Court Opinion

ID: 9834224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:24:18.224847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.866530
License: Public Domain

On Motions for Rehearing.
 The only point which we think it is necessary to discuss is that raised in the ap-pellees’ motion for rehearing relating to special issue No. 10. The issue is set out in full in the original opinion and submits the question of discovered peril. Immediately following this issue the court charged the jury as follows: “In connection with this issue No. 10, as explanatory thereof, you are instructed that before you can find for the plaintiff upon the issue of discovered peril submitted to you by the Court, you must find from a preponderance of the evidence that the engineer operating the engine actually discovered the peril of the plaintiff Ebl.en at síich á distance from the track that he could, with all means at his command, by the exercise of ordinary care,' have ■ prevented the accident; and in connection, therewith you are further instructed that you cannot find for the plaintiff upon the issue of discovered peril on the ground that the engineer in the exercise of or-, dinary qare could have discovered the plain*1066tiff in time to have prevented the accident or that he was negligent in not discovering plaintiff sooner if he did, than he actually did discover him, as the duties of the operators of the engine did not arise until his peril is actually discovered.”
We held that this was a general charge and think there can be no question about the correctness of that holding.
Appellee calls to our attention the fact that the language quoted is taken verbatim from the case of H. E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Sherman, et al. (Tex. Com. App.) 42 S.W.(2d) 241. -We find that this statement is true, but by a careful consideration of the Sherman Case both as reported by the Commission of Appeals and by the Court of Civil Appeals [10 S.W. (2d) 243], we find that this charge was not attacked in either court upon the ground that it was a general charge and upon the further ground that it clearly indicated to the jury what the result of their answers would be. In other words, the charge was not challenged in the Sherman Case as it is here and we are convinced that, if the objections had been made to it in that case that are urged here, the court would have condemned it. The books are full of cases which hold that an explanation or definition which clearly indicates to the jury as to which party will be benefited by a particular answer, is erroneous. A number of these have been cited in Texas Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Davis (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S.W.(2d) 240. Measured by the rules laid down by the Commission of Appeals in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. McLean, 280 S. W. 557, 559; McFaddin v. Hebert, 118 Tex. 314, 15 S.W.(2d) 213, and numerous other cases, the explanation given by the court which followed special issue No. 10 is clearly a general charge. In the Humble Case, supra, Judge Harvey held thai a general charge is an instruction given by the court to the jury as to the law pertaining to the case or any phase thereof. The charge given in the instant case certainly comes within this definition. Judge Harvey further held that “for a charge to be a general pne, it is not necessary that it be one submitting an issue of fact for determination by the jury, with instruction that if they find such facts to exist to find verdict thereon in favor of one of the parties.” Of course, if the charge instructs the jury as to the law and further tells them that, if they find certain facts to exist that they can or cannot find in favor of one of the parties, it must necessarily be a general charge and the charge under consideration does that very thing. . It begins by saying that “before you can find for the plaintiff” and latér on in the same paragraph says “you are further instructed that you cannot find for. the plaintiff,” etc.
Believing that our original opinion and dis-. position of the case is correct, both motions for rehearing are overruled.