Court Opinion

ID: 9561078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:02:22.408754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:31.695214
License: Public Domain

Horowitz, J.
(dissenting) — The constitutional right of a defendant to a fair trial enjoined by the Fourteenth Amendment requires defendant be not deprived of the benefit of his applicable constitutional rights. Each constitutional right, to which a defendant is entitled, need not be justified by the same rationale. Thus the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be justified by the necessity of insuring the integrity of the fact-finding process (United States v. Penta, 475 F.2d 92 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 870, 38 L. Ed. 2d 88, 94 S. Ct. 89 (1973)), whereas, the justifying rationale of the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is its deterrent effect against illegal police behavior which violates the Fourth Amendment. Even if the Fourth Amendment may not bear directly upon the fact-finding process as does the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is still entitled to the benefit of the Fourth Amendment and therefore entitled to a trial free of evidence obtained by its violation. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 80 S. Ct. 1437 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 84 A.L.R.2d 933 (1961).
Moreover, insofar as the majority opinion makes it possible for the state to benefit from its violation of the Fourth Amendment by the use of a constitutionally tainted conviction, to that extent is the defendant deprived of his Fourth Amendment rights. The majority opinion makes that possible. That opinion, in effect, holds that although a prior *173conviction, reversed on Fourth Amendment grounds, cannot be used for impeachment purposes in a pending trial (see State v. Hill, 83 Wn.2d 558, 520 P.2d 618 (1974)), nevertheless, the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment will not serve to invalidate the conviction on a pending charge if the reversal occurs after the pending trial. By such a holding, the propriety of the use of the prior conviction is made to depend upon the speed with which the reversal is obtained — a ground irrelevant to constitutionally enjoined fair trial requirements. In addition, the decision to approve the use of a questionably valid and highly prejudicial prior conviction, then on appeal on Fourth Amendment grounds and reversed after conviction on the pending charge, could have the unfortunate effect of placing a premium on violation of the Fourth Amendment. It would create the expectation that such violation will be overlooked if the prior conviction is used prior to its reversal.
The majority opinion in support of its holding relies heavily upon United States v. Penta, supra, rejecting the rationale of Beto v. Stacks, 408 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1969). Penta distinguishes between admissibility of a prior conviction reversed after trial of a pending charge if reversal is based on a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, and the case of a conviction reversed after trial on a pending charge if based on the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Penta argues the violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel impairs the integrity of the fact-finding process whereas the violation of the Fourth Amendment does not. Inadequately considered is the fact that regardless of the existence of the distinction, a defendant is also entitled to the benefit of the Fourth Amendment and entitled to reversal of a conviction on the pending charge if he has been convicted by the use of evidence illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. A defendant’s constitutional right to receive a fair trial is not satisfied merely because his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel has *174been observed. Fair trial also requires a defendant not be convicted on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the conviction then to be used for the purpose of impairing the general credibility of the defendant in the trial of a later charge. The broad prohibition of the Fourth Amendment grants no such license for its violation. Nor does it indirectly condone such violation because the constitutionally infirm conviction is reversed after rather than before trial of the pending charge.
Beto v. Stacks, supra, the rationale of which the majority opinion rejects, rightly pointed out:
More importantly, a constitutional right is not to be disparaged because it bears less directly than another on the fact-finding process. The issue before this court turns on “the limitations which the Constitution places on state criminal procedures.” . . . Such limitations include not only “The recent right-to-counsel cases, starting with Gideon v. Wainright * * *,” but also “The exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments * * *.” . . . Since the Constitution requires that the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure be excluded at the first trial, no reason appears to allow a conviction based upon such tainted evidence to prejudice the defendant at a subsequent trial. To permit such a practice is to allow the accused to “suffer anew” the denial of his constitutional rights.
(Footnote omitted.) Beto v. Stacks, supra at 316-17.
It is true RCW 10.52.030 authorizes the admission in evidence of a prior conviction “for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony.” The statute, however, necessarily proceeds upon the assumption the prior conviction is a valid one. A reversed conviction is invalid. See State v. Hill, supra. Even a prior valid conviction may be misused. Beto v. Stacks, supra at 318 states:
[W]e must be cautious in the use of prior convictions to guard against the danger that the jury may subconsciously or overtly metamorphize evidence of prior crimes into proof of present guilt.
See concurring opinion of Rosellini, J.
*175I do not believe the legislature intended the inadmissibility of a reversed conviction to impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant to depend on whether the reversal occurred prior to its use at trial of a pending charge or thereafter. This does not mean a defendant cannot be retried — it merely means that upon a new trial being held on the pending charge, the constitutionally infirm conviction cannot be received in evidence for general impeachment purposes.
In the instant case the state undertook to benefit in the trial of the pending charge from the use over objection of a prior conviction then on appeal. It is only fair the state should assume the risk of reversal of the conviction so obtained. It matters not whether the reversal is obtained on Sixth or Fourth Amendment grounds. Each confers a constitutional right upon a defendant of which he may not be deprived. The other cases relied upon in the majority opinion to support its position are distinguishable and do not compel a result contrary to that here reached.
I agree with the Court of Appeals and would reverse for a new trial.
Utter, J., concurs with Horowitz, J.