Court Opinion

ID: 9492085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:31:33.580989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:05.806150
License: Public Domain

COFFMAN, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority that the defendant is not entitled to a three-level reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility and that his offense level was properly enhanced for obstruction of justice, I would not count as relevant conduct his purchases of cocaine in *9801993 and 1994.1 Although the trial court’s factual findings as to the 1993 and 1994 transactions are not clearly erroneous, that court erred in its determination that the factual findings warrant the application of the relevant conduct guideline, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
A court must find “distinctive similarities between the offense of conviction and the remote conduct” before classifying pri- or acts as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. 1B1.3. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1482 (6th Cir.1996). “Isolated, unrelated events that happen only to be similar in kind” do not warrant the application of the relevant conduct guideline or support increasing a defendant’s base offense level under the guidelines. Id. (citing United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir.1993)). In adjudicating whether a defendant’s previous conduct is similar enough in kind to constitute part of the same course of conduct, courts must not overly generalize the nature of the criminal conduct and therein “render worthless the relevant conduct analysis.” Hill, 79 F.3d at 1483.
The Sentencing Guidelines and this court apply a sliding-scale approach to the relevant conduct determination. “Where one of the factors is weak or absent, there must be a substantially stronger showing of at least one other factor.” Id. (citing United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903 (9th Cir.1992)). Thus, the pertinent factors— time interval, similarity of conduct, nature of the offenses, and regularity of the conduct — should be analyzed not as discrete, autonomous criteria, but in relation to each other.
A series of isolated drug transactions, separated by an extended period of time, cannot be categorized as a single episode or an ongoing series of offenses mandating the application of the relevant conduct guideline.2 “Generally, where two isolated *981drug transactions are separated by more than one year, a ‘relevant conduct’ finding may not be premised on the sole similarity that both transactions involved the same type of drug.... Therefore the government [is] required to compensate for the weakness of the temporal and regularity factors by presenting substantially stronger proof of similarity.” Hill, 79 F.3d at 1484. In the instant case, the 1993 and 1994 occurrences lack the requisite strong similarity and temporal proximity to the 1996 offense and are not connected to the offense of conviction by proven, regular, and repetitious drug activity.
Gilbert was arrested in 1996 and charged with distributing 1.54 grams of cocaine base that he either sold to an undercover agent or had in his possession when he was arrested. 3.43 grams were attributed to Gilbert based on $490 he possessed at the time of his arrest. Almost two years before his 1996 arrest, Gilbert bought 127.56 grams of cocaine base from Irvin, and three and one-half years before his 1996 arrest, Gilbert bought from Beaver 113.39 grams of cocaine base. Irvin saw the defendant engage in regular drug sales throughout 1993 and most of 1994.3
The temporal proximity between the 1993-94 occurrences and the offense of conviction is attenuated and, although involving the same kind of drug, the incidents are dissimilar. The testimony credited by the district court easily supports a finding that Gilbert dealt cocaine regularly on the streets of Saginaw from February 1993 through at least October 1994. Beyond that time frame, however, the district court heard neither proof of regular, continuous cocaine sales by the defendant nor proof of even one drug sale by Gilbert in 1995 or 1996, prior to the date of his arrest. Admittedly, witnesses testified that in 1995 and 1996 Gilbert continued to be a 4KP gang member; was unemployed without any regular legal source of income; was once viewed with a gold chain and $400 in cash; had a pager; and was seated near some crack cocaine once in 1995. None of this evidence, however, amounts to firm proof of continuous drug dealing by the defendant in 1995 or 1996.
Underscoring this omission from the testimony are the FBI’s regular, continuous purchases of drugs in the 4th and Kirk/3rd and Norman vicinity throughout the spring and summer of 1996. Considering their opportunities to have observed drug activity, surely the FBI agents would have seen Gilbert — an every-other-day crack dealer in 1993 and most of 1994 — selling drugs at least one time other than the date of his *982arrest, had he been dealing drugs regularly in 1995 and 1996. Yet the record contains no such proof that Gilbert was continuing his 1993-94 behavior.
While drug activity cannot be condoned, neither should this court permit draconian stretching of the evidence to justify a sentence longer than is warranted. The defendant’s jewelry, unemployment, and gang membership in 1995 and 1996, coupled with one isolated drug incident in each of those two years, do not combine to create a continuous course of conduct in 1995 and 1996. Intuitive inferences based upon a pattern of continuous drug dealing in 1993 and 1994 are not an adequate substitute for solid proof of continuation of the scheme. The evidence is thus insufficient, either to support a continued course of conduct in 1995 and 1996, to explain the lack of proof of constant drug activity by the defendant during 1995 and 1996, or to link the 1993-94 every-other-day dealing with either the arguable possession offense in October 1995 or with the isolated crack ■ sale in 1996.
Absent a finding of fact that the defendant himself (not merely other members of his gang4) engaged in an ongoing pattern of selling crack cocaine during 1995 and 1996, his offense level cannot be raised based on relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. The drug activity which the majority would include here as relevant conduct is simply not part of the same course of conduct as the offense to which Gilbert pleaded guilty.5 If the defendant is such a major drug dealer that he should be taken “off the streets for 15 years or so,” as the majority concludes, then surely the prosecution could have produced evidence of at least one drug sale by the defendant in the 20 to 22 months which intervened between the last instance of supposedly relevant conduct and the date of the defendant’s arrest. That this court requires no proof of regular drug sales in 1995 and 1996, instead inferring regular drug dealing from Gilbert’s gang membership during those two years, contravenes the purpose of § 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines. The relevant conduct assessment should make the defendant answer only for other criminal conduct that is essentially part of the offense of conviction, instead of penalizing him for conduct which, while also criminal, has its own independent existence.
I would reverse as to the district court’s relevant conduct determination.

. The October 1995 event qualifies neither as relevant conduct nor as proof of a common scheme or the same course of conduct by which to ensnare the 1993 and 1994 drug purchases and sales as relevant conduct. First, neither the district court nor the presen-tence investigation report, whose factual conclusions that court accepted, explicitly found as a matter of fact that Gilbert possessed crack cocaine on October 2, 1995. Although the charge against the defendant arising from that incident was dismissed, both the presen-tence report and the district court included the October 1995 drug calculations as relevant conduct, as does the majority. Yet at sentencing, both the defendant and the district court cast the debate in either-or terms: Either the defendant would be sentenced according to only the amount of drugs he possessed in August 1996 or the 1993 and 1994 transactions would count against him as relevant conduct. On appeal, the defendant has not discussed the October 1995 event, nor has the United States urged waiver of the defendant's objection to the inclusion of any amount of cocaine base beyond the amount in his possession at the time of his 1996 arrest. The defendant's challenge to the inclusion of the 1995 amount is properly before this court because it was factored into the total drug weight at sentencing, over the defendant’s objection. Whether the 1995 amounts should be included as relevant conduct need not be remanded to the district court as the issue can be determined as a matter of law.
Second, that event could not have been linked, as relevant conduct, to the August 1996 drug sale to which the defendant pleaded guilty because it occurred 10 months earlier; involved possession, not sale; and was not joined to the offense of conviction by proof of any repetitive activity.
Third, without proof of regular drug sales in 1995 and 1996, the October 1995 event cannot create a bridge between the 1993 and 1994 drug activity on the one hand and the August 1996 offense of conviction on the other.
Accordingly, I am unable to categorize the October 1995 event as either relevant conduct or continued drug purchase/sale activity. While its inclusion does not affect the base offense level, the drug calculation from that incident is improperly included by the district court and by the majority, because only the 1993 and 1994 drug activity are at the center of this appeal, due to the defendant's either-or stance both here and below.

. Compare United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321 (6th Cir.1990). In that case, the defendant engaged in a continuous pattern of drug purchases and resales: the same amount each week, every week without fail for 20 months. That conduct was characterized properly as relevant conduct. Here, any proof of the *981defendant’s drag sales or purchases after October or December 1994 is sporadic, irregular, and separated by long stretches of time.

. These two witnesses' evidence is less compelling than the majority portrays it. Beaver was not in Saginaw continuously from February 1993 until June 1994. Instead, in February 1993 he left Saginaw and returned to California for three or four months. Thereafter he returned to Saginaw “at least once a month every month up until June of '94” for an unspecified duration each time. When he visited Saginaw, Beaver went to the 4th and Kirk/3rd and Norman area "on different occasions,” but he failed to explain whether these occasions were frequent or sporadic. On “most days” of these "different occasions,” Beaver saw Gilbert in the area. Inconclusive at best as to frequency, Beaver’s testimony does not support a finding that he saw Gilbert frequently in the relevant area.
That factual refinement is rendered moot by Irvin’s testimony that he saw Gilbert selling drags at 4th and Kirk/3rd and Norman "every other day” during 1993 and 1994, but the majority accords undue weight to the scope of that proof as well. At the sentencing hearing, Irvin twice claimed to have sold Gilbert drugs in December 1994; before the grand jury, he fixed the date at July or August of that year. The district court accepted the factual findings in Gilbert’s presentence investigation report, which concluded that the sale was in the summer of 1994. Irvin conceded, however, that he was arrested in October of 1994. If Irvin’s arrest ended his opportunity to observe Gilbert selling drugs, then 22 months elapsed between the defendant’s last proven sale in 1994 and the offense of conviction. If he remained free through December, and if Irvin’s sale to Gilbert occurred in December (contrary to the district court’s finding), then the lapse in proven drug sales was 20 months.

. Compare Fed.R.Evid. 404, barring evidence of a person's character for the purpose of proving action in conformity with that character trait. Comments explain that character evidence "permits the trier of fact to reward the good man and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.” In this case, the United States seeks to punish the defendant for selling drugs based on his gang membership, not on evidence of any actual sales.

. The Seventh Circuit cautions:
[T]he aggregation rule "grants the government a fearsome tool in drug cases.... [B]efore we allow defendants to serve enhanced sentences based on conduct that the government, for one reason or another, did not see fit to include either in its indictment or its plea agreement, we must be satisfied that the allegedly related conduct is, in fact, intertwined with the offense of conviction. Likewise, we again remind prosecutors 'not to indict defendants on relatively minor offenses and then seek enhancement sentences later by asserting that the defendant has committed other more serious crimes for which, for whatever reason, the defendant was not prosecuted and has not been convicted.’ ”
United States v. Bacallao, 149 F.3d 717, 721 (7th Cir.1998), citing United States v. Fischer, 905 F.2d 140, 142 (7th Cir.1990).