Court Opinion

ID: 9519995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:29:00.425395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:25.562063
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RAKOWSKI, specially concurring: While the majority correctly follows Fefferman, I assert that the Fefferman holding is a misstatement of the precedent that it is purportedly based on as well as a perverse interpretation of section 3 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/3 (West 1994)). Accordingly, I write separately. The language at issue in section 3 is clear and unambiguous. It states: “The provisions of this Act hereinafter following shall apply automatically and without election to *** all employers and all their employees, engaged in any department of the following enterprises or businesses which are declared to be extra hazardous, namely: 1. The erection, maintaining, removing, remodeling, alteringt,] or demolishing of any structure.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/3 (West 1994). Prior to Fefferman, the supreme court had consistently assigned a commonsense interpretation to the above-emphasized language. In fact, the court in Walsh v. Industrial Comm’n, 345 Ill. 366, 178 N.E. 82 (1931), extensively considered the language of section 3, although it had already established the basic principles upon which this case is based. In Walsh, the court defined “business” as “an employment which occupies a substantial portion of the time and attention of one engaged in it.” Walsh, 345 Ill. at 369, 178 N.E. at 83; accord Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 407 Ill. 360, 366, 95 N.E.2d 482, 486 (1950) (following and quoting Walsh). It defined “maintain” as “ ‘the act of holding or keeping in any particular state or condition.’ ” Walsh, 345 Ill. at 369, 178 N.E. at 83; accord Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 407 Ill. at 366, 95 N.E.2d at 486 (following and quoting Walsh). Under these definitions and prior case law, the court held: “The line of demarcation between maintaining a structure as an incident rather than as a business, and the business of maintaining a structure, is not readily defined, but we are of the opinion that a safe rule is, that where one maintains buildings or structures for profit, whether that profit be as compensation for his services or by way of rentals received, and such maintenance requires a substantial portion of his time and attention, he must be said to be engaged in the business of maintaining a structure within the contemplation of the Workmen’s Compensation [A]ct.” Walsh, 345 Ill. at 370, 178 N.E. at 84. Accord Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 407 Ill. at 366-67, 95 N.E.2d at 486. Under these principles, the supreme court has repeatedly held employers whose principal business is to maintain structures as rental properties accountable under the Act pursuant to section 3. See Walsh, 345 Ill. at 370, 178 N.E. at 84 (concluding that employer who rented and maintained 10 buildings was liable under the Act when a worker was injured while repairing a roof of one of the properties); Rogalski v. Industrial Comm’n, 342 Ill. 37, 39-40, 173 N.E. 813, 814 (1930) (concluding that employer who owned, rented, and maintained property as well as a hotel was liable under the Act where claimant was injured while assisting in remodeling one of employer’s buildings); Jacobi v. Industrial Comm’n, 342 Ill. 210, 213-14, 173 N.E. 748, 749 (1930) (owner of a three-unit apartment building who lived in one unit, but rented the remaining, was liable under the Act where a painter fell from a ladder and suffered a fractured skull); Davis v. Industrial Comm’n, 297 Ill. 29, 30-32, 130 N.E. 333, 334 (1921) (owner of apartment buildings liable under the Act where claimant was injured while washing one of the owner’s buildings); Storrs v. Industrial Comm’n, 285 Ill. 595, 597, 121 N.E. 267, 267-68 (1918) (owner of rental properties liable under the Act where claimant was painting and calcimining one of the buildings and received a blinding injury to one of his eyes); Johnson v. Choate, 284 Ill. 214, 220, 119 N.E. 972, 974 (1918) (concluding that the defendant, who maintained and leased a large building, was liable under the Act to a worker injured while making plumbing repairs). Conversely, the court had held that employers who are performing maintenance work to their structures that is incidental to conducting their principal businesses are not subject to the Act pursuant to section 3. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 407 Ill. at 367, 95 N.E.2d at 486 (although electric and gas company leased some space in its headquarters to another tenant in the same building, the company was not liable under the Act for injuries to a window washer because rental of space was “so trifling” as not to constitute a business of the company); T. Johnson Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 306 Ill. 197, 201, 137 N.E. 789, 791 (1922) (a cooperage company that entered into contract for the painting of its smokestacks at its factory was not in business of maintaining a structure because its “buildings were only a necessary incident or means as a place of carrying on the business”); see also 1 T. Anger-stein, Illinois Workmen’s Compensation § 810, at 462 (1952) (“The maintaining of buildings occupied and used incident to the conducting a business or enterprise [is] not within the provisions of subsection 1 of section 3”). In 1969, the supreme court reapplied the above principles and rules in Pulliam, 43 Ill. 2d 364, 253 N.E.2d 448. In that case, Pulliam operated a funeral home business and employed claimant to drive ambulances and to help with funerals. When this work was slow, however, Pulliam also assigned claimant to paint the funeral home. The court decided that “a funeral home comes within that line of cases holding that the rental of a structure by the owner for profit constitutes maintaining a structure.” Pulliam, 43 Ill. 2d at 365-66, 253 N.E.2d at 459. The court reasoned: “The principal purpose of the funeral home is to provide a place for the family and friends of the decedent to view him and possibly conduct a funeral service there. The funeral service and viewing can [be], and sometimes [are], done in some other building. Nevertheless, the viewing and possibly the funeral service [are] normally conducted at a funeral home which is designed for this activity. While the cost of the use of the room or rooms and appurtenant facilities at the funeral home by the decedent, his family[,] and friends is not normally made as a separate charge, there is no doubt that such use constitutes a part of the charge by the funeral director. In short, the use of the funeral home for the activity conducted therein is not unlike the use of a hotel or motel room for lodging or a hall for a wedding reception or other ceremony.” Pulliam, 43 Ill. 2d at 366, 253 N.E.2d at 449. While the reasoning in Pulliam that the funeral home business is akin to a business of owning and managing rental properties is tenuous, it is nevertheless in accord with the aforementioned supreme court precedent. However, the court in Fefferman clearly misstates the holding in Pulliam. In Fefferman, the employer was in the business of supplying merchandise, textiles, government surplus, and hospital supplies. The employer stored these goods at a building that was held in trust for him and his family. In finding that employer was in the business of maintaining a structure, the court purportedly followed Pulliam. It stated in part: “Although Pulliam analogized the use of a funeral home to the renting of a hotel or motel room for a wedding reception or other ceremony, its clear rationale was that the building was a capital asset which had a noticeable or conspicuous impact on the generation of revenue from his business to the owner of the building. Pulliam effectively, albeit sub silentio, overruled the Walsh line of cases insofar as they held that maintaining a building as an incident to a business is not maintaining a structure under the Act.” (Emphasis omitted.) Fefferman, 71 Ill. 2d at 330, 375 N.E.2d at 1279. The court concluded that the trust property was a prominent aspect of employer’s revenue he received from his business. It reasoned that the property was a capital asset because he stored his goods there and that, consequently, there was no doubt that it contributed to the revenue, even if only indirectly. Fefferman, 71 Ill. 2d at 330, 375 N.E.2d at 1279; see also Graphic Group, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 1045, 522 N.E.2d at 131 (following Fefferman). As is readily apparent, the supreme court misstated the Pulliam decision and clearly disregarded its holding. In so doing, it rejected a long line of cases that applied a commonsense interpretation of section 3. Even worse, it ignored the plain and unambiguous language of that section. Pulliam did not in any way overrule the Walsh line of cases. Rather, it was the Fefferman court that changed the law. However, instead of being intellectually honest and saying so, it claimed the Pulliam court had changed the law. I respectfully submit that the proper interpretation of section 3 is the one followed in Walsh and its progeny. Unfortunately, the Fefferman court has left us with no choice but to disrespect the clear intent of the Act.