Court Opinion

ID: 9919478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:27.751866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.361654
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                                  RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2022-SC-0278-MR

JORDAN G. ALFORD                                                         APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM SIMPSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE MARK A. THURMOND, JUDGE
                             NO. 18-CR-00305

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                    AFFIRMING

        Following a jury trial, Jordan Alford was found guilty of wanton murder

by a Simpson County jury and sentenced to twenty years’ by the trial court in

accordance with the jury’s recommendation. Alford now appeals his murder

conviction as a matter of right, asserting errors regarding: (a) the exclusion of

certain “state of mind” evidence; (b) improper opinion testimony by an

investigating detective; (c) jury instructions allowing for rejection of his self-

protection defense if Alford was the “initial aggressor;” (d) the refusal of the trial

court to give a missing evidence instruction; and (e) the denial of Alford’s

motion for a directed verdict. Lastly, Alford argues that this Court should

determine that he was immune from prosecution based upon our

Commonwealth’s self-defense statutes. Finding none of his contentions

meritorious, we affirm his conviction and sentence.
                 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Damian Cook was nineteen years old when he was beaten to death by

Alford. Alford admitted striking Cook, but it was disputed whether Alford acted

in self-defense or to intimidate or enact revenge on Cook based on threats Cook

made to Alexis Olliphant and Willa Jean Davenport.

      For three weeks, Cook had been living in a garage in a trailer park in

Franklin, Kentucky that belonged to the mother of a friend. His friend’s mother

had allowed him to stay there after Cook’s own mother had “put [him] out on

the street.”

      Olliphant testified extensively about her interactions with Cook. She

explained that Cook had been her friend but had gotten “back on drugs.” She

heard that Cook had told people he was responsible for breaking into the trailer

she shared with her boyfriend, and he had taken their money, a watch, a

marijuana plant, and her boyfriend’s car.

      During the late evening of August 6, 2018, Olliphant and her boyfriend

went out on the streets of their trailer park looking to confront Cook. When

they found him, Olliphant put him in a chokehold while her boyfriend hit him

repeatedly while wearing mixed martial arts (MMA) gloves. Following this

assault, Olliphant immediately started taunting Cook on Facebook messenger

with offensive language inviting Cook to come to her residence for another

confrontation. Cook ignored both the early messages and a phone call made by

Olliphant but finally started to respond with threats including stating he had

“30 rounds” implying he had a firearm he would use and messaged a picture of

                                       2
himself in dark clothes, a hood and a bandana over his face. Olliphant decided

to tell her roommate Davenport about these threats. Davenport in turn called

her uncle Alford and spoke to him about what was happening. The next day,

August 7, 2018, Alford and his sister Amie Alford (who is Davenport’s mother),

drove from Tennessee to Franklin, Kentucky.

      Olliphant testified that after Amie and Alford arrived, she showed them

the threatening messages from Cook and Amie and Alford armed themselves

with a stick and a bat from their car’s trunk. Olliphant further testified that the

three women (Olliphant, Davenport and Amie) together with Alford walked to

the garage where Cook was living but that she stayed up on the roadside with

Davenport while Amie and Alford went down the driveway to Cook’s garage.

Olliphant did not hear any dialogue and did not see Cook. She did however

hear “two loud thuds.”

      Davenport testified that after Alford and Amie arrived at the mobile home

park, they discussed the messages Olliphant had received from Cook.

Afterwards, Alford was approached by a neighbor, Jimmy Hoskins, who spoke

with him. According to Davenport, Alford only knew Cook based on pictures

and messages that Olliphant showed Alford on her phone. According to

Davenport, Amie grabbed a “tire thumper” from her car’s back seat and Alford

had taken “a stick” from the trunk prior to being given a bat by Hoskins. At the

garage where Cook was living, Amie told Davenport and Olliphant to stay on

the road while she and Alford went towards the garage. Alford entered the

garage and Davenport stated that she could see Alford raise his arm, she heard

                                        3
but did not see two strikes. After leaving the garage, Davenport testified that

Alford said, “I’ve been hit like that a few times and pulled through” and gave

the bat back to Hoskins.

      Amie testified that Alford had informed her that Davenport and Olliphant

had been trying to reach her, they were being threatened by a neighbor in their

trailer park and Alford volunteered to go with her to Kentucky since he did not

want her going alone. Upon arriving in Kentucky, Amie found the two young

women to be distraught, stating they had been up all night in fear over the

messages. After Olliphant and Davenport pointed out the garage where Cook

was staying, Amie testified she told the young women to stay on the road.

According to Amie, the entrance to the garage was open wide enough for

someone to walk through; Alford went in first and told Amie to wait outside

because Cook might have a firearm. Amie stated she heard Alford tell Cook that

he had “f----ed with the wrong family.” Amie explained that she then went

inside the garage and saw Alford swing at Cook but did not see him strike Cook

because of where Alford was standing. She admitted that she struck Cook in

the leg while he was seated on a sofa and knocked a stereo off a table. While

walking back, Alford told Amie “I got him good a couple of times.” When

questioned regarding seeing a knife, that was later photographed at the scene

by police, Amie testified that she had not seen one.

      Alford in turn testified that while he had looked at Cook’s Facebook page,

he had never met Cook and knew nothing of him other than what he was told

by Olliphant, Davenport and Hoskins. According to Alford, Hoskins told him

                                        4
that Cook was known for having a knife or a gun on him and gave him the bat

to defend himself. Based upon what he knew at the time, Alford testified he

believed he would be in danger when he met with Cook, but he did not intend

to harm Cook.

      Alford explained that when he arrived at Cook’s garage, Cook was seated

on a couch and Cook “waved him in.” Alford testified that after he asked Cook

to stop intimidating his family and stealing from them, Cook lunged off the

couch at Alford with a knife trying to kill him. In response, Alford struck Cook

with the bat. Alford did not believe he had hit Cook very hard and Cook didn’t

fall to the ground but sat back on the couch. After leaving Cook’s, Alford

testified he returned the bat to Hoskins.

      None of these four participants contacted the police, called for medical

assistance, or went back to check on Cook’s condition. Amie and Alford drove

home to Tennessee. Approximately two hours later, two of Cook’s neighbors

found him on the floor of the garage. According to the men, Cook was breathing

but unconscious and it looked like he had been “beaten half to death.”

      Detective Amos investigated the circumstances surrounding Cook’s death

and personally observed the position of Cook’s body in the garage and the

location of Cook’s wounds before Cook was transported to the hospital. He later

attended Cook’s autopsy.

      External signs of Cook’s injuries included a large hematoma that

projected out approximately three inches from his skull and another on the

right side of the crown of his skull. Cook was transported to the Franklin

                                        5
Medical Center and then flown to a trauma center in Nashville, but he never

regained consciousness. In Nashville he was pronounced brain dead and life

support was subsequently withdrawn on August 11, 2018. Cook’s autopsy

showed a centerline skull fracture, orbital bone fracture, bleeding on the brain

and herniation of the brain all resulting from blunt force injuries to the head.

      Olliphant was charged with complicity to commit murder; she pled guilty

to first-degree wanton endangerment and was sentenced to five years’

imprisonment. Davenport was also charged with complicity to commit murder;

she pled guilty to first-degree wanton endangerment and was sentenced to five

years’ imprisonment. Amie was charged with murder but eventually pled guilty

to first-degree manslaughter and received a fifteen-year sentence.

      A five-day jury trial on Alford’s charges was conducted and concluded on

March 15, 2022. The trial court instructed the jury on wanton murder and the

lesser included crimes of second-degree manslaughter and reckless homicide.

The trial court also instructed the jury on self-defense albeit with an “initial

aggressor” qualification. The jury found Alford guilty of wanton murder.

      During sentencing, the jury was provided with a sentencing range of

twenty to fifty years’, or life. The jury recommended a sentence of twenty years’.

The Simpson Circuit Court sentenced Alford in accordance with this

recommendation with credit for time served.

                                         6
                               II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A.      Did the trial court err by excluding certain “state of mind”
        evidence as hearsay? - Preserved

        Alford asserts that the trial court committed reversible error on two

separate occasions by: (1) not allowing Alford to testify about what he had been

told about Cook by Hoskins, the man who had allegedly given him the bat

which he used to kill Cook; and, (2) not allowing him to admit a photograph

from Cook’s Facebook profile which showed him wearing a bandana around his

face.

        Alford argues that this evidence should have been admitted as it went to

his state of mind and, given his claim of self-defense, he should have been

allowed to fully establish the basis for his fear of Cook and the reasonableness

of his actions. Prior to confronting him, the only things Alford knew about Cook

were what he had been told by others including Hoskins, the messages shown

to him, and, allegedly, the photograph on Cook’s Facebook profile.

        1.    Did the trial court err by excluding Alford’s testimony
              restating what he had allegedly been told by Hoskins? -
              Preserved

        Alford was not able to call Hoskins as a witness as he died prior to the

trial. Therefore, Alford was the only one who could testify about the warnings

he received from Hoskins about Cook.

        Alford testified that Hoskins had stated to him, “[l]ook man you should

probably take something with you,” that “[Cook] has been known to have a

knife or a gun, he is known to have a weapon on him,” and “[y]ou [Alford]

should probably take something with you.”
                                         7
      The Commonwealth objected to Alford’s obvious hearsay testimony, and

the trial court admonished the jury to disregard it. The trial court ruled that

Hoskins’s statements could only come in under Kentucky Rules of Evidence

(KRE) 803(3) to show the declarant’s (Hoskin’s) state of mind but that Alford

could testify to his own state of mind, and why he believed what he did, without

restating the hearsay statements made by Hoskins.

      While Alford is correct that the impression Hoskins’s statements made

upon him may have helped form his opinion of Cook and made him fearful of

Cook, therefore making this hearsay conversation relevant to his defense of

self-preservation, we do not need to analyze the hearsay statements in that

context since, in this instance, there was ultimately no prejudice to Alford.

      The trial court allowed Alford to testify on direct that, based on his

conversation with Hoskins concerning Cook, Alford believed he needed a

weapon to defend himself. Additionally, while being cross-examined by the

Commonwealth, Alford testified that Hoskins told him he should probably take

something for protection, handed Alford the bat, and told him he should take it

to protect himself from Cook. Following Alford’s written motion for a new trial

which contained this present argument, the trial court determined that given

the abundance of subsequent testimony that Alford provided to the jury

regarding what Hoskins had told him, and how he reacted to such information,

the issue of the original hearsay ruling and admonishment had become moot.

After considering Alford’s testimony, we agree that any error by the trial court

in precluding Alford’s hearsay testimony was harmless.

                                        8
       2.   Did the trial court err in excluding a photograph of Cook
            which Alford alleged to have viewed on Cook’s Facebook
            profile? - Preserved

      At trial, Alford attempted to introduce a photograph of Cook found on

Cook’s Facebook profile, which showed Cook wearing a bandana as a mask.

The Commonwealth objected on the basis that this photograph was hearsay.

Alford explained that because he had not met Cook earlier, he looked him up

on Facebook while he and his sister were traveling to Kentucky. Alford argued

he was not offering the photograph for the truth of the matter asserted but for

the fact that Cook was wearing the bandana as a mask, which confirmed

Olliphant and Davenport’s statements that he wore a mask, thus giving Alford

a basis for believing they were telling the truth. Alford also argued that Cook’s

“demeanor and his pictures caused [Alford] concern.”

      The trial court ruled that the photograph constituted hearsay evidence

and for it to come in, the photograph would have to be reflective of the

declarant’s (Cook’s) state of mind, not the listener’s (Alford’s) pursuant to KRE

803(3). Determining that the photograph was not pertinent to Cook’s state of

mind, the trial court excluded its admission.

      Alford now argues that the admission of the Facebook photograph would

have allowed the jury to infer: Alford should have reasonably been in fear of

Cook; Cook was prone to violence; Cook was armed; and/or Cook was more

likely to have been the initial aggressor necessitating Alford striking him in self-

defense.

                                         9
      Online social media has become an ever-present fact of life in

contemporary society serving to record, accurately or not, both everyday

activities and tragic events. As such, it can be a treasure trove of evidence for

use in both criminal and civil proceedings.

      We must address this Facebook photograph in two ways, considering the

content of the photograph itself and as a piece of digital media associated with

Cook by being on his Facebook profile. For the latter issue, we must first

discern the photograph’s relevancy and then give consideration to its

authenticity.

              a. Should the photograph have been admitted?

      We initially consider whether the trial court was correct to determine that

the photograph constituted hearsay. Hearsay is defined in KRE 801(c) as “a

statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or

hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”

KRE 801(a) defines statements as being: “(1) An oral or written assertion; or

(2) Nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an

assertion.”

      Photographs are generally not hearsay since they usually do not contain

or represent a “statement” or “assertion,” but instead are the memorialization

of a particular moment in time.

      The next consideration is whether the photograph could properly be

admitted based on Alford’s justifications, that it was relevant for understanding

his state of mind when he confronted Cook and helped to justify Alford’s

                                        10
actions. Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. KRE 402. Evidence is

relevant if it is material and probative. KRE 401. It is material if it goes to a fact

of consequence in the case, and it is probative if it tends to make a matter of

fact even marginally more or less likely. Id. Furthermore, the standard for

admission of evidence is only whether it makes a relevant issue more or less

probable, not whether it compels a conclusion. Bush v. Commonwealth, 839

S.W.2d 550, 557-58 (Ky. 1992).

      We have addressed these issues in specific regard to self-defense

matters.

      “In self-defense cases, fear by the defendant of the victim is an
      element of the defense and can be proved by evidence of violent
      acts of the victim, threats by the victim, and even hearsay
      statements about such threats, provided that the defendant knew
      of such acts, threats, or statements at the time of the encounter.”
      Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, §
      2.15[4][d] (4th ed. 2003). Such evidence is admissible because it is
      not offered to prove the victim’s character or to show action in
      conformity therewith, but to prove the defendant’s state of mind—
      his fear of the victim—at the time he acted in self-defense. Saylor v.
      Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Ky. 2004).

Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 779 (Ky. 2013) (footnote omitted).

      The photograph’s effect on Alford is a valid consideration as it supported

his impression, mistaken or not, that Cook could be a threat and added

credence to his impression that Olliphant and Davenport were being truthful

about the threat that Cook posed. This provided context for Alford’s later

encounter with Cook and could have contributed to the lens through which

Alford viewed Cook. The trial court erred in not allowing the admission of the

                                         11
photograph on hearsay grounds as it was not hearsay and was otherwise both

relevant and probative.

      If the photograph’s content had been properly deemed admissible, the

next hurdle would have been a determination of whether the photograph was

actually Cook’s. To do that, material posted to social media must be properly

authenticated. 1

             b. How should a social media photograph properly be
                authenticated prior to admission?

      The next area of inquiry is the ability of the trial court to reliably

authenticate what is being proffered. Meaning, is the item presented (as

originally found online) actually what the party claims it is?

      Traditional authentication rules apply to Facebook posts, whether such

posts consist of a profile page entry, message, photograph or video.

      Under KRE 901, a document must be authenticated before it can be

admitted into evidence. While the proponent’s burden is slight, it is

nonetheless real and requires a showing “sufficient to support a finding that

the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” KRE 901(a); Johnson v.

Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563 (Ky. 2004).

      In our pre-internet opinion in Beason v. Commonwealth, 548 S.W.2d

835, 837 (Ky. 1977) (quoting 2 McCormick on Evid. § 212, 527 (1972)), we held

      1 In the context of this case, unless there was a claim that the photograph was

not publicly accessible on Facebook, the necessity of authenticating the photograph
would be limited. Alford’s alleged subjective fears did not depend on the photograph’s
authenticity, only on its existence and how it depicted Cook.

                                          12
“[i]f the offered item possesses characteristics which are fairly unique and

readily identifiable and if the substance of which the item is composed is

relatively impervious to change, the trial court is viewed as having broad

discretion to admit merely on the basis of testimony that the item is the one in

question and is in a substantially unchanged condition.” However, if the offered

evidence “is of such a nature . . . to be susceptible to alteration by tampering or

contamination, sound exercise of the trial court's discretion may require a

substantially more elaborate foundation.” Id. (quoting 2 McCormick on Evid.

§ 212, at 527 (1972)).

      These principles still hold and as we have stated “are perhaps stronger

today, in light of technological advancements.” Brafman v. Commonwealth, 612

S.W.3d 850, 866–67 n. 67 (Ky. 2020). In Brafman we stated that “[t]rial courts

must understand how easy it is for anyone to present themselves as someone

they are not on social media, in anonymous online forums, or through cell

phone communication, or to use such technology to manufacture a profile in

someone else’s name” and “texts and chats can be selectively solicited or

deleted by the recipient at will.” Id.

      Such concerns become even more imperative given the constant

advancement and ubiquity of software which now allows the most

unsophisticated of users to manipulate images with professional-quality

results. The emergence of artificial intelligence, with the capacity and initiative

to manipulate digital images—without user input—will only serve to further

                                         13
compromise our determinations of authenticity unless such advancements are

both recognized and addressed by our courts.

      When it comes to materials found on the web, one commentary on

Federal Rules of Evidence 901, which essentially mirrors our own KRE 901,

suggests:

      To authenticate a printout of a web page, the proponent must offer
      evidence that: (1) the printout accurately reflects the computer
      image of the web page as of a specified date; (2) the website where
      the posting appears is owned or controlled by a particular person
      or entity; and (3) the authorship of the web posting is reasonably
      attributable to that person or entity. Evidence that may
      corroborate these points could include testimony of others who
      saw the posting on the website, continuation of the posting on the
      website so that it is available to be seen by the court, or evidence
      that the party to whom the posting is attributed made similar
      postings or published the same information elsewhere.”

Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 5 Federal Evidence § 9:9 (4th

ed.) (updated May 2014).

      While it does not appear that either the trial court or the Commonwealth

questioned whether or not the Facebook profile photograph of Cook was

authentic, care must be taken when a court is faced with items which allegedly

were taken from the internet.

            c. The error in excluding the photograph was harmless as it
               was cumulative of other admitted evidence

      The photograph, if properly authenticated as existing online and being

viewed by Alford, should have been admitted not for any message it may have

communicated, but for the effect the photograph had upon Alford. The

photograph should have been considered relevant given Alford’s testimony that

he acted in self-defense and his viewing of the arguably threatening photograph
                                       14
occurred in proximate time to his encounter with Cook. However, even

assuming Alford could have, if given opportunity, properly authenticated the

photograph as being online and available to viewing by him, we can still not

find reason to set aside his verdict because the photograph was cumulative.

      Regarding the issue before the jury of Alford’s alleged fear of Cook, and

his apprehension at confronting him, any error by the trial court in refusing to

allow the Facebook profile photograph was harmless. Alford was able to put on

his full theory of defense: Davenport and Olliphant were in fear of Cook, Cook

had sent messages and a photograph that Olliphant found threatening, Alford

was apprehensive of meeting Cook because of what Davenport, Olliphant and

Hoskins had told him, Alford had feared Cook based upon what he saw on

Cook’s Facebook profile, Hoskins was the source of the bat used by Alford, and

Alford had reason to believe Cook was possibly armed. Even without placing

Cook’s Facebook profile into evidence, Alford was able to testify that his viewing

of the profile made him apprehensive of Cook.

      In sum, while the trial court erred in excluding the photograph as

hearsay when it should have appropriately been admitted for its effect on

Alford, the excluded evidence was cumulative, and its exclusion was not so

prejudicial to Alford as to necessitate a retrial.

B.    Did the trial court err by allowing a detective to testify regarding
      matters where he was not qualified to give an opinion? - Partially
      Preserved

      Alford next claims that on four separate occasions, Detective Amos gave

impermissible testimony when he: (1) opined that Cook was sitting when

                                         15
struck; (2) opined Olliphant’s boyfriend could not have struck the fatal blow

while wearing MMA gloves; (3) described what defensive wounds are; and (4)

answered hypotheticals involving when self-defense was appropriate.

      In the first instance, the Commonwealth asked the investigating detective

if, “based on your training and experience would Jordan Alford be able to strike

[Cook] on the top of his head while he was standing?” Alford’s counsel objected

that this called for expert testimony. The trial court overruled the objection but

asked that a foundation be laid. Detective Amos was asked if he had any

training where he “would be able to determine where someone would strike

somebody else based upon their heights?” Detective Amos responded in the

affirmative and stated that he had at the police academy during baton training.

Alford did not renew his objection, nor did he ask for a Daubert 2 hearing.

      The Commonwealth then restated his initial question and asked “based

on your training and experience, and looking at this investigation would

[Alford] be able to strike [Cook] on the top of his head while [Cook] was

standing?” Detective Amos answered, “no.”

      KRE 702 “permit[s] opinion evidence from experts providing ‘scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge’ if it will ‘assist the trier of fact’ in

understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue.” Gray v.

Commonwealth, 480 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Ky. 2016). In order to testify as an

      2 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

                                          16
expert, “a witness [must be] qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education[.]” KRE 702.

      In Alexander v. Swearer, 642 S.W.2d 896, 897 (Ky. 1982), we said that

“[e]ssential fairness in a trial requires that the trial court carefully scrutinize

the qualifications and the testimony of the officer before permitting his opinion

testimony to be submitted to a jury[,]” and in this instance we are satisfied here

that Detective Amos’s qualifications and personal observations were sufficient

to allow him to testify as to what he believed were the relative positions of the

two parties at the time Cook was struck based upon what he saw regarding the

position of Cook’s body, the location of Cook’s head wounds, and the relative

heights of Alford and Cook. Furthermore, such testimony falls more towards

general lay testimony where a witness would understand what wounds can be

inflicted based on whether the person is sitting or standing. Even were we to

determine that Detective Amos’s testimony in this area had been expert

evidence, the trial court was not requested to hold a Daubert hearing before the

testimony was admitted and such was not required here. 3

      Next, the trial court also overruled Alford’s objection that there was a

lack of foundation to Detective Amos testifying that he did not believe the MMA

      3 See City of Owensboro v. Adams, 136 S.W.3d 446, 451 n.1 (Ky. 2004)

(“Nevertheless, a court need not always hold a Daubert hearing even when the
evidence is offered in a jury trial, Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 667 (6th Cir.
2000), though it should do so when admissibility is not obvious from the record.
Commonwealth v. Christie, Ky., 98 S.W.3d 485, 488 (2002).”); Tharp v. Commonwealth,
40 S.W.3d 356, 367-68 (Ky. 2000) (holding that trial court’s failure to conduct Daubert
hearing sua sponte is not palpable error).

                                          17
gloves worn by Olliphant’s boyfriend—when he had previously assaulted

Cook—could have caused Cook’s fatal injuries.

      The Commonwealth argues that the detective’s opinions were admissible

because each was rationally based upon his own perceptions drawn from his

personal investigation of the crime. Alford argues that Detective Amos was not

qualified to give his opinions on matters actually falling under KRE 702.

      However, in this instance we determine that Detective Amos’s testimony

as to whether the MMA gloves worn by Olliphant’s boyfriend could have caused

Cook’s ultimately fatal injuries would more reasonably fall under the detective’s

generalized capacity to testify. “The degree to which a witness may give an

opinion, of course, is predicated in part upon whether and the extent to which

the witness has sufficient life experiences that would permit making a

judgment as to the matter involved.” Mondie v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d

203, 212 (Ky. 2005) (citing Richard H. Underwood & Glen Weissenberger,

Kentucky Evidence 2004 Courtroom Manual 343 n. 24 (Anderson Publishing Co.

2003).

      Alford presented no testimony and no evidence whatsoever that

Olliphant’s boyfriend’s act of hitting Cook while wearing padded MMA gloves,

the day before Alford repeatedly struck Cook in the head with a bat, could have

been the actual cause of the horrific head injuries or the brain injuries that

resulted in Cook’s death. There was no issue presented in this matter as to

who, or what instrument, caused Cook’s death and we will not entertain such

new notions on appeal.

                                       18
      Next, Alford argues that it was improper for the trial court to allow the

detective to offer testimony regarding defensive wounds. On direct examination,

the Commonwealth asked Detective Amos what defensive wounds were to

which Alford’s counsel objected stating that a foundation based on his training

would first need to be laid. The trial court overruled the objection and Detective

Amos testified that defensive wounds were wounds someone could sustain if

they were being attacked and stuck their hands up to stop the attack resulting

in injuries to their hands or arms. Detective Amos further testified that when

he attended Cook’s autopsy, he saw no defensive injuries. No objection was

made to the detective’s testimony as to whether he observed defensive wounds

on Cook’s body.

      We find no error in the trial court allowing the detective’s limited

testimony regarding what constitutes defensive wounds and further find no

error in Detective Amos testifying whether Cook’s body showeds signs of

defensive wounds. Both of these areas of inquiry fall readily within the training,

experience, and personal observations of this detective and no further

qualifications were necessary.

      Lastly, Alford argues that Detective Amos’s opinions in response to

hypothetical questions posed regarding self-defense were improper. On re-

direct, the Commonwealth asked the detective, “[i]f someone comes into the

homeowner’s home, one with a baseball bat and the other with a stick or some

sort of wooden object, would, in that scenario, would the homeowner have the

right to protect themselves?” No objection was made by Alford and the detective

                                        19
agreed the homeowner would have that right. The Commonwealth then asked,

“[i]f the homeowner had protected themselves in that situation would the

attacker have a right to self-defense?” At this juncture Alford’s counsel did

object stating the Commonwealth was getting “off” and was venturing into

“legal stuff.” The trial court overruled this objection because Alford’s own

counsel had been allowed to ask similar types of questions regarding self-

defense on cross examination. The detective went on to answer that if an

armed attacker were in a homeowner’s house and the homeowner was

defending himself, “then the attacker would not have the self-defense right.”

      We agree with the trial court that Alford “opened the door” to this line of

questioning by the Commonwealth when his own counsel asked the detective

hypothetical questions during cross-examination about self-defense including

regarding a scenario where one person was lunging at another with a knife. See

Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky. 2009).

      On appeal, Alford argues that Detective Amos’s testimony constituted

legal opinions which invaded the province of the jury. That is true and we do

find the entire line of questioning, by both Alford and the Commonwealth, to

have been inappropriate and unnecessary to the jury’s understanding of the

issues or the law in our Commonwealth. It is not the province of law

enforcement officers to inform the jury as to what our laws are or how they are

to be applied. Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 32 (Ky. 1998).

      We note that the jury was correctly instructed by the trial court

regarding the right to self-defense, the detective’s opinions regarding the right

                                        20
to self-defense, although abridged, were not inconsistent with our law or the

instructions given to the jury, and the detective’s cursory responses to the

hypothetical questions posed did not indicate that Alford was guilty or that the

detective had himself determined Alford to be guilty.

      While it would have been proper to exclude the detective’s hypothetical

testimony regarding what actions constitute either lawful or unlawful self-

defense, we may confidently determine here that neither the questioning nor

the detective’s responses substantially swayed the jury’s judgment in this

matter and we are satisfied that the error was harmless. Winstead v.

Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Ky. 2009).

C.    Did the trial court erroneously instruct the jury? - Preserved

      Alford argues that the trial court erred by giving the jury an instruction,

in addition to a self-defense instruction, which allowed for the jury to reject his

defense by finding him the initial aggressor. In this case, the trial court

instructed the jury on the allowable defense of self-protection in accord with

KRS 503.050 but added the initial aggressor qualification found in KRS

503.060(3) which states:

      Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 503.050, the use of
      physical force by a defendant upon another person is not
      justifiable when:

      (3) The defendant was the initial aggressor, except that his use of
      physical force upon the other person under this circumstance is
      justifiable when:

        (a) His initial physical force was nondeadly and the force returned
        by the other is such that he believes himself to be in imminent
        danger of death or serious physical injury; or

                                        21
       (b) He withdraws from the encounter and effectively
       communicates to the other person his intent to do so and the
       latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful
       physical force.

      “Instructions must be based upon the evidence and they must properly

and intelligibly state the law.” Howard v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.2d 177, 178

(Ky. 1981). “When the question is whether a trial court erred by: (1) giving an

instruction that was not supported by the evidence; or (2) not giving an

instruction that was required by the evidence; the appropriate standard for

appellate review is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Sargent v.

Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Ky. 2015), overruled on other grounds by Univ.

Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Shwab, 628 S.W.3d 112 (Ky. 2021). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

      Alford cites to our opinion in Conley v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 756

(Ky. 2019), for the proposition that the initial aggressor instruction should not

have been given because there was no evidence presented at trial that Alford

was an initial aggressor. In Conley, unlike in this case, there was simply no

evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, of the defendant being an initial

aggressor.

      In Stepp v. Commonwealth, 608 S.W.2d 371 (Ky. 1980), this Court

decided that in determining whether a limitation to a self-defense instruction is

                                        22
proper, the trial court must consider the circumstances surrounding the

incident as a whole:

      It is not every assertion of such belief that is adequate to support a
      plea of self-defense. It is the whole circumstances which surround
      the incident that must be considered by the trial judge in deciding
      whether an instruction on self-defense is proper or whether an
      instruction on self-defense with limitations is proper. We have held
      that before such qualifying instructions are proper there must of
      course be evidence to justify it. In other words, the trial judge must
      find as a matter of law that there is sufficient evidence to justify
      such limitations before instructing the jury.

Id. at 374 (citing Mayfield v. Commonwealth, 479, S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1972);
Crigger v. Commonwealth, 225 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. 1949)).

      For a defendant to be the initial aggressor, the defendant must use

physical force prior to any act of purported self-protection. KRS 503.060(3)(a).

Alford claims the Commonwealth presented no evidence that he used physical

force on Cook prior to Cook, allegedly, lunging towards him with a knife, and

therefore there was no evidence to support giving a limiting initial aggressor

instruction. We disagree. It is undisputed that Alford armed himself prior to his

meeting with Cook and approached the garage, without any advance notice to

Cook, intending to confront him. Alford never mentioned being assaulted by

Cook at the scene of the incident. The only evidence of Cook lunging at Alford

came from Alford’s own testimony. There was ample evidence from which a jury

could, and ultimately did, determine that Alford was not acting in self-defense

and was the initial aggressor when he repeatedly struck Cook. Therefore, the

trial court did not act erroneously in providing the qualifying instruction.

                                        23
D.    Did the trial court err in denying Alford a missing evidence
      instruction regarding a knife found at the scene? - Preserved

      Alford tendered a “missing evidence” instruction to the trial court relative

to a knife which had been photographed at the scene, but which was not

collected by law enforcement. Generally, we review a trial court’s decision to

provide certain jury instructions under an abuse of discretion standard and

reverse only if its decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair or unsupported by

sound legal principals. Downs v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 604 (Ky. 2020).

      The knife in question was a large folding knife that, rather uniquely, had

a blade which was longer than the grip into which the blade folded. Therefore,

the knife, even when folded as this one was, would be dangerous and able to

stab a person up to the area of the blade which was not encased in the handle.

      A paramedic witnessed Cook on the ground beside his sofa and found

the folded knife under Cook when he was rolled onto a backboard. A trooper

later photographed the knife and noted its presence in a report but did not

collect it into evidence. At trial, the trooper explained that if there was no

evidence an item had been used in a crime, it would not be collected. At the

time of his investigation, there was only a badly beaten victim and Alford had

yet to allege that he had defended himself from a knife attack. The lead

detective in this case also testified that law enforcement would have been

looking for a weapon that could have caused Cook’s injuries, not a knife or a

gun, since Cook had only blunt force wounds.

      Despite not having the knife to show the jury, Alford was able to

introduce two separate photographs of the knife taken at the scene.
                                         24
      Alford sought a lost or destroyed evidence instruction which stated:

              If you find that law enforcement intentionally failed to
              preserve the knife, as seen in the Defendants Exhibit
              “F”, as evidence in this case, or that law enforcement
              knew or should have known that it could have been
              evidence in this case, you may infer, but are not
              required to infer, that this evidence was unfavorable to
              the Commonwealth and favorable to the Defendant.

      The trial court rejected the instruction believing that law enforcement

may have been negligent but did not exhibit bad faith and noted the jury was

able to view photographs of the knife in the context of Alford’s testimony.

      Following Alford’s conviction, he made a motion for a new trial, adding to

his argument that he lost the opportunity to have the knife tested for DNA or

fingerprints.

      We only find a due process violation regarding missing or destroyed

evidence when “evidence was intentionally destroyed by the Commonwealth or

destroyed inadvertently outside normal practices”. Estep v. Commonwealth, 64

S.W.3d 805, 809 (Ky. 2002) (citing Tamme v. Commonwealth, 579 S.W.2d 51,

54 (Ky. 1988)). Accordingly, a failure to preserve potentially useful evidence

does not rise to a violation of due process absent a showing that law

enforcement acted in bad faith. Collins v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 569, 572

(Ky. 1997).

      On appeal, Alford recognizes our precedent but argues that this standard

is too stringent and the alleged negligence of law enforcement in failing to

secure and preserve the knife “critically prejudiced” him. There very well could

be instances where negligent police investigation, and their failure to secure

                                        25
obvious or relevant evidence, could work just such an injustice to a defendant

as to require either a missing evidence instruction or reversal. However, due

process does not require such an outcome here.

         The knife was photographed, those photographs were seen by the jury,

and Alford was able to show that the knife was dangerous even while folded. It

was also acknowledged that the knife was in close proximity to Cook, under his

body, when he was found, giving ample credence to Alford’s testimony that

Cook had it in his hand and later collapsed onto the knife after being struck by

Alford. Since there was no testimony questioning who owned the knife, and no

testimony that either Alford or Amie possessed a knife when they entered

Cook’s garage, there was no reason to presume the knife belonged to anyone

other than Cook. Furthermore, to the extent that law enforcement was

negligent in not securing the knife, such negligence was practically invited by

Alford since he neither summoned medical assistance nor informed law

enforcement that Cook had lunged at him with a knife and initiated their

melee. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not commit an abuse of

discretion in refusing to provide the instruction.

E.       Was Alford entitled to a directed verdict? - Preserved.

         Alford argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a

directed verdict as to the wanton murder charge alleging that “a reasonable

juror could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Alford was the initial

aggressor and attacked Cook for a purpose rather than acting out of fear for his

life.”

                                         26
      In considering whether a motion for directed verdict should be granted,

“[t]he trial court must draw all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence

in favor of the party opposing the motion, and a directed verdict should not be

given unless the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.”

Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983).

      As stated in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991):

      If the evidence is sufficient to induce a reasonable juror to believe
      beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
      verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on the
      motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence for the
      Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury questions as to
      the credibility and weight to be given to such testimony.

      On appeal, the denial of a directed verdict motion is reviewed to

determine whether “under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly

unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then is the defendant is entitled to a

directed verdict of acquittal.” Lamb v. Commonwealth, 510 S.W.3d 316, 325

(Ky. 2017) (quoting Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187).

      KRS 507.020(1)(b) provides in relevant part that a person is guilty of

wanton murder when: “[U]nder circumstances manifesting extreme indifference

to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of

death to another person and thereby causes the death of another person.”

      The jury was further properly instructed that to engage in wanton

conduct, one must be aware of and consciously disregard “a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The

risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a

                                        27
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would

observe in the situation.” KRS 501.020(3).

      A wanton mental state alone is not enough to justify a conviction under

KRS 507.020(1)(b) for wanton murder, as evidence of further circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to human life must accompany an actor’s

wantonness. Brown v. Commonwealth, 174 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Ky. 2005). This

element has been described as “aggravated wantonness.” Graves v.

Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Ky. 2000).

      The jury here could infer Alford’s intent “from the act itself or from the

circumstances surrounding it.” Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 86

(Ky. 1998). Alford was also “presumed to intend the logical and probable

consequences of his conduct,” and his intent could also be inferred from his

actions preceding and following the charged offense. Stopher v. Commonwealth,

57 S.W.3d 787, 802 (Ky. 2001). Based upon the evidence presented, including

Alford’s own testimony, we cannot say that the jury was unreasonable in

concluding that Alford’s conduct manifested an extreme indifference to human

life. The Commonwealth produced ample evidence of substance proving that

Alford sought out Cook while armed with a bat, struck Cook at least twice in

the head with the bat, and then left him unattended and unaided while his

brain swelled from the blows ultimately resulting in his death. Alford

disregarded the grave risk of injury or death associated with his actions, and

we find that the trial court did not err in denying Alford’s motion for a directed

verdict on wanton murder.

                                        28
F.    Was Alford entitled to statutory immunity? - Unpreserved

      Lastly, Alford argues that he is entitled to immunity from criminal

liability under our Commonwealth’s self-protection statutes. This error is

unpreserved and Alford therefore requests palpable error review which would

require that this Court find the error resulted in manifest injustice.

      Alford asserts that he “subjectively believed that his life was in danger”

and cites to Hatcher v. Commonwealth, 310 S.W.3d 691, 700 (Ky. App. 2010),

for the proposition that “the doctrine of self-protection turns upon a

defendant’s subjective belief of the need to use force[.]”

      According to Alford, “the totality of the circumstances and the

‘probabilities’ support the conclusion that [Alford] was placed in sudden mortal

fear for himself, that he responded reasonably by using a bat in self-defense,

considering the size of [Cook], his reputation for always having a knife or a

gun, and the apparent threats of the knife before.” In sum, Alford recounts the

details of the defense he offered at trial and asks us to reject the

Commonwealth’s evidence and the jury’s determination.

      KRS 503.085 states in relevant part:

      (1) A person who uses force as permitted in KRS 503.050,
      503.055, 503.070, and 503.080 is justified in using such force and
      is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of
      such force, unless the person against whom the force was used is
      a peace officer, as defined in KRS 446.010, who was acting in the
      performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified
      himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law, or the
      person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the
      person was a peace officer. As used in this subsection, the term
      “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in custody,
      and charging or prosecuting the defendant.

                                        29
      (2) A law enforcement agency may use standard procedures for
      investigating the use of force as described in subsection (1) of this
      section, but the agency may not arrest the person for using force
      unless it determines that there is probable cause that the force
      that was used was unlawful.

      In Commonwealth v. Lemons, 437 S.W.3d 708, 715 (Ky. 2014), we

subsequently determined that a de novo standard of review is not appropriate

in a determination of probable cause in a self-defense/defense of others

immunity case and instead would look to whether the trial court had a

“substantial basis” for not dismissing the case, utilizing our probable cause

standards which have been “defined as ‘reasonable grounds for belief,

supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.’” Id. at

715. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 217 S.W.3d 190, 200 (Ky. 2006)). The

evidence of record herein was, to say the least, inconsistent and does not

categorically lead to a determination that Alford acted in self-defense.

Therefore, there was no error in the trial court failing to act on its own volition

to dismiss the criminal action.

                                  III. CONCLUSION

      We affirm Alford’s conviction and his sentence by the Simpson Circuit

Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                        30
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Kayley Barnes
Kathleen K. Schmidt
Assistant Public Advocates

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin L. Condor
Assistant Solicitor General

                               31