Court Opinion

ID: 9943361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 14:02:28.893869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:51.085213
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                            NICHOLAS J. PAPPAS,

                                 Appellant,

                                     v.

                             NICOLE T. PAPPAS,

                                  Appellee.

                               No. 2D22-1791

                              February 23, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sarasota County; Hunter W. Carroll,
Judge.

Nicholas J. Pappas, pro se.

Nicole T. Pappas, pro se.

ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, Judge.
     Nicholas Pappas (the Former Husband) appeals from a
postdissolution order in which the trial court granted in part and denied
in part the supplemental petition to modify or terminate the alimony
obligation of Nicole Pappas (the Former Wife), temporarily suspended her
alimony obligation, and denied the Former Husband's motions for
contempt and attorneys' fees. We reverse the order to the extent that it
temporarily suspended the Former Wife's alimony obligation and
included two factual errors pertinent to the determination of the Former
Wife's expenses. In all other respects, we affirm without further
discussion.
     The parties divorced in April 2021. In the final judgment of
dissolution, the Former Husband was awarded permanent alimony.
Thereafter, the Former Wife filed a supplemental petition to modify or
terminate alimony in which she asserted that an unexpected demotion at
work and the corresponding pay cut warranted reduction or termination
of her alimony obligation. The following day, the Former Husband moved
for the Former Wife to be held in contempt for failure to pay any alimony.
     A few months later, the Former Wife moved to continue the hearing
set on her petition and on the Former Husband's motion, asserting that
she was currently on short-term disability leave from work and thus
would be "unable to provide the Court with current employment
information." She also filed a financial affidavit indicating a further
reduction in her salary based on that short-term leave.
     At the hearing on the petition, however, the Former Wife was
permitted, over the Former Husband's objections, to argue and present
evidence of her short-term disability leave as a basis for modifying or
terminating alimony. The trial court ultimately granted in part and
denied in part the Former Wife's petition, reducing her monthly alimony
obligation but then also suspending that obligation altogether for eight
months "based on Former Wife's temporary disability."
     The Former Husband raises multiple arguments on appeal, but at
the outset we note that several of those arguments—including those
raised in his untimely motion for rehearing—are unpreserved. See Reid
v. Cooper, 955 So. 2d 31, 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (concluding that the
appellant's untimely motion for rehearing was a nullity). Accordingly, we
decline to consider them. See Fine v. Fine, 308 So. 3d 172, 173 (Fla. 4th

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DCA 2020) (declining to consider the appellant's argument that the trial
court erred by omitting certain stipulations from the final judgment
"because the former wife did not move for rehearing or otherwise bring
the error to the trial court's attention").
      We are not, however, precluded from considering his argument that
the trial court erred in temporarily suspending alimony based on the
Former Wife's short-term disability. This argument is consistent with his
timely objection below and is therefore preserved.
      In her petition to modify or terminate alimony, the Former Wife
asserted as grounds only her demotion and the resulting diminution in
pay. Nowhere in the petition did the Former Wife assert her short-term
disability as grounds for modifying or suspending alimony; nor did she
move to amend her petition to incorporate her disability as a basis for
modification or suspension. Rather, she raised her disability only as
grounds for continuing the hearing that had been set on her petition and
on the Former Husband's contempt motion. Moreover, at that hearing,
the Former Husband objected to the Former Wife's presentation of
evidence regarding her disability and to the trial court's consideration of
it as a basis for relief from her alimony obligation.
      "Where . . . a judgment is not based on an issue that had been
framed by the pleadings, noticed for hearing, or litigated by the parties, it
may not stand." Sabine v. Sabine, 834 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 2d DCA
2003). Although such an issue may nonetheless be tried by consent,
"[i]mplied consent arises when arguments and evidence are presented on
the issue without objection by the opposing party." C.J. v. Dep't. of Child.
& Fam. Servs., 9 So. 3d 750, 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Here, however, the
Former Husband objected. Consequently, the trial court erred in
temporarily suspending her alimony obligation on this ground, and we

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reverse and remand for vacatur of that portion of the order. See Sabine,
834 So. 2d at 960 ("The record clearly established that Mrs. Sabine's
counsel had vehemently objected to the trial court's procedure and
consideration of a reduction in the amount that Mr. Sabine should pay,
and thus, the issue was not tried by consent."); cf. Kraus v. Kraus, 344
So. 3d 634, 636 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (affirming the trial court's order
modifying alimony where the issues of the former husband's medical
condition and loss of income were not raised in his petition but
nonetheless were tried by consent).
     Although we affirm the order with respect to the trial court's overall
reduction in the Former Wife's alimony obligation based on her
unexpected demotion, two errors in the court's factual findings also
require correction on remand.1 In calculating the Former Wife's net
income, the trial court implicitly found the Former Wife to have a
monthly residential insurance expense of $274 and expressly found her
to have a monthly telephone expense of $190. As the Former Husband
points out, however, the Former Wife testified at the evidentiary hearing
that although she had had insurance on her former residence, she did
not have it on her current residence and the $274 had been included on

     1 The untimeliness of the Former Husband's motion for rehearing

does not preclude us from reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the trial court's determination of the Former Wife's expenses.
See Fla. Fam. L. R. P. 12.530(e) (2022) ("When an action has been tried
by the court without a jury, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
judgment may be raised on appeal whether or not the party raising the
question has made any objection to it in the trial court or made a motion
for rehearing . . . ."); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 297 So. 3d 700, 703
(Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (concluding that the wife needed not raise her
challenge to the specific amount the trial court awarded in durational
alimony in a motion for rehearing since the claim constituted a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument).

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her most recent financial affidavit by mistake. She also testified that her
monthly telephone expense, which appears to cover only the children's
telephones, had been reduced from $335 to $95. The court should
therefore recalculate the Former Wife's net income based on these
corrected amounts.
     Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

CASANUEVA and KELLY, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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