Court Opinion

ID: 9796255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:52:52.395911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:23.488688
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J.
I dissent.
The principles articulated in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 65-74 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468] (Green)1 are not distinguishable but directly on point. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, this is not a case of prosecutorial misconduct; it is one of legal error. (See People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1125-1126, 1128 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45] (Guiton); Griffin v. United States (1991) 502 U.S. 46, 55, fn. 1, 58-59 [112 S.Ct. 466, 471, 474, 116 L.Ed.2d 371] (Griffin).) When, as here, the prosecutor premises his argument on an erroneous legal theory of guilt, the jury instructions do not clarify any possible misunderstanding, and the reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury predicated a guilty verdict on that erroneous theory, the judgment cannot stand. (Guiton, at p. 1128.) As I shall explain, this analysis applies, beyond cavil, to the facts before us and warrants reversal of defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance.
I
In Green, the defendant was charged, among other crimes, with simple kidnapping. The evidence suggested, and the prosecutor argued, that the asportation could be divided into three portions, including the “last 90 feet
*52that defendant walked [the victim] to the spot where he killed her.” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68; see id. at pp. 62-63.) The trial court gave the standard jury instruction, directing “that the crime is committed when the defendant moves a person . . . ‘for a substantial distance, that is, a distance more than slight or trivial.’ ” (Id. at p. 68.) On appeal, this court concluded that the “latter brief movement [was] insufficient as a matter of law to support the verdict of guilt . . . .” (Id. at p. 67, fn. omitted; see People v. Brown (1974) 11 Cal.3d 784 [114 Cal.Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226], overruled in People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 239.)
In assessing the import of its conclusion, the court began with the uncertainty whether “the jury actually based its general verdict of guilt” on this legally insufficient segment of the asportation. (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 67.) The Attorney General contended that a continuous kidnapping had occurred beginning with the initial movement and ending with the murder. (Ibid.) The court was unpersuaded: “The fatal flaw in this ‘continuous kidnapping’ theory, however, is that it was simply not the theory on which the case was tried.” (Ibid.)
The court then turned to the prosecutor’s argument. Although he referenced the first two segments, the district attorney “emphasized repeatedly that the latter [90-foot] movement was itself sufficient to satisfy the ‘substantial distance’ requirement and hence to constitute a kidnaping. Thus he focused the jury’s attention on defendant’s [latter] movement of the victim . . . and stated: ‘Now, that distance, 90 feet, . . . seems rather insignificant . . . , but. . . it’s a movement of substantial distance . ...’.. . Later the prosecutor returned to this issue and told the jury . . . l[a\ny one of the three is sufficient for a kidnap ... 90 feet, you have to conclude that was a substantial distance if for some reason you conclude the [other two segments] were not or the other elements were not present during the portion of the move. Now, that of course, would give you the crime of simple kidnapping. . . .’” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68, fn. omitted, all bracketed text added.) Not only did the prosecutor emphasize the 90-foot movement as sufficient to satisfy the element of asportation, “[n]othing in the instructions, moreover, disabused the jury of this notion. The instructions . . . told the jury only that the crime is committed when the defendant moves a person . . . ‘for a substantial distance . . . .’No further guidance was provided . . . .” (Id. at pp. 68-69; see id. at p. 71.)
The court found that “[i]n these circumstances the governing rule on appeal is both settled and clear: when the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record
*53on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand.” {Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69; see Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at pp. 52-55, 58-59 [112 S.Ct. at pp. 470-471, 474]; see also People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal..4th 1023, 1034 [68 Cal.Rptr.2d 655, 945 P.2d 1204].) The court recognized that the record “contained] evidence that could have led the jury to predicate its kidnaping verdict on the legally sufficient portion of [the] asportation. But it also contained] evidence that could have led the jury to rely ... on ... the legally insufficient portion [] of that movement. The instructions permitted the jury to take the latter course; and the district attorney expressly urged such a verdict in his argument, at least with respect to the final 90 feet that the victim was transported. We simply cannot tell from this record which theory the jury in fact adopted.” {Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 71; cf. People v. Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1036 [“That the jury here was not, in the end, invited to reach a guilty verdict by a faulty analytical path is clear from a consideration of the context of the prosecutor’s summation”].)
In Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th 1116, the court expressly reaffirmed these principles. There, the defendant was charged in one count with selling or transporting cocaine, and the trial court instructed on both even though the evidence did not support a finding he sold the drug. The court upheld the conviction and distinguished Green as a case of legal insufficiency rather than one of evidentiary insufficiency. (See Guiton, at pp. 1125-1126; Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at pp. 55, fn. 1, 58-59 [112 S.Ct. at pp. 471-474].) The defendant argued the distinction was “ ‘illusory, since judgments that are not supported by the requisite minimum of proof are invalid as a matter of law .... Insufficiency of proof, in other words, is legal error.’ [Citation.]” {Guitón, at p. 1125, italics omitted.) Quoting Griffin, at page 59 [112 S.Ct. at page 474], the Guitón court explained, “ ‘This represents a purely semantical dispute. In one sense “legal error” includes inadequacy of evidence— namely, when the phrase is used as a term of art to designate those mistakes that it is the business of judges (in jury cases) and of appellate courts to identify and correct. In this sense “legal error” occurs when a jury, properly instructed as to the law, convicts on the basis of evidence that no reasonable person could regard as sufficient. But in another sense—a more natural and less artful sense—the term “legal error” means a mistake about the law, as opposed to a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence. . . .’ [Citation.]” {Guitón, at p. 1125.)
“The Griffin court thus drew a distinction between a mistake about the law, which is subject to the rule generally requiring reversal, and a mistake concerning the weight or the factual import of the evidence, which does not require reversal when another valid basis for conviction exists. . . . . *54Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law—whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. . . .’ ” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) Thus, a reviewing court will “ ‘ “negate a verdict that, while supported by evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the law [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1125-1126.) Accordingly, reversal is generally required in those instances “in which ‘a particular theory of conviction ... is contrary to law,’ or, phrased slightly differently, cases involving a legally inadequate theory’ . . . [including] a case where the inadequate theory ‘fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1128.)
“To analyze the Green facts in terms of Griffin, ... a jury would be well equipped to analyze the evidence and determine whether the victim had been asported, and to determine the distance of the asportation. The jury would, however, not be equipped to determine whether, as a matter of law, 90 feet is insufficient. A reasonable jury, given no specific guidance regarding the required distance [citation], could have found 90 feet to be sufficient, and could have relied on that segment of asportation in its verdict. That being the case, reversal was appropriate. Nothing in Griffin casts doubt on the Green result.” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.)
II
As explicated in Guitón, we have here a case of legal insufficiency requiring reversal (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128): The prosecutor argued an erroneous theory of guilt and the instructions failed to correct any misunderstanding of the law he may have conveyed and on which the jury may have relied in reaching its verdict.2 “We simply cannot tell from this record which theory the jury in fact adopted.” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 71.)
*55Significantly, the prosecutor never mentioned the elements of possession in his opening final argument. Rather, he advanced the self-described “simple” theory that one could not become under the influence of a controlled substance without possessing that substance; therefore, because the evidence showed defendant was under the influence of phencyclidine (PCP), he must be guilty of possessing it to have been in such condition. The prosecutor began with that point—“[C]ertainly the most compelling evidence is that the defendant was under the influence of PCP”—and ended with it—“So you make your decision based upon the evidence here, and I believe that the evidence here, clearly, beyond a reasonable doubt, establishes that the defendant had to have been in possession of PCP in order to get under the influence of PCP on November the 3rd . . . .”
Even a cursory review of the argument in its entirety makes plain the “evidence here” was limited to defendant’s state of intoxication. In between the statements quoted above, the prosecutor discussed virtually nothing else and advanced no other theory of guilt. He recited in detail the officers’ observations, including the drug recognition expert’s evaluation of defendant’s condition, and then posited, “So the only evidence that you have ... all points to the fact that the defendant was clearly under the influence that night . . . , and in the van [where] he is . . . found sitting by the police officers, is a vial of PCP.” (Italics added.) The prosecutor then told the jury that to return a guilty verdict it need not find defendant possessed the vial found in the van, the only possible basis for a conviction. “Now, you can go into your deliberation room and you can say, ‘Well, gee, how do we know that was the vial. . .’? We know he got [high on PCP] by being in possession of PCP. How do we know [it] was the PCP [in the vial]? Maybe he had another bottle at home, or maybe he had five other bottles at home. That’s not the issue. [^ And it does not necessarily require that you all unanimously agree that it was some PCP from this vial. That is simply additional evidence that what he was under the influence [of] was clearly PCP, and in order to get under the influence, he had to possess PCP.” (Italics added.) Inverting the evidentiary relationship between defendant’s intoxication and the charge of possession, the prosecutor thus argued the PCP in the vial was circumstantial evidence defendant was under the influence of PCP, which was circumstantial evidence he must have possessed the drug to get under the influence, but not necessarily the PCP in the vial.
In his closing final argument, the prosecutor returned to his original thesis but with even greater emphasis. “What do we know? We know . . . Mr. Morales is wasted; okay? He is intoxicated on PCP. HQ ... HD ... You don’t get drunk unless you take in the intoxicant. You can’t take in the intoxicant if you don’t have it. Very simple. Very simple deductive process. I *56can’t drink beer until I’m drunk unless I have beer to drink.” He again mentioned the vial found in the van, but merely to reiterate, “Now, the vial of PCP in the van ... is certainly circumstantial evidence, that it is PCP we’re talking about [that caused defendant’s intoxication].” (Italics added.)
Finally, the prosecutor addressed the elements of the offense.3 Nevertheless, he stuck fast to the theme he had already developed, arguing that each was established solely by virtue of defendant’s intoxication: “And [defense] counsel adeptly says there are the elements of the offense of possession, one must exercise control in order to ingest the intoxicant. . . . HQ . . . It’s a little hard to get yourself loaded if you’re not aware of the presence of what you’re getting yourself loaded on. And the nature of it. . . . [I]f I get intoxicated on that six-pack, it’s because I knew the nature of it. [IQ . . .So there has to be evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a sufficient quantity for Mr. Morales to get high. He was high. He was intoxicated. fl[| ... So all of those elements are conclusively proven based upon the condition that Mr. Morales is in at the time he’s found. Very simple. Very simple process.” (Italics added.)
The sum and substance of the prosecutor’s argument thus urged the jury to find defendant guilty of possessing PCP based on the fact he must have used it to become intoxicated. This constituted legal error, i.e., “ ‘a mistake about the law.’ ” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) For more than three decades, courts have “rejected] the theory that circumstantial reasoning from use to possession is permitted.” (People v. Spann (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 400, 407 [232 Cal.Rptr. 31]; see People v. Fein (1971) 4 Cal.3d 747, 754 [94 Cal.Rptr. 607, 484 P.2d 583]; People v. Sullivan (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 562, 565 [44 Cal.Rptr. 524]; see also People v. Leal (1966) 64 Cal.2d 504, 510 [50 Cal.Rptr. 777, 413 P.2d 665].) In People v. Palaschak (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1236, 1240-1241 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 722, 893 P.2d 717] (Palaschak), the court reaffirmed this basic principle: “[E]vidence of ingestion of drugs, standing alone, should not be deemed adequate to sustain a possession charge .... Ingestion, whether or not accompanied by useless traces or residue, at best raises only an inference of prior possession. HQ As stated in [People v.] Sullivan, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d at page 565, if proof of ingestion of illegal drugs were sufficient to sustain a possession charge, then every person under the influence of an illegal drug could be charged with possessing it because, logically, one who ingests a drug must have possessed it at least temporarily.” (Italics omitted.)
*57The court “discem[ed] no good reason why substantial evidence of past possession of [an illegal drug] (within the period of the applicable statute of limitations) should be deemed insufficient to sustain a conviction of that offense [simply because the defendant had already ingested the drug by the time of his arrest]” (Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1240, italics omitted), and disapproved “broad dictum” in People v. Fein, supra, 4 Cal.3d 747, and People v. Sullivan, supra, 234 Cal.App.2d 562, suggesting otherwise. (Palaschak,, at p. 1241.) At the same time, however, it carefully distinguished and circumscribed its relevance to those circumstances “in which there exists sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence of past possession, over and above evidence of mere use or ingestion.” (Ibid.) Logically, this principle applies to proof of each element as well as the charge itself. The reason for the limitation is clear: evidence of use or ingestion does not necessarily establish all the elements of criminal possession since the defendant may not have knowingly possessed an illegal drug at the time of ingestion or known of its contraband nature. (See ibid:, see also id. at p. 1242 [finding all elements of LSD possession established by direct and circumstantial evidence notwithstanding loss or destruction of the drug by ingestion].) A contrary rule may also present venue and statute of limitations problems.
As the record here attests, the prosecutor cited no “direct or circumstantial evidence of past possession, over and above evidence of mere use or ingestion’’’ (Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 1241, italics added.) The majority suggests the jury could have found defendant guilty based on inferences drawn from other evidence. The “fatal flaw” in this reasoning, however, “is that it was simply not the theory on which the case was tried.” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 67.)
The prosecution’s case consisted almost exclusively of the officers’ testimony regarding defendant’s state of intoxication and the distinctive odor of ether associated with PCP.4 The majority notes defendant refused to submit a sample of his urine. Not only did the prosecutor fail to argue the refusal as consciousness of guilt and the trial court fail to instruct on the point, its evidentiary significance is probably negligible given the wording of the admonition, which did not reference a possible possession charge but instead indicated, “A criminal complaint charging you with being under the influence of a narcotic or drug may be filed against you.” (Italics added.) The only other evidence the majority cites is that “[defendant was found, intoxicated by PCP, in a van containing a vial of the substance. His wife had gone to the police seeking help for him—presumably, help in dealing with the substance’s effects.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 46.) These “circumstances” merely *58reiterate in one respect or another the fact defendant was intoxicated on PCP. Even if such evidence were not susceptible of reasonable nonincriminatory inferences, as a matter of law it is insufficient to prove possession. (Palaschak, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 1240-1241.)
Equally to the point, while defendant may have been found in a van containing a vial of PCP, there was no evidence of who owned the van. The vial was discovered under the driver’s seat, and defendant was found on the other side sitting in the open passenger’s side door. No direct evidence established who drove the van to the police station, but defendant’s profound state of intoxication as well as his wife’s presence and request for assistance strongly support a reasonable inference he was not the last person driving the vehicle. Nor does the record contain any indication he ever drove it. As the defense also noted, no fingerprints were taken from the van or the vial.5
As did the prosecutor, the majority also fails to relate any of the circumstantial evidence it relies on to the elements of the charge. Guilt is not simply a matter of being in proximity to a controlled substance. Just as intoxication alone is insufficient, “proof of opportunity of access to a place where narcotics are found, without more, will not support a finding of unlawful possession.” (People v. Redrick (1961) 55 Cal.2d 282, 285 [10 Cal.Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255].) At the same time, primary reliance on defendant’s state of intoxication tends to undercut the argument he knew of the vial’s presence. The majority also cites no other fact from which a reasonable jury could find that the vial contained a usable quantity of PCP. Given the paltry evidentiary record, the jury “had substantial incentives to take the easier path urged by the district attorney” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 73), i.e., to predicate its finding of possession solely on defendant’s intoxication, a “[v]ery simple deductive process” as he described it, rather than to guess whether all the elements were satisfied by other circumstantial evidence.
Contrary to the majority’s analysis, “[n]othing in the instructions, moreover, disabused the jury of this notion.” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68.) The trial court instructed in standard terms: “In order to prove [possession of a controlled substance], each of the following elements must be proved: One, a person exercised control or the right to control a certain controlled *59substance; two, such person had knowledge of its presence; three, such person had knowledge of its nature as a controlled substance; and, four, the substance was in an amount sufficient to be used as a controlled substance.” “No further guidance was provided” on the evidentiary significance of intoxication. (Green, at p. 68.) While the “instructions themselves did not [expressly] permit a conviction solely on evidence of intoxication” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 47), such technical accuracy did not cure the fatal infection caused by the prosecutor’s erroneous theory of guilt.6
Nor did any of the trial court’s routine admonitions assist in a proper understanding of the law as to the relationship between intoxication and possession. Prior to the testimony, the court instructed, “You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you, whether or not you agree with the law. If anything concerning the law said by the attorneys in their arguments, or at any other time during the trial, conflicts with my instructions on the law, you must follow my instructions and disregard what they say regarding the law.” (Italics added.) As previously discussed, the court’s enumeration of the elements of possession in no way conflicted with the prosecutor’s assertion that intoxication provided the requisite proof. (See Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68.) As the court in Guitón expressly noted, a “reasonable jury, given no specific guidance regarding” applicable principles of law, could have relied on findings consistent with the facts but inconsistent with the law in reaching its verdict. (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) This record affords no basis for concluding otherwise. (Cf. id. at p. 1130 [legal error under Green may be harmless if “it is possible to determine from other portions of the verdict that the jury necessarily found the defendant guilty on a proper theory”].)
The circumstantial evidence instructions also did not conflict with the prosecutor’s argument.7 The prosecutor argued that “all of those elements [of possession] are conclusively proven based upon the condition that Mr. *60Morales is in at the time he’s found. Very simple. Very simple process.” A reasonable jury assessing the legal import of the circumstantial evidence instructions in light of that argument would have no reason to conclude that the prosecutor had misstated the law or that it could not properly convict solely on the basis of defendant’s “condition.”
Given the totality of the record, this case comes squarely within the rule “of a ‘legally inadequate theory’ generally requiring reversal.” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128.) To paraphrase Guitón: At issue was whether intoxication was sufficient to satisfy the elements, or the “statutory definition,” of possession. There was no insufficiency of proof in the sense that there clearly was evidence from which a jury could find that defendant was intoxicated on PCP. Instead, we have held that intoxication alone is “legally insufficient.” A jury would be well equipped to analyze the evidence and determine whether defendant was under the influence of PCP. The jury would, however, not be equipped to determine whether, as a matter of law, such intoxication is insufficient to prove possession. A reasonable jury, given no specific guidance regarding the relationship between the two, could have found intoxication alone to be sufficient, and could have relied on that fact in its verdict. (Ibid.)
The relevant inquiry is not, as the majority implies (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 43-44), whether the trial court rather than the prosecutor presented a legally incorrect theory. Reversal is required when, as here, “the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are . . . legally incorrect” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69); “[njothing in the instructions . . . disabused the jury of this [erroneous] notion” {id. at p. 68); and “the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested . . . .” (Id. at p. 69; see Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1128-1129; Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at pp. 58-59 [112 S.Ct. at p. 474].) The actual source of the error is not controlling, particularly when, as here, the error will commonly arise from a combination of factors. (See Green, at p. 68.)
The inquiry is also not as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The critical question is whether the reviewing court can determine if the jury returned *61“ ‘ “a verdict that, while supported by [the] evidence, may have been based on an erroneous view of the law . . . (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1125-1126; see id. at pp. 1128-1129; Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 59 [112 S.Ct. at p. 474].) Thus, even if the evidence were sufficient (see, ante, fn. 6), that determination would be irrelevant to resolving defendant’s claim of legal error.
Ill
The prosecutor argued that “all of those elements [of possession of PCP] are conclusively proven based upon the condition that Mr. Morales is in at the time he’s found.” Plainly, this was “ ‘a particular theory of conviction . . . contrary to law,’ ” i.e., a “ ‘legally inadequate theory’ ” of guilt (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1128), yet he exhorted the jury to apply the law to the facts as he erroneously described. Neither the tenuous state of the evidence nor the unadorned instructions led the jury away from this misperception. I not only “cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested” (Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69), I cannot discern that any correct alternative was ever presented to this jury; and thus “the conviction cannot stand.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Since I find the evidence insufficient, I would also preclude retrial. (See Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1,11 [98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1].)
Werdegar, J., concurred.

Overruled on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 239 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 973 P.2d 512], and People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99], footnote 3.

The majority and Justice Kennard thus mischaracterize defendant’s claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct subject to waiver on appeal. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 43-44; cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., ante, at pp. 50-51; cf. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 27-36 [separately addressing the defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct, most of which had been waived by failure to object].) As Green, Guitón, and Griffin establish, when a prosecutor advances an erroneous theory of guilt that jury instructions fail to clarify, the result is legal error for which the reviewing court may reverse irrespective of a contemporaneous objection. (See Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1121-1122, 1128-1129; Green, at pp. 65-74; see also Griffin, supra, 502 U.S. at pp. 52-54, 58-59 [112 S.Ct. at pp. 470-471, 473].) This situation differs qualitatively from a simple misstatement of a legal principle and thus invokes a different standard of review. (Cf. Green, at p. 34 [finding the defendant had waived claim of misconduct based on prosecutor’s “partial misstatement of the law of reasonable doubt”].)

“The elements of the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, such as PCP, are [1] [actual or constructive] dominion and control of the substance [2] in a quantity usable for consumption or sale, [3] with knowledge of its presence and [4] of its restricted dangerous drug character. Each of these elements may be established circumstantially. [Citation.]” (People v. Camp (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 244, 247-248 [163 Cal.Rptr. 510].)

The only other testimony concerned the chain of custody for the vial and evidence describing the scientific testing of the liquid in the vial.

Considering the totality of this evidence, even in the light most favorable to the judgment below, I find it fails to “disclose[] substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 [162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) The prosecution made no serious attempt, apart from relying on defendant’s state of intoxication, to establish the elements of possession of a controlled substance according to the foregoing standard.

Compounding the misimpression conveyed by the bare-bones instruction, the prosecutor told the jury it had the “duty” to “determine what the facts are in kind of a clinical fashion, [and] apply the law that the judge gives you in an absolutely clinical fashion. HQ . . . You just take that law, apply it to the facts you found and you make your determination.” In sum, he told the jury to “go in and judge this evidence solely, on the law.” “The facts” as presented, however, related virtually exclusively to defendant’s PCP intoxication, which the prosecutor erroneously argued was sufficient under “the law” as given by the judge. (See Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 68.)

Regarding circumstantial evidence, the court instructed in part, “a finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only, one, consistent with the theory that the defendant is guilty of a crime, but, two, cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion. HQ Further, each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, before an inference essential to *60establish guilt may be found to have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, each fact or circumstance upon which such inference necessarily rests must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ft[] Also, if the circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant’s guilt and the other to his being not guilty, you must adopt that interpretation which points to the defendant’s being not guilty and reject that interpretation which points to his guilt, [ft] If, on the other hand, one interpretation of such evidence appears to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable.”