Court Opinion

ID: 9385160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-06 00:00:26.770493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.297335
License: Public Domain

Case: 20-70022      Document: 00516702531         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/05/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                             FILED
                                                                          April 5, 2023
                                   No. 20-70022                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                             Clerk

   Garland Bernell Harper,

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                                            Respondent—Appellee.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:16-CV-762

   ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC
   Before Willett, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          The petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no member of
   the panel or judge in regular active service requested that the court be polled
   on rehearing en banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35), the
   petition for    rehearing   en banc      is   DENIED. The opinion is
   WITHDRAWN, and the following opinion is SUBSTITUTED:
          A Texas jury convicted Garland Bernell Harper of murder and
   sentenced him to death. After his direct appeal and habeas petitions were
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   both denied in state court, Harper raised 31 claims in a federal habeas
   petition. The district court denied all his claims and also denied a certificate
   of appealability (COA). Harper asks us to issue a COA on eight of those
   claims which he presents as posing five distinct legal issues. We DENY
   Harper a COA on all of his claims for the reasons explained below.
                                          I
          Harper was convicted of murdering his girlfriend, Triska Rose, and
   her two daughters: Mya, aged seven, and Briana, aged sixteen. The jury
   sentenced Harper to death in a separate punishment phase.
          Harper filed a direct appeal raising eight claims. The Texas Court of
   Criminal Appeals (TCCA) found no error and affirmed Harper’s
   conviction. Harper later filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in
   state court. The trial court drafted proposed findings of fact and conclusions
   of law, recommending that Harper’s application be denied. The TCCA
   adopted these findings of fact and conclusions of law with a few minor
   adjustments and denied Harper’s application. Harper then filed a petition for
   a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which was 291 pages long and
   contained 31 claims.
          The district court denied each of Harper’s claims in a sixteen-page
   opinion and did not certify any issue for review on appeal. Harper asks us to
   issue a certificate of appealability on eight of the thirty-one claims. Some
   claims overlap and, as a result, Harper presents them as five issues: (1) a
   Confrontation Clause claim (claim 2 of Harper’s habeas petition); (2) a
   Strickland claim premised on ineffective assistance of counsel during voir
   dire (claim 11); (3) a Batson claim (claims 12, 13, and 28); (4) a second
   Strickland claim premised on counsel’s failure to argue that Harper’s mental
   illness rendered his confession involuntary (claims 15 and 16); and (5) a third

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   Strickland claim premised on counsel’s failure to object on reliability grounds
   to the government’s expert on future dangerousness, Dr. Moeller (claim 7).
                                         II
          We may issue a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has
   made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
   § 2253(c)(2). When a district court has decided a claim on the merits, this
   showing requires the applicant to demonstrate that jurists of reason “could
   disagree with the district court’s resolution of [the] constitutional claims” or
   “could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
   encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115 (2017)
   (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)). On the other hand,
   “[f]or claims denied on procedural grounds,” the applicant must show that
   jurists of reason could debate both “whether the petition states a valid claim
   of the denial of a constitutional right” and “whether the district court was
   correct in its procedural ruling.” Nelson v. Davis, 952 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir.
   2020) (quoting Segundo v. Davis, 831 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2016)). In a
   capital case, “any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved
   in the petitioner’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
          Where, as here, “a state court has reviewed a petitioner’s claim on the
   merits, our review is constrained by the deferential standards of review found
   in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (‘AEDPA’).” Id.
   (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). “Under these circumstances, we may not issue a
   COA unless reasonable jurists could debate that the state court’s decision
   was either ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
   established Federal law,’ or ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of
   the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”
   Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2)). “For
   claims that are not adjudicated on the merits in the state court, however, we

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   do not apply the deferential scheme laid out in § 2254(d) and instead apply a
   de novo standard of review.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
                                          A
          Harper’s first issue-presented is that the district court erred by failing
   to consider his Confrontation Clause claim (whether on the merits or as part
   of a separate ineffective-assistance argument). The district court cited
   procedural grounds for declining to consider this issue. A COA will issue,
   then, only if jurists of reason (1) “would find it debatable whether the petition
   states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” and (2) “would find
   it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
   Segundo, 831 F.3d at 350 (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). We find the second
   element dispositive and therefore do not address the first.
          The Confrontation Clause claim received only a single footnote in
   Harper’s state and federal habeas petitions. That fact places the district
   court’s decision beyond reasonable debate, for two independent reasons.
          First, it is beyond debate that Harper failed to exhaust this claim in
   state court. Instead, he presented the claim to the state court in a single
   footnote that he nested deep in the body of a 232-page petition that separately
   presented 24 distinct claims. “The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when
   the substance of the federal habeas claim has been fairly presented to the
   highest state court.” Adekeye v. Davis, 938 F.3d 678, 682 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (quoting Soffar v. Dretke, 368 F.3d 441, 465 (5th Cir. 2004)). A fair
   opportunity requires that “all the facts necessary to support the federal claim
   were before the state courts” and “the habeas petitioner must have ‘fairly
   presented’ to the state courts the ‘substance’ of his federal habeas corpus
   claim.” Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (quoting Picard v. Connor,
   404 U.S. 270, 275, 277–78 (1971)). “Arguments raised in a perfunctory
   manner, such as in a footnote, are waived” because they do not give the state

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   court a fair opportunity to consider the claim. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of
   Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
   Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002)).
          Second, it is also beyond debate that Harper also failed to exhaust this
   claim in the district court. Federal habeas petitions must “specify all the
   grounds for relief available to the petitioner” and “state the facts supporting
   each ground.” Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005) (quoting Rule 2(c),
   Rules Governing § 2254 Cases). “[C]onclusory allegations of
   ineffective assistance of counsel do not raise a constitutional issue in a federal
   habeas proceeding.” Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2000)
   (citing Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th Cir. 1983)). For the same
   reasons that Harper did not fairly present this issue to the state courts, it is
   beyond debate that Harper did not fairly present his Confrontation Clause
   claim to the district court. A single conclusory footnote in a 291-page federal
   habeas petition is not enough to put a district court on notice of a claim.
          Harper argues that it doesn’t matter that he put his Confrontation
   Clause claim in a footnote because that footnote cited a transcript in which
   his trial counsel made the essence of a Confrontation Clause objection.
   Harper bases this argument on Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005) (per
   curiam). That case and its progeny hold that a claim properly presented in an
   earlier proceeding can be incorporated by reference into a federal habeas
   petition. Ramey v. Davis, 942 F.3d 241, 248–49 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Dye,
   546 U.S. at 4). But Dye and Ramey involved claims that were properly raised
   in prior briefs—not exhibits. See id. (claim properly raised in direct appeal
   brief and state habeas petition, but insufficiently briefed in federal habeas
   petition, was incorporated by reference); Dye, 546 U.S. at 3–4 (claim
   properly raised in a state habeas brief was incorporated by reference in federal
   habeas petition).

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          But Harper’s footnote did not incorporate any claim or argument by
   reference. Instead, Harper cited the transcript only to support a factual
   assertion: “The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy was available
   to testify two days later, but defense counsel declined to call him to the
   stand.” That factual assertion may be a predicate for an argument that
   Harper might have made, but it is not an argument by itself. It is beyond
   debate that claims cannot be hidden inside of voluminous exhibits cited in
   footnotes hidden inside of habeas petitions that are hundreds of pages long.
   See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases 2 advisory committee’s note to
   Rule 2(c) (noting that Rule 2 does not require judges to grope through “two
   thousand pages of irrational, prolix and redundant pleadings” (quoting Passic
   v. Michigan, 98 F. Supp. 1015, 1016 (E.D. Mich. 1951)); Adams v. Armontrout,
   897 F.2d 332, 333 (8th Cir. 1990) (“[I]t would be unwise to saddle district
   judges with the burden of reading through voluminous records and
   transcripts in every case.” (quoting Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1051
   (2d Cir. 1983)). Dye didn’t turn habeas petitions into matryoshka dolls.
          After the district court dismissed his habeas petition, Harper filed a
   Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the district
   court had improperly overlooked his claim. The district court denied this
   motion, finding that the argument had not been fairly placed before the court.
   Harper challenges that denial, and he also argues that the district court
   should have construed his reply brief, which did raise a Confrontation Clause
   argument, as a Rule 15 motion to amend his habeas petition. We need not
   address these arguments. Even if they are sound, it is beyond debate that
   Harper’s claim would still be unexhausted for failing to fairly present the
   Confrontation Clause claim to the state habeas court.

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                                          B
          Harper’s second claim is that his counsel’s performance was
   ineffective for failing to strike or challenge for cause three jurors—Dowlin,
   Basey-Higgs, and Williams. The state habeas court adjudicated this claim on
   the merits. Accordingly, “we may not issue a COA unless reasonable jurists
   could debate that the state court’s decision was . . . ‘contrary to, or involved
   an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.’” Nelson, 952
   F.3d at 658 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
          Harper’s ineffective-assistance claim requires him to show “(1) that
   his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient
   performance prejudiced his defense.” Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 589
   (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689–94
   (1984)). “Regarding the first prong, to establish deficient performance, a
   petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an
   objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. (alteration adopted) (internal
   quotation marks omitted)). “Regarding the second prong, to establish
   prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
   but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
   have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
   undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          On the first prong, Harper argues (1) that the death penalty cannot be
   mandatory, see Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994); Sumner v.
   Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 75–78 (1987); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336
   (1976) (plurality); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976)
   (plurality), and (2) that jurors must be willing and able to give effect to
   mitigating evidence when deciding whether to approve the death sentence,
   Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 733–35 (1992); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.

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   302, 327–28 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1982). But
   the state court rejected these arguments, reasoning that “none of the cited
   jurors indicated that they would automatically vote for the death penalty in
   every case[,] and all expressed the opinion that they could answer the special
   issues in such a way that either life or death would result based on the
   evidence and the law.” Accordingly, the state court concluded that Harper’s
   counsel was not ineffective for failing to use a peremptory strike against these
   jurors. Harper has not identified any clearly established federal law that
   would allow reasonable jurists to debate this conclusion.
          Nor has Harper even argued that reasonable jurists could debate
   Strickland’s second prong. No COA will issue on this claim.
                                          C
          Harper’s third claim is that the prosecutor discriminated against
   prospective black jurors (Harper’s “Batson” claim). The Government
   argues that Harper’s Batson claim has evolved considerably since it was first
   presented on direct appeal, and as a result most of it is procedurally defaulted.
   We begin by considering whether jurists of reason could debate whether any
   component of this claim has survived procedural default. See Nelson, 952 F.3d
   at 658. For those components whose procedural viability is at least debatable,
   we conclude that it is nonetheless beyond debate that the state habeas court’s
   merits decision was neither “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law”
   nor “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.” Nelson, 952 F.3d
   at 658 (quotations omitted). We will not issue a COA on this claim.
                                          1
          Federal habeas review of a claim is procedurally barred if the highest
   available state court “dismissed the claim on a state-law procedural ground
   instead of deciding it on the merits.” Rocha v. Thaler, 626 F.3d 815, 820 (5th
   Cir. 2010) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)). But to qualify,

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   that state-law procedural ground must be both an “independent and
   adequate ground for dismissal.” Id. (quoting Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409,
   420 (5th Cir. 1997)). Independent means “independent of the merits of the
   federal claim.” Id. at 821 (quoting Finley v. Johnson, 243 F.3d 215, 218 (5th
   Cir. 2001)). Adequate means that the rule is “strictly or regularly applied
   evenhandedly to the vast majority of similar claims.” Id. (quoting Amos v.
   Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir. 1995)).
           The TCCA dismissed Harper’s Batson claim in part under its
   procedural rule that arguments that could have been raised on direct appeal
   but were not are procedurally defaulted. See Ex parte Nelson, 137 S.W.3d 666,
   667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (en banc) (“It is well-settled ‘that the writ of
   habeas corpus should not be used to litigate matters which should have been
   raised on direct appeal.’” (quoting Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d 189, 199
   (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc))). We have previously recognized this rule
   as an adequate state ground that bars federal habeas relief, Aguilar v. Dretke,
   428 F.3d 526, 535 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Ex parte Gardner, 959 S.W.2d at
   199), and Harper does not argue that we should reconsider that decision. So,
   the first question we must answer is whether any of Harper’s Batson
   arguments have at least debatably survived procedural default. 1
           The merits of Harper’s Batson claim take two forms. First, he says that
   the prosecution’s strikes followed a pattern that gave rise to an inference of
   discrimination. Second, he says that each of the prosecution’s five stated
   reasons for using a peremptory strike against juror Banks were pretextual.

           1
             Petitioners can overcome procedural default if they demonstrate “cause for the
   default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
   that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”
   Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); see also Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229,
   239 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing Coleman). However, Harper does not argue this point, and
   we do not see any arguments that could debatably allow for excusing procedural default.

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           We start with Harper’s “pattern of strikes” argument. Harper did
   make a version of this argument on direct appeal. But he didn’t present any
   evidence of the racial makeup of the jury pool as a whole. The TCCA held
   that the juror questionnaires, which would have provided evidence of the
   racial makeup of the jury pool, were essential to substantiate Harper’s claim
   that there was a racial disparity between the venire and the seated jury. In
   other words, by failing to introduce the juror questionnaires, Harper was
   effectively asking the TCCA to take his word that the seated jurors were
   more likely to be white than the venire was. Because the record lacked
   evidence of the racial makeup of the accepted members, Harper could not
   substantiate this claim. As a result, the TCCA dismissed his claim on direct
   appeal. When Harper tried to offer that evidence in his state habeas litigation,
   the TCCA held that Texas law barred him from relying on arguments or
   evidence that he could have but failed to raise on direct appeal.
           Harper does not even argue that the TCCA misapplied Texas law by
   “dismiss[ing] the claim on a state-law procedural ground instead of deciding
   it on the merits.” Rocha, 626 F.3d at 820. Therefore, it is beyond debate that
   Harper has procedurally defaulted the “juror questionnaire” aspects of his
   “pattern of strikes” argument. 2 Harper has, however, exhausted the more
   limited “pattern of strikes” argument that he presented on direct appeal.
           Next, we consider Harper’s argument that the State’s five proffered
   reasons for striking juror Banks were pretextual. We agree that he exhausted
   his objections to the State’s first and second proffered reasons.

           2
             Because it is beyond debate that Texas’s abuse-of-the-writ doctrine prevents
   Harper from relying on evidence that was not in the record on direct appeal, we need not
   consider the Government’s alternative argument that Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170,
   181–82 (2011), compels the same result.

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          The State’s third proffered reason for striking Banks was her
   statement that “everybody is capable of rehabilitation.” On direct appeal,
   Harper argued that this reason was pretextual because jurors Cotton and
   Basey also expressed that the chance for rehabilitation was the most
   important factor to them but were seated anyways. However, in his habeas
   petition, Harper relied on a comparison to five additional jurors—jurors
   Price, Moore, Pavlovich, Summer, and Vaughan—who, like Cotton, Basey,
   and Banks, expressed that rehabilitation is the most important goal of
   criminal punishment. Because Harper did not rely on a comparison to these
   additional jurors on direct appeal, it is beyond debate that he cannot do so
   now. However, Harper can rely on the comparison to the first two jurors.
          The State’s fourth proffered reason was that Banks failed to answer
   the question about whether life in prison is more effective than the death
   penalty. In his direct appeal, Harper’s only objection to this proffered reason
   was that there was no evidence that Banks was being “deceptive, or
   untruthful, in failing to answer that question.” In his two habeas petitions,
   Harper reshaped his argument, relying on evidence not presented on direct
   appeal. He now argues that this reason is pretextual, citing evidence that the
   prosecution failed to strike three other jurors who also failed to answer parts
   of the questionnaire. Harper did not make this comparative argument on
   direct appeal, so it is beyond debate that he cannot make it now. Still, he has
   exhausted the “deception” argument that he made on direct appeal.
          Finally, Harper argues that the State’s fifth proffered reason—
   Banks’s strong belief in the importance of forgiveness based in part on her
   background in ministry—was pretextual. But Harper did not make any
   version of this argument on direct appeal. As a result, jurists of reason could
   conclude only that this argument is entirely procedurally defaulted.

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                                          2
          Having sorted through which arguments in support of Harper’s
   Batson claim were at least debatably exhausted, we next consider whether
   reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s denial of the non-defaulted
   Batson arguments. We conclude that no debate is possible.
          Where, as here, the defendant has made out a prima facie case that
   race motivated the challenged strikes, and the prosecutor has provided a
   race-neutral explanation for the strike, the trial court must weigh the
   evidence and decide whether the prosecutor’s explanation is credible or mere
   pretext for discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98, 98 n.21
   (1986). Because this question “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility,”
   id. at 98 n.21, and the best evidence of credibility is “the demeanor of the
   attorney who exercises the challenge,” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,
   365 (1991) (plurality opinion), the trial court’s decision “is entitled to ‘great
   deference’ and ‘must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous,’” Felkner v.
   Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (citation omitted) (quoting Batson, 476
   U.S. at 98 n.21 and Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008)). “[T]he
   federal court’s role is to ‘determine whether the trial court’s determination
   of the prosecutor’s neutrality with respect to race was objectively
   unreasonable and has been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
   contrary.’” Hoffman v. Cain, 752 F.3d 430, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting
   Murphy v. Dretke, 416 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir. 2005)).
          We start with Harper’s pattern of strikes argument. For statistical
   evidence like this to be relevant, “data concerning the entire jury pool is
   necessary. The number of strikes used to excuse minority . . . jury pool
   members is irrelevant on its own.” Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 278–79
   (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). As noted above, Harper cannot use evidence

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   that he did not present on direct appeal. 3 Because he cannot rely on the juror
   questionnaires, and because his statistical claim fails without that evidence,
   the district court’s dismissal of this argument is not debatable.
           Next, we consider Harper’s argument that each of the prosecutor’s
   five stated reasons for striking Banks was pretextual.
           The prosecutor’s first reason was that Banks did not answer questions
   directly and tended to “ponder,” out loud, and at length. Banks was indeed
   loquacious and noncommittal. At first, she seemed to say that she was
   categorically opposed to the death penalty, saying: “I mean, I’m pretty
   settled—I feel like I’m pretty settled on my thoughts concerning the death
   penalty. I don’t like to see people die. [Prosecutor:] Right. [Banks:] Period. I
   mean, who does?” She then indicated that the death penalty might be
   appropriate for serial killers. When the prosecutor later asked if the death
   penalty should only be used for serial killers, she responded that “[t]hose are
   not the only cases” and indicated that the murderer’s remorse or chance for
   rehabilitation were the most important factors to her. Three pages of the
   transcript are then taken up by Banks’s extended discussion of the facts of an
   unrelated DUI homicide case, and why she felt that 30 years imprisonment
   was justified because the crash took the lives of five children. Even after
   dozens of pages of the transcript were taken up discussing the death penalty,
   Banks still said that she had made only an “initial response,” and that if she
   had another “30 minutes to ponder on the question” she might change her
   mind on when the death penalty is appropriate. Given these facts, jurists of
   reason could not debate the trial court’s conclusion that “clearly
   established” federal law supports the state court’s decision denying this

           3
             Even if Harper had presented this evidence, we recently denied Batson claims
   based on similar statistics. See Sheppard v. Davis, 967 F.3d 458, 472 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
   denied sub nom. Sheppard v. Lumpkin, 141 S. Ct. 2677 (2021).

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   aspect of the Batson claim. Nelson, 952 F.3d at 658 (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          The prosecutor’s second and third proffered reasons were that Banks
   was opposed to the death penalty, and that she believed strongly in giving
   people a chance to rehabilitate themselves in prison. True, Banks later walked
   back her statement that she was “pretty settled” in her opposition to the
   death penalty. But even then, she continually insisted on the importance of
   rehabilitation and tied her distaste for the death penalty to her religious
   beliefs. There is nothing wrong with expressing a distaste for the death
   penalty. Nor is it racially discriminatory for a prosecutor to use a peremptory
   strike because a juror expresses such distaste. As such, there is no room to
   debate the district court’s conclusion that clearly established law supports
   the state court’s decision on this part of Harper’s Batson claim. See id.
          Harper fares no better with his argument that the prosecutor’s fourth
   proffered reason was pretextual. In his direct appeal, Harper argued that
   Banks was not being untruthful or deceptive by failing to respond to one of
   the items on the questionnaire. But this argument does nothing to
   demonstrate that the prosecutor’s stated reason was pretextual. Both things
   can be true: Banks could have been fully truthful and forthcoming, and the
   prosecutor could have been concerned that she failed to respond to one of the
   most important items on the questionnaire. Therefore, it is beyond debate
   that the trial court properly treated the state court’s rejection of this claim as
   dispositive and in accord with clearly established federal law. See id.
          Finally, even if Harper had evidence tending to disprove some of the
   prosecutor’s proffered reasons, that would not open the trial court’s actual
   decision to debate. “[A] Batson claim will not succeed where the defendant
   fails to rebut each of the prosecutor’s legitimate reasons.” Sheppard, 967 F.3d
   at 472 (citing Fields v. Thaler, 588 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 2009); Stevens v.

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   Epps, 618 F.3d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 2010)). Harper failed to rebut the
   prosecution’s fifth stated reason for striking Banks at all. Therefore, the
   district court’s rejection of Harper’s Batson claim is not debatable.
                                           3
          Harper next argues that his counsel on direct appeal rendered
   ineffective assistance by making an incomplete Batson claim. He faults his
   counsel on direct appeal for conducting only a limited comparative juror
   analysis, failing to rebut the prosecutor’s fifth stated reason for striking Banks
   at all, and failing to include the questionnaires of the jurors in the record.
          An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim “requires a
   showing that (1) counsel’s performance was legally deficient, and (2) the
   deficiency prejudiced the defense.” United States v. Bernard, 762 F.3d 467,
   471 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). “Applying AEDPA
   deference to Strickland’s already deferential standard, we must deny relief if
   ‘there is any reasonable argument that [appellate] counsel satisfied
   Strickland’s deferential standard’ despite failing to make the argument [in
   question]. In other words, we must deny relief ‘if there was a reasonable
   justification for the state court’s decision.’” Higgins v. Cain, 720 F.3d 255,
   265 (5th Cir. 2013) (first alteration in original) (quoting Harrington v. Richter,
   562 U.S. 86, 105, 109 (2011)).
          The habeas court conducted an extensive argument-by-argument
   review of Harper’s comparative juror analysis argument. It considered each
   argument that Harper said should have been raised. It found that each of
   these arguments was meritless and that, as a result, Harper’s appellate
   counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.
          But Harper does not take issue with what the habeas court concluded.
   Instead, he takes issue with how the habeas court reached that conclusion. He
   argues that the habeas court improperly relied on the prosecutor’s

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                                    No. 20-70022

   subsequent affidavit which explained some of the inconsistencies in her
   proffered reasons for striking Banks. For example, the prosecutor averred
   that her inaccurate statement that Banks wanted to do away with the death
   penalty was an “honest mistake based on the prosecutor’s impression after
   Banks repeatedly emphasized her belief in forgiveness and rehabilitation.”
   The habeas court also relied on the prosecutor’s testimony that while other
   jurors mentioned rehabilitation, the prosecutor only struck Banks because
   those jurors “did not reach the intensity of Banks’ belief in rehabilitation and
   forgiveness.” Harper argues that by relying on this “post hoc” reasoning, the
   habeas court violated Miller-El II’s “stand or fall” rule. See Miller-El v.
   Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251–52 (2005) (Miller-El II).
          Miller-El II’s “stand or fall” rule means that prosecutors and later
   reviewing courts cannot accept “either entirely different substituted reasons
   or post hoc reasons for strikes.” Chamberlin v. Fisher, 885 F.3d 832, 841 (5th
   Cir. 2018) (en banc). But Miller-El II “does not extend to preventing the
   prosecution from later supporting its originally proffered reasons with
   additional record evidence, especially if a defendant is allowed to raise
   objections to juror selection years after a conviction and to allege newly
   discovered comparisons to other prospective jurors.” Id. “Nothing in the
   ‘stand or fall’ statement means that the prosecutor would forfeit the
   opportunity to respond to such contentions.” Id.
          If the prosecution was not able to explain why it did not strike certain
   jurors after the fact, it would have to foresee future Batson claims and explain
   why it was not striking each prospective juror during jury selection. See
   Chamberlin v. Fisher, 855 F.3d 657, 674 (5th Cir. 2017) (Clement, J.,
   dissenting) (“[T]o avoid the result reached by the majority here, during jury
   selection the prosecution would not only have had to explain why it struck
   specific black jurors—as it did—but also why it did not strike all white
   prospective jurors as well. There is nothing in Batson, Miller-El II, or any

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                                         No. 20-70022

   other case that compels anything of the sort.”) (emphasis in original), rev’d,
   885 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (adopting Judge Clement’s dissenting
   opinion on rehearing en banc). Miller-El II requires consistency, not
   prophecy. As such, jurists of reasons could not debate the district court’s
   conclusion rejecting the “ineffective assistance” aspect of Harper’s Batson
   claim. See Nelson, 952 F.3d at 658. We will not issue a COA this claim.
                                               D
           Harper next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
   object to the introduction of Dr. Moeller’s testimony on the basis that it was
   unreliable under the standard set forth in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573
   (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc). 4
           The Supreme Court has acknowledged that testimony from
   psychologists on likelihood of future dangerousness is rather shaky in general
   because studies have shown that such testimony is wrong more often than it
   is right. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (considering a report
   from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) stating that psychiatric
   opinions regarding future dangerousness are wrong “most of the time”); see
   also Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 275 n.53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting
   that “[m]ore recent psychiatric and legal articles have reached a similar
   conclusion [to the APA’s amicus brief in Barefoot], although some conclude

           4
             In his habeas petition, Harper repeatedly states that his counsel should have
   objected to the introduction of Dr. Moeller’s testimony based on both Daubert v. Merrell
   Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kelly. But as the State correctly notes,
   Daubert applies only to proceedings based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Daubert,
   509 U.S. at 588 (discussing Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence). Harper’s trial
   occurred in a Texas court—not a federal court—so his trial counsel could not have made a
   Daubert challenge. Instead, Kelly’s three-element test, which resembles Daubert’s test,
   governs. See Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 573. The rest of this opinion will discuss only whether
   Harper’s trial counsel erred in failing to object to the introduction of Dr. Moeller’s
   testimony under the Texas rules of evidence (a “Kelly” challenge).

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                                     No. 20-70022

   that the accuracy of clinicians’ predictions may now be slightly better than
   chance when they also use risk assessment and actuarial tools”).
   Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901, and the Texas
   Court of Criminal Appeals in Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 275–77, each concluded
   that expert testimony on future dangerousness may be admissible in some
   cases if it is reliable.
           Even if we assumed that Harper’s counsel rendered ineffective
   assistance, it is beyond debate that Harper fails Strickland’s second prong—
   prejudice—for two reasons: (1) the record shows that the trial court would
   have denied a Kelly objection, and (2) there was ample evidence of future
   dangerousness in the record apart from Dr. Moeller’s testimony.
           First, a Kelly objection would have been futile. While Harper’s
   counsel did not specifically make a Kelly objection, he did “object to
   [Dr. Moeller’s] testimony as having any value if it’s from a lay perspective.”
   Harper’s counsel also told the court, as a part of his argument that
   Dr. Moeller should not be able to testify, that the prosecution was “not
   calling Dr. Moeller to explain his report . . . . [t]hey’re calling Dr. Moeller to
   disavow that report.” The court overruled those objections. It is exceedingly
   unlikely that the court would have changed its mind had Harper’s counsel
   merely uttered the words “Kelly” or “Daubert.” See Clark v. Collins, 19 F.3d
   959, 966 (5th Cir. 1994) (no ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
   make an objection that would have been overruled).
           Second, there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s finding on
   future dangerousness even without Dr. Moeller’s testimony. First and
   foremost, there was the evidence of this crime: Harper brutally murdered
   four people, including two young girls. The jury also heard evidence that he
   raped and killed another woman back in 1989, put a knife to a woman’s neck
   and robbed her, forced a different woman into his car and assaulted her,

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                                         No. 20-70022

   assaulted a cab driver and refused to pay his fare, stole a purse from a former
   co-worker and withdrew $800 from her account before being arrested, stole
   a woman’s purse and pushed her pregnant sister into a shopping cart before
   stealing a car and fleeing the scene, and took another woman’s purse,
   knocked her down, and again fled in a car.
           In light of this overwhelming evidence that Harper was dangerous,
   there is no room for jurists of reason to even debate whether Dr. Moeller’s
   testimony caused prejudice. See Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 281 (erroneously
   admitted testimony from psychologist on likelihood of future dangerousness
   did not cause prejudice because there was “ample evidence” of such
   dangerousness “quite apart from [the psychologist’s] testimony”); see also
   Busby v. Davis, 925 F.3d 699, 723 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 897
   (2020) (no ineffective assistance of counsel because it was “highly likely”
   that the result would have been the same without the error). 5
                                               E
           Harper’s final argument on appeal is that his trial counsel was
   ineffective for not arguing that his mental illness rendered his confession
   involuntary. He argues that had counsel raised this argument, there is a
   reasonable probability that the trial court would have suppressed his
   confession, or that at least one juror would have voted to acquit.
           We are not the first court to address this issue. The habeas court
   rejected Harper’s claim. It found that trial counsel was not ineffective, as a
   matter of state law, because that court did consider whether Harper’s claim

           5
              The State also argues that this entire line of argument is procedurally barred.
   Harper responds that we should excuse the default, citing the equitable exception set forth
   in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). See also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013). We
   need not address these points, because even if we were to both identify and excuse Harper’s
   default, the prejudice prong is beyond debate and is therefore independently dispositive.

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   was voluntary. The habeas court noted that the trial court watched the video
   of Harper’s confession which showed that Harper was given his Miranda
   warnings, asked questions about the warnings, and did not appear intoxicated
   or otherwise impaired. Based on these facts, the trial court found that Harper
   was not coerced in any way, and it admitted the confession. Given the trial
   court’s findings, the state habeas court concluded that the result would not
   have been any different had trial counsel made this additional argument. The
   habeas court also concluded that it was “speculative at best that at least one
   juror would have found the applicant’s confession involuntary.”
          The habeas court’s findings were not an “unreasonable determination
   of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The trial court and the jury were both
   able to watch Harper’s confession and heard testimony about his mental
   health. Based on these facts, they were able to consider what probative value
   Harper’s confession had even without a specific argument from Harper’s
   trial counsel. Because it is beyond debate that the habeas court’s decision was
   reasonable, no COA will issue on this claim.
                                        III
          We DENY Harper’s application for a COA on all claims.

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