Court Opinion

ID: 9892344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:10:00.619412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:18.002499
License: Public Domain

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 1       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2 Opinion Number: _____________________

 3 Filing Date: October 18, 2023

 4 No. A-1-CA-39288

 5 STATE OF NEW MEXICO,

 6         Plaintiff-Appellee,

 7 v.

 8 KOREY BUECKER a/k/a KOREY
 9 WILSON BUECKER,

10         Defendant-Appellant.

11 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY
12 William G.W. Shoobridge, District Court Judge

13 Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
14 Maris Veidemanis, Assistant Attorney General
15 Santa Fe, NM

16 for Appellee

17 Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
18 Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender
19 Santa Fe, NM

20 for Appellant
 1                                      OPINION

 2 ATTREP, Chief Judge.

 3 {1}    Following a conditional plea, Defendant Korey Buecker appeals the district

 4 court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant argues the district court erred by

 5 denying his suppression motion on two grounds. First, Defendant contends he was

 6 subjected to a de facto arrest without probable cause. Specifically, Defendant

 7 challenges his lengthy detention in a patrol car with handcuffs while a limited

 8 number of law enforcement officers conducted a nighttime investigation of gunshots

 9 fired and a roving domestic violence incident. Considering the totality of the

10 circumstances—including that probable cause for Defendant’s arrest arose within

11 ten minutes of the challenged detention—we conclude the intrusion upon

12 Defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to privacy was outweighed by the

13 government’s substantial justification for the intrusion. We accordingly affirm the

14 district court’s determinations that Defendant’s detention was reasonable and he was

15 not subjected to an unlawful de facto arrest. Second, Defendant contends the waiver

16 of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and his confession

17 were not voluntary. Because Defendant has not advanced a developed or well-

18 supported argument why the district erred, and we are otherwise satisfied that

19 Defendant’s waiver and confession were voluntary, we affirm the district court on

20 this basis as well.
 1 BACKGROUND

 2 {2}    The following background is derived from the facts as found by the district

 3 court after the suppression hearing, which Defendant does not challenge, as well as

 4 officer testimony at the suppression hearing and various lapel camera footage

 5 received by the district court. See Rule 12-318(A)(4) NMRA (providing that the

 6 brief in chief “shall set forth a specific attack on any finding, or the finding shall be

 7 deemed conclusive”); State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 22, 138 N.M. 9, 116 P.3d

 8 80 (providing that in the absence of findings from the district court, “we must draw

 9 from the record to derive findings based on reasonable facts and inferences and

10 determine whether those facts and inferences support the conclusion reached by the

11 court” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

12 {3}    Officers Jorge Soriano and Crystal Marin of the Hobbs Police Department

13 responded to a nighttime report of a “roving domestic” involving a woman yelling

14 out of a truck pulling a box trailer in the 1300 block of East Llano Drive in Hobbs,

15 New Mexico. Upon arriving, the officers did not find a woman or a truck. Shortly

16 thereafter, the officers responded to another call—this time reporting gunshots in the

17 1300 block of East Green Acres Drive, only a couple of streets away. Driving down

18 East Green Acres Drive, the officers saw an unoccupied truck with a box trailer

19 parked in the road in front of a house but still running. The officers then saw

20 Defendant emerge from the side yard of the house. Upon being approached and told

                                               2
 1 that he was going to be patted down, Defendant stated that he had two knives on his

 2 person. The officers recovered the two knives, but no firearm.

 3 {4}    After being told that the officers were investigating a report of shots fired,

 4 Defendant said that he too had heard the shots. Defendant then gave confusing and

 5 contradictory answers to the officers’ questions about the truck. Defendant told the

 6 officers that the truck belonged to his father, but denied driving the truck. Defendant

 7 claimed his father had been driving the truck, but when asked where his father was,

 8 Defendant responded that he should be at home in another part of the city. Defendant

 9 then claimed not to know who had been driving the truck or how it had gotten to the

10 house on East Green Acres Drive. Officer Marin explained that the situation was

11 “very concerning” given the report of a possible domestic involving Defendant’s

12 father’s truck followed shortly thereafter by a report of gunshots in the area.

13 {5}    Meanwhile, other officers had arrived and begun investigating, searching in

14 the dark with flashlights, apparently for shell casings, gunshot victims, and/or

15 witnesses. One officer spoke with a neighbor who stated he heard gunshots and then

16 saw a woman run into the house on East Green Acres Drive and a man run to the

17 side of the house. Around this time, a shell casing was found in the yard of the house

18 on East Green Acres Drive, where officers had located Defendant. The district court

19 found, “Following [the] spent casing being discovered, Officer Soriano made the

20 decision that due to the nature of the separate calls about a roving domestic and shots

                                              3
 1 fired, Defendant would be handcuffed in the back of his patrol car for the pendency

 2 of the investigation.” Officer Soriano explained to Defendant that he needed to help

 3 out with the investigation in order to expedite it.

 4 {6}    After detaining Defendant in the backseat of his patrol car, Officer Soriano

 5 called in the license plate of the truck to dispatch and joined in the search. A little

 6 over eight minutes later, Officer Soriano spoke on the telephone with the registered

 7 owner of the truck, Defendant’s father, who informed Officer Soriano that his truck

 8 was missing, that his son did not have permission to be driving it, that there were

 9 two firearms in the truck, and that he wanted to report the truck as stolen and to press

10 charges. By this point, Defendant had been handcuffed and in the backseat of Officer

11 Soriano’s patrol car for just over ten minutes.

12 {7}    Approximately forty-five minutes after Defendant was handcuffed and placed

13 in the patrol car, Detective Ahmaad White began speaking with Defendant.

14 Following an advisement of rights under Miranda, Defendant confessed to taking

15 his father’s truck without permission and discharging his father’s 9 mm handgun,

16 which was missing from the truck. After explaining to Defendant’s parents, who

17 were on scene by this time, that Defendant faced charges for unlawful taking of a

18 motor vehicle, negligent discharge of a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a

19 felon, Detective White formally arrested Defendant—approximately one hour after

20 Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car.

                                              4
 1 {8}    In the instant case, Defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a

 2 felon (NMSA 1978, § 30-7-16(A)(1) (2019, amended 2022)) and negligent use of a

 3 firearm (NMSA 1978, § 30-7-4(A)(1) (1993)). Defendant moved to suppress his

 4 confession on the grounds that, inter alia, he was subjected to a de facto arrest not

 5 supported by probable cause when he was handcuffed and placed in the back of the

 6 patrol car for nearly an hour, and his Miranda waiver and confession were

 7 involuntary. Following the district court’s denial of his motion and subsequent

 8 motion to reconsider, Defendant conditionally pled guilty to both crimes, reserving

 9 his right to appeal.

10 DISCUSSION

11 {9}    A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed

12 question of fact and law. State v. Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 8, 338 P.3d 128.

13 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to the [s]tate as the prevailing party,

14 indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the district court’s ruling and

15 disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” State v. Pacheco, 2008-

16 NMCA-131, ¶ 3, 145 N.M. 40, 193 P.3d 587. We review de novo the district court’s

17 application of the law to the facts. Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 8. We additionally

18 bear in mind that “it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate, by providing well-

19 supported and clear arguments that the district court has erred.” State v. Johnson,

20 ___-NMCA-___, ¶ 38, ___ P.3d ___ (A-1-CA-39367, June 30, 2023) (alteration,

                                             5
 1 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also State v. Aragon, 1999-

 2 NMCA-060, ¶ 10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (explaining that “it is [the

 3 d]efendant’s burden on appeal to demonstrate any claimed error below” given the

 4 presumption of correctness we accord the district court’s rulings).

 5 I.     De Facto Arrest

 6 {10}   Defendant does not contest that reasonable suspicion supported his detention,

 7 but argues that handcuffing and placing him in the back of a patrol car for nearly an

 8 hour transformed his lawful detention into a de facto arrest not supported by probable

 9 cause. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides protection

10 against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 See State v. Martinez, 2018-NMSC-

11 007, ¶ 10, 410 P.3d 186. A warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, State

12 v. Williams, 2011-NMSC-026, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 729, 255 P.3d 307, but a law

13 enforcement officer may temporarily detain an individual for investigatory purposes,

14 absent probable cause, if they have “reasonable and articulable suspicion that the

15 law is being or has been broken.” State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M.

16 119, 2 P.3d 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When a detention

          Although Defendant briefly mentions Article II, Section 10 of the New
          1

   Mexico Constitution in his brief in chief, he does not argue that it should be
   construed any differently than the Fourth Amendment. We therefore limit our
   analysis to the Fourth Amendment. Cf. State v. Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, ¶ 30,
   150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734 (declining to decide an undeveloped state constitutional
   argument).

                                             6
 1 exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it becomes a de facto

 2 arrest requiring probable cause.” State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 15, 122 N.M.

 3 84, 920 P.2d 1038. As this Court previously has explained, “There is no bright-line

 4 test for evaluating when an investigatory detention becomes invasive enough to

 5 become a de facto arrest.” Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 14. Our overarching

 6 inquiry—the reasonableness of the detention—requires us to weigh, on the one hand,

 7 the government’s justification for the intrusion against, on the other hand, the nature

 8 and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests. See

 9 State v. Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-062, ¶ 11, 400 P.3d 312. “Where the government’s

10 justification for the intrusion outweighs the nature and quality of the intrusion upon

11 a defendant’s right to privacy, the detention is more likely to be considered

12 reasonable.” Id. “Conversely, where the intrusion is significant and the

13 government’s justification is not, the detention is considered a[n unlawful] de facto

14 arrest and, thus, an unreasonable seizure.” Id. We examine the State’s justification

15 for the intrusion and then turn to the nature and quality of the intrusion on

16 Defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests.

17 A.     Justification for the Detention

18 {11}   In examining the justification for the detention, we “typically focus on one or

19 both of two considerations: (1) the nature of the criminal activity suspected or afoot,

20 . . . and/or (2) the specific reasons supporting particular intrusive actions taken by

                                              7
 1 an officer during a detention.” Id. ¶ 12 (citations omitted). Focusing solely on the

 2 nature of the criminal activity, Defendant contends the State’s justification for

 3 detaining him was exceedingly minimal because, according to him, “At most, both

 4 calls involved completed petty misdemeanors.” We cannot agree with Defendant’s

 5 assessment of the nature of the criminal activity suspected or the seriousness of the

 6 situation confronting the officers. Prior to Defendant’s challenged detention,

 7 Officers responded to gunshots fired in a residential neighborhood at night; nearby,

 8 the vehicle reportedly involved in a potential domestic violence incident was found

 9 abandoned, still running in the street. The officer’s investigation thus involved

10 potentially violent felony offenses—e.g., shooting at or from a motor vehicle,

11 shooting at a dwelling house, or aggravated assault with a deadly weapon—with the

12 possibility of victims. Moreover, by the time of Defendant’s challenged detention,

13 Defendant, the only suspect to the crimes being investigated, had given nonsensical

14 and evasive answers to the officers’ questions; a spent casing had been found in the

15 yard of the house where Defendant was located; and a neighbor had confirmed the

16 presence of a man running to the side of that house at the time gunshots were fired.

17 See Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-062, ¶ 18 (providing that evolving circumstances during the

18 course of an investigation may justify “a graduated response based on a more

19 substantial government interest”). In light of all of this, we conclude that the

20 government’s justification for the detention was substantial. See State v. Lovato,

                                             8
 1 1991-NMCA-083, ¶ 27, 112 N.M. 517, 817 P.2d 251 (holding, as a matter of law,

 2 that the intrusiveness of a stop was reasonable “in view of the level of danger the

 3 officers reasonably could assume to exist” given the nature of the crime (a drive-by

 4 shooting) being investigated); cf. Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 17 (holding that

 5 drug-related criminal activity provided a “substantial” governmental justification for

 6 the intrusion).

 7 B.     Nature and Quality of the Intrusion

 8 {12}   In analyzing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth

 9 Amendment interests, courts consider and weigh various factors, including the

10 character or level of the intrusion on the individual, as well as the length of the

11 detention and, relatedly, the diligence of the police in conducting their investigation.

12 See Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-062, ¶ 13; Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 14.

13 {13}   We first consider the level of the intrusion. Here, it was undoubtedly high

14 because Defendant was placed in handcuffs and put in the back of a patrol car.

15 Nevertheless, “[a]lthough the back of a patrol car is not an ideal location for the

16 purposes of an investigatory detention, detention in a patrol car does not constitute

17 an arrest per se.” State v. Werner, 1994-NMSC-025, ¶ 14, 117 N.M. 315, 871 P.2d

18 971 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, the fact that

19 Defendant was handcuffed is not determinative and does not automatically transform

20 his detention into a de facto arrest. See Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 20. As

                                              9
 1 discussed, officers were faced with a dangerous and potentially volatile situation

 2 involving a roving domestic violence incident and the discharge of a firearm at night

 3 in a residential neighborhood. Because Defendant was the only suspect but no

 4 firearm was found on his person, officers logically could have concluded that

 5 Defendant might access a firearm if not secured. Given this danger, and the apparent

 6 need for Officers Marin and Soriano to join in the investigation and search for

 7 potential gunshot victims and witnesses, 2 we cannot say that the level of detention

 8 was unreasonable. Compare Lovato, 1991-NMCA-083, ¶ 27 (concluding that, where

 9 “the officers had just received a report of a drive-by shooting and that minutes later

10 they encountered and stopped a vehicle believed by them to be the one described in

11 the broadcast,” “the level of intrusion under these circumstances was not

12 inappropriate in view of the level of danger the officers reasonably could assume to

13 exist”), with Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-062, ¶ 22 (concluding that the defendant’s

14 detention in a patrol car while handcuffed was unreasonable, in part because there

15 was “no evidence that the officers knew that [the d]efendant had a history of violence

16 or feared for their safety”).

          2
           Officer Soriano testified at the suppression hearing that five officers—the
   number on the scene—were the minimum number of officers needed to search the
   area for gunshot victims and other evidence, but that ten would be more ideal. The
   district court found, and Defendant has not challenged, that there were “limited
   officers” available to conduct the investigation and search for victims and witnesses.

                                             10
 1 {14}   We next consider the length of the detention and the diligence of the

 2 investigation. See Pacheco, 2008-NMCA-131, ¶ 19 (addressing these factors

 3 together because “both rest on the same underlying premise, an impermissibly

 4 protracted detention”); Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 24 (addressing both factors

 5 together). As for the length of delay, both parties agree that the relevant period of

 6 detention began when Defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of the patrol

 7 car, but they diverge on how long that period lasted. The State contends it lasted

 8 approximately forty-five minutes—until Defendant made his confession to

 9 Detective White—while Defendant contends it lasted nearly an hour—until his

10 formal arrest by Detective White. We do not agree with either party. Cf. State v.

11 Nash, 2007-NMCA-141, ¶ 5, 142 N.M. 754, 170 P.3d 533 (providing that “[d]espite

12 the failure of both parties to cite the correct law, we apply the controlling cases as

13 the issues are properly before this Court”). As this Court observed in Skippings, what

14 matters is the amount of time until probable cause for arrest has arisen. 3 See 2014-

          3
           Defendant acknowledges this principle in his brief in chief by repeatedly
   citing the notion that a de facto arrest must be supported by probable cause. See, e.g.,
   State v. Hernandez, 1997-NMCA-006, ¶ 27, 122 N.M. 809, 932 P.2d 499 (“When a
   detention becomes a de facto arrest, a showing of probable cause is required to
   support it.”); State v. Flores, 1996-NMCA-059, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 84, 920 P.2d 1038
   (“When a detention exceeds the boundaries of a permissible investigatory stop, it
   becomes a de facto arrest requiring probable cause.”); see also, e.g., United States v.
   Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 917 (9th Cir. 1988) (providing that a de facto arrest supported
   by probable cause is lawful); United States v. Hernandez, 825 F.2d 846, 852 (5th
   Cir. 1987) (same).

                                             11
 1 NMCA-117, ¶ 15 (focusing on period of time until probable cause arose even though

 2 formal arrest occurred later); see also id. ¶ 14 (“When an officer with reasonable

 3 suspicion but without probable cause detains an individual in an unreasonable

 4 manner, the detention may amount to a[n unlawful] de facto arrest, rather than an

 5 investigatory detention.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation

 6 omitted)).

 7 {15}   The district court did not make any explicit determinations about the duration

 8 of Defendant’s detention or when probable cause arose. Viewing the facts in the light

 9 most favorable to the district court’s ruling, the amount of time Defendant spent

10 handcuffed and in the back of the patrol car before probable cause arose was

11 approximately ten minutes. See id. ¶ 15 (viewing the evidence in the light most

12 favorable to the prevailing party in determining when probable cause arose and the

13 relevant period of detention); cf. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 22 (providing that, in

14 the absence of findings from the district court, “we must draw from the record to

15 derive findings based on reasonable facts and inferences” (internal quotation marks

16 and citation omitted)). By that point, Defendant’s father had told Officer Soriano

17 that his truck (as well as two firearms) were missing, Defendant did not have

18 permission to take his truck, and he wanted to press charges. Upon learning this

19 information, Officer Soriano had probable cause to arrest Defendant for at least one

20 felony offense. See State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 69, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d

                                            12
 1 807 (“Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officers’

 2 knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient

 3 to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been, or is

 4 being, committed.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), overruled on

 5 other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110; see

 6 also, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 30-16D-1(A) (2009) (providing that unlawful taking of a

 7 motor vehicle, which is committed when a defendant takes a motor vehicle without

 8 the owner’s consent, is at least a fourth degree felony).

 9 {16}   As for the diligence of the investigation, Defendant offers little in the way of

10 argument, maintaining again that the investigation, at most, involved “possibly one

11 or two misdemeanor offenses that were no longer occurring,” and broadly asserting

12 that “[t]he facts of this case do not bespeak a narrow and diligent investigation.” But,

13 as discussed, Defendant’s characterization of the incident belies the seriousness of

14 the situation confronting the officers. And Defendant’s assertion that the

15 investigation was not narrow or diligent is made without further explanation. Such

16 an argument is inadequate to warrant our review. See State v. Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-

17 027, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 761, 228 P.3d 1181 (noting that we will “not review unclear or

18 undeveloped arguments [that] require us to guess at what a part[y’s] arguments

19 might be”). Nevertheless, based on an independent review of the record, we are

20 satisfied that the officers did not delay their investigation or that they were otherwise

                                              13
 1 unreasonable in conducting it. See Skippings, 2014-NMCA-117, ¶ 24 (providing that

 2 “[t]he length of the detention (ten minutes) was reasonably limited to the time

 3 required to perform all of the[ investigative] activities” and “[t]here is nothing to

 4 indicate that the agents delayed the investigation or were otherwise unreasonable in

 5 conducting the investigation”).

 6 C.     Totality of the Circumstances

 7 {17}   Although the intrusion upon Defendant’s privacy rights was considerable, we

 8 cannot say that it outweighed the government’s substantial justification for the

 9 intrusion, considering the offenses being investigated and the potential danger faced

10 by officers. See Ortiz, 2017-NMCA-062, ¶ 17 (providing that a “significant”

11 government interest “presumptively justif[ies] a higher level of intrusion during an

12 investigatory detention”); cf. State v. Contreras, 2003-NMCA-129, ¶ 14, 134 N.M.

13 503, 79 P.3d 1111 (holding that “the gravity of the public concern and the public

14 interest served by the seizure” of a suspected drunk driver “weigh heavily in the

15 [reasonableness] balancing test”). All in all, under the particular factual

16 circumstances of this case and in light of the argument presented by Defendant on

17 appeal, we affirm the district court’s determinations that Defendant’s detention was

18 reasonable and he was not subjected to an unlawful de facto arrest. See Ortiz, 2017-

19 NMCA-062, ¶ 19 (providing that “the test of reasonableness is one based on the

20 totality of the circumstances”); see also Johnson, ___-NMCA-___, ¶ 38 (placing the

                                            14
 1 burden on the appellant to demonstrate error); Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶ 10

 2 (same).

 3 II.    Voluntariness of Miranda Waiver and Confession

 4 {18}   Defendant next argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to

 5 suppress his statements, arguing that his Miranda waiver and confession were

 6 involuntary. Regardless of whether voluntariness is examined within the context of

 7 the Fifth Amendment, for Miranda waivers, or within the context of the due process

 8 clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for confessions, “the benchmark is the absence

 9 of governmental coercion or police overreaching.” State v. Fekete, 1995-NMSC-

10 049, ¶ 48, 120 N.M. 290, 901 P.2d 708 (internal quotation marks and citation

11 omitted); see also id. ¶¶ 33, 50 (equating the inquiry of whether there was

12 governmental coercion or police overreaching under the Fifth Amendment and the

13 due process clause, notwithstanding the fact that “[a] claim that the police coerced a

14 statement requires a different analysis than a claim that an accused voluntarily

15 waived [their] Fifth Amendment protections under Miranda”).

16 {19}   Defendant fails to persuade us the district court erred in concluding that his

17 Miranda waiver or confession were the product of governmental coercion or police

18 overreaching. His argument in this regard is undeveloped and lacking citation to any

19 persuasive authority. Defendant merely sets out the general test for determining

20 whether a waiver or statement is “voluntary.” Then, after listing tactics used by

                                             15
 1 officers that Defendant characterizes as “coercive,” he baldly asserts, without further

 2 analysis, that such tactics “overbor[e his] will and rendered any subsequent

 3 statement involuntary.” Defendant offers no elicitation of how the particular tactics

 4 used in this case amounted to official coercion. See State v. Ortiz, 2009-NMCA-092,

 5 ¶ 32, 146 N.M. 873, 215 P.3d 811 (refusing to address undeveloped, conclusory

 6 arguments, reasoning that “[a] party cannot throw out legal theories without

 7 connecting them to any elements and any factual support for the elements” (internal

 8 quotation marks and citation omitted)). And as the State correctly points out in its

 9 answer brief, Defendant does “not cite a single case holding that statements even

10 remotely similar to those made by [the officers] constitute coercion.” See State v.

11 Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 60, 327 P.3d 1129 (providing that an appellate

12 court “will not consider an issue if no authority is cited in support of the issue and

13 that, given no cited authority, we assume no such authority exists”). Again, such an

14 argument is inadequate to warrant our review. See Fuentes, 2010-NMCA-027, ¶ 29;

15 State v. Stevenson, 2020-NMCA-005, ¶ 20, 455 P.3d 890 (“We will not address an

16 undeveloped argument or perform [a d]efendant’s research for him.”). Nevertheless,

17 based on an independent review of the record and relevant case law, we are satisfied

18 that Defendant’s Miranda waiver and confession were not the product of

19 governmental coercion or police overreaching. See, e.g., State v. Barrera, 2001-

20 NMSC-014, ¶ 27, 130 N.M. 227, 22 P.3d 1177 (concluding the defendant’s Miranda

                                             16
 1 waiver and confession were voluntary where law enforcement did not make threats

 2 or promises of leniency or use physical force, notwithstanding that the defendant

 3 was questioned in close and restrictive quarters by two officers). We therefore reject

 4 Defendant’s contention that the district court erred in concluding his waiver and

 5 confession were voluntary.

 6 CONCLUSION

 7 {20}   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Defendant’s

 8 motion to suppress.

 9 {21}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

10                                         ____________________________________
11                                         JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

12 WE CONCUR:

13 _________________________
14 MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

15 _________________________
16 ZACHARY A. IVES, Judge

                                             17