Court Opinion

ID: 9607484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:10.234005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:38.984179
License: Public Domain

*285McQUADE, Justice
(dissenting).
By act of Congress, September 14, 1959, “the [National Labor Relations] Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.” 29 U.S.C.. § 164(c) (1) Proviso.1 Respondents union’s activity complained of by appellant is clearly a “labor dispute.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(9);2 National Maritime Union of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 342 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1965). Cf. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 84 S.Ct. 391, 11 L.Ed.2d 347 (1964). See Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L.Ed. 872 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 58 S.Ct. 703, 82 L.Ed. 1012 (1938); Marine Cooks and Stewards AFL v. Panama S. S. Co., 362 U.S. 365, 80 S.Ct. 779, 4 L.Ed.2d 797 (1960). (The three preceding cases were decided under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 113 [3], wherein the term “labor dispute” is defined in virtually the exact language of 29 U.S.C. § 152[9].) Cf., N.L.R.B. v. International Longshoremen’s Association, 332 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1964).
The “standards” referred to are minimum dollar amounts established by the Board for jurisdictional purposes, and included within “the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959,” are:
“all retail enterprises which fall within its [the Board’s] statutory jurisdiction and which do a gross volume of business of at least $500,000 per annum * * * whether it [the retail enterprise] consists of one or more establishments or locations, and whether it operates m one or more States.
“ * * * [T]he Board [has] decided to apply only a gross volume of business standard to such [retail] enterprises.” Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., 122 NLRB 88 (1958). (Italics in original.) See 23 NLRB Ann.Rep. 7-8 (1958).
See 25 NLRB Ann.Rep. 18-19 (1960), 105 Cong.Rec. 6548-6549; Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., 111 U.S.App.D.C. 55, 294 F.2d 251, 255 (Appendix) (1961); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10, 20 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 671, 677 n. 10, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 n. 10 (1963); cf. Hirsch v. McCulloch, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 303 F.2d 208 (1962); N.L.R.B. v. Pease Oil Company, 279 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1960); see also Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81 (1958). In Carolina Supplies, after announcing the above standard, the Board proceeded to consider only the gross volume of business of the petitioner therein, noting that “all sales were made within the State of South Carolina” (122 NLRB at 88) and, finding the gross volume to be $635,000, asserted jurisdiction (122 NLRB at 90). See Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 132 NLRB 797 (1961); Keystone Universal Carpet Company, 130 NLRB 4 (1961); accord, Lansing Automakers Federal Credit Union, 150 NLRB 1122 (1965); see also National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 83 S.Ct. 312, 9 L.Ed.2d 279 (1963). See also N.L.R.B. v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1966).
*286To be within the Board’s “statutory-jurisdiction,” the retail enterprise involved in the labor dispute must engage in operations “affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C.' § 160(a). In the case at bar, the trial court found:
“That plaintiff [appellant] buys most of its purchases of stock for resale from or through said organization [a merchants’ cooperative headquartered in Spokane, .Washington] and the same are transported by truck from Spokane, Washington, to Lewiston, Idaho;”
Schedule A of appellant’s U. S. corporate income tax return for 1961 reports $445,-333.96 of merchandise brought for sale. (For 1960 the figure was $385,101.63) Appellant’s out-of-state purchases for resale clearly place it within the Board’s statutory jurisdiction since its “inflow” operations are of sufficient magnitude to “affect commerce.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6) and 152(7).3 Raynal Plymouth Corporation, 131 NLRB 1040, 1045 (1961); cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 601 (1957); National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 71 S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed. 1284 (1951); National Labor Relations Board v. Stoller, 207 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 919, 74 S.Ct. 517, 98 L.Ed. 1074 (1954); Southern Dolomite, 129 NLRB 1342 (1961); see National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp., supra; 26 NLRB Ann.Rep. 23 (1961). The words “gross volume of business” have been equated with gross sales by both the Board, Fashion Mills, Inc., Etc., 127 NLRB 731 (1960), and the United States Supreme Court, National Labor Relations Board v. Reliance Fuel Corp., supra.
“When, an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act [29 U.S.C. § 157 or § 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board * *.” San Diego Bldg. Trade Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). See Weber v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 75 S.Ct. 480, 99 L.Ed. 546 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs etc. Union, 346 U.S. 485, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228 (1953).
In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Millmen’s Union v. Garmon, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, as the only exception to total federal preemption in the area of labor disputes “affecting commerce,” that the States have power to enjoin and compensate for “the consequences * * * of conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order.” 359 U.S. at 247, 79 S.Ct. at 781. On February 21, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled, Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 86 S.Ct. 657, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), that a federal district court had jurisdiction to apply state remedies for false and misleading statements circulated during a union organizing campaign if the complainant pleads and proves that the statements were made with malice and injured him. That court observed that “the exercise of state jurisdiction here would be a ‘merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act,’ ” 383 U.S. at 61, 86 S.Ct. at 662, 15 L.Ed.2d at 589, stressing the “ ‘type of conduct’ involved, i. e., ‘intimidation and threats of violence,’ affect [ing] such compelling state interests as to permit the *287exercise, of state jurisdiction. Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. at 248, 79 S.Ct. at 781.” (Italics in original) The opinion then states:
“We similarly conclude that a State’s concern with redressing malicious libel is 'so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility’ that it fits within the exception specifically carved out by Garmon.”
The court also noted:
“The function of libel suits in preventing violence has long been recognized.” 383 U.S. at 64 n. 6, 86 S.Ct. at 664 n. 6, 15 L.Ed.2d at 590 n. 6.
In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas said:
“Today marks the first departure from what has become a well-established rule that only where the public’s compelling interest in preventing violence or the threat of violence is involved can the exclusiveness of the federal structure for resolving labor disputes be breached.” 383 U.S. at 72, 86 S.Ct. at 668, 15 L.Ed.2d at 595.
This dissent also noted that the United States Supreme Court had “narrowly restricted] the permissible exceptions to the general rule of pre-emption [of labor disputes].” 383 U.S. at 72, 86 S.Ct. at 668, 15 L.Ed.2d at 595. Cf., Heldman v. Local 84, Intl’s Molders & Allied Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 50 Misc.2d 444, 270 N.Y.S.2d 738 (Supreme Court, Queens Co., Part 1, May 23, 1966). See Hanna Min. Co. v. District 2, M.E.B.A., 382 U.S. 181, 86 S.Ct. 327, 15 L.Ed.2d 254 (1965).
In its order dismissing the action and dissolving the temporary injunction, the trial court here found:
“That all picketing was peaceful and truthful and for the purpose of advising the public that plaintiff is 'non-union.’ ”
This finding, substantiated by the record and unquestioned by the majority, brings respondent union’s activity squarely within the protection of § 8(b) (7) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C):
“Provided further, that nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, * * *. (Italics in original)
Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Local 3, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 339 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1964); see N. L. R. B. v. Local 239, International Bro. of Teamsters, Etc., 340 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1965); N. L. R. B. v. Local 3, International Bro. of Electrical Workers, 317 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1963); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157. The trial judge states in his memorandum opinion “that the picketing did not have the prohibitory effect mentioned in 29 U.S.C.A. 158(b) (7) (C),”4 which effect (secondary boycott) would remove the picketing from its protected status.
The trial judge found that appellant’s gross retail sales were $561,593.52 for 1960 and $538,414.71 for 1961. The 1961 figure is supported by appellant’s federal corporate income tax return for that year, and Jack Cox, appellant’s owner, admitted, approximately, both figures. The picketing complained of herein began in February 1962. Thus, for purposes of jurisdiction, the National Labor Relations Board will look to appellant’s business volume for 1961. Jos. McSweeney & Sons, Inc., 119 NLRB 1399 (1958); Keystone Universal Carpet Company, supra; see Aroostook Federation of Farmers, Inc., 114 NLRB 538 (1955); 23 NLRB Ann.Rep. 12 (1958).
*288Moreover, the trial court found that the picketing complained of herein “resulted in plaintiff’s [appellant’s] sales running below $500,000.00 to wit; $465,671.08 for the full calendar year of 1962.” Even if, given the facts of this case, the Board would normally consider the 1962 figure, since the picketing complained of caused the 1962 drop in gross sales, the Board would not consider the 1962 figure as a factor in defeasance of its jurisdiction. Essex County, Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters, Etc., 95 NLRB 969 (1951); Hygienic Sanitation Company, 118 NLRB 1030 (1957).
Thus, respondent union’s picketing, of which appellant complains, presents a “labor dispute,” and if the picketing activity was in fact peaceful and informational, as found by the trial judge, it was protected by federal statute. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) ; 29 U.S.C. § 157. If, as contended by appellant, the picketing constituted an unfair labor practice, it was prohibited by federal statute. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b). In either case the power to regulate the picketing complained of herein is exclusively vested in the competence of the National Labor Relations Board. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council Millmen’s Union v. Garmon, supra; cf. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, supra; see also Hanna Min. Co. v. District 2, M.E.B.A., supra.
The Board has power under certain conditions to decline to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction and thereby subject a labor dispute to state regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c). However, due to appellant’s undisputed gross sales for 1961 (and 1960) and its undisputed volume of purchases for resale in interstate commerce during that period, the Board has no discretion to decline jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) proviso. Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., supra; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., supra; Keystone Universal Carpet Company, supra (gross sales). Raynal Plymouth Corporation, supra; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, supra; National Labor Relations Board v. Stoller, supra (purchases made in interstate commerce). Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Cartaret Towing Company, 307 F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1962); see Anno. 9 L.Ed.2d 1100, 1102 (“Since the 1958 standards relating to retail enterprises prevailed on August 1, 1959, the statute [29 U.S.C. § 164(c)] apparently has the effect of requiring the Board to assert jurisdiction of retail enterprises which do a gross volume of business of at least $500,000 annually.”). Cf., Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., supra; see also Radio and Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union v. Broadcast Serv., 380 U.S. 255, 85 S.Ct. 876, 13 L.Ed.2d 789 (1965).
The courts of Idaho have no proper concern with regulation of activity so clearly within the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board as the picketing complained of herein. The majority opinion also concludes that the controversy here is within the exclusive competence of the Board and that the Board must assert jurisdiction in the premises. However, the majority improperly dilutes the judicial authority of the district court below in directing that it seek the Board’s advisory opinion “whether the Board would decline to assert jurisdiction on the basis of its current standards.” 29 C.F.R. 102.98(b).
From the contents of the regulation, this procedure does not seem properly applicable to the controversy before this court for two reasons. First, the question of jurisdiction herein does not pertain to “current standards” of the Board, for, as noted above, the $500,000.00 gross volume retail standard was “frozen” on September 14, 1959, by 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1). Secondly, the regulation provides for an advisory opinion “[w]henever * * * [any] court * * * is in doubt whether the Board would assert jurisdiction.” Here the findings of the trial court relating to appellant’s commerce data for 1961 (and 1960) leave no doubt that the Board has no discretion to decline jur*289isdiction, “on the basis of its current standards,” over the controversy herein. Carolina Supplies and Cement Co., supra; 23 NLRB Ann .Rep. 7-8 (1958); 25 NLRB Ann.Rep. 18-20 (1960); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc., supra; Keystone Universal Carpet Company, supra; cf. Leedom v. Fitch Sanitarium, Inc., supra.
Even if the Board’s assertion of its exclusive jurisdiction herein were in doubt, as a matter of policy it seems unbefitting the district court below, or any court in this state, to petition for the Board’s advisory opinion regarding jurisdiction. Such conduct casts a court in the role of advocate for one of the parties (in the case at bar, for appellant). Note that upon filing a petition for the Board’s advisory opinion, the District Court below as “petitioner shall immediately serve * • * * a copy of the petition upon all parties to the proceeding and upon the director of the Board’s regional office having jurisdiction * * * ” 29 C.F.R. 102.100. See 29 C. F.R. 102.112 and 102.113(b).
29 C.F.R. 102.98(a) permits a party litigant to petition for the Board’s advisory opinion. On July 31, 1962, the Board’s regional director for the Lewiston area, Thomas P. Graham (the regional office is located in Seattle, Washington), telephoned and wrote to the Idaho Commissioner of Labor. This was in response to the Commissioner’s telegram of July 26, 1962, which noted that appellant had requested a representation election and sought Regional Director Graham’s advice whether the National Labor Relations Board would take jurisdiction. Director Graham stated that the Board had never made a final determination whether it had jurisdiction over appellant (previously the federal Board had dismissed an unfair labor charge by respondent union on the merits without reaching the question of jurisdiction; the Board had also indicated that it would assert jurisdiction on the basis of Cox’s reported income in excess of $500,000 for 1962). He cited Regulation 102.98 (29 C.F.R. 102.-98) and suggested that “either one of the parties or your agency may wish to avail themselves of the opportunity of obtaining an advisory opinion by the Board.” On November 2, 1962, appellant’s attorney wrote to Director Graham, noted that this case was pending in the District Court in Lewiston, and enclosed a petition (Form NLRB-502 [4-53] ) for representation election.5 This petition form does not provide for any commerce data. The letter stated appellant’s records showed that its total “sales for the preceding 12 months is below $500,000, and for the preceding 6 months, it ran about $38,000 per month.” The letter stated “that the enclosed be filed for the purpose of having the question of jurisdiction determined immediately or as soon as possible,” and closed with the request, “May we hear from you as soon as possible with reference to the processing of this Petition.” On November 7, 1962, a Board hearing examiner wrote to appellant’s attorney, “As I think you are aware, no jurisdiction determination was made by the Board in the prior cases involving this Employer.” The letter noted the conflict in the gross sales figures contained in appellant’s attorney’s letter of November 2, and “the information submitted by the Employer in Case No. 19-RM-380 [which] indicated that the total annual volume of sales was in excess of $500,000,” and stated that, therefore, “it will be necessary, before *290jurisdictional determination can be made, for the Employer to submit” a certified statement of .1961 and 1962 gross sales, and an indication of the source from which obtained. The letter concluded, “With the above information, the determination which you are seeking by the filing of the petition will be made without further delay.” On November 28, 1962, Board- Regional Director Graham wrote appellant that its petition “for an investigation and certification of representatives” was then being dismissed since investigation showed that “the labor organizations named in your petition does not now claim to represent a majority of the employees in the unit described.” This letter of November 28, 1962, is the latest communication between appellant and the National Labor Relations Board contained in the record. In this regard the trial judge stated in his memorandum decision :
“In my humble opinion, the plaintiff never exhausted its methods of obtaining a ruling of the Board as to whether it would accept jurisdiction of the controversy involved here. Plaintiff could have filed with the Board an unfair labor practice charge against the Union, (that is its complaint here) but has not done so. Neither has an advisory opinion as to jurisdiction been properly sought. Thus the Board has not been properly given the opportunity to make in the first instance a ruling as to whether it would accept jrtrisdiction or not.”
From the preceding discussion it would seem improper judicial administration for this court to order the district court below to petition for the National Labor Relations Board’s advisory opinion regarding its jurisdiction over the controversy herein. I would affirm.
McFADDEN, C. J., concurs in the dissent.

. Neither the original House nor Senate Bills contained the above provision. It was added in conference. Regarding it, Representative Thompson of New Jersey, a conferee, remarked to the House on September 4, 1959:
“The conferees insisted upon an amendment which prevents the NLRB from declining to exercise its existing jurisdiction and thereby depi'iving both employers and employees of the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. * * * The conference report prevents further cession. The current standards of the NLRB assure the widest effective exercise of Federal jurisdiction in the history of the National Labor Relations Act.” 105 Cong.Rec. 18134.

. “(9) The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.”

. “(6) the term ‘commerce’ means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.”
“ (7) The term ‘affecting commerce’ means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.”

. “* * * [Informational picketing is a protected labor activity] unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.”

. The printed form of petition (Form NLRB-502 [4-53]) states:
“The Petitioner alleges that the following circumstances exist and requests that the National Labor Relations Board proceed under its proper authority:
“1. Purpose of this Petition (Check only the one box which is appropriate)
* * * * *
“B [X] [the item cheeked by appellant] RM-REPRESENTATION (EMPLOYER). — One or more individuals or labor organizations have presented a claim to Petitioner to be recognized as the representative of employees of Petitioner as defined in section 9(a) of the act.”