Court Opinion

ID: 9739333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:12:29.784259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.719623
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
White, J.
I agree that individuals who are not bona fide partners, joint venturers, or trustees cannot bind themselves to pay more than eight percent interest on ordinary loans merely by signing papers saying they are partners, joint venturers, or trustees. Individuals, including husbands and wives, may, nevertheless, become bona fide partners or joint venturers in investment enterprises or trustees of such a trust.1 In fact it would seem to me that whenever two or more persons associate themselves together as active participants in a business enterprise, without incorporating, they probably become either a joint venture, a partnership, or a business trust.2
There is almost no evidence in the case at bar that the husband and wife appellants were engaged in any business enterprise. They stipulated that they “entered into this partner ship/joint venture/trust agreement/for the purpose of obtaining the loan in question and investing the proceeds of this loan, with a view towards long term appreciation and resulting gain.” That vague general statement could refer to a *377business enterprise but seems more descriptive of the purchase of a painting or an antique for the home, which they could well be buying “with a view toward long term appreciation.” Had the amount of the note been sufficient (e.g., $10,000.00 instead of $100.00) the described investment might well have been a family home or a vacant lot on which they expected to build their home in the future.
The evidence was quite obviously insufficient to sustain the finding that the husband and wife “entered into a valid partnership agreement”/". . . a valid joint venture”/". . . a valid trust agreement.” But the greatest doubt as to the bona fides of any of these agreements arises out of the very obvious fact that they were entered into for purpose of creating “facts” on which to base these three test cases. The findings in each of these cases “[t]hat a genuine controversy exists between the parties” is wholly unsupported.3
It may be that we are performing a public service by interpreting the 1969 amendment to the usury statute. I cannot believe, however, that any interpretation based on the vague generalizations here called “An Agreed Statement of Facts” can be of much help in the later decision of a live case arising out of real facts. Nor do I believe the time of trial courts and appellate courts should be devoted to the decision of moot cases or the rendition of advisory opinions. My inclination is to follow the rule stated in Zoercher v. Agler (1930), 202 Ind. 214, 221, n. 1, 172 N. E. 186, 70 A. L. R. 1232, as follows:
“While declaratory judgments acts should be liberally interpreted, Tennessee Eastern Electric Co. v. Hannah (1928), 157 Tenn. 582, 12 S. W. (2d) 372, an examination of the recent cases shows that in a large number of them the courts are compelled to refuse to determine controversies which are not real. Moot or theoretical questions cannot be litigated under such acts, Kelly v. Jackson (1925), 206 Ky. 815, *378268 S. W. 539; Miller v. Miller, supra [149 Tenn. 463, 261 S. W. 965] ; Garden City News v. Hurst (1929), 129 Kans. 365, 282 Pac. 720; nor can actions be brought merely to secure free advice where there is no present existing controversy, Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. (1929), 227 App. Div. 156, 237 N. Y. Supp. 64; Dietz v. Zimmer (1929), 231 Ky. 546, 21 S. W. (2d) 999).”
With these reservations I concur in the court’s opinion by Chief Justice Hoffman.
Note. — Reported in 266 N. E. 2d 221.

. “Appellant could become the business partner of her husband, and is bound by an estoppel in pais as any other person. Her representations to the bank that she was such partner and was borrowing money with her husband to be used in the partnership business were as binding upon her as if she were a feme sole.” Anderson v. Citizens Nat. Bank (1906), 38 Ind. App. 190, 193, 76 N.E. 811, 812.

. “If the intent to do those things which constitute a joint venture exists, the parties will be joint venturers even though they also intended to avoid the personal liability that attaches to joint venturers.” 46 Am. Jur. 2d 31, Joint Venturers § 9, citing Bryce v. Bull, 106 Fla. 336, 143 So. 409.

. The stipulation of the parties that the controversy is genuine can have little weight dn the face of the inferences which arise out of the simultaneous execution of the three agreements, the three loans of $100.00 each, and the immediate filing of the three declaratory judgment actions.