Court Opinion

ID: 9723181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:05:23.508437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.333112
License: Public Domain

RILEY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the word "lost", as used in IC. 22-8~-3-18, must connote "total deprivation of the use of a body part." Majority opinion at 1179. The majority then cites to I.C. 22-3-3-10(c) in support of this conclusion. Id. at n. 1. Instead of supporting the majority's conclusion, 1.C. 22-8-3-10(c) actually undermines it. The statute provides that permanent loss of use can be either total or partial.
The Worker's Compensation Act is for the benefit of the employee and "should be liberally construed so as not to negate the Act's humane purposes." Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 251, 297 N.E.2d 425, 427. In keeping with the goal of liberal construction, the phrase "lost the use of" should be interpreted to refer to either total or partial loss.
It is undisputed that Linville's first injury resulted in a permanent and partial loss of use of her right hand. It is also undisputed that a second injury resulted in the permanent and partial loss of use of her left hand. As Dr. Gibson opined at the hearing on Linville's request for benefits from the Second Injury Fund, the two injuries combined to leave Linville with an actual, if not mathematical, permanent and total impairment.
I conclude that the Board's findings and conclusions are based on an erroneous interpretation of the statute and Dr. Gibson's testimony. I further conclude that the majority's interpretation of the statute is narrow and erroneous. I would reverse and remand to the Board with instructions that Linville receive compensation from the See-ond Injury Fund.