Court Opinion

ID: 9918434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-12 22:00:54.697488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:14.165019
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566
UIRC-GSA HOLDINGS, LLC,
                                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                 v.

WILLIAM BLAIR & COMPANY, L.L.C., and MICHAEL KALT,
                                     Defendants-Appellees.
                    ____________________

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
          No. 15-cv-9518 — Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.
                    ____________________

  ARGUED OCTOBER 26, 2023 — DECIDED JANUARY 12, 2024
               ____________________

   Before FLAUM, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
    BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. UIRC-GSA Holdings acquires and
manages properties occupied by the U.S. government. Wil-
liam Blair is a financial services company. Blair was helping
UIRC with a bond offering when a third company undertook
a similar offering. Both UIRC and the third company used cer-
tain documents during the offering process. UIRC showed
Blair its documents, which UIRC had copyrighted. When
UIRC learned that Blair was involved in the similar offering,
2                                       Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

UIRC sued Blair for copyright infringement. Blair prevailed
at summary judgment and the district court awarded Blair at-
torneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. UIRC now appeals, ar-
guing the district court erred when it ruled that UIRC lacked
the requisite originality for valid copyrights in the documents
and by awarding fees to Blair.
   UIRC did not independently draft much of the text in the
documents, and the new text it drafted consists entirely of un-
copyrightable material. The district court was correct to grant
Blair’s summary judgment motion, and that court did not
abuse its discretion by awarding Blair fees.
                        I. Background
    UIRC acquires and manages properties leased to the U.S.
General Services Administration. To acquire these properties,
UIRC needs to raise money. But finding outside sources of
capital is challenging for UIRC, as government-occupied
rental property presents unique risks. For example, although
the government is unlikely to fail to pay its rent, it often occu-
pies an entire building; if it decides to leave, the building emp-
ties immediately.
    UIRC came up with a strategy to pool a dozen GSA prop-
erties, use the pool as security for a bond, then offer the bond
to the market. By spreading the risks out across numerous
properties, UIRC hoped the bonds would present a more ap-
pealing investment opportunity.
    To facilitate the offering, UIRC produced two documents:
a private placement memorandum (PPM) and an indenture
of trust. PPMs advertise the bonds; trust indentures govern
the bond issuer’s relationship with anyone who buys them.
UIRC did not draft these offering documents from scratch.
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                         3

One of UIRC’s lawyers emailed UIRC executives a copy of of-
fering documents prepared by the Idaho Housing and Fi-
nance Association (“Idaho”). The UIRC executives then used
language from the Idaho documents in their own drafts.
    When UIRC’s ﬁrst transaction closed in the summer of
2012, UIRC submitted the corresponding PPM and indenture
of trust to the U.S. Copyright Oﬃce. The Copyright Oﬃce
asked UIRC to clarify which parts of the bond documents re-
ﬂected “the author’s original text or substantial revisions to
the preexisting text,” noting that courts have limited copy-
rights in contractual agreements that way. UIRC clariﬁed it
wanted a copyright only in the “additional and revised text”
it drafted, not the “standard legal language.” The Copyright
Oﬃce approved the application with the limiting language.
   After a second, less successful, oﬀering, UIRC decided to
hire a placement agent to help it market the bonds. Enter Wil-
liam Blair. Blair worked with UIRC on the third and fourth
transactions. UIRC also copyrighted the additional and re-
vised text in, as relevant here, the fourth transaction’s associ-
ated oﬀering documents.
   But trouble ensued. While Blair and UIRC were working
on the ﬁfth transaction, another company hired Blair to draft
bond documents and ﬁnd investors for a similar transaction.
According to UIRC, the bond documents the third party used
were strikingly similar to UIRC’s documents from the ﬁrst
and fourth transactions. They were so similar, in fact, that ref-
erences to UIRC remained in the ﬁnal documents.
    When UIRC learned about the similar transaction, it sued.
Among its claims, UIRC alleged Blair copied original portions
of the first and fourth sets of UIRC’s offering documents,
4                                       Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

infringing its copyrights in violation of the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
   After discovery, Blair and UIRC moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted Blair’s motion, deciding
that UIRC’s oﬀering documents could not be subject to copy-
right protection. Key to the district court’s decision was that
UIRC’s documents were “incredibly similar” to the Idaho
documents. And the non-trivial language UIRC added—facts,
short phrases, and functional language—could not be copy-
righted.
    After final judgment, Blair as the prevailing party moved
to recover its attorneys’ fees, permitted under 17 U.S.C. § 505.
The district court applied the factors the Supreme Court en-
dorsed for § 505 fees motions in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., con-
cluding at least three of the four factors weighed toward Blair.
See 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994). So, the district court granted
Blair’s motion.
    UIRC ﬁled separate appeals from the summary judgment
and fees orders, which we have consolidated for considera-
tion and decision.
                     II. Copyrightability
    A plaintiff must prove two elements to establish copyright
infringement. First, he must demonstrate he owns “a valid
copyright.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 361 (1991). Second, he must show the defendant copied
“constituent elements of the work that are original.” Id. Be-
cause we resolve UIRC’s claim on the first element, we do not
discuss the second.
    The Constitution empowers Congress to “secur[e] for lim-
ited Times to Authors … the exclusive Right to their
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                                   5

respective Writings … .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress
has exercised this copyright power, restricting the exclusive
right of protection to “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression … .” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(2023).
    To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be origi-
nal to the author. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. Originality is the glue
holding copyright law together. An original work is one the
author “independently created” and “possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity.” Id. But originality cannot bind
everything. Ideas, methods of operation, concepts, and the
like, no matter how independent and creative, are not copy-
rightable. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
    UIRC did not independently create most of the language
in the documents at issue. Instead, it copied much of the lan-
guage from the Idaho materials. We agree with the district
court that the language UIRC did draft lacks the creative ex-
pression required for copyright protection. It is either facts,
fragmented phrases, or language dictated solely by functional
considerations.
                                   A.
    To support a valid copyright, a writing must be inde-
pendently created. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345. There must be “suffi-
cient nontrivial expressive variation” in the writing in ques-
tion, so as “to make it distinguishable from [an] underlying
work in some meaningful way.” Schrock v. Learning Curve
Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009) 1; see Nova Design

    1 Schrock is a derivative-use case. See id. at 518. When an author com-

bines “preexisting material in which copyright subsists” and some “mate-
rial contributed by the author,” the author’s additions can support a
6                                              Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, LLC, 652 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2011).
Outright copying, thus, obviates originality. Feist, 499 U.S. at
345.
    Independent creation is a short hurdle, but it still matters.
For example, consider photographs of Thomas & Friends
train characters, which this court held were distinguishable
from the characters themselves. Schrock, 586 F.3d at 522. The
photographer’s “angle, perspective, lighting, and dimension”
supplied the variation making them copyrightable. Id. The
copyright was “narrow,” but it was a copyright nonetheless.
Id.
    An influential treatise uses a different visual art form—
painting—to explain distinguishable variation. See 1 NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01(A)(1). Suppose an art student creates a
master copy of a Rembrandt. His canvas mirrors the original
to the last brushstroke (an artistic accomplishment on its
own). But “he has not produced anything that ‘owes its
origin’ to him … .” Id. (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). Authorship is what copyright
demands. Id.
    Or, consider the Supreme Court’s tale of two poets. See
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345–46. “[E]ach ignorant of the other,” they
write identical poems. Id. at 346. Both are copyrightable even
though neither is novel. Unlike the Rembrandt imitator, the

copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a), (b) (2023). We do not discuss that nook of
copyright law here. Instead, we end the analysis by holding that UIRC’s
copyright is invalid. Regardless, for purposes of independent creation, the
fact that Schrock is a derivative-use case is not important—“the originality
requirement for derivative works is not more demanding than the origi-
nality requirement for other works … .” 586 F.3d at 521.
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                                       7

poets have established authorship by creating something en-
tirely of their own.
    UIRC and Idaho are unlike these two poets. UIRC has ad-
mitted to knowing the Idaho documents existed. And if Idaho
is Rembrandt, UIRC is the art student: much of the language
UIRC highlights in its copyrighted documents is indistin-
guishable from language Idaho created. 2 Where they differ,
most of UIRC’s nuances are “[]trivial … variations,” wholly
unlike the toy photographer’s perspective and lighting.
Schrock, 586 F.3d at 521.
    Consider three highlighted sections from UIRC’s docu-
ments. First, UIRC highlighted Article V, Section 5.01 in its
indenture of trust for the fourth bond offering. The only dif-
ferences (besides formatting) between Section 5.01 in Idaho’s
indenture of trust and that same section in UIRC’s document
are nine substitutions of “Project” for “Properties”; a change
from “Borrower” to “Issuer”; and a new clause reading, “and
initial funding of reserves for the Bonds.” Even the section
number is the same.
    Second, in the final PPM for its fourth offering, UIRC high-
lighted Sections 3(b), 4, and 5 (among others) under “Pledge
of Trust Estate.” Again, UIRC uses the highlighter to lasso
every word composing these paragraphs. But here UIRC
made only one change to Idaho’s version: it ended section 5
with a period, and Idaho used a semicolon.
   Third, consider the “Application of Revenues” sections—
specifically, the paragraphs of UIRC’s PPM for its first

    2 In its filings in the district court, UIRC used a highlighter to indicate

the copyrighted sections of its documents.
8                                        Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

transaction concerning the order of payments. In this section,
UIRC describes how the trustee will distribute money to the
various accounts or funds and for what purposes and how the
trustee and issuer can use the remaining money. UIRC ex-
plains it had to draft the payment flow exactly as it did to as-
sure bondholders that “problems at one of the … properties
would not materially affect” their security. Idaho has a similar
section. As UIRC explains it, this is the most important aspect
of its bond structure. Although this is perhaps UIRC’s best
claim to originality, it still fails. See also infra II(B).
    The trivial variations persist in the version of the Applica-
tion of Revenues section in the PPM for UIRC’s first transac-
tion. In one paragraph, UIRC deletes one deadline; switches
out “following” for “after” and “with” for “in”; and swaps a
second deadline with its own. In another paragraph, it simply
replaces “Expense Fund” with “Administrative Expense
Fund” and “S&P” with “NAIC.”
    Small variations aside, UIRC did contribute new, substan-
tive material to this Application of Revenues section. Rather
than disqualify the whole document, copyright law may still
protect what UIRC contributed. Nova Design Build, 652 F.3d at
818; Pickett v. Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 405 (7th Cir. 2000); Merritt
Forbes & Co. Inc. v. Newman Inv. Sec., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 943, 951,
953 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (considering copyrightability of a bond
document, but denying summary judgment motion because
originality is genuine issue of material fact, and explaining
that “new elements” of a copied work are the only ones “pro-
tected by copyright”).
    In Nova Design Build, Inc. v. Grace Hotels, a design company
claimed that a hotel conglomerate infringed its copyrights in
its architectural designs. 652 F.3d at 815–16. Grace Hotels and
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                          9

Nova had agreed to work together on a new Holiday Inn
Express, with Nova supplying the designs. Id. at 815. The
agreement fell apart, and, after Grace built the hotel, Nova
sued, alleging Grace used its designs anyway. Id. at 816. This
court sided with Grace. Id. at 818. Nova’s designs were gener-
ally based on the Holiday Inn Express prototype. But some of
its designs contained “added features,” such as an extra floor,
which lacked originality. Other features “were specifically re-
quested by Grace.” The court concluded that “there was no
creative element to these features” warranting copyright pro-
tection. Id.
   This is the approach we take here. UIRC cannot use the
highlighter to make Idaho’s contributions disappear. But cop-
ied language does not de facto taint the whole work. Thus, we
next consider whether the Copyright Act can protect the un-
copied material.
                               B.
    After excising the copied language, what remains is a mix-
ture of fragmented phrases, facts, and language dictated
solely by functional considerations. Fragmented phrases and
facts are not copyrightable. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (facts); Alberto-Culver
Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 1972)
(short phrases and expressions). Language dictated solely by
function is not copyrightable either. Publ’ns Int'l, Ltd. v. Mere-
dith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1996).
    As above, we return to the Application of Revenues sec-
tions of the PPM for UIRC’s first transaction. Some of UIRC’s
more substantive contributions are facts or fragmented
phrases. For example, it replaced some of Idaho’s language
10                                       Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

with “Mortgage,” “Assignment of Lease,” and “Collateral As-
signment of Rents” in a list of legal documents in the opening
paragraph of the section. Elsewhere, it added the phrase “the
Loan Agreement obligates the Borrower to (and the Issuer
shall cause the Borrower to)” to Idaho’s language in the first
paragraph of the section. Other contributions are more sub-
stantial. For example, although UIRC used some of Idaho’s
language for the payment order section discussed above,
UIRC re-sequenced the paragraphs, creating a different order.
And the order matters.
    But here, and wherever UIRC made substantive additions,
it was not creative expression. Rather, UIRC was responding
to the demands of function. Two key cases illustrate how
functional additions differ from creative additions.
    First, in Publications International, Ltd. v. Meredith Corp., a
publisher argued that it had a copyright in a series of recipes,
but the recipes amounted to a list of ingredients and step-by-
step instructions for making the dishes. See 88 F.3d at 475, 480.
This alone could not support a valid copyright. Id. at 480.
Without any “expressive elaboration upon [their] functional
components,” the recipes were “barebones,” nothing more
than “the directions for producing a certain dish.” Id. at 480,
481; see 1 NIMMER, supra, § 2A.13. Considering the definition
of a “recipe,” this court concluded that, at its most fundamen-
tal, a recipe is an uncopyrightable “‘procedure, process, [or]
system.’” Publ’ns Int'l., 88 F.3d at 481 (quoting 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b)) (alteration in original). Had the publisher com-
mented on the history of the recipe or provided wine pairings,
for example, it could copyright the recipe. See id.
   So too here. UIRC included no expressive elaborations,
choosing instead to present its idea to potential investors with
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                                     11

the formal technicality common to bond documents. Bond
documents are, at their foundation, barebones descriptions of
the offering and terms and conditions. See, e.g., Prospectus,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Indenture/corporate
indenture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 3 Without
any elevating creativity, the documents consist of little more
than an uncopyrightable “method of operation” or “process.”
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2023).
    UIRC gives some insight into its drafting process. Even
though there were other ways UIRC could explain the pay-
ment of order flows provision, it wrote the provision exactly
as it did to assure bondholders that their security would be
safe. For example, when the second bond offering was less
successful, UIRC cited “changes it made to its bond docu-
ments.”
    An author’s decision to phrase things one way may in
some cases be evidence of creative expression. In American
Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, for example, the crea-
tivity in a taxonomy of dental procedures was the author’s
classification and explanation after “the fundamental scheme
ha[d] been devised.” 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997). But in
American Dental, and unlike here, functional demands did not
constrain the taxonomist’s prosaic choice.
   In the second key case, Incredible Technologies, Inc. v. Virtual
Technologies, Inc., this court rejected a copyright infringement

    3 See also Boyle v. Stephens, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1351 (SAS), 1998 WL 80175,

at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1998) (“[P]laintiff’s copyright does not preclude
others from also describing … fund characteristics … . Otherwise, plaintiff
could prevent competitors from fully describing the mutual fund concept
in a prospectus or other selling materials … .”).
12                                       Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

claim in the markings on an arcade cabinet’s control panel.
400 F.3d 1007, 1014, 1013 (7th Cir. 2005). Incredible Technolo-
gies made the Golden Tee arcade game. Id. at 1009. Virtual
Technologies decided to make a competing arcade game—
PGA Tour Golf. Id. Virtual Technologies wanted to make a
game very similar to Golden Tee. Id. at 1010. So it purchased
a Golden Tee cabinet and hired a firm to design a game that
could fit seamlessly within IT’s preexisting system. PGA Tour
Golf’s control panel, unsurprisingly, turned out “nearly iden-
tical” to Golden Tee’s. Id. The panels consisted of a trackball
in the center (a “golfer” “swings” by rolling it), arrows around
the trackball, a horizontal graphic demonstrating flight paths
(indicating the direction the “ball” would move), five buttons
around the trackball, and textual instructions. Id. at 1010,
1013.
     This court ruled that IT’s control panel was not subject to
copyright protection because practical, non-creative reasons
governed IT’s choices. Id. at 1013. First, the control panel’s lay-
out was “dictated by functional considerations.” Id. at 1014.
The trackball must have been in the middle so both left- and
right-handed golfers could use it. Second, IT situated the but-
tons “for purposes of convenience”; this choice “cannot be
said to be expressive.” Third, an arrow is not “imaginative or
creative,” even though “something other than an arrow could
have been used to indicate direction.” Id. Here, UIRC may
have chosen its language carefully, but as in Incredible Tech-
nologies, its choices were driven by convenience and function,
not creativity. So, we hold that UIRC’s documents are not en-
titled to copyright protection.
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                       13

                              C.
   Before turning to attorney’s fees, we review four final
points.
    First, UIRC’s bond documents could resemble advertise-
ments, which “are clearly copyrightable.” 1 NIMMER, supra,
§ 2A.08(G)(4). Even if the bond documents were advertise-
ments, the fact that a writing advertises a product does not
make it per se copyrightable. The question remains whether
the work has some spark of creative expression. See id.
(whether content is dictated solely by functional considera-
tions is still relevant issue in advertising context). As an ad-
vertisement or as a legal instrument, the uncopied parts of the
bond documents are not creative enough.
    Second, just as Publications International did not hold that
recipes are per se uncopyrightable, we do not hold that bond
documents are per se uncopyrightable. See 88 F.3d at 482. Le-
gal documents could be copyrightable just as paintings are.
See generally 1 NIMMER, supra, § 2A.11. And although legal
documents are hardly works of art, the Supreme Court di-
vorced meritoriousness and creativeness more than 100 years
ago. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
251–252 (1903).
    Third, UIRC relies on Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove to argue it
can copyright the “arrangement, expression and manner of
presentation” of its documents. 648 F.3d 489, 499 (7th Cir.
2011) (quotations omitted). In Taflove, a professor and a grad-
uate student sued another professor and graduate student,
claiming copyright infringement of a mathematical model. Id.
at 493–94. The plaintiffs in Taflove argued that the model’s
equations and figures, as well as the text describing the
14                                      Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

model, were subject to copyright protection. Id. at 494, 500.
Because their idea could be expressed in only one way, a cop-
yright over that expression is invalid, so the court ruled for
the defendants. Id. at 498, 500.
    But UIRC focuses on a different part of the opinion. The
Taflove plaintiffs relied on a Seventh Circuit case ensuring au-
thors protection over the “arrangement, expression and man-
ner of presentation” of mathematical data. Id. at 499; see Flick-
Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 548 (7th Cir.
1965). But the Taflove court found that case to be about the
style of the writing, not its words. Taflove, 648 F.3d at 499. And
the Taflove plaintiffs did not argue that “the defendants ap-
propriated their creative presentation” of their research, but
that the defendants “copied the substance of the equations, fig-
ures and text.” Id. The same is true here. UIRC focuses not on
“such aspects as the color or font” of its documents but on the
language it used. Id. It cannot shoehorn substance into
caselaw addressing style.
    Fourth, UIRC points out that witnesses described the doc-
uments as “creative,” which it bears as a stone and sling sure
to outmatch our precedent. But “an expert may not offer legal
opinions,” so we need not consider this testimony further.
Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 732 F.3d 710, 721 (7th Cir. 2013).
   Having decided that the district court did not err by
awarding summary judgment to Blair, we turn to UIRC’s ap-
peal of the district court’s fees decision.
                       III. Attorneys’ Fees
   UIRC disagrees with the district court’s award of
$1,531,611.75 in attorneys’ fees to Blair under the Copyright
Act’s fees provision. “In any civil action” under the Copyright
Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566                                            15

Act, a court “in its discretion” may “award a reasonable attor-
ney’s fee to the prevailing party … .” 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2023).
Accordingly, we will reverse only if the district court abuses
this discretion. Sullivan v. Flora, Inc., 936 F.3d 562, 575 (7th Cir.
2019). An abuse of discretion is “an erroneous conclusion of
law, a record that contains no evidence rationally supporting
the court’s decision, or facts that are clearly erroneous as the
district court found them.” LHO Chicago River, L.L.C. v.
Rosemoor Suites, LLC, 988 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2021).
    The Supreme Court has permitted courts to use four fac-
tors to “guide [their] discretion.” Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19.
The factors are:
       (1) the frivolousness of the suit; (2) the losing
       party’s motivation for bringing or defending
       against a suit; (3) the objective unreasonableness of
       the claims advanced by the losing party; and (4) the
       need to advance considerations of compensation
       and deterrence.
Live Face on Web, LLC v. Cremation Soc’y of Illinois, Inc., 77 F.4th
630, 631 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534 n.19)).
    Ultimately, “there is a strong presumption that prevailing
defendants may recover costs.” Design Basics, LLC v. Kerstiens
Homes & Designs, Inc., 1 F.4th 502, 508 (7th Cir. 2021). When
we have reversed a district court’s entry of § 505 fees, we have
done so because the district court failed to consider the Fogerty
factors or reached an obviously wrong result when consider-
ing them. See Mostly Memories, Inc. v. For Your Ease Only, Inc.,
526 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 2008); Eagle Servs. Corp. v. H2O
Indus. Servs., Inc., 532 F.3d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2008).
16                                     Nos. 23-1527 & 23-2566

    The district court considered all four factors and did not
abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Blair. First, the court
held UIRC failed to rebut the presumption in favor of Blair on
the first factor (frivolousness). Second, the court assumed that
UIRC won the second factor (improper motive) without much
discussion. Third, the court sided with Blair on the third fac-
tor (objective unreasonableness of the claim). The district
court found UIRC’s decision not to be forthcoming about the
Idaho documents, either earlier in the litigation or before the
Copyright Office, problematic. Fourth, similarly, the court
sided with Blair on the fourth factor (advancing considera-
tions of compensation and deterrence) because of UIRC’s fail-
ure to disclose.
    Finally, Blair has requested that we extend the district
court’s fee order to the attorneys’ fees it incurred defending
this appeal. We invite Blair to move for those fees with the
appropriate substantiation within 30 days of the date of this
decision, after which UIRC will have 15 days to respond.
                       IV. Conclusion
   UIRC did not have a valid copyright in the bond docu-
ments it alleges Blair copied. Much of its language is indistin-
guishable from the language Idaho used in its documents,
and the nontrivial additions are not copyrightable. To boot,
the district court properly weighed the Fogerty factors, so it
did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees to Blair.
   We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s decision to enter
summary judgment for Blair and to award Blair fees.