Court Opinion

ID: 9699542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:32:13.76988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:52.439738
License: Public Domain

Holden, C. J.
Concurring. I agree that proceedings in the juvenile courts are designed to be protective rather than penal. But the humanitarian concept of the Juvenile Court Act does not relieve a juvenile commitment from the fundamental demands of due process.
In the present proceedings the right of the petitioner to assistance of competent counsel, acting with an informed guardian ad litem, has been carefully observed. Yet there has been no indication that the juvenile proceedings, in which the petitioner was found delinquent, resulted in any undue advantage. Indeed there is no challenge to the finding of delinquency. In this context, I concur that the mere absence of an explanation to the juvenile of the right to assistance of counsel does not result in the denial of due process of law.
It is one of the anomalies of the juvenile court system that in deal-ling with children under sixteen years of age, the statute imposes on the court itself the duties of a guardian. The court is called upon to protect not only the welfare of the child before it, but it must safeguard his legal rights as well. In removing a child of less than sixteen years from the posture of one accused, and the stigma of guilt, the statute imposes on the juvenile court the task of preserving the delicate balance between two demands, — the welfare of the child and his right to equal protection and due process of the law.
I agree that the laudable objectives of the act and the fundamental requirements of procedural due process are not incompatible. In re Poulin, 100 N. H. 458, 129 A. 2d 672, 673. But this combination of duties and functions assigned to the judge of the juvenile court calls upon .him to devote scrupulous attention to both considerations.
Accordingly, it is my view that the record of juvenile proceedings, called for in 33 V.S.A. §603, should be something more than the minutes of what took place. It must establish the jurisdictional facts. Brighton v. Charleston, 114 Vt. 316, 331, 44 A. 2d 628. It should also appear that the adjudication is sound in law. In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 504, 115 Atl. 730. As to this, the report of the Department of Social Welfare has no force as evidence at the trial of the case. Brighton v. Charleston, supra 114 Vt. at 329. The record should demonstrate that the hearing was fairly conducted. Anything less than this is arbitrary power. People v. Fitzgerald, 244 N. Y. 307, 155 N. E. 584, 587.
*380Should it appear the interest of the child, his natural parents, and that of the state are in conflict, a special guardian for the child should be designated. Where complications of substantive or procedural law are involved, the. right of all parties to be, heard with the assistance of counsel should be observed. The observance of this right in the transcript of the proceedings should be a part of the judicial record referred to in Section 603.
I resort to a separate concurring opinion to state these views, for I believe without an adequate record, juvenile proceedings will be constantly beset by constitutional objections. Such vulnerability is neither consistent with the high purpose of the statute nor the best interest of the juvenile, whether he be a delinquent or a dependent and neglected child. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender (cited in the main opinion), 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547 (1957); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. (1909).