Court Opinion

ID: 9602161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:15.095743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.199656
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds there was nothing for a jury to pass upon in this case, and affirms the trial court in granting a summary judgment for the defendant.
This is a case of first impression in Georgia. The facts are that Pollard, defendant, employed Bowden, as truck-driver. Bowden had a propensity for drinking alcoholic beverages to excess, particularly on weekends, which was well known by his employer. Nevertheless, on a Saturday morning Bowden was entrusted with the keys to a large Mack truck owned by defendant. Bowden warmed the truck up at 7:00 a.m., preparatory to driving the truck during the day for defendant, but was notified around 7:15 a.m. that the truck would not be used that day. Bowden walked away and left the truck unlocked, and with the ignition keys in the same, in a high-crime area in Atlanta. An intermeddler, stranger to both defendant and the truck-driver, got into the truck and drove it away from its parked position, and collided with plaintiffs automobile.
This is not a case where a child drives his father’s automobile after locating the keys, and the question of a father’s responsibility for the conduct of his minor child is not here involved. Despite that, the majority opinion cites two parent-and-child cases as its authority for holding there was no jury issue as to liability, to wit, Roach v. Dozier, 97 Ga. App. 568 (103 SE2d 691), where a 15-year-old son drove his father’s hearse without permission and caused a collision; and Chester v. Evans, 115 Ga. App. 46 (153 SE2d 583), where a 13 year-old- child drove his father’s Dodge automobile without permission and caused a collision. We repeat that these cases are *112inapplicable. The majority states that it considers as controlling the case of Brown v. Sheffield, 121 Ga. App. 383 (173 SE2d 891), which was decided squarely on the doctrine of respondeat superior and on doctrine of negligent entrustment to an incompetent driver. It was held that declaratory judgment should have been granted as to Count 1 (respondeat superior), and should not have been granted as to Count 2 (negligent entrustment). It is more than a little difficult to understand how the majority opinion can contend that the above authority is controlling as to the case now under construction, and how it supports the position of the majority, especially as it was there held a good cause of action was set forth as to negligent entrustment.

Not a single one of the three Georgia cases cited involves the leaving of a motor vehicle parked in a high-crime area, unlocked, and with the ignition keys in the ignition switch!

The majority opinion comments on the California case of Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440 (393 P2d 164), which involved a truck parked on the street in a skid-row neighborhood with the key left in the ignition, and states that the California court held that a jury question of liability was thus presented. (These are facts very kindred to the facts in the case sub judice).
And then the majority opinion makes this amazing statement: "This California case is contrary to the overwhelming majority view as noted in 51 ALR2d 633 where the annotation points out that in most jurisdictions a third party cannot recover from the owner or operator who leaves keys in an ignition in the absence of a statute obligating the motorist to remove his keys from the ignition when leaving the car unattended on a public street.” I do not read 51 ALR2d as do my distinguished associates. I believe exactly the reverse of the foregoing statement is true, and that a vast majority of the cases cited in 51 ALR2d 633 et seq. support a cause of action against one who leaves keys in the ignition switch in a place where the car might reasonably be driven off by a third person; and at the very least, a jury question is made as to liability.
First of all, page 633, which the majority cites, is an *113Index only, and lists: "Locking ignition or door, 646. Disposition of keys, 651.” Now, I feel compelled to quote from those pages and other pages following in context in rebuttal of the majority opinion’s assertion that this volume of ALR shows the vast majority view in most jurisdictions is against recovery as to the operator who leaves car keys in the ignition switch. The language at page 646 is as follows: "Numerous cases hold or recognize that failing to secure the ignition switch of a motor vehicle and leaving the door unlocked, when parking such a vehicle in a public street, are circumstances tending to establish negligence which gives rise to liability where the vehicle is thereafter set in motion by an intermeddler, and injury or damage to another results.
"Connecticut.—Block v. Pascucci (1930) 111 Conn 58, 149 A 210.
"District of Columbia.—Ross v. Hartman (1943) 78 App DC 217, 139 F2d 14, 158 ALR 1370, cert den 321 US 790, 88 L ed 1080, 64 S Ct 790; Bullock v. Dahlstrom (1946, Mun Ct App Dis Co) 46 A2d 370.
"Illinois.—Ney v Yellow Cab Co. (1954) 2 Ill2d 74, 117 NE2d 74, 51 ALR2d 624; Moran v Borden Co. (1941) 309 Ill App 391, 33 NE2d 166; Ostergard v Frisch (1948) 333 Ill App 359, 77 NE2d 537, 22 NCCA NS 490.
"Louisiana.—Maggiore v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, Inc. (1933, La App) 150 So 394.
"Maine.—Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co. (1934) 132 Me 379, 171 A 387.
"Massachusetts.—See Malloy v. Newman (1941) 310 Mass 269, 37 NE2d 1001, overruled on another ground in Galbraith v Levin (1948) 323 Mass 255, 81 NE2d 560, infra, § 14.
"Minnesota.—Wannebo v. Gates (1948) 227 Minn 194, 34 NW3d 695.
"New Hampshire.—Barlow v. Verrill (1936) 88 NH 25, 183 A 857, 104 ALR 1126.
"New Jersey.—Lomano v. Idea Towel Supply Co. (1947) 25 NJ Misc 162, 51 A2d 888.
"New York.—Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros. (1942) 288 NY 16, 41 NE2d, 140 ALR 534; Lee v Van Buren & N.Y. Bill Posting Co. (1920) 190 App Div 742, 180 NYS 295; Gumbrell v. Clausen-Flanagan Brewery (1922) *114199 App Div 778, 192 NYS 451; Teich v. Ruppert (1922) 201 App Div 682, 194 NYS 645; Connell v. Berland (1928) 223 App Div 234, 228 NYS 20, affd 248 NY 641, 162 NE 557.
"North Carolina.—Campbell v Model Steam Laundry (1925) 190 NC 649, 130 SE 638.
"Ohio.—Garbo v Walker (1955, CP) 57 Ohio Ops 363, 71 Ohio L Abs 368, 129 NE2d 537; Wagner v Arthur (1956, CP) 73 Ohio L Abs 16, 134 NE2d 409.
"South Carolina.—Pfaehler v Ten Cent Taxi Co. (1942) 198 SC 476, 18 SE2d 331.
"Tennessee.—Morris v. Bolling (1948) 31 Tenn App 577, 218 SW2d 754.”
Indicating the paucity of cases to the contrary, note the following guarded language at page 649, to wit:
"In some cases the view has been taken that the parking of a motor vehicle in a public street with the ignition switch unsecured and the doors unlocked is, as a matter of law, insufficient by itself to support a finding of negligence with respect to the parking of the vehicle, at least in the absence of a statute or ordinance requiring that designated precautions be taken.” (Emphasis supplied.) But notice the language at page 652:
"In a number of cases the opinion has been expressed that the particular injury or damage involved was not, or the jury could properly find it was not, the natural, probable, or foreseeable consequence of negligent conduct in the parking of a motor vehicle on a public street, where such vehicle was later put in motion by the act of a stranger or unauthorized person.”
Please note that the question of liability, in the foregoing cited cases, is left for determination by a jury.
"California.—Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal2d 60, 271 P2d 23, superseding (Cal App) 260 P2d 277.
"Illinois.—Cockrell v Sullivan (1951) 344 III App 620, 101 NE2d 878; Barton v Williams (1955) 4 Ill App2d 266, 124 NE2d 356.
"Indiana.—Kiste v Red Cab, Inc. (1952) 122 Ind App 587, 106 NE2d 395.
"Louisiana.—Tabary v New Orleans Public Service (1932, La App) 142 So 800; Boudreaux v New Orleans Public Service (1932, La App) 142 So 802; Castay v Katz *115& Besthoff (1933, La App) 148 So 76; Midkiff v Watkins (1951, La App) 52 So 2d 573.
"Michigan.—Roberts v Lundy (1942) 301 Mich 726, 4 NW2d 74, infra, § 18.
"New Jersey.—Saracco v Lyttle (1951) 11 NJ Super 254, 78 A2d 288; Reti v. Vaniska, Inc. (1951) 14 NJ Super 94, 81 A2d 377, cert den 8 NJ 39, 83 A3d 665; Kinsley v Von Atzingen (1952) 20 NJ 378, 90 A2d 37.
"New York.—Tierney v New York Dugan Bros. (1942) 288 NY 16, 41 NE2d 161, 140 ALR 534; Mann v Parshall (1930) 229 App Div 366, 241 NYS 673.
"Ohio.—Wagner v Arthur (1956, CP) 73 Ohio L Abs 16, 134 NE2d 409.
"Pennsylvania.—Rapczynski v W. T. Cowan, Inc. (1940) 138 Pa Super 392, 10 A2d 810.
"Tennessee.—Morris v Bolling (1948) 31 Tenn App. 577, 218 SW2d 754.
"England.—Ruoff v Long & Co. (Eng) [1916] 1 KB 148 - Div Ct.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It must be noted that even these cases make it a question for the jury, and not a summary judgment or directed verdict adjudication.
Again, at page 657: "However, in a number of other cases, it has been held or recognized that where the owner of a motor vehicle left it parked unattended and unlocked in the street, and it was thereafter set in motion by a stranger or intermeddler, causing damage or injuring another, the owner was liable for the resulting damages, and the act of the intermeddler did not necessarily constitute an efficient intervening cause.
"Illinois.—Ney v Yellow Cab Co. (1954) 2 Ill2d 74, 117 NE2d 74, 51 ALR2d 624; Moran v Borden Co. (1941) 309 Ill App 391, 33 NE2d 166; Ostergard v Frisch (1948) 333 Ill App 359, 77 NE2d 537, 22 NCCA NS 490.
"Louisiana.—Maggiore v Laundry & Dry Cleaning Service, Inc. (1933, La App) 150 So 394.
"Maine.—Hatch v Globe Laundry Co. (1934) 132 Me 379, 171 A 387, infra, § 16.
"North Carolina.—Campbell v Model Steam Laundry (1925) 190 NC 649, 130 SE 638.
"Pennsylvania.—Don v J. S. Ivins Sons, Inc. (1926) 90 Pa Super 105.
*116"South Carolina.—Pfaehler v Ten Cent Taxi Co. (1942) 198 SC 476, 18 SE2d 331.
"Tennessee.—Morris v Bolling (1948) 31 Tenn App 577, 218 SW2d 754.” (Emphasis supplied.)
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent, as I would reverse the judgment granting summary judgment for the defendant.