Court Opinion

ID: 9579843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:59:10.155677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:49.543926
License: Public Domain

Browning, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I emphatically disagree with the 4th syllabus point of this opinion.
The recidivist law in this state is contained in Code, 61-11-19, as amended, and since it is quoted in the majority opinion it will not be repeated here. In State v. Blankenship, 137 W. Va. 1, 69 S. E. 2d 398, the defendant was convicted in the criminal court of McDowell County of murder of the second degree. Thereafter the prosecuting attorney of that county filed an information to the effect that the defendant had been twice before convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, and . . upon being asked if he was the same person who had been previously convicted of each of two offenses punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, the defendant in open court acknowledged that he was the person who had been previously so convicted.” (Italics supplied.) The trial court sen*163tenced the prisoner under the habitual criminal statute to imprisonment for the remainder of his life hut upon writ of error to that judgment the circuit court of McDowell County set aside the sentence of life imprisonment”... on the ground that the defendant, before he was questioned as to his identity in connection with two prior convictions, had not been duly cautioned as required by the statute, but refused to set aside the verdict and grant the defendant a new trial and remanded-the case to the criminal court for the.entry of- a judgment of imprisonment in compliance with the requirements of the habitual criminal statute. Upon the remand the defendant, after being duly cautioned, again acknowledged in open court that he was the same . person who had been twice previously convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary.” The defendant was then resentenced to life in the penitentiary, the circuit court of McDowell County refused a writ of error and this Court, after granting a writ of error to the last mentioned order, affirmed the circuit court. This Court found no merit in defendant’s contention that he should have been previously notified that the state would present an information against him, the Court stating with reference to the pertinent procedure “the information was presented to the court by the prosecuting attorney immediately after the defendant was convicted and before he was sentenced and during the same term of court at which he was convicted as provided by the statute. The defendant was personally present when the information was presented and he, of course, knew whether he had been previously convicted as charged. He was also duly cautioned and freely acknowledged in open court that he was the same person. . . .” (Italics supplied.)
The Blankenship case came to this Court upon writ of error, however State ex rel. Cox v. Boles, Warden, 146 W. Va. 392, 120 S. E. 2d 707, was an original proceeding in habeas corpus. In the Cox case no written information was filed and this Court held that the additional five year sentence imposed by the trial court for conviction of a previous felony was void. Judge Haymond, who wrote the opinion for the Court, in construing the applicable statute said: “It *164affirmatively appears, however, from the record in this proceeding and the stipulation in writing between the attorney for the petitioner and an assistant attorney general that no information concerning the prior conviction and sentence of the petitioner was ever filed by the prosecuting attorney and that the petitioner, before he acknowledged his identity as the person who had been previously convicted and sentenced, was not duly cautioned by the court. These two mandatory requirements of the statute were not complied with in connection with the imposition of the additional five year period of confinement; and for that reason the circuit court was without jurisdiction to impose that additional confinement upon the petitioner and that portion of the sentence imposed by the judgment entered February 18, 1959, is void and of no force and effect.” (Italics supplied.)
In Spry v. Boles, Warden (C. A. 4, 1962), 299 F. 2d 332, the Court had before it for consideration a writ of habeas corpus filed by Spry, a prisoner in the West Virginia State Penitentiary. The writ was granted by that Court and the respondent was ordered to release the prisoner. The reason for such action is stated in the Court’s opinion and will be quoted verbatim:
“The act in question requires that the prisoner be ‘duly cautioned’. We are satisfied that this requirement is mandatory and that if the petitioner was not duly cautioned prior to his admission of his identity and prior to the imposition of the fife sentence then the failure to do so denied to the prisoner ‘due process of law’ and consequently the sentence imposed under the statute was void. This view of the law is confirmed by that of the Supreme Court of West Virginia in State ex rel. Cox v. Bowles, W. Va., 120 S. E. 2d 707 (1961). In that case there was no written information filed and the defendant was not ‘duly cautioned’. The Court said:
“ ‘These two mandatory requirements of the statute were not complied with in connection with the imposition of the additional five year period of confinement; and for that reason the circuit court was without jurisdiction to impose that additional confinement upon the petitioner and that portion of the sentence imposed by the *165judgment entered February 18, 1959, is void and of no force and effect.’
“Since we are bound by that Court’s interpretation of this statute, Johnson v. Tucker, Warden, 249 F. 2d 650 (4 Cir. 1957), there can be no doubt that the life sentence was void if the petitioner was not ‘duly cautioned’.”
It is apparent from the language of the statute and the decisions heretofore cited that the allegations contained in the information are not the subject of a “plea” such as the allegations contained in an indictment. It seems clear that the words “duly cautioned” require the trial judge to inform the prisoner of the consequences of his acknowledgment that he is the same person alleged to have been convicted of a previous felony or felonies. The following quotation from the statute, “or after being duly cautioned if he acknowledged in open court that he is the same person,” conclusively shows that something more than an acknowledgment of identity is necessary. (Italics supplied.).
The Court, in its opinion in the instant case, after stating that the term “duly cautioned” had never been construed by this Court proceeded to do so in this language: “We therefore hold that the statutory provision regarding ‘duly cautioned’ contained in the statute in question has been fully met when a written information has been filed and the court has advised the accused of the fifing of an information with regard to the former conviction and sentence or convictions and sentences, and cautions or advises the accused of each separate former conviction and sentence pertaining to each offense, charge and place of confinement, before the accused acknowledged that he is the same person formerly convicted and sentenced. Any other interpretation or construction of the statute in question would not be justified.” It is my opinion that such an interpretation of that mandatory provision in our recidivist statute completely reads out of the statute the words “duly cautioned” and that the Court is holding that all that is necessary is that the prisoner acknowledge that he is the same person. Certainly- this is the type of statute that must be construed most strongly against the state and in favor of the prisoner, and when this Court *166held in State v. Graham, 68 W. Va. 248, 69 S. E. 2d 1010, that the original habitual criminal act was constitutional it may be assumed that.it did so with the understanding that the phrase “duly cautioned” meant something in addition to the word “acknowledged”. At the risk of unnecessary repetition, the statute so states in the following clear and unambiguous language: “. . . or after being duly cautioned if he acknowledged in open court that he is the samé person the court shall sentence him to such further confinement as is prescribed by section 18 of this article on a second or third conviction as the case may be.”
Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and favorably to the liberty of the citizen. State v. Mason, 141 W. Va. 217, 89 S. E. 2d 425. “It is well established that in the interpretation of a statute significance and effect shall be accorded, if possible, to every section, clause, word or part of the act.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S. E. 876. In State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, etc., 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S. E. 2d 353, this Court quoted with approval the following statements from 17 M. J. Statutes, § 42: “In the interpretation of a statute, effect shall be given, if possible, to every section, clause, word or. part of the statute... Every part of an act is presumed to be of some effect and is not to be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary . . . Courts are justified in rejecting any part of a statute as unnecessary and irrelevant only' as a last resort when it has been found impossible, to give effect to all the language used and reach a rational conclusion. . . :”
Diligent research , indicates that no other appellate court has attempted to define or interpret the words “duly cautioned” when used together in a statute. However, the word “duly” has been held many times to have acquired a fixed legal meaning and when used before any word implying action means that the act is to be done properly, regularly and according to law. See “Duly,” Words and Phrases, VoL 13. The word “caution”, when appearing in a criminal statute, has apparently not been construed.' The 3rd and 4th definitions thereof in Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, áre as follows:
*167“3. A precept or warning against evil of any kind; an exhortation to wariness; something, as a word, act, or command, that conveys a warning.
“4. Careful attention to the probable effects of an act, in order that failure or harm might be avoided; prudence in regard to danger; provident care; wariness; cautiousness.”
Among the synonyms listed are: “.. . counsel, advice, warning, admonition”. It will be observed that, while neither of the above quoted definitions precisely fit the situation described in the statute, when read in context, the synonyms show a meaning which is necessary to give the word any effect.
It has been held many times by the Supreme Court of Illinois that the words “duly admonished” appearing in a Court order, without more, show compliance with a statutory provision which forbids the acceptance of a plea of guilty “until the court shall have fully explained to the accused” the consequences of his plea. Annotations, Chapter 38, § 732, Criminal Code, Smith-Hurd, Illinois Annotated Statutes. While perhaps reasoning in reverse, the word “caution” has also been equated therewith. In its holding in the case of People v. Pennington, (Ill.) 107 N. E. 871, 872, the Court said: “. . . The words ‘duly admonished’ have a well defined meaning when used in this connection. The word ‘duly’ has acquired a fixed legal meaning, and when used before any word implying action it means that the act was done properly, regularly and according to law. . . One of the common and well-understood meanings of the word ‘admonish’ is to caution or advise. . . The recital in this record that the defendant entered his plea of guilty to the charge in the indictment, and ‘having been duly admonished by the court’ persisted therein, shows conclusively that the court fully explained to the plaintiff in error the consequences of entering such a plea, as that was the only caution or advice which the law required the court to give him at that time.”
Without attempting to define the words “duly cautioned” as used in the statute, since the majority opinion renders this unnecessary, suffice to say, that such words mean more *168than merely requiring the trial court to read the information to the prisoner and inquire if he is the same person.
Believing as I do, upon the writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued, the prisoner having served the maximum sentence provided by statute for the crime for which he was convicted, I would grant the relief requested by the prisoner and direct the respondent, the Warden of the West Virginia State Penitentiary, to forthwith release the prisoner.