Court Opinion

ID: 9533416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:31:36.835461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:02.790066
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
This appeal involves what is described by the City of Philadelphia as a Commonwealth takeover of the Philadelphia Parking Authority initiated by the Pennsylvania General Assembly via Act 22 of 2001. I write to explain my reasons for supporting this Court’s present per curiam order.
In the Parking Authority Law of 1947,1 the General Assem*441bly authorized certain political subdivisions in Pennsylvania to create local parking authorities. Pursuant to the enactment, Appellant, the City of Philadelphia (the “City”), created the Philadelphia Parking Authority in 1950, with the City’s Mayor exercising appointment authority over all five directors of the authority’s governing board pursuant to Section 8 of the Law, 53 P.S. § 348 (superseded). Initially, the Philadelphia Parking Authority asserted control only over off-street parking functions, such as parking garages; however, in 1983, it assumed responsibility for on-street parking as well.2 The authority has also, throughout its existence, issued numerous tax-exempt municipal bonds, including several issues that remain outstanding.
Act 22 of 2001, signed into law on June 19, 2001, recodified the Parking Authority Law at Sections 5501 through 5517 of Pennsylvania’s Consolidated Statutes, 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5501-5517, with several material amendments. Of primary import here, Act 22 reconstituted the authority’s board by: increasing its maximum complement from five to eleven members; repositing in the executive branch of the Commonwealth appointment authority for six new members (a majority of the maximum membership); and phasing out the positions of the mayoral appointees.3 See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(b), (e). The enactment also requires the reconstituted Philadelphia Parking Authority (“PPA”), during its fiscal year beginning in 2001, to transfer to the Philadelphia School District that portion of *442its retained earnings, not exceeding $45,000,000, that will not jeopardize its ability to meet debt service payments or to retire outstanding bonds. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(q). In subsequent years, PPA must transfer the maximum amount it deems available for such purpose. See id.
Shortly after signing Act 22 into law, the Governor invoked its provisions to appoint six new members of PPA’s board. Subsequently, on June 29, 2001, the City filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County against PPA and the Governor’s six appointees,4 alleging, inter alia, that Act 22: violates constitutional guarantees of Home Rule for the City; breaches various statutory' pledges found in the Parking Authority Law; contravenes the constitutional prohibition of the passage of any law impairing the obligation of contracts; constitutes unconstitutional special legislation; effects an unconstitutional delegation of a municipal function to a special commission; and was enacted as part of a bill containing more than one subject in violation of the constitutional bar against the passage of bills addressing multiple topics. In addition to a request for declaratory relief, the City sought a permanent injunction preventing the carrying into effect of any provision of Section 5508.1, including the seating of the gubernatorial appointees to the board. The City, however, did not name the Governor as a party to its action.5
By order dated July 10, 2001, the common pleas court determined that the matter should properly have been commenced in the Commonwealth Court under the provisions of the Judicial Code establishing the Commonwealth Court’s original and exclusive jurisdiction over most forms of actions “against the Commonwealth.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).6 The *443court reasoned that the executive branch of state government, in the person of the Governor, was an indispensable party to the action. In this regard, the court referred primarily to the Governor’s interests in having his appointees take their seats and in making future appointments. Accordingly, the common pleas court transferred the proceeding to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to Section 5103(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(a).
Upon presentation of the City’s challenge, the Commonwealth Court conducted a hearing and determined that PPA was not an agency of the Commonwealth,7 and hence, its status as a party defendant could not render the action one against the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Court acknowledged that Act 22 directs that PPA shall exercise “public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency of the Commonwealth,” and “shall not be deemed to be an instrumentality of the municipality.” 53 P.S. § 5505(a)(1), (3). Nevertheless, in concluding that its jurisdiction was not implicated, it relied upon PPA’s local function and prior decisions in which the preAct 22 Philadelphia Parking Authority had been deemed a local agency for jurisdictional purposes. See E-Z Parks, Inc. v. Larson, 91 Pa.Cmwlth. 600, 498 A.2d 1364 (1985), aff'd, 509 Pa. 496, 503 A.2d 931 (1986); Rhoads v. Lancaster Parking Auth., 103 Pa.Cmwlth. 303, 520 A.2d 122 (1987). The Commonwealth Court also disagreed with the common pleas court’s conclusion that the Governor was an indispensable party to the litigation, since relief, for example a declaration that Act 22 is unconstitutional, could be granted without his participation. Although recognizing that such a declaration would effectively nullify the Governor’s board appointments, the Commonwealth Court emphasized that the City’s complaint requested no relief impacting the Governor directly. Further, the court observed that the Governor is authorized by a multitude of statutes to make appointments to various *444bodies and that these appointments, with nothing more, do not implicate the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction.
While it therefore concluded that jurisdiction lay in the common pleas court, citing this Court’s disapproval of the practice of retransferring cases, see Balshy v. Rank, 507 Pa. 384, 388, 490 A.2d 415, 416 (1985),8 the Commonwealth Court nevertheless dismissed the action to allow the City to bring the jurisdictional question before this Court. Additionally, although it had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, the court ■indicated that, for purposes of judicial economy, it would discuss the merits of the request for preliminary injunction submitted by the City. In this regard, the court reached the conclusion that the City had failed to demonstrate the essential prerequisites of a clear right to relief and irreparable harm.
Subsequently, the City filed an emergency application for stay with this Court seeking to forestall a meeting of PPA’s board to be held that day at which the Governor’s six new appointees were scheduled to join. The City also filed a King’s Bench petition requesting the Court to entertain the matter in our original jurisdiction, as well as a notice of appeal of the Commonwealth Court order dismissing the matter for lack of jurisdiction. While this Court denied the application for stay as moot and declined to exercise plenary jurisdiction over the matter, it established an expedited briefing schedule on the question of original jurisdiction. Because both the Commonwealth Court and the common pleas court found jurisdiction lacking in their respective tribunals, thereby delaying disposition of the underlying matter, the Court also stayed further implementation of Act 22 pending resolution of the jurisdictional issue. This Court’s present order lifts such stay, vacates the' Commonwealth Court’s order, and remands to that- tribunal for disposition of the City’s action on its merits.
*445Although the City is the appellant before this Court due to the dismissal of its claims, it supports the Commonwealth Court’s conclusions that PPA is a local agency and the Governor is not an indispensable party, as well as the reasoning provided in support of these determinations. PPA, on the other hand, emphasizes the plain language of its enabling statute as establishing its status as a Commonwealth agency for purposes of the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction, and contends that the Governor’s interests are inextricably intertwined with the lawsuit and necessarily will be adversely affected if the City were to obtain relief.
Because the question of whether original jurisdiction lies in the Commonwealth Court or the court of common pleas is a question of law, this Court’s scope of review is plenary. See, e.g., Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 130, 665 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1995) (citation omitted). As the Commonwealth Court and the parties have recognized, our central task is to apply the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdictional statute, which provides, with limited exceptions not here applicable
(a) The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:
(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity....
42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1).
I. Whether PPA is a Commonwealth Agency
This Court has previously explained that Section 761(a) of the Judicial Code establishes the Commonwealth Court as a judicial forum for uniform and consistent resolutions of questions of statewide impact, to include actions that are against the Commonwealth. See T & R Painting Co., Inc. v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 466 Pa. 493, 498, 353 A.2d 800, 802 (1976). The Court has also indicated, as a general proposition, that there is no particular need for such uniform statewide resolution of issues involving the powers and duties of local authorities operating in a single county, city, or municipality. See id.
*446In concluding that PPA is not a Commonwealth agency, the Commonwealth Court relied upon the latter of these precepts, supporting its finding regarding the predominate local character of the entity with the decisions in E-Z Parks, 91 Pa. Cmwlth. at 600, 498 A.2d at 1364, and Rhoads, 103 Pa.Cmwlth. at 303, 520 A.2d at 122, in which parking authorities had been deemed local agencies for purposes of immunity and jurisdiction. The difficulty with this analysis, however, is that Act 22 enabled the reconstitution of the governing body of PPA by repositing in the executive branch of the Commonwealth appointment authority over a majority of PPA’s present board complement and by phasing out existing board positions. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1. Therefore, the pre-Act 22 Philadelphia Parking Authority that was the subject of E-Z Parks simply was not the. PPA that appeared as a party defendant in the Commonwealth Court — E-Z Parks concerned the Philadelphia Parking Authority entity whose five-member governing body was appointed solely by the City’s Mayor pursuant to the former Parking Authority Law.9 As described by the Commonwealth Court, the net effect of Act 22 was “to transfer control of the Authority immediately from the present board members appointed by the Mayor of Philadelphia to the six new board members appointed by the Governor.”
The reconstituting of the governing body of PPA is the predominate factor in my assessment here. While the members of the reconstituted board do not serve exclusively at the pleasure of the Governor,10 the fact remains that PPA’s control structure no longer resembles that of a traditional local authority. Moreover, although the Commonwealth Court observed that PPA does not serve a statewide function per se, it is significant that, by obliging PPA to channel substantial revenues to school funding, the General Assembly has directly *447employed PPA as an instrumentality in furtherance of the Legislature’s own constitutional obligation to provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education. See Pa. Const. Art. III, § 14. The substantial state interest in education and educational funding is further manifested in the Education Empowerment Act, Act 16 of 2000, which amended the Public School Code,11 inter alia, to address distress in facets of the Pennsylvania school system, including budget and funding issues. See, e.g., 24 P.S. § 6-696 (pertaining to distress in school districts of the first class). See generally Marrero v. Commonwealth, 559 Pa. 14, 20, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (1999)(crediting the Commonwealth Court’s determination that the “General Assembly has satisfied [the constitutional mandate to provide ‘a thorough and efficient system of public education’] by enacting a number of statutes relating to the operation and funding of the public school system in both the Commonwealth and, in particular, in the City of Philadelphia” (emphasis in original)). Together with the express admonition of the General Assembly that PPA constitutes a Commonwealth agency, see 53 Pa.C.S. § 5505(a)(1), these factors convincingly establish that the City’s present action is one against the Commonwealth. Moreover, given the interests involved and the unique character of the legislation, the City’s challenge to Act 22’s validity is, by its nature, a matter uniquely suited to the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction.12
II. Whether the Governor is an Indispensable Party
While I have concluded that the present action is one against the Commonwealth due to PPG’s status as a Commonwealth agency and thus jurisdiction was properly in the Commonwealth Court, I do support the Commonwealth Court’s conclusion that the Governor is not an indispensable party. *448This Court has described the pertinent inquiry as “whether justice can be done in the absence of [the] third party.” CRY, Inc. v. Mill Service, Inc., 536 Pa. 462, 469, 640 A.2d 372, 375 (1994). In this regard, I credit the Commonwealth Court’s observation that the Governor maintains no direct role in the implementation of Act 22 or in the operations of PPA above and beyond the fulfillment of his appointment obligations. In the circumstances, and as in many other instances of civil proceedings against Commonwealth agencies, I conclude that the Governor’s interests are not sufficiently immediate and direct as to require his presence as a party, but are of such a nature that they are adequately represented by his appointees. Certainly, the Governor remains free to pursue intervention, which should be liberally allowed pursuant to the applicable procedural rules if he were to choose to do so. See generally Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 2326-2350.

. Act of June 5, 1947, P.L. 458 (as amended 53 P.S. §§ 341-356 (superseded)).

. Subsumed within this function was the installation and maintenance of parking meters; promulgation of on-street parking regulations; installation of signage; issuance of parking permits; collection of parking meter receipts and fines; issuance of parking tickets; and the towing of illegally parked vehicles.

. Pursuant to Act 22, the mayoral appointees are to continue in office until their terms expire or they leave office, at which time their positions are abolished; further, no board member serving on the effective date of the Act may remain in office beyond June 1, 2006. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1 (i). The Governor's appointment power is a continuing one, with his six original appointees serving for one year, after which time the appointments are to be staggered in terms of eight, nine, and ten years. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(1). In addition, the Governor has the authority to change the composition of the board by removal of appointees for misfeasance or malfeasance in office. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508.1(g).

. For the sake of convenience, we refer to the party defendants before the common pleas court, and appellees here, collectively, as “PPA.”

. Apparently, the City also filed a federal action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in which it did name the Governor as a party defendant. See City of Phila. v. Governor of the Commonwealth of Pa., No. 01-CV-3291 (E.D.Pa.).

. The common pleas courts’ own jurisdiction is general, see Pa. Const. Art. V, § 10(b), subject to exceptions provided by law, such as by *443Section 761(b) of the Judicial Code, which establishes exclusivity in the Commonwealth Court over actions against the Commonwealth.

. For purposes of the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction, "actions against the Commonwealth” expressly subsumes civil proceedings against Commonwealth agencies. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 102.

. We note, however, that the Court's comments in Balshy were directed to the practice of "retransfer” by courts of common pleas to the Commonwealth Court, which has appellate jurisdiction over them.

. Rhoads concerned the Lancaster Parking Authority, also organized pursuant to the Parking Authority Law of 1947. See Rhoads, 103 Pa.Cmwlth. at 304, 520 A.2d at 123.

. As previously noted, Act 22 establishes fixed terms for board members and provides for their removal only upon clear and convincing evidence of misfeasance or malfeasance in office. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5508..1(g).

. Act of March 10, 1947, P.L. 30 (as amended 24 P.S. § 1-101-27 2702).

. Although the lack of any direct exposure of the state treasury in an action for monetary damages may constitute a significant factor in determining whether an action is against the Commonwealth for immunity purposes, I do not consider such factor controlling here.