Court Opinion

ID: 9378067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 16:08:31.243211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:18.798235
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Marple,                        :
                 Petitioner                :
                                           :
       v.                                  :   No. 319 C.D. 2022
                                           :
Pennsylvania Public                        :
Utility Commission,                        :
                  Respondent               :   Argued: October 12, 2022

BEFORE:       HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
              HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
              HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
              HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE CEISLER                                                 FILED: March 9, 2023

       Petitioner Township of Marple (Township) petitions for review of Respondent
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (Commission) March 10, 2022 opinion
and order (Decision). Through this Decision, the Commission granted Intervenor
PECO Energy Company’s (PECO)1 “Petition . . . For a Finding Pursuant to 53 P.S.
§ 10619”2 (PECO Petition), which pertained to a proposed gas reliability station

       1
         The General Assembly has, by virtue of enacting the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.
C.S. §§ 101-3316, given the Commission “all-embracing regulatory jurisdiction over the
operations of public utilities [in this Commonwealth].” PECO Energy Co. v. Twp. of Upper
Dublin, 922 A.2d 996, 1003 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). “PECO is a public utility within the meaning of
Section 102 of the . . . Code . . . , 66 Pa. C.S. § 102.” Decision at 1.
       2
         Section 619 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31,
1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. § 10619. Section 619 states, in relevant part:
(Footnote continued on next page…)
(Station) PECO desired to build in the Township. Upon review, we vacate the
Decision and remand this matter to the Commission for further proceedings.
                                        I. Background
       PECO initiated this project during the Spring of 2019, when it began searching
for a suitable site upon which to build the Station. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
499a. Shortly thereafter, PECO focused its attention upon a property located at 2090
Sproul Road in the Township (Property), and, on May 31, 2019, an engineering firm
drafted a site plan on PECO’s behalf, which diagrammed the layout of the Station as
envisioned on the Property. Id. at 2125a. Per this site plan,
              [t]he . . . Station’s design includes two buildings, a
              “Station Building” and a “Fiber Building.” The Station
              Building will be enclosed and provide weather protection
              for the pipes, valves, regulators, and electronic equipment
              necessary for the operation of the Station and provide
              climate control for the proper functioning of this
              equipment. [The] Station Building will be locked to
              protect the equipment from unauthorized access.
              Additionally, the Station Building will include several
              sound-dampening features. The Fiber Building will
              protect sensitive telecommunication equipment necessary
              to connect the Station to PECO’s control room and provide
              an enhanced aesthetic appeal. The . . . Station will also
              include a perimeter security fence . . . made of sound-
              absorbing material that will be constructed and maintained
              by PECO.

              [Article VI of the MPC, which confers zoning powers upon
              municipalities,] shall not apply to any existing or proposed building,
              or extension thereof, used or to be used by a public utility
              corporation, if, upon petition of the corporation, the . . . Commission
              shall, after a public hearing, decide that the present or proposed
              situation of the building in question is reasonably necessary for the
              convenience or welfare of the public.
53 P.S. § 10619.

                                                2
Decision at 7 (citations omitted). In June 2020, PECO entered into an agreement of
sale with the Property’s owner and, in short order, began doing roadwork and
pipeline construction to facilitate a connection between its liquefied natural gas
facility in West Conshohocken and the Property. See R.R. at 231a, 236a-37a, 287a-
88a.3
        PECO then submitted a zoning application to the Township’s Zoning Hearing
Board (Board), through which it requested a special exception that would authorize
it to use the Property as the site of the Station, as allowed under the Township’s
Zoning Ordinance.4 See id. at 379a-89a. The Board ultimately found that PECO had
failed to establish that it was entitled to its desired special exception and, on
November 18, 2020, denied PECO’s zoning application on that basis. See id. at
387a-94a.
        On February 26, 2021, PECO filed the PECO Petition with the Commission,
through which it requested that the Commission rule that the entire Project was
exempt from the Township’s Zoning Ordinance. Therein, PECO asked the
Commission to rule that proposed locations on the Property for both the Station
Building and Fiber Building were both reasonably necessary for the convenience

        3
            As the Commission explained,
                 [t]he gas arriving in the Station will originate from a new PECO
                 liquified natural gas [facility] in West Conshohocken. The gas will
                 travel through a new gas main and will run at a lower pressure than
                 typical of an interstate transmission line. PECO indicated that the
                 purpose of the proposed Station is to reduce gas pressure from a new
                 12-inch main that connects the West Conshohocken . . . facility and
                 [to] inject [the gas] into the existing 16-inch main serving Marple
                 Township at the point of lowest pressure at the intersection of
                 Lawrence Road and Sproul Road.
Decision at 7 (citations omitted).

        4
            Township of Marple Zoning Ordinance, Delaware County, Pa., as amended (1997).

                                                  3
and welfare of the public, which would have the effect of exempting the buildings
from the Zoning Ordinance’s strictures. Id. at 12a, 20a-21a. Additionally, PECO
sought to have the Commission determine that the perimeter security fence qualified
as a “facility” under Section 102 of the Code and, thus, that the requirements
imposed by the Zoning Ordinance were inapplicable to the fence. Id. at 12a, 18a-
20a. The Township intervened in the matter, as did a number of pro se individuals.
The Commission then held a series of hearings and a panel of two administrative
law judges (ALJs) subsequently granted the PECO Petition on December 8, 2021.
Decision at 4. In essence, these ALJs
              [found] that PECO met its burden of proving that the two
              buildings associated with the Gas Reliability Station
              should be exempt from [the] Township[’s Zoning
              Ordinance] because the proposed situation of the buildings
              is reasonably necessary for the public convenience or
              welfare of the public. The ALJs initially emphasized the
              very limited scope of the Commission’s inquiry under
              Section 619 of the MPC. The ALJs stated that as a
              certificated gas utility within the meaning of the Code,
              PECO has the authority to build a station along the
              pipeline to manage the distribution and supply of natural
              gas in its pipes as long as it is running its facilities in
              compliance with state and federal regulations.
              Consequently, the ALJs found that concerns the
              municipalities and the [pro se] Protestants raised about
              issues related to noise, gas emissions, aesthetics, traffic,
              and other health and safety concerns were beyond the
              Commission’s review.
Decision at 13 (citations omitted).
       PECO, the Township, and Theodore Uhlman, a pro se litigant, then filed
exceptions to the ALJs’ ruling.5 Id. The Commission granted PECO’s exceptions,

       5
         PECO’s exceptions called for clarification regarding several parts of the ALJs’ ruling,
but did not broadly challenge that ruling, while the Township used its exceptions to attack the
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                               4
granted in part and denied in part the Township’s exceptions, and denied Uhlman’s
exceptions in full. See id. at 81-83. In response, the Township appealed the
Commission’s Decision to our Court.6
                                          II. Discussion
       On appeal,7 the Township raises two arguments, which we reorder and
summarize as follows. First, the Township claims that the Commission erred by

ALJs’ reasonable necessity determination, as well as the ALJs’ narrow interpretation of the scope
of Section 619 proceedings. See Decision at 15-55.

       6
           Uhlman filed a notice of intervention with our Court on May 6, 2022.
       7
                The Commonwealth Court’s scope of review of a Commission order
                is to determine whether the Commission’s findings of fact are
                supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was
                committed or whether constitutional rights were violated. Popowsky
                v. Pa. Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’]n, . . . 910 A.2d 38 ([Pa.] 2006). The
                standard of review to be applied when reviewing a Commission
                decision is that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that
                of the Commission when substantial evidence supports the
                Commission’s decision on a matter within the Commission’s
                expertise. City of Lancaster (Water) v. Pa. Pub[.] Util[.] Comm[’]n,
                769 A.2d 567 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) [(citing Popowsky v. Pa. Pub.
                Util. Comm’n, 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997))]. Substantial
                evidence is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
                adequate to support a conclusion. Borough of E. McKeesport v.
                Special/Temporary Civ[.] Serv[.] Comm[’]n, 942 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.
                Cmwlth. 2008).
McCloskey v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 127 A.3d 860, 866 n.16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
                We defer to the Commission’s interpretation of the Code and its own
                regulations unless the Commission’s interpretations are clearly
                erroneous. Coal. for Affordable Util. Servs. & Energy Efficiency in
                Pa. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 120 A.3d 1087, 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth.
                2015). . . . Such “deference is even more necessary when the
                statutory scheme is technically complex.” Id. (internal quotation
                marks and citation omitted). However, on issues of law, “our
                standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
                Id.
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  5
declining to consider the Station’s potential negative environmental impact upon the
public health, safety, and welfare, as well as its effect upon the Township’s
development goals, as expressed through the Township’s Zoning Ordinance and
comprehensive plan. Township’s Br. at 25-32. Second, the Township asserts that the
Commission abused its discretion by determining that PECO had established that it
was reasonably necessary for the convenience and welfare of the public to site the
Station on the Property. According to the Township, the evidence presented by
PECO only established that its selection of the Property as the buildings’ site only
benefitted PECO itself, not the general public. Furthermore, in the Township’s
estimation, PECO’s putative site search, during which it purported to consider 15
other locations for these buildings, was essentially a sham, as PECO had already
chosen the Property before conducting the search and, in doing so, ignored other
viable locations and its own search criteria. Id. at 19-25.8

McCloskey v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 225 A.3d 192, 202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020).

       8
          In his brief, Intervenor Uhlman broadly echoes and joins in the Township’s concerns,
including about the inadequacy of the Commission’s environmental review regarding the
buildings’ proposed site, while also stating his intent to “focus on very few points” pertaining to
that review. See Uhlman’s Br. at 2-4. However, Uhlman’s brief is deficient in multiple ways. His
brief does not include a statement of jurisdiction, a statement of both the scope of review and the
standard of review, a statement of the questions involved, a statement of the case, a summary of
argument, or a short conclusion stating the precise relief sought, all of which our Rules of Appellate
Procedure require parties to include in their appellate briefs. See Pa. R.A.P. 2111, 2116-2119.
Furthermore, Uhlman does not cite to any law in his brief to support his arguments, other than by
expressing his concern at the very end that the Commission’s failure to substantively address these
environmental concerns will result in “no governmental entity . . . meeting the obligation under
section 2 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to act on behalf of the people
and review these issues to ensure the public peace and safety.” Uhlman’s Br. at 3-4. Presumably,
this reference is meant to pertain to article I, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
provides: “All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on their
authority and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness. For the advancement of these ends
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                  6
       It is well settled that, by enacting the Code, the General Assembly intended to
vest the Commission with preeminent authority to regulate utilities on a statewide
basis. See Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 179 A.3d 670, 690-95
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). This reflects the reality that
              [l]ocal authorities not only are ill-equipped to comprehend
              the needs of the public beyond their jurisdiction, but, and
              equally important, those authorities, if they had the power
              to regulate, necessarily would exercise that power with an
              eye toward the local situation and not with the best
              interests of the public at large as the point of reference.
Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Twp., 105 A.2d 287, 293 (Pa. 1954). Indeed,
as our Supreme Court has remarked,
              [t]he necessity for conformity in the regulation and control
              of public utilities is as apparent as the electric lines which
              one views traversing the Commonwealth. If each
              [municipality was] to pronounce its own regulation and
              control over electric wires, pipe lines and oil lines, the
              conveyors of power and fuel could become so twisted and
              knotted as to affect adversely the welfare of the entire
              state. It is for that reason that the [General Assembly] has
              vested in the . . . Commission exclusive authority over the
              complex and technical service and engineering questions
              arising in the location, construction and maintenance of all
              public utilities facilities.
Chester Cnty. v. Phila. Elec. Co., 218 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 1966); see 66 Pa. C.S. §
1501 (giving the Commission the power to regulate public utilities’ facilities and
services throughout Pennsylvania). Accordingly, absent an express statutory

they have at all times an inalienable and indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish their
government in such manner as they may think proper.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 2. Uhlman, however,
neglects to develop his argument on this point in any meaningful way. Accordingly, to the extent
that Uhlman sought to raise issues beyond those presented by the Township, we conclude that he
has waived them on account of his legally inadequate brief. Jerry’s Bar, Inc. v. Com., 172 A.3d
1196, 1198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

                                               7
directive to the contrary, municipalities are preempted from regulating public
utilities’ operations. See Sunoco, 179 A.3d at 692, 694-95.
       Section 619 of the MPC establishes such a carve-out, however, which gives
municipalities the ability to regulate via local ordinance the location of a building
that a public utility wishes to build or use, unless the “Commission decide[s] that the
present or proposed situation of the building in question is reasonably necessary for
the convenience or welfare of the public.” 53 P.S. § 10619.9 This exception is one
of narrow construction, for “to the extent that Section 619 . . . gives any authority to
local governments to regulate public utilities, that authority must be strictly limited
to the express statutory language.” Com. v. Del. & H. Ry. Co., 339 A.2d 155, 157
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1975). “Section 619 . . . does not require a utility to prove that the site
it has selected is absolutely necessary or that it is the best possible site.” O’Connor
v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 582 A.2d 427, 433 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). In order to satisfy
its burden in a Section 619 proceeding, “[t]he [public utility] must show that it has
made a reasonable decision, not the best possible decision. Evidence of an alternative
may be the basis for questioning the reasonableness of the [utility’s] decision but
[the] mere existence of an alternative site does not invalidate [its] judgment.” Id.
(quoting Re Phila. Suburban Water Co., 54 Pa. PUC 127, 132 (1980)).

       9
          The MPC does not provide a definition for “building,” so this word “must be construed
in accordance with its common and ordinary meaning.” Chamberlain v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 114 A.3d 385, 394 (Pa. 2015) (citing 1 Pa. C.S. § 1903). “In ascertaining the common and
approved usage or meaning, a court may resort to the dictionary definitions of the terms left
undefined by the legislature.” Mountz v. Columbia Borough, 260 A.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting Leventakos v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Spyros Painting), 82 A.3d
481, 484 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). Per Merriam-Webster, a building is “a usually roofed and walled
structure built for permanent use (as for a dwelling).” https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/building (last visited March 8, 2023).

                                               8
      Here, there are three parts of the proposed Station that are at issue: the security
fence, the Fiber Building, and the Station Building. With regard to the fence, the
Commission properly concluded that it is a “facility” and, thus, that it is exempt from
regulation by the Township. Section 102 of the Code defines “facilities,” in relevant
part, as “[a]ll the plant and equipment of a public utility, including all tangible and
intangible real and personal property without limitation, and any and all means and
instrumentalities in any manner owned, operated, leased, licensed, used, controlled,
furnished, or supplied for, by, or in connection with, the business of any public
utility.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 102. Reading Section 102 of the Code in conjunction with
Section 619 of the MPC leads us to the conclusion that, in the context of public
utilities, anything that does not qualify as a building under the latter should be
considered a facility under the former. Thus, because the security fence does not fall
within the common understanding of what constitutes a building, it is a facility that
stands outside the Township’s regulatory authority. As for the Fiber Building and
Station Building, they are self-evidently buildings, so they are theoretically subject
to the Township’s Zoning Ordinance pursuant to Section 619.
      With this in mind, we turn to the specifics of the Township’s first argument,
regarding the Commission’s treatment of the buildings’ potential impact upon the
public health, safety, and welfare. As already noted, the Township’s position is that
the Commission erred by failing to consider evidence regarding the buildings’ effect
upon the Township’s comprehensive plan and Zoning Ordinance, as well as about
emissions from on-site heaters, noise, and the impact radius of a potential explosion.
      The first portion of this argument is meritless. To reiterate, local ordinances
and regulations are applicable only after the Commission has concluded that a public
utility has not established that it is reasonably necessary to use a specific site for a

                                           9
proposed building. Furthermore, though the Township maintains that the
Commission did not adhere to a relevant policy statement, which provides that, in
Section 619 proceedings, the Commission will consider the effect of proposed siting
upon local comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances, see Township’s Br. at 30, it
is well settled that policy statements do not legally bind governmental agencies.
Borough of Bedford v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 972 A.2d 53, 64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).10
Given this, the Commission was not required to consider how the Township’s
comprehensive plan and Zoning Ordinance would be affected by siting the buildings
on the Property.
       However, as for the Township’s concerns regarding potential explosions,
noise, and emissions from the Station’s buildings, we agree with the Township that
the Commission erred when it flatly deemed environmental concerns to be outside
the purview of Section 619 proceedings. The Commission concluded that it could
not consider such concerns when determining whether there was a reasonable
necessity to site the buildings upon the Property, because “[a]ncillary issues
unrelated to . . . siting . . . , such as the issues related to the siting or route of the
public utility’s facilities, public safety, or environmental requirements, are outside
the scope of a Section 619 proceeding.” Decision at 44. In addition, the Commission
stated that
               [though it] is not empowered under Section 619 of the
               MPC to evaluate the various aspects of the environmental
               impact of a project, it defers to the determinations of those
               agencies with jurisdiction over such environmental
       10
           The Supreme Court has “recognize[d] that in some situations it may be difficult to
differentiate between administrative regulations and statements of policy which are not rules or
regulations[.]” Pa. Hum. Rels. Comm’n v. Norristown Area Sch. Dist., 374 A.2d 671, 677-78 (Pa.
1977). The Township, however, does not argue that the Commission policy statement the
Township refers to in its brief is actually a rule or regulation, see Township’s Br. at 30-32, so we
assume without deciding that it is, in fact, a policy statement.

                                                10
               impacts, including the Pennsylvania Department of
               Environmental Protection . . . . Moreover, . . . granting
               PECO an exemption from zoning requirements related to
               the buildings does not exempt PECO from compliance
               with the Commission’s Regulations or the Code or
               regulation by any other agencies responsible for health and
               safety.
Id. To the contrary, in proceedings of this nature, the Commission is obligated to
consider “the environmental impacts of placing [a building] at [a] proposed
location,” while also deferring to environmental determinations made by other
agencies with primary regulatory jurisdiction over such matters. See Del-AWARE
Unlimited, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 513 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).
The source of the Commission’s responsibility to conduct this type of review in a
Section 619 proceeding is not the MPC itself or another statute; rather, it is article I,
section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which is better known as the
Environmental Rights Amendment (ERA).11 See City of Lancaster v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm’n (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 251 M.D. 2019, filed Feb. 21, 2020), slip op. at 11 n.8,
2020 WL 864986, at *5 n.8 (stating that existing Section 619 case law “reflect[s] the
general point that the [Commission] and its adjudicatory decisions and regulations
are subject to the ERA, which is consonant with the Supreme Court’s statement in
PEDF [, see note 13, infra,] that all agencies of the Commonwealth are bound by

       11
          The ERA reads as follows: “The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
        The Township invoked the ERA by discussing our extant case law in its appellate brief.
See Township’s Br. at 19-22, 25-26, 32 (citing Del-AWARE, 513 A.2d at 595-96; O’Connor, 582
A.2d at 428, 432). Additionally, though there was some apparent confusion during oral argument,
the only environmental impact-related issues that Township’s counsel expressly waived were those
pertaining to remediation of soil contamination at the Property.

                                                11
the ERA”);12 see also Energy Conservation Council of Pa. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 25
A.3d 440, 446-47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (“Any decision by the [Commission] as to the
environmental impact [of a public utility project] must be set against the backdrop
of [the ERA].”).13 In other words, a Section 619 proceeding is constitutionally
inadequate unless the Commission completes an appropriately thorough
environmental review of a building siting proposal and, in addition, factors the
results into its ultimate determination regarding the reasonable necessity of the
proposed siting. Here, however, the Commission sidestepped this obligation and,
though it stated that it would defer to other agencies’ determinations regarding
environmental issues, failed to identify any such outside agency determinations that
pertained to explosion impact radius, noise, or heater emissions. See Decision at 44-
45. The Commission’s “deference” in this context thus appears to have been nothing
more than illusory and its environmental review substantively nonexistent. See id. at
37-45. This failure renders the Decision entirely deficient from a constitutional
standpoint.

       12
          Unreported Commonwealth Court opinions issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited
for their persuasive value. See Section 414(a) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

       13
          We note that Del-AWARE and its progeny relied upon a test that was articulated by our
Court in Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973), as the basis for determining the scope
of the Commission’s environmental review duties in a Section 619 proceeding. See Del-AWARE,
513 A.2d at 595-96; O’Connor, 582 A.2d at 431-32. Similarly, Energy Conservation did not
involve a Section 619 proceeding, but nevertheless dealt with broader questions regarding the
responsibilities imposed by the ERA upon the Commission, as determined through the Payne test.
See 25 A.3d at 447, 450-52. Payne was expressly overruled by our Supreme Court in Pennsylvania
Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017)
(PEDF), but that ultimately has no bearing on the relevance of Del-AWARE, Energy Conservation,
and O’Connor to this matter. This is because “th[o]se cases reflect the general point that the
[Commission] and its adjudicatory decisions and regulations are subject to the ERA, which is
consonant with the Supreme Court’s statement in PEDF that all agencies of the Commonwealth
are bound by the ERA.” City of Lancaster, slip op. at 11 n.8, 2020 WL 864986, at *5 n.8.

                                              12
                                         III. Conclusion
      Accordingly, we vacate the Commission’s Decision and remand this matter
to the Commission, with instructions that it issue an Amended Decision regarding
the PECO Petition, which must incorporate the results of a constitutionally sound
environmental impact review as to the proposed siting on the Property of the Fiber
Building and the Station Building.14

                                              __________________________________
                                              ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

      14
           Due to our resolution of this matter, we decline to reach the Township’s remaining issue.

                                                 13
           IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Township of Marple,                    :
                 Petitioner            :
                                       :
      v.                               :   No. 319 C.D. 2022
                                       :
Pennsylvania Public                    :
Utility Commission,                    :
                  Respondent           :

                                     ORDER

      AND NOW, this 9th day of March, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED that
Respondent Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (Commission) March 10,
2022 opinion and order is VACATED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this matter
is REMANDED to the Commission, with instructions that it issue an Amended
Decision regarding Intervenor PECO Energy Company’s “Petition . . . For a Finding
Pursuant to 53 P.S. § 10619,” which must incorporate the results of a constitutionally
sound environmental impact review as to siting the so-called “Fiber Building” and
“Station Building” upon the property located at 2090 Sproul Road in the Township
of Marple, Pennsylvania.
      Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                       __________________________________
                                       ELLEN CEISLER, Judge