Court Opinion

ID: 9931219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:16:58.381613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:24.400406
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                     FEBRUARY 8, 2024
                                                                 In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                                WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                               DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,                           )
                                               )         No. 39384-4-III
                     Respondent,               )
                                               )
       v.                                      )
                                               )
ISAIAH THOMAS OLIVER,                          )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
                     Appellant.                )

       STAAB, J. — Isaiah Oliver appeals from a conviction for first degree unlawful

possession of a firearm following a bench trial. He argues: (1) defense counsel was

ineffective for failing to bring a motion to suppress the firearm observed by Officer Clay

Pierson with the aid of a flashlight while looking through the window of a vehicle at

night, and (2) the trial court erred in finding that the plain view exception to the warrant

requirement applied. We disagree with both arguments and affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       Officer Pierson was employed by the Kalispell Tribal Police Department. On the

date of the incident in question, Officer Pierson was on duty and conducting a daily prowl

check at an apartment complex. While at the complex, he noticed a bright green Dodge

Charger with its lights on, parked at the complex’s office even though the office was
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

closed. Officer Pierson was fairly familiar with vehicles in the complex and had never

seen the Charger before, and there were not usually vehicles parked in that area with their

lights on.

       Officer Pierson left the apartment complex to respond to a welfare check at a

nearby casino. At the casino he noticed the same Charger and saw two individuals

exiting the vehicle. After Officer Pierson conducted the welfare check, he returned to the

Charger and shined his flashlight through the driver’s side window. He immediately

observed a firearm “tucked in the driver’s seat and the center console.” Rep. of Proc.

(Nov. 7, 2022) at 128.

       Officer Pierson learned that the passenger of the vehicle was Isaiah Oliver and that

he and the driver were both prohibited from possessing firearms.

       Oliver was placed under arrest, and the State charged him with first degree

unlawful possession of a firearm. He waived his right to a jury trial and the case was

tried to the bench.

       At trial, Officer Pierson testified about his discovery of the firearm. Defense

counsel cross-examined Officer Pierson and elicited testimony that the Charger had tinted

windows.1

       1
         On appeal, Oliver’s counsel argues that Oliver’s attorney at trial failed to conduct
any cross-examination of Officer Pierson during the bench trial and failed to ask about
the tinted windows. See Br. of Appellant at 7. This assertion is belied by the record.

                                             2
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

       Following a bench trial, the trial court found Oliver guilty of one count of first

degree unlawful possession of a firearm based on the firearm observed by Officer Pierson

in the Charger. The court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Relevant to this appeal, the court found:

              12) Upon looking in the driver’s side door window, Officer Pierson
       observed a semi-automatic handgun lodged between the driver’s seat and
       the center console of the vehicle in plain view;

             13) Officer Pierson testified that he also looked in the passenger side
       door window with the assistance of a flashlight and observed the same
       semi-automatic handgun lodged between the driver’s seat and the center
       console of the vehicle in plain view from that view[.]

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 93. It also concluded that “Oliver knowingly had a firearm in his

possession or control, to wit a Ruger .45 which was in plain view and within his

immediate area of control while riding as a passenger in the vehicle.” CP at 94.

       Oliver appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

1.     INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Oliver argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion to

suppress the firearm observed by Officer Pierson through the window of the Charger.

This court disagrees.

       Criminal defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to effective

assistance of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; State v. Lopez,

                                              3
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

190 Wn.2d 104, 115, 410 P.3d 1117 (2018). “A claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel” is “an issue of constitutional magnitude” that “may be considered for the first

time on appeal.” State v. Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1, 9, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). Claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed de novo. State v. White, 80 Wn. App. 406,

410, 907 P.2d 310 (1995).

       A defendant bears the burden of showing (1) that his counsel’s performance “fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the

circumstances” and, if so, (2) that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

poor performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. State v.

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). “If either element . . . is not

satisfied, the inquiry ends.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

       In reviewing the record for deficiencies, there is a strong presumption that

counsel’s performance was reasonable. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. “The burden is

on a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel to show deficient

representation.” Id. at 335. “The reasonableness of counsel’s performance is to be

evaluated from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the

circumstances.” Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384, 106 S. Ct. 2574, 91 L. Ed.

2d 305 (1986). “When counsel’s conduct can be characterized as legitimate trial strategy

or tactics, performance is not deficient.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863.

                                              4
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

       “If a defendant centers their claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on their

attorney’s failure to object, then ‘the defendant must show that the objection would likely

have succeeded.’” State v. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d 239, 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021) (quoting

State v. Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d 480, 508, 438 P.3d 541 (2019)). “‘Only in egregious

circumstances, on testimony central to the State’s case, will the failure to object

constitute incompetence of counsel justifying reversal.’” Id. (quoting Crow, 8 Wn. App.

2d at 508).

       Oliver maintains that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to bring a motion

to suppress the firearm found in Officer Pierson’s initial search of the Charger with the

flashlight. He claims that the search was unconstitutional under both the United States

and Washington Constitutions. Oliver fails to show that a motion to suppress was likely

to succeed.

       The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches and seizures. “A Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government

violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” State

v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577, 591, 451 P.3d 1060 (2019). Similarly, article I, section 7

of the Washington Constitution states that “‘[n]o person shall be disturbed in his [or her]

private affairs, or his [or her] home invaded, without authority of law.’” Id. at 586

(alteration in original) (quoting article I, sec. 7). Under the Washington Constitution, “a

search occurs when the government disturbs ‘those privacy interests which citizens of

                                              5
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass

absent a warrant.’” Id. (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151

(1984)).

         Notably, the open view doctrine provides that a detection does not constitute a

search “‘when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something by utilization of one

or more of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those senses are

used[.]’” State v. Bobic, 140 Wn.2d 250, 259, 996 P.2d 610 (2000) (quoting State v.

Rose, 128 Wn.2d 388, 392, 909 P.2d 280 (1996)).

         There is no argument regarding whether Officer Pierson was permitted to be in the

area of the vehicle. Just as Officer Pierson could lawfully be parked outside of the

casino, he could also intentionally look through the windows of the vehicle also parked

there.

         In regard to Officer Pierson’s use of a flashlight to look through the window of the

vehicle, our Supreme Court has upheld the use of a flashlight under the open view

doctrine where the flashlight “does not transform an observation which would fall within

the open view doctrine during daylight into an impermissible search simply because

darkness falls.” Rose, 128 Wn.2d at 398-99. “There is no reasonable expectation of

privacy in” “contraband [left] in plain sight, visible through” a window. Id. at 394, 399.

The court in Rose explained that employing a flashlight does not render the viewing

intrusive because it is an “exceedingly common device.” Id. at 399.

                                               6
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

       Here, Officer Pierson used a flashlight to aid in looking through the window of the

vehicle at night. This use of a flashlight to aid in seeing what would apparently be

readily visible during daylight hours is permissible under the open view doctrine, and

therefore did not transform Officer Pierson’s observation inside the vehicle into a search.

       Although Oliver argues on appeal that the vehicle’s windows were tinted and

therefore Officer Pierson still would not have been able to see through them during

daylight hours without the aid of a flashlight, the record is undeveloped as to this fact and

therefore this court cannot rely on it as a basis for finding that a motion to suppress

brought by defense counsel would have succeeded.2

       On the record before us, defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring a

motion to dismiss Officer Pierson’s “search” of the Charger because it did not constitute

a search under the open view doctrine.

2.     PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION TO WARRANT REQUIREMENT

       Next, we reject Oliver’s contention that the trial court found that the “plain view”

exception to the warrant requirement applied to Officer Pierson’s initial “search” of the

       2
        Oliver maintains that it is the State’s burden on appeal to show that Officer
Pierson could have seen the firearm through the window without the aid of a flashlight
during daylight hours. However, the defendant, not the State, carries the burden in an
“ineffective assistance of counsel” claim. See State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335.

                                              7
No. 39384-4-III
State v. Oliver

vehicle.3 Following the bench trial, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and a judgment in which the court determined that the firearm was in “plain view” to

any individual sitting on the passenger side of the Charger and also in “plain view” when

Officer Pierson looked through the window. This conclusion was part of the trial court’s

finding of guilt, it was not a finding that the plain view exception to the warrant

requirement applied. At the time the court entered the finding it was not addressing any

allegations of a warrantless search.

       Affirmed.

       A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

                                              _________________________________
                                                      Staab, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________________             _________________________________
      Fearing, C.J.                                   Pennell, J.

       3
          Oliver also assigns error to the trial court’s conclusions that the possession or
control of the firearm occurred in the State of Washington and each of the elements of
unlawful possession of a firearm were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. However, he
fails to provide argument in support of his assignments of error and we therefore decline
to consider it. See State v. Stubbs, 144 Wn. App. 644, 652, 184 P.3d 660 (2008)
(“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to allow for
our meaningful review.”), rev’d on other grounds, 170 Wn.2d 117, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).

                                              8