Court Opinion

ID: 9952565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 07:17:18.26702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:02.541842
License: Public Domain

Affirm in part; Reverse and Remand in part and Opinion Filed March 15,
2024

                                        In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-23-00053-CV

                  WILLIAM GARLAND SIMONS, Appellant
                                V.
                  MEDICAL HYPERBARICS, INC., Appellee

                On Appeal from the 298th Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-07223

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Nowell, Miskel, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Nowell
      The trial court granted appellee Medical Hyperbarics, Inc.’s (MHI) traditional

and no-evidence motion for summary judgment on its original verified petition for

damages against appellant William Garland Simons. Simons challenges the trial

court’s subject matter jurisdiction to grant summary judgment and contends the trial

court erred because genuine issues of material fact exist. Simons also asserts the

trial court denied him his constitutional right to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees. We

reverse the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further proceedings.

In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
                                      Background

      On February 27, 2019, Simons became ill at a restaurant while vacationing in

Cozumel, Mexico. Patrons placed him in a taxicab, and the driver took him to

Cozumel International Hospital (the Cozumel Facility), a facility specializing in

treatment for divers experiencing decompression sickness.

      Simons signed an Obligation to Pay Agreement (OTP Agreement), which

explained his obligations regarding payments for his medical care at the Cozumel

Facility. The OTP Agreement provided, in relevant part, that Simons was of sound

mind, fully understood the consequences, and “chose to obligate [himself] to make

payments for the services [he] received and want[ed] to continue receiving services

at this facility.” It further provided:

      I am aware of their rates. This is my voluntary promise to pay the
      charges for the services rendered to me, in case my insurance does NOT
      cover the charges in full. The benefit of this credit extended to me is
      issued by MHI, Dallas Texas. . . .
      The emergency treatment services were rendered at this private facility
      WITHOUT any coercion. Now at the therapy stages, it is my choice to
      receive further services at this private facility, rather than seek
      repatriation for continued therapy.

Simons initialed each paragraph in the OTP Agreement and signed the

“Confirmation by Patient.” Carter Robert witnessed it.

      The Cozumel Facility provided care to Simons from February 27, 2019 to

March 2, 2019 at the cost of $24,433.08. Simons paid $9,732.00 and his insurance

                                          –2–
carrier filed a partial payment of $1,441.81 to MHI, a Texas-based third-party billing

service that services medial providers around the world.

         On March 12, 2020, MHI sent a letter informing Simons he owed the

$13,259.27 balance, and if payment was not received by March 26, 2020, it would

take legal action.

         On May 22, 2020, MHI filed its original verified petition for damages to

recover the remaining $13,259.27 owed for Simons’s medical expenses based on

breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and attorneys’ fees. On June 29, 2020,

Simons filed an unverified original answer, specific denial, and affirmative defenses.

Simons filed an unverified amended answer on December 18, 2020.

         On November 24, 2021, MHI filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for

summary judgment. MHI argued, in part, that it was entitled to summary judgment

on its sworn account claim because Simons did not file a verified denial. On

December 28, 2021, Simons filed a verification affidavit to “Defendant’s Amended

Answer filed in this case on December 18, 2020.” MHI filed a motion to strike

Simons’s verification as untimely.

         On January 13, 2022, Simons filed a verified second amended answer1 and

responses to both MHI’s motion to strike and its summary judgment motion. He

asserted MHI had no standing or capacity to bring suit because it was not assigned

   1
       MHI did not file a motion to strike or object to Simons’s verified second amended answer.

                                                   –3–
to collect his medical bills. He challenged the merits of the breach of contract claim,

in part, because he lacked the mental capacity to sign the OTP Agreement given his

medical condition at the time. He also challenged the no-evidence motion for

summary judgment because MHI failed to list any elements of his affirmative

defenses for which there was no evidence.

      On April 14, 2022, the trial court granted MHI’s motion to strike Simons’s

December 28, 2021 verification and December 18, 2021 amended answer. On the

same day, in a separate order, the trial court granted MHI’s traditional summary

judgment on its sworn account and breach of contract claims and granted MHI’s no-

evidence summary judgment on Simons’s affirmative defenses. On December 21,

2022, the trial court awarded $32,619.50 in attorneys’ fees, $35,000 in conditional

appellate attorneys’ fees, and $897.70 in costs. This appeal followed.

                    Summary Judgment Standard of Review

      We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Lujan v.

Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018). A traditional motion for summary

judgment requires the moving party to show no genuine issue of material fact exists,

and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan, 555

S.W.3d at 84. If the movant carries this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant

to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Id. In

reviewing the summary judgment, we must credit evidence favoring the non-

                                         –4–
movant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in his favor.

Id.

      We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency

standard used to review a directed verdict. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Timpte Indus.,

Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). To defeat a no-evidence summary

judgment, the nonmovant is required to produce evidence that raises a genuine issue

of material fact on each challenged element of its claim. Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310;

see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

                 MHI’s Standing and Capacity to Pursue Claims

      Simons asserts MHI lacks standing and capacity to pursue its claims because

the “sued-upon claims is without proof of an assignment from any medical

provider,” as “facility: Cozumel” in the OTP Agreement is a generic description of

a medical location. MHI responds Simons (1) confused standing and capacity, (2)

failed to raise capacity as an affirmative defense, and (3) failed to present any

evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.

      A party must have both standing and capacity to sue. Austin Nursing Ctr.,

Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005). “A plaintiff has standing when it

is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority; a party

has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether it has a

justiciable interest in the controversy.”       Id. at 848–49.    While standing is a

jurisdictional issue, lack of capacity is an affirmative defense. 6200 GP, LLC v.

                                          –5–
Multi Serv. Corp., No. 05-16-01491-CV, 2018 WL 3154594, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      “Texas law is clear, and this court has previously held numerous times, that a

challenge to a party’s privity of contract is a challenge to capacity, not standing.”

Transcon. Realty Invs., Inc. v. Wicks, 442 S.W.3d 676, 679 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2014, pet. denied); see also 6200 GP, LLC, 2018 WL 3154594, at *3. Simons argues

MHI is not entitled to sue based on the OTP Agreement because there was no privity

of contract; therefore, this is a challenge to capacity, not standing.

      Privity is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable

contract with either the plaintiff or someone who assigned the cause of action to the

plaintiff. 6200 GP, LLC, 2018 WL 3154594, at *3. In its most general sense, the

word “assign” or “assignment” means the transfer of property or some right or

interest from one person to another. Id. It is a manifestation by the owner of a right

of his intention to transfer the right to an assignee. Id. To recover on an assigned

cause of action, the party claiming the assigned right must plead and prove that a

cause of action capable of being assigned existed and was assigned to the party

alleging assignment occurred. Id. at *4. Once a cause of action is assigned, “the

assignee becomes the real party in interest with authority to prosecute the suit to

judgment.” Id. (quoting S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19 S.W.3d 452, 465 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2000, no pet.).

                                          –6–
      MHI attached the affidavit of Eric Munoz, the Claims Administrator and

custodian of business records for MHI, to its motion for summary judgment. Munoz

testified he was familiar with MHI’s record-keeping system, and MHI was a third-

party billing provider for the Cozumel Facility. He further stated, “The Cozumel

Facility assigned its rights to collect for the medical services provided to [Simons]

to MHI at the time the care was provided to Simons.” His testimony was sufficient

to establish an assignment between the parties and subsequent privity of contract for

MHI to sue for recovery of outstanding medical bills. See 6200 GP, LLC, 2018 WL

31544594, at *6 (“A person may testify to a sale and assignment without providing

any documentary evidence.”); see also Ortega v. CACH, LLC, 396 S.W.3d 622, 627

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (in debt collection action, bank

officer’s affidavit testimony that “agreement and account was, on 8/18/2009 sold,

transferred and set over unto CACH, LLC” was not conclusory and established

assignment).

      The record also contains an initialed copy of the OTP Agreement, which lists

“Facility: Cozumel” and states, “The benefit of this credit extended to me is issued

by MHI, Dallas Texas.” The itemized bill MHI sent Simons lists many different

facilities it “provid[es] services for.” The list includes “COZUMEL, Q. Roo,

Mexico, Ph: 52.987.872.1430.” The address and phone number of “COZUMEL”

matches the information in the OTP Agreement. Finally, the itemized bill states at

                                        –7–
the bottom, “BENEFITS ASSIGNED – PLEASE PAY FROM THIS INVOICE

DIRECTLY TO: [MHI Dallas address].” (Emphasis in original.)

      Simons failed to provide any summary judgment evidence raising a genuine

issue of material fact as to the validity of the assignment of Simons’s medical bills

from the Cozumel Facility to MHI. To the extent he argues the Cozumel Facility

should not be considered a legal entity because it is not a business organization but

a “facility,” he provided no legal authority or evidence for this proposition.

Simons’s first issue is overruled.

                                     Sworn Account

      In his second issue, Simons argues the trial court erred by granting summary

judgment on MHI’s sworn account claim. MHI responds Simons did not file a sworn

denial sufficient to rebut Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 185 or, in the alternative, it

established its sworn account claim as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

      The essential elements to prove a sworn account are: (1) a sale and delivery

of merchandise or performance of services; (2) the amount of the account is just, that

is, that the prices were charged in accordance with an agreement or were customary

and reasonable prices; and (3) the amount is unpaid. Daniels v. Lavery, No. 05-06-

00216-CV, 2007 WL 549223, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 23, 2007, no pet.)

(mem. op.). When an action is founded on an open account on which a systematic

record has been kept and is supported by an affidavit, the account shall be taken as

prima facie evidence of the claim, unless the party resisting the claim files a sworn

                                          –8–
denial under oath. TEX. R. CIV. P. 185; Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun &

Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821, 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). An

opponent that does not properly file a written denial under oath will not be permitted

to dispute the receipt of the services or the correctness of the charges. Id. A sworn

general denial does not constitute a denial of the account and is insufficient to

remove the evidentiary presumption created by a properly worded and verified suit

on an account. Id. The defendant’s written denial must state more than a broad

generalization that he “specifically denies” the sworn account allegations; instead,

the verified affidavit must address the facts on which the defendant intends to rebut

the plaintiff’s affidavit. Id.

       Simons’s second amended answer and verified denial was more than a general

denial and specifically denied the sworn account allegations. See, e.g., Prof’l Servs.

Techs., LLC v. Whipple, No. 04-20-00273-CV, 2021 WL 3174259, at *3 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio July 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding affidavit

specifically denying “the amount Plaintiff claims is owed” on the sworn account

directly controverted defendant’s sworn account as required by rules 185 and

93(10)). To the extent MHI argues otherwise, we disagree and address Simons’s

arguments attacking the summary judgment.

       Simons first argues the trial court erred by granting summary on the sworn

account because the claim was not properly assigned to MHI; we have previously

disposed of this argument. Simons next contends rule 185 does not apply because

                                         –9–
the rule does not cover transactions between third parties or parties who are strangers

to a transaction. See Harris v. Jackson & Walker, L.L.P., No. 05-93-01795-CV,

1995 WL 23008, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 20, 1995, no writ) (mem. op.) (“A

‘stranger to the account’ may controvert and disprove the sworn account without

filing a written, sworn denial). Because MHI was assigned the claim, it is not a third

party or stranger to the transaction. Simons is not a stranger to the transaction

because the OTP Agreement reflects his name, signature, date of birth, and social

security number, and the itemized invoice reflects his name and date of birth.

Accordingly, rule 185 applies.

      Simons next summarily challenges MHI’s itemized invoice because it does

not describe with reasonable certainty the items sold. We disagree. Rule 185 states,

“No particularization or description of the nature of the competent parts of the

account or claim is necessary unless the trial court sustains special exceptions to the

pleadings.” Simons did not file special exceptions asking for particularity regarding

the “items sold,” and he has not identified how or why the itemized invoice is

deficient in describing the “items sold.” See, e.g., S. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. SM Energy

Co., 398 S.W.3d 350, 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (rejecting

appellant’s complaints that accounting did not specify exactly what services were

provided because it included unexplained abbreviations and appellant did not

specially except). Instead, the invoice provides the dates of service, the services

                                        –10–
rendered (i.e.: chest x-ray, USG vascular, bubble echocardiogram, labs,

room/board), and the hours and rates charged for each service rendered.

      Although Simons filed a sworn denial, MHI was entitled to summary

judgment on its sworn account because it produced legal and competent summary

judgment evidence establishing the validity of its claim as a matter of law. MHI

included a sworn affidavit from its Claims Administrator, the OTP Agreement, the

itemized invoice for services rendered, and the request for payment letter sent to

Simons. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 185.

      Simons did not bring forth any evidence raising a fact issue precluding

summary judgment. His affidavit provides unsupported conclusory statements

regarding the fraudulent nature of the charges and that the charges are “not just and

true and not the usual, customary, and reasonable prices charged.” See, e.g., Adcock

v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 03-22-00418-CV, 2024 WL 201963, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding statements that do not

provide “specific factual bases on which the conclusion was drawn” are conclusory).

Affidavits containing conclusory statements that fail to provide the underlying facts

supporting those conclusions are not proper summary judgment evidence. Padilla

v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., 497 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).   Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting

summary judgment as a matter of law on MHI’s sworn account claim.

                                       –11–
        In reaching this conclusion, we need not consider whether the trial court erred

by striking Simons’s first amended answer and verification. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

Simons’s second issue is overruled.

                                 Breach of Contract

        In his third issue, Simons argues the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment on MHI’s breach of contract claim because fact issues exist as to whether

there was a meeting of the minds for an enforceable contract and whether the

Cozumel Facility fully performed the OTP Agreement.

        A breach of contract action requires proof of four elements: (1) formation of

a valid contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant; and

(4) damages as a result of the breach. S & S Emergency Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott,

564 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tex. 2018). Simons has not challenged elements three and

four.

        To the extent Simons relies on the absence of a valid assignment to support

privity of contract, we have rejected this argument. The majority of Simons’s

remaining argument consists of a copy of his affidavit attached to his summary

judgment response, in which he asserted he never agreed to the charges because he

was without mental capacity to enter into the contract. He claimed by the time he

arrived at the Cozumel Facility, he had lost his motor skills, his vision was blurred,

and he had “tremendous pain in my spine giving me a feeling that my neck had

collapsed.” He believed he suffered from “the bends or nitrogen narcosis” and could

                                         –12–
not read or understand the OTP Agreement. Because of his mental and physical

condition, he maintained there was no meeting of the minds to form a valid contract

with the Cozumel Facility, agents of the facility, or MHI.

      Texas law has long presumed that a party to a contract has the mental capacity

to enter into the contract. McKeehan v. McKeehan, 355 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tex.

App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied); Harrell v. Hochderffer, 345 S.W.3d 653, 661–62

(Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). The fact that a party raises the issue of

incompetence does not, alone, obligate the summary-judgment movant to prove

mental competence or disprove the possibility of incompetence. McKeehan, 355

S.W.3d at 295. Rather, to raise a question of fact sufficient to overcome the

presumption that Simons had the requisite mental capacity to complete and sign the

OTP Agreement—i.e., to defeat MHI’s motion for summary judgment on the ground

he lacked the mental capacity to enter into a contract—Simons had to present

competent summary-judgment evidence showing he lacked “sufficient mind and

memory at the time of execution to understand the nature and effect of [his] act.” Id.

      “While circumstantial evidence may be offered to raise an issue of material

fact, such evidence must transcend mere suspicion. Evidence that is so slight as to

make any inference a guess is in legal effect no evidence.” Harrell, 345 S.W.3d at

661 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)) (citations

omitted). Here, the inference of mental incapacity suggested by Simons’s loss of his

motor skills, blurred vision, and pain in his spine does not rise above mere suspicion,

                                        –13–
as such difficulties “can be explained by physical disability just as easily as mental

incapacity.” Id. Likewise, his conclusory statement he “suffered from the bends or

nitrogen narcosis,” absent medical testimony or other evidence suggesting the

conditions render someone mentally incapacitated, does not give rise to the inference

he did not understand the OTP Agreement when he signed it. See, e.g., McKeehan,

355 S.W.3d at 295–96 (absent medical evidence suggesting brain radiation treatment

renders someone mentally incapacitated, the mere statement in an affidavit did not

create a fact issue regarding mental capacity to sign contract). Thus, Simons failed

to bring forth evidence creating a material fact issue of his mental capacity to enter

into the OTP Agreement.

      Simon also implies he was never made aware of the claimed rates for medical

services, and the charges were not usual, customary, or reasonable. When a contract

fails to state an exact price, the law presumes the parties to the contract intended a

reasonable price. Seabourne v. Seabourne, 493 S.W.3d 222, 229 n.9 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 241 (Tex.

2016)).

      While the OTP Agreement does not specifically provide for medical rates,

“the failure to specify a price does not necessarily render the contract so indefinite

as to be unenforceable.” Crisp Analytical Lab, L.L.C. v. Jakalam Props, Ltd., 422

S.W.3d 85, 90 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). Simons initialed the OTP

Agreement in which he voluntarily promised to pay the charges for the services

                                        –14–
rendered. The record contains the itemized invoice for Simons’s services, the

demand letter for the services, and Munoz’s affidavit confirming the debt owing was

just and lawful after applying offsets, payments, and credits. Simons’s affidavit

contains only conclusory statements the charges were unreasonable without any

supporting controverting evidence explaining why the rates were unreasonable or

unusual, and without providing contrary evidence of reasonable rates. Thus, he

failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the formation of the contract

based on a lack of a specified reasonable price for the medical services received.

      Simons also asserts a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding MHI’s

performance of the contract. Specifically, he argues there is a fact issue as to

“whether or not there was at least one attending physician for the times billed for

physicians.” In his affidavit, he states the fee for “a doctor on duty” was unfounded

because there was only an “unskilled worker referred to as a ‘tender’ watching

[him].” Thus, he was charged “$325 per hour for a total of sixteen hours in four

visits for a hyperbaric doctor who was not there.” The assertion that there was only

an “unskilled tender” watching him does not create a fact issue regarding whether a

“hyperbaric doctor” was on duty.

      To the extent he implies the Cozumel Facility did not perform under the

contract, he admitted a “USG Vascular,” also called a bubble test, was performed on

him. The itemized bill also indicates he received a chest x-ray. The OTP Agreement

states, “[e]mergency treatment services were rendered.” Simons has not raised a

                                         –15–
genuine issue of material fact regarding the Cozumel Facility’s performance of the

contract (i.e.: providing medical services). Simons’s third issue is overruled.

                               Affirmative Defenses

      Simons next challenges MHI’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on

his affirmative defenses because MHI failed to identify any elements for which there

was no evidence. MHI concedes it did not comply with rule 166a(i). See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(i) (“The motion must state the elements to which there is no

evidence.”). However, a plaintiff is not required to move for summary judgment on

the defendant’s affirmative defenses and has no obligation to negate those defenses.

See Marx v. FDP, LP, 474 S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet.

denied) (citing Brownlee v. Brownlee, 665 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tex. 1984)). The

defendant’s mere pleading of affirmative defenses does not prevent the rendition of

summary judgment for a plaintiff who conclusively establishes each element of its

cause of action as a matter of law. Id. at 378. To the contrary, a defendant relying

upon an affirmative defense must bring forward sufficient summary judgment

evidence to raise an issue of fact on each element of the defense to avoid summary

judgment. Id.

      The trial court properly granted summary judgment as a matter of law on

MHI’s sworn account and breach of contract claims. Simons neither supported his

affirmative defenses through summary judgment evidence in his response nor filed

his own motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, despite MHI’s failure to

                                        –16–
comply with rule 166a(i), the trial court’s order granting a no-evidence summary

judgment on Simons’s affirmative defenses did not cause the rendition of an

improper judgment requiring reversal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a); see also Pinnacle

Anesthesia Consultants, P.A. v. Fisher, 309 S.W.3d 93, 103 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2009, pet. denied) (granting no-evidence summary judgment did not result in entry

of improper judgment because trial court properly granted traditional summary

judgment). We overrule Simons’s fourth issue.

                                   Attorneys’ Fees

      In his final issue, Simons argues the trial court denied him his constitutional

due process right to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees; therefore, the award of attorneys’

fees must be reversed.

      The Texas Constitution provides:

      In the trial of all causes in the district courts, the plaintiff or defendant
      shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial by
      jury; but no jury shall be empaneled in any civil case unless demanded
      by a party to the case, and a jury fee be paid by the party demanding a
      jury, for such sum, and with such exceptions as may be prescribed by
      the Legislature.
TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 10.

      MHI sought “attorneys’ fees in accordance with Ch. 38 of the Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code (to be proven at a later time)” as part of its general request for relief

in its summary judgment motion.          The trial court’s order granting summary

judgment stated, “Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable and necessary

attorneys’ fees and costs in an amount to be determined by hearing.”
                                        –17–
       MHI then filed an application for attorneys’ fees and costs, in which it

requested $32,619.50 in attorneys’ fees, $35,000 in conditional appellate attorneys’

fees, and $894.70 in costs. It attached (1) an attorney affidavit explaining the

reasonable and necessary fees, (2) the biographies of attorneys that worked the file,

and (3) the redacted itemized billing statements. Simons filed a response in which

he refused to stipulate to fees and requested the fee issue “be submitted to a fact

finder in a conventional trial.” He further argued the fees sought were unreasonable

because they totaled three times the actual damages award.

       The court held a hearing in which Simons emphasized his request for a jury

trial on attorneys’ fees and reminded the court he made his original request for a jury

trial in 2020 and paid the fee. MHI’s counsel stated, “I believe if [Simons] is

insisting on a jury for the sole issue of attorneys’ fees, he would be entitled to that.

I don’t think it’s a good idea. . . . I don’t disagree that [he’s] entitled to a jury, but I

think it’s a bad idea.” The trial court stated, “If at the conclusion of the hearing I

believe that we should pursue these claims in front of a jury, then I’ll so rule.”

       Darla Gabbitas, MHI’s attorney, testified as an expert on fees. Simons

objected to her testimony because no jury was impaneled. The court overruled the

objection and the hearing continued. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

asked Simons’s attorney, “Before I rule, are you wanting to continue on with your

request for a jury trial on fees?” He said he had not changed his position, objected

to the entire hearing, and reminded the court MHI’s attorney “admitted that he

                                           –18–
doesn’t have a leg to stand on.” The trial judge’s phone starting ringing, and she

abruptly ended the hearing without ruling. The court signed an order on December

21, 2022 awarding MHI’s requested fees and costs in their entirety.

      We review the “denial of a jury demand for an abuse of discretion.” Interest

of A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282–83 (Tex. 2019). A trial court abuses its

discretion when a “decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference to

guiding principles.” Id. The distinction between a jury trial that is permissive under

the law and one that is available as a matter of right is more than mere semantics.

Id. at 283. When a jury trial is available as a matter of right, a timely request is

presumptively reasonable and ordinarily must be granted absent evidence that

granting the request would “(1) injure the adverse party, (2) disrupt the court’s

docket, or (3) impede the ordinary handling of the court’s business.” Id.

      Each party pays their own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract dictates

otherwise. In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 809 (Tex. 2017) (orig.

proceeding). “When fee-shifting is authorized, whether by statute or contract, the

party seeking a fee award must prove the reasonableness and necessity of the

requested attorney’s fees.” Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578

S.W.3d 469, 484 (Tex. 2019). “In general, the reasonableness of statutory attorney’s

fees is a jury question.” City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351,

367 (Tex. 2000); see TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; Pisharodi v. Columbia Valley

Healthcare Sys., L.P., 622 S.W.3d 74, 87 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

                                        –19–
2020, no pet.). However, any award of fees, including attorneys’ fees, “is limited

by the wording of the statute or contract that creates an exception to the American

Rule.” JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 597 S.W.3d 481, 491 (Tex. 2019) (under

the American rule, attorneys’ fees are not awarded unless a statute or contract

authorizes them); Pisharodi, 22 S.W.3d at 88.

      Section 38.001(b) permits the recovery of attorneys’ fees but does not dictate

how to determine the attorneys’ fee amount, except that the award must be

“reasonable.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(b) (“A person may

recover reasonable attorney’s fees from an individual or organization . . . in addition

to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is for . . . (7) a sworn account;

or (8) oral or written contract”). Thus, the statute is silent on the “critical judge-or-

jury question.” See Transcon. Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 229 (Tex. 2010)

(observing that labor code section 408.221 does not state explicitly that the court

alone is to determine the amount of attorney’s fees, nor does it expressly forbid a

jury from deciding the matter). When faced with a similar silent fee-shifting

provision in Crump, the Supreme Court of Texas construed the statute as entitling

the parties to have the jury determine the disputed issue of the reasonableness of the

attorneys’ fees. Id. In doing so, the court construed the statute in a manner that did

not disturb the presumption of constitutional compliance to a right to a jury trial on

attorneys’ fees. Id.; see also Pisharodi, 622 S.W.3d at 89 (citing In re Allcat Claims

Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455, 468 (Tex. 2011) (“When construing statutes we

                                         –20–
presume the Legislature intended them to comply with the Texas Constitution.”).

Similarly, because section 38.001(b) does not dictate the manner to determine the

amount of attorneys’ fees, providing only that the award must be “reasonable,”

reasonableness remains a fact issue that a jury, upon proper request, may resolve.

Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 230–31; Pisharodi, 622 S.W.3d at 90.

      A defendant must object in the trial court to the submission of attorneys’ fees

to the judge or risk waiver of the right to have the jury decide the issue. Jefferson

Cnty. v. Nguyen, No. 09-13-00505-CV, 2015 WL 4597560, at *25 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont July 31, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Courts have held that a party’s failure

to timely object to the submission of attorneys’ fees to the court waives its complaint

on appeal, even when the right to a jury trial has previously been perfected. Id.

      Simons filed his request for a jury trial and paid his fee. He objected to the

trial court considering the fee issue in his response to MHI’s application for fees and

objected throughout the hearing on MHI’s application for fees. MHI’s counsel

conceded Simons was entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees and argued, “it’s a

bad idea.” His opinion on Simons’s constitutional right to a jury trial on attorneys’

fees, absent any legal authority, was irrelevant.

      Because Simons was entitled to a jury trial on attorneys’ fees as a matter of

right, his timely request was presumptively reasonable and should have been

granted. Interest of A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d at 283. The record does not contain any

evidence that granting his request would (1) injure MHI, (2) disrupt the court’s

                                        –21–
docket, or (3) impede the ordinary handling of the court’s business. Id. The trial

court abused its discretion by denying Simons’s timely request for a jury trial on

attorneys’ fees.

      In reaching this conclusion, we reject MHI’s argument that Simons was not

entitled to a jury trial on fees because its application for fees constituted a motion

for summary judgment on fees. See In re Estate of Hutchins, 391 S.W.3d 578, 585

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) (stating courts look to substance of the motion to

determine the relief sought and not merely its title). When construing whether a

motion is a traditional or no-evidence motion for summary judgment despite titled

otherwise, courts consider, in part, whether the party cited and applied a traditional

or no-evidence standard of review. See, e.g., Luna v. Garcia, No. 02-23-00209-CV,

2023 WL 7400927, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 9, 2023, pet. denied) (mem.

op.); McArdle v. Stahl, No. 03-04-00817-CV, 2006 WL 1648988, at *1 n.1 (Tex.

App.—Austin June 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). MHI’s application for fees does

not contain any summary judgment standard of review. Neither the parties nor the

trial court indicated the application should be considered a summary judgment

motion during the hearing. Rather, the trial court stated she was undecided on

whether a jury trial was necessary.

      Despite these facts, MHI relies on our holding in Arnold v. Addison, No. 05-

20-00001-CV, 2021 WL 5984875, at *14 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 2021, no

pet.) (mem. op.) in which we concluded the appellees’ motion for “determination of

                                        –22–
fees” was a summary judgment motion because the motion “specifically cited

authority and evidence purportedly establishing appellees’ right to recover

reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and the amount of the fees sought.” Id. In

that case, the party challenging attorneys’ fees did not raise a constitutional

challenge to a timely requested jury trial on attorneys’ fees. Moreover, MHI raised

this argument for the first time on appeal, and we decline to abrogate Simons’s right

to a jury trial under the Texas Constitution by after-the-fact, creative lawyering. See

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10.

      The denial of a party’s constitutional right to trial by jury constitutes reversible

error. See McDaniel v. Yarbrough, 898 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.1995); Asafi v.

Rauscher, No. 14-10-00606-CV, 2011 WL 4031015, at *9, n.10 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 13, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.). As such, we need not

address the application for fees, and therefore, provide no opinion on its merits. TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.1. We sustain Simons’s fifth issue, reverse the trial court’s award of

$32,619.50 in attorneys’ fees, $35,000.00 for conditional appellate attorneys’ fees,

and $897.70 in costs, and remand for further proceedings.

                                         –23–
                                    Conclusion

      We reverse the trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees and remand for further

proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                           /Erin A. Nowell//
230053f.p05                                ERIN A. NOWELL
                                           JUSTICE

                                        –24–
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

 WILLIAM GARLAND SIMONS,                       On Appeal from the 298th Judicial
 Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DC-20-07223.
 No. 05-23-00053-CV          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
                                               Justices Miskel and Kennedy
 MEDICAL HYPERBARICS, INC.,                    participating.
 Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion
of the trial court’s judgment awarding $32,619.50 in attorneys’ fees, $35,000.00 for
conditional appellate attorneys’ fees, and $897.70 in costs. In all other respects, the
trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 15th day of March, 2024.

                                        –25–