Court Opinion

ID: 9856120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:38:48.613595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:05.654191
License: Public Domain

Felton and Townsend, JJ.,
dissenting. This is a workmen’s compensation case, in which the claimant seeks to recover on account of a broken hip sustained when a fellow workman pushed him and caused him to fall while they were in a line formed to receive their pay. The single director found the accident not compensable because the injury resulted from horseplay initiated by the claimant. The full board, reviewing the findings of the single director, found that the accident was compensable, as the injuries arose out of and in the course of the employment of the claimant.
There is certainly evidence to support the finding of the single director. However, since the award was reviewed by the full board, the latter having been upheld by the superior court, which judgment is the subject of the exception here, it is necessary for this court to determine whether or not there is any evidence to support the finding of the full board that the injuries of the claimant arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is contended that the claimant’s injuries resulted from wilful misconduct, and also that they resulted from horseplay. The distinction between these defenses is this: wilful misconduct will bar recovery, even though the accident arises in the course of the employment, and even though it arises out of it, but wilful misconduct contemplates “the idea of premeditation, obstinacy and intentional wrongdoing.” Armour & Co. v. Little, 83 Ga. App. 762, 766 (64 S. E. 2d, 707); Code, §§ 114-102, 114-105. Horseplay contemplates a stepping aside from the employment in a spirit of fun and prankishness, and is therefore not something arising out of the employment; nevertheless, it will not bar recovery if it was not initiated or participated in by the claimant. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93 (47 S. E. 2d, 673). The full board found as a matter of fact that these contentions were invalid. There was evidence to support this finding. All the witnesses agreed that the injury was not intentional, nor the result of malice, ill-will, or mutual combat of any kind. The claimant’s testimony was to the effect *823that, when he shook Morris Hamlin and told him to let the lady go ahead of him in the line, which he did at Stone’s suggestion and in a spirit of courtesy, Hamlin stepped back; that Mrs. Durand received her check, Hamlin received his, and the claimant was in the act of receiving his when Hamlin came over and pushed him. The board was authorized to find from this testimony that, whatever Hamlin’s conduct may have been, that of the claimant was not horseplay but was an expression of courtesy toward a female fellow-employee. An act of courtesy toward a fellow employee, even though negligent, and even though not in itself an expressly assigned duty, will not bar recovery for injuries resulting therefrom on the ground that it constitutes an abandonment of the employer’s business. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Parham, 69 Ga. App. 258 (25 S. E. 2d, 147); American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Benford, 77 Ga. App. 93, supra; Glens Falls Indemnity Co. v. Sockwell, 58 Ga. App. 111, supra.
It is axiomatic that, where the award of the full board is supported by any evidence, it will not be disturbed by this court. The evidence here demands a finding that the injury did not result from wilful misconduct on the part of either party; and that most favorable to the claimant authorizes a finding that he was not and had not been motivated by the instincts of a prankster, but was merely carrying out the directions of a fellow employee in a spirit of helpfulness and courtesy when he caused Hamlin to step back. This being so, the board was authorized to find that any horseplay on Hamlin’s part in shoving him was not horseplay initiated or participated in by him, and would not bar his recovery.
We therefore believe that the judge of the superior court correctly affirmed the award of the full board, and dissent from the judgment of reversal.