Court Opinion

ID: 9364646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 21:00:31.374261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.531759
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4081

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ANTONIO BLAKE SPENCER,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:19-cr-00092-FL-1)

        Submitted: December 30, 2022                                      Decided: January 18, 2023

        Before DIAZ and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan Dubois, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
        North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A.
        Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, David G. Beraka, Assistant United States
        Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina,
        for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Antonio Blake Spencer appeals the 99-month sentence and three-year term of

        supervised release imposed following his guilty plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement,

        to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),

        924(a)(2).   On appeal, Spencer argues that the district court erred by inadequately

        explaining its rationale for imposing two discretionary supervised release conditions. The

        Government has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as barred by Spencer’s waiver of the

        right to appeal included in the plea agreement. We grant the Government’s motion to

        dismiss. *

               “When the government seeks to enforce an appeal waiver and has not breached the

        plea agreement, we will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We review the validity of an appellate waiver

        de novo.” United States v. Soloff, 993 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2021). “A waiver is valid if

               *
                 In Spencer’s response to the Government’s motion to dismiss, he posits for the
        first time that the district court did not orally pronounce at sentencing these two
        discretionary conditions of supervised release, in violation of United States v. Rogers, 961
        F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020). In its reply, the Government correctly notes that Spencer did not
        raise his Rogers argument in his opening brief. Typically, “contentions not raised in the
        argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.” Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714
        F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Bartko, 728 F.3d 327,
        335 (4th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that issue not raised in opening brief is waived). Although
        on rare occasion, we may choose to “overlook” this rule if “a miscarriage of justice would
        otherwise result,” Suarez-Valenzuela, 714 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted),
        we conclude that such circumstances are not present here and decline to consider Spencer’s
        claim of Rogers error.

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        the defendant knowingly and intelligently agreed to waive the right to appeal.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “When a district court questions a defendant during a [Fed. R.

        Crim. P.] 11 hearing regarding an appeal waiver and the record shows that the defendant

        understood the import of his concessions, we generally will hold that the waiver is valid.”

        Boutcher, 998 F.3d at 608.

               Spencer does not assert on appeal that the appellate waiver was not knowing or

        intelligent or that his agreement to the waiver was in any way involuntary. Our review of

        the plea hearing transcript confirms that Spencer was competent to plead guilty and that he

        understood the terms of the plea agreement, including the appellate waiver. Therefore, the

        waiver is valid and enforceable. Moreover, Spencer’s challenge to the district court’s

        explanation for imposing certain supervised release conditions falls within the waiver’s

        scope. See United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021) (recognizing that

        claim “that the district court erred in the process by which it sentenced [a defendant] to the

        financial conditions on his supervised release . . . would be covered by the appeal waiver”).

               Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        DISMISSED

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