Court Opinion

ID: 9690661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:30:57.899272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:00.862206
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. To me, the majority opinion seems to disregard reality.
The decision to dissolve the marital bond and settle the concomitant issue of child custody and care is one of the most painful and emotional of all human experiences. Each experience is alike but in a different way. Judicial resolution is difficult to say the least. Any effort to render the judicial task less onerous and to diminish the trauma to litigants is highly desirable.
When parties decide to dissolve the marital bond, there are three significant areas of concern: (1) dissolution of the marital contract; (2) assignment and disposition of property; and (3) care and support of infant children. Not infrequently, the latter concern is presented to the court upon agreement of the parties. Economics dictate such. For many, a protracted divorce may well lead to financial ruin. It is thus a laudable goal to resolve the matter of custody through agreement of the parties.
An agreement of custody often leaves children as it finds them — in the joint custody state into which they were born. Ordinarily, the court summarily ratifies the agreement and no adversarial proceeding underlies the joint custody decree.
Upon the unlikely failure of the “agreement,” I think fair play demands the matter of custody be heard de novo under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.270. Otherwise, the parties would be effectively denied an initial adversarial proceeding adjudicating custody pursuant to the child’s best interest. KRS 403.270(2). Moreover, any other rule would be counterproductive. Such would discourage agreement and result in lengthy adversarial proceedings for fear of being bound by the two-year period of repose set forth in KRS 403.340(1). I would, thus, apply KRS 403.340(1) only in cases where custody had been awarded upon findings entered after a full adversarial hearing.
The majority relies upon Carnes v. Carnes, Ky., 704 S.W.2d 207 (1986), for the proposition that KRS 403.340 is implicated in cases of joint custody agreements. The majority specifically states that Carnes “requires a modification of a joint custody agreement under KRS 403.340 .... ” I, however, view the majority’s interpretation of Carnes as somewhat misplaced.
The majority presupposes that Carnes actually involves a joint custody decree. While it is true the decree was labeled as such, the Carnes court pointed out:
In actuality, the “joint custody” decree granted custody of the children to Hum-fleet and visitation rights to Carnes.
Id. at 208. To fairly interpret Carnes, the above sentence must be given due consid*816eration. The Carnes court uniquely quoted the phrase “joint custody” and plainly stated the decree, in fact, granted custody to Humfleet and visitation rights to Carnes. Such is not the nature of a joint custody decree, but rather a sole custody decree. In joint custody, one parent is not “granted custody” and the other visitation; rather, both parties enjoy joint custody of the child. It is my opinion that Carnes deals with modification of a sole custody decree and has no application to a joint custody agreement.
In view of the foregoing, I would adhere to the principle enunciated in Benassi v. Havens, Ky.App., 710 S.W.2d 867 (1986). I also have no serious objection to the restriction placed upon Benassi by Mennem-eyer v. Mennemeyer, Ky.App., 887 S.W.2d 555 (1994). I, however, think the restriction unnecessary. Because of the enormous costs involved in present day judicial proceedings, “running-to-the-courthouse” over custodial matters is not so prevalent as it once was. Moreover, the modern trend toward joint custody in lieu of sole custody, wherein the custodial parent had almost dictatorial power over matters of education and moral training, has lessened the desire to re-Iitigate custody arrangements. The problem is more illusory than real. In any event, I would not overrule Mennemeyer.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the circuit court.
GUDGEL, Chief Judge, and DYCHE and COMBS, Judges, Join in this dissenting opinion.