Court Opinion

ID: 9916744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 16:03:06.765629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:52.868377
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                             ROBERT GLEGG,
                                Appellant,

                                      v.

           KATALIN VAN DEN HURK and RICHARD PEACEY,
                           Appellees.

                             No. 4D2023-0026

                             [January 10, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Martin J. Bidwill, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE18017682.

  Laura M. Arcaro of the Arcaro Law Group, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellant.

  C. Edward McGee, Jr., of McGee & Huskey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellees.

KLINGENSMITH, C.J.

   Appellant Robert Glegg (“the Father”) brought tort claims in a civil
action in civil court against appellees Katalin Van Den Hurk (“the Mother”)
and Richard Peacey (“the Stepfather”) alleging intentional interference with
custodial rights and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
against both in a dispute stemming from the custody of their then-teenage
daughter. 1 The trial court entered final summary judgment in favor of the
appellees on both counts, and the Father now appeals. We affirm the
summary judgment in favor of the Mother without comment. See Stone v.
Wall, 734 So. 2d 1038, 1047 (Fla. 1999). For the reasons set forth below,
we also affirm summary judgment in favor of the Stepfather.

   Relating to the Stepfather, the allegations centered around his alleged
conspiracy with the Mother’s failure to force the daughter to return to
Canada and back to the Father’s custody against the daughter’s adamant
wishes to remain in Florida. The Father describes this conspiracy as an

1 In 2016, the daughter was granted the right to withdraw from parental control

by an Ontario court.
“international kidnapping.” Relating to the Stepfather, the conspiracy as
alleged included the Stepfather’s failure to prevent the daughter’s
enrollment in a Florida high school, and his acquiescence and failure to
intervene in the daughter’s and the Mother’s plans. This included allowing
the daughter to stay in his home, driving the daughter to attend classes
after enrolling in her Florida high school, allowing the purchase of the
daughter’s school supplies and uniforms, and failing to intervene as the
daughter pursued early admission to attend the University of Miami. The
Father also accuses the Stepfather of assisting the Mother in allegedly
persuading the daughter to obtain her emancipation from the Father in
Canada.

   The standard of review for an entry of summary judgment is de novo.
Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130
(Fla. 2000). Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(a), the summary
judgment standard mirrors the standard for directed verdict; the focus of
the analysis is whether “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Mane FL Corp. v. Beckman, 355
So. 3d 418, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) (quoting In re Amends. to Fla. R. Civ.
P. 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021)).

    Florida recognizes a cause of action for the tortious interference of a
parent’s custodial rights but only in the context of a parent suing a third-
party for such interference. See Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1039. As aptly noted
by Judge Gross, when the purported interference is by a co-parent, “the
family court is better suited than the civil court to address such issues.
In the time that a defendant in a civil suit has to file a motion to dismiss,
a family court judge can hold a hearing, take evidence, and fashion a
remedy.” Davis v. Hilton, 780 So. 2d 974, 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (Gross,
J., concurring specially). Further, family courts have “remedial tools” that
civil courts do not have that can address custody issues between parents
“before it festers into a problem beyond control.” Id. In keeping with the
rationale set forth in Stone and Davis, we hold that such tort claims by
one parent against another should be brought in the family courts, not the
civil courts.

   In contrast, the Father was entitled to bring his tortious interference
action in civil court against any person like the Stepfather who is a third
party to the parent-child relationship. But to prove a claim for intentional
interference of custodial rights, a plaintiff must show:

      (1) the complaining parent has a right to establish or maintain
      a parental or custodial relationship with his/her minor child;
      (2) a party outside of the relationship between the complaining

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      parent and his/her child intentionally interfered with the
      complaining parent’s parental or custodial relationship with
      his/her child by removing or detaining the child from
      returning to the complaining parent, without that parent’s
      consent, or by otherwise preventing the complaining parent
      from exercising his/her parental or custodial rights; (3) the
      outside party’s intentional interference caused harm to the
      complaining parent’s parental or custodial relationship with
      his/her child; and (4) damages resulted from such
      interference.

Stone, 734 So. 2d at 1042.

    We agree with the trial court that the record was devoid of any evidence
supporting the Father’s claim on the custodial interference count against
the Stepfather. The Stepfather was not involved in the relationship
between the daughter and her parents and he left all decisions relating to
custody and the daughter’s residence to her parents. The Stepfather’s
alleged conduct, including providing housing and transportation for the
daughter or failing to intervene in the Mother’s relationship with the
daughter, simply does not constitute intentional interference with the
Father’s parental or custodial relationship with the daughter.            As
explained in Stone, the custodial interference tort typically requires more
tortious conduct than the Stepfather is alleged to have committed here.
See id. at 1043.

   Similarly, the Father’s IIED claim against the Stepfather also fails
because the record evidence does not pass the high threshold for IIED
claims under Florida law. To support a claim for IIED, a plaintiff must
prove:

      (1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless, that
      is, he intended his behavior when he knew or should have
      known that emotional distress would likely result;
      (2) the conduct was outrageous, that is, as to go beyond all
      bounds of decency, and to be regarded as odious and utterly
      intolerable in a civilized community;
      (3) the conduct caused emotional distress; and
      (4) the emotional distress was severe.

Brown v. Brown, 800 So. 2d 359, 362–63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting
Clemente v. Horne, 707 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also
Mellette v. Trinity Mem’l Cemetery, Inc., 95 So. 3d 1043, 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA
2012) (quoting Gallogly v. Rodriguez, 970 So. 2d 470, 471 (Fla. 2d DCA

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2007)). The question of whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous enough
to support an IIED claim is a question of law, not a question of fact. Baker
v. Fla. Nat’l Bank, 559 So. 2d 284, 287 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). While the
Father wildly exaggerates when describing the Stepfather’s conduct as a
conspiracy to “kidnapping,” courts do not focus on the alleged victim’s
subjective response to, or description of, the actor’s conduct. See Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Based
on a review of the record, the Stepfather’s actions and inactions are
nowhere near the level of “outrageous” conduct necessary to establish an
IIED claim under Florida law. See Escadote I Corp. v. Ocean Three Condo.
Ass’n, Inc., 307 So. 3d 938, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (affirming summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s IIED claim because the record did not contain
any evidence sustaining the claim).

  Therefore, the trial court’s final summary judgment in favor of appellees
was proper.

   Affirmed.

GROSS and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                           *         *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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