Court Opinion

ID: 9847037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:52:43.992538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:59.392819
License: Public Domain

KEETON, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I consider the above majority opinion in direct conflict with Art. V, Sec. 9, of the Constitution, and Sec. 72-608 I.C.; and Walters v. City of Weiser, 66 Idaho 615, 164 P.2d 593.
The case basically presents for determination the question: Is the death of a workman, who is afflicted with coronary insufficiency and arteriosclerotic muscular disease, doing the customary work for which he was employed, and who was advised by doctors who examined him three days before his death that his condition was serious, that he should not work for a period of time, continues on the job, suffers a heart attack which results in his death, compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, because of such alleged accident ?
A workman, injured by accident, Sec. 72-201 I.C., and in case of his death resulting from accident, his widow or other dependents, Sec. 72-301 I.C., is entitled to compensation as specified in the act. Sec. 72-201 I.C. defines an accident as:
“ ‘Accident,’ as used in this law, means an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be definitely located as to time when and place *25where it occurred, causing an injury, as defined in this law.”
and the terms “injury” and “personal injury”, as
“The terms ‘injury’ and ‘personal injury,’ as the same are used in this law, shall be construed to include only an injury caused by an accident, as above defined, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body. The said terms shall in no case be construed to include an occupational disease in any form and only such nonoccupational diseases as result directly from an injury.”
The evidence discloses that deceased had a. diseased condition of the heart, arteriosclerotic muscular disease; that on the day ■of the heart attack and death, he was, before the attack, performing his customary ■duties. There was no heavy strain or lifting. Any type of muscular activity would likely bring about exactly what happened. The death, under the circumstances, cannot be said to be unexpected or accidental, and ■could, and probably would have occurred regardless of the work.
The holding that deceased met death due to an accident is to extend the Workmen’s Compensation Law far beyond its terms. We should not attempt to escape from the legislative declaration limiting liability of the employer to accidental death, or injury '.by accident.
This Court has held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not meant or intended as life or health insurance. Wade v. Pacific Coast Elevator Co., 64 Idaho 176, 129 P.2d 894; Swan v. Williamson, 74 Idaho 32, 257 P.2d 552.
In Walters v. City of Weiser, supra, an electrician who had a weak heart, continued to work, contracted influenza, attended a firemen’s meeting and died of rheumatic heart disease complicated by influenza. Such death was held not to be accidental within the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
In Swan v. Williamson, supra, the workman was found dead at his place of employment. This Court held that the suddenness of the death did not meet the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act in the definition of what constituted an accident.
In the situation being considered the workman was stricken with a heart attack while sitting in a pickup motor vehicle near the place of his employment. He died shortly thereafter. The Board found that claimant had failed to prove an accidental injury or a causal connection between the death and the employment. This holding is correct.
Death is a termination of life. It may be caused by an accident but death on the job, or shortly after leaving the place of employment, without something more, is *26not an accident within the terms of the Act.
Further, if the evidence were to be viewed in the light most favorable to the claimant, there is still no liability of the employer, However, there is a conflict in the evidence, and the Board’s decision on such conflict should be final.
While it might be possible or probable that death resulted from overexertion, the Board’s conclusion that such is not the case is binding on this Court. The finding of the Board should not be disturbed where there is any competent, substantial evidence to sustain such finding. The order appealed from should be affirmed.