lose the constitutional protection of freedom of speech it must be “directed to inciting or producing an imminent lawless action and [must be] likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (89 SC 1827, 23 LE2d 430) (1969). Houck’s invitation to his listeners to go by the restaurant and “give a little five fingers in the face there to Bob Weinberg” and to “go by and spit in his face for me” (see footnote) did not incite imminent lawless action. It could not reasonably have been interpreted by the listeners to the program as an imminent direction to assault Weinberg but was simply hyperbole or a mocking exaggeration of Houck’s negative opinion of Weinberg and the restaurant.
The comments that Houck was “going to come up there and kick his you-know-what” and that he was “gonna come see [him] personally after this ...” (see footnote) do not, in. my opinion, meet the severity test for creating a jury issue for emotional distress as set forth by this court in Moses v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 Ga. App. 222 (369 SE2d 541) (1988). When the totality of the circumstances are considered, pursuant to the standard set forth in Moses, these comments, again, must be considered as hyperbole or sarcastic humor. Moreover, the comments made by Houck in a radio station studio some distance away from the plaintiff, who was at his restaurant, did not create a clear and present danger of personal injury to the plaintiff and are therefore not actionable. I believe “the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were correctly granted by the trial judge, because it cannot be said that the statements uttered during the course of this [radio] program gave rise to a clear and present danger of personal injury to the plaintiff.” Walt Disney Productions v. Shan*240non, 247 Ga. 402, 404 (276 SE2d 580) (1981). These comments, while obnoxious, could not reasonably be interpreted as fighting words. And the mere fact that they were offensive, without creating a clear and present danger of physical harm, does not strip them of their constitutional protection. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U. S. 46 (108 SC 876, 99 LE2d 41) (1988). Consequently, I would hold that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims.
Decided December 20, 1989
Rehearing denied January 17, 1990
Carr, Tabb & Pope, W. Pitts Carr, Erick E. Huber, for appellants.
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, James C. Rawls, Frank Love, Jr., Jennifer F. Weiss, Steven J. Labovitz, for appellees.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Benham join in this dissent.