Court Opinion

ID: 9757911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:04:02.377351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:45.496841
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING STATEMENT BY
LALLY-GREEN, J.:
¶ 1 The Majority holds that “H & R Block waived its challenge to the class certification by failing to challenge the Order granting certification during its cross-appeal.” Majority Opinion at 790. I respectfully disagree and, therefore, dissent.
*792¶ 2 As the Majority clearly explains in its procedural history, this is a class action case where the trial court initially granted summary judgment to H & R Block on all issues. Basile appealed. H & R Block filed a protective cross-appeal, but did not include within that cross-appeal a challenge to the trial court’s order certifying the class. After the appeal was decided by this Court, it was addressed by the Supreme Court, and then remanded to this Court.
¶ 3 On remand, this Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to H & R Block on Basile’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. This Court held that Ba-sile had presented a sufficient prima facie case to defeat H & R Block’s motion for summary judgment. This Court then remanded for a trial on the fiduciary duty claim. Before a trial on the remand took place, H & R Block filed a motion to decertify the class. The trial court granted this motion. Basile appealed to this Court. This is the appeal before us.
¶ 4 In my view, H & R Block was not “aggrieved” by the original order of the trial court because H & R Block had been granted summary judgment on all issues. Since H & R Block was not an “aggrieved party,” it had no right to appeal. See, Pa.R.A.P. 501 (“Except where the right of appeal is enlarged by statute, any party who is aggrieved by an appealable order ... may appeal therefrom.”) (Emphasis added). Rule of Appellate Procedure 511, regarding cross-appeals, does not provide that un-aggrieved appellees may file cross-appeals as a matter of course. To the- contrary, the Official Note to Rule 511 specifically provides: “An appellee should not be required to file a cross-appeal because the Court below ruled against it on an issue, so long as the judgment granted appellee the relief it sought.”
¶ 5 While H & R Block did file a protective cross-appeal, such an appeal was not necessary to preserve issues it may wish to argue, should the case be reversed on appeal. See, Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 888 A.2d 601, 607 n. 11, citing, Pa.R.A.P. 511, Official Note.
¶ 6 If H & R Block, as the winning party, was not required under the appellate rules to file a cross-appeal, then I respectfully disagree that “H & R Block waived its challenge to the class certification by failing to challenge the Order granting certification during its cross-appeal.” Majority Opinion at 790. I respectfully suggest that, under our current Rules of Appellate Procedure, since H & R Block was not an “aggrieved party,” it cannot be faulted for failing to raise issues in a “protective cross-appeal” that it was not required to file.3
¶ 7 Finally, my review of the relevant class action rules and case law fails to yield a time frame for filing a decertification motion, prior to a trial on the merits. “[0]ur class action rules contain no ex*793press time limit for decertifying a class so long as decertification takes place before reaching the merits. See, Pa. R.C.P. 1710(d).” Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 162 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 744, 829 A.2d 311 (2003). In the instant case, this Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. On remand, the trial court was prepared to hold a trial on this claim. At that point, H & R Block filed its decertification motion. On remand, the trial court had not yet “reached the merits” of the controversy. Thus, I would conclude that the court did not err by entertaining H & R Block’s motion. Because the Majority holds to the contrary, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.

. Moreover, I respectfully suggest that the Majority's reliance on Bird Hill Farms, Inc. v. United States Cargo & Courier Serv., Inc., 845 A.2d 900, 903 (Pa.Super.2004), is somewhat unclear. Bird Hill Farms stands for the proposition that once a final order has been entered, all earlier interlocutory orders are subject to review. Thus, as in Bird Hill Farms, if a plaintiff sues defendant A and defendant B, and the court grants summary judgment only to defendant A, that order is interlocutory because the case is still pending against defendant B. After the court grants summary judgment to defendant B, then the plaintiff can file an appeal at that time challenging both summary judgment orders. Id.
Bird Hill Farms focused on the timing of an appeal by an aggrieved party from more than one summary judgment order. Here, H & R Block was not an aggrieved party. Thus, I fail, respectfully, to see how Bird Hill Farms is helpful in the analysis of the case before us.