Court Opinion

ID: 9773598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:51:08.677555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:55.465970
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
DONNELLY, Acting Presiding Judge.
I agree that the doctrine of assumption of risk is not properly in this case. However, I do not concur in the position taken by the principal opinion as to the question of contributory negligence on the part of Loyd Turpin.
Under the facts in this case, the defenses of assumption of risk and contributory negligence do not differ in legal effect. “Assumption of risk is based upon consent, assent, or ‘waiver’ of the results coming from the plaintiff’s conduct in entering into the place of peril, or upon the course of chosen conduct. Such being the case, this consent must be (a) voluntary, and (b) with knowledge, comprehension, or ‘appreciation’ of the risks involved. 65 C.J.S. Negligence, § 174, p. 848 et seq.; 38 Am.Jur. Negligence, § 173, p. 847; Terry v. Boss Hotels, Inc., Mo., 376 S.W.2d 239; Fletcher v. Kemp, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 178, 183, 186. Where plaintiff claims the defendant owes plaintiff an affirmative duty and a wrong is done in violation of that duty, and as a consequence of that wrong and as a choice of alternatives the plaintiff enters upon a course of conduct which involves a danger, the end product may be what some writers refer to as assumption of risk in the ‘secondary sense.’ In such situation there is considerable controversy and conflict as to whether the conduct of the plaintiff is really contributory negligence. It is said that it is a ‘phase’ of contributory negligence. It is also said that contributory negligence and assumption of risk overlap at this point. But irrespective of doctrinal nomenclature, all authorities *492hold that the plaintiff’s conduct in respect to ‘voluntariness' and ‘appreciation’ of the risk is to be judged by the standard of that of a reasonably prudent person exercising ordinary care for his own safety under the circumstances existing at the time. * * *” Bullock v. Benjamin Moore & Company, Mo.App., 392 S.W.2d 10, 13.
One who participates in a “quick draw” contest, or a scuffle, or a sparring match, assumes “the risks ordinarily incident thereto.” 7 A.L.R.2d 704, 714; Cf. Gibeline v. Smith, 106 Mo.App. 545, 80 S.W. 961; McAdams v. Windham, 208 Ala. 492, 94 So. 742, 30 A.L.R. 194. However, this is true only “so long as the game is played in good faith and without negligence.” Harper and James, The Law of Torts, Vol. 2, § 21.5, p. 1181; Cf. Page v. Unterreiner, Mo.App., 106 S.W.2d 528; Keaton v. Good, Mo.App., 350 S.W.2d 119.
A “quick draw” contest is not inherently dangerous if the guns used are not loaded. The determinative factor in this case is that if defendant had completely unloaded his gun there would have been no risk for Turpin to assume and no danger to guard against. Turpin was entitled to assume that defendant would exercise a very high degree of care in handling the gun, particularly when it was anticipated that he would point it at Turpin and would pull the trigger. Turpin was not required to assume that defendant would act negligently. There was no duty on his part to guard against negligent conduct on the part of defendant until he was aware of the dangerous condition the conduct created. He had no knowledge of the dangerous condition until the gun fired. The essential question is whether defendant adequately inspected the gun to- ascertain it was unloaded. In these circumstances, can we say that Turpin was negligent in failing to ascertain that defendant inadequately inspected the gun? I think not.
I am of the opinion that there “is no substantial evidence of record upon which to predicate” contributory negligence on the part of Turpin “from the inception of actionable negligence on the part of defendant.” (Emphasis mine.) White v. Bunn, 346 Mo. 1112, 1118, 145 S.W.2d 138, 141.
I respectfully dissent.