Court Opinion

ID: 9913739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 18:02:10.723792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:42.046469
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/28/23 P. v. Lai CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                    (San Joaquin)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096993

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
                                                                                       2019-0016316)
           v.

 ADRIAN LAI,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         On November 9, 2021, this court upheld defendant Adrian Lai’s conviction for
three counts of felony stalking and denied defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s order
requiring him to register as a sex offender for life because the statutory scheme tiering the
required length of sex offender registration had not yet taken effect. (People v. Lai
(Nov. 9, 2021, C091679) [nonpub. opn.] (Lai I).) Rather, we concluded the Department

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of Justice (DOJ) would place defendant in an appropriate tiered category pursuant to
Penal Code section 290, subdivision (d)(5) after the law went into effect.1
       Defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for review, and on January 19,
2022, the matter was transferred back to us with directions to vacate the prior decision
and reconsider the matter in light of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 731) (Senate Bill No. 567). We did so and issued a new opinion affirming our
original analysis concerning defendant’s convictions and sex offender registration.
However, we remanded the matter for resentencing in light of the changes Senate Bill
No. 567 made to the trial court’s authority to select an appropriate triad term. (People v.
Lai (April 7, 2022, C091679) [nonpub. opn.] (Lai II).)
       Defendant appeals the judgment entered on remand. However, rather than
challenge the trial court’s reimposition of an upper term sentence, he brings a
multifaceted challenge to the trial court’s failure to revisit the requirement that he register
as a sex offender, including how long such registration should continue. For the reasons
we shall explain, we affirm.

                                      BACKGROUND
       We need not recount the facts underlying defendant’s convictions for stalking, as
they are described in detail in this court’s opinion in Lai II, supra, C091679, and are
unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal. It is enough to note defendant stalked three
women unknown to him by repeatedly approaching them despite their requests to be left
alone, inquiring whether they were single, sometimes asking them out, sometimes
following them in his car, and staring, which caused each woman distress and fear.
       Following defendant’s original appeal, this court’s remittitur directed the trial
court to “resentence defendant under . . . section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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No. 567.” (Lai II, supra, C091679.) In accordance with this direction, on September 12,
2022, the trial court held resentencing proceedings to determine whether defendant
should still be sentenced to an upper term. It does not appear the parties submitted any
briefing on remand, and neither party argued at that hearing the remittitur required a
different or expanded inquiry.
       Consistent with the trial court’s understanding of the remittitur, the People
presented certified records that defendant had been previously convicted of misdemeanor
stalking (§ 646.9) and possession of a concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2)), which
the People argued could be used to aggravate defendant’s sentence. The trial court
agreed, electing to leave defendant’s upper term sentence intact in light of his prior
convictions. Defendant did not request the trial court revisit its previous section 290.006
determination, but did ask for the return of his cellular telephone. In fact, the record
reveals no discussion of defendant’s sex offender registration requirement whatsoever on
remand. Defendant timely appealed.

                                        DISCUSSION
       Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s compliance with the amendments of
Senate Bill No. 567 at his resentencing on remand; rather, he attacks the trial court’s
failure to revisit the requirement that he register as a sex offender. Specifically,
defendant faults the trial court for failing to exercise informed discretion in its
registration determination, to consider new information in making that determination, and
to orally pronounce the registration determination. Defendant further argues insufficient
evidence supports both the requirement that he register as a sex offender in the first
instance and the trial court’s implied findings required to uphold a determination that he
register for life under the amended statute. Recognizing his failure to object at the
resentencing proceeding could forfeit these issues, defendant asserts his counsel was
ineffective for not raising them, he did not have a meaningful opportunity to object, and

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we should accept his objection to the lifetime registration requirement at his original
sentencing as sufficient to preserve the issue in this appeal.
       The People counter that defendant forfeited these issues by not objecting at
resentencing, is precluded from challenging the trial court’s determination to subject him
to sex offender registration for failure to bring that claim in his original appeal, and that
any challenge to defendant’s lifetime registration requirement is moot. In support of the
last point, the People have moved for judicial notice of a declaration of a DOJ employee,
which states that on June 9, 2022, that employee designated defendant as a Tier 1
offender. The People have also requested judicial notice of a September 21, 2023, DOJ
letter advising defendant of that status.
       We conclude the propriety of the trial court’s previous section 290.006
determination is not before us, as defendant did not ask the trial court to revisit that
determination, and therefore, he has forfeited his arguments that the trial court should
have done so. (See, e.g., People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406 [“ ‘A party in a
criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not
object to the sentence at trial’ ”].) Moreover, defendant had an adequate opportunity to
request this relief if he believed he was entitled to it2 (Scott, at p. 406), and defendant has
not established his objections at his original sentencing preserved an argument he failed
to make at his resentencing hearing.

2      Defendant’s suggestion he was prevented from raising this issue because the trial
court did not give him notice of its intended ruling, ignores that the court did not make a
new section 290.006 determination. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests defendant
was prevented from requesting the court reconsider its prior determination. On the
contrary, defendant litigated the return of his cellular telephone at this hearing, thus
demonstrating he was able to raise extraneous issues without objection from the court or
the People.

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       Nor has defendant established his counsel was ineffective for failing to request the
trial court revisit the registration requirement. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198.) We defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions (ibid.), and it would have been
reasonable for counsel to rely on the statutory scheme under which the DOJ would
determine defendant’s appropriate tier as referenced in our previous appellate decisions.
(Lai I, supra, C091679; Lai II, supra, C091679.)
       In point of fact, the DOJ redesignated defendant as a Tier 1 offender months prior
to the resentencing hearing and notified defendant of that determination after he filed his
opening brief in this appeal. We grant the People’s request for judicial notice that the
DOJ made this determination on June 9, 2022, and transmitted a letter documenting that
determination to defendant on September 21, 2023. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459;
People v. Osorio (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1411 [judicially noticing discharge from
parole paperwork], disapproved on other grounds in People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th
640, 646.) However, this does not end the inquiry. Judicial notice cannot be used to
establish the truth of the facts underlying these acts, to wit that defendant is a Tier 1
offender. (See, e.g., In re K.M. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 450, 456 [“judicial notice may be
taken of the existence of court documents but not the truth of factual findings made in
other court rulings”]; Shaeffer v. State (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 348, 354 [judicially noticing
commission report, but recognizing limitation that such notice does not include the truth
of the report’s contents].) Nonetheless, in exceptional circumstances, we may take the
extraordinary step of considering extra record evidence to establish defendant’s appellate
arguments are moot. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(c); In re K.M., at pp. 455-457
[extra record evidence may be offered to establish appeal’s mootness]; People v. Osorio,
at p. 1411 [same].) We do so and conclude that even if defendant’s arguments were not
forfeited, all but one of them have been mooted by the DOJ Tier 1 designation
determination.

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       As to that remaining argument, we concur with the People that defendant may not
revisit the propriety of the trial court’s original determination that he must register as a
sex offender in this successive appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Jordan (2018)
21 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143-1144 [waiver precludes raising defect in sentence following
remand if that defect was present in the original sentence and not challenged in the
original appeal].) Having failed to raise that issue in his previous appeal (Lai II, supra,
C091679), he may not do so now. (Jordan, at p. 1143 [“When a defendant had an
opportunity to challenge his or her sentence in an earlier appeal and failed to do so, he or
she may not belatedly raise the same issue in a later appeal or a collateral attack on the
judgment, absent good cause”].)3 Given the procedural stance of this determination,
defendant’s reliance on People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119 is inapt, as that case
recognizes the ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a court
order on appeal without objecting in the trial court. (Id. at pp. 1126-1128.) It does not
alter the well-established rule against challenging prior trial court determinations in
successive appeals. (Jordan, at pp. 1143-1144.)

3       Defendant has not established any of the reasons for not applying this rule, to wit:
(1) that the issue was not ripe in the original appeal; (2) that there was a significant
change in facts or law; or (3) that there was a justifiable reason for the delay. (People v.
Jordan, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1144.) The standard for determining whether
defendant should register as a sex offender in the first instance has not changed.
(Compare § 290.006, subd. (a) with former § 290.006, subd. (a) [both requiring the trial
court to determine if defendant “committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion
or for purposes of sexual gratification” in order to require registration for offense not
designated by § 290].)

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                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                               /s/
                                           EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
ROBIE, J.

    /s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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