Court Opinion

ID: 9720488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:32:52.566357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:39.046076
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority on the first two issues: namely, the jurisdiction of the commission and should the correctional guards be employed by the City of Detroit. Since they are obviously not part of the city public *280police department, the dispositive issue here is whether they were, and are, subject to the same or similar hazards as those faced by Detroit policemen.
The interpretation and application of the statutory language embodied in MCL 423.232; MSA 17.455(32), by the MERC is the focal point of this argument. This language is as follows:
"Public police and fire departments means any department of a city, county, village, or township having employees engaged as policemen, or in firefighting or subject to the hazards thereof.” (Emphasis added.)
I believe the MERC board and its hearing officer erred in determining that the correctional officers were subject to the hazards police officers encounter and I would find, therefore, that the plaintiffs were ineligible for compulsory arbitration under the statute. In Michigan Employment Relations Commission v Detroit Symphony Orchestra, Inc, 393 Mich 116, 121; 223 NW2d 283 (1974), it was stated:
"The standard of appellate review of MERC Board findings of fact is set forth in the labor mediation act as follows:
" '* * * The findings of the board with respect to questions of fact if supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. * * *’ MCL 423.23(e); MSA 17.454(25)(e).
"This standard comports with Const 1963, art 6, § 28 which sets forth the minimum constitutional scope of judicial review of administrative decisions.”
Later in this case, the Supreme Court elaborated on this standard of review, stating:
*281"What the drafters of the Constitution intended was a thorough judicial review of administrative decision, a review which considers the whole record—that is, both sides of the record—not just those portions of the record supporting the findings of the administrative agency. Although such a review does not attain the status of de novo review, it necessarily entails a degree of qualitative and quantitative evaluation of evidence considered by an agency. Such review must be undertaken with considerable sensitivity in order that the courts accord due deference to administrative expertise and not invade the province of exclusive fact-finding by displacing an agency’s choice between two reasonably differing views. Cognizant of these concerns, the courts must walk the tightrope of duty which requires judges to provide the prescribed meaningful review.”
There is no argument, and there can be no argument, that plaintiffs were members of the Detroit Police Department. Plaintiffs’ counsel stipulated that they were not. Let us then examine the comparative hazards. The hazards of police department work were set out in the testimony of the Executive Deputy Chief of the Detroit Police Department, James Bannon. His testimony suggests that city police are exposed to hazards of such variety, scope, and intensity as to lead me to conclude that the MERC board’s findings were not supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.
The city police officers have a wide range of duties and resultant hazards, including walking beats, riding motorcycles, responding to radio reports of crimes, riding patrol cars, investigating narcotics cases, sex-related offenses, robberies and homicides. The police are charged with the general enforcement of all the criminal laws of the state, be they misdemeanor, felony, or motor-vehicle connected. Police officers have an obligation to carry *282their identification cards, badges, and guns even when off duty, and to respond to life threatening situations at any time. Police must assist firemen in their work. They also must respond to and intervene in family squabbles, which is one of the most dangerous of police activities since, on the national average, 50% of the police officers killed or injured are killed or injured in responding to domestic calls. Statistics were introduced showing the number of injuries resulting to police through the entire spectrum of police activities. They showed that out of approximately 4,000 field officers, 2,728 can be expected to be injured in some way in the course of a year. Deputy Chief Bannon also indicated that, due to the stress of police work in urban communities, police officers have the highest occupational rates of suicide and divorce, and one of the highest rates of alcoholism in the country.
The functions of the plaintiffs’ correctional guards at the Detroit House of Correction (De-HoCo), and the hazards attendant to those functions, were outlined by its director, William Rucks. The following facts were revealed: The day shift at DeHoCo consists of about 22 correctional guards, only two of whom carry a weapon on duty. None of the correctional guards are authorized to carry a weapon or make an arrest while off-duty. If the guards discover that contraband is being smuggled into DeHoCo, they can only detain the wrongdoer. They must alert a local police department to effectuate the arrest. As to occupational hazards, witness Rucks related that, in his 23 years at De-HoCo, no guard had been stabbed or shot and he could only recall four to six guards being injured by prisoner attacks. Further, he recalled only about three incidents where weapons had to be *283issued to the correctional guards. Although there were other witnesses presented whose testimony also addressed this issue, their descriptions of the occupational hazards of the plaintiffs were consistent with that of Mr. Rucks.
I do not think that the plaintiffs carried their burden of establishing that they were, and are, subject to the risks and hazards to which members of the police department are subject. Therefore, the MERC board determination should be reversed and the plaintiffs held not entitled to compulsory arbitration under the statute.