Court Opinion

ID: 9913234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-27 15:05:44.35074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:02.426465
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0004-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROCCO MALDONADO,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided December 27, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 10-07-1246.

                   Rocco Maldonado, appellant pro se.

                   Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief
                   Appellate Attorney, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant, convicted on multiple robbery and weapons charges, appeals

from the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

                                        I.

      After a trial in 2011, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1, second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, and two

fourth-degree weapons charges for possession of a stun gun and an imitation

firearm. The trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of forty years, with

an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility, pursuant to the No Early

Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7. On direct appeal, we affirmed the conviction

and sentence. State v. Maldonado, No. A-4047-11 (App. Div. Jan. 15, 2015)

(Maldonado I).

      Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) in 2015,

alleging he had accepted a plea offer which the State improperly withdrew. The

first PCR court denied the application without an evidentiary hearing, and we

affirmed on appeal. State v. Maldonado, No. A-2368-16 (App. Div. Mar. 22,

2018) (Maldonado II). After the federal district court denied defendant's writ of

habeas corpus making the same claim, defendant filed a second PCR petition.

We recount the next stage of the procedural history as set forth in State v.

                                                                            A-0004-22
                                        2
Maldonado, No. A-2175-19 (App. Div. May 19, 2021) (Maldonado III) (slip op.

at 3):

               On July 19, 2019, defendant pro se filed his second
               petition for PCR, this time alleging trial counsel was
               ineffective in advising him of the essential elements of
               first-degree robbery; he believed he could not be
               convicted of first-degree robbery because "nothing was
               taken from the home" during the home invasion.
               Defendant claims, in reliance on this alleged improper
               advice, [that] he chose to go to trial rather than accept
               a lesser sentence through a plea. The PCR court issued
               an order requiring defendant to show cause as to why
               his second PCR petition was timely. After receiving
               defendant's response, the PCR court denied defendant's
               second petition in a December 2, 2019 order because
               defendant failed to file his second petition within one
               year of the denial of his first petition. See R. 3:22-4(b);
               R. 3:22-12(a)(2).

We affirmed on appeal.

         On May 4, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging newly

discovered evidence warranted relief. Defendant contended that he recently

discovered that his trial counsel was the Asbury Park, Monmouth County

municipal prosecutor while he simultaneously represented defendant on his

Ocean County criminal charges.            He also argues that trial counsel was

ineffective when he advised defendant he would not be convicted of first-degree

robbery, and he would at most be found guilty of theft.

                                                                             A-0004-22
                                           3
      The motion court rejected defendant's arguments and made written

findings.    It found no conflict of interest, "because [trial counsel's]

representation of the State at the municipal level in Monmouth County was not

directly adverse to [defendant's Ocean County matter]," and there was "no

indication . . . [of a] significant risk that the representation of the State at the

municipal level in another county materially limited [trial counsel's]

responsibilities to the defendant." The motion court concluded trial counsel had

no duty to obtain defendant's informed consent. The motion court also found

trial counsel's service as municipal prosecutor in a different county did not

constitute "newly discovered evidence." The court found trial counsel's position

as municipal prosecutor was a matter of public record and could have been

discovered by defendant's due diligence beforehand. The motion court rejected

defendant's argument that trial counsel was ineffective because he should have

known defendant was likely to be convicted on his robbery charges, finding the

arguments "conclusory."

      Defendant appeals, arguing:

      POINT ONE

            The Trial Court Erred In Denying Defendant's Motion
            For New Trial Based On Newly Discovered Evidence
            Without An Evidentiary Hearing As There Is No
            Evidence On Record To Establish That Defendant

                                                                              A-0004-22
                                         4
            Waived His Right To Conflict Free Representation By
            Defense Counsel Warranting Reversal Of Defendant's
            Convictions [and] Sentence And Remand For New
            Trial

      POINT TWO

            Defense Counsel's Failure To Render Effective
            Assistance Resulted In Prejudice And Injury Toward
            Petitioner Because There Is A Reasonable Probability
            Defendant Would Have Accepted By The Trial Court
            And Defendant Would Not Have Been Exposed To An
            Extended Term Conviction

                                        II.

      "[A] motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial

judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with on appeal

unless a clear abuse [of discretion] has been shown." State v. Armour, 446 N.J.

295 (App. Div. 2016) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Russo, 333

N.J. Super. 119, 137 (App. Div. 2000)). "A trial court's ruling on a motion for

a new trial 'shall not be reversed unless it clearly appears that there was a

miscarriage of justice under the law.'" Id. at 305 (quoting R. 2:10-1).

      Rule 3:20-1 states: "The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the

defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice." "[P]ursuant to Rule

3:20-1, the trial judge shall not set aside a jury verdict unless 'it clearly and

                                                                             A-0004-22
                                        5
convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law.'"

Armour, 446 N.J. Super. at 305-06.

      The Supreme Court has stated:

            [T]o qualify as newly discovered evidence entitling a
            party to a new trial, the new evidence must be (1)
            material to the issue and not merely cumulative or
            impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the
            trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence
            beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably
            change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted.

            [State v. Fortin, 464 N.J. Super. 193, 216 (App. Div.
            2020) (quoting State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314
            (1981)).]

"All three [prongs of the] test[] must be met before the evidence can be said to

justify a new trial." Ibid. (quoting Carter, 85 N.J. at 314). "The defendant has

the burden to establish each prong is met." Ibid. (quoting State v. Smith, 29 N.J.

561, 573 (1959)).

                                        III.

      Defendant's first point on appeal falls flat as the record contains sufficient

factual support for the motion court's findings. The court correctly determined

there was no conflict of interest. While that ended the substantive inquiry, the

court went on to note that trial counsel's status could have been discovered by

defendant's reasonable diligence before he pleaded guilty. The motion court

                                                                              A-0004-22
                                         6
properly exercised its discretion, and we see no need to disturb its order denying

a new trial.

      We briefly comment on defendant's second point on appeal, alleging

ineffectiveness of counsel. Defendant's argument is framed as part of the new

trial motion appeal, and the court rejected the argument as improperly included

in the new trial motion. Nevertheless, we analyze the second point as defendant's

third motion for post-conviction relief.

      Rule 3:22-4(b) places strict limitations on second and subsequent petitions

for PCR.       It compels dismissal of a subsequent PCR petition unless the

defendant's claim is: (1) brought within the applicable time period; and (2) falls

within one of three grounds for relief. See R. 3:22-4(b).

      Rule 3:22-4(b)(1) requires second and subsequent PCR petitions to be

timely filed under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which instructs that petitions cannot be

filed beyond one year after the latest of:

               (A) the date on which the constitutional right asserted
               was initially recognized by the United States Supreme
               Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey, if that right
               has been newly recognized by either of those Courts
               and made retroactive by either of those Courts to cases
               on collateral review; or

               (B) the date on which the factual predicate for the relief
               sought was discovered, if that factual predicate could

                                                                            A-0004-22
                                           7
            not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
            of reasonable diligence; or

            (C) the date of the denial of the first or subsequent
            application for post-conviction relief where ineffective
            assistance of counsel that represented the defendant on
            the first or subsequent application for post-conviction
            relief is being alleged.

      The one-year limitation for second or subsequent petitions cannot be

relaxed. R. 3:22-12(b); see also R. 1:3-4(c) (prohibiting the court and parties

from enlarging the time to file a petition for PCR under Rule 3:22-12).

Regarding the allowable grounds for relief, Rule 3:22-4(b)(1) requires that a

second or subsequent petition for PCR allege either:

            (A) that the petition relies on a new rule of
            constitutional law, made retroactive to defendant's
            petition by the United States Supreme Court or the
            Supreme Court of New Jersey, that was unavailable
            during the pendency of any prior proceedings; or

            (B) that the factual predicate for the relief sought could
            not have been discovered earlier through the exercise
            of reasonable diligence, and the facts underlying the
            ground for relief, if proven and viewed in light of the
            evidence as a whole, would raise a reasonable
            probability that the relief sought would be granted; or

            (C) that the petition alleges a prima facie case of
            ineffective assistance of counsel that represented the
            defendant on the first or subsequent application for
            post-conviction relief.

                                                                         A-0004-22
                                        8
      When we apply these rules, we simple conclude that defendant's third PCR

petition is time-barred. Defendant fails to satisfy the first requirement of Rule

3:22-4(b)(1)—the time limitation set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). Defendant did

not claim a new constitutional right, so his petition cannot be considered timely

under Rule 3:22-12(a)(2)(A). Next, defendant's petition is untimely under Rule

3:22-12(a)(2)(B) as the factual predicate of his claims, that he received improper

advice about not taking the plea offer, was known to him more than a year before

he filed this third petition. Finally, defendant's petition is not timely under Rule

3:22-12(a)(2)(C) because his petition was beyond the one-year time

requirement.

      Affirmed.

                                                                              A-0004-22
                                         9