Court Opinion

ID: 9580452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:05:06.379615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:17.138719
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that appellee voluntarily resigned his position without good cause and is therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, I must respectfully dissent.
This case arose out of a dispute involving appellee’s teaching contract. Appellee filed an application for unemployment benefits. The application was granted, appellee was awarded benefits, and Bulloch Academy filed an appeal. At the hearing on that appeal, the administrative hearing officer rendered a decision in favor of Bulloch Academy. On appeal by appellee, the Board of Review of the Department of Labor affirmed the administrative officer’s decision with one dissent. Appellee filed an appeal from that decision to the Superior Court of Bulloch County, which reversed the decision of the board of review, stating that it could find no evidence to support the board’s findings. This appeal was brought from that ruling.
A brief recitation of the facts is necessary to put the issues in proper perspective. During a disagreement between appellee and the headmistress over the dismissal of his assistant, appellee offered to resign if the headmistress would type a letter of resignation. The headmistress offered to prepare the letter and ordered appellee to remove his personal effects from the premises. In compliance therewith, appellee removed his effects from the premises. A disagreement later ensued between appellee and the headmistress over the amount of pay appellee was due on the remainder of his contract, and appellee did not sign the letter of resignation. He left the premises to resolve the contract dispute with the headmistress’ superior but returned to work the next day, at which time he was informed by the headmistress that he had been discharged.
The majority concludes that appellee effectively resigned by making a unilateral decision to resign which was unconditional and effective immediately when it was verbally conveyed to his superior. That holding is based upon Young v. Minton, 49 Ga. App. 545 (176 SE 662) (1934), which states: “[A] resignation may become effective without such acceptance and even impliedly, as by abandonment of all duties and work.”
*46Young is a 1934 case and should be limited to its particular facts and to the era in which it was decided. It was decided during the throes of the depression at a time when employees had very few rights. Since the Young decision, however, the Employment Security Law and other public welfare laws have been passed. The facts of this case must be viewed in light of the purposes and policies behind these new laws. The Employment Security Law was passed to carry out the public policy of providing economic security to displaced employees.
1. The first issue to be decided here is whether the employee effectively resigned his position. A resignation, to be effective, must be made with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 123, 141 (8 SE2d 757) (1940). To constitute a resignation, it must be unconditional and be made with the intent to operate immediately as such. Poland v. Glover, 111 FSupp. 675 (W. D. New York) (1953).
By application of the rules stated above to the facts of this case, it can be seen that appellee never effectively resigned his position. Appellee merely offered to resign at sometime in the future; therefore, his actions did not constitute a formal renouncement or relinquishment of his position. The resignation here contained a condition precedent: appellee offered to resign “if the headmistress would type a letter of resignation.” His offer to resign was not intended to operate immediately but was to be effective when a letter of resignation was typed and signed. Since the condition precedent was not satisfied, no resignation took place.
Contrary to the majority’s assertion that Allen v. Lankford, 170 Ga. App. 605 (317 SE2d 645) (1984), is not authority for the proposition that an immediate resignation cannot be accomplished by an employee’s oral conveyance of his unilateral decision to do so but requires a formal offer and acceptance, I believe it is indistinguishable and controlling on the issue in this case. Allen v. Lankford, is a 1984 case which, although not involving the Employment Security Law, is consistent with the purposes and principles of that law. Allen, a public school teacher, submitted a letter of resignation which read, “I wish to resign my position,” but later withdrew the letter before the board of education accepted it. The court found that “[a] teacher having tendered a written resignation to his principal or superintendent, may regard it as ineffective and withdraw it until it is accepted by the board of education.” Id. at 606. The majority bases its distinction of the Allen case on the language contained in the letter of resignation; however, this factor was not considered in the decision of that case and is therefore not a valid distinguishing factor. Since appellee withdrew his offer to resign before it was accepted by Bulloch Academy, I can find no evidence that an effective resignation took place.
2. Finally, we must consider whether appellee abandoned his du*47ties, which would effectively terminate his employment. “ ‘In order to constitute an abandonment of an office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment.’ ” Patten v. Miller, supra at 139. Whether appellee left with his superior’s permission is in dispute; however, it is uncontested that appellee left in order to resolve a dispute concerning his contract and that he did report to work as usual the next day. Under the circumstances, appellee’s acts are not evidence that he intended to totally relinquish his position. By application of the above rule to the facts of the present case, I can find no evidence that appellee’s acts constituted an abandonment of his employment.
Decided July 15, 1987
Rehearing denied July 31, 1987
J. Michael Hall, for appellant.
Fletcher Farrington, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Annette M. Cowart, Senior Attorney, for appellee.
Since no effective resignation took place and appellee did not abandon his duties in such a manner as to terminate his own employment, appellee is entitled to unemployment compensation and the decision of the superior court should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this dissent.