Court Opinion

ID: 9630877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:23:19.421895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:45.548425
License: Public Domain

ARABIAN, J., Dissenting.
Although I harbor no hostility to the concept of ameliorative legislation and the corresponding rule articulated in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 [48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948] (Estrada) (see In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1053-1059 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 74, 884 P.2d 1022] (dis. opn. of Arabian, J.)), I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the present case comes within neither the analysis nor the rationale of Estrada. Careful consideration of explicit evidence of legislative intent reveals a twofold reason for declining to accord defendant Nasalga and those similarly situated the benefit of amendments to Penal Code section 12022.6 (section 12022.6): First, the ameliorative impact on punishment is apparent only; as a matter of economic reality, the change had no mitigatory effect. Therefore, it does not invoke the rule of Estrada. Second, even assuming otherwise, the Legislature has spoken to its intent by virtue of the express motive and purpose for raising the dollar amounts necessary to trigger the sentencing enhancements, which plainly contradict any expectation or intention they should apply to all defendants whose judgments were not yet final as of the operative date. The court is not free to ignore this clear *800expression of legislative will; on the contrary, its sole function is to effectuate it.
In Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, the court rejected the principle set forth in People v. Harmon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 9 [4 Cal.Rptr. 161, 351 P.2d 329] “that the punishment in effect when the act was committed should prevail.” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 742.) The Harmon court had based this conclusion on the general saving clause contained in Government Code section 9608 as well as the common law and statutory rule presumptively according new legislation prospective effect only. (People v. Harmon, supra, 54 Cal.2d at pp. 23-25; see Pen. Code, § 3.) Reconsidering this analysis, the court in Estrada articulated a more flexible framework by which to resolve whether a particular reduction in punishment applies retroactively. As with all statutory construction, the determination focuses on the touchstone of legislative intent. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.) If that is uncertain— for example, in the absence of a specific saving clause—then the court must consult “other factors.” (Ibid.)
In Estrada, the record was devoid of any direct or even indirect evidence of intent. The court could only postulate “ ‘that the lesser penalty . . . [was now deemed] sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law.’ ” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) This inference assumed “paramount importance” (id. at p. 744 ) in finding that the mitigated punishment should apply even to those crimes committed prior to its effective date: “to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modem theories of penology. . . . [<j|] . . . ‘There is no place in the scheme of punishment for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance or retribution. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 745.) Since the hypothesis of a “desire for vengeance” was the only countervailing consideration implied by the record, the court determined the Legislature must have intended the lesser penalty to operate retroactively notwithstanding principles of statutory constmction supporting a contrary result. (Id. at pp. 746-748.)1
The rationale of Estrada applies only when amendatory changes have mitigated punishment, a premise the majority2 here simply assumes from the fact the enhancement term for this particular defendant would decrease. In *801actuality, the history of the amendment contains no evidence the Legislature conceived of or intended the higher threshold amounts as ameliorative. Rather, the sole purpose was to acknowledge the impact of inflation on the value of the dollar during the 15 years since the enactment of section 12022.6 and to maintain economic parity with the levels originally deemed sufficient to warrant sentence enhancement. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 939 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 22, 1992; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Hg. Mins. June 12, 1992.) The fact the amendment included a five-year review provision to adjust for future inflation confirms this narrow objective. (§ 12022.6, subd. (e).)
Manifestly, such purpose had no relation to penological concerns or goals. The inevitable inflationary effects of time are nothing more than a matter of economic reality; they are entirely neutral on the question of how to measure criminal culpability and assess a commensurate punishment. Indeed, comparing the pre- and postamendment statutory schemes, it is clear the Legislature did not effect an overall reduction in punishment. (Cf. In re Griffin (1965) 63 Cal.2d 757 [48 Cal.Rptr. 183, 408 P.2d 959] [Estrada inapplicable because net effect of amendment did not decrease punishment].) Moreover, apart from compensating for inflation, there is no rationale explaining why some now receive a lesser sentence and others do not. To wit, in absolute dollar terms, the penalty has decreased only for defendants who steal $25,000-$50,000 or $100,000-$150,000 but remains the same for thefts of $50,000-$100,000 or more than $150,000. Adjusting for an inflationary rate of 100 percent, there is no change in penalty for $50,000-$150,000 or more than $200,000, but an increase for takings of $150,000-$200,000. For example, theft of $80,000 prior to the amendment warranted a one-year enhancement, whereas theft of $160,000 (i.e., $80,000 adjusted for inflation) will now subject the defendant to an additional two years in prison.
On this record, no forgiveness of penalty appears. To the contrary, we may reasonably deduce the Legislature was of the view that due to inflation the increased amounts now reflect the same level of criminality as the lesser amounts had originally in terms of impact on the victim and threat to society. In other words, the person who stole $50,000 in 1993 was deserving of the same enhancement as the person who stole $25,000 in 1989 not to mitigate punishment but because the crimes were equivalent in “real dollar” terms. Unlike the case in Estrada, we are not dealing with an inference “ ‘that the lesser penalty ... is [now deemed] sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of *802the criminal law.’ ” (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) From an economic perspective—the only one relevant to theft crimes—persons such as defendant are not being punished more harshly: it is the same penalty for the same crime. (See plur. opn., ante, at p. 795.) Absent an intent to ameliorate, ‘‘‘’Estrada is not implicated on these facts.” (In re Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1046.)3
The majority explain the import of this limited, inflation-driven motivation as follows: “The Legislature’s statement of intent with regard to the amendments indicates only its consideration of the decline in the dollar’s value since 1977, its attempt to adjust downward the penalties ... to approximate that decline, and its concern with future legislative considerations of the ongoing effects of inflation . . . .” (Plur. opn., ante, at p. 795, italics added.) As it relates to the inquiry now before us, this observation begs the question: simply to describe legislative action in terms of a statement of intent, without assessing it in the larger context, does not assist the effort to discern its significance on the issue of retroactivity. Alternately, it proves too much: the Legislature clearly and unequivocally expressed its purpose in amending section 12022.6, which by its own terms was unrelated to mitigation of punishment. The majority’s analysis essentially ignores this fact even though the reasoning in Estrada remains grounded in the fundamental principle of deference to legislative intent. (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)
Equally unpersuasive is the reliance on In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761 [48 Cal.Rptr. 186, 408 P.2d 962], which involved an increase from $50 to $100 in the amount necessary to elevate issuing an insufficient funds check (Pen. Code, § 476a) from a misdemeanor to a felony. The case followed directly on Estrada, and the court gave the defendant, who had issued a check for $75, the benefit of the amendment. Although the opinion in Kirk contains no discussion of or reference to the legislative history or intent of the relevant amendment, the majority nevertheless take it as precedent for a similar result here because “the reasonable inference is the Legislature acted in response to the effects of inflation.” (Plur. opn., ante, at p. 793.)
Given the lack of analysis in Kirk, this proffered explanation is conjecture at best; quite probably it is entirely incorrect. The Legislature originally set the felony threshold amount at $50 in 1955 (Stats. 1955, ch. 1862, § 1, p. 3457) and increased it to $100 in 1963 (Stats. 1963, ch. 1448, § 1, p. 3003). *803During that intervening eight-year period, the California consumer price index rose approximately 18 percent, not 100 percent as the majority speculate. (See Cal. Statistical Abstracts (1995) table D-12, p. 60.)4 Thus, in the absence of any specifics, the more likely explanation for the change in amounts was a legislative determination the original felony classification calculated at $50 had been too low, i.e., the punishment was too severe for the crime. In such a circumstance, the rule of Estrada would apply to the extent this court determined its rationale should embrace a range of ameliorative legislation not just reductions in punishment. Contrary to the implication of the majority, Kirk stands for no more than this now unremarkable proposition. (See In re Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1054, fn. 3, (dis. opn. of Arabian, J.).) Moreover, whatever the result in Kirk, Estrada clearly counsels that each case must be evaluated on its own merits with evidence of legislative intent the controlling and determinative factor. Only in the absence of some indication otherwise may the court default to a presumption of retroactivity.
On the foregoing basis I conclude the majority erroneously invoke the rule of Estrada both because the amendment in question is not ameliorative and because the legislative purpose negates retroactive application. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
George, J., concurred.

As the majority in In re Pedro T„ supra, 8 Cal.4th at page 1045, footnote 1, noted, however, “Since those words were written . . . , the development of modem theories of penology has continued to unfold. (See Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1) [‘The Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.’].)”

Although in her concurring opinion Justice Kennard takes exception to the plurality’s discussion of In re Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th 1041, she agrees with the analysis by which the plurality find Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, applicable in these circumstances to afford *801defendant the benefit of the reduced penalty. Thus, notwithstanding separate opinions, a majority of the court have reached the same result based upon the same rationale. Since I disagree with both the plurality and the concurrence, for convenience I will refer to their collective position as “the majority.”

At least two additional considerations militate against an intent to mitigate punishment: The amended version of section 12022.6 retains the provision allowing aggregation of losses for imposition of additional penalties. The Legislature also added three- and four-year enhancements for large-scale thefts. (§ 12022.6, subds. (c) & (d).)

According to the 1995 California Statistical Abstracts, the consumer price index was 25.7 in 1955 and 30.4 in 1963.