Court Opinion

ID: 9889343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-09 18:04:04.981029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:46.379400
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/9/23 Estate of McCalebb CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 ESTATE OF VONCILE R.                                             B321122
 MCCALEBB et al.,
                                                                  (Los Angeles County
           Plaintiffs and Respondents,                            Super. Ct. No. 20STCV31703)

           v.

 AG LYNWOOD, LLC,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel M. Crowley, Judge. Affirmed.
     Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Lann G. McIntyre,
Ernest Slome, Tracy D. Forbath, Kathleen M. Walker,
Lynnette A. Christopoulos and Suzanne L. Schmidt for
Defendant and Appellant.
     Greene Broillet & Wheeler, Scott H. Carr, Ivan Puchalt,
Aaron L. Osten; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner, and
Kevin K. Nguyen for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
               _______________________________
                       INTRODUCTION

       Voncile McCalebb (McCalebb) was a resident at
AG Lynwood Care Center (Lynwood), a 24-hour skilled nursing
facility that provides long-term care. After McCalebb passed
away in April 2020 her estate and two adult children, Lisa Rabb
(Lisa) and Lashawn Rabb (Lashawn), filed a lawsuit alleging
Lynwood provided substandard care with respect to her
“nourishment and general treatment” and failed “to take
adequate measures to protect decedent from contracting
Covid-19.”
       After unsuccessfully attempting to remove the case to
federal court, Lynwood petitioned to compel arbitration in the
superior court asserting the parties were bound by the
arbitration agreement purportedly signed by Lisa on behalf of her
mother. The court denied the petition, concluding Lynwood failed
to prove Lisa had actual or ostensible authority to execute the
arbitration agreement, or that Lisa or Lashawn signed the
arbitration agreement in their personal capacity. We affirm.

         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.     McCalebb Is Admitted to Lynwood
       On February 2, 2018 McCalebb was admitted to Lynwood’s
skilled nursing facility. Although McCalebb “had basic
awareness of the world around her and made her own legal
decisions,” she “required extensive assistance with her activities
of daily living.”
       As part of the admission process, Lisa purportedly signed
two form arbitration agreements presented by Lynwood. One

                                2
covered medical malpractice and the second covered disputes
other than medical malpractice, including the Elder Abuse and
Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. Each arbitration
agreement had signature lines for the resident, the resident’s
representative, and Lynwood’s representative. McCalebb’s name
was printed on both documents on the resident line, but she did
not sign either of the agreements. Lisa’s name was handwritten
on the documents on the “Resident Representative” line, and she
purportedly signed the agreements on her mother’s behalf.
Directly above the signature block, each of the pre-printed forms
included the following language: “By virtue of Resident’s
consent, instruction and/or durable power of attorney, I hereby
certify that I am authorized to act as Resident’s agent in
executing and delivering of this arbitration agreement.”1
       Nine days later, Lisa signed a document entitled “Physician
Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST)” indicating she
was her mother’s “[l]egally [r]ecognized [d]ecisionmaker,” and
that Lynwood should attempt resuscitation and provide full
treatment in the event her mother had no pulse or was not
breathing.
       Lashawn did not sign any of the documents.
       On April 21, 2020 McCalebb was transferred to St. Francis
Hospital where she was diagnosed as being in “respiratory
distress” with “agonal breathing.” McCalebb tested positive for
COVID-19 and was found to be “severely dehydrated and
malnourished and nonverbal.” McCalebb’s “condition

1     Although the record contains two arbitration agreements
with separate signature lines, in their briefing the parties
construe them as a single agreement.

                                3
deteriorated rapidly,” and she died on April 29, 2020. She was
71 years old.

B.     The Trial Court Denies the Petition To Compel Arbitration
       On August 20, 2020 the Estate of Voncile R. McCalebb, as
well as Lisa and Lashawn in their individual capacities, filed a
complaint against Lynwood for elder abuse and neglect,
negligence and negligence per se, violation of the residents’ bill of
rights, wrongful death and concealment. The complaint alleged
Lynwood failed “to take adequate measures to protect decedent
from contracting Covid-19” and that McCalebb “received
substandard care with respect to her nourishment and general
treatment.”
       Lynwood removed the action to federal court on October 23,
2020 and sought arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims. The matter was
remanded to state court on March 1, 2021.
       Once back in state court, Lynwood filed the operative
petition to compel arbitration. Lynwood argued that Lisa acted
as her mother’s actual or ostensible agent when she signed the
arbitration agreement and that “Plaintiffs are contractually
bound to adjudicate this matter in binding arbitration and not in
state court.” Lynwood supported its petition with an attorney
declaration attaching two arbitration agreements (which as noted
above the parties treat as one), the POLST, and a declaration
from Lynwood’s records custodian attesting the documents were
from its files. In opposition, plaintiffs submitted a declaration
from Lisa attesting she did not recall signing the arbitration
agreement.2 Plaintiffs argued that even if Lisa did sign the

2     Lynwood requests judicial notice of the briefing from its
federal motion to compel arbitration. Lynwood argues these

                                 4
agreement, Lynwood “utterly fails to carry [its] burden, supplying
no evidence that would support a finding of either actual or
ostensible agency.” Plaintiffs further argued the wrongful death
claim was not subject to arbitration because neither Lisa nor
Lashawn signed the agreement in their individual capacities.
       The trial court denied the petition to compel arbitration. It
determined Lynwood presented insufficient evidence to meet its
burden of proving Lisa was McCalebb’s agent. As the trial court
explained, “Even assuming Lisa Rabb’s purported signature is
valid, her representation [that she was] her mother’s
representative is insufficient without more,” and that “Moving
Party offers no evidence that Lisa Rabb’s mother employed her as
an agent at the time the arbitration agreement was signed, or
that her mother caused Defendant to believe Lisa Rabb was
authorized to act as her agent.” The trial court further concluded
that “nothing in the arbitration agreement indicates that
Plaintiffs signed in their personal capacity.”
       Lynwood timely appealed.

documents estop Lisa from claiming she does not remember
signing the arbitration agreement. We deny the request for
judicial notice because these documents were not presented to the
trial court. (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996)
14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [“Reviewing courts generally do not
take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court.”];
accord, State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase &
Co. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1133, fn. 7.) In any event, as did
the trial court, for purposes of our analysis we assume Lisa
signed the arbitration agreement.

                                 5
                         DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       “Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.2 and 1290.2 create
a summary procedure for resolving petitions to compel
arbitration upon submitted evidence.” (Rogers v. Roseville SH,
LLC (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1065, 1072 (Rogers); accord,
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951,
972 (Engalla).) Generally, “when a petition to compel arbitration
is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written
agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must
determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its
enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the
existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting
the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v.
Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413;
accord, Flores v. Evergreen at San Diego, LLC (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 581, 586 (Flores).)
       ““‘[T]he right to compel arbitration depends upon the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties.’”
[Citation.] ‘“The question of whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists is determined by reference to the law applicable
to contracts generally.”’” (Kinder v. Capistrano Beach Care
Center, LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 804, 811 (Kinder); accord,
Garrison v. Superior Court (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 253, 263.)
       “‘There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an
order denying a [petition] to compel arbitration.’” (Lopez v.
Bartlett Care Center, LLC (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 311, 317 (Lopez),
internal quotation marks omitted.) “[I]f the court’s denial rests

                                6
solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of review is
employed.” (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted; accord,
Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 736,
744 (Garcia) [“We review de novo the legal conclusions
underlying a trial court’s denial of a petition to compel
arbitration.”].) “If the court’s order is based on a decision of fact,
then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.” (Lopez, at
p. 317.)
       In this case, we review the matter de novo because the trial
court’s ruling was based primarily on a question of law: whether
Lynwood presented sufficient evidence to carry its burden of
proof that Lisa was her mother’s agent when Lisa signed the
arbitration agreement. (Kinder, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 811
[“Here, defendants’ motion presents primarily a legal issue that
we review de novo: whether, . . . a defendant moving to compel
arbitration meets its initial burden of proving the plaintiff agreed
to arbitrate solely by submitting an agreement signed by a third
party who states in the agreement he or she has authority to sign
on the plaintiff's behalf”]; Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America
(2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1121 [“However, ‘[w]hen, as here, the
court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration is based on
the court’s finding that petitioner failed to carry its burden of
proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether that finding
was erroneous as a matter of law.’”]; Robertson v. Health Net of
California, Inc. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425 [“if the court’s
denial rests solely on a decision of law, then a de novo standard of
review is employed”].)

                                  7
B.    The Trial Court Correctly Ruled Lynwood Failed To
      Demonstrate McCalebb Agreed To Arbitrate
      On appeal, Lynwood argues the following evidence it
presented to the trial court demonstrated Lisa was her mother’s
agent and bound McCalebb to arbitration: the arbitration
agreement, the POLST, and McCalebb’s conduct (or non-conduct)
relating to the signing of the arbitration agreement and
acceptance of Lynwood’s care. We agree with the trial court that
Lynwood’s showing was insufficient.

      1.      The Law of Agency
      “‘Generally, a person,’” like McCalebb, “‘who is not a party
to an arbitration agreement is not bound by it. [Citation.]
However, there are exceptions. For example, . . . a person who is
authorized to act as the [resident or] patient’s agent can bind the
[resident or] patient to an arbitration agreement. [Citations].’”
(Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074; accord, Young v.
Horizon West, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1128 [“‘Even the
strong public policy in favor of arbitration does not extend to
those who are not parties to an arbitration agreement or who
have not authorized anyone to act for them in executing such an
agreement.’”]; Bouton v. USAA Casualty Ins. Co. (2008)
43 Cal.4th 1190, 1199 [“‘there is no policy compelling persons to
accept arbitration of controversies they have not agreed to
arbitrate’”]; Flores, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 587.)
      “An agent is one who represents another, called the
principal, in dealings with third persons. [Citation.] In
California, an agency is either actual or ostensible. [Citation.]
Actual agency arises when the principal’s conduct causes the
agent reasonably to believe that the principal consents to the

                                 8
agent’s act on behalf of the principal. [Citations.] Ostensible
agency arises when the principal’s conduct causes the third party
reasonably to believe that the agent has the authority to act on
the principal’s behalf.” (Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074,
internal quotation marks omitted.)
       “An agency, whether actual or ostensible, cannot be created
by the conduct of the agent alone; rather, conduct by the principal
is essential to create the agency. [Citations.] The principal must
in some manner indicate that the agent is to act for the principal,
and the agent must act or agree to act on the principal’s behalf
and subject to the principal’s control. [Citations.] Thus, the
formation of an agency relationship is a bilateral matter. Words
or conduct by both principal and agent are necessary to create the
relationship.” (Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074, internal
quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted.)
       As the party seeking arbitration, Lynwood bears the
burden of proving Lisa was McCalebb’s actual or ostensible
agent. (Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074.) Lynwood
“does not meet its burden of proving the existence of an
arbitration agreement when it [fails to] present [sufficient]
evidence that the purported principal’s conduct caused the agent
or the third party to believe that the agent had the authority to
bind the principal.” (Id. at p. 1075.)

      2.    Lynwood Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence of
            Actual Agency
     According to Lynwood, it demonstrated Lisa was her
mother’s actual agent because Lisa “expressly acknowledged her
authority to enter into the [arbitration] agreement on behalf of
her mother. By signing the agreement on her mother’s behalf,

                                9
[Lisa] certified and affirmatively represented she was ‘authorized
to act as Resident’s agent in executing and delivering this
arbitration agreement.’” Further, in Lynwood’s view, the POLST,
which was signed nine days after the arbitration agreement,
“‘confirmed’” Lisa was her mother’s “‘legally recognized decision-
maker.’”
       But a party seeking arbitration on an agency theory cannot
meet its burden of proving the signatory acted as the principal’s
actual agent merely by relying on the agent’s representations. It
is well settled, as a general principle of contract law and in the
context of arbitration agreements executed by a resident’s family
member upon admission to a nursing facility, that “[a] person
cannot become the agent of another merely by representing
herself as such.” (Pagarigan v. Libby Care Center, Inc. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 298, 301 (Pagarigan) [adult children’s signature
not evidence of actual authority to enter into arbitration
agreement]; accord, Kinder, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 812-813;
Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th
1076, 1087 (Valentine) [husband’s signature on a line marked
“resident’s representative” beneath language stating the
signatory had authority to enter into arbitration agreement on
the patient’s behalf insufficient to establish agency]; Flores,
supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 588 [similar].)
       The POLST does not help Lynwood. As a threshold matter,
because it post-dates the arbitration agreement, Lynwood needed
to present evidence that McCalebb intended it to ratify Lisa’s
agreement to arbitration on her behalf. (See Flores, supra,
148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 588-589 [power of attorney signed after
admission to facility did not ratify arbitration agreement absent
facts suggesting that, by signing the power of attorney form, wife

                               10
intended to ratify husband’s earlier agreement to the
arbitration].)
       In any event, even if Lisa was authorized to make certain
medical decisions for McCalebb relating to life-sustaining
treatment (the only subject of the POLST), this is not evidence
her mother authorized Lisa to enter into the arbitration
agreement. On its face, the POLST is limited to the life-saving
measures Lynwood should take in the event of a medical
emergency and, of course, makes no mention or reference to the
arbitration agreement. As such, the POLST neither confirms
Lisa was her mother’s actual agent, nor retroactively authorizes
Lisa to sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of her mother.
As in Pagarigan, “Defendants do not explain how the next of kin’s
authority to make medical treatment decisions for the patient at
the request of the treating physician translates into authority to
sign an arbitration agreement on the patient’s behalf at the
request of the nursing home.” (Pagarigan, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th
at p. 302; accord, Hogan v. Country Villa Health Services (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 259, 268 [emphasizing the “critical” distinction
between a child admitting a parent to a facility with a durable
power of attorney, and Pagarigan and Goliger, where they lacked
such authority]; Goliger v. AMS Properties, Inc. (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 374, 377.)3

3     Lynwood further contends that because Lisa acknowledged
her mother had capacity to make her own legal decisions, “[t]he
inference is therefore compelling that McCalebb either
authorized, or, at a minimum, permitted [Lisa] to sign the
arbitration agreement and the other papers necessary to procure
McCalebb’s admission to Lynwood.” But this argument suffers
from the same shortcoming as the POLST: Lisa’s authority to
make certain medical decisions for her mother does not translate

                               11
       Lynwood’s reliance on Tomerlin v. Canadian Indemnity Co.
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 638, 643 (Tomerlin) and County First National
Bank v. Coast Dairies & Land Co. (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 355
(First National) is misplaced. Tomerlin, an insurance coverage
case, held the attorney retained by the insurer had both actual
and ostensible authority to bind the insurer largely because its
claims manager admitted the attorney was retained “‘to
represent . . . our interests in the lawsuit,’” and the insurer failed
to challenge or limit any exercised authority with respect to “the
question of policy coverage.” (Tomerlin, at p. 644.) First
National involved a promissory note executed by a company’s
general manager on the company’s behalf. (First National, at
p. 357.) The court held the general manager had actual and
ostensible authority to bind the company because he was in “full
charge of all of the company’s affairs,” regularly did business
with the bank, and the company’s board never repudiated or
questioned his financial decisions. (Id. at p. 358.)
       Relying on these cases, Lynwood argues McCalebb “took no
steps to limit [Lisa’s] authority” and “did not object to [Lisa]’s
power to make decisions and sign documents on her behalf.” But
Lynwood presented no evidence McCalebb ever authorized Lisa
to act as her agent or to bind her contractually, or that McCalebb
was even aware that Lisa signed the arbitration agreement on
her behalf. (See Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076 [“There
was no evidence that Claude approved similar acts by Richard in
the past or that Claude remained silent even though he knew

into authority to arbitrate and waive her right to a jury trial.
(Pagarigan, supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 302; accord, Goliger v.
AMS Properties, Inc., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 377.)

                                 12
that Richard had signed the arbitration agreement on his
behalf.”].)

      3.     Lynwood Failed To Present Sufficient Evidence of
             Ostensible Agency
      Lynwood also presented insufficient evidence Lisa was her
mother’s ostensible agent. Citing Civil Code section 2317,
Lynwood argues that “[o]stensible authority arises when a
principal intentionally or by want of ordinary care causes a third
party to believe the agent possesses certain authority.” And
according to Lynwood, “McCalebb’s passive acceptance of [Lisa]’s
active involvement in her affairs” and that “McCalebb did not
object to [Lisa] signing all of the admission paperwork and the
arbitration agreement” demonstrate ostensible agency. But,
again, Lynwood cites no record evidence supporting these
propositions. Regardless, as we explained in Kinder, supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 816, “A defendant cannot prove a plaintiff
consented to arbitration merely by showing the plaintiff stood
idly by while the purported agent signed on his or her behalf.”
(See also Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1076 [rejecting
similar argument]; Goldman v. Sunbridge Healthcare, LLC
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173 [rejecting facility’s argument
the patient’s “silence on the matter be considered to be an
adoptive admission of the arbitration agreements signed by” the
patient’s wife]; Valentine, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1088-1089
[“Contrary to defendants’ argument, Lila’s silence in this instance
was insufficient to convey ostensible authority to Roy to execute
arbitration agreements on her behalf.”].)

                                13
      4.     McCalebb’s Acceptance of Medical Care Did Not
             Ratify the Arbitration Agreement
       Lynwood further contends McCalebb ratified Lisa’s signing
of the arbitration agreement by accepting the benefit of medical
care from Lynwood and failing to rescind the arbitration
agreement. Lynwood forfeited this argument by failing to raise it
below. (See Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 59, 68.) It also fails on the merits.
       Even if the arbitration agreement was signed as part of the
admission process to Lynwood, the agreement indicated that
“[t]he execution of this arbitration agreement is not a
precondition to receiving medical treatment or for admission to
the Facility.” As we held in Kinder, any “agreement to arbitrate
cannot be inferred from the mere fact that [McCalebb] accepted
treatment. Further, defendants were prohibited by statute from
imposing any such condition.” (Kinder, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 816; accord, Health & Saf. Code, § 1599.81, subd. (a) [“[a]ll
contracts of admission that contain an arbitration clause shall
clearly indicate that agreement to arbitration is not a
precondition for medical treatment or for admission to the
facility”].)
       Lynwood relies on NORCAL Mutual Ins. Co. v. Newton
(2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 64 (NORCAL), but it is inapposite. In
NORCAL, the court concluded that a wife was bound to arbitrate
under a professional liability insurance policy purchased by her
husband because she received benefits of the policy by accepting
a defense and demanding a litigation settlement. The court
explained that although the wife was not a party to the
agreement, “[I]t is clear that . . . [the wife’s] demands for
arbitration, along with her acceptance of a defense funded by [the

                               14
insurer] in the malpractice case and agreement to the settlement
resulting from that defense, constituted conduct seeking the
benefit, and therefore requiring acceptance of the burden, of the
insurance policy.” (Id. at p. 81.) In other words, she “was not
entitled to make use of the policy as long as it worked to her
advantage, then attempt to avoid its application in defining the
forum in which her dispute with NORCAL should be resolved.”
(Id. at p. 84.)
       By contrast, McCalebb’s passive acceptance of medical care
provided by Lynwood is not evidence of her acceptance of the
separate arbitration agreement. As Warfield v. Summerville
Senior Living, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 443, 450-451,
explained, “[Respondent] is not trying to take advantage of
certain provisions of a contract while avoiding the application of
other provisions of that same contract. Rather, [respondent] has
utilized the services of the residential care facility as provided
under certain admissions documents. Those are separate
agreements from the arbitration agreement—a different, optional
agreement.” (Id. at pp. 450-451.)
       And as to non-recission of the arbitration agreement, as in
Valentine, Lynwood presented no evidence that McCalebb knew
the arbitration agreement existed, that Lisa signed it, or that she
had a right to rescind. (Valentine, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1090 [rejecting failure-to-rescind ratification argument because
“[t]here is no evidence Lila knew the arbitration agreements
existed, that Roy signed them, or that she had a right to rescind
them. The fact Lila or Roy did not rescind the agreements,
without more, does not indicate Roy signed them as Lila’s
agent”]; Rogers, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1076-1077
[similar].)

                                15
C.     The Trial Court Correctly Ruled the Individual Wrongful
       Death Claims Brought by Lisa and Lashawn Were Not
       Subject to Arbitration
       Lynwood argues the individual wrongful death claims are
subject to the arbitration agreement under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1295. This argument fails because Lynwood
presented no evidence McCalebb signed the arbitration
agreement directly or through Lisa as her agent (which would
have bound McCalebb’s estate and heirs), or that Lisa and
Lashawn signed the arbitration agreement in their individual
capacities.
       “Unlike some jurisdictions wherein wrongful death actions
are derivative, Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 ‘creates a
new cause of action in favor of the heirs as beneficiaries, based
upon their own independent pecuniary injury suffered by loss of a
relative, and distinct from any the deceased might have
maintained had he survived. [Citations.]’” (Horwich v. Superior
Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 272, 283; accord, Hass v. RhodyCo
Productions (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 11, 25 [“wrongful death claims
‘are not derivative claims but are independent actions accruing to
a decedent’s heirs’”].)
       Lynwood contends the arbitration agreement encompasses
the individual wrongful death claims because it purports to bind
“the parties hereto, including the heirs, representative, executors,
administrators, successors, and assigns of such parties.” Citing
Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838 (Ruiz), Lynwood argues
that “[n]on-signatories to an arbitration agreement may be bound
by the agreement’s terms when the agreement, as here, complies
with Code of Civil Procedure section 1295.” Section 1295,
subdivision (a), deals with “[a]ny contract for medical services

                                16
which contains a provision for arbitration of any dispute as to
professional negligence of a health care provider.”
       In Ruiz, supra, 50 Cal.4th 838, the patient signed an
arbitration “agreement [that] provided for the arbitration of any
malpractice claims. . . . The agreement further provided that it
was the intention of the parties ‘that this agreement binds all
parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to treatment or
service provided by the physician including any spouse or heirs of
the patient and any children, whether born or unborn, at the
time of the occurrence giving rise to the claim.’ Elsewhere the
agreement specifically provided for arbitration of wrongful death
and loss of consortium claims.” (Id. at pp. 841-842.) The
Supreme Court held “that all wrongful death claimants are
bound by arbitration agreements entered into pursuant to
section 1295, at least when . . . the language of the agreement
manifests an intent to bind these claimants.” (Id. at p. 841.)
“‘Section 1295 was enacted as part of the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). . . . The purpose of
section 1295 is to encourage and facilitate arbitration of medical
malpractice disputes,’” because it “furthers MICRA’s goal of
reducing costs in the resolution of malpractice claims and
therefore malpractice insurance premiums.” (Id. at pp. 843-844.)
       But this case is distinguishable from Ruiz because
McCalebb did not sign the arbitration agreement (either directly
or through an agent) and thus expressed no intent to arbitrate
claims brought on her behalf. (See Goldman v. Sunbridge
Healthcare, LLC, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 1177 [“Unlike the
circumstance in Ruiz, Edward did not agree to arbitrate and thus
did not bind any successor in interest to arbitrate claims on his
behalf.”].)

                               17
        Lisa signed the arbitration agreement as “Resident
Representative” and not in her individual capacity. And there is
no language in the arbitration agreement indicating the
“Resident Representative” agrees to arbitrate claims brought in
his or her individual capacity. (See Goliger v. AMS Properties,
Inc., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 377 [“We now turn to
arbitration of Binshtock’s personal claim for her mother’s
wrongful death. Binshtock signed the arbitration forms in her
capacity as her mother’s ‘responsible party.’ Nothing on the
arbitration form indicates she signed in her personal capacity.”];
accord, Fitzhugh v. Granada Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center,
LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 469, 471, 474 [husband’s wrongful
death claims not subject to arbitration in absence of evidence he
signed arbitration agreements in individual capacity].) As noted
above, Lashawn did not sign any documents and could not have
agreed to arbitrate her individual claims.
        Ruiz is also distinguishable because the wrongful death
allegation in this complaint is primarily based on elder “abuse
and neglect,” not professional malpractice. (Avila v. Southern
California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 842
(Avila) [“If the primary basis for the wrongful death claim sounds
in professional negligence as defined by MICRA, then section
1295 applies. If, as plaintiffs claim here, the primary basis is
under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act
. . . then section 1295 does not apply and neither does Ruiz’s
exception to the general rule that one who has not consented
cannot be compelled to arbitrate.”].
        In Daniels v. Sunrise Senior Living (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
674 (Daniels), a woman was admitted to a residential care facility
for the elderly. (Id. at p. 677.) Upon admission, her daughter

                               18
and attorney in fact, Daniels, signed a residency agreement with
an arbitration clause binding the parties and their “‘spouse,
heirs, representatives, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns.’” (Id. at p. 678.) After her mother’s death, Daniels
brought survivor and wrongful death claims. (Ibid.) In affirming
denial of arbitration, the court explained Ruiz did not apply to
wrongful death claims: “More generally, we disagree that Ruiz
should be extended to arbitration agreements not governed by
section 1295, or that are entered into with a person other than a
health care provider for claims other than medical malpractice.”
(Id. at p. 683; see also Valentine, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 1084
[“a patient of a skilled nursing facility can bind her heirs to
arbitrate wrongful death claims arising only from medical
malpractice, but not from elder abuse”].)
       Lynwood argues plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action,
partially based on the allegation Lynwood did not provide
“decedent proper medical treatment,” triggers section 1295. But
this reads the complaint too broadly. The allegation Lynwood
cites is actually from the elder abuse and neglect cause of action
(incorporated by reference into the negligence claim). Although
there is “at least some overlap between” professional negligence
and elder abuse (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 843), in our
view this case is pleaded as one for wrongful death, negligence,
and elder abuse primarily based on neglect. This is not a case
where plaintiffs allege Lynwood’s “staff actively undertook to
provide treatment” and did so in a substandard manner. (See
Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) Nor is the complaint “replete with
references to the extensive medical care . . . received.” (See
Alexander v. Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla (2018)

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23 Cal.App.5th 206, 223.) Rather, the complaint alleges “the
general neglect . . . included allowing [McCalebb] to become
malnourished, dehydrated and subject to bed sores, as well as the
separate failure to take adequate measures to protect decedent
from contracting Covid-19, were all contributing factors in
causing [her] demise.”
       As Avila explains, such allegations “‘“speak[] not of the
undertaking of medical services, but of the failure to provide
medical care.”’ [Citation.]” (Avila, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
p. 843; accord, Sababin v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
81, 89 [“Our Supreme Court teaches that neglect under the Act
‘refers not to the substandard performance of medical services
but, rather, to the “failure of those responsible for attending to
the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults,
regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their
custodial obligations.” [Citation.] Thus, the statutory definition
of “neglect” speaks not of the undertaking of medical services, but
of the failure to provide medical care.’”].)
       In sum, Lynwood failed to establish Lisa had actual or
ostensible authority to bind McCalebb to arbitration, and it also
failed to establish Lisa or Lashawn agreed to arbitrate their
individual wrongful death claims. The trial court properly denied
the petition for arbitration.4

4     Because we affirm the trial court’s decision that plaintiffs
are not subject to arbitration, we need not address the parties’
arguments under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2. That
statute authorizes a trial court to deny a petition for arbitration
when not all parties are subject to arbitration and there exists
the possibility of a conflicting ruling on common issues of law or
fact.

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                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying the petition to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on appeal.

                              MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

             PERLUSS, P. J.

             FEUER, J.

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