Court Opinion

ID: 9382861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 21:00:33.106803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:42.186736
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4259

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ELIO GARCIA GODINEZ, a/k/a Chiva, a/k/a Elio Godinez Garcia,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr., District Judge. (3:19-cr-00403-MOC-DCK-1)

        Submitted: February 21, 2023                                      Decided: March 27, 2023

        Before WYNN, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Sandra Barrett, Hendersonville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Elio Garcia Godinez appeals his convictions and 300-month sentence imposed

        following his guilty plea to conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine, in violation of

        21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846; conspiracy to commit money laundering, in

        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h); and distribution and possession with intent to distribute

        methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2. On

        appeal, counsel for Godinez has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

        738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning

        (1) whether Godinez’s guilty plea is valid; (2) whether Godinez’s downward variant

        sentence is reasonable, and (3) whether the conditions of supervised release in Godinez’s

        written judgment are consistent with the district court’s pronouncement of these conditions

        at the sentencing hearing. Godinez was notified of his right to file a pro se supplemental

        brief, but he has not done so. The Government declined to file a responsive brief. For the

        following reasons, we affirm.

               Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the district court, through a colloquy with the

        defendant, must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the

        charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory minimum penalty, the maximum

        possible penalty he faces upon conviction, and the various rights he is relinquishing by

        pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). The district court also must ensure that the

        defendant’s plea was voluntary, was supported by a sufficient factual basis, and did not

        result from force or threats, or promises not contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim.

        P. 11(b)(2), (3). In reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this court

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        “accord[s] deference to the trial court’s decision as to how best to conduct the mandated

        colloquy with the defendant.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 295 (4th Cir.

        2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Because Godinez did not move in the district court to withdraw his guilty plea, we

        review the validity of his guilty plea for plain error. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d

        621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). To establish plain error, Godinez must establish that “(1) an error

        was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error

        seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

        United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). In the guilty plea context, a defendant meets his burden to establish that a plain

        error affected his substantial rights by showing a reasonable probability that he would not

        have pled guilty but for the district court’s Rule 11 omissions. United States v. Sanya, 774

        F.3d 812, 815-16 (4th Cir. 2014). We have reviewed the Rule 11 colloquy and, discerning

        no plain error, we conclude that Godinez’s guilty plea is valid.

               We review “all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

        [Sentencing] Guidelines range under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United

        States v. Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). However, because

        Godinez did not request a sentence lower than the one he received, we review his sentence

        for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 2010). In

        conducting this review, we must first ensure that the sentence is procedurally reasonable,

        “consider[ing] whether the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory

        [G]uidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an appropriate sentence,

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        considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, and sufficiently explained the chosen

        sentence.” Torres-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted). When

        imposing a sentence, the district court must make an individualized assessment based on

        the facts presented, state in open court the reasons supporting its chosen sentence, and

        address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence and, if it

        rejects them, explain why in a manner allowing for meaningful appellate review. United

        States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019). If the sentence is free of “significant

        procedural error,” we then review it for substantive reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account

        the totality of the circumstances.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “Any

        sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively

        reasonable.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). Having

        reviewed the record, we discern no procedural error. Moreover, Godinez was sentenced

        below the Guidelines range, and he fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness

        afforded his below-Guidelines sentence. Id.

               Finally, we review de novo whether the sentence imposed in the written judgment

        is consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. United States v.

        Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2020). “[B]ecause a defendant has a right to be

        present when he is sentenced, a district court must orally pronounce all non-mandatory

        conditions of supervised release at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Singletary,

        984 F.3d 341, 344 (4th Cir. 2021). “Discretionary conditions that appear for the first time

        in a subsequent written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant has not been sentenced to

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        those conditions, and a remand for resentencing is required.” Id. (citing Rogers, 961 F.3d

        at 295, 300-01).

               “[A] district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary

        conditions through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’

        conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those

        conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. “[S]o long as the defendant

        is informed orally that a certain set of conditions will be imposed . . ., then a later-issued

        written judgment that details those conditions may be construed fairly as a ‘clarification’

        of an otherwise ‘vague’ oral pronouncement.” Id. “Express incorporation” is not only “a

        critical part of the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing” but “also provides us, as a

        reviewing court, with the crucial objective indication that a district court has undertaken

        the necessary individualized assessment and made a considered determination, at the time

        of sentencing, that an identifiable set of discretionary conditions should be imposed on a

        defendant’s supervised release.” Id. at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted). Having

        reviewed the record, we perceive no error in the district court’s pronouncement of

        Godinez’s sentence.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.

        This court requires that counsel inform Godinez, in writing, of the right to petition the

        Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Godinez requests that a petition

        be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

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        move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

        that a copy thereof was served on Godinez.

              We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                    AFFIRMED

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