Court Opinion

ID: 9701695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:32:14.139952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:27.505007
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Roberts:
I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that Mrs. Truver is barred from obtaining the relief she seeks either because of the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches.
*311In Silver v. Silver, 421 Pa. 533, 539, 219 A. 2d 659, 663 (1966), as the majority points out, we held that in an action for the breach of a constructive trust the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the grantee breaches the trust or until the grantor should reasonably know about the grantee’s breach. “By starting the statute of limitations running at that time, rather than at the time the conveyance is first made, one enjoying a confidential relationship will not be able to profit by concealing, for a five year period, his intention to dishonor his promise to reconvey property entrusted to him.” Ibid. Likewise, the Restatement 2d, Trusts, §409 (1959) requires knowledge of a breach by the beneficiary before he may be barred by laches from enforcing a resulting or constructive trust.
The majority opinion while not suggesting that Mrs. Truver had knowledge of Mrs. Kennedy’s conveyances, imposes a duty upon her to have made frequent inquiries about the status of the realty, to have displayed “curiosity”. In my view appellant was under no such duty. Mrs. Truver, a resident of Texas, had every right to assume that her sister-trustee would continue to preserve, hold and account for her interest in the property. It was not until she noticed the construction in 1961 that she first had cause to be suspicious and thereafter she immediately demonstrated her concern. Nor do I see how Charlotte Kennedy was unduly prejudiced by the death of her mother, some two months prior to the institution of this suit, and the death of her mother’s lawyer. The majority is willing to conclude that the record evidence clearly establishes the existence of a constructive trust, and Charlotte Kennedy as donee stands in the shoes of her mother.
I am in substantial accord with the view taken by Mr. Justice Jones on the remaining issues of this case. Accordingly I dissent from the Court’s judgment.
Mr. Justice Musmanno and Mr. Justice O’Brien join in this dissenting opinion.