Court Opinion

ID: 9518226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:47:39.650117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:52.534981
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, Judge,
concurring:
I concur with the majority insofar as it finds that nothing in the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. § 21 et seq., provides the kind of unambiguous evidence of congressional intent necessary to displace this Commonwealth’s consumer protection laws prohibiting late payment fees, annual fees, return check fees, etc. I would journey one step further, however, and hold that allowing Ohio’s definition of “interest rate” or “rate of interest” to preempt Pennsylvania’s consumer protection laws would amount to an unconstitutional delegation of Congressional power to the State of Ohio’s legislature. For this reason, I must write separately.
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const, amend. X. Generally, the states have full power to regulate within their limits, matters of internal police, which include whatever will promote the peace, comfort, convenience, and prosperity of their people (collectively referred to as the states’ police powers). See Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 2 S.Ct. 185, 27 L.Ed. 442 (1883).
Banks and banking are areas which have traditionally fallen under the ambit of the states’ police powers. Because our country has traditionally favored widely dispersed control of banking, the United' States Supreme Court has held that “banking and related financial activities are of profound local *117concern.” Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 177, 105 S.Ct. 2545, 2555, 86 L.Ed.2d 112 (1985); see also Lewis v. BT Invest. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 100 S.Ct. 2009, 64 L.Ed.2d 702 (1980) (noting that as a matter of history and present commercial reality, banking and related financial activities are of profound local concern).
Similarly, the courts of this Commonwealth have held that banking and the regulation of interest rates are subjects squarely within the police powers of the Commonwealth. Smith v. Mitchell, 420 Pa.Super. 137, 140, 616 A.2d 17, 19 (1992) (citing Equitable Credit & Discount Co. v. Geier, 342 Pa. 445, 454-56, 21 A.2d 53, 58 (1941)). At common law, the taking of any interest, whatever the percentage, was illegal. The present right to impose or charge interest is derived from state statutory authority. It naturally follows, therefore, that the right or privilege to charge interest and other concomitant fees are subject to state legislative control. See Equitable Loan Society, Inc. v. Bell, 339 Pa. 449, 14 A.2d 316 (1940); Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 A. 869 (1913).
It is elementary that the subject of the maximum amount to be charged ... for the use of money loaned within the jurisdiction of the state is one within the police power of such state.
Smith, 420 Pa.Super. at 141, 616 A.2d at 19 (quoting Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 569, 31 S.Ct. 132, 133, 54 L.Ed. 1151 (1910) and Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176, 30 S.Ct. 644, 646, 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910)). Regarding the necessity of state action in areas of extreme local concern, Thomas Jefferson once pronounced that, “[w]ere we directed from Washington when to sow, and when to reap, we should soon want bread.” Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (1853).
The states’ police powers, including this Commonwealth’s authority to regulate the rates of interest and other ancillary fees charged against consumer loans and credit cards, however, are not without limitation. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ... *118any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2. State police powers, therefore, cannot embrace a subject textually committed to Congress by the United States Constitution, nor can they defeat or impair statutes passed by Congress in order to carry out the powers granted to it. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25, 25 S.Ct. 358, 361, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905).
When “the field which Congress is said to have preempted has been traditionally occupied by the States [e.g., within the-states’ police powers — banking, consumer protection, etc.] ... “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). The touchstone of a preemption analysis, therefore, turns on congressional intent. Cippollone, — U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 2617, 120 L.Ed.2d at 422 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 1190, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978)); see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982) (holding that preemption is not foreclosed by the fact that the federal statute intrudes into the range of subjects over which the states have traditionally exercised their police powers if Congress’ intent to displace state law is clear).
Generally, Congress’ intention to preempt may be either express or implied. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). Specifically, state law is preempted by federal law in three circumstances:
(1) where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state law;
(2) in the absence of explicit statutory language, where Congress regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy exclusively; and
*119(3) where state law actually conflicts "with federal law.
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990).
Here, the parties and amicus curiae cannot dispute that Congress, in enacting the NBA, neither expressly preempted state consumer protection laws or banking laws, nor intended the federal government to exclusively occupy the field. Preemption applies, therefore, only if Pennsylvania’s consumer protection laws “actually conflict” with Section 85 of the NBA. English, swpra.
To ascertain whether Pennsylvania’s laws actually conflict with and are, therefore, preempted by Section 85, we must look to the intent of Congress, the plain and ordinary meanings of Section 85’s terms, and the federal common law. After so doing, I find that Bank One has not met its burden of showing that Pennsylvania’s consumer protection laws conflict with Section 85 of the NBA or that Congress’ “clear and manifest purpose” in enacting Section 85 was to preempt state contract law prohibiting late payment fees, annual fees, return check fees, etc. Cippollone, supra; Rice, supra.
The pertinent language of Section 85 of the NBA provides: Any association may take, receive, and charge on any loan or discount made, ... or other evidence of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State ... where the bank is located.
12 U.S.C. § 85 (emphasis added). Section 85 of the NBA has been referred to by many courts as the “most favored lender doctrine:”
[Section] 85 was designed by Congress to place national banks on a plane of at least competitive equality with other lenders in the respective states, and, indeed, to give national banks a possible advantage over state banks in the field of interest rates. Thus, a national bank is not limited to the interest rate that a state bank may charge with respect to a particular type of loan if another lender in the state is permitted to charge a higher rate of interest on the same *120type of loan. In that situation the national bank may charge the higher rate.
Fisher v. First National Bank, 548 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1977). Section 85 was enacted, therefore, to eliminate state control over the interest rates charged by federally chartered commercial banks. See M. Nahas & Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 930 F.2d 608 (8th Cir.1991); Brown v. First Nat’l City Bank, 503 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.1974).
Section 85 of the NBA has also been interpreted as permitting national banks to charge customers throughout the country the rates of interest permitted in the state where it is located — the “exportation principle.” See Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 99 S.Ct. 540, 58 L.Ed.2d 534 (1978) and Fisher, supra. The Court in Marquette held that national banks need not comply with any other state’s interest rate law when doing business in a state other than the one in which they are located. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 307-13, 99 S.Ct. at 545-48. This holding, in effect, created a de facto national interest rate.
The impact of the Marquette decision on consumer credit business has been overwhelming. While some states continue to enact consumer protection legislation, see, e.g., 69 P.S. § 1101 et seq., and 73 P.S. § 201-1 et seq.,1 others view the *121Marquette decision as an opportunity for economic development. By relaxing interest rates and usury laws generally, these states assist their resident national banks in nationwide consumer credit transactions and allure out-of-state bank holding company subsidiaries into their jurisdictions for the same purpose. See Robert A. Burgess & Monica A. Ciolfi, Exportation or Exploitation? A State Regulators’ View of Interstate Credit Card Transactions, 42 Bus.Law. 929 (1987). The effect of Marquette, therefore, has been to deny millions of consumers the protections of the laws of the states in which they reside. It is my belief that in order to ensure and stimulate public confidence and participation in commercial transactions, interstate lenders, like Bank One, must be compelled to comply with all consumer protection laws and/or regulations other than the rate laws in the states in which their borrowing consumers reside unless and until Congress speaks resoundingly to the contrary.
The NBA does not expressly define “interest rates” or “rates of interest” as used in Section 85. Additionally, there is nothing in the legislative history of the NBA from which we could glean a possible congressional intent to include late fees, return check fees, over-credit-limit charges, etc. within the definition of “rate of interest.” Absent an express definition or clear congressional intent, in order to determine whether the Pennsylvania consumer protection laws are preempted, we must look to the ordinary meaning of the term(s) and consider the then existing federal common law definitions. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 111 S.Ct. 403, 112 L.Ed.2d 356 (1990); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 100 S.Ct. 311, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979); Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 95 S.Ct. 1180, 43 L.Ed.2d 469 (1975). “[Wjhere words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning at common law or in the law of this country[,] they are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. *122575, 583, 98 S.Ct. 866, 871, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978); see also Evans v. First Nat’l Bank, 251 U.S. 108, 40 S.Ct. 58, 64 L.Ed. 171 (1919) (holding that federal law completely defines what constitutes the taking of usury by a national bank, referring to state law only to determine the maximum permitted rate).
“Interest rate” is defined as “[t]he percentage of an amount of money which is paid for its use for a specified time.” Black’s Law Dictionary 730 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). Similarly, “interest” is defined as “a charge for borrowed money[,] generally a percentage of the amount borrowed.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 630 (1989) (emphasis added). The plain and ordinary meaning of “interest” or “interest rate,” therefore, does not include late fees, annual fees, or the like. FMC Corp., supra.
Similarly, in common parlance, “interest rate” or “rate of interest” has a very narrow meaning. For example, when one is asked what interest rate he or she is paying on a loan, the response is, “eleven and one-half percent” or “ten and three-eighths percent.” If it is a real estate loan, the response may be, “nine and one-half percent, and two points.” Conversely, lay persons are not likely to associate “interest rate” with late payment fees, return check fees, etc., because those fees are usually contingent upon the borrower’s default, and are not part of the “interest” paid to obtain the funds.
Turning now to the federal common law interpretation of “interest rates” or “rates of interest,” the trial court relied, in large part, on Greenwood Trust Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.1992) in finding that Pennsylvania’s laws prohibiting the assessment of annual fees, late payment fees, and the like, are preempted by Section 85, because Ohio law, the state in which Bank One is “located,” permits such fees and charges. This reliance is misplaced in that Greenwood Trust and its progeny fail to distinguish between interest and/or interest rates, the amount charged for the use of money, and contingent penalty fees, the amount imposed upon a contractual default.
*123Prior to the passage of the NBA in 1864, the United States Supreme Court examined the dichotomy between “interest rates” and “contingent default charges.” In Lloyd v. Scott, 29 U.S. (9 Pet.) 205, 7 L.Ed. 833 (1830), the Court held that contingent default charges (e.g., late fees, etc.) were' not “interest:”
If a party agree[s] to pay a specific sum exceeding the lawful interest, provided he do[es] not pay the principal by a day certain, it is not usury. By a punctual payment of the principal, he may avoid the payment of the sum stated, which is considered as a penalty.
Id. at 226, 7 L.Ed. 833 (emphasis added). Accordingly, an interest rate is not rendered usurious by a debtor/cardholder’s agreement to pay late fees contingent upon his or her delinquency, because the payment or non-payment of that late fee is completely within the debtor’s control. By definition, therefore, an agreement to pay late fees, etc., cannot be deemed equivalent to an agreement to pay a fixed interest rate.
One year prior to the enactment of the NBA, the Supreme Court once again spoke to the differences between interest rates and contingent default charges:
The payment of anything additional depends also upon a contingency, and not upon any happenings of a certain event, which of itself would be deemed insufficient to make a loan usurious.
Spain v. Hamilton’s Administrator, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 604, 626, 17 L.Ed. 619 (1863). Again, these cases stand for the proposition that only where the charge is required for a loan, and not where it is contingent on the happening of an uncertain event, will the charge be considered “interest” at federal common law. Because Congress is presumed to have adopted the federal common law meaning of “interest” in enacting Section 85, Perrin, supra, Burns, supra, the statute cannot be interpreted to include contingent default charges within the cardholder’s control, such as the fees imposed by Bank One in this case (e.g., late fees, return check fees).
*124Since the passage of the NBA, federal courts have consistently upheld the interest rate/contingent penalty charge dichotomy. For example, in Merchants’ Nat’l Bank v. Sevier, 14 F. 662 (C.C.D.Ark.1882), the Arkansas Federal Court held that a provision in a promissory note “to pay an attorney’s fee of 10 percent on the amount due if suit is brought to enforce payment (contingent default charge) ... is a stipulation for a penalty or forfeiture, and tends to the oppression of the debtor ... is a cover for usury ... and [is] void.” Id. at 663-64. The court in Sevier stated that “[i]t would be idle to limit interest to a certain rate, if, under another name, forfeitures may be imposed to an amount without limit.” Id.; see also Citizens Nat’l Bank of Orange, Va. v. Waugh, 78 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.1935); Chestertoum Park of Md. v. Walker, 163 F. 510 (4th Cir.1908); Schlesinger v. Arline, 31 F. 648 (C.C.S.D.Ga.1887); Hughitt v. Johnson, 28 F. 865 (C.C.E.D.Mo.1886); Adams v. Addington, 16 F. 89 (C.C.N.D.Tex.1883); Hardin v. Olson, 14 F. 705 (C.C.D.Minn.1882) (each upholding the distinction between interest rates and contingent penalty fees or charges).
Just last year, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Texas, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1631, 123 L.Ed.2d 245 (1993) reaffirmed its position that “interest,” at common law, does not include processing fees or penalty charges. In Texas, the Court examined the Debt Collection Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C.S. §§ 3701 et seq., and found that:
The common law rule requiring parties owing debts to the Federal Government to pay prejudgment interest where the underlying claim is a contractual obligation to pay money differs from the prejudgment interest liability imposed by [the] Debt Collections Act ... in that under the common law ... processing fees and penalty charges are not imposed [as interest].
Id. — U.S. at ---, 113 S.Ct. at 1635-36 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See United States v. Childs, 266 U.S. 304, 45 S.Ct. 110, 69 L.Ed. 299 (1924) (holding that “the word ‘interest! is to be understood in its ordinary sense---To hold that Congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and *125invokes a special definition of the word ‘interest’ that is unwarranted.” (citations omitted)).
The logic behind this continuing federal common law distinction is clear. If charges and fees within a cardholder’s control (e.g., contingent penalty charges like laté fees) are deemed “interest,” the banks or creditors could not possibly know whether the ultimate interest rate on any given account would exceed thé interest ceiling provided by law. The cardholder could, therefore, render his or her account usurious and, hence, unlawful by simply being delinquent on his or her payments, thereby incurring “x” amount of late charges. In the absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary, I find that the term “interest rates” or “rates of interest” as used in Section 85 of the NBA ought to be construed in compliance with the term’s plain and ordinary meaning and its well entrenched federal common law meaning so as not to include contingent default fees. Cippollone, supra.
After sidestepping and ignoring the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “interest rate” or “rate of interest,” the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Greenwood Trust, supra, the case on which the trial court relied, baldly stated that “federal case law has long suggested that, in ordinary usage, interest may encompass late fees and kindred charges.” 971 F.2d at 825. For support, the First Circuit cited the following cases: American Timber & Trading Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 690 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1982) (compensating balance requirement); Fisher v. First Nat’l Bank, 548 F.2d 255 (8th Cir.1977) (fee for cash advance); Panos v. Smith, 116 F.2d 445 (6th Cir.1940) (taxes and recording fees); Cronkleton v. Hall, 66 F.2d 384 (8th Cir.1933) (bonus or commission paid to lender) (citation omitted). Id. at 829.
All of the federal cases cited by the court in Greenwood Trust, however, save one federal district court case, involved required, up-front loan charges, not charges contingent upon the debtor’s/cardholder’s contractual default — e.g., late fees, return check fees. In relying on these cases to expand the scope of Section 85 preemption, therefore, the Greenwood Trust court has ignored federal precedent, Lloyd, supra, *126Spain, supra, et al, and erroneously equated “required fees” with “contingent fees,” the latter requiring the happening of an uncertain event. Again, according to federal common law, a required fee may, in certain circumstances, constitute “interest,” while a contingent charge may not.
Next, I submit that applying Ohio’s definition of “interest rate” or “rate of interest” to Section 85 so as to preempt Pennsylvania’s inveterate consumer protection laws is unconstitutional. Absent a congressional declaration of what constitutes “rate of interest,” I find that applying one state’s definition is contrary to both the public policy of this Commonwealth and the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, the majority’s employment of Ohio law to define “rate of interest” in Section 85 amounts to an improper delegation of Congressional power to a state. Neither Ohio law, nor the law of any other state may determine the preemptive scope of a federal statute without input from Congress.
It is axiomatic that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Interpreting “rate of interest” as used in Section 85 to preempt only those state laws which regulate time-based rates of interest (e.g., APR’s) or required fees (e.g., annual fees) for a loan avoids any constitutional question because such an interpretation sets a definite federal limit on Section 85’s preemptive scope. Interpreting “rate of interest” to include late fees and other contingent default charges as defined by Ohio law and/or various other states’ laws, however, raises fundamental constitutional concerns.
“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 1. Moreover, the Congress shall have power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu*127tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.... ” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Generally, Congress is not permitted to abdicate or transfer this power to a state. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421, 55 S.Ct. 241, 248-49, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529, 55 S.Ct. 837, 843, 79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935); see also United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 78 S.Ct. 291, 2 L.Ed.2d 282 (1958); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 40 S.Ct. 438, 64 L.Ed. 834 (1920); In Re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572 (1891); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Sometimes, however, legislation must be adapted to complex conditions involving tedious details with which Congress cannot deal directly. “The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply.” Ryan, 293 U.S. at 421, 55 S.Ct. at 421. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress may adopt, for application to federal territory located within state boundaries, future criminal legislation of the state in which the territory is located, Sharpnack, supra. The Court has also held that Congress may adopt future state legislation with respect to personal injury actions occurring within territory under its jurisdiction, but also within the boundaries of the state. Murray v. Joe Gerrick & Co., 291 U.S. 315, 318, 54 S.Ct. 432, 433, 78 L.Ed. 821 (1934).
The distinction to be drawn is that Congress may delegate power to states to establish rules or laws to be applied within their own borders, but it may not delegate authority to states to establish rules or laws for the entire country. That one state may speak for the nation “[i]s contrary to the structural assumptions and the tacit postulates of the Constitution as a *128whole.” Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 5-20 (1988). This intrastate/interstate distinction, insofar as it pertains to congressional delegation to states, is critical:
Congress cannot simply delegate to the states the power to legislate in areas that are reserved to Congress — e.g., powers under the interstate commerce clause — but Congress may by federal legislation adopt and incorporate by reference state laws that already exist or that may exist in the future. For example, Congress cannot delegate to Illinois the power to legislate federal pollution standards for the whole country.' Then Congress would be abdicating interstate commerce control to one state to legislate for the entire nation. However, Congress can enact legislation prescribing that the federal pollution standard in each state shall be the same as the state standard. Then, it is not abdicating its authority but merely incorporating by reference future legislation.
2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law — Substance and Procedure, § 12.6 (1986). See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 2629, 73 L.Ed.2d 269 (1982); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S.Ct. 1515, 89 L.Ed. 1915 (1945) (each case invalidating state laws that purported to regulate commercial conduct on an extraterritorial basis).
In my opinion, allowing Ohio law to define “rate of interest” in Section 85 of the NBA unconstitutionally enlarges the preemptive scope of the statute in that, by doing so, Congress is delegating to Ohio the power to legislate federal banking law for the entire country. The effect of this is to trump the individual states’ consumer protection laws.2
Moreover, looking to state law to ascertain the preemptive reach of Section 85 produces absurd and unpredictable results. The Ohio legislature or judicial system may, at any time, alter or expand its definition of “rate of interest,” thereby having *129further negative ramifications on this state’s and other states’ “non-interest rate” or consumer protection laws. Under this scheme, therefore, the legislature and/or courts of Ohio are completely unaccountable to the vast majority of cardholders — e.g., Pennsylvania cardholders — who are subjected to its laws. I cannot approbate such an application.
The trial court relied on the decision in Greenwood Trust, supra, which, in turn, cites various United States Supreme Court decisions, to support its proposition that state law, and Ohio law specifically, may be used to define “rate of interest” as that term is used in Section 85. Such reliance is misplaced in that all of the cases to which the Greenwood Trust court cites lack the extraterritorial/interstate impact of the instant case , and are, therefore, distinguishable on that basis alone. Brown-Forman, supra; Southern Pacific, supra.
Because the financial protection of this Commonwealth’s citizens is of profound local concern, Northeast Bancorp, supra, Smith, supra, I find that Bank One has not met its burden of showing that Congress intended Section 85 of the NBA to nationalize or federalize the Ohio definition of “interest.” Additionally, Bank One has not established that Congress’ “clear and manifest purpose” of using the term “interest” or “rate of interest” in Section 85 was to preempt state laws prohibiting late fees, annual fees, etc. Cippollone, supra. Until Congress speaks to this precise issue, the term “rate of interest” in Section 85 must be interpreted in accordance with federal common law. Finally, and based on the foregoing, I suggest that extending Section 85’s preemptive scope to vitiate Pennsylvania’s consumer credit laws is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I concur.

. The particular Pennsylvania law at issue is the Pennsylvania Goods and Services Installment Sales Act (the Sales Act). 69 P.S. § 1101 et seq. (1994). Among other things, the Sales Act comprehensively regulates credit card transactions insofar as they involve the purchase of goods and/or services within Pennsylvania. 69 P.S. § 1103. While the Sales Act permits a credit card issuer to impose a nominal service charge, 69 P.S. § 1904, the Act expressly prohibits the imposition of any “fee[s], expense[s], delinquencies], collection^] or other charge[s].” 69 P.S. § 1906 (emphasis added).
Examples of other state statutes which regulate either bank credit cards or retailer credit cards via the adoption of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code or similar provisions include: Cal.Civ.Code §§ 1802.19, 1810.1-1810.12 (1985 & Supp.1994); Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 5-1-101 to 5-9-103 (1973 & Supp.1993); Idaho Code §§ 28-41-101 to 28-49-107 (Supp.1993); Ind.Code Ann. §§ 24-4.5-1-101 to 24-4.5-6-203 (1982 & Supp.1993); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 537.1101 — .8101 (1987 & Supp.1994); Kan.Stat.Ann. §§ 16a-l-101 to 16a-9-102 (1988 & Supp.1993); Me. Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 9-A, §§ 1-101 to 11-121 (1980 & Supp.1994); Okla. .Stat.Ann. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (1983 & Supp.1994); S.C.Code *121Ann. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-10-106 (1989 & Supp.1993); Utah Code Ann. §§ 70C-1-101 to 70C-9-102 (1990 & Supp.1993); Wis.Stat.Ann. §§ 421.101-427.105 (1988 & Supp.1994); Wyo.Stat. §§ 40-14-101 to 40-14-702 (1977 & Supp.1993).

. See infra note 1 and accompanying text.