Court Opinion

ID: 9477055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:12:28.450273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:39.863050
License: Public Domain

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Hill was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. That statute reads, in part, as follows:
*765641. Public money, property or records. Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, ... any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Specifically, the charge against Hill in a one count indictment was that he “did unlawfully steal money in the amount of three thousand and one hundred dollars ($3,100.00) and a 1985 Chevrolet Camero automobile ..., a thing of value of more than $100.00, both property of the Drug Enforcement Administration, an agency of the United States, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 641.”
The jury was instructed that “to ‘steal’ means to take away from one in lawful possession without right and with the intent to deprive the owner, either temporarily or permanently of the use or benefit of that property.” This instruction was based on language appearing in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271, 72 S.Ct. 240, 254, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), which language was itself based, in turn, on language in Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 171 N.E. 569, 571 (N.Y.Ct. of App.1930). We note, parenthetically, that Irving Trust was a civil case, not a criminal case. Morissette, however, was a criminal case and involves a consideration of the same statute with which we are here concerned.
The portion of § 641 here involved declares that “[wjhoever [1] embezzles, [2] steals, [3] purloins, [4] or knowingly converts to his own use ... money or thing of value of the United States or any department or agency thereof ... [sjhall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both” if the value of such property exceeds $100.00.1 In Morissette, the charge was that the defendant did unlawfully “steal and convert” property of the United States. The defendant was convicted in the district court, and the jury in that case was instructed that a so-called “criminal intent” was not an essential element of the crime charged. The Circuit Court upheld the defendant’s conviction, but the Supreme Court, on certiora-ri, reversed. The Supreme Court held that even though “criminal intent” is not mentioned in § 641, it is an essential element of all four ways set forth above for violating the statute. In Morissette, the particular issue was whether a “criminal intent” was an essential element of the fourth way of violating the statute, i.e., “knowingly converts,” which the Supreme Court said it was. The Supreme Court in that case also observed that “there is considerable overlapping in the embezzlement, stealing, purloining and knowing conversion grouped in this statute.”
My basic disagreement with the majority opinion is that it holds as a matter of law that Hill came into possession of the money and automobile lawfully. In my view of the record the evidence is such as to permit the jury, as the fact finder, to find that Hill came into possession of the money and automobile by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, trickery, and chicanery, in which event Hill would not have come into possession of the money and automobile in a lawful manner.
When one gives property to another for a specific purpose, and the receiving party immediately upon receipt thereof converts the property to his own use, one inference, and I suggest a fair inference, is that the receiving party never did intend to fulfill the purpose for which the property was given, and, by pretending that he would, he induced the owner of the property to part company with his property. In the instant case, Hill got possession of the money and automobile for the purpose of proceeding to a residential home where he was to make a “drug buy,” and, after getting the money and the vehicle, he at once “took-off,” running red lights and “shaking” the agents who were following in a second vehicle. Hill later abandoned *766the automobile, took a taxi to a downtown hotel and used the government’s money, or part of it, to buy cocaine for his personal consumption. A couple of days later, Hill “surrendered,” apparently at the insistence of his sister. The automobile was recovered, but all the money was missing.
Further, at trial, Hill testified, on cross examination, that before he received the money and the keys to the automobile he began to be “concerned” about the success of the scheme. Also, one of the drug agents testified that it was Hill’s “suggestion” that he (Hill) be allowed to drive to the scene of the proposed drug purchase by himself, whereas the drug agents testified that ordinarily they would drive an informant to the scene of a drug sale.
The argument that Hill obtained the money and vehicle by deception, intending to appropriate both to his own use, was made by the government to the jury and I believe it to be a plausible argument supported by the record. And defense counsel argued quite vigorously the converse to the jury, i.e., that Hill received the money and automobile lawfully and without criminal intent, and therefore, under the district court’s instruction that “to ‘steal’ means to take away from one in lawful possession without right ...”, he could not have “stolen” the items.
The majority opinion suggests that the jury was not adequately instructed on this particular matter. Be that as it may, on appeal, defense counsel makes no challenge to any instruction, nor does he claim that the jury should have been more fully instructed on any matter. On appeal, counsel’s only argument is that, on the record as made, Hill, as a matter of law, came into possession of the money and automobile lawfully. With this I cannot agree. That issue was for the jury to decide.2

. Obtaining property of the United States by fraud, deception, misrepresentation, trickery, or chicanery is not one of the alternate ways mentioned in § 641 whereby one can violate the statute.

. In support of my belief that one who obtains property of another through fraud, deception, or chicanery with an intent to convert the same to his own use and feloniously converts it to his own use, "steals,” see United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957): United States v. Shoels, 685 F.2d 379 (10th Cir.1982); Loney v. United States, 151 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.1945). Compare with Hite v. United States, 168 F.2d 973 (10th Cir.1948). In Shoels we said the reasoning in Hite was rejected by the Supreme Court in Turley.