Court Opinion

ID: 9603548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:07:40.65378+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:53.998244
License: Public Domain

*597GILLETTE, J.,
concurring.
The court today announces a salutary principle of constitutional law — the state will not be permitted to use, for any purpose, evidence extracted from a criminal defendant by a knowing violation of the defendant’s right to counsel under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. The decision is unanimous. I write separately only because I have, in the not too distant past, argued the other side of this question, and I feel a responsibility to explain briefly what has led me to change my mind.
In State v. Mills, 76 Or App 301, 710 P2d 148 (1985), rev den 300 Or 546 (1986), a seven-member majority of the en banc Court of Appeals held that use of Miranda-violative statements for impeachment purposes does not violate the Oregon Constitution. I was the author of that opinion, which was the result of an extensive examination of the pertinent authorities. As I reread that opinion now, however, I am forced to admit that it argued more passionately than persuasively. The opinion concluded:
“[W]e believe it is a perversion of an Oregon constitutional right to turn a shield (the right to keep the state from using illegally obtained evidence) into a sword (the right to take affirmative advantage of the unavailability of that evidence to work a fraud on the trier of fact). One of the functions of the exclusionary rule is to preserve the integrity of our judicial system by refusing admission to evidence that was obtained in violation of the document that created the judicial system — the constitution. But a court system that countenances perjury also loses its integrity — there can be no respect for law when a court is not even free to insist that witnesses appearing before it obey the oath they take to tell the truth. The proper balance of these twin challenges to the integrity of our judicial system is, we think, to permit a defendant to keep illegally obtained evidence from a jury unless he takes the stand — something he cannot be compelled to do — and, by his testimony, makes that evidence pertinent to determining whether he is telling the truth. This is a very limited rule: The evidence against defendant is not made generally admissible if he testifies; it is admissible only and to the extent it impeaches a statement he had made under oath at trial. He is still free to testify as to other matters, and many defendants may choose to do so. But he is not free to take the oath with his fingers crossed.
*598“A defendant’s right to testify does not exist in a vacuum independent from the truth-seeking purpose of our judicial process, a process in which the technique of impeachment plays a vital role. To eliminate one of the impeachment process’ more valuable tools — the use of prior inconsistent statements that are otherwise reliable — simply licenses perjury. This we will not do. We accordingly reject defendant’s argument for an independent rule under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. * * *”
Id. at 310-11.
Those are strong words, but I am afraid that they are wrong. The flaw in Mills was that it raised the chance to impeach a defendant during trial above the proscriptions of our Constitution. It did this in the name of “judicial integrity.” But the Constitution, and our faithfulness to it, is this court’s — or any court’s — true integrity.
What the police did in this case was lawless. Worse, it was calculated lawlessness. This court is constantly called upon to hold the other two branches of the government, the legislative and the executive, within constitutional bounds. We cannot expect to be listened to for long if we decry such unconstitutional acts in general, but wink at them when we think they make the work of our own, judicial branch easier.
It may be true that, by our ruling today, we give a determined perjurer a better chance at misleading the trier of fact. But we give no “license” — we do not guarantee his success. Juries and judges have other ways of detecting perjured testimony — they’ve been doing it for centuries. On the other hand, the Mills approach did license calculated violations of the Constitution, as the actions of the officers in this case demonstrate. Today, this court says, “No more.” Persuaded by reflection and by history, I concur.