Court Opinion

ID: 9741732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:01:06.684812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:25.714425
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(concurring). I agree that the WCAB must make further fact-finding in this case, but I do not agree with all that is said in the majority opinion. I, therefore, write separately.
By a three to two division, the majority of the WCAB concluded that plaintiff had knowledge of the injury for which he seeks compensation on April 23, 1971. The board then stated the test of Lewis v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 360; 230 NW2d 538 (1975), and concluded that plaintiff had failed to notify his employer of the injury in a timely manner under MCL 418.381; MSA 17.237(381). In so concluding, the WCAB erred.
Section 381 imposes obligations on employers and employees. An employee has an obligation to notify his employer within three months of sustaining the injury that the injury has occurred and must make a claim for compensation within six months thereafter. The employer has an obligation to report the accident to the bureau so that the employee may be informed of his rights. Norris v Chrysler Corp, 391 Mich 469, 476; 216 NW2d 783 (1974). If the employer has "notice or knowledge” of the accident within the three months, the *39six-month statute of limitations for making a claim for compensation does not begin to run until a report by the employer of the injury is filed with the bureau.
Two types of questions have arisen under § 381, whether the notice was timely and whether it was sufficient. Questions of timeliness are governed by Lewis, supra. Questions of sufficiency are governed by Norris, supra. See also, Meads v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 540; 266 NW2d 146 (1978), Krol v Hamtramck, 398 Mich 341; 248 NW2d 195 (1976).
In this case the record clearly shows that plaintiff filed a claim for group health and accident benefits within days after his heart attack based on the happening of the heart attack. To receive these group insurance benefits, plaintiff filed a form with his employer weekly. Plaintiff apparently indicated in this form that the injury was not occupationally related. Notwithstanding that fact, I would conclude that filing for the group health benefits was both timely and sufficient notice to the employer of the injury under § 381 and, therefore, conclude the WCAB erred as a matter of law in holding plaintiff was barred from relief under the act.
The same conclusion was reached by a panel of this Court concerning an occupational disease on similar facts in Hilton v General Motors Corp, 81 Mich App 21, 24-25; 264 NW2d 102 (1978):
"The board’s decision was nonetheless erroneous in that it failed to appreciate the significance of the sickness and accident benefit information submitted by the plaintiff to the defendant on March 9, six days after the plaintiff had been informed of his disability by his own doctor. This notice of the fact of disability (as distinguished from notice of the cause of disability) was *40clearly timely under MCL 418.441; MSA 17.237(441), which provides that an employee must inform the employer of his disability within 120 days after he learns of his disability and of its work-related nature. Lewis v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 360; 230 NW2d 538 (1975). The fact that the employee-plaintiff indicated therein that the injury was not work-related did not make the notice 'insufficient’ under the test of sufficiency enunciated in Norris, supra. Under Norris, notice is sufficient if the employer is informed thereby of the fact of disability or injury. Under the Norris test, sufficiency of notice does not turn upon whether the employer is or is not informed of the cause of disability. A determination of work relation is to be made by the hearing referee and not by the employer. Norris, supra, at 480.
"Under Lewis, supra, the notice was timely, and under Norris, supra, the notice was sufficient; therefore, the board erred, as a matter of law, in holding the plaintiff barred from obtaining relief under the act.”
As Meads, Norris and Hilton make clear, once the employer has "notice or knowledge” of the injury, it is its responsibility to notify the bureau. If the bureau is not notified, the employer runs the risk that the board will find the injury compensi-ble and, therefore, the statute of limitations to have been tolled. The employee does not have the responsibility to determine that his injury was compensable.
I would return this case to the WCAB for determination of whether plaintiffs heart attack was a compensable injury under the act.