Court Opinion

ID: 9684920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:18:47.88247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:07.691938
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated rape by a jury. His punishment, enhanced by allegation and proof of a prior robbery conviction, was assessed by the court at ninety-nine (99) years’ confinement.
On appeal a panel of the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but vacated the sentence and remanded the cause to the trial court for the re-assessment of punishment by another district judge, the original trial judge being held disqualified. In assaying appellant’s eighth ground of error, the appellate court found the prosecutor guilty of reprehensible pros-ecutorial misconduct, and concluded the judicial misconduct could not be tolerated. Tamminen v. State, 644 S.W.2d 209 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982).
Before turning to the eighth ground of error, the basis for the vacation of the sentence, a brief recitation of the facts is in order. The San Antonio court commenced its discussion of the facts: “The voluminous record depicts a night of terror, brutality, and sexual abuse. The evidence spins a web of facts and circumstances from which the jury was justified and virtually compelled to convict appellant of aggravated rape.”
The prosecutrix P- and another woman, C_, both seventeen years of age, went to the Lamp Post Inn on the night of December 8, 1976. There they came in contact with appellant and his friends. C_ was threatened and P_was yanked out of her chair and told to try to get some drugs. Later in the *804parking lot, where P_ and C_ had gone with appellant and two men of whom they were fearful, a friend of P-gave her three or four baggies of marihuana. The three men, all members of the Bandido Motorcycle Club, took the girls in appellant’s pickup truck to a motel where appellant had a room.
At the room the girls were forced to disrobe at gunpoint. One of the men left. Appellant and another man, “Shooter,” then forced the girls to perform oral sex with them and they each had sexual intercourse with both of the girls. The girls were brutally beaten and pistol whipped. C- was sodomized in her rectum by use of a gun. The girls were told they would be killed if they screamed.
The girls were bleeding so badly at one point the appellant put them in the bathtub to clean up. The bleeding continued and the girls were returned to the bedroom. Appellant suggested they “waste” the girls, but “Shooter” recommended taking the girls somewhere else.
As a result of the noise, the police were called. While the police were trying to gain entrance, a naked C_, with blood on her face, came out the door and fell in the hall. P-was on a bed unable to get up. Appellant and his companion had departed, apparently through an open window. Appellant was apprehended near the motel and a .45 caliber automatic pistol was found near where appellant was seen attempting to climb a fence during his flight.
At the penalty stage of the trial before the court, eighteen days after the jury’s verdict, appellant entered a plea of “true” to the allegations concerning the prior felony conviction. Record evidence in support of the allegations also was offered, showing a 1962 Alabama robbery conviction with a punishment of twelve (12) years’ imprisonment. A Department of Public Safety Crime Analyst testified in 1976 appellant was “a national sergeant at arms with the Bandidos.” Another crime analyst with Harris County testified a sergeant at arms in the Bandidos was an “enforcer.” Three other law enforcement officers testified appellant’s reputation for being a peaceful and law-abiding citizen was bad.
Appellant testified he was no longer affiliated with the Bandidos. He called a Bexar County deputy sheriff, who returned him from Alabama in 1980. The deputy testified appellant was described to him in Alabama as being a model citizen and appellant did not give him any problems on the return trip to San Antonio. Appellant told the deputy he had been a Bandidos sergeant at arms, but had quit, had gotten married and had a baby boy.
At the close of the penalty stage the trial judge assessed punishment at 99 years’ imprisonment, which was within the range of punishment for the alleged crime.
Appellant’s eighth ground of error, which caused the vacation of the punishment assessed, read:
“The Trial Court committed reversible error when, prior to sentencing, it received evidence and denied appellant and appellant’s counsel access to this evidence, which had been secretly presented to the Court by the prosecution, such evidence being a document compiled by the Texas Department of Public Safety. The document itself is rank hearsay and highly prejudicial to the appellant. Such conduct denied the appellant his right to confrontation under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas and Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., Articles 1.05 and 1.25 and the appellant’s right to a public trial under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the State of Texas and Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., Article 1.05 and 1.24.”1
*805At the hearing on the motion for new trial,2 it was established by the testimony of one of appellant’s lawyers that on the day before the penalty stage of the trial defense counsel were in the trial judge’s chambers, apparently to see the pre-sentence report which had been ordered and to discuss the punishment to be assessed. While there, counsel observed on the judge’s desk a booklet or document dealing with the Ban-dido Motorcycle Club.3 One of the lawyers requested to see the booklet, but the trial judge declined to permit counsel to examine the document.
It was also shown that sometime after the trial commenced assistant district attorney Dick Ryman furnished the trial judge with a document compiled by the Department of Public Safety regarding the Bandi-do Motorcycle Organization. Ryman testified he furnished the document for general information purposes. He denied it was to influence the punishment assessed. He did not furnish a copy of the same to defense counsel because he had been informed it was classified information. Ryman had obtained the document from an investigator in his office.
The exact circumstances of how the document was delivered to the judge were not well developed.4 At the close of the new trial hearing, the trial judge ordered the document marked appellant’s Exhibit A, and made a part of the appellate record.
The Court of Appeals found that in receiving and accepting the document in question prior to imposing punishment the trial judge had denied the appellant the right to confrontation and cross-examination and denied appellant his right to a public trial “to the extent that the judge made use of it.” The Court of Appeals pointedly censured the prosecutor for violating the spirit of Article 2.01, Y.A.C.C.P., and the trial judge for violating State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon No. 3A(4), and concluded the judicial conduct could not be tolerated.
The Court of Appeals found the trial judge received and accepted the document and made use of it despite
(1) the fact the document was not formally offered into evidence prior to the imposition of punishment;
(2) the fact there was no objection at the penalty stage to the court’s possible consideration of the document, though appellant’s counsel had observed the document in the judge’s chambers the day before;
(3) the fact that the record is silent, as the Court of Appeals acknowledges, as to whether the judge read the document;
(4) the fact that , the judge expressly stated at the penalty stage that he was basing the assessment of punishment upon the testimony of the prosecutrix and her companion on the night in question. This did not include the document.
In addition, if the evidence was received and accepted as found by the Court of Appeals, that court did not deal with the well established rule that the trial judge, as the trier of the facts, at the penalty stage of the trial, is presumed to have disregarded any evidence that was improperly admitted. Kimithi v. State, 546 S.W.2d 323, 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Maden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Flowers v. State, 482 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Smith v. State, 478 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Garrett v. State, 165 Tex. Cr.R. 328, 307 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App. 1957). See also Rhine v. State, 642 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th]—1982). Expressed another way — the trial judge is presumed to have relied only on properly admitted evidence when sitting as the trier of the facts. Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). This presumption also applies when the evidence in dispute arises *806during the penalty stage of the trial. Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Kimithi v. State, supra.
Further, in Angelle v. State, 571 S.W.2d 301, 303 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), it was made clear that the burden is on the defendant to show that he objected and that the trial judge “relied on or even considered” improper evidence in determining punishment. The appellant here did not sustain his burden.
As earlier noted, the appellant did not object at the penalty stage of the trial to any consideration of the document seen the day before in the judge’s chambers by defense counsel. In his motion for new trial, appellant alleged in Paragraph VIII:
“It is believed that prior to the punishment hearing, the court was furnished with ex parte materials, and discussions relative thereto, which are considered to be highly prejudicial to the Defendant, and which sole purpose would be to inflame the mind of the trial judge to such a degree that an impartial punishment hearing would be impossible.”
At the hearing on the new trial motion, the appellant at no time objected or contended he was denied the right to confrontation or denied a public trial. He raises these contentions for the first time on appeal.
Where the objection made in the trial court by the defendant is not the same as that urged on appeal, he has not properly preserved the complaint for review. Hodge v. State, 631 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Nelson v. State, 607 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Ex parte Scarbrough, 604 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Reger v. State, 598 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); McIlveen v. State, 559 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Bouchillon v. State, 540 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).
The complaints appellant presented in his ground of error were not preserved for review.
It is also observed that after examining the sealed document (appellant’s Exhibit A) the Court of Appeals wrote:
“The document, which appears to be a compilation of information about the Bandido Motorcycle Club, gives names and other information regarding some of the officers of the club. It purports to record names of members in prison, under indictment, those convicted of felonies, and some of those being sought by law enforcement officers. Appellant’s name is in Exhibit A. The document has both specific and general information; and it can be characterized as a document most unfavorable to the Bandidos .... ”
An examination of the document shows that appellant’s name appears on only one page.5
It is undisputed from the evidence properly before the trial court that the appellant was a member of the Bandido Motorcycle Club, was a national officer, that a Bandido sergeant at arms like appellant was an enforcer, etc. Appellant admitted in his testimony he had been a member of the Bandi-dos.
In Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313,326 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), this court wrote:
“The improper admission of evidence does not constitute reversible error if the same facts were shown by facts to which no objection was addressed. Watson v. State, 532 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Hayles v. State, 507 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).” See also Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Boles v. State, 598 S.W.2d 274, 279 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Wood v. State, 511 S.W.2d 37 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).
*807It is noted that the pre-sentence report is not in the record, so we are unable to determine how much of the same information contained in the document was reflected in said report as well. The pre-sen-tence report was before the court without objection,6 and it had apparently been seen by appellant’s counsel.
Further, the reputation of the Bandido Motorcycle Club is common knowledge to most law enforcement personnel and the trial judges trying criminal cases. One needs only to read the opinions of this court over the last few years to be aware of that reputation.7
Surely it cannot be said that a trial judge must put aside his common knowledge in deciding on the punishment to be assessed a criminal defendant.
The facts do not show that the trial judge accepted the document into evidence or that he considered or otherwise utilized the document. The record does not show he even read the document. If it was before the court, it is presumed that the court disregarded any inadmissible evidence, and the appellant did not sustain his burden to show the court considered or relied upon improper evidence. There was no objection to the document at the penalty stage of the trial, and the eomplaint in the motion for new trial does not comport with the complaint on appeal. Thus no review is preserved. Further, an examination of the document shows that some of the information contained therein was shown by other facts properly in evidence. Still further, the reputation of the Bandidos is common knowledge. If it can be said to be any error at all, the error is harmless error, or at least not reversible error. The appellant was not denied the right to confrontation and cross-examination or denied a public trial to any extent as found by the Court of Appeals.
The majority of this court now states it “cannot find a violation of due process that taints the assessment of punishment by the trial court, such that a new punishment hearing conducted by another judge is required.8 I fully agree, but the Court of Appeals did not base its decision on a violation of due process. The majority, however, does not discuss the basis of the appellate opinion below in vacating the sentence.
The majority also expressly declines to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals with respect to the conduct of the prosecut*808ing attorney and further states: “Nor are we disposed to reject its findings that ex parte acceptance of the D.P.S. compilation by the trial judge is conduct that ‘cannot be tolerated’ in the criminal justice system. ...”
While the action of the prosecutor in furnishing the document is not to be commended, I find difficulty, in light of the facts, in condemning the trial judge without more. The facts of the “furnishing” are not clearly developed. Though the document was seen in the judge’s chambers by defense counsel, the record is silent as to whether he read the same, and he expressly stated the evidence upon which the assessed punishment was based.9 It did not include the document. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority today clarifies what it meant by “acceptance” nor points to facts, constituting the same. While every trial judge must exercise extreme caution to prevent attorneys for either party or others to ex parte show him evidence, documents, etc., relating to a case pending before him, I find no violation of State Bar of Texas, Rules and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon No. 3A(4),10 under the record before this court. Those of us in the armchairs of the ivory towers of appellate courts should not shoot from the hip. Only when standing, after careful consideration of an adequate record, and with adequate cause, should we fire bullets of condemnation at those at the front of our criminal justice system. I dissent to the majority’s refusal to reject the finding of judicial misconduct by the Court of Appeals.
I concur in the result reached by the majority reversing that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals vacating the sentence and remanding the cause for reassessment of punishment before a different judge. I also agree the judgment of the trial court shall be in all things affirmed. I dissent to parts of the majority’s opinion, for the reasons above enumerated.
W.C. DAVIS, J., joins in this opinion.

. The State complained that the ground of error was multifarious and not in compliance with Article 40.09, § 9, V.A.C.C.P., and that nothing was presented for review. Williams v. State, 605 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Madrid v. State, 595 S.W.2d 106 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), cert. den. 449 U.S. 848, 101 S.Ct. 134, 66 L.Ed.2d 58; Ely v. State, 582 S.W.2d 416 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. It appears the court heard the motion to reduce “sentence” or the punishment assessed at the same time.

. One of appellant’s attorneys, who had represented a number of Bandidos in criminal cases, testified the booklet did not look like anything he had seen before.

.The trial judge was not called as a witness. See and cf. Article 38.13, V.A.C.C.P.

. Under a list of known members of the Bandi-dos to be convicted felons is found appellant’s name on page 14 as follows:
“Charles Edward Tanninen, aka ‘Chi-Lite’, w/m, date 3-23-44, DPS # 2,005,983, Texas DL # 0832 8743.”
The fact that appellant had a prior felony conviction, was known as Chi Lite, his age, etc., were in evidence from other sources.

.It has been said that the primary purpose of a presentence report is to provide the court with information upon which to base a rational decision on the motion for probation. Rodriguez v. State, 502 S.W.2d 13 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). See also Bean v. State, 563 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. Cr.App.1978) (concurring opinion); Nunez v. State, 565 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (concurring opinion). Nevertheless, it became quite common for the court to order a pre-sen-tence report even where the issue of probation was not involved and the same was utilized without objection. See Mason v. State, 604 S.W.2d 83 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The practice has now been legitimatized by Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 2466, ch. 639, effective September 1, 1981. See now Article 37.07, § 3(d), V.A.C. C.P.
It should be remembered that these reports often contain reports of arrests not resulting in final convictions. McNeese v. State, 468 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Valdez v. State, 491 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), reports of pending indictments, Clay v. State, 518 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and hearsay statements, Brown v. State, 478 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). It would appear that these matters may now be properly considered by the court using the pre-sentence report to determine punishment as well as the issue of probation.
In Lee v. State, 505 S.W.2d 816 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974), it was held the trial court is not required to disregard a hearsay statement in a pre-sen-tence report and the use of such statement does not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation and cross-examination.

. The Court of Appeals characterized the document in question as being unfavorable to the Bandidos. If there has ever been a favorable report, this writer is certainly unaware of any such report that has surfaced.

. The trial judge was not disqualified even if a remand for reassessment of punishment was necessary. Frequently where a trial judge has improperly admitted and considered a void pri- or conviction in assessing punishment the cause is remanded for reassessment of punishment without regard to the void conviction. The same judge is not disqualified from performing this task. See Bullard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), and cases there cited.

. While at the penalty stage the trial judge stated he was basing the punishment upon the testimony of the prosecutrix and her companion, he later stated into the record that he was also considering the prior Alabama robbery conviction alleged for enhancement of punishment to which the appellant entered a plea of “true.”

. Said Canon reads:
“A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other private communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding.”