Court Opinion

ID: 9691514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:36:39.871653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:21.926028
License: Public Domain

Hoekstra, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in section n, which is that the lower court erred in granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim brought under the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HORA), MCL 37.1101 et seq.; MSA *2413.550(101) et seq. I would affirm the order of the lower court granting defendants’ motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact about whether she was qualified for the position from which she was terminated.
The majority correctly states that the lower court’s analysis was improper in this case because plaintiff presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent, namely, defendant Martha J. Piney’s alleged statement that she terminated plaintiff’s employment because of plaintiff’s handicap. When a plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of discriminatory intent, there is no need to utilize the burden of proof analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683-684; 385 NW2d 586 (1986); Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 609; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). In Harrison, a race discrimination case, this Court explained how a court should instead analyze whether summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriate in cases in which a plaintiff presents direct evidence of discriminatory animus.1 There, this Court held the following:
*242[W]e hold that the following principles of proof apply in a typical single-plaintiff, mixed-motive employment discrimination case. First, as with circumstantial discrimination cases, in a case involving direct evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff always bears the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer acted with illegal discriminatory animus. Second, whatever the nature of the challenged employment action, the plaintiff must establish evidence of the plaintiff’s qualification (or other eligibility) and direct proof that the discriminatory animus was causally related to the decisionmaker’s action. Upon such a presentation of proofs, an employer may not avoid trial by merely “articulating” a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Under such circumstances, the case ordinarily must be submitted to the factfinder for a determination whether the plaintiff’s claims are true. [Harrison, supra at 612-613.]
Thus, according to this Court in Harrison, the plaintiff must present proof not only of the employer’s discriminatory animus, but also proof of the plaintiff’s own qualifications.2
Our Supreme Court determined the boundaries of the next inquiry, what it means to be a qualified employee, in Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688; 568 NW2d 64 (1997) (analyzing age and sex discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas analysis).3 The Court stated that “[a]n employee is *243qualified if he was performing his job at a level that met the employer’s legitimate expectations.” Id. at 699, citing Bouwman v Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App 670, 679; 319 NW2d 621 (1982); Menard v First Security Services Corp, 848 F2d 281, 285 (CA 1, 1988); McDonald v Union Camp Corp, 898 F2d 1155, 1160 (CA 6, 1990). Accordingly, I would hold that the recent pronouncements of this Court in Harrison and our Supreme Court in Town together provide the proper analysis for deciding when summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is appropriately granted in a case involving direct evidence of handicapper discrimination.
To support their burden as the moving party, defendants presented in the form of the monthly performance reviews signed by plaintiff and defendant Piney well-documented evidence that plaintiff was not working at a level that met defendant Piney’s expectations. Plaintiff’s first-month review reveals that Piney rated plaintiff’s work performance as satisfactory with the exception of plaintiffs telephone and customer service skills, which Piney indicated needed *244improvement. Plaintiffs second-month review indicates that plaintiff continued to have difficulty with her telephone and customer service skills. Indeed, this review specifically stated that Piney would terminate plaintiffs employment if plaintiff did not make improvements in those areas. Plaintiffs third-month review indicates an improvement in her work performance, which apparently caused Piney to have “hopes that [plaintiff] will continue to develop” and end plaintiffs probationary period. However, as both parties concede, Piney met with plaintiff seven days later to discuss her concern that plaintiff’s work performance had since declined and instead displayed the same problems evident at the first and second performance reviews. Piney told plaintiff that she would review plaintiff’s progress in one week and that, if improvements were not made, then she would terminate plaintiff’s employment. Shortly thereafter, Piney terminated plaintiffs employment.
In response to defendants’ evidence of her poor work performance at the Piney Insurance Agency, plaintiff presented three pieces of evidence: first, the absence of any complaints from policyholders; second, the exceipts of deposition testimony from plaintiffs two peers that they did not notice a change in plaintiff’s work performance; and third, plaintiff’s “promotion” to a permanent position two weeks before her termination. I would hold that plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about her qualifications, not because the evidence she has proffered in this regard is weak, but because it is irrelevant. “ ‘If the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to make out its claim, a trial would be useless and the moving party is entitled to *245summary judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996), quoting Celotex v Catrett, 477 US 317, 331; 106 S Ct 2548; 91 L Ed 2d 265 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Initially, I would disregard the absence of any complaints by policyholders. Defendant Piney’s complaint about plaintiff’s work performance concerned plaintiff’s telephone and customer service skills, which would not necessarily result in complaints by the policyholders, only dissatisfaction by the employer. Therefore, this piece of evidence is unavailing. With regard to plaintiff’s second piece of evidence, I note that in light of our Supreme Court’s definition of a qualified employee, plaintiff’s peers’ assessments of her work performance, or even plaintiff’s own assessment, are irrelevant because it is the “employer’s legitimate expectations” that dictate the standard to which plaintiff should perform. Town, supra at 699. Last, the short-lived duration of plaintiff’s term of employment at the Piney Insurance Agency and the sole positive evaluation of her work performance, the third monthly review that ended her probationary period, is evidence that favors defendants’ claim that plaintiff was not performing her job at a level that met; her employer’s legitimate expectations. Plaintiff cannot raise a material issue of fact regarding the question of the quality of her work performance merely by challenging the judgment of her supervisor. See, e.g., McDonald, supra at 1160 (stating that the court’s aim should not be to review bad business decisions or question the soundness of an employer’s judgment).
*246While this Court must resolve all doubts in favor of the party opposing summary disposition, I would conclude that plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a material factual dispute that she was qualified for the position from which she was discharged, as “qualified” is defined in Town, supra at 699. Simply put, plaintiff did not present relevant evidence to show that she was doing her job well enough to rule out the possibility that she was discharged for inadequate job performance. Consequently, I believe that plaintiff has failed to prove a prima facie case of handicapper discrimination and would affirm the lower court’s decision to grant defendants summary disposition. I note that although the lower court applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis, it arrived at the same conclusion I reach. My reasoning is consistent with the lower court’s decision that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her poor work performance was a mere pretext for defendants’ discrimination, the third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
My analysis of this issue makes it unnecessary to reach plaintiff’s argument that the lower court erred in granting defendants State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, State Farm Annuity and Life Insurance Company, State Farm General Insurance Company, State Farm Life Insurance Company, and State Farm Mutual Insurance Company summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims, which is discussed in section m of the majority opinion; therefore, I express no opinion with regard to this issue. I am in agreement with the majority’s resolution of plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which is discussed in section IV.

 Michigan courts have not yet addressed the principles of proof for a direct-evidence case involving handicapper discrimination; however, Harrison is sufficiently similar to this case to justify adopting the principles of proof espoused there. Both cases involve a plaintiff’s direct evidence of discrimination, are single-plaintiff cases, and involve a defendant’s mixed motives. See Harrison, supra at 610. This case is a mixed-motive case because defendants’ adverse employment decision could have been based on several factors, including a legitimate factor such as plaintiffs work performance as well as a legally impermissible factor such as plaintiffs handicap.

 The majority also cites Monette v Electronic Data Systems Corp, 90 F3d 1173 (CA 6, 1996), a case that included claims under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ada), 42 USC 12101 et seq.,as well as Michigan’s hcra. It is appropriate to consider the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ analysis because the hcra and the ada share similar purposes and contain similar definitions. Stevens v Inland Waters, Inc, 220 Mich App 212, 216-217; 559 NW2d 61 (1996).

 I recognize that the definition in Town, supra at 699, is derived from a plurality decision of our Supreme Court, which is technically not binding on this Court because a majority of the justices failed to concur on the exact reasoning for the holding. Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109; 244 NW2d 98 (1976). However, I believe that a careful reading of Justice *243Riley’s concurring opinion in Town, supra at 707-714, reveals that she did not disagree with the lead opinion’s proposition that the question about an employee’s qualifications is answered by considering whether the employer’s expectations were satisfied. For example, Justice Riley would require that employers be given wide discretion in setting job standards and in deciding whether employees meet those standards. Id. at 709. Because Justice Riley’s perspective is similar, if not the same, to that of the lead opinion in this respect, it would be wasteful of judicial resources to disregard Town. See People v Scarborough, 189 Mich App 341, 344; 471 NW2d 567 (1991). In any event, I am additionally persuaded by the language of the decisions upon which the definition relies, Town, supra at 699, n 22, and therefore would adopt the definition in Town as the proper approach to determining whether an employee is qualified. See also Ang v Procter & Gamble Co, 932 F2d 540, 548 (CA 6, 1991) (holding that the test of whether an employee is qualified is whether the employee is meeting the “employer’s legitimate expectations”).