Court Opinion

ID: 9893753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 16:01:55.767841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:22.071521
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10231    Document: 77-1      Date Filed: 10/30/2023   Page: 1 of 33

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10231
                           ____________________

        INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS, LLC,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        RING POWER CORPORATION,
        ZIEGLER INC.,
        THOMPSON TRACTOR COMPANY, INC.,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 5:20-cv-00226-TKW-MJF
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        2                           Opinion of the Court                   22-10231

                                 ____________________

        Before BRANCH and GRANT, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,∗
        District Judge.
        PER CURIAM:
                This antitrust case involves dealers of heavy construction
        equipment and their relationship with industry auction platforms.
        Plaintiff-Appellant International Construction Products, LLC
        (“ICP”) sued Defendant-Appellees Ring Power Corporation (“Ring
        Power”), Thompson Tractor Company (“Thompson”), and
        Ziegler Inc. (“Ziegler”) (collectively “Defendants”) for alleged
        violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act and for tortious interference
        with contract. In essence, ICP alleged that Defendants conspired
        to thwart ICP’s relationship with IronPlanet, a heavy construction
        equipment auction site, by conspiring to boycott IronPlanet if it did
        not cut ties with ICP. The district court granted Defendants
        summary judgment on each of ICP’s claims. After review, and
        with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
                           I.     Factual Background
              ICP was a distributor of new (as opposed to used) heavy
        construction equipment that sold its products online directly to
        consumers. This business model was unusual in the heavy

        ∗ Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle

        District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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        22-10231                     Opinion of the Court                            3

        construction equipment marketplace because such equipment is
        typically sold through an intermediary dealer network.
              Defendants are dealers of heavy construction equipment
        manufactured by Caterpillar, Inc. They often sell their used
        equipment through online auction websites, such as IronPlanet, or
        through auction companies, such as Cat Auction Services (“CAS”)1
        and Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (“Ritchie Bros”).2 Importantly,
        Defendants had ownership interests—some overlapping—in the
        auction market: Ring Power was a minority shareholder of
        IronPlanet; Ziegler was a minority shareholder of CAS; and
        Ziegler’s president and CEO, Bill Hoeft, was a founding member
        and chairman of the board of directors of CAS.
              The industry auction companies began to consolidate. In
        January 2014, IronPlanet and CAS began merger negotiations that
        were consummated in 2015. Then, the newly-merged entity
        merged again—this time with Ritchie Bros, consolidating the three

        1
            Caterpillar held a 29.8% stake in CAS.
        2
          Typically, buyers of heavy construction equipment rely upon dealer
        networks to connect them with distributors. Distributors, such as ICP,
        considered the development of a traditional dealer network a steep barrier to
        entry into the heavy equipment market, requiring them to connect with
        middlemen who would in turn connect them to buyers. Buyers also had the
        option of buying equipment through online auction sites, like IronPlanet, that
        permit them to place bids on pieces of equipment at online auctions, sealed-
        bid auctions (in which buyers simultaneously submit sealed bids to the seller),
        and     on-site    auctions.        See   How       to    buy,    IronPlanet,
        https://www.ironplanet.com/how-to-buy?kwtag=footer.
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        4                           Opinion of the Court                      22-10231

        companies into one. Hoeft, a member of the CAS merger team,
        was in regular contact with IronPlanet during these mergers.
               While the IronPlanet-CAS merger negotiations were
        ongoing, in March 2014, ICP struck a deal with IronPlanet to have
        IronPlanet sell ICP’s new heavy construction equipment on its
        website through a dedicated IronPlanet-ICP online storefront. ICP
        and IronPlanet announced the deal at a trade expo and made
        waves, as the new venture represented a shift in the longstanding
        business model of the heavy construction equipment industry. 3
        The following month, IronPlanet abruptly terminated its
        relationship with ICP. According to deposition testimony of
        IronPlanet employees, the deal with ICP consumed extensive
        technological resources, distracted from the “top priority” (the
        IronPlanet-CAS merger), and was not as lucrative as originally
        anticipated. 4
              The Defendants for their part made their own concerns
        about the ICP partnership known to IronPlanet. Two weeks after
        the announcement of the IronPlanet-ICP deal, CAS CEO Gary

        3
         The record demonstrates that various stakeholders were concerned about
        the IronPlanet-ICP deal due to the possibility of IronPlanet shifting from an
        auction site that was manufacturer-neutral to one that promoted one
        manufacturer over another. Not only was Caterpillar (as the manufacturer)
        concerned about the IronPlanet-ICP deal, but the dealers (as exclusive
        Caterpillar dealers) were also concerned with the possibility of having their
        used equipment listed next to new equipment and potentially selling for less.
        4
            In fact, only a single sale was made through the new ICP storefront.
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        22-10231                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        Trettel emailed Hoeft (Ziegler Chairman and CAS board member):
        “[CAS] is greatly concerned over this development [i.e., the
        IronPlanet-ICP deal] and we will need to have discussions on how
        to proceed with the [merger] negotiations. [Caterpillar] has
        indicated this would kill the” IronPlanet-CAS merger.
                Hoeft then sent an email to IronPlanet CEO Greg Owens on
        March 18, 2014. Hoeft’s email, sent in response to IronPlanet’s
        most recent merger oﬀer, was signed with his name and one of his
        titles: “Chairman, President & CEO, Ziegler Inc.” The email
        stated, in relevant part:
               We and Caterpillar, noted the recent article in
               Equipment World, which highlighted Iron Planet’s
               new relationship with [ICP]. We would like to better
               understand that relationship, as we are concerned
               that Caterpillar and the CAT dealers would have
               signiﬁcant concerns about any arrangement where
               Iron Planet is providing auction services for new
               equipment for a Caterpillar competitor.5

        5
          An investment banker for CAS drafted a proposed email to be sent by Hoeft
        to IronPlanet that stated, in relevant part:
               We and Caterpillar noted . . . Iron Planet’s new relationship
               with [ICP]. Without more full understanding, I have a strong
               suspicion that such a relationship would kill any hope of a
               transaction between Iron Planet and [CAS] from Caterpillar’s
               perspective.
        This proposed email was not sent.
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10231

               In April 2014, executives from Ring Power and Thompson
        discussed the IronPlanet-ICP deal with each other. On April 1,
        following a Ring Power board meeting, Ring Power’s Senior VP
        Richard Fowler commented in an email to other Ring Power
        executives that Caterpillar was “not happy” with the prospect of
        the IronPlanet-ICP deal. Over a period of two days that month,
        Fowler also had several phone calls with two Thompson oﬃcials
        (Billy Seals and Richard Lindley),6 IronPlanet CEO Owens, and
        Caterpillar’s merger liaison.
              On April 3, 2014, IronPlanet scrubbed ICP’s products from
        its website—supposedly without informing ICP beforehand. On
        April 4, IronPlanet President Jeﬀ Jeter called ICP founder and
        chairman Tim Frank to inform him the deal was oﬀ because of
        “concerns over” the relationship. Jeter told Frank that Caterpillar
        and at least one other manufacturer were “putting pressure” on
        IronPlanet to terminate the ICP deal and told him that they would
        “stop doing business with [IronPlanet] on the equipment side” if
        the deal was not terminated. 7 Jeter wrote in an email to Owens

        6
         Lindley testified that these calls with Fowler did not concern IronPlanet or
        ICP, relating instead to a piece of used equipment.
        7
          Specifically, Jeter told Frank that Caterpillar and at least one other
        manufacturer were “putting pressure” on IronPlanet to terminate the ICP deal
        and told him that they would “stop doing business with [IronPlanet] on the
        equipment side” if the deal was not terminated. The district court, in its
        summary judgment order, ruled that, to the extent ICP offered this evidence
        to prove the truth of the matter asserted (i.e., that IronPlanet terminated its
        relationship with ICP because of pressure it received from Caterpillar and
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        22-10231                     Opinion of the Court                                7

        that same day summarizing his conversation with Frank, stating
        that Frank “underst[ood their] pressure and said he suspect[ed it
        would] be hard to brush oﬀ if they are serious.” 8
               Thompson’s Lindley, while negotiating a consignment of a
        six-machine package between Thompson and IronPlanet, heard
        about the ICP deal and had asked IronPlanet’s Bob Winnette “what
        does this mean?” On April 4, Winnette informed Lindley that ICP
        products had been removed from the IronPlanet website. Three
        days later, Winnette sent an internal email stating that they
        “need[ed] a statement from Owens, Jeter, or [another IronPlanet
        VP] with [IronPlanet’s] status and where we are headed if
        anywhere with ICP.” He warned that, “[u]ntil [they] have a
        statement . . . Thompson is in the holding pattern with us.” Jeter,
        in response, stated, “Our deal with ICP has been terminated and
        removed from the IronPlanet website.” Jeter’s email was then

        other entities), it was hearsay. The district court also ruled that it did not
        qualify as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) as a co-
        conspirator statement because IronPlanet was not alleged to be a co-
        conspirator. The district court further ruled that the statements were not
        admissible under the exception for unavailable witnesses under Rule
        804(b)(3)(A). During his deposition, Jeter testified that he did not recall the
        substance of his conversation with Frank but did not testify that he forgot
        having the conversation at all; thus, he was not unavailable under Rule
        804(a)(3). Regardless of its ruling, the district court chose to consider Jeter’s
        statements as part of the summary judgment record and concluded that they
        were not direct evidence of a conspiracy and did not tie any specific Defendant
        to the supposed “pressure” on IronPlanet.
        8
            Jeter later testified that “they” referred to manufacturers and dealers.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10231

        forwarded to Thompson oﬃcials by Frank Langham of IronPlanet.
        Lindley requested “a [W]ord document on IronPlanet letterhead
        with [that] statement” with Jeter’s “name and title at the end.”
        IronPlanet complied.
               Several days later, on April 14, 2014, after exchanging emails
        regarding the termination, Jeter and Frank spoke on the phone.
        Jeter told Frank that “the pressure they were under was very
        strong,” and when Frank asked from whom the pressure was
        coming, Jeter responded “you know who our investors are.” In
        June 2014, Thompson VP Kenny Bishop wrote in an email to a
        Caterpillar oﬃcial that IronPlanet’s deal with ICP caused an
        “uproar” from Caterpillar dealers, causing IronPlanet to remove
        ICP from its website.
               On January 29, 2015, ICP sued Caterpillar, CAS, and various
        other manufacturers in federal court in Delaware seeking
        compensatory damages and injunctive relief under federal
        antitrust laws, as well as compensatory damages, punitive
        damages, and injunctive relief under state law. The Delaware court
        granted ICP leave to amend to add the three dealer Defendants in
        this appeal. The court initially dismissed the claims against the
        dealers for lack of personal jurisdiction, but then reconsidered and
        transferred the claims to the Northern District of Florida. The
        claims against Caterpillar remained in Delaware.
               Following transfer, the Florida district court granted ICP
        leave to ﬁle an amended complaint focusing on the claims against
        the dealer Defendants. The amended complaint advances four
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        22-10231                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        causes of action: two claims under Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-
        Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Counts 1 and 2), and two claims for
        tortious interference under state law (Counts 3 and 4).9 ICP alleged
        that Defendants, in conjunction with Caterpillar and another
        manufacturer, illegally conspired to cause IronPlanet to terminate
        its contract with ICP by boycotting and pressuring IronPlanet.
        Defendants each denied ICP’s allegations and asserted various
        aﬃrmative defenses, including that their conduct was lawful,
        justiﬁed, and pro-competitive.
               The district court established a two-phase discovery
        schedule, limiting Phase 1 to fact discovery on the issue of whether
        a conspiracy existed to boycott IronPlanet. At the close of Phase 1,
        the court would entertain summary judgment motions before
        moving on to Phase 2, which would focus on expert discovery and
        the “issues of market deﬁnition, antitrust injury, and damages.”
        Phase 1 of discovery ended in July 2021, at which time Defendants
        each ﬁled motions for summary judgment.
               The district court granted Defendants’ motions for
        summary judgment on all counts. First, as to the Sherman Act § 1
        antitrust claims, the district court found that “no reasonable jury
        could ﬁnd that Defendants individually threatened to boycott
        IronPlanet if it did not terminate its relationship with [ICP].
        Accordingly, there is no parallel conduct from which the jury could

        9
         The complaint alleged that the relevant state law was that of Illinois or, in
        the alternative, Florida.
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10231

        possibly infer the existence of a conspiracy.” The district court
        concluded that “the summary judgment evidence d[id] not tend to
        exclude the possibility that Defendants acted independently and
        [the evidence was] as consistent with permissible competition as
        with illegal conspiracy.”
               Second, as to ICP’s state law claims, the district court,
        applying Florida law,10 held that “there [was] no evidence from
        which a jury could ﬁnd that [Defendants] intentionally and
        unjustiﬁably interfered with the business relationship between
        IronPlanet and [ICP] or induced IronPlanet to breach its agreement
        with [ICP.]” The district court ultimately concluded, as to both
        claims, that while
               a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that IronPlanet was
               “pressured” into terminating its relationship with
               [ICP], there is simply no evidence (direct or
               circumstantial) from which a jury could ﬁnd that the
               dealer [D]efendants named in this case were
               responsible for exerting that pressure, much less that
               they unlawfully entered into an agreement to do so.
        Additionally, the district court determined that, as to Thompson
        and Ziegler speciﬁcally, even if they had threatened to boycott
        IronPlanet because of the ICP deal, those Defendants were justiﬁed
        (or “privileged”) under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766

        10
          The district court recognized that, while the parties disagreed as to which
        state law applied (North Carolina, Illinois, or Florida), they agreed that there
        were no material differences in the applicable law of those states.
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        22-10231                Opinion of the Court                          11

        cmt. l and Florida law in refusing to deal with IronPlanet out of
        concern for their own respective business interests. The district
        court entered ﬁnal judgment for Defendants, and ICP timely
        appealed.
                                    II.    Discussion
                   A. Sherman Act claims
               Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract,
        combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . among the
        several States, or with foreign nations or commerce among the
        several States, or with foreign nations” is illegal. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
        Notably, “the Supreme Court has long concluded that Congress
        intended only to prohibit ‘unreasonable’ restraints on trade.”
        Quality Auto Painting Ctr. of Roselle, Inc. v. State Farm Indem. Co., 917
        F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (citing Arizona v. Maricopa
        Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)). Section 1, therefore,
        “prohibits (1) conspiracies that (2) unreasonably (3) restrain
        interstate or foreign trade.” Id.
                The “ﬁrst inquiry” of a Sherman Act claim is whether
        defendants made an “agreement that restrains trade.” Tidmore Oil
        Co. v. BP Oil Co./Gulf Prod. Div., 932 F.2d 1384, 1388 (11th Cir. 1991).
        Importantly, “the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict the long
        recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an
        entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
        discretion as to parties with whom he will deal’”; only “collusion,”
        rather than independent action, is proscribed. Verizon Commc’ns
        Inc. v. L. Oﬀs. of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004)
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10231

        (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). An
        illegal conspiracy under § 1 can be demonstrated in two ways:
        direct or circumstantial evidence.
               A plaintiﬀ can present “direct . . . evidence that reasonably
        tends to prove that the parties ‘had a conscious commitment to a
        common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.’”
        Dinnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts, 851 F.2d 1575, 1579 (11th Cir. 1988)
        (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764
        (1984)). That being said, “it is only in rare cases that a plaintiﬀ can
        establish the existence of a conspiracy by showing an explicit
        agreement.” Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555,
        1573–74 (11th Cir. 1991). “Direct evidence is evidence which, if
        believed, resolves a matter in issue.” City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros
        Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 565 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting
        parenthetically 1 John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence
        § 185, at 777 (4th ed. 1992)). It is evidence that “is based on personal
        knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without
        inference or presumption.” Evidence, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
        2019) (emphasis added).
               “[M]ost conspiracies are proved by inferences drawn from
        the behavior of the alleged conspirators.” Todorov v. DCH Healthcare
        Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 (11th Cir. 1991). To survive summary
        judgment on the basis of circumstantial evidence, a “plaintiﬀ must
        present ‘evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
        [defendants] were acting independently.’” Am. Contractors Supply,
        LLC v. HD Supply Constr. Supply, Inc., 989 F.3d at 1233 (quoting
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        22-10231                  Opinion of the Court                             13

        Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761). “[C]onduct as consistent with
        permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not,
        standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy.”
        Harcros, 158 F.3d at 570 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
        Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). The plaintiﬀ, “in other words,
        must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of
        the competing inference[ ] of independent action.” Id. (quoting
        Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (alterations in original)). 11 The evidence
        “need not be such that only an inference of conspiracy may be
        derived from it,” but the evidence must “tend to exclude the
        inference of independent action.” Am. Contractors, 989 F.3d at 1234
        (quoting DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Abrasive Co., 887 F.2d
        1499, 1509 (11th Cir. 1989)). “Mere equipoise of the evidence does
        not establish an agreement.” Id. at 1233.
                While “parallel business behavior” or “conscious
        parallelism” can be circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy, the fact
        that defendants engaged in parallel conduct does not, on its own,
        establish a conspiracy for purposes of § 1. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
        550 U.S. 544, 561 n.7 (2007). Rather, the plaintiﬀ must demonstrate
        that “each defendant engaging in the parallel action acted contrary
        to its economic self-interest, or [show] other ‘plus factors’ tending

        11
          We have stated that “courts must be mindful that,” while “‘on summary
        judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be
        viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion[,] . . .
        antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous
        evidence in a § 1 case.’” Harcros, 158 F.3d at 569–70 (quoting Matsushita, 475
        U.S. at 586) (alteration adopted).
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10231

        to establish that the defendants were . . . in a collusive agreement
        to . . . restrain trade.” Harcros, 158 F.3d at 570–71 (internal
        quotation omitted). Neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has
        established a deﬁnitive list of “plus factors”; instead, any evidence
        that “tends to exclude the possibility of independent action” could
        operate as a “plus factor” suﬃcient to enhance circumstantial
        evidence beyond “the realm of equipoise.” Williamson Oil Co. v.
        Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
        Harcros, 158 F.3d at 571 n.35). “[A]n agreement is properly inferred
        from conscious parallelism only when ‘plus factors’ exist.” Todorov,
        921 F.2d at 1456 n.30. 12
                       1. Direct Evidence
               In its opening brief, while not clearly articulated, ICP
        appears to argue that there is direct evidence of a conspiracy
        among Defendants. But contrary to ICP’s arguments on appeal,
        the summary judgment record does not contain any direct evidence
        of an agreement between Defendants to boycott IronPlanet. In
        other words, there is no evidence that shows that Defendants
        explicitly agreed to boycott IronPlanet so that IronPlanet would
        terminate its relationship with ICP. We examine each piece of

        12
           While we have not set forth an exhaustive list of plus factors in our prior
        case law, we have recognized that “a showing that the defendants’ behavior
        would not be reasonable or explicable (i.e., not in their legitimate economic
        self-interest) if they were not conspiring to fix prices or otherwise restrain
        trade,” could constitute a plus factor. Harcros, 158 F.3d at 572.
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        22-10231                    Opinion of the Court                                 15

        evidence that ICP contends constitutes direct evidence and how it
        falls short.
                First, ICP points to internal emails among Caterpillar
        executives discussing the IronPlanet-ICP relationship, including an
        email in which the Caterpillar oﬃcial recounts that IronPlanet’s
        Owens, during merger negotiations, said “if we [CAS and
        IronPlanet] can come to some for[m] of agreement, then the ICP
        initiative would go away.” As an initial matter, neither Caterpillar
        nor IronPlanet are not defendants in this lawsuit. Accordingly, an
        internal corporate discussion with one non-party about another
        non-party is not in any way direct evidence of a conspiracy among
        the Defendants.
                Second, ICP points to IronPlanet President Jeter’s April 4 call
        with ICP founder and chairman Tim Frank to inform him the deal
        was oﬀ because of “concerns over” the relationship.13 During that
        call, Jeter told Frank that Caterpillar and at least one other

        13
          ICP argues that the district court erred in ruling that comments made by
        IronPlanet’s Jeter to ICP’s Frank during the April 4, 2014, phone call were
        inadmissible hearsay. “We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for
        abuse of discretion.” Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Wave Cruiser LLC, 36 F.4th 1346,
        1353 (11th Cir. 2022). “[E]ven a clearly erroneous evidentiary ruling will be
        affirmed if harmless.” Id. (quotation omitted). An error is harmless unless “it
        affects the substantial rights of the parties.” Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843
        F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). Even assuming the
        district court incorrectly determined that the statement was admissible, the
        error was harmless because the district court considered the statement as
        supposed direct evidence of a conspiracy; therefore, ICP’s substantial rights
        were not affected.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10231

        manufacturer were “putting pressure” on IronPlanet to terminate
        the ICP deal and told him that manufacturers and dealers would
        “stop doing business with [IronPlanet] on the equipment side” if
        the deal was not terminated. Direct evidence, by deﬁnition, does
        not require inferences to prove what it is oﬀered to prove. This
        phone call is not direct evidence of a conspiracy among the
        Defendants because it requires several inferences: just because
        Frank understood that some dealers were putting pressure on
        IronPlanet does not mean (a) the dealers were the Defendants in
        this case or (b) the dealers agreed to put this pressure on IronPlanet
        as part of an illegal concerted eﬀort. The telephone conversation
        cannot be direct evidence of an agreement on the part of
        Defendants due to the necessary inferences its consideration
        requires.
               Third, ICP contends that Jeter’s email to Owens on April 4
        summarizing his conversation with Frank, in which he stated that
        Frank “underst[ood IronPlanet’s] pressure and said he suspect[ed it
        would] be hard to brush oﬀ if they are serious,” constitutes direct
        evidence. This email is not direct evidence of a conspiracy because,
        despite the fact that Jeter testiﬁed that those entities referenced in
        his email were manufacturers and dealers, the email does not
        indicate which speciﬁc entities were exerting pressure on
        IronPlanet, or whether those entities were doing so by virtue of an
        anticompetitive agreement. To conclude that the email and
        preceding conversation concerned the Defendants requires the
        drawing of multiple inferences.
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        22-10231              Opinion of the Court                       17

                Fourth, ICP points to Frank’s testimony that when he asked
        Jeter “who besides Caterpillar was putting pressure on” IronPlanet,
        Jeter replied, “you know who our investors are.” ICP argues that
        this is direct evidence of a conspiracy, given that Ring Power was a
        minority shareholder of IronPlanet. However, ICP gives away the
        game by arguing that there are “reasonable inferences [to be]
        drawn from Jeter’s admission[.]” Direct evidence of a conspiracy
        does not require any inferences to be drawn and a mere reference
        to “investors” does not constitute proof of any unlawful conduct
        by Ring Power, much less a conspiracy between Ring Power and
        any other Defendant.
               Fifth, ICP relies on a June 2014 email from Thompson VP
        Kenny Bishop to a Caterpillar oﬃcial referring to “uproar from Cat
        dealers” prompting termination of the deal with ICP. But, by its
        own words, ICP necessarily concedes that this email is not direct
        evidence of a conspiracy when admitting that the desired
        conclusion is permitted only by an inference from consideration of
        the evidence.
               Sixth, ICP points to an email from CAS CEO Gary Trettel to
        Ziegler’s Hoeft stating that “[CAS] is greatly concerned over this
        development [i.e., the IronPlanet-ICP deal] and we will need to
        have discussions on how to proceed with the [merger] negotiations.
        [Caterpillar] has indicated this would kill the” IronPlanet-CAS
        merger. This email is not direct evidence of a conspiracy because,
        on its face, it contains no mention of any agreement between
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        18                        Opinion of the Court                       22-10231

        Defendants to boycott IronPlanet but rather speaks to CAS’s
        opinion of the IronPlanet-ICP deal.
                Seventh, ICP points to an email sent by Hoeft to IronPlanet’s
        Owens stating, “We would like to better understand that
        relationship [with ICP], as we are concerned that Caterpillar and
        the CAT dealers would have signiﬁcant concerns about any
        arrangement where IronPlanet is providing auction services for
        new equipment for a Caterpillar competitor.” In ICP’s view, the
        email “reﬂects Ziegler’s coordination with others[,] speak[ing] on
        behalf of Caterpillar and a group of ‘dealers.’” ICP contends that
        these emails “directly establish that Ziegler executives used the Cat
        Auction merger negotiations to pressure IronPlanet into severing
        its relationship with ICP.” ICP is incorrect. The parties make much
        of the question as to what “hat” Hoeft was wearing when he sent
        this email—in other words, was he acting on behalf of Ziegler or
        the CAS merger team? 14 But even if we were to accept ICP’s

        14
          ICP raises as an enumeration of error the district court’s apparent decision
        not to consider any events related to the CAS-IronPlanet merger because the
        Delaware district court previously ruled that the merger did not restrain trade.
        Accordingly, the district court did not permit ICP to rely upon the merger
        agreement to establish concerted action. However, the district court explicitly
        addressed the merger negotiations, including the email from Hoeft to Owens
        during negotiations expressing concern about the ICP-IronPlanet relationship.
        The district court also considered the context of the merger when analyzing
        the speed at which IronPlanet switched from building up the website featuring
        ICP’s products to taking it down. The district court directly engaged with
        evidence from the merger negotiations and found it not to be probative
        evidence tending to show Defendants acted in concert in boycotting
        IronPlanet. To the extent that ICP argues that the district court was wrong in
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        22-10231                  Opinion of the Court                             19

        argument that Hoeft sent the email in his capacity as a Ziegler
        representative rather than as a CAS representative, it is still
        insuﬃcient direct evidence that Ziegler entered a conspiracy with
        the other Defendants to boycott IronPlanet. On its face, Hoeft’s
        email simply asks for information about IronPlanet’s relationship
        with ICP. To reach the conclusion that Ziegler entered into a
        conspiracy with the other Defendants, we would have to make
        several inferences—e.g., that Hoeft was, in fact, acting on behalf of
        Ziegler rather than CAS, that Hoeft inquired after the IronPlanet-
        ICP deal at the behest of at least one other Defendant, and that an
        inquiry into the deal was intended to be and was received as a veiled
        threat to boycott IronPlanet—thus disqualifying this evidence as
        direct evidence of a conspiracy.
               Eighth, ICP points to the emails between Thompson
        oﬃcials and IronPlanet in which Thompson sought conﬁrmation
        that the deal with ICP had been terminated and the ICP products
        were removed from the IronPlanet website.                   These
        communications consisted of the following: IronPlanet’s Winnette
        informed Lindley that ICP products had been removed from the
        IronPlanet website. Three days later, Winnette sent an internal
        email stating that they “need[ed] a statement from Owens, Jeter, or
        [another IronPlanet VP] with [IronPlanet’s] status and where we

        concluding that this information was not probative of concerted action, we
        agree with the district court. Communications between non-parties are not
        probative of the Defendants actions in this case (even granting ICP’s argument
        that Hoeft wore his Ziegler “hat” for purposes of his communications with
        IronPlanet). Thus, ICP’s enumeration is meritless.
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                       22-10231

        are headed if anywhere with ICP.” He warned that, “[u]ntil [they]
        have a statement . . . Thompson is in the holding pattern with us.”
        Jeter, in response, stated, “Our deal with ICP has been terminated
        and removed from the IronPlanet website.” Jeter’s email was then
        forwarded to Thompson oﬃcials by Frank Langham of IronPlanet.
        Lindley requested “a [W]ord document on IronPlanet letterhead
        with [that] statement” with Jeter’s “name and title at the end.”
        IronPlanet complied. Nothing in those communications, or the
        resulting statement from IronPlanet, constitutes direct evidence of
        a conspiracy among the Defendants. There is not even a single
        mention of another dealer or entity in those communications, and
        the communications simply do not establish that Thompson
        unlawfully conspired with anyone to restrain trade. Additionally,
        these emails are simply requests for information about an arguably
        industry-changing event that do not support the existence of the
        alleged conspiracy.
                               15
              As to Ring Power, ICP points to the following: (1) internal
        Ring Power emails regarding the “concerns” about the IronPlanet-
        ICP deal harbored by Ring Power executives and the

        15
          ICP seemingly concedes that there is no direct evidence tying Ring Power
        to the conspiracy, stating in its opening brief that “[b]ased on record evidence,
        a reasonable jury could also conclude that Ring Power played a key role in
        coordinating and leading the conspiracy,” and that there is “more than enough
        evidence from [which] a jury could reasonably infer Ring Power’s involvement
        in the conspiracy.” Irrespective of ICP’s concession, however, we will
        consider whether the proffered evidence implicating Ring Power constitutes
        direct evidence of a conspiracy.
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        22-10231               Opinion of the Court                       21

        communication of those concerns to Caterpillar; and (2) “a ﬂurry
        of phone calls” between Ring Power’s Fowler and oﬃcials at
        Caterpillar, Thompson, and IronPlanet following Fowler’s email to
        Ring Power’s CEO informing him of the IronPlanet-ICP deal.
        Neither of these pieces of evidence is direct evidence of a
        conspiracy. Emails internal to Ring Power containing no mention
        of any other Defendant (much less an agreement between them to
        boycott IronPlanet) do not show the existence of an illegal
        conspiracy to restrain trade. Nor does a series of phone calls: a
        factﬁnder would be required to make an inference that the phone
        calls were, indeed, concerning not only the IronPlanet-ICP deal,
        but also an agreement between Ring Power and Thompson, in
        order to conclude that there was a conspiracy between those
        Defendants. The phone calls are therefore plainly not direct
        evidence of such a conspiracy.
              Accordingly, ICP has failed to put forth any direct evidence
        proving that Defendants conspired to boycott IronPlanet until it
        terminated its relationship with ICP.
                     2. Circumstantial Evidence with Plus Factors
                In its reply brief, ICP asserts for the ﬁrst time that the
        evidence it initially argued was direct evidence of a conspiracy is
        also circumstantial evidence of such. Thus, ICP also needs to show
        the existence of plus factors. But ICP tacitly admits that it has not
        done so. Instead, ICP argues that, under DeLong, it is not limited to
        a “two-track” requirement of either direct evidence or
        circumstantial evidence and plus factors; it contends that “antitrust
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10231

        plaintiﬀs may rely on the cumulative weight of various kinds of
        evidence, including that which requires interpretation or
        inferences, even without a showing of ‘parallel conduct.’”
                DeLong, however, does not hold that the cumulative weight
        of the evidence (without plus factors) can get a plaintiﬀ past
        summary judgment in an antitrust case. In DeLong, we considered
        a plaintiﬀ’s claims of vertical price conspiracy and concluded that
        by “[v]iewing the totality of the evidence . . . , a jury reasonably
        could conclude that [the defendants] worked together to develop”
        a competing product “and agreed to sell it at an inﬂated price,” i.e.,
        the evidence “all reasonably tend[ed] to support [the plaintiﬀ’s]
        conspiracy allegation.” 887 F.2d at 1511–12. While it is true that
        we did not explicitly consider any “plus factors,” we did state that
        evidence of parallel conduct “need not be such that only an
        inference of conspiracy may be derived from it,” but instead, “[i]t
        must . . . tend to exclude the inference of independent action.” Id.
        at 1509. This holding—which plainly states that inferences are not
        enough at summary judgment—is not inconsistent with our
        requirement of plus factors discussed in other cases. Indeed, prior
        to our decision in DeLong, we held in Dunnivant v. Bi-State Auto Parts
        that “[i]n order to avoid a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiﬀ
        must come forward with signiﬁcant probative evidence supporting
        its theory of conscious parallelism with some ‘plus’ factor which
        tends to indicate the absence of independent action.” 851 F.2d
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        22-10231                   Opinion of the Court                               23

        1575, 1583 (11th Cir. 1988). 16 And after DeLong, we have conﬁrmed
        the need for plus factors in a circumstantial evidence case: “To
        ensure that we do not punish unilateral conduct, . . . we require
        more than mere evidence of parallel conduct by competitors to
        support an inference of a conspiracy; an agreement is properly
        inferred from conscious parallelism only when ‘plus factors’ exist.”
        Todorov, 921 F.2d at 1456 n.30. DeLong does not require otherwise
        or hold to the contrary. ICP cannot preclude summary judgment
        by reliance on circumstantial evidence alone, without any
        discussion or argument of plus factors because “[m]ere equipoise
        of the evidence does not establish an agreement.” Am. Contractors,
        989 F.3d at 1234.
               Even considering all of the purported direct evidence as
        circumstantial evidence, nothing permits the inference that
        Defendants illegally conspired to boycott IronPlanet in an eﬀort to
        thwart the IronPlanet-ICP deal. And even if the circumstantial
        evidence permitted such an inference, ICP has failed to put forth
        any plus factors that bring its evidence out of the realm of
        equipoise. ICP has only made the conclusory argument that the
        alleged conspiracy was economically rational for Defendants. At
        most, ICP has put forth evidence tending to show that Defendants

        16
           Under our “prior panel precedent rule,” we are required to follow the
        precedent of the first panel to address the relevant issue, “unless and until the
        first panel’s holding is overruled by the Court sitting en banc or by the
        Supreme Court.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1300 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001).
        Thus, if any conflict did exist between DeLong and Dunnivant, our holding and
        reasoning in Dunnivant would win the day.
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10231

        independently harbored concerns about the eﬀects the IronPlanet-
        ICP deal would have on the heavy construction equipment
        industry and their own respective businesses, and communicated
        those concerns to IronPlanet in the form of requests for additional
        information. That conduct is not illegal under the Sherman Act.
                Because ICP has not pointed to direct evidence of a
        conspiracy or to circumstantial evidence with additional plus
        factors that would permit the inference that Defendants acted in
        concert rather than independently, its Sherman Act claims fail. The
        district court did not err in granting Defendants summary
        judgment on these claims.
                   B. Tortious interference with contract
              ICP advanced two causes of action for tortious interference
        with contract under state law for (1) lost proﬁts and (2) damaged
        equity and goodwill. The district court granted Defendants
        summary judgment on those claims because it concluded that
        there was no evidence from which a jury could ﬁnd that
        Defendants intentionally and unjustiﬁably interfered with “the
        business relationship between” ICP and IronPlanet or induced
        IronPlanet to breach its agreement with ICP.17
            First, as to Ring Power, the district court found that “the
        summary judgment evidence fail[ed] to show that Ring Power

        17
           The district court used the phrase “business relationship” twice in its
        summary judgment order but analyzed ICP’s claims under the correct
        framework for tortious interference with contract.
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        22-10231              Opinion of the Court                       25

        threatened to boycott IronPlanet,” because it issued “nothing more
        than inquiries” into the IronPlanet-ICP relationship. It concluded
        that the record evidence showed that Ring Power’s inquiries did not
        contain or imply any threat of a boycott, nor did IronPlanet
        perceive any of the inquiries as a threat of a boycott.
               Second, the district court found that the same was true for
        Thompson, determining that even if Thompson’s request for
        conﬁrmation from IronPlanet that it had terminated the deal with
        ICP was a “veiled threat,” such a “threat would not be actionable
        because Thompson was justiﬁed in not dealing (or threatening not
        to deal) with IronPlanet under the circumstances” according to the
        commentary to § 766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. It also
        held that Thompson “was motivated by its legitimate business
        interests,” i.e., “that its used equipment would sell for less,” and
        thus was entitled to summary judgment.
               Lastly, as to Ziegler, the district court concluded that even
        assuming that Hoeft’s email to IronPlanet inquiring about the ICP
        relationship was sent on behalf of Ziegler rather than CAS, and
        further assuming that the email contained or implied a threat to
        boycott IronPlanet, the claims would still not be actionable because
        “Ziegler, like Thompson, was free to independently decide who to
        deal with based on its own business interests.”
               ICP argues that the district court erroneously determined
        that no Defendant threatened to boycott IronPlanet because “there
        is evidence from which a reasonable jury could ﬁnd that IronPlanet
        terminated its ICP contract under pressure from dealers, and
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        26                        Opinion of the Court                     22-10231

        speciﬁcally in response to threats to its merger plans and its
        equipment consignments.” It also argues that § 766 to the
        Restatement “draws a contrast between a refusal to deal motivated
        by an ‘aversion’ to a third party, and a refusal to deal (or threat of
        such refusal) that is accompanied by statements or signals actively
        seeking the cancellation of a contract with a third party.” Because
        Defendants “moved beyond refraining from business based on an
        ‘aversion,’” their purported threats constituted unjustiﬁable
        interference.
                ICP also contends that the district court erroneously relied
        on Florida law’s “privilege to interfere” which protects actions
        taken to promote one’s own economic self-interest; ICP argues that
        the privilege does not apply where improper means are employed,
        such as threats and intimidation. ICP contends that Defendants’
        “concerted pressure campaign” qualiﬁes as improper means.
        Lastly, ICP argues that “[t]he district court usurped the jury’s role”
        in determining whether Defendants’ alleged interference was
        improper.
               Under Florida law, 18 “[t]he tort of contractual interference
        occurs when: [1] a contract exists; [2] the third-party has knowledge
        of the contract; [3] the third party intentionally interferes with a
        party’s rights under the contract; [4] there is no justiﬁcation or

        18
          The parties do not agree on which state’s laws apply in this case—North
        Carolina, Illinois, or Florida. However, the parties have agreed that there is
        no meaningful difference between the three states’ tortious interference laws.
        The district court applied Florida law, so we will do the same here.
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        22-10231                     Opinion of the Court                              27

        privilege for the interference; and [5] there are damages.” Mariscotti
        v. Merco Grp. At Akoya, Inc., 917 So. 2d 890, 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).
        We focus on the third and fourth elements here: whether there was
        an unjustiﬁable interference by Defendants into ICP’s agreement
        with IronPlanet. See, e.g., Cedar Hills Properties Corp. v. E. Fed. Corp.,
        575 So. 2d 673, 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“In order to maintain an
        action for tortious interference with contractual rights, a plaintiﬀ
        must prove that a third party interfered with a contract by
        inﬂuencing, inducing or coercing one of the parties to breach the
        contract, thereby causing injury to the other party.” (quotation
        omitted and alteration adopted)); Stutzke v. D.G.C. Liquidation Co.,
        533 So. 2d 897, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (“A cause of action for
        tortious interference requires that there be direct, intentional
        interference.”).
               The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 19 explains that,
        with respect to the “means of interference,” “[t]here is no technical
        requirement as to the kind of conduct that may result in
        interference,” but notes that “[t]he interference is often by

        19
             Section 766 provides:
                  One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the
                  performance of a contract (except a contract to marry)
                  between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise
                  causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject
                  to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the
                  other from the failure of the third person to perform the
                  contract.
        Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766.
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                      22-10231

        inducement . . . conveying to the third person the actor’s desire to
        inﬂuence him not to deal with the other.” Restatement (Second)
        of Torts § 766 cmt. k.
               However, there are certain justiﬁcations for interference,
        including refusing to deal. Again, the commentary to § 766
        provides guidance on when an individual or entity’s refusal to deal
        with a third party constitutes an unjustiﬁable interference with the
        third party’s business relationship with the plaintiﬀ:
              A refusal to deal is one means by which a person may
              induce another to commit a breach of his contract
              with a third person. Thus A may induce B to break
              his contract with C by threatening not to enter into,
              or to sever, business relations with B unless B does
              break the contract. This situation frequently presents
              a nice question of fact. While, under the rule stated in
              this Section, A may not, without some justiﬁcation induce
              B to break his contract with C, A is ordinarily free to refuse
              to deal with B for any reason or no reason. The diﬃcult
              question of fact presented in this situation is whether
              A is merely exercising his freedom to select the
              persons with whom he will do business or is inducing
              B not to perform his contract with C. That freedom
              is not restricted by the relationship between B and C;
              and A’s aversion to C is as legitimate a reason for his refusal
              to deal with B as his aversion to B. If he is merely
              exercising that freedom, he is not liable to C for the
              harm caused by B’s choice not to lose A’s business for
              the sake of getting C’s.
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        22-10231                Opinion of the Court                          29

               On the other hand, if A, instead of merely refusing to
               deal with B and leaving B to make his own decision
               on what to do about it, goes further and uses his own
               refusal to deal or the threat of it as a means of
               aﬃrmative inducement, compulsion or pressure to
               make B break his contract with C, he may be acting
               improperly and subject to liability under the rule
               stated in this Section.
        Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. l (emphasis added).
                Under Florida law, “there can be no claim [for tortious
        interference] where the action complained of is undertaken to
        safeguard or promote one’s ﬁnancial or economic interest.” Genet
        Co. v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 498 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
        Further, “[i]f a defendant interferes with a contract in order to
        safeguard a preexisting economic interest of his own, the
        defendant’s right to protect his own established economic interest
        outweighs the plaintiﬀ’s right to be free of interference, and his
        actions are usually recognized as privileged and nonactionable.”
        Heavener, Ogier Servs., Inc. v. R. W. Fla. Region, Inc., 418 So. 2d 1074,
        1076 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); see also id. (“Even if the contract is
        terminable at will, the interferer’s actions are tortious and
        actionable if the motive is purely malicious and not coupled with
        any legitimate competitive economic interest.”). Moreover, a
        defendant may not utilize improper means, such as threats,
        intimidation, or conspiratorial conduct, and still enjoy the privilege
        of business competition. See Int’l Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Austral
        Insulated Prod., Inc., 262 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting
        cases); see also Sec. Title Guarantee Corp. of Baltimore v. McDill
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10231

        Columbus Corp., 543 So. 2d 852, 855 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (“[S]o long
        as improper means are not employed, activities taken to safeguard
        or promote one’s own ﬁnancial interests are entirely non-
        actionable.”).
                  1. Ring Power
                We turn ﬁrst to ICP’s argument that Ring Power threatened
        to boycott IronPlanet and thus intentionally interfered with ICP’s
        relationship with IronPlanet. ICP, however, has not cited to any
        evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that Ring Power
        interfered with its IronPlanet deal, either in its opening brief or in
        its reply brief. Rather, it rests its arguments on evidence that, at
        most, indicates that Ring Power was concerned about the
        IronPlanet-ICP deal and that Ring Power’s Fowler “engaged in a
        ﬂurry of phone calls with oﬃcials at Caterpillar, Thompson, and
        IronPlanet.” ICP has not pointed to any evidence that Ring Power
        took any action to threaten or pressure IronPlanet to terminate its
        deal with ICP and thus has not created a genuine issue of material
        fact on the third element of tortious interference with contract
        under Florida law. Tamiami Trail, 463 So.2d at 1127. Therefore,
        Ring Power is entitled to summary judgment on the tortious
        interference with contract claims.
                  2. Thompson
              We turn next to Thompson. ICP relies upon the
        communications between Thompson’s Lindley and IronPlanet as
        evidence of intentional interference in which IronPlanet expressed
        concern internally that it would be in a “holding pattern” with
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        22-10231               Opinion of the Court                         31

        Thompson while the ICP deal remained intact and in which
        Thompson requested a formal statement on IronPlanet letterhead
        that the ICP deal had been terminated. We agree with the district
        court that nothing in those communications could be reasonably
        construed as a threat of boycott and thus cannot satisfy the third
        element of tortious interference under Florida law. Id.
              However, even if they could be so construed, Thompson’s
        actions would be justiﬁed under § 766 cmt. l to the Restatement
        (Second) of Torts, which provides:
               A may induce B to break his contract with C by
               threatening not to enter into, or to sever, business
               relations with B unless B does break the contract
               [with C]. . . . A may not, without some justiﬁcation
               induce B to break his contract with C, [but] A is
               ordinarily free to refuse to deal with B for any reason
               or no reason[, and] A’s aversion to C is as legitimate a
               reason for his refusal to deal with B as his aversion to
               B.
        Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. l. In other words, we are
        presented with the precise scenario contemplated by the
        Restatement: Thompson’s aversion to ICP is “a legitimate reason
        for [its] refusal to deal” with IronPlanet. Id.; Heavener, 418 So.2d at
        1076; Genet, 498 So.2d at 684. While ICP contends that Thompson
        went “beyond” a mere refusal to deal by “actively seeking
        cancellation of a contract with a third party,” i.e., aﬃrmatively
        inducing a breach of contract, the communications did no such
        thing, as evidenced by the fact that they did not take place until
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10231

        several days after ICP’s products had been removed from
        IronPlanet’s website and IronPlanet oﬃcials informed ICP of the
        termination. We agree with the district court that the evidence
        showed that Thompson acted primarily to protect its business
        interests, and thus any interference was justiﬁed. Because
        Thompson’s refusal to deal was justiﬁed, it is entitled to summary
        judgment on these claims.
                  3. Ziegler
               Lastly, with respect to Ziegler, even assuming that Hoeft’s
        email to IronPlanet was sent on behalf of Ziegler rather than CAS,
        we agree with the district court that the email did not contain any
        threat of boycott, it could not have been construed as a threat to
        boycott, and it was not received or understood by IronPlanet to be
        a threat of boycott, evidenced by Jeter’s testimony that he did not
        receive any threats from Defendants. And even if Hoeft’s email
        were to be construed as a threat, it would not be actionable as
        interference because Ziegler, like Thompson, was entitled to refuse
        to deal with IronPlanet while IronPlanet was engaged with ICP
        based upon its own business interests. Restatement (Second) of
        Torts § 766 cmt. l; Heavener, 418 So. 2d at 1076; Genet, 498 So. 2d at
        684. For that reason, Ziegler is also entitled to summary judgment
        on ICP’s tortious interference claims.
                                    III. Conclusion
                ICP has failed to carry its burden on summary judgment on
        its claims arising under § 1 of the Sherman Act as well as its state-
        law claims for tortious interference with contract. ICP has not put
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        22-10231              Opinion of the Court                       33

        forth suﬃcient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to infer that
        Defendants acted in concert in conspiring to boycott IronPlanet if
        it did not terminate its relationship with ICP and therefore its § 1
        claims must fail. ICP has also failed to put forth suﬃcient evidence
        to preclude summary judgment on its state-law tortious
        interference claims. Accordingly, we aﬃrm the judgment of the
        district court.
              AFFIRMED.