Court Opinion

ID: 9409266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:26.337394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.724922
License: Public Domain

J-S20025-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    RASHEED GRANT                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1677 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 24, 2022,
             in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004010-2017.

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED JULY 17, 2023

        Rasheed Grant appeals from the order denying his first petition for relief

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46.

We affirm.

        The trial court opinion from Grant’s direct appeal previously summarized

the pertinent facts and testimony at trial in detail. As to the Commonwealth’s

evidence, the trial court stated:

               At trial, Police Officer Daniel Flanagan (“Officer Flanagan”)
        testified that on March 28, 2017, around 2:45 p.m., he received
        a radio report of a gunshot on the 700 block of North Uber Street
        in the city and county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Officer
        Flanagan was about four (4) blocks away, and he activated his
        vehicle’s lights and sirens and arrived at the location “probably in
        less than two minutes.” He was the first officer on the scene and
        was met there by Michelle Ayres (“Ms. Ayres”), who advised that
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20025-23

     [Grant] had just fired a gun at her granddaughter, Shaquetta
     Alexander (“Shaquetta”). Ms. Ayres advised that [Grant] fired one
     shot from near the end of her block, where Uber Street intersects
     with Brown Street. [Grant] fired the shot while standing on “the
     south sidewalk of Brown Street on the southeast corner,” on the
     “other side of a fence” that faced Brown Street. [Grant] had
     already left the scene, however, and Officer Flanagan did not
     observe any bullet holes. To Officer Flanagan’s knowledge, no
     bullet was ever recovered. Once additional officers arrived, Officer
     Flanagan transported Ms. Ayers to Central Detectives to be
     formally interviewed.

           Meanwhile, Shaquetta remained inside Ms. Ayres’ house and
     “didn’t want anything to do with the police.” When Officer
     Flanagan entered the residence to speak with Shaquetta, “she ran
     down to a lower bedroom and slammed the door and said
     something to the effect from behind the door that she wasn’t
     talking to the police.”

            Ms. Ayres testified that Shaquetta, whom Ms. Ayres
     “raised,” lived at Ms. Ayres’ home at the time of the shooting was
     in a relationship with [Grant]. [Ms. Ayres testified that Shaquetta
     and Grant had “an on and off again type relationship,” although
     Grant eventually “started beating” Shaquetta, she “kept going
     back to him.”] Ms. Ayres explained that she was home watching
     television with Shaquetta and Shaquetta’s 2 or 3-year-old
     daughter when Shaquetta engaged in an argument with Grant
     over the telephone. Less than five (5) minutes after the phone
     conversation, Shaquetta went outside to meet [Grant] in person,
     and they resumed their argument in front of the neighboring home
     at 767 North Uber Street.

            From her exterior doorway, Ms. Ayres observed [Grant]
     “calling Shaquetta all kinds of . . . foul names” and then strike her
     “upside the head.” After witnessing the physical violence, Ms.
     Ayres told her granddaughter to return inside the house, but
     Shaquetta initially refused and said she would “handle” the
     situation. Fearing for Shaquetta’s safety, Ms. Ayres called 911 on
     her cell phone.

           Shaquetta eventually returned to Ms. Ayres’ driveway and
     [Grant] walked away toward Brown Street. While Ms. Ayres was
     on the phone with the 911 dispatcher, she saw [Grant] stop near
     the corner of Uber and Brown Streets, retrieve a dark-colored gun
     from beneath his maroon or burgundy hoody, and point the

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      weapon toward Shaquetta. Ms. Ayres told Shaquetta to “duck!
      Get down,” and [Grant] fired the gun. The gunshot “made a big
      loud noise” but fortunately no bullet struck Shaquetta (or anyone
      else). Ms. Ayres informed the 911 dispatcher about the gunshot
      as [Grant] walked away toward 19th and Brown Streets. The
      Commonwealth played the 911 call at trial and Ms. Ayres can be
      heard telling the dispatcher that [Grant] had just shot a gun at
      her granddaughter. A sound resembling a gunshot is also audible.

            Following the incident, Ms. Ayres provided a written
      statement at Central Detectives, which was identical to her trial
      testimony. Ms. Ayres advised in her statement that she was
      standing in front of her screen door watching Shaquetta and
      [Grant] argue in front of her neighbor’s residence. After striking
      Shaquetta on the head, [Grant] walked away to the intersection
      of Uber and Brown Streets and made a right turn down Brown
      Street. While standing on the sidewalk of Brown Street, at the
      edge of the fence near the corner home, [Grant] retrieved a gun
      from beneath his hoody and fired one shot at Shaquetta.

            Detective John Gallagher was the detective who interviewed
      and obtained Ms. Ayres’ statement. He testified that following the
      interview, he went to the crime scene but encountered no
      witnesses with any pertinent information. Although Detective
      Gallagher knocked on the door of several neighbors, only one man
      spoke to him, and that individual advised that he neither heard
      nor say anything regarding the incident.

             Ms. Ayres informed Detective Gallagher that [Grant] shot at
      Shaquetta from the [] 1900 block of Brown Street, as he stood
      beside a bush that was located to his left side. A 45-caliber fired
      cartridge casing (FFC) was recovered in this area, but the actual
      bullet discharged from the casing was never recovered.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/19, 2-4 (footnotes omitted).

      The trial court then summarized the testimony presented by Grant, as

follows:

            [Grant] presented the testimony of Latanya Walker (“Ms.
      Walker”) and Shaquetta. Ms. Walker, who claimed to be [Grant’s]
      “close personal friend,” testified that on the day of the incident
      she had driven [Grant] to the vicinity of 19th and Brown Streets.
      [Grant] then exited the vehicle and walked around the corner to

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      the 700 block of North Uber Street. After waiting in her vehicle
      for around a minute, Ms. Walker likewise exited her vehicle and
      followed [Grant] without his knowledge.

            Ms. Walker testified that she observed [Grant] and
      Shaquetta having a conversation on North Uber Street. When
      [Grant] turned away from Shaquetta and began walking back
      down Brown Street, Ms. Walker “scurried back to the car.” Ms.
      Walker testified that she never saw [Grant] carrying or firing any
      gun, and that when [Grant] returned to her vehicle, she simply
      took him to his doctor’s appointment.

             Shaquetta testified last and described her “on and off again
      relationship” with [Grant]. She claimed that on the day of the
      incident she was arguing with [Grant] over the phone. [Grant]
      thereafter came to Ms. Ayres’ home and they resumed their
      argument outside the corner house at 769 Uber Street, while Ms.
      Ayres watched them from the doorway of her home.

            Shaquetta testified that she started “yelling” and “cussing”
      and [Grant] “turned to walk away,” but she “grabbed his arm” and
      they continued arguing. Shaquetta claimed that after [Grant]
      began walking away, again, she returned inside Ms. Ayres’ home
      and then heard Ms. Ayres scream, “Oh, my God, he has a gun!”
      However, Shaquetta herself denied that [Grant] possessed or fired
      any gun at her. Regarding the 911 recording on which a gunshot
      is purportedly audible, Shaquetta claimed that the noise was Ms.
      Ayers’ screen door slamming when Shaquetta entered the house.
      Shaquetta claimed the door was missing the contraption that
      prevented the door from slamming shut, and thus when the door
      shut, it made a “loud bang.”

            [Shaquetta further testified that she told a police lieutenant
      who responded to the scene that Grant did not shoot her or
      possess a gun. She as well attended Grant’s preliminary hearing,
      and, while she did not testify, she told the District Attorney she
      had no desire to “press any charges” against Grant “because
      nothing happened.” Shaquetta additionally wrote several letters
      to the District Attorney’s Office advising that she did not want
      charges pressed against Grant. She also visited the District
      Attorney’s Office in person to urge the Commonwealth to drop
      charges against Grant.]

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/19, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).

                                     -4-
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      Lastly, the trial court summarized the evidence the Commonwealth

presented in rebuttal, regarding a prior incident involving Shaquetta and

Grant:

             On April 12, 2017, around two weeks after the alleged
      shooting, Shaquetta and [Grant] had another “heated argument”
      during which [Grant] repeatedly struck Shaquetta and gave her a
      black eye. After being treated at the hospital, Shaquetta provided
      a written statement to police and filed a criminal complaint against
      [Grant]. Shaquetta’s statement described how [Grant] punched
      and kicked her multiple times in the face, pulled her by the hair,
      and “slammed” her into a wall - - all in the presence of Shaquetta’s
      daughter. Following this incident, Shaquetta went to Family Court
      and obtained a temporary protection from abuse order against
      [Grant], but she failed to return to Court a few days later to
      finalize the order. She later informed the District Attorney that
      she did not want any charges pressed against [Grant].

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/19, at 6 (citations omitted).

      On August 10, 2018, a jury convicted Grant of carrying a firearm without

a license and carrying a firearm without a license on the public streets of

Philadelphia. The jury acquitted Grant of aggravated assault and possession

of an instrument of crime. After the jury trial, the trial court conducted a

stipulated bench trial and found Grant guilty of persons not to possess a

firearm.   On December 7, 2018, the trial court sentenced Grant to an

aggregate term of seven to fourteen years in prison. Thereafter, Grant filed

a post-sentence motion in which he sought reconsideration of his sentence.

The trial court denied the motion.

      Grant appealed to this Court and challenged the weight and sufficiency

of the evidence supporting his convictions.     We affirmed his judgment of

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sentence on August 19, 2020. Commonwealth v. Grant, 240 A.3d 174 (Pa.

Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision). In his sufficiency challenge, Grant

claimed that Ms. Ayers’ eyewitness testimony was “so inherently unreliable

that a verdict based upon it could amount to no more that surmise and

conjecture.”   Id. at 2. We found this claim not preserved for our review,

because it was not raised with specificity in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

Id. at 4. In a footnote, we concluded that, even if not waived, the sufficiency

challenge was meritless because any inconsistencies in her testimony were

minor and her testimony “dovetailed with the audio recording of her account

of the incident as it unfolded while on a 911 call, her statements to the

responding police officers, and her written statement of the event.” Id. at 5

n.1. As to his weight claim, we found that it was waived because he raised it

for the first time in his Rule 1925(b) statement, rather than in a post-sentence

motion. Id. at 7.

      Grant sought further review.     On December 23, 2020, our Supreme

Court denied Grant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v.

Grant, 242 A.3d 1290 (Pa. 2020).

      Grant filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 23, 2021. The PCRA

court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on January 19, 2022.

The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss. On June 9, 2022, the PCRA

court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Grant’s amended

petition without a hearing. Grant did not file a response. By order entered

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June 24, 2022, the PCRA court denied the petition.           This timely appeal

followed. Both Grant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Grant raises the following three issues, which we reordered for ease of

disposition:

            Whether the PCRA court’s finding[s] are supported by the
      record and free of legal error by refusing to grant the relief
      requested in [Grant’s] PCRA petition based upon the following:

         I.     Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file
                a post-verdict motion that the verdict was against the
                weight of the evidence.

         II.    Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
                to appeal the denial of the motion to reconsider
                sentence.

         III.   Whether the PCRA Court erred in denying [Grant’s]
                PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing on the
                issues raised in the amended PCRA petition.

Grant’s Brief at 8 (excess capitalization omitted).

      Our scope and standard of review is well-settled:

        In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the findings
        of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA
        court's hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the
        prevailing party.   Because most PCRA appeals involve
        questions of fact and law, we employ a mixed standard of
        review. We defer to the PCRA court's factual findings and
        credibility determinations supported by the record. In
        contrast, we review the PCRA court's legal conclusions de
        novo.

Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

                                      -7-
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      Grant’s first two claims challenge the effectiveness of counsel.        To

obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective,

a petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel's

ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable

adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009).                “Generally, counsel’s

performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will

only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id.

This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is

of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her

action or inaction; and (3) petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's act or

omission. Id. at 533. A finding of "prejudice" requires the petitioner to show

"that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."        Id.   In

assessing a claim of ineffectiveness, when it is clear that the petitioner has

failed to meet the prejudice prong, the court may dispose of the claim on that

basis alone, without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been

met. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1995). Counsel

cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim.

Commonwealth v. Loner, 836 A.2d 125, 132 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).

      In his first issue, Grant contends that trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of

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the evidence.    Before determining ineffectiveness, we first determine the

merits of Grant’s underlying claim.

      This Court summarized the law regarding challenges to the weight of

the evidence as follows:

              The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the
      finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
      evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new
      trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony
      and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
      credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
      determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
      clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
      weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

            On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined
      to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
      jury verdict did not shock it conscience. Thus, appellate review of
      a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(citations omitted). As we have often reiterated, “the trial court’s denial of a

motion for a new trial based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least

assailable of its rulings.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1036

(Pa. 2007).

      Although on direct appeal this Court found Grant’s weight claim waived,

the trial court still addressed this claim in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and found

it to be meritless:

           Here, the Commonwealth relied primarily on the statements
      and testimony of Ms. Ayres to establish that [Grant] unlawfully
      possessed a firearm on March 28, 2017. [The parties stipulated

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      that at the time of the incident, Grant did not possess a valid
      license to carry a firearm in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.]

             Ms. Ayres testified that [Grant] and Shaquetta were
      engaged in an argument during which [Grant] called Shaquetta
      “all kinds . . . of foul names” and struck her “upside the head.”
      Ms. Ayres called 911, and while speaking with the dispatcher, she
      saw [Grant] retrieve a dark-colored gun from beneath his hoody,
      point the weapon at Shaquetta, and fire the gun. On the tape
      recording of the 911 call, Ms. Ayres can be heard saying that
      [Grant] had just shot his gun at Shaquetta, and a sound
      resembling a gunshot is audible.

            When police officers arrived only minutes later, Ms. Ayres
      essentially repeated the same facts to them – i.e., that [Grant]
      and Shaquetta were arguing, that [Grant] struck Shaquetta, and
      that [Grant] then pulled out a gun and fired a shot at Shaquetta.
      Ms. Ayres also pinpointed the location where [Grant] stood when
      he fired the gun. Furthermore, Ms. Ayres’ written statement to
      Detective Gallagher is consistent with her testimony at trial, her
      contemporaneous statements to the 911 dispatcher, and her
      statements to responding police officers.

            Accordingly, the jury’s finding that [Grant] carried a firearm
      in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106 and 6018, and this [c]ourt’s
      finding that [Grant] possessed a firearm in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.
      § 6105, clearly were not “so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one’s sense of justice.” [Grant’s] challenge to the weight of the
      evidence is therefore meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/8/19, at 9 (paragraph breaks added; footnote omitted).

      In dismissing Grant’s first ineffectiveness claim, the PCRA court, who

also sat as the trial court, reaffirmed that Grant’s weight claim was meritless

given the consistent testimony from Ms. Ayres. Referencing our discussion in

the footnote from Grant’s direct appeal, see supra, the PCRA court further

agreed that “[a]ny inconsistencies in Ms. [Ayres’] testimony were minor and

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as such a challenge to the weight of the evidence claim would not have entitled

[Grant] to any relief.” PCRA Court Opinion, 10/24/22, at 5.1

       In arguing to the contrary, Grant asserts that the PCRA court

“erroneously dismissed [his first ineffectiveness] claim without evaluating the

weight of [the defense witnesses’] testimony which directly contradicted the

testimony of Ms. [Ayres].”         Grant’s Brief at 15.   According to Grant, “the

evidence at trial showed that Ms. [Ayres] made inconsistencies during her

testimony and was motivated to fabricate her story based on her hatred for

[him].” Id.

       Applying our standard of review, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s reasoning.      Grant’s claim to the contrary merely asks this

Court to reassess the credibility determinations made by the fact-finder. This

we cannot do. Gonzalez, supra. Moreover, although Grant challenges the

court’s characterization of the inconsistencies in Ms. Ayres’ testimony as

minor, he does not adequately explain how any particular inconsistency would

render the verdict against the weight of the evidence.2
____________________________________________

1Contrary to the PCRA’s court’s reference, in the footnote in Grant, supra,
we stated that even if preserved, Grant’s sufficiency challenge would be
meritless.

2  Although Grant challenges the PCRA court’s statement regarding the
consistency of Ms. Ayres’ testimony as “a complete misrepresentation of the
evidence,” the only inconsistency Grant addresses was whether Ms. Ayres was
inside or outside her home when the gun was fired. See Grant’s Brief at 22-
23. Grant does not explain how this inconsistency rendered Ms. Ayres entire
trial testimony unworthy of belief. Moreover, in the footnote addressing
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Accordingly, as there is no merit to Grant’s underlying weight of the

evidence claim, he is not entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel was

ineffective in failing to file a post-sentence motion preserving the claim for

appeal.

       In his second issue, Grant asserts that his appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to appeal the discretionary aspects of his aggregate

sentence.    According to Grant, his sentence of seven to fourteen years of

imprisonment was “harsh and unreasonable because [he] has begun to turn

his life around, and such a lengthy sentence prevents him from being able to

financially care for his daughter.” Grant’s Brief at 15-16. We conclude this

claim warrants no relief.

       In order to establish prejudice with respect to a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel, “the [PCRA] petitioner must show that there

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding

would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance.”

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014). Once again,

we first determine whether Grant’s sentencing claim had merit.

       Sentencing is matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

court. Commonwealth v. Hill, 66 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. 2013). The

sentencing court is given broad discretion in determining whether a sentence
____________________________________________

Grant’s sufficiency claim, we agreed with the trial court’s belief that only minor
inconsistencies occurred during Ms. Ayres’ testimony.                Grant, non-
precedential decision at 5 n.1.

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is manifestly excessive because the sentencing judge is in the “best position

to measure factors such as the nature of the crime, the defendant’s character

and   the   defendant’s   display   of     remorse,   defiance,   or   indifference.”

Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation

omitted). Thus, a sentence will only be deemed an abuse of discretion where

it is obviously unreasonable or where the record demonstrates that it was the

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70

A.3d 1281, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2013).

      Moreover, when the trial court had the benefit of a pre-sentence report

(“PSI”), we must

             presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
      information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed
      those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. A
      [PSI] constitutes the record and speaks for itself. . . . Having
      been fully informed by the [PSI], the sentencing court’s discretion
      should not be disturbed. This is particularly true . . . in those
      circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge had
      any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations, and
      there we will presume also that the weighing process took place
      in a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the
      position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to
      apply them in the case at hand.

Commonwealth v. Hallock, 603 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. Super. 1992) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988)).

      Finally, we will only reverse a sentence within the statutory guidelines if

the application of the guidelines is unreasonable, that is, if the sentencing

court imposed the sentence without express or implicit consideration of the

general standards of section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code. To comply with

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these standards, a sentencing court must consider the protection of the public,

the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 147 (Pa. Super. 2011).

      At the sentencing hearing held on December 7, 2018, the trial court

referenced Grant’s pre-sentence report, was informed of the applicable

guidelines, and then heard argument from the parties. In addition, Shaquetta

Alexander testified regarding Grant’s character and mitigating circumstances;

Grant’s father was also present. Grant also exercised his right of allocution,

and informed the court of programs that he participated in while incarcerated.

The trial court then provided the lengthy comments before imposing sentence:

            THE COURT: All right, thank you.

            I have reviewed the presentence report. It notes [Grant]
      was primarily raised by his father who was a master electrician
      and carpenter. [Grant’s father] is here today, and [Grant] was
      provided with all of his needs. And [Grant] did manage to
      graduate from high school in 1997. There is no formal training.
      It says that he can do carpentry but there is no formal training
      and there is no record of employment. . . . Oh, temp agency for
      $1,600.

            There doesn’t seem to be any medical, mental health, . . .
      no other health issues, substance abuse with [m]arijuana.

             As far as [Grant’s] prior record, you know, it’s abysmal. As
      a juvenile, nine arrests, eight adjudications, four commitments
      from age 15 through age 16. And just constant, criminal mischief,
      institutional vandalism, receiving stolen property, attempted
      theft. And then we get [to] age 16, aggravated assault. So
      [Grant] spent much of his time in juvenile commitment.

             And then when he turns 18 there is no lapse in criminal
      activity; nine arrests as an adult, three convictions, four
      commitments, three violations of probation and parole, including
      this one. Age 18, aggravated assault[.] Age 22, carjacking for

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     which he got a five-to-ten-year sentence. And now at age 37, we
     are here.

           It’s a record of a life that has been just replete with
     conviction after conviction after conviction and for very violent
     crimes.

           So, I’m pleased that [Grant] is now at this age starting to
     understand, starting to show some maturity in regard to his
     decisions that he’s making, decisions to take advantage of these
     programs and I think sincerely start to benefit from these type of
     programs. Certainly, programs such as this were available and
     offered to him in the past throughout all your many, many, many,
     custody and probation supervisions, but nothing seemed to really
     take. To [] really have no discernable record of employment at
     this point in life. I understand you were incarcerated for a fair
     amount of time, but even when you get out, nothing.

            So, turning to the case involved here, it’s very, very sad to
     see a family at odds with one another and for one family member
     to come in and testify that she saw [Grant] shoot at . . . her
     granddaughter, and for then [Shaquetta] to come in and say that
     her grandmother was lying and testified to that on the stand, it’s
     very heartbreaking. Clearly, the jury believed Ms. [Ayres].
     [T]here is [a] record of [Grant] abusing [Shaquetta] . . . after this
     happened[.] And for some reason I guess whatever reason as
     [Shaquetta] explained to the court, she still has very strong
     feelings for [Grant], doesn’t want him incarcerated for reasons
     that she has that I won’t comment on, but they are her reasons
     and I thank you for coming into court and stating them for me so
     that I can take that into consideration.

            I think [Grant] you are just starting down the road of
     possibly rehabilitating. The horrendous behavior and violent
     propensity that you had over the years, certainly on March 17th
     you - - quite frankly, you could have killed this woman[.] I
     understand your maintaining your innocence, the jury found you
     guilty of having that gun. . . . [Y]ou are a felon who is never,
     ever permitted to have a gun[.]

            The guidelines for you are certainly very high because of all
     of this prior criminal activity. The guidelines are for six to twelve
     years, and I understand that you expect some mitigation by the
     court and I will take that into consideration.

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N.T., 12/7/18, at 20-24 (some formatting adjusted).

      The trial court then imposed the aggregate sentence of seven to

fourteen years of incarceration. When Grant began to question the length of

the sentence, the court further stated, “it’s not an aggravated sentence, it’s a

very fair sentence under the circumstances here.” Id. at 26.

      In rejecting Grant’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the denial of his discretionary sentencing claim, the PCRA

court summarized the PCRA court explained the rationale supporting its

sentencing choice as follows:

             [Grant] was sentenced within the [sentencing guidelines]
      and below the sentence recommended by the Commonwealth.
      The [c]ourt specifically considered [Grant’s PSI], his staggering
      criminal history in the city of Philadelphia, his failures to
      rehabilitate, and his conduct in this case. The [c]ourt noted
      [Grant’s] “abysmal” criminal history that included no less than
      nine (9) juvenile adjudications for a myriad of crimes and that his
      criminal activity has continued unabated through adulthood, with
      multiple arrests and convictions. The trial court noted that
      “notwithstanding the many opportunities provided to him, [Grant]
      thus far has made precious little effort to rehabilitate. He is a
      serial offender with a record of [a] life that has been just replete
      with conviction after conviction after conviction for very violent
      crimes.”

           Because the trial court acted within its discretion in crafting
      [Grant’s] sentence, [Grant’s ineffectiveness] does not merit relief.

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/24/22, at 6 (citations and footnote omitted).

      Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. The

trial court considered Grant’s pre-sentence report and imposed a guideline-

range sentence.    Thus, we presume that the trial court was aware of the

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statutory mitigating factors and weighed them accordingly. Hallock, supra.

Indeed, given the court’s lengthy comments enumerated above, the trial court

clearly considered Grant’s recent efforts at rehabilitation and other mitigating

factors.

      In essence, Grant claims that the trial court did not give sufficient weight

to these factors. Such a claim does not raise a substantial question, which

would permit this Court to review the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Commonwealth v. Ratushny, 17 A.3d 1269, 1273 (Pa. Super. 2011). Thus,

appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise this

meritless claim on appeal. Loner, supra.

      In his final issue on appeal, Grant asserts that the trial court erred in

denying his PCRA petition without a hearing.        As our Supreme Court has

summarized:

            The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without
      a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no genuine
      issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not entitled
      to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate purpose
      would be served by further proceedings. [See Pa.R.Crim.P.
      909(B)(2).] To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to
      dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that
      he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
      would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
      abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d at 750 (citations omitted).

      Grant asserts that “a hearing should be held on any issue that the PCRA

[c]ourt is not certain lacks merit.” Grant’s Brief at 15. Here, as demonstrated

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above, the PCRA could had no uncertainty as to the meritless nature of Grant’s

ineffectiveness claims.

      In sum, the PCRA court correctly determined that Grant’s ineffectiveness

claims lacked merit and that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. We

therefore affirm the order denying Grant post-conviction relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

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