Court Opinion

ID: 9691805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:00:22.184848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:39.458206
License: Public Domain

21-1999-cr (L)
United States v. McPartland, Spota

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         August Term 2022

                (Argued: October 20, 2022              Decided: August 25, 2023)

                                     Nos. 21-1999-cr, 21-2004-cr

                           ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

                                     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                              Appellee,

                                                -v.-

                       CHRISTOPHER MCPARTLAND, THOMAS J. SPOTA,

                                       Defendants-Appellants.

                           ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

Before:         LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, NARDINI and MENASHI, Circuit Judges.

       Defendants-Appellants Christopher McPartland and Thomas J. Spota
appeal from their judgments of conviction in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York (Azrack, J.). Following a five-week jury trial,
Defendants-Appellants were convicted on counts of conspiracy to tamper with
witnesses and obstruct an official proceeding, substantive witness tampering and
obstruction of an official proceeding, obstruction of justice, and being accessories
after the fact to the deprivation of the civil rights of a victim. The district court

                                                 1
sentenced Defendants-Appellants, principally, to five years’ imprisonment each.
On appeal, Defendants-Appellants raise challenges to the district court’s
admission of certain testimony at trial—in particular, testimony about
subordinates’ fear of retaliation and testimony about bad acts that formed the basis
for that fear of retaliation. Defendants-Appellants also challenge the district
court’s denial of their application to admit the government’s bill of particulars, and
McPartland challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for an evidentiary
hearing and new trial. We find Defendants-Appellants’ arguments to be without
merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR APPELLEE:                          JUSTINA GERACI, Assistant United States
                                       Attorney (Jo Ann M. Navickas, Nicole
                                       Boeckmann, and Michael Maffei, Assistant
                                       United States Attorneys, and Lara Treinis
                                       Gatz, Special Assistant United States
                                       Attorney, on the brief), for Breon Peace,
                                       United States Attorney for the Eastern
                                       District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS:             LARRY H. KRANTZ, Krantz & Berman LLP,
                                       New York, NY (Lisa Cahill, Krantz &
                                       Berman LLP, New York, NY; Bradley
                                       Gershel, Ballard Spahr LLP, New York, NY,
                                       on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant
                                       Christopher McPartland.

                                       ALAN VINEGRAD, Covington & Burling LLP,
                                       New York, NY (Erin Monju, Covington &
                                       Burling LLP, New York, NY, on the brief), for
                                       Defendant-Appellant Thomas J. Spota.
DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge:

      This is an appeal by two former prosecutors—Defendants-Appellants

Thomas J. Spota, previously the Suffolk County District Attorney, and Christopher

                                          2
McPartland, previously the chief of the Government Corruption Bureau for the

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office (“SCDAO”)—who were convicted for

their roles in covering up an assault carried out by James Burke, then the police

chief for Suffolk County. After a five-week jury trial in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of New York (Azrack, J.), Spota and McPartland were

found guilty of conspiracy to tamper with witnesses and obstruct an official

proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k); substantive witness tampering and

obstruction of an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1),

1512(b)(2)(A), 1512(b)(3), and 1512(c)(2); obstruction of justice, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1503(a) and 1503(b)(3); and being accessories after the fact to the

deprivation of the civil rights of the assault victim, Christopher Loeb, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 3.    On August 10, 2021, the district court entered judgment

sentencing Spota and McPartland principally to five years’ imprisonment each.

      On appeal, Spota and McPartland argue that the district court improperly

admitted what they characterize as irrelevant and inflammatory evidence—

primarily, evidence that certain law enforcement officers feared retaliation if they

were not complicit in the cover-up, as well as evidence of various bad acts carried

out by Defendants-Appellants’ co-conspirator, Burke.        Spota and McPartland

                                         3
also challenge the district court’s denial of their application to admit the

government’s bill of particulars, and McPartland challenges the district court’s

denial of his Rule 33 motion, Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, for an evidentiary hearing and

new trial. Because we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the evidence of the officers’ fear of retaliation, that any error in

admitting the evidence relating to Burke was harmless, and that Spota and

McPartland’s other arguments are without merit, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

                                 BACKGROUND

                            I.   Factual Background

       In December 2012, Burke, the then–Chief of Department of the Suffolk

County Police Department (“SCPD”), violently assaulted Loeb, who was at the

time being held in an interrogation room in a police precinct.     Loeb had been

arrested after a search turned up evidence that he had been burglarizing cars—

including, notably, a vehicle belonging to Burke, from which Loeb appeared to

have taken several items.    Three SCPD detectives in the Criminal Intelligence

unit—Kenneth Bombace, Anthony Leto, and Michael Malone—interrogated Loeb.

They yelled at, cursed, and slapped him, but could not extract a confession; Burke

                                        4
himself then went into the interview room, where he fiercely punched, kicked,

kneed, and screamed at Loeb, stopping only when the other officers intervened.

      After the assault, Burke ordered other high-ranking members of the SCPD—

including then-Lieutenant James Hickey, who led the Criminal Intelligence unit—

to ensure that the rank-and-file detectives who had witnessed or participated in

the assault would not reveal what had occurred. Burke also enlisted the help of

his long-time friend and mentor, Spota, the District Attorney of Suffolk County, as

well as McPartland, one of Spota’s top prosecutors in the SCDAO, to help keep the

witnesses quiet and to control the criminal case against Loeb.

      In the spring of 2013, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of

New York, with the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”),

opened a federal grand jury investigation into the assault.      Burke, Spota, and

McPartland responded by using the influence afforded by their positions, along

with various threats of retaliation, to conceal Burke’s crimes and to prevent

witnesses from cooperating with the federal investigation. Thus, although the

federal investigators served grand jury subpoenas in June 2013 on various

potential witnesses—most notably, SCPD detectives Bombace and Leto—the

investigation came up mostly dry. In December 2013, after determining that they

                                        5
had insufficient evidence to pursue any charges, the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the

FBI closed the investigation.

      But approximately one year later, the grand jury investigation was

reinvigorated as certain key law enforcement witnesses—most notably Bombace,

Leto, and Hickey—upon being immunized or entering into cooperation

agreements, admitted to participating in the conspiracy and testified to Burke’s

conduct. Shortly thereafter, Burke was charged for his role in the assault and in

the cover-up. In February 2016, he pleaded guilty to the charges and later was

sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment. In October 2017, Spota and McPartland

were indicted for their role in the conspiracy and charged with four counts:

conspiracy to tamper with witnesses and obstruct an official proceeding,

substantive witness tampering and obstruction of an official proceeding,

obstruction of justice, and being accessories after the fact to the deprivation of

Loeb’s civil rights.

                                II.   The Trial

      Spota and McPartland’s trial commenced on November 14, 2019. Over the

course of five weeks, the government presented evidence, including hundreds of

exhibits and the testimony of dozens of witnesses, supporting the charges that

                                        6
Spota and McPartland, together with others, carried out a concerted plan, which

involved both witness tampering and the obstruction of the federal grand jury

investigation, to cover up Burke’s assault on Loeb. Central to the government’s

case was the testimony of Hickey, who spoke directly to the key roles of Spota and

McPartland in the conspiracy, along with the testimony of Bombace and Leto, who

discussed the pressures they were under to carry out Spota and McPartland’s

desired ends.

                             A. The “Inner Circle”

      As the government elicited at trial, Spota and Burke had a relationship that

was widely known in the Suffolk County law enforcement community to be

extremely close. They had been “close friends for over 40 years” and “Spota was

Burke’s fiercest defender and protector.” MA-1130.1 Similarly, McPartland and

Burke were characterized as having a close personal and professional relationship,

with one witness describing them as “best friends” and saying that McPartland

“would be the first person that Burke would turn to when he was in trouble.” Id.

Spota, Burke, and McPartland referred to themselves as “the administration.”

      1Citations in the format of “MA-__” and “SA-__” are to the Appendix of
Defendant-Appellant Christopher McPartland and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant
Thomas Spota, respectively. Citations to “SPA-__” are to the Special Appendix of
Defendant-Appellant Thomas Spota.

                                        7
MA-1141 to -42.      And, according to the testimony elicited at trial, “the

administration” had a reputation for being tightly knit and vindictive—“[a]n

enemy of one [was] an enemy of all” and could expect to “face dire consequences.”

MA-1132, MA-1135.

      The three also had a slightly larger clique—this one comprised of

themselves, Hickey, and William Madigan, the Chief of Detectives of the SCPD—

which they called “the inner circle.” MA-1129 to -30. Like “the administration,”

the inner circle was built on a combination of loyalty and vindictiveness. Indeed,

according to his testimony, Hickey joined the inner circle in 2005 through an

incident targeting an “enemy” of Burke’s, Patrick Cuff.

      As Cuff himself testified, he first appeared on Burke’s blacklist following an

incident in 1993, when Cuff was a lieutenant in the SCPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau.

At that time, the Internal Affairs Bureau was investigating Burke for his alleged

sexual relationship with Lowrita Rickenbacker, a woman with a prior felony

conviction who was known to be actively engaged in criminal conduct, including

possession and sale of illegal drugs, prostitution, and larceny.    As part of the

investigation, Cuff interviewed Burke.       During the interview, Cuff, as he

                                         8
acknowledged at trial, “chuckled” at Burke’s description of his own reputation as

“sterling,” earning Burke’s ire. MA-1563.

      Hickey’s “induction” into the inner circle came over a decade later.        In

September 2005, he encountered Cuff—who was now an inspector in the SCPD—

deeply upset because his son had been arrested for possession of a service weapon

and he believed the SCDAO had moved to upgrade the misdemeanor charge to a

felony. Upon seeing Cuff upset, Hickey called Burke to tell him, and heard Burke

in turn call Spota and McPartland into the room so Hickey could relay the

information to them as well.      Hickey explained at trial that he called Burke

because he knew Burke hated Cuff, and he believed that telling Burke would

“ingratiate” him with the administration. MA-1407.       And it indeed appeared to

do so—six or seven weeks later, Hickey was, in his telling, “suddenly promoted”

to commanding officer of the Criminal Intelligence unit.        Id.   To Hickey the

lesson of this incident was clear—that friends of Burke’s “administration” would

be rewarded, and enemies punished.

      Once “inducted,” and after Burke’s promotion to Chief of Department,

Hickey acted as a liaison between the inner circle and his detectives in the Criminal

Intelligence unit, specifically the four who comprised the “palace guards”—

                                         9
Bombace, Leto, Malone, and Cliff Lent.     MA-1156.   The detectives frequently

carried out tasks, both personal and work-related, for Burke.   In one instance,

Leto tailed the stepson of Burke’s girlfriend, who had been giving her trouble,

hoping to catch him breaking the law. In another, Burke had two detectives sent

to confront his girlfriend’s contractor. Aware of Burke’s disagreements with a

colleague in the SCPD, Bombace was ordered to serve as a “lookout” while another

friend of Burke’s, Sanjiv Panchal, removed a GPS tracking device Panchal had

previously placed on the colleague’s vehicle. Leto also testified to “spying on”

county executive Steve Bellone and reporting back to Hickey about whom Bellone

was meeting with. MA-772. These orders often came to them from Hickey; they

knew the information they reported was being passed up the chain to Burke; and

the “palace guards . . . would do anything and everything that the king, Burke,

would ask them to do.” MA-1156.

            B. Loeb’s Interrogation and the Immediate Aftermath

      Several witnesses at the trial provided testimony regarding the events

leading up to and including the assault of Loeb on December 14, 2012.        As

relevant here, on that morning, Burke had reported that his SCPD-issued vehicle

had been broken into and various items were stolen, including a “party bag”

                                      10
containing, among other things, dildos, condoms, pornography, and Viagra.

MA-338, MA-499 to -502.

      Although the Criminal Intelligence unit would not normally be involved

with a vehicle break-in, at Burke’s request, Hickey assigned a number of his

detectives to investigate. After initially reporting to Burke’s house to canvass the

scene, detectives Bombace, Leto, and Malone were directed to report to the Fourth

Precinct, where Loeb and another burglary suspect were in custody.

      As Leto testified at trial, the detectives felt pressure to secure a confession

from Loeb, as he had burglarized “the chief’s” car—but their attempts were

unsuccessful.   MA-775 to -76.     It was at this point that Burke arrived at the

Fourth Precinct and became “upset” when told that Loeb had not confessed.

MA-777. Burke then entered the interview room to confront Loeb, and after a

brief exchange in which Loeb called Burke a “pervert,” Burke began violently

assaulting Loeb—punching him in the head and body as Loeb was handcuffed to

the floor, grabbing Loeb’s ears, and shaking and kneeing the detainee. MA-776

to -77. Burke desisted only when the detectives physically pulled him away.

      Following the assault, the SCDAO proceeded with its prosecution of Loeb

for the vehicle break-ins and thefts. Initially, the prosecution was overseen by

                                         11
McPartland, then the Chief of the Government Corruption Bureau, even though

car thefts would not normally be within his bureau’s purview.      Burke told Hickey

that McPartland was handling the case so as to “take care of it for us.” MA-1166.

But Loeb subsequently went public with his allegations of being assaulted in

police custody. As a result, Spota faced considerable pressure around February

2013 to transfer the case to a special prosecutor, which he ultimately did. When

a special prosecutor was appointed from the Queens District Attorney’s Office,

Spota and McPartland initially expressed that they were “very pleased” given

their “very friendly” relationship with that office. MA-1199. Even still, Spota

and McPartland asked Madigan to serve as a liaison between the special

prosecutor and the police department, monitoring all interactions and “report[ing]

back.” MA-1199 to -203; see also MA-563 to -64, MA-616.

                                  C. The Cover-Up

      Hickey testified that, in fact, Burke, Spota, and McPartland reacted to the

public allegations with panic.       McPartland “immediately reach[ed] out [to

Hickey], discussing the need for . . . [Hickey] to keep [his] guys quiet and tight”

and telling him “that to keep Jimmy out of jail, . . . we need[] to keep the guys quiet

and in line.” MA-1187 to -88. Spota also spoke with Hickey during this period,

                                          12
inquiring whether the detectives were “towing [sic] the line.”            MA-1187.

Hickey recalled meeting with Burke and McPartland in February 2013 to discuss

potential explanations for Burke’s presence at the police station on the day of the

assault.   During this meeting, Burke proposed various explanations, “and

McPartland would okay [them] or not.” MA-1192. Ultimately Burke proposed

saying that “he just popped his head in,” and McPartland approved of this

explanation by nodding his head. MA-1191 to -95.

      There were “constant” inquiries from both Spota and McPartland during

this time as to whether Hickey, as commanding officer of the Criminal Intelligence

unit, could ensure that his men were “doing okay”—that they would “stay with

the story and not tell the truth,” rather than “chang[e] their tune.” MA-1195 to -

96.   This would become a common refrain.          Hickey recounted that “[e]very

single time [he] saw Spota . . . [or] McPartland, in passing, in a meeting, on the

phone, they would inquire, how are your men? How are the guys? How are

they doing?” MA-1195. Hickey would then ask his detectives if everyone was

“holding tight” and “good,” and report “back up the chain of command.” MA-

1196 to -97. “[I]t was . . . a daily, nonstop, constant pressure [on Hickey] . . . to

keep track of [his] men and to report back up the chain.” MA-1205.

                                         13
      Bombace and Leto also testified at trial about the cover-up from their

perspective. Leto explained that after the appointment of the special prosecutor,

Bombace, Leto, and Malone met with Hickey, who informed them of the

appointment and told them “what [their] story was going to be . . . [if] the special

prosecutor asked . . . about if [Burke] went into the room with Christopher Loeb.”

MA-782. The detectives subsequently met with Burke himself, who told them

that he “might have poked [his] head” into the interview room, which Bombace

and Leto both testified to having understood to signify that this was the account

they should give the special prosecutor. MA-557 to -58, MA-783.

      On June 25, 2013, Bombace and Leto received grand jury subpoenas as part

of the federal investigation. On the same day, they informed Hickey that they

had been served with subpoenas “[s]o that he would know that . . . [they] were . . .

not going to rat out” and “[s]o he would pass it up the chain to Burke and

everybody else”—including Spota. MA-784 to -85. Hickey, after failing to get

in contact with Burke, called McPartland, who told him to “get [his] guys

together,” “find out exactly what was said to them by the agents serving the grand

jury subpoenas,” and “to report back [his] findings.” MA-1211 to -12. Hickey

then met with his detectives, whom Hickey described as “extremely nervous,”

                                        14
“scared,” and “very apprehensive.” MA-1213 to -14. That day, Burke met with

Spota, McPartland, Madigan, and Emily Constant, who as Chief Assistant District

Attorney was essentially the “number two” person in the SCDAO, at Spota’s

home, where they discussed the subpoenas and the federal investigation. Burke

later told Hickey that keeping his detectives quiet was Hickey’s new “full-time

job,” MA-1218 to -19, and that his “only job was to keep [Burke] alive, to keep [his]

guys calm, to keep them from ratting, to let them know if there was [sic] any

changes,” MA-1230.

      In September 2013, ahead of a state court hearing related to the Loeb

prosecution, Hickey, Burke, and McPartland met to prepare Burke, should he have

to testify in the hearing, and to discuss which of Hickey’s detectives could testify

in the alternative. 2   Burke and McPartland settled on Leto, because they

perceived that he would be the most reliable. When Hickey commented that Leto

was “not going to like it,” Burke became angry, observing that “this is what they

signed up for. They want to make the most money, drive the nicest cars, have

the nicest job, this is what they signed up for.”      MA-1245.     Leto—who was

      2 By this point, according to Hickey, Burke had repeatedly and openly
acknowledged beating Loeb in conversations with both Spota and McPartland at which
Hickey was also present. MA-1244.

                                         15
separately tapped by the special prosecutor to testify—was upset and didn’t want

to testify. But he nevertheless gave false testimony about what had happened on

the day of Loeb’s arrest, denying that an assault had occurred.

       Bombace and Leto both admitted at trial that they lied to the special

prosecutor when they parroted Burke’s false story that he had merely popped his

head in during Loeb’s interrogation.       MA-558, MA-790.        Bombace likewise

admitted to lying to the FBI during the federal investigation, denying that Burke

had beaten Loeb.     MA-561.     When asked about their decision not to testify

truthfully, both Bombace and Leto explained that they feared retaliation by Burke

and his associates. For example, Leto explained that he feared his sons would be

set up or falsely accused of a crime if he were to testify against Burke, specifically

noting Burke’s “powerful friends,” Spota and McPartland.          MA-774, MA-786.

Similarly, Bombace explained his fear that if he and Leto “told the truth, that [they]

would be retaliated against, even with as much as a . . . targeted criminal

prosecution.” MA-558.

      Hickey’s testimony hit on the same themes. When asked if he “[felt] like

[he] had any choice in the matter in terms of [his] role,” Hickey replied,

“Absolutely not.”    Specifically, he testified, “If I went against Burke, Spota or

                                         16
McPartland, especially as someone that’s part of the inner circle . . . I’d be dead.

I’d be finished.   I would be public enemy number one.”           MA-1205 to -06.

Hickey—along with several other witnesses, including Leto—observed that, when

Burke was named Chief of Department of the SCPD in 2012, he promptly demoted

Cuff the maximum possible four ranks, after which Spota, McPartland, Burke,

Hickey, and Madigan held a “demotion party.”

      In December 2013, Burke was notified by an FBI agent involved with the

federal investigation of the assault on Loeb that the investigation was being

closed—and Burke was cleared.       Hickey testified that Burke was “elated” and

boasted that this is “what happens when you just hold tight.” MA-1252. Spota

indicated to Hickey that his men had done “great,” while McPartland

congratulated Hickey for a good job. MA-1253.

                     D. The Federal Investigation Reopens

      The administration’s success, however, was only temporary. In September

2014, Hickey learned that two Suffolk County detectives serving on the FBI gang

task force had been asked to leave a proffer session in the Central Islip federal

courthouse, prompting concern among the co-conspirators that the federal

investigation had recommenced. Hickey located Burke, who immediately called

                                        17
McPartland and placed him on speaker phone. McPartland first speculated that

Bombace had decided to cooperate, before telling Hickey that he “need[ed] to take

the temperature of [his] guys, find out what’s going on, and make sure that they’re

all quiet.”   MA-1265 to -66.     That day, Spota also asked Hickey if his “guys

[were] holding tight,” and whether “it look[ed] like any of them are cooperating

or looking to cooperate.”       MA-1268.     By this time Burke was “extremely,

extremely concerned,” and advised Hickey that he should make sure that he

wasn’t being followed and that his conversations were not being intercepted.

MA-1266, MA-1269.

      In early June 2015, Bombace informed Hickey that his attorney had heard

from the U.S. Attorney’s Office that the federal investigation into Loeb’s assault

had been reopened and that subpoenas would be forthcoming. Hickey testified

that he informed Burke, who insisted they meet with Spota and McPartland the

next day to explain the situation.

      Spota, McPartland, Burke, and Hickey discussed next steps and who might

be cooperating with the FBI.      According to Hickey’s testimony, after Hickey

suggested that Bombace may have been the one who “flipped,” Spota responded

by saying “these guys can’t change their testimony now,” remarking further that

                                        18
he would see to it that Bombace would never work in Suffolk County again if he

cooperated. MA-1290 to -92. McPartland told Hickey to “find out if anyone’s

talking, if anyone’s cooperating, and, if so, we will take immediate steps to

discredit them.”   MA-1292.    Burke, addressing Spota, said, “Tommy, can you

believe this? Can you believe that the feds are going to try to put me in jail for

tapping some junkie thief on the top of his head?”        MA-1292.     Spota then

reminded the group to be “careful for bugs and wiretaps.” MA-1293.

      At the end of the meeting, as Hickey started to leave, Burke told Hickey to

remind his detectives of “what happens when you go against the administration.”

MA-1309 to -10. According to Hickey, McPartland then added, “just ask John

Oliva.” MA-1293.

      The government elicited testimony from Hickey and others explaining

McPartland’s reference to John Oliva, a former SCPD detective.       Back in 2014,

McPartland, with Spota’s authorization, obtained a warrant to wiretap Oliva after

concluding that he was the likely source of unflattering leaks to a particular

Newsday reporter who had authored articles critical of Burke.          Spota and

McPartland were both active in monitoring the wire, which eventually captured

Oliva leaking information, a possible felony offense. In September 2014, Oliva

                                       19
was arrested and pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor for official misconduct. By

referencing these recent events in discussing potential defectors among Hickey’s

detectives, McPartland made his intentions clear—Spota and McPartland were not

afraid to use the resources of their office to punish an enemy.

      Burke’s girlfriend, Barbara Craft, testified that throughout the summer of

2015, Burke was on the phone with McPartland discussing the Loeb investigation

and expressing concern that Hickey and his detectives were talking about him.

Hickey testified that in August, after hearing from Bombace again about the

building federal investigation, Hickey met with Burke and McPartland; there

McPartland accused Hickey of having “lost control” of Bombace, whom he called

a “rat.” MA-1314, MA-1318 to -19.

      According to Hickey’s testimony, Burke, Spota, and McPartland continued

to pressure Hickey to maintain the cover-up throughout the summer of 2015 and

into the fall. For a time, Hickey remained resolved, but the stress and anxiety

from the cover-up continued to mount. Hickey experienced, among other things,

hallucinations, memory loss, and confusion, eventually leading to his

hospitalization in October 2015. A week after his hospital stay, Hickey himself

was served with a federal grand jury subpoena. Shortly thereafter, Hickey hired

                                        20
an attorney and began cooperating with law enforcement authorities, thus

permitting the full scope of Burke, Spota, and McPartland’s cover-up to come to

light.

                          E. The Defense and Rebuttal Cases

         After the government rested, Spota and McPartland each proffered

stipulations and related exhibits but called no additional witnesses in their

respective defenses. 3 In rebuttal, the government called a witness to clarify an

issue raised by the defense, relating to certain swipe card records of Spota’s and

Hickey’s entries into the two buildings that housed the SCDAO during the

relevant period. The parties then offered their summations.

                                      F. The Verdict

         The trial concluded on December 17, 2019, with the jury convicting both

Spota and McPartland on all four counts in the indictment.

         3Constant, the former Chief Assistant District Attorney at the SCDAO, had
testified earlier in the trial as a defense witness after being first called by the government.
As a defense witness, her testimony called into question a number of aspects of the
government’s case. For example, she testified to having had two conversations with
Spota that suggested he did not know about either the Loeb assault or its cover-up until
October 2015. She also testified that relations between Burke and Spota had cooled by
2012, making cooperation between them less likely, and that Spota had legitimate
concerns motivating his authorization of the Oliva wiretap.

                                              21
                   III.   Subsequent Procedural History

      On February 27, 2020, McPartland moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule

33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and requested an evidentiary

hearing in support of that motion. The district court denied the motion.

      On August 10, 2021, Spota and McPartland were each sentenced,

principally, to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

                                 DISCUSSION

      On appeal, Spota and McPartland contend the district court erred in three

respects: (1) its admission of evidence relating to the state of mind of the law

enforcement officers who participated in the cover-up, Burke’s prior bad acts, and

the bag stolen from Burke’s vehicle; (2) its denial of Defendants-Appellants’

application to admit the government’s bill of particulars; and, only on behalf of

McPartland, (3) its denial of McPartland’s Rule 33 motion for an evidentiary

hearing and new trial. We address each argument in turn.

                           I.   Evidentiary Challenges

      We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and

“will disturb an evidentiary ruling only where the decision to admit or exclude

evidence was manifestly erroneous.” United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56, 67 (2d

                                       22
Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if a decision was manifestly

erroneous, we will affirm if the error was harmless.”        Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted).

      Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence” where “the fact is of consequence

in determining the action.”     Fed. R. Evid. 401.   A district court “may exclude

relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of

one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading

the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

      “We accord great deference to a district court in ruling as to the relevancy

and unfair prejudice of proffered evidence, mindful that it sees the witnesses, the

parties, the jurors, and the attorneys, and is thus in a superior position to evaluate

the likely impact of the evidence.” United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 217 (2d

Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a district court’s

Rule 403 determination, we “generally maximize [the evidence’s] probative value

and minimize its prejudicial effect.” United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 155 (2d

Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

                                         23
       Rule 404(b) governs the admissibility of evidence of “other acts”—“crimes,

wrongs, or acts” other than those charged in the indictment. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 4

Such evidence is not admissible “to prove a person’s character in order to show

that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character,”

but it may be admitted “for another purpose.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), (2). This

Court “has adopted an inclusionary approach to other act evidence under Rule

404(b), which allows such evidence to be admitted for any purpose other than to

demonstrate criminal propensity.”          LaFlam, 369 F.3d at 156 (internal quotation

marks omitted). For example, evidence of uncharged criminal conduct that “is

inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense . . . [or]

necessary to complete the story of the crime at trial” is not typically excluded

under Rule 404(b).       United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 37 (2d Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted).           “To determine whether a district court

       4 The 2020 Amendment to Rule 404(b), effective December 1, 2020, imposes new
notice requirements on the prosecution in a criminal case. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)
advisory committee’s note to 2020 amendment. Pursuant to Rule 404(b)(3), the
prosecution must generally provide the defendant with pretrial notice “in writing” that
“identif[ies] the evidence that it intends to offer pursuant to the rule” and “articulate[s] a
non-propensity purpose for which the evidence is offered and the basis for concluding
that the evidence is relevant in light of this purpose.” Id. This notice must be provided
“in such time as to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to meet the evidence.” Id.
Because Spota and McPartland’s trial occurred prior to December 1, 2020, the provisions
of this amendment are not implicated here.

                                             24
properly admitted other act evidence, the reviewing court considers whether (1) it

was offered for a proper purpose; (2) it was relevant to a material issue in dispute;

(3) its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect; and

(4) the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so

requested by the defendant.” LaFlam, 369 F.3d at 156.

                          A. Fear-of-Retaliation Testimony

      Spota and McPartland first contend the admission of testimony explaining

that the officers participated in the cover-up out of a fear of retaliation was in

violation of Rules 401, 403, 602, 701, and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

We disagree.

      To begin, we discern no arbitrariness or irrationality in the district court’s

determination that the fear-of-retaliation testimony was relevant “to explain the

actions of the coconspirators [i.e., the officers] and to complete the story of the

charged conspiracy.” SPA-3; see also MA-244 to -46, MA-250 to -52.5            Evidence

of a co-conspirator’s state of mind may be relevant “to explain how a criminal

      5  The district court issued a written order, dated November 9, 2019, permitting the
introduction of, among other things, the fear-of-retaliation testimony, the Oliva wiretap
and prosecution, the Cuff incidents, and the Rickenbacker investigation. See SPA-1 to -
9. This order was issued after the parties submitted various motions in limine relating to
these categories of evidence.

                                           25
[enterprise] developed,” “to help the jury understand the basis for the co-

conspirators’ relationship of mutual trust,” United States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566

(2d Cir. 1996), or “to complete the story of the crime on trial,” United States v.

Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 942 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and alteration

omitted). Here, without this testimony, the jury would have lacked a complete

picture as to why the officers chose to participate in the cover-up, despite the stress

and criminal penalties to which participation in a years-long cover-up would

expose them.      Moreover, the officers’ fear of retaliation, along with their

understanding of the administration’s willingness to operate corruptly, was

necessary to explain why the officers interpreted the occasionally cryptic

statements by Burke, Spota, and McPartland as instructions to lie—such as when

Burke told Bombace and Leto that he “might have poked [his] head” into the

interview room. MA-557 to -58; see United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161, 168 (2d

Cir. 2011) (“[Testimony regarding prior] witness intimidation activities . . . of

which [the defendant] was likely aware . . . was admissible to provide a basis for

[the witness] (and the jury) to understand the full import of many of [the

defendant’s] statements to [the witness].”). Given that the testimony of Hickey,

Bombace, and Leto was critical to the government’s case, their explanations

                                          26
regarding how Burke, Spota, and McPartland operated the conspiracy through

fear of reprisal provided important context for the jury. Accordingly, we reject

Spota and McPartland’s relevancy challenge.

      Moreover, we disagree with Spota and McPartland’s contention that the

government’s use of the fear-of-retaliation testimony improperly served to

establish the truth of the officers’ beliefs.     The government’s statements in

summation, such as that “[r]etaliation is sure to follow” those who cross Burke,

Spota, and McPartland, MA-1937, were said in the context of the court’s limiting

instruction that the evidence—particularly the testimony relating to specific,

purportedly retaliatory actions taken by Burke, Spota, or McPartland—was to be

used only to consider the state of mind of the witnesses. In light of the highly

probative nature of the evidence at issue, this limiting instruction was sufficient to

prevent improper use of the testimony. See United States v. Reichberg, 5 F.4th 233,

244 (2d Cir. 2021) (“We presume that juries follow limiting instructions . . . .”

(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)).       We thus reject Spota and

McPartland’s argument that the fear-of-retaliation testimony was misused in a

manner that created unfair prejudice, and we conclude that their challenge to this

testimony under Rule 403 is without merit.

                                         27
      Spota and McPartland also challenge the testimony under Rules 602 and

701, which require, respectively, that a lay witness testify only to matters within

his or her “personal knowledge,” Fed. R. Evid. 602, and offer opinion testimony

based only on the “the witness’s perception,” Fed. R. Evid. 701(a). Defendants-

Appellants note that, besides Hickey, the officers who related their fears of

retaliatory conduct did not testify to having actually spoken to either Spota or

McPartland about the Loeb affair, nor did they testify that Hickey ever

communicated any direct threats from Spota or McPartland to them.

       On review, however, we disagree with Spota and McPartland’s contention

that the fear-of-retaliation testimony was “sheer speculation” and “entirely based

on [the officers’] imaginations.”      Br. of Appellant McPartland at 46–47.

Bombace and Leto need not have spoken directly to Defendants-Appellants about

the Loeb assault and cover-up in order to have personal knowledge that there was

a possibility of retaliation by “the administration.”    Rather, an officer could

perceive a possibility of retaliation—and fear that retaliation would happen—

simply from working in the SCPD and experiencing the department’s culture, as

Hickey, Bombace, and Leto all invariably did.    See United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d

453, 458–59 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[P]ersonal knowledge of a fact is not an absolute to

                                        28
Rule 602’s foundational requirement, which may consist of what the witness

thinks he knows from personal perception.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting this evidence under Rules 602 and 701.

       Finally, McPartland argues that the testimony about fear of retaliation—

referring to the officers’ testimony describing their fears, as opposed to their

testimony regarding the specific instances that informed those fears—was

admitted as “backdoor propensity evidence” in violation of Rule 404(b). 6 Br. of

Appellant McPartland at 44. On this point, we are unpersuaded.

       Simply put, the officers’ fear-of-retaliation testimony does not constitute

“other crimes, wrongs, or acts” that fall under Rule 404(b). 7           The testimony is

comprised of the officers’ statements about what they thought Burke, Spota, and

McPartland might do if they did not cooperate in the cover-up.              Although this

testimony may paint Spota and McPartland in a bad light, it is not evidence of

other crimes, wrongs, or acts within the meaning of Rule 404(b)—the officers’

       6  Spota argues that the fear-of-retaliation testimony was inadmissible under Rules
401, 403, 602, and 701—but he does not argue that the district court’s admission of the
fear-of-retaliation testimony violated Rule 404(b). See Br. of Appellant Spota at 52.
       7 To the extent the fear-of-retaliation testimony dovetails with the evidence of

specific incidents of retaliation, we discuss the application of Rule 404(b) in the following
sections.

                                             29
statements were merely lay opinion testimony that, as the district court stated,

reveals the state of mind of the officers.      Accordingly, we conclude that

McPartland does not present a colorable argument under Rule 404(b), and that the

fear-of-retaliation testimony was properly admitted.

                    B. The Oliva Wiretap and Prosecution

      Spota and McPartland next argue that the district court’s decision to admit

evidence of the Oliva wiretap and prosecution was in violation of Rules 401, 403,

and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence because, among other things, the

wiretap was lawful and some testimony, such as a discussion of profane text

messages, led to unfair prejudice that outweighed the probative value of the

testimony. We find these arguments to be without merit.

      Here, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding that

the Oliva evidence was “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offenses and

therefore outside the scope of Rule 404(b)(1)’s prohibition. SPA-5. According

to Hickey’s testimony, when he met with Burke, Spota, and McPartland in June

2015 to discuss the reopening of the federal investigation, McPartland pointedly

said, “just ask John Oliva,” after Burke reminded Hickey of what happens to those

who “go against the administration.”     MA-1397.      This statement—a threat to

                                       30
any officers who were considering cooperating with the investigation—directly

bears on whether McPartland committed the charged crimes. But to understand

the reference to Oliva, it was necessary that the jury hear evidence about the Oliva

wiretap and prosecution.     Thus, this evidence was properly admitted, not to

prove anything about the defendants’ character (much less to show that any of

their specific actions were in accordance with that character), but rather to make

sensible to the jury key evidence of the charged offense.

      Additionally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

assessment of the Oliva evidence under Rule 403. It reasonably found that the

evidence of the Oliva wiretap and prosecution was highly probative because it

provided context for other relevant evidence—namely, the alleged threat by

McPartland—and it involved conduct “not . . . any more sensational or disturbing

than the crimes with which [the defendants were] charged.”         United States v.

Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1990).      Further, the district court’s

limiting instruction, which reminded the jury that the Oliva wiretap and

prosecution were lawful, served to lessen any prejudicial effect of the evidence—

as did the district court’s instruction that the evidence “was admitted for only

limited purposes” relating to understanding the relationships and motivations of

                                        31
Defendants-Appellants and their co-coconspirators. SA-512.           Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s decision to admit the Oliva evidence.

     C. The Prosecution of Cuff’s Son and the Rickenbacker Investigation

      Spota and McPartland next contend that the district court’s decision to

admit evidence related to the prosecution of Cuff’s son and the 1993 investigation

into Burke’s relationship with Lowrita Rickenbacker was in violation of Rules 401,

403, and 404(b).8 Defendants-Appellants argue that the district court improperly

permitted a number of witnesses to testify about the charges against Cuff’s son,

even though only Hickey’s testimony suggested any wrongdoing by Spota and

McPartland in connection with those charges.          They also argue that the court

erred in allowing multiple witnesses to discuss Burke’s relationship with

Rickenbacker, including testimony that he had sexual relations in his police

cruiser, as well as affairs with other prostitutes.

      8   Spota and McPartland also purport to challenge the admissibility of this
evidence under Rule 802, the rule against hearsay. Their arguments simply state that
certain testimony was hearsay, without further explanation. See, e.g., Br. of Appellant
Spota at 42 (alleging that Hickey’s testimony that he knew Spota was responsible for the
upgraded charge against Cuff’s son was “a baseless assertion, grounded in hearsay”); id.
at 43 (stating that “granular details” about Burke’s affair with Rickenbacker were
“introduced through lengthy hearsay”). As Spota and McPartland do not make any
meaningful arguments on hearsay grounds, we do not consider whether the testimony at
trial consisted of improperly admitted hearsay.

                                          32
      Again, we disagree that the evidence was inadmissible.         First, we agree

with the district court that the evidence about Hickey’s and Cuff’s beliefs that the

charge against Cuff’s son was to be upgraded was necessary “to complete the story

of the charged conspiracy.” SPA-6. The account of the upgraded charge against

Cuff’s son explains Hickey’s introduction to the inner circle, which in turn

provides context for his role as the liaison between “the administration” and the

Criminal Intelligence detectives. Without understanding Hickey’s place in the

inner circle—including the loyalty to Burke that Hickey demonstrated in order to

earn that place—the jury could not have understood why Hickey was entrusted

with the all-important responsibility of keeping his detectives in line, but was at

the same time subject to threats and pressure from Burke, Spota, and McPartland.

As such, this is the sort of evidence “to explain the mutual trust that existed

between coconspirators” that “[w]e have held repeatedly [to be] within the court’s

discretion to admit.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993); see also

United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33–34 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[E]vidence of [the

defendant’s] prior criminal conduct with his co-conspirators was relevant . . . to

help explain to the jury how the illegal relationship between the participants in the

crime developed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                         33
      We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding that the risk of unfair prejudice from this evidence was not substantially

outweighed by its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Hickey’s and Cuff’s

beliefs that the charge would be upgraded, and the fact that Hickey relayed Cuff’s

distress to Burke, Spota, and McPartland, provided highly probative context about

the administration and the inner circle. Meanwhile, any prejudicial effect against

Spota and McPartland, based on either Hickey’s belief that they upgraded the

charge or their participation in the discussion of Cuff, was lessened by the district

court’s limiting instructions informing the jury of the legality of the prosecution of

Cuff’s son and the limited purposes for which this evidence was admitted. See

SA-512.   Additionally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

determination that the evidence about the prosecution of Cuff’s son, which was a

lawful exercise of the SCDAO’s discretion, was “not more sensational or

disturbing” than the obstruction charges against Spota and McPartland. SPA-6;

see Williams, 205 F.3d at 34 (finding “no undue prejudice” in admitting evidence of

prior criminal conduct where “the evidence did not involve conduct more serious

than the charged crime and the district court gave a proper limiting instruction”).

                                         34
      Evidence of the Rickenbacker investigation, meanwhile, was necessary to

understand why Hickey’s phone call to Burke after learning about Cuff’s concern

that his son would be indicted for a felony was meaningful enough to earn Hickey

a place in the inner circle. As such, it too was necessary to complete the story of

the charged conspiracy. Accordingly, the testimony regarding the Rickenbacker

investigation was not improperly admitted as evidence of “other crimes, wrongs,

or acts” under Rule 404(b). See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 37.

      We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the evidence about the Rickenbacker investigation was “critical

to understand[ing] Burke’s hatred of Cuff,” and therefore more probative than

unfairly prejudicial.   SPA-6 to -7, -10.    The only direct relation between this

evidence and Defendants-Appellants was the testimony that Spota represented

Burke in the investigation, but the district court’s limiting instruction that the

representation was legal and ethical served to lessen any prejudicial effect against

Spota. See SA-511. As such, we affirm as to the district court’s admission of this

evidence.

                                        35
       D. The Remaining Cuff Incidents and Burke’s Other “Bad Acts”

      Finally, Spota and McPartland challenge the district court’s admission of

testimony regarding the “party bag” stolen from Burke’s vehicle and Loeb’s

subsequent reference to Burke as a “pervert”; the assorted tasks the detectives did

at Burke’s behest; and the remaining incidents involving Cuff, namely Cuff’s four-

rank demotion upon Burke becoming Chief of Department, and a separate

instance in July 2015, when Burke sought someone to “take accurate attendance”

at Cuff’s retirement party to see who was friendly with Cuff and thus should be

considered an enemy, MA-1408 to -09. We first conclude that admission of the

party bag was not in error.     On the other hand, we conclude that in certain

instances, the district court erroneously admitted testimony regarding Burke’s bad

acts, but that such errors were ultimately harmless.

      To begin, we conclude that evidence of Burke’s “party bag” was admissible

under Rule 403.    The party bag and its contents provided context for Loeb’s

labeling of Burke as a “pervert,” and for Burke’s assault on Loeb. That context,

in turn, was relevant to understanding the cover-up, as executed by Burke, Spota,

and McPartland.     Nor was the probative value of this evidence substantially

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice toward Spota and McPartland, neither

                                        36
of whom bore any relationship to the bag or its contents. As such, we conclude

the district court did not err in admitting this evidence.

      Next, we consider the district court’s admission of evidence concerning

Cuff’s demotion and retirement party as evidence of the co-conspirators’ state of

mind. The logic underlying the district court’s determination is sound: testimony

involving particular events offered to explain the co-conspirators’ fear of

retaliation is not offered “to prove [the defendants’] character in order to show that

on a particular occasion [the defendants] acted in accordance with the character,”

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), but rather, to demonstrate the basis for the co-conspirators’

beliefs. Accordingly, where the witness’s fear of retaliation is relevant, as it is

here for the reasons previously discussed, we have upheld district courts’

decisions to admit a witness’s testimony regarding past acts of reprisal that

provide the foundation for his or her fear of the defendant. See, e.g., Simels, 654

F.3d at 168 (“The Court . . . did not err in admitting evidence about violence

committed by gang members, evidence relevant to [the witness’s] fear of

reprisal.”); see also 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal

Evidence § 4:37 (4th ed.) (“Other acts by the defendant may explain the conduct of

other people, apparently in reaction. Often the proof shows threatening, violent,

                                         37
or abusive behavior, which tends to prove fear on the part of victims or others, and

knowing of that fear helps understand behavior that would otherwise be hard to

decipher.”).

      As such, it was not error for the district court to permit Hickey and Leto to

testify to their understanding that Burke demoted Cuff in retaliation for his role in

the Rickenbacker investigation, and to permit Hickey to testify regarding the

incident involving Cuff’s retirement party.        With regard to both of these

witnesses, such testimony was offered as part of their explanations for why they

feared retaliation from the administration—a point made clear by the district

court’s instructions that such evidence should be considered only “to the extent it

relates to the state of mind of the alleged co-conspirators of the defendants.” SA-

513. For the same reasons, the testimony from Hickey, Bombace, and Leto about

the various tasks the detectives performed for Burke—such as when Leto tailed

the stepson of Burke’s girlfriend or spied on the county executive—was

admissible. By illustrating the detectives’ willingness to follow Burke’s orders,

that evidence further highlighted their fear of retaliation from Burke and the rest

of the administration.

                                         38
      But this accounts only for some of the testimony involving the Cuff incidents

and Burke’s other questionable acts that the district court permitted to come in.

In addition to Hickey and Leto, four other witnesses—Dennis Sullivan, Stuart

Cameron, John Meehan, and Cuff himself—testified about Burke’s demotion of

Cuff, even though their states of mind were not at issue. Similarly, in addition to

allowing Bombace to testify about Burke’s use of a GPS device to track a colleague,

the court allowed Panchal, the individual who actually placed the device, to

describe the incident.   To be sure, such testimony may be admissible in some

circumstances in order to bolster the reasonableness of the co-conspirators’ fears

by corroborating the events providing the foundation for their beliefs. See United

States v. Everett, 825 F.2d 658, 660–61 (2d Cir. 1987) (explaining that evidence of

“other crimes” is admissible to corroborate “crucial prosecution testimony,” so

long as the corroborating testimony is “direct and the matter corroborated is

significant” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But in the present case, though

this testimony may otherwise have been admissible, we conclude that it was

needlessly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. In particular, by permitting six

witnesses to testify regarding the Cuff demotion—including Cuff himself and

three other non-conspirators—whatever probative value came from the

                                        39
corroboration of Hickey and Leto’s fears was substantially outweighed by the

potential prejudice associated with hearing again and again about Burke’s history

of vindictiveness.9   The repetition of such testimony risked distracting the jury

and transmogrifying the trial into a reckoning on Burke’s character. Accordingly,

the testimony of the non-conspirators regarding these incidents should have been

excluded.

      Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court’s errors were harmless in

light of the myriad other evidence presented at trial. “A district court’s erroneous

admission of evidence is harmless if the appellate court can conclude with fair

assurance that the evidence did not substantially influence the jury.”            United

States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 164 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In the harmless error analysis, we consider “(1) the overall strength of

the prosecution’s case; (2) the prosecutor’s conduct with respect to the improperly

      9   The other two purposes for which the district court admitted this evidence—to
illustrate motive by “show[ing] that defendants considered Burke’s enemies to be their
enemies,” and to show the close relationship between Burke, Spota, and McPartland—do
not alter our analysis. SPA-6. The evidence about Cuff’s demotion and retirement
party only marginally involves Spota and McPartland. Indeed, neither Spota nor
McPartland figure in the testimony recounting Cuff’s demotion, aside from their
participation in the “demotion party,” MA-1408, and neither Spota nor McPartland were
mentioned at trial in relation to Cuff’s retirement. In any case, either of these purposes
would have been achieved by permitting only Hickey and Leto to discuss these events—
not the various other witnesses.

                                           40
admitted evidence; (3) the importance of the wrongly admitted evidence; and

(4) whether such evidence was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence.”

United States v. McCallum, 584 F.3d 471, 478 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks

and alteration omitted).    “We have frequently stated that the strength of the

government’s case is the most critical factor in assessing whether error was

harmless.” United States v. Ramirez, 609 F.3d 495, 501 (2d Cir. 2010).

       Here, the government’s case was strong. Hickey was no doubt a critical

witness whose testimony, if believed, left “no question [that] both . . . defendants

[were] guilty of each and every single offense in the indictment.” MA-2043. But

the government also presented other witnesses and evidence to corroborate

Hickey’s testimony.     For example, phone records showed that multiple calls

occurred between the phones attributed to Burke and McPartland, Burke and

Hickey, and Burke and Madigan, on December 14, 2012, the day of the assault; and

between the phones attributed to Spota and McPartland, Burke and Madigan,

Spota and Madigan, McPartland and Madigan, Spota and Hickey, and Burke and

Hickey, on June 25, 2013, the day of the subpoenas.          Similarly, analysis of

cellphone locations provided corroboration for meetings about which Hickey

testified.

                                         41
      Additionally, testimony from multiple witnesses corroborated Hickey’s

account and, despite a lack of direct contact between these other witnesses and

Defendants-Appellants, the testimony alluded to Spota and McPartland’s

presence and role in the cover-up. For example, Leto testified to his belief that

Burke reported to Spota, MA-769, and he explained that he informed Hickey about

his subpoena so Hickey “would pass it up the chain to Burke and everybody else,”

MA-784 (emphasis added). Hickey’s role in the cover-up, Leto perceived, was to

“pass[] . . . information back to Chief Burke and all of them.” MA-846 (emphasis

added).   Bombace testified that there was “a seamless existence [between] the

DA’s office and the police department,” MA-617, and he spoke of his fear that, if

he were to cooperate with the federal investigation, he might be targeted “[b]y

Chief Burke and his associates . . . [w]hat [he] perceived was the District Attorney’s

office, too,” MA-625. And Craft, Burke’s girlfriend, testified that in the summer

of 2015, after the federal investigation was reopened, she heard Burke speak with

McPartland over the phone about concerns that Hickey and Bombace “were

talking about him.”       MA-1800 to -01.        Together, all of this testimony

                                         42
corroborated Hickey’s account of the cover-up and strengthened the case against

Spota and McPartland. 10

      Moreover, the evidence about Cuff’s demotion and retirement party, as well

as the detectives’ “tasks,” comprised only a small part of the government’s case.

In summation, the government specifically mentioned the demotion and the

retirement party only once each, as examples of retaliation by Burke against an

enemy; and in rebuttal the government made only one substantive reference to

Cuff at all.   Discussion of the tasks performed by the detectives was similarly

brief. These remarks by the government could have been made based only on

the properly admitted testimony from Hickey and Leto and, accordingly, could

not have misled the jury. As a result, we conclude that although the admission

of cumulative evidence regarding Cuff’s demotion and retirement party, and the

tasks performed for Burke, was in error, it was ultimately harmless.

      10Some evidence pointed in the other direction. Constant testified that by 2012
Burke and Spota were not on good terms, making a coordinated cover-up less likely. See
MA-1681. Still, the jury was entitled to discount that evidence and to credit Hickey’s
testimony and its corroboration.

                                         43
       II.   Application to Admit the Government’s Bill of Particulars

      Next, Spota and McPartland challenge the district court’s denial of their

application to admit the government’s pre-trial bill of particulars. In summation,

the government argued that the June 25, 2013 meeting attended by Burke,

McPartland, Spota, Madigan, and Constant, as well as another meeting of the same

group in October 2015, were evidence of the cover-up. Spota and McPartland

subsequently sought to introduce the government’s pre-trial bill of particulars,

arguing that the government’s purported position in summation—that Constant

was a co-conspirator—was inconsistent with the bill of particulars, which did not

list Constant among the list of co-conspirators.     The district court denied the

application, and in rebuttal, the government clarified it was not arguing that

Constant was a co-conspirator. On appeal, Spota and McPartland repeat their

arguments from trial.

      As above, we review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. Litvak, 889 F.3d at 67. We have previously stated that although bills

of particulars “are not evidence in and of themselves,” “a prior inconsistent bill of

particulars [may] be considered an admission by the government in an

appropriate situation,” and may therefore be admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) of

                                         44
the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260–62

(2d Cir. 1991) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (defining a

statement made by an opposing party as “not hearsay”).          The inconsistency

should be clear on its face. Cf. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir.

1984) (explaining that when admitting a prior inconsistent opening statement under

Rule 801(d)(2), the inconsistency “should be clear and of a quality which obviates

any need for the trier of fact to explore other events”).

      Here, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the

application to admit the bill of particulars. There was no “clear” inconsistency

about Constant’s status in the government’s statements. Id. Indeed, there was

no inconsistency at all, as the government did not state in its opening summation

that Constant was a co-conspirator.      Moreover, even assuming arguendo there

was an inconsistency generated by the government’s opening summation, the

government’s clarification in rebuttal obviated any need to admit the bill of

particulars. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the application

to admit the bill of particulars.

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                             III.   Rule 33 Motion

      Finally, McPartland challenges the district court’s denial of his request for

an evidentiary hearing and new trial under Rule 33.          Following the verdict,

McPartland filed a Rule 33 motion seeking a new trial on the current record or,

alternatively, an evidentiary hearing to establish, inter alia, that Hickey testified

falsely as to critical parts of his trial testimony and that the government knew or

should have known the testimony was false.           The district court denied the

motion.

      We review the district court’s denial of a motion under Rule 33 for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Vinas, 910 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 2018).

      A district court abuses its discretion in denying a Rule 33 motion
      when (1) its decision rests on an error of law or a clearly erroneous
      factual finding, or (2) its decision—though not necessarily the product
      of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be
      located within the range of permissible decisions.

      Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).          The district court

itself “has broad discretion to decide Rule 33 motions based upon its evaluation of

the proof produced.”     United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 364 (2d Cir. 1995)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “The ultimate test on a Rule 33 motion is

whether letting a guilty verdict stand would be a manifest injustice.”           United

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States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001). As we have explained, to grant

a new trial pursuant to Rule 33, “[t]here must be a real concern that an innocent

person may have been convicted.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 969 F.2d

1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992)).

      Here, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of

McPartland’s motion for a new trial and evidentiary hearing. It considered all

the circumstances surrounding Hickey’s testimony, including those McPartland

raises now on appeal. For example, McPartland argues on appeal that Hickey’s

testimony regarding the February 2013 meeting—in which McPartland allegedly

approved Burke’s story that he merely “popped his head” into the interrogation

room—was clearly false because there is no reference to this meeting in either the

government’s witness materials or Hickey’s own notes.         But the district court

appropriately explained that the omission of the meeting from Hickey’s calendar

was “not dispositive.”        See MA-2116 to -17.   Moreover, the district court’s

conclusion that Hickey’s testimony was credible—and, at a minimum, not at the

level of “patently incredible” required for a court to reject the jury’s credibility

determination, Sanchez, 969 F.2d at 1414—is located within the range of

                                         47
permissible decisions and does not rest on an error of law or a clearly erroneous

factual finding. See MA-2113 to -18.

       Further, McPartland incorrectly interprets the district court as requiring

newly discovered evidence in order to make a successful Rule 33 motion. The

district court’s reference to a lack of “newly discovered evidence” was merely to

underscore the point that McPartland could have pressed his perjury arguments

at trial; it did not require that he present new evidence. See MA-2120. Indeed,

the district court expressly acknowledged that “Rule 33 does not require that a

motion involve newly discovered evidence.” MA-2120 n.8. Thus, the district

court did not impose an erroneous burden on McPartland.

       Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that

McPartland’s failure to press his perjury argument at trial counseled against relief.

McPartland claims that he could not have asserted this argument at trial because

he would have had to call as a witness the prosecutor who was, at the time, trying

the case, thus leading to her disqualification under the advocate-witness rule.11

But as the district court correctly noted, McPartland could have called government

       11 See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct R. 3.7(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (“A lawyer shall
not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness . . . .”).

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agents other than the prosecutor to testify about Hickey’s disclosures to the

government; and if he truly needed the testimony of the prosecutor, he could have

requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury.   Cf. United States v. Leung, 40

F.3d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that in some circumstances, the trial court

should undertake an independent in camera review of government files to

determine materiality of the evidence). Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying McPartland his requested relief.

                                 CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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