Court Opinion

ID: 9864761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:10:07.732315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:37.339902
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hilliard,
dissenting.
So far as my brother Butler adheres to the views expressed in Webb v. People, 83 Colo. 1, 262 Pac. 906, I am in agreement with him, but beyond that I am quite as much opposed to his opinion as I am to that of the court. In my judgment the Webb case should be held to be controlling, for as I read it, it is sound in reason and salutary in effect.
One thing seems plain; that all the members of the court agree that the Webb case and the one at bar are similar. The lack of unanimity arises out of two things; that the case at bar is like or unlike Dunn v. United States, 284 U. S. 390, 52 Sup. Ct. 189, and that the Webb case is only partially sound. My opinion is that the court is mistaken in believing the Webb and Dunn cases to be similar, and that Mr. Justice Butler is mistaken in his position that in such circumstances a new trial can be had.
*35Assuming, however, that the Webb and Dunn eases are alike, I do not conceive that- it is our duty to follow the latter and overrule the former. Within their respective spheres the Supreme Court of Colorado and the Supreme Court of the United States are equally powerful. Each, I presume, should respect the views and decisions of the other. In some circumstances our judgments may be reversed by those of that tribunal; in others, that court is as bound by what we have held as courts of inferior jurisdiction in this state are bound. What I argue chiefly is that I dislike overturning our unanimous decision in the Webb case solely because the Supreme Court of the United States, whose decision in no way controls us (Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019), has taken a different view upon a case there of first impression and contrary to what the majority in this cause concede the weight of authority may be.
The point made by Mr. Justice Butler, that the proper procedure is to remand and order a new trial, is, I think, sufficiently answered by what Mr. Justice Campbell said in the Webb case, at page 3: “* * * there is no verdict upon which defendant can be legally sentenced, and a reversal for a new trial upon any of the other grounds [of error alleged] would be useless since the -verdict of the jury finding the defendant not guilty under the first count would entitle her to urge successfully the plea of former jeopardy upon either ground of the information.” This language, it seems to me, gives potency to the provisions of our Constitution.
I wish to emphasize somewhat another point made by Mr. Justice Butler that care on the part of district attorneys and trial judges will obviate situations of this Idnd. My views on the duties of such officers may be found in Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, at page 65, 300 Pac. 575, 598, and although apparently apocryphal, are those to which I feel I must continue to subscribe. In short, we should not strain constitutions and overrule *36fixed precedents to accommodate those who are entitled to no greater rights than accused persons.
I am of opinion that the judgment should he reversed and the defendants discharged.