Court Opinion

ID: 9439072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:20:26.765644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:08.277621
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
with whom HENDERSON, Circuit Judge joins, concurring:
I join the opinion of the court and write separately only to note another reason underscoring why the condition requiring that the Secretary of Agriculture determine whether a compelling public interest existed in the Compact region does not involve an impermissible delegation.
The Compact Clause has always been recognized as a device to protect federal power from encroachments by the states. The Framers required the “Consent of Congress” before any state could “enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 3. It has ever since been “evident that the [Compact Clause] prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519,13 S.Ct. 728, 734, 37 L.Ed. 537 (1893). As Joseph Story explained, “the consent of congress may be properly required, in order to check any infringement of the rights of the national government; and at the same time a total prohibition, to enter into any compact or agreement, might be attended with permanent inconvenience, or public mischief.” Joseph Story, 3 COMMENTARIES on the Constitution of the United States § 1397 (1833); see also Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitutiorir — A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L. J. 685, 694-95 (1925).
The Compact Clause was drafted at a time when the states were relatively powerful and *1479independent entities. The drafters of the Constitution sought to ensure the supremacy of federal power in interstate affairs. Although the drafters spoke of congressional consent, it is clear that they hoped not just to vindicate the legislative power of Congress, but to protect the power of the entire federal government with the Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has since recognized that the Compact Clause required congressional consent for interstate compacts only when the compact infringes upon federal power. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 459-60, 471, 98 S.Ct. 799, 805-06, 811-12, 54 L.Ed.2d 682 (1978).
With this background in mind, it is clear that the process of consent in the instant ease fully realized the purpose of the Compact Clause. The New England states appropriately sought congressional consent to the dairy compact, which will affect the federal regulation of milk prices pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-624, 671-674 (1994). They obtained that consent from Congress and its delegate, the Secretary of Agriculture. Both Congress and the Secretary were capable of vindicating the federal power protected by the Compact Clause, the former under the Clause itself, and the latter by virtue of delegated and statutory powers. As the Supreme Court has observed, “the constitution makes no provision respecting the mode or form in which the consent of congress is to be signified, very properly leaving that matter to the wisdom of that body, to be decided upon according to the ordinary rules of law, and of right reason.” Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85-86, 5 L.Ed. 547 (1823). For these reasons, the balance of power envisioned in the Compact Clause has been preserved by the actions of the New England states, Congress, and the Secretary.