Court Opinion

ID: 9707338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:09:11.225513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:31.341271
License: Public Domain

MORAN, J., dissenting: I agree that the plaintiff corporation, Doctors Convalescent Center, should be classified as a public official under the doctrine set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 11 L Ed2d 686. However, I believe that we should reverse and remand this case for trial because the complaint can be construed to state a cause of action on the theory that the articles were published with actual malice. Plaintiff’s allegations of a conspiracy to publish libelous matters that were false, malicious and designed to harm the plaintiff in its business, presuppose willful deliberation and are therefore sufficient to state a cause of action. In Dyer v. Davis (La App), 189 So2d 678, 681 (1966), Writ refused 250 La 533, 197 So2d 679, the court said: “We note that in Article 9 of his petition, plaintiff alleges a conspiracy between defendants in the publication of the allegedly offensive editorial and in Article 10 avers as a fact that the defamatory nature of the comment was known to defendants. In paragraphs 14 and 16 it is avowed in substance that the alleged conspiracy was deliberate, willful, false, and malicious. For the purposes of disposing of the exception of no cause of action, it suffices to state the allegations noted bring the case within the rule of the New York Times decisions, supra, which in effect hold that as regards public officials, to be actionable a libel must be with ‘actual malice,’ which means it must be knowingly false or made with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The essence of the verbiage chosen by plaintiff to state his case is what determines whether he has in fact stated a cause of action. The language employed in the case at bar in substance charges actual malice in that it alleges a deliberate and willfully false statement, the equivalent of knowingly false. We hold, therefore, the petition states a cause of action in law.” The Supreme Court of the United States in New York Times did not prescribe any federal constitutional rules as to how to plead actual malice, but merely laid down the theory that for a public official to establish actual malice a libelous article must be shown to have been published with knowledge or with a reckless disregard of whether or not the article was false. I would therefore hold that the allegation of conspiracy along with the allegations that the statements were false and malicious do not negate the necessity of an allegation of actual malice but rather that they constitute an allegation of actual malice. Plaintiff also specifically alleges that: “To the extent that the assertions set out in Paragraph 5 were not technically false, they were made without necessary qualification and in such distorted form as to give a false impression wholly unfair to the plaintiff. The entire series of articles published by the defendant as herein alleged was, and was meant by the defendant to be, a single connected attack upon the plaintiff, and the intermixture of non-accusatory assertions was designed to create an atmosphere of authenticity further to hurt and damage the plaintiff.” I believe this language describing the reporting being complained of takes this case out of the decision in Suchomel v. Suburban Life Newspapers, Inc., 40 Ill2d 32, 240 NE2d 1, wherein the court decided that actual malice was not apparent on the face of the libelous article because it appeared to be a straightforward report of both sides of a public controversy. The allegation in the present case in substance charges the defendant with intentional false reporting. Then too, in Suchomel the complaint was dismissed on motion for a summary judgment, whereas the complaint in the present case was dismissed on motion directed toward the complaint itself. The above language quoted from the complaint protesting the manner of reporting brings this case within the ambit of the decision announced in Coursey v. Greater Niles Pub. Corp., 40 Ill2d 257, 289 NE2d 837. The court there stated that the complaint incorporated by reference the article in question which on its face gave rise to factual inferences tending to support the charge of actual malice. The complaint here alleges that there were printed and published of and concerning the plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the business of operating a nursing home for the care of mentally retarded children, false assertions that it had permitted children under its care to be kept under conditions which were “indescribable” and “unbelievable,” to be beaten, to be given injections by untrained personnel, to have their bodies “covered” with their own excrement, to play with excrement and vomitus, to be kept under conditions “terrifying to them,” to be “filthy” and to stand in “desperate need” of bathing and cleansing, to go about in ragged clothing, without shoes, socks or underwear, to bite and beat each other, to suffer a coma while dehydrated, with an infected throat and bruises, to be “miserable” and “neglected,” to exist under conditions which called for a thorough investigation, to remain in temperature in the 40s, naked except for diapers, to suffer from malnutrition, and from uncleanliness to the extent of open sores on the body and scales on the scalp, and to suffer from various diseases evidencing neglect. The content of the articles in the instant case could also give rise to factual inferences tending to support the charge of actual malice. For the purposes of considering the motion in this case, we must assume that all of the allegations are true and that therefore the articles complained of were the result of a conspiracy by the defendants to injure the plaintiff’s business by the malicious publication of false statements. These are factual allegations from which actual malice may reasonably be said to exist. I see no purpose in searching for the magic words “. . - with knowledge it was false or with such a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not,” in order to find an allegation of actual malice. New York Times does not so require. The design and willful deliberation which are part of a conspiracy along with the charge of intentional false reporting indicate the presence of knowledge or reckless disregard of it. The only way plaintiff can recover is to prove the designing and planning of the conspiracy which presupposes actual knowledge and to prove that the “intermixture of nonaecusatory assertions was designed to create an atmosphere of authenticity further to hurt and damage the plaintiff.” This latter charge complains of the result of the conspiracy and on its face requires the plaintiff to prove knowledge. A design or conspiracy to create such an atmosphere could only be based on the knowledge that the statements were false. If they were true, there would be no need to conspire to create this atmosphere for the truth itself would be sufficient to achieve the aims of defendant. When all the allegations are admitted to be true, as must be done, I see no conclusion except that the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action. Ordinarily, where specific facts are set out in a pleading, the pleader need not state the legal conclusions to be drawn from such facts. In other words, it is sufficient if the pleader states the facts and leaves the court to find the law. (71 CJS 38, Pleading, § 15.) This doctrine is the backbone of our Civil Practice Act which calls for liberal construction of pleadings. “Pleadings shall be liberally construed with a view to doing substantial justice between the parties.” (Ill Rev Stats, c 110, § 33(3).) “No pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he is called upon to meet.” (Ill Rev Stats, c 110, §42(2).) Liberal construction of pleadings has been the policy of this court. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. J. J. Wuellner & Sons, Inc., 72 Ill App2d 488, 218 NE2d 823. The statement by the majority, “(p) leadings are construed most strongly against the pleader,” conflicts with the letter and spirit of the Civil Practice Act and with what we had to say in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. v. J. J. Wuellner & Sons, supra, and Fanning v. Lemay, 78 Ill App2d 166, 222 NE2d 815. Plaintiff’s complaint sets out in full the newspaper accounts which were the subject matter of this suit. In addition, it specifically alleges that these articles were the result of a conspiracy, were false and reported in a distorted form, and were maliciously designed to harm the plaintiff in its business. When these allegations are admitted as true and construed as a whole, as they must be, the conclusion is inescapable that actual malice is present. At the very minimum, a charge of conspiracy which presupposes a willful deliberation along with a charge that the articles were false establishes a reckless disregard of whether or not the articles were false. To take the time necessary to consider and deliberate and then still publish false articles appears to me to be squarely within the actual malice requirement of New York Times. I therefore dissent. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for trial.