Court Opinion

ID: 9480310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:44:29.976639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:36.529559
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I do not agree that appellant’s claim is time-barred, I respectfully dissent. I would adopt the analysis of Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d 916, 920-21 (6th Cir.1989). Accord Boyd v. United States, 482 F.Supp. 1126, 1129-30 (W.D.Pa.1980); Mack v. United States Postal Service, 414 F.Supp. 504, 506-08 (E.D.Mich.1976). Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
First, because the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) is clear and unambiguous, it is not necessary to resort to consideration of legislative history. “[S]ection 2675(a) expressly provides that if the agency fails to finally dispose of the claim within six months after filing, ‘at the option of the claimant any time thereafter,’ such failure may ‘be deemed a final denial of the claim_’” Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d at 920 (emphasis added in cited case). The plain language of the statute itself thus places the option of constructive denial in the hands of the claimant and specifically grants the claimant “any time thereafter” to file an action in court. Id. at 921. Nothing in the statute requires the claimant to deem the agency’s failure to act within six months as a final denial.
As noted by the majority opinion, at 1367 n. 6, under the above construction of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the period within which the claimant can deem the agency’s failure to make a final disposition of a claim within six months a constructive denial of the claim is “open-ended.” However, the agency can close the “open-ended” period simply by denying the claim in writing and sending the denial to the claimant by certified or registered mail. Notice of the final denial of the claim would start the six-month statutory period provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) running. Conn v. United *1368States, 867 F.2d at 921. For example, m the present case, if the agency had properly notified appellant that his claim had been denied, that is, by sending appellant a copy of its final denial of his claim on October 13,1987, by certified or registered mail, the six-month statutory period would have expired on April 13, 1988. However, because the agency failed to properly notify appellant that it had denied his claim, the six-month period never began to run. It would be particularly inappropriate to place the risk of agency inaction or failure to properly notify the claimant on the claimant. The agency’s failure to properly notify the claimant of the denial of his or her claim should not operate in the agency’s favor.
Second, I would not add a “reasonable time” limitation to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The statute itself contains no such qualification. Moreover, the addition of a “reasonable time” period after the six-month period allowed for agency action will require reviewing courts to “deal each case on an ad hoc basis in which multifarious, indeed unlimited, factors would need to be considered and weighed.” Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d at 921.
Even if I were persuaded that the majority opinion was correct in adding a “reasonable time” limitation, I cannot agree that the delay in the present case is unreasonable. Appellant submitted his claim in February 1987; the Bureau of Prisons acknowledged receipt of the claim in April 1987. The agency then had six months, or until October 1987, to make a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Even if one assumes appellant immediately exercised his option to deem the agency’s inaction as a constructive final denial, by my calculations, appellant delayed only 6 months7 and actually filed his action in court within 12 months. In my opinion, 6 months, or even 12 months, is a “reasonable time.”
Finally, if there should be a time limitation on the claimant’s option to deem the agency’s failure to make a final disposition within six months a final denial, I would argue that the applicable time limitation should be the six-year period contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). But cf. Conn v. United States, 867 F.2d at 920 (rejecting six-year limitation in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)), citing Menkarell v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir.1972) (holding 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) does not apply to Federal Tort Claims Act actions), United States v. Glenn, 231 F.2d 884 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 926, 77 S.Ct. 223, 1 L.Ed.2d 161 (1956), and Wesreco, Inc. v. United States Department of the Interior, 618 F.Supp. 562 (D.Utah 1985) (same). Here, I would argue that appellant exercised his option to deem his claim constructively denied in October 1988, when he filed his action in court, only 12 months after the expiration of the agency’s six-month period to act.

. Appellant first presented his administrative claim in February 1987. The Bureau of Prisons acknowledged receipt of the claim in April 1987. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), the six-month period for administrative action expired in October 1987. Because appellant filed this action in October 1988 and is allowed 6 months to file after notice of final denial pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), I have subtracted 6 months from the filing date to April 1988. Thus, even assuming appellant exercised his option to deem the agency’s inaction as a final denial at the earliest possible time, appellant waited only 6 months, from October 1987 to April 1988.