Court Opinion

ID: 9623931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:46:29.304077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:35.777474
License: Public Domain

Langenbach, J.†
(dissenting)—Justice is one of the noblest concepts of the human heart. True justice makes no distinction in persons; whether a man is rich or poor, great or small, justice is his due. What follows is not a merely philosophical dissertation. It is a factual account of judicial indifference and official neglect which had the result of inexcusably delaying the prosecution of a wayward Indian for three crudely perpetrated forgeries.
This dissent is based upon the simple ground that the state has denied Floyd Frank Wells that justice which is his due. Official inertia and an almost studied official indifference have denied him his rights both to a speedy trial and to effective legal representation. Defendant was arrested in November 1963. In the interim a cast of five superior court judges, the prosecuting attorney, his deputy, and four attorneys have crossed the stage of action.
The core of the problem is revealed in the following statement made by one of the trial judges:
Two and a half years in the Yakima County jail is unconscionable. It is your fault—not anybody here.
*509I agree completely that there was unconscionable delay in the prosecution of this case. I do not agree that the defendant was the effective cause of that delay.
A reading of the record will reveal beyond peradventure that the factor most relevant to the delay in this case was the failure of responsible officials to make any useful or sufficient inquiry into the extent of the defendant’s indigency. When the defendant, upon being proposed the question, stated that he was expecting to receive money in the future, judicial inquiry ended. No attempt was made to plumb the reality of defendant’s belief that he would soon be able to hire counsel. The officials, like Micawber, were “fresh and full of faith that something would turn up.” As a result the defendant passed years in jail. The court attempted to justify the delays by defendant’s consistent belief that wealth was just around the corner. On the other hand, defendant’s consistent failure to obtain that money was evident enough to the court that it felt compelled to assign him counsel on four different occasions. The vice of this procedure lay in the fact that each time defendant made a new assertion of imminent prosperity, his appointed counsel were allowed to withdraw (however awkward the position in which this left his defense). The record does not reveal that defendant ever received the large amount of money which he felt was coming. He did obtain enough money in February 1964, to support the issuance of a $3,000 bond under which he was at liberty for 2 months. On this point, the deputy prosecuting attorney stated in April 1964:
Apparently, Your Honor, he has some money, but his ex-wife has it tied up on the coast. He tried to get some, he did get a little, but it didn’t last very long, he was out on bail. (Italics ours.)
Turning now to a more detailed discussion of the facts, except for 2 months’ liberty under bond, defendant has been in jail since his arrest on November 22, 1963. The crucial period is the year and a half which passed between defendant’s arrest and his trial in May 1965. What occurred during that period must be viewed against the unquestion*510able constitutional presumption that a defendant is innocent until a jury, at the end of a fair and speedy trial, declares otherwise. Bearing that presumption of innocence most emphatically in mind, we must ask how well this record comports with constitutional concepts of justice in criminal prosecutions.
The original statement of facts, transcript and briefs are deficient in many particulars. This became patent at the departmental hearing and even more so at the later en banc hearing. At the latter hearing numerous assertions were orally advanced by the prosecutor to chink the yawning crevasses. In an attempt more properly to fill those gaps, the superior court was ordered to supplement the record with such data as might be found in its files. Three supplemental records were forthcoming. While these are helpful, it must, in fairness to the defendant, be noted that they contain references to conversations and instruments not of record as well as statements of the prosecutor nowhere substantiated in the transcripts. Nevertheless, we proceed with a very adequate knowledge of what transpired, and more particularly what failed to transpire in the trial court.
Arrested in November 1963, defendant was arraigned December 2, 1963, on an information charging one count of forgery. At that arraignment defendant stated that he wanted an attorney but had no funds with which to hire one. Asked whether he had any money coming from an Indian agency in Oregon, defendant replied:
No, sir, not until February. I won’t have no money until February. The Court: Well, how much will you have coming then? The Defendant: About $6,000.00. The Court: Six thousand dollars? The Defendant: Yes, sir. The Court: Well, I think you’d better made arrangements to hire your own lawyer. I am sure if you got $6,000.00 coming in February, you can hire a lawyer. Don’t you think so, Mr. Prosecuting Attorney? Mr. Olwell: Well, I would think so, Your Honor. The Court: Yes. You tell them how much money you got coming in February, and I think you’ll be able to hire a lawyer. The Defendant: Okay. (End of Proceedings)
*511However, the court was overly sanguine because two attorneys thereafter refused to take the case upon mere representations of future wealth.
On February 4, 1964 (70 days after the information was filed and 62 days after arraignment, see RCW 10.46.010), defendant, still without an attorney, was again before the court.
Mr. Olwell: ... He was supposed to have quite a bit of money coming from the Warm Springs Indian Agency. The only reason he is here this morning is so I can make a record of this. It has been quite a while since he has been before the court and I gave him some time to find out if he could get an attorney and then Jerry En-right approached me and he was possibly going to represent the man, so I let the matter go from there. Finally, I went down and talked to him and asked him if he wasn’t getting kind of tired sitting down there and he said he was waiting for some money so he could get out on bail, from the Indian Agency, and I thought there ought to be something on the record. The Court: What is the situation, Mr. Wells? Apparently, this matter was continued when you were arraigned so you could hire a lawyer. What have you done about it? The Defendant: Yes, well, I talked to Jerry Enright, and I’m still waiting for my money. My sister-in-law is supposed to bail me out within a week. He wants the money before he takes the case.
On February 25, 1964, defendant bailed himself out under a $3,000 property bond and was at liberty until April 23, 1964. On April 23, the defendant was back in jail and was yet without funds to hire an attorney. The court appointed an attorney to represent him. Five months had passed since the arrest.
In May 1964, the information was twice amended to add two additional counts of forgery without any arraignment. Three days later defendant asked for a continuance to get absent witnesses (whom he felt were important to his defense against the new second cause of action). He appeared with his appointed attorney who stated:
Mr. Holst: . . . He also advises me, Your Honor, that somehow, somewhere he has some money that he *512can get ahold of for bail. I told him, “You are not entitled to the services at the expense of Yakima County”, so I think if he is bailed out, he should pay for his own counsel.
The court granted the continuance, noting that defendant thereby waived “any benefit or any rights that he may have under the 60 day rule insofar as any Continuance from the present trial setting to the fall jury term is concerned.”
In August 1964, defendant appeared in court on his own “demur” and motion for immediate trial. After some discussion these were continued. On September 3, 1964, defendant was finally arraigned on the information which had been amended over 3 months before. Appearing with appointed counsel and pleading not guilty, defendant withdrew his demurrer and motion for immediate trial. Thereupon, his appointed counsel stated:
Mr. Holst: May it please the Court, Mr. Wells advises me this morning that he is going to have a bail bondsman from Seattle bail him out, and also I believe that he told me—that is, Mr. Wells did—that he had some money available. Is that correct, Mr. Wells? Mr. Wells: Yes. Mr. Holst: In view of those circumstances, Your Honor, I would like to be relieved of any further obligation in this matter. If the Defendant has adequate funds to bail himself out, then certainly he is, under the law, I do not believe entitled to have Court appointed counsel. The Court: Mr. Wells, do I understand that you are having yourself bailed out, or expect to have that accomplished very shortly? Mr. Wells: Yes. The Court: And you are paying some bondsman a fee for that, or someone is doing that on your behalf? Mr. Wells: Yes, sir. The Court: Are you paying him yourself? Mr. Wells: I’m not doing it directly, no, sir. My mother is coming. The Court: Do I understand you have some funds available with which you have to hire an attorney, whether it be Mr. Holst or some other attorney, you have such funds available. Mr. Wells: Yes, sir.
The appointed attorney was then allowed to withdraw.
On October 20, 1964, defendant was again before the court. Appearing pro se he sought to have his case stricken *513from the fall docket (which was granted) and to have his bail reduced (which was denied). On January 6, 1965, with trial set for January 27, a second attorney was appointed to represent the defendant, he being without funds. But the new attorney was not notified of his appointment until January 16, 10 days before trial! On January 26, 1965, the case was continued until May 25, 1965. On May 25 and 26 trial was had and defendant was found guilty on all three counts. He was sentenced the following October 27 to three consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment.
On November 5, 1965, an order was entered allowing the second attorney to withdraw. The order recited that defendant had funds to hire an attorney. Defendant, alone, gave notice of appeal in November 1965. Months later, in April 1966, defendant appeared before the court:
The Court: . . . Now, Mr. Wells, do you or don’t you have enough money to handle this appeal? Mr. Wells: No, I don’t. The Court: Do you want a lawyer? Mr. Wells: Yes, sir. The Court: From the thickness of the file and your being back here again—you were here a year ago—after having about two attorneys, or three, you are going to get an attorney, Mr. Wells, and that’s going to be the man that handles your appeal, and that’s going to end it. Mr. Wells: Yes, your Honor. The Court: This playing footsies has gone far enough. Mr. Wells: Yes, your Honor.
The court appointed a third attorney, but he was almost immediately allowed to withdraw. A fourth attorney was appointed in May 1966, and he perfected the appeal proceedings.
In November 1966, 3 years from the date of his arrest, defendant was sent to the Washington Corrections Center at Shelton, where the minimum sentences were fixed at 3 years on each count, to be served consecutively. No attention seems to have been paid to the 3 years already served in the Yakima County jail.
The most striking fact about this case is the curious alacrity with which the trial court repeatedly accepted de*514fendant’s bald statements that he would be receiving money from the Oregon Indian Agency, or that his mother was going to bail him out or that his sister-in-law was flying to his aid. The initial acceptance of a 2 month delay might be understandable, even though a cursory investigation could disclose serious discrepancies between the time an Indian believes his allotment due, the time it is in fact due and the time it is in fact paid as well as between the amount expected and the amount actually to be granted. But that 2 months’ delay was only the beginning.
The record in this case reveals that the trial court failed to perform its duty as set out in the case of In re Wilken v. Squier, 50 Wn.2d 58, 61, 309 P.2d 746 (1957):
The right of an accused to appear and defend by counsel is expressly guaranteed by Art. I, § 22 (amendment 10) of the state constitution. In furtherance of this constitutional guarantee, RCW 10.01.110 and 10.40.030 imposes upon the court three duties: (1) to inform the defendant that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned; (2) to ascertain whether because of the defendant’ s poverty he is unable to employ counsel, in which event, the court must inform the defendant that the court shall appoint counsel for the defendant at public expense if he so desires; (3) to ask whether the defendant desires the aid of counsel. (Italics ours.)
Had there been an attempt to “ascertain” the true extent of defendant’s indigency at the outset, this paltry case would not now be consuming both our time and the last shreds of defendant’s constitutional rights to a speedy trial and effective legal representation.6 It is curious that an attempt should be made to label defendant’s optimistic visions of wealth as the cause of the delay when that delay in fact occurred because the court was content to rely upon that optimism rather than perform the duty enjoined upon it in *515In re Wilken v. Squier, supra. It would be difficult to mislead a court which had properly performed that duty.
There is a nondelegable responsibility resting upon the court and the state as prosecutor in criminal actions to ascertain promptly and adequately whether, because of defendant’s poverty, he is unable to employ counsel. It is their further responsibility to see that such a defendant has timely legal counsel and that the trial of such criminal actions be prosecuted with dispatch.7 That flagrantly was not the case here. The court’s failure to perform its duty resulted in a serious violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. To do him adequate justice, under the circumstances of this particular case, the conviction should be reversed and the action dismissed.
Donworth, Hunter, and Hamilton, JJ., concur in the result of the dissent.

Judge Langenbach is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.

It is also likely that the early appointment of an alert and aggressive attorney would have seen defendant pleading guilty to, or at least tried at once upon the initial count. Rather, for three counts of forgery which netted him $104, defendant faces a 60-year sentence after having served 3 years in jail without credit.

Under RCW 10.46.010 if the accused is not brought to trial within 60 days after the information has been filed, the court shall order the case dismissed unless good cause is shown. This statute should be construed strictly in favor of the accused, especially if he is an indigent and is unable to secure his release on bail. Otherwise, long periods of imprisonment without a judicial finding of guilt might become the lot of poor and obscure defendants regardless of how innocent they are presumed. It is the duty of the state to expedite such trials in a speedy manner. There is no reason why, in the exercise of good judgment and discretion by the court and prosecutor, such cases should not be set for trial during the current and pending jury terms.