Court Opinion

ID: 9724706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:09:33.257636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:05.026231
License: Public Domain

O’Connor, J.
(dissenting). “At common law, rape was defined as ‘the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.’ 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 210 (1778).” Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 127 (1981). The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay, c. 18, § 15 (1814), provided in relevant part: “If any man shall ravish any maid, or single woman, committing carnal copulation with her by force, against her own will... he shall be punished ....” Id. Prior to the amendment of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (Ter. Ed.) (defining and punishing rape), and G. L. c. 277, § 29 (Ter. Ed.) (defining the word “rape” as used in an indictment), by St. 1974 c. 474, §§ 1, 7, those statutes “utilized the common law terms to define rape.” Id. at 129. Statute 1974, c. 474, § 1, rewrote G. L. c. 265, § 22, to read “[wjhoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a person, and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury, shall be punished . . . .” Although c. 265, § 22, was again amended by St. 1980, c. 459, § 6, in order to provide varying penalties in accordance with the presence or absence *658of specified aggravating factors, the statutory definition of rape continues to be the definition supplied by St. 1974, c. 474, § 1. See G. L. c. 265, § 22 (o) (6).
Thus, for several hundred years, a proper understanding of the word “force,” as used in the Commonwealth’s rape statutes, has been critical to their application, and nothing suggests that, as successor statutes or amendments were enacted, the Legislature intended a redefinition of that term. Nevertheless, not until today has this court discovered that the Legislature, presumably from the beginning, has intended “force” in rape to include constructive, as well as physical, force. The very lateness of the court’s discovery makes it questionable. This is especially so when one considers the principle, deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence, that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the Commonwealth. I do not agree that the word, “force,” in G. L. c. 265, § 22, clearly refers to constructive, nonphysical, force.
One may well argue that there ought to be a law criminalizing the kind of conduct ascribed to the defendant before the grand jury and that the range of penalties ought to be the same as provided in G. L. c. 265, § 22 (6), for rape. But those are matters for the Legislature, not judges, to resolve. The court’s responsibility is to interpret statutes as they are written and, with respect to criminal statutes, to resolve statutory ambiguities against the government. As Justice Holmes wrote in McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), “[although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear.” In addition, the rule that criminal statutes must be strictly construed against the government “is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not the judicial department. It is the Legislature, not *659the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). “It is an ancient rule, to which we have long adhered, that ‘[p]enal statutes must be construed strictly and not extended by equity, or by the probable or supposed intention of the legislature as derived from doubtful words; but that in order to charge a party with a penalty, he must be brought within its operation, as manifested by express words or necessary implication . . . .’ We examine the statute, therefore, particularly mindful that its words are not to be stretched to accomplish a result not expressed.” Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 686-687 (1986), quoting Libby v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 273 Mass. 522, 525-526 (1930).
Citing Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 538-539 (1981), the court states that “[w]e previously have recognized that a defendant can be guilty of rape without having used or threatened physical force if the consent of the complainant was obtained from the victim’s fear arising from threats or conduct of a third party.” Ante at 651. The court implies that Therrien provides support for the proposition that neither physical force nor the threat of bodily injury is necessary for rape, and that some other kind of threat will suffice. Therrien does not support that proposition. In Therrien, the defendant was one of three men who had had intercourse with a woman. The defendant did not personally use physical force on the victim or threaten her with bodily harm, but his conduct followed, and took advantage of, the use of force in his presence by the other two men to compel the victim to submit to intercourse with them. In concluding that the evidence warranted a finding that the defendant was guilty of rape, the court reasoned that, “[i]f the victim appears to consent to intercourse because of a threat of a third person or because of fears arising from actions of a third person, and a defendant knew of those threats or of the circumstances causing those fears, such a defendant could properly be found guilty of rape.” Id. at 538-539. Therrien only stands for the principle that a defendant can be found to *660have consciously used the conduct of others as a threat of bodily harm to induce intercourse with him, and thereby to have committed rape. There is nothing in the Therrien opinion that even implies that intercourse obtained without physical force or threat of bodily harm constitutes rape.
The victim in this case told the grand jury that the defendant, wearing a gun, told her to get into the car with him and that he started driving toward the police station. She said that she “started to cry and he said that if [she] cried he would lock [her] up for more things than he was planning on. He made [her] beg him not to lock [her] up.” Explaining why she submitted to intercourse, the victim testified: “I felt that if I did not do what he wanted, he was going to arrest me. ... I was really scared. I was petrified he was going to put me in jail. I had a prior criminal record and I felt if I got arrested one more time I was going to go to Framingham.” There was no suggestion in the victim’s testimony that she submitted to intercourse because of a threat of bodily injury. The victim’s testimony was clear. She submitted in order to avoid arrest, prosecution, and resulting imprisonment. Surely, there is nothing in Therrien that implies that one who obtains intercourse by fraudulently impersonating a police officer and threatening the victim with arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment violates G. L. ó. 265, § 22 (¿>).
The court states: “No case has held that rape is limited solely to the use of physical force. Indeed, the words of the statute are to the contrary.” Ante at 651-652. Of course, I do not contend that rape is limited solely to the use of physical force. As the statute expressly provides, rape also includes threat of bodily injury as a means to compel intercourse. My contention is that rape consists of a use of physical force or a threat to do bodily injury — related concepts — in order to compel a person to submit to sexual intercourse. If the court’s intention is simply to point out that we have never before said that the word, “force,” in our rape statute is limited to physical force, my response is that apparently, despite the resourcefulness of prosecutors, no one ever before has argued to this court that a rape may be committed without *661either physical force or threat of bodily injury. Were the statute fairly susceptible to such a construction, one would reasonably expect that argument to have been made long before now.
The out-of-State cases mentioned by the court warrant little discussion. I shall refrain from distinguishing the out-of-State statutes from G. L. c. 265, § 22. It is enough to say that the core of each of those decisions is the court’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to intercourse by threatening bodily injury. Those cases do not support the court’s construction of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b).
I turn to the court’s argument that, “[bjecause robbery and rape are both crimes of violence, there is no reason to conclude the Legislature assigned a different, more limited meaning to the word ‘force’ in the rape statute from its meaning in the robbery statute.” Ante at 652. The court’s argument seems to assume that the word, “force,” in the robbery statutes, G. L. c. 265, § 19, and c. 277, § 39, is not limited to physical force. The court’s assumption is unjustified. Chapter 265, § 19, provides in relevant part that “[wjhoever ... by force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear” steals from another shall be punished. Chapter 277, § 39, defines the word, “robbery,” as “[t]he taking and carrying away of personal property of another from his person and against his will, by force and violence, or by assault and putting in fear, with intent to steal.” The robbery statutes distinguish between “force and violence” (physical force) and “assault and putting in fear” (constructive force), and it is clear from our robbery cases that “assault and putting in fear” is the equivalent of threat of bodily injury. Thus, an interpretation of “force” in the rape statute as referring only to physical force does not suggest that the Legislature assigned a more limited meaning to that word in the rape statute than in the robbery statutes. The rape statute and the robbery statutes criminalize the use of physical force or threat of bodily injury to accomplish different objectives.
*662The court’s reference to robbery and rape as “crimes of violence” is worthy of comment. I agree that robbery and, until today, rape, have been considered to be crimes of violence. However, now that neither physical force nor threat of bodily injury is a necessary element of rape — now that threat of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, and presumably other threats not involving bodily injury, whether accompanied by fraud or not, are enough — rape appears no longer to be a necessarily violent crime. The court’s holding is not expressly limited to threats made by real or make-believe police officers, and it is difficult to see how, with principle, it can be so limited. If a defendant obtains intercourse by threatening his employee, or by threatening a fellow employee under his supervision with demotion or job loss, is that constructive force sufficient for rape? If not, why not, in light of today’s decision? If so, rape in such circumstances cannot truly be characterized as a violent crime.
The court’s construction of G. L. c. 265, § 22 (6), not only runs counter to the important principle that criminal laws must be construed strictly, but it also runs afoul of another, perhaps less important but nevertheless time honored and helpful, rule of statutory construction. The statute’s express provision that it is a crime to compel a person to submit to sexual intercourse by “force ... or ... by threat of bodily injury,” forcefully suggests that the word “force” in that context does not include threat of bodily injury. If “force” does include threat of bodily injury, the words “or ... by threat of bodily injury” add nothing to the statute. “Where it is possible, as it is here, a statute should be construed so as to avoid rendering words in that statute meaningless.” A Juvenile, petitioner, 364 Mass. 531, 536 (1974). “[E]very phrase of a statute should be given some effect.” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 366 Mass. 423, 428 (1974). In order to give meaning — effect — to the words, “or ... by threat of bodily injury,” it is necessary to construe “force” as not including threat of bodily injury and, if “force” does not include “threat of bodily injury,” there can be no justification for *663saying that it does include other nonphysical forces such as threat of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration — or job loss.
There is one more ancient aid to statutory construction that the court has chosen to ignore: “Expressio unius est ex-clusio alteráis.” Innella v. Fire Comm’r of Boston, 331 Mass. 250, 252 (1954). “[T]he statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute.” Collatos v. Boston Retirement Bd., 396 Mass. 684, 687 (1986). Commonwealth v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 98 Mass. 25, 29 (1867). General Laws c. 265, § 22 [b), expressly and specifically provides that compelling intercourse by threat of bodily injury is a crime. The statute omits reference to any other threat, strongly implying that no other threat will suffice for rape.
General Laws c. 265, § 22 (6), provides that “[wjhoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a person and compels such person to submit by force and against his will, or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury, shall be punished . ...” By a process of reasoning that I am unable to understand, the court concludes that the construction of c. 265, § 22 (b), for which I argue “reads out of the statute the requirement that the force used be against the will of the person so compelled,” whereas if the statute is construed as the court construes it, those words are given meaning. Ante at 654. Of course, the relevant rule of construction is that meaning must be given to every statutory word “[wjhere it is possible” to do so. A Juvenile, petitioner, supra at 536. Here, the words, “by force and against his will,” appear to be redundant no matter which construction is adopted because the act of compelling a person to submit to intercourse necessarily involves a violation of that person’s will, and that is true regardless of whether the compulsion is accomplished by physical or nonphysical force. The court’s interpretation of the statutory word, “force,” as including nonphysical force does not give any meaning to the phrase, “and against his will,” that that phrase would not have if the word, “force,” were limited to physical force.
*664In my view, one that seems to be shared by the court, no evidence was presented to the grand jury demonstrating probable cause to arrest the defendant for obtaining sexual intercourse by the use of physical force or threat of bodily injury. Unlike the court, however, for the reasons I have expressed, I believe that it follows from that that no evidence was presented of probable cause to arrest the defendant for rape. Because I also believe that “[fjraud cannot be allowed to supply the place of the force which the statute makes mandatory,” Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 338 Mass. 377, 384 (1959), I conclude, as did the Superior Court judge, that the indictment ought to be dismissed.