Court Opinion

ID: 9946308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:10:44.369402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:40.034157
License: Public Domain

J-S44001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: K.M., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: K.K., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2166 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered July 21, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 2023-00002

  IN THE INTEREST OF: A.F.S., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: K.K., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2167 EDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered July 21, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Orphans' Court at
                            No(s): 2023-00003

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 29, 2024

       K.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the July 21, 2023 decrees involuntarily

terminating her parental rights to her sons, K.M, born January 2011, and

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44001-23

A.F.S., born November 2019 (collectively, “the Children”).1 After review, we

affirm.

       We glean the following relevant factual and procedural history from the

certified record. On December 30, 2020, Monroe County Children and Youth

Services (“CYS” or “the Agency”) received a referral concerning Mother’s

mental health and alleged use of illegal substances.2 Specifically, Mother “was

seeking help for her mental health. At that time, she was diagnosed with

[m]ajor [d]epressive [d]isorder, [a]nxiety, and [d]epression.      [S]he stated

that she was experiencing fits of uncontrolled rage and . . . admitted to daily

methamphetamine use [a]nd . . . to recently using heroin.” N.T., 6/16/23, at

15-16. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine on

January 20, 2021.        See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21.   Thereafter, the Agency

obtained protective custody of the Children on January 22, 2021, which was

confirmed at a shelter care hearing on January 25, 2023. See N.T., 6/16/23,

at 24-25, 29.

       On February 4, 2021, the court adjudicated the Children dependent and

established their respective permanency goals as return to parent or guardian

with concurrent goals of adoption. Mother’s permanency objectives included,

____________________________________________

1 By the same decrees, the orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights

of K.M.’s father, M.M., and A.F.S.’s father, C.S. These individuals neither filed
an appeal nor participated in the instant appeals.
2 The family had come to the attention of the Agency on three prior occasions,

dating back to May 2012, related to substance abuse and housing issues. See
N.T., 6/14/23, at 14-15.

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in part, participating in drug and alcohol treatment and screening, engaging

in mental health treatment, and maintaining safe and stable housing. See

Petitioner’s Exhibits 1 & 2. Mother was additionally required to participate in

regular supervised visitation with the Children, and a referral was made to

Justice Works for weekly supervised visitation. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 18.

        Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted

regular review hearings at which it maintained the Children’s commitment and

placement. During this time, Mother was charged with possession of a firearm

with the manufacturer number altered in February 2022.           The disposition

and/or status of this charge is unclear from the certified record.          See

Petitioner’s Exhibit 27.      Mother additionally pleaded guilty to drug-related

charges in April 20223 and was sentenced to six months’ probation in June

2022.      See id.     The probation department filed a violation of probation

petition in December 2022.4 A bench warrant was issued the following month,

in January 2023. See id.

        On June 2, 2022, the Children’s permanency goals were changed to

adoption. See id. at 51, 78.

        As to Mother’s progress, the orphans’ court stated:

____________________________________________

3 The record reflects unknown periods of incarceration in March and April 2022,

the latter stemming from an April 2022 incident between Mother and her
current paramour. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 27; N.T., 6/14/23, at 48.

4 We are unable to discern from the certified record the genesis of the
probation violation.

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                                          ...

       13. Goals were discussed and services were offered to Mother, but
       she has not met any goals set forth in the Permanency Plan. . . .

                                          ...

       16. While the [Children have] been in care, Mother has had
       continued use of drugs and violated the terms of her probation.

       17. Mother has lacked stable housing and employment.

       18. Mother appeared for at least one visit with [the Children]
       where she was under the influence. She also had injuries to her
       face at that visit that appeared to be from domestic violence.

       19. Mother is currently unemployed and has a warrant outstanding
       for her arrest.

       20. Mother last visited the [Children] in September 2022. She has
       had no contact with the [Children] since that date, and very little
       contact with CYS.

                                          ...

Orphans’ Court Opinion and Decree, 7/21/23, at 3.5

       On January 11, 2023, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of parental rights.        The orphans’ court held a hearing on the

petitions on June 14, 2023, at which time the Children were twelve and three

years old.6 The Agency presented the testimony of the former caseworker,

____________________________________________

5 While the orphans’ court entered separate opinions and decrees for each
child, as they are substantially similar, we will cite to the court’s opinion and
decree with respect to K.M. in the interest of clarity.

6 On January 13, 2023, the orphans’ court appointed Hillary A. Madden,
Esquire, as the Children’s legal counsel and guardian ad litem (“GAL”). The
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Victoria Lipyanic, and current caseworker, Rachel Starkes.7         The Agency

further proffered Agency Exhibits 1 through 30, which were admitted without

objection.    See N.T., 6/14/23, at 70.          Mother, while not present, was

represented by counsel. She did not offer any additional evidence.

       By opinions and decrees dated and entered July 21, 2023, the orphans’

court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Children

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). On August 21, 2023, Mother

filed timely notices of appeal at each docket number noted above, along with

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).8 On August 28, 2023, the orphans’ court issued

____________________________________________

certified record confirms that the Children’s legal and best interests do not
conflict. See id. at 60, 62, 71; see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a); In re
K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1238 (Pa. 2020) (holding appellate courts should
engage in “limited sua sponte review” concerning a child’s statutory right to
counsel in the termination context).

7 Ms. Lipyanic testified that she was involved with this matter from January

22, 2021, at the time the Agency took protective custody of the Children, until
January 29, 2021, when the case was transferred to the Agency’s Permanency
Unit. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 27, 29. Ms. Starkes testified that she did not
commence her role as caseworker until July 2022. See id. at 38.

8  We note that Mother’s time in which to file a timely appeal with respect to
the orphans’ court’s decrees technically fell on August 20, 2023. See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Since that day was a Sunday, however, Mother’s time in
which to appeal was extended until Monday, August 21, 2023, by operation of
statute. See Pa.R.J.A. 107(a)-(b) (relating to the computation of time and
setting forth a rule of construction that excludes the last day of any period
that falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday); Pa.R.A.P. 107
(incorporating by reference the rules of construction set forth in the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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statements pursuant to Rule 1925(a) referencing the reasoning set forth in its

prior opinions and decrees. On September 18, 2023, this Court consolidated

Mother’s appeals sua sponte.

       On appeal, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).9 Mother’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up). We

review Mother’s issue under an abuse of discretion standard, which our

Supreme Court has explained “is limited to a determination of whether the

decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence.” In re

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).             When applying this

standard, appellate courts must accept the trial court’s findings of fact and

credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. See Interest

of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual

findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb

the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021). An

abuse of discretion in this context exists “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id.

____________________________________________

Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration with respect to the Pennsylvania
Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903, cmt.

9 The Children’s GAL/counsel filed a brief advocating for this Court to affirm

the decrees.

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      The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.             See

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.     The trial court must initially determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven

enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a).             Only if the court

determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under

Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section

2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the

petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing

evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing

as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of

the truth of the precise facts in issue.”    C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (citation

omitted).

      In the case sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as

follows:

      (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
      be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

            (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
            least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
            petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
            relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
            failed to perform parental duties.

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                                   ...

     (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

     To establish grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1),

“[a] petitioner. . . must demonstrate by competent, clear and convincing

evidence, ‘[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six

months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced

a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or

failed to perform parental duties.’” C.M., 255 A.3d at 363-364 (citation

omitted) (footnote omitted). While undefined,

     our courts long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the
     needs of a child, such as love, protection, guidance and support.
     Parental duties are carried out through affirmative actions that
     develop and maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of
     such positive actions undoubtedly includes communication and
     association. The performance of parental duties requires that a
     parent exert himself to take and maintain a place of importance
     in the child’s life.

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Furthermore, “[f]ortitude is required, as a parent must act with ‘reasonable

firmness’ to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of preserving a

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parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more suitable time to perform

parental responsibilities.” Id. at 592 (citation omitted).

      In assessing Section 2511(a)(1), trial courts should consider the entire

history of the case and avoid applying the statutory six-month requirement

mechanically.   C.M., 255 A.3d at 364.      However, the General Assembly’s

emphasis on the six months immediately preceding the filing of the

termination petition indicates this timeframe is the “most critical period for

evaluation” of a parent’s conduct. L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592.

      “[T]he question of whether a parent has failed or refused to perform

parental duties must be analyzed in relation to the particular circumstances of

the case.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 1977). Thus, “even where

the evidence clearly establishes a parent has failed to perform affirmative

parental duties for a period in excess of six months. . ., the court ‘must

examine the individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the

parent to determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances,

clearly warrants permitting the involuntary termination [of parental rights].’”

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 593.        The totality of the circumstances includes

consideration of the following: “(1) the parent’s explanation for his or her

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the parent and child, if

any, including any efforts made by the parent to reestablish contact with the

child; and (3) the effect that termination of parental rights would have on the

child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id. As explained by our Supreme Court,

“the purpose of this analysis is to give effect to our mandate that courts avoid

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a mechanical application of the law regarding the termination of parental

rights. The law must be applied with the purpose of serving needs and welfare

of    each   individual   child   in   his   or     her    particular   circumstances.”

Id.

       Instantly, the orphans’ court concluded that Mother failed to perform

her affirmative duties, satisfying grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1). The court stated:

       In this case, [Mother has] failed to perform parental duties for a
       period exceeding the last six months. . . . The [Children have]
       been in foster care for two and a half years. Mother has continued
       to lack housing and employment and failed to remain drug free.
       She last visited with the [Children] in September 2022, after only
       [resuming] visits in July 2022. Mother did not appear at the
       [subject] hearing, nor did she provide any evidence as to her
       efforts to overcome her lack of performance of parental duties.
       She also had a warrant outstanding at the time of the [subject]
       hearing.     CYS provided clear and convincing evidence for
       termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1) as to
       Mother.

Orphans’ Court Opinion and Decree, 7/21/23, at 8.

       Mother    nonetheless      argues     that    she    attempted     to   maintain

communication with the Children and “a place of importance in their lives as

their mother.” Mother’s Brief at 9-10. She further asserts that she suffered

from substance abuse and mental illness and, as such, her conduct was

reasonable. See id. at 10.

       A review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s finding of grounds

for termination under Section 2511(a)(1).            The testimony of Ms. Starkes

reveals that Mother declined to participate in services, but for a brief period

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in the beginning of 2022, and failed to satisfy her objectives aimed at

reunification with the Children. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 41, 65-66, 71, 83. On

direct examination, Ms. Starkes stated:

       Q. As far as goals and objectives for each parent, let’s talk about
       [Mother] for a moment. Has she achieved any kind of housing to
       the best of your knowledge?

       A. No.

       Q. To your knowledge, she is still homeless at this point?

       A. Correct.

                                          ...

       Q. To the best of your knowledge, is she receiving any mental
       health services?

       A. None that I am aware of.

                                          ...

       Q. And when was the last time she submitted any urine screens?

       A. I believe it was September of 2022 as well.

Id. at 65-66.

       Mother in large part failed to comply with drug screens. See id. at 37,

40-41, 46, 84; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 21. As evinced, she completed a

total of four drug screens since the Children came into custody of the Agency10

____________________________________________

10We observe that a screen collected on March 8, 2021, was positive for
methamphetamine and amphetamine. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21.

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and executed refusals11 on 16 occasions from September 2021 through

September 2022.         See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21.   Similarly, despite several

reported attempts, she failed to successfully complete a drug and alcohol

evaluation and/or treatment. See id. at 35, 38, 40-46, 52, 55-57, 84.

       As such, on cross-examination by counsel for Mother, Ms. Starkes

confirmed:

       Q. Okay. And -- So -- And to date, mom has not achieved any of
       the goals laid out for her?

       A. No. [Mother] hasn’t met any of the goals, to my
       knowledge. I haven’t had contact with her since September
       2022.

Id. at 71 (emphasis added).

       Furthermore, Ms. Starkes testified that, as of January 1, 2022, Mother

had cancelled her visitations for the last four weeks. See id. at 41. Over the

next three months, Mother participated in a total of five visitations.12 See

Petitioner’s Exhibit 18. Significantly, Mother’s visitation was then placed on

hold in April 2022 due to lack of contact. See id. at 48-49, 82; see also

Petitioner’s Exhibit 18.       Ms. Starkes then testified that, after resuming

visitation in July 2022, Mother had not engaged in visitation with the Children

since September 2022, nearly one year prior:

____________________________________________

11These refusals were executed in connection with Mother’s visitation with
Children. See Petitioner’s Exhibit 21.

12Notably, Mother failed to show for two scheduled visitations in February
2022. See id.; see also N.T., 6/14/23, at 47.

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      Q. Has she not visited the children since September of 2022?

      A. That’s correct.

      Q. So it’s been almost a year since she visited with them?

      A. Yes.

Id. at 65, 83; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 18.

      Since that time, Mother had irregular telephone contact, until K.M.

requested such contact cease. Id. at 71, 83. Ms. Starkes testified:

      Q. Has she -- up until the point where [K.M.] said he didn’t want
      phone contact with [M]other, was she regularly contacting them
      after September of 2022?

      A. I think it was more sporadic. It was -- we tried to set up some
      type of schedule that way it didn’t interfere with the foster parents’
      work schedules as well as [K.M.]’s extracurricular activities and
      bed times and things like that. But [Mother] was calling at any
      hour and would not leave the foster parents alone some days.
      Which got a little bit frustrating for them as well.

Id. at 83.

      As such, the record supports the court’s determination that Mother has

failed to perform her parental duties in excess of the six months prior to the

filing of the termination petitions.    We reiterate, “[p]arental rights are not

preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s

parental responsibilities while others [meet] the child’s physical and emotional

needs.”      In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation

omitted).     Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances, as we

discern no error of law or abuse of discretion, we do not disturb the orphans’

court’s finding of grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).

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       Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section

2511(a)(1), we next must determine whether termination was proper under

Section 2511(b), which affords primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.          23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(b).    Of note, we “should consider the matter from the child’s

perspective, placing [his or her] developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the Interest of K.T.,

296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). Moreover, this determination “should not

be applied mechanically,” but “must be made on a case-by-case basis,”

wherein “the court must determine each child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106.

Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be considered. Id. at

1113 n.28. While the particular facts of each case determine the factors to

be considered, our precedent indicates that relevant points of inquiry include

“intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at

267.

       Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation

pursuant to Section 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her

parent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, we must

render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to

the child[.]” K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves consideration of

the effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent.   Id. at 1109.   In

termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is

                                    - 14 -
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the   kind   of   loss   that   would   predictably    cause      ‘extreme   emotional

consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-1110, quoting

E.M., supra at 484.         Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however,

“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse impact” in the

termination context. K.T., supra at 1111. Specifically, Pennsylvania courts

must not truncate their analysis and preclude severance “based solely on

evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.” Id. at 1114.

      Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the

biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, security, and

stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., supra at 1111

(emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, we consider factors that arise from

the facts of each case, such as: (1) the child’s need for permanency and length

of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is bonded with foster parents; and

(3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at 1113.

      Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors

may    contribute    equally    to   the     determination   of    a   child’s   specific

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of

‘primary’ importance in the Section 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109.

      In questioning the orphans’ court’s finding that Section 2511(b) also

favors termination of her parental rights, Mother argues that it is “impossible”

that no bond exists between she and the Children, referencing in part her

visitations and telephone calls. She maintains, “[t]his bond deserves a closer

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look so that the severance of that relationship can be thoroughly examined.”

Mother’s Brief at 12.

      Moreover, Mother posits that she unsuccessfully requested services to

address her relationship with K.M. See id. at 12. Further, while recognizing

that K.M. requested her telephone calls stop, Mother questions his relationship

with his foster parents, stating, “[t]estimony established that [K.M.] was still

not at a comfort level to refer to his foster parents as ‘mom’ and ‘dad,’ which

raises questions as to whether being adopted best serves his welfare.” See

id. at 12-13.

      At the time of the June 2023 termination proceeding, the Children had

been removed for approximately two and a half years. As indicated supra,

the record reveals several gaps in Mother’s visitation and contact with the

Children and that she had not engaged in visitation with the Children since

September 2022. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 36, 41, 47, 49, 57, 59, 65, 83; see

also Petitioner’s Exhibit 18.

      Despite sporadic telephone calls since that time, in April 2023, K.M.,

then twelve years old, requested the telephone calls with Mother stop. Ms.

Starkes testified:

      Q. Do you know if mom had [tele]phone contact with the boys
      since September of 2022?

      A. She’s tried contacting the boys by [tele]phone, and I think she’s
      had a few [tele]phone calls. However, at a point in time, [K.M.]
      had asked to no longer speak with her on the [tele]phone. And
      due to [A.F.S.] only being 3, he doesn’t really interact on the
      [tele]phone.

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      ...

Id. at 71; see also id. at 62 (“[K.M.] had also informed me that he no longer

wanted to speak with [Mother] and had asked the foster parents to stop asking

him to have [tele]phone calls with her.”), 82. Further, Ms. Starkes indicated

that K.M.’s visitation with members of his biological family caused him to

suffer distress. See id. at 62, 80-81 (“[K.M.’s] behaviors ha[d] been declining

ever since he had a visit with his maternal grandmother. . . . At that point, I

was told [K.M.] disclosed to his therapist that he was acting out due to seeing

his biological family members.”).

      As a result, Ms. Starkes, reported K.M.’s wishes to not reunify with

Mother:

      Q. Okay. And did the boys -- did they desire to be reunited with
      mom?

      A. I’m sorry, can you repeat that?

      Q. Do you know if the boys desire to be reunited with mom?

      A. N -- I’ve discussed with [K.M.] and he said he would like to be
      adopted by the [foster parents] and that he did not want to remain
      -- he did not want to go back to [Mother].

Id.

      Moreover, the Children, twelve and three years old at the time of the

subject proceeding, had been placed together in their current pre-adoptive

foster home for a year and a half. See id. at 64. Ms. Starkes observed that

the Children were doing well with their medical and physical needs met. See

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id. K.M. was engaged in outpatient therapy.13 See id. His current therapist

expressed support for termination of parental rights. See Petitioner’s Exhibit

6. A.F.S. was enrolled in early intervention services.14 See id. at 64.

       Significantly, Ms. Starkes observed a bond between the Children and

their foster parents. Ms. Starkes described:

       [A.F.S.] is identifying both his foster parents as his mom and dad.
       He’s very attached and bonded with [foster mother] especially,
       but he has a good bond with both the foster parents. As far as
       [K.M.] is concerned, he is very bonded to both foster parents as
       well. Although he is not a comfort level, I think, of calling them
       mom and dad. He does still sometimes call them [by their first
       names]. But he still wishes to be adopted by them.

Id. at 65. She further explained:

       Myself and the foster-care coordinator took [K.M.] out for dinner
       to discuss the [subject] hearing coming up. We discussed
       everything with [K.M.] and let him ask questions, although he
       didn’t have any. We confirmed with him that he would have no
       contact with his biological parents if this termination went through
       and he got adopted by his foster parents. [K.M.] seemed very
       comfortable with that and said that he wanted to be adopted with
       his brother, [A.F.S.].

Id. at 60.

       Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the record corroborates the

orphans’ court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights

____________________________________________

13 K.M. had been engaged in therapy with various providers since the spring

of 2021. See N.T., 6/14/23, at 36; see also Petitioner’s Exhibits 5-7.

14 A.F.S. had been engaged in early intervention services since the spring of

2022. See id. at 45; see also Petitioner’s Exhibit 11. He had also previously
received behavioral, occupational, and speech therapy. See id. at 57; see
also Petitioner’s Exhibits 12 & 13.

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J-S44001-23

best serves the Children’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and

welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). As such, we do not disturb it. Since our

review confirms that there was a sufficient basis for the involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and

(b), we affirm the orphans’ court’s decrees.

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the termination decrees.

      Decrees affirmed.

Date: 2/29/2024

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