Court Opinion

ID: 9707606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:37.048279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.719653
License: Public Domain

R. I. Cooper, J.
(concurring). The prosecutor in his closing argument stated as follows:
"We didn’t hear her testimony. She’s the only person there who could testify as to what happened at that time.”
The prosecutor was referring to the fact that the defendant’s wife had not testified even though the *544defendant had named her as an alibi witness. The defense argued that the closing comments by the prosecutor violated the trial judge’s order which granted defendant’s motion in limine prohibiting the introduction of any testimony regarding statements made by defendant’s wife.
The pertinent statutory language reads as follows:
"A husband shall not be examined as a witness for or against his wife without her consent; nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent * * *.” MCL 600.2162; MSA 27A.2162.
The trial judge’s order granting defendant’s motion in limine reads in pertinent part as follows:
"It is hereby ordered that any statements made by Sharri Spencer, codefendant of Duane Spencer, shall be and the same are hereby suppressed at the trial of Duane Robert Spencer, defendant herein.”
I believe the trial judge was correct in overruling defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s remarks concerning the wife’s failure to testify. The trial judge observed that spousal privilege had nothing to do with the facts of the case. The trial judge had ordered that any statements of the wife would not be allowed. However, he did not deny the prosecutor the right to make comments about the defendant’s claim that he was with his wife during the time of the crime.
Where a person claims an alibi, the prosecutor has a right to comment upon the failure to produce alibi witnesses. I do not find that the trial *545judge’s conclusion was in conflict with the above cited statute stating that a wife shall not testify against her husband without his consent. In fact, it could be strongly emphasized that, by naming her as an alibi witness, it is clear that defendant consented to her testifying as to his presence at the time of the alleged breaking and entering. Any testimony she might have provided regarding his being with her in their motel room at the time of the breaking and entering would have been testimony on his behalf. Further, to testify as to his presence or activities at the time of the breaking and entering would not reveal any confidential conversations shared between the husband and wife. Again, the judge’s order would thus not have been violated. It would be inconsistent to allow a defendant to claim his wife as an alibi witness, which by itself results, in his giving consent, and yet then state that he may invoke spousal privilege and thereby block the prosecutor from delving into his alibi. I do not feel this principle, as applied by the trial judge, is any less valid than the principle that if a defendant testifies he waives his right to remain silent during cross-examination.
While I realize case law favors the majority opinion, I believe the subject should be reconsidered due to the reasoning expressed above.
Regarding other matters covered by Judge Shepherd, I concur with his conclusion as to the error of allowing testimony regarding the defendant’s prior incarceration and unemployment. Also I concur with his conclusion regarding the error of admitting the alleged "threatening letters”. For the latter reasons, defendant’s convictions should be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial.