Court Opinion

ID: 9843689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:41:51.476281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:52.161012
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 23] Because the trial court carefully, fairly, and properly followed the law and found the facts, I dissent from the majority’s reversal.
[¶ 24] The trial court carefully followed the majority’s four-part analysis in Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, 560 N.W.2d 903. The majority reweighs the evidence, saying, at ¶ 14, “We believe the court gave far too little consideration to the evidence presented by Karen on this issue.” The majority does this despite our doctrine, “We do not reweigh the evidence.” See Wolf v. Estate of Serigkt, 1997 ND 240, 573 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1997); Wagner v. Sheridan Co. Soc. Services Bd., 518 N.W.2d 724, 728 n. 4 (N.D.1994); Habeck v. MacDonald, 520 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D.1994); Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 261 (N.D.1994); Spangler v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 519 N.W.2d 576, 580 (N.D.1994); and State v. Pacheco, 506 N.W.2d 408, 410 (N.D.1993). Here, the majority’s analysis ignores the specific finding by the trial court and arbitrarily re-finds the facts to achieve the pre-ordained result. For example, the majority omits the following from the trial court’s order:
She presented no evidence as to whether she would have problems obtaining licen-sure in Minnesota, her state of residency. Mike presented copies of employment advertisements from the Grand Forks Herald. Karen stated that the positions would require licensure or were below her educational level. One ad for the Northeast Human Service Center listed a salary range which is comparable to her position in Fort Wayne, but she stated that she and the Northeast personnel would not get along since she was instrumental in reducing that Center’s funding from the state legislature. Mike inquired whether she made any applications for positions in communities within a 125 mile radius of Grand Forks as permitted under the decree. These would include North Dakota communities such as Fargo, Jamestown, and Devils Lake and Crookston and Moorhead, Minnesota. Karen testified that she had not made any applications within that radius. In response to a MeritCare ad in Fargo, she stated that it would likely require a license, however the ad did not state that a license is required. Karen devoted 80% of her efforts in finding employment to Indiana and 20% to North Dakota.
[¶ 25] If one were inclined to retry, one could as easily reverse the trial court’s finding on the motivation of the custodial mother, in view of her repeated efforts to violate and deny the father’s rights under the divorce decree, and her job-seeking efforts focusing far from the father. But the road to retrial in these eases is a one-way street.
[¶ 26] The extended families live near the father. In Stout at ¶¶ 38-39 and 45, the majority thought the proximity of the extended family was a very important consideration:
We begin our analysis of Julene’s request to move to Arkansas with Tell by applying the first factor articulated above — the prospective advantages of the move in improving the custodial parent’s and child’s quality of life.
Neither James nor Julene has any family in North Dakota. If allowed to move to Arkansas, Julene would be within fifty miles of her parents and a sister, as well as a two-hour drive from James’ parents. In the original divorce proceeding, the trial court incorporated by reference the partial transcript of proceedings of the original hearing into its December 6, 1995, Memorandum Decision and Order. In that transcript, the trial court specifically noted, ‘[t]here is an advantage on the other hand to having your family close and your support system. I don’t deny that it’s an advantage.’ The trial court clearly found *515it would be an advantage to Julene and Tell to have extended family close by.
* ⅜ * * * *
The court failed to consider the benefits a network of close family members would provide and other non-eeonomie advantages.
Under the majority view, however, the proximity of the extended family is apparently important only if it is to be in proximity of the custodial mother. See Paulson v. Bauske, 1998 ND 17, 574 N.W.2d 801.
[¶ 27] Sadly, the majority continues its inexorable drive to substitute completely “the happiness of the custodial mother” for the “best interests of the child.” Id. at ¶27.
[¶ 28] I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
[¶ 29] Dale V. Sandstrom