Court Opinion

ID: 9688049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:58:24.439295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:34.640502
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). In separate opinions, four of my colleagues conclude that this action cannot be maintained against the defendant police officers. Three justices, in separate opinions, would permit the plaintiff to maintain this action.
The lead opinion rules against the plaintiff on alternative grounds, stating that the officers owed no duty in tort, but, if there was a duty in tort, the action nevertheless cannot be maintained because a special relationship had not been established between the plaintiff’s decedent and the officers within the mean*337ing of the special relationship exception to the public-duty doctrine.
A concurring justice so concludes on the alternative grounds that police officers do not have a duty to rescue at common law, and that such nonfeasance cannot give rise to a special relationship within the meaning of the public-duty doctrine, and a failure to rescue can be described as within the ambit of “executive decisions regarding use of resources in protection of the general public . . . ,”1
Two justices, also expressing their views supportive of the viability of the public-duty doctrine, conclude that a special relationship was established within the meaning of that doctrine, and that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to permit the issue of the officers’ gross negligence to be submitted to the jury.
It appears that the public-duty doctrine is being incorporated into the jurisprudence because of the dangerous working conditions facing police officers, a consideration not applicable to governmental employment generally. The immunity from tort liability for police officers created today by judicial opinion applies only for acts of nonfeasance, such as a failure to rescue, but the implications for the jurisprudence in appearing to adopt the public-duty doctrine may have far-reaching ramifications.
i
In Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 658-659; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), this Court declined to decide whether to adopt the public-*338duty doctrine. Today the Court adopts the public-duty doctrine without consideration of prior Michigan case law, indicating that the public-duty doctrine is not part of the law of this state, and without consideration of 1986 PA 175, which amended § 7 of the governmental tort liability act2 in a manner that is inconsistent with recognition of a public-duty doctrine.
n
When Ross was decided, the governmental tort liability act did “not address whether or when individual officers, employees, and agents are immune from tort liability.”3 This Court said: “Thus, the existence and scope of individual immunity continues to be a creature of judicial decision-making.” Id. at 629.
Ross continued that Bush v Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich 716; 275 NW2d 268 (1979), and Lockaby v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65; 276 NW2d 1 (1979), had “obfuscated the precise parameters of individual immunity,” with Lockaby adding “to the confusion.”
After further reviewing the intervening case law, the Court held that judges, legislators and the highest executive officials of all levels of government were absolutely immune from all tort liability when acting within their judicial, legislative, or executive authority. The Court declared that lower level officials, employees and agents were immune only when they were
*3391) acting during the course of their employment and acting, or reasonably believe they are acting, within the scope of their authority;
2) acting in good faith; and
3) performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts.
Under this test, no individual immunity exists for ultra vires activities.[4]
The Court then proceeded to define “discretionary” and “ministerial acts,” adding for clarity “the word ‘decisional,’ ” so the operative term would be “discretionary-decisional” acts.5
in
Within a year and a half, the Legislature responded to Ross with the enactment of 1986 PA 175. The House Legislative Analysis observed that the statute dealt with in Ross did not address officer-employee immunity, but traditionally those “individuals have been absolutely immune from tort liability when engaged in discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts within the scope of their authority.”6 The House Analysis continued that “[t]wo 1979 Michigan Supreme Court decisions, however [undoubtedly Bush v Oscoda and Lockaby v Wayne Co], confused the issue by tending to define individual immunity with respect to 'governmental function,’ i.e., whether the individual was performing primarily discretion*340ary activities that were of the essence to government,”7
The analysis further continued that the 1986 legislation would define governmental function as it was defined in Ross,8 and would eliminate the discretionary-ministerial distinction, providing expressly that “without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question” (emphasis added), a governmental employee would be immune if:
(a) He or she is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2).]
Despite the clear legislative decision, following a careful analysis of Ross, and earlier decisions of this *341Court,9 to abrogate, except for the highest officers, individual officer and employee immunity from tort liability based on either governmental function or the discretionary-decisional nature of the activity, the majority reinstates governmental immunity by substituting “policy” decision for “discretionary” decision.10 That policy decisions and discretionary decisions are one and the same appears from the following, cited by the lead opinion:
Because of the unusual and extraordinary nature of police work it is unfair to allow “a jury of laymen with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exercise of a policeman’s discretionary professional duty.”[11] [Emphasis added.]
*342The concurring-dissenting opinion similarly states that the public-duty doctrine recognizes that police officers and their departments must make discretionary or policy decisions to carry out the duties imposed on them. The opinion also similarly expresses the author’s and signer’s belief that the “tort system is ill-equipped to second-guess a discretionary decision . . . ,”12 Still later: “recognition that there are situations in which discretionary or policy decisions are no longer at issue . . . .” Ante, p 332. Still later: “a policy or discretionary consideration”; “there is no longer at issue a generalized discretionary or policy decision”; “the police officer faces a ministerial obligation to perform his police officer’s duty . . . .”13
IV
It is clear that the majority is substituting its belief that police officers, because of the dangerous character of their work — adverted to in the Zavala segment of Ross (see text accompanying n 25), of which the Legislature, in its careful review of Ross, also became aware — should be immune because they are confronted with difficult decisional choices.
The Legislature was fully aware that police officers are engaged in dangerous work and are called upon to make difficult choices, but decided nevertheless to eliminate the discretionary-decisional (policy)/ministerial distinction, and to hold governmental officers *343and employees, except those at the highest levels, subject to liability on the basis of gross negligence, defined as reckless conduct.
The lead opinion compounds its failure to comply with the legislative directive, and the substitution of its policy choices for the legislative policy choice that no governmental employees including police officers — except those at the highest level of government — should be immune because they are called upon to make difficult policy decisions, but rather should be subject to liability for gross negligence, defined as reckless conduct, by stating that no liability arises because the defendant officers owed no duty to the plaintiffs decedent.
The lead opinion asserts that no duty arises under state statutes because, in order to be subject to liability in tort, the duty must be expressed in terms of tort liability. Since only rarely does a statute expressly provide for tort liability, the lead opinion could stop there and direct that plaintiffs complaint be dismissed. There is no need to incorporate the public-duty or special relationship doctrines for police officers, and potentially for other governmental employees.
v
The majority states that “the public-duty doctrine is a doctrine of tort law.”14 Whether labeled a doctrine of tort law, or a doctrine of governmental immunity, or a revelation, it is a common-law creation of this Court that provides police officers with de facto immunity.
*344The statute sets July 1, 1965, as the date as of which common-law immunity is to be determined.15 If this Court were free to continue to engage in so-called common-law development of tort law — for governmental liability and immunity purposes only— plaintiffs might someday argue for this Court to readopt its position in Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41; 247 NW2d 512 (1976), where this Court abrogated common-law immunity. Section 7(1) indicates the Legislature’s intent to halt common-law development after July 1, 1965. The majority assumes the power to create another layer of immunity, in the guise of a tort law doctrine, for which there was no precedent in 1965.16
The legislative intent expressed in subsection 7(1) is clear: the courts are not to continue to write governmental immunity law, whether under one label or another.
The signers of the lead opinion err in asserting that 1986 PA 175 “is consistent with” their expansion of governmental immunity.17 The lead opinion’s error is highlighted in its footnote 9, where it states that § 7(1) would actually compel this Court to recognize the doctrine “to the extent that the doctrine shields the state from liability.” The 1986 act supplanted Ross and other decisions after July 1, 1965. The public-duty doctrine had not been adopted in any reported appellate judicial opinion in this state before July 1, *3451965. Subsection 7(1) is not a mandate to this Court to adopt all mechanisms that shield the state from liability.
Before the 1986 amendments, Ross established the common-law liability of lower level governmental employees by providing immunity for all acts that were discretionary-decisional, while providing for liability when a ministerial-operational function was performed negligently.18 The 1986 legislation changed the law of immunity by increasing the immunity of lower level employees for ministerial acts, allowing liability only when the conduct constituted gross negligence, rather than simple negligence. At the same time, however, the act decreased immunity by allowing liability to attach for grossly negligent discretionarydecisional actions, actions that had previously been completely immune from liability (absent exceptions not relevant here, such as intentionally tortious acts). This is the only reading of 1986 PA 175 that gives full effect to the abolition of the discretionary/ministerial distinction and the establishment of gross negligence as the standard of care.19
*346The lead opinion argues “that the dangerous work environment inherent in police activities is a counterbalancing concern” when deciding whether the public-duty doctrine should be adopted.20 This is the same reason this Court advanced in the Zavala segment of Ross to justify insulating the officers involved on the basis of the discretionary nature of their inaction.21
vi
The lead opinion states that the question presented is whether “the public-duty doctrine should still be recognized in Michigan,” and “conclude[s] that the public-duty doctrine remains valid in Michigan.”22 (Emphasis added.) The concurring-dissenting opinion similarly asserts that the public-duty doctrine “should be continued,.”23 (Emphasis added.) When so asserting, neither opinion discusses prior Michigan case law, nor does either opinion state when, before the 1986 legislation was enacted, the public-duty doctrine was adopted.24
A
Ross was one of nine cases consolidated on appeal, decided in one opinion entitled Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing). In one of the cases, *347Zavala v Zinser, 123 Mich App 352; 333 NW2d 278 (1983), a divided Court of Appeals dismissed an action against police officers on the basis of the public-duty doctrine.25
This Court expressly declined in Ross to decide whether to adopt the public-duty doctrine,26 and ruled that summary judgment was properly granted, dismissing the action against the police officers, because the “plaintiffs merely alleged negligent performance of a discretionary-decisional act . . . .”27 The Court thus predicated affirmance of the Court of Appeals decision on the discretionary-ministerial distinction, not on the public-duty doctrine.
B
The lead opinion, in holding that the public-duty doctrine applies in Michigan, quotes Justice Cooley’s description of the public-duty doctrine in his treatise on the law of torts.28 Justice Cooley’s treatise, as edited in the 4th edition, cited one Michigan case, his opinion for the Court in Moss v Cummings, 44 Mich 359; 6 NW 843 (1880). There, a tax assessor was alleged to have undervalued property in his jurisdiction. Landowners sued for recovery of taxes they had paid on the theory that the assessor’s undervaluation *348was illegal and therefore any tax collection was void. This Court rejected the landowner’s claim:
The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an individual wrong only when some person can show that in the public duty was involved also a duty to himself as an individual, and that he has suffered a special and peculiar injury by reason of its nonperformance. [Id. at 360-361.]
The Court observed, however, that an action would lie for overvaluation of the property: “We have held that the collection of the tax levy might be restrained in such a case, so far, at least, as it was excessive.” Id. at 361.
Thus, if the plaintiff could show injury, such as a landowner whose property was overvalued, an action would lie even though the tax assessor’s duty was to the public at large.29 Moss v Cummings was essentially a standing, not a public-duty, case.
This becomes even clearer upon consideration of Raynsford v Phelps, 43 Mich 342; 5 NW 403 (1880), decided shortly before Moss v Cummings was decided. There Justice Cooley, again writing for the Court, declared that an action could be maintained against a tax collector who had negligently allowed a tax lien to attach to a parcel of real estate, forcing the mortgage holder to redeem the property at a tax sale. The mortgagee sought to collect his damages, with the tax collector arguing that he owed no duty to individuals. This Court held that an action could be maintained because there was a special injury.
*349It is immaterial that the duty is one primarily imposed on public grounds, and therefore primarily a duty owing to the public: the right of action springs from the fact that the private individual receives a special and peculiar injury from the neglect in performance, which it was in part the purpose of the law to protect him against.
* * *
[The plaintiff] has a right to understand that the officer is commissioned by the law to act only with due respect to the rights of individuals, and that if he acts otherwise and causes special injury, he disobeys his commission and is not within the protection the commission might otherwise give. [Id., pp 345-346 (emphasis added).][30]
More recently, at a time when this Court was composed of the same persons who composed the Court when Ross was decided,31 this Court decided Fiser v City of Ann Arbor, 417 Mich 461; 339 NW2d 413 (1983), holding that an action could be maintained against police officers for their negligence in a high speed chase that caused the suspect to crash into the plaintiffs vehicle.32 The Court found a specific duty under general statutes regulating police conduct on the roadways that the defendants had claimed was a “duty they owe to the public.” Id., p 470.33
*350Section 5 of the governmental tort liability act,34 providing that governmental agencies are subject to liability for the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an officer, agent, or employee, was involved. The Court quoted from McKay v Hargis, 351 Mich 409; 88 NW2d 456 (1958), where this Court
set out the standard by which to determine a claim of negligence on the part of a police officer. The officer’s conduct should be compared to “that care which a reasonably prudent man would exercise in the discharge of official duties of like nature under like circumstances.” [Id., p 470.]
Justice Ryan, writing for three members of the Court, concurred in remanding the case for trial, and adverted to the discretionary-ministerial distinction.35
VII
Within a year and a half after Ross was decided, the Legislature enacted 1986 PA 175, abolishing the discretionary-ministerial distinction relied on in Ross in affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s action in Zavala v Zinser, and adverted to in the concurring opinion in Fiser, and carefully defined and limited the liability of governmental employees to situations where their conduct amounts to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of injury or damage, meaning “conduct *351so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.”36
A
The Legislature, in enacting 1986 PA 175, delineated the parameters of actions against government employees.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has analyzed the effect of 1986 PA 175 on Court of Appeals case law concerning the public-duty doctrine. Under the circumstance that the issue has been briefed, this Court should review 1986 PA 175 to determine if a public-duty doctrine is consistent with the 1986 amendments.
The Legislature has created a comprehensive scheme of tort liability for governmental employees, including providing immunity to employees if they meet all the criteria listed in subsections a, b, and c. (See n 36.) If these criteria are not met, the statute allows a cause of action.
*352The majority adds an additional prong to the test: At least in the case of police officers, and possibly others, even if they fail to meet the criteria of § 7(2), there will still be immunity if the officer’s responsibility is characterized as a duty to the public at large and the conduct alleged did not establish a judicially created and defined “special relationship” between the victim and the officer.
These additional requirements are not required to save the statute from constitutional infirmity, nor are they a reasonable construction of the text.37 The public-duty doctrine is a judicial creation that engrafts additional requirements inconsistent with the language chosen by the Legislature.
The reasons advanced by the majority for adopting the public-duty doctrine are policy judgments that the Legislature was able to review when it enacted § 7(2).
The Legislature has provided what it determined to be sufficient protection for all governmental employees by requiring a showing of gross negligence. If police officers require additional protection, the policy arguments contained in the majority opinion will serve them well. In a court of law, those arguments should not.
While this Court has held that exceptions to the statutory immunity are to be strictly construed, it is not this Court’s role to eliminate causes of action the Legislature has granted, nor is it our role to protect the government from suits. Our obligation is to construe the statutory provisions involved, including eval*353uating common-law doctrines that might or might not have been adopted before the enactment of these statutory provisions, and determine if they are consistent with the legislative enactment.38
B
The public-duty doctrine, as articulated by the majority in separate opinions, serves to shield the government from liability despite grossly negligent conduct by its employees, in contravention of the Legislature’s decision to limit immunity and provide for liability for gross negligence. As stated by the Alaska Supreme Court:
[W]e consider that the “duty to all, duty to no-one” doctrine is in reality a form of sovereign immunity, which is a matter dealt with by statute in Alaska, and not to be amplified by court-created doctrine. [Adams v State, 555 P2d 235, 241 (Alas, 1976).[39]
*354The police have a duty under state law and the Charter of the City of Detroit to protect the public and to perform their jobs with due care.40 These legislative pronouncements state a police officer’s duty in mandatory terms.
The Legislature has thus created the cause of action for breach of a policeman’s duty. I do not *355argue for creation of a common-law duty, but merely recognition of the statutory duty the Legislature has imposed on police officers.41 Section 7(2) does not define the scope of a governmental employee’s duty. That duty is expressed in the enactments of the Legislature and in the Detroit City Charter, the very same provisions of law relied on to define “governmental function,” which, under Ross, as codified in the 1986 legislation, immunizes the City of Detroit from liability.42
The elimination of the pre-1986 discretionary-ministerial distinction evidences a legislative intent to avoid the inquiry otherwise necessary to determine whether a duty is owed.
Moreover, the 1986 legislation defines the duty pursuant to which a governmental employee is subject to liability. Section 7(2) (c) provides immunity to a governmental employee whose “conduct does not amount to gross negligence,” when the governmental agency for whom the governmental employee is *356working “is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function” (Emphasis added.)
Governmental function is defined as “an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.”43
The combining in § 7(2) of these factors, all of which must be met, for there to be immunity, obliges this Court to find grossly negligent conduct to be actionable when an employee is engaged in a governmental function, because, if the employee were not so engaged, there would be no immunity, the gross negligence standard would not apply, and then the officer would be subject to personal liability for ordinary negligence. Because defendant officers were engaged in a governmental function, the scope of their duty is determined by the scope of the governmental function in which they were engaged.
c
Many duties recognized in tort are “public” in that the duty does not specifically run to one person or group of persons. Motorists driving on Michigan roadways owe a duty to all drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and property owners (i.e., the public generally) to operate their vehicles with due care. While a driver may only be sued for breach of this duty by someone injured because of the breach, the duty is not a limited one running only from the motorist to the victim.44
*357Because a breach by a person who is not a governmental employee of a duty owed to the general public is actionable by one private citizen against the other, it is apparent that merely because a particular duty may be owed to the general public does not justify the conclusion that the breach is not actionable. The emptiness of the concept that a duty to all is a duty to none, or at least not actionable by anyone once characterized as a “public duty,” emphasizes that the majority’s conclusion is another ipse dixit resurrecting sovereign immunity under another name.
D
The lead opinion contends that “the public-duty doctrine serves a useful purpose by protecting governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions.”45 The concurring-dissenting opinion similarly argues: “The legal tort system is ill-equipped to second-guess a discretionary decision.”46
The majority’s analysis is rooted in a mistrust of the legal system, so stated in the opinions of the majority, who fear liability will be imposed because of inappropriate second-guessing by juries of what police officers should have done in a particular circumstance. Judges, however, will properly instruct juries on the law, including § 7(2)(c)’s requirement of prov*358ing gross negligence, and juries will generally bring in a result pursuant to law.
In those instances where the jury might act inappropriately the trial court may grant a motion for directed verdict, grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or order a new trial, either without condition or, under remittitur, require a party to accept a lesser verdict to avoid a new trial. An aggrieved party may seek relief in the Court of Appeals. With these protections, local police departments need not fear they will face unreasonable burdens.
The concurring-dissenting opinion argues: “Evaluations of the propriety of decisions such as budgetary items, training, equipment, procedures, and response techniques, are best left to the other branches of government.”47 To the extent these policy decisions are made by the government itself, immunity will continue to protect that entity, as it protected the City of Detroit in this case.
Nor are those concerns relevant in the instant case. A decision was made to dispatch the defendant officers to the scene. The relevant inquiry under the 1986 legislation is whether the officers performed their duty without gross negligence once they arrived on the scene. There is no risk that police departments will cease responding to distress calls because of the fear of liability.48
*359The policy arguments relied on by the majority, including the fear of exposing the government to “excessive” liability, were
rejected with the abrogation of absolute sovereign immunity and should likewise be rejected as a policy basis for the public-duty rule. The argument is particularly compelling if the public-duty doctrine is seen as a function of sovereign immunity, rather than as an independent concept of negligence.[49]
As expressed by the Arizona Supreme Court: “We are also told that not only will the public treasury suffer but government will come to a standstill because its agents will be afraid to act. We can’t but recall the dire predictions attendant to the publication of the *360[Arizona decision abolishing complete governmental immunity]. Arizona survived!”50 Not only has Arizona survived, at least a dozen states have managed to continue providing police protection, directing emergency call responses, and otherwise making the decisions necessary to continue modem government.51
Moreover, once a plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to hold an officer subject to liability pursuant to § 7(2), the officers and, because officers will generally insist on indemnification, the municipality, will “bear the burden of damages as opposed to the innocent victim, because even a small municipality normally has financial resources far beyond those of a private citizen.”52
The Supreme Court of Colorado said:
Perhaps the most persuasive reason for the abandonment of the public duty rule is that it creates needless confusion in the law and results in uneven and inequitable results in practice. As the Supreme Court of Arizona said in abandoning the public-duty rule, “[w]e shall no longer engage in the speculative exercise of determining whether the tortfeasor has a general duty to the injured party, which spells no recovery, or if he had a specific individual duty which means recovery.” Ryan [v State, 134 Ariz 308; 656 P2d 597 *361(1982)]. [Leake v Cain, 720 P2d 152, 159 (Colo, 1986) (citations omitted).]
Michigan has not heretofore engaged in such complicated analysis under the public-duty doctrine, but engaged in a similar inquiry under the now-rejected discretionary/ministerial distinction. It was rejected before and should be rejected again.
The public-duty doctrine has come under considerable criticism in other courts and in scholarly writings.53 Where a state legislature has statutorily defined the limits of tort liability, as has the Michigan Legislature, the public-duty doctrine is no more than sovereign immunity brought back to life, in the face of the legislative enactment.

 Ante, p 329.

 MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2). See n 36 for text of subsection 7(2).

 Ross, supra, p 628. The act authorized governmental agencies to defend, indemnify and insure officers and employees. MCL 691.1408; MSA 3.996(108); MCL 691.1409; MSA 3.996(109).

 Ross, supra, pp 633-634 (emphasis added).

 Id., p 634.

 House Legislative Analysis, HB 5163 (Substitute H-2), First Analysis, November 19, 1985, p 1.

 Id. (emphasis added).

 Ross defined governmental function as follows:
We therefore conclude that a governmental function is an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law. [420 Mich 620.]
The analysis stated:
The bill would define “governmental function” as an activity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, chapter [sic], ordinance, or other law. [House Legislative Analysis Section, HB 5163 (Second Analysis), January 16, 1986.]
See text accompanying n 43 for definition of governmental function enacted by 1986 PA 175.

 The 1986 legislation expressly preserved the distinction drawn by this Court in Parker v Highland Park, 404 Mich 183; 273 NW2d 413 (1978), holding that the operation of a general hospital by a city is not a governmental function, and Perry v Kalamazoo State Hosp, 404 Mich 205; 273 NW2d 421 (1978), holding that the operation of a mental hospital by the state was immune.
The act provides:
This act does not grant immunity to a governmental agency with respect to the ownership or operation of a hospital or county medical care facility or to the agents or employees of such hospital or county medical care facility.
“Hospital” means a facility offering in-patient, overnight care, and services for observation, diagnosis, and active treatment of an individual with a medical, surgical, obstetric, chronic, or rehabilitative condition requiring the daily direction or supervision of a physician. The term does not include a hospital owned or operated by the department of mental health or a hospital operated by the department of corrections.

 The lead opinion states that the public-duty “doctrine protects governments from unreasonable interference with policy decisions . . . .” Ante, p 317.

 Ante, p 321. This is a quotation from Share v Stonington, 187 Conn 147, 157; 444 A2d 1379 (1982), which was decided in a state that applies a *342simple negligence standard, not gross negligence. “The issue presented in this appeal is whether the plaintiff . . . has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town[.]” Id., p 148 (emphasis added).

 Ante, p 331.

 Id. p 335.

 Ante, p 323.

 MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1), states: “Except as otherwise provided in this act, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.” (Emphasis added.)

 The decisions of the Court of Appeals cited by the msuority extend back no further than 1970. Ante, p 322, n 7. See n 38.

 Ante, p 323.

 420 Mich 633-634.

 Examples of ministerial duties, both public and private in nature, which could form the basis for liability, include “the preparation of ballots, the registration of voters, the recording of documents, the filing of papers, the care of prisoners, the driving of vehicles, the repair of highways, the collection of taxes, the signing of licenses once they are authorized, the taking of acknowledgements, and dipping sheep.” Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 132, p 990. Prosser further notes that there is no reason to distinguish “between ministerial ‘misfeasance’ and ‘nonfeasance.’ If there is a clear duty to act at all, liability may be predicated quite as readily upon nonaction as upon action.” Id., pp 990-991. Thus, negligent failure to prepare ballots at all is as culpable as negligent failure to prepare ballots properly, even though the duty of a ballot preparer is to the public at large to ensure the proper exercise of the franchise.

 Ante, p 317.

 Police officers, especially when faced with a potentially dangerous situation, must be given a wide degree of discretion in determining what type of action will best ensure the safety of the individuals involved and the general public, the cessation of unlawful conduct, and the apprehension of wrongdoers. [420 Mich 659.]

 Ante, p 313.

 Id, p 330.

 See n 38.

 Subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals have embraced the public-duty doctrine, but this Court has not heretofore returned to decide the question it left open in Ross. See n 38.

 As to the liability of the individual officers, we need not decide the “public/individual” duty issue or whether the “special relationship” allegations were legally sufficient, since we conclude that the officers are entitled to individual immunity from tort liability. [Ross, supra, pp 658-659.]

 See text accompanying n 5 for source of “discretionary-cfecmowal.”

 Ante, p 316, quoting 2 Cooley, Torts (4th ed), § 300, pp 385-386.

 Under the majority’s definition of a special relationship, I doubt the landowner would qualify- The government official can assess the value of land without direct contact with the landowner, and the only “reliance” by the landowner is in paying the tax like other landowners.

 Similarly, the police have a statutory obligation to enforce the laws. If they perform their job in a grossly negligent manner, they are no longer within the protection the statutes might otherwise provide.

 Justice Boyle did not participate in Fiser. Justice Kavanagh did not participate in Ross.

 The action was against the City of Ann Arbor, three Ann Arbor police officers, and the driver and owners of an automobile that struck the plaintiffs vehicle during the high-speed chase.

 See also Stevens v Black, 212 Mich 281; 180 NW 503 (1920), where the Court extensively discussed with approval foreign jurisdiction case law stating public employees could be held liable for some breaches of their official duty, although the discussion was dicta because the Court *350found the defendant acted without statutory authorization and could be held hable on that basis.

 MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105).

 [I]t is immaterial whether the decision to pursue and the actual pursuit were discretionary or ministerial acts because if the city has no immunity defense, neither do the police officers. See Lockaby v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65; 276 NW2d 1 (1979). [Id., p 477.]

 (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, and without regard to the discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question, each officer and employee of a governmental agency . . . shall be im nine from tort liability for injuries to persons or damages to property caused by the officer . . . while in the course of employment or service . . . while acting on behalf of a governmental agency if all of the following are met:
(a) The officer ... is acting or reasonably believes he or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.
(b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.
(c) The officer’s . . . conduct does not amount to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. As used in this subdivision, “gross negligence” means conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results. [MCL 691.1407(2); MSA 3.996(107)(2) (emphasis added).]

 The silence of my colleagues’ opinions on these and other legal issues, rather than the policy considerations prominent throughout their discussions of the public-duty doctrine, underscores that the Court is delving into public policy concerns more appropriate for the Legislature.

 The lead opinion states that “[i]n recent years the Court of Appeals has consistently relied on the [public-duty] doctrine” as support for the assertion in the lead opinion that “the public-duty doctrine is a part of the law of this state” although this Court, in Ross, declined to adopt the public-duty doctrine. Ante, p 322.
One Court of Appeals decision, that adverted to decisions in other jurisdictions that had adopted the public-duty doctrine, Rose v Mackie, 22 Mich App 463; 177 NW2d 633 (1970), preceded the decision in Zavala, which led this Court in Ross to decline to adopt the public-duty doctrine.
The Legislature, in its careful review of Ross and earlier decisions of this Court, was surely aware of Zavala and this Court’s decision in Ross not to adopt that doctrine when it enacted the 1986 legislation eliminating the discretionary/ministerial distinction. Had the Legislature wished to incorporate the public-duty doctrine, it could have done so, but then it would have been faced with the same quandary that will face this Court in future cases — how to reconcile a public-duty doctrine with the concept that governmental employees are not immune from liability, but, rather, are subject to liability for gross negligence in the performance of their governmental functions.

 To say that there is no duty is, of course, to start with the conclusion. The question is whether or not there should be liability for the negligent failure to provide adequate police protection. [Hiss v *354City of New York, 22 NY2d 579, 585; 240 NE2d 860 (1968) (Keating, J., dissenting).]

 A state statute has long provided:
It shall be the duty of the police and nightwatchmen and officers of the force under the direction of the mayor and chief of police, and in conformity with the ordinances of the city, and laws of the state, to suppress all riots, disturbances and breaches of the peace and to pursue and arrest any person fleeing from justice in any part of the state; to apprehend any and all persons in the act of committing any offense against the laws of the state, or the ordinances of the city, involving a breach of the peace, and to take the offender forthwith before the proper court or magistrate, to be dealt with for the offense; to make complaints to the proper officers and magistrates of any person known or believed by them to be guilty of the violation of the ordinances of the city, or the penal laws of the state; and at all times diligently and faithfully to enforce all such laws, ordinances and regulations for the preservation of good order and the public welfare as the council may ordain; and to serve all process directed or delivered to them for service, and for such purposes the chief of police, and every policeman and nightwatchman, shall have all the powers of constables, and may arrest upon view and without process, any person in the act of violating any ordinance of the city involving a breach of the peace, or of committing any crime against the laws of the state. The chief of police and any policeman may serve and execute all process in suits and proceedings for violations of the ordinances of the city, and also any other process which, by law, a constable may serve. [MCL 92.4; MSA 5.1752 (emphasis added).]
The Detroit City Charter, ch 11, § 7-1101 provides:
The police department shall preserve the public peace, prevent crime, arrest offenders, protect the rights of persons and property, guard the public health, preserve order, and enforce the laws of the state and the nation and the ordinances of the city. [Emphasis added.]

 Thus, the lead opinion’s quotation from Riss, ante, p 319, that it is not “[f]or the courts to proclaim a new and general duty” is inapposite. I would not proclaim a new duty; I would merely enforce the duty the Legislature has seen fit to impose.

 The lead opinion also asserts that “duty” as used in these legal pronouncements does not actually mean “duty,” but rather a nonbinding list of tasks. Ante, p 323. However,
“A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.” Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 53, p 324. The terse legal conclusion that a duty is owed by one to another represents a judgment, as a matter of policy, that the latter’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the former’s conduct. [Antcliff v State Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich 624, 630-631; 327 NW2d 814 (1982).]

 MCL 691.1401(f); MSA 3.996(101)(f).

 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 4, p 7, employs duty “to denote the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to another to *357whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which that actor’s conduct is a legal cause.” As comment a explains, “The breach of a duty . . . does not make the actor liable. It merely subjects him to liability.” Imposition of liability requires the tortfeasor’s conduct to be a legal cause of the victim’s injury and the lack of an applicable defense for the tortfeasor. Id., § 5, p 9.

 Ante, p 317.

 Ante, p 331.

 Ante, p 331.

 There is every reason to believe, however, that imposing liability for gross negligence, once a call has been responded to, will encourage police officers to do their jobs properly. Note, Government liability and the public duty doctrine, 32 Vill L R 505, 530, 538-540 (1987), states:
[IJmposing liability on police merely provides an incentive for law enforcement officers to perform their preexisting job responsi*359bilities adequately. . . . Furthermore, public indignation usually accompanies a tax increase of any land. It is submitted that the public fury accompanying a preventable tax increase, necessitated by adverse police nonfeasance judgments, would provide a powerful incentive for an agency to reform its practices adequately. . . .
[B]y abrogating the public duty doctrine a clear message will be sent to law enforcement agencies, that lackadaisical responses to pleas for protection will no longer be tolerated. Agencies suffering large damage judgments must modify their practices to limit exposure to liability as an ordinary citizen or company would. By modifying their practices where necessary, police will increase public confidence in law enforcement agencies.

 Leake v Cain, 720 P2d 152, 159 (Colo, 1986), citing Commercial Garner Corp v Indian River Co, 371 So 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla, 1979), where the Supreme Court of Florida said:
[W]e believe it to be circuitous reasoning to conclude that no cause of action exists for a negligent act or omission by an agent of the state or its political subdivisions where the duty breached is said to be owed to the public at large but not to any particular person. . . . [I]t is clear that the [public duty] doctrine is a function of municipal sovereign immunity and not a traditional negligence concept which has meaning apart from the governmental setting. Accordingly, its efficacy is dependent on the continuing vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

 Ryan v State, 134 Ariz 308, 309; 656 P2d 597 (1982).

 Van Valkenburgh, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, § 10: Slouching toward sovereign immunity, 29 New Eng L R 1079, 1090, n 91 (1995), enumerates twelve states that had abolished the public-duty doctrine as of 1994. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.

 Note, Government liability, n 48 supra, p 537. The Supreme Court of Alaska has expressed similar reasoning. Alaska’s statute defining liability, “in establishing a procedure for suits against the state in tort, represented the adoption in Alaska of the policy of risk-spreading, the policy that society, rather than the injured individual, should bear the cost of the state’s negligence.” Adams at 244.

 Judge Keating, dissenting in Riss, noted that the majority in that case rested its decision “upon a legal rule which long ago should have been abandoned, having lost any justification it might once have had. Despite almost universal condemnation by legal scholars, the rule survives, finding its continuing strength, not in its power to persuade, but in its ability to arouse unwarranted judicial fears of the consequences of overturning it.” Id., n 39 supra, p 583.