Court Opinion

ID: 9380548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 15:07:36.329733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.139897
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Lykins v. Hale, 2023-Ohio-752.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                           CLERMONT COUNTY

 DONALD H. LYKINS,                                    :

        Appellant,                                    :          CASE NO. CA2022-07-037

                                                      :                   OPINION
     - vs -                                                                3/13/2023
                                                      :

 JEFFREY S. HALE, et al.,                             :

        Appellees.                                    :

              APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                             Case No. 2020 CVA 00833

Donald H. Lykins, pro se.

Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A., and Christopher R. Conard and Zachary B. White, for appellees.

        PIPER, P.J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Donald Lykins, appeals the decision of the Clermont County Court

of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Jeffrey Hale. 1 Lykins

brought this case against Hale for legal malpractice following divorce proceedings with

1. Hale's law firm was also named a defendant in this case. For ease of discussion, we will refer to Hale
and his law firm in the singular.
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Lykins' now ex-wife, Susana.

                                 LYKINS' CONTESTED DIVORCE

        {¶2}    Lykins and Susana were married on August 31, 1996.2 Two children were

born issue of their marriage. On June 2, 2015, Susanna filed a complaint for divorce from

Lykins. The divorce proceedings primarily involved issues of child custody, child support,

and spousal support. The proceedings were highly contentious and prolonged. Lykins v.

Lykins, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2017-06-028 and CA2017-06-032, 2018-Ohio-2144, ¶

1.

        {¶3}    On October 31, 2016, Jeffrey Hale entered an appearance as counsel for

Lykins. Previously, three other attorneys had represented Lykins, and all were permitted to

withdraw as Lykins' counsel. Despite hiring Hale, Lykins also engaged in significant self-

representation by signing and filing pleadings and communicating directly with opposing

counsel.

        {¶4}    The divorce trial began on January 23, 2017, less than 3 months after Hale

entered his appearance. Following the first day of trial, the case was continued in progress.

On February 28, 2017, like his three predecessors, Hale moved to withdraw as Lykins'

counsel, citing difficulty in communication that resulted in a dysfunctional relationship.

        {¶5}    On May 5, 2017, the domestic relations court held a final hearing during which

Susana and Lykins provided additional testimony and evidence. Lykins represented himself

at the final hearing. After taking the matter under advisement, the domestic relations court

designated Susana as the residential parent of their minor children and ordered Lykins to

pay spousal support and child support to Susana. This court affirmed the decision of the

2. Although Donald and Susana share the same last name, we refer to Donald as "Lykins" while referring to
Susana by her first name. Susana is not a party to this case and is mentioned only briefly to provide factual
background.

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domestic relations court as to parental rights and responsibilities and spousal support, but

concluded the court erred in its calculation of Lykins' child support obligation. Therefore,

this court issued a limited remand for purposes of redetermining the child support obligation.

Lykins, 2018-Ohio-2144, at ¶ 76.

                      LYKINS SUES HALE FOR LEGAL MALPRACTICE

         {¶6}   On February 23, 2018, Lykins filed a complaint ("First Case") against Hale

alleging legal malpractice in the divorce case. In the First Case, Lykins hired, as an expert,

attorney Gregory Keyser to prepare an expert report on whether Hale's representation fell

below the applicable standard of care ("Keyser Report"). The Keyser Report was filed in

the trial court on May 31, 2019. Later, Lykins dismissed the First Case pursuant to Civ.R.

41(A).

         {¶7}   On October 5, 2020, Lykins refiled his legal malpractice complaint ("Second

Case") against Hale. For reasons unclear, Keyser was not used as an expert witness in

the Second Case. Rather, in the Second Case, Lykins hired attorney Nicholas Kulik as an

expert. Kulik was only recently licensed to practice law in November 2016.

         {¶8}   Kulik prepared an expert report ("Kulik Report") indicating that Hale's

representation of Lykins had fallen below the applicable standard of care. The Kulik Report

was dated May 26, 2021. In response to Hale's motion for summary judgment, Lykins

submitted an affidavit from Kulik and a "supplemental analysis." The trial court found that

there was competing expert testimony which created genuine issues of material fact and

therefore denied Hale's motion for summary judgment.3

         {¶9}   Shortly before the day of trial, Hale's counsel discovered that Kulik had

3. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Hale provided his own expert who produced a report
extensively detailing that Hale did not deviate from the standard of care. The trial court found the differing
opinions would be better decided by a trier of fact.

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substantially plagiarized Keyser's report which had been filed in the previously dismissed

First Case. Kulik had also failed to identify Keyser's report as a document relied upon in

forming his independent opinion.      Upon discovery of this impropriety, Hale's counsel

immediately notified Lykins' counsel representing him at the time, as well as the trial court.

Hale followed up with a motion to exclude Kulik's testimony as an expert in the case.

       {¶10} The trial court scheduled a hearing on Hale's motion to exclude for June 9,

2022, four days before the scheduled final hearing. At the evidentiary hearing on the motion

to exclude, Hale provided the trial court with copies of the Keyser Report and the Kulik

Report and highlighted the extent of Kulik's plagiarism. During the hearing, Kulik admitted

to retyping multiple portions of the Keyser Report verbatim into his own report. Despite

plagiarizing from the Keyser Report in a substantial way and not identifying it as a document

he reviewed in forming his own independent opinion, Kulik maintained that the opinions he

expressed were his own based upon his independent analysis. Due to the volume and

substance of the material plagiarized, it appears the trial court was unpersuaded.

       {¶11} The trial court granted Hale's motion to exclude Kulik as an expert, finding

that Kulik's opinions were unreliable and inadmissible.         The trial court specifically

determined that Kulik copied his opinions from Keyser's report. The trial court also denied

Lykins' oral motion for a 90-day continuance to obtain a new expert and to file a new report.

Hale filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's initial decision denying Hale

summary judgment. In opposing Hale's motion for reconsideration of summary judgment,

Lykins made a motion requesting the trial court reconsider the exclusion of Kulik's

testimony.

       {¶12} On July 1, 2022, the trial court denied Lykins' motion for reconsideration and

granted Hale's motion for reconsideration of its earlier denial of summary judgment. The

trial court found that Lykins lacked expert testimony concerning the applicable standard of

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care and therefore could not prevail on his legal malpractice claim. As a result, the trial

court granted summary judgment in favor of Hale. Lykins now appeals, raising three

assignments of error for review.           For ease of discussion, we will address Lykins'

assignments of error out of order.

       {¶13} Assignment of Error No. 1:

       {¶14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADHERE TO ITS OWN

AUGUST 31, 2021, SCHEDULING ORDER BY GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY FILED ON JUNE 7, 2022.

       {¶15} Assignment of Error No. 3:

       {¶16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN THE COURT FOUND THE PLAINTIFF'S

EXPERT REPORT TO BE UNRELIABLE BASED UPON HIS SPECIALIZED SKILL,

TRAINING, EDUCATION, AND EXPERIENCE.

       {¶17} Lykins' first and third assignments of error will be addressed first because they

both concern the trial court's decision to exclude Kulik. In his first assignment of error,

Lykins argues the trial court should have denied Hale's motion to exclude because it was

filed after the trial court's deadline for motions in limine to be filed, pursuant to the scheduling

order. In his third assignment of error, Lykins argues the trial court abused its discretion by

finding Kulik's report to be unreliable.

       {¶18} The standard of review for all of the matters raised herein is abuse of

discretion. An abuse of discretion means more than an error of law or judgment. Vaughn

v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-08-078, 2022-Ohio-1805, ¶ 26. Rather, an abuse

of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable. Sparks v. Sparks, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2015-10-095, 2016-Ohio-

2896, ¶ 7, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

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                                                                    Clermont CA2022-07-037

                FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: SCHEDULING ORDER

       {¶19} Lykins first argues the trial court erred when "it failed to adhere to its own

[scheduling order]." Lykins argues that the trial court's consideration of Hale's motion to

exclude was an "unconscionable action" that proves the trial judge was biased against him

"in that he never wanted a legal malpractice case to move forward under his watch."

       {¶20} As relevant to Lykins' argument, the record reflects that Lykins filed the Kulik

Report on June 11, 2021. The trial court then issued a scheduling order on August 31,

2021. The scheduling order addressed a number of issues: it set the case for a jury trial

from June 13-17, 2022, and provided various dates for the disclosure of witnesses, the

submission of proposed jury instructions, and the filing of trial briefs. As pertinent here, the

scheduling order provided that motions in limine were to be served no later than 14 days

prior to trial. In this case, that would mean a motion in limine should have been filed and

served prior to May 31, 2022.

       {¶21} The record shows that Hale filed a "motion to exclude" on June 7, 2022,

approximately six days prior to trial. Lykins argues that the "motion to exclude" is nothing

more than a motion in limine by another name and therefore submits that the trial court

should have "adhere[d]" to its prior scheduling order and denied Hale's motion to exclude.

Lykins maintains that Hale was deceitful in captioning his motion a "motion to exclude," and

that the decision to allow the motion was unreasonable.

       {¶22} Hale submits that he only discovered that Kulik plagiarized the Keyser Report

as he prepared for trial and had limited options. Hale argues that his decision to proceed

with the motion to exclude was based upon the trial court's express statement that it did not

want any "surprises" at trial. This desire to avoid "surprises" was confirmed by the trial court

during the motion hearing:

              TRIAL COURT: I greatly appreciate that [the request for

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              exclusion] was raised pretrial – and [Hale's counsel] has
              referenced, I think, on a prior telephone conversation with the
              Court and counsel – that the reason – at least one reason that
              he did bring it to my attention is because I tried to make it clear
              ahead of time that I don't like last minute issues, and you know,
              I want to have as much heads up on any contested issues that
              are coming before the Court. So I appreciate that it was handled
              in this matter.

       {¶23} Despite the trial court's statements, Lykins argues that the trial court's

decision was tainted by bias and deceit. Lykins ignores the fact that Hale could have

presented the arguments concerning Kulik's plagiarized report at trial. Instead, Lykins

focuses on the fact that the "motion to exclude" is really a "motion in limine" and therefore

fell outside the permissible time period as contained in the scheduling order.

       {¶24} Upon reviewing the record, we find Lykins' arguments to be without merit. A

trial court's grant or denial of a motion in limine is a tentative, preliminary, or presumptive

ruling about an evidentiary issue that is anticipated but has not yet been presented in its full

context. State ex rel. Solid Rock Ministries Internatl. v. Monroe, 12th Dist. Warren No.

CA2021-04-035, 2022-Ohio-431, ¶ 23. A trial court's decision on a motion in limine merely

provides a preliminary ruling that must be preserved at trial through an objection, proffer, or

other ruling on the record. Id. On the other hand, a motion to exclude expert witness

testimony, once excluded, may not be revisited in the way that a motion in limine permits.

Hale was not seeking a tentative ruling.

       {¶25} The trial court had discretion to consider the motion to exclude and therefore

did not err or abuse its discretion. Furthermore, it is well established that trial courts have

inherent power to manage their own dockets and the progress of the proceedings before

them. Canady v. Rekau & Rekau, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-32, 2009-Ohio-4974, ¶ 16.

Although scheduling orders are useful in setting the parameters of litigation, the trial court,

using its inherent authority, had ample reasons to consider Hale's motion to exclude when

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it did. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in managing its own

docket and ruling on the motion to exclude expert testimony.

           THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: EXCLUDING "EXPERT" KULIK

       {¶26} In his third assignment of error, Lykins argues the trial court erred when it

determined that Kulik's opinions were unreliable and prevented Kulik from testifying as an

expert witness. Lykins contends that the issues discussed at the June 9, 2022, hearing,

especially as to Kulik's plagiarism and his inexperience, went to the "weight and or

credibility" of the testimony, rather than admissibility.

       {¶27} It is well established that trial courts have broad discretion in determining

whether evidence is admissible. Komenovich v. AK Steel Corp., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA98-

08-172, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 152, at *19 (Jan. 25, 1999). With respect to expert opinions,

trial courts have been deemed "gatekeepers" tasked with screening such evidence for

relevancy and reliability. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 12th Dist. Madison No.

CA2007-08-025, 2008-Ohio-4436, ¶ 14. See also Scott v. Yates, 71 Ohio St.3d 219, 221

(1994) (trial courts are assigned the responsibility to make threshold determinations

regarding admissibility).

       {¶28} For expert testimony to be admissible, Evid.R. 702 requires:

              (A) The witness' testimony either relates to matters beyond the
              knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels
              a misconception common among lay persons;

              (B) The witness is qualified as an expert by specialized
              knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding
              the subject matter of the testimony;

              (C) The witness' testimony is based on reliable scientific,
              technical, or other specialized information.

Estate of Smith v. W. Brown Local School Dist., 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2014-06-012,

2015-Ohio-154, ¶ 34.

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       {¶29} The expert witness is not required to be the best witness on the subject, but

his or her testimony must assist the trier of fact in the search for the truth. Alexander v. Mt.

Carmel Med. Ctr., 56 Ohio St. 2d 155, 159 (1978). The expert must demonstrate some

knowledge on the particular subject superior to that possessed by an ordinary juror. Yates

at 221. "A ruling concerning the admission of expert testimony is within the broad discretion

of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Schneble v. Stark,

12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2011-06-063 and CA2011-06-064, 2012-Ohio-3130, ¶ 20.

       {¶30} In the present case, Kulik submitted his report was a "true and accurate" copy

of the report he prepared. He attested that his opinions were "based upon my years of

experience as a practitioner of domestic relations law in Ohio, and upon the materials that

I reviewed as listed in these reports." He further attested that his "opinions" "were formed

to a reasonable degree of certainty."

       {¶31} During his testimony in the hearing on the motion to exclude, Kulik admitted

that his report contained a "material omission" in that he did not reference the Keyser Report

in the list of materials he reviewed. He further admitted to manually retyping multiple

portions of the Keyser Report into his own report.

       {¶32} The trial court granted Hale's motion to exclude expert testimony from Kulik.

Among other things, the trial court emphasized Kulik's plagiarism and concluded that the

opinions expressed in Kulik's report were not his own. As stated by the trial court:

              As the vast majority of Kulik's opinions and the vast majority of
              the entire report were copied verbatim from Keyser's report,
              they are not the product of an independent analysis by Kulik of
              the materials provided by Lykins. They are not opinions based
              upon Kulik's specialized knowledge, training, skill, and/or
              experience. They are Keyser's opinions * * *. Because Kulik's
              opinions are not his own, but were plagiarized from Keyser,
              Kulik's opinions are not reliable and therefore not admittible
              either at trial, or as evidence offered in opposition to a motion
              for summary judgment, pursuant to Evid. R. 702(C). Further,
              since Kulik failed to identify Keyser's report as something he

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              relied upon in forming "his" opinions, his report and opinions are
              inadmissible under Evid. R. 705. By plagiarizing Keyser's
              opinions and offering them as his own, Kulik has irreparably
              tainted any opinions he may offer in this case.

       {¶33} Following review, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

excluding expert testimony from Kulik and finding his report to be of no evidentiary value.

As the "gatekeeper," the trial court was in the best position to evaluate whether Kulik was

an appropriate expert. Holland, 2008-Ohio-4436, at ¶ 14. The trial court found that the

amount of material plagiarized, and the substance of the material plagiarized rendered

Kulik's opinion meaningless as it was devoid of any independent analysis belonging to Kulik.

Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by excluding Kulik from

testifying as an expert. Lykins' third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶34} As a result, Lykins' first and third assignments of error are without merit and

are hereby overruled. We now address Lykins' final argument that he should have been

permitted additional time to find a new expert.

       {¶35} Assignment of Error No. 2:

       {¶36} TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S

REQUEST FOR A CONTINUANCE OF THE TRIAL AND AN EXTENSION TO OBTAIN A

NEW EXPERT.

       {¶37} Lykins, in his second assignment or error, argues the trial court erred when it

denied his request for a continuance of the trial date in order to obtain a new expert. As

with the other assignments of error, the decision to grant or deny a continuance is entrusted

to the sound discretion of the trial court. Black v. Black, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2008-06-

022, 2009-Ohio-92, ¶ 11, citing State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981). Accordingly,

we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion.           Dakin v. Springboro

Pediatrics, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-11-113, 2013-Ohio-2867, ¶ 10.

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                                                                    Clermont CA2022-07-037

       {¶38} In ruling on a motion for continuance, the trial court may consider the following

factors:

              the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances
              have been requested and received; the inconvenience to
              litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether
              the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is
              dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the [movant]
              contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request
              for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the
              unique facts of each case.

Unger at 67-68; Tener v. Tener-Tucker, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2004-05-061, 2005-Ohio-

3892, ¶ 42. The court should weigh any potential prejudice to the movant against the

"court's right to control its own docket and the public's interest in the prompt and efficient

dispatch of judgment." Black at ¶ 12, citing Unger at 67.

       {¶39} In evaluating Lykins' request for a continuance, the trial court noted that Lykins

personally solicited Kulik, despite his lack of experience. Kulik had never previously testified

as an expert, instead he plagiarized Keyser's report. The trial court noted that Lykins

himself should have known Kulik would be materially influenced by Keyser's report. Once

obtaining Kulik's report, Lykins should have known Kulik substantially copied the report of

the previous expert. After all, Kulik copied voluminous portions of Keyser's report. The trial

court found Lykins' failure to recognize the plagiarism was "inexcusable." After considering

these factors, the trial court denied Lykins' request for a continuance.

       {¶40} After reviewing the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Lykins' request for a continuance. This case began with the filing of the complaint

in the First Case in February 2018. Lykins voluntarily dismissed his claim in May 2019. He

then refiled the case in October 2020, this time utilizing a new expert witness. While Lykins

complains that Hale did not raise the issue concerning Kulik's plagiarism until the eve of

trial, we note that Lykins should have been aware that Kulik copied Keyser's report. As

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correctly noted by the trial court, Lykins himself provided the Keyser Report to Kulik. Hale

was not required to alert Lykins to the deficiencies of his own case. In fact, the record

indicates that Hale appropriately brought Kulik's plagiarism to the attention of the trial court

based upon the trial court's admonition that it wanted no surprises at trial. The trial court

stated that Lykins should not be provided "a third bite at the apple" to find an admissible,

reliable expert opinion. Furthermore, had Hale waited to raise this issue at trial, which he

could have done, Kulik simply would have been excluded and judgment would have been

rendered in Hale's favor given the lack of expert testimony.

        {¶41} The trial court was not obligated to further delay these proceedings so that

Lykins could once again secure a new expert. The trial court further addressed Lykins'

suggestion of a proffer of a new report from Kulik, written in his own words this time. The

trial court found "To suggest that one can plagiarize someone else's work, then after getting

caught, reword the document and pass it off as your own, defies credulity." Instead, the

record suggests that Lykins would begin a fresh search for a new expert.4 Lykins' request

for a 90-day extension to identify another expert was without a clear indication that he would

be ready to proceed. For all those reasons, we find the trial court did not act arbitrarily,

unreasonably, or unconscionably in denying Lykins' unspecific request for a continuance.

Lykins' second assignment of error is overruled.

        {¶42} Judgment affirmed.

        M. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.

4. At oral argument on this appeal, Lykins represented he was intending to call Keyser as an expert since he
could no longer use Kulik. However, we can find nowhere in the record where Lykins informed the trial court
he was going to call Keyser instead of Kulik.

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