Court Opinion

ID: 9960143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:04:13.939796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:13.610014
License: Public Domain

IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                      Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc.,              FILED
                                         Appellant-Defendant             Apr 15 2024, 9:10 am

                                                                              CLERK
                                                                          Indiana Supreme Court
                                                     v.                      Court of Appeals
                                                                               and Tax Court

                                         Gerard A. Kirsch,
                                           Appellee-Plaintiff

                                             April 15, 2024
                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CT-1728
                         Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court
                          The Honorable Mary Margaret Lloyd, Judge
                                        Trial Court Cause No.
                                        82D05-2109-CT-4406

                                 Opinion by Judge Mathias
                               Judges Bailey and Crone concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024    Page 1 of 8
      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. (“Calvary”) appeals the

      Vanderburgh Superior Court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on

      Gerard Kirsch’s complaint alleging Calvary’s negligence. Calvary presents a

      single issue for our review, namely, whether it is entitled to summary judgment

      under Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   During the summer of 2019, Kirsch, then a member of the Calvary Board of

      Trustees, volunteered to spearhead a project to build a shed on the church

      property. The shed was to be used as a garage for a van the church had

      purchased. Kirsch and others constructed the shed over several months. On

      September 14, when the shed was almost completed, Kirsch was climbing a

      ladder when he fell and sustained a serious injury. At the time of the fall, Kirsch

      was holding a large piece of sheet metal in one hand and a screw gun in the

      other as he ascended the ladder. As a result of the fall, Kirsch suffered a deep

      laceration to his arm which required surgery. Kirsch suffered permanent nerve

      damage in that arm.

[4]   On September 10, 2021, Kirsch filed a complaint against Calvary alleging

      negligence. Calvary moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not

      liable to Kirsch under Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 as a matter of law. The

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024        Page 2 of 8
      trial court denied that motion. Kirsch asked the court to certify the issue for

      interlocutory appeal, which it did, and we accepted jurisdiction.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   Calvary appeals the trial court’s denial of its summary judgment motion. Our

      standard of review is well settled:

              When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for
              summary judgment, we “stand in the shoes of the trial court.”
              Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (quoting
              Murray v. Indianapolis Public Schools, 128 N.E.3d 450, 452 (Ind.
              2019)). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated
              evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
              material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
              a matter of law.” Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co. v. Johnson, 109
              N.E.3d 953, 955-56 (Ind. 2018) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).
              We will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
              moving party. Ryan v. TCI Architects/Engineers/Contractors. Inc.,
              72 N.E.3d 908, 912-13 (Ind. 2017). We review summary
              judgment de novo. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.
              2014).

      Munster Med. Rsch. Found., Inc. v. Hintz, 222 N.E.3d 950, 955 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2023) (citation omitted), trans. denied. Calvary’s appeal turns on a question of

      statutory construction, which is “particularly appropriate for resolution by

      summary judgment,” as it is a pure question of law. See Floyd Cnty. v. City of

      New Albany, 1 N.E.3d 207, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[6]   As our Supreme Court has explained:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024             Page 3 of 8
        When interpreting a statute, our primary goal is to fulfill the
        legislature’s intent. Adams v. State, 960 N.E.2d 793, 798 (Ind.
        2012). And the “best evidence” of that intent is the statute’s
        language. Id. If that language is clear and unambiguous, we
        simply apply its plain and ordinary meaning, heeding both what
        it “does say” and what it “does not say.” State v. Dugan, 793
        N.E.2d 1034, 1036 (Ind. 2003).

        ***

        Under well-established principles of statutory interpretation, a
        statute is ambiguous when it allows more than one reasonable
        interpretation. Adams, 960 N.E.2d at 798. . . . And if we conclude
        a statute is ambiguous, then we resort to the rules of statutory
        interpretation to fulfill the legislature’s intent. Suggs v. State, 51
        N.E.3d 1190, 1194 (Ind. 2016).

Mi.D. v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 812-13 (Ind. 2016). One rule of statutory

interpretation is that

        [s]tatutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
        construed. In re Adoption of Force (1956), 126 Ind. App. 156, 131
        N.E.2d 157. This rule has special force when the statute affects a
        common law right or duty. See Hinshaw v. Board of Comm’rs of Jay
        County (1993), Ind., 611 N.E.2d 637. When the legislature enacts
        a statute in derogation of the common law, this Court presumes
        that the legislature is aware of the common law, and does not
        intend to make any change therein beyond what it declares either
        in express terms or by unmistakable implication. Tittle v. Mahan
        (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 796, 800.

Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. 1993).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024           Page 4 of 8
[7]   Calvary interprets Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 (“the statute”) to preclude its

      liability for Kirsch’s injuries. The statute provides in relevant part as follows:

              a nonprofit religious organization has only the following duties
              concerning persons who enter premises owned, operated, or
              controlled by the nonprofit religious organization and used
              primarily for worship services:

              (1) If a person enters the premises with the actual or implied
              permission of the nonprofit religious organization, the nonprofit
              religious organization has a duty to:

                       (A) warn the person of a hidden danger on the
                       premises if a representative of the nonprofit religious
                       organization has actual knowledge of the hidden
                       danger; and

                       (B) refrain from intentionally harming the person.

      Id.

[8]   The statute is in derogation of the common law set out in Burrell v. Meads that

              [a] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm
              caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he

                       (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
                       discover the condition, and should realize that it
                       involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such
                       invitees, and

                       (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize
                       the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against
                       it, and

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024              Page 5 of 8
                        (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
                        against the danger.

       569 N.E.2d 637, 639-40 (Ind. 1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §

       343 (1965)).

[9]    Calvary maintains that it is not liable to Kirsch under the statute because his

       injury occurred on its premises, which it owns and which are used primarily for

       worship services; that the danger to Kirsch was not hidden; and that it did not

       intentionally harm Kirsch. In support, Calvary cites this Court’s opinion in

       Henderson v. New Wineskin Ministries Corporation, 160 N.E.3d 582 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020). In Henderson, a woman slipped and fell in the parking lot of her church.

       After she filed suit, the church moved for summary judgment on the ground

       that it was not liable for her injuries under the statute. The trial court granted

       summary judgment for the church.

[10]   On appeal, another panel of this Court affirmed summary judgment for the

       church. Id. at 587. We held that the term “premises” was unambiguous and

       applied its ordinary meaning from Black’s Law Dictionary: a “house or

       building, along with its grounds[.]” Id. at 586 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary

       1371 (10th ed. 2019)). And we observed that that definition “follows our

       premises-liability jurisprudence, as we have generally considered a parking lot

       to be included in the term ‘premises.’” Id.

[11]   We conclude that Henderson is not applicable here. Henderson turned on the

       definition of “premises” alone. But we must consider the additional and explicit

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024          Page 6 of 8
       qualifier to “premises” in the statute, namely, “premises . . . used primarily for

       worship services.” I.C. § 34-31-7-2. We conclude that that qualifier, on the facts

       before us, renders the statutory language subject to more than one reasonable

       interpretation and is therefore ambiguous. Specifically, the phrase

       “premises . . . used primarily for worship services” could mean either (1) the

       entire premises, including all buildings and the entire grounds, even where only

       a portion of those spaces are used primarily for worship services; or (2) only

       that portion of the whole of the buildings and grounds that are actually used

       primarily for worship services, for instance, the main worship building and its

       parking lot. 1

[12]   Again, the statute is in derogation of the common law, and so it must be strictly

       construed. Bartrom, 618 N.E.2d at 10. If “premises” in this context were to

       include all buildings and grounds of a nonprofit religious organization without

       limitation, including areas not used primarily for worship services, the

       legislature would not have needed to add the qualifying language. Indeed, by

       limiting the statute’s reach to premises used primarily for worship services, the

       legislature has excluded premises used only occasionally for worship services.

[13]   We therefore hold that, under Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2,

       “premises . . . used primarily for worship services” means only those portions of

       the premises that are used primarily for worship services. Here, in support of its

       1
         We agree with Henderson that the parking lot in that case was “used primarily for worship services” because
       it was integral to attendance of those services.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024                                Page 7 of 8
       summary judgment motion, Calvary did not designate evidence that the shed

       where Kirsch was injured was used primarily for worship services. Indeed, the

       evidence makes clear that it is otherwise. In any event, Calvary’s summary

       judgment motion turns solely on an interpretation of the statute that we reject.

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment for

       Calvary.

[14]   We affirm.

       Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur.

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Ronald A. Mingus
       Alexander M. Beeman
       Katherine M. Haire
       Reminger Co., L.P.A.
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Robert T. Garwood
       Gerling Law Offices
       Evansville, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1728 | April 15, 2024        Page 8 of 8