Court Opinion

ID: 9671982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:46:36.483913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:13.561612
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
ONION, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was indicted for murder.1 Two prior felony convictions were alleged for enhancement of punishment. The jury found appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Upon proof of one of the alleged prior convictions, the jury assessed punishment at 22 years’ imprisonment.
On appeal the appellant raised a number of grounds of error. His sixth ground of error read:
*389The trial court erred in overruling appellant’s objection to the trial court’s submission to the jury of the lesser included offense of ‘voluntary manslaughter’ for the reason that such lesser included offense was not raised by the evidence and that such charge to the jury only served to confuse the jury as to the issues involved, thus permitting the jury panel in this case to ‘compromise’ its verdict to the detriment of the appellant.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Austin Court of Appeals overruled all grounds of error and affirmed the conviction. Pennington v. State, 644 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.App.-Austin 1982). In overruling the sixth ground of error, the Court of Appeals held that if the evidence raises the issue of a lesser included offense a charge thereon is properly given, and that a defendant does not, however, have an exclusive proprietary interest in lesser included offense charges to the jury. The court concluded the evidence in the instant case was sufficient to require the submission of the charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
In his petition for discretionary review, appellant argues in a sole ground of review that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the trial court properly charged on voluntary manslaughter where there was no evidence to support such a charge and where evidence showed jurors reached a “compromise verdict” on the unsupported lesser included offense charge.
We granted appellant’s petition to determine the correctness of the Court of Appeals’ disposition of appellant’s sixth ground of error.
In the course of our research and examination of the record, we find that with the trial court’s permission appellant’s counsel orally dictated his objections to the court reporter in the court’s presence. See Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P. The record reflects the following objections as to the submission of voluntary manslaughter:
“MR. GREENWOOD (Defense Counsel): The Court has charged on voluntary manslaughter. We object to the Court’s charge on voluntary manslaughter. We do not want any lesser included offenses in the charge and we object to it; straight murder or not guilty. Now, if the Court is of a mind to charge on voluntary manslaughter, for the same reason as any other affirmative defense we think that the Melany versus William Ayers, A-y-e-r-s opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals would also apply in the lesser included offense situation and we would submit that if the Court is going to give that charge, that that charge is still fundamentally defective for failing to misapply the burden of proof.
“THE COURT: Now, wait a minute. Are you talking about in 6?
“MR. GREENWOOD: Yes, sir.
Keep going?
“THE COURT: Go ahead.”
Later, after other oral objections to the charge, we find:
“MR. GREENWOOD: ... Of course, the reasons are that we don’t want any lesser included offense in this case because the State has gotten Mr. Pennington indicted as an habitual criminal, and if he is convicted of any of these lesser included offenses, especially in view of the Court’s ruling as to the validity of these prior convictions, then he goes for life anyway. So with that in mind, we object to the Court’s ruling on all of those. Note our exception.”2 (Emphasis supplied.)
We have found no written objections to the charge nor any special requested charges. See Articles 36.14 and 36.15, Y.A. C.C.P.
*390Article 36.14, supra, provides, inter alia, for the judge to give a written charge to the jury in each felony case. It provides in part:
“Before said charge is read to the jury, the defendant or his counsel shall have a reasonable time to examine the same and he shall present his objections thereto in writing, distinctly specifying each ground of objection. * * * The requirement that the objections dictated to the court reporter in the presence of the court and the state’s counsel before the reading of the court’s charge to the jury_” (Emphasis supplied.)
This article is mandatory and there must be strict compliance with its provisions to warrant review. Seefurth v. State, 422 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Templeton v. State, 152 Tex.Cr.R. 121, 210 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.Cr.App.1948); Cedillo v. State, 307 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1957); Hays v. State, 84 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex.Cr.App.1935); Everett v. State, 57 S.W.2d 140 (Tex.Cr.App.1933). See James v. State, 418 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).
The real purpose of this enactment is to enable the trial judge to know in what respect the defendant regards the charge as defective and to afford him an opportunity to correct it before reading the charge to the jury. Seefurth v. State, supra at 936, and cases there cited. See also Fiveash v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 345, 67 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1934).
This article serves a statutory purpose in preventing the trial judge from being “sand-bagged” and in preventing unnecessary reversals. Seefurth v. State, supra at 936. It is a statute which the courts can neither ignore nor emasculate. See Vinson v. State, 179 S.W. 574 (Tex.Cr.App.1915).
Thus as a predicate for complaint to a jury charge on appeal the accused is required to distinctly specify each ground of objection. Littleton v. State, 239 S.W. 202 (Tex.Cr.App.1922). To constitute a valid objection to jury instructions, the objection must be specific and clear enough to apprise the trial court of the nature of the objection. James v. State, 418 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); Wells v. State, 634 (Tex.Cr.App. 868, 872 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982-pet. ref’d.). If the objection is not specific enough, nothing is presented for review. Hackbarth v. State, 617 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Smith v. State, 439 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.Cr.App.1969); Cage v. State, 320 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.Cr.App.1959); Bratton v. State, 111 S.W.2d 259 (Tex.Cr.App.1938).
It is clear then that a general objection which does not distinctly specify the claimed error in the charge is not sufficient to preserve error. Myers v. State, 468 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Young v. State, 422 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Crabtree v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 63, 127 S.W.2d 906 (Tex.Cr.App.1939); Boss v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 593, 116 S.W.2d 739 (Tex.Cr. App.1937).
An examination of the objections made by the appellant does not show that he distinctly specified to the trial judge that he was objecting to the submission of voluntary manslaughter “for the reason that such lesser included offense was not raised by the evidence.” He generally objected stating he did not want the charge, but he did not object on the ground he now urges on appeal. His sixth ground of error leaves the contrary impression. The Court of Appeals did not observe this discrepancy, apparently relying on appellant’s brief. Since the trial objection to the charge did not comport with the contention on appeal, nothing was presented for review. Error presented on appeal must be the same as the objection raised before the trial court. Nelson v. State, 607 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Simpkins v. State, 590 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Bouchillon v. State, 540 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Lejeune v. State, 538 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.Cr. App.1976). See also Vanderbilt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); McIlveen v. State, 559 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

. The indictment alleged the deceased to be Mary Rutherford Owens. The appellant testi-fled she was his wife.

. Prior to this last objection, appellant’s counsel orally requested a charge on criminally negligent homicide. The court stated that if it gave that charge it would also charge on involuntary manslaughter, that it would charge on murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. Appellant’s counsel then withdrew his request for a charge on criminally negligent homicide. The court had already agreed to give a charge on the ‘‘defense’’ of accident.