Court Opinion

ID: 9745786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:31:45.768923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:04.575658
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LUND, dissenting: The majority recognizes that there is an exception to the exclusive liability created by the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 43, par. 135). That exception allows negligence action against dramshop owners, where an invitee is injured by the wrongful acts of another and the owner did not act reasonably in preventing the assault. However, duty creating the cause of action only exists where the wrongful conduct was foreseeable. (Boyd v. Racine Currency Exchange, Inc. (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 95, 97, 306 N.E.2d 39, 41.) The Boyd opinion also stated foreseeability alone does not result in the imposition of a duty; the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the defendant must also be taken into account. Boyd, 56 Ill. 2d at 99, 306 N.E.2d at 41-42, citing Lance v. Senior (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 516, 518, 224 N.E.2d 231, 233. Opinions of the Illinois Appellate and Supreme Courts fail to provide guidelines as to when a foreseeability duty exists (or does not exist) as a matter of law, because each case is limited by its own facts. (See Lutz, 208 Ill. App. 3d 565, 567 N.E.2d 477; Yangas, 113 Ill. App. 3d 398, 447 N.E.2d 484; Lewis, 222 Ill. App. 3d 843, 584 N.E.2d 437; Loomis, 250 Ill. App. 3d 753, 620 N.E.2d 664.) Textbooks are of little assistance. See 45 Am. Jur. 2d Intoxicating Liquors § 557 (1969 & Supp. 1994). The cited decisions all recognize that the dramshop owners owe a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable dangers by others. If there is such a duty, then it appears axiomatic that the owner (or owners) must be in a condition to recognize something that is foreseeable. The jury in this case could find from the evidence that (1) All-hands was intoxicated and abusive when he entered the bar; (2) the warning, "here comes trouble,” by plaintiff should have been heard by Scott; (3) Scott was aware of earlier fighting in the bar; (4) Scott was intoxicated; and (5) Allhands’ prior conduct toward Lisa Jenkins, coupled with Allhands’ continued drinking, his asking for $20 pool games, and plaintiff’s earlier warning, should have caused Scott to be aware of the danger. The evidence presented sustains a finding that the bar owner should have foreseen danger from Allhands. If danger was foreseeable, then a duty to protect the invitees existed. Scott’s intoxication should never be allowed as an excuse. Plaintiff’s conduct in trying to stop Allhands from pounding Kevin’s head with a pool ball can hardly be considered inappropriate or not anticipated. Appropriate to this dissent, and in this case, is the following quotation: "Frequently foreseeability is no more than a convenient formula by which a court disposes of an otherwise intractable case; in such situations foreseeability is treated as a question of law. The court may say that foreseeability is for the jury, but decides the issue itself because varying inferences are not possible. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 101 (1928). In general, courts appear confused whether the issue of foreseeability is one for the court or the jury. They also seem reluctant to relinquish the power that foreseeability gives them over the disposition of the case.” Hardie, Confronting Foreseeability in Products Litigation, For the Defense, Vol. 36 (October 1994), at 8-9. There was hesitation about the use of this article printed in a magazine for defense counsel. However, those few reading this dissent should not be concerned. Appellate judges receive, without solicitation, State and National magazines published for both plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel. Bias, then, is equally weighed.