Court Opinion

ID: 9389074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 16:07:38.374484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:24.225834
License: Public Domain

J-S07035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee              :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 ERNEST REGINALD MORRIS                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :       No. 1992 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 19, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0005182-2005

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED APRIL 24, 2023

      Appellant, Ernest Reginald Morris, appeals pro se from the order entered

in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his serial

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      The PCRA court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

         A jury found [Appellant] guilty of conspiracy, murder of the
         first degree, murder of an unborn child, two counts of
         murder of the second degree, kidnapping and related
         offenses stemming from the January 31, 2005, shooting
         deaths of Shawne Mims, Jennifer Pennington and
         Pennington’s unborn child. He received three consecutive
         terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole,
         plus a consecutive term of incarceration of 43 to 90 years.
         The Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on
         direct appeal [on November 1, 2010] and our Supreme
         Court denied allowance of appeal on December 29, 2011.
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       [Appellant] filed a PCRA petition in July 2012, which this
       court dismissed without an evidentiary hearing on August
       20, 2013. The Superior Court affirmed the dismissal[ on
       October 10, 2014, and our Supreme Court denied allowance
       of appeal on February 4, 2015]. Commonwealth v.
       Morris, 108 A.3d 110 (Pa.Super. [2014), appeal denied,
       631 Pa. 712, 109 A.3d 679 (2015)]. [Appellant] filed a pro
       se PCRA petition in June 2018, which this court dismissed
       as untimely on February 13, 2019.

       [Appellant] filed the instant serial pro se PCRA on December
       14, 2021. He conceded the facial untimeliness of the
       petition, but alleged he met the governmental interference
       and newly discovered fact exceptions to the PCRA’s
       limitations period codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i, ii).
       In particular, he claimed to have learned for the first time
       on August 21, 2020, from fellow inmate Thomas Drew that
       a trial witness against [Appellant], Wayne Caldwell,
       allegedly had a history of informing for, and receiving
       favorable treatment from, the government. [Appellant]
       claimed he then pursued and eventually received records on
       November 8, 2021, related to an open guilty plea involving
       Caldwell and his sentencing on January 14, 2010.

       The court gave [Appellant] notice on March [2], 2022, of its
       intention to dismiss the serial petition without a hearing due
       to untimeliness.      [Appellant] subsequently received an
       extension of 45 days in which to respond to the notice.
       Rather than respond to the substance of the notice,
       however, and without court permission, [Appellant] filed a
       supplemental petition on March 23, 2022.1 He reasserted
       the claims related to Caldwell and added similar claims
       related to trial witness Laverne Brewer. Again without court
       approval, [Appellant] filed a second supplemental petition
       on May 12, 2022, reiterating the claims related to Caldwell
       and Brewer and claiming governmental interference and
       new facts related to trial witnesses Kristen Holmes and
       Kathleen Somers-Wells.

          1[Appellant] also filed a separate petition seeking the
          recusal of the undersigned, which was denied on April
          14, 2022.

       This court dismissed the serial petition by Order dated July

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           19, 2022, for the reasons stated in the notice of intent to
           dismiss.2 [Appellant] appealed and subsequently produced
           a court-ordered Pa.R.[A].P. 1925(b) concise statement of
           errors.

              2 In dismissing the petition, the court considered
              [Appellant’s] supplemental petition and second
              supplemental petition, which were filed without leave
              of court, only to the extent that they failed to respond
              to the substance of the notice of intent to dismiss.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed September 27, 2022, at 1-3).

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

           Did [Appellant] satisfy the governmental interference and
           new facts exceptions to excuse a late PCRA petition, where
           [Appellant] uncovered exculpatory evidence that was never
           provided by the Commonwealth in violation of Brady[1]?

           Did the Commonwealth violate [Appellant’s] due process
           rights and violate the mandate of Brady by: a) failing to
           disclose cooperation agreements with witnesses Wayne
           Caldwell, Laverne Brewer, and Kristin Holmes; b) failing to
           disclose Caldwell’s exceptionally long history and practice of
           informant work in exchange for leniency in his own cases;
           c) suppressing evidence of Caldwell’s extensive criminal
           history; d) not informing [Appellant] that Brewer and
           witness Kathleen Wells were ordered to have regular contact
           with a member of the prosecution team for a period of three
           years leading up to [Appellant’s] trial; e) never disclosing
           Holmes’ psychiatric reports where she suffered from severe
           mental illness?

           Did the PCRA court err by failing to conduct an evidentiary
           hearing?

           Did the PCRA court err by refusing to rule on [Appellant’s]
           Motion   for   Discovery,   in   light    of   “exceptional
           circumstances?”

____________________________________________

1   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

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          Did the PCRA court err by denying [Appellant’s] Motion to
          Recuse Judge Steven T. O’Neill?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that he filed the current PCRA petition

within one year of obtaining the transcript of Caldwell’s guilty plea and

sentencing hearing that disclosed an agreement in place for Caldwell’s

cooperation, and that initiated Appellant’s investigation into Caldwell’s work

as an informant. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth failed to disclose

that Caldwell received lenient treatment in his own case in exchange for his

testimony against Appellant. Appellant claims Caldwell also had a history of

being a state and federal government informant that remained undisclosed to

Appellant and hidden by the Commonwealth for over a decade.             Appellant

maintains that Caldwell’s past cooperation included informant work for the FBI

in up to 60 investigations, and he repeatedly received consideration for that

cooperation in his own criminal cases. Appellant insists this information would

have been vital to the defense because Caldwell was a key Commonwealth

witness, and his testimony was the only evidence establishing Appellant’s

motive.

      Prior to speaking with Thomas Drew in August 2020, Appellant contends

he had no facts or proof to support his mere belief that Caldwell was

cooperating with the government. Appellant posits that his mere belief could

not have formed the basis for an earlier PCRA petition. Appellant submits that

he did not have any information to establish a factual basis that an agreement

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existed between Caldwell and the Commonwealth until Appellant acquired

Caldwell’s transcripts on November 8, 2021. Appellant emphasizes that the

transcripts were the material evidence which formed the basis for Appellant’s

claims.

      Appellant further argues that he believed he attached a “request to

amend” to his supplemental PCRA petitions.          Appellant asserts that he

ultimately discovered he did not file the request to amend.         Nevertheless,

Appellant claims the court should have permitted Appellant to correct the

defect in the supplemental petitions by allowing Appellant to seek leave to

amend. Appellant emphasizes that when he learned he had not attached the

request for leave to amend to the supplemental petitions, he sought leave to

amend, but the court failed to rule on that request.

      Appellant   claims   that   his   current   PCRA   petition   satisfies   the

governmental interference exception to the PCRA time-bar because the

Commonwealth interfered with Appellant’s ability to raise the claim sooner

because prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence demonstrating that

Caldwell was engaged in the practice of informing on others to Caldwell’s own

benefit.   Appellant insists the Commonwealth further failed to disclose

Caldwell’s crimen falsi convictions and his extensive criminal history.

Appellant avers the Commonwealth failed to provide the following Brady

material: (1) Caldwell was a career criminal with crimen falsi convictions; (2)

had an extensive history of informing on others, assisting in as many as 60

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FBI   investigations;   (3)   had   reached   an   actual   agreement   with   the

Commonwealth where he was given a specific promise of leniency in exchange

for testifying against Appellant; and (4) had been encouraged and permitted

by the Commonwealth to give false testimony.

      Appellant maintains that he could not have discovered Caldwell’s

transcripts earlier with the exercise of due diligence.      Appellant notes that

there is no longer a public record presumption, such that the court could have

presumed that Appellant could have gained access to transcripts contained in

Caldwell’s federal criminal case file. Appellant insists that he was entitled to

rely upon the Commonwealth’s assertion that all exculpatory materials had

been turned over; Appellant had no reason to believe that the Commonwealth

violated Brady until he reviewed Caldwell’s transcripts.         Based on these

claims, Appellant suggests his PCRA petition also satisfies the “newly-

discovered facts” exception to the PCRA time-bar. Appellant concludes the

PCRA court erred by dismissing his petition as untimely, and this Court must

grant relief. We disagree.

      The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, 654 Pa. 600, 216 A.3d 1044 (2019). A PCRA petition must be filed

within one year of the date the underlying judgment becomes final.             42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed final at the conclusion of direct

review or at the expiration of time for seeking review.          42 Pa.C.S.A. §

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9545(b)(3). Generally, to obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more

than one year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner

must allege and prove at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:

         (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
         of interference by government officials with the presentation
         of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
         Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
         States;

         (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).     “Any petition invoking an exception

provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within one year of the date the claim

could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

      “Although a Brady violation may fall within the governmental

interference exception, the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to raise

the claim was the result of interference by government officials, and the

information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due

diligence.”   Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 596 Pa. 219, 227, 941 A.2d

1263, 1268 (2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S.Ct. 271, 172 L.Ed.2d

201 (2008).

      To meet the “newly-discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in

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Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate “he did not know the

facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts

earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111

A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015).       Due diligence demands that a PCRA

petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. Id.

     Instantly, Appellant concedes that his current PCRA petition is facially

untimely. In addressing whether Appellant satisfied a timeliness exception,

the PCRA court reasoned:

        Here, the petition filed on December 14, 2021, did not plead
        a basis for this court to determine that he could not have
        raised his claims related to Caldwell sooner. Indeed, while
        [Appellant] asserted that he did not know about Caldwell’s
        alleged history of testifying for the Commonwealth in
        exchange for leniency until speaking with fellow inmate
        Thomas Drew in August 2020, the affidavit from Drew that
        [Appellant] attached to his petition belies that assertion.
        Notably, Drew states in the affidavit that [Appellant] told
        him on August 21, 2020, that [Appellant] already suspected
        Caldwell had been given favorable treatment for his
        testimony against [Appellant].      See Petition for Post-
        Conviction Relief, filed 12/14/21, Exh. “A.” [Appellant] did
        not plead, however, an explanation for why he did not act
        on this prior suspicion with more diligence and in a more
        timely manner.        He, therefore, failed to demonstrate
        through his own pleadings that he could not have discovered
        sooner the purported new facts and governmental
        interference allegedly related to Caldwell.

        In addition, when advised in the notice of intent to dismiss
        that he did not meet the asserted exceptions to the PCRA’s
        limitations period, [Appellant] did not [seek] to address the
        defect; instead he filed a series of supplemental petitions
        without court permission, raising additional claims of
        governmental interference and new facts in connection with
        Brewer, Holmes and Somers-Wells. The failure to receive
        court permission before supplementing his petition is fatal

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         to those additional claims. See Commonwealth v. Porter,
         [613 Pa. 510, 523-24,] 35 A.3d 4, 12 ([2012]) (stating that
         amendment of a PCRA is permitted only by direction or leave
         of the court).4 This court, therefore, properly determined
         that it lacked jurisdiction to consider [Appellant’s] untimely
         claims.

               4 Even had [Appellant’s] claims related to Brewer,
               Holmes and Somers-Wells been properly asserted,
               they fail for the same reasons as his claims related to
               Caldwell. Indeed, while [Appellant] alleged that he
               only learned of the claims related to Caldwell in
               August 2020, he did not plead an explanation as to
               why he could not have learned sooner of the claims
               related to Brewer, Holmes and Somers-Wells.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5-6). The record supports the court’s decision that

Appellant cannot satisfy a time-bar exception.

      At the outset, Appellant’s proffered time-bar claim is more properly

construed as one under the “newly-discovered facts” exception.           Although

Appellant also cites the “governmental interference” exception, Appellant does

not explain how government officials interfered with his ability to present his

claim sooner by somehow prohibiting Appellant from accessing Caldwell’s

transcripts.       Rather, Appellant seeks to argue that the transcripts from

Caldwell’s guilty plea and sentencing proceedings constitute “new facts”

because they allegedly show that Caldwell received a lenient sentence in

exchange for his testimony against Appellant, that Caldwell had a significant

previous criminal history and history as an informant, and these facts were

not disclosed to Appellant at the time of his trial constituting a violation of

Brady.

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      Nevertheless, our review of the guilty plea and sentencing transcripts

from Caldwell’s proceedings makes clear that no deal was in place regarding

Caldwell’s testimony against Appellant.      To be sure, Caldwell’s guilty plea

hearing transcript confirms that Caldwell entered an open guilty plea on

August 21, 2009, to access device fraud and related offenses, and there was

no agreement or promises made in exchange for Caldwell’s guilty plea. The

judge expressly stated that what the court would sentence Caldwell to had

“absolutely nothing to do with [Caldwell] being a witness in [Appellant’s] case

and what [the court] would give [as a sentence] in [Caldwell’s] case.” (N.T.

Caldwell’s Plea Hearing, 8/21/09, at 17, attached to Appellant’s PCRA Petition,

filed 12/14/21). The court went on to say that “even though I happen to be

presiding on [Appellant’s] case, I have nothing—I never knew anything about

this, this case just happens to be—so no expectation between you and I[.]”

(Id.) Following Caldwell’s guilty plea, the court deferred sentencing pending

a pre-sentence investigation report.

      Following the plea, Caldwell testified against Appellant on September

17, 2009. Caldwell proceeded to sentencing on January 14, 2010, in his own

case. At that time, Caldwell’s counsel sought leniency based on Caldwell’s

testimony against Appellant.     Specifically, Caldwell’s counsel noted that

Caldwell was in fear for his life that Appellant or others would seek to exact

revenge on Caldwell. The Commonwealth then confirmed that when Caldwell

pled guilty there were no deals in place and the court would be fashioning

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Caldwell’s sentence. (See N.T. Caldwell’s Sentencing Hearing, 1/14/10, at

29, attached to Appellant’s PCRA Petition, filed 12/14/21). Nevertheless, the

Commonwealth acknowledged that Caldwell put his safety at risk by testifying

against Appellant, so the Commonwealth declined to seek a specific sentence.

(See id. at 31).     In fashioning Caldwell’s sentence, the court noted the

dangers of being a “snitch” and the actual violence that might befall Caldwell

based on his testimony against Appellant. The court said it would impose a

mitigated sentence, by a few months, so that the court could keep Caldwell in

county jail instead of a state correctional institution for Caldwell’s own safety.

Thus, the court imposed concurrent terms of 11½ to 23 months’ imprisonment

for Caldwell’s convictions plus a lengthy probationary tail. The court warned

Caldwell that if he violated his probation, the court would not afford Caldwell

the same leniency again. (Id. at 37).

      On this record, we cannot agree with Appellant that he has uncovered

any “new fact” based on Caldwell’s “deal” with the Commonwealth in exchange

for Caldwell’s testimony, to satisfy the first prong of the time-bar exception.

To the contrary, the transcripts from Caldwell’s guilty plea and sentencing

proceedings are consistent with Caldwell’s testimony at Appellant’s trial that

he merely hoped for leniency in his own case. In this respect, the transcripts

are merely a new source for previously known information (that Caldwell

hoped for leniency in his own sentence) and offer no “new facts.” See Brown,

supra (explaining     that focus on      exception   set forth under      Section

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9545(b)(1)(ii) is on newly discovered facts, not on newly discovered or newly

willing source for previously known facts). Appellant’s interpretation of the

transcripts as demonstrating a deal in place between Caldwell and the

Commonwealth in exchange for Caldwell’s testimony is simply a misreading

of the transcripts or plucking sentences from those transcripts without proper

context.

         Regarding Appellant’s remaining claims pertaining to Caldwell’s prior

criminal record and history of being an informant, we agree with the PCRA

court that Appellant has failed to show that he could not have uncovered the

transcripts in Caldwell’s case sooner by the exercise of due diligence. On this

point,    Appellant   makes   much   of   our   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in

Commonwealth v. Small, 662 Pa. 309, 238 A.3d 1267 (2020). In Small,

our Supreme Court made clear there is no longer a “public record

presumption” pursuant to which a court may find that information available to

the public is not a fact that was previously “unknown” to the petitioner.

Nevertheless, the Court clarified, “that [Appellant] is relieved of the public

record presumption does not mean that [Appellant] prevails.… The textual

requirements of the time-bar exception remain.”      Id. at 340, 238 A.3d at

1286. Therefore, “although Small eliminates the public record presumption,

it does not abrogate the requirement that petitioners perform due diligence to

discover the facts upon which their claim is predicated.” Commonwealth v.

Keener, No. 1165 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 2359373, at *4 (Pa.Super. June 30,

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2022) (unpublished memorandum).2

       Here, Thomas Drew’s affidavit attached to Appellant’s current PCRA

petition states that Appellant had suspicions about Caldwell’s cooperation with

the government. Appellant provides no explanation for why he could not have

accessed Caldwell’s criminal docket and transcripts in the decade between

Appellant’s trial and the filing of his current PCRA petition in an effort to

confirm or dispel his suspicions.          See id.   Had Appellant exercised due

diligence in accessing the criminal docket and transcripts for Caldwell’s case

sooner, he would have obtained the information on which his current claims

are predicated.

       Regarding the other Commonwealth witnesses Brewer, Holmes, and

Somers-Wells, Appellant raised claims concerning those witnesses for the first

time in supplemental PCRA petitions filed without leave of court. The PCRA

court accurately observed that an “amendment [to a PCRA petition] is

permitted only by direction or leave of the PCRA court.” Porter, supra at

523-24, 35 A.3d at 12. Nevertheless, the record shows that Appellant filed a

motion on May 5, 2022, seeking an extension of time to supplement his PCRA

petition.   Appellant filed another motion on July 8, 2022, seeking leave to

supplement or amend his PCRA petition. The PCRA court did not rule on these

motions. Because “[a]mendment[s to a PCRA petition] shall be freely allowed

____________________________________________

2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on non-precedential decisions
from this Court filed after May 1, 2019, for persuasive value).

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to achieve substantial justice,” (see Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(A)), we will not

disregard Appellant’s supplemental petitions.

       Significantly, however, Appellant provides no analysis on appeal of a

time-bar exception concerning the information related to Brewer, Holmes, and

Somers-Wells. (See Appellant’s Brief at 12-18). Instead, Appellant dedicates

his argument concerning the proffered time-bar exceptions to the information

involving Caldwell.      Appellant merely indicates that his investigation into

Caldwell “motivated him to learn more about the circumstances surrounding

the testimony of” Brewer, Somers-Wells and Holmes. (See Appellant’s Reply

Brief at 4). This statement is insufficient to constitute a developed argument

concerning a time-bar exception for the claims related to Brewer, Somers-

Wells and Holmes. Therefore, Appellant has not satisfied a time-bar exception

and Appellant’s current PCRA petition remains untimely.3

       In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA judge was the same

jurist who sentenced Caldwell. Appellant claims the PCRA court “inadvertently

____________________________________________

3 Based on our disposition that Appellant’s current petition is untimely and the
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the underlying
Brady claims, we need not address Appellant’s second issue on appeal.
Likewise, we need not address Appellant’s third or fourth issues, seeking
discovery and an evidentiary hearing. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E) (stating
discovery is not permitted during PCRA proceedings in non-capital cases,
absent showing of exceptional circumstances. See also Commonwealth v.
Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 398, 218
A.3d 380 (2019) (stating PCRA court is not required to hold evidentiary
hearing where court is able to determine from record that relief is
unavailable).

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became a witness of the Commonwealth’s concealment of exculpatory

evidence that was never disclosed to [Appellant].” (Appellant’s Brief at 34).

Further, Appellant insists the PCRA court has shown hostility toward Appellant

at various times over the life of his case, including in pre-trial hearings.4

Appellant concludes the court erred by denying his recusal motion, and this

Court must vacate the order denying PCRA relief, and remand for an

evidentiary hearing before a new jurist. We disagree.

       With respect to Appellant’s recusal motion, our scope and standard of

review are as follows:

          The standards for recusal are well established. It is the
          burden of the party requesting recusal to produce evidence
          establishing bias, prejudice or unfairness which raises a
          substantial doubt as to the jurist’s ability to preside
          impartially.

              In considering a recusal request, the jurist must first
              make a conscientious determination of his or her
              ability to assess the case in an impartial manner, free
              of personal bias or interest in the outcome. The jurist
              must then consider whether his or her continued
              involvement in the case creates an appearance of
              impropriety and/or would tend to undermine public
              confidence in the judiciary. This is a personal and
              unreviewable decision that only the jurist can make.
              Where a jurist rules that he or she can hear and
              dispose of a case fairly and without prejudice, that
              decision will not be overruled on appeal but for an
              abuse of discretion.     In reviewing a denial of a
              disqualification motion, we recognize that our judges
____________________________________________

4 Appellant did not make this particular claim in his recusal motion filed March
23, 2022. As Appellant raises this claim for the first time on appeal, it is
waived and we will give it no further attention. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating
issues raised for first time on appeal are waived).

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            are honorable, fair and competent.

Commonwealth v. Dip, 221 A.3d 201, 206 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied,

658 Pa. 542, 229 A.3d 567 (2020) (internal citations omitted).

      Further, a recusal request must be timely made. Commonwealth v.

Blount, 207 A.3d 925, 930 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 583,

218 A.3d 1198 (2019). “[A] party must seek recusal of a jurist at the earliest

possible moment, i.e., when the party knows of the facts that form the basis

for a motion to recuse. If the party fails to present a motion to recuse at that

time, then the party’s recusal issue is time-barred and waived.” Id. at 930-

31.

      Instantly, the court addressed Appellant’s claim for recusal as follows:

         [Appellant] claimed in a motion to recuse…that the
         undersigned had a duty to recuse himself because he
         presided over an open guilty plea and sentencing involving
         Caldwell in 2010. As an initial matter, the motion is
         untimely.   [Appellant] alleged in his petition, filed on
         December 14, 2021, that Caldwell had received leniency in
         exchange for his testimony against [Appellant], but he did
         not move for the undersigned’s recusal until March 23,
         2022, after issuance of the notice of intent to dismiss on
         March 2, 2022. The motion, therefore, raises the…troubling
         concern…where a defendant moves for recusal after
         receiving an adverse ruling.

         Additionally, the undersigned made a conscientious
         determination that recusal was not warranted because the
         undersigned was able to adjudicate the petition in an
         impartial manner and the undersigned’s continued
         involvement would create neither an appearance of
         impropriety nor tend to undermine public confidence in the
         judiciary. [Appellant], therefore, is not entitled to relief on
         this final claim.

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(PCRA Court Opinion at 9) (emphasis in original).

      Initially, Appellant’s recusal issue is arguably moot, as he seems to claim

the PCRA judge should recuse himself if further proceedings continue upon

remand.   (See Appellant’s Brief at 33).      As we are not remanding for an

evidentiary hearing, there are no further proceedings that will occur. To the

extent Appellant argues that the court should not have ruled on Appellant’s

PCRA petition because it had previously presided over matters involving

Caldwell, we observe that Appellant attached the guilty plea and sentencing

transcripts involving Caldwell to his current PCRA petition. Those transcripts

make clear that the PCRA judge involved in Appellant’s case (who also

presided over Appellant’s jury trial) presided over Caldwell’s proceedings.

Thus, Appellant could have moved for recusal at that time. Instead, Appellant

did not seek recusal until after the court issued Rule 907 notice. Under these

circumstances, we agree with the PCRA court that the recusal motion was

untimely. See Blount, supra.

      Moreover,   as   discussed   above,     the   transcripts   from   Caldwell’s

proceedings belie Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth made

Caldwell any deal in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. Thus, even

if Appellant’s recusal motion was timely, we would see no abuse of discretion

in the court’s denial of the motion, as there was no appearance of impropriety

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in this case.5 See Dip, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA

relief.

          Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2023

____________________________________________

5 Appellant has filed two applications for relief in this Court, alleging that
during the pendency of this appeal he has uncovered additional evidence of
Brady violations. Appellant asked us to remand to the PCRA court so that he
can further pursue these claims.      Based on our disposition, we deny
Appellant’s requests for remand. Appellant is free to raise his new claims in
a serial PCRA petition, where he must first plead and prove the court’s
jurisdiction to consider same.

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