Court Opinion

ID: 9685382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:35:26.202467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:05.310056
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring).
In my special writing in State v. Flittie, 425 N.W.2d 1, 6 (S.D.1988) (Henderson, J., concurring in part, concurring in result in part), I strove to preserve the integrity of State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.1976) (Opperman II). This Court, in Op-perman II, extended broader protection against unreasonable search and seizure under our state constitution than the United States Supreme Court did under the Fourth Amendment:
We are mindful that the United States Supreme Court found that the inventory procedure followed in this case did not amount to an “unreasonable search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, [428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) ]. That decision is binding on this court as a matter of federal constitutional law. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 65 S.Ct. 459, 89 L.Ed. 789 [(1945)]. “However, manifestly the question remains for us to decide whether it offends any of the provisions of our own constitution and we are under no compulsion to follow the United States Supreme Court in that regard.” House of Seagram v. Assam Drug Co., 1970, 85 S.D. 27, 32, 176 N.W.2d 491, 494.
There can be no doubt that this court has the power to provide an individual with greater protection under the state constitution than does the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 1975, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570.
Opperman II, 247 N.W.2d at 674 (footnote omitted).
Opperman II and Flittie, however, dealt with warrantless automobile searches, a different facet of the law of search and seizure. The present case involves a search undertaken pursuant to a warrant, bringing into play the Leon/Sheppard “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule. The long and convoluted history of the exclusionary rule in South Dakota, attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, convinces this writer that we can follow Leon without jettisoning Opper-man II, and, on that basis, I can concur with the majority opinion. While this Court may extend broader protection than that of the Fourth Amendment, there is no requirement that it must do so in all contexts. The rationale behind the “good faith” exception, that justice is not served by exclusion of evidence where such exclusion can have no deterrent effect on police lawlessness, is sound.
HISTORY-EXCLUSIONARY RULE
1909—State v. Madison, 23 S.D. 584, 122 N.W. 647 (Common law: Relevant evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant was not to be excluded even if illegally obtained.)
1931—State v. Gooder, 57 S.D. 619, 234 N.W. 610 (Federal exclusionary rule adopted, although still a minority position among state courts: “[A]s was said by Justice Holmes: ‘We are free to choose between two principles of policy,’ and we think that the application of the federal rule is choosing the *830lesser of the two evils.” 57 S.D. at 626, 234 N.W. at 613.)
1935 — 1935 South Dakota Session Laws, ch. 96, §§ 1 and 2 (Gooder overridden by statute: Section 1 provided that the finding of evidence pursuant to a search warrant was conclusive proof that there was probable cause for the issue of the warrant, while Section 2 provided that defects or insufficiencies in search warrants or underlying affidavits did not justify exclusion of evidence seized.)
1957—State v. Lane, 76 S.D. 544, 82 N.W.2d 286 (1935 South Dakota Session Laws, ch. 96, § 1, was held unconstitutional, but § 2 was upheld as merely amending a judicial rule of exclusion.) (Henderson J., special writer in this case, then urging unconstitutionality some 31 years ago as a young attorney.)
1960 — SDC 34.1102 enacted (This essentially was a reenactment of 1935 South Dakota Session Laws, ch. 96, § 2.)
1961—Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (Due process requires a state to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence.)
1963-Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (Constitutionality of state searches is to be judged under the same standards as federal searches under the Fourth Amendment.)
1966—State v. McCreary, 82 S.D. 111, 142 N.W.2d 240 (Mapp was applied by this Court, striking down SDC 34.1102 as unconstitutional — A search warrant must be valid for evidence seized pursuant to it to be admitted.)
1976—State v. Overman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D.) (This Court, under the state constitution, may provide wider protection against unreasonable search and seizure than the Fourth Amendment— “Inventory search” of an automobile’s glove compartment, on Opperman’s facts, was held unreasonable under the state, not the federal, constitution and evidence thereby seized was excluda-ble.)
1982-State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.) (Search of a vehicle’s glove compartment during search incident to a legal arrest, as opposed to a later “inventory” search, was held reasonable under the state constitution.)
1984-United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737, establishing “good faith” exclusionary rule as part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
1985-State v. Jackson, 371 N.W.2d 341, 344-45 (S.D.) (Henderson, J., concurring in result) {Leon/Sheppard “good faith” exception first noted as radically changing the law of evidence.) This latter statement of “radically changing the law of evidence” by this special writer, I tendered after the Iverson case now cited in Justice Sabers’ dissent. I full well knew of the enormous impact of Leon/Sheppard when I wrote the concurrence in .result in Jackson.
FEELING THEIR OATS
Appreciating that newspapers are not legal authority but often express, succinctly, current mood swings in our country, I deign to refer to the Wall Street Journal, front page, Wednesday, June 15, 1988. This article is captioned “Asserting Rights, State Supreme Courts Are Feeling Their Oats About Civil Liberties.” Specifically, the State of New Jersey is portrayed as having a Supreme Court which protects, very jealously, individual liberties under the New Jersey State Constitution. And even more specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court, per the article, veered away from the “good faith” ruling of the United States Supreme Court when Fourth Amendment scrutiny pertains to probable cause and search warrants. Apparently, the New Jersey Court took the position that it need not “experiment with fundamental rights protected by the Fourth Amendment counterpart of our state constitution.” The general tenor of the article, both by expressions of state supreme courts and law professors, being that *831states are utilizing their state constitutions to expand rights beyond those which the United States Supreme Court finds to be protected under the federal constitution. All in all, the article in the Wall Street Journal wins credence to Justice Sabers’ viewpoints of protecting citizens’ rights under our state constitution to a greater extent than that which is now being done by the United States Supreme Court under the federal constitution.
This particular informant, instanter, seemed to have very specific information concerning Saiz. I note that the circuit judge, who issued the search warrant, questioned the affiants. It was certainly not a willy-nilly approach to the issuance of a search warrant. I further note that another circuit judge, who tried this case, denied the motion to suppress, employing the “totality of the circumstances” test which was resurrected by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Under State v. O’Connor, 378 N.W.2d 248 (S.D.1985), it appears that this Court approved the “totality of the circumstances” test which is applicable to probable cause challenges founded under art. VI, § 11, of the S.D. Constitution. It would appear to me that the Aguilar and Spinelli two-pronged probable cause test is old hat in South Dakota by virtue of the opinion in O’Connor, written by Circuit Judge Marshall Young, who was substituting for a disqualified Justice. I am truly convinced, therefore, that the exclusionary rule should not be imposed in this case for the reason that these law enforcement officers acted objectively, in good faith, and there were no transgressions on their part. Many writers and students of the law seem to have lost sight of the fact that the exclusionary rule was never intended to become a personal constitutional right but, rather, was implemented to guard Fourth Amendment rights. Surely, the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent and deter police misconduct rather than to punish any error of a judge or magistrate. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 990, 104 S.Ct. at 3429, 82 L.Ed.2d at 745. There is simply no police misconduct whatsoever in this case and there was careful consideration of the presentation of the affidavits by Circuit Judge Tschetter, who also saw fit to personally question the affiants. Under all of the circumstances, I can comfortably join the majority opinion without benefit of taking a soft approach to the rights created by our own state constitution.