Court Opinion

ID: 9391249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-01 17:02:42.678953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:40.326016
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/1/23 Kassab v. Kachi CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                      DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 JOANDARK KASSAB,                                                             D079954

            Plaintiff and Appellant,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. 37-2016-00026336-
                                                                              CU-FR-CTL)
 NABIL N. KACHI et al.,

            Defendants and Respondents.

          APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eddie C. Sturgeon, Judge. Requests for judicial notice denied. Affirmed.
          Joandark Kassab, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
          Law Office of Quintin G. Shammam and Quintin G. Shammam for
Defendants and Respondents.
      Joandark Kassab appeals from a summary judgment in her action to
set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real property and a policy of
term life insurance. Defendants offered admissible evidence showing that
she was not injured because (1) the secured debt on the property exceeded its
value, and (2) the unmatured life insurance had no cash value. Because
Kassab offered no evidence to create a triable issue on the essential element
of injury, we affirm the judgment.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

      In 2012, Kassab contracted with a company owned by Nabil Kachi,
Hatra Engineering and Construction, to build retail and office space. After
disputes between them arose, an arbitrator awarded Kassab $142,382.
      In 2014, about a week before the arbitration award was issued, Kachi
quitclaimed a single-family residence (the Property) to his son, Nadeem “as
trustee” of the Kachi Family Irrevocable Trust. The deed was notarized on

October 4, 2014, which the parties call the “Transfer Date.”2 At that time the
Property was encumbered by two deeds of trust totaling $933,000. Kachi also
owned a $200,000 term life insurance policy. In October 2014, he transferred
it to the Kachi Irrevocable Life Insurance Trust.

1      The “Statement of Facts” in Kassab’s opening brief does not contain
any record citations. Accordingly, the facts are drawn from our independent
review of the record and the respondents’ brief. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening brief must provide a summary of
significant facts “limited to matters in the record”; see also rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)
[each brief must support any reference to a matter in the record by citation to
the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears].)
2      “The inquiry of whether any harm has been done is viewed
retroactively to the point of transfer, not forward looking of what equity there
is after the transfer.” (Goldman v. Dardashti (In re Melamed) (Bankr.
C.D.Cal. 2021) 634 B.R. 361, 370.)
                                        2
      At the end of 2014, the superior court confirmed the arbitration award

and entered a $148,877 judgment in Kassab’s favor against Kachi.3
      About two years later, Kassab filed a complaint against Kachi alleging
that his transfer of the Property and the life insurance were fraudulent

conveyances.4 The operative first amended complaint alleges three causes of
action: (1) fraudulent conveyance of the Property and life insurance; (2)
“constructive” fraudulent conveyance; and (3) conspiracy to “hinder, delay
and defraud” Kassab “in the collection of the arbitration award.”
      A fraudulent transfer may be set aside only by one who is injured by
the transfer. And a creditor suffers no injury if the property’s encumbrances
exceed its value. (See Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179

Cal.App.4th 834, 842.) Invoking this principle, Kachi5 moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that Kassab could not establish an essential
element of her case, injury. In support of the motion, two appraisals of the
Property showed that its fair market value was $740,000 to $778,000 on the
transfer date. In light of the negative equity, Kachi asserted Kassab suffered

3     Kassab’s request for judicial notice of the arbitration award, judgment,
and grant deed is denied as moot because these documents are already in the
augmented record on appeal. Her two requests for judicial notice of a
judgment lien and writ of execution are denied because these documents are
not relevant to any issue on appeal. (See Appel v. Superior Court (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 329, 342, fn. 6 [judicial notice denied where materials are not
relevant or necessary to the court’s analysis].)
4     Kachi’s wife, Nour, as well as Nadeem Kachi, as trustee of the two
trusts, were also defendants. Hereafter, references to “Kachi” include all the
named defendants unless the context indicates otherwise.
5     Nabil Kachi died in July 2019. The motion was brought “by and
through his successor-in-interest, Nour Kachi” and by Nadeem Kachi, as
trustee of the two trusts.
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no injury because the transfer did not put beyond her reach an asset that
otherwise would be available to pay the judgment. As to the term life policy,
Kachi maintained that on the transfer date it was unmatured and, therefore,
had no value.
      Kassab submitted no admissible evidence in opposition. Citing a real
estate website, she claimed the Property was worth at least $1.2 million. Her
opposition referred to an exhibit showing a $1,223,000 appraisal—but the
exhibit number was blank, and it was never filled in:

      After conducting an unreported hearing, the trial court granted
summary judgment. It determined that “[d]efendants have met their burden
to show the fair market value of the [Property] at the time of the transfer by
[Kachi] was less than the amount owed on the property,” and Kassab offered
no evidence of value as of the date of transfer. The court also ruled that the
life insurance policy had no value because Kachi was alive on the date of
transfer and “term life insurance is generally accepted as having no value,
since once its term has expired its worthless.” Because the two fraudulent
conveyance causes of action failed, so too did the conspiracy claim.

                                DISCUSSION

A.    Appealability

      In a self-represented filing, Kassab purported to appeal from orders
(1) granting summary judgment; (2) taking her motion for reconsideration off
calendar; (3) denying her motion for reconsideration; and (4) denying her
request for a statement of decision. Shortly after the appeal was docketed,

                                       4
we notified the parties that none of these were appealable orders. We
subsequently allowed the appeal to proceed, notifying the parties that
appealability may be addressed in the merits briefs.
      Especially given Kassab’s self-represented status, we construe the
order granting summary judgment to include an appealable judgment, and
the notice of appeal to adequately identify it. (See Mitchell v. Los Robles
Regional Medical Center (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 291, 296, fn. 2.) Kachi does
not contend otherwise.

B.   The Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment Because the
     Undisputed Evidence Established That Kassab Suffered No Injury, Even
     If the Transfers Were Done with Fraudulent Intent.

      The Uniform Voidable Transfers Act (Act) (Civ. Code, § 3439 et seq.)
permits defrauded creditors to reach property in the hands of a transferee.
(See Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Schroeder (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 834,
840.) But to constitute a fraudulent transfer, the debtor must have disposed
of an “asset.” (Civ. Code, § 3439.01, subd. (m).) By statutory definition,
“asset” does not include property “to the extent it is encumbered by a valid
lien.” (Id., § 3439.01, subd. (a)(1).)
      Thus, if valid encumbrance(s) on the property exceed its value, then the
transferred property is not an “asset.” If the transferred property is not an
“asset” within the meaning of the Act it cannot be set aside, no matter how
fraudulent the debtor’s intent. The rationale is that a creditor is not injured
by a transfer unless the property otherwise would be “ ‘subject to the
payment of [the] debt.’ ” (Mehrtash v. Mehrtash (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 75, 80
(Mehrtash).) This rule applies to both a common law action to set aside a
fraudulent conveyance as well as to one under the Act. (See Berger v. Varum
(2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1013, 1020.)

                                         5
      We review the trial court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment
independently to determine “whether triable issues of fact exist to reinstate
the action.” (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1138, 1142.) We look to the evidence before the trial court (Wilson v. 21st
Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 716–717), construing the opposing
party’s submissions liberally and applying stricter scrutiny to the moving
party’s evidence, resolving doubts in favor of the former. (Wiener, at p. 1142.)
When a defendant moves for summary judgment and demonstrates that the
plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of a claim, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to the challenged
element. (Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 604.) If the plaintiff
fails to do so, “ ‘no amount of factual conflicts upon other aspects of the case
will affect the result and the motion for summary judgment should be

granted.’ ”6 (Willard v. Hagemeister (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 406, 415–416.)
      Here, there is no dispute that Nabil transferred the Property to the
family trust when an adverse arbitration award was apparently imminent.
For purposes of summary judgment, that alone is likely sufficient to create a
triable issue of fraudulent intent. But the key question remains: Was there
substantial evidence from which a jury could conclude that the Property was
an “asset.”
      Kachi submitted declarations of licensed real estate appraisers showing
the Property’s fair market value on the transfer date was $740,000 to

6      Kassab asserts the law favors trial on the merits and summary
judgment is a “drastic” procedure. All true, but “ ‘it is also true “[j]ustice
requires that a defendant be as much entitled to be rid of an unmeritorious
lawsuit as a plaintiff is entitled to maintain a good one.” ’ ” (Conte v. Wyeth,
Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 89, 97.)
                                        6
$778,000. They also showed that as of the transfer date, the balance on the
first deed of trust was $827,923 and the second was approximately $105,833.
      With the moving parties having offered admissible evidence that the
Property was not an asset under the Act, on summary judgment the burden
shifted to Kassab to present admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact
to the contrary. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
850.) She failed to do so. Although Kassab repeatedly asserted that the
Property’s value was $1,223,000, she submitted no declaration, no appraisal,
nor any other admissible evidence to support such a finding. Her eight-page
list of “Disputed Material Facts” contests nearly every issue in the underlying
case—but it refers to no admissible evidence on any of them.
      Summary judgment is an evidentiary proceeding designed to “pierce”
mere allegations to determine whether a trial “is truly necessary to resolve
the dispute between the parties.” (Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148
Cal.App.4th 1487, 1492.) Thus, although Kassab asserts “there were no
fewer than forty (40) disputed material facts,” she overlooks that her bare
assertion a fact is disputed does not make it so. The whole point of summary
judgment is to get behind naked contentions to determine if they are
supported by admissible evidence. Kassab is correct that in ruling on the
motion, “the declarations of . . . the opposing party are liberally construed.”
But here, there was nothing for the trial court to construe, liberally or
otherwise, because she submitted no declaration or any other admissible
evidence on the valuation issue. Accordingly, the trial court correctly granted
summary judgment. (See Mehrtash, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 81
[concluding that the plaintiff “produced no evidence that the value of the
property could support any net recovery for her in the event the conveyance
were set aside”].)

                                        7
      The court also correctly granted summary judgment against Kassab
with respect to the transfer of the life insurance policy. Term life insurance
pays upon the contingency of the insured’s death during the term of the
policy. (In re Marriage of Spengler (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 288, 295.) Unlike
whole life insurance, term insurance is generally regarded as having no value
because once its term has expired it is worthless. (In re Marriage of
Lorenz (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 464, 468.) Moreover, even if it did have value
during the insured’s life, an ownership interest in an unmatured term life

insurance policy is exempt from the reach of creditors. (Code Civ. Proc., 7

§ 704.100, subd. (a).)8

C.   The Summary Judgment is Not a Collateral Attack on the Arbitration
     Award

      Citing the general rule that judicial review of arbitration awards is
extremely limited, Kassab contends that anyone who “hinders [her] from
enforcing her judgment is evidently in contempt” of the underlying judgment.
As we can best understand it, she claims that because dismissing her
fraudulent conveyance action impedes her ability to collect on a final
judgment, it is tantamount to an attack on the judgment confirming the
arbitration award itself. The argument fails, however, because summary
judgment against her on the fraudulent conveyance action does not affect the
validity of the underlying arbitral judgment. If there are other assets
properly subject to her claim as judgment creditor, nothing in the summary
judgment precludes her from attempting to satisfy her judgment from them.

7     Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
8      “Unmatured life insurance policies (including endowment and annuity
policies), but not the loan value of such policies, are exempt without making a
claim.” (§ 704.100, subd. (a).)
                                       8
D.   The Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on the Third Cause of
     Action for Civil Conspiracy

      Kassab’s third cause of action is entitled “Conspiracy.” It alleges that
defendants “knowingly and willingly conspired between themselves to hinder,
delay, and defraud [Kassab] in the collection of the arbitration award and
[her] judgment . . . .” Conspiracy, however, is not a cause of action, but rather
a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually
committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a
common plan or design in carrying it out. “ ‘Standing alone, a conspiracy
does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be activated by the
commission of an actual tort. [Citation.] [It] cannot be alleged as a tort
separate from the underlying wrong it is organized to achieve.’ ” (Moran v.
Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 954–955.)
      Because the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants on the substantive causes of action, the conspiracy claim
necessarily fails as a matter of law. (See Richard B. LeVine, Inc. v. Higashi
(2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 566, 574 [“ ‘A civil conspiracy however atrocious, does
not per se give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been
committed resulting in damage’ ”].)

E.   The Trial Court Was Not Obligated to Issue a Statement of Decision

      Section 437c, subdivision (g) requires the court to provide a “statement

of reasons” for its determination to grant a motion for summary judgment. 9

9      “Upon the grant of a motion for summary judgment on the ground that
there is no triable issue of material fact, the court shall, by written or oral
order, specify the reasons for its determination. The order shall specifically
refer to the evidence proffered in support of and, if applicable, in opposition to
the motion that indicates no triable issue exists. The court shall also state its
                                        9
Here, the court complied with this requirement by issuing a two-page single-
spaced explanation of its ruling. It discussed the evidence (e.g., “[t]wo
appraisals were submitted by defendants”), the law (e.g., citing Mehrtash,
supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 75), and the application of law to evidence (e.g., “the
court may only consider the value at the time of the transfer”).
      Nevertheless, Kassab contends that the trial court erroneously denied
her request to prepare a statement of decision under section 632. A
statement of decision, however, is required only “upon the trial of a question
of fact by the court.” (Ibid.) Here, the trial court did not conduct a trial on a
question of fact. Indeed, the opposite occurred—the court concluded there
was no evidence creating a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the court was
not required to prepare a statement of decision.
      The trial court filed a written specification of reasons for granting the
motion. Nothing more was required.

F.   Any Issues Involving a Surviving Spouse’s Community Property Interest
     Are Outside the Pleadings and Were Not Required to Be Negated.

      Relying on Probate Code provisions involving a spouse’s obligation to
pay certain debts, Kassab contends that Kachi’s surviving spouse, Nour, is
legally responsible for some or all of the arbitral judgment. A defendant
moving for summary judgment, however, is only obligated to negate the
plaintiff’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint and need not refute
“liability on some theoretical possibility not included in the pleadings.”
(Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)
Because Kassab’s complaint does not allege any theories of liability other

reasons for any other determination. The court shall record its determination
by court reporter or written order.” (§ 437c, subd. (g).)
                                       10
than fraudulent conveyance of the Property and the insurance policy, neither
Kachi nor the trial court were obligated to consider any additional theories.

G.   No Request for a Continuance Was Made in the Trial Court, and in Any
     Event, the Issue Cannot Be Raised for the First Time in the Reply Brief.

      For the first time in her reply brief, Kassab contends that the trial
court should have continued the hearing to afford her an opportunity “to
correct any deficiencies” in her response to Kachi’s separate statement of
disputed material facts The record, however, does not indicate that Kassab
asked for a continuance. Moreover, “ ‘ “ ‘points raised in the reply brief for
the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure
to present them before.’ ” ’ ” (High Sierra Rural Alliance v. County of
Plumas (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 102, 111, fn. 2.)
      In any event, Kassab lost the summary judgment motion for lack of
admissible evidence, not because of any procedural deficiencies in her papers.
Thus, even assuming the court somehow erred in not continuing the hearing
on its own motion, there was no prejudice.

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                              DISPOSITION

     The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                  DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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