Court Opinion

ID: 9412891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 21:05:53.196855+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:35.738021
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                    2023 IL App (4th) 220850-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                           FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                             August 1, 2023
                                             NO. 4-22-0850
not precedent except in the                                                               Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                        4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).                IN THE APPELLATE COURT                                 Court, IL

                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

   THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
              Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
              v.                                                 )      Peoria County
   ANDRE L. MORGAN,                                              )      No. 20DT15
              Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                                 )      Honorable
                                                                 )      Sean W. Donahue,
                                                                 )      Judge Presiding.

                   PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
                   Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

  ¶1      Held: The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial where defendant’s
                waiver of counsel was invalid due to a lack of compliance with Illinois Supreme
                Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).

  ¶2               In July 2022, a jury found defendant, Andre L. Morgan, guilty of two counts of

  driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)), and

  three traffic offenses. The citations for the traffic offenses do not appear in the record, but other

  documents show they were for improper lane usage, disregarding a traffic control light, and

  operating an uninsured motor vehicle.

  ¶3               Defendant appeals, arguing the trial court erred by allowing him to waive his

  fundamental right to counsel without providing the admonishments required by Illinois Supreme

  Court Rule 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). We reverse and remand for a new trial.

  ¶4                                       I. BACKGROUND
¶5             Defendant was arrested on December 22, 2019, after he was observed driving in

the center of the roadway and crossing the center line. A subsequent breath test revealed

defendant had a blood-alcohol content of 0.208. On January 7, 2022, defendant appeared pro se

in the trial court. The court noted the State had indicated it was not waiving the possibility of a

jail sentence and asked defendant, “Do you think you’re going to hire private counsel or are you

asking for the appointment of the public defender?” Defendant replied, “At this point, I’ll

probably hire one.” During the process, defendant asked, “What am I—is this the arraignment

today? What is today?” The court told defendant, “[B]asically it’s an arraignment with an

opportunity for you to tell me I want time to go speak with an attorney or I’m asking for you to

appoint the public defender.”

¶6             The trial court told defendant he was charged with “DUI and DUI BAC over .08,”

and “[t]hose are Class A misdemeanors punishable by up to a year in jail on the high end. Court

supervision on the low end.” During the hearing, the court noted the proceedings would include

the companion traffic citations, but it did not have those at that time, even though they “should

have all been together.” After defendant described the citations, the court stated “it sounds like”

two of them were petty offenses punishable by a fine. Defendant showed the court his original

citations, and a clerk took them to make copies, but there was no further discussion of the

charges or the potential punishment associated with them. The court continued the matter for

defendant to hire private counsel.

¶7             On February 28, 2020, defendant appeared, and the following colloquy occurred:

                       “THE COURT: [L]ast time you were here, you had indicated you were

               going to hire counsel?

                       [DEFENDANT]: No, I didn’t need counsel, is what I said. I spoke with—I

                                                -2-
               have a lawyer friend, so I’m not bringing in any counsel. I know how I want to

               handle the situation.

                       I didn’t know what the State was offering or anything like that.

                       THE COURT: So you want to talk to the State as a self-represented

               litigant?

                       [DEFENDANT]: Pretty much, yeah.

                       THE COURT: Okay. Grab a seat in the front row. [The assistant state’s

               attorney] will talk to you shortly, okay?”

After defendant spoke with the assistant state’s attorney, the court continued the matter until

April 3, 2020. The court provided no admonishments under rule 401(a).

¶8             The record does not contain transcripts of court proceedings between February 29,

2020, and January 22, 2021. However, the record shows a notice was mailed to defendant on

March 20, 2020, setting the next hearing for June 26, 2020, and, on May 28, 2020, the matter

was continued to July 27, 2020, by agreement of the parties. On July 23, 2020, a private attorney

entered an appearance. On October 23, 2020, defendant pleaded guilty to a single count of DUI

under a negotiated plea agreement. As part of that process, defendant signed a guilty plea form

stating he was informed of the nature of the charge against him and the minimum and maximum

penalty to which he may be subjected. The form also stated defendant understood he had the

right to a lawyer, or the trial court would appoint a lawyer to represent him if he was indigent.

The court entered an order with a box checked stating defendant was informed of the minimum

and maximum possible penalties, and the consequences thereof, for each charge “in the

information,” although the record shows defendant was charged by a “citation and complaint.”

The court imposed fines and fees and sentenced defendant to 18 months of conditional discharge.

                                                -3-
¶9             On November 10, 2020, defendant sought to withdraw his plea, alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel. On January 22, 2021, a hearing was held, and the trial court

noted defendant was appearing pro se. The court found it failed to sufficiently admonish

defendant of his appeal rights at the time of the plea, and it granted defendant’s motion to

withdraw the plea. The court asked defendant if he was going to hire counsel, and defendant

requested a public defender. Defendant stated he understood his case, but also needed some legal

guidance. The court appointed public defender Nick Rochford to represent defendant, who was

later replaced by Syed Ahmad.

¶ 10           On May 13, 2022, defendant appeared, and the trial court noted his attorney was

not present due to illness. The following colloquy then occurred:

                      “[DEFENDANT]: And this was a motion to review this morning, right?

                       THE COURT: Just a review—

                       [DEFENDANT]: Okay.

                       THE COURT: —of where we’re heading.

                       [DEFENDANT]: That was one of my issues was with my attorney, and

               that was one of the things that I was going to do this morning was maybe assume

               my own defense from him. Mr. Ahmad will not be representing me. He has

               basically proven to me beyond any reasonable doubt that he does not have my

               best interest at heart, and I have proof and evidence of that.

                       THE COURT: Okay. So you’re—

                       [DEFENDANT]: Yeah.

                       THE COURT: —moving to fire the public defender’s office and represent

               yourself?

                                                -4-
                       [DEFENDANT]: Exactly, at this point.

                       THE COURT: So what do you want to do? Well, then can we just set it on

               the trial call?

                       [DEFENDANT]: I would like to—first of all, I want to put those—

               those—he removed motions the last time that I was here. And we sat out there and

               he, as we were going through our little discussion and everything, I noticed that

               he removed two motions that should not have been removed that I really want you

               to rule on and basically see the tape and everything else, whichever one they

               choose to provide. ***.

                       THE COURT: All right. We’ll set it for a hearing. [Defendant] wishes—

               as a self-represented litigant—wishes to renew his motion to suppress, so I want

               to set that for a hearing.”

After additional discussion about requests for discovery, the court told defendant, “[I]f you have

any motions you plan on filing, you need to get those filed. The other motions were withdrawn,

so you’ll have to figure out how to file your motions and get those in by [the next hearing date].”

The court again provided no admonishments under Rule 401(a).

¶ 11           On July 7, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress,

which the court denied. On July 18, 2022, a jury trial was held, during which defendant

proceeded on a theory of entrapment as to the traffic citations. Defendant sought to show the

arresting officer drove at a high rate of speed without emergency lights activated, causing

defendant to also drive unpredictably. Evidence at trial included testimony an officer saw

defendant’s vehicle cross over the center line and enter an intersection against a red light.

Officers detected the odor of alcohol on defendant’s breath, and defendant showed various signs

                                                -5-
of intoxication. Defendant was unable to provide proof of insurance. At the police station

defendant took a breath test that registered a 0.208 blood-alcohol content. The jury found

defendant guilty on all charges. The court sentenced defendant to 14 days in jail and 24 months

of conditional discharge. Throughout the proceedings, defendant never raised issues concerning

a lack of admonishments under Rule 401(a).

¶ 12           This appealed followed.

¶ 13                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14           On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing him to waive his

fundamental right to counsel without providing the admonishments required by Rule 401(a).

¶ 15           In Illinois, a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel occurs following

substantial compliance with Rule 401(a). People v. Campbell, 224 Ill. 2d 80, 87, 862 N.E.2d 933,

935 (2006). Rule 401(a) provides:

              “Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver

               of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without

               first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and

               determining that he understands the following:

                      (1) the nature of the charge;

                      (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,

               when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of

               prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and

                      (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel

               appointed for him by the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).

Under Rule 401(b), “[t]he proceedings required by this rule to be in open court shall be taken

                                                -6-
verbatim, and upon order of the trial court transcribed, filed and made a part of the common law

record.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(b) (eff. July 1, 1984).

¶ 16             A person accused of a crime has a constitutional right to counsel at every critical

stage of proceedings. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). While a defendant also

has the right to self-representation, he must act knowingly and intelligently when forgoing

counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). Given the importance of the right to

counsel, it “should not be lightly deemed waived.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.

Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d 742, 749, 589 N.E.2d 824, 829 (1992).

¶ 17            “The purpose of the rule is to ensure that a waiver of counsel is knowingly and

intelligently made.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 62,

102 N.E.3d 126. The trial court must give Rule 401(a) admonishments at the time the defendant

waives his right to counsel. People v. Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d 320, 329, 845 N.E.2d 944, 952

(2006). Under the “continuing waiver rule,” although defendants enjoy the right to counsel

during all critical stages of a criminal proceeding, including posttrial and sentencing proceedings,

a defendant can waive the right to counsel, and that waiver stays in place throughout the

remaining stages. People v. Baker, 92 Ill. 2d 85, 91-92, 440 N.E.2d 856, 859 (1982). However,

there are two exceptions to the continuing waiver rule, necessitating another Rule 401(a)

admonishment. They are “[when] (1) the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other

circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.” People

v. Palmer, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1151, 1162, 889 N.E.2d 244, 253 (2008).

¶ 18            “[S]trict, technical compliance with Rule 401(a) is not always required; rather,

substantial compliance will be sufficient to effectuate a valid waiver if the record indicates that

the waiver was otherwise made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and the admonishments

                                                  -7-
the defendant received did not prejudice his rights.” Jiles, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 329. Whether a trial

court failed to substantially comply with Rule 401(a) admonishments is a question of law we

review de novo. People v. Pike, 2016 IL App (1st) 122626, ¶ 114, 53 N.E.3d 147.

¶ 19           Initially, we note defendant failed to object to the lack of Rule 401(a)

admonishments at trial or in a posttrial motion. Thus, the issue was forfeited and cannot be

considered on appeal unless it was plain error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). “The

plain-error doctrine bypasses forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider

unpreserved error when: (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or

(2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Seal, 2015 IL App

(4th) 130775, ¶ 26, 38 N.E.3d 642 (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 186-87, 830 N.E.2d

467, 479 (2005)). “This court has consistently held the right to counsel is so fundamental that we

will review as plain error a claim there was no effective waiver of counsel although the issue was

not raised in the trial court.” Seal, 2015 IL App (4th) 130775, ¶ 26; see People v. Stoops, 313 Ill.

App. 3d 269, 273, 728 N.E.2d 1241, 1244 (2000). We therefore address defendant’s claim on

appeal.

¶ 20           Here, the trial court did not admonish defendant under Rule 401(a). The court

gave no admonishments at the time of defendant’s waiver of counsel. Without any compliance

with Rule 401(a), there cannot be substantial compliance. See Seal, 2015 IL App 4th 130775,

¶ 30 (noting a lack of compliance under the facts of the case, substantial or otherwise).

Nevertheless, the State argues the court substantially complied with the rule, asserting the court

told defendant of the nature of the charges and his right to counsel at the arraignment and noting

defendant stated at his next appearance that he did not need counsel.

                                                -8-
¶ 21            However, defendant did not waive counsel at the arraignment. Instead, he

specifically asked for time to seek counsel. Accordingly, Rule 401(a) was not triggered at that

time. Moreover, the admonishments given at the arraignment were incomplete for purposes of

Rule 401(a). The trial court did not have the traffic citations before it, so it did not discern

whether those offenses were subject to Rule 401(a), and it did not inform defendant of the nature

of those charges or the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law for those offenses.

Instead, when defendant described the citations, the court stated it “sounds like” two of them

were petty offenses subject to a fine. Then, the court did not inform defendant he had a right to

counsel and, if he was indigent, to have counsel appointed for him. Instead, the court merely

asked defendant if he planned to seek counsel or ask for a public defender to be appointed.

Further, the court never determined whether defendant understood any of the admonishments.

¶ 22            At the next hearing, when defendant specifically waived counsel, the trial court

gave no admonishments whatsoever. That lack of admonishments was a clear violation of Rule

401(a). “The admonishments pursuant to Rule 401(a) must be provided when the court learns

defendant chooses to waive counsel so that defendant can consider the ramifications of such a

decision.” Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 750. “Prior admonishments and the defendant’s decision

to discharge counsel do not somehow cause [a] defendant to forgo the right to be fully informed

of the ramifications of acting on his own behalf.” Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 750.

¶ 23            Moreover, defendant was later appointed counsel and again sought to proceed

pro se, triggering the requirement for new admonishments. See People v. Martin, 2021 IL App

(4th) 180267, ¶ 36, 183 N.E. 3d 1053. But the trial court gave none.

¶ 24            We also will not interpret defendant’s signed plea agreement as providing

sufficient admonishments, as that document does not show they were made by the trial court to

                                                 -9-
defendant personally in open court, nor did it provide the complete information required by Rule

401(a). Further, that agreement was not contemporaneous with defendant’s second waiver of

counsel.

¶ 25           Under these circumstances, where the trial court never specifically gave Rule

401(a) admonishments, and it gave no admonishments contemporaneously with either of

defendant’s counsel waivers, we cannot find substantial compliance with Rule 401(a). Indeed,

we have previously rejected the State’s piecemeal approach to finding substantial compliance

with Rule 401(a). See Langley, 226 Ill. App. 3d at 749-50 (noting seven months expired between

admonishments given at the defendant’s arraignment and his decision to waive counsel). As this

court has previously noted:

               “ ‘There must be limits to the notion of ‘substantial compliance.’ We step back

               and emphasize that defendant was never given any admonishments whatsoever.

               Yes, we can comb the record for isolated comments after defendant waived

               counsel, as the State does, and try to scrap together bits and pieces to construct a

               case that defendant knew all three items of information at some point before

               trial—the nature of the charges, the maximum and minimum term of years he

               faced, and his right to counsel—but then what is left of Rule 401? Nothing,

               essentially.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 210662,

               ¶ 78 (quoting People v. Moore, 2021 IL App (1st) 172811, ¶ 31, 204 N.E.3d 802).

¶ 26           We further find inapt the State’s reliance on People v. Herndon, 2015 IL App

(1st) 123375, 37 N.E.3d 398, and People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, 116 N.E.3d

249. In those cases, the trial courts admonished the defendants under Rule 401(a), albeit

incorrectly or incompletely. See Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, ¶ 48; Herndon, 2015 IL

                                               - 10 -
App (1st) 123375, ¶ 5. That is in stark contrast to the situation we are confronted with here,

where there was no compliance, substantial or otherwise. See People v. Smith, 2020 IL App (3d)

160454, ¶¶ 54-55, 156 N.E.3d 20 (distinguishing Maxey). Here, we conclude the trial court failed

to comply with Rule 401(a) in any fashion, rendering defendant’s convictions invalid.

¶ 27           Because defendant’s waiver of counsel was invalid, his convictions must be

reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Normally, we would first be required to

determine defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt so that retrial would not

constitute double jeopardy. Moore, 2021 IL App (1st) 172811, ¶ 37. However, defendant does

not argue the evidence was insufficient, and he specifically asks for a retrial. “It is firmly

established that the constitutional right to not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is a

personal privilege which may be forfeited.” People v. Bannister, 378 Ill. App. 3d 19, 29, 880

N.E.2d 607, 617 (2007). The right is forfeited when the defendant seeks and obtains a new trial.

Bannister, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 29; see People v. Meuris, 2016 IL App (2d) 140194, ¶ 19, 51

N.E.3d 1102 (accepting the defendant’s “concession” of the lack of a double jeopardy

impediment to a new trial where the defendant sought a remand for a new trial). Thus, in asking

for a new trial, defendant has forfeited any double jeopardy argument. We note the evidence was

sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse and

remand for a new trial.

¶ 28                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29           For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is

remanded for a new trial.

¶ 30           Reversed and remanded.

                                                - 11 -