Court Opinion

ID: 9351954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 16:01:27.001511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:39.857712
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 21-4044    Document: 010110792548   Date Filed: 01/04/2023   Page: 1
                                                                          FILED
                                                                   United States Court of
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     Appeals
                                                                       Tenth Circuit
                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                          _________________________________
                                                                     January 4, 2023

                                                                  Christopher M. Wolpert
     BRENT GORDON, as general                                         Clerk of Court
     guardian of S.G.; JASON DIXON,
     as general guardian of L.D.; LISA
     SIMMONS, as general guardian of
     B.S.; BARBARA CALCHERA, as
     general guardian of M.C.; BRET
     ROBISON, as general guardian of
     D.R.; MANUEL NOGALES, as
     general guardian of I.N.; I. C., a
     minor,

          Plaintiffs - Appellants,

     v.                                                No. 21-4044
                                              (D.C. No. 2:1-CV-00677-HCN)
     JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT;                            (D. Utah)
     GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT;
     CANYONS SCHOOL DISTRICT;
     UTAH HIGH SCHOOL
     ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION;
     MARTIN BATES; ANTHONY
     GODFREY, Superintendent of
     Jordan School District; RICK L.
     ROBINS,

          Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, BACHARACH, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.

 *
       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 21-4044    Document: 010110792548   Date Filed: 01/04/2023   Page: 2

                          _________________________________

       This case began with an effort to compel the creation of a separate

 football league for high-school girls. Local officials declined, stating that

 it was enough for the girls to participate on their schools’ coed football

 teams. The girls’ parents sued and sought class certification, invoking Title

 IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), and the

 Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court

 certified a class on the equal protection claims and denied certification on

 the Title IX claims. On the equal protection claims, the district court

 conducted a bench trial and found no constitutional violation. These

 rulings led to this appeal.

       In deciding the appeal, we address two main issues:

       1.     Refusal to certify a class on the Title IX claims. In
              considering certification of a class on the Title IX claims, the
              district court found no commonality because some aspects of
              the claims involved individualized inquiries. But the presence
              of some individualized inquiries doesn’t prevent a common
              question of law or fact. So we conclude that the district court
              erred by applying the wrong standard on commonality.

       2.     Rejection of the equal protection claims based on the trial
              evidence. Based on the trial evidence, the district court
              rejected the equal protection claims, finding that (1) the policy
              of a gender-neutral football team had been facially neutral and
              (2) no discriminatory purpose had existed. The allowance of
              coed football teams was indeed gender neutral, and the court
              didn’t clearly err by finding no discriminatory purpose. So we
              uphold the district court’s rejection of the equal protection
              claims.

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 1.    We have appellate jurisdiction.

       The threshold question is appellate jurisdiction. When the case began

 in district court, all of the girls were minors (under eighteen) and

 represented by their parents. By the time that the parents filed the notice of

 appeal, however, six of the seven girls had turned eighteen. And all of the

 girls have now graduated from high school. These developments trigger

 issues involving sufficiency of the notice of appeal, substitution of parties,

 and mootness.

       A.     The notice of appeal on class-related issues is sufficient.

       The defendants seek dismissal of the appeal on class-related issues,

 arguing that (1) the notice of appeal didn’t identify the daughters as the

 appellants and (2) six of the seven parents lacked standing to file the

 notice of appeal because their daughters had already turned eighteen.

 These arguments don’t merit dismissal of the appeal.

       The notice of appeal identified the appellants as “all plaintiffs and

 Sam Gordon, both individually and as the representatives of the certified

 class.” Appellants’ App’x vol. 2, at 554 (cleaned up). This reference to “all

 plaintiffs” would suffice if it named at least one person qualified to appeal

 on behalf of the class. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(3).

       The notice did identify at least one parent with the power to appeal

 (Delainee Robison’s father). Though six of the seven girls had already

 turned eighteen, one of the girls (Delainee Robison) was still seventeen

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 when the parents filed the notice of appeal. So the defendants concede that

 Delainee Robison’s father could appeal on behalf of his daughter and the

 putative classes that she represented. We agree, concluding that the

 father’s authority to file the notice of appeal sufficed for Delainee Robison

 and the designated classes that she represented. See Fed. R. App. P.

 3(c)(3).

       B.     The girls are entitled to substitution as the appellants.

       Because all of the girls are now eighteen, they seek substitution as

 the appellants, replacing their parents (who had represented the girls as

 guardians). The defendants don’t object, and we grant the motion to

 substitute. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(b).

       C.     The girls’ individual claims are moot.

       Though the notice of appeal triggered our jurisdiction on class-

 related issues, the defendants argue that the girls’ individual claims

 became moot when they graduated high school. The girls declined to

 respond in their reply brief, waiving any non-obvious defects in the

 defendants’ argument on mootness. See Eaton v. Pacheco, 931 F.3d 1009,

 1031 (10th Cir. 2019).

       We see no obvious defect in the defendants’ argument. When

 students seek to enjoin their high schools and then graduate, there’s no

 reasonable basis to expect the alleged injury to recur. Bauchman ex rel.

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 Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 548 (10th Cir. 1997). So the

 girls’ individual claims are moot.

 2.    On the Title IX claims, the district court applied the wrong
       standard on commonality.

       On the Title IX claims, the girls sought certification of a class. The

 court denied certification, reasoning that the girls had failed to show

 commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). This showing required

 identification of only a single issue shared by members of the class. DG v.

 Devaughn, 594 F.3d 1188, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010).

       We consider whether the district court applied the correct standard

 on commonality. For this inquiry, we apply de novo review. Carpenter v.

 Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2006).

       To prevail on the Title IX claims, each class member had to prove a

 reasonable expectation of competition for girls’ teams. See Roberts v.

 Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993). So each

 class member appeared to share this burden.

       Despite the apparent sharing of this burden, the district court

 reasoned that differences existed on the level of interest at each school.

 But these variations would affect a separate inquiry, predominance—not

 commonality. See Naylor Farms, Inc. v. Chaparral Energy, LLC, 923 F.3d

 779, 789 (10th Cir. 2019) (discussing the predominance inquiry).

 Predominance wasn’t required because the girls were seeking certification

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 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 676 (10th

 Cir. 2010).

       The district court erred by focusing on differences between schools

 rather than the need for all class members to prove a reasonable

 expectation of competition within the three districts. The girls argued in

 district court and on appeal that competition would be reasonable if the

 districts had enough high schools able to participate. According to the

 girls, that inquiry involved consideration of the girls’ collective interest

 within the three districts.

       Neither the district court nor the defendants have addressed the need

 to consider the collective interest in girls’ football throughout the three

 districts. That consideration would appear to affect the ability of each class

 member to prove a reasonable expectation of competition. For example,

 even if several high schools could fill rosters for girls-only teams, those

 teams needed opponents. To determine the availability of enough

 opponents, a court would need to consider the collective interest

 throughout the three districts.

       On its face, this consideration would appear common to each class

 member. The district court overlooked the potential commonality of this

 inquiry based on other inquiries that might vary from school to school. The

 district court thus erred by applying the wrong standard for commonality.

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       The school districts argue that any error in denying certification

 would be harmless “because the district court properly ruled against the

 [girls] on the merits of the [individual] Title IX claims.” School Districts

 Appellees’ Answer Br. at 34. But we can’t consider this argument.

       Because the individual Title IX claims are moot, the only remaining

 Title IX claims are those asserted by the proposed class. And we can’t

 reach the merits of the Title IX claims until the proposed class is certified.

 See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 n.7 (1980) (“A

 named plaintiff whose claim expires may not continue to press the appeal

 on the merits until a class has been properly certified.”); see also Pederson

 v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 867, 872 n.14 (5th Cir. 2000); 1 see

 generally Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297, 305

 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[S]o long as a plaintiff files a motion to certify a class

 when he still has a live claim, the mooting of that claim while the motion

 is pending precludes the court from reaching the merits but does not

 preclude it from deciding the certification motion.”).

       The district court decided the merits of the Title IX claims by the

 girls individually but not by the proposed class. And we can’t reach the

 1
        There a group of female college students sued under Title IX,
 seeking an injunction. But they graduated during the course of the
 litigation. They appealed, but the Fifth Circuit concluded that (1) the
 individual claims had become moot when the students graduated college
 and (2) the appeals court could consider the denial of class certification
 but not the merits. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 867, 872 n.14.

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 merits of the proposed class’s claims until a Title IX class is certified.

 Because no class has been certified, we can’t find the error harmless based

 on the merits of the underlying Title IX claims.

       The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in U.S. Parole

 Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). There a federal prisoner

 sued individually and on behalf of a proposed class, challenging the

 validity of federal parole guidelines. Id. at 393. The district court denied

 class certification and granted summary judgment to the defendants. Id.

 After the appeal was filed, the prisoner completed his sentence, rendering

 his individual claims moot. Id. at 394. But the issue on class certification

 remained. The Court of Appeals held that the district court had erred in

 denying certification and considered the merits to avoid “improvidently

 dissipat[ing] judicial effort.” Id. at 394–95 (quoting U.S. Parole Comm’n

 v. Geraghty, 579 F.2d 238, 254 (3d Cir. 1978)).

       The Supreme Court concluded that

             the Court of Appeals had obtained jurisdiction only on the
              challenge involving denial of class certification and

             consideration of the merits would be “inappropriate.”

 Id. at 404, 408. For these conclusions, the Supreme Court explained that if

 the Court of Appeals were to uphold the denial of certification, “the

 controversy on the merits [would] be moot.” Id. at 408; see also id. at 404

 (stating that if the court determines that class certification was properly

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 denied, “the claim on the merits must be dismissed as moot”). As a result,

 the Supreme Court cautioned that the Court of Appeals couldn’t consider

 the merits of the proposed class’s claims until the district court had an

 opportunity to revisit certification. Id. at 404.

       Given the Supreme Court’s caution about considering the merits of

 the proposed class’s claims prior to certification, we must confine our

 review to the denial of class certification. That ruling rested on the wrong

 standard, so we must reverse and remand for reconsideration of class

 certification on the Title IX claims.

 3.    The district court didn’t err by finding that the defendants’ coed
       football program had satisfied the Equal Protection Clause.

       The district court certified a class on the equal protection claims and

 conducted a bench trial. After the evidence closed, the court found that

             the defendants’ football program was facially neutral and

             the defendants had no discriminatory purpose.

 We uphold these findings.

       The level of scrutiny varies based on the nature of the disputed

 policy. When the policy is facially neutral, courts consider only the

 existence of a rational basis; when the policy bears facial classifications

 based on gender, courts require an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”

 See Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008)

 (applying the test for a rational basis when the policy is facially neutral);

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  Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1982) (stating that an

  “exceedingly persuasive justification” is required for a program that

  discriminated based on gender).

        To determine whether the policy was facially neutral, we consider the

  policy’s treatment of gender. The policy drew no distinction based on

  gender, allowing girls and boys to play on the same football teams. So the

  district court properly concluded that the policies were facially neutral.

        The girls insist that

             they received less playing time on the coed teams than they
              would have had on an all-girls team and

             with more playing time, the girls could have developed
              valuable skills.

  But the advantages of a girls-only league wouldn’t cast doubt on the facial

  neutrality of coed teams.

        The girls point to cases where institutions discriminated against

  female or Black applicants by relegating them to inferior institutions. See

  United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 520–21 (1996) (excluding women

  from a prestigious state military institution but admitting them to an

  institution that did not provide the same rigorous educational

  environment); Sweatt v. Painter, 329 U.S. 629, 634–35 (1950) (excluding

  Black applicants from a law school but permitting them to apply to a law

  school that did not provide the same quality of education or career

  prospects). But the defendants haven’t excluded the girls; they can play

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  alongside boys on the same teams. Given the ability of girls and boys to

  play on the same teams, the district court didn’t err in regarding the policy

  as facially neutral.

        The girls point out that the Constitution sometimes permits separate

  programs for girls and boys. Certainly the Constitution doesn’t bar

  separation of all athletic programs for girls and boys. But just because the

  Constitution permits separate teams for girls and boys doesn’t mean that

  the Constitution requires separate teams. The question here is not whether

  the Constitution would have permitted a girls-only team, but whether a

  program is facially neutral when it allows girls and boys to participate on

  the same team. That program is facially neutral even if the defendants

  could have separated the football programs for girls and boys.

        Though the policy itself was facially neutral, we’d intensify our

  scrutiny if the policy had masked a discriminatory purpose. Vill. of

  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68

  (1977). Alleging such a purpose, the plaintiffs point to evidence that

             girls participated in football less frequently than boys,

             the defendants had discriminated against girls in the past, and

             the defendants had offered girls’ teams in other sports.

        Though boys showed greater interest in football than girls, the

  district court found no policy or practice discouraging girls from playing

  football. Some girls explained that they hadn’t played football because

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  they were too small and could have obtained injuries, pointing out that

  more girls might play if they were to compete against girls-only teams. But

  the court could reasonably question the number of girls that would play

  even when competing against girls-only teams.

        The girls also refer to the availability of girls’ teams in other sports.

  According to the girls, the defendants’ discriminatory purpose is reflected

  in the availability of girls-only teams in other sports. The defendants

  countered with evidence of limited resources. For example, some evidence

  suggested that the creation of girls-only teams would require schools to

  take fields away from other sports. That evidence allowed a reasonable

  factfinder to reject a discriminatory purpose.

        The girls also argue that the district court’s explanation itself

  improperly relied on gendered stereotypes about “cultural attitudes.”

  Appellants’ App’x vol. 2, at 529. The district court did not define “cultural

  attitudes,” and the girls characterize this term as a stereotype about girls’

  disinterest in sports.

        The girls’ characterization rests on speculation. The court more

  likely was referring to the evidence that boys had shown greater interest in

  playing football than girls. The court’s reliance on this evidence didn’t

  suggest an improper stereotype.

        The district court could have relied more heavily on the girls’

  evidence of a discriminatory purpose. But we consider only whether the

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  district court clearly erred. Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Schs. Bd. of Educ.,

  147 F.3d 1200, 1217 (10th Cir. 1998). In our view, the district court didn’t

  clearly err. Even if the district court could have found a discriminatory

  purpose, a contrary finding was at least permissible. The high schools

  allowed every girl to play alongside boys on the football teams. Even

  though the girls might have benefited from having their own teams, the

  district court had a reasonable evidentiary basis to reject the allegation of

  a discriminatory purpose.

  4.    Conclusion

        Because the girls have turned eighteen, we substitute them for their

  parents. The girls’ individual claims became moot when they graduated

  high school. But we still have jurisdiction to address the class-related

  claims.

        On the Title IX claims, the district court erred by denying class

  certification. In denying certification, the court relied on variations

  between schools. But the element at issue—commonality—required the

  presence of only a single legal or factual issue in common among members

  of the class. And here, each class member shared a factual issue involving

  the reasonableness of an expectation of competition. So we reverse and

  remand the Title IX claims for reconsideration of commonality and the

  other requirements for class certification.

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        On the equal protection claims, we affirm the judgment for the

  defendants. The district court didn’t err in finding a facially neutral policy

  and rejecting the allegation of a discriminatory purpose. Girls could play

  alongside boys, and the coed programs didn’t deprive the girls of an

  opportunity otherwise available to boys.

                                      Entered for the Court

                                      Robert E. Bacharach
                                      Circuit Judge

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