Court Opinion

ID: 9477870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:33:19.294065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:05.724177
License: Public Domain

CELEBREZZE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
If the district court’s dismissals of Counts III and IV of plaintiff Knafel’s complaint were the only issues facing us in this case, I would have little difficulty joining in the majority’s determination that we are without jurisdiction over her appeal. Viewing Knafel’s appeal in isolation, I can discern no equitable or juridical concerns that would justify a departure from the normal procedure requiring Knafel to appeal these dismissals after ultimate termination of her case in the district court. *1163Under these circumstances, we would have no reason to acquiesce in the district court’s unexplained Rule 54(b) certification. See Corrosioneering Inc. v. Thyssen Envtl. Sys. Inc., 807 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.1986); COMPACT v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville, 786 F.2d 227 (6th Cir.1986); Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 58 (6th Cir.1986).
This case is complicated, however, by the presence of plaintiff Wuchich’s appeal.* I agree with the majority that the district court’s dismissal of Wuchich’s complaint should be affirmed; the intentional torts arising out of alleged retaliatory work assignments are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982). It appears to me, however, that as a practical matter, our decision on the merits of Wuchich’s claim will also be dispositive of Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of Count IV, due to the similarity between the two. As the majority itself notes, the two claims are “parallel.” The plaintiffs were less cautious: in their motion to consolidate, they referred to their claims as “virtually identical.” The district court accordingly granted the motion and ordered consolidation. Finally, in dismissing Wuchich’s claim, the district court did not undertake a separate analysis, but instead explicitly relied on its reasoning in dismissing Knafel’s Count IV. Given that the two claims are so closely intertwined, it is difficult to imagine how our resolution of Wuchich’s appeal could be anything but dispositive of Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of Count IV.
Under these circumstances, I believe that we should take this practical consideration into account and accept the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification, at least insofar as it implicates Count IV of Knafel’s complaint. I find little reason to remand Count IV to the district court when this court announces a dispositive holding in the very same appeal. Juridical concerns, therefore, counsel that we should accept jurisdiction and decide this aspect of Knafel’s appeal along with Wuchich’s. See Corrosioneering, 807 F.2d at 1283 (listing as one factor to be considered in reviewing a Rule 54(b) certification, “the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time” (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadephia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir.1975))).
Moreover, I do not believe that we should refrain from accepting jurisdiction over Knafel’s appeal solely on the ground that the district court failed to explain its Rule 54(b) order. To my knowledge this court has never held that the failure to explain a Rule 54(b) certification, standing alone, rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect. Rather, our analyses in Solomon, COMPACT, and Corrosioneering teach that upon finding the district court’s certification deficient, this court must independently review the relevant juridical and equitable considerations, insofar as they are disclosed by the record and elucidated by the parties, to determine whether the district court’s Rule 54(b) order is nonetheless salvageable. See Corrosioneering, 807 F.2d at 1284-85 (court undertakes an “independent analysis of the juridical and equitable concerns present in the instant case” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1285-86 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (concluding that in spite of the failure to explain, the court should exercise its jurisdiction); COMPACT, 786 F.2d at 230-31 (court finds it impossible to determine upon its independent review of the record, which issues as to which parties the district court’s Rule 54(b) order purported to finally decide); Solomon, 782 F.2d at 61-62 (finding that interest of justice would be better served if the appeal were presented as a “unified package”). Applying these principles to the instant case, I would accept jurisdiction over Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of Count IV, since it will be effectively resolved by our decision on the merits of Wuchich’s appeal.
The decision to accept jurisdiction over Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of *1164Count IY brings into question whether the court should also accept the remainder of Knafel’s appeal, i.e., the appeal from the dismissal of Count III. Having accepted half of the district court’s Rule 54(b) certification, considerations of judicial economy might indicate, in the proper case, that the court should take jurisdiction over the entire appeal. However, because the Supreme Court has already granted a writ of certiorari on the same issue, see Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 226, 98 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), I see no reason for this court to take jurisdiction over the remainder of Knafel’s appeal. In my opinion, the district court is in as good a position as we are, if not better, to apply the Court's eventual decision in Lingle to this case in the first instance. Accordingly, I see no advantage in taking jurisdiction over Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of Count III.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the majority’s decision not to accept jurisdiction over Knafel’s appeal from the dismissal of Count III and in the court’s disposition of Wuchich’s claim on the merits. However, I dissent from the court’s refusal to take jurisdiction over the appeal from the dismissal of Knafel’s Count IV; I would affirm that dismissal in accordance with our decision on the merits of Wuc-hich’s appeal.

 In spite of the district court’s order consolidating Wuchich’s and Knafel’s cases, under Sixth Circuit precedent we clearly have jurisdiction over Wuchich’s appeal even though the district court did not certify it under Rule 54(b). See Kraft, Inc. v. Local Union 327, 683 F.2d 131 (6th Cir.1982) (per curiam); but see Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Eller, 827 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.1987) (per curiam); Huene v. United States, 743 F.2d 703 (9th Cir.1984).