Court Opinion

ID: 9381725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 16:08:08.877108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.192403
License: Public Domain

J-A09036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 AMY J. SUNDAY                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellant             :
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
 CLIFFORD D. FORESTER; JULIA R.           :
 FORESTER; AND FORESTER & PAUL            :
 REAL ESTATE HOLDINGS, LLC                :   No. 110 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered January 4, 2022,
            in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County,
                   Civil Division at No(s): 2020-04911-CV.

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:             FILED: MARCH 23, 2023

      In this business-dissolution case, Amy J. Sunday appeals from the order

directing her to execute a settlement agreement with some – but not all – of

the defendants. Because Ms. Sunday’s cause of action for dissolution against

Forester & Paul Real Estate Holdings, LLC (“F&P” or “the LLC”) is unresolved,

we quash this appeal as premature.

      On August 24, 2020, Ms. Sunday sued Clifford and Julia Forester and

F&P. In her Complaint, she raised three counts: (1) against Mr. Forester and

F&P for dissolution of the LLC, (2) against Mr. Forester for breach of contract,

and (3) the Foresters for unjust enrichment. See Complaint at 9-13.

      A lawyer entered her appearance on behalf of the Foresters. However,

no attorney entered an appearance on behalf of F&P. As such, F&P never

appeared to participate in this matter before the court of common pleas or
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this Court.1 Moreover, none of the defendants filed preliminary objections or

an answer to the Complaint.

       The docket sat essentially dormant for a year; Ms. Sunday and the

Foresters negotiated a possible settlement. On August 2, 2021 the Foresters

filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement against Ms. Sunday. The trial

court received Joint Stipulations of Fact. Following briefing, the court entered

an order granting the motion to enforce, and Ms. Sunday appealed.

       After receiving Ms. Sunday’s notice of appeal and docketing statement,

this Court issued a show-cause order. We questioned, sua sponte, whether

the appealed-from order was final, as Ms. Sunday asserted in her docketing

statement. See Superior Court Order, 3/8/22, at 1. She filed a response to

the order. This Court discharged the show-cause order and deferred the issue

of appellate jurisdiction to this merits panel.

       “The establishment of jurisdiction is of equal importance as the

establishment of a meritorious claim for relief.” Robinson v. Pennsylvania

Bd. of Probation & Parole, 582 A.2d 857, 860 (Pa. 1990). Although the

parties have not raised appealability, this Court “may always consider that

question on our own motion.” Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (en banc).
____________________________________________

1 “LLC entities, generally, may not proceed in Pennsylvania courts of common
pleas except through a licensed attorney.” David R. Nicholson, Builder,
LLC v. Jablonski, 163 A.3d 1048, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2017), disapproved of on
other grounds by Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, Inc., 265 A.3d
383 (Pa. 2021).

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      A jurisdictional issue presents us with “a question of law; the appellate

standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review plenary.” Id.

      This Court’s appellate jurisdiction only extends to “(1) a final order or

an order certified by the trial court as a final order; (2) an interlocutory order

as of right; (3) an interlocutory order by permission; (4) or a collateral order.”

Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Hodes, 784 A.2d 144, 144 (Pa.

Super. 2001).

      Ms. Sunday argues that the appealed-from order is final. However, she

omits the definition of a “final order” from her response to this Court’s show-

cause order, and she fails to analyze our jurisdiction in her brief. Instead, Ms.

Sunday claims the appealed-from order “is final because it requires [her] to

sign a settlement agreement which has the effect of terminating the litigation

. . . .” Ms. Sunday’s Response to March 8, 2022 Order at 1 (citing Kulp v.

Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. 2000)).

      Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, “an appeal may

be taken of right from any final order of a . . . trial court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a).

By definition, a final order “disposes of all claims and of all parties . . . [or] is

entered as a final order pursuant to paragraph (c) of this Rule . . . .” Pa.R.A.P.

341(b). Paragraph (c) provides:

         When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
         action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
         third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
         trial court or other government unit may enter a final order
         as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties
         only upon an express determination that an immediate
         appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case. Such

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         an order becomes appealable when entered.       In the
         absence of such a determination and entry of a final
         order, any order or other form of decision that
         adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall
         not constitute a final order. In addition, the following
         conditions shall apply:

            (1)   An application for a determination of finality
                  under paragraph (c) must be filed within 30
                  days of entry of the order. During the time an
                  application for a determination of finality is
                  pending, the action is stayed.

            (2)   Unless the trial court or other government unit
                  acts on the application within 30 days after it is
                  filed, the trial court or other government unit
                  shall no longer consider the application and it
                  shall be deemed denied.

            (3)   A notice of appeal may be filed within 30 days
                  after entry of an order as amended unless a
                  shorter time period is provided in Pa.R.A.P.
                  903(c). Any denial of such an application is
                  reviewable only through a petition for
                  permission to appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 1311.

Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) (emphasis added).

      As mentioned, Ms. Sunday relies upon Kulp, supra, for the proposition

that the appealed-from order is, in effect, a final order. Admittedly, the Kulp

Court said, “Although the instant order does not fit any of [the final-order

definition] perfectly, we must consider whether the practical ramification of

the order will be to dispose of the case, making review appropriate.” Kulp,

765 A.2d at 798 (citing Commonwealth v. J.H.B., 760 A.2d 27, 28 (Pa.

Super. 2000)). Thus, Ms. Sunday’s reliance upon Kulp and argument that

the order “effectively puts [her] out of court” is understandable. Ms. Sunday’s

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Response to March 8, 2022 Order at 2. Nevertheless, her reliance upon Kulp

is misplaced.

     Twenty years ago, this Court rejected the statement from Kulp as being

no longer good law. In Brickman Group, Ltd. v. CGU Ins. Co., 829 A.2d

1160, (Pa. Super. 2003), we explained as follows:

        [Appellant] urges that, in those cases where an order “does
        not fit any of these [Rule 341(b)] definitions perfectly,” this
        Court should “consider whether the practical ramification of
        the order will be to dispose of the case, making review
        appropriate.” Kulp . . . 765 A.2d [at] 798. We first note
        that the preceding language from Kulp traces its origin to
        caselaw evaluating the appealability of orders prior to the
        1992 amendment of Rule 341.               See [id.] (citing
        Commonwealth v. J.H.B., 760 A.2d [at] 28 . . . (“In
        ascertaining what is a final appealable order, this Court
        must look beyond the technical effect of the adjudication to
        its practical ramifications.”) (quoting Grove North
        America v. Arrow Lift & Constr. Equip. Co., . . . 617 A.2d
        369, 372 (Pa. Super. 1992)).

              The Court in Robert H. McKinney, Jr., Associates,
        Inc. v. Albright, . . . 632 A.2d 937 (Pa. Super. 1993),
        explained the significance of the 1992 amendment:

           Case law which interpreted the earlier provisions of
           Rule 341, considered final all orders which had a
           practical consequence of putting a litigant out of court.
           These included instances where a party was dismissed
           from a case or, in some circumstances, where some,
           but not all of the counts of a multi-count complaint
           were dismissed. Thus, finality was often determined
           without regard to the fact that the litigation did not
           end as to all claims or all parties. However, under the
           amended version of Rule 341, as quoted above, this
           is no longer the case for actions commenced after July
           6, 1992. Under the [current] rule, an appeal may not
           be taken from an order dismissing less than all claims
           or all parties from a case. An exception to this general
           rule exists under subparagraph (c), whenever an

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          express determination has been made by the trial
          court that an immediate appeal would facilitate
          resolution of the entire case.

       Id. at 938–39.

              [Appellant] maintains that the conditional nature of
       [appellee’s] claims against the additional defendants
       rendered them essentially dismissed upon the granting of
       summary judgment in favor of [appellee].          Therefore,
       [appellant] asserts, we should consider that the “practical
       ramification” of the order is to dispose of the entire case.
       Yet, it has been firmly established since the promulgation of
       the 1992 amendment to Pa.R.A.P. 341 that orders can be
       considered final and appealable only if they meet the
       requirements set forth in the rule. Keefer v. Keefer, 741
       A.2d 808 (Pa. Super. 1999) (quashing appeal where three
       actions consolidated into one and order did not dismiss all
       claims and all parties arising under the three
       actions); Prelude, Inc. v. Jorcyk, 695 A.2d 422 (Pa.
       Super. 1997) (en banc ) (quashing appeals where order did
       not dismiss all defendants and finality determination under
       341(c) was not pursued notwithstanding the fact that two
       remaining defendants had filed for federal bankruptcy
       protection) . . .

              As stated by the majority in Prelude, 695 A.2d at
       422, “Rule 341 is fundamental to the exercise of jurisdiction
       by this court. It is not surprising, therefore, that the rule
       has been rigorously applied.” Id. at 424 (collecting cases).
       In Prelude, the case had been dismissed against all but two
       defendants. The two remaining defendants both had filed
       for federal bankruptcy protection. The Court held that the
       order dismissing less than all of the defendants was not a
       final, appealable order. The Court further noted that no
       finality determination pursuant to 341(c) had been pursued.
       Therefore, the Court held that it did not have jurisdiction
       over the case and quashed the appeal.

             The dissent argued [appellant’s] position, stating,
       “Because Prelude has, in effect, been put out of court, I
       believe that an immediate appeal from the trial court's order
       is warranted.” Id. at 425–426.         The dissent, while
       conceding that the appeal did not meet the requirements of
       Rule 341, nevertheless found quashal to be an “inequitable”

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         result and urged a “liberal construction of Rule 341.” Id. at
         425.

Brickman Group, Ltd. v. CGU Ins. Co., 829 A.2d 1160, 1163–64 (Pa. Super.

2003). We quashed the appeal.

      Like the appellant in Brickman Group, Ms. Sunday argues for the same

construction of Rule 341(b) as the dissent in Prelude. Although the appealed-

from order does not perfectly meet the definition of a final order, she would

have us overlook the absence of true finality, because the appealed-from order

“effectively” puts her out of court. As this Court sitting en banc has rejected

that approach to Rule 341(b), we may not apply it in such a fashion. See

Prelude, supra. To do so would be to exercise an appellate jurisdiction that

has yet to vest under Rule 341(a).

      As stated, Ms. Sunday sued F&P for dissolution. The LLC has neither

responded to her claim in an answer, nor has it filed preliminary objections.

Additionally, F&P is not a party to the settlement agreement which the trial

court ordered Ms. Sunday to execute. Thus, the appealed-from order does

not dispose of “of all claims and of all parties,” because Ms. Sunday’s claim

for dissolution against F&P remains pending before the trial court. Pa.R.A.P.

341(b)(1).

      Furthermore, Ms. Sunday did not ask the trial court to certify “that an

immediate appeal [from the order in question] would facilitate resolution of

the entire case . . . within 30 days of entry of the order.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)(1).

“In the absence of such a determination and entry of a final order, any order

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or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties

shall not constitute a final order.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) (emphasis added). Nor

did Ms. Sunday petition for permission to appeal with this Court regarding the

appealed-from order. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(c)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 1311.

      Therefore, the order is, by definition, not final.

      Also, the appealed-from order does not meet the definition of a collateral

order. Under, Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 a collateral order is “an order

[(1)] separate from and collateral to the main cause of action, [(2)] where the

right involved is too important to be denied review and [(3)] the question

presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case,

the claim will be irreparably lost.” Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). While the enforceability

of the settlement agreement is separable from the main cause of action, and

Ms. Sunday’s rights under it are arguably too important to be denied review,

those rights will not be irreparable lost “if review is postponed until final

judgment in the case.” Id.

      The Foresters may not enter a settlement agreement on behalf of the

unrepresented LLC, which took no part in settlement negotiations, the motion

to compel, or this appeal. Accordingly, the Foresters have no authority to

compel Ms. Sunday to discontinue her lawsuit against an unrepresented LLC.

      Thus, once the matter between Ms. Sunday and F&P resolves itself (via

discontinuance or judgment), Ms. Sunday may appeal from the order resolving

her case against it. In a future appeal, Ms. Sunday may, if she wished, raise

issues regarding the order that directed her to execute the settlement

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agreement with the Foresters. If the trial court erroneously compelled her to

sign the settlement agreement, the remedy of reversal will cure that error. If

that occurs, Ms. Sunday and the Foresters may resume negotiations or

proceed to trial. Either way, her rights would not be irreparably lost. Thus,

the appealed-from order is not a collateral order.

      Lastly, the order is not an interlocutory order appealable as of right

under Rule of Appellate Procedure 311.

      The order is unappealable. See Chase Manhattan Mortgage, supra.

We lack jurisdiction to decide the merits at this time.

      Appeal quashed.

      Oral argument scheduled for April 12, 2023, canceled.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/23/2023

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