Court Opinion

ID: 9841896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:10:09.345237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:00.012010
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice ^Brewer,
with whom concurred Mr. Justice Pecicham, Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. 'Justice Day,dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion and judgment in this case and for these reasons:
This was an action in the Common Pleas. Court of Jefferson County, Pennsylvania, to recover damages on account of the death of ..the husband of plaintiff. On the trial the court oi*15dered a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence on the part of the decedent, with leave to the plaintiff to move to take the same off. This motion was made and overruled; judgment for the defendant was entered, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. The decedent was killed while attempting to couple a steam shovel to a caboose. The steam shovel was being moved in interstate transportation and was not equipped with the safety coupler required by act of Congress of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531. The eighth section of that act provides:'
“That any employé of any such common carrier who may be injured by any locomotive, car or train in use contrary to the provision of this act shall not be deemed thereby to have assumed the risk thereby occasioned, although continuing in the employment of such carrier after the unlawful use of such locomotive, car or train had been brought to his knowledge.”
This, while removing from the employe the burden of any assumption of risk, does not relieve him from liability for contributory negligence. For the rule is well settled that while, in cases of this nature, a violation of the statutory obligation of the employer is negligence per se, and actionable if injuries are sustained by servants in consequence thereof, there is •no setting aside of the. ordinary rules relating to contributory negligence, which is available as a defense, notwithstanding the statute, unless that statute is so worded as to leave no doubt' that this defense is also to be excluded. Taylor v. Carew Manufacturing Company, 143 Massachusetts, 470; Krause v. Morgan, 53 Ohio St. 26; East Tennessee, &c. Railroad Company v. Rush, 15 Lea (Tenn.), 145, 150; Queen v. Dayton Coal, &c. Company, 95 Tennessee, 458; Reynolds v. Hindman, 32 Iowa, 146; Caswell v. Worth, 85 E. C. L. 849; Buckner v. Richmond, &c. Railroad Company, 72 Mississippi, 873; Victor Coal Company v. Muir, 20 Colorado, 320; Holum, Admr., &c. v. Chicago, &c. Railway Company, 80 Wisconsin, 299; Kilpatrick v. Grand Trunk Railway, 74 Vermont, 288; Denver & R. G. Railroad Company v. Arrighi, 129 Fed. Rep. 347; Winkler v. Phila*16delphia &c. Railroad Company, 4 Pennewilks Delaware Rep. 80. The Interstate Commerce Commission held this to be the rule in reference to this particular statute. 14th Ann. Rep. 1900, p. 84. Indeed it is not contended by the majority that the defense of contributory negligence has been taken away.
That there is a vital difference between' assumption of risk and contributory negligence is clear. As said by this court in Choctaw, Oklahoma, &c. Railroad Company v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64, 68: “The question of assumption of risk is quite apart from that of contributory negligence.” See also Union Pacific Railway Co. v. O’Brien, 161 U. S. 451, 456. This proposition, however, is so familiar and elementary that citation of authorities is superfluous.
In the motion for a nonsuit the second proposition was that “the evidence upon behalf of plaintiff proves conclusively that the accident happened because the deceased failed to keep'his head at least as low as the floor of the steam shovel—that this omission was the fault of the deceased exclusively—and that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence and there can be no recovery in this case.”
In ordering the nonsuit-the trial court said:
“True, under said act he was not considered to have assumed the risks of his employment, but by this is certainly meant no more than such risks as he was exposed to thereby, and resulted' in injury free from his own negligent act. It would hardly be argued that defendant would be liable, under such circumstances, were the employé to voluntarily inflict an injury upon himself by means of the use of the improperly equipped car. And yet it is but a step from contributory negligence to such an act.
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“It seems very clear to us that, whatever view we may take of this case, we are led to the legal conclusion that decedent was guilty of negligence that contributed to his death, and that the plaintiff, however deserving she may be, or however much we regret the unfortunate accident, cannot recover.”
*17The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in the following per curiam opinion:
"Whether the act of Congress in regard to the use of automatic couplings on cars employed in interstate commerce has any applicability at all in actions for negligence in the courts of Pennsylvania is a question that does not arise in this case, and we therefore express no opinion upon it. The learned .judge below sustained the nonsuit on the ground of the deceased’s contributory negligence, and the judgment is affirmed-on his opinion on that subject.”
That contributory negligence is a non-Federal question is"’ not doubted, and that when a state court decides a case-' upon grounds which are non-Federal and sufficient to sustain the decision this court has no jurisdiction is Conceded. .
While sometimes negligence is a mixed question of law and fact, yet in the present cage, whether the decedent in attempting to make the coupling, after the warning given by the conductor, lifted his head unnecessarily and negligently, is solely a question of fact, and in cases coming on error from the' judgment of a state court the findings of that court on questions of fact have-always been held conclusive on us. See Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U. S. 313, 319, and the many cases cited in the opinion.
It would seem from this brief statement that the case o'ught to be, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Escape, -from this 'conclusion can only be accomplished in one of these ways: By investigation of the testimony and holding that there was no proof of contributory negligence. If the case came from one of the lower Federal courts we might properly consider whether there was sufficient-evidence-.of contributory negligence; but, as shown- above, a very different rule obtains in respect.,to cases coming from a state court. We said this very term, in Bachtel v. Wilson, 204 U. S. 36, 40, in reference to a case coming from a state court to this: “Before we can pronounce this judgment in conflict with .the Federal Constitution it must be made to appear that this decision was one necessarily'in-con*18flict therewith, and not that possibly or even probably it was.” Before then we can disturb this judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania it must (paraphrasing the language just quoted a little) be made to appear that its decision of the question of contributory negligence was one necessarily in disregard of the testimony and not that possibly or even probably it was.
It cannot be said that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the decedent. The plaintiff’s testimony (and the defendant offered none) showed that deceased was an experienced brakeman; that the link and pin coupling was in constant use on other than passenger coaches; that before the deceased went under the' car the pin had'- already been set; that as he was going under the car he was twice notified to be careful and keep his head down, and yet, without any. necessity therefor being shown, he lifted- his head and' it was crushed between the two cars; that all he had to do was to guide the free end of the drawbar into the slot, and while the drawbar weighed seventy-five to eighty pounds, it was fastened at one end, and the lifting and guiding was only of the other and loose end; that the drawheads were of the standard height and the body of the shovel car higher than that of the caboose. Imme; diately thereafter the coupling was made by another brakeman without difficulty. If an iron is dangerously hot; and one knows that it is hot and is warned not to touch it, and does touch it without any necessity therefor being shown, and is thereby burned, it is trifling to say that there is no evidence of negligence. ‘
A second alternative is that this court finds that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognizes no difference between assumption of risk and contributory negligence. But that is not to be imputed in view of the rulings in the lower court, affirmed by the Supreme Court, to say nothing of the recognized standing and ability of that court.
Or we may hold that the Pennsylvania courts intentionally, wrongfully and without any evidence thereof found that' there *19.was contributory negligence in order to avoid the binding force-of the Federal law. During the course of the argument, in response to an interrogation, counsel for plaintiff in error bluntly charged that upon those courts. Of course this court always speaks in respectful terms of the decisions it reviews, but the implication of the most courteous language may be as certain as a direct charge.
It is intimated that the Pennsylvania courts confuse assumption of risk and contributory negligence—in other words, are unmindful of the difference between them, and Patterson v. Pittsburg, &c. Railroad Company, 76 Pa. St. 389, is cited as authority. That case was. decided more than thirty-years ago, and might, therefore, fairly be considered not an expression of the- present views of -those courts. But on examination - of the case, in which a judgment in favor of the railroad was reversed by the Supreme Court, we find this language which .is supposed to indicate the confusion- (pp. 393, 394):
“In this discussion, however, we are not to forget that the servant is required to exercise ordinary prudence’. If the instrumentality by which he is required to perform his service is so obviously and immediately dangerous, that a man of common prudence would refuse to use it, the master cannot be held liable for the resulting damage. In such case the law adjudges the servant guilty of concurrent negligence, and will refuse him that aid to which he otherwise would be entitled. But where the servant, in obedience to the requirement of the mastfer, incurs the risk of machinery, which though dangerous, is not so much so as to threaten immediate injury, or where it is reasonably probable that it may be safely used by extraordinary caution or skill, the rule is -different. In such case the master is liable for a resulting accident.”
Curiously enough in Narramore v. Cleveland, &c. Railway Company, 37 C. C. A. 499, 505, a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, in the opinion announced by Circuit Judge Taft is language not altogether dissimilar:
"“Assumption of risk and contributory negligence approxi*20mate where the danger is so obvious and imminent that no ordinarily prudent man would assume the risk of injury therefrom. But where the danger, though present and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit-of assuming, and which prudent men who must earn a living are willing to assume for extra compensation, one who assumes the risk cannot be said to be guilty of contributory negligence if, having in view the risk of danger assumed, he uses care reasonably commensurate with the risk to avoid injurious consequences: One who does not use such care, and who, by reason thereof, suffers injury, is guilty of contributory negligence, and cannot recover, because he, and not the master, causes the injury, or because •they jointly cause it.”
For these reasons I dissent from the opinion and judgment, and’ am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Peckham, Mr. Justice McKenna and Mr. Justice Day concur in this dissent.