Court Opinion

ID: 9902216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-24 15:04:34.842101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.681615
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: NOVEMBER 17, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0410-MR

JERARD GARRETT                                                        APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
            ACTION NOS. 13-CR-000246-001 & 13-CR-000744-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Jerard Garrett, pro se, appeals from the Jefferson Circuit

Court’s denial of his motion to alter, amend, or vacate judgment and sentence

pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Garrett contends

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and post-

conviction proceedings. Upon careful review, we affirm.
                                 BACKGROUND

             The charges against Garrett arose from two murders committed during

separate drug transactions that occurred several days apart.

                     In one indictment, a Jefferson County grand jury
             charged Garrett and his co-defendant, Billy Richardson,
             with one count each of murder, first-degree robbery,
             first-degree wanton endangerment, third-degree
             terroristic threatening, and being a first-degree persistent
             felony offender (“PFO1”), arising from the murder of
             Jamie Young on December 29, 2012. In a separate
             indictment, the grand jury charged Garrett and
             Richardson with one count each of murder and first-
             degree robbery, arising from the murder of Kenny Forbes
             on December 23, 2012. Over Garrett’s objection, the
             trial court consolidated the charges in the two
             indictments for trial. Pursuant to RCr 6.18, the trial court
             found that the defendants’ practice of scheduling
             meetings through a known intermediary to conduct a
             drug transaction, then robbing the victim, was
             sufficiently unique to warrant joinder of the charges and
             consolidation of the indictments.

Garrett v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 217, 220-21 (Ky. 2017), as modified (Dec.

20, 2017) (footnote omitted).

             The jury convicted Garrett of two counts of murder, two counts of

first-degree robbery, one count of first-degree wanton endangerment, one count of

third-degree terroristic threatening and being a first-degree persistent felony

offender (PFO). He entered into a sentencing agreement pursuant to which the

Commonwealth agreed to dismiss the PFO charge and recommend a cumulative

                                         -2-
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years.

The trial court sentenced Garrett in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

             On direct appeal, Garrett argued that the ballistic examiner’s

testimony that the bullets found at both murder scenes were fired from the same

weapon should not have been admitted; that the trial court abused its discretion by

joining the Forbes and Young murder charges together in a single trial; that the

trial court should not have allowed a witness, Jamie Quisenberry, to make an in-

court identification of Garrett as the one who shot Young because Quisenberry had

not been able to identify him in a photographic lineup five days after the shooting;

that the trial court improperly allowed a police detective’s testimony to bolster his

own credibility; and that the Commonwealth’s use of CourtNet information

regarding a witness’s address was improper. These alleged errors were all

preserved for appeal by the objections of Garrett’s trial counsel. The final

judgment and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See id. at 228.

             Garrett subsequently filed a RCr 11.42 motion, pro se. He alleged

that he was denied counsel during arraignment; the Commonwealth failed to turn

over two photo packs to his defense counsel; the Commonwealth failed to turn

over exculpatory evidence; and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

objections to the jury instructions, for failing to preserve the record for appeal, and

for advising him to accept the sentencing agreement. An attorney from the

                                          -3-
Department of Public Advocacy was subsequently appointed to represent Garrett.

He filed a supplemental RCr 11.42 motion. In reliance on an unpublished opinion

of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, United States v. Tibbs, Case No.

2016-CF1-19431, 2019 WL 4359486 (D.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2019), he argued

that the Daubert1 hearing on the admissibility of the testimony of the ballistics

expert was inadequate.

              The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the RCr 11.42 motion

and heard testimony from Garrett and from his trial counsel.2 Garrett’s trial

counsel testified at length about his theory of the case and his defense strategy.

The trial court then entered an opinion and order denying the motion. This appeal

by Garrett followed.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              Garrett claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, in

violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the two-pronged test

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.

2d 674 (1984), accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).

1
 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d
469 (1993).
2
  Although the recording of the RCr 11.42 hearing was not designated to be made part of the
record, it was in the record before this panel, and we were able to review it.

                                              -4-
             Under the Strickland framework, an appellant must first
             show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
             Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052. A
             “deficient performance” contains errors “so serious that
             counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed
             the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, the
             appellant must show that counsel’s deficient performance
             prejudiced his defense at trial. Id. “This requires
             showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to
             deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
             reliable.” Id. An appellant must satisfy both elements of
             the Strickland test in order to merit relief. Id.

Commonwealth v. McGorman, 489 S.W.3d 731, 736 (Ky. 2016).

             In reviewing counsel’s performance, we are required to presume that

counsel’s performance was reasonable. Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96,

103 (Ky. 2007). We review “the trial court’s factual findings for clear error while

reviewing the application of its legal standards and precedents de novo.” Ford v.

Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 156 (Ky. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v.

Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 875 (Ky. 2012)).

                                     ANALYSIS

1. The trial court’s findings were adequate

             Garrett argues that the trial court failed to make adequate findings

following the evidentiary hearing, as required by RCr 11.42(6), which provides as

follows:

             At the conclusion of the hearing or hearings, the court
             shall make findings determinative of the material issues
             of fact and enter a final order accordingly. If it appears

                                          -5-
             that the movant is entitled to relief, the court shall vacate
             the judgment and discharge, resentence, or grant him or
             her a new trial, or correct the sentence as may be
             appropriate. A final order shall not be reversed or
             remanded because of the failure of the court to make a
             finding of fact on an issue essential to the order unless
             such failure is brought to the attention of the court by a
             written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
             pursuant to Civil Rule 52.02.

RCr 11.42(6).

             Garrett contends that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02

to request such findings.

             This argument fails for several reasons. First, the trial court’s opinion

and order does contain adequate findings to support its decision to deny the

motion. Second, Garrett does not specify what evidence was presented at the

hearing that should have formed the basis for any additional findings. RCr

11.42(2) expressly requires the movant to “state specifically the grounds on which

the sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in

support of such grounds[,]” or face “a summary dismissal of the motion.” RCr

11.42(2). Third, his claim that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for

failing to file a motion for additional findings pursuant to CR 52.02 is not

sustainable because “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-

conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally

                                          -6-
ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Bowling v. Commonwealth,

981 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991)).

2. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate witnesses and
evidence

             Next, Garrett argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

perform an adequate investigation, thus depriving him of a reasonable defense. In

rejecting this argument, the trial court stated that Garrett had not provided details

about what investigation was lacking nor about which witnesses could have

testified on his behalf. The trial court concluded that his allegations were

speculative and lacking in specific factual support. Garrett contends that his

appointed post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to provide such

factual support for these unidentified allegations and for failing to seek

substantiation of the allegations at the evidentiary hearing. Garrett relies on

Kentucky Revised Statute 31.110(2)(a), which states in relevant part that “[a]

needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under subsection (1)

of this section is entitled: . . . [t]o be counseled and defended at all stages of the

matter[.]” As previously stated, no right to effective post-conviction counsel has

been recognized in Kentucky. In any event, Garrett’s post-conviction counsel

would have had to rely on Garrett to inform him about the specific evidence his

trial counsel should have investigated. “RCr 11.42 motions are not intended to

                                           -7-
conduct further discovery or fishing expeditions. It is well-settled, ‘vague

allegations, including those of failure to investigate, do not warrant an evidentiary

hearing and warrant summary dismissal of the RCr 11.42 motion.’” Prescott v.

Commonwealth, 572 S.W.3d 913, 926 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted).

Garrett’s claim lacks specificity and does not overcome the strong presumption

that his counsel’s performance was reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066.

3. Trial counsel was not ineffective in his handling of witnesses and the
introduction of photo packs

               Garrett’s next argument relates to the testimony of trial witness Jamie

Quisenberry, an eyewitness to one of the shootings. Garrett’s trial counsel

objected to Quisenberry making an in-court identification of Garrett as the shooter,

on the grounds that Quisenberry had failed to identify Garrett in a photographic

line up five days after the shooting. The trial court overturned the objection. On

direct appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision,

stating as follows:

                      Garrett’s argument is not well taken. After
               appellate briefs were submitted in this case, this Court
               issued an Opinion in Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527
               S.W.3d 792 (Ky. 2017), rejecting the very claim Garrett
               now presents. In Fairley, we held that the witness’s
               inability to identify the defendant in a photographic
               lineup did not bar him from making an in-court
               identification:

                                          -8-
                                [T]he proper course is to permit the
                         witness to attempt to identify the suspect in
                         court and, if an identification is made, allow
                         the defense to thoroughly cross-examine the
                         witness concerning his failure to make a
                         prior identification. The jury is fully
                         capable of determining what weight to
                         assign to the in-court identification . . . .
                         Accordingly the trial court did not abuse its
                         discretion in permitting the introduction of
                         this evidence.

                 Id. at 797.

                         In Fairley, we also rejected the defendant’s
                 assertion that the witness’s in-court identification should
                 have been analyzed by the trial court under the factors set
                 forth in Biggers[3] before allowing the witness to testify.
                 Id. at 798. “In Biggers, the Supreme Court set forth a
                 two-prong due process test for considering an
                 identification by a witness following impermissible
                 suggestive pretrial procedures such as a photo array or
                 line-up.” Id. at 797-98. We expressly declined to extend
                 Biggers to in-court identifications when no unduly
                 suggestive pretrial behavior has been alleged; “‘a primary
                 aim of the Biggers line of cases was deterrence of law
                 enforcement’s use of improper lineups, showups, and
                 photo arrays, a factor clearly not present in the case
                 before us.’” Id. at 799 (citation omitted).

                        Garrett has not suggested that the photographic
                 lineup presented to Quisenberry was unduly suggestive,
                 or alleged any other improper pretrial procedures; rather,
                 Garrett argues that the in-court identification by a witness
                 who did not make an identification previously is unduly
                 suggestive. This reasoning does not trigger application
                 of Biggers, and is unsupported by Kentucky case law.
                 The trial court followed the proper course of action by

3
    Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).

                                                 -9-
             allowing Quisenberry to make an in-court identification,
             allowing Garrett the opportunity to cross-examine him,
             and letting the jury assess Quisenberry’s credibility and
             weigh the evidence presented.

Garrett, 534 S.W.3d at 224-25.

             In its order and opinion denying the RCr 11.42 motion, the trial court

correctly ruled that this claim had been decided because the Kentucky Supreme

Court held that the trial court properly permitted Quisenberry to make the in-court

identification of Garrett. Garrett argues that the trial court erred because “a failure

to prevail on a palpable error claim [on direct appeal] does not obviate a proper

ineffective assistance claim.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky.

2006), as modified (May 23, 2006). But the Kentucky Supreme Court did not

engage in palpable error review because Garrett’s trial counsel objected to

Quisenberry’s in-court identification and thus properly preserved the error for

appellate review.

             Garrett also raises an argument regarding another eyewitness, Charles

Young. Garrett claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to file a motion

to compel the introduction of some additional photo packs at trial. Apparently, the

additional photo packs could have been used to impeach Young’s identification of

Garrett as the shooter. Garrett’s previous attorney had filed a motion to suppress

both Young and Quisenberry’s identification of Garrett. A hearing was held on the

motion to suppress, and it was denied. At the RCr 11.42 hearing, Garrett’s trial

                                         -10-
counsel testified that he knew of the existence of other photo packs from his

review of the suppression hearing. Rather than filing a motion to compel the

Commonwealth to produce them at trial, he decided it would be a more effective

trial strategy to “spring it” on the investigating police officer in order to impeach

his testimony. He explained that on cross-examination, the officer several times

was forced to testify that he had no explanation for the other photo packs. “To

show ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be

considered sound trial strategy. A defense attorney must enjoy great discretion in

trying a case, especially with regard to trial strategy and tactics.” Vincent v.

Commonwealth, 584 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Ky. App. 2019) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Garrett has not offered any basis for overcoming the

presumption that his trial counsel’s decision was sound trial strategy.

4. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to subpoena a defense witness

             According to Garrett, an individual named Michael McCain or

McClain should have been subpoenaed as a defense witness. Garrett claims he

could have testified that one of the victims was carrying a bag which did not

contain drugs but a handgun. In his RCr 11.42 memorandum, he alleged that this

was a Brady violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.

Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Garrett claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

                                         -11-
investigate and subpoena McCain. This argument is clearly refuted by the record,

which shows that trial counsel moved to compel discovery, specifically requesting

information about an individual named “LaMichael McClain” and also tendered an

order to the trial court requiring the police to disclose evidence relating to

individuals allegedly involved in the shootings, including “LaMichael McClain.”

We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that this claim is purely speculative and

does not warrant relief under RCr 11.42.

5. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object on the grounds that the
jury instructions were flawed and resulted in a lack of unanimous verdict

             Garrett argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the jury instructions which he claims deprived him of a unanimous verdict.

             The jury was asked to find Garrett guilty of robbery if he acted alone

or in complicity with Richardson to steal or attempt to steal money and/or

marijuana from the victim Kenny Forbes and in doing so, acting alone or in

complicity with Richardson, he caused physical injury to Forbes. A similar

instruction asked the jury to find Garrett guilty of murder if he acted alone or in

complicity with Richardson to kill Kenny Forbes by shooting him with a gun and

in doing so, acting alone or in complicity with Richardson, he intentionally caused

Kenny Forbes’s death. The jury instructions for Garrett’s codefendant, Billy

Richardson, followed the same pattern, with the jury being asked to determine

whether Richardson acted alone or in complicity with Garrett to commit robbery

                                          -12-
and/or murder. The jury found Garrett guilty of both the murder and robbery of

Kenny Forbes and found Richardson not guilty of either charge.

             Garrett argues that his trial counsel should have objected after the

return of these verdicts on the grounds that the jury’s finding of guilt was not

unanimous. He contends that because the jury found Richardson not guilty of the

murder or robbery of Forbes, the alternative theory of “in complicity” found in

Garrett’s instructions means the verdict was not unanimous.

             The Kentucky Supreme Court has identified three different types of

unanimous verdict violations. “The first type . . . occurs when multiple counts of

the same offense are adjudicated in a single trial.” Cox v. Commonwealth, 553

S.W.3d 808, 812 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted). The second type “occurs when a

jury instruction may be satisfied by multiple criminal acts by the defendant.” Id.

More specifically, this requirement “is violated when ‘a general jury verdict [is]

based on an instruction including two or more separate instances of a criminal

offense, whether explicitly stated in the instruction or based on the proof.’” Id.

The third type stems from a “combination jury instruction.” “A ‘combination’

instruction permitting a conviction of the same offense under either of multiple

alternative theories does not deprive a defendant of his right to a unanimous

verdict, so long as there is evidence to support a conviction under either theory.”

Id.

                                         -13-
             Garrett seems to be alleging the third type of violation but does not

meet it because there was evidence to support a conviction under either theory, that

is, that Richardson or Garrett was either acting alone or in complicity with the

other. For example, if the jury had found both men acted alone in committing the

murder and robbery of one victim, unanimity would have been implicated because

the verdicts would have been contradictory. By finding that Richardson was not

guilty of acting alone or in complicity with Garrett, however, the jury clearly found

that Garrett acted alone, not in complicity with Richardson. There was nothing

contradictory or inconsistent in the jury’s verdicts and nothing to indicate a lack of

unanimity. Consequently, trial counsel was not ineffective for not objecting to the

verdicts on the grounds of lack of unanimity.

             Garrett further argues that there was a constructive amendment

between his indictment for the murder of Jamie Young and the jury instructions on

this offense with the result that the final verdict lacked unanimity. His argument in

this regard is somewhat confusing. The indictment charged Garrett and

Richardson with acting alone or in complicity with each other to murder Jamie

Young. Richardson’s second-degree manslaughter instruction required the jury to

find that Garrett killed Jamie Young and that prior to the killing Richardson had

acted in complicity with Garrett to rob and/or engage in a drug transaction with

Jamie Young and that in doing so, Richardson was aware of and consciously

                                         -14-
disregarded a substantial and justifiable risk that Jamie Young would be killed.

Richardson was found guilty under this instruction. Garrett indicates that the

jury’s finding means that there was no complicity relating to the killing of Jamie

Young, only that Garrett alone killed him. He seems to argue that this removed the

alternative theory of “in complicity” and the verdict could not be unanimous under

both theories. The instructions required the jury to determine the level of

culpability between Richardson and Garrett and the jury did so. The jury

determined that Garrett acted alone in killing Young, and that Richardson prior to

the killing had acted in complicity with Garrett to rob and/or engage in a drug

transaction with Young. We fail to see how the verdict was not unanimous. If the

jury had found that Garrett acted in complicity with Richardson to commit murder,

then Richardson would also have been convicted of murder under that instruction

and the jury would not have proceeded to the second-degree manslaughter

instruction.

               The verdicts did not lack unanimity and consequently Garrett’s trial

counsel was not ineffective for not raising an objection.

6. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to alleged prosecutorial
misconduct

               The lead detective in the Forbes murder investigation secured

surveillance video of a liquor store parking lot located near the scene of the

murder. The video showed an individual who appeared to be Forbes entering a

                                         -15-
black sedan in a gas station parking lot across the street. Shortly thereafter, a red

truck left the parking lot. The video does not show either a robbery or a murder.

The prosecutor took the video home and enlarged it to make it easier to view as a

PowerPoint. Garrett contends that his counsel should have objected to this

modified video being shown to the jury. At the RCr 11.42 hearing, trial counsel

testified that he did object to the enlarged footage and explained the prosecutor

made no alterations to the video except to enlarge it. Garrett argues that by

enlarging the video, the Commonwealth was able to present a false impression of

what the video was really showing. But he does not explain what this false

impression was.

             Garrett also argues that his trial counsel should have objected to

testimony by Detective Guffy about a series of phone calls the victim Forbes made

before his death. Garrett argues that the testimony regarding the phone records

was not adequately authenticated. He presents a summary of Guffy’s testimony

but does not provide a reference to where it is located in the record. He contends

that the testimony presented a false impression of the facts premised solely upon

inferences, but he does not elaborate on this contention any further. Garrett has

simply not demonstrated or explained how his attorney’s alleged failure to object

to the allegedly inadequate foundation for the testimony constituted deficient

performance, much less how it deprived him of a fair trial.

                                         -16-
                                 CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

opinion and order denying Garrett’s RCr 11.42 motion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jerard Garrett, pro se                   Daniel Cameron
Eddyville, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Ken W. Riggs
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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