Court Opinion

ID: 9368834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 12:09:14.291921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.784494
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                               No. 04-21-00553-CV

                                 IN THE INTEREST OF L.M.C., a Child

                      From the 408th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                   Trial Court No. 2016-CI-16354
                              Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:          Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                  Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 1, 2023

MODIFIED; AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

           Mother appeals from a final order in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, arguing

the trial court erred by not rendering a final order in strict compliance with the parties’ mediated

settlement agreement. We sustain Mother’s first issue, modify the final order, and affirm the final

order as modified.

                                                   BACKGROUND

           Mother and Father are the parents of the child, L.M.C. 1 In February 2017, the trial court

rendered a final judgment in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, appointing Mother and

Father joint managing conservators of the child. Almost two years later, in January 2019, Mother

1
 To protect the identity of the minor child, we do not refer to the parties and the child by their names in this opinion.
See TEX. FAM. CODE. § 109.002(d).
                                                                                                          04-21-00553-CV

filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship. On July 11, 2020, the trial court signed

temporary orders in the modification suit. In March 2021, the parties signed a mediated settlement

agreement, which contained provisions regarding Father’s possession and access to the child. In

September 2021, each party filed a motion to enter a final order. The trial court held a hearing on

the motions to enter and signed a final order. Mother appealed.

                                                     DISCUSSION

           We review a trial court’s rendition of judgment on a mediated settlement agreement under

an abuse of discretion standard. In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 450 (Tex. 2013); In re S.L.E., No. 04-

19-00092-CV, 2020 WL 1866467, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 15, 2020, pet. denied).

Generally, when a mediated settlement agreement meets the requirements of section 153.0071(d) 2

of the Texas Family Code, a trial court has no discretion to render a judgment that varies from the

terms of the mediated settlement agreement. Byrd v. Byrd, No. 04-11-00700-CV, 2012 WL

6013424, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 30, 2012, no pet.); Garcia-Udall v. Udall, 141

S.W.3d 323, 332 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). “If a mediated settlement agreement meets

the requirements of [section 153.0071(d)], a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated

settlement agreement notwithstanding Rule 11, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, or another rule of

law.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0071(e).

2
    Section 153.0071(d) provides:

           A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement:

             (1) provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters
                 or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation;

             (2) is signed by each party to the agreement; and

             (3) is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is
                 signed.

TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0071(d).

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                                                                                     04-21-00553-CV

       In this case, the parties’ mediated settlement agreement (“the MSA”) meets the

requirements of section 153.0071(d). Furthermore, Father does not argue that any exception to

Section 153.0071(e)’s mandate applies. See id. § 153.0071(e)(1) (providing a trial court may

decline to enforce a MSA when it makes certain findings, including a finding that domestic

violence impaired a party’s ability to make decisions and the agreement is not in the best interest

of the child); Byrd, 2012 WL 6013424, at *5 (indicating a trial court may decline to enforce a MSA

upon finding that the agreement was illegal, violated public policy, was drafted in error, or was

ambiguous); Udall, 141 S.W.3d at 331-32 (noting a trial court has authority not to enforce illegal

provisions in a MSA). Therefore, the trial court had no discretion to render a final order that

deviated from the MSA. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0071(e); Byrd, 2012 WL 6013424, at *5;

Udall, 141 S.W.3d at 332.

       The pertinent provision in the MSA provides:

               [Father’s] extended summer possession shall occur in accordance with the
       SPO in the parties’ July 11, 2020 Temporary Orders, except for the following:
       Without written notice by the required date specifying an extended period or
       periods of summer possession for that year, [Father] shall have possession of the
       child for thirty consecutive days in that year beginning at 6:00 p.m. on July 7 and
       ending at 6:00 p.m. on August 6[.]

(emphasis added).

       Notwithstanding this provision, the trial court’s final order provides in relevant part:

       (d) Parents Who Reside More than 100 Miles Apart

               Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Modified Standard
       Possession Order, when [Dad] resides more than 100 miles from the residence of
       the child, [Dad] shall have the right to possession of the child as follows:

       ....

       4. Extended Summer Possession by [Father] –

       With Written Notice by April 1 – If [Father] gives [Mother] written notice by April
       1 of a year specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession for that

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                                                                                                    04-21-00553-CV

         year, [Father] shall have possession of the child for forty-two days beginning no
         earlier than the day after the child’s school is dismissed for the summer vacation
         and ending no later than seven days before school resumes at the end of the summer
         vacation in that year, to be exercised in no more than two separate periods of at
         least seven consecutive days each, as specified in the written notice. These
         possession periods shall begin and end at 6:00 p.m. on each applicable day.

         Without Written Notice by April 1 – If [Father] does not give [Mother] written
         notice by April 1, specifying an extended period or periods of summer possession
         for that year, [Father] shall have possession of the child for forty-two consecutive
         days following his even numbered July 1-7 visitation.

(emphasis added).

         Mother argues that the final order deviates from the terms of the MSA because it provides

Father forty-two consecutive days of extended summer possession when he does not give timely

written notice specifying his extended period or periods of summer possession, whereas the MSA

provides Father “possession of the child for thirty consecutive days in that year beginning at 6:00

p.m. on July 7 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on August 6” when he does not give timely written notice

of his extended period or periods of summer possession. Father acknowledges in his brief that this

provision “does not strictly comply with the MSA and it should be modified.” We agree with the

parties that this provision deviates from the MSA. Therefore, we sustain Mother’s first issue and

modify the final order to comply with the MSA.3 See Byrd, 2012 WL 6013424, at *7 (modifying

the trial court’s judgment to comply with the terms of the MSA).

                                                  CONCLUSION

         In accordance with the MSA, the final order is modified to reflect that under the section

titled, “Parents Who Reside More Than 100 Miles Apart,” when Father does not give written notice

by April 1 of a year, he “shall have possession of the child for thirty consecutive days in that year

3
 Because our resolution of Mother’s first issue disposes of the appeal, we need not address Mother’s remaining issues.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                                        -4-
                                                                               04-21-00553-CV

beginning at 6:00 p.m. on July 7 and ending at 6:00 p.m. on August 6.” As modified, the trial

court’s final order is affirmed.

                                              Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

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