Court Opinion

ID: 9390577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 20:03:03.007682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.467297
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION THREE

 WALTER WELLSFRY et al.,
         Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                              A165175
 v.
 OCEAN COLONY PARTNERS,                       (San Mateo County
 LLC,                                         Super. Ct. No. 19CIV02280)
         Defendant and Respondent.

       Walter Wellsfry (“Wellsfry”) alleges he injured himself when he stepped
on a small tree root camouflaged in a grassy walking area he traversed while
golfing at a course owned by Ocean Colony Partners, LLC, dba Half Moon
Bay Golf Links (“OCP”).
       Wellsfry and his spouse Leslie Bates-Wellsfry (collectively, “plaintiffs”)
sued OCP for negligence and loss of consortium premised upon OCP’s alleged
breach of its duty of care to Wellsfry by its failure to either remove or warn of
the tree root. The trial court found the lawsuit barred by the primary
assumption of risk doctrine and granted summary judgment. In so doing, the
court found that playing outdoor golf included the inherent risk of injury
caused by stepping on a tree root in an area used to access tee boxes. The
court further found that OCP had not increased the inherent risk of injury
and had not failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the inherent risk of
injury that would not have altered the fundamental nature of the sport.
       We affirm.

                                        1
                 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
The Incident
      On July 28, 2018, Wellsfry was playing golf on a golf course located
near the coastal bluffs in Half Moon Bay, which OCP owns, maintains, and
manages. Wellsfry was playing on the “Old Course,” which exemplified “the
traditional American Parklands–style course, with the fairways flanked by
several species of evergreen trees.”
      At approximately 3:30 p.m. to 3:45 p.m., Wellsfry parked his golf cart
near a water station. He did not notice any trees or tree roots in the area.
He walked from his cart to the tee box for the 14th hole, took a shot, and then
walked down a “gentle slope” on the opposite side of the water station back
toward his golf cart. He described the area as “a combination of dirt and
sand,” or “a combination of grasses and . . . a sandy surface.” Suddenly, he
felt “searing pain” and fell into his golf cart. Wellsfry knew he had stepped2
on something but did not see what it was and could not say if his foot caught
or twisted on anything. Another golfer pointed out a tree root, but Wellsfry
did not recall if the other golfer said she had seen Wellsfry step on that root.
Believing he may have just sprained his ankle, Wellsfry continued playing
golf and later that day reported the incident to OCP’s general manager.

1     The factual recitation is taken from the parties’ pleadings, separate
statements of undisputed facts, and supporting evidence submitted on OCP’s
motion for summary judgment. We set forth only those facts necessary to
resolve this appeal.
2
      The parties dispute whether Wellsfry “stepped” or “tripped” on a tree
root. As the resolution of this appeal does not turn on whether Wellsfry
tripped or stepped, we use the term step or stepped for convenience and we
deny as moot plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of certain dictionary
definitions of the word “trip.” (See Miller v. Zurich American Ins. Co. (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 247, 255, fn. 5 [request for judicial notice denied as moot as
documents were not necessary to resolve appellate issues].)

                                        2
      Wellsfry described the tree root as approximately 1.5 inches high by 1.5
inches wide or “it may have been a little smaller;” “the color of the root and
the sand and the grass . . . just blended right in.” He estimated the nearest
tree was approximately 60 to 100 feet away. Wellsfry knew trees were very
common on golf courses. However, he did not notice any tree roots as he
walked from his golf cart to the tee box and did not expect to see any; he
played “a lot of golf” and had “never seen roots like that, close to a tee box
and a water fountain, ever.”
The Complaint
      On April 18, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint for negligence and loss of
consortium based on the injuries sustained by Wellsfry on the golf course. It
alleged that Wellsfry had fallen “by tripping on a root that was concealed in
the grass in reasonably close proximity to where a tree had been removed but
the root had remained on the surface creating a hazard although in an
otherwise grassy area of the golf course,” and “the presence of a root as a
hidden obstruction created a condition that was negligently maintained and
dangerous with an unreasonable risk of harm to anyone that entered that
area.” It further alleged that OCP knew or should have known of the
reasonably foreseeable danger posed by the condition of the golf course and
had sufficient time to take measures to protect against the dangerous
condition. OCP filed an answer denying liability and asserting several
affirmative defenses, including the primary assumption of risk doctrine.
The Motion for Summary Judgment
      OCP sought summary judgment based on the primary assumption of
risk doctrine. In support of its motion, OCP offered portions of depositions
taken of Wellsfry and the following individuals: professional arborist Dennis
Yniguez; OCP Director of Golf Course Maintenance and Superintendent

                                        3
Daniel Miller; and OCP General Manager William Troyanoski. OCP also
requested judicial notice of the United States Golf Association’s published
rules of golf for 2019 as updated in June 2018, and certain documents taken
from the internet explaining the nature of the sport of golf including its
inherent risks. Plaintiffs opposed the request for judicial notice.
      Professional arborist Dennis Yniguez stated that an outdoor park-style
golf course with trees and plants normally included roots at the ground
surface. Such roots were not generally removed as part of tree or stump
removal because the retention of the roots in situs reduced erosion and
stabilized the area where the roots were located for many years. Yniguez
further explained the actual process of root removal; that the process would
be time consuming and expensive as a parkland-style golf course generally
consisted of tens of thousands of square yards; and that there were negative
impacts on the golf course surface and to persons in the area both during and
after the root removal process.
      OCP Director of Maintenance and Superintendent Daniel Miller
explained OCP’s procedures concerning the maintenance of the golf course,
including the area golfers used to traverse to and from the tee box for the
14th hole. He routinely inspected the area and knew about tree roots in that
area, but he did not believe any of them posed a hazard. OCP maintenance
staff also inspected the area daily and cut the grass weekly. During the year
before Wellsfry’s complaint, approximately 30,000 golfers had traversed the
golf course and Miller had not received any complaint or report of injuries
caused by the ground surface in the area where Wellsfry was injured.
      Miller also reviewed why no reasonable steps could be taken to
eliminate the inherent risks associated with the topographical features of the
golf course without altering the fundamental nature of the sport. He

                                       4
explained that the “[i]mposition of a duty to remove or provide warnings
regarding the presence at the ground surface of roots, including roots
measuring approximately 1.5 inches by 1.5 inches, would change the nature
of golf courses and the experience of golfing by requiring far more extensive
manicuring of the golf courses. Part of the inherent and generally pleasing
element of nature would be removed from golf. Every potential walking area
of the course would have to be free of bumps and projections: this would likely
be an area of tens of thousands of square yards. That would significantly
change the interaction between golf players and nature, and the interface
between the golfer and the ground. The surface of the ground is the golfer’s
foundation when engaging in the sport of golf, and that would necessarily be
changed if there [were] a duty to eliminate roots, including roots measuring
approximately 1.5 inches by 1.5 inches.”
      Miller opined that an enormous burden would be placed on owners of
golf courses if they were obligated to locate and remove tree roots, specifically
roots measuring 1.5 inches by 1.5 inches and smaller. Roots are generally
underground where it is difficult to see them. Experience shows that roots
can come to and project above the surface of the ground, whether by ordinary
wear and tear, growth of subsurface vegetation, weather events, people
compressing or kicking at the ground, divots, etc., so as to displace and/or
compact the earth that had been concealing the object thereby resulting in
projecting above the ground such that it could be stepped upon. Imposition of
a duty to remove or warn of conditions on or just below the surface of the
ground which could potentially hurt a person’s foot . . . would also result in
significant adverse consequences to the community: costs of locating and
removing such conditions would be considerable – especially to the extent the
duty required subsurface examination to locate objects close to the surface

                                        5
that . . . might become exposed – and [the costs] would be passed along to the
golfers.”
      In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs argued
that the danger of tree roots that are outside the playing area and not easily
seen is not a risk of playing golf. Plaintiffs also argued that OCP could have
taken reasonable steps (removal or warning of tree roots in the relevant area)
to minimize the risk of injury, which steps would not have altered the
fundamental nature of the sport. In support, they filed portions of the
deposition testimony of Wellsfry and Miller and a declaration of George
Kelley, proffered as an expert knowledgeable in the sport of golf and the
management and maintenance of golf courses.
      Plaintiffs highlighted, among other things, the following portions of
Miller’s deposition testimony: he agreed hazards should be marked with
traffic cones or small flags; he had directed that roots not be left in place after
the removal of a tree and its stump; he had seen some tree roots in the
relevant area before Wellsfry’s complaint; and he had gone to the area and
arranged for the removal of several tree roots after Wellsfry’s complaint.
According to plaintiffs, Miller’s deposition testimony that tree roots were
removed “ ‘if we [feel] there’s an issue,’ ’’ or “ ‘in some cases if we feel there is
a possibility of a trip hazard,’ ” contradicted his later submitted declaration
that he had not seen any trees roots in the relevant area that he thought
represented a hazard.
      Kelley opined that “[t]ripping on a tree root that is not easily seen
where there are no trees outside the playing area is not a risk of playing golf.”
He further opined that golf course owners had a duty to provide a reasonable
and safe environment for golfers; that if there were conditions that created a
potentially hazardous condition not easily seen in an area golfers were likely

                                          6
to walk it was the responsibility of the golf course owner to provide warnings
of the hazard; and it was below reasonable golf course maintenance
standards not to mark any area that created a potential safety hazard.
      Kelley’s declaration attached three photographs that had been
represented to him as showing the relevant area and a close-up “photograph
of the tree root that caused the fall.”3 Kelley discussed his evaluation of the
photographs of the area and the close-up tree root, stating only that the
depicted area was not in the golf playing area or in any of the designated
components of the golf course, but was an area where golfers were expected to
traverse to and from the tee box for the 14th hole, and there were no trees in
near where the fall occurred.
Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
      The trial court granted OCP’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred this lawsuit as OCP
owed no duty of care to Wellsfry to prevent his injury caused by “stepping on
a tree root in the area” used by golfers to traverse to and from the tee box for
the 14th hole.
      In support of its ruling, the court explained that it was undisputed that
Wellsfry was playing golf at the time of his injury. Even if the area in which

3      The trial court did not rule on OCP’s written evidentiary objections to
the admission of the photographs. Consequently, the court was “required by
[Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (c), to consider [the
photographs]. Similarly, ‘on appeal after a motion for summary judgment is
granted, we review the record de novo, considering all of the evidence set
forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections
have been made and sustained.’ ” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512,
534.) In its responsive brief, OCP does not renew its evidentiary objections to
the photographs. Accordingly, we deem the photographs to be part of the
record on appeal.

                                        7
he was injured did not technically fall within the “ ‘playing area’ ” of the golf
course, OCP was entitled to rely on the primary assumption of risk doctrine
because a fundamental part of the sport of golf included the inherent risks
assumed by a golfer navigating the course, “including its terrain and natural
obstacles, such as slopes, mounds, trees, leaves, water, sand, pavement, and
tree roots,” and that “[e]ven with the use of a golf cart, the act of playing golf
requires walking sometimes lengthy distances to reach the tee box and the
location where the ball has landed after being struck. In walking those
locations, golfers must deal with and overcome the terrain, including natural
obstacles like tree roots. Indeed, dealing with fatigue caused by navigating
the terrain and obstacles of a golf course is a fundamental part of the sport.
This includes navigating the area where Wellsfry was injured – which, as
[p]laintiffs concede, golfers must regularly traverse to get to and from the tee
box for the 14th hole.”
      The court further found that “[b]ecause stepping on a tree root in the
area where Wellsfry was injured is a risk inherent to the sport of golf,” OCP
could not be held liable for negligence because it had not increased the risks
to Wellsfry beyond that risk of injury inherent to playing golf and OCP had
not failed to take “ ‘reasonable steps’ ” to minimize that inherent risk of
injury. The court explained: “Indeed, [p]laintiffs present[ed] no evidence that
[OCP, which] knew about the existence of tree roots in the area, knew or
should have known that the camouflaged root stepped on by Wellsfry was
hazardous before Wellsfry was injured. By contrast, [OCP] presented
evidence that it had received no reports of any injuries or hazardous
conditions in the area before Wellsfry was injured even though tens of
thousands of golfers had played on the golf course . . . and regularly
‘traversed’ the area where Wellsfry was injured . . . . [OCP] also presented

                                         8
evidence that it regularly inspected the area and had not identified any
hazardous conditions before Wellsfry was injured . . . . Based on these
undisputed facts, [OCP] had no reason to suspect that the tree root that
Wellsfry stepped on presented any sort of hazard before Wellsfry was
injured.” (Italics in original.)
         The court granted OCP’s request for judicial notice of the information
regarding golfing “solely for the purpose of determining the legal issue of
inherent risk,” and it overruled plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to OCP’s
evidence. It did not rule on OCP’s objections to plaintiffs’ evidence.
         Following the issuance of its summary judgment order, the court
entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of OCP. This appeal ensued.
                                   DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
         In reviewing the propriety of a grant of summary judgment, our review
is de novo. “[W]e conduct the same procedure employed by the trial court.
We examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the
motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving
party’s favor, and (3) the opposition — assuming movant has met its initial
burden — to ‘decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the
existence of a triable, material fact issue. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] We need
not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary
judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale.”
(Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621,
630.)4

4     Consequently, we do not separately address plaintiffs’ arguments that
challenge some of the trial court’s statements in its written order.

                                         9
      The applicability of the primary assumption of risk doctrine may be
resolved on summary judgment where the record does not reflect triable
issues of material facts. (Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500 (Shin).)
Judges applying the primary assumption of risk doctrine in cases regarding a
recreational context may consider their own “common experience with the
recreational activity involved” and “may also consult case law, other
published materials, and documentary evidence introduced by the parties on
a motion for summary judgment.” (Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 1148, 1158.) Expert opinions may also be considered “ ‘for purposes
of weighing whether the inherent risks of the activity were increased by the
defendant’s conduct.’ ” (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31
Cal.4th 990, 1017–1018, citing to Huffman v. City of Poway (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 975, 995, fn. 23; American Golf Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 30, 37 (American Golf); Staten v. Superior Court (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1628, 1635-1637 (Staten).)
II. Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine as Applied to Owners and
Operators of Sporting Venues
      “Generally, everyone has a duty of care not to cause an unreasonable
risk of harm or injury to others. (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)” (Mayes v. La
Sierra University (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 686, 697 (Mayes).) Hence, “ ‘for
example, a property owner ordinarily is required to use due care to eliminate
dangerous conditions on . . . [the] property.’ ” (American Golf, supra, 79
Cal.App.4th at p. 36, quoting Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 315
(Knight).)
      “ ‘In the sports setting, however, conditions or conduct that otherwise
might be viewed as dangerous often are an integral part of the sport itself.’ ”
(American Golf, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 36, quoting Knight, supra, 3 Cal.

                                       10
4th at p. 315.) “Under the assumption of the risk doctrine, ordinarily a
recreation provider owes no duty to a participant in an active sport to use due
care to eliminate risks inherent in the sport.” (American Golf, supra, 79
Cal.App.4th at p. 36.) Since its reformulation in Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at
p. 296, “California’s assumption of risk doctrine has taken two quite different
forms. Primary assumption of risk is a complete bar to recovery. It applies
when, as a matter of law, the defendant owed no duty to guard against a
particular risk of harm. Secondary assumption of the risk applies when the
defendant owes a duty, but the plaintiff has knowingly encountered a risk of
injury caused by the defendant’s breach. Liability in [the latter] cases is
adjudicated under the rules of comparative negligence.” (Gregory v. Cott
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 996, 1001; see Shin, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 492 [the
secondary assumption of risk doctrine relates to the allocation of damages,
not to the question of duty].)
      “[P]articipation in an active sport is governed by primary assumption of
risk, and a defendant owes no duty of care to protect a plaintiff against risks
inherent in the sport.” (Staten, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 1632.) “When the
risks are inherent, the defendant does not have a ‘duty to protect the plaintiff
from those risks [citation] or take steps to reduce those risks.’ ” (Fazio v.
Fairbanks Ranch Country Club (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1058 (Fazio);
see American Golf, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 37 [“[t]he standards in the
industry define the nature of the sport”].) Nonetheless, the courts have held
that “[i]n any case in which the primary assumption of risk doctrine applies,”
the owners and operators of sports venues owe participants “a duty ‘not to act
so as to increase the risk of injury over that inherent in the activity.’
[Citation.] [And,] owners and operators of sports venues . . . have an
additional duty to undertake reasonable steps or measures to protect their

                                        11
customers’ . . . safety – if they can do so without altering the nature of the
sport . . . .” (Mayes, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 698; italics in original.)
III. Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine Includes the Inherent
Risks of Playing Golf on an Outdoor Course
      Our Supreme Court has held that the primary assumption of risk
doctrine applies to golf played on an outdoor course. (See Shin, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 485 [“[w]e hold that the primary assumption of risk doctrine
does apply to golf and that being struck by a carelessly hit ball is an inherent
risk of the sport”].) The open question is whether the inherent risk of playing
golf on an outdoor course includes risks associated with the topographical
features of the course. We find it does.
      Golf is a sport whose object is for players to use special clubs to hit a
small ball over lengthy distances and ultimately into a hole in the ground
surface. When golf is played outdoors, it is common knowledge that the game
does not use a “standardized playing area,” but rather takes place on the
varied natural terrain of the ground surface of the course. Because each golf
course is unique, golfers can reasonably expect to encounter myriad
variations in the ground surface and obstacles as they traverse a golf course.
(See American Golf, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 34 [“[g]olf courses are
designed with both fixed and removable obstacles, to make play interesting
and challenging;” “[f]ixed obstacles include trees, lakes, ponds, benches,
bridges, sand bunkers, sand traps, and rocks”].) As explained by OCP’s
Director of Maintenance and Superintendent Daniel Miller, “[t]he type of
grass used, such as Bermuda, Bentgrass, Zoysia, Poa Annua, or Ryegrass, the
presence or absence of trees, bushes, roots, holes, protuberances, furrows,
gouges, rocks, acorns, seeds, and other conditions of the terrain, can and
regularly do affect the golfer’s experience, both in terms of how the ball

                                        12
interacts with the terrain and in the color, density, and the overall
appearance of the terrain and the feel and atmosphere of the course.” Hence,
the ground surface of a golf course “establishes a significant portion of the
challenge and atmosphere of golf and constitutes the interface between the
golfer . . . and nature that is part of the gestalt of golf.”
      We therefore conclude one who plays golf on an outdoor course assumes
those risks associated with the topographical features of the course. (See
Hahn v. Town of West Haverstraw (2d Cir. 2014) 563 Fed. Appx. 75, 77
[primary assumption of risk doctrine barred lawsuit where plaintiff golfer
was injured due to golf cart wheel striking a stone on a golf cart path]; Simon
v. Hamlet Windwatch Development, LLC (N.Y.A.D. 2014) 120 A.D.3d 657,
657–658 [primary assumption of risk doctrine barred lawsuit where plaintiff
golfer stepped into the area of the cart path containing a depressed drainage
grate and, as a result, fell onto a wooden step and injured himself]; Brust v.
Town of Caroga (N.Y.A.D. 2001) 287 A.D.2d 923, 925 (Brust) [primary
assumption of risk doctrine barred lawsuit where plaintiff golfer was injured
when she stopped her golf cart on a path perpendicular to the crest of a small
hill in front of the green and as she began to walk towards her golf ball the
cart rolled down the slope of the fairway, ultimately striking her and causing
her injury]; Egeth v. County of Westchester (N.Y.A.D. 1994) 206 A.D.2d 502,
502 (Egeth) [primary assumption of risk doctrine barred lawsuit where
plaintiff golfer was injured while walking over a low mound of earth that
separated the seventh green from the golf cart path as plaintiff was aware of
the golf course’s topographical features, “the terrain around the green was

                                          13
inherent to the nature of the golf course,” and “under the circumstances, the
plaintiff was not unnecessarily or unreasonably exposed to danger”].)5
IV. The Primary Assumption of Risk Doctrine Bars This Lawsuit
      The primary assumption of risk doctrine bars this lawsuit for the
reasons stated by the trial court: the inherent risks of playing golf on OCP’s
outdoor course included the risks associated with the topographical features
of the course – in this case stepping on a small inconspicuous tree root in the
grassy area used by golfers to access the tee box for the 14th hole; OCP did
not increase the risk of injury beyond the inherent risks associated with the
sport; and OCP did not fail to take reasonable steps to minimize the inherent
risks that would not have altered the fundamental nature of the sport.
      Plaintiffs allege Wellsfry was injured when he stepped on the remnant
of a removed tree – specifically, a small tree root (approximately 1.5 inches
high and 1.5 inches wide) left in the ground surface of the area used by
golfers to traverse to and from the tee box for the 14th hole. Photographs of
the area taken from a distance show the ground surface was not smooth but
rather was a grassy expanse with areas of dirt and sand. Similarly, the close-
up photograph of a tree root shows a root nestled in a grassy area with the
height of the tree root either just below or approximately the same height as
the grassy area surrounding it.
      Because Wellsfry was aware of the obviously uneven grassy expanse,
he “must be held to a common appreciation of the fact” that there was a risk
of injury as he walked over this ground surface. (Brust, supra, 287 A.D.2d at

5     We see no merit to plaintiffs’ argument that reliance on Egeth, supra,
206 A.D.2d 502, also cited by the trial court, is misplaced. We cite Egeth and
the other non-California authority to support our decision that the inherent
risks of playing golf on an outdoor course include risks associated with the
topographical features of the golf course.

                                      14
p. 925.) By walking over this ground surface, Wellsfry assumed the obvious
risk that he might step on a small inconspicuous object because he could not
see what was hidden in the ground surface, whether the object was a tree
root or some other small object such as a rock, stone, acorn, etc. This risk
itself is inherent in playing golf on an outdoor course; it is not a hidden risk, a
unique risk, or an increase in the risk inherent in the sport. (See, e.g.,
Danieley v. Goldmine Ski Associates, Inc. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 111, 123
[“ ‘[e]ach person who participates in the sport of skiing accepts the dangers
that inhere in that sport insofar as the dangers are obvious and necessary;’ ”
“ ‘[t]hose dangers include, but are not limited to, injuries that can result from
variations in terrain; surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions; bare spots;
rocks, trees and other forms of natural growth or debris . . .’ ”; italics added].)
      In asserting that an inherent risk of playing golf on OCP’s golf course
did not include the risk of stepping on a tree root, plaintiffs ask us to consider
that Wellsfry had not “voluntarily” undertaken the risk of encountering tree
roots in the area used by golfers to access the tee box for the 14th hole.
According to plaintiffs, the tree root was not in a “natural” condition but was
the remnant of a tree that had been removed manually by OCP (i.e. man-
made condition); the surrounding grass, dirt, and sand camouflaged the tree
root; there was no warning of the presence of tree roots – either as a natural
warning (e.g. attached to a tree) or a manufactured one (e.g. signage, flag, or
chalk); there was no reason for golfers to suspect any danger given the
location of the incident; and a golfer traversing the treeless area would have
no reason to think that “tripping hazards lay underneath.” Plaintiffs also
contend they “are not arguing that a golf course [owner] needs to warn golfers
about every tree root on a course. The only type of tree root that is relevant
here is the one that Wellsfry tripped on: an inconspicuous tree root remaining

                                        15
from a manually uprooted tree in an area without any immediately
surrounding trees.” (Italics in original.) We find these arguments
unavailing.
      Our Supreme Court in Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, made clear that a
particular plaintiff’s subjective knowledge, awareness, or expectations as to
the “existence and magnitude of the risks the plaintiff voluntarily chose to
encounter” is not a relevant inquiry when applying the assumption of risk
doctrine. (Id. at p. 313, italics in original.) “[T]he question of the existence
and scope of a defendant's duty of care is a legal question which depends on
the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties' general
relationship to the activity, and is an issue to be decided by the court, rather
than the jury.” (Id. at p. 313, italics in original.) The focus is solely on
“whether, in light of the nature of the sporting activity,” it can be said that
“defendant’s conduct breached a legal duty of care to plaintiff.” (Id. at
p. 315.) “As used in the context of primary assumption of risk,” an obvious
risk “is one within the contemplation of the activity, whether or not it is
actually observed” by the injured plaintiff. (Beninati v. Black Rock City, LLC
(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 650, 660.) Here, there is no question that Wellsfry
was aware he was not traversing a smooth ground surface, but rather a
grassy expanse that included dirt and sand and one that might well have
small inconspicuous objects hidden in the grassy expanse.
      Plaintiffs also argue that summary judgment should have been denied
because OCP failed to meet its initial burden of showing that (1) its
maintenance of the golf course had not increased the risk of injury beyond
that inherent in the risk of playing golf, and (2) it had not failed to take
reasonable steps to minimize the risk of injury that would not have altered
the fundamental nature of the sport. We disagree. OCP’s separate

                                        16
statement of facts and supporting evidence (which included declarations of an
expert arborist and OCP’s maintenance director) are sufficient to meet its
initial burden on summary judgment. The declarations of OCP’s
maintenance director and superintendent and an expert arborist, described
in detail ante, constitute prima facie evidence showing that OCP’s failure to
remove or warn of the presence of small inconspicuous tree roots in the
grassy expanse used by golfers to access the tee box for the 14th hole had not
increased the inherent risks associated with the topographical features of the
golf course and that it had not failed to take reasonable steps to minimize the
inherent risks associated with the topographical features of the course that
would not have altered the fundamental nature of the sport.
      In contrast, we find plaintiffs’ proffered evidence does not raise triable
issues of fact as to whether OCP increased the inherent risk of harm by
“uprooting a tree and leaving protruding roots without providing any
warning to golfers traversing the area,” and whether OCP could have taken
reasonable steps to minimize the inherent risk of harm that would not alter
the fundamental nature of the sport by either removing the roots (as it did
after the incident) or posting a warning of the presence of the roots.
      Plaintiffs’ expert Kelley opined in broad, general terms about the
responsibility of golf course owners to provide a reasonable and safe playing
environment, but completely failed to explain why or how the tree root
represented as the one that caused Wellsfry’s injury or any of the tree roots
left in situs constituted a dangerous condition or tripping hazard that
required either removal or a warning to golfers.6 Hence, Kelley’s opinion “is

6     While not dispositive, we note that it is impossible to make a finding of
a dangerous condition or tripping hazard based on the photographs of the
relevant area as they either show a grassy expanse including areas of dirt
and sand or a close-up of a tree root nestled in a grassy area.

                                       17
not sufficient to create a duty on the part of [OCP] where none exists. . . . It
will always be possible for a plaintiff who suffers a sport injury to obtain
expert testimony that the injury would not have occurred if the recreation
provider had done something differently. Such expert testimony is not
sufficient to establish that the recreation provider increased the inherent
risks of the sport. Such expert opinion does not create a triable issue of fact
on a motion for summary judgment based on the primary assumption of the
risk defense.” (American Golf, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.)
      OCP’s Director of Maintenance and Superintendent Miller’s testimony
also does not raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether OCP
increased the risks inherent in the sport by creating a dangerous condition or
tripping hazard in the area where Wellsfry was injured. Miller made it quite
clear that – before Wellsfry’s complaint – Miller had routinely inspected the
relevant area almost daily and did not find any tree roots that posed a
tripping hazard. After the complaint, Miller examined the relevant area and
again failed to find any tree roots that posed a tripping hazard. Indeed,
Miller could not even locate the tree root that had prompted Wellsfry’s
complaint. In an abundance of caution, Miller decided to remove three tree
roots, taking his “best guess” as to the root that might have possibly been the
one that Wellsfry stepped on. The fact that Miller chose to remove these tree
roots is not evidence of a dangerous condition or tripping hazard at the time
of Wellsfry’s injury. As the trial court correctly ruled, “evidence of remedial
measures taken” after Wellsfry’s injury “ ‘is inadmissible to prove negligence
or culpable conduct in connection with the event.’ (Evid. Code, § 1151.)”
“ ‘Whether a given set of facts and circumstances creates a dangerous
condition is usually a question of fact. [Citation.] The issue of a dangerous
condition becomes a question of law only where reasonable minds can come to

                                       18
only one conclusion.’ ” (Fazio, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1064.) On this
record, we see no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find
that the grassy area used by golfers to access the tee box for the 14th hole
“posed a substantial risk of injury to the foreseeable user exercising due
care.” (Ibid.)
      Plaintiffs’ reliance on Morgan v. Fuji Country USA, Inc. (1995) 34
Cal.App.4th 127 (Morgan) is misplaced. In Morgan, the court found that the
primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply to bar a lawsuit by an
injured golfer who was struck by an errant golf ball. (Id. at p. 130.) The
court explained that, even though an inherent risk of playing golf was the
risk of being struck by a golf ball, the defendant golf course owner owed a
duty of care to golfers to minimize that inherent risk by designing and
maintaining its course if it could do so without altering the nature of the
game. (Id. at pp. 134–135.) In finding there was a triable issue of fact, the
court emphasized evidence indicating the relevant area was “particularly
dangerous” due to the defendant’s removal of trees. (Id. at pp. 134–135.)
Here, plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find that the ground surface of the golf course used by
golfers to access the tee box for the 14th hole was “particularly dangerous”
(id. at p. 135) or posed a substantial risk of injury to golfers exercising
reasonable care. Indeed, the absence of complaints or reports of injuries
shows that “this was not an area of great danger” or a place where OCP could
reasonably expect that golfers would be at risk for injuries as they traversed
the grassy expanse to access the tee box for the 14th hole. (American Golf,
supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 39.)
      Nor are we persuaded by plaintiffs’ reliance on Fazio, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th 1053, and Luna v. Vela (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 102 (Luna). In

                                        19
Fazio, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a stage constructed by the
defendant. (Fazio, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) The court held that
the primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply because a reasonable
trier of fact could conclude that the defendant’s placement of the stage
increased the risk of falling, noting expert testimony that the construction of
the stage fell below industry standards. (Id. at p. 1063.) In Luna, the
plaintiff was injured when he tripped over tie lines supporting a volleyball
net that was part of a volleyball court the defendant had constructed in his
front yard. (Luna, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 105.) The court held that the
primary assumption of risk doctrine did not apply because there was evidence
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant had
increased the risk of tripping due to his placement of the tie lines securing
the net. (Id. at p. 112.) In contrast, again, plaintiffs in the case before us
point to no evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find that OCP’s failure to remove or warn of the presence of small
inconspicuous tree roots increased the risk of injury beyond the risk of injury
inherent in walking through the grassy expanse used by golfers to access the
tee box for the 14th hole.
      In sum, OCP met its initial burden of proffering prima facie evidence
that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred this lawsuit and
plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proffering evidence raising triable
issues of fact that would preclude summary judgment dismissing this
lawsuit. Therefore, we shall affirm.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Ocean Colony
Partners, LLP, is awarded costs on appeal.

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                                          _________________________
                                          Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

A165175/Wellsfry et al., v. Ocean Colony Partners, LLC.

                                     21
Trial Court:   San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge:   Hon. Danny Chou

Counsel:       Decker Law, James Decker, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

               Vogle Meredith Burke, Daniel Streza and Guy Stilson for
               Defendant and Respondent.

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