Court Opinion

ID: 9848407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:18:57.477086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:16.901642
License: Public Domain

HEDRICK, Chief Judge.
Defendant’s first contention is that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized by police. Defendant argues the search warrant was not issued with probable cause as required under the “totality of the circumstances” test of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 321, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed. 2d 527 (1983). He bases this on his contention that the affidavit submitted to secure the search warrant does not have sufficient information to establish probable cause. The State *426all but concedes the affidavit is insufficient, but argues the court did not err in denying the motion to suppress due to the “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule.
The “good faith exception” is enunciated and elaborated on in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 (1982). Our State recognized this “good faith exception” in State v. Welch, 316 N.C. 578, 342 S.E. 2d 789 (1986). We hold the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence because of the good faith exception.
Defendant further contends “the officers did not have a right to search [defendant’s] garage, a licensed business in a premises separate from the residence home of the Defendant.” Even though the garage was a separate building and a place of business, it could be searched as part of defendant’s residence. State v. Trapper, 48 N.C. App. 481, 269 S.E. 2d 680 (1980).
Defendant next argues a delay of three and one-half days between execution and return of the inventory of items seized was an undue delay in violation of G.S. 15A-257. The statute does not state a particular time for return of the inventory, and we hold that in this case the delay was not undue or unreasonable, and we can conceive of no prejudice.
Under G.S. 15A-242, defendant argues that several items were improperly seized. The statute allows for seizure of contraband or evidence of an offense. Pursuant to a lawful search warrant, officers have a right to seize any articles thought to be connected to the drug business of defendant. All items in this case were properly seized.
Defendant also argues the search warrant fails to meet the requirements of G.S. 15A-246(1) in that the time of issuance is not found above the signature of the magistrate. Such an omission could be significant, but in this case there is no prejudice since the time of issuance was noted elsewhere on the face of the warrant.
Defendant next argues the trial court erred by allowing impeachment of Wood, the State’s witness. Wood was asked about his prior inconsistent statement to Detective Durst. Following Wood’s denial of the statement, Durst testified as to what Wood told him. Defendant asserts that although G.S. 8C-1, Rule 607 *427allows the State to impeach its own witnesses by use of a prior inconsistent statement, the State “may not use such a statement under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible.” United States v. Miller, 664 F. 2d 94, 97 (1981).
In this case, two witnesses had already testified as to Wood’s involvement. Wood’s actions were important to the State’s case, and his testimony was needed. There is no showing that the prior inconsistent statement was used for any purpose other than impeachment. The State acted in good faith, and there was no error in allowing impeachment.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred in its motions to dismiss, to set aside the verdicts and for a new trial. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must determine “whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 766, 309 S.E. 2d 232, 235-36 (1983). If there is substantial evidence of these determinations, denial of the motion is proper. Id.
In considering whether this evidence is sufficient, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Lowery, 309 N.C. 763, 309 S.E. 2d 232 (1983).
For a defendant to be convicted of trafficking in cocaine, he must be someone “who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses 28 grams or more of coca leaves or any salts, compound, derivative or preparation thereof. . . .” G.S. 90-95(h)(3). In this case, the jury found defendant guilty of selling more than 28 grams of cocaine. There is ample evidence that defendant sold more than 28 grams of cocaine. For this reason, the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
Likewise, we find the motions to set aside the verdicts and for a new trial were properly denied since there was sufficient evidence for the verdicts. These arguments have no merit.
We hold defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
*428No error.
Judge Greene concurs.
Judge Becton dissents.