Court Opinion

ID: 9846082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:34:21.574811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.078796
License: Public Domain

*813IKUTA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that an alien convicted of the state offense of possession of drug paraphernalia and given limited relief under a state expungement scheme does not have a “conviction” for purposes of determining whether an alien is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) or deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). According to the majority, the Equal Protection Clause compels this ruling, because aliens convicted of certain federal drug crimes expunged under the Federal First Offender Act (FFOA) do not have a “conviction” for purposes of determining inadmissibility or deportability under §§ 1182(a)(2) and 1227(a)(2). The majority is wrong. The Equal Protection Clause does not compel us to invalidate a distinction between aliens who receive relief under the FFOA and aliens who receive relief under state law, because “[djistinctions between different classes of aliens in the immigration context are subject to rational basis review and must be upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Avila-Sanchez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.2007)). Before we may invalidate such a distinction, it must “be wholly irrational.” Id. (quoting de Martinez v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 759, 764 (9th Cir.2004)). Here, there is a rational reason to distinguish between aliens whose convictions are expunged under the FFOA and those who obtain limited relief under the sort of state scheme at issue in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney General to cancel removal of a qualified alien who is inadmissible to, or deportable from, the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. To be eligible for this relief, an alien must, among other things, not have a conviction for a drug-related offense, as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(C). Under the INA definition of conviction, an alien has a “conviction” whether or not the alien’s sentence is subsequently expunged. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). Yet, beginning with our 1994 decision in Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.1994), we have step-by-step rewritten the definition of “conviction” for purposes of immigration law. Previous cases detail this process, see, e.g., Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1284, 1287-90 (9th Cir.2004), Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 734-43 (9th Cir.2000), but a brief review is necessary to understand why, even in light of existing precedent, the majority now extends our equal protection jurisprudence too far.
A
Section 241(a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 204, codified at 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11) (1952), provided that any alien “convicted of a violation of, or a conspiracy to violate, any law or regulation relating to the illicit possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs” or other drug crimes was subject to deportation upon order of the Attorney General. Matter of A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 441 (1959) (Att’y Gen.). At that time, the Act did not define the words “convicted” or “conviction.” In 1959, the Attorney General took the position that, given the “continuing and serious Federal concern” regarding drug trafficking, “Congress did not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should escape deportation because, as in California, the State affords a procedure authorizing a technical erasure of the conviction.” Id. at 445.
In 1970, Congress enacted the FFOA to provide relief for persons convicted of simple possession of a controlled substance as *814a first offense. In consideration of this enactment, the BIA held that a conviction expunged under the FFOA or “under a state law which is the counterpart” of the FFOA could not serve as the basis for deportation. Matter of Werk, 16 I. & N. Dec. 234, 236 (BIA 1977). In a subsequent decision regarding the effect of a Maryland expungement statute, the BIA clarified the meaning of “state law counterpart” by holding that “if a statute applies to offenders of more serious drug violations, it will not be considered to be the state equivalent to the [FFOA].” Matter of Deris, 20 I. & N. Dec. 5, 10 (BIA 1989). In light of this determination, the BIA held that, because the Maryland expungement statute at issue covered persons guilty of controlled substance offenses that were more serious than simple possession, it did not qualify as a state counterpart. Id. at 11.
In Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1190, we rejected this conclusion on equal protection grounds. In that ease, the petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of marijuana possession under Montana law, but was allowed to withdraw her guilty plea and have her charge dismissed under Montana’s expungement statute. Because a range of more serious offenses was eligible for expungement, the BIA held that the Montana statute was not an exact counterpart of the FFOA, and thus the petitioner was deportable. Id. at 1188. The government contended that this distinction was rational “because of the differing goals and results that obtain under the Federal First Offender statute, as opposed to broader state expunction remedies,” id. at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted), and because “its policy of requiring an exact state counterpart effects a consistent Congressional policy to deal harshly with drug offenders under the immigration laws [and] to deal strictly with aliens who violate laws governing controlled substances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). We disagreed, concluding that “distinguishing Garberding for deportation because of the breadth of Montana’s expungement statute, not because of what she did, has no logical relation to the fair administration of the immigration laws.” Id. at 1191. Unable to discern a rational basis for distinguishing between a federal and state expungement scheme (notwithstanding the reason offered by the government), we held that the order for Garberding’s deportation violated her right to equal protection under the Constitution. Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1190-91.
Following Garberding, the BIA reexamined its position and held that “an alien who has been accorded rehabilitative treatment under a state statute will not be deported if he establishes that he would have been eligible for federal first offender treatment under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (1988) had he been prosecuted under federal law.” Matter of Manrique, 21 I. & N. Dec. 58, 64 (1995). A year after Manrique, however, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which substantially amended the INA. Among other changes, Congress provided a statutory definition of “conviction”:
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.
*8158 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). As the plain language of this section makes clear, an alien who is found guilty, or pleads guilty, and is subject to a penalty ordered by the court, is considered convicted for purposes of immigration law. In light of this new definition, the BIA reexamined its treatment of state expungement statutes and held that the decision in Manrique was superseded by IIRIRA:
We therefore interpret the new definition to provide that an alien is considered convicted for immigration purposes upon the initial satisfaction of the requirements of section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act, and that he remains convicted notwithstanding a subsequent state action purporting to erase all evidence of the original determination of guilt through a rehabilitative procedure.
Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 523 (BIA 1999).
But in Lujan-Armendariz, we rejected the BIA’s reasoning. There, a petitioner convicted of attempted possession of cocaine challenged the BIA’s determination of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (a successor to section 241(a)(11) of the INA)1 after Arizona vacated his conviction and dismissed the charges pursuant to an expungement statute. 222 F.3d at 733. Our disagreement with the BIA was based on a two-step analysis. First, after reasoning that Congress’s definition of “conviction” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) did not repeal by implication the protection afforded by the FFOA to first offenders, namely, that a § 3607(a) disposition “shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose,” id. at 744 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b)), we construed the FFOA as carving out an exception to the definition of “conviction” in § 1101(a)(48)(A). Id. at 745. Second, because a conviction that qualified for expungement under the FFOA would not count as a conviction for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), we held that the principles of equal protection required “the benefits of the Act be extended to aliens whose offenses are expunged under state rehabilitative laws, provided that they would have been eligible for relief under the Act had their offenses been prosecuted as federal crimes.” Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749. We stated, “there is no rational basis for a federal statute that treats persons adjudged guilty of a drug offense under state law more harshly than persons adjudged guilty of the identical offense under federal law.” Id.
Our subsequent decision in Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir.2000) extended Lujan-Armendariz further. In Cardenas-Uriarie, we rejected the BIA’s determination that a petitioner who had been convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia under Arizona law, and subsequently had his conviction expunged under a state scheme, was deportable under 8 U.S.C § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having committed a crime relating to a controlled substance. Id. at 1137-38. Although the first step of the Imjan-Armendariz analysis required the petitioner to have been “adjudged guilty of the identical offense under federal law,” 222 F.3d at 749, we bypassed this “identical offense” requirement. Instead, we inferred that Congress would have intended that a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia should be included under the FFOA when it is “a less serious offense than simple possession *816of a controlled substance.” Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137. From there, we determined that the equal protection analysis in Lujam-Armendariz applied even though petitioner’s offense was not an offense that could have qualified for relief under the FFOA. Id. at 1137-38.
In sum, before the decision today, an alien did not have a “conviction” for immigration purposes if: (1) “adjudged guilty” of a state crime that was identical to an offense under federal law, Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749, or of the state offense of possession of drug paraphernalia, Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137; (2) the offense was expunged under state law; and (3) the alien would have qualified for and received expungement of this offense under the FFOA had it been prosecuted as a federal crime, Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749.
B
The BIA rejected the Lujan-Armendariz analysis. See Matter of Salazar-Regino, 23 I. & N. Dec. 223 (2002) (concluding that, “except in the Ninth Circuit, a first-time simple drug possession offense expunged under a state rehabilitative statute is a conviction under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act”).
In Acosta v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit also rejected our approach. 341 F.3d 218 (3rd Cir.2003). In that case, a petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of heroin possession in violation of Pennsylvania law. Id. at 220. The state court placed him on probation, and subsequently dismissed the charges against him without an adjudication of guilt. After the BIA ruled that the proceeding constituted a “conviction” for immigration purposes, the petitioner argued for an exception to the definition of “conviction” based on equal protection principles, as interpreted in Lujan-Armendariz. Id. at 224. Judge (now Justice) Alito rejected the petitioner’s argument. Noting that “[ujnder rational-basis review, a classification must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification,” id. at 226-27 (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993)), the Third Circuit concluded:
[W]e can easily see a rational basis for a distinction between aliens whose criminal cases are dismissed under the federal FFOA and those whose charges are handled under similar state schemes. Familiar with the operation of the federal criminal justice system, Congress could have thought that aliens whose federal charges are dismissed under the FFOA are unlikely to present a substantial threat of committing subsequent serious crimes. By contrast, Congress may have been unfamiliar with the operation of state schemes that resemble the FFOA. Congress could have worried that state criminal justice systems, under the pressure created by heavy case loads, might permit dangerous offenders to plead down to simple possession charges and take advantage of those state schemes to escape what is considered a conviction under state law. Particularly in view of Congress’s power in immigration matters, it seems plain that rational-basis review is satisfied here. As the Supreme Court recently noted, “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003).
341 F.3d 218, 227 (3rd Cir.2003).
Other circuits that have considered the effect of IIRIRA’s definition of “conviction” have likewise rejected our approach. See Madriz-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir.2004) (rejecting Lu*817jan-Armendariz’s equal protection analysis “as have all the courts of appeals which have considered it,” and stating that an equal protection challenge based on the FFOA “is without merit”); Resendiz-Alcaraz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 383 F.3d 1262, 1272 (11th Cir.2004) (rejecting Lujan-Armendariz’s equal protection analysis because “a rational basis exists for distinguishing between aliens whose charges are dismissed under the FFOA and those whose charges are dismissed under state rehabilitative statutes”); Elkins v. Comfort, 392 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir.2004) (noting the “prevailing view in other circuits” that “there is a rational basis for distinguishing even state-court dispositions from those under the FFOA,” and holding there is a rational basis for denying a petitioner convicted under Korean law the benefit of the FFOA); Gill v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 574, 577-78 (7th Cir.2003) (rejecting Dajan-Armendariz’s analysis and noting that every other court that has considered the subject has concluded that state law expungements “do not negate a ‘conviction’ for purposes of immigration law”); see also Vasquez-Velezmoro v. INS, 281 F.3d 693, 697 (8th Cir.2002) (declining to adopt the holding and reasoning of Lujan-Armendañz, but concluding that petitioner’s equal protection claim failed because the petitioner was not similarly situated to a person eligible for FFOA treatment); Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 299, 309 (1st Cir.2000) (holding that § 1101(a)(48)(A) passes rational basis review in the context of a substantive due process challenge because it advances “the government’s need for a nationally uniform definition of the term ‘conviction’ for immigration purposes”).
More important, our approach in Lujan-Armendariz is inconsistent with our en banc decision in Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (per curiam). In that case, we noted that “Congress has particularly broad and sweeping powers when it comes to immigration, and is therefore entitled to an additional measure of deference when it legislates as to admission, exclusion, removal, naturalization or other matters pertaining to aliens.” Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1205-06. Once we identify “a rational reason Congress may have had in adopting [the law],” our analysis must end. Id. This conclusion is consistent with direction from the Supreme Court. In determining whether a federal classification “allowing benefits to some aliens but not to others is permissible,” we must not “substitute our judgment for that of Congress.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 1893, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976); see also F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993) (“Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”). Here, as Acosta and the decisions from other circuits make clear, it is easy to identify a rational reason for making “a distinction between aliens whose criminal cases are dismissed under the federal FFOA and those whose charges are handled under similar state schemes.” Acosta, 341 F.3d at 227. Accordingly, our en banc decision in Abebe and the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence counsel that we revisit Lujam-Armendariz, not that we extend further its erroneous determination that the Equal Protection Clause compels us to exclude from the definition of “conviction” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) certain state drug convictions expunged under state law.
*818II
But even if we do not revisit our equal protection analysis, which has roamed far from the standards set by the Supreme Court, I would conclude that Ramirez is not entitled to immigration relief under either our case law or the Equal Protection Clause. The basis for this conclusion is straightforward: Ramirez simply did not obtain relief analogous to that provided by the FFOA.
In 1993, Ramirez was convicted under section 11364 of the California Health and Safety Code for possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to five days in jail. Ramirez was subsequently granted relief under section 1203.4a of the California Penal Code,2 which provides that a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor and not granted probation can “be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in section 12021.1 of this code or section 13555 of the Vehicle Code.”3 Cal. Pen.Code § 1203.4a(a). In granting Ramirez such relief, the state court imposed additional restrictions, stating: “[TJhis order does not relieve the defendant of the obligation to disclose this conviction in response to any direct question contained in any questionnaire or application for public office, for licensure by any state o[r] local agency, or for contracting with the California State Lottery.”
In his hearing before the immigration judge (IJ), Ramirez sought relief in the form of cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The IJ held that Ramirez did not qualify for this form of relief because his state conviction “still exists for Immigration purposes.” The IJ noted that the state court’s order granting Ramirez a remedy under section 1203.4a “shows that even for the State of California, the respondent has a conviction, at least for disclosing it for public office, of seeking [sic] , a license by any State or local agency, and for even contracting with the California State lottery.” The BIA affirmed, holding that “the respondent failed to demonstrate statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal,” because he failed to carry his burden of demonstrating “he could have satisfied the requirements of the [FFOA] under 18 U.S.C. § 3607.”
In analyzing Ramirez’s appeal of the BIA’s denial under the three-prong Lujanr-Armendariz test, we first consider *819whether Ramirez was “adjudged guilty” of an offense that was identical to an offense under federal law. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749. The answer to this question is no. Ramirez was not adjudged guilty of a drug-related offense that would qualify for FFOA expungement. Our case law, however (as noted above), requires us to conclude that Ramirez’s conviction for the state offense of possession of drug paraphernalia satisfies this prong of the test. See Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137-38.
Skipping ahead for a moment, a similar result occurs under the third prong of the test, which addresses the question whether the alien would have qualified for and received expungement of the offense under the FFOA. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749. Here, the answer is also no. The FFOA applies only to defendants who have received a term of probation of not more than one year, 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a); Ramirez received jail time. Three circuits have held there is a rational basis to distinguish between aliens who receive different sentences. See Fernandez-Bernal v. Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1304, 1317 (11th Cir.2001) (holding it does not violate equal protection to treat an alien who is sentenced to two years of probation and a term of jail differently than an alien receiving FFOA relief); Vasquez-Velezmoro, 281 F.3d at 697 (holding that a person sentenced to ten years probation by a Texas court would not be eligible for FFOA relief, and “[t]his difference in sentences is a rational basis for treating petitioner differently from an alien whose conviction is expunged under the FFOA.”); Elkins, 392 F.3d at 1163 (10th Cir.2004) (holding that there is a rational basis for denying petitioner the benefits of the FFOA in an immigration proceeding because petitioner was subject to a two-year suspension of sentence, rather than probation). In Lujan-Armendariz, we expressly left this issue open. Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18 (holding that, because the petitioner in that case was sentenced only to probation, we did not need to decide whether a person subject to imprisonment could qualify for relief). Ramirez fails to meet the requirement of the third prong of the Lujan-Armendariz test. This deficiency is not relevant to our analysis, however, because the BIA did not rely on this ground in rejecting Ramirez’s appeal. See Andia v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that, in reviewing the BIA’s decision, we may rely only on the grounds relied upon by the BIA).
Thus, the analysis turns on the second prong of the Lujan-Armendariz test, which requires expungement of an offense under state law.4 Lujan-Armendariz, 222 *820F.3d at 749. Yet, Ramirez cannot pass this test. A person receiving relief under section 1203.4a of the California Penal Code does not benefit from a full expungement, but rather, depending on the circumstances, retains the consequences of his conviction in important contexts, potentially implicating rights such as eligibility for a driver’s license, application for public office, receipt of a license from a local agency, and possession of a firearm, see District of Columbia v. Heller, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm for private use). There is no principled basis for concluding it is irrational to distinguish between the limited state rehabilitation statute in this case and the FFOA, which provides that a disposition under § 3607(a) “shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a disqualification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose.” 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b).
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion for two reasons. First, the majority claims that section 1203.4 expungement is equivalent to an expungement under the FFOA because the exceptions to relief under section 1203.4a are narrow, minimal, and residual. Maj. Op. at 808-10, 811. This conclusion is contrary to our reasoning in Ramirez-Castro v. INS, 287 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.2002). In Ramirez-Castro, a petitioner sought to terminate deportation proceedings on the ground that his prior firearms conviction had been expunged under section 1203.4(a), a statute similar to section 1203.4a.5
We stated that “as a general rule, an expunged conviction qualifies as a conviction” for purposes of § 1101(a)(48)(A), but noted that we had carved out an exception to this general rule “in cases involving first-time simple possession of narcotics.” 287 F.3d at 1174. After determining that the petitioner’s firearms conviction was not within the scope of the FFOA, we went on to consider petitioner’s argument that his prior conviction had been erased for immigration purposes because it had been expunged under section 1203.4. We rejected petitioner’s argument, explaining that even “assuming that some state expungement statutes could eliminate completely the immigration consequences of a state conviction, California Penal Code section 1203.4 is not such a statute.” Id. at 1175 (footnote omitted). In this context, we found it significant that a defendant retained the consequences of a conviction imposed by section 13555 of the California Vehicle Code even after a conviction is expunged under section 1203.4. Accordingly, we concluded that “[i]n view of the fact that California Penal Code section 1203.4(a) provides only a limited expungement even under state law, it is reasonable for the BIA to conclude that a conviction expunged under that provision remains a conviction for purposes of federal law.” Id. Because Ramirez-Castro involved a firearm conviction, we did not have to address the question whether a first-time drug conviction expunged under section 1203.4 was analogous to a first-time drug conviction expunged under the FFOA. However, our holding in Ramirez-Castro indicates that the even more limited ex-*821pungement in our case is not equivalent to the FFOA’s full expungement.
Second, the majority claims that Lujan-Armendariz’s second prong is met because the scope of relief provided by a state expungement statute is less important than whether the petitioner would qualify for FFOA relief at all. Maj. Op. at 808-09 (“the critical question is not the nature of the state’s expungement statute but rather ‘what [the petitioner] did.’ ”) (citing Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18) (alteration in original). In support, the majority points out that in several prior decisions we required the BIA to grant immigration relief to petitioners receiving relief under state rehabilitative laws even though the state laws at issue did not provide complete expungement. Maj. Op. at 810.
Again, I disagree. The three cases cited by the majority to buttress this proposition are inapposite, because in none of them did we consider or even mention the extent to which the state expungement scheme removed the consequences of a conviction. For example, Garberding is entirely silent on the scope of the state statute, and did not even quote the section of the Montana statute cited by the majority. See Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1187; see also Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1138 (mentioning that the petitioner’s conviction was expunged by section 13-907 of the Arizona Revised Code, which allowed convictions under the statute to be used as a conviction “in any subsequent prosecution of such person by the state or any of its subdivisions for any offense,” but only to assure ourselves that the petitioner had not been convicted of another controlled substance offense in Arizona). When we did address the scope of the expungement provided by a state expungement statute, see Ramirez-Castro, we determined it was not sufficient to erase the immigration consequences of the crime.
I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that the scope of relief provided by the state statute is irrelevant. The question under our equal protection jurisprudence is whether there is a rational basis for distinguishing aliens receiving relief under the FFOA from aliens receiving relief under the state rehabilitation test. A state’s decision to completely rehabilitate a convict reflects its assessment that a person has reformed and should be given a fresh start. A rehabilitation statute that provides only partial or limited relief reflects a different determination. Although the majority cites Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18, for the proposition that “the critical question is not the nature of the state’s expungement statute but rather what the petitioner did,” Maj. Op. at 809, we made this statement in connection with our conclusion that the difference between a deferred adjudication of guilty in the FFOA and the vacatur provided by the Arizona statute at issue in Lujan-Armendariz was irrelevant. See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 738 n. 18. It does not support the majority’s claim that the scope of relief provided by a state expungement statute is irrelevant.
In this case, the limited nature of the relief provided by section 1203.4a of the California Penal Code makes it “reasonable for the BIA to conclude that a conviction expunged under [such a] provision remains a conviction for purposes of federal law.” Ramirez-Castro, 287 F.3d at 1175 (examining the similar language in section 1203.4(a) of the California Penal Code). Because there is a rational basis to distinguish between Ramirez and a person who receives full expungement under the FFOA, the BIA’s determination that Ramirez had a conviction for purposes of § 1182(a)(2) and § 1227(a)(2), and therefore could not qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), *822did not violate Ramirez’s equal protection rights.
Ill
Our prior decisions have led us, step by step, to the conclusion that Congress could have no rational reason for treating the expungement offered under the FFOA to certain first offenders convicted for certain federal drug crimes differently from a more limited expungement offered under state law to persons convicted for different state drug crimes. Clearly, we have traveled far from our main task of determining, “not whether the statutory scheme makes sense to us, but whether we can conceive of a rational reason Congress may have had in adopting it.” Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1205-06. By holding that aliens receiving even limited relief under a state rehabilitation statute must be treated the same as first offenders whose convictions are expunged by the FFOA, the majority today further strains our equal protection jurisprudence and takes yet another step in rewriting the definition of “conviction” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A). I respectfully dissent.

. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance ... is deportable.

. Although the caption of the court order granting relief refers to "order dismissing accusation against probationer,” the reference to Ramirez as probationer appears to be a scrivener's error. The court order otherwise correctly references section 1203.4a, and relief was granted under section 1203.4a. Section 1203.4a of the California Penal Code allows limited expungement for a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor and not granted probation, while section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code allows limited expungement for a defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of probation. Because Ramirez was sentenced to jail time, not probation, the court would be authorized to grant relief only under section 1203.4a.

. Section 12021.1 of the California Penal Code provides that it is a felony for persons convicted for certain violent crimes to own or possess a firearm, notwithstanding whether the person received relief under section 1203.4a. Section 13555 of the California Vehicle Code provides:
A termination of probation and dismissal of charges pursuant to Section 1203.4 or a dismissal of charges pursuant to Section 1203.4a of the Penal Code does not affect any revocation or suspension of the privilege of the person convicted to drive a motor vehicle under this chapter. Such person's prior conviction shall be considered a conviction for the purpose of revoking or suspending or otherwise limiting such privilege on the ground of two or more convictions.

. The majority notes that in Lujan-Armendariz, the state expungement statute did not relieve defendants of all residual consequences of their convictions. Specifically, the ex-pungement statute precluded relief, in certain cases, from various department of transportation and game and fish commission penalties. Lujan-Armendariz did not discuss this aspect of the state expungement statute, stating only that the statute’s exceptions to "the release ‘from all penalties and disabilities’ ” were "not relevant here.” 222 F.3d at 733 n. 6. Nor does Lujan-Armendariz explain why the difference between the limited relief provided by the Arizona expungement statute and the full relief provided by the FFOA failed to provide a rational basis for distinguishing “between aliens whose criminal cases are dismissed under the federal FFOA and those whose charges are handled under similar state schemes.” Acosta, 341 F.3d at 227. Nevertheless, the situation in this case is different. As explained below, section 1203.4a provides less relief than the ex-pungement statute at issue in Lujan-Armendariz, including depriving certain convicts of a constitutional right. And unlike the petitioner in Lujan-Armendariz, who apparently was not subject to residual consequences, Ramirez himself was subject to residual consequences.

. Section 1203.4(a) (the statute at issue in Ramirez-Castro) states that after expungement, a defendant "shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code." Cal. Pen.Code § 1203.4(a).
Section 1203.4a(a) (the statute at issue here) states that after expungement, a defendant "shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has been convicted, except as provided in Section 12021.1 of this code or Section 13555 of the Vehicle Code.” Cal. Pen.Code § 1203.4a(a).