Court Opinion

ID: 9897811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:25.083629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.904906
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Senior Judge Clements

              CHRISTIAN COLEMAN
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0173-23-1                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                             Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge

                              (Kelly L. DiCorrado; Infinity Law Group, PLC, on brief), for
                              appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Andrew T. Hull, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Appellant, Christian Coleman, pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted

              non-violent felon more than ten years after his conviction, and carrying a concealed weapon, second

              offense. By final order entered December 28, 2022, the trial court sentenced him to a total of five

              years, six months’ incarceration, with three years, six months suspended. Coleman challenges the

              active sentence the trial court imposed, contending that the trial court considered “improper and

              irrelevant factors” when it imposed an active sentence that exceeded the “high end” of the

              sentencing guidelines. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously

              holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                         BACKGROUND

       In October 2022, Coleman pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted

non-violent felon more than ten years after his conviction, and carrying a concealed weapon, second

offense.1 Before accepting Coleman’s guilty pleas, the trial court conducted a colloquy with him

to ensure that he understood their implications. Coleman acknowledged that he had “read,

sign[ed] and underst[oo]d” the “Advice to Defendants Pleading Guilty” form. On that form,

Coleman recognized that he faced a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for each

charge and that the trial court was not required to follow the sentencing guidelines

recommendation. Coleman confirmed that there was no agreement or promises made to him

regarding the sentence the trial court could impose. Coleman indicated that he was satisfied with

his attorney and declined the opportunity to ask the trial court questions.

       According to the agreed stipulation of facts, in March 2022 at 10:48 p.m., Norfolk police

officers conducted a traffic stop of a silver Nissan Altima that was speeding and failed to stop

before turning at a red light. Officer Martinson instructed Coleman, who was sitting in the front

passenger seat, “to step out of the car and move toward the rear of the vehicle.” As Coleman

spoke with the officer, Martinson shined his flashlight and saw “what appeared to be a firearm”

in the front pocket of Coleman’s hooded sweatshirt. Martinson recovered a “Glock 36 handgun”

from Coleman’s sweatshirt pocket. After Martinson read Coleman his Miranda2 rights, Coleman

admitted that he was a convicted felon and did not have a concealed weapon permit.

       The trial court found that Coleman’s pleas were freely, voluntarily, and intelligently

entered, with an understanding of the charges and consequences of his pleas. Based on

       1
         Coleman did not have a plea agreement, but he pleaded guilty to an amended indictment
and signed a stipulation of facts after waiving his right to a preliminary hearing.
       2
           Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                               -2-
Coleman’s guilty pleas, the trial court convicted him of the charges, ordered a presentence

report, and allowed Coleman to remain on bond pending sentencing.

       At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth asked the trial court to impose a sentence

between the low and middle range of the discretionary sentencing guidelines.3 The

Commonwealth acknowledged Coleman’s criminal history, including a 2020 conviction for

assault and battery of a law enforcement officer and carrying a concealed weapon. The

Commonwealth “underst[oo]d the facts” of Coleman’s previous convictions but noted that

Coleman had served seven months’ incarceration for those offenses. The Commonwealth noted

that the circumstances surrounding Coleman’s most recent offenses were not aggravating “in any

way”—Coleman was cooperative with the police officers, and he admitted that he was a

convicted felon and did not have a concealed weapon permit.

       Coleman asked the trial court to impose an active three months’ incarceration. Coleman

stressed that he was cooperative, truthful, and honest with the officers. In addition, he did not

resist, or “show any signs of force or obstruction.” Coleman reiterated that he had pleaded guilty

to the charges and accepted responsibility for his actions “from the very beginning.” In

Coleman’s view, his acceptance of responsibility, and the fact that he did not flee from the scene

despite his co-defendant’s stated desire, showed that he had grown and learned from his past.

Coleman now appreciated the “problem with the firearms” in Norfolk. Though he contended that

he had carried the weapon for “safety” reasons, he acknowledged that he could no longer “put

[him]self in the position where [he has] safety issues.” Coleman noted that he had been “doing

really well” and did “everything” he was required to do with pretrial. In addition, he had

       3
        The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended a sentence between a low end of
seven months and a high end of one year, two months’ incarceration, with a midpoint of one
year.
                                             -3-
maintained employment, helped provide for his two-year-old son, and had saved money because he

knew he would have to serve “additional time.”

       The trial court noted the details of Coleman’s prior assault and battery of a law enforcement

officer conviction, concluding that seven months’ incarceration was “[n]ot enough” time to serve

under those circumstances. Notwithstanding Coleman’s acceptance of responsibility, the trial court

found that Coleman had not learned or changed because he was a convicted felon who “got a gun

again” and had not “learned to stop carrying a gun.” The trial court sentenced Coleman to a total of

five years and six months’ imprisonment with three years and six months suspended.

       As noted above, Coleman challenges the active sentence the trial court imposed. He

argues that the trial court failed to consider his mitigating evidence and, instead, imposed an

“excessive” sentence that exceeded the sentencing guidelines based on its “opinion that

[Coleman] did not receive a proper sentence” for his prior conviction for assault and battery of a

law enforcement officer.

       “The sentencing guidelines are advisory only and do not require trial courts to impose

specific sentences.” Runyon v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). Rather, the

guidelines are a tool for the judge’s use in determining an appropriate sentence. Luttrell v.

Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461, 465 (2004). A judge’s failure to follow the sentencing

guidelines “shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other post-conviction relief.”

Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Accordingly, we consider only whether the sentence imposed represents

an abuse of the trial court’s broad sentencing discretion. Scott v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App.

35, 46 (2011).

       “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and the sentence does not

exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an abuse of discretion.”

Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston v. Commonwealth,

                                                 -4-
274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)). “[O]nce it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations

set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end.” Thomason v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 99 (2018) (quoting Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 565). Here, the

sentences the trial court imposed were within the ranges set by the legislature. See Code

§§ 18.2-10, 18.2-308, 18.2-308.2.

       The abuse of discretion standard, however, also “includes review to determine that the

discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Greer, 63

Va. App. 561, 568 (2014) (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 203, 260 (2008)). The

Supreme Court has “focused” that standard “by identifying the ‘three principal ways’ by which a

court abuses its discretion:” by failing to consider a relevant factor that should have been given

significant weight, by considering an irrelevant or improper factor, or by committing a clear error

of judgment when weighing all proper factors. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 213

(2013) (quoting Landrum v. Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352

(2011)). Coleman posits that the trial court abused its discretion by considering an irrelevant or

improper factor—that the sentence he received for his 2020 convictions were “[n]ot enough” and

that he had a “propensity for violence.” His arguments, however, fail to demonstrate any abuse

of discretion.

       It was within the trial court’s purview to weigh the mitigating evidence Coleman

presented, including his acceptance of responsibility, the care he provided for his son, and his

compliant interaction with the police officers who arrested him. Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34

Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The record does not support Coleman’s contention that the trial court

failed to consider his mitigating evidence. “Criminal sentencing decisions are among the most

difficult judgment calls trial judges face.” Minh Duy Du, 292 Va. at 563. “Because this task is

so difficult, it must rest heavily on judges closest to the facts of the case—those hearing and

                                                -5-
seeing the witnesses, taking into account their verbal and nonverbal communication, and placing

all of it in the context of the entire case.” Id. Balanced against Coleman’s mitigating evidence,

however, was his criminal history which included an assault and battery of a law enforcement

officer and a prior firearm charge. In addition, the trial court reasonably found that Coleman had

not changed because he was a convicted felon who had not “learned to stop carrying a gun.” Thus,

the record does not support the argument that the trial court failed to consider Coleman’s

mitigation evidence. “Appellant’s sentence was within the statutory range, and our task is

complete.” Thomason, 69 Va. App. at 99.

                                         CONCLUSION

       Finding no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, its judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

                                               -6-