Court Opinion

ID: 9563827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:47:53.0302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:05.359807
License: Public Domain

*1328QUINN, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part:
While I concur in the court’s reversal of the judgment of dismissal, I write separately because I disagree with some of the directions given by the majority to the trial court on remand. In my view, a proper resolution of this case requires a determination by the trial court of three questions: (1) Was any evidence available in a quantity sufficient to be tested at the time Officer Meals completed his field test and returned to his car? (2) If so, did the state have a duty, under either the United States or Colorado Constitution, to preserve that evidence? (3) If it did, what sanction is appropriate in light of the state’s failure to preserve the evidence?
I.
Since, as the majority has observed, the state has no duty to preserve nonexistent evidence, a determination of whether the porcelain dish contained a quantity of residue sufficient for later laboratory testing is crucial to the resolution of this case. My disagreement with the majority on this issue does not relate to the necessity for such a determination, but rather, to the appropriate time frame on which the trial court should focus in making that determination. The majority directs the trial court to determine whether there was a residue remaining in the dish on February 1, 1983, after Officer Meals realized that the sale would not be consummated. In view of the fact that the charges filed against the defendant are based on the preliminary negotiations between Officer Meals and Fleish-man on January 31, 1983, the appropriate inquiry, in my opinion, should be whether there was any residue that could be tested when Officer Meals returned with the tray to his car on January 31, immediately following the field test.
I agree with the majority that Officer Meals had no obligation to endanger his cover by taking an additional sample of the powder during his preliminary negotiations with Fleishman. In view of the not unreasonable possibility that the final sale would not be completed as contemplated, however, I believe that it was incumbent on the officer to determine whether any residue had been left of the field test sample, and to preserve any such existing residue, as soon as he had safely completed his preliminary negotiations on January 31 and returned to his car.
II.
If the trial court determines that there was sufficient residue to preserve on January 31, after the completion of Officer Meals’ preliminary negotiations with Fle-ishman, I believe the next inquiry should be whether the state had a duty, either under the Colorado or United States Constitution, to preserve that evidence.
Although in this case the defendant’s motion to dismiss makes reference to a denial of due process under both the Colorado and United States Constitutions, the trial court did not indicate whether it considered its holding to be dictated by state or federal due process requirements, or both. In People v. Gann, 724 P.2d 1318, 1321 (Colo.1986), we indicated that the federal due process requirements for preservation of evidence are determined by applying the “constitutional materiality” standard of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). We declined in Gann, however, to resolve whether the Trombetta standard or some other standard should be adopted as part of state constitutional doctrine. As in Gann, I believe that question should be answered in the first instance by a trial court only after the issue is squarely placed before it under a fully developed record.
On remand, the trial court in this case should first consider whether the evidence involved here meets the Trombetta standard of “constitutional materiality” and thus can be the basis for a federal due process claim predicated on the state’s failure to preserve evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the defense of charges filed against the defendant. This determination should be made by considering: (1) whether the evidence possessed an exculpatory value that *1329was apparent to the officer before it was destroyed; and (2) whether the evidence was of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534.
If it is determined that the evidence in this case does not meet the Trombetta standard, it will then be necessary for the trial court to consider whether a more expansive duty regarding the preservation of evidence exists under Colorado’s Due Process Clause. If the court determines that such duty exists, it should then decide whether the state breached that duty in this. case.
III.
If the trial court determines that the state breached its duty to preserve evidence under either the federal or state constitution, it must fashion an appropriate sanction. I concur in the majority’s observation that the sanction of dismissal is a drastic remedy, and I would place the sanction of suppression in that same category. In some situations, however, no sanction less than dismissal or suppression can adequately vindicate the constitutional deprivation resulting from the loss or destruction of exculpatory evidence. If in this case, for example, the trial court were to find that there was a sufficient residue to preserve and that Officer Meals’ failure to preserve the residue deprived the defendant of the only practicable means of controverting the very evidence on which the charges are based, then it would appear to me that anything less than suppression would be an illusory sanction at best and would fall far short of redressing the constitutional violation.