Court Opinion

ID: 9838806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 06:06:26.261146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:49.571933
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                          COURT OF APPEALS

DAVID KRIEGER, ANDREW KRIEGER, JAMES                             FOR PUBLICATION
SPERLING, and MARGARET SPERLING, on                              September 7, 2023
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly                    9:05 a.m.
Situated,

              Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                No. 359895
                                                                 Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                                 LC No. 20-000094-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

              Defendants-Appellants.

THOMAS HOLLEY, KATHERINE HOLLEY,
MONTY WISEMAN, JILL WISEMAN, THOMAS
DECOE, MICHELLE DECOE, ROBERT
MISHLER, JR, and SUSAN MISHLER, on Behalf
of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,

              Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                No. 359896
                                                                 Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                                 LC No. 20-000102-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

              Defendants-Appellants.

CHRISTOPHER FORBES and LAURA FORBES,
on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated,

                                             -1-
             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                No. 359897
                                                 Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                 LC No. 20-000103-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

             Defendant-Appellant.

PAMELA FAGAN, NICOLE KRAMER, and
SANDFORD HARDWARE 1, LLC, on Behalf of
Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                No. 359898
                                                 Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                 LC No. 20-000111-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

CARL SWARTHOUT, on Behalf of Himself and All
Others Similarly Situated,

             Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                No. 359899
                                                 Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                 LC No. 20-000112-MZ
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

ROBERT WOODS and HOLLY JOHNSON, on
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                No. 359900

                                           -2-
                                                    Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                    LC No. 20-000116-MM
LAKES AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

            Defendants-Appellants,

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

            Defendant,

and

CITY OF SAGINAW,

            Other Party,

and

AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

            Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee.

JOE BRUNEAU, DAVID PHILLIPS, DANA
RALKO, PATTY RALKO, MARY RANDALL,
OSRO RANDALL, JAMES MRDUTT, and ALICIA
MRDUTT, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others
Similarly Situated,

            Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                   No. 359901
                                                    Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                    LC No. 20-000118-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

            Defendants-Appellants.

THOMAS BORCHARD, CHARLES BORCHARD,
DENNIS BORCHARD, SALLY BRADLEY,
CHRISTOPHER ICE, CDI CONSTRUCTION

                                              -3-
GROUP, INC, TOM MCCANN FAMILY, LLC,
JOHN MADDENS, TYLIA MADDENS, BRIAN
PARENT, SHASTA PARENT, BARBARA
STEVENS, TROY VALLEY, LAUREN VALLEY,
and ROBERT EMMET WITT REVOCABLE
LIVING TRUST,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                               No. 359902
                                                Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                LC No. 20-000121-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

PATRICK T. WORTLEY, doing business as
CRAWFORD INSURANCE AGENCY, KRYSTEIN
GILLETTE, JOSHUA GILLETTE, MATT
MCQUAID, MCQUAID MASONRY, LLC,
STEPHANIE O’DELL, MIKE ROBERSON,
RONALD ROENICKE, SANFORD CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, SCOTT HARRIS, doing business as
SCOTT HARRIS BUILDER, CAROL SIEG, and
KENNETH SIEG,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                               No. 359903
                                                Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                LC No. 20-000140-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

DARYL ZELENAK, SUZETTE GAY-ZELENAK,
MIKE CALLAN, and REGAN WEILAND, on
Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly
Situated,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                         -4-
v                                               No. 359904
                                                Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                LC No. 20-000151-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

PLEASANT BEACH MOBILE HOME RESORT,
LLC, CAROL CLARKSON, DAVE CLARKSON,
BRIAN MATTHIAS, PATRICK PANGLE,
PATRICIA PANGLE, JARED NICKEL, MID
MICHIGAN PRESSURE CLEANING, LLC, MID
MICHIGAN WINDOW CLEANING & POWER
WASHING, LLC, doing business as MID
MICHIGAN CARPET CLEANING, JULIE VAN
AMEYDE, JOHN SMILNAK, RANDALL MIER,
and KIM MIER, on Behalf of Themselves and All
Others Similarly Situated,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                               No. 359905
                                                Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                LC No. 20-000156-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

             Defendants-Appellants.

PAUL CODER, JASON DERUS, KURT FAUST,
REBECCA FAUST, CARL STEVEN KOCKS,
LISA KOCKS, ROBERT MUSSELL, JOY
MUSSELL, ROSS NOEL, KAREN NOEL,
WAYNE SHANDS, CAROL SHANDS, DENICE
TRUELOVE, LUKE DINNAN, JILL DINNAN,
MICHELL LAFOND, RYAN RICHMOND,
SARAH RICHMOND, JOHN DOWGIALLO, and
SANDRA DOWGIALLO,

             Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                               No. 359906
                                                Court of Claims

                                         -5-
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT         LC No. 20-000230-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

TINA REINIG, GLORIA GROVER, MARY MAY,
RAUL VELASCO, RICHARD WOLF, RONALD
KIPFMILLER, MARK LICKTEIG, SHANE
NICKERSON, TERRY VISNAW, KARIE
DINGMAN, JOSEPH KRUEGER, CLEORIA
FRENCH, LAWRENCE DUREK, JARED
BRUNER, LORI FEINAUER, MARQUETTA
MAXWELL, TEAL SAYLOR, JODY ROGERS
RODRIGUEZ, TERRA DESHIELDS, JAMES
SMAZENKA, WADE WHITE, THOMAS
SHEPHERD, MELISSA WINCHELL, JUDY
KOEPPLINGER, JORDAN EDWARDS, JERRY
VESPRINI, CINDY LONG, TIMOTHY APPLE,
STEVE WHITE, LYN KNAPP, WILLIAM
VASICEK, MICHAEL LANDON, LINDA
CHARTRAND, MERLE LEMAIRE, MARY
WEILAND, LAWRENCE JURLOWSKI, JOHN
MONROE, JAMES PLATKO, JAMES
BRASSEUR, DAN ABBE, DENZEL MARTIN,
GAIL HAK, KEVIN STOKES, JAMES
MCGUINNESS, RUSSELL KLEINHANS,
JENNIFER HOUTRIDES, JEFFREY ESCKILSEN,
ARTHUR KICKLAND, WILSON GUM, DIANA
WILSON, RUTH FRANKLIN, TIMOTHY BELL,
ALENE MCCOY, BHARATI SHARMA, BILL
DEHAAN, ROBERT ORRYS, HOWARD
LOGSDON, JAROD SCHALK, LEE SHELDON,
ELMER LAPERE, WILLIAM PRECZEWSKI,
LEONARD WILLIS, TIM HAKES, KATHY
PARRENT, JOSEPH KOZLOWSKI, BARBARA
MCLEAN, DAWN GLESNER, KEVIN GREEN,
PHILLIP MAXWELL, HELEN JOHNSON, JANE
DARBY, RITA KRAWIEC, TERRY THOMPSON,
SIGNEY CASE, DAVID BURKHART, PAUL
IDZIKOWSKI, JUDITH MARSH, BART JONES,
SUGENDRINI PONNAMPALAM, ANN
LAZZARO, DOUGLAS ARNOLD, WILLIAM
DURAND, DINO VESPRINI, LANCE COOK,
KELSEY FINNEY, JEFFREY GREEN, TRACY

                                   -6-
SCHOLTZ, ASA MAY, JANET GUILLIFORD,
MARY HUNTLEY, LYLE BINIECKI, MARK
BURCH, ROBIN ODELL, PATRICIA PUNG,
JOHN LUESING, ROBERT MATHIS, DENISE
BOMAN, ROBERT HOFFMAN, BARBARA
SCHOMER, LAWRENCE PIOTROWSKI,
DEBORA MEYER, TODD MUNGER, EVELYN
DARK, DONNA LEE ATHERTON, STEVEN
PARKHURST, LARRY GRELL, LOREN
WALDIE, PATRICIA LAWRENCE, FRANK
HEAD, BRIAN DANKERT, MARIA URSUY,
JAMES FORST, STEVEN MILLS, RONALD
BOWMAN, KAREN SANDERS, KEITH POPOUR,
DWAYNE DRYS, ROY CURLEY, GLORIA
TAYLOR, RODNEY FROST, CHARLES
WALKER, MARJORIE MCFARLANE, JACK
KELLY, JANET STOIKE, VALERIE WALTERS,
SHEILA CASE, CHRIS WAGNER, CHARLES
BIRDEN, JAMES SIMON, ROBERT MCMANUS,
BARBARA WARNER, CURT SEITZ, TIMOTHY
PENNINGTON, PETRINA RICE, AMY
SCHNEIDER, ROBERT BUNKER, SHARON
PARKER, ROBERT MASON, BARBARA
LOOMIS, KIMBERLY POHL, WAYNE
MITCHELL, JAMES BRUBAKER, CAROL
YOUNGBLOOD, ROBERT YOUNGBLOOD,
EMILY SIMBECK, BRUCE RICH, DAVID
ALEXANDER, EDITH MASON-MEAD,
GORDON HUCKINS, LESLIE TRELFA,
RICHARD WARE, KENNETH MADISON,
ANDREA ZOMERFELD, DONNA SZYMANSKI,
JILL COUCH, SANDRA HEWITT, RONALD
SCHWENN, CYNTHIA PACKARD, SUSAN
KLICH, PRICILLA COREY, MARK
TRANCYGIER, JOHN J. FREHLING, RAYMOND
DARABOS, JOHN E. FREHLING, BRIAN
COONS, JAMES BLIMKA, HARRY NOWACKI,
GREG PAXTON, RALPH BURKE, CHRIS
TORBET, BETTY ATHEY, CHAD CHANDLER,
JANET KNAPP, RUSSELL JINKS, RANDY
ZDENEK, DIANE DYMCZYK, MICHELLE
DOEDE, JENNA POST, CRAIG KULESZA,
GORDON BIRKMEIER, PATRICIA BIRKMEIER,
GARY NORTH, JOHN JUCIUS, CATHY
SCHILINSKI, ROBERT FRANKS, TIM WESSON,
JOHN MONTGOMERY, CHARLES STEFFEY,

                                 -7-
SANDRA BURNHAM, CHRISTENE HILL, R.
DEAN COOPER, RUTH ANN BAZZANI, DAVID
CHARBONNEAU, YVONNE MARTIN,
ANTHONY PIWOWARSKI, IRENE
PIWOWARSKI, THOMAS STADLER, MARTIN
BONNER, SHAWN INGLES, MARK MARTIN,
and ARTHUR DUBAY,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                        No. 359907
                                         Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT         LC No. 20-000232-MZ
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

DONALD TURSKEY, TERESA TURSKEY, ERIC
TURNQUIST, KURT STANLEY, JASON
PARSONS, TINA PARSONS, KATHLEEN
CHORBAGIAN, MARK CHORBAGIAN, JOSEPH
UHELSKI, BECKY UHELSKI, DUANE
WHITMAN, BRENDA WHITMAN, JEFFREY
KRIEBEL, BROOKE KRIEBEL, JAMES
RODGERS, MARY RODGERS, CHRIS MILLER,
TERRY MILLER, REX CLARK, and NANCY
CLARK,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                        No. 359908
                                         Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT         LC No. 20-000233-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

          Defendant-Appellant,

and

MARIO FUSCO and LUKE TRUMBLE,

          Defendants.

                                   -8-
BOB BEAUCHAMP, DEBBIE BEAUCHAMP,
WILLIAM BOYD, GLENDA BOYD, JOYCE
BREWSTER, JEFFREY BRUSHABER, JENNIFER
BRUSHABER, SHARON CAMPBELL, PAUL
CLARK, MARK DOTY, BARBARA DOTY,
ELEANOR GURICH, THOMAS HERBER,
NATALIE HERBER, DOUG JANES, PAM JANES,
TRENTON JOSLIN, ASHLEY JOSLIN, MICHAEL
PETTYES, LISA PETTYES, GERALD
PSCHOLKA, SANDRA PSCHOLKA, CHARLES
REESE, JOYCE RELITZ, BRIAN TALKINGTON,
TINA TALKINGTON, JEFFREY TIMMONS, LISA
TIMMONS, ROBB WEBBER, ANITA WEBBER,
JOHN WILLING, ROBERT DALE, TINA DALE,
THEODORE YANKO, and NANCY YANKO,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                        No. 359909
                                         Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT         LC No. 20-000235-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

          Defendant-Appellant.

AFFILIATED FM INSURANCE COMPANY,
ALTMAN MANAGEMENT, LLC, AMERICAN
GUARANTEE & LIABILITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, AXIS SURPLUS INSURANCE
COMPANY, CITIZENS INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA, CITIZENS INSURANCE
COMPANY OF MIDWEST, CONIFER
INSURANCE COMPANY, ESSENTIA
INSURANCE COMPANY, FACTORY MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY, FARM BUREAU
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF
MICHIGAN, FLORIST MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY HORTICA, HASTINGS MUTUAL
INSURANCE, and HOUSTON CASUALTY
COMPANY UK BRANCH SUBSCRIBING TO
UMR REF NO. B128417631W20, Subrogee of
DOLLAR GENERAL CORPORATION, and
INDEPENDENT SPECIALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, Subrogee of ALTMAN
MANAGEMENT, LLC, and INDIAN HARBOR

                                  -9-
INSURANCE COMPANY, INTERSTATE FIRE &
CASUALTY COMPANY, Subrogee of ALTMAN
MANAGEMENT, LLC, and LEXINGTON
INSURANCE COMPANY, MEEMIC
INSURANCE, NATIONAL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE, PIONEER MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, PRINCETON EXCESS AND
SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE COMPANY,
TELEPHONE & DATA SYSTEMS, INC.,
TRISURA SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. VPC-
CN0000010-05, Subrogee of NICHOLAS CHAD,
and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO.
NCIP648136-2019, Subrogee of MATTHEW
GEHREHKE, and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS
AT LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO
POLICY NO. NCIP407517-2019, Subrogee of
JOSEPH HARRIS, and CERTAIN
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON
SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. NCIP660734-
2019, Subrogee of TIM HUVER, and CERTAIN
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON
SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO. NCIP750302,
Subrogee of LISA KABAT, and CERTAIN
UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S LONDON
SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO NCIP823658,
Subrogee of JAMES LYNCH and ASHLEY
LYNCH, and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NO. NCIP807996-2020, Subrogee of CHARLES
MICHAEL, and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NO. NCIP00631003, Subrogee of MEGAN
MICHAELS and JACOB MICHAELS, and
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO.
844682-2020, Subrogee of JODY NEIMAN, and
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO.
NCIP878669, Subrogee of LARRY PARSONS, and
CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO.
NCIP303385-2020, Subrogee of DANIEL

                                    -10-
REAUME, and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NO. NCIP576330-2019, Subrogee of MARK
SPRAGUE, and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT
LLOYD’S LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY
NO. NCIP616384, Subrogee of JASON THOMAS,
and CERTAIN UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S
LONDON SUBSCRIBING TO POLICY NO.
DNAPF006484-00, Subrogee of TRI-CITY EQUITY
GROUP, LLC,

            Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                             No. 359910
                                              Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and           LC No. 20-000236-MM
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

            Defendants-Appellants,

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

            Defendant.

BRIAN BAILEY, KENDRICK BELCHER,
JENNIFER BELCHER, STEPHEN BLOOD,
JOYCE LONG, NATHAN BROOKS, KRISTEN
BROOKS, WARD COMER, PATRICIA COMER
TODD DENNIS, MARK GAHRY, YVONNE
GAHRY, JOHN GRAPPIN, GLORIA GRAPIPN,
SCOTT GRATOPP, DANNEILLE GRATOPP,
SECOND LAKE MARINA, ROBERT GRATOPP,
SCOTT GRATOPP, CARY GREZESZAK,
TAMARA GREZESZAK, JOYCE GREZESZAK,
SCOTT HADDON, ERIKA HADDON, MICHAEL
JASINSKI, MARY JASINSKI, NANCY LASKEY,
EARL LEWIS, RITA LEWIS, RANDY LONG,
DIANE LONG, ROBERT LONG, BRENDA LONG,
DARWIN MAGNUS, DIANE MAGNUS,
GREGORY MULCAHY, COLLEEN MULCAHY,
GORDON NICHOLS, KINDRA NICHOLS,
JACQUELINE OWENS, LEONARD OZERAJTYS,

                                     -11-
SHAWN OZERAJTYS, JOHN RAHN, MARY
BETH FERGUSON-RAHNM, TRINA REIF,
Beneficiary of the CLARK TRUST, COREY
ROBINSON, CHAD TOMS, Trustee of the TOMS
FAMILY TRUST, DAWN TOMS, DANIEL
TURLEY, AMY TURLEY, NICHOLAS
UNSWORTH, VANESSA UNSWORTH, SCOTT
WINTERLEE, TERRI WINTERLEE, MELISSA
DAWES, GEORGE WISKUP, and JULIE WISKUP,

           Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                          No. 359911
                                           Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT           LC No. 20-000237-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

           Defendant-Appellant.

EDWARD BERKOBIEN, CAITLYN LAPLOW,
ARMANDO RAMOS, RANDY R. RICE, JAMES
ANTAL, AMY BLAKE, EUGENE BECKHAM,
MADELINE BERKOBIEN, CATERA
CAMPBELL, TIMOTHY CRAWFORD,
GERALYN DUST, JILL HOGENSON, KYNAN
FOERSTER, RACHEL GUENTENSBERGER,
MARC HILDERBRANDT, JILL HOGENSON,
JUSTIN LAPLOW, CHADWICK LAROEQUE,
MICHELLE OSTAHOWSKI, ARMANDO
RAMOS, WILLIAM CHARLES REESE, RANDY
R. RICE, NORMAN ROSENBROEK, NICOLE
ROUSSEAU, CHARLES SCHOENMEYER,
WALLY SLEEPER, KLAUS SOMMER, LAURA
SWETT, HENRY THOMPSON, ROBERT
TWEDDLE, LAWRENCE VERGA III, CINDY
VERONESI, KRISTA WALTZ, BETH
WOODCOCK, DAVID WOODWARD, and DAVID
ZAHN,

           Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                          No. 359912
                                           Court of Claims

                                   -12-
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT          LC No. 20-000239-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

ANDREA JAMROG,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                         No. 359913
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT          LC No. 20-000240-MZ
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

MICHAEL ADAMS, THOMAS DECOE,
KATHERINE HOLLEY, JILL WISEMAN,
DARLENE ADOLPH, ROSARIO AGNELLO,
KELLY AIKEN, ERIC ALARIE, KIM AMBS,
FRANK ANDERA, PATRICIA ATHEY, KAREN
AVERY, MADELINE AYERS, REX BADDER,
RANDOLPH BAUMGARTER, KELLY BEARD,
COLLEEN BEAUDOING, LAURA BECKER,
JOHN BENCI, THOMAS JOHN BENDER,
CAROLYN BENKO, RENEE BERGER, DALE
BISCHER, STUART BLOOMFIELD, DAVID
BLUMLO, THOMAS BOEHM, RENITA
BONADIES, BRENT BONNER, CASEY BOOTH,
BARBARA BORN, PAUL BOURGEAU, DONALD
BOYER, DONALD BRADLEY, SCOTT BRADY,
JOHN BRANDON, DAVID BREASBOIS,
RHONDA BRECKON, CRAIG BREWSTER, SR.,
JAMES BRICAULT, DOROTHY BRISTER,
COLEEN BROOKS, JENNIFER BROWN, NANCY
BROWN, MARSHA BRUBAKER, MICHAEL
BRUNS, MALCOLM BRYANT, MICHAEL
BUDA, JENNIFER BURNS, JOSHUA BURNS,
LARRY BUTCHER, RUTH ANN BUTLER,
SHANNYN CALDWELL, ROBIN CAMPBELL,
CARLOS CAMPBELL, DIABENESE CAMPBELL,
RICHARD CAMPBELL, VIRGINIA CAMPBELL,

                                   -13-
ROBIN CAMPBELL, RONNIE CARSON,
MATTHEW CAY, JUDY CHASTAIN, CHRIST
CHRISTODOLU, DONALD CIANEK, JOHN
CIKALO, RODNEY CLARE, JEFFREY CLARK,
RYAN CLARK, WILLIAM CLARK, TAMARA
CLARK-MOORE, SHERRY CLEMONS, LINDA
CLEVER, LARRY CLIPPER, LINDSAY
COCHRAN, KRISTIE COCKING, CHARLES
COLLEY, DREW COLLINS, DARIN CORBAT,
CATHERINE COX, JUDITH COX, RUSSELL
CRAIG, LINDA CRISWELL, CHARLES
CUTCHER, SALOMEY DARABOS, PAULINE
DAVIS, KELLY DAY, MICHELLE DECOE, ELLA
DELDUCA, MARSHA DEMARS, VERA DICE,
HAROLD DICKERSON, ARTHUR DIETRICH,
GREGORY DOMAGALSKI, ROGER
DOMINOWSKI, TRULY DOMINOWSKI,
PATRICK DOUGLAS, SUZANNE DOWNEY,
DONALD DRAYTON, ARTHUR DUBAY,
ANTOINETTE DUNIKOWSKI, THOMAS
DYMORA, JUDY EICHMAN, DAVID ENGWIS,
PHILLIP ERWAY, CHARLES ERWELL, CATHY
FARRAND, MICHILLE FEDERER, CHARLES
FERGREUS, DIANE FEJEDELEM, GERTRUDE
FERNETTE, MARCELLA FERRIGAN, TYLER
FINNEY, RICHARD FIX, FLATS
CONDOMINIUM CAMPGROUND, SANDRA
FLATT, SUE FLATTERY, DANIEL FLUM,
KATHLEEN FOGUS, KIM FOURNIER,
GREGORY FOYE, TERESA FRIEDLE, JAMES
FROST, SUE FRY, SCOTT FULLER, DANIEL
GADWELL, RICHARD GAFT, LOIS
GALLIMORE, DAVID GALLT, KEVIN
GARTUNG, BARBARA GARZA, VERNON
GEHRLS, JOEL GERENDASY, DAVID
GERMAIN, FRANK GIANNATTASIO, JEFFREY
GIBSON, SUSAN GOULETTE, NINA GRAHAM,
KRISTY GRAPPIN, DONALD GRAVES,
HAROLD GREBLO, JACOB GREEN, WINONDA
GREEN, EARL B. GREGORY, PETER
GREGORY, CHERYL GRIFFIN, PATTI GRUZIN,
ELIZABETH HACKWORTH, SHANE HADOUS,
JEFFREY HANH, AMY HAINES, KAREN
HAMILTON, THOMAS HAMMOND, ROXANNE
HARLESS, KIMBERLY HARTMAN, LANDRA
HARTMAN, ELIZABETH HARTWICK, CINDY

                                 -14-
HEDRICH, THOMAS HELDT, KENNETH HELM,
CHERYL HILBRANDT, RONDALD
HILBRANDT, ANN HILGENDORF, DOUGLAS
HILL, GAIL HINKLEY, BRIAN HOCK, LISA
HOFFERT, THOMAS HOHENSEE, THOMAS
HOLLEY, RICHARD HOSFORD, BOBBIE
HOSKINS, TABITHA HOSKINS, NORMA
HOWE, DONNA HRYNEZUK, CASH HUBBARD,
BARBARA HUCKINS, HOWARD HUGHES,
CLYDE HULLETT, ROBERT HUNTOON,
LANCE IRELAND, CHARLES IRELAND II,
LYNN IRISH, KATHY JERRY, JOSEPH
JESSELAITIS, RICHARD JODTS, BARBARA
JOHNSON, JENNIFER JOHNSON, ROBERT
JOHNSON, SYLVIA JORDAN, AGNES KADLEE,
CAROL KAWECK, CYNTHIA KEHOE,
KIMBERLY KELLOGG, MICHAEL J. KELLY,
RUTH KENNEDY, PATRICK KENNEDY,
KATHLEEN KENWORTHY, GREGORY
KESSLER, FLOYD KILBREATH, MARY
KINASZ, PATTI KING, CHRISTOPHER
KINSMAN, NANCY KIRKBY, KARIN
KLAWENDER, RANDY KLUMP, DOROTHY
KOCSIS, NANCY KOENIG, MARK
KOWALCZYK, CHARLES KRAEMER, ERIC
KRAFT, CLARK KREUTZBERG, LOUIS KRICK,
CINDY KROL, LONNIE KUBIK, WADE
KUNISH, KIP KUSSRO, REBECCA KWATER,
TIMOTHY LACROSS, BRUCE LAMB, SANDRA
LANSING, JUSTIN LAPLOW, MESHELL
LARSON, SUE LAUER, DEBORAH LAWLER,
LINDA LECKRONE, CHRISTINE LEGACY,
ROBERT LEIGEB, BONNIE LEITZ, LISA
LEMIEUR, RONAN LER, ROBERT LEMER,
KATHY LYNN LEVELY, KEVIN LIEBETREU,
EDWARD LINCOLN, ANITA LOPEZ, JEANETTE
LOVELESS, ERIC LURINS, MARY LYNCH,
RICHARD LYONS, PAUL MADDEN, VALERIE
MALKIN, DANIEL MALLOY, JOSEPH
MANELIS, JAMES MANN, JOYCE MANSFIELD,
KRISTINE MANWELL, MARGARET MASTERS-
JUN, TAWSE MATTHES, MARY MATTHESS,
VIOLET MCCREADIE, FREADA MCDANIELS,
PEGGY MCDANIELS, AGNES MCDONALD,
FLOYD MCDONALD, ROBERT MCDONALD,
NORMAN MCGARRY, ROBERT MCGINNIS,

                                -15-
MARGO MCIVOR, MAC MCKELLAR, JOYCE
MCLAUGHLIN, JUDY MERTES, RAYMOND
MEYER, LISA MEYER, CRISTIAN MICLEA,
DELBERT MIDDLETON, LINDA MIDDELSEN,
JAMES LAMONT MILLER, CARLTON MILLS,
BECKY MINNIS, CAROL MITCHELL, DAWN
MOBLEY, SEAN MOBLEY, CHRISTOPHER
MOHN, JORDAN MOORE, MARTHA MOORE,
CHARLES MUIRHEAD, CHARLES MUIRHEAD
II, HAROLD MURPHY, WILLIAM MURRAY,
ALEXANDRA MUTER, DARYELL NATZEL,
SALLY NAYLOR, JEAN NAYLORE, CHRISTINE
NEILSON, PATRICK NIELSON, JAMES
NEMETH, JAMES NEVEAU, JR., DWIGHT
NEWPORT, KIMBERLY NICHOLLS, ERIC
OBOYLE, CAROLYN OCHAB, MATTHEW
OLSON, LUANNE OSTERGREN, JOYCE
OSTRANDER, PENNY OWNES, JODY PAGEL,
DANNY PARKINSON, DAVID PASEK,
ANDREW PASSARIELLO, DALE PATENAUDE,
SHERI PAWLOWSKI, BRIDGETT PETSNICK,
WILLIAM PFLUEGER, RONALD PLATT,
MARVIN PLOTZKA, NORMAN PLOTZKA,
SUSAN POLITO, NICHOLAS POSUNIAK,
SANDRA PREIMER, EUGENE PROSS, KEITH
PROSS, NANCY QUEEN, PATRICIA RAMBO,
MARK RAMER, LUANN RAMER, DANIEL
REAUME, CHARLES REESE, SHAWN REILLY,
AMANDA REINKE, MILFORD RICE, APRIL
ROBINSON, SANDRA ROLANDS, DOROTHY
ROSE, TERREL ROSS, VIRGINIA ROUSSEAU,
CHRISTOPHER RUBIS, ANNETTE RUBY,
STEPHEN RUPP, JOSEPH RYAN, CAROL
RZENDZIAN, MARK SADEK, ROBIN
SANBURN, BRAD SAUVE, ROBERT
SCHERZER, MAUREEN SCHMIDT, LISA
SCHMITTLING, MARK SCHMITZ, JENNY
SCHMITZER, STEVEN SEDLAR, MARGARET
SEE, CHARLENE SHEAR, DANIEL SHERIDAN,
CARRY SHINKEL, RONALD SIZELAND,
RAYMOND SLAVENS, WALLY SLEEPER,
RICHARD SMITH, GAIL SMITH, RONALD
SMITH, TIMOTHY SMITH, EDWARD
SOMMERFIELD, MICHELLE SOWA, CYNTHIA
SOWINSKI, JOANNE SPARKS, PATRICIA
SPENCER, KENNETH SPITLER, CRYSTAL

                                -16-
STARKEY, JOHN STASA, RICHARD STASA,
JAMES STECK, JAMES STICKLE, GRACE
STINTON, RUTH STOINSKI, BETTY STRICKER,
MARIA LISA STRUSSIONE, ROBERT STUPAR,
BRIAN STURZA, STACY SUMMERS, EILEEN
SURBROOK, KIRK SUTLIFF, MARIAN
SUTTON, JAMES TANNER, KAREN DIANE
TAYLOR, THOMAS TEER, PARTRICIA
THEOBALD, BEATA THIERRY, DONNA
THOMAS, AMY THOMAS, KELVIN THOMAS,
MALERIE THOMASON, JAMES THUNBERG,
JUDITH TIBURZI, DAVID TROMBLEY,
DOROTHY TURRELL, DEBRA VANHORN,
SHARON VANY, LAWRENCE VERGA III, JULIE
VEZINIA, JOHN VINSON, AARON WAGNER,
KURT WAGNER, PHILIP WALKER, ROY
WALKER, KENNETH WEBER, MELISSA-RAE
WELCH, DEBRA WHEATLEY, MARCIA WHITE,
SUSANA WIATR, DAVID WILLIAMS, GAIL
WILSON, MARK WILSON, ROBERT
WISCHMEYER, CHARLES WISE, MONTY
WISEMAN, TODD WITTBRODT, GLORIA
WORSHAM, VERNON YASCOLT, DENNIS
YIATRAS, and BONNIE ZAWISLAK,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                         No. 359914
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT          LC No. 20-000241-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
ALLSTATE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY, ALLSTATE
INDEMNITY COMPANY, ALLSTATE VEHICLE
AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY INSURANCE
COMPANY, ALLSTATE NEW JERSEY
PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY, ALLSTATE TEXAS LLOYDS, and

                                   -17-
ALLSTATE FIRE AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
COMPANY,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                         No. 359915
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and       LC No. 20-000245-MM
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

          Defendants-Appellants,

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL and STATE OF
MICHIGAN,

          Defendants.

JOEL HALLIDAY, DEBBIE HALLIDAY, BRIAN
HENRY, LINDSEY HENRY, KENNETH WADE
HOOD, MACKENZIE KASTL, JESS KING,
MICHAEL KUBACKI, CYNTHIA KUBACKI,
SUZANNA MCARDLE, GREGORY MENARD,
LORI MENARD, and JONATHAN NEWPORT,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                         No. 359916
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT          LC No. 20-000257-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NEW YORK, AMERICAN
BANKERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF
FLORIDA, AMERICAN SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY, LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY, SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                   -18-
HISCOX SYNDICATES LIMITED,
PROGRESSIVE MICHIGAN INSURANCE
COMPANY, PROGRESSIVE MARATHON
INSURANCE COMPANY, WESTPORT
INSURANCE CORP, ALLIANZ GLOBAL RISKS
US INSURANCE COMPANY, and AMERICAN
STRATEGIC INSURANCE CORP,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                         No. 359917
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and       LC No. 20-000246-MM
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT
LAKES, AND ENERGY,

          Defendants-Appellants,

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

          Defendant.

STEVEN OARD, LORRAINE ROTTMAN,
AUGUSTINE SALAS, LAURA SWETT,
WILLIAM WEBER, SHARON WOODWARD,
JOHN YAKICH, and ROBERTA ZIMMERMAN,

          Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                         No. 359918
                                          Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT          LC No. 20-000260-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

          Defendants-Appellants.

DONNA ARNOLD, JOSEPH BALHORN,
CYNTHIA BALHORN, ANTHONY BAX, RICK
BISHOP, WILLIAM BRANDIMORE, and KAIR
COUGHLIN,

                                   -19-
                Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                    No. 359919
                                                                     Court of Claims
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT, GREAT                                     LC No. 20-000262-MM
LAKES, AND ENERGY and DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

                Defendants-Appellants.

Before: GARRETT, P.J., and K. F. KELLY and HOOD, JJ.

GARRETT, P.J.

        These consolidated appeals stem from the failure of the Edenville Dam in May 2020, which
resulted in devastating flooding and property damage to nearby residents. Plaintiffs brought claims
of inverse condemnation against state defendants for damaging their property without providing
just compensation. Plaintiffs’ allegations focus primarily on actions taken by the Department of
Environment, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) that contributed to the dam failure. Defendants
moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by invoking governmental immunity,
despite acknowledging that immunity did not apply to constitutional claims such as inverse
condemnation. The Court of Claims instead reviewed defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8)
because defendants’ argument—that plaintiffs’ allegations were inadequate to satisfy the elements
of an inverse condemnation claim—sounded akin to a motion for failure to state a claim on which
relief can be granted. Unlike motions for summary disposition reviewed under subrule (C)(7),
motions evaluated under subrule (C)(8) consider whether the plaintiffs alleged a legally sufficient
claim by looking to the pleadings alone and accepting their factual allegations as true. Confining
its review to plaintiffs’ complaints, the Court of Claims concluded that plaintiffs pleaded viable
inverse condemnation actions and therefore denied summary disposition to defendants on those
claims.1

       On appeal, defendants challenge to the Court of Claims’ decision is twofold. First,
defendants contend that the Court of Claims erroneously applied the standards of MCR
2.116(C)(8) to review their motion for summary disposition. Properly reviewed, defendants assert,
the Court of Claims should have considered hundreds of pages of publicly available documentary
evidence that contradict plaintiffs’ factual allegations. Applying well-settled precedent, we hold

1
  The Court of Claims’ order denying summary disposition only listed EGLE and the Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) as defendants, but a few complaints also stated claims against the
Attorney General, the State of Michigan, and other government officials. We use “defendants” to
refer collectively to all defendants named in plaintiffs’ complaints. Because plaintiffs’ allegations
primarily relate to actions taken by EGLE, we will refer to particular defendants individually as
necessary.

                                                -20-
that the Court of Claims correctly evaluated defendants’ motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and appropriately limited its analysis to a review of the pleadings. Second,
defendants argue that, even confined to the pleadings, plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to state
a claim for inverse condemnation. Again, we disagree. Accepting plaintiffs’ factual allegations
as true, which we must at this stage, plaintiffs adequately alleged the elements of a viable inverse
condemnation claim. We affirm.

                                  I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        The parties dispute many key facts. But as we will discuss, our appellate posture is a review
of defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore, when reciting
contested facts, we accept the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints as true and construe those
allegations in plaintiffs’ favor. See Johnson v Pastoriza, 491 Mich 417, 435; 818 NW2d 279
(2012).

                                 A. EDENVILLE DAM FAILURE

       The Edenville Dam was built in 1924 to hold back water from the Tittabawassee and
Tobacco Rivers. The dam formed Wixom Lake, crossing portions of Midland County and
Gladwin County. Boyce Hydro Power, LLC (Boyce), a private company, purchased the Edenville
Dam in 2004. Boyce acquired a license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
to operate the dam to generate hydroelectric power.2 Boyce had a long history of noncompliance
with regulatory requests from FERC to upgrade the dam. Federal regulators warned Boyce that
the dam was not structurally adequate and that its spillway capacity—”the maximum outflow flood
which a dam can safely pass”—was inadequate in the event of a “Probable Maximum Flood”
(PMF).3 Fixing the dam, regulators told Boyce, was necessary “to protect life, limb, and property.”
After years of unaddressed regulatory violations, FERC revoked Boyce’s federal license in
September 2018.

        Upon revocation, the Edenville Dam fell under the oversight of state agencies: EGLE and
the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiffs alleged that, within nine days of the license
revocation, Michigan inspectors conducted a cursory inspection of the dam and determined that it
was in fair structural condition. In January 2019, an entity known as the “Four Lakes Task
Force”—having been delegated authority by Midland and Gladwin Counties—petitioned in circuit
court for an order establishing a legal water level for Wixom Lake. The Midland Circuit Court
granted the petition in mid-2019, setting the lake level at the levels previously required by FERC.
Around this time, the Four Lakes Task Force began the process of acquiring the Edenville Dam

2
 FERC is an independent regulatory agency within the United States Department of Energy that,
among other things, “[l]icenses and inspects private, municipal, and state hydroelectric projects.”
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, What FERC Does, <https://www.ferc.gov/what-ferc-
does> (accessed July 14, 2023).
3
 Plaintiffs described a PMF as “the flood that may be expected from the most severe combination
of critical meteorologic and hydrologic conditions that is reasonably possible in the drainage basin
under study.”

                                                 -21-
from Boyce. According to plaintiffs, civil engineering reports financed by the State confirmed
that the Edenville Dam lacked adequate spillway capacity and needed significant repairs to meet
EGLE safety requirements.

        In November 2019, EGLE rejected Boyce’s request for a “drawdown”—a lowering of the
lake level—purportedly out of concern about harm to aquatic life and other environmental impacts.
Boyce lowered the lake level anyway, and EGLE threatened legal action against Boyce over the
unapproved drawdown. Then in April 2020, EGLE issued a permit to Boyce to raise the lake water
levels and, according to plaintiffs, conditioned the permit on Boyce maintaining high water levels
without further drawdowns. Throughout its oversight of the dam, plaintiffs alleged that Michigan
regulators knew about the dam’s inadequate spillway, overall deterioration, and need for repairs.
Despite these warnings, plaintiffs allege, the EGLE actively moved to prevent Boyce from drawing
down the lake level, pressured Boyce to raise the lake level, and concealed the risks that the dam’s
condition presented.

        On May 19, 2020, concerns about the Edenville Dam’s inadequate spillway came to
fruition. Amid heavy rainfall, the dam failed. Floodwaters moved downstream over Sanford Dam,
which also failed.4 Thousands of residents in nearby towns were forced to evacuate to seek safe
shelter. The flooding caused extensive damage and destruction to homes and businesses in
surrounding communities.

                                 B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

        The Edenville Dam failure prompted substantial litigation, much of which is not before us.
Relevant here, various groups of plaintiffs5 sued defendants in the Court of Claims.6 Plaintiffs
brought claims for inverse condemnation, alleging that the Edenville Dam’s failure and subsequent
damage to their properties constituted an unconstitutional taking by defendants. Plaintiffs alleged
that defendants took affirmative actions that led to the dam’s failure—including wrongfully
certifying that the dam was in fair condition and capable of use, denying a drawdown permit to
Boyce to lower lake water levels, and authorizing the water levels to be raised in spring 2020—all
with full knowledge that the dam would fail from heavy rainfall and flooding. Plaintiffs also

4
  The focus of this appeal is on the failure of the Edenville Dam. Any mention of “the dam”
therefore refers to the Edenville Dam.
5
  Plaintiffs are mainly a collection of individual property owners and businesses. Some plaintiffs
are subrogated insurers who seek reimbursement from defendants for covering their insureds’
claims.
6
 The Court of Claims is a statewide court of limited jurisdiction, situated within the Court of
Appeals, that handles various civil actions filed against state agencies. See MCL 600.6419(1)(a).
Appeals from the Court of Claims are treated as if the Court of Claims were a circuit court. MCL
600.6446(1).

                                               -22-
alleged that, despite the dam being privately owned by Boyce, defendants’ operational control over
the dam constituted a public use.

        Instead of filing an answer to the complaints, defendants moved for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(7).7 While acknowledging that an inverse condemnation claim was a
constitutional claim and not subject to governmental immunity, defendants nevertheless contended
that immunity applied because plaintiffs could not satisfy the elements of their inverse
condemnation claims. Broadly, defendants argued that plaintiffs had not established that
defendants took any affirmative actions or that those actions were directly aimed at plaintiffs’
properties. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims rested on allegations
that defendants failed to issue a permit, sufficiently regulate, or adequately supervise the Edenville
Dam, which could not constitute affirmative actions under Michigan law. Defendants refuted
several of plaintiffs’ factual allegations and attached hundreds of pages of documentary evidence
in support of their arguments.

       Plaintiffs responded, arguing that defendants were not entitled to immunity from the
inverse condemnation claims. Plaintiffs requested that the Court of Claims recast defendants’
motion for summary disposition as one brought under MCR 2.116(C)(8) because defendants
attacked the sufficiency of the pleadings. Under that subrule, plaintiffs argued that they adequately
alleged the elements of their inverse condemnation claims, including that defendants took
affirmative actions directly aimed at plaintiffs’ properties.

        The Court of Claims denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition on plaintiffs’
inverse condemnation claims.8 The Court of Claims first rejected defendants’ attempt to invoke
MCR 2.116(C)(7) to dismiss the inverse condemnation claims because they were constitutional
claims not subject to governmental immunity. Instead, because defendants argued that plaintiffs
had not adequately pleaded their inverse condemnation claims, the Court of Claims evaluated
defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Therefore, the Court of Claims declined to consider
the documentary evidence offered by defendants, and looked only to the pleadings, accepting as
true the allegations made by plaintiffs. From this posture, the Court of Claims concluded that
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged affirmative actions taken by defendants that were aimed at plaintiffs’
properties. These allegations centered on defendants’ knowledge of the need for repairs at the
Edenville Dam and their affirmative acts that were designed to pressure Boyce to increase the
water levels in Wixom Lake. Defendants unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.

7
 Defendants filed several motions for summary disposition before the cases were all consolidated
below, raising nearly identical arguments about the inverse condemnation claims in each motion.
Some plaintiffs filed suit after the motion briefing and evidently agreed that their claims would be
governed by the Court of Claims’ decision on summary disposition.
8
 The Court of Claims granted summary disposition to defendants on trespass claims advanced by
some plaintiffs. The Court of Claims also expressly declined to review any claims on which
defendants did not move for summary disposition. This appeal only involves the denial of
summary disposition on plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims.

                                                -23-
       After we dismissed defendants’ claim of appeal by right on jurisdictional grounds,9
defendants filed an application for leave to appeal. We granted defendants’ application and
consolidated the 25 cases now before us.10

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        We begin with a procedural point. In its decision, the Court of Claims cited allegations
from only five of the 25 complaints: those in Dockets 359895 (Krieger, et al.); 359896 (Holley, et
al.); 359897 (Forbes, et al.); 359899 (Swarthout, et al.); and 359913 (Jamrog). The Court of
Claims’ opinion explained that while other complaints contained relevant allegations about
defendants’ conduct, the opinion used examples from the five complaints “for the sake of brevity.”
Defendants have followed the Court of Claims’ example on appeal and relied exclusively on these
five complaints in their briefing. At oral argument, counsel for both parties agreed that the five
complaints chosen by the Court of Claims were fairly representative of plaintiffs’ allegations as a
whole. Under these extraordinary circumstances, we will also rely on these five complaints when
discussing the plaintiffs’ allegations.11

                          A. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

        As our Supreme Court has aptly noted, “[t]he standards governing summary disposition
are cited so often and have become such a part of the fabric of our caselaw that the reader of
judicial opinions is likely to skim ahead to the analysis.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc,
504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). “But this case reveals the dangers in doing so.” Id.
Resolution of this appeal turns in significant part on the proper court rule for reviewing defendants’
motion for summary disposition. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary
disposition, as well as the interpretation and application of the court rules, de novo. Dextrom v
Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 416; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). That means we evaluate the legal
issue independently and without deference to the court below. Genesee Co Drain Comm’r v
Genesee Co, 504 Mich 410, 417; 934 NW2d 805 (2019).

                            1. MCR 2.116(C)(7) OR MCR 2.116(C)(8)

     Defendants argue that the Court of Claims erred by declining to review their motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and by instead evaluating their motion under the

9
 Krieger v Dep’t of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered November 8, 2021 (Docket No. 358076) (Krieger I).
10
   Krieger v Dep’t of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered June 10, 2022 (Docket No. 359895). For brevity, we note that substantively
identical orders were entered in each of the 25 dockets.
11
   Assuming without deciding that the Court of Claims erred by failing to analyze each complaint
individually, defendants (as the appellants) had the burden to demonstrate that a mistake was made.
See Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415, 435 n 9; 957 NW2d 357 (2020). Defendants have not
raised this issue as a claim of error, and through their representations to this Court, have effectively
conceded that they are not entitled to relief on this basis.

                                                 -24-
standards of MCR 2.116(C)(8). This distinction shapes the deference given to plaintiffs’ factual
allegations and the types of documents that a reviewing court may consider.

        Under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a defendant may seek summary disposition on grounds that a
plaintiff’s claim is barred because of immunity granted by law. Dextrom, 287 Mich App at 428.
When reviewing a motion under this subrule, we consider “all documentary evidence submitted
by the parties, accepting as true the contents of the complaint unless affidavits or other appropriate
documents specifically contradict them.” Beals v Michigan, 497 Mich 363, 370; 871 NW2d 5
(2015) (cleaned up). See also Dextrom, 287 Mich App at 428 (“[T]his Court must accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, unless other evidence
contradicts them.”). If a genuine issue of material fact exists after properly considering all the
evidence, dismissal is inappropriate. Id. at 429. But “[i]f no facts are in dispute, and if reasonable
minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of those facts, the question whether the claim is
barred is an issue of law for the court.” Id.

         Review of a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) is more limited. A
motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. Mays v Governor, 506 Mich
157, 172-173; 954 NW2d 139 (2020) (opinion by BERNSTEIN, J.). “We accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true, deciding the motion on the pleadings alone.” Id. at 173
(emphasis added). We also construe all well-pleaded factual allegations in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Johnson, 491 Mich at 435. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) may only
be granted when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly
justify recovery.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160.

       The Court of Claims denied defendants’ motion for summary disposition on plaintiffs’
inverse condemnation claims. “Michigan recognizes the theory of inverse condemnation as a
means of enforcing the constitutional ban on uncompensated takings of property.” Proctor v
Saginaw Co Bd of Comm’rs, 340 Mich App 1, 16 n 10; 985 NW2d 193 (2022) (cleaned up). See
also Const 1963, art 10, § 2 (prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation). Although the state government is generally immune from tort liability, such
immunity does not apply to inverse condemnation claims. See Electro-Tech, Inc v HF Campbell
Co, 433 Mich 57, 91 n 38; 445 NW2d 61 (1989) (“Since the obligation to pay just compensation
arises under the constitution and not in tort, the immunity doctrine does not insulate the
government from liability.”). As our Supreme Court explained in Thom v State Hwy Comm’r, 376
Mich 608, 628; 138 NW2d 322 (1965):

       To permit the State to assert the defense of governmental immunity in such
       circumstances would be utterly to vitiate the constitutional provision providing for
       just compensation for the taking of private property for public use, for it would
       mean that the owner of property alleged to have been taken without compensation
       would be left without judicial recourse.

        Consistent with this precedent, the Court of Claims explained that, because plaintiffs
alleged that defendants’ actions “amounted to inverse condemnation and an uncompensated taking
in violation of art 10, § 2” of the Michigan Constitution, governmental immunity simply did not
apply. Therefore, the Court of Claims ruled that defendants’ motion and claim of immunity under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) lacked merit. Defendants’ central argument, the Court of Claims noted, was

                                                -25-
that plaintiffs did not adequately plead an inverse condemnation claim. This contention sounded
akin to an argument that plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
MCR 2.116(C)(8). Thus, the Court of Claims held that it would evaluate defendants’ motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and as such, declined to consider documentary
evidence outside the pleadings.

       On appeal, defendants concede that governmental immunity does not apply to properly
pleaded inverse condemnation claims. Instead, defendants argue that plaintiffs’ claims, while
styled as inverse condemnation claims, are actually tort claims to which immunity applies.
Therefore, defendants’ theory follows, the Court of Claims should have analyzed their motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims as barred by
governmental immunity.

        Briefly, plaintiffs contend that this Court has already ruled that the Court of Claims
properly analyzed defendants’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and
therefore, the law-of-the-case doctrine compels us to follow that decision. Under that doctrine, “if
an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings,
the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.” Rott v Rott, 508
Mich 274, 286; 972 NW2d 789 (2021) (cleaned up). But importantly, the law-of-the-case doctrine
applies only when issues are “actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly, in the prior appeal,”
and “does not apply to claims that were not decided on the merits.” Id. at 287 (cleaned up).

       In support of their position, plaintiffs stress this Court’s prior dismissal of defendants’
claim of appeal by right in which this Court stated:

       As the trial court recognized, the gravamen of defendants’ motion for summary
       disposition with regard to plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims was not a claim
       of immunity from such constitutional claims but rather an assertion that plaintiffs
       did not adequately plead the inverse condemnation claims. Accordingly, in relevant
       part, the trial court’s order constitutes an order denying a motion for summary
       disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) premised on failure to state a claim, not an
       order denying governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7). See Blair v
       Checker Cab Co, 219 Mich App 667, 670-671; 558 NW2d 439 (1996) (trial court
       properly considered motion for summary disposition under appropriate subrule
       despite motion being framed under another subrule). [Krieger I, unpub order at 2
       (emphasis added).]

Because this order involved a jurisdictional question about whether defendants had an appeal by
right from a decision of the Court of Claims,12 the order did not actually decide the merits of
whether the Court of Claims properly reviewed defendants’ motion for summary disposition under

12
  Generally, this Court has jurisdiction of an appeal of right from a “final order” of the trial court,
MCR 7.203(A)(1), which includes “an order denying governmental immunity to a governmental
party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee under MCR 2.116(C)(7),” MCR
7.202(6)(a)(v).

                                                 -26-
MCR 2.116(C)(8). See Rott, 508 Mich at 287. The law-of-the-case doctrine therefore does not
apply, and we turn to our de novo review of the issue.

        As discussed, the normal rules of governmental immunity do not apply to inverse
condemnation claims because such claims are constitutional. Electro-Tech, Inc, 433 Mich at 91 n
38. It logically follows, therefore, that MCR 2.116(C)(7) is an inappropriate vehicle to attack a
plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim because immunity by law is not granted for such claims.
Moreover, as the Court of Claims noted, defendants’ position sounds as one attacking the legal
sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claims, making MCR 2.116(C)(8) the proper basis under which to grant
or deny a motion for summary disposition. “[W]here a party brings a summary disposition motion
under the wrong subrule, the trial court may proceed under the appropriate subrule as long as
neither party is misled.” Blair v Checker Cab Co, 219 Mich App 667, 670-671; 558 NW2d 439
(1996). The Court of Claims correctly determined that the appropriate subrule for reviewing
defendants’ motion was MCR 2.116(C)(8).

         Defendants claim several precedents from this Court have “endorsed the use of MCR
2.116(C)(7) to attack inverse condemnation claims.” The cited cases tell a different story.
Defendants first point to this Court’s decision in Hinojosa v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 263 Mich
App 537; 688 NW2d 550 (2004). There, the plaintiffs brought trespass-nuisance and inverse
condemnation claims against the DNR after a fire at a government-owned, abandoned property
damaged the plaintiffs’ neighboring home. Id. at 539-540. In relevant part, the DNR moved for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), and the trial court granted its motion.
Id. at 540. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs’ trespass-nuisance claim was barred by
governmental immunity. Id. On the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court concluded that
the “plaintiffs had not alleged a ‘taking’ of property that required just compensation.” Id. We
agreed, holding that the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant took affirmative actions directed
at their properties and thus “ ‘failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.’ ” Id. at 550,
quoting MCR 2.116(C)(8). By expressly relying on MCR 2.116(C)(8) to affirm the dismissal of
the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim, Hinojosa did not endorse defendants’ proposal to
attack an inverse condemnation claim under MCR 2.116(C)(7). If anything, the decision supports
the Court of Claims’ conclusion that defendants’ motion should be analyzed under MCR
2.116(C)(8).

        Defendants’ reliance on Attorney General v Ankersen, 148 Mich App 524; 385 NW2d 658
(1986), is equally unpersuasive. Ankersen did not once reference summary disposition or the
proper standard for reviewing such a motion under MCR 2.116(C). In that case, the
counterplaintiffs brought an inverse condemnation claim based on the state’s “granting of licenses
and subsequent failures to supervise and regulate . . . [waste] disposal operations,” which allegedly
decreased the value of the counterplaintiffs’ property. Id. at 560-561. Although the trial court
“made no ruling concerning whether counterplaintiffs’ property was the subject of inverse
condemnation,” we held on appeal that the inverse condemnation claim failed as a matter of law.
Id. at 561. Nowhere did Ankersen suggest that governmental immunity applied to dismiss the
inverse condemnation claim. Ankersen simply has no bearing on defendants’ argument.

        Finally, defendants highlight Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills
Country Club, 283 Mich App 264; 769 NW2d 234 (2009), but it too offers little support. There,
the plaintiff alleged an inverse condemnation claim against the city for failure to prevent flooding

                                                 -27-
to the Frolings’ property. Id. at 273. The city moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7), (C)(8), and (C)(10), and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 274. This Court’s
opinion did not specify under which subrule the trial court granted summary disposition. We
affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s inverse condemnation claim, holding that the claim failed
because the plaintiff had “not alleged any affirmative action by the city directly aimed at the
Frolings’ property.” Id. at 296. Although we again did not specify which subrule of summary
disposition applied, the failure to allege an element of an inverse condemnation claim tracks with
the failure to state a claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Thus, Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust
appears to cut against plaintiffs’ argument, and at best, offers no support. In sum, our precedents
have not endorsed defendants’ position to challenge an inverse condemnation claim under MCR
2.116(C)(7).

       For these reasons, the Court of Claims did not err by rejecting defendants’ unfounded
attempt to invoke the standards of MCR 2.116(C)(7) and by analyzing defendants’ motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(8).

                   2. DOCUMENTS REFERENCED IN THE COMPLAINTS

        Next, defendants contend that, even reviewing their motion under subrule (C)(8), the Court
of Claims had to consider documentary evidence “referenced” by plaintiffs in their pleadings, such
as FERC reports, e-mails, court documents, and state officials’ statements. In support, defendants
rely on MCR 2.113(C)(2), which provides that “[a]n attachment or reference to an attachment
under subrule (C)(1)(a) or (b) is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Subrule (C)(1)(a) and (b),
in turn, provide:

               (1) If a claim or defense is based on a written instrument, a copy of the
       instrument or its pertinent parts must be attached to the pleading and labeled
       according to standards established by the State Court Administrative Office unless
       the instrument is

               (a) a matter of public record in the county in which the action is commenced
       and its location in the record is stated in the pleading;

              (b) in the possession of the adverse party and the pleading so states[.] [MCR
       2.113(C).]

        In El-Khalil, our Supreme Court explored the interplay between MCR 2.113(C) and MCR
2.116(C)(8). The El-Khalil trial court, in reviewing the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), considered e-mails that were attached to the plaintiff’s
complaint. El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 163. Our Supreme Court agreed that the trial court could
consider these e-mails because they were part of the pleadings under MCR 2.113(C). Id. But the
Court made a critical clarification about materials attached to a complaint:

       The trial court’s error was not in considering the e-mails as part of the pleadings;
       the trial court erred by considering the content of the e-mails as substantive
       evidence sufficient to dismiss plaintiff’s claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8). [Id.
       (emphasis added).]

                                                -28-
In other words, even if a party attaches materials to its complaint that become part of the pleadings,
doing so does not automatically permit consideration of those materials as substantive evidence.

        In El-Khalil, the e-mails properly considered by the trial court were explicitly attached by
the plaintiff to his complaint. Id. The same cannot be said here. Although evidence may have
been referenced by plaintiffs, it was not attached to their complaint. With limited exception, only
an “attachment” to the complaint is considered part of the pleadings. See MCR 2.113(C)(2). The
exception—that a “reference to an attachment under subrule (C)(1)(a) or (b) is a part of the
pleading for all purposes”—is inapplicable here. Subrule (C)(1)(a) and (b) apply only when a
“claim or defense is based on a written instrument,” but the party need not attach the instrument
to the pleading. Plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims are not based on a written instrument,
such as a contract. See Bodnar v St John Providence, Inc, 327 Mich App 203, 212; 933 NW2d
363 (2019) (“[W]hen an action is premised on a written contract, the contract generally must be
attached to the complaint and thus becomes part of the pleadings.”). But even assuming the Court
of Claims should have considered the documentary evidence referenced in the complaints, El-
Khalil instructs that this evidence should not be considered as “substantive evidence sufficient to
dismiss plaintiff[s’] claim[s] under MCR 2.116(C)(8).” El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 163 (emphasis
added). Defendants urge us to do the opposite—consider the referenced documents as substantive
evidence that contradicts plaintiffs’ factual allegations. Thus, in several respects, defendants’
position lacks merit.

        Defendants also contend that “Michigan courts are not required to assume the truth of an
allegation that contradicts the public record relied on for the allegation just because the allegation
is in a complaint.” We have never adopted that proposition. In El-Khalil, for instance, our
Supreme Court once again “emphasize[d] that a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) must be decided on the pleadings alone and that all factual allegations must be taken
as true.” Id. at 155. Defendants reference federal caselaw interpreting the federal equivalent of
MCR 2.116(C)(8) in an effort to avoid the standard of review compelled by our precedents. Not
only does federal caselaw lack precedential value on matters involving the proper interpretation of
Michigan court rules, see Bienenstock & Assoc, Inc v Lowry, 314 Mich App 508, 515; 887 NW2d
237 (2016), but the federal cases cited by defendants are factually distinguishable.13 Most
importantly, though, the rules from these federal cases that defendants seek to apply depart from
our binding precedent.

13
  Defendants cite Commercial Money Ctr, Inc v Illinois Union Ins Co, 508 F3d 327, 335-336 (CA
6, 2007), but that case involved an insurance policy and various documents related to it, which
made such documents “integral to the claims.” Defendants further rely on Bailey v Ann Arbor,
860 F3d 382, 387 (CA 6, 2017), for the language, “If [the plaintiff’s] pleadings internally
contradict verifiable facts central to his claims, that makes his allegations implausible.” In that
case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that it was proper to consider
public video of a robbery that contradicted the plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at 386-387. But Bailey
involved a motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity, id. at 385, which is more
analogous to MCR 2.116(C)(7).

                                                -29-
                                       3. JUDICIAL NOTICE

         Finally, defendants suggest that the Court of Claims should have taken judicial notice of
publicly available evidence that was outside the pleadings. A court may take judicial notice of a
fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” MRE 201(b). This authority
includes taking judicial notice of public records. See Johnson v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 310
Mich App 635, 649; 873 NW2d 842 (2015). “Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.” MRE 201(e).

        Defendants cite no authority to support their claim that a trial court, or this Court, should
take judicial notice of hundreds of pages of publicly available documents when deciding a motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(8). When “a party fails to cite any supporting legal authority for its position,
the issue is deemed abandoned.” Bill & Dena Brown Trust v Garcia, 312 Mich App 684, 695; 880
NW2d 269 (2015) (cleaned up). Defendants merely cite Ponte v Ponte Estate, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued April 24, 2012 (Docket No. 300789), p 2 n 1, a
case where the trial court took judicial notice of a prior judgment of divorce that occurred in the
same jurisdiction and this Court’s decision on appeal from that judgment. Nothing about Ponte
resembles this case or defendants’ interpretation that a court may take judicial notice of evidence
outside the pleadings simply because the evidence may be publicly available. Exercising judicial
notice over a sweeping amount of documentary evidence would conflict with the otherwise well-
established standard of MCR 2.116(C)(8) that explicitly limits the court to consideration of the
pleadings. See Mays, 506 Mich at 173. Not only that, but it is debatable whether exercising
judicial notice would be appropriate under these circumstances when the parties vigorously dispute
how to interpret the evidence. Defendants do not identify which facts in the publicly available
evidence are “not subject to reasonable dispute,” and thus appropriate for taking judicial notice.
See MRE 201(b). For these reasons, defendants’ judicial notice argument lacks merit.

        Defendants’ position on the applicable standard of review is untenable. First, defendants
improperly invoked MCR 2.116(C)(7) to dismiss plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Second, as a
fallback position, defendants argue for an interpretation of MCR 2.116(C)(8) that would allow a
reviewing court to consider documentary evidence that contradicts the factual allegations in the
complaint. But that is a veiled attempt to obtain review under MCR 2.116(C)(7) by a different
name. See Beals, 497 Mich at 370. In sum, the Court of Claims did not err by reviewing
defendants’ motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and limiting its analysis to the pleadings.

                  B. ADEQUACY OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS

        Defendants focus their remaining challenge on the viability of plaintiffs’ inverse
condemnation claims. Defendants argue that these claims are legally defective in two respects:
(1) defendants did not take affirmative actions directly aimed at plaintiffs’ properties and (2)
plaintiffs’ property was not put to a public use. Before turning to these arguments, we begin with
the legal background.

                                                 -30-
                                    1. LEGAL BACKGROUND

        The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit the taking of private property for
public use without just compensation. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 10, § 2.14 As noted,
“Michigan recognizes the theory of inverse condemnation as a means of enforcing the
constitutional ban on uncompensated takings of property.” Proctor, 340 Mich App at 16 n 10
(cleaned up). Inverse condemnation is “a cause of action against a governmental defendant to
recover the value of property which has been taken . . . even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency.” Mays, 506 Mich at 173
(cleaned up). As alleged in this case, “[i]nverse condemnation can occur without a physical taking
of the property; a diminution in the value of the property or a partial destruction can constitute a
‘taking.’ ” Merkur Steel Supply Inc v Detroit, 261 Mich App 116, 125; 680 NW2d 485 (2004).
For instance, “[i]t is well settled that a governmental actor may cause a taking of private property
by flooding the property or diverting excess surface water onto the property.” Wiggins v City of
Burton, 291 Mich App 532, 572; 805 NW2d 517 (2011). “Generally, a plaintiff alleging a de facto
taking or inverse condemnation must establish (1) that the government’s actions were a substantial
cause of the decline of the property’s value and (2) that the government abused its powers in
affirmative actions directly aimed at the property.”15 Blue Harvest, Inc v Dep’t of Transp, 288
Mich App 267, 277; 792 NW2d 798 (2010). See also Charles Murphy, MD, PC v Detroit, 201
Mich App 54, 56; 506 NW2d 5 (1993) (“While there is no exact formula to establish a de facto
taking, there must be some action by the government specifically directed toward the plaintiff’s
property that has the effect of limiting the use of the property.”).

            2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DIRECTED AT PLAINTIFFS’ PROPERTY

        Defendants argue that they did not abuse their power by taking affirmative actions directed
at plaintiffs’ properties.

        To understand what allegations are sufficient to plead affirmative actions directly aimed at
plaintiffs’ property, it helps to understand what allegations are not. Nearly 40 years ago, we held
that “the state’s alleged misfeasance in licensing and supervising [a waste disposal] operation [did]
not constitute affirmative actions directly aimed at the [counterplaintiffs’] property.” Ankersen,
148 Mich App at 562 (quotation marks omitted). That case involved a lawsuit against the operators
of a waste disposal business that sought the abatement of a fire hazard caused by the improper
storage of hazardous industrial waste. Id. at 531-532. A countercomplaint alleged that the state
counterdefendants contributed to the creation of the nuisance when they granted licenses to the
business and failed to regulate the waste disposal operations, and that their actions amounted to an

14
     Plaintiffs bring their inverse condemnation claims solely under the Michigan Constitution.
15
  Although defendants challenged the substantial cause element on summary disposition, they do
not renew that argument on appeal.

                                                 -31-
uncompensated taking. Id. at 532, 560-561. We rejected this counterclaim, holding that the
alleged “inaction and omissions by the state” could not sustain a takings claim. Id. at 562.16

        We applied the holding from Ankersen directly to Hinojosa. There, the legal issue was
whether Michigan’s takings clause “require[d] the state to justly compensate neighboring property
owners for damage caused by a fire that spread from an abandoned house after the state acquired
it through tax delinquency proceedings.” Hinojosa, 263 Mich App at 538. Citing Ankersen, 148
Mich App at 561-562, we held that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the state took affirmative
action toward their properties. Id. “At most, [the state] failed to abate a fire-hazard nuisance,” a
similar type of allegation to the one that Ankersen found insufficient to sustain an inverse
condemnation claim. Id.

       More recent cases have dealt with the viability of inverse condemnation claims premised
on government-induced flooding. In Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust, 283 Mich App at
296, the plaintiffs argued that the city took their property for public use when the city “refused to
construct a drainage system to cure their private water problems” and approved their neighbors’
construction plans that contributed to flooding on the plaintiffs’ property. We rejected this inverse
condemnation claim, holding that the plaintiffs had alleged no affirmative actions taken by the city
that were directly aimed at the plaintiffs’ property. Id. Finally, in Wiggins, 291 Mich App at 538,
572, we held that the installation of drains on neighboring properties that were then connected to
a storm-retention easement on the plaintiffs’ property was an affirmative action by the city directly
aimed at the plaintiffs’ property. But after the city transferred ownership of the drains to the private
property owners, “any material increase in the flow of water through the drain” could not confer
inverse condemnation liability. Id. at 572-573.

        In this case, plaintiffs alleged that defendants knew about the Edenville Dam’s inability to
withstand significant rainfall because of insufficient spillway capacity and knew that the dam’s
poor conditions posed a danger to the surrounding area and properties. Plaintiffs also alleged that
defendants actively prevented efforts to repair the dam and threatened enforcement actions if the
water levels were drawn down. Finally, plaintiffs claimed that defendants acted to conceal the
risks posed by the dam and raise the lake levels to dangerous levels because it was more concerned
with protecting environmental conditions in the lake. Accepting these allegations as true, plaintiffs
sufficiently pleaded affirmative actions taken by defendants that were aimed directly at plaintiffs’
properties. Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate more than mere regulatory actions, such as issuing
or denying a permit, Ankersen, 148 Mich App at 561-562, or failing to abate a nuisance, Hinojosa,
263 Mich App at 538. Rather, plaintiffs’ allegations show active steps by defendants to authorize
higher lake levels and to conceal critical information about the risk that the dam’s condition posed
to plaintiffs’ specific properties in the surrounding area. Put differently, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants’ affirmative actions “set into motion the destructive forces” that caused the dam failure

16
   Because Ankersen was decided in 1984, its rule of law is not strictly binding precedent. See
MCR 7.215(J)(1) (noting that a panel of this Court must follow published decisions issued by this
Court on or after November 1, 1990). Still, pre-November 1, 1990 published opinions are regarded
as precedent and entitled to deference if not disputed by more recent caselaw. Woodring v Phoenix
Ins Co, 325 Mich App 108, 114-115; 923 NW2d 607 (2018).

                                                 -32-
and the damage to plaintiffs’ properties that were in the direct line of harm. Peterman v Dep’t of
Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 191; 521 NW2d 499 (1994).

        Our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mays, which involved the Flint water crisis, is
highly instructive. Just as here, the Mays Court analyzed whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded
inverse condemnation to overcome a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8).
Mays, 506 Mich at 172-180. The plaintiffs in Mays alleged damages arising from the defendants
servicing their property with toxic water from the Flint River. Id. at 170-171. The Court held that
the plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, were sufficient to state an inverse condemnation claim on
which relief could be granted. Id. at 179. Most relevant here, the Court rejected the defendants’
position that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged affirmative actions by the defendants that
were directed at the plaintiffs’ properties. Id. at 174-175. The Court explained:

       Plaintiffs allege that defendants committed an affirmative act directed at their
       property when the state defendants authorized the city defendants to use the Flint
       River as an interim water source while both sets of defendants knew that using the
       river could result in harm to property. Defendants then allegedly concealed or
       misrepresented data and made false statements about the safety of the river water
       in an attempt to downplay the risk of its use and consumption. The state defendants
       argue that if there were an affirmative act that was directed at the plaintiffs’
       property, it was the city defendants who effectuated the act, not the state defendants.
       While discovery may bear evidence that supports this conclusion, at this stage of
       proceedings, we must accept all of plaintiffs’ allegations as true. See MCR
       2.116(C)(8); El-Khalil, 504 Mich at 160. If true, plaintiffs’ allegations are
       sufficient to conclude that the state defendants abused their powers and took
       affirmative actions directly aimed at plaintiffs’ property. [Id. at 175.]17

        In this case, the Court of Claims discussed and analogized Mays, explaining that “just like
in Mays, plaintiffs have alleged that defendant[s] committed an affirmative act aimed at their
properties when defendant[s] required Boyce to raise water levels at Wixom Lake in the spring of
2020 and/or to keep the water levels high.” The Court of Claims reasoned that plaintiffs’
allegations that “defendant[s] concealed or obfuscated the risks at the time” were “similar to the
allegations in Mays that the defendants committed an affirmative act by authorizing the use of the
Flint River as a drinking water source despite knowing of the risks, while at the same time
concealing those risks.” We agree with the Court of Claims and find Mays particularly analogous
in two respects.

        First, Mays held that allegations that the state defendants “authorized” the city defendants
to switch the water source for Flint residents despite knowledge of its risk was an affirmative act
directed at the plaintiff’s properties. Mays, 506 Mich at 175. In this case, defendants insist that
any affirmative actions leading to the dam failure were taken by Boyce, and thus plaintiffs have

17
   A majority of the Court agreed that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim for inverse
condemnation and agreed with the lead opinion’s reasoning on that point. Mays, 506 Mich at 172
n 5 (opinion by BERNSTEIN, J.); id. at 224, 224 n 1 (VIVIANO, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

                                                -33-
not alleged affirmative actions taken by defendants themselves. But the authorization of the water
source switch in Mays is akin to plaintiffs’ allegations in this case that defendants authorized Boyce
to raise its water levels weeks before the dam failure. In both cases, the plaintiffs alleged that the
state defendants authorized another entity to take actions directly aimed at the plaintiffs’
properties. Consistent with Mays, the allegations that defendants authorized Boyce to raise water
levels despite knowledge of the dam’s risk of failure are sufficiently pleaded affirmative actions.

        Second, Mays emphasized allegations that the state defendants concealed data and made
false public statements about the safety of the drinking water from the Flint River. Mays, 506
Mich at 175. Similarly, plaintiffs here allege that EGLE engaged in a “long pattern of misleading
statements, dating back to 2018, designed to conceal and obscure the dangerous condition of the
dam.” For instance, plaintiffs allege that, after conducting a cursory inspection of the Edenville
Dam in 2018, EGLE reported that the dam was structurally sound when it was not. As other
evidence of concealment, plaintiffs also claim that a state agency spokesperson stated after the
dam failure that EGLE had strong concerns about the dam’s inadequate spillway capacity.
Together, plaintiffs’ allegations, like in Mays, are enough to conclude that defendants took
affirmative actions directly aimed at plaintiffs’ properties.

                                          3. PUBLIC USE

        Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims fail because defendants
did not put plaintiffs’ property to a public use.18

        Traditionally, the question of “public use” under Article 10, § 2 of the Michigan
Constitution arises when the government seeks to use its power of eminent domain to take private
property. Outside of this context, Michigan courts have not squarely addressed when affirmative
actions taken by the state that have downstream effects aimed at private properties constitute a
taking for “public use.” Indeed, most inverse condemnation cases, including ones involving
government-induced flooding, mention public use only in passing. See, e.g., Wiggins, 291 Mich
App at 571; Marilyn Froling Revocable Trust, 283 Mich App at 296. Ankersen briefly discussed
what constitutes a public use, holding that “the granting of a license to a private citizen or a private
corporation for the purpose of allowing that person or corporation to conduct a private business
cannot be regarded as a taking of private property by the government for public use.” Ankersen,
148 Mich App at 561. The Court reasoned that “the issuance of a license does not in any way
grant the public a right of use in the property.” Id. at 562. But Ankersen vastly oversimplified the
analysis. Article 10, § 2 of the Michigan Constitution does not merely ask whether the public has

18
   Some plaintiffs contend that defendants did not preserve this argument below. While the public
use argument was not the focus of defendants’ motions for summary disposition, at least one of
their motions expressly challenged plaintiffs’ allegations that EGLE exercised such control over
the Edenville Dam so as to put it to a public use. Once an issue is raised below, “a party is generally
free to make a more sophisticated or fully developed argument on appeal than was made in the
trial court.” Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 228; 964 NW2d 809 (2020).
Therefore, we consider this issue preserved.

                                                 -34-
a “right of use” in private property taken by the government. See Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich
445, 476; 684 NW2d 765 (2004).

        In Hathcock, 471 Mich at 468-476, decided twenty years after Ankersen, our Supreme
Court comprehensively analyzed what “public use” meant to the drafters of Michigan’s 1963
Constitution. The Court explained that the “public use” requirement was a limitation on the state’s
ability to exercise its power of eminent domain. Id. at 472. But “[w]hen our Constitution was
ratified in 1963, it was well-established in this Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence that the
constitutional ‘public use’ requirement was not an absolute bar against the transfer of condemned
property to private entities.” Id. The unstated but necessary corollary to the “public use”
requirement is that the state is prohibited from “transferring condemned property to private entities
for a private use.” Id. Ultimately, our Supreme Court enumerated three types of circumstances
where the transfer of condemned property to a private party is for a public use: “(1) where public
necessity of the extreme sort requires collective action; (2) where the property remains subject to
public oversight after transfer to a private entity; and (3) where the property is selected because of
facts of independent public significance, rather than the interests of the private entity to which the
property is eventually transferred.” Id. at 476 (cleaned up). In this third circumstance, we look at
whether the “act of condemnation itself” was a public use, “rather than the use to which the
condemned land eventually would be put.” Id. at 475-476. While this case arises from a different
context than Hathcock, we find Hathcock’s reasoning on the meaning of “public use” in the
Michigan Constitution instructive for deciding when the taking of private property that results
from government-induced flooding is for a public use.

        In this case, plaintiffs alleged that defendants exercised control over the Edenville Dam so
much so that their use of the dam constituted a public use. Although privately-owned by Boyce,
the dam was “subject to public oversight” by defendants. See id. at 476. The “act of
condemnation” by defendants was the alleged affirmative actions taken by defendants to keep lake
water levels high and conceal risks, contributing to the dam failure and the damage to plaintiffs’
properties. Analogizing to Hathcock, the relevant question is whether defendants took plaintiffs’
property by controlling the operation of the dam for a public use, not whether plaintiffs’ property—
once taken—would be put to a public use. See id. at 475-476. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
pressured Boyce to keep water levels high to protect aquatic life, prioritizing that interest at the
expense of the safety of people and property. Accepting these allegations as true, they suggest that
defendants, through their operational control of the dam, put the dam to a public use in their pursuit
of environmental protection. Therefore, plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded that defendants’
alleged taking of their private property constituted a public use for which plaintiff are entitled to
just compensation. While discovery may reveal facts contradicting these allegations, our role now
is to accept these allegations as true and determine whether they state a viable claim of inverse
condemnation. See Mays, 506 Mich at 175. At this stage, plaintiffs’ claim is not “so clearly
unenforceable that no factual development could possibly justify recovery.” El-Khalil, 504 Mich
at 160.

       Furthermore, defendants broadly argue that an inverse condemnation claim cannot survive
when it rests on allegations that a private entity’s operation of its private property resulted in
damages. Defendants cite several cases for the proposition that “public use” can only arise from
government actions on government projects. We decline to accept defendants’ implicit suggestion
to hold, in this context, and as a matter of law, that an inverse condemnation case can never be

                                                -35-
sustained when the alleged damages arise from a privately owned dam. “Flooding cases, like other
takings cases, should be assessed with reference to the particular circumstances of each case, and
not by resorting to blanket exclusionary rules.” Arkansas Game & Fish Comm v United States,
568 US 23, 37; 133 S Ct 511; 184 L Ed 2d 417 (2012) (cleaned up). The fact that most previous
inverse condemnation cases in Michigan have involved government projects is unsurprising.19
Because an inverse condemnation claim must be brought against the government, see Wiggins,
291 Mich App at 573, proving sufficient state action will often be easier when the government
unilaterally owned and operated a dam. But that does not mean that, when allegations are made
that the government—acting along with a privately owned dam operator—took affirmative steps
that caused the dam to fail and damaged downstream property owners, Michigan’s takings clause
provides no remedy. See Fritz v Washoe Co, 132 Nev 580, 584; 376 P3d 794 (2016) (“When a
private party and a government entity act in concert, government responsibility for any resulting
damage to other private property may be established by demonstrating that the government entity
was substantially involved in the development of private lands for public use which unreasonably
injured the property of others.”) (cleaned up).

        Defendants misconstrue language from Wiggins to conclude that water flowing through a
privately owned dam can never provide the basis for an inverse condemnation claim. In Wiggins,
291 Mich App at 536-538, the city constructed and installed drains on two properties abutting the
plaintiffs’ property in order to address a problem with the flow of surface water. Before
completion of the project, the neighboring property owners signed documents stating that, when
the city completed the project, the drains would “ ‘belong solely to the [property owners] and
[would] be the [property owners’] responsibility to maintain/repair.’ ” Id. at 537. Ultimately, the
plaintiffs alleged that the new drainage system redirected water from their neighbors’ properties
onto their own property, resulted in damages that constituted an uncompensated taking. Id. at 538.
In evaluating the plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claims, we grouped the allegations in two
buckets: the installation of the drain itself, and the subsequent increase in the flow of surface water
through the drain onto the plaintiffs’ property. Id. at 572-573. First, we held that “the construction
and installation of the drain itself was an affirmative act by the City or its agents, specifically
directed toward the [plaintiffs’] property, which had the effect of limiting the use of the [plaintiffs’]
parcel.” Id. at 572. But “any material increase in the flow of water through the drain . . . could
not have constituted a taking as a matter of law.” Id. We reasoned that there was no state action
to support plaintiffs’ inverse condemnation claim on this ground because the increased flow of
water necessarily occurred after the city’s involvement in the drainage project ceased. Id. at 572-
573. Thus, we held that “the City can have no inverse-condemnation liability arising out of the
flow of water through the privately owned drain.” Id. at 573.

19
  Although unpublished, this Court has allowed an inverse condemnation claim to proceed when
the claim stemmed from government involvement in a private construction project on private
property. See Nakfoor v Our Savior Lutheran Church, unpublished per curiam opinion of the
Court of Appeals, issued January 30, 2018 (Docket No. 335257) (denying summary disposition to
Drain Commissioner when the plaintiffs alleged that the commissioner “authoriz[ed] or approv[ed]
the fill activity that resulted in the increase in the elevation of [a private church’s] property, which
had the effect of diverting excess storm water onto plaintiffs’ property”).

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        This case is distinguishable. Taken as true, plaintiffs’ allegations establish that defendants
were closely involved in the operation of the dam through the time of its failure. Plaintiffs allege
that defendants took active steps to pressure and encourage Boyce to raise the water levels in
Wixom Lake. Unlike in Wiggins, where the city disclaimed any role in maintenance or repair of
the drain after transferring ownership to the private property owners, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants maintained operational control over Edenville Dam in the period leading up to its
collapse. Wiggins therefore does not compel dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. For these reasons,
defendants’ public use argument lacks merit.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

        The Court of Claims correctly evaluated defendants’ motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8). In doing so, the Court of Claims properly limited its review to the pleadings
and declined to consider additional documentary evidence. Accepting plaintiffs’ factual
allegations as true, we conclude that plaintiffs stated viable claims for inverse condemnation.

       The decision of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood

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