Court Opinion

ID: 9869852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:41:21.279792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:04.600289
License: Public Domain

Tom, J.P., and Manzanet-Daniels, J.,
dissent in a memorandum by Tom, J.P., as follows: In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner challenges a determination by respondents that she was “indicated” for child maltreatment based on the use of her child to facilitate a crime. I would find that petitioner’s utilization of her five-year-old son to steal two coats and a pair of boots from Bloomingdale’s constituted maltreatment and was sufficiently egregious so as to create an imminent risk of physical, mental and emotional harm to the child (see Matter of Bernthon v Mattioli, 34 AD3d 1165, 1166 [3d Dept 2006], appeal withdrawn 8 NY3d 918 [2007]; see generally Social Services Law § 412 [2] [a]). Further, I would find that the ALJ’s determination that petitioner’s actions were reasonably related to employment in childcare was rational (see Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, 431 [2009]), and that petitioner’s name should remain on the registry maintained by respondent New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) for the purposes of informing providers and licensing agencies that she is the subject of an indicated child maltreatment report for future employment in child care or foster care, and adoption (see Social Services Law §§ 422, 424-a).
Initially, petitioner does not contest any of the underlying facts regarding the shoplifting incident or the factual findings made by the ALJ. Nor did she testify or present any evidence at the hearing before the ALJ to contradict respondent New York City Administration for Children’s Services’ (ACS) investigation notes and summary admitted into evidence. Thus, all the evidentiary facts and record evidence presented to the ALJ’s were unchallenged.
The undisputed evidence shows that on December 30, 2012 petitioner tried to steal merchandise from Bloomingdale’s us*412ing her five-year-old son to facilitate the theft. Specifically, after entering a fitting room, she hid two coats under her son’s clothing and made him put on a pair of boots. She also concealed a coat under her own clothing and hid several cell phone cases on her person. The total value of the stolen merchandise was approximately $2,700.
A store detective noticed the merchandise was missing and stopped petitioner immediately as she tried to exit the fitting room. In response to questioning, petitioner admitted stealing the items. Petitioner was detained and arrested in the presence of the child and petitioner’s sister came to pick up the child.1
Petitioner was charged with petit larceny, criminal possession of stolen property, and endangering the welfare of a child. She ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser violation of disorderly conduct which was later sealed.
The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (SCR)—operated by OCFS—received a telephone report of petitioner’s arrest and referred the matter to ACS. Over the next two months, ACS investigated the issue.
According to the ACS notes in evidence, on December 31, 2012, the investigator went to petitioner’s home and spoke with the family members including her mother and sisters. They were surprised about the stealing incident and stated that the child “gets everything he needs.”
The investigator also met with the child, who appeared “calm,” stated that he felt “happy” and “safe” at home. However, the child reported that petitioner had hit him in the past with her hands and had once smacked his lip causing him to bleed. The child also reported that his mother was taken to jail by the police because she was stealing, and, when asked if petitioner had ever stolen before, first responded “yes,” then “no.” The child also stated that the mother put shoes on him and the police took them away.
On January 4, 2013, the investigator spoke with the store detective who handled the matter at issue, and who stated that he did not see any suspicious marks on the child, that the child did not appear distraught by the incident, and that the child was playing with video games and interacting normally at that time.
*413On that same date, the investigator spoke with the school social worker, who also stated that she never observed any marks or bruises on the child or anything concerning regarding the child.
On January 7, 2013, the investigator met with petitioner at her home, who declined to comment on the shoplifting incident on the advice of counsel. She claimed that the child’s basic needs were met at home and, in contrast with the child’s statements, denied using any physical discipline. At the end of the visit, the child was described as “clean, healthy looking and cared for.”
On January 31, 2013, the investigator again met with petitioner at her home. She asserted that the child did not see her getting arrested, that he was not separated from her for a long time, and that he was not “effected [sic].”
Apparently based on its investigation summary that “there is no child [ ] likely to be in immediate or impending danger of serious harm” and that no “Safety Plan/Controlling Interventions are necessary at this time,” ACS did not commence a neglect proceeding against petitioner. However, on February 28, 2013, ACS closed the report as “indicated” against petitioner. In particular, the investigation narrative found that the allegation of inadequate guardianship was substantiated as petitioner was arrested for shoplifting in the presence of the child and used the child to “harbor stolen items.” The narrative found that petitioner exercised poor judgment “and as a result the child’s mental and emotional condition has been placed at risk of impairment. Child reported that he witnessed [petitioner] stealing items and being arrested as a result.” CPS was directed to provide petitioner “with information to community based services such as parenting to teach her appropriate disciplinary method as well as decision making.”
As noted above, the sole consequence of an “indicated” report is that petitioner’s name was included in the registry maintained by OCFS for the purposes of informing providers and licensing agencies concerning petitioner’s future application for childcare related employment, and foster care and adoption. Yet, as the majority notes, an agency may still choose to hire or approve persons with indicated reports provided they “maintain a written record, as part of the application file or employment record, of the specific reasons why such person was determined to be appropriate to receive a foster care or adoption placement or to provide day care services” (Social Services Law § 424-a [2] [a]).
Because petitioner claimed the indicated report would be a *414“huge barrier in obtaining employment in the childcare/ education fields” she was interested in, she asked SCR to amend the report of maltreatment to unfounded. In May 2013, SCR denied the request, scheduled a hearing, and specifically determined that the maltreatment report “is relevant and reasonably related to employment, licensure or certification in the child care field.” SCR noted that it had considered each of the factors set forth in the Guidelines for Determining Whether Indicated Instances of Child Abuse and Maltreatment are Relevant and Reasonably Related to Employment or Licensure, and referenced the factors that it deemed particularly relevant, including the detrimental or harmful effects of petitioner’s actions on her son and her son’s age at the time of the incident.
A hearing was held on October 25, 2013. ACS introduced its investigation records, and petitioner, who was represented by counsel, did not testify or call witnesses. Petitioner’s attorney argued that her actions did not rise to the level of maltreatment and that “there’s no sign that this is a pattern of behavior at all.” Petitioner’s attorney also contended that ACS argued that petitioner’s actions rose to the level of maltreatment because any act of theft risks a physical confrontation, even though no violence occurred in this case. ACS also contended that her actions placed the child at risk of mental or emotional harm by exploiting her child to commit a crime. ACS further argued that her improper conduct was reasonably related to work in the field of childcare because it showed that she failed to exercise even a minimum degree of care of her child and showed that she would be a poor role model for children.
In a written decision on February 11, 2014, the ALJ denied petitioner’s appeal, finding that (i) a fair preponderance of the evidence demonstrated maltreatment; and (ii) the maltreatment was relevant and reasonably related to employment in childcare. Significantly, the ALJ made the following relevant findings of fact:
“The [petitioner] was arrested while attempting to steal three coats, a pair of shoes, and several cell phone cases from Bloomingdales [sic]. At the time of her arrest, the [petitioner] had hidden two coats under [the child’s] clothing and stolen a pair of boots, by having [the child] put on the stolen boots.
“[The child] was present when the [petitioner] was arrested.
“[The child] was not at all distraught and was playing with video games and interacting normally after the [petitioner] was detained for shoplifting.
“[Petitioner] exploited . . . her 5 year old son for the purposes of shoplifting.”
*415Based on the record evidence, the ALJ concluded that petitioner’s actions placed the child “at imminent risk of physical and mental impairment,” that petitioner “failed to exercise a minimum degree of care under the circumstances in question,” and “[t]hat failure is what placed [the child] in imminent risk of physical and emotional impairment.” More specifically, the ALJ found that “[t]he criminal act of shoplifting can result in a physical or violent response, creating a threat of harm to the child’s physical condition.” As to the child’s mental or emotional health, the ALJ found that “[exploitation of a child to commit a crime, as well as teaching a child how to commit a crime, rises to ... a level of outrageous behavior,” and “create [d] an imminent risk to the child’s emotional condition in that [the child] will not control his impulses, and will proceed from accompanying his mother in shoplifting to doing it on his own.” He also remarked that “[o]ne expects a parent to teach a child ... to not steal” but that petitioner exploited her son and taught him stealing was “acceptable behavior” and “how to shoplift.” Moreover, he noted that the fact that the child does not “comprehend the gravity of the circumstances under which the mother is being arrested, does not negate the fact that the child is being endangered by the mother’s action.”
The ALJ also found that petitioner’s maltreatment is “currently relevant and reasonably related to childcare employment, the adoption of a child or the provision of foster care.” This determination was based on his prior discussion of petitioner’s actions in “exploiting a child in order to commit a criminal act,” and a negative inference he drew against petitioner for failing to testify. In that regard, he noted that petitioner failed to present “evidence of remedial steps which would prevent [her] behavior from reoccurring.”
Petitioner commenced this article 78 proceeding challenging the determination as affected by errors of law and as lacking a rational basis in law and fact. Supreme Court granted the petition on the grounds that the ALJ “misapplied the statutory standard for maltreatment and misapplied the Nicholson standard,” and that the ALJ failed to consider all of the OCFS Guideline factors for whether maltreatment is relevant and reasonably related to employment or licensure.
It is well established that the scope of review of petitioner’s article 78 petition is whether respondents’ determination denying petitioner’s request to amend her indicated report to unfounded was arbitrary and capricious, lacked a rational basis or was affected by an error of law (CPLR 7803 [3]; Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431; Matter of Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free *416School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale & Mamaroneck, Westchester County, 34 NY2d 222, 231 [1974]). Notably, “[arbitrary action is without sound basis in reason and is generally taken without regard to the facts” (Pell, 34 NY2d at 231). If there is a rational basis for the determination, a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment even if the court concludes that it would have reached a different result than the one reached by the agency (Peckham, 12 NY3d at 431).
Here, in determining whether ACS established maltreatment by a fair preponderance of the evidence in accordance with Social Services Law § 422 (8) (which was amended in 2008 to comply with rulings that the prior “some credible evidence” standard violated due process), the ALJ applied the correct standard of review pursuant to Nicholson v Scoppetta (3 NY3d 357, 368 [2004]), i.e., “first, that a child’s physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired and second, that the actual or threatened harm to the child is a consequence of the failure of the parent or caretaker to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship.” Indeed, the ALJ specifically cited to these standards in his decision.
It is therefore unclear why the majority sets forth the litigation and legislative history relating to the Social Services Law and the pre-2008 standard requiring that a child protective agency had to show that there was “some credible evidence” of maltreatment. Nothing in this record supports a finding that this outdated standard was applied by the ALJ.
Further, the ALJ properly utilized the statutory definition of a maltreated child pursuant to 18 NYCRR 432.1 (b) (1), which provides in pertinent part that a maltreated child is one
“whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care...
“(ii) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by misusing a drug or drugs; or by misusing alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court.”
The ALJ also applied the correct definition for impairment of mental or emotional health pursuant to Family Ct Act § 1012 *417(h). That section provides as follows: “ Impairment of emotional health’ and ‘impairment of mental or emotional condition’ includes a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual functioning in relation to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive, control of aggressive or self-destructive impulses, ability to think and reason, or acting out or misbehavior, including incorrigibility, ungovernability or habitual truancy; provided, however, that such impairment must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness or inability of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child.”
Based on the foregoing applicable standards and the undisputed record evidence, the ALJ rationally concluded that petitioner’s actions in exploiting her five-year-old son to steal caused the child’s mental and emotional condition to be in imminent danger of impairment. There can be no doubt that exploiting a child to steal and teaching a child that such behavior is acceptable has long-lasting consequences for that child’s emotional and mental development at an age when the child primarily learns from observation of the parent’s actions. There is simply nothing irrational about reaching such a conclusion.
Similarly, the ALJ rationally found that petitioner’s action in using her child to commit a crime placed her son in imminent danger of physical harm. While this case does not entail the more extreme circumstances present in Matter of Rashard D. (15 AD3d 209 [1st Dept 2005] [child directed to rob a bank]), even the commission of minor crimes, especially those involving theft, raises the potential for physical harm to the participants.
In fact, using a child to aid in shoplifting “would support a finding of neglect” (Matter of Bernthon v Mattioli, 34 AD3d at 1166).2 Even a single incident “where the parent’s judgment was strongly impaired and the child exposed to a risk of substantial harm can sustain a finding of neglect” (Matter of Kayla W., 47 AD3d 571, 572 [1st Dept 2008] [internal quotation marks omitted]). And, utilizing and teaching a child to steal is the type of outrageous behavior which in and of itself *418creates an imminent risk of emotional harm to the child (see e.g. Matter of Christina LL., 233 AD2d 705 [3d Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 812 [1997]).
Contrary to the majority’s contention, it is of no moment that there was no evidence before the ALJ that the child suffered a specific tangible injury (see Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369 [“ ‘Imminent danger’ reflects the Legislature’s judgment that a finding of neglect may be appropriate even when a child has not actually been harmed”]). The imminent danger standard exists specifically to protect children who have not yet been harmed and to prevent impairment (see Matter of Nassau County Dept. of Social Servs. v Denise J., 87 NY2d 73, 79 [1995]). Here, the basis for the ALJ’s determination was not actual harm but a risk of imminent harm to the child. Thus, for example, we have upheld a finding of neglect where a mother was found intoxicated on the street with her child even though the child did not suffer actual injury (see Matter of Pedro C. [Josephine B.], 1 AD3d 267 [1st Dept 2003]). It is of no moment that ACS determined in its discretion not to pursue a neglect proceeding against petitioner.
Nor were findings from mental health experts necessary to support the ALJ’s determination. While such additional evidence may have been helpful, it was rational for the ALJ to conclude that this serious incident of theft, which, according to the child, may have occurred before, presented an imminent risk of impairment to the child.
As to the issue of imminence, I see nothing irrational about finding that the risk to this child caused by petitioner’s actions was “near or impending” and not “merely possible” (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369). Initially, the potential for physical confrontation during a theft is imminent. Further, utilizing a child to commit a crime and teaching a child that such behavior is acceptable must have an immediate impact on that child’s emotional and mental well-being, particularly in a young child who is just learning to differentiate between right and wrong. As the ALJ noted, this is so even where the child does not “comprehend the gravity of the circumstances.”
I disagree with the majority that cases finding no maltreatment where a parent engaged in a single instance of corporal punishment are dispositive here (see e.g. Matter of Senande v Carrion, 83 AD3d 851 [2d Dept 2011] [mother hit child with a slipper]). While the majority may consider only physical harm to be “far more immediate,” mental and emotional harm can be just as immediate. Nor is a finding of maltreatment limited to situations in which parents engage in even more “extreme *419parental behavior resulting in obvious danger” (see e.g. Matter of Rosemary V. [Jorge V.], 103 AD3d 484 [1st Dept 2013] [father left children home alone at night so he could engage in a narcotics transaction]).
More significant, to describe the ALJ’s determination as “subjective” or to intimate that petitioner’s actions were merely “foolish” or constituted “undesirable parental behavior” (Nicholson, 3 NY3d at 369) is simply unfounded and erroneous. The majority relies on cases involving the accidental or passive creation of a risk to a child. However, this case does not concern the type of accidental corporal punishment at issue in Matter of Parker v Carrión (80 AD3d 458 [1st Dept 2011]). Nor does it concern the range of things that might be considered merely undesirable parenting such as corporal punishment, allowing a child to stay up late, permitting the consumption of excessive unhealthy foods, or allowing a child to watch an extremely violent film. Here, we have a parent teaching a child how to commit a crime.
Certainly, this case bears no relation to the “undesirable parental behavior” at issue in Nicholson, which concerned the difficult choices faced by battered mothers (see 3 NY3d at 371). Indeed, this case is not akin to the circumstances of a child being exposed to domestic violence against his parent. Rather, this case concerns petitioner exhibiting a strongly impaired judgment when she purposely used her child to steal and taught him such behavior was appropriate. Once again, a child of such tender age learns from observing the parent’s actions whose actions will have a long-lasting effect on the child. Of course, the majority can identify no precedent treating the intentional exploitation of a child to commit a crime as merely undesirable.
I would also find that the ALJ rationally found that petitioner’s actions are reasonably related to a position in childcare. As a matter of common sense, it should go without saying that an individual who utilizes her own child to commit a crime and teaches the child how to steal lacks the necessary judgment to care for children, and would serve as a poor role model for them. In any event, the ALJ’s decision indicates that he considered the relevant OCFS Guidelines. Initially, SCR’s denial of petitioner’s request was before the ALJ and it detailed various relevant factors, including the detrimental or harmful effects of petitioner’s actions on her son and her son’s age at the time of the incident. In addition, the guidelines emphasize that “not all factors will be relevant to each particular case” and thus, contrary to the majority’s position, the ALJ was not mandated to discuss all the factors.
*420Also contrary to the majority’s claim, the ALJ considered more than one factor. Indeed, by referring to his previous discussion about the nature of petitioner’s actions, the ALJ was considering the seriousness of the incident (factor 1) and the age of the child (factor 4), both of which do not weigh in petitioner’s favor. Nor would I find that the passage of only one year between the incident and the hearing (factor 5) weighed in petitioner’s favor. The fact that no serious injury occurred to the child (factor 2) or that no other incidents of maltreatment were known to the ALJ (factor 6) are not factors that needed to be discussed. Nor was factor 10, which concerns incidents of serious injury or death, relevant to the determination.
Moreover, as the majority recognizes, the ALJ properly took a strong inference against petitioner for failing to testify at the hearing (see Denise J., 87 NY2d at 79). Accordingly, he properly found that factor 8 (b), which concerns whether there is any evidence of rehabilitation, weighed against petitioner, who decided not to testify at the hearing. Further, a negative inference could be drawn not only that shoplifting would reoccur but also that it had happened in petitioner’s past based on the child’s response to ACS’ investigator’s question concerning whether petitioner had ever stolen before; the child initially responded “yes” then “no.”
Finally, it appears that the majority’s decision is based in part on a concern that petitioner “will essentially be barred from pursuing a career in her chosen field of early childhood development.” First, this ignores the fact that petitioner will not be precluded from such work but would be required to face an appropriate obstacle given her actions. If petitioner can demonstrate she has changed, an employer may choose to hire her and will simply explain why she is an appropriate hire in writing. More important, the majority ignores what should be the main concern: the purpose of the registry is primarily to protect children who may have the misfortune of being cared for and miseducated by caregivers such as petitioner. If petitioner can exploit her own child to commit a crime, how can she be entrusted to care for other children when no evidence was presented to show petitioner has been rehabilitated? The focus of concern should be on the vulnerable children who are in need of child or foster care and adoption. Regardless, the majority is improperly substituting its judgment for that of the agency, which most certainly had a rational basis for its determination.
For these reasons, I would reverse Supreme Court’s order and dismiss this proceeding.

. While the majority correctly notes that there is no evidence that the child was transported to the precinct, contrary to the majority’s description, the statement of the store detective contained in the ACS investigation notes was that the child was present when his mother was arrested. The separate statement from petitioner in which she claims her son was not present when she was arrested may refer to her formal arrest at the precinct.

. The “legal questions at stake in Bernthon” are different from those raised here, but the reason the Third Department permitted hearsay statements at the custody trial was because those statements—that the child had been used by her father to aid his shoplifting-—supported the allegations of neglect raised in that custody proceeding. In any event, it is a correct statement of the law to note that evidence of using a child to aid in shoplifting would support a finding of neglect.