Court Opinion

ID: 9633436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:47:43.629453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:55.146620
License: Public Domain

Rees, J.,
dissenting: I believe that the majority relies upon unacceptable result-desired reasoning to reach its decision. Within the majority opinion there is a search for supposed legislative intent to support the announced outcome. Our inquiry should be an examination of the operative effect of the statutory law and precedential case authority, as expressed by the legislature and our Supreme Court, that applies to our facts and the *169question addressed. The legislature and our Supreme Court should be taken at their word in conducting the inquiry. We are not and cannot be mind readers. We should not go beyond ascertainment and harmonization of the expressed statutory and precedential case law operative at the times material to the case before us. It is not our role to legislate and it is inappropriate for. us to undertake to do so.
The majority opinion fairly sets forth the factual and procedural underpinning of this case. It also fairly describes Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974). However, my colleagues’ admiration of Justice Fontron’s dissent in Browning seems to blind them from the fact that, as a member of the Browning court, Justice Fontron stood alone.
Two matters need to be mentioned. The first and more important of these is that Browning is a stepparent adoption case. The case before us concerns third-party adoption. The other is that it is of no consequence that Kimberly and Scott Spunaugle are related to J.M.U. other than as her adoptive parents.
The question raised for resolution is whether a parent of one of an unmarried minor child’s deceased parents is entitled to visitation rights with the child after the child’s adoption by third parties. Under the facts of this case, it develops that our answer to the question is governed by the pertinent case and statutory law operative during the period from July 1, 1984, to July 1, 1990.
Since Browning, 215 Kan. 501, was filed in 1974, it has not been overruled, modified, or distinguished by our Supreme Court.
Browning concerned the operative effect of two statutes. One .was the 1971 predecessor version of K.S.A. 38-129 then in effect. Within that statute (the “1971 visitation statute") there was this text:
“If either the father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased, the parents of such deceased person may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the minor child during its minority by the district court upon a finding that such visitation rights would be in the best interests of the minor child.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 38-129; L. 1971, ch. 149, § 1.
The other statute was the 1967 predecessor version of K.S.A. 59-2103 then in effect. Within that statute (the “1967 adoption statute”) was this text:
*170“[An adopted child] . . . shall be entitled to the same rights of person and property as a natural child of the person . . . adopting the child. The person . . . adopting such child shall be entitled to exercise all the rights of a natural parent and be subject to all the liabilities of that relation. Upon . . .adoption all the rights of natural parents to the adopted child . . . shall cease, except the rights of a natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 1971 Supp. 59-2103; L. 1967, ch. 316, § 1.
As said by the majority here, the Supreme Court, in arriving at its decision in Browning, reasoned and held that the adoption of the child by the stepfather controlled disposition of the question before it. The stepfather’s adoption was held to operate to prohibit the natural paternal grandmother from exercising visitation rights because, by the adoption, the child had a new father and new paternal grandparents. 215 Kan. at 506. It is said in Broioning that “[p]ublic policy demands that an adoption carry with it a complete breaking of old ties.” 215 Kan. at 505. See In re Herbst, 217 Kan. 164, 168, 535 P.2d 437 (1975). Since the filing of Browning and Herbst, neither the Supreme Court nor the legislature has expressed rejection of the Browning public policy pronouncement.
Browning held that:
“In our opinion K.S.A. 38-129 [the 1971 visitation statute] was not designed by the legislature to overturn the previously established adoption laws of the State of Kansas, but was enacted and intended to apply subject to the adoption laws. In other words, adoption proceedings properly conducted and accomplished under the probate code override 38-129 . . . .” (Emphasis added.) 215 Kan. at 506.
After presently immaterial intervening legislative change to K.S.A. 59-2103 in 1979 (L. 1979, ch. 180, § 1) and to K.S.A. 38-129 in 1982 (L. 1982, ch. 182, § 149), the version of K.S.A. 38-129 that applies to this case (the “1984 visitation statute”) is this:
“(a) The district court may grant the grandparents of an unmarried minor child reasonable visitation rights to the child during the child’s minority upon a finding that the visitation rights would be in the child’s best interests and when a substantial relationship between the child and the grandparent has been established.
“(b) The district court may grant the parents of a deceased person visitation rights . . . , pursuant to this section, even if the surviving parent has *171remarried and the surviving parent’s spouse has adopted the child. ...” (L. 1984, ch. 152, § 1.)
The version of K.S.A. 59-2103 that applies to this case (the “1983 adoption statute”) includes this:
“(b) [An adopted child] . . . shall be entitled to the same personal and property rights as a natural child of the adoptive parent. The adoptive parent shall be entitled to exercise all the rights of a natural parent and be subject to all the liabilities of that relationship. Upon adoption all the rights of natural parents to the adopted child . . . shall cease, except the rights of a natural parent who is the spouse of the adopting parent.
“(c) If a parent of a child is deceased and the surviving parent’s spouse adopts the child, the parents of the deceased parent may be granted reasonable visitation rights to the child in accordance with K.S.A. 38-129.” (Emphasis added.) (L. 1983, ch. 140, § 43.)
As mentioned, the operative statutes in the case before us are the 1984 visitation statute and the 1983 adoption statute. As I read them, subsection (b) of the 1984 visitation statute and subsection (c) of the 1983 adoption statute authorize grandparent visitation where there is stepparent adoption. Under this statutory authorization, the result in Browning would have been different.
As also mentioned, in Browning the pertinent statutes were the 1971 visitation statute and the 1967 adoption statute. As I read the 1971 visitation statute and subsection (a) of the 1984 visitation statute, I find no difference relevant to our case. The only material difference between the two is that subsection (a) of the 1984 visitation statute grants authority for grandparent visitation to the broad category of “grandparents of an unmarried minor child,” while the visitation authority under the 1971 visitation statute extended only to the smaller category of parents of a deceased parent of an unmarried minor child.
For the purposes of the case before us, there is no material difference between the 1971 and the 1984 visitation státutes. Further, subsection (b) of the 1983 adoption statute, which is applicable to this case, is for all practical purposes identical to the 1967 adoption statute which was involved in Browning.
In the present case, I am persuaded that, oh the authority of Browning, 215 Kan. at 506, subsection (b) of the 1983 ádoption statute overrides subsection (a) of the 1984 visitation statute with the result being that grandparent visitation is not authorized in cases where the child has been adopted by third parties. The *172fundamendal holding in Browning was that “adoption proceedings . . . override 38-129.” (Emphasis added.)
Thus, it - is my conclusion that the answer to the posited question raised for resolution on this appeal should be answered- in the negative. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Elder’s request for visitation.' The language of Browning and the statutes is clear and direct.' There is no need to hunt for legislative intent that, at best, is speculative. Further, it clearly is decided and held in Browning that the adoption statute overrides the visitation statute. The result reached by the majority violates the reported rule that we are duty-bound to follow our Supreme Court’s decisions. Batt v. Globe Engineering Co., 13 Kan. App. 2d 500, 507, 774 P.2d 371, rev. denied 245 Kan. 782 (1989); Dick Hatfield Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bob Watson Motors, Inc., 10 Kan. App. 2d 350, 352, 699 P.2d 566, aff'd 238 Kan. 41, 708 P.2d 494 (1985); Stratton v. Garvey Internat’l, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 254, Syl. ¶ 6, 676 P.2d 1290 (1984). No exception to the rule applies here.
The majority tells us that the 1983 adoption statute (K.S.A. 59-2103) has been repealed. This is only partially true. Although subsections (b) and (c) of the 1983 adoption statute were repealed by the 1990 legislature (L. 1990, ch. 145, § 38), subsection (b) was simultaneously reenacted with only insignificant cosmetic change. K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 59-2118(b); L. 1990, ch. 145, § 8.
In their answer to Elder’s petition, the Spunaugles asked for the award of costs and reasonable attorney fees pursuant to K.S.A. 38-131. The trial court made no awards or mention of costs or attorney fees in its journal entry. Similarly, the majority is silent on the subject.
K.S.A. 38-131 directs that “costs and reasonable attorney fees shall be awarded to the respondent in an action filed pursuant to K.S.A. 38-129 et seq. unless the court determines that justice and equity otherwise require.” (Emphasis added.) In Spradling v. Harris, 13 Kan. App. 2d 595, 602-03, 778 P.2d 365, rev. denied 245 Kan. 785 (1989), the trial court made no finding that justice and equity would “otherwise require"; nonetheless, it ordered the respondent to pay her own attorney fees. We reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to order attorney fees *173and costs be paid by the petitioner unless it found justice and equity otherwise required. 13 Kan. App. 2d at 603.
In this case, the trial court should be directed to award costs and attorney fees to the Spunaugles unless it finds that justice and equity otherwise require. The case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to comply with the statutory directions set forth in K.S.A. 38-131.