Court Opinion

ID: 9553346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:28:19.645542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:30:51.707504
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (specially concurring). A. The admission into evidence of the regulation was not error. Defendants contend that “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADMITTED PLAINTIFF’S EXHIBIT 3 INTO EVIDENCE.” The majority of the Court ‘(finds 'that it need not decide whether admission of the State Board of Education regulation was error, because even if error, it was harmless error. Harmless error vs. prejudicial error needs refashioning. Two rules are involved: (1) Rule 61, Harmless Error [§ 21—1—1(61), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4)]: No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence ... is ground for granting a new trial . unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. Rule 61 is a mandate to the district courts, but one which our appellate courts consider, as well. Hyde v. Anderson, 68 N.M. 50, 358 P.2d 619 (1961); City of Albuquerque v. Ackerman, 82 N.M. 360, 482 P.2d 63 (1971). We also follow § 21-2-1(17) (10), N.M. S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4). Under Rule 17(10), this Court shall “disregard any error or defect in the . . . proceedings which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party, and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect.” “[T]he problem of prejudicial error is largely a problem in legal psychology.” 7 Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 61.03, at 61-6. According to Rules 61 and 17(10), an appellate court may not base a ruling on an error in admission or exclusion of evidence unless the error infringes on a party’s “substantial rights”, or violates “substantial justice”. Yet in actual practice, if an appellate court sees fit to affirm a judgment below, the court finds an erroneous admission of evidence to have been “harmless”. If the court wishes to reverse, the error is found to be “prejudicial”. Appellate judges often disagree as to the prejudicial impact of an error below. This disagreement reflects the fact that they are attempting to determine the error’s effect upon the minds of the jurors, from whatever indirect indications of this they can glean from the record. Such a determination is hazardous, at best. Nonetheless, the harmless error rule “has led to a marked reduction of reversals based upon procedural errors which do no real harm.” In Re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005, 1011 (2d Cir. 1942). For a masterful analysis of the hazards of the harmless error rule, and of the rule’s place in our law, I suggest the reading of Judge Jerome N. Frank’s dissents in Keller v. Brooklyn Bus Corporation, 128 F.2d 510 (2nd Cir. 1942); United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2nd Cir. 1946); United States v. Lamothe, 152 F.2d 340 (2nd Cir. 1945); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766, 66 S.Ct. 168, 90 L.Ed. 462 (1945). In a jury trial, in which a general verdict is returned, the “manner in which [the] jury discharged its functions is, for us an unknowable. . . .” Keller v. Brooklyn Bus Corporation, supra, (Frank, J., dissenting) 128 F.2d at 516. In the instant case, no one but the jurors know the effect upon' their verdict of the introduction into evidence of the regulation. One method of learning the knowledge of the jury is to request, in addition to the general verdict, interrogatories which direct the jury to find upon particular questions of fact. Section 21-1-1(49), N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4). It is a “well-settled rule that an erroneous ruling wh’ch relates to the substantial rights of a party is ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the whole record that it was not prejudicial.” McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 347-48, 56 S.Ct. 764, 766, 80 L.Ed. 1205, 1209 (1936). See, also, Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 66 S.Ct. 1172, 90 L.Ed. 1484 (1946). I conclude that defendants’ rights were not prejudiced by admission into evidence of the Board of Education regulation. (2) Rule 103(a) of New Mexico Rules of Evidence [§ 204-103, N.M.S.A.1953 (Repl.Vol. 4, 1973 Supp.)] reads as follows : Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and (1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context; . . . This rule of evidence merely restates the law on the subject as it then existed. Frost v. Markham, 86 N.M. 261, 522 P.2d 808 (1974). The only objection defendants made was “The document shouldn’t be given to the jury in the first place.” The court overruled the objection because defendants’ objection was, “that the document was not relevant to plaintiff’s case.” It has long been the rule that counsel must advise the trial court of the specific ground on which he objects to admission of evidence. To have been sufficient, the objection in the instant case to the admission of the Board of Education regulation should have stated a specific reason why its admission was irrelevant, prejudicial or might otherwise impair defendants’ substantial rights. Henderson v. Dreyfus, 26 N.M. 541, 191 P. 442 (1919); State v. Lewis, 36 N.M. 218, 12 P.2d 849 (1932); Tobeck v. United Nuclear-Homestake Partners, 85 N.M. 431, 512 P.2d 1267 (Ct. App.1973). Defendants’ objection did not meet this test. The objection must be sufficient to inform the court on a specific ground that the admission of the regulation was not applicable and prejudicial that it might cause an inconsistent verdict, or might influence the verdict of the jury, etc. Furthermore, the same regulation was contained in its entirety in a subsequent exhibit admitted into evidence without obj ection. Admission into evidence of the regulation was not error. B. The verdicts were not inconsistent. Defendants contend that there is no substantial evidence to support the jury’s allegedly inconsistent verdicts. Appellants do not define “inconsistent verdicts”. Their point seems to be, simply, that the evidence does not allow a jury consistently to find for defendant Smith and against appellants. However, they did not, at trial, object to the court’s Instruction No. 3, which instructed the jury that, [ajlthough there is more than one defendant in this action, it does not follow from that fact alone that if one is liable the others are liable. . . .You will decide each defendant’s case separately as if each were a separate lawsuit. Nor did appellants object to the form of the verdict. When inconsistent verdicts are not properly raised, their validity will not be determined on review. Jackson v. Southwestern Public Service Company, 66 N.M. 458, 349 P.2d 1029 (1960). Definitions of “inconsistent verdicts” are scarce. One is not to be found in New Mexico law. “Inconsistent verdicts” are verdicts which are so contrary to each other that the basis upon which each verdict was reached cannot be determined. (1) For example, “inconsistent verdicts” do not arise where two defendants are charged with a joint wrong and one defendant is acquitted. In Miranda v. Halama-Enderstein Co., 37 N.M. 87, 18 P.2d 1019 (1933), the plaintiff sued the landlord and tenant for a joint tort. The landlord was granted a directed verdict. The tenant contended that “the cause of action being for a joint tort, and the co-defendant having been found not guilty, it follows that there was no joint tort, and that it was error to go on with the case against appellant as for an individual tort.” The court said: Passing the fact that this proposition is presented here for the first time, we think it unsound. “ * * * Where two or more are sued [for a joint wrong] one cannot complain because another has been dismissed out of court or been acquitted. Though two or more are sued and a joint tort alleged, the general rule is that a recovery may be had against one only. [Citations omitted]. Cases cited by appellant illustrate a minority doctrine which we know of no reason for accepting. This language was affirmed in Jackson, supra, in which plaintiff sued the Town of Santa Rosa and Southwestern Public Service Company for a joint tort in which the jury found for the Town of Santa Rosa and against Southwestern Public Service Company. In Stang v. Hertz Corporation, 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972), plaintiff sued Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. and Hertz Corporation. The tire was manufactured by Firestone and it was mounted on a Hertz car. The jury found for Firestone and against Hertz.. On appeal, the court said: The issues as between the petitioner and Firestone, and the petitioner and Hertz are not the same. Consequently, we see no reason why the verdict for Firestone should interfere with the disposition of this case against Hertz. (2) “Inconsistent verdicts” can arise where defendants are sued under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In a case in which a plaintiff sues a servant on a negligence theory, and also the master, or employer, on a theory of respondeat superior, a verdict for the servant, along with a verdict against the master, would together constitute inconsistent verdicts. The reason is that the master’s liability arises out of the servant’s negligence. U.J.I. No. 4.3; 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 619b, at 421; 53 Am.Jur. 2d, Master and Servant § 406, at 413. In the instant case, as is explained in the majority opinion, plaintiff claimed different acts of negligence as to defendant Smith, who did not incur liability, and appellants, who did. The verdict against appellants did not depend on the theory of respondeat superior. The issues as between plaintiff and Smith, and plaintiff and appellants, were different. Consequently, the verdicts were not inconsistent. See Stang v. Hertz Corporation, supra; Miracle Milk Bottling Distributing Co. v. Drake, 12 Ariz.App. 439, 471 P.2d 741 (1970). The defendants’ contentions do not meet the standards of an inconsistent verdict. Although the standard of care for the defendants and defendant Smith were the same, the acts performed by each of the defendants were different. The plaintiff’s case against the two defendants were not identical. Defendants confine their argument to the defendants’ conduct toward the Pyrex flash for the pressure experiment, and failure to employ a gauge during the experiment, and what the jury may have used as its basis for a verdict. We do not sit in the jury room to discover the thinking of those people. Nor do we conjecture and surmise upon the reasons for its verdict. The verdicts of the jury were not inconsistent.