Court Opinion

ID: 9535658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:51:44.423689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:18.066992
License: Public Domain

Brickley, J.
The issue before the Court involves whether the examining magistrate in this case erred in binding over the defendánt, Susan Stafford, for second-degree murder. The Court of Ap*127peals held that the magistrate abdicated, and therefore abused, his discretion in the manner in which he relied on People v Oster, 67 Mich App 490; 241 NW2d 260 (1976), to bind the defendant over for second-degree murder at a remanded preliminary examination. We conclude that the Court of Appeals did not clearly err, and affirm that Court’s decision.
i
The prosecutor charged defendant with open murder for the stabbing death of her boyfriend, Jeffrey Huff, on July 16, 1985. The facts developed at the preliminary hearing and at trial revealed that defendant and Huff met in West Virginia in either September or October 1984. Huff relocated to Michigan the following month, and he and defendant became live-in companions in Oxford, Michigan, soon afterwards. Defendant testified that she and Huff lived together fairly happily for the first three months of 1985. However, beginning in March 1985, and ending with Huff’s death on July 16, defendant testified that numerous incidents of violent abuse occurred where Huff physically threatened, slapped, choked and battered her.
A number of attacks preceded the stabbing on July 16. On July 12, defendant testified that Huff attacked her while out horseback riding, threatening to kill her and nearly causing her horse to go out of control. Defendant called the police and they advised her to remove from her residence guns she had purchased earlier as a gift for Huff. Huff hid nearby until the police departed.
Two days later, on July 14, while driving in an automobile, Huff and defendant argued over the removal of the guns, and Huff subsequently *128pushed defendant from the moving automobile. The violence escalated at defendant’s residence when defendant’s teenage daughter, Murphy, intervened. Huff and Murphy struggled, and Huff slammed the girl’s face against the ground. Murphy suffered broken teeth and lacerations of the mouth which required stitches at a hospital. The police again responded to this incident, but did not arrest Huff.
Defendant and Huff sought counseling from an alcohol and drug abuse counselor on July 16. Later that evening, Huff took defendant’s car to buy food for that evening’s meal. Defendant testified she began to worry when Huff failed to return after some period of time. She testified that she and her daughter had decided to leave the residence to prevent further abuse of her daughter once Huff returned with her automobile.
Eventually Huff, smelling of alcohol, returned accompanied by a male friend, Mills, in Mills’ car. Defendant testified that while she spoke on the telephone, Huff entered and began attacking her. As a subterfuge, defendant casually told Huff she needed to get a cigarette, but instead ran to a female neighbor’s house nearby. Upon arrival, defendant urgently asked the neighbor, Farden, to telephone the police for assistance. Defendant then telephoned her residence to check on her daughter but, upon receiving no answer, returned in haste with Farden to her home. On her way out, defendant grabbed a large butcher knife from Farden’s kitchen, and Farden retrieved a baseball bat and collared her German shepherd dog.
Once at defendant’s residence, defendant asked Farden to call for her daughter Murphy to come out of the house. Murphy came outside, followed shortly afterward by Huff. Defendant and Huff *129exchanged angry words in the dark night and an altercation ensued in which Huff initially attacked both Farden and defendant. At some point during the struggle, the knife held by defendant penetrated Huff’s chest. He walked a few steps and fell, dying at the scene. Defendant followed him, and seeing blood on the knife exclaimed numerous times, "Oh my God, I’ve stabbed him.” The police arrived just minutes later and arrested defendant for murder.
n
At the conclusion of the initial preliminary examination, the magistrate declined to bind the defendant over for either first- or second-degree murder. The magistrate explicitly noted a lack of evidence of premeditation on the defendant’s part and the existence of facts indicating that she acted in self-defense and without malice, including testimony that she had sought police protection in the past, had called the police just prior to the stabbing, and that the victim had initiated the fatal altercation. The magistrate nevertheless concluded that the defendant’s conduct in stabbing decedent with a knife evidenced probable cause of a reckless indifference for life supporting a binding over for manslaughter. Consequently, the magistrate bound the defendant over for trial on the charge of involuntary manslaughter only.
Before trial, the prosecution moved to remand the case to the examining magistrate to present additional evidence on probable cause of second-degree murder. Specifically, the prosecution desired to present testimony of the medical examiner and to introduce into evidence the knife wielded *130by defendant on the night of the homicide.1 The trial court granted this motion over the objection of defense counsel, and remanded the case for further preliminary proceedings.
The medical examiner alone testified on remand before the magistrate. He speculated that the knife wound inflicted on the decedent indicated a "hook type” thrust. He also opined that the defendant would necessarily have been aware of impaling and withdrawing the knife. His testimony contradicted the defendant’s testimony that only after decedent fell did she realize she had stabbed him. Additionally, the prosecution introduced the homicide weapon into evidence.
In its closing argument, the prosecution for the first time cited the case of People v Oster, supra, and contended that Oster required the magistrate to bind the defendant over for second-degree murder. At the conclusion of the examination, the magistrate reversed his initial decision and bound the defendant over for second-degree murder as requested by the prosecution.
The magistrate, although he referred to "new evidence,” did not explicitly find any new facts or retreat from his findings at the initial examination. However, the magistrate asserted that "[i]t was never the intention of the Court to analyze the evidence of the testimony of the witnesses to weigh the evidence to such an extent as to prepare or give a defense for the defendant.” Nonetheless, the magistrate reiterated his initial findings of *131strong evidence indicating self-defense: "reviewing all the evidence, it seems clear that in the mind of the defendant that her daughter was in danger [although] . . . the daughter was not in as much danger as maybe the defendant thought she was. However, that does not take away from the fact that the Court finds that the defendant was of a mind that her daughter was still in trouble.”
The magistrate focused on People v Oster in his concluding and dispositive remarks:
The Court has had an opportunity to read People versus Oster as been [sic] presented by the prosecutor. And the Court will read the one paragraph that I find is interesting or pertinent or guiding in this case. On Page 496, "The evidence presented at the examination showed the defendant stabbed Goodman with the knife and that Goodman died as a result. This clearly is sufficient to bind the defendant over on second-degree murder charge, as the malice necessary for the charge may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon which perpetrated the killing.” Later on in that opinion, the Court of Appeals refers to those paragraphs as guidelines and the Court will use this as a guideline in this case as to the obligations of an examining magistrate.
While the Court could very easily take the information or the evidence presented and weigh as to the — as between the degrees of the homicide, it’s not the duty of the Court to, from all of the evidence presented, to stand in the shoes of the trier of fact, and I follow that and try to follow that. In this case, if the People v Oster says that that’s the sufficient amount to bind over the defendant on second-degree murder, then I think that the argument must continue with the trier of fact as to what the meaning of the fight was and whether the defendant was in such heat that — to reduce this to manslaughter and that’s something for the trier of fact to find.
The Court’s satisfied by the addition of the *132information, witnesses, that the minimum amount of evidence has been presented to support the bindover on second-degree murder in this case, that being set out in the paragraph that I just read to you out of People v Oster. I do specifically find, though, that there was no premeditation, and no malice aforethought to support first degree murder, and based upon [sic] that I will not bind over on open murder charge. The rest of the degrees is left for the trier of fact, from the evidence, and their [sic] interpretation of what the evidence was. [Emphasis supplied.]
The magistrate consequently bound the defendant over for second-degree murder. A jury convicted Stafford of involuntary manslaughter, and she appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction,2 holding that the magistrate erred in binding the defendant over for second-degree murder. The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court’s remand for the presentation of new evidence violated the defendant’s right to due process of law. We affirm only as to the former issue and therefore find it unnecessary to address the latter issue whether the remand was erroneous.3_
*133III
In People v King, 412 Mich 145, 153-155; 312 NW2d 629 (1981), this Court delineated the scope of the magistrate’s function at a preliminary examination. We held in King that a magistrate must examine the entire record in arriving at a decision regarding probable cause. We said there that the scope of the magistrate’s inquiry
is not limited to whether the prosecution has presented evidence on each element of the offense. The magistrate is required to make his determination "after an examination of the whole matter.” Although the prosecution has presented some evidence on each element, if upon an examination of the whole matter the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the magistrate that the offense charged has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it, then he should not bind the defendant over on the offense charged but may bind him over on a lesser offense as to which he is so satisfied. [412 Mich 154.]
The Court of Appeals holding in the instant case that the magistrate abdicated his discretion by relying too literally or narrowly on People v Oster, supra, accords with our decision in King.
A review of the initial preliminary examination indicates that the magistrate did review the entire record before him in reaching his initial decision to bind over the defendant, and, just as in King, supra, pp 154-155,
found insufficient reason to believe that the offense *134of first- or second-degree murder had been committed because, based on the evidence presented, malice and premeditation were lacking. He found that the offense of manslaughter had been committed and probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed it.
On remand, however, the magistrate felt constrained by Oster to change that decision. By doing so, the Court of Appeals found that the magistrate impermissibly failed to exercise his discretion.
The uncontradicted testimony in this case indicated that the victim attacked defendant and her neighbor and that during the ensuing fray defendant stabbed the victim. At the initial examination, the magistrate noted that the evidence did not indicate a plan to kill on defendant’s part and concluded that, given the decedent’s history of domestic abuse, the defendant had reasonable grounds to fear for the safety of her daughter and herself.
On remand, the magistrate’s stated findings of fact did not differ in any significant respect, but he relied this time on Oster as "pertinent or guiding” in a way that negated his previous findings. The Court of Appeals concluded that this reliance on Oster constituted an abdication of discretion rising to abuse of discretion. We find no clear error by the Court of Appeals in so holding.4
The Oster case is factually distinguishable. Oster involved a fight between two men at a party, in which the defendant pulled out a knife, leapt down a stairway, and stabbed the victim several times. In contrast, this case involved a single stabbing by a physically smaller woman of a man who had *135exhibited violent behavior in the household numerous times in the past. Three other witnesses confirmed that defendant had called the police before she armed herself and went back to attempt to protect her daughter, that she said she "wasn’t gonna to let him hurt them again,” and that after the victim fell she exclaimed, "Oh my God, I’ve stabbed him.”
Moreover, the legal principles articulated in Oster did not control this case. The Oster Court held that evidence showing that the defendant fatally stabbed the victim "clearly is sufficient to bind over defendant on a second-degree murder charge, as the malice necessary for that charge may be presumed from the use of a deadly weapon to perpetrate the killing.” 67 Mich App 496. While this remains an accurate statement, Oster does not suggest that all other evidence should be disregarded just because of the use of a deadly weapon. The magistrate seemed to use the right standard in finding insufficient probable cause on premeditation and malice at the initial examination, but then on remand apparently disregarded his obligation to perform an "examination of the whole matter” because of one sentence in Oster. The Court of Appeals in the instant case held that the magistrate read too much into Oster and too little into the scope of the examining function as outlined in King. Although the magistrate’s reasons for reversing his initial determination might arguably support differing interpretations, the reading of the Court of Appeals is not without support in the record.5 We therefore decline to overturn its interpretation as clear error.
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals *136and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Levin, Cavanagh, and Archer, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.

 The medical examiner did not testify at the initial preliminary examination because the parties stipulated that the knife wound was the cause of death. The medical examiner had not completed his autopsy report at the time of the initial preliminary examination. MCL 766.4; MSA 28.922 entitles a person charged with a crime to a preliminary examination within twelve days of arraignment. Although the violation of the twelve-day rule constitutes a reversible error at trial, People v Weston, 413 Mich 371, 376; 319 NW2d 537 (1982), the prosecution may obtain a continuance for good cause.

 We held in People v Vail, 393 Mich 460, 464; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), that a conviction of a charge unwarranted by the proofs requires reversal "because a defendant’s chances of acquittal on any valid charge is substantially decreased by the possibility of a compromise verdict.”

 The dissent suggests we should address the remand issue because "if the remand was improper, the discretion issue would have been rendered moot.” Of course the reverse is also true since our decision on the discretion issue renders the remand issue moot. Also having accorded the appellant the relief she sought by the resolution of the discretion issue, we follow the well-established rule of avoiding a constitutional question when the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis. It is also a well-recognized operating principle of appellate jurisprudence that we do not decide issues that are not necessary for the disposition of the case or controversy before us. The dissent also suggests that this Court should apply a harmless error analysis to the abuse of the magistrate’s decision because defendant never claimed insufficient evidence existed for her bindover on second-degree murder or her involuntary manslaughter conviction. *133We note in response that defendant did challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at her preliminary examination and at trial on a motion for directed verdict. Moreover, the prosecution did not make an argument that defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in this Court or in the Court of Appeals. And, of course, we granted leave on the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence.

 See People v McIntosh, 62 Mich App 422, 446-448; 234 NW2d 157 (1975), modified on other grounds 400 Mich 1; 252 NW2d 779 (1977), where the Court held that the failure to exercise discretion when called on to do so constitutes an abdication and hence an abuse of discretion.

 The dissent appropriately observes that "when the magistrate’s reasoning is subject to differing interpretations, and one of those interpretations constitutes a proper use of discretion,” it is wrong to not follow the interpretation that supports the magistrate. However, *136our observation that the magistrate’s reasons might support a different interpretation does not in our judgment result in clear, legal error when the Court of Appeals did not find a different interpretation that would support the magistrate’s findings.