Court Opinion

ID: 9764506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:24:54.217104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.443683
License: Public Domain

THOMPSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The intent of OCGA § 17-8-75 is to prohibit argument which introduces facts that are not put on the record and are calculated to prejudice the accused. Adams v. State, 260 Ga. 298, 299 (392 SE2d 866) (1990). See also Dingler v. State, 293 Ga. App. 27, 31, 32 (666 SE2d 441) (2008). The statute consists of two sentences. The first sentence authorizes the trial court to intervene on its own motion to prevent counsel from injecting prejudicial facts which are not in evidence by way of argument. See Brooks v. State, 183 Ga. 466, 468 (188 SE 711) (1936). The second sentence provides additional remedies if an objection to improper argument is made and sustained: rebuke of counsel, curative instructions, and mistrial. Our courts have consistently interpreted the statute in such a way as to require counsel to request the additional remedies he or she wants *224the trial court to impose.3 Until now, this matter was “considered settled in this State.” Id. Thus, even if an objection to improper argument is sustained, counsel must first ask the trial court to rebuke counsel and give curative instructions if he or she expects to assign error upon the trial court’s failure to do so. Prince v. State, 257 Ga. 84, 88 (355 SE2d 424) (1987); Brooks v. State, supra.
Decided November 8, 2010.
Daniel F. Farnsworth, for appellant.
This interpretation of OCGA § 17-8-75 has been longstanding and the legislature has always acquiesced in it. Indeed, the statute “is not [even] of legislative origin. It has appeared in several of our codes, [but] the principles undoubtedly are taken from four decisions of this court.” Brooks v. State, supra, citing Augusta & Summerville R. Co. v. Randall, 85 Ga. 297, 317 (4 SE 674) (1890); Croom v. State, 90 Ga. 430 (4) (17 SE 1003) (1892); Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Johnson, 90 Ga. 500 (6) (16 SE 49) (1892); Farmer v. State, 91 Ga. 720 (18 SE 987) (1893).
Where a statute has, by a long series of decisions, received a judicial construction in which the General Assembly has acquiesced and thereby given its implicit legislative approval, the courts should not disturb that settled construction. Even those who regard “stare decisis” with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. A reinterpretation of a statute after the General Assembly’s implicit acceptance of the original interpretation would constitute a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Radioshack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing II, 282 Ga. 841, 843 (653 SE2d 680) (2007).
By interpreting the statute anew, the majority is trampling upon more than 120 years of case law and interfering with the legislative prerogative. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this dissent.
*225Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

 See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 276 Ga. 829, 834 (4) (583 SE2d 873) (2003); Kyler v. State, 270 Ga. 81, 82 (508 SE2d 152) (1998); Phillips v. State, 230 Ga. 444 (1) (197 SE2d 720) (1973); Walley v. State, 298 Ga. App. 483, 485 (2) (680 SE2d 550) (2009); Williams v. Terry, 197 Ga. App. 209, 210 (3) (398 SE2d 239) (1990); but see Arrington v. State, 286 Ga. 335, 345 (687 SE2d 438) (2009); Bolden v. State, 272 Ga. 1 (525 SE2d 690) (2000).