Court Opinion

ID: 9365209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 08:09:21.29309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:43.711609
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-22-00034-CR
     ___________________________

   STEVEN LARRASQUITU, Appellant

                    V.

         THE STATE OF TEXAS

  On Appeal from the 213th District Court
         Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 1660860D

  Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                              I. INTRODUCTION

      A jury found appellant Steven Larrasquitu guilty of two counts of indecency

with a child by contact and assessed his punishment at twenty years’ imprisonment for

each offense. The trial court sentenced Larrasquitu accordingly and ordered the

sentences to run consecutively.

      On appeal, Larrasquitu raises two points:

      (1) Did the trial court err by denying his motion for mistrial after the
      prosecutor argued outside the record that before trial she had instructed the
      complainant to refer to Larrasquitu as the “Defendant”?

      (2) Did the trial court err by overruling his objection after the prosecutor
      argued outside the record that Larrasquitu had obtained a second cell phone
      after the complainant’s charges surfaced?

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Larrasquitu’s

motion for mistrial because it admonished the jury to remember the evidence and

instructed the jurors to disregard the prosecutor’s comment. We further hold that the

prosecutor’s argument—that Larrasquitu had obtained a second phone after the

complainant’s outcry—was a reasonable deduction from the evidence and that the

trial court thus did not abuse its discretion by overruling Larrasquitu’s objection.

Accordingly, we overrule both of Larrasquitu’s points and affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

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                          II. LARRASQUITU’S POINTS

      Larrasquitu’s two points complain about improper prosecutorial arguments

made during closing arguments. His two points are, however, in different procedural

postures. In Larrasquitu’s first point, the trial court sustained his objection, instructed

the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comment, but denied his motion for mistrial.

And in his second point, the trial court overruled his objection to the prosecutor’s

argument.

                                 A. APPLICABLE LAW

                           1. Law Common to Both Points

      During closing argument, the State may (1) summarize the evidence, (2) make

reasonable deductions from the evidence, (3) answer opposing counsel’s arguments,

or (4) plead for law enforcement. Freeman v. State, 340 S.W.3d 717, 727 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2011).

                           2. Denial of Motion for Mistrial

      When a trial court sustains an objection and instructs the jury to disregard

improper argument but denies a defendant’s motion for mistrial, the issue is whether

the trial court abused its discretion by denying the mistrial.          Hawkins v. State,

135 S.W.3d 72, 76–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). A mistrial is required only in extreme

circumstances, such as when the improper argument causes incurable prejudice, that

is, the argument is “so prejudicial that expenditure of further time and expense would

be wasteful and futile.” Id. at 77 (quoting Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim.

                                            3
App. 1999)). In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by denying a

mistrial, we balance three factors: (1) the severity of the misconduct (prejudicial

effect); (2) the curative measures; and (3) the certainty of conviction absent the

misconduct. Id.; Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on

reh’g).

          Generally, an instruction to disregard improper jury argument suffices to cure

error. Davis v. State, 894 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).

This general rule has, however, an exception: an instruction to disregard will not cure

the error when the jury argument is manifestly improper or extreme. Id. at 474–75. If

the prosecutor argues outside the record and injects personal opinion, an instruction

to disregard will cure the error unless the argument is clearly calculated to inflame the

jury and withdrawing the impression is impossible. Id. at 475.

                               3. Overruling an Objection

          We review a trial court’s overruling an objection to improper jury argument for

an abuse of discretion. Winchester v. State, No. 02-19-00293-CR, 2020 WL 7258058, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 10, 2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). Provided the trial court’s decision falls within the zone of reasonable

disagreement, it does not abuse its discretion. Id.

          When the trial court errs by overruling a defense objection that the

prosecutor’s argument exceeded the permissible bounds, we will not reverse the

judgment unless the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Tex. R. App. P.

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44.2(b); Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).               In

determining whether substantial rights were affected, we consider (1) the severity of

the misconduct (that is, the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks), (2) the

presence or absence of any curative measures, and (3) the certainty of conviction

absent the misconduct. Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 728.

                                   B. FIRST POINT

      In Larrasquitu’s first point, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor argued outside the record that she

had instructed the complainant before trial to refer to him as the “Defendant.” We

hold that the trial court’s admonition to remember the evidence and instruction to

disregard the prosecutor’s comment cured any prejudice.

                                    1. Background

      For context, we begin with defense counsel’s observation during argument that

the complainant had consistently referred to Larrasquitu as the “Defendant” and not

as “Steve” or “Steven.” From this, defense counsel argued that someone had coached

the complainant, who was ten years old at the time of trial, to refer to Larrasquitu as

the “Defendant.”

      During the State’s rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that the week before trial

while the complainant was sitting in the prosecutor’s office, the complainant balked at

calling Larrasquitu by his name, so the prosecutor and the complainant agreed to refer

to him as the “Defendant.” When defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was

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testifying, the trial court initially overruled defense counsel’s objection and instructed

the jury to remember the evidence. But when defense counsel persisted in his

objection, the trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard

the prosecutor’s comment. The trial court, however, denied defense counsel’s motion

for mistrial.

                                     2. Discussion

       The State concedes that the prosecutor’s argument went outside the record, but

it argues that the trial court’s admonition to remember the evidence and instruction to

disregard the prosecutor’s comment cured any prejudice. See Davis, 894 S.W.2d at

474–75. We agree.

                             a. The use of the two terms

       By our count, the complainant referred to Larrasquitu four times as the

“Defendant” and once as “Steve.” The record shows why she switched from one

name to the other.

                                b. Direct examination

       While the complainant was on the stand, the prosecutor initially referred to

Larrasquitu as “Steven.” After the complainant identified Larrasquitu in court, the

prosecutor transitioned to calling Larrasquitu the “Defendant” fairly quickly. The trial

court referred to him as the “Defendant,” as well. Larrasquitu had been referred to as

the “Defendant” twenty times by the prosecutor, and one time by the trial court, by

the time the following exchange occurred,

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      [Prosecutor:] Q. You mean, no one else besides you and -- who else was
      in the room?

             [The complainant:] A. Do I say his name?

           Q. You can say his name if you want to, or we can call him the
      Defendant like we’ve been calling him.

             A. The Defendant.

             Q. Okay. So you and the Defendant -- was there anybody else in
      the room?

             A. Nobody else. Just me and the Defendant.

Consequently, the reason that the complainant referred to Larrasquitu as the

“Defendant” shows itself from the testimony on the record and before the jury.

      After this exchange, the prosecutor continued to refer to Larrasquitu as the

“Defendant.” On one occasion, the complainant referred to him as the “Defendant,”

as well. Thus, throughout the prosecutor’s direct examination, after the complainant

identified Larrasquitu in court, the prosecutor consistently referred to Larrasquitu as

the “Defendant,” as did the complainant.

                               c. Cross-examination

      During cross-examination, defense counsel referred to Larrasquitu twice as

“Steve,” and the complainant also referred to him as “Steve.” Comparing this to the

direct examination, we see that the complainant—by referring to Larrasquitu as

“Steve”—followed the lead of the person questioning her.

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      Thereafter, defense counsel continued to refer to Larrasquitu as “Steve” or

“Steven.”   But on two occasions, even defense counsel referred to him as the

“Defendant.” One of the two times that defense counsel referred to Larrasquitu as

the “Defendant” was when she underscored that the complainant, when questioned

by the prosecutor, had referred to Larrasquitu as the “Defendant.”

                             d. Redirect examination

      On redirect, the prosecutor continued to refer to Larrasquitu as the

“Defendant.” And the complainant mimicked the prosecutor by identifying him as

the “Defendant.”

                             e. Recross-examination

      On recross-examination, defense counsel referred to Larrasquitu as the

“Defendant” once.

                                    f. Analysis

      The record shows that the prosecutor, the trial court, and even defense counsel

referred to Larrasquitu as the “Defendant” and that the complainant did so only after

asking the prosecutor how she was supposed to refer to him. Even then, when

defense counsel referred to Larrasquitu as “Steve,” the complainant followed her

example. Thus, the trial court’s admonishment to remember the evidence would have

reminded the jury of record evidence that explained why the complainant had referred

to Larrasquitu as the “Defendant” and that showed that she did not refer to him

exclusively as the “Defendant.”

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       In light of this record, the prosecutor’s argument was not so manifestly

improper or extreme as to render the trial court’s instruction incapable of effectuating

its curative purpose. See id. at 474. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it denied Larrasquitu’s motion for mistrial, and we overrule

his first point.

                                 C. SECOND POINT

       In Larrasquitu’s second point, he contends that the trial court abused its

discretion by overruling his objection, after the prosecutor argued outside the record,

that Larrasquitu had obtained a second cell phone after the complainant’s charges

surfaced.

                                   1. Background

       During final arguments, the prosecutor summarized the complainant’s

testimony that Larrasquitu had taken pictures of her with his phone while she had

performed the “evil pose” and then argued that after the complainant had made her

allegations, Larrasquitu had obtained a new phone. Defense counsel objected that the

prosecutor was arguing outside the record and was testifying.          The trial court

overruled defense counsel’s objection.

                                    2. Discussion

       Larrasquitu testified that when he had left the home in which he had lived with

the complainant and her mother, he had taken his “phone”—not his “phones”—and

he also testified that when he had appeared for his interview with a detective, he had a

                                           9
different phone. The complainant made her initial allegations on August 17, 2020,

and the detective interviewed Larrasquitu about six weeks later on October 8, 2020.

Although Larrasquitu argues that the State failed to ask whether he had multiple

phones or whether he had purchased a new phone, we conclude that the argument

that Larrasquitu had obtained a new phone after the complainant’s allegations arose is

a reasonable deduction from the evidence. See Freeman, 340 S.W.3d at 727. Thus, we

hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Larrasquitu’s

objection. We overrule Larrasquitu’s second point.

                               III. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Larrasquitu’s two points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments of conviction.

                                                     /s/ Brian Walker

                                                     Brian Walker
                                                     Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: January 19, 2023

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