Court Opinion

ID: 9707582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:01.654667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.380718
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT,
Judge, dissenting:
Because I would find that the order appealed from is a collateral order, I would reach the merits of this appeal. See R.W. v. Hampe, 426 Pa.Super. 306, 626 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1993) (holding that an order partially sealing the record to preclude plaintiff’s name from being used in the caption was appealable as a collateral order). It is hard to imagine an order more separable from and collateral to the main cause of action than the one before us, which has so little relationship to the underlying criminal trial that Sartin’s counsel did not address it. Likewise, the claimed right of public access is too important to be denied review. Finally, the press, which seeks to publish news, will be irreparably harmed if review of this order awaits disposition of the unrelated underlying criminal trial. Additionally, it is inconceivable that if Sartin is convicted, the press will have standing to appeal from his judgment of sentence and request a new trial based on this order. Furthermore, if Sartin is not convicted, there can be no appeal at all. As a result, I would find that the order at issue in this case is “effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 705 A.2d at 832 n. 2. See also In Re Estate of Petro, 694 A.2d 627, 636 (Pa.Super.1997) (Ford Elliott, J. dissenting) (two necessary corollaries to the collateral order doctrine are that “ ‘(1) the lower court’s determination on the collateral matter must be final and (2) deferred appellate review of the lower court’s determination would be either ineffective or impossible.’ ”), quoting Zigmont Pines, Pennsylvania Appellate Practice: Procedural Requirements and the Vagaries of Jurisdiction (Part 1), 91 Dick.L.Rev. 55, 109-110 (1986).
As a result, I respectfully dissent.