Court Opinion

ID: 9906614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:06:11.548464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:16.569740
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                         Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-0557

                                  Megan Guetzkow, et al.,
                                      Respondents,

                                              vs.

                                      Brian John Irgens,
                                          Appellant.

                                  Filed December 4, 2023
                                         Affirmed
                                     Wheelock, Judge

                                Wright County District Court
                                 File No. 86-CV-18-2938

Gerald W. Von Korff, Rinke Noonan, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondents)

Brian John Irgens, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

       Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and

Wheelock, Judge.

                            NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

       Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that his motions, which

requested that the district court (1) set aside the sheriff’s sale of a property that he alleges

is his homestead, (2) order respondents to dismiss their complaints against him in Pope

County District Court, and (3) order respondents to record documents discharging the

sheriff’s certificate of sale, were impermissible collateral attacks. He also asserts that the
district court denied him due process when it canceled the hearing on his motions. We

affirm.

                                          FACTS

          In 2019, respondents Megan Guetzkow, on behalf of her minor daughter, and

Mariah Guetzkow (collectively, “Guetzkow”) secured a judgment for damages in the

amount of $841,621.15 in a personal-injury lawsuit against appellant Brian John Irgens in

Wright County District Court. The damages award was based on Irgens’s sexual abuse of

the respondents. Irgens appealed the judgment, and this court affirmed. Guetzkow v.

Irgens, No. A19-2075, 2020 WL 4743464 (Minn. App. Aug. 17, 2020) (Guetzkow I), rev.

denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2020).

          While the personal-injury lawsuit was pending and Irgens was incarcerated for

criminal convictions based on the same conduct, Irgens inherited real property in Pope

County and recorded a notice of homestead in that county. The order for judgment on the

personal-injury claim and this court’s opinion in Guetzkow I both briefly reference Irgens’s

claimed homestead exemption. In its findings of fact, the district court recited that Irgens

“claims the Pope County property as his homestead.” In Guetzkow I, we stated that “[t]he

record shows that two of the real-estate properties that [Irgens] is expected to receive from

his father’s estate each have a taxable market value of more than $200,000, one of which

is Irgens’s homestead.” Id. at *4.

          In 2021, Guetzkow filed a declaratory-judgment action in Pope County challenging

Irgens’s notice of homestead. The Pope County District Court granted summary judgment

in favor of Guetzkow, issuing a declaratory judgment that Irgens’s homestead-exemption

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claim was not valid. Irgens appealed, and this court affirmed. Guetzkow v. Irgens,

No. A21-1328, 2022 WL 1297621 (Minn. App. May 2, 2022) (Guetzkow II), rev. denied

(Minn. July 19, 2022).

      In August 2022 and January 2023, Irgens filed motions in the personal-injury action

seeking an order (1) setting aside the sheriff’s sale of the Pope County property based on

his continued assertion that the property is his homestead, (2) directing Guetzkow to

dismiss their complaints in Pope County District Court, and (3) directing Guetzkow to

record documents discharging the sheriff’s certificate of sale. The district court denied

Irgens’s motions because it determined that they were impermissible collateral attacks on

the Pope County declaratory judgment.

      Irgens appeals.

                                      DECISION

      Irgens attempts to raise several issues, but his brief primarily contains bare

allegations unsupported by argument or applicable law. An assignment of error based on

“mere assertion” and not supported by argument is waived unless prejudicial error is

obvious on mere inspection. Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d

133, 135 (Minn. 1971). We do not presume error on appeal; rather, the burden rests on the

“one who relies upon” the error to make the error appear affirmatively before there can be

reversal. Midway Ctr. Assocs. v. Midway Ctr., Inc., 237 N.W.2d 76, 78 (Minn. 1975)

(quotation omitted). This court generally holds pro se litigants to the same standard as

attorneys. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 1.04; see Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn.

2010). Irgens’s brief is almost wholly composed of direct quotes from cases and treatises

                                            3
addressing legal principles generally, most of which have no relevance to the issues present

in this case. Several of Irgens’s arguments are not supported by the record or appropriate

legal authority, and therefore, we do not consider these arguments on appeal.

       Irgens attempts to make legal arguments that pertain to issues that were arguably

relevant to the Wright County damages judgment, Guetzkow I, the Pope County declaratory

judgment, and Guetzkow II—but are not relevant here. 1 We discern two arguments in

Irgens’s self-represented brief that relate to the Wright County District Court decision on

appeal. First, Irgens asserts that the district court erred by determining that his motions

were impermissible collateral attacks and argues that the Pope County declaratory

judgment and this court’s opinion affirming that judgment in Guetzkow II are

unenforceable because the Wright County order for judgment and Guetzkow I conclusively

established his right to the homestead exemption. Second, Irgens argues that the district

court violated Irgens’s due‑process rights by denying him a hearing on his motions. In

addition, Irgens asks this court to sanction Guetzkow’s counsel.

1
  For example, Irgens argues that Guetzkow lacked standing in the declaratory-judgment
proceedings in Pope County and in Guetzkow II because Guetzkow failed to prove injury
in fact and were not proper parties to the action because they were not parties to his
notice-of-homestead filing. Irgens’s other arguments include various alleged procedural
deficiencies, improper choices of remedies, and a breach-of-contract theory. Irgens does
not explain, and we do not see, how they are relevant to any issue properly before this
court. Moreover, these arguments suffer from the same lack of factual and legal support
that plague the remainder of the brief, and therefore, we do not review them.

                                             4
I.     The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Irgens’s motions
       for injunctive relief because they are impermissible collateral attacks on prior
       judicial decisions.

       Irgens argues that his motions were not impermissible collateral attacks because the

decisions he challenges—Guetzkow II and the Pope County declaratory judgment—are

void. He asserts that Guetzkow I and the Wright County order for judgment are final

determinations that he is entitled to a homestead exemption. He argues that, therefore, the

Pope County District Court and this court in Guetzkow II lacked subject matter jurisdiction

to decide the issue of the validity of the homestead exemption, rendering those decisions

void and open to collateral attack.

       An attack on a prior judgment is collateral when it is made in a proceeding other

than the one in which the challenged judgment was entered. Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Nat.

Res., 612 N.W.2d 862, 866 (Minn. 2000).

              Where a direct attack on a judgment attempts to annul, amend,
              reverse, or vacate a judgment or to declare it void in an
              appropriate proceeding instituted initially and primarily for
              that purpose, an impermissible collateral attack similarly
              attacks the validity of a judgment, but the attack is purely
              secondary or incidental.

Aaron Carlson Corp. v. Cohen, 933 N.W.2d 63, 71 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Irgens’s motions are collateral attacks because they seek relief enjoining the effects of

judicial determinations made in other proceedings.

       A collateral attack may be permissible if the challenged judgment is void for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 866. However, Minnesota law places

“limits on the ability of a party to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a basis for

                                             5
attacking a final judgment.” Aili v. State, 963 N.W.2d 442, 452 (Minn. 2021). When a

party collaterally attacks a judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

Minnesota courts follow section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments in deciding

whether to allow the attack. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 867. The Second Restatement provides

that such an attack should not be permitted unless

                     (1) [t]he subject matter of the action was so plainly
              beyond the court’s jurisdiction that its entertaining the action
              was a manifest abuse of authority; or
                     (2) [a]llowing the judgment to stand would substantially
              infringe the authority of another tribunal or agency of
              government; or
                     (3) [t]he judgment was rendered by a court lacking
              capability to make an adequately informed determination of a
              question concerning its own jurisdiction and as a matter of
              procedural fairness the party seeking to avoid the judgment
              should have opportunity belatedly to attack the court’s subject
              matter jurisdiction.

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 12 (1982). This is a high bar. “[A] judgment is not

void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction unless no arguable basis for jurisdiction

existed.” Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 870 (quotation omitted). And a party cannot attack subject

matter jurisdiction just because they disagree with the result of the decision, as subject

matter jurisdiction “comprehends the power to decide a particular case wrongly as well as

rightly.” Robinette v. Price, 8 N.W.2d 800, 805 (Minn. 1943).

       “Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court’s authority to decide a particular class

of actions and its authority to decide the particular questions before it.” State ex rel. Swan

Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 711 N.W.2d 522, 525

(Minn. App. 2006), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2006). Minnesota district courts have

                                              6
broad subject matter jurisdiction to decide civil actions. Minn. Stat. § 484.01, subd. 1(1)

(2022); Anderson v. County of Lyon, 784 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied

(Minn. Aug. 24, 2010). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this court

reviews de novo. Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 866.

       Irgens’s first argument is that the Pope County declaratory judgment—and our

Guetzkow II decision—are void because the decisions in Guetzkow I had already finally

determined that he was entitled to the homestead exemption for the Pope County property.

In support, he cites authority referring to res judicata/claim preclusion, collateral estoppel,

collateral attack, the law-of-the-case doctrine, the first-to-file rule, comity, and the Full

Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

       But Irgens does not explain how any of these doctrines affect subject matter

jurisdiction. And most of these legal doctrines do not negate subject matter jurisdiction

because they are prudential, not mandatory. See Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d

829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (“[N]either res judicata nor collateral estoppel is to be rigidly

applied.”); Bode, 612 N.W.2d at 868 (analyzing a collateral attack according to “competing

principles of finality and validity”); Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n.1 (Minn. 1994)

(explaining that law of the case is a “discretionary doctrine”); Levine v. Bayview Loan

Servicing, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 49, 56 (Minn. App. 2019) (explaining that “comity is a

principle taken into account when addressing whether to apply the first-to-file rule,” which

                                              7
is “not a rigid rule”). 2 Thus, even if we concluded that any of them applied, these doctrines

do not affect the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction in the Pope County

declaratory-judgment proceeding or our subject matter jurisdiction in Guetzkow II.

Because the district court and this court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, Irgens’s

collateral attacks on the Pope County judgment and Guetzkow II lack merit.

       Nevertheless, we note that whether or not the property qualified as a homestead was

not at issue in the Wright County personal-injury lawsuit, and we did not review it in

Guetzkow I, either. Thus, the statements Irgens references cannot be relied on as having

decided the issue or otherwise used to establish the validity of Irgens’s claimed homestead

exemption. “Comments that are not necessary to a decision . . . are non-binding dicta.”

See In re Welfare of Child. of J.D.T., 946 N.W.2d 321, 327 n.6 (Minn. 2020). The district

court’s statement in the Wright County order for judgment that Irgens “claims the Pope

County property as his homestead” is not a legal determination that his claim was valid

because that issue was not relevant to and not contested in the personal-injury lawsuit. And

our reference in Guetzkow I to the claimed homestead exemption is merely a reference that

is not a legal determination. Nor could our reference to Irgens’s claimed homestead

exemption be a factual determination. See Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 679 (Minn.

App. 2009) (“It is not within the province of appellate courts to determine issues of fact on

appeal.” (quotation omitted)). Thus, the excerpts from the Wright County order for

2
 The Full Faith and Credit Clause can affect subject matter jurisdiction. See Matson v.
Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1983). But because it governs recognition of judicial
determinations between states, it does not apply here. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.

                                              8
judgment and Guetzkow I decision that Irgens cites have no preclusive effect and did not

decide the validity of the homestead exemption.

       Irgens has not met the high bar to prove that the decisions in the Pope County

declaratory judgment and Guetzkow II are void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The

district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Irgens’s collateral attacks

are impermissible.

II.    Irgens does not demonstrate that the district court’s cancellation of the hearing
       on his motions was prejudicial error.

       Irgens next asserts that the district court violated his constitutional due-process

rights by canceling the hearing on his motions, but he does not provide any legal argument

to support this assertion. We do not consider an issue when it is not supported by the record

or by legal authority. State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22 (Minn. 2008) (citing Louden v.

Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946)) (“We will not consider pro se claims on appeal

that are unsupported by either arguments or citations to legal authority.”).

       Moreover, a district court’s denial of a hearing in a civil matter, even if erroneous,

will not be reversed if the error was harmless. See In re Condemnation by Suburban

Hennepin Reg’l Park Dist., 561 N.W.2d 195, 197-98 (Minn. App. 1997) (citing Minn. R.

Civ. P. 61). The appellant must show both error and that the error caused them prejudice.

Bloom v. Hydrotherm, Inc., 499 N.W.2d 842, 845 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn.

June 28, 1993). Irgens makes general claims about due process but does not explain how

the district court’s decision not to hold a hearing prejudiced him. Because Irgens does not

assert or demonstrate prejudice, we reject this argument.

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III.   Irgens’s request for sanctions is denied.

       Finally, Irgens urges this court to sanction Guetzkow’s counsel. Irgens asserts that

Guetzkow’s counsel engaged in misconduct by representing his minor daughter in the

personal-injury lawsuit against him, thereby causing his daughter to breach her fiduciary

duty to him as her father, by charging her attorney fees, and by filing “frivolous actions”—

all of which, he asserts, was “predatory.” He does not, however, ask us to review a

determination by the district court regarding sanctions, identify a statute or rule authorizing

him to move this court for sanctions, or specify what sanction he would have this court

impose. In Minnesota, a statute sets forth the appropriate procedure to request sanctions

in civil lawsuits. Minn. Stat. § 549.211, subd. 4 (2022). Irgens did not comply with that

statute in making his request for sanctions, and thus, his request is not properly before us.

Irgens’s request for sanctions is denied, and his attempt to deny his victims the measure of

redress awarded by the Wright County District Court is at an end.

       In summary, none of the issues Irgens raises in his brief provide a basis for relief.

       Affirmed.

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