Court Opinion

ID: 9860113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:11:09.855314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:04.130032
License: Public Domain

BURKE, P. J., dissenting in part: I agree with the majority opinion that the case presented a question of fact to be determined by the jury. In the cases cited by plaintiffs the courts hold that the negligence or lack of negligence of the driver who stopped, or the negligence or lack of negligence of the driver who ran into him from the rear, whether the driver who stopped gave a signal in time for the driver from the rear to stop and all other questions relating to due care on the part of the two drivers are jury questions. See Stegmann v. Zachariah, 46 Ill App2d 7, 196 NE2d 703, for a recent case involving a collision with a stopped vehicle. I agree with the contention of the defendant that the court was without power to set aside the special finding of the jury and that the trial judge should have granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The majority opinion recognizes that the plaintiffs in their post-trial motion do not make the point that the special finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or move to have the special finding set aside. The provisions of sec 68.1(2) of the Civil Practice Act require that the post-trial motion must contain the points relied upon, particularly specifying the grounds in support thereof and must state the relief desired. This paragraph concludes by stating that a party may not urge as error on the review of the ruling on his post-trial motion any point, ground or relief not particularly specified in the motion. If the trial judge thought that the post-trial motion should contain the point now urged he could have suggested to the plaintiffs an amendment of their motion to embrace the point. Assuming, arguendo, that the point was made in the post-trial motion the trial judge should not have usurped the function of the jury by holding that the finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. There was competent evidence to support the finding. The majority opinion grants a new trial “solely” because of the prejudicial confusion that appeared in the jury’s “inconsistent verdicts.” The books contain numerous opinions of our Supreme and Appellate Courts deciding that the answers to special interrogatories control the general verdicts. In these cases the reviewing courts have not thought that the inconsistency between the special finding and the general verdict showed confusion in the thinking of the jurors which would justify the court in ignoring the answers to the special interrogatory. To so hold renders ineffective the provisions of sec 65 of the Civil Practice Act that when the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict the former controls the latter and the court may render judgment accordingly. There was no issue before the trial judge as to whether the special finding was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. He could not sua sponte raise an issue for plaintiffs that they had not raised themselves and then rule on it in their favor. The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.