Court Opinion

ID: 9909704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 21:03:12.746009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:55.358617
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211081-U
                                             No. 1-21-1081
                                    Order filed December 13, 2023
                                                                                        Third Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                           FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                            )   Appeal from the
                                                                 )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   Cook County.
                                                                 )
     v.                                                          )   No. 10 CR 8077
                                                                 )
 JAMES COTTON,                                                   )   Honorable
                                                                 )   Michele McDowell Pitman,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                  )   Judge, presiding.

           JUSTICE R. VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Reyes and Justice D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

                                               ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm the trial court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction
                petition alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel because defendant failed to
                make a substantial showing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
                to present certain evidence of defendant’s history of mental health issues in
                mitigation at sentencing.

¶2        Defendant James Cotton appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his petition pursuant

to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)), contending that

he made a substantial showing that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
No. 1-21-1081

present certain evidence of defendant’s history of mental health issues at sentencing. Specifically,

defendant claims that multiple witnesses informed counsel of defendant’s mental health issues, but

counsel chose not to elicit their testimony at the sentencing hearing. Defendant contends that there

is a reasonable probability the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence if counsel had

presented such evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4                                       A. Trial and Sentencing

¶5      Defendant was charged with one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West

2010)). At defendant’s jury trial, the evidence established that, on the night of March 29, 2010,

defendant was walking to his aunt’s home when Romeo Burdine approached him seeking to buy

drugs. 1 Cotton, 2016 IL App (1st) 132820-U, ¶ 18. Defendant and Burdine went to Burdine’s

apartment, where they smoked marijuana and crack cocaine, drank alcohol, and watched

pornographic movies. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Burdine told defendant that he was gay and HIV positive, and

the defendant responded that he was not gay and warned the victim not to “come on” to him. Id.

Later that night, defendant began masturbating and Burdine attempted to perform oral sex on him.

Id. ¶ 20. Defendant left the apartment but returned to retrieve his phone charger. Id. As defendant

tried to leave the apartment a second time, Burdine grabbed the hood of his jacket and demanded

defendant pay him for the drugs and alcohol. Id. Defendant denied owing Burdine anything, and

the two men began to fight. Id. Defendant struck Burdine three times with his elbows and Burdine

began snoring. Id. Defendant then poured bleach on Burdine to clean blood off his body. Id. ¶ 22.

        1
          The record on appeal does not include a report of proceedings for the jury trial. Accordingly, we
rely on our prior decision to furnish the facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal. See Cotton, 2016 IL
App (1st) 132820-U, ¶¶ 15-30.

                                                    -2-
No. 1-21-1081

Defendant left the apartment with Burdine’s DVD player and DVDs, which he planned to sell for

drugs. Id.

¶6     Police arrested defendant on April 5, 2010. Id. ¶ 23. When police officers questioned him,

defendant denied knowing Burdine, did not mention fighting with him, and denied stealing

Burdine’s DVD player and DVDs. Id. He eventually admitted to police that he poured bleach on

Burdine to “erase the evidence.” Id. ¶ 64. However, at trial, defendant denied that was his intent.

Id. ¶ 25. When police told defendant that Burdine had died, defendant admitted that he fought with

Burdine but told police various versions of the events thereafter. Id. The jury found defendant

guilty of first degree murder.

¶7     At the sentencing hearing on August 21, 2013, the court stated that it had reviewed the

presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI indicated that defendant claimed he had been

diagnosed with mild depression while enrolled in a drug rehabilitation program in 2001. He was

prescribed medication for depression but took it for only a short period of time. According to the

PSI, defendant experienced no need for mental health treatment after 2001.

¶8     In aggravation, the State presented a victim impact statement from Burdine’s brother,

Swayzer Burdine. Swayzer stated that his brother was a kind and loving person who was close to

his family. Burdine’s murder was the first time the family had experienced a violent death. The

State requested a 50-year sentence, 10 years less than the 60-year maximum sentence for first

degree murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2010)).

¶9     In mitigation, defendant’s mother, Sharon Flemister, testified that “drugs and alcohol took

over [defendant’s] life.” Defendant became sober in jail while awaiting trial, and his mother

believed that he had potential for rehabilitation. Defendant’s stepfather, Theodoric Flemister,

testified that defendant had a positive impact on his family. Prior to being arrested, defendant

                                               -3-
No. 1-21-1081

attended church, excelled in sports, earned a college scholarship, was employed, and volunteered.

Theodoric acknowledged that defendant had “self-destructive tendencies via addictions,” but

testified that defendant had never hurt another person prior to this incident.

¶ 10   Christina Reid, a family friend, stated that she had known defendant since he was 10 years

old and regarded him as a nephew. As a child, defendant was athletic and popular in school, and

she was optimistic for defendant’s future when he left to attend college. However, he struggled

with drug and alcohol addiction after college and alternated between employment and periods of

substance abuse. Defendant became sober, mature, and spiritual while in jail. Reid acknowledged

that defendant would always struggle with addiction but noted that he now had resources to help.

She assured the court that defendant had a supportive community that loved him and would always

be available to help him.

¶ 11   Camilla Hudson, also a family friend, stated that she had known defendant for

approximately 13 years. Defendant struggled with drug and alcohol addiction but wanted to

overcome his addiction and hoped to become a productive and contributing member of his family

and society. Hudson requested that defendant be allowed to attend drug and alcohol rehabilitation

instead of prison.

¶ 12   Defendant also presented three letters in mitigation. Nontombi Norma Tutu, the daughter

of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, stated that she met defendant while attending a fundraiser for the

Foundation for Hospices in Sub-Saharan Africa. Defendant was volunteering at the event and

spoke with her about the challenges facing young African and African American men. She also

met defendant’s family and believed that they would support his rehabilitation. Linda Hannah, a

family friend and the director of a pre-apprenticeship program that defendant completed, stated

that defendant was a model student with excellent attendance and that he had hoped to become a

                                                -4-
No. 1-21-1081

plumber or electrician. Hannah acknowledged that defendant was a troubled young man in some

respects but noted that he got along well with his classmates. Reverend Dr. Jeremiah Wright,

defendant’s family’s pastor for 36 years, stated that defendant had found a deep and genuine

relationship with God while in jail. 2

¶ 13    In allocution, defendant insisted that he acted in self-defense when Burdine tried to engage

in sexual activity with him and stated that, while in jail, he had grown spiritually, started two

ministries, and restored his relationship with his son. Cotton, 2016 IL App (1st) 132820-U, ¶ 36.

Defendant also presented a group exhibit consisting of letters from family members, clergy,

coworkers, and doctors. Id. ¶ 34. Defense counsel argued that defendant had no prior history of

violence, no prior felony convictions, and had only received supervision for his prior misdemeanor

battery and criminal sexual abuse convictions. Id. ¶ 35. Defendant requested the minimum

sentence of 20 years. Id.

¶ 14    The trial court stated that it “considered the large amount of mitigation evidence” and

sentenced defendant to 37 years’ imprisonment. Id. ¶ 38. The court explained that defendant’s drug

and alcohol addiction did not excuse his brutal murder of Burdine. Id. ¶ 37. The court noted that,

although he asked for mercy at sentencing, “defendant showed no mercy in killing the victim.” Id.

The court also rejected defendant’s claim of self-defense because the jury had already rejected that

theory. Id. Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the trial court denied. Id. ¶

39.

        2
           The report of proceedings for the sentencing hearing does not include the remainder of Wright’s
letter, the State’s or defendant’s argument, or the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we rely on our prior
decision to furnish the facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal. See Cotton, 2016 IL App (1st)
132820-U, ¶¶ 33-39.

                                                   -5-
No. 1-21-1081

¶ 15    On direct appeal, defendant raised allegations of constitutional violations at trial and argued

that his 37-year sentence was excessive because it was effectively a life sentence. Id. ¶ 88. This

court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, reasoning that the trial court “properly

balanced the seriousness of the offense with the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 95.

This court explained that the trial court adequately considered the “great amount of mitigation

evidence” and defendant’s struggles with drug and alcohol addiction, and properly balanced that

mitigating evidence against the seriousness of the offense. Id. ¶¶ 90-91.

¶ 16                                B. Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 17    In August 2018, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Defendant alleged that

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate his mental health despite

knowing about defendant’s history of self-harm and suicide attempts. Specifically, defendant

alleged that counsel saw cuts and bruises on defendant’s arms, which were evidence of self-harm.

Defendant argued that counsel’s failure to investigate his mental health resulted in no behavioral

clinical examination (BCX) or hearing to determine defendant’s fitness to stand trial, and that,

even if he had been found fit to stand trial, he still could have introduced the results of a BCX as

mitigation evidence at sentencing.3

¶ 18    Defendant attached to his petition his own affidavit claiming that he told trial counsel that

he had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression in 2002 and was prescribed multiple

medications for those issues. Defendant attested that his medication ran out after he completed

rehabilitation and, as a result, he began using drugs again. He also attested that counsel knew that

he had a history of self-harm and suicide attempts.

        3
          Defendant does not appeal the dismissal of his claims that counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by not seeking a BCX or fitness hearing.

                                                   -6-
No. 1-21-1081

¶ 19   Defendant also attached affidavits from his mother, his sister, Reid, and Hannah. His

mother attested that she told trial counsel of defendant’s “ongoing battle with drugs, alcohol,

depression, [and] anxiety.” She also told counsel that defendant sought therapy and counseling for

depression and erratic behavior in 1991, and that, sometime prior to trial, she saw burn marks on

defendant’s arms and heard defendant say that he felt worthless and ashamed. Defendant’s sister,

Tamarra Allen, attested that she believed defendant had suffered from depression and anxiety since

he was an adolescent. She also suspected that defendant suffered from bipolar disorder but

acknowledged that he had not been so diagnosed. When defendant lived with Allen in 2002, she

saw him using cigarettes to burn his arm. Allen attested that she provided this information to trial

counsel. Reid attested that she had “extensive conversations” with trial counsel about defendant’s

history of anxiety, depression, and struggles with drug and alcohol abuse dating back to his “teen

years.” She told counsel that defendant would “mutilate his own skin with burns and piercings and

attempt to self-medicate with controlled substances.” Hannah attested that, while defendant was

enrolled in her pre-apprenticeship program, he said that he took antidepressants but was unable to

get his prescriptions refilled. Hannah also attested that prior to trial, defendant “did not understand

the advice of counsel,” seemed depressed, and “constantly said he needed medication for

depression.”

¶ 20   Finally, defendant attached medical records to his petition. Billing records from a drug

rehabilitation program indicate that defendant underwent treatment between April 24, 2000, and

October 6, 2003. Defendant was billed twice each for “Detox” and “Rehab,” once for “In patient

Assessment,” and three times for “Psych Exam Follow-Up.” A July 26, 2017, psychiatric

diagnostic evaluation from Western Illinois Correctional Center notes defendant’s history of drug

and alcohol abuse. A September 13, 2017, psychiatric progress note, also from Western Illinois

                                                 -7-
No. 1-21-1081

Correctional Center, indicates that defendant claimed he had attempted suicide twice, most

recently in 2007. Defendant also claimed he had a history of self-harm by burning. A January 28,

2017, mental health progress note from Menard Correctional Center states that defendant claimed

he began burning himself with cigarettes after he realized that he had a substance abuse problem.

Defendant also “report[ed] symptoms of depression” due to his son not responding to letters but

denied having suicidal ideation and denied inflicting self-harm while in prison. Defendant was

diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.

¶ 21   The trial court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and appointed

postconviction counsel. The State moved to dismiss the petition, arguing in relevant part that

defendant failed to establish prejudice as a result of counsel’s failure to investigate his mental

health. On April 2, 2021, the trial court appointed defendant new postconviction counsel and heard

argument on the State’s motion to dismiss. On July 23, 2021, the court granted the State’s motion

to dismiss, finding, in part, that defendant’s “alleged mental illness” was “not a diagnosis that has

been given to this Court.” The court also noted that, during preparation of the PSI, defendant stated

that he did not need mental health services.

¶ 22   Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 23                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 24   On appeal, defendant argues that he made a substantial showing that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence at sentencing that he suffered from mental

health issues beyond drug and alcohol addiction. Specifically, defendant contends that counsel

should have presented, as mitigation evidence, his alleged history of depression, suicidal ideation,

self-harm, and bipolar disorder.

                                                 -8-
No. 1-21-1081

¶ 25    Defendant could have raised this claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct

appeal, but he did not. In postconviction proceedings, a defendant typically forfeits an issue that

he could have, but did not, raise on direct appeal. See People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22.

However, the doctrine of forfeiture is “relaxed *** where the facts relating to the issue do not

appear on the face of the original appellate record.” Id. That is the case here. Defendant’s petition

is based on matters outside of the original appellate record, namely, affidavits and medical records

regarding his mental health history. Furthermore, the State does not argue forfeiture, so it has

forfeited defendant’s forfeiture of these claims. See People v. Jones, 2018 IL App (1st)

151307, ¶ 47. Therefore, we hold that defendant has not forfeited his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, and we will address the merits of this appeal. 4

¶ 26    The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) provides a three-

stage process by which a criminal defendant can allege that his constitutional rights were violated

at trial or sentencing. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. In this case, the trial court dismissed

defendant’s petition at the second stage. At the second stage, the trial court must determine whether

the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation. People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 33. The second stage tests the legal sufficiency

of the petition, and the court may not engage in fact-finding or weigh credibility. Id. ¶ 35 (quoting

People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 385 (1998)). We take as true all well-pleaded facts not

positively rebutted by the trial record, and the question is whether the allegations, if proven at an

        4
          We do, however, hold that defendant has forfeited his claim that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to correct the PSI to include his history of additional mental health issues.
Defendant did not include this claim in his postconviction petition; rather, he raises it for the first time on
appeal. See People v. Tapia, 2014 IL App (2d) 111314, ¶ 34, 45 (citing People v. Meeks, 81 Ill. 2d 524,
533 (1980) (“any objections to the sufficiency of the report must first be presented to the trial court.”)).

                                                     -9-
No. 1-21-1081

evidentiary hearing, would entitle a defendant to relief. Id. We review the second-stage dismissal

of a postconviction petition de novo, meaning that we perform the same analysis as the trial court.

See People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006, ¶ 24; People v. Begay, 2018 IL App (1st) 150446, ¶ 34.

¶ 27   To establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) counsel’s deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A

defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test. People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 107

(2000). We address the prejudice prong first. See People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53 (a court

may proceed directly to the prejudice prong without addressing the objective reasonableness of

counsel’s performance). To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding at issue would have been

different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 74 (1997). A defendant

may not merely speculate that he may have been prejudiced; rather, he must “affirmatively prove”

that “substantial prejudice” resulted from counsel’s error. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693; Johnson,

2021 IL 126291, ¶ 52.

¶ 28   When imposing a sentence, a court must consider several factors, including the nature of

the offense and the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. People v. Charles, 2018 IL App (1st)

153625, ¶ 45. The court must determine the weight of each factor and consider all mitigating

evidence presented. Id. The seriousness of the offense is the most important factor in sentencing.

See id. ¶ 45 (“the court need not impose the minimum sentence merely because there are mitigating

factors.”); People v. Foxx, 2018 IL App (1st) 162345, ¶ 50; People v. Kelley, 2015 IL App (1st)

132782, ¶ 94. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the trial court properly considered the

                                               - 10 -
No. 1-21-1081

mitigating evidence presented. People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 19. As noted

above, defendant claims that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce evidence of his

mental health issues beyond drug and alcohol addiction as mitigation at sentencing.

¶ 29    We find that defendant does not make a substantial showing of prejudice under Strickland.

There is no reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a lesser sentence if

counsel had presented evidence that defendant may have, at some point, suffered from depression,

suicidal ideation, self-harm, and bipolar disorder. Defendant’s sentence was based primarily on

the seriousness of the crime, which is the most important factor in sentencing. See Charles, 2018

IL App (1st) 153625, ¶ 45 (severity of the offense outweighs mitigating factors). The evidence at

trial established that defendant committed a brutal murder and repeatedly tried to cover it up, first

by pouring bleach on Burdine’s body and then by lying to police. Additional evidence of

defendant’s mental health issues at sentencing would not have changed the facts of this crime or

the trial court’s evaluation of its seriousness.

¶ 30    Despite the gruesome nature of this crime, defendant received a sentence in the middle of

the range for first degree murder, which carries a maximum sentence of 60 years.5 See 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2012). The trial court sentenced defendant to 23 years less than the

maximum based on the robust mitigation package that trial counsel presented. That mitigation

package included evidence of defendant’s addiction to drugs and alcohol, which are types of

mental health issues, so it is inaccurate to say that counsel failed to present evidence of defendant’s

mental health issues at sentencing. Defendant’s addiction issues were much more relevant to this

        5
            In some cases, the maximum sentence for first degree murder can be 100 years (id. § 5-4.5-
20(a)(2)) or natural life (id. § 5-4.5-20(a)(1)(3)).

                                                       - 11 -
No. 1-21-1081

drug-fueled murder than the other mental health issues his petition alleges. It is unlikely that the

trial court would have reduced defendant’s sentence further based on generalized, non-expert

claims that he may have experienced depression, suicidal ideation, self-harm, and bipolar disorder

years before or after murdering Burdine.

¶ 31   The materials that defendant attached to his petition do suggest that he suffered from

mental health issues beyond drug and alcohol addiction at some point, and that his friends and

family told trial counsel as much. However, defendant fails to show how those facts affected his

understanding of his actions or his ability to obey the law such that his sentence would have been

reduced. See Id. § 5-3.1(a)(16). To put it simply, the fact that defendant experienced suicidal

ideation does not explain killing someone else. Similarly, the fact that defendant inflicted self-

harm by burning himself does not justify pouring bleach on Burdine to conceal evidence of the

murder.

¶ 32   Defendant argues that his mental illness was “directly relevant to his culpability for this

offense and his rehabilitative potential.” He contends that his lack of access to mental health

medication at the time of the murder caused him to relapse into drug and alcohol abuse. However,

he fails to explain why, specifically, this evidence would have resulted in a lesser sentence in this

case. Evidence of defendant’s mental health issues would not have been “inherently mitigating.”

See People v. Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 139 (1997); see also People v. Holman, 2014 IL App (3d)

120905, ¶ 75. Indeed, evidence of mental illness combined with drug and alcohol addiction may

be an aggravating factor, as it may make the defendant more dangerous and support a longer

sentence. See People v. Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d 151, 189-90 (2002) (evidence of mental illness coupled

with drug and alcohol dependencies may demonstrate dangerousness); Holman, 2014 IL App (3d)

120905, ¶ 75 (defendant’s history of mental health issues and substance abuse problems not

                                               - 12 -
No. 1-21-1081

inherently mitigating where defendant “had been given numerous previous chances at

rehabilitation”).

¶ 33    The cases that defendant cites are factually dissimilar, do not involve postconviction

proceedings, and do not support advancing this case to the third stage. See, e.g., People v.

Robinson, 221 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1052 (1991) (reducing the defendant’s 20-year sentence for

aggravated criminal sexual assault by 10 years on direct appeal because the defendant was

diagnosed and hospitalized for schizoaffective disorder during trial); People v. Williams, 62 Ill.

App. 3d 966, 975 (1978) (reducing the defendant’s 40 to 140-year sentence for armed robbery and

attempted murder on direct appeal because of the defendant’s young age, lack of criminal history,

troubled family history, and suicidal thoughts).

¶ 34    Finally, we note that, at the time of defendant’s sentencing hearing in 2013, “serious mental

illness” was not included in the Unified Code of Corrections’ list of mitigating factors that the trial

court must consider. See 730 ILCS 5/5-3.1(a) (West 2012); see also People v. Brunner, 2012 IL

App (4th) 100708, ¶ 64 (noting that the legislature purposefully left out defendant’s “mental-health

issues” as a mitigating factor). The legislature only added “serious mental illness” as a mitigating

factor in 2016. 730 ILCS 5/5-3.1(a)(16) (West 2016). Even if trial counsel had presented additional

evidence of defendant’s mental health issues, the trial court was, at the time, under no obligation

to consider it in mitigation. Accordingly, we hold that defendant fails to establish prejudice under

Strickland. Because we resolve defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to his

failure to demonstrate prejudice, we need not decide whether counsel’s performance was

objectively reasonable. See Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53. As defendant cannot meet the

prejudice prong of the Strickland test, his postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

fails, and the trial court properly dismissed it.

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No. 1-21-1081

¶ 35                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s

postconviction petition.

¶ 37   Affirmed.

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