Court Opinion

ID: 9711770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:38:38.491663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.351140
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
JACKSON, J.
I am unable to concur in the conclusions reached by the majority opinion herein and dissent thereto.
*113This is the companion case to one entitled Mary E. Schooler v. State of Indiana, being numbered 30662 on the dockets of this Court, decided July 8, 1966, and reported in 218 N. E. 2d 135. By reference such case and my dissent therein are hereby incorporated and made a part hereof.
The affidavit in the case at bar, omitting caption, formal parts and signatures, reads as follows:
“Undersigned being duly sworn upon oath, says: That on or about the 29 day of August, A.D., 1963, at the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, said Defendant, Jilean Stallings, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry awanj goods to-wit: 2 shirts, value $65.00, 1 man’s suit, value $135.00, which were owned, offered for sale and displayed by Meyers & McCarthy, 128 W. Wayne St., a mercantile establishment, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.” (Emphasis supplied)
The affidavit in the Schooler case, supra, omitting caption, formal parts and signatures, reads as follows:
“Undersigned being duly sworn, upon oath, says: That on or about the 29 day of August, A.D., 1963, at the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, said Defendant, Mary E. Schooler did then and there unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away goods to-wit: 2 mens shirts value $65.00,1 man’s suit value $135.00 which were owned, offered for sale and displayed by Myers & McCarthy, 128 W. Wayne St. a mercantile establishment contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.” (Emphasis supplied)
In support of its case the State produced five (5) witnesses, three of whom, McAtee, Ahlemeyer and Meyers were employees of the Meyers and McCarthy store. One witness, Ware, was the attendant at the parking lot where appellant parked her car, and one witness, Harold Taylor, was a policeman for the City of Fort Wayne.
Not a single witness produced by the State testified he at any time ever saw the appellant Jilean Stallings “take, steal or carry away goods” mentioned in the affidavit, or any other *114merchandise. The three store employees and the policeman were asked on cross-examination if they had seen the appellant take anything from the store. Each of them testified they did not.
The only evidence in any way linking the appellant with the merchandise alleged to have been stolen was the fact that in her unlocked car, which had the window open and down, there was observed a large brown paper bag containing two shirts and a suit. This merchandise was later identified as having the same labels as other merchandise in Meyers and McCarthy’s store. Not one single witness ever placed any of the merchandise in the bag in the hands of the appellant or her companion. It seems beyond credulity and any reasonable stretch of imagination that appellant would place recently stolen merchandise in an unlocked car, with the window down, in a public parking lot where anyone could see it and where free access to it could be had by anyone.
This is a criminal case and the law requires that the guilt of the defendant be proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N. E. 2d 641; Lindley v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 165, 166 N. E. 661; Acts 1905, ch. 169, § 261, p. 584, being § 9-1806 Burns 1956 Replacement.
If any essential allegation of the offense charged is not proved, the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law. Hawkins v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 111, 177 N. E. 2d 40; Baker v. State (1956), 236 Ind. 55, 138 N. E. 2d 641; La Mar v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 508, 109 N. E. 2d 614; Carrier v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 726, 89 N. E. 2d 74; Price v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 316, 184 N. E. 181.
In the case at bar there is not one scintilla of evidence that the appellant “did then and there unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away” anything, let alone merchandise from Meyers and McCarthy.
Furthermore, in addition to the infirmities heretofore pointed out, the unlawful arrest of the appellant and the il*115legal search of her car in violation of her constitutional rights, alone, requires the reversal of the judgment herein.
Finally, one Mary Schooler has been convicted' of the theft of the merchandise described in the affidavit in the case at bar. Mary Schooler and the appellant were charged individually and not jointly or as accomplices.
This cause should, be reversed and remanded to the trial court with instructions to grant appellant’s motion for a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 231 N. E. 2d 29.