Court Opinion

ID: 9941994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:02:39.356408+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.914862
License: Public Domain

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                    Decided: February 20, 2024

 S24Y0049, S24Y0050. IN THE MATTER OF DEIRDRE MARIA
                       STEPHENS.

      PER CURIAM.

      These disciplinary matters are before the Court on the report

and recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board, which

reviewed the report and recommendation of Special Master Patrick

Longan at the request of Deirdre Maria Stephens (State Bar No.

678789), pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214, 4-215, and 4-216. The Special

Master concluded that Stephens, who has been a member of the

State Bar of Georgia since 1997, violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a),1 1.15 (II)

      1 Rule 1.15 (I) (a) provides, in relevant part: “A lawyer shall hold funds

or other property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer’s possession
in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s own funds or
other property.”
(a),2 3.3 (a) (1),3 and 8.4 (a) (4)4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional

Conduct (“GRPC” or the “Rules”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), and

recommended disbarment, the maximum penalty for a violation of

any of these Rules. The Review Board adopted the Special Master’s

findings of fact and conclusions of law but recommends that

Stephens receive a six-month suspension and public reprimand,

with conditions for reinstatement. Having reviewed the record, and

for the reasons discussed below, we reject the recommendation of the

Review Board and, instead, agree with the Special Master that

disbarment is warranted.

      1. Special Master’s Report

      (a) Findings of Fact

      Regarding State Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) No.

7488, the Special Master made the following findings of fact. On May

      2 Rule 1.15 (II) (a) provides, in relevant part: “All funds held by a lawyer

for a client and all funds held by a lawyer in any other fiduciary capacity shall
be deposited in and administered from a trust account.”
       3 Rule 3.3 (a) (1) provides: “A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false

statement of material fact or law to a tribunal[.]”
       4 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides: “It shall be a violation of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”
                                         2
2, 2018, a $700 check was presented on Stephens’s trust account,

but there were insufficient funds available to cover the check. The

reason for the overdraft was that Stephens did not realize that a

client, who had been making regular monthly payments into her

trust account, had not made an expected payment. The payment

Stephens expected that would have prevented the overdraft was for

fees that Stephens had already earned. When Stephens learned of

the overdraft, she contacted the client, who paid her the fees owed,

and she then deposited personal funds into her trust account to cover

the overdraft. The Special Master determined that no client was

harmed by the overdraft or the deposit of earned fees into the trust

account, although there was potential injury to clients from allowing

the trust account to go below the minimum required balance.

     Next, regarding SDBD No. 7489, the Special Master recounted

the following. In 2015, Stephens represented a client and his

company in connection with the sale of the company’s assets to a

limited liability company (the “LLC”). The parties executed an Asset

Purchase Agreement and a Bill of Sale, with the terms of the

                                 3
Agreement providing that the LLC was to pay $80,000 upon request

“as a deposit” while the remainder of the $180,000 purchase price

was to be paid no later than December 1, 2015. The LLC owner was

not able to pay the $80,000 before he had to leave the United States

on other business, although he did give the client a post-dated check

for $80,000. Nevertheless, the client pressured the LLC owner to pay

him while he was away, and in response, the LLC owner wired

$75,000 into Stephens’s trust account and delivered the remaining

$5,000 to the client in cash after he returned to the United States.

No provision in the parties’ Agreement required the initial $80,000

to be held in escrow or to be paid into, or maintained in, Stephens’s

trust account; rather, it was done as a matter of expediency and

convenience.

     Stephens testified that she disbursed the $75,000 to the client

almost immediately after she received the funds into her bank

account and when she paid him there was no indication of any claim

by the LLC owner to the money or the possibility of any return of

funds. The State Bar offered no evidence to the contrary, and the

                                 4
record did not pinpoint the exact date of the disbursement to the

client. On June 17, 2015, Stephens sent a letter to the LLC owner

on behalf of her client’s company alleging that the LLC had breached

the Agreement; the letter purported to terminate the deal and

asserted that the client would be keeping the $80,000 as liquidated

damages. One month later, the LLC owner and the LLC

(collectively, “the plaintiffs”) sued the client and his company for

breach of the Agreement and sought an injunction to enforce the

transaction; the case also included a claim for unjust enrichment

and alleged that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover $80,000 for

fraud. The plaintiffs then filed an emergency motion for

interlocutory injunction, and in August 2015, the trial court held a

hearing on that motion. During the hearing, counsel for the

plaintiffs stated, “we just found out today that the $80,000 is still in

the trust account,” and they confirmed with the court that they

wanted the court to consider ordering as an additional remedy that

Stephens not dispose of the $80,000. The court then asked Stephens,

“I don’t mean to be presumptuous – is it still in your trust account,”

                                   5
and she responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” When Stephens told the

court this, she knew the information was false; in fact, only $75,000

of the $80,000 had ever been in her trust account, and all of those

funds had been disbursed to the client at some point before the

hearing. The trial court entered an injunction that relied upon

Stephens’s false statement, with the August 28, 2015, order stating,

“The $80,000 shall be maintained in defense counsel’s escrow

account until further order of this court or the conclusion of the

litigation, whichever comes first.”

     In April 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to require the

defendants to deposit funds into the registry of the court, because in

deposition testimony “none of the Defendants were able to confirm

that the $80,000 was still in their attorney’s trust account,” and

after the trial court ordered a response in June 2016, Stephens filed

a response stating, “There has been no change in the money that is

being held in trust.” In context, the Special Master determined that

this statement was intentionally false and meant to deceive the

court, which Stephens succeeded in doing, as the court denied the

                                  6
plaintiffs’ motion.

     Trial was then held in 2017, and the jury found in favor of the

plaintiffs with the judgment providing that the plaintiffs recover the

principal sum of $80,000 with interest plus attorney fees. The client

filed a notice of appeal in October 2017, and a trial judge granted

the plaintiffs’ motion for supersedeas bond pending appeal from the

judgment; however, neither Stephens nor her client ever filed a

supersedeas bond. In April 2018, the judge ordered Stephens to

“release the $80,000 held in her trust account for Defendant . . . and

pay them to Plaintiffs in partial satisfaction of this Court’s

judgment[,]” but Stephens did not comply with this order. In July

2018, the trial judge dismissed the client’s notice of appeal in the

case for not filing the trial transcript; Stephens had taken no steps

to rebut the presumption that the eight-month delay in filing

transcripts was unreasonable, as no one had appeared on behalf of

the client at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the appeal.

     In April 2019, the trial court entered an order on contempt and

to show cause; the court found Stephens in contempt for failing to

                                  7
comply with the court’s order to pay $80,000 to the plaintiffs; and

the court noted that Stephens failed to respond to the motion for

contempt and did not appear at the hearing on that motion. The trial

court also ordered Stephens to give an accounting to the court within

ten days of the status of the $80,000 and to show cause why she

should not be sanctioned, but she did not comply with this order.

Instead, Stephens filed a notice of appeal of the contempt order,

which was based on an erroneous legal theory that the contempt

motion had to be personally served on her. The clerk of the trial court

sent notice to Stephens that she needed to submit an amended

notice of appeal before the appeal could be accepted, but she never

did so. Then, in June 2019, the trial court entered an order reciting

the foregoing procedural history and found that Stephens “has

willfully refused to comply with this Court’s orders regarding the

$80,000, even after being given notice of her contempt and an

opportunity to be heard on the matter and show cause as to the

status of the funds,” and ordered that she pay the funds to the

plaintiffs by 5:00 p.m. on July 1, 2019. On July 5, 2019, Stephens

                                  8
filed a notice of compliance, stating that she had “released” the funds

to the plaintiffs. However, the Special Master determined that this

statement was false and intended to lead the court to believe that

the funds had been in her trust account all along when, in reality,

she had to pay from her own personal funds to cover the judgment.

In addition, Stephens never complied with the part of the order that

required her to provide an accounting of the funds that were

supposed to have been in her trust account since 2015.

     Finally, in September 2019, in response to the grievance filed

against her, Stephens made additional false and misleading

statements, stating:

     Throughout this legal ordeal I have informed my client
     that if a Motion for Contempt was filed and properly
     served then the money had to be released as I would not
     jeopardize my license so that he could attempt to
     negotiate with the Plaintiff. This put me at odds with my
     client. Despite the lack of jurisdiction due to the lack of
     personal service, the Court gave me until July 1, 2019 to
     release the money. . . . My client instructed me
     vehemently not to release the money without a valid order
     from the Court, but since the Court seemed to be ignoring
     the rules, I was afraid to comply with my client’s request
     in spite of him threatening to report me to the Bar for
     doing so. The final order which has been provided to you

                                  9
      previously, called for me to release the funds and nothing
      more, nothing less. They were released.

      The Special Master concluded that this response was intended

to deceive the Bar into believing that Stephens had kept the funds

in her account all along.

      (b) Conclusions of Law

      With regard to SDBD No. 7488, the Special Master found that

Stephens admitted to violating Rule 1.15 (I) (a) and Rule 1.15 (II)

(a), by allowing her trust account to fall below the minimum

required balance and causing an overdraft on her trust account.

      Next, with regard to SDBD No. 7489, the Special Master

determined that Stephens violated Rule 3.3 (a) (1) and Rule 8.4 (a)

(4) in the following ways.5 First, she knowingly made a false

      5 The Special Master noted that the Formal Complaint alleged that
Stephens violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (a) as well. However, the
Special Master concluded that the State Bar had not proven that she violated
Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (a) by clear and convincing evidence. As noted in
the findings of fact, neither the Asset Purchase Agreement nor the Bill of Sale
required that she escrow the “deposit.” In addition, Stephens testified that she
disbursed the money to her client before there was any dispute about the
contract and before there would have been any reason to believe that the
disbursement would be improper, and the State Bar offered no evidence to the
contrary.
                                       10
statement of material fact to a tribunal in August 2015, when she

told the trial court that the $80,000 deposit was in her trust account,

even though she knew this statement was false and dishonest. In

addition, her failure to correct her false statement to the court at

any time was the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation,

see GRPC 3.3, Comment 3 (“There are circumstances where failure

to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative

misrepresentation.”), and her ongoing silence over the course of

several years violated both Rules. She also violated Rules 3.3 (a) (1)

and 8.4 (a) (4) in July 2016, in her response to the plaintiffs’ motion

to pay funds into the registry of the court, when she wrote: “There

has been no change in the money that is being held in trust.” She

knew the statement was misleading and it was intended to deceive

the court. Finally, she violated both Rules when she paid the

plaintiffs and stated that she had “released” the funds, because she

was not holding the money, so it could not be released. By describing

her payment this way, she intended to give the court the false

impression that she had been holding the money all along.

                                  11
     (c) The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for
     Imposing Lawyer Sanctions

     The Special Master looked to the ABA Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) to determine the appropriate

punishment for Stephens’s misconduct, see In the Matter of Morse,

266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), and noted that the ABA

Standards set forth presumptive sanctions based upon the nature of

the duty violated, the attorney’s state of mind, and the injury or

potential injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, as well as the

existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. See ABA Standard

3.0. The Special Master then concluded that Stephens violated Rules

1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (a) in her handling of the trust account in

SDBD No. 7488; that she did not cause any actual injury to a client,

but she did cause potential injury when she allowed the balance in

the trust account to fall below the amount necessary to prevent an

overdraft; and that the presumptive sanction for each of these

violations is a reprimand. See ABA Standard 4.13 (reprimand is

generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with

                                 12
client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client).

     As for her violations of Rule 3.3 (a) (1) in SDBD No. 7489, the

Special Master concluded that Stephens made intentionally false

statements to the court about the $80,000 for years and improperly

withheld material information. These actions caused serious injury

to the plaintiffs, who were deprived of $80,000 for over a year, and

caused serious adverse effects on the underlying legal proceedings,

including leading the court to believe that it was not necessary to

order the funds to be paid into the registry of the court. Moreover,

her refusal to comply with the trial court’s orders multiplied the

proceedings. See ABA Standard 6.11 (disbarment is generally

appropriate when a lawyer, with the intent to deceive the court,

makes a false statement or improperly withholds material

information and causes a serious or potentially significant adverse

effect on the legal proceeding).

     Finally, with regard to her violations of Rule 8.4 (a) (4) in

SDBD No. 7489, the Special Master determined that Stephens

knowingly engaged in dishonest and deceitful misrepresentations

                                   13
about the location of the $80,000, and that these actions reflected

adversely on her fitness to practice law. See ABA Standard 5.11 (b)

(disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in any

other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s

fitness to practice law).

     The Special Master determined that in aggravation, Stephens

had a dishonest and selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.22 (b);

engaged in a pattern of misconduct as she acted deceitfully from

2015 to 2019, see ABA Standard 9.22 (c); committed multiple

offenses, see ABA Standard 9.22 (d); engaged in deceptive practices

in the disciplinary process (by stating in her response to the

grievance that she “released” the funds), see ABA Standard 9.22 (f);

and had substantial experience in the practice of law, see ABA

Standard 9.22 (i). In mitigation, the Special Master noted the

absence of a prior disciplinary record, see ABA Standard 9.32 (a);

her good character and reputation, see ABA Standard 9.32 (g), as

evidenced by letters she submitted from her peers attesting to this;

                                14
and that she expressed remorse, see ABA Standard 9.32 (l).

     The Special Master then noted that the recommendation of

disbarment is in line with the discipline imposed in most similar

cases. See In the Matter of Manning-Wallace, 291 Ga. 96, 97 (727

SE2d   502)   (2012)   (accepting     special   master’s   report   and

recommendation and disbarring attorney who submitted false

evidence to a tribunal, made materially false statements about the

evidence to the tribunal, and failed to take any remedial action after

making the false statements and submitting the false evidence); see

also In the Matter of Koehler, 297 Ga. 794 (778 SE2d 218) (2015)

(accepting special master’s report and recommendation and

disbarring attorney based on multiple instances of misconduct,

including violations of Rules 3.3 and 8.4 (a) (4) after lawyer made

materially deceitful and misleading statements in federal civil

action); In the Matter of Minsk, 296 Ga. 152 (765 SE2d 361) (2014)

(on notice of discipline, disbarring attorney, who was in default, for

making knowingly false and misleading statements to his client, to

court, and to third parties in connection with bankruptcy case); In

                                 15
the Matter of Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. 861 (764 SE2d 549) (2014)

(accepting special master’s report and recommendation and

disbarring attorney, who was in default, for multiple acts of

misconduct including mispresenting her hours and her fees to a

court).

     However, the Special Master noted that there were cases that

were, to some extent, inconsistent with a recommendation of

disbarment for Stephens. See In the Matter of Branan, 300 Ga. 779

(798 SE2d 218) (2017) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline

and imposing one-month suspension and public reprimand for

attorney who violated Rule 3.3 (a) (1) by submitting false statement

to court about loan to client); In the Matter of Wright, 291 Ga. 841

(732 SE2d 275) (2012) (accepting report and recommendation of the

review panel and imposing six-month suspension and public

reprimand for attorney who violated Rules 3.3 and 8.4, by making

false statements to the Georgia Court of Appeals); In the Matter of

Wilkinson, 284 Ga. 548 (668 SE2d 707) (2008) (accepting petition for

voluntary discipline and imposing one-month suspension and public

                                16
reprimand for attorney who violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by making false

statements to trial court and the Georgia Court of Appeals); In the

Matter of Bone, 283 Ga. 147 (657 SE2d 244) (2008) (accepting

petition for voluntary discipline and imposing three-month

suspension for attorney who violated Rule 3.3 (a) (1) when he falsely

represented to a court that no recording of a settlement conference

had been made); In the Matter of Johnson, 281 Ga. 674 (641 SE2d

535) (2007) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing

30-day suspension and public reprimand for public defender who

violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by representing clients as private counsel

without informing courts).

     In conclusion, based upon the foregoing findings of fact and

conclusions of law, the presumptive sanctions, the aggravating and

mitigating factors, and the weight of authority in similar cases, the

Special Master recommended disbarment.

     2. Stephens’s Exceptions Before the Review Board and the State
     Bar’s Response

     Stephens filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and

                                 17
sought review by the Review Board pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214, 4-

215, and 4-216. While she did not dispute the Special Master’s

findings of fact or conclusions of law, she did take issue with his

weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors. As for SDBD No.

7488, Stephens stated that since there was no actual harm suffered

by any client or third party because of the negligent trust account

overdraft, an admonition was an appropriate sanction. See ABA

Standard 7.4 (providing that admonition is generally appropriate

when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence that is

a violation of a duty owed as a professional and causes little or no

actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system).

In addition, she contended that this case is distinguishable from

other trust account cases where more severe sanctions were

imposed. See, e.g., In the Matter of Storrs, 300 Ga. 68 (792 SE2d 664)

(2016) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing

three-month suspension for lawyer who withdrew $11,150 in client

funds for his personal use).

     As for SDBD No. 7489, Stephens asserted that she made her

                                   18
misrepresentation to the court based on her belief that the $80,000

was still in her client’s safe and available, and that she could

redeposit it to her trust account at any time based on assurances she

received from her client. In terms of the aggravating factors found

by the Special Master, she claimed that she did not have a dishonest

or selfish motive, but instead that her motive was solely to protect

her client; that while it was true that she engaged in a “years-long”

deceit of the trial court, this did not constitute a pattern of

misconduct, because it was simply a “continuation of one

misconduct”; that while she violated multiple rules, there were

actually only two disciplinary matters charging rule violations; and

that while it was true that she had substantial experience in the

practice of law, she only had three years of practice in the area of

law in question. As for matters in mitigation, in addition to the

absence of a prior disciplinary record, good character or reputation,

and remorse, Stephens offered the following mitigating factors: (1)

the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive (as she did not profit or

gain from her actions in either matter), see ABA Standard 9.32 (b);

                                 19
(2) her timely good faith effort to make restitution or rectify

consequences of misconduct by making the plaintiffs whole, see ABA

Standard 9.32 (d); and (3) the imposition of other penalties or

sanctions, based on the fact that she ended up personally paying the

$80,000 owed by her client, see ABA Standard 9.32 (k). Moreover,

Stephens stated, as to her mental state, that during the relevant

period, she had been dealing with her ailing mother, which required

her to travel out of state regularly and which caused her

considerable mental anguish, and that the disciplinary authorities

should take into consideration her personal or emotional problems

in dealing with her elderly mother at the time. See ABA Standard

9.32 (c).

     Finally, regarding the level of discipline, Stephens reiterated

that as to SDBD No. 7488, a letter of admonition is the appropriate

level of discipline, and that in SDBD No. 7489, she should only

receive a six-month suspension. Stephens noted that she paid the

$80,000, albeit late; that there was little or no serious or potentially

serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system due to her

                                  20
misrepresentations to the court and the State Bar; and that ABA

Standard 7.2 provides that suspension is generally appropriate

when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a

duty owed as a professional and causes injury or potential injury to

a client, the public, or the legal system. Stephens contended that

this case is essentially about her failure to inform the court that she

had previously complied with the client’s demand that she release

the funds; that this is the type of misconduct contemplated by ABA

Standard 7.2; and that the appropriate discipline to be imposed is a

one-month to six-month suspension. Stephens then “concur[red]

with the Special Master’s reference to cases that are inconsistent

with disbarment” and asserted that those cases were more

appropriate based on the facts of this case.

     The State Bar filed a response to her exceptions, generally

contending that the Special Master’s application of the ABA

Standards including the balancing of mitigating and aggravating

factors was correct, and that the Special Master’s recommendation

of disbarment was supported by case law.

                                  21
     3. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation

     The Review Board issued its report and recommendation of a

six-month suspension and public reprimand. The Review Board

adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the

Special Master, noting that Stephens had not shown, or attempted

to show, that the findings of the Special Master were clearly

erroneous or manifestly in error. The Review Board also agreed with

the Special Master and adopted his findings regarding the duties

violated, the analysis of Stephens’s mental state, and the injury or

potential injury caused by her misconduct.

     However, the Review Board disagreed to a certain extent with

the Special Master’s consideration of the aggravating and mitigating

factors, the analysis of which it noted centered on the violations that

occurred regarding SDBD No. 7489. The Review Board agreed that

ABA Standard 9.22 (b) applied because Stephens acted dishonestly,

but it did not believe that her conduct was also for a selfish motive.

It also agreed that Stephens committed multiple offenses, see ABA

Standard 9.22 (d), but disagreed with the Special Master’s

                                  22
statement that Stephens violated “each rule multiple times,” as it

believed this was not supported by the findings of fact. Next, it

agreed with the Special Master that Stephens engaged in deceptive

practices in the disciplinary process (although it noted that

Stephens did take responsibility for this deception) and agreed that

she had substantial experience in the practice of law. See ABA

Standards 9.22 (f) and (i). However, the Review Board disagreed

with the Special Master that Stephens engaged in a pattern of

misconduct and found that this was not an aggravating factor

because the misconduct arose from a continuation of the initial

misconduct and “not a pattern of misconduct involving different

behaviors.” In addition, the Review Board found that the Special

Master did not give enough weight to the factors in mitigation,

including the “significant” evidence Stephens had shown of her good

reputation and character and the lack of a prior disciplinary record.

Moreover, it found that Stephens did not profit or gain from her

violations; on the contrary, she deposited $80,000 of her personal

funds to make the injured plaintiffs whole; and while forced or

                                 23
compelled restitution is neither an aggravating nor mitigating

factor, see ABA Standard 9.4 (a), the Review Board asserted that it

should be seen as mitigating here pursuant to ABA Standard 9.32

(d), as she did rectify the consequences of her misconduct. Finally,

while the Special Master found remorse as a mitigating factor, the

Review Board determined that the level of remorse on behalf of

Stephens went underappreciated by the Special Master; and that

during oral argument, it was apparent to the Review Board that

Stephens’s remorse was genuine.

     Accordingly, the Review Board recommended a six-month

suspension from the practice of law, a public reprimand, and a

condition that within one year of reinstatement Stephens utilize the

Law Practice Management program of the State Bar and complete

a CLE course aimed at trust account management or financial

account management in general. The Review Board stated, without

providing citations, that the cases of punishment less than

disbarment cited by the Special Master were more appropriate in

analyzing the facts of this case.

                                    24
     4. The State Bar’s Exceptions to the Review Board’s Report

     The State Bar asks this Court to enter a final judgment

disbarring Stephens. The State Bar asserts that the Review Board

was wrong in finding that ABA Standard 9.22 (c) (pattern of

misconduct) did not apply because the Review Board’s requirement

that the conduct involve “different behaviors” is contradicted by the

ABA comments, which explain that ABA Standard 9.22 (c) applies

to repeated instances of similar conduct. Second, the Bar contends

that the Review Board erred when it concluded that Stephens’s

ultimate compliance with multiple court orders should be considered

mitigating because she only paid the money back under the threat

of contempt of court. See ABA Standard 9.4 (a) (forced or compelled

restitution should not be considered mitigating). Finally, it asserts

that the Review Board erred when it stated that the level of remorse

of Stephens went unappreciated by the Special Master; the Special

Master concluded that the remorse factor applied; it was the Special

Master, not the Review Board, that heard Stephens testify about her

remorse under oath; and the Special Master, therefore, was in the

                                 25
best position to evaluate this factor, as it was based upon an in-

person assessment of her credibility and honesty.

     The    State   Bar    asserts      that   the   Special   Master’s

recommendation of disbarment is supported by case law from this

Court in cases involving a lawyer’s deliberate and knowing

misrepresentations to a court, and that no case law justified a lesser

penalty. See In the Matter of Shehane, 276 Ga. 168, 170 (575 SE2d

503) (2003) (disbarring attorney for his “deliberate, deceitful acts to

obfuscate the truth”); Koehler, 297 Ga. at 796 (disbarment

appropriate sanction where lawyer made materially deceitful and

misleading statements in court filings); Minsk, 296 Ga. at 153

(disbarment was appropriate where attorney had pattern of making

knowingly false statements); Jones-Lewis, 295 Ga. at 862

(disbarment appropriate sanction where lawyer, who was in default,

made false statements to court).

     5. Stephens’s Response

     Stephens states that to the extent that the Special Master and

Review Board have a different view of the application of ABA

                                   26
Standard 9.22 (c), she should get the benefit of the Review Board’s

application.   She   also   agrees    with   the   Review    Board’s

recommendation of discipline, including the conditions imposed, and

states that the cases cited by the Review Board, along with other

cases, support such a recommendation. See In the Matter of Adams,

291 Ga. 768 (732 SE2d 446) (2012) (accepting petition for voluntary

discipline and imposing 18-month suspension where attorney

admitted that he was indicted on 17 counts of false statements based

on his conduct in submitting sworn statements containing

misrepresentations of the number of hours that he worked

representing indigent clients and billed to Gwinnett Judicial Circuit

Indigent Defense Program; charges were nolle prossed after he

agreed to reimbursement, to a lifetime ban on representing any

indigent defendant whose representation was paid through public

funds, and to file petition for voluntary discipline with the State

Bar); In the Matter of Hardwick, 288 Ga. 60, 60-61 (701 SE2d 163)

(2010) (accepting petition for voluntary discipline and imposing six-

month suspension for attorney’s acts of abandoning client to client’s

                                 27
detriment and submitting false statement in disciplinary process).

     6. Analysis and Conclusion.

     The parties do not dispute the Special Master’s findings of fact

regarding the rule violations, and we agree that the evidence

supports the Special Master’s determinations that Stephens

violated Rules 1.15 (I) (a) and 1.15 (II) (a) in SDBD No. 7488, and

Rules 3.3 (a) (1) and 8.4 (a) (4) in SDBD No. 7489. In addition, the

Special Master and Review Board agree on Stephens’s mental state

at the time that she committed these offenses; that she acted

negligently in regard to the trust account violations and

intentionally in regard to the lawsuit against the client; and we

likewise agree that the record supports such determinations. And

while Stephens asked the Review Board to take into consideration

her mental anguish at the time the conduct arose based on her need

to take care of her ailing mother, there is no clear error in its failure

to do so, as Stephens offered no evidence to support her claim.

     Thus, the only issues before the Court that are in dispute are

the (1) relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and (2)

                                   28
appropriate level of discipline to impose. As to the first issue, the

Review Board appears to have agreed with Stephens that ABA

Standard 9.22 (c) (pattern of misconduct) did not apply, because the

misconduct arose from a continuation of the initial misconduct, not

“different behaviors.” However, we do not agree with the Review

Board’s conclusion, because this is not a limitation we have

previously recognized and we see no reason to do so here given the

multiple misstatements that Stephens made to the trial court over

a four-year period. See, e.g., In the Matter of Coulter, 304 Ga. 81, 85

(816 SE2d 1) (2018) (special master determined that facts

demonstrated a pattern of misconduct under ABA Standard 9.22 (c),

where attorney committed multiple violations of trust account rules

in relation to a single client); In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635, 642

(820 SE2d 716) (2018) (special master determined that attorney

engaged in pattern of misconduct, see ABA Standard 9.22 (c),

pointing to his admission of multiple withdrawals of children’s

money from trust account for improper purposes).

     In addition, the Review Board appears to have agreed with

                                  29
Stephens that ABA Standard 9.32 (d) (rectifying the consequences

of misconduct) should apply. However, while it is true that Stephens

eventually paid the $80,000 owed to the plaintiffs out of her own

funds, she only did so after receiving multiple court orders

demanding that she do so and threatening her with contempt for

failure to comply with the court’s order. Thus, we likewise do not

agree with the Review Board’s determination that her conduct in

this regard can be considered a mitigating factor. See ABA Standard

9.4 (a) (providing that forced or compelled restitution is not

mitigating). See also In the Matter of Thomson, 266 Ga. 157, 158 n.

1 (464 SE2d 818) (1996) (restitution in response to court order was

not mitigating).

     Finally, the Review Board appears to have agreed with

Stephens that she did not act with a selfish motive and that her level

of remorse was underappreciated. But, as the State Bar points out

in its exceptions to this Court, it was the Special Master and not the

Review Board who heard Stephens testify about her remorse and it

is the Special Master who is in the best position to judge the

                                 30
credibility of a witness. See In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409,

416 (877 SE2d 248) (2022). To the extent that the Review Board

discredited the Special Master’s findings in this regard, we caution

the Review Board that these are the sort of “findings that generally

should be left to the Special Master in the first instance.” In the

Matter of Crowther, S23Y1117, S23Y1119, Op. at 47 n. 12 (Jan. 17,

2024); see Bar Rule 4-216 (a) (“The findings of fact made by a Special

Master may be reversed if the State Disciplinary Review Board finds

them to be clearly erroneous or manifestly in error. Conclusions of

law and determinations of appropriate sanctions shall be reviewed

de novo.”). See generally In the Matter of Paine, 316 Ga. 157, 165

(886 SE2d 824) (2023) (holding that the Review Board cannot

“ignor[e] findings from the Special Master and [make] its own

findings inconsistent with the Special Master’s findings, without

explaining why the Special Master’s findings were clearly

erroneous”) (emphasis in original). Here, while Stephens claimed

that her motive was solely to protect her client, the Special Master

found that her conduct was, at least in part, motivated by a selfish

                                 31
concern to conceal her mishandling of the funds and her initial false

statements to the court.

     As to the level of discipline, the fact that Stephens repeatedly

lied to the trial court over the course of four years, initially made

misrepresentations to the State Bar when it began investigating this

matter, and only paid restitution after the threat of contempt makes

this matter significantly more egregious than the cases the Review

Board relied on to recommend a lesser sanction than disbarment.

See Branan, 300 Ga. at 779 (imposing one-month suspension and

review panel reprimand where attorney submitted a single false

statement to a court about a loan to a client); Wright, 291 Ga. at 841

(imposing six-month suspension and public reprimand where

attorney made a single false statement in appellate brief before the

Georgia Court of Appeals); Wilkinson, 284 Ga. at 548-549 (imposing

one-month    suspension    and   public   reprimand    for   negligent

misrepresentations to the trial court and the Georgia Court of

Appeals); Bone, 283 Ga. at 147-148 (imposing three-month

suspension where attorney corrected his misrepresentation to the

                                 32
court that no recording of a settlement conference had been made).

And   Adams     and   Hardwick,    both cited     by Stephens,     are

distinguishable, in that the attorney in Adams admitted to violating

only Rule 8.4 (a) (4) and had filed a petition for voluntary discipline

as part of the resolution of a criminal matter involving his

misconduct, see 291 Ga. at 768, and Hardwick involved only one

instance of the attorney making a false statement in the disciplinary

process. See 288 Ga. at 60-61. Therefore, in light of the severity of

her actions, which included lying to the court over the course of

several years, and our precedent involving attorneys who made

multiple, intentional false or misleading statements to a court, we

agree with the Special Master that disbarment is the only

appropriate sanction for Stephens’s violations of the Rules. See

Eddings, 314 Ga. at 409-410 (disbarment was warranted where

attorney made multiple false statements in connection with

representation of a client and in disciplinary proceedings); Koehler,

297 Ga. at 796 (disbarment was appropriate sanction where lawyer

repeatedly asserted frivolous claims in multiple tribunals and made

                                  33
materially deceitful and misleading statements in court filings);

Minsk, 296 Ga. at 153 (disbarment was appropriate sanction where

lawyer had pattern of making knowingly false statements to his

client, the court, and third parties). Accordingly, it is hereby ordered

that the name Deirdre Maria Stephens be removed from the rolls of

persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Stephens

is reminded of her duties under Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Disbarred. All the Justices concur.

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