Court Opinion

ID: 9727902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:52:34.404751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.234847
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice.
Defendant, Phillip Steele (Steele) appeals his rape conviction, raising multiple issues. We reverse the circuit court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence that was suppressed by the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office, and address a number of other issues raised by Steele that are capable of repetition on retrial.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 3, 1992, A.S., the alleged victim, was a seventeen-year-old female living and working on her own in Sioux Falls. After spending the evening and early morning hours of the following day “cruising the loop” with friends, A.S. encountered Steele at a convenience store where he was looking for a ride home. A.S. left the store with Steele in her car at 3:16 a.m. on January 4. Later that morning, AS. dropped Steele off at the bus depot located at 7th and Minnesota, then drove south to 41st and Minnesota where at 5:27 a.m., she signaled a police officer and reported a rape. Steele and A.S. had two very different versions of what happened that morning. A.S. testified to a continuous and brutal two and one-half to three hour rape, while Steele testified to two incidents of brief consensual sex. The issue for the jury was which version to believe, which witness was more credible.
Steele was arrested on January 4, 1992 and charged with Rape in the Second Degree in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(2). On January 9, 1992, the grand jury returned an indictment charging him with Rape in the Second Degree, and the State also filed a Part II Information alleging that he was a habitual offender under SDCL 22-7-7. At arraignment, Steele pled not guilty to both the indictment and the information. On February 13, 1992, hearing was held on the State’s motion to introduce prior bad acts evidence at trial, which motion was granted by the court. A trial was held on April 22-23, 1992, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the rape charge. On May 4, 1992, Steele was re-arraigned on the Part II Information and he admitted the information at that time.
Prior to trial, the Defense sent a letter of discovery to the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office, and also relied on the circuit court’s adopted rules of criminal discovery which require open files and disclosure of all information. Subsequent to the trial and *664conviction, A.S. volunteered to the Sioux Falls Argus Leader that she had contracted chlamydia,1 a sexually transmitted venereal disease, from Steele. The State’s Attorney later admitted that prior to trial, he possessed knowledge that A.S. had chlamydia, and claimed she had contracted it from Steele. The State also admitted discussing this evidence at a staff meeting in the office of the State’s Attorney, resulting in a decision not to disclose this information to the Defense because, in the view of the State’s Attorney, it was irrelevant and would be inadmissible. After the information became known to Steele through the newspaper story, he had himself tested for chlamydia, and the results of the test were negative. His wife also tested negative for chlamydia.
Sentencing was set for July 22, but was delayed for one week to allow hearing on the motion for new trial prior to sentencing. The trial court allowed A.S. to make her victim impact statement on July 22, and she offered to retract her statements alleging that she had gotten chlamydia from Steele. On July 29, 1992, hearing was held on the motion for new trial. The court denied the motion, and proceeded immediately to sentence the defendant to 100 years in the penitentiary. Steele appeals from this judgment and sentence.

DISCUSSION

1. Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence
The granting or refusing of a new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is largely in the discretion of the trial court. Unless there has been an abuse of such discretion, this court will not interfere with the action of the trial court upon such motion. State v. Willis, 396 N.W.2d 152, 158 (S.D.1986) (Willis II) (citing State v. Lufkins, 309 N.W.2d 331 (S.D.1981); State v. Martinez, 88 S.D. 369, 220 N.W.2d 530 (1974)). See also State v. Feuillerat, 292 N.W.2d 326, 333 (S.D.1980) (citing State v. Gerdes, 258 N.W.2d 839 (S.D.1977); State v. Coleman, 17 S.D. 594, 98 N.W. 175 (1904); Wilson v. Seaman, 15 S.D.'103, 87 N.W. 577 (1901)).
We note at the outset that this is not the first time that this court has been called upon to examine the actions of the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office in suppression of evidence. In at least one other case, we reviewed a situation where the prosecution knew that the alleged victim in a pending rape case brought second rape charges against another individual. Willis II, 396 N.W.2d at 153-54. The Sioux Falls Police Department investigated and filed a report, but the State’s Attorney decided not to bring charges. Id. at 153. It was undisputed that “[n]o mention of this alleged rape was ever made to Willis or his counsel inspite [sic] of direct and continuing requests for any exculpatory evidence.” Id. In his defense, Willis alleged that he had the consent of the victim. See State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 195-96 (S.D.1985) (Willis I). After analyzing the actions of the State’s Attorney’s office, this court stated that, “We certainly do not condone the activities of the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office in handling this newly discovered evidence. We do not believe, however, that there is a reasonable probability that this evidence would probably produce a different result at a new trial.”2
*665Willis II, 396 N.W.2d at 164. It appears from the present case that although the Minnehaha County State’s Attorney’s Office has been reprimanded by this court for suppression of evidence, that office relies on the fact that in hindsight, this court will decide that the defendant would have been convicted anyway. Rather, the concern should be with the fundamental fairness of the prosecution at the outset.
Suppression of evidence by the prosecution goes directly to the fundamental fairness of the trial, the basic due process rights of the accused. We look to the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in what has become known as the Brady rule case: “We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The Court later explained the Brady rule stating, “A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2397, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976) (emphasis added). After reviewing the entire line of cases stemming from Brady, we stated: “Thus, where [the defendant] was not aware of the evidence, if the evidence is both favorable and material, and he has made a request for the evidence, there has been a due process violation.” Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 477 (S.D.1990). In other words, four questions are to be answered when there is suppression of evidence by the prosecution. If the answers to these four questions are in the affirmative, the defendant’s due process rights have been violated and a new trial must be granted:
(1)Was the defense unaware of the evidence?
(2) Is the evidence favorable to the defense?
(3) Is the evidence material to the defense?
(4) Did the defense make a request for the evidence?
Evidence is favorable where it creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Ashker, 457 N.W.2d at 477 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability* is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (emphasis added). See Ashker, 457 N.W.2d at 477.
As outlined previously, it was only through a post-conviction news story that the Defense discovered A.S.’s allegations that she contracted chlamydia from Steele. The Alabama Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation to that presented here. Ex parte Geeslin, 505 So.2d 1246 (Ala.1986). In Geeslin, two weeks after defendant’s conviction of rape, the defense attorney discovered evidence that the standard rape examination performed on the victim included a vaginal smear showing the presence of gonorrhea. Geeslin, 505 So.2d at 1247. It was undisputed that the prosecutor never revealed to the defense that the victim’s gonorrhea test was positive while the defendant’s test was negative, in spite of a discovery request for all information held by the prosecution. Id. at 1246-47. Prior to trial, the prosecuting attorney even spent time preparing expert testimony to show that the defendant’s negative test result could have been affected by antibiotics taken during the time period between the alleged rape and the defendant’s gonorrhea test. Id. at 1247. However, no information regarding the gonorrhea testing was *666used at trial. When the defense discovered the facts about the gonorrhea tests, motion for new trial was filed on the ground that “the State had failed to comply with the pretrial order for production of exculpatory matter known to the State.” Id. Denial of the motion was at first affirmed, Geeslin v. Alabama, 505 So.2d 1242 (Ala.Crim.App.1986), but later reversed by the Supreme Court of Alabama. Geeslin, 505 So.2d at 1248, cert. denied, Alabama v. Geeslin, 481 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 1974, 95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987). In its decision, the Alabama Supreme Court repeated the Brady principles, including the point that, “ ‘Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.’ ” Geeslin, 505 So.2d at 1247 (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935))). The court held that the district attorney’s failure to produce or inform the defense of the gonorrhea test results was a “suppression,” despite the state’s urging that the defense should have known about or discovered these test results on their own. Id. at 1248. The court noted that the prosecution obviously thought this was important evidence, since the district attorney “went to considerable effort to develop rebuttal evidence against it.” Id. The court also saw these test results as having a “significant potential effect” on the jury’s determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and concluded that, “Because the assistant district attorney’s failure to comply -with the motion to produce exculpatory evidence adversely affected the fundamental fairness of Geeslin’s trial, Geeslin was denied his right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.” Id. (citing U.S. Const., amend. XIV and the Alabama State Constitution).
In the present case, Steele’s defense was that he believed he had the consent of the alleged victim. Steele and A.S. told two very different versions of the events of that night. The victim’s version was that the assault lasted for two and one-half to three hours and consisted of continuous and repeated assaults.3 Steele’s version was that there were a couple of attempts to have intercourse and also oral sex, but that these did not last very long and terminated after a short period of time. Information hurriedly put together by the Defense, so that the new trial motion hearing could be held the same day as sentencing,4 tended to show that the male’s chances of contracting chlamydia increase as the number of sexual contacts increases. The fact that both Steele and his wife tested negative for chlamydia, while the alleged victim tested positive should have been given to the jury so that this could be weighed along with other evidence as they decided which version of the events was more believable. Further, the Defense argues that A.S.’s public accusation that Steele infected her with a sexually transmitted disease without any real basis for the accusation, and her later offer of retraction, goes directly to her credibility. Again, credibility was a key issue in the trial, and this information may well have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors. The Defense also argued that had the State revealed this information prior to trial, it could have influenced other decisions made regarding trial strategy; i.e., the Defense may have rested at the end of the State’s case and relied on whether or not they had proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt.5
The State suggests that Steele may have contracted chlamydia, but that it could have self-resolved, or cleared up by prescription medicine taken by Steele while he was in jail. However, if the State had not suppressed the evidence at the outset, Steele could have *667been tested much closer to the time of arrest. The delay in testing was due only to the actions of the State, not the Defense. The State submits that there was nothing about this evidence that would have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors. The question remains, however, that if the State thought this evidence was of such little use and consequence, why was a staff meeting held to discuss and decide that this evidence should be kept from the Defense?
The circuit court’s letter outlining the rationale for denial of the new trial motion shows its basis in the rape shield statute, SDCL 23A-22-15. If evidence was offered that the victim had chlamydia, and that she did not contract it from the Defendant, the jury would become aware that the victim had been engaged in some prior sexual contact with a third person. However, this is not “specific instances of a victim’s prior sexual conduct.” SDCL 23A-22-15 (emphasis added).6 During the course of the trial, the jury became aware of other information indicating that A.S. was sexually active. Most importantly, Steele sought not to offer evidence on any specific instance of A.S.’s prior sexual contacts, as prohibited by the rape shield statute. Rather, the Defense sought to offer evidence that had direct bearing on the believability of the two versions of the events of January 4.
This suppression of evidence by the prosecution denied Steele his right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the due process clauses of the U.S. and our State constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; S.D. Const, art. VI, § 2. Therefore, the conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
2. Prior Bad Act Evidence
The trial court ruled that evidence regarding Steele’s arrests of the same day for public indecency (urinating outside) and disorderly conduct were admissible under SDCL 19-12-5.7 This court has recently discussed this statute, noting that it is a rule of general inadmissibility with limited exceptions. State v. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d 420, 421 (S.D.1990). We also noted that trial courts must be “ever vigilant” so that the rule is not swallowed up by the exceptions. Id. (citations omitted). The process that must be followed by trial courts to determine admissibility under this rule involves two questions: First, is the intended purpose for offering the other acts evidence relevant to some material issue in the case? Second, is the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect? State v. Basker, 468 N.W.2d 413, 415 (S.D.1991) (citing State v. Dickey, 459 N.W.2d 445, 449 (S.D.1990) (additional citations omitted)). See also State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 18 (S.D.1989); State v. Bradley, 431 N.W.2d 317 (S.D.1988); State v. Titus, 426 N.W.2d 578 (S.D.1988); State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840 (S.D.1988). This balancing process is in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court’s determinations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Klein, 444 N.W.2d at 18-19; Chapin, 460 N.W.2d at 421 (citing State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1978)). However, and most importantly to the present case, we have stated that the balancing process undertaken by the trial court “must be conducted on the record.” Klein, 444 N.W.2d at 19 (citing State v. Eagle Hawk, 411 N.W.2d 120 (S.D.1987)). See also Titus, 426 N.W.2d at 580.
As occurred in Chapin, the trial court in the present case made findings that were “generic in nature,” simply restating that the evidence of prior bad acts was admissible for the purpose of showing intent, preparation, plan and knowledge. See Chapin, 460 N.W.2d at 421. The trial court did not iden*668tify the specific exception under which the bad act evidence was sought to be admitted, nor did it perform an analysis of the facts and nature of the prior bad acts. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d at 422. As stated by this court in Chapin, “Only by performing a meaningful analysis of each case can the courts assure that the exceptions do not, in fact, entirely swallow the rule of inadmissibility.” Id. Because the trial court failed to perform the proper analysis, the conviction is reversible on this ground.8
3. Admissibility of Photographs of the Defendant Where Identity is Not a Jury Issue
Steele admitted to sexual contact with A.S.; his defense was consent. Nevertheless, the State obtained color photographs of Steele and had these enlarged and mounted. The close-up shots showed Steele bare-chested, and were clear depictions of the various Native American tattoos on his chest and arms. A.S. had already made an unchallenged positive identification of Steele, who in fact stipulated to the identification, and that he was involved in the incident. The Defense argues that admission of these photographs into evidence was improper, as it only served the State’s purpose of arousing the jury with pictures of an Indian male with tattoos on his bare chest.
This court has generally considered admission of photographs into evidence. See, e.g., Woodfork, 454 N.W.2d at 387 (citing State v. Swallow, 350 N.W.2d 606, 610 (S.D.1984); State v. Kane, 266 N.W.2d 552, 558 (S.D.1978)). We have stated that the trial court should “weigh the probative value of the photographs in resolving a material issue as against the dangers of prejudice to the appellant through needless arousals of the passions of the jurors.” Kane, 266 N.W.2d at 558. However, we have not specifically addressed the situation where the defendant’s identity is not an issue.
Other courts have discussed the offering of photographs of the defendant into evidence. See,.e.g., United States v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226, 228 n. 2 (7th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 457, 21 L.Ed.2d 445 (1968). In Reed, the court stated:
[W]e point out that there is grave risk in the introduction of photographs [of the defendant] where other evidence is produced or available to show the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. The character of the pictures themselves may carry prejudicial implications, through police notations or the appearance or pose of the accused in the photograph.... Where the existence of other evidence makes the use of photographs unnecessary, and there is no other reason for their use, their use, in itself, may imply that their purpose in evidence is to indicate to the jury that the accused has a history of convictions or arrests. In determining the relevancy of photographs, the balance of the possibility of prejudice as against the necessity of their use is one factor to be considered by the trial court.
Id. Likewise, the West Virginia Supreme Court has considered this issue. West Virginia v. Reed, 166 W.Va. 558, 276 S.E.2d 313 (1981). This case concerned admission of a photograph depicting the defendant in long hair at time of arrest, as opposed to short hair at time of trial. The court stated:
*669We have always held that the admission of photographs rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and that its rulings will be upheld unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. [Citations omitted.] However, to be admissible photographs must be offered for some relevant purpose and must have probative value which outweighs any prejudicial effect.
Reed, 276 S.E.2d at 318 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals has considered the situation where photographs of a defendant are offered where his identity is not an issue. Arca v. Maryland, 71 Md.App. 102, 523 A.2d 1064 (1987). The defendant was charged with first degree murder, and convicted of manslaughter. The defendant’s sole defense was that he acted in self-defense. “That appellant was the actor ... was never an issue at trial.” Area, 523 A.2d at 1064. The state moved into evidence a police photograph of the defendant. The defense objected based on relevance, arguing that identification was not an issue. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted a “sanitized” version of the police photograph, removing indications that this was a “mug shot” from the photograph. The court held that this was reversible error, stating:
In most eases where police photographs are offered, the identity of the defendant, either as the criminal agent or as a recidivist for enhanced punishment purposes, is at issue, and the photographs are offered to help establish that identity. [Citation omitted.] Here, as we have observed, identity was not in issue. The State had absolutely no need for the photographs— either the original array or a “sanitized” copy of them. They simply were not relevant to any issue that the jury would be asked to decide.
Area, 523 A.2d at 1065-66 (emphasis added). In reaching its decision, the Area court considered the tests utilized for admission of police photographs or “mug shots.” Some federal courts apply a three-prong test which requires the state to show three elements. See United States v. Harrington, 490 F.2d 487, 494 (2nd Cir.1973). The Harrington court stated:
We perceive three prerequisites to a ruling that the introduction of “mug shot” type photographs does not result in reversible error:
1. The Government must have a demonstrable need to introduce the photographs; and
2. The photographs themselves, if shown to the jury, must not imply that the defendant has a prior criminal record; and
3. The manner of introduction at trial must be such that it does not draw particular attention to the source or implications of the photographs.
490 F.2d at 494. Courts applying this test state that all three prerequisites must be met so that admission of the photographs does not amount to an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207, 214 (1st Cir.1978); United States v. Torres-Flores, 827 F.2d 1031, 1037 (5th Cir.1987). The Fosher court, repeating the test set out in Harrington, further noted: ‘While it should be clear to all, we reiterate that this test presupposes that the photographs themselves are relevant to a material issue at hand. ” Fosher, 568 F.2d at 215 (citing Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added)).
Other courts have chosen to utilize the Harrington factors in the application of a balancing test, where in “‘the exercise of discretion, the trial court must balance the probative value of the mug shots against their prejudicial impact on the defendant.’ ” Area, 523 A.2d at 1065 (quoting Straughn v. Maryland, 297 Md. 329, 465 A.2d 1166, 1169 (1983) (citing United States v. Johnson, 623 F.2d 339 (4th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957, 101 S.Ct. 366, 66 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980); Connecticut v. Woods, 171 Conn. 610, 370 A.2d 1080 (1976); Illinois v. Jones, 34 Ill. App.3d 103, 339 N.E.2d 485 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953, 96 S.Ct. 3179, 49 L.Ed.2d 1192 (1976); North Carolina v. Hatcher, 277 N.C. 380, 177 S.E.2d 892 (1970))). See also United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Johnson, 623 F.2d 339 (4th Cir.1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 957, 101 S.Ct. 366, 66 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980). A “critical element” in this balancing test is the state’s need for the photographs. “[W]ere they merely cumulative to other unim-*670peached evidence? If the State has no real need to introduce the photographs, there is nothing against which to balance any prejudice to the accused.” Area, 523 A.2d at 1065. When the photographs are not relevant to any issue that the jury must decide, “the State’s side of the scale, then, has a weight of zero.” Id at 1066.
The photographs of Steele were not relevant to any issue that the jury was asked to decide. Steele’s identity, whether he had tattoos, and whether he is a Native American were not issues for the jury. Since there was no probative value whatsoever to these photographs, the prejudice caused to Steele cannot be “outweighed,” and it was error for the trial court to allow these photographs into evidence.
4. Jury Instruction on Credibility of Alleged Victim
The trial court gave the following jury instruction offered by the State, over the objections of the Defense:
In order for the Defendant to be convicted of the offense charged in the indictment, it is not necessary that the testimony of the victim be corroborated by other witnesses. It is sufficient if you find her testimony credible beyond a reasonable doubt.
During settling of the jury instructions, the Defense asked if this was a “stock” instruction. The State replied that it was not, but that it was from the case of State v. Willis, and the trial court indicated that it had cheeked the citation. It was the Defense position that this instruction was misleading, placed too much weight on the testimony of A.S., and was unnecessary since there was already a jury instruction regarding the credibility of the witnesses.
Authority for this jury instruction cannot be located in either Willis case. See Willis I, 370 N.W.2d at 193; Willis II, 396 N.W.2d at 152. SDCL 15-6-51(b) on settlement of jury instructions states in part that, “It shall be insufficient to state generally that an instruction does or does not state the law, but it shall be necessary to specify clearly wherein any instruction, or part thereof objected to, is insufficient or does not state the law.” Id. (emphasis added). Counsel offering jury instructions, both defense and prosecution, should be prepared to offer the specific authority on which a proposed instruction is based. This allows a more fair and full discussion of proposed jury instructions, and aids the court in reaching decisions whether to accept or reject the instructions.
In regard to the present case, we have stated that “as a general rule, it is not essential to a sexual offense conviction that the testimony of the victim be corroborated by other evidence.” State v. Blalock, 434 N.W.2d 55, 59 (S.D.1988) (citing State v. Grey Owl, 316 N.W.2d 801, 804 (S.D.1982)). Based on these prior holdings, the language contained in the first sentence of the instruction is appropriate. No authority is located to support the second sentence of the instruction, which is not even clear or complete on its face — sufficient for what? Therefore, the language of the second sentence of the instruction should properly be deleted.
5. Testimony Regarding Steele’s Place of Employment
The trial court denied Steele’s motion in limine asking that no testimony regarding his place of employment be allowed. Steele (and his wife) were both employed at Studio One, an adult theater and bookstore. Steele argues that any probative value of such testimony was outweighed by the prejudicial effect it could have on the jury. State opposed the motion, arguing that Steele’s place of employment was part of the scheme of events leading up to the rape, which events the State planned to introduce as prior bad acts evidence. Further, Steele had told a police officer that he had seen A.S. in Studio One on some prior occasion. A.S. denied that she had ever been inside Studio One, and the State wished to use that for impeachment purposes.
State argues that Studio One was a “geographical center around which the events of that night revolved,” and that Studio One was “the base of the Defendant’s operations that night” and “an essential link in the chain.” These arguments appear ludicrous. Steele and A.S. met at a convenience store that night, and left together from that loca*671tion at 3:16 a.m. Sometime before 5:27 a.m., Steele was dropped off outside the bus depot at 7th and Minnesota. His place of employment had no relationship to the events that occurred between Steele and A.S. Again, one wonders if Steele were a lawyer, a minister or a school teacher, would the State refer to his law office, church, or school building as his “base of operations”?
The State places much reliance on the “vehemence” of A.S.’s denial that she had ever been in Studio One. Although a clerk did not recall seeing A.S. in the store, she also testified that “many times” she had to ask people under eighteen to leave the store, especially around tournament time, and that she was not on duty twenty-four hours a day. Even if there were any relevance to mention of Steele’s place of employment, the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative value. See, e.g., Woodfork, 454 N.W.2d at 335 (citations omitted). In a rape prosecution, the fact that Steele worked at an adult bookstore and theater, even as a janitor, could have a highly prejudicial effect on the jury’s perception that such a person would be more likely to commit a rape.
SABERS, J., concurs in part; concurs specially in part.
MILLER, C.J., and HENDERSON and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.

. Chlamydia is a venereal or sexually transmitted disease, included in the same category as gonorrhea, syphilis and genital herpes. "Sexually transmitted diseases (STD), also called venereal diseases (VD), are all highly contagious between sexual partners. They are passed from one person to another through sexual intercourse or close contact involving the genitalia, mouth or rectum. The STD are surpassed only by the common cold and flu among common infectious diseases in the United States.... Chlamydial infections are even more common than gonorrhea, and like gonorrhea are a frequent cause of pelvic inflammatory disease." 5A Lawyers’ Medical Cyclopedia of Personal Injuries and Allied Specialties § 36.18(A) (3rd ed. 1986).

. This court, in reviewing Willis’ motion for new trial based on the newly discovered evidence, applied the two-fold test as set out in Lufkins, 309 N.W.2d at 336. Willis, 396 N.W.2d at 153. That test is: (1) Is the evidence cumulative; and (2) is there a reasonable possibility that the newly discovered evidence would probably produce a different result on retrial? Id. However, it is questionable whether this test imposes additional requirements beyond that required by the U.S. Supreme Court in a suppression of evidence claim. Neither Lufkins, or the case cited therein *665from which the two-fold test is derived dealt with a new trial motion based on a suppression of evidence claim. See State v. Dowling, 87 S.D. 532, 211 N.W.2d 572 (1973). It appears that guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court cases is more correctly applied in the more recent case of Ashker v. Solem, 457 N.W.2d 473, 477-78 (S.D.1990) discussed herein.

.The record reveals undisputed evidence that two hours and eleven minutes elapsed from the time they left the convenience store, until the time the rape was reported. A police officer also testified that he timed the route driven from the convenience store to the alleged crime scene, and the drive took fifteen minutes.

. Holding both the new trial motion hearing and the sentencing on the same day gives the appearance that the court had already decided to proceed with sentencing, no matter what came out at the hearing.

. Defense awareness of this information may also have influenced the offering of a plea agreement by the prosecutor.

. Other cases interpreting SDCL 23A-22-15 all involve situations where the defense sought to offer evidence about the victim’s specific prior sexual contacts with either the defendant or other specific third persons. See, e.g., State v. Wood-fork, 454 N.W.2d 332 (S.D.1990); State v. Lykken, 484 N.W.2d 869 (S.D.1992); State v. Mitchell, 491 N.W.2d 438 (S.D.1992).

. SDCL 19-12-5 provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

. On retrial, the trial court may take guidance from other courts that have considered similar issues. In an appeal from a rape conviction, one court has held that it was error for the trial court to allow admission of evidence that the defendant had been arrested for “prowling” (peering through the window into the home of a woman) two days earlier. Wisconsin v. Grant, 139 Wis.2d 45, 406 N.W.2d 744, 746-47 (1987). The court stated that, "The potential dangers in admitting other-acts testimony are well known. Our rules of evidence do not allow this type of evidence to be admitted merely to show that the Defendant had a propensity to commit the type of acts for which he is charged.” Id. at 747. In another trial for attempted rape, the alleged victim was allowed to testify that the defendant and others were going to "do some cocaine” at a party on the same evening. King v. Virginia, 217 Va. 912, 234 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1977). The Virginia Supreme Court reiterated the "general rule that evidence that a defendant has committed an unrelated crime is inadmissible against him.” Id. at 69. The court did note the exception that "evidence of other criminal acts is admissible where such evidence is connected with or leads up to the offense for which the accused is being tried. But the use of cocaine had nothing to do with the crime of attempted rape for which [the defendant] was being tried.” Id.