Court Opinion

ID: 9622189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:13:14.1553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:14.383779
License: Public Domain

Justice KITTREDGE,
dissenting.
I join Chief Justice Toal in dissent in rejecting the equal protection challenge to section 63-3-530(A)(17) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2008). I write separately because my view of the equal protection challenge and Riggs v. Riggs, 353 S.C. 230, 578 S.E.2d 3 (2003) differs from that of the Chief Justice. Because I would affirm the family court, I would address Appellant’s remaining issue. I believe legislative intent concerning a parent’s potential obligation to financially contribute to his or her child’s college education includes a limitation to the cost of a South Carolina publicly supported college or university. I would, therefore, remand to the family court to determine if Appellant’s contribution should be modified.
I.
I join the Chief Justice in result as to the constitutionality of section 63-3-530(A)(17) (Supp.2008) (the successor statute to section 20-7-420(A)(17) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. *3362007)) insofar as it reflects legislative intent to authorize the family court to order parents to contribute to their child’s college educational expenses under the Risinger10 framework. Risinger’s construction of legislative intent has stood the test of time, as the Legislature has amended many subsections of this jurisdictional statute through the intervening thirty years, but the “exceptional circumstances” language in subsection (A)(17) remains largely unchanged.
As Chief Justice Toal notes, the majority has ignored our issue preservation rules and redefined the class in a manner not presented “below, in brief, or at oral argument.” (Toal, C.J., dissent at n.l). The majority so acknowledges in footnote 5, “[tjhough Appellant does not raise this specific classification, we note that this Court is asked, on appeal, to reconsider the validity of Risinger”
From a policy standpoint, the decision of the majority may be easily understood. A legislative policy of treating children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents differently than children of married parents for purposes of requiring parental financial support to attend college is most assuredly a debatable proposition. Because no suspect classification is involved, however, the standard of review is deferential. Against an equal protection challenge implicating no suspect classification, a court must sustain the legislation if it is reasonably related to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved, members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances, and the classification rests on some rational relationship. German Evangelical Lutheran Church of Charleston v. City of Charleston, 352 S.C. 600, 608, 576 S.E.2d 150, 154 (2003); see also In re Marriage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1980) (applying the rational relationship test as neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right are implicated); In re Marriage of Kohring, 999 S.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Mo.1999) (finding no equal protection violation because there was no involvement of a suspect class, no infringement of a fundamental right, and the existence of a rational relationship to legitimate state interest); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (1978) (applying rational relationship test).
*337Although the policy rationale underlying section 63-3-530(A)(17) is subject to debate, I believe the statute survives an equal protection challenge. I thus vote to affirm the family court and uphold the statute on the basis that it satisfies the rational basis test. Having rejected the equal protection argument, I return to this Court’s construction in Risinger of the “exceptional circumstances” statutory language. In this regard, I am especially mindful of the more than three decades that the Legislature has left the statutory interpretation of Risinger in place. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977) (recognizing that “considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress is free to change this Court’s interpretation of its legislation”). I would defer to the Legislature, and if the Legislature, as a policy matter, wants to overrule Risinger’s statutory construction, they are certainly free to do so.
II.
I respectfully disagree with Chief Justice Toal’s view, as extrapolated from Riggs v. Riggs, 353 S.C. 230, 578 S.E.2d 3 (2003), that the Legislature intended to authorize the family court to order parents of intact families to contribute to the college educational expenses of their children. I do not read Riggs that broadly. Riggs dealt with a disabled adult child and targeted statutory language authorizing the family court to order “child support past age eighteen where there are physical or mental disabilities.” Id. at 234, 578 S.E.2d at 5 (quoting from S.C.Code § 20-7-420(A)(17), the predecessor to § 63-3-530(A)(17)). The Court relied initially on “a common law duty of parental support for a child who has reached majority but is so physically or mentally disabled as to be unable to support herself.” Id. at 234-35, 578 S.E.2d at 5. Riggs observed that “[wjhere the disability prevents the child from becoming emancipated, the presumption of emancipation upon reaching majority is inapplicable.” Id. at 235, 578 S.E.2d at 5.
The Court in Riggs next construed the language of section 20-7-420(A)(17) which authorized the family court to order “child support past age eighteen where there are physical or mental disabilities.” Id. at 234-35, 578 S.E.2d at 5. Riggs *338found the statutory provision “to be consistent with this common law duty and h[e]ld the family court is vested with jurisdiction to order child support for an unemancipated disabled adult child.” Id. at 235, 578 S.E.2d at 5.
The issue of an unemancipated disabled adult child, with its common law underpinnings, is a far cry from a non-disabled adult child who wants to attend college. Imposing a duty of support in the former situation (through the common law and statutorily) is easily understandable. In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent, I would not venture beyond Risinger. Accordingly, I would hold that legislative approval for the family court ordering a parent to contribute to his or her adult child’s college educational expenses is limited to children of separated, divorced, or unmarried parents.
III.
Because I reject Appellant’s constitutional challenge and vote to affirm the family court, I would address Appellant’s contention concerning the scope of his financial obligation. My assessment of legislative intent is that a parent’s contribution should be determined and limited based on the cost of a South Carolina publicly supported college-or university. Respondent suggests it is unfair to limit a child’s selection to a South Carolina publicly supported college or university. I agree with Respondent on that point, but I view the issue differently. The issue, as I see it, is to what degree the Legislature has authorized the family court to compel the contribution of a parent to an adult child’s college education. Given that Risinger discerned legislative intent from the “exceptional circumstances” provision, I find it incongruous that the Legislature would place no reasonable limitation on a parent’s contribution.
The Risinger framework entails a host of limitations as a function of legislative intent, including consideration of the adult child’s ability to work to defray college expenses, exhaustion of scholarships, availability of student loans, and the parent’s ability to contribute. Regardless of a parent’s wealth, the Risinger factors will apply in all cases. As I construe legislative intent, it matters not that a parent can easily afford the most expensive college education. Parents *339will often allow an adult child to attend the college of his or her choice, but that is a voluntary decision free from governmental interference.11 I do not believe the Legislature has authorized the family court to accept an adult child’s college selection without regard to the costs. I believe a limitation to a South Carolina publicly supported college or university is in accord with legislative intent as set forth in Risinger.
IV.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the order of the family court requiring Appellant, pursuant to section 63-3-530(A)(17), to contribute to the son’s college educational expenses. But I would limit Appellant’s contribution to what his pro rata assessment would have been at a South Carolina publicly supported college or university. Accordingly, I would remand to the family court to determine if Appellant’s contribution should be modified.

. Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 39, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653-54 (1979).

. A different situation is presented where parents, through a court approved separation agreement, agree to voluntarily provide support at a certain level to an adult child’s college education expenses.