Court Opinion

ID: 9719464
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:53:43.156664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:07.528006
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, J.
I dissent. With all due deference to the detailed findings and carefully drawn conclusions rendered by the learned trial court, I must *1331respectfully voice my disagreement with its restrictive interpretation of Penal Code section 825 and its invalidation of certain policies of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) pertaining to arrestees confined in city jail facilities. I submit that some of the rules promulgated by the majority opinion in upholding the judgment rendered by the trial court are unsupported by constitutional, statutory, or case law and will impose an onerous burden upon LAPD.1 Without such support in the law, this court is without authority to mandate what procedures are to be used by LAPD in processing, transporting, and housing the many thousands of felony arrestees taken into custody each year by that agency.
I
Application of the Requirement in Penal Code Section 825 That An Arrestee Be Taken Before A Magistrate Without Unnecessary Delay And, in Any Event, Within Two Days After Arrest
Establishing the constitutional right to speedy trial during the time preceding a suspect’s initial court appearance, article I, section 14 of the California Constitution requires that “A person charged with a felony by complaint . . . shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate . . . .” (See also Pen. Code, § 849, subd. (a).) Section 8252 enforces this mandate by providing: “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays; provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following.” Section 825 thus commands that a felony arrestee be brought to court as soon as reasonably possible but, in any event, that the initial court appearance take place within a maximum two-day period as defined by the statute.
A. Defining the “Two-day” Maximum Period
The record before the trial court indicates that during the year 1981, the focus of the parties’ evidence, LAPD made approximately 33,000 felony arrests, resulting in the transportation of nearly 12,000 prisoners to court and the filing of approximately 8,900 felony complaints.
*1332The trial court found that LAPD issues to each detective a document entitled arrestee release schedule, commonly referred to as the due-out schedule, which is based on the advice of the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office concerning the method of calculating the “two-day” maximum period under section 825. According to the schedule, the first step of this calculation is to count 48 hours from the time of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays. (The statute expressly excludes Sundays and holidays from the calculation of the two days, and Saturdays are municipal court holidays. Gov. Code, § 71345; People v. Ross (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 364, 368 [46 Cal.Rptr. 41].) When the end of this 48-hour period falls at a time when court is normally not in session (the schedule assumes normal court hours to be from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.), the schedule adds the duration of the next court session to the maximum two-day period.
Statistics covering one of the downtown felony arraignment courts revealed that over a period of several months, 87 percent of the felony arraignments took place on the “due-out date” as calculated by the LAPD arrestee release schedule; 4 percent took place after expiration of this period, and 9 percent prior to the last day of the maximum period. The rate of arraignments transpiring prior to the LAPD “due-out date” was several percentage points higher in some of the branch courts.
The majority opinion, like the court below, holds that LAPD’s interpretation of the maximum period specified in section 825 is erroneous. Considering itself bound by statements in People v. Powell (1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 59 [429 P.2d 137], and People v. Hall (1964) 62 Cal.2d 104, 108, footnote 6 [41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700], while apparently recognizing that the language in question is dictum, the majority chooses not to follow several later decisions of the Courts of Appeal, infra, which approve LAPD’s 48-hour method of calculating the two-day maximum period. Instead, the majority affirms the trial court’s holding that the “correct rule is that a defendant arrested at any time on one day must be arraigned on the second court day thereafter.” (Italics added.) Thus, for example, a suspect arrested at 11 p.m. on Monday must, under the rule adopted by the majority, be arraigned no later than the close of court business on Wednesday.
The record indicates that during the relatively short period between arrest and arraignment, the case must be assigned to a detective for “followup investigation,” which is required both by LAPD policy and the Los Angeles District Attorney’s case-filing guidelines and involves the following: potential witnesses are interviewed to confirm the information in the police reports and determine the witnesses’ credibility and availability; further investigation may be conducted at the crime scene, sometimes resulting in the need for laboratory analysis; the existence and extent of any prior *1333criminal record of the arrestee is determined; he or she is interviewed at the jail, and any statement is checked for accuracy and any exculpatory information investigated. The detective prepares a written report and, after obtaining approval from a supervisor, personally presents the case to a prosecutor in the district attorney’s office, who may require further follow-up investigation. Detectives give priority to cases in which the suspect is in custody but sometimes wait to accumulate completed cases in order to avoid time-consuming multiple trips to various branches of the district attorney’s office. The trial court found that the detectives “have heavy workloads” and “cannot accomplish the tasks required of them without all detectives operating consistently at a high level of efficiency.” LAPD has reluctantly found it necessary to authorize substantial overtime for followup investigation work.
Once any additional investigation is completed, the prosecutor either files felony charges, refers the matter to the city attorney’s office for misdemean- or prosecution, or rejects the case. If a felony charge is filed, the detective arranges to have the arrestee transported to court. LAPD has contracted with the sheriff’s department to provide such transportation. The sheriff’s buses make two runs; the first set of buses typically leaves the police department jails as early as 5:30 a.m., arriving at the various courts at approximately 9 a.m. A second set of buses leaves the jails around 9 a.m., arriving at court before noon. Therefore, even if a felony case is filed in the morning, it is usually too late for the scheduled transportation to take place until the next day.
“In construing a statute . . . the court ‘turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’ [Citations.]” (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764 [150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227].) However, the language of section 825 is ambiguous on the point in question. The statute states that an arrestee must be brought to court “within two days.” Although this could suggest that a period of two calendar days was intended, section 825 was amended in 1961 to provide for an extension of this period if “the two days prescribed herein expire at a time” when court is not in session. Use of the phrase “at a time” rather than “on a day” suggests that the Legislature was speaking in terms of hours and envisioned a 48-hour period beginning at the time of arrest. Unlike the majority, which “find[s] no ambiguity or uncertainty” on the face of section 825 (majority opn., ante, p. 1314), I find the statutory phrase uncertain and the concept of “time” inherently ambiguous. “The word is expressive both of a precise point or terminus and of an interval between two points.” (Black’s Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1329, col. 2, italics in original.) Resort to the legislative history of the statute is thus appropriate in attempting to harmonize and make sense of its various *1334provisions. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].)
Section 825, as originally worded, stated merely that “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay.”3 In 1927, section 825 was amended to read, in pertinent part, “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays . . . .” (Stats. 1927, ch. 616, § 1, p. 1044.) In 1955, in his opinion for the court in Rogers v. Superior Court (1955) 46 Cal.2d 3, 9 [291 P.2d 929], then-Justice Traynor addressed the two-day provision which had been added to section 825 and, for no apparent reason other than literary prerogative, referred to it as “the 48-hour period” following the arrest. The Courts of Appeal adopted this practice and, in a series of decisions between 1957 and 1960, described the two-day provision in section 825 as “48 hours.” (People v. Soto (1957) 155 Cal.App.2d 344, 346 [317 *1335P.2d 1005]; People v. Speaks (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 25, 37 [319 P.2d 709]; People v. Schindler (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 584, 589 [3 Cal.Rptr. 865]; People v. Hall (1960) 186 Cal.App.2d 388, 394 [8 Cal.Rptr. 760].) During this period the California Supreme Court again used the phrase “48 hours” in referring to the time period set forth in this statute. (People v. Jackson (1959) 53 Cal.2d 89, 94 [346 P.2d 389]; People v. Lane (1961) 56 Cal.2d 773, 780 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57]. See also Van Atta v. Scott (1980) 27 Cal.3d 424, 431 [166 Cal.Rptr. 149, 613 P.2d 210].)
The Legislature amended section 825 in 1961, adding the following language to the requirement that the defendant be taken before a magistrate within two days: “provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following.” (Stats. 1961, ch. 2209, § 1, p. 4554, italics added.)
Three years later, the California Supreme Court made a brief reference to section 825 in People v. Hall, supra, 62 Cal.2d 104, in which a conviction for murder was overturned on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment. (Id., at p. 109.) The recitation of facts in the opinion reflects that the defendant was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on a Saturday and was arraigned the following Wednesday. In a footnote, the court observed that “By failing to take defendant before a magistrate ‘within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays’ (Pen. Code, § 825), the officers exceeded the maximum period during which a defendant may be lawfully detained.” (Id, at p. 108, fn. 6.) No reference was made, however, to the language added by the 1961 amendment.4 The footnote went on to note that although the defendant had been interrogated during this detention, “California law, however, does not require the exclusion of evidence as a consequence of such a violation.” (Ibid.) These two sentences comprise the entire discussion of the arraignment in Hall and certainly do not constitute a holding.
In 1965, the Court of Appeal in People v. Ross, supra, 236 Cal.App.2d 364, was faced with the issue whether an arrestee had been illegally detained beyond the maximum period allowed by section 825. In that case, the two-day maximum period was calculated by counting 48 hours from the date and time of arrest. (Id., at p. 368.) This procedure was adopted without discussion, and the possibility that section 825 might refer to two calendar days rather than 48 hours as suggested in the earlier opinion in Hall was not acknowledged, nor was any reference made to that case.
*1336Two years later, this issue again came to the attention of the California Supreme Court in People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32. The murder convictions of the codefendants in Powell were reversed because the police had obtained incriminating statements without warning the defendants of their constitutional rights as required by the decisions in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], which were decided after the trial in that case had been completed. Although the Escobedo-Dorado issue was dispositive of the appeal, the court went on to discuss the delay in arraignment, noting that “the police and prosecuting authorities are not blameless even under the law as it stood at the time of the investigation and trial.” (Id., at p. 58.) The codefendants had been arrested on a Sunday and arraigned the following Wednesday. Without considering the language added by the 1961 amendment,5 the court stated that this detention was “patently illegal” under the two-day maximum period established by section 825 and observed that there was “unnecessary delay” within the meaning of the statute because the intent of the police was to conduct repeated interrogations of the defendants. (Id., at pp. 59-61.) No citation was made to the footnote in Hall, or to the contrary analysis in People v. Ross, supra, 236 Cal.App.2d at page 368, or to the numerous references by the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal to the statutory provision as a “48-hour” rule. The Powell decision did not reach a holding as to the meaning of the “two-day” provision and instead concluded the discussion with the following statement: “As the judgment must be reversed because of violation of the Escobedo-Dorado rules, we need not decide at this time whether the circumstances just described amounted to such prejudice as to render reversible the denial of defendants’ constitutional and statutory rights to prompt arraignment. But we cannot condone such conduct by the police, and any repetition thereof will be closely scrutinized.” (Id., at p. 61.)
The next case to address this issue, People v. Chambers (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 89 [80 Cal.Rptr. 672], used the same method of calculation as People v. Ross, supra, 236 Cal.App.2d at page 368, counting a 48-hour period beginning at the date and time of arrest. Again, this conclusion was not supported by any analysis of section 825, and the previous decisions in Hall, Ross and Powell were not cited.
In People v. Lee (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 514, 521 [83 Cal.Rptr. 715], the opinions in Chambers and Ross were cited as controlling authority, and the 48-hour method of calculating the maximum period in section 825 was again utilized. Other than the citation to the authority of Chambers and *1337Ross, however, the decision in Lee contained no analysis of this issue. Surprisingly, the opinion in Lee cited both Powell and Hall in discussing a related issue, without acknowledging the contrary interpretation of the two-day provision of section 825 found in those opinions. (People v. Lee, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at pp. 521-523.) The court that decided People v. Lee came to an identical decision in People v. Vick (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1067 [90 Cal.Rptr. 236]. Finally, the court in People v. Santos (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 397, 403 [102 Cal.Rptr. 678], followed the holding in People v. Lee, supra, on identical facts without any independent analysis of the issue. There appears to be no decision of the Courts of Appeal which discusses those portions of Powell and Hall relating to the two-day provision of section 825. In denying petitions for hearing in the Ross, Chambers, Lee, and Vick cases, the Supreme Court failed to avail itself of the opportunity to clarify this issue.
Although the California Supreme Court has twice spoken on this issue in Powell and Hall, I disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that these decisions constitute binding precedent on this question. Of course under the doctrine of stare decisis both the trial court and this tribunal are bound to follow decisions of the California Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) But it is equally well-established that “The doctrine of stare decisis applies only to judicial precedents, i.e., to the ratio decidendi or actual ground of decision of a case cited as authority.” (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 902 [160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41].) “Incidental statements or conclusions not necessary to the decision are not to be regarded as authority.” (Simmons v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 373, 378 [341 P.2d 13].) The reason for this rule was explained by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia (1821) 19 U.S. 264, 399 [5 L.Ed. 257, 290]: “It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.”
This does not mean that expressions of the Supreme Court not necessary to the decisions in which they appear may simply be ignored. “[I]t does not follow that the dictum of a court is always and at all times to be discarded. A correct principle of law may be announced in a given case, although it may not be necessary to there apply it, because of other principles upon *1338which the case then under consideration may be disposed of.” (San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v. Stanislaus (1908) 155 Cal. 21, 28 [99 P. 365], italics in original.) Such dictum, while not controlling authority, carries persuasive weight and should be followed where it reflects a thorough analysis of the issue or reflects compelling logic. (United Steelworkers of America v. Board of Education (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 823, 835 [209 Cal.Rptr. 16]; Graydon v. Pasadena Redevelopment Agency (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 631, 643 [164 Cal.Rptr. 56]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 785, P- 756.)
The discussions in Powell and Hall concerning section 825 are not necessary to those decisions and thus constitute dictum, just as does the Supreme Court’s contrary characterization of this statute in 1980 as providing a period of “48 hours.” (Van Atta v. Scott, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 431.) The dictum in these opinions carries little persuasive weight since the issue is not thoroughly discussed. The most obvious defect in the discussions in Powell and Hall is that the court considered only the first portion of section 825 which states, “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within two days after his arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays . . . .” The court did not discuss the crucial additional language, added in 1961, which states that “when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, such time shall be extended to include the duration of the next regular court session on the judicial day immediately following.” (Italics added.) Having failed to consider the impact of the entire statute, the foregoing discussions by the Supreme Court are of little assistance in deciding the issue now before us.6
Justice Leonard Friedman as author of the Third District’s opinions in Ng v. State Personnel Bd. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 600, 606-607 [137 Cal.Rptr. 387], and People v. Gregg (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 502, 506-507 [85 Cal.Rptr. 273], declined to follow California Supreme Court dictum. In Ng, the Court of Appeal observed with reference to a recent Supreme Court opinion’s discussion of a statute-. “The quoted sentence is dictum, entitled to respect but not binding. [Citation.] The sentence is an elliptical but inaccurate rendition of part of Government Code section 19630. ...[][]... Were the Supreme Court squarely faced with the question, the court would *1339doubtless follow the statute rather than its dictum.” (68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 606-607, italics added.) In Gregg, the Court of Appeal stated: “The per curiam [Supreme Court] opinion did not clothe the statement with reasoning or discussion. In its support the opinion cited no case law . . . . [1j] • • • • [If] We distinguish between ratio decidendi and dictum, because the brief statement. . . cites only secondary authority and, in light of primary authority, represents an erroneous interpretation of the law.” (People v. Gregg, supra, at pp. 506-507.)
I agree with the majority that previous decisions of the Courts of Appeal are also not persuasive because they lack any analysis of the issue. No reasons are given in those opinions for adopting the 48-hour method of calculation, and the alternative possibility of construing the statute to refer to two calendar days as suggested in Powell and Hall is not acknowledged. Since this court is therefore not bound by any prior judicial decisions interpreting the two-day provision of section 825, the statute itself must be examined with particular emphasis on the language added by the 1961 amendment.
In construing the intent of the Legislature in enacting this amendment to section 825, this court must be guided by familiar rules of statutory interpretation. “We begin with the fundamental rule that a court ‘should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In determining such intent ‘[t]he court turns first to the words themselves for the answer.’ [Citation.] We are required to give effect to statutes ‘according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.’ [Citations.] ‘If possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose’ [citation]; ‘a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.’ [Citation.]” (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224], italics added.) Furthermore, “the Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is enacted and to have enacted and amended statutes ‘ “in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing upon them.’” [Citations.]” (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 897 [231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288].)
As noted by the majority (ante, p. 1314, fn. 3), we previously granted appellants’ motion “that the Court take judicial notice of the legislative history of the Penal Code § 825, particularly respecting 1961 amendments to that statute (Stats. 1961, ch. 2209), pursuant to California Evidence Code § 459, subd. (a).” The trial court did not have the benefit of this legislative history. “The interpretation of a statute, however, is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court.” *1340(California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699 [170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856]; see also Evid. Code, § 459, subd. (a).)
“General background materials pertaining to this 1961 legislation” amending section 825 were furnished by the Legislative Intent Service (see Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 219 [185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912]) and included the transcript of a public hearing of the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure conducted on February 18 and 19, 1960, pertaining to “Laws of Arrest.”7 Such documents are the type of material this division has readily consulted in the past. (F & P Growers Assn. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 667, 678 [214 Cal.Rptr. 355]; Post v. Prati (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 626, 634 [153 Cal.Rptr. 511].) Contrary to the opinion of the majority (ante, p. 1314, fn. 4), there is ample precedent and justification for considering interim hearings as part of a statute’s legislative history (Flesher v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 322, 325 [152 Cal.Rptr. 459, 590 P.2d 35]), even hearings conducted prior to the introduction of the specific bill that led to the statutory enactment in question. (Seibert v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 1, 17, 20 [120 Cal.Rptr. 233].)
As appellants correctly note, the trial court’s interpretation of section 825, requiring that an arrestee be brought to court on the second judicial day following his or her arrest regardless of the time of day the arrest was made, would render the 1961 amendment a nullity. The language added to the statute in 1927 already provided that Sundays and holidays were to be excluded from the two-day period within which an arrestee must be taken before a magistrate following the arrest. The addition in 1961 of the qualifying language which begins “provided, however, that when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session,” obviously was intended to extend this period under certain circumstances. It appears that in using the phrase “when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time” (rather than “on a day”) “when the court ... is not in session,” the Legislature understood that the two-day period subject to extension was a 48-hour period rather than two calendar days; under the above-quoted rules of statutory construction, we must deem the Legislature to have been aware of the frequent judicial references to the two-day provision of section 825 as a 48-hour period.
*1341In interpreting section 825, one need not rely only on the presumption that the Legislature was aware of judicial decisions construing the statute. (People v. Overstreet, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 897.) The aforementioned transcript of the hearing of the Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure reflects repeated references (at pp. 4-7) to the two-day proviso under section 825 as a “48-hour” period, including two such references by the Chairman of the Committee, Assemblyman John A. O’Connell. Additionally, the transcript of that hearing reflects several references (at pp. 5, 7), one by the committee chairman, to an opinion in which this court discussed a defendant’s claim “that failure to take him before a magistrate within 48 hours constituted a denial of due process” (People v. Grace (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 68, 78 [332 P.2d 811]), as well as a reference to the opinion in Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.2d 3, in which then-Justice Tray-nor stated for the Supreme Court that under section 825, “Detention beyond the 48-hour statutory maximum without being taken before a magistrate is unquestionably illegal. [Fn. omitted.]” (Id., at p. 9.)8
The majority takes the position that under its interpretation of the statute, the 1961 amendment to section 825 would not be rendered a nullity and the language extending the time “when the two days prescribed herein expire at a time when the court ... is not in session” (§ 825) need not be viewed as surplusage, because “a magistrate in a district which has only one judge or justice, or magistrate ‘on call’ under Penal Code section 810, might be unexpectedly ill, or absent for some reason.” (Majority opn., ante, p. 1314.) The fallacy of this argument is apparent from the following circumstances: (1) section 810 was enacted in 1973, 12 years after the 1961 amendment to section 825; (2) section 849 provides that in the case of a person arrested without a warrant, he or she “shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county . . .” (italics added; see also § 821); therefore, since all judges of all courts *1342in the county are defined as magistrates (§ 808), the absence of a magistrate in a one-judge district should not be assumed to have concerned the Legislature; and (3) not only does the legislative history behind the enactment of the 1961 amendment fail to support the majority’s speculative hypothesis, but on the contrary the testimony and discussion at the aforementioned hearing pertaining to section 825 were concerned almost exclusively with the problem of arraignments in large metropolitan areas and the expiration of the 48-hour period at a time outside regular court hours.
The majority also asserts that the Legislature’s failure to substitute the term “48 hours” for “two days” when it amended section 825 in 1961 reflected legislative recognition that the maximum period of detention, excluding weekends and holidays, comprised two calendar days. (Majority opn., ante, p. 1310.) However, a more reasonable explanation for the legislative choice of phrase in reiterating a “two-day” period is that the Legislature, as already demonstrated, was aware that the statute had been interpreted by courts and law enforcement agencies as providing a 48-hour maximum period of detention prior to the initial court appearance unless extended over a weekend or holiday. The Legislature, had it desired to do so, could have provided for an extension when the two-day period expires “on a day” when the court is not in session instead of referring as it did to expiration “at a time” when court is not in session.
The majority observes that “the Legislature has used the term ‘48 hours’ rather than ‘two days’ when it wished to do so,” citing section 824. (Majority opn., ante, p. 1310.) That statute, enacted in 1981, provides: “When an adult willfully misrepresents himself or herself to be a minor under 18 years of age when taken into custody and this misrepresentation effects a material delay in investigation which prevents the filing of a criminal complaint against him or her in a court of competent jurisdiction within 48 hours, the complaint shall be filed within 48 hours from the time the true age is determined, excluding nonjudicial days.”
The legislative history behind the enactment of section 824, far from supporting the majority’s view, actually provides yet another indication that the Legislature shares the view that section 825’s proviso comprises a 48-hour period, subject to extension when it expires on a weekend or holiday or at a “time” when court is not in session. The first of the two references in section 824 to “48 hours” also supports this characterization of the period in question. In analyzing the need for enactment of section 824, numerous legislative reports referred to section 825 as having established a 48-hour rule. For example, the analysis of Assembly Bill No. 1303 by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice states: “Because of the 48 hour time limit imposed by the present statutes, some adults who are arrested for serious *1343crimes are released from custody.” The analysis of the bill by the Senate Committee on Judiciary, while referring to the requirement “that an adult defendant be brought before a magistrate within two days of her or his arrest,” proceeds under the caption “Need for legislation” to observe: “Because at this time the present 48-hour limitation for filing complaints has often passed, some adult arrestees . . . must be released from custody.” Similarly the third-reading analyses of Assembly Bill No. 1303 by both the Senate Democratic Caucus and the Senate Republican Caucus refer to “the present 48-hour limitation.”
From the foregoing, I conclude that in enacting the 1961 amendment to section 825, the Legislature contemplated the calculation of a 48-hour period, excluding weekends and holidays, beginning at the time of arrest.9 If this 48-hour period expires “at a time when the court... is not in session,” the maximum period of detention extends to the end of the next regular court session on the following judicial day; if the period expires when court is in session, the arraignment must take place at some time during that session.10
B. What Constitutes “Unnecessary Delay”
The trial court’s written statement of decision interpreted case authority as “suggestpng] that where the investigative delay is for a ‘good’ purpose (making sure you have the right man) instead of a ‘bad’ purpose (sweating a confession out of the defendant), a reasonable delay for investigation is permitted as ‘necessary.’ ” The trial court therefore ruled that “time neces*1344sary to conduct a follow-up investigation where necessary for District Attorney evaluation of the case is a necessary delay, except where the purpose is to interrogate the defendant.” However, the court imposed a requirement that the follow-up investigation in all cases in which the felony arrestee remains in custody “be completed no later than the first court day after arrest.” The court below ruled additionally: “Scientific and laboratory work, not necessary to determine the charge against a defendant, will . . . involve ‘an unnecessary delay.’ . . . [H] Accumulation of cases by detectives so as to reduce the number of time-consuming trips to the District Attorney’s office must be classified as ‘unnecessary’ unless the delay is minimal— a matter of hours. However, a delay to the next day in causing the arraignment of a defendant must be classified as unreasonable and therefore unnecessary if done merely to complete investigation in other cases, [fl] The court holds that failure to arraign a defendant on the day of a prosecutor’s decision to charge a defendant is an unnecessary delay if there remained time in that day to arraign the defendant. . . . The court finds that it is feasible for the LAPD to cause same-day arraignment to be made in cases where the filing decision is made during the morning or very early afternoon hours.”
The majority upholds every aspect of the trial court’s holding that LAPD’s routine policies cause “unnecessary delay” in bringing felony in-custody arrestees before a magistrate. For the reasons that follow, I must voice disagreement with certain conclusions reached by the trial court.
Where an arrest is made without a warrant, section 849 directs that at the time the arrestee is taken to court, “a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate.” In such cases, therefore, the arrestee’s appearance in court will necessarily be delayed during the time it takes to determine whether such a complaint should be filed and, where such a determination is made, to physically prepare the document. (People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 327 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]; Stanley v. Justice Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 250.) But while it is unquestioned that the arrestee may be kept in custody for a reasonable period of time not exceeding the aforementioned statutory period while the case is presented to the prosecuting attorney and evaluated by him to determine what charges, if any, should be filed, previous cases have not clarified the extent to which further investigation can properly constitute a part of this process of determining whether charges should be filed.
In People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 329, the California Supreme Court cited with approval the court’s observation in People v. Williams, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 36, 43, that “There is no authority to delay for the purpose of investigating the case.” But the next sentence of the *1345Williams opinion recognized that delay is allowed “for the district attorney to evaluate the evidence for the limited purpose of determining what charge, if any, is to be filed.” The statement in Williams, as to the absence of authority for delay for the purpose of investigating the case, was unsupported by any analysis and unnecessary to the decision, since the record in that case failed to disclose “any reason whatsoever” for the delay. (People v. Williams, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at p. 43.) Quotation of this language in People v. Thompson, pertaining to whether further investigation would justify delay, was also unnecessary to the decision and therefore dictum since the issue before the court in Thompson was whether the arrestee’s appearance before a magistrate could properly be delayed so that the arresting officer could get some sleep. Such a delay was held “unnecessary.” (27 Cal.3d at pp. 328-329.)
An important factor apparently not considered by the courts in Williams and Thompson is that the existence of a reasonable suspicion of guilt justifying an arrest is not by itself a sufficient basis upon which to determine whether criminal charges should be filed. Further investigation will frequently be required either to confirm or refute the arresting officer’s initial conclusions and for the purpose of determining which charges, if any, should be filed. (See Gov. Code, § 26501.) The foregoing decision by the district attorney must be based on the presence or absence of sufficient evidence to convict the accused of the charge in question.11 On the other *1346hand, where sufficient evidence already exists to permit an intelligent filing decision, additional delay in arraignment to permit further investigation is rendered unnecessary, and interrogation of the defendant under such circumstances for the sole purpose of strengthening the prosecution’s case has been held improper if it delays the arraignment. However, interrogation of the arrestee may still be proper where “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety” (New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 656 [81 L.Ed.2d 550, 557, 104 S.Ct. 2626]), such as the need to locate a missing victim (see People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436, 446 [42 Cal.Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753]), or to confirm exculpatory information which could “exonerate the arrestee and obviate the need for formal criminal proceedings” (Stanley v. Justice Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d at p. 250), thereby leading to the suspect’s release.
In People v. Powell, supra, 67 Cal.2d 32, 60-61, the court characterized as improper a delay in arraignment for the purpose of conducting further interrogation. The two suspects in Powell were placed under arrest for the murder of a police officer and the attempted murder of a second officer, and both suspects immediately made voluntary statements implicating themselves in the crime but accusing each other of shooting the officers. The suspects were not brought before a magistrate until three days later, during which time eight increasingly incriminatory statements were obtained from each of them. The Supreme Court’s opinion condemned the practice followed in the investigation.
The decision in Powell, however, has not been interpreted to prohibit all delay in arraignment resulting from interrogation of in-custody suspects. In People v. King (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 817 [76 Cal.Rptr. 145], the defendant and four other suspects were arrested for murder. The defendant was interrogated and gave an incriminating statement prior to his arraignment on the second court day following his arrest. Focusing on the intent of the police, the court found no unnecessary delay: “The delay in arraignment appears to have been brought about, not for the purpose of eliciting damaging statements from an accused, but rather for the purpose of untangling a skein of circumstantial evidence which implicated five suspects in varying degrees and rationally determining from the weight of available evidence which of the five suspects should be publicly charged with murder. The circumstances are thus quite different from those in Powell, supra . . . *1347(Id., at p. 823.) Delay for investigation which included an attempt to obtain admissions from the suspect was also found permissible in People v. Lee, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at pages 519-522 (multiple interrogations over a four-day period prior to arraignment), and People v. Ross, supra, 236 Cal.App.2d at page 369 (officer spoke briefly with both suspects, then put them in adjoining cells containing a hidden microphone).
I therefore conclude that there is no basis in law for the court’s prohibition of any interrogation which delays arraignment of in-custody arrestees within the two-day maximum period of detention allowed under section 825. In my opinion a rule is arbitrary which precludes further investigation delaying the arraignment of a jailed suspect within the two-day period just because that investigation includes interrogation of the suspect. Interrogation under these circumstances may be necessary in order to permit the prosecutor, quite apart from merely strengthening his case against the suspect, to make an informed decision concerning the filing of charges. The determination of what will constitute necessary or justifiable delay is best made on a case-by-case basis rather than by way of a blanket restriction.
I must also voice my disagreement with the majority’s approval of the trial court’s prohibition against any delay for “[sjcientific and laboratory work, not necessary to determine the charge against the defendant.” The results of such investigation may be of vital importance to the prosecutor in making an informed filing decision. In some cases, for example, analysis of blood or semen samples, paint, or shoe or tire markings might exculpate a suspect. There is also no support in the applicable statutes or the cases interpreting them for the trial court’s creation of a oné-day limitation on follow-up investigations of any type. Determination of the permissible length of such delay must be based on the particular facts of each case. (Stanley v. Justice Court, supra, 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 250.) The only maximum limit applicable in all cases is the two-day provision embodied in section 825.
It is apparent from the evidence presented to the trial court that imposing a one-day limit on investigation could encourage the filing of charges which otherwise might have been rejected had they been further investigated, thereby prolonging the time in custody for some suspects whose cases ultimately will have to be dismissed on motion of either the prosecution or the defense. Under some circumstances, the strong interest in avoiding unnecessary prosecutions will best be served by a short delay for necessary investigation within the two-day period under section 825, prior to the expiration of the allowable time for filing charges and arraigning the suspect.
*1348II
Visitation Rights of Prearraignment Arrestees
My principal disagreement with the second portion of the majority’s opinion invalidating certain LAPD policies pertaining to the confinement of prisoners is in the area of visitation rights. With rare exceptions, both misdemeanor and felony arrestees in LAPD jails are allowed no visitors except for attorneys and bailbondsmen. These jails were not designed to include visitation facilities since detainees are held for no more than a few days. Detainees are provided at all reasonable times with either unlimited or substantial access to telephones, which can be used to make only collect calls.
The trial court held that this denial of visitation violates section 2601, subdivision (d) which confers on prisoners the right “To have personal visits . . .,” since the Supreme Court in De Lancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865, 872 [183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142], held on equal protection grounds that “detainees retain rights at least equivalent to those guaranteed state prisoners under sections 2600 and 2601.” The trial court therefore ordered the “development of a plan of visitation within the limitations of present facilities” and further required “any new jail facilities to take into account the statutory need to provide opportunities for visitation.” However, the judgment rendered by the trial court goes much further than any other judicial or administrative implementation of section 2601, subdivision (d) by requiring “reasonable opportunities for visitation on each weekday, Saturday, Sunday and holiday . . . including visitation by minor children of the arrestee in the company of a responsible adult.” A “maximum of two visits per day for each prisoner” must be allowed under the judgment. (Italics added.)
Any attempt to apply the statutory right to visitation to the situation of prearraignment detainees raises obvious practical difficulties in view of the short time such individuals are held in police jail facilities. Section 2601, subdivision (d) does not specify how often such visits must be allowed, and apparently there is no authority specifically addressing the issue.
The regulations promulgated by the Board of Corrections under authority of sections 6030 and 6031 specify that pretrial detainees held in county jail “shall be allowed no fewer than two visits totaling at least one hour per inmate each week.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§ 1006, subd. (b)(3), 1062.) If a comparable right of visitation of an average of one visit every three and a half days were conferred upon prearraignment detainees, it would frequently serve no purpose. The record in the present case demonstrates that *1349misdemeanor arrestees are brought to court, at the latest, on the court day following their arrest. Therefore, misdemeanor arrestees generally would receive no personal visits if two such visits were permitted after one week or one visit only after three and a half days. Felony arrestees would fare only slightly better in light of the previously discussed statutory requirements affecting the time for their arraignment. The vast majority of prearraignment detainees would still be denied a right to such visits.
Apparently in response to this dilemma, the trial court ordered that visitation be allowed on a daily basis. However, such an order goes far beyond the equality of treatment envisioned by the decision in De Lancie and in fact confers upon prearraignment detainees far greater rights to personal visits than those enjoyed either by pretrial detainees held in county jail or state prisoners.
Security considerations, which are a major factor in LAPD’s jail visitation policy, must be paramount in a police department’s supervision of visits to its jail facilities. (§ 2601, subd. (d); De Lancie v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 872, fn. 6.) As observed by the United States Supreme Court, custodial administrators “should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. [Citations.] ‘Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and . . . courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.'’ [Citation.]” (Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 547-548 [60 L.Ed.2d 447, 474, 99 S.Ct. 1861], italics added.)
I submit that the majority’s decision conferring upon prearraignment detainees in city jails a right of two daily visits is unjustified by any legal authority and would impose unreasonable risks and burdens upon LAPD in carrying out its responsibilities in maintaining the city jails.
Conclusion
However beneficial certain improvements in procedure may seem from the standpoint of plaintiffs and others concerned with ameliorating the perceived inadequacies in municipal court arraignment procedures and the condition of city jails, our proper judicial function in the present case must be limited to determining whether the policies and procedures employed by LAPD in administering and managing its jail facilities and transporting prisoners to their initial court appearance run afoul of any provision of constitutional, statutory, administrative, or case law. I find no violations of the law in the LAPD policies and procedures addressed in this dissent. *1350Although many of the improvements sought by plaintiffs may be socially desirable, if they are to come into being, they should be effected appropriately by legislative enactment rather than by judicial decree.
The petition of defendants and appellants for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 18, 1988. Arguelles, J., did not participate therein. Lucas, C. J., and Panelli, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
*1351Appendix DAY OF ARREST TIME OF ARREST DAY & TIME DUE OUT Monday 0001 to 0859 Wednesday 1600 0900 to 1600 Wednesday time of arrest 1601 to 2400 Thursday 1600 Tuesday 0001 to 0859 Thursday 1600 0900 to 1600 Thursday time of arrest 1601 to 2400 Friday 1600 Wednesday 0001 to 0859 Friday 1600 0900 to 1600 Friday time of arrest 1601 to 2400 Monday 1600 Thursday 0001 to 0859 Monday 1600 0900 to 1600 Monday time of arrest 1601 to 2400 Tuesday 1600 Friday 0001 to 0859 Tuesday 1600 0900 to 1600 Tuesday time of arrest 1601 to 2400 Wednesday 1600 Saturday 0001 to 0859 Wednesday 1600 0900 to 1600 Wednesday 1600 1601 to 2400 Wednesday 1600 Sunday 0001 to 0859 Wednesday 1600 0900 to 1600 Wednesday 1600 1601 to 2400 Wednesday 1600 Holiday 0001 to 2400 Time commences to run at 0001 of the court day immediately following the holiday. NOTE; When a legal holiday occurs following the arrest, add an additional 24 hours when computing the day and time due out.

 The record reflects that the judgment rendered by the trial court is to take effect only upon finality of this appeal.

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

 When it was initially enacted, section 825 was intended to apply only to arrests pursuant to warrants. Both the original version of section 825, enacted in 1871, and its predecessor, section 119 of the Criminal Practice Act, enacted 20 years earlier, were placed in a chapter entitled The Warrant of Arrest, a circumstance to be considered in ascertaining the legislative purpose. (American Federation of Teachers v. Board of Education (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 829, 836 [166 Cal.Rptr. 89].) This chapter included section 813 which established, as does its current version, the grounds for issuing an arrest warrant. Section 821, both as originally enacted and in its present version, directs that when an arrest is made, the defendant must be taken before the magistrate who issued the warrant or another magistrate in the same county. Section 825, in its original form, added simply that “The defendant must in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay . . . .” The immediately succeeding provision in the 1872 Code, section 826, specified the procedure if the defendant was taken before a different magistrate from the one who issued the warrant.
An arrest made without a warrant was covered by section 849, enacted in 1872 and placed in another chapter entitled Arrest, By Whom and How Made. Section 849 provided that the accused was to be taken before the nearest magistrate without unnecessary delay and an accusatory pleading “stating the charge against the arrested person, shall be laid before such magistrate.” Although section 849, like section 825, mandates that the initial court appearance take place “without unnecessary delay,” section 849 contains no “two-day” maximum.
This once-clear distinction between section 825, regarding arrests pursuant to warrant, and section 849, controlling warrantless arrests, became blurred over the years. Recently (in 1981) section 824, which expressly deals only with arrests made without a warrant, was added to the chapter entitled The Warrant of Arrest. Furthermore, court decisions consistently have treated section 825 as if it applied to all arrests, with or without a warrant. (See, e.g., People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 329 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883];Dragna v. White (1955) 45 Cal.2d 469, 472-473 [289 P.2d 428]; Barrett, Police Practices and the Law— From Arrest to Release or Charge (1962) 50 Cal.L.Rev. 11, 30, fn. 79; but see, People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 243 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108]; People v. Williams (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 36, 42, fn. 1 [137 Cal.Rptr. 70]; Stanley v. Justice Court (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 250-251 [127 Cal.Rptr. 532].) Accordingly, given the foregoing lengthy history of judicial interpretation, restoration of the originally-intended limited applicability of section 825 to arrests made pursuant to warrant is perhaps beyond judicial reach at this late date, and it may be necessary to assume that section 825 applies to all arrests whether made with or without a warrant.

The arrest in Hall was made on May 19, 1962, after the effective date of the amendment.

The arrests in Powell occurred on March 10, 1963, after the effective date of the amendment.

The majority’s reliance on People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 243-244, is, misplaced. The entire focus of the discussion in Pettingill is on the “unnecessary delay” aspect of section 825. Although the court in Pettingill does make reference to the maximum “two-day detention” authorized by section 825 in its discussion of the Powell case, it also quotes a passage from Powell that cites Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, 46 Cal.2d 3, 10, a case in which the period is described as “48 hours.” No attempt to define the nature of the two-day period is made in Pettingill.

The Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure on June 13, 1961, reported favorably on Senate Bill No. 550, recommending that the bill be amended. As amended, the bill was passed by the Assembly; the Senate concurred in the Assembly amendment, and upon approval by the Governor the bill was chaptered as chapter 2209, amending section 825 effective September 15, 1961.

 “Chairman O’Connell: May I ask—there have been a couple of cases that came out of Los Angeles, Strain and Grace, where the arrestee was held much longer than the forty-eight hours before being arraigned, and I think that [Justice] Vallee criticized the-—
“Mr. Burns [Assistant City Attorney of Los Angeles]: Judge Vallee didn’t count his holidays in one of those cases. He was wrong, but it was too late after he had made the decision— “Chairman O’Connell: My point was that there have been examples of cases where people were not brought before a magistrate in forty-eight hours and I wonder just how often this happens, is there any special reason for it or has there been a change in practice since those cases so that it now never happens. Just what is the answer?
“Mr. Burns: No, it’s happened quite regularly up to, you might say, the People vs. Grace. That was, Rogers vs. Superior Court plus Dragna vs. White and the Grace Case. They were the three cases that finally focussed [s7c] the problem. It’s a problem created by judicial decision - 825, relating to arrests under warrants, Penal Code Section 825 is in the Chapter, Arrests Under Warrant, a warrant arrest. . . .” (Assem. Interim Com. Rep. (1960) Crim. Procedure, Laws of Arrest, p. 5, italics added.)

 Respondents claim that such an interpretation of section 825 would occasionally create anomalies as to the time similarly situated arrestees are initially brought to court. However, such differences in treatment would also result from the rule adopted by the majority and from any other practicable rule. Differences in treatment resulting from minor differences in circumstances unavoidably result from any statute which establishes fixed time limits for the performance of an act. The apparent severity of any disparity in treatment is significantly lessened by the circumstance that section 825 establishes the fixed time period only as an outside limit in which each defendant must be brought to court. The basic limitation applicable under the statute in all situations is that the arrestee be “taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay.” (§ 825; People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 243.)

While the LAPD due-out schedule would require that a person arrested at 9:30 a.m. Monday be arraigned by 9:30 a.m. Wednesday, as appellant agreed at oral argument there is no authority requiring that an arraignment be conducted by a particular hour during a court session. Such a rule could have the absurd result of fostering interruptions of the court’s calendar call by counsel requesting priority as the minute hand of the courtroom clock approaches the 48-hour anniversary of his client’s arrest. It must be assumed that such a result was not intended by the Legislature. As observed in other contexts, “the law does not take fractions of a day into account unless provision is specifically made for them. [Citation.] When an act must be performed on a specified day, performance does not relate to any particular time of day but extends throughout the day.” (Green v. American Cas. Co. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 270, 273 [94 Cal.Rptr. 528].) “Courts may have to count days, but they are not required to count hours and minutes . . . .” (Gordon v. Wolfe (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 162, 166 [224 Cal.Rptr. 481].)

 The time and effort that must go into a prosecutor’s filing decision is apparent from the Uniform Crime Charging Standards (1974) California District Attorneys Association, page 13: “The primary responsibility of a prosecutor in charging is to determine whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict the accused of the particular crime in question and to authorize the filing of appropriate charges.
“1. Basic criteria for charging
“The prosecutor should charge only if the following four basic requirements are satisfied:
“a. The prosecutor, based on a complete investigation and a thorough consideration of all pertinent data readily available to him, is satisfied that the evidence shows the accused is guilty of the crime to be charged.
“b. There is legally sufficient, admissible evidence of a corpus delicti.
“c. There is legally sufficient, admissible evidence of the accused’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
“d. The prosecutor has considered the probability of conviction by an objective fact-finder hearing the admissible evidence. The admissible evidence should be of such convincing force that it would warrant conviction of the crime charged by a reasonable and objective fact-finder after hearing all the evidence available to the prosecutor at the time of charging and after hearing the most plausible, reasonably foreseeable defense that could be raised under the evidence presented to the prosecutor.
“Commentary
“The prosecutor should go through this four-step process in evaluating a case even though these steps are integrally related and the issues often overlap. This four-step process will help prevent the filing of inadequate cases because the failure to consider one or more of these issues separately could cause a prosecutor to overlook an issue or problem in the case.” (See also 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 3-3.9 (2d ed. 1980) pp. 3.53-3.59.)
*1346The trial court’s findings reflect that filing standards closely paralleling the foregoing are routinely followed in Los Angeles County. The district attorney carefully examines the case prior to filing so as to (1) minimize unnecessary incarceration of suspects in weak cases which should not be filed, (2) maximize the prosecutor’s efficiency by giving priority to cases in which conviction is most likely, and (3) avoid overcharging in view of the limitations on plea bargaining imposed by section 1192.7.