Court Opinion

ID: 9702967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:34:57.928543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:44.262655
License: Public Domain

McDERMOTT, Justice,
concurring.
Whatever the merit of the decision in Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 316, 42 L.Ed.2d 274 (1974), I believe that this Court erred when it extended the Jones holding to cases arising under the Crimes Code of 1972: a view shared by Mr. Justice Nix, the author of the Jones Opinion in Support of Affirmance, who vigorously dissented in Commonwealth v. Manning, 477 Pa. 495, 500, 384 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1978).
One of the obvious purposes of the Crimes Code was to separately define individual offenses and to codify the body of law which had developed prior to its adoption. In Manning, id. this Court undid all of that work as it related to the varying degrees of homicide.
In addition, I have always viewed as paradoxical the rationale behind the giving of instructions on all aspects of homicide regardless of the offense charged. Purportedly the giving of such instructions “was intended to prevent the prosecution from failing where some element of the crime of murder was not made, ... [and] ... it was designed to redound to the benefit of the defendant since its effect is *446actually to empower the jury to extend mercy to an accused by finding a lesser degree of crime than is established by the evidence. See, Commonwealth v. Jones, supra, 457 Pa. at 569, 319 A.2d at 146.
It seems to me that both aspects of this rationale, extracted from anachronisms of the common law, defeat and confuse the purposes of a codified modern criminal code.
They relieve the Commonwealth of establishing their full burden of proof. If the Commonwealth charges murder, they should be obliged to prove all the elements or fail of their charge. The jury ought not be invited to compromise a defendant into a lesser charge of homicide because they are doubtful of the proofs. Both the Commonwealth and defendant are entitled to the charge proved, or nothing. To say that the jury may show “mercy” by reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter is a watery “mercy” if it results from an available compromise of the truth of the occasion.
It is always a small “mercy” to be convicted of a crime when one is innocent of any. Certainly the Commonwealth should not, as a gift from the jury, receive the “mercy” of a victim of compromise.
At all events, the “mercy” should be mercy for something, and not a compromise of the evidence or the proofs.
“Mercy” is not a factor to be considered. “Mercy” is a quality that strains the truth determining process. It overlooks, it forgets, it forgives, it has its place, but certainly not in the determination of facts.
Hence, while I applaud the step taken by the majority, I would go the next logical step and extend our holding here to all types of manslaughter.
A defendant who a jury is persuaded is guilty of murder in the first degree or third degree, may wish to show mercy, but it should be called “mercy” and not voluntary manslaughter.
For these reasons I join in the opinion of the majority in overruling Commonwealth v. Manning, supra; and in the *447opinion of Mr. Justice Larsen that the rule we announce today be extended to all types of manslaughter.