Court Opinion

ID: 9793475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:48:23.355641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:20.735233
License: Public Domain

DEITS, C. J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the authority of a probation officer to conduct a home visit, pursuant to ORS 137.540(1), does not encompass the authority to conduct a search of the probationer’s residence. I also agree that defendant’s probation officer here did not have “reasonable grounds” to believe that she would find evidence of a probation violation. I would hold, however, that a probation officer has general authority to request a probationer’s consent to a search of his or her residence. Consequently, as the majority recognizes, the critical issue in this case becomes whether defendant’s consent was voluntary. 164 Or App at 99. In contrast to the majority, I would hold that defendant’s consent was voluntary and that, therefore, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.
In assessing the voluntariness of a defendant’s consent to a search, we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the consent was the product of defendant’s free will or was the result of express or implied coercion. E.g., State v. Parker, 317 Or 225, 230, 855 P2d 636 (1993). We will not disturb the trial court’s findings of historical fact, but whether consent was voluntary is a legal issue that we review independently. State v. Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or App 100, 113, 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den 327 Or 82 (1998).
*104Here, the trial court found that:
“[Defendant’s probation officer, Oatley,] wrote the defendant a letter and said, ‘Come in, I want to see you. Nobody has seen you.’ And he came in on time at 4:30. She chatted with him and said, You know, no one has seen you for a long time. We need to go over to your house and take a look around. So have a seat here because we’ve got to go and check you out. Do you still live at 8601 North Hamlin?’ Yes,’ he said yes. ‘And how did you get here? Did you drive a car?’ He says, ‘No.’ She said Well, we’ll drive our car and you can go with us, and we’ll go and take a look — and look around your house.’ He says, ‘Fine. Okay.’
“And she put him in the back, which I can understand that. And of course she had on her weapon, she had on her flak jacket. But that’s not coercion, that’s normal. And your client is familiar with the situation, based on his history with the government. So I don’t think it’s coercion just by having on your guns and protective jacket. I think I have a * * * that indicates that even a most honorable person is not really coerced just by the sight of a weapon on an officer. You need a little more than that, than what we have. The guns were not pointed, they were not drawn, there were no threats here.”1 (Emphasis added.)
Based on those findings, the trial court concluded that defendant’s consent to search his residence was voluntary. However, the court then went on to hold that defendant’s probation officer, Oatley, had no authority to request defendant’s consent to search except under the terms of the probation agreement, which required that there be reasonable grounds to believe that a probation violation had occurred before consent could be requested. Consequently, because the trial court concluded that Oatley did not have reasonable grounds to believe that a probation violation had occurred, the court granted defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search.
*105In my view, the trial court erred in concluding that defendant’s probation officer could not request consent to search except under the terms of the probation agreement. Generally, a peace officer has authority to request consent to search without reasonable suspicion that any offense has occurred. See State v. Mesa, 110 Or App 261, 265, 822 P2d 143 (1991), rev den 313 Or 211 (1992) (“No justification is necessary for an officer to ask for consent.”); State v. Auer, 90 Or App 459, 464, 752 P2d 1250 (1988) (reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to asking for consent to search). There is no reason why a probationer should be entitled to greater protection than an ordinary citizen. See State v. Gulley, 324 Or 57, 65, 921 P2d 396 (1996). Further, there is no existing authority that compels the conclusion that a probation officer’s ability to ask for consent to search should be limited. Of course, there is a difference in the effect of a probationer’s refusal to consent to a search, which depends on whether the probation officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a violation will be found. If the probation officer has such grounds, then the probationer’s refusal will constitute a violation of probation; whereas, if the probation officer requests consent to search without reasonable grounds to believe a probation violation has occurred, then the probationer may refuse and there are no consequences for that refusal. See State v. Davis, 133 Or App 467, 891 P2d 1373, rev den 321 Or 429 (1995) (refusal of request for consent based on conditions of probation is a violation of the condition); State v. Hindman, 125 Or App 434, 439, 866 P2d 481 (1993) (same).
The trial court found that defendant told his probation officer that she could look around the house. The majority does not dispute that, but concludes that defendant’s consent was not voluntary. I disagree. The majority explains its conclusion as follows:
“As the trial court observed, from the time of the initial contact with defendant in her office to when she was in defendant’s residence, Oatley conveyed her intention that she was going to conduct a search of defendant’s residence to ascertain whether he was in compliance with the conditions of probation. Any consent was coerced by the possibility that defendant would, be arrested for a violation of his probation *106if he did not cooperate. Defendant is not unlike the defendant in Freund who had no reasonable opportunity to choose to consent to a search when the police told her that they were there to pick up the marijuana.” 164 Or App at 100 (emphasis added).
I believe that the majority errs in concluding that defendant’s consent was not voluntary, because it gives too much weight to the fact that defendant was on probation and to the assumption that defendant’s “consent was coerced by the possibility that [he] would be arrested for a violation of his probation if he did not cooperate.” While that is a fact that should be considered as part of the “totality of the circumstances,” it is not determinative under all circumstances. Anytime that a person is asked to consent to a search, the person is faced with the possible consequences of that decision. In some cases, the consequence is to wait with the police while a search warrant is obtained, see State v. Rodal, 161 Or App 232, 241-42, 985 P2d 863 (1999), while in others, it is the revocation of his or her probation or parole, see Davis, 133 Or App 467. The mere fact that there are adverse consequences to giving or refusing consent does not automatically destroy a person’s ability to voluntarily give consent. If it did, then any consent that resulted in the evidence of a crime would be invalidated because of the coercive possibility that it could result in arrest.
In particular, if we take the majority’s reasoning to its logical conclusion, then it would be impossible for a probation officer, even with the reasonable grounds required by ORS 137.540(1), to carry out a search of a probationer’s person, vehicle, or premises.2 The conditions of probation do not provide consent to search but, rather, the promise to consent when a request to search supported by reasonable grounds is made. Hindman, 125 Or App at 439. A possible result, in the *107event that the requested consent is refused, is revocation of probation. Under the majority’s reasoning, therefore, even if consent is given, it would be invalid because it would be a result of the coercive “possibility of arrest for violating the conditions of parole.” That cannot be right. In fact, in Davis, we recognized that, in the absence of evidence of other coercive circumstances, the threat that refusing consent will violate the defendant’s conditions of probation is not in itself coercive enough to invalidate a defendant’s consent to a search. We held the search in Davis valid because “[o]ther than the pressure on defendant not to violate the terms of his probation, there was nothing coercive about the circumstances.”3 133 Or App at 476.
The other basis supporting the majority’s conclusion that defendant’s consent was not voluntary was that defendant had no reasonable opportunity to refuse consent. That finding, however, is inconsistent with the trial court’s finding that Oatley did not threaten or coerce defendant. There is no evidence in this record that Oatley threátened defendant in any way, nor is there evidence that she told him that he was required to submit to a search. Rather, Oatley described her conversations with defendant as “extremely friendly” and said that defendant told her several times it was okay for her to go into his house and look around, and, although defendant’s roommate, Watson, testified that she herself felt “very intimidated,” she also testified that defendant did not look nervous and that he was not getting pushed around. At no time, during the interview in Oatley’s office, during the ride to his house, or after arriving at the house, did defendant *108express any doubts or concerns about allowing Oatley to search his home.
I agree with the trial court that defendant did have the opportunity to refuse consent. I would hold that, after considering the totality of the circumstances here, that defendant’s consent was voluntary. Accordingly, the trial court erred in allowing the motion to suppress. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.

 The majority argues that its conclusions are based “only on findings of the trial court that are supported by the evidence” and the conclusions of the dissent are based on findings that are not so supported. 164 Or App at 101. I disagree. While the trial court’s summary of the testimony before it may not have been verbatim, the court’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.

 ORS 137.540(1) provides, in part:
“The court may sentence the defendant to probation, which shall be subject to the following general conditions unless specifically deleted by the court. The probationer shall:
“(i) Consent to the search of person, vehicle or premises upon the request of a representative of the supervising officer if the supervising officer has reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a violation will be found * *

 In Davis, the defendant’s probation officer had reasonable grounds to request a search of the defendant’s home. The question we were asked to decide was whether the defendant’s mere acquiescence in the search, which for “an ordinary citizen * * * does not constitute voluntary consentí",1” constituted valid consent in view of “the ongoing supervisory relationship between the probation officer and the probationer!. 1” 133 Or App at 474-75. We held that it did.
The majority cites Davis in support of the principle that “fmlere acquiescence to police authority does not constitute a voluntary consent to search.” 164 Or App at 99. In Davis, we held that “generally, an ordinary citizen’s ‘mere acquiescence’ to police authority does not constitute voluntary consent to search.” 133 Or App at 474. We went on to hold, however, that “under some circumstances, a probationer’s acquiescence to a search by the probation officer may constitute consent.” Id. at 475.