Court Opinion

ID: 9486391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:46:54.550001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:42.149117
License: Public Domain

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Although I agree with Parts I, II and IV of the majority’s opinion, I strongly disagree with Part III. The majority holds that the late substitution of alternate juror Dunbar for juror Castillo was harmless error, despite the fact that the district court made no attempt to ascertain whether Dunbar had been subject to any outside influences during the sixteen hours in which he had been discharged from jury service. The majority relies on Davis’ failure to make a showing of prejudice to reach its conclusion. While I agree that Davis did not make a showing of prejudice, I question seriously how Davis was supposed to make such a showing. The only source of evidence which could have substantiated Davis’ claim of jury taint was the jury itself because the district court did not question Dunbar before reinstating him. The district court then denied Davis access to this evidence when it refused Davis’ post-trial motion asking the court to “conduct an examination of the jurors to determine the extent outside influences affected the deliberations, or at least to grant leave for counsel to interview the jurors and submit affidavits.”1 Because of Dunbar’s improper substitution, Davis faced a significant possibility of jury taint and we have no evidence in the record demonstrating that he was not prejudiced, For these reasons, I believe Davis was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial and thus I would reverse Davis’ conviction and remand for a new trial.
As we pointed out in United States v. Josefik, Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c) does not allow for the recall of an alternate juror after he or she has been discharged. 753 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Soteras v. United States, 471 U.S. 1055, 105 S.Ct. 2117, 85 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Both the district court in Josefik and the district court in this case violated Rule 24(c) by recalling an alternate juror. The basic facts of these two cases are quite similar. In both eases, the district court became aware of a problem with one of the jurors within a few minutes after sending the jury to deliberate. Likewise, the district court’s response in both cases was to telephone a discharged alternate, asking the alternate to return to court the next day.
At this point, however, the facts of the two cases diverge sharply. In Josefik, the district court undertook two crucial precautions to insure that the alternate juror had not been subject to any outside influences during the interval between her discharge and recall. When the district judge in Josefik called the alternate to ask her to return, she told the alternate not to discuss the case with anyone. 753 F.2d at 587. In addition, when the alternate returned to court, the judge questioned her to insure that she had not discussed the case with anyone. Id. Therefore in Josefik, the reviewing court had an adequate record upon which to base its conclusion that the Rule 24(c) violation did not prejudice the defendant.
In contrast, the district court in the instant case failed to undertake any of these precautions. The district judge did not instruct Dunbar to refrain from discussing the case when he discharged Dunbar. In fact, the *1418district judge admitted that he never admonished the jury not to discuss the case: “in this ease I did not instruct the jury not to talk about the case with anybody ... and that probably aggravates whatever problem we have here.... ” Furthermore, when Dunbar was telephoned and asked to return to court the next day, he was not informed that he might have to serve as a juror nor was he told to refrain from discussing the case in the interim period. Finally, when Dunbar did return to court, the district court did not question Dunbar to determine whether he had discussed the case with anyone, learned any other information about the case, or formed an opinion as to Davis’ innocence or guilt during the sixteen hours between his discharge and recall.
Neglecting to instruct a recalled alternate not to speak with anyone might be harmless error if the district court ascertained that the alternate juror had not been subject to outside influences. Therefore, the more important precaution taken by the district court in Josefik was to question the alternate before reinstating her. We underscored the importance of this precaution in Henderson v. Lane, 613 F.2d 175 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 986, 100 S.Ct. 2971, 64 L.Ed.2d 844 (1980). In Henderson, we examined the constitutionality of the substitution procedure employed by an Illinois court when replacing a juror with an alternate. In upholding the constitutionality of the substitution, we noted that “[t]he court questioned the alternate juror[ ] about [his] activities since discharge.” Id. at 176. Furthermore, the alternate had been examined by defense counsel “about his activities after dismissal and the possibility that [he] had formed opinions about guilt or innocence during that time” and was reinstated “only after reaffirming his ability to make a fair decision in the case.” Id. at 178-79.
Other circuits faced with this issue have similarly relied on a district court’s questioning of a recalled alternate to insure that the alternate had not yet formed an opinion and was free from any outside influences. See United States v. Quiroz-Cortez, 960 F.2d 418, 420 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that the late substitution of an alternate juror was not prejudicial to defendant because the district court had carefully instructed the alternate not to discuss the case before dismissing her and upon recall, the alternate twice affirmed that she had complied with the court’s instruction); United States v. Guevara, 823 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir.1987) (affirming district court’s decision to substitute alternate juror after deliberations had begun, in part, because the district court had questioned the alternate juror to learn if he had discussed the ease with anyone or had been exposed to any extrinsic information concerning the case); United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1058 (2nd Cir.) (allowing late juror substitution where district court first interviewed the alternate to affirm that the alternate could deliberate fully and fairly), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S.Ct. 2431, 77 L.Ed.2d 1318 (1983); United States v. Evans, 635 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (4th Cir.1980) (affirming substitution where the district court examined the alternate juror to determine if anything had occurred during the time of her discharge to destroy her impartiality or otherwise render her unable to function as a juror), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 943, 101 S.Ct. 3090, 69 L.Ed.2d 958 (1981).
Though I in no way encourage the practice of recalling discharged alternates,2 I believe that if it is done, it is absolutely essential that the recalled alternate be questioned to insure the alternate’s freedom from outside influences before reinstatement. Because the district court in the instant case did not question Dunbar, the majority simply does not have an adequate record upon which to base'its conclusion that Davis was not prejudiced. The district court’s denial of Davis’ post-trial motion to interrogate the jurors to establish any possible prejudice only exacerbated this difficulty. I am convinced that the majority’s holding is an anomaly because I can find no decision in any federal circuit approving of similar juror mishandling under *1419the rubric of either harmless error or failure to show specific prejudicial juror taint. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s resolution of the case.

. “Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, Judgement of Acquittal, and/or Arrest of Judgment, and for Hearing.”

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b) provides the proper procedure to be followed when a juror becomes incapacitated after the jury retires to deliberate: ”[I]f the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the remaining 11 jurors.”