Court Opinion

ID: 9898239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:29:21.57874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:14.168345
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                        Washington State
                                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Division Two

                                                                                       September 12, 2023

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                               No. 55776-2-II

                               Respondent,

        v.                                                   UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 RASHAD DEMETRIUS BABBS,

                               Appellant.

       CHE, J. — In 2003, Rashad Babbs pled guilty to one count of second degree unlawful

possession of a firearm and proceeded to a jury trial on first degree murder and attempted first

degree murder charges, both with alleged firearm sentencing enhancements. A jury convicted

Babbs of first degree murder with a firearm sentencing enhancement. The trial court declared a

mistrial on the attempted first degree murder with a firearm sentencing enhancement count; later,

Babbs was convicted as charged. Babbs was 21 years old at the time of the crimes. The trial

court sentenced Babbs to the high end of the sentencing ranges for a total of 734 months of

confinement.

       In 2018, the sentencing court granted Babbs’s motion to vacate his judgment and

sentence due to a change in the law. In 2021, the sentencing court resentenced Babbs to the low

end of the standard sentencing ranges, imposing a sentence of 570.75 months of confinement.

Babbs appeals his standard range sentence. Babbs also raises additional claims in a statement of

additional grounds (SAG).
No. 55776-2-II

       We hold that Babbs cannot appeal his standard range sentence. We further hold that

Babbs’s SAG challenge to his offender score fails. We do not reach the remainder of Babbs’

arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                             FACTS

       In March 2001, Rashad Babbs and Phillip Hicks stopped Jonathan Webber and his wife,

Chica Webber, as they were walking. State v. Hicks, noted at 134 Wn. App. 1026, 2006 WL

2223807, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2006) (unpublished). The two men asked the Webbers

if they had drugs and the Webbers told the men that they did not. Id. The Webbers walked away

and the two men followed them, demanding that the Webbers empty their pockets. Id. As the

Webbers continued to walk away, the two men shot at them. Id. Jonathan Webber sustained

several wounds and Chica Webber died. Id. Chica was pregnant and the mother of a two-year-

old. Babbs was 21 years old at the time.

       The State charged Babbs with aggravated first degree murder and, in the alternative, first

degree felony murder (count I), attempted first degree murder (count II), and second degree

unlawful possession of a firearm (count IV). The State alleged firearm sentencing enhancements

on counts I and II. Babbs pled guilty to the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm

charge before trial. After trial on the remaining charges, a jury convicted Babbs of one count of

first degree felony murder with a firearm sentencing enhancement and a mistrial was declared on

the attempted first degree murder charge. A second trial resulted in a conviction for first degree

                                                 2
No. 55776-2-II

attempted murder with a firearm sentencing enhancement. The trial court sentenced Babbs to

734 months of total confinement.1 Babbs appealed his convictions and we affirmed. Id.

       In 2021, after our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Weatherwax,2 Babbs was

resentenced. Prior to his resentencing, Babbs submitted a presentencing report and numerous

addendums, agreeing with the State’s offender score recalculation3 and requesting an

“exceptionally lenient sentence.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 11. Babbs requested that the trial court

“impose two, concurrent 300-month terms (240 months, plus 60 months for the firearm

enhancements).” CP at 11. Babbs further requested that his unlawful possession of a firearm

conviction run concurrent with his other convictions.

       Babbs argued that “an exceptionally lenient sentence [was] justified because [his] ability

to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially diminished due to a

combination of neurodevelopmental deficits, a history of frontal lobe injuries, and mental

illness.” CP at 11. Babbs explained that he “had endured numerous adverse and traumatic

experiences as a child; sustained multiple significant injuries to his head; his brain was not fully

mature; he suffered from mental illness; and he appears to be borderline intellectually disabled.”

CP at 10-11. Babbs further explained that “[c]ombined these factors significantly lessened his

1
 The court sentenced Babbs to 374 months of confinement on count I, 240 months of
confinement on count II, and 22 months of confinement on count III. Babbs’s sentence included
two 60-month firearm sentence enhancements on counts I and II.
2
  188 Wn.2d 139, 392 P.3d 1054 (2017). Under Weatherwax, where “the seriousness levels of
two or more serious violent offenses are identical, the trial court must choose the offense whose
standard range is lower as the starting point for calculating the consecutive sentences.” Id. at
156.
3
  The State recalculated Babbs’s offender score as 0 points for the completed murder, 4 points
for the attempted murder, and 5 points for the second degree unlawful possession of a firearm.

                                                  3
No. 55776-2-II

ability to consider and weigh options and most significantly to control his actions, especially in

the presence of a peer.” CP at 11.

       Babbs submitted evidence of his academic achievements and certificates demonstrating

his participation in programs while incarcerated. Babbs also submitted numerous supportive

letters from community members requesting leniency and consideration for Babbs’s youth at the

time of the crime. Several letters emphasized Babbs’s role as a mentor.

       Babbs’s codefendant, Hicks, acknowledged that he initiated the crime and requested

leniency for Babbs. Babbs submitted a declaration from a developmental psychologist, Laurence

Steinberg, outlining, among other topics, “the current understanding of neurobiological and

psychological development during adolescence.” CP at 37. The declaration did not specifically

address Babbs.

       The State submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting high-end sentences.

Specifically, the State recommended a sentence of “280.5 months for Count I [felony murder in

the first degree] plus the 60-month [firearm enhancement], consecutive to a sentence of 320

months for Count II [attempted first degree murder] plus the 60-month [firearm enhancement],

with those two sentences concurrent to the 22-month sentence for Count I[V] [second degree

unlawful possession of a firearm].”4 CP at 367.

       In May 2021, the sentencing court held a resentencing hearing. During the hearing,

Chica Webber’s mother and sister addressed the court. Chica’s family emphasized the

4
  At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a different sentence. The State
recommended 320 months of confinement on count I plus the 60-month firearm enhancement,
256.5 months of confinement on count II plus the 60-month firearm enhancement, and 22
months of confinement on count III. The State further recommended that counts I and II run
consecutively and that count IV run concurrent to the other counts.

                                                  4
No. 55776-2-II

importance of both forgiveness and consequences for Babbs’s actions. Babbs’s sister and

cousins also addressed the court. Babbs’s sister described Babbs as having “made a lot of

changes in his life.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 14. She recounted his efforts to improve himself and

expressed her confidence in his ability to contribute to the broader community upon release.

          Defense counsel questioned Babbs concerning the circumstances of his conviction.

Babbs said he was “remorseful” and felt “ashamed that [he] caused this harm.” RP at 21-22.

Babbs recounted his traumatic childhood and experience with mental illness. Babbs described

his rehabilitative efforts since incarceration, stating that he has “worked tireless[ly] over the

years to dedicate [himself] to formal education, self-education, spiritual awareness, and

mentor[ship].” RP 35. Babbs explained that since his incarceration, he obtained his GED

(general equivalency diploma), became a barber, engaged in educational opportunities, and

mentored other inmates.

          Babbs argued for a downward departure from the standard range citing the following: (1)

the multiple offense policy, (2) rehabilitation as a mitigating factor, and (3) Babbs had a

diminished ability to conform his conduct to the law due to neurodevelopment factors. Babbs

argued,

          it’s not a question of knowing right from wrong. He knew right from wrong. . . .
          It’s not a question of his cognitive ability. Certainly somebody at 21 is—has the
          ability to think and know the differences between right and wrong.

                  It’s more what the law speaks to in terms of impaired ability to conform
          your conduct. In that instant, he reacted on instinct, and it was an instinct tied to
          his brain. It was an instinct from growing up in the streets. It was an instinct from
          the trauma that he learned. . . .

                 And that’s a mitigating circumstance.

RP at 42-43.

                                                    5
No. 55776-2-II

         In response, the State argued that although the court has “unfettered discretion when

[sentencing] juvenile offenders,” such discretion does not extend to offenders older than 18. RP

at 47. The State acknowledged that the court “can still account for youthfulness and brain

maturation . . . but in a far more structured way . . . largely through RCW 9.94A.535.” RP at 47.

In addressing Babbs’s ability to discern right from wrong, the State recited his criminal history,

explaining that he “knew from his history what was wrong and what was right, and [that] he had

to know based on those experiences that what he was doing that night was absolutely wrong.”

RP at 51.

         In delivering its oral ruling, the sentencing court made clear that it had “reviewed

everything that ha[d] been submitted in this case, and [that the court] spent plenty of time going

through the file.” RP at 55. The court acknowledged Babbs’s difficult childhood, substance

abuse history, gang affiliation, criminal conduct, academic record, and mental health issues. The

court also acknowledged that Babbs “[was] successful in Job Corp., and [was] trained . . . [in]

masonry.” RP at 55. The court described its familiarity with changes to the understanding of

brain development and its familiarity with Houston-Sconiers.5 The court explained that the case

“draws the line at age 18 for the Court to have pretty much unfettered discretion in the

sentencing [of] youthful offenders.” RP at 56. However, the court explained that “after age 18,

the Court has more constraints, and departing must be limited to exceptional circumstances

where the defendant did not know his behavior was wrong or he was significantly impaired in

controlling his behavior.” RP at 56-57.

5
    State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017).

                                                  6
No. 55776-2-II

       After reiterating that it had reviewed everything, the sentencing court declined to impose

an exceptional sentence. The court explained that it

       is finding no support for those conclusions and is denying [Babbs’s] request for
       an exceptional sentence.

              The Court’s not saying that there aren’t mitigating circumstances for
       [Babbs’s] sentence. [Babbs does] claim a low IQ, yet [he was] able to complete
       Job Corp[s] with a trade. . . .

               This was not [Babbs’s] first criminal offense, as we’ve gone through [his]
       criminal history, and it was not [Babbs’s] first felony. [Babbs] actually had nine
       felonies and . . . ten misdemeanors in 16 criminal cases, many from threats and
       assaultive conduct. And [Babbs] knew well by 21 years and approximately nine
       months the consequences of stealing and the consequences of acting out violently.

RP at 57. The court repeated that it “considered the increased understanding of brain

development and” Babbs’s “personal circumstances, the trauma in his upbringing, and the lack

of positive role models . . . in his youth and also the rehabilitative efforts in prison.” RP at 58.

       Noting that it could not “disregard that these were heinous, callous, selfish acts,” the

court sentenced Babbs at the low end of the standard range. RP at 58. The court ordered 240

months of confinement for the first degree murder conviction, 210.75 months for the attempted

first degree murder conviction, and 22 months for the second degree unlawful possession of a

firearm conviction. The court further ordered 60-month firearm sentencing enhancements for

both the murder and attempted murder convictions. Babbs’s standard range sentences and

firearm sentencing enhancements for the murder and attempted murder convictions ran

consecutively to each other while Babbs’s unlawful possession conviction ran concurrent with

his other convictions.

       Babbs appeals.

                                                   7
No. 55776-2-II

                                            ANALYSIS

       Babbs argues that his de facto life sentence violates the Washington constitution’s

prohibition against cruel punishment. Babbs contends that he is entitled to a resentencing

hearing that places an emphasis on forward looking factors. Babbs further contends that

individualized sentencing requirements to consider youth extend to adult offenders. Finally,

Babbs argues that the sentencing court misapprehended its discretion to impose a mitigated

sentence by imposing too strict a test in considering his impaired ability to reflect before acting

and failing to consider his rehabilitative efforts as a mitigating factor for a sentence below the

standard range. Because Babbs cannot appeal his standard range sentence, we do not reach the

merits of Babbs’s arguments.

                                         I. APPEALABILITY

       The State argues that “Babbs may not appeal his standard range sentence” because the

“trial court properly recognized its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence and followed the

proper procedures” in declining to impose such a sentence. Br. of Resp’t at 17. We agree.

       A sentence that is within the standard range for an offense is not appealable. RCW

9.94A.585(1). A sentencing court’s “decision regarding the length of a sentence within the

standard range is not appealable because ‘as a matter of law there can be no abuse of

discretion.’” State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 710, 854 P.2d 1042 (1993) (quoting State v.

Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183, 713 P.2d 719 (1986)). However, such a prohibition does not bar

a defendant’s “‘right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which

a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision.’” State v. Mandefero, 14 Wn. App. 2d

                                                  8
No. 55776-2-II

825, 833, 473 P.3d 1239 (2020) (quoting State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 147, 65 P.3d 1214

(2003)).

       Where a defendant requests a sentence below the standard range, our review is limited

“to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an

impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.”

State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997).

A.     Refusal To Exercise Discretion

       A court refuses to exercise its discretion where “it refuses categorically to impose an

exceptional sentence below the standard range under any circumstances.” Id. “[A] trial court

that has considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an exceptional sentence

has exercised its discretion, and the defendant may not appeal that ruling.” Id.

       Here, the sentencing court did not categorically refuse to consider Babbs’s request for an

exceptional sentence. Instead, the trial court “reviewed everything that ha[d] been submitted”

and determined that an exceptional sentence was not warranted. RP at 55. The court elaborated

that it “considered the increased understanding of brain development and [Babbs’s] personal

circumstances, the trauma in his upbringing, and the lack of positive role models . . . in his youth

and also the rehabilitative efforts in prison.” RP at 58.

       In light of its review, the court sentenced Babbs to the low end of the standard range

despite having characterized his crimes as “heinous, callous, selfish acts.” RP at 58. The court

discussed the limitations of its sentencing discretion, acknowledged that departure from the

standard sentencing range was limited to exceptional circumstances, and declined to find the

existence of such circumstances after its review of the record.

                                                  9
No. 55776-2-II

       The record makes clear that the sentencing court was aware of its discretion to impose an

exceptional sentence, considered the evidence submitted, and declined to exercise its discretion.

Accordingly, the trial court did not categorically refuse to exercise its discretion in imposing

Babbs’s standard range sentence.

B.     Reliance on an Impermissible Basis

       A court relies on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence

where, for example, “it refuses to consider the request because of the defendant’s race, sex or

religion.” Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330. Babbs argues that the sentencing court

imposed a de facto life sentence onto a late adolescent, which violated the state constitutional

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

       Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution prohibits the imposition of “cruel

punishment.” Our constitution “further requires courts to exercise ‘complete discretion to

consider mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any juvenile defendant,’ even

when faced with mandatory statutory language.” In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d

305, 311, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (quoting Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21). A court has

discretion to impose any sentence below the applicable SRA (Sentencing Reform Act of 1981,

chapter 9.94A RCW) range when sentencing a juvenile defendant. Houston-Sconiers, 188

Wn.2d at 21. But when sentencing adult defendants, sentencing courts are “allowed to consider

youth as a mitigating factor.” State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680, 696, 358 P.3d 359 (2015)

(emphasis added).

       In Monschke, two petitioners were convicted of aggravated first degree murder. 197

Wn.2d at 307. The trial court sentenced the 19- and 20-year-old defendants to mandatory life

                                                 10
No. 55776-2-II

without parole (LWOP) sentences under RCW 10.95.030(1). Id. at 307-08. Our Supreme Court

held that because the aggravated murder statue required “LWOP for all defendants 18 and older,

regardless of individual characteristics, [the statute] violates the state constitution.” Id. at 326.

         The court explained that “the variability in individual attributes of youthfulness are

exactly why courts must have discretion to consider those attributes as they apply to each

individual youthful offender.” Id. at 323. The court emphasized that because “no meaningful

neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18 . . . sentencing courts must have

discretion to take the mitigating qualities of youth—those qualities emphasized in Miller and

Houston-Sconiers—into account for defendants younger and older than 18.” Id. at 326.

Monschke left “it up to sentencing courts to determine which individual defendants merit

leniency for [mitigating] characteristics” of youth. Id.

         Recently, our Supreme Court held Monschke applies only to defendants under 21 years

old, convicted of aggravated first-degree murder, and sentenced to mandatory LWOP. In re

Pers. Restraint of Davis, 200 Wn.2d 75, 77-78, 514 P.3d 653 (2022).

         In Anderson, 17-year-old Anderson was convicted for two counts of first degree murder

and sentenced to just over 61 years of confinement. State v. Anderson, 200 Wn.2d 266, 272, 516

P.3d 1214 (2022). Anderson was resentenced under Miller v. Alabama.6 Anderson, 200 Wn.2d

at 272. At Anderson’s resentencing hearing, the court explained that Anderson “‘planned and

initiated this attack’” and that there “‘was nothing impetuous about it.’” Id. at 276. The

resentencing court concluded that “Anderson had not shown that immaturity was a factor in his

commission of [the] murders.” Id. Despite those statements, the resentencing court considered

6
    567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012).

                                                  11
No. 55776-2-II

Anderson’s rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated. Id. at 277. The resentencing court imposed

the original sentence. Id. at 278.

          On appeal, our Supreme Court affirmed the sentence and held “that the resentencing

court appropriately considered Anderson’s youthful characteristics and that substantial evidence

supports the court’s conclusion that Anderson’s crimes did not reflect those characteristics.” Id.

at 280.

          Here, the sentencing court did not rely on an impermissible basis in refusing to impose an

exceptional sentence. Monschke does not extend to Babbs’s circumstance as he was 21 when he

committed the crimes. Monschke’s holding is limited to defendants between 18- to 20-years-old

and does not extend to 21-year-old defendants. Furthermore, Babbs did not face a mandatory

LWOP sentence like in Monschke; here, the sentencing court had discretion to impose an

exceptional sentence. Also, after reviewing the entire record, the sentencing court expressly

found no support for the conclusions that Babbs “did not know his behavior was wrong or [that]

he was significantly impaired in controlling his behavior” such that an exceptional sentence was

warranted. RP at 56-57.

          Rather than rely on an impermissible basis in declining to impose an exceptional

sentence, the sentencing court properly considered the facts of Babbs’s case. The sentencing

court “reviewed everything that [was] . . . submitted” by the parties, including a declaration by

Babbs’s codefendant and letters submitted on Babbs’s behalf. RP at 55. The court considered

Babbs’s low IQ, “the increased understanding of brain development and . . . Babbs’[s] personal

circumstances, the trauma in his upbringing, and the lack of positive role models . . . in his youth

and also [Babbs’s] rehabilitative efforts in prison.” RP at 58. The court further recounted

                                                  12
No. 55776-2-II

Babbs’s “heinous, callous, selfish acts” that caused the death of Chica Webber and her unborn

child. RP at 58. The court explained that in light of its review, it was denying Babbs’s request

for an exceptional sentence and imposing a sentence at the low end of the standard sentencing

range. Although Babbs may not agree with the sentencing court’s decision, such disagreement is

not premised on an appealable basis.

       Accordingly, after considering the facts and concluding that there was no basis for an

exceptional sentence, the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion and imposed a

standard range sentence. Thus, we conclude that Babbs may not appeal his standard range

sentence.

                         STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS

       In his SAG, Babbs argues that (1) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct where it

“presented . . . Babbs’ criminal history incorrectly during the resentencing,” resulting in a higher

sentence and miscalculated offender score, and (2) the court erred “in using . . . Babbs’[s]

criminal history to conclude that . . . [his] brain was developed, and he knew right from wrong

when he committed the crime as a young adult.” SAG at 2.

       We address Babbs’s challenge to the calculation of his offender score; however, having

determined that Babbs may not appeal his standard range sentence, we decline to address his

remaining arguments.

       Babbs argues that the State misrepresented his criminal history during his resentencing

hearing, that the sentencing court miscalculated his offender score, and sentence length as a

result. Specifically, Babbs argues that his offender score should be calculated as 3, not 4, on his

attempted murder conviction. Babbs contends that the presentation of criminal history caused

                                                 13
No. 55776-2-II

the court to decline imposing concurrent sentences and that such misrepresentation amounted to

prosecutorial misconduct.

       To the extent Babbs is arguing that the trial court incorrectly calculated his offender

score, this claim fails. While Babbs is correct that his juvenile offenses committed prior to him

turning 15 years old should not be used in calculating his offender score, there is no evidence

that they were. Under Weatherwax,7 the trial court correctly calculated Babbs’s offender score

as 0 on his first degree murder conviction. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b). In calculating Babbs’s

offender score as 4 for his first degree attempted murder conviction, the trial court correctly

included one point for each prior adult nonviolent felony conviction and half a point for each

prior qualifying juvenile nonviolent felony conviction. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b); RCW

9.94A.525(9). In calculating Babbs’s offender score as 5 for his unlawful possession conviction,

the trial court correctly included one point for each adult prior felony conviction, half a point for

each qualifying juvenile prior conviction, and one point for his current violent adult felony

conviction. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a); RCW 9.94A.525(7).

       Accordingly, the trial court correctly calculated Babbs’s offender score. Having

determined that Babbs may not appeal his standard range sentence and that the trial court

correctly calculated Babbs’s offender score, we decline to consider his remaining SAG claims.

                                          CONCLUSION

       We affirm Babbs’s sentence.

7
  188 Wn.2d at 156 (holding “that for purposes of RCW 9.94A.589(1)(b), (1) anticipatory
offenses have the same seriousness level as their target crimes and (2) when the seriousness
levels of two or more serious violent offenses are identical, the trial court must choose the
offense whose standard range is lower as the starting point for calculating the consecutive
sentences.”).

                                                 14
No. 55776-2-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

                                                     Che, J.
 We concur:

 Lee, P.J.

 Price, J.

                                                15