Court Opinion

ID: 9410650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-22 19:09:37.843235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:59.241636
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00241-CV

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

DOROTHY SANDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND
AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF CECILIA STANFORD, DECEASED,
AND JULIE STANFORD,                                                    Appellants,

                                             v.

AUTOZONE PARTS, INC.,                                                     Appellee.

              On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
                       of Nueces County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

              Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Peña
               Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

      This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted in favor of appellee AutoZone

Parts, Inc. (AutoZone) on negligent undertaking and gross negligence claims brought by
appellants, Dorothy Sands, in her individual capacity and as representative of the estate

of Cecilia Stanford, deceased, and Julie Stanford (who we will collectively refer to as

“Sands”). By two issues, which we analyze as one, Sands contends that the trial court

erred in granting AutoZone’s motion for summary judgment because there exists a

genuine issue of material fact as to each challenged element of her claims.1 We affirm.

                                          I.      BACKGROUND

        AutoZone is a retail chain that sells automotive parts and accessories. AutoZone

also provides customers with a complimentary diagnostic service. Using an electronic

scanner that plugs into a port and communicates with a vehicle’s onboard computer,

AutoZone advertises its “Fix Finder” service as an easy way “to troubleshoot why your

Check Engine Light is on.” AutoZone compares the results of the diagnostic test with “an

extensive database of repair solutions from ASE certified mechanics to help you find the

most likely fix.” Each customer receives a “FREE, easy-to-read MYZONE HEALTH

REPORT, which includes relevant codes, and details the action that needs to be taken,”

including suggested repair parts that can be purchased through AutoZone. If the

diagnostic test reveals a problem with the vehicle that cannot be readily identified or

repaired by the customer, then it is AutoZone’s policy to refer the customer to a qualified

mechanic.

        On the evening of October 23, 2017, Cecilia Stanford took her vehicle to a local

        1  In the “Issues Presented” section of her brief, Sands lists a third issue: “Whether the trial court
erred in implicitly denying [Sands]’s Motion for Reconsideration.” Sands did not address this issue in the
argument section of her brief and thus waived the issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Hernandez v.
Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (“When, as here, the appellate issues
are unsupported by argument or lack citation to the record or legal authority, nothing is presented for
review.” (citing Republic Underwriters Ins. v. Mex–Tex, Inc., 150 S.W.3d 423, 427 (Tex. 2004)).
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AutoZone because her vehicle’s check-engine light was on. After conducting a free

diagnostic test, an AutoZone employee provided Stanford with a written report, which

revealed the source of her check engine light as trouble code “P1751,” defined as “a fault

in the automatic transmission control relay circuit.” The report did not suggest any repair

parts or direct Stanford to take any further action.

       Stanford called her sister Kara Sands the following morning, and the two of them

discussed Stanford’s vehicle and her visit to AutoZone the night before. According to

Kara, the AutoZone employee was unable to provide Stanford with any further details

about the trouble code and told Stanford that it was fine to drive the vehicle home.

Stanford told Kara that she intended to take the vehicle to a mechanic after work that day,

and Kara offered to give her a ride home from the mechanic’s shop.

       On her way to work, however, Stanford’s vehicle stalled and became disabled in

the inside, westbound lane of the 13900 block of Northwest Boulevard in Corpus Christi,

Texas. Stanford called Kara again and explained the situation. Stanford expressed

concern that her vehicle may by struck from behind by another vehicle. Although Stanford

had turned the vehicle’s emergency flashers on and other motorists were driving around

her, Stanford told Kara that she was going to exit her vehicle and push it out of the lane

of traffic. Kara believed that doing so would place Stanford in a dangerous position and

advised her not to do it.

       Stanford elected to push her vehicle off the roadway, and while doing so, she was

fatally struck from behind by motorist Dacota Deaver. Deaver later acknowledged that he

had taken his eyes off the road at the time of the collision and that the accident probably

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would not have happened if he had maintained a proper lookout.

        Sands brought wrongful death and survival claims against AutoZone based on

theories of negligent undertaking and gross negligence.2 Sands alleges in her live petition

that “Stanford’s reliance on AutoZone’s safe vehicle representations put her in the

position she was in on the morning of her death.”

        After extensive discovery, AutoZone filed a combined no-evidence and traditional

motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia, that there was no evidence that

AutoZone’s undertaking proximately caused Stanford’s injuries. The trial court granted

the motion without comment, and this appeal ensued.3

                        II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

        We review summary judgments de novo. Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619

S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. 2021). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant

and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.

Bush v. Lone Oak Club, LLC, 601 S.W.3d 639, 646 (Tex. 2020). A summary judgment

motion may be brought on traditional or no-evidence grounds. See TEX. R. CIV. P.166a.

        If a party moves for summary judgment on both no-evidence and traditional

grounds, as AutoZone did here, we first consider the no-evidence motion. See Lightning

Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, 520 S.W.3d 39 (Tex. 2017) (citing Ford Motor

Co., 135 S.W.3d at 600). “If the non-movant fails to overcome its no-evidence burden on

        2 Sands also brought negligence claims against Deaver, but those claims were later severed and

are not part of this appeal.
        3Sands also brought a claim of ordinary negligence against AutoZone. The trial court granted
AutoZone’s separate motion for partial summary judgment on that claim earlier in the case, and Sands does
not appeal that decision.
                                                   4
any claim, we need not address the traditional motion to the extent it addresses the same

claim.” Id.

       A party may move for a no-evidence motion for summary judgment “on the ground

that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on

which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).

“A no-evidence motion for summary judgment immediately shifts the burden to the

nonmovant.” Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace, 642 S.W.3d 502, 514 (Tex. 2022). “To

defeat a no-evidence motion, the non-movant must produce evidence raising a genuine

issue of material fact as to the challenged elements.” First United Pentecostal Church of

Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 220 (Tex. 2017). “Material facts are those facts

which affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Smith v. Mosbacker, 94

S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (cleaned up).

       The essential elements of negligence are a legal duty owed by the defendant to

the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by that breach. IHS

Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2003).

Negligent undertaking is a form of negligence that turns on “whether a defendant acted

in a way that requires the imposition of a duty where one otherwise would not exist.” Nall

v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam); see, e.g., Osuna v. S. Pac.

R.R., 641 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. 1982) (“Having undertaken to place a flashing light at

the crossing for the purpose of warning travelers, the railroad was under a duty to keep

the signal in good repair, even though the signal was not legally required.”). In addition to

the elements of an ordinary negligence claim, the plaintiff must show: “(1) the defendant

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undertook to perform services that it knew or should have known were necessary for the

plaintiff’s protection; (2) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in performing

those services; and either (a) the plaintiff relied upon the defendant’s performance, or

(b) the defendant’s performance increased the plaintiff’s risk of harm.” Nall, 404 S.W.3d

at 555–56.

                             III.   NEGLIGENT UNDERTAKING

       The parties disagree about AutoZone’s duty to Stanford in this case. According to

Sands, AutoZone’s gratuitous diagnostic service created a legal duty on AutoZone’s part

to “provide trustworthy advice” to Stanford, just as AutoZone represented in its

advertisements. Sands argues that AutoZone breached this duty by telling Stanford that

it was okay to drive her vehicle home rather than advising her to take it directly to a

qualified mechanic. Essentially, Sands argues that AutoZone’s bad advice gave Stanford

a false sense of security about the trustworthiness of her vehicle.

       AutoZone responds that its undertaking was limited to providing Stanford with the

results of the diagnostic test, and it satisfied this obligation. AutoZone notes that it does

not provide repair services, and Stanford’s vehicle left the store in the same condition as

when it arrived. According to AutoZone, Stanford left its store “in a better position”

because she had the results from the diagnostic test, which identified a problem with the

vehicle’s transmission.

       We note that “not giving a safety warning is an omission, not an undertaking.”

Elephant Ins. Co. v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 152 (Tex. 2022) (collecting cases).

Assuming without deciding that AutoZone’s affirmative representation to Stanford that her

                                             6
vehicle was safe to operate constituted an undertaking, we nonetheless conclude that

Stanford’s injuries were too attenuated from any negligence on AutoZone’s part to satisfy

proximate cause.

A.     Applicable Law

       “Although a plaintiff asserting a claim for negligent undertaking must prove

additional elements relative to the defendant’s assumption of a duty, the plaintiff must

also prove that the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” Doe v.

Messina, 349 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (citing

Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2000)); see Nall, 404 S.W.3d at

555 (“In Torrington, we held that a jury submission for a negligence claim predicated on

a negligent-undertaking theory requires a broad-form negligence question accompanied

by instructions detailing the essential elements of an undertaking claim.”). “Proximate

cause has two elements: cause-in-fact and foreseeability.” W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162

S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005). In its motion for summary judgment, AutoZone argued that

there was no evidence of either element.

       To satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement, the defendant’s negligent act or omission

must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s injury without which

the harm would not have occurred. Id. However, cause-in-fact is not established where

the defendant’s negligence does no more than furnish a condition which makes the

plaintiff’s injuries possible. Id. More specifically, “[w]here the initial act of negligence was

not the active and efficient cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, but merely created the condition by

which the second act of negligence could occur, the resulting harm is too attenuated from

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the defendants’ conduct to constitute the cause in fact of plaintiffs’ injuries.” IHS Cedars,

143 S.W.3d at 799. “In other words, even if the injury would not have happened but for

the defendant’s conduct, the connection between the defendant and the plaintiff’s injuries

simply may be too attenuated to constitute legal cause.” Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater

Dall., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995).

B.      Analysis

        On appeal, Sands contends AutoZone’s negligent undertaking was the cause-in-

fact of Stanford’s injuries because but for AutoZone’s bad advice, “Stanford would not

have been on the road driving her car at the time it stalled in the middle of the road.” That

may be true, but even so, it is not evidence that AutoZone’s negligence was the cause-

in-fact of Stanford’s injuries. Instead, the fact that Stanford was driving her vehicle merely

created the condition that made Deaver’s negligence possible, and Deaver’s failure to

maintain a proper lookout was the active and efficient cause of Stanford’s injuries and

death. 4 See IHS Cedars, 143 S.W.3d at 799. Texas courts have reached the same

conclusion under similar circumstances. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470,

471–72 (Tex. 1991) (“Plaintiffs assert that, had the sign functioned properly, Perez would

not have been at the place where the collision occurred at the time it occurred. We

conclude that these particular circumstances are too remotely connected with [the sign

manufacturer’s] conduct.”); Bell v. Campbell, 434 S.W.2d 117, 120, 122 (Tex. 1968) (“It

        4  AutoZone argues that Stanford’s own negligence further weakens the causal link between its
alleged negligent undertaking and her injuries and death. According to AutoZone, Stanford’s decision to
exit her vehicle and push it from behind while her back was turned to oncoming traffic was another active
and efficient cause that cannot be attributed to AutoZone. Because we conclude that AutoZone’s
negligence was not the proximate cause of Stanford’s death, we find it unnecessary to consider Stanford’s
conduct in our analysis.
                                                   8
is clear that Payton, Bell and Bransford would not have been injured but for respondents’

negligence, which created the condition that made the second collision possible. The

active and immediate cause of the second collision, however, was an entirely

independent agency, Fore.”); Fort Worth & D.C.R. Co. v. Garrett, 28 S.W.2d 301, 305

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1930, writ ref’d) (finding railroad company that blocked a crossing

and directed its employee to direct traffic was not the cause-in-fact of the employee’s

death because “the act of the automobile driver in hitting the deceased” was “an

independent and efficient intervening cause”); City of Vernon v. Lisman, 17 S.W.2d 769,

770–71 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1929) (“So here the act of the driver of the passing automobile

in striking Lisman was itself an efficient intervening cause of his death, whether such act

was negligence or not. It adds nothing to plaintiff’s case that the accident would not have

happened but for the negligence of the city in maintaining the mudhole.”).

       We conclude that Sands has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to

the first element of proximate cause because, as a matter of law, AutoZone’s alleged

negligent undertaking was too attenuated to serve as the cause-in-fact of Stanford’s

injuries and resulting death. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting

AutoZone’s no evidence motion for summary judgment on this claim.

                               IV.    GROSS NEGLIGENCE

       Sands also brought a claim against AutoZone for gross negligence based on the

same undertaking. Generally, a claimant who cannot support an ordinary negligence

claim cannot succeed on a gross-negligence claim. Nowzaradan v. Ryans, 347 S.W.3d

734, 739 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“[E]xcepting certain worker’s

                                            9
compensation cases, it is well established that a finding of ordinary negligence is

prerequisite to a finding of gross negligence.” (citing Sonic Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Croix, 278

S.W.3d 377, 395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied); see Rayner v.

Claxton, 659 S.W.3d 223, 260–61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) (“[W]e have already

determined the condition of the truck played no part in the incident. Accordingly, no act

or omission with respect to the truck’s condition can be the act or omission which serves

as a basis for a finding of gross negligence.”); RT Realty, L.P. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 181

S.W.3d 905, 915 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“Without a duty, there can be no

negligence and no gross negligence.”). Having already found that Sands’s negligent

undertaking claim fails as a matter of law, so too must her gross negligence claim based

on the same undertaking. See Nowzaradan, 347 S.W.3d at 739. Sands’s sole issue is

overruled.

                                    V.     CONCLUSION

       We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                GINA M. BENAVIDES
                                                                Justice

Delivered and filed on the
20th day of July, 2023.

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