Court Opinion

ID: 9681557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:35.30509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.428923
License: Public Domain

CRAMER, Justice
(concurring).
On rehearing appellant asserts that we erred in construing Art. 6687b, § 22(a), V.A.C.S., in that under the Act the judge would be acting in his judicial capacity in performance of the duties imposed on him under the Act, and not in an administrative capacity only.
I am of the opinion on rehearing, as held in Prince v. Garrison, Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W.2d 241, that the statute properly interpreted, contemplates that an affirmative finding of fact should be made by the judge of the corporation (police) court; such finding however would not be a judgment revoking a license, but only an administrative act, to wit, a finding of fact to be certified to the Department of Public Safety; that such Department may as an administrative body take such action with reference to the revoking of appellee’s license as it deems appropriate under the rules governing such matters; and that as held in the Prince case, supra, the judge in making the original findings of fact, acts as an administrative officer, and not as a court.
I am. further of the opinion that the record shows the 'pleadings 0f 'appellee make a question of fact for the trier of the facts upon the formal trial of all controverted issues on the merits — a question of whether or not the findings of fact necessary to the validity of the action taken by the director of Public Safety, in suspending appellee’s license, were made by the judge of the corporation (police) court, or by a licensed examiner employee of the Department of Public Safety. The petition in this case alleges it was before a licensed examiner, and if such allegation is true, Art. 6687b, § 22 has not been complied with and the action ■ by the Director was not based on a necessary prerequisite, to wit, that the findings were made by the administrative official named in the statute, namely, the judge of the corporation (police) court.
Under such conclusion we should grant the motion for rehearing and on such rehearing reverse 'the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial on the fact issues raised by the pleadings, to wit, whether the matter was heard by the judge of the corporation (police) court or by a licensed examiner employee of the Department of Public Safety, together with such other controverted fact issues as may develop from the evidence on such retrial of the cause.
Chief Justice Dixon and I now agree on the disposition of this cause. Therefore I concur in sustaining the motion for rehearing, reversing the judgment of the trial court, and remanding the cause for a ■new trial.