Court Opinion

ID: 9597188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:56:20.587688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:37.029423
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the court’s resolution of most of the issues in this case. I cannot agree, however, with the court’s decision that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding Garner from offering extrinsic evidence under Alaska Rules of Evidence 404 and 403, that J.H. abused her own child on prior occasions, and therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides that evidence of a person’s character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. This admonition is repeated in Rule 404(b), with certain exceptions:
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Alaska Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead*1196ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
We have derived two principles from an examination of these rules: (1) a trial court has no discretion to admit evidence of a character trait solely for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity with that trait at a later time, but (2) the court has discretion to admit character evidence for other purposes, if its probative value outweighs the considerations set out in Rule 403, i.e. confusion of issues and delay of the trial. Moor v. State, 709 P.2d 498 (Alaska App., 1985); Lerchenstein v. State, 697 P.2d 312, 315-16 (Alaska App.1985) petition for hearing granted, (Alaska, June 25, 1985).
The line separating the prohibited uses from the permitted uses of character evidence is admittedly a narrow one. Nevertheless, there are distinguishing factors. One commentator gives the following example of a prohibited use of character evidence:
[T]here would probably be a general consensus that the following example illustrates an impermissible propensity inference: The defendant is charged with murdering his wife by stabbing. He admits being present at the time of the fatal incident, but claims that a third person stabbed his wife. To show that the defendant was the assailant, the prosecutor offers to prove that on several previous occasions the defendant had become involved in fistfights with neighbors.
The relevance of the fistfight evidence is clearly dependent upon a propensity inference: The fact that the defendant has been violent on previous occasions shows that he — at least in comparison to people who have not been violent — has a propensity for violence, and from this propensity the factfinder is asked to infer that the defendant was violent on the occasion in question. Moreover, all of the factors that justify excluding some specific acts evidence are present. If the defendant disputes his involvement in the fistfights, there may be time-consuming and distracting litigation of collateral issues. The factfinder may be more willing to return a guilty verdict after hearing the evidence simply because the defendant appears to be a bad person. Finally, the probative value of several fistfights with neighbors to prove a deadly assault with a knofe against one’s spouse is not great, [footnotes omitted.]
Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 777, 782-83 (1981).
In this case, Garner is charged with the homicide of a child and seeks to defend by showing that J.H. was present at approximately the time the incident occurred and committed the crime. To show that J.H. was the assailant, he offers to prove that on two other occasions J.H. became angry at her own child and vigorously shook her. Thus, he sought to show that J.H. had a character trait (i.e. a propensity to become angry to the point of violence with children), and acted in conformity with that trait by assaulting Justin Pahang, the victim. Under Moor and Lerchenstein, this evidence was inadmissible for this purpose and the trial court had no discretion to admit it.1 A fortiori, it was not an abuse *1197of discretion to limit Garner to cross-examination regarding it.
In my view, this case is but another in a long list of cases in which this court ignores trial court discretion and simply substitutes its judgment for that of the trial court on the discretionary issues. See, e.g., Browning v. State, 707 P.2d 266 (Alaska App.1985) (Singleton, J. dissenting); Johnson v. Fairbanks, 703 P.2d 442, 444-47 (Alaska App.1985) (Singleton, J. dissenting); Jackson v. State, 695 P.2d 227, 233-37 (Alaska App.1985) (Singleton, J. dissenting); Williamson v. State, 692 P.2d 965, 974 n. 1 (Alaska App.1984) (Singleton, J. dissenting). See generally Wright, The Doubtful OmniscieAppellate Courts, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 751 (1957).
J.H.’s feelings regarding her own child, however manifested, do not establish a motive to injure Justin.2 See, e.g., 2 J. Wig-more, Evidence, § 394, et. seq. (Ghadbourn rev.ed. 1979). Thus, it is immaterial that, if in fact the evidence did establish that J.H. had a motive to injure Justin, her means and opportunity to injure him would make the evidence admissible. Id., Section 141. In summary, this is another case in which the probative value of the evidence was very weak and the risk of confusing the issues and extending the trial (by in effect, trying J.H. for incidents of alleged abuse of her own child) were very great. See United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 910-13 (2d Cir.1984) (rejecting similar evidence presented by the defendant for these reasons). Under these circumstances, even if it was discretionary with the trial court whether to admit or exclude the evidence, a proposition I would reject, his rejection of the evidence is not an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s decision not to admit the evidence should be affirmed on appeal. I, therefore, dissent from the court’s decision to reverse.3

. While there is some suggestion in Garner's brief and in the majority opinion, that extrinsic evidence of J.H.’s treatment of her own child was somehow relevant to show her "identity” as the person abusing Justin, this is plainly wrong. While one could say, generally, that in a criminal case the “identity” of the perpetrator is always an issue, such loose language leads only to confusion. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 410, at 477-78 (Chadbourn rev.ed. 1979). Where a person’s prior acts are used to identify him as the person who committed present acts, the past conduct must be virtually the mirror image of the present conduct. See, e.g., Id. § 412 at 479-80. Thus, some of the cases speak of a signature crime or a modus operandi. Here, as the majority opinion makes clear, the differences between J.H.’s conduct with her own child so completely predominate over any similarities to the circumstances surrounding Justin’s injuries, that it simply cannot be said that that prior conduct serves to identify her as Justin’s assailant. See Galauska v. State, 527 P.2d 459, 467-68 (Alaska 1974), modified on other grounds, 532 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1975); Adams v. State, 704 P.2d 794, 798 & n. 5 (Alaska App.1985).

. It is important to differentiate motive (an emotion) — the state of feeling impelling one toward an act — and intent — the mental state accompanying an act. See 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 306, at 259 (Chadbourn rev.ed. 1979). For this reason, Alaska cases limit use of similar act evidence to show "motive” to acts affirmatively linked with the specific crime or victim under consideration. See Gould v. State, 579 P.2d 535, 539 (Alaska 1978) (affirmative link between alleged prior bad acts establishing motive and the specific crime being prosecuted is required). Accord, Fields v. State, 629 P.2d 46, 49-51 (Alaska 1981) (prior bad check charge not admissible to show defendant’s insolvency); Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240, 1246-51 (Alaska 1980) (prior sexual acts with same victim admissible). There is no evidence that J.H. had any strong feelings regarding Justin Pahang. Hence, her actions regarding her own daughter could not establish a "motive" for injuring Justin.

. Two other aspects of this case require brief mention. First, Garner claims that the state and federal constitutions limit the trial court’s discretion under Evidence Rule 403, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). While a trial court might properly apply some hypothetical evidence rule in a way which violates the constitution, it is settled in this jurisdiction that a proper application of Evidence Rule 403 does not violate the state or federal constitutions, even if it excludes some evidence arguably favorable to the defense. See Larson v. State, 656 P.2d 571, 575 (Alaska App.1982). If exclusion of evidence favorable to the accused violates the constitution, it violates Rule 403. Conversely, if it does not violate Rule 403 it does not violate the constitution.
Secondly, even if we interpret the interplay between Rules 403 and 404 in the defendant’s favor, as the majority holds, the trial court still does not abuse its discretion in excluding defense evidence where the probative value of the evidence is weak and the risk that the "sideshow [determining whether J.H. abused her child] will swallow up the circus [whether Garner is guilty of Justin’s homicide]” is great. See cases cited in United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 910-12 (2d Cir.1984) upholding the exclusion of defense evidence. See abo People v. Mowers, 644 P.2d 916, 918-20 (Colo.1982), appeal dbmbsed, 459 U.S. 803, 103 S.Ct. 25, 74 L.Ed.2d 41 (1982).