Court Opinion

ID: 9819239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:20:42.822228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.616759
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE McCUSKEY, dissenting: Because the majority’s analysis goes beyond the plain language of the Act, I respectfully dissent. The primary rule used in the interpretation of a statute is to ascertain the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1990). The legislature’s intent is best evidenced by the language of the enactment. Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. Consequently, “where an enactment is clear and unambiguous a court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.” Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. Indeed, “[t]he court must interpret the statute on the basis of what was written and not search for any subtle or not readily apparent meaning.” (Emphasis added.) Mid-American Elevator Co. v. Nor-con, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 582, 588, 679 N.E.2d 387, 391 (1996). In this case, I find from the plain and unambiguous language of the Act no requirement that a physician must demonstrate a causal connection between the underlying event and the services rendered before his lien attaches. Notwithstanding the absence of such a requirement, the majority goes far beyond the unambiguous language of the Act and engages in a strained analysis attempting to reach its desired result. The majority reads into the Act a condition “that the legislature did not express.” Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189, 561 N.E.2d at 661. The majority has clearly entered into the area of judicial legislation, which is an improper infringement into the province of the General Assembly. See Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utilities Co., 158 Ill. 2d 133, 142-43, 632 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (1994) (stating that “[i]t is not for us to usurp a function accorded to the General Assembly by the Constitution”). The intent of entering into the field of judicial legislation is further evidenced by the fact that, now after having created its causal requirement, the majority must answer the question of how the physician demonstrates there is a connection. The majority then proceeds to create even more law by placing upon the physician the burden of demonstrating a causal connection. In reading this requirement into the Act, the majority provides no statutory authority whatsoever for its final conclusion. It is a long established principle that “ ‘[i]t is not for the courts to pass upon what the *** laws ought to be, but to declare what they are.’ ” Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220, 447 N.E.2d 394, 399 (1983), quoting People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill. 421, 428, 86 N.E. 672 (1908). It is clear that in this case the majority has chosen to amend the statute by judicial fiat. Accordingly, I dissent.