Court Opinion

ID: 9528971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:45:48.423184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:33.879040
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent to this decision. Title 22 O.S.1971, § 1162, provides:
“When an indictment or information is called for trial, or upon conviction the *971defendant is brought up for judgment, if a doubt arise as to the sanity of the defendant, the court must order a jury to be impaneled from the jurors summoned and returned for the term, or who may be summoned by direction of the court, to inquire into the fact.”
The following section, § 1163, provides: “The trial of the cause or the pronouncing the judgment, as the case may be, must be suspended until the question of insanity is determined by the verdict of the jury.”
Defendant offered the testimony of two reputable psychiatrists, both of whom testified that they believed defendant was insane at the time the offense occurred, and that she was insane at the time of trial. That testimony was not overcome by any evidence offered by the State, except for the testimony of the State Psychiatrist who testified she believed defendant was not psychotic. This testimony only created a doubt as to defendant’s present condition of sanity. The transcript of testimony reveals, commencing at page 262, that defense counsel entered numerous motions, including that of defendant’s condition of sanity. In ruling on the motions, the trial judge stated, in part:
“The question of sanity is one for the jury. Then in the event she were found not guilty by reason of insanity, whether or not she is dangerous is a jury question. Perhaps upon the jury’s determination in that regard, the Court would or would not order her sent to a mental hospital. In other words, if I were to direct a verdict at this juncture which frankly the court might be inclined to do, it would be based upon the State’s failure, perhaps, to prove her sanity by competent evidence; and in demurring to the evidence and asking for a directed verdict, the Defendant has not indicated in any way that the Court should find her insane. I think the question will have to be put finally to the jury, so your motion will be overruled and exceptions allowed.” (Emphasis added.)
As I view this record, two questions were presented by the defendant’s testimony: “Was defendant insane at the time the homicide occurred?” And secondly, “Was the defendant insane at the time of her trial?” The first question was properly presented to the trial jury by the court’s instructions, but the second question was not properly resolved. The first question was presented in defendant’s motion for new trial and is now presented in this appeal. Notwithstanding the jury’s verdict, and as stated by the trial judge, the State presented no testimony to overcome the testimony of the two psychiatrists that defendant was insane at the time of the homicide.
The purpose of the statute, 22 O.S.1971, § 1163, is to assure that a convicted defendant —who might be insane at the time of trial— shall not be sentenced to the State Penitentiary until the question of present sanity is properly resolved. Notwithstanding the fact that defendant’s motion for a jury determination of her present sanity was not specifically pressed by defense counsel, the motion was filed and it is contained in the record. I believe its merits were borne out by defense witnesses. Therefore, I believe the judgment and sentence should not have been imposed, until a jury determined the condition of defendant’s sanity at the time she stood trial.
In Rice v. State, 80 Okl.Cr. 277, 158 P.2d 912 (1945), this Court provided in the second paragraph of the syllabus:
“When the question of insanity arises, it is the duty of the trial court to immediately suspend all proceedings and submit the issue of present insanity to a separate jury impaneled for that purpose only.”
The Attorney General cites Jones v. State, Okl.Cr., 479 P.2d 591 (1971), in which this writer concurred, for the proposition that the jury was not bound to give credence to the opinions of the two psychiatrists who testified concerning defendant’s condition of sanity. The instant case is readily distinguished from the Jones case *972and also from the facts of Dare v. State, Okl.Cr., 378 P.2d 339 (1963), in that the question presented in both Jones and Dare concerned the single question of the defendant’s sanity at the time the offense was committed. The instant case presented that question, and also presented the question of defendant’s sanity at the time of trial.
This Court stated in Berwick v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 5, 10, 229 P.2d 604, 609, (1951):
“[I]f the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the crime he would not be treated as having the capacity to commit the crime, and if he was also insane at the time of the trial he would not be treated as having the ability to make a rational defense and his trial, as we have seen from the authorities heretofore mentioned, would of necessity be deferred until said person was again rational. The issue is a fundamental one, where if a doubt arises as to the present sanity of the defendant the court must order a jury impaneled to inquire into the fact. Counsel for defendant could not waive this question. This court so held in Signs v. State, 35 Okl.Cr. 340, 250 P. 938, which holding has been approved in Johnson v. State, [73 Okl.Cr. 370, 121 P.2d 625].”
Therefore, I believe this conviction should be reversed and remanded for a jury determination of defendant’s condition of sanity at the time of 'her trial; and in the event she is found to' have been incompetent at that time, then the judgment and conviction should be vacated and set aside; and, when defendant regains her sanity, she should then be put to trial at a time when she is able to assist defense counsel in her defense.
However, insofar as the majority decision affirms this conviction, defense counsel is admonished to consider the United States Supreme Court’s decision in David X. Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973), wherein petitioner was granted an evidenti-ary hearing into the validity of his guilty plea, premised in part upon his contention of incompetency, when he entered his plea; and also Nolan v. United States, 466 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1972), wherein Plaintiff-Ap-pellee was granted an evidentiary hearing concerning his alleged condition of incompetency, when he stood trial and was convicted by a jury.
Defendant should be granted post conviction relief under the provisions of 22 O.S.1971, § 1080 et. seq., and she should be ordered back for an evidentiary hearing into her condition of sanity at the time of trial, which would no doubt also consider her condition at present. Because defendant has already exhausted her funds, and this appeal was granted at State expense, I believe defendant is entitled to have court appointed counsel for her post conviction relief, and that the State should also pay for the services of the same two private psychiatrists who examined her and testified at her trial. Otherwise, the hearing will not present a full and complete determination into the issues to be presented.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent to the majority decision herein, for the foregoing stated reasons; and while I dissent, I urge further consideration of his defendant’s conviction.