Court Opinion

ID: 9889223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 23:03:04.072791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:12.478872
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23
                   CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

      IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                             DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
         Plaintiff and Respondent,           A164989
 v.
 WILLIAM EVERS,                              (Mendocino County Super.
         Defendant and Appellant.            Ct. No. 12-CR-01240)

        William Evers pled guilty to assault on a police officer with a
firearm after being arrested in connection with a string of residential
burglaries. At sentencing, the trial court ordered Evers to pay
restitution to two victims and assessed a 15 percent administrative fee
on the restitution amounts. The court also imposed a $10,000
restitution fine and imposed but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution
fine. The court declined Evers’ request to reduce the two restitution
fines by applying a statutory formula and concluded that, under the
circumstances, the maximum fines were warranted.
        Evers now argues—and the Attorney General agrees—that the
15 percent administrative fee was invalid because the statute pursuant
to which it was imposed was repealed before the date of his sentencing.
Evers also argues that the restitution fines were unconstitutional
under People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 and similar cases
requiring sentencing courts to take into account a defendant’s ability to
pay, and that he properly raised his constitutional challenge to the
fines by submitting two informal post-judgment motions to the trial
court under Penal Code section 1237.2.1 The Attorney General
responds that Evers forfeited his Dueñas challenge by failing to make
any argument or objection on that basis at the sentencing hearing, and
that a motion under section 1237.2 does not cure the forfeiture.
      We reverse the trial court’s orders insofar as they require Evers
to pay the 15 percent administrative fee, but otherwise affirm, finding
that Evers’ motions under section 1237.2 did not excuse his forfeiture.
                            BACKGROUND
      After being released from prison in 2018, Evers worked briefly
in 2020, but otherwise was unemployed. In 2021, he was living in the
forest in Mendocino County and obtaining food, alcohol, firearms, and
other items from occupied and unoccupied residences.
      In May 2021, two officers responded to a report that Evers had
broken into a residence. Upon encountering Evers, one officer chased
him on foot. Evers shot at or near the officer and escaped. He was
later apprehended and charged by criminal complaint with attempted
murder of a peace officer, grand theft of a firearm, two counts of
vandalism, and 15 counts of burglary, along with special circumstances
allegations.
      Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court added a count to the
complaint for assault on a peace officer with a firearm, and dismissed
the remaining counts. As a factual basis for his plea, Evers admitted
that he “assaulted Mendocino County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Kelly
with a firearm knowing Deputy Kelly was a peace officer engaged in
the lawful performance of his duties.” Evers pled guilty to the single

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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count and two prior strikes, and agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life
in prison.
      At the outset of the March 24, 2022 sentencing hearing, Evers’
attorney asked “to be heard on the restitution fine.” The court first
ordered Evers to pay direct restitution of $1,450 and $839.99 to two
victims, with 10 percent annual interest, and a 15 percent
administrative fee. It permanently stayed $30.00 and $40.00 court
assessments, and otherwise accepted the plea.
      The court then explained that “typically [it] reduces the
restitution fine,” but, in Evers’ case, “[i]n light of the amount of actual
restitution ordered . . . , which is approximately $2,500, I am not going
to reduce the restitution fines . . . under [section] 1202.4(b). So the
Court will order the $10,000 [restitution fine].” The court also ordered
but suspended a $10,000 parole restitution fine under section 1202.45.
(See § 1202.45, subd. (a) [parole restitution fine shall be imposed in
same amount as restitution fine].) Evers’ attorney argued that the
fines should be reduced to $6,000 according to a statutory formula.
Under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), the court responded, it was
required to impose a restitution fine, absent a finding under
subdivision (c) of “compelling and extraordinary reasons.” The court
stated it could not “make those findings,” but noted other factors it
could consider to increase the fine above the $300 statutory minimum,
including Evers’ ability to pay. It stated that Evers “will be at least
able to earn wages while incarcerated,” and noted he would be
incarcerated for 25 years to life, so inability to pay was not “a reason
not to impose [the restitution] fine or to reduce that fine.” The court
explained that the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of its

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commission, the economic gain to Evers, the extent of loss to others,
and the number of victims supported the maximum fine.
      Evers’ attorney then asked the court to use the formula in
section 1202.4, subdivision (b)(2) to reduce the restitution fine
to $7,500. The court rejected that proposal for the reasons it had
already stated. It confirmed final details of the sentence and entered
judgment.
      In November and December 2022, Evers’ appellate counsel sent
two informal letter motions to the trial court, asking the court to
(1) strike the 15 percent administrative fee applied to the two direct
victim restitution orders; and (2) reduce the restitution fines to the
statutory minimum of $300 and stay enforcement until there is a
showing of ability to pay. Among other things, counsel argued that the
many practical limitations on work in prison and the amount of victim
restitution ordered meant that Evers may never have the ability to
make any payments against the restitution fines. Counsel cited
section 1237.2 as requiring the filing of the informal motions in the
trial court prior to appeal. The trial court did not act on the motions.
                             DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Evers continues to challenge the fees and fines
imposed at sentencing. First, he argues that the 15 percent
administrative fee is not statutorily authorized. Second, he argues that
the court’s imposition of the two $10,000 restitution fines violated his
constitutional rights to be free of excessive fines and to due process and
equal protection, at least without consideration of his ability to pay
them. We address the issues in turn.

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   1. Restitution Administrative Fee
      Evers first argues that the 15 percent administrative fee applied
to the victim restitution orders was invalid because the statutory
subdivision pursuant to which it was imposed had been repealed at the
time of his sentencing. Section 1203.1, subdivision (l) was indeed
repealed as of January 1, 2022, more than two months before Evers
was sentenced. (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 22; see People v. Prudholme
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 966, fn. 8.) The Attorney General concedes that
we should reverse the 15 percent administrative fee. We agree.
   2. Restitution Fines
      The Attorney General argues that Evers has forfeited his
constitutional challenges to the restitution fines. Evers concedes that
his trial counsel did not make constitutional arguments at sentencing,
did not argue that Evers lacked the ability to pay the fines, and did not
request a hearing concerning his ability to pay. His sentencing hearing
occurred more than two years after Dueñas was decided. We therefore
presume his trial counsel was aware of the case. On those bare facts,
we agree with the Attorney General that Evers forfeited his
constitutional challenges to the restitution fines.
      Evers argues that the two informal motions his appellate counsel
submitted directly to the trial court pursuant to section 1237.2 negate
any forfeiture because they gave the trial court an opportunity to
correct the alleged error. In relevant part, section 1237.2 provides that
“[a]n appeal may not be taken by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction on the ground of an error in the imposition . . . of fines . . .
unless the defendant first presents the claim in the trial court at the
time of sentencing, or if the error is not discovered until after

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sentencing, the defendant first makes a motion for correction in the
trial court . . . .”
       Section 1237.2 creates an alternative pathway to correct certain
sentencing errors without resorting to appeal. (People v. Clark (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 248, 255–256.) The Legislature created this pathway
“ ‘to conserve judicial resources and [allow litigants to] efficiently
present claims in a single forum.’ ” (Id. at p. 256; cf. People v. Fares
(1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 957 [“We are disturbed that this attempt at
a minor correction of a sentence error has required the formal appellate
process”].) Because the purpose of the rule is to avoid the unnecessary
expenditure of appellate resources, it “only applies in cases where the
erroneous imposition or calculation of fines, penalty assessments,
surcharges, fees, or costs are the sole issue on appeal.” (§ 1237.2; see
Clark, at p. 256.)
       Section 1237.2 requires a “motion for correction” only when “the
error is not discovered until after sentencing.” (§ 1237.2.) That does
not appear to describe the situation here. As we have noted, there is no
indication that Evers’ trial counsel was unaware of Dueñas and similar
cases prior to the sentencing hearing.2 Yet even when the trial court

       2 Evers suggests in his reply brief that, if defense counsel “was

aware of the error in the trial court but opted to waive the error, then
trial counsel would clearly have provided ineffective assistance of
counsel, which constitutes an avoidance of the State’s affirmative
defense of forfeiture or waiver.” We do not consider an ineffective
assistance claim raised for the first time in a reply brief. (People v.
Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527, 550, fn. 9.) We likewise do not consider
Evers’ claim made for the first time in reply that his plea form, by
omitting the notation “TBD” next to the checked box, did not advise
him that he would have to pay an amount to the Victim Restitution
Fund.

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stated that it was taking Evers’ ability to pay into account by
considering the possibility of future wages he could earn while in
prison, Evers did not challenge the court’s reasoning, request a hearing
on his ability to pay, or argue that the amount was unconstitutional.
Instead, he argued only that the court should rely on statutory
formulas to impose fines of $6,000 or at most $7,500, far more than
what he contends on appeal is constitutionally permissible.
      “[A] sentencing court may not impose . . . restitution fines
without giving the defendant, on request, an opportunity to present
evidence and argument why such monetary exactions exceed his ability
to pay.” (People v. Cowan (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 32, 48, review granted
June 17, 2020, S261952, italics added.) Once caselaw exists holding
that a hearing on ability to pay is constitutionally required when
requested, a defendant who does not object or ask for a hearing forfeits
the claim of error. (People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 624;
cf.; People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 854 [finding no forfeiture where
trial court imposed $10,000 restitution fine without mentioning it at
the sentencing hearing, depriving defendant of any opportunity to
object].)
      Some cases have construed section 1237.2 as a vehicle to correct
ministerial errors, rather than to resolve substantive challenges to the
interpretation or application of sentencing statutes, in which case it
would not apply to Evers’ claim in any event. (See People v. Clark,
supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 256; People v. Jordan (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
1136, 1142.) But regardless, in light of the purposes of the statute
discussed above, we find no basis to conclude that it was intended to
create a mechanism to avoid forfeiture in this context by having

                                    7
appellate counsel present the trial court with constitutional and factual
arguments concerning the defendant’s ability to pay months after the
sentencing hearing has concluded—a mechanism that arbitrarily would
be available only when the imposition of the fines is “the sole issue on
appeal.” (§ 1237.2.)
      To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be timely.
(See, e.g., Keener v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 247, 264; SCI
California Funeral Services, Inc. v. Five Bridges Foundation (2012)
203 Cal.App.4th 549, 564; Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 547, 584; In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
1146, 1154 & fn. 5.) Section 1237.2 does not change our conclusion that
Evers’ constitutional objection was not.
                             DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s direct victim restitution orders are reversed
insofar as they impose a 15 percent administrative fee on the
restitution amounts. Evers’ sentence is otherwise affirmed.3
                                           GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
STREETER, J.

      3 We deny Evers’ request for judicial notice as irrelevant to our

resolution of this appeal.

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Trial Court:                    Superior Court of Mendocino County

Trial Judge:                    Honorable Keith Faulder

Counsel for Defendant and       Walter K. Pyle
Appellant:
Counsel for Plaintiff and       Rob Bonta
Respondent:                     Attorney General of California
                                Lance E. Winters
                                Chief Assistant Attorney General
                                Jeffrey M. Laurence
                                Senior Assistant Attorney General
                                Arthur P. Beever
                                Deputy Attorney General
                                Claudia H. Phillips
                                Deputy Attorney General

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