Court Opinion

ID: 9621229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:53:56.904649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:59.238444
License: Public Domain

Eggleston, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the holding of the majority opinion that the ■conveyance by W. C. Owens to A. J. Owens of the grantor’s interest in his father’s estate should be set aside on the ground of gross inadequacy of consideration amounting to constructive fraud.
It is uncontradicted that the grantee, A. J. Owens, while .acting as administrator of his father’s estate, received a conveyance of the entire interest of his brother, W. C. Owens, an heir and distributee, in both the personal property and real •estate owned by their father, for the sum of $5,000. It appears from a fair reading of the evidence that the grantor’s interest in the personal estate was worth about $6,000 and that his interest in the real estate was worth more than :$10,000.
As both the majority and dissenting opinions point out, the bill of complaint alleged that the deed, absolute on its face, was intended as a mortgage to secure liabilities which the grantee had incurred on behalf of the grantor, and that upon the taking of depositions the plaintiff, the grantor, changed his position and attacked the validity of the deed on the additional ground of gross inadequacy in price and ■constructive fraud.
In his brief filed in this Court the appellee grantee says: “In his effort to attack the validity of the deed, appellant advanced two positions, viz: (1) that the deed was intended *978as a mere encumbrance to secure the payment of certain indebtedness owing by him; and, (2) that the consideration paid by appellee was so grossly inadequate as to amount to a constructive fraud upon appellant.” The appellee’s brief then states that the first point “has been abandoned by the appellant because very little, if any, evidence was offered in support of such contention.” The brief thus points up the only question presented on this appeal:
“The Issue Involved
“The 'sole question at issue is whether the sale by the appellant to the appellee was induced by fraud, either actual or constructive.”
There is no contention by appellee that the decree should be affirmed on the grounds raised in the dissenting opinion, namely, (1) that an avoidance of the conveyance because of constructive fraud was not within the scope of the pleadings and was not before the court; (2) that the appellant’s case on appeal is different from that which he attempted to make out in the lower court.
As I read the record and briefs, both parties clearly understood the issue upon which the case had been heard and decided in the lower court and what issue was to be determined on appeal. It is my view that the majority opinion correctly decides the issue which was submitted to us.