Court Opinion

ID: 9561016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:01:15.82999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:28.672826
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.
(dissenting in part): I respectfully dissent from the portion of the foregoing opinion which limits the defendant in his defense.
In my opinion the defendant on the hearing of the motion to vacate the judgment should have been permitted to show that he had a valid defense to the cause of action on its merit. Upon proper showing the trial court should then have conditionally vacated the judgment and ordered issues upon the merits made up by the filing of proper pleadings (provided they were not already filed). Thereupon the case should have been tried upon such issues in the same manner as though no judgment had ever been rendered in the case, following the procedure outlined in Meixell v. Kirkpatrick, 25 Kan. IS, which was decided on an irregularity under G. S. 1949, 60-3007, Third.
To hold otherwise ignores the specific provisions of G. S. 1949, 60-3013, which in part provide: “A judgment shall not be vacated on motion . . . until it is adjudged that there is a valid defense *841to the action on which the judgment is rendered; . . (Emphasis added.) In my opinion this statute does not permit the subjective approach to the nature of the ground which permits vacation of a judgment after term. Once the ground is satisfactorily determined by the trial court on an objective basis, the provisions of 60-3013, supra, apply with full force. Defense to the action cannot be construed as a defense to some lesser issue embraced within the action. No distinction has ever been made by this court heretofore as illustrated by all the decisions cited in the opinion for the court.
Justice Valentine, speaking for the court in Ames v. Brinsden, 25 Kan. 746, undertook masterfully to clarify the procedure under circumstances and facts presented in the instant case. While it is true that some of the statements made in the opinion are dictum the opinion fully covers the situation here presented. On the point here in question, though dictum, the following was said:
“. . . If, however, the defendant had wished to make a full defense to the action, it would have been necessary for him to make the same showing that would be required to be made in other cases, to authorize the court to set aside his default and permit him to answer. The defendant, however, did uot make any such showing in this case; he did not pretend that he had any defense to the action; he did not pretend that the amount of the judgment could be reduced if the case was tried upon its merits. He simply asked that the judgment should be set aside and vacated, and did not ask for or suggest anything further; . . .” (p. 750.)
In my opinion the foregoing is the proper procedure.
It is only proper that a party who takes a default judgment through some irregularity should be subjected to the penalty which forces him to present the case fully on the merits after timely application is made to vacate the judgment pursuant to the code of civil procedure. This would command orderly procedure in the courts and tend to foster respect for the law.
Price, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.