Court Opinion

ID: 9865238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:28:12.618109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:03.049189
License: Public Domain

*300Mr. Justice Bouck, dissenting.
There is but one question involved in this case, namely, Was there before the trial court, at the time the nonsuit was granted, evidence which, when given the most favorable effect from the standpoint of the plaintiff, was sufficient to make out a prima facie case? It matters not what we may technically call the action, whether an action of deceit, or one in quasi contract on the ground of unjust enrichment, or something else. Beading the record to ascertain whether it presents evidence which thus favors the plaintiff, I respectfully submit that the plaintiff has met the required test, and that it was the function of the jury—not the function of the trial judge—to weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
The opinion herein states some of the evidence, but not all. I think a careful reading of the record discloses that the relation between the plaintiff and the defendant Hood, a licensed real estate broker, was one of principal and agent; .that if the evidence favorable to the plaintiff were believed by the proper fact-finding body—not necessarily by the trial judge—Hood made false representations as to the amount for which Watson, the owner, was willing to sell the real property involved, leading the plaintiff to believe that the agent Hood could not procure the property for a lower price; that Hood thereupon went to the owner and procured the property for a much lower price without informing the plaintiff of his action; that —after an intermediate conveyance to one Winograd—■ Hood then sold the property to the plaintiff at a substantially advanced price, thus himself profiting contrary to the vital principles recognized as governing the duties of an agent to his principal.
It is immaterial that the evidence favorable to the plaintiff may have been in some respects contradicted by the two defendants when they were called for statutory cross-examination. Such contradiction would, nevertheless, leave ample substantial evidence in favor of the *301plaintiff, so as to require submission of tbe case to the jury. Whether, if the case were to go to the jury, the jury would find that the„ plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence, is a question concerning the duties of jurors, not the duties of the trial judge.
This court’s pronouncement in Pace v. Cline, 59 Colo. 138,147 Pac. 672, a case startlingly similar to the one at bar, seems not only enlightening and persuasive, but conclusive here.
We are not bound by the trial judge’s view that the present action must be regarded as one for damages on account of fraud and deceit. I think the complaint stated, and the evidence tended to prove, a clearly sufficient cause of action in assumpsit on well-recognized grounds, and this court should have so held.
In an analogous case, Sandoval v. Randolph, 222 U. S. 161, 162, 56 L. Ed. 142, 143, 32 Sup. Ct. 48, 49, the Supreme Court of the United States declared:
“The action was in debt to recover this excess over the cost of the property, as money had and received for the use of the plaintiff.
“It would be a great scandal.if a principal thus betrayed by his agent might not declare in assumpsit without relying upon fraud and deceit in an action for damages. And so the court below held was the law, and that such was the action, notwithstanding the conduct of the Sandovals was characterized as deceitful and fraudulent.
“Neither is it now contended that an agent who makes a secret profit in the execution of his ag*ency may not be compelled to disgorge and required to do so in an action upon an implied promise. * * *
“What they do say is, that as a matter of law there was no relation of principal and agent, since there was conclusive evidence that they were themselves the owners of the property at the time they agreed to act for the plaintiff in buying1 it. Upon this hypothesis it is said *302that there is no evidence to support a judgment grounded upon their liability for a breach of duty as agents, since one may not act as agent for the.,buyer in the sale of property of which he is himself the sole owner. “But the finding-of fact was that the defendants, after agreeing to purchase in behalf of the plaintiff, ‘and in pursuance of that agreement, purchased the said mining property, ’ etc. This finding is a flat contradiction of the claim that they were the owners when they agreed to represent the plaintiff in buying the property.”
As I think, the trial judge committed prejudicial error by taking the plaintiff’s prima facie case from the jury. This court has obviously approved this assumption by the trial judge of fact-finding powers. I therefore dissent from the decision and opinion of the majority herein.
Mr. Justice Young concurs in this opinion.