Court Opinion

ID: 9480848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:00:29.33771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:57.298565
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
After considering this matter on petition for rehearing, I find that I must dissent from the majority opinion. I do so because I am convinced that irrespective of which party asserts jurisdiction, plaintiff’s claim should satisfy the jurisdictional amount under the same standard of review. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 354, 81 S.Ct. 1570, 1573, 6 L.Ed.2d 890 (1961) (“No matter which party brings it into court, the controversy remains the same; it involves the same amount of money and is to be adjudicated and determined under the same rules.”) Under St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590-91, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), original jurisdiction is effectively established by showing that the claim is probably in excess of the requisite jurisdictional level, see, e.g., Jeffries v. Silvercup Bakers, Inc., 434 F.2d 310, 312 (7th Cir.1970); whereas under the new standard proposed by the majority opinion, removal jurisdiction is established only upon showing that the claim is absolutely in excess of the threshold jurisdictional amount. I find the difference between these two burdens, and the results they respectively produce, too disparate as a basis for determining jurisdiction since jurisdiction is jurisdiction: we either have jurisdiction over a particular claim or we do not, or so it seems to me.1 *148Indeed, this uneven application of the legal certainty test, which the majority would impose, seems to conflict with our past decisions that have stated that the standard for determining jurisdictional amount should favor “those parties seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal district court.” Opelika Nursing Home v. Richardson, 448 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir.1971) (emphasis added).
Of course, I agree that the amount in controversy should be determined from the face of plaintiffs pleading unless and until challenged as having been asserted in “bad faith.” A claim of jurisdiction is asserted in bad faith if it appears “to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that amount, and that his claim was therefore colorable for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction.” Red Cab, 303 U.S. at 289-90, 58 S.Ct. at 590. It would seem to me no less that plaintiffs claim is as impermissibly “colorable” when it is understated for the purpose of precluding removal jurisdiction as when it is exaggerated for the purpose of conferring jurisdiction. I would hold that a removing defendant shows plaintiffs bad faith if it shows that the claim is probably for more than the statutory amount, that is, that the damages alleged evince the probability that a reasonable jury would award more than the jurisdictional amount. This standard is clearly supported by the logic that a lawyer has at least a prima facie duty to seek the highest judgment for his client that the injury suffered will reasonably support. Although there may be valid reasons for a plaintiff choosing a state forum, which are independent of the amount of the claim, such valid reasons (e.g., allowable discovery, eviden-tiary questions, and jury or judge characteristics) cannot constitute good faith as to the allegation of jurisdictional amount when the jurisdictional question, and hence the specific good faith question, focuses only on whether the amount alleged forecloses jurisdiction; in other words, the question of bad faith for purposes of jurisdiction is whether the amount of the claim alleged in the state court complaint is “colored” to avoid federal jurisdiction, for whatever reason. If the injury claimed will reasonably support damages in an amount required by the statute, then federal jurisdiction exists.
Nonetheless, the majority concludes that when the state court pleading is shown to have understated the value of the claim, this “colored” amount is not asserted in bad faith if it is lawfully possible to recover less than the jurisdictional prerequisite irrespective of what the claim is reasonably worth, assuming liability. This new standard allows the purpose of the removal statute to be avoided and jurisdiction to be unscrupulously manipulated. I say this because the majority holding permits remand to the state court on an understated “colored” amount, but yet, after one year, the state court complaint can be amended to increase damages far in exeess of the federal jurisdictional amount, when the statutory right of the nonresident defendant to remove to the federal court will have expired.
Notwithstanding the worrisome possibilities for abuse, the majority would justify the new burden effectively by giving deference to plaintiffs choice of forum. There is no reason to value the plaintiff’s right to select a state court forum as a more worthy consideration than the nonresident de*149fendant’s statutory right to seek an impartial tribunal. Consequently, I would think, that choice of forum should not play even an indirect determining role in the jurisdictional analysis.
In sum, I would hold that the defendant’s burden of persuading the court that the value of plaintiffs claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount is satisfied when, assuming liability, the defendant demonstrates that the pleadings and evidence before the court show injuries and losses to an extent that a reasonable jury would probably return a verdict in excess of the jurisdictional amount. The district court should enjoy broad discretion in making this determination. The jurisdictional inquiry imposed under this standard is no more extensive than that required under the majority’s analysis. Under either standard, the trial court must determine the • permissible range of a damage award. The difference is that the majority requires that the entire range of awards exceed the jurisdictional amount; I would require only that the range of awards embrace the jurisdictional amount.
Because the majority opinion attempts to formulate a burden for establishing removal jurisdiction that is substantially inconsistent with the burden for establishing original federal jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent.

. I am at a loss to understand the logic of the majority opinion in asserting that the effect of its new standard is to even the respective burdens between the plaintiff and defendant in establishing federal jurisdiction. The majority opinion states, and correctly so, that the plaintiff asserting original jurisdiction must show to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is not less than the jurisdictional amount; the *148majority opinion further states, and correctly so, that most of the cases have held that a removing defendant must show a probability that plaintiffs claim exceeds jurisdictional limits. From a juxtaposition of these two burdens, the majority opinion concludes that plaintiff is put to a legal certainty test whereas defendant is put to a probability test and then concludes that defendant’s burden is much too light when compared to plaintiffs. A proper analysis and comparison of the "legal certainty” and “probability” tests, however, reveals that these two burdens, although under different names, are actually identical. When a plaintiff who is asserting original jurisdiction is required to prove to a legal certainty that his claim is not for less than the jurisdictional amount, he is in reality only required to prove the probability of reaching the jurisdictional requisite. This is the same burden the removing defendant was required to satisfy in those cases in which the majority now rejects as too light.