Court Opinion

ID: 9492267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:36:35.956902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:12.912010
License: Public Domain

SCHALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court states that Bailey’s appeal presents a “free-standing” constitutional issue. By that, it means a constitutional issue that does not also involve a challenge to the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation. I agree with the court’s characterization of Bailey’s claim. However, I am unable to agree with the court’s conclusion that we have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Our jurisdiction over appeals from the United States Court of Appeals for Veter- • ans Claims is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7292. That section, which is titled “Review by United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,” provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) After a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is entered in a case, any party to the case may obtain a review of the decision with respect to the validity of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the Court in making the decision....
(c) The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision....
(d)(1) The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions. The court shall hold unlawful and set aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied upon in the decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that the *874Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit finds to be
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or without observance of procedure required by law.
(2) Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter presents a constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a factual determination, or (B) a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.
The court states that subsections (a), (c), and (d) each contain a grant of jurisdiction, that no one subsection alone defines our jurisdiction, and that all three subsections must be read together. Starting from that premise, the court reads subsection (a) as dealing primarily with standing and subsections (c) and (d) as stating and defining our jurisdiction. Noting that federal courts are vested with the duty to uphold the Constitution, the court concludes that, in subsections (c) and (d), Congress granted us authority to consider constitutional issues that are raised in an appeal from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, even if the appeal does not involve a challenge to the validity or interpretation of a statute or regulation. I agree with the court that the provisions of subsections (a), (c), and (d) must be read together. However, I do not agree with the conclusion that the court draws from such a reading.
In my view, a reading of subsections (a), (c), and (d) compels the conclusion that we only have jurisdiction to consider a constitutional issue if it is raised as part of a challenge to the validity of a statute or regulation or as part of a challenge to the interpretation of a statute or regulation. In other words, we lack jurisdiction to consider the kind of “free-standing” constitutional claim that Bailey raises in this appeal.
I believe that subsection (a) frames our jurisdiction, for it is the part of section 7292 that gives a party the right to appeal to us a decision of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. The right that the provision gives is limited. A party may only obtain a review of the decision “with respect to the validity of any statute or regulation ... or any interpretation thereof’ that was relied on by the court in making its decision. In other words, a party is only given the right to appeal a limited aspect of the court’s decision. Thus, I do not share the court’s view that subsection (a) is mainly a standing provision.
Significantly, in subsection (c), we are given review authority that is expressly tied to the kind of appeal that subsection (a) permits. We are told that we have jurisdiction “to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.” (emphasis added) Of course “this section” refers to section 7292. Considering the reference to “this section,” I believe that the only correct reading of subsection (c) is that our review authority does not extend beyond the appeal boundaries that are staked out in subsection (a).
The court relies upon the part of subsection (c), just quoted, that give us authority to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, the part of subsection (d)(1) that states we “shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting constitutional and statutory provisions,” and the part of subsection (d)(2) that states we may review a challenge to a factual determination or a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case only if a constitutional issue is presented as providing additional grants of jurisdiction. I am unable to *875agree. I do not believe that the language of the statute supports such a reading. To me, the better reading is that the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) upon which the court relies simply serve to explain the parameters of the basic jurisdictional grant that is set forth in subsection (a) and in the first part of subsection (c).
I also believe that such a reading is more consistent with pertinent rules of statutory interpretation. A statute is to be read in its entirety in a manner that yields a logical and sensible result and does not render a part of the statute superfluous. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982); Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1384-85 (Fed.Cir.1998). It does not seem logical to me that Congress would create a very limited right of appeal to this court in subsection (a) and then, in a somewhat surreptitious manner, expand that right in subsections (c) and (d). Moreover, reading the statute as doing so renders subsection (a) superfluous because, under such á reading, the jurisdictional grant contained in subsection (a) appears again in subsection (c). Finally, I believe that the court’s reading of section 7292 is at odds with the proposition that a grant of a right to appeal is to be strictly construed and not expanded beyond its express terms. See California Coastal Comm. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 579, 107 S.Ct. 1419, 94 L.Ed.2d 577 (1987) (“Statutes authorizing appeals are to be strictly construed.”); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 247, 104 S.Ct. 615, 78 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).
The court states that its holding is supported by precedent. Again, I must disagree. The cases which the court cites, Helfer v. West, 174 F.3d at 1335 (Fed.Cir.1999), Madden v. Gober, 125 F.3d 1477 (Fed.Cir.1997), and Albun v. Brown, 9 F.3d 1528 (Fed.Cir.1993), do not support the proposition that we have jurisdiction to consider the kind of “free-standing” constitutional claim that is raised by Bailey. As far as the two latter cases are concerned, although Madden and Albun both state that we have authority to review constitutional issues, see 125 F.3d at 1480, and 9 F.3d at 1530, respectively, each case simply makes the assertion in the context of a general statement relating to jurisdiction. Neither case involved the issue that is before the court in this case-whether we have jurisdiction to consider a “free-standing” constitutional claim.
Neither does Heifer, upon which the court mainly relies, support the conclusion that we have jurisdiction in this case. Heifer in fact recognizes that our authority under subsection (c) of section 7292 is framed by the right-to-appeal language of subsection (a) of the statute. This is evident by the statement, “Consistent with subsection (a) of the statute, subsection (c) gives us ‘exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought under this section, and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, to the extent presented and necessary to a decision.’ ” Heifer, 174 F.3d at 1335-1336. Moreover, in Heifer, the constitutional claim was raised in the setting of a challenge to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ interpretation of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Thus, against the backdrop of Heifer’s argument that, under the terms of EAJA, he had a constitutionally protected interest in his request for attorney feés and expenses, we stated, “Mr. Heifer’s constitutional argument is that by ruling against him as it did, the Court of Veterans Appeals deprived him of a property interest without due process of law.” Id. at 1335. We explained Heifer’s constitutional argument as follows:
Mr. Heifer argues that the Court of Veterans Appeals has adopted a legal rule that when the Secretary does not alter his litigating position despite an intervening change in the law that ren*876ders his position untenable, the Secretary’s position cannot be substantially justified. According to Mr. Heifer, this case falls within the scope of that legal rule, and when the Court of Veterans Appeals failed to apply that rule to his case and failed to explain why it was not doing so, it denied him due process.
Id. at 1335-1336. In other words, Heifer argued that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims interpreted EAJA in a manner that denied him due process. Thus, Heifer did not involve a “free-standing” constitutional claim as is presented in this case. Rather, it involved a constitutional claim that arose as part of a challenge to the interpretation of a statute, in that case EAJA.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not believe that we have authority to consider Bailey’s claim that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims deprived him of his constitutional right to due process in the course of the disciplinary proceedings that resulted in his public reprimand. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.