Court Opinion

ID: 9701807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:38:55.385204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:29.897556
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, J„

dissenting in part:
I cannot agree with that part of the majority’s opinion which holds that Sylvia Hall Williams’s amended declaration seeking damages for mental anguish is barred by limitations. The amendment merely supplements a timely filed declaration stating a cause of action for wrongful death, by introducing an element of damages expressly permitted by statute. The amendment does not, in my view, *510predicate liability upon some new, independent cause of action.
It is well settled that an amendment to a declaration which states a cause of action not encompassed in the original declaration will be barred if not filed within the limitations period. But an amendment such as the one in the present case, introducing a new element of damages, does not constitute a new cause of action and relates back to the commencement of the action. The courts have so held, and have permitted such amendments even though the statute of limitations had run. Hall v. Pennsylvania B. Co., 257 Pa. 54, 100 A. 1035, 1039-1040 (1916).
Thus, in Caldwell v. Hodges, 18 Tenn. App. 355, 77 S.W.2d 817, 822 (1934), the plaintiff was permitted to amend the original declaration in a wrongful death action to include as damages certain medical expenses, even though the amendment introduced “an element of damage not mentioned in the [original! declaration” and was filed after the statutory period of limitations. The court held that “an amendment claiming increased damages, or additional items of damages, for the same wrongful act seasonably pleaded, does not introduce a new cause of action within the statute of limitations.” (77 S.W.2d at 823.) Similarly, in Schwab v. P. J. Oesterling & Son, Inc., 386 Pa. 388, 126 A. 2d 418 (1956), the plaintiff in a survival action was permitted to amend the original complaint after the limitations period to include loss of earnings of the decedent, an element of damages not included in the original complaint. The court held that an amendment introducing “ ‘an additional element or an added claim of damage arising from the same circumstances’ ” is not barred by limitations. (126 A. 2d at 421.) See also Indiana Toll Road Commission v. Bartusch, 135 Ind. App. 123, 184 N.E.2d 34 (1962).
Similarly, I believe that the amendment naming Raynetta Renee Fowlkes was proper. A child of the decedent is a primary beneficiary in an action for wrongful death. Maryland Code (1974), § 3-904 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. A person entitled to bring an action under a wrongful death statute may intervene in a pending *511action even after the period of limitations has run. Rabe v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 198 Cal. 290, 244 P. 1077, 1079-1081 (1926); 2 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 11:55 (2d ed. 1975). And the wrongful death action of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes cannot constitutionally be barred by reason of her illegitimacy. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972).
For these reasons, I believe that the judgment in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams against Worsham and the judgment in favor of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes against Worsham should both be affirmed.
Judge Levine has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed in this dissent.