Court Opinion

ID: 9676240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:19:03.017458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:46.217700
License: Public Domain

ANDELL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority agrees Elomary v. State and Sebree v. State conclude that expert testimony is required in a criminal mischief case to establish the fair market value of the cost of repairs to the damaged property. Elomary v. State, 796 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Sebree v. State, 695 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.); see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.06(b) (Vernon 1994). The majority also agrees (1) Robert Walker’s experience as a property investor does not qualify him as an expert witness on repairing or restoring the house and (2) Wyleta Tarwater-Nixon’s testimony, concerning the amount of the estimate she received to repair the damage to the house, was inadmissible hearsay. Unable to locate any admissible expert testimony to establish the fair market value of the cost of repairs, the majority proceeds to conduct a harmless error analysis.
I do not agree that Elomary and Sebree can be distinguished as the majority attempts to do. Both the Court of Criminal Appeals and this Court have interpreted Penal Code section 28.06(b) to require expert testimony to establish the fair market value of the cost of repairs to the damaged property. While I agree that common sense dictates that it would cost at least $750 to repair the damage shown in the photographs, this evidence and the testimony of the police officers do not constitute the required expert testimony. There is simply no evidence in this case to establish the fair market value of the cost of repairs to the house in the manner required by law.
I would conclude that the trial court’s errors were harmful because the erroneously admitted testimony was the only evidence of a necessary element of the offense. See TexR.AppP. 81(b)(2). There is some evidence of the cost of repairs to the house, however, albeit inadmissible hearsay, so appellant would not be entitled to an acquittal. *614See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 931 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). I would therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.
Accordingly, I dissent.
O’CONNOR, J., joins this dissenting opinion.