Court Opinion

ID: 9529827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:54:35.219723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:55.951254
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the equipment error renders the defendant’s Miranda waiver and subsequent statement involuntary, and therefore, I dissent. There is no indication in the record that the “promise” to tape the interview was something for which the defendant bargained. In other words, the record is devoid of any facts that suggest that but for this promise, the defendant would have refused to sign the Miranda waiver or give a statement. The document signed by the defendant is clearly an inartfully worded boilerplate Miranda waiver form used in Kankakee County to appease a local circuit court judge who will not admit an audiotape of a confession or statement unless the defendant has agreed in writing to the audiotape. There is absolutely no indication in the record that the tape’s technical deficiency was a result of intentional wrongdoing by the police. The lack of audio on the tape simply appears to be an unfortunate equipment malfunction or unintentional operator error. It does not rise to the level of an unkept law enforcement promise sufficient to bring into question the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement. Traditionally, such unkept promises or improper inducements that defeat seemingly voluntary statements have taken the form of promises of probation (People v. Jones, 8 Ill. App. 3d 849, 291 N.E.2d 305 (1972)), or other improper promises of leniency (People v. Overturf, 67 Ill. App. 3d 741, 385 N.E.2d 166 (1979)). It is interesting to note that in Overturf, this court discussed the fact that defendant bargained for the promise of leniency before giving his inculpatory statement. Overturf, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 744. When finding such a promise of leniency rendered defendant’s statement involuntary, the Overturf court focused almost entirely on the circumstances surrounding the bargain. Overturf, 67 Ill. App. 3d at 744. Again, there is no indication in the record that the promise to audiotape was something for which this defendant bargained. This court has acknowledged that not every unkept promise, even a promise of leniency, renders a statement involuntary. In People v. Anderson, Justice Slater noted that a “promise of leniency did not render defendant’s statement involuntary, since the defendant admitted that it had no effect on his decision to cooperate because he had made that decision prior to the promise.” People v. Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d 636, 641, 587 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (1992). The proffered evidence from Detective Etzel in this case shows that before defendant signed the waiver form, he was read his Miranda rights verbally and agreed to waive them and speak to the police. Therefore, just as in Anderson, it appears from the State’s proffer that this defendant also agreed to make a statement “prior to the promise” to record the statement contained in the written boilerplate Miranda waiver form. The majority claims Gilliam states that “whether the police made any threats or promises to obtain the defendant’s statement” is “of particular importance” when analyzing the voluntariness of a statement. 368 Ill. App. 3d at 552. That is a strained reading of the test for voluntariness set forth by the Gilliam court. The Gilliam court stated: “[T]he test of voluntariness is whether the defendant made the statement freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the defendant’s will was overcome at the time he or she confessed. [Citation.] Whether a statement is voluntarily given depends upon the totality of the circumstances. The question must be answered on the facts of each case; no single fact is dispositive. Factors to consider when determining voluntariness include: the defendant’s age, intelligence, background, experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time of questioning; the legality and duration of the detention; the duration of the questioning; and any physical or mental abuse by police, including the existence of threats or promises.” (Emphasis added.) Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500-01. Clearly, the “threats or promises” listed by the Gilliam court were threats or promises related to “physical or mental abuse.” Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 501. There is no indication that the Supreme Court placed “particular importance” on these threats or promises above and beyond any other factor. In fact, the Supreme Court stated, “no single fact is dispositive.” Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d at 500. Looking at the totality of the circumstances and all of the factors set forth in Gilliam, the failure to audiotape the defendant’s statement cannot be said to have rendered it involuntary. Furthermore, after stating that the police broke their promise, the majority notes that a court “need not determine whether the defendant would have signed the voluntary statement form if he had not been promised that his statement would be preserved through video and audiotape.” 368 Ill. App. 3d at 553. It cites no authority for this proposition because none exists. Today, the majority announces an ipso facto test that has no basis or foundation in well-settled precedent. To my knowledge, no court, until today, has held that the test to determine whether a defendant’s inculpatory statement was voluntary starts and finishes with the inquiry of whether the police broke a promise. (If the majority is correct, then by analogy a “john” who passes either counterfeit money or a bad check to a hooker is guilty of rape.) Certainly, broken promises are but one factor announced in Gilliam. And, as this court has previously acknowledged, a broken promise is not by itself sufficient to render a statement involuntary. See Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The Anderson court correctly noted that the broken promise “had no effect on [the defendant’s] decision to cooperate” and, therefore, when correctly reviewing the totality of the circumstances, found that defendant’s inculpatory statement was voluntary. Anderson, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 641. The majority’s declaration that the sole factor of a broken promise is by itself “sufficient evidence that the defendant’s statement was not voluntarily given” (368 Ill. App. 3d at 553) is a rapid departure from and expansion of well-settled law to which I cannot agree. In essence, today the appellate court has overruled the Supreme Court of Illinois by replacing the multi-factor Gilliam test with its own one-factor (broken promise) test. I am reasonably comfortable that we cannot do that. Finally, I disagree with the trial court’s assertion that allowing the officer to testify to the content of defendant’s statement would somehow force the defendant to testify and violate his fifth amendment rights. If that were the case, no officer would ever be allowed to testify to inculpatory statements made by a defendant for fear that the defendant would have to take the stand to refute the officer’s testimony. For that matter, taking the trial court’s reasoning to its logical extreme, the State would never be allowed to put on any inculpatory evidence for fear that the only way to rebut such evidence would be for the defendant to testify to proclaim his innocence and refute the State’s evidence.