Court Opinion

ID: 9369883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 21:02:52.958072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:17.473052
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 180413-U
             NOTICE
                                                                                          NOTICE
 Decision filed 02/09/23. The
                                                                               This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-18-0413
                                                                               Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
                                                                               not precedent except in the
 the filing of a Petition for                  IN THE                          limited circumstances allowed
 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                                               under Rule 23(e)(1).
 the same.
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Hamilton County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 17-CF-47
                                                )
ALISA M. McPHERSON,                             )     Honorable
                                                )     Barry L. Vaughan,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Moore and Barberis concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: Where the defendant admittedly violated her probation for the second time, the
               circuit court did not err in finding a probation violation or sentencing her to a prison
               term one year above the minimum. The court also did not err in refusing to consider
               defendant’s untimely postsentencing motion. As any argument to the contrary
               would lack merit, we grant the defendant’s appointed counsel on appeal leave to
               withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶2       Defendant, Alisa M. McPherson, appeals the circuit court’s orders revoking her probation

and sentencing her to four years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s appointed attorney, the Office of the

State Appellate Defender (OSAD), filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, arguing that this appeal

presents no arguably meritorious issues. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). OSAD

has notified defendant of its motion. This court provided defendant with ample opportunity to file

a response, but she has not done so. After reviewing the record and considering OSAD’s motion

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and the supporting memorandum, we agree that this appeal presents no issue of even arguable

merit. Therefore, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶3                                    BACKGROUND

¶4     Defendant was charged with one count of burglary and two counts of possession of a

controlled substance. She pleaded guilty to burglary in exchange for 2½ years’ probation and the

State’s agreement to dismiss the remaining charges. The State’s factual basis showed that

defendant was found behind the wheel of a truck while her fiancé, John Ferris, was removing items

from a storage building and placing them in the truck. The circuit court accepted the plea and

imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

¶5     On April 6, 2018, the State petitioned to revoke defendant’s probation, alleging that she

had not reported to her probation officer since December 2017, had been arrested for possession

of a controlled substance, had consumed drugs and alcohol, and had failed to pay fines, complete

drug counseling, or to appear for a court hearing. Defendant stipulated that she had violated

probation.

¶6     Following a hearing, the court sentenced defendant to four years’ probation. One condition

of probation was that she spend the first 60 days in “home confinement” with Ronald Baker, her

ex-father-in-law.

¶7     On July 11, 2018, the State petitioned to revoke defendant’s second probation, alleging that

she did not begin her home confinement with Baker as ordered. At a hearing on the petition, Baker

testified that he picked defendant up from jail on July 9, 2018. He drove her to a gas station, where

he bought her a drink and cigarettes, then to the welfare office so she could check on her benefits.

Then, they drove to Walmart, where defendant demanded that Baker buy her clothes. When he

refused, she asked him to take her to her house or to her grandmother’s house.

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¶8     Baker refused these requests. Defendant wanted a pizza, so they drove to Domino’s to

pick it up. When they arrived at Domino’s, defendant got out to smoke a cigarette while Baker

went inside for the pizza. When he returned, defendant was gone. He waited for 30 minutes, but

she did not return.

¶9     Baker drove home and called defendant’s probation officer, Denise Givens, to let her know

that defendant was missing. Givens asked Baker to go back to Domino’s to see if defendant had

returned. Baker went back to the restaurant, but defendant was not there. Later that night, he

called Domino’s and was told defendant had never returned to the restaurant.

¶ 10   Baker explained that staying at his house was defendant’s idea. He said that she “brought

this up whenever she was in jail.” He agreed that defendant could be placed under “house arrest”

at his home because this was something she wanted to do, although she had never asked for his

permission to do so.

¶ 11   Givens testified that, immediately after the prior hearing, she explained to defendant the

conditions of her probation. Defendant understood that she had to reside with Baker for 60 days.

A few hours later, Baker called to say that defendant had run away. Later, she received a voicemail

message from defendant who said that she had gotten into an argument with Baker and left.

¶ 12   Givens spoke to defendant the following day and told her to go back to Baker’s house. She

explained that the court had ordered her to reside with Baker and only the court could change the

terms of probation. Givens told defendant to report to her office the following day, July 11.

¶ 13   Defendant did not report to Givens on July 11. On July 12, Givens received a call from

Carissa Pyles. Pyles said that she resided at Wildflower house, a “sober living” facility. Pyles

said that defendant was living there, too, and wanted to talk to Givens. Givens said that defendant

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had to return to Baker’s residence, and arranged for defendant to report to her on July 13. When

defendant reported on July 13, she was arrested.

¶ 14   Defendant testified that Baker was being “verbally abusive.” Baker refused to take her

home so that she could get some clothes. On the way to Walmart, they passed her grandmother’s

house. Defendant asked him to stop so she could get money from her grandmother to buy clothes.

He again refused, saying, “We are not dealing with your family. They are not your family no

more.” When the subject of her children came up, Baker said, “you need to just not worry about

your kids right now,” which upset defendant.

¶ 15   Baker was smoking marijuana and offered her some. Baker ordered a pizza with meat from

Domino’s. She said she did not want a pizza with meat because she was a vegetarian. Baker

replied, “you can just pick it off.” Baker got angry at Walmart, and stormed out, leaving her with

a shopping cart full of groceries. She described Baker as “being really mean.” She “ran” to a

friend’s house after they stopped at Domino’s. There, she met Pyles, who took her home to shower

and get some clothes.

¶ 16   Defendant left a voicemail message for Givens, then spent the night at the friend’s house.

She spent the next night with another friend. The next day, she went to the Wildflower house,

where she stayed until July 13.

¶ 17   Defendant said that she called Givens on July 10 and 11 and was told that she needed to

return to Baker’s residence. Defendant was “scared” because Baker was “not just verbally but

mentally and emotionally” abusive. Defendant testified that she did not want to stay with Baker

because there were “too many triggers” at his house.

¶ 18   In rebuttal, Baker denied that he was abusive. He denied smoking marijuana. He did not

take defendant to see her family because “they are always into some kind of drugs.”

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¶ 19   The court found that the State had proved that defendant violated her probation. The court

noted that during the sentencing hearing defendant never expressed any reservations about living

with Baker and, “frankly, that was one of the reasons the Court opted for another chance at

probation instead of accepting the State’s recommendation of going to DOC.” The court revoked

defendant’s probation and scheduled a sentencing hearing.

¶ 20   The presentence report showed that defendant had a burglary conviction from 2004, when

she was 17 years old. Following the hearing, the court conceded that it had likely “set [defendant]

up to fail” when it ordered her to live with Baker, but that this appeared to be the only alternative

to prison. Noting the prior conviction, the court sentenced defendant to four years’ imprisonment,

one year above the minimum. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 21   On the thirty-first day after sentencing, defendant mailed to the court a motion to reconsider

the sentence. She contended that her “ONLY motivation to change living arrangements was

because of the open drug use and her desire to stay clean and sober and not violate any probational

rules.” The record does not show that the court ever took any action on defendant’s motion.

¶ 22                                    ANALYSIS

¶ 23   OSAD contends that there is no good-faith argument that the circuit court erred by revoking

defendant’s probation and sentencing her to prison. We agree.

¶ 24   OSAD initially maintains that the court did not err in finding that defendant violated her

probation. OSAD contends that the State followed appropriate procedures by filing a revocation

petition alleging the specific acts that violated probation and providing her with adequate notice.

¶ 25   Further, the State proved that defendant violated her probation. In a revocation proceeding,

the State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated her

probation. 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4.1(c) (West 2018); People v. Crowell, 53 Ill. 2d 447, 451 (1973). In

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reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support a revocation, we decide “whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have

found the defendant guilty” by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Reher, 361 Ill. App. 3d

697, 700 (2005). It is the responsibility of the fact finder to judge the weight of the evidence,

assess the credibility of the witnesses, and draw any reasonable inferences. People v. Ramos, 316

Ill. App. 3d 18, 22 (2000).

¶ 26   Here, it was not seriously disputed that defendant failed to comply with the conditions of

her probation. One such condition was that she reside with Baker for 60 days. However, before

even arriving at Baker’s house, defendant absconded and made living arrangements of her own

choosing. She ignored Givens’s repeated directives to return to Baker’s house and missed an

appointment with Givens before finally appearing three days later.

¶ 27   Defense counsel acknowledged in closing that defendant “didn’t strictly comply with the

Court’s order.” In her own testimony, defendant admitted that she did not reside with Baker as

the court ordered, but attempted to rationalize her conduct by blaming Baker. However, as the

court noted, at the sentencing hearing, defendant never expressed any reservations about living

with Baker. And Baker testified without contradiction that the idea of living with him as an

alternative to going to prison originated with defendant. Defendant did not present any evidence

that Baker posed a physical danger to her such that she had no choice but to run away from him

and seek alternative living arrangements without first petitioning the court.

¶ 28   OSAD further contends that no reasonably meritorious argument exists that the circuit

court abused its discretion in sentencing. After revoking her probation, the court could sentence

defendant to any sentence appropriate for the original offense. People v. Rollins, 166 Ill. App. 3d

843, 844-45 (1988). A circuit court had great discretion in sentencing a defendant, basing its

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decision on the particular circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant’s

credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and

age. People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). We presumptively defer to the trial court’s

sentencing decision because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings,

has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on

the “cold” record. Id. We will not disturb a sentence within the statutory range unless it is “greatly

at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of

the offense.” Id. at 54.

¶ 29   Here, after two failed attempts at probation, it could not be seriously argued that the court

abused its discretion by sentencing defendant to prison. Moreover, the four-year sentence was

only one year above the minimum for a Class 2 felony such as burglary. See 720 ILCS 5/19-1(a)

(West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2016). Given that defendant had previously been

convicted of the same offense, a sentence above the minimum was justified on that basis alone.

¶ 30   Finally, OSAD suggests that there is no viable argument that the court erred by failing to

rule on defendant’s untimely motion to reconsider the sentence. A court’s authority to modify a

sentence terminates after 30 days. People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2003) (citing 730 ILCS

5/5-8-1(c) (West 2002)). Here, the court properly advised defendant that she had 30 days to file a

motion to reconsider the sentence, but her motion was mailed on the thirty-first day. Thus, the

court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Id.; People v. Bonds, 317 Ill. App. 3d 411, 416-17 (2000).

¶ 31                                   CONCLUSION

¶ 32   As this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit, we grant OSAD leave to withdraw and

affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 33   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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