Court Opinion

ID: 9714374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:36:13.294813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.623721
License: Public Domain

RATLIFF, Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur on the majority opinion, I believe some additional comment is appropriate regarding the issue of whether or not battery committed upon prisoners in the county jail by the county sheriff comes within the ambit of official misconduct under Indiana Code section 35-44-1-2(1). The heart of this issue is the closeness in relation to the duties of the office of the actions claimed to be official misconduct.
It has been stated that the language of Ind.Code § 35-44-1-2(1) is broad enough in scope to render official misconduct any crime committed by a person who happens to be a public official, but that the legislature's intent was to make official misconduct only those crimes which could be committed only by a public official. West's ALC. § 85-44-1-2 Commentary by BJ. Small. Both analyses are, in my opinion, incorrect. Under the first premise, any offense committed by a public official would be official misconduct no matter how far removed from any official duties. The second premise would exclude such crimes as theft, bribery, forgery, and perjury, for example, from the purview of official misconduct, because such acts are crimes when committed by anyone, although the public clearly would consider any such actions by a public official to be official misconduct. Rather, the focus must be on whether the act was done by a public official in the course of his official duties. See People v. Genser, (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 351, 56 Cal.Rptr. 380 (conduct which constitutes an offense against public justice or the administration of law includes both malfeasance and nonfeasance by an officer in connection with the administration of his public duties).
Where the alleged misconduct bears no relation to official duties, there is no official misconduct. For example, a conviction for misconduct cannot rest upon eriminal behavior which is unrelated to the performance of official duties. Kauffman v. Glassboro, (1981) 181 N.J.Super. 273, 437 A.2d 334 (burglary by a police officer unrelated to official duties). On the other hand forgeries of endorsements on checks received in payment of traffic fines which forgeries were done by clerk receiving the checks were held to be sufficiently related to official duties to constitute misconduct. State v. Schultz, (1976) 71 N.J. 590, 367 A.2d 423. Likewise, sale by the police chief of confidential police information to a key figure in organized crime was held sufficient proof of official misconduct. State v. Hess, (1983) 279 S.C. 14, 301 S.E.2d 547.
In this case, Daugherty was the county sheriff? charged with the duty of keeping prisoners in the county jail. The evidence showed mistreatment of prisoners in the form of beatings administered to such prisoners. Mistreatment of prisoners is wrong in itself,1 and the beatings here clearly constituted the crime of battery. That such crime was committed in the course of Daugherty's official duties cannot be doubted.
Daugherty's acquittal of the separate battery charge does not entitle him to a reversal of the conviction of official miscon-duet. It has been held that where bribery and misconduct charges were based on the same factual allegations, acquittal of bribery did not necessarily impugn the validity *55of the misconduct conviction. State v. Peterson, (1981) 181 N.J.Super. 261, 437 A.2d 327, cert. denied 89 N.J. 413, 446 A.2d 144. Here, the commission of the acts of battery which formed the basis for the official misconduct charge was clearly proven. Under those circumstances, that the jury, for whatever reason, acquitted Daugherty of the separate charges of battery, does not vitiate the conviction of official misconduct.

. See Indiana Code section 11-11-5-4(1) prohibiting the Indiana Department of Correction imposing corporal punishment as a disciplinary action. >