Court Opinion

ID: 9526438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:17:24.520307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:51.207844
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). On June 19, 1946, petitioner Harold H. Emmons was disbarred from the practice of law under the procedure provided in Rule No 15 of the Supreme Court Rules adopted for the State Bar of Michigan. The order for disbarment *319was affirmed by the Supreme Court in Re Emmons, 316 Mich 674. The facts leading up to and causes for disbarment are to be found in the above case. Petitioner now seeks reinstatement and has filed a petition for that purpose with the clerk of the circuit court of Wayne county. The petition was referred to a grievance committee. The committee conducted a hearing and filed its report recommending reinstatement. Subsequently, this report was referred to Judges Elliott, Eos and Brown who considered the report and recommendations and denied petitioner’s prayer for reinstatment. Petitioner appeals.
The testimony taken before the grievance committee and upon which it based its report is thoroughly reported in Mr. Justice Reid’s opinion and will not be repeated.
Petitioner urges that under Rule No 15, § 13 of the Supreme Court Rules for the State Bar of Michigan, the 3 judges erred in overruling the unanimous findings of fact and recommendations of the grievance committee. I am not in accord with petitioner’s theory that the recommendations of the grievance committee in the 'absence of other testimony should be affirmed by the 3 judges. The recommendations-of the grievance committee are only advisory and not binding upon the court as the court has inherent, power to entertain and pass upon petitions for reinstatement and in its discretion may grant or deny the same. See In re Salsbury, 217 Mich 260; Matter of John A. King, 54 Ohio St 415 (43 NE 686); Petition of Gaffney, 28 Cal2d 761 (171 P2d 873).
Of material importance is the determination of what evidence the 3 judges, in addition to the report of the grievance committee, may consider in granting or denying reinstatement.
The 3 judges stated:
“We find that his present moral character .and fit*320ness to practice law cannot properly be determined without giving great consideration to conduct so described by the Supreme Court and the former grievance committee.
“We find also that we should consider the long litigation that Mr. Emmons made necessary before a settlement partially reimbursing the trust funds was «effected, and should also consider that the present petitioner, by injunctive proceedings in Ingham county and later in the Federal courts, held up for years the proceedings for disbarment.”
I concur in the views as above expressed. It follows that the 3 judges had a right to and did consider what we said in Re Emmons, supra, 684, 685, 691, 692;
“It was not until some time after the allowance of defendant’s final account in August, 1935, that the nature of the questionable investments by defendant came to the attention of Probate Judge Murphy. He thereupon appointed a guardian ad litem for the unascertained beneficiaries of the crippled .children’s trust. Prom a report to the court by the guardian ad litem made in May, 1936, the probate court for the first time learned that defendant had used trust funds in purchasing for the trust estate from himself or members of his family 34,119 shares of stock and certificates of indebtedness in the Chemical Research 'Corporation, and like purchases of 7,120 shares of Wolverine Producing & Refining Company, and that ■these items, constituting a part of the trust estate, had been purchased at an expenditure of upwards of $231,000 of trust funds during the years 1929 to 1932. • * * * It further appears that in the settlement of the accounting case the Foundation took over from .defendant 34,119 shares of Chemical Research stock some of which had been purchased at $20 per share ■ from defendant or members of his family with trust funds; and that the market value of this stock during the year of the finál estate settlement (1935) varied from $2.35 down to $1.65 per share. The'record *321shows that at no time pending negotiations for the settlement of the accounting suit was the Chemical Research stock worth as must as had been paid for it. * * *
“On the other hand, we have not stressed or been influenced by the disclosure in this record that for his services in the Cummings estate defendant, by probate orders, was rather liberally compensated in the amount of $125,000. The justness of the ordered compensation is not challenged. Likewise we have refrained from reciting the details of the many devious ways in which defendant has sought to, and has succeeded in, deferring final decision in the proceedings now before us. * * #
“The record before us necessitates concurrence with and affirmance of the holdings of the circuit judges, the gist of which is that throughout his activities in connection with the Cummings estate and the testamentary trust defendant herein was acting as a fiduciary, that he wrongfully failed to give bonds •ordered by Judge Hulbert in 1928, that defendant improperly and wrongfully used trust funds in self-dealings; and we'find this resulted in prejudice and ‘loss to the trust estate, that such self-dealings weré intentionally and wrongfully concealed by defendant from the court having jurisdiction of the matter, and ■that, notwithstanding defendant’s claim of good faith and exercise of his best judgment, under this record a disciplinary order was essential.”
The judges also had a right to consider that the purposes of the Foundation “for the care, maintenance and education of crippled children, who otherwise are destitute of the proper and necessary means for their care, medical attendance and education” were voided and that through the machination of petitioner these children were deprived of the benevolence of the Foundation for a long time.
Our Court, among others, has given expression to the tests to be applied to one who petitions for reinstatement.- ■ • .
*322In re Salsbüry, supra, we said:
“The right of the court disbarring an attorney to reinstate him is inherent in such court and has long-been exercised. To reinstate a disbarred attorney .means to again invest him with the right to practice. * * * ,
“This is a proceeding upon a showing that, since such disbarment, the petitioner has by a life of rectitude demonstrated that he is possessed of moral character sufficient to again be a member of the bar. .The right to reinstate being- inherent in the court we think the .practice is well stated in the Matter of John A. King, 54 Ohio St 415 (43 NE 686):
, “ ‘When a member of the bar of the State has been, upon .proper proceedings, disbarred, and the judgment remains in full force and unreversed, the only remedy of the party is, at the proper time and on a proper showing, to apply to the court in which he was disbarred to be reinstated.
■“ ‘The court rendering the judgment of disbarment, retains a continuing jurisdiction over the subject, as in many similar cases; and may, upon a proper showing of reformation of the party, or other satisfactory reasons, arising after the disbarment, reinstate him in the practice of his profession. Readmission, as upon application and examination in the first instance, is not the proper course.’ ” (Italics supplied.)
In Beeks v. State Bar of California, 35 Cal2d 268 (217 P2d 409), the court said:
“In McArthur v. State Bar (1946), 28 Cal2d 779, 788 (172 P2d 55, 60), we reaffirmed the principal that ‘Upon an application by"a disbarred attornéy for reinstatement, the object of the court, as observed in Kepler v. State Bar, 216 Cal 52, 55 (13 P2d 509, 510) “is to determine Whether or not 'the character of the applicant -is such that he should be admitted to an office of trust, and recommended to the public as a ¡trustworthy person, fit to be' consulted by others in *323matters of confidence. (Citations.) In such proceeding. the burden of proof is upon the one who seeks, after disbarment, to accomplish a restoration to the ranks of the legal profession, and, before the court may grant the petition for reinstatement,. it must be satisfied and fully convinced by positive evidence that the effort he has made toward- rehabilitation of his character has been successful-. (Citations. ) It is only, reasonable that the person seeking-reinstatement, after disbarment, should be required to present stronger proof of his present honesty and integrity than one seeking admission for the first time whose character has never been in question. * * * The proof presented must be sufficient to overcome the court’s former adverse judgment of applicant’s character.” ’” - -
In re Stump, 272 Ky 593, 598 (114 SW2d 1094), the court said:
“The fundamental consideration-is the nature and degree of misconduct for which the attorney was disbarred and circumstances attending the offense. . In sequence are his conception, of. the serious nature- of his act and his previous and,-what is of more importance, his subsequent conduct and attitude toward the courts and the practice. This involves the element of time since disbarment as constituting his testing-period, for character is not developed or reconstruct-, ed in a-day; * * * By his subsequent life and coir-duet he must have demonstrated his reformation. * * * The ultimate and decisive question is always ■whether the applicant is now of good moral character and is a fit and proper person to be reintrusted with the confidences and privileges of an attorney at law. * * * Therefore, one proven to have violated those conditions of good behavior and professional integrity annexed to the granting of the privilege of practicing law, in applying for restoration, has the bur-, den of overcoming by persuasive-evidence the former adverse judgment on his qualification. In short, if the disbarred-attorney can prove after the expiration' *324o£ a reasonable length of time that he appreciates the significance of his aerelictions; has lived a consistent life of probity and integrity, and shows that he possesses that good character necessary to guarantee uprightness and honor in his professional dealings and the faithful discharge of his duties as a lawyer, and therefore is worthy to be restored, the court will so order. * * *
“We appraise the evidence in the light of the foregoing observations and under the control of that attitude.”
See, also, In re Nolan’s Petition for Reinstatement, 310 Mich 204.
In the Salsbury Case, supra, the proceedings for reinstatement were before this Court by virtue of the inherent powers of this Court in such proceedings, but the showing necessary for reinstatement is the same regardless of whether such proceedings are by virtue of the inherent powers of the court or under Rule No 15, § 13 of the Supreme Court Rules for the State Bar of Michigan.
Mention has been made of the character of the witnesses produced by petitioner as well as the fact that their testimony was uncontradicted. Such evidence should be considered by the 3 judges as well as by the Supreme Court in taking into consideration whether petitioner is a proper person to be invested with the privileges of an attorney at law.
Rule No 15, § 13, of the Supreme Court Rules for the State Bar of Michigan provides that the order of the 3 judges is “subject to review by the Supreme Court, in its discretion, upon the law and the facts.” In the Emmons Case, 316 Mich 674, we did not decide the scope of the review under these rules, but we did review and evaluate the testimony presented in the record.
Proceedings for disbarment as well as proceedings for reinstatement are not in the strict sense actions *325at law or subject to the rules in law cases tried without the aid of a jury. A judgment of disbarment is conclusive evidence of a person’s unfitness to practice law and the person disbarred has the burden on a subsequent petition for admission to overcome by evidence the judgment of disbarment and show that he is a proper person to be intrusted to the practice of law. In my opinion, the Supreme Court has a duty to review petitioner’s application for reinstatement in the light of his previous record as an attorney as well as his conduct since disbarment in order to determine whether or not there has been rehabilitation. Nowhere in the record can there be found any evidence that petitioner acknowledges the justness of his disbarment or has made complete restitution of funds belonging to the “Endowment.” His actions which brought about disbarment exhibit a total disregard of his obligations as an attorney as well as a lack of moral responsibility which must be possessed by attorneys. His restoration to the practice of law would lower confidence iii the profession and be against public interest.
The order denying the petition for rehearing should be affirmed. No costs.