Court Opinion

ID: 9882752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:31.835891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:55.232160
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Earth Mobile, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2023-Ohio-3354.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

EARTH MOBILE, INC.,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                  :
                                                                   No. 111851
                 v.                                    :

U.S. BANK, N.A.,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellee.                   :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 21, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-945693

                                            Appearances:

                 Abdul Ismaiyl and Abdul Muhaymin, pro se.

                 Taft, Stettinius & Hollister LLP, and Timothy C. Sullivan,
                 for appellee.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J.:

                   Appellants, Abdul Ismaiyl and Abdul Muhaymin (collectively

“appellants”), appeal from the trial court’s judgments dismissing this action for lack

of prosecution and denying their motions to intervene; for a continuance of trial, a
new trial, and findings of fact and conclusions of law; and to take judicial notice.

Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.

I.   Background

              In March 2021, Earth Mobile, Inc. (“Earth Mobile”) filed a complaint

against defendant-appellee, U.S. Bank, N.A. (the “Bank”), asserting claims for bad

faith, conversion, tortious interference with business relations, breach of contract,

and unjust enrichment. The claims were predicated upon Earth Mobile’s allegations

that the Bank inappropriately removed approximately $100,000 from Earth

Mobile’s two corporate checking accounts and then closed the accounts. The

complaint asked for an accounting of the funds removed from the accounts.

              The Bank answered the complaint and denied the allegations. The

trial court held several pretrials in which it set dates for discovery completion and

the filing of dispositive motions, and scheduled the final pretrial for June 9, 2022,

and trial for July 18, 2022. In March 2022, the trial court granted the motion of

Earth Mobile’s attorney to withdraw.

              The Bank then filed a motion for summary judgment in which it

argued there was no genuine issue of material fact because it had removed money

from Earth Mobile’s accounts when it returned to the Ohio Department of Job and

Family Services (“ODJFS”) 15 unemployment benefit payments totaling $62,589

made by the ODJFS to six different individuals — none of whom were an owner or

signer on Earth Mobile’s accounts — and deposited into Earth Mobile’s accounts.

The Bank averred that it paid the remaining funds in the accounts to Earth Mobile
and then closed the accounts. The Bank argued that the Deposit Account Agreement

between the Bank and Earth Mobile regarding Earth Mobile’s accounts specifically

authorized the Bank to reverse the unemployment benefit payments made to the

accounts, return the funds to the ODJFS, and close the accounts.

                Earth Mobile, represented by new counsel, filed a brief in opposition

to the Bank’s motion. The trial court denied the Bank’s motion, ruling that:

      The core issue in this case is the disposition of assets from an account
      of the plaintiff which were held at defendant’s Bank. During the height
      of the Covid-19 pandemic, plaintiff deposited or caused to be deposited
      a number of payments from ODJFS for unemployment benefits for
      various individuals associated with the plaintiff. None of the
      individuals were owners or signers on the account(s) to which the
      deposits were made. These deposits directly violate the agreement
      between the plaintiff and the Bank. Defendant Bank, through its
      representative, avers that these deposits were returned to ODJFS, and
      the remaining funds from the account — including Paycheck Protection
      Program (PPP) funds — were returned to the plaintiff. The total
      amount defendant alleges to have returned to the plaintiff is a sum of
      approximately $32,000. Defendant Bank provides no additional
      evidence to prove that these funds were returned. Plaintiff, through its
      representative, avers that these funds were never returned. Because
      there is a dispute of fact regarding the disposition of the remaining
      funds in the account, the court is unable to grant defendant’s motion
      for summary judgment. Trial remains as previously set.

                On June 8, 2022, Earth Mobile filed a motion for summary judgment;

on June 9, 2022, it filed an amended motion for summary judgment. Earth Mobile’s

counsel also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The trial court held the final

pretrial on June 9, as scheduled. In its journal entry regarding the final pretrial, the

court stated:

      06/09/22: Case called for final pretrial; all counsel and representative
      for plaintiff appeared.      Issues discussed, including attorney
       McCollough’s continuing representation of plaintiff. Amended motion
       for summary judgment, filed 06/09/22, is stricken. This motion was
       filed out of rule and without leave of court. The court refuses to
       entertain this motion at this late date. Motion for summary judgment,
       filed 06/08/22, is stricken. This motion was filed out of rule and
       without leave of court. Additionally, plaintiff filed a superseding
       motion. Trial date is maintained, no further continuances will be
       provided.

              On June 22, 2022, the Bank filed a motion in limine, asking the court

to prohibit any evidence or testimony at trial regarding the Bank’s return of funds to

ODJFS. On June 24, 2022, the trial court granted the motion of Earth Mobile’s

counsel to withdraw. The court’s journal entry stated:

       Motion to withdraw, filed 06/09/2022, is granted. A representative for
       plaintiff participated at the last pretrial and did not object to the
       withdrawal at that time. No further objection has been filed with the
       court. Plaintiff may not proceed without representation, as Ohio law
       requires corporate litigants to be represented by an attorney licensed
       in the state of Ohio. Trial date maintained.

              On July 11, 2022, one week before trial, appellants filed a motion to

intervene, contending they had individual fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment,

and bad faith claims to assert against the Bank. The Bank filed a brief in opposition,

arguing that appellants’ motion was untimely. On July 14, 2022, appellants filed an

amended motion to intervene and a motion pursuant to Civ.R. 6 for a continuance

of trial.

              On July 18, 2022, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice for

failure to prosecute. The court ruled:

       07/18/2022: Case called for trial. Counsel for defendant and
       defendant’s representative appeared. No counsel appeared on behalf
       of plaintiff. Putative intervening parties did not appear. Motion
       pursuant to Civ.R. 6 pro se filed 07/14/2022 is denied. Amended
      motion to intervene and be joined as co-plaintiffs, filed 07/14/2022, is
      denied. This case has been pending for almost sixteen months, and the
      putative plaintiffs did not attempt to become involved in the litigation
      until the eve of trial. Despite having two separate attorneys in this
      matter, neither sought to add any individual plaintiffs. Further, as the
      action between the parties is based on a contractual relationship
      between the plaintiff corporation and the defendant, the court finds no
      merit in allowing individual grievants to join in this litigation. Motion
      to intervene as co-plaintiffs, filed 07/11/2022, is moot. These litigants
      have filed a superseding motion. Defendant U.S. Bank’s motion in
      limine, filed 06/22/2022, is granted. Pursuant to Civ.R. 15(G), case is
      dismissed with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Final.

               Appellants then filed a “motion for new trial due to judgment being

contrary to law,” which the trial court denied. The court ruled that to the extent the

motion was filed on behalf of Earth Mobile, it was deemed stricken because non-

attorneys cannot represent a corporation. The court ruled that to the extent the

motion was filed on behalf of appellants seeking a new trial, “no trial was held so

there is no potential new trial for the court to consider.” To the extent the motion

asked the court to reconsider its ruling on the motion to intervene, the court stated

that it “stands by its rulings. The putative intervening parties had a minimum of 16

months’ notice of the filing of this case but took no action until it appeared — on the

eve of trial — that the plaintiff would have no counsel to go forward to trial.” The

court found that “the putative intervening parties have other options should they

believe they have just claims to be adjudicated by the court.”

               On August 15, 2022, appellants filed a motion for findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The next day, they filed their notice of appeal with this court.1

      1 One who is not a party to an action generally has no right of appeal.
                                                                        State ex rel.
Lipson v. Hunter, 2 Ohio St.2d 225, 208 N.E.2d 133 (1965). One who has attempted to
They then filed an amended motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law in the

trial court. The trial court dismissed the original motion for findings of fact and

conclusions of law and, because an appeal had been filed, found that it did not have

jurisdiction to rule on the amended motion. Appellants then filed a “motion for

mandatory judicial notice and hearing,” and the trial court again found that it lacked

jurisdiction to rule on the motion in light of appellants’ appeal.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Dismissal of the Complaint; Denial of Motion to Intervene

                 In their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial

court (1) erred in dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute; and (2)

abused its discretion in denying appellants’ motion to intervene as co-plaintiffs. We

find no error.

                 First, under App.R. 3(A) and 4(A)(1), Earth Mobile was required to

file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of the trial court’s judgment in

order to preserve its right to challenge the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint, as

well as any other rulings made by the trial court regarding Earth Mobile. The record,

however, reflects that the notice of appeal filed on August 16, 2022, was filed by the

“putative co-plaintiff intervenors who gives (sic) this Court notice of appeal to the

Cuyahoga County Eighth District Court of Appeals” and was signed by appellants.

The notice does not state that the appeal was filed by Earth Mobile, nor was the

intervene, however, has the requisite standing to appeal. Januzzi v. Hickman, 61 Ohio
St.3d 40, 45, 572 N.E.2d 642 (1991).
notice signed by any licensed attorney on behalf of Earth Mobile.2 “The failure to

timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain

the appeal.” State v. Hamberg, 2015-Ohio-5074, 53 N.E.3d 918, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.),

citing State ex rel. Curran v. Brookes, 142 Ohio St. 107, 50 N.E.2d 995 (1943),

paragraph seven of the syllabus. Accordingly, because Earth Mobile did not file a

timely notice of appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to consider any of the trial

court rulings regarding Earth Mobile, including the court’s dismissal of the case with

prejudice.

               With respect to appellants’ motion to intervene, we review the trial

court’s denial for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio Dept. of

Natural Resources, 130 Ohio St.3d 30, 2011-Ohio-4612, 955 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 41.

“‘Abuse of discretion’ is a term of art, describing a judgment neither comporting with

the record, nor reason.” Klayman v. Luck, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 97074 and

97075, 2012-Ohio-3354, ¶ 12, citing State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-677,

148 N.E. 362 (1925). “‘A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning

process that would support that decision.’” Klayman at id., quoting AAAA Ents. Inc.

v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment, 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553

N.E.2d 597 (1990).

      2 “A corporation cannot maintain litigation in propria persona, or appear in court

through an officer of the corporation or an appointed agent not admitted to the practice
of law.” Union Savs. Assn. v. Home Owners Aid, 23 Ohio St.2d 60, 262 N.E.2d 558
(1970), syllabus.
               Civ.R. 24 governs a party’s right to intervene in an action. Under

Civ.R. 24(A), “upon timely application,” anyone shall be permitted to intervene in

an action when (1) a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) the

applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject

matter of the action and the disposition of the action may impair or impede the

applicant’s ability to protect that interest.     Under Civ.R. 24(B), “upon timely

application,” a trial court may permit a party to intervene in an action when (1) a

statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) an applicant’s claim or defense

and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. Thus, Civ.R. 24

makes clear that the application to intervene, whether by right or permissively, must

be “timely.”

               The trial court denied the motion to intervene as untimely because it

was filed on the “eve of trial.” The trial court also found that because the action was

based wholly upon a contractual relationship between Earth Mobile — a corporation

— and the Bank, there was no merit to allowing appellants to intervene at such a late

stage of the litigation to assert individual claims.

               When reviewing an application to intervene, a trial court must first

determine whether the application is timely. State ex rel. EPA v. Washington Cty.

Bd. of Comms., 4th Dist. Washington No. 20CA13, 2021-Ohio-1970, ¶ 11, citing State

ex rel. First New Shiloh Baptist Church v. Meagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 501, 503, 696

N.E.2d 1058 (1998). Whether a motion to intervene is timely depends on the facts

and circumstances of the case. First New Shiloh Baptist Church at id. Factors to be
considered in determining whether the motion is timely are: (1) how far the suit has

progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time

preceding the application during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably

should have known of his interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties

due to the proposed intervenor’s failure to promptly apply for intervention; and (5)

any unusual circumstances weighing heavily against or in favor of intervention. Id.

               Considering these factors, there is no question that appellants’

motion to intervene was untimely. Regarding how far the case had progressed and

the purpose for intervention, the record demonstrates that the case had been

pending for nearly 16 months when appellants filed their motion to intervene, and

the case was only a week away from trial. Significantly, despite the appearance of

two different attorneys for Earth Mobile, neither attorney took any action in 16

months to add appellants to the case, presumably because the checking accounts at

issue were owned by a corporation, and the contract governing the accounts was

between Earth Mobile and the Bank, not between appellants and the Bank. As the

trial court found, it seems that appellants attempted to intervene on the eve of trial

only when it appeared that Earth Mobile would not have counsel to go forward at

trial.

               Regarding the length of time preceding the motion to intervene in

which appellants knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the case,

it is apparent that appellants’ claims arose from the same facts and circumstances

as Earth Mobile’s claim, i.e., the Bank’s removal of certain deposits from Earth
Mobile’s corporate account and the return of those funds to ODJFS. Thus, as

owner/members of Earth Mobile, appellants were on notice when the complaint was

filed on March 30, 2021, nearly 16 months before their motion to intervene was filed,

of their interest in the case.

               With respect to any prejudice to the original parties, it is apparent that

allowing appellants to intervene only one week prior to trial would certainly have

prejudiced the Bank, who, like every litigant, is entitled to proceed to trial without

unnecessary delay. The trial — which had been scheduled for months — would have

been delayed, discovery would have been reopened, and the pretrial process would

have begun anew, adding expenses in the case for the Bank that could have been

avoided if appellants had timely moved to intervene.

               Finally, the record does not reflect any unusual circumstances that

would justify appellants’ late intervention. Although appellants contend they should

have been allowed to intervene because they would be time-barred from asserting

their claims in a separate action, R.C. 2305.09 provides that fraud and conversion

claims shall be brought within four years after the cause of action accrued. A cause

of action accrues when the tortious act is committed. Mattress Matters, Inc. v.

Trunzo, 2016-Ohio-7723, 74 N.E.23d 739, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). As alleged in Earth

Mobile’s complaint, the Bank removed the disputed funds in June or July 2020, so

the four-year statute of limitations for appellants’ claims is not yet implicated.

Moreover, appellants’ assertion that intervening was the only way to protect their

interest as owners of Earth Mobile is incorrect. Earth Mobile could have voluntarily
dismissed the case at any point before trial under Civ.R. 41(A) and then refiled after

it obtained new counsel.

              In Davis v. Border, 170 Ohio App.3d 758, 2007-Ohio-692, 869

N.E.2d 46 (11th Dist.), the Eleventh District affirmed the trial court’s denial of the

appellant-insurer’s motion to intervene because the insurer’s motion was filed 14

months after its insured was served with the complaint and notified the insurer of

the case, discovery in the case was completed and a motion for summary judgment

had been filed, trial was scheduled in 14 days, and the insurer gave no reason for its

14-month delay in moving to intervene. Id. at ¶ 51, 54. Under these circumstances,

the court found that “by any reasonable standard,” the insurer’s motion to intervene

was untimely. Id. at ¶ 54.

              We reach the same result here. Appellants’ motion was filed nearly

16 months after the complaint was filed, after discovery in the case was completed

and a motion for summary judgment had been filed, trial was scheduled in one week,

and appellants did not give a valid reason for their significant delay in moving to

intervene. Because the motion to intervene was obviously untimely, the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. The first assignment of error is

overruled.

      B. Motion for Continuance of Trial

              In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial

court abused its discretion and denied their due process rights by denying their

motion for a continuance of trial. Because the trial court properly denied appellants’
motion to intervene, there was no reason to grant a continuance of trial on Earth

Mobile’s claims. The second assignment of error is overruled.

      C. Due Process

              In their third assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial

court violated their due process rights because the court “prevented them from

entering the courtroom on the day of trial” but then stated in its journal entry

dismissing the case that “the putative intervening parties did not appear.”

Appellants’ allegation is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever in the record and

thus, is wholly without merit.

              Appellants next contend that the trial court’s grant of the Bank’s

motion in limine demonstrated its bias against them. Although Earth Mobile did

not appeal this ruling, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in

granting the Bank’s motion because of appellants’ assertion of bias. See Caldwell v.

Lucic Ents., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97303, 2012-Ohio-1059, ¶ 8 (an appellate court

reviews the grant or denial of a motion in limine for an abuse of discretion).

              In its complaint, Earth Mobile alleged that the Bank improperly

removed various deposits from its checking accounts. The Bank’s motion in limine

asked the court to exclude any evidence about the Bank’s removal and return of the

unemployment benefit deposits to ODJFS because the evidence was irrelevant to

Earth Mobile’s claims. We agree. In its journal entry denying the Bank’s motion for

summary judgment, the trial court specifically found that the deposits to Earth

Mobile’s corporate checking accounts from ODJFS “directly violate the agreement
between the plaintiff and the Bank.” Because the deposits were improper and a

breach of the agreement, the Bank’s removal of the deposits and its return of the

funds to ODJFS was not actionable by Earth Mobile. Thus, any evidence about the

improper deposits was irrelevant to Earth Mobile’s claims and hence, inadmissible

under Evid.R. 402.3

                The proper removal from Earth Mobile’s accounts of unemployment

payments intended for third persons who were not owners or signers on Earth

Mobile’s accounts is also not probative evidence that the Bank made other improper

fund removals, as alleged by Earth Mobile. Thus, admission of the evidence would

also be improper under Evid.R. 403 because its probative value would be

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

or misleading the jury.4

                Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

Bank’s motion in limine, and thus it cannot be said that the ruling demonstrated any

bias against appellants. The third assignment of error is overruled.

       D. Motion for New Trial

                After the trial court issued its entry dismissing the case for prejudice,

appellants filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Civ.R. 59(A)(7), contending that

       3 Evid.R. 402 states that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible * * *. Evidence which

is not relevant is not admissible.”
       4 Under Evid.R. 403, evidence, even if relevant, “is not admissible if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the
issues, or of misleading the jury.”
under that provision of Civ.R. 59, a new trial may be granted where “the judgment

is contrary to law.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that to the extent the

motion was filed on behalf of Earth Mobile, it was deemed stricken because

appellants could not represent a corporation, and to the extent the motion was filed

on behalf of appellants, because no trial was held in the case, “there is no potential

new trial for the court to consider.” In their fourth assignment of error, appellants

contend that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new

trial.

                An appellate court will not reverse a decision regarding whether to

grant a new trial absent an abuse of discretion. Quinlan v. Highland, 5th Dist.

Muskingum No. CT2018-0030, 2018-Ohio-4096, ¶ 14, citing Yungwirth v. McAvoy,

32 Ohio St.2d 285, 291 N.E.2d 739 (1972).

                “A threshold question in determining whether a new trial, pursuant

to Civ.R. 59, is warranted is whether the trial court had in fact conducted a ‘trial.’”

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-436, 2018-Ohio-1037, ¶ 20,

citing Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-307, 2012-Ohio-

6232, ¶ 13 (considering as an initial matter whether a trial was conducted because

“a motion for a new trial properly lies only after a trial”); Fougere v. Estate of

Fougere, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-72, 2017-Ohio-7905, ¶ 14 (“A motion for a

new trial is a nullity unless it is filed after a trial has occurred.”).

                A proceeding is considered a trial for purposes of Civ.R. 59 when the

indicia of trial substantially predominate in the proceeding. First Bank of Marietta
v. Mascrete, Inc., 79 Ohio St.3d 503, 507, 684 N.E.2d 38 (1997). For example,

courts should consider whether the proceeding took place in court, whether it was

held in the presence of a judge or magistrate, whether the parties or counsel were

present, whether arguments were presented in court, and whether a judgment was

rendered on the evidence. Id. Other indicia may be considered but “the focus of the

inquiry is whether there is substantial predominance of indicia of trial such that the

proceeding is properly characterized as a trial for Civ.R. 59 purposes.” Id.

               No indicia of trial are present here. No proceeding was held where

evidence or argument was presented in court after which a judgment was rendered.

The trial court dismissed the case before trial because although counsel for the Bank

and the Bank’s representative appeared for trial, neither counsel for Earth Mobile

nor the putative intervening parties appeared. Because no trial was had in this case,

there is no “new” trial to be had. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in denying appellants’ motion for a new trial. The fourth assignment of

error is overruled.

      E. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

               On August 15, 2022, appellants filed a motion for findings of fact and

conclusions of law pursuant to Civ.R. 52. The next day, they filed a notice of appeal

in this court. On the same day, they filed an “amended motion” for findings of fact

and conclusions of law in the trial court. The trial court dismissed the original

motion and, because an appeal had been filed, found that it did not have jurisdiction

to rule on the amended motion. In their fifth assignment of error, appellants
contend that the trial court erred when it “refused to answer” their motion for

findings of fact and conclusions of law.

               Civ.R. 52 states that “When questions of fact are tried by the court

without a jury, judgment may be general for the prevailing party unless one of the

parties in writing requests otherwise * * * in which case, the court shall state in

writing the findings of fact found separately from the conclusions of law.” The court

did not conduct a trial without a jury in this case and did not decide any questions

of fact. Thus, the court had no duty to enter any findings of fact or conclusions of

law. See Byrd v. Frush, 5th Dist. Licking No. 13-CA-10, 2013-Ohio-3682, ¶ 31

(“Pursuant to Civ.R. 52, the trial court is only required to provide findings of fact or

conclusions of law when ‘questions of fact are tried by the court without a jury.’”).

The fifth assignment of error is therefore overruled.

      F. Judicial Notice

               On August 24, 2022, after appellants had filed their notice of appeal,

they filed a “motion for mandatory judicial notice and hearing” in the trial court,

asking the court to take judicial notice of common law decisions regarding the effect

of an appeal on a trial court’s obligation to issue findings of fact and conclusions of

law pursuant to Civ.R. 52. Appellants asserted that the trial court should issue

findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Civ.R. 52 and, citing

Langsam v. Tindera, 64 Ohio App.3d 228, 580 N.E.2d 1157 (8th Dist.1990), argued

that a trial court retains jurisdiction to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law

even after an appeal has been filed. The trial court ruled that it was without
jurisdiction to rule on the motion during the pendency of appellants’ appeal. In their

sixth assignment of error, appellants contend that the trial court’s ruling was

erroneous.

                We need not consider whether a trial court retains jurisdiction to

issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after an appeal has been filed because,

as discussed above, a trial court’s obligation to issue findings of fact and conclusions

of law under Civ.R. 52 arises only when questions of fact are tried by the court

without a jury. Because the trial court did not conduct a trial or decide any questions

of fact, it had no obligation to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, whether

before or after appellants filed their notice of appeal. The sixth assignment of error

is overruled.

                Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, PRESIDING JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR