Court Opinion

ID: 9865393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:05:02.027495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:35:41.290406
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 P. v. Conchas CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B320546

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. GA094259)
         v.

RAYMOND FRANK CONCHAS,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Drew E. Edwards, Judge. Affirmed.
      Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       In 2013, appellant Raymond Conchas devised a plan with
fellow gang members Peter Parra and Kevin Cabrera to rob drug
dealer Zane Goldstein1 under the guise of buying marijuana from
him. During the attempted robbery, Parra fatally shot Zane. All
three defendants were convicted of first degree murder. The jury
also found true the special circumstance allegation under Penal
Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)2 that the defendants
committed the murder while attempting to commit a robbery and
that appellant and Cabrera, while not the actual killers, were
major participants in the attempted robbery and acted with
reckless indifference to human life.
       In 2019, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).3 Following appointment
of counsel and a hearing, the trial court denied the petition,
finding that appellant was not eligible for relief because he was a
major participant and acted with reckless indifference.
       Appellant does not challenge on appeal that he was a major
participant in the attempted robbery. He argues the evidence
contradicts the court’s finding that he pointed a shotgun at Zane.
Consequently, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support a finding that he acted with reckless indifference under

1      Zachary Goldstein, Zane’s brother, was present during the
incident and testified at trial. We refer to Zane and Zachary by
their first names to avoid confusion.
2      All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
3      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. We hereafter
refer to the statute as section 1172.6.

                                2
the factors outlined in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788
(Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). We
conclude substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
findings and therefore affirm the denial of appellant’s petition for
resentencing.
                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       The underlying facts presented at trial are discussed in
detail in this court’s prior opinion, People v. Parra (February 24,
2017, B263792) [nonpub. opn.] (Parra). We summarize them
here to provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We otherwise
do not rely on this factual background in resolving the issues
presented in this appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
I.     Prosecution Case
       Appellant, Parra, and Cabrera were members of the North
Side Pasadena (NSP) gang. On January 13, 2013, two days
before the shooting, appellant received a text from another gang
member with the contact information for Zane, “a white boy that
sells weed.” Appellant made multiple calls to Cabrera and Parra
on January 14 and 15, 2013. On January 15, the day of the
shooting, appellant exchanged texts with Zane, asking to buy
marijuana later that afternoon. Appellant asked Zane to meet
him at an apartment complex on North Holliston Avenue in
Pasadena.
       Zane drove his Jeep to the apartment complex accompanied
by his brother Zachary. Zachary testified at trial that after they
arrived, a heavy-set Hispanic man wearing a black sports jersey,
whom he identified as Cabrera, approached the Jeep and asked
Zane to drive into the driveway of the complex. Zane agreed.
       Directed by Cabrera, Zane drove down the driveway and
turned into a parking stall at the end. He left the engine

                                3
running. Cabrera entered the back seat of the Jeep behind the
driver’s side, next to Zachary. As soon as he did so, Zachary saw
a taller, lankier, Hispanic man approach the driver’s side of the
Jeep carrying a single-barrel, sawed-off shotgun. Zachary also
described this man as having a bald or shaved head, and wearing
a white tank top and jeans; he did not recall seeing any tattoos on
the man’s arm. Zachary identified this man at the preliminary
hearing and trial as appellant, the tallest of the three defendants.
He testified at trial that he got a good look at the person and he
was certain that it was appellant who pointed the shotgun.4 The
man pointed the shotgun at Zane’s face, and said, “Don’t move or
I’ll blast you.” Zane backed out of the parking space and sped
forward out of the driveway, with Cabrera still in the backseat.
        Zane drove around the corner and stopped. Zane and
Zachary yelled at Cabrera to get out. Cabrera refused and
demanded the marijuana. Cabrera then said he had a gun, and
told Zane, “Give me the weed. You want your homie [referring to
Zachary] to get blasted?”
        Zachary testified that he saw no weapon and thought
Cabrera might be bluffing. He began pushing Cabrera out of the
Jeep, but Cabrera resisted. Zachary eventually was able to eject
Cabrera from the Jeep. At that point, Zachary heard “the sound
of a weapon going off” and the shattering of glass, but did not see

4     It is undisputed that Parra was bald at the time of the
incident; appellant had “buzzed” dark hair and tattoos on his
right arm. Parra was wearing a white tank top and appellant
was wearing a dark shirt. A neighbor testified at trial that he
heard a voice say, “Get the fuck out.” He looked out his window,
and saw two men next to an SUV. One of them had dark hair,
and the second one was either bald or had a shaven head.

                                4
a shooter because his view was obstructed by the driver’s seat.
Zane’s head snapped back against the driver’s headrest, and
Zachary was wounded in the forearm by a projectile. Zachary
saw a four-door tan car stopped alongside the Jeep. Cabrera got
in the rear passenger side of the car, and the car drove off.
Zachary saw two other people in the car, seated in front.
      Zachary called 911, reporting that three Hispanic men tried
to rob him and his brother, that one of them shot Zane in the
head, that the men had a shotgun and a pistol, and that the
shooter and his companions drove off in a tan car.
      Zane died of a single gunshot wound to the head. The
windshield of his Jeep had an impact hole and pieces from a
shotgun shell were found on the ground outside the Jeep on the
driver’s side. Police recovered appellant’s cell phone from the
back seat of Zane’s vehicle.5
      The prosecution played footage at trial of surveillance
videos taken from nearby cameras on Holliston. The videos
depicted events before and after the shooting, but were not clear
enough to identify the faces of the people shown. The videos
showed Zane’s Jeep stopping in the street at the apartment
complex on Holliston. Three people were concealed behind a
hedge at Tyler Alley, which opened onto Holliston. One person,
identified by witnesses as Cabrera, approached the Jeep. The
two others, identified as appellant and Parra, remained behind
the hedge. The Jeep then pulled into the driveway of the

5    Police also seized appellant’s tan Toyota Camry from an
apartment complex where his mother and sister lived. The
hubcaps had been removed, and the entire vehicle had been
wiped down.

                               5
complex. As soon as it did so, appellant and Parra walked from
behind the hedge down Holliston and into the driveway where
the Jeep had gone.
       The videos then depicted the Jeep exiting the driveway and
turning right on Holliston. Appellant exited the driveway and
ran back down Tyler Alley. Parra followed, taking the same
route and walking with an apparent limp.6 Then a tan sedan
backed out of Tyler Alley, and followed the Jeep.
       Ashley Ceballos, Cabrera’s girlfriend, was interviewed by
police detectives on January 23, 2015. Ceballos said that she and
Cabrera spent the night before the shooting at the home of a
friend named Belin, which was walking distance from the crime
scene. On the day of the shooting, sometime after 12:00 p.m.,
appellant, Parra, and appellant’s girlfriend, Stephanie Jacequez,
arrived at Belin’s home. Ceballos gave appellant money to buy
marijuana for her. He, Parra, and Cabrera left a short time later.
       Ceballos told police that she and Jacequez left and walked
to the corner of Holliston. They saw appellant and Parra jogging
toward appellant’s car, parked in Tyler Alley. The car backed
quickly out of the alley and sped off down Holliston. Appellant
was driving, and Parra was in the passenger seat. Ceballos
walked down Holliston, then heard what sounded like a
firecracker.
       Ceballos identified all three defendants in the surveillance
footage. She identified Parra as the person walking with a limp
and told police that Parra had not walked like that when she had
seen him earlier in the day.

6   It was suggested at trial that Parra was walking in this
manner because he had a shotgun concealed in his pant leg.

                                6
II.    Defense
       Appellant testified on his own behalf. He admitted
becoming an NSP member in 2012, but claimed he was never
active in the gang.
       On January 13, 2013, fellow NSP member Cabrera asked
appellant to drive him to buy marijuana. Appellant declined, but
then heard from a friend about Zane, a local marijuana dealer.
Appellant testified that Cabrera borrowed appellant’s cell phone
on January 14, 2013 during a family party and failed to return it.
The next day, the day of the incident, appellant went to Belin's
house to retrieve his phone from Cabrera. Cabrera and Ceballos
were there, and Ceballos asked appellant to drive her to a
medical marijuana shop. Appellant declined, but gave Cabrera
Zane’s contact information. Appellant testified that Cabrera used
appellant’s phone to contact Zane and asked appellant to attend
the meeting with him. While they were waiting, Parra arrived at
Belin’s house. Appellant acknowledged that Parra was an NSP
member, but testified at trial that he did not know Parra was
going to be there that day.
       Cabrera, Parra, and appellant went to meet Zane. While in
the alley near the street, Cabrera said he was going to “buy the
weed real quick,” and told appellant and Parra to wait. The Jeep
drove down a driveway out of sight with Cabrera walking
alongside. Suspicious, appellant followed, as did Parra, and saw
the Jeep pull into the carport.
       Before appellant reached the Jeep, it backed up and sped
out of the driveway. As it did so, Cabrera’s leg and jacket were
hanging out of the open rear passenger door. Concerned for
Cabrera’s safety, appellant ran to his car in the alley and

                                7
followed the Jeep. Parra also got into appellant’s car, sitting in
the front passenger seat.
      Appellant testified that as he turned the corner, he saw
Cabrera struggling with someone inside the Jeep. Appellant
drove up to the Jeep, but “before [he] could put the car in park,
[he] heard a pop.” Cabrera jumped into appellant’s car and
appellant began to drive away. He looked back and saw “a big
old hole in the windshield” of the Jeep. Appellant claimed that
he never saw anyone with a gun that day. While driving back to
Belin's house, however, Parra told appellant to keep his mouth
shut or he and Jacequez would be hurt.
      On cross-examination, appellant admitted that when he
stopped next to Zane’s Jeep, Parra exited the passenger side.
Appellant then “heard a pop. [Parra] jumped back in. [Cabrera]
jumped in the back seat, and I took off.” When Parra reentered
the car, he was carrying a short barrel shotgun. Appellant
claimed he had not seen Parra with the shotgun before the
shooting.
      Appellant identified all three defendants in the
surveillance videos. He admitted that the videos showed Parra
walking “with a slight affect to his body,” when he walked from
the carport after Zane’s Jeep left with Cabrera inside. But
appellant denied noticing that Parra moved awkwardly during
the incident, and denied that the reason Parra was walking in
that manner was because he had concealed a shotgun in his
pants.
                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.    Conviction and Sentence
      Appellant, Parra, and Cabrera were jointly tried. A jury
convicted all three defendants of first degree murder (§ 187, subd.

                                8
(a); count 1) and found true the attempted-robbery-murder
special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The jury also
convicted defendants of attempted second degree robbery
(§§ 664/211; count 2), and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182,
subd. (a)(1); count 3). On the conspiracy count, the jury found
true the overt act that appellant pointed a loaded shotgun at the
victim. As to all counts, the jury found that a principal
discharged a firearm (a shotgun) causing death
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d) and (e)(1)), and that the crime was
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)).
       The trial court sentenced appellant to life without the
possibility of parole on count 1, plus 25 years to life for the
firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d)
and (e)(1). The court also imposed terms of two years on count 2,
life without parole on count 3, and 25 years to life for the firearm
enhancement on each count, but stayed those sentences pursuant
to section 654.
       A different panel of this court affirmed the convictions of
appellant, Parra, and Cabrera on direct appeal.7 As relevant
here, appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to
support the jury’s true finding on the attempted robbery-murder
special circumstance because it failed to prove that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life in aiding and abetting the
attempted robbery. (See People v. Parra, supra.) This court
reviewed the factors under Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and
concluded there was “no question that substantial evidence

7     The court remanded the matter for correction of several
sentencing errors. (See People v. Parra, supra.)

                                 9
showed” that appellant was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference.8 (See People v. Parra, supra.) Citing the
cell phone evidence, this court found that appellant “was the
mastermind of the plan to rob Zane, the culmination of which
was Zane’s death.” (People v. Parra, supra.)
       In addition, the court relied on Zachary’s testimony
identifying appellant as the one who pointed a shotgun at Zane in
the carport and threatened to kill him. Notably, the court
expressly rejected appellant’s contention that Zachary’s
identification was unreliable. The court found that “Zachary’s
identification of Conchas as the one who pointed the shotgun at
Zane and threatened to kill him was not physically impossible:
Conchas was present in the carport, and Zachary personally
observed the assailant with the shotgun. Further, even though
the evidence suggested that Parra carried the shotgun stuffed
down a pant leg when he returned from the carport to Tyler
Alley, and later used it when he shot Zane after the pursuit, it is
not physically impossible that Conchas, after using the gun in the
carport, gave it to Parra to conceal and carry after the robbery
was interrupted. In short, Zachary's identification of Conchas as
the person who used the shotgun in the carport constituted
substantial evidence of that fact.” (See People v. Parra, supra.)

8      The jury made the special circumstance finding prior to our
Supreme Court’s decisions in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and
Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, which clarified the law regarding
major participants in an underlying offense who act with reckless
indifference to life. As such, on appeal this court independently
analyzed whether the evidence supported the jury’s finding under
section 190.2 under the standards established by Banks and
Clark.

                                10
The court also noted that in convicting appellant of conspiracy,
the jury found true the alleged overt act that he “pointed a loaded
shotgun at the victim.” (People v. Parra, supra.)
       The court also reasoned, “Considering Conchas’ awareness
‘of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants’
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803), the jury could infer that
Conchas knew the inherent danger involved when he and fellow
NSP gang members planned to rob a marijuana dealer using a
sawed-off shotgun after luring him to a place of seclusion.”
(People v. Parra, supra.) Further, the court found that appellant
was “‘present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate
or prevent the actual murder.’” (Id., quoting Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803.) The court noted that after Zane drove out of
the complex, appellant pursued him in his vehicle, “carrying
Parra, who was then armed with a shotgun.” The court rejected
as “unlikely” appellant’s testimony that he did not notice Parra
was armed, particularly given the finding that appellant had
pointed a weapon at Zane just moments before. (People v. Parra,
supra.) The court also found that appellant “‘play[ed] a
particular role in the death.’ ([Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p.
803].) He drove the shooter, Parra, to the scene of the shooting,
and stopped next to Zane’s car, which allowed Parra to get out
and shoot Zane. After the shooting, Parra got back in, Cabrera
entered, and Conchas drove off with the two men he had
recruited to rob Zane, leaving Zane fatally wounded.” (People v.
Parra, supra.)

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II.     Section 1172.6 Proceedings
       A.    Petition and response
       On January 14, 2019, appellant filed a form petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6. He checked the boxes
indicating that he was convicted of first or second degree murder
pursuant to the felony murder rule or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of
first degree felony murder because he was not the actual killer,
was not a major participant in the underlying felony, and did not
act with reckless indifference to human life during the course of
the felony. The court appointed counsel for appellant.
       In March 2019, the People filed an opposition to the
petition, contending that the statute was unconstitutional. In
June 2019, the People filed a supplemental opposition. The
People conceded that appellant had been convicted under the
felony-murder rule, but argued he was ineligible for relief on the
grounds that he was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life. Citing the
factors set forth in Banks, the People argued that all three
defendants “planned and coordinated the robbery of Zane
Goldstein,” and each “played a significant role,” in the criminal
enterprise. The People cited the evidence that both appellant
and Parra were armed with firearms, appellant pointed a
shotgun at Zane and threatened to “blast” him, appellant and
Parra pursued the vehicle after Zane resisted, and all three
defendants fled together after Parra shot Zane. The People also
requested that the court take judicial notice of the prior decision
of this court in People v. Parra, supra. The court granted that
request, with no objection by appellant.

                                12
       In March 2020, appellant filed a reply brief arguing that he
had established a prima facie case for resentencing, and
requesting that the court issue an order to show cause and set
the matter for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (d)(3). He asserted that he did not have a firearm
during the attempted robbery and that there had not been any
plan to kill anyone, and therefore that he did not act with
reckless indifference to human life.
       B.    Hearing and decision
       The court issued an order to show cause, and held an
evidentiary hearing on April 29, 2022. The People relied on the
prior appellate decision, the preliminary hearing transcripts, and
the evidence presented at trial. Appellant’s counsel conceded in
his opening statement that appellant was a major participant in
the attempted robbery, but argued that appellant’s petition
should be granted because he did not act with reckless
indifference to human life.
       Appellant testified and called Stephanie Jacequez as a
witness on his behalf. He also submitted four exhibits—
surveillance video clips, two photographs of the apartment
complex, and one photograph of the carport.
       Jacequez, who was not called as a witness during the trial,
testified that in 2013 she was living with appellant and their
children. On the day of the incident, she and appellant went to
Cabrera’s residence around noon. To her knowledge, appellant
was not armed. She also did not see Cabrera or Parra with any
weapons that day. She testified that at the time, appellant had a
“sleeve” of tattoos covering his right forearm. She reviewed the
surveillance video, which she described as “blurry,” but identified
Parra as the bald individual wearing a white shirt. She also

                                13
identified appellant as the individual running down the driveway
from the carport. Appellant testified that on the day of the
incident, he and Jacequez went to Cabrera’s house and he and
Cabrera discussed getting marijuana. He acknowledged that he
was not completely truthful during his testimony at trial and
that he lied about his “involvement in planning the robbery.” He
previously testified that he had no intention to rob anyone, but in
fact he and Cabrera planned to arrange to buy marijuana from
Zane. When Zane arrived, “it was going to be a basic snatch and
grab. . . . Show us the marijuana. One of us grabs the weed,
runs, and after one would be a distraction in case there is a
pursuit.” Appellant also admitted that he contacted Zane by text
message and “basically put the plan into effect, and that he had
lied at trial when he claimed he had given his phone to Cabrera.
He said he lied at trial because his prior attorney told him that if
he was involved in the robbery, he could be convicted for the
murder. He claimed that Parra was not part of the plan.
Appellant did not have a weapon at any point that day, nor did
Cabrera; consequently, he did not think the attempted robbery
would create any danger to human life.
       Viewing the video footage, appellant testified that he had a
“buzzed cut” with short black hair, wearing a black short-sleeved
shirt, black and white checkered shorts, white socks, and white
shoes. He also had tattoos on his right forearm. He identified
Cabrera as wearing blue jeans and a black and white jacket, and
Parra as bald and wearing all white. On that day, he gave Zane
the address of the apartment complex on Holliston to meet them.
Parra arrived at the “last minute”; appellant and Cabrera
informed Parra of the robbery plan while they were walking to

                                 14
meet Zane. He did not see Parra with a weapon when Parra
arrived.
       Appellant explained that the plan was once the Jeep
arrived, Cabrera would enter the car and ask to see the
marijuana. Once the marijuana was shown, Cabrera was
supposed to snatch the drugs and run through the alley.
Appellant planned to stay in the alley and stop anyone who
pursued Cabrera. They had not planned for the Jeep to pull into
the driveway, so once it did, appellant and Parra walked after it
to see what was happening. By the time appellant neared the
Jeep, it was backing out rapidly.
       Appellant also testified that after the Jeep left with
Cabrera inside, he pursued it to help Cabrera. Appellant was not
armed. He acknowledged that the video showed Parra walking
oddly, but insisted he did not see a gun on Parra. Appellant ran
to his car and Parra got in the passenger side. Appellant did not
see any weapon on Parra at that time and saw nothing to make
him suspicious that Parra might have a gun. Appellant drove
around the corner and saw the Jeep parked on the street.
Appellant pulled his car in front of the Jeep. He testified that the
following events happened “so fast.” As he pulled over, Parra
jumped out of the car. Then appellant “heard a pop.” He
“immediately hit the gas” out of fear after hearing the gunshot,
and Parra and Cabrera jumped in the car as it was moving. As
he was driving away, appellant looked back and saw a hole in the
Jeep’s windshield. He did not see anyone get shot. He did see
Parra with a single barrel shotgun, approximately 10 inches long,
when Parra got back in the car. When Parra reentered the car,
appellant realized that Parra had fired the shotgun, but
appellant was not aware that Zane had been killed until later.

                                15
       During cross-examination, appellant acknowledged that
Parra was a fellow NSP gang member. He also acknowledged
that the plan was to “put up a fight” if anyone pursued Cabrera
after he grabbed the marijuana. He agreed that drug dealing can
be a dangerous business and he had no idea if Zane would be
armed.
       At the continued hearing on May 4, 2022, the court
admitted appellant’s exhibits without objection and took judicial
notice of the transcript of testimony from the trial. Appellant’s
counsel argued that there was insufficient evidence for the court
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant knew that Parra
was armed. He also argued that appellant could not have done
anything to stop Parra from shooting Zane. The court took the
matter under submission.
       The court issued a written decision on May 6, 2022,
denying appellant’s petition. The court discussed the Banks
factors, concluding that appellant was a major participant in the
criminal enterprise that led to Zane’s death, and that appellant
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       Specifically, the court found that cell phone evidence
introduced at trial established that appellant was “the
mastermind of the plan to rob Mr. Goldstein, the culmination of
which was Mr. Goldstein’s death.” The court also rejected as
“not credible” appellant’s testimony during the evidentiary
hearing that he was not armed at any point during the incident,
noting that at trial, appellant “was identified by a witness as a
person who pointed a shotgun at Mr. Goldstein during the
attempted robbery and threatened to kill him.” The court
continued, “[i]n considering whether [appellant] was aware of the
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime at issue in

                               16
this case, it is quite reasonable to infer that [appellant] as a
member of the North Side Pasadena street gang, knew the
inherent dangers of the crimes at issue in this case when he and
other members of his gang made a plan to rob an individual
selling marijuana using a sawed off shotgun after luring the
intended victim into a place of seclusion.”
       The court also found that the evidence presented at trial
established that appellant “was present at the scene of the
killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder.
The jury heard testimony that [appellant] pursued Mr. Goldstein
in his car with his co-defendant Mr. Parra, who was armed with a
shotgun that ultimately fired the fatal shot.” The court again
found appellant was not credible either at trial or during the
hearing when he testified that he was not aware that Parra was
armed, based on “a review of all the evidence in his case.” Thus,
the court concluded that “[t]he totality of all the evidence
produced both at the trial . . . and at the evidentiary hearing
regarding this petition leads this Court to the conclusion that
[appellant] was a major participant in the attempted robbery in
this case, and that he acted with a reckless indifference to human
life.”
       Appellant timely appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Governing Law
       Section 189 was amended in 2019 to limit liability for
murder under a felony-murder theory to a participant who (1)
was “the actual killer,” (2) “with the intent to kill,” aided or
abetted “the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first
degree,” or (3) “was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life as described in

                                17
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)-(3); see
People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) The
language of section 189, subdivision (e)(3) tracks the language of
the robbery-murder special provision in section 190.2, subdivision
(d), both requiring a finding that a participant was a “major
participant” in the underlying felony (here, an attempted
robbery) and acted with “reckless indifference” to human life.
(See §§ 189, subd. (e)(3), 190.2, subd. (d).)
       Section 1172.6 permits individuals who were convicted of
felony murder or murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory, but who could not be convicted of murder
following the changes to section 189, to petition the sentencing
court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining
counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       At the evidentiary hearing on a section 1172.6 petition, the
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
“that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder
under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
At the hearing, the court “may consider evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under
current law, including witness testimony, stipulated evidence,
and matters judicially noticed. The court may also consider the
procedural history of the case recited in any prior appellate
opinion.” (Ibid.) Additionally, both the petitioner and the People
“may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their
respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “A finding that there is substantial
evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter is insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the

                                18
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.) Resentencing is
unavailable if the petitioner was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) The trial court acts as
an independent factfinder and determines whether the
prosecution has met its burden. (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 970, 984 (Ramirez).)
II.    Standard of Review
       On appeal from an order denying a section 1172.6 petition
after an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Richardson (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298 (Clements).) “The scope of our review for substantial
evidence is well settled. The test is not whether the People met
their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [a
defendant in a section 1172.6 proceeding] was ineligible for
resentencing, but rather ‘whether any rational trier of fact could
have’ made the same determination, namely that ‘[t]he record ...
disclose[s] . . . evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [as did the
superior court].’” (People v. Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 652,
662-663, quoting People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357;
see also People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 111.) Thus, our
job on review “is to determine whether there is any substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational
fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Clements,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)

                                 19
        “‘In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
[order] the existence of every fact the [superior court] could
reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.]
“Conflicts [in the evidence] . . . subject to justifiable suspicion do
not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge . . . to determine the . . . truth or falsity
of the facts upon which a determination depends.”’” (People v.
Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 663, citations omitted;
People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th 87, 112-113 [“Our role is
not to reweigh the evidence, nor is it our role to judge the
credibility of witnesses.”].) “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the
judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.”
(People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 639.)
III. Banks and Clark
        In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th 522, our Supreme Court “clarified the meaning of the
special circumstances statute” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 674) and set forth the factors relevant to determining
whether a defendant is a major participant in a felony who acted
with reckless indifference to life. The major participant and
reckless indifference factors “significantly overlap” in that “‘the
greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the
more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-615, quoting Tison v.
Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153 (Tison).)
        In Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623, the court set
forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining

                                   20
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. The first factor relates to weapons: Was the defendant
aware that weapons would be used in the felony? Did the
defendant use a weapon? How many weapons were used in the
crime? (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The court cautioned
that “[t]he mere fact of a defendant’s awareness that a gun will
be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish reckless
indifference to human life.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 617, fn. 74
[“A robbery in which the only factor supporting reckless
indifference to human life is the fact of the use of a gun is what
we meant by ‘a garden-variety armed robbery’ in Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 802.”].) The second factor is the defendant’s
physical proximity to the murder and the events leading up to it,
and the opportunities that proximity afforded to restrain the
crime or aid the victim. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) The
third factor is the duration of the felony, particularly the
duration of the interaction between victims and perpetrators;
more prolonged incidents provide “‘a greater window of
opportunity for violence.’” (Id. at pp. 620-621.) The fourth factor
is the defendant’s awareness of codefendants’ propensity for
violence or likelihood of killing a victim. (Id. at p. 621.) The final
factor is the defendant’s efforts to minimize the risk of violence
during the felony, though the court cautioned that “some effort to
minimize the risk of violence does not, in itself, necessarily
foreclose a finding that defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Id. at pp. 621-622.)
       No single factor is determinative. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 618, 621–623.) Instead, courts must assess the totality of a
defendant’s culpability along a spectrum. (See Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 705.) At the least culpable end of the spectrum is

                                 21
the defendant in Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782, a
getaway driver who was a “‘minor actor in an armed robbery, not
on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have
had any culpable mental state,’” and thus was minimally
culpable for the murder that ensued. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 800.). At the other, highly culpable, end of the spectrum are
the defendants in Tison, supra, 481 U.S. 137, who “had broken
convicted murderers out of jail, armed them, captured an
innocent family, ‘held [the family] at gunpoint while the two
murderers deliberated whether the family should live or die,
[and] then stood by while all four members were shot.’” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 705, quoting Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 802.)
       A defendant’s youth at the time of the crime “is a relevant
factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 987, citing In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 453-454
(Moore).) This is because children generally lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment of adults, and are also generally less
responsible and mature. (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p.
453.) As with the other factors, youth alone is not dispositive. (In
re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450, 470.)
       At bottom, “[r]eckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit
in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a
grave risk of death’” (In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 676,
quoting Tison, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157), and “encompasses a
willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
distinct aim, even if the [appellant] does not specifically desire
that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 617.) Although recklessness has a subjective

                                 22
element, “it is the jury’s objective determination that ultimately
determines recklessness”; “a defendant’s good faith but
unreasonable belief that he or she was not posing a risk to
human life in pursuing the felony does not suffice to foreclose a
determination of reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p.
622.)
IV.     Analysis
       Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s finding that
he was a major participant in the attempted robbery. Instead, he
argues only that there was insufficient evidence to support the
finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Applying the factors identified by Clark, and viewing the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant acted with reckless indifference
to human life.
       Appellant’s central focus is on the trial court’s finding that
appellant pointed the shotgun at Zane and threatened to “blast”
him. Appellant argues that this finding is “contrary to the
evidence,” pointing to Zachary’s testimony that the person with
the shotgun was wearing a white shirt and jeans, was bald, and
Zachary did not see any tattoos on the man’s arms. This
evidence, he argues, unequivocally matches the description of
Parra, not appellant.
       “While an appellate court can overturn a judgment when it
concludes the evidence supporting it was ‘inherently improbable,’
such a finding is so rare as to be almost nonexistent. ‘“To
warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who
has been believed by a trial court, there must exist either a
physical impossibility that they are true, or their falsity must be

                                 23
apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions.”
[Citations.] Such cases are rare indeed.’” (People v. Ennis (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 721, 728–729.) Appellant recognizes this
weighty standard, but suggests that this case is one such rarity.
We disagree.
       As appellant notes, there was inconsistent evidence
regarding the identity of the assailant who pointed the shotgun
at Zane. These inconsistencies were presented at trial and the
jury nevertheless found that appellant wielded the shotgun. In
appellant’s direct appeal, this court found that substantial
evidence supported the jury’s verdict and expressly rejected
appellant’s argument that Zane’s identification was mistaken.
Subsequently, following the evidentiary hearing on appellant’s
resentencing petition, the same judge who presided over
appellant’s trial found that appellant had pointed the shotgun at
Zane. We find no basis to depart from these findings. Zachary
testified at trial that he got a good look at the individual pointing
the shotgun and that he was certain it was appellant; he made
the same identification at the preliminary hearing. Further,
Zachary’s testimony that the man had a shaved head and that he
did not see any tattoos was not necessarily inconsistent with his
identification of appellant.
       Appellant suggests, without authority, that the trial court
was required to find that Zachary was mistaken in his
identification of appellant, rather than in his description of the
assailant’s clothing. We will not reweigh this evidence, and we
disagree with appellant that it was physically impossible for
appellant to have pointed the shotgun at Zane. The video
surveillance footage showed that an individual later identified as
Parra was dressed in a white shirt and jeans and that both

                                 24
appellant and Parra followed the Jeep after Zane drove into the
apartment complex. The footage did not show, however, which
defendant pointed the shotgun at Zane. Appellant was present
near the Jeep at the time and Zachary identified him as the
assailant with the shotgun. Further, as this court previously
noted, even if Parra was subsequently carrying the shotgun in his
pant leg, it was not physically impossible that appellant first
pointed the gun at Zane, then gave the gun to Parra to conceal
and carry as they pursued the Jeep.
      As such, the trial court’s finding that appellant pointed the
shotgun at Zane was supported by substantial evidence. Thus,
appellant’s use of a weapon and threat to shoot Zane during the
attempted robbery weighs heavily in favor of the finding that he
acted in reckless disregard for human life.9 (See Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 618.)
      Similarly, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that
appellant was aware that Parra was armed during the course of
the incident was supported by substantial evidence. The
evidence demonstrated that Parra was carrying a 10-inch

      9 The court’s finding that appellant was armed

distinguishes this case from those cited by appellant, in which
the defendant was aware that his confederate was armed, but did
not personally use a weapon. (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 613, 618 [“The mere fact of a defendant's awareness that a
gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life.”]; Ramirez, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 988 [insufficient evidence of reckless
indifference where “Ramirez was aware Rios had a gun and
intended to use it during the carjacking”].)

                                25
shotgun when he entered the front passenger seat of appellant’s
car. From that evidence, along with appellant’s own prior
brandishing of the weapon, a factfinder could reasonably
conclude that appellant was aware that Parra was armed as they
began the pursuit of the Jeep. The trial court was entitled to
reject appellant’s testimony to the contrary, and we will not
disturb that credibility finding on appeal.
       The remaining Clark factors offer little support for
appellant. He concedes that he was present at the scene of the
shooting, but argues that there is no evidence that he knew Parra
would shoot Zane, and that he pursued the Jeep only out of
concern for Cabrera. The evidence demonstrated that appellant
was present for the commission of the robbery and the shooting,
and did nothing to prevent the murder. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 619 [“‘[i]f the defendant fails to act as a restraining
influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the
resulting murders’”].) On the contrary, he drove his armed
confederate in pursuit of the fleeing victims, then facilitated the
murder by pulling his car in front of Zane’s vehicle. This allowed
Parra to jump out of the car, shoot Zane, and quickly jump back
in, at which point appellant sped away from the scene. He made
no effort to restrain Parra or aid the victim, despite his testimony
that he heard the gunshot and saw the large hole in the Jeep’s
windshield. (See People v. Douglas (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1, 10
[defendant “displayed no interest in moderating violence or in
aiding his bloody and suffering victim”].)
       Appellant contends that the brief duration of the incident
weighs in his favor. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 620
[prolonged incidents provide “a greater window of opportunity for
violence”]; Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [appellant

                                26
did not have a “meaningful opportunity” to intervene in sudden
and unprovoked shooting by associate].) We disagree. As
planned by appellant, he and his confederates laid in wait for the
victims to arrive, directed their vehicle to a secluded area, then
appellant threatened Zane with a shotgun. When the attempted
robbery was thwarted by Zane’s decision to flee, appellant
decided to continue the confrontation by pursuing the Jeep,
accompanied by a fellow armed gang member, rather than taking
the opportunity to de-escalate the situation. Appellant then
pulled in front of the Jeep, preventing further escape and
allowing Parra to confront the victims with the shotgun. As such,
the incident had a more prolonged opportunity for violence than
appellant suggests, which cuts against him.
       We also note that the trial court’s factual finding that
appellant was a major participant in the underlying felony as the
“mastermind” of the plan is itself supportive of the court’s further
factual finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (See People v. Cody, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 113; see also
In re Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677 [“The greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely
that he [or she] acted with reckless indifference to human life”];
Tison, supra, at p. 158, fn. 12 [a defendant’s status as a major
participant in the underlying felony will “often provide significant
support for . . . a [reckless indifference] finding”].)
       Appellant cites his youth as another factor in his favor, as
he was 23 years old at the time of the shooting. While the trial
court could consider appellant’s age and maturity level along
with the other factors, it was not required to treat it as the
decisive factor. (See, e.g., People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
466, 489 [finding harmless error in court’s failure to consider 23-

                                27
year-old defendant’s age and noting that “[p]resumably, the
presumption of immaturity weakens as a defendant approaches
26”]; see also In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 470.)
       Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant acted with
reckless indifference to human life. He was ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6, and the petition was correctly
denied.
                          DISPOSITION
       The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                          COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

                               28