Court Opinion

ID: 9378677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-12 08:08:54.996135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:38.640116
License: Public Domain

Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part, and Majority and
Dissenting Opinions filed March 9, 2023.

                                      In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00361-CV

                   IN THE INTEREST OF A.Y.C., A CHILD

                    On Appeal from the 313th District Court
                             Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. 2020-02304J

                            DISSENTING OPINION

      While Mother and Father raise a variety of interesting issues that the majority
has chosen to address, we should reverse based on the absence of subject matter
jurisdiction.

                                     ANALYSIS

      “It is well-settled that ‘[a] judgment may properly be rendered against a party
only if the court has authority to adjudicate the type of controversy involved in the
action.’” Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 74-75 (Tex. 2000) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 (1982)); see also Tex. Const. art. V, § 8
(“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original
jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where
exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this constitution or
other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”). Subject matter
jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo. Powell v. Stover, 165
S.W.3d 322, 324 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); Barabarawi v. Rayyan, 406 S.W.3d
767, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.); cf. In re S.J., 522 S.W.3d
576, 582-83 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding [mand.
denied]) (unless one of the enumerated grounds in Texas Family Code section
152.201 is satisfied, the trial court “cannot exercise jurisdiction over a child custody
determination”) (citing In re Dean, 393 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex. 2012) (orig.
proceeding)).       A court that acts without subject matter jurisdiction commits
fundamental error that may be reviewed for the first time on appeal. City of Houston
v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). A judgment is void if
rendered by a court without subject matter jurisdiction. In re United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding); In re Stern, 436 S.W.3d
41, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding [mand. dism’d]).
      Here, the Department initiated proceedings against Mother and Father;
therefore, it had the burden of establishing the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction.   See In re Forlenza, 140 S.W.3d 373, 376 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding). While district courts presumptively have jurisdiction to hear claims,
this presumption does not apply to actions grounded in statutes. Id. (citations
omitted).   When jurisdiction is conferred by statute, a claim must satisfy the
requisites of the statutory scheme before a district court may exercise subject matter
jurisdiction. Id.
      Jurisdiction concerning the Department’s claims against Mother and Father is
expressly set forth in the Texas Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.201.
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In relevant part, jurisdiction is only conferred if:

      this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement
      of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months
      before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
      from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live
      in this state[.]

Id. at (a)(1). “Home state” is defined (in relevant part) as “the state in which a child
lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” Id. §
152.102(7).
      Neither the parties nor the majority have cited any evidence in the record that
either Mother or Father lived in Texas within six months of the commencement of
proceedings in this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(g) (a party’s statement of facts
pertinent to the issues “must be supported by record references”). A de novo review
of the record reveals it contains no evidence that Mother or Father have ever lived
in Texas. Therefore, our analysis concerning subject matter jurisdiction is limited
to whether Adam lived in Texas for at least six consecutive months with a person
“acting as a parent”. “Acting as a parent” is defined as a person, other than a parent,
who (in relevant part) “has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right
to legal custody under the law of this state.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 152.102(13)(B).
      The Department failed to introduce any evidence tending to prove that
Calderon either was awarded legal custody by a court or that he claimed a right to
legal custody of Adam; these are the only two statutory routes to “acting as a parent”
under Texas law. See id. This absence of jurisdictional evidence should be
dispositive, particularly given the absence of evidence tending to prove the
formality, timing, or plausibility of the fictional claim of custody utilized by the
majority to presume subject matter jurisdiction under a statutory scheme. See

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Schirado v. Foote, 785 N.W.2d 235, 240 (N.D. 2010) (“national case law
consistently presents three elements considered in determining if a person claims a
right to legal custody under the laws of a state: 1) formality, 2) timing and 3)
plausibility”); see also In re S.J.A., 272 S.W.3d 678, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,
no pet.) (examining whether Mother claimed a right to child custody under the laws
of Florida); accord Hay v. King, No. A12-1130, 2013 WL 216359, at *4-10 (Minn.
Ct. App., Jan. 22, 2013) (not designated for publication); Sulier v. Veneskey, 878
S.E.2d 633, 647 (N.C. Ct. App. 2022) (“We hold this analysis is consistent with the
function of the UCCJEA and principles of certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Given the absence of relevant
authority in Texas concerning this uniform act, we should examine how these other
courts interpret this issue rather than ignore them. See Sulier, 878 S.E.2d at 644
(“Since the UCCJEA is a uniform act, in the absence of any North Carolina cases
addressing this issue in detail, we find the analysis by other courts instructive.”).
      I believe, however, that the State of Texas nonetheless retains the right to
acquire emergency orders authorizing possession of children when the statutory
prerequisites are satisfied. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 152.204, 262.102(a).
Because the trial court incorrectly granted relief without subject matter jurisdiction,
we should remand the issue of emergency custody by the State of Texas back to the
trial court for further proceedings.
      Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

                                        /s/       Meagan Hassan
                                                  Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Christopher and Justices Wise and Hassan.
(Christopher, C.J., majority).

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