Court Opinion

ID: 9524387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:52:17.25173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:52.081538
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I agree with my colleagues that the trial court erred in its apparent use of polygraph-test results in passing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial. I do not think, however, that the defendant’s conviction should be set aside and a new trial granted. The use of the polygraph information in no way tainted the verdict of the jury. In the interest of judicial economy, I would, in this case, consider the merits of the defendant’s contention raised in his motion for a new trial and determine whether the trial court’s denial constituted an abuse of discretion. This, in essence, was the procedure followed by the appellate court in this case. (103 Ill. App. 3d 967.) As stated by the appellate court, the jury in this case was the trier of the facts and the trial court’s only function in passing on the defendant’s motion was to determine, as a matter of law, whether the verdict could stand. In doing this, the court was required to view the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the State. In considering the merits of the defendant’s motion, I find that the evidence and inferences considered in this light support the verdict of guilty. The trial court’s denial of the motion for a new trial was therefore not an abuse of discretion and the error committed by the trial court must be considered as harmless error. The majority opinion relies on People v. Nimmer (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 319, and People v. Cooper (1947), 398 Ill. 468. Neither case is in point. Both cases were bench trials where the conduct of the judge tainted the actual finding of guilt. In neither case was the error involved committed in passing on a motion for a new trial. Since the verdict of the jury in our case was not tainted by the error of the judge, I can see no reason for granting a new trial. The complete record is before us. We can determine whether the judge’s action in denying the defendant a new trial was an abuse of discretion. By applying the same standards that we apply in all criminal cases, we can finalize this litigation here and now. The opinion of my colleagues needlessly launches this case on another journey through the trial court, the appellate court, and again, ultimately, to this court. This additional caseload should not be imposed upon the judicial system of this State when we are, at this time, in a position to determine the merits of the defendant’s contentions. I, therefore, dissent.