Court Opinion

ID: 9833145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:29:34.729738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.122171
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee has filed a motion for rehearing, in which it is most earnestly insisted that the court erred in reversing and remanding this case for a new trial. It is especially insisted that the evidence is insufficient to raise an issue of fact as to the alleged negli*699gence being tbe proximate cause of tbe injury ; that tbe onjy conclusion to draw from' tbe evidence is that appellee’s injury resulted from tbe unforeseeable cause of tbe fainting and falling over tbe banister, guarding tbe front of tbe balcony, and striking and injuring appellant. Tbe earnestness with wbicb tbis contention is presented by able counsel has caused us carefully again to review tbe record and our conclusions announced in tbe original opinion. We are unable to agree with counsel for appellee as to tbe legal effect of tbe evidence in tbe record, and must adhere to our original opinion. ’
It is elementary that liability for personal injuries is dependent in tbe law of negligence upon tbe presence of two facts; namely: (1) Negligence on tbe part of defendant, either in setting a harmful force in motion, or, as in tbe instant case, in creating a dangerous situation from which a harmful force may be set in motion and a foreseeable injury to another results; and (2) an injury wbicb proximately results therefrom. In the instant case, tbe evidence, in our opinion, clearly raises tbe issue of the negligence of appellee in creating a dangerous condition as to tbe use of tbe aisle in question by patrons of appellee’s theater, and we shall not enlarge upon tbe discussion in the original opinion in tbis respect.
We believe tbe evidence is sufficient to submit to tbe jury, as a disputed issue of fact, that tbe injury to appellant was the proximate result of such negligence. As appears from tbe original opinion, we conclude that tbe evidence did not establish as a matter of law tbe cause of tbe falling of tbe girl, Mary Lou Bills. It is true that in an abandoned pleading appellant alleged that tbis girl was caused to faint because of tbe negligence of appellee in not maintaining a proper ventilation in its theater. Tbis evidence was correctly admitted by the trial court, and is entitled to be considered with other evidence on this issue. Tbe fact that appellant went to trial on tbis issue, and then in tbis second trial abandoned tbe allegations, and thereby impliedly admitted that such ground of recovery could not be established, to our minds weakens the probative force of this evidence. Certainly it cannot be said that tbis establishes as a matter of law that Mary Lou Bills fell on tbe occasion in question because she fainted. We pointed out, furthermore, that direct evidence as to tbe position of the girl’s body while she was -falling tended to contradict tbe assertion that she fainted, and thereby wa.s caused to fall from tbe balcony. While this evidence contained in tbe abandoned pleading is not sufficient to establish as a matter of law the cause of said fall, it is, of course, sufficient to raise an issue of such cause. Was there any evidence of probative force controverting tbis evidence as to tbe cause of the fall and raising tbe issue that such occurrence was caused by tbe negligence of appellant?
Generally, it may Ibe said that such an issue can be raised either by direct evidence or by a reasonable inference arising from a fair deduction from evidence establishing existing facts. An established existing condition of a narrow aisle, its space approximately occupied by those using tbe adjacent seats, and safeguarded only by a low protecting rail, could have caused tbe fall as stated in the original opinion. Hence an inference that such fall happened because of tbis condition is not a mere speculation, but is a fair deduction from established facts. A trial court is no more warranted in resolving a fair deduction, or a reasonable inference, drawn from established facts, against appel-lee, than it would be warranted in so resolving any other disputed evidence. In moving for peremptory instruction, appellee must be deemed to have admitted tbe truth of all material evidence offered by appellant. It also must be deemed to have admitted as a fact every favorable inference, fairly and reasonably dedueible from such evidence. If it is fairly and reasonably dedueible from tbe evidence that, in tbe instant case, Mary Lou Bills was caused to fall by reason of. stumbling in tbe darkened and narrow aisle, and was unable to protect herself on account of a low guard rail, then such inference must be deemed by tbe trial court to have been admitted as a fact by appellee when it presented the motion for peremptory instruction. Tbis tbe trial court did not do, but must have regarded such deduction as mere speculation unwarranted from tbe facts. To tbis we could not agree, and hence reversed and remanded tbe case.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.