Court Opinion

ID: 9752289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:55:30.216999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:13.253074
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring. I concur that we can not affirm the restitution award for most of the reasons stated in the opinion for the Court. I agree with Justice Morse, in part, that if we were to apply the standard applicable to civil damage awards, we would affirm at least part of the restitution award. Without further action from the Legislature, which I agree with Justice Morse would be desirable, I do not believe that lost profits are appropriate for restitution awards.
Both the majority and the dissent conclude that lost profits are appropriate for restitution awards, but differ on whether they could be awarded on this factual record. They both rely on cases irom other states that have authorized lost-profit awards. In looking at decisions from other states, we must look carefully at the statutes on which they are based because the authorization of restitution is wholly statutory.
A good example is State v. Ihde, 532 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995), which upholds a restitution order that includes lost profits. The Iowa statute involved authorizes the sentencing court to order restitution for “pecuniary damages,” defined to include “‘all damages to the extent not paid by an insurer, which a victim could recover against the offender in a civil action arising out of the same facts or event.’” Id. at 828 (quoting Iowa Code § 910.1(2) (1991)). If the Iowa statute were in effect here, I would agree with Justice Morse that some of the profits would be recoverable in a civil action and would uphold at least a portion of the restitution order. The Vermont statute is, however, unlike the Iowa statute.
Our statute requires the court to consider restitution whenever a victim suffers a material loss. 13 V.S.A. § 7043(a). The award can include a payment “to compensate for damages to the victim’s property or person.” Id. § 7043(b). Because of this sparse and narrow language, we held in State v. Jarvis, 146 Vt. 636, 638, 509 A.2d 1005, *471006 (1986), that “only liquidated amounts which are easily ascertained and measured are recoverable under the legislative scheme.” Whatever may be included in Iowa, this authorization is too narrow for the kind of lost profits included here.
The state with criminal restitution law most similar to Vermont’s is Arizona. The Arizona statute allows a restitution order to include an amount for “economic loss,” to include “losses which would not have been incurred but for the offense,” but not “consequential damages.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-105(14) (Supp. 1996). The Arizona courts have held that a restitution order may include lost profits, only when the defendant has actually taken the profits — for example, where a store clerk embezzles sales proceeds. See State v. Barrett, 864 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (lost-profit component of restitution award not proper where defendant stole inventory rather than cash from sales proceeds; evidence did not show causal relationship between defendant’s action and victim’s purported lost profits); State v. Young, 842 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (lost-profit component of restitution award appropriate where defendant sold merchandise to customers, did not record sales, and kept proceeds; presumably defendant made sales at retail price, depriving victim of profit on each sale); cf. State v. Pearce, 751 P.2d 603, 605 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (victim’s breach of contract and lost profits were consequential damages resulting from defendant’s theft, and not proper subject of restitution). I would follow the rule of the Arizona courts as long as we have the current statute.