Court Opinion

ID: 9850243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:56.876548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:33.603995
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice,
dissenting.
It may be that the interests of the two children would best be served if they were placed in the home of their paternal grandparents.1 However, for the majority to make that determination it was necessary to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses and substitute its judgment for that of the district judge. The manner in which the majority makes its determination is contrary to established appellate rules. I respectfully suggest that the majority has ignored some basic appellate rules, which follow.
We accord great deference to the factual determination of the trial court. The trial court is in a better position to judge demeanor, truth and veracity of witnesses, and also to determine the credibility and the value of their testimony. On appeal, the supreme court presumes findings of fact to be correct and will not disturb them absent a finding that they are clearly erroneous or contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
On appeal, the reviewing court examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, presumes that it is true, and leaves out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the unsuccessful party that conflicts with the successful party’s evidence. Furthermore, the reviewing court may make every favorable inference that may reasonably and fairly be drawn from the evidence produced by the successful party. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, whose judgment must be sustained unless clearly erroneous, manifestly wrong, or totally against the evidence.
The appellate court will not set aside the trial court’s findings merely because it might have reached a different result.
See Yates v. Yates, Wyo., 702 P.2d 1252 (1985); Lebsack v. Town of Torrington, Wyo., 698 P.2d 1141 (1985); Scott v. Fagan, Wyo., 684 P.2d 805 (1984); State ex rel. Wyoming Workers Compensation Division v. Colvin, Wyo., 681 P.2d 269 (1984); Consolidated Freightways v. Drake, Wyo., *355678 P.2d 874 (1984); Doenz v. Garber, Wyo., 665 P.2d 932 (1983); City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Arch Sellery, Inc. v. Simpson, Wyo., 360 P.2d 911 (1961).
Under the standards of appellate review set out above, appellee produced an abundance of evidence to justify the district court’s determination regarding custody.
An employee of the Sublette County Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (D-PASS) testified that the interaction between appellee Sherry Fanning and her children had improved and that she had developed the skills to properly raise the children and provide for their needs.
A staff member of the Sublette Community Mental Health Center in Pinedale testified that appellee’s parenting skills had improved and that she is willing to learn. He further testified that mothers generally have more influence on their children, and appellee had a positive influence on her children.
Another D-PASS employee testified that appellee met all obligations imposed on her, that her interaction with the children was good, and that she could care for the children.
A counselor at Southwest Counseling in Green River testified she had been working with appellee since March, 1984, and saw significant progress in her emotional and psychological makeup, and that appellee was now an effective parent. She recommended that appellee be the custodial parent.
Appellee testified she had been taking parenting classes, had a job, was self-supporting, and had her own apartment. Her work hours were designed so she could return the children to Pinedale on Sunday and allow her to go to Pinedale to visit the following Friday. Her activities with the children included camping, going to the zoo, Lagoon, and Salt Lake City.
Appellant contends that the children were bruised or scuffed when they returned from visiting their mother. However, appellee and other witnesses testified that the children were also bruised or scuffed when they had been with appellant or the grandparents. In appellee’s estimation the bruises and scuffs were the result of rambunctious, healthy children, quite normal and ordinary.
According to appellate rules set out, supra, the trial court was entitled to believe the favorable evidence produced by appel-lee and disregard the evidence produced by appellant.
The majority determined that the trial court utilized maternal preference for its custody decision. If that was the sole basis for the court’s decision the criterion would be incorrect, according to § 20-2-113, W.S.1977 and Fink v. Fink, Wyo., 685 P.2d 34 (1984). My review of the record and reading of the trial court’s opinion letter, however, lead me to believe that gender was only one consideration and not the sole consideration employed by the trial court to arrive at its decision. A trial court is not precluded from considering gender as one of the factors in custody determinations.
If the trial court did, in fact, improperly use maternal preference as the sole basis for its custody award, the case should be remanded with instruction to reconsider the case under correct principles of law. It seems reversal with instructions to enter an order granting custody to appellant is inappropriate.
I would affirm the trial court.

. In reversing this case the majority granted custody to the appellant father. In reality, however, custody will be with the grandparents, as it was before trial. Evidence at trial showed that the children were living in the grandparents’ home. There was no evidence that appellant could provide any type of a home except through his mother.