Court Opinion

ID: 9689960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:50:23.958684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:52.891545
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.

(concurring in part and dissenting in

part). While I agree with the majority’s finding that the 1983 Cadillac was a proper object for seizure and forfeiture, I cannot agree with the finding that the prosecutor failed to institute the forfeiture proceedings "promptly” as required by § 7523 of the controlled substances act.
This Court has upheld a delay of 2 Vi months between the time of seizure and the institution of forfeiture proceedings. People v One 1979 Honda Automobile, 139 Mich App 651; 362 NW2d 860 (1984). However, a 6Vi-month delay between seizure and institution of forfeiture proceedings was found excessive. Lenawee Prosecutor v One 1981 Buick Two-Door Riviera, 165 Mich App 762; 419 NW2d 458 (1988).
Here the time of delay was four months. The trial court weighed the Parish factors and considered dispositive the prosecutor’s reason for delay, to do research and investigation into whether forfeiture proceedings could be brought against additional property of the Woods. Dep’t of Natural Resources v Parish, 71 Mich App 745; 249 NW2d 163 (1976). A nonjury finding of fact should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. People v Vandergrift, 107 Mich App 555, 558; 309 NW2d 665 (1981). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when "although there is evidence to support it, the *284reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Tuttle v Dep’t of State Highways, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976).
I am not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
I would affirm.