Court Opinion

ID: 9819227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:35.396586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.496056
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, dissenting: As the majority opinion correctly points out, Illinois has never enacted a statutory defense of safety rule violation. Thus, in determining whether an injury arose out of claimant’s employment, the question is whether claimant overstepped the boundaries defining the work to be done (not arising out of) or whether the violation related to the method of accomplishing the work to be done (arising out of). See 2 A. Larson & L. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 31.00, at 6 — 10 (1997). Claimant was within the plant on his way to the break room for a scheduled 10-minute break. As such, he was within the course and scope of his employment. The fact that he violated a company rule by riding double on the lift relates to the method used in going on a break. Thus, according to Professor Larson’s rationale, claimant’s injury arose out of his employment. Moreover, the cases cited by the majority do not support its position. In fact, several cases are directly contrary to the majority position. In Chadwick v. Industrial Comm’n, 179 Ill. App. 3d 715, 534 N.E.2d 1000 (1989), claimant failed to use a safety line while working on scaffolding approximately 70 to 75 feet in the air. The failure to use such a safety line was in direct violation of a safety rule. The court held that claimant was performing the duties for which he was hired and was not engaging in any work activity that was unauthorized. In reversing the Commission’s denial of benefits, the court quoted from Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm’n: “[W]here the violation of a rule or order of the employer takes the employee entirely out of the sphere of his employment and he is injured while violating such rule or order it cannot be then said that the accident arose out of the employment, and in such a case no compensation can be recovered. If, however, in violating such a rule or order the employee does not put himself out of the sphere of his employment, so that it may be said he is not acting in the course of it, he is only guilty of negligence in violating such rule or order and recovery is not thereby barred. [Citation.] *** [I]t does not matter in the slightest degree how many orders the employee disobeys or how bad his conduct may have been, if he was still acting in this sphere of his employment and in the course of it the accident arose out of it.” (Emphasis added.) Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 302 Ill. 401, 406, 134 N.E. 754, 755-56 (1922), quoted in Chadwick, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 717, 534 N.E.2d at 1001. Chadwick would mandate recovery in the instant case. In Gerald D. Hines Interests v. Industrial Comm’n, 191 Ill. App. 3d 913, 548 N.E.2d 342 (1989), claimant failed to follow specific instructions by failing to break open a glass key box that housed an extra key, failing to seek out security, or by failing to contact management when he locked his key in the subbasement. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the Commission’s award of benefits, holding: “ [Violating a direct order is not sufficient to remove the employee from the scope of employment as long as the employee remains within the sphere of his work. (A.L. Randall Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1922), 305 Ill. 558, 137 N.E. 435; see also Chadwick v. Industrial Comm’n (1989), 179 Ill. App. 3d 715, 534 N.E.2d 1000.) As a matter of law, therefore claimant’s negligence and failure to follow direct orders did not remove him from the scope of his employment.” Gerald D. Hines Interests, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 917, 548 N.E.2d at 345. The Hines court rejected the employer’s reliance on Orsini v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987), and Curtis v. Industrial Comm’n, 158 Ill. App. 3d 344, 511 N.E.2d 866 (1987), distinguishing both. In Orsini, claimant, who was injured while working on his personal automobile during work hours, was not subjected to a risk that was incidental to his employment. Instead, his conduct “was of a personal nature solely for his own convenience.” Gerald D. Hines Interests, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 918, 548 N.E.2d at 345. The claimant in Curtis, who was injured during his lunch break while pouring waste gasoline into barrels to take home for his own use, was not injured in the course of his employment. The Curtis court found that claimant “was in a place and performing an act which had no connection with his duties as a truck driver, and instead was engaged in a self-benefitting activity not within the scope of his ordinary duties.” Gerald D. Hines Interests, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 918, 548 N.E.2d at 345. Hines, too, would mandate recovery in the instant case. In Hatfill v. Industrial Comm’n, 202 Ill. App. 3d 547, 560 N.E.2d 369 (1990), claimant had left work and was on his way to his car when he jumped over a drainage ditch. The court held that claimant’s injuries occurred while he was engaged in an activity that benefitted only himself and not his employer. Although cited by the majority, Hatfill is not a safety rule violation case: “Lastly, we consider the claimant’s arguments that a knowing violation of a safety rule does not destroy the compensability of an employee’s injuries and that the Commission erroneously denied the claimant benefits because of his negligence in leaving the work place. We find these arguments to be without merit. The Commission did not base its determination on either of these criteria but found that the claimant’s injuries were not a result of fulfilling any duties required of his employment.” Hatfill, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 554, 560 N.E.2d at 374. Jewel Cos. v. Industrial Comm’n, 57 Ill. 2d 38, 310 N.E.2d 12 (1974), is a case very similar to the instant fact situation. The claimant was employed as an apprentice mechanic at Jewel’s Melrose Park facility. The facility was fenced in and encompassed several square blocks and approximately 99 acres of land. Because the facility was so large, Jewel provided several different cafeterias and restaurants for employees to purchase meals. At the time of the accident, claimant was heading to a restaurant located several blocks from the garage in which he worked. Because of the distance, claimant rode his motorcycle, which he used to get to work. While driving to the restaurant, he was involved in an accident and injured. The Commission awarded benefits but the circuit court reversed. The supreme court reversed the circuit court and reinstated the Commission’s decision, finding that, although the injury occurred during claimant’s lunch break, it arose out of his employment. Jewel Cos., 57 Ill. 2d at 40, 310 N.E.2d at 13. In Roberts & Oake v. Industrial Comm’n, 378 Ill. 612, 39 N.E.2d 315 (1942), relied upon by the court in Jewel Cos., claimant was a butcher, working for a meat packing firm in the Union Stockyards. He left the building in which he was working and started to run for a truck that was proceeding east on 45th Place. He made a jump for the running board, lost his footing, and was killed. The supreme court specifically noted that the employer did not have exclusive control over 45th Place. The court found that, although this property was owned by the Union Stockyards Company, it was obvious that all trucks or peddlers having any business in the stockyards had a right to use this roadway. The court held that where a lunch period is not subject to the employer’s control or restriction in any way, the employee is free to go where he will at that time. However, if the employee sustains an injury on a public street, the injury does not rise out of the employment. Importantly, however, the court noted that the result may be different if claimant takes his lunch break on the employer’s premises: “It cannot, logically, be contended that the employer had exclusive control over this roadway so that it would be liable for all injuries which might be sustained thereon. If only the trucks of Roberts & Oake had use of this roadway and it was owned and supervised by the employer, the situation might be different.” (Emphasis added.) Roberts & Oake, 378 Ill. at 615, 39 N.E.2d at 316. In the instant case, claimant was on his way to the break room for a 10-minute break. As such, he was within the sphere of his employment. At no time did claimant overstep the boundaries defining the work to be done. Because the 10-minute break is clearly within the sphere of claimant’s employment and because the rule he violated involved how claimant would get to the break room, it related to the method of accomplishing his work. As such, the injury arose out of and in the course of employment. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the cause to the Commission for calculation of benefits. BARICK, J., joins in this dissent.