Court Opinion

ID: 9907641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 19:05:36.789293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:27.243276
License: Public Domain

STATE OF MINNESOTA

                                 IN SUPREME COURT

                                        A22-0299

Original Jurisdiction                                                      PER CURIAM
                                                  Took no part, Moore, III, Procaccini, JJ.

In re Petition for Disciplinary Action
Against David L. Ludescher, a Minnesota                          Filed: December 6, 2023
Attorney, Registration No. 194347                               Office of Appellate Courts

                              ________________________

Susan M. Humiston, Director, Binh T. Tuong, Deputy Director, Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for petitioner.

Jessica L. Klander, Aram V. Desteian, James C. Kovacs, Gillian L. Gilbert, Bassford
Remele, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

                              ________________________

                                     SYLLABUS

       1.     The attorney discipline referee did not err by concluding that the juvenile

court’s orders purporting to grant the attorney’s client temporary custody (both physical

and legal) of the client’s child were unenforceable.

       2.     The attorney discipline referee did not err by concluding that the transaction

set-aside provision in Minnesota Statutes section 524.5-417(e) (2022) did not apply to the

termination of the attorney’s on-going attorney-client relationship with a client who

became subject to a conservatorship.
       3.      The attorney discipline referee did not misinterpret Minnesota Rule of

Professional Conduct 1.6 by determining that the attorney violated the rules of professional

misconduct when the attorney failed to disclose his incapacitated client’s file to the

conservator.

       4.      Suspension from the practice of law for a minimum of 60 days followed by

a 2-year term of supervised probation is the appropriate discipline for this attorney’s

misconduct.

       Suspended.

                                      OPINION

PER CURIAM.

       The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility petitioned for

disciplinary action against respondent-attorney David L. Ludescher, alleging professional

misconduct in two client matters. We appointed a referee, who, after conducting an

evidentiary hearing, found that the Director had proved by clear and convincing evidence

that Ludescher committed misconduct including (1) incompetent representation, (2)

bringing frivolous claims, (3) making knowingly false statements, (4) acting to embarrass

or burden a third person, (4) failing to reasonably protect a client’s interest upon

termination, (5) engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, (6)

charging or collecting an unreasonable fee, and (7) failing to withdraw representation upon

termination. The referee also found five aggravating factors and no mitigating factors. The

referee recommended that Ludescher be suspended from the practice of law for 30 days.

                                             2
       Ludescher contends that the referee misinterpreted relevant law and the Rules of

Professional Conduct and failed to adequately consider the record when making certain

findings and conclusions. The Director defends the referee’s reasoning and findings but

argues that the referee’s disciplinary recommendation is insufficient given the seriousness

of Ludescher’s misconduct. We agree with the referee’s legal conclusions and conclude

that the referee’s findings were not clearly erroneous.       Consequently, the referee’s

rule-violation conclusions are supported. We also conclude that the appropriate discipline

is a 60-day suspension from the practice of law followed by a 2-year term of supervised

probation.

                                         FACTS

       Ludescher was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1988, began practicing in

child protection matters in 1989, and began working on guardianship and conservatorship

cases in 2000. The petition for disciplinary action arises from Ludescher’s conduct in two

client matters: the J.K. matter, involving a child protection case, and the G.N. matter,

involving a guardianship/conservatorship case. We review the facts of each matter in turn.

J.K. Matter

       J.K. is the father of a child who was the subject of a child in need of protection or

services (CHIPS) petition filed by the Rice County Attorney’s Office in September 2017.

Though not married, J.K. and the child’s mother lived together with the child, and J.K.

signed a recognition of parentage and the child’s birth certificate. The child’s mother had

sole physical and legal custody of the child because she was not married when the child

was born. See Minn. Stat. § 257.541, subd. 1 (2022). J.K. could have petitioned for

                                             3
custody of the child, see id., subd. 2(b) (2022), but J.K. had not petitioned for custody

before the CHIPS matter commenced. Consequently, J.K. did not have custodial rights to

the child, and he was initially listed only as a participant, rather than a party, in the CHIPS

proceedings. J.K. retained Ludescher to represent him in the CHIPS matter, and Ludescher

understood that J.K. did not have custodial rights.

       Ludescher understood that a parent labeled as a participant to a CHIPS matter does

not have legal custody over the child subject to the CHIPS petition, and also understood

that a non-custodial parent could not be granted legal custody of a child because the CHIPS

disposition statute only permits legal custody to be transferred to a child-placing or social

services agency.     Ludescher simultaneously understood that J.K. was labeled as a

participant and did not have custodial rights to P.K. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd.

1(a)(1)(i) (2022).    Ludescher understood that when a court places a child with a

non-custodial father, the court can only transfer legal custody of the child to a child-placing

agency, or to the responsible social services agency. See id., subd. 1(a)(2) (2022).

       Despite this legal framework, the juvenile court issued an order that included

language purporting to grant J.K. “temporary physical and legal custody” of the child

subject to Rice County Social Services’ (the agency’s) protective supervision. This

language became a part of the template orders used throughout the CHIPS proceedings.

       Ludescher understood that while a CHIPS proceeding is ongoing, the juvenile court

has exclusive jurisdiction over custody of the child. See also Minn. Stat. § 260C.101,

subd. 1 (2022). Nevertheless, Ludescher initiated a separate paternity and custody action

                                              4
for J.K. in family court. 1 Ludescher also filed a motion to dismiss the CHIPS petition as it

related to J.K.’s child. In support of the motion, Ludescher argued that J.K. had been

granted temporary legal custody, was a fit parent, and had filed for permanent custody. He

also contended that Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), 2 prevented the county from

interfering with J.K.’s rights as a parent. The juvenile court denied this motion to dismiss

because J.K. had no custodial rights to the child other than the temporary rights given to

him in the CHIPS proceedings and because the purpose of the CHIPS proceedings was to

reunify the child with its mother, the custodial parent.

       After a 2-day court trial, the juvenile court issued an order on December 12, 2017,

adjudicating the child as CHIPS and reiterating that J.K. only had temporary custody and

that the mother would have sole custody of the child absent the CHIPS proceedings.

Ludescher moved for a new trial, again citing Troxel, and requested that the juvenile court

conclude J.K. was a custodial parent. The juvenile court denied this motion on January 19,

2018, reiterating that the child would return to the mother’s custody absent the CHIPS

proceedings, that custody motions were not permitted because it had continuing and

exclusive jurisdiction over the child’s custody, and that the remainder of Ludescher’s

1
       The family court did not take any action on this filing.
2
        Troxel v. Granville did not control here. In Troxel, the United States Supreme Court
held in a plurality opinion that the application of a statute that authorized state courts to
award visitation rights to a non-parent “whenever ‘visitation may serve the best interest of
the child’ ” violated a custodial parent’s due process right to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children. 530 U.S. 57, 60, 75 (2000). Troxel differs
vastly from J.K.’s circumstances given that J.K. is not and has never been a custodial
parent.

                                              5
arguments had already been addressed by the court. The court also repeatedly advised

Ludescher during hearings that reunification would only occur with the mother, that J.K.

lacked custodial rights, and that the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over custody

decisions. 3

       Despite his understanding of the controlling CHIPS statutes and the juvenile court’s

orders, Ludescher continuously argued throughout the CHIPS proceedings that J.K. had

custody of the child. On March 15, 2018, the juvenile court issued an order authorizing

the agency to begin a trial home visit with the mother when she obtained safe housing. On

April 3, 2018, Assistant Rice County Attorney Jennifer Nelson moved to increase the

mother’s visitation. The juvenile court granted this motion on April 11, 2018, reiterating

that the mother was the only custodial parent in the case and the agency was therefore

obligated to reunite the mother and the child.

       On May 1, 2018, the agency commenced a trial home visit with the mother and the

child. Nelson sent Ludescher a letter explaining that the agency placed the child on a trial

home visit, so J.K. no longer had temporary custody. Up until this point, Nelson had not

3
       Ludescher appealed the December 12 and January 19 order to the court of appeals
in January 2018, and the court of appeals issued its nonprecedential opinion in May 2018.
See In re Welfare of Children of S.E.M., A18-0177, 2018 WL 2407268 (Minn. App. May
29, 2018). The court of appeals upheld the adjudication, concluded that the juvenile court’s
original and exclusive jurisdiction precluded a family court from issuing a custody
determination during the CHIPS proceedings, and found no persuasive reason to overturn
the court’s dispositional orders. Id. at *4, 6–7. The court of appeals also stated in a footnote
that even though the juvenile “court ordered that the child ‘remain in the temporary
physical and legal custody of father,’ ” Rice County Social Service, “not a noncustodial
parent, has legal responsibility for a child ‘taken into custody’ and placed with a
noncustodial parent under the CHIPS statute.” Id. at *1, n.2.

                                               6
fully realized there was language granting J.K. “temporary legal and physical custody,”

and the juvenile court did not understand this language to be the basis for Ludescher’s

repeated custody arguments. Nelson understood Ludescher’s custody arguments to be

based on J.K. being the child’s custodian, and the juvenile court understood Ludescher’s

custody arguments to be based on the signed recognition of parentage and the child’s living

arrangement with J.K. Ludescher never informed Nelson or the juvenile court of the

legally erroneous language granting J.K. temporary legal custody.

       After receiving the May 1, 2018, letter from Nelson, Ludescher repeatedly called

and e-mailed Nelson, attempting to bully and threaten her into returning the child to J.K.

Nelson testified that Ludescher repeatedly yelled at her throughout the case, threatened to

trespass the agency from J.K.’s property, and once “was so upset and agitated that

[Ludescher] put his hands on the male guardian ad litem.” Ludescher e-mailed the Rice

County Attorney and the county sheriff a letter in which he claimed that Nelson may have

engaged in criminal intentional deprivation of parental rights by helping the mother take

the child from J.K. In the letter, Ludescher alleged that J.K. had court-ordered temporary

legal and physical custody, and sole custody of the child. Ludescher failed to mention that

custody would revert back to the mother if the CHIPS proceedings were dismissed because

J.K. had no custodial rights, or that the court had authorized a trial home visit with the

mother. As a result of Ludescher’s e-mail, Nelson was questioned by the sheriff and a

criminal investigation was commenced by the Le Sueur County Sheriff to avoid any

conflicts of interest.

                                            7
        On May 4, 2018, Ludescher moved the juvenile court for ex parte relief, seeking to

have custody of the child returned to J.K. On May 7, 2018, the court denied the motion,

recognizing that the prior orders purporting to grant temporary legal custody of the child

to J.K. were unenforceable given the CHIPS statutes, and scheduled a hearing for May 10,

2018.    At the hearing, Ludescher again accused Nelson of a crime and read her a

Miranda-esque warning on the record. 4 Ludescher also argued that J.K. had custody based

on the temporary custody granted in prior CHIPS orders. On June 25, 2018, upon a motion

from Nelson, the juvenile court sanctioned Ludescher and ordered him to cease and desist

his custody arguments.

G.N. Matter

        G.N. retained Ludescher in early 2017 for representation in the litigation of G.N.’s

father’s estate (estate case). On December 14, 2017, G.N. was committed as mentally ill

to the Commissioner of Human Services and North Memorial Health Hospital for an initial

period of 6 months, which was later extended for another 12 months.

4
       Though Ludescher denied making these statements at the evidentiary hearing, the
referee found that the transcript of the May 10, 2018, hearing included the following
statements from Ludescher:

        Your Honor, before we get started, I don’t know if it’s appropriate that we
        continue forward. I have made a complaint to the Rice County Sheriff’s
        Office asking the Rice County Sheriff to investigate intentional deprivation
        of parental rights. They have agreed to do so . . . I would advise the parties
        that anything they say can and could be used against them. They have a right
        not to testify or not to say anything, and their Fifth Amendment rights are
        implicated if, in fact, there is a criminal investigation and the matter moves
        forward.

                                             8
       On March 2, 2018, Ludescher filed a certificate of representation on G.N.’s behalf

in the estate case. In late March, the court appointed Stephen Ecker to serve as G.N.’s

attorney     in     proceedings   regarding       a   guardianship   and    conservatorship

(guardianship/conservatorship case) and appointed Alternative Resolutions, Inc. (ARI) as

G.N.’s emergency guardian and conservator. ARI’s appointments became permanent in

June 2018.

       J. Scott Braden represented ARI in the guardianship/conservatorship case. The

letters of guardianship and conservatorship granted ARI full powers and authority,

including those in Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5-313(c), 524.5-417(c) (2022).         Those powers

included the powers to represent G.N. in any court proceedings, and to approve or withhold

approval of any contract, except for necessities, that G.N. wanted to make. See Minn. Stat.

§ 524.5-417(c).

       On July 12, 2018, Braden, on ARI’s behalf, terminated Ludescher’s representation

of G.N. in the estate case and requested Ludescher’s files on G.N. Ludescher still

continued to provide G.N. legal services and to bill him for those services at a rate of $200

per hour. On August 3, 2018, Braden sent another letter, again requesting G.N.’s file and

an invoice for services. Because Ludescher had sent ARI a bill, Braden testified that ARI

needed the invoices to do its fiduciary duty to verify Ludescher’s fees before paying

Ludescher’s bill.

       Ludescher did not provide the file or invoices. On August 10, 2018, Ludescher

requested the documentation that established ARI as G.N.’s guardian and conservator.

Braden sent Ludescher the requested documentation on August 15, 2018, explained that

                                              9
ARI had full contract authority with no restrictions, reminded Ludescher that ARI

terminated Ludescher’s contract with G.N. on July 12, 2018, and again requested G.N.’s

file. Ludescher did not provide the file.

       At a hearing in the estate case on August 17, 2018, Ludescher appeared and

contested his discharge. The probate court took the issue under advisement and gave

Ludescher the opportunity to file a brief; Ludescher did not do so. On September 4, 2018,

the probate court issued an ex parte order, finding that ARI was G.N.’s substitute decision

maker in the estate case, and that Braden was the proper attorney of record for service of

process on G.N. Ludescher did not file a withdrawal of representation in the estate case.

The probate court issued another order on November 15, 2018, finding that Ludescher had

not been G.N.’s attorney of record in the estate case since July 2018.

       Despite these orders from the probate court, Ludescher did not produce G.N.’s file

and continued to consult with and bill G.N. A trial in the estate matter was scheduled for

February 2019 and Braden and ARI still did not have G.N.’s file, both of which they

believed were necessary to represent G.N.’s best interests at the trial, so Braden filed an ex

parte motion seeking an order requiring Ludescher to release his complete file on G.N. The

probate court granted this motion and ordered Ludescher to release G.N.’s file within 48

hours, including all e-mails, correspondence, pleadings, records, and invoices. Ludescher

partially complied, sending the file without any invoices—Ludescher claimed that G.N.

did not want him to disclose the invoices.

       On April 5, 2019, while G.N. was still incapacitated, Ludescher filed a claim in

conciliation court against G.N. seeking $8,372.10 for legal services provided from

                                             10
February 2018 through April 2019. Ludescher filed this conciliation claim even though

ARI was willing to pay Ludescher’s legal fees if the invoices supported Ludescher’s billing

and G.N. had the financial resources.

       On August 30, 2019, at a conciliation hearing, Ludescher told the conciliation court

that he and G.N. had reached a settlement agreement wherein G.N. would pay $5,000.

ARI, as G.N.’s guardian and conservator, disputed the validity of this agreement given

G.N.’s lack of capacity, and ARI again requested Ludescher’s retainer agreement and

itemized invoices. Ludescher was, again, ordered to produce his retainer agreement and

itemized invoices by September 30, 2019. Ludescher again did not comply.

       On October 16, 2019, the probate court terminated G.N.’s guardianship and

conservatorship. On October 28, 2019, Ludescher requested, and the conciliation court

granted, dismissal of the conciliation claim because G.N., now restored to capacity, would

voluntarily pay Ludescher.

       The invoices, obtained in this disciplinary process, show that Ludescher charged

G.N. $3,160 in legal fees and $165.85 in total expenses between July 12, 2018 (the date

ARI terminated Ludescher’s representation) and October 19, 2019 (when G.N. was

restored to capacity). These charges included fees associated with the conciliation action

Ludescher filed against G.N.

Disciplinary Proceedings

       The Director received complaints about Ludescher’s conduct in July and August

2018 (in the J.K. matter), and September 2019 (in the G.N. matter), and opened an

investigation. On March 3, 2022, the Director petitioned for disciplinary action against

                                            11
Ludescher based on his alleged misconduct in both the J.K. and G.N. matters. The Director

alleged the following rule violations: (1) Ludescher’s repeated arguments that J.K. had

custody of the child violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 and 3.1; (2) Ludescher’s

allegations of criminal activity against Nelson and knowingly false statement that J.K. had

sole temporary legal and physical custody violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.1 and 4.4(a);

(3) Ludescher’s suit against G.N., an incapacitated client, for attorney’s fees when ARI

was willing to pay the fees violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.1, and 8.4(d);

(4) Ludescher’s refusal to provide G.N.’s file upon termination and request, refusal to

produce invoices to the conservator, and simultaneous demand for payment of said invoices

violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(d) and 8.4(d); and (5) Ludescher’s choice to continue

representing and billing G.N. without court authorization after Ludescher’s services were

terminated violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a), 1.16(a)(3), and 8.4(d).

      After Ludescher answered the petition, we appointed a referee who held a 3-day

evidentiary hearing at which the parties submitted a collective 114 exhibits and presented

testimony from Rice County District Court Judge Long, Jennifer Nelson, Carrie Doom

(Director’s child protection expert), J. Scott Braden, Ludescher, J.K., Patricia Zenner

(Ludescher’s     child    protection    expert),    and    Jill   Sauber     (Ludescher’s

guardianship/conservatorship expert).

      The referee concluded the following: (1) Ludescher’s custody arguments in the J.K.

matter “had no support in fact and law and showed a lack of thoroughness, preparedness

and legal skill in representing a client,” violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1 and 3.1;

(2) Ludescher made “a knowingly false statement” by claiming that Nelson deprived J.K.

                                            12
of parental rights and helped abduct J.K.’s child, violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.1;

(3) Ludescher’s claims that Nelson committed a crime “had no purpose other than to

embarrass” Nelson, violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 4.4(a); (4) Ludescher’s refusal to

produce G.N.’s file upon termination or any of the invoices violated Minn. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.16(d) and 8.4(d); (5) Ludescher’s choice to sue G.N. for fees that G.N.’s

conservator was willing to pay “had no basis in law or fact; demonstrated a lack of legal

knowledge, skill necessary for representation; and was conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice,” violating Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.1, and 8.4(d);

(5) Ludescher’s continued billing of G.N. without court authorization amounted to the

charging of an unreasonable fee in violation of Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a); and

(6) Ludescher’s failure to withdraw from representing G.N. violated Minn. R. Prof.

Conduct 1.16(a)(3).

      The referee found several aggravating factors: (1) G.N.’s vulnerability;

(2) Ludescher’s substantial experience in both CHIPS and guardianship/conservatorship

cases; (3) Ludescher’s history of prior discipline; (4) Ludescher’s knowingly false

statement during the disciplinary hearing; and (5) Ludescher’s lack of recognition or

remorse for his misconduct.    The referee found no mitigating factors.      The referee

recommended a 30-day suspension.

                                      ANALYSIS

      Ludescher timely ordered a transcript, so the referee’s findings of fact and

conclusions are not binding. Rule 14(e), Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility

(RLPR).    We nevertheless extend “great deference” to the referee’s findings and

                                           13
conclusions. In re MacDonald, 906 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. 2018) (citation omitted)

(internal quotation marks omitted).      “We review the referee’s findings of fact and

application of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to the facts of the case for clear

error.” In re Nielson, 977 N.W.2d 599, 608 (Minn. 2022). “A referee’s findings are clearly

erroneous when they leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

made.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We “review de novo the

referee’s interpretation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and other conclusions of law

that do not rely on the referee’s factual findings.” In re Laver, 984 N.W.2d 556, 565 (Minn.

2023) (citing In re Montez, 812 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2012)).

       Ludescher argues the referee made three errors of law that resulted in incorrect

rule-violation conclusions. Specifically, he argues the referee erred by (1) concluding that

the juvenile court’s custody-granting orders were unenforceable, (2) concluding that Minn.

Stat. § 524.5-417 did not apply to Ludescher’s representation of G.N., and (3)

misinterpreting Minn. R. Prof. Conduct. 1.6 in concluding that Ludescher’s failure to

provide G.N.’s file violated the rules of professional conduct. We address each argument

in turn—as well as Ludescher’s arguments against the referee’s findings and conclusions—

and then address the appropriate discipline for Ludescher's misconduct.

                                             I.

       We first address Ludescher’s argument regarding the juvenile court’s orders in the

J.K. matter. Ludescher argues that his actions were made with the support of valid juvenile

court orders granting J.K. temporary custody of the child. Ludescher first asks us to

determine that the referee improperly found that the juvenile court’s orders were

                                             14
unenforceable. If this court does so, Ludescher’s remaining arguments are best understood

as claiming that his actions cannot constitute rule violations because he acted with the

support of valid court orders. Because Ludescher’s arguments that he did not violate any

rules of professional conduct rely on his assumption that the referee made a legal error, we

will first review Ludescher’s arguments about the enforceability of the juvenile court’s

orders before turning to a review of the referee’s rule-violation conclusions.

                                             A.

       We begin by describing the legal backdrop in CHIPS cases. Unmarried mothers

have sole legal and physical custody of their children born outside of marriage under Minn.

Stat. § 257.541, subd. 1. (2022). If a court adjudicates a child as CHIPS, the court may

place the child with a non-custodial father under Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 1(a)(1)(i)

(2022). Minnesota law, however, specifically states that such an order placing a child with

a non-custodial father “does not confer legal custody [of the child] on that parent.” Id.

After a CHIPS adjudication, Minn. Stat. § 260C.201, subd. 1(a)(2) (2022) only grants the

court two choices for transferring legal custody of the child—custody can be transferred to

a child-placing agency or to the responsible social services agency.

       The referee determined that “[t]he juvenile court’s order conferring temporary legal

custody to JK is unsupported by Minnesota law because the juvenile court could not have

transferred legal custody to JK as a disposition.” The referee also found that the testimony

of Ludescher’s expert witness that the juvenile court’s orders were valid and enforceable

was “not reasonable” and “not persuasive or credible” given the CHIPS laws and the court

of appeals opinion associated with this case, see In re Children of S.E.M., No. A18-0177,

                                            15
2018 WL 2407268, *1 n.2 (Minn. App. May 29, 2018) (holding that even though the

juvenile court in this case “ordered that the child ‘remain in the temporary physical and

legal custody of father,’ ” the agency, “not a noncustodial parent, has legal responsibility

for a child ‘taken into custody’ and placed with a noncustodial parent under the CHIPS

statute”).

       Ludescher argues that it is a “fundamental and perfunctory” concept that “[a] court

order is a court order,” and claims the Rooker-Feldman doctrine supports his contention.

Ludescher also seems to point to the result of the referee’s decision as support for his legal

argument because Ludescher believes the result of this interpretation “obligates attorneys

to challenge the validity of a court order to the detriment of their own client’s interests if

the legal reasoning or outcome may be later deemed flawed.”

       Ludescher provided no caselaw that supports his argument that an “order is an

order” and therefore is always enforceable without any caveats, likely because supporting

authority does not exist 5. The most apt caselaw is that surrounding the liability imputed

on sheriffs who process court orders. In Robinette v. Price, 8 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn.

1943), we held that, “[a] sheriff, being neither permitted nor required to inquire into the

validity of an order placed in his hands for execution, is protected by the order even though

the proceedings in which it was issued are erroneous and voidable.” The Robinette holding

5
       Our decision in this case should not be misconstrued to undermine the basic
principle that court orders are enforceable until held otherwise. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
108.01, subd. 1. Rather, our decision recognizes an attorney’s duty of candor to the court,
and holds that this duty requires an attorney to inform the court if he knows its order
contains a blatant legal error and not to take advantage of an erroneous court order.

                                             16
could be seen as suggesting that when someone acts with the support of a seemingly-valid

court order and it is not their job to assess the validity of the order, then they cannot be

penalized for complying with the order.

       But Ludescher’s circumstances are inherently different than that of the sheriff in

Robinette because Ludescher is an attorney. Ludescher’s job is, in part, to assess the

validity of the order: he must competently interpret and apply the law, and he is required

by the rules of professional conduct to be honest and forthright with the court in making

arguments. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.3. Ludescher testified in the disciplinary

hearing that he knew the child’s placement with J.K. did not automatically grant custody

on the noncustodial parent. His own testimony shows he knew the juvenile court’s orders

were unsupported by the law. Thus, Ludescher had an ethical obligation not to improperly

leverage or take affirmative action based on the loose language of an order that was

contrary to governing law. This obligation did not require Ludescher to act against his

client, but it did require Ludescher to inform the court of the error in the order, refrain from

the following improper acts: initiating a separate paternity and custody action for J.K. in

family court, filing a motion to dismiss the CHIPS petition in relation to J.K.’s child on the

grounds that J.K. had been granted temporary legal custody, sending a letter to the Rice

County Attorney and sheriff referencing the erroneous court order and alleging that Nelson

may have engaged in intentional criminal deprivation of parental rights, and filing a motion

for ex parte relief for the return of custody to J.K. Ludescher used the loose language of

the court order as the basis for filing multiple custody actions and to accuse opposing

counsel, Nelson, of a criminal offense; these actions show he affirmatively and improperly

                                              17
leveraged the juvenile court’s order while knowing the order was contrary to governing

law.

       We next turn to Ludescher’s Rooker-Feldman argument. We have explained that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits federal district courts from exercising subject-

matter jurisdiction over claims seeking relief that would, in essence, vacate a state court

judgment, because only the United States Supreme Court may review such judgments.” In

re Nora, 942 N.W.2d 127, 130 n.2 (Minn. 2019). Ludescher’s argument is that the referee

does not have the power to determine that the juvenile court’s orders were unenforceable.

There is no caselaw applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in this way. Moreover, we find

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine inappropriate here because the juvenile court

itself deemed these orders unenforceable in its May 7, 2018, order. The court of appeals

also undermined the validity of the juvenile court’s orders in its May 2018 opinion, S.E.M.,

2018 WL 2407268, at *1 n.2. These decisions were both made in May 2018—over 4 years

before the referee in these proceedings determined that the orders were unenforceable. The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here because the referee simply reiterated the

conclusion of both the juvenile court and the court of appeals that these orders were

unenforceable.

       Lastly, we note that Ludescher’s argument that “an order is an order” is factually

disingenuous given the language in the juvenile court’s orders. The first order issued by

the juvenile court on September 13, 2017, stated that the child “shall remain in the

temporary legal and physical custody of . . . [J.K.] subject to the protective supervision of”

the agency. After this order, Ludescher moved to dismiss the CHIPS petition as it related

                                             18
to J.K., arguing that the petition should be dismissed because J.K.’s conduct was not in

question in the CHIPS proceedings and “the court granted temporary custody to [J.K.],” so

the child no longer needed protection.

       On October 20, 2017, the juvenile court denied Ludescher’s motion, explaining that

the child was in “temporary physical and legal custody” of J.K. and “subject to the

protective supervision” of the agency, and confirmed that J.K. “does not have any

court-ordered custodial rights or parenting time.” When the juvenile court summarized

Ludescher’s custody argument, it stated that the argument was based on a custody

agreement that J.K. and the mother had reached. The juvenile court concluded that the

mother was the custodial parent of the child, so the goal of the CHIPS proceedings was to

reunify the child with the mother, not J.K. In other words, it became clear in this

October 20, 2017, order that the juvenile court did not understand Ludescher’s custody

argument to be based on the temporary grant of custody in the juvenile court’s earlier order.

And the juvenile court clearly articulated that J.K. had no custodial rights to the child

outside of the temporary grant in the CHIPS proceedings. The juvenile court continuously

reiterated that J.K. had no custodial rights outside the temporary grant in later orders

throughout the CHIPS proceedings. The juvenile court also ordered on March 15, 2018,

that the agency “shall have the authority to begin a trial home visit with the Mother if/when

she obtains safe housing for the Children.”

       Accordingly, Ludescher’s argument that “an order is an order” fails upon

considering what the juvenile court’s orders made clear: (1) J.K. did not have any lasting

custodial rights to the child; (2) the juvenile court did not intend to confer any permanent

                                              19
custody on J.K.; (3) the mother remained the only custodial parent; (4) the purpose of the

CHIPS proceeding was to reunify the mother and the child; and (5) the agency had

authority to start trial home visits with the mother. All of these points clearly undermine

Ludescher’s arguments that the juvenile court’s order conferred custody of the child on

J.K. These points also undermine Ludescher’s argument that “an order is an order” because

he clearly disregarded these portions of the orders in making his repeated custody

arguments. Ludesher’s argument, then, seems to be that “an order is an order” only as to

the portions that are favorable to his client—but all unfavorable portions of the order are

not enforceable.

       In sum, Ludescher’s actions with respect to the order are not protected by Robinette;

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply; the record shows that the juvenile court did

not intend to confer custody of the child on J.K.; and Ludescher knew that conferring

custody on J.K. was not a lawful CHIPS disposition. Consequently, the referee did not

make an error of law in concluding that the portions of the juvenile court’s orders

purporting to give J.K. custody of the child were unenforceable.

                                            B.

       We next turn to Ludescher’s arguments regarding the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions in the J.K. matter. Ludescher’s arguments on the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions relating to this matter are based on his assumption that he acted under the

authority of a valid court order, or that his repeated custody arguments were good faith

arguments aimed at expanding or modifying the law and are therefore protected from

disciplinary action under Minnesota Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1. As explained

                                            20
above, the juvenile court’s orders did not validly confer custody. Moreso, we do not find

Ludescher’s argument that he made good faith arguments to expand the law compelling

given that the referee found that Ludescher knew “a parent who is labeled as a participant

to a CHIPS proceeding does not have legal custody of a child who is the subject of a CHIPS

petition” and that “a non-custodial parent could not be given legal custody of a child as a

disposition during a CHIPS proceeding because the CHIPS disposition statute only permits

legal custody to be transferred to a child placing agency or the county’s social services

agency.” Ludescher does not challenge these findings, and the record does not support that

the judge or opposing counsel in the CHIPS matter understood Ludescher’s custody

argument to be a good faith attempt to modify the existing and well-established law.

Consequently, we do not find Ludescher’s claim that he acted in good faith to modify

existing law to be compelling. A good faith effort to modify the law did not require

Ludescher to accuse Nelson of the crime of depriving parental rights, nor did it require

Ludescher’s unprofessional and bullying behavior. Ludescher’s actions do not indicate

good faith.

       Based on our finding of no legal error in the referee’s conclusions on the

unenforceability of the juvenile court’s orders, our conclusion that Ludescher did not act

in good faith to modify existing law, and Ludescher’s failure to support his rule-violation

arguments with any additional support or challenges to the referee’s findings that underly

these rule-violation conclusions, we decline to review the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions.

                                            21
                                             II.

       Next, we address Ludescher’s argument that ARI’s termination of his legal

representation of G.N. was not valid because ARI did not follow the procedure laid out in

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-417 (2022). Ludescher argues that his representation and billing of

G.N. after this purported termination was therefore done under a still-existing

attorney-client relationship and, so, could not have constituted violations of the Minnesota

Rules of Professional Conduct. Again, because Ludescher’s arguments that he did not

violate the rules of professional conduct rely on his assumption that the referee made a

legal error, we will first review Ludescher’s arguments about the applicability of section

524.5-417 to the termination of his attorney-client relationship with G.N. before turning to

a review of the referee’s rule-violation conclusions.

                                             A.

       Ludescher argues that the referee incorrectly interpreted section 524.5-417(e)

because the statute’s plain language required ARI to petition for a court order to invalidate

the attorney-client relationship, and because G.N. had retained Ludescher in the months

before he was declared incapacitated.

       In July 2018, Braden, ARI’s attorney, terminated Ludescher’s legal representation

of G.N. via letter and requested G.N.’s file. Ludescher continued to provide G.N. legal

services after this termination and did not send Braden G.N.’s file. On August 17, 2018,

Ludescher appeared at a hearing in the estate case to contest his discharge. The probate

court took the issue under advisement and gave Ludescher the chance to file a brief on the

issue; Ludescher never filed a brief. The probate court, in a November 2018 order,

                                             22
determined that ARI was G.N.’s guardian and conservator, would act as G.N.’s substitute

decision maker in the estate case, and named Braden as the proper attorney of record. The

probate court took “judicial notice” of the prior order “establishing that ARI, as [G.N.’s]

Guardian and Conservator, is his substitute decision maker with power to approve or

withhold approval of any contracts, and establishing J. Scott Braden as their attorney in the

present matter.” The probate court explained that “[t]his had the effect of legally validating

ARI’s authority, through attorney Braden, to terminate Mr. Ludescher’s contract to

represent [G.N.], which ARI did by letter on July 12, 2018.” Finally, the probate court

stated that “Ludescher never submitted a brief in support of his position” and,

consequently, found the issue moot moving forward. Ludescher argued about section

524.5-417(e)’s applicability for the first time in these disciplinary proceedings.

       The first letter of conservatorship granted the conservator all powers within Minn.

Stat. § 524.5-313(c), and the second granted the conservator the powers in Minn. Stat.

§ 524.5-417(c)(1)-(6). This includes “the power to approve or withhold approval of any

contract, except for necessities, which the person subject to conservatorship may make or

wish to make.” Id. § 524.5-417(c)(5). It also includes “the duty to pay out of the estate of

the person subject to conservatorship all lawful debts of the person subject to

conservatorship.” Id. § 524.5-417(c)(2).

       Ludescher argues that irrespective of ARI’s powers as a conservator under section

524.5-417(c), the conservator was required under section 524.5-417(e) to petition the court

to terminate Ludescher’s representation of G.N. Section 524.5-417(e) states:

                                             23
       Transaction set aside. If a person subject to conservatorship has made a
       financial transaction or gift or entered into a contract during the two-year
       period before establishment of the conservatorship, the conservator may
       petition for court review of the transaction, gift, or contract. If the court finds
       that the person subject to conservatorship was incapacitated or subject to
       duress, coercion, or undue influence when the transaction, gift, or contract
       was made, the court may declare the transaction, gift, or contract void except
       as against a bona fide transferee for value and order reimbursement or other
       appropriate relief. This paragraph does not affect any other right or remedy
       that may be available to the person subject to conservatorship with respect to
       the transaction, gift, or contract.

Minn. Stat. § 524.5-417(e).

       Braden and Jill Sauber (Ludescher’s expert) also testified about how section

524.5-417(e) works. Braden explained that section 524.5-417(e) is usually used for

procedures like selling a house or land, entering a cell phone contract, or significant gifts.

In those cases, section 524.5-417(e) is “a two-year period of time where [conservators] try

to get [a conservatee’s] money back.” Braden testified that the decision to terminate

Ludescher’s representation was not about setting aside a transaction for which they would

attempt to recoup money, instead it was a termination of Ludescher’s ongoing or future

representation. Braden also testified that even if there were something about Ludscher’s

relationship with G.N. that needed to be set aside through section 524.5-417(e), ARI and

Braden could not determine that without G.N.’s file and Ludescher’s invoices, which

Ludescher repeatedly refused to provide.

       Sauber testified that section 524.5-417(e) applies to any contract the conservator

believed was the result of duress, coercion, or undue influence and requires the conservator

to “actually present evidence that the person was subject to duress, coercion, or undue

influence, or was in fact incapacitated at that time.” She explained that the difference

                                               24
between sections 524.5-417(e) and (c)(5) is “temporal in nature,” so you look at the date

the conservator was appointed and “[a]ny transactions going forward from that point in

time are subject to the withholding or approval of the conservator. Anything going back

in time, if the conservator wants to set aside or void a transaction, must fall into [section

524.5-417(e)] and the conservator must follow th[ose] procedures.” Sauber also testified

that Braden did not have the ability to unilaterally cancel Ludescher’s representation of

G.N. based on section 524.5-417(e).

       The referee “did not find [Sauber’s] expert[] testimony” on section 524.5-417(e)

and its applicability to Ludescher’s circumstances to be “persuasive given the broad powers

of a conservator needed to protect the assets of the conservatee, the explicit language of

the statute, and the testimony of Mr. Braden regarding the workings of the professional

conservator under the law.” The referee found that Ludescher never asked ARI or Braden

to follow the statutory process in section 524.5-417(e) to terminate Ludescher’s

representation, and even if he had made such a request, Ludescher’s “failure to provide his

retainer agreement and the invoices would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for ARI

to seek a transaction set-aside” under section 524.5-417(e). Regardless, the referee found

that Braden and ARI were not required to use section 524.5-417(e) to prevent Ludescher

from continuing to act as G.N.’s attorney because the powers of conservatorship given to

ARI included the ability to initiate or terminate any representation on behalf of G.N.

       While Ludescher argues that the language of section 524.5-417(e) plainly applies to

attorney-client relationships, there is no caselaw in Minnesota that applies that statute to

attorney-client relationships. The only authoritative caselaw Ludescher cites to is Hagen

                                             25
v. Rekow, in which this court held that a guardian of an estate “does not become the alter

ego of the incompetent and is not empowered . . . to change an act performed by the

incompetent while mentally normal.” 91 N.W.2d 768, 771 (Minn. 1958). This court then

listed examples from prior caselaw where a guardian made changes to the ward’s savings

account in trust for another person, changed the beneficiary of the ward’s life insurance

policy, or waived a ward’s rights. Id. In Lawler v. Dunn, however, this court explained

that “[t]he right of a client to discharge his attorney at his election, with or without cause,

is universally recognized by the authorities.” 176 N.W. 989, 990 (Minn. 1920). This court

explained that if a client can terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time without

cause, and if a client has this right “as an implied condition of the contract under the law,

it follows as a natural consequence that he cannot be compelled to pay damages for

exercising that right which his contract gives him.” Id. The court held that the attorney

retains the right to recover the reasonable value of the services rendered, but the client’s

discharge of the attorney does not constitute a breach of contract. Id.

       By its terms, section 524.5-417(e) applies when a conservator seeks to void a

contract or transaction the conservatee entered into before the conservatorship started if

that contract or transaction was entered into under duress or coercion. See Minn. Stat.

§ 524.5-417(e).    This provision allows the conservator to protect the conservatee’s

financial assets if a transaction/contract was entered under duress before the conservatee

was declared incapacitated. Given that an attorney-client relationship is terminable at any

time without penalty to a client and that ARI and Braden did not seek to undo any actions

taken in Ludescher’s pre-conservatorship legal representation, but instead sought merely

                                              26
to choose different representation going forward, section 524.5-417(e) did not apply to

Ludescher’s ongoing attorney-client relationship with G.N. The testimony from Sauber

and Braden is also consistent with this conclusion because ARI did not seek to recoup funds

already paid or earned by Ludescher. Instead, ARI sought to terminate the relationship

going forward and sought G.N.’s file and invoices from Ludescher so that it could perform

its fiduciary duty and pay Ludescher for his pre-conservatorship services. Consequently,

we conclude the referee did not err by concluding that section 524.5-417(e) did not apply

to ARI’s termination of Ludescher’s ongoing legal representation of G.N.

                                            B.

       We next turn to Ludescher’s arguments regarding the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions in the G.N. matter.        Again, Ludescher’s arguments on the referee’s

rule-violation conclusions are based on his assumption that section 524.5-417(e) should

have applied to ARI’s termination of his attorney-client relationship with G.N., and that he

had an ongoing attorney-client relationship with G.N. As we have explained, we disagree

with this contention and instead conclude that the referee properly determined that section

524.5-417(e) was not applicable.      Because we find no legal error in the referee’s

conclusions on the applicability of section 524.5-417(e) and Ludescher does not support

his rule-violation arguments with additional support and does not challenge the referee’s

                                            27
underlying factual findings, we find it unnecessary to review the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions. 6

6
        Although unnecessary, we do briefly address the rule-violation findings. We review
the referee’s application of the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct to facts for clear
error. In re Aitkin, 787 N.W.2d 152,158 (Minn. 2010). When we are left with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake was made, the clearly erroneous standard is satisfied.
In re Bonner, 896 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Minn. 2017). The referee found that Ludescher’s
failure to produce G.N.’s file to ARI after termination violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct
1.16(d) and 8.4(d). Rule 1.16(d) states that after termination “a lawyer shall take steps to
the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests,” which includes “giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, [and]
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled.” Rule 8.4(d) states that it
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” As the referee found, and Ludescher did not contest,
Ludescher’s actions in failing to produce the file and invoices “impaired ARI’s ability to
act as guardian and conservator for GN”; these actions required ARI to “take additional
measures to protect GN’s interests,” which ultimately cost G.N. money that he would not
have otherwise incurred had [Ludescher] complied with ARI’s requests. Ludescher’s
actions also “resulted in unnecessary litigation as each of the motions seeking confirmation
of ARI’s decision-making authority and Respondent’s files would not have been needed.”
These findings are supported by Braden’s testimony. Consequently, the referee’s
rule-violations conclusion was not clearly erroneous.
        The referee concluded Ludescher’s “conduct in suing an incapacitated client for
attorney’s fees – when a conservator was available and willing to pay the fees, subject to
performing its court-ordered fiduciary duties” – violated Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.1, 3.1,
and 8.4(d) because his actions “had no basis in law or fact; demonstrated a lack of legal
knowledge, skill necessary for representation; and was conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.” Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to “provide competent representation
to a client,” which includes “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.” Rule 3.1 states that lawyers “shall not bring
or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in
law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.” Rule 8.4(d) states that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.” As the referee found and Ludescher did not contest, ARI was willing to pay
Ludescher’s bills if they were supported by the invoices, and Ludescher tried to circumvent
ARI’s fiduciary duty to G.N. by filing a conciliation action against G.N. Ludescher tried
to contravene the conservatorship process, meant to protect G.N.’s estate and assets. Had
Ludescher simply provided ARI with the invoices for his bills, there would have been no

                                             28
                                              III.

       Next, we address Ludescher’s arguments that the referee misinterpreted Minnesota

Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(a) by rejecting his argument that the rule permits but

does not require disclosure of a client’s file under court order. Ludescher claims that this

misinterpretation led to unsupported rule-violation conclusions. Because Ludescher’s

arguments about whether he violated the various rules of professional conduct rely on his

assumption that the referee misinterpreted Rule 1.6(a), we first review Ludescher’s

arguments about Rule 1.6(a) before turning to a review of the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions.

reason for Ludescher to sue G.N. in conciliation court. Consequently, the referee’s
rule-violation conclusion was not clearly erroneous.
        Next the referee concluded that Ludescher’s “conduct in continuing to bill an
incapacitated GN absent court authorization, amounted to an unreasonable fee” violating
Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a). Rule 1.5(a) states that “[a] lawyer shall not . . . charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses” and lists a number of
criteria to be used in determining if a fee is valid. Clear in the plain language of the rule
and the comments is that these fees are charged to clients. Ludescher did not have an
ongoing attorney client relationship with G.N. after ARI terminated Ludescher on July 12,
2018. But the referee found, and Ludescher does not contest, that he charged G.N. “$3,160
in legal fees and $165.85 in total expenses between July 12, 2018, and October 19, 2019,
including all fees associated with the conciliation court case filed against GN” Meaning,
Ludescher charged G.N. for fees when they did not have an ongoing attorney client
relationship, and charged G.N. for fees accrued while Ludescher was suing G.N.
Consequently, the referee’s rule-violation conclusion was not clearly erroneous.
        Finally, the referee found that Ludescher’s failure “to withdraw from representing
GN after he was discharged by ARI violated [Minn. R. Prof. Conduct] 1.16(a)(3).” Rule
1.16(a)(3) states that a lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client if . . . the
lawyer is discharged.” Given that section 524.5-417(e) did not apply and Ludescher’s
contract was terminated on July 12, 2018, the probate court ordered that Ludescher could
no longer represent G.N. in the estate case, and there is no dispute that Ludescher never
filed a withdrawal, the referee’s rule-violation conclusion was not clearly erroneous.

                                              29
       The referee found that Ludescher’s claim that he was prohibited from providing

G.N.’s information was “not persuasive.” The referee explained that Rule 1.6(b) “permits

a lawyer to reveal information related to a client if ‘the lawyer reasonably believes the

disclosure is necessary to comply with other law or a court order,’ ” and Ludescher “was

explicitly directed by the court to provide his file and invoices” and “any reasonable

attorney would have understood the disclosure was necessary to comply with the court’s

order.” Because Ludescher “was court-ordered to provide the information,” the referee

determined that Ludescher could not “use Rule 1.6, MRPC, as an excuse not to comply

with the court’s order.” Ludescher argues the referee misinterpreted the plain language in

Rule 1.6(a) by rejecting the argument that Rule 1.6(a) prevented Ludescher from disclosing

his client’s information. Ludescher contends that Rule 1.6 allows for permissive disclosure

of a client’s file when under a court order but does not require disclosure. Ludescher,

however, does not support his arguments with any legal citation other than his citations to

the rule, so we decline to review this argument as it is forfeited.        In re McCloud,

955 N.W.2d 270, 280 n.12 (Minn. 2021) (deeming an argument forfeited because the

attorney provided “no argument or citation to authority supporting this conclusion”). 7

7
        We also note the logical infirmity of this argument—the referee did not find that
Ludescher violated Rule 1.6. Instead, the referee found that Ludescher violated rule
1.16(d) by failing to disclose G.N.’s file, which the conservator (who acted as G.N.) was
entitled to have. Ludescher is attempting to use Rule 1.6 as a shield against his obligation
to disclose the file in Rule 1.16(d). For this to work, Rule 1.6 would have to prohibit a
disclosure of a file in this instance, which it does not do by its plain language because of
the applicability of Rule 1.6(b)(9) (permitting disclosure if “the lawyer reasonably believes
the disclosure is necessary to comply with other law or a court order”). Consequently, it
is irrelevant whether Rule 1.6 requires disclosure so long as it permits disclosure.

                                             30
       As Ludescher’s arguments about the validity of the referee’s rule-violation

conclusions are based on his assumption that the referee misinterpreted Rule 1.6, we

decline to review the referee’s rule-violation conclusions because the condition precedent

Ludescher gave for these arguments—the referee’s supposed misinterpretation of Rule

1.6—has been forfeited.

                                              IV.

       Finally, we consider the appropriate discipline for Ludescher’s misconduct. The

referee recommended a 30-day suspension but noted that none of the disciplinary cases

cited by the parties “appear[ed] to fit well with the misconduct found [in Ludescher’s case],

and so the recommended sanction of suspension reflects deference to the Supreme Court

in establishing the appropriate sanction.” The Director argues that a 60-day suspension

and probation term would be more consistent with the purposes of discipline given the

nature of the misconduct, the vulnerability of the clients, and the presence of multiple

aggravating factors. Ludescher argues that no suspension is warranted, but alternatively

argues that a 60-day suspension is unwarranted given how easily distinguished Ludescher’s

case is from other 60-day discipline cases.

       Although we give great weight to the referee’s recommendation for discipline, we

retain the “ultimate responsibility for determining appropriate discipline.” In re Montez,

812 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Minn. 2012). The purpose of disciplinary sanctions is to protect the

public and judicial system and to deter future misconduct by attorneys—not to punish the

attorney. In re Vaught, 693 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Minn. 2005). We consider four factors

when imposing discipline: (1) the nature of the misconduct; (2) the cumulative weight of

                                              31
the disciplinary violation; (3) the harm to the public; and (4) the harm to the legal

profession.   In re Butler, 960 N.W.2d 540, 552 (Minn. 2021).           We also consider

aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. Finally, while we consult similar cases and attempt

to impose consistent discipline, the proper discipline is ultimately determined “based on

the unique facts and circumstances of each case.” In re Matson, 889 N.W.2d 17, 25 (Minn.

2017) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                            A.

       We begin with the nature of Ludescher’s misconduct. Ludescher’s misconduct

included making knowingly false statements, which we have stated “demonstrates a lack

of honesty and integrity, and warrants severe discipline.” In re Lundeen, 811 N.W.2d 602,

606, 608 (Minn. 2012) (citing In re Ulanowski, 800 N.W.2d 785, 800 (Minn. 2011)

(Ulanowski I)). Ludescher charged G.N. unreasonable fees, which we have held warrants

suspension, especially when coupled with other misconduct.          See In re Igbanugo,

863 N.W.2d 751, 760–762 (Minn. 2015). Ludescher’s actions in both matters involved

bringing frivolous claims, and we have held that “[s]ubmitting frivolous claims is conduct

also subject to sanctions. We have held that suspension is appropriate when an attorney

files one frivolous, vexatious lawsuit.” Ulanowski I, 800 N.W.2d at 800.

       Ludescher committed misconduct towards Nelson by telling the county attorney and

sheriff that she committed a crime, and we have held that “[i]mproperly threatening

criminal prosecution and harassing opposing counsel may also subject an attorney to

discipline.” Ulanowski I, 800 N.W.2d at 800-01 (citing to Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458, 461

                                            32
(Minn. 2007) (noting an attorney had been admonished for improperly threatening

“criminal prosecution to coerce payment in a civil matter”)).

                                            B.

       We next consider the cumulative weight of Ludescher’s disciplinary violations. We

distinguish between “a brief lapse in judgment or a single, isolated incident and multiple

instances of misconduct occurring over a substantial amount of time.” In re Pearson¸

888 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The referee found Ludescher committed multiple rule violations between 2017 and 2019.

Ludescher’s actions spanned multiple years, two client matters, and involved repetitive

misconduct of the same nature in both client matters.           Consequently, Ludescher’s

misconduct involved multiple instances of misconduct over a substantial amount of time

and cannot be characterized as a brief lapse in judgment. See Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d 617,

621 (Minn. 2018) (concluding that while misappropriation only occurred once, the

misconduct was neither a “brief lapse in judgment” nor a “single, isolated incident”

because other misconduct spanned 2 years).

                                            C.

       Next, we evaluate the harm that Ludescher’s misconduct caused to the public and

to the legal profession. The Director contends that Ludescher’s actions harmed Nelson and

Braden and interfered with ARI’s ability to fulfill its duties. The Director also contends

that Ludescher’s arguments that were contrary to well established law undermined public

confidence and wasted judicial resources, that Ludescher’s attempt to exploit a court error

to benefit his client while knowing it was erroneous harmed the legal profession, and that

                                            33
Ludescher’s repeated advocacy of frivolous arguments based on these knowingly false

theories harmed the legal profession. Additionally, the Director argues that Ludescher’s

refusal to comply with court orders and harassing opposing counsel undermined the public

trust in the legal system. Ludescher made no argument regarding the harm caused to the

legal profession or public.

       In assessing harm, we consider how many and to what extent clients were harmed.

In re Coleman, 793 N.W.2d 296, 308 (Minn. 2011). Ludescher’s actions resulted in harm

to his clients and others involved in the cases. Ludescher’s actions caused Nelson

emotional distress given the criminal investigation opened against her and the

embarrassment caused to her when Ludescher read her a Miranda-esque warning on the

record at a proceeding where others were present. Braden also testified that Ludescher’s

actions had a negative impact on him. Ludescher’s actions harmed G.N. by accumulating

legal and other fees that were unnecessary. In general, Ludescher’s violations of the rules

of professional conduct are inherently detrimental to respect for the legal profession and

the judicial system as a whole. See In re Jaeger, 834 N.W.2d 705, 710–11 (Minn. 2013).

Ludescher’s false statements to the juvenile court in the J.K. matter undermined public

confidence in the legal system. See In re Sea, 932 N.W.2d 28, 36 (Minn. 2019). And the

referee determined that Ludescher made frivolous claims in both matters, which are a waste

of the court’s resources. See In re Albrecht, 779 N.W.2d 530, 542 (Minn. 2010) (stating

that an attorney’s neglect caused “the needless expenditure of judicial resources and the

resources of opposing counsel, which harmed the legal profession”).

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                                             D.

       To determine the appropriate discipline, we also must examine any mitigating and

aggravating factors. The referee found no mitigating factors and Ludescher does not

contend that any mitigating factors exist. The referee found five aggravating factors:

(1) G.N.’s vulnerability, (2) Ludescher’s substantial experience in CHIPS and

guardianship    and    conservatorship     matters,   (3) Ludescher’s     prior   discipline,

(4) Ludescher’s knowingly false statement at a disciplinary hearing, and (5) Ludescher’s

lack of remorse.

       Our caselaw supports the referee’s determination that these factors should aggravate

Ludescher’s discipline. G.N. was subject to a conservatorship and when “an attorney

exhibits callous disregard for the physical and financial well-being of vulnerable,

dependent persons, that attorney has a heavy burden to persuade the court [of their] fitness

to continue the practice of law.” See In re Harrigan, 841 N.W.2d 624, 631 (Minn. 2014)

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ulanowski, 834 N.W.2d

697, 704 (Minn. 2013) (Ulanowski II).

       We have held that substantial experience practicing law is an aggravating factor.

See In re Tigue, 900 N.W.2d 424, 432 (Minn. 2017). Ludescher has been a lawyer for over

30 years, which is substantial experience practicing law; he has also practiced in CHIPS

matters since 1989 and conservatorship and guardianship matters since 2000, which

constitutes substantial experience in the specific areas involved here. See Ulanowski I,

800 N.W.2d at 802 (finding 6 years after admission to practice law and 2 years of full-time

practice at the time of his first act of misconduct was an aggravating factor).

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       Prior discipline is an aggravating factor. See, e.g., Capistrant, 905 N.W.2d at 619

(finding that previous discipline “weighs heavily” because it was for similar misconduct).

Ludescher has two prior admonitions, which included misconduct in representing a client

despite having a monetary judgment against that client and without obtaining written

informed consent, as well as misconduct in entering into a mortgage transaction with a

client and continuing to represent the client without obtaining informed written consent.

Although these incidents of prior discipline are an aggravating factor, we do not conclude

that these weigh heavily against Ludescher given the lack of severity of the prior discipline

and the differences between the prior discipline and Ludescher’s current misconduct.

       The referee found, and Ludescher does not contest, that he made a knowingly false

statement at the disciplinary hearing by “unequivocally” denying that he gave Nelson a

Miranda-esque warning on the record. We have “recognized that misconduct in the referee

hearing may be an aggravating factor.” In re Adams, 942 N.W.2d 720, 729 (Minn. 2020).

We have also held that “[m]aking misrepresentations can be considered an aggravating

factor.” Ulanowski I, 800 N.W.2d at 802. Lastly, we consider an attorney’s lack of

remorse and failure to appreciate the severity of the misconduct to be aggravating factors.

In re Winter, 770 N.W.2d 463, 468 (Minn. 2009). Ludescher’s false statement at the

disciplinary hearing illustrates his lack of remorse and failure to appreciate the severity of

his misconduct.

                                             36
                                             E.

       Finally, we consider similar cases “to ensure that our disciplinary decision is

consistent with prior sanctions.” In re Nathanson, 812 N.W.2d 70, 80 (Minn. 2012). The

parties analogize using three cases: In re MacDonald, 906 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 2018); In

re Torgerson, 870 N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 2015); and In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn.

1990). Ludescher generally argues that these cases are dissimilar to his case, while the

Director argues they are similar. Although these prior decisions do have certain similarities

to this case, we agree with both Ludescher and the referee that none of these cases provide

particularly strong guidance as to the appropriate discipline here.

       In MacDonald, the attorney harmed two clients by making recklessly false

statements about a judge, disrupting court proceedings, taking photographs in the court

room, and providing incompetent legal representation. 906 N.W.2d at 240–43. The

attorney’s actions were aggravated by two factors: first, her substantial practice in the area

of law; and second, her lack of remorse, lack of insight into the effect of her misconduct,

and her blaming of others; there were no mitigating factors. Id. at 248–49. This court

imposed a 60–day suspension followed by 2 years of probation. Id. at 250–51. Ludescher’s

conduct spanned a similar amount of client matters and encompassed one of the same forms

of misconduct. However, Ludescher was not cited for making false statements about a

judge, disrupting a court proceeding, or taking photographs in the courtroom. In general,

Ludescher’s conduct was dissimilar to the conduct in MacDonald, and Ludescher’s case

involves over twice as many aggravating factors as MacDonald, including client

vulnerability, making a false statement at the disciplinary proceeding, and prior discipline.

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       In Torgerson, the attorney committed misconduct in five client matters, as well as

misconduct in the course of another attorney’s discipline matter. 870 N.W.2d at 606–08.

The attorney made false statements; disobeyed a court order; acted belligerently toward a

judge and court staff; engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice; and

used a retainer agreement that required a client to pay a nonrefundable flat fee. Id. The

attorney’s actions were aggravated by substantial experience in the practice of law and

failure to recognize the wrongfulness of their conduct. Id. at 613–14. The attorney’s

actions were mitigated by the fact that others may have provoked her to make the

statements underlying some of her misconduct. Id. at 614. This court issued a 60–day

suspension. Id. at 616. Overall, the misconduct in Torgerson is somewhat similar to the

misconduct here, except that more clients were involved in Torgerson. But Ludescher’s

case involves more aggravating factors—client vulnerability, making a false statement at

a disciplinary hearing, and prior discipline—and no mitigating factors.

       In Graham, the attorney engaged in misconduct by making false statements about a

judge, county attorney, magistrate, and another attorney.      453 N.W.2d at 319.      The

attorney’s actions were aggravated by continued misconduct in the disciplinary

proceedings, and additional frivolous legal petitions to remove the Director from the case

and from office. Id. at 325. The court also mentioned that the attorney’s attitude was

problematic as it resembled a choice to believe that a conspiracy existed against him and

find fault with others rather than himself. Id. While Graham does not seem to involve

harm to any clients, the attorney’s conduct is more involved but similar to Ludescher’s

actions toward Nelson.     The attorney in Graham, however, committed many more

                                            38
instances of this misconduct in a more public setting. On the other hand, we also note that

Ludescher’s case involves more aggravating factors, namely lack of remorse, client

vulnerability, substantial experience, and prior discipline. Even so, the overall conduct in

Graham is dissimilar to most of the misconduct at issue in Ludescher’s case.

       A review and comparison of these cases to Ludescher’s circumstances shows the

existence of more aggravating factors in Ludescher’s case, and sometimes more

voluminous misconduct. Consequently, we concur with the referee that a suspension is

appropriate based on the facts and circumstances of this case. But based on the significant

aggravating factors present here, and in light of the nature and extent of Ludescher’s

misconduct, we conclude that the appropriate discipline is a 60-day suspension from the

practice of law followed by a 2-year term of unsupervised probation.

       Accordingly, we order that:

       1.     Respondent David L. Ludescher is suspended from the practice of law,

effective 14 days from the date of this opinion, for a minimum of 60 days.

       2.     Respondent shall comply with Rule 26, RLPR (requiring notice of

suspension to clients, opposing counsel, and tribunals), and shall pay $900 in costs pursuant

to Rule 24, RLPR.

       3.     Respondent shall be eligible for reinstatement to the practice of law

following the expiration of the suspension provided that, not less than 15 days before the

end of the suspension period, respondent files with the Clerk of Appellate Courts and serves

upon the Director an affidavit establishing that he is current in continuing legal education

                                             39
requirements; has complied with Rules 24 and 26, RLPR; and has complied with any other

conditions for reinstatement imposed by the court.

       4.     Within 1 year of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file with the Clerk

of the Appellate Courts and serve upon the Director proof of successful completion of the

written examination required for admission to the practice of law by the Minnesota State

Board of Law Examiners on the subject of professional responsibility. See Rule 4.A.(5),

Rules for Admission to the Bar (requiring evidence that an applicant has successfully

completed the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination). Failure to timely file

the required documentation shall result in automatic suspension, as provided in Rule

18(e)(3), RLPR.

       5.     Upon reinstatement to the practice of law, respondent shall be placed on

supervised probation for 2 years, subject to the following conditions:

              a.     Respondent shall abide by the Minnesota Rules of Professional

              Conduct.

              b.     Respondent shall cooperate fully with the Director’s Office in its

       efforts to monitor compliance with this probation. Respondent shall promptly

       respond to the Director’s correspondence by its due date. Respondent shall provide

       to the Director a current mailing address and shall immediately notify the Director

       of any change of address.       Respondent shall cooperate with the Director’s

       investigation of any allegations of unprofessional conduct that may come to the

       Director’s attention.   Upon the Director’s request, respondent shall provide

                                             40
       authorization for release of information and documentation to verify compliance

       with the terms of this probation.

       MOORE, III, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

       PROCACCINI, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,

took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

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