Court Opinion

ID: 9580796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:04.050621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:32.365568
License: Public Domain

*601Miller, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that the trial court’s suppression ruling cannot stand, I would vacate the same and remand the case for further factual findings as to whether access to the residence might be justified upon the arrest warrant for Delyno Brown.
Initially, it is appropriate to point out that the majority decides this case upon an issue as to which there is procedural default. Specifically, neither the parties nor the trial court analyzed this case under the theory of search incident to arrest, and the State has not raised it on appeal. While we will apply the “right for any reason rule” to correct a trial court’s ruling on grounds not addressed below (Gaston v. State, 257 Ga. App. 480, 483 (2) (571 SE2d 477) (2002)), “we do not apply a ‘wrong for any reason’ rule to reverse incorrect rulings on issues not raised or ruled upon in the trial court.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Designs Unlimited v. Rodriguez, 267 Ga. App. 847, 847-848 (601 SE2d 381) (2004).
Moreover, it is ironic that the majority relies upon Dennis v. State, 166 Ga. App. 715, 717 (305 SE2d 443) (1983) and State v. Camp, 175 Ga. App. 591 (333 SE2d 896) (1985) to justify the instant seizure under the theory of search incident to lawful arrest because Dennis and Camp bear only on the issue before this Court — whether the officers’ entry into and search of the residence was legal, absent (i) a search warrant, or, as discussed below, an arrest warrant justifying such entry, (ii) voluntary consent of the owner or other person reasonably believed by the police to possess such authority over the premises, or (iii) exigent circumstances based upon a police officer’s reasonable belief that entry is necessary to respond to an emergency therein. See Dennis, supra, 166 Ga. App. at 717 (exigent circumstances); Camp, supra, 175 Ga. App. at 595 (2) (consent).
Contrary to the majority’s view of the evidence, in suppressing “all” the evidence seized, the trial court implicitly found that the contraband, including the marijuana cigarette, was inside the residence beyond Venzen’s immediate control. See Welchel v. State, 255 Ga. App. 556, 557 (565 SE2d 870) (2002) (“[T]he reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment.”).
As we have held:
Even when an officer outside a home legally observes contraband in the house, it does not follow that the in-home seizure of the observed objects is lawful, for the plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer only if the officer’s access to the object itself has some prior Fourth Amendment justification.
*602(Punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742, 745 (2) (583 SE2d 573) (2003); see also State v. David, 269 Ga. 533, 535 (2) (501 SE2d 494) (1998). Access to an object in a private home is secured “only by obtaining a warrant, obtaining consent, or by the existence of exigent circumstances.” (Punctuationandfootnote omitted.) Schwartz, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 746 (2). The State bears the burden of demonstrating that exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry into a private home. Welchel, supra, 255 Ga. App. at 558-559. Such circumstances arise when an officer reasonably believes that immediate action is necessary in response to an emergency situation, Schwartz, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 746 (2), e.g., to preserve life, to avert serious injury, or to protect contraband from the danger of immediate destruction. Welchel, supra, 255 Ga. App. at 559.
Once Venzen was lawfully arrested upon the odor of burning marijuana and the fact that the police had seen him put a burning cigarette down inside the residence as he came to the door, the contraband was in no “danger of immediate destruction,” and the officer therefore could have obtained a search warrant before entering the premises. The trial court correctly found no exigency in this case. That factual determination — which falls directly within the province of the trial court — must be upheld if supported by any evidence. See Jackson v. State, 280 Ga. App. 716, 718 (1) (634 SE2d 846) (2006) (whether exigent circumstances exist “is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court, and the judge’s decision, if supported by any evidence, is to be accepted”) (citation, punctuation and footnote omitted).
Absent consent or exigent circumstances, as here, the officers in this case needed a search warrant or other Fourth Amendment justification to justify their entry into the residence. See Schwartz, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 746 (2); David, supra, 269 Ga. at 536 (2). Because the officers went to the residence to serve an arrest warrant on Brown, the further question therefore arises as to whether the arrest warrant authorized their entry therein and the plain view seizure of the contraband which followed.
“An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 73 (2) (b) (561 SE2d 414) (2002). This limited authority, however, does not extend to a third party’s house. “ ‘[E]ven when armed with an arrest warrant, police must have either a search warrant, exigent circumstances or consent to lawfully enter a third person’s home to arrest someone who does not reside there.’ ” (Footnote omitted.) Schwartz, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 744 (1).
*603Decided July 16, 2007.
Richard W. Shelton, Solicitor-General, Sandra K. Guest, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellant.
Fulp & Holt, John D. Holt, for appellee.
Thus, if Brown lived in the apartment and the officers had reason to believe he was there, they properly entered the residence pursuant to the arrest warrant, giving them access to and the right to seize the marijuana in plain view. See Brannan, supra, 275 Ga. at 73 (2) (b); May v. State, 181 Ga. App. 228 (1) (351 SE2d 649) (1986). If, however, Brown resided elsewhere, the warrant did not authorize the entry, and the officers lacked lawful access. See Schwartz, supra, 261 Ga. App. at 744 (1). It appears that neither the trial court — nor the parties — addressed these critical factual issues, and the trial court never determined whether the arrest warrant authorized the officer’s entry.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to analyze the State’s motion to suppress in the context of the law of search incident to arrest. Neither did the trial court err in refusing to find exigent circumstances authorizing immediate seizure of the marijuana. The record shows, however, that further factual determinations by the trial court are required. Accordingly, rather than reversing the trial court’s suppression ruling for the wrong reason as the majority does, I would vacate such ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Atkins v. State, 254 Ga. 641, 642 (331 SE2d 597) (1985); State v. Brown, 269 Ga. App. 875, 877 (605 SE2d 628) (2004).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Barnes and Judge Adams join in this dissent.