Court Opinion

ID: 9503476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:46:26.381091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:30.079236
License: Public Domain

LEESON, J.,
specially concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Attorney General’s certified ballot title complies substantially with the requirements of ORS 250.035 (1997). I disagree with the majority that it is appropriate for this court, in this proceeding, to engage in the interpretive exercise that it does to come .to that conclusion. Accordingly, I concur only in the result.
The text of the measure at issue consists of one sentence:
“Notwithstanding any other measure passed in the same election, a proportional, voter-approved tax cut, including an increase in an allowed deduction or subtraction from income, shall not be invalidated because it benefits middle class or above taxpayers.”
Petitioner contends that, although the measure purports to protect “proportional” tax cuts, it also states that “proportional” tax cuts include deductions or subtractions from income. According to petitioner, under any reasonable definition of the word “proportional,” deductions and subtractions never are proportional, so the wording of the proposed measure is misleading. That is, voters will not necessarily *160understand that increases in deductions or subtractions from income do not yield “proportional” tax cuts. He argues that
“most voters are not CPAs, or tax policy devotees. Many sane, intelligent voters could read this language and assume that increases in deductions or subtractions from income do, in fact, yield ‘proportional’ tax cuts.”
The Attorney General responds that petitioner’s argument “requires a disputable interpretation of the proposed measure’s meaning.” In the Attorney General’s opinion, the phrase “proportional, voter-approved tax cut” in the measure may refer “only to those ‘allowed increases’ that are proportional in fact.” The Attorney General contends that his certified ballot title has avoided giving an opinion about the meaning of the word “proportional,” or an opinion about the implications of the syntactical structure of the measure. Rather, he notes, he has identified the subject of the measure as proportional voter-approved tax cuts, he has repeated the syntax that is employed in the measure in his ballot title summary, and he has explained that the key word, “proportional,” is not defined in the measure.
The majority resolves the debate between petitioner and the Attorney General about the meaning of the measure. It holds that the Attorney General’s ballot title should be certified as written because the measure admits of only one plausible interpretation. Although the majority might concede that not all voters are CPAs or tax policy devotees, it apparently believes that they are old-fashioned grammarians who readily will understand that the use of the word “including,” the present participial form of the verb “include,” in the subordinate clause in the measure means that “only those deductions or subtractions from income that fit the description in the independent clause * * * truly are ‘proportional.]’ ” 330 Or at 158.
In my view, petitioner has made a credible argument that voters who are not well-schooled in English grammar could believe that, under this proposed measure, deductions or subtractions from income are “proportional” tax cuts. However, the Attorney General also has made a credible argument that the proposed measure can be read to mean that “proportional, voter-approved tax cut” applies only to *161“allowed increases” that are in fact proportional. Because the Attorney General’s reading of the proposed measure is reasonable, this court should certify the Attorney General’s ballot title as complying substantially with the requirements ofORS 250.035(1997).
Unfortunately, the majority not only certifies the Attorney General’s ballot title, it uses this ballot title challenge proceeding to announce its interpretation of the proposed measure. In my view, it is not necessary or appropriate for this court in this ballot title proceeding to determine what the proposed measure means. Interpretation, should this proposed measure become part of the Oregon Constitution, is for another day. When, as here, the majority’s interpretive exercise is not necessary to conclude that the Attorney General’s ballot title complies substantially with the statutory requirements, doing so is inappropriate. See Rooney v. Kulongoski (Elections Division #13), 322 Or 15, 41, 902 P2d 1143 (1995) (in ballot title challenge cases, “our task is to see to it that the interpretive exercise be minimal”).
Van Hoomissen, J., joins in this concurrence.