Court Opinion

ID: 9930375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 19:00:46.947632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:32.802245
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1203       Document: 010110995688     Date Filed: 02/06/2024    Page: 1

                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                        PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     February 6, 2024
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                               FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                           _________________________________

     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

          Plaintiff - Appellee,

     v.                                                       No. 22-1203

     KENNETH DEVEREAUX,

          Defendant - Appellant.
                         _________________________________

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                                for the District of Colorado
                             (D.C. No. 1:21-CR-00352-RM-1)
                          _________________________________

 Submitted on the briefs: *

 Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender and Jacob Rasch-Chabot, Assistant Federal
 Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant Kenneth Devereaux.

 Cole Finnegan, U.S. Attorney and J. Bishop Grewell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver,
 Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of America.
                          _________________________________

 Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 *
   After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument.
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 EBEL, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       In this direct criminal appeal, Defendant Kenneth Devereaux challenges his

 sixty-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Devereaux

 contends that, in calculating his sentence under the guidelines, the district court erred

 in treating his prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) for assault resulting in

 serious bodily injury as a “crime of violence” and then using that prior conviction to

 increase Devereaux’s base offense level. The district court deemed Devereaux’s

 prior § 113(a)(6) conviction to be a “crime of violence” after determining that it had

 as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

 person of another.

       A § 113(a)(6) assault can be committed either intentionally or recklessly. The

 question here is whether those alternate mentes reae are elements of two different

 offenses proscribed by § 113(a)(6) or are instead different means to commit a single

 indivisible offense. Applying Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), we

 conclude they are different means to commit a single indivisible offense. In light of

 that and because the least criminalized conduct § 113(a)(6) proscribes is recklessness,

 a § 113(a)(6) conviction categorically does not have as an element the use, attempted

 use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. See Borden v.

 United States, 593 U.S.—, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) (plurality). The district court,

 therefore, erred in treating Devereaux’s prior § 113(a)(6) conviction as a “crime of

                                             2
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 violence.” Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we

 VACATE Devereaux’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

         Devereaux pled guilty to being a previously convicted felon in possession of a

 firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In preparation for sentencing, a

 probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”), which used U.S.S.G.

 § 2K2.1(a) to calculate Devereaux’s base offense level. 1 Section 2K2.1 applies to a

 variety of firearm offenses; § 2K2.1(a) provides different base offense levels

 depending on the circumstances of a given case. Here, the PSR originally calculated

 Devereaux’s base offense level to be 20, based on the fact that Devereaux admitted

 possessing an unlawful short-barreled shotgun. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II).

         Devereaux’s base offense level would have, instead, been 22 if, in addition to

 his possessing the short-barreled shotgun, one of his prior convictions qualified as a

 “crime of violence.” See id. § 2K2.1(a)(3). Before sentencing, the district court

 raised the possibility that Devereaux’s prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6)

 for assault resulting in serious bodily injury qualified as a “crime of violence.” 2

 1
     The PSR used the 2021 sentencing guidelines, as do we.
 2
   18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) provides: “Whoever, within the special maritime and
 territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of assault shall be punished as
 follows: . . . (6) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by a fine under this title or
 imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.”

                                              3
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       Devereaux, the Government, and the probation officer all responded that

 Devereaux’s prior § 113(a)(6) felony conviction did not qualify as a “crime of

 violence.” The district court disagreed and increased Devereaux’s base offense level

 to 22. 3 In doing so, the court concluded that Devereaux’s prior § 113(a)(6) assault

 conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” because it “has as an element the use,

 attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). 4

       A court applies the now familiar categorical approach to determine whether a

 prior conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). See

 Maloid, 71 F.4th at 804–05. The categorical approach focuses on the elements of the

 3
   The district court initially suggested another of Devereaux’s prior felony
 convictions, one for aiding and abetting involuntary manslaughter, should also be
 deemed a “crime of violence.” The district court, however, ultimately determined
 that prior conviction did not qualify as a “crime of violence.” That decision is not
 before us in this appeal.
 4
   The guideline provision that applies to Devereaux’s felon-in-possession conviction,
 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, incorporates the definition of “crime of violence” found in
 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and its application note 1. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, app. n.1.
 Relevant here, § 4B1.2(a) defines “crime of violence” in two ways: an “offense under
 federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,
 that—(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
 against the person of another, or (2) is . . . aggravated assault,” among other
 enumerated offenses. The former definition is referred to as the “elements clause”;
 the latter as the “enumerated clause.” United States v. Maloid, 71 F.4th 795, 801
 (10th Cir. 2023). The district court held that Devereaux’s § 113(a)(6) conviction did
 not qualify as “aggravated assault” under § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s enumerated clause. That
 decision is not before us on appeal.

                                            4
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 prior offense of conviction and not on the defendant’s actual conduct underlying that

 prior conviction. See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504.

          If some conduct that would be a crime under the statute [of prior conviction]
          would not be a ‘crime of violence’ under § 4B1.2(a), then any conviction
          under that statute will not qualify as a ‘crime of violence’ for a sentence
          enhancement under the Guidelines, regardless of whether the conduct that
          led to a defendant’s prior conviction was in fact violent.”

 Maloid, 71 F.4th at 805 (quoting United States v. O’Connor, 874 F.3d 1147, 1151

 (10th Cir. 2017)).

          One problem with treating Devereaux’s prior § 113(a)(6) assault conviction as

 a “crime of violence” is that a § 113(a)(6) assault can be committed recklessly, see

 United States v. Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1232, 1233‒35 (10th Cir. 2006), but a

 reckless offense categorically does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or

 threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” Borden, 141 S. Ct.

 at 1821‒22 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Here, the district court avoided

 this problem by ruling that § 113(a)(6) is divisible; that is, it proscribes not one but

 two different offenses: 1) intentional and 2) reckless assault resulting in serious

 injury. 5 Treating § 113(a)(6) as divisible, the district court applied the modified

 categorical approach and, reviewing the relevant Shepard 6 documents—including

 charging and plea documents from Devereaux’s prior assault case—determined that

 5
   The district court distinguished between intentional and reckless assault resulting in
 serious bodily injury. We do the same. But Zunie, using Model Penal Code’s
 terminology, specifically held that § 113(a)(6) could be committed “purposely,
 knowingly, or recklessly.” 444 F.3d at 1235.
 6
     Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
                                               5
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 Devereaux’s previous § 113(a)(6) conviction was for intentional, rather than reckless,

 assault resulting in serious bodily injury. On that basis, the district court determined

 that Devereaux’s prior assault conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” that

 increased his base offense level from 20 to 22, which in turn raised his advisory

 imprisonment range from 57 to 71 months up to 70 to 87 months. The district court

 then imposed a below-guideline sentence of 60 months in prison.

        Devereaux appeals the district court’s decision to treat his prior § 113(a)(6)

 assault conviction as a “crime of violence.” The Government agrees with Devereaux

 that the district court erred.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This court reviews de novo the question of “[w]hether a prior conviction

 qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the Guidelines.” United States v. Gieswein,

 887 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th Cir. 2018).

                                   III. DISCUSSION

        The question we address is whether the alternate mentes reae 7 that can violate

 § 113(a)(6)—intentional (purposeful and knowing) and reckless—are elements of

 separate assault offenses or are instead different factual means to commit a single,

 indivisible assault offense. Applying the Supreme Court’s guidance in Mathis, we

 conclude that § 113(a)(6) sets forth a single offense—assault resulting in serious

 bodily injury—that can be committed by means of either intentional or reckless

 7
  The parties use the phrase mentes reae, which is the plural of mens rea. We follow
 suit.
                                            6
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 conduct. Thus, we assess whether a prior § 113(a)(6) conviction qualifies as a crime

 of violence using the categorical, rather than the modified categorical, approach.

 A. Mathis’ guidance

       As we previously noted, the categorical approach focuses on the elements of

 the prior offense of conviction rather than on the actual conduct underlying that

 conviction. See Mathis, 579 U.S. at 504.

       “Elements” are the “constituent parts” of a crime’s legal definition—the
       things the “prosecution must prove to sustain a conviction.” Black’s Law
       Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014). At a trial, they are what the jury must
       find beyond a reasonable doubt to convict the defendant, see Richardson
       v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999); and at a plea hearing, they are
       what the defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty, see
       McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).

 Id.

       When a criminal statute “list[s] elements in the alternative, and thereby

 define[s] multiple crimes,” a court applies the modified categorical approach. Id.

 at 505. “Under that approach, a sentencing court [first] looks to a limited class of

 documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement and

 colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted

 of.” Id. After making that determination, the court can then apply the categorical

 approach to determine whether that offense of conviction qualifies as a “crime of

 violence.” Id. at 506-07.

       The Supreme Court recognizes there is a different type of criminal statute, one

 which sets forth, not “multiple elements” that create separate offenses, but instead

                                            7
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 “enumerates various factual means of committing a single element.” Id. at 506. The

 modified categorical approach does not apply to a conviction under that type of

 statute. Id. at 503, 506‒07, 513, 517. Instead, in that situation, only the categorical

 approach applies based on the offense’s elements, regardless of what factual means

 the defendant employed to commit the single indivisible offense. See id. at 503, 513.

        As an example of a statute that sets forth several factual means to commit a

 single offense, Mathis cites the following:

        [S]uppose a statute requires use of a “deadly weapon” as an element of a
        crime and further provides that the use of a “knife, gun, bat, or similar
        weapon” would all qualify. See Descamps[ v. United States], 570 U.S.
        [254,] 271 [(2013)]; Richardson, 526 U.S., at 817. Because that kind of
        list merely specifies diverse means of satisfying a single element of a
        single crime—or otherwise said, spells out various factual ways of
        committing some component of the offense—a jury need not find (or a
        defendant admit) any particular item: A jury could convict even if some
        jurors “conclude[d] that the defendant used a knife” while others
        “conclude[d] he used a gun,” so long as all agreed that the defendant used
        a “deadly weapon.” Ibid.; see Descamps, 570 U.S., at 270 (describing
        means, for this reason, as “legally extraneous circumstances”).

 Id. at 506.

        Here, the specific question is whether the different mentes reae (intentional

 assault or reckless assault) that can support a § 113(a)(6) conviction are different

 means by which a defendant can commit a single indivisible assault offense or,

 instead, whether the different mentes reae are elements of separate and different

 assault offenses. As an initial matter, we have not found any precedent holding that

 differing mentes reae cannot be different means to commit a single offense. Mathis

                                               8
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 noted that possibility. See 579 U.S. at 512 n.3. 8 In fact, this court has on occasion

 treated different mentes reae as means to commit one element of a single indivisible

 offense rather than as different elements of separate criminal offenses. See United

 States v. Kepler, 74 F.4th 1292, 1304 (10th Cir. 2023) (stating that “[ma]lice is the

 8
  Mathis noted that one of the reasons the Court applies a categorical approach that
 focuses on the elements of a prior conviction, 579 U.S. at 510, is that

        an elements-focus avoids unfairness to defendants. Statements of “non-
        elemental fact” in the records of prior convictions are prone to error precisely
        because their proof is unnecessary. [Descamps, 570 U.S.] at 270. At trial,
        and still more at plea hearings, a defendant may have no incentive to contest
        what does not matter under the law; to the contrary, he “may have good
        reason not to”—or even be precluded from doing so by the court. Ibid. When
        that is true, a prosecutor’s or judge’s mistake as to means, reflected in the
        record, is likely to go uncorrected. See ibid. Such inaccuracies should not
        come back to haunt the defendant many years down the road by triggering a
        lengthy mandatory sentence.

 Mathis, 579 U.S. at 512 (footnote omitted). Mathis further explained:

        To see the point most clearly, consider an example arising in the immigration
        context: A defendant charged under a statute that criminalizes “intentionally,
        knowingly, or recklessly” assaulting another—as exists in many States . . .—
        has no apparent reason to dispute a prosecutor’s statement that he committed
        the crime intentionally (as opposed to recklessly) if those mental states are
        interchangeable means of satisfying a single mens rea element. But such a
        statement, if treated as reliable, could make a huge difference in a deportation
        proceeding years in the future, because an intentional assault (unlike a
        reckless one) qualifies as a “crime involving moral turpitude,” and so
        requires removal from the country.

 Id. at 512 n.3.

                                               9
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  mens rea element of [federal] second-degree murder, and depraved-heart recklessness

  is one way to prove malice”). 9

        Mathis sets forth three factors for a court to consider in making the

  elements-versus-means determination.

        First, a . . . court decision may provide the answer by, for example,
        specifying which elements require unanimous jury agreement. Mathis,
        579 U.S. at 517–18. Second, the statute itself may provide the answer,
        such as by tying the alternatives to different punishments. Id. at 518.
        Finally, when the first two tools do not resolve the matter, a court can
        take a “peek” at the record of the prior conviction, but only for the
        “limited purpose of determining whether [the listed items are] element[s]
        of the offense.” Id. at 518 (quoting Rendon v. Holder, 782 F.3d 466, 473–
        74 (9th Cir. 2015) [(Kozinski, J. (dissent from denial of rehearing en
        banc)] (alterations in original)).

  United States v. Winrow, 49 F.4th 1372, 1376–77 (10th Cir. 2022). 10

  9
    Other circuits, addressing different state statutes that expressly include several
  mentes reae, have deemed those mentes reae to be means rather than elements. See,
  e.g., United States v. Brasby, 61 F.4th 127, 135 & n.35 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Cabeda
  v. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 165, 174 n. 9 (3d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Hoxworth,
  11 F.4th 693, 696 (8th Cir. 2021)).
  10
     Here, the district court, in erroneously concluding that the differing mentes reae
  for committing assault under § 113(a)(6) were elements of separate and different
  assault offenses, did not address or apply Mathis and, in fact, appears to have
  analyzed the question contrary to Mathis. For example, the district court erroneously
  thought that Congress’s intent in drafting § 113(a) was irrelevant. The district court
  also several times mentioned taking a “peek” at documents from Devereaux’s prior
  § 113(a)(6) prosecution when applying the modified categorical approach. But, when
  employing the modified categorical approach, a court is not limited to “a peek.” It
  can look at and rely on all relevant Shepard documents in order to determine under
  which of a divisible statute’s multiple offenses the defendant was convicted. It is
  when a court is, instead, making Mathis’ elements-versus-means determination that
  the court can only “peek” at the relevant documents in order to determine whether the
  different ways to violate a criminal statute are elements that the Government must
                                            10
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        “Ordinarily, a statute is indivisible unless we can tell with certainty that the

  alternative statutory components constitute elements (rather than means).” United

  States v. Wilkins, 30 F.4th 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v.

  Cantu, 964 F.3d 924, 929 (10th Cir. 2020)).

  B. Applying Mathis, the different mentes reae that can violate § 113(a)(6) are
  means to commit a single indivisible assault offense

        We apply, then, the factors Mathis identified—the statute of Devereaux’s prior

  assault conviction (§ 113(a)(6)), case law interpreting that statute and, if necessary, a

  peek at the record underlying Devereaux’s prior conviction, see Mathis, 579 U.S. at

  517‒18, to conclude that the differing mentes reae by which a defendant can commit

  a § 113(a)(6) assault are means to commit a single indivisible offense.

        1. The statute

        Applying Mathis’ factors, we begin in this case with the statute itself,

  § 113(a)(6). Here, that does not aid our elements-versus-means determination.

        Mathis notes several ways by which “the statute on its face may resolve the”

  elements-versus-means question. 579 U.S. at 518. “If statutory alternatives carry

  different punishments, then under Apprendi[ v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),]

  they must be elements.” That interpretive guidance applies to 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) as

  a whole. In enacting § 113(a), Congress set forth eight separate assault offenses,

  prove to a factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt or are instead means that the
  Government need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
                                             11
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  each with different elements and different punishments. 11 See generally United

  States v. Clark, 981 F.3d 1154, 1165 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that § 113(a) “covers a

  11

        18 U.S.C. § 113 Assaults within maritime and territorial jurisdiction

               (a) Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial
        jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished
        as follows:

                      (1) Assault with intent to commit murder or a
               violation of section 2241 or 2242, by a fine under this title,
               imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both.

                      (2) Assault with intent to commit any felony, except
               murder or a violation of section 2241 or 2242, by a fine
               under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years,
               or both.

                      (3) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to
               do bodily harm, by a fine under this title or imprisonment
               for not more than ten years, or both.

                      (4) Assault by striking, beating, or wounding, by a
               fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 1
               year, or both.

                      (5) Simple assault, by a fine under this title or
               imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, or if
               the victim of the assault is an individual who has not
               attained the age of 16 years, by fine under this title or
               imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.

                      (6) Assault resulting in serious bodily injury, by a
               fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten
               years, or both.

                     (7) Assault resulting in substantial bodily injury to a
               spouse or intimate partner, a dating partner, or an individual
                                            12
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  wide range of ‘[a]ssaults within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction’”).

  But the question here is whether one of those eight separate offenses—assault

  resulting in serious bodily injury, § 113(a)(6)—is further divisible into separate

  offenses for intentional assaults resulting in serious bodily injury and reckless

  assaults resulting in serious bodily injury. The language of § 113(a)(6)—“[w]hoever,

  within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty

  of an assault shall be punished as follows: . . . (6) Assault resulting in serious bodily

  injury, by a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or

  both”—does not suggest more than one offense.

        Mathis further suggests considering whether the statute “is drafted to offer

  ‘illustrative examples’”; if so, those examples are means. 579 U.S. at 518. Further,

  the “statute may itself identify which things must be charged (and so are elements)

  and which need not be (and so are means).” Id. Neither is the case with § 113(a)(6)

  because the statute itself does not set forth any mens rea by which a defendant can

  violate § 113(a)(6). Instead, the alternate intentional and reckless mentes reae by

               who has not attained the age of 16 years, by a fine under this
               title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both.

                      (8) Assault of a spouse, intimate partner, or dating
               partner by strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle
               or suffocate, by a fine under this title, imprisonment for not
               more than 10 years, or both.

  (Emphasis added.)

                                              13
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  which a defendant can violate § 113(a)(6) come from judicial gloss courts have

  placed on the statute. 12 See Zunie, 444 F.3d at 1235.

        2. Case law interpreting § 113(a)(6)

        As Mathis suggests, we turn next to case law interpreting § 113(a)(6). This is

  the most helpful interpretive guidance in our case and leads us to conclude that the

  differing mentes reae by which one can violate § 113(a)(6) are means by which to

  commit a single indivisible assault offense.

               a. Generally

        As a starting point, the Tenth Circuit, relying on the express language of the

  statute, has consistently indicated that a § 113(a)(6) offense requires proof of two

  elements: “(1) the defendant assaulted a victim and (2) the victim suffered serious

  bodily injury.” United States v. Mann, 899 F.3d 898, 902 (10th Cir. 2018), overruled

  on other grounds by Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1821 (2021) 13; see also Clark, 981 F.3d

  at 1165; Zunie, 444 F.3d at 1233.

  12
    Courts apply the categorical/modified categorical approach to elements provided
  by judicial interpretation rather than the statute’s language. Cf. Taylor v. United
  States, 495 U.S 575, 578, 598, 602 (1995); Kepler, 74 F.4th at 1297‒98, 1300.
  13
    Mann also held that a § 113(a)(6) assault conviction categorically qualified as a
  “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s elements clause, even though it could
  be committed recklessly. 899 F.3d at 900–02. As explained in the next section of
  this opinion, Borden overruled Mann on that point.

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        In Zunie, the Tenth Circuit held that a § 113(a)(6) assault can be committed

  either intentionally or recklessly. 14 See 444 F3d at 1233–36. In reaching that

  conclusion, Zunie reasoned as follows: Under the common law, assault is a general

  (rather than a specific) intent crime. Id. at 1233. The Tenth Circuit has defined a

  general intent crime as “one in which an act was done voluntarily and intentionally,

  and not because of mistake or accident.” Id. at 1234 (quoting United States v. Blair,

  54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995)). But “[t]he Model Penal Code suggests replacing

  conceptions of ‘specific intent’ and ‘general intent’ with a ‘hierarchy of culpable

  states of mind,’ including (1) purpose, (2) knowledge, (3) recklessness, and

  (4) negligence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980)).

  Under the Model Penal Code, a general intent crime like assault can be committed by

  a defendant acting with three of the four mentes reae that the Code recognizes:

  purpose, knowledge, and recklessness. 15 Id. at 1235. Zunie, thus, concluded that an

  assault under § 113(a)(6) could be committed by a defendant acting “purposely,

  knowingly, or recklessly.” Id. Neither the parties nor the district court have cited,

  14
    The specific question presented in Zunie was whether there was sufficient evidence
  to support the defendant’s § 113(a)(6) conviction. See 444 F.3d at 1233.

  15
     Under the Model Penal Code, “[a] person acts purposefully when he ‘consciously
  desires’ a particular result”; “[h]e acts knowingly when ‘he is aware that [a] result is
  practically certain to follow from his conduct,’ whatever his affirmative desire”; and
  “[a] person acts recklessly . . . when he ‘consciously disregards a substantial and
  unjustifiable risk’ attached to his conduct, in ‘gross deviation’ from accepted
  standards.” Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1823 (quoting Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404, and Model
  Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c)).

                                             15
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  nor have we found, any case law in the Tenth Circuit or otherwise directly addressing

  whether a jury must agree unanimously on a specific mens rea before convicting a

  defendant under § 113(a)(6).

               b. The Supreme Court’s decision in Borden

        Although it does not address a § 113(a)(6) assault, Borden is essential to the

  rest of our discussion. In Borden, a plurality of the Supreme Court applied the

  categorical approach to hold that a crime that can be committed recklessly

  categorically does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use

  of physical force against the person of another.” 141 S. Ct. at 1821–22, 1825, 1834

  (holding Tennessee conviction for reckless aggravated assault categorically did not

  qualify as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s elements clause). A

  fifth justice, Justice Thomas, also held that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s elements

  clause “does not encompass petitioner’s conviction for reckless aggravated assault.”

  Id. at 1834 (Thomas, J., concurring). Borden reasoned that “[t]he phrase ‘against

  another,’ when modifying the ‘use of force,’ demands that the perpetrator direct his

  action at, or target, another individual. Reckless conduct is not aimed in that

  prescribed manner.” Id. at 1825. 16

        Although Borden addressed a statute and the issue presented here involves

  sentencing guideline provisions, the Tenth Circuit has “applied Borden to the

  16
     See Kepler, 74 F.4th at 1302 n.11 (noting that five justices in Borden “concluded
  that a criminal offense with a reckless mens rea does not qualify as a violent crime
  entailing ‘use of physical force against the person . . . of another.’” (quoting Borden,
  141 S. Ct. at 1825)).
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Appellate Case: 22-1203    Document: 010110995688        Date Filed: 02/06/2024      Page: 17

  sentencing guidelines, holding that a crime of violence under the sentencing

  guidelines requires a mens rea greater than recklessness.” Wilkins, 30 F.4th at 1201

  n.1 (citing United States v. Ash, 7 F.4th 962, 963 (10th Cir. 2021), which applied

  Borden to hold that a Kansas conviction for reckless aggravated battery does not

  qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2).

               c. After Borden, Benally indicates that § 113(a)(6) proscribes a
               single indivisible assault offense

        The parties, in agreeing that § 113(a)(6) sets forth a single indivisible assault

  offense, primarily rely on this court’s post-Borden decision in United States v.

  Benally, 19 F.4th 1250 (10th Cir. 2021). Benally specifically addressed whether the

  Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, required

  restitution in that case. 19 F.4th at 1252. The MVRA requires restitution for certain

  designated offenses, including “crimes of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.

  See 19 F.4th at 1256 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(i)). Similar to the

  sentencing guideline provision at issue here, 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) defines a “crime of

  violence” to include “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or

  threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Applying

  Borden, Benally held that a § 113(a)(6) conviction for assault resulting in serious

  bodily injury did not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

  physical force against the person or property of another” because § 113(a)(6) can be

  committed with a mens rea of recklessness. 19 F.4th at 1258 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

  § 16(a)).

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         Benally supports our conclusion here that § 113(a)(6) sets forth a single

  indivisible assault offense, to which only the categorical, and not the modified

  categorical, approach applies, although Benally did not explicitly address the

  element-versus-means inquiry presented in this case. See also Jones v. United States,

  36 F.4th 974, 986 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding, in second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255

  proceeding, that “[b]ecause an assault resulting in serious bodily injury under § 113(a)(6)

  can be committed recklessly, after Borden it cannot qualify as” a crime of violence under

  18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)’s elements clause) (citing Benally). 17

  17
     In making a Mathis elements-versus-means determination, courts also consider
  pattern jury instructions. See Wilkins, 30 F.4th at 1204. Here, however, pattern
  instructions do not provide any compelling insight. The Tenth Circuit does not have
  a pattern jury instruction for § 113(a)(6). Although Eighth Circuit pattern criminal
  instruction 6.18.113(6) addresses § 113(a)(6) and requires proof of an assault,
  defined as “any intentional and voluntary attempt or threat to injure another person,”
  Eighth Circuit precedent recognizes that a § 113(a)(6) assault can also be committed
  recklessly, see United States v. Ashley, 255 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2001). Ninth
  Circuit pattern criminal instruction 8.8 requires proof that the defendant assaulted the
  victim “by intentionally” striking or wounding him, but the comments to that
  instruction further note that proof of battery can also support a § 113(a)(6)
  conviction, and “at common law, criminal battery is shown if the defendant’s conduct
  is reckless.” In United States v. Charley, 1 F.4th 637, 641, 648 n.7 (9th Cir. 2021),
  the Ninth Circuit noted that the trial court in that case instructed jurors that it was the
  Government’s burden to prove that the defendant charged with assault under
  § 113(a)(6) “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” struck or wounded the victim.
  That instruction suggests those differing mentes reae are means to prove one assault
  offense. But Charley did not specifically address the propriety of that instruction.
  These authorities, then, do not provide any compelling insight into whether
  intentional and reckless mentes reae are elements or means for purposes of a
  § 113(a)(6) assault.
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                                   IV. CONCLUSION

        In sum, “[o]rdinarily, a statute is indivisible unless we can tell with certainty

  that the alternative statutory components constitute elements (rather than means).”

  Wilkins, 30 F.4th at 1203. We cannot say here “with certainty” that the different

  mentes reae that can violate § 113(a)(6) are elements of different offenses. Instead,

  § 113(a)(6)’s language, as well as the case law applying that statute—particularly

  Benally—indicate that § 113(a)(6) sets forth a single indivisible assault offense that

  can be violated by different mentes reae. The district court, therefore, erred in

  applying the modified categorical approach to determine whether Devereaux’s prior

  § 113(a)(6) assault conviction was based on intentional rather than reckless conduct.

  Because § 113(a)(6) sets forth a single indivisible assault offense that could be

  committed recklessly, a § 113(a)(6) conviction categorically does not have as an

  element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person

  of another, see Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822, as required by U.S.S.G. § § 4B1.2(a)(1),

  which § 2K2.1(a)(3) incorporates. Because the district court, therefore, erred in

  treating Devereaux’s prior § 113(a)(6) conviction as a “crime of violence” for

  purposes of calculating Devereaux’s offense level, we VACATE his sentence and

  REMAND for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

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