Court Opinion

ID: 9541941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:30:00.845925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:05:25.250319
License: Public Domain

Jones, J. (dissenting).
Because I believe that the trial court committed reversible error with respect to the two issues before this Court, I respectfully dissent. I will first address the improper bolstering issue.
The majority, in describing the testimony of Cruz and Ruballo, states that it was “not a model of consistency” (majority op at 186). That is an understatement. The witnesses’ testimony before the grand jury and at the suppression hearing, statements given to the investigating police officers, and prior written statements were riddled with inconsistencies. As a result, both witnesses were impeached when cross-examined by defense counsel, thereby casting doubt on whether a robbery actually occurred.
Over the objection of the defense, the prosecutor was permitted to introduce the witnesses’ prior consistent statements under the guise of rehabilitation. The prosecutor, in the redirect examination of Cruz, questioned him about his prior statements which conformed to his trial testimony, asking him whether those statements were correct. Even more egregious, the *189prosecutor was permitted to go through Ruballo’s prior written statement given to the police “to clarify what’s incorrect and what is correct.” As pointed out in the Appellate Division dissent (People v Ochoa, 57 AD3d 342, 347 [1st Dept 2008]), by characterizing some allegations as false, the prosecutor implied that the remaining statements were true.
It is well settled that a witness who has been impeached cannot be rehabilitated by use of a prior consistent statement, unless the opposing party suggests that the witness’s account is a recent fabrication (see People v McDaniel, 81 NY2d 10 [1993]; People v McClean, 69 NY2d 426 [1987]; People v Davis, 44 NY2d 269 [1978]). In such a case, a consistent statement made before the motive to fabricate arose may be admissible (see McDaniel, 81 NY2d at 16; McClean, 69 NY2d at 428; Davis, 44 NY2d at 277-278). As stated by one commentator, “[e]ven when the witness’ credibility is attacked by proof of inconsistent statements, the witness’ credibility may not be supported by proof of consistent statements. . . . The inconsistency is not removed by the fact that the witness has also made consistent statements, and consequently the consistent statements may not be shown” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-503 [Farrell 11th ed]).
In rejecting defendants’ claims that the trial court permitted improper bolstering of the testimony, the majority calls this redirect examination proper rehabilitation. In support of this conclusion, they rely on People v Regina (19 NY2d 65, 78 [1966]) and People v Torre (42 NY2d 1036, 1037 [1977]), both of which can be distinguished from the instant case. In Regina, the prosecution witness was asked one question to clarify an answer given on cross-examination. On cross-examination, a detective was asked whether he made any notes “that night,” and he replied “[n]o” (19 NY2d at 77). On redirect by the prosecutor, the detective was asked if he had ever made any notes of the occurrence and he answered that he had done so three days later. In Torre, the Court held that where only part of a statement is drawn out on cross-examination, the other parts may be introduced on redirect examination so that the statement may be explained or clarified.
In the instant case, the court permitted improper bolstering. This was not a case of clarifying or explaining a statement only partially examined by opposing counsel. This was an attempt to recast the entire testimony of two witnesses who had given many versions of the crime and surrounding events.
*190The fact that the court permitted such bolstering by the prosecutor severely prejudiced the defendants and cannot be viewed as harmless error in a case in which the evidence was not overwhelming and depended on the credibility of two witnesses who were admitted drug users and in a place Ruballo described as a “crack house.” This error standing alone is a basis for reversal where preserved.
Next I turn to the issue of the juror note. By conducting an ex parte conference with a deliberating juror, in response to the juror’s note, without providing prior notice of the note to counsel, the trial court erred.
CPL 310.30 sets forth the procedure to be followed by the court when a note is received from a deliberating jury. The instruction is very clear and it would have been very simple for the court to have followed the dictates of this statute. The majority excuses the failure to do so by saying that the judge acted within his discretion and that this was “nothing more than an inquiiy of a ministerial nature” (majority op at 188, citing People v Hameed, 88 NY2d 232 [1996]). Hameed was wholly different from the case at bar. It involved a juror’s inquiry about whether he would be permitted to attend church while the jury was sequestered. It is the only case cited by the majority which is clearly a ministerial inquiry. None of the other cases relied upon by the majority are on point. They are cases in which defendant was not present but defense counsel was present or had an opportunity to have input in the jury instruction. In People v Lykes (81 NY2d 767 [1993]), the judge sent a note to the jury seeking clarification of its inquiry. Unlike the instant case, both defendant and defense counsel were given an opportunity to participate before any instruction was given to the jury. In People v Collins (99 NY2d 14 [2002]), the defendant was not present during the drafting of the verdict sheet but his counsel was present (see also People v Harris, 76 NY2d 810 [1990] [where the judge along with the prosecutor and defense counsel went to the door of the jury room and the judge asked whether the request for the readback of testimony was for the victim]).
Whether a jury note is a ministerial or substantive inquiry can vary depending on the circumstances of the particular case. In this case, where the note came one hour after the jury had announced that it had reached a verdict, following three days of deliberation and two notes declaring a deadlock, this court had every reason to believe that the verdict was a problem to at least one juror.
*191In addition, the action taken by the court cannot be justified by facts which come to light as a result of the inquiry. The court’s response must be driven by inferences which can reasonably be drawn before the inquiry is conducted. Under these circumstances it was error to fail to treat the note as a potentially “important, substantive juror inquiry” and thus apply the safeguards mandated by People v O’Rama (78 NY2d 270, 279-280 [1991]).
Accordingly, I would reverse the orders of the Appellate Division and remit to Supreme Court for retrial.
Judges Graffeo, Read and Smith concur with Judge Pigott; Judge Jones dissents and votes to reverse and order a new trial in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick concur.
In each case: Order affirmed.