Court Opinion

ID: 9697299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:12:15.555079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.159989
License: Public Domain

Schettino, J.
(dissenting). The vice of the indictment under consideration (the substantive part of which is set out in 54 N. J. Super, at pages 175-176) is not only that it does not state sufficient particulars concerning the crime charged (the remedy for which would be a bill of particulars, State v. Bove, 98 N. J. L. 350, 355 (Sup. Ct. 1922), affirmed 98 N. J. L. 576 (E. & A. 1923)) but also that it does not utter with sufficient clarity just what particular crime is charged. That this indictment may only be interpreted after very great difficulty is indicated by a reading of the majority opinion in the Appellate Division (54 N. J. Super. 170, 185) and of the concurring opinion of the Chief Justice. Certainly defendant had at least as much difficulty in trying to interpret it.
An indictment deficient for want of a statement of the essential facts may not be saved by a bill of particulars, State v. Gibbs, 134 N. J. L. 366 (Sup. Ct. 1946) and State v. Daly, 3 N. J. Super. 247 (App. Div. 1949). This is so because an indictment must allege facts sufficient to sustain a conviction, State v. Winne, 12 N. J. 152, 178 (1953), and also because otherwise an accused might be brought to trial upon a charge not found by the grand jury or upon a charge different from the one which the grand jury intended. Linden Park Blood Horse Association v. State, 55 N. J. L. 557, 558 (E. & A. 1893); State v. Schmid, 57 N. J. L. 625, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1895); State v. Sullivan, 33 N. J. Super. 138, 141-142 (App. Div. 1954).
*23An indictment should be drawn, if possible, so that a defendant would have no difficulty in understanding the charge. As a defendant’s liberty is at .stake, no less should be permitted. I would not condone an indictment such as the present one which is "obviously the work product of one ignorant in law or one too careless to perform his duties” with the required particularity. State v. McDonald, 50 N. J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 1958), affirmed 30 N. J. 126 (1959). It does not inform, let alone clearly inform, defendant (State v. Laird, 25 N. J. 298, 303 (1957)) "in certain, definite and understandable terms” (State v. Borrell, 18 N. J. 16, 21 (1955)) of the charge he is called upon to meet.
I am mindful that an indictment should be quashed only when clearly and palpably defective. State v. Weleck, 10 N. J. 355, 364 (1952). However, the test is less restrictive in a case, such as the instant one, where the statute of limitations is no bar to an intelligible indictment. See State v. Winne, supra, (12 N. J. at page 182). Rather than follow the suggestion proposed by the Chief Justice that "the State should re-evaluate the situation and consider the advisability of superseding indictments consonant with the constitutional right to indictment upon the ultimate facts as the State knows them,” I would require such steps be taken by the State.
I would therefore hold that the motion to quash the indictment should have been granted.
Weintraub, C. J., concurring in result.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Burling, Jacobs, Francis, Proctor and Hall—6.
For reversal—Justice Sci-iettino—1.