Court Opinion

ID: 9567865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:29.065916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:51.369338
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur specially with regard to Division 1 because, although I agree that there is a fact question regarding whether the property in question was used as a residence at the time the deed to secure debt was executed, resolution of that question may not necessarily be dis-positive of this case. The record reflects that J. C. Maddox, the bank’s attorney and a director of the bank, handled the November 11, 1985 transfer of the property from Robert Maddox to his wife, and consequently the identity of the current owner was known to and acknowledged by the bank within the meaning of OCGA § 44-14-162.1. Of course, if it is determined that the property was not residential, then the bank’s knowledge is immaterial, the trial court’s ruling that the provisions of OCGA § 44-14-162.1 et seq. are inapplicable was correct, and the foreclosure was proper. However, since the record reflects that technically no notice of foreclosure was given to Rebecca Dickens, if the property is determined to have been residential, the question remains whether the notice requirements of OCGA § 44-14-162.1 et seq. were complied with and consequently whether the foreclosure was proper. Only then can the question of attorney fees be resolved.