Court Opinion

ID: 9538223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:32:49.060085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:39.682289
License: Public Domain

WINDES, Justice,
with whom UDALL, Justice, concurs (dissenting).
*335We are unable to concur in the majority opinion. Because of the somewhat lengthy thesis on the history and theory of community property law, we feel that the one question for decision has been somewhat obscured and, as a basis for our views, briefly state the problem presented as follows : Does a husband who purchases a family car with community funds thereby become personally liable under the family car doctrine for its negligent operation by the wife while being used for the purpose for which purchased, the husband not participating in the tortious act?
The majority answers this question in the affirmative by applying the common law principles applicable to master and servant and says, in effect, that the husband, having the control and management of the community family car, made the wife his agent when he permitted its use by her. The majority reaches this conclusion on the theory that this court has in the past erroneously treated the community as an •entity. The reasoning to logically arrive at this determination must be as follows: This court said in Donn v. Kunz, 52 Ariz. 219, 79 P.2d 965, that the family car doctrine did not apply so far as to make the "husband personally liable because, in furnishing the community car, he did not furnish it individually but in so doing acted in a representative capacity as agent of the community. Since there is no entity, the community, for which he could be agent, the wife became his agent when driving the car. We think this is fallacious reasoning.
Donn v. Kunz was not wrong in the statement that the husband in furnishing the car acted in a representative capacity and that he did not in so doing act individually, unless the majority also intends to upset the reasoning in this respect as announced by the late Justice Franklin in La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 137 P. 426, 428, which is one of the foundation stones of our community property law. Therein, the existence of an entity at least to the' extent of the existence of a marital community was recognized where it is said the policy of the community property law “is to give the wife in this marital community an equal dignity * Likewise, therein it is stated that for expediency the law considers it necessary in the handling of community personalty to have an agent of the community with power to act. Later in the opinion this agency is referred to as “statutory agent or trustee”. The majority opinion herein recognizes this representative capacity of the husband in handling community personalty but calls him a “statutory administrator”. We care not whether you call the husband an agent of the marital community, an agent of the wife, trustee or statutory administrator. The result is the same, he is acting in a representative capacity. There is nothing unusual about the *336use of the term “agent of the community” as descriptive of this representative capacity. It has been used by the Federal and various state courts having community property laws. De Lappe v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 113 F.2d 48; Baca v. Village of Belen, 30 N.M. 541, 240 P. 803. Long after Bortle v. Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425, 67 A.L.R. 1152, which the majority claims entirely abolished the entity theory, the Washington court in Page v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 12 Wash.2d 101, 120 P.2d 527, 532, used the following language:
“That the husband as statutory agent for the community has complete power to buy or sell community personalty and make its contracts is a well-established rule in this state.”
This court in its previous pronouncements never intended and we are sure no other court ever intended to say that the marital community or partnership composed of the husband and wife was a separate entity such as a corporation or business partnership. All we mean and the other courts mean when using the term is that the husband in handling community property acts not for himself only but for himself and in a representative capacity for his wife for their mutual interests. When he furnishes the automobile with the wife’s funds, he is not furnishing it individually. This so-called marital community through the agency of the husband furnishes it for the use of both as such.
An attempt is made to justify the imposition of individual liability upon the basis that since the husband has the power to dispose of community personalty, by permitting the wife to use the car, he thereby made her his agent. This is extending the scope of authority of statutory agency far beyond that announced in La Tourette v. La Tourette, supra. Therein it was said:
“The law, in giving this power to the husband during coverture to dispose of the personal property, does not do this in recognition of any higher or superior right that he has therein, but because the law considers it expedient and necessary in business transactions affecting the personalty to have an agent of the community with power to act. So it has clothed the husband with this agency, deeming him the best qualified for the purpose, but limiting such agency to the personalty and during the period of coverture.”
By the majority decision herein it is said the power of control permits the husband for his own pleasure to purchase, partly with the wife’s funds, a family car for his own exclusive personal use. His agency in disposing of the community property must be exercised in good faith for the benefit of both their interests. Jarrett v. *337Arnerich, 44 Wash.2d 55, 265 P.2d 282. To permit him for his own personal pleasure to the exclusion of the wife’s rights to thus consume the wife’s share of the community property would be nothing short of a fraud upon her.
The state of Washington, long after Bortle v. Osborne, supra, wherein the majority say the entity theory was rejected, had no trouble in disposing, upon sound principles, of the identical question before us here. In Perren v. Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P.2d 867, the wife while driving a community car on community affairs negligently operated the same and the trial court rendered personal judgment against the husband. The supreme court reversed, holding that the husband was not personally liable when not present and participating in the tort and there could be no separate liability imposed upon him. We have held long ago that under our statute relating to the rights and liabilities of married women, the husband is not responsible for the wife’s torts, Hageman v. Vanderdoes, 15 Ariz. 312, 138 P. 1053, L.R.A.1915A, 491, and in Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304, wherein we had the problem of personal liability of the wife for negligent operation by the husband of a highway patrol car, we held no personal liability of the wife for the reason that under the decision in Hageman v. Vanderdoes, supra, the husband was not personally liable. In other words, we said since the husband if the situation were reversed would not be personally liable, the wife is not personally liable.
1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property, is cited and quoted from. We are willing to admit that this work is recognized as an eminent authority on the principles of community property law. We would likewise quote what this same work has to say concerning the exact problem we have in this case. In discussing the respective personal liability of one spouse for the negligent operation of a community car by the other, it is said (section 182, page 526):
“It should be apparent, under the principle of the community property system that each spouse is a separate person in his or her own right, that the wife is acting as an individual in driving the automobile just as much as the husband would be in driving it. He should no more be liable for her tort than she should be for his. The invocation of this doctrine is only another attempt to drag in by the heels the common law principle that the wife is always subject to the husband’s orders and that as her master he is responsible for her tortious acts. Even if the husband has requested or ordered her to proceed to do a certain thing, in the course of which she commits a tortious act, their relation *338is not one of master and servant. In the absence of any authorization of the tortious act itself, or ratification of it, so as to tar him with the same brush, there is no reason why his property should be liable. As an individual in her own right, she and her own property should bear the responsibility for her tort. * * * ”
de Funiak is entirely correct in saying that the wife in operating a community car is acting as a separate individual and “he (the husband) should no more be liable for her tort than she' would be for his”. He is correct when he says, “In the absence ■of any authorization of the tortious act itself, or ratification of it, so as to tar him with the same brush, there is no reason why his property should be liable.” He is correct when he says that to hold the husband is “only another attempt to drag in by the heels the common law principle that the wife is always subject to the husband’s orders and that as her master he is responsible for her tortious acts.” It will probably come as a distinct shock to the married women of the state to learn that hereafter their right to the use of the community car (indeed, of all community personalty purchased for joint use) is subordinate to that of their husbands, and that, by virtue of his newly acquired status, the husband could (if he dared) forbid her the use thereof.
Not only do the majority err in ruling that the husband is personally liable, they compound the error by limiting his personal liability to the extent of his ownership of one-half the community property at the time of the accident. The majority say defendant is responsible under the family car doctrine. That doctrine is based upon the doctrine of a respondeat superior. Benton v. Regeser, 20 Ariz. 273, 179 P. 966. It is elementary not only in this state but in all states that if one is liable under the principles of respondeat superior, he is liable to the full extent of the damage inflicted by his agent-tort-feasor. There is no such thing in the law as making one jointly liable for a tort under these principles and limiting the amount of recovery by the amount of property, community or separate, which he held at a particular time. Respondeat superior means “Let the master answer”, not in part but in full for the wrongful acts of his agent. If the wife-tort-feasor acting for their community interests were living, one certainly could not sue the husband alone as principal and limit plaintiff’s recovery to the extent of one-half the community property they held at the time of the wrong. Why the incident of her death makes this possible is not explained. Not only is such a rule not the law, it is impracticable. It changes the measure of damages this defendant must pay to the value of one-half *339the community property at the time of the accident. This is something never heard of before. It is not and cannot be the law anywhere except in Arizona after this majority decision is announced.
The judgment should be affirmed.
UDALL, J., concurs.