Court Opinion

ID: 9632738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:23:44.307917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:21.887037
License: Public Domain

Shields, C.J.
(dissenting) — The majority emphasizes the final disjunctive phrase in the last sentence of RCW 26.09.002: alteration of the existing pattern of interaction should occur only when "required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm." This emphasis leads the majority to conclude the record contains "no evidence Mrs. Kovacs' personality or parenting style has had a negative impact on the children." Majority, at 731. That lack of evidence in turn results in a finding the trial court abused its discretion.
Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by relying on the views of a qualified expert witness. See George v. Helliar, 62 Wn. App. 378, 385, 814 P.2d 238 (1991). *733The court here relied primarily on the testimony of Dr. Jorgensen, an experienced clinical psychologist whose specialty is child and family relationships, and followed his recommendation. Dr. Jorgensen acknowledged it was a close call. I believe it is the trial court's function to make that call, not this court's; therefore, I dissent.
RCW 26.09.0022 must be read in its entirety and in relation to RCW 26.09.184(1), .187(3) and .191(3). Thus read, the policy standard of this state in matters of parental custody on dissolution of marriage is the best interests of the child. Those interests are served by a parenting arrangement which best maintains a child's emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care and which alters the pattern of interaction between a parent and child only as necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents. The objective of the policy is to foster the relationship between the child and each parent. This objective is specifically identified in RCW 26.09.184(1) and the criteria for residential provisions is set forth in RCW 26.09.187(3). However, when fostering the relationship between the child and a parent is inconsistent with the child's best interests, the pattern of interaction may be additionally altered, with restrictions imposed if required to protect the child from physical, mental or emotional harm. The physical, mental or emotional harms are specifically identified in RCW 26.09.191(3). Thus *734the best interests of the child are served in one way when no physical, mental or emotional harm exists and in another way when it does exist. If no harm exists, no finding is required. The majority fails to make this distinction.
A showing of physical, mental or emotional harm is adequate cause for modification of the residential provisions of a permanent parenting plan, RCW 26.09.270, but modification is not analogous to the initial development of the parenting plan unless the harm then exists. Such an analogy ignores the objective set forth in RCW 26.09.184(1)(c) to: "[p]rovide for the child's changing needs as the child grows and matures, in a way that minimizes the need for future modifications to the permanent parenting plan." That objective requires an assessment of future prospects.
Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's findings are not supported in the record. See In re Stell, 56 Wn. App. 356, 366-67, 783 P.2d 615 (1989); In re Marriage of Woffinden, 33 Wn. App. 326, 330-31, 654 P.2d 1219 (1982), review denied, 99 Wn.2d 1001 (1983). It does not occur when findings are not required to support a conclusion of law. Here, a finding of negative impact is not required to support the trial court's conclusion of law. The majority's emphasis on the historical responsibility for performing parenting functions in RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(i) is too narrowly circumscribed. That factor is broader and, although it is to be given the greatest weight, the other factors must be considered as well. The result of the majority's emphasis would most often be automatic residential placement with the mother. The trial court's required findings are supported in the record, albeit on conflicting testimony.
It is the trial court's duly to weigh the evidence presented by expert witnesses. The majority finds the testimony of Donna Gort, a mental health practitioner who appeared on Mrs. Kovacs' behalf, more persuasive than that of Dr. Jorgensen; it overlooks the fact Ms. Gort never met Mr. Kovacs and administered no tests to Mrs. Kovacs or the children.3
*735In contrast, Dr. Jorgensen met separately with Mr. and Mrs. Kovacs, two times each, and with the Kovacs children three times. He administered standardized tests to all of them and prepared a written report which was admitted into evidence. On the basis of his observations and the tests, Dr. Jorgensen concluded Mrs. Kovacs has a personality disorder and recommended placement of the children with Mr. Kovacs. Dr. Jorgensen specifically considered the fact Mrs. Kovacs had more continuity with the children and is more nurturing, but concluded Mr. Kovacs' stability, responsibility and ability to establish limits for them tipped the scales in his favor. The majority correctly points out Dr. Jorgensen admitted that a person with a personality disorder can be an adequate parent; it overlooks the fact Dr. Jorgensen continued testifying "[t]he personality disorder will affect the parenting. That's inevitable. . . . Whether it affects it in a destructive way or a very mild way is what's left to be seen."
RCW 26.09.187(3)(a)(iii) requires the court to consider each parent's potential for future performance of parenting functions. The trial court placed the children with Mr. Kovacs because the evidence established he could offer a more stable and structured environment for the children than could Mrs. Kovacs. Considering the purposes of the Parenting Act of 1987 in general, the residential placement provision in particular, and Dr. Jorgensen's carefully weighed recommendation, I do not believe it can reasonably be said the court's discretion was exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. RCW 26.09.002, .004(3), .184(1), .187(3); Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wn. App. 499, 507, 784 P.2d 554 (1990). No abuse of discretion has been shown. I would affirm.
Review granted at 121 Wn.2d 1008 (1993).

 RCW 26.09.002 provides:
"Parents have the responsibility to make decisions and perform other parental functions necessary for the care and growth of their minor children. In any proceeding between parents under this chapter, the best interests of the child shall be the standard by which the court determines and allocates the parties' parental responsibilities. The state recognizes the fundamental importance of the parent-child relationship to the welfare of the child, and that the relationship between the child and each parent should be fostered unless inconsistent with the child's best interests. The best interests of the child are served by a parenting arrangement that best maintains a child's emotional growth, health and stability, and physical care. Further, the best interest of the child is ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between a parent and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the changed relationship of the parents or as required to protect the child from physical, mental, or emotional harm."

 Ms. Gort also testified "[m]y concern is I’ve seen children taken away from mothers before, but I've never seen it done successfully", indicating a preconceived notion.