Court Opinion

ID: 9946788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 15:18:36.8067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:42.630733
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1543-22

C.G.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

D.W.,

          Defendant-Respondent.

                   Submitted February 5, 2024 – Decided March 1, 2024

                   Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket
                   No. FM-07-0612-17.

                   Ronda Casson Cotroneo, PC, attorneys for appellant
                   (Ronda Lillian Controneo, on the brief).

                   Rodríguez Law Firm LLC, attorneys for respondent
                   (Maritza Rodríguez, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Plaintiff C.G. appeals from the trial court's December 16, 2022 order

denying her request to relocate—with her son Sam—from Kearny to the

Borough of Franklin.1 Based on our review of the record and the applicable

legal principles, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

                                       I.

      Plaintiff and defendant D.W. were married in November 2013, separated

in January 2016, and divorced in June 2017. They had one child together, Sam,

born in 2012. Sam is defendant's only child. Plaintiff married her current

husband, B.A., in 2020. Plaintiff and B.A. have three children together, ages

six, two, and one.

      When the parties divorced, both resided less than a twenty-minute drive

from each other and from Sam's school. The parties executed a separation

agreement wherein they agreed to generally split Sam's time between plaintiff

and defendant equally. They alternated weekends and major holidays and would

split the weekdays.   The marital settlement agreement ("MSA") gave both

parents joint legal and residential custody of Sam. Plaintiff was named parent

1
  We refer to the parties, child, and other family members involved in this case
using either initials or pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the child. See R.
1:38-3(d).
                                                                          A-1543-22
                                       2
of primary residence ("PPR") for education purposes only. The parenting time

outlined in the separation agreement was incorporated into the MSA. After the

divorce,   the   parties   successfully   communicated     and   shared    parental

responsibilities for Sam until this relocation dispute.

      Pursuant to the MSA, defendant retained ownership of the marital home

and has resided there since 2014. Defendant and Sam are the only occupants,

and defendant often works from his home office. He lives approximately ten to

twelve minutes away from Sam's current school. Defendant has worked as an

associate creative director for the same marketing and advertising agency since

the divorce. He testified his company is flexible with his schedule, so he can go

into the office on days he does not have Sam. However, his schedule does not

allow him to transport Sam to and from extra-curricular activities.

      Plaintiff has moved multiple times since the divorce. Initially, she moved

out of the marital home to an apartment in Nutley. Thereafter, she lived in

Harrison and then at two different apartments in Kearny before purchasing her

home in Franklin. Plaintiff has also had several different jobs since the divorce. 2

2
  During the marriage, plaintiff worked as a paralegal for two years but moved
to a different paralegal job. She then worked as a mental health specialist at a
university for two-and-a-half years until the divorce, when she became a
personal trainer. She then opened a cash advance business in 2016 with B.A.'s

                                                                              A-1543-22
                                          3
      In 2018, Sam started kindergarten at Hudson Arts and Science Charter

School ("Hudson Charter") in Kearny, where he remains today. He was referred

for an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") in December 2019 to address

concerns with English and math and to provide speech and occupational therapy.

During the 2021-2022 academic year, Sam was in third grade and received math

and English resource support. Sam's grades slowly improved until, during the

fourth quarter, he got straight A's. He also received math support in 2022-2023

but less frequently. His IEP describes no behavioral problems.

      When Hurricane Ida hit in September 2021, plaintiff's Kearny apartment

flooded, and she began searching for a new home for her growing family .

Shortly thereafter, plaintiff made an offer on a house in Franklin—roughly sixty

miles from her Kearny apartment—and moved into the house in November.

Plaintiff did not tell defendant she had purchased a house until her bid was

accepted in mid-September. At that time, she suggested that Sam live with her

a majority of the time and change schools to one closer to her new home.

      Defendant filed an order to show cause seeking to prevent plaintiff from

relocating and changing Sam's school. On September 30, 2021, the order was

assistance. She also briefly owned a photography studio and then opened a
trucking business.
                                                                           A-1543-22
                                       4
granted, in part, directing Sam to continue attending Hudson Charter, setting a

plenary hearing date, and ordering the parties to choose a mutually agreeable

expert to opine on the best interest of the child. The parties agreed to retain a

joint expert for a best interest custody evaluation of Sam in the context of the

intra-state relocation application.

      The court conducted a hearing over the course of four days between June

and July 2022.3     The court heard testimony from defendant, plaintiff, and

plaintiff's husband, sister, and mother. No expert testimony was presented.

Plaintiff and her witnesses testified regarding Sam's interactions with plaintiff's

family and their various recreational activities. Plaintiff testified Sam "loves

being a big brother" and has a great relationship with his younger siblings. She

testified concerning Sam's relationship with other members of her family and

the close and supportive extended family that lived in proximity to plaintiff.

Plaintiff and her family members also raised concerns regarding Sam's well-

3
    Because we limit our discussion below to the court's analysis of "the
preference" of the child under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) and the court's decision not to
conduct a child interview pursuant to Rule 5:8-6, we only briefly summarize the
trial testimony.

                                                                             A-1543-22
                                        5
being when at defendant's house.4 Plaintiff believed this emotional turmoil to

be serious enough to warrant seeking a therapist for Sam.

      Since the December 2022 order, Sam has continued to attend Hudson

Charter and lived primarily with defendant. Plaintiff acknowledged 2022 was

Sam's best year in school and that he made the honor roll every semester, which

was in part the result of defendant's efforts.5 Defendant testified he always had

Sam attend school in person as opposed to virtual, unlike plaintiff, despite Sam

not liking virtual school. Sam also missed school at times when he was with

plaintiff, but had perfect attendance when with defendant. Notwithstanding

plaintiff's concerns regarding Sam needing therapy, he was only seen by a

therapist once since plaintiff moved to Franklin, and the therapist has not shown

any concern regarding Sam. Defendant also testified that he provides structure

to Sam and teaches him various "real life" skills he needs to learn such as doing

laundry, raking leaves, and shoveling snow. They also cook together and do

various activities and enjoy watching television shows together.

4
   Defendant testified he texted plaintiff stating that Sam "always breaks down
like a little cry baby." Defendant also acknowledged calling Sam derogatory
names in conversations with plaintiff.
5
  In March 2022, prior to the relocation hearing, plaintiff also unilaterally
unenrolled Sam from his school by checking a box on the re-enrollment form
marked "I do not wish to continue enrollment for the upcoming year ."
                                                                           A-1543-22
                                       6
      The trial court determined plaintiff could not relocate with Sam and that

it was in Sam's best interest to remain at Hudson Charter. It entered an order

designating defendant as PPR for educational purposes only and modified the

parenting schedule giving defendant custody during the week, plaintiff custody

on weekends during the school year, and reversing custody in the summer.

Despite the court indicating it would conduct a child interview, Sam was never

interviewed.

                                       II.

      Plaintiff contends the trial court committed reversible error when it

misinterpreted and misapplied the best interests factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4,

and in denying plaintiff's relocation request. Plaintiff further posits the trial

court erred by not interviewing Sam or, in the alternative, failing to articulate

its reasons for not interviewing him. She asserts the trial court erred when it

failed to consider plaintiff's proposed parenting plan.    Plaintiff urges us to

remand to a different judge because the trial judge's ruling expressed a

preference for the outcome.

      Our standard of review is such that we will not disturb a trial judge's

factual findings when they are "supported by adequate, substantial and credible

evidence." Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).

                                                                           A-1543-22
                                       7
We only "disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge

[when] we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to

offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen,

78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). However, "all legal issues are

reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017)

(citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

      Family courts maintain "special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters," so "appellate courts should accord deference to family court

factfinding."   Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).        "Deference is

especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves

questions of credibility.'" Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D.,

149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). "Discretionary determinations, supported by the

record, are examined to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has

occurred." Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 564.

      Courts should apply the best interests analysis to determine "cause" under

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 in all relocation disputes where parents share legal custody. See

A.J. v. R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 176 (App. Div. 2019), where we concluded

                                                                            A-1543-22
                                        8
Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017), also applies to intra-state relocation

cases and that trial courts must apply N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.

      N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) provides the statutory factors for a best interests

analysis, requiring that:

            [i]n making an award of custody, the court shall
            consider but not be limited to the following factors: the
            parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in
            matters relating to the child; the parents' willingness to
            accept custody and any history of unwillingness to
            allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse;
            the interaction and relationship of the child with its
            parents and siblings; the history of domestic violence,
            if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either
            parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the
            preference of the child when of sufficient age and
            capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision;
            the needs of the child; the stability of the home
            environment offered; the quality and continuity of the
            child's education; the fitness of the parents; the
            geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the
            extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior
            to or subsequent to the separation; the parents'
            employment responsibilities; and the age and number
            of the children. A parent shall not be deemed unfit
            unless the parents' conduct has a substantial adverse
            effect on the child.

            [(Emphasis added).]

Failure to conduct an appropriate best interests analysis and application of

incorrect law both constitute reversible error. A.J., 461 N.J. Super. at 182-83.

                                                                           A-1543-22
                                        9
      We confine our analysis to the issue concerning the court's failure to

conduct a child interview. Prior to the commencement of testimony at the trial,

plaintiff requested the court to conduct an interview of Sam. The court noted it

would conduct such interview "at some point in time." The court also invited

the parties to submit proposed questions for the interview. However, when the

court rendered its decision, it noted, as to "the preference of the child" factor

under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), that "neither party accepted the court's invitation to

submit proposed questions, nor was the child produced for an interview ." The

court did not address the factor any further, and there is nothing in the record

besides an initial discussion on the first day of the hearing to suggest any action

was taken to secure an interview.

      Rule 5:8-6 provides in pertinent part:

            The court may, in order to protect the best interests of
            the children, conduct the custody hearing in a family
            action prior to a final hearing of the entire family
            action. As part of the custody hearing, the court may
            on its own motion or at the request of a litigant conduct
            an in camera interview with the child(ren). In the
            absence of good cause, the decision to conduct an
            interview shall be made before trial. If the court elects
            not to conduct an interview, it shall place its reasons on
            the record. If the court elects to conduct an interview,
            it shall afford counsel the opportunity to submit
            questions for the court's use during the interview and
            shall place on the record its reasons for not asking any
            question thus submitted.

                                                                             A-1543-22
                                       10
            [(Emphasis added).]

      As we noted in D.A. v. R.C., the Supreme Court amended Rule 5:8-6 in

2002 to provide trial courts with discretion as to whether to conduct a child

interview in a contested custody case. 6 438 N.J. Super 431, 455 (App. Div.

2014). Importantly, however, we further noted that Rule 5:8-6 "contains equally

clear, non-discretionary" language that mandates "[i]f the court elects not to

conduct an interview, it shall place its reasons on the record." Id. at 456.

      Although the decision to interview a child is now discretionary under Rule

5:8-6, the court must nevertheless evaluate "the preference of the child" pursuant

to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) in making a best interests determination in the context of a

relocation hearing. If the preference of the child can be derived from some other

source, such as expert testimony, it may provide a basis for the court to not

conduct a child interview. The parties in this case agreed to retain a custody

6
  The Rule previously stated that the court "shall" conduct a child interview. R.
5:8-6 (1992). The Supreme Court amended Rule 5:8-6, in part, based on the
recommendation of the Family Practice Committee. "[O]rdinarily . . . mental
health professionals are better equipped than the judge . . . to conduct a
meaningful interview." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt.
1.4.3 on R. 5:8-6 (2024); see Fall & Romanowski, Current New Jersey Family
Law, Child Custody, Protection & Support, § 23:3-6(c). Here, there was no such
interview of the child by a mental health professional which may have provided
some insight to the judge as to the child's preference under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).
                                                                               A-1543-22
                                       11
expert but never did so. Accordingly, the court was left without sufficient

information to address this important factor. Our Supreme Court has noted that

"in all custody determinations, the preference of the child[] . . . must be accorded

'due weight.'" Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 501 (1981) (quoting Lavene v. Lavene,

148 N.J. Super. 267, 271 (App. Div. 1977)). In the absence of expert testimony,

it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze the "preference of the child" factor.

As we noted in Mackowski v. Mackowski,

            Too often, judges deciding issues in the Family Part
            must rely solely on the "voices" of the attorneys who
            prepare the competing affidavits and certifications on
            the pretense that the litigant is speaking. [The judge's
            interview] insures that where custody is a "genuine and
            substantial" issue, the judge will not be insulated from
            seeing and hearing the subject of the dispute. The
            "voice" seen and heard will not be that of the lawyer or
            litigant but that of the child who is the subject of the
            dispute. The value of a properly conducted interview
            enabling the judge to see and hear the child first-hand
            outweighs the possibility of harm that may befall a
            child by being subjected to the interview process. On
            balance, it is not the interview that is ultimately
            harmful, but the custody dispute between the parties
            that potentially wre[a]ks havoc with the child.

            [317 N.J. Super. 8, 14 (App. Div. 1998), superseded by
            statute on other grounds, R. 5:8-6, as recognized in
            D.A., 438 N.J. Super. at 457.]

      Here, in discussing the preference of the child factor, the court noted

"neither party accepted the court's invitation to submit proposed questions, nor

                                                                              A-1543-22
                                        12
was the child produced for an interview." No doubt the better practice would

have been for plaintiff's counsel to more actively pursue the scheduling of the

child interview.   Nevertheless, this is ultimately the court's responsibility,

particularly when it advised the parties of its intent to interview Sam.

      This was not a situation where the child lacked the appropriate age or

maturity to be interviewed. This is also not a circumstance where the child was

refusing to speak to the court, or plaintiff's counsel was somehow interfering

with the court's ability to interview the child. Without the interview or expert

testimony, the court was not in a position to meaningfully address the

"preference of the child" factor under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), and its analysis was,

therefore, incomplete.7 In the absence of a more compelling explanation as to

why the interview was not conducted, we conclude the court misapplied its

discretion in failing to conduct the interview, particularly in the absence of

expert testimony. Accordingly, we are constrained to vacate the court's order

and remand for further proceedings.

7
  Additionally, a child interview may provide the court insight on other factors
under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) above and beyond the "preference of the child." For
example, Sam's interview may inform the court's decision on "the interaction
and relationship of the child with [his] parents and siblings," "the needs of the
child," and "the stability of the home environment." Ibid.
                                                                           A-1543-22
                                       13
      On remand, the court shall conduct an interview of the child and rebalance

the factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). Moreover, because it has been some time

since the trial, we recognize there may be new and relevant information pertinent

to the court's best interest analysis. Accordingly, the parties should be permitted

to submit updated certifications regarding any new information they believe is

relevant for the court's consideration. We leave it to the court's sound discretion

as to whether additional testimony is needed after considering any additional

information provided by the parties. The court shall conduct a case management

conference within thirty days and fix reasonable deadlines for the parties to

submit this additional information. The parties may also submit questions for

Sam's interview.

      Finally, we reject plaintiff's argument that the matter should be remanded

to a different judge. We do not view the court here as having been committed

"to its findings" such that it is necessary to have the matter addressed on remand

by a different fact finder. See N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103

N.J. 591, 617 (1986). The remaining arguments raised on the appeal lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                                             A-1543-22
                                       14