Court Opinion

ID: 9788698
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:16:01.99667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.065415
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting:
Today the court declares inadmissible, as the product of an illegal search, the physical evidence of the defendant's manufacture of methamphetamine in his home. The majority does so despite discovery of the evidence during the execution of a warrant to search the defendant's home, issued by a neutral magistrate, in reliance upon a three and one-half page, single-spaced, typewritten affidavit, and despite acknowledging a finding of sufficient reliable information in the affidavit to implicate the defendant in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Although the affidavit undeniably alleges observations of the - defendant's continuous, and very recent, production of methamphetamine at a number of locations, the majority finds fatal to the search of his home the failure of the affidavit to document observations at that specific location for almost a month. Because I believe the majority opinion betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of the staleness inquiry; amounts to a substantial departure from the precedent of not only this court but federal and state courts across the country; and evinces a general hostility toward the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, I respectfully dissent.
Ordinarily, it would be enough for reversal of a suppression order that the search fell within the good faith exception to the exelu-sionary rule. People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164 (Colo.1998). Because of the majority's staleness analysis, however, I feel obliged to explain why there was actually a substantial basis for the magistrate's finding of probable cause and issuance of the warrant. Although I do not consider the existence of probable cause to search the defendant's home a close question in this appeal, I do consider it important to emphasize that a warrant is not erroneously issued at all as long as there is at least a "substantial basis" to support it. People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 150 (Colo.2001).
While specific statutes or rules may impose formal time limitations on the execution of a search warrant, see, e.g., § 16-8-305(6), 6 C.R.S. (2002) (ten days from date of issuance); Crim. P. 41(d)(V)(VI) (same), the Fourth Amendment has never been construed to assign a life-span to information disclosing the commission of a crime. "Staleness" is simply a concept that expresses the reality that information making it likely that items connected to a crime will be found at a particular time and place may lose its force with the passage of time. Information amounting to probable cause to search for evidence of a crime at a particular point in time may therefore no longer amount to probable cause to search at a later point in time. Probable cause, however, "is not determined by merely counting the number of days between the time of the facts relied upon and the warrant's issuance." United States v. Rahn, 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.1975). Rather, the likelihood that evidence of a erime will still be found in the same place is a function of a host of variables that are unrelated to the calendar. See Andresen v. State, 24 Md.App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975). Chief among them is the nature of the criminal activity at issue.
Along with virtually every other jurisdiction considering the question, we have often acknowledged that the passage of time becomes less significant where information indi*1118cates criminal activity of a protracted or continuous nature. See, e.g., People v. Erthal, 194 Colo. 147, 570 P.2d 534 (Colo.1977) ("There was no information that the suspect continuously engaged in criminal activity or continued to use feloniously obtained tools, factors which might have justified the belief that the stolen items would still be in the location searched."); United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir.1972) (time has no meaning in determining probable cause apart from the nature and length of criminal activity and the nature of property to be seized). Time lapses running weeks, or even months, have been upheld where affidavits for search warrants indicated probable cause of ongoing criminal enterprises, of a wide variety. See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seisure § 8."T(a), 344-46 nn. 17-26 (3d ed.1996) (illegal paramilitary operations, gambling operations, ongoing fraud or loansharking operations, ongoing processing or repeated sales of drugs, liquor, or guns, repeated thefts or receipt of stolen property).
Especially with regard to illegal drugs, probable cause of ongoing sales and production has been expressly distinguished from probable cause of mere use. Compare Andresen, ("The observation of half-smoked marijuana cigarette in an ashtray at a cocktail party may well be stale the day after the cleaning lady has been in .. ..") with United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir.1978) (holding in context of widespread and continuing conspiracy to smuggle drugs, "The upshot of this rule to practical application has been to allow fairly long periods of time to elapse between information and search warrant of criminal activity.") In light of the nature of the manufacturing or growing process and the nature of a conspiracy or enterprise to produce and/or sell drugs, information that is months old has regularly been held sufficient to establish probable cause to support a search. See, e.g., United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir.2001) (three months since cocaine sale); United States v. Smith, 266 F.3d 902 (8th Cir.2001) (three months since cocaine sale); United States v. Ruff, 984 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.1998) (two months since observation of meth lab); United States v. Dixon, 247 F.Supp.2d 926 (S.D.Ohio 2002) (two months since cocaine sale); United States v. Seibert, 779 F.Supp. 366 (E.D.Pa.1991) (three months since meth sale at defendant's trailer); Lovett v. Commonwealth, 103 S.W.3d 72 (Ky.2003) (two months since observation of meth lab); State v. Hage, 568 N.W.2d 741 (N.D.1997) (four months since supplier of meth lab ingredients named); State v. Wilson, 120 Or.App. 382, 852 P.2d 910 (1993) (six weeks since observation of meth lab); People v. Wilson, 182 Cal.App.3d 742, 227 Cal.Rptr. 528 (1986) (six weeks since observation of strong odor of meth).
The affidavit in this case indicated ongoing operations. It made clear that the affiant officer had already seized a meth lab from the defendant's home in August, as a result of which the defendant was charged with manufacturing and distributing and was released on bond. It also contained detailed information from an informant who had been in the defendant's home in December, four months later, that the defendant was still regularly manufacturing methamphetamine at both his home and the Orchard location. The affidavit further contained detailed information from another informant from early January, just days before the issuance and execution of the warrant, that the defendant and another man were continuing to manufacture methamphetamine at the Orchard address, as well as several other locations. Unlike the majority, I consider it permissible to infer from this information that the defendant had not, in the last month, mysteriously stopped manufacturing methamphetamine at his home and removed all evidence of his operations there, while continuing to maintain all of his other operations.
Where the location to be searched is a suspected drug dealer's home, often no greater nexus to that specific location is required because experience dictates that drug dealers ordinarily keep their supply, records, and monetary profits at home. See generally 2 LaFave, at 879. It literally defies commonsense, where there is good reason to believe that the defendant (while out of jail on bond for doing the same thing) continues to use methamphetamine, to acquire a supply of the materials required for its manufacture, and in fact to manufacture the drug at a number *1119of locations simultaneously; and where he clearly manufactured the drug in his home before being arrested and was observed still doing so at least four months afterward; to hold that there is not even a reasonable probability that his home has continued to be one of his manufacturing sites, or at least still contains evidence of his ongoing manufacturing operations. The majority's decision to limit the life-span of probable cause to a set number of days following the last information of drug manufacturing at a particular location is not only contrary to our prior holdings but fails to appreciate the significance of being a continuing and ongoing operation.
While I am concerned about the majority's attempt to distinguish this case from our prior "course of conduct" cases on the grounds that we have not previously decided a case involving the same number of days between observation and issuance, see maj. op. at 1115, I am much more concerned by its holding that no well-trained police officer could reasonably believe the information to still establish probable cause. The majority not only reduces the probable cause determination to a mechanical (if not arbitrary) counting process; it forces police officers to predict precisely where the court will draw the cutoff line. Even if it did not fly in the face of an abundance of counter-examples from courts across the country, this holding can only serve to encourage officers to rely on their own counting rather than the appropriate assessment of the nature and cireum-stances of the criminal activity by a neutral magistrate. Having a good faith exeeption serves little purpose if acting in good faith means nothing more than accurately predicting the ultimate conclusion of the courts.
The exeeption to the exelusionary sanction does not apply, nor should it, if the magistrate misbehaves or is misled by police misbehavior, or if the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause-is so "bare bones"-as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. In this case, the trial court did not apply the good faith exception because it believed that the month-long interval between observations of manufacturing in the defendant's home and issuance of the warrant not only rendered that information stale but made unreasonable any belief by trained officers that the affidavit contained probable cause for the search. In upholding that ruling, the majority in effect finds it unreasonable for well-trained officers to rely on a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate that would be upheld as fully justified by other justices of the jurisdiction's highest court.
The good faith exception to the exelusion-ary rule springs from the realization that the suppression of evidence as a sanction is unlikely to significantly modify executive branch behavior undertaken in objectively reasonable good faith United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In addition to avoiding an extremely high cost to society, with little corresponding benefit, the exception has an additional salutary effect of promoting a judicial preference for warrants, by largely insulating executive branch officers from the mistakes of judicial magistrates. Not only does the majority's narrow interpretation nullify virtually any beneficial effect of the good faith exception; its unrealistic time and place restrictions on the probable cause determination severely undercut incentives to seek warrants in cases of ongoing methamphetamine operations. If delay by the police, in order to accumulate more and better information, is rewarded by disallowing information as stale, police will be faced with the dilemma whether to act on less information while it is more fresh, relying on the exigencies of the situation to excuse judicial approval in advance. Because I consider the majority holding to be wrong, both as a matter of law and as a matter of policy, and because I believe it will have a substantial negative impact on combating a serious social problem in this jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to say that JUSTICE KOURLIS and JUSTICE RICE join in this dissent.
Appendix A
STATE OF COLORADO
COUNTY OF FREMONT
ss. AFFIDAVIT
*1120In support of a request for the issuance of a SEARCH WARRANT FOR: 406 Riverside Drive, a yellow house with blue trim, located in the City of Canon City, County of Fremont, State of Colorado to search for Methamphetamine, ephedrine based pills, psudoephedrine based pills, drug paraphernalia, Methamphetamine lab equipment, precursor chemicals, money, records, weapons, receipts, and any other items that would relate to the use, possession, manufacturing, or trafficking of drugs.
THE UNDERSIGNED AFFIANT, BEING FIRST DULY SWORN UPON OATH, DEPOSES AND SAYS:
Your Affiant is Andrew J. Lopez, a Police Officer with the Canon City Police Department. I have been employed as a police officer for approximately seven years and am currently assigned to the narcotics investigations division of the Canon City Police Department. I have attended at least 192 hours of narcotics training involving the searches of vehicles and homes containing Methamphetamine labs, money, precursor chemicals, lab equipment, multiple grams of illegal drugs, and large amounts of money. I have also experienced first hand searches of vehicles and homes containing Methamphetamine labs, money, precursor chemicals, lab equipment, multiple grams of illegal drugs, and large amounts of money.
On December 12th, 2002 I received a phone call from South Metro Drug Task Force Agent Angela Fritz, who advised she had information regarding the manufacture of methamphetamine in Canon City. Agent Fritz advised the following:
e She had two persons in custody after they were reported to have been purchasing large quantities of ephedrine and pseu-doephedrine based pills at a store in her area
@ They stopped the two persons at a traffic stop and saw in plain view numerous boxes of pills and a glass methamphetamine pipe
® One of the two persons, wishing to remain anonymous, told her the following:
A On Monday, December 9th, 2002, they were in Wade Miller's house, 406 Riverside Drive, Canon City, Fremont County, Colorado, and Wade was actively manufacturing methamphetamine in the house
A They smoked some methamphetamine with Wade, which he had just manufactured
A Wade had Toluene, Coffee Pots, Muri-atic Acid, Anhydrous Ammonia and Salt
A Wade's batch of methamphetamine was "salting out"
A Wade drive's [sic] a Blue Ford Bronco
A Wade is keeping methamphetamine manufacturing supplies under the kitchen cabinets in his house
A They are a methamphetamine user and manufacturer and were collecting pills to manufacture methamphetamine
A Wade Miller has also been cooking at an address on Orchard, at the entrance to Mountain View Park, in the last trailer to the East
A The trailer belongs to Valerie Shetrone and a man named Nick (last name unknown)
A Valerie and Nick allow Wade and Jacob Lopez to manufacture methamphetamine in the trailer
A The trailer has an addition to the rear with some sort of aluminum cover over it
A Jacob Lopez has been recently arrested, but Wade continues to manufacture in the trailer
A Approximately 2 weeks ago they per- * sonally observed Sudafed pills, Xylol, a "bubbler," Red Devil Lye, Tubing, and Glassware in this trailer home
A Wade has been regularly manufacturing methamphetamine at either the Riverside or the Orchard address
Agent Fritz went on to say the second person arrested, wishing to remain anonymous, offered Jim Sampson's current location, stating that Jim was at the Eeono Lodge on the North end of Pueblo, and had a warrant for his arrest.
I advised Canon City Police Department Detective Jeff Worley of the information I received. Detective Worley identified the *1121Orchard address as 926 Orchard, with a trailer number believed to be # C, and described it as two White trailer houses with Brown trim, connected by some kind of walkway between the two, with a round metal building attached on the North side. Detective Wor-ley found one car parked at the trailer, bearing Colorado license plate number 629CRH, which came back to a Claudia J. Shetrone and a Valeria R. Holtz of 926 Orchard Avenue. Detective Worley also went to 406 Riv-ergide where he found an 85 Ford 2 door, bearing Colorado license plate number NOV-LU, which came back to James E. and Marsha L. Miller. Detective Worley indicated that there were several people around the property at the time he went by.
I recognized all the chemicals and terms referred to by the first anonymous party as being integral parts of the methamphetamine manufacturing process. I know Jacob Lopez was just recently arrested and Wade Miller is currently out on bond on charges of manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine, after I found a meth lab in his home on August 14th, 2002. I also know Jacob Lopez was arrested following the seizure of this meth lab, when he approached 406 Riverside and was found to have methamphetamine and paraphernalia with him. I also know Jim Sampson was wanted on a warrant for manufacturing meth at his shop at 2027 South Street, located [sic] on November 22nd, 2002. I recalled Wade Miller's Criminal History and knew he was arrested in Canon City 1992[sic] for 2 counts of Distributing Marijuana, and Distribution of Dangerous Drugs (Methamphetamine).
On January 3rd, 2002(sic] Fremont County Sheriff's Deputy Mike Joliffe spoke to a person, wishing to remain anonymous, who advised the following:
A Wade Miller 05/25/64 is driving a navy blue, Ford, Bronco
A Wade Miller and Jacob Lopez manufacture methamphetamine together
A Jeff West owns a fake penis that has a fake bladder, that West, Jacob Lopez and Wade Miller use to pass urinalysis test [sic] as part of the M.A.P.P. program
A Wade Miller uses his boss's credit card to purchase urine from an online business through the internet
A Wade Miller and Jacob Lopez use a trailer located on Orchard Avenue in Canon City. This trailer is next to Mountain View Park. The trailer has a metal rounded building located at the back of the trailer
A The trailer they use to manufacture methamphetamine belongs to Nick Buf-mack
A Bufmack stated to Miller, that it is ok to make meth in the trailer, but he wants to know when they are doing it
A Bufmack has a girlfriend named Val (the only name this person has ever heard her called)
A Val has a mother that lives in the area of the trailer and has in the past reported smelling strange smells coming from the area
A Recently the police responded to one complaint of the smell and Jacob Lopez was hiding in the trailer until they left
A A person by the name of Jim Woldridge purchases the chemicals and ephedrine based pills for Wade Miller
A Wade Miller manufactures methamphetamine on Friday nights, but only if he has at least 1000 ephedrine based pills to cook with
A Wade Miller in the past has gone to a home in Florence that belongs to Cindy and Rod Steele
A Miller and Rod would manufacture methamphetamine in the shed on the property
A Rod has anhydrous ammonia tanks buried in the back yard
A Wade Miller's brother Chuck Miller and his girlfriend/wife with a last name of Washburn, will go to Salida and Denver to purchase Ephedrine based pills for Wade
A Chuck and Washburn live on some property up in Tallahassee
A Wade will go up on the property on occasion to manufacture methamphetamine
*1122A Wade has anhydrous ammonia tanks buried on the property
A Wade is sharing anhydrous ammonia tanks with John Messer
A Messer lives in Williamsburg.
On this same date Fremont County Sheriff's Deputy Jay Dexter arrested Wade Miller for driving under revocation. Miller was arrested driving a blue, Ford, Bronco that registered to Harmony Britton. I arrested Harmony Britton for possession of Methamphetamine after she approached 406 Riverside following the seizure of the meth lab at the residence on August 14th, 2002.
I recognized all the chemicals and terms referred to by the first anonymous party as being integral parts of the methamphetamine manufacturing process. I know Jacob Lopez was just recently arrested and Wade Miller is currently out on bond on charges of manufacturing and distributing methamphetamine, after I found a meth lab in his home on August 14th, 2002. I have received several anonymous tips since Wade Miller bonded out that he has continued to manufacture and sell methamphetamine. I also arrested Jacob Lopez following the seizure of this meth lab, when Jacob approached 406 Riverside there was methamphetamine and paraphernalia on his person.
Wade Miller's Criminal History shows the following:
1992 arrested for marijuana distribution and distribution of dangerous drugs.
1994 arrested for DUI.
2002 arrested for distribution and manufacturing of schedule II, possession of schedule II, possession of narcotic equipment, driving under the influence of drugs, marijuana and unlawful manufacturing of schedule II.
I know the anonymous person that spoke to Deputy Jolliffe is not the same as the anonymous person I spoke to, because they are of different genders.
Subscribed and sworn before me this 6th Day of January, 20083.