Court Opinion

ID: 9779151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:38:25.108739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:22.379745
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The Court abandoned the carving doctrine “for the compelling reason that it encourages crime,” Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, at 822 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) (Opinion on Rehearing), and opted for the “Blockburger rule” as the test to resolve jeopardy problems. Id., at 824. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). One day criminologists may determine how much crime in Texas has been discouraged since advent of McWilliams in 1982, but we already know the mischief caused by adopting “the strict construction of the Constitutions of the United States and of this State,” McWilliams, supra, at 824. It is again evident in the instant cause.
In its unpublished opinion the Waco Court of Appeals, failing like some other courts before it to comprehend what Blockburger v. United States is all about, invokes Blockburger as “the applicable test;” the fallacy in such opinions is a notion that Blockburger is a test for every jeopardy claim, when it is not.
Blockburger was, of course, a prosecution under federal law. As it was then, and still is now, the federal practice is to charge in an indictment as many counts as there are statutory offenses arising out of a transaction, and in one trial to obtain a jury finding on each count. The jeopardy question decided in Blockburger is whether an accused in such case may suffer multiple punishments — not multiple convictions. In McWilliams the majority seems to have overlooked that fine point.
“Since McWilliams we have been given to understand that when one act or transaction violates ‘two distinct statutory provisions,’ the ‘Blockburger test’ is purely a rule of statutory construction, utilized in what is ‘essentially a factual inquiry as to legislative intent [rather than] a conclusive presumption of law,’ Garrett v. United States, [471 U.S. 773], at 779, [105 S.Ct. 2407], at 2411-2412, [85 L.Ed.2d 764], at 771-772 [1985]; Whalen v. United States, [445 U.S. 684], at 708, [100 S.Ct. 1432, at 1446, 63 L.Ed.2d 715, at 734 (1980)] (Rehnquist dissenting); Rathmell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (Clinton dissenting, n. 6). Whether by Blockburger or other means a court has determined that the legislative body intended punishment for both offenses, it then must decide whether successive prosecutions axe barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause....”
Ex parte May, 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).* Accord: Ex parte Crosby, 703 S.W.2d 683, at 685 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); see Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d 513, 518 (CA5 1986).
*353Blockburger, then, is a test to determine legislative intent regarding multiple punishments in a single trial on an indictment alleging offenses in two or more counts, used only when an act or transaction violates at least “TWO distinct statutory provisions.” In the instant cause just ONE statutory provision was violated, and the Waco Court thought it was violated twice. However, as explained in the opinion of this Court, the same theft was alleged and proved in both separate criminal actions. Thus Blockburger has no application whatsoever.
With those observations. I join the opinion of the Court.

A11 emphasis is mine throughout unless otherwise noted.