Court Opinion

ID: 9528681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:05.343313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:12.844080
License: Public Domain

BAKER, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion regarding the proximate cause of Matthew’s death. The facts as construed in the Kovachs’ favor establish that Matthew should have received 15 ml of Codeine, which would have filled one-half of the Cup. Instead, Nurse Robinette poured at least 30 ml of Codeine, filling the Cup, and gave the medicine to Matthew, who drank it all. As a result of the overdose, Matthew died.
Assuming for argument’s sake that the Cup should not be used for administering medication that requires precision measurement, I believe that the Kovachs have failed to establish that imprecise measuring caused Nurse Robinette to administer the overdose of Codeine to Matthew. The nurse administered at least double the recommended dosage of the drug to Matthew. No reasonable factfinder would conclude that her actions were the result of a measuring error. Although there are many other possible causes of the tragic error, I can only conclude, based on these facts, that it cannot be found to have resulted from imprecise measuring. Therefore, I believe that the designated evidence establishes that the Kovachs have failed to show that the alleged defect, failure to warn, and/or breach of duty on the part of the Cup Defendants- was the proximate cause of Matthew’s death.
The majority relies in part on cases standing for the following proposition: there is “a presumption that an adequate warning would be heeded. This operates to the benefit of a manufacturer where adequate warnings are in fact given. Where warnings are inadequate or missing, however, the presumption is in essence a presumption of causation.” Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind.App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541, 555 (1979); see also Summit Bank v. Panos, 570 N.E.2d 960, 968 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), abrogated on other grounds by Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185 (Ind.1992); Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1168 (Ind.Ct.App.1988). As acknowledged by the majority, “[i]n all these cases, the absent or inadequate warning involved the very risk that caused injury to the plaintiff....” Op. p. 71. Given those factual scenarios, it was logical to conclude therein that a causal link existed between the product missing an appropriate warning and the injuries caused by the risk that should have been warned against.
Here, in contrast, I do not believe that the risk that the Kovachs argue should have been warned against — imprecise measuring — is the risk that caused Matthew’s death. Although the precise nature of Nurse Robinette’s error is not discernible, I can only conclude that no reasonable factfinder could have determined that it was a measuring error. Under these circumstances, I simply do not believe that the presumption of causation applied by *73the Ortho cases comes into play. As noted by the Cup Defendants, “it is illogical to conclude that any omitted or inadequate warning justifies a presumption of causation regardless of whether the risk of the warning at issue is the risk that actually caused the harm.” Appellees’ Br. p. 12 (emphasis in original). Thus, where, as here, an absent or inadequate warning did not involve the risk that caused injury to the plaintiff, I do not believe that there is a presumption of causation. Here, therefore, it was incumbent on the Kovachs to establish proximate causation — or, at the least, to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding proximate causation. They have failed on both accounts. Consequently, I would affirm the entry of summary judgment in the Cup Defendants’ favor.