Court Opinion

ID: 9784354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:42:57.070774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:53.475728
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I have no objection to returning this case to the trial court for clarification of the grounds for its injunction, I disagree with several basic premises for the majority's constitutional holding. Because I believe that courts lack jurisdiction under the Colorado Labor Peace Act to enjoin residential labor picketing that is not coercive or intimidating and because I believe that such an injunction by a state court would, in any event, be preempted by operation of the National Labor Relations Act, I would reverse the court of appeals' determination that the domiciliary picketing provision of the Act is facially unconstitutional.
Initially, I consider it misleading to characterize the Labor Peace Act as granting concurrent jurisdiction to the courts to enjoin unfair labor practices. Although the Act makes clear that the failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not bar the pursuit of equitable or legal relief in the courts, § 8-3-110(1), 3 C.R.S. (2000), its designation of certain labor practices as unfair in no way broadens the power of courts to grant legal or equitable relief, nor does it eliminate the requirement of immediate and irreparable injury for injunctive relief, The Act regulates labor relations by designating certain labor practices unfair and providing administrative, and in some cases legal, remedies. Rather than expanding the powers of courts to enjoin labor practices, the Act, along with providing alternate remedies, actually restricts the jurisdiction of the courts to order *1208injunctive relief for conduct arising our of labor disputes See § 8-3-118; see also Denver Milk Producers v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs Warehousemen & Helpers Union, 116 Colo. 389, 413, 183 P.2d 529, 540 (1947) (statute does not take away any rights from labor unions, but bestows upon them additional rights in "labor disputes").
Moreover, I do not believe that section 8-3-108(2)(a) should be construed to designate peaceful, noncoercive picketing of a fellow employee's domicile an unfair labor practice. In light of that section's controlling theme of protecting an employee and his family from coercion or intimidation in the context of labor relations, and in light of the specific prohibition of section 8-3-109 against treating as an unfair labor practice an employee's right to express, declare, and publish his views, including by peaceful picketing, see Pueblo Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Harper Constr. Co., 134 Colo. 469, 480, 307 P.2d 468, 474-75 (1957), the domiciliary "picketing" labeled unfair by the statute should be construed as coercive, nonpeaceful picketing. See Denver Milk Producers, 116 Colo. at 428-29, 183 P.2d at 547-48 ("[Plick-eting as employed in the act must be held as intended in its coercive, and not in its persuasive, sense," to avoid invading right to freedom of speech contrary to an explicit provision of the statute) (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also People ex rel. Shaffer v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 175 Colo. 187, 189-90, 486 P.2d 10, 11 (1971) (finding "throughout the provisions of the Labor Peace Act an express recognition of the right of employees to engage in peaceful picketing"); ef § 8-3-110(18)(a) (granting director authority to place restrictions on picketing where such picketing is found to lead to riots, disturbances, assaults, or injury to persons or property).
Except as otherwise provided in the Act, section 8-8-118 expressly removes jurisdiction from courts to enjoin certain conduct arising out of labor disputes, including publicizing or communicating information about a dispute by advertising or speaking without intimidation or coercion or by any other method not involving or threatening fraud, violence, or breach of the peace. § 8-3-118(1)(e). Both because I do not believe the Act provides for enjoining unfair labor practices by courts and because I do not believe in any event that the Act designates noneoer-cive picketing of an employee's domicile an unfair labor practice, I would hold that courts lack the jurisdiction to enjoin such peaceful, noneoereive picketing.
Apart from the provisions of the Labor Peace Act itself, I believe that any order enjoining peaceful picketing in a labor context implicating the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 to 188 (1994) ("NLRA"), would be preempted. In general, the National Labor Relations Board is presumed to have exclusive jurisdiction over matters concerning activities arguably subject to protection under section 7, or prohibition under section 8, of the NLRA. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 200, 90 S.Ct. 872, 25 L.Ed.2d 218 (1970); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Among other things, peaceful labor picketing falls within the purview of matters preempted by the NLRA and cannot be enjoined by a state court. Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139, 78 S.Ct. 206, 2 L.Ed.2d 151 (1957).
It is well accepted, however, that state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction with the National Labor Relations Board to enjoin picketing accompanied by coercive, violent, or threatening conduct. Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749-50, 62 S.Ct. 820, 86 L.Ed. 1154 (1942) (upholding order of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board pursuant to state Employment Peace Act designating as unfair labor practice the picketing of another employee's domicile); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Golden Cycle Corp., 134 Colo. 140, 147, 300 P.2d 799, 803 (1956).
With regard particularly to the picketing of an employee's residence, the National Labor Relations Board in specific instances involving coercive, violent, or threatening actions, has declared such conduct unfair labor practices violating section 8(b)(1)(a) of the *1209NLRA, see, e.g., Communications Workers of Am., Local 1118, 305 N.L.R.B. 770, 1991 WL 258340 (1991); United Mechanics' Union Local 150-F, 151 N.L.R.B. 386, 1965 WL 15734 (1965), including the conduct at issue in this case, United Steelworkers of Am., 2000 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 495 (Aug. 2, 2000). As such, residential picketing falls squarely within the "arguably prohibited or protected" standard announced in Garmon, and is presumably a matter within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. To the extent that such picketing is coercive, violent, or threatening, and only to that extent, a state court can enjoin such conduct as an exercise of the state's police powers.
In my view, the provisions of the Labor Peace Act contemplate the limited jurisdiction afforded state courts as a result of federal preemption and do not purport to grant jurisdiction in excess of that yielded by the NLRA. Thus, I believe that state courts have jurisdiction to enjoin picketing only to the extent that such picketing is conducted in a violent, threatening, or coercive manner so as to implicate the equitable powers of the courts and not offend section 8-8-118(1)(e).
While I do not disagree with the majority's decision to remand for clarification of the bases for the trial court's preliminary injfuncetion against domiciliary picketing, I note that the trial court made express findings of property damage, threats, and intimidation of family members of non-striking employees, which as the majority points out could justify the injunction of otherwise peaceful picketing. Maj. Op. at 1205 (citing Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. 836 (1941), as upholding an injunction against peaceful picketing when the picketing was set in a background of violence). To the extent that the trial court enjoined peaceful residential picketing solely as a labor practice designated unfair by seetion 8-3-108(2)(a), and not on the basis of findings of coercive, violent, or threatening conduct, I would hold that the trial court's action was expressly barred by the Act and preempted by federal law. I believe therefore that the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute unconstitutionally permitted such action, and I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion affirming that holding.