Court Opinion

ID: 9584547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:49:53.036673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:25.229771
License: Public Domain

Justice Whichard
dissenting.
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the State did not present substantial evidence to support the charge of embezzlement. Embezzlement occurs when a person has “been entrusted with and received into his possession lawfully the personal *515property of another, and thereafter with felonious intent . . . fraudulently converts] the property to his own use.” State v. Griffin, 239 N.C. 41, 45, 79 S.E.2d 230, 233 (1953). The State must present sufficient evidence of each element of the crime charged. State v. Bates, 309 N.C. 528, 533, 308 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1983). The elements of embezzlement are:
First, that the accused was the agent of the person or corporation alleged, and ... by the terms of his employment he was charged with receiving the money or property of his principal; second, that he did, in fact, receive such money; third, that he received it in the course of his employment; further, that he, knowing it was not his own, converted it to his own use or to the use of some third person, not the true owner.
State v. Blackley, 138 N.C. 620, 625-26, 50 S.E. 310, 312 (1905). In this case there was no evidence that Lillie McCoy had a property interest in the proceeds of the draft that defendant received from State Farm and deposited in his personal account. The State’s evidence on the second element of the offense thus fails.
The majority has determined that McCoy’s right to ratify defendant’s act and accept the sum offered in the draft gives her a legal interest in the converted funds sufficient to support the element of ownership in another. The State may allege ownership in “the person having a ‘general interest’ in the stolen property— that is, the actual owner — or the person with a ‘special interest’ in the property — that is, the person who had possession and control of it at the time when it was stolen.” State v. Carr, 21 N.C. App. 470, 472, 204 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1974) (citing State v. Smith, 266 N.C. 747, 147 S.E.2d 165 (1966); State v. Law, 228 N.C. 443, 45 S.E.2d 374 (1947)). We have stated that this rule, which developed in the context of larceny cases, “may properly be applied to indictments alleging embezzlement ... of the property of another.” State v. Kornegay, 313 N.C. 1, 27, 326 S.E.2d 881, 900 (1985).
The right to ratify defendant’s act and accept the sum offered in the draft did not give McCoy a general interest in the draft because, as the majority notes, only after accepting State Farm’s offer would she be entitled to the proceeds of the draft.
It is a rule too well established to admit of debate that if a principal, with full knowledge of the material facts, takes and retains the benefits of an unauthorized act of his agent, he thereby ratifies such act, and with the benefits he must *516necessarily accept the burdens incident thereto or which naturally result therefrom.
Snyder v. Freeman, 300 N.C. 204, 213, 266 S.E.2d 593, 600 (1980) (quoting Maxwell v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 204 N.C. 309, 318, 168 S.E. 403, 407 (1933)). Conversely, prior to ratification, the principal retains no benefit from the unauthorized contract and consequently has nothing of value from the agent’s transaction. Therefore, prior to ratification and acceptance, McCoy was not the actual owner of the funds. She had not yet endorsed the draft and received the proceeds of the draft into her possession. She did not even know the draft existed. Even if defendant had delivered the draft to her, without her endorsement, her claim remained unpaid. See Paris v. Builders Corp., 244 N.C. 35, 38, 92 S.E.2d 405, 407-08 (1956) (“in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the delivery and acceptance of a check is not payment until the check is paid”). The draft was merely an offer made by State Farm to McCoy, who had yet to learn of it, much less accept it. Further, she had not signed the release, which State Farm made a condition to her receipt of the funds. The Court of Appeals was correct when it stated:
There is no question that, had McCoy agreed to the settlement and release, and after obtaining the check defendant placed the funds in his personal account for his own use, substantial evidence would exist that defendant had “initially . . . acquired lawfully, pursuant to a trust relationship, and then wrongfully converted” the property in question.
State v. Johnson, 108 N.C. App. 550, 555, 424 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1993).
Because McCoy’s right of ratification was not a general property interest, the evidence that she had that right is sufficient to establish ownership only if that right qualifies as a special property interest. In larceny cases we have held that the allegation of ownership in a bailee or a custodian of the converted property did not result in a fatal variance in an indictment because although the bailee or custodian was not the legal owner, he had a special interest in the property. In making this determination we focused on the fact that the bailee or custodian had possession or control of the stolen item. See State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 474, 290 S.E.2d 625, 632 (1982) (allegation of ownership in person having custody and control of stolen motorcycle sufficient to support element of larceny); Smith, 266 N.C. at 749, 147 S.E.2d at 166 (owner*517ship alleged in bailee sufficient where bailee had custody and control of stolen property); State v. Bishop, 98 N.C. 773, 777, 4 S.E. 357, 359 (1887) (ownership alleged in bailee sufficient where bailee had possession of property).
In Komegay, we applied a special property interest analysis to the embezzlement element of ownership in another. Kornegay, 313 N.C. at 26-28, 326 S.E.2d at 900. In the indictment the State alleged ownership of the converted funds in Carolyn Stallings. Stallings held a power of attorney as guardian ad litem for her husband, who was incompetent. Her attorney, the defendant, negotiated a settlement of a claim with State Farm Insurance Company on behalf of Stallings as guardian ad litem for her husband, who had been in an accident with State Farm’s insured. Stallings endorsed the checks from State Farm, which were paid pursuant to the medical payment and uninsured motorist provisions of the policy. She then authorized their deposit in the law firm’s trust account, from which the defendant attorney later withdrew them for his personal use. On those facts we recognized that Stallings had “a special property interest in the [money] deposited in the trust account.” Id. at 27, 326 S.E.2d at 900. In support of finding a special property interest, we relied on her endorsement of the checks, the fact that she would have a claim for reimbursement for the funds from the trust account because she had been paying her husband’s medical bills, and the fact that the payments were made at a time when she had been acting pursuant to a power of attorney from her husband. Id. In essence, we analyzed her interest in terms of her control and possession of the funds.
Here, by contrast, McCoy never endorsed the draft, signed the release, or took control of the funds; therefore, her right to ratify defendant’s act did not give her a special property interest in the funds. That right only gave her the possibility of accepting State Farm’s offer and taking possession and control of the settlement funds. Under our precedents, I do not believe that such a mere possibility qualifies as a special property interest.
To determine that the right to ratify defendant’s act is either a general or special property interest sufficient to support the element of ownership in another subverts our prior analyses of property interests in embezzlement and larceny cases. Defendant may, as he contends, be guilty of obtaining property by false *518pretenses from State Farm, but the State has failed to prove that he is guilty of embezzlement from McCoy.
I therefore respectfully dissent and vote to affirm the result reached by the Court of Appeals.
Justice PARKER joins in this dissenting opinion.