Court Opinion

ID: 9739269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:31.788386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.254122
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: The majority concludes that under the circumstances of this case, Miranda warnings were not required. The majority reaches this conclusion by determining that the defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation. I believe this conclusion to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, I dissent. The procedural safeguards of Miranda warnings did not develop in contemplation of the prison inmate being questioned concerning an offense during his incarceration. They developed, instead, in response to the need to protect fifth amendment rights of persons previously at liberty, cut off from the outside world, and placed in a police-dominated environment. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.) Thus, the traditional Miranda formulation does not lend itself to easy application in prisoner interrogation cases. Despite his prisoner status, the prison inmate is just as susceptible to compelled self-incrimination as is the person taken off the street. Although I recognize that Miranda clearly is not implicated in every prison inmate interrogation situation (see, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins (1990), 496 U.S. 292, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 110 S. Ct. 2394), nevertheless, the inmate, like his unincarcerated counterpart, may be subjected to criminal penalty based upon his incriminating statements. Therefore, I remain firm in my conviction that the prison inmate’s fifth amendment rights should be no less vigorously protected. In order for Miranda warnings to be required, the suspect must be in custody. Given the peculiar nature of the prison setting, every inmate is literally “in custody.” Thus, it is apparent that the test for Miranda in the prison setting requires that some special attention be given to the particular circumstance of each case. The relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the inmate’s position would have understood himself to be in custody. Leviston v. Black (8th Cir. 1988), 843 F.2d 302, 304. As the court in Cervantes v. Walker (9th Cir. 1978), 589 F.2d 424, 428, noted, restriction, with regard to a person’s liberty, is a relative concept, one not determined exclusively by the lack of freedom to leave. In the prison setting, restriction necessarily implies a change in the surroundings of the prison inmate, greater than that already existing in the prison environment, which results in an added imposition on his freedom of movement. To determine whether Miranda warnings are implicated, it is necessary, then, to look to some act which places further limitations on the prison inmate. Cervantes further noted that this approach best reconciles Mathis v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 88 S. Ct. 1503, with the principles of Miranda. The Cervantes court reasoned that, in Mathis, the questioning of the defendant by a government agent, not himself a member of the prison staff, on a matter not under investigation within the prison itself, may be said to have constituted an additional imposition on the defendant’s limited freedom of movement, requiring Miranda warnings. Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428. A similar conclusion results by application of the Cervantes analysis to the facts here. Defendant was questioned by an investigator, not the prison warden or a counselor, whose primary duty was to investigate incidents and prepare cases for prosecution. The interview, while conducted in part for security purposes, also served an additional purpose of determining whether defendant would have a necessity defense available in the event of his prosecution. Thus, this investigation, like the investigation in Mathis, could also be viewed as having constituted an additional imposition on defendant’s limited freedom of movement, necessitating Miranda warnings. The majority considers the physical aspects of defendant’s restriction, and concludes that he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda because his “freedom of movement was not more severely restricted during the interview than it had been previously.” (146 Ill. 2d at 455; see also Cervantes, 589 F.2d at 428.) In applying the Cervantes test, the majority acknowledges that a further limiting restriction was posed because defendant remained handcuffed during the interview with Irvin. However, the majority then apparently discounts the relevance of this fact on the basis that defendant did not ask to have the handcuffs removed. I believe, as the majority finds, that defendant was further restricted as a result of the continued handcuffing. However, unlike the majority, I do not believe that defendant’s perceived acquiescence in being so restricted negates the fact of that restriction. The majority places great stock in the fact that defendant did not request to have the handcuffs removed. From this fact, the majority seems to infer that defendant felt unrestricted. I note with equal vigor that there is no mention in the majority’s discussion that Irvin ever offered to have the cuffs removed. Yet the majority does not then suggest that the absence of such an invitation contributed to defendant’s restriction. Moreover, Irvin testified that handcuffs are sometimes removed from prisoners whom he questions in his office. This fact supports a finding that since defendant’s handcuffs were not removed, he was further restricted, not only in relation to the prison population as a whole, but in relation to those other inmates whose handcuffs are removed during an interview with Irvin. Additionally, defendant posited the argument that he was further restricted during the interview than if he had remained at “home,” in his cell. The majority’s response is that defendant failed to consider that, while defendant could have requested to leave Irvin’s office, he could not have requested to leave his cell. I agree with defendant. At least while in his. cell, defendant was not handcuffed. However, once he was taken inside the interview room, he was deprived, not only of his normal freedom of movement within the prison setting, but also of the familiarity of his jail cell. Further, the majority overlooks the potential consequence of defendant’s request to leave the interview. Any thought given by defendant to request leave would naturally have been tempered by his knowledge of the potential consequence of such conduct. Absent advice from Irvin or a belief by defendant that he could leave without threat or fear of punishment for his failure to cooperate, the fact that he could request to leave had no diminishing effect on defendant’s compelled presence at the interview. The questioning here took place in a context where defendant’s freedom to depart was restricted. (See Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 91 S. Ct. 711.) Thus, I believe that a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have understood himself to be in custody. The majority next concludes that defendant was not interrogated, as that term is understood for Miranda purposes. It rejects defendant’s contention that Irvin attempted to elicit incriminating statements from defendant as to whether defendant would mount a necessity defense to a potential weapons charge. It concludes, instead, that the purpose of Irvin’s questioning was to determine whether defendant’s possession of the shanks was in response to fear of an attack by fellow inmates. The majority views Irvin’s questioning as having been limited to inquiries regarding safety concerns. I note that Irvin had been instructed by the State’s Attorney not to give Miranda warnings to prison inmates being investigated in shank cases. Further, I note that, subsequent to the interview, criminal charges were filed against defendant. I am not persuaded that Irvin’s questions were as innocuous as the majority perceives. Irvin’s questions to defendant regarding safety were the functional equivalent of questions concerning the availability of a necessity defense. Even though his questions may have been framed in terms of safety concerns, they, nonetheless, elicited the incriminating responses regarding the necessity defense. Moreover, application of Miranda warnings is not dependent upon the reason the questions were asked at the time. (See Mathis v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 88 S. Ct. 1503.) The fact that the primary purpose of the questioning here was related to safety concerns for defendant is not determinative on the issue of when the Miranda interrogation occurred. See Mathis, 391 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381, 88 S. Ct. 1503 (fact that questions were asked as part of a routine tax investigation where no criminal proceedings might even be brought did not negate Miranda requirement since tax investigations frequently lead to criminal prosecutions). As Professor Kamisar has stated: “[S]o long as the police conduct is likely to elicit incriminating statements and thus endanger the privilege, it is police ‘interrogation,’ regardless of its primary purpose or motivation, and that if it otherwise qualifies as ‘interrogation,’ it does not become something else because the interrogator’s main purpose is [something other] than the procuring of incriminating statements, even though self-incrimination may be foreseen as a windfall.” (Emphasis in original.) Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is “Interrogation”? When does it Matter?, 67 Georgetown L.J. 1, 9 (1978). Defendant was subjected to words which Irvin should have known were reasonably likely to elicit testimony by defendant against himself. Thus, the duality of purpose in Irvin’s interview of defendant did not serve to preclude the necessity of Miranda warnings. Additionally, I believe that Irvin’s attempt to determine the availability of a necessity defense belies any claimed unawareness that criminal charges were contemplated. Finally, the majority attempts to accommodate its decision within the confínes of Miranda by concluding that Irvin’s office was not an inherently coercive environment. It supports this conclusion on the basis that no police officers were present during the interview; Irvin was not wearing a uniform at the time of the interview; Irvin had no power to impose any disciplinary measure; and the interview lasted 10 minutes. I am not persuaded that these facts had any trans-formative effect on defendant’s perception of the coercive nature of the interview process. There is no suggestion that defendant was unaware of Irvin’s position and authority. Thus, the fact that Irvin was not in uniform made him no less an investigator in defendant’s eyes. Further, I cannot believe that defendant would feel any less compelled to cooperate because Irvin would not himself mete out the punishment for defendant’s uncooperative conduct. Arguably, there are some facts, for example, the absence of police during the interview, which might tend to support a finding that Miranda was not implicated. However, on the whole, the facts that: (1) defendant was restricted during the interview to a greater extent than he was while in his prison cell; (2) defendant could have been penalized for his failure to cooperate; (3) Irvin was an investigator who had a primary duty to prepare cases for prosecution; (4) Irvin took direction in investigating shank cases from the prosecuting arm of the State; and (5) defendant was indirectly questioned about a necessity defense, strongly support the opposite conclusion. Under these circumstances, defendant had sufficient reason to feel that Irvin had legal authority to compel him to be present at the interview and to answer questions; and that Irvin, whether directly or indirectly, could affect the defendant’s future treatment. Compare Illinois v. Perkins (1990), 496 U.S. 292, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243, 110 S. Ct. 2394. Necessarily, prison inmates must surrender some of their constitutional rights in order to permit proper prison administration and discipline. Notwithstanding this concern, the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination must be carefully guarded and must not be unnecessarily compromised by the needs of penal administration. For the reasons stated, I would affirm the lower courts’ decisions that Miranda warnings were required. JUSTICE CLARK joins in this dissent.