Court Opinion

ID: 9647532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:39:09.150058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:49.453466
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge COHN JUBELIRER.
I concur with the majority that subsections (1) and (2) of Section 9-629 of The Philadelphia Code (Code) as modified by Ordinance No. 060345-AAA (Ordinance), are not preempted. However, because I would also find that subsections (5)(a)(.l) and (.4) of Section 9-622 of the Code as modified by the Ordinance, are not preempted, I must dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion that holds otherwise. In sum, The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Act)1 does not specifically identify any item as conclusively being “drug paraphernalia” and, therefore, does not identify any item as necessarily being impermissible to sell. Thus, the scienter provision of the Act is necessary to protect retailers and others who, given the Act’s lack of precision, may genuinely be unsure as to whether an item they are selling is contraband. In contrast, the Ordinance specifically identified items that may not be sold, thus leaving no doubt as to whether the items were contraband. The explicit nature of the prohibition obviates the need for scien-ter. The City of Philadelphia’s (City) exercise of authority is consistent with the authority delegated by the General Assembly in the Act itself, and reserved by the City by its status as a home rule community.
The present case involves Section 41.1 of the Act.2 The relevant language of the Act provides that “[njothing in this act relating to drug paraphernalia shall be deemed to supersede or invalidate any consistent local ordinance, including zoning and nuisance ordinances, relating to the possession, sale or use of drug paraphernalia.” 35 P.S. § 780-141.1 (emphasis added). The dispute is whether Section 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and (.4) of the Code is “consistent” with the Act.
The majority reasons that because Section 13(a)(33) of the Act, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33), imposes a scienter requirement and that subsections (a)(.l) and (.4) of Section 9-622 of the Code do not, these subsections are inconsistent with the Act. Section 13(a)(33) reads in relevant part: “(a) [t]he following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited:_ (33) The delivery of, possession with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know” that the item will be used to “manufacture ... produce ... prepare ... pack, repack ... contain, *1214conceal ... ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance....” 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33) (emphasis added). The majority contrasts this language from the Act with the language from Section 9-622(5) of the Code, which does not include a scienter provision. This section of the Code, instead, reads “[i]t shall be unlawful for any retail business to sell or furnish by gift, purchase or other means any of the following.... ” Section 9-622(5) of the Code. The majority concludes that the Act “exempts persons from liability who do not know, or cannot reasonably know, that the tobacco item being sold would be used by the buyer to ingest illegal drugs” and that the Ordinance’s lack of a similar provision is an irreconcilable conflict between the Ordinance and Act. Holt’s Cigar Company, Inc v. City of Philadelphia, 952 A.2d 1199, 1206 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), op. at 1205-06.
To fully appreciate the scienter requirement set forth in Section 13(a)(33) of the Act, one must examine Section 2 of the Act, 35 P.S.V§ 780-102. Section 2 is a definitional section that defines many terms, including “drug paraphernalia.” As noted by the majority, the definition • for “drug paraphernalia” has two components. The first component is an extensive list of items that the statute identifies as sometimes being “drug paraphernalia.”3 The list contains many items that may have innocuous uses, such as “[bjlenders, bowls, containers, [and] spoons.... ” 35 P.S. § 780-102. The list in the first component of the “drug paraphernalia” definition is not meant to be exhaustive. The second component of the definition is a delineation of criteria to consider when evaluating, under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, if an item listed in the first component of the definition, or any other item that is not listed, constitutes “drug paraphernalia.” This list of criteria is, itself, not exhaustive, as the statutory language provides that “all other logically relevant factors” should also be considered. 35 P.S. § 780-102. Therefore, due to this second component, the evaluation of whether a given item is “drug paraphernalia” encompasses the totality of the circumstances.
The majority explicitly concludes that it is for a court to evaluate these factors and make this determination. Holt, 952 A.2d at 1205. (“In short, whether specifically listed in Section 2 or not, an item is determined unlawful drug paraphernalia only after the court applies the ... 15-part test.”) If only a court may determine whether a given item is drug paraphernalia, it follows that such analysis may only be done on a case by case basis. Therefore, under such review, particularly when dealing with items that may have an innocuous use," the state of mind of the seller of the object is important. Indeed, one of the factors of the second component of the “drug paraphernalia” definition mentions for consideration the “direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to persons who he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of this act....” 35 P.S. § 780-102 (emphasis added).
Although the statutory language does indicate that these factors should be weighed by a court, the language also indicates that the factors should be considered by “other authorities].” 35 P.S. § 780-102 (“In determining whether an object is *1215drug paraphernalia, a court or other authority should consider, in addition to all other logically relevant factors-”). The phrase “other authority” is not defined by the Act. I believe a reasonable inference from this language is that the phrase would include municipal authorities, that is local legislative bodies, such as the City Council of Philadelphia. First, the qualifier “any” as to authority seems purposely broad so as to be inclusive of the variety of governmental bodies that could, in one way or another, deal with issues addressed by the Act. Second, as discussed earlier, Section 41.1 of the Act authorizes local ordinances that relate “to the possession, sale or use of drug paraphernalia.”4 Local ordinances are necessarily enacted by “municipal authorities,” which are defined as “[t]he body or board authorized by law to enact ordinances or adopt resolutions for the particular municipality.” Municipality Authorities Act,5 53 Pa.C.S. § 5602. From this it can be reasonably inferred that “other authority” was meant to include local legislative bodies. Thus, the Act directs both courts and local legislative bodies to utilize these factors when regulating drug paraphernalia. While a court’s vision in deciding a case is limited to the facts of the particular case before it, a legislative body’s focus in enacting legislation necessarily takes on a broader perspective, requiring the legislative body to evaluate the totality of the circumstances within the community as a whole.
In the present case, the City, an “authority,” evaluated the totality of the circumstances within its community. Philadelphia’s City Council’s Committee on Licenses and Inspections conducted a hearing (City Hr’g Tr.) regarding the Ordinance prior to its passage. At this hearing, extensive testimony was presented that described the manner in which these items were being used for illicit purposes, the extent of this illicit use, and the common knowledge within the community of how these items were being used. The testimony also addressed the manner in which various corner stores were distributing these items. The testimony indicated that the items in these stores were directed toward and, in fact, were used in conjunction with marijuana by youth, beginning with preteen children. The whole of the testimony clearly identified a problem within the City that was directly linked with these particular items from the particular locations targeted by the Ordinance.6
*1217(.4) of Section 9-622(5)(a) of the Code are clear, and explicitly identify particular items that may not be sold by retailers. This stands in contrast to the Act’s articulation of what constitutes “drug paraphernalia” which, as previously discussed, provided only examples of items that sometimes are drug paraphernalia and, thus, are only sometimes illegal. In such an instance a scienter element is essential; the determination of whether an item is drug paraphernalia takes place after the sale, at the time of trial. In contrast, subsections (.1) and (.4) obviate the need for a scienter requirement by specifically identifying, upfront, prior to any sale, what items may not be sold.7
Thus, while the Ordinance does not contain a scienter requirement on its face, the clear delineation of what, for purposes of the Ordinance, constitutes “drug paraphernalia” obviates the need for such a requirement. As the Act affords authorities, such as the City, the opportunity to consider these factors and to legislate in furtherance of the Act’s goals, I find the City’s actions, and the Ordinance itself, to be consistent with the Act.
Additionally, to the extent there was any ambiguity as to whether the Ordinance conflicted with the Act, I believe the deferential standard set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Nutter v. Dougherty, 595 Pa. 340, 938 A.2d 401 (2007), requires this Court to, in the facts and circumstances of this case, defer to the City’s exercise of municipal powers.
Our Supreme Court, in Nutter, recognized that the local actions of a home rule community are still subject to traditional preemption notions. However, the Court was very clear in discussing these preemption principles and their relationship to local action by stating that “[w]e cannot stress enough that a home rule municipality’s exercise of its local authority is not lightly intruded upon, with ambiguities regarding such authority resolved in favor of the municipality.” Id. at 361-62, 938 A.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
In Nutter, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed our Court’s conclusion that a Philadelphia ordinance that limited campaign contributions to candidates for municipal office was not in conflict with state law, specifically the Election Code,8 and Pennsylvania constitutional language stating that “[a]ll laws regulating the holding of elections by the citizens, or for the registration of electors, shall be uniform throughout the State_” Pa. Const. Art. VII, § 6. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court went into a lengthy discussion relying heavily on Department of Licenses and Inspections, Board of License and Inspection Review v. Weber, 394 Pa. 466, 147 A.2d 326 (1959), a case that, in the present appeal, the City also relies on:
Weber presented the question whether the state Beauty Culture Act precluded Philadelphia from passing additional li-censure requirements for beauticians in its municipal Health Code. There as here, the act in question itself was silent as to local supplementation, and that omission, appellee argued, was tantamount to an affirmation of the General Assembly’s preemptive intent. We rejected this argument, relying in part on *1218the Commonwealth’s parallel Barber Act. The two acts, we noted, had initially been passed in tandem in 1931, at which time neither statute addressed local supplementation. Soon after the Barber Act’s passage, however, a trial court deemed it to have preemptive effect over local regulation in that field. The General Assembly, in 1935, responded by revising the Barber Act to specifically provide that “[n]othing contained in this act, or the act to which this [is] an amendment, shall be construed as prohibiting any municipality from adopting appropriate ordinances, not inconsistent with ... this act....” 147 A.2d at 328. We found this language probative of the legislature’s original intent, in passing the parallel 1931 acts, to leave the fields of barbering and cosmetology open to local supplementation.
While this ruling to some extent sounded in the peculiar legislative histories of the two parallel acts, this Court nonetheless spoke to the broader issues of preemption implicated in the case. Specifically, the Court noted that:
The Legislature could not be expected to itemize the last towel and drop of antiseptic which, for sanitation and cleanliness, would be required in every barber and beauty shop in the State. The size of the municipality, congestion of population, geography of locale, weather and climate prevailing in the area could have a very decided bearing on the extent of the meticulousness of the sanitary supervision required in any particular group of shops. It would not be unnatural to assume that regulations could be stricter and more rigid in large cities where the turnover in clientele would be comparatively rapid as against a village or small rural center where the customers are known by their first name, occupation and frequency of visit.
Id. at 329. Furthermore, we quoted our Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association[9] decision to the effect that “[a] municipal corporation ... may make such additional regulations in aid and furtherance of the purposes of the general law.” Id. at 330 (quoting W. Penna. Rest. Ass’n., 77 A.2d at 620).
Nutter, 595 Pa. at 364, 938 A.2d at 415 (footnote and second bracketed alteration added).
The City’s argument in this case is quite consistent with the confines established by the Supreme Court in Weber, as discussed in Nutter. The City argues that:
[H]ere, a large urban area like Philadelphia has a greater need than most other municipalities in the Commonwealth for stricter, more rigid regulation of items commonly used for illegal drug use. Philadelphia has an unfortunate proximity to illegal drugs. Its international airport, major shopping terminals and proximity to major interstates and rail systems facilitate drug trafficking, and major New York drug trafficking organizations use Philadelphia as a shipment point for illegal drugs.... Further, as the hearing testimony established, the specific problem targeted in this case is inexpensive cigars sold by convenience and drug stores that are not commonly known as purveyors of primarily drug paraphernalia.... Clearly such a problem is exacerbated in a large urban area like Philadelphia, where Wawa stores and Sunoco mini-mart type shops proliferate, as compared to the bucolic pas*1219tures of Adams County, for example. It therefore furthers the purpose of the ... Act, not frustrates it, when the City enacts legislation in the field of Drug Paraphernalia that targets a specific problem within that field, blunt cigars, and deals with it more specifically and strictly than does the Act itself.
(City’s Br. at 18-19.) Given Nutter and its explicit direction, I would find this argument adequately supports the City’s exercise of its home rule municipality powers.
Accordingly, because I believe that the City appropriately and consistently legislated in furtherance of the Act’s provisions, I would reverse the trial court’s order as to Section 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and (.4). Additionally, even if there is ambiguity on the point of whether or not the Ordinance is preempted, per Nutter, I would find in favor of the City. For these reasons I must concur in part, and dissent in part from the majority’s thoughtful opinion.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. The Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, added by Section 4 of the Act of December 4, 1980, P.L. 1093, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101-780-144.

. Added by Section 4 of the Act of December 4, 1980, P.L. 1093, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-141.1

. See Holt, 952 A.2d at 1204 n. 12, for the extensive list of items identified as “drug paraphernalia.”

. Arguably, Section 41.1 not only allows municipalities to do so, but tacitly encourages them to do so.

. 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5601-23.

. Examples of the testimony presented follow.
A thirty-six year veteran detective, assigned to the Philadelphia District Attorney’s office, who also serves as the Director of an anti-drug group, "Not in My Neighborhood” offered the following testimony:
The purpose of our group is to fight against illegal sale and use of drugs and drug paraphernalia in our City. The way we are doing this is, we have a narcotics tip sheet that we get out to the community where people fill out where there’s drug comers, drug houses and anywhere there’s illegal drugs going on....
The other way we’re fighting against drug paraphernalia is, we’re going after stores that are selling it in our neighborhoods, near our schools and around our kids....
[Detective lists multiple examples of convenience stores that sell over twenty types of blunts].
... These blunts are used by kids to smoke marijuana.
Blunts come in many popular flavors. They’ve been made available in more than 30 different ones, including banana, chocolate, créme de mint, watermelon, blueberry, sour apple, vanilla and so on. After these flavored blunts are purchased, they’re cut open, the tobacco is removed and replaced with marijuana and smoked. Sometimes the blunts are laced with additives such as cocaine, LSD and PCP. A marijuana-filled
*1216The prohibition of subsections (.1) and
blunt is as strong as four joints. Flavored blunts are mainly used by teenagers to smoke marijuana.
There’s also a hollow blunt, and that is just a wrap with no tobacco in it, and that’s sold for no other reason than to smoke marijuana. On the wrapper, it says, "Number one blunt in the world.”
We also found that flavored blunts are being sold in stores like [various drug store chains], gas stations, Chinese food stores, delis, beer distributors, malls, barbers shops, hairdressers and cigar shops.
(City Hr'g Tr. at 21-24.)
The medical director for Gaudenzia, Incorporated, a drug and alcohol treatment organization, testified from his experience dealing with children who have presented for drug addiction treatment, that marijuana was the "main gateway drug that is an entryway into a life of drug addiction” and that the marijuana use starts "around 7 or 8 years old smoking blunts, using drugs.” (City Hr’g Tr. at 33.) He noted that these items were "available so readily on our neighborhood comers to minors, adolescents. People have no idea what they're getting into.” (City Hr’g Tr. at 33.) He also testified that “I think it really sends a wrong message when you can get a blunt, a pack of cigarette papers along with your Now and Laters and Lemonheads and pretzel sticks.” (City H’rg Tr. at 40.)
Additionally, an Associate Professor of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine testified as to "the ravages, the ravages in [his] patient population" caused by long-term drug use that starts with "young people” using marijuana. He discussed the subsequent "incidence of depression, suicide and a lot of other medical problems that we all end up paying for.” (City Hr’g Tr. at 35.)
A local attorney testified that “[ejfforts to stop the grip of violent drug trade Eire dealt a serious blow when the use of drugs, especially the gateway drug of marijuana, are given tacit approval. Any drug dealer ... [need] only walk down [to] the store to get the tools necessary [for their trade because] these stores do not prohibit the sales of crack pipes, blunts and cigarette papers that are ostensibly used for tobacco[, but are instead] used to facilitate the drug trade.” (City H’rg Tr. at 47.) He also testified that "a clear message” is being sent to kids "that drugs are permissible and sanctioned” because the "tools of the drug trade are sold in the same places where mom buys milk, eggs and gets gas.... ” (City Hr'g Tr. at 49.) He also testified that people who do actually smoke blunts with tobacco and who do roll their own cigarettes can still acquire these materials through a tobacco specialty store. (City Hr'g Tr. at 50.)
A former Assistant District Attorney from the Philadelphia District Attorney's Public Nuisance Task Force testified about various sting operations in Philadelphia clubs, in which mounds of tobacco were found on the floor, having been hollowed out from blunts, to enable marijuana to be placed inside. He also testified that undercover agents on the scene saw people carving out the tobacco from the blunts and filling the carved-out blunts with marijuana.
The founder and executive director of Mothers in Charge, a local citizen action group composed of "mothers, grandmothers, aunts and sisters, many of whom have lost our sons and daughters to violence [that often] goes hand in hand with ... drug use,” testified as to her concerns that blunts, with their varying aromas and colors, were being marketed to children. (City H’rg Tr. at 62-63.) She noted that “kids begin smoking young because they think it’s cool with the different flavors and aromas and colors. And before that, before long, it leads to other types of illegal drug use." (City Hr’g Tr. at 63.)
Additionally, a drug and alcohol counselor from Presbyterian Medical Center testified that many of the items that had been discussed at the hearing were listed “by name” on "a marijuana website” as being "good ... to smoke marijuana through....” (City Hr’g Tr. at 67.) Thus, he testified that the use of these items as drug paraphernalia is well known and would be known to the businesses that sell them. He also testified that, from his own experience, "[fit’s very typical for me on my way to work to stop into [a convenience store] and [see] the person in front of me purchase a single blunt and not go around the comer, but directly go outside the store, empty that blunt onto the ground, fill it with marijuana and stand at the bus stop and smoke these products.” (City Hr’g Tr. at 67.)
The executive director of a citizens action group, Men United for a Better Philadelphia, testified that "[o]ne of the top calls that we get as an organization is from the' residents of Philadelphia asking us to come out to the communities where there are these stop and go’s and stores on the corner of their blocks that provide these kind of items to the youth in their communities_” (City Hr’g Tr. at 82.)

. It is not this Court’s function to determine if, in fact, there is such a problem in the City. It is also not our function to evaluate the merits and efficacy of the means chosen by the City to address what the City has identified as a problem. Our review is limited to determining if there was a basis for the City’s identification of the problem, and if the means chosen to address the problem reasonably relate to it.

. Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. 2600-3591

. Western Pennsylvania Restaurant Association v. Pittsburgh, 366 Pa. 374, 77 A.2d 616 (1951).