Court Opinion

ID: 9750145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:23:25.442442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:02.340608
License: Public Domain

*996McINTYRE, J.,
Dissenting. — I agree with the majority that the felony-murder escape rule applies to burglary. (People v. Bodely (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 311, 313 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 72]; People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 623 [150 Cal.Rptr. 515].) However, neither the law nor the facts justify the majority’s extension of the escape rule to the circumstances of this case. The escape rule has never been applied where, as here, no one pursued Russell immediately following the burglary, no one alerted police that a burglary had taken place or that the Meurses’ Oldsmobile had been stolen, and about 15 minutes had elapsed between the time Creighton left the neighborhood and observed that the Meurses’ garage door was closed and the time Officer Williams spotted the Oldsmobile nearly five miles away stopped at a red light. Russell had completed his escape from the burglary and reached a place of temporary safety. Not mentioned by the majority is the fact that police did not connect the Oldsmobile with the Meurses’ burglary until well after the fatal crash. Subjectively, neither Russell nor Officer Williams had reason to believe Russell was fleeing from the scene of a burglary.
The majority relies on People v. Johnson (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 552 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 23] (Johnson), a case which is readily distinguishable. Johnson involved the face-to-face robbery of two individuals in circumstances in which the defendant would have assumed the robbery victims reported the crimes immediately. (Id. at p. 555.) Police did not immediately locate the defendant’s stolen car, but the ensuing chase ended in the death of another driver. (Id. at pp. 555-556.) The Johnson court applied an objective test under the felony-murder escape rule to conclude that Johnson had not “actually” reached a place of temporary safety before the homicide occurred. (Id. at pp. 559-560.)
Here, Russell and his claimed accomplice stayed in the house as much as 12 minutes after Creighton saw a shadowy form on the porch. And because Creighton continued to load his truck in preparation to leave, there would have been little reason for a burglar like Russell to believe he had called police. Given Russell’s state of intoxication, it is of little significance that Russell left a drum and duffle bag containing some of the Meurses’ property at the point of entry into the house. Based on the lapse of time and distance, Russell had actually reached a place of temporary safety as a matter of law under the objective test set forth in Johnson. (Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 561.) Accordingly, the burglary and homicide were not part of one continuous transaction for purposes of the felony-murder rule. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1259 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].)
There is certainly sufficient evidence to form the basis of a second degree murder conviction given Russell’s conduct after he saw Officer Williams, but I conclude the extension of the felony-murder escape rule to the situation we *997have here is unwarranted. As tragic and unnecessary as Rodrigo Vega’s death was, the degree of culpability present here does not comport with first degree murder. I would reverse Russell’s conviction of first degree felony-murder in count 1.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 9, 2010. McIntyre, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 1, 2010, SI86956.