Court Opinion

ID: 9852681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:34:50.849891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:32.009837
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
In essence, appellant is challenging the validity of his guilty plea, claiming that ineffective assistance of counsel infected it. A plea of guilty must be made knowingly, voluntarily, and with an understanding of the consequences. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). See Haggins v. State, 259 Ga. 188 (380 SE2d 711) (1989), which applies this. If a defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel, the plea is not intelligently and voluntarily made. McBryar v. McElroy, 510 FSupp. 706 (N.D.Ga. 1981); Logan v. State, 256 Ga. 664, 665 (352 SE2d 567) (1987). See Kight v. State, 158 Ga. App. 698, 699 (282 SE2d 176) (1981).
If a defendant believes that he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel in entering his plea, he has a right to withdraw it “[a]t any time before judgment is pronounced.” OCGA § 17-7-93 (b). Even after that time, a motion to withdraw may be made in term, but it addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Kight, 175 Ga. App. 65 (1) (332 SE2d 363) (1985). See also Right v. State, supra, 158 Ga. App., where the issue was whether counsel had effectively represented defendant, and Wood v. State, 190 Ga. App. 179, 180 (1) (378 SE2d 520) (1989), where the grounds of the motion constituted a challenge to the effectiveness of counsel.
“Where the question on appeal [of a judgment entered on a guilty plea] is one which may be resolved by facts appearing in the record . . . , a direct appeal will lie.” Smith v. State, 253 Ga. 169 *47(316 SE2d 757) (1984). This would include an out-of-time appeal, if a motion for such is granted by the trial court. See Hunter v. State, 260 Ga. 762 (399 SE2d 921) (1991), where it was recognized that a ground for allowing a late direct appeal is the failure of defendant’s counsel to file a timely appeal. Otherwise, “the only prescribed means for the appellant’s filing the motion to withdraw his guilty plea, after the term of court at which the judgment of conviction was rendered, [is] through habeas corpus proceedings.” Conlogue v. State, 243 Ga. 141, 142-143 (253 SE2d 168) (1979).3 See State v. Kight, supra, 175 Ga. App. at 66; Staley v. State, 184 Ga. App. 402 (361 SE2d 702) (1987); Bowens v. State, 194 Ga. App. 391 (390 SE2d 634) (1990).
Decided July 16, 1992.
Habeas corpus is the remedy in this case, not a remand. The issues sought to be raised, as summarized at the beginning of Division 3 of the majority opinion, are not subject to direct appeal because they cannot be resolved “by facts appearing in the record.” Smith, supra. Compare Lewis v. State, 191 Ga. App. 509 (382 SE2d 207) (1989). Since Holt’s challenge to the effectiveness of counsel would require additional inquiry and the presentation of evidence, it is not subject to a direct appeal, and the judgment of conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
The procedure created in Thompson v. State, 204 Ga. App. 220 (419 SE2d 541) (1992), and followed in this case, delays finality of judgments based on guilty pleas by permitting an appeal, an automatic remand, and another appeal after a hearing and adverse decision by the trial court, when a defendant does not challenge the validity of his plea within the term in which it is entered and the validity as to effectiveness of counsel may not be tested on the existing record. If the term goes by before defendant realizes he or she wishes to complain of counsel’s representation, “the earliest practicable opportunity” for a hearing on the issue is a habeas corpus proceeding, not a circuitous appeal and especially an out-of-time appeal and eventual remand for a hearing before the issue is addressed.
Thompson, moreover, appears to present an inconsistency. If the plea is held to be valid, as was done in Division 1 of that opinion, then how at the same time can it be open to a charge of invalidity because possibly infected by inadequate counsel?
I am authorized to state that Judge Andrews and Judge Johnson join in this dissent.
*48Terry Holt, pro se.
H. Lamar Cole, District Attorney, Robert T. Gilchrist, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

 Dicta appearing in Conlogue to the effect that there is no appeal from a judgment entered on a guilty plea was disapproved in Smith.