Court Opinion

ID: 9919015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:23.850217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.156309
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: January 17, 2024

                    S23A1089. SHELLMAN v. THE STATE.

       PINSON, Justice.

       Appellant Isaac Antonio Shellman was convicted of malice

murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during a

crime in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Shanelle

Shellman. 1 On appeal, Shellman contends that (1) the evidence was

       1 The crimes occurred on July 13, 2016. On October 19, 2016, a Chatham

County grand jury indicted Shellman for malice murder (Count 1), felony mur-
der predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2), aggravated assault by family
violence (Count 3), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Count 4), violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act (Count 5), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon during a crime (Count 6). Shellman
was tried by a jury from April 22 to 25, 2019. The trial court granted Shell-
man’s motion for directed verdict as to Count 5, and the jury found Shellman
guilty on all remaining counts (Counts 1 through 4 and Count 6). Shellman
was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life without parole for Count 1, five
years in prison on Count 4, and 15 years in prison on Count 6. Count 3 and
Count 1 merged and Count 2 was vacated by operation of law. Shellman filed
a timely motion for new trial and amended that motion through new counsel.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that Shellman’s sentence for Count
4 should merge into Count 6 but denied the motion for new trial on other
grounds. Shellman was re-sentenced on May 18, 2023, merging Count 4 into
insufficient to sustain his convictions as a matter of constitutional

due process and under OCGA § 24-14-6, and (2) the trial court

abused its discretion by admitting into evidence under OCGA § 24-

8-807 (Rule 807) a journal found in a closet at the crime scene.

      These claims fail. The evidence was sufficient to support Shell-

man’s convictions, and the jury was authorized to reject as unrea-

sonable Shellman’s alternative hypothesis that he was framed by a

police officer. And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ad-

mitting the journal entries under Rule 807: The entries had suffi-

cient guarantees of trustworthiness because they detailed in Sha-

nelle’s own words her volatile relationship with Shellman, and there

was no evidence that she had a motive to fabricate her statements

when she wrote them. Those statements were material because they

provided evidence about the nature of the relationship that sheds

light on Shellman’s motive in committing the offenses charged. And

Count 6. Shellman filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to the
August 2023 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
                                      2
Shellman has not shown that the State could have reasonably pro-

cured other, more probative evidence of motive than the victim’s own

writings describing acts of domestic violence, or that the interests of

justice were not best served by the journal’s admission. So we affirm

his convictions and sentence.

     1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evi-

dence at trial showed the following. On January 13, 2016, Shanelle’s

two minor children heard her scream “get off of me,” followed by “a

loud bump” from a bedroom in their home. The children went to the

bedroom, saw Shanelle and Shellman lying on the floor, and called

911. When the police arrived, the children took them to the bedroom

where “there was blood everywhere.” Officers found Shanelle and

Shellman on the bedroom floor, both having suffered gunshot

wounds to the head, and Shellman had a gun in his right hand. Sha-

nelle was dead, but Shellman still had a pulse and was breathing.

Emergency medical personnel took him to a hospital.

     At the hospital, an investigator recovered three live .380-cali-

ber rounds from Shellman’s pants pocket. Once a search warrant

                                  3
was issued, investigators and crime scene technicians entered the

home. They recovered the gun that had been in Shellman’s hand,

three live rounds from that gun, a bullet, and two spent shell casings

from the crime scene. After an autopsy was performed, a medical

examiner recovered the bullet from Shanelle’s head and submitted

it to the GBI. A GBI firearms expert determined that the gun found

in Shellman’s hand worked properly and that it fired the bullet and

shell casings found at the crime scene as well as the bullet recovered

from Shanelle’s head. The gun used .380-caliber ammunition—the

same type of ammunition that was found in Shellman’s pants

pocket.

     Investigators also recovered a journal from a closet in the bed-

room where Shanelle and Shellman were found. At trial, the State

presented evidence that Shanelle had written in this journal in the

days before the murder about her marital troubles with Shellman

and her belief that Shellman no longer loved her. The journal also

contained allegations of both Shanelle and Shellman’s infidelity and

recorded that Shellman and Shanelle had frequent arguments,

                                  4
Shellman was “mean” to Shanelle, and he was “violent for nothing.”

     Many witnesses testified that Shellman was controlling and

abusive towards Shanelle. Shanelle’s best friend, Tiyisha Grisby,

testified that Shanelle called her one night and asked for Grisby to

pick her up after Shellman shoved Shanelle’s head into a wall and

punched her while calling her “b***h[ ]” and “hoe[ ].” Once, Shellman

put a gun to Shanelle’s head and threatened to kill her, telling her

that if she ever left, he would find her, kill her, and bury her body

where it could not be found. On several occasions, Shanelle told

Grisby that she had “bruises . . . all on her body,” because she and

Shellman got into frequent arguments and Shellman would punch

her, pull her hair, and spit on her.

     Shanelle’s mother described Shanelle and Shellman’s marriage

as “an up-and-down relationship,” explaining that Shanelle told her

that she planned to leave Shellman. A week before the murder, Sha-

nelle told her mother that she and Shellman had “problems,” that

they “had been fighting,” and that Shellman had “hit her,” “beat her

and pulled her hair out.” Shanelle’s neighbor testified that about a

                                   5
month before the murder, Shanelle went to the neighbor’s house and

told her “he’s trying to kill me, help me, he’s trying to kill me.” Sha-

nelle used the neighbor’s phone to call 911 and report that Shellman

assaulted her and that she feared for her life. Shanelle told the re-

sponding officer that Shellman became upset because he saw a pic-

ture of her with another man from several years prior.

     Shellman testified in his own defense at trial. When asked

about his relationship with Shanelle, Shellman explained he and

Shanelle “fussed like twice,” but were “loving each other right,” and

that they were not “fighting,” and he disputed that he ever put a gun

to Shanelle’s head. Shellman further testified that on the day of the

murder, he and Shanelle were talking in their room, and then he

went out to the front porch to smoke a cigar. According to him, while

outside, he saw a police officer at his neighbor’s house and started

speaking to the officer as another officer pulled up in a car and

stepped out with a gun in his hand. Shellman testified that when

the second officer arrived, the first officer began speaking to Shell-

man in an aggressive manner, but Shellman remained respectful.

                                   6
Shellman said that the first officer then shot him in the face, and

Shellman fell down on the porch, bleeding. According to Shellman,

one of the officers placed a gun on the right side of Shellman’s pants.

Per Shellman’s testimony, an officer then stepped on his face as the

officer went inside his house. Shellman testified that he lost con-

sciousness and that he had no knowledge of anything that happened

between that moment and when he awoke, months later. Shellman

denied killing his wife, attempting to commit suicide, or owning a

gun at the time of his wife’s death.

     2. Shellman claims that the evidence was not sufficient to sup-

port his convictions for malice murder or possession of a firearm by

a convicted felon during a crime, either as a matter of constitutional

due process, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99

SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979), or under OCGA § 24-14-6 (“To war-

rant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall

not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude

every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the ac-

cused.”). We address each claim in turn.

                                  7
      (a) When evaluating a due process challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence, “we view the evidence presented at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether any rational trier of

fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Peacock v. State, 314

Ga. 709, 714 (2) (b) (878 SE2d 247) (2022) (citation and punctuation

omitted). See also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (III) (B). In doing so, we

“leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the

evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be

derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State, 313 Ga. 885, 891 (2) (a) (873

SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     In support of his claim that the evidence was not sufficient as

a matter of due process, Shellman offers only a conclusory sugges-

tion that “the absence of evidence elucidating what happened” was

not a sufficient basis for the jury’s finding of guilt. But the evidence

summarized above authorized the jury to find Shellman guilty be-

yond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and the related firearm-

possession count. Shanelle’s two children testified that they heard

                                   8
Shanelle scream “get off of me,” then heard a loud “bump,” after

which they went into the bedroom and found Shanelle and Shellman

lying on the floor with severe injuries and Shellman with a gun in

his hand. And testimony from responding police officers was con-

sistent with the children’s testimony that both Shellman and Sha-

nelle were on the bedroom floor. Further, a GBI firearms expert tes-

tified that all the ballistics evidence found at the crime scene and

the bullet removed from Shanelle’s head were fired by the gun in

Shellman’s hand, and that ammunition found in Shellman’s pants

pocket also matched the ballistics evidence. See Smith v. State, 315

Ga. 357, 359-361 (1) (882 SE2d 289) (2022) (evidence was sufficient

to support malice murder conviction where two witnesses identified

the defendant as holding a rifle near the victim and a firearms ex-

pert matched shell casings found at the crime scene and the bullet

that killed the victim with a rifle found near the defendant’s house).

Finally, multiple witnesses testified about the tumultuous nature of

Shellman and Shanelle’s relationship and Shellman’s history of

                                  9
abusing Shanelle. This evidence was sufficient to support Shell-

man’s convictions as a matter of constitutional due process.

     (b) A conviction can rest on circumstantial evidence alone if

that evidence “exclude[s] every other reasonable hypothesis save

that of the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. See Davenport v.

State, 309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020). Not every hypoth-

esis is a “reasonable” one, and the evidence “need not exclude every

conceivable inference or hypothesis,” only the reasonable ones.

Graves v. State, 306 Ga. 485, 487 (1) (831 SE2d 747) (2019) (citation

and punctuation omitted). “The questions whether any alternative

hypotheses are reasonable and whether the circumstantial evidence

excludes any such hypotheses are for the jury.” Willis v. State, 315

Ga. 19, 24 (2) (880 SE2d 158) (2022). See also Merritt v. State, 285

Ga. 778, 779 (1) (683 SE2d 855) (2009). We will not disturb the jury’s

findings on those questions unless they are “insupportable as a mat-

ter of law.” Graves, 306 Ga. at 487 (1) (citation and punctuation

omitted).

     Shellman claims that the evidence was not sufficient under

                                 10
OCGA § 24-14-6 because it did not exclude the hypothesis he offered

at trial: that he was shot by a police officer outside of his home on

the front porch, after which the officer placed a gun in Shellman’s

hand and stepped on his face, and Shellman lost consciousness.

     Even assuming the evidence against Shellman was entirely cir-

cumstantial, the evidence authorized the jury to reject Shellman’s

alternative hypothesis as unreasonable. As recounted above, Shell-

man’s two children and the responding officers all testified that

Shellman and Shanelle were lying wounded on the bedroom floor,

not on the front porch as he claimed. And the bullet recovered from

Shanelle’s body matched not only the gun in Shellman’s hand, but

also the ammunition in his pocket. That evidence authorized the

jury to reject as unreasonable Shellman’s claim that he was actually

shot outside the house, lost consciousness, and was then moved into

the bedroom and planted with incriminating ballistics evidence.

Thus, the evidence was sufficient under OCGA § 24-14-6 to support

Shellman’s convictions. See Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 650 (2) (889

SE2d 885) (2023) (explaining that “where the jury is authorized to

                                 11
find that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to ex-

clude every reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the ac-

cused, we will not disturb that finding unless it is insupportable as

a matter of law”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     3. Shellman also contends that the trial court abused its dis-

cretion by admitting evidence of Shanelle’s journal entries under

Rule 807 because the entries failed to meet the requirements of that

rule. “[A] trial court’s decision to admit hearsay evidence is reviewed

for an abuse of its discretion.” Kennebrew v. State, 317 Ga. 324, 335

(4) (893 SE2d 96) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a) Before trial, the State filed a notice of its intent to offer

hearsay statements from Shanelle’s journal under Rule 807 and

later filed a proffer of the statements. After a hearing and over Shell-

man’s objection, the trial court ruled that certain portions of the

journal were admissible under “Rule 807 if offered in the proper con-

text and procedurally.”

     At trial, the State established that police found the journal in

the closet in the bedroom of the crime scene. And Shanelle’s mother

                                  12
identified the handwriting in the journal as Shanelle’s, explaining

that she recognized Shanelle’s handwriting because she had re-

ceived cards and letters from her.

     The State published the admitted portions of the journal to the

jury. The journal showed Shanelle’s thoughts regarding her rela-

tionship with Shellman in the days before the murder. Shanelle

wrote that she was unhappy, and that Shellman treated her “like

s**t,” made her “feel like nothing,” was “violent for nothing,” and “no

longer love[d] [her.]” The entries also expressed that Shellman and

Shanelle had frequent “arguments [stemming] from [Shellman’s] ir-

rational thinking,” that Shellman accused Shanelle of being unfaith-

ful and lying “about everything” and “for nothing,” and that because

he did not believe her, she was “scared of what may happen.”

     (b) Rule 807 is often referred to as the residual hearsay excep-

tion. Under this rule, a statement “not specifically covered by any

law” but having “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-

thiness” is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the court determines

that “(1) [t]he statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (2)

                                  13
[t]he statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered

than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through

reasonable efforts; and (3) [t]he general purposes of the rules of evi-

dence and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of

the statement into evidence.” OCGA § 24-8-807. In assessing

whether evidence is admissible under Rule 807, a trial court “should

consider the totality of the circumstances.” Jones v. State, 311 Ga.

455, 460 (2) (b) (858 SE2d 462) (2021).

     On appeal, Shellman does not contend that the journal entries

were inadmissible under Rule 807 because they were “specifically

covered” by another law, OCGA § 24-8-807, so we consider here only

whether the entries had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness

and whether the three requirements of Rule 807 were satisfied. See

Kennebrew, 317 Ga. at 335 (4) n.8.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

the journal entries had sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.

Whether a statement is sufficiently trustworthy is determined by

“the circumstances under which the statements were originally

                                  14
made rather than the credibility of the witness reporting them in

court.” Jones, 311 Ga. at 460 (2) (b) (cleaned up). Here, the entries

detailed in Shanelle’s “own words” her volatile relationship with

Shellman, and there was no evidence suggesting that Shanelle “had

a motive to fabricate her statements when she wrote them.” Id. Fur-

ther, the journal entries’ depiction of Shanelle and Shellman’s rela-

tionship was consistent with testimony from Shanelle’s mother, best

friend, and neighbor, who all highlighted the Shellmans’ tumultuous

relationship and Shellman’s abuse and jealousy. See Tanner, 301

Ga. at 856 (1) (statements had sufficient guarantees of trustworthi-

ness in part because “the statements were consistent with other ev-

idence”).2

      2 Shellman also suggests that the journal entries were not properly au-

thenticated. But Shanelle’s mother testified that she recognized Shanelle’s
handwriting from handwritten Mother’s Day cards and letters. That is enough.
See OCGA § 24-9-901 (b) (2) & (4) (stating that the requisite authentication of
evidence may be satisfied by, among other things, “[n]onexpert opinion as to
the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for pur-
poses of the litigation,” and “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal pat-
terns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circum-
stances”). See also Jones, 311 Ga. at 461 (2) (b) n.5 (indicating that victim’s
sister’s familiarity with and identification of victim’s handwriting helped es-
tablish that diary entries were written by the victim); Smith v. State, 300 Ga.

                                      15
      The journal entries also met the requirements of Rule 807 (1)-

(3). The entries were material because they offered firsthand details

in Shanelle’s own words about the nature of her and Shellman’s re-

lationship, including allegations of infidelity and dishonesty, the

couple’s frequent arguments, Shellman’s anger, jealousy, and vio-

lence, and Shanelle’s sentiment that she was unhappy and that

Shellman “no longer love[d] [her]” in the days leading up to the mur-

der. In other words, the entries provided “evidence of the nature of

the relationship between” Shellman and Shanelle “that sheds light

on” his “motive in committing the offenses charged.” Jones, 311 Ga.

at 461 (2) (b) (cleaned up). See also Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 418

(2) (a) (788 SE2d 442) (2016) (“[The] testimony was relevant to help

the jury understand why [the appellant] might have used violence

against [the victim].”).

538, 540-541 (1) (b) (796 SE2d 666) (2017) (holding accomplice’s testimony
identifying the defendant’s handwriting because “he was familiar with” de-
fendant’s handwriting, and because “many of the letters were either directly
given to him by [the defendant] or were delivered by a third party at [the de-
fendant’s] request,” adequately established letters were written by the defend-
ant).
                                      16
     Shellman also has not shown that there was “other evidence

that the State could have procured with reasonable efforts that

would have been more probative to show” Shellman’s motive than

the journal entries, which provided Shanelle’s “firsthand account of

her relationship with” Shellman. Jones, 311 Ga. at 461 (2) (b). As for

the entries’ probative value, when, as here, an alleged victim of do-

mestic violence is deceased, the victim’s “own writings” describing

acts of domestic violence may be “highly probative” “in light of the

often-secretive nature of domestic violence.” Smart, 299 Ga. at 422

(3). Although other witnesses also testified in general terms about

the nature of Shellman and Shanelle’s relationship, it was within

the trial court’s discretion to conclude that Shanelle’s own contem-

poraneous account was more probative than any third party’s testi-

mony.

     Finally, Shellman offers no argument that the interests of jus-

tice were not best served by the admission of the journal entries.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

journal entries under Rule 807.

                                  17
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                           18