Court Opinion

ID: 9711653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:04.441376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.522025
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority misconstrues the statute, ignoring the legislative mandate that taxing statutes “shall be strictly construed.” Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C. S.A. § 1928(b)(3) (Supp.1964-1979); See Estate of Carlson, 479 Pa. 421, 424, 388 A.2d 726, 728 (1978) (“A taxing statute *489must not only be strictly construed, but all reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.”) This principle of construction is particularly compelling in times when taxation and inflation ravage taxpayers.
The Tax Reform Code of 1971, 72 P.S. § 7202(a) imposes a six percent sales tax on retail sales of “tangible personal property”, defined by 72 P.S. § 7201(m) as follows:
(m) “Tangible personal property.” Corporeal personal property including, but not limited to, goods, wares, merchandise, steam and natural and manufactured and bottled gas for non-residential use, electricity for non-residential use, intrastate telephone and telegraph service for non-residential use.... Nor shall said term include steam, natural and manufactured and bottled gas, fuel oil, electricity or intrastate telephone or telegraph service when purchased directly by the user thereof solely for his own residential use.
The taxpayer in this case, landlord of an apartment building, purchases electricity, gas, and fuel oil for the entire apartment building. The Commonwealth contends that the sales tax applies because these utilities are not purchased directly by the tenants. The Commonwealth’s contention is without merit.
The utilities are put to residential use and are simply not encompassed in the definition of “tangible personal property” which includes “gas for non-residential use, electricity for non-residential use . . . . ” (emphasis supplied). As long as the utilities are put to residential use it is irrelevant that the landlord pays for them.
The Commonwealth Court maintained that the statutory language “including but not limited to ” (emphasis supplied) suggests a legislative intent to “exclude nothing”. Aldine Apartments, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa.Cmwlth. 204, 208, 395 A.2d 299, 302 (1978). The court concluded that utilities purchased by the landlord are taxable because, unlike utili*490ties purchased directly by residential users, they are not expressly excluded from the broad statutory language. This analysis is offensive to the legislative mandate that taxing statutes be strictly construed. The inclusion of property in a taxing statute must be express and cannot be inferred from a failure to exclude. See Commonwealth v. Repplier Coal Co., 348 Pa. 372, 380, 35 A.2d 319, 323 (1944) (“The words imposing the tax should be clear and unambiguous . . . nor can words be extended by implication”); Commonwealth v. Allied Building Credits, Inc., 385 Pa. 370, 123 A.2d 686 (1956).
The majority maintains that the last sentence of the definition which excludes utilities purchased by residential users implies a legislative intent to tax utilities purchased by a landlord. The majority erroneously infers an intent to include from an express intent to exclude a similar property. Such an inference is illogical and wholly ignores the legislative mandate of construing taxing statutes strictly.
The majority also suggests that the position advanced in this dissent would render the last sentence of the definition “meaningless” since the utilities purchased directly are not included in the definition in the first place. See 1 Pa.C.S.A., § 1921(a) (Supp.1964-1979) (“Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions”) The last sentence of the definition is not rendered “meaningless” but at most redundant. Further, the principle of giving effect to all statutory provisions is in direct conflict with the principle of strictly construing taxation statutes. When such conflict exists, the principle of giving effect to all statutory provisions must yield because it is stated in conditional terms — “if possible.”
Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court.