Court Opinion

ID: 9770100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:42:49.792931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:11.904233
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
MUNDY, J.:
I agree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court in overruling Appellants’ preliminary objections as to the cause of action for wrongful termination. As the trial court correctly concluded and the majority artfully points out, “[Appellants’] right to a demurrer ... is not clear and free from doubt” because “[a] good faith argument has alleged that [Appel-lee’s] dismissal violated public policy.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/05/09, at 7.
I, however, respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court and to sustain Appellants’ preliminary objections as to the cause of action *126for intentional interference with a contractual relationship. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, my review of the applicable law does not reflect that this Court is constrained by the holding in Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Super.1998). Rather, from my analysis of the law in this area, I discern that different panels of this Court have made contradictory rulings regarding a plaintiffs ability to bring an action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship in an at-will employment context. Therefore, I do not agree with the majority that Hennessy, supra, represents the decisional law of this Court.
As an initial matter, I recognize, as the majority notes, that the language cited in footnote six of Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611, 618 (1980) is mere dicta and, therefore, not binding upon this Court. In Yaindl, supra, footnote six is merely a component of a broader discussion wherein a panel of this Court opined that the cause of action for wrongful discharge is a more specific example of the cause of action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship. As this point was not essential to the panel’s holding, it is dicta. See Valles v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 758 A.2d 1288, 1246 (Pa.Super.2000) (noting that a statement that is not necessary to the disposition of the case is dicta and, therefore, not binding authority).
Nevertheless, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the language in Curran v. Children’s Service Center, 396 Pa.Super. 29, 578 A.2d 8, 18 (1990), as dicta. In Curran, supra, a panel of this Court considered whether an at-will employee could bring an action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship against the supervisor who terminated him. As a preliminary issue necessary in determining whether the employee had posited a legally cognizable cause of action, the panel determined that a cause of action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship existed in the at-will employment context. Id. The panel unequivocally proclaimed, “[a] cause of action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship may be sustained even though the employment relationship is at-will.” Id. Only after making this determination did the panel proceed to conclude that the supervisor was an agent of the employer and, thus, “there [was] no third party against whom an action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship [could] lie.” Id. Had the panel not determined that an at-will employee may bring an action for intentional interference with a contractual relationship, the panel would never have reached the question of whether the supervisor was an appropriate third party. As such, I reason that the panel’s preliminary determination is essential to its ruling and, therefore, should not be considered dicta to the holding in Curran.1
Moreover, Curran, supra, refers to Comment g of Section 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which explicitly addresses contracts terminable at-will. Our Supreme Court has adopted Section 766. See Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466, 470 (1979). *127Comment g of Section 766 states the following in pertinent part.
A similar situation exists with a contract that, by its terms or otherwise, permits the third person to terminate the agreement at will. Until he has so terminated it, the contract is valid and subsisting, and the defendant may not properly interfere with it. The fact that a contract is terminable at will, however, is to be taken into account in determining damages that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of its breach.
One’s interest in a contract terminable at will is primarily an interest in future relations between the parties, and he has no legal assurance of them. For this reason, an interference with this interest is closely analogous to interference with prospective contractual relations.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, Comment g. I recognize that while our Supreme Court has formally adopted Section 766, it has not addressed the current issue or specifically mentioned the application of Comment g. Thus, I concede our Supreme Court’s adoption of Section 766 did not necessarily mandate that the Hennessy Court follow the precepts of Comment g. See Lance v. Wyeth, 4 A.3d 160, 169 (Pa.Super.2010) (noting that this Court must adhere to the principles established by our Supreme Court until our Supreme Court alters its approach). Nonetheless, I find it notable that the decision in Hennessy failed to address Section 766, Comment g, or the Curran decision.
Moreover, this Court’s “jurisprudential task is to effectuate the decisional law of [our Supreme Court], not to restrict it through curtailed readings of controlling authority.” In re Estate of Stephano, 602 Pa. 527, 981 A.2d 138, 142 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Millner, 585 Pa. 237, 888 A.2d 680, 693 (2005). It is well settled that “[a]s an intermediate appellate court, this Court is obligated to follow the precedent set down by our Supreme Court. It is not the prerogative of [this Court] to enunciate new precepts of law or to expand existing legal doctrines. Such is a province reserved to [our] Supreme Court.” Lance, supra at 169. As such, because of our Supreme Court’s adoption of Section 766 as controlling authority and the precedent of this Court recognizing Comment g of the same section, I believe it was incumbent upon the panel in Hennessy to explain its departure from the path established by our Supreme Court. In failing to do so, the Hennessy decision not only contradicts a prior panel of this Court, but the decision also commits the jurisprudential error which our Supreme Court has explicitly denounced. In departing from Comment g, the Hennessy decision enunciates a new precept of law. See Lance, supra at 169.
Given our Supreme Court’s precedent regarding Section 766 as well as this Court’s own contradictory precedent citing Comment g of Section 766, I would conclude that the Hennessy decision is not controlling upon this Court. For all of the foregoing reasons, I believe that the state of this Court’s decisional law as to the issue before us is in conflict. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision to overrule all preliminary objections.

. In determining whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is likely to recognize the tort of intentional interference with a contractual relationship in an at-will employment context, a Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania noted that the preliminary determination in Curran was essential to its holding. Brooks v. Systems Manufacturing Corp., 2004 WL 2028755, *6 (E.D.Pa.2004). The Court stated, in Curran, the Pennsylvania Superior Court "[held] that recovery for intentional interference with performance of an at-will employment contract was actionable.” Id. (emphasis added).