Court Opinion

ID: 8991375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-27 12:11:52.141488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:10:55.410235
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Brennan,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart and Mr. Justice Marshall join,
dissenting.
Petitioners were convicted for violations of Revised Code of Washington § 9.68.010 (Supp. 1972), which provides:
“Every person who—
“(1) Having knowledge of the contents thereof shall exhibit, sell, distribute, display for sale or distribution, or having knowledge of the contents thereof shall have in his possession with the intent to sell or distribute any book, magazine, pamphlet, comic book, newspaper, writing, photograph, motion picture film, phonograph record, tape or wire recording, picture, drawing, figure, image, or any object or thing which is obscene; or
“(2) Having knowledge of the contents thereof shall cause to be performed or exhibited, or shall engage in the performance or exhibition of any show, act, play, dance or motion picture which is obscene ;
“Shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
“The provisions of this section shall not apply to acts done in the scope of his employment by a motion picture operator or projectionist employed by the owner or manager of a theatre or other place for the showing of motion pictures, unless the motion picture operator or projectionist has a financial in*953terest in such theatre or place wherein he is so employed or unless he caused to be performed or exhibited such performance or motion picture without the knowledge and consent of the manager or owner of the theatre or other place of showing.”
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the convictions, 82 Wash. 2d 584, 512 P. 2d 1049, and subsequently denied a petition for rehearing.
It is my view that “at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene’ contents.” Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U. S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 9.68.010 is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari, and, since the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court was rendered after Miller, reverse.1 In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U. S. 483, 494 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, on the basis of the Court’s own holding in Jenkins v. Georgia, ante, p. 153, its denial of certiorari is improper. As permitted by Rule 21 (1) of the Rules of this Court, which provides that the record in a case need not be certified to this Court, certain of these petitioners did not certify the allegedly obscene materials involved *954in this case.2 It is plain, therefore, that the Court, which has not requested the certification of those materials, has failed to discharge its admitted responsibility under Jenkins independently to review those materials under the second and third parts of the Miller obscenity test. Nor can it be assumed that the court below performed such a review, since that responsibility was not made clear until Jenkins. Those petitioners have thus never been provided the independent judicial review to which the Court held them entitled in Jenkins. At a minimum, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for such a review.

 petitioners Samuel Kravitz, Albert T. Duane, and James M. Tidyman were convicted of exhibiting allegedly obscene films, none of which has been certified to this Court.

 Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.