Court Opinion

ID: 9742191
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:08:12.995989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:29.323010
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting: I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Industrial Commission’s second decision in this case, on remand from the circuit court, is entitled to greater deference than its initial decision. For that reason, I respectfully dissent. In this case, the circuit court reversed the Commission’s initial decision, finding that it was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. On reconsideration of the same record — the parties did not present any additional evidence — the Commission then reached a different result. The majority concludes from this chronology that the Commission’s later decision is entitled to greater deference because it represents the Commission’s last word on the subject. I do not agree. Reading the circuit court’s initial order, the Commission understandably believed that it was to reach a different result on remand, and it did so. Accordingly, I do not agree with the majority that the Commission’s later decision should command more deference than its original one. In my view, the Commission’s first decision, which represents the Commission’s original view of the evidence, is entitled to greater deference. In its first decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the decision of the arbitrator, who concluded that the claimant’s respiratory condition was not caused by exposure to coal dust. The arbitrator’s decision carefully reviewed the testimony of the three expert witnesses in the case, who disagreed on the question whether the claimant was suffering from coal worker’s pneumoconiosis, but who all found the claimant’s history of smoking to be significant. It is within the province of the Commission to judge the credibility of witnesses, to draw reasonable inferences from their testimony, and to determine what weight the testimony is to be given. Parro v. Industrial Comm’n, 167 Ill. 2d 385, 396 (1995). Accordingly, the decision of the Industrial Commission on a question of fact will not be disturbed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lee v. Industrial Comm’n, 167 Ill. 2d 77, 82 (1995); Brady v. Louis Ruffolo & Sons Construction Co., 143 Ill. 2d 542, 549 (1991); Orsini v. Industrial Comm’n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44 (1987). I do not believe that the Commission’s first decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the appellate court, Industrial Commission division, which upheld the Commission’s original decision in this case.