Court Opinion

ID: 9627279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:41:25.222478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:40.727870
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the government’s notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) was insufficient.
I
A federal grand jury indicted Gregory Sperow, the defendant-appellant, on one count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) & 846. The second paragraph of the indictment stated: “It is further alleged that the amount of marihuana involved exceeded 100 kilograms in violation of penalty provision 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(vii).”
Before trial, the government filed the required information (the “ § 851 notice”) giving Sperow “notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment pursuant to Title 21 U.S.C. Sections 851 & 841(b)(l)(B)(vii).” The § 851 notice further provided that “[t]he government seeks a mandatory min*1229imum term of imprisonment of ten (10) years imprisonment since this offense involves more than 100 kilograms of marihuana and because defendant has a prior conviction in United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Case Number 80-0639-E.” The government attached a copy of the judgment, which indicated that Sperow was convicted for conspiracy to import a controlled substance, conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute, illegal importation of a controlled substance, and conspiracy to violate currency reporting requirements.
The government subsequently filed a motion to strike the second paragraph of the grand jury indictment after determining that the weight of marijuana involved was less than 100 kilograms. The motion to strike stated that the government “moves to strike the second paragraph of the grand jury indictment, which allegation established an enhanced penalty, on grounds subsequent investigation revealed that the amount of marijuana seized weighed no more than 98.5 kilograms of marijuana, exclusive of packaging material.” The government never amended or withdrew the § 851 enhancement notice.
II
Sperow argues on appeal that the district court erred by increasing his sentence based on the prior conviction because the government withdrew the § 851 notice, or, in the alternative, because the government did not provide actual or fair notice.
A
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), a defendant who commits a federal drug violation involving less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, after a prior conviction for another drug offense, is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. To enhance a sentence based on a prior conviction, however, the government must give notice before trial, or before entry of the plea of guilty, of the conviction to be relied upon. Section 851(a) states in relevant part:
No person who stands convicted of an offense under [21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq.] shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.
21 U.S.C. § 851(a).
In United States v. Severino, 316 F.3d 939 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), we explained that this section “is a procedural statute.” Id. at 943. And there we held that “[tjhese procedures take form in four requirements”: (1) “[t]he information must be in writing;” (2) “it must be filed with the court and served on the defendant or his counsel;” (3) “it must be filed and served before trial or before a guilty plea;” and (4) “the substance of the information must identify the previous conviction(s).” Id. With respect to the fourth requirement, we further held that “[i]f the defendant, reading the information in context, will have no trouble understanding which prior conviction the prosecutor means to identify, the information then has ‘staffed] ... the previous convictions,’ and the statutory purpose of providing defendant notice has been satisfied.” Id. at 943-44 (alterations and omissions in original) (emphasis added).
B
The majority does not contend, nor can it, that the government’s § 851 notice failed to satisfy these requirements. The government filed a. written information with the court and served it on the defen*1230dant before trial. Moreover, Sperow would “have no trouble understanding which prior conviction the government meant to identify.” The § 851 notice clearly stated that the “defendant has a prior conviction in United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Case Number 8-0639-E” and attached a copy of the underlying judgment and commitment order. Therefore, the government satisfied the statutory requirements.
Straying from the requirements we set forth in Severino, the majority now concludes that the § 851 notice was defective by effectively focusing on which subsection rather than which prior conviction serves to enhance Sperow’s sentence. The majority reasons that the § 851 notice sought an enhancement only if two predicates were satisfied: (1) the offense involved more than 100 kilograms of marijuana as described in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B)(vii), and (2) Sperow had a prior conviction. Because the government filed a motion to strike the allegation in the indictment that the weight of marijuana exceeded 100 kilograms, the majority concludes that the entire § 851 notice was revoked, because 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(l)(B)(vii)2 no longer served as a potential enhancement, but rather 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).3 In effect, the majority’s reasoning depends upon the irrelevant circumstance that the government identified the larger quantity subsection to give notice of its intent,4 not that the government specified the incorrect prior conviction. Such reasoning turns § 851(a) on its head and elevates form over substance, something we have long cautioned against. Severino, 316 F.3d at 944. Nowhere in § 851(a) is the government required to specify which subsection of § 841 it is relying on for an enhancement. Instead, the statute, and our decision in Severino, simply require the government to identify which prior conviction it is relying on for an enhancement. Accordingly, because the § 851 notice in this case fulfilled the statutory requirements by providing Sperow with knowledge before trial that he faced an enhancement based upon his prior conviction, I cannot join the majority in rendering such notice inoperative.
Moreover, the majority places too much weight on two statements by the government. First, the majority refers to the government’s statement well into the trial that “[t]he sentence of the defendant can be no more than 20 years.” Unlike the majority, I do not believe such a misstatement during trial as to the maximum possible sentence revokes a § 851 notice that satisfies the statutory requirements. Second, the majority refers to the government’s incorrect statement to the probation officer after trial that “the enhancement was gone.” The majority’s position in this case ultimately rests on the premise that “one of the purposes of § 851 is *1231to ensure!] proper notice so a defendant is able to challenge the information ... [and] make an informed decision about whether or not to plead guilty.” Ante, at 1226 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). While I believe the majority imprudently relies on that purported purpose of the statute to trump the plain meaning of its language, even under such approach the government’s statement after trial is irrelevant because it surely could not influence Sperov/s decision to plead guilty or to proceed to trial.
Finally, contrary to the majority’s assertion, I do not take the position that once the government flies § 851 notice that satisfies the statutory requirements, it cannot later amend or withdraw that notice. But I simply cannot accept the majority’s “apparent withdrawal” doctrine in this ease, which has no basis in our precedents. Ante, at 1228. The majority’s novel contraption, with little explanation or justification, places a new burden on the government of ensuring until the end of the proceedings that an objectively reasonable person would conclude that the government continues to seek an enhanced sentence based on a prior conviction. But such notion cannot be found in the statute.5 Section 851 requires notice, “before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty,” of “the previous conviction to be relied upon” for the sentencing enhancement. And Sperow got it. The government’s later amendment to the indictment (but not the § 851 notice) and its misstatement during trial were simply insufficient to operate as a withdrawal of the statutorily sufficient § 851 notice in this case.
Ill
In sum, I would affirm the district court’s determination that the government’s § 851 notice satisfied the statutory requirements. The government gave Sperow “fair notice of which prior conviction the government had in mind for seeking a sentence enhancement” and it did not withdraw that notice. Severino, 316 F.3d at 944. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

. Section 841(b)(l)(B)(vii) provides in relevant part that in a case involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, such person convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no less than five years and no more than 40 years, unless that person commits such violation after a prior felony drug conviction, in which case the term of imprisonment shall be no less than 10 years and no more than life imprisonment.

. Section 841(b)(1)(D) provides in relevant part that in a case involving less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, such person convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of no more than five years, unless that person commits such violation after a prior felony drug conviction, in which case the term of imprisonment shall be no more than 10 years.

.Indeed, the majority acknowledges that the § 851 notice in this case was properly filed. See ante, at 1228.

. In light of the majority’s “apparent withdrawal” invention, a prosecutor may be wise in the future to file a terse notice containing only two sentences: (1) "The government seeks an enhanced sentence for the defendant's prior conviction for [identify prior conviction]”; and (2) "This notice is effective unless and until the government expressly amends or withdraws such notice in writing and signed by [name].” With such provision, no defendant could maintain a reasonable belief that the government apparently withdrew the previously filed § 851 notice based on a later amendment to the indictment or a slip of the tongue during the trial.