Court Opinion

ID: 9407969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 23:00:38.670305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.989279
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                ______________

                      No. 23-1940
                    ______________

CARA ROWLAND, individually and on behalf of all others
              similarly situated

                           v.

             BISSELL HOMECARE, INC.,
                               Appellant

                    ______________

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                    (No. 2-22-cv-01500)
 U.S. District Judge: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand
                      ______________

                      No. 23-1941
                    ______________

MONICA ZORTEA, individually and on behalf of all others
               similarly situated

                           v.
     SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.;
       SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.

     SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,
                              Appellant
               ______________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                   (No. 2-22-cv-01309)
     U.S. District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon

                    ______________

                      No. 23-1955
                    ______________

MONICA ZORTEA, individually and on behalf of all others
               similarly situated

                           v.

            COSTCO WHOLESALE CORP.,
                              Appellant

                    ______________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                    (No. 2-22-cv-01316)
     U.S. District Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan

                           2
                    ______________

                      No. 23-1960
                    ______________

CARA ROWLAND, individually and on behalf of all others
              similarly situated

                            v.

                HELEN OF TROY LTD.,
   a/k/a Helen of Troy LP, a/k/a Hot Tools Professional

                HELEN OF TROY LTD.,
                                  Appellant
                   ______________

     On Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                   (No. 2-22-cv-01495)
     U.S. District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon

      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                    July 10, 2023
                  ______________

 Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and CHUNG Circuit
                    Judges.

                  (Filed: July 10, 2023)

                            3
Kenneth A. Held
Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr.
James LaMarca
Elizabeth Pollock-Avery
Lynch Carpenter
1133 Penn Avenue
5th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Cara Rowland and Monica
Zortea

Joe N. Nguyen
Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young
2005 Market Street
Suite 2600
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Robert F. Tom
Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz
165 Madison Avenue
Suite 2000, First Horizon Building
Memphis, TN 38103

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Bissell Homecare Inc.

Michael J. Mueller
Ryan P. Phair
Samuel J. Thomas
Hunton Andrews Kurth
2200 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20037-1701

                            4
Michael A. Comber
Stephen W. Gorman
Devin M. Misour
Comber Miller
300 Koppers Building
436 Seventh Avenue, Suite 300
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Trevor S. Cox
Thomas R. Waskom
Hunton Andrews Kurth
951 E Byrd Street
Riverfront Plaza, East Tower
Richmond, VA 23219

Counsel for Defendants-Appellants Samsung Electronics
America Inc. and Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd.

Kihyun P. Bae
James Moon
Davis Wright Tremaine
865 S Figueroa Street
Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90017

James E. Howard
Caleah Whitten
Davis Wright Tremaine
920 Fifth Avenue
Suite 3300
Seattle, WA 98104

                               5
John G. Papianou
Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads
1735 Market Street
21st Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Costco Wholesale Corp.

Emily E. Mahler
Kyle T. McGee
Margolis Edelstein
535 Smithfield Street
Suite 1100
Pittsburgh, PA 15222

          Counsel for Defendant-Appellant Helen of Troy Ltd.
                       ______________

                  OPINION OF THE COURT
                      ______________

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.

       This consolidated appeal arises out of four putative
class actions filed in state court alleging violations of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.
(“MMWA”). Defendants removed the cases to federal court
under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(2), and Plaintiffs moved to remand to state court.1

      1
        Plaintiffs are Cara Rowland and Monica Zortea.
Defendants include Costco Wholesale Corp., Samsung

                               6
The District Courts correctly remanded the actions, so we will
affirm.

                                I

       In each case, Plaintiffs filed a single-count, putative
class action complaint alleging that Defendants either
concealed written warranties prior to sale or provided
warranties that prohibit the use of third-party repair services or
parts in violation of the MMWA.2 Defendants removed the
actions to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania pursuant to CAFA,3 and Plaintiffs
moved to remand to state court.

        The District Court held that remand was appropriate
because (1) MMWA’s jurisdictional requirements were not
satisfied; and (2) neither CAFA nor traditional diversity
jurisdiction can be used to circumvent those jurisdictional
requirements. Zortea v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 2:22-
CV-01316, 2023 WL 1970579, at *3-7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 13,
2023); Rowland v. Helen of Troy Ltd., No. 2:22-cv-1495, 2022
WL 18715775, at *2-5 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 22-1495, 2023 WL 1996691
(W.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2023). Defendants timely petitioned for

Electronics America, Inc., Helen of Troy, Ltd., and Bissell
Homecare Inc.
        2
          Plaintiffs seek injunctive, declaratory, and other
equitable relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.
        3
          Defendants, except Samsung, also removed the
individual MMWA claims based on traditional diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

                                7
review of the remand orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c),
and we granted their petitions.

                               II4

        A defendant may only remove a civil action to federal
court if the plaintiff could have originally filed the action in
federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987). Defendants, as the parties seeking to remove the case
to federal court, bear the burden of establishing federal
jurisdiction. Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins. Co., 561 F.3d 144,
151 (3d Cir. 2009). We review the allegations in the
complaints and notices of removal, see id., to determine
whether the MMWA, CAFA, or the diversity statute provide a
basis for federal jurisdiction over these putative class actions.

                               A

       Under the MMWA, a consumer “may bring suit for
damages and other legal and equitable relief—(A) in any court
of competent jurisdiction in any State or the District of
Columbia; or (B) in an appropriate district court of the United
States, subject to paragraph (3).” 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).
Paragraph 3, in turn, provides that:

       No claim shall be cognizable in a suit brought under
[paragraph (d)(1)(B)]—

       4
         We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1453(c) and review issues of subject matter jurisdiction and
statutory interpretation de novo. Kaufman v. Allstate N.J. Ins.
Co., 561 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2009).

                               8
       (A)    if the amount in controversy of any individual
              claim is less than the sum or value of $25;
       (B)    if the amount in controversy is less than the sum
              or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and
              costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be
              determined in this suit; or
       (C)    if the action is brought as a class action, and the
              number of named plaintiffs is less than one
              hundred.

15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3).

        As the statute’s plain text demonstrates, the only way to
invoke federal jurisdiction is through § 2310(d)(1)(B), as this
is the only jurisdictional provision that expressly references
federal courts. Section 2310(d)(1)(B) explicitly authorizes suit
“in an appropriate district court of the United States,” while
§ 2310(d)(1)(A) authorizes suit “in any court of competent
jurisdiction in any State or the District of Columbia.” If
§ 2310(d)(1)(A) was intended to provide an alternative path to
federal court, as Defendants argue, Congress could have said
so expressly, as it did in § 2310(d)(1)(B).5 See Weichsel v. JP

       5
           Defendants argue that because § 2310(d)(1)(A)
authorizes suit “in any court of competent jurisdiction in any
State,” rather than “of any State,” it covers all state and federal
courts located in the state. This interpretation is not only
unpersuasive for the reasons set forth above, but it also
contradicts the MMWA’s legislative history, which reflects
that § 2310(d)(1)(A) only authorizes suit “in any State court of
competent jurisdiction.” H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107 at 7703-04
(1974); see also S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1408 at 7759 (1974)
(adopting the House provisions that “specifically authorized

                                9
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 65 F.4th 105, 113 (3d Cir. 2023)
(“Where a statute or regulation uses specific language in one
[provision] but different language in another, the Court
presumes different meanings were intended.” (quotations
omitted)). Its failure to do so therefore indicates that only
§ 2310(d)(1)(B) authorizes suit in federal court.

       Congress also made clear that a federal court can hear
an MMWA claim under limited circumstances. Section
2310(d)(1)(B) provides that plaintiffs can bring suit in federal
court “subject to” the requirements set forth in Paragraph 3. 15
U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)(B). Because “subject to” means “only if,”
see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 126 (2012),6 the MMWA allows

suits to be brought in an appropriate United States district court
if [Paragraph 3’s requirements are satisfied]”).
        Moreover, although the MMWA does not define “court
of competent jurisdiction,” a term “is given more precise
content by the neighboring words with which it is associated.”
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). Section
2310(d)(1)(A) utilizes the term “court of competent
jurisdiction” in conjunction with reference to “any State or the
District of Columbia,” indicating that it was intended only to
authorize suit in state court.
        Furthermore, Defendants’ reliance on cases examining
forum selection clauses is misplaced. Here, we do not examine
one jurisdictional clause in isolation but instead must analyze
the entire statute, which demonstrates that § 2310(d)(1)(A)
does not include federal courts.
        6
          Dictionaries from the time of the MMWA’s enactment
in 1975 further support this definition. See Subject, Oxford
English Dictionary (II Supp. 1972) (defining “subject to” as

                               10
plaintiffs to sue in federal court, but only if they comply with
the requirements set forth in Paragraph 3, see Samuel-Bassett
v. KIA Motors Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“[F]ederal jurisdiction for a [MMWA] claim does not exist
unless [Paragraph 3’s requirements are satisfied].”); see also
Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 582 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997)
(“The [MMWA] requires that the amount in controversy
exceed $50,000 to establish federal jurisdiction.”); Talley v.
Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-01137, 2021 WL 7209448, at
*5-7 (D. Del. Nov. 26, 2021) (“[T]he [MMWA] lets [plaintiffs]
sue in federal court, but only if they comply with paragraph
(3).”).

        Other parts of the statute’s text support this conclusion.
Specifically, Paragraph 3 provides that “[n]o claim shall be
cognizable” in federal court if the jurisdictional requirements
are not satisfied. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3). The word
“cognizable” is defined, in relevant part, as “[c]apable of being
tried or examined before a designated tribunal; within the
jurisdiction of court or power given to court to adjudicate
controversy.” Cognizable, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed.
1968) (citations omitted); see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 136 (2008) (noting that
“cognizable by” means “about the same thing” as “has

“[d]ependent upon a certain . . . modifying condition” or
“conditional upon”); Subject To, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th
ed. 1968) (defining “subject to” as “provided that”); Subject,
The Random House College Dictionary (Rev. ed. 1973)
(defining “subject [to]” as “dependent upon something”);
Subject, Webster’s New World Dictionary, College Edition
(1968) (defining “subject to” as “contingent or conditional
upon”).

                               11
jurisdiction”). In short, the statute’s plain text reflects that
§ 2310(d)(1)(B) provides the sole basis for proceeding in
federal court.

        The conclusion that § 2310(d)(1)(B) provides the only
path for federal courts to hear an MMWA claim is supported
by “one of the most basic interpretive canons” that we construe
a statute “so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous,
void or insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303,
314 (2009) (quotations omitted). Section 2310(d)(1)(B), on
the one hand, only allows suit in federal district court if the
jurisdictional requirements in Paragraph 3 are satisfied.
Section 2310(d)(1)(A), on the other hand, allows suit in any
state court “of competent jurisdiction” with no additional
jurisdictional requirements. If § 2310(d)(1)(A) included both
federal and state courts, it would render § 2310(d)(1)(B) and
Paragraph 3’s jurisdictional requirements “insignificant, if not
wholly superfluous.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001); see also Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543
(2015) (“[T]he canon against surplusage is strongest when an
interpretation would render superfluous another part of the
same statutory scheme.” (quotations omitted)). We can avoid
this result and give full effect to both provisions by reading
§ 2310(d)(1)(B) as providing the only avenue for litigating
MMWA claims in federal court.7

       This conclusion is also consistent with the statute’s

       7
        Such an interpretation is also consistent with our duty
to “interpret the statute as a symmetrical and coherent
regulatory scheme, and fit, if possible, all parts into [a]
harmonious whole.” Argueta-Orellana v. Att’y Gen., 35 F.4th
144, 148 (3d Cir. 2022) (quotations and citations omitted).

                              12
purpose. By imposing additional requirements for federal
jurisdiction, Congress manifested an intent to restrict access to
federal court for MMWA claims. See Saval v. BL Ltd., 710
F.2d 1027, 1030 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating the MMWA’s
jurisdictional requirements were “designed to restrict access to
federal courts”); see also Landsman & Funk PC v. Skinder-
Strauss Assocs., 640 F.3d 72, 79 (3d Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc
granted, 650 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2011), reinstated in part by 2012
WL 2052685 (3d Cir. Apr. 17, 2012) (explaining federal courts
lack diversity jurisdiction where Congress has “explicitly
expressed an intent to strip federal courts of [diversity]
jurisdiction”). In fact, the threshold dollar amount for bringing
MMWA claims in federal court was set at $50,000, which, at
the time of the MMWA’s enactment, was significantly more
than the $10,000 threshold for both federal question and
diversity jurisdiction. See Federal Question Jurisdictional
Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(b), 94 Stat.
2369 (1980); Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2(b), 72 Stat. 415 (1958).
It would thus contradict Congress’ intent to read
§ 2310(d)(1)(A) as providing an alternative and less restrictive
path to litigating MMWA claims in federal court. Therefore,
MMWA claims can only be brought in federal court if the
§ 2310(d)(3) requirements are satisfied.

        Defendants here do not claim that these requirements
are satisfied. Indeed, at a minimum, the third requirement—
that a class action name at least one hundred plaintiffs—is not
satisfied because each complaint names only one plaintiff. 15
U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(C). Because the prerequisites are not
satisfied, there is no federal jurisdiction under the MMWA.

                               13
                                 B

       We next examine whether CAFA provides an
independent basis for federal jurisdiction over MMWA claims
even where the MMWA federal jurisdictional requirements are
not satisfied. CAFA grants federal diversity jurisdiction over
class actions when (1) the parties are minimally diverse, (2) the
class consists of at least one hundred members (that need not
all be named), and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000. Judon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773
F.3d 495, 500 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2),
(5)(B), (6)). We have yet to address whether CAFA supersedes
the MMWA’s jurisdictional limitations, but the only circuit
court to do so precedentially has concluded that it does not.8
See Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 966 F.3d 1027, 1032-35
(9th Cir. 2020). For the following reasons, we reach the same
conclusion.

                                 1

       We begin with the presumption that federal courts have

       8
         The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion in a nonprecedential opinion. Kuns v.
Ford Motor Co., 543 F. App’x 572, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit “assum[ed]
without deciding” that CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements
superseded MMWA’s because neither party “challenge[d] this
conclusion.” Leflar v. Target Corp., 57 F.4th 600, 602 n.1 (8th
Cir. 2023). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit chose
“not [to] take sides on this issue . . . because it [did] not affect
the outcome” of the case. Ware v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 6
F.4th 726, 733 n.2 (7th Cir. 2021).

                                14
diversity jurisdiction, including under CAFA, regardless of the
nature of the claim, so long as the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 are satisfied. Landsman & Funk PC, 640 F.3d at 80.
This presumption is rebutted where Congress has “explicitly
expressed an intent to strip federal courts of [diversity]
jurisdiction, or where such jurisdiction is found to be
irreconcilable with a congressional statute.” Id. at 79 (citation
omitted).9

        The MMWA’s stringent jurisdictional requirements are
irreconcilable with CAFA. Specifically, the MMWA and
CAFA have competing requirements for how many plaintiffs
must be named in a class action that can be brought in federal
court. While CAFA requires only a single named plaintiff to
litigate on behalf of absent class members, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(5)(B), the MMWA requires at least one hundred
named plaintiffs, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(C). Allowing CAFA
to govern MMWA class claims would undercut the MMWA’s
requirement and allow an MMWA class action to proceed in
contravention of the MMWA. Because applying CAFA in this
context would render the MMWA’s named-plaintiff
requirement meaningless, the presumption of diversity
jurisdiction has been rebutted here. As a result, CAFA does
not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction over MMWA class
actions that do not satisfy the MMWA’s jurisdictional

       9
        Landsman & Funk PC involved an evaluation of the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 640 F.3d at
74, which, unlike the MMWA, authorizes suit in federal court
without additional requirements, compare 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(d)(1)(B) with 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).

                               15
requirements.10

                                2

       Our holding does not render either statute unenforceable
and is consistent with the strong presumption against the
implied repeal of one federal statute by another. Simon v. FIA
Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 2013). “[W]hen
two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective.” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.
v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143-44 (2001)
(quotations omitted); see also Simon, 732 F.3d at 274
(requiring “clear and manifest” congressional intent for
implied repeal (quoting Hawaii v. Off. of Hawaiian Affs., 556
U.S. 163, 175 (2009))).

       10
           Defendant Samsung makes arguments related to
supplemental jurisdiction, which allows a district court to
exercise such jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so
related to claims . . . within [the court’s] original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a).      Section 1367(a)’s plain text reveals that
supplemental jurisdiction applies only where multiple claims
are being pursued in a single complaint, which is not the case
here. Thus, while we have suggested that a district court could
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an MMWA claim
where the complaint contained other claims with original
jurisdiction, see Suber, 104 F.3d at 588 n.12, a district court
cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an MMWA
claim where no other claims are asserted.

                               16
       The statutes can coexist. CAFA still governs class
actions that meet its jurisdictional requirements outside the
narrow context of MMWA class actions.11 Floyd, 966 F.3d at
1035. Furthermore, giving force to the MMWA’s more
specific jurisdictional requirements is mandated by the “basic
principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a
narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a
later enacted statute covering a more generalized spectrum.”
Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).

       11
          Defendants assert that the pleadings satisfy CAFA’s
amount-in-controversy requirement. Different Defendants
make different arguments on this subject. For example, some
argue that Plaintiffs’ decision not to seek damages cannot bind
the class before the class is certified. The cases upon which
those Defendants rely, however, involve cases in which the
complaint sought damages and those plaintiffs tried to cap
them by stating that they would not seek damages exceeding
$5,000,000. See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S.
588, 591 (2013); Judon, 773 F.3d at 504 n.8. These cases are
therefore inapt because this case involves requests for only
equitable relief, the value of which would be measured by the
value of the rights Plaintiffs seek to protect. In re Corestates
Tr. Fee Litig., 39 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1994). At least one
Defendant wrongly argues that the cost of compliance with an
order granting such relief is the measure of the amount in
controversy. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Tarbuck,
62 F.3d 538, 539 (3d Cir. 1995). Other Defendants provide the
dollar value of the products and warranties sold to
Pennsylvania residents. Because CAFA cannot circumvent
MMWA’s jurisdictional requirements, we need not decide
whether this last method for calculating the amount in
controversy is correct for this MMWA case.

                               17
Moreover, although CAFA was enacted thirty years after the
MMWA and was “intended to expand substantially federal
court jurisdiction over class actions,” S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 43
(2005), “CAFA does not demonstrate any intent by Congress
to repeal or alter parts of the MMWA’s jurisdictional
requirements,” Floyd, 966 F.3d at 1035. Indeed, when it
enacted CAFA, Congress could have addressed the MMWA’s
unique jurisdictional requirements, see Hall v. United States,
566 U.S. 506, 516 (2012) (“We assume that Congress is aware
of existing law when it passes legislation.”), but instead left the
MMWA undisturbed.12 For these reasons, CAFA does not

       12
          We recognize that CAFA expressly exempts class
actions involving the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and state corporate governance claims,
but does not exempt the MMWA. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9).
Congress appeared to be mindful of the complex litigation
schemes implicated by these exempted securities claims. See
Ring v. AXA Fin., Inc., 483 F.3d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 2007)
(describing how the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act addressed the “unintended consequence” of “the migration
of class actions alleging fraud in securities transactions from
federal to state court” that occurred after the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) instituted heighted pleading
requirements); S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 48, 50 (2005) (CAFA’s
securities carve-out meant “to avoid disturbing in any way the
federal vs. state court jurisdictional lines already drawn in the
securities litigation class action context by the enactment of the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998.”).
       In light of these unique circumstances, we conclude that
CAFA’s silence as to the MMWA does not establish the “clear
and manifest” intent necessary for implied repeal. Simon, 732
F.3d at 274. Indeed, the text of the MMWA reflects a desire

                                18
displace the MMWA’s named-plaintiff requirement and thus
cannot serve as a basis for federal jurisdiction over MMWA
class actions.

                                C

        Defendants Bissell and Helen of Troy also assert that
Plaintiffs’ individual claims can be removed under traditional
diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).13 As
discussed, there is a presumption that diversity jurisdiction
exists absent a clear statement to the contrary or where such
jurisdiction is irreconcilable with a federal statute. Landsman
& Funk PC, 640 F.3d at 79-80. Here, there are two relevant
differences between the MMWA and the federal diversity
statute: (1) the MMWA requires the amount in controversy to
be at least $50,000, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B), while the
federal diversity statute requires it to exceed $75,000, 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a); and (2) attorneys’ fees cannot be considered
as part of the amount of controversy under the MMWA, Suber,
104 F.3d at 588 n.12; Samuel-Bassett, 357 F.3d at 402, but can
be considered under the federal diversity statute “if such fees
are available to successful plaintiffs under the statutory cause
of action,” Suber, 104 F.3d at 585, which they are under the
MMWA, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).

      Despite these differences, the statutes can be reconciled
by requiring that both the MMWA’s $50,000 amount-in-
controversy requirement and the federal diversity statute’s

on the part of Congress to circumscribe the number of MMWA
cases heard by federal courts to a select few.
       13
          There is no dispute that the parties in those actions are
completely diverse.

                                19
$75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement are satisfied. To
satisfy both requirements, the amount in controversy would
need to exceed $75,000, $50,000 of which could not be
attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). Of course, once
the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied, a
party need not resort to diversity jurisdiction as the MMWA’s
requirements would be met, giving the court federal question
jurisdiction. Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356, 356 (3d Cir. 1985).
Thus, the statutes are reconcilable.

        Here, Defendants rely exclusively on attorneys’ fees to
assert that they have established the amount in controversy.
Attorneys’ fees, however, do not count toward the amount in
controversy under the MMWA, and Defendants identify no
other amounts that would satisfy either the $50,000 or $75,000
requirements in 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a), respectively, for the individual claims. Therefore,
the District Courts correctly remanded the individual claims to
state court.

                              III
       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

                              20