Court Opinion

ID: 9352056
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 20:00:36.439037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:50.959361
License: Public Domain

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                                                             [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 21-13496
                           ____________________

        AMERICAN BUILDERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-81357-WM
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13496

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, ROSENBAUM, and MARCUS,
        Circuit Judges.
        MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
                 Ernest Guthrie fell from a roof and became paralyzed from
        the waist down, never to walk again. Within months, his medical
        bills climbed past $400,000, and future costs projected into the mil-
        lions. Three insurance companies potentially provided coverage
        for Guthrie. This appeal is a battle between two of them.
                 The primary insurer for Guthrie’s company was Southern-
        Owners Insurance Company. At the time of the accident, Guthrie
        was performing subcontracting work for Beck Construction, which
        had a policy with American Builders Insurance Company and an
        excess policy with Evanston Insurance Company. American Build-
        ers investigated the accident, assessed Beck Construction’s liability,
        and evaluated Guthrie’s claim. Southern-Owners, in contrast, did
        little to nothing for months. When push came to shove, Southern-
        Owners refused to pay any amount to Guthrie to settle the claim,
        and American Builders and Evanston ponied up a million dollars
        apiece instead.
               American Builders then sued Southern-Owners for com-
        mon law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equitable subroga-
        tion. Along the way, Southern-Owners moved for summary judg-
        ment, but the district court denied the motion. A federal trial jury
        heard the case and found in favor of American Builders. After the
        entry of final judgment, Southern-Owners sought judgment as a
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                         3

        matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial. The district court
        denied those motions, too. On appeal, Southern-Owners chal-
        lenges the denials of its summary judgment and post-trial motions.
               After thorough review of the record and with the benefit of
        oral argument, we affirm.
                                          I.
                                         A.
               Ernest Guthrie, an employee of Ernest Guthrie, LLC per-
        forming work for Beck Construction, slipped from the roof of a
        house on April 1, 2019, and crashed to the ground. He became
        paralyzed from the waist down. Guthrie’s lawyer, Stuart Cohen,
        wrote to Beck Construction to assert the company’s liability and
        request insurance information. Beck Construction, in turn, put its
        insurer, American Builders on notice on May 8. American Builders
        had issued a general liability policy to Beck Construction, with a
        limit of $1 million for each occurrence. American Builders’ claim
        specialist investigated the incident by meeting with the company
        and its outside investigator and collecting hospital records, rehabil-
        itation facility records, and correspondences about the claim and
        injuries.
              Cohen investigated his client’s claim, too. He determined
        that Beck Construction instructed Guthrie to climb onto the roof
        without providing any fall protection, while two spotters focused
        on their phones. Guthrie had already sustained $400,000 in medical
        expenses, and Cohen calculated Guthrie’s claim at $4 million to $5
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-13496

        million, even if Guthrie were partially liable. On September 5, Co-
        hen demanded that American Builders pay its $1 million policy
        limit within thirty days in exchange for a release of Beck Construc-
        tion from liability. American Builders requested an extension, and
        Cohen granted ten days, placing the deadline on October 14.
               Cohen conditioned that demand on the lack of other availa-
        ble insurance. But, as it turns out, there were two other relevant
        policies: Evanston provided an excess policy worth $1 million per
        occurrence to Beck Construction, and Southern-Owners -- which
        would become the defendant in the instant bad-faith case -- sold
        Ernest Guthrie, LLC a policy that covered $1 million. Southern-
        Owners’ policy contained an endorsement naming Beck Construc-
        tion as an additional insured for any work Ernest Guthrie, LLC per-
        formed for Beck Construction, and making its policy the primary
        insurer for claims arising from Beck Construction’s work.
                During American Builders’ investigation, it discovered these
        additional policies. So, on September 12, it tendered the defense of
        and indemnity for Guthrie’s claim to Southern-Owners. In its let-
        ter to Southern-Owners, American Builders attached the certificate
        of insurance listing Beck Construction as an additional insured on
        Ernest Guthrie, LLC’s policy; the initial notice of the claim to
        American Builders; and Cohen’s September 5 demand letter. A
        couple weeks later, on September 25, Southern-Owners’ counsel
        sent letters to Cohen, American Builders, and Beck Construction,
        requesting additional incident reports, medical records, workers’
        compensation records, potentially applicable insurance policies,
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                        5

        applicable construction contracts, and transcripts or recordings of
        statements by Guthrie and Beck Construction. She also asked Co-
        hen for a forty-five-day extension on the September 5 demand.
               Two days later, Cohen provided Southern-Owners with
        Guthrie’s medical records and bills, American Builders’ insurance
        policy, and correspondences from Cohen to American Builders in
        May and June that explained the accident. Cohen did not respond
        to the forty-five-day extension request, but, that same day, Ameri-
        can Builders requested an extension for American Builders until
        November 4, which Cohen granted. In his letter granting the ex-
        tension, Cohen explained that he recently became aware that
        Southern-Owners and Evanston might also provide coverage for
        the accident. Because of this new information, Guthrie would now
        only execute a release of American Builders that reserved his rights
        to pursue claims against either Evanston or Southern-Owners.
               On October 10, American Builders retained counsel to ad-
        dress Cohen’s new stipulation. Working quickly, the attorney con-
        cluded in a few days that Guthrie’s claim was worth around $20
        million to $30 million, far exceeding any applicable policy’s cover-
        age even if Beck Construction were largely not responsible. On
        October 14, he then informed Cohen that American Builders was
        prepared to pay its $1 million policy limit but that it could not ac-
        cept Cohen’s new stipulation because it provided only a partial re-
        lease.
               During the early weeks of October, the record does not re-
        flect that Southern-Owners did anything, other than request
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                21-13496

        extensions. But on October 18 -- over a month after receiving no-
        tice of Guthrie’s injury -- Southern-Owners contacted the lawyer
        that American Builders had retained for Beck Construction to set
        up an interview with Russell Beck, the company’s principal. South-
        ern-Owners and the attorney spent the rest of October and all of
        November trying to set up a time to talk.
               On November 25, still struggling to set up a meeting with
        Beck, Southern-Owners wrote Cohen, describing the setback and
        noting that it had no written documentation on the claim. South-
        ern-Owners also requested until December 20 to respond to the
        September 5 demand letter. That same day, Southern-Owners told
        American Builders that it would agree to a defense of Beck Con-
        struction under a reservation of rights, but only after it spoke with
        someone from Beck Construction and completed its investigation.
        The letter noted that Southern-Owners’ policy included an em-
        ployer liability exclusion, which might bar coverage. American
        Builders passed along the contents of that letter to Beck Construc-
        tion the same day. Also on November 25, Beck Construction’s law-
        yer offered November 26 or 27 for an interview with Beck, but
        Southern-Owners declined because this was not enough notice.
        He then proposed a telephone conference, but Southern-Owners
        demanded an in-person meeting.
              Meanwhile, Cohen continued his attempts to secure pay-
        ment for Guthrie. On November 18, he wrote to Evanston’s claims
        manager, attaching the September 5 demand letter, the medical
        records, and other relevant documents, and made a new demand:
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                        7

        a $2 million payout in exchange for a complete release of both
        American Builders and Evanston, with a decision due by December
        18. American Builders received a copy of the November 18 de-
        mand letter two days later.
               On December 10, nearly three months after it received no-
        tice of the claim, Southern-Owners finally met with Beck. Beck
        told Southern-Owners that Ernest Guthrie, LLC employed Guth-
        rie; Guthrie was performing subcontracting work for Beck Con-
        struction; the other people on site were not responsible for spotting
        Guthrie; Guthrie did not request fall protection; and Guthrie ad-
        mitted that he “f*cked up” and “stepped off the roof.” Based on
        that conversation, Southern-Owners believed it had a strong liabil-
        ity defense. One week later, Southern-Owners decided it should
        talk with the other two workers present. At that time, Southern-
        Owners’ counsel was “in the process of reaching out” to them.
               Also on December 10, Evanston told American Builders’
        counsel -- who was no longer involved in the case -- that it planned
        to tender its full policy to Guthrie, even though it was not the pri-
        mary insurer. After reactivating his file, counsel saw the Novem-
        ber 18 demand letter. With only eight days until that letter’s dead-
        line, he once again worked fast, reviewed the 2,700-page file, and
        concluded that American Builders should tender its policy limit to
        avoid a bad-faith claim.
               On December 17, after internal discussions, American Build-
        ers decided to tender its limit. It then called Cohen to request a
        one-day extension and discuss the Southern-Owners policy. It
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        8                      Opinion of the Court               21-13496

        learned that Guthrie did “not wish to pursue coverage under the
        [Southern-Owners] Policy and desire[d] to move forward with set-
        tlement without involving [Southern-Owners], directly.” Ameri-
        can Builders’ counsel’s understanding was that Cohen and Guthrie
        simply wanted the payout and did not care where the money came
        from.
                The next day, American Builders’ counsel notified Southern-
        Owners of the November 18 demand letter. Since Southern-Own-
        ers was listed as the primary insurer, counsel believed that South-
        ern-Owners had a primary obligation to pay, so he reached out to
        give Southern-Owners a chance to step up before American Build-
        ers did. Additionally, Southern-Owners’ policy required an insured
        receive consent before accepting any settlement. Counsel did not
        want American Builders -- standing in the shoes of Beck Construc-
        tion -- to breach Southern-Owners’ contract by tendering payment
        without consent. Southern-Owners confirmed that it would not
        tender its coverage by the December 19 deadline. American Build-
        ers’ counsel then told Southern-Owners that American Builders
        would be paying its policy limit. Later that day, he wrote to South-
        ern-Owners’ counsel to confirm that American Builders was forced
        to pay the policy because Southern-Owners would not, and that
        American Builders would seek equitable subrogation against
        Southern-Owners.
               American Builders paid the policy on December 19, and
        Guthrie provided a release for Beck Construction, American Build-
        ers, and Evanston the next day. At that point, Southern-Owners --
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                        9

        having only conducted one interview with Beck -- ended its inves-
        tigation.
                                         B.
                American Builders sued Southern-Owners in Florida state
        court for common law bad faith under Florida’s doctrine of equita-
        ble subrogation. Southern-Owners removed the case to the United
        States District Court for the Southern District of Florida based on
        diversity jurisdiction. Southern-Owners later moved for summary
        judgment, in part because it claimed its policy did not cover Guth-
        rie’s injury. The district court denied the motion.
               The parties then consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate
        judge, who oversaw a three-day jury trial. After the close of Amer-
        ican Builders’ evidence, Southern-Owners moved for judgment as
        a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a). South-
        ern-Owners’ only argument was that American Builders intro-
        duced no evidence that proved Guthrie attempted to settle with
        Southern-Owners. The court denied the motion. After the close
        of all evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of American
        Builders, and the district court entered final judgment for
        $1,091,240.82. Southern-Owners then filed a renewed motion for
        judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), or, in the alternative,
        a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. This time, Southern-Own-
        ers argued that it could not have settled Guthrie’s demand, and that
        American Builders, standing in the insured’s shoes, breached
        Southern-Owners’ contract by failing to receive its consent before
        settling with Guthrie. The district court denied those motions.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13496

               This timely appeal followed.
                                         II.
               “We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment as
        a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, viewing
        the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”
        St. Louis Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Rockhill Ins. Co., 5 F.4th 1235, 1242
        (11th Cir. 2021). “We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial
        for abuse of discretion,” giving deference to the district court
        “where a new trial is denied and the jury’s verdict is left undis-
        turbed.” McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv., Inc., 817 F.3d 1241,
        1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “We
        review a district court’s decision on summary judgment de novo,”
        viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most
        favorable to the non-moving party. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975,
        978 (11th Cir. 2017).
                                         A.
                The first and most significant issue in this appeal is whether
        American Builders proved a bad faith claim. Taking the evidence
        in the light most favorable to American Builders, a reasonable jury
        could have found (as it did) both that Southern-Owners acted in
        bad faith and that its bad faith caused American Builders to pay its
        policy. Moreover, American Builders did not breach Southern-
        Owners’ contract and relieve Southern-Owners of its good-faith
        duties. The district court did not err in denying Southern-Owners’
        Rule 50(b) motion.
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        21-13496                Opinion of the Court                         11

                                           1.
                Under controlling Florida law, “the critical inquiry in a bad
        faith [action] is whether the insurer diligently, and with the same
        haste and precision as if it were in the insured’s shoes, worked on
        the insured’s behalf to avoid an excess judgment.” Harvey v.
        GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 259 So. 3d 1, 7 (Fla. 2018). Additionally, any
        “damages claimed by an insured in a bad faith case ‘must be caused
        by the insurer’s bad faith.’” Id. (citation omitted). That is, the bad
        faith conduct must “directly and in natural and continuous se-
        quence produce[] or contribute[] substantially to producing such
        [damage], so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the bad faith
        conduct, the [damage] would not have occurred.” Id. at 11 (quot-
        ing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Civ.) 404.6(a)).
                The bad faith inquiry “is determined under the ‘totality of
        the circumstances’ standard,” id. at 7, and we focus “not on the ac-
        tions of the claimant but rather on those of the insurer in fulfilling
        its obligations to the insured,” Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d
        665, 677 (Fla. 2004). That said, a claimant’s actions -- such as a de-
        cision not to offer a settlement -- remain relevant in assessing bad
        faith. See Powell v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 12,
        14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Pelaez v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 13 F.4th
        1243, 1254 (11th Cir. 2021). Insurers have obligations “to advise
        the insured of settlement opportunities, to advise as to the probable
        outcome of the litigation, to warn of the possibility of an excess
        judgment, and to advise the insured of any steps he might take to
        avoid [the] same,” as well as to “investigate the facts, give fair
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13496

        consideration to a settlement offer that is not unreasonable under
        the facts, and settle, if possible, where a reasonably prudent person,
        faced with the prospect of paying the total recovery, would do so.”
        Bos. Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla.
        1980). These “obligations . . . are not a mere checklist,” however,
        and, as the Florida Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n insurer is
        not absolved of liability simply because it advises its insured of set-
        tlement opportunities, the probable outcome of the litigation, and
        the possibility of an excess judgment.” Harvey, 259 So. 3d at 7.
                Moreover, insurance companies occasionally have an af-
        firmative duty to offer settlements. “Bad faith may be inferred
        from a delay in settlement negotiations which is willful and with-
        out reasonable cause.” Powell, 584 So. 2d at 14. Thus, “[w]here
        liability is clear, and injuries so serious that a judgment in excess of
        the policy limits is likely,” the insurer must “initiate settlement ne-
        gotiations.” Id. “In such a case, where ‘[t]he financial exposure to
        [the insured] [i]s a ticking financial time bomb’ and ‘[s]uit c[an] be
        filed at any time,’ any ‘delay in making an offer under the circum-
        stances of this case even where there was no assurance that the
        claim could be settled could be viewed by a fact finder as evidence
        of bad faith.’” Harvey, 259 So. 2d at 7 (alterations in original) (cita-
        tion omitted).
               At the end of trial, the district court properly and thoroughly
        instructed the jury on bad faith. The court charged the jury to con-
        sider “all of the circumstances” in determining whether the insurer
        “use[d] the same degree of care and diligence as a person of
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                        13

        ordinary care and prudence should exercise in the management of
        his own business,” “investigate[d] the facts, . . . and “settle[d], if
        possible, where a reasonably prudent person faced with the pro-
        spect of paying the total recovery would do so.” Moreover, the
        district court instructed the jury on causation, observing, among
        other things, that bad faith must “directly and in natural and con-
        tinuous sequence produce[] or contribute[] substantially to produc-
        ing” any damage, though it “need not be the only cause.”
                On this record, there was enough evidence to allow the jury
        to reasonably find that Southern-Owners acted in bad faith because
        it delayed acting on its duty to investigate and settle Guthrie’s
        claim. American Builders notified Southern-Owners of the acci-
        dent on September 12, and Cohen furnished the company with all
        relevant documents on September 27. Among those documents
        were proof of Guthrie’s paraplegic status and medical bills already
        exceeding $400,000 and correspondences between Cohen and
        American Builders, laying out Cohen’s theory of Beck Construc-
        tion’s liability. Right off the bat, Southern-Owners had little work
        left because the pertinent information landed in its lap. Those doc-
        uments painted a picture of “injuries so serious that a judgment in
        excess of the policy limits [was] likely.” Powell, 584 So. 2d at 14.
        All that remained was a meeting with Beck, who could have helped
        inform Southern-Owners whether “liability [was] clear.” Id. In-
        stead of meeting with Beck, though, Southern-Owners dawdled. It
        did nothing for several weeks before finally reaching out to Beck
        Construction’s lawyer. Then, when Southern-Owners finally did
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13496

        speak with counsel, it delayed reasonable offers to interview Beck
        for nearly two months, turning down an in-person meeting for be-
        ing last-minute and a phone interview for not being in person. Af-
        ter finally meeting with Beck in early December, Southern-Owners
        decided it needed to follow up with the two other workers on site
        that day. But it delayed again, providing no evidence that it
        reached out to them for at least another two weeks. As of Decem-
        ber 18, Southern-Owners still had not contacted them -- even
        though Southern-Owners had requested until December 20 to re-
        spond to Cohen’s September 5 demand. With no time to spare,
        Southern-Owners was in essentially the same position it was in on
        September 27.
                That body of evidence could lead a reasonable jury to con-
        clude that Southern-Owners delayed its investigation instead of at-
        tempting “to resolve the coverage dispute promptly” or using “dil-
        igence and thoroughness.” Pozzi Window Co. v. Auto-Owners
        Ins., 446 F.3d 1178, 1188 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting State Farm Mut.
        Auto. Ins. Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 63 (Fla. 1995)). And, in that
        delay, a jury could reasonably find that Southern-Owners com-
        pletely neglected its “affirmative duty to initiate settlement negoti-
        ations,” Powell, 584 So. 2d at 14, while Guthrie’s hospital bills
        climbed due to his traumatic injury.
               A reasonable jury could also find that Southern-Owners’ bad
        faith caused American Builders’ damages. See Harvey, 259 So. 3d
        at 7. When American Builders informed Southern-Owners of Co-
        hen’s November 18 demand, Southern-Owners refused to pay
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                        15

        because it was still investigating the claims. Evanston had already
        tendered its $1 million policy on December 10, but the demand re-
        quested $2 million, so the next million needed to come from either
        Southern-Owners or American Builders. After Southern-Owners
        balked, American Builders had no choice but to tender payment.
        Southern-Owners’ delay in investigating and settling led to its ina-
        bility to tender an offer on December 18. As a result, a reasonable
        jury could find (as it did) that American Builders’ damages
        stemmed directly and naturally from Southern-Owners’ bad faith.
        See id. at 11.
               In defense, Southern-Owners points the finger at Guthrie
        and Cohen. It focuses on their two settlement demands, neither of
        which named Southern-Owners, and on Cohen’s statement that he
        and Guthrie had no interest in negotiating with Southern-Owners
        directly. However, “[t]he lack of a formal offer to settle does not
        preclude a finding of bad faith.” Powell, 584 So. 2d at 14. Instead,
        under Florida law, it “is merely one factor to be considered.” Id. A
        jury could find that even though Guthrie and Cohen never made
        an offer to Southern-Owners, this did not wipe Southern-Owners’
        hands clean. What’s more, Southern-Owners was left to explain
        why its own actions were not in bad faith, rather than focusing on
        just the claimant’s actions. Harvey, 259 So. 3d at 7. Of course,
        “there’s a difference between focusing on a claimant’s actions,
        which would be improper, and factoring a claimant’s actions into
        the totality of the circumstances analysis, which is not improper.”
        Pelaez, 13 F.4th at 1254 (emphasis in original). In this case, though,
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        16                         Opinion of the Court                      21-13496

        Southern-Owners flipped Florida law on its head and exclusively
        focused on Guthrie and Cohen’s actions.
                                              2.
                In the alternative, Southern-Owners argues that a reasona-
        ble jury should have found that it had no duty to act in good faith
        because American Builders breached Southern-Owners’ contract
        by not receiving consent before settling the claim. 1 As we see it,
        this affirmative defense fails, for two separate reasons. For starters,
        a reasonable jury could find that American Builders’ failure to re-
        ceive consent did not substantially prejudice Southern-Owners.
        What’s more, a reasonable jury could also find that Southern-Own-
        ers did not act diligently or in good faith in attempting to obtain
        consent.

        1 Southern-Owners argued that a reasonable jury would have found in its fa-
        vor on this affirmative defense for the first time in its Rule 50(b) motion. But
        “[d]istrict courts lack authority to grant a Rule 50(b) motion on a ground not
        previously raised in a Rule 50(a) motion prior to the submission of the case to
        the jury.” Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1270 n.31 (11th Cir. 2022).
        American Builders, however, did not raise this lack of authority in district
        court and thus “fail[ed] to raise the inadequacy of [the] Rule 50(a) motion in
        response to [the] Rule 50(b) motion.” Howard v. Walgreen Co., 605 F.3d
        1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2010). By not raising the argument in the trial court,
        American Builders “forfeited [its] right to raise waiver on appeal.” Id. More-
        over, none of the exceptions to forfeiture apply, and American Builders does
        not argue otherwise. Thus, we consider this argument forfeited, and turn to
        the merits of the affirmative defense.
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        21-13496                Opinion of the Court                        17

               Southern-Owners’ contract with Beck Construction pro-
        vided that “[n]o insured will, except at the insured’s own cost, vol-
        untarily make a payment, assume any obligation, or incur any ex-
        pense, other than for first aid, without our consent.” “[T]his lan-
        guage requires the insured to obtain the insurer’s consent before
        settling.” Am. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Perez, 712 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla.
        3d DCA 1998). That is, “while an insured is free to enter into a
        reasonable settlement when its insurer has wrongfully refused to
        provide it with a defense to a suit, . . . the insured is not similarly
        free to independently engage in such settlements where, as here,
        the insurer had not declined a defense to suit.” First Am. Title Ins.
        Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 695 So. 2d 475, 477 (Fla. 3d DCA
        1997); see also Am. Reliance Ins. Co., 712 So. 2d at 1212–13.
                The Florida Supreme Court requires an insurer to establish
        three things in order to succeed on this affirmative defense: (1) a
        lack of consent; (2) substantial prejudice to the insurer; and (3) dil-
        igence and good faith by the insurer in attempting to receive con-
        sent. See Ramos v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 336 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. 1976);
        Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Am. Pride Bldg. Co., 601 F.3d 1143,
        1149–50 (11th Cir. 2010). The first element has a few exceptions.
        The insured may settle without obtaining consent if the insurer
        “wrongfully refused to provide [the insured] with a defense to a
        suit,” First Am. Tit. Ins. Co., 695 So. 2d at 477, or offers a condi-
        tional defense that the parties cannot agree upon, Taylor v. Safeco
        Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 743, 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Moreover, even
        if the insured was obliged to obtain consent, the failure to do so is
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        18                         Opinion of the Court             21-13496

        not an affirmative defense unless the insurer also establishes sub-
        stantial prejudice and evinces good faith in bringing about the co-
        operation of the insured. Ramos, 336 So. 2d at 75. As the Florida
        Supreme Court put it:
               This Court . . . emphasized that to constitute the
               breach of a policy, the lack of cooperation must be
               material and the insurance company must show that
               it was substantially prejudiced in the particular case
               by failure to cooperate. Furthermore, . . . the insurer
               must show that it has exercised diligence and good
               faith in bringing about the cooperation of its insured
               and must show that it has complied in good faith with
               the terms of the policy.
        Id. (citations omitted).
               We start with the first element: lack of consent. Over the
        objection of Southern-Owners, the district court instructed the jury
        to decide “whether American Builders Insurance Company volun-
        tarily made a payment without obtaining Southern-Owners Insur-
        ance Company’s prior consent, or whether American Builders In-
        surance Company was legally obligated to make such payment.”
        Both parties agree that American Builders never received consent
        before paying. Instead, they debate only whether American Build-
        ers needed to obtain consent because its payment was not “volun-
        tary.”
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                      19

               American Builders argued to the jury that its payment was
        involuntary because Southern-Owners unreasonably withheld
        consent and forced American Builders to either pay without con-
        sent or face a bad faith suit itself. The theory went this way: when
        Southern-Owners told American Builders that it would not tender
        payment, American Builders “involuntarily” paid “because of cir-
        cumstances beyond [its] control,” since the “situation requir[ed]
        immediate response to protect its legal interests.” See Rolyn Cos.
        v. R & J Sales of Tex., Inc., 412 F. App’x 252, 255 (11th Cir. 2011)
        (quotation marks and citation omitted). Southern-Owners re-
        sponded that it could not have unreasonably withheld consent be-
        cause American Builders had already decided to pay. The jury was
        told by Southern-Owners that American Builders made its decision
        voluntarily and before seeking any consent.
                We need not settle whether American Builders made a vol-
        untary payment under Florida law because Southern-Owners also
        bore the burden to prove two additional things -- substantial prej-
        udice and good faith -- in order to sustain its affirmative defense,
        and the jury could reasonably have found that Southern-Owners
        failed to prove either.
               Turning first to prejudice, the district court instructed the
        jury that Southern-Owners “must establish that [American Build-
        ers’] breach of the consent provision was material and caused de-
        fendant to suffer substantial prejudice.” See Ramos, 336 So. 2d at
        75. Southern-Owners provided no evidence of substantial preju-
        dice. In fact, its claim adjuster (John Blaser) unambiguously
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        20                    Opinion of the Court                21-13496

        testified that he did not know how Southern-Owners was preju-
        diced by American Builders’ decision to pay. When first asked
        whether Southern-Owners suffered any prejudice, the claim ad-
        juster responded “maybe.” And when asked if he had any facts of
        prejudice, he simply replied, “Not that I’m aware of at this time.”
               We are unpersuaded by Southern-Owners’ claim that it has
        been prejudiced. For starters, Southern-Owners argues it was
        “blindsided” by American Builders’ decision to pay on December
        18 because it was not aware of Cohen’s November 18 demand.
        This argument has several flaws. To begin, American Builders may
        have decided to pay before it called Southern-Owners, but it did
        not plan to tender payment until after learning whether Southern-
        Owners decided to pay instead. The evidence was sufficient to es-
        tablish that American Builders’ payment was contingent on South-
        ern-Owners’ decision. Moreover, this argument overlooks that, by
        the December 18 phone call with American Builders, Southern-
        Owners should have been ready to decide whether it would pay
        anyway because it had asked for an extension on its own investiga-
        tion until December 20. Lastly, it ignores the company’s long
        months of delay. An insurer must have a reasonable time to inves-
        tigate the claim, see Bos. Old Colony, 386 So. 2d at 785, but the
        evidence adduced at trial strongly suggested that Southern-Owners
        largely sat on its thumbs.
              Southern-Owners also says that the $1,091,240.92 judgment
        entered by the district court turned Southern-Owners into a judg-
        ment debtor in an amount greater than its policy limits, resulting
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        21-13496               Opinion of the Court                       21

        in substantial prejudice. But Southern-Owners forfeited this argu-
        ment by not raising it in district court. See Blue Martini Kendall,
        LLC v. Miami Dade County, 816 F.3d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 2016).
        Regardless, a post-trial judgment does not affect “the rights of the
        insurer in defense of the cause.” Ramos, 336 So. 2d at 75. The
        judgment could not have affected Southern-Owners’ defense be-
        cause it came after Southern-Owners decided not to provide cov-
        erage.
                Finally, as we have already detailed at length, a reasonable
        jury could (and did) plainly find that Southern-Owners did not
        “show that it [had] exercised diligence and good faith.” Id. Amer-
        ican Builders did everything when it came to investigating Guth-
        rie’s claim and deciding whether the insured should make a pay-
        ment, all while Southern-Owners sat back and watched. The Flor-
        ida Supreme Court has been clear on this point: without good faith,
        an insurer may not avail itself of an affirmative defense based on an
        insured’s failure to cooperate. See id.
               The long and short of it is that, on this record, the evidence
        is not “so overwhelmingly in favor of [Southern-Owners] that a
        reasonable jury could not” have ruled for American Builders on
        bad faith and against Southern-Owners on breach of contract. Mid-
        dlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir.
        2001). We see no error in the denial of Southern-Owners’
        Rule 50(b) motion.
                                         B.
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13496

               Next up is Southern-Owners’ claim that the district court
        abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. South-
        ern-Owners offers four reasons: (1) it did not act in bad faith be-
        cause it was not offered an opportunity to settle; (2) any bad faith
        did not cause American Builders’ damages; (3) American Builders
        breached its contract; and (4) generally, it did not act in bad faith.
                All four of these arguments are retreads of the arguments for
        judgment as a matter of law that we have already rejected. The
        district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial. For
        a new trial, Southern-Owners must show “the verdict ‘[was]
        against the clear weight of the evidence or . . . result[ed] in a mis-
        carriage of justice.’” Chmielewski v. City of St. Pete Beach, 890
        F.3d 942, 948 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). As we’ve already
        explained in some detail, sufficient evidence existed for a rational
        jury to find that: (1) Southern-Owners delayed in its investigation
        and neglected to act on its affirmative duty to settle, Powell, 584
        So. 2d at 14; (2) Southern-Owners’ bad faith caused American
        Builders to suffer damages, Harvey, 259 So. 3d at 7, 11; and
        (3) American Builders did not breach because Southern-Owners
        did not establish substantial prejudice or good faith, Ramos, 336 So.
        2d at 75. The limited evidence favoring Southern-Owners -- its
        multiple requests for extensions of time and the details from the
        Beck interview -- does not amount to “the clear weight of the evi-
        dence.” Chmielewski, 890 F.3d at 948 (citation omitted).
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        21-13496                Opinion of the Court                        23

              The jury’s verdict was not against the clear weight of the
        evidence, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing Southern-Owners’ Rule 59 motion.
                                          C.
               The last issue raised is whether the district court erred in
        denying Southern-Owners’ summary judgment motion because its
        policy purportedly did not cover Guthrie’s injuries. We will not
        consider this issue for two separate reasons.
               First, during oral argument, Southern-Owners maintained
        for the first time that a purely legal issue denied at summary judg-
        ment is appealable after trial. Oral Argument at 24:00–27:45.
        Southern-Owners said nothing about this in its briefing to our
        Court. “We do not consider arguments raised for the first time at
        oral argument.” Hernandez v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 15 F.4th
        1321, 1330 (11th Cir. 2021).
                Second, and in any event, Southern-Owners is incorrect.
        Our circuit has no such legal-issue exception to the general rule
        that “a party may not appeal an order denying summary judgment
        after there has been a full trial on the merits.” Carrizosa v. Chiquita
        Brands Int’l, Inc., 47 F.4th 1278, 1339 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
        marks and citation omitted); see also Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180,
        183–84 (2011) (“May a party . . . appeal an order denying summary
        judgment after a full trial on the merits? Our answer is no.”). In
        Ortiz, the Supreme Court left open the question whether an “issue
        of a ‘purely legal nature’ . . . is preserved for appeal by an
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        24                          Opinion of the Court                        21-13496

        unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.” 562 U.S. at 190 (ci-
        tation omitted). Other circuits are split on the answer to that ques-
        tion.2 Both before and after Ortiz, however, we have repeatedly
        and broadly held that “this Court will not review the pretrial denial
        of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and judgment
        on the merits.” Lind v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F.3d 1281,
        1286 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Akouri v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408
        F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have held that, after a full
        trial and judgment on the merits, we will not review the pretrial
        denial of a motion for summary judgment.”); Pensacola Motor
        Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1219 (11th Cir.
        2012) (same); Scott v. United States, 825 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir.

        2 The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits
        allow appeals of purely legal arguments denied at summary judgment. See,
        e.g., Rothstein v. Carriere, 373 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004); Pennbarr Corp. v.
        Ins. Co. of N. Am., 976 F.2d 145, 149–55 (3d Cir. 1992); McPherson v. Kelsey,
        125 F.3d 989, 995 (6th Cir. 1997); Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320
        F.3d 714, 719–20 (7th Cir. 2003); Pavon v. Swift Transp. Co., 192 F.3d 902, 906
        (9th Cir. 1999); Ruyle v. Cont’l Oil Co., 44 F.3d 837, 841–42 (10th Cir. 1994);
        Feld v. Feld, 688 F.3d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United Techs. Corp. v. Chro-
        malloy Gas Turbine Corp., 189 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Eighth
        Circuit allows appeals of decisions “based on [the] resolution of a preliminary
        legal issue,” like statute of limitations, estoppel, or standing. Kirk v. Schaeffler
        Grp. USA, Inc., 887 F.3d 376, 384 (8th Cir. 2018). The First, Fourth, and Fifth
        Circuits do not allow appeals of any denials of summary judgment after a trial
        on the merits, unless the issues are preserved in a Rule 50 motion. See, e.g., Ji
        v. Bose Corp., 626 F.3d 116, 127–28 (1st Cir. 2010); Chesapeake Paper Prods.
        Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 51 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995); Feld
        Motor Sports, Inc. v. Traxxas, L.P., 861 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 2017).
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        21-13496              Opinion of the Court                      25

        2016) (same); St. Louis Condo. Ass’n., 5 F.4th at 1242 (same); Car-
        rizosa, 47 F.4th at 1339 (same).
              AFFIRMED.