Court Opinion

ID: 9482660
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:56:53.939044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:07.588184
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
Although I concur in the results reached by the majority, I write separately to emphasize what I believe to be the most important aspect of this case. .
In this case, the administrative law judge (AU) largely disregarded the medical diagnoses of Marbury’s psychogenically caused seizures as provided by Marbury’s treating physicians. In his decision, the AU observed that Marbury had no history of seizures prior to 1985, that Marbury’s physicians could not find any physical cause for the seizures, and that no disinterested person had observed the seizures occurring. Drawing upon only these observations, the AU chose to disregard the diagnoses of two treating physicians in favor of his own diagnosis that Marbury’s claimed seizure disorder was “questionable.”
An AU sitting as a hearing officer abuses his discretion when he substitutes his own uninformed medical evaluations for those of a claimant’s treating physicians: “Absent a good showing, of cause to the contrary, the opinions of treating physicians must be accorded substantial or considerable weight by the Secretary.” Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir.1988). See also MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053-54 (11th Cir.1986); Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir.1985). Two medical diagnoses made at different times by different treating physicians revealed that Marbury did in fact suffer from a psychogenically caused seizure disorder. Nevertheless, in the case at bar, it is obvious that the AU accorded little or no weight to these diagnoses. An AU may, of course, engage in whatever idle speculations regarding the legitimacy of the claims that come before him in his private or personal capacity; however, as a hearing officer he may not arbitrarily *841substitute his own hunch or intuition for the diagnosis of a medical professional.
Because the ALJ made no factual findings supporting an inference that the treating physicians were incompetent or otherwise failed to perform their duties in a professional manner, the AU’s decision not to credit seriously the medical diagnoses indicating psychogenically caused seizures cannot stand. Lamb, 847 F.2d at 703; MacGregor, 786 F.2d at 1053-54; Broughton, 776 F.2d at 961-62. Although the AU could have legitimately discounted the diagnoses, he could have done so only if he had clearly articulated his reasons for such action. See Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1012 (11th Cir.1987). Moreover, the AU’s proffered reasons for discounting the diagnoses had to be supported by substantial evidence. Lamb, 847 F.2d at 703. In this case, the AU has not articulated any valid reasons for calling into question the diagnoses — much less supported his medical conclusions with substantial or considerable evidence.1
Although Social Security disability benefits must be reserved only for those who qualify to receive them, an AU may not arrogate the power to act as both judge and physician. The AU in this case clearly exceeded his legal authority by allowing his personal views regarding the non-physical source of Marbury’s seizure disorder to interfere with his responsibilities to administer fairly the Social Security disability programs. On remand, let us hope that the AU refrains from playing doctor and instead satisfies himself with merely serving as a judge.

. Indeed, the ALJ did not even have before him a diagnosis from a non-treating physician that supported his medical conclusions. Cf. Lamb, 847 F.2d at 703.