Court Opinion

ID: 9480214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:41:12.888664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:32.736148
License: Public Domain

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority brings this case to an end by finding a “waiver” of the alleged undisclosed plea agreement issue in state court, which bars further litigation of that issue in the federal system. The waiver issue was not raised or addressed by the parties in the district court, nor was waiver raised by the parties as an issue before this court. I would prefer rather than see this case concluded in this fashion to affirm Judge Sharp’s grant of the writ, or in the alternative to reverse on the basis that there was no exhaustion of state remedies as urged by the state. Judge Sharp noted that the “substantive evidence of guilt appears to be strong” and that appears to be so, but that does not resolve this case.
The majority bases its holding primarily on the statement of Burgin’s court-appointed counsel at oral argument as to when petitioner became aware of the alleged plea bargain conversation. His counsel, in arguing that the claim had been “clearly exhausted,” stated to this court that Burgin *999knew of this conversation before his state appellate brief was filed. The state, however, contended at oral argument that knowledge of the allegedly overheard conversation came to Burgin only after his appeal through the state court system had been concluded, and therefore there had been no fair opportunity for the state courts to consider that evidence. Judge Sharp made no factual finding as to when Burgin actually found out from his son about the alleged plea agreement conversation, except to find that it was “later.” When this evidence was known to Burgin remains for me too vague. The exhaustion argument of defendant’s counsel has now been converted by the majority into a waiver. In the particular procedural and factual circumstances of this case I am not satisfied with that result.
Judge Sharp expressed doubts in his Memorandum and Order of September 7, 1988, as to whether petitioner had satisfied the exhaustion requirement in Indiana. Judge Sharp held, however, that there had been compliance, if only “minimal,” leaving him with “serious reservations” about available state remedies. In this court, the state forcibly argued that this particular after-discovered evidence claim “has never been presented to the Indiana courts and because there is a method available to petitioner by which he could put this evidence before the Indiana courts petitioner has failed to exhaust his available state remedies.” See Delph v. State, 273 Ind. 38, 401 N.E.2d 700 (Ind.1980); Newman v. State, 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684 (1975). The state made no waiver argument.
The alleged factual circumstances that need to be fully aired are set forth in Burgin’s petition quoted in Judge Sharp’s Memorandum and Order. Beitler and Bur-gin were arrested at the same time. Prior to trial, Burgin sought disclosure of any state deals or agreements with any informant. Nothing on that subject was revealed by the state. It seems to be undisputed, however, and admitted by Beitler that prior to Burgin’s trial that Beitler and her attorney at least discussed with the state prosecutor the possibility of her testifying against Burgin. Beitler does not, however, as Judge Sharp wrote, “recall any arrangement whatsoever.” As Judge Sharp evaluates Beitler, she was the state’s “star witness.” Beitler’s claim is that she had been promised nothing for her testimony even though it might be helpful to the state against Burgin. Burgin’s and Beit-ler’s scheduled joint trial was then severed. Beitler’s separate trial was originally scheduled ahead of Burgin’s for November 1983. His was set for January 1984. During the course of Beitler’s discussions with the state prosecutor, her trial date, however, was continued until after Burgin’s trial, and she had had the opportunity to testify against him. This is not an unusual sequence when a plea agreement has been reached. Realistically these circumstances at least suggest the likelihood of some understanding, if not explicit then implicit, that if Beitler testified against Burgin, her favorable testimony would be given some consideration, and that, in some fashion, she would benefit. After Beitler had testified at petitioner’s trial she then admitted to a favorable plea agreement. That so-called later favorable plea agreement may not have taken her completely by surprise.
This Beitler earlier plea agreement possibility came primarily from the testimony of Burgin’s young son. Judge Sharp heard the boy testify upon direct examination and be subjected to what he described as vigorous cross-examination. Judge Sharp tells us the boy withstood it “admirably.” He viewed the boy’s evidence as unrefuted and noted that there was nothing to indicate that the prosecutor and Beitler’s attorney, neither of whom testified, were for some reason unavailable for that purpose.
Judge Sharp carefully considered this case in the context in which it was presented to him and decided it was necessary to grant the writ. I am not satisfied to conclude this case as does the majority because of my lurking feeling that there well may be something to the alleged Beitler plea arrangement that was not revealed. It is difficult to see why such a viable issue would have been deliberately waived by Burgin by not raising it in the state courts, or if that was not done intentionally then *1000what conceivable reason or excuse could be offered by Burgin to try to explain that default away. He will, however, not get that chance.
In these particular circumstances I believe justice would be better served by not resolving this case on the basis of waiver.