Court Opinion

ID: 9607488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:10.544553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:39.696144
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The majority concludes there is no evidence of actual notice. A careful review of the record in totality reveals the erroneous decision of the majority.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Williams v. Chesterfield Lumber Co., 267 S.C. 607, 230 S.E.2d 447 (1976), elucidates:
Summary judgment can only be granted in those cases where plain, palpable and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ. All ambiguities, eonclu*621sions and inferences arising in and from the evidence must be construed most strongly against the movant for summary judgment. Title Insurance Company v. Christian, 267 S.C. 71, 226 S.E.2d 240 (1976); Eagle Construction Company, Inc., v. Richland Const. Company, Inc., 264 S.C. 71, 74, 212 S.E.2d 580 (1975).
Id. at 610, 280 S.E.2d at 448. See also Hammond v. Scott, 268 S.C. 137, 232 S.E.2d 336 (1977); Gardner v. Campbell, 257 S.C. 209,184 S.E.2d 700 (1971).
In Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting and Towing Co., 301 S.C. 418, 392 S.E.2d 460 (1990), our Supreme Court illuminates:
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” See S.C.R.C.P. 56(c) (1989). LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E.2d 711 (1988). Crescent Company of Spartanburg, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, [266 S.C. 598, 225 S.E.2d 656 (1976) ] supra.
The grant of summary judgment is appropriate only if it is clear that no genuine issue of material fact exists, that inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing by the record properly before the Court the absence of a triable issue of fact. See Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc. v. Hilton, 278 S.C. 624, 300 S.E.2d 594 (1983). All inferences from facts in the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Eagle Construction Co. v. Richland Construction Company, Inc., 264 S.C. 71, 212 S.E.2d 580 (1975). A party who fails to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is not entitled to summary judgment even though his adversary does not come forward *622with opposing materials. Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota v. Christian, 267 S.C. 71, 226 S.E.2d 240 (1976).
Id. at 421-22, 392 S.E.2d at 462.
Dowling v. Home Buyers Warranty Corporation, II, 303 S.C. 295, 400 S.E.2d 143 (1991), articulates:
It is axiomatic summary judgment should not be granted unless there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting and Towing Co., 301 S.C. 418, 392 S.E.2d 460 (1990); Tom Jenkins Realty, Inc. v. Hilton, 278 S.C. 624, 300 S.E.2d 594 (1983). Even if there is no dispute regarding the facts, summary judgment should be denied if there is a dispute as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. Gilliland v. Elmwood Properties, 301 S.C. 295, 391 S.E.2d 577 (1990).
Id. at 297-98,400 S.E.2d at 145.
Rothrock v. Copeland, 305 S.C. 402, 409 S.E.2d 366 (1991), addresses summary judgment:
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must not try issues of fact, but must discern whether genuine issues of fact exist to be tried. Spencer v. Miller, 259 S.C. 453, 192 S.E.2d 863 (1972). If triable issues exist, those issues must go to the jury. Id. In making its determination, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. Summary judgment is proper where plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ. Williams v. Chesterfield Lumber Co., 267 S.C. 607, 230 S.E.2d 447 (1976). Summary judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Abrams v. Wright, 262 S.C. 141, 202 S.E.2d 859 (1974).
Id. at 405, 409 S.E.2d at 367-68.
The case of Baughman, et al. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., et al., 306 S.C. 101, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991), expounds:
Since it is a drastic remedy, summary judgment “should be cautiously invoked so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of the disputed factual issues.” Watson v. Southern Ry. Co., 420 F.Supp. 483, 486 (D.S.C.1975); see *623also Holloman v. McAllister, 289 S.C. 183, 186, 345 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1986) (“an extreme remedy to be cautiously invoked”). This means, among other things, that summary judgment must not be granted until the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete discovery.
Id, at 112,410 S.E.2d at 543.
Heretofore, the Court of Appeals has issued several opinions resulting in inconsistency. The Court previously held the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Pryor v. Northwest Apts., Ltd., 321 S.C. 524, 469 S.E.2d 630 (S.C.Ct.App.1996); Bravis v. Dunbar, 316 S.C. 263, 449 S.E.2d 495 (Ct.App.1994); Thomas v. Waters, 315 S.C. 524, 445 S.E.2d 659 (Ct.App.1994); Dickert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 306 S.C. 311, 411 S.E.2d 672 (Ct.App.1991).
On the other hand, this Court has also stated that at the summary judgment stage of a proceeding, it is only necessary for the nonmoving party to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting determination by a jury for summary judgment to be denied. See Hill v. York County Sheriff's Dep’t, 313 S.C. 303, 437 S.E.2d 179 (Ct.App.1993); Anders v. South Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 307 S.C. 371, 415 S.E.2d 406 (Ct.App.1992).
In order to provide guidance to the Bench and Bar, I would hereby expressly overrule Hill and Anders. The statements contained in Hill and Anders to the effect of “it is only necessary ... to submit a scintilla of evidence ...” are erroneous.

NOTICE

It is imperative to review the law of notice with specificity in the case sub judice. It is axiomatic the terminology in the case law has resulted in an amalgamation of terms such as “actual notice,” “constructive notice,” “express notice,” and “implied notice.”
In a simplistic analysis, the law recognizes a bifurcation of notice: (1) “actual notice,” and (2) “constructive notice.” Scholars and writers have divided “actual notice” into: (1) “express notice,” which involves direct information, and (2) *624“implied notice,” which is notice inferred from facts available to the person charged with means of knowledge. In some cases, courts have classified “implied notice” as “constructive notice.” Other jurisdictions refer to “implied actual notice.” Basically, it is important to recognize that “constructive notice” is a legal inference, while “implied actual notice” is an inference of fact. The result is that the same factual record may be utilitarian to prove “constructive notice” or “implied actual notice.” See 58 Am.JuR.2d Notice §§ 5-7 (1989).

DEFINITIONS

Actual Notice

Ab initio, the term “actual notice,” is not restricted by its facial import. Rather, “actual notice” means that which is directly and personally given to the person to be notified and embraces those things that reasonably diligent inquiry and exercise of the information at hand would have disclosed. Id.
Actual notice. Actual notice has been defined as notice expressly and actually given, and brought home to the party directly. The term “actual notice,” however, is generally given a wider meaning as embracing two classes, express and implied; the former includes all knowledge of a degree above that which depends upon collateral inference, or which imposes upon the party the further duty of inquiry; the latter imputes knowledge to the party because he is shown to be conscious of having the means of knowledge. In this sense actual notice is such notice as is positively proved to have been given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry.
Constructive notice. Constructive notice is information or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a person (although he may not actually have it), because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it. Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.
*625Express notice. Express notice embraces not only knowledge, but also that which is communicated by direct information, either written or oral, from those who are cognizant of the fact communicated. See also Actual notice, above.
Implied notice. Implied notice is one of the varieties of actual notice (not constructive) and is distinguished from “express” actual notice. It is notice inferred or imputed to a party by reason of his knowledge of facts or circumstances collateral to the main fact, of such a character as to put him upon inquiry, and which, if the inquiry were followed up with due diligence, would lead him definitely to the knowledge of the main fact. “Implied notice” is a presumption of fact, relating to what one can learn by reasonable inquiry, and arises from actual notice of circumstances, and not from constructive notice. Or as otherwise defined, implied notice may be said to exist where the fact in question lies open to the knowledge of the party, so that the exercise of reasonable observation and watchfulness would not fall [sic] to apprise him of it, although no one has told him of it in so many words.
Black’s Law Dictionary 1061-62 (6th ed. 1990).

SOUTH CAROLINA PRECEDENT

In a plethora of scenarios, “notice” is analyzed in reference to its impact on a particular theory. “When a person knows of a thing he has ‘notice’ thereof, as no one needs notice of what he already knows.” Walker v. Preacher, et al., 185 S.C. 462, 467, 194 S.E. 868, 870 (1938).
Amplifying the use of “notice” as it relates to parties inter sese is City of Greenville v. Washington American League Baseball Club, et al., 205 S.C. 495, 509, 32 S.E.2d 777, 782 (1945): “Furthermore, if there are circumstances sufficient to put the party upon inquiry, he is held to have notice of everything which that inquiry, properly conducted, would certainly disclose.”
A commonsensical statement in regard to “notice” is contained in Hannah v. United Refrigerated Servs., Inc., 312 S.C. 42, 430 S.E.2d 539 (Ct.App.1993):
Stated differently, “[n]o one needs notice of what he already knows.” Id.; Dicks & Gillam, Inc. v. Cleland, 295 S.C. 124, *626128, 367 S.E.2d 430, 433 (Ct.App.1988). “Actual notice is synonymous with knowledge.” Jefferson County Bank v. Erickson, 188 Minn. 354, 247 N.W. 245, 247 (1933).
Id. at 47, 430 S.E.2dat542.
Williams v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., et al., 187 S.C. 103, 196 S.E. 519 (1938), explicates “constructive notice”:
Constructive notice is thus defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d Ed., p. 1258: “Constructive notice is a presumption of law making it impossible for one to deny the matter covering which notice is given.”
“Constructive notice is a legal inference from established facts, and like other legal presumptions does not admit of dispute. It is in its nature no more than evidence of notice, the presumption of which is so violent that the Courts will not even allow its being controverted.” 20 R.C.L. 340.
It will not be argued that this arbitrary rule of constructive notice, founded on presumption, should be enforced against one who is in complete ignorance of the facts from which the presumption arises.
“Constructive notice, strictly speaking, is ineffective unless there is a statute providing therefor.” 20 R.C.L. 342.
As we have said, we know of no statute which gives to the records of the court of probate the effect of constructive notice. Usually those who invoke the power of the probate court to adjudge one insane seek to shun publicity thereabout.
“In some cases it has been said that constructive notice is a creature of ‘positive law5 or a ‘creature of the statute,’ ineffectual unless provided by statute, and that, to be of any force, the statute must be strictly complied with.”
“ * * * Constructive notice rests on a strictly legal presumption and may be a creature of positive law. The same facts sometimes may be such as to prove both constructive and actual notice, that is, a court may infer constructive notice and a jury may infer actual notice from the facts. There may be cases when the facts show actual, when they do not warrant the inference of constructive notice.” 46 C.J. 541.
It seems plain that one cannot be held to have constructive notice of facts from which the presumption of notice *627arises, who is wholly ignorant of those facts, and a knowledge of which is the necessary influence of his conduct, or actions in the premises.
Id. at 114-15,196 S.E. at 524.
The equivalency of “actual notice” is articulated in a dissent penned in Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Chavis, et al., 254 S.C. 507, 525, 176 S.E.2d 131, 140 (1970): “It is settled law that knowledge of facts sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry is equivalent to actual notice of such facts as a reasonably diligent inquiry would certainly have disclosed.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeals recognized an expansion of the strict definition of “actual notice” in Fuller-Ahrens Partnership v. South Carolina Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., et al., 311 S.C. 177, 427 S.E.2d 920 (Ct.App.1993): “ ‘Actual notice may be inferred from circumstances. That which puts a party upon inquiry may be the equivalent of actual notice.’ ” Id. at 185, 427 S.E.2d at 924 (quoting Patellis v. Tanner, 197 Ga. 471, 29 S.E.2d 419, 424 (Ct.App.1944)).
In contrariety to the conclusion of the majority that there is no evidence of “actual notice” in this record, I conclude that the affidavits and information submitted by the plaintiff are sufficient to meet a summary judgment analysis in connection with the law of “actual notice.” This case falls within the ambit of “implied actual notice” by definition. I believe that South Carolina would follow a majority of jurisdictions in recognizing “implied actual notice” as a definition of “actual notice.”
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendant.