Court Opinion

ID: 9401801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 06:08:41.194677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.360807
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 8, 2023

                                         In the
                               Court of Appeals
                        Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 No. 05-21-01058-CV

                    AZITA NAZARY, Appellant
                              V.
SOLID CLASSIC, LP D/B/A CLASSIC BMW AND SOLID CLASSIC I, INC.
                 D/B/A CLASSIC BMW, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
                                Collin County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. 401-02809-2020

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
                       Before Justices Carlyle, Garcia, and Miskel
                               Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      Azita Nazary appeals from a no-evidence summary judgment granted in favor

of Solid Classic, LP and Solid Classic I, Inc. (collectively, “Classic”)—owners of

the Classic BMW car dealership. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 47.4.

      Ms. Nazary alleges that she slipped and fell on a small puddle of water in the

Classic BMW service department. She sued Classic for negligence based on theories

of premises liability and negligent activity. Classic moved for traditional and no-

evidence summary judgment, arguing: (1) there is no evidence that Classic had
actual or constructive knowledge of any water on its floor; (2) there is no evidence

that Classic failed to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk posed

by any water on its floor; and (3) Ms. Nazary’s negligent-activity theory fails

because her claim as alleged sounds solely in premises liability.

      Ms. Nazary responded to Classic’s motion, attaching as evidence deposition

excerpts and a photograph she took approximately four months after the accident

showing another puddle of water in an area of the service floor near where she fell.

In response to Classic’s argument that she lacked evidence showing actual or

constructive knowledge of any water on its floor, she relied on her deposition

testimony that a Classic employee told her after she fell that the rails on the service

floor’s garage doors were “always leaking.” She added that Classic’s service

manager testified that if there were water on the ground, it would “provide a slip and

fall possibility for employees as well as customers.”

      Based primarily on that evidence, she argued, “[a] jury could, and should, find

that there was water on the ground, and that that amount of water on the ground

constitutes an unreasonably dangerous condition.” Further, she contended, “[a] jury

could find that [Classic’s] employees knew that there was water on the ground in

that area, well before Plaintiff slipped and fell.” And “[a] jury could, and should,

find that [Classic] knew or should have known about the water in that area.”

      With respect to whether Classic breached a duty of care concerning any water

on its floor, Ms. Nazary’s response consisted entirely of the following paragraph:

                                         –2–
             Defendants stated in [their] Motion for Summary Judgment that
      “there is no evidence that Classic failed to exercise reasonable care in
      reducing or eliminating the risk” posed by the water on the ground. See
      Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants do not allege
      [they] cleaned up the water on the ground before Plaintiff slipped and
      fell. Defendants have no evidence to indicate [they] took any
      precautions or corrective measures to protect Plaintiff. The issue that
      resulted in water on the ground was persistent and ongoing. Therefore,
      a jury could, and should, find that Defendants failed to correct the
      dangerous condition before Plaintiff’s injury.

      Classic objected to Ms. Nazary’s summary judgment evidence in its reply, and

Ms. Nazary filed a surreply addressing those objections. Her surreply referenced a

deposition excerpt in which Classic’s service manager, after reviewing surveillance

video from the incident, identified one of the people coming to Ms. Nazary’s aid

after her fall as a Classic employee. But Ms. Nazary did not attach that deposition

excerpt to either her summary judgment response or her surreply.

      After the trial court notified the parties it was granting Classic’s summary

judgment motion, Ms. Nazary filed a motion seeking leave to late-file the evidence

referenced in her surreply. The trial court held a hearing on that motion, after which

it entered an order: (1) denying Ms. Nazary’s motion to late-file evidence;

(2) granting Classic’s no-evidence summary judgment motion; and (3) denying

Classic’s traditional summary judgment motion. Ms. Nazary filed a motion for new

trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

      We review a summary judgment de novo, taking as true all evidence favorable

to the non-movant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts

                                         –3–
in the non-movant’s favor. Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254,

257 (Tex. 2017). To defeat a no-evidence motion, the non-movant must produce

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine fact issue as to each challenged element. First

United Pentecostal Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017);

see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). This requires that the non-movant specifically identify

the evidence it seeks to have the trial court consider and explain why that evidence

demonstrates the existence of a fact issue. Great Hans, LLC v. Liberty Life Serv.

Corp., No. 05-20-00113-CV, 2021 WL 5822841, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 8,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The trial court is not required to search through the record

and determine on its own whether a fact issue exists without specific guidance from

the non-movant. Id.

       A genuine fact issue exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would

enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Id. (quoting

Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)). Thus, a fact

issue does not exist if the evidence is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere

surmise or suspicion” of its existence. Id. (quoting Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz, 432

S.W.3d 865, 875 (Tex. 2014)).

       Ms. Nazary first contends the trial court erred by granting Classic’s no-

evidence motion on her slip-and-fall claim.1 Relevant to this issue, Classic agrees it

   1
     Ms. Nazary’s brief does not challenge the summary judgment to the extent it dismisses her claim
based on a negligent-activity theory.
                                               –4–
owed Ms. Nazary an invitee duty to exercise reasonable care to protect her from

dangerous conditions on its premises that were known or reasonably discoverable.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 814 (Tex. 2002). To prove her claim,

Ms. Nazary must establish: (1) Classic had actual or constructive knowledge of a

dangerous condition on its premises; (2) the dangerous condition posed an

unreasonable risk of harm; (3) Classic did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or

eliminate the risk; and (4) Classic’s failure to use such care proximately caused her

injuries. CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. 2000).

      Classic’s no-evidence motion challenged the knowledge and breach elements.

Consequently, Ms. Nazary had the burden of pointing the trial court to specific

evidence it wished the court to consider on each of those elements, explaining why

that evidence created a genuine fact issue. See Great Hans, LLC, 2021 WL 5822841,

at *2. We address only the breach element because it is dispositive in this case.

      The supreme court has explained that a premises owner or operator must “take

whatever action is reasonably prudent under the circumstances to reduce or eliminate

the unreasonable risk” posed by a known dangerous condition. TXI Operations, L.P.

v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 763, 764–65 (Tex. 2009). This means the owner or operator

must “either adequately warn of the dangerous condition or make the condition

reasonably safe.” See id. at 765.

      As in the trial court, Ms. Nazary devotes only a single paragraph of her brief

to the breach element—a paragraph without legal authorities, record citations, or

                                         –5–
analysis applying appropriate legal standards. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Graham

v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 05-09-01310-CV, 2011 WL 3435371, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 8, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      Ms. Nazary’s inadequate response to Classic’s no-evidence motion is

dispositive here. Ms. Nazary had the burden of pointing the trial court to specific

summary judgment evidence and explaining why that evidence raised a fact issue as

to whether Classic failed to either adequately warn her of the wet floor or make the

wet floor reasonably safe. See Great Hans, LLC, 2021 WL 5822841, at *2. She did

neither. Neither our Court nor the trial court is responsible for independently

reviewing the record, searching for evidence or authorities that might support Ms.

Nazary’s claims, and making her arguments for her. See Graham, 2011 WL 3435371,

at *2. Instead, she argued Classic failed to cite evidence showing that it exercised

reasonable care. That was not Classic’s burden.

      Because Ms. Nazary failed to point the trial court to more than a scintilla of

summary judgment evidence suggesting that Classic failed to exercise reasonable

care, we cannot conclude the trial court erred by granting Classic’s no-evidence

motion for summary judgment on the breach element. Thus, we need not decide

whether Ms. Nazary produced sufficient evidence to show Classic had actual or

constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition.

      Ms. Nazary next contends the trial court erred by denying her leave to late-

file summary judgment evidence. We review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of

                                        –6–
discretion. See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 688

(Tex. 2002). A trial court should grant a motion to late-file a summary judgment

response if the movant establishes: (1) good cause for failing to timely respond,

“showing that the failure to respond was not intentional or the result of conscious

indifference, but the result of accident or mistake”; and (2) that “allowing the late

response will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seeking

summary judgment.” Id.

      Here, Ms. Nazary provided no affidavit or other evidence explaining why she

failed to timely file the evidence referenced in her surreply, and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by rejecting her bare assertion that the failure was

unintentional. See id. Moreover, Ms. Nazary contends only that the evidence

corroborates her testimony that a Classic employee came to her aid after the fall and

told her the garage-door rails were “always leaking.” She does not explain how that

evidence creates a fact issue as to whether Classic breached its duty to exercise

reasonable care, even if it had knowledge of any dangerous condition. Thus, because

we conclude the trial court did not err by granting Classic’s no-evidence motion

based on the breach element, any error in denying Ms. Nazary leave to late-file the

evidence was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a).

                                         –7–
     Having overruled each of Ms. Nazary’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

211058f.p05                            /Cory L. Carlyle/
                                       CORY L. CARLYLE
                                       JUSTICE

                                    –8–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                   JUDGMENT

AZITA NAZARY, Appellant                        On Appeal from the 401st Judicial
                                               District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-21-01058-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. 401-02809-
                                               2020.
SOLID CLASSIC, LP D/B/A                        Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
CLASSIC BMW AND SOLID                          Justices Garcia and Miskel
CLASSIC I, INC. D/B/A CLASSIC                  participating.
BMW, Appellees

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

       It is ORDERED that appellee SOLID CLASSIC, LP D/B/A CLASSIC
BMW AND SOLID CLASSIC I, INC. D/B/A CLASSIC BMW recover their costs
of this appeal from appellant AZITA NAZARY.

Judgment entered this 8th day of June, 2023.

                                         –9–