Court Opinion

ID: 9689014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:16:24.051247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:26.935957
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, the defendants’ maintenance of a nuisance per se could not create liability under these facts. In my view, the question of proximate cause arising from the removal of the grenade from the firing range is a question of fact for the trier of fact, thus rendering the order of summary judgment improper.
A trial court in considering a motion for summary judgment brought pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(3) "has the limited function of determining whether a material issue of fact exists. The trial court must carefully avoid making a finding of fact under the guise of determining that no issue of material fact exists”. Brooks v Reed, 93 Mich App 166, 170; 286 NW2d 81 (1979), Partrich v Muscat, 84 Mich App 724, 730-731; 270 NW2d 506 (1978).
The parties in the instant matter stipulated to a statement of facts for the trial court’s use in deciding their motions for summary judgment. In *127support of their respective motions, the parties also argued to the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact existed. However, in Hull v Detroit Equipment Installation, Inc, 12 Mich App 532, 534; 163 NW2d 271 (1968), this Court stated:
"While each of the parties assert that there is no factual dispute, this does not of necessity give the trial court carte blanche authority to resolve ultimate factual issues on the motion. The court’s role is to determine from the pleadings, affidavits and other evidence on the record whether there are genuine issues of fact. See Zamler v Smith (1965), 375 Mich 675.”
In the instant case, the lower court concluded that "the creation and maintenance of the nuisance per se was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs’ injuries”. This conclusion must be measured against the Supreme Court holding in Bluemer v Saginaw Central Oil & Gas Service, Inc, 356 Mich 399, 413-414; 97 NW2d 90 (1959), quoting the prior decision in Brown v Nichols, 337 Mich 684, 689-690; 60 NW2d 907 (1953):
" 'The question as to what constitutes a nuisance is one of law for the court, but it is for the jury to decide whether a particular act or structure or use of property, which is not a nuisance per se, is a nuisance in fact and whether an alleged nuisance is the cause of the losses or injuries complained of and to what extent such losses or injuries are attributable to the nuisance.’ 66 CJS, Nuisances, p 960, § 153.”
See also Melendres v Soales, 105 Mich App 73; 306 NW2d 399 (1981), citing Gerzeski v Dep’t of State Highways, 403 Mich 149; 268 NW2d 525 (1978), for a similar explication of the jury’s role in nuisance cases.
The mere fact that the boys removed the gre*128nade from the dangerous area before it exploded should not, I believe, remove the causation question from consideration by the trier of fact. Rather, the time and place of the explosion would properly be factors for the fact finder to consider in determining the causal connection between nuisance and injuries.
I would reverse the decision of the lower court, insofar as it granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and remand this case for trial.