Court Opinion

ID: 9701382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:17:33.421575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:23.097501
License: Public Domain

MICHOL O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion as to its disposition of issue one. I agree that the trial court erred in replacing a disabled juror after the jury was already sworn. However, I would hold this was constitutional structural error warranting reversal. Even if it was not a constitutional error, as the majority holds, I would hold the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights.
Constitutional Error
One of the most valuable rights guaranteed a defendant by the United States Constitution1 and the Texas Constitution2 is the right to trial by an impartial jury. *299The value of this right depends upon the impartiality of the jury. The Texas Constitution requires the Legislature to enact procedures for jury selection and standards for juror qualification.3 When these procedures are followed, we presume a defendant was tried by an impartial jury. Otherwise, the presumption is lost.
Once the jury is sworn, it is a closed class that may not be re-opened or altered. Although the number of jurors serving on the jury may decrease after the jury is sworn, it may not be changed by the addition or replacement of other jurors, unless they are alternate jurors. This is contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure with rules designed to avoid the untimely and erroneous addition of someone to the jury: (1) under Articles 36.29 and 36.30, a trial is permitted to proceed with less than 12 jurors, and (2) under Article 33.011, a district judge may impanel up to four alternate jurors, the purpose of which is to replace a juror who becomes disqualified or disabled from serving before the jury retires to consider its verdict. Here, the trial court ignored the assistant district attorney’s and defense counsel’s statements that the trial could proceed with less than 12 jurors (Article 36.30), and the trial court did not select any alternate jurors that would have avoided the situation entirely (Article 33.011). It is reversible error to deprive a defendant of a lawfully constituted jury. See Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 394 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (stating that erroneous excusal of veniremember is reversible error if it deprived defendant of a lawfully constituted jury).
Under Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), an appellate court must conduct a harmless error analysis of constitutional errors, unless the error is a structural constitutional error. See also Forbes v. State, 976 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.); Tex.R.App. P. 44.2(a). Structural constitutional errors are automatically reversible error. Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. An error is considered a structural constitutional error if it affects the framework in which the trial takes place and defies analysis by harmless error standards.4 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1264-65, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. An error is mere trial error if it occurs during the presentation of evidence, and if the effect on a trial can be measured or compared in the context of the other evidence presented to determine whether its admission was harmless. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-308, 111 S.Ct. at 1263-64; Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
I would hold the error in replacing a disabled juror after the jury was sworn with a juror who had been released was structural error because its effect cannot be measured against the remaining evidence at trial. This error tainted the jury. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 83-85, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2276-77, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (stating trial court’s failure to remove biased juror was constitutional error).
The trial court’s error is analogous to seating a disqualified juror; once the jury *300was sworn, the jury was closed to new members and nobody was eligible to be seated as a juror. Therefore, the seating of an ineligible panelist is the equivalent of seating a disqualified juror. That is fundamental to the nature of a defendant’s right to a qualified jury. It is automatically reversible error to allow a disqualified juror to serve on the jury if the defendant objects before the verdict is rendered. See Tex.Code Crim. P. art. 44.46(1). The appellant objected to replacing the disabled juror. Thus, we should hold the trial court’s error in allowing him to serve was automatically reversible error.
The majority finds the error was not constitutional error because the Legislature prescribes the manner in which juries are selected. Thus, the majority concludes any error in the selection of juries cannot be a constitutional error. I disagree. See Chappell v. State, 850 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (finding automatic reversible error where statute allowing only one jury shuffle was violated). Whatever method the Legislature enacts for the selection of jurors, it must meet constitutional standards. Therefore, the failure to observe the Legislature’s enactments regarding jury selection can result in constitutional error.
Substantial Rights
Even if this case is governed by Rule 44.2(b), I would hold the appellant’s substantial rights were affected. The Court of Criminal Appeals recently said that a defendant has a substantial right in qualified jurors. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386, 393 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Thus, the appellant’s rights go to those who serve on the jury. See id. Here, a disqualified juror served over the appellant’s objection, and the appellant was deprived of a lawfully constituted jury. See id. at 394.
Under the majority’s holding that it was not a constitutional error, the burden shifted to the appellant to show harm. Under the majority’s approach, the appellant can never prove he was harmed when a statute involving the selection of the jury is violated. The majority concludes the record does not reflect any taint upon the juror. Of course it does not; the replacement juror was never questioned by the trial court to determine what happened after he was released and called back to serve, nor was appellant allowed the opportunity to do the same.

. The Sixth Amendment states, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury....”

. Tex. Const, art. 1, § 10.

. Article 1, section 15 of the Texas Constitution instructs the Legislature to enact laws that protect the right to a jury trial. It says, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and to maintain its purity and efficiency.”

. The United States Supreme Court has recognized the following as examples of structural constitutional error: total deprivation of counsel, a biased judge, the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant’s race from a grand jury, denial of the right to self representation at trial, and denial of the right to a public trial. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (citations omitted); Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372. These are structural errors because their effect on a trial cannot be compared or measured against evidence admitted at trial; the entire trial process is tainted by these constitutional errors. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246; Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 372.