Court Opinion

ID: 9943277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 23:02:08.272602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:44.227834
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Saldivar CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E081789

 v.                                                                      (Super.Ct.No. FSB025636)

 ERIC SALDIVAR,                                                          OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Harold T. Wilson,

Jr., Judge. Reversed.

         Matthew A. Lopas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Christine Y. Friedman and Eric

A. Swenson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
       In 2001 defendant and appellant Eric Henry Saldivar was found guilty of first

degree murder for shooting a man in the back as he ran away from him. Defendant was

sentenced to 100 years to life, plus 10 years. In 2023, defendant was diagnosed with

advanced decompensated cirrhosis of the liver, which was described by doctors at the

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) as an advanced illness with an

end-of-life trajectory. In April 2023, the CDCR recommended to the trial court that it

determine whether defendant was entitled to recall of his sentence and compassionate

release pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.2.1 The trial court denied the request finding

that it had not been shown that defendant suffered from a medical condition with an end-

of-life trajectory and that, regardless, he posed a threat to the community if he was

released.

       Defendant contends we must reverse the trial court’s order. He insists that section

1172.2 creates a presumption requiring the court to recall the sentence of an incarcerated

person with a qualifying medical condition unless the court finds that the person poses an

unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The trial court erred by insisting on a

timeline for defendant’s end of life, which was not a requirement of section 1172.2, and

failed to apply the proper standard for determining whether he posed an unreasonable risk

to public safety should he be released. We find that the trial court abused its discretion

because its findings were not supported by the evidence. We reverse and remand for the

trial court to recall defendant’s sentence.

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                              2
                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.      UNDERLYING FACTS AND CONVICTION

       The facts are taken from the previous unpublished opinion on direct appeal in

People v. Gerard Gutierrez, et al., case No. E030483, filed on November 27, 2022

(Opinion).2 Sometime between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m., on February 22, 2001, defendant shot

the victim twice in the back as the victim ran down O Street in Colton. Gerard Gutierrez

drove the getaway car. The victim told responding law enforcement officers that

defendant had shot him. The victim died approximately one hour later. Gutierrez and

defendant were later spotted driving on the freeway; pursuing law enforcement activated

their lights and sirens. Prior to Gutierrez pulling over the car, defendant threw a handgun

out the window. The handgun was recovered and contained three live and three spent

rounds. Gang expert testimony was presented that defendant was a member of the

Mexican Mafia and that the Mexican Mafia had authorized the killing of the victim for

being an informant and for committing sexual offenses.

       Defendant was charged with first degree murder (§ 187) and personally and

intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53,

subd. (d)). It was further alleged that the crime was committed on behalf of, and to

benefit, a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), and that defendant had suffered

three prior serious and violent felony convictions within the meaning of section 667,

subdivision (a)(1), (b) through (i), and section 1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (d). A

       2 The Opinion has been made part of the record on appeal and we cite to it from
the clerk’s transcript.

                                             3
jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder; and the section 12022.53, subdivision

(d), weapons-use enhancement was found true. The jury found the gang allegation not

true. The trial court found the prior conviction allegations true, but struck one of the

prior convictions at sentencing. Defendant was sentenced to a determinate term of 10

years on the section 667, subdivision (a)(1), prior convictions, and an indeterminate term

of 100 years to life. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal.

       B.     RECOMMENDATION FROM CDCR TO RECALL DEFENDANT’S

              SENTENCE

       On April 26, 2023, a letter was submitted to the trial court that was authored by

Dr. Joseph Bick, who was the director of health care services for the CDCR. Dr. Bick

recommended that defendant’s current prison commitment and sentence be recalled.

Defendant was housed at the California Institution for Men (CIM). Dr. Bick provided

that defendant “has been diagnosed with advanced incurable cirrhosis of the liver. His

cirrhosis is considered to be decompensated. This means that he has developed dilated

veins in his esophagus that are prone to bleed (esophageal varices), fluid that accumulates

in his intraabdominal area (ascites), swelling of his legs (peripheral edema), and impaired

cognitive functioning (hepatic encephalopathy). In addition, he has had episodes of

severe life threatening infection due to his cirrhosis which have required intensive care

unit hospitalization. This is an advanced illness with a clear and irreversible end of life

trajectory. [Defendant] is permanently medically incapacitated and requires nursing

assistance for activities of daily living. He is able to transfer to his bedside commode but

                                              4
requires [a] walker to ambulate short distances. [Defendant]’s physical abilities are

significantly limited.”

       The report submitted provided the details of defendant’s current crimes and

sentence. His disciplinary history in prison included nine serious rule violation reports,

including—on several occasions—possession of a deadly weapon. If released, defendant

would live with his sister. She was willing to care for defendant if he was released. Dr.

Bick requested that if the trial court were to grant the compassionate release, the CDCR

was seeking an order providing for release in 30 days so that the CDCR could ensure that

his housing and medical needs could be met.

       A diagnostic study and evaluation report was prepared by a correctional counselor

at the CIM on April 18, 2023. It was signed by a parole representative and the warden of

the prison. Defendant was 58 years old. He had received a sentence of 110 years to life

on November 6, 2001. His minimum parole eligibility date was August 15, 2082. A

review of the electronic records management system revealed that defendant had an

extended history of association and/or membership in the Mexican Mafia. The report

outlined the current offense committed by defendant.

       Defendant’s criminal history included as follows: burglary in 1982 resulting in 12

months of probation; receiving stolen property in 1983 resulting in 36 months of

probation; burglary and robbery in 1986 with a four-year state prison sentence; and

attempted murder with the use of a firearm in 1990 with a 14-year state prison sentence.

       Defendant was not participating in any mental health treatment while in prison

custody. He used some medical equipment, including a four-wheeled walker. He was

                                             5
listed as an inactive, monitored Mexican Mafia member. The report indicated that it was

very difficult to become a member of the Mexican Mafia and that defendant had “devoted

his life to this criminal organization to simply obtain the rank of membership.” In 2015,

he was offered an opportunity to participate in a “Step Down” program to cease

promoting or being involved in the gang. Defendant refused to participate.

       The report also detailed defendant’s history in the penal system. He was assigned

to a “Level IV” facility, which was the highest security designation in the CDCR. In

2016, he had to be assigned to the administrative segregation unit as he posed a threat to

other inmates. In October 2018, he was involved in a physical altercation with another

inmate. The same month he committed a battery on another inmate with a deadly

weapon and was once again placed in the administrative segregation unit. In both 2020

and 2021, he was found guilty of possession of a deadly weapon. In 2020, he had an

additional violation of disobeying an order. The report provided that defendant

“continues to be involved in violent behavior and fails to adhere to laws and regulations.”

Defendant had participated in some work duties and took some anger management and

substance abuse recovery group classes.

       As for defendant’s medical evaluation, the report provided the same information

previously reported by Dr. Bick, that defendant had been diagnosed with advanced

decompensated cirrhosis. It was described as an “advanced illness with an end of Life

trajectory.” He had multiple hospitalizations for liver failure complications. He required

nursing assistance for activities of daily living. He used a walker to ambulate short

distances. He could get to his bedside toilet but had difficulty walking short distances

                                             6
due to abdominal distention. He was frail and a fall risk due to immobility and difficulty

with coordination.

       The diagnostic report listed the factors for consideration in granting compassionate

release. Defendant was considered to have an advanced illness with an end-of-life

trajectory. He was an inactive, monitored member of the Mexican Mafia. The report

provided, “Releasing [defendant] to the community would provide an inherent risk to the

civilian population. [Defendant]’s behavior within prison demonstrates [he] remains an

active member of the [Mexican Mafia]. . . . With this complete lack of supervision,

[defendant] could continue his acts of violence as he has within the prison facility.” The

report also noted that defendant had committed criminal acts prior to his incarceration

“indicating he would potentially be a danger to the public if released.” His criminal

sophistication had increased with the most recent conviction for murder. “His violent

offenses are recent which continues to cause concern in the institutional setting.”

       A “medical chrono” was also provided to the trial court, which had been prepared

by Dr. Kirk Torres, chief physician and surgeon at the CIM, on January 19, 2023. It was

also signed by Dr. Muhammad Farooq, chief medical executive at the CIM. Defendant

was being housed in an outpatient housing unit. His illness was described as advanced

decompensated cirrhosis, which was an advanced illness with end-of-life trajectory.

There was no timeline as to the end of his life. Defendant filed a waiver of his right to be

present at the recall of his sentence hearing and to release his medical information.

                                             7
       C.     RULING

       The matter was first discussed on May 12, 2023, at a hearing on defendant’s

section 1172.6 petition (which was denied). The hearing on the issue of compassionate

release was set for June 13, 2023, to accommodate defendant being present at the hearing

if he chose to be present. The matter was then continued by stipulation on June 13, 2023,

to June 20, 2023. The matter was again continued on June 20, 2023, to June 27, 2023, in

order for defense counsel to obtain additional treatment and progress regarding

defendant’s medical diagnosis. On June 27, 2023, the matter was again continued by

stipulation to July 7, 2023.

       The matter was heard on July 7, 2023, without defendant present. Counsel for

defendant submitted based on the filings in the case and presented no further evidence.

The People objected to his release. The prosecutor argued that defendant’s medical

condition had been described as a “serious medical condition,” but it was not clearly

established that he was at the end of his life. There was no information as to how long

defendant was expected to live. The prosecutor provided that defendant had been

evaluated by a transplant specialist, which would significantly change defendant’s

outcome, but provided no further information.

       The prosecutor further argued that it would be contrary to public safety to release

defendant; he had been incarcerated since 2019. His criminal history included the

attempted murder of two law enforcement officers. He was released in 1999 for those

crimes, and soon thereafter committed the instant crimes. He had multiple infractions

                                             8
while in custody. In 2020 and 2021, he had infractions for possession of a deadly

weapon. The People presented no additional evidence.

       The trial court stated it had considered the positions of both parties and reviewed

the documents from the CDCR. These documents included the medical chrono and the

diagnostic study. The trial court found, “First comments, Court[] concurs with the

position of [the] People with respect to the end of life. Although it is noted within the

California correctional health service letter that [defendant] suffers from an advanced

illness with a clear irreversible end-of-life trajectory. There is no end of life or time line

with respect [t]o that diagnosis. It is just a comment with respect to the medical

condition.”

       The trial court then noted that it was concerned about the “threat to the community

that [defendant] represents.” The trial court reviewed defendant’s criminal record, which

spanned from 1985 until the current offenses in 2000. The trial court also believed that

defendant was a member of the Mexican Mafia. “He has not been stepped out.” The trial

court further noted that defendant’s disciplinary history within the penal system was

“increasing and continuous.” The trial court stated, “Of concern to the court noted that in

2020, there was a conviction for possession of a deadly weapon as 306 rule violation

within the system, and in 2021 another possession of a deadly weapon, guilty as

charged.”

       The trial court then referred to the diagnostic study. All three “individuals signed

off indicating that [defendant] has committed criminal acts prior to his incarceration

indicating he would potentially be a danger to the public if released.” The trial court was

                                               9
concerned that the “violent offenses” were recent and continued to be a concern in the

institutional setting. The trial court noted that if the CDCR was concerned and felt that

defendant “still represents a threat within their controlled, locked environment, then

clearly, he would have the same threat level to the community if released at large.”

       The trial court concluded that “with respect to end of life, the timeline has not

been provided or set forth.” Further, it found that defendant would be a threat to the

community if released based upon his prior record; his continuing, escalating violence;

and the opinion of the three individuals in the diagnostic study from the CDCR that he

still represented a threat within the penal system. The request for compassionate release

was denied without prejudice. Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the denial of his

section 1172.2 petition on July 24, 2023.

                                       DISCUSSION

       Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by applying an incorrect

standard in denying the petition to recall his sentence. First, defendant insists that the

medical evaluation provided by Dr. Bick provided sufficient evidence that defendant had

a medical condition with an end-of-life trajectory. The trial court erred by finding that he

had not met the criteria of a medical condition because there was no timeline as to his end

of life, which is not required by section 1172.2. Further, the trial court did not consider

in finding that defendant was a threat to society whether if he was released based on his

“current condition” he would commit a “super strike” upon his release.

       The People concede defendant has shown that he met the requirement for an

advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory as required by section 1172.2, subdivision

                                             10
(b)(1). We will accept the concession and need not address the issue. The People insist

the trial court impliedly found that defendant’s release would pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to public safety under the guidelines set forth in section 1172.2 and substantial

evidence supports the determination.

       Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 960 (2022-2023 Reg. Sess.)

amended the substantive requirements and procedures governing the compassionate

release of incarcerated persons. (Stats. 2022, ch. 744, §§ 1-3.) It essentially replaced all

of subdivision (e) of section 11703, the provision formerly governing compassionate

releases, with section 1172.2. (Stats. 2022, ch. 74, §§ 1-3.)4

       Section 1172.2, subdivision (a) provides, “Notwithstanding any other law and

consistent with paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 1170, if the statewide chief

medical executive, in consultation with other clinical executives, as needed, determines

that an incarcerated person satisfies the medical criteria set forth in subdivision (b), the

[CDCR] shall recommend to the court that the incarcerated person’s sentence be

recalled.” Section (b) of section 1172.2 provides, “There shall be a presumption favoring

recall and resentencing under this section if the court finds that the facts described in

       3 Section 1170, subdivision (e), provided for compassionate release for those
prisoners suffering from a terminal illness that could produce death within six months,
and the release of the prisoner would not pose a threat to public safety. The trial court
still retained the discretion to resentence or recall the sentence even when such medical
condition was proven. (People v. Torres (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 550, 556.)

       4 We refer to section 1172.2 effective January 1, 2024. (Stats. 2023, c. 131 (A.B.
1754), § 158, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.) It only has minor changes from the original version
effective January 1, 2023.

                                              11
paragraph (1) or (2) exist, which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is

an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section

1170.18, based on the incarcerated person’s current physical and mental condition.”

Relevant here, section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1), provides “The incarcerated person has

a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory. Examples include, but are

not limited to, metastatic solid-tumor cancer, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-

stage organ disease, and advanced end-stage dementia.”

       Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) provides, “As used throughout this code,

‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an unreasonable risk that the

petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of

subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” These new violent

felonies are considered “ ‘super strikes.’ ” (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th

1138, 1150-1151.) “Those super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to

commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon

of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life

imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against

minors under the age of 14.” (Ibid.)

       We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s determination that a petitioner

poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (See Nijmeddin v. Superior Court

(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 77, 83 (Nijmeddin).) “A trial court abuses its discretion when the

factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.” (People v. Cluff

(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.)

                                             12
       In Nijmeddin, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th 77, the defendant was diagnosed with

incurable pancreatic cancer and was expected to live for only one year. Despite his

medical condition, “[t]he trial court declined to recall [the defendant’s] sentence on the

ground that he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court cited a

variety of concerns, including [the defendant’s] ‘mental acuity . . . [¶] . . . his ability to

continue to commit crimes . . . his ability to pick up a phone and obtain things that he

might need to go somewhere or do something to be a risk of dangerousness to others.’ ”

(Id. at p. 82.) On appeal, by way of a petition for writ of mandate, the Attorney General

conceded that the trial court erred by refusing to recall defendant’s sentence.

       The appellate court agreed that the trial court had abused its discretion. The

appellate court first noted, “It is undisputed that [the defendant] has a serious and

advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory, which means he is presumptively entitled

to compassionate release.” (Nijmeddin, super, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 83.) The appellate

court noted that the trial court made no findings as to “the unreasonable risk of

commission of ‘super strike’ offenses; it simply expressed a generalized concern about

petitioner’s ‘ability to commit crimes.’ ” (Id. at p. 83.) Further, the trial court failed to

consider the defendant’s current physical and mental condition. It found that a

“generalized concern” that the person is able “ ‘to continue to commit crimes’ ” is

insufficient to support a finding that the person is likely to commit a super strike “based

on” the person’s “ ‘current physical and mental condition.’ ” (Ibid.) The appellate court

concluded that “[t]he record lacks any substantial evidence that [the defendant], who is

severely physically incapacitated and getting worse by the day, ‘is an unreasonable risk

                                               13
of danger to public safety’ [citation], as defined by section 1170.18, subdivision (c).”

(Ibid.)

          Here, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply the standard

for determining whether to recall a sentence under section 1172.2. Specifically, the trial

court required that there be a timeline for defendant’s end-of-life trajectory despite

section 1172.2 not requiring a specific timeline for end of life. Further, the trial court

only found that defendant was a threat to the community and did not consider whether,

based on his current physical and mental condition, posed an unreasonable risk to society

that he would commit a “super strike.” The People contend that the trial court impliedly

found the factors in section 1172.2. The People insist the trial court is presumed to

understand the law and apply it correctly, absent affirmative evidence in the record.

Defendant counters that the trial court failed to make the requisite finding to overcome

the presumption that his sentence should be recalled, and the order of the trial court

should be reversed.

          We agree with the People that we must presume the trial court was aware of the

law and applied it to the determination of whether defendant was entitled to recall of his

sentence. (People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1152 [reviewing court

presumes trial court knew and properly applied the law; it is appellant’s burden to rebut

that presumption by an affirmative showing].) The record supports the trial court was

aware of the factors in section 1172.2; section 1172.2 was mentioned at the first hearing

on the recommendation from the CDCR that defendant’s sentence be recalled. Further,

the trial court stated at the final hearing that it had read the diagnostic report. That report

                                               14
was entitled, “Diagnostic Study and Evaluation Report Pursuant to the Provisions of

Penal Code section 1172.2.” (All caps. omitted.) Finally, the trial court stated, “[W]ith

respect to release pursuant to 1172.2, compassionate release, the Court finds there is not.”

Based on this record, we must presume the trial court was aware of the factors in section

1172.2 when considering whether to recall defendant’s sentence. However, the trial

abused its discretion when it declined to recall defendant’s sentence.

       The People have conceded that defendant met the first requirement of section

1172.2, subdivision (b)(1) that he had “a serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life

trajectory.” As such, there was a presumption that his sentence should be recalled and he

be resentenced unless he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety to commit

a “super strike” based on his current physical and mental condition. (§ 1172.2, subd. (b).)

       Here, the trial court found that based on defendant’s prior record; his continuing,

escalating violence; and the opinion of the three individuals in the diagnostic study from

the CDCR; that he still represented a threat within the penal system, that defendant was a

“threat to the community.”

       Here, as in Nijmeddin, the “trial court made no findings as to the unreasonable risk

of commission of ‘super strike’ offenses; it simply expressed a generalized concern about

petitioner's ‘ability to continue to commit crimes.’” (Nijmeddin, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at

p. 83.) The trial court never found that defendant was at risk of committing a super

strike. Further, the evidence did not support that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of

committing a super strike. The three officials at the prison stated that defendant’s release

into the community would provide an “inherent risk to the civilian population” and he

                                             15
would continue to commit acts of violence. However, these officials never stated that

defendant posed an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike” and never

considered defendant’s current physical condition.

       Further, defendant’s criminal record involved attempted murders involving law

enforcement officers occurring in 1990. Defendant was released and immediately

committed the current offense of shooting at the victim in the back as he ran away. The

first degree murder in this case was committed in 2000, which was almost 23 years prior

to the request for compassionate release. The trial court also referred to the fact that

defendant was a member of the Mexican Mafia. The reports listed defendant as an

“inactive monitored member.” Further, the jury did not find that defendant committed

the first degree murder on behalf of the gang, and the reports did not show that defendant

had ever been convicted of a gang crime. While defendant may have been a member of

the Mexican Mafia, there was no evidence of his current involvement and how it would

result in him committing a “super strike” should he be released. Further, there was

evidence that defendant had rules violations in 2020 and 2021 for possession of a deadly

weapon but there is no evidence of the circumstances or the type of weapon possessed.

Moreover, the two rule violations occurred almost two years prior to the request to recall

his sentence and there was no evidence of any recent rule violations.

       The above evidence does not support that, at the time of the recommendation by

the CDCR to recall defendant’s sentence in 2023, defendant posed an unreasonable risk

of committing a “super strike” offense if he were to be released. This is further apparent

based on his physical condition, as discussed post.

                                             16
       The reports stated that defendant was “permanently medically incapacitated” and

was “frail and a fall risk.” He required nursing assistance for activities of daily living.

He could walk only short distances and used a walker. The People presented no other

evidence that defendant was still capable of committing a “super strike” even with such

diagnosis. There was no evidence of his ability to presumably handle a weapon to

commit murder, or whether he had the capacity to conspire with another to commit some

other “super strike.”

       Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is no substantial evidence

supporting the finding that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super

strike if he was granted compassionate release. Because there is no substantial evidence

that defendant poses an unreasonable risk of endangering public safety by committing a

super strike offense, the presumption that his sentence be recalled has not been overcome.

We accordingly conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to recall his

sentence. Section 1172.2, subdivision (b), mandates that defendant’s sentence be

recalled.5

                                      DISPOSITION

       We reverse the trial court’s order refusing to recall defendant’s sentence under

section 1172.2 and direct the trial court to grant the petition and to recall defendant’s

       5 We are empowered to “direct immediate issuance of a remittitur only on the
parties’ stipulation or on dismissal of the appeal under rule 8.244(c)(2)” of the California
Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).) As such, we will simply reverse
the trial court’s orders denying compassionate release of defendant without ordering
immediate issuance of the remittitur.

                                              17
sentence. We encourage the trial court to consider the original request by the CDCR that

it be given 30 days to ensure defendant’s housing and medical needs are met in granting

the recall of his sentence.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                      MILLER
                                                                             Acting P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
                                J.

FIELDS
                                J.

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