Court Opinion

ID: 9718684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:30:05.998284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.515043
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority acknowledges that “there was no evidence presented at the small claims trial that Tucker possessed actual knowledge that the pit bull had dangerous propensities.” Op. at 670. The majority nonetheless concludes, based on evidence that Hall previously had two pit bull-sharpei mixes put to sleep for exhibiting possible signs of viciousness and evidence that the pit bull was chained to a stake in Tucker’s backyard for four months, that Tucker “knew or should have known that the pit bull was dangerous or vicious.” Id. at 671. I disagree.
Hall testified as follows regarding the two pit bull-sharpei mixes she previously had owned:
They never bit a person. Ever. I just seen [sic] signs where I thought that maybe, there might be something wrong, and yes, I gave over them [sic].... I wouldn’t, I don’t want to have a dog that’s mean.
Tr. at 24. Hall also testified as to her arrangement with Tucker:
He had nothing to do with my dog.... He did it as a favor to me to let me keep him there. I was looking for a home for him and he had no contact with him. I put him out toward the back and me and my children took care of my dog.
Id. at 25. Finally, Hall testified as to the temperament of her dog:
Q: And did this dog have any history of any violence or (inaudible) behavior at all?
A: No. No.
Q: Had this dog been around kids?
A: Lots.
Q: Okay. Never had any problems with kids?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Had any problems with your dog or anybody else had?
A: No. He loved everybody.
Id. at 36-37.
I agree with the majority that there is no evidence that Tucker had actual knowledge that the dog was dangerous. I also agree with the majority that the law in Indiana is that even where there is no evidence of actual knowledge, there can still be liability if there is evidence that the particular breed to which the dog belongs has dangerous propensities. See Poznanski, 788 N.E.2d at 1259. I part ways with the majority, however, with respect to its conclusion that there was such evidence in this case. The majority notes evidence that Hall had two pit bull-sharpei mixed breed dogs put to sleep because they exhibited dangerous tendencies. There was no evidence that this dog was a pit bull-*672sharpei mix, however.1 Moreover, Hall testified that her dogs never bit anyone, but she had them put to sleep because she saw signs that there “might be something wrong.” Tr. at 24 (emphasis added). Hall’s testimony could support the conclusion that she would not keep a dog that she thought might be or become dangerous, and the fact that she kept this dog tends to counter the inference of any dangerous tendencies. Finally, there was no evidence that Tucker knew that Hall previously had the two dogs put to sleep. The majority also notes evidence that the dog was staked in Tucker’s back yard for four months with “no apparent training or socialization.” Op. at 671. However, there was evidence that Hall and her children were taking care of the dog. See Tr. at 26 (when Hall was asked if any person other than Tucker was watching the dog, she said, “Me, he was mine, so.”). Hall did not elaborate on what “taking care of the dog” involved, but I do not believe it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that the dog had no interaction or care for the four months it was kept on Tucker’s property.
In Poznanski the court noted that there was no evidence the owner had knowledge that his dog exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities, and further noted that there was no evidence that the breed to which his dog belonged, a mixed-breed sheep dog, exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities. 788 N.E.2d at 1260. The court therefore concluded that a jury could not infer that the owner knew his dog was dangerous or vicious. Id. I believe this case, in which there was no evidence that Tucker had knowledge the dog exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities and no evidence that Tucker knew the breed to which Hall’s dog belonged exhibited dangerous or vicious propensities, should have the same result. To hold otherwise is basically to hold as a matter of law that pit bulls are per se dangerous and vicious animals, without requiring evidence of such as we do for all other domesticated animals. In my view, Poznanski does not stand for the proposition that the viciousness of a particular breed can be inferred. Rather, Poznanski requires evidence of viciousness.2 I believe the majority decision expands liability with respect to domestic animals beyond the bounds of Poz-nanski.
Although I agree it is unfortunate that Duke incurred medical expenses as a result of an injury that was not her fault, and I acknowledge that Duke was representing herself in the small claims trial and was probably unaware of the proof she needed to present to succeed on her claim, we are a court of law and must find as a matter of law that there is evidence to support holding someone else responsible.3 I do not believe we can do so in this case.
*673I would reverse the judgment of the trial court against Tucker.

. In fact, Duke never stated the breed of dog in her testimony, nor did she elicit the breed during her cross-examination of witnesses. She referred to it only as a "dog.” See, e.g., Tr. at 6. On cross-examination of Hall by counsel for Tucker's landlord, however, it was established that Hall owned a "pit bull.” Tr. at 25.

. The majority opinion notes comments by the small claims court at the motion to correct error hearing in which the court "[a]ck-nowledg[es] the dearth of evidence presented at trial regarding the pit bull breed,” Op. at 669, and states that "the trier [of] fact ... has to apply common sense and common knowledge .... [A]s most common people would know the physical attributes of an American Pit Bull as being capable of infl[i]cting serious injury on someone.” Id. at 669- 670 (quoting Tr. at 47).

.Although I do not believe the evidence supports imposing liability on Tucker, I express no opinion about Hall’s liability. I do note, however, that the judgment was against both Hall and Tucker, and as Hall has not joined this appeal, Duke would not be without recompense for her injuries if the judgment against Tucker was reversed.