Court Opinion

ID: 9533564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:32:39.430104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:05.416335
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring.
I join the majority’s result, but write separately to express my reason.
The majority certifies a ballot title that is different from that certified by the Attorney General. I believe that that action violates the separation of powers principle stated in Article III, section 1, of the Oregon Constitution. However, I concur with the majority’s action for the reasons expressed in my concurring opinion in Sizemore v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 229, 905 P2d 1146 (1995) (Durham, J., concurring).
I also have a concern about one of the majority’s statements. The majority, citing Aughenbaugh v. Roberts, 309 Or 510, 516, 789 P2d 656 (1990), indicates that, in the face of ambiguous wording in an initiative, “use in the ballot *343title of the actual wording of the measure usually is the preferred choice under the requirements of ORS 250.035 (1993).” 322 Or 340 (footnote omitted). The majority acknowledges that that passage from Aughenbaugh is inapplicable here, because the Attorney General, for valid reasons, chose not to explain the measure by repeating its terms. I agree. However, I question whether the court should follow a “preference” (to use Aughenbaugh’s term) for using a measure’s ambiguous words in describing, in the ballot title, the effect of a measure.1
ORS 250.035(2), as amended by Oregon Laws 1995, chapter 534, section 1, provides:
“The ballot title of any state measure to be initiated or referred shall consist of:
“(a) A caption of not more than 10 words that reasonably identifies the subject matter of the state measure. The caption of an initiative or referendum amendment to the constitution shall begin with the phrase, ‘Amends Constitution,’ which shall not be counted for purposes of the 10-word caption limit;
“(b) A simple and understandable statement of not more than 15 words that describes the result if the state measure is approved. The statement required by this paragraph shall include either the phrase, T vote’ or ‘vote yes,’ or a substantially similar phrase, which may be placed at any point within the statement;
“(c) A simple and understandable statement of not more than 15 words that describes the result if the state measure is rejected. The statement required by this paragraph shall include either the phrase, T vote’ or Vote no,’ or a substantially similar phrase, which may be placed at any point within the statement; and
“(d) A concise and impartial statement of not more than 85 words summarizing the measure and its major effect.”
*344Three observations about the 1995 amendments are relevant. First, under that statute, the caption identifies the “subject matter” of the measure. Although the amendment substituted the phrase “subject matter” for the former statutory term “subject,” see ORS 250.035(l)(a) (1993) (caption identifies measure’s “subject”), that change does not alter the substance of the caption’s function.
Second, the legislature made no change in the function of the summary, which summarizes “the measure and its major effect.” ORS 250.035(2)(c).
Third, the legislature deleted the former requirement of a 20-word question that “plainly phrases the chief purpose of the measure,” ORS 250.035(l)(b) (1993), and substituted the requirement of two statements describing the “result” of approval or rejection of the measure. I refer to those new requirements as “result” statements.
The statute obligates the Attorney General and this court, in drafting the summary, to state the actual effect, i.e., the practical consequences of approval of the measure. As this court said in Fred Meyer, Inc. v. Roberts, 308 Or 169, 175, 777 P2d 406 (1989), “[t]he purpose of the [summary] is to help voters understand what will happen if the measure is approved, and * * * the [summary] should * * * be worded so that voters will understand the breadth of its impact.” In addition, the “result” statements must describe explicitly the consequences of approval or rejection of the measure.
In my view, the Attorney General and this court would not necessarily satisfy the statutory obligation to communicate the results or effects of a measure simply by repeating the measure’s words. For example, if a measure proposes in terms to repeal one or more identified statutes, a ballot title summary that repeats only those operative words would fail to describe the measure’s result or effect on the law or on the rights of affected persons.2 The purpose of the result statements and the *345summary is to explain the consequences of adoption or rejection of the measure.3
That point takes on an extra measure of importance if the text of the measure is ambiguous. The Attorney General or this court may conclude that the text of a measure is subject to more than one plausible interpretation and that, despite best efforts to discern the drafter’s intention, the words of the measure do not make its meaning clear. If an ambiguity in a measure leaves its intention unclear, the Attorney General and this court do not satisfy the statutory obligation under ORS 250.035(2)(b), (c), and (d) to state the result and effect of the measure by repeating the measure’s obscure terms in the ballot title, and thereby merely perpetuating those doubts.
This case does not require a determination of the obligation of the Attorney General and this court in preparing result statements and a summary for an ambiguous initiative measure. Despite petitioner’s argument to the contrary, the text of this measure does convey its meaning without ambiguity, as the majority holds. It may be that the ballot title for an ambiguous measure should identify the ambiguity and either acknowledge that the ballot title cannot state the result and effect of the measure, because it is ambiguous, or attempt to describe the anticipated results and effects under each of the disputed plausible interpretations of the measure. I express no opinion on the resolution of that issue, except to emphasize that repetition in a ballot title of ambiguous terms in a measure rarely would satisfy the statutory obligation to state the measure’s result and effect.
I concur.

 Aughenbaugh indicated that a measure’s text should be used in a ballot title summary, “absent a compelling reason to the contrary,” and cited Sampson v. Roberts, 309 Or 335, 340, 788 P2d 421 (1990), for that proposition. Sampson, in turn, cited Glerum v. Roberts, 308 Or 22, 27, 774 P2d 1093 (1989), for the same proposition. The point oí Aughenbaugh, Sampson, and Glerum is that, in general, a ballot title should use the terms in the measure, not different terms that may convey a different meaning. Those cases do not hold that the terms in the measure necessarily convey its subject, purpose, or major effect.

 Reed v. Roberts, 304 Or 649, 748 P2d 542 (1988), illustrates the point. In Reed, the ballot measure sought to repeal the statute that requires state Bar membership to practice law. In modifying the ballot title’s question to state the measure’s chief purpose, this court added text to explain that purpose and did not merely identify the statute that the measure would repeal.

 See ACLU v. Paulus, 282 Or 547, 550, 580 P2d 171 (1978) (“It is part of the function of the ballot title to explain the purpose of a legal text that otherwise is obscure to laymen, so far as this is possible without prejudging future disputes about its meaning.”).