Court Opinion

ID: 9480927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:02:57.427685+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:00.329911
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I concur in the per curiam opinion with the exception of Part III. I do not agree that the word “children” as used in the insurance policy is unambiguous. Because “children” can be construed to include “stepchildren,” I believe the ambiguity in the ERISA policy should be construed in favor of Evans, and that it was error to dismiss Evans’ complaint.
Numerous authorities have noted or held that stepchildren may be included as children in insurance contracts. See Hummel v. Supreme Conclave Improved Order Heptasophs, 256 Pa. 164, 169-71, 100 A. 589, 590 (1917); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Beebe, 57 F.Supp. 754, 757 (D.Md.1944) (depending upon circumstances of use, “child” may include stepchildren (interpreting California law)); Martin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 73 Me. 25, 27 (1881) (“[t]he word ‘child’ in legal documents ... may include grandchildren, step-children, children of adoption, & e.”); Hilliker v. Dowell, 54 Mich.App. 249, 252, 220 N.W.2d 712, 714 (1974) (stepchildren included within insurance beneficiary designation “children”); Lehman v. Lehman, 215 Pa. 344, 351, 64 A. 598, 600 (1906) (dicta that “the child of the widow by her former husband would be let in on the same plane with the donor’s own children”); Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Burke, 368 S.E.2d 301, 305 (W.Va.1988) (“Courts have held that a stepchild was a ‘child,’ ‘orphan’ or ‘relative’ under the beneficiary-designation provisions of an agreement or statute involving death benefits.”).
These cases span over one hundred years, and they are not, as the majority would characterize them, merely “conflicting judicial interpretations.” Opinion at 1442. Instead, they indicate that the word “children” is elastic, admitting more than biological children. This elasticity reflects social conditions today, when families are more fluid and the trend in the law has been to extend to stepchildren those rights and privileges accorded biological children. See Klossner v. San Juan County, 93 Wash.2d 42, 46, 605 P.2d 330, 332 (1980).
Under these circumstances, Evans’ policy should be construed in his favor to encompass stepchildren in the word “children.” This is particularly appropriate here, as Evans alleges he specifically named Gerald as an insured upon enrollment in the plan. As this court recently stated in Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir.1990).
In light of the drafters’ expertise and experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater diligence. Moreover, once the policy language has been drafted, it is not usually subject to amendment by the insured, even if he sees an ambiguity; an insurer’s practice of forcing the insured to guess and hope regarding the scope of coverage requires that any doubts be resolved in favor of the party who has been placed in such a predicament.
Because the word “children” is ambiguous, the policy should be construed to include stepchildren.
Nor did the stepchild relationship necessarily end upon Evans’ divorce from Gerald’s biological mother. The dissolution of a marriage does not terminate affinity relationships in cases involving inheritance tax, *1444insurance benefits, and worker’s compensation issues. In re Bordeaux’ Estate, 37 Wash.2d 561, 594, 225 P.2d 433, 440 (1950). After a comprehensive analysis, Bordeaux held that based on affinity, children of a deceased spouse were stepchildren of the surviving spouse for inheritance tax purposes, even though there was no surviving issue of the marriage. Bordeaux is the leading authority on the issue of affinity relationships, and accurately states the view followed in a majority of jurisdictions. See Petition of the United States, 418 F.2d 264, 270-71 (1st Cir.1969); Mahoney, Support and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-Child Relationship, 70 Cornell L.Rev. 38, 57 (1984). But see Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Hogan, 5 F.Supp. 598, 605 (D.Minn.1934) (only when issue survives the dissolution of the marriage does affinity relationship continue between the stepparent and the other children of the former spouse).
Evans pled sufficient facts which, if true, could support a finding that the affinity relationship with Gerald continued under both the majority and the minority views. Under both views, the maintenance of strong filial ties and contact after divorce is crucial in determining the continued existence of affinity relationships. The complaint alleges that Gerald regularly spent several nights a week with Evans; Gerald used “Evans” as his last name; and Evans regularly contributed to Gerald’s financial support. Although his complaint is ambiguous, Evans specifically alleges in his briefs that he and Gerald’s biological mother have surviving issue of their marriage.
I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III of the opinion affirming the dismissal of Evans’ complaint.