Court Opinion

ID: 2775369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-01-31 00:11:42.516714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:57.424721
License: Public Domain

J-A30011-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                       PENNSYLVANIA
                            Appellee

                       v.

KANIKA OUM

                            Appellant                No. 1939 EDA 2013

             Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 13, 2013
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001090-2012

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                        FILED JANUARY 30, 2015

        Kanika Oum appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.         We affirm in part, and

vacate and remand in part, and we rely upon the opinion authored by the

Honorable Charles J. Cunningham, III.

        On November 1, 2011, Oum and his co-defendant, Samneang

Samneang,1 shot a fifteen-year old boy in the face near the intersection of

75th Street and Buist Avenue in Southwest Philadelphia. Following trial, a

____________________________________________

*
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
  Co-defendant’s name is Samneang Sin, however he was charged and tried
as Samneang Samneang. See N.T. Trial, 2/27/13, at 49-50. Samneang’s
related appeal is docketed at 1824 EDA 2013.
J-A30011-14

jury convicted Oum of attempted murder,2 criminal conspiracy,3 aggravated

assault,4 violation of the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA),5 and possession of an

instrument of crime (PIC).6

        The court sentenced Oum to a term of imprisonment of 15-30 years

for attempted murder, a consecutive term of 5-10 years on the conspiracy

conviction, and a consecutive term of 2-5 years on the VUFA conviction, for

an aggregate term of 22-45 years’ imprisonment. The court imposed no

further penalty on the PIC conviction. The court also determined the

aggravated assault conviction merged for sentencing purposes.

        Oum filed a timely appeal to this Court. The trial court ordered Oum

to file a Rule 1925(b) statement within 21 days.    See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

After seeking an extension of time, which the court granted, Oum filed his

Rule 1925(b) statement on September 12, 2013.           He now raises the

following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

2
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502(a).
3
    18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903(a), 2502(a).
4
    18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a).
5
    18 Pa.C.S. § 6106.
6
    18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a).

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         1. Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to
            repeatedly elicit hearsay?

         2. Did the trial court err in permitting testimony that
            Defendant had been seen with a firearm prior to the
            shooting, where the incident was remote and unrelated,
            and Defendant was not the alleged shooter in the case at
            trial, making the probative value of this evidence
            outweighed by its prejudicial impact on the jury?

         3. Did the trial court err by permitting the prosecutor to elicit
            prejudicial testimony that Defendant’s brother had asked a
            witness not to come to court?

         4. Did the trial court err by refusing to declare a mistrial after
            the prosecutor impermissibly implied during his closing
            argument that Defendant had a burden to produce
            witnesses and evidence in his defense?

         5. Should this Court remand the matter for re-sentencing in
            light of the lower’s court’s sua sponte recognition that
            Defendant’s sentence is improper?

Appellant’s Brief, at 14.

      Upon review of the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, and the record as

a whole, we find that the trial court has correctly disposed of issues 1-4 in

his opinion.   See Opinion, 2/7/14, at 8-19.         Therefore, we affirm the

convictions based on Judge Cunningham’s opinion.

      With respect to Oum’s fifth issue, the trial court acknowledged in its

Rule 1925(a) opinion that Oum’s sentence was illegal. The court sentenced

Oum to 15-30 years for attempted murder, and a consecutive term of 5-10

years on the conspiracy to commit murder conviction.          As the trial court

recognized, Oum could not be sentenced for two inchoate crimes for conduct

designed to culminate in the same offense, that is, murder. Section 906 of

                                      -3-
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the Crimes Code precludes conviction of more than one of the inchoate

crimes of criminal attempt, criminal solicitation or criminal conspiracy “for

conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the commission of the same

crime.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 906. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 78 A.3d 1136

(Pa. Super. 2013) (sentence for conspiracy and attempted murder should

have merged); see also Commonwealth v. Martinez, 438 A.2d 984 (Pa.

Super. 1981) (where criminal conspiracy to commit burglary and subsequent

attempted burglary constituted “conduct designed to culminate in the

commission of the same crime,” that is, burglary, defendant should not have

been sentenced for both attempt and conspiracy, but should have only been

sentenced for one or the other); Cf. Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 39 A.3d
977 (Pa. 2012) (where defendant's convictions for two inchoate crimes had

separate criminal purposes they did not merge.)

      We agree with the trial court’s assessment. Therefore, we vacate the

judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with 18

Pa.C.S. § 906. See Commonwealth v. Watts, 465 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super.

(1983). Counsel is directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion in

the event of further proceedings in this matter.

      Affirmed   in   part;   vacated   and   remanded   in   part.   Jurisdiction

relinquished.

                                        -4-
J-A30011-14

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/30/2015

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                             COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

                 FIRST JUDlCL10 Pa.

123. 507 A2d 66 (Pa. 1986), held that out of court testimonia1 statements made by non-

party witnesses are admissible as substantive evidence if such witness is available to

testify. Brady held : "The simple fact is that ' the usual dangers of hcarsay are largely

nonexistent where the witness testifies at trial. California v. Greell. SlIprfl at 399
                                                  I                                      u.s.
/ 55, 90 S.O. at /911. By hypothesi s in these situations. (he out-of-court declarant is now

a witness in-collrl where he or she is placed under oath, subject to cross-examination and

under observation by the finder of fact. See Common wealth v. Thil'kield, supra at 502

Pa. 542, 467 A,2d 323 (McDennott, 1. dissenting: 'the fact that [the oath and Cross-

examination requirement] are supp lied in u\e current trial defuses hearsay concerns and

provides the ract-finder with ample opportunity to determine truth.'). Indeed, the cross-

examination lo which a recanting witness is subjected will likely be meaningful and

vigorous since the witness is already 'on the spot' in having to explain the discrepancies

between earlier statements and direct testimony, or deny that the earlier stateme nts were

made at all." [d. 507 A.2d at 69 (In accord Commonweulth v. Mollelt, S A.3d 291 (pa.

Super, 2010); Commotr wenlth v. Charlloll, 906 A.2d 554 (pa. Super. 2006)

        The recently amended Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence CPa.R.E,) provide in part

al Rule H03.1 "The following statements arc not excluded by the rule against hearsay if

the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about the prior statement:

"(1) Prior Inconsistent S tatcmcnt of Declar:mt-W irness. A prior statement by a

declarant-witness that is inconsistent with the declarant-witness 's testimony and: ... (B) is

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a writing signed and adopted by the declarant.. ...(2) Prior Statement of Identification

by Declarant-Witness. A prior statement by a dedamnt·witness identifying a person or

thing, made after perceiving the person or thing, provided that the declarant-witness

testifies to the making of the prior statement."

       The only witness to identify Defendant as thc driver was Seagull Mok. Neither

the victim of the shooting, Mr. Members, nor his companion, Nasir, was able to identify

the drive r of the car involved. Mr. Dum's testimony that he received a eall from Mr.

Mok telling him that, Defendant. his cousin, had been in front of his house looking      rOT

him and not to come out because of gun shots clearly relates to the identity of one of the

perpetrators. (N.T., 2127/2013. pgs. 193, 194, 202) Mr. Oum 's testimony Ulal Mr. Mok

had seen lhe car involved in the shooting and could identify its occupants is clearly

admissible pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803.1(2).

        Detective Park testified that b.e took a signed written statement from Mr. Qum on

November 2, 2011 , shortly afier Mr. Members was shol. (N.T., 212812013, pgs. 81 , 84)

Detective Park also testified that when he asked him what he     kzlCW   about the shooting

Mr. Own responded that he had received a phone call from Mr. Mok who told him:

"Kinika Dum and another Asian guy named Sam came around in a black I'fonda Accord

to the 7400 block of Buist A venue and asked for me . Seagull said they didn't say why

they were looking for me, but Seagull told them that he didn't know where I was. Seagull

Ihen said that Sam shouted out from the passenger's side window, 876 A.2d 1002,

1006 (Pa. Super. 2005) "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment, but

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an 'overridi ng misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly

unreasonable, or the resulL or bias, prejudice, ill-will or par.1iality, as shown by the

evidence or the record.'"   Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 86 (pa. Super. 2012)

citing Commollwealtft v. Cascarfio, 981 A.2d 245, 249 (pa.Super.2009) OUT Superior

Court in Commollllleoltl, v. fo/tIIson, 758 A.2d 166, 173 (pa. Supcr. 2005), held: "The

basic requisite ror the admission of any evidence in a case is that it be competent and

relevant. lbough relevance has nol been precisely Or universally defined, the l:ourts of

this Commonwealth have repeatedly stated that evidence is adm issible if, and only if, the

evidence logically or reasonably tcnds to prove or disprove a material fact in issue, tends

to make such fact more or less probable, or affords the basis fo r or supports a reasonable

inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact." (internal citations

omillcd)

        Pa.R.E. at Rule 403 provide that "The court may exclude relevant evidence if its

probative value is ouLweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: Wlfair

prej udice, confusing the issues, mjsleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or

needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. "Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply

because it is harmful La the defendant's case.      Rather, excl usion of evidence on this

ground ' is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a

decision based upon something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case ... '

Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 891 (Pa. Super. 2012)

       The testimony of both Me. Own and Detective Park was obvious ly " harmful to

Defendant but was not " unfairl y prejudicial" to him. This is particularly so in light of the

admission into evidence, without objection, of transcripts of phone conversations of

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Defendant's co·defeodan, recorded while he was incarcerated awaiting lrial. In the first

transcript, Defendant tells the party on the other end: "Yeah. The bull , Seagull from

Soulh Philly. He came thc first time, but he switched it. He made a different statement,

bUll can' t Jet him show Up and shit." (N.T., 2128/2013, pg. 108) The transcript from yet

another conversation revealed:

        Defendant: "Fucking nut ass Seagull made a statement on me, 100."
        Male: "Yeah? Want me to go and talk to the nigga? Want me to go talk to
        him?"
        DefemhlOt: "We already got somebody to talk to him, but that bitch ass
        nigga came to court last time, but now we're trying to get somebody to talk
        to him to tell him not to come to court."
        Male: "Yeah, they' ll do it." (Inaudible.)
        Ocfcod:lUt: "Man, in do get out of here. I'mma ruck that nigga up ."
        (N.T., 2128/2013, pg. 109)

II is clear from the transcripts that Defendant was attempting to prevent Mr. Mok from

testifying or, at   me very least, influence his testimony as well as that orMr. Qum.     The

testimony of Mr. Qum , which was corroborated by that of Detecti ve Park, is relevant to

the identity of the occupants of the Honda and portrays Mr. Mok' s present sense of his

observations before anyone had an opportunity       lO   intimidate him or otherwise innuence

his testimony.

n.      TESTIMONY            OF     Dn'EN J)A:'fPS         PRIOR      BAD     ACTS      WAS

        ADMISSABLE.

        Defendant in his second complaint states, "The COlli1 erred by aJlowi ng me

Commonwealth to elicit testimony from Vyreak: Qum about seeing Defendant with a

handgun in a prior, unrelated incident." Defendant's complaint is without merit.

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       Pa.R.E. Rule 404 provides in part: (b) Crimes, Wrongs or Otber Acts.

(2) ...... 11tis evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,

opportunity, inlent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of

accident. In a criminal case, this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the

evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.       (3) Evidence of other crimes.

wrongs, or acts proffered under s ubsection (b)(2) of this rule may be admitted in a

criminal case only upon a showing that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its

potential for prejudice." In CommnmtJealllr v. il1elelldez·Rodriguez. 856 A.2d 1278,

1283 (Pa. Super. 2004)   Ollr   Superior Court held: "It is a'Ciomatic that evidence of prior

crimes is not admissible for the so le purpose of demonslrating a criminal defendant's

propensity to commit crimes. This rule is not without exception, however. Evidence may

be admissible in certain eirewnstanecs where it is re lcvant for somc other legitimate

purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the dcfendant's character."        Evidence that

Defendant was seen in possesSion of a gWl prior to the shooting is "admissible, as it tends

to prove the means to commit the crime." Commrmweallh v. BrolVn, 538 Pa. 410, 42t ,

648 A.2d 1177, 1182 (1994) A weapon shown to have bccn in a defendant's possession

may be properly admitted into evidence even tbough it cannot be identified positively as

the weapon used in committing a cri me; it may tend to prove that the dcfendant had a

weapon si milar to the one used." Commollwealllr v. Lark, 3 16 Pa. Super. 240, 254, 462

A.2d 1329. 1336-37 (1983)         There is no "bright-line" I.hreshold determining when the

prior acts become too remote in time to be admi ssible pursuant to Rule 404.

Commntlwealtll v. Reed, 990 A.2d 1158, 1168 (Pa. 2010)

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•

           On direct examination Vyreak Own testi fied that he had secn Defendant possess a

    gun prior to the shooting of Mr. Members but equivocated as to when this occurred.

    (N.T., 2128/20 13 , pg. 223)   (0   his written statement to Detective Conway he clead)' stated

    that he had seen Defendant with gun approximately three weeks prior to the shooting.

    (N.T., 212812013, pg. 223) Defendant' s possession of a gun within a period of three

    weeks prior to the shooting is sufficiently close in time to demonstrate his intent, the

    absence of mistake or accident, and a common scheme or plan.

    Ill.   TESTIMONY AS TO WITNESS' STATE OF MIND WAS ADMISSABLE.

            Defendant ill his fourth compluinl states; "The Court' erred by aJlowing the

    Commonwealth to elicit testimony from Seagull Mok about Defendant' s brother telling

    him to nolcome to court." Defendant 's complaint is without merit.

            "The term ' hearsay' is defined as an out-of-court statement, which is offered in

    evidence to prove the truth of the maEtcr asserted . ... Pa.R.E.801(c). Hearsay statements

    are generally inadmissible unless they fall under an enumerated e.xccption, Pa.R.E. 802.

    An out-ot:.court statement is not hearsay when it has a purpose other than La convince the

    fact finder oftlle truth of the statement." CommoJlwealt" v. BlIsa"et, 54 A,3d 35, 68·69

    (Pa, 2012) (internal citations om itted)

            Prior to presenting testimony of the second day of trial, February 28 , 2013, the

    Commonwealth requested that the Court issue a beneh warrant to secure the presence of

    Mr. Mok the following day. Counsel tor the Commonwealth, Mr. McCool, advised the

    Court thaI, although Mr. Mok had agreed to appear that day he was not present in the

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courtroom. He further adviscd the Court that when he sent police officers to bring him to

court, they were advised by his wife that she hadn 't seen him. (N.T" 212812013, pg. 5)

       When Me. Mok did appear on the third day of lriaJ, March t, 20 13. he testified

that he failed to appear the previous day because he   W'd S   "scared" and that he had been

told not to come to court by Defendant's "brother" and "a couple other friend"." (N.T.,

212812013, pgs. 6, 7) TIle Commonwealth offered this testimony not for the truth of the

matter but for cohis slate of mind, how hc's feeling, what pressure is being placed on him

not to be here today." (N.T., 212812013, pg. 6)

       This testimony was espeCially relevant in light of the evidence of the phone

transcripts admitted the previoLts day which specifically mentioned Mr. Mok.              On

admilting these transcripts , the Court cautioned the jury: "Just a reminder, whilt you just

heard is only coming from one defendant. Il's only about the one defendant You can

really only use it with regard to the one defendant. Those are not the words of Kinika

Oun1, ilIld it wasnrt introduced as evidence against Kinika Qum. Tt's only evidence

against Samncang Sin."

Ill.   COUNSEL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH'S COMMENT DID NOT

       WARRANT A MISTRIAL.

       Defendant in his fifth complaint states, "The prosecutor committed prosecutorial

misconduct Ulat warranted a mistrial when during closing argument he impermissibly

conuuented on Defendant's burden of proof and right to remain silent." Defendant's

complaint is without merit.

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         A defendanfs Motion for a Misuial is provided for in Pennsy lvania Rules of

Criminal Procedure (Pa.R.Crim.P.) at Rule 605 (8) which provides: "When an event

prej udicial to the defendanl occurs during trial only the defendant may move fo r a

mistrial; the motion shall be made when the event is disclosed. Otherwise, the trial judge

may declare a mistrial only for reasons of manifest necessity."            "Every unwise or

irrelevant remark made in the co urse of the trial by a j udge, a witness, or counsel, does

noL compel the grantin g of a new trial. A new tria l is required when the remark is

prejudi cial ; that is. when it is of such a nature or substance or delivered in s uch a manner

that it may reasonably be sai d to have deprived the defendant of a fa ir and impartial

tria!." Commol/weallh v. Goosby, 450 Pa. 609, 301 A.2d 673 ( 1973).

         The Superior Court of Pennsylvania bas discussed the issues to be considered in

the granting of a mistrial. [n Commonwealth         Y.   Hudson,   955 A.2d 103 1, 1034 (Pa.

Super. 2008), citing Commonwealth v. Tej eda, 834 A.2d 619, 623 (Pa. Super. 2003) our

Superior Court held that "A motion for a mistri al is within the discretion of the trial court .

[AJ mistrial (upon motion by one of the parties1 is required only when an incident is of

such a nature th at its unavoidable effect is to deprive tlle appellant of a fair and impartial

trial.   II is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a defendant was

prejudiced by the incident that is the bas is of a motio n tor a mistrial. On appeal, our

standard of review is whether the trial court abused that discretion.            An abuse of

discretion is more than a n error of judgment. On appeaJ, the trial court will not be fo und

to have abused its discretion tmless the record discloses that the judgment exercised by

the trial court was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prej udice, bias, or

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ill-will."   Hudsoll concluded the "inquiry into whether prejudice has accrued is

necessarily a fact specific one." [d., at 1034.

        Our Superior Court, in Commoll wealth v. Bracey. 831 A.2d 678, 682 (Pa. Super.

2003). citing Commolllvealtfl    I'.   S tilley, 455 Pa. Super. 543, 689 A.2d 242. 250 (Pa.

Super. 1997), held that "A mistrial is an 'ex lreme remedy ... [that] , ,. must be granted

only when an incident is of such a nature that its lUlavoidable effect is to deprive

defendant of a f..1ir trial. ' A trial court may remove taint caused by improper testimony

through curative instructions. Courts must consider all surrounding circumstances before

finding that curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme remedy of a mistrial is

required, The circumstances which the cowt must consider include whether the improper

remark was intentionally elicited by the Commonwealth, whether the answer was

responsive to the question posed, whether the Commonwealth exploited the reference,

and whether the curalive instruct jon was appropriate," (Citations omined.)

         "Because a criminal trial is an adversary proceeding, the prosecution as well as

the defense must be allowed rea.<;;onablc latitude in presenting its case to the jury."

Commollwe.alth v. Paddy , 800 A.2d 294, 316 (pa, Super. 2001)              A prosecutor is

generally allowed to vigorous ly prescnt and argue his case, as long as the comments are

supported by evidence and contain inferences which are reasonably derived from that

evidence. It is well-settled law mat attorneys' statements or questions at trial are not

evidence. The foclls of this Court's consideration of claims regarding prosceutonui

misconduct is to detennine whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial and not

whether the defendant was deprived of a perfect trial." Commo" wealth v. Kemp , 753

A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. 2000)         Our Supreme Court laler explained that " proseculorial

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misconduct docs not occur unless the unavoidable effect of the comments at issue was to

prejudice the jurors by fonning in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the

defendant, thus impeding their ability to weigh the evidence objectively and render a true

verdict."   Commonwealtlt v. Cuevas, 832 A,2d 388, 394 (Pa. 2003) Furthermore. the

"Commonwealth may 'fairly respond' to closing remarks made by the defense."

Commollweal/II v. Brown, 449 Pa Super. 346, 357-58, 673 A.2d 975, 981 (Pa. Super.

1996) Additionally, "comments by a prosecutor, which would otherwise be in error, have

been held not to be erroneous if made in response to a defense argument." BrowlI, Td.,

673 A.2d at 981 , citing COl1ullo",,,enltlt v. Fielder, 417 Pa. Super. 455 , 612 A2d 1028

(Pa. Super_ 1992)

        Defendant in his complaint mischaracterizes counsel for the Commonwealth's

closing argument. During his closing argument counsel for Defendant stated: "Four

wilnesses, half or that is two. 'lbey called two. They called Nasir and Quenzel." (N.T.,

3/ 112013, pg. 86)   In response to tbis comment in his closing argument, counsel for the

Commonwealth stated:

        "Ladies and gentl emen, I want to just briefly address a couple things that
        tlll; derense attorney said to you about the witnesses, that 1 only called --
        told you ha1f the story ....... you know, it's so funny and it's so
        disingenuous for lhe defense attorney to get up here and say that, that I
        gave you half the story as if somehow he's handcuffed. Folks, the burden
        of proof is on me. It never shifts. It's my burden to prove my case. BUL
        you know what, folks, it is --it's fairness. It's all aboUl fairness. If 1 don't
        call witnesses, there's nothing preventing the defense aLtorney from
        subpoenaing people into the courtroom. If he thinks I'm not telling the
        whole story or I'm not giving you the whole truth or I'm misrepresenting
        something or hiding something, he can call witnesses. He could have
        called them. He could have called lhem_" (N T, 31112013, pgs. 117, liS)

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       At thisjum·ture
                 .     counsel for Defendant objected. In response, the Court instructed

the jury:

       "THE COURT: You should understand that what the DA is saying and
       that the law says, is that the defense nevcr has to call any witnesses, never
       has to produce any evidence. (NT., 31112013, pg. 118)

Counscl for Defendant did not object further to the Court's instruction.

        It is dear that in his closing counsel for the Commonwealth never intended for the

jul'}' to believe that the burden of proof had somchow shifted to Defendant. In prefacing

his remarks he made it clear that "the burden of proof is on me. It never shifts. It's my

burden to prove my case."    The Court's cW1 A.2d 1281 (po. Super. 1983) 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 905 provides in

part: "Grading of criminal attempt, solicitation and conspiracy (a) GRADfNG.- Except

as otherwise provided in this title, attempt, solicitation and conspiracy are crimes of the

same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted Or solicited or is an

object of the conspiracy." Furthennore, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 provides: "A per.son may not

be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes of criminal attempt, eMina!

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solicitation or criminal conspiracy for conduct designed to commit or to culminate in the

conunission of the same crime."

       At the conclusion of his trial, Derendant was found guilty of both attempted

murder and conspiracy to comm it murder all arising from the single act of the shooting of

Mr. Members which resulted in serious bodily injury. 18 Pa.C.s.A. § 1102 provides in

part: "(c)   A{tempt~   solicitation and conspiracy.--Notwithstanding section 1103(1)

(relating to sentence of imprisorunent for felony), a person who has heen convicted of

attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to comm it murder. murder of an unborn child or

murder of a law enforcement officer where serious bodily injury results may be sentenced

to a term of imprisoruncnt which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years.

Where serious bod ily if\jury does not result, the person may be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment which shaH be fixed by the court at not more than 20 years: " Defendant

was subsequently senlenced to incarceration in a s tate correctional institution fo r a period

of 3 to 8 years on the charge of attempted murder a.. well as a consecutive tenn of

eonfmernent of 2 to 5 years on the charge of conspi racy to commit murder, for a totai

combined period of incarceration of 5 to 13 years on these two charges, well within tne

maximwn allowable on either one of these charges. 10 vie'.'1 of these circwnstances, the

Court recommends that this matter be remanded only ror the purpose of resentencing

Defendant.

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•

    CONCLUSION

           The Court finds that its evidentiary rulings are supported on the record. 'lne

    Court also finds thal Defendant's sentencing on two inchoate offenses is improper and

    recommends that this matter be remanded for re-sentencing.

                                               BY THE COURT:

    Fcbruary7,20l4
                                                                 ES J. CUNN   GIlAM, ill

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