Court Opinion

ID: 9840085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 05:07:56.860149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:18.462698
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                       UNPUBLISHED
In re CAMPBELL, Minors.                                                September 14, 2023

                                                                       No. 364817
                                                                       Hillsdale Circuit Court
                                                                       Family Division
                                                                       LC No. 2021-000695-NA

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and O’BRIEN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to the minor children, AC and IC, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii), and
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). We affirm.

                                   I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         “In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been
met.” In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). After the trial court
determines that at least one of the statutory grounds has been met, the trial court must also find by
a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can
terminate parental rights. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court
reviews the trial court’s finding regarding the child’s best interests for clear error. In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing
court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to
the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80
(quotation marks and citation omitted).

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                                       II. BEST INTERESTS

        In his sole issue raised on appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred by finding
that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interests.1 We disagree.

        “Once a statutory ground for termination has been proven, the trial court must find that
termination is in the child’s best interests before it can terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts,
297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “[T]he focus at the best-
interest stage” is on the children, not the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. The trial court
should weigh all the evidence available on the record to determine the children’s best interests. In
re Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. The trial court may consider such factors as “the child’s bond to
the parent[;] the parent’s parenting ability[;] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and
finality[;] and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts, 297
Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). The trial court may also consider the parent’s history and
psychological evaluations, the child’s age, inappropriate parenting techniques, as well as continued
involvement in domestic violence relationships. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 131; 777 NW2d
728 (2009). The strength of the bond between parent and child, the visitation history, the parents’
questionable relationships, the child’s well-being in care, and the possibility of adoption are also
valid considerations. In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 301; 690 NW2d 505 (2004); In re AH, 245
Mich App 77, 89; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). Other considerations include the length of time that the
children were in foster care or placed with relatives, the likelihood that “the child could be returned
to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all,” and compliance with the service plan.
In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, the trial court must
“consider the best interests of each child individually and . . . explicitly address each child’s
placement with relatives at the time of the termination hearing if applicable.” In re Olive/Metts,
297 Mich App at 44.

        First, respondent contends that the trial court simply indicated that the children’s best
interests supported termination without properly considering the best-interest factors. This
contention is not supported by the record. The trial court determined that termination was in the
best interests of AC and IC by comparing their joint placement in a foster home to placement in
respondent’s home. The trial court explained that AC and IC thrived in foster care, and they had
a strong, healthy bond with their foster parents. Their foster parents tended to their significant
special needs including therapy to address their sexual acting out, AC’s aggression against other
children at school, and IC’s learning disabilities, PTSD and disinhibited social engagement
disorder. Respondent did not attend their medical or school appointments, including IC’s
individualized educational plan meetings. In contrast, AC demonstrated an insecure attachment

1
  Because respondent does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination, this Court may
presume that the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the unchallenged statutory grounds
were established by clear and convincing evidence. See In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 98-99;
585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 353.
Nonetheless, we are satisfied from our review of the record that the trial court did not clearly err
when it found that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).

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to respondent, and IC did not have a bond with respondent. Additionally, the trial court explained
that respondent made insufficient progress in addressing his barriers to removal to safely place his
children back in his care. Finally, because of their ages (3 and 6.5 years old at the time of
termination), multiple removals, and significant history of trauma, permanency was urgently
needed for these children. For these reasons, the trial court determined that it was in the best
interests of AC and IC to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The trial court made express
findings on the record regarding each child and explicitly considered relevant factors. See id.

        Second, respondent contends that the best-interest factors favored him because he had a
strong bond with his children; he had parenting ability because he parented the children since birth;
and he had income, so he could provide permanency and stability. Additionally, he contends that
that the home of a stranger had a serious disadvantage over his home because a father’s love would
be absent in a foster home. Finally, respondent asserts that he substantially complied with the
parent-agency treatment plan.

        Addressing, respondent’s second argument, the trial court did not clearly err with respect
to its best-interest analysis. The record suggests that he had no bond with one child and an
inappropriate bond with the other. According to her attachment assessment, AC had an insecure
ambivalent bond with respondent. According to her attachment assessment, IC had a secure bond
with respondent; however, this bond was deemed inappropriate because of her disinhibited social
engagement disorder diagnosis, which caused her to quickly attach to men, including complete
strangers. It appears that respondent erroneously evaluated this factor from his perspective, not the
children’s. In re Moss, 301 Mich App ay 87.

        In contrast, the children had no or little bond with respondent but had strong bonds with
their foster parents. Initially, when AC and IC were placed with their foster parents, AC was afraid
of men and would not let her foster father meet her needs. She quickly became attached to her
foster mother but would scream when men attempted to help her. Throughout the course of these
proceedings, AC and IC developed a significant bond with their foster parents. They referred to
them as their “mommy” and “daddy,” and referred to their mother and respondent as their “old
mommy” and “old daddy.” AC became comfortable with her foster father and allowed him to
meet her needs.

        Third, the record does not support the assertion that respondent had parenting ability simply
because he raised them. Throughout this case, respondent showed that he did not develop
appropriate parenting skills and could not meet his children’s basic needs. Respondent participated
in some services, but he failed to attend others, and did not learn from the services that he attended.
For example, when respondent still had parenting time, he did not interact appropriately with his
children. He needed to be coached during parenting-time visits and would ask AC questions that
she was too young to understand and answer. Often, the caseworkers had to direct respondent’s
attention back to the children during visits. Respondent’s caseworkers were surprised at how little
progress he made during parenting visits considering that he had participated in Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) services in past proceedings. Respondent also did not
properly prepare for parenting-time visits. He sometimes brought pull-ups and wipes provided by
the DHHS to parenting time, but he often relied on the foster parents to provide them.
Additionally, he brought soda-pop, which was inappropriate given the children’s serious dental

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needs. Respondent did not follow through on promises he made, such as bringing presents for AC
and IC.

        Respondent never participated in his children’s medical and educational appointments,
even though the children’s severe tooth decay and global developmental delays were conditions
that led to the trial court taking jurisdiction over these children.2 His house remained unsanitary
and unsafe for children as well. Despite cleaning in preparation for a home visit, respondent still
left marijuana, pills and a glass pipe out within the reach of his children in his household, the house
was still unclean, and respondent permitted people subject to their own Children’s Protective
Services (CPS) investigations to live in the house. These examples showed that respondent did
not develop the required skills to safely and effectively care for his daughters’ basic needs.
Respondent’s failure to complete or comply with his parent-agency plan, including addressing his
domestic violence history, negatively impacted his parenting skills.

        Fourth, respondent did not explain how his source of income (approximately $800 per
month) can provide permanency and stability for his children.3 He cites no authority and makes
no effort to explain how this criterion alone established that respondent could provide permanency
and stability for his daughters. Beyond this, respondent was not forthcoming regarding his
financial situation and ability to financially support his children. Despite being asked numerous
times, respondent never provided his caseworker with his lease agreement. Respondent had $800
per month in income, was behind on his electricity bills, and his mother helped him pay for his car
insurance. Respondent was offered financial resources by the DHHS, but he did not partake in
those services.

         Overall, respondent did not show that he could provide his children with permanency and
stability through appropriate and safe housing. Throughout the case, his parenting skills did not
improve, he did not obtain domestic violence counseling, he was untruthful with his substance
abuse counselor, and his parenting time visits elicited traumatic, sexually disturbing responses
from the girls that ceased after visits were suspended.

        Fifth, respondent argues that the foster parents could not provide a father’s love because
they were not biological parents. This argument is disingenuous and unpersuasive. Respondent
provides no citation for the argument that a foster parent is innately unable to provide a father’s
love to children. Looking at the record in this case, it is clear that this is not true with these
children. AC and IC entered their foster family traumatized. AC was afraid of men and refused
to let her foster father tend to her basic needs. The foster parents worked with the children’s
therapist to better understand trauma related to child sexual assault and to meet AC’s and IC’s
needs. They made sure the children’s medical and educational needs were met. The children

2
 Neither child was fully immunized and neither had attended any doctor’s appointments after they
were born. At removal, the children were 2 (IC) and 5 (AC) years old. IC needed root canal
surgery, both girls needed cavities filled, AC had a yeast infection, and both had been struggling
with head lice and bed bugs for several months.
3
  This is particularly true in light of respondent’s admission that he consumes approximately six
to seven joints a day or fifteen pounds of marijuana per month.

                                                 -4-
developed a significant bond with their foster parents. AC developed to a point at which she was
no longer afraid of her foster father and allowed him to care for her. In contrast, respondent had
an insecure ambivalent attachment with AC and an inappropriate attachment with IC.

        The trial court’s best-interest analysis was also supported by respondent’s failure to comply
with his parent-agency agreement. AC and IC were brought into the trial court’s jurisdiction for
failure to provide for their medical health, their emotional well-being, and their unfit home
environment. To remedy his barriers to reunification, respondent was required to attend all
parenting-time visits, as well as all medical, dental, education, and behavioral health appointments
for AC and IC, comply with, and benefit from, parenting education, attend individual therapy,
follow the recommendations in his psychological evaluation and to maintain suitable housing for
his children.4 Respondent did not substantially comply with these goals.

        Respondent’s parent-agency plan required respondent to attend and increase parenting-
time visits. He did not attend all of his parenting-time visits and did not show progress in these
visits. He needed to be coached during parenting-time visits and would ask AC questions that she
was too young to understand and answer. Often, the caseworkers had to direct respondent’s
attention back to the children during visits. Notably, respondent completed his psychological
evaluation and was diagnosed with bipolar with schizoaffective disorder and a cannabis-use
disorder. The psychological evaluation recommended that respondent receive supervised and
structured visitation, individual counseling, counseling with his girlfriend at the time, and
domestic-violence counseling. He was also advised to stop marijuana use. Respondent complied
with his plan to the extent that he participated in psychiatric care and was reported to take his
medications. Otherwise, he failed to address his mental health. He did not participate in therapy
services until April 2022. Respondent’s therapist reported that he missed some appointments. His
therapist readily admitted that she did not read respondent’s psychological evaluation but they
worked the most on his childhood trauma and sexual abuse. The trial court heard no evidence that
respondent received any domestic violence, anger management, and relationship counseling. He
did not request those services. Respondent also did not refrain from using marijuana. On the basis
of this information, respondent did not comply with the requirements of his psychological
evaluation.

        Ultimately, the trial court reviewed the best interest factors and concluded by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination was in the children’s best interests. In re
Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 40. The trial court’s best-interest determination on the record does
not leave a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed . . . .” In re Moss, 301
Mich App at 80 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                              /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

4
 At removal, the children’s beds were covered in feces, the kitchen had black mold and there was
garbage throughout the house. Respondent made some progress but the house remained dirty.

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