Court Opinion

ID: 9573566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:56:52.107815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:41:54.024478
License: Public Domain

Barnes, Judge,
dissenting.
I concur fully in Judge Miller’s dissent. I write separately to emphasize that our job is not to review and reweigh the evidence, but only to decide whether “any evidence” supports the decision of the workers’ compensation board. “A finding of fact by an administrative law judge or the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation, when supported by any evidence, is conclusive and binding.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Roy v. Norman, 261 Ga. 303, 305 (404 SE2d 117) (1991).
The ALJ is vested with the authority to make findings of fact in workers’ compensation claims. The appellate division of the workers’ compensation board must accept the ALJ’s findings where there is a preponderance of competent and credible evidence to support the decision. The appellate division accepted the ALJ’s finding. . . . This decision cannot be disturbed as long as there is any evidence to support it, because neither the superior court nor the appellate court has the power to find facts.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hallisey v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 268 Ga. 57, 58-59 (1) (484 SE2d 653) (1997). In this case, evidence supports the board’s decision, and therefore we should affirm it.
The board found as a fact that “the evidence is sufficient to show that the employee’s lunch break was not regularly scheduled because the orientation schedule each day would determine when the lunch break would occur,” and concluded as a matter of law that the employer’s “lunch break defense” did not apply. The appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation agreed, ruling that “[a]fter a review of the record as a whole, we find the employer/ *796insurer have not proven by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence in the record that the lunch break defense is applicable and bars the employee’s claim.” The appellate division continued, “We find, as the administrative law judge correctly found, that the employee’s lunch break was not regularly scheduled because the employee’s work schedule/orientation dictated when the employee would be entitled to lunch.”
The majority, however, concludes that the evidence shows that Adams’ injury occurred during a scheduled lunch break. Under the majority’s reasoning, the fact that the new employees took a lunch break every day around lunchtime is sufficient to render it “scheduled.” That reasoning ignores the training director’s testimony that the sessions did not break at a specific time, but whenever the new employees finished with their questions, much as the lunchtime of the employee in Miles v. Brown Transport Corp., 163 Ga. App. 563, 564 (294 SE2d 734) (1982), was not regularly scheduled because she ate when her workload permitted her to eat. Because our duty is not to reweigh the evidence and draw our own conclusions from it, but to determine whether any evidence supports the board’s decision, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.