Court Opinion

ID: 9688007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:56:55.258203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.094039
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the Opinion of my learned Brother.
First, I do not agree with the conclusion that the trial judge eschewed knowledge of the factual basis for the plea. The trial judge asked the defendant if she had assaulted Joseph Wasyl on the 30th day of July, 1965, with the intent to rob him, being armed. The defendant answered in the affirmative. The later colloquy in which the defendant made reference to driving an automobile, prompting the trial judge to remark that he had not heard the facts in the ease, did not, in my judgment, demonstrate any failure on the part of the trial judge to ascertain that there was a factual basis for the plea. I do not believe it is necessary for the trial judge to elicit a detailed recital of an accused’s actions in order to satisfy our *280rule * or to accept the plea in good conscience. It is sufficient, in my judgment, that the accused admit of his having committed the offense. This can he done in the statutory language.
Second, I must respectfully disagree with my Brother and the Court of Appeals on the question of the need for remand where it is claimed that a guilty plea stems from an inadmissible confession. For myself, I subscribe to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in McCann v Richardson, 397 US 759; 90 S Ct 1441; 25 L Ed 763 (1970):
“His later petition for collateral relief asserting that a coerced confession induced his plea is at most a claim that the admissibility of his confession was mistakenly assessed and that since he was erroneously advised, either under the then applicable law or under the law later announced, his plea was an unintelligent and voidable act. The Constitution, however, does not render pleas of guilty so vulnerable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The third issue treated by my Brother is an issue admittedly not raised in these proceedings. My views on that issue are expressed in my dissent in People v Jaworski, 387 Mich 21 (1972).
Black, J., concurred with T. E. Brennan, J.

 GCR 1963, 785.3(2).—Reporter.