Court Opinion

ID: 9613695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:19:18.483836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:31.084473
License: Public Domain

Oxner, Justice
(concurring and dissenting).
I am in accord with the majority opinion in the decision of all questions except that relating to the failure of the Court to submit to the jury by appropriate instructions the question of venue.
Every indictment for murder must contain allegations as to the place of assault and the place of death. State v. Platt, 154 S. C. 1, 151 S. E. 206. Not only must these essentials be alleged, but they must be proved. State v. Rector, 158 S. C. 212, 155 S. E. 385. In the indictment on which appellants were tried, it is alleged that in Horry County they, inflicted upon the body of Robert Daniel Oliver “one mortal wound, of which said mortal wound the said Robert Daniel Oliver then and there died.” It will be noted that both the place of- the assault and the place of death were fixed in Horry County. These facts were put in issue by the plea of not guilty interposed by appellants. The burden was upon the State to prove these allegations.
In undertaking to prove the foregoing elements, the State relied largely, if not altogether, upon several confessions obtained from each of the appellants in Pennsylvania. They are conflicting as to the place of the assault and the place of death. From these confessions, when considered in connection with the medical testimony offered by the State, it could be reasonably infered that the deceased was struck in the head with a pistol in Plorry County and that the wound there inflicted was sufficient to cause almost instant death. On the other hand, they also reasonably warrant a conclusion that the deceased was alive in the trunk of the car when appellants left South Carolina. Gantt did not testify. The other appellant, Gainey, testified positively that the deceased was both struck with a pistol and shot at Wadesboro, North Carolina. Under this conflicting evidence, *446it was for the jury to determine the place of the fatal assault and the place of death.
In the fair and able charge of the trial Judge, there is no reference to the disputed issue of venue. He fully covered all the essential elements of the offense of murder and the jury was carefully instructed that these must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. But so far as the record discloses, during the charge the indictment was not read to the jury, nor was the allegation contained therein with reference to the place of the assault and place of death called to their attention. Nowhere in the charge do I find that the jury was instructed, either directly or by implication, that the burden was upon the State to establish the place of assault and the place of death as alleged in the indictment. The general charge with reference to the crime of murder was insufficient. The locus of a crime is not a part of the crime itself. Where the facts relating to venue are undisputed, an instruction with reference to this aspect of the case is perhaps unnecessary. But here it was a vital issue. It went to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Certain statutes are set out in the majority opinion with reference to the place of trial where a person is assaulted in one county and dies in another county or another state, but as pointed out in State v. Coleman, 17 S. C. 473, these statutes did not make any change in the rules of criminal pleading nor, I may add, in the rule that the State must prove the essential allegations contained in the indictment.
It is stated in the brief of counsel for appellants: “Before the Judge charged- the jury, numerous written requests to charge were made and among them was one which requested in substance, that His Honor charge the jury that the State must prove the place of assault and the place of death of deceased.” The record does not show that any request to the above effect was made. However, it does show that the Court refused some request made by appellants, but its contents are not disclosed. The language used by one of the attorneys for appellants on a motion for a new trial *447rather indicates that he thought that such a request had been made. The fifth ground of the motion for a new trial and the ruling of the Court thereon are as follows:
“Mr. Gasque: Fifth, that his Honor erred in refusing to charge that the State must prove the place of assault and the place of death of the deceased. I might call your attention to the case of State v. Rector, 158 S. C. 212, 155 S. E. 385, 386. (reads)
“The Court: Mr. Gasque and Mr. McCaskill, of course there is evidence that the assault was committed in this County sufficient to have caused death. The Rector case and all other cases are all based upon both sections of the 1942 Code, the exact Section numbers I don’t recall at this particular moment. There is, however, a fifth factual situation, possibly more, which are not questioned by any of those Sections I have referred to except possibly the first Section. Where the origin of the unlawful act or acts resulting in the death of the deceased is determined, under such factual situation, the venue is properly laid in the County where the unlawful act or acts, which finally resulted in the death of the deceased, occurred. I, therefore, overrule that motion.”
I think the ruling of the Court indicates a misconception of the issue sought to be raised. Counsel was not contending that there was no evidence to go to the jury in support of the allegation that the assault was made and death resulted in Horry County. The evidence was conflicting on this issue and the question could not have been raised by motion for a directed verdict. It is also true that if the fatal blow was inflicted in Horry County and death resulted in another county or state, venue could be laid in Horry County. But there is no such allegation in the indictment. It fixes both the place of the assault and the place of death in HorryCounty.
The question as to whether counsel for appellants are correct in stating that they requested the Court to charge the jury on the disputed issue of venue is not material, since *448in a capital case we are charged with the duty of carefully scrutinizing the record to see that all rights of the accused have been safeguarded.
The evidence discloses a brutal murder and the overwhelming weight thereof shows that the offense was committed by appellants. The only uncertainty is the locus of the crime. But the enormity of the offense does not relieve us of the responsibility of determining whether there were any errors of law during the course of the trial substantially affecting the rights of appellants. If there were such errors, we have no alternative but to reverse the judgment and order a new trial. In such a case a new trial is granted, not in the exercise of discretion, but in obedience to the command of law.
I am unable to escape the conclusion that the failure to submit to the jury the disputed question of venue constituted prejudicial error. It seems to me that this conclusion is sustained not only by our own decisions but those from other jurisdictions. People v. Hetenyi, 227 App. Div. 310, 98 N. Y. S. (2d) 990, affirmed 301 N. Y. 757, 95 N. E. (2d) 819; State v. Igo, 108 Mo. 568, 18 S. W. 923; State v. Brooks, 136 N. J. L. 577, 57 A. (2d) 34; 23 C. J. S., Criminal Law, § 1196(b).
For the foregoing reasons, I think a new trial should be granted.
Taylor, J., concurs.