Court Opinion

ID: 9554131
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 20:01:08.899392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:05.572825
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-12709      Document: 36-1        Date Filed: 08/07/2023   Page: 1 of 18

                                                                  [PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                             ____________________

                                      No. 21-12709
                             ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                           Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        LISETTE LOPEZ,
        a.k.a. Lissette Lopez Prat,

                                                        Defendant-Appellant.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-20550-CMA
                            ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               21-12709

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and GRANT,
        Circuit Judges.
        WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
               This appeal requires us to decide how to apply the categori-
        cal approach to a conspiracy crime—a question of ﬁrst impression
        in our Circuit. The United States seeks to revoke Lisette Lopez’s
        naturalization on the ground that she committed a crime of moral
        turpitude within ﬁve years of applying for citizenship and willfully
        concealed or misrepresented during the application process the fact
        that she had committed a crime. The district court granted judg-
        ment on the pleadings in favor of the government on the ground
        that Lopez had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the
        statutory period. Because the crime to which Lopez pleaded
        guilty—conspiring to launder money—did not categorically in-
        volve moral turpitude, we reverse and remand for further proceed-
        ings consistent with this decision.
                                I. BACKGROUND
              Lisette Lopez is a naturalized citizen of the United States.
        She was born in Cuba and was a national of Venezuela when she
        sought American citizenship. In 2003, she ﬁled an Application for
        Naturalization (Form N-400), on which she certiﬁed under penalty
        of perjury that she had never “committed a crime or oﬀense for
        which [she was] NOT arrested.” She signed the form again after
        completing her naturalization interview. On the day she took her
        naturalization oath in 2007, she signed Form N-445, attesting that
        she had not committed a crime or oﬀense for which she was not
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        21-12709               Opinion of the Court                         3

        arrested since her initial interview. Lopez became an American cit-
        izen on August 10, 2007.
               Lopez was charged in 2012 with healthcare fraud and con-
        spiracy crimes. In 2012, Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to com-
        mit money laundering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). In the accompany-
        ing factual proﬀer, she admitted that in 2004, she incorporated a
        pharmacy called Medline, which she operated from August 2004
        to July 2008. Lopez admitted that she and her husband, Lazaro
        Prat, submitted millions of dollars in Medicare claims on behalf of
        Medline from February 2005 to July 2008. The proﬀer stated that
        “[d]uring this time period, [Lopez] was aware that Prat was submit-
        ting and causing the submission [of ] several million dollars in false
        and fraudulent Medicare claims on behalf of Medline.” She and
        Prat agreed to launder the money and conducted transactions with
        the proceeds to disguise their nature. Lopez admitted that she
        bought property, including a Mercedes S430, with money from a
        bank account that she was aware contained the proceeds of the
        fraudulent claims. In December 2012, Lopez was adjudicated
        guilty and sentenced to four years of imprisonment followed by
        three years of supervised release. In her plea agreement, she
        acknowledged that her guilty plea could result in her denaturaliza-
        tion.
               In 2021, the United States ﬁled a complaint in the district
        court to revoke Lopez’s naturalization. The complaint alleged that
        Lopez had illegally procured her naturalization on the ground that
        she had failed to meet the requirement of “good moral character.”
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-12709

        8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3). It alleged that Lopez had committed a crime
        of moral turpitude and had willfully misrepresented or concealed
        the fact that she had committed a crime during the naturalization
        process.
               Lopez moved to dismiss the complaint. She asserted that the
        denaturalization action was barred by a statute of limitations, see
        28 U.S.C. § 2462, and the doctrine of laches. She also argued that
        the government failed to state a claim, see FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6),
        because the crime of which she was convicted did not categorically
        involve moral turpitude. The district court denied the motion to
        dismiss.
               The government moved for judgment on the pleadings on
        the ground that Lopez had illegally procured her naturalization be-
        cause she had committed a crime of moral turpitude during the
        statutory period. The district court granted that motion. It con-
        cluded that the conspiracy crime to which Lopez pleaded guilty
        overlapped with the statutory “good moral character” period and
        that her crime of conviction involved moral turpitude.
                          II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
                We review de novo a judgment on the pleadings. Samara v.
        Taylor, 38 F.4th 141, 149 (11th Cir. 2022). “Judgment on the plead-
        ings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and
        the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Can-
        non v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001).
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        21-12709               Opinion of the Court                         5

                                 III. DISCUSSION
                A district court must “enter[] a judgment of denaturaliza-
        tion against a naturalized citizen whose citizenship was procured
        illegally or by willful misrepresentation of material facts.” Fe-
        dorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 517 (1981); see 8 U.S.C.
        § 1451(a). A lack of “strict compliance with all the congressionally
        imposed prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship” will “ren-
        der[] the certiﬁcate of citizenship ‘illegally procured.’” Fedorenko,
        449 U.S. at 506. Federal law requires that an applicant for naturali-
        zation be “a person of good moral character” from ﬁve years be-
        fore ﬁling her application up to the time she is granted citizenship.
        8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). “No person shall be regarded as, or found to be,
        a person of good moral character who, during the period for which
        good moral character is required to be established,” committed
        one of the speciﬁed forms of misconduct, id. § 1101(f ), including
        “a crime involving moral turpitude,” id. §§ 1101(f )(3),
        1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
                 “To determine whether a[] . . . prior conviction qualiﬁes as
        . . . a crime involving moral turpitude, we apply the categorical ap-
        proach.” George v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 953 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.
        2020). We examine the elements of the oﬀense the naturalized cit-
        izen was convicted of committing—not her actual conduct—to de-
        termine if every means of committing that crime necessarily in-
        volves moral turpitude. See id. at 1303–04. Moral turpitude means
        conduct that involves “baseness, vileness, or depravity.” Daye v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 38 F.4th 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 21-12709

                 The application of the categorical approach depends on the
        statutory structure. “[I]f the . . . statute of conviction is indivisi-
        ble—that is, if it deﬁnes only one crime with a single set of ele-
        ments—we ask whether the least culpable conduct that the statute
        makes criminal qualiﬁes as . . . a crime involving moral turpitude.”
        George, 953 F.3d at 1303. By contrast, “if the statute has multiple,
        alternative elements, and so eﬀectively creates several diﬀerent
        crimes, we apply the modiﬁed categorical approach.” Id. (citation
        and internal quotation marks omitted). Under that approach, we
        review “a limited class of documents”—called Shepard docu-
        ments—“to determine what crime, with what elements, a defend-
        ant was convicted of.” Id. at 1303–04 (quoting Mathis v. United
        States, 579 U.S. 500, 505–06 (2016)); see Shepard v. United States, 544
        U.S. 13, 26 (2005). We then identify the least culpable conduct en-
        compassed by that crime. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 519 (holding that the
        categorical approach’s reliance upon elements rather than means
        “does not change when a statute happens to list possible alternative
        means of commission”); George, 953 F.3d at 1304 (explaining that
        the elements of the crime of conviction must “categorically ﬁt
        within the federal deﬁnition of . . . a crime involving moral turpi-
        tude”). If the crime could be committed in a manner that does not
        involve moral turpitude, then the statute is overbroad—that is to
        say, it does not “categorically” involve moral turpitude.
               When a defendant has been convicted of a conspiracy crime,
        the categorical approach demands that we determine whether the
        underlying substantive oﬀense is divisible. If it is, we must identify
        the elements of the underlying crime that the defendant was
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        21-12709               Opinion of the Court                          7

        convicted of conspiring to violate. Under the modiﬁed categorical
        approach, we look to Shepard documents, such as an indictment, to
        determine what elements were encompassed by Lopez’s guilty
        plea. See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 505–06; George, 953 F.3d at 1303–04. “We
        then do what the categorical approach demands and determine
        whether the elements of the crime of conviction . . . categorically
        ﬁt within the federal deﬁnition of . . . a crime involving moral tur-
        pitude.” See George, 953 F.3d at 1304 (citation and internal quotation
        marks omitted). This approach is consistent with the requirement
        of determining what elements the government would have had to
        prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504.
                To our knowledge, each of our sister circuits that have con-
        sidered the question has likewise concluded that when a defendant
        has been convicted of conspiring to commit a crime, the categori-
        cal approach requires the court to determine whether the statute
        deﬁning the underlying crime is divisible if it would otherwise be
        overbroad. See Santana-Felix v. Barr, 924 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2019)
        (“Having determined that the object oﬀense of Santana-Felix’s con-
        spiracy conviction was second-degree murder, we must determine
        whether second-degree murder . . . . is a categorical match, and if
        it is not, whether the statute is divisible so that we may apply the
        modiﬁed categorical approach.”); Shaw v. Sessions, 898 F.3d 448, 453
        (4th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen a sentencing court must determine if a
        defendant’s conviction under a generic conspiracy statute is cate-
        gorically identical to a generic federal crime[,] it should look be-
        yond the statute and, instead, apply the categorical approach to the
        conspiracy’s object.” (citing United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 192–
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12709

        93 (4th Cir. 1999))); United States v. Ochoa, 861 F.3d 1010, 1016–17
        (9th Cir. 2017) (applying the categorical approach to the object of
        a conspiracy), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v.
        Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615, 1620 (2021); see also United States
        v. Shaﬀers, 22 F.4th 655, 666 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[W]here the crime of
        conviction incorporates the definition of another crime . . . we
        have often recognized that the sentencing court may need to eval-
        uate whether that other statute is divisible.”). The Board of Immi-
        gration Appeals too holds that “[a] conspiracy to commit an of-
        fense involves moral turpitude only when the underlying substan-
        tive oﬀense is a crime involving moral turpitude.” In re Flores, 17 I.
        & N. Dec. 225, 228 (B.I.A. 1980).
               We must apply the modiﬁed categorical approach to Lopez’s
        conspiracy conviction. We ﬁrst determine the elements of the of-
        fense that Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit. We then
        determine whether that oﬀense categorically involves moral turpi-
        tude.
                            A. Section 1956(h) Is Divisible.
                Lopez pleaded guilty to conspiring to launder money. The
        conspiracy statute that Lopez pleaded guilty to violating, section
        1956(h), is undoubtably divisible by the underlying crimes a defend-
        ant could be convicted of conspiring to commit. The statute pro-
        hibits “conspir[ing] to commit any oﬀense deﬁned in [section 1956]
        or section 1957” of Title 18. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).
               Lopez’s indictment—a Shepard document—charged her un-
        der section 1956(h) with conspiring to launder money in violation
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        21-12709                  Opinion of the Court                       9

        of sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1957. Section 1957 prohibits “know-
        ingly engag[ing] . . . in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
        property of a value greater than $10,000 and . . . derived from spec-
        iﬁed unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). That provision is clearly
        indivisible, as it does not include any clauses that could be con-
        strued as alternative elements. See Talamantes-Enriquez v. U.S. Att’y
        Gen., 12 F.4th 1340, 1349 (11th Cir. 2021). Section 1956(a)(1), in con-
        trast, prohibits ﬁnancial transactions involving the proceeds of cer-
        tain unlawful activity under alternative circumstances:
               Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a ﬁ-
               nancial transaction represents the proceeds of some
               form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
               conduct such a ﬁnancial transaction which in fact in-
               volves the proceeds of speciﬁed unlawful activity—
               (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of
               speciﬁed unlawful activity; or
               (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a
               violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Rev-
               enue Code of 1986; or
               (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole
               or in part—
                       (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the loca-
                       tion, the source, the ownership, or the control
                       of the proceeds of speciﬁed unlawful activity;
                       or
                       (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting require-
                       ment under State or Federal law,
               [shall be punished as provided.]
        18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12709

               Section 1956(a)(1) encompasses four clauses that could be
        construed as elements or means. We express no opinion as to
        whether section 1956(a)(1)(A) and section 1956(a)(1)(B) outline sep-
        arate oﬀenses. We need decide only whether section
        1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) are elements of diﬀer-
        ent crimes or instead means of committing the same crime be-
        cause, for reasons we explain later, a violation of section
        1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) does not categorically involve moral turpitude.
                The touchstone of a divisibility analysis is whether alterna-
        tive clauses in the statute describe elements of the crime or means
        of commission. “Alternative sets of elements usually signal divisi-
        bility.” Talamantes-Enriquez, 12 F.4th at 1349. “But alternative sets
        of various factual means of committing a single element usually
        do not.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “If
        statutory alternatives carry diﬀerent punishments, then . . . they
        must be elements.” Mathis, 579 U.S. at 518. “Conversely, if a statu-
        tory list is drafted to oﬀer ‘illustrative examples,’ then it includes
        only a crime’s means of commission.” Id. (citation omitted). If it is
        not clear from the text of the statute, caselaw, or other evidence
        such as an indictment or jury instructions whether the statute is
        divisible—in other words, if those “sources do not speak plainly”—
        then “courts must resolve the inquiry in favor of indivisibility.”
        United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1204 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation
        and internal quotation marks omitted).
              No precedent controls the question whether section
        1956(a)(1)(B) is divisible. In the context of a suﬃciency-of-the-
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        21-12709                Opinion of the Court                          11

        evidence challenge, we once stated that “[t]he four subsections of
        Section 1956(a)(1) are separate oﬀenses, each of which requires the
        Government to prove an element not required under the others.”
        United States v. Calderon, 169 F.3d 718, 720 (11th Cir. 1999). But we
        later described that statement as dicta and concluded that we are
        not bound by it. United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1361 (11th Cir.
        2009). In the context of duplicative-prosecution challenges, which
        apply a diﬀerent test than the divisibility analysis under the categor-
        ical approach, we have since held that similarly structured sections
        1956(a)(2) and 1956(a)(3) each constitute a single crime. United
        States v. Felts, 579 F.3d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 2009) (discussing section
        1956(a)(2)); Seher, 562 F.3d at 1362 (discussing section 1956(a)(3)).
        These decisions suggest that, at an even higher level of speciﬁcity,
        section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) describe alter-
        native means of committing the same crime.
               The Second Circuit has addressed the distinction between
        sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii). See United States v.
        Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1153–54 (2d Cir. 1995). Cloyd Holmes and Sal-
        vatore Frasca argued that the government had charged them under
        a “multiplicitous indictment,” “one that charges in separate counts
        two or more crimes, when in fact and law, only one crime has been
        committed.” Id. The Second Circuit declined to “accept the gov-
        ernment’s implicit contention that the same ﬁnancial transaction
        gives rise to two separate crimes simply because the defendant, at
        the time he deposited the money, knew that what he was doing—
        the prohibited conduct—was designed for two unlawful purposes:
        concealing proceeds and avoiding reporting requirements.” Id. at
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                 21-12709

        1155. It ruled that “[C]ongress must be deemed to have intended
        only a single punishment for each transaction even though the de-
        fendant may have had two improper purposes in mind.” Id. at
        1155–56. So, it treated sections 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (B)(ii) as diﬀer-
        ent means of committing the same oﬀense, not as separate of-
        fenses.
               We likewise conclude that section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and sec-
        tion 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii) outline two means of committing the same
        knowing-concealment crime. Conviction under both clauses re-
        quires proof of the same mens rea: knowledge. 18 U.S.C.
        § 1956(a)(1)(B). Conviction under either clause results in the same
        penalty: “a ﬁne of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the
        property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or im-
        prisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.” Id.
        § 1956(a)(1). The diﬀerence lies only in what facts the defendant
        knew about the nature and purpose of the transaction and funds at
        issue. Knowledge of the improper purpose is the means by which
        the transaction is rendered illicit. Even when a transaction has both
        prohibited purposes, it constitutes a single crime so long as the de-
        fendant knew of at least one of those illicit purposes.
         B. Lopez’s Crime of Conviction Does Not Categorically Involve Moral
                                     Turpitude.
               When we turn to whether violations of section 1957 or sec-
        tion 1956(a)(1)(B) are crimes of moral turpitude, we look to the
        least culpable conduct prohibited for each oﬀense. Section 1957
        contains no alternative elements. And structuring a transaction
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        21-12709                Opinion of the Court                         13

        that involves proceeds of unlawful activity to avoid a reporting re-
        quirement, under subpart (ii), constitutes the least culpable con-
        duct prohibited by section 1956(a)(1)(B).
                This Court deﬁnes moral turpitude as “baseness, vileness, or
        depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his
        fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
        customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” Daye, 38
        F.4th at 1360 (citation omitted). We have determined that a crime
        involving moral turpitude is one that violates both a statute and an
        independent “moral norm.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]he inherent
        nature of the oﬀense,” and not “the circumstances surrounding a
        defendant’s particular conduct,” is the focus of our analysis. Fajardo
        v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omit-
        ted).
               Our precedents are instructive. Fraud oﬀenses meet this
        standard. Zarate v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 26 F.4th 1196, 1201 (11th Cir.
        2022); see also Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“[C]rimes
        in which fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as in-
        volving moral turpitude.”). Other oﬀenses, in contrast, must “sat-
        isfy the ‘inherently base, vile, or depraved’ requirement.” Daye, 38
        F.4th at 1360 (citation omitted). This Court has long held that,
        “[g]enerally, a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is con-
        sidered to be one involving moral turpitude.” Itani v. Ashcroft, 298
        F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Gloria, 494
        F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1974)). But that language should not be
        “taken literally to mean that non-fraudulent deceit always involves
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 21-12709

        moral turpitude.” Zarate, 26 F.4th at 1208 (emphasis added). The
        crime must still involve conduct that is “inherently base, vile, or
        depraved.” Id. at 1202 (citation omitted).
               Examples of base, vile, and depraved conduct from our
        caselaw highlight the distinction between behavior that is inher-
        ently immoral and that which is merely illegal. Compare Gelin v. U.S.
        Att’y Gen., 837 F.3d 1236, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2016) (“This Court has
        also previously held that uttering a forged instrument, resisting an
        officer with violence, criminal reckless conduct, second-degree ar-
        son, aggravated battery, aggravated child abuse, and misprision of
        a felony are all crimes involving moral turpitude.”), with United
        States v. Smith, 420 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that
        “dispensing of amphetamine sulphate tablets without a prescrip-
        tion” and “possessing tax-paid alcoholic beverages in a ‘dry’
        county” are not crimes of moral turpitude). A requirement of
        “criminal intent” may be informative. Smith, 420 F.2d at 432; see
        also Keungne v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1281, 1287 (11th Cir. 2009)
        (holding that criminal recklessness involves moral turpitude).
                Section 1957 does not deﬁne a crime of moral turpitude.
        The prohibited conduct involves “knowingly engag[ing] . . . in a
        monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value
        greater than $10,000 and . . . derived from speciﬁed unlawful activ-
        ity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1957. Engaging in a transaction with “criminally
        derived property” is not inherently fraudulent and does not neces-
        sarily require deceit. See Zarate, 26 F.4th at 1202, 1208. Nor is such
        activity “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Id. (citation omitted).
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        21-12709                Opinion of the Court                         15

               Structuring a transaction to avoid a reporting requirement,
        as deﬁned by 18 U.S.C. section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii), is also not a crime
        categorically involving moral turpitude. The oﬀense does not nec-
        essarily involve fraud. See id. at 1202 (“Fraud requires that a mis-
        representation be made to obtain a benefit from someone or cause
        a detriment to someone.”). And, although the crime arguably in-
        volves deceit, it does not necessarily involve activity that is “inher-
        ently base, vile, or depraved.” Id. at 1202, 1208 (citation omitted).
        The structuring and reporting of ﬁnancial transactions has no in-
        herent moral signiﬁcance. For example, the Supreme Court de-
        scribed violation of a currency-export reporting requirement as
        causing “minimal” harm and only depriving the government of in-
        formation. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–39 (1998)
        (discussing the severity of the crime in an Excessive Fines Clause
        case); see 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A) (1998). The Ninth Circuit has
        held that the violation of a diﬀerent statute prohibiting the struc-
        turing of transactions to avoid currency reporting requirements is
        not a crime of moral turpitude. Goldeshtein v. Immigr. & Naturaliza-
        tion Serv., 8 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1993); see 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).
        And the Fifth Circuit rejected an analogy between a violation of
        section 1956(a)(3)(B), which involves concealing or disguising the
        nature of funds, and the violation of a “mere reporting require-
        ment.” Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2003). It
        determined that the former involved moral turpitude even though
        the latter did not. Id. So we hold that a violation of section
        1956(a)(1)(B) is not categorically a crime of moral turpitude.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-12709

                                IV. CONCLUSION
               We REVERSE the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
        government and remand for further proceedings consistent with
        this opinion. We leave it to the district court to determine ﬁrst
        whether all the counts should be dismissed in the light of this deci-
        sion.
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        21-12709                  GRANT, J., concurring                         1

        GRANT, Circuit Judge, concurring:
               The majority’s analysis adds yet another level of complica-
        tion to the famously bewildering categorical approach. Unfortu-
        nately, it is correct.
                The result is another example of the absurdities that can fol-
        low from the categorical approach. Lopez pleaded guilty to con-
        spiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C.
        § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), a crime that plainly involves moral turpitude. See
        Zarate v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 26 F.4th 1196, 1201 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (“crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have always been re-
        garded as involving moral turpitude”). She committed that crime
        during a time period that rendered her ineligible for citizenship. See
        8 U.S.C. § 1427(a). That means her citizenship was illegally pro-
        cured, and the United States should be able to denaturalize her. See
        id. § 1451(a).
               But no. That straightforward and just outcome falls victim
        to the categorical approach, which produces quite the opposite—
        an outcome that is both complicated and unjust. So instead of con-
        sidering the specific statutory provision in the count that Lopez
        pleaded guilty to violating, we consider whether a different statu-
        tory provision—one that no one has argued she violated—would
        also qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. Because it would
        not, Lopez retains her citizenship.1 That result is baffling.

        1 At least for now.The government may still have a viable denaturalization
        claim based on concealment or misrepresentation under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
USCA11 Case: 21-12709      Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 08/07/2023     Page: 18 of 18

        2                       GRANT, J., concurring                21-12709

               The categorical approach flouts the intent of Congress, re-
        quires an inordinate amount of judicial energy, and defies common
        sense. For those reasons and more, I join the list of judges who
        have criticized the categorical approach or pleaded with Congress
        to set us free from it. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 990 F.3d 94,
        126–27 (2d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Park, J., concurring) (collecting
        cases). I respectfully, if reluctantly, concur.