Court Opinion

ID: 9539793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:10:26.602669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:20.952149
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
Although I agree with the majority that the subpoena in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 13, of the California Constitution (Brovelli v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 524, 529 [15 Cal.Rptr. 630, 364 P.2d 462]), I cannot join them in importing the questionable federal required-records exception into our state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Once again, the majority have construed the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination narrowly and begrudgingly, treating it as a historic relic to be, at most, merely tolerated. (See People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 323 [243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), quoting Quinn v. United States (1955) 349 U.S. 155, 162 [99 L.Ed. 964, 972, 75 S.Ct. 668, 51 A.L.R.2d 1157].) I dissent because the fundamental protections afforded by the California Declaration of Rights (Cal. Const., art. I) are more than mere antiquities which can be readily discarded in favor of the more limited protections provided by federal authority.
In relegating the discussion of Bulmash’s state constitutional claims to the ultimate footnote (ante, p. 490, fn. 15), the majority have abdicated their judicial obligation to independently determine matters of state law and have impermissibly resolved Bulmash’s state constitutional claim by a simple, mechanical invocation of current federal precedent. (People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 352 [161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401].)1 However, it is incontrovertible that the California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force which is the first line of protection for the *492individual against the excesses of state officials. (.People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 549-550 [119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099].)
In interpreting the scope of the fundamental liberties protected by the California Declaration of Rights, we sit as the court of last resort, and guard the full panoply of rights Californians have come to expect as their due.2 (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753].) Consequently, the construction of a provision of our state Constitution remains a matter of California law regardless of the narrower interpretation of similar provisions in the federal Constitution. Our charter specifically provides that rights guaranteed in our state Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the federal charter. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 24; People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 247-248 [145 Cal.Rptr. 861, 578 P.2d 108].)
Unfortunately, there are those who are not convinced that our state Constitution means what it says in article I, section 24, and that it is a document of independent force. As a result the majority here continue a disturbing trend of leaving the interpretation of our state Constitution to the judicial guardians of the United States Constitution—a task that frequently produces diminishing individual protections.
Article I, section 15, of the California Constitution commands that an individual cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself in a criminal case. In the past we have broadly construed the privilege and have been solicitous in protecting this fundamental constitutional right. (Reynolds v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 834, 842-843 [117 Cal.Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45].) Indeed, there can be no doubt that the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination assures greater protections for individuals than those provided by the federal Constitution. (See, e.g., People v. Rivera (1985) 41 Cal.3d 388, 395 [221 Cal.Rptr. 562, 710 P.2d 362]; In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 550 [213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637]; People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 251; Reynolds v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 834, 842-843.)
In light of these greater protections, I cannot join the majority in adopting exceptions which denigrate the basic purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege reflects the framers’ opposition to the unlimited power of the government and manifests our unwillingness to subject those suspected of a crime “ ‘to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.’ ” (Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 809-810 [210 Cal.Rptr. 204, 693 P.2d 789], quoting Murphy v. Waterfront *493Comm’n. (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 55 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594].) The privilege is inherent in our adversary system of criminal justice and recognizes that such a system is undermined when the People, despite their superior investigative and prosecutorial powers, avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling the accused to prove the charge against him out of his own mouth. (In re Misener, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 551-552.) Consequently, unless and until a witness in any official proceeding is protected against the use of his compelled answers and their fruits in any subsequent criminal prosecution, the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination allows him to refuse to answer any question or to produce any material which may reveal potentially incriminating information. (See Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 142-143 [137 Cal.Rptr. 14, 560 P.2d 1193].)
In an effort to safeguard this fundamental privilege, we have traditionally resolved the conflict between the state’s desire to obtain information and the individual’s right to be free from self-incrimination by providing the individual with use immunity for any self-incriminating statements made in a civil or administrative proceeding. (See, e.g., Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 40 Cal.3d 822, 827 [221 Cal.Rptr. 529, 710 P.2d 329]; Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 802, 809-810; People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 889 [120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024]; People v. Superior Court (Kaufman) (1977) 12 Cal.3d 421, 428-429 [115 Cal.Rptr. 812, 525 P.2d 716]; Byers v. Justice Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1039, 1056-1057 [80 Cal.Rptr 553, 458 P.2d 465], vacated on other grounds in California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424 [29 L.Ed.2d 9, 91 S.Ct. 1535].)3 Such an accommodation is eminently reasonable in this case, and Bulmash should be ordered to comply with the subpoena only if he is assured that the People will not use the material he is requested to produce as evidence against him in any subsequent criminal prosecution. Use immunity would protect Bulmash’s privilege against self-incrimination without impairing the Labor Commissioner’s effective enforcement of the Labor Code. (Ante, p. 479, fn. 5.)
The majority nevertheless eschew this reasonable accommodation, and instead force Bulmash to disclose information that could reveal misdemeanor violations of the Labor Code without providing him any protection from prosecution. The majority do so by relying on Shapiro v. United States *494(1948) 335 U.S. 1 [92 L.Ed. 1787, 68 S.Ct. 1375], a case which the Supreme Court itself has not explicitly followed since its pronouncement. Indeed, the majority’s discussion of cases which concededly do not apply the required-records exception (ante, pp. 487-489), impliedly recognizes that the rule announced in Shapiro is of questionable vitality. Nonetheless, the majority engraft this exception onto our own state Constitution.
In the absence of the most compelling justification I do not believe we should adopt an exception which compels Bulmash to surrender the very protection the privilege against self-incrimination was designed to guarantee. The fact that the government need only require records to be kept in order to demand incriminating disclosures is merely a description of what is attempted, not a rationale for obviating the privilege against self-incrimination. “The notion that because a disclosure is required the privilege does not apply, if extended to its full logical reach, is capable of entirely destroying the privilege.” (Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government’s Need for Information, 1966 Sup.Ct.Rev. 103, 148-149.)
The defendant in a criminal trial “has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, . . . and convince a jury through its own resources.” (In re Misener, supra, 38 Cal.3d 543, 556, quoting Williams v. Florida (1970) 399 U.S. 78, 112 [26 L.Ed.2d 446, 483, 90 S.Ct. 1893] (conc. and dis. opn. of Black, J.).) Rather than creating exceptions to that basic right, I believe that if Bulmash is to be prosecuted for violations of the Labor Code the Labor Commissioner should obtain evidence of his crime through the time-honored method of independent investigation. I therefore dissent.
Broussard, J., concurred.

The majority’s casual reliance on a case decided seven decades ago, Paladini v. Superior Court (1918) 178 Cal. 369 [173 P. 588], is clearly inapposite. In that case Paladini did not claim, as Bulmash does here, that compliance with the state market director’s administrative subpoena might reveal criminal conduct. Instead he argued that he was not obligated to comply with the subpoena because the license revocation proceeding was essentially criminal. The court rejected this claim by stating, “the proceeding before the state market director is not criminal in its nature, and the order compelling the petitioner to produce their books before the state market director was not in violation of the constitutional provision which prohibits a court or officer from requiring a defendant in a criminal case to furnish evidence against himself.” (Paladini v. Superior Court, supra, 178 Cal. at p. 374 (italics added).) As should be obvious, this is currently an incorrect statement of the law, and the privilege against self-incrimination indeed applies to any proceeding in which the witness’s testimony may tend to incriminate him. (People v. Rucker (1980) 26 Cal.3d 368, 378 [162 Cal.Rptr. 13, 605 P.2d 843], citing Lefkowitz v. Turley (1973) 414 U.S. 70, 77 [38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281, 94 S.Ct. 316].) Nonetheless, the majority rely on this outdated statement in a vain attempt to find a California case that is consistent with the federal required-records exception.

This is not the first time defendant Bulmash has relied on state authority. He did so successfully in a different context, resulting in a unanimous decision in Bulmash v. Davis (1979) 24 Cal.3d 691 [157 Cal.Rptr. 66, 597 P.2d 469].

In concluding that use immunity was compelled by the privilege against self-incrimination, this court defined the scope of the privilege as set forth in article I, section 15, of the California Constitution and codified in Evidence Code section 940. Because section 940, as construed by the courts of this state, establishes the requirement for use immunity as a statutory rule relating to the substantive law of the privilege against self-incrimination, it is specifically exempted from the so-called “Truth in Evidence” section of our state Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d); People v. Weaver (1985) 39 Cal.3d 654, 659 [217 Cal.Rptr. 245, 703 P.2d 1139].)