Court Opinion

ID: 9574786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:24.409063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:12.760525
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
dissenting: There is evidence both of actionable negligence and of contributory negligence. The decisive question: Does the evidence establish conclusively, as a matter of law, that negligence of the plaintiff contributed to his injury as a concurring proximate cause thereof? The Court answers in the affirmative, reversing the court below on the ground that judgment of involuntary nonsuit should have been entered. My analysis of the evidence impels me to a different view.
The court will declare a plaintiff contributorily negligent as a matter of law only when, upon facts admitted or established by uncontradicted evidence, contributory negligence of the plaintiff is the only reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom. Too, testimony of defendant’s witness, favorable to plaintiff, must be considered in plaintiff’s favor upon consideration of defendant’s motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit at the close of all the evidence. These well-established propositions are relevant here.
In Tysinger v. Dairy Products, 225 N.C. 717, 36 S.E. 2d 246, plaintiff’s testator was held contributorily negligent as a matter of law. In that case, as here, the highway was 22 feet wide; its course was east-west; and plaintiff’s testator was struck by defendant’s truck while attempting to cross from the south to the north side of the highway. The distinguishing facts are these: Defendant’s truck, traveling east, was on its right side of the highway, adjacent to the shoulder on the south side, and plaintiff’s testator, before going upon the highway, was walking west along the south shoulder, thus facing in the direction of the oncoming truck; and plaintiff’s testator walked north from his place of safety on the south shoulder, directly in the path of the approaching truck, making contact with the right side thereof as it veered to the left just before the impact. After an analysis of the evidence, Winborne, J., says: "And there is no evidence of anything that gave or should have given notice to the operator of defendant’s truck that plaintiff’s testator was unaware of the approach of the truck, and would not obey the rule of the road, until the time the testator started across the highway, nor is there evidence as to how close *419tbe truck was to him wben be started across — except tbe fact tbat be was stricken by tbe side of tbe truck near tbe center of tbe bigbway.”
As to the Virginia case of Jenkins v. Johnson, 186 Va. 191, 42 S.E. 2d 319, suffice it to say tbat tbe factual situation there impresses me as analogous to tbat in tbe Tysinger case rather than to tbat in tbe case now before tbe Court.
In Williams v. Henderson, 230 N.C. 707, 55 S.E. 2d 462, judgment of involuntary nonsuit was reversed. Here again we have an east-west bigb-way on which plaintiff’s intestate was struck by defendant’s truck while attempting to cross from tbe south side to tbe north side of tbe bigbway. Defendant’s truck, traveling east, was on its right side of tbe bigbway, adjacent to tbe shoulder on tbe south side, and plaintiff’s intestate was standing at her mailbox on tbe south shoulder, with her back towards tbe approaching truck, apparently oblivious of its approach. “When this truck was within 15 or 20 feet of deceased, she turned suddenly and ‘started back across tbe bigbway in a fast walk.’ ” Tbe Ty singer case was distinguished on tbe ground tbat tbe driver in tbe Williams case was negligent in failing to give timely warning to a pedestrian apparently unaware of tbe approach of tbe truck. As to contributory negligence, Barnhill, J. (now G.J.), says: “Of course it was tbe duty of tbe deceased to look before she started back across tbe bigbway. Even so, under tbe circumstances here disclosed, her failure so to do may not be said to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is for tbe jury to say whether her neglect in this respect was one of tbe proximate causes of her injury and death.”
In my opinion, tbe facts here are more favorable to tbe plaintiff than in tbe Williams case. These features should be noted:
1. Smith, defendant’s witness, who was standing behind the cab on defendant’s truck, facing in tbe direction of travel, west, saw tbe plaintiff, while walking slowly across tbe bigbway, proceeding from tbe south side towards tbe north side thereof, apparently oblivious of tbe approach of defendant’s truck. “Mr. Garmon was coming on, not looking at him.” No warning was given to plaintiff.
2. Defendant’s truck, traveling west, was on its right side of tbe bigb-way; and plaintiff was walking slowly, visible to tbe driver of tbe truck during tbe entire course of such walk until be reached tbe point of impact,only a foot and one-balf from tbe northern edge of tbe bard surface. There is no evidence of any sudden, unforeseeable act of plaintiff, such as darting out in front of the oncoming truck, nor is there any evidence of hesitation, stopping or change of direction or pace while walking across tbe bigbway.
*420In addition to these distinguishing features, I am persuaded that, under the facts in the case now under consideration, it was permissible for the jury to find that plaintiff had the right of way.
It is not unlawful for a pedestrian to cross a public highway. If, while so engaged, he is injured or killed from contact with a motor vehicle on such public highway, the statutory rule as to right of way is relevant. G.S. 20-174. In relation to the cited statute, it has been held consistently that a pedestrian’s failure to yield the right of way is not contributory negligence per se, but only evidence thereof for consideration with all other facts and circumstances. Bank v. Phillips, 236 N.C. 470, 73 S.E. 2d 323; Simpson v. Curry, 237 N.C. 260, 74 S.E. 2d 649; Goodson v. Williams, 237 N.C. 291, 74 S.E. 2d 762.
G.S, 20-155 (a) provides: “When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection and/or junction at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle on the right except as otherwise provided in sec. 20-156.” (Italics added.) Even so, the driver of the vehicle on the left has the right of way if, when he reaches and enters the intersection, the vehicle approaching on his right is far enough away so that, in the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, he is justified in the belief that he can pass over the intersection in safety. In such case, upon his entering the intersection, it becomes the duty of the driver of the vehicle approaching on the right to decrease his speed, bring his car under control, and, if necessary, stop it in order to yield the right of way and thereby avoid a collision. Cab Co. v. Sanders, 223 N.C. 626, 27 S.E. 2d 631; S. v. Hill, 233 N.C. 61, 62 S.E. 2d 532, and cases cited.
The rights as between motorist and motorist are relative. Williams v. Henderson, supra. This is equally true as between motorist and pedestrian. “The rights of pedestrians and vehicular traffic in the use of streets and highways are generally 'mutual, equal, and co-ordinate.’ A pedestrian should use ordinary care for his own safety when crossing a street or highway; however, he has the right to assume that others will use a like care to avoid injuring him.” 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles, sec. 448. “A person in a public highway may rely upon the exercise of reasonable care on the part of drivers of vehicles to avoid injury. A failure to anticipate the omission of such care does not render him negligent.” Deputy v. Kimmell, 73 W. Va. 595, 80 S.E. 919, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 989, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 656.
If, when plaintiff started his slow walk across the highway, the defendant’s truck was not in sight, as plaintiff’s evidence tends to show, or was far enough away that plaintiff, in the exercise of due care, was justified in believing that he could cross safely ahead of the approaching truck of defendant, as the testimony of Smith, defendant’s witness, tends to show, *421in either case defendant should have yielded the right of way to plaintiff. The fact that he lacked only a foot and a half of completing the crossing when struck by the right front fender and headlight of defendant’s truck is a circumstance tending to show that he was justified in believing he could cross safely.
Smith, defendant’s witness, testified, in substance: That he saw plaintiff, carrying the flambeaux, when plaintiff started across the highway, and as plaintiff continued across the highway; that “(he) wished (he) was sitting in the front by Mr. Thomas so (he) could tell him that (plaintiff) was crossing”; that “(he) wanted to go get there in the front seat to warn him, maybe he didn’t see the man”; that “(he) had seen him away from it a good distance”; and his testimony as to the actual distance from the truck to plaintiff when he first saw plaintiff, neither clear nor consistent, varied from testimony that plaintiff was some 300 feet away when the witness first observed him on the highway to testimony permitting inferences that plaintiff was much farther away from defendant’s truck when plaintiff started his walk across the highway. The evidence permits the inference that had defendant seen what Smith saw, according to Smith’s testimony, defendant could and would have stopped or slowed down or turned out to the left and in doing so avoided striking-plaintiff; and the evidence permits the further inference that the explanation for defendant’s failure to do so is that defendant, blinded by the sun, drove on when unable to see what was taking place on the highway ahead of him. Surely, failure of plaintiff to anticipate that defendant would drive on under such circumstances should not be charged to plaintiff as contributory negligence as a matter of law.
A motorist who saw plaintiff would have seen that, crossing towards the barricades with a flambeau in each hand, he was engaged in performing duties incident to the construction work then in progress. While plaintiff’s status is distinguishable from -that of a man actually engaged in work on the traveled portion of a highway, Murray v. R. R., 218 N.C. 392, 11 S.E. 2d 326; Anno.: 30 A.L.R. 2d p. 876 et seq., these facts seem pertinent as additional circumstances bearing upon the issues of negligence and contributory negligence. It is noteworthy that plaintiff’s work in locating the lighted flambeaux had to be performed at the barricades near the north edge of the hard surfaced highway then in use. Compare: Fleming v. Holleman, 190 N.C. 449, 130 S.E. 171; Daughtry v. Cline, 224 N.C. 381, 30 S.E. 2d. 322.
Assuming that plaintiff was justified in starting across the highway, having looked and having observed no vehicle dangerously near, he was not required as a matter of law to look continuously for the approach of motor vehicles while crossing: “If, as he leaves the curb, he looks for the approach of machines, he is not necessarily guilty of negligence in failing *422to keep a continuous lookout or to look a second time, but whether he has exercised a reasonable degree of prudence is a question for the jury.” Again: “Even if he sees an automobile approaching, he is not under the duty of continually watching its approach, provided its proximity and apparent speed are such as to justify an ordinarily prudent man in believing that he would have sufficient time to cross ahead of it with safety.” Huddy, Vol. 5-6, Encyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Ed., sec. 86; also, see 5 Am. Jur., Automobiles sec. 451; Deputy v. Kimmell, supra; Ritter v. Hicks, 102 W. Va. 541, 135 S.E. 601, 50 A.L.R. 1505.
If, while crossing the highway, plaintiff should have been more vigilant in his lookout for a vehicle approaching from his right, it is well to remember that at most he is chargeable with what he would have seen had he so looked, to wit, a truck approaching at 20 to 25 miles per hour with no other vehicular traffic involved.
My conclusion is as follows: This case is distinguishable from the Tysinger case where plaintiff’s testator was held contributorily negligent as a matter of law; it is more favorable to plaintiff than the Williams case, where the issue of contributory negligence was held to be for the jury; and it rather closely resembles the Goodson case, where the issue of contributory negligence was held to be for the jury.
For the reasons stated, I think the issue of contributory negligence was for the jury. Since the Court’s decision is that judgment of involuntary nonsuit should have been entered, there is no occasion to comment on assignments of error not relating to this determinative question.