Court Opinion

ID: 9796409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:57.700926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:13.059145
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Judge,
dissenting.
Relying primarily on a reason that has never been litigated by the parties, or addressed by the trial court, the Court today holds that the Municipality’s drug paraphernalia ordinances are unconstitutional because they are vague.
But a properly enacted law is presumed to be constitutional, and courts should “construe enactments to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality to the extent possible.”1 In addition, the party claiming that an enactment is unconstitutional has the burden of rebutting the presumption of constitutionality.2 In this case, Myers owned a “head shop” and was charged with and convicted of knowingly possessing drug paraphernalia with the intent to sell it.
In his pre-trial motions, Myers argued that the challenged ordinances’ definitions of “drug paraphernalia” did not provide him with adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. But our supreme court has recognized that the possibility of difficult or borderline cases will not invalidate an enactment “where there is a hard core of cases to which the ordinary person would doubtlessly know the statute unquestionably applies.”3
I conclude that Myers’s conduct as the owner of a “head shop” does not present a “borderline” case. To the contrary, his conduct fell within the “hard core of cases.” The factual record supports the conclusion that items in Myers’s inventory had the objective characteristics or design that indicated that the items were intended to facilitate a violation of a statute under AS 11.71 (controlled substances).
Myers also argued that the ordinances have the potential for arbitrary enforcement. But an appellate court will not invalidate an enactment on this ground unless “there is some history of arbitrary or selective enforcement.” 4 As Judge Clark found, Myers made no such showing.
I would not find the ordinances unconstitutional based on reasons not raised or argued by the appellant, nor briefed in any meaningful way. Based on Judge Clark’s narrow interpretation and application of the ordinances in this case, and in light of Myers’s conduct, I would affirm Myers’s convictions.
Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s holding.

. See Nason v. State, 102 P.3d 962, 964 (Alaska App.2004).

. Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3, 9 (Alaska 1974); see also Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 544 (Alaska 1997).

. Holton v. State, 602 P.2d 1228, 1237 (Alaska 1979).