Court Opinion

ID: 9754662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:08:58.956602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:54.832505
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (5th) 220745-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                         NOTICE
 Decision filed 08/25/23. The
                                                                              This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be               NO. 5-22-0745
                                                                              Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                 not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                               IN THE                         limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                    under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Champaign County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 21-CF-1424
                                                )
JEREMIAH F. MARTIN,                             )     Honorable
                                                )     Randall B. Rosenbaum,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Welch and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1       Held: Where there was no error in the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s petition for
               relief from judgment, and any argument to the contrary would lack substantial
               merit, the defendant’s appointed appellate counsel is granted leave to withdraw,
               and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶2       The defendant, Jeremiah F. Martin, appeals from the circuit court’s order denying his

petition for relief from judgment. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022). His appointed counsel on

appeal, the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD), has concluded that this appeal lacks

merit, and on that basis, it has filed with this court a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel. See

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). The Finley motion was accompanied by a legal

memorandum in support thereof. The defendant has filed a response to OSAD’s motion. After

examining OSAD’s Finley motion and memorandum, the defendant’s written response, and the

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entire record on appeal, this court agrees with OSAD that this appeal lacks merit. Accordingly,

OSAD is granted leave to withdraw as counsel, and the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign

County, denying the defendant’s petition for relief from judgment, is affirmed.

¶3                                    BACKGROUND

¶4     On November 22, 2021, the defendant was charged by information with four felony counts.

He allegedly committed the four felonies less than one week earlier. In count 1, he was charged

with the offense of armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)), which is a Class

X felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2020)). It was alleged that the defendant “knowingly

possessed a firearm, namely a shotgun, after having previously been convicted of the offense of

Unlawful Possession of a Weapon by a Felon, a Class 3 felony, in Champaign County cause

number 2002 CF 1266 and of the offense of Burglary, a Class 2 felony, in Champaign County

cause number 1997 CF 321.” As for counts 2 through 4, they alleged additional crimes.

¶5     On March 31, 2022, the defendant, his defense attorney, and an assistant state’s attorney

appeared before the circuit court. The parties informed the court of a plea agreement, under which

the defendant would plead guilty to count 1, armed habitual criminal, in exchange for the State’s

recommending a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 6½ years, to be followed by mandatory

supervised release (MSR) for a term of 3 years; counts 2 through 4 would be dismissed. The court

properly admonished and questioned the defendant about the nature of the charge, the possible

penalties, his right to plead guilty or not guilty, his right to a trial, his rights at trial, and the

consequences of a plea of guilty. In regard to the nature of the charge, the court told the defendant

the following: “Says that on or about November 19th of 2021, in Champaign County, you

committed the offense of armed habitual criminal in that you knowingly possessed a firearm,

namely a shotgun, after having previously been convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by

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a felon, a Class 3 felony, in Champaign [sic] case 2002-CF-1266, and the offense of burglary, a

Class 2 felony, in Champaign County case 1997-CF-321.”               The defendant indicated his

understanding of all these various matters and rights. The court also questioned the defendant

regarding the voluntariness of his plea, and his answers indicated that it was voluntary. The

prosecutor recited a factual basis for the plea. The defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of armed

habitual criminal. Finding the plea knowing and voluntary, the court accepted it. The court

imposed a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 6½ years, to be followed by MSR for a term of

3 years. The court admonished the defendant about a motion to withdraw guilty plea and the

process of appeal.

¶6     The defendant did not file a motion to withdraw guilty plea. He did not pursue an appeal

from the judgment of conviction.

¶7     On August 1, 2022, four months after entering his plea of guilty and being sentenced, the

defendant mailed to the clerk of the circuit court a hand-written, pro se “petition to void

judgment/order regarding unlawful sentence” under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2022)). The defendant stated that he was not seeking to “void his guilty

plea” but was instead asking the court “to set aside 1 void sentencing order because criteria used

in charging information for Armed Habitual Criminal was outside of allowed timeframe.” In his

petition, the defendant presented three specific claims, viz.: (1) Under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

95(a)(4)(E), “[t]he first felony *** must have occurred when offender was over the age of 21”;

however, the defendant’s “first felony” was committed when he was only 20 years of age.

(2) Under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95, the offense for which the defendant was sentenced must have been

committed within 20 years after judgment was entered on the first conviction, but the defendant’s

first conviction (for the offense of burglary) was entered 23 years before he committed the instant

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offense. (3) The defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, in

Champaign County case No. 2002-CF-1266, was improperly employed in this case, because that

offense (i) was a Class 3 felony and (ii) was “outside General Limitation period of 10 years.” In

his prayer for relief, the defendant requested (1) a hearing on the matters presented in his petition,

(2) vacatur of the sentencing order “with downward departure in sentencing,” and (3) a finding

“that information charging him with armed habitual criminal is fatally flawed and non applicable.”

¶8     Not long after the defendant filed his section 2-1401 petition, the State filed a motion to

dismiss it. The State argued, inter alia, that a section 2-1401 petition is a forum to correct errors

of fact in the prosecution of a case, not errors of law, but the defendant, in his own section 2-1401

petition, presented only errors of law; the petition did not mention any errors of fact.

¶9     On October 5, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order that denied the defendant’s

section 2-1401 petition. The court found, inter alia, that the defendant was convicted of the

offense of armed habitual criminal (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)) but most of his arguments

related to the statute concerning adjudication as a habitual criminal (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West

2020)), a statute that had no relevance to his case.

¶ 10   The defendant appealed from the court’s order. The court appointed OSAD to represent

him on appeal.

¶ 11                                     ANALYSIS

¶ 12   This appeal is from the circuit court’s order denying the defendant’s section 2-1401 petition

for relief from judgment. OSAD has concluded that this appeal lacks merit, and on that basis, it

has filed a Finley motion to withdraw as counsel. Regardless of what else can be said about the

defendant’s petition, its claims were misbegotten, and its denial was warranted. When the circuit

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court denies a section 2-1401 petition, appellate review of the denial is de novo. People v. Vincent,

226 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2007).

¶ 13   The defendant was charged with, and entered a fully negotiated plea of guilty to, the offense

of armed habitual criminal. Armed habitual criminal is defined in section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal

Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)). That section reads as follows:

               “(a) A person commits the offense of being an armed habitual criminal if he or she

       receives, sells, possesses, or transfers any firearm after having been convicted a total of 2

       or more times of any combination of the following offenses:

                       (1) a forcible felony as defined in Section 2-8 of this Code;

                       (2) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon; aggravated unlawful use of a

               weapon; aggravated discharge of a firearm; vehicular hijacking; aggravated

               vehicular hijacking; aggravated battery of a child ***; intimidation; aggravated

               intimidation; gunrunning; home invasion; or aggravated battery with a firearm ***;

               or

                       (3) any violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or the Cannabis

               Control Act that is punishable as a Class 3 felony or higher.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)

               (West 2020).

Section 2-8 of the Criminal Code defines “forcible felony” to include a variety of violent or

potentially violent felonies, including burglary. 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2020). “Being an armed

habitual criminal is a Class X felony.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2020). “[T]he language of

section 24-1.7 demonstrates an unmistakable purpose to criminalize recidivist offenders who

subsequently receive, possess, sell, or transfer firearms. [Citation.] Moreover, the statute evinces

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a clear intent that the crime apply to those offenders whose prior offenses were of a particular

serious class or nature.” People v. Adams, 404 Ill. App. 3d 405, 411 (2010).

¶ 14   Here, the defendant possessed a firearm, and he did so after having been convicted of

burglary and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. That is all that was needed for him to be guilty

of armed habitual criminal, as defined in section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal Code. His valid plea

of guilty was all that was necessary for the court to enter judgment.

¶ 15   In his section 2-1401 petition, the defendant complained about his young age (20 years old)

at the time he committed the burglary that resulted in one of his prior convictions, and the timing

of his past convictions in relation to the instant offense. However, none of those points has

anything to do with armed habitual criminal, the offense to which he validly pleaded guilty. They

are unmentioned anywhere in section 24-1.7(a).

¶ 16   Instead, the points raised by the defendant in his petition stem from a completely different

statute—the Habitual Criminal Act, found in section 5-4.5-95(a) of the Unified Code of

Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(a) (West 2022))—a statute that bears no relationship

whatsoever to the instant case.

¶ 17   Under the Habitual Criminal Act:

       “Every person who has been twice convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that

       contains the same elements as an offense now *** classified in Illinois as a Class X felony,

       criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, or first degree murder, and who is

       thereafter convicted of a Class X felony, criminal sexual assault, or first degree murder,

       committed after the 2 prior convictions, shall be adjudged an habitual criminal.” 730 ILCS

       5/5-4.5-95(a)(1) (West 2022).

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Anyone who is so adjudged “shall be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.” 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-95(a)(5) (West 2022).

¶ 18   It is in the provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act that we find reference to the points

raised by the defendant in his petition—i.e., the requirement that the defendant must have been

“21 years of age or older” at the time he committed “[t]he first offense” (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

95(a)(4)(E) (West 2020)), and the requirement that “[t]he third offense” must be committed

“within 20 years” after “the first conviction,” excluding time spent in custody (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-

95(a)(4)(B) (West 2020)). However, these age and timing requirements have no relevance to the

defendant. He was not adjudged a habitual criminal. From what is known of his criminal history,

he would not even qualify for sentencing as a habitual criminal. That is why the Habitual Criminal

Act was never discussed (or even mentioned) during the proceedings that resulted in the instant

conviction. If the Habitual Criminal Act had been applicable to the defendant in this case, he

would be serving a term of natural life imprisonment, rather than a prison term of a mere 6½ years.

¶ 19                                   CONCLUSION

¶ 20   The circuit court did not err in denying the defendant’s petition for relief from judgment.

Any argument to the contrary would lack merit. Accordingly, OSAD is granted leave to withdraw

as the defendant’s counsel, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 21   Motion granted; judgment affirmed.

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