Court Opinion

ID: 9911327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 20:04:31.680944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:26.764689
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221359-U

                                                                            SECOND DIVISION
                                                                            December 19, 2023

                                          No. 1-22-1359

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Cook County.
                                                )
      v.                                        )     No. 14 CR 16254
                                                )
LARRY JOHNSON,                                  )     Honorable
                                                )     Ursula Walowski,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices McBride and Ellis concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: We affirm the summary dismissal of defendant’s petition for postconviction
       relief; defendant forfeited the argument raised for the first time on appeal that the trial
       court improperly imposed consecutive sentences; and defendant’s claim that as an
       emerging adult he is entitled to sentencing protections provided by Miller v. Alabama is
       frivolous and patently without merit where the claim is not supported by factual
       allegations that defendant’s brain development was similar to that of a juvenile at the
       time of the offense.

¶2     The State charged, tried, and convicted defendant, Larry Johnson, for three counts of

attempt (first degree murder). The circuit court of Cook County sentenced defendant to three

terms of 31 years’ imprisonment on each count to be served consecutively for a total aggregate

sentence of 93 years’ imprisonment. Defendant filed a direct appeal in which he only argued the

trial court failed to conduct an adequate preliminary hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102
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Ill. 2d 181 (1984), on defendant’s posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. This

court agreed and remanded the case for an adequate Krankel hearing. Following remand,

defendant appealed the trial court’s findings under Krankel. The trial court appointed the Office

of the State Appellate Defender to represent defendant. Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a

motion pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), requesting leave to withdraw as

defendant’s counsel because an appeal of the case would lack arguable merit. This court found

the arguments regarding the Krankel hearing were conclusory and that defendant’s remaining

contentions were not the subject of the order on appeal. We granted the motion for leave to

withdraw and affirmed the trial court.

¶3     Thereafter, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Defendant’s pro se

petition alleged, inter alia, that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

raise several claims on direct appeal, among them a claim the trial court erred in imposing

consecutive sentences. The specific ground on which defendant claimed appellate counsel should

have challenged consecutive sentencing was that his crimes were committed during a single

course of conduct without a change in the criminal objective or motivation, therefore consecutive

sentences were not authorized. Defendant’s pro se petition also claimed his 93-year sentence

violated the Illinois Proportionate Penalties Clause as applied to him as an emerging adult who

was 21 years old at the time of the attempt murders.

¶4     The trial court summarily dismissed the pro se petition for postconviction relief.

Defendant appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition. For the following reasons, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶5                                        BACKGROUND

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¶6     We have previously summarized in detail the facts leading to defendant’s conviction and

sentence when we determined that defendant’s case should be remanded for a preliminary

inquiry pursuant to Krankel. People v. Larry Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 180171-U. We will not

repeat that entire history here. For purposes of our disposition of this appeal, it will suffice to say

that as a result of a shooting on August 13, 2014, the State charged defendant with the attempt

(first degree murder) of Tempestt Woods, Devante Wandick, and D’Mario Gatlin. At

defendant’s trial, Woods testified that as she approached the back porch of a residence where

Wandick was sitting defendant ran in front of her and defendant shot her in the right forearm and

stomach. She heard additional gunshots, then she was shot twice more. As a result of the

shooting Woods was hospitalized for three weeks. Woods underwent multiple surgeries. Woods

has scarring on her arms, pelvis, and back.

¶7     Gatlin testified that he was sitting on the back porch of Watkin’s residence with Wandick

and another man. Gatlin saw Woods approach the porch and saw her get shot. The shooter came

to the porch steps and shot Gatlin in the back. Gatlin identified defendant as the shooter. Gatlin

testified defendant shot him twice more in the leg and stomach, then Gatlin saw defendant shoot

toward Wandick. Gatlin was hospitalized for one month after the shooting. At the time of trial

Gatlin had three bullets in his body: one in the chest, one in the buttocks, and a fragment in a rib.

Gatlin had three surgeries and had scars from his injuries.

¶8     Wandick testified he, Gatlin, and a third individual known as “Blue Eyes” were on the

back porch. Wandick saw Woods and saw defendant shoot her. Wandick knew defendant and

recognized him. When defendant approached the back porch, Wandick jumped over the banister,

then ran to the front of the residence and told someone to call an ambulance. Later, Wandick

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realized he was shot in the foot. Wandick identified defendant as the shooter when police

arrived. Wandick received treatment in the hospital.

¶9     At defendant’s sentencing, the trial court found, in relevant part, that defendant

“committed this act, which basically you went up to a porch of people and started shooting a

weapon. Did not [sic] cause death in this case but it surely caused severe bodily harm as I heard

from Miss Tempest, Mr. Wandick and Mr. Gatlin as far as how their life has completely changed

and been affected by the injuries as a result of gunshot received [sic] because you decided to

unload a firearm on a porch of people.” The court stated it had “gone through the law and cases”

and determined that “the law does require the enhancements on attempt murder with a firearm in

your case.” The court also found based on its review of the statute and the case law that the

sentences “must be consecutive. That it’s mandatory. That I’m bound by that it’s consecutive

because the law talks to offenses, not single course of action. Because there are three separate

people. So the fact that you only had one firearm and this was one course of conduct, apparently

those arguments have not succeeded thus far.” The court also stated that it was “bound by the

guidelines so I’m going to sentence you to 93 years because that pretty much is a life sentence.

Which is the minimum that I am allowed to set in this case. *** So it will be the 93 years Illinois

Department of Corrections total.”

¶ 10   On May 16, 2022, defendant filed his pro se petition for postconviction relief. The

petition alleged, in pertinent part, that defendant’s rights under the United States and Illinois

constitutions were denied in that defendant:

               “was denied his right to effective assistance of appellate counsel where

       appellate counsel failed to raise *** the following meritorious issues on direct

       appeal: *** [t]rial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences where

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       [defendant] was sentenced to three 31-year sentences to run consecutively which

       summed to a 93-year sentence, where there was no substantial change in the

       nature of the criminal objective and the offenses were committed as part of a

       single course of conduct. *** [Defendant cited several cases in support of his

       claim that consecutive sentencing is improper where there is no substantial

       change in the criminal objective.] Previous court’s review of the cases in this area

       indicates that a finding of independent criminal motivation must be supported by

       the record. *** In the present case [defendant] was sentenced to consecutive

       sentences just like in Miller. And also like in Miller, in the present case, the

       record supported the finding that the shooter only had one criminal objective, i.e.,

       to kill the people attempted. Applying the ruling in Davis, in the present case,

       based off the records finding that there was no substantial change in the

       defendant’s criminal objective, consecutive sentences cannot be imposed and the

       court shall modify the consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences just like in

       Miller.”

¶ 11   Defendant’s pro se petition for postconviction relief also claimed, in pertinent part, that:

              “a de facto life sentence of 93 years in prison violated [the] state

       constitution’s Proportionate Penalties Clause pursuant to Miller v. Alabama ***.

       [Defendant noted] recent science supported by Dr. Steinberg’s testimony under

       oath in an unrelated case stating that young adults often lag behind in their ability

       to make good decisions while emotionally stressed until they are 22 or 23 years

       old and [defendant] in the instant case was only two months into his 21st birthday

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       when he was arrested. *** [Defendant cited articles on] the Neuroscience of 20-

       Somethings, Emerging Adults *** and Adolescent Maturity and the Brain.”

Defendant said nothing more about himself.

¶ 12   The trial court issued a written order summarily dismissing the pro se petition as

frivolous and patently without merit. In that order, the trial court wrote, in relevant part, that

petitioner contended his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise, inter alia, that his

three convictions were from a single course of conduct and the trial court abused its discretion by

imposing a firearm enhancement to each of the three attempt murders. The court found that “the

unraised issues ***are not reasonably probable to succeed on appeal and that counsel was not

objectively unreasonable for failing to raise these claims.”

¶ 13   The trial court found that defendant claimed that appellate counsel failed to raise the issue

of his “sentences being imposed consecutively based upon the argument that these attempt

murders were committed during a single course of conduct without a change in the criminal

objective or motivation.” The court noted that several of the authorities defendant cited in

support of that claim involved portions of the sentencing statute that were no longer in effect at

the time of defendant’s sentencing. Nonetheless, defendant contended the applicable statute

“precluded the imposition of consecutive sentences for his three attempted murder convictions.”

The court found that defendant ignored the portion of the statute that made defendant “eligible

for consecutive sentences as his single course of conduct involved the commission of a Class X

felony and the infliction of severe bodily injury of each of the victims.” The court further found

that the applicable statute “mandated the imposition of consecutive sentences where ‘[o]ne of the

offenses for which the defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1

felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.’ ” The court found that defendant’s

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“actions were found to have caused severe bodily harm and permanent disfigurement of all three

victims.” The court held that defendant “has not established deficient performance or prejudice

in support of this ineffective assistance claim.”

¶ 14   Turning to defendant’s arguments concerning the firearm enhancements, the trial court

concluded that defendant argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the

issue of “the trial court’s purported abuse of discretion in imposing a firearm enhancement to

each of his three attempted murder sentences where ‘only one gun was used’ and ‘the statute

does not make it clear whether or not a defendant can be sentenced to more than one

enhancement ***.’ ”

¶ 15   The trial court wrote that defendant’s focus on the fact there was only one gun was

mistaken. The court wrote that “[t]hese three sentences stemmed from [defendant’s] attempt to

murder three separate individuals, through his personal discharge of one firearm three times, and

which resulted in great bodily harm and/or permanent disfigurement of three victims. As such,

the enhancements were mandatory ***.” The court found that defendant “used [one] gun to

shoot three separate victims with three separate shots from that one firearm and caused all three

victims severe bodily harm and permanent disfigurement. Here [defendant’s] convictions were

based upon these three separate acts ***. Accordingly, appellate counsel was objectively

reasonable for not raising this issue and it was not reasonably probable that this issue would have

been successful had it been raised.”

¶ 16   As for defendant’s Proportionate Penalties Clause claim, the trial court found that: “In

support of his own youthfulness, [defendant] submits that he was ‘only two months into his 21st

birthday when he was arrested.’ ” The court noted that “Illinois courts consider sentencing

claims for young adults under the Proportionate Penalties Clause” and that “ ‘Young adult

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defendants are not entitled to a presumption that [Miller v. Alabama] applied to them.’ ” Rather,

“ ‘under Harris, a young adult defendant must plead and ultimately prove, that his or her

individual characteristics require the application of Miller.’ ” In this case, the court found that:

                 “In support of his entitlement to the application of Miller, [defendant]

       merely alleges his age and cites generally to scientific studies regarding brain

       development. [Defendant] sets forth no facts, outside of his age, that allow for

       objective or independent corroboration—let alone any facts that set forth that his

       individual characteristics require the application of Miller. Accordingly, this court

       finds [defendant’s] Proportionate Penalties claim frivolous and patently without

       merit.”

¶ 17   On August 3, 2022, the trial court entered its written order summarily dismissing

defendant’s petition for postconvicton relief. This appeal followed.

¶ 18                                          ANALYSIS

¶ 19   This is an appeal from the summary dismissal of a pro se petition for postconvicton relief

under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-7 (West 2022)).

The procedures on petitions under the Act are well-established and well known. The part of that

process relevant here is the one that requires that:

                 "Once a petitioner files a petition under the Act, the trial court must first,

       independently and without considering any argument by the State, decide whether

       the petition is ‘frivolous or is patently without merit.’ [Citation.] A postconviction

       petition is frivolous or patently without merit only if it ‘has no arguable basis

       either in law or in fact.’ [Citations.] A petition lacking an arguable basis in law or

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       fact is one ‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual

       allegation.’ [Citation.]

               To survive dismissal at this initial stage, the postconviction petition ‘need

       only present the gist of a constitutional claim,’ which is a low threshold that

       requires the petition to contain only a limited amount of detail. [Citation.]

       Additionally, a petition need not make legal arguments or cite legal authority.

       [Citation.] All well-pleaded facts must be taken as true unless ‘positively

       rebutted’ by the trial record. [Citation.] *** Our supreme court has instructed that

       pro se postconviction petitions should be viewed ‘with a lenient eye, allowing

       borderline cases to proceed to stage two.’ [Citation.]” Id. ¶¶ 41-42.

¶ 20   This court reviews the summary dismissal of a pro se petition for postconviction relief de

novo. People v. Myers, 2023 IL App (1st) 210642, ¶ 41 (“We review the summary dismissal of a

postconviction petition de novo.”).

¶ 21   Defendant’s petition raises a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in

defendant’s direct appeal and a violation of the Proportionate Penalties Clause. Turning first to

defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on direct appeal, the standards

for such a claim are, again, well-known and well established.

               “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is cognizable

       under the Post-Conviction Act. [Citation.] Claims of ineffective assistance of

       counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466

       U.S. 668 (1984). *** Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that

       counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance

       substantially prejudiced defendant. [Citation.] ‘Claims of ineffective assistance of

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       appellate counsel are measured against the same standard as those dealing with

       ineffective assistance of trial counsel.’ [Citation.] At the first stage of

       proceedings, a petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel may not be

       summarily dismissed if (1) it is arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an

       objective standard of reasonableness and (2) it is arguable that the defendant was

       prejudiced. [Citation.] Unless the underlying issue is meritorious, petitioner

       suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal. [Citation.]

       Further, it is essential that a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of

       appellate counsel set forth an error of constitutional dimension that occurred

       during the trial, which counsel failed to raise on direct appeal. [Citation.]” People

       v. Dixon, 2022 IL App (1st) 200162, ¶ 32.

¶ 22   Defendant’s pro se petition challenged defendant’s consecutive sentencing but on the

ground there was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective and the offenses

were committed as part of a single course of conduct. Now, for the first time on appeal,

defendant claims that appellate counsel’s performance was ineffective because appellate counsel

failed to challenge on direct appeal the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences on the

ground the trial court “wrongly equated a finding of great bodily harm or permanent

disfigurement for the purpose of the firearm enhancement in the attempt murder statute, with the

phrase ‘severe bodily injury’ for the purposes of mandatory consecutive sentencing.”

¶ 23   Section 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code), the attempt statute, states:

“an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the person personally discharged a

firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent

disfigurement, or death to another person is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term

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of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” (Emphasis

added.) 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(D) (West 2022); and section 5-8-4(d)(1) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, the consecutive sentencing statute, provides that: “[t]he court shall impose

consecutive sentences in each of the following circumstances: (1) One of the offenses for which

the defendant was convicted was first degree murder or a Class X or Class 1 felony and the

defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(d)(1) (West

2022).

¶ 24     The State argues defendant forfeited the ineffectiveness claim raised on appeal by failing

to allege it in his petition, and it may not be reviewed on appeal. Section 122-3 of the Act states

that “[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an

amended petition is waived.” 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 2022). Our supreme court has emphasized

that the appellate court has no authority to address issues not raised in a postconviction petition,

including issues involving fundamental fairness:

                 “Our detailed discussion of this issue is intended to stress that our

         appellate court is not free, as this court is under its supervisory authority, to

         excuse, in the context of postconviction proceedings, an appellate waiver caused

         by the failure of a defendant to include issues in his or her postconviction

         petition.” People v Jones 213 Ill. 2d 498, 508 (2004).

¶ 25     Defendant responds that under the rules requiring a liberal construction of pro se

postconviction petitions, specifically pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in People v.

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2009), and our sister District’s decision in People v. Mescall, 403 Ill.

App. 3d 956, 962 (2020), this court should similarly find that the pro se petition sufficiently

raised the consecutive sentencing issue defendant argues on appeal. For the following reasons we

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disagree and find that our liberal construction rules cannot save defendant’s claims on appeal

from forfeiture.

¶ 26    Our rules surrounding the issue of liberal construction of pro se postconviction petitions

are clear.

                “It is well established that ‘claims not raised in a petition cannot be argued

        for the first time on appeal.’ [Citation.] However, as stated above, our supreme

        court expressed concern that pro se petitions should be given a liberal

        construction and should be reviewed ‘ “with a lenient eye, allowing borderline

        cases to proceed.” ’ [Citations.] ‘While in a given case the pro se defendant may

        be aware of all the facts pertaining to his claim, he will, in all likelihood, be

        unaware of the precise legal basis for his claim or all the legal elements of that

        claim.’ [Citation.] It is for this reason that a pro se defendant is required to present

        only the ‘gist’ of a constitutional claim, which is ‘something less than a

        completely pled or fully stated claim.’ [Citation.] The question on appeal from the

        dismissal of a postconviction petition is whether the allegations in the petition,

        when liberally construed and taken as true, are sufficient to invoke relief under the

        Act. [Citations.]” Myers, 2023 IL App (1st) 210642, ¶ 45.

¶ 27    In Hodges, our supreme court rejected the State’s argument the defendant had forfeited a

postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call certain witnesses

because the witnesses’ testimony would have supported a finding of second degree murder or

“imperfect self-defense.” The State argued the “defendant, who was acting pro se, ‘chose’ to

focus only on self-defense and not on second degree murder as well.” The court found that the

petition for postconviction relief “did not expressly allege that this same testimony would have

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supported ‘unreasonable belief’ second degree murder.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 21. Our supreme

court stated that the State’s construction of the petition was “inconsistent with the requirement

that a pro se petition be given a liberal construction.” Id. Instead, our supreme court found that

“whether defendant's pro se petition, which focused on self-defense, could be said to have

included allegations regarding ‘unreasonable belief’ second degree murder—i.e., imperfect self-

defense—is at minimum the type of ‘borderline’ question which, under a liberal construction,

should be answered in defendant's favor.” Id.

¶ 28   Defendant advocates for a similar result. He argues that since he alleged a claim of

ineffectiveness for failing to challenge the imposition of consecutive sentences his claim

necessarily encompasses whether there was a finding of severe bodily injury. We are not

persuaded a similar result is warranted. In Hodges, the defendant raised second degree murder at

trial and the postconviction petition did raise the issue of “self-defense.” Our supreme court

focused on the question of whether the claims in the petition focused on “self-defense” “could be

said to have included allegations regarding ‘unreasonable belief’ second degree murder—i.e.,

imperfect self-defense.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 21. The only difference in the claim that was not

specifically stated in the petition was whether the self-defense was “perfect” or “imperfect.” See

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 20-21.

¶ 29   The decision in Mescall is similarly distinguishable. In Mescall, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 962,

the State argued the petition claimed ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel based on

the failure to challenge a consecutive sentence only on the ground the trial court “failed to

articulate how [the defendant’s] acts constituted a single course of conduct” but not on the

ground the trial court mistakenly determined that “consecutive sentences were mandatory.” Id.

The Mescall court found that liberally construed the postconviction petition encompassed both

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claims. See id. There, the petition raised the issue of the applicability of the consecutive

sentencing statute the trial court applied in toto—that is, the petition alleged the defendant “could

have been sentenced under an earlier more lenient law.” Id. at 962. The petition went on to

specifically allege “ ‘the trial judge could have only imposed mandatory consecutive sentences

only if he found that the charged acts occurred as part of a single course of conduct.’ ” Id.

¶ 30   The court found the petition sufficiently raised the issue that the trial court erred in

imposing mandatory consecutive sentences. Id. In that case, the State argued that the amended

version of the sentencing statute applied, but the Mescall court found the “amended statute [did]

not apply to [the] defendant’s case.” Id. at 964. Therefore, defendant was entitled to be sentenced

under an earlier, more lenient law. The court determined that “at the time of defendant’s

sentencing, consecutive sentences under the applicable statute were mandatory only if the acts

were committed in a single course of conduct.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Ultimately, the

Mescall court concluded that the trial court believed consecutive sentences were mandated

(under the amended statute), but that (under the correct statute):

               “Given the language of the information, the evidence at trial, and the

       general verdict of the jury, defendant presented an arguable basis for his claim

       that any finding by the trial court that the acts were committed during a single

       course of conduct for purposes of imposing mandatory consecutive sentences

       under the 1996 version of section 5–8–4(a) would have been erroneous.” Mescall,

       403 Ill. App. 3d at 966.

¶ 31   In this case, the difference in the claim that was not raised in the petition involves

completely different aspects of the sentencing statute and completely different elements of proof.

Unlike “self-defense” and “imperfect self-defense” in the cited case, the nature of the proof here

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is whether there was a single course of conduct (as alleged in the petition) and whether there was

severe bodily injury (as alleged on appeal). These are wholly distinct issues for the trial court to

decide. See People v. Williams, 335 Ill. App. 3d 596, 599-602 (2002) (discussing intricacies of

the “severe bodily injury” determination for purposes of the consecutive sentencing statute).

Further, the petition in this case did not raise the claim argued on appeal generally, like the

petition in Mescall. In both of the primary cases defendant relies on, the allegations in the

petition bore some relationship to the arguments raised on appeal. In this case we can find no

relationship whatsoever.

¶ 32   Recently, in Myers, this court found that the allegations in the petition adequately alleged

the claims asserted on appeal. Myers, 2023 IL App (1st) 210642 ¶ 46. There, the petition alleged

counsel was ineffective in failing to exclude the testimony of two witnesses but on appeal, the

arguments focused on excluding a detective’s testimony based on those two witnesses’

testimonies. Id. The court found that the petition alleged a claim of ineffective assistance based

on the failure to exclude the evidence that was the subject of all of the witnesses’ testimony. See

id. ¶¶ 47-48. In Myers, the testimony sought to be excluded between the witnesses and the

detective all went to the same facts and claim. Id. ¶¶ 47-50. This case is different. The allegations

in the petition and the claims on appeal do not involve the same facts and relate to wholly

separate claims.

¶ 33   The court has written that:

               “[A] pro se petitioner need allege only enough facts to make out a claim

       that is arguably constitutional for purposes of invoking the Act. [Citations.]

       ‘However low the threshold, the petition must “clearly set forth” the respects in

       which the petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. (Internal quotation

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        marks omitted.)’ [Citations.] This means that the pleading must bear some

        relationship to the issue raised on appeal. [Citation.] Liberal construction does not

        mean that we distort reality. [Citation.]” People v. Thomas, 2014 IL App (2d)

        121001, ¶ 48 (citing, inter alia, Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 9).

¶ 34    In this case, the petition bears no relationship to the issue raised on appeal. We reject

defendant’s argument that his claim should proceed because the trial court in this case

“addressed the propriety of consecutive sentences vis-à-vis the ‘severe bodily injury’ provision

of the statute.” The portion of the trial court’s written order on which defendant relies for that

claim is titled “Single Course of Conduct’ and the trial court only discussed that defendant was

eligible for consecutive sentencing based on his single course of conduct. Consistent with the

statute that defendant asserted (that was not applicable at the time of sentencing), the court

further noted that the single course of conduct involved the infliction of severe bodily injury. The

court concluded that “under the version of the statute that was in place at the time of his

sentencing” defendant was eligible for consecutive sentencing based on the offense “and the

defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” But the trial court did not discuss the meaning of the

phrase “severe bodily injury” or state any facts on which it found severe bodily injury—the court

only recited the language of the statute—because defendant did not ask the court to revisit those

issues in his petition; and therein lies the best reason for finding forfeiture in this case. “The

underlying purpose of the forfeiture rule is to ‘preserve finite judicial resources by creating an

incentive for litigants to bring to trial courts' attention alleged errors, thereby giving trial courts

an opportunity to correct their mistakes’ (Emphasis added.) [Citation.]” People v. Primm, 319

Ill. App. 3d 411, 423 (2000).

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¶ 35   As previously noted, “[i]t is well established that ‘claims not raised in a petition cannot

be argued for the first time on appeal.’ ” Myers, 2023 IL App (1st) 210642, ¶ 45 (citing People v.

Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 505-06 (2004)). Defendant did not raise a claim that the trial court

conflated “great bodily harm” with “severe bodily injury” that can be saved by a liberal

construction of his postconviction petition. We find defendant has forfeited this issue on appeal.

¶ 36   Forfeiture aside, defendant’s claim that consecutive sentences were not authorized is

completely rebutted by the record. The record shows the victims were severely wounded and all

three suffered disfigurement. The record shows victims Woods and Gatlin were shot multiple

times, their wounds required multiple surgeries, and they spent weeks in the hospital. They

displayed their surgical scars in court. Victim Wandick was shot in the foot. He testified he

suffered broken bones and ligament damage which prevent him from standing for periods of

time. He testified he has a bullet hole in his foot and a bone protruding from his foot as a result

of the shooting. All three victims received scars and a permanent alteration of their physical

appearance. Therefore, the consecutive sentences were required.

¶ 37   We turn next to defendant’s claim the imposition of a de facto life sentence in this case

violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him. Initially,

we note this claim is not forfeited for the reason defendant did not raise it in his direct appeal.

The courts have directed young adults that Proportionate Penalties Clause claims can and should

be raised in postconviction proceedings where an appropriate record can be developed. See

People v. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶ 36 (discussing forfeiture of Proportionate

Penalties Clause claims). See also People v. Ford, 2021 IL App (5th) 170259, ¶ 25 (“An as-

applied challenge to a defendant’s sentence requires a showing that his sentence is

unconstitutional as it applies to the specific facts and circumstances of the defendant’s case.

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[Citation.] For purposes of appellate review, it is paramount that the record is sufficiently

developed because all as-applied challenges are dependent on the specific facts and

circumstances of the individual raising the challenge.”).

¶ 38   In this context, we also review the summary dismissal of a postconviction petition de

novo. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶ 23. Under the Act, young adult offenders may

challenge a de facto life sentence—and there is no dispute defendant received a de facto life

sentence—under the Proportionate Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶ 27 (citing

People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶¶ 46, 48).

¶ 39   As already pointed out above, “ ‘[a] petition may be summarily dismissed as frivolous or

patently without merit only if the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.’

[Citations.] That is, the petition is based on a legal theory ‘completely contradicted by the

record’ or on factual allegations determined as ‘fantastic or delusional.’ [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 22.

¶ 40   “Our supreme court has recognized that young adults may raise as-applied challenges to

life sentences based on the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development under

the proportionate penalties clause.” Id. ¶ 27. “At the first stage, a defendant ‘is not trying to

prove the merits of [an] as-applied proportionate penalties claim’ but ‘need only state the gist of

a constitutional violation, which may then be fleshed out in further proceedings.’ [Citation.]” Id.

(citing People v. Zumot, 2021 IL App (1st) 191743, ¶ 30). Nonetheless, the defendant bears the

burden to allege “facts showing that his particular circumstances fall under Miller and that a

sentence imposed on an adult pursuant to the relevant statutes is nonetheless so disproportionate

to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community.” People v. Thomas, 2022 IL App

(1st) 200164, ¶ 52. That is, the defendant must “make a connection between the applicable

science and his own characteristics” Id. ¶ 49. A defendant does this by alleging “ ‘facts that can

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be corroborated, are objective in nature, and bear directly on the Supreme Court’s observation in

Miller that a hallmark of youth is the lack of a fully formed character—traits that are not fixed

and a corresponding capacity for meaningful rehabilitation,’ [Citation.]” Id. Although “a

defendant needs to be specific enough [in their factual allegations] to show their claim can be

substantiated at the later stages” of postconviction proceedings, it is clear that a conclusory

assertion that Miller should apply to the defendant as a young adult is insufficient to survive first

stage review. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶¶ 29-31, 50. See also Thomas, 2022 IL App

(1st) 200164, ¶¶ 51-54.

¶ 41   Defendant argues the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his pro se claim that his

sentence violates the Proportionate Penalties Clause as applied to him because the trial court

“used an inappropriately high standard in evaluating [defendant’s] pro se, first stage claim.”

Defendant argues the claim has an arguable basis in law, and this court has recognized that

emerging adults can raise Proportionate Penalties Clause claims and argue that the protections

provided by Miller should apply to them.

¶ 42   In this case, the trial court summarily dismissed the claim based on finding defendant did

not allege sufficient facts to allow for “objective or independent corroboration that his individual

characteristics require the application of Miller.” As to the facts, defendant argues that he alleged

enough facts to meet the “low pleading threshold” at the first stage. Defendant argues that his

allegations—consisting of his age—“coupled with the record establish that his claim *** has an

arguable factual basis.” The portions of the record on which defendant relies are the PSI and

certain inferences about defendant’s upbringing, and the nature and alleged motive for the

offense, which defendant asserts itself “shows a level of impulsivity, impetuosity, and

recklessness that factor into the diminished culpability for youthful offenders.” Defendant also

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blames the lack of factual development on trial and appellate counsel’s failure to raise the

Proportionate Penalties Clause claim and argues that as “a pro se and incarcerated litigant,

[defendant] could not be aware of exactly how much factual development he needed.”

¶ 43   In this case, defendant failed to reach the low pleading threshold required at the first stage

of postconviction proceedings. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶¶ 29-31, 50. See also

Thomas, 2022 IL App (1st) 200164, ¶¶ 51-54. Defendant said nothing about himself, other than

his age. Defendant did not allege that his mental development was more like that of a juvenile at

the time of the offense, or that he has impulse control issues. Cf. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st)

210355, ¶ 28. Defendant did not allege specific information about his own brain development or

any facts specific to himself to link his claims to studies surrounding young adult brain

development. Id. ¶¶ 28-29.

¶ 44   On appeal, defendant argues we should infer much from the facts of the offense and the

PSI. However, this court, pursuant to Harris, has found that “information from the PSI is ‘basic.’

It ‘does not contain evidence about how the evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain

development *** applies to defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.’ ” Thomas, 2022 IL

App (1st) 200164, ¶ 52 (quoting Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 46). We also find the trial record is

insufficient to support defendant’s claims. Defendant’s alleged motive for the shooting—

retaliation for disrespecting a friend—his posing for photos possessing guns, and the brazenness

of the offense are equally compatible with a criminal mind as they may be with youthful

impetuousness. Defendant cited no facts to link his offense to any characteristics of youth in

himself at the time of the offense, to studies surrounding young adult brain development, or any

relevant Miller factors. Cf. Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶ 28 (“These allegations are

specific to Herring and linked to his claims about studies surrounding young adult brain

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development. In this way, Herring “sufficiently alleged that [he] could establish the existence of

facts personal to him that warranted consideration of the Miller factors in fashioning an

appropriate sentence.”). The trial court only found that defendant’s conduct was “unacceptable”

and “had to be punished.” The record does not contain an express finding of impulsiveness or

immaturity. Cf. Thomas, 2022 IL 200164, ¶ 53 (trial court in earlier case had made remarks that

were “powerful support for the [defendant’s] claim”). Finally, defendant cites no authority for

his suggestion that his pleading deficiency should be excused because his trial counsel did not

raise the issue at sentencing nor did appellate counsel raise it on appeal.

¶ 45   Defendant did nothing more than make a bare allegation of youth and cite to scientific

studies. Under the law as it stands, this is not enough to raise even an arguable claim of a

constitutional violation. See Herring, 2022 IL App (1st) 210355, ¶ 29 (citing People v. Howard,

2021 IL App (2d) 190695, ¶ 46). We find the trial court did not err in summarily dismissing

defendant’s petition. See Thomas, 2022 IL App (1st) 200164, ¶ 54.

¶ 46                                      CONCLUSION

¶ 47   For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 48   Affirmed.

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