Court Opinion

ID: 9530301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:54.16047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:04.284898
License: Public Domain

Utter, C.J.
(dissenting) — For two and a half decades, we have adhered to a vested rights doctrine that ensures "certainty in the date of vesting of rights." Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475, 484, 513 P.2d 36, 76 A.L.R.3d 360 (1973); State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954). In adopting our fixed rule, we explained that we were rejecting the flexible rules of other states in order to set a clearly recognizable point at which a developer's rights will vest. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 129-30, 331 P.2d 856 (1958). The majority opinion throws us back into the uncertainty that *632existed before our present doctrine, with none of the benefits of either the fixed or flexible rules.
Under Washington law, a vested right to develop land in accordance with the prevailing zoning ordinance accrues at the time of application for a building permit if the application fully complies with the requirements of the ordinance. State ex rel. Craven v. Tacoma, 63 Wn.2d 23, 27-28, 385 P.2d 372 (1963); State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra. Accordingly, when a zoning ordinance is repealed or revised, a developer will have the right to build in accordance with the former ordinance if: (1) The developer applied for the building permit before the ordinance was changed; and (2) The application for the permit fully satisfied all of the requirements of the former ordinance. State ex rel. Craven v. Tacoma, supra at 27-28; State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra at 496. Where the building permit was already issued to the developer before the ordinance was changed, it also must be shown that the permit issued conformed to the then-existing zoning ordinance and building regulations. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., supra at 481; Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856 (1958). In the rare case in which city officials explicitly frustrate the developer's diligent efforts to complete the permit application, the developer may nevertheless have a vested right despite his failure to meet all of the requirements of the former zoning ordinance. Parkridge v. Seattle, 89 Wn.2d 454, 465-66, 573 P.2d 359 (1978).
The Kitsap Lake Environmental Association contends that Mercer Enterprises does not have a vested right to build in accordance with former Bremerton ordinance No. 3210 because Mercer's applications for a building permit did not satisfy the density requirements set by the ordinance. The Bremerton ordinance established a maximum density requirement of 9 dwelling units per acre. The record shows that in its applications, Mercer applied for a building permit for Phase 1 of the project (with an average density of 11.78 units per acre) and submitted a site plan *633showing that the entire 3-phase development would have an overall average density of approximately 9 units per acre.
The question of whether Mercer's application complied with density requirements thus depends on whether one examines solely Phase 1 which exceeded the permissible density, or looks at the entire project which would upon completion have a satisfactory overall average density. The majority finds that it is proper to consider the density of the 3-phase development as a whole. They believe this because the site plan for the whole project was submitted along with the application for a building permit for Phase 1 land; " [throughout all the negotiations between Mercer and the City, the 49-acre project was considered as a complete whole"; and "[t]he only reference to construction phases was contained in the building permit application." Majority opinion at page 628. However, in vested rights cases, the building permit application is the central factor, and the developer's rights are determined by what he actually applied for in his building permit application. See, e.g., Pierce v. King County, 62 Wn.2d 324, 335-36, 382 P.2d 628 (1963) (explaining that a developer's right to build cannot vest until he applies for a building permit for the property); see also, e.g., Hass v. Kirkland, 78 Wn.2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971) (developer could not claim vested rights as of March 1966, even though he had corresponded with City about his plans, because he had not actually applied for a building permit to carry out those plans); Ford v. Bellingham-Whatcom County Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wn. App. 709, 714-15, 558 P.2d 821, 826 (1977) (vested rights doctrine cannot apply until developer actually makes a valid application for the building permit). The building permit application is the focal point because the Washington vested rights doctrine is predicated on the ability to determine with certainty what the developer has applied for and what specific rights have accrued as a result. See Hull v. Hunt, supra at 130. In vested rights cases in which a building permit was already issued before the ordinance change, the *634certainty is established by examining the property for which the permit was issued. See, e.g, Hull v. Hunt, supra at 130-31. In vested rights cases in which a permit was not issued before the zoning change, the certainty is established by only looking at the property for which the developer actually applied in his permit application. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, supra at 495-96.
In the present case, the record shows that Mercer Enterprises applied for a building permit only for Phase 1 of the project. The original September application stated unambiguously that it was seeking a building permit only for Phase 1. The January and March applications revised the overall site plan and the Phase 1 plot plan, but did not request building permits for the rest of the project. Moreover, Mercer's architect-engineer, the person who applied for the building permit and submitted the site plan, acknowledged that if his building permit for Phase 1 had been approved, he would have sought building permits for Phases 2 and 3 at some point in the future.
Accordingly, in determining the rights of Mercer Enterprises, we must consider only the density of Phase 1. Since the 11.78 units per acre density of Phase 1 exceeded the density requirements of the ordinance, Mercer did not acquire vested rights.
There is an additional reason for finding that Mercer does not have vested rights. In order to gain vested rights, the developer's application for a building permit must comply with the applicable building code as well as the applicable zoning ordinance. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475, 479, 481-84, 513 P.2d 36, 76 A.L.R.3d 360 (1973). The building code in this case provides that an application for a building permit must contain plans and specifications which
shall be of sufficient clarity to indicate the nature and extent of the work proposed and show in detail that it will conform to the provisions of this Code and all relevant laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations.
*635Bremerton Building Code § 301(d). The record shows and the trial court expressly found that Mercer did not submit "storm and sewer plans, plumbing and electrical plans, foundation investigations, and water service plans necessary before issuance of a final permit." At trial, the Bremerton building official testified that the storm, sewer, foundation, and water plans were essential prerequisites for issuance of a building permit and that he could not have granted a permit to Mercer Enterprises on the basis of its applications.
The applications for the building permit therefore did not satisfy all of the requirements established by the applicable building code. The majority concludes, however, that the application was nevertheless sufficient to vest rights "even if it did require some further information to complete the processing before a permit could be issued." Majority opinion at page 630. Citing Parkridge v. Seattle, supra, and Richland Homeowner's Preservation Ass'n v. Young, 18 Wn. App. 405, 568 P.2d 818 (1977), the majority indicates that a developer can acquire a vested right on the basis of an insufficient application and thereafter retroactively satisfy the remaining requirements for a full application. Majority opinion at pages 630-31. Neither Parkridge nor Young supports such a holding in the present case. In Parkridge, the court permitted retroactive completion of some of the requirements for a building permit application, but only because the evidence showed that the City had explicitly frustrated the developer's diligent efforts to fulfill these requirements. The developer in Parkridge submitted an application for a building permit that contained the required schematic drawings and "'was consistent with the [then-existing] ordinances."' Parkridge, at page 465. In the following months, the City repeatedly delayed its consideration of the application and continually set new requirements for the developer to meet in order to complete the application. While the developer was attempting to meet these new requirements, the City rejected the application *636on the basis of a newly enacted ordinance. Parkridge, at pages 465-66.
The record in the present case does not show comparable City frustration or comparable developer diligence. On December 15, 1976, the Bremerton building official sent a letter to Mercer Enterprises stating that its application lacked sewer, storm drainage, and water service plans, and that this information must be submitted before a permit could be considered. Yet, in its January 1977 and March 1977 applications, Mercer did not supply this information.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Young also does not support the granting of vested rights in this case on the basis of an incomplete application which will be retroactively cured on a subsequent date. The Young case did not involve a vested rights claim at all and involved, rather, a claim that the City had improperly issued a building permit on the basis of an incomplete application. Although the court held in Young that the City could issue the building permit contingent upon certain retroactive corrections of the application, the court did not address the question of whether the incomplete application was sufficient to vest rights in the developer. See Young, at pages 416-18. In vested rights cases in which a permit has already been issued, the reviewing court must determine not only that the permit was correctly issued, but also that the application was sufficiently complete to vest rights. See, e.g., Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., supra at 481.
Thus, neither Parkridge nor Young authorizes retroactive completion of the building permit application in this case. In the absence of the extreme circumstances that existed in the Parkridge case, an application for a building permit cannot vest rights unless it is complete at the time of application. See, e.g., State ex rel. Craven v. Tacoma, 63 Wn.2d 23, 27-28, 385 P.2d 372 (1963). The complete application requirement is necessary in order to establish with certainty the developer's right to build under the former ordinance and also in order to preclude speculation in *637building permits. " [T]he cost of preparing plans and meeting the requirements of building codes is such that good faith application can be assumed." Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., supra at 484. The requirement of complete compliance at the time of application should be applied in this case, and vested rights accordingly denied for failure to comply with building code requirements.
The majority emphasizes that the City indicated approval in its December 29, 1976, letter and that Mercer acted reasonably on the basis of the City's assurances. Although these are factors in determining vested rights in other jurisdictions, See Annot., Retroactive Effect of Zoning Regulation, In Absence of Saving Clause, on Pending Application for Building Permit, 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973), the Washington rule was designed to eliminate examination of the "'moves and countermoves of . . . parties"'. Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 130, 331 P.2d 856 (1958). Under our doctrine, vested rights are determined solely by the developer's compliance with the then-existing ordinances and building regulations.
Since the application in this case did not comply with the zoning ordinance and the building code, the developer did not acquire vested rights. The trial court ruling should be reversed.
Rosellini, Brachtenbach, and Williams, JJ., concur with Utter, C.J.