Court Opinion

ID: 9953466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:42.21965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:55:10.868895
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 362124
                                                                     Calhoun Circuit Court
DEMARCUS GEORGIO JUPREE BOLDEN,                                      LC No. 2019-000303-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: PATEL, P.J., and RICK and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals following his jury convictions of one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(c) (penetration during the commission of another
felony), one count of breaking and entering without permission, MCL 750.115, and one count of
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. The trial court
sentenced defendant to serve 135 to 360 months in prison for his CSC-I conviction, 38 to 120
months for his assault conviction, and 90 days for his conviction of breaking and entering.

        Defendant now argues on appeal (1) that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the
381/2-month delay between his arrest and the trial; (2) that he was entitled to resentencing because
his CSC-I sentence was disproportionate; (3) that Michigan’s 2021 Sex Offender Registration Act
(SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., is an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment, and, therefore, he
should be removed from the Michigan sex offender registry; (4) that requiring defendant to register
as a sex offender for life absent an individualized assessment of risk constituted cruel or unusual
punishment; and (5) that his sentence to lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM) constituted cruel
and/or unusual punishment as well as an unreasonable search. For reasons explained in this
opinion, we affirm.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

                                       A. THE OFFENSE

       This case arose from an incident in which defendant entered the victim’s house on the
pretense of avoiding the police. The defendant’s girlfriend was a friend of the victim, and the

                                                -1-
victim had hung out with defendant on past occasions. After entering the victim’s apartment,
defendant accused the victim of allowing his girlfriend to cheat on him. Defendant then ordered
the victim to suck his penis. Defendant then choked the victim, dragged her into the living room,
forced her to suck his penis, and ejaculated on the victim’s mouth, hair, and face. Defendant then
left the victim’s apartment, but he returned a few minutes later because he forgot his car keys. The
victim did not open the door, so defendant broke into the house through the kitchen window,
grabbed his keys, and left the apartment.

        Police officers subsequently arrived at the victim’s apartment because a neighbor had
called and reported that a man and a woman were arguing in the victim’s apartment. One of the
officers stated that, when he arrived at the victim’s apartment, the victim cracked open her door to
speak with him. The victim was crying at the time. The victim falsely told the police officers that
nothing was wrong and that she was upset because she had discovered that her boyfriend had
cheated on her. The victim later admitted that she had lied to the police officers because she was
afraid of defendant retaliating against her.

        Later that day, the victim went to the hospital for a medical assessment because she had
suffered multiple minor bodily injuries. The victim then confessed to the police officers, who were
present with her at the hospital, that defendant sexually assaulted her. The victim then underwent
a sexual-assault examination, during which the sexual assault nurse examiner collected swabs from
the victim’s body, including lip and chin swabs, and swabs from the victim’s hair. These swabs,
along with a DNA swab obtained from defendant, were utilized in a subsequent forensic DNA
analysis. The DNA analyst stated that the DNA sample did not fully match defendant’s sample,
but she opined that, based on a “likelihood ratio,” the unknown male DNA belonged to defendant.

                                     B. PRETRIAL & TRIAL

       Shortly after his arrest in January 2019, defendant moved for a speedy trial. Over the next
141/2 months, the parties engaged in two motion hearings concerning bond for defendant and a
preliminary examination but failed to engage in a trial. Unfortunately, the widespread outbreak of
COVID-19 in 2020 led to a 24-month extension of the pretrial period. Consequently, the trial did
not occur until approximately 381/2 months after defendant’s arrest.

       After the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of all charges, and the trial court sentenced
defendant, in pertinent part, to 135 to 360 months in prison for his CSC-I conviction with credit
for 603 days served, to lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM), and to a lifetime registration as a
sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). See MCL 750.520b(2)(d)
and MCL 28.715(13).

        Defendant subsequently moved to correct an invalid sentence. Defendant argued that
Michigan’s 2021 SORA constituted a criminal punishment, meaning that no part of it could be
retroactively applied to him; that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender for life without
an individualized assessment of risk constituted cruel or unusual punishment; and that defendant’s
LEM punishment was also cruel or unusual. The trial court denied defendant’s motion.

       Defendant now appeals.

                                                -2-
                                           II. ANALYSIS

                                A. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

        Defendant argues that the 381/2-month delay between his arrest and the trial denied him of
his right to a speedy trial. We disagree.

       To preserve a speedy-trial issue for appeal, a defendant must make a formal demand for a
speedy trial on the record. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 111; 605 NW2d 28 (1999). Defendant
made such a demand. Therefore, this issue is preserved for appeal.

        Whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial is a mixed question of fact and law. People
v Waclawski, 286 Mich App 634, 664; 780 NW2d 321 (2009). The factual findings are reviewed
for clear error, while the constitutional issue is a question of law subject to de novo review. Id. In
addition, this Court must determine whether any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. Violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial requires dismissal of the charge with
prejudice. Id. at 664, 665; see MCR 6.004(A).

        A criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the federal and Michigan
constitutions as well as by statute and court rule. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20;
People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d 208 (2006); MCR 6.004. To determine whether
a defendant has been denied his or her right to a speedy trial, this Court balances the following:
“(1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4)
the prejudice to the defendant.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261, 262.

                                  1. LENGTH OF THE DELAY

      We agree with defendant that the delay between the date of his arrest and the trial was
presumptively prejudicial.

        The delay period commences at the defendant’s arrest. Id. at 261. “[T]here is no set
number of days between a defendant’s arrest and trial that is determinative of a speedy trial claim.”
Waclawski, 286 Mich App at 665. Nevertheless, a delay of more than 18 months is presumptively
prejudicial to the defendant and shifts the burden to the prosecution to prove a lack of prejudice.
Williams, 475 Mich at 262. A presumptively prejudicial delay serves as a “triggering mechanism”
and requires this Court to further inquire, by means of the other three factors, into whether a
defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct
2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994).
In this case, defendant was arrested approximately 381/2 months before the trial, well beyond the
18-month threshold for a presumption of prejudice.

     Although presumptively prejudicial, most of the delay is attributable to the outbreak of
COVID-19, not to the prosecution.

                                 2. REASONS FOR THE DELAY

       Delays between a defendant’s arrest and the trial can be divided into one of several
categories and are typically attributed to the prosecution or the defendant.

                                                 -3-
       For example, unexplained delays are attributed to the prosecutor. Waclawski, 286 Mich
App at 666. Scheduling delays and delays caused by the court system are also attributed to the
prosecutor, but are given a neutral tint and minimal weight. Williams, 475 Mich at 263. Delays
sought by defense counsel, whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned, are
ordinarily attributable to the defendant. Vermont v Brillon, 556 US 81, 90-91; 129 S Ct 1283; 173
L Ed 2d 231 (2009). The outbreak of COVID-19 added an additional category of delays for this
Court to consider. This Court has not yet addressed in a published opinion how courts should
consider delays resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic with respect to speedy-trial claims. But
we find the federal case of United States v Smith, 494 F Supp 3d 772 (ED Cal, 2020), instructive.1
In Smith, 494 F Supp 3d at 783, the federal court stated:

               The Court finds the delay to be neither attributable to the Government nor
       Smith. Instead, the Court’s decision to take responsible, emergency health
       measures to limit the spread of COVID-19 is responsible for the delay. The Court’s
       inability to safely conduct a jury trial is a good-faith and reasonable justification
       for the delay. One that does not weigh against the Government.

Accordingly, we conclude that trial delays caused by COVID-19 are not attributable to the
prosecution.

        The 381/2-month delay in the present case can be broadly divided into two time periods:
Pre-COVID and post-COVID. The post-COVID period lasted approximately 24 months (from
March 2020 to March 2022), and the pre-COVID period lasted approximately 141/2 months (from
January 2019 to March 2020). Consequently, as defense counsel admitted, COVID-19 was
largely, though not exclusively, the major source of delay given how long the pandemic persisted.
As for the pre-COVID period, one month of the delay can be attributed to the fact that the
prosecution was awaiting DNA results. We classify this delay as a delay inherent in the system.
See People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 460; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). Although this delay is
technically attributable to the prosecution, it should be assigned a neutral tint and minimal weight
for determining whether defendant was denied a speedy trial. See id. Nevertheless, this delay
does not account for the additional 131/2 months of delay for which no explanation has been
offered. Therefore, these months should be attributed to the prosecution and should not be given
a neutral tint. See Williams, 475 Mich at 261.

       For these reasons, we attribute 141/2 months of the delay to the prosecution, 24 months to
COVID-19, and none to defendant. Of the months attributed to the prosecution, only one month
should be given a neutral tint. Even so, the fact remains that over 62% of the delay (24 months
divided by 381/2 months) was caused by COVID-19, not the prosecution. Therefore, this factor
provides very little weight in determining whether defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial.

1
  Although a lower federal court’s decisions are not binding precedent for this Court, we may find
the federal court’s reasoning persuasive. See People v Gillam, 479 Mich 253, 261; 734 NW2d
585 (2007).

                                                -4-
                        3. DEFENDANT’S ASSERTION OF THE RIGHT

        In this case, defendant very promptly asserted his right to a speedy trial: in the same month
as his arrest. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the fact that the delay was presumptively
prejudicial, we conclude that the delay in defendant’s trial was not actually prejudicial to him or
to his case.

                             4. PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT

       A defendant can experience two types of prejudice while awaiting trial: prejudice to a
person and prejudice to the defense. Williams, 475 Mich at 264. The latter type of prejudice is
the more crucial in assessing a speedy-trial claim. Id. This fourth element is critical for this
Court’s determination whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial was prejudiced. Cain, 238
Mich App at 112.

         On the question of personal prejudice, defendant asserts that he lost contact with family
and friends, lost income opportunities, and suffered anxiety because of the outbreak of COVID-
19 within the jail. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the time spent in jail awaiting
trial has a detrimental impact on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life;
and it enforces idleness.” Barker, 407 US at 532. During the entire delay, the parties engaged in
six motion hearings regarding bond for defendant and defendant’s repeated violations of his bond
conditions. Although it is not clear from the record how much of the 381/2 months defendant spent
outside of jail, it is clear that defendant spent some of that time working a job and with his family.

        As for anxiety, defendant argues that the outbreak of COVID-19 in Michigan’s jails and
prisons caused him severe anxiety. It remains unclear, however, whether defendant’s fears were
justified, given that the jail had taken precautions, including social distancing, to prevent the spread
of COVID-19. In other words, the only fact that we can be sure of is that defendant was anxious
about the spread of COVID-19. This Court has made it clear that anxiety alone remains
insufficient to establish a violation of the right to a speedy trial. Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 462.

        Regarding prejudice to his case, defendant maintains that the delay prejudiced his ability
to prepare an adequate defense because, by the time of the trial, witnesses had difficulty
remembering important details about the case. In order to establish that his defense was
prejudiced, defendant must assert that the potential prejudice to his defense was “actual and
substantial to the extent that it meaningfully impaired her ability to defend against the state’s
charges and, as a result, the disposition of the criminal proceeding was likely affected.” Cain 238
Mich App at 110 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although certain witnesses, including
the victim, police officers, and defense witnesses had trouble remembering certain details from the
case, defendant has failed to show that their lapse of memory impaired his ability to present an
adequate defense against the state’s charges and likely impacted the case’s outcome.

       For these reasons, defendant has failed to establish that the delay prejudiced his right to a
speedy trial or that this Court should vacate his convictions and dismiss the charges with prejudice.

                                                  -5-
             B. DEFENDANT’S SENTENCE WAS NOT DISPROPORTIONATE

       Defendant argues that the trial court’s within-the-guidelines sentencing of defendant was
disproportionate to the seriousness of defendant’s offense. We disagree.

         This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s sentencing of defendant to
135 to 360 months in prison. See People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 471; 902 NW2d 327 (2017).
Such a review requires an examination whether the trial court abused its discretion by “violating
the principle of proportionality.” Id. at 477. Courts review a sentence for reasonableness without
regard to whether the trial court sentenced a defendant within the guidelines; whether a sentence
is reasonable depends on whether it is disproportionate to the “seriousness of the circumstances
surrounding the offense and offender.” People v Posey, ___ Mich ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023)
(Docket No. 162373); slip op at 3, 4. Under this standard, courts may not render any decisions
that fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. People v Odom, 327 Mich App
297, 303; 933 NW2d 719 (2019). Such decisions include those that are “arbitrary or capricious.”
People v Grant, 329 Mich App 626, 635, 637; 944 NW2d 172 (2019).

         Although the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Michigan Supreme Court
has held that, when trial courts depart from sentencing guidelines, “appellate courts must review
all sentences for reasonableness . . . .” Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29. The Court also stated
that every sentence “should be tailored to the particular circumstances of the case and the offender
in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection and its interest in maximizing the
offender’s rehabilitative potential.” People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557; 208 NW2d 504 (1973).
See also Graham v Florida, 560 US 48, 59; 130 S Ct 2011; 176 L Ed 2d 825 (2010). In determining
a sentence’s reasonableness, appellate courts must look to “whether the sentence is proportionate
to the seriousness of the matter.” Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29. The Supreme Court first
outlined the proportionality test in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Posey,
___ Mich at ___; slip op at 29. In Milbourn, 435 Mich at 656, the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed that the legislative guidelines “represent the actual sentencing practices of the judiciary,
and . . . [are] the best ‘barometer’ of where on the continuum from the least to the most threatening
circumstances a given case falls.” Overall, “the guidelines reflect the relative seriousness of the
different combinations of offense and offender characteristics.” Id. at 658.

        Although sentences that fall within the recommended sentencing guidelines range are
presumptively proportionate, the Michigan Supreme Court has recently held that this Court must
review “within-guidelines sentences” in accordance with the reasonableness test outlined in
Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 459, 460. Posey, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 5, 16-19. This test requires
that sentences imposed by a trial court be proportionate to the offender and to the gravity of the
offense. See Steanhouse, 500 Mich at 459, 460. This Court “may” consider the following,
nonexhaustive list of factors when determining a sentence’s proportionality:

       (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors that were inadequately considered by
       the guidelines; and (3) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the
       relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant’s misconduct
       while in custody, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, and the defendant’s
       potential for rehabilitation. [People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 126; 933 NW2d
       314 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]

                                                 -6-
        The trial court sentenced defendant to 135 to 360 months imprisonment, which fell within
the guidelines range of 81 to 135 months. See MCL 777.62.

      Defendant argues that his sentence was disproportionate because the trial court placed too
much weight on his prior criminal history and on the pain suffered by the victim. We disagree.

                                    1. OFFENSE VARIABLES

        Despite defense counsel’s arguments to the contrary, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by considering the victim’s mental and physical injuries when it sentenced defendant.
The trial court assigned defendant 10 points under Offense Variables (OVs) 3 and 4. Defendant
correctly observes that the trial court considered these variables in establishing the guidelines range
of 81 to 135 months. Defendant has failed, however, to establish that the trial court’s assignment
of 10 points under both OV 3 and OV 4 constituted an abuse of discretion.

       OV 3 deals with physical injury to a victim and requires an assessment of 10 points in
offenses involving “[b]odily injury requiring medical treatment occurred to a victim.”
MCL 777.33(1)(d).

        In People v Barnes, 332 Mich App 494, 497; 957 NW2d 62 (2020), the defendant was
convicted of CSC-I, and the trial court sentenced the defendant to serve 42 to 80 years in prison
for each conviction. The defendant’s minimum sentence exceeded the guidelines minimum
sentence range of 101/2 to 35 years in prison. Id. at 498. As part of the sentencing process, the
trial court assigned defendant 10 points under OV 3. Id. at 499. This Court concluded that the
trial court’s assessment of 10 points under OV 3 was proper because the victim had suffered a
physical injury, namely sexual assault, that required her to be transported to a hospital for a forensic
medical examination. Id. at 500. Although the nurse could not confirm that the injuries on the
victim were the result of sexual assault, the nurse concluded that the injuries were consistent with
sexual assault and proscribed emergency contraceptives to the victim. Id.

        As for physical harm, this case strongly mirrors the fact pattern of Barnes, 332 Mich App
at 500, wherein the victim was physically assaulted, requiring her to be transported to the hospital
for a medical examination. Likewise, the present victim was transported to a hospital for a forensic
medical examination. Although the DNA analyst could not confirm that defendant had sexually
assaulted the victim, she indicated that defendant was likely the victim’s assailant. See id.
Moreover, as the nurse explained in detail, the victim suffered multiple injuries to her body.2

       OV 4 concerns “psychological harm to a victim” and requires an assessment of 10 points
in offenses involving “[s]erious psychological injury requiring professional treatment [that]
occurred to a victim.” MCL 777.34(1)(a).

2
  The nurse testified to numerous lacerations and bruises on the victim’s neck, face, ear, breast,
arm and back, including “a petechiae [i.e., capillaries broken under the skin] in the roof of her
mouth.”

                                                  -7-
           In People v Lawhorn, 320 Mich App 194, 196, 211; 907 NW2d 832 (2017), a trial court
convicted a defendant of third-degree child abuse and sentenced the defendant to “365 days in
jail . . . and 60 months’ probation,” which constituted a “one month” increase from the sentencing
guidelines range. The trial court assigned the defendant 10 points under OV 4. Id. at 210. The
trial court justified its holding on the grounds that the guidelines accounted for only “some degree
of the harm the victim suffered . . . .” Id. This Court found the trial court’s justification persuasive,
stating, “[I]t was reasonable . . . to conclude that the factors [that the trial court] considered,
especially the effects of defendant’s behavior on the victim that culminated in his stabbing another
child and saying that he hated his life and that nobody loved him, were not adequately considered
in the guidelines calculation.” Id. at 210, 211.

         Like the victim in Lawhorn, 320 Mich App at 210, 211, the victim in this case suffered
immense psychological harm. The victim testified that defendant’s abuse seriously undermined
her physical and mental health: her doctor diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder, she
was unable to keep a steady job, and she was unable to have her own house. Two police officers
testified that the victim appeared very upset when they spoke with her. To add insult to injury,
defendant’s family and friends harassed the victim. As the trial court explained at sentencing, this
horrific incident marked a profound, lifechanging event for the victim during which she was
attacked and strangled in her own home. Also, the fact that the victim had to seek professional
help, such as counseling, also supports the trial court’s conclusion regarding the severity of her
psychological suffering.

        Additionally, unlike the situations in Lawhorn, 320 Mich App at 196, 211, and Barnes, 332
Mich App at 497, 498, wherein the defendants were sentenced outside the guidelines range, in this
case, defendant was sentenced within the guidelines range. Under these circumstances, defendant
has failed to overcome the presumption that his sentence was reasonable considering the points
assigned to him by the trial court under OV 3 and OV 4.

                            2. DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY

         Defendant has wrongly asserted that the trial court erred by considering defendant’s prior
arrests, which did not result in convictions, when it sentenced him.

        This Court has stated that “[u]nder the sentencing guidelines, the recommendation for a
defendant’s minimum sentence is determined in significant part by the defendant’s criminal
history.” People v Young, 276 Mich App 446, 454; 740 NW2d 347 (2007). As part of the
guidelines’ calculation process, trial courts consider a defendant’s prior offenses. See
MCL 777.21(1). Such offenses can include felonies or misdemeanors. See Young, 276 Mich App
at 454. Overall, “[w]hen calculating the sentencing guidelines, a court may consider all record
evidence, including the contents of a [presentence investigation report].” People v Wellman, 320
Mich App 603, 608; 910 NW2d 304 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted; second
alteration in original). This Court has also stated that, when imposing sentence, trial courts “may
consider other criminal activity for which no conviction resulted, provided that defendant has an
opportunity for refutation.” People v Williams, 111 Mich App 818, 825; 314 NW2d 769 (1981).

       Therefore, the trial court did not err by considering all defendant’s criminal history,
including his misdemeanors and his arrests, which did not result in convictions, when sentencing

                                                  -8-
defendant. Defendant had an opportunity for refutation, but defendant’s criminal history, which
included one conviction and several arrests for domestic violence, provided a crucial component
of the trial court’s justification for defendant’s sentence.

       In summary, defendant’s 135-month sentence for his CSC-I conviction was not
disproportionate, and he is not entitled to resentencing.

                              C. EX POST FACTO PUNISHMENT

       Defendant correctly asserts that the 2021 SORA constitutes a criminal punishment,
notwithstanding the Legislature’s intent to the contrary, but it does not constitute an ex post facto
punishment.

        “In order to preserve a claim that a defendant’s sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or
unusual, the defendant must first raise the claim in the trial court.” People v Lymon, 342 Mich App
46, 62; 993 NW2d 24 (2022). Defendant raised this issue before the trial court in his motion to
correct an invalid sentence. Therefore, defendant preserved this issue on appeal.

        This Court reviews preserved questions of constitutional error de novo. People v Brown,
294 Mich App 377, 389; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). “A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and
courts will construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is plainly apparent.”
People v Malone (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket
No. 331903); slip op at 4. “The party challenging the statute’s constitutionality has the burden of
proving its invalidity.” Id. “When a party asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a
statute, the party must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which the statute would be
valid.” People v Dillon, 296 Mich App 506, 510; 822 NW2d 611 (2012).

        The Michigan Legislature enacted SORA in 1994 to assist law enforcement with
preventing convicted sex offenders from reoffending. People v Betts, 507 Mich 527, 533; 968
NW2d 497 (2021). Within the succeeding decades, SORA experienced a series of amendments.
See id. at 533-536. Most recently, SORA was amended in 2020 and is currently referred to as “the
2021 SORA.” Lymon, 342 Mich App at 65. Although some of the 2020 changes to SORA were
ameliorative, other changes were more restrictive. Id.

        Pursuant to SORA, defendant is considered a “Tier III” offender because he was convicted
of CSC-I. See MCL 28.722(v)(iv). Consequently, defendant is subject to mandatory sex offender
registration for life under MCL 28.725(13) (reporting requirements for registered individuals and
Tier III offenders). Accordingly, the trial court required defendant to register as a sex offender for
life.

      Defendant argues that he should be removed from the sex offender registry because
Michigan’s 2021 SORA represents unconstitutional ex post facto punishment. We disagree.

        The United States Constitution prohibits ex post facto laws. Betts, 507 Mich at 542; see
US Const, art I, § 10; Const 1963, art 1, § 10. A law is ex post facto if it: “(1) punishes an act that
was innocent when the act was committed; (2) makes an act a more serious criminal offense;
(3) increases the punishment for a [committed] crime; or (4) allows the prosecution to convict on
less evidence.” Betts, 507 Mich at 542 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in

                                                 -9-
original). Examining whether a law falls under the third category of ex post facto laws requires a
two-pronged analysis. Id. For the first prong of this analysis, we will determine whether the
Legislature intended SORA to be a criminal punishment or a civil remedy. Id. If the Legislature
intended for SORA to be a criminal punishment, “the retroactive application of such a statute
violates the ex post facto prohibitions, and the inquiry ends.” Id. at 543. However, if the
Legislature intended for the statute to serve as a civil remedy, this Court must determine “whether
the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to
deem it civil.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        1. MICHIGAN’S 2021 SORA CONSTITUTES A CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

        Although the Legislature intended for the 2021 SORA to be a civil remedy, defendant has
correctly asserted that the statute constitutes a criminal punishment.

      The United States Supreme Court has stated that, when determining whether a statute’s
scheme is truly punitive in purpose or effect, the following factors are especially relevant:

       “[W]hether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: [1] has been regarded
       in our history and traditions as a punishment; [2] imposes an affirmative disability
       or restraint; [3] promotes the traditional aims of punishment; [4] has a rational
       connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or [5] is excessive with respect to this
       purpose.” [Id. at 545, quoting Smith v Doe, 538 US 84, 97; 123 S Ct 1140; 155 L
       Ed 2d 164 (2003) (alterations in Betts).]

If a defendant can establish, by means of these factors, that a statute’s punitive effect negated the
Legislature’s intent to deem the statute a civil regulation, a defendant must next demonstrate that
the punishment of being required to comply with the statute constituted “cruel and/or unusual
punishment.” Lymon, 342 Mich App at 81.

         In Lymon, this Court concluded that, although the Michigan Legislature intended for the
2021 SORA’s aggregate punitive effective to be civil, the act imposes a criminal punishment on a
sex offender registrant. Id. at 70, 81. In its analysis, this Court considered the following factors:
(1) whether SORA has been regarded in our history and traditions as a criminal punishment,
(2) how the 2021 SORA effects are felt by those subject to it, (3) whether the 2021 SORA promotes
traditional aims of punishment, (4) whether the 2021 SORA has a rational connection to a
nonpunitive purpose, and (5) whether the regulatory means selected are reasonable, given the
Legislature’s nonpunitive objective. Id. at 71-79. Regarding SORA 2021, this Court concluded
that (1) the 2021 SORA continues to bear a significant resemblance to the traditional punishments
of shaming and parole because it publishes information about the registrant and encourages social
ostracism; (2) it imposes significant affirmative obligations on registrants by requiring, on pain of
imprisonment, that they report common life changes within a brief period of time; (3) it promotes
the traditional aims of punishment because it seeks to protect the public through deterrence and
because its restrictions support retribution; (4) like the 2011 SORA, the 2021 SORA encourages
the nonpunitive purpose of public safety by identifying sex offenders who might resume their illicit
activities and alerts the public to such dangers; and (5) given the uncertainty surrounding the 2021
SORA’s effectiveness at decreasing recidivism, the restraints it imposes are excessive,

                                                -10-
notwithstanding the fact that they are fewer in number than the restrictions in the 2011 SORA. Id.
at 75, 77-79, 81.

       For these reasons, defendant correctly asserts that the 2021 SORA constitutes a criminal
punishment. Defendant has failed to establish, however, that requiring him to register as a sex
offender for life constituted a cruel or unusual punishment.

    2. REQUIRING DEFENDANT TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER FOR LIFE WAS
                         NOT CRUEL OR UNUSUAL

        “The Michigan Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment, Const 1963, art 1, § 16,
whereas the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, US Const,
Am VIII.” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 204; 817 NW2d 599 (2011). If a punishment
satisfies the Michigan Constitution’s restrictions on cruel or unusual punishment, it necessarily
satisfies the more lenient requirements of the United States Constitution. Id. The Michigan
Supreme Court has stated that, generally speaking, sentences “should be tailored to the particular
circumstances of the case and the offender in an effort to balance both society’s need for protection
and its interest in maximizing the offender’s rehabilitative potential.” People v McFarlin, 389
Mich 557, 574; 208 NW2d 504 (1973). For determining whether a punishment is cruel or unusual,
courts examine whether the punishment was unjustifiably disproportionate to the offense by
considering the following factors:

       (1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity of the offense, (2) the
       penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other offenses
       in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the
       penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and (4) whether the penalty
       imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. [Lymon, 342 Mich App at 82.]

                       a. HARSHNESS OF DEFENDANT’S PENALTY

       Defendant’s sentence was not unjustifiably disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.

        Because defendant was convicted on a charge of CSC-I, defendant is subject to lifetime
mandatory sex offender registration. See People v Jarrell, 344 Mich App 464, 473, 487; 1 NW3d
359 (2022);3 MCL 28.722(v)(iv); MCL 28.725(13). In Jarrell, 344 Mich App at 472-473, the
defendant was convicted of CSC-I for sexually penetrating the victim. The defendant made
credible threats of harm to the victim, which led the victim to believe that she owed the defendant
a debt, that she was being watched, and that defendant would harm or kill the victim or her

3
  The Michigan Supreme Court has held the application for leave to appeal in abeyance regarding
People v Jarrell pending its decision in People v Lymon (Docket No. 164685). The application
for leave to appeal was granted on January 11, 2023, regarding “whether requiring a defendant to
register as a sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) . . . for a non-sexual
crime, such as unlawful imprisonment of a minor, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under
Const 1963, art 1, § 16 or cruel and unusual punishment under US Const, Am VIII."

                                                -11-
daughter. Id. at 468-472. This Court stated, “Amid this ongoing restraint—reinforced by
significant psychological pressure and the frequent display of weapons—[the defendant] orally
and vaginally penetrated the victim without her consent.” Id. at 485. This Court concluded that
the trial court’s imposition of lifetime SORA registration on the defendant was not unduly harsh,
given the “heinous facts underlying [the defendant’s] convictions” and because the defendant
faced a statutory maximum life sentence for his convictions. Id.

        In this case, defendant forced the victim to perform oral sex on him against her will and in
her own home; he brutally attacked her, strangled her, and reentered her house after raping her,
which likely caused the victim additional trauma. The trial court found that defendant’s offense
had been an extremely negative and “life changing event” for the victim. Just before the trial court
sentenced defendant, the victim testified in detail regarding the horrendous physical and
psychological suffering that she endured because of defendant’s offense against her. She asked
the trial court to consider her suffering when it sentenced defendant. Although the defendant’s
sentence to electronic monitoring will last for the remainder of his life, it is reasonable to assume,
given the immense trauma that defendant’s offense created, that the victim has also been sentenced
to years of mental suffering and hardship, from which she may never fully recover. The only
difference between the two parties in this case is that the victim, unlike defendant, did nothing to
merit her lifetime sentence.

       For these reasons, just as this Court stated in Jarrell, defendant’s lifetime registration
requirement is not unjustifiably disproportionate to his offense.

      b. DEFENDANT’S PENALTY RELATIVE TO OTHER MICHIGAN PENALTIES

        Defendant’s mandatory lifetime sex offender registration is not unduly harsh in light of
other penalties imposed for other offenses in Michigan. See id. at ___; slip op at 11. Defendant
argues that there are no other postincarceration sentences in Michigan that last for the offender’s
lifetime. However, in Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6, and Jarrell, 344 Mich App
at 486, this Court stated that sentences mandated by the Legislature are presumptively proportional
and presumptively valid, meaning that they are presumptively not cruel or unusual. Moreover,
this Court stated that lifetime registration is not the only mandatory penalty imposed in Michigan.
Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.

       Mandatory lifetime imprisonment is the penalty imposed for first-degree murder,
       MCL 750.316(2). Two years’ imprisonment is the mandatory punishment for the
       possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1). A
       second conviction results in the mandatory punishment of five years’
       imprisonment, and a third conviction is subject to a mandatory 10-year period. Id.
       Additionally, certain CSC-I convictions may impose a mandatory 25-year
       minimum sentence, MCL 750.520b(2)(b), or a mandatory life sentence,
       MCL 750.520b(2)(c). [Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6.]

        Despite defendant’s argument that postincarceration life sentences are unique and rarely
applied in Michigan, defendant has not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption that
his legislatively mandated sentence was proportional to his offense.

                                                -12-
                             c. COMPARISON TO OTHER STATES

        The penalty imposed for defendant’s offense in Michigan, relative to the penalty imposed
for the same offense in other jurisdictions, does not weigh in defendant’s favor.

        In Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7, the defendant argued that only 18 states have
substantially implemented the federal Sex Offenders Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),
42 USC 16901 et seq., that there was no consensus that these registries served to improve public
safety, and research indicated that the dangerousness of sex offenders had been previously
exaggerated. See People v Betts, 507 Mich 527, 560; 968 NW2d 497 (2021). In this case,
defendant similarly argued that only 18 states have implemented the federal SORNA act; that the
danger posed to the public by sex offenders has been overblown; that Michigan falls into a minority
of states that have substantially implemented SORNA; and that Michigan is unique among those
states that have implemented SORNA because lifetime registration is a mandatory condition,
notwithstanding the fact that defendant was never assessed as posing a future risk to children.
Defendant also argues that, in several states, obligations regarding lifetime registration are
discretionary, depending on a registrant’s risk of recidivism. Nevertheless, this Court stated in
Jarrell, 344 Mich App at 486, that many states other than Michigan have a tiered system for sex
offender registration, wherein lifetime registration is reserved for “the most heinous perpetrators
of sexual assault.”

         Additionally, defendant’s arguments ignore the fact that the trial court in this case, like the
trial court in Malone, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 5, applied an individualized approach
“pertaining to [defendant’s] own circumstances.” In Malone, the defendant was charged with
CSC-I and permitted to plead to CSC-II. Id. at ___; slip op at 2-3. The defendant was also
remanded to a juvenile facility for treatment. Id. at ___; slip op at 3. In the present case, the trial
judge determined that there was no justification at that time to run defendant’s sentences
consecutive, despite the recommendation of probation. The trial court also considered defendant’s
felonies and misdemeanors as well as the fact that there was a pretrial period when defendant had
not been in trouble and had complied with the trial court’s orders. All these facts suggest that the
trial court gave defendant an individualized assessment of his risk to reoffend. See id. at ___; slip
op at 7.

       For these reasons, defendant has failed to establish that the penalty imposed for his offense
in Michigan constituted cruel or unusual punishment in light of other jurisdictions’ penalties for
the same offense.

                              d. THE GOAL OF REHABILITATION

      This Court has conclusively stated that lifetime registration for sexual offenders does not
advance the justice system’s overall goal of rehabilitation. Id. at ___; slip op at 8; Jarrell, 344
Mich App at 486.

        Nevertheless, because the other three factors weigh against defendant, defendant has failed
to establish that his sentence to lifetime registration was cruel or unusual. See Malone, ___ Mich
App at ___; slip op at 5-8; Jarrell, 344 Mich App at 485-487.

                                                 -13-
                         D. LIFETIME ELECTRONIC MONITORING

      Lastly, defendant argues that his sentence to LEM constituted a cruel or unusual
punishment and an unreasonable search. We disagree.

        “In order to preserve a claim that a defendant’s sentence is unconstitutionally cruel or
unusual, the defendant must first raise the claim in the trial court.” Lymon, 342 Mich App at 62.
The same standard applies for the preservation of constitutional issues in general. See People v
Swenor, 336 Mich App 550, 562; 971 NW2d 33 (2021). Defendant raised this issue before the
trial court in his motion to correct an invalid sentence. Therefore, defendant preserved this issue
on appeal.

        This Court reviews preserved questions of constitutional error de novo. Brown, 294 Mich
App at 389. “A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and courts will construe a statute as
constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is plainly apparent.” Malone, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 4. “The party challenging the statute’s constitutionality has the burden of proving its
invalidity.” Id. “When a party asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the
party must demonstrate that no circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid.”
Dillon, 296 Mich App at 510.

                           1. CRUEL OR UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

        This Court has concluded that the Legislature “ ‘intended mandatory [LEM] to be an
additional punishment and part of the sentence itself when required by the CSC-I or CSC-II
statutes.’ ” People v Hallak, 310 Mich App 555, 571; 873 NW2d 811 (2015), overruled on other
grounds 499 Mich 879 (2016), quoting People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 335-336; 817 NW2d 497
(2012). This Court has also concluded that “lifetime monitoring would help to protect potential
victims from defendant, who in turn would likely be deterred from engaging in such acts if he were
closely monitored. Accordingly, when employing an as-applied standard under the state
Constitution, lifetime electronic monitoring is not cruel or unusual punishment.” Hallak, 310 Mich
App at 577. Moreover, LEM does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment as applied to
defendant.

                       a. HARSHNESS OF DEFENDANT’S PENALTY

         MCL 791.285(3) defines LEM as a device “by which, through global positioning system
satellite or other means, an individual’s movement and location are tracked and recorded.” There
is no statutory provision for “any kind of discretion with respect to, review of, or relief from the
required monitoring.” Hallak, 310 Mich App at 568. Although LEM is certainly a great burden
to a defendant, defendant has failed to show how his physical burden outweighs the physical and
psychological harm suffered by the victim, whom defendant raped and strangled in her own home.
Despite his burden, LEM will allow defendant to travel, work, and engage in his community. In
other words, defendant will still be able to live a relatively normal life. Consequently, defendant’s
sentence to LEM was not unjustifiably disproportionate to his offense.

                                                -14-
      b. DEFENDANT’S PENALTY RELATIVE TO OTHER MICHIGAN PENALTIES

      Defendant’s sentence to LEM is a lenient punishment compared to life imprisonment
which can be imposed for other serious crimes in Michigan such as first-degree murder,
MCL 750.316; second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; armed robbery, MCL 750.529; kidnapping,
MCL 750.349; and arson, MCL 750.72.

                             c. COMPARISON TO OTHER STATES

         As this Court stated in Hallak, 310 Mich App at 575, many states have imposed LEM as a
penalty for various CSC crimes. Moreover, at least 11 states, including Michigan, have mandated
LEM for defendants convicted of the most serious CSC offenses (CSC offense against a minor).
Id. Society has a legitimate interest in preventing individual offenders from causing further injury
to society. Id. at 575, 576. Moreover, “at least 10 states besides Michigan have determined that
mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is of value in ensuring such protection.” Id. at 576.
Although the risk of recidivism for sex offenders may not be as severe as this Court previously
believed, neither the Michigan Supreme Court nor this Court has denied that a risk of recidivism
for sexual offenders exists. See Betts, 507 Mich at 560; Hallak, 310 Mich App at 575. The record
for this case indicates that defendant’s raping of the victim was not his first violent encounter with
a woman.4 The trial court considered defendant’s prior criminal history, which included several
domestic-violence arrests and one domestic-violence conviction from 2012. In other words, there
was a risk of recidivism on the part of defendant. The trial court did not make it explicitly clear
how much of a role this risk played in its sentence of defendant, however.

                              d. THE GOAL OF REHABILITATION

      Unfortunately, this Court has not yet explored in a published opinion whether LEM
undermines the goal of criminal rehabilitation. See Hallak, 310 Mich App at 555.

        Nevertheless, in light of the first three considerations, defendant has failed to establish that
his particular sentence to LEM constituted cruel or unusual punishment.

                                 2. UNREASONABLE SEARCH

       Defendant has also failed to establish that his sentence constituted an unreasonable search.

       This Court has stated that “the placement of an electronic monitoring device to monitor
defendant’s movement constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.” Hallak, 310
Mich App at 579; see US Const Am IV. Determining a search’s reasonableness requires a court
to balance the interests of the public in searching for evidence of criminal activity against an
individual’s interest in maintaining their right to privacy. Hallak, 310 Mich App at 579. This
Court determined that “the strong public interest in the benefit of monitoring those convicted of

4
  On one occasion that occurred after the incident at issue in this case, defendant was arrested,
though not convicted, for lying to a police officer and for engaging in domestic violence with the
mother of his child.

                                                 -15-
CSC-II against a child under the age of 13 outweighs any minimal impact on defendant’s reduced
privacy interest.” Id. at 581. Because this case concerns a CSC-I conviction, this case involves a
more serious offense than the crime at issue in Hallak. Therefore, this Court’s ruling in Hallak
would plainly apply to defendant’s offense.

       Consequently, defendant’s sentence to LEM did not constitute an unreasonable search.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Sima G. Patel
                                                            /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                            /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

                                              -16-