Court Opinion

ID: 9715187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:57:10.874545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:32.302730
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring). Because we are bound by our Supreme Court’s opinion in People v Poole, 444 *560Mich 151; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), I concur with the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, to express serious reservations regarding our Supreme Court’s conclusion that non-self-inculpatory statements are admissible under MRE 804(b)(3), and to urge the Court to reconsider this issue and adopt the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the corresponding federal rule set forth in Williamson v United States, 512 US 594; 114 S Ct 2431; 129 L Ed 2d 476 (1994).
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination during trial, the Confrontation Clause, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20, normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “ ‘indicia of reliability.’ ” Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980). This reliability requirement is fulfilled when the hearsay statement either “ ‘ “falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” ’ ” or occurs under circumstances with “ ‘ “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” ’ ” People v Welch, 226 Mich App 461, 467; 574 NW2d 682 (1997) (citations omitted).
Generally, a hearsay statement is deemed to possess an indicia of reliability when made under specific circumstances that make it more probable than not that the substance of the statement is true. People v Malone, 445 Mich 369, 402, n 12; 518 NW2d 418 (1994) (Cavanagh, C.J., dissenting). Thus, MRE 804(b)(3) provides that, if the declarant is unavailable as a witness, the following is not excluded by the hearsay rule:
Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuni*561ary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.
The underlying rationale of the exception is that a reasonable person will not incriminate himself by admitting a damaging fact unless he believes that fact to be true. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 271-272; 547 NW2d 280 (1996).
MRE 804(b)(3) was modeled on FRE 804(b)(3). Poole, supra at 161. In Williamson, the Supreme Court addressed whether statements that were not self-inculpatory, but that were made in the course of a narrative of events that as a whole is against the declarant’s penal interest, were admissible under FRE 804(b)(3). The Court first considered whether the word “statement” in the court rule could be applied to an extended narrative or whether it applied only to individual declarations within the narrative. In rejecting the former interpretation, the Court explained:
Although the text of the Rule does not directly resolve the matter, the principle behind the Rule, so far as it is discernible from the text, points clearly to the narrower reading. Rule 804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true. This notion simply does not extend to the broader definition of “statement.” The fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession’s non-self-inculpatory parts. One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.
*562. . . And when part of the confession is actually self-exculpatory, the generalization on which Rule 804(b)(3) is founded becomes even less applicable. Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-exculpatory statements. [Williamson, supra at 599-600.]
A reasonable person will not be likely to make a self-inculpatory statement if it is not true. However, the fact that a non-self-inculpatory statement is made in proximity to a self-inculpatory statement does not provide any information regarding the reliability of the statement. Accordingly, such non-self-inculpatory statements should be treated no differently from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded.
In sum, were it not for our Supreme Court’s decision in Poole, I would affirm the trial court’s order.