Court Opinion

ID: 9394237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 20:00:10.956651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.107140
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SEAN JACKSON,                                   DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                  DC-0752-17-0381-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND                       DATE: May 12, 2023
       URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
                 Agency.

              THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sean Jackson, Fairfax Station, Virginia, pro se.

           Robert C. Kusnir, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was removed from his Real Estate Analyst position based on
     four charges: (1) rude conduct (two specifications); (2) absence without leave
     (AWOL)     (two   specifications);   (3)   failure   to   follow   instructions   (six
     specifications); and (4) falsifying time and attendance records (WebTA) (three
     specifications). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7 at 53-57. The appellant filed an
     appeal in which he argued that the agency committed harmful error, denied him
     reasonable accommodation, and retaliated against him for prior equal employment
     opportunity (EEO) activity. IAF, Tabs 1, 10.
¶3        After the appellant withdrew his request for a hearing, the administrative
     judge issued a decision based on the written record.       IAF, Tabs 18, 34.      The
     administrative judge sustained the charge of rude conduct, finding that the agency
     proved both specifications.    IAF, Tab 34, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-9.         The
     administrative judge also sustained the AWOL charge, finding that the appellant
     was specifically put on notice over a year prior to the time period in question that
     he could not combine his reasonable accommodation of telework and agency
     telework to total 5 days a week. Rather, he was explicitly notified that he was
                                                                                          3

     entitled to work at home only 3 days a week and he was required to work in the
     office on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. ID at 9-12. Similarly, the administrative
     judge sustained all six specifications and the charge of failure to follow
     instructions. ID at 12-15. Regarding the charge of falsifying the WebTA, the
     administrative judge sustained the charge, but only sustained one of the three
     specifications.   ID at 15-18.      The administrative judge then addressed the
     appellant’s affirmative defenses of harmful error, denial of reasonable
     accommodation, and retaliation for his prior EEO activity, and found that the
     appellant failed to prove any of his affirmative defenses. ID at 18-23. Based on
     the sustained charges, the appellant’s prior disciplinary record for similar
     offenses, and the deciding official’s consideration of the appropriate Douglas 2
     factors, the administrative judge affirmed the agency’s decision to remove the
     appellant. ID at 23-25.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for R eview (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge correctly sustained the AWOL charge and properly
     concluded that the appellant failed to establish disability discriminat ion.
¶5         On   review,    the   appellant    challenges    the   administrative    judge’s
     determination that the agency proved the AWOL charge. 3              Specifically, he
     contends that management was “not on one accord” regarding his reasonable
     accommodation provisions and that his managers’ personal biases were not
     considered. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. He also argues that his case is similar to Equal

     2
       See Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a
     nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining the appropriateness of a penalty
     for misconduct).
     3
       The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s findings concerning his
     harmful procedural error or retaliation for EEO activity affirmative defenses, nor does
     he argue that the administrative judge erred in sustaining the rude conduct, failure to
     follow instructions, and falsifying WebTA charges.
                                                                                     4

     Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753 (6th Cir.
     2015), which involved a request for telework. The appellant asserts that, even
     though the appellant in Ford lost her appeal because her job could not be
     completed from home, his entire job duties could be performed by teleworking.
     PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. The appellant also contends that the AWOL charge should
     not have been sustained because it results from a “miscommunication” about a
     reasonable accommodation issue that “never was cleared [up] in writing,” as he
     requested. Id.
¶6        To prove that the appellant was AWOL, the agency must show that he was
     absent during the stated period and that the absence was unauthorized or that a
     request for leave was properly denied.        Robb v. Department of Defense,
     77 M.S.P.R. 130, 132-33 (1997). An AWOL charge may be sustained even when
     the agency fails to prove that the employee was AWOL for t he entire period
     charged. Senior v. U.S. Postal Service, 85 M.S.P.R. 283, 289 (2000).
¶7        Here, the administrative judge found that the agency proved the AWOL
     charge by preponderant evidence.     ID at 10-12.    In making this finding, the
     administrative judge fully discussed the AWOL charge and the relevance of the
     appellant’s reasonable accommodation as it relates to this charge and found that
     the appellant was put on explicit notice that he was entitled to telework only
     3 days a week, and that he was required to work in the office on Tuesdays and
     Wednesdays. ID at 9-12. Further, the evidence shows, and the appellant does not
     deny, that he failed to report to work in the office 2 days a week, even though he
     was repeatedly notified by his supervisors that he was required to work in the
     office on Tuesdays and Wednesdays. IAF, Tab 7 at 66-73, 147, 204-05.
¶8        To the extent the appellant argues that the decision in Ford supports his
     claim that he is entitled to telework full-time because the agency had approved
                                                                                        5

     his reasonable accommodation request to telework 3 days a week, we disagree. 4
     Ford addresses an employer’s requirement under the Americans with Disabilities
     Act (ADA) to make reasonable accommodations for an otherwise qualified
     individual with a disability. See generally 782 F.3d 753. In deciding Ford, the
     U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the general rule under the
     ADA is “that regularly attending work on-site is essential to most jobs, especially
     the interactive ones.”     Id. at 761-62.   Here, it is undisputed that the agency
     provided the appellant with reasonable accommodation of teleworking 3 days a
     week and advised him that he was required to work in the office on the
     agency-required core days. There is no record evidence that the appellant ever
     sought       additional   reasonable   accommodation     with   updated     medical
     documentation. Hence, we find no support in Ford for the appellant’s claim that
     the agency was required to accommodate his disability by allowing him to
     telework 5 days a week, or that he was entitled to combine his existing
     accommodation with eligibility under the agency’s telework policy to telework
     full-time.
¶9         Therefore, even though the appellant disagrees with the administrative
     judge’s findings and determinations concerning the AWOL charge and the
     agency’s requirement that he work in the office 2 days a week , we have reviewed
     the record evidence and we find no support for the appellant’s contention that he
     was improperly charged with AWOL or that the agency committed disability
     discrimination by failing to allow him to telework 5 days a week. Accordingly,
     we find no basis upon which to disturb the administrative judge’s determination
     that the agency proved the AWOL charge by preponderant evidence.

     4
       The agency does not dispute that the appellant had a disability entitling him to a
     reasonable accommodation.
                                                                                         6

      The appellant’s disparate penalties claim does not provide a basis for reversing
      the initial decision.
¶10        Finally, the appellant challenges the removal penalty on the ground that he
      was treated more harshly than other employees. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4. When
      analyzing disparate penalty claims, the relevant inquiry is whether the agency
      knowingly and unjustifiably treated similarly situated employees differently.
      Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14; see Facer v. Department of the
      Air Force, 836 F.2d 535, 539 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (providing that a person does not
      have a legally protected interest in the evenness of a misconduct penalty assessed
      on him compared to that assessed on others unless employees are knowingly
      treated differently “in a way not justified by the facts, and intentionally for
      reasons other than the efficiency of the service”). To establish disparate penalties
      among employees, the appellant must show that “the charges and the
      circumstances surrounding the charged behavior are substantially similar.”
      Miskill v. Social Security Administration, 863 F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
      The universe of potential comparators will vary from case to case, but should be
      limited to those employees whose misconduct or other circumstances closely
      resemble those of the appellant. Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 13.
¶11        Here, the appellant’s disparate penalties claim consists solely of his
      allegation that he “has seen employees fighting and other serious actions that
      have not resulted in removal.”      PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.        This allegation is
      insufficient to show that the employees in question engaged in the same or similar
      conduct as the appellant or that the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated
      those employees differently.    Hence, the appellant’s disparate penalties claim
      does not provide a basis for disturbing the administrative judge’s finding that
      removal is a reasonable penalty in this case.
                                                                                          7

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable t ime
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U .S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to    the   court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   8

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. I f so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                  9

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other securi ty.       See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                      10

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisd iction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       11

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.