Court Opinion

ID: 9651567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:27:07.65364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:36.074710
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Wright, J.:
The question here involved is one which materially affects property rights in this Commonwealth. A spring depends for its water supply upon percolations beneath the surface of the ground, and the owner of adjoining land employs explosives in the lawful use of his property for mining purposes. It is my view that, in holding the adjoining owner liable for a change in the quality of the water supply, the majority is extending the doctrine of tort liability to an unwarranted extent.
It is important to bear in mind (1) that the damage claimed by these plaintiffs was not the result of diversion of mine drainage water from its natural *313water course, which was the situation in Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143, 142 A. 2d 171; (2) that the alleged contamination of the water supply occurred in the mining process, and was not the result of a trespass on and invasion of plaintiffs’ property by vibrations in the ground; and (3) that the defendants were not negligent in the mining operation, and harm was not intended or foreseeable. As stated by President Judge Pentz: “The result of the special findings is to confine the cause of the contamination of the spring to the blasting by the defendants in their stripping operation, blasting being a normal activity in mining, without negligence, or intent to harm plaintiffs and without disregard of the rights of the plaintiffs in and to underground or percolating waters”.
It has always been settled law in this Commonwealth “that where a spring depends for its supply upon Nitrations or percolations of water through the land of an owner above, and in the use of the land for mining or other lawful purposes the spring is destroyed, such owner is not liable for the damages thus caused to the proprietors of the spring, unless the injury was occasioned by malice or negligence. To such percolations or Nitrations, then, the inferior owner has no right”: Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. 514. See also Lybe’s Appeal, 106 Pa. 626; Williams v. Ladew, 161 Pa. 283. The majority opinion cites Rothrauff v. Sinking Spring Water Co., 339 Pa. 129, 14 A. 2d 87, and Zimmerman v. Union Paving Co., 335 Pa. 319, 6 A. 2d 901, but these cases support the established rule. In the RotJiratiff case our Supreme Court said: “This much is settled,- — that when a spring depends for its supply upon Nitrations and percolations through the land of an adjoining owner, and in the use of that land for lawful purposes the spring is destroyed, such owner, in the absence of malice and negligence on his *314■part, is not liable for the damage thus occasioned”. In tbe Zimmerman case, wherein it was held that defendant’s conduct had not resulted in any legal damage, our Supreme Court said “that the subterranean sources of a spring are not perceptible, and damage caused by operations in their vicinity cannot usually be foreseen or avoided”. In Collins v. Chartiers V. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 A. 1012; 139 Pa. 111, 21 A. 147, also cited in the majority opinion, our Supreme Court said: “Hence the practical inquiry is, first, whether the damage was necessary and unavoidable; secondly, if not, was it sufficiently obvious to have been foreseen, and also preventable by reasonable care and expenditure”? There is therefore merit in the suggestion that the theory of liability must be that an actor is responsible only for injuries which he can foresee. See Harclerode v. Detwiler, 61 Pa. D. & C. 541.
It is of course true that liability for concussion damage resulting from non-negligent blasting operations has now been established: Federoff v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A. 2d 817; Laventhol v. A. DiSandro Contracting Co., 173 Pa. Superior Ct. 522, 98 A. 2d 422. However, as initially emphasized, that is not the situation in the case at bar. These ■plaintiffs did not establish concussion damage. The contamination of the spring did not result from a trespass on or invasion of their property by vibrations in the ground. It is clear from the record that there was no reduction in the quantity of the water supply. It is equally clear that the change in its quality was a natural consequence of the mining operation, something totally unrelated to the method used in removing the coal. Since the contamination of percolating waters occurs in the mining process regardless of the use of explosives, and since there is no liability without negligence when explosives are not used, it is my *315view that it is unreasonable to impose liability for the same result simply because of the use of explosives. Gunther and Watkins, JJ., join in this dissent.