Court Opinion

ID: 9552796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:17:04.916549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:00.230997
License: Public Domain

*474DISSENTING OPINION OF
NAKAMURA, J.
WITH WHOM RICHARDSON, C.J., JOINS
The issue in a nutshell is whether the parents of an eleven year old boy who was fatally injured in a collision between a bicycle and an automobile are his “dependents” for purposes of the no-fault insurance law. The court concludes they are, since they are his “survivors.” But HRS § 294-4(l)(B) only obligates an insurer to make the payment in question “for the benefit of the surviving spouse and any dependent, as defined in section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.”1 And as the parents concededly were not dependent on the child for support, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Our concern here is not with general damages recoverable in tort; it is with the statutory benefits delineated in HRS § 294-2(10).2 *475More particularly, we are dealing with no-fault benefits expressly designed to cover monthly earnings loss. The court reasons that had the victim “been permanently incapacitated and continued to live, he would have been entitled to work loss benefits under HRS § 294-2(10)(C).’’ It also claims to draw support for its conclusion from a statement in a legislative committee report that “[bjenefits would also be paid for loss of future anticipated earnings.” Yet as HIG points out, neither rationale can explain away the statute’s employment of dependency rather than survival as the pertinent criterion for benefit entitlement under HRS § 294-4(l)(B), a precondition rendered explicit by a reference to a section of the Internal Revenue Code.3
The court rejects HIG’s thesis on grounds that the argument carried to a logical conclusion “would result in the disallowance of all no-fault benefits where the person suffering accidental harm dies as a result of his injuries leaving neither surviving spouse nor dependent.” But HIG does not suggest that HRS § 294-2(10) is *476subject to such a reading. It has acknowledged liability for medical expenses payable under § 294-2(10)(A) and funeral expenses payable under § 294-2(10)(D). It merely asserts that in a death case, § 294-4(1)(B) only obligates an insurance carrier to make the payments described in § 294-2(10)(C) “for the benefit of the surviving spouse and any dependent.” And where an accident victim leaves neither, HIG contends the statute contemplates no payment of benefits for monthly earnings loss, actual or otherwise.
II.
HIG’s interpretation of HRS § 294-4(1)(B) does not fly in the face of logic; nor does it carry an unjust result. Where medical services have been furnished the accident victim or where funeral expenses have been incurred, the payment thereof would be of primary benefit to the suppliers of those services. Damages to cover wages that might have been earned by the victim, however, would primarily benefit certain survivors of the victim. Moreover, HIG’s view that the benefits in question are not claimable comports with the interpretation of HRS § 294-4(1)(B) by the state commissioner of motor vehicle insurance, who is charged with oversight of the scheme of reparations established by HRS chapter 294.
When the no-fault insurance system was adopted, tort liability with respect to accidental harm resulting from motor vehicle accidents was abolished, except where such accountability is preserved by HRS § 294-6. A situation in which liability has been kept intact is where death occurs. Thus the damages claimed here are collectible as they have been, by way of a tort action.
I would reverse the circuit court’s denial of HIG’s motion for summary judgment.

 On December 16, 1977, when the fatal accident occurred, HRS § 294-4(l)(B> read:
Every no-fault and self-insurer shall provide no-fault benefits for accidental harm as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 294-5(c):
(B) In the case of death arising out of a motor vehicle accident of any person, including the owner, operator, occupant, or user of the insured motor vehicle, or any pedestrian (including a bicyclist) who sustains accidental harm as a result of the operation, maintenance, or use of said vehicle, the insurer shall pay, without regard to fault, to the legal representative of such person, for the benefit of the surviving spouse and any dependent, as defined in section 152 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, of such person, an amount equal to the no-fault benefits payable to such spouse and dependent as a result of the death of such person, subject, however, to the provisions of section 294-2(10).

 At the time of the accident, HRS § 294-2(10) read:
“No-fault benefits” with respect to any accidental harm shall be subject to an aggregate limit of $15,000 per person or his survivor and means:
(A) All appropriate and.reasonable expenses necessarily incurred for medical, hospital, surgical, professional nursing, dental, optometric, ambulance, prosthetic services, products and accommodations furnished, x-ray and may include any non-medical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance with the teachings, faith or belief of any group which depends for healing upon spiritual means through prayer;
(B) All appropriate and reasonable expenses necessarily incurred for *475psychiatric, physical, and occupational therapy and rehabilitation;
(C) Monthly earnings loss measured by an amount equal to the lesser of;
(i) $800 per month, or
(ii) The monthly earnings for the period during which the accidental harm results in the inability to engage in available and appropriate gainful activity, or
(iii) A monthly amount equal to the amount, if any, by which the lesser of (i) or (ii) exceeds any lower monthly earnings of the person sustaining injury at the time he resumes gainful activity.
(D) All appropriate and reasonable expenses necessarily incurred as a result of such accidental harm, including, but not limited to, (i) expenses incurred in obtaining services in substitution of those that the injured or deceased person would have performed not for income but for the benefit of himself or his family up to $800 per month, (ii) funeral expenses not to exceed $1,500, and (iii) attorney’s fees and costs to the extent provided in section 294-30(a); provided that the term, when applied to a no-fault policy issued at no cost under the provisions of section 294-24(b)(2), shall not include benefits under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) for any person receiving public assistance benefits.

 A “dependent” within the meaning of the pertinent code provision is an individual who stands in a stated familial relationship with the taxpayer or who has as his principal place of abode the taxpayer’s home and is a member of the taxpayer’s household and has also received over half of his support for the taxable year from the taxpayer. See I.R.C. | 152 (1954).
There is no contention that the parents of the victim fell within the foregoing meaning of “dependent.”