Court Opinion

ID: 9533790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:39.301373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:10.514983
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
We have held that the record must contain an adequate basis to support a determination by the court that the defendant understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Wright v. People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo.1984). However, the concern of this court on review must be with realities, and not with semantics or ritual. People v. Canino, 181 Colo. 207, 508 P.2d 1273 (1973). In my view, the record in this case demonstrates that the plea of guilty was entered by the defendant voluntarily and with an understanding of the essential elements of the charge.
The guilty plea in this case was entered pursuant to a plea agreement, and was followed by the dismissal of several charges against the defendant. Although the district court did not read the information to the defendant at the providency hearing, it is significant that the defendant was represented by counsel at the hearing. Counsel discussed the charges and the plea agreement with the defendant before the plea was entered. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2258, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526 P.2d 144, 145 (1974).
The pre-sentence report prepared by the probation department provides a factual basis for the guilty plea, Canino, 181 Colo. at 212, 508 P.2d at 1275, and, in my view, is sufficient to demonstrate the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. The defendant’s admission in the report that he attempted to sell several radios which he had removed from an automobile that did not belong to him, while not directly relating to his state of mind, establishes the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the specific intent element required for breaking and entering of an automobile. See C.R.S.1963, §§ 40-5-10(1) & 40-5-2(1); see e.g., People v. Hodges, 624 P.2d 1308 (Colo.1981) (specific intent may be inferred from surrounding circumstances).
The fact that the pre-sentence report was prepared after the defendant’s plea was accepted is, in my view, of no consequence. There is no reason to believe that the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge was any different or less complete between the time he entered his plea and the time he provided his statement to the probation department. I therefore perceive no principled basis for holding that the defendant’s admissions in the report are not relevant to the determination of the defendant’s understanding of the offense at the time of the providency hearing.
I would conclude that the guilty plea entered by the defendant at the providency hearing in 1965 was valid, and that the district court properly denied the Crim.P. 35 motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.
I am authorized to say that ROVIRA, J., joins me in this dissent.