Court Opinion

ID: 9713516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:16:42.661095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:13.555646
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I disagree with the result set forth in the majority opinion. My disagreement is with the majority’s finding that Dr. Godbole’s hearsay testimony is competent. In its opinion, the majority finds that the alleged conversation the defendant purported to have with a person from the Mayo Clinic to have been properly admitted, by the trial court. With regard to the competency of the testimony of Dr. Godbole, the majority finds the testimony to be competent based upon the principle that calls made by a witness to a place of business relating to that business are admissible assuming regularity and authority in answering. (Godair v. Ham National Bank (1907), 225 Ill. 572, 80 N.E. 407.) This principle applies whether the caller/witness knew the identification of the answering party or not. Godair v. Ham National Bank (1907), 225 Ill. 572, 80 N.E. 407. While I do not find fault with the above-stated provisions, they are not applicable in this instance. After a search of authority, I have been unable to locate any cases where the above provisions have been applied in a similar instance as the present case. The rule is applied only to those cases when one party to the litigation places a business telephone call to the establishment of the other party to the litigation by means of a number listed for business purposes. (See, e.g., Godair v. Ham National Bank (1907), 225 Ill. 572, 80 N.E. 407; Rogers Grain Co. v. Tanton (1907), 136 Ill. App. 533; Trapp v. Rockford Electric Co. (1914), 186 Ill. App. 379; Delaney v. McNeil & Higgins Co. (1915), 195 Ill. App. 524; Korch v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America (1946), 329 Ill. App. 96, 67 N.E.2d 298; Holland v. O’Shea (1950), 342 Ill. App. 127, 95 N.E.2d 517; Gothberg v. Nemerovski (1965), 58 Ill. App. 2d 372, 208 N.E.2d 12; Devers v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (1980), 86 Ill. App. 3d 542, 408 N.E.2d 462; Smith v. Seiber (1984), 127 Ill. App. 3d 950, 469 N.E.2d 231; see also 71 A.L.R. 5 (1931); 105 A.L.R. 326 (1936); 18 Ill. L. & Prac. Evidence §45, at 184 (1956).) In the instant case the defendant is seeking to introduce his self-serving testimony of a telephone call he made to a third person who is not identified, and who is not involved in this action, against the plaintiff, who has no way of proving or disproving the defendant’s contention. The doctor defendant’s hearsay testimony at trial included both the fact that he actually made the call to the clinic and information he had allegedly learned from the conversation. The Illinois Supreme Court, in Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322, adopted Rules 703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. Rules Evid. 703, 705). Federal Rule 703 has been interpreted to allow opinions based upon facts not in evidence. (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 193, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326). Under Federal Rule 705 an expert may give an opinion without disclosing the facts underlying that opinion. Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 194, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326. The key element in applying Rules 703 and 705 is the assurance that the information upon which a testifying expert bases his opinion is of a type that is reliable. (Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 193, 417 N.E.2d 1322, 1326.) In the instant case, the information obtained by the doctor cannot be considered reliable. The defendant’s account of his telephone conversation is contrary to ordinary medical practices concerning confidentiality. Ordinarily, a clinic would not release confidential medical records concerning one of its patients to a telephone caller. The defendant does not argue, and the majority does not suggest, that the release of confidential medical records to a telephone caller is an established medical practice. Further, the defendant has not produced any Mayo Clinic log or notation indicating that a call or request was made to them to release the plaintiff’s records. The defendant cannot identify what day he called, what time he called, or whom he spoke to. In addition, the doctor’s testimony is by Its nature self-serving, without any of the underlying foundational requirements which permit the introduction of hearsay testimony under the rules enunciated in People v. Ward (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 559, 388 N.E.2d 171, and Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417 N.E.2d 1322. Thus, the trial court failed to exclude the doctor’s testimony concerning the call he purportedly made to the Mayo Clinic. Finally, since the area of the testimony covered related to a critical issue in this case, the error was so prejudicial that a new trial is in order.