Court Opinion

ID: 9657894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:40:32.652428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.208028
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). Rent control returns to Wisconsin, this time by judicial edict. State level rent control legislation in this state had two principal effects: (1) It proscribed rent increases; (2) it placed limitations upon the right of landlords to terminate tenancies.1 Such state level rent control law expired in 1949, and has not been reenacted. In fact, no suggestion has been made nor action taken by the legislature to reimpose such restrictions.2
Since 1949, it has been the law in Wisconsin, as it was before the rent control law interim, that a month-to-month tenancy can be terminated by either landlord or tenant, for any reason at all or for no reason at all, by the giving of at least thirty days’ notice in writing of termination.3
It remains the law in Wisconsin, as the legislature has provided, that any tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by giving at least thirty days’ written notice that he shall remove from the premises. His reasons for so doing are immaterial. In fact, he need have or give no reason at all.
*401It now becomes law in Wisconsin, well beyond the clear language of the applicable statute, that a landlord may not terminate a month-to-month tenancy by giving thirty days’ written notice that the tenant is to remove from the premises, if he is motivated by the tenant’s having filed a complaint against the landlord with local authorities. If such be the motivation, the thirty-day notice is invalid and the tenant stays on. It is certainly predictable that, so motivated, the landlord may not increase the rent. So the tenant remains in the same premises at the same rental, with a tenure that is something more than a month-to-month tenancy, whether the landlord likes it or not.
There are those who identify solely with the problems of tenants, particularly those in large metropolitan areas, in securing adequate housing at reasonable rates. They will applaud the sociological effect of this judicially imposed restriction upon a landlord’s right to terminate a month-to-month tenancy under these circumstances.
There are those who identify primarily with the problems facing landlords, particularly owners of duplexes and smaller housing units in large metropolitan areas, who are struggling to pay heavy property tax levies and maintain their properties without going in the red. They will be much less enthusiastic about this court-imposed limitation on a landlord’s right to terminate a tenancy.
There are those who will view this decision with a wider perspective. Citizens who respect the division between legislative, executive and judicial functions in our form of government will and should, in this writer’s opinion, be appalled at this clear example of judicial lawmaking. Our government, including its state level, is divided into three branches. The legislative branch is to enact the laws that determine questions of basic public policy. The executive branch is to administer such laws. The judicial branch is to interpret, apply and constitutionally test them. When an appellate court amends *402a law to give it an application, contrary to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute, the judicial invasion of the legislative field is obvious. A spike has been driven for the railroad track that leads away from the checks and balances inherent in our tripartite form of government.
Here we do not deal with the matter of broad or narrow interpretation of constitutional provisions or protections, always tersely stated and seldom specifically spelled out. The Law Eeform Division, Milwaukee Legal-Plan Services, which brings this appeal on behalf of an ex-tenant, does contend that sec. 234.03, Stats., relating to the termination of tenancies, is unconstitutional. However, that issue is not reached in the majority opinion, and not dealt with in this dissent.
Nor do we here deal with the right of the legislature to place reasonable restrictions upon the use of property for the promotion of the general welfare, reasonably calculated to safeguard public health and safety.4 Actually, a number of state legislatures have limited the right of a landlord to terminate a tenancy where a complaint has been made against such landlord by such tenant.5 If the Wisconsin legislature had made the policy judgment involved — that it is socially desirable to impose this limitation upon landlords — the case would be clear.6 For *403the court to do what the legislature did not do is a something else, or should be.
The invitation to the court to do what the legislature did not do is set forth in appellant’s brief thusly: . it is the task of the Court to determine what the legislature would have done in the light of the purpose and effect of the statute, if it had been faced with the problem now before the Court.” It is difficult to imagine a more incorrect description of the role of the courts in interpreting and applying statutes. It is what the legislature did do, not what they might have done, that is before us. There is an area for interpreting legislative actions or intent, liberally or not so liberally, although where meaning of words is clear there is nothing to be interpreted.7 However, there is no right of a court to say if the legislature knew then what we know now, they would have done differently, and proceed to substitute such different law for the one actually enacted by the legislature. That makes the court a super-legislature, not a reviewing court at all.
The majority opinion does not travel the full route suggested by appellant. It finds in a general policy statement, enacted as part of a different statute, a legislative intent to change the sec. 234.03 procedure. In so doing, it sets forth and relies upon the subsection labeled “Findings,” incorporated in sec. 66.435, Stats, (the Urban Renewal Act), dealing with the acquisition and clearance of slum, blighted or deteriorated areas. This subsection (2) is clearly intended to warrant and justify the expenditure of public funds for eliminating or remedying slum conditions by setting forth the public purpose served *404by such expenditures. The subsection is a part of the specific statute in which it is located. It does not reach out to alter or amend enactments in other sections of the statute book. Such general findings and declarations of policy undergird and explain the specific enactments by the legislature of which they are a part. They are not a delegation to the judicial branch to alter, amend or repeal all statutory provisions that the court feels do not sufficiently forward the public purpose or public need set forth.
The Wisconsin Family Code begins with a statement of broad public policy, favoring the maintenance of stable family life in this state.8 Does this have any effect upon the specific grounds for divorce established by the legislature? May a court find any or all of such grounds inconsistent with the broadly stated declaration of public policy that family stability is a public good. The answer is, No. Divorce remains a creature of statute, and litigants are entitled to look to the statutory provisions as enacted to determine their rights.9
There is a long-standing rule of construction in this state that the Workmen’s Compensation Act be liberally construed to further its beneficent purposes.10 Does this entitle a court to find a clear and precise procedural requirement invalid because it does not further such public purpose of the Act? Can a court grant compensation, where there is no statutory provision for so doing, in order to effectuate the liberal construction of the public purpose? Of course not. The provisions of the compensation act are to be liberally construed, but this is no delegation to the courts of any power to alter, amend, or *405suspend the specific statutory requirements for recovery. 11
The majority opinion quotes approvingly a Washington, D. C., case in which the author, Judge J. Skelly Wright, makes controlling “. . . the social context in which our decisions will have operational effect.” 12 This is fancy language for substituting presumed sociological benefits for a legal interpretation of legislative enactments and intents. It transfers to the courts a policy-deciding function constitutionally delegated to the legislative branch of our government. It is the legislature, the branch of government most responsive and responsible to the will of the people, that is to decide issues of public policy “. . . in the social context in which our decisions will have operational effect.” Courts are neither constitutionally authorized nor well-equipped to determine the public policy in areas of debate and controversy. That is the legislative, not the judicial, function.
Perils along this course for courts are exemplified by Judge Wright’s listing “. . . the inequality of bargaining power between tenant and landlord,” as a factor to be considered in interpreting the provisions of a legislative enactment. Applied to the corporate owner of a multimillion-dollar high-rise in the nation’s capital, the Goliath-David comparison is apt, although Goliaths don’t always win. Applied to the retired pensioner or workingman owner of a Milwaukee duplex, the giant-pygmy analogy does not hold, particularly with groups such as the Law Reform Division, Milwaukee Legal-Plan Services enlisted on the side of tenant power. The sequence of events in this case shows the hurdles the respondent-*406landlord faced and still faces in implementing a thirty-day notice to terminate a month-to-month tenancy:
May . 31, 1968: Landlord served thirty-day notice to terminate tenancy.
July 9, 1968: Landlord commenced unlawful detainer action in county court.
July 26, 1968: Landlord secured judgment following trial in county court.
October 11, 1968: Trial de novo on tenant’s appeal to circuit court. Landlord granted judgment.
November 3,1968: Tenant vacated premises in lieu of filing appeal bond which would have permitted him to remain in premises.
December 1, 1969: On appeal, case argued in supreme court.
January 9, 1970: Case remanded to circuit court for new trial. In the record is the tenant’s demand for a jury trial, so the end is not yet. More chapters remain to be added to the book.
It is not the sharpness of the sword placed in the tenant’s hands as much as the expense of raising the shield of defending costly court proceedings that makes “inequality” a doubtful description of the relationship between the parties in this case.
Actually, the vacation of the premises by the appellant back in 1968 makes this entire controversy moot, meaning that in reality there no longer is a true controversy existing.13 Appellant no longer has an existing right which the judgment substantially affects. The law reform division attorney argues that the case is saved from mootness because the costs in the county court ac*407tion are involved. These costs amount to $5.60. While liability ior costs can preserve a case,14 if this alone is always enough, the door is open insisting upon review of judgments which have no practical effect upon the rights of the parties involved. In two recent cases involving elections, the high court of the land dismissed appeals, holding the issues raised to be moot because the election was over.15 In both it can be assumed the costs amounted to more than $5.60, but both cases were dismissed as moot. The law reform system staff did not attempt here to bring a class action on behalf of appellant and other tenants similarly situated, present and future. Since it did not do so, the case it did bring is moot and has been since November 3,1968.
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, or, in the alternative, the appeal should be dismissed for the reason that the case is moot.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Leo B. Han-ley concurs in this dissenting opinion.

 Sec. 234.26, ch. 442, Laws of 1947, entitled “Emergency Control of Rentals,” enacted in 1947 legislative session, and by its provisions, remained in effect until April 1, 1949.

 Assembly Bill 654 passed both houses of the Wisconsin legislature at the 1969 session. It contains new statutory provisions relating to the landlord-tenant relationship, but does not add the new defense to unlawful detainer actions created by the majority opinion.

 Sec. 234.03, Stats.

 State v. Dried Milk Co-operative (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 357, 114 N. W. 2d 412; State v. Voshart (1968), 39 Wis. 2d 419, 435, 159 N. W. 2d 1.

 See ch. 80, sec. 71, Illinois Revised Statutes; ch. 215, New Jersey Laws 1967; ch. 55, Laws 1968, House Bill No. 1606, Rhode Island; Michigan Public Act 1968, 297; Maryland Laws of 1969, ch. 223. (cited in appellant’s brief.)

 “Legislation and administrative rules, such as the . . . building codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with respect to the condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment — that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property owner — which has rendered the old common-law rule obsolete. . . .” Pines v. Perssion (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 596, 111 N. W. 2d 409.

 “. . . While the legislative intent may have been otherwise . . . yet it is not within the province of this court to seek secondary sources of legislative intent where the meaning of the statute is plain and unambiguous.” West Side Bank v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank (1968), 37 Wis. 2d 661, 669, 670, 155 N. W. 2d 587; see also Miller v. Wadkins (1966), 31 Wis. 2d 281, 142 N. W. 2d 855; State v. Caruso (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 696, 172 N. W. 2d 195.

 See. 245.001 (2), Stats.

 Reading v. Reading (1954), 268 Wis. 56, 66 N. W. 2d 753; O’Neill v. O’Neill (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 406, 117 N. W. 2d 267.

 Waunakee Canning Corp. v. Industrial Comm. (1955), 268 Wis. 518, 68 N. W. 2d 25; State v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 4 Wis. 2d 472, 90 N. W. 2d 397; Grant County Service Bureau v. Industrial Comm. (1964), 25 Wis. 2d 579, 131 N. W. 2d 393.

 “Appellants’ last contention is that public policy requires a reversal. But workmen’s compensation is wholly statutory and questions of what should be public policy concerning it are determined by the legislature. . . .” Harry Crow & Son, Inc. v. Industrial Comm. (1963), 18 Wis. 2d 436, 442, 118 N. W. 2d 841.

 Edwards v. Habib (D. C. Cir. 1968), 397 Fed. 2d 687, 701.

 “ ‘. . . this court (will not) entertain an appeal unless the appellant has an existing right which the order or judgment appealed from, if erroneous, has substantially prejudiced.’ ” Doering v. Swoboda, (1934), 214 Wis. 481, 484, 253 N. W. 657. See also Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Workers’ Union (1948), 252 Wis. 436, 440, 31 N. W. 2d 772, 32 N. W. 2d 190.

 Smith v. Whitewater (1947), 251 Wis. 306, 309, 29 N. W. 2d 33.

 Brockington v. Rhodes (1969), 396 U. S. 41, 90 Sup. Ct. 206, 24 L. Ed. 2d 209; Hall v. Beals (1969), 396 U. S. 45, 90 Sup. Ct. 200. 24 L. Ed. 2d 214.