Court Opinion

ID: 9709212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:42:52.006368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.051497
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein because of my conclusion that a jury issue is presented as to whether the defendant corporation is liable under the safe-place statute for the damages resulting from plaintiff’s injury.
In Brown v. Appleton Masonic Temple Asso. (1943), 243 Wis. 147, 9 N. W. (2d) 637, this court upheld a direction of a nonsuit in an action to recover damages resulting from a fall on a slippery ballroom floor. In passing upon the issue of liability under the safe-place statute, this court stated (p.149) :
“There was no proof that there was such an accumulation of wax, or any foreign substance, or water, or defect on the floor as to cause plaintiff to slip. To facilitate the usual, proper use of a ballroom floor for dancing it is necessary and customary to have it slippery by waxing it. Consequently the facts merely that the floor was waxed and slippery cannot be held to constitute a violation of the safe-place statute in the absence of proof that there was such an excessive accumulation of wax or some foreign substance, or some defect because of which it was not as free from danger as the nature of the place would permit; and therefore was not ‘safe’ within the meaning-of that term as used in secs. 101.01 (11) and 101.06 of the safe-place statutes.”
We interpret this statement as holding that if there had been an unusual accumulation of wax on the ■ floor in the Brown Case there might have been liability. This is because it would have been directly related to the maintenance of a public building.
In the instant case there was an unusual accumulation of wax on the floor. The majority opinion holds that there is no liability because the condition was temporary. We consider *421that the past decisions of this court; correctly interpreted do not establish such á principle.
■This court has consistently held that the failure .to turn on a light' in a public building may impose liability under the safe-place statute.' Zimmers v. St. Sebastian’s Congregation (1951), 258 Wis. 496, 46 N. W. (2d) 820; Kinney v. Luebkeman (1934), 214 Wis. 1, 252 N. W. 282; and Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church (1930), 202 Wis. 111, 114, 230. N. W. 708. The condition which prevails as a result of failing to turn on a light already installed in the premises certainly falls within the category of a temporary condition.
It is only “temporary conditions wholly disassociated from the structure” which preclude imposition of liability under the safe-place statute. Jaeger v. Evangelical Lutheran Holy Ghost Congregation (1935), 219 Wis. 209, 212, 262 N. W. 585; and Harnett v. St. Mary’s Congregation (1956), 271 Wis. 603, 610, 74 N. W. (2d) 382. The wax applied to a floor of a public building constitutes maintenance and is associated with the structure.
The rationale of the majority opinion seems to be that anything having to do with the act of maintenance of a public building which is temporary in character relieves the owner from liability under the safe-place statute. We consider that this is reading an exception into the statute which is not permissible. The term “safe” as used in the safe-place statute is defined in sec. 101.01 (11), Stats., which definition is quoted in the majority opinion. An act of maintenance or repair which is not carried on in a manner that is as free from danger as the building “will reasonably permit” clearly violates the safe-place statute.
Much reliance is placed by the majority opinion of this court on the cases of Juul v. School Dist. (1918), 168 Wis. 111, 169 N. W. 309, and Cronce v. Schuetz (1942), 239 Wis. 425, 1 N. W. (2d) 789. In both of those cases the *422injuries resulted from a temporary unsafe condition connected with the cleaning of floors, not the waxing thereof. The Juul Case distinctly held that cleaning a floor is not an act of maintenance within the meaning of the safe-place statute. Therefore, it is a temporary condition disassociated with the structure of the building. While the Cronce Case seems to hold that cleaning floors constitutes maintenance, liability was not imposed because there was no showing that the floor-cleaning operation was being done in a negligent manner, and it would be asking the “unreasonable” of the owner to require that he only clean floors after all of the tenants had left the building.
However, the applying of a wax coating to a floor stands in the same category as paint applied to a wall and is maintenance connected with the structure. In the instant case the waxing operation was not being conducted in as safe a manner as the premises would reasonably permit, or at least a jury would clearly be warranted in so finding this to be the case from the testimony that the defendant’s employee left the puddle of wax on the floor unguarded while he went to a distant part of the building to get more wax.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Wingert joins in this dissent.