Court Opinion

ID: 9536503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:00:52.813899+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:35.307637
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice,
with whom LAVENDER, Justice, joins, dissenting from part III of the court’s opinion.
Three products liability defendants— Kerr-McGee Refining Corporation [Manufacturer], J.D. Fite, d/b/a Clayton Propane, Inc. [Wholesaler], and Kiamichi Valley LP Gas Co. [Retailer] — came to be exonerated by verdict in a wrongful death action. The latter two [claimants] appeal from an adverse postjudgment disposition of their ancillary claim against Manufacturer for counsel fees and other litigation expenses incurred when defending the lawsuit.1
I.
TODAY’S HOLDING BY THE COURT
The court pronounces a new exception to the American Rule: when, in a products liability contest, the manufacturer and its co-defendant “marketers” (wholesalers, distributors or retailers) are exonerated by verdict, marketers may recover from the manufacturer attorney’s fees and other suit expenses, if their own defense efforts conferred a substantial benefit upon the manufacturer. Never before has the legal system, of this state recognized such fee-shifting claims among exonerated tort defendants.2 Today’s pronouncement raises an implied-in-law manufacturer’s promise in favor of an exonerated marketer to indemnify the latter for defense-related expenditures. In short, the opinion transforms the manufacturer’s current status vis-a-vis its product distributors, immediate and remote, from one of an indemnitor from loss to that more akin to an of indemnitor against liability.
Although I join in giving birth to manufacturer’s liability for the marketer’s exoneration-related defense expenses, I would confine the new claim’s actionability, at least for now, to death cases; I would today impose upon the manufacturer a duty to provide marketers, on request, with legal defense services, to be afforded either by common or separate representation, as strategy choices may dictate; I would also prescribe distinctly different parameters of liability for exonerated marketers’ self-procured legal services where (a) the manufacturer’s tendered representation was rejected and (b) the manufacturer refused to provide any defense services.3
*307Moreover, I would not, as the court does today, allow the new rule of liability to have a fully retrospective sweep, but would restrict its teachings to this case, cases currently in trial or appellate process, and to all future claims arising after the pronouncement’s effective date4 To the additional duty I would create today — one which would require manufacturers to provide defense services on request — I would give a purely prospective effect and apply it only to claims arising after the issuance of mandate in this appeal.5
In part III of its opinion, the court concludes that because Wholesaler’s defense efforts benefited Manufacturer, Wholesaler should be allowed to recover. I would deny that claim. In my view, this marketer did not bring itself within the purview of today’s new exception to the American Rule because its contribution, made by way of self-procured legal services, was not shown to be significant, unique and essential; Wholesaler merely reinforced Manufacturer’s position by aligning itself with the mainstream of common defense efforts.
Lastly, I concur in that part of today’s judgment that denies Retailer’s claim; as for the court’s disposition of Wholesaler’s demand, I join the opinion only insofar as it ushers in a new indemnity claim for an exonerated marketer’s recovery from the manufacturer of the expenses incurred for self-procured legal defense services shown to have been significant, essential and unique.
II.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE AMERICAN RULE AND THE NEED FOR INCORPORATION OF ESSENTIAL SAFEGUARDS INTO THE NEW EXCEPTION CREATED BY TODAY’S PRONOUNCEMENT
The American Rule, which obtains in Oklahoma,6 makes each party responsible for its own counsel-fee expense in the absence of a contrary statute or contract. Although this State does recognize at least two equitable exceptions,7 neither of the exoneration-related indemnity claims be*308fore us today comes within the purview of either exception.8
Under the theory of products liability, the seller of a defective product is liable to the buyer for injury or death occasioned by the product’s unreasonable harm-dealing flaw.9 If the plaintiff prevails and the seller becomes a judgment-debtor who pays compensation, the seller is given a noncon-ventional indemnity claim against the manufacturer — the entity responsible for the defect’s presence.10 Although some cases refer to the seller’s (or marketer’s) demand as one in “implied indemnity,” the correct legal theory that underpins this kind of claim is an implied-in-law promise11 (o.f the manufacturer) to hold the seller harmless from loss occasioned by the product’s actionable defects.12 The manufacturer’s duty to indemnify a marketer’s loss clearly is founded on quasi contract.13 When indemnity is so sought for the amount of plaintiff’s loss, attorney’s fees incurred in the course of a vanquished marketer’s defense become a legitimately includable recovery item.14
A manufacturer’s vicarious accountability to a marketer, whenever triggered by *309verdict condemning the product, is analogous to the common-law liability of a servant to his master for compensation paid by the latter to a third person who was injured by the servant’s negligence.15 If, in an action based solely on respondeat superi- or, the servant prevails, he bears no common-law liability, in quasi contract or otherwise, for the exonerated master’s legal expenses.16
Today’s new exception to our present-day version of the American Rule goes beyond the common-law sweep of implied-in-law loss-related responsibility to pay for legal expenses incurred and harm dealt by a defective product. For the first time in our jurisprudence, exoneration, much like yesteryear’s loss, becomes the triggering device for a quasi-contractual promise to indemnify. In my view, a manufacturer’s liability for the marketer’s self-procured legal service must not be founded upon the latter’s solely duplicative defense effort advanced side-by-side with that of the manufacturer. Rather, the marketer’s quasi-contractual claim to such indemnity should be founded on a significant, essential and unique contribution toward the product’s exoneration.
Counsel-fee claims by exonerated marketers against prevailing manufacturers should not be recognized, at least for now, except in wrongful death actions. To extend the new indemnity farther would contravene the American Rule’s legislative modification to be found in 23 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 103.17 By the terms of § 103 the prevailing party in an action either to vindicate personal rights or for damages for personal injury may now recover up to $10,000.00 in litigation expenses against a vanquished opponent found to have asserted “a claim or defense in bad faith or upon insufficient legal or factual grounds.” Because wrongful death claims — such as the very suit in the aftermath of which the instant indemnity demands arose — are explicitly excluded from the §103 fee-shifting regime, I would restrict the new exception’s application to wrongful death/products liability cases.
Concurrently with the fashioning of today’s new exoneration-related indemnity claim, the court should also impose a new duty upon the manufacturer to provide the marketer, on request, with separate or joint representation, as strategy choices may dictate. I would today declare that the following duties shall govern in the interaction of marketers with the manufacturer for coordination of their common defense of the product:
1) If the manufacturer provides legal services on request, there should be no post-exoneration indemnity claim for counsel-fee recovery.
*3102) If the manufacturer tenders representation but the marketer rejects it, the latter can recover only for those self-procured, services that provided a significant, unique and essential component of the product’s defense.
3) If the marketer requested legal services but the manufacturer refused to provide them in any form, then the marketer would be entitled to full indemnity for all self-procured defense services.
4) A marketer who, without consultation with or notice to the manufacturer, procures its own legal representation is to be denied indemnity for litigation expenses.
5) If separate counsel were requested but all the manufacturer would provide is common representation, then the exonerated marketer would be entitled to full indemnity upon showing that common representation would have been injurious to its legitimate trial strategy-
III.
QUASI CONTRACT AND THE EXTENT OF THE DUTY I WOULD IMPOSE UPON MANUFACTURERS TO PROVIDE LEGAL DEFENSE SERVICES
The concept of unjust enrichment — the law’s prerequisite for imposition of implied indemnity — requires that promisee receive promisor’s benefits under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable accountability.18 Quasi contract jurisprudence withholds favorable treatment from a claimant who did not further the best interest of the party against whom recovery is sought.19 For example, an implied-in-law promise will not be raised in favor of the law’s familiar “officious volunteer20 or self-serving intermeddler” 21 — i.e., one whose performance was neither beneficial nor necessary.
To the extent a marketer refuses the manufacturer’s tender of defense services and unnecessarily hires separate counsel, the marketer becomes a self-serving in-*311termeddler rather than a quasi-contractual promisee or obligee conferring a beneficial service on the manufacturer.22 This would be the case if the plaintiff had brought a frivolous suit.23 The exonerated marketer should be entitled to recover its litigation expenses against the equally blameless manufacturer only if the marketer’s self-procured defense efforts provided a significant, essential and unique component of the successful common defense. If no safeguards are built into today’s exoneration-related extension of the American Rule, all manufacturers likely will become unconditional, open-ended obligors for counsel fees incurred by prevailing marketers indiscriminately haled into court as defendants in groundless controversies pressed by irresponsible legal counsel whose conduct makes them amenable to Rule 11 sanctions.24
Both claimants assert here that during pretrial discovery they had “informally” requested that Manufacturer take over the action’s defense and met with rejection. This event is utterly without any legal significance on Manufacturer’s liability because at the time it took place negligence counts were still pending below against both Wholesaler and Retailer. While these were later voluntarily dismissed in advance of trial, neither marketer renewed the prior request after the claim stood confined to one strictly in products liability. Under these facts, Manufacturer had had no opportunity to offer — on request — either common or separate representation for its marketers.
I would hold that Wholesaler’s right to indemnity would be securely anchored on an implied-in-law obligation only if that marketer could show that it had made a significant, essential and unique contribution to the product’s defense. This it did not do. The measure of recovery, which the court today extends to Wholesaler, should be reserved — under the norms I would apply prospectively25 — for marketers whose request for representation had been wrongly rejected.
*312IV.
SUMMARY
I join the court in carving out a new exception to the American Rule that allows an exonerated marketer counsel-fee recovery against an equally victorious manufacturer, but I would confine such claim’s actionability, at least for now, to death cases and I would apply today’s teachings prospectively to this case, those currently in trial or appellate process, and to all claims arising after the pronouncement’s effective date. I would be willing to join the court in transforming the manufacturer's status from that of indemnitor from loss to one more akin to indemnitor against liability,26 if this change (a) were restricted today to wrongful death litigation, which, as a class, stands unaffected by the legislative fee-shifting regime of § 103, and (b) were not given a fully retrospective sweep.
The court concludes that Wholesaler’s legal services conferred a substantial benefit upon Manufacturer. In my view, the advantage Manufacturer received via Wholesaler’s defense effort was nothing more than a purely incidental benefit derived from the latter’s pro forma alignment “on the same side of the table.” I would hence deny Wholesaler’s quest to be indemnified. I fully concur in today’s judgment insofar as it denies Retailer’s claim. That marketer’s openly hostile trial strategy, whose pursuit simply failed to confer on Manufacturer any legal benefit, contributed absolutely nothing to the product’s exoneration.
Lastly, I would fashion a new duty for manufacturers to provide marketers with legal defense services on request. This requirement would have a purely prospective effect, extending its teachings only to claims arising after the issuance of mandate.

. The action was tried on products liability theory alone. Allegations of negligence and breach of warranty, initially advanced against the claimants as well as Manufacturer, were later voluntarily dismissed. A substantial part of the litigation expenses incurred by the claimants may have been attributable to defending certain independent claims pressed solely against them. Those expenses are clearly beyond the ambit of Manufacturer’s liability for indemnity, since they are utterly unrelated to its legal accountability for the product’s safety.

. The duty to indemnify a vicariously liable prevailing party for exoneration-related litigation expenses was unknown to the common law in the context of a master/servant status-based relation. See the authorities cited infra note 15.

. In other jurisdictions, when the manufacturer and its co-defendant-marketers all have been exonerated from liability for the product’s harm, courts have held the manufacturer liable for its co-defendants’ counsel fees upon various grounds. See, e.g., Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059, 1067 (Alaska 1979) (manufacturer, who had a duty to defend its marketers, refused to take over the product’s defense; retailer's "right to indemnity” was held controlling); Boudreau v. General Elec. Co., 2 Haw.App. 10, 625 P.2d 384, 386 (1981) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 9) (manufacturer, who had ignored the seller’s tender of defense service, was held liable based on "general law” for litigation expenses incurred by exonerated seller); Pullman Standard v. Abex Corp., 693 S.W.2d 336, 338-339 (Tenn.1985) (indemnitor/indemni-tee relationship provides the basis for the manufacturer’s liability under a court-created exception to the American Rule); Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 447 and 450 (Utah App.1988) (recovery allowed only if 1) the manufacturer’s product is defective, 2) the marketer committed no wrong vis-a-vis the flawed product and 3) the manufacturer had notice of the indemnity claim).
Other courts have held that because marketers would have been entitled to indemnification for any judgment against them, they may recover against the manufacturer litigation expenses incurred in successfully defending the product-re*307lated claim. See, e.g., Pender v. Skillcraft Industries, Inc., 358 So.2d 45, 47 (Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1978); JKT Co., Inc. v. Hardwick, 284 S.C. 10, 325 S.E.2d 329, 333 (App.1984); Piedmont Equipment Co., Inc. v. Eberhard Mfg., 99 Nev. 523, 665 P.2d 256, 260 (1983). Accord: Maple Chair Co. v. W.S. Badcock Corp., 385 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.1980), where the court knew of no equitable basis for exonerated retailer's counsel-fee award against the manufacturer when the product’s alleged defect stands uncon-demned by verdict.
See also generally, Annot.: Attorneys’ Fees in Products Liability Suits, 53 A.L.R.4th 414.

.See Schepp v. Hess, Okl., 770 P.2d 34, 38-39 (1989). Were I writing on a clean slate, I would follow my dissent in Qualls v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., Okl., 629 P.2d 1258, 1259-1260 (1981), and give purely prospective effect to today’s extension of the American Rule, applying it only to claims arising after mandate. In Qualls, the court gave retrospective application to a statute authorizing recovery of counsel fees. Since I am bound by Qualls, I would adopt here the prospectivity standard most consistent with my own notions of fairness. See Schepp v. Hess, supra; see also, Chandler v. Denton, Okl., 741 P.2d 855, 864 n. 21 (1987), where, writing for the court, I was called upon to follow precedent settled by an opinion from which I had dissented.

. See Harry R. Carlile Trust v. Cotton Petroleum, Okl., 732 P.2d 438, 446 (1987).

. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1624, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Moses v. Hoebel, Okl., 646 P.2d 601, 603 (1982).

. See City National Bank & Trust Co. v. Owens, Okl., 565 P.2d 4, 7-9 (1977) (costs, including attorney’s fees, may be assessed against a party for litigation misconduct which causes another to incur counsel fees needlessly); State ex rel. Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 598 P.2d 659, 660 (1979) (when, through litigation, a lawyer successfully preserves or creates a fund which benefits a class, counsel fees may be awarded and paid from the fund; a fee request invoking the “equitable or trust fund doctrine” is analogous to a quantum meruit action). The equitable fund doctrine is especially applicable in a stockholders’ derivative suit. See Warren v. Century Bankcorporation, Inc., Okl., 741 P.2d 846, 853 (1987) (shareholders who successfully sue in behalf of the corporation and thereby enrich that entity are entitled to recover reasonable litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, from either corporate assets or funds within the court’s control).

. The concurring opinion cites Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Company, 396 U.S. 375, 393-394, 90 S.Ct. 616, 625-627, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970), for its conclusion that Wholesaler’s indemnity claim against Manufacturer fits within the "equitable fund” exception of the American Rule. In Mills, shareholders prevailed in an action under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to set aside a corporate merger accomplished by the use of a misleading proxy statement. On the question whether counsel fees were recoverable under the American Rule’s common or equitable fund exception, the Court stated the doctrine could be invoked even though its claimed beneficiary did not actually create a monetary fund.
Mills carves out an exception to the American Rule which appears to go beyond the parameters of the traditional common fund doctrine. Oklahoma case law has not recognized this prong. Moreover, Mills is distinguishable from this case. Unlike in Mills, Wholesaler's exoneration neither created nor preserved for Manufacturer’s use any identifiable corporate fund.

. Braden v. Hendricks, Okl., 695 P.2d 1343, 1351-1352 (1985).

. Braden v. Hendricks, supra note 9 at 1349-1350.

. At common law, a person’s vicarious liability for a sustained loss that was occasioned by the harmful conduct of another gives rise to an implied-in-law (non-contractual) indemnity claim against the responsible actor. See Travelers Ins. v. L. V. French Tr. Serv., Okl., 770 P.2d 551, 555 n. 16 (1988).

. A marketer's right of indemnity against a manufacturer is one for loss rather than liability. See Porter v. Norton-Stuart Pontiac-Cadillac of Enid, Okl., 405 P.2d 109, 111 (1965) (one who had been held constructively liable as an employer recovered indemnity from the actual employer for compensation paid to a third person injured because of the employee's negligence). A claim for indemnity from loss accrues once payment is made for the injury, while an action for indemnity from liability will lie as soon as the occasion for which indemnity is due has arisen. Travelers Ins. v. L.V. French Tr. Serv., supra note 11 at 555-556.

. A quasi contract, a constructive contract, or an implied-in-law contract is not to be confused with an implied contract. The latter is created by the parties’ conduct showing a mutual intent to form a contract — one that is implied by the facts. A quasi contract is one implied in law, regardless of a party’s intent. A legal obligation is thus created by means of an involuntary promise; in the latter instance, by operation of law. First Nat. Bank v. Matlock, 99 Okl. 150, 226 P. 328, 331-332 (1924); T & S Inv. Co. v. Coury, Okl., 593 P.2d 503, 504-505 (1979).
See also, Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modern Law (1938) at 475, where a quasi contract is described as follows:
"In our own law 'quasi contracts’ have often been confused with implied contracts, due to the fact that where the procedure of the Common Law prevails, the fiction of a promise, where none in fact exists, permits the favorite remedy of implied assumpsit. This is illustrated in cases brought to recover money paid by mistake, or obtained by fraud, likewise in cases where necessaries have been furnished an insane person, or a neglected wife or child. ‘In all these cases no true contract exists. They are by many authors termed quasi contracts, a term borrowed from the Civil Law. ’ A quasi contract is no contract or promise at all. It is an obligation which the law creates in the absence of any agreement. ‘Duty, and not a promise or agreement or intention of the person sought to be charged, defines it.”’ (citations omitted and emphasis added)

. United General Ins. v. Crane Carrier Co., Okl., 695 P.2d 1334, 1339 (1984); see, e.g., Griffin v. Bredouw, Okl., 420 P.2d 546, 549 (1966), where it was held that the American Rule does not inhibit recovery of attorney’s fees sought as but one item among multiple elements of damage *309flowing from the same transaction or occurrence that precipitated the action.

.See Stulginski v. Cizauskas, 125 Conn. 293, 5 A.2d 10, 11-12 (1939); Porter v. Norton-Stuart Pontiac-Cadillac of Enid, supra note 12 at 115 (in the master/servant context the question whether indemnitee had the right to recover litigation expenses from indemnitor was not there tendered for review); Annot. Servant’s liability to master for negligent or other wrongful injury to person or property of master or of third person for which master is responsible, 110 A.L.R. 831. Cf. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Stanley, Okl., 372 P.2d 852, 857 (1962) (in an action predicated solely on respondeat superior a verdict favoring the servant exonerates the master from all liability ); United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511-513, 74 S.Ct. 695, 697-698, 98 L.Ed. 898 (1954) (absent authorizing legislation, the Court declined to allow the employer [United States] to recover indemnity from an employee after the former had been held liable for the employee’s negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act)..

. See the authorities cited supra note 15.

. The terms of 23 O.S.Supp.1986 § 103 provide:
"In any action for damages for personal injury except injury resulting in death, or in any action for damages to personal rights the court shall, subsequent to adjudication on the merits and upon motion of the prevailing party, determine whether a claim or defense asserted in the action by a nonprevailing party was asserted in bad faith, was not well grounded in fact, or was unwarranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Upon so finding, the court shall enter a judgment ordering such nonprevailing party to reimburse the prevailing party an amount not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars (110,000.00) for reasonable costs, including *310attorneys fees, incurred with respect to such claim or defense." (emphasis added).

. Welling v. American Roofing, Etc., Okl., 617 P.2d 206, 209 (1980); Conkling’s Estate v. Champlin, 193 Okl. 79, 141 P.2d 569 (1943) (the court's syllabus ¶ 1). See also, Rankin v. Emigh, 218 U.S. 27, 35, 30 S.Ct. 672, 676, 54 L.Ed. 915 (1910); Gard v. Razanskas, 248 Iowa 1333, 85 N.W.2d 612, 614 (1957); Holloway v. People's Water Co., 100 Kan. 414, 167 P. 265, 270 (1917); National Shawmut Bank v. Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co., 318 Mass. 142, 61 N.E.2d 18, 21 (1945).

. See Welling v. American Roofing, Etc., supra note 18 at 210, where the court held that in the absence of evidence that the obligation sought to be recovered was established in bad faith, contractor was entitled to prevail against homeowner in quasi contract; Sarber v. Harris, Okl., 368 P.2d 93, 95-96 (1962), where it was held that when a vendee advances money in part performance of an oral sales contract that is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and then refuses to proceed with the transaction while the other party is ready and willing to fulfill his obligations, the sum advanced cannot be recovered quasi ex contractu against the vendor; Thurlwell v. Rabbit, 110 Okl. 285, 235 P. 923, 926 (1925), (holding that a quasi-contractual action is founded on a promise implied-in-law that arises when the defendant possesses funds which he, in equity and good conscience, has no right to retain.). See also in this connection, Roussel v. Russell, Okl., 339 P.2d 522, 527-528 (1959); Jones v. Goldberger, Okl., 323 P.2d 344, 346-367 (1958); Rogers v. Lassiter, 196 Okl. 228, 164 P.2d 632, 633 (1945) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 1).

. A "volunteer” is one who introduces himself into matters which do not concern him and does something which he is neither legally nor ethically bound to do or which is not in pursuance of the protection of another’s interest. Kelly v. Tyra, 103 Minn. 176, 114 N.W. 750, 752 (1908).
See also, Restatement of Restitution § 113 at 464 (1937), which provides:
"A person who has performed the noncontrac-tual duty of another by supplying a third person with necessaries which in violation of such duty the other had failed to supply, although acting without the other’s knowledge or consent, is entitled to restitution therefor from the other if he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor.” (emphasis added).

. See United Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Johnson, 181 Okl. 328, 73 P.2d 846 (1937) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 3); Matter of Estate of Mil-born, 122 Ill.App.3d 688, 78 Ill.Dec. 241, 244, 461 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (1984); Britt v. Britt, 320 N.C. 573, 359 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1987); Restatement of Restitution § 2 at 15 (1937), which states:
*311"A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor." (emphasis added).

. Quasi-contractual liability will not be applied if it clearly appears that the claimant (or would-be promisee) incurred expenses for his own benefit or advantage, and not for that of the promisor; a party cannot of his own volition create an obligation in his favor by acting in his own interest based on a need that he created. See Berry v. Barbour, Okl., 279 P.2d 335, 336 (1955); McBride v. Bridges, 202 Okl. 508, 215 P.2d 830, 832 (1950); Everhart v. Miles, 47 Md.App. 131, 422 A.2d 28, 31 (1980).

. Because manufacturers may be exposed to groundless controversies pressed by irresponsible legal counsel, the manufacturer should be under no duty to indemnify a marketer with products or public liability coverage. When faced with a frivolous claim, those marketers should look for legal representation to their own insurers — without recourse to the manufacturer — or let the manufacturer assume the burden of their entire defense. In short, I would deny indemnification to insured marketers for self-procured defense expenses incurred without consultation with, or request for representation by, the manufacturer.

. Pressing a groundless claim may subject plaintiff’s counsel to Rule 11 sanctions. See Eastway Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-254 (2d Cir.1985). Oklahoma’s counterpart of Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P., is found in 12 O.S.Supp.1987 § 2011, which provides in pertinent part:
"Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address and Oklahoma Bar Association identification number shall be stated. * * * The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harrass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. * * * If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” (emphasis added)
See also, Winters v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 740 P.2d 724, 728 n. 22 (1987).

.See part II of this opinion.

. For the distinction between indemnity from loss and that against liability, see supra note 12.