Court Opinion

ID: 9719828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:06:05.649059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.494564
License: Public Domain

STRUTZ, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the majority of the court, who hold that an accused in a criminal proceeding has no right to trial by the court without a jury, where the defendant has made a timely waiver and such waiver was consented to by the prosecuting attorney.
Section 29-1602 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 provides:
“Issues of Fact Tried by Jury; When Trial by Jury May be Waived. In any case, whether a misdemeanor or felony, a trial jury may be waived by the consent of the defendant and the state’s attorney expressed in open court and entered on the minutes *168of the court. Otherwise, the issues -of fact must be tried by the jury.”
In this case the defendant, in a timely manner, waived trial by jury. This was ■consented to by the special assistant attorney general, William S. Murray, who was in. charge of the prosecution. The waiver and consent were expressed in open court, and were entered on the minutes of the court as required by our statute. The trial court, however, refused to try the case without a jury, and proceeded to try the same to a jury. A verdict was rendered by the jury over the defendant’s- plea of not guilty.
This court has. held that the right to trial by a constitutional jury may be waived by an accused, with the consent of the State’s counsel. In re Kortgaard, 66 N.D. 555, 267 N.W. 438, 105 A.L.R. 1107.
Both the Federal Constitution and our State Constitution guarantee to one accused of a crime a trial by jury. In North Dakota, however, an additional right has been given by statute to such a person when charged with a crime. He may waive trial by jury, with the consent of the prosecution.
One of the fundamental rules of statutory construction is to ascertain, if possible, what the legislative intent or purpose was in enacting a statute under consideration by the court. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 321, p. 560.
A statute will, if possible, be construed to give it meaning. It is to be construed liberally with a view to effecting its objects and to promoting justice. Sec. 1-0201, N.D.R.C.1943.
What was the purpose of the Legislative Assembly in enacting Section 29-1602 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943? Clearly, it was to give an accused the right to waive trial by jury. And, if it gave to the accused the right to waive trial by jury, it must have intended, as a corollary, to then provide for trial by the court. What possible purpose would there be in enacting a statute granting the right to waive trial by jury if, by waiving trial by jury, a trial by the court does not follow? Unless we hold that waiver of trial by jury carries with it trial by the court, the statute granting to an accused the right to waive trial by jury, with consent of the prosecuting attorney, is absolutely meaningless. This court should not adopt a construction which will render meaningless the Act of the Legislative Assembly. Only by assuming that, where an accused waives trial by jury, issues of fact are to be tried by the court does the statute granting waiver have any meaning or sense. The extension of the privilege of waiving trial by jury has been more frequently and more strongly recommended than almost any other reform in criminal procedure. Or-field on Cr.Proc. (1947), p. 390.
There are numerous decisions upholding the constitutionality of positive legislative enactments providing that one charged with a crime shall have the right to waive a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the court. 48 A.L.R. 772 and cases cited.
The Michigan statute provides that in certain criminal proceedings an accused is authorized to waive trial by jury and be tried by the court, while the North Dakota statute (Sec. 29-1602) merely provides for waiver of jury trial. Trial by the court must be assumed to give the statute meaning.
The Michigan court, in People v. Steele, 94 Mich. 437, 54 N.W. 171, held that, where an accused expressly waives trial by jury and demands trial by the court without a jury and the court, against his protest, orders trial by jury, such trial by jury is error and the conviction of the accused by the jury must be set aside.
The court points out that the statute giving an accused the right to waive trial by jury offers to the accused a choice of two modes of trial, either by jury or by the court. He cannot, against his will, be deprived of such choice. The statute *169allowing a defendant to waive trial by jury does not, therefore, deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to be tried by the jury. Such a statute merely gives him an additional right to be tried by the court if he so desires.
In the case of People v. Martin, 256 Mich. 33, 239 N.W. 341, the defendant was charged with bastardy, a quasi-criminal offense. He waived trial by jury, as he had the right to do under the Michigan statute. The trial court, however, denied him a trial by the court and submitted the case to a jury. The Michigan Supreme Court held that this was reversible error, holding that the right to' be tried by the court was as much a privilege as was the right to be tried by a jury.
The Supreme Court of Ohio reached a similar result in the case of State v. Smith, 123 Ohio St. 237, 174 N.E. 768. In that case, the court held that the statute giving the right to waive a jury and elect to be tried by the court is mandatory, and the court has no power to reject the waiver of the accused and order the case to be tried to a jury, unless it comes to the attention of the trial court that the accused is not sane. In such case, the question of sanity must first be determined.
The courts of Texas have held that trial by jury of a defendant, after he has waived his trial by jury and requested trial by the court, is reversible error. Grady v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 115, 35 S.W.2d 158. In Texas the right to waive a trial 'by jury is recognized by the Constitution as well as by statute, and not by statute only as is the case in North Dakota. Texas, like North Dakota, however, does not specifically provide for trial by the court on waiver of trial by jury.
Our statute also gives to a person accused of a crime a choice of two modes of trial. He can be tried either by a jury or by the court with the consent of the prosecution. I believe this is a substantial right and the trial court, whatever his reason may be, has no right to deprive the accused of whichever mode he desires to choose.
Since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be permitted to forego the privilege of a jury trial when his better judgment tells him that his rights and interests are safer in the keeping of a judge than of a jury. 50 C.J.S. Juries § 86, pp. 792, 793.
Surely there can be no sound basis for reasoning which holds that a trial by jury is a right and a privilege which cannot be denied to an accused, and then argue that the statutory right of its surrender by the accused and his right of trial by the court, which must be read into the law to give it meaning, shall be subject to the whim and fancy of the trial judge.
Because of the error of the trial court in ordering trial by jury after the defendant, with the consent of the State, had waived jury trial, the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and new trial ordered.