Court Opinion

ID: 9706817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:52:16.955921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:30.038932
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
concurring. I agree that the trial court properly admitted the tape recording of the victim’s statement and did not err in denying defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; I therefore join the majority in affirming. I write separately, however, to point out that the disagreement between the majority and the dissent on the foundational requirements of Rule 803(5) need not be resolved to decide this appeal. Even under the dissent’s more restrictive interpretation of the rule, the foundational requirements were satisfied in this ease.
To ensure that a statement accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge, that witness “must either testify (1) that he recalls having made an accurate memorandum or (2) that though he now does not recollect his state of mind when making the record, he would not have made it *100unless it were correct.” 4 Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 803(5)[01], at 803-180 to -181 (1995). Under the second approach, the witness can testify that he would not have written or signed a memorandum unless he had been convinced it was correct. Id. at 803-181; 2 McCormick on Evidence § 283, at 259 (4th ed. 1992).
Although this case involved a tape recording rather than a signed statement, the witness’s testimony is analogous to the foundational predicate for a written memorandum. See, e.g., Dennis v. Scarborough, 360 So. 2d 278, 279 (Ala. 1978) (the witness testified that “he must have known the recording’s veracity (though not whether the statement itself was accurate) because he otherwise would not have written them down.”); Walker v. Larson, 169 N.W.2d 737, 742 (Minn. 1969) (witness “testified that he had never signed any paper which did not contain true facts within his own knowledge.”). Referring to statements in a transcript of the tape recording, the state’s attorney asked the victim, “[W]ould you have said them if they were not true?” The victim replied, “I don’t believe I would have.” The state’s attorney then asked the victim, “Is there a single thing in those two pages [of the transcript] that you think you would have deliberately said to the police officer if they were not true?” She replied, “No.” In its Rule 803(5) analysis, the trial court relied upon this testimony by the witness, saying: “She[] further testified that ... if she had talked to a police officer, and that is now established, about this incident, she would have endeavored to be truthful. . . . She has not given evidence saying that what she said previously is incorrect.” *
In United States v. Patterson, 678 P.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1982), the court concluded that the foundational requirement was satisfied under circumstances similar to this case. In Patterson, the government sought to introduce the defendant’s grand jury testimony as past recollection recorded. The court concluded that the witness’s testimony that “he did not think he had lied to the grand jury” was sufficient to establish that the grand jury testimony accurately reflected the witness’s knowledge. Id. at 779. In sum, the tape *101recording of the victim’s statements was properly admitted under either the majority or dissent’s interpretation of the foundational requirements of Rule 803(5).
I have been authorized to state that Justice Gibson joins in this concurrence.

 Although the trial court may have determined the admissibility of the tape recording under the disputed interpretation of Rule 803(5), we can affirm its admissibility determination on any legal ground which would justify the result. Richards v. Union High Sch. Dist. No. 32, 137 Vt. 132, 134, 400 A.2d 987, 989 (1979) (“Error will not result in reversal if the record before us discloses any legal ground which would justify the result, even though the ground may not have been raised below and may not be briefed.”).