Court Opinion

ID: 9363848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 20:07:31.192041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.361879
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Meyer, 2023-Ohio-95.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO,                               :       JUDGES:
                                             :       Hon. Earle E. Wise, P.J.
        Plaintiff - Appellee                 :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                             :       Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
-vs-                                         :
                                             :
AARON J. MEYER,                              :       Case No. 22-COA-013
                                             :
        Defendant - Appellant                :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Ashland County
                                                     Municipal Court, Case No.
                                                     21TRC08417

JUDGMENT:                                            Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    January 12, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant

ANDREW N. BUSH                                       JOSEPH P. KERNS, JR.
Assistant Director of Law                            P.O. Box 345
1213 E. Main St.                                     153 West Main Street
Ashland, Ohio 44805                                  Ashland, Ohio 44805
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                     2

Baldwin, J.

       {¶1}   Aaron Meyer appeals his conviction for O.V.I., a violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(D). The State of Ohio is appellee.

                     STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE

       {¶2}   Officer Kyle Dress of the Ashland Police Department walked through Riley’s

Bar at 1:00 a.m. on November 25, 2021 and exchanged a few words with Appellant,

Aaron Meyer. Meyer made comments that the Officer understood as “I should not be

driving, don’t worry, don’t look at me, I will be fine, I will get a ride.” (Suppression Hearing

Transcript, p. 8, lines 8-14).

       {¶3}   At 2:30 a.m. Officer Dress noticed a vehicle leave the parking lot near

Riley’s and travel five to ten miles per hour in a twenty-five mile per hour zone. While

Dress followed the vehicle, the driver twice failed to stop behind the stop bar in violation

of Ashland Codified Ordinance 331.19(A). In the first instance, he stopped with the front

wheels past the stop bar and the rear wheels on the stop bar. At the second stop, all four

wheels passed beyond the stop bar before the car came to a complete stop. Officer Dress

switched on his overhead lights and the driver promptly pulled to the side of the road.

       {¶4}   Officer Dress recognized the driver as Meyer, the person who earlier was

seen drinking at Riley’s and who acknowledged that he should not be driving. When

Meyer saw the officer, he put his head down, as if in defeat and explained that he was

not able to find a ride. Meyer did not put his window down completely when Officer Dress

approached and the Officer suspected this was done to hide the odor of alcoholic

beverages. He asked Meyer to step from the car and he then noticed a moderately strong
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                      3

odor of alcoholic beverages. Officer Dress asked Meyer how much he had to drink and

he admitted to drinking eight or nine beers beginning at 9:00 p.m.

       {¶5}   Officer Dress conducted filed sobriety tests and charged Meyer with O.V.I.

in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) and 4511.19(A)(1)(d) and a violation of Ashland

Codified Ordinance 331.19 for running the stop signs.

       {¶6}   Meyer moved to suppress the results of the field sobriety tests contending

that the extension of the traffic stop to administer those tests was improper. Officer Dress

testified at the hearing on the motion, the motion was denied and Meyer amended his

plea to no contest and was found guilty of the charge. He filed a timely appeal and

submitted one assignment of error:

       {¶7}   “I. THE TRAIL(SIC) COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CONTINUED

DETENTION OF THE APPELLANT WAS PROPER.”

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       {¶8}   Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.

The trial court is the finder of fact in evaluating a motion to suppress; therefore, it is in the

best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Id. The

trial court's findings of fact must be accepted by an appellate court if they are supported

by competent, credible evidence. Id. “Accepting facts as true, the appellate court must

then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,

whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id. That is, the appellate court will

review the application of the legal standard to the facts de novo. Id.
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                   4

       {¶9}   There are three methods of challenging a trial court's ruling on a motion to

suppress on appeal. State v. Goins, 5th Dist. Morgan No. 05-8, 2006-Ohio-74, ¶ 10. First,

an appellant may challenge the trial court's finding of fact. Id. Second, an appellant may

argue the trial court failed to apply the appropriate test or correct law to the findings of

fact. Id. Finally, an appellant may argue the trial court has incorrectly decided the ultimate

or final issue raised in the motion to suppress. Id. When reviewing this type of claim, an

appellate court must independently determine, without deference to the trial court's

conclusion, whether the facts meet the appropriate legal standard in any given case. State

v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641 N.E.2d 1172 (8th Dist. 1994).

       {¶10} While Meyer characterizes the facts differently than appellee, we do not find

that he is challenging the findings of fact or that the wrong test was applied. Meyer is

contending that the trial court incorrectly decided the ultimate or final issue raised in the

motion to suppress and therefore we review the decision de novo.

                                        ANALYSIS

       {¶11} Meyer reviews the facts and concludes that Officer Dress did not have “did

not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue the detention” and highlights the

fact that the Officer did not report that he had glassy, blood-shot eyes, slurred speech,

lethargic movements or difficulty getting in or out of the vehicle. And, while Meyer does

mention facts that could tend to support a conclusion of reasonable, articulable suspicion,

he considers them in isolation rather than measuring their cumulative impact.

       {¶12} A police officer may perform field sobriety tests after the officer stopped the

vehicle for a minor traffic offense, when “the request is separately justified by a reasonable

suspicion based upon articulable facts that the motorist is intoxicated.” Parma Hts. v.
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                     5

Dedejczyk, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97664, 2012-Ohio-3458, ¶ 29, citing State v. Evans,

127 Ohio App.3d 56, 62, 711 N.E.2d 761 (11th Dist. 1998). When evaluating the

reasonableness for the field sobriety tests, a reviewing court considers “the totality of the

circumstances, viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the

scene who must react to events as they unfold.” Dedejczyk at ¶ 29, quoting State v. Dye,

11th Dist. Portage No. 2001-P-0140, 2002-Ohio-7158, ¶ 18.

       {¶13} Meyer argues that there is no evidence that he exhibited glassy, blood-shot

eyes, slurred speech, lethargic movements or difficulty getting in or out of the vehicle.

These observations are not conclusive in this context, but only facts that the officer and

the trial court must consider. State v. Horvath, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18 CAC 01 0006,

2018-Ohio-5379, ¶ 24. In State v. Hodges, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2022 CA 00012, 2022-

Ohio-3535, ¶¶ 16-17, we reviewed a lengthy and non-exhaustive list of factors that are

relevant to evaluate whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to administer field

sobriety tests under the totality of circumstances:

       (1)    The time of day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as opposed to,

       e.g., Tuesday morning);

       (2)    The location of the stop (whether near establishments selling

       alcohol);

       (3)    Any indicia of erratic driving before the stop that may indicate a lack

       of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking, etc.);

       (4)    Whether there is a cognizable report that the driver may be

       intoxicated;

       (5)    The condition of the suspect's eyes (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.);
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                      6

       (6)    Impairments of the suspect's ability to speak (slurred speech, overly

       deliberate speech, etc.);

       (7)    The odor of alcohol coming from the interior of the car, or, more

       significantly, on the suspect's person or breath;

       (8)    The intensity of that odor, as described by the officer (“very strong,”

       “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.);

       (9)    The suspect's demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.);

       (10)   Any actions by the suspect after the stop that might indicate a lack

       of coordination (dropping keys, falling over, fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and

       (11)   The suspect's admission of alcohol consumption, the number of

       drinks had, and the amount of time in which they were consumed, if given.

Evans at 63, 711 N.E.761, fn. 2. “All of these factors, together with the officer's previous

experience in dealing with drunken drivers, may be taken into account by a reviewing

court in determining whether the officer acted reasonably.” Id.

       {¶14} In analyzing the facts presented, we accept the template set forth by the

Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007–Ohio–2204, 865

N.E.2d 1282, paragraph two of the syllabus: “The ‘reasonable and articulable’ standard

applied to a prolonged traffic stop encompasses the totality of the circumstances, and a

court may not evaluate in isolation each articulated reason for the stop.” The intrusion on

the drivers' liberty resulting from a field sobriety test is minor, and the officer therefore

need only have reasonable suspicion the driver is under the influence of alcohol in order

to conduct a field sobriety test. State v. Knox, Greene App. No. 2005–CA–74, 2006–
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                                    7

Ohio–3039. See also, State v. Bright, 5th Dist. Guernsey App. No. 2009–CA–28, 2010–

Ohio–1111.

      {¶15} The trial court provides the required review of the relevant facts in its

judgment entry:

             Based on the observed bad driving (extreme slow speed and multiple

      stop sign violations), the presence of Defendant in Riley's Bar, Defendant's

      own admission that he shouldn't be driving and would get a ride, the

      observation of Defendant actually holding a beer 1.5 hours earlier at Riley's,

      the fact that Defendant left the bar at closing time, the moderate odor of

      alcoholic beverage on his person, his effort to conceal the odor, and his

      admission of 8 or 9 beers recently consumed, the Officer suspected

      impairment and decided to perform Standardized Filed Sobriety Tests.

Judgment Entry Regarding Defendant's Motion To Suppress, Mar. 24, 2022, p. 3.

      {¶16} We cannot improve upon the trial courts analysis of the facts of this case

and we agree that the conduct of the Field Sobriety Tests was “separately justified by a

reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts” that Meyer was intoxicated.
Ashland County, Case No. 22-COA-013                                      8

      {¶17} Meyers assignment of error is denied and the judgment of the Ashland

County Municipal Court is affirmed.

By: Baldwin, J.

Wise, Earle, P.J. and

Wise, John, J. concur.