Court Opinion

ID: 9530172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:57:56.618217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:01.134869
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment of the superior court should be affirmed. However, the affirmance should be on a straight forward application of Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988).
In Greater Area Inc. v. Bookman, 657 P.2d 828, 829 (Alaska 1982), we adopted the so called “discovery rule” to determine when a cause of action accrues:
According to the best formulation of [the discovery] rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the client discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of action.
(Citation omitted).
Mine Safety, a products liability case, reaffirmed this “best formulation” of the discovery rule. It begins our analysis: “The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action.” Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 291 (citing Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter Int’l, 694 P.2d 143, 144 (Alaska 1984)). The language of Hanebuth (“the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action”) is slightly different from that in Bookman (“the existence of all the elements of [the] cause of action”), but the difference is irrelevant; the phrases have the same meaning.
Mine Safety resulted in the following conclusion:
It is uncontroverted that Stiles knew he was hit in the head while wearing a safety helmet designed to protect against such blows. The helmet cracked and the suspension clips broke on impact. Parker [Drilling Company] investigated the accident and the result of that investigation was available to Stiles shortly after the accident. In addition, Parker’s safety officer kept the helmet for two years where it was available for inspection. These facts were available to Stiles the day of the accident. (Footnote omitted). We conclude that under these circumstances a reasonable person would have notice of facts “ ‘sufficient to prompt a person of average prudence to inquire,’ and thus [the person] should be deemed to have notice of all facts which reason*1369able inquiry would disclose.” (Citations omitted).
Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 292. The Book-man rule was applied: Stiles knew all of the elements of his cause of action, which should have prompted him to inquire.
No case following Bookman has ever explicitly declared that the discovery rule it adopted has been modified in any respect. Instead, we are now told that the discovery rule formulated in Mine Safety contemplates two separately identifiable accrual dates.1 I do not agree. As I analyze Mine Safety and other cases dating back to Bookman, discovery of all the elements of (or “all elements essential to”) the cause, of action provides a claimant with knowledge sufficient to prompt a person of average prudence to inquire. At this point we deem the claimant to have notice of all facts which a reasonable inquiry would disclose. Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 292 (citing Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 376 (Alaska 1987)).2
*1370Furthermore, we are told that Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, (Alaska 1991), “added a third part to our discovery rule_” at 1367. I suggest that Peder-sen did not add a third part to our discovery rule; it added an additional accrual rule.
If the presentation of the law here proffered by the court is correct, the “best formulation” of the discovery rule we identified in Bookman is now but one of several separate rules used to determine when a cause of action accrues.
At a medical appointment on February 27, 1984, Cameron “attributed his breathing problems to his working conditions in the tunnels at the Terror Lake Project and he knew he had breathing problems.” He knew by then that he had been damaged. He knew also the identity of the potential defendants. He had complained to others about working conditions in the tunnel. In short, by February 27 Cameron had sufficient information to alert a reasonable person to the fact that “he ... [had] a potential cause of action,” that is, he had discovered all elements essential to his cause of action. This information was sufficient to prompt a prudent person to then inquire into facts which would tend to establish a sufficient basis to support filing a cause of action.
A reasonable inquiry by Cameron would have disclosed facts tending to establish a sufficient basis to support filing a cause of action, within the time permitted by the statute of limitations to bring the action. Indeed, significant additional facts were disclosed by May 7, 1985, as Dr. Wilder’s letter to Cameron’s attorney establishes. It is not necessary that a potential plaintiff understand the technical nature of his or her claim, or the precise facts that will be introduced at a trial, to have a sufficient basis for filing suit. See, e.g., Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 291; Sharrow v. Archer, 658 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Alaska 1983). Cameron’s cause of action accrued on February 27, 1984, more than two years before he filed suit. His action is barred by AS 09.10.070.
The legislature has determined reasonable time limits within which actions are to be brought. It is within the province of this court to establish rules to determine when the time limits commence. It is not within the province of this court to determine whether the time limits are reasonable. Thus it is neither our right nor our responsibility to determine “whether ten months was a reasonable time for Cameron to investigate and file his claim.”
The substantial dicta in the court’s opinion can serve only to further confuse an issue already complicated by Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 818 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1990), and Pedersen v. Zielski. These newly evolving accrual rules, added to the long standing Bookman rule, will reduce to guesswork the determination of when an action must be commenced, a result which does not serve any affected interests.

. The “other cases” the court cites in support of its assertion that we have applied an inquiry notice date other than the date the claimant has ‘knowledge of the elements of the cause of action’ do not all stand up on close examination. In State v. Welch, 805 P.2d 979, 981-82 (Alaska 1991), we stated:
The law to be applied to this case is the so called “discovery rule,” which holds that a statute of limitations does not begin to run until a plaintiff “discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all the elements of his cause of action." (Citation omitted).
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the parents, we conclude that reasonable minds could not differ on whether the parents were on inquiry notice prior to January 12, 1987. On the basis of the uncontro-verted facts, a reasonable person should have known of a potential claim against the state substantially prior to that date. Therefore, suit filed January 12, 1989, is barred by AS 09.55.580(a).
(Footnote omitted, emphasis added).
As I read Welch, discovery of ‘all the elements’ and knowledge of a ‘potential claim’ are used interchangeably. However, it is clear to me that the court interprets ‘potential cause of action’ as meaning something different than ‘all the elements.’ I do not agree, as I have previously stated. Pedersen v. Zielski, 822 P.2d 903, (Alaska 1991) (Compton, Justice, dissenting).
Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co., 803 P.2d 386, 389-90 (Alaska 1990), presents a similar equating of terms:
Under the rule in Stiles, the statute began to run when Yurioff reasonably should have begun an inquiry to protect his rights. It is enough that Yurioff knew that the ATV malfunctioned and an accident ensued; it is not necessary that he have actual knowledge or evidence that the throttle was the cause of the malfunction. By his own testimony, Yurioff was aware of both the malfunction and his injury on the day of the accident. We hold that the discovery rule did not toll the statute while Yurioff was bedridden.
Yurioff had knowledge of the elements essential to a products liability cause of action on the date of injury. His products liability case was dismissed.
Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1987), does not make reference to protecting one’s rights. Rather, after quoting a discussion of our adoption of the discovery rule from Gudenau & Co., Inc. v. Sweeney Insurance, Inc., 736 P.2d 763, 766-67 (Alaska 1987), we concluded that “the superior court correctly determined that Russell should have known of the existence of the facts alleged as comprising her cause of action in 1983.” Id. at 375. We went on to remark that “[ojrdinarily summary judgment would be inappropriate and a remand to the superior court would be required. (Footnote omitted). If, however, there are uncontro-verted facts that indicate when Russell reasonably should have known that she had a cause of action, then this court can dispose of the question as a matter of law.” Id. at 375-76.

. In Mine Safety, 756 P.2d at 291 (Alaska 1988), we remarked that “[w]e look to the date when a reasonable person has enough information to alert that person that he or she has a potential cause of action or should begin an inquiry to protect his or her rights.” The language comes from Sharrow v. Archer, 658 P.2d 1331, 1334 and n. 5 (Alaska 1983):
The fact that the Sharrows had not been informed of the “wrong” by the “wrongdoer" or were not convinced that there was “proof’ of the wrong or aware of “sworn testimony and documentary evidence” substantiating it does not establish that a reasonable person would be unaware of the wrong or the wrongdoing.5
5. In Tobacco & Allied Stocks, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir. 1957), the court rejected a claim by plaintiffs that laches should not attach until the district court in a prior case had issued its opinion finding fraud: "To have such knowledge of fraud as will begin the operation of laches, however, a legal adjudication of the question of fraud is hardly necessary. It is sufficient if facts come to plaintiffs attention that would warrant the inferences which reasonable men would draw, and that would put reasonable men on inquiry to protect their rights.” Id. at 904.
*1370To say that a person should begin an inquiry to protect his or her rights is not different from saying that a person is aware of "the wrong or the wrongdoing.” The date a claimant is alerted to the fact that "he or she has a potential cause of action” and the date a claimant must "begin[ ] an inquiry to protect his or her rights” are not different dates.