Court Opinion

ID: 9378217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 19:00:35.018267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.569017
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50411         Document: 00516670933             Page: 1     Date Filed: 03/09/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                            March 9, 2023
                                        No. 22-50411
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   Arturo S. Lopez, Sr.,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Frank Kendall, III, Secretary of the Air Force; Mary D. Garcia,
   Human Resource Specialist, Employee Relations Labor, Laughlin Air Force
   Base,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 5:21-CV-646

   Before Clement, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Arturo S. Lopez, Sr., brought retaliation claims under Title VII of the
   Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., against
   the Secretary of the Air Force and Mary Garcia, an Air Force Human
   Resources Specialist. Lopez’s civil complaint alleges that Garcia retaliated
   against him for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII. The

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-50411

   only relevant document attached to the pleading is a memorandum sent by
   the Air Force to Lopez informing him that he could file a federal suit because
   an investigation into his Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
   complaint had not been completed within 180 days.
          The defendants moved to dismiss Lopez’s civil complaint under
   Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on administrative exhaustion
   grounds. The defendants attached Lopez’s EEO complaint to their motion
   to dismiss. That document states that Garcia “discriminated against [Lopez]
   on May 14, 2020[,] when [Lopez] was made aware through [an] e[-]mail that
   [he] received [from] the . . . Merit Systems [P]rotection [B]oard” that Garcia
   “intentionally and maliciously made and falsified entries” on his records.
   The defendants also attached an EEO counselor’s report to support a time-
   based affirmative defense that Lopez did not contact an EEO counselor until
   August 6, 2020, which was past the statutorily required period for reporting
   his claim. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1) (45-day requirement for reporting).
   Neither the EEO report nor the alleged facts on which defendants based their
   affirmative defense were expressly referenced in Lopez’s civil complaint or
   contained in the documents attached thereto.
          Relying on the EEO complaint and EEO counselor’s report, the
   magistrate judge recommended that the district court dismiss Lopez’s civil
   complaint because Lopez failed timely to contact an EEO counselor before
   filing suit. See id. The district court adopted the recommendation and
   dismissed Lopez’s claims. Lopez now appeals. Because we conclude that
   the district court misapplied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, we reverse and
   remand.
          Our review is de novo. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir.
   2006). And, like the district court, our consideration is “limited to the
   complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents

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   attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced
   by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), LP v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d
   383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Collins v. Morgan Stanley
   Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 2000) (defendants may attach
   documents to a motion to dismiss to “assist[] the plaintiff in establishing the
   basis of the suit” if the documents “are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint
   and are central to [his] claim”).
          Because it is a mandatory claims processing rule, not a jurisdictional
   requirement, failure to exhaust administrative remedies under Title VII is an
   affirmative defense. See Ft. Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850–51
   (2019). “[D]ismissal under [R]ule 12(b)(6) may be appropriate based on a
   successful affirmative defense,” when the defense “appear[s] on the face of
   the complaint.” EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,
   467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Stevens v. St. Tammany Par. Gov’t,
   17 F.4th 563, 571 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he [affirmative] defense is abundantly
   clear on the face of the pleadings, which incorporate and repeatedly refer to
   the state court litigation. Therefore, it was properly considered here at the
   motion to dismiss stage.”).
          To exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing a Title VII
   action in federal court, Lopez was required to “initiate contact with [an EEO]
   [c]ounselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be
   discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). Indeed, “[f]ailure to notify the
   EEO counselor in a timely fashion may bar a claim” unless the claimant
   successfully asserts “a defense of waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling.”
   Pacheco v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1992). Relevant here, the 45-day
   time limit is extended when the claimant “shows that . . . he or she did not
   know and reasonably should not have [] known that the discriminatory matter
   or personnel action occurred.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2). The district
   court dismissed Lopez’s claims because he failed timely to exhaust his

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   administrative remedies, i.e., his “EEO counseling exceed[ed] the 45-day
   deadline required by statute[.]”
           But in dismissing Lopez’s claims, the district court relied on
   documents, the EEO complaint and the EEO counselor’s report, that were
   not attached to or explicitly referenced by the civil complaint. See Lone Star
   Fund V, 594 F.3d at 387.1 Relying on those documents, the district court
   concluded that Lopez had access to information about the alleged retaliation
   on May 14, 2020, yet failed to contact an EEO counselor until August 6,
   2020, well more than 45 days later. Neither Lopez’s civil complaint nor the
   Air Force memorandum attached to it mention the August 6 EEO contact.
   And even assuming that Lopez’s EEO complaint was appropriately
   considered in deciding the defendants’ motion to dismiss, that document
   does not refer to an August 6 contact, either. The EEO complaint merely
   includes a checkmark indicating that Lopez “discussed [his] complaint with
   an [EEO] counselor.” Therefore, the district court appears to have plucked
   August 6 as Lopez’s initial EEO contact solely from the EEO counselor’s
   report, which was not attached to or referenced in Lopez’s civil complaint or
   the documents attached to it.
           The district court thus improperly relied upon the EEO counselor’s
   report in determining that the defendants’ administrative exhaustion defense
   appeared “on the face of the complaint.” EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., 467

           1
              It is at least arguable that the EEO complaint is “referenced by the complaint”
   and by the Air Force memorandum attached to it, Lone Star Fund V, 594 F.3d at 387, and
   it is certainly central to Lopez’s civil complaint, as Garcia’s alleged discrimination is the
   subject of both the EEO complaint and this action. But our decision does not turn on the
   EEO complaint. To glean both the initial date Lopez purportedly had knowledge of the
   alleged discrimination and the date of his initial EEO contact, the district court could not
   rely upon Lopez’s EEO complaint alone.

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                                   No. 22-50411

   F.3d at 470; cf. Lone Star Fund V, 594 F.3d at 387. Doing so ran afoul of the
   Rule 12(b)(6) standard, such that dismissal on the pleadings was premature.
          Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and
   the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.

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