Court Opinion

ID: 9884375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:54:10.358941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:37.623488
License: Public Domain

*832HANSON, Justice
(dissenting).
Although I agree with the conclusion of the majority that Thompson waived her right to a jury trial on sentencing factors, I conclude that Thompson’s consent to have the district court determine those factors was ineffective to the extent that it did not include the possibility that this court could later reject some of the factors relied on by the district court but nevertheless affirm the same sentencing departure by an independent review of the record and a weighing of other sentencing factors. Accordingly, I would vacate Thompson’s sentence and remand for resentencing to allow the district court to determine the appropriate weight to be given to the remaining departure factors and to determine the appropriate level of departure.
I recognize that our pre-Blakely case law reflected a willingness by this court to independently examine the record to determine whether there are legitimate reasons for a departure where the reason given by the district court is inadequate or improper. Williams v. State, 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn.1985). But I believe that Blakely has changed the landscape sufficiently to require us to reconsider that practice, both in general and in this case.
As to the general use of the practice, Blakely has perhaps sharpened our appreciation of the dynamics of a sentencing departure. When we assumed that the district court could perform the fact finding function, we had no occasion to reflect on the additional discretion that the district court possesses to determine whether and precisely how to depart after finding that there were aggravating facts. Now that Blakely has clarified that the fact finding function must be done by the jury, unless waived by the defendant, the other function of the district court, to exercise discretion in determining whether and how to depart, comes into clearer focus.
In other words, even if a sentencing jury is used and it finds aggravating facts, the decisions to depart and by how much to depart are not automatic, but call upon the district court to exercise discretion, based on the court’s broader experience in sentencing and ability to compare the facts of the current case, as found by the jury, with the facts of other similar cases. Of course, the district court has no discretion to depart unless the jury finds aggravating facts, but conversely the district court has discretion not to depart, or to decide precisely how much to depart, where the jury finds aggravating facts. In my view, this discretion was not altered by Blakely.
Given this better clarity on the discretionary role of the district court, I conclude that the practice of this court of independently examining the record and weighing the facts to sustain a particular departure that was based on both proper and improper factors is generally unwise and should be discontinued. Instead, where this court concludes that some of the aggravating factors relied on by the district court were erroneous or improper, it should remand for resentencing to allow the district court to exercise the necessary discretion to decide on the proper sentence, based on the district court’s evaluation of the remaining aggravating factors.
It is true, as noted by the majority, that the district court’s finding that Thompson committed a major economic offense, which we conclude was supported by the minimum of two qualified aggravating factors, conferred on the district court the discretion to impose a double upward sentencing departure. But that departure was not made mandatory or automatic under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. *833Thus, although the district court could have reached the same departure decision for a major economic offense supported by two qualified aggravating factors as it did when it believed its finding of a major economic offense was supported by four qualified aggravating factors, we cannot be sure that it would have because that decision is left to the district court’s discretion. In other words, the finding of a major economic offense, whether made by the court or a jury, does not end the matter, and the district court must then exercise discretion to decide whether to depart and, if so, by how much.
Moreover, where, as here, the defendant has waived the right to a sentencing jury, the question arises whether the defendant’s consent to fact finding by the district court includes an independent review of the record and the exercise of discretion by this court. The advisory given to Thompson by the district court, to enable her to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, did not include any mention of that possibility. And the consent given by Thompson was specific to the district judge — “I wish you to decide it, not the jury.”
On this record, Thompson’s consent was not broad enough to encompass our independent weighing of the aggravating factors. Further, her consent contemplated that the district court, after finding the facts, would exercise discretion in deciding whether and how to depart. Because we can only speculate about how the district court might have exercised that discretion, based on two instead of four aggravating factors, and because we are not engaged in the day to day function of criminal sentencing, we should not presume that the district court would exercise its discretion in precisely the same manner, but should remand to the district court for resentenc-ing.