Court Opinion

ID: 9861100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:41:09.07103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:13.346668
License: Public Domain

SCHREIBER, J.,
dissenting.
The Middlesex County Ethics Committee filed the following charge against the respondent Lennox Hinds:
*642At a press conference conducted on January 20,1977, during the selection of a jury in the Joanne Chesimard criminal trial, and speaking as a member of the defense team, he termed the trial before Judge Theodore Appleby to be a “travesty”; he stated that Judge Appleby “does not have the judicial temperament or racial sensitivity to sit as an impartial judge”; he stated that “it was only after the trial began that we began to have fears that what we are seeing is a legalized lynching”; he stated that the members of the Joanne Cheismard defense team had been “gagged” by Judge Appleby; he stated that Judge Appleby was asking prospective jurors self-serving questions which he said were leading to “the creation of a hangman’s court” and he stated that “it will be a kangeroo [sic] court unless the judge recluses [s/c] himself” and that a kangeroo [sic] court means a guilty verdict.
The Committee asserted that the respondent had violated DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 7-107(D).
The attorney investigating the matter for the Committee had requested that Hinds confer with him to offer any information or explanation which might assist the Committee in determining whether to proceed. See R. 1:20-2(h) and (k). Hinds refused. The Committee subsequently instituted formal proceedings by approving the charge recited above.
The Committee has never been permitted to hold a hearing. There is no record. The Court certified this case to consider the constitutional challenges to DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 7-107(D). I submit we erred in doing so.1
It is an established principle that a court should, whenever feasible, decide a case on nonconstitutional grounds. That feasibility exists here. The parties sharply contested whether the respondent was “associated with the ... defense,” a condition precedent to violation of DR 7-107(D). If the respondent prevailed in this respect that charge would have been dismissed. *643Moreover, that finding could have had an effect on the propriety of the charge under DR 1-102(A)(5) concerning conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Thus it was possible that the entire controversy may have been decided without reaching the constitutional issues.
I agree with the majority that DR 7-107(D) is constitutional. The Rule bears repeating:
During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, the lawyer or a law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or participate in making an extra-judicial statement that he expects to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
The policy underlying this Disciplinary Rule is that the defendant and the State are entitled to and should have a fair trial. The attorney’s right to speak is not completely prohibited. He may make appropriate argument in the courtroom. See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 987, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965). He may after the case has been completed properly comment on the matter. What he may not do is intentionally disseminate to the public statements relating to the trial which are “reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial.”
The majority contends that the charge should be dismissed for two reasons, neither of which is valid. First it claims that its interpretation of DR 7—107(D) involves some new concept. I submit that application of the stated test—reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial—does not involve any new or unforeseen dogma. The so-called “balancing test” referred to by the majority, ante at 626, is nothing more than the usual weighing which any fact finder must do when evaluating facts to reach a conclusion. Nor do I foresee any unfairness to the respondent. The Rule was written “by and for lawyers.” In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 (D.C.1977). As stated in that case: “The language of a rule setting guidelines for members of the bar need not meet the precise standards of clarity that might be required of rules of conduct for laymen.” Id. at 126.
*644• The second reason advanced is even more curious. It is that the charge should be dismissed because the factual dispute concerning the respondent’s relationship to the defendant has never been resolved. Thus the respondent has successfully evaded a hearing to resolve whether he was “associated with the ... defense” by instituting a constitutional attack—which the Court finds is unsuccessful.2
Lastly, I disagree with the majority’s opinion that it seems quite certain that the First Amendment would require application of a “clear and present danger” standard to conduct under DR 1-102(A)(5). That rule reads as follows:
DR 1-102 Misconduct
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(5) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
[Emphasis added.]
This Disciplinary Rule on its face requires that the conduct must be shown to be prejudicial. There must be clear and convincing evidence that the attorney’s conduct did in fact hinder, block or obstruct the administration of justice. I envisage no constitutional impediment to that standard. Assuredly attorneys whether directly related or not to an ongoing trial should not be permitted to frustrate a fair trial. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, 620 (1966). In truth it is conceivable that an attorney who is not associated with the defense may have such standing in the community that his words may have a substantially greater impact on the fairness of a trial than those of the attorney of record.3 This is *645not to say that attorneys may not criticize courts, judges, their decisions, and the judicial system. There is a proper time and place for such criticism.
We shall not know whether the respondent’s conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice or whether respondent was associated with the defense and violated DR 7-107(D)” due to the improper aborting of this proceeding. Innovative arguments advanced in support of the contention that a rule has not been violated may at times be relevant in determining the *646sanction to be applied. However, they should not serve as vehicles to evade due disciplinary proceedings. I would remand the matter to the District VIII Ethics Committee to process the complaint and proceed pursuant to R. 1:20-2.

Our certification requested respondent Hinds to brief the question of whether further factual findings were necessary. His brief argued none were needed because the Disciplinary Rules were facially unconstitutional and because there was a record in the United States District Court. The brief filed by the Ethics and Professional Services took the position that the Court could consider the facial constitutional issue and, if DR 1-102(A)(5) and DR 7-107(D) were found to be constitutional, the matter should be remanded to the District Ethics Committee.

I also do not . agree with the Court’s very restrictive definition of what “associated with” means. It has limited the concept to any attorney who (1) cooperates with the defendant on a regular and continuing basis, (2) provides legal assistance and (3) holds himself out to be a member of the defense team. Ante at 627. An attorney could escape the effect of the rule by eliminating any one condition.

The majority opines that an attorney not professionally connected with a pending criminal case “would seemingly enjoy the same free speech rights as *645any other citizen.” Ante at 633. The majority relies on four decisions in support of this proposition. Two are not apropos. Koenigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957), related to the rejection of plaintiff as an applicant for the bar because of his refusal to answer questions as to membership in the Communist Party. In the Matter of R.J.M., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed.2d 64 (1982), concerned the validity of a rule of the Missouri Supreme Court regulating advertising by attorneys. The issue was whether the advertising was misleading or whether there was any other justification for its regulation. There was no discussion or consideration of the issue involved in this case—the impact on an ongoing trial. The third, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979), held that lawyers are officers of the court subject to disciplinary sanctions to which non-lawyers are not subject, that they have First Amendment rights of free speech, but that they also have many privileges not enjoyed by others, and that with these privileges come responsibilities including compliance with codes of professional conduct. The fourth case, Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 374 F.Supp. 784, 788 (N.D.Tex.1974), is a district court case which assumes there is a very limited scope of areas in which attorneys’ standards may be prescribed: (1) inability to represent clients competently and honestly and (2) direct interference with an ongoing trial.
Moreover, DR 1-102(A)(5) applies to an attorney who is acting as a member of the bar and not as an ordinary citizen, as the majority states. Ante at 634. The majority overlooks its previous statement that attorneys in their capacity as judicial officers “differ from ordinary citizens.” Ante at 616. Justice Brennan observed in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 636, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1383, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473, 1483 (1959):
A lawyer does not acquire any license to do these things [criticisms of a judge’s integrity] by not being presently engaged in a case. They are equally serious whether he currently is engaged in litigation before the judge or not. We can conceive no ground whereby the pendency of litigation might be thought to make an attorney’s out-of-court remarks more censurable, other than that they might tend to obstruct the administration of justice.