Court Opinion

ID: 9773788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:58:33.852765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:57.372147
License: Public Domain

GERALD M. SMITH, Senior Judge,
concurring in result.
I reluctantly concur in the opinion of Judge Teitelman, but write to express my reservations about the law that has been explicated in this area by the courts.
It is usual that automobile policies provide insurance for the named insured when operating a non-owned vehicle. Because such operation is normally with the permission of the owner of the other vehicle the liability policy of that vehicle normally also provides coverage for the permittee’s operation. That concept has been carried forward into under-insured motorist coverage as evidenced by the policy before us. The named insured and any family member is provided with underin-sured motorist coverage without regard to the vehicle being occupied. Such coverage is also provided to any other person occupying the covered automobile. A named insured or family member injured while occupying a non-covered vehicle could receive underin-sured motorist coverage under the family policy and under the policy of the non-covered vehicle. A non-family member injured while occupying a covered vehicle could also be covered by his own policy as well as the covered vehicle policy. The “other insurance” provisions of automobile policies represent an attempt to establish the respective obligations of the insurers in the circumstance where such multiple coverage exists.
In Krenski v. Aubuchon, 841 S.W.2d 721 (Mo.App.1992) we dealt with a policy which specifically provided that “Underinsured motor vehicles coverage shall be excess over all other bodily injury bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident.” We held that language created an ambiguity sufficient to overcome specific limits on un-derinsured coverage which had been found in *376Rodriguez v. General Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. banc 1991) not to be ambiguous. It is not unreasonable to interpret such language to mean that underinsured motorist coverage is in addition to the tort-feasor’s insurance coverage.
The Supreme Court did not address “other insurance” provisions in Rodriguez. Either the policy did not contain such a provision, which I regard as unlikely, or the plaintiff therein did not perceive that provision to create an ambiguity and did not bring that provision to the Court’s attention. Although the Court addresses the concept of “excess” insurance, it makes no specific reference to any “other insurance” provision of the policy.
In Zemelman v. Equity Mutual Insurance Company, 935 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.App.1996) the Western District of this court found an “other insurance” provision identical to the one before us created an ambiguity as to the extent of underinsured motorist coverage. The language of that policy as to the definition of “underinsured” and the limit of liability was identical to Rodriguez and the Zemel-man court found neither of those provisions ambiguous. In reliance on Krenski, supra the court concluded that the “other insurance” provision could lead a reasonable policy holder to conclude that the limitations unambiguously set forth earlier did not apply.
The language found to create ambiguity in Krenski and the language before the court in Zemelman are considerably different. The language relied upon in Zemelman is “However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance.” That language clearly addresses the multiple coverage situation referred to earlier in this opinion. Reliance upon that language to create an ambiguity in the underinsured coverage requires a conclusion that the policy issued to Zemelman provided insurance for the vehicle which collided with him. Equity Mutual did not provide insurance for the tortfeasor’s vehicle. No reasonable argument could be posited that another person injured in the accident not covered by the Equity Mutual underinsured motorist provisions could recover against Equity Mutual for the negligence of the tortfeasor. I am unable to conclude here that Hartford provided insurance “with respect to a vehicle” not owned by Goza and that the “other insurance” provision creates an ambiguity with respect to the underinsured motorist coverage.
Courts cannot create an ambiguity in order to distort the language of an unambiguous policy or in order to enforce a particular construction which it might feel is more appropriate. Rodriguez, supra [2,3,4,5], The extensive dicta discussion at the end of the Zemelman opinion suggests that may have happened. That discussion is premised upon the idea that “the courts have carved a niteh which allows the insured to avoid the harsh effect of Rodriguez and the unambiguous definition of underinsured and limit of liability language.” Zemelman [6]. But Rodriguez points out that the effect of underinsured motorist coverage is to assure the insured of receiving the contracted amount of protection, either from the tortfeasor and/or from his insurer. Rodriguez, ftnt. 1. There is nothing harsh about enforcing the contract between the insurer and insured that guarantees that the insured will recover from some source the amount of his damages up to the limit of underinsured coverage. There is no reason to require that he receive more than the contracted for amount. Such a guarantee of a minimum recovery is not illusory protection as Zemelman suggests. Underin-sured motorist coverage is quite inexpensive ($10 in this case) and when the nature of the protection is understood a reasonable policyholder would not expect to recover more than the underinsured motorist damages contracted for.
The Supreme Court denied transfer in Zemelman which does not indicate its approval of the decision but does allow the ease to stand as authority. Thereafter, the Southern District followed Zemelman in Jackson v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America, 949 S.W.2d 130 (Mo.App.1997). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Sommers, 954 S.W.2d 18 (Mo.App. E.D.1997) this district distinguished Zemel-man and Jackson on the basis that “the ‘other insurance’ clause in those cases could reasonably be interpreted to provide cover*377age in excess of all other applicable coverage.” I believe Zemelman and Jackson were incorrectly decided and disagree with the basis in Sommers upon which those cases were distinguished. But all three districts have accepted the “ambiguity” set forth in Judge Teitelman’s opinion and I feel myself bound by that precedent.
I therefore concur in result.