Court Opinion

ID: 9625376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:38:28.662147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:07.380942
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot concur in the reasoning or the conclusion reached in the majority opinion in the above styled case. In dissenting, I feel that I should express the reasons for by position.
Simply stated, House Joint Resolution No. 508, 1953 S.L. 513, 64 O.S.Supp.1953 § 82.2, provides for satisfaction and release of deficiency judgments in favor of the Commissioners of the Land Office, by the payment of the unpaid principal of said judgment plus. interest thereon at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of rendition of said judgment. , The practical effect of the act is the remittance of all interest on such judgments in excess of five per cent. Prior to the passage of the act, this court, in the case of State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Collins, 206 Okl. 99, 241 P.2d 400, held that, in an action to recover the amount due on a prior final money judgment, the trial court was without authority to reduce the interest rate from ten per cent to six per cent. The statute now under consideration provided the theretofore lacking authority.
The inhibition constituting the foundation of the opinion in the Collins case was removed by the adoption of the statute unless it was unconstitutional. The question then for determination herein is: “Does such act contravene the provisions of the Constitution?” I think not.
'The majority opinion holds that the statute attempts to extinguish a part of the judgment obligation due to the State. But such is not its effect. It provides for the extinguishment of a part of'the interest on the judgment obligation. ' The situá-is not comparable to that in the case of State ex rel. State Commissioners of Land Office v. Weems, 197 Okl. 106, 168 P.2d 629, cited and relied on in the majority opinion, in the Weems case, the principal of the judgment as well as the interest thereon were attempted to be cancelled for little or no consideration. Admittedly that could not be done.
. But interest on a judgment in favor of the State is no more “indebtedness, liabilities, or obligations of any corporation, or individual, to this State,” Olcl.Const. Art. 5, Sec. 53, than interest and penalties upon past due and delinquent taxes. As to the latter, interest and penalties on delinquent taxes, it was held, in the case of City of McAlester v. Jones, 181 Okl. 77, 72 P.2d 371, that an act which remitted such penalties and interest was not unconstitutional. The situation in the reported cáse has many parallels to the situation herein. There it had been held in Holliman v. Cole, 168 Okl. 473, 34 P.2d 597, that the Governor was without authority to remit penalties and interest on delinquent taxes by executive order. Here it has been held in State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Collins, supra, that the trial court was without authority to reduce the interest rate on a prior judgment. In both situations, authority was subsequently granted for the remission or reduction by legislative enactment. That a similar act as to reduction of interest on a mortgage indebtedness before judgment was a grant, and direction of use, of such authority, was the holding in the recent case of State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Froese, 200 Okl. 486, 197 P.2d 296.
It is therefore my conclusion that, since the act in question directs the satisfaction of a judgment in favor of the State upon payment of the entire principal amount plus interest at a reduced amount, it is not a remission of an indebtedness as within the contemplation of Art. 5, Sec. 53 of Okl.Const. and is valid under the holding in the case of City of McAlester v. Jones, supra. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that the views expressed in this dissent are concurred in by WELCH and O’NEAL, JJ.