Court Opinion

ID: 9490140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:34:09.672323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:55.308078
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The ALJ’s findings which have been approved by the district court and by the majority are erroneous.
First, the ALJ erroneously discounted Hall’s subjective complaints of pain solely because she refused to take prescription pain relievers. Although functioning without such medication may contradict complaints of pain, Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir.1996), legitimate reasons exist for refusing medication and coping with pain. In Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984), this court instructed adjudicators to consider the side effects of medication before discounting complaints of pain. Id. at 1322, quoted in Johnson, 87 F.3d at 1017. Indeed, continued use of prescription-strength pain relievers increases the risks of side effects such as bleeding ulcers and addiction. See, e.g., J.E. Schmidt, Attorneys’ Dictionary of Medicine A-276 (1997) (describing side effects of prolonged treatment with ansaids); id. at C-268 (defining codeine as derivative of opium and habit-forming).
The Commissioner offered no evidence disputing Hall’s statement that she refused to take stronger medicine because of its sleep-inducing effect and fear of addiction. The majority states that Hall’s “testimony that her pain was relieved by Ibuprofen and a hot pad ... contradicts a need for prescription medication to alleviate her pain.” Maj. op. at 1258. I disagree. Using over-the-counter pain relievers and heating pads constitutes a legitimate method of pain control, without entirely relieving pain, for people who choose to avoid the risks and side effects associated with stronger medications. It is a common experience that people, such as Hall, rely on heating pads and over-the-counter medicine and forego the relief of stronger medications. Indeed, heavy pain medications may often prove ineffective. Hall’s decision to avoid the side effects of prescription-strength pain relievers in no way contradicts her claims of pain. Thus, I believe the record lacked substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision to discount Hall’s subjective complaints of pain.
Second, the evidence fails to support the ALJ’s conclusion that a significant number of jobs that Hall could perform exist in the economy. The Commissioner bears the burden of demonstrating that a significant number of jobs exist that Hall could perform. See Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 179-80 (8th Cir.1997). To meet this burden, the Commissioner can rely on the testimony of a vocational expert, Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 188-89 (8th Cir.1997) who must “determine whether jobs exist for someone with the claimant’s precise disabilities.” Montgomery v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, 277 (8th Cir.1995) (quoting Jelinek v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir.1989)). In addition, this court recently recognized a distinction between testimony from a vocational expert indicating that he “was hedging or giving qualified responses[,]” and testimony that merely demonstrates awareness that he was addressing hypothetical questions. Long, 108 F.3d at 188-89.
In Hall’s case, the vocational expert merely cited raw numbers of available jobs without specifying how many of those jobs Hall could perform based on her precise disabilities. Furthermore, the expert hedged and offered qualified responses because he acknowledged that her disabilities would “preclude a majority” of those jobs, and stated that her limitations would “drastically reduce” the numbers he used to reflect available jobs in the economy. Tr. at 62-66. *1261Merely identifying large numbers of available jobs without specifying how many of those jobs a claimant could perform is insufficient to meet the Commissioner’s burden.
The majority recognizes that “[t]he testimony elicited from the [vocational expert] ... could have been more precise[,]” but concludes that the expert’s qualified testimony combined with 340 available jobs constitutes a significant number. Maj. op. at 1259. The majority relies on Jenkins v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 1083, 1087 (8th Cir.1988), to support its conclusion. In Jenkins, however, this court decided 500 security jobs constituted a significant number in light of the claimant’s twenty-five years of security experience. Id. Hall does not have such experience. I believe relying upon Jenkins for establishing a minimum significant number is improper.
In sum, the ALJ erroneously discounted Hall’s complaints of pain because of her refusal to take prescription pain relievers. In addition, the Commissioner failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that Hall could perform a significant number of available jobs in the economy. The record establishes that Hall is severely disabled and entitled to disability benefits.
I would, therefore, reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructions that it require the Commissioner to grant disability benefits to Hall.