Court Opinion

ID: 9552745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:15:56.663644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:47.572212
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
dissenting.
I heartily join in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rovira. I find it difficult to understand why the majority views the conduct of the first juror in consulting the dictionary to clarify her understanding of the words “vague” and “imaginary,” “doubt” and “reasonable” as misconduct so egregious as to warrant setting aside the guilty verdict in this case. As the opinion of the court of appeals suggests, the words are not legal terms but are common words. That they are combined into the definitional instruction of reasonable doubt does not change their basic meaning. Since they are not legal terms of art, they do not have a special meaning. If that were so, special definitional instructions would of necessity be given in order to convey that special meaning to the jury.
In my view, the affidavits simply do not establish that the jurors applied any other rule of law than that contained in the instructions. The defendant has totally failed to establish that the verdict was the result of the first juror’s consultation of her dictionary or that the second juror changed her mind as a result of her discussions with the first juror. Undoubtedly, the verdict of guilty was based on the record of evidence establishing the defendant’s criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals upholding the jury verdict.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice HODGES and Justice ROVIRA join in this dissent.