Court Opinion

ID: 9369775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 18:02:17.040723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.987414
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/9/23 P. v. Andrade CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B313650

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. MA063875)
           v.

 MATTHEW ANDRADE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Charles A. Chung, Judge. Sentence vacated
with directions.
      William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Allison H. Chung, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      Matthew Andrade appeals from the judgment following his
no contest plea to human trafficking (Pen. Code, § 236.1,
subdivision (b))1 and other charges related to an incident where
he restrained an individual against her will while his confederate
robbed and threatened to kill her. The trial court sentenced
Andrade to concurrent upper terms on each of his convictions.
      While Andrade’s appeal was pending, the Legislature
amended section 1170, subdivision (b), to require the trial court
to impose a sentence that does not exceed the middle term unless
the defendant stipulates to the facts supporting circumstances in
aggravation or a jury or a judge in a court trial finds those facts
true beyond a reasonable doubt. Andrade argues the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing upper terms by improperly
weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors. He also argues,
in supplemental briefing, he is entitled to resentencing under the
new legislation. We agree with Andrade’s second argument,
vacate his sentence, and direct the trial court to resentence
Andrade under amended section 1170, subdivision (b).

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.    Andrade Commits Multiple Crimes
      In the summer of 2014 Lisa L., who worked as an escort,
met James Jackson in the laundry room of her apartment
complex. Jackson told Lisa he recognized her from an
advertisement on an adult services platform Lisa used to solicit
clients. Jackson later sent Lisa several text messages stating she

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
should work for him and allow him to be her pimp. Lisa refused
and said she wanted to work for herself. The tone of the text
messages began to “escalate,” and Jackson accused Lisa of
stealing his clients and said she owed him money. In one of the
text messages, Jackson threatened to take Lisa “out to the
desert” and kill her. Lisa blocked text messages from Jackson’s
phone.
       On the evening of August 1, 2014 Lisa received a text
message from someone she did not recognize, asking for an
appointment. Lisa sent her address, and a few hours later
Andrade appeared at her front door. Lisa led Andrade through
her living room and up the stairs to her bedroom, where Andrade
gave her $200, the agreed-upon price. Lisa noticed the money
“was fake.” As she reached for her cell phone to call her
boyfriend, she “got hit” with “a hard, metal-like object” in the
back of her head. She felt “lightheaded” and fell to the floor.
When she regained consciousness, her hands were cuffed behind
her back. Andrade pulled out a “fake badge” and told Lisa she
was under arrest. Andrade dragged Lisa down the stairs, put her
on the couch, and pinned her down. Andrade made a phone call
and said, “I got the girl.” Two minutes later, Jackson walked into
Lisa’s apartment. He searched through Lisa’s wallet and then
switched positions with Andrade, leaning on Lisa to prevent her
from getting up. Lisa felt a cold metal object against the back of
her head; Jackson told her he was going to kill her and take her
out to the desert.
       When Jackson and Andrade went to the front door to check
whether the hallway was clear for them to escape, Lisa ran out
through the back door to the patio and screamed. A neighbor
came to help her call the police. Lisa told the police officer who

                                3
responded that Andrade hit her in the back of the head with the
barrel of the gun. Lisa suffered a fractured wrist from the
incident.
      The People charged Andrade with, among other crimes,
kidnapping to commit robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1); count 1), first
degree residential robbery (§ 211; count 2), human trafficking
with the intent to pimp or pander (§ 236.1, subd. (b); count 3),
making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a); count 4), assault with
a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 7), conspiracy to
commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 8), and assault with a
firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count 9). On counts 1, 2, and 8 the
People alleged Andrade personally used a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and on count 9 the
People alleged Andrade personally used a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022.5.

      B.     Andrade Pleads No Contest, and the Trial Court
             Sentences Him
      A jury trial commenced in the fall of 2016. Lisa and the
police officer who responded to the 911 call testified about the
events of August 1, 2014. Andrade testified in his defense and
described the incident in a way that minimized his culpability.
      According to Andrade, Jackson told him that Lisa worked
for him as a prostitute, that she owed him money, and that she
stopped talking to him. Andrade testified Jackson said that he
was going to send Lisa a text message asking for an escort
appointment and that Andrade would pose as the client.
Andrade said that at first he refused to participate in the plan,
but that he eventually agreed because he “was under duress.”
Pursuant to Jackson’s instructions, Andrade purchased handcuffs

                                 4
from a sporting goods store. Andrade stated that on the way to
Lisa’s apartment Jackson gave him a toy gun.
       Andrade testified that, once he arrived at Lisa’s apartment,
he followed Lisa upstairs and gave her two fake 100 dollar bills
Jackson had given him. Andrade stated that when Lisa looked at
the bills she told him that she could not “see” him. Andrade said
he pulled out his police identification, told Lisa that she was
under arrest, and instructed her to put her hands behind her
back. Andrade stated that Lisa began to slap and hit him and
that he tried to defend himself by handcuffing her. Andrade
testified he walked Lisa downstairs, called Jackson, and opened
the door for Jackson to come into the apartment. According to
Andrade, Lisa recognized Jackson and screamed for both men to
get out. Andrade stated that he told Jackson they should leave
and that, as they walked out, Jackson took Lisa’s identification
and cell phone from the kitchen table. Andrade denied he used a
gun, hit Lisa, or dragged her down the stairs.
       At the close of evidence, Andrade agreed to a negotiated
disposition of the case. The People agreed to amend the
information to change count 1 from kidnapping to commit
robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)) to kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)),
dismiss the conspiracy to commit murder charge (count 8), and
add to counts 3 and 4 an allegation a principal used a firearm in
the commission of the crimes, within the meaning of section
12022.53, subdivision (b).2 Andrade agreed to plead no contest to
all the charges and to admit the firearm allegations, and the
parties agreed the court would impose a prison sentence between

2     At a subsequent hearing, the parties agreed the firearm
allegation for the human trafficking charge (count 3) should be
changed to section 12022.5, subdivision (a).

                                 5
zero years and 40 years four months, based on argument at a
sentencing hearing the court would hold in a month. Andrade
pleaded no contest to the charges as amended and admitted the
firearm allegations.
       Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other circumstances,
one month became almost five years, and on September 24, 2021
the trial court held the sentencing hearing. Counsel for Andrade
asked the court to consider several mitigating factors, including
Andrade’s military service, other employment history, and lack of
a criminal record. The prosecutor argued that, based on a policy
directive from the new District Attorney, the People could ask for
no more than a 20-year prison sentence.
       The court found three aggravating circumstances:
(1) “There was extreme sophistication involved. The defendant
posed as an officer, utilized a badge, handcuffs, and a gun.”;
(2) “There was extreme violence involved, pistol-whipping at one
point. The victim was forced to kneel before the defendant with
her back toward him. His feet were on the back of her knees
holding her in place. The gun was put to the back of her skull,
and it looked pretty much like an execution-style situation.”; “On
top of that,” the court continued, (3) Andrade’s experience as a
peace officer and a member of the armed forces was “a factor to
consider in terms of culpability and responsibility” (although the
court also said Andrade’s military service “weighs into
sentencing . . . both ways”). The court imposed the upper term of
20 years on count 3 and imposed and stayed, under section 654,
execution of a term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement.3

3     Section 12022.5, subdivision (c), provides the “court may, in
the interest of justice pursuant to Section 1385 and at the time of

                                 6
The court imposed the upper term on each of the remaining
counts, plus 10-year terms for the firearm enhancements, all
concurrent to the sentence imposed on count 3. Andrade timely
appealed.4

                          DISCUSSION

       A.   Applicable Law
       When the trial court sentenced Andrade in 2021,
section 1170, subdivision (b), provided: “When a judgment of
imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the choice of the appropriate term shall rest
within the sound discretion of the court.” (Stats. 2020, ch. 29,
§ 14; see People v. Flowers (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 680, 684, review
granted Oct. 12, 2022, S276237; People v. Zabelle (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1108 (Zabelle).) Effective January 1, 2022,
the Legislature amended section 1170, subdivision (b), to provide:

sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise required
to be imposed by this section.” Section 12022.5, subdivision (c),
does not authorize the court to impose and stay execution of the
enhancement. On remand the trial court must impose (without
staying execution of), strike, or dismiss the enhancement (see
People v. Brewer (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 98, 104; People v. Lopez
(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364), subject to the limitations in
amended section 1170.1, subdivision (d) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, §
1.3).

4      Andrade’s notice of appeal did not state his appeal is based
on grounds that arose after entry of the plea and that do not
affect the plea’s validity, as required under California Rules of
Court, former rule 8.304(b)(4)(B). We granted Andrade’s motion
to amend his notice of appeal to include that statement.

                                 7
“(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the
statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound
discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).
[¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; see
Zabelle, at p. 1108; People v. Whitmore (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
116, 131.) The court, however, “may consider the defendant’s
prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified
record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a
jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).)
       The Legislature amended section 1170, subdivision (b), “to
limit the sentencing discretion of trial courts” and to “potentially
lessen punishment for defendants sentenced to the upper term on
an offense.” (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1108, 1109.)
Andrade argues, the People concede, and we agree he is entitled
to the ameliorative benefit of the amended statute. (See People v.
Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308 [“‘in the absence
of contrary indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for
ameliorative changes to the criminal law to extend as broadly as
possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that
are final and sentences that are not’”]; People v. Dunn (2022)
81 Cal.App.5th 394, 403 [defendant was “entitled to the benefit
of” the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), because “her

                                  8
case was not final” on the effective date of the amendments],
review granted, Oct. 12, 2022, S275655; Zabelle, at p. 1108.)5

      B.      The Trial Court’s Sentence Did Not Comply with
              Amended Section 1170, Subdivision (b), and the Error
              Was Not Harmless
       Andrade contends, the People concede, and we agree the
trial court’s imposition of upper terms violated the Sixth
Amendment and did not comply with amended section 1170,
subdivision (b).6 Andrade did not stipulate to, and a jury did not
find beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts underlying the three

5      The People assert Andrade forfeited his argument the trial
court erred in imposing upper term sentences because he “did not
raise any of the grounds he now raises in this appeal.” The
amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b), however, did not
become effective until after the trial court sentenced Andrade.
Andrade did not forfeit, by failing to make, an argument existing
law did not yet support. (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1,
7-8 [“‘“[r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for
failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have
been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in
existence”’”].)

6      The Supreme Court has granted review in People v.
Mitchell, (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted
November 14, 2002, S277314, to decide whether the amendments
to section 1170, subdivision (b), that limit a trial court’s
discretion to impose upper term sentences apply retroactively to
defendants sentenced pursuant to stipulated plea agreements.
The People do not argue the amendments do not apply to
Andrade because he was convicted pursuant to a plea; to the
contrary, as stated, the People concede the new law applies to
him.

                                9
aggravating circumstances the court relied on to impose the
upper terms. (See Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.
270, 281 [“any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater
potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and
established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a
preponderance of the evidence”]; Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1109, 1111 [“the trial court’s imposition of the upper term
based on its own factfinding violated defendant’s rights under the
Sixth Amendment,” and the trial court erred in relying upon facts
“that were not found true in the manner section 1170 now
prescribes”].)
       The People argue that “any error under Cunningham and
newly amended section 1170, subdivision (b) was harmless.” We
cannot reach that conclusion.
       The Supreme Court has granted review in People v. Lynch
(May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
August 10, 2022, S274942, to decide what standard of prejudice
applies on appeal when determining whether a case should be
remanded for resentencing in light of the amendments to section
1170, subdivision (b). Until the Supreme Court decides the issue,
we use the test articulated by the court in People v. Lopez (2022)
78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez) and reformulated by the courts in
Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th 1098 and People v. Wandrey
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 962 (Wandrey), review granted Sept. 28,
2022, S275942.
       “The denial of the right to a jury trial on aggravating
circumstances is reviewed under the harmless error standard set
forth in” Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [87 S.Ct. 824
(Chapman). (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 838
(Sandoval); see Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110;

                               10
Wandrey, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, review granted.) If a
reviewing court concludes, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,
unquestionably would have found true at least a single
aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the
Sixth Amendment error properly may be found harmless.”
(Sandoval, at p. 839; see People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 408, review granted; Zabelle, at p. 1111.)
       Whether a violation of section 1170, subdivision (b), is
harmless is an issue of state law we review under People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (People v. Ross (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1354; Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1110; Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467, fn. 11.) In Lopez
the court held that sentencing error under amended section 1170,
subdivision (b), is harmless if the reviewing court “can conclude
beyond reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the aggravating factors on which
the trial court relied,” other than those related to the defendant’s
prior convictions, and that otherwise the reviewing court must
determine whether it is reasonably probable the “trial court
would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the
upper term if it had recognized that it could permissibly rely on
only a single one of the aggravating factors, a few of the
aggravating factors, or none of the aggravating factors, rather
than all of the factors on which it previously relied.” (Lopez, at
p. 467 & fn. 11.) In Zabelle the court restated this test as follows:
If the trial court relied on more than one aggravating
circumstance, we must determine “for each aggravating fact . . .
whether it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found
the fact not true” and “then, with the aggravating facts that

                                 11
survive this review, . . . whether it is reasonably probable that
the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it
considered only these aggravating facts.” (Zabelle, at p. 1112;7
see Wandrey, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 982 [even if the trial
court properly relied on one aggravating factor to support
imposing an upper term, the reviewing court must ask “whether
the trial court would have exercised its discretion in the same
way if it had been aware of the statutory presumption in favor of
the middle term”]; see also People v. Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th
at p. 410 [stating another formulation of the harmless error test
under section 1170, subdivision (b)], review granted.)
       The constitutional and statutory violations were not
harmless here. As discussed, the trial court cited three
aggravating circumstances that justified imposing upper terms:
The crimes involved great violence, Andrade’s conduct indicated
sophistication, and Andrade’s service in the military and
employment with law enforcement made him more culpable. We
cannot conclude under either the Chapman or Watson standard a
jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt any of
these aggravating circumstances. The first two circumstances
involve “somewhat vague or subjective” standards that require
“an imprecise quantitative or comparative evaluation of the
facts,” making it difficult for a reviewing court “to conclude with
confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the
jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the
trial court.” (Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840; see People v.

7     The court in Zabelle stated that its “quibble with Lopez is a
very minor one” and that the two approaches “are the same in
terms of outcomes.” (Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113.)

                                12
Ross, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1355; Wandrey, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
         While the trial court found Andrade’s conduct in using a
badge, handcuffs, and a gun to pose as a peace officer indicated
extreme sophistication, it is reasonably probable a jury would
find his conduct was not all that sophisticated. Andrade testified
he went into Lisa’s apartment with a toy gun and handcuffs he
purchased at a sporting goods store; a jury could easily find that
using these rudimentary props reflected the planning of
amateurs, not sophisticated criminals. In addition, the plan
unraveled as soon as Andrade and Jackson took their eyes off
Lisa and she escaped to the patio. (See Wandrey, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 [while “it may seem intuitively obvious
that [the defendant] abused a position of trust, this is less true as
to . . . whether [his] offenses indicated planning”; “[s]ome degree
of speculation would necessarily be required for us to conclude
the jury would have agreed with the trial court’s evaluation”],
review granted; People v. Cardenas (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1468,
1483 [“While a jury could have found the crime involved planning
and sophistication we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt it
would have done so.”].)
         Nor can we say it is reasonably probable a jury would find
beyond a reasonable doubt Andrade’s conduct involved great
violence, which, like sophistication, requires a subjective and
comparative evaluation of the facts. (See People v. Ross, supra,
86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1354 [“whether the crime involved great
violence” under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1),
requires a “subjective evaluation”]; see also Sandoval, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 849 [examples of inherently vague and subjective
potential aggravating circumstances include whether “‘[t]he

                                 13
victim was particularly vulnerable,’ whether the crime ‘involved
a[ ] . . . taking or damage of great monetary value’ or whether the
‘quantity of contraband’ involved was ‘large’”].) While the ordeal
undoubtedly was frightening, Lisa’s only injury was to her wrist.
         Moreover, contrary to the People’s assertion, the evidence
relating to these two circumstances was not “overwhelming and
uncontested.” Andrade testified Jackson came up with the idea
to commit the crime and forced him to participate in it. Although
Andrade later admitted firearm-use allegations for purposes of
the negotiated disposition, at trial he denied he used a gun, hit
Lisa, or dragged her down the stairs. (See People v. Kerley (2018)
23 Cal.App.5th 513, 530 [“testimony of a single witness, if
believed by the factfinder, is sufficient to prove any fact”].) And
the jury made no findings because Andrade pleaded no contest
before the jury returned a verdict.
         The court’s third aggravating circumstance, Andrade’s
military service and law enforcement background, was not a valid
aggravating circumstance because it was not reasonably related
to the court’s decision to impose appropriate terms of
imprisonment. (See Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840
[“aggravating circumstances not set forth in rules or statutes”
must be “‘reasonably related to the decision being made’”]; People
v. Moberly (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196 [“a trial court is
free to base an upper term sentence upon any aggravating
circumstance that (1) the court deems significant and (2) is
reasonably related to the decision being made”]; California Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(c) [trial court may consider factors
“statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or which
reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under

                                14
which the crime was committed”].)8 Although the trial court
stated it was not holding Andrade to a higher standard because
he had served in the armed forces or worked in law enforcement,
the court proceeded to do just that, finding that “very high
standards are promulgated to those who enter those fields” and
that “we do rightfully expect more from people in those
professions.” Andrade’s service to his country in the army and
his service to fellow citizens as a peace officer were not
circumstances a trial court or a jury could use to impose upper
terms. (See People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 817
[“[a]n aggravating circumstance is a fact that makes the offense
‘distinctively worse than the ordinary’”]; People v. Hicks (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512 [same].)

       C.    The Trial Court Must Resentence Andrade
       Where, as here, the trial court’s failure to comply with
amended section 1170, subdivision (b), is not harmless, the
reviewing court must direct the trial court to resentence the
defendant under the amended statute. (See People v. Ross,
supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1356 [to give the amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b), “full effect, a remand for
resentencing is appropriate”]; Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1115 [remand for resentencing was appropriate where the
reviewing court could not determine whether the trial court
would have imposed the same sentence had it been left with four
aggravating circumstances instead of eight].) Therefore, Andrade
is entitled to a full resentencing. (See People v. Buycks (2018)

8     Contrary to the People’s assertion, the trial court did not
find Andrade’s “use of his status as a police officer” was an
aggravating circumstance.

                                15
5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“when part of a sentence is stricken on
review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all
counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its
sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances”’];
People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46 [“the need to apply
amended section[ ] 1170, subdivision (b) . . . creates sufficiently
‘“changed circumstances”’ [citation] to warrant a full
resentencing,” which includes determining “whether to impose an
upper, middle, or lower term, and whether to impose concurrent
or consecutive sentences”]; People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
887, 902 [“the trial court may revisit all of its sentencing choices
in light of” the amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b)].)
       Citing People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 (Stamps), the
People contend that, “should this Court find prejudicial error, the
appropriate relief is remand to afford the prosecution and trial
court the option of returning to the status quo ante,” which the
People assert means they should have “an opportunity to
withdraw approval for the plea agreement . . . .” In Stamps the
defendant “entered into a plea agreement for a specified term
that included a prior serious felony enhancement,” but while his
appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted a new law that gave
the trial court discretion to strike the enhancement in
furtherance of justice. (Id. at p. 692.) After concluding the new
law applied retroactively to the defendant, the Supreme Court
held that, should the defendant seek relief under the new law,
“the trial court is not authorized to unilaterally modify the plea
agreement by striking the serious felony enhancement but
otherwise keeping the remainder of the bargain.” (Id. at p. 707.)
Rather, the Supreme Court stated, unless the prosecution agrees
to a downward departure in the sentence, “‘the prosecutor is

                                16
entitled to the same remedy as the defendant—withdrawal of
assent to the plea agreement.’” (Ibid.)
        Stamps is distinguishable. Andrade’s plea agreement did
not provide for a specified term of imprisonment. Andrade
pleaded no contest to the amended charges, and the parties
agreed to a prison sentence ranging from zero years to 40 years
four months. Directing the trial court to resentence Andrade
under amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which may result in
a shorter prison sentence, would not deprive the People of the
benefit of their bargain or give Andrade a “‘bounty in excess of
that to which he is entitled.’” (Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 703.) Should the People fail to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the aggravating circumstances to support an upper term on
count 3, the court could impose an aggregate sentence between
zero years and the 20 years the trial court imposed (and the
People asked for) at the last sentencing hearing,9 which would
still fall within the range of prison time specified in the plea
agreement (i.e., between zero years and 40 years four months).
(See People v. Henderson (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 785, 789
[“striking the enhancement while preserving the plea deal does
not deprive the People of the benefit of their bargain” because the
sentence “would stay within the range of possible outcomes
agreed to by the parties”].) The People do not argue that they

9     See People v. Brunton (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1097, 1108
[when a defendant’s sentence is legally authorized, the “‘original
aggregate prison term cannot be increased on remand’” following
a partially successful appeal]; People v. Rosas (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 107, 109, fn. 1 [same]; see also People v. Collins
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 216 [“‘a defendant should not be required to
risk being given greater punishment on a retrial for the privilege
of exercising his right to appeal’”].)

                                17
lost the opportunity to have the court impose a sentence of up to
40 years four months or that they lost the ability to prove
aggravating circumstances by a lower standard of proof. They
argue only that they are entitled to withdraw their approval of
the plea because it “was the result of plea bargaining in which
[Andrade] obtained the benefit of a less severe punishment than
that which could result if he were convicted of all charged
offenses.” And even that is not a proper reason for allowing the
People to withdraw their approval of the plea because, if the jury
convicted Andrade on all counts, he could receive a greater
aggregate prison sentence, a result that would effectively
penalize Andrade for taking an appeal. (See People v. Flores
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420, 450 [“a defendant exercising his right
to appeal based on an ameliorative change in the law ‘should not
be penalized . . . by being rendered vulnerable to punishment
more severe than under his plea bargain’”], review granted June
22, 2022, S274561.)

                                18
                        DISPOSITION

      The convictions are affirmed, but the sentences are
vacated. The trial court is directed to resentence Andrade in
accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b), and any other
applicable ameliorative legislation.

                                             SEGAL, J.

We concur:

                  PERLUSS, P. J.

                  FEUER, J.

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