Court Opinion

ID: 9555343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 18:06:31.846596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:25.215457
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/11/23 P. v. James CA4/2
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E080318

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. CR66667)

 KATHEY LYNN JAMES,                                                      OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Kathey Lynn James, in pro. per.; and Michael Allen, under appointment by the

Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

         No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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                                                 I.

                                        INTRODUCTION

         This is defendant and appellant Kathey Lynn James second appeal from a
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postjudgment order denying her Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95)

petition for resentencing under the procedures established by Senate Bill Nos. 775 and
     3
1437. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d

436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), requesting this

court to conduct an independent review of the record. In addition, defendant has had an

opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court and has done so raising multiple

issues concerning her trial and the denial of her petitions. Having considered defendant’s

supplemental brief in accordance with People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216

(Delgadillo), we shall affirm.

         1
             All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.
         2
         Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6, with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section
1172.6 for ease of reference unless otherwise indicated.
         3
          Defendant had appealed in 2020 from the denial of her first section 1172.6
petition for resentencing. (See People v. James (Oct. 1, 2020, No. E074665) [nonpub.
opn.] (James II).)

                                                 2
                                              II.
                                                                        4
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On December 26, 1995, while defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine,

one of the volatile chemicals she was using in the process caught on fire. A conflagration

followed in which her home was destroyed and three of her four minor children were

killed. Defendant escaped through the window of the front bathroom. Her oldest son

also escaped through a window. (James I, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 250-257.)

       A jury found defendant guilty on three counts of second degree murder (§ 187,

subd. (a)), one count of manufacturing methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code,

§ 11379.6, subd. (a)), and one count of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine

(§ 182). The jury expressly based each of the murder verdicts on both implied malice

and second degree felony murder. Defendant was sentenced to 45 years to life in prison.

(James I, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 250.)

       After defendant appealed from the judgment, on March 12, 1998, in the published

portion of the opinion, we held that: (1) manufacturing methamphetamine is inherently

dangerous to human life and can serve as an underlying felony for the charge of second

degree felony murder; (2) instruction on methamphetamine manufacturing as an

inherently dangerous felony did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights; (3) holding

that manufacturing methamphetamine is an inherently dangerous felony could be applied

       4
        A summary of the factual background is taken from this court’s partially
published opinion in defendant’s direct prior appeal, case No. E019765. (People v.
James (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 244 (James I).)

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retroactively; and (4) there was substantial evidence defendant acted with implied malice.

(James I, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th 244.)

       Following the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony-murder

rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder (see Stats.

2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f)), on January 11, 2019, defendant filed a petition for

resentencing pursuant to former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). (James II, supra,

E074665.) On January 31, 2020, the trial court heard oral argument on defendant’s

petition. The prosecutor requested the court dismiss the petition, arguing that defendant

was convicted of three counts of murder under an implied malice theory, and not based

on natural and probable consequences or felony murder and that defendant “was the

actual killer.” (James II, supra, E074665.) The trial court dismissed the petition “over

the objection of the defense.” (James II, supra, E074665.)

       Defendant subsequently appealed from the denial of her petition for resentencing

and filed an over 100-page supplemental brief arguing, in part, that the trial court erred in

dismissing her petition without issuing an order to show cause, that the court could not

rely on this court’s prior opinion to establish the facts of this case to prove her

ineligibility, and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel during the petition for
           5
rehearing. (James II, supra, E074665.) In a nonpublished opinion filed on October 1,

       5
          Defendant also rehashed the arguments made in her first appeal, claiming the
trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury, her due process rights were violated
when the felony-murder rule was applied to the charge of manufacturing
methamphetamine, and her due process rights were violated due to a lack of notice
manufacturing methamphetamine is an inherently dangerous felony.

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2020, we specifically rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court erred in relying

on our prior appellate opinion from her direct appeal in finding her ineligible for relief

under section 1172.6. (James II, supra, E074665.) We found that defendant’s record of

conviction showed she was ineligible for relief as a matter of law, rejected her other

contentions, and affirmed the order dismissing defendant’s section 1172.6 petition for

resentencing. (James II, supra, E074665.)

       On August 31, 2022, defendant filed a new second petition for resentencing

pursuant to former section 1170.95.

       After appointing counsel, the trial court heard the matter on November 18, 2022.

The prosecutor requested the court deny the petition “with prejudice.” The prosecutor

argued defendant’s first petition had been “denied due to her being the actual killer and

implied malice, second-degree murder” and summarized the facts as follows: “She

[defendant] essentially was cooking meth in her trailer, or house, and a fire broke out,

killing three of her children.” Defense counsel objected “for the record.” The court

denied the petition, finding “defendant was the actual killer based upon the

documentation in the record as cited by counsel.” Defendant timely appealed.

                                             III.

                                       DISCUSSION

       After defendant appealed, appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under the

authority of Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a

statement of the case, a summary of the procedural background and potential issue of

                                              5
whether the trial court erred in relying on our prior appellate opinion from the direct

appeal for more than the procedural history to find defendant was the actual killer in

denying defendant relief under section 1172.6, and requesting this court exercise our

discretion to independently review the record to determine whether there are any arguable

issues on appeal pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.

       We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and she

has done so. In her supplemental brief, defendant contends (1) the law of the case does

not bar her appeal based on this court’s prior determination of issues in James I; (2)

collateral estoppel does not apply due to intervening law, perjury of trial witnesses,

suppression of evidence, and other factors undermining the integrity of her murder

convictions; (3) the determination that manufacturing methamphetamine as an inherently

dangerous felony is contrary to the method for evaluation of felonies in the abstract; (4)

her felony-murder prosecution and inherently dangerous felony jury instruction

prejudiced the jury’s finding of implied malice and deprived her the right to manslaughter

instructions consistent with the trial evidence; (5) the prosecution offered false and

perjured testimony to the jury at trial; (6) she was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial

suppression of evidence of the cause of the fire; (7) it is improper for the court to rely on

the appellate decision to determine the facts of the case and evidence presented at trial;

(8) this court’s determination that she was the actual killer in her prior section 1172.6

appeal (James II) was not supported by the law or the record of conviction; and (9) the

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James I opinion upholding the jury’s implied malice determination is premised on facts

not in evidence.

       A. Legal Background

       In Wende, our Supreme Court held that “Courts of Appeal must conduct a review

of the entire record whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal which

raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as frivolous.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14

Cal.5th at p. 221.) The Wende procedure applies “to the first appeal as of right and is

compelled by the constitutional right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.” (Ibid.)

       In Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216, the Supreme Court held that the Wende

independent review procedure is not constitutionally required in an appeal from a

postconviction order denying a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing because the

denial does not implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel in a first appeal as

of right. (Delgadillo, supra, at pp. 222, 224-226.) The court further found that general

due process principles regarding fundamental fairness does not compel a Wende

independent review of the order. (Id. at pp. 229-232.) However, the court explained that

if a no-issues brief is filed in a section 1172.6 appeal and the defendant then “files a

supplemental brief or letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific

arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, at

p. 232.) We are not required to conduct “an independent review of the entire record to

identify unraised issues” but may do so at our discretion. (Ibid. [“While it is wholly

                                              7
within the court’s discretion, the Court of Appeal is not barred from conducting its own

independent review of the record in any individual section 1172.6 appeal.”])

       Senate Bill No. 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and

eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder to

ensure a person’s sentence is proportionate with his or her individual criminal culpability.

(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th

952, 957, 971 (Lewis).) The bill added subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states

that “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in

a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708;

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50-51.) Section 189, subdivision (e), now

limits the circumstances under which a person may be convicted of first degree felony

murder: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in

subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a death occurs is liable for murder

only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2)

The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,

commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission

of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the

underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in

subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) These amendments,

however, maintained the viability of murder convictions based on implied malice, and the

definition of implied malice remains unchanged. (People v. Clements (2022) 75

                                              8
Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) “Second degree implied malice murder . . . is not based on a

theory of imputed malice.” (People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 444.)

       The Legislature also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted of

first degree felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences

doctrine to seek retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under

the new law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; People v. Strong,

supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “[T]he process begins with the filing of a petition containing

a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he

petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of

changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019 . . . .” (People v.

Strong, supra, at p. 708.) “When the trial court receives a petition containing the

necessary declaration and other required information, the court must evaluate the petition

‘to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.]

If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible

for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Ibid.)

       The prima facie determination under section 1172.6 is a question of law, and the

trial court may deny a petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is ineligible for

resentencing as a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) In determining

whether a petitioner made a prima facie case for relief, the court may review the record of

conviction. (Id. at pp. 971-972, fn. 6.) The record of conviction allows the court “to

distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless. This is

                                               9
consistent with the statute’s overall purpose: to ensure that . . . culpability is

commensurate with a person’s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless petitions

can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step prima facie review process.” (Id. at p.

971.) The record of conviction includes the parties’ closing arguments, the verdict and

jury instructions. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13; People v. Ervin (2021)

72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106; People v. Jenkins (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 924, 935.) A trial

court’s failure to follow the procedures enacted in section 1172.6 is analyzed for

prejudice under the state law standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.

(Lewis, supra, at pp. 973-974.)

       B. Analysis

       In her supplemental brief, defendant raises numerous contentions that were

already raised and rejected on appeal in James I and James II. Under the doctrine of law

of the case, a party may not seek appellate reconsideration of an already decided issue in

the same case absent some significant change in circumstances. (People v. Boyer (2006)

38 Cal.4th 412, 441, superseded by statute on another ground.) We find no compelling

change in circumstances here that would justify reconsidering such issues. (People v.

Boyer, supra, at p. 441.) Furthermore, defendant may not use the procedures set forth in

section 1172.6 to relitigate her conviction or the underlying trial.

       Moreover, as we had previously explained in James II, defendant’s record of

conviction clearly shows that she is categorically ineligible for relief. Defendant was

convicted of murder because, while she was manufacturing methamphetamine, a lab

                                              10
chemical caught her home on fire and three of her children died in the blaze. (James I,

supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 250.) In convicting her, “the jury expressly based each of the

murder verdicts on both implied malice and second degree felony murder.” (Ibid.) In her

direct appeal, we concluded “there was sufficient evidence that defendant performed an

act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with the knowledge that

her act endangered the life of others, and with conscious disregard for human life, to

support the jury’s finding that she acted with implied malice.” (James I, supra, at p.

280.) Implied malice remains a valid theory of second degree murder even after the

changes to the law that section 1172.6 implements. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th

981, 988-991.) That is enough to require a court to deny a petitioner’s petition. The trial

court, therefore, correctly did so here.

       We need not address the alternative felony-murder theory because it would not

affect her convictions even if, as at least one case has stated in dicta, “the second degree

felony-murder rule in California is eliminated.” (In re White (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 933,

937, fn. 2.) The trial court analyzed the matter under the current law that applies to a first

degree felony murder conviction under section 189, subdivision (e)(1). First degree

felony murder is a killing during one of a short list of crimes found in section 189,

subdivision (a), while second-degree felony murder is a killing during certain unlisted

crimes.

       The trial court correctly denied defendant’s second section 1172.6 petition for

resentencing.

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                                        IV.

                                  DISPOSITION

     The order denying defendant’s second section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                           CODRINGTON
                                                                     Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL
                       J.

MENETREZ
                       J.

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