Court Opinion

ID: 9402127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:01:04.344194+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:57.620056
License: Public Domain

20-3554
   Chao Lin v. Garland
                                                                            BIA
                                                                  Christensen, IJ
                                                                  A209 390 956
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
   New York, on the 15th day of June, two thousand twenty-
   three.

   PRESENT:
            ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
            MYRNA PÉREZ,
                 Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   CHAO LIN,
                     Petitioner,

                     v.                                   20-3554
                                                          NAC
   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
            Respondent.
   _____________________________________

   FOR PETITIONER:                    Troy Nader Moslemi, Esq.,
                                      Flushing, NY.

   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
                                      Attorney General; John S. Hogan,
                               Assistant Director; Matthew A.
                               Spurlock, Trial Attorney, Office
                               of Immigration Litigation, United
                               States Department of Justice,
                               Washington, DC.

    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

    Petitioner Chao Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s

Republic of China, seeks review of a September 17, 2020,

decision of the BIA affirming a May 31, 2018, decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum,

withholding    of   removal,   and   relief   under   the   Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”).       In re Chao Lin, No. A209 390 956

(B.I.A. Sept. 17, 2020), aff’g No. A209 390 956 (Immig. Ct.

N.Y. City May 31, 2018).       We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts and procedural history.

    We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by

the BIA.     See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d

Cir. 2005).     The applicable standards of review are well

established.        See   8    U.S.C.    § 1252(b)(4)(B)      (“[T]he

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
                              2
contrary.”); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d

Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility determination for

substantial evidence).

    “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility

determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s

or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such

statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any

inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without regard

to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to

the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant

factor.”   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   “We defer . . . to

an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality

of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-

finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”    Xiu

Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord

Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.

    The record here contains substantial evidence to support

the IJ’s credibility determination. Lin alleged that, in

January 2016, the police arrested and detained him for 15

                                3
days following a raid on an underground Christian church,

other inmates beat him because of his religion, and he feared

future arrests and beatings on the same grounds.              The agency

reasonably     relied     on     inconsistencies       between      Lin’s

statements, testimony from his pastor in the United States,

and   a   letter   from   a    friend   in    China.    See    8   U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

      Indeed, Lin does not dispute that the record reflects

inconsistencies regarding what he was doing in the church

when the raid began, whether the individual who introduced

him to the church and wrote a letter in support of his

application had been detained following the raid, and his

practice of Christianity in the United States. Lin argues

that these inconsistencies are trivial.            However, the agency

may   rely   on    “the   cumulative         effect”   of   even    minor

inconsistencies.     See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167 (quotation

marks omitted).

      The multiple inconsistencies, relating to both events in

China and Lin’s practice of Christianity in the United States,

constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

determination.     See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia

                                   4
Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; see also Likai Gao v. Barr, 968 F.3d

137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]even a single inconsistency

might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled

to   find   him   credible.   Multiple   inconsistencies   would   so

preclude even more forcefully.”).

      Moreover, the agency was not required to credit his

explanations for the inconsistencies, particularly as the

record reflected that his pastor changed his testimony when

Lin shook his head in response to a statement that created an

inconsistency.      See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d

Cir. 2005); see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d

Cir. 2007) 170 (“[A] single false document or a single

instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the

petitioner) infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated

or unauthenticated evidence.”).          Finally, contrary to Lin’s

position,     the    adverse     credibility     determination     is

dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

because all three forms of relief were based on the same

factual predicate.     See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–

57 (2d Cir. 2006).

                                  5
    For the foregoing reasons, Lin’s petition for review is

DENIED.

                          FOR THE COURT:
                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                          Clerk of Court

                            6