Court Opinion

ID: 9612220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:06:04.156392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:04.035750
License: Public Domain

CLAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority unjustifiably attempts to reduce the dissent to a concern about questions of timeliness, but the legal and factual issues addressed here cannot be so narrowly confined. Instead of improperly reframing the issues in an attempt to diminish the dissent, the majority should have meaningfully engaged the merits of the arguments presented by this opinion. The majority insists on imposing an obli*426gation to arbitrate disputes even where parties never agreed to submit a particular dispute to arbitration. The general presumption in favor of arbitration cannot be interpreted so broadly. In this case, the majority violates the express terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement inasmuch as the parties simply did not contemplate that questions of timeliness would be submitted to an arbitrator. Instead of effectuating the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the majority blithely ignores the express intent and understanding of the parties, and the plain language of the parties’ agreement.
The principal difficulty with the majority opinion is that it wrongfully insulates decisions regarding arbitrability from judicial adjudication even when there is no basis for believing that the parties have contractually agreed to submit the subject matter of a particular dispute to arbitration. In addition to being unrestrained and over-broad in its implications, the majority opinion is problematical on two levels — namely, it improperly determines when a matter should be subject to arbitration, and whether the parties have agreed that there should be a judicial or arbitrable decision to adjudicate the dispute.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are relatively simple. Plaintiff United Steelworkers of America, AFLCIO-CLC, is a union which represents employees of Defendant Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc. The parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement which sets forth a four-step grievance appeal process. In pertinent part, the collective bargaining agreement contains a thirty-day period to appeal a grievance decision from step 3 to arbitration:
Article 28
Adjustment of Grievances
1. Should disagreements arise as to the meaning and application of or compliance with the provisions of this agreement ... the matter shall be settled promptly in the following manner:
STEP 4:
It is agreed that the Union shall have thirty (30) days from the time of the written Step 3 decision to notify the Company in writing that it is appealing a grievance to arbitration.
(J.A. 19) (formatting added). The thirty-day period excludes “Saturdays, Sundays, [hjolidays and off days (including vacations [or] [s]hutdown for repairs).” (J.A. 20) Article 28 of the collective bargaining agreement limits the authority of the arbitrator:
An arbitrator to whom any grievance shall be submitted shall be authorized only to interpret and apply the provisions of the agreement insofar as shall be necessary to the determining of such grievances, but he shall not have authority to alter in any way the provisions of this agreement.
(J.A. 19) The parties also conditioned the right to arbitrate a grievance decision on strict compliance with the time limits set forth in the collective bargaining agreement:
Article 28
Adjustment of Grievances
4. Both parties mutually agree that grievances to be considered must be filed promptly as set forth above after the occurrence thereof. Grievances not appealed within the time limits set forth in Steps 1, 2, 3, or k shall be considered settled on the basis of the decision last made and shall not be eligible for further discussion or appeal.
*427(J.A. 20) (emphasis added). Notably, the collective bargaining agreement contains no provision for the determination of arbi-trability. Nothing in the collective bargaining agreement indicates that a dispute concerning timeliness should be submitted to arbitration. Indeed, the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement indicate that the parties simply did not contemplate submitting such disputes to arbitration; rather, the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement shows that the parties contractually agreed that the failure to pursue a timely appeal constitutes a substantive bar to arbitration.
On March 2, 2004, the Defendant employer terminated two employees “for multiple, severe and willful violations of Company Work Rules in disregard of the Company’s business interest.” (J.A. 42; see also J.A. 43 (same)). Plaintiff filed grievances alleging that the employees were subject to “unjust suspension [and] discharge [ ] for a verbal altercation” with a supervisor. (J.A. 37; see also J.A. 38 (same)). On March 29, 2004, Defendant issued a written step 3 decision denying Plaintiffs “grievance[s] and requests] for reinstatement and back pay.” (J.A. 42; see also J.A. 43 (same)). Plaintiff received the employer’s decision on April 8, 2004, and appealed the decision on May 19, 2004. Defendant received notice of Plaintiffs appeal on May 24, 2004, and denied the request to refer the grievances to arbitration because the thirty day period to request an appeal had expired. In turn, Plaintiff filed an action to compel arbitration of the grievances under the collective bargaining agreement in the Western District of Kentucky. The district court, applying Gen. Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 89 v. Moog Louisville Warehouse, 852 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1988), granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, finding that under the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement the grievances were not arbitrable because Plaintiff failed to timely file an appeal. The district court concluded that the limitations period set forth in the collective bargaining agreement barred Plaintiffs grievances from proceeding to arbitration.1
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Framework
In this ease, the district court’s summary judgment decision is reviewed de novo, “as is the district court’s decision to [deny Plaintiffs] motion to compel arbitration.” McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 489 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Wiepking v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 940 F.2d 996, 998 (6th Cir.1991)). “Similarly, the district court’s decisions regarding the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the arbi-trability of a particular dispute are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Floss v. *428Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir.2000)).
The Supreme Court has clearly established that “[a]rbitration ... is a matter of consent, not coercion.” EEOC. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). The Federal Arbitration Act (“the Act”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., “directs courts to place arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts, but it ‘does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so.’ ” Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293, 122 S.Ct. 754 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L.Ed.2d 488 (1989)). Although “ambiguities in the language of [an arbitration] agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” courts cannot “override the clear intent of the parties, or reach a result inconsistent with the plain text of the contract, simply because the policy favoring arbitration is implicated.” Id. (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 476, 109 S.Ct. 1248); see also Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, and Agr. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), and Local 131, UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir.1983) (noting that a “collective bargaining agreement should [not] be construed to affirmatively promote any particular policy”). Simply put, the Act “make[s] arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.” Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n. 12, 87 S.Ct. 1801, 18 L.Ed.2d 1270 (1967).
Generally, under the presumption of ar-bitrability, “a court, not an arbitrator, will ordinarily decide an ‘arbitrability’ question,” Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 82, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002) (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 115 S.Ct. 1920, 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995)), and “the arbitrator [ ] decide[s] ‘allegation^] of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitra-bility,’” id. at 84, 123 S.Ct. 588 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). Notably, the Supreme Court has found that “labor disputes ... cannot be broken down so easily into their ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ aspects” because “[questions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by it.” John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 556-57, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964).
The rationale that underlines the presumption of arbitrability is that arbitrators are “well situated to answer [ ] question^]” related to “contract interpretation and arbitration procedures,” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003), and “in a better position than courts to interpret the terms of a [collective bargaining agreement],” Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 78, 119 S.Ct. 391, 142 L.Ed.2d 361 (1998) (citing AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986)) (emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, the presumption of arbitrability is rebuttable. “[W]here the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that ‘[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted *429dispute.” AT & T, 475 U.S. at 650, 106 S.Ct. 1415 (quoting Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347) (alteration in original). “[WJhen courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators should decide arbitrability[,] [c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakable]’ evidence that they did so.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 944, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415). Courts are also charged with determining whether the parties “intended to have a court, rather than an arbitrator, interpret and apply” an arbitration provision. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 86, 123 S.Ct. 588.
The Supreme Court has recognized that whether a court or an arbitrator “has the primary authority to decide whether a party has agreed to arbitrate can make a critical difference to a party resisting arbitration.” First Options, 514 U.S. at 942, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Indeed, “one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the ‘who should decide arbitrability’ point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide.” Id. at 945, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (citations omitted). “[T]he question of ar-bitrability — whether a collective-bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance— is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.” AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415.
II. Analysis
Essentially, the issue in this case is whether, under the collective bargaining agreement, the thirty day period to refer a grievance to arbitration begins to run as of the date of receipt of Defendant’s written decision — as Plaintiff contends, thus, making the grievance timely and therefore ar-bitrable — or the date of its issuance, as Defendant argues, thereby rendering the grievance untimely and therefore not arbi-trable. The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in Moog. The defendant in Moog
discharged a member of the plaintiff union who protested his discharge through the procedurally defined grievance steps up to the final stage of arbitration. [Defendant] refused the demand for arbitration, contending that the request made was untimely and therefore rendered the grievance not ar-bitrable. The union brought [an] action to compel [defendant] to arbitrate.
852 F.2d at 872. The language of the collective bargaining agreement in Moog provided that
if the Union fails to notify the Company ... within 15 calendar days after the Company gives its answer [to the grievance] ..., then the Union shall he conclusively presumed to have accepted the Company’s answer thereto and said grievance shall not thereafter be arbitra-ble.
Id. at 873 (emphasis added). The collective bargaining agreement in Moog stipulated that an untimely grievance was not arbitrable. The plain language of the agreement shows that submitting disputes concerning timeliness to arbitration was simply never contemplated by the parties.
In light of the language contained in the collective bargaining agreement, “Moog held that a grievance was not properly arbitrable because the union had not submitted its grievance within the time frame dictated in the collective bargaining agreement.” Armco Employees Indep. Fed’n v. AK Steel Corp., 252 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir.2001). Indeed, Moog found that, under the parties’ collective bargaining *430agreement, timeliness was a question of substantive arbitrability that should be presented to a court and not an arbitrator. See Id. at 860 (noting that “Moog concluded that th[e] [collective bargaining agreement] language indicated substantive not procedural arbitrability.”) (emphasis in original). The holding in Moog is clearly fact specific; the Court simply interpreted and applied the language contained in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.
Under Moog, courts are charged with reviewing the collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the time limitations are procedural or substantive provisions based on the language contained therein. Moog, 852 F.2d at 872. Simply put, the language set forth in the parties’ agreement is dispositive and must be used to determine whether a particular dispute was intended by the parties to be arbitra-ble. Express contractual provisions, to the extent that they are available, must be consulted to determine whether the failure to follow the procedures outlined in the agreement constitutes a procedural issue that may be presented to an arbitrator or a substantive issue that precludes arbitra-bility. Id. (expressly holding that this Court “examine[s], therefore, the agreement that sets out the mutual understanding of the parties”). In short, contractual provisions and the parties’ express intent are the guiding principles in this inquiry. This approach presumably makes sense because parties may negotiate different collective bargaining agreement provisions and may contractually decide whether to treat time limitations as procedural or substantive matters.
In Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, a “case eoncern[ing] contracts between a commercial lender and its customers, each of which contain[ed] a clause providing for arbitration of all contract-related disputes,” the parties disputed whether the contracts “forbid class arbitration.” 539 U.S. at 447, 123 S.Ct. 2402. The Supreme Court held that “[i]n certain limited circumstances” it is appropriate for “courts [to] assume that the parties intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter (in the absence of “clea[r] and unmistakable]” evidence to the contrary).” Id. at 452, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (citing AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415). The Court explained that
[t]hese limited instances typically involve matters of a kind that “contracting parties would likely have expected a court” to decide. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83, 123 S.Ct. 588, 154 L.Ed.2d 491 (2002). They include certain gateway matters, such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a con-cededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy. See generally Howsam, supra. See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964) (whether an arbitration agreement survives a corporate merger); AT & T, supra, at 651-52 (whether a labor-management layoff controversy falls within the scope of an arbitration clause).
Id. The Court found that
[t]he question here — whether the contracts forbid class arbitration-does not fall into this narrow exception. It concerns neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties. Unlike First Options, the question is not whether the parties wanted a judge or an arbitrator to decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter: 514 U.S. at 942-945, 115 S.Ct. 1920. Rather the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.
*431Id. at 452-53, 123 S.Ct. 2402 (emphasis in original). Although the Court found that “th[e] matter of contract interpretation should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide,” this outcome was clearly based on “the arbitration contracts’ sweeping language concerning the scope of the questions committed to arbitration.” Id. at 453, 123 S.Ct. 2402. As in Moog, the Supreme Court determined whether the dispute should be presented to an arbitrator or to a court based on the underlying facts and the language contained in the parties’ agreements.
The majority cites a plethora of cases in support of its position in this case. However, the cases are plainly distinguishable from this matter. See, e.g, Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs., Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 741-42 (1st Cir.1995) (Court found that the language in the collective bargaining agreement was almost identical to the arbitration agreement in Wiley); Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 765 v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 625 F.2d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir.1980) (parties selected an arbitrator “to fill in the interstices of the written text. The arbitration clause refers, after all, to ‘any difference in opinion ... regarding the interpretation or application of any provision of this Agreement’ ”); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 340 F.2d 237, 238 (2d Cir.1965) (finding that the parties’ collective bargaining agreement included “broad provisions for the arbitration of disputes”); Local 1422, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. S.C. Stevedores Ass’n, 170 F.3d 407, 408 (4th Cir.1999) (employer made no effort to factually distinguish the parties’ collective bargaining agreement from the arbitration agreement in Wiley); Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesman’s Union, Local 1095, United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 834 F.2d 751, 754 (9th Cir.1987) (the principal issue was not “whether [the arbitrator] had jurisdiction over the dispute, but rather whether he could proceed without [a party] present.”); Denhardt v. Trailways, Inc., 767 F.2d 687, 689 (10th Cir.1985) (the parties’ collective bargaining agreement expressly “state[d] that arbitration is the exclusive means for resolving grievances”); Aluminum Brick and Glass Workers Int'l Union v. AAA Plumbing Pottery Corp., 991 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir.1993) (employer made no effort to factually distinguish the parties’ collective bargaining agreement from the arbitration agreement in Wiley); Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union Local 722, AFL-CIO, 746 F.2d 1503, 1507 (D.C.Cir.1984) (finding that the employer “has not even attempted to distinguish Wiley” and that “Wiley is indistinguishable”).
Notably, cases the majority purportedly relies on clearly support a finding that not all disputes should be submitted to arbitration. See Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir.1995) (plainly holding that the district court must determine “whether the subject matter of the dispute was subject to arbitration under the parties’ agreement” and interpreting the express language in the parties collective bargaining agreement to determine whether the grievance was arbi-trable); Beer, Soft Drink, Water, Fruit Juice, Carbonic Gas, Liquor Sales Drivers, Helpers, Inside Workers, Bottlers, Warehousemen Sch. Sightseeing, Charter Bus Drivers, Gen. Promotional Employees of Affiliated Indus., Local Union No. 744 v. Metro. Distribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 300, 304 n. 4 (7th Cir.1985) (noting that it may be “proper for a court to determine whether one party to a collective bargaining agreement has waived its right to arbitration because it has pursued its dispute in administrative or judicial proceedings rather than in arbitration”); Auto., Petroleum and Allied Indus. Employees Union, Lo*432cal No. 618 v. Town and Country Ford, Inc., 709 F.2d 509, 511 (8th Cir.1983) (discussing Wiley and Philadelphia Printing and finding that “[t]he essential inquiry when determining the arbitrability of an issue should be the intent of the parties to the contract”).
Contrary to the majority’s averments, as illustrated in the cases cited above, the circuit courts of appeals are divided on the question of whether a union may compel a company, or vice versa, to arbitrate a grievance appeal filed after the time period set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. It is clear, however, that at least two courts have found that disputes concerning the interpretation of collective bargaining agreement provision may be properly presented to a court. See, e.g., Philadelphia Printing Pressmen’s Union No. 16 v. Int’l Paper Co., 648 F.2d 900, 904 (3d Cir.1981); see also United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Cherokee Elec. Co-op., No. 86-AR-2163-M, 1987 WL 17056, at *2 (N.D.Ala. Feb.19, 1987), aff'd, 829 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir.1987).
In Philadelphia Printing, a case where a union waited for approximately ten months to submit a written grievance challenging the termination of an employee, the parties were not in agreement that the underlying dispute was arbitrable. When the employer denied the grievance, the union sued to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit found that in order to rule on whether “the parties [] are obligated to submit the [] matter to arbitration,” it must first determine “whether, or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate.” Philadelphia Printing, 648 F.2d at 903 (quoting Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Corp., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962)). The Court noted that “[although the parties could have provided that any dispute over whether there is an arbitrable dispute would be for the arbitrator, this was not done.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court found that under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the “grievance-arbitration procedure” was not a “ ‘mere procedural formality1 to be dispensed with unilaterally.” Id. at 904. The Third Circuit held that the failure to proceed with the grievance procedures, as required by the collective bargaining agreement, substantively precluded an order to arbitrate. Id. As the Court aptly stated:
[w]hat the Union seeks is to skip the entire grievance machinery established by the collective bargaining agreement and to proceed directly to arbitration of a controversy that has not ripened into a grievance. This it may not do.
Id. at 904 (footnote omitted). Contrary to the majority’s averments, the Court simply did not base its decision on the timeliness of the grievance; rather, the Court found that the parties never agreed to arbitrate the underlying dispute. Id. at 904 n. 7.
In Cherokee, a case where a grievance was not filed within the time frame stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that a dispute concerning the timeliness of a grievance was not arbi-trable. Contrary to the majority’s arguments, timeliness was not the principal issue in Cherokee; rather, “[t]he issue before th[e] court [wa]s whether the parties to the Collective Bargaining Agreement intended to arbitrate all grievances or whether, because of an express exclusion or other ‘forceful evidence,’ [the employer] intended to exclude from arbitration those grievances that are untimely filed.” Cherokee, 1987 WL 17056, at *2.
The parties’ collective bargaining agreement stipulated that “[a]ny grievance not reported within five (5) working days of first knowledge of the occurrence causing *433the grievance shall be deemed wiaved [sic] and non-existent.” Id. at *1. As in the instant case, “[t]he contract [in Cherokee] clearly state[d] that if the time limitations are not complied with, the grievance is deemed waived, non-existent, and a settlement of the grievance in favor of the party to whom the default runs” is required. Id. at *4. Since the time limitation provision substantively barred the grievance from being referred to arbitration, “the Collective Bargaining Agreement expressly excluded [untimely arbitration grievances] from arbitration.” Id. In Cherokee, whether the time limitation provision was a substantive bar to arbitrability was determined based on the parties’ intent and the language contained in the parties’ contractual agreement. The district court aptly recognized that “the question of arbitrability — whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.” Id. at *2 (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415). Cherokee, like Philadelphia Printing, supports an affir-mance of the district court’s decision in this case. In the instant case, the parties never agreed to submit the underlying dispute to arbitration, Philadelphia Printing, 648 F.2d at 903, and the time limitation provision at issue in this case is a substantive bar to arbitrability, Cherokee, 1987 WL 17056, at *2.
Contrary to the majority’s contention, Moog can be reconciled with Wiley. In Wiley, a union sued to compel a company to arbitrate pursuant to a “collective bargaining agreement [that] provides for arbitration as the final stage of grievance procedures which are stated to be the ‘sole means of obtaining adjustment’ of ‘any diferences, grievance or dispute between the Employer and the Union arising out of or relating to this agreement,’ or its interpretation or application, or enforcement.” 376 U.S. at 553, 84 S.Ct. 909 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The company argued that the union failed to follow the procedural steps set forth in the collective bargaining agreement to commence an arbitration, and that a court should determine whether the failure to adhere to the procedural requirements precluded arbitration. The company urged the Supreme Court to find “that the question whether ‘procedural’ conditions to arbitration have been met must be decided by the court and not the arbitrator.” Id. at 556, 84 S.Ct. 909. Based on the express provisions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the company’s position. Rather, the Court found that
labor disputes of the kind involved here cannot be broken down so easily into their ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ aspects. Questions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the parties to the contract or those covered by it.
Id. at 556-57, 84 S.Ct. 909 (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority’s argument, Wiley expressly left open the possibility that, depending on the facts, the intent and understanding of the parties, and the language contained in the collective bargaining agreement, procedural issues and disputes may be properly presented to a court rather than an arbitrator. Id. at 546-47, 84 S.Ct. 909 (“ ‘[W]hether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties.’ ”) (quoting Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962)). Indeed, the Supreme Court bluntly discouraged the compartmentalization of disputes and *434issues as procedural or substantive. This approach is compatible with Moog because a distinction between procedural and substantive issues must be grounded in the facts surrounding the dispute and the language contained in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The outcome in Wiley makes sense because the broad language in the parties’ arbitration agreement made all disputes under the agreement in that case arbitrable.
In Howsam, a ease concerning whether a court or an arbitrator of the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) should enforce a NASD time limit rule for the submission of arbitration claims, the Supreme Court found that
the applicability of the NASD [arbitration] time limit rule is a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not for the judge. The time limit rule closely resembles the gateway questions that this Court has found not to be “questions of arbitrability.” E.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, supra, at 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, (referring to “waiver, delay, or a like defense”). Such a dispute seems an “aspec[t] of the [controversy] which called the grievance procedures into play.” John Wiley, supra, at 559, 84 S.Ct. 909.
537 U.S. at 85, 123 S.Ct. 588. Notably, Howsam is distinguishable from this case and Moog, in part, because it did not involve a labor arbitration matter and did not concern the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the majority misconstrues the holding in Howsam.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court expressly held that the NASD time limit rule is a procedural inquiry that is properly presented to an arbitrator. However, nothing in Howsam supports the majority’s proposition that all time limit rules — regardless of parties’ intent and the language contained in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement — are procedural issues. As in Moog, the holding in Howsam is fact specific. Unlike this case, in Howsam the parties expressly agreed to submit all disputes to arbitration:
[A]ll controversies ... concerning or arising from ... any account ..., any transaction ..., or ... the construction, performance or breach of ... any ... agreement between us ... shall be determined by arbitration before any self-regulatory organization or exchange of which Dean Witter is a member.
Id. at 81, 123 S.Ct. 588 (citation omitted) (alterations in original). Since the language in the parties’ arbitration agreement was extraordinarily broad, the Supreme Court simply could not “conclude that the parties intended to have a court, rather than an arbitrator, interpret and apply the NASD time limit rule.” Id. at 86, 123 S.Ct. 588.
The majority is wrongfully attempting to expand Howsam to this case. The Supreme Court’s guidance with respect to NASD time limit rules simply cannot be imposed and grafted onto this case because there are special policy considerations that apply in NASD arbitrations. See, e.g., Howsam, 537 U.S. at 85, 123 S.Ct. 588 (finding that “the NASD arbitrator ][are] comparatively more expert about their own [time limitation] rule, [and are] comparatively better able to interpret and to apply it”). Concededly, this Court has found that Howsam governs the issue of the timeliness of submission of claims for a NASD arbitration. See Smith v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., No. 02-6158, 2004 WL 1859623 (6th Cir.2004) (per curiam) (unpublished case) (applying How-sam and noting that Howsam “made it clear that the validity of the defense raised in [a NASD arbitration case] was a matter for the arbitrator to determine”). This *435Court should continue to confine the application of Howsam to NASD arbitration cases because nothing in Hotvsam stands for the proposition that the arbitrability of disputes concerning time limitation provisions in collective bargaining agreements is governed by that case. Consequently, there is no legal or factual basis for extending and imposing the holding in How-sam to the instant case.
The majority misconstrues Wiley and Howsam to improperly create an across-the-board rule to govern the arbitrability of time limitation provisions in labor arbitration cases. As explained above, this approach is misplaced. Unless the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed that an arbitrator is to determine issues of arbitrability, courts should be able to determine whether a dispute is subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Warrior, 363 U.S. at 582-83, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (Arbitration is favored “unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute”). A determination with respect to whether a time limitation provision constitutes a procedural or substantive issue should be based on the facts underlying the claim and the language contained in the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Wiley, 376 U.S. at 546-47, 84 S.Ct. 909 (“[Wjhether or not the company was bound to arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered into by the parties.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has aptly stated, “the question of arbitrability— whether a collective bargaining agreement creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance — is undeniably an issue for judicial determination.” AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649, 106 S.Ct. 1415.
Contrary to the majority’s holding, this Court is charged with giving effect to the parties’ intent as reflected by the language in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. In this case, the plain language of the collective bargaining agreement stipulates that the union’s failure to adhere to the time limit provisions constitutes forfeiture of the right to arbitrate the grievance decisions. The parties simply did not agree to submit disputes surrounding timeliness to an arbitrator. Based on the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties contractually agreed that failure to pursue a timely appeal constitutes a substantive bar to proceeding to arbitration. Based upon the plain language in the parties’ agreement, the district court in the instant case correctly found that the parties never contemplated presenting to an arbitrator an untimely request for arbitration.
The majority’s holding in this case is anything but narrow and is not limited in any principled way. Because the holding could be logically extended to any threshold or procedural issue, the majority’s holding presents the threat of sweeping within its ambit matters that the parties intended to reserve for the court. More specifically, the majority’s holding is fundamentally flawed because it opens the door to having nonarbitrable disputes improperly resolved by an arbitrator from the inception of an arbitration demand. This holding would extend Congress’ policy in favor of arbitration where the parties have agreed to arbitrate beyond anything Congress reasonably intended, and would impose an obligation on parties to arbitrate disputes where the parties have not agreed to arbitrate. See, e.g, Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 293-94, 122 S.Ct. 754; see also Volt, 489 U.S. at 478, 109 S.Ct. 1248. Because the majority installs arbitration as the inevitable and unavoidable first step in resolving disputes, even when *436arbitration is not contractually required, the majority violates federal policy which prohibits the imposition of compulsory arbitration upon parties except when they are bound by an arbitration agreement. Cf. Litton Fin. Printing Div., a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 209, 111 S.Ct. 2215, 115 L.Ed.2d 177 (1991) (holding that “we refuse to apply th[e] presumption [of arbitrability] wholesale in the context of an expired bargaining agreement, for to do so would make limitless the contractual obligation to arbitrate”). The majority’s conclusion will undoubtedly encompass situations and cases where the issue of arbitrability should properly be decided by the district court rather than an arbitrator based on the parties’ express intent and the plain language in the parties’ arbitration agreement.
In other words, the majority opinion as written, and certainly by implication, will compel arbitration, including the decision whether a matter is arbitrable, even where the parties have not contractually agreed to resolve a dispute in an arbitral forum. Furthermore, under the majority’s approach, since arbitrators will be asked to resolve threshold and procedural issues, arbitrators will be able to define and determine the scope of their own jurisdiction even with respect to matters that are not arbitrable. The majority would require matters of contract interpretation intended for the court to be reduced to substantive law governing the arbitrator, which he can ignore or not as he pleases, subject only to this Court’s review of the arbitrator’s final award. This approach is fundamentally at odds with Supreme Court precedent, First Options, 514 U.S. at 945, 115 S.Ct. 1920 (recognizing that parties “often might not focus ... upon the significance of having arbitrators decide the scope of their own powers”), and is particularly problematic because once a matter is submitted to an arbitrator, the standard of review is highly deferential, Mich. Family Res., Inc. v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 475 F.3d 746, 748 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (establishing that the review of an arbitration decision is so extremely deferential, at least in the Sixth Circuit, that such review is virtually meaningless and tantamount to rubber-stamping the arbitrator’s decision).
As a result of the majority opinion herein, the precarious future of labor arbitration cases in this Circuit is predictable: because of the holding in this case, district courts will send matters to the arbitrator from the onset; the arbitrator will interpret the collective bargaining agreement and render a decision; the decision may be appealed by a party; but the courts, instead of performing an independent review of the arbitrator’s decision even where circumstances warrant, will affirm the arbitrator’s decision. Essentially, there will be no independent or meaningful review of an arbitrator’s jurisdictional determination. This is particularly problematical to the extent that courts have an incentive to minimize judicial review of arbitration decisions in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid delaying or complicating a case, and that this same motivation exists to close the courthouse doors to litigants and deprive them of their rights.
This case creates a thinly-veiled conduit to divert matters to arbitration notwithstanding that the parties have never expressed an intent to arbitrate. This outcome has a strong potential to substantially erode — and ultimately eliminate — appropriate judicial adjudication in arbitration cases. The majority essentially deprives parties of their right to have their disputes settled by a court, even though the parties have not waived that right. This is simply not what the Supreme Court envisioned in Howsam or Wiley; the Supreme Court clearly did *437not intend for the courthouse doors to be slammed shut, in such a wholesale fashion, with respect to determining arbitra-bility. Indeed, this Court cannot create artificial jurisdictional limitations. Cf. Jones v. Bock, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 910, 919, 166 L.Ed.2d 798 (2007) (bluntly reminding this Court that we cannot depart from usual practice on the basis of “perceived policy concerns”).
The issue of arbitrability simply cannot be insulated from judicial review where not justified by the law, the particular circumstances of the dispute, or the parties’ arbitration agreement. Again, the outcome of this case broadly insulates arbitration decisions from judicial adjudication even in the absence of any appropriate legal justification. This outcome is particularly troublesome because this Court has so sweepingly overruled Moog that parties’ express intent with respect to arbitration will often be rendered meaningless. Under the majority’s formulation, arbitration •will be ordered so long as a party to the dispute can point to the existence of an arbitration agreement and demand arbitration even though the dispute at issue is not remotely covered by the express terms of the arbitration provision in the parties’ contract. Furthermore, under the majority’s approach, the arbitrator himself gets to decide the issue of arbitrability as a threshold matter — with little or no likelihood of judicial review or correction — even when the parties’ dispute is not one which is even arguably covered by the arbitration agreement.
CONCLUSION
The parties in this ease did not agree to submit a dispute concerning timeliness to an arbitrator. The majority improperly compels the Defendant company to arbitrate where nothing in the collective bargaining agreement suggests that the parties intended an arbitrator to determine the arbitrability of the underlying dispute. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district court’s decision. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. The district court properly found that Plaintiff's appeal to arbitration was untimely. The plain language of the contract indicates that the clock begins to run on the date of the written Step 3 decision. See J.A. 19 (The parties "agreed that the Union shall have thirty (30) days from the time of the written Step 3 decision to notify the Company in writing that it is appealing a grievance to arbitration.”) (emphasis added). Defendant had to receive notice of Plaintiff's appeal to arbitration within thirty days. The step 3 decision for Plaintiff’s grievances was issued on March 29, 2004. Defendant received the notice of appeal to arbitration on May 24, 2004. As the district court aptly noted, "[ejxcluding holidays and weekends, there were 39 business days between these two dates.” United Steelworkers of America, AFL CIO-CLC v. Saint Gobain Ceramics & Plastics Inc., No. 304CV603S, 2005 WL 3088550, at *5-6 (W.D.Ky. Nov. 14, 2005) (unpublished case). Therefore, Plaintiff’s notice of appeal to arbitration was untimely under the terms of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.