Court Opinion

ID: 9825731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:01:13.34823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:18.828508
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION. McCulloch, C. J. I differed widely with the majority as to the effect of the testimony in this case, but I did not record my dissent from the original opinion for the reason that nothing is gained by expressing a dissent on a mere question of fact. However, the court has, in an additional opinion on rehearing, expressed views which in effect relate to questions of law, therefore I feel justified in recording- my dissent at this time. I think that the conclusions of the court upon all the questions relating to the liability of appellee Rumph are against the clear preponderance of the evidence. In the first place, there is no evidence that the alleged option between Reed and Rumph to sell the land on a commission basis of ten per centum ever became effective. The negotiations which led up to the preparation of the option contract were at a time when it was thought that the appellants, Reed heirs, had title to the land, and Rumph was to serve merely as sales agent. It was later discovered that the Reed heirs had no title. The option contract was never signed by the parties and never became effective, but, on the contrary, Reed and Rumpb entered into a new agreement whereby Rumph was to employ attorneys to look after the interests of the Reed heirs and divide the proceeds of any settlement with adverse claimants on the basis that the attorneys were to receive one-half and Rumph and the Reed heirs should divide the other half. The testimony on .this subject was conflicting, but the decree of the chancellor was based upon the testimony of Mjr. Smead, the attorney, and Rumph, on the one hand, as against George Reed alone on the other hand. The conclusion of the majority is based upon the unsupported testimony of Reed as against that of both Smead and Rumph. In the next place, the court is giving too much effect to the failure of Rumph to mention to the Reed heirs the fact that he had executed a quitclaim deed to the Sewell heirs and placed it in escrow. It is undisputed that, at the time this deed was executed and left with Mr. Gaughan, there was no agreement whatever for a settlement, and the deed was not placed strictly in escrow, for there was no consideration agreed upon and no one had the absolute right to deliver the deed to the grantees. The deed was executed merely for the purpose of having it ready if it was found that a payment of some amount could be secured from the prospective purchaser. Now, there was nothing at that time for Rumph to disclose to the Reed heirs further than the bare fact that, in an effort to secure a price for the heirs, he had executed a quitclaim deed merely for the purpose of having it ready in the event a satisfactory deal could be made. According to the testimony in the case, Reed and the other heirs knew at that time that Rumph was engaged in an effort to find some one who would pay something to buy peace from the Reed heirs. All that Rlumph could have disclosed to the Reed heirs would have been the bare fact of the execution of the deed, and there was nothing in addition to that over and above the facts which the Reed heirs already knew. The agreement for the price came suddenly and unexpectedly at an opportune moment when the purchasers from the -Sewell heirs were anxious to close the deal and were willing to pay the disproportionate price of $4,500 to remove a cloud on the title caused by the execution of the deed to Rumph as trustee. The only circumstance which the majority find in justification for setting aside the settlement between the Reed heirs and Rumph is that he failed to tell them about this deed, and it seems to me that that fact is very far from showing a failure on the part of Rumph to disclose material information which might have affected the settlement. The error of law which I think the majority has fallen into is in holding Rumph liable for the whole of the amount collected by him, even if it be held that the settlement between Rumph and the Rieed heirs should be set aside because of his failure to disclose the fact about his having previously executed a quitclaim deed to the Sewells. If, as the preponderance of the evidence shows, the last agreement between Rumph and Reed was that attorneys should be employed and given half of the proceeds, then the setting aside of the settlement between Rumph and the Reed heirs should not enlarge their rights above the stipulations of the- contract. In other words, if the court-finds justification in setting aside that last settlement, the rights of the parties are still dependent upon the terms of the contract. I perceive no reason why a court of equity should declare a forfeiture of the rights of Rumph under the contract. It is undisputed that he received a price largely in excess of anything that was expected after it was discovered that the Reed heirs in fact had no title. According to the preponderance of the testimony, Rumph was authorized to employ the attorney, and it is not just that Rumph should be required to lose the amount paid to the attorney out of the price received. In any view of the case, it seems to me that complete justice would be done by giving to the Reed heirs all that they would have obtained under the contract, less the amount which they received from Rumph in the original settlement. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hart agrees with me in the expression of these views.