Court Opinion

ID: 9777554
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:15:09.419747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:56.172926
License: Public Domain

MALONEY, Judge,
concurring.
Appellant claims his written statement is not admissible because it does not show on its face that he “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily” waived the rights enumerated in Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 38.22(2)(a). The majority disagrees, holding that article 38.22’s waiver requirements were met based upon certain “additional language” on the face of the statement, presumably the language set forth on pages 384-85 of the majority’s opinion as appearing immediately above appellant’s signature. Majority op. at 386. I write to clarify what that “additional language” is and how it satisfies the waiver requirement and also to emphasize the mandatory nature of the waiver requirement.
Article 38.22 provides that a statement of an accused is not admissible against him unless the statement shows that he was (1) informed of the rights listed in Subsection (a) and (2) that he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights.1 Warning and waiver are separate components. As this Court stated in Clark v. State, 627 S.W.2d 693, 704 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), “the sufficiency of the warnings required by Miranda and Art. 38.22, and the voluntariness of the waiver of the rights protected by those warnings are two distinct and separate requirements which must be met for a confession to be admissible.” Further, article 38.22 explicitly requires that these two matters be shown “on the face of the statement.” Al*403though specific in requiring what must be shown on the statement, article 88.22 does not set forth any specific requirements as to how a statement should reflect warning and waiver.
Appellant’s statement is denoted at the top as “VOLUNTARY STATEMENT.” The statement states that appellant “was duly warned and advised” of the following matters, tracking nearly verbatim the language from subsection (a):
(1) I have the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and any statement I make will be used against me at my trial;
(2) Any statement I make will be used as evidence against me in court;
(3) I have the right to have a lawyer present to advise me prior to and during questioning;
(4) If I am unable to employ a lawyer, I have the right to have a lawyer appointed (without cost to me) to advise me prior to and during my questioning;
(4) [sic] I have the right to terminate the interview at any time
Each of these was initialled by appellant. The statement closes with the following clause:
I have read each page of this statement consisting of 2 pages, each page of which bears my signature, and corrections, if any bear my initials, and I certify that I have made no request for the advice or presence of a lawyer before or during any part of this statement nor at any time before it was finished did I request that this statement be stopped. I also declare that I was not told or prompted what to say in this statement.
Following this clause, the statement is signed by appellant. Under the signature line appears “Signature of person giving voluntary statement.”
Appellant’s initialling of each of the five matters evidences that he was informed of them and that he read them. The placement of the warnings at the top of the page, before appellant’s statement, is evidence that appellant received the warnings before making his statement. This satisfies the warning requirement of Subsection (a). Appellant’s signature at the bottom of the statement evidences his approval of everything contained thereon. The final clause states that appellant did not request the advice or presence of an attorney or ask that the statement be stopped. Reading this clause in connection with the warnings at the top of the statement, it is apparent that appellant knowingly waived his rights to an attorney and to remain silent.2 The statement is titled “Voluntary Statement” and the signature of appellant is labeled as the signature of one “giving a voluntary statement.” All of these matters evidence appellant’s knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. See and compare Cannon v. State, 691 S.W.2d 664, 674 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985) (statement titled “Voluntary Statement” and stating that rights were “voluntarily waiv[ed]” complied with subsection (b)). As the Court points out, the best practice would be for an express statement, in the language of article 38.22, that the accused “prior to and during the making of the statement, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the [above described] rights.” See Penny v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (approving last paragraph of written statement, which read “I further affirm that I knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the above rights prior to and during the making of this statement.”). However, a statement that does not so explicitly provide is not necessarily inadmissible. In this case, a common sense look at the statement reveals that it satisfies the requirements of article 38.22.
The majority also points out that the trial court found adequate waiver of appellant’s rights on the face of the statement based upon appellant’s initialling of the warnings at *404the top of the statement. While the majority does not disapprove of this finding, I would emphasize that initialling of the warnings does not evidence waiver.
With these comments, I concur in the opinion of the majority and join the judgment of the Court.
MEYERS, J., joins.

. Article 38.22 § 2 provides in its entirety:
Sec. 2. No written statement made by an accused as a result of custodial interrogation is admissible as evidence against him in any criminal proceeding unless it is shown on the face of the statement that:
(a) The accused, prior to making the statement, either received from a magistrate the warning provided in Article 15.17 of this code or received from the person to whom the statement is made a warning that:
(1)he has the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all and that any statement he makes may be used against him at his trial;
(2) any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him in court;
(3) he has the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning;
(4) if he is unable to employ a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer appointed to advise him prior to and during any questioning; and
(5) he has the right to terminate the interview at any time; and
(b) the accused, prior to and during the making of the statement, knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights set out in the warning prescribed by Subsection (a) of this section.

. Although the final clause does not state anything about the statement being used as evidence against appellant at trial, that is not a “right” to be waived. Subsection (b) requires that appellant "waive! ] the rights set out in the warning prescribed by Subsection (a)." (emphasis added) That appellant’s statements can be used against him at a trial is not a "right” of appellant; rather, it is a fact that appellant should be warned, of. Appellant’s statement reflects that he was properly informed of that fact.