Court Opinion

ID: 9865424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 17:08:45.100888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:22.720247
License: Public Domain

J-S25006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MORRIS C. BUEALE                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1642 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0005828-2019

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2023

       Appellant Morris C. Bueale appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed after a jury convicted him of rape, involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse (IDSI), and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).1 Appellant

challenges the weight of the evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and

the trial court’s jury instructions. Appellant also argues that his trial counsel

was ineffective. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case

as follows:

       [O]n December 4, 2018, [Appellant] hired a sex worker, [A.M.
       (the victim)], to come to his home sometime around 4:00-5:00
       a.m. [The victim] asked for advance payment, and [Appellant]
       attempted to pay her with counterfeit money. When she rejected
       the bills, he carried her downstairs and raped her at knifepoint,
       orally, vaginally, and anally. Afterwards, [Appellant] kept her
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), and 907(a), respectively.
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       phone and threatened to kill her and her family if she went to the
       police. [The victim] immediately flagged down a passerby who
       called the police. [The victim] was taken to the Special Victims
       Unit where she was interviewed and administered a rape kit.
       [Appellant] was arrested on or about December 19, 2018.

       [Appellant] filed several pre-trial motions. Relevant to this appeal
       was an April 13, 2021 motion to pierce the Rape Shield Law[2] and
       introduce evidence of [the victim’s] past sexual conduct. On May
       14, 2021, the Honorable Charles A. Ehrlich denied the motion.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/26/23, at 1 (citations omitted).

       The Honorable Shanese I. Johnson presided at Appellant’s jury trial,

which lasted from September 30, 2021 to October 5, 2021. Laura A. Wimmer,

Esq. (trial counsel) represented Appellant at trial.       During the trial, the

Commonwealth played portions of the video recording of Appellant’s police

interview. N.T. Trial, 10/1/21, at 4-5. After the video ended, the assistant

district attorney explained that she had accidentally played a portion of

Appellant’s interview that was supposed to be redacted pursuant to the Rape

Shield Law. Id. at 6-7. Specifically, Appellant’s trial counsel clarified that the

Commonwealth had played the following statement by Appellant: “well, [the

victim] told me that she got raped two days ago.” Id. at 7. Appellant argued

____________________________________________

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104. The Rape Shield Law provides, in relevant part,
“[e]vidence of specific instances of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct,
past sexual victimization, allegations of past sexual victimization, opinion
evidence of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence
of the alleged victim’s past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in
prosecutions” for rape. 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a); see also Commonwealth v.
Rogers, 250 A.3d 1209, 1216 (Pa. 2021) (explaining that the Rape Shield
Law “prevents a sexual assault trial from degenerating into an attack upon
the victim’s reputation for chastity. It additionally removes obstacles to the
reporting of sex crimes” (citations omitted and formatting altered)).

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that the Commonwealth had pierced the Rape Shield Law and requested to

cross-examine the Commonwealth’s DNA expert about finding DNA from a

male other than Appellant when testing the victim’s rape kit. Id. The trial

court initially held its decision under advisement, but later ruled that the

Commonwealth’s error in playing a redacted portion of Appellant’s interview

did not pierce the Rape Shield Law. N.T. Trial, 10/4/21, at 3.

       On October 5, 2021, the trial court held a charging conference with

counsel. During that conference, the trial court denied Appellant’s request to

include Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions (Pa. SSJI

(Crim)) 3.21A (Failure to Call Potential Witness) and 3.21B (Failure to Produce

Document or Other Tangible Evidence at Trial) in the jury charge. N.T. Trial,

10/5/21, at 19, 23. The trial court granted the Commonwealth’s request to

include Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13B (Conviction Based on Victim’s Uncorroborated

Testimony in Sexual Offenses—General) in the jury instructions. Id. at 31.

The trial court then recited a list of instructions it intended to give in its jury

charge and Appellant did not object to this list. Id. at 35. After the trial court

finished charging the jury, Appellant objected to the instruction regarding a

witness’s prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 131-32.

       Ultimately, the jury found Appellant not guilty of strangulation,3 and

guilty of rape, IDSI, and PIC. On May 20, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate term of nine to eighteen years’ incarceration.
____________________________________________

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1).

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Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of his

sentence. On June 17, 2022, the trial court granted Appellant’s post-sentence

motion and re-sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of eight to sixteen

years’ incarceration.      Appellant did not file any additional post-sentence

motions, but he filed a timely notice of appeal.4     Appellant served a Rule

1925(b) statement on the trial court,5 and the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing Appellant’s issues.

       On appeal Appellant raises the following issues, which we reorder as

follows:

       1. Was the verdict against the weight of the evidence during the
          trial?

____________________________________________

4 Shaka M. Johnson, Esq. represented Appellant at sentencing and at re-
sentencing. John W. McDanel, Esq. represents Appellant on appeal.

5 On August 1, 2022, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) directing the Commonwealth, the appellee in this matter, to file a
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. See Trial Ct. Order,
8/1/22. Where the trial court has not directed the appellant to file a Rule
1925(b) statement, “[t]he requirements of Rule 1925(b) are not invoked . . .
.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 745 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted). Nevertheless, Appellant voluntarily served a Rule 1925(b)
statement on the trial court and on the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at Ex. A (Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement). However, Appellant’s
Rule 1925(b) statement does not appear in the certified record. Although it
appears that Appellant never filed his statement with the trial court, we
decline to find waiver on this basis because the trial court’s August 1, 2022
order did not apply to him. See Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 745 n.7; see also
Commonwealth Powell, 228 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2020) (declining to find
waiver where the Commonwealth did not file a Rule 1925(b) statement
because of the trial court’s order did not comply with Rule 1925(b)).

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       2. Did the trial court commit an error of law in failing to allow the
          entire video tape of Appellant’s investigative interview to be
          viewed by the jury and did the trial court commit an error of
          law in [its] charge to the jury?

       3. Was Appellant’s trial counsel ineffective for failing to call the
          nurse exam[in]er to testify regarding the condition of the
          victim and for failing to have [] Appellant testify at trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 5 (formatting altered).6

                              Weight of the Evidence

       Appellant argues that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence

because the victim’s testimony was inconsistent and the evidence did not

contradict Appellant’s defense that the sexual relations between Appellant and

the victim were consensual. Id. at 11.

       The Commonwealth responds that Appellant waived this claim because

he did not raise it before the trial court. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8 (citing

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)).

____________________________________________

6 We note that although Appellant presents three questions in his statement

of questions involved, he has actually raised six questions on appeal. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (providing that “[t]he statement of the questions involved
must state concisely the issues to be resolved, expressed in the terms and
circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail”). Further, the
argument section of Appellant’s brief is not divided into separate sections for
each question. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating “[t]he argument shall be
divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have
at the head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein”). Lastly,
Appellant did not attach a copy of his Rule 1925(b) statement to his brief.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11). We do not condone Appellant’s failures to comply
with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, but because they do not impede our
review, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Melvin, 548 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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      Before we address the merits of Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence

claim, we must determine whether he has preserved it for appeal. “[T]he

applicability of waiver principles . . . is a question of law, over which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018) (citations

omitted).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 provides that a challenge

to the weight of the evidence must be raised in a motion for a new trial that

is presented orally, on the record, before sentencing, by written motion before

sentencing, or in a post-sentence motion.       Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A); see also

Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004). The

failure to properly preserve a weight-of-the-evidence claim will result in

waiver, even if the trial court addresses the issue in its opinion.

Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 494 (Pa. 2009).

      Instantly, the record reflects that Appellant did not raise his weight-of-

the-evidence claim prior to or at sentencing, nor did he include it in his post-

sentence motion. Therefore, Appellant has waived his challenge to the weight

of the evidence and no relief is due.        See Gillard, 850 A.2d at 1277;

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A).

                       Appellant’s Recorded Interview

      In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying

his request to play the entire recording of Appellant’s interview with the police.

Appellant’s Brief at 13-15.    Specifically, Appellant contends that after the

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Commonwealth inadvertently played a portion of Appellant’s interview that

was supposed to be excluded pursuant to the Rape Shield Law, the entire

interview should have been played because the omission of that statement’s

context prejudiced Appellant. Id. at 13-14. Appellant concludes that this

error was not harmless because the uncontradicted evidence of guilt was not

overwhelming. Id. at 14-15.

      The Commonwealth responds that Appellant has waived this claim

because he did not request that the trial court play the entire video of his

interview with the police. Commonwealth’s Brief at 14-16.

      Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claim regarding the Rape

Shield Law, we first consider whether he has properly preserved this claim for

appeal. In order to preserve a claim of error for appellate review, a defendant

must make a specific objection before the trial court in a timely fashion and

at the appropriate stage of the proceedings. Commonwealth v. Russell,

209 A.3d 419, 429 (Pa. Super. 2019).        A defendant’s failure to raise an

objection regarding an evidentiary issue results in waiver.     Id.; see also

Pa.R.E. 103(a) (providing that a party may only claim error regarding the

admission or exclusion of evidence if he or she makes a timely objection);

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised before the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”).

      Our review of the record indicates that Appellant never requested the

trial court to order the Commonwealth to play the entirety of his recorded

interview after the Commonwealth inadvertently played a redacted portion of

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that interview. The only request Appellant made at that time was to cross-

examine the Commonwealth’s DNA expert about DNA test results that had

been excluded by the trial court under the Rape Shield Law. See N.T. Trial,

10/1/21, at 7. Because Appellant did not request the trial court to order the

Commonwealth to play the entire video during the trial, he has failed to

preserve this issue for appeal, therefore it is waived and no relief is due. See

Russell, 209 A.3d at 429; Pa.R.E. 103(a); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

                              Jury Instructions

      In his third and fourth issues, Appellant argues that the trial court erred

by denying his request to include two proposed instructions in its jury charge

and by including a third instruction that was opposed by Appellant. Appellant’s

Brief at 15-19. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred by

omitting Pa. SSJI (Crim) 3.21A and 3.21B from its jury charge and by including

Pa. SSJI (Crim) 4.13B in the jury instructions. Id. at 16-19.

      The Commonwealth responds that Appellant waived these claims

because he did not object after the trial court completed its jury instructions.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-18 n.4.

      Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims regarding the jury

instructions, we must determine if he has preserved them for appeal. It is

well-established that “[a] specific and timely objection must be made to

preserve a challenge to a particular jury instruction. Failure to do so results

in waiver.” Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220,

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225 (Pa. 2005) (holding that “the mere submission and subsequent denial of

proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or omitted from the

instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve an issue, absent a

specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial court’s ruling

respecting the points” (footnote omitted)).

      Here, the record reflects that Appellant did not raise his objection to the

jury instructions with the trial court that he now challenges on appeal before

this Court. Indeed, Appellant did not raise any objections at the jury charging

instructions conference nor after the trial court instructed the jury. See N.T.

Trial, 10/5/21, at 19, 23, 31, 35, 129-32. Therefore, Appellant has waived

his challenges to the jury instructions on appeal. See Pressley, 887 A.2d at

225; Olsen, 82 A.3d at 1050; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, no relief is due.

                      Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

      In his final two claims, Appellant argues that trial counsel was

ineffective.   Appellant’s Brief at 11-13. First, Appellant contends that trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to call Nurse Examiner Noah Brophy as a

witness.   Id. at 11-12.    Second, Appellant asserts that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to call Appellant as a witness.   Id. at 13.   Appellant

concludes that his ineffectiveness claims are clearly meritorious, and this

Court should address them. Id.

      Generally, a criminal defendant may not assert claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel on direct appeal. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79

A.3d 562, 577-80 (Pa. 2013).      Instead, such claims are to be deferred to

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review pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).7 Id. However, our

Supreme Court has recognized three exceptions to the general rule.           In

Holmes, the Court held that a trial court has discretion to address

ineffectiveness claims on direct review in cases where (1) there are

extraordinary circumstances in which trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is

apparent from the record and “meritorious to the extent that immediate

consideration best serves the interests of justice;” or (2) “there is good cause

shown,” and the defendant knowingly and expressly waives his entitlement to

seek subsequent PCRA review of his conviction and sentence. Id. at 563-64.

More recently, our Supreme Court adopted a third exception, which requires

“trial courts to address claims challenging trial counsel’s performance where

the defendant is statutorily precluded from obtaining subsequent PCRA

review.” Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. 2018).8 Our

Supreme Court concluded that because the defendant in Delgros was

sentenced only to a fine, he was ineligible to seek relief under the PCRA. Id.

at 354-55 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543).

____________________________________________

7 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

8 We acknowledge that there is an additional circumstance in which a
defendant may raise an ineffectiveness claim outside of a PCRA petition. This
occurs where a defendant alleges PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness in connection
with a first PCRA petition. In that situation, the defendant may challenge
PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity, even if on appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021). However, in the
instant case, Appellant has not pursued PCRA relief and has not been
represented by PCRA counsel.          Therefore, Bradley is inapplicable to
Appellant’s case, which is on direct appeal. See id.

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      Here, the trial court concluded that Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims cannot be heard on direct appeal because they are not

apparent from the record and Appellant has not waived his right to file a PCRA

petition. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 8.

      Based our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s

conclusions. First, Appellant’s claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are not

apparent from the record nor meritorious to the extent that immediate

consideration of his claims best serves the interests of justice. See Holmes,

79 A.3d at 563. Second, there is no indication in the certified record that

Appellant has expressly waived his right to PCRA review.       See id. at 564.

Lastly, because the trial court imposed a sentence of eight to sixteen years of

imprisonment, Appellant is not statutorily barred from seeking PCRA relief.

See Delgros, 183 A.3d at 361; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (setting

forth eligibility for PCRA relief). Therefore, because we conclude that none of

the exceptions apply, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims cannot be considered

on direct appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss these claims without prejudice to

Appellant’s right to raise them in a timely petition under the PCRA.

                                  Conclusion

      For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to relief and we affirm

Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/25/2023

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