Court Opinion

ID: 9649719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:07:06.646922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:14.063092
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
The majority defines “[t]he issue in this case [as] whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority in applying the continuing violation doctrine to conclude that plaintiff, the Alpha Board of Education (Board), improperly denied health insurance benefits to certain part-time employees.” Ante, 190 N.J. at 36, 918 A.2d at 580 (2006). Acknowledging both that “the collective negotiations *49agreement provided that a grievance must be filed within seven school days [and that] defendant, the Alpha Education Association (Association), did not filé a grievance until more than two years after the Board discontinued providing the benefits[,]” id. at 36, 918 A.2d at 580,1 the majority concurs with “[t]he arbitrator [who] found that the grievance was not timely filed, but sustained it because there was a continuing violation.” Ibid.
To so conclude, the majority perforce ignores our recent and consistent holdings in respect of the applicability and reach of the “continuing violation” doctrine, as well as the scope of our duties in respect of public-sector collective negotiations agreements. Because the majority misapplies that doctrine, I respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
We have made clear that, under New Jersey law, the “continuing violation” doctrine is “an equitable exception to the statute of limitations^]” Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 6, 803 A.2d 611 (2002). As Shepherd explains, “[u]nder that doctrine, a plaintiff may pursue a claim ... if he or she can demonstrate that each asserted act by a defendant is part of a pattern and at least one of those acts occurred within the statutory limitations period.” Id. at 6-7, 803 A.2d 611 (citation omitted). Stated differently, a continuing violation “claim, by definition, is comprised of a pattern or series of acts connected for liability purposes by the fact ‘that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period.’ ” Id. at 24, 803 A.2d 611 (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2074, 153 L.Ed.2d 106, 124 (2002)).
*50Our application of the continuing violation doctrine, however, has been limited to “the assertion of discrimination in employment[.]” North Plainfield Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ. of the Borough of North Plainfield, 96 N.J. 587, 595, 476 A.2d 1245 (1984). In the context of this case, and relying explicitly on Shepherd, the Appellate Division, in an unpublished per curiam decision, correctly held that “[t]he [continuing violation] doctrine is intended to ameliorate the harshness created by a strict application of the statute of limitations! ] in the context of employment discrimination cases alleging a hostile work environment, not to rescue defendant from the consequences of its deliberate, ill-fated strategy.” Therefore, because the claims asserted by the Association in the arbitration against the Board do not, on their face, allege employment discrimination, the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable.
B.
Seeking to justify its unprecedented extension of the continuing violation doctrine to the cause at issue between the Association and the Board, the majority takes great pains to distinguish what is, to me, clear, unequivocal, and binding precedent: North Plainfield, supra, 96 N.J. at 595, 476 A.2d 1245. In North Plainfield, two teachers who took semester-long sabbatical leaves were not advanced to their next pay grade when they returned from their sabbaticals. Id. at 591, 476 A.2d 1245. After the teachers returned to their teaching duties, the North Plainfield teachers’ union filed a grievance alleging that the failure to advance those two teachers to their next pay grade while on sabbatical violated the collective negotiations agreement between the school board and the union. Ibid. Based on the school board’s policy and practice of denying credit for salary advancement to teachers for time spent on sabbatical, the arbitrator sustained the school board’s position; tellingly, “[t]he teachers neither denied knowledge of the [school board]’s practice nor sought to correct or modify the award.” Ibid.
*51Undaunted, a year later both teachers petitioned for statutory in-service credit for their sabbaticals from the Commissioner of the Department of Education, seeking “[i]n essence ... prospective relief that would obviate the denial of credit for the time spent on sabbatical and would reverse the [school boardj’s decision for future years.” Id. at 592, 476 A.2d 1245. That petition was classified as a contested case and, thus, was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law for adjudication. Ibid. The Administrative Law Judge issued an initial decision dismissing the petition as time-barred, noting that a claim for an annual increment “ ‘must be filed within 90 days after receipt of the notice by the petitioner of the order, ruling or other action concerning which the hearing is requested.’ ” Id. at 594, 476 A.2d 1245 (quoting N.J.A.C. 6:24-1.2). The Commissioner adopted that initial decision as the final agency action, and the State Board of Education affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 590, 476 A.2d 1245. The teachers appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed. Solely “focusfing] on the timeliness of the filing of the petition,” id. at 592, 476 A.2d 1245, we, in turn, “reverse[d] the judgment of the Appellate Division and reinstate^] the decision of the State Board of Education.” Id. at 595, 476 A.2d 1245. We specifically noted:
Nor does the withholding of the increment constitute a continuing violation. Such a claim, which is associated with the assertion of discrimination in employment, has no relevance to this case. Furthermore, the fact that the teachers will always lag one step behind is not attributable to a new violation each year, but to the effect of an earlier employment decision, one that is protected by the regulatory period of limitations.

[Ibid]

c.
As the Appellate Division aptly concluded, North Plainfield is indistinguishable from this case. As in North Plainfield, there was a limitations period applicable for the timeliness of claims: in North Plainfield, the limitations period was imposed by regulation, id. at 594, 476 A.2d 1245, while the limitations period here was contractually agreed to in the collective negotiations agree*52ment. Also, as in North Plainfield, whether the union members here were entitled to some benefit resulted from an isolated, single, and discrete determination by the school board: in North Plainfield, the claim arose as a result of the school board’s refusal to credit the teachers for the period during which they were on sabbatical, id. at 591, 476 A.2d 1245, whereas the claim here arose as a result of an isolated, single and discrete determination that non-full-time staff members are not entitled to paid health benefits. Further, as in North Plainfield, the school board’s decision was consistent with prior, long-standing policy. In short, there simply is no principled way to distinguish this case from North Plainfield. Thus, our conclusion, as the Appellate Division correctly saw it, is entirely free from doubt: the Association’s grievance is time-barred.
II.
In the end, what the majority seeks is to apply the continuing violation doctrine in the context of this labor arbitration. However, to reach that goal, the majority must overcome North Plain-field’s clear and unambiguous import, and it must ignore the Association’s unwillingness to place this issue where it squarely and properly belongs: on the bargaining table.
A.
According to the majority, North Plainfield is distinguishable in three separate respects. I address — and reject — each such rationale in turn.
First, the majority acknowledges that, in North Plainfield, “the nature of the violation was not continuous, but rather, it was an isolated decision.” Ante, at 47, 918 A.2d at 587. Yet, the majority fails to inform how the decision at issue here — the denial of paid health benefits to part-time workers — is in any way substantively different than the denial of a pay increment in North Plainfield. The reason for that failure is straightforward: there is no substantive difference between the two.
*53Second, the majority asserts that North Plainfield differs from this case because “the substance of the [teachers’ union]’s grievance was decided by the arbitrator on the merits and the [teachers’ union] lost.” Ibid. That statement undoubtedly is correct; however, its accuracy is myopic. That statement ignores the fact that our decision in North Plainfield did not arise from the earlier arbitration — from which an appeal was never taken — but from the procedural limitations of a later petition filed by those teachers with the Commissioner of Education. North Plainfield, supra, 96 N.J. at 591-92, 476 A.2d 1245. If a fair and balanced apples-to-apples comparison is to be made, one must compare the decision of the Commissioner in North Plainfield to the arbitrator’s decision in this case. That comparison yields far more parallels than the convenient yet inapposite arbitrator-to-arbitrator comparison suggested by the majority.
Third, the majority notes that “the issue [in North Plainfield] was a discretionary statutory benefit and not a statutory entitlement[,]” explaining that a different result would have been likely in the latter instance. Ante, at 47, 918 A.2d at 587. Again, the majority fails to inform how this constitutes a substantive difference from the case at hand. On the contrary, the collective negotiations agreement here mandated paid health benefits for full-time employees — akin to the statutory entitlement in North Plainfield — but left the Board free to determine whether to grant paid health benefits to part-time employees — much like the discretionary benefit in North Plainfield. In sum, North Plainfield is indistinguishable from this ease. As the Appellate Division correctly acknowledged, North Plainfield’s holding must control here.
B.
At oral argument, we were informed that, despite the pendency of this appeal and despite intervening collective negotiations agreements between the Association and the Board,2 the Associa*54tion had not sought, as a matter of contract, paid health benefits for part-time employees. Under those circumstances, we should be loath to inject ourselves into the middle of what are properly matters for contract negotiation. For that reason, the decision of the majority is, to me, ill-advised. Instead, we are best guided by the injunction of Camden Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, supra, 181 N.J. at 200-01, 854 A.2d 342: “In this public-sector employment dispute, a court should not deliver by fiat what was not obtained through negotiation.” In the end, we should hew to our longstanding rule that “[t]he court will not write a new contract for the parties or vary, enlarge, alter or distort its terms for the benefit of one to the detriment of the other under the guise of judicial interpretation.” Standard Refinery Union, Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 31 N.J.Super. 548, 552, 107 A.2d 513 (App.Div.1954) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, the majority tacitly dismantles the core holding we reached but two years ago in Camden Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander. In that case, we explained that “we have not endorsed a presumption in favor of arbitrability for the public sectorf, but that conversely, we expressly have approved such a presumption for private-sector bargaining.” Supra, 181 N.J. at 203, 854 A.2d 342 (citation omitted). Instead, we endorsed the rationale of Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Bloomfield v. Bloomfield Educ. Ass’n, 251 N.J.Super. 379, 598 A.2d 518 (App.Div.1990), aff'd o.b., 126 N.J. 300, 598 A.2d 517 (1991), and explained that, in a public-sector setting, the following four-step analysis obtains:
[1] The duty to arbitrate springs from contract, and the parties can only be compelled to arbitrate those matters which are within the scope of the arbitration clause of their contract. [2] When there is a dispute as to whether a grievance falls within the terms of the arbitration clause of the contract, it is the duty of the courts to determine whether the matter is arbitrable. [3] However, in determining whether a matter is arbitrable, the court is limited to ascertaining whether the *55party seeking arbitration is making a claim which, on its face, is covered by the contract and within the arbitration clause. The court may not, in any way, pass upon the merits of the actual dispute. [4] If the arbitrator is found to have jurisdiction over a matter, the court must send it to arbitration, even though the court may think the dispute is patently frivolous.
[Camden Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, supra, 181 N.J. at 204-05, 854 A.2d 342 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Bloomfield v. Bloomfield Educ. Ass’n, supra, 251 N.J.Super. at 384, 598 A.2d 518 (citations omitted)).] 3
An application of those principles here leads inescapably to the following conclusions: (1) that the limitations period expressly adopted in this collective negotiations agreement for the filing of a grievance defines the parties’ obligation to arbitrate; (2) that, when presented with a dispute whether this grievance is arbitrable, that determination belongs to the courts, and not the arbitrator; (3) that the Association’s grievance here was facially barred by the collective negotiations agreement; and (4) there is nothing to remand to an arbitrator for determination.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division and conclude that the Association’s two-year unexplained delay in seeking arbitration is fatal to its claim. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE — 5.
For affirmance — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.

 "Unlike private-sector employees, public employees are not given the right to ‘bargain collectively.' Public employees instead may engage in collective negotiations.” Camden Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, 181 N.J. 187, 193-94, 854 A.2d 342 (2004) (citations omitted).

 The collective negotiations agreement at issue in this case covered the period from September 1, 2000 to August 31, 2002. Ante, at 37, 918 A.2d at 580-81. *54Assuming that the term of that agreement fairly represented the practice between these parties, there should have been at least three intervening collective negotiations agreements between the Board and the Association before this appeal was argued.

 The majority relies heavily on the Legislature's later adoption of a statutory presumption of arbitrability in the public sector setting. Ante at 48, 918 A.2d at 587. I do not consider that factor relevant; although the Legislature changed the outcome reached in Camden Bd. of Educ. v. Alexander, supra, it did not affect the reasoning of that decision. It is upon that reasoning — and not the outcome — that I rely.