Court Opinion

ID: 9378866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 21:00:39.671174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:14.993367
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-5079     Document: 010110825530      Date Filed: 03/13/2023   Page: 1
                                                           FILED
                                               United States Court of Appeals
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS      Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       March 13, 2023
                          _______________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  RENESE BRAMLETT,

         Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                        No. 22-5079
                                                (D.C. No. 4:20-CV-00537-JFH-CDL)
  SCOTT CROW,                                               (N.D. Okla.)

         Respondent - Appellee.
                      _______________________________________

                                         ORDER
                          _______________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                _______________________________________

       Mr. Renese Bramlett was convicted of first-degree murder. The

 prosecution didn’t seek the death penalty, so a life sentence was

 mandatory; but the jury could include the possibility of parole or deny that

 possibility. The jury opted to deny the possibility of parole.

       Mr. Bramlett unsuccessfully pursued state-court remedies (including

 a direct appeal and post-conviction appeal) and petitioned in federal

 district court for a writ of habeas corpus. In his federal habeas petition, he

 claimed in part that Oklahoma’s statutory procedure had violated his right
Appellate Case: 22-5079   Document: 010110825530    Date Filed: 03/13/2023   Page: 2

 to due process. 1 The district court rejected the habeas claim, and Mr.

 Bramlett wants to appeal.

       He not only renews his habeas claim for denial of due process, but

 also asserts a new claim: ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to

 object to the prosecutor’s closing argument.

 I.    The state-law claim doesn’t provide an arguable basis for habeas
       relief.

       Because Mr. Bramlett seeks to attack the “process issued by a State

 court,” he can appeal only upon the issuance of a certificate of

 appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). We can issue a certificate only if

 Mr. Bramlett made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

 right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To assess the strength of that showing, we

 consider whether reasonable jurists could “find the district court’s

 assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v.

 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

       Mr. Bramlett invokes the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process

 clause based on the State’s opportunity to present evidence in aggravation

 1
       Mr. Bramlett also claimed misconduct by the prosecutor for
 appealing to sympathy. The state appellate court rejected this claim under
 the plain-error standard, and the federal district court held that the state
 appellate court’s decision was not contrary to clearly established federal
 law or an unreasonable application of a clearly established right. Here Mr.
 Bramlett doesn’t renew his claim for prosecutorial misconduct. But he does
 allege ineffective assistance of his trial attorney for failing to object to the
 prosecutor’s remarks.
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 and the defendant’s inability to present evidence in mitigation. Okla. Stat.

 tit. 21 § 701.10-1(A). We must consider the debatability of this claim

 based on the underlying statutory restrictions for habeas relief. See Miller-

 El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (stating that when deciding

 whether to grant a certificate of appealability, the Court “look[s] to the

 District Court’s application of [The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

 Penalty Act] to petitioner’s constitutional claims.”). These statutory

 restrictions would prevent habeas relief in the absence of (1) a clearly

 established constitutional right as determined by the Supreme Court or (2)

 an unreasonable determination of facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

       The federal district court rejected Mr. Bramlett’s claim, reasoning

 that the Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right to

 present mitigating evidence in non-capital cases. We agree with this

 reasoning to the extent that it bears on part of Mr. Bramlett’s habeas claim.

 The Supreme Court has rejected Eighth Amendment claims involving the

 inability to present mitigating evidence in noncapital cases. See Harmelin

 v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991) (regarding an Eighth

 Amendment challenge to a sentence of life imprisonment based on the

 failure to consider mitigating factors); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333,

 349 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We have not held that the Eighth

 Amendment’s requirement that the jury be allowed to consider and give

 effect to all relevant mitigating evidence in capital cases . . . applies to

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 noncapital cases.”). To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether

 due process entitles noncapital defendants to present mitigating evidence.

 So no jurist could reasonably find a Supreme Court precedent that clearly

 establishes a right under the Due Process Clause to present mitigating

 evidence in noncapital cases. 2

       But Mr. Bramlett’s claim goes beyond his inability to present

 mitigating evidence. He claims that Oklahoma law unfairly allows the State

 to present aggravating evidence while disallowing a comparable right for

 defendants to present mitigating evidence.

       The state statute exists as part of Oklahoma’s procedure for

 bifurcating criminal cases when the prosecutor seeks enhancement of a

 sentence based on prior felony convictions. Mahdavi v. State, 478 P.3d

 449, 462 (Okla. Crim. App. 2020) (Kuehn, V.P.J., concurring in the result).

 The state procedure authorizes bifurcation of criminal cases when the

 prosecution has a right to present evidence of prior felony convictions.

 Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.10-1(a). Through bifurcation, the procedure is

 designed to prevent prosecutors from using prior felony convictions during

 the guilt phase of a criminal trial.

 2
       We’ve held that the right to due process does not entitle defendants
 in noncapital cases to present mitigating evidence. Scrivner v. Tansy, 68
 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995).

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       To determine whether this procedure triggers a denial of due process,

 we consider whether the procedure “offends some principle of justice so

 rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as

 fundamental.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (quoting

 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). We thus apply this

 standard to the state’s procedure for bifurcation when prior felony

 convictions are inadmissible at the guilt stage and admissible for

 sentencing.

       Under the state procedure, the prosecution can present only evidence

 of prior felony convictions; the statute does not authorize prosecutors to

 present other forms of aggravating evidence. See Mahdavi, 478 P.3d at 462

 (Kuehn, V.P.J., concurring in results) (stating that the law limits the State

 “to presenting a limited category of evidence — prior convictions”). The

 United States Supreme Court has never considered whether a bifurcated

 procedure like this one would offend a deep-rooted tradition or otherwise

 trample on a fundamental right. Given the absence of a Supreme Court

 precedent that clearly establishes this constitutional right, Mr. Bramlett’s

 proposed appellate argument isn’t reasonably debatable. So we deny a

 certificate of appealability on Mr. Bramlett’s argument involving his

 inability to present mitigating evidence when the State presents evidence

 of prior felony convictions.

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 II.   Any jurist would regard the claim of ineffective assistance as
       procedurally barred.

       Mr. Bramlett alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to

 object to the State’s closing argument. Ordinarily a habeas petitioner must

 exhaust state court remedies, and Mr. Bramlett hasn’t raised this claim in

 the state court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). So the claim is

 technically unexhausted.

       But exhaustion would be futile because Mr. Bramlett has already

 pursued state-court remedies involving both a direct appeal and a post-

 conviction appeal. And if Mr. Bramlett were to present the claim now, it

 would be procedurally barred. See Cummings v. Sirmons, 506 F.3d 1211,

 1223 (10th Cir. 2007). So the claim is subject to an anticipatory procedural

 bar. See id.

       Given the anticipatory procedural bar, we could consider the merits

 of the claim only if Mr. Bramlett satisfies the requirements for one of two

 exceptions: (1) cause and prejudice or (2) a fundamental miscarriage of

 justice based on actual innocence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

 750 (1991). Mr. Bramlett has not invoked either exception.

       Given the anticipatory procedural bar, no reasonable jurist could

 credit the petitioner’s appeal point on the claim of ineffective assistance.

                                      ***

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       Because Mr. Bramlett’s habeas claims aren’t reasonably debatable,

 we deny his request for a certificate of appealability. In the absence of a

 certificate, we dismiss the appeal.

                                       Entered for the Court

                                       Robert E. Bacharach
                                       Circuit Judge

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