Court Opinion

ID: 9450918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:00:45.719859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:29.682867
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The opinion of the court refers to the sentence of three years pronounced by the District Court on February 7, 1962, in the absence of appellant as a violation of “due process” and of “appellant’s constitutional rights,” citing United States v. Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 84 S.Ct. 295. But Behrens very clearly is not a constitutional decision. It simply holds that it is error to impose a sentence in the absence of the defendant. 375 U.S. 162, 166, 84 S.Ct. 295. And even if I were to concede the existence of a constitutional issue, I could not agree that the February 7 sentence was “void”; “a nullity”; that the trial court “had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence”; that the sentence “could not become operative”; or “in contemplation of law is non-existent.” The sentence was invalid because imposed through procedural error, simple or constitutional in origin. Even the latter would not defeat the total jurisdiction of the court nor render the sentence legally non-existent. The failure to accord to an accused a constitutional right does not defeat jurisdiction. In Linkletter v. Walker, 85 S.Ct. 1731, despite an admitted violation of the Fourth Amendment, the state proceedings were held valid to support conviction.
In its brief the government states: “The United States concedes that if the order [of February 7] was valid then Appellant’s sentence could not have been increased by the court at a later date.” The sentence was not valid in the sense that it was free from error, but it was jurisdictionally valid; and I have no doubt that had appellant served a full three years without complaint he would have had an absolute right to release. Nor would I change the result because appellant did request correction of the error in his sentencing. I would hold the court powerless to increase the sentence, or, if need be, bar the imposition of an increased sentence through the exercise of this court’s supervisory power in the administration of criminal justice. Any other result, to me, seems manifestly unfair.