Court Opinion

ID: 9527944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:44.783911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:18.269105
License: Public Domain

Gillespie, J.,
dissenting.
Appellee filed a suggestion of error in which seven errors were suggested. The Court- called for a reply to only one point: The doctrine of recordation as laid down in Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, affects titles to real estate, is a rule of property, and is the law of this case. The majority overruled the sug*241gestión of error and thereby adhered to the decision of the original opinion to the effect that Peeples v. Boy-kin, supra, did not establish a rule of property.
With deference, I am unable to agree to the conclusions of the majority on the stated question. I think the rule laid down by Peeples v. Boykin, and as understood by the bench and bar, established a rule of property; and the change in the rule should be applied prospectively, but all transactions occurring prior to the change in the rule should be controlled by the rule of property existing at the time of their occurrence.
This Court has said that the stability and certainty of rules relating to muniments of titles to real estate is of first importance. The law favors the repose of society in general; it especially favors stability in the law as it affects or involves the descent, transfer, sale, title, or possession of property. Courts sometimes find that a rule of law that affects or involves these considerations, is unsound and mischievous in operation and should be overruled; whereupon two competing considerations-confront the Court, (1) The need for stability in the law affecting property, and the protection of rights and titles established under the unsound rule, and (2) the need for a change in a rule of law that has proven to be unsound and mischievous in operation. The Court then has a choice of either refusing to change the rule or of changing the rule only as to transactions occurring subsequent to the change. In either case, the vested rights and titles acquired while the error prevailed are upheld and protected.
Appellee contends that Peeples v. Boykin established a rule of property in that it was there held that recordation of the deed purporting to convey the full title plus possession by a cotenant for ten years vested complete title; that notice to the cotenants was conclusively presumed from these circumstances. That seems to me to be what the bench and bar has understood the case to hold. In 1948, after Peeples v. Boykin had been in the *242books for twenty-five years, this Court said of that decision, in the case of McDonald v. Roberson, 204 Miss. 737, 38 So. 2d 189, the following.
“In Peeples v. Boykin, 132 Miss. 359, 96 So. 177, this Court held that where a person who would otherwise be a tenant in common remained in exclusive and continuous possession, claiming to be the owner under a recorded deed purporting to convey the entire interest in the property, the title would mature in the occupant on the expiration of ten years from the date of the recordation of the deed, even though the deed in severalty was made by other tenants in common, and there was no visible change in the character of the occupancy after the recordation of the deed, and no actual notice was given by the occupant — the theory being that when the deed was recorded, that fact, coupled with the occupancy under it, gave rise immediately to a cause of action to the cotenants whose interests had not been conveyed. ’ ’
The annotators of every code since Peeples v. Boykin was decided have placed the following annotation under what is now Section 711, Mississippi Code of 1942:
“Tenant in common cannot acquire title against co-tenant without notice; recorded deed held notice to co-tenant of adverse claim. Peeples v. Boykin, 132 M. 359, 96 So. 177.”
The definition of a rule of property is set out in 54 C. J. 1110, Section 8, as follows: “Rule of Property. A settled legal principle governing the ownership and devolution of property; the decisions of the highest court of a state when they relate to and settle some principle of local law directly applicable to this. In the plural, those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the rules which affect the title and possession thereto.”
“Rules of property are defined as those rules governing the descent, transfer, or sale of property, and the *243rules which affect the title and possession thereof.” Bucher v. Chesire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 31 L. Ed. 795.
In Fuller v. Mullins, 143 Ky. 639, 137 S. W. 243, the holding is summarized in the headnote as follows: “The rule that certain things are sufficient for acquisition of title by adverse possession disclosed in a long series of opinions by the supreme court has become a rule of property, from which, under the rule of stare decisis, it cannot depart.”
In Stewart v. Hunt, (Mich.) (1942) 5 N. W. 2d 737, there was involved the question as to adverse possession of an easement and the issue was whether a user by successive owners could be tacked together to reach the prescribed time. The court had previously held in the negative, but recognized that the previous decision was against the overwhelming weight of authority. The court applied its former decision, saying: “Any change, if desirable, should be accomplished by legislation, prospective in operation, rather than by judicial redecision, which would disturb vested rights.”
A rule of property as a legal principle has been applied by this Court in a number of cases. In Webb v. Mobile and Ohio R. R. Co., 105 Miss. 175, 62 So. 168, the validity of a tax sale was involved. The Court held that the rule, under prior decisions, that parol evidence was admissible to correct a deed was a rule of property. The Court said: “The stability and certainty of rules relating to muniments of title to real estate is of first importance.”
In Forest Production and Manufacturing Co. v. Buckley, 107 Miss. 897, 66 So. 279, the Court declined to overrule a former decision as to the construction of a timber deed because the former decision was a rule of property.
In Robertson v. Puffer Manufacturing Co., 112 Miss. 890, 73 So. 804, there was involved the question of whether a document was a lease or a conditional sales *244•contract. The Court held that a previous decision holding such document a lease was a rule of property and declined to overrule it.
The rule of property principle was applied in the case of K. C. Lumber Co. v. Moss, 119 Miss. 185, 80 So. 638. A tax sale was there involved.
In Magee v. Morehead, 123 So. 881, a rule of property was held to be involved and the Court declined to ovérrule the decision under which it was established.
In Daniel Boon v. Bowers, 30 Miss. 246, the Court declined to overrule a prior decision because of the “important bearing upon titles to property.”
In Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 81 Miss. 90, 32 So. 937, this Court said: “* * * A Yule of property’ is a ‘ settled legal principle governing the ownership and devolution of property.’ This principle can be settled only by the supreme court of the state, and its utterances, in cases pending before it involving the title to property, construing statutes or constitutional provisions, have the effect of establishing a rule of property to the extent only that the particular statute or constitutional provision was in that case involved, or necessarily considered and determined by the court in the •case then pending before it; and such rule of property, when so established, becomes and remains the settled legal principle governing the acquisition and title to property, to which construction is applicable, so long as such decision remains unreversed by the supreme court giving such construction. If such construction is given upon ah issue directly involved in the case, or necessarily considered, and necessitates the application of the judicial mind to the precise question, then immediately the rule of property established thereby becomes the law for similar cases, and is upheld and continued in the future by the doctrine of stare decisis. The acquiring of the ownership of property is always accompanied with the vesting of rights under and pursuant to the then existing law as declared by the supreme court of the state. This *245law so declared remains a rule of property until that law shall he changed by the state supreme court overruling or modifying such prior decision, in which case the rule of property would be changed to correspond with the latest utterance of the supreme court upon the subject. This change in the rule of property would only affect transactions occurring subsequent to such change in the decision of the state supreme court. As to all transactions affecting the ownership of devolution of property, occurring prior to such change in the rule, they would be controlled by the rule of property existing at the time of their occurrence. All rights of property must be governed and protected by the laws existing, and as they existed, at the time of the vesting of the right. This principle, so manifestly in accordance with the plainest principles of justice, receives our fullest approval, and will be applied in all cases coming within its scope. It is binding, in proper cases, upon the state as upon the individual. The state has not one law for the citizen, and a different application of it to itself. It has received the sanction of the highest court of the land in many cases * *
Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. State, (1911) 97 Miss. 571, 54 So. 247, involved the validity of state land patents. A group of individuals entered into a conspiracy to secure tax lands from the state in excess of the 240 acres allowed by statute to one individual. This was accomplished by using the names of 96 persons who by prearrangement were to convey to the group when the patents were issued. The state filed suit to set aside the patents as a fraud on the state. The court held that fraud was shown but noted that a similar scheme had previously been before the court and had been held to be devoid of fraud, causing forfeiture. The Court overruled its prior decision, but applied the precedent to the transaction involved, despite the fraud. Speaking through Justice Anderson, this Court said:
*246‘ ‘ There is no escape from the conclusion that that case is decisive of this, in favor of appellant. The ruling in that case, however, is so manifestly unsound and mischievous in its effect that it is hereby overruled. Nevertheless, as contended for appellant, it was a rule of property, covering the period of the transactions here involved. It is the law of this case * *
In State Tax Commission v. Brown, 188 Miss. 483, 193 So. 794, this Court said: “* * * It frequently happens that personal and judicial opinion diverge, and sometimes lie far apart. But a judge should follow the judicial path, and act upon judicial opinion when the laAv has been settled. Often a judge of the appellate court would decide a case differently from his predecessors, Avere it a matter of original decision. There should be stability in the law; and if every judge followed his personal opinion, rather than the judicial opinion of his associates and predecessors, there Avould be no such thing as a settled rule. The public could not safety rely upon the advice of counsel, who must form his opinion upon the decisions of the Court. This Court has given protection to citizens from the effect of overruling cases, holding that transactions had or done under a construction making the act valid at the time it was done continue legal, although afterwards a change of decision was made by the Court. See Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 571, 54 So. 247; State v. Longino, et al, 109 Miss. 125, 67 So. 902; Ann. Cas. 1916 E, 371.”
In Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. State, 134 Miss. 533, 98 So. 158, this Court applied a rule of property, saying: “We are not here concerned Avith the correctness of the decision in Hardy v. Hartman, supra, and the rule there applied, Avhether correct or not, to titles derived through patents issued to the Pearl Improvement and Navigation Company has become a rule of property and will not be now departed from . . .”
I think Peeples v. Boykin established a legal princi pie. That case examined a state of facts and reached 4 *247legal conclusion. It held that the recorded deed was notice and an ouster of the other cotenants, and that possession for the statutory period vested title. It is not significant whether this might be called a rule of evidence or a rule as to the quantum of proof. Technical distinctions seem to me to be of little importance. The question is whether a legal principle was announced directly governing the ownership, devolution, descent, transfer, or sale of property, or which affect the title and possession thereof.
For thirty years prior to this Court’s opinion overruling the Peeples case, this Court said to all persons dealing in property: If you, or your mortgagor, or grantor, have adversely possessed the land for ten years under a recorded deed purporting to vest in the grantee the full title, your title is good, and this is true notwithstanding the possession is by one who is a co-tenant of those not signing the deed. Then on November 14, 1954, this Court overruled Peeples v. Boykin, and knocked the foundation from under any and all titles that had become vested prior thereto. The wisdom and justice of applying a rule of property seems plain to me.
“Upon no theory can security be given to contracts and titles, and at the same time progress and improvement be made in jurisprudence, but by shaking off the error of the past, while we uphold contracts and titles acquired while the error prevailed.” Hall v. Wells, 54 Miss. 289.
I think the suggestion of error should be sustained and the case affirmed, and that the change of the law brought about by overruling Peeples v. Boykin should not affect any title vested under the principle announced in that case.