Court Opinion

ID: 9408657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:07:18.164875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.248506
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-1128
                               Filed July 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MARQUIS ALONZO MOORE,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Michael Motto, District

Associate Judge.

      A defendant appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction.

AFFIRMED.

      Ronald W. Kepford, Winterset, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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BADDING, Judge.

      As part of a global plea agreement covering three separate cases, Marquis

Moore pled guilty to driving while barred as a habitual offender.1 Under the

agreement, the State would recommend “supervised probation conditioned upon

successful completion” of a residential treatment program. The State abided by

that recommendation at the sentencing hearing and specified that a suspended

two-year indeterminate term of imprisonment should be imposed, to run

concurrently to the sentences in one of the companion cases.

      For his recommendation, defense counsel stated, “We don’t have any

particular objection to the recommendation by the State,” before going on to

request a deferred judgment for Moore. Counsel argued that granting a deferred

judgment would give Moore a shot at becoming “a legally functioning member of

the community” by getting his driver’s license back. The State resisted that request

because of Moore’s long criminal history. The court agreed, rejected that option,

and imposed the sentence otherwise agreed to by the parties.

      Moore now appeals the sentence imposed.2 He argues the district court’s

decision to impose a suspended sentence rather than grant his request for a

1  This appeal only involves the sentence imposed upon this aggravated
misdemeanor conviction. While Moore pled guilty to other charges in a separate
felony case, and the sentencing hearing encompassed both cases, this appeal
does not involve the sentences imposed on the convictions in the felony case. A
serious misdemeanor case was also dismissed as part of the plea agreement.
2 Because Moore pled guilty, he must show good cause before we have jurisdiction

to hear his appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2020). While the plea
agreement indicates there was an agreed-upon sentencing recommendation that
the court ultimately adopted, at the sentencing hearing Moore advocated for a
deferred judgment, which the State resisted. Cf. State v. Damme, 944
N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2020) (limiting a finding of good cause to “when the
defendant appeals a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to in the
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deferred judgment was an abuse of discretion. Specifically, he claims “[t]he court

did not consider [his] age, prior criminal record, employment, family circumstances,

the nature of the offense committed, and harm to the victim,” and the court “flatly

failed to address the compelling and mitigating factors.”

       While the court did not specifically mention each of the factors Moore points

to, that “does not necessarily mean [they were] not considered.” State v. Boltz, 542

N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).            And while Iowa Rule of Criminal

Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires a sentencing court to “state on the record its reason

for selecting the particular sentence,” it need not “give its reasons for rejecting

particular sentencing options.”      State v. Lloyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713–14

(Iowa 1995). Even so, the court here gave its reasons for rejecting a deferred

judgment:

               In looking at his history, I don’t think he is appropriate for a
       deferred judgment either. I mean, I understand these aren’t the most
       serious of charges that he’s pleading guilty to, two driving while
       barreds and marijuana but he’s—you know deferred judgments are
       appropriate when, you know, somebody is pretty young and we have
       something that’s out of character, and Mr. Moore has a lot of prior
       driving while barreds and a domestic—or that was reduced from a
       felony. So anyway, I don’t think a deferred judgment is appropriate
       in this case, but I will otherwise abide by the plea agreement and put
       him on supervised probation.

In its written sentencing order, the court additionally stated that it had considered

the parties’ plea agreement, along with the nature and circumstances of the

offense.

plea bargain”). Because the initial joint sentencing recommendation turned into a
contested one at the sentencing hearing, we find that Moore has established good
cause for his appeal, giving us jurisdiction to proceed.
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       Though terse, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision. See

Boltz, 542 N.W.2d at 11 (“Even a succinct and terse statement of reasons may be

sufficient as long as the brevity displayed does not prevent us from reviewing the

exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.”). So, on the issue presented for

our review in this appeal, we affirm.

       AFFIRMED.