Court Opinion

ID: 9430226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:29:16.781525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:23.776954
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
This is an exceptional case. It involves a dispute between the Marshals Service and a Federal District Court. Ordinarily, the marshals and the federal courts which they serve *44have a close and harmonious relationship. To be sure, the special responsibilities of the marshal — an office that serves both the Executive and Judicial Branches — can give rise to administrative problems.1 Customarily such problems are resolved on a voluntary, cooperative basis, either in the individual court or circuit, or in high-level discussions between the Executive and Judicial Branches.2 Open disputes between the marshals and the courts are rare, and appropriately so.
The question whether federal marshals should be required to transport state prisoners to testify in federal litigation is, however, a recurring problem that has not been resolved amicably, either between the federal courts and the marshals3 or between the marshals and the States.4 The majority notes that, in “exceptional circumstances,” ante, at 43, the district court may order marshals to transport state prisoners. I entirely agree. The majority’s holding, however, is that, absent such circumstances, the district court may not *45order marshals to do so because no statute expressly authorizes that action. In my view, this conclusion ignores the importance of history and tradition in defining the relationship between the Marshals Service and the Federal Judiciary.
History and tradition suggest that the court’s authority over the marshal is not so narrowly circumscribed as the Court suggests. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress placed the marshal under the direction of the court. Because the office of the marshal was patterned after the office of the common-law sheriff,5 there was no need for Congress to define the judge’s authority to issue orders to the marshal with any particularity. Instead, § 27 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided that a marshal should be appointed in each *46judicial district.6 The primary duty of the marshal, as expressed in that Act, was “to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit.” In carrying out his duty to execute “all lawful precepts directed to him,” each marshal was given the power to appoint “one or more deputies,” but such deputies were removable at will by the appropriate federal judge. Read against the background of the relationship between the judge and the sheriff that had existed at common law, it is evident that the statute simply assumed that the judge had ample power to call upon the marshal for appropriate assistance in carrying out the duties of judicial office.
Although the marshal was subsequently given a variety of other duties, including some subject to direction from the *47Executive Branch7 it was not until 1861 that Congress gave the Attorney General any authority over United States marshals.8 Furthermore, it was not until 1969 that the Attorney General formalized his control over the marshals through the establishment of the Office of the Director of the Marshals Service.9
Under the current statutory framework, the United States marshals owe obligations both to the Executive Branch and to the Judiciary. Thus, although as the majority points out, the Marshals Service is under the control of the Attorney General, ante, at 36, n. 1, marshals also remain subject to the instructions of the court.10 Indeed, Congress has considered, but not passed, legislation to lodge control of the marshals exclusively in the Executive Branch.11 Thus, Congress has not yet divested the Judiciary of the control of marshals that it has had since 1789, and that it has shared with the Attorney General since 1861.
Throughout our history, the marshals have played an important role in the administration of justice. Although their most dramatic exploits may be called to mind by references to names like Bat Masterson, Wyatt Earp, and David Neagle, or to events like the enforcement of civil rights legislation in the 1960’s, the primary assistance to the Federal Judiciary provided by the marshals has been in the area of *48protection of the trial process, including the courtroom itself, and the service of writs issued by the judges. The duty of the Marshals Service “to service the federal forum”12 does, however, encompass more than these two specific activities.
Many aspects of the court’s authority over the marshal are not set forth in detail in any Act of Congress. Thus, it is not the Congress that decided that formal proceedings in our courtroom shall be preceded by the Marshal’s cry of “Oyez, Oyez.” Nor is it Congress, or the United States Marshals Service, that has decided to use different language to call the court to order in other federal courthouses. Decisions of that kind concerning the administration of justice in federal courts are made by federal judges.
When a federal judge orders the marshal to open court at a particular time, or in a particular way, to provide appropriate security for a trial participant, or to escort a prisoner from the lockup in the federal building to the courtroom, the court is exercising judicial power in a manner that is certainly “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” as that phrase is used in the All Writs Act.13 In my judgment, however, such an order is not a “writ.” The court’s authority to issue such directives to the marshal is therefore not derived from the All Writs Act, but rather is simply one of the powers of the federal judicial office that has long been an aspect of the relationship between the court and its officers.
These daily instances of judicial authority over the marshal reflect the conventional relationship between the court and the marshal. The closeness of the relationship is derived, not from an assertion of judicial power over an unwilling marshal, but from the cooperative nature of the shared mission to administer justice. This case represents one of those un*49usual instances in which the ordinary mechanisms for addressing disagreements have apparently failed. The majority holds that the answer must be found in an explicit statutory delineation of each exercise of judicial authority. In my view, the nature of the shared mission of the federal courts and the federal marshals should provide the standard for resolving the dispute. Thus, the controlling question is whether the district court’s order is reasonably related to the administration of justice and is a sound exercise of judicial discretion.14
As noted, the Court recognizes that there may be “exceptional circumstances” in which it would be appropriate for a trial court to order the marshal to transport a state prisoner to a federal courthouse. See ante, at 43. In my judgment, even with respect to an ordinary witness, special circumstances might make it appropriate to order the marshal to transport the witness to court, even though there may not be any common-law writ that would be available in a comparable situation. The question whether such an order to a marshal constitutes an appropriate exercise of the judge’s inherent power to control the course of proceedings in a particular trial should not, in my opinion, be answered by reference to the All Writs Act, but rather by reference to the traditional relationship between the court and the marshal and to the particular facts that may support the order in a particular case.
In this case, four factors suggest that ordering the federal marshal to transport the state prisoners was a sound exercise of judicial discretion. First, federal marshals have consider*50able expertise in transporting prisoners to federal courts;15 moreover, the marshals acknowledge that they have ample authority to transport state, as well as federal, prisoners when appropriate.16 Second, in this instance, the federal marshal will be responsible for the prisoners when they are in the federal courthouse.17 Third, federal marshals frequently house federal prisoners at state and local jails, and, indeed, have developed special programs to serve that end.18 Fourth, in this case, the District Court, through the Magistrate, specifically found that requiring the State to bear the entire responsibility of transporting the state prisoners for this federal litigation would impose an unfair financial hardship upon the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.19 This finding derives support, not only from the particular facts disclosed by this record,20 but also from the strong federal policy *51favoring cooperation with the States in the administration of civil rights litigation in the federal courts.21 Thus, I believe that it was an appropriate exercise of the District Court’s discretion to issue the order that it did in this case.
This is not the kind of confrontation that should arise between the marshals and the federal courts. There are a variety of mechanisms that should be used before the marshals and the courts engage in judicial combat. The district judges and the individual marshals should be able to resolve most difficulties. If they are unable to, the Circuit Conference should be asked to intervene. If the problem is a recurring, national disagreement, as this issue seems to be, the Marshals Service and the Judicial Conference can seek to address it. If these mechanisms fail, however, and if the district court issues an order to the marshal, then the historic relationship between the marshal and the courts, reflected in the current statutory framework, convinces me that the court’s order should be upheld if it is reasonably related to the administration of justice and is an appropriate exercise of the district court’s discretion.
Because I believe that the District Court’s order in this case was fully consistent with the historic relationship between the federal court and the federal marshal, I respectfully dissent.

 See Report by the Comptroller General, U. S. Marshals’ Dilemma: Serving Two Branches of Government (1982).

 See, e. g., U. S. Marshals Service, Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1985) (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding court security); id., at 26 (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding contract guard program); Hearings on H. R. 7039 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 175 (1982) (citing agreement between the Attorney General and The Chief Justice regarding court security and the allocation of marshals).

 See Ford v. Allen, 728 F. 2d 1369 (CA11 1984) (per curiam); Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d 466 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1070 (1984); Ford v. Carballo, 577 F. 2d 404 (CA7 1978); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F. 2d 476 (CA5 1977).

 See Wiggins v. County of Alameda, 717 F. 2d, at 469 (“We decry the inability of state and federal officials to resolve such matters fairly and equitably . . .”).

 See U. S. Dept, of Justice, United States Marshals Service-Then . . . and Now 3 (1978) (“the Marshal carried on the tradition of the English common law sheriff, possessing complete authority within his bailiwick”). Indeed, one of the objections expressed to the Judiciary Act of 1789 was that it would lead to conflicts between the federal marshals and the local sheriffs. 1 Annals of Cong. 826 (1789) (statement of Rep. Stone) (“in different tribunals, not connected, mischiefs may happen. Will a sheriff be justifiable in delivering up his prisoner to the marshal, or will it be a proper return by the marshal that the prisoner is kept by the State sheriff”). In 1792, moreover, Congress expressly provided that “the marshals of the several districts and their deputies, shall have the same powers in executing the laws of the United States, as sheriffs and their deputies in the several states have by law, in executing the laws of their respective states,” 1 Stat. 265 — a provision that, in substance, exists today, 28 U. S. C. § 570. On the power of the sheriff at English common law, see G. Atkinson, Sheriff-Law 5 (1861) (“The sheriff is the immediate officer to all the Courts at Westminster to execute writs. . . . [Wjhether a writ comes to him, by authority, or without authority, or is awarded against whom it does not lie, he cannot doubt, or dispute its validity”).
The title for the marshals may have been derived from the example of the marshals to the British and colonial vice-admiralty courts. See L. Ball, The United States Marshals of New Mexico and Arizona Territories 3 (1978). See also C. Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the American Revolution 10 (1960) (In the colonial vice-admiralty courts, “[t]he marshals’ duties were similar to those of a sheriff: serving processes, taking custody of goods or people, and executing the decrees of the court”).

 “Sec. 27. And be it further enacted, That a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable from office at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to attend the district and circuit courts when sitting therein, and also the Supreme Court in the district in which that court shall sit. And to execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States, and he shall have power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty, and to appoint as there shall be occasion, one or more deputies, who shall be removable from office by the judge of the district court, or the circuit court sitting within the district, at the pleasure of either; and before he enters on the duties of his office, he shall become bound for the faithful performance of the same, by himself and by his deputies before the judge of the district court to the United States, jointly and severally, with two good and sufficient sureties, inhabitants and freeholders of such district, to be approved by the district judge, in the sum of twenty thousand dollars, and shall take before said judge, as shall also his deputies, before they enter on the duties of their appointment, the following oath of office: T, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will faithfully execute all lawful precepts directed to the marshal of the district of under the authority of the United States, and true returns make, and in all things well and truly, and without malice or partiality, perform the duties of the office of marshal (or marshal’s deputy, as the case may be) of the district of , during my continuance in said office, and take only my lawful fees. So help me God.’ ” 1 Stat. 87.

 See U. S. Dept, of Justice, The Office of the United States Marshal 2-3 (1981).

 See Report by the Comptroller General, supra n. 1, at 8 (“On August 2,1861, an act of Congress (ch. 37,12 Stat. 285) placed U. S. attorneys and marshals under the general superintendence and direction of the Attorney General. The 1861 legislation neither explicitly repealed nor made reference to any prior statutes affecting marshals”).

 Id., at 10.

 See 28 U. S. C. § 569(a) (“The United States marshal of each district is the marshal of the district court and of the court of appeals when sitting in his district, . . . and may, in the discretion of the respective courts, be required to attend any session of court”).

 See Hearings on H. R. 7039, supra n. 2, at 141.

 «The raison d’etre of the Marshal Service is to service the federal forum in civil as well as criminal litigation.” Ballard v. Spradlev, 557 F. 2d, at 481.

 The statute’s original and present forms are both quoted by the Court, ante, at 40-41, and n. 6.

 Four of the five United States Courts of Appeals that have considered federal-court orders to transport state prisoners for their testimony in federal litigation have viewed the issue as a question of the District Court’s discretion, and located the authority for that discretion in a specific statutory provision. See eases cited in n. 3, swpra.

 The marshals transported more than 130,000 prisoners in fiscal year 1984. Oversight Hearing, swpra n.- 2, at 10.

 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38-40.

 See ante, at 37, n. 3.

 Oversight Hearing, supra n. 2, at 16.

 See Magistrate’s opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a-59a. The Magistrate ordered the Marshals Service to transport the prisoners from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the federal courthouse in Philadelphia. The State, in contrast, remained responsible for transporting the prisoners from their prisons in other parts of the State to the Philadelphia Detention Center. Id., at 58a.

 The Magistrate found that the financial costs imposed by his requirement that the State transport the prisoners to the Philadelphia Detention Center were “significant,” id., at 59a. Determining that it was “equitable and reasonable,” ibid., to refrain from imposing additional costs on the State, he emphasized that the Marshal already made frequent trips from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the federal courthouse because federal prisoners were often housed at the Detention Center during their federal trials. Id., at 60a. According to the Magistrate’s findings, the Detention Center is “relatively close” to the federal courthouse. Id., at 59a-60a. At oral argument, the Federal Government reported that “the Marshal typically brings between six and twelve prisoners from the Philadelphia Detention Center to the Federal Courthouse on an average day.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 28.

 Cf. Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, at the Dedication of the National Center for State Courts 8 (1978) (“I would hope that there will be close cooperation and coordination between our two systems — close, I repeat, but voluntary. Our experience with the State-Federal Councils has shown us the value of cooperation”).