Court Opinion

ID: 9779774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 00:44:48.945243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:40.317144
License: Public Domain

FRIEDLANDER, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the Majority that Hunt Construction, by virtue of its relationship to Baker Concrete, did not owe a nondele-gable duty to Garrett so as to support a finding of vicarious liability. I respectfully dissent, however, from the Majority's conclusion that Hunt Construction independently owed a duty to Garrett based on contract. I would further conclude that Hunt Construction did not assume a duty to Garrett based on conduct.
A considered reading of the contract language as a whole makes clear that Hunt Construction did not assume a duty to Garrett by contract. The various contract documents expressly state that Hunt Construction's duties were undertaken "[wlith-out assuming the safety obligations and responsibilities of the individual Contractors," one of whom was Baker Concrete. Appendix at 92. Again, in paragraph 24.14, Owner and Hunt Construction made clear that Hunt Construction "shall not have control over or charge of or be responsible for ... safety precautions and programs in connection with the Work of each of the Contractors, since these are the Contractor's responsibilities." Id. at 104-05. The Agreement between the Owner and Hunt Construction further provided that Baker Concrete would "remain the controlling employer responsible for the safety programs and precautions" applicable to its work and that Hunt Construction's contractual responsibilities would "not extend to direct control over or charge of the acts or omissions of [Baker Conerete]." Appendix at 102-08.
These limiting provisions are an unequivocal statement that Hunt Construction was not responsible for project safety and the safety of Baker Concrete's employees and that such responsibility remained with Baker Concrete. In drafting the documents, Hunt Construction and the Owner clearly expressed their intent in this regard. Where the contract indicates that the parties did not intend to charge one party with a duty of care, the contract will not support a claim of negligence. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind.Ct.App.2004); Plan-Tec., Inc. v. Wiggins, 443 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.Ct.App.1983). The language employed by the Owner and Hunt Construction clearly demonstrates that the parties did not intend to charge Hunt Construction with a duty of care to onsite employees.
Further evidencing the intent of Hunt Construction and the Owner is the inclusion of language in the contract that Hunt Construction's services were for the sole benefit of the Owner and not the employees of a separate contractor on the project. While this duty may have coincidentally benefited the workers onsite, it does not alter the fact that Hunt Construction's obligations under its contract with the Owner *806were intended to benefit the Owner, not the workers of other contractors.
Although the Majority quotes large portions of the various contract documents dealing with safety on the jobsite, the Majority pays short shrift to the language limiting Hunt Construction's liability, noting only that the contract contains provisions that "purport [] to limit Hunt Construction's duties regarding safety...." Op. at 804. The Majority wholly ignores the clear import of these provisions and fails to give them effect, essentially rendering them ineffective and meaningless. The Majority's holding will fundamentally alter contracts of this nature and make it virtually impossible for a contractor taking on the role of construction manager to limit its liability so as not to become an insurer of safety for workers of other contractors.
Indeed, the manner in which the contracts at issue here were drafted seems to me to be a well-settled practice in the industry. To impose a duty of care on Hunt Construction for the safety of the employees of each contractor here is tantamount to making Hunt Construction an insurer of safety. The parties clearly sought to avoid such an interpretation by including clear language limiting Hunt Construction's liability. Moreover, the Majority's construction of the contractual provisions at issue undermines the framework often employed in projects of this nature. To carry out the intent of the parties, we must give effect to the clear and unequivocal language in the contract documents that Hunt Construction owed a duty only to the Owner and not to the workers onsite.
Because the Majority found that Hunt Construction owed a duty of care pursuant to its contracts, the Majority did not address Garrett's argument that Hunt Construction also assumed a duty of care by its conduct. I reject Garrett's contention in this regard as well. Hunt undertook a duty to the Owner to insure there was a safety program in place for the project. Hunt Construction's conduct was in accordance with its contractual obligations to the Owner. In performing its duties to the Owner, Hunt Construction did not assume a duty of care to Garrett.
Absent a duty, a party may not be held liable for negligence. See Williams v. Cingular Wireless, 809 N.E.2d 473, trans. denied. Finding no duty on behalf of Hunt Construction, Hunt Construction is entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Garrett and order entry of summary judgment in favor of Hunt Construction.