Court Opinion

ID: 9763410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:44:29.673535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:42.448505
License: Public Domain

REEVES, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority and respectfully dissent. I would set aside the void nunc pro tunc judgment since it corrects a judicial error made twelve years earlier.
Because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested or filed, the trial court is presumed to have made all the findings necessary to support its judgment. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990). Thus, it is presumed the trial court found that the alleged error was clerical. The question, however, of whether an error corrected by a nunc pro tunc judgment is clerical or judicial is a question of law and the trial court’s finding or conclusion is not binding on this appellate court. Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex.1968); Seago v. Bell, 764 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1989, no writ). I find the trial court erred as a matter of law by presumably finding there was a clerical error in the original judgment.
The majority opinion flagrantly ignores the burden of proof imposed upon the Texas Department of Human Resources (the Department) in obtaining a nunc pro tunc judgment. An application for the entry of a judgment nunc pro tunc requires the trial court to determine what the facts were at the time the original judgment was rendered. Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex.App.—Austin 1983, no writ). A judgment nunc pro tunc should be granted only if the evidence is clear, satisfactory, and convincing that a clerical error was made. Pruet v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Davis, 647 S.W.2d at 783; Perry v. Nueces County, 549 S.W.2d 239, 242 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Evidence may be in the form of oral testimony of witnesses, written documents, the court’s docket, and the judge’s personal recollection. Pruet, 715 S.W.2d at 705. The evidence in this case, however, is not clear, satisfactory, and convincing that a clerical error was made in the original order.
The majority cites only the nonsuit motion and the presumption that the trial judge ruled from his personal recollection as evidence supporting the nunc pro tunc judgment. Neither the motion nor the presumption proves by clear and convincing evidence that a clerical error was made in the original order.
Motions are no evidence of what judgment the court rendered; a judge does not have to grant every request set forth in a motion. The majority is correct when it concludes that the trial court should not have granted the nonsuit with prejudice because it “improperly adjudicated the rights of the parties”: The law regarding nonsuits requires dismissals without prejudice. A dismissal with prejudice functions as a final determination on the merits of the suit. Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1991); Zimmerman v. Texaco, Inc., 409 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1966); writ ref'd n.r.e., 413 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex.1967). Thus, the original nonsuit order dismissing the case with prejudice resulted from judicial reasoning or from a judicial determination. What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that a judicial error cannot be corrected by a judgment nunc pro tunc. Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex.1978). An incorrectly rendered judgment cannot be altered when the written judgment precisely reflects the incorrect rendition. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex.1986). Such is the case here.
The presumption that a judge’s personal recollection supports the finding of a clerical error was rebutted by the evidence. The trial judge signed the nunc pro tunc order twelve years after the original judg*487ment. Surely the great length of time between renditions begins to rebut the presumption that the trial judge personally recollected . what judgment he originally rendered. Additionally, during the nunc pro tunc hearing the trial judge did not voice any recollection about the judgment he originally rendered. Finally, Thompson’s counsel, who was the attorney of record in the paternity suit that was brought in 1977, argued during the nunc pro tunc hearing that there was no error with the original nonsuit order; he refused to accept the nonsuit unless it was with prejudice.
Considering the state of the evidence it is incredulous that the busy trial judge personally recollected what judgment he originally rendered twelve years earlier. There is neither a court docket noting the judgment rendered by the court nor is there a statement of fact relevant to the 1977 order documenting the judgment that was possibly rendered orally which could refresh the judge’s memory. The only evidence of the judgment rendered originally by the trial court is the order dismissing the suit with prejudice. A clerical error was not established by clear and convincing evidence. The court was without plenary power to change a judicial error twelve years after rendering its original judgment. The trial court erred as a matter of law by presumably finding a clerical error with the original judgment.
The majority opinion shuns an elementary principle of jurisprudence — the finality of judgments. The burden of proof imposed upon the Department as applicant embraces this principle of law. The majority, however, desecrates this elementary principle by relaxing the applicant’s burden of proof. I refuse to give litigants the keys to the floodgate of relitigating issues once judgments have become final, especially when twelve years have elapsed since rendition. Consequently, I dissent.