Court Opinion

ID: 9654639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:45:31.056156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:12.038137
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON COURT’S OWN MOTION FOR REHEARING
We granted a motion for rehearing to reconsider the appellant’s grounds of error in light of Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals six days after our original opinion in this cause.
Moreover, we must clarify the language in our original opinion to eliminate any possible confusion concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s instruction on voluntary manslaughter. We expressly hold that the evidence did not raise sudden passion rising from an adequate cause. Any language in the original opinion that can be interpreted as holding otherwise is expressly disavowed.
In overruling appellant’s first ground of error, we held that, although the charge on voluntary manslaughter was erroneously submitted to the jury by the trial court, the error was beneficial to the appellant. We also held that “acting under sudden passion rising from an adequate cause” was not an element of voluntary manslaughter, and the State was not required to introduce evidence of sudden passion rising from an adequate cause to sustain this conviction. We now find that this language is in direct conflict with the new holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals in Bradley. We, therefore, agree with appellant’s contention in his first ground of error that the trial court erroneously submitted an issue of voluntary manslaughter to the jury. The error, however, does not *30require a reversal of the conviction unless appellant timely objected to the charge on the basis that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. As the Court of Criminal Appeals stated in Bradley (688 S.W.2d at p. 853):
We hasten to add that this disposition of the case hinges on the fact that appellant vociferously objected to the inclusion of the voluntary manslaughter charge. Failure to object to the charge when given on the ground that the evidence does not support it would signal acquiescence on the part of the accused in the trial court’s judgment that sudden passion was raised.
In our original opinion, we held that appellant had failed to object to the charge on the ground that voluntary manslaughter was not raised by the evidence. Since the disposition of this case now hinges on the objection made by defense counsel at trial, we set forth the objection:
MR. BANALES (defense counsel): Your Honor, we would have one objection. Your Honor, we first recognize that when we had the Voir Dire that I told the jury that there might be the possibility that lesser included offenses might be submitted to the jury in the Court’s Charge. And, as a matter of fact, I submitted to the Court with copies to the Prosecution a proposed Charge that included three lesser included offenses and those were voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault and assault. I’ve talked to my client regarding, as I understand, the law of lesser included offenses. And after careful and deliberate discussions with my client on this particular issue my client and I have agreed that we would not wish to submit to the jury any lesser included offense. Whether based on the evidence or not. We recognize the consequences. My client has instructed me to urge the Court not to submit the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter or of involuntary manslaughter or of criminally negligent homicide or of aggravated assault or of assault. In effect what we’re asking the Court to do is to submit to the jury the sole issue of murder. And upon that basis with my client’s instructions and after having discussed with him and explained to him the law of the lesser included offenses we choose now not to have those lesser included offenses submitted. The second objection that we have, Your Honor, is that we feel that there is no evidence to support the submission of the lesser charges of involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. For one, the culpability requirement I don’t think is important in any degree by the evidence. I think all the evidence shows voluntary conduct on my client’s part. I don’t think that there’s any degree of recklessness in there. I don’t think that there’s any degree of criminal negligence in the evidence. Consequently, we would ask the Court not to submit the offenses of involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide.
COURT: All right, taking the second matter first this really is an objection to submitting involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide on the grounds that there’s no evidence to support the submission.
MR. BANALES: Yes, sir.
COURT: And your first objection, I take it, is that you’re objecting to the case being submitted on any lesser included offenses of murder to be submitted and requesting it to be submitted either as murder or not guilty?
MR. BANALES: Yes, sir.
COURT: In other words, murder or nothing.
MR. BANALES: Right.
COURT: State?
MS. COLTRIN: On the first contention regarding the other lesser included offenses and whether the evidence supports the finding I don’t like to be arguing what Defense Counsel may argue later, but I do think that there is evidence raised that Defendant was angered by a drunk pushing him, spitting. May have spit on his face, was yelling at him. Had his hands up. And I think that that *31raises the issue of voluntary manslaughter. As far as the involuntary manslaughter and the criminal negligence there was testimony again by the Defense himself that when he kicked the Defendant — excuse me, when he kicked the victim he only meant to keep him down. He didn’t mean to hurt him. And I think that that would raise the issue of involuntary manslaughter and criminal negligence.
COURT: Well, the first objection is considered by the Court, to say the least, it’s very unusual to have such an objection come from the Defense. The Court feels that it has the duty and the responsibility of correctly charging the jury. Accordingly, the Court will overrule the first objection or state it (sic) differently will deny the request that the case be submitted on no lesser included offenses. Second objection is denied or overruled. Anything else?
MR. BANALES: We’re ready, Your Honor.
MS. COLTRIN: Not from the State.
We now adhere to our original holding that error was not preserved. Appellant’s counsel made essentially two objections. His first was that his client and he agreed that no lesser included offenses should be submitted to the jury, “whether based on the evidence or not.” Counsel’s second objection was that the evidence did not raise the lesser included offenses of involuntary manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide.
As noted in the original opinion, the trial court charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated assault and assault. From appellant’s objection, it is clear that, with regard to involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide, the objection was specifically directed to the sufficiency of the evidence. With regard to voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault and assault, the extent of the objection was only that appellant did not wish for the jury to be charged on these issues. As noted in the original opinion, an appellant is not entitled to pick and choose which offenses should be included in the charge, irrespective of the evidence. Humphries v. State, 615 S.W.2d 737 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). The trial court, thus, correctly overruled appellant’s wholesale objection to the inclusion of all lesser included offenses on the basis that appellant “did not wish to submit to the jury any lesser included offenses.”
Appellant’s second objection, raising sufficiency of the evidence, was limited to the issues of involuntary manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. This objection was insufficient to support the ground of error now raised by appellant on appeal.
We further note that at no time did appellant’s counsel argue that the evidence was insufficient to raise sudden passion rising from an adequate cause. This matter simply was not addressed by appellant’s objection or argument. We adhere to our original disposition of appellant’s second ground of error.
Appellant has also filed a motion for rehearing. We have considered his arguments, and they are without merit. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, except as to punishment. The punishment assessed by the trial court is set aside, and the cause is remanded for proper assessment of punishment and pronouncement of sentence.