Court Opinion

ID: 9711109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:24:35.749866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:02.349174
License: Public Domain

Weaver, District Judge,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that the motion to dismiss should have been overruled as to Oram, and in that I agree. However, it holds that the motion should be sustained as to the other defendants.
While this is a case of first impression in this state, it is,'nevertheless, elementary that the opinions and holdings of this court should rest first upon the applicable law of this state and that holdings of other jurisdictions should be secondary.
The majority opinion cites from State v. Hunt, 91 Ariz. 149, 370 P. 2d 642, as follows: “But mere presence at a place where a narcotic drug is found is not sufficient.” In that case the defendant had been in the house just before it was searched, but at the time of the search the defendant was in a grocery store some distance away and the only persons in the house were the tenant and two' other persons. The facts are entirely different than the instant case, but it should be noted that in that case the court also said: “Exclusive possession is not required as two or more persons may have joint possession of the drug.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz. 411, 368 P. 2d 649, defendant and another man were sitting on a park bench. *339They were searched and released, whereupon they boarded an airplane. The officers then searched the area near the bench and found a package of heroin. The defendant and his companion were taken from the plane. These facts bear no similarity to the case now before this court for consideration.
In Evans v. United States, 257 F. 2d 121, the defendant Mildred Evans occupied an apartment which was frequented by a male acquaintance, William Evans, who was not her husband. At the time of the arrest William had been at the apartment 5 minutes. Twenty-two grains of marihuana were found concealed under the carpet on the top step. Both Mildred and William disclaimed knowledge or possession of the marihuana, but both defendants were tried on the charge. Mildred was acquitted. William was convicted and the conviction affirmed. The case supports the theory that the question of the innocence or guilt of all three defendants should be submitted to the jury in the instant case.
It has been said in jest that the Supreme Court corrects' the errors of the trial court and perpetuates its own errors. I would urge that this court not perpetuate the holding in State v. Eberhardt, 176 Neb. 18, 125 N. W. 2d 1, cited in the majority opinion. The holding in that case relating to “possession” was based on a series of authorities from other jurisdictions, without any reference whatever to the statutory law of those jurisdictions. It finds no support whatever in Nebraska law and has since then been, in my opinion, repudiated by this court in State v. Stroh, ante p. 24, 146 N. W. 2d 756. The Stroh case involved a charge of breaking and entering but also involved the question of who had posisession of certain burglary tools, and the opinion reads in part as follows: “But, the evidence does show that the defendant and his two accomplices entered the building together and that some of them had possession of the tools admitted in evidence * * *. There is evidence here that the defendant broke into and entered, along *340with two companions, the building in question. Even though not identified as. having any particular tool in his possession, the entry into the building at 1:40 a.m. with two companions possessing such tools is sufficient to warrant an inference, under the circumstances, that he had knowledge of and was connected with the actual possession of such tools. It was relevant to> the issue of intent. The above case (referring to a citation by defendant Stroh) also found that there was no- proof that the articles found had ever been in the possession of any of the defendants. In this case, the opposite is true since the tools were found in the possession of either the defendant or his two accomplices.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Nebraska law properly applicable to the case now before the court is as follows: “A common purpose among two' or more persons, to commit a crime need not be shown by positive evidence but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act and from defendant’s conduct subsequent thereto. * * * Participation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed. * * * The credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are for the jury to determine in a criminal case and the verdict of the jury may not be disturbed by this court unless it is clearly wrong.” State v. Knecht, ante p. 149, 147 N. W. 2d 167.
“It is only where there is a total failure of proof to establish a material allegation of the information, or the testimony is of so weak or doubtful a character that a conviction based thereon cannot be sustained, that the trial court is justified in directing a verdict for the defendant.” State v. Knecht, supra. See, also, State v. Martin, 177 Neb. 209, 128 N. W. 2d 583.
“It is the province of the jury to> determine the circumstances surrounding and which shed light upon the alleged crime; and if, assuming as proved the facts which the evidence tends to establish, they cannot be accounted for upon any rational theory which does not include the *341guilt of the accused, the proof cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have failed ” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Bundy, ante p. 160, 147 N. W. 2d 500.
The motions of all three defendants should have been overruled and the matter submitted to the jury for decision.
Carter, J., joins in this dissent.