Court Opinion

ID: 9926014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 18:01:39.060539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.554784
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         JAN 23 2024
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ENGINEER.AI CORP., DBA Builder.AI, a No. 23-55055
Delaware corporation,
                                     D.C. No.
              Plaintiff-Appellant,   2:22-cv-03552-SPG-KS

  v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
BARRY B. KAUFMAN, an individual;
LAW OFFICES OF BARRY B.
KAUFMAN, a professional corporation,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Central District of California
                 Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

                    Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023
                             Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, R. NELSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

       Plaintiff, Engineer.AI, alleges that Defendants engaged in an intentional

campaign to damage its business. Plaintiff sued Defendants for (1) allegedly

defamatory statements made in a 2019 Wall Street Journal article (“WSJ Article”);

(2) an allegedly defamatory letter (“Lakestar Letter”) sent to Plaintiff’s investor,

       *     This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Lakestar Advisors GmbH (“Lakestar”); and (3) other allegedly unlawful and

unethical litigation conduct. The district court struck portions of the First Amended

Complaint and dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim as Plaintiff had

not plausibly alleged that Defendants had any involvement in the publication of the

WSJ Article. The district court also denied leave to amend, as Plaintiff’s claims

were barred by the relevant statute of limitations. We affirm.

      1. California’s litigation privilege, codified in California Civil Code Section

47(b), “applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve

the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to

the action.” Rusheen v. Cohen, 128 P.3d 713, 718 (Cal. 2006) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, “communications with some relation to judicial proceedings are

absolutely immune from tort liability by the litigation privilege.” Id. at 718–19

(citation and quotations omitted).

      Defendants sent a letter to one of Plaintiff’s investors, Lakestar, to request

investor presentations. Defendants thought that these presentations could assist it as

it investigated Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that in their request for documents,

Defendants intentionally misrepresented Plaintiff’s functionality, the conduct of its

officers, and its ongoing employee-related litigation.         Plaintiff’s arguments,

however, are misplaced. California’s litigation privilege extends to communications

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sent to nonparties if they possess a “substantial interest in the outcome of the

litigation.” Sharper Image Corp. v. Target Corp., 425 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1077 (N.D.

Cal. 2006) (quoting Costa v. Superior Ct., 204 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).

Here, Lakestar invested millions of dollars in Plaintiff, so it had a “substantial

interest” in ongoing litigation that might affect its investment in the company. Thus,

the district court properly ruled that the California litigation privilege shields

statements in the Lakestar Letter.

      Plaintiff also argues that the district court misapplied the litigation privilege

to several of Defendant’s allegedly unethical communications, such as

(a) “threaten[ing] EAI and its employees with administrative and/or civil actions,”

(b) “instructing Joiner and his wife to record privileged discussions,” and

(c) “threaten[ing] counsel with an administrative action in an attempt to gain an

advantage in a civil dispute.” Any alleged threats are still activities protected by the

litigation privilege because they were made in connection with ongoing litigation.

See Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 54 (Cal. Ct.

App. 2015) (applying the litigation privilege to “allegations that defendants solicited

and used confidential information for the purpose of filing various actions against

plaintiffs”).

      As for the alleged instructions to record privileged communications, they are

also shielded by the litigation privilege as they were made in relation to the

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underlying judicial proceedings.        Moreover, although Plaintiff argues in a

conclusory fashion that the instructions were unlawful, it has made no effort to show

that the conduct “was illegal as a matter of law.” Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2, 15

(Cal. 2006).

      2. The district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint because

Plaintiff had not “show[n] that Defendants played a role in the publication of the

WSJ Article.” Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient. In determining a lawyer’s

liability, California law distinguishes the conduct of a lawyer from that of the client.

See Rogers v. Peinado, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 817, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“The

client’s malice is not imputed to the attorney; rather, the liability of the attorney

depends upon the attorney’s own action of maliciously pursuing an objectively

untenable claim.”). Plaintiff only pleaded that it was “clear” that the WSJ Article

was instigated by ex-employees who were represented by Defendant.                  That

conclusory statement does not plausibly allege that Defendants were involved in the

publication of the WSJ Article.

      3. The district court’s denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion.

Plaintiff’s claim for defamation is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, Cal.

Civ. Proc. § 340, while Plaintiff’s remaining three claims are subject to a two -year

statute of limitations, see Cal. Civ. Proc. § 339. In California, the “statute of

limitations commence[s] . . . when the alleged defamatory statements [are]

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published.” Knoell v. Petrovich, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Here, the WSJ Article was published in 2019. Plaintiff did not file suit until almost

three years later. All claims were therefore time-barred. Amendment would be

futile.

          AFFIRMED.

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