Court Opinion

ID: 9460274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:46:15.89185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:33.268470
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I agree that the district court’s judgment should be reversed. However, in my view such reversal should not be predicated upon possible infirmities resulting from the admission of co-conspirator statements,1 when there is an error which more clearly warrants a new trial.
Rodrigues contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as to the essential elements of the crime with which he was charged and of which he was convicted. The government maintains that Rodrigues is barred by Rule 30, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, from complaining of this omission, since his counsel voiced no objection at trial.2 The interdiction of Rule 30, however, is inoperative regarding this asserted error.
In Screws v. United States,3 the Supreme Court held that where a trial court fails “to submit to the jury the essential ingredients of the ... offense . . . it is necessary to take note of it on our own motion.”4 Stated otherwise, the omission from jury instructions of an explanation of all the *667necessary elements of a crime is, per se, “plain error.” 5
Rodrigues was charged in a one-count indictment with “conspiracy to defraud the United States of and concerning its governmental function,” a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.6 In United States v. Vazquez7 this Court stated that, where an indictment charges conspiracy to defraud the United States under section 371, “fraud is an essential ingredient of the offense.”8 Fraud, in this connection, has been defined by the Supreme Court as “deceit, craft or trickery, or at least [as] means that are dishonest.” 9 The gravamen of the offense, then, is the defendant’s state of mind —he must be found to possess the intent to defraud, to commit craft, deceit, or trickery, before a conviction will lie. The district court did not so instruct the jury, and such omission, in light of Vazquez and its progenitors, was plain error.
This ground for reversal would appear preferable for several reasons. First, as discussed above, the Supreme Court in Screws mandated that we consider this type of error, even if raised for the first time on appeal. Second, questions regarding the use of co-conspirator statements, particularly under the rule of Bey, supra, present grave issues that should only be resolved with a complete record at hand.10 Finally, it seems that the question of the appellant’s intent was, practically speaking, the fulcrum of the government’s case. Criminal statutes must be construed and applied strictissimi juris, and without a charge on the element of intent, there can be no assurance that the jury so applied section 371 in this case.
Thus, notwithstanding the appellant’s failure to object to the lack of instructions setting out each element of the crime, I would conclude that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

. The majority, invoking United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1971), rejects Rodrigues’ claim that the failure of the court to instruct the jury regarding the admissibility of co-conspirator statements was error.
I, too, would reject this contention of Rodrigues because, irrespective of the rule of Bey, no objection was made at trial to this asserted error in the instructions. Rule 30, F.R.Cr.P., thus bars our consideration of such omission on this appeal. Cf. United States v. Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 690 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 379 U.S. 947, 85 S.Ct. 440, 13 L.Ed.2d 544 (1964).

. Rule 30 bars consideration of errors in a trial court’s instructions that were not objected to before the jury retired. See Note 1, supra.

. 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945).

. Id. at 107, 65 S.Ct. at 1038.

. See United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 71 (2d Cir. 1962), rev’d on other grounds, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Pursuant to rule 52(b), F.R.Cr.P., “[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court.” See United States v. Grasso, 437 F.2d 317, 319 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920, 91 S.Ct. 2236, 29 L.Ed.2d 698 (1971).

. Section 371 proscribes two separate offenses to wit, conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. The indictment in this ease clearly charged Rodrigues only with the latter crime.

. 319 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1963).

. Id. at 384.

. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924).

. Though as a panel member I joined the majority opinion in Bey, I was then, and continue to be, troubled by some of the ramifications of that case. Particularly nettlesome is the question whether Bey’s rejection of the need for certain limiting instructions comports altogether with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the co-conspirator rule. See, e. g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (particularly the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). For example, if, under Bey, the jury need not find at least a prima facie case of conspiracy on the basis solely of independent evidence, the very “bootstrapping effect” warned against in Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75, 62 S.Ct. 457, may occur.