Court Opinion

ID: 9497986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:05:09.980246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:32.566676
License: Public Domain

AMBRO, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Mr. Okeke seeks cancellation of removal. To qualify, he must establish, among other things, continuous physical presence in the United States for ten years immediately preceding his application for that relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A).10 “[A]ny period” of continuous physical presence is “deemed to end” when an alien commits a controlled substance offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(l);11 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) held that, under § 1229b(d)(l), Okeke’s 1983 controlled substance offense 12 ended his period of continuous physical presence. The BIA further held that, under In re Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000), a new period of continuous physical presence could not begin after an old period ends under § 1229b(d)(l). It thus concluded that Ok-eke had not accrued the required ten year *592period necessary to qualify for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l), as he first entered the United States in 1981 and his period of continuous physical presence ended in 1983 (with the commission of the drug offense in New York) and could not start over.
Okeke argues that, even assuming he committed a qualifying drug offense in 1983, he began a new period of continuous physical presence on May 5, 1984 — the date of his most recent admission into the United States. Because he was continuously physically present in the United States until he applied for cancellation of removal more than ten years later in 1998, Okeke contends he meets the ten year period requirement.
Both Judge Garth and I agree with Ok-eke. But we do so by traveling different paths of analysis. He believes the BIA’s recent decision in In re Cisneros-Gonzalez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 668 (BIA 2004), limits the reach of Mendoza and mandates the result here. I do not believe Cisneros goes so far and instead conclude that Mendoza is an impermissible reading of § 1229b(d)(l), even after according the BIA the deference called for under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
I. Cisneros does not hold that a new period of continuous physical presence begins whenever an alien reenters the United States.
As Judge Garth correctly notes, Cisne-ros states that Mendoza “did not resolve the question, presented here, whether an alien who departed the United States after being served with a valid charging document can seek relief in a subsequent removal proceeding, based on a new period of continuous physical presence measured from the date of his return.” Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 670. In fact, Cisneros holds that an alien who departed the United States after being served with a valid charging document can seek relief in a subsequent removal proceeding, based on a new period of continuous physical presence measured from the date of his return. However, the reason the alien can seek relief in a subsequent removal proceeding is not because he or she left and reentered the United States. Rather, the BIA reasoned, it is because “the ‘notice to appear’ referred to in section [1229b(d)(l) ] pertains only to the charging document served in the proceedings in which the alien applies for cancellation of removal, and not to charging documents served on the alien in prior proceedings” (hereinafter “the Cisne-ros rule”).13 Id. at 672.
The Cisneros rule, in context, applied as follows. Cisneros received an NTA for his first removal proceeding (“NTA # 1”) in 1990. He was deported on January 10, 1991, and illegally returned the next day. He was present in the United States from then until he received an NTA for his second removal proceeding (“NTA #2”) on June 5, 2001 — more than 10 years after his illegal return. When Cisneros applied to cancel the removal order based on the proceedings begun on June 5, 2001, the BIA held that only NTA #2, not NTA # 1, ended his period of physical presence under § 1229b(d)(l) because, to repeat, “the ‘notice to appear’ referred to in [§ 1229b(d)(l) ] pertains only to the charging document served in the proceedings in *593which [Cisneros] applie[d] for cancellation of removal [that is, NTA # 2], and not to charging documents served on [him] in prior proceedings [that is, NTA # 1].” Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 672.
In this context, I do not believe that Okeke can rely on Cisneros, for it does not overrule Mendoza’s determination that “the clock cannot be reset so that an alien accrues continuous physical presence ... after ... the commission of a specified crime.” Mendoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1240. Cisneros does not change Mendoza’s rule that, when an alien commits a crime specified in § 1229b(d)(l) or receives an NTA specified in § 1229b(d)(l), any period of continuous presence ends and no other period shall ever begin again. Instead, Cisneros merely clarifies which NTA is specified in § 1229b(d)(l) (only the NTA served in the proceedings in which the alien applies for cancellation of removal). Cisneros, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 670. Under Mendoza, and even after Cisneros, Okeke cannot reset his clock and accrue continuous physical presence time because he committed an offense specified in § 1229b(d)(l). The mere fact of his subsequent reentering (whether lawful or unlawful) does not change this situation. Thus, if Okeke is to prevail, I believe that we must conclude that Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is not permitted. For the following reasons, I believe we should do so.
II. Okeke began a new period of continuous physical presence after he committed a specified offense because Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is impermissible. Section 1229b(d)(l) must be interpreted to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart after the commission of a specified offense.
Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) — that the clock cannot be reset so that an alien accrues continuous physical presence after the commission of a specified offense — is incorrect. Properly construing the statute, Okeke began a new period of continuous physical presence after he committed the offense at issue.
We review the BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) according to the standards set out in Chevron. See Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1069 (3d Cir.1993). If Congress has directly spoken on an issue, we give the BIA no deference. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778. If a statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue, we ask whether the BIA’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. However, “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction .... If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (citations omitted).
Perhaps the most fundamental principle of statutory construction is that words in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning whenever possible. See Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997). Section 1229b(d)(l)’s- clause “any period ... shall be deemed to end” should be given its ordinary meaning: any period ends. The ordinary meaning of this clause simply does not imply that future periods of continuous presence are barred. Yet, Mendoza not only interpreted it to mean any period ends, but also added whole cloth that no future period can begin anew: 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1240.
Another plain language argument for interpreting § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart *594focuses on its “any period” language. “[A]ny” indicates that there can be multiple periods of physical presence. As BIA Member Guendelsberger’s dissent in Mendoza notes:
the core statement that “any period of continuous presence ... shall be deemed to end” strongly suggests that there may be more than one period to be considered. Although [§ 1229b(d)] clearly cuts off the accrual of a period of time prior to a specified event, it does not speak to periods of time after the event in question. The reference to ending “any period” of physical presence suggests that another period of physical presence ensues.
22 I. & N. Dec. at 1245-46 (Guendelsber-ger, dissenting).
In addition, interpreting § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart avoids a logical conundrum, as Mendoza’s interpretation requires periods of continuous physical presence to “end” before they even begin. BIA Member Villageliu, dissenting in Mendoza, pointed out this incongruity:
The word “period” means “an interval of time.” Putting the words “any period” in context with the words “continuous physical presence” cannot logically refer to a period of time whose continuity would be ended before the period of time even begins because, logically, continuity would not transcend its own ending.
22 I. & N. Dec. at 1254 (citation omitted) (Villageliu, dissenting).
A further argument for interpreting § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart is that it preserves the concept of a “period of continuous physical presence,” explicitly described in the plain language of the statute, with regard to aliens seeking cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l) who have committed a crime specified in § 1229b(d)(l). Otherwise, the concept of a “period of continuous physical presence” is destroyed because, as explained below, the effective rule under Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is that if you commit a specified offense you can never get a cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l) (regardless of any periods of continuous presence, no matter when or how long they were). If Congress had meant this to be the rule, it would simply have stated it.
The reason the effective rule under Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is that if you commit a specified offense you can never get a cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l) is as follows. Section 1229b(b)(l) requires that, for cancellation of removal, an alien must have been “physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than ten years immediately preceding the date of such application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(A) (emphasis added). Thus, an alien cannot use an “old period” — that is, a past period that is not “immediately preceding” his or her application for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l)— to support such an application. Thus, for example, an alien filing an application in year 19, who arrived in the United States in year 0 and committed a specified offense in year 10, could not use the period from year 0 to year 10 because that period does not “immediately preced[e]” the filing of the application in year 19. Hence, if (1) an alien can never use an old period, and (2) under Mendoza’s interpretation, the clock can never restart, Mendoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1240, then as soon as an alien commits a specified offense he or she will never be able to show ten years of continuous physical presence immediately preceding the application for cancellation of removal. Therefore, the effective rule under Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is that if you commit a specified offense you can never get a cancellation of removal *595under § 1229b(b)(l). In this context, interpreting § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart preserves the concept of a “period of continuous physical presence,” otherwise destroyed under Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l), with regard to aliens seeking cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l) who have committed a crime specified in § 1229b(d)(l).
Importantly, there is an event that bars an alien from receiving cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l), but it is not commission of a specified offense; rather, it is conviction of a specified offense. Section 1229b(b)(l)(C) says that an alien can never get a cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l) if he or she has “been convicted” of a specified offense.14 If the rule was the same for commissions and convictions, why did Congress make the distinction? 15
Moreover, the forerunner statutory section to § 1229b, § 244 of the Immigration *596and Nationality Act (“INA”) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (repealed 1996)),16 was interpreted as allowing the continuous physical presence clock to restart, Mendoza, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1246 (Guendelsberger, dissenting), and Congress never stated that § 1229b should be interpreted differently. Cf. Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 782 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985) (Where “ ‘Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.’ ”) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978)); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (re-enactment of a statute “generally includes the settled judicial interpretation” thereof). Therefore, we presume that Congress also intended § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the clock to restart.
Under the old statutory regime — INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 — the duration of continuous physical presence an alien had to demonstrate in order to be eligible for suspension of deportation and adjustment of status depended on why the alien was deportable. An alien deportable on most noncriminal grounds had to demonstrate seven years of continuous physical presence immediately preceding the alien’s application for suspension of deportation. INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1). However, an alien deportable on most criminal grounds had to demonstrate ten years of continuous physical presence immediately following the commission of the act, or assumption of the status, eonstitut-ing a ground for deportation. INA § 244(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(2). As BIA Member Guendelsberger explained in his dissent in Mendoza, “the resetting of the physical presence clock upon the occurrence of particular events has been and remains inherent in the eligibility provisions for suspension of deportation.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1246 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (citing In re Bufalino, 11 I. & N. Dec. 351, 357-58 (BIA 1965) (finding that a respondent who is deportable under several grounds, one of which is listed in § 244(a)(2), is ineligible for relief under § 244(a)(1) and must establish eligibility under § 244(a)(2) from the date of the commission of the last deportable act)). That the forerunner to § 1229b was interpreted to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart supports interpreting § 1229b that way.
A final reason Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) is impermissible is that, because of the serious consequences of deportation, rules of statutory interpretation relating to immigration statutes require that ambiguities be construed in the favor of the alien. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225, 87 S.Ct. 473, 17 L.Ed.2d 318 (1966); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S.Ct. 374, 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948) (“To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.”); Sawkow v. INS, 314 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir.1963) (“Of course, any *597doubt in the interpretation of the statute must be resolved in favor of the alien
Conclusion
We review the BIA’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) according to the standards set forth in Chevron. As the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue of whether the continuous physical presence clock may restart, we ask whether the BIA’s interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute. In Chevron, the Supreme Court stated that if we determine, using the traditional tools of statutory construction, that Congress had an intention on an issue of statutory interpretation, we must give effect to that intention. Using the traditional tools of statutory construction, I determine that Congress intended in § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart after the commission of a specified offense. Thus, Mendoza’s interpretation of § 1229b(d)(l) to mean that the clock cannot be reset so that an alien accrues continuous physical presence after the commission of a specified offense is impermissible.
Assuming Okeke committed a controlled substance offense in 1983, he began a new period of continuous physical presence on May 5, 1984 — the date of his most recent admission into the United States. Thus, because Okeke was continuously physically present in the United States from May 5, 1984 until he applied for cancellation of removal more than ten years later, he has accrued the required ten-year period necessary to qualify for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l). I therefore concur with the result reached by Judge Garth.

. Section 1229b(b)(l)(A) reads:
[The Attorney General may cancel removal of an alien who is inadmissible or deporta-ble from the United States if the alien] has been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of such application^]

. Section 1229b(d)(l) provides:
Termination of continuous period
For purposes of this section, any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end (A) ... when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a) of this title, or (B) when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) of this title that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) of this title or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever is earliest.

.The BIA held that in 1983 Okeke possessed marijuana in violation of New York Penal Law § 221.20.

. Cisneros crafted a sensible rule for calculating periods of presence with regard to notices to appear ("NTAs”) insofar as, under that case, if the outcome of the proceedings initiated by an NTA is favorable to an alien (or if an alien receives an NTA by mistake), the alien will not "lose” continuous physical presence time accumulated before he or she received the "invalid” NTA.

. Judge Nygaard would hold that Okeke is ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l)(C). However, neither the IJ nor the BIA addressed the issue of whether Okeke is ineligible under § 1229b(b)(l)(C), and neither the Government nor Okeke has raised the issue to us. As the Government itself acknowledges in its brief, the issue before us is not whether Okeke was convicted of a controlled substance offense (and is thus ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(l)(C)), but rather whether Okeke committed an offense that permanently ended his period of continuous physical presence (and is thus ineligible under § 1229b(b)(l)(A)). See Government Brief at 16-19 ("Okeke is ineligible for cancellation of removal not because he was convicted but because he committed a controlled substance offense.” (emphasis in original)). We thus may not raise the issue sua sponte and decide it de novo. Rather, we must remand so that the BIA may have the first opportunity to address the issue. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 15-16, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002) (holding that the Ninth Circuit erred in addressing an issue not yet addressed by the BIA and stating that "[a] court of appeals 'is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiiy into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiiy.’ Rather, ‘the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.’ ” (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985))).

. Another argument for interpreting § 1229b(d)(l) to allow the continuous physical presence clock to restart is that, when the clock is not allowed to restart, an odd rule (probably not intended by Congress) is created for permanent resident aliens applying for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a). This provision does not have an "immediately preceding the date of such application” requirement. Rather, § 1229b(a) requires only that an alien "has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2).
The following example will illustrate the strange rule that results under § 1229b(a) when the continuous presence clock (or continuous residence clock in the case of § 1229b(a)) is not allowed to restart. Permanent resident alien "X” has resided in the United States since year 0, but in year 1 committed a offense specified in § 1229b(d)(l). If X applies for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a) in year 20, X will not qualify because X did not reside in the United States continuously for 7 years, as X’s period of continuous residency ended in year 1 and did not restart. On the other hand, permanent resident alien "Y” has only resided in the United States since year 11, and in year 19 committed an offense specified in§ 1229b(d)(l). If Y applies for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(a) in year 20, Y will qualify because Y resided in the United States continuously for over 7 years (from year 11 to 19). Why would Congress prefer to cancel the removal of Y who has resided continuously in the United States for approximately half as long as X? More importantly, why would Congress choose to cancel the removal of Y (who has committed an offense recently, is less likely reformed, and is more likely to recidivate), but not cancel the removal of X (who has committed an offense less recently, is more likely reformed, and is less likely to recidivate)?

. The Conference Report states that "[n]ew section 240A [codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b] establishes revised rules for the type of relief that is currently available to excludable and deportable aliens under 212(c) and 244(a)-(d).” Joint Explanatory Statement, Conference Report: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, H.R.Rep. No. 104-828, 142 Cong. Rec. H10841-02, H10896, 1996 WL 539315 (1996).