Court Opinion

ID: 9381023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 19:03:38.944929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:29.286701
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 200470-U

                                  Order filed March 21, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Peoria County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-20-0470
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 18 CF 697
                                                       )
      JOSE GUADALUPE RAMIREZ,                          )       Honorable
                                                       )       Katherine S. Gorman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The trial court’s imposition of a mandatory life sentence on a 21-year-old defendant
                  was not unconstitutional as applied to him, and the trial court did not err in denying
                  defendant’s request to appoint an expert for sentencing proceedings or his request
                  to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Affirmed.

¶2          The trial court convicted defendant of two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-

     1(a)(1) (West 2018)) for the murders of his adoptive parents and sentenced him to mandatory life

     imprisonment without parole (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020)). Defendant raises three

     arguments on appeal. First, he argues his mandatory life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to
     him, alleging the court failed to consider his youth, traumatic and abusive upbringing, mental

     health issues, and potential for rehabilitation. Second, defendant argues the court erred in refusing

     to appoint an expert for sentencing proceedings, which precluded him from presenting evidence

     to support his as-applied constitutional challenges. Third, he argues the court erred in denying his

     as-applied constitutional challenges without allowing him to develop the record pursuant to People

     v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932. His second and third arguments are made in the alternative to his first

     argument if we find the record is insufficient to rule on his first argument. We affirm.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4           On October 28, 2018, defendant called 911 to report his parents missing and that someone

     had broken into their house. Police entered the home and saw blood throughout. The television

     was missing from the living room. Dresser drawers and jewelry boxes were open in the parent’s

     bedroom. Police noted large bloodstains on the floor of the bedroom and all sheets and bedding

     had been removed from the bed. Defendant later confessed to police that he and his codefendant

     had snuck into the house, where defendant then maced his parents, hit them over the head with a

     bat, and stabbed them in the stomach and throat. They wrapped the bodies in a tent and a tarp,

     loaded them into his father’s car, and threw them off a bridge.

¶5          Defendant led police to the purported dump site in the Kewanee area, approximately 45

     minutes away from the house. Police did not find the bodies there. The bodies were found two

     days later in the Spoon River, 12 minutes away from the house. The victims were wearing pajamas.

     The cause of death for both victims was multiple blunt-force and sharp-force injuries. Defendant’s

     father had bruises all over his torso and head area, stab wounds to the torso, slice marks to the

     throat, skin tears in the head, and his right ear was destroyed. Defendant’s mother had a single stab

     wound under her right armpit, multiple stab wounds or slices on her throat, and skin tears on the

                                                      2
     top of her head. The coroner’s autopsy revealed the time between onset of injuries and death was

     minutes.

¶6          Police recovered the missing television and other items in the crawlspace at defendant’s

     friend’s house where defendant had been staying. While being interviewed at the station, defendant

     told police “the why” was not important. He felt remorse for getting his friend involved, but not

     for the murders themselves, because he felt that he could not live while his parents were still alive.

     He was 21½ years old at the time of the murders.

¶7          Before trial, Dr. Terry Killian evaluated defendant’s fitness to stand trial and his sanity at

     the time of the offense. He reported the evaluation was thorough, as defendant was facing a

     possible sentence of life in prison without parole. Defense counsel did not provide the State or trial

     court with a copy of Dr. Killian’s report prior to trial. The report included the following history.

     Defendant was removed from his biological mother’s care when he was three years old due to

     physical and sexual abuse by the mother’s boyfriends. He was abused in foster care. The victims

     adopted defendant when he was eight years old. Defendant began seeing a therapist shortly after

     the adoption and continued to see her until two months before the murders. The therapist diagnosed

     him with reactive attachment disorder (RAD). Her therapy notes specified a concern for his

     adoptive mother’s safety at home. Defendant attended a residential therapeutic high school out of

     state, returning to Illinois for his senior year. Dr. Killian noted defendant’s childhood was fraught

     with abuse but concluded that defendant was fit to stand trial and sane at the time of the offense.

¶8          The trial court found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder after a three-

     day bench trial. After the trial, defendant filed several posttrial motions: (1) a motion asking the

     court to appoint a mental health expert for sentencing; (2) a motion to declare the mandatory

     natural life imprisonment statute (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (West 2020)) unconstitutional under the

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       United States and Illinois constitutions as applied to defendant, due to his age and mental health

       issues; and (3) an amended motion requesting a hearing pursuant to Harris, 2018 IL 121932, and

       asking the court to appoint Dr. Killian to prepare a report and testify at the requested hearing. When

       these motions were denied, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, averring that the court erred

       in denying defendant’s request for an expert for sentencing purposes.

¶9            Defendant sought an expert to evaluate defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSI)

       and history for the purpose of mitigation. The State argued that Dr. Killian had already examined

       defendant, and although the State was never provided a copy of the report, defense counsel was in

       possession of the psychiatric evaluation and presumably would call Dr. Killian to testify at

       sentencing if the report contained mitigating information. Defendant argued Dr. Killian’s purpose

       for initially evaluating defendant was not for mitigation, but for fitness and sanity. He wanted to

       find a qualified individual to evaluate for mitigation at a more economical rate than Dr. Killian.

       Defendant later asked the court to appoint Dr. Killian, as Dr. Killian could probably use his report

       for the purposes of mitigation, and it would likely be quicker and cheaper than hiring a different

       expert. He asked for funds not to exceed $3000. The State objected because Dr. Killian already

       wrote a report that the State had not seen.

¶ 10          On January 27, 2020, the trial court issued a written order denying defendant’s motion to

       declare the sentencing statute unconstitutional. The trial court wrote,

                              “Both the Unites States Supreme Court and the Illinois Supreme Court have

                      ‘unmistakenly instructed that youth matters in sentencing.’ Roper v. Simmons, 543

                      U.S. 551, 578-579 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Miller v.

                      Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 1.

                                                         4
                              The Supreme Court has never extended its reasoning to young adults age 18

                      or over. In fact, the Supreme Court has clearly and consistently drawn the line

                      between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing is 18.

                              Further, claims for extending Miller to offenders 18 years of age or older

                      have been repeatedly rejected. United States v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1039-40

                      (10th Cir. 2017); U.S. v. Marshall, 736 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2013); People v.

                      Argeta, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 245-246 (Ct. App. 2012).

                              In the instant case, the Defendant was 21 ½ at the time of the offense. The

                      Defendant’s claim fails both generally and as applied.”

¶ 11          Before sentencing, the court received and reviewed the PSI, Dr. Killian’s pretrial forensic

       psychiatric evaluation, and Dr. Killian’s proffered testimony. The State moved to strike Dr.

       Killian’s proffered testimony, arguing that his testimony asked the court to disregard the law. The

       trial court allowed the testimony, stating it would address the proffered testimony in its sentencing

       remarks.

¶ 12          At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that, because defendant was over 18 years of

       age and had murdered two people, he was subject to mandatory life imprisonment without parole.

       730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) (West 2020). The State offered no evidence in aggravation but

       presented a victim impact statement. Defendant offered no formal evidence in mitigation but

       presented letters in his support, which stated defendant was publicly humiliated and emotionally

       abused by his adoptive mother, and his actions were not typical of him. Defendant stated in

       allocution,

                              “I can’t excuse the actions that I have done, but I feel like that if I’m given

                      life without the possibility of parole, I’m being denied the chance that I cannot

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                      prove to people that I can change, but I also realize that actions always have

                      consequences, whether good or bad, and whatever consequences you give me

                      today, I will completely respect those.”

¶ 13          The trial court considered the PSI, trial evidence, victim impact statement, statement in

       allocution, arguments of counsel, statutory and nonstatutory factors in aggravation and mitigation,

       defendant’s history and character, and seriousness of the offense. In ruling, the trial court found,

                              “In aggravation, Mr. Ramirez, I sat through the trial and I watched you when

                      you were being interrogated, and I watched you confess to killing your parents with

                      little to absolutely no emotion, with no remorse, with no concern of the terror, the

                      fear, and the betrayal that they must have felt while you pepper sprayed them, beat

                      them, and then stabbed them.

                      ***

                              One of the most disconcerting events—in my involvement in what occurred

                      and then my role in this case has been one of the most disconcerting things I’ve

                      ever seen. The legislature has set out what happens to people that do things that you

                      did.

                              Mr. Ramirez, I read every word of those letters from people that knew you

                      before, and I read every word of the terrible things that happened to you before your

                      parents ever got involved, and through those things, I have compassion for you that

                      you as a child had to suffer that and it shouldn’t have happened, period.

                              But you were given an opportunity with your parents that lots of children

                      that endured things like you did would have loved to have had *** and instead of

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                      working it out, you acted out in a manner that was so vicious to the people that

                      altered the course of their entire lives for you.

                                                               ***

                              There’s lots of children that have difficult lives, and there is not one instance

                      where what you did can be put into context or explained.

                              With respect to the proffered testimony of Terry Kilian, whether I consider

                      that testimony or I don’t, it does not change the outcome of what you have done.

                              You are correct when you indicated that there are consequences for your

                      actions, and the fact that you were approximately 21 and a half years of age does

                      not in any way, shape, or form change the analysis of what should be done pursuant

                      to statute because that age has been considered by many courts along the way.”

       Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without parole.

¶ 14          Defendant moved to reconsider his sentence, arguing it was excessive and unconstitutional

       as applied to him. The court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.

¶ 15                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16          Defendant’s primary contention is that his sentence of mandatory life without parole is

       unconstitutional as applied to him, and the record is sufficiently developed to allow this court to

       review his claim. Alternatively, he contends, if the record is not sufficient to review his claim, we

       should remand the matter for new sentencing proceedings because the trial court erroneously

       refused to appoint an expert for sentencing and failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

¶ 17          Because defendant’s alternative argument relies on the premise that the record is

       insufficient to review his claim, we must first determine whether the record is sufficient.

¶ 18                                     A. Completeness of the Record

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¶ 19          “All as-applied constitutional challenges are, by definition, dependent on the specific facts

       and circumstances of the person raising the challenge. Therefore, it is paramount that the record

       be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate

       review.” Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 39. “A court is not capable of making an ‘as applied’

       determination of unconstitutionality when there has been no evidentiary hearing and no findings

       of fact. Without an evidentiary record, any finding that a statute is unconstitutional ‘as applied’ is

       premature.” Id. A defendant must present an as-applied constitutional challenge to the trial court

       in order to create a sufficiently developed record; however, there is a very narrow exception to that

       rule for an as-applied claim pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) for which the

       record is sufficiently developed for appellate review. People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32. In

       Holman, the supreme court found the record sufficient to decide the defendant’s Miller claim, and

       it therefore addressed the merits of the defendant’s claim in the interest of judicial economy.

       Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 32.

¶ 20          Here, defendant presented his as-applied constitutional challenge both before and after he

       was sentenced. In his amended motion to declare the sentencing statute unconstitutional, filed

       before sentencing, defendant asserted he was 21½ years old at the time of the offense with a long

       history of mental health diagnosis and issues; the status of his mental health treatment played a

       part in the events leading to his conviction; and “in light of developments in the areas of law,

       medicine, psychology, and science, to conclude that someone who is the age of the defendant is

       beyond redemption and is incapable of rehabilitation violates the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.

       Constitution as well as the Illinois Constitution.” Defendant again raised this claim in his motion

       to reconsider the sentence.

                                                         8
¶ 21           Dr. Killian’s forensic psychiatric evaluation report, dated August 24, 2019, specifically

       referenced the issue of mitigation as applied to defendant. Further, Dr. Killian’s proffered

       testimony addressed the issue of appropriate punishment considering defendant’s RAD diagnosis,

       his psychological and social history, his childhood abuse, his age, and his potential for

       rehabilitation. Thus, we find the record to be sufficiently complete regarding defendant’s youth,

       abusive upbringing, mental health issues, and his potential for rehabilitation. Accordingly, we

       address the merits of defendant’s claim in the interest of judicial economy. Id.

¶ 22                                 B. As-Applied Constitutional Challenge

¶ 23           Whether a sentence is constitutional is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. People

       v. Taylor, 2015 IL 117267, ¶ 11. “Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging

       the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing its invalidity.” People v.

       Coty, 2020 IL 123972, ¶ 22. “A court must construe a statute so as to uphold its constitutionality

       if reasonably possible.” Id. “A defendant who has an adequate opportunity to present evidence in

       support of an as-applied, constitutional claim will have his claim adjudged on the record he

       presents.” Id.

¶ 24           “By definition, an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on the particular

       circumstances and facts of the individual defendant or petitioner. Therefore, it is paramount that

       the record be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of

       appellate review.” People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37. The eighth amendment prohibits,

       among other things, “cruel and unusual punishments” (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to

       the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 15. A statute

       may be deemed unconstitutionally disproportionate in violation of the proportionate penalties

       clause of the Illinois constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, § 11) if the punishment for the offense is

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       cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the

       community. People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328, 338 (2002) (Leon Miller).

¶ 25          The emerging adult theory proposes to apply Miller protections to young adults over the

       age of 18 because recent research in brain development suggests the brain and maturity continue

       to develop into a person’s mid-twenties. However, “the Supreme Court has clearly and consistently

       drawn the line between juveniles and adults for the purpose of sentencing at the age of 18.” Harris,

       2018 IL 121932, ¶ 58. Claims for extending Miller protections to offenders 18 years of age or

       older have been repeatedly rejected. Id. ¶ 61. But juvenile defendants may still be sentenced to life

       imprisonment without parole if the trial court determines the defendant’s conduct shows

       irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the possibility

       of rehabilitation. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 46. The trial court may make that decision only after

       considering the defendant’s youth and attendant characteristics, which include:

                              “(1) the juvenile defendant's chronological age at the time of the offense

                      and any evidence of his particular immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to

                      appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the juvenile defendant's family and home

                      environment; (3) the juvenile defendant's degree of participation in the homicide

                      and any evidence of familial or peer pressures that may have affected him; (4) the

                      juvenile defendant's incompetence, including his inability to deal with police

                      officers or prosecutors and his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (5) the

                      juvenile defendant's prospects for rehabilitation.” Id.

¶ 26          Defendant maintains the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without considering

       his age (21½ years), history of abuse, mental health issues, or capacity for rehabilitation. Defendant

       asks us to vacate his sentence in light of the recent advances in adolescent brain development

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       research and Illinois courts’ recognition of the evolving standards of decency in sentencing young

       adults to life sentences, where there is no opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation even after

       decades in prison.

¶ 27          The State argues we should reject any claim that defendant’s sentence violates the eighth

       amendment under Miller because such a challenge is not cognizable for adult offenders over the

       age of 18. Even so, the State maintains the sentencing hearing was “Miller compliant” because the

       court did in fact consider defendant’s youth and attendant circumstances. We agree with the State

       on both points.

¶ 28          We decline to extend Miller and its progeny to a 21-year-old defendant and reiterate that,

       for Miller purposes, the line between juveniles and adults is 18. However, Illinois courts have “not

       foreclosed emerging adult defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising an as applied

       proportionate penalties clause challenge [under the Illinois constitution] to life sentences based on

       the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development.” People v. Clark, 2023 IL

       127273, ¶ 87. “Our supreme court has twice acknowledged that young adults—at least those who

       were 20 years of age or younger at the time of their crimes—may still rely on the evolving

       neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller to support as-applied challenges

       to life sentences brought pursuant to the Illinois proportionate penalties clause. People v. Daniels,

       2020 IL App (1st) 171738, ¶ 25; see Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (19-year-old defendant

       sentenced to a term of natural life in prison); Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 1, 48 (defendant, aged

       18 years and 3 months, sentenced to 76 years in prison). “The evolving science on brain

       development may support such claims at some time in the future, but for now individuals who are

       21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim.” People

       v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 33. Even assuming a 21½ year old defendant can raise

                                                        11
       an as-applied proportionate-penalties challenge to his or her sentence, we conclude defendant’s

       claim lacks merit.

¶ 29          Here, Dr. Killian focused on defendant’s individual characteristics, rather than the

       emerging adult theory, and suggested that theory ignores situations where there exist clear and

       well-documented reasons why there may be a further delay in brain development, as in defendant’s

       case. Dr. Killian opined “a sentence of life without parole is not appropriate for Mr. Ramirez under

       the particular circumstances of the case.” The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

       Disorders (DSM) classifies RAD as a “trauma and stress-related condition of early childhood

       caused by social neglect and maltreatment.” According to Dr. Killian, defendant fits the pattern of

       RAD “due to the physical and sexual abuse that he received from a string of adults in the home of

       his mother and continuing with the abuse that he continued to receive in the foster care system, all

       of which had a profound effect on him.”

¶ 30          In addressing the issue of mitigation, Dr. Killian wrote, “Mr. Ramirez obviously suffered

       severe trauma in his childhood, being taken from his biological mother because of chronic abuse

       *** In addition, Mr. Ramirez described a lot of emotional abuse from his adoptive parents.” He

       believed defendant could rehabilitate himself to the point of being a functional member of society

       and not pose a threat. But he further opined that defendant is currently too young to assess how he

       may be in 20, 30, or even 40 years. Although predictions of future human behaviors are difficult

       to make, the following factors weigh in defendant’s favor: (1) he had virtually no history of

       criminal behavior; (2) there is very little indication of violence with other people; and (3) statistics

       show that aggressive, violent behavior decreases dramatically by the age of 40. Dr. Killian

       concluded, “it would be my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that it would be

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       wrong to incarcerate Mr. Ramirez for life without parole and find that there is no likelihood of

       rehabilitation based on the facts and circumstances of this case.”

¶ 31          During the forensic psychiatric exam, defendant told Dr. Killian he killed his adoptive

       parents “because they were really horrible people, to put it bluntly.” Dr. Killian asked why it was

       necessary to kill them, even if they were terrible, and defendant answered, “I tried suicide because

       I couldn’t stand being with them and I realized that they’re the ones who should be dead.” He told

       Dr. Killian he could not live while his adoptive parents were still alive. Dr. Killian also asked

       defendant whether he would have still murdered his adoptive parents, knowing he would likely

       get caught, and defendant stated yes, he would have still murdered his parents, but only if his

       codefendant was not going to be charged. He felt guilty about his codefendant being caught. When

       asked if he had any thoughts about hurting anyone else, defendant said, “There have always been

       two sides of me; I love helping people and I will do random acts of kindness, and then sometimes,

       for no reason, I want to beat somebody. It’s like the two sides of my brain are fighting with each

       other.” Dr. Killian’s proffered testimony states, “I am not suggesting that he needn’t/shouldn’t be

       punished. I believe he should go to prison for a long time.”

¶ 32          Defendant’s allegation that the trial court failed to consider his youth, traumatic and

       abusive upbringing, significant mental health issues, and potential of rehabilitation is flatly

       contradicted by the record. The trial court reviewed several documents, including Dr. Killian’s

       report and proffered testimony, which contained discussion of defendant’s individual

       characteristics, such as his age, traumatic and abusive upbringing, mental health issues, and

       potential for rehabilitation, and it specifically expressed its compassion for defendant’s traumatic

       upbringing. But “our supreme court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant’s mental or

       psychological impairments may not be inherently mitigating, or may not be mitigating enough to

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       overcome the evidence in aggravation.” People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 192289, ¶ 57. In

       this case, defendant enlisted a friend to help him murder his adoptive parents. The two discussed

       murdering his adoptive parents several times and discussed various methods over a period of

       months. They went to a hardware store to purchase items in preparation days before the murder.

       Defendant waited until his parents slept, entered their home, maced them, beat them over the head

       with a bat, stabbed them in the stomach and throat, inflicting multiple blunt-force and sharp-force

       injuries that killed them within minutes, and then wrapped their bodies and dumped them off a

       bridge. He attempted to clean the blood, but then staged the home to look like the scene of a

       burglary. He called 911 to report his parents missing days later. One police officer testified

       defendant showed more concern for a missing cat than for his missing parents. He confessed to

       the murders, but then misled police about the location of the bodies. Even considering defendant’s

       individual characteristics, the mandatory sentence of life without parole was not so wholly

       disproportionate to the offense so as to shock the moral sense of the community. Leon Miller, 202

       Ill. 2d at 238. Accordingly, we decline to find the sentencing statute unconstitutional as it applies

       to defendant.

¶ 33                                 C. Defendant’s Alternative Arguments

¶ 34          Because we have concluded the record is sufficient to review defendant’s as-applied

       proportionate-penalties claim, we need not address defendant’s alternative arguments, which rest

       on the premise that the record is not sufficient.

¶ 35                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36          The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 37          Affirmed.

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