Court Opinion

ID: 9853833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:56:06.106962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:10.069533
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
The issue in this case is whether uninsured motorist carriers (UMC) deserve special treatment not accorded other defendants in the application of rules for service and the privilege of dismissal and renewal under OCGA § 9-2-61. Because I find no justification for treating UMCs differently, I concur in the affirmance of the Court of Appeals. I write separately because the majority’s opinion fails to clarify the conflict between Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co.1 and Hobbs v. Arthur,2 the issue for which certiorari was granted, and instead relies upon the difficult distinction between void and voidable cases.
1. USF&G contends that because heightened service rules apply to UMCs, it may raise as a defense in the renewal action the failure *435of the plaintiff to meet these heightened rules in the original action. In its petition for certiorari, USF&G relied on Bohannon3 to argue that a heightened rule for service applies to UMCs. In Bohannon, this Court affirmed the granting of a UMC’s motion to dismiss when the plaintiff served the UMC outside the statute of limitation. The court did so without conducting any analysis of whether the plaintiff acted diligently. Bohannon confirmed the approach taken in several Court of Appeals opinions in which the court affirmed judgments in favor of UMCs that had not been served within the two-year statute of limitation. In none of those cases did the Court of Appeals consider the diligence of the plaintiff in perfecting service.4
The failure to consider diligence in cases involving UMCs contrasts with the analysis given other defendants. The courts generally apply a diligence standard to plaintiffs who timely file their complaint, but serve the defendant outside the statute of limitation in order to determine if the late service relates back to the filing of the complaint. In those cases, the rule has long been that if a trial court determines that a plaintiff did not act diligently, but was guilty of laches in perfecting service, then the trial court may exercise its discretion in finding that the service does not relate back and in dismissing the complaint.5
Contrary to USF&G’s contentions, there is nothing in Bohannon that exempts UMCs from this relation-back doctrine. OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), which requires service of process on the UMC, contains no language requiring more stringent service requirements. On the contrary, the statute provides that service is to be made “as though the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant.” Because a plaintiff has a “grace period” in which to serve party defendants, if the plaintiff acts with diligence, the plaintiff serving the UMC should have the same “grace period.” Additionally, a UMC suffers none of the infirmities of other classes of defendants, such as *436minors and incompetents, for whom heightened service rules apply.6 Finding nothing in the statute nor in public policy to justify special treatment for UMCs, I would hold that the same service rules apply to UMCs that the courts apply to other types of defendants.
2. Having reasoned that there is no rationale for according UMCs special treatment, the issue of whether a UMC may raise as a defense in a renewal suit the plaintiff’s lack of diligence in service in the original action is easily answered. In Hobbs,7 which did not involve a UMC, this Court held that a plaintiff’s lack of diligence in perfecting service in the original suit is not a defense in a renewal suit. While this Court’s interpretation of OCGA § 9-2-61 in Hobbs may result in unfairness to defendants who are called upon to defend stale claims long after the statute of limitation has run, the unfairness cuts across the spectrum of potential defendants and, as with rules for service, there is no justification for carving out a special rule for UMCs. The solution lies in a legislative reconsideration of OCGA § 9-2-61 or a judicial reconsideration of Hobbs. Therefore, I would hold that a plaintiff serving a UMC is entitled to the escape hatch provided in Hobbs.
3. Admittedly, the equal application of Hobbs to UMCs weakens Bohannon and allows a plaintiff to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. It also provides judicial relief for a situation that the Bohannon court said required legislative action.8 Now there is no penalty for violating the rule set forth in Bohannon and a lawyer caught in a Bohannon trap who fails to dismiss and renew under Hobbs may well be facing a malpractice suit. Rather than ignore this conflict, the majority should address and resolve it after considering the competing public policy rationales.
4.1 further disagree with the majority’s suggestion that a plaintiff can wait to serve a UMC until he files a renewal suit. This statement in Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore9 must be taken in the context of that case. There the plaintiff had the opportunity to dismiss and file a renewal suit before the statute of limitation expired. If the plaintiff fails to serve the UMC in the original action and files a renewal suit after the running of the statute of limitation, then, as long as Bohannon has any vitality, the UMC would have the benefit of the bar of the statute of limitation.10
*437Decided October 6, 1997.
Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, William H. Larsen, Thomas P. Allen III, for appellant.
Charles M. Cork III, for appellee.

 259 Ga. 162 (377 SE2d 853) (1989).

 264 Ga. 359, 361 (444 SE2d 322) (1994).

 259 Ga. 162.

 Williams v. Thomas, 183 Ga. App. 51 (357 SE2d 872) (1987) (summary judgment to UMC affirmed where plaintiff served UMC one month after statute of limitation ran); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 179 Ga. App. 343 (347 SE2d 368) (1986) (affirming grant of UMC’s motion to dismiss where UMC served two months after statute of limitation expired); Kemp v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 460 (340 SE2d 26) (1986) (affirming grant of summary judgment to UMC that was served nine months after statute of limitation expired). But see Williams v. Colonial Ins. Co., 199 Ga. App. 760 (406 SE2d 99) (1991) (where complaint was filed on last day of statute of limitation, service on UMC within five business days relates back).

 See, e.g., Morse v. Flint River Community Hosp., 215 Ga. App. 224 (450 SE2d 253) (1994); Childs v. Catlin, 134 Ga. App. 778, 782 (216 SE2d 360) (1975); Hilton v. Maddox, Bishop, Hayton Frame & Trim Contractors, 125 Ga. App. 423, 425 (188 SE2d 167) (1972); Richard C. Ruskell, Davis & Shulman’s Georgia Practice & Procedure (1995 ed.), § 8-8.

 See OCGA § 9-11-4 (d) (3), (4); Brooks v. Young, 220 Ga. App. 47 (467 SE2d 230) (1996) (applying special rules for service on minors).

 264 Ga. 359.

 259 Ga. at 163.

 265 Ga. 836, 838 (462 SE2d 713) (1995).

 See Stout v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 226 Ga. App. 220 (486 SE2d 195) (1997).