Court Opinion

ID: 9952634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:12:48.616337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.315082
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven J. Meyers                          :
                                          :
                                          :
                   v.                     :   No. 33 C.D. 2022
                                          :   Submitted: February 3, 2023
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,             :
Department of Transportation,             :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,               :
                         Appellant        :

BEFORE:      HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
PRESIDENT JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER                FILED: March 20, 2024

      The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Driver Licensing (Department), appeals from an Order of the Court of Common
Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) sustaining an appeal of Steven J. Meyers
(Licensee) from the Department’s suspension of his driver’s license. Department
argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Licensee did not refuse
to submit to a chemical test. Although this is a challenging case, consistent with our
precedent we find that Licensee’s silence was a refusal and, therefore, we reverse.
      Officer Nathan Homyak (Officer Homyak) arrested Licensee for suspected
driving under the influence.      (Trial Court Opinion (Trial Ct. Op.) at 1-2.)
Department suspended Licensee’s driver’s license for a period of 18 months based
on Licensee’s refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood and Licensee’s previous
arrest for driving under the influence pursuant to Section 1547(b)(1)(ii) of the
Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(ii), also known as the Implied Consent Law.
(Official Notice of Suspension, Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 7a.)              Licensee
appealed, and the trial court held a hearing on October 29, 2021. (Trial Ct. Op. at
1.) Department presented Officer Homyak of the Johnstown Police Department as
its witness, and Licensee testified as well. The trial court found the facts as follows.
      Officer Homyak stopped Licensee after observing Licensee perform a
“burnout.” (Findings of Fact (FOF) ¶ 1.) During the stop, Officer Homyak observed
that Licensee smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, and had an unsteady gait. (Id.
¶ 2.) Licensee was verbally “belligerent[]” and “did not want to complete field
sobriety tests.” (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) Officer Homyak then placed Licensee in custody and
took Licensee to a hospital for a chemical test of his blood. (Id. ¶ 5.) “Either before
Officer Homyak started to read or before he completed reading the Chemical Testing
Warnings [(DL-26 form)] to [Licensee], [Licensee] indicated that he would not give
blood for a chemical test.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Licensee “continued to behave in a generally
disruptive manner” at the hospital, but Officer Homyak was able to read the entirety
of the DL-26 form to Licensee. (Id. ¶ 7.) “After Officer Homyak finished reading
the DL-26 form, [Licensee] remained silent for approximately 30 seconds. At this
time, Officer Homyak informed [Licensee] that [Licensee’s] silence was deemed to
be a refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Once Officer Homyak
told Licensee his silence constituted a refusal, Licensee told Officer Homyak that he
would provide a blood sample. (Id. ¶ 9.) Officer Homyak and a nurse then
completed paperwork for Licensee’s refusal, which took one or two minutes. (Id. ¶
10.) The trial court found:

                                           2
      It is unclear whether [Licensee] told Officer Homyak he would submit
      to a chemical test of blood (1) immediately after Officer Homyak told
      [Licensee] that his silence was deemed to be a refusal, or (2) only after
      Officer Homyak had begun or otherwise completed the paperwork
      pertaining to [Licensee]’s refusal. Neither party established a more
      concrete timeframe by a preponderance of the evidence.

(Id. ¶ 9 n.1.) Approximately 90 to 150 seconds elapsed between Officer Homyak
reading Licensee the DL-26 form and Officer Homyak completing the paperwork
pertaining to Licensee’s refusal. (Id. ¶ 11.)
      After the hearing, the parties submitted briefs to the trial court. Based on the
hearing and the parties’ briefs, the trial court sustained Licensee’s appeal. The trial
court issued an opinion explaining its reasoning:

      In the cases the [Department] cites, the licensee either made a physical
      act indicating (confirming) a refusal in conjunction with his or her
      silence or was afforded at least one of the following: (1) multiple
      readings of the DL-26 form, or (2) considerably more time to determine
      whether to comply. Confirmation of silence as a refusal can be as
      simple as telling the licensee that continued silence will be deemed to
      be a refusal. . . .

      Under all of the circumstances of this case, this [c]ourt holds that
      [Licensee] was not permitted a meaningful opportunity to submit to
      chemical testing as there was no confirmation of [Licensee]’s refusal.
      This [c]ourt emphasizes the following facts in reaching its conclusion:
      (1) [Licensee] was only afforded approximately 30 seconds to
      determine whether to comply after being read the DL-26 form, and
      (2) [Licensee] made no oral statements or took no physical action
      confirming his refusal after the DL-26 form had been read in its
      entirety. . . . Here, [Licensee]’s approximately 30 seconds of silence
      was ambiguous, i.e., [Licensee] could have been thinking about
      whether to comply or intending to refuse through obstinance; and there
      was no confirmation of [Licensee]’s refusal.

      [Licensee]’s unruly conduct prior to being read the DL-26 form and
      his disruptiveness while the form was being read are not sufficient to
      deem a mere 30-second silence to be a refusal (absent something more).
      To hold that approximately 30 seconds of silence following the reading

                                          3
       of the DL-26 form – absent something else occurring after the form
       has been read – strays dangerously close to holding that a licensee
       must instantaneously submit to a chemical test upon request.

(Id. at 5-6 (emphasis in original).)
       On appeal to this Court,1 the Department argues that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in concluding that Licensee did not refuse chemical testing through his
conduct, and that Licensee’s subsequent assent to a blood test did not invalidate his
refusal. (Department’s Brief (Br.) at 17.) The Department argues that “[Licensee’s]
failure to respond to Officer Ho[m]yak’s request for a blood test, after the officer
finished warning [Licensee] that remaining silent would be deemed a refusal, was
the culmination of [Licensee’s] lengthy course of bad conduct that night.” (Id. at
18.) The Department further contends that the DL-26 form specifically warns
licensees that silence will be deemed a refusal. (Id. at 22-23.)
       Licensee responds that the trial court correctly sustained Licensee’s appeal
because there was substantial evidence for the trial court to conclude that Licensee’s
30-second period of silence after Officer Homyak read the DL-26 form did not
constitute a refusal. (Licensee’s Br. at 2.) Licensee argues that the 30-second delay
was not “substantial[,]” and a licensee must be given a “meaningful opportunity” to
consent to a chemical test, which did not happen here. (Id. at 5.)
       Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code states, in relevant part:

       (a) General rule.--Any person who drives, operates or is in actual
       physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth
       shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of
       breath or blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of

       1
          In reviewing a driver’s license suspension appeal, “[o]ur standard of review is limited to
determining whether [the trial court] committed an error of law, whether [the trial court] abused
its discretion, or whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence.” Garlick v.
Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 176 A.3d 1030, 1035 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

                                                 4
      blood or the presence of a controlled substance if a police officer has
      reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving,
      operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in
      violation of [S]ection . . . . 3802 [of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.
      § 3802] (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled
      substance). . . .

      (b) Civil penalties for refusal.--

            (1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of [S]ection
            3802 is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do
            so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the
            police officer, the [D]epartment shall suspend the operating
            privilege of the person. . .

                   ....

                   (ii) For a period of 18 months if any of the following apply:

                          (B) The person has, prior to the refusal under this
                          paragraph, been sentenced for:

                                           (I) an offense under section 3802.

75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a), (b)(1)(ii)(B)(I) (emphasis omitted). Further,

      [t]o sustain a license suspension under Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle
      Code, [the Department] has the burden of establishing that (1) the
      licensee was arrested for drunken driving by a police officer having
      reasonable grounds to believe that the licensee was driving while under
      the influence, (2) the licensee was requested to submit to a chemical
      test, (3) the licensee refused to do so and (4) the licensee was warned
      that refusal would result in a license suspension. Once [the
      Department] meets this burden, the burden shifts to the licensee to
      establish that he or she either was not capable of making a knowing and
      conscious refusal or was physically unable to take the test.

Giannopoulos v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 82 A.3d 1092, 1094
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). The Department must also show that the police officer gave
the licensee a “meaningful opportunity” to submit to a chemical test. Grogg v. Dep’t

                                             5
of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 79 A.3d 715, 718 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). If a
licensee is provided with such opportunity, our Court has long held that anything
other than an unequivocal assent to a chemical test is a refusal. Factor v. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 199 A.3d 492, 497 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). This
Court has also held that a licensee’s silence after being read the DL-26 form will
constitute a refusal. Dep’t of Transp. v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 936 n.2 (Pa. 1996);
Grogg, 79 A.3d at 719; Sitoski v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 11
A.3d 12, 21-22 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010); Broadbelt v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 903 A.2d 636, 641 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Whether a licensee’s conduct
constitutes a refusal to submit to a chemical test is a question of law reviewable by
this Court. McKenna v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Diver Licensing, 72 A.3d 294,
298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
       Licensees need not “instantaneously” submit to a chemical test upon request.
Nardone v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 748 (Pa.
2015). “In determining whether a licensee had a sufficient opportunity to submit to
testing, the number of passing minutes between the time the officer reads the DL-26
[f]orm and the deemed refusal is irrelevant, so long as a licensee’s conduct evidences
a refusal.” Lukach v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth.,
No. 1456 C.D. 2017, filed June 4, 2018), slip op. at 7 (internal quotations and citation
omitted);2 see Nardone, 130 A.3d at 751 (holding that the licensee had a meaningful
opportunity to submit but refused a chemical test when the licensee requested an
alternative form of testing after the officer read the DL-26 form, even though the

       2
          Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 126(b)(1)-(2), Pa.R.A.P.
126(b)(1)-(2), and Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §
69.414(a), an unreported opinion of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for its persuasive
value.

                                                6
exchange only lasted 60 seconds); Moody v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver
Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 864 C.D. 2021, filed May 9, 2023), slip op. at 8 (holding
the licensee had a meaningful opportunity to submit but refused a chemical test when
over the course of five to six minutes the officer read the DL-26 form twice, the
licensee asked no questions, and the licensee remained silent); Rickards v. Dep’t of
Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1225 C.D. 2019, filed May
26, 2020), slip op. at 17 (holding that the licensee had a meaningful opportunity to
submit to a chemical test when the licensee read the first half of the DL-26 form
silently for 20 seconds, read the latter half out loud, and remained silent when the
police officer asked multiple times if the licensee would submit); Broadbelt, 903
A.2d at 641 (holding that the licensee had a meaningful opportunity to submit to
chemical testing and ultimately refused by silence when he had 12 minutes to
consider the DL-26 form warnings, never indicated that he did not understand the
warnings, and there were no distractions impeding the licensee from comprehending
the warnings). “[P]olice officers are not required to spend time either cajoling a[
licensee] or waiting for [them] to change [their] mind.” Grogg, 79 A.3d at 719.
Rather, police officers are required to inform licensees of the consequences of a
refusal. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 555 A.2d 873, 877
(Pa. 1989).
      Here, Licensee was silent for 30 seconds after Officer Homyak read the DL-
26 form, which states that if Licensee remained silent, his silence would be deemed
a refusal. (Department’s Exhibit 1, Item #2.) Whether a licensee refused a chemical
test is a question of law. The trial court does find the facts, but, contrary to
Licensee’s assertions, this Court is not bound to confirm the legal conclusion as
reached by the trial court based on those facts if the trial court’s application of the

                                          7
law was in error. All that was required of Officer Homyak was that he read the DL-
26 form, which informed Licensee of the consequences for refusal, and give
Licensee a meaningful opportunity to submit. O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877; Grogg,
79 A.3d at 718. Officer Homyak waited at least 30 seconds after reading Licensee
the DL-26 form before deeming Licensee’s silence as a refusal; this was a
meaningful opportunity to submit.3 Officer Homyak was not required to cajole
Licensee to submit or wait for Licensee to change his mind. Grogg, 79 A.3d at 719.

       3
           We recognize the trial court’s assertion that to hold 30 seconds constitutes a meaningful
opportunity to submit “strays dangerously close to holding that a licensee must instantaneously
submit to chemical testing upon request.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6.) However, 30 seconds to respond
to the single question, whether Licensee would submit to a blood test or face a suspension of his
operating privilege should he refuse, particularly when Licensee had no right to confer with an
attorney or anyone else, was a reasonable opportunity under these circumstances. While 30
seconds may sound like a short amount of time, it has been considered sufficient to enable someone
to identify a defendant and to respond in knock-and-announce situations. For instance, in State v.
Portillo, (N.J. Super., No. A–0679–16T3, filed June 11, 2018), 2018 WL 2924234, on appeal from
a conviction for armed robbery, the defense argued the prosecutor’s statement in her closing
argument that “[30] seconds was sufficient time to enable the victims to identify [the defendant]”
was improper. Portillo, 2018 WL 2924234, at *4. In the prosecutor’s closing argument, to
illustrate the passage of time, the prosecutor “stood silent while she allowed [30] seconds to elapse”
and then stated to the jury that “‘[t]he [30] seconds is up. . . . [30] seconds is more than enough
time to be able to look at somebody, stare at them . . . remember their face an hour later, [and]
remember their face [5] years later.’” Id. On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey held “[t]he
prosecutor did not mislead the jury, nor did the prosecutor purport to instruct the jury. . . . [There
was] nothing improper in the prosecutor’s argument.” Id. See also People v. Calles, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 673, 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (“By comparing the passage of 30 seconds on a watch with
the evidence of the events, the jury applied a natural phenomenon—the passage of time.”).
Furthermore, in the knock-and-announce context, a 20-second wait after announcing one’s
presence and requesting entry during execution of a search warrant in an alleged bookmaking
operation was held to be reasonable to conclude admittance was being denied. See People v. Elder,
134 Cal. Rptr. 212, 216 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (“Twenty seconds is not a flash of time allowing for
no response at all.”).
         Here, Officer Homyak and Licensee sat in silence for at least 30 seconds after Officer
Homyak read Licensee the DL-26 form. Considering the duration of 30 seconds, this was enough
time for Licensee to comprehend the DL-26 form Officer Homyak had just read to him and
respond.

                                                  8
Licensee did not ask any questions or otherwise indicate that he would take a test
during his period of silence, and Officer Homyak had no duty to confirm that
Licensee’s silence was a refusal. If we were to accept the trial court’s conclusion
that Officer Homyak needed to do, or wait for Licensee to do, “something else”
before deeming Licensee’s silence as a refusal, Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6, silence would
never be able to be considered a refusal, which goes against our well-settled
caselaw.4 Renwick, 669 A.2d at 936 n.2; Grogg, 79 A.3d at 719; Sitoski, 11 A.3d at
21-22; Broadbelt, 903 A.2d at 641.
       Under the circumstances, as found by the trial court, Licensee refused
chemical testing. Licensee first refused a chemical test either while or before Officer
Homyak read the DL-26 form and otherwise acted belligerent leading up to that
moment. After Officer Homyak read the DL-26 form specifically warning Licensee

       4
           The dissent explains that in cases where we have found silence to constitute a refusal,
“the arresting officer made multiple readings of the DL-26 form over periods of time ranging from
6 to 12 minutes and the licensee’s conduct physically demonstrated a refusal[,]” which did not
occur here. Meyers v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 33 C.D.
2022, filed March 20, 2024), slip op. at 5 (Leavitt, S.J., dissenting). The dissent also cites
McDonald v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 708 A.2d 154 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1998), for the proposition that a meaningful opportunity to submit includes an
opportunity to ask questions. Id. In McDonald, the Court concluded “when a licensee delays a
decision because of confusion as to his or her rights and then assents to submit to a chemical test
when those rights are made clear[,]” this is not a refusal. 708 A.2d at 156 (citation omitted). All
that is required of an officer is that he read the DL-26 form to a licensee and give the licensee a
meaningful opportunity to submit. O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 877; Grogg, 79 A.3d at 718. Officer
Homyak read the entire DL-26 form to Licensee and waited at least 30 seconds for Licensee to
answer the single question posed, give any indication of consent, or ask questions. While Licensee
did not turn his head away, close his eyes, request his handcuffs be removed, or swear in this time,
like the licensees in the cases upon which the dissent relies, Licensee also did not exhibit any
behavior that would indicate consent, nor did he ask any questions about his rights; Licensee only
sat in silence after being read the DL-26 form, which specifically warns that silence will constitute
refusal. (See Department’s Exhibit 1, Item #2.) It is well settled that “anything less than an
unqualified, unequivocal assent to submit to chemical testing constitutes a refusal to consent
thereto.” Factor, 199 A.3d at 497 (emphasis added).

                                                 9
about the consequences of remaining silent, Licensee remained silent. Although the
trial court found it unclear whether Licensee submitted immediately after Officer
Homyak told Licensee that his silence was a refusal or while Officer Homyak was
completing the paperwork for a refusal, in either situation the trial court found
Licensee said he would provide a blood sample after Officer Homyak deemed
Licensee’s silence a refusal. (FOF ¶ 9.) “[O]nce a licensee refuses chemical
testing, the refusal cannot be vitiated by a later assent.” Vora v. Dep’t of Transp.,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 79 A.3d 743, 747 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).
      As such, we conclude that under these circumstances, and consistent with our
precedent, the trial court erred in finding that the Department did not meet its burden
of proof. Further, Licensee did not present any evidence to show that his refusal was
not knowing or conscious. Therefore, we reverse.

                                        __________________________________________
                                        RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

                                          10
       IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven J. Meyers                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                   v.                   :   No. 33 C.D. 2022
                                        :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
Department of Transportation,           :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,             :
                         Appellant      :

                                     ORDER

      NOW, March 20, 2024, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria
County, entered in the above-captioned matter, is REVERSED.

                                      __________________________________________
                                      RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Steven J. Meyers                              :
                                              :
               v.                             :       No. 33 C.D. 2022
                                              :       Submitted: February 3, 2023
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,                 :
Department of Transportation,                 :
Bureau of Driver Licensing,                   :
                  Appellant                   :

BEFORE:        HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
               HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
               HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

DISSENTING OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                                       FILED: March 20, 2024

               The Implied Consent Law1 requires that every licensee arrested for
driving under the influence be warned of the consequence of refusing a blood alcohol
test. Specifically, the arresting officer must use the language on the prescribed DL-
26 form2 to warn the licensee that a refusal to consent to a blood test can result in a
license revocation. The officer must then give the licensee a meaningful opportunity
to consider the warning and decide whether to consent. Here, the Court of Common
Pleas of Cambria County (trial court) found that the arresting officer acted
precipitously in deeming Steven J. Meyers’ (Licensee) failure to speak within 30

1
  Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1547(b), is commonly known as the Implied
Consent Law.
2
  The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) has promulgated the DL-26 form,
which sets forth the prescribed language of the warning to be given to motorists arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol (DUI) about the penalties for refusing chemical tests. Police use
the DL-26 form to comply with the requirements of Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code during DUI
arrests.
seconds of the first reading of the warning as a refusal. I would affirm the trial court
and, thus, respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court order.
             In these cases, PennDOT has the burden of showing that the licensee
was offered a meaningful opportunity to comply with the police officer’s request that
he submit to a chemical test of his blood. Conrad v. Department of Transportation,
598 A.2d 336, 343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991); Nardone v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 130 A.3d 738, 748 (Pa. 2015) (noting that PennDOT
must prove the licensee was given a “meaningful opportunity” or a “reasonable and
sufficient opportunity” to comply with chemical testing requirement). The licensee
need not “instantaneously” express a willingness to submit to a chemical test upon
request. Nardone, 130 A.3d at 748. On the other hand, “police officers are not
required to spend time either cajoling [a licensee] or waiting for [a licensee] to
change [his] mind.” Grogg v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 79 A.3d 715, 719 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “The question of whether a
licensee refuses to submit to a chemical test is a legal one, based on the facts found
by the trial court.” Nardone, 130 A.3d at 748.
             A refusal to submit to a blood test need not be expressly stated by the
licensee; rather, the refusal can be inferred from a licensee’s overall conduct. In
Walkden v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 103 A.3d
432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), the state trooper twice read the required warning to the
licensee, who responded with a request to have his handcuffs removed. We affirmed
the trial court’s conclusion that the licensee’s conduct constituted a refusal, noting
that “‘anything substantially less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent’ to submit
to testing constitutes a refusal to do so.” Id. at 440 (quoting Department of
Transportation v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. 1996)). In Renwick, 669 A.2d

                                        MHL-2
934, our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that by responding to
the arresting officer’s repeated readings of the consent form by turning her head
away, closing her eyes, and refusing to sign the DL-26 form, the licensee
demonstrated a refusal. On the other hand, we have affirmed the trial court’s
conclusion that a licensee’s response to a reading of the DL-26 form with expletives
did not constitute a refusal. Solomon v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing, 966 A.2d 640, 643 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
               Silence that follows the reading of the DL-26 form can constitute
overall conduct that expresses a refusal.                In Broadbelt v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 903 A.2d 636, 639-40 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2006), the licensee was read the implied consent form twice and read the form to
himself; his silence over the span of 12 minutes was deemed a refusal. The same
conclusion was reached in Moody v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of
Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 864 C.D. 2021, filed May 9, 2023)
(unreported),3 where the licensee was twice read the implied consent form over a 5-
to 6-minute period; stated that she did not understand the warning; did not respond
when asked which part of the warning she did not understand; and remained silent
when requested again to take the test. Likewise, in Rickards v. Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1225 C.D. 2019, filed
May 26, 2020) (unreported), the licensee’s silence was deemed a refusal after she
was read the DL-26 form; read the form herself; and remained silent while the police
officer repeatedly asked if she would submit to a chemical test.

3
 An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for its
persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,
210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
                                            MHL-3
             Here, Licensee did not turn his head away or close his eyes after Officer
Homyak read the DL-26 form; did not request to have his handcuffs removed; and
did not swear. After 30 seconds, before Licensee said anything, Officer Homyak
informed Licensee that his silence would be considered a refusal.           Licensee
immediately stated that he would provide a blood sample. While refusal to submit
to testing cannot be vitiated by a later assent, Vora v. Department of Transportation,
Bureau of Driver Licensing, 79 A.3d 743, 747 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013), Licensee’s only
statement was that he would comply with the request for chemical testing.
             Here, the trial court found that Licensee “made no oral statements or
took no physical action confirming his refusal after the DL-26 form had been read
in its entirety.” Trial Court Op. at 5. The trial court found Licensee’s 30 seconds of
silence to be “ambiguous,” noting that he may “have been thinking about whether to
comply or [] to refuse[.]” Id. Further, Licensee’s only statement after hearing the
reading was one of assent. On these facts, the trial court concluded that Licensee
did not refuse the request for chemical testing. It reasoned:
             To hold that approximately 30 seconds of silence following the
             reading of the DL-26 form - absent something else occurring
             after the form has been read - strays dangerously close to holding
             that a licensee must instantaneously submit to chemical testing
             upon request.

Trial Court Op. at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
             The majority construes the trial court’s reasoning to mean “that Officer
Homyak needed to do, or wait for Licensee to do, ‘something else’ before deeming
Licensee’s silence as a refusal.” Meyers v. Department of Transportation, Bureau
of Driver Licensing (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 33 C.D. 2022, filed March 20, 2024), slip op.
at 9. I disagree. The arresting officer need only respond with the patience required
to give the licensee a “meaningful opportunity” to assent to the chemical test.

                                       MHL-4
Nardone, 130 A.3d 748. A meaningful opportunity includes the ability to ask
questions. See, e.g., McDonald v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver
Licensing, 708 A.2d 154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). A meaningful opportunity also
includes the ability to ponder.
               Here, the trial court found, as fact, that Licensee’s 30 seconds of silence
was “ambiguous” at best and did not express a refusal. Trial Court Op. at 5. This
factual finding should not be disturbed on appellate review. Middletown Township
v. Lands of Stone, 939 A.2d 331, 338 (Pa. 2007). The precedent has uniformly
deferred to the trial court’s determination on whether a licensee’s silence has
expressed a refusal. In those cases, the arresting officer made multiple readings of
the DL-26 form over periods of time ranging from 6 to 12 minutes, and the licensee’s
conduct physically demonstrated a refusal. Broadbelt, 903 A.2d 636; Moody (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 864 C.D. 2021, filed May 9, 2023); Rickards (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1225
C.D. 2019, filed May 26, 2020).
               The majority creates, in essence, a “30-second rule” that will require a
licensee to give assent within 30 seconds after hearing the warning. Such a rigid
rule departs from the well-established principle that these cases require a fact-
intensive inquiry into whether the licensee’s “overall conduct demonstrates an
unwillingness to assent to an officer’s request for chemical testing.” Nardone, 130
A.3d at 749 (emphasis added).4 A 30-second rule sharply limits the scope of the
inquiry into a licensee’s overall conduct.

4
  In McDonald, for example, the trial court credited a licensee’s testimony that she was confused
by the consent form; that she was attempting to sign the consent form when it was taken away by
the officer; and that she was willing to provide a blood sample. We affirmed the trial court’s
decision that it is not a refusal when a licensee delays a decision because of confusion as to her
rights but then assents to a chemical test once those rights are clarified. McDonald, 708 A.2d at
156.

                                            MHL-5
             Our Supreme Court has explained that a licensee need not
“instantaneously” submit to a chemical test upon request. Nardone, 130 A.3d at 748.
The trial court concluded that requiring a licensee to consent within 30 seconds to a
single reading of the warning comes “dangerously close to holding that a licensee
must instantaneously submit[.]” Trial Court Op. at 6. I agree.
             Even where a licensee has declared a refusal to take a blood test, the
officer must read the warning and give the licensee a reasonable time to change his
mind. I would affirm based on the basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the trial
court.

                         _____________________________________________
                         MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

                                      MHL-6