Court Opinion

ID: 9762275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:18:43.467724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:32.650019
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
On original submission of this cause we did not consider the statement of facts appearing in the record because the same was not filed with the clerk of the trial court within ninety days after the date notice of appeal was given as required by Sec. 4 of Art. 759a, V.A.C.C.P.
By affidavit it is made known that both appellant’s trial counsel and the Judge who presided at the trial, died pending the appeal. We have concluded that the late filing of the statement of facts was through no fault or laches on the part of appellant, and we therefore consider the same.
The conviction was upon the second count of an indictment alleging that appellant fraudulently passed a forged instrument in writing, to-wit, a check on the Citizens National Bank in the sum of $181.-52 payable to Toys and Sports Inc. or order, signed Charles J. Williams, Route #1, Azle, Texas, dated December 20, 1962 and bearing the stamp “Insufficient Funds.”
The evidence reflects that appellant, using the name Charles J. Williams, acquired a drivers license and later, using the license for identification, opened a checking account in the Citizens National Bank of Weatherford, Texas. Subsequent to the opening of the account, appellant went to a store in Fort Worth known as Toys and Sports Inc., and purchased a custom made rifle, together with some shells and a gun case. In making the purchase appellant identified himself at the request of the store manager as Charles J. Williams, Route 1, Azle, Texas, again exhibiting the drivers license. The store manager, then accepted the check in the amount of $181.52, in payment for the items heretofore mentioned. The check in question, upon being forwarded to the Citizens National Bank of Weath-erford, was by that bank not paid but was returned with the following notation marked thereon, “Returned by reason of insufficient funds.”
It was shown that no person by the name of “Charles J. Williams” resided in the vicinity of Azle, Texas.
We are constrained to agree with appellant that the evidence presented is insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
 To constitute the offense of forgery, the instrument must purport to be the act of another. Art. 988 P.C. “Another,” as used in said article, includes all other persons, real or fictitious, “except the person engaged in the forgery.” The state’s evidence shows that appellant drew the check upon an account he had himself opened under the name he signed to the check, identifying himself by an operators license he had applied for and received under said name.
Carnalan v. State, 110 Tex.Cr.R. 550, 9 S.W.2d 1034, contains the following language, “If the fictitious name is one which the accused is in the habit of using, and one by which he is known and does business, a conviction cannot be sustained.” Also, “ * * * Nor is it forgery when the offense is not the assumption of the name of a supposed third person, but the adopting of an alias or alternative name by the party charged.”
The above rule fits squarely upon the fact situation in the instant case, as the appellant seems to have merely adopted an alias or alternative name, obtained a drivers license under it, opened a bank account and written checks, all under his adopted alias. Thus the act did not purport to be that of another.
*329Dunlap v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 198, 332 S.W.2d 727, also supports our position with the following language, “An instrument signed in an assumed name and passed by the person signing it as his own act is not forgery in that it does not purport to be the act of another.” By way of illustration, to show how the signing of a name by which the defendant was sometimes called, may sustain a forgery conviction, Dunlap cites Ware v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 639, 65 S.W.2d 310. In Ware, the accused falsely represented his name to be Perry Scott (the name signed to the checks) when in fact his name was Perry Scott Ware. The controlling factor in affirming the conviction in that case was the fact that there was no testimony showing that he had any kind of business relations or had been engaged in any commercial transaction under the name Perry Scott.
In the instant case appellant had engaged in business relations under the name affixed to the check, by obtaining a drivers license, opening a bank account and drawing checks, some good and others returned for insufficient funds. Thus Ware, supra, is distinguished from the case at bar.
It appears that appellant stands convicted for passing a forged instrument upon evidence showing the fraudulent giving of a check upon which was stamped insufficient funds.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted, the order of affirmance is set aside, and accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.