Court Opinion

ID: 9545583
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:50.998007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:08.646767
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I do not join the Court in reversing the conviction because I am not persuaded that introduction of the hypnotically enhanced testimony constituted other than harmless error.
The verdict is supported by substantial credible evidence, wholly independent of whether defendant was wearing a mask. The undisputed fact that defendant broke into the house unannounced with a gun in his hand, coupled with the evidence that Tyrell screamed, “Don’t shoot, don’t shoot!” and that she saw defendant point the gun at Duncan while exclaiming, “You bastard,” sufficiently supports the verdict and the conclusion that this error was harmless. Particularly is this so in light of (1) defendant’s tenuous explanation of the event, that he stumbled, fell, and in some way accidentally shot Duncan in the head, (2) defendant’s suspect explanation of why he secreted the murder weapon and went into hiding, and (3) the long distance operator’s testimony that she overheard defendant say that someone had tried to rip him off and that defendant had killed that person.
In light of all of the facts and circumstances adduced at trial, I am not persuaded that, absent the error, there is any reasonable likelihood that defendant might have obtained a more favorable verdict.1 Nor am I persuaded that the error was sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict.2 I would affirm.
Finally, it must be noted that notwithstanding indications in the main opinion to the contrary, my analysis of the admission of this testimony utilizes the identical harmless error test the Court has previously established and consistently employed. The issue of whether the erroneous admission of evidence amounts to harmless or prejudicial error in any particular case cannot be decided in a vacuum. Instead, in order to determine whether the error is so substantial and prejudicial that in its absence there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant,3 it is imperative to weigh factors such as the nature, extent, posture, substance, credibility, sufficiency and impact of the evidence properly admitted. In doing so, it is necessary to review the error-free evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
Most recently in State v. Bruce,4 we applied this established harmless error test by reviewing the error-free evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and then concluded that “[i]t is clear to us that the State presented sufficient evidence and eyewitness testimony to prove that defendant robbed the ... convenience store. ‘Erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if there is convincing, properly admitted evidence of all essential elements of the case.’ ”5
*1125This is the harmless error standard I have utilized and the Court has consistently employed.6 Contrary to the view expressed in the main opinion, it has not and does not “encourag[e] the improper admission of evidence by de facto weakening the sanctions against it.”7 In fact, it is only through the continued use of this standard that we actually avoid “substituting our judgment for that of the jury.”8
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL,. C.J.

. Utah R.Crim.P. 30.

. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).

. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989).

. 779 P.2d 646, 655-656 (Utah 1989).

. Id. (quoting United States v. Baker, 693 F.2d 183, 189 (D.C.Cir.1982), and citing State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 643 (1970)).

. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, No. 870096, 115 Utah Adv.Rep. 6, 10-11, slip op. at 5, 11-12 (Utah August 17, 1989) (all circumstances of case considered in harmless error analysis); Bruce, 119 P.2d at 656 (error was harmless in view of fact that state presented sufficient evidence of essential elements of case); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213-1214, (1989) (“Whether an error in the admission of [hypnotically enhanced] testimony offered by the State or in the exclusion of testimony [on the reliability of that evidence] offered by the accused is harmless under [the federal constitutional harmless error] standard depends on many factors. Those factors include the importance of the witness’s testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, whether the testimony was corroborated or contradicted, and the overall strength of the State’s case.” (citations omitted); analysis of quoted factors leads to conclusion that errors were harmless beyond reasonable doubt) comparing Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Okla.Crim.App.) (“erroneous admission of post-hypnotic identification was harmless because the other evidence, although circumstantial, was overwhelming"), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246, 104 S.Ct. 3524, 82 L.Ed.2d 831 (1984) with Harmon v. State, 700 P.2d 212, 214, 216-17 (Okla.Crim.App.1985) (“erroneous admission of post-hypnotic identification was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the only other evidence against [the defendant] was inconclusive hair evidence and two reports of damaging admissions”), petition for reh’g pending; State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) (alleged constitutional error found harmless in face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, isolated nature of error, and trial judge’s instruction).

. Majority at 1122.

. Id.