Court Opinion

ID: 9490940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:59:21.551402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:24.824216
License: Public Domain

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in parts I., II.A, II.B., and III., and I dissent from part II.C.
*937Kathryn Reinhold complains, in part, that because she refused the amorous approaches of Dennis Martin, her immediate supervisor, Martin refused to approve her attendance at a professional conference and assigned her extra work duties. Martin, however, was only a work coordinator and did not have the employer’s authority to hire, fire, promote, demote, or alter any of the terms and conditions of Reinhold’s employment. When persons with that authority at the Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind (VSDB) learned of Martin’s conduct, they conducted an investigation, following which they disciplined Martin.
Based on this evidence, the jury found, in relevant part, that VSDB violated Title VII through the quid pro quo sexual harassment created by Martin’s advances. Because I believe that under our precedent the evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to establish a quid pro quo violation, I respectfully dissent.
To establish a quid pro quo violation of Title VII, a plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct and that her reaction to the conduct was used as a basis for decisions affecting “tangible aspects of [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Spencer v. General Electric Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir.1990) (finding that conditioning a promotion on sexual favors established a pri-ma facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment). Because the person harassing the employee on a quid pro quo basis wields the employer’s authority to alter the terms and conditions of employment, the law imposes strict liability on the employer for this form of harassment. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 n. 6 (4th Cir.1983). Thus, if the employer has not conferred employment authority on the harasser, the employer cannot be held strictly liable under a quid pro quo theory for the harasser’s conduct unless the employer failed to take remedial steps after learning of the harassment.
In this case, Martin was simply a work coordinator who supervised several employees. He did not have the power to hire or fire any of them, to promote or demote them, or to alter the terms and conditions of their employment. Because the entire basis for imposing strict liability based on a quid pro quo theory was absent, Reinhold’s quid pro ' quo case must fail. While there was evidence that Martin refused Reinhold permis- . sion to go to a conference, this single refusal to attend a non-mandatory professional conference did not change the terms of Reinhold’s employment. Even should denial of conference attendance be considered the alteration of a term or condition of employment, the alteration would be de minimis. Reinhold did not present evidence that established any link between attendance at the . conference and a promotion or other tangible employment benefit. Reinhold’s position, authority, or responsibilities were not threatened, and she suffered no reduction in her ■ compensation as a result of her nonatten-danee at the conference. The same can be said with respect to the additional psychological evaluations that Martin assigned to Reinhold. In short, quid pro quo liability does not follow from such collateral and intangible events.
The majority opinion relies, to support its position, on the EEOC Guidelines which state that it is sufficient to establish a quid pro quo violation by showing that a “submission to or rejection of [sexually harassing] conduct ... [was] used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.” Slip op. at 932 (emphasis added). The majority’s reliance on the EEOC Guidelines, however, substantively extends our holdings in Spencer and Katz. Heretofore, our precedent required that the discriminatory employment decision affect “tangible aspects of the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” which is far narrower than a decision “affecting such individual.” Yet, that is the very basis for the majority’s opinion. As it holds, “Under the broad definition contained in Spencer and the EEOC Guidelines, we are convinced that Reinhold has shown that she was denied a ‘job benefit’ and that Martin used Reinhold’s rejection of his advances as the ‘basis for employment decisions’ affecting Reinhold.” Slip op. at 933 (emphasis added).
In extending employer strict liability to this extent, the majority opinion fails to rec*938ognize the essential basis justifying the imposition of strict liability in the first place, i.e., that the employer have expressly conferred on the harassing person its employment authority vis-a-vis the victim. For these reasons, I would reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants.