Court Opinion

ID: 9786892
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:04:30.114769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:48.095871
License: Public Domain

DEITS, C. J.,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying defendant’s OEC 412 motion to admit evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior. The majority correctly states that the standard of decision for this inquiry is the three-part analysis set out in State v. Wright, 97 Or App 401, 776 P2d 1294, rev den 308 Or 593 (1989). I agree with the majority that the evidence that defendant sought to have admitted concerned the victim’s “past sexual behavior.” OEC 412(2); Wright, 97 Or App at 405. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was necessary to rebut or explain medical evidence offered by the state and was, accordingly, in one of the categories of past sexual behavior evidence made admissible under OEC 412. OEC 412(2)(b)(B); Wright, 97 Or App at 405. I take issue, however, with the majority’s treatment of the third part of the analysis under OEC 412 relating to balancing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. I believe that the trial court was correct in concluding that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. For the reasons that I will discuss, in my opinion, the trial *229court did not err in refusing to admit the disputed evidence. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
OEC 412 is a rule of relevancy that is specifically applicable to determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence of the past sexual behavior of victims of certain sex crimes. See State ex rel Davey v. Frankel, 312 Or 286, 290, 823 P2d 394 (1991) (OEC 412 “defin[es] the scope of relevant admissible evidence narrowly * * *.”). Under OEC 412, evidence of prior sexual behavior of a victim is not relevant and not admissible in prosecutions for certain sex crimes, unless it fits within one of the statutory exceptions. See State v. Lajoie, 316 Or 63, 68,849 P2d 479 (1993) (“OEC 412 is a blanket limitation on the introduction of evidence of an alleged victim’s past sexual behavior in a prosecution for a sexual crime.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, even if the evidence is relevant under one of the OEC 412 exceptions, it is not admissible unless its “probative value * * * outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.” OEC 412(4)(c).
As noted above, OEG 412 is implicated only when a party seeks admission of “evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior.” OEC 412(1), (2). As a threshold matter, then, when faced with an OEC 412 motion, a court must determine whether the evidence concerns a victim’s past sexual behavior. State v. Cervantes, 130 Or App 147, 150 n 1, 881 P2d 151 (1994); Wright, 97 Or App at 417. As noted above, I agree with the majority that the evidence that defendant sought to have admitted was evidence of S’s past sexual behavior.1 I *230also agree with the majority that the evidence that defendant sought to have admitted was relevant “to rebut or explain * * * medical evidence” under OEC 412(2)(b)(B). 171 Or App at 225.
My disagreement with the majority centers around its conclusion that the trial court erred in concluding, under OEC 412(4)(c), that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. As the majority correctly observes, review of the trial court’s conclusion regarding the balancing of the probative versus the prejudicial effect of this evidence is for abuse of discretion. 171 Or App at 225, citing State v. Wattenbarger, 97 Or App 414, 418, 776 P2d 1292, rev den 308 Or 331 (1989). See also State v. Williams, 313 Or 19, 29-30, 828 P2d 1006, cert den sub nom Williams v. Oregon, 506 US 858 (1992) (reviewing ruling on probative versus prejudicial value under OEC 403 for abuse of discretion). Our task on review of rulings like this one is limited:
“We simply determine whether, on the facts of the particular case, the trial court’s ruling was within the reasonable or permissible range. We need not determine whether [the] ruling was the only one possible. It may be that the record will support either admission or exclusion; if so, the trial court’s ruling will be affirmed, regardless of which solution we would prefer.” Carter v. Moberly, 263 Or 193, 201, 501 P2d 1276 (1972).
In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case by concluding that the probative value of defendant’s proffered evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and we should defer to that decision.
The majority concludes that “the probative value of the proffered evidence is so great that the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion” by excluding it. 171 Or App at 227. According to the majority, I “refuse[ ] to recognize * * * that the state used S’s physical condition as the centerpiece of its argument to the jury after having successfully excluded relevant evidence of what events could have caused her condition.” 171 Or App at 227.1 acknowledge that the proffered evidence undoubtedly had some logically probative value. However, the legislature has directed that such evidence be “necessary” — and hence highly logically probative — in order *231to be admissible at all under OEC 412(2)(b)(B), the exception applicable here. Accordingly, concluding that the proffered evidence is admissible under that exception requires a determination that the evidence has a high degree of logical probative value.2
That determination does not, however, end the matter. Even if the proffered evidence has probative value, the legislature has expressed the intention that the evidence still should be excluded unless that probative value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court concluded that it did not and, as noted above, I would hold that that conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial “if it appeals to the preferences of the trier of fact for reasons that are unrelated to the power of the evidence to establish a material fact.” State v. Barone, 328 Or 68, 87, 969 P2d 1013 (1998). The majority states that “the evidence * * * would [not] unduly distract the factfinder and cause a decision on an improper basis.” 171 Or App at 226. I disagree. Evidence that S had been sexually active in other contexts could well have appealed to the factfinder on a basis unrelated to the power of that evidence to establish that there was another explanation for her physical condition. The legislature has acknowledged as much in commenting on why it enacted OEC 412: “to protect victims of sexual crimes from the degrading and *232embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives.” Legislative Commentary to OEC 412, reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence 194 (3d ed 1996). See also State v. Beden, 162 Or App 178, 187, 986 P2d 94 (1999) (disclosure of those details might provide an improper basis for a juror to assess the credibility of a victim-witness or to decide the case). In particular, here, at least some of defendant’s proffered evidence — namely Samantha’s testimony that S ran away from home and had “spent the night in army men’s house” where soldiers “slept on top” of S and that, after that incident, S started to be sexually active and “slept with other little boys” — could have led the jury to speculate that S had consented to prior sexual activity and to base its decision on an improper view about S’s character because of that activity. The majority states that, given S’s extreme youth at the time, her consent is unlikely. Although I agree, I also recognize that the proffered evidence could nevertheless allow jurors to draw an inference of consent, which would be even more unfairly prejudicial in light of her extreme youth. That is exactly the type of speculation that rape-shield laws are designed to protect against.
In any event, even if S’s purported sexual behavior were nonconsensual, that does not mean that hearing it could not have caused the jury to base its decision on a improper basis. Victims of sexual assault still are often seen as blameworthy. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F3d 673, 685 (6th Cir 1998) (“[A] historic social stigma has attached to victims of sexual violence. In particular a tradition of ‘blaming the victim’ of sexual violence sets these victims apart from those of other violent crimes.”); Paul S. Grobman, The Constitutionality of Statutorily Restricting Public Access to Judicial Proceedings: The Case of the Rape Shield Mandatory Disclosure Provision, 66 Boston Univ L Rev 271, 275 (1986) (discussing public tendency to believe that rape victims “asked for it”). In fact, testimony in this case demonstrates the double standard that still operates against victims of sexual abuse. Samantha’s sister testified that, after “checking” S for signs of penetration after S returned from the soldiers’ house, S’s mother was “absolutely mad” and beat S. Whether or not S consented to the conduct, her mother believed that she should be punished for no longer being a virgin. Similar prejudice against S could *233easily have arisen in the minds of the jurors based on the irrational, but still active, belief that victims of sexual abuse are in some way responsible for the abuse.
Although the majority might have decided this question differently in the first instance, that does not entitle it to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of the purported “past sexual behavior” of S.
I also do not agree with the majority that, under our analysis in State v. Beeler, 166 Or App 275, 999 P2d 497 (2000), defendant’s right to present a defense or to confront witnesses under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,3 and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution4 was infringed upon. In our decision in Beeler, we addressed a similar question. We explained that, in determining whether evidence must be admitted because excluding it would infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront witnesses and to present exculpatory evidence, “the constitutional issue reduces to a weighing of the state’s interest in excluding [the] defendant’s evidence against the value of that evidence to the defense.” Beeler, 166 Or App at 283-84. As we stated in Beeler, the state’s interest in excluding evidence of this nature is to carry out the objective of OEC 412 to “protect victims of sexual crimes from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their personal lives thereby encouraging] victims to report and assist in the prosecution of the crime.” Id. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no question that *234the admission of the proffered evidence here would undermine that interest of the state, because it would disclose intimate and embarrassing details of the victim’s personal life.
*233“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel; * * ® to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favorM”
*234In addition, as discussed above, the value of the evidence that defendant seeks to offer is tenuous. The evidence concerns events that occurred some time before the alleged events on which the criminal charges here were based and consists of second- and third-hand accounts of what happened. Further, even defendant himself testified that he did not believe that some of the events occurred. The value of this evidence to defendant was further reduced because he was allowed to present evidence that supported an alternative theory that explained the state’s physical evidence. Defendant presented evidence that he had “checked” S, in accordance with Ugandan custom, when he suspected that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with a boyfriend after his daughters visited the boyfriend’s house and lied about it to him and that he determined after checking her that she was not a virgin. I would hold that the value of the proffered evidence to the defense does not outweigh the state’s interest in excluding it and, consequently, that the trial court was not constitutionally required to admit it. OEC 412(2)(b)(C).
Finally, the majority holds that, because defendant’s proffered evidence should have been admitted, defendant’s convictions on several charges with respect to which S’s physical condition was not an issue — that is, charges not alleging penetration — must be reversed, in addition to the convictions on those charges with respect to which S’s physical condition was an issue.5 According to the majority, its result is required because the excluded evidence bears directly on S’s credibility. Even if evidence of prior sexual behavior could sometimes be relevant to a victim’s credibility, however, it could not have been relevant to S’s credibility in this case. S was not asked to testify whether the prior sexual conduct occurred. At the hearing on defendant’s OEC 412 motion, only defendant *235and his sister Samantha testified; S did not testify. At trial, she testified that she had been sexually abused by defendant. The credibility of that testimony would not have been undermined or supported by admitting evidence about an alternative explanation for S’s physical condition, because S’s testimony that defendant sexually abused her is not inconsistent with S having engaged in prior sexual behavior. Because S never was asked to testify about her prior sexual behavior, the evidence that defendant did offer was not relevant to her credibility. I would not reverse defendant’s convictions on the charges in which S’s physical condition was not an issue.
For the reasons stated above, I dissent.

 According to the state, the trial court concluded that the purported behavior did not in fact occur and, accordingly, the trial court correctly excluded the evidence on that basis. The state relies on OEC 412(4)(b), which requires the trial court to determine “conditionM of fact.” In State v. Beeler, 166 Or App 275, 280-81, 999 P2d 497, rev den 331 Or 244 (2000), this court held that, under OEC 412(4)(b), “it was error for the trial court to exclude the state’s evidence and to order admission of defendant’s evidence without making a determination regarding the complainant’s conduct.” Id. at 281. In this case, contrary to the state’s assertion, the trial court did not explicitly make that determination. Instead, the trial court concluded that, even if the purported sexual behavior had occurred, it would not be admissible. Accordingly, under Beeler, a remand to the trial court might be necessary to allow the trial court to make that factual determination in the first instance. However, because I would conclude that, in any event, the evidence was properly excluded and would, therefore, affirm the trial court, under my analysis a remand would not be required. See Beeler, 166 Or App at 281-85 (where trial court wrongly admitted evidence as a matter of law under OEC 412, court reversed and did not remand for a determination of whether purported evidence in fact occurred).

 agree with the trial court’s assessment that the practical probative value of the proffered evidence was undermined by several factors. The evidence concerned events remote in time and place. There was no direct evidence of S’s sexual behavior. No witness testified from his or her own personal knowledge that S had engaged in sexual behavior. Defendant, in fact, testified at the OEC 412 hearing that he did not believe S was raped by the three men in Kenya. I agree with the majority’s suggestion that defendant’s disbelief of the reports of rape does not “prevent” the admissibility of the evidence. 171 Or App at 227. However, defendant’s disbelief detracts from the probative value of the proffered evidence. Further, defendant could have called S as a witness at the hearing to testify as to the events, but he chose not to do so. In light of those flaws, I would agree with the trial court that the probative value of the evidence was relatively slight, not “great,” as the majority determines. Id. at 227. See Legislative Commentary to OEC 412, reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence, 195 (3d ed 1996) (“In determining the admissibility of evidence, the court should consider * the amount of time that has elapsed between the alleged prior act and the act charged in the prosecution. The greater the lapse of time, the less likely it is that the evidence will be admitted.”).

 Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, provides, in part:

 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, provides, in part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favorM”
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part:
‘TNlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of lawM”

 Defendant has requested that his conviction as to all “sex-related” counts be reversed. Neither defendant nor the majority explains why the exclusion of defendant’s proffered evidence is more relevant to the sex-related charges that did not implicate S’s physical condition than it is to the non-sex-related charges that also did not implicate S’s physical condition. If S’s credibility is the issue, then the dividing line should more properly be those charges about which S testified.