Court Opinion

ID: 9905084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-28 18:11:11.975909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:24.161791
License: Public Domain

478                           October 19, 2023                            No. 29

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                     STATE OF OREGON

                      STATE OF OREGON,
                      Respondent on Review,
                                 v.
                     DEBORAH LYNN REED,
                       Petitioner on Review.
                   (CC 19CR12088, 18CR64481)
               (CA A170999, A171000) (SC S069360)

    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted December 1, 2022.
   Morgen E. Daniels, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed
the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs was
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender.
   Peenesh Shah, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on
review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Flynn, Chief Justice, and Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog,
Bushong, James, and Masih, Justices.**
    DUNCAN, J.
   The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgments of the circuit court are reversed, and the cases
are remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

______________
   * Appeal from Lincoln County Circuit Court, Sheryl Bachart, Judge. 317
Or App 453, 505 P3d 444 (2022).
    ** Balmer, J., retired December 31, 2022, and did not participate in the deci-
sion of this case. Walters, J., retired December 31, 2022, participated at oral
argument, but did not participate in the decision of this case. Nelson, J., resigned
February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the decision of this case.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)   479
480                                                State v. Reed

          DUNCAN, J.
         Defendant moved to suppress evidence resulting
from a police interrogation. In her motion, defendant asserted
that police officers violated Article I, section 12, of the Oregon
Constitution when they interrogated her in compelling cir-
cumstances without first advising her of her Miranda rights.
The trial court denied the motion, ruling that the interroga-
tion did not occur in compelling circumstances. The case pro-
ceeded to a bench trial, and the trial court convicted defendant
of multiple drug offenses. Thereafter, defendant’s probation
in an earlier case was revoked based in part on the evidence
resulting from the interrogation and her new convictions.
         Defendant appealed both the judgment of conviction
and the judgment revoking her probation, challenging the
trial court’s conclusion that the interrogation did not occur
in compelling circumstances. The appeals were consolidated,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed both judgments. State v.
Reed, 317 Or App 453, 455, 505 P3d 444 (2022). On review,
we reverse and remand. As we explain below, the interroga-
tion occurred in compelling circumstances, specifically:
      •   defendant was on probation and subject to con-
          ditions that, among other things, required her to
          obey all laws, report to her probation officer, answer
          all reasonable inquiries by her probation officer,
          and consent to searches at her probation officer’s
          request if he had reasonable grounds to believe that
          evidence of a probation violation would be found;
      •   two police officers interrupted a mandatory meet-
          ing between defendant and her probation officer in
          the probation officer’s office;
      •   defendant was not free to leave the office without
          her probation officer’s permission, and, because the
          office was in a secured building, she could not exit
          the building on her own;
      •   the police officers told both defendant and the pro-
          bation officer that they wanted them to stay in the
          office; and the police officers accused defendant of
          new crimes.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                                   481

Altogether, those circumstances were compelling. Therefore,
the police officers were required to advise defendant of her
Miranda rights before interrogating her. Because they failed
to do so, evidence resulting from the interrogation must be
suppressed.
       I. HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL FACTS
          The interrogation at issue in this case occurred
while defendant was on probation and subject to statutory
probation conditions, including that she “[o]bey all laws,”
“[r]eport as required and abide by the direction of the super-
vising officer,” “[p]romptly and truthfully answer all reason-
able inquiries by the Department of Corrections or a county
community corrections agency,” and “[c]onsent to the search
of person, vehicle or premises upon the request of a represen-
tative of the supervising officer if the supervising officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a violation will
be found.” ORS 137.540. If defendant’s probation officer had
reasonable grounds to believe that defendant had violated
the conditions of her probation, he could arrest her imme-
diately. See ORS 133.239(2) (authorizing a probation officer
to arrest a probationer); ORS 137.545(2) (providing that a
probationer may be arrested without a warrant for violating
any condition of probation); ORS 144.350(1)(a) (authorizing a
probation officer to order a probationer’s arrest “upon being
informed and having reasonable grounds to believe” that
the probationer violated the conditions of probation).1 If a
court determined that defendant had violated the conditions
of her probation, it could revoke her probation and sentence
her to 19 to 20 months in prison.
          On the day of the interrogation, defendant was
meeting with her probation officer, Eoff, in a small room at
the probation office. Defendant’s attendance at the meeting
was mandatory. She could not leave the meeting without
Eoff’s permission. Moreover, because the probation office
was secured, defendant was not free to move around the
office alone. She had to be escorted at all times.
    1
      A probation officer may lawfully arrest a probationer upon a lesser quan-
tum of proof than would be required for a police officer to arrest someone. See
State v. Gulley, 324 Or 57, 65, 921 P2d 396 (1996) (“ ‘[R]easonable grounds’ means
a quantum of information that is greater than that which would justify a ‘stop,’
but less than that required for ‘probable cause.’ ”).
482                                            State v. Reed

         Two police officers came to the room where defen-
dant and Eoff were meeting. They asked defendant and
Eoff if they could speak with them, and defendant and Eoff
agreed. Eoff asked them if they wanted him to excuse defen-
dant so that they could talk with her alone. They said no and
that they wanted to talk to both defendant and Eoff. Eoff
did not excuse defendant. Eoff had not finished his meeting
with defendant, so defendant was not free to leave his office.
         One of the police officers stood in the doorway, and
the other slid past him and sat down in the room. The police
officers did not advise defendant of her Miranda rights. Nor
did they tell her that she could terminate their questioning.
         The police officers confronted defendant. They
told her that they “knew everything that was happening.”
Defendant was on probation for drug-related crimes, and
the police officers told her that they “knew she was selling
drugs again.” They stated that they had information that
she had sold drugs earlier that day. They also accused her
of possessing drugs as they spoke. They demanded to know
“how much she had on her.” Defendant denied having drugs
on her and stated that the officers could search her person
and her purse. One of the officers asked defendant if he could
search her car, and defendant gave him her keys. Defendant
made incriminating statements. Then, about two minutes
into the interrogation, the officer with defendant’s keys left
to search defendant’s car. During the search, the officer dis-
covered evidence of drug-related crimes.
         Meanwhile, the other officer continued to interro-
gate defendant. In response to that part of the interroga-
tion, defendant made additional incriminating statements
and allowed the officer to search her phone and purse. Those
searches resulted in the discovery of additional evidence of
drug-related crimes.
         The state charged defendant with manufacturing,
delivering, and possessing heroin (Counts 1-3), and manu-
facturing, possessing, and delivering methamphetamine
(Counts 4-6). Defendant moved to suppress evidence result-
ing from the police officers’ interrogation on the ground
that the officers had violated Article I, section 12, by
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                                 483

interrogating her in compelling circumstances without first
advising her of her Miranda rights. In ruling on the motion,
the trial court divided the interrogation into two parts: the
part before the officer left to search defendant’s car and the
part after he left. The trial court denied the motion as to the
first part of the interrogation but granted it as to the second.
          Defendant waived her right to a jury trial, and the
trial court convicted defendant of Counts 3-6. Based in part
on the evidence resulting from the interrogation and defen-
dant’s conviction, defendant’s probation was subsequently
revoked.
          Defendant appealed the judgments in both the
criminal case and the probation case, challenging the trial
court’s denial of her motion to suppress the evidence result-
ing from the first part of the interrogation. The appeals
were consolidated, and the Court of Appeals affirmed both
judgments. Reed, 317 Or App at 455. On defendant’s peti-
tion, we allowed review to address whether the circum-
stances surrounding the first part of the interrogation were
compelling.2
                       II. DISCUSSION
          Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution
provides, “No person shall be * * * compelled in any crimi-
nal prosecution to testify against himself.” It “guarantees
a right to remain silent and a ‘derivative or adjunct right
to have the advice of counsel in responding to police ques-
tioning.’ ” State v. Ward, 367 Or 188, 190-91, 475 P3d 420
(2020) (quoting State v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364, 399, 374 P3d
853 (2016), cert den, 580 US 1070 (2017)). Police officers are
required to inform individuals of those rights prior to inter-
rogating them “in custody or otherwise compelling circum-
stances.” State v. McAnulty, 356 Or 432, 454, 338 P3d 653
(2014), cert den, 577 US 829 (2015).
          The Article I, section 12, requirement that police
officers inform individuals of their rights prior to certain

    2
      In the Court of Appeals, the state argued that, even if Miranda warnings
were required and improperly withheld, defendant’s voluntary consent to the
search of her car was sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation
such that evidence discovered in the car was nonetheless admissible. Because the
state has not renewed that argument in this court, we do not address it.
484                                                                State v. Reed

interrogations is similar to, but broader than, the require-
ment under the federal constitution established in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires police officers to inform individuals of their right
to remain silent and their right to counsel before subjecting
them to custodial interrogation. Id. at 478-79. The purpose
of requiring police officers to provide that information—that
is, to give what are now known as Miranda warnings—is to
counter the coercive effects inherent in custodial interroga-
tions. Id. at 448. The Court recognized that custodial inter-
rogations can impair individuals’ awareness of, and willing-
ness to assert, their rights. Id. at 449, 467. It explained that
police interrogations can involve a variety of coercive ele-
ments, including certain locations and interrogation tactics.
Id. at 445-55. It observed that modern interrogations tend
to involve psychologically coercive tactics rather than phys-
ically coercive ones. Id. at 448. And it further observed that
psychologically coercive tactics can make individuals less
aware of their rights and undermine their will to resist pres-
sures to waive them. Id. at 455, 465. The Court reviewed and
quoted police manuals describing tactics for investigators to
use when interrogating a person, id. at 448-56, including
conducting the interrogation at the investigator’s office or
other location of the investigator’s choosing, isolating the
person, proceeding as if the person’s guilt is already an
established fact, giving false information, and keeping the
person “off balance, for example, by trading on his insecurity
about himself or his surroundings,” id. at 455.3 Such tac-
tics can “impair [a person’s] capacity for rational judgment.”
     3
       Regarding the location of an interrogation, the Miranda court quoted one
manual as advising that, “ ‘[i]f at all practicable, the interrogation should take
place in the investigator’s office or at least in a room of his own choice’ ” to reduce
the subject’s awareness of his rights and support he might have from family or
friends. 384 US at 449-50 (quoting Charles E. O’Hara & Gregory L. O’Hara,
Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation, 99 (1st ed 1956)). “ ‘The subject should be
deprived of every psychological advantage. * * * In his own office, the investigator
possesses all the advantages. The atmosphere suggests the invincibility of the
forces of the law.’ ” Miranda, 384 US at 449-50 (quoting O’Hara, Fundamentals at
99). Regarding the manner of interrogation, the Court noted that “the manuals
instruct the police to display an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt and from
outward appearance to maintain only an interest in confirming certain details.
The guilt of the subject is to be posited as fact.” Miranda, 384 US at 450.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                                   485

Id. at 465. They can “overcome free choice in producing a
statement.” Id. at 474; id. at 469 (“The circumstances sur-
rounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly
to overbear the will” of the person being interrogated.).
          The Miranda warnings inform individuals that
they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say
can and will be used against them in a court of law, that
they have the right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation, and that, if they cannot afford an attorney,
one will be appointed for them on request before the interro-
gation. Id. at 479. The warnings are intended to inform indi-
viduals of their right to remain silent, assure them a con-
tinuous opportunity to exercise that right, and warn them
of the consequences of waiving it. Id. at 467-69. They serve
to counteract “the potentiality for compulsion” and ensure
that, if an individual makes a statement during a custodial
interrogation, the statement is “the product of free choice.”
Id. at 457. The warnings are necessary because the right to
be free from compelled self-incrimination “is fulfilled only
when the person is guaranteed the right to remain silent
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his
own will.” Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted). If
the warnings are required before an interrogation but are
not given, any statements resulting from the interrogation
must be suppressed. Id. at 457 (holding that, even if state-
ments might not have been found “involuntary in traditional
terms,” suppression was required where officers failed “to
afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interroga-
tion to insure that the statements were truly the product of
free choice”).4

    More recently, in State v. Jackson, 364 Or 1, 430 P3d 1067 (2018), this court
described interrogation strategies, some of which are similar to those described
in Miranda. Specifically, it described the “Reid Technique,” which involves “iso-
lating a suspect in a small room to increase anxiety; confronting the suspect
with accusations of guilt and emphasizing the strength of the evidence against
the suspect; offering sympathy and justifications or rationalizations to allow the
suspect to minimize the crime; and encouraging the suspect to see confession as
a means of terminating the interview.” Id. at 29.
    4
      The Miranda Court summarized its holdings as follows:
        “To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody
    or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
    way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination
    is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the
486                                                             State v. Reed

         Oregon law recognizes that circumstances other
than custody can be coercive—that is, they can undermine
an individual’s ability or willingness to exercise their consti-
tutional rights. Because those circumstances can have the
effects that the Miranda warnings are intended to counter,
Oregon law requires police officers to give Miranda warnings
before interrogating an individual in those circumstances.
State v. Magee, 304 Or 261, 266, 744 P2d 250 (1987) (Article I,
section 12, “furnishes an independent basis” for requiring
that police administer Miranda warnings). Thus, under
Oregon law, police officers “are required to give Miranda
warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling cir-
cumstances.” McAnulty, 356 Or at 454 (emphasis added).
         There is no bright-line rule under Oregon law for
when circumstances are compelling for the purposes of
Article I, section 12. This court has held that, “before ques-
tioning, police must give Miranda warnings to a person who
is in full custody or in circumstances that create a setting
which judges would and officers should recognize to be com-
pelling.” State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638, 136 P3d 22
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether circum-
stances are compelling for the purposes of Article I, section 12,
“does not turn on either the officer’s or the suspect’s sub-
jective belief or intent; rather, it turns on how a reasonable
person in the suspect’s position would have understood

    privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the
    person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will
    be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be
    warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
    anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the
    right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attor-
    ney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
    Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
    interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
    afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these
    rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and
    until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial,
    no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.”
384 US at 478-79. This court has described the warnings required by Article I,
section 12, of the Oregon Constitution as “Miranda-like” warnings. See, e.g., State
v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 7, 791 P2d 836 (1990). But, for ease of reference, in this opin-
ion, we use the term “Miranda warnings” to refer to the warnings required by
state and federal law. Because no warnings were given in this case, there is no
need for us to determine whether there is any difference between the state and
federal requirements.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                487

[their] situation.” State v. Shaff, 343 Or 639, 645, 175 P3d
454 (2007).
          When determining whether a defendant’s encoun-
ter with police officers was compelling, this court “has con-
sidered a host of factors,” including: (1) the length of the
encounter, (2) the location of the encounter, (3) the defen-
dant’s ability to terminate the encounter, and (4) the amount
of pressure exerted on the defendant. Roble-Baker, 340 Or at
640-41. “Those factors are neither the exclusive factors that
this court will consider, nor are they to be applied mechan-
ically. Rather, in determining whether the police placed a
defendant in compelling circumstances, this court will con-
sider all the circumstances, and its overarching inquiry is
whether the officers created the sort of police-dominated
atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to coun-
teract.” Id. at 641. The totality of the circumstances include
whether the defendant could face administrative sanctions
or other consequences if they did not cooperate. See, e.g.,
State v. Breazile, 189 Or App 138, 146, 74 P3d 1099 (2003)
(explaining that, because the question was “how a reason-
able person in defendant’s position would have understood
the circumstances of his questioning[,] [d]efendant’s status
as a prisoner and his understanding of the rules govern-
ing his status [were] relevant in making that determina-
tion” (emphasis in original)); see also State v. Shelby, 314
Or App 425, 429, 497 P3d 772 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 209
(2022) (concluding that defendant, an inmate, was in com-
pelling circumstances during a jail disciplinary hearing
because defendant was not adequately informed that he did
not have to attend the hearing and because defendant could
have faced administrative sanctions as a result of the hear-
ing); State v. Heise-Fay, 274 Or App 196, 208, 360 P3d 615
(2015) (explaining that the presence of DHS workers during
police questioning added to the coercive implications of the
encounter because “a reasonable person in defendant’s situ-
ation would have been concerned that, if she was not ‘hon-
est and cooperative’ and was arrested, DHS would take her
children into protective custody”).
        Essentially, under Oregon law, Miranda warnings
are required when there is a significant risk that conditions
488                                            State v. Reed

created by the state could undermine a person’s ability or
willingness to assert their constitutional rights to remain
silent and have counsel present during a police interro-
gation. See Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 641 (explaining that
whether warnings were required before police questioning
depends on whether the circumstances created the type
of atmosphere that Miranda warnings were intended to
counteract); Miranda, 384 US at 449, 467 (stating that the
warnings serve to protect against the “potentiality for com-
pulsion” and ensure that a defendant’s statements are “the
product of free choice”). The warnings are intended to help
ensure that, if a person submits to interrogation, despite
their right not to, the submission is a knowing and volun-
tary choice. In doing so, the warnings help ensure that any
statements resulting from the interrogation are reliable.
          The state bears the burden of proving that a defen-
dant’s unwarned statements were made under circum-
stances that were not compelling. Roble-Baker, 340 Or at
639. If Miranda warnings are not given when required,
resulting evidence must be suppressed. State v. Vondehn,
348 Or 462, 476, 236 P3d 691 (2010) (explaining that the
state may not use either physical evidence or incriminating
statements derived from a violation of Article I, section 12,
against defendant). Whether the circumstances were com-
pelling is a question of law that we review for legal error,
and we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical
fact if there is any evidence in the record to support them.
Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 633; Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485,
487, 443 P2d 621 (1968).
          Having reviewed the relevant law, we return to the
facts of this case. As we explain below, we conclude that the
state failed to carry its burden of proving that defendant’s
unwarned statements were made in circumstances that were
not compelling. As mentioned, whether the circumstances
surrounding a defendant’s interrogation are compelling
depends on the totality of the circumstances, including, but
not limited to, the length of the interrogation, the location
of the interrogation, the defendant’s ability to terminate the
interrogation, and the pressure exerted on the defendant.
Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 640-41. Here, the duration of the
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                 489

interrogation was short, which weighs against a conclusion
that the circumstances were compelling, but the other fac-
tors weigh in favor of a conclusion that the circumstances
were compelling.
          First, the interrogation took place in a police-
dominated environment. Defendant was in a small room,
alone with her probation officer and the two police officers.
The room was in the probation office, which was secured,
and, like a police station, served as the place of work for
officers who, among other duties, investigate new criminal
activity. See Miranda, 384 US at 449-50 (describing manuals
that advise investigators to conduct interrogations in their
offices because the location “suggests the invincibility of the
forces of the law” (quoting Charles E. O’Hara & Gregory L.
O’Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation, 99 (1st ed
1956))).
          Second, defendant was not free to leave. Defendant
was subject to a probation condition that required her to
report to her probation officer, and she was attending a man-
datory meeting with her probation officer. As a legal matter,
she could not leave without his permission. As a practical
matter, she could not leave without his assistance because
she could not move around the probation office alone. When
the two police officers came to the office, defendant’s proba-
tion officer asked them if they wanted him to excuse defen-
dant. They said no and that they wanted to talk to both the
probation officer and defendant. Their statements conveyed
both that defendant was not free to leave and that the police
officers were there to talk to defendant about matters that
would be of interest to her probation officer. And, as an addi-
tional bar to defendant’s ability to leave, one of the police
officers stood in the office’s doorway.
          Third, the pressure exerted on defendant was sig-
nificant. Although the police officers requested to speak with
defendant and her probation officer, and defendant and her
probation officer agreed to that request, the police officers
then told the probation officer that they did not want him to
excuse defendant. Thus, at a time when defendant was not
free to leave, she was then subjected to confrontational ques-
tioning that assumed her guilt. They told defendant that they
490                                             State v. Reed

“knew everything” that she was doing. They told her that
they “knew she was selling drugs” and that they wanted to
know “how much she had on her.” They “display[ed] an air of
confidence in [her] guilt” and “posited [her guilt] as a fact.”
Miranda, 384 US at 450. Even more importantly though,
defendant was subject to probation conditions that created
a significant risk that she would believe either that she did
not have the right to remain silent during the interroga-
tion or that, if she exercised that right, she would be penal-
ized. As mentioned, defendant was required to obey all laws,
answer all reasonable inquiries by her probation officer, and
consent to searches at her probation officer’s request if he
had reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of a proba-
tion violation would be found. Although the police officers
did not explicitly point out defendant’s probation conditions,
defendant was responsible for knowing them, and everyone
in the office during the interrogation would have been aware
that defendant was subject to probation conditions and that
she could be arrested, prosecuted, and penalized for violat-
ing them. Defendant’s probation officer was in the room with
the police officers and defendant; indeed, the police officers
had had him stay. A reasonable person in defendant’s posi-
tion would have recognized that (1) if she did not answer the
police officers’ questions, her probation officer could repeat
the questions; (2) if she did not answer her probation officer,
he could arrest her for violating a condition of her probation;
and (3) if a court found that she had violated her probation,
it could send her to prison for up to 20 months. Similarly, a
reasonable person in defendant’s position would have recog-
nized that refusing to consent to a search could ultimately
lead to her arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment for violat-
ing the condition that she consent to searches at her proba-
tion officer’s request if he has reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence of a probation violation would be found. Thus,
defendant was in state-created circumstances that carried
a significant risk of undermining her ability or willingness
to exercise her constitutional rights. She was facing the pos-
sibility of immediate arrest and subsequent prosecution and
imprisonment for violating the conditions of her probation.
Those circumstances were compelling circumstances for the
purposes of Article I, section 12.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                                                  491

         Although this case involves state law, we note that
the Supreme Court has concluded that probation conditions
that penalize the exercise of a person’s Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent and right to counsel are coercive. As
discussed above, federal law requires Miranda warnings
before custodial interrogations. It does not require them in
“otherwise compelling circumstances” as Oregon law does.
McAnulty, 356 Or at 454. But, in cases involving whether, for
the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, a defendant’s state-
ments were compelled, the Supreme Court has stated that
interrogations of probationers whose conditions of probation
require them to answer questions by their probation officers
are compelled.5
          In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420, 104 S Ct
1136, 79 L Ed 2d 409 (1984), the defendant moved to sup-
press statements made during a meeting with his probation
officer. The Supreme Court considered the conditions of the
defendant’s probation to determine whether the defendant’s
statements were compelled. Id. at 426. One of the conditions
required the defendant to “be truthful with [his] probation
officer ‘in all matters.’ ” Id. at 422. The Court explained that
a state may not impose an affirmative obligation to respond
if the “questions put to the probationer, however relevant to
his probationary status, call for answers that would incrim-
inate him in a pending or later criminal prosecution.” Id. at
435. Therefore, the Court further explained, if a state were
to assert, either expressly or by implication, “that invoca-
tion of the privilege [against compelled self-incrimination]
would lead to revocation of probation, * * * the probationer’s
answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a
criminal prosecution.” Id. Ultimately, however, the Court

     5
       Under the Fifth Amendment, a person is ordinarily required to timely
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US
420, 427, 104 S Ct 1136, 79 L Ed 2d 409 (1984). The “usual rule” is that, if a
person “makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the government has
not ‘compelled’ him to incriminate himself.” Id. at 427-28. But the “usual rule”
does not apply in custodial interrogations, id. at 429, or when “the assertion of
the privilege is penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent, and
* * * compel * * * incriminating testimony,” id. at 434 (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted). Thus, when presented with the question of whether a per-
son’s failure to timely assert the privilege during a noncustodial interrogation
should be excused, the Court determines whether the person’s disclosure was
“compelled.” Id. at 434-35.
492                                                          State v. Reed

concluded that the defendant’s statements were not com-
pelled, because the defendant’s probation condition “pro-
scribed only false statements; it said nothing about his free-
dom to decline to answer particular questions[.]” Id. at 437.
         Following Murphy, the Ninth Circuit held in United
States v. Saechao, 418 F3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir 2005), that
statements made by the defendant—who was subject to
Oregon’s statutory probation conditions, including the condi-
tion requiring him to “promptly and truthfully answer all rea-
sonable inquiries” by his probation officer—were compelled.
The court noted that, in contrast to the probation condition at
issue in Murphy, the defendant’s probation condition imposed
an “affirmative obligation to respond to his probation officer’s
questions.” Id. at 1078. In other words, the defendant was
“compelled by threat of penalty to answer the probation offi-
cer’s inquiry.” Id. In light of that threat, the court concluded
that the state had taken the “ ‘impermissible step’ ” of requir-
ing the probationer “ ‘to choose between making incriminat-
ing statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by
remaining silent.’ ” Id. (quoting Murphy, 465 US at 436).
         Thus, in both Murphy and Saechao, the courts
concluded that, for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
statements resulting from the interrogation of probationers
whose conditions of probation require them to make the
statements are compelled and, therefore, inadmissible. The
logic underlying those cases supports our conclusion that,
for the purposes of Article I, section 12, the circumstances
in the interrogation at issue in this case were compelling.6
                         III.    CONCLUSION
         In sum, we conclude that, before the police officers
questioned defendant, their actions created a significant
risk of undermining defendant’s ability or willingness to
exercise her constitutional rights. To counter the coercive
effect of their actions, the police officers were required to
inform defendant of her Miranda rights before interrogating
her. Because they failed to do so, evidence resulting from the
interrogation is inadmissible.

    6
      Defendant does not argue that any of the conditions of her probation vio-
lated her constitutional rights, and we express no opinion on the matter.
Cite as 371 Or 478 (2023)                               493

       The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
judgments of the circuit court are reversed, and the cases
are remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.