Court Opinion

ID: 9774064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:08:02.326107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:50.389994
License: Public Domain

ALEXANDER, J.,
concurring.
[¶ 13] I concur in and join the Court’s opinion. I write separately to remind parties considering post-conviction relief from a conviction after a plea that success on a post-conviction petition is not the equivalent of a get-out-of-jail-free card. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that a successful post-conviction petitioner may end up in a worse position than before.
[¶ 14] The relief afforded a post-conviction petitioner who successfully challenges a conviction through a claim of inadequate advice about potential consequences of the conviction is to vacate the conviction, not to dismiss the charge. See 15 M.R.S. § 2130 (2009) (listing the relief that may be considered in granting post conviction relief).
[¶ 15] With the conviction vacated, the underlying case returns to the active criminal trial docket, and the petitioner is placed in the same position he or she was in immediately before the plea proceeding. That may be in jail, awaiting trial, unable to make bail, or in the community on bail but subject to bail conditions such as limitations on driving, or drinking, or contact with certain other individuals.
[¶ 16] If the petitioner is again convicted after either a trial or another plea, he or she is subject to a renewed sentence, but with an important difference. Having successfully attacked the conviction and the resulting sentence, the petitioner loses the benefit of any bargain with the prosecution or the court that led to the original conviction and sentence. On resentencing, the petitioner is subject to the full range of sentencing options allowed by law, here the operating after suspension statute, 29-A M.R.S. § 2557-A(2)(A) (2008). The potential sentence is not capped by the sentence that was imposed after the original plea.
[¶ 17] This year, the United States Supreme Court has reminded us of that risk in very explicit terms. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), the Court addressed a case, much like the case before us today, in which the post-conviction petitioner asserted that, prior to entering a plea, the petitioner had received incorrect advice from counsel regarding the potential collateral consequences of the conviction. In Padilla, the consequences related to immigration status; here they relate to suspension of driving privileges. In both cases, the petitioner succeeded in vacating the original conviction.
[¶ 18] In Padilla, the Court reminded us of the risks of post-conviction success:
*431The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea — an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial — imposes its own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.
Id., 130 S.Ct. at 1485-86 (emphasis in original).
[¶ 19] The same must be said here. Those who successfully challenge a conviction resulting from a plea, based on claimed inadequacy of advice about potential consequences that may, or may not, have made a difference when deciding to enter a plea rather than proceed to trial, lose the benefit of any bargain that resulted in a reduced sentence or dismissal of other related charges. They return to court in the status they were in prior to entry of the plea, and subject to the full range of sentences and charges that existed at that time, should they again be convicted after trial or plea.