Court Opinion

ID: 9765575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:07:56.218212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:11.719533
License: Public Domain

DALTON, Judge
(dissenting).
It is with regret that I find it necessary to dissent in this case and to specifically state the reasons for my dissent.
The essential holding of the majority opinion is that plaintiff can submit and recover on general negligence under the ■res ipsa loquitur doctrine even though he has pleaded and proved specific negligence and tendered to the court an instruction on such specific negligence. The holding, evidenced by a single paragraph of the majority opinion, is as follows:
“We hold that the submission of general negligence was proper, but we do so on the peculiar facts of this case. We do not mean to impair in any way the general rule that the pleading or precise proof of specific negligence constitutes a bar to the submission of general negligence as to the same act or occurrence, or as to an occurrence which the specific negligence explains.” (Italics ours.)
In other words, the majority opinion while purporting to recognize certain well-established rules of practice and procedure in this state has undertaken to write an exception thereto for which exception we find no basis in this record. We believe that the writing of such am, exception into the established law of this state will result in unlimited confusion and misunderstanding; and that it will cause the members of the Bar and the courts of this state an un*60ending amount of grief and difficulty. In our opinion the record in this case provides no basis for such an exception to the general rules.
In this case the plaintiff, in a single count of his petition, pleaded general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine as a contributing cause of his injury and also pleaded specific negligence of defendant in failing to provide him a reasonably safe place in which to work. He then offered such evidence as he deemed sufficient to make out a case for the jury of general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and also a case for the jury on the specific negligence pleaded in his petition. Thereafter, he submitted to the court instructions under each of the mentioned theories, and could, no doubt, have as easily obtained a verdict for plaintiff on the basis of the specific negligence charged and supported by evidence as he did under the general negligence submission. The trial court, however, refused the instruction submitting specific negligence, but gave the instruction submitting general negligence and a verdict was returned for plaintiff. It is defendant’s position that, under the facts shown, the plaintiff had no right to submit his case on general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and give the jury a roving commission to return a verdict for plaintiff on any type or kind of negligence a jury might find from the unusual circumstances shown. With that position we fully agree.
The majority opinion recognizes the existence of two well-settled rules of practice and procedure, to wit: (1) that where a complaint contains a charge of general negligence coupled with a charge of specific negligence the complainant will be confined to the specific acts of negligence charged in his petition; and (2) that where plaintiff alleges the specific acts of negligence causing his injury he is required to prove those specific acts and cannot rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See West’s Digest, Negligence, ^119(4). Other cases appear under particular headings in West’s Digest. And see the cases cited in the majority opinion.
In the case of Zasemowich v. American Mfg. Co., Mo.Sup., 213 S.W. 799, 802(3) the court said: “It has now become elementary law in this state that where a general allegation of negligence in a petition is followed by a charge of specific acts of negligence, the plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon the specific acts thus alleged.”
In the case of State ex rel. Anderson v. Hostetter, 346 Mo. 249, 140 S.W.2d 21, 25(3-4) the court said: “Furthermore, we have held that where a general charge of negligence is coupled with specific charges, as here, the specific charges take precedence and any question of a general allegation passes out of the case.” And see McManamee v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.. (1896), 135 Mo. 440, 37 S.W. 119, 121.
In determining whether the record presents a substantial basis for the proposed exception a review of the record is required.
In his petition, after pleading the specific facts upon which he sought to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the plaintiff alleged “that he had nothing to do with the installation or fixation or securing of said' pipe and the mechanics thereof, but all of the same was exclusively under the control of defendant at all times, and he does not know the exact reason that said pipe suddenly began .revolving wildly and seemingly out of control, but the same and said occurrence was extremely unusual and out of the ordinary and would not have taken place without negligence and failure to use due care on the part of defendant, and the facts thereof are peculiarly within the knowledge of defendant, and in relation thereto plaintiff alleges that the aforesaid negligence of defendant directly-contributed to his said injuries.”
This pleading clearly invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur negligence in its strict and distinctive sense.
*61Thereafter, in the same count of his petition the plaintiff pleaded the specific negligence of the defendant in failing to provide him a safe place in which to work and pin-pointed the exact negligence causing his injury. The charge of specific negligence is fully set out in the majority opinion, to which opinion reference is had.
At the close of all the evidence the plaintiff submitted to the court two instructions, the first being based upon the plea of general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, which instruction is fully set out in the majority opinion. “Such a submission of necessity excludes from its hypothesis reliance upon specific circumstances or circumstantial evidence which affirmatively tends to establish negligence of the defendant as a matter of fact as contrasted with negligence inferred from the permissible deduction of probability based on common experience.” Jarboe v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 359 Mo. 8, 220 S.W.2d 27, 31(11-13); Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Banc, 358 Mo. 491, 215 S.W.2d 506, 509(1-3). Plaintiff also asked the court to give Instruction No. 10, based upon his pleading and proof of specific negligence, as follows:

Instruction No. 10

“The Court instructs the jury if you believe from the evidence that defendant on February 13, 1957, at the time and place described in evidence maintained on its property and right of way wet and slick clay near said air compressor and sanding facilities and that plaintiff was likely to use said surface thereat in performing his customary duties, and that the above-submitted condition of the surface thereat rendered same and his working place provided by defendant for his use, if so, dangerous and not reasonably safe for such ordinary use, if so, and that defendant knew or by ordinary care would have timely known of all the above-submitted facts prior to his alleged slipping thereon and in time by such care to have remedied said condition and made said surface thereat reasonably safe for such use and thereby prevented plaintiff from slipping and falling and being injured, if so, and that defendant negligently failed so to do and that as a direct result thereof as a whole or in part plaintiff on said occasion slipped on said surface thereat on the said property of defendant, if so, and was thereby injured,, if so, then you will .return a verdict for plaintiff.” (Italics ours.)
In requesting the court to give this latter instruction the plaintiff, in effect, made a solemn admission that the record in the case fully supported the giving of this instruction, as the record in fact did.
It will be noted that the majority opinion, with meticulous care, has set out the detailed facts and circumstances upon which the plaintiff relies to support his charge of general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, but when the writer of the opinion reached the question of proximate cause, that is, as to whether any negligence connected with the unusual facts and circumstances shown caused plaintiff’s injuries, he found no such evidence in the record and was forced to admit that, “It may fairly be said that plaintiff did not state the precise cause of his slipping and fall.” A reference is then made to the statement of plaintiff’s counsel that plaintiff had “slipped there in some clay” and a further reference is made to other evidence as to the presence of “wet clay around the place where they worked.”
It is apparent, therefore, that respondent’s statement in his brief is correct to the effect that plaintiff “did not offer evidence as to zvhy or how he slipped (Italics ours.) It does appear, however, that he fell and was injured, because he slipped. A careful reading of the record, and particularly a study of plaintiff’s own testimony, discloses that he did not attribute his slipping and falling, or his injuries to either the whirling pipe or the noise therefrom, nor to his fear thereof, nor to his excitement or haste to escape. He limited his testimony to the mere fact *62that he “didn’t get but about two feet when he slipped and fell.” It is true that plaintiff was, no doubt, scared and may-have started to run, as did the other employees, and that such was a natural reaction ; however, only the plaintiff fell and he did not ascribe his fall to any matter connected with the unusual situation or his reaction thereto, but to the fact that he slipped. "I didn’t get to run, my feet went out from under me, my left leg went underneath me and I fell back.” (Italics ours.) As to the condition of the ground, he said: “The ground was wet * * * this clay that they dug there was wet * * all around the south side of the tank and part of the back end of the tank where the release valve was * * In this case it is clear that plaintiff’s own testimony does not ascribe his fall or his injuries to the unusual circumstances which were set out with such meticulous care in the majority opinion. He ascribed his injuries to the fact that he slipped and fell.
While we recognize that a jury under a proper .res ipsa loquitur submission, if the plaintiff had had a right to so submit his case, a jury might have supplemented plaintiff’s testimony and found a connection between the unusual circumstances and plaintiff's fall, yet on this record the plaintiff was not entitled to a res ipsa loquitur submission in view of his own pleadings, his own testimony and the fact that he and his counsel, by a specific instruction tendered to the court, recognized that plaintiff slipped and fell and was injured due to the wet clay and the failure of the defendant to provide him with a safe place in which to work. We are not here dealing with a case where a plaintiff pleaded general negligence only and made no proof of specific negligence.
In pleading general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and also specific negligence in the same count, the plaintiff was pleading two totally different theories of recovery, because proof of general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine may be made without the offering of any evidence of negligence, as such, while proof of specific negligence requires direct or circumstantial evidence of specific negligence. The difference between these two theories is the underlying basis for the development and application of the two rules of pleading and practice hereinbefore set out and also -recognized in the majority opinion.
In making an exception to these well-established rules, the majority opinion overlooks the nature and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and the reasons which brought the established rules into existence in the first place. See 38 Am. Jur., Negligence, Sections 297 and 298.
It has been said that the principal difference between a res ipsa loquitur case and a specific negligence case would seem to be that the very basis of liability, the existence of some kind of negligence (any type or kind that the jury may find), may be shown by a particular kind of circumstantial evidence, namely, an unusual occurrence of a character which ordinarily results from negligence, and from which, therefore, the negligence is a reasonable conclusion under the doctrine of probabilities, while in a specific negligence case the careless acts or omissions which constitute negligence must be stated and proved; in other words, in a res ipsa case, the ultimate fact, some type or kind of negligence, is inferred without any evidential facts except the unusual occurrence itself, while in a specific negligence case there must be evidential facts sufficient to show some pleaded negligent acts or omissions which were the proximate cause of the occurrence. Mueller v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 358 Mo. 247, 214 S.W.2d 1, 3; Palmer v. Brooks, 350 Mo. 1055, 169 S.W. 2d 906, 909; Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 350 Mo. 431, 166 S.W.2d 575, 579; Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1004; Removich v. Bambrick Bros. Construction Co., 264 Mo. 43, 173 S.W. 686, 687, L.R.A.1917E, 233; Girratono v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 363 Mo. 359, 251 S.W.2d 59, 62.
*63it has also been said that although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence, it does not rest for its application on specific circumstances peculiar to an individual occurrence and pointing of their own force to a specific human fault as does circumstantial evidence, but in its strict sense is based on generic circumstances peculiar to a class of physical causes producing an occurrence and pointing to no specific human fault. Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, 215 S.W.2d 506; Tayer v. York Ice Machinery Corp., 342 Mo. 912, 119 S.W.2d 240, 117 A.L.R. 1414.
The plaintiff in the first count of his petition, as stated relies on res ipsa loquitur in its strict and distinctive sense and not on circumstantial evidence. “While the rule of res ipsa loquitur in its distinctive sense, and the principal as to circumstantial evidence, perform different and distinctive functions, or at least work with different materials, they are alike in this, that they seek to infer from, what is known, or at least from what the evidence, direct or circumstantial, tends to establish, the existence of some unknown fault of omission or commission constituting negligence, and not merely to characterize known conditions as negligence.” (Italics ours.) Annotation 59 A.L.R. p. 468, 470.
Plaintiff, therefore, in pleading general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and also specific negligence in the same count of his petition, and in further seeking to submit his cause to the jury on both theories at the same time, was seeking to establish the existence of some unknown fault of omission or commission on the part of the defendant constituting negligence (a roving commission to the jury) and also to establish the specific negligence pleaded and shown by his own evidence.
The majority opinion recognizes the absolute inconsistency between these two theories when it states: “The two types of negligence should not have been combined, and the court properly refused plaintiff’s separate tendered instruction on specific negligence, having given Instruction No. 1.”
However, we think the settled law of this state required the court to refuse Instruction No. 1, because in such situation plaintiff was bound by his own pleading and proof of specific negligence and could not submit his cause on general negligence. Cook v. Union Electric Light & Power Co., Mo.App., 232 S.W. 248, 249.
Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has many times been referred to as a rule of necessity to avoid the miscarriage of justice where direct evidence is unavailable and it may be invoked where there is no evidence of specific negligence causing the injury. Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra, 215 S.W.2d 506, 509(4); Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., supra, 166 S.W.2d 575. No such necessity appears in this case.
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is also a rule of evidence, as stated, in that it permits a prima facie case of “some kind of negligence” to be established without direct proof of any particular negligence and, therefore, furnishes a substitute for specific proof but, if the plaintiff either pleads the specific negligence causing his injury or proves specific negligence, the jury may not be permitted to speculate or guess that his injury was caused by some other unknown and unspecified type of negligence.
“The plaintiff is bound by his evidence in a res ipsa case just as he would be in any ordinary negligence action and cannot in effect say to the jury, T have shown you exactly how the accident occurred but you are, nevertheless, still at liberty to speculate and presume it may have happened some other way.’ ” Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Electric Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S. W.2d 21, 25(5); Sanders v. City of Carthage, 330 Mo. 844, 51 S.W.2d 529, 531(4, 5); Berry v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 343 Mo. 474, 121 S.W.2d 825, 830(3). Clearly, the plaintiff cannot “fill in all the gaps in his own case and leave nothing to inference, and then recover on some other *64theory.” Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Electric Co., supra. That is exactly what the plaintiff has done in this case.
In view of the record in this case and the established law, it is not surprising that the respondent in his “supplemental and answer brief”, filed in this case after its transfer to Court en Banc, said: “At the outset, we have a confession. We could find no case where the procedural rule of pleading invoked * * * had ever been applied to our situation or had ever been applied to FELA cases, and did not conceive this even as possible, and we are now called upon to defend our course.” Respondent has cited no case and we find none cited in the majority opinion which justifies the making of an exception to the well-established rules of practice and procedure heretofore in effect in this state.
In a specific negligence case the plaintiff may, of course, plead as many specific charges of negligence as may have contributed to cause his injury and he may submit such charges as are supported by evidence, and he may submit them conjunctively or disjunctively, but to hold, as the majority opinion does, that “While the problem is certainly not free of difficulty, we have determined that the allegations of specific negligence in failing to furnish plaintiff a safe place to work (and referring to wet, slick clay) should not and do not affect his right to submit a res ipsa theory on the already completed negligence alleged in the sudden and violent revolving of the pipe,” (italics ours) is to make an exception which overlooks the nature and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and its inconsistency tvith specific negligence, in a case where the plaintiff has pleaded and proved specific negligence and requested an instruction on the ground that his injury was caused by such specific negligence in failing to provide him a reasonably safe place in which to work. Jarboe v. Kansas City Public Service Co., supra, 220 S.W.2d 27, 31(7-10).
It is difficult for us to find any real basis in this record for the exception which the majority opinion proposes to make, because it is conceded that, except for some basis for making an exception, the holding is contrary to well-established general rules and particularly to the rule that where plaintiff pleads and proves specific negligence he may not recover upon general negligence.
In this case, as stated, the plaintiff attempted to submit his case upon both general negligence under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (Instruction No. 1) and on specific negligence, as set out in Instruction No. 10. He failed to do so only because the trial court refused to give Instruction No. 10 on specific negligence. In trying to find a basis for the proposed exception to the general rules, the majority opinion refers to “the peculiar facts of this case” and says that “the totality of the facts involved two successive acts or occurrences of alleged negligence, each separate and distinct from the other.” (Italics ours.) There is also a suggestion that plaintiff “might elect to ignore the specific negligence (which may also have been a contributing factor) without impairing the always essential element of causation.” (Italics ours.) This latter statement ignores the fact that plaintiff did not elect to ignore specific negligence but, on the contrary, elected to submit his case upon both general and specific negligence. His failure to do so was only because the trial court gave his instruction on general negligence and refused his instruction on specific negligence, but plaintiff is bound by his request for the submission on specific negligence, and the error assigned on this appeal is on the giving of the instruction on general negligence. Further, the statement in the opinion that “the totality of the facts involved two successive acts or occurrences of alleged negligence, each separate and distinct from the other” and that the “specific negligence was a subsequent and different thing” ignores the fact that plaintiff himself by his own pleadings and evidence and by tendering Instruction No. 10 recognized that defendant’s negligent failure to provide a safe place to work was *65clearly a subsequent, intervening, independent and direct proximate cause, occurring after the unusual circumstances, and directly causing plaintiff to slip, fall and be injured.
The only other possible basis, which the majority opinion suggests as a ground for an exception to the general rules, is because the present action is an F.E.L.A. case and because under the substantive law, as applied by the Federal courts in such a case, “any demonstrated negligence of the defendant which ‘played a part’ in the injury is sufficient to make a submissible case.” We assume that this assigned reason for the exception is based essentially upon the “in whole or in part” provision of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, but, under the facts of this case, that rule is wholly unimportant because there is no question here but that plaintiff made a case for the jury and the case involves only the negligence of a single defendant and there was but a single fall and a single injury to plaintiff. The issue here is as to a proper submission of the case under the law of Missouri. The majority opinion fails to state why the established rules of practice and procedure in this state would not, under the facts of this case, accord to an F.E.L.A. claimant all of the substantive rights to which he is entitled. In other words, the opinion states no substantial basis for making an exception to the general rules on the facts shown by this record.
We can find no sound basis in this record for making any exception in this case to the established rules of practice and procedure and, if an exception is to be made, it should be made on a more substantial basis than appears in the majority opinion. Even if some valid basis for an exception should be worked out under similar facts, it should not be done in a case where the plaintiff has affirmatively elected to act in direct violation of long-established rules of practice and procedure, without any necessity therefor, and has pleaded, proved and asked the trial court to submit both general and specific negligence for one injury against one defendant and where his request for the giving of Instruction No. 10 affirmatively admitted that he had pleaded, proven and asked recovery upon the specific negligence charged, which actually caused his injury. The court’s error in giving the general negligence instruction under the circumstances shown was clearly chargeable to plaintiff’s counsel and the court should not now undertake to relieve him from his own folly.
The majority opinion refers to two cases as lending “some support * * * by analogy.” The first is Hall v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.Sup., 266 S.W.2d 597, where a plaintiff was caught between the doors of defendant’s bus as she attempted to alight and, when she screamed, the doors opened up and she fell out into the street. While in that case the cause was submitted upon.the res ipsa loquitur doctrine based upon the closing of the doors, it is clear that the plaintiff in her petition had not pleaded the opening of the doors as the specific negligence which caused her fall and injury. Neither had she shown that her injuries were sustained absent the fact that she had first been caught and then released. Nor had the plaintiff in that case submitted an instruction and asked the court to submit to the jury, as a ground for recovery, the defendant’s specific negligence in opening the doors and causing her to fall and be injured. We find no analogy in that case to support the proposed exception to the general rules.
The case of Jones v. Terminal R. R. Ass’n of St. Louis, Mo.Sup., 242 S.W.2d 473 is also cited in support of the proposed exception to the well-established rules of practice and procedure in this state. We find nothing in that case to support the trial court’s action in this case in giving the res ipsa loquitur instruction and in refusing the instruction which plaintiff tendered on specific negligence. In the Jones case there was no pleading or proof of any specific negligence of defendant, nor was there a tender of an instruction on that basis. It is clear from a reading of the opinion that it was plaintiff who instinctively grabbed *66the steel gate as the elevator started to descend. In that case the plaintiff did not attribute his injuries to any negligence of defendant other than the res ipsa loquitur negligence pleaded and submitted.
It seems to us that the statement in the opinion as to the ruling of the case “on the specific facts of this case” is but an excuse for the making of an exception for which we find no support in any Missouri case or in any recognized text. We think the opinion is definitely erroneous and a most dangerous precedent. We must, therefore, most respectfully dissent.