Court Opinion

ID: 9558541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:11:55.120484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:22.844600
License: Public Domain

WOOD (Parker), J.
I dissent. The case was tried without a jury. The trial judge had the benefit of personal observation of the witnesses. He stated that he believed the prosecutrix. The rule is that if the circumstances reasonably justify the findings of the trier of facts, the opinion of the .reviewing court that those circumstances also might be reconciled reasonably with the innocence of the defendant will *272not warrant interference with the determination of the trier of the facts. (People v. Newland, (1940) 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778].)
Appellant’s only contention on appeal is that the testimony of the prosecutrix is disproved by the physical facts and is so inherently improbable that it is unworthy of belief.
In support of his contention, the appellant refers to testimony as follows: (1) that there was no evidence of a struggle at the place of the trouble, on the ground or otherwise ; (2) that there were no marks on her face to indicate that he had struck her on the face; (3) that there were no marks on his face to indicate that she had struck him on the face; and (4) that there were no marks on or about her neck to indicate that he had choked her. Defendant’s argument is: (1) that the ground, at the place where the prosecutrix said there was a struggle, was “possibly sand or mixed with white sand” and therefore was impressionable, and if her testimony, that there was a struggle while they were on the ground, were true, the ground would have shown evidence other than ordinary footprints; (2) that if defendant struck her on the face, as she said he did, such striking necessarily would have left some marks, bruises or scratches on her face; (3) that if she struck him on the face, as she said she did, such striking would have left some evidence thereof on his face; and (4) that if he choked her, as she said he did, there would have been evidence of it on her neck;
Although it was not unreasonable to believe that there would be marks on the ground as a result of the kicking and struggling related by the prosecutrix, it should not be concluded that such marks would result necessarily. The degree of hardness of the surface of ground that is “possibly sand or mixed with white sand” would depend upon the compactness of the sand, if it was sand, and on the kind, proportions, and compactness of various elements constituting the mixture, if it was mixed with sand. Concerning the struggle, she testified that after she was on the ground she was unable to fight any more, or do “any more kicking, hardly,” but she could move about, “tore up the ground there,” and “was fighting, trying to get up.” The testimony concerning the kind of ground was not so explicit that it must be concluded that evidence of such a struggle would appear certainly on the ground. There was evidence *273that footprints covering a "radius of one yard” were found at the place where the intercourse occurred. In other words, there were footprints which covered a space 6 feet in diameter. The defendant was standing while he was vomiting after the intercourse and the prosecutrix was standing by him. If any marks evidencing a struggle had been on the ground they might have been obliterated by the footprints.
The evidence relative to the striking and choking, likewise, was not so specific as to the manner in which those acts were committed that it must be concluded that marks, bruises or scratches would appear certainly on the face or neck of the prosecutrix or on the face of the defendant. Whether there would be noticeable results of striking on the face with a fist, or of choking, would depend on numerous conditions, such as the part of the fist which came in contact with the face, the force used, and the complexion of the person struck or choked. Her testimony, concerning those acts, was that he hit her a good many times with his fist, principally on the temple, but it did not cause her to fall; that she struck him on the face many times and kicked him; and that the choking was done by pulling her coat collar together at the neck. It cannot be declared accurately that striking and choking a person, in the manner described in the testimony herein, could not be done without producing obvious physical results thereof. The part of the fist which came in contact with the temple of the prosecutrix is not indicated by the testimony, but it is reasonably probable that a person could be hit on the temple several times with a fist in such a manner that no bruise or scratch would result therefrom. Also it is reasonably probable that a coat collar might be so constructed of smooth, soft materials that it could be pulled together in such a manner around the neck of a person that the person would be choked temporarily and no mark on the body result therefrom.
The testimony herein was different materially from the testimony in the case of People v. Fremont, (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 292 [70 P.2d 1005], cited by appellant as an authority holding that since no marks were visible, indicating that a person had been choked, that the testimony of the person that she was choked was inherently improbable. In that case the testimony was (p. 295) that the defendant "grabbed my throat and started jerking me back and forth and ... I *274could not hardly see.” The court said (p. 299): "... the physician . . . found no marks or bruises about the neck of the prosecutrix. Such marks would naturally be found after a severe and prolonged choking.” The evidence as to choking in the present case cannot be characterized as severe.
The evidence of the prosecutrix was sufficient to show the resistance required by law. “In this state it is not required that the prosecutrix resist as long as strength endures or consciousness continues. The resistance required in each case depends upon the circumstances of that case, such as the relative strength of the parties, the uselessness of resistance, the degree of force manifested and other factors. The resistance of the prosecutrix need only be such as to make nonconsent and actual resistance reasonably manifest.” (People v. Burnette, (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 215, 224 [102 P.2d 790].)
It was not necessary that her testimony be corroborated. (People v. Norrington, (1921) 55 Cal.App. 103, 108 [202 P. 932].) Nor was it a requirement that the prosecutrix make an outcry. (People v. Norrington, supra, at page 111.) Appellant argues that the failure to make an outcry, where an opportunity exists, raises a strong presumption of consent; that she did not scream although she was within 60 feet of her home; and that she had an opportunity to make an outcry, in that her mouth was not muffled and her coat collar was not pulled together all of the time. A statement made in People v. Norrington, supra, at page 111, is applicable here: “From all of the facts . . . the jury [judge] may not unreasonably have believed that, throughout the experiences through which she passed . . . the prosecutrix acted upon the honest belief that she best could extricate herself from her predicament by remaining calm and collected, relying upon her wits rather than by making an outcry and thus peradventure run the risk of being choked into insensibility. ’ ’
The facts in the case of People v. Kinne, (1938) 25 Cal.App.2d 112 [76 P.2d 714] were similar in several respects to the facts in the present case. In that case the prosecutrix and the defendant boarded an electric car at the same place. When the prosecutrix left the car, the defendant also left the car and followed her about one-half of a mile, grabbed her around the neck, told her not to scream, pushed her into a vacant lot, and raped her. She testified that she did not *275resist because she was afraid to resist. The only ground of appeal was that there was no resistance. The court said, at page 114, “Obviously the same question raised herein on appeal was presented to the trial judge . . . and, from a review of the evidence, it cannot be said that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in adjudging the defendant guilty. . . . What would have happened to the prosecutrix at the hands of the defendant, if she had pursued a different course, is problematical.”
In regard to the asserted refusal of the trial court, referred to in the majority opinion, to permit the defendant to show alleged inconsistent statements made by the prosecutrix, the record on appeal shows the complete proceedings in that respect were as follows: “Q. You remember seeing a Deputy District Attorney, in Harry Borde’s office and telling him your story? A. Yes. Q. You talked to two of them? A. No, sir. Q. Are you talking about the Deputy District Attorney that told you he could not issue a complaint-Mr. Galliano : Objected to as immaterial, not impeaching. Mr. Tablet : I have something which may be in the nature of inconsistent statements- The Court : Overruled. Q. By Mr. Tablet : You did not tell Mr. Borde the same story that you are telling here ? Mr. Galliano : Objected to as immaterial, not proper impeachment. The Court : Sustained. Mr. Tablet : No further questions. Mr. Galliano : No redirect.”
It will be noted that the attorney for the defendant stated, when the first objection above quoted was made, that, “I have something which may be in the nature of inconsistent statements,” and that the court overruled the objection. It will be noted further that defendant’s attorney thereupon asked an objectionable question which was as follows: “You did not tell Mr. Borde the same story that you are telling here ? ’ ’ An answer to that question would have been a conclusion. The deputy district attorney objected to the question “as immaterial and not proper impeachment.” The court then said, “sustained.” The grounds stated as the basis for the objection were, perhaps, insufficient. The ruling, sustaining the objection, was correct, however, since the answer to the question would have been an opinion of the witness as to the comparison of the two conversations. In the case of Davey v. Sou. Pac. Co., (1897) 116 Cal. 325 [48 P. 117], at page *276330, it was stated: “An objection to evidence is but a reason offered for its exclusion. The objection may be untenable or insufficient, yet, if sustained, and there appears any other reason for which the evidence should have been excluded, the ruling must stand. And even where no objection is made, but the court excludes evidence of its own motion, the ruling will be sustained, if the evidence was for any reason inadmissible.
“ ‘If the court decides correctly in rejecting the testimony, it is not important whether the best objection was made, or whether any objection was made. ’ [Citing cases.]
“Nor does the fact that a party has made an improper or insufficient objection in the court below preclude or estop him in this court from justifying a ruling in his favor upon any other ground.”
It was stated in People v. Bidleman, (1894) 104 Cal. 608 [38 P. 502], at page 612: “Upon cross-examination of a witness for the prosecution counsel for defendant asked him what conclusion he came to, from the manner in which defendant conducted the business, as to whether or not he was the manager and had full control, or otherwise. The court very properly refused to permit the question to be answered, though the district attorney did not state the grounds of his objection.” (See also Careaga v. Moore, (1925) 70 Cal.App. 614, 623 [234 P. 121].)
After that correct ruling to his objectionable question, the attorney for defendant did not pursue further the suggestion he had theretofore made that he had something “which may be” in the “nature” of inconsistent statements.
The trial judge’s unfavorable opinion of the deputy probation officer was not a proper basis for denying probation.
In my opinion the judgment and motion denying a new trial should be affirmed, and the trial judge should reopen the hearing of defendant’s application for probation to consider a further report concerning defendant, if any, since the previous ruling on his application.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 14, 1943.