Court Opinion

ID: 9930512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 00:05:22.069401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:54.250823
License: Public Domain

02/06/2024

                                          DA 22-0429
                                                                                  Case Number: DA 22-0429

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                          2024 MT 20

DUANE BURCHILL,

              Petitioner and Appellant,

         v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Respondent and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-20-302(A)
                      Honorable Peter B. Ohman, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      Joseph P. Howard, Joseph P. Howard, P.C., Helena, Montana

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Mardell Ployhar,
                      Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                      Audrey Cromwell, Gallatin County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana

                                                 Submitted on Briefs: November 29, 2023

                                                           Decided: February 6, 2024

Filed:

                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Duane Burchill appeals the order of the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court,

Gallatin County, denying his amended petition for postconviction relief. Burchill asserts

that his counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to object to the prosecutor’s

misconduct. We affirm.

                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2     Burchill was convicted in 2017 of two counts of robbery, one count of conspiracy

to commit deceptive practices, and one count of possession of dangerous drugs. Burchill’s

retained trial counsel, Jack Sands, represented him on appeal. Burchill raised four issues

on appeal: (1) that cell phone evidence was improperly admitted; (2) that the search of his

home was illegal; (3) that the search of his truck was illegal; and (4) that evidence of the

handgun should not have been admitted due to foundational issues. We affirmed Burchill’s

conviction. State v. Burchill, 2019 MT 285, ¶ 39, 398 Mont. 52, 454 P.3d 633. Burchill

subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The District Court appointed

counsel, and Burchill filed an amended petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial

counsel for Sands’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct during Burchill’s

cross-examination. We restate the facts below only as necessary to resolve the denial of

Burchill’s postconviction petition.

¶3     The Magic Diamond II Casino in Bozeman was robbed on the night of

September 18, 2016, and again the night of September 24, 2016. The individual who

                                             2
committed the two robberies wore a Jack Skellington1 mask and brandished a .380 caliber

semi-automatic handgun. Witnesses to both robberies described the suspect as difficult to

understand and speculated that he either had an accent or had taken steps to modify his

voice. The suspect stole $585 during the first robbery and $899 during the second robbery.

After the first robbery, law enforcement used a canine to track the suspect. The canine

tracked the suspect to an area northwest of the casino in the Babcock Vista trailer court.

¶4     After the second robbery, law enforcement learned of informant Joshua Martz, who

was arrested on unrelated charges in the days between the two robberies. Martz identified

Burchill as the suspect of the robberies and said that he unknowingly became the getaway

driver after the first robbery when he picked up Burchill in the trailer court where the canine

lost the trail. Martz reported that Burchill had nearly $600 in cash and a Jack Skellington

mask. Martz told law enforcement that Burchill likely would store the mask at Burchill’s

residence or in a storage tote in the bed of his truck. The information regarding the canine

track and amount of money stolen from the casino had not been publicly released,

indicating that Martz could not have known the information unless he was involved.

¶5     Law enforcement later located the mask in a locked tote in the bed of Burchill’s

truck. A .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun hidden inside a rubber glove also was found

within the middle paneling of Burchill’s truck. DNA recovered from swabs taken from the

mask and the glove matched Burchill’s DNA. Drug paraphernalia seized from Burchill’s

truck tested positive for methamphetamine.

1
 Jack Skellington is the main character in the animated motion picture, The Nightmare Before
Christmas (Walt Disney Pictures (1993)).
                                              3
¶6     At trial, Lindsey Lang testified that she met Burchill a few weeks prior to the first

robbery. Lang said that Burchill was in a “desperate place” in the weeks before the first

robbery and that he had posed to her a “hypothetical-type” question about committing a

robbery with him. Lang stated that Burchill asked her how she would feel about “being

the driver.”

¶7     Martz testified that Burchill arranged for the two to meet in the trailer court behind

the mall the night of the first robbery. According to Martz, Burchill came up to Martz’s

vehicle with “a mask rolled up in one hand and money in his left hand.” Martz stated that

Burchill provided him with approximately $500 to go buy methamphetamine for the two

of them. Martz also testified that he had waited in the truck while Burchill went into Bob

Wards and purchased “3800” ammunition not long before the first robbery, and that

Burchill sometimes would talk in a bizarre accent when he was high.

¶8     Burchill denied at trial that he committed the robberies. He testified that he was at

the Bozeman Ponds until approximately 6:00 p.m. on the night of the first robbery. He

then went to a different casino in the mall for about an hour and a half, after which he drove

to Livingston to meet up with a man named David. Burchill said that he also was looking

for Martz in Livingston because Martz owed him $800, but he was unable to find him.

Burchill claimed he spent the evening before the second robbery in Livingston at the house

of a man named Donovan and that he loaned Martz his truck that evening because Martz

said that he would go get the money he owed Burchill. Burchill stated his truck was

returned the next morning and that he was at home on the night of the second robbery.

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¶9    Burchill stated on cross-examination, “I was set up, with a mask that I had, by Josh

Martz.” Burchill elaborated that he did not believe that Martz, or anyone he knew, took

his mask and used it in the commission of the robbery. Rather, he asserted that Martz saw

the robbery on the news, noticed that Burchill had the same mask, placed the mask inside

the tote in Burchill’s truck, and then placed locks on Burchill’s tote to prevent Burchill

from opening the tote. When the prosecutor inquired further about Martz’s motive to frame

Burchill, Burchill stated, “[Martz] not only wanted to get rid of me, he wanted to steal

everything I had, apparently. I don’t know.”

¶10   The prosecutor asked Burchill about the ammunition found in his tote. Burchill

denied going to Bob Wards and purchasing the ammunition. The prosecutor asked if Martz

was “being untruthful” about the ammunition purchase, to which Burchill replied, “Yes.”

The prosecutor further inquired about the differences between Martz’s and Burchill’s

testimony:

      Prosecutor: Did you get in [Martz’s] vehicle with a mask?

      Burchill: No, sir.

      Prosecutor: Did he purchase any drugs for you that night?

      Burchill: No, sir.

      Prosecutor: Did you go with him to Donovan’s, in Livingston, that night?

      Burchill: No, sir.

      Prosecutor: Did he rip you off for drugs?

      Burchill: No, sir.

                                            5
      Prosecutor: So all of that that Mr. Martz testified to was a complete
      fabrication?

      Burchill: Yes, sir.

                                        .   .   .

      Prosecutor: Would you ever talk in weird accents?

      Burchill: No.

      Prosecutor: So that was also a lie from Mr. Martz?

      Burchill: I would say 98 percent of what Josh Martz said was a lie, yes.

¶11   Burchill also denied speaking with Lang about committing a robbery.            The

following exchange occurred:

      Prosecutor: But it is true that you talked to [Lang] about committing a
      robbery, correct?

      Burchill: No.

      Prosecutor: And it’s also—so it’s not correct then either that you asked her
      to be the getaway driver?

      Burchill: No.

      Prosecutor: So that was a complete fabrication from Lindsey Lang?

Burchill’s counsel objected to the last question on the grounds that it misstated Lang’s

testimony. The Court sustained the objection. The prosecutor asked Burchill if he heard

Lang’s testimony regarding Burchill posing a hypothetical to her about committing the

robberies. Burchill responded that he believed that Lang was referencing something else.

The prosecutor then asked Burchill to verify if he had “ever talked to Ms. Lang about

anything regarding a robbery or being a getaway driver?” Burchill responded, “I’ve never

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talked to anybody about robbery . . . .” The prosecutor finished his questioning regarding

Lang by asking Burchill if there was “any motive that you can think of that would make

[Lang] come in here and lie about those things.” Burchill responded, “I don’t think that

she necessarily lied.”

¶12    The prosecutor also questioned Burchill about his testimony that he gave Martz

permission to tell his probation officer that he worked for Burchill. The prosecutor asked,

“So you told Martz that he could use you, basically as a lie to his probation officer because

he was not working for you at the time, correct?” Burchill replied, “Well, technically, it’s

[a] little bit of a gray area. I wouldn’t say it’s, necessarily, a straight up lie because he was

transitioning to potentially work with me . . . .” When the prosecutor asked whether it was

a “combination of a lie and a half truth,” the court sustained defense counsel’s objection

on the ground that it was argumentative.

¶13    The prosecutor asked Burchill about his claim that someone had planted items in

one of the totes that was in the back of his truck. Burchill responded by alleging that people

he was living with had stolen some of his possessions, and he complained that the

detectives did not adequately investigate the theft of his belongings. Burchill discussed

speaking to the detectives about that theft when they came to interview him about the

robberies. Burchill stated, “And I talked to the detectives when they first came and seen

me. Before I even could defend myself on anything else because I didn’t have any of the

details.” Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor and Burchill had the following exchange:

       Prosecutor: You said that you needed the details to defend yourself, correct?
       You just stated that, correct?

                                               7
       Burchill: I didn’t even know anything about it, no.

       Prosecutor: But you stated that. You needed the details to defend yourself?

       Burchill: Well, as far as having conversation, I did, yes. There’s nothing I
       could really tell the detectives other than I was wondering about what got
       stolen from me because they did bring that up.

       Prosecutor: You could just tell the truth, couldn’t you? Or is this one of those
       gray areas?

       Burchill: That these guys have been stealing from me?

       Prosecutor: About defending yourself. You could just tell the truth.

       Burchill: That’s a whole other situation. I was talking about when they came
       and talked to me as far as what got stolen from me. As far as giving them any
       information about robbery, no, I had no information on that, so I couldn’t
       talk to them, and I didn’t.

¶14    Burchill’s amended postconviction petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel

when Sands failed to object to the prosecutor’s “were they lying” questions. Sands testified

at an evidentiary hearing on the petition that he did not believe the prosecutor’s “were they

lying questions” were objectionable. Rather, Sands believed the questions about whether

Martz was untruthful had “some probative value” because Burchill’s testimony

contradicted Martz’s testimony. While Sands declined to use the word “lying” to describe

Martz’s testimony, he confirmed that the defense’s “theory of the case was that [] Martz

was being untruthful. [Martz] was doing this for benefits, and we had good solid evidence

of that . . . .” Further, Sands commented that he lodged several objections during the trial,

and he believed objecting too often may annoy the court and the jury.

                                              8
¶15    The District Court concluded that Burchill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims

were procedurally barred by § 46-21-105(2), MCA, because he did not raise those issues

in his direct appeal. The court concluded further that, regardless of the procedural bar,

Sands’s performance was objectively reasonable and Burchill suffered no prejudice.

                               STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶16    We review the denial of a postconviction relief petition to determine whether the

court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct.

Whitlow v. State, 2008 MT 140, ¶ 9, 343 Mont. 90, 183 P.3d 861 (citation omitted). Claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel present mixed questions of law and fact, which we

review de novo. Whitlow, ¶ 9 (citation omitted).

                                       DISCUSSION

¶17    We address briefly the District Court’s conclusion that because counsel Sands failed

to object to the “were they lying” line of questions, Burchill’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim was record-based and thus procedurally barred in postconviction relief, as it

could have been raised on appeal. See § 46-21-105(2), MCA (“When a petitioner has been

afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal of the petitioner’s conviction, grounds for relief

that were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised,

considered, or decided in a proceeding brought under this chapter.”). The State agrees that

Burchill’s claim is appropriate to address on the merits under our precedent in State v.

Webster, 2005 MT 38, 326 Mont. 112, 107 P.3d 500. We accordingly turn to the merits of

Burchill’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

                                              9
¶18    The right to counsel in criminal prosecutions is guaranteed by the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by Article II, Section 24 of

the Montana Constitution. Whitlow, ¶ 10. In assessing claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, we apply the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). Whitlow, ¶ 10. The petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Under the first prong, the defendant must

prove that his “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Whitlow, ¶ 10 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064). To evaluate a claim of deficiency, “[t]he

proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing

professional norms.” Whitlow, ¶ 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at

2065). The second prong requires that the defendant “show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Bomar v. State, 2012 MT 163, ¶ 8, 365 Mont. 474, 285 P.3d 396

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068).

¶19    “Misconduct by a prosecutor may form the basis for granting a new trial where the

prosecutor’s actions have deprived the defendant of a fair and impartial trial.” Clausell v.

State, 2005 MT 33, ¶ 11, 326 Mont. 63, 106 P.3d 1175 (citing State v. Gray, 207 Mont.

261, 266-67, 673 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (1983)). Burchill argues the prosecutor committed

misconduct on two grounds: (1) the prosecutor repeatedly asked Burchill to comment on

the credibility of other witnesses by asking “were they lying” questions; and (2) the

                                             10
prosecutor posed questions evincing his personal opinion that Burchill’s testimony was not

truthful. Sands’s failure to object to such questions, Burchill alleges, constitutes deficient

performance that prejudiced Burchill’s defense, which entitles him to a new trial.

¶20    First, Burchill argues that the prosecutor impermissibly pressed Burchill at trial to

testify to the credibility of Martz and Lang.2 Burchill contends that the prosecutor’s “were

they lying” questions were improper because they had no probative value.

¶21    We have declined to adopt a bright-line rule whether a prosecutor may ask a

defendant “were they lying” questions when the defendant’s testimony contradicts that of

a witness. See State v. Hart, 2000 MT 332, ¶ 43, 303 Mont. 71, 15 P.3d 917; accord

Webster; ¶ 15; State v. Ailer, 2018 MT 18, ¶ 16, 390 Mont. 200, 410 P.3d 964. Some

jurisdictions hold that such questions are always improper; other jurisdictions hold that

they are always proper. Hart, ¶ 37 (citations omitted). Others follow a middle ground,

holding that the permissibility depends on the circumstances.             Hart, ¶ 37 (citations

omitted). We adopted this approach in Hart. Generally, the rationale for refusing “were

they lying” questions is that it impermissibly infringes upon the role of the jury to make

credibility determinations. Hart, ¶ 38 (citations omitted). We reasoned, however, that

“there may be circumstances in which ‘were they lying’ questions have probative value in

clarifying a particular line of testimony, in evaluating the credibility of a defendant who is

claiming that everyone else is lying, or when a witness flatly denies the occurrence of

events.” Hart, ¶ 40 (citing State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn. 1999)).

2
  Burchill has abandoned on appeal his claim that Sands was ineffective for failing to object when
the prosecutor asked Burchill whether witness Hazal Evans was lying.
                                               11
¶22    The State’s use of the “were they lying” questions here closely resembles that in

Hart. In that case, the victim and two other witnesses testified that the defendant hit the

victim in the head and shoulders several times with a cattle prod. Hart, ¶ 11. On direct

examination, the defendant testified that it was actually the victim in possession of the

cattle prod and she had come at him with the cattle prod in hand. Hart, ¶ 14. The defendant

claimed he injured the victim in self-defense. Hart, ¶ 14. On cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked the defendant if the victim and other two witnesses “were lying” when

they testified that it was the defendant in possession of it, to which the defendant responded

affirmatively. Hart, ¶ 14. We held that the questions did not infringe upon the jury’s role

in making determinations of witness credibility because the only important distinction

between the defendant’s testimony and the victim’s testimony was that each witness

claimed the other one committed the crime. Hart, ¶ 39.

¶23    Burchill urges the Court to distinguish Hart because whether Burchill asked Lang

about possibly committing a robbery and whether Burchill purchased ammunition from

Martz were circumstantial and not the “central issue[s]” of the case. The State responds

that to reach a verdict, it was necessary for the jury to determine whether Martz’s testimony

or Burchill’s testimony was accurate. Like in Hart, the State argues, the questions posed

by the prosecutor focused the jury’s attention on the credibility determination, which was

the central issue of the case. Hart, ¶ 44.

¶24    Burchill further attempts to distinguish Hart in asserting that, unlike in Hart, it

cannot be said that the “only explanation” for the difference between Burchill’s testimony

and that of Martz and Lang was that “somebody was lying.” See Hart, ¶ 44. Burchill

                                             12
points to Pilot, which we cited in Hart, where the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that

“were they lying” questions may be permissible when the defendant creates a credibility

contest by “flatly den[ying] the occurrence of events” in “circumstances that exclude the

possibility that the prosecution’s witnesses may have been mistaken or testified to events

based on assumptions or a faulty memory[.]” Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 517. Because Martz

admitted that he struggled to recall the “chronology of events” during the time frame at

issue and Lang “was less than a sure historian in terms of recalling dates” in her testimony,

Burchill argues that the District Court wrongly “ignored these innocent explanations” for

differences in their testimony.

¶25    Like in Hart, though, the only explanation for the discrepancies between the

defendant’s and witness’s testimony was that either the defendant or the witness was lying.

Hart, ¶ 44. Burchill’s testimony that he had never had a conversation with Lang about a

robbery was directly contrary to Lang’s testimony that Burchill had posed a hypothetical

to her about committing a robbery. Martz testified that he picked Burchill up after the first

robbery and that Burchill had money and the mask. Burchill, in contrast, testified that he

was in a different county at that time and that Martz’s version of events never occurred.

Where a witness “flatly denies the occurrence of events[,]” we have held that “were they

lying” questions have probative value. Hart, ¶ 40 (citing Pilot, 595 N.W.2d at 518). The

central theme of Burchill’s defense was that he was framed, particularly by Martz. Burchill

and Martz’s stories were diametrically opposed; only one could be telling the truth.

Burchill wanted the jury to believe that Martz made up a story to get Burchill so he could

get favorable treatment in his own case.

                                             13
¶26    The principal issue was the credibility of the witnesses because the jury needed to

have reasonable doubt regarding Martz’s and Lang’s credibility to find Burchill not guilty.

See Ailer, ¶ 16. “In either situation, the jury must still decide which witness is more

credible.” Hart, ¶ 39. The District Court therefore correctly concluded that the questions

were appropriate and that Sands’s decision not to object was reasonable because the

objection likely would not have been sustained.          Sands made appropriate strategic

objections during Burchill’s cross-examination, which the court sustained. He was not

deficient for declining to object to the prosecutor’s “were they lying” questions because

the questions were permissible under our precedent.

¶27    Burchill next argues the prosecutor committed misconduct when he asked Burchill

on cross-examination, “You could just tell the truth, couldn’t you?” According to Burchill,

this question implied the prosecutor’s personal belief that Burchill had not yet told the truth

regarding his involvement in any of the crimes charged.

¶28    It is improper for a prosecutor to offer personal opinions on a witness’s credibility.

State v. Hayden, 2008 MT 274, ¶ 28, 345 Mont. 252, 190 P.3d 1091 (citations omitted).

When evaluating claimed prosecutorial misconduct, the questions or argument must be

analyzed “in the context of the entire argument.” State v. McDonald, 2013 MT 97, ¶ 14,

369 Mont. 483, 299 P.3d 799 (quoting State v. Makarchuk, 2009 MT 82, ¶ 24, 349 Mont.

507, 204 P.3d 1213).

¶29    Evaluating the entire context of the prosecutor’s line of questioning, we agree with

the District Court that the prosecutor did not express his personal opinion whether Burchill

was telling the truth. The prosecutor asked the question in response to Burchill’s statement

                                              14
that he met with detectives “[b]efore I even could defend myself on anything else because

I didn’t have any of the details.” As the District Court found, this line of questioning did

not imply the prosecutor’s opinion, but rather “quer[ied] [Burchill] on why he would need

advanced information in order to give a truthful statement.” Because the prosecutor did

not voice his personal opinion on Burchill’s credibility, the District Court correctly

concluded that Sands was not deficient for failing to object to the question.

¶30    Sands’s performance was not deficient for failing to make objections.             The

prosecutor’s questions were within the scope of permissible questions allowed on

cross-examination.    As such, Sands’s representation did not fall below an objective

standard of reasonableness under Strickland. We therefore need not address whether

Burchill was prejudiced by the failure to object.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶31    We affirm the District Court’s denial of Burchill’s petition for postconviction relief.

                                                    /S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR
/S/ JIM RICE

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