Court Opinion

ID: 9958854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 06:13:43.464016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:52.325418
License: Public Domain

Affirmed as Modified and Opinion Filed April 2, 2024

                                      In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-01281-CR
                               No. 05-22-01288-CR

                          JULIO LOPEZ, Appellant
                                   V.
                       THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
                             Dallas County, Texas
               Trial Court Cause Nos. F21-00643-U; F20-22494-U

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Goldstein
      Julio Lopez appeals his burglary of a habitation convictions. A jury convicted

appellant and sentenced him to forty years’ confinement in each case. In two issues,

appellant argues the trial court erred in excusing two veniremembers before they

were placed under oath, and the evidence is legally insufficient to support his

conviction. In a single cross-issue, the State asks that we modify the judgment to

reflect that appellant is required to pay only one court cost. As modified, we affirm

the trial court’s judgment.
                                     BACKGROUND

      VOIR DIRE

      Appellant was charged by indictment with two counts of burglary of a

habitation: The Mansions at Mercer Crossing (The Mansions) and The Luxe at

Mercer Crossing (The Luxe). At trial in August 2022, the trial judge began by

having the indictment in each case read aloud, to which appellant pled not guilty.

The trial judge called in the venirepanel; introduced herself, her staff, the attorneys,

and appellant to the members of the venire; and explained that she instructed “these

people that I’ve introduced you to” to avoid the appearance of impropriety “not to

have any conversations” with veniremembers “outside of normal pleasantries.” The

trial judge then proceeded to explain general housekeeping matters, including the

trial schedule.    Next, proceeding row by row, the trial judge asked the

veniremembers if they had any “scheduling conflicts” “between now and Thursday

between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.,” had a brief discussion with some members of the

venire concerning potential conflicts, and made note. When the trial judge reached

Panel Member 50, the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: Okay. We’ll make note of that, and we’ll do what we
      can to work around that. All right. Anyone else on the third row?
      ‘Cause I know Mr. Puga is ready to tell me. Panel Member 50, for the
      record.

      VENIREPERSON: I understand just like 50 percent English.
      THE COURT: Okay. I will get to those disqualifications here in just
      one moment. Let me ask this, have you been able to follow along with
      what I’ve been saying?
                                          –2–
        VENIREPERSON: (Nonresponsive.)
        THE COURT: All right. You are free to go. Thank you for letting us
        know. All right. I see another hand here. Panel Member -- is it 18?
        Yes.

The trial judge continued to inquire about scheduling conflicts, and a veniremember

on the back row expressed difficulty speaking and understanding English:

        THE COURT: All right. We’ll make note of that, and we’ll do what
        we can to work around it. Anyone else on that back row? All right. I
        see another hand over here. Is it Mr. Burns?

        VENIREPERSON: Dupont.

        THE COURT: Dupont. I’m sorry. Panel Member 60, for the record.
        VENIREPERSON: I not speak English. I understand. When you speak
        too fast, no.

        THE COURT: And how much have you been able to follow along, if
        you had to put a percentage on it? No? Okay. Let’s see here. All right.
        You can claim – you’re excused. You’re free to go. Thank you. All
        right. I saw -- any other hands on the back row, scheduling conflicts?
When no more veniremembers raised a hand relative to scheduling conflicts, the trial

judge administered “the oath to tell the truth” to the venirepanel, and voir dire

proceeded. Appellant did not object to the release of the two panel members prior

to the administration of the oath or when the trial court confirmed the jurors excused

or disqualified, noted the parties’ use of peremptory strikes, or empaneled the jury

with one alternate juror.1

    1
      The record reflects the trial court, outside the presence of the venirepanel, confirmed those jurors
excused or disqualified, which included “Panel Member 50, disqualified for language” and “60, disqualified
for language” to which neither the State nor appellant had objection. The trial court then identified the
“strike zone through 73, with an alternate range of 74 through 77.” The jury was comprised of members
from the first 40 members of the venirepanel with the alternate being no. 74.
                                                  –3–
TRIAL ON THE MERITS

      The State called four witnesses in its case in chief. Farmers Branch police

detective Jeffery Turley testified he worked a case involving burglaries at The Luxe

and The Mansions, two adjacent apartment complexes, in the summer of 2020.

Turley met with management and obtained still photos from video surveillance at

the complexes and screenshots from Facebook Marketplace showing items stolen

from the complexes. As Turley later reviewed this information at his office, another

detective walked by, saw the photos, and identified appellant as the man in the

photos. The other detective was able to give Turley appellant’s name and birthdate,

which Turley used to obtain appellant’s photo from an online law enforcement

database. Appellant’s database photo matched the photos from the surveillance and

Facebook Marketplace, and Turley obtained a search warrant for appellant’s

Facebook account.

      Facebook provided Turley with “[o]ver 17,000” pages that Turley’s review,

in conjunction with surveillance video and the apartment complexes’ video footage,

confirmed appellant was the one on surveillance video and on Facebook selling

stolen items. Turley described the stolen items as appliances removed from multiple

units including microwaves, refrigerators, dishwashers, and oven ranges. Turley

was able to match from one Facebook photo the serial number on an appliance to an

invoice from the apartment complex identifying the appliance as one that was stolen

                                        –4–
from the apartment complex.        Not all the stolen items posted on Facebook

Marketplace “had their serial numbers posted on Facebook too.”

      Turley testified that the burglaries at the apartment complexes occurred

between September 3 and September 10, 2020. Although the burglarized apartments

were vacant, Turley charged appellant with burglary of a habitation because the

apartment units were “designed for overnight accommodations,” “fully furnished

with appliances,” and “readily available at any point in time for a resident to occupy

them.”   “Everything – water, electricity, the ability to cook and store food.

Everything was ready in these apartments.” In the same building as the vacant

burglarized apartments, there were other apartments that were occupied.

      Christopher Reynolds testified he was The Luxe construction manager. When

Reynolds learned that appliances were being stolen, he compiled a list of the serial

numbers of all the property he believed had been stolen. Reynolds also reviewed

appellant’s Facebook Marketplace and saw ads showing “pictures of basically our

apartments.” It appeared to Reynolds that appellant had “taken pictures inside our

apartment of the ranges and refrigerators and such.”          Reynolds identified a

dishwasher, five-burner stove, and “multi-split unit” on appellant’s Facebook for

which Reynolds had serial numbers. On cross-examination, Reynolds testified that,

“two to three weeks after we get the appliances, we will turn them over to the leasing

site,” and he had to have a certificate of occupancy “before they can go to leasing.”

                                         –5–
Reynolds testified that surveillance video showed an apartment being “hit,” and

“leasing had that entire building” where the apartment was located.

      Robert Rood testified he was The Mansions project manager. Rood became

aware of some burglaries at The Mansions and identified a range and a dishwasher

that were stolen. Rood testified the serial number of the range stolen from The

Mansions matched the serial number of a range appellant listed for sale on Facebook

Marketplace.

      At the conclusion of the guilt/innocence phase, the jury found appellant guilty

of both burglary of a habitation offenses. Following a punishment hearing, the jury

sentenced appellant to forty years’ confinement in each case. This appeal followed.

                                      DISCUSSION

      Issue One: Appellant failed to preserve complaint for appellate review.

      In his first issue, appellant complains that:

      The trial court erred in excusing two veniremembers based on their
      answers to questions posed to them and answered before they were
      placed under oath as required under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
      35.02, and of Due Process and Due Course of Law under the 4th 5th &
      14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 sections 13 &
      19 of Texas Constitution and section 1.04 of the Texas Code of
      Criminal Procedure.

Specifically, appellant argues the jury was illegally empaneled, seated, and sworn

and some members were improperly excused because their answers to the court’s

initial questions were made when they were not under oath, and they were never

                                         –6–
asked to ratify their previous answers after later receiving the oath as required under

article 35.02 of the code of criminal procedure.

       To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the party must timely object and

specify the grounds that support the objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see also

Guzmon v. State, 697 S.W.2d 404, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Hawkins v. State,

660 S.W.2d 65, 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Appellant failed to object at the time

the veniremembers were excused or at the time the trial court identified the potential

jurors, including the two at issue, that were excused or disqualified and specifically

asked if either the State or defense had objections. Because appellant failed to object

to the trial court’s dismissal of two veniremembers at the time of dismissal or when

given the opportunity to object, appellant has failed to preserve this issue for our

review. See id.

        A defendant has no right that any particular individual serve on the jury.

Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). The defendant’s only

substantial right is that the jurors who do serve be qualified. Id. The defendant’s

rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excused. Id. In addition to his

other shortcomings, appellant’s argument neither attempts to demonstrate any lack

of qualification on the part of those jurors who actually served, see id., nor challenges

the disqualifications based upon language. On this record, in light of the opportunity

and failure to object to the disqualification of two prospective jurors, we overrule

appellant’s first issue.

                                          –7–
      Issue Two: Evidence was legally sufficient to support conviction.

      In his second issue, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his conviction. Specifically, appellant contends that:

      The State’s evidence was insufficient to prove that the burglarized
      premises at the time of the burglary was a habitation within the statutory
      definition. No rational juror could have found the elements of burglary
      of habitation proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant is entitled
      to reversal of his conviction and rendering a judgment of acquittal.

       We apply well-known standards when reviewing challenges to the legal

sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979);

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We

view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine

whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2017).

      To prove appellant committed burglary of a habitation as charged, the State

had to show appellant entered a “habitation” without the effective consent of the

owner and attempted, committed, or intended to commit theft. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 30.02(a). “Habitation” is defined by the penal code as “a structure or vehicle

that is adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons,” including “each

separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle” and “each

structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.” Id. § 30.01(1).

                                         –8–
        Appellant argues that no rational juror could have found the elements of

burglary of a habitation proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this argument,

the only challenged element being “habitation, appellant asserts that the buildings

from which the appliances were stolen were not “habitations” at the time of the

burglaries because “no one had ever resided there, even overnight”; the apartments

did not contain beds, furniture, or “belongings typical of a home”; and the apartments

were not “occupant ready” because there was “no electricity or water – only the

hookups.”

        “What makes a structure ‘suitable’ or ‘not suitable’ for overnight

accommodation is a complex, subjective factual question fit for a jury’s

determination.” Salazar v. State, 284 S.W.3d 874, 876–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)2

(quoting Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 209–10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).

“The jury may look to a host of considerations such as the contents of the structure,

including bedding, electricity, plumbing, or furniture; the jury may also look to and

consider the type of structure and its typical use as a means for overnight

accommodation.” Id. In Salazar, although no one lived in the residence at issue,

the owner was in the process of remodeling it for resale. Id. at 875. Similarly, the

apartments at issue here were unoccupied but were “designed for overnight

accommodations,” “completely furnished” with appliances, wired for electricity,

    2
    Salazar juxtaposes “building” and “habitation” in the hierarchy of properties. Buildings are typically
commercial properties or government offices or perhaps professional places of employment. Id.
                                                  –9–
water accessible, and “readily available at any point in time for a resident to occupy

them.” Further, the jury heard evidence that the same building as the vacant

burglarized apartments there were occupied apartments.           “The determination

whether a burglarized place is a ‘building’ or ‘habitation’ will be overturned on

appeal only if the appellant can show that no reasonable trier of fact could have

found the place to have been a habitation under the criteria above.” Blankenship,

780 S.W.2d at 209-210. We conclude that, from this evidence, a rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt,

specifically the element that the apartments here were “habitations” within the

meaning of penal code sections 30.02(a) and 30.01(1). See TEX. PENAL CODE §§

30.02(a); 30.01(1); Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232; Salazar, 284 S.W.3d at 875–77. We

overrule appellant’s second issue.

      State Cross Issue: Court Costs

      In a single cross-issue, the State asks that we modify the judgment to reflect

that appellant is required to pay only one court cost. This Court “has the power to

correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record speak the

truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so.” Asberry v. State, 813

S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd); accord Bigley v. State, 865

S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Abron v. State, 997 S.W.2d 281, 282

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (court of

appeals may “modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm it as modified”).

                                        –10–
      Here, each judgment assessed court costs of $290. In a single criminal action

in which a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses or of multiple counts of

the same offense, the court may assess each court cost or fee only once against a

defendant. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 102.073(a). For purposes of this rule, a

person convicted of two or more offenses in the same trial is convicted of those

offenses in a single criminal action. Shuler v. State, 650 S.W.3d 683, 690 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.). Generally, a cost should be assessed in the case with

the highest category offense but, when the convictions are for the same category of

offense and the costs are the same, the costs should be assessed in the case with the

lowest trial court case number. Id.; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. § 102.073(b).

      A review of the certified bill of costs for each case shows two identical fees

totaling $290. Because the costs are duplicative and both convictions are for the

same offense, court costs should have been assessed only in trial court cause number

F20-22494-U (appellate cause number 05-22-01288-CR) the case which has the

lower trial court case number. See id.

      Accordingly, we modify the judgment in trial court cause number F21-00643-

U (appellate cause number 05-22-01281-CR) to delete the court costs. We modify

the bill of costs in trial court cause number F21-00643-U (appellate cause number

05-22-01281-CR) to delete all amounts assessed and reflect that the initial and

remaining amounts due are $0. See Contreras v. State, No. 05-20-00186-CR, 2021

                                         –11–
WL 6071640, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 23, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). We sustain the State’s cross-issue.

      As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                           /Bonnie Lee Goldstein//
221281f.u05                                BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
221288f.u05                                JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                       –12–
                              Court of Appeals
                       Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      JUDGMENT

JULIO LOPEZ, Appellant                             On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
                                                   District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01281-CR             V.                  Trial Court Cause No. F21-00643-U.
                                                   Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                       Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and
                                                   Breedlove participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      We REMOVE “$290” under “Court Costs” and INSERT “$0” in its
      place.

Additionally, the trial court’s bill of costs is MODIFIED as follows:

      We REMOVE the following charges: (i) Clerk’s Fee $40.00, (ii) Jury Fee
      $1.00, (iii) Court House Sec. Fee $10.00, (iv) Cons. State Fees $185.00, (v) County
      Records Mgt. $25.00, (vi) Specialty Court $25.00, and State Jury Fee $4.00; and

      We REMOVE the amount $290.00” from the entries for “Cost Amt.,” “Total
      Amt.,” “Balance Amt.,” “Initial Amount Due,” and “Remaining Amount Due” and
      INSERT “$0.00” for each entry.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 2nd day of April, 2024.

                                            –13–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

JULIO LOPEZ, Appellant                        On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
                                              District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-01288-CR          V.                Trial Court Cause No. F20-22494-U.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and
                                              Breedlove participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 2nd day of April, 2024.

                                       –14–