Court Opinion

ID: 9959590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 13:08:03.397731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:37.663547
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Manter v. CPF Senior Living – Northgate Park L.L.C., 2024-Ohio-1385.]

                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                            HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 PAUL J. MANTER,                                  :          APPEAL NO. C-230478
                                                             TRIAL NO. A-2104337
       Plaintiff-Appellant,                       :
                                                                 O P I N I O N.
    vs.                                           :

 CPF SENIOR LIVING – NORTHGATE                    :
 PARK LLC,
                                                  :
 GRACE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
                                                  :
     and
                                                  :
 NORTHGATE PARK, LLC,

       Defendants-Appellees.                      :

Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part, and Cause
                           Remanded

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 12, 2024

Ferris & Manter, and James K. Ferris, for Plaintiff-Appellant,

Plunkett Cooney, PC, and Christina L. Corl, for Defendants-Appellees.
                        OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

KINSLEY, Judge.

        {¶1}     Plaintiff-appellant Paul Manter appeals from the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees CPF Senior Living – Northgate

Park, LLC, Grace Management, Inc., and Northgate Park, LLC, (collectively,

“Northgate”). Paul1 asserts six assignments of error.

        {¶2}    First, he argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

in favor of Northgate when genuine issues of material fact existed for trial. Second, he

argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding Northgate was not a

nursing home under R.C. Chapter 3721, but rather a residential facility under R.C.

5119.34 and 5123.19. Third, he argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in

finding he failed to identify a source of duty as to his negligence claim. Fourth, he

argues that the trial court erred in finding Northgate’s breach of a “Residence and

Services Agreement” (“RSA”) could not constitute a breach of duty under his

negligence claim. Fifth, he argues that genuine issues of material fact existed as to his

breach of contract claim. And sixth, he argues that the trial court erred in finding his

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) failed.

        {¶3}    We overrule Paul’s first assignment of error, because the specific factual

disputes Paul raises were immaterial to resolving his claims. We sustain Paul’s second

assignment of error, because the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that

Northgate was licensed under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19. Further, because the rights

described in R.C. 3721.13 may be a source of duty Northgate owed Paul independent

of their contractual obligations, we sustain Paul’s third assignment of error. But we

overrule Paul’s fourth assignment of error, because a breach of contract does not

1 Because Paul and his son, Aaron Manter, share a last name, we refer to them by their first names.

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

create a source of duty for a tort claim under Ohio law. We sustain Paul’s fifth

assignment of error, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the kind of

care Paul needed and actually received. Lastly, we overrule Paul’s sixth assignment of

error, because Northgate’s conduct did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous

conduct required to sustain an IIED claim.

       {¶4}   The judgment of the trial court is accordingly affirmed in part and

reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings on Paul’s

remaining claims.

                        Factual and Procedural Background

       {¶5}   Paul is in his mid-70s and suffers from hypertension, hyperlipidema,

chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, congestive heart failure, and neuropathy in his

extremities. He also struggled with alcoholism. Due to these health ailments, Paul’s

son, Aaron Manter, convinced him to move into an assisted living facility.

       {¶6}   On October 5, 2018, Paul entered into the RSA with Northgate. The RSA

identified Northgate as an assisted living community and specified the following:

       5.1 Observation and Consultation.

       Community staff will observe your health status to identify and help you

       respond to your dietary, social and personal needs by way of a nursing

       assessment. Consultations will be determined by the Wellness Director.

                                             ***

       5.5 Personal Assistance and Care

       [Northgate] provides different levels of personal assistance and care,

       depending on your needs. Upon admission to [Northgate], the staff

       performed a comprehensive assessment of your needs. We determined

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              OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

with you, in accordance with [Northgate’s] Resident Assessment, that

your appropriate care service package is Level ONE * * * Staff will

reassess you regularly to determine the level of personal

assistance and care that you need.

                                      ***

5.7 Excluded and Non-Covered Services.

This Agreement does not entitle you to receive any services for * * * any

condition requiring services that [Northgate] is not licensed, staffed, or

equipped to provide, or does not routinely provide.

5.8 Skilled Nursing Care

We do not provide Skilled Nursing Care at the Northgate Park except

the Administration of medication hypodermically or orally by the

Community’s Licensed staff. Any other Skilled Nursing Care must be

provided by an Outside provider. Per Ohio’s Administrative Code Rule

3701-17-50, the Term “Skilled Nursing Care” shall mean procedures

that require technical skills [and] Knowledge beyond those the

untrained possesses and that are commonly employed in providing for

the physical, mental and emotional needs of the ill or otherwise

incapacitated. ‘Skilled Nursing Care’ includes, but is not limited to, the

following:

                                      ***

Objective observation of changes in the resident’s condition as a means

of analyzing and determining the nursing care required and the need for

further medical diagnosis and treatment

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶7}   Initially, under Paul’s “Level of Care Evaluation” (“care plan”)

Northgate was not required to assist Paul with bathing. Instead, Care Connection of

Cincinnati, LLC, (“Care Connection”) a home healthcare provider, would assist Paul

with showering twice a week. Later, because Paul was not bathing himself, his care

plan was modified to include the following: “Requires stand-by or hands-on

assistance from caregiver (wash back and feet) for bath/shower 2-3 times a week[.]

Sundays and Thursday[s] 2nd Shift.” (Emphasis added.)

       {¶8}   On December 29, 2019, Paul was admitted to the hospital after suffering

a fall at Northgate. An ulcer was discovered on Paul’s left foot, which continued to

deteriorate during his stay at the hospital. After several failed procedures to salvage

his left foot, Paul’s left leg was amputated below the knee on February 5, 2020.

       {¶9}   Paul filed his complaint against Atria Northgate Park, LLC, CPF Senior

Living – Northgate Park, LLC, HCP Cincinnati OH OPCO, LLC, Grace Management,

Inc., Northgate Park Senior Living, and Care Connection on December 20, 2021. He

alleged claims of negligence, spoilation, breach of contract, IIED, unjust enrichment,

and violation of his rights under R.C. 3721.13 and 3721.14. Defendants HCP Cincinnati

OH OPCO, LLC, Atria Northgate Park, LLC, and Care Connection were later dismissed

with prejudice.

       {¶10} The remaining parties conducted discovery, including the depositions

of Paul, Aaron, and current and former Northgate staff.       In his deposition, Paul

testified that due to his previous struggles with alcoholism, he had very little memory

of what transpired during his time at Northgate, including his fall which led to his

hospitalization. He recalled Northgate staff taking him to shower, observing him

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

bathing, and cleaning his back at times. He admitted that he probably refused baths.

He also described the Northgate staff as courteous and kind. He believed they had a

tough job to do, and he never held anything against them.

       {¶11}    Aaron also testified to Paul’s memory issues. He testified that Paul

had short-term memory loss due to his alcoholism. In January 2019, Aaron received

a call from Northgate staff informing him that Paul was not bathing appropriately and

that Paul would be bathed twice a week by Northgate staff. In March 2019, Paul’s

primary care physician informed Paul that he would require wound care. According

to Aaron, the wounds developed on Paul’s feet from water retention that swelled and

caused Paul’s skin to crack. Though Care Connection was dressing these wounds for

Paul, Aaron was not aware that Care Connection was involved in Paul’s care until he

requested nursing notes from Northgate after Paul’s hospitalization.

       {¶12} Aaron frequently visited Paul at Northgate. He often noticed a bad odor

from Paul during his visits, which Aaron thought might have been because Paul did

not do his laundry regularly. Paul was typically wearing socks and shoes when Aaron

visited him. But on one occasion, Aaron noticed Paul jerked when Aaron grabbed his

feet to change Paul’s socks. And on another occasion, Aaron brought Paul new shoes,

and Paul complained that it felt as though something was in his shoe. Aaron, however,

did not speak to anyone at Northgate regarding these issues.

       {¶13} Rosemarie Caldwell, executive director during Paul’s time at Northgate,

testified that Northgate was a residential care facility, not a nursing home. According

to Caldwell, Northgate had on staff a wellness director, nurses to administer

medication, and resident assistants to carry out resident care plans. Caldwell could

not explain why there were no nursing notes for Paul between January 2019 and

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

August 2019 nor any documentation of Paul’s bathing schedule. She agreed, however,

that if Paul was noncompliant with bathing, that was something she would expect to

see in the nursing notes.

       {¶14} Stephanie Watkins, former wellness director at Northgate, testified that

charting for residents was typically done only when something was abnormal. She

also agreed that bathing records should have been included when charting for a

resident. She testified that Paul’s care plan was modified to include bathing because

Northgate staff smelled an odor outside of his unit. She made this modification after

speaking to both Paul and Aaron. She admitted that bathing was not a skilled nursing

task. And she maintained that as an assisted living facility, Northgate resident

assistants would not do skin checks or monitor wounds.

       {¶15} When questioned as to the definition of stand-by bathing assistance,

Watkins testified that was limited to reminding residents to bathe and that resident

assistants would do nothing further to assist in bathing. She also clarified that Paul

was receiving stand-by bathing assistance, not hands-on bathing assistance.

       {¶16} But Karen Kuntz, a staff nurse at Northgate, testified that stand-by

assistance meant encouraging the resident to shower and standing nearby to ensure

the resident did not fall. She testified that hands-on bathing assistance would entail

physically bathing the resident. She did not, however, find the gap in nursing notes to

be odd.

       {¶17} Dr. Kevin D. Nolan, M.D., a vascular surgeon, opined on behalf of

Northgate. He opined that Northgate’s staff would not have the training to either

identify the ulcer on Paul’s left foot or understand that he should have been referred

for medical treatment. He further opined that Paul’s left leg was amputated because

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

of his poorly controlled vascular disease leading to deterioration of the ulcer. And he

opined that Paul’s foot was salvageable upon arrival at the hospital.

       {¶18} Dr. Steven Levin, M.D., a vascular, cardiac, and general surgeon, offered

an opinion on behalf of Paul. He opined that Paul’s left leg could have been saved if

he had received the basic hygiene care he had contracted for by Northgate. He also

opined that if Aaron had been notified that Paul continued to refuse bathing, he could

have spoken with Paul regarding the issue.

       {¶19} On December 8, 2022, Northgate moved for summary judgment, which

the trial court granted. In its decision, the trial court reasoned that Paul’s negligence

claim was encompassed by his breach of contract claim. It further found that Paul’s

spoliation claim failed, because Northgate staff testified that regular note taking was

not standard practice. It also found that Northgate did not breach its contractual

duties regarding bathing, because Paul had only contracted for stand-by bathing

assistance, which he was provided, and Paul’s testimony regarding bathing was

unreliable due to his medical conditions. It concluded Paul’s IIED claim failed,

because Paul testified that Northgate staff were nothing but kind and courteous

towards him, which hardly met the high bar of extreme and outrageous conduct. It

also found that in the absence of allegations of fraud or bad faith, Paul’s unjust

enrichment claim was without merit. Lastly, it found that Northgate was not a nursing

home as defined in R.C. Chapter 3721, but rather was a residential facility under R.C.

5119.34 and 5123.19. Accordingly, Paul was not afforded the same protections as a

resident of a home under R.C. 3721.01(A)(1)(a).

       {¶20} Paul now appeals.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                  Standard of Review

       {¶21} Summary judgment decisions are reviewed de novo. Al Neyer, LLC v.

Westfield Ins. Co., 2020-Ohio-5417, 163 N.E.3d 106, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.). Summary

judgment is proper under Civ.R. 56(C) where “(1) no genuine issue of material fact

remains, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and

construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that

conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is

made.” Id. at ¶ 14. The moving party has the initial burden of informing the court of

the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the record that set forth specific

facts demonstrating entitlement to summary judgment. Id. at ¶ 15. If the moving party

fails to meet its burden, summary judgment is not appropriate. Id.

                            Genuine Issues of Material Fact

       {¶22} In his first assignment of error, Paul argues that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment in favor of Northgate, because there were genuine issues

of material fact for trial. Specifically, Paul contends that the trial court misstated the

size of his wound and how many months elapsed between hospitalization and

amputation.

       {¶23} But “[a] fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

the applicable substantive law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cirino v. Bur. of

Workers’ Comp., 2021-Ohio-1382, 171 N.E.3d 840, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.). Neither the size

of Paul’s wound nor the amount of time that elapsed between hospitalization and

amputation affects the outcome of any of his claims. Indeed, there were genuine issues

of material fact that existed as to Paul’s claims, as will be discussed in detail below.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

The facts that Paul raises in his first assignment of error, however, are immaterial.

Accordingly, we overrule Paul’s first assignment of error.

                              Classification of Northgate

       {¶24} Next, Paul argues the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding

Northgate was not a nursing home under R.C. Chapter 3721, but rather a residential

facility under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19.

       {¶25} Northgate’s license states that it is a residential care facility. The license

further states that it was issued in accordance with R.C. Chapter 3721, which governs

nursing homes and residential care facilities, and with Ohio Adm.Code 3701-17, which

also governs nursing homes. Additionally, Caldwell testified that Northgate is a

residential care facility.

       {¶26} R.C. 3721.01(A)(1)(a) provides that a “home” includes nursing homes

and residential care facilities. R.C. 3721.01(A)(7) defines a “residential care facility”

as a facility that provides accommodations for unrelated individuals and supervision

and personal care for these individuals who are dependent by reason of age or physical

or mental impairment, either with or without skilled nursing care. Thus, a residential

care facility can be classified as a home without providing skilled nursing care under

R.C. 3721.01(A)(7).

       {¶27} Despite the fact that its license makes no mention of R.C. 5119.34 and

5123.19, Northgate maintains that it is licensed under these statutory sections and not

under R.C. Chapter 3721. R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19 govern residential facilities for

adults with mental illnesses and developmental disabilities respectively. Northgate

argues that it is licensed under these statutory sections, because R.C. 3721.01(A)(1)(c)

specifies that a “home” does not include residential facilities licensed under R.C.

                                               10
                         OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

5119.34 and 5123.19 and because it does not provide skilled nursing care. Neither

argument has merit.

        {¶28} As we discussed above, R.C. 3721.01(A)(7) explicitly states that a

residential care facility, which is how Northgate is classified on its license, does not

need to provide skilled nursing care to qualify as a home. Thus, even though Northgate

does not provide skilled nursing care, it can still qualify as a home. Further, while R.C.

3721.01(A)(1)(c) does specify that residential facilities under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19

do not qualify as a home, Northgate does not explain how this exemption is applicable

to it. In its summary judgment motion, Northgate included an affidavit from its

current executive director, Elizabeth Dinnesen, in which she averred that it was

“clearly stated” on Northgate’s license that it was licensed under R.C. 5119.34 and

5123.19. Again, Northgate’s license does not reference these statutory sections at all.

And aside from this affidavit, Northgate provided no support for its position that it

was licensed under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19.

        {¶29} Therefore, because the evidence before the trial court did not support a

finding that Northgate was licensed under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19, the trial court

erred a matter of law in making this determination.                  Because it misclassified

Northgate, the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Northgate

on Paul’s claim under R.C. 3721.13 and 3721.14.2 Paul’s second assignment of error is

accordingly sustained.

2 In making this determination, we do not reach the question of whether Northgate is a “home”
under the statutory definition set forth in R.C. 3721.01(A)(1)(a).

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                       Negligence

       {¶30} In Paul’s third assignment of error, he argues the trial court erred as a

matter of law in finding he failed to identify a source of duty as to his negligence claim.

And in his fourth assignment of error, he argues the trial court erred in finding

Northgate’s breach of the RSA could not constitute a breach of duty under his

negligence claim. Because both assignments of error consider the source of duty, we

consider them together.

       {¶31} Under R.C. 3721.13, residents of a home, as defined by R.C.

3721.01(A)(1)(a), are afforded certain rights. And under R.C. 3721.17(G)(1), a resident

whose rights are violated has a cause of action against the home committing the

violation. If the resident can show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

violation of his rights resulted from a negligent act or omission of the home and that

violation was the proximate cause of the resident’s injury, the resident may recover

compensatory damages. R.C. 3721.17(G)(2)(a).

       {¶32} But, while generally a tort claim based upon the same underlying

actions cannot coexist with the contract action, such a tort claim is actionable if the

breaching party also breached a duty owed independent of the contract. Evans

Landscaping, Inc. v. Stenger, 2011-Ohio-6033, 969 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.).

       {¶33} Here, Paul maintains that, because he was afforded the rights of a

resident of a home under R.C. 3721.13, Northgate owed him a duty independent of the

RSA. As we held above, the trial court erred in finding Northgate was licensed under

R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19. If on remand the trial court determines Northgate is a

“home” under R.C. 3721.01(A)(1)(a), then Paul is entitled to the rights defined under

R.C. 3721.13. And if Paul is entitled to those rights, then he did identify a source of

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

duty for his negligence claim beyond Northgate’s alleged breach of the RSA. But Paul

may not rely on a breach of the RSA alone as a source of duty. See id. at ¶ 16.

       {¶34} Therefore, we sustain Paul’s third assignment of error, because the trial

court erred as a matter of law in finding he failed to identify a source of duty as to his

negligence claim. But we overrule Paul’s fourth assignment of error, because under

Ohio law, a breach of contract does not create a tort claim. The trial court’s grant of

summary judgment as to Paul’s negligence and resident’s rights claims in favor of

Northgate is accordingly reversed.

                                  Breach of Contract

       {¶35} In Paul’s fifth assignment of error, he argues genuine issues of material

fact existed as to his breach of contract claim.

       {¶36} “The elements of a breach of contract claim include: (1) the existence of

a contract, (2) performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach by the defendant, and (4)

damages resulting from the breach.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ma v.

Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2023-Ohio-1727, 216 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).

Here, the parties focus on the third element: whether Northgate breached the RSA

and accompanying care plan.

       {¶37} As discussed above, Paul’s care plan was modified to include the

following: “Requires stand-by or hands-on assistance from caregiver (wash back

and feet) for bath/shower 2-3 times a week[.] Sundays and Thursday[s] 2nd Shift.”

(Emphasis added.) Northgate contends Paul had only contracted for stand-by bathing

assistance and that stand-by bathing assistance was limited to reminding Paul to

bathe. Northgate acknowledges its staff did not consistently describe what stand-by

bathing assistance meant. Instead, Northgate argues “regardless of which description

                                               13
                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

[Paul] emphasizes, his own deposition testimony makes clear that the duty was

satisfied.”

       {¶38} But the deposition testimony regarding Paul’s bathing routine actually

creates a genuine issue of material fact. While Watkins testified stand-by bathing

assistance was limited to reminding Paul to bathe, Kuntz testified that it included

encouraging Paul to bathe and standing nearby to ensure he did not fall. Moreover,

Paul himself recalled Northgate staff being nearby when he showered and even

washing his back.

       {¶39} In an attempt to resolve the dispute of fact as to the bathing provision,

the trial court discredited Paul’s testimony given his memory issues. But later, it relied

on Paul’s recollection that Northgate staff were nothing but kind and courteous to

conclude his IIED claim was without merit. On a motion for summary judgment, it is

not the duty of the trial court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. See Grubach v.

Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-283, 2020-Ohio-3467, ¶ 40 (“A court

cannot weigh credibility when considering evidentiary material presented in favor of,

or in opposition to, a summary judgment motion.”). “Such functions are for the trier

of fact, not for a judge ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Id. Thus, at the

summary judgment stage, the trial court should not have discredited parts of Paul’s

testimony as a means of resolving the factual dispute that existed as to the bathing

provision.

       {¶40} Not only were there genuine issues of material fact as to what kind of

bathing assistance Paul actually received, but there were also material disputes of fact

regarding the level of care Paul needed. The RSA clearly stated that, “Staff will reassess

you regularly to determine the level of personal assistance and care that you need.” In

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

fact, this language in the RSA appears to be precisely why Paul’s level of care was

modified to include bathing assistance. Caldwell testified that because staff smelled

an odor outside of Paul’s unit, she spoke with Paul and Aaron to modify Paul’s care

plan to include bathing.

       {¶41} Thus, because genuine issues of material fact existed as to the kind of

care Paul needed and whether he was receiving the care he contracted for, we sustain

Paul’s fifth assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment as to Paul’s breach of contract claim in favor of Northgate.

                                         IIED

       {¶42} Lastly, Paul argues the trial court erred in finding his IIED claim failed.

       {¶43} “To state a claim for [IIED], the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s

conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all

possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in

a civilized community.” FAP Properties XL, LLC v. Griffin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-

210646, 2022-Ohio-3410, ¶ 24. Paul spoke highly of Northgate staff, describing them

as kind and courteous. He also testified they had a tough job to do and that he held

nothing against them. Further, Aaron did not testify to any extreme or outrageous

conduct by Northgate staff.

       {¶44} As discussed above, Northgate’s actions may or may not have amounted

to a breach of contract and negligence. But its actions did not rise to the level of

extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain an IIED claim. Paul’s sixth

assignment of error is therefore overruled and the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of Northgate as to his IIED claim is affirmed.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                       Conclusion

       {¶45} We overrule Paul’s first assignment of error, because the factual

disputes he raised, namely the size of his ulcer and length of time between

hospitalization and amputation, were immaterial to resolving his claims. We sustain

Paul’s second assignment of error, because the trial court erred as a matter of law in

finding that Northgate was licensed under R.C. 5119.34 and 5123.19.

       {¶46} Further, because Paul may be entitled to the rights described under R.C.

3721.13, which would be a source of duty Northgate owed him independent of the RSA,

we sustain Paul’s third assignment of error. But we overrule Paul’s fourth assignment

of error, because a breach of the RSA does not create a tort claim under Ohio law.

       {¶47} We sustain Paul’s fifth assignment of error, because genuine issues of

material fact existed as to the kind of care Paul needed and actually received. Lastly,

we overrule Paul’s sixth assignment of error, because Northgate’s conduct did not rise

to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct required to sustain an IIED claim. We

remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.

                Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded.

ZAYAS, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:
       The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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