Court Opinion

ID: 9768557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:08:17.238373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.869701
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, appellees are limited to a recovery of $100,000 against the Harris County Hospital District. I write to stress that I reach this conclusion because of the nature of the causes of action brought by appellees.
This is not a suit for damages under the “bystander doctrine.” Therefore, it is distinguishable from City of Austin v. Davis, 693 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.App.—Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).1
*767In a recent opinion, our sister court held that, when a wife’s claims for damages are derivative of her husband’s claims for injuries he suffered as a result of the negligence of the State, the wife is not entitled to her own “per person” damage allocation under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Ramming, 861 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, n.w.h.) (not yet reported). The Ramming court limited the total damage award to the husband and wife to the “one-person” cap in the Texas Tort Claims Act. 861 S.W.2d at 466. I agree with the analysis in Ramming.
Appellees brought'two actions: a survival action and a wrongful death action. Wrongful death actions and survival actions are “wholly derivative of the decedent’s rights.” Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.1992). The Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that the right of statutory beneficiaries, under the Wrongful Death Statute,2 to maintain a wrongful death action is “entirely derivative of the decedent’s right to have sued for his own injuries immediately prior to his death, and is subject to the same defenses to which the decedent’s actions would have been subject.” Russell, 841 S.W.2d at 347. Wrongful death action plaintiffs stand in the legal shoes of the decedent. Id
Because of the derivative nature of survival and wrongful death actions, I conclude we are constrained by Cooksey to hold that ap-pellees’ recovery is limited to $100,000.00 for the damages incurred as a result of the wrongful death of the deceased in this case.

. In my opinion, Davis can be reconciled with City of Austin v. Cooksey, 570 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. 1978). Cooksey involved a suit under the wrongful death statute, a "derivative” cause of action; Davis involved a suit under the "bystander doctrine,” which is not a "derivative” claim.

. Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.002 (Vernon 1986).