Court Opinion

ID: 9833421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:41:40.512884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:02.441142
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant’s motion for a rehearing indicates that our opinion herein as to rights of .a father to the custody of his child, when contested by others, is not perhaps as clear as it should be. What we hold is:
[5] 1. The welfare of the child is the paramount issue.
2. That the welfare of the child would be best subserved by committing it to the custody of its parent must appear from the evidence. Such fact does prima facie appear when parentage is proven; this for the reason that, on account of the affection that *1119parents usually have for their children, the law presumes, until the contrary is shown, that the hest interest of a child will bo sub-served by committing it to the custody of its father or mother, as the case may be.
[6] 3. This legal presumption is evidence as to the paramount issue, but is not conclusive.
4. If the prima facie case arising from the legal presumption referred, to is attempted to be overcoine by evidence to the contrary, this raises an issue of fact for the jury.
5. If the jury, looking to all of the evidence in the case, should find that a father was not in any way disqualified to have the care and custody of his child, the prima facie case in his favor arising from the proof of his parentage would not be overthrown, and he should be awarded the custody of his child.
[7] 6. A father is not the owner of his child, in the sense of its being his personal property. His legal right to its custody arises from the law’s regard for the child’s welfare.
[8] 7. Where two parties are competing for the custody of a child, the comparative affection of such parties for the child, their willingness and ability to administer to its present and future material and moral welfare, are to be considered by the jury for what, under the evidence, they may deem them to be worth, in deciding the issue of the child’s welfare.
' We think that these views are in harmony with the decisions of the courts in this and other jurisdictions, based, as they are, on the well-established doctrine that the welfare of children is a matter of supreme importance to the state, and that children are the wards of courts having jurisdiction in such matter.
It was error to admit the testimony of the witness Wood as to what appellant’s father said, in his absence, as to not sending Mrs. Clayton’s trunk to her.
[8] The testimony as to appellant’s attending a dance when his wife was sick should not have been admitted. He and his wife were living apart at that time, and, at most, such conduct would only tend to show a lack of affection on his part toward his wife, which is not an issue in this case. That a man has lost his love for his wife is no proof that he does not love his child.
[10] We have concluded that we were in error in saying that it was competent tc> prove the general reputation of appellant as to being unkind to his child. That he was unkind to his child is material, but, if such is a fact, it is susceptible of better proof than general reputation.
[11] What Mrs. Kerbey told appellant as to what his wife said about his not coming to see her any more would not be admissible, if offered by appellees, but would be admissible on the part of appellant, as tending to explain why he did not visit his child after such conversation. It is immaterial as to whether appellant’s wife in fact so instructed her mother. If appellant believed Mrs. Kerbey’s statement, it would have had the same effect upon his mind, whether true or untrue.
[12] The testimony of A. L. Kerbey that he had been informed that there were indications that some one had tried to burn his bam will be admissible as his explanation of why he had his shotgun at the time of. the interview with appellant near his barn, if appellant testifies to facts tending to show that he was induced thereby to believe that Kerbey might shoot him if he went to his (Kerbey’s) house, and that it was for this reason that he did not thereafter visit his child, which was, and has ever since been, living at Kerbey’s house. The issue in this regard is not, did som'e one attempt to burn Kerbey’s barn, but did Kerbey, from what he had been told, believe such to be the fact, and was thereby induced to carry his shotgun and that he did carry the same with the view of shooting appellant. The reasonableness of such explanation is for the jury, and affects the weight but not the admissibility of the testimony.
Appellees have also filed a motion for a rehearing, in which they insist that we should affirm the judgment of the trial court. We have carefully considered this motion, and have reached the conclusion that it, as well as appellant’s motion for a rehearing, should be overruled.
Motions overruled.