Court Opinion

ID: 9520399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:39:02.734195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:10.173591
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority that a new transfer hearing should be conducted in this case. Nothing in the record indicates that the trial judge who presided at the original transfer hearing was aware that the defendant would have to be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment upon conviction of the charges here. That important information was necessary for the court and parties to consider in determining whether the best interests of the defendant or of society warranted his prosecution under the Criminal Code of 1961 rather than under the Juvenile Court Act. The majority opinion also holds that the transfer hearing was deficient in two additional respects: that the court failed to investigate the defendant’s history, “especially as it related to his potential for rehabilitation,” and that the court failed “to investigate the availability of rehabilitative services available for the defendant if he were retained under the jurisdiction of the Act.” (119 Ill. 2d at 16.) I do not believe that the transfer hearing can be faulted on those grounds, and I do not join that part of the majority opinion. The judge heard sufficient evidence regarding the defendant’s personal history and potential for rehabilitation. All prior encounters with the police were disclosed, and the defendant’s interview with the juvenile authorities, who inquired into his background, was entered in evidence. Also, the defendant’s mother testified at the hearing. With respect to the availability of rehabilitative services, the chief juvenile probation officer of Macon County testified at the hearing, and he explained that he was not aware of any resources that would be suitable for the defendant. In reaching that conclusion, the probation officer indicated his knowledge of the criminal offenses with which the defendant could be charged if tried as an adult. I would conclude that an adequate inquiry into those subjects was made at the transfer hearing, and I do not believe that due process required more. In People v. Taylor (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 289, 305, this court stated that the circumstances to be considered by a trial judge at a transfer hearing cannot be assigned rigid weights, nor can the decision be reduced to the certainty of a mathematical formula. Moreover, Taylor noted that “ ‘not all of the relevant factors *** need be resolved against the juvenile to justify the waiver of jurisdiction.’ ” (Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 305.) Thus, the State does not have to prove that each relevant circumstance supports transfer; rather, one circumstance alone may be sufficient to compel that decision. The defendant was charged with the brutal murder of an elderly couple, as well as with robbery, residential burglary, home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault. Any one of the charges alone could sustain a decision to transfer; in combination they would provide overwhelming support for that decision when balanced against the alternative of retaining the minor in the juvenile system until he attains the age of 21. It is not evident what further information, apart from that concerning the potential punishment for these offenses, could have been presented at the transfer hearing and would have outweighed the seriousness of these charges. Unlike the majority, then, I do not believe that we may seriously question either the adequacy of the information concerning the defendant’s personal history, or the chief juvenile probation officer’s opinion that there were no juvenile programs suitable for this defendant. In suggesting that further inquiry into those matters was necessary, the majority disregards Taylor’s analysis of the transfer provisions and slights the gravity of the crimes committed here. The significant inquiry in this case concerned the period of incarceration to which the defendant could be sentenced upon conviction. Because there is no indication in the record that the parties and the court were aware that a term of natural life imprisonment would be the required punishment upon a transfer and conviction of the murders, I agree with the majority that a new transfer hearing should be conducted here.