Court Opinion

ID: 9903399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:35:50.181817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.020368
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

YVELAN PIERRE,

            Appellant,
                                  Case No. 5D23-168
v.                                LT Case No. 16-2008-CF-3055-AXXX-MA

STATE OF FLORIDA,

            Appellee.

_______________________________/

Decision filed March 17, 2023

3.853 Appeal from Circuit Court
for Duval County,
Tatiana Salvador, Judge.

Yvelan Pierre, Milton, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Daren L. Shippy,
Assistant Attorney General,
Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

      AFFIRMED.

SOUD and MACIVER, JJ., concur.
MAKAR, J., concurs, with opinion.
                                                       Case No. 5D23-168
                                   LT Case No. 16-2008-CF-3055-AXXX-MA

MAKAR, J., concurring.

      This case involves the denial of the Yvelan Pierre’s Rule 3.853 motion

for post-conviction DNA testing. The trial court determined the motion was

facially sufficient, and the State was ordered to show cause why DNA testing

should not be ordered. The show cause order directed that the State shall

indicate “any justifications” for denying the defendant’s request, but none

was offered. The State’s one sentence response, instead, stated it had

reviewed the motion and had “no objection to the Court entering an order

directing the State to test materials for DNA comparison.” Nonetheless, the

trial court thereafter entered a detailed order explaining that (a) the evidence

to be tested still existed; and (b) DNA test results would likely be admissible

as evidence; but that (c) no reasonable probability existed that the outcome

of the criminal case against the defendant would have been different with

DNA testing of the evidence. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.853(5)(A)–(B). As such, the

trial court denied the relief sought despite the State’s lack of an objection.

      Because it raised no objection to the motion in the trial court, the State

was directed to file an answer brief in this Court addressing why the relief

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sought should not be granted. The State’s response regarding its lack of an

objection was less than helpful, stating in total as follows:

      The State’s lack of an objection was not binding on the trial court
      the same as the State’s concession of error on appeal is not
      binding on this Court. . . . Moreover, a lack of objection is not the
      same as an agreement or acknowledgement by the State that
      Defendant’s motion has merit. It is nothing more than a lack of
      objection, which may be based on any number of reasons not
      relevant to the merits of the motion.

The lack of an objection to, or even whole-hearted agreement with, a motion

seeking DNA testing, of course, is not binding on the trial court, which is

required to make legislatively mandated findings. § 925.11(2)(f), Fla. Stat.

(2022).

      Even if non-binding, a party’s failure to object to an opposing party’s

motion nevertheless has significance, often that the relief sought should be

granted. When a party does not object to a motion for an extension of time,

for example, a trial court will generally interpret that as implied approval and

have little hesitation in granting relief absent some apparent abuse of the

privilege; the same applies to evidence admitted at trial where no objection

is lodged. Lack of an objection doesn’t diminish a court’s inherent judicial

power to adjudicate a motion—granting it, denying it, in whole or in part—but

it is readily seen as acquiescing in the relief sought in many, if not most,

contexts.

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      The same is true in this case. The lack of an objection to a motion for

DNA testing is a tacit approval, potentially leading a trial court to believe that

the State has studiously apprised the situation and determined that relief is

appropriate. Busy trial judges may even sign off on an order granting relief

without as thorough a review of the record as occurred in this case, believing

the parties are in accord and that the motion is meritorious.

      For these reasons, the lack of an objection should be based on a

reasoned assessment rather than “any number of reasons not relevant to the

merits of the motion.” Objections, or the lack of them, ought not be based on

irrelevancies; instead, a court-ordered response to a facially sufficient motion

for DNA testing should explain the State’s position to assist the trial court in

its requisite findings, analysis, and holding. For instance, on appeal the State

agrees that DNA testing would not lead to a different outcome in the criminal

trial. An objection on that basis with an explanation should have been made

in the trial court versus lodging no objection and putting the entire onus on

the trial court’s shoulders. Alternatively, if the State has no objection to DNA

testing, it should explain how the movant has met the three requisites under

the statute/rule, including an assessment of the probability that the criminal

case’s outcome would be different with DNA testing.

                                        4
      Here, the trial court did a commendable job on its own, without input

from the State, to review the record and transcripts, analyze the legal issues,

and prepare a detailed written order that shows no basis for reversal. A

reasoned assessment from the State in these types of cases, however,

would undoubtedly assist busy trial judges and facilitate their statutory

obligations to make findings and decide whether relief is warranted.

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