Court Opinion

ID: 9742391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:12:52.948159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:32.095947
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McNULTY, specially concurring: I agree that a literal reading of Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1)(c) supports the dissenting opinion’s view in this case that disqualification of the trial judge was required absent a written remittitur by counsel and the parties. It further concludes, however, that while the majority apparently construes the rule to permit a qualitative evaluation to be made as to whether disqualification is required, it can find no such discretionary latitude under the rule as currently drafted. It is my opinion that the supreme court in People v. Del Vecchio (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 265, 544 N.E.2d 312, construing the language of former Rule 67(c), the predecessor to Rule 63(C), provides the authority to permit a qualitative evaluation to be made of the facts and circumstances of each case in which the issue of disqualification is raised. Therefore, I conclude that under the facts and circumstances of this case, a determination that any violation of Rule 63(C)(1)(c) mandates a per se reversal would advance neither the purpose of the rule nor the ends of justice.