Court Opinion

ID: 9851611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:15:56.808592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:08.435304
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES:
I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the circuit court’s order compelling petitioner to disclose the skim stock formula. Since this order is before us on a common law writ of cei'tiorari, we may reverse the trial court’s decision only if it is affected by an error of law. Berry v. Spigner, 226 S.C. 183, 84 S.E.2d 381 (1954). We cannot consider the facts, “except to ascertain whether the order is wholly unsupported by the evidence.” Id. Since I find evidence in the record, particularly *482the affidavit of Dr. Duddey, which supports the-circuit court’s order, I would affirm.
In my opinion, the majority reverses not because there is no evidence, nor because the circuit court committed an error of law, but because, in the majority’s view, the petitioners’ experts were more persuasive than those of respondent. For example, the majority states respondent’s experts did not address Queiser’s assertion that a tire’s performance is not dependent on its initial composition. Dr. Duddey, however, acknowledged that post-manufacturing factors could explain the tire’s failure, but also maintained that he needed the formula in order to determine whether a design defect, perhaps in the antidegradant package component of the formula, contributed to its failure. In my view, whether this was sufficiently specific is a judgment call for the trial judge.
Moreover, the majority opines that “a chemical analysis necessitating the discovery of Bridgestone’s skim stock formula is not the sole, or even the best, means to test for defect” and holds there is “no evidence that the skim stock formula is essential to a defect inquiry.” It is not respondent’s burden under either the Trade Secrets Act or Rule 26(c)(7), SCRCP to demonstrate that knowledge of the trade secret is the “best” or “sole” way for it to proceed, nor that it is “essential,” but rather that it has a “substantial need”14 for this “relevant and necessary”15 information. Applying our limited scope of review on certiorari16 to the order before us, I would hold there is evidence to support the trial judge’s findings that respondent has met his burden. '
I would affirm.

. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-8-60(B).

. Rule 26(c)(7), SCRCP.

. Compare Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.2007); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. 2003) citing In re Continental General Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 609, (Tex. 1998), relied upon by the majority, both of which came before the reviewing courts under the more liberal "abuse of discretion” standard of review.