Court Opinion

ID: 9586134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:35.699775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:21.234166
License: Public Domain

*369EASTAUGH, Justice,
concurring.
I join the court’s opinion. Under Alaska’s prevailing summary judgment standard,1 Meyer’s conclusory denial of paternity was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.2 CSED has not argued that we should adopt a different summary judgment standard, such as that employed in the federal courts.3 FABE, Justice, with whom BRYNER, Justice, joins, dissenting.

. See Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15, 25 (Alaska 1978).

. See In re J.B., 922 P.2d 878, 881 n. 4 (Alaska 1996).

. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). See also Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 943 (Alaska 1988) (“Instead of adopting the summary judgment standard articulated in Anderson, we choose to continue our longstanding interpretation of our summary judgment standard as contained in Civil Rule 56(c).”).