Court Opinion

ID: 9566239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:35:27.077645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:39.696990
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice.
The State charged defendant Ramos with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under age sixteen. The jury returned a verdict finding Ramos guilty on both counts. Ramos filed two separate motions for new trial. One argued that he had been improperly denied use of his peremp*569tory challenges. The other alleged that newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial. The district court denied both motions. Ramos appeals from the denials.
On October 19,1987, Carol Schrader took her two daughters, Johanna and Shandi, 14 and 13 years old, to a psychologist at the Department of Health & Welfare for counseling for sexual abuse. The psychologist talked with the girls in his office while Mrs. Schrader waited outside. Following this visitation with Johanna and Shandi, the psychologist told Mrs. Schrader that sexual abuse is a matter that must be reported. Mrs. Schrader did not want to report the matter, stating her girls had asked her not to. The psychologist nevertheless set up an appointment for Mrs. Schrader with a case worker and a deputy sheriff at the Department of Health & Welfare. At that meeting the next day, the girls accused Eric Ramos, a neighbor, of being the person who had molested them. Criminal charges of lewd and lascivious conduct were filed against Ramos, leading to the filing of an information, the entry of defendant’s plea of not guilty, and the setting of the case for trial.
During jury voir dire, three venirepersons — Edmiston, Peterson and Shadel — expressed a belief that Ramos was guilty by virtue of the fact that he was on trial, and that he would have to present evidence which dissuaded them of his guilt. Edmiston was excused on defendant’s challenge for cause. The trial judge then read to the venirepersons an instruction dealing with the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in criminal cases. Peterson continued to express the opinion that defendant would have to prove himself innocent. He was excused for cause. Shadel, upon subsequent questioning by the court, indicated his willingness to follow the instructions of the court. The defendant challenged Shadel for cause, but the trial court denied the motion. In completing jury selection, Ramos used one peremptory challenge to remove Shadel from the panel. He then used the balance of his peremptory challenges.
After the jury returned a verdict of guilty against him, Ramos filed two motions for new trial, one on the basis of the court’s refusal to excuse Shadel. The motion was denied. Ramos appeals from the denial of this motion and from the court’s refusal to excuse Shadel.
I
Regarding the first new trial motion, Ramos argues that he is entitled to a fair and impartial jury and that since Shadel had expressed his opinion that Ramos must be guilty of something or he would not be on trial, the trial court should have immediately excused him for cause. However, Shadel did not sit on the jury. Ramos removed him with one of his peremptory challenges.
Alternatively, Ramos argues that he was prejudiced because he was forced to use one of his peremptory challenges to excuse Shadel. Specifically, Ramos, citing this Court’s holding in State v. Dickens, 68 Idaho 173, 191 P.2d 364 (1948), argues that his right to exercise the full complement of his peremptory challenges was impaired and that that alone was sufficient to warrant reversal. In Dickens, we noted that, “[I]t plainly appears, that the practical result of the disallowance by the court of defendant’s challenge for cause ... was to contract the number of peremptory challenges to which he was entitled, and that such an error may have been seriously prejudicial to defendant.” 68 Idaho at 177, 191 P.2d at 366 (quoting People v. Weil, 40 Cal. 268).
However, in State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312, 486 P.2d 1025 (1971), we stated more recently that:
Appellant has further assigned error to the trial court’s not excusing juror Nelson for cause. Juror Nelson was excused on the appellant's first peremptory challenge and did not participate in the trial. Thus the error, if any, claimed by the appellant in not excusing Nelson for cause, would have to be shown by the *570fact that this resulted in one or more of the other jurors deliberating in the case who were biased. Appellants failed to establish this. On the contrary, the record demonstrates that fair and impartial jurors were available and selected to participate in the trial of the charge against appellant.
94 Idaho at 319, 486 P.2d at 1032 (emphasis in original). Our holding in Wozniak is inconsistent with our earlier statement in Dickens. Wozniak, as the most recent expression of this Court, has implicitly overruled the statement in Dickens. Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).
Applying the holding in Wozniak to the instant case, it is clear that Ramos made no showing in his motion for new trial that he was prejudiced by being required to use a peremptory challenge to remove Shadel. Ramos has not demonstrated, nor has he even suggested, that any of the other jurors remaining on the panel were not impartial or were biased. Thus, if there was any error, it was harmless. State v. Wozniak, supra.
II
Defendant Ramos moved for a second time requesting a new trial on the basis that fabricated the charges against him as a cover-up to shield the real perpetrator of the crime, and (2) on the additional basis that such evidence also established that Carol Schrader had given perjured testimony at trial. The district court also denied that motion for a new trial. We will first address Ramos’ allegation that perjury occurred at trial.
The factual basis for the motion was a letter sent to the judge after trial. One of the jurors, who worked at Kootenai Medical Center, noticed the chart of a 15-year-old girl named Johanna, whose home was in the same vicinity as that of Johanna Schrader. This Johanna had been admitted to the psychiatric floor of the hospital and reportedly had been sexually molested by her stepfather and by three other people. Concerned by this, the juror wrote to the trial judge. A copy of the letter was forwarded to counsel for both parties. Based on this letter, defense counsel made inquiry of both the juror and the hospital administrator. Thereafter, defense counsel subpoenaed the hospital administrator to produce at the scheduled sentencing date any records which the hospital might have pertaining to the admission and treatment of any person named Johanna during 1987 or 1988. The hospital responded by delivering records to the clerk of the court in a sealed envelope. That information revealed that the patient in question, Johanna Gemmrig, was in fact the same as Johanna Schrader, and that she claimed to have been molested by her grandfather during the summers of 1986 and 1987.
In support of the motion for a new trial, defendant subpoenaed the treatment records. The hospital holding the records delivered them to the district court, which reviewed them in camera and disclosed the relevant portions of the record to the parties, but denied defense counsel access to the records, declaring that such was done in order to safeguard the privacy of Johanna Schrader. Ramos appeals from the denial of access to the records.
Ramos contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him full access to the subpoenaed hospital records. However, the record reveals that the district court did release all relevant portions of the record. Moreover, the hospital records are now available to Ramos’ attorney since they are an exhibit filed with the Supreme Court clerk. Ramos has not identified any relevant portions of the hospital records which were kept from his attorney prior to the second new trial motion hearing.
Ramos further argues that the mother of the two children, Carol Schrader, perjured herself at trial. At trial Ramos questioned Carol Schrader concerning any other sexual molestation of her daughters. At one point, Mrs. Schrader testified that *571Johanna had reported one instance of molestation which occurred two years earlier, and that the report turned out to be unfounded. Ramos argues that Johanna Schrader’s medical records disclosed that in the course of post-trial psychiatric treatment, Johanna stated that she had been molested by family members (including her grandfather) and that the molestation by the grandfather had continued until she reported it to her mother in the summer of 1987 (one to two months before the accusation was made naming Ramos). Ramos contends that this newly discovered evidence showed that Carol Schrader had committed perjury at trial, and he should therefore be entitled to a new trial.
Ramos contends that this Court should apply the test enunciated in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928), adopted by this Court in State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152, cert, denied 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 582, 93 L.Ed.2d 585 (1986), as the proper test to deal with new trial motions based on allegedly perjured testimony. The State, on the other hand, contends that the Larrison test is only applicable when the newly discovered evidence is the recantation of trial testimony by a prosecution witness. When the newly discovered evidence is any evidence other than the recantation of trial testimony by a prosecution witness, according to the State, the test used is the test set forth in State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 551 P.2d 972 (1976). We need not resolve that legal issue because the trial court found that there was no perjured testimony. Perjury occurs when a witness has intentionally and deliberately misrepresented a state of affairs, knowing those affairs to be false. The record in this case supports the finding that there was not any intentional or deliberate misrepresentation of facts by Carol Schrader. The following is an excerpt from the dialogue that occurred at trial where defense counsel was questioning Mrs. Schrader:
Q. On an earlier occasion she came to you and told you she had been sexually molested?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. How long ago was that?
A. Two years ago.
Q. That’s two years ago from now. What I am trying to ask you, Mrs. Schrader, was it about a year and a half prior to the alleged events involving Eric Ramos?
A. I don’t remember when she told me. As can clearly be seen, Carol Schrader at one point said the incident occurred two years ago, followed by an admission that she couldn’t remember when she had been told. The two statements are not necessarily contradictory or inconsistent. The statement, “How long ago was that?” could refer either to the time when the daughter had been molested, or the time that she told her mother. If the statement was that the molestation occurred two years ago, then that is not inconsistent with the subsequent statement that, “I don’t remember when she told me.” The district court judge who presided at the trial, and who had the benefit of observing the witnesses testify, concluded that there was no perjury, apparently concluding to interpret the two answers as (1) that Johanna had been sexually molested two years ago, and (2) the mother did not remember when Johanna told her about it. That is certainly one reasonable interpretation of the evidence, and based upon that interpretation there is no basis for the claim that the mother, Mrs. Schrader, perjured herself. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to grant Ramos’ motion for new trial based upon his allegations of perjured testimony.
In addition, Ramos contended that such newly discovered evidence entitled him to a new trial in and of itself, as it tended to support his theory that the charges against him were fabricated to shield the real perpetrator. The district court rejected this contention on the basis that the evidence was not in fact “newly discovered.” The district court noted that:
Johanna testified at trial that she had, prior to October 12th, told her mother, *572Carol, that she had been sexually molested. Defense counsel did not ask any specifics on what Johanna had told her mother or who had molested her. Ramos had the opportunity to develop facts as to the prior molestations and the reporting of the same but for strategy or other reasons chose not to develop such facts____ Carol Schrader testified after Johanna at trial. A review of Carol Schrader’s trial testimony reveals that Ramos also declined to inquire of Carol as to what Johanna told Carol after Ramos established at trial through the testimony of Carol that Johanna had reported a prior molestation.
The defense trial strategy was not to use obtainable evidence during trial in the form of who had previously molested Johanna. Therefore, evidence of prior molestation is not newly discovered evidence.
We agree with the district court’s finding that since defense counsel elected not to pursue and develop this line of inquiry, the evidence cannot be characterized as newly discovered evidence entitling Ramos to a new trial.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
JOHNSON, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.