Court Opinion

ID: 9642055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:46:54.322758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:42.590702
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Chief Justice, dissenting. Upon further extensive review of the record in this case, I must agree with my Brother Purtle that the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding that Miller knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim, Bolin. A jury could not have found this circumstance to exist without gross speculation. Giving the evidence on this circumstance its strongest probative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the state, it could not be classified as more than a scintilla. In .addition to the facts related in Justice Purtle’s dissent, the only evidence the jury might possibly have considered to support this finding was Hudson’s testimony that, when he was first confronted by Miller, who was" holding the cash box in both hands .and carrying it like it was a' heavy object, Miller madé a move and commanded, “You get in here.” Hudson demonstrated the move for the jury in a manner not. disclosed by the record. Hudson neyer saw a weapon until Miller had come out the side door and had gone down the street toward an alley, moving away from Hudson at all times; Perhaps the move Miller made when holding the box- was justifiably interpreted by Hudson as an indication that Miller was reaching for a concealed weapon. Still,.the requirements of this particular aggravating circumstance are not met by a showing that the accused knowingly created a great fear of death by a person other, than the victim; instead, Miller must have knowingly created,.a greát risk of death to a person other than Bolin, i.e., Hudson. There is not the slightest indication that when Miller came out the side.door that he ever, saw, or even looked toward, Hudson. The only evidence in the case indicates thát the gun. Hudson saw Miller put in his belt was empty. In his incriminating statement,- which was introduced in evidence, Miller said that the only four cartridges in the weapon were fired at Bolin before Hudson, appeared. But even if an inference could be drawn that the weapon was loaded, there was no evidence that any effort to use it on Hudson was ever made by Miller. However favorably toward the state the jury- viewed it, this evidence was not substantial to support a finding that Miller, knowingly created a great risk of death to Hudson. I cannot accept the approach of the majority in its substituted opinion that somehow we should not require the same test for substantial evidence to sustain a jury finding of an aggravating circumstance, on which the infliction of the death penalty may hinge, just because 12 average citizens, untrained in the law, perhaps confused by the submission of an aggravating circumstance for which there was no basis, did the best they could but still “deliberately and conscientiously” agreed upon a wrong answer in making a sincere and honest finding “as they understood it.” The position taken by the majority to treat the jury’s finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstance as something other than a “separate little verdict”, which may be supported by evidence less than substantial, according to the usual tests, simply does not satisfy the requirements for a constitutionally imposed death penalty. The test for substantial evidence is not met by evidence which merely creates a suspicion or which amounts to no more than a scintilla or which gives equal support to inconsistent inferences; it must be of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable and material certainty and precision, compel a conclusion, one way or another,; it must force or induce the mind to pass beyond a suspicion or conjecture. Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 598 S.W. 2d 748 (1980). “Any” evidence is not substantial evidence; substantial evidence is valid, legal and persuasive evidence and it must do more than create a suspicion of the fact to be established. Pickens-Bond Construction Co. v. Case, 266 Ark. 323, 584 S.W. 2d 21. I submit the majority has not used the test for substantial evidence. How certain and precise is evidence, which does not compel a conclusion, but merely permits an appellate court to say that the “issue is whether, on the evidence the jurors could have sincerely and honestly have made the finding as they understood the question” or to test for substantial evidence by putting its members in the jurors’ position (as they understood it?) and understanding what the jury meant by answering this interrogatory as it did? If the majority finds the evidence to be substantial, it should demonstrate how it meets the test without resort to the ex-tenuatory explanations given. The basic concern expressed by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1972) centered on defendants being condemned to death capriciously and arbitrarily. Collins v. State, 261 Ark. 195, 548 S.W. 2d 106, cert. den. 434 U.S. 878, 98 S, Ct. 231, 54 L. Ed. 2d 158, reh. den. 434 U.S. 977, 98 S. Ct. 540, 54 L. Ed. 2d 471 (1977). See also, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 96 S. Ct. 3001, 49 L. Ed. 974 (1976). We clearly recognized in Collins that a trial judge should impose life imprisonment without parole for a capital felony murder, “if he found that there was not sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding on any aggravating circumstance enumerated in § 41-4711,1 and that there was not sufficient evidence to support its finding that sufficient aggravating circumstances existed or that there were not sufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, but there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt.” [Emphasis mine.] We also said in Collins, in reference to this court’s power to reduce a sentence in death penalty cases, that “[t]here is a vast difference in reviewing a sentence for error (including error resulting from insufficient evidentiary support) in the sentencing procedure and reviewing a sentence resulting from a proper and legal sentencing procedure where sufficiency of evidence is not a basis for review.” In Collins, we emphasized the importance of the jury’s findings on aggravated circumstances, in imposing a death penalty which will pass constitutional examination and in avoiding arbitrary, capricious or freakish imposition of this extreme penalty. We said: *** If a guilty verdict is returned, the same jury in the sentencing phase of a bifurcated trial may then hear testimony tending to show one of more specifically enumerated groups of aggravating circumstances; but the death penalty cannot be imposed unless the jury unanimously finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more aggravating circumstance[s] exist (specifying in writing which of them does) and finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances found to exist. ** In pointing out that there was a meaningful appellate review of the imposition of a death penalty, we stated: There is a meaningful appellate review by this court of the appropriateness of the death penalty in a particular case, considering both the. punishment and any errors on points raised in the trial court, including the sufficiency of the evidence to support any part of the jury verdict. This appellate review includes: (1) a determination whether the sentence was the result of passion, prejudice or any arbitrary factor; (2) whether the evidence support the jury’s finding of any statutory aggravating circumstances; (3) Whether the evidence supports the jury’s findings on the question whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating ones; (4) whether the sentence is excessive. On appellate review, this court can reduce the sentence, or grant a new trial, in -its-discretion, if the sentence is excessive or there-is error affecting the sentence only, or where there is insufficient evidentiary support for the sentence. *** - [Emphasis mine.] We recognized in Collins that'there is no specific requirement that this court compare sentences, but found that “the scope of permissible review of the sentence on appeal would necessarily require that we consult prior cases as precedent for our determining whether there was error in the sentencing procedure, whether the evidence was sufficient to support any finding made by the jury, whether any of the findings was the result of passion or prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and whether there had been an abuse of the discretion of either the jury or the trial judge in imposing the sentence.” [Emphasis mine.] In Collins, we concluded: These sentencing and- review procedures certainly leave no substantial risk- that the death sentence will be imposed randomly, arbitrarily, capriciously, wantonly or freakishly, and tend to promote evenhanded, rational and consistent imposition of the death penalty.*** On the basis of this conclusion, review was denied by the United States Supreme Court at 434 U.S. 878, 98 S. Ct. 231, 54 L. Ed. 2d 158. The majority has now effectively sawed off one of the legs upon which that conclusion stood and has rendered our death penalty statute’s constitutionality suspect. The importance of the' scope of appellate review outlined in Collins was given emphasis in Neal v. State, 261 Ark. 336, 548 S.W. 2d 135.2 Not only did we point out that “it will at least be as easy to review the record to see if there is súfficient evidentiary support for a jury’s findings on these, particularized circumstances as it is when a jury’s general finding of guilt is questioned,” and we also pointed out that there was no necessity for a mechanism requiring a report from the trial judge and an accumulation of the records of all capital cases. The reason was that a review w;as meaningful when the appellate court undertook to “review a case in which a defendant is sentenced to die in the light of other decisions to determine whether the punishment was too great and taking its function to be to ‘guarantee that the [aggravating and mitigating] reasons present in one case will reach a similar result to that reached under similar circumstances in another case.’” [Emphasis mine.] I ask, how is an appellate review meaningful if the appellate court does not give any significance to the fact that a jury found an aggravating circumstance for which there was no evidentiary support, or even something less than substantial evidence, as we have defined it. Is the door not thrown .open to arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty? Could the majority have swallowed a verdict in which a jury had, deliberately and conscientiously, given an affirmative answer to the question whether the murder tyas committed for the purpose of disrupting or hindering the lawful exercise of a governmental or political function? We say that arbitrary means “decisive but unreasoned” and that capricious defined as “not guided by steady judgment-or purpose.” City of North Little Rock v. Habrle, 239 Ark. 1007, 395 S.W. 2d 751. What could be more arbitrary and capricious than finding an aggravating circumstance that did not exist? If we do not require the same degree of proof to sustain a jury verdict on an aggravating circumstance as we require for a finding of guilty, then why do wé not? In what kind of position must we put ourselves to. accept ¿verdict not supported by substantial evidence because we understand what a jury meant? Perhaps there are. others, who, as I, do not' understand it. We have never before upheld a jury’s answer to an interrogatory when there was no substantial evidence to support it, just because the jury answered it as they understood' it. A jury’s answer to a question “as it understood it” is certainly “decisive but unreasoned,” if its understanding was wrong. I am well aware of the fact that appellant did not object to the instruction given on aggravating circumstances nor to the verdict form including this circumstance; however, this does not bar our review of the sufficiency of evidence when the question has been raised on appeal. I am also aware of the potential argument that an erroneous finding as to one aggravating circumstance should not overturn the verdict because the jury found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance. The flaw in this argument is that it is for the jury, and the jury alone, to impose a death sentence in the first instance, in obedience to statutory guidelines for the exercise of its discretion. It shall impose the sentence, if, but only if, it unanimously finds that aggravating circumstances justify a death sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1302 (Repl. 1977). Even with the questioned circumstance eliminated, I agree that the evidence justified the requisite findings of the existence of aggravating circumstances and that the three aggravating circumstances supported by the evidence, would outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, mitigating circumstances which did not exist. But there was some reason for including the third statutory requisite that the aggravating circumstances must be found to justify a sentence of death beyond a reasonable doubt. How can this court know how much weight the jury gave a non-existent circumstance in deciding that the. death penalty was justified? That decision rested entirely with the jury. It is not up to this court to say that because a jury could have reached its conclusion on the basis -of three, rather than four, aggravating circumstances that it necessarily did. The state’s taking of a human life is a serious matter. This is the reason that we have come to the point where we impose elaborate safeguards to make sure that it is done only in. stricly limited types of situations. The mere fact that an appellate court can read a record and say that it thinks a death penalty was justified in a particular case is not an adequate safeguard, any more than the exercise of standardless discretion by a jury, which is primarily the conscience of the community. The courts can only afford protection against a jury’s artibrary or capricious action. There is no way that this court on appellate review of other death penalty cases can properly classify this case in determining whether another death penalty was properly imposed. I am compelled to register a respectful dissent. Since I find error in the sentencing procedure, I would correct it by reducing the punishment to life imprisonment without parole, unless the state should elect to seek a retrial, in which event, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I dissent only from that portion of the opinion which covers Point IX in appellant’s appeal. This point covers the aggravating circumstances. I agree that aggravating circumstances one and four as found by the jury were proper. However, I do not agree that the evidence supports finding aggravating circumstances two and three. I will first discuss aggravating circumstances number two which the jury found to exist. The jury answered yes to the following: The defendant did, beyond a reasonable doubt, in the commission of the capital felony murder knowingly create a great risk of death to a person other than the victim. This finding was based upon the theory that the appellant created a great risk of death to the witness, Jim Hudson. Jim Hudson testified that he heard the shots next door and went over to investigate. He stated: ... In fact, I got in the door, had the door pushed open and then right in my face was a black guy and he had a metal box in his hand. Both hands were just carrying it in front of him like this. He was carrying it just like it was a heavy box or something but that is the way he was carrying it. Yes, I am indicating that his fingers were underneath the object and his thumbs encircling the top. ... I recognized that as being his money box . . 1 He turned away from the police station, well he had the gun or he had a gun in his hand. It was more down to his side. He was glancing from side to side as he went toward the alley. I would say approximately half way between the door that he came out of in the alley, he then stuck the gun in front, apparently in his belt or in his clothing. And then he run. And he turned up the alley. . . . This is the only possible evidence upon which the jury could have found the appellant created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim, and it prevents me from agreeing that this was a proper finding of an aggravating circumstance. When the witness encountered the appellant, both hands were holding a box in front of him. The witness backed out of the building; and, when he next saw the appellant, he was leaving the scene of the crime. When he saw the appellant leaving the scene, the gun was in his hand down by his side, and then it was placed inside the front of his belt or in his clothing. The appellant ran away. At no time was the gun aimed at the witness nor were any shots fired which could have conceivably struck this witness or any other person. Therefore, I simply cannot see that there is enough evidence to support this finding of an aggravating circumstance. The second finding of aggravating circumstance which I disagree with was: The defendant did, beyond a reasonable doubt, commit the.capital felony murder for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody. By no stretch of imagination can I believe that the victim was killed for any purpose other than to obtain his money. The majority concludes that the appellant must have had thoughts running through his mind that he should kill the victim to keep from being identified. However, the aggravating circumstance in this case found that the killing was for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody.- Certainly, he had not been in custody and could not have been attempting to escape. It is certainly more logical to presume that the appellant thought he would never be identified, and no thought was in his mind of preventing an arrest. It is my opinion that this aggravating circumstance is intended to cover a situation, where a person is physically attempting to prevent arrest or trying to escape from custody. In view of the erroneous findings by the jury of these two mitigating circumstances, I would reduce the sentence to life without parole and return it to the trial court "giving the prosecution an option to either concur in the life without parole sentence or retry the appellant. I am authorized to state that Mays, J., joins me in this dissent.   This was the controlling statute at the time of the Collins trial. The present corresponding statute is Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1303 (Repl. 1977).    Cert. dea, .434 U.S. 878, 98 S. Ct. 231, 54 L. Ed. 2d 158, reh. den. 434 U.S. 961; 98 S. Ct. 495, 54 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1977).