Court Opinion

ID: 9950443
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 23:03:08.785885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:10.433374
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/13/24 Miranda v. Superior Court CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

 ADAM MIRANDA,                                                              B330458

           Petitioner,                                                      (Los Angeles County
                                                                            Super. Ct. No. A362694)
           v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS
 ANGELES COUNTY,

           Respondent;

 THE PEOPLE,

           Real Party in Interest.

     ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Ronald Coen,
Judge. Petition granted.
       Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender, Joseph
Trigilio and Saivandana Petersen, Deputy Federal Public
Defenders, for Petitioner.
       No appearance for Respondent.
       No appearance for Real Party in Interest.

                  ‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

       Petitioner Adam Miranda filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Los Angeles Superior Court. Although his counsel
regularly checked the court’s docket to determine when the
petition was assigned to a judge for consideration, no notice of
assignment or minute order ever appeared. Instead, counsel
received notice that the petition had been considered and denied.
Miranda filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court, arguing
the lack of notice of the assignment improperly deprived him of
his right to peremptorily challenge the judge assigned to rule on
the petition. We agree and grant the petition.
       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In 1982, a jury found Miranda guilty of first degree murder,
assault with intent to commit murder, and first degree burglary.
The jury also found firearm and great bodily injury enhancement
allegations to be true. The jury additionally found true a special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while
Miranda was engaged in the attempted commission of a robbery.
(People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 70.) Briefly summarized,
the evidence at the trial established that in 1980, Miranda and a
codefendant walked into an AM-PM mini-market shortly after
2:00 a.m. Miranda pointed a gun at one of the two employees and
demanded that he put money in a bag. Miranda then shot both

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employees before he and the codefendant fled from the store.
One employee died, but the other survived. (Id. at pp. 71–72.)
       Miranda was sentenced to death. In 1987, the California
Supreme Court affirmed Miranda’s conviction in full and denied
a habeas petition in which Miranda claimed he was denied
effective assistance of counsel and that the death penalty in
California is unconstitutional. (People v. Miranda, supra, 44
Cal.3d at pp. 70–71.) The court denied Miranda’s two subsequent
habeas corpus petitions challenging his conviction and sentence.
(In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541, 544.)
       However, in 2008, our high court granted Miranda’s fourth
habeas petition. The court held the prosecution had improperly
failed to disclose information implicating someone else in another
murder committed two weeks before the murder at the AM-PM
mini-market—a murder to which Miranda ended up pleading
guilty shortly after his jury trial conviction in this case. (In re
Miranda, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 444–445.) Because the earlier
murder was the only evidence in aggravation introduced during
the penalty phase of the AM-PM mini-market murder trial, the
court held the sentence of death should be vacated.
       Miranda continued filing habeas petitions in state and
federal court. On June 1, 2023, Miranda, represented by a
deputy federal public defender, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in the Los Angeles Superior Court. On June 2, Judge
William Ryan granted Miranda’s unopposed application to file
several exhibits to the petition under seal. On June 27, Judge
Ronald Coen summarily denied the petition. On June 30, counsel
received Judge Coen’s order denying the petition.
       On July 25, Miranda filed a petition for writ of mandate in
this court, seeking an order vacating the denial of his habeas

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petition in the trial court on the ground that he was deprived of
an opportunity to file a motion to disqualify the judge assigned to
rule on the petition, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 170.6 (section 170.6). Miranda’s counsel declared that
after Judge Ryan issued the order granting the application to file
exhibits under seal, her office regularly monitored the superior
court’s docket for minute orders assigning the case to a different
judge for decision. Counsel did not see any transfer or
assignment orders. She declared that “[h]ad any such order
appeared, [she] would have considered filing a peremptory
challenge under . . . section 170.6.”
       Counsel further declared that her cocounsel subsequently
inquired with the court to determine whether it had issued a
minute order or other notice of the assignment of the matter to
Judge Coen. According to the declaration, on July 19, cocounsel
“was informed that it appears the case was transferred to Judge
Coen with no minute order generated documenting that
transfer.”
       We issued an order to show cause and permitted the
People, as the real party in interest, to file a written return or
other response.1 The People, represented by the Attorney
General, declined to file a response. We subsequently issued an
order requesting that counsel for the superior court inform us
whether Miranda or his counsel were notified that the habeas
petition was being assigned to Judge Coen and, if so, when and
how such notification was given. Counsel for the superior court
responded: “Although the Superior Court has instituted a

1     Prior to issuing the order to show cause we also provided
the People the opportunity to submit a preliminary response to
Miranda’s petition. The People declined to do so.

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notification of assignment process to comply with Maas v.
Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 962, the Superior Court cannot
demonstrate that a notice of assignment was issued in response
to this habeas petition.”
                             DISCUSSION
         Miranda Was Improperly Deprived of the
         Opportunity to File a Peremptory Challenge Due to
         Lack of Notice of an Assignment
         Miranda seeks relief from this court on the ground that the
lack of an order assigning his petition to Judge Coen deprived
him of his right to file a peremptory challenge. We agree.
         In Maas v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.5th 962 (Maas), our
Supreme Court considered whether a party may challenge the
judge assigned to rule on a petition for writ of habeas corpus
before an order to show cause has been issued, pursuant to
section 170.6. The court answered the question in the
affirmative, holding that “a petitioner who requests the name of
the judge assigned to examine his or her habeas corpus petition is
entitled to notice of that assignment, and also is entitled to
peremptorily challenge the assigned judge, so long as all of the
procedural requirements of section 170.6 have been satisfied
. . . .” (Id. at p. 970.)
         In Maas, the petitioner was a self-represented state prison
inmate. (Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th 962 at pp. 970–971.) After filing
a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner twice wrote the
superior court clerk asking for the name of the judge assigned to
rule on the petition. He did not receive a response and the
petition was summarily denied. (Id. at p. 971.) The petitioner
then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Court of
Appeal, complaining that the superior court clerk had not timely

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notified him of the judge’s assignment and declaring that, had he
been informed, he would have moved to disqualify the assigned
judge pursuant to section 170.6. (Ibid.)
       In reaching its ultimate holding, the Maas court considered
section 170.6 and concluded a petition for writ of habeas corpus
proceeding is part of a “special proceeding” within the meaning of
the statute, and a judge who decides whether the petition states a
prima facie case resolves a contested issue of law. As a result, “a
habeas corpus petitioner who files a motion for disqualification in
proper form and in compliance with the procedural requirements
of section 170.6 has a right to disqualify the judge assigned to try,
or hear any matter within, that habeas corpus proceeding.”
(Maas, supra, 1 Cal.5th 962 at pp. 975–976, 977.) The court
further reasoned that although “responding to a petitioner’s
request for the name of the judge assigned to examine his or her
habeas corpus petition, and allowing a reasonable amount of time
for receipt of any resulting motion under section 170.6, will
impact a court’s ability to adhere to” the timelines requiring
expeditious initial review of habeas corpus petitions, a petitioner
who asks for the name of the judge assigned to consider the
petition and then chooses to file a section 170.6 motion “may
properly be considered to have accepted any resulting delay in
the examination of and ruling on the petition.” (Id. at pp. 981,
982.)
       While the Maas court expressly considered a petitioner who
requested notification, we find the court’s analysis and holding
applicable here. Maas established that a petitioner who files a
writ of habeas corpus has a statutory right to file a peremptory
challenge pursuant to section 170.6. We are aware of no context
in which the court may effectively deprive a litigant of the

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opportunity to file a section 170.6 challenge by failing to make
available, even to counsel, information indicating an assignment
has been made.
       Miranda’s counsel has represented that no order
memorializing the assignment appeared on the trial court’s
docket. Counsel for the superior court also indicates it cannot
demonstrate a notice of assignment was issued. We note that
while the Los Angeles Superior Court local rules describe the
assignment process for petitions for writs of habeas corpus, they
may not provide certainty regarding which judicial officer will be
assigned, and they do not allow a petitioner to know when an
assignment will be made. Pursuant to the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Local Rules, rule 8.33 (a)(1)(A), in non-capital
felony cases, a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking review of
an order made after the defendant was held to answer must be
filed with the supervising judge of the district where the sentence
was imposed. The rule further provides that “[t]he supervising
judge (sitting as a master calendar court) will promptly assign
the petition to the department where sentence was imposed . . . .
If the petition challenges an order or ruling made by the judge
then-assigned to that department, the supervising judge shall
assign the petition to a judge other than the judge whose order or
ruling is sought to be reviewed.” (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local
Rules, rule 8.33 (a)(1)(A).)
       It appears this procedure was more or less followed in this
case. Pursuant to the rule, Miranda’s petition was filed with the
supervising judge in Department 100. Miranda’s original
sentence was imposed in Department 101 by Judge Kathleen
Parker. Judge Coen was presiding in Department 101 when he
issued the order denying Miranda’s petition.

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       However, the record does not reflect any minute order,
other documentation, or verbal pronouncement memorializing
Department 100’s “prompt assignment” of the matter to
Department 101. Thus, even if Miranda could be charged with
knowing that, pursuant to the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Local Rules, rule 8.33, the matter would be assigned to
Department 101, he could not know exactly when that
assignment would take place. This is an important detail, since
when the assignment occurred was also information Miranda
needed to establish when the clock would begin to run for a
peremptory challenge.
       “As a general rule, a challenge of a judge is permitted
under section 170.6 any time before the commencement of a trial
or hearing. [Citations.] . . . Subdivision (2) of section 170.6,
however, establishes three exceptions to the general rule, namely
the ‘10-day/5-day’ rule, the ‘master calendar’ rule, and the ‘all
purpose assignment’ rule.”2 (People v. Superior Court (Lavi)
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1164, 1171.) While the exceptions apply under
different circumstances, they all require that the litigants be
aware that an assignment has been made. (Id. at pp. 1180,
fn. 12, 1183; Jones v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 390,
404.) And even if the general rule applies, it implicitly
contemplates that the litigants will know when the trial or
hearing will commence—a circumstance that does not come to

2     Following the Maas decision, at least two courts have
considered the timeliness of section 170.6 challenges in habeas
corpus proceedings. (Bontilao v. Superior Court (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 980; People v. Superior Court (Reagan) (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 766.) Both courts concluded the assignment
procedures presented in those cases reflected an “all purpose
assignment.”

                                8
pass when petitions may be summarily denied without any
advance notice.
       The rules governing the timing of section 170.6
disqualification motions thus suggest the assignment of a matter
to a judge or particular department must be announced or
publicized in some fashion so that the litigants may become
aware that it has occurred. For example, in People v. Superior
Court (Reagan), supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 766, the court concluded,
in the context of the question of timeliness, that the court
provided notice of the assignment when the assigned judge
ordered an informal response to the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. (Id. at p. 771.) It appears undisputed that in this case
there simply was no record of the assignment to Judge Coen, and
no formal or informal means by which the assignment was made
known before Judge Coen ruled on the petition.
       The facts of this case do not call for us to consider what
form of notice of assignment the trial court must provide to a
petitioner who may not have ready access to the court docket and
who does not request notice of the assignment, as the petitioner
did in Maas. The problem in this case was more fundamental. It
appears no one except the court knew or could have known that
an assignment to Judge Coen in Department 101 was made, even
counsel who was regularly checking the court docket for
information about an anticipated assignment. Under these
circumstances, Miranda was improperly deprived of his statutory
right to file a challenge pursuant to section 170.6.
                           DISPOSITION
       Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing
respondent trial court to (1) vacate the summary denial of
Miranda’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, (2) assign the

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petition for decision; and (3) issue an order reflecting the
assignment or provide other notice of assignment to all relevant
parties and counsel, consistent with Maas and Miranda’s right to
file a disqualification motion pursuant to section 170.6. This
decision is final forthwith as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.490(b)(2).)
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                           ADAMS, J.

We concur:

                  EDMON, P. J.

                  EGERTON, J.

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