Court Opinion

ID: 9860997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:38:55.895207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:58.812775
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent both as to standing and the propriety of the search. The trial judge granted the motion to suppress, finding a failure to show probable cause. The State in its motion for reconsideration requested that the trial court deny the motion to suppress on the basis of Terry. As to the facts, the majority refers to testimony of defendant Sparks and the detective’s testimony as to permission to search. The record shows Detective Robert Steil asked defendant whose car it was and defendant Sparks answered that it was not his car, it was his girlfriend’s. When Steil asked defendant if he could search the vehicle, defendant responded that it was not his car. The Secretary of State certificate shows Nunn to be the owner of the vehicle. Defendant Sparks also testified that the car was not his. Concerning any belongings of defendant Sparks in the car, he did not testify that he had clothes in the car. He was asked whether Nunn had clothes in the car and he answered “yes.” I suggest that the record does not show that defendant testified that any of the items in Nunn’s car belonged to him, nor did he testify he had clothes for the trip. Defendants filed the motion to suppress and had the burden to adduce evidence sufficient to sustain the motion. Since the State questioned defendant Sparks’ standing, his burden included adducing sufficient evidence to demonstrate standing. Since our review is de novo, defendant’s evidence must be sufficient to require such a ruling as a matter of law. Defendant lacked standing to challenge the search of Nunn’s vehicle. A review of Rakas and Johnson supports a finding of lack of standing. In McCoy, this court found that the defendant lacked standing in circumstances more favorable to defendant McCoy than the facts shown here. Aside from the standing issue, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence found in Nunn’s car. No issue is raised by the defendants that the detention was unreasonable as to time. The testimony suggests the canine units were available to be used here before the stop. The evidence shows the dogs alerted to the presence of drugs and the trunk was not opened until after the canine alert. The canine search is not a search for fourth amendment purposes. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 121, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-45 (1983). The informant’s information was detailed and, in my view, more extensive than the information provided in White. I agree with the majority wherein it states: “In this case, the informant told police defendants’ names, race, and approximate ages; from where they were traveling; the make, model, color, and license plate of their car; the date they would be traveling to Springfield; and their approximate arrival time. Furthermore, unlike the anonymous informant in White, Detective Pennington knew the informant here from another unrelated case. In addition, simply by observation, police corroborated the make, model, color, and license plate of the car- prior to initiating the stop, as well as the date and approximate time defendants were traveling through Springfield.” 315 Ill. App. 3d at 793. The record does not show any request by the defendants to reveal the name of the informant. The record does suggest the defendants did know the informant. The Supreme Court in White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 309, 110 S. Ct. at 2416, stated: “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” As the State argues, White stressed the importance of the informant’s knowledge of the defendant’s future actions. Here, the actions of defendants followed the information given by the informant. The information provided was detailed. This information, combined with the corroboration of the identified people arriving in Springfield at the time suggested and the canine alert showing the presence of drugs, was reliable and a sound basis for the police action. J.L. also supports a finding that the search was proper. In J.L., the Supreme Court stated: “We speak in today’s decision only of cases in which the officer’s authority to make the initial stop is at issue. In that context, we hold that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.” J.L., 529 U.S. at 274, 146 L. Ed. 2d at 262, 120 S. Ct. at 1380. The order of the trial court granting defendants’ motion to suppress should be reversed.