Court Opinion

ID: 9902393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 04:00:51.372148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:49.862907
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY
    and HEALTHY GULF,

                 Plaintiffs,

          v.                                                  Civil Action No. 22-1877 (RDM)

    U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, et
    al.,

                  Defendants.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

         The Center for Biological Diversity and Healthy Gulf (“Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against

the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)

and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Dkt. 1 (Compl.); Dkt. 11 (Am. Compl.).

Plaintiffs allege that the Service’s decision to list the eastern black rail (the “rail”), an elusive

small bird subspecies, as threatened instead of as endangered, and the Service’s related

determination that the designation of critical habitat for the rail was “not prudent,” violated both

the ESA and the APA. Dkt. 11 at 23–27 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116–46). Pending before the Court is

the Service’s motion for a partial voluntary remand without vacatur to permit the agency to

reconsider its listing decision and to further explain that decision. Dkt. 21. For the following

reasons, the Court will GRANT the Service’s motion. 1

         An agency may seek voluntary remand in a case challenging its administrative action

only if the agency “intends to take further action with respect to” the challenged action. Limnia,

1
  Plaintiffs “concur that the remand should be without vacatur to allow the threatened listing to
remain in place.” Dkt. 23 at 26.
Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 857 F.3d 379, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Once that “threshold

requirement is satisfied, a court has ‘broad discretion to grant or deny an agency’s motion to

remand.’” Am. Waterways Operators v. Wheeler, 427 F. Supp. 3d 95, 97 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting

Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 901 F.3d 414, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2018)). In exercising that

discretion, the reviewing court must “consider whether remand would unduly prejudice the non-

moving party” and whether the agency’s “request appears to be frivolous or made in bad faith.”

Id. at 98 (quoting Util. Solid Waste, 901 F.3d at 436).

       Here, the Service seeks remand “to reconsider its [listing] decision and to provide

additional explanation for the decision reached.” Dkt. 25 at 7. The agency’s asserted intent to

revisit the challenged decision meets the threshold requirement for granting voluntary remand.

Moreover, as explained below, the Service’s motion is neither frivolous nor made in bad faith

and granting the motion will not unduly prejudice Plaintiffs. For these reasons and given the

inherent authority of agencies to reconsider their decisions, the Court concludes that the equities

weigh decidedly in favor of granting the Service’s motion.

       Plaintiffs argue that the Court should exercise its discretion to deny the Service’s motion

for two reasons: first, a remand will unduly prejudice them, Dkt. 23 at 15–19, and second, the

Service has failed to present a “substantial and legitimate” reason for seeking remand, id. at 19–

24. With respect to their first contention, Plaintiffs argue that granting the Service’s motion will

prejudice them by “further delay[ing] an endangerment determination and exacerbat[ing] the risk

of extinction.” Dkt. 23 at 15. But Plaintiffs are, in no scenario, guaranteed an endangerment

listing determination. This Court lacks the authority to step into the shoes of the Service and to

make its own listing determination; were the parties to litigate this case now, and were Plaintiffs

to prevail, the proper remedy would almost certainly still require a remand to the agency for

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further consideration of the listing determination. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 657 (2007). Indeed, that is the relief that Plaintiffs themselves

seek in their amended complaint. Dkt. 11 at 27–28 (Am. Compl. ¶ G). Thus, even if Plaintiffs

are successful, relief from the Court would lead to the same result that Plaintiffs now oppose:

remand of the listing decision to the Service for further consideration.

       To be sure, remand following a decision on summary judgment would presumably come

with the Court’s analysis of the relevant legal issues, which might, in turn, affect the Service’s

analysis on remand. But Plaintiffs’ (implicit) reliance on the potential benefit of a judicial

decision before the matter is remanded stands traditional principles of administrative law on their

head. Ideally, agencies render decisions based on a complete record and their best view of the

law and facts, and courts review those fully considered and final decisions; it is not the Court’s

role to guide the agency in the decision-making process but, rather, to ensure that the agency’s

decision, once made, is lawful. Absent evidence that an agency is skirting a statutory or

regulatory timeline or is engaged in intentional delay, providing the agency with time to reach a

fully considered decision, and, if necessary, to reconsider a decision that it has come to doubt,

does not constitute prejudicial delay—it is how the system is supposed to work.

       But even putting that normal order of things aside, it is far from clear that a decision at

the summary judgment stage would, in fact, expedite final resolution of the listing determination

in the manner that Plaintiffs posit; even with the benefit of a judicial decision to guide the agency

on remand, it is likely that the Service would retain substantial discretion in deciding whether

and how to list the eastern black rail. And, as the Service points out, if Plaintiffs are satisfied

with the Service’s revised listing decision on voluntary remand, they might obtain the relief that

they seek—the listing of the rail as endangered—more expeditiously than they would following

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summary judgment briefing, a judicial decision on the merits, and a court-ordered remand.

Although the Service (understandably) has not committed itself to any specific disposition on

remand, it has indicated that it is open to reaching the disposition that Plaintiffs seek. See, e.g.,

Dkt. 25 at 19. Thus, although it is possible that a voluntary remand might delay the final

resolution of the parties’ dispute, it is equally possible (and, if anything, more likely) that

providing the Service with the opportunity to reconsider its listing decision now will expedite

that ultimate resolution. The Court, accordingly, is unpersuaded that Plaintiffs will suffer undue

prejudice from the voluntary remand.

       Plaintiffs next argue that the Court should deny the Service’s motion because the Service

has failed to present “any reason to support reconsideration.” Dkt. 23 at 19 (typeface altered).

On Plaintiffs’ telling, the agency “must . . . provide a substantial and legitimate reason as to why

it has decided to reconsider its previous determination so the Court can determine whether the

request is frivolous or made in bad faith.” Id. (emphasis in original). Elsewhere, Plaintiffs argue

that the “Service presents no reasons for remand.” Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). As explained

above, however, the Service has presented two reasons for seeking voluntary remand—it wants

to reconsider the challenged listing decision, and it wants to provide additional explanation.

Plaintiffs, for their part, identify no legal requirement that an agency explain why it wishes to

reconsider a challenged decision, much less that it offer a “substantial” reason for doing so. The

cases make clear, moreover, that an agency need not “confess error or impropriety in order to

obtain a voluntary remand”—it can be enough “to profess intention to reconsider.” Limnia, 857

F.3d at 387; see Util. Solid Waste, 901 F.3d at 436 (“[E]ven if there are no intervening events,

the agency may request a remand (without confessing error) in order to reconsider its previous

position.” (quoting SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); Am.

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Waterways, 727 F. Supp. 3d at 98–99 (“An agency’s professed intent to revisit the challenged

decision is a necessary condition to obtain remand, but it is not always a sufficient condition.”

(internal citation omitted)).

        As the Court sees it, any inquiry into why an agency wants to reconsider a decision is

simply part and parcel of evaluating whether an agency’s request is frivolous or made in bad

faith. See Organic Trade Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Argic., 2022 WL 951335, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 30,

2022) (“[I]f the agency appropriately demonstrates its intent to revisit the challenged decision, a

court may consider whether the request for remand is ‘substantial and legitimate,’ or

alternatively, ‘if the agency’s request appears to be frivolous or made in bad faith.’” (internal

citations omitted)). Here, the Service might have more fully explained why it believes that

reconsideration is warranted, but that omission is not dispositive for at least two reasons. First,

the very nature of the determination at issue is one that turns on ever-evolving scientific evidence

and analysis, and Plaintiffs themselves maintain that the Service’s analysis requires correction.

It is thus unsurprising that the Service wants to reconsider its listing determination. Second,

Plaintiffs point to no evidence that the Service’s request is premised on anything other than the

relevant facts and law. The Court, therefore, assumes, as it must, that the agency is acting in

good faith. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 526 F.3d 763, 769 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

        The Court will, accordingly, grant the Service’s motion for voluntary remand and will

allow the agency to reconsider and to better explain its listing determination.

                                             *    *   *

        That leaves the question whether the Court should adopt the Service’s suggested remand

schedule of sending a proposed rule to the Federal Register by July 15, 2026. Dkt. 21 at 24.

Although a close question, the Court will adopt that schedule in light of the Service’s

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representation that it needs to “strike a reasonable balance between the additional resources that

must be expended on the eastern black rail determination and actions for other species that have

no protection under the ESA.” Dkt. 25 at 21. That said, the Court is concerned about how much

time the Service has requested, particularly given Plaintiffs’ contention that the eastern black rail

faces existential risks that, at present, are not sufficiently redressed by its threatened species

listing or by other federal and state laws. As Plaintiffs’ request, the Court will therefore retain

jurisdiction over this matter during the remand and will require the Service to file status reports

every three months. The Court notes that it has reviewed the Service’s current list of priorities.

If any of those priorities are removed or postponed or if the Service’s capacity to make listing

determinations expands for any reason, the Service should inform the Court in its next status

report and should, to the extent possible, propose measures to expedite this matter. Similarly,

Plaintiffs should bring to the Court’s attention any changed circumstances that permit or require

greater expedition.

                                          CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the Service’s motion for partial voluntary remand without

vacatur, Dkt. 21, is hereby GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that: (1) the Service shall

submit a status report every three months beginning on or before March 1, 2024, updating the

Court as to its progress on the reconsideration of the eastern black rail listing decision and, as

described above, apprising the Court whenever the Service’s current priorities or capacity

changes and proposing corresponding next steps for expediting this matter; and (2) the parties

shall submit a joint status report on or before December 15, 2023, advising the Court how they

propose proceeding with respect to the first and second claims set forth in Plaintiffs’ amended

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complaint, Dkt. 11 at 23–24 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 116–25), concerning the Service’s “not prudent”

critical habitat determination, which is not subject to the voluntary remand.

       SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                     RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                     United States District Judge

Date: November 26, 2023

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