Court Opinion

ID: 9669270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:47:17.425528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:54.839850
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial because questions of fact were raised in the trial court that should have been submitted to the jury for determination.
Even though the majority opinion contains the statement that only favorable evidence to Maxwell was considered and all adverse evidence was disregarded, a close examination of the opinion reveals the contrary to be true. Plaintiff’s case is stated in its worst possible light.
In the series of points, plaintiff has brought before this court, it is first insisted that the evidence did not establish “good faith dissatisfaction” on the part of defendant as a matter of law. It is also urged that the evidence did not establish as a matter of law that the term “necessary services” used by defendant in its letter of November 29, 1967, included the obligation on plaintiff’s part to secure new business.
I consider the memorandum of agreement dated November 16, 1967, and the letter of November 29, 1967, as the written agreement between these parties in an attempt to arrive at their intentions. The rule is well stated by Chief Justice Calvert, speaking for the Supreme Court of Texas in Board of Ins. Com’rs v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co., 150 Tex. 258, 239 S.W.2d 803, 809 (1951):
“ ‘Where several instruments, executed contemporaneously or at different times, pertain to the same transaction, they will be read together although they do not expressly refer to each other.’ ”
The crucial words set forth in the letter of November 29, 1967, are “providing that you are able to satisfactorily perform the necessary services.” The record before us shows conclusively the reason defendant discharged plaintiff was that plaintiff had failed to secure new business. Yet, it is noted that there is no mention either in the memorandum of agreement dated Novem*443ber 16, 1967, or the letter of November 29, 1967, of any requirement by defendant of plaintiff that he was to secure new business. In fact, no specific duties are outlined, and only the words “necessary services” give any indication as to what plaintiff was being employed to do.
I have concluded from a study of all of the cases I have found on the subject that the parties to a contract may specifically provide that the employee’s services must be performed to the satisfaction of the employer, in which event in a suit for wrongful discharge the burden of proof is upon the employee to establish as a fact that the employer did not act in good faith. In Watkins & Thurman v. Napier, 44 Tex. Civ.App. 432, 98 S.W. 904, 906 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas, 1907, no writ), the written contract provided that if the employer was dissatisfied at any time with the employee’s services, the employment could be ended at the expiration of any month. The employee did not allege that no grounds for dismissal existed, and the evidence showed the employee disobeyed the employer’s instruction as to selling its goods. That court held under these circumstances the employer was the sole judge as to whether he was dissatisfied. However, in Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas, 1952, no writ), an employment contract for an indefinite period of time provided it should continue as long as the services were satisfactory to the employer. That court said: “But Texas follows the general or majority rule that the employer must be in good faith dissatisfied and that this presents a question of fact.” The case was reversed and remanded to try that issue. The case of Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas, 1947, error ref. n. r. e.) holds that even though a contract may provide for employment satisfactory to the employer, there must exist a basis of genuine dissatisfaction. In Noa Spears Co. v. Inbau, 186 S.W. 357, 358 (Tex. Civ.App.—San Antonio, 1916, error dism.) the written contract provided for employment for a year conditioned upon plaintiff performing his contract “according to his ability and to the satisfaction of the first party.” The jury found the employee performed his services to the satisfaction of the employer, although the employer testified to the contrary. The Court of Civil Appeals held that there was evidence to support the finding, and that the issue was properly submitted.
A different rule applies to a contract which is either silent entirely on the subject or requires satisfactory performance by the employee but does not show by its terms that the determination of “satisfaction” is to be made by the employer. In both of these instances the employee is required to perform his duties with reasonable satisfaction. The question of reasonable satisfaction is ordinarily a question of fact unless reasonable men could not differ on the subject. The case of Ingram v. Dallas County Water Control and Imp. Dist., 425 S.W.2d 366 (Tex.Civ.App.— Dallas, 1966, no writ) is an example of one in which the employment contract did not specifically cover the subject of satisfactory employment and the court held there would be an implied obligation to perform the services in a satisfactory manner. That court also said that there is an implied agreement on the part of the employer that he will not unjustly or wrongfully discharge the employee during the period of the contract. In Porter v. United Motels, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tex.Civ. App.—Waco, 1958, no writ), an oral agreement was made to employ plaintiff as a hotel manager as long as he faithfully and satisfactorily performed his duties as manager. That court held that it is the law that an employer may not discharge his employee during the period of employment except for good cause. That court also said:
“Furthermore, where performance is to be the satisfaction of one of the parties, his dissatisfaction must be founded on facts such as would induce action on the part of a reasonable man. He may *444not act arbitrarily or without reason in the matter, and the law will say that he is satisfied with that with which he ought to be satisfied.”
The case of Golden Rod Mills v. Green, 230 S.W. 1089, 1090 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio, 1921, error dism.) involves a written contract which is not directly quoted. That opinion contained the following:
“There is no provision in the contract self executing that gives the absolute right to discharge appellee when not giving satisfactory service. We think there is a broad distinction between giving per se the right to discharge in certain cases where the matters are of such a personal character as not to need a jury to determine, and a contract where the employee contracts and obligates himself to perform in general terms satisfactory service.”
The case of Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530, 544 Tex.Civ.App.—Houston, 1960, error ref. n. r. e.) 162 Tex. 440, 347 S.W.2d 596 (1961), is a well-written opinion touching on this subject. The facts were that appellant employed appellee as comptroller for a period of five years with three five-year options. Appel-lee was discharged and brought suit contending his discharge was without good cause and secured a jury finding to that effect. Judgment was rendered for appel-lee and appellant contended the instruction attached to the issue as to good cause was erroneous. Such instruction defined good cause for discharge as meaning a failure of the employee to perform those duties in the scope of his employment as a man of ordinary prudence in an industry would have done under the same or similar circumstances. The case was reversed and remanded and it was stated:
“The court should have asked the jury whether the issues answered affirmatively showed acts by appellee so inconsistent with the employer-employee relation as to be good cause for discharge.”
Under the facts of the case before us, an issue was raised for the jury as to whether defendant had good cause to discharge plaintiff. If defendant had intended for plaintiff to be obligated to secure new business as a condition for retaining his employment, such a provision could have been specifically included in either the memorandum of agreement to sell or the letter of November 29, 1967. Not only is there no written provision, but the testimony does not show an oral agreement to secure new business. Plaintiff testified as follows:
“Q. Maybe I better rephrase the question. Mr. Maxwell, my question was, at the time you signed that one agreement and at the time they gave you this other one, was there or not anything said that you would be required to obtain particular results or so much more new business in order to continue your employment ?
“A. No, sir, it wasn’t.
“Q. Did you or not ever make an agreement with Cardinal Petroleum Company that you would sell this business and guarantee any increase in business in order to continue the employment for five years?
“A. No, sir.”
The record shows that defendant began to complain about the absence of new business shortly after the contract was made, and continued until the time of plaintiff’s discharge. Plaintiff also admitted that he had stated that there were possibilities of increasing the business and that there was a possibility he could do a better job if he was relieved of some of the other problems. However, as said in the majority opinion, in passing upon the authority of the trial court to instruct a verdict, this court must review evidence favorable to appellant, disregard all adverse evidence and inference, and indulge every reasonable intendment and inference in favor of the one against *445whom instruction was given. Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Harrison-Wilson-Pearson, 151 Tex. 635, 253 S.W.2d 422 (1952).
The record in this case does not establish as a matter of law that failure of plaintiff to secure new business was good cause for his discharge.
The last two paragraphs of the majority opinion indicate that the case is affirmed because the contract sued upon is not sufficiently certain, and therefore unenforceable. This is a matter that was not raised by the parties at any point of this litigation. Furthermore, there is no suggestion in any of the pleadings and no mention in the defendant’s motion for instructed verdict, that defendant was entitled to judgment because the contract was unenforceable. There is no counterpoint in defendant’s brief in this court raising this question.
The memorandum of agreement to sell dated November 16, 1967 contained this paragraph:
“It is understood and agreed that at the time a formal contract is prepared by Mission and Cardinal, the payments due to Mission by Cardinal under this agreement may be changed as to allocation between assets purchased, the consideration to be paid to Mission and A. P. Maxwell for their covenants not to compete, and the amount of annual salary to be paid A. P. Maxwell as an employee of Cardinal. Such allocation shall not, however, reduce the over-all consideration provided for herein.”
This provision indicates the parties had one agreement encompassing the sale of the business by plaintiff to defendant, and the employment of plaintiff by defendant. The payment of an annual salary by Cardinal to Maxwell was a part of the over-all consideration for the combined transaction. According to such provision, defendant could change the allocation between the assets purchased, the payment for the covenant not to compete, and the amount of the annual salary to be paid plaintiff, but defendant could not reduce the over-all consideration provided for.
Defendant is not in a position to say, and in fact has not done so, that it will accept the benefits of the memorandum of agreement to sell, and retain the business sold to it, and at the same time contend the very agreement under which it purchased such business was so uncertain as to be unenforceable.