Court Opinion

ID: 9388723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:01:46.606291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.117635
License: Public Domain

Rel: April 21, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0522
                                _________________________

                                   Richard W. Bentley

                                                  v.

                                 James Randall Bentley

                       Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court
                                   (CV-19-7)
                           _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0526
                                _________________________

                                   Richard W. Bentley
SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

                                    v.

                             Leslie Bentley

                 Appeal from Cullman Circuit Court
                           (CV-20-900058)

COOK, Justice.

     These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between Richard

W. Bentley and his brother, James Randall Bentley ("Randy"), and from

a dispute between Richard and his ex-wife, Leslie Bentley.

     In case no. CV-19-7, an action concerning the administration of the

estate of Richard and Randy's father, Dedrick William Bentley ("the

estate action"), Richard, as coexecutor of Dedrick's estate, asserted cross-

claims against Randy, as the other coexecutor of the estate. Richard

sought, among other things, the return of certain real property previously

owned by their parents to Dedrick's estate and sought to eject Randy from

that property. Randy filed a motion for a summary judgment on those

cross-claims, which was granted by the circuit court. Although the circuit

court certified its partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule

54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., that certification was improper, and therefore

Richard's appeal from the partial summary judgment (appeal no. SC-

                                     2
SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

2022-0522) is due to be dismissed.

     In case no. CV-20-900058 ("the fraudulent-transfer action"), Leslie

sued Richard in the circuit court, seeking to set aside, pursuant to the

Alabama Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the AFTA"), § 8-9A-1 et seq., Ala.

Code 1975, the allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets that Richard had

obtained or inherited from Dedrick's estate to a trust that Richard had

created. Leslie filed a motion for a summary judgment, which was

granted by the circuit court, and Richard appealed (appeal no. SC-2022-

0526). For the reasons stated below, we affirm the circuit court's

judgment in that case.

                     Facts and Procedural History

     Richard and Randy are the sons of Dedrick and his wife, Betty

Chatham Bentley. On June 22, 1998, Dedrick and Betty executed a

warranty deed transferring ownership of the real property on which their

residence was located ("the Bentley property") to Randy. Dedrick and

Betty retained a life estate in the Bentley property. Richard alleges that

Dedrick and Betty deeded the Bentley property to Randy because they

were concerned about losing the property if it became necessary for Betty

to be admitted to a nursing home but that Betty died without ever being

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admitted to a nursing home. According to Richard, Randy had made an

agreement with Dedrick to transfer the Bentley property back to Dedrick

if Betty predeceased him. Randy denies the allegation that he had agreed

to return the Bentley property, and he contends that there is no evidence

of a written agreement to that effect.

     On February 1, 2017, Dedrick executed a will that contained the

following pertinent provision:

          "My wife, Betty Chatham Bentley, who is currently
     deceased, conveyed to our son, James Randall Bentley, our
     home located at:

           "[address and description of the Bentley property]

           "My wife and I retained a life estate in the above
     conveyance which was executed on June 22, 1998 and
     recorded on June 22, 1998 in the Cullman County Probate
     Office at Book 469 Page 61. This conveyance was made with
     the understanding that my son, James Randall Bentley,
     would convey back to me the said real property in the event
     his mother, Betty Chatham Bentley, should pass away.

            "In the event my son, James Randall Bentley, conveys
     the above described real property back to me by an
     unencumbered general warranty deed, then upon my death I
     devise and bequeath all my property, whether it be personal,
     real or mixed equally to each of my two (2) sons, James Randal
     [sic] Bentley and Richard William Bentley.

            "In the event my son, James Randall Bentley, refuses or
     fails to convey the above real property to me as set out above,
     all of my remaining property, whether it be real, personal or
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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

     mixed will be devised and bequeathed to my son, Richard
     William Bentley."

On April 30, 2018, Dedrick executed a power of attorney in favor of

Randy. Richard alleges that Randy took advantage of Dedrick's alleged

failing mental health to have his own lawyer prepare the power of

attorney for Dedrick. Dedrick executed the document in the lawyer's

office in the presence of both Randy and Richard. Richard alleges that

Randy then used the power of attorney to gain control over Dedrick's

bank accounts and to transfer the funds in those accounts to himself.

     On May 9, 2018, Randy transferred $130,031.15 from Dedrick's

bank account to Randy's account at a different bank. Richard alleges that

this transfer was fraudulent, but Randy denies the allegation. Randy

points out that the funds were in a "payable on death" account with

Randy as Dedrick's beneficiary. He contends that he transferred the

funds out of the account in Dedrick's name in an effort to assist Dedrick

in qualifying for certain veteran's benefits.

     On May 21, 2018, pursuant to the power of attorney, Randy

conveyed to Richard a 2003 Corvette automobile owned by Dedrick. The

bill of sale reflected that Richard paid nothing for the Corvette and stated

that the Corvette was a "gift from D.W. Bentley."
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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

      On May 22, 2018, Richard executed a document titled the "Richard

W. Bentley Trust of 2018," pursuant to which he purported to transfer

the Corvette, as well as any assets he might inherit from Dedrick's estate,

into that trust. Richard named a friend, Richard Edward Morgan, Jr., as

trustee.

      Dedrick died on June 7, 2018. A few days later, Randy filed in the

Cullman Probate Court a petition to probate a will purportedly executed

by Dedrick on September 9, 1994. On October 1, 2018, Richard objected

to Randy's petition and submitted to the probate court the will that

Dedrick had executed in 2017. He later petitioned the court to probate

that will.

      On March 15, 2019, the probate court entered an order admitting

Dedrick's 2017 will for probate and appointing both Randy and Richard

as coexecutors of Dedrick's estate over Randy's objection. Shortly

thereafter, Randy and Richard each filed a petition to remove the estate

proceedings to the Cullman Circuit Court; that court granted those

petitions.

      On August 17, 2019, Richard filed a cross-claim against Randy in

the estate action. He later amended that cross-claim and alleged, among

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

others, claims seeking to have the Bentley property placed into a

"constructive trust" or a "resulting trust" for the benefit of Dedrick's

estate and seeking to eject Randy from the Bentley property.

     Leslie and Richard were divorced in 1995. Thereafter, Leslie

commenced an action against Richard for past-due child support ("the

child-support action") and, in 1998, 1999, and 2004, obtained several

judgments against him for past-due child support. On August 29, 2018,

three months after Richard established his trust and purported to

transfer assets into it, the trial court in that action entered a judgment

against Richard for $78,802.99, which included the total amount of child

support he owed as well as attorney fees.

     When Richard failed to make any payments toward the judgment

entered in the child-support action, Leslie had a writ of garnishment

issued against Dedrick's estate. Leslie stated that she had learned about

Richard's trust after receiving a copy of the trust document from Randy

in response to the writ of garnishment. As a result, on February 27, 2020,

Leslie commenced the fraudulent-transfer action against Richard and

Morgan, the trustee of Richard's trust, in which she sought to set aside

what she alleged was the fraudulent transfer of assets from Dedrick's

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

estate to Richard's trust by Richard in violation of the provisions of the

AFTA.

     On April 24, 2020, Leslie moved to consolidate the fraudulent-

transfer action with the estate action. The circuit court granted Leslie's

motion and entered an order consolidating the two actions.

     Six months later, Randy filed a motion for a judgment on the

pleadings or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment as to Richard's

cross-claims in the estate action seeking to have the Bentley property

placed into a "constructive trust" or a "resulting trust" and seeking to

eject Randy from the Bentley property. In his motion, Randy argued that

he owned the Bentley property, that Dedrick had lived on the Bentley

property pursuant to his life estate until his death, that he and Dedrick

had both performed their obligations under the warranty deed

transferring title of the Bentley property to Randy, and that Dedrick's

will anticipated that Randy would keep all of his interest in the Bentley

property.

     A couple of months after Randy filed his summary-judgment

motion, Leslie filed her own summary-judgment motion in the

fraudulent-transfer action, in which she argued that Richard had

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

maintained possession of the Corvette that was supposedly transferred

to Richard's trust, that Richard had concealed the purported transfer of

the Corvette to the trust, that Leslie had commenced the child-support

action against Richard before he had purported to transfer the Corvette

to the trust, and that the Corvette composed substantially all of Richard's

assets. She further argued that the purported transfer had occurred

shortly before she had obtained a substantial judgment against Richard

in the child-support action, that the purported transfer was made

without Richard's receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange

for the transfer, and that Richard was insolvent at the time of, or as a

result of, the purported transfer. Leslie therefore contended that she was

entitled to relief under the AFTA.

     The circuit court held a hearing on both summary-judgment

motions on December 7, 2021. That same day, the circuit court entered a

partial summary judgment in favor of Randy on Richard's cross-claims

seeking to have the Bentley property placed into a "constructive trust" or

a "resulting trust" for the benefit of Dedrick's estate and seeking to eject

Randy from the Bentley property. At Randy's request, the circuit court

certified its partial summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b),

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

Ala. R. Civ. P.

     On December 29, 2021, the circuit court entered a summary

judgment in favor of Leslie and established a lien upon the Corvette and

any further distributions to Richard's trust, to the extent of Leslie's

outstanding judgment against him in the child-support action. The

circuit court found that the purported transfers by Richard to th e trust

were fraudulent transfers and void to the extent of Leslie's outstanding

judgment. The circuit court further authorized Leslie to levy execution

on the Corvette and any other asset acquired by Richard's trust.

     Richard filed a postjudgment motion as to both judgments, which

was denied by operation of law. In appeal no. SC-2022-0522, Richard

challenges the circuit court's partial summary judgment in favor of

Randy in the estate action. In appeal no. SC-2022-0526, Richard

challenges the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Leslie in the

fraudulent-transfer action. This Court consolidated the appeals.

                          Standards of Review

     In Scrushy v. Tucker, 955 So. 2d 988 (Ala. 2006), this Court

articulated the following standard of review applicable to an order

entered pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.:

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

     "Whether the action involves separate claims and whether
     there is a final decision as to at least one of the claims are
     questions of law to which we will apply a de novo standard of
     review. Whether there was 'no just reason for delay' is an
     inquiry committed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
     and, as to that issue, we must determine whether the trial
     court exceeded its discretion."

955 So. 2d at 996.

     Additionally,

           " ' "[t]his Court's review of a summary judgment is de
     novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So. 2d
     72, 74 (Ala. 2003). We apply the same standard of review as
     the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine
     whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no
     genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is
     entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R.
     Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899
     So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala. 2004). In making such a
     determination, we must review the evidence in the light most
     favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756,
     758 (Ala. 1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie
     showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the
     burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce 'substantial
     evidence' as to the existence of a genuine issue of material
     fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d
     794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12.
     '[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality
     that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial
     judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought
     to be proved.' West v. Founders Life Assur. Co. of Fla., 547 So.
     2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989)." ' "

Gooden v. City of Talladega, 966 So. 2d 232, 235 (Ala. 2007) (quoting

Prince v. Poole, 935 So. 2d 431, 442 (Ala. 2006), quoting in turn Dow v.
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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004)).

"Questions of law are reviewed de novo." Pritchett v. ICN Med. Alliance,

Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. 2006).

                                 Analysis

                         Appeal No. SC-2022-0522 --
                Partial Summary Judgment in Favor of Randy

     First, as best we can discern, Randy argues that the circuit court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the cross-claims because Richard

asserted those claims "on behalf of the estate" without Randy's

agreement as his coexecutor. Because this Court is " 'duty bound to notice

ex mero motu the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction,' " we must first

address this issue before discussing the merits of Richard's arguments on

appeal. Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003)

(quoting Stamps v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2

(Ala. 1994)).

     Relying on Stone v. Jones, 530 So. 2d 232 (Ala. 1988), Randy

contends that Alabama law requires that all coexecutors must join in a

lawsuit brought on behalf of an estate. Randy's reliance on Stone is

misplaced.

     In Stone, the plaintiff, one of two coexecutors of her mother's estate,
                                    12
SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

asserted a claim against the estate of the trustee who had administered

a trust established for the benefit of the plaintiff's mother, in an effort to

obtain benefits to which her mother's estate was allegedly entitled. The

other coexecutor refused to join in the claim. This Court held that, in

cases in which the use of discretion is required in making decisions that

are not within the normal process of administering a decedent's estate,

coexecutors must act unanimously in making those decisions. The Court

further held that an executor's decision to file a lawsuit is discretionary

in nature. 530 So. 3d at 235. See also Douglass v. Jones, 628 So. 2d 940,

941 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993) (recognizing that lawsuits on behalf of an estate

must be brought unanimously by coexecutors).

     In this case, Richard asserted his cross-claims against his

coexecutor -- Randy. This Court has not questioned the trial court's

subject-matter jurisdiction in previous cases in which coexecutors have

sued each other. See, generally, Cox v. Parrish, 292 So. 3d 312 (Ala. 2019)

(coexecutors' ability to sue one another did not impact the trial court's

subject-matter jurisdiction); and Kershaw v. Kershaw, 848 So. 2d 942

(Ala. 2002) (same). Based on the foregoing, there is nothing that would

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SC-2022-0522 and SC-2022-0526

cause us to believe that the circuit court lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction or that we lack appellate jurisdiction in this case.

     Having established that we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we

now turn to Richard's contention that the circuit court's certification of

its partial summary judgment in favor of Randy as final pursuant to Rule

54(b) was improper.

     Rule 54(b) provides, in part:

     "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
     whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
     claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may
     direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer
     than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
     determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon
     an express direction for the entry of judgment."

This Court has discussed what it considers when reviewing a judgment

adjudicating fewer than all the claims in a case that has been certified as

final under Rule 54(b):

           " 'If a trial court certifies a judgment as final pursuant
     to Rule 54(b), an appeal will generally lie from that judgment.'
     Baugus v. City of Florence, 968 So. 2d 529, 531 (Ala. 2007)
     (emphasis added). However, this Court will not consider an
     appeal from a judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) if
     it determines that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
     concluding that there is 'no just reason for delay.' Rule 54(b)
     ….

           "A trial court exceeds its discretion in determining that
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     there is 'no just reason for delay' when … 'the issues in the
     claim being certified and a claim that will remain pending in
     the trial court " 'are so closely intertwined that separate
     adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent
     results.' " ' Schlarb v. Lee, 955 So. 2d 418, 419-20 (Ala. 2006)
     (quoting Clarke-Mobile Counties Gas Dist. v. Prior Energy
     Corp., 834 So. 2d 88, 95 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Branch v.
     SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, N.A., 514 So. 2d 1373, 1374 (Ala.
     1987))."

Loachapoka Water Auth., Inc. v. Water Works Bd. of Auburn, 74 So. 3d

419, 422-23 (Ala. 2011). See also Kirkley v. Phillips, 197 So. 3d 464, 472-

73 (Ala. 2015).

     It is difficult to conceive of issues that are more closely intertwined

than those related to the administration of a decedent's estate. Here, the

circuit court certified as final its partial summary judgment as to two of

six cross-claims asserted by Richard against Randy. Randy argues that

the circuit court properly determined that there was no just reason for

delaying the certification of the judgment resolving those two cross-

claims as final because they dealt only with the Bentley property, which

he maintains he has owned since Dedrick and Betty deeded it to him in

1998. We disagree.

     We have only to look at Dedrick's 2017 will to conclude that the

disposition of the Bentley property is intertwined with the other

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provisions of the will. The disposition of the remainder of Dedrick's estate

hinges on whether Randy returned the Bentley property to Dedrick, and

the various disputes between the brothers inform each issue raised in

Richard's cross-claims. Under these circumstances, we conclude that

Richard's cross-claims relating to the Bentley property should not be

adjudicated separately from his other cross-claims.

     Because the issues presented by Richard's cross-claims in this case

are so closely intertwined, we conclude that the circuit court exceeded its

discretion in certifying its partial summary judgment in favor of Randy

as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Further, because a "nonfinal judgment

will not support an appeal," Dzwonkowski v. Sonitrol of Mobile, Inc., 892

So. 2d 354, 363 (Ala. 2004), we must dismiss this appeal. We, therefore,

pretermit discussion of Richard's remaining claims on appeal.

                     Appeal No. SC-2022-0526 --
                 Summary Judgment in Favor of Leslie 1

     1Because     the circuit court's ruling on Leslie's summary-judgment
motion effectively disposed of all of her claims against Richard and
Morgan, the trustee of Richard's trust, we can consider her appeal. See,
e.g., Hamilton v. Guardian Tax AL, LLC, 342 So. 3d 172 (Ala. 2021)
(recognizing that an appeal is generally final when all claims or the rights
or liabilities of all of the parties have been decided).

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     In appeal no. SC-2022-0526, Leslie contends that Richard violated

the provisions of the AFTA 2 when he purported to transfer assets from

Dedrick's estate to his trust without first disclosing the transfer to her.

According to Leslie, because Richard had no creditors other than her, it

is clear that he made the purported transfer to avoid his obligation to her

under the judgment entered in the child-support action.

     Section 8-9A-4, Ala. Code 1975, which is part of the AFTA, applies

to transfers made to avoid obligations to present and future creditors; §

8-9A-5, Ala. Code 1975, applies only to transfers made to avoid

obligations to present creditors. At the time the purported transfer was

made, Leslie was a present creditor; both sections are therefore

applicable here.

     Section 8-9A-4 provides:

           "(a) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
     creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the
     transfer was made, if the debtor made the transfer with actual
     intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.

           "(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a),

     2We  note briefly that the current law applicable to fraudulent
transactions is the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act ("the UVTA"), §
8-9B-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which became effective on January 1,
2019. Because Richard's trust was created on May 22, 2018, however, the
UVTA does not apply in this case. See § 8-9B-16, Ala. Code 1975.
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    consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:

               "(1) The transfer was to an insider;

               "(2) The debtor retained possession or control
         of the property transferred after the transfer;

               "(3) The transfer was disclosed or concealed;

              "(4) Before the transfer was made the debtor
         had been sued or threatened with suit;

              "(5) The transfer was of substantially all the
         debtor's assets;

               "(6) The debtor absconded;

               "(7) The debtor removed or concealed assets;

              "(8) The value of the consideration received
         by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
         value of the asset transferred;

               "(9) The debtor was insolvent or became
         insolvent shortly after the transfer was made;

               "(10) The transfer occurred shortly before or
         shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and

              "(11) The debtor transferred the essential
         assets of the business to a lienor who transferred
         the assets to an insider of the debtor.

          "(c) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
    creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the
    transfer was made, if the debtor made the transfer without
    receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
    transfer and the debtor:
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                "(1) Was engaged or was about to engage in
           a business or a transaction for which the
           remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
           small in relation to the business or transaction; or

                 "(2) Intended to incur, or believed or
           reasonably should have believed that he or she
           would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay
           as they became due."

(Emphasis added.)

     Section 8-9A-5 provides:

           "(a) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
     creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the
     debtor made the transfer without receiving a reasonably
     equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and the debtor
     was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as
     a result of the transfer.

           "(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
     creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the
     transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt and
     the debtor was insolvent at that time and the insider had
     reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent."

Before determining whether Richard's purported transfer of the assets

violated the above provisions, we first address whether Richard's actions

constituted a "transfer" as that term is used in the AFTA.

     Section 8-9A-1(13), Ala. Code 1975, defines a "transfer" as follows:

"Every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or

involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an
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asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and the creation of

a lien or other encumbrance." Richard's trust document states:

           "[Richard] hereby transfers, conveys and delivers to
     [Morgan] the property and rights described below, the receipt
     of which property is acknowledged by [Morgan], which
     property and rights, together with any other property that
     may later become subject to this trust, shall constitute the
     trust estate, and shall be held, administered and distributed
     by [Morgan] as provided herein:

                 "1) A 2003 Corvette ….

                "2) Any and all assets of any nature
           obtained as a result of the settlement of the Estate
           of Dedrick William Bentley, [Richard's] father."

Based on the foregoing, it is evident to this Court that the terms of

Richard's trust called for a "transfer" of assets and property within the

provisions of the AFTA.

     However, Richard argues that Leslie did not prove that he had the

"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor" required by § 8-

9A-4(a) of the AFTA when he created the trust or that he transferred any

asset to the trust, despite the clear terms of the trust document quoted

above. Accordingly, Richard maintains, Leslie was not entitled to a

summary judgment.

     We note, however, as did Leslie, that the record contains a plethora

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of evidence indicating that Richard had an actual intent to "hinder, delay,

or defraud" Leslie, as provided in § 8-9A-4 of the AFTA. First, the record

indicates that Richard never transferred the 2003 Corvette to the trust

or the trustee, notwithstanding that the trust document itself

acknowledges the trust's receipt of the Corvette. Additionally, Morgan

admitted in his deposition that Richard has had possession of the

Corvette since the trust was created. We note, too, that Richard testified

in his deposition that he still has physical possession of the Corvette and

pays for its insurance, tags, and maintenance. Richard concealed the

trust document from Leslie. At the time Richard executed the trust

document, Leslie had already commenced the child-support action,

Richard had been served and had answered in that action, and the action

was still pending.

     The record further indicates that, at the time Richard created the

trust, he had no money. Additionally, the record also indicates that, when

Richard purportedly transferred his assets to the trust, he had not been

employed since "like '90 something," he had no bank account, and he

owned nothing but a guitar, the Corvette, and an old van. Finally, when

Richard was asked at a deposition about the purpose of the trust, he

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answered: "I'm really hiding a lot man. This is a hider."

     Based on the foregoing, we conclude that no genuine issue of

material fact existed as to whether Richard had the actual intent to hide

his assets from Leslie when he created his trust and purported to transfer

assets to the trust as prohibited by §§ 8-9A-4 and 8-9A-5 of the AFTA.

Therefore, the circuit court properly entered a summary judgment in

Leslie's favor, and that judgment is due to be affirmed.

                               Conclusion

     Because the circuit court's Rule 54(b) certification of the partial

summary judgment in favor of Randy in the estate action was improper,

we dismiss appeal no. SC-2022-0522. In appeal no. SC-2022-0526, we

affirm the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of Leslie in the

fraudulent-transfer action.

     SC-2022-0522 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

     SC-2022-0526 -- AFFIRMED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise and Stewart, JJ., concur.

     Sellers, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

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