Court Opinion

ID: 9742557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:15:49.822893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:33.631643
License: Public Domain

Hallows, C. J.
(dissenting, in 'part). I think this case is a good example of why this court should apply *54the Powers rule 1 to the apportionment of negligence as it does to damages. This proposed application of the Powers rule was first advocated in Lawver v. Park Falls (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 308, 314, 151 N. W. 2d 68, in the concurring opinion, and I have reiterated it in Pruss v. Strube (1968), 37 Wis. 2d 539, 546, 155 N. W. 2d 650, and again in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 120, 139, 177 N. W. 2d 513 (dissenting opinion) and Bourassa v. Gateway Erectors, Inc. (1972), 54 Wis. 2d 176, 181, n. 1, 194 N. W. 2d 602. If this court is capable of determining in this case that the apportionment of causal negligence to the pedestrian, to the automobile driver, and to the owner of the premises was error and to decide that the pedestrian was at least as negligent as the owner of the racetrack, then this court is capable of determining the apportionment of causal negligence between the three parties with a proper option for a new trial in the event the apportionment is not accepted and should do so. A trial court apportions negligence in a trial to the court and I see no difference in the ability of the trial court to review and correct the apportionment of negligence by the jury. The apportionment of causal negligence is no more peculiarly the province of the jury than damages.
If this state is to keep its present form of comparative negligence (sec. 895.045, Stats.), then the rule should provide for the comparison of plaintiff’s causal negligence with the combined negligence of all the other persons who were causally negligent and not compared with each tort-feasor’s causal negligence separately. Under the present rule, if the plaintiff is 34 percent negligent and defendant A is 33 percent negligent and defendant B is 33 percent negligent, the plaintiff cannot *55recover against either A or B although his negligence is not as great as their combined negligence; this is unfair. The rule of comparing the causal negligence of the plaintiff with the causal negligence of each defendant separately originated by the construction of the statute in Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. (1934), 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. W. 721. In that case the court held that while the plaintiff’s negligence had to be a factor in the comparison of all the negligence contributing to the damages in a multi-tort-feasor case, the plaintiff’s recovery was based on a comparison of his negligence with the negligence of each tort-feasor separately. This doctrine was followed in Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co. (1961), 14 Wis. 2d 601, 609, 610, 111 N. W. 2d 495. In neither of these cases did the court consider sec. 990.001 (1), nor its predecessor section. This section relates to the rules for the construction of laws and provides the singular includes the plural and the plural includes the singular. I would overrule Walker and Schwenn and compare the negligence of the plaintiff with the combined negligence of all the other persons whose negligence is causal to determine whether the plaintiff can recover. This is the rule in Arkansas,2 Connecticut, Nevada, and Texas.3
*56In the dissenting opinion in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 120, 131, 177 N. W. 2d 513, it was suggested that this court should adopt the pure comparative negligence doctrine. Since that time, many states have adopted some form of comparative negligence either by statute or by court rule. See Annot. (1970), Negligence-Comparative-Contributory, 32 A. L. R. 3d 463; 15 Personal Injury Commentator 380-383.4 The present Wisconsin statute (sec. 895.045), amended by Laws of 1971, ch. 47, after the Vincent Case, provides the plaintiff can recover if his negligence is “not greater than” the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. There are six other states which have this formula of comparative negligence.5 Prior to 1971, *57Wisconsin’s comparative negligence statute provided the plaintiff could recover only if his negligence was “not as great as” the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought. See sec. 895.045, Stats. 1969. There are ten states which have adopted this formula.6 There *58are four states which have taken modified views of comparative negligence.7
By far the more logical and just rule of comparative negligence to supplant the harsh common-law doctrine of contributory negligence is the doctrine known as “pure comparative negligence.” Under this doctrine, every injured person recovers the amount of his damages reduced by the percentage of his causal negligence and every person causing damage to another is ultimately liable only for the percentage of negligence apportioned to him. It may be that under the rule applicable to joint tort-feasors, one tort-feasor is liable for the total damage to which a plaintiff is entitled and under the pure comparative negligence doctrine as under other comparative doctrines one defendant may initially pay more than his proportionate share; nevertheless, he should then have a right of contribution based on comparative negligence to recover the overpayment. See Bielski v. Schulze (1962), 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N. W. 2d 105. The pure comparative negligence doctrine has been adopted by five jurisdictions.8
*59It is true most states have adopted some form of comparative negligence by statute, but the state of Florida has recently adopted the pure form of comparative negligence by court rule,9 and New York has adopted by court rule the pure form of comparative negligence for the purpose of contribution,10 although New York has not expressly applied the doctrine to the primary plaintiff and defendant relationship.
If the Wisconsin legislature is bent upon adopting some form of no-fault liability, then as a part of that legislative plan it should adopt pure negligence for the gaps left by the no-fault plan. Certainly if it is good public policy for a plaintiff regardless of his fault to recover up to a limited amount of damages for certain injuries, it is just as logical, if not more so, that he recover for all his injuries to their full amount reduced by the percentage of his negligence which caused such injuries. I would suggest to the legislature that, in the absence of this court action, it adopt the pure form of comparative negligence for the area beyond which the no-fault provision of its plan does not grant relief. This is what Rhode Island has recently done in adopting a no-fault plan.11 But I believe this court has the power to adopt the doctrine of pure comparative negligence for all negligence cases and should do so; 12 if the legislature desires to go *60farther and change it to provide for recovery regardless of fault in some instances, it, of course, has such powér.

 Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1960), 10 Wis. 2d 78, 102 N. W. 2d 393.

 Comparative negligence in Arkansas is provided for by statute. Ark. Stat. Annot., sec. 27-1730.1 (Repl. 1962) provides that “Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery of damages for any injury, property damage or death where the negligence of the person injured or killed is of less degree than the negligence of any person, firm, or corporation causing such damage.” Sec. 27-1730.2 states the rule that “where such contributory negligence is shown on the part of the person injured, damaged or killed, the amount of the recovery shall be diminished in proportion to such contributory negligence.” The Arkansas Supreme Court has construed sec. 27 — 1730.1 to mean that a contributorily negligent plaintiff may recover if his negligence is less than that of all the defendants combined. Walton v. Tull (1962), 234 Ark. 882, *56891-894, 356 S. W. 2d 20; Riddell v. Little (Ark. 1972), 488 S. W. 2d 34, 36. In Walton, the court observed that the basic purpose of the statute “is to distribute the total damages among those who caused them ... We are not convinced that the legislature meant to go any farther than to deny a recovery to a plaintiff whose own negligence was at least 60 percent of the cause of his damage.” It should be noted that, in Walton, the Arkansas Supreme Court specifically rejected the reasoning of Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., supra, as unsatisfactory. The Arkansas court, notably, considered the Arkansas and Wisconsin statutes comparable.

 Conn. Public and Special Acts, Vol. XXXVI, Public Act No. 273, sec. 6 (a) (effective Jan. 1, 1973); Nevada Laws of 1973, ch. 787 (Senate Bill No. 624) (approved May 3, 1973); Texas Laws of 1973, ch. 28.

 See also: Ghiardi and Hogan, Comparative Negligence — The Wisconsin Rule and Procedure, 18 Defense Law Journal, No. 6 (October, 1969), reprinted by the Defense Research Institute Monograph Series.

 Connecticut — Public Act No. 273, sec. 6 (a) (effective Jan. 1, 1973). The Connecticut rule differs from sec. 896.046, Wis. Stats., as construed by Walker v. Kroger, supra, in that, by statute, Connecticut has declared that the negligence of the defendants should be combined in order to determine whether the plaintiff can recover.
New Hampshire — N. H. Rev. Stats. Annot. (1971), sec. 507:7-a.
*57Vermont — Vermont Stats. Annot. (1973), title 12, sec. 1036 (effective July 1, 1970).
New Jersey — Laws of 1973, ch. 146; N. J. S. A. 2A:15-5.1 to 2A: 16-5.3.
Nevada — Laws of 1973, ch. 787 (Senate Bill No. 524), amending ch. 41 of Nevada Revised Statutes (Approved May 3, 1973). The Nevada formula approximates the Connecticut formula. Nevada provides that “the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall not bar a recovery if the negligence of the person seeking recovery was not greater than the negligence or gross negligence of the person or persons against whom recovery is sought . . . the judge may, and when requested by any party shall instruct the jury that: (a) The plaintiff may not recover if his contributory negligence has contributed more to the injury than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of multiple defendants.”
Texas — Laws of 1973, ch. 28 (H. B. No. 88) (effective Sept. 1, 1973). The Texas formula is also patterned on the Connecticut approach. Texas provides that contributory negligence “shall not bar recovery ... if such negligence is not greater than the negligence of the person or party or persons or parties against whom recovery is sought . . . .”

 Arkansas — Ark. Stat. Annot., sec. 27-1730.1 (Repl. 1962). As noted previously in footnote 2, supra, the Arkansas formula provides that a plaintiff may recover if his negligence is less than the combined negligence of all defendants.
Colorado — Colo. Rev. Stats., sec. 41-2-14 (1963) (Cum. Supp. 1971) (effective July 1, 1971).
Idaho — Laws of 1971, ch. 186 (effective May 20, 1971), Idaho Code (Cum. Supp. 1973) sec. 6-801.
Hawaii — Laws of 1969, ch. 227, sec. 1, Hawaii Rev. Stats., sec. 663-31 (effective June 14, 1969).
Massachusetts — Mass. Annot. Laws, ch. 231, sec. 85 (effective January 1,1971).
Maine — Maine Rev. Stat. Annot., title 14, sec. 156 (effective October 1, 1969).
Minnesota — Minn. Stats. (1971), sec. 604.01 (1) (effective July 1, 1969).
*58Oregon — Ore. Rev. Stats. (1973), sec. 18.470 (effective Sept. 9, 1971).
North Dakota — Laws of North Dakota (1973), ch. 78, sec. 1, sec. 9-10-07, approved March 13, 1973.
Utah — Utah Code Annot. (1963), sec. 78-27-37 (1973 pocket part).

 Nebraska and South Dakota have adopted the “slight-gross” variation of comparative negligence (Neb. Rev. Stats. 1943), sec. 26-1151; South Dakota Compiled Laws (1967), sec. 20-9-2); Georgia has engrafted last clear chance onto a “not as great as” formulation of comparative negligence (Ga. Code Annot., secs. 94—703 and 105-603; Conaway v. McCrory Stores Corp. (1950), 82 Ga. App. 97, 60 S. E. 2d 631) and Tennessee has engrafted last clear chance onto a “remote contributory negligence” rule. Hansard v. Ferguson (1939), 23 Tenn. App. 306, 132 S. W. 2d 221.

 Puerto Rico — PR Laws Annot., title 81, sec. 5141.
Mississippi — Miss. Code Annot. (1972), title 11, sec. 11-7-15.
*59Rhode Island — R. I. Gen. Laws (1969), sec. 9-20-4.
Florida—Jones v. Hoffman (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), 272 So. 2d 529.
Washington—Wash. Leg. Serv., Laws of 1978, ch. 138 (Senate Bill No. 2045) (effective April 1, 1974), sec. 1.

 Jones v. Hoffman, supra, note 8.

 Dole v. Dow Chemical Co. (1972), 30 N. Y. 2d 143, 282 N. E. 2d 288; Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co. (1972), 31 N. Y. 2d 25, 286 N. E. 2d 241.

 R. I. Gen. Laws, sec. 9-20-4 (1969).

 No major legal obstacle prevents the courts from adopting a comparative negligence rule. See Prosser, Torts (3d ed.), p. 445; *60Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev. (1962), 463, 506, 509.