Court Opinion

ID: 9580337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:09.787312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:13.251065
License: Public Domain

Johnson, Judge,
dissenting.
While it is true that in Brandvain v. Ridgeview Institute, 188 Ga. App. 106, 111 (1) (a) (372 SE2d 265) (1988), aff’d 259 Ga. 376 (382 SE2d 597) (1989), the trial court had entered judgment on the jury’s verdict before granting the contrary motion for directed verdict, there was no suggestion in that case that such a procedure was required. To the contrary, this court specifically stated in Brandvain that “ruling on the motion prior to the entry of the . . . judgment would have been *487procedurally and conceptually more orderly as contemplated by OCGA § 9-11-50 (b). . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. This is precisely the procedure which was followed in the present case, yet we are now holding that a more convoluted procedure is required.
Decided March 20, 1992.
Novy & Jaymes, Eugene Novy, Deborah M. Vaughan, for appellant.
Brennan & Wasden, Wiley A. Wasden III, for appellee.
As I understand the majority’s ruling, this case will now be returned to the trial court, where the judge, after first entering judgment on the jury’s verdict, will be authorized sua sponte to vacate that judgment, re-grant the defendant-appellee’s motion for directed verdict, and enter judgment accordingly, following which the appellant-plaintiff will be in position to file a new appeal. All of this is totally unnecessary and could be obviated by simply reaching the merits of the main appeal at the present time. Believing the holding in Division 1 of the majority’s opinion both frustrates judicial economy and efficiency and adds a needless layer of complexity to post-trial practice in this state, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Sognier joins in this dissent.