Court Opinion

ID: 9725549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:52:23.011493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:16.404905
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Mote, P.J.
— The majority opinion and decision herein appears to be predicated upon alleged error of the trial court in the giving of appellee’s tendered Instructions Numbers 5, 8 and 20, which are as follows:
“Instruction No. 5. The defense of contributory negligence is an issue in this case.
“Instruction No. 8. The plaintiff was under a duty to give her driver a timely warning of any approaching danger *6which she saw or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have seen when it appeared that her driver was unaware of such approaching danger.
“Instruction No. 20. The law of this State does not recognize the doctrine of comparative negligence.
“Therefore, if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff was negligent and that such negligence proximately contributed to cause his injuries, the Plaintiff cannot recover on account.”
The reasons asserted for such error is that contributory negligence is not an issue in the cause and that there is no evidence of such contributory negligence in the record. The presumption, I suppose, is that it is prejudicial and reversible error to instruct a jury on a theory proof of which is absent from the record.
While I have no dispute with the theory, I am not impressed with the contention that contributory negligence, by its very definition and a definition called upon in support of the majority, was not a factor to be considered by the jury. Not, of course, that appellant in fact was guilty of contributory negligence, but that the jury would have an opportunity to determine the issue.
It is difficult for me to perceive, without a stipulation or agreement in the record, a situation involving a claim for damages at common law which would entirely eliminate from the consideration of the jury whether the claimant, as here, was or was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Does not the jury, and not the court, possess the role of determining whether a passenger in an automobile “has used that degree of care for his own safety that an ordinary prudent person in like circumstances would use.”
It seems to me that Kaminski v. Meadows, 264 F. 2d 53, (7th Cir . . . 1959) ; and Tuttle v. Reid (1964), 198 N. E. 2d 610, sustain my view.
That “a guest cannot be charged with contributory negligence if, by such use of his eyes and ears as the situation per*7mits, and such as a prudent person would have made, he fails to discover a peril in time to avoid an accident” may be admitted. But to reverse a trial court judgment based upon a jury verdict with the conclusion that appellant upheld her duty as a passenger to warn the driver and under the circumstances of this ease completely, and as a matter of law, proceeds too far for my own imagination, at least.
It is my view that the record evidence and the legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom required submission to the jury the question of contributory negligence.
I would affirm the judgment.
Note. — Reported in 221 N. E. 2d 452.