Court Opinion

ID: 9751113
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:07:40.37208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:35.822124
License: Public Domain

*683Shea, J.
(concurring and dissenting). I agree with the disposition of the case made by this court except with respect to the seventh count in which treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-566 were claimed against the city for “wilfully” removing or destroying the bridge. The trial court erroneously assumed that a finding by the jury of a “wrongful” destruction of the bridge under the fifth count or of “nuisance” under the sixth count was equivalent to a finding that the city had acted “wilfully” under § 52-566. The judgment trebling the damages in accordance with the statute as claimed in the seventh count must be vacated, and the verdict for the actual damages sustained, as found by the jury under the fifth and sixth counts, must be reinstated.
Our finding of error on the seventh count, however, should not have the effect of a final disposition of that count, as the opinion of this court treats it. We have set aside the determination of the trial court on the seventh count only because of the erroneous basis upon which it was reached, not because the claim lacks merit or because the evidence was insufficient to support it.
Our appellate rules do not require an appellee to request that a case be remanded for further proceedings in the event that error is found in the judgment. The defendant neither in brief nor in argument has claimed that the error which we have found would justify the directed judgment on the seventh count which the opinion mandates. Such a result would follow if we had sustained the other claims of the defendant, that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of wilful destruction of the bridge, as required by § 52-566, and that the statute does not apply to municipalities. The *684opinion does not reach these grounds for error, but rests wholly upon the absence of any determination by court or jury of the factual issues raised in the seventh count. It compounds the error we have found by effectively resolving those issues in favor of the defendant.
The only explanation offered in the opinion for refusing another opportunity to adjudicate the merits of the seventh count in the trial court is contained in footnote 4, which refers to the lack of any exception by the plaintiffs to the failure of the court to submit that count to the jury as well as to the absence of any claim of error in this appeal related thereto. The transcript indicates that when the court advised the jury that only the fifth and sixth counts would be submitted to them neither party objected. They must be deemed, therefore, to have waived the right to a jury determination of the issues of the seventh count. That waiver, however, cannot be enlarged to constitute a waiver of the claim for treble damages itself. Both parties by their silence effectively consented to a court trial of the seventh count. The trial court declared in response to a question from the jury prior to the verdict1 that it would treble any amount of damages which the jury might award. Why the plaintiffs should have objected to such action on the part of the trial court, as the opinion *685of this court assumes, I cannot imagine. The plaintiffs had absolutely no reason to except to the manner in which the trial court handled the seventh count or to raise any issue related thereto on appeal. A litigant can hardly be expected to object to rulings favorable to him.
I dissent, therefore, from the failure to remand the seventh count to the trial court for a new trial.

 The statement in footnote 4 of the opinion that the plaintiffs did not know they would prevail on the seventh count before the verdict is subject to misinterpretation. When the jury inquired, “Are treble damages automatically then added to our findings?”, the court responded, “The answer to that is yes. I will handle that after I hear from you.” The plaintiffs, therefore, knew that any damages found by the jury would be trebled automatically by the court, a result which would give them the maximum relief requested under the seventh count. It is true, of course, that they did not know that the jury would award them any damages.