Court Opinion

ID: 9653708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:52:16.881647+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:00.854220
License: Public Domain

BARRON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While I concur with the majority that this case must be reversed, I would reverse and render in favor of appellant.
The evidence shows that Mrs. Russell was a widow of the age of 79 at the time of the accident which occurred on October 18, 1965. The accident happened shortly after 11:00 a. m. on said date at the Harris County Domed Stadium, Houston, Texas. Mrs. Russell was visiting the stadium with her sister and a friend and taking a paid guided tour of the stadium. The accident occurred on the fifth floor of the stadium at the west entrance to the press boxes, on a step dividing.a split elevation entrance to the press boxes. The step in question is wide in length and was described as being about as wide as the courtroom in which the trial was held. There is a corridor or walkway between the involved step and the press box area which is approximately eight feet wide. Mrs. Russell could not point out precisely where she fell, but she did limit it to the general area. While there was much dispute con*749cerning the depth of the riser to the tread of the step, in my opinion, the jury was justified from the testimony of her attorney in believing that there was an 8⅞6 inch riser approximately on the first step at the place where appellee pointed out she fell. The jury was also justified in believing that the tread of the step was 12 inches. There was only one step involved. From the top surface, one step down and one additional step to the lower level was required to enter the area. Mrs. Russell testified that she fell by reason of the depth of the first step. Only about 1%6th of an inch is possibly involved under any theory.
The entire area in question is constructed of concrete and is covered with a non-skid finish. There were no handrails at the step in question. In addition to tours, the area is used by the general public for ball games. The testimony shows that at the time of trial a large number of people, estimated at 600,000, had used the step, and that no other accidents had been reported by reason of such use. Mrs. Russell’s group was led by a tour guide, and at each point of interest the guide would group the people together and give a little spiel on the point of interest. On a given signal by the guide, the group would move on to the next point. This particular tour was a leisure tour for elderly people. Mrs. Russell expressed a strong desire to view the press boxes because many important people had been there and she had read about it. There were about 40 people in her group, and before she started to use the step, about one-half of that number had gone down into the area and she had observed them. The guide had preceded appellee to the lower level and was apparently waiting for the entire group to get there. Mrs. Russell was near the step, and she put her right foot out and stepped down. She testified that the step was deeper than she thought, deeper than an ordinary step, and it threw her. As a result thereof she fell down on the concrete floor and sustained personal injuries.
Mrs. Russell had never before been to the fifth floor of the Astrodome and had never before used the particular step. However, she testified that the entire area was well lighted and that there was nothing concealed. She could plainly see the place where she stepped. There was no debris or any rubblish on the floor, and the place was clean. She saw no defects in the step and none were shown. She testified that it was open, apparent and obvious to her. Ap-pellee further testified that she thought she could move down on the step, but is was too deep for her, and that when she began to step down and when she reached the step it was deeper than she thought and “it threw me.” When she judged the depth of a step she simply looked at it as she came to it. Her eyesight was good and her depth perception was normal. She could see the place where she was stepping, and she did not slip. Neither was she distracted nor was there any foreign substance on the step. Mrs. Russell was shown to be an unusually robust woman considering her age.
The Astrodome was built by Harris County, Texas, which employed as architects the firms of Wilson, Morris, Crain & Anderson and Lloyd and Morgan. H. A. Lott, Inc. was general contractor. Plans and specifications were prepared by the architects and were presented to the City of Houston for a building permit. A building permit was issued to Harris County, and the plans and specifications apparently complied with the building code of the City of Houston applicable to the construction of the Astrodome. Talbott Wilson, the architect, stated that there is no requirement under the Houston Building Code for a handrailing on the step in question, and that the single step is not a “stairway” under the building code. There was much dispute concerning the applicable building code, but no issues of fact were submitted to the jury relative to the alleged violation thereof or compliance therewith. The various *750codes were used for comparison, presumably on the question of what a reasonable step would be so far as depth is concerned. Section 2870 of the Houston City Code of 1942 was introduced into evidence to show that “stairways” were required to have handrails. The evidence conclusively shows, however, that the 1963 building code was adopted by the City of Houston on March 20, 1963, and that the Astrodome was built under a special code which applied to the stadium exclusively. The stadium building permit was issued on March 6, 1963. Mr. Wilson, the architect, further testified that the 1942 code had no application to the construction of the fifth floor, and that the area involved does not fall under the code definition of a stairway. The area and place of the. fall is known and described as a concourse. He testified that a handrail is not required at such place. Wilson testified that a stairway is a connection between two floors or levels of a building, and that it is required to be enclosed and have a fire door to it. He testified that the place of the fall is a change of elevation within an identical level or floor, more or less as a curbing is a change of elevation in a street.
Charles Marley Green, an architect called to testify by appellee, testified to a formula for constructing steps. He testified that the better formula is that the sum of the rise and the tread should equal seventeen to seventeen and one-half inches, and that such is the commonly-known rule that is used for stairways. In the case of a public building the witness testified that the maximum rise of a step should be 7¾ inches and “that is a little bit more than allowed.” He testified that all “stairways” should have handrails and that the steps should be uniform. It is extremely difficult to get each step of identical height. Consequently %oths of an inch is recognized as an allowable tolerance in both the tread and the rise. The witness stated that the involved step or steps did not fit within generally accepted architectural principles, but he was talking about “stairways”.
Green further testified that when he looked at the step at the west entrance from the top level down to the lower level the depth of the step was not readily apparent to him from where he stood. He gave as his reason that the color of the concrete was the same on the steps on both landings, and therefore it was difficult for him to judge the variation. Mr. Routzong, Director of Stadium Operations, however, testified that Torginal was not on the floor at the time of the accident in 1965, but that a substance called Sanifene was there. Sani-fene creates a sheen on the floor.
County Judge Bill Elliott testified that Houston Sports Association, Inc. had no right to alter the involved steps under the express terms of the lease contract between appellant and the county. The lease was never admitted into evidence, but the portion of the contract above referred to was read to him and was acknowledged to be a portion of the lease contract. Harris County hired the architects and consulted with appellant relative to the plans and specifications. The Astrodome was completed in April, 1965. The accident occurred approximately six months after appellant took possession thereof. Appellant was familiar with the steps involved, but there is no evidence that any employee of appellant knew the actual height of the step.
Lamar L. Monkres, chief plan checker in the Building Inspection Department of Public Works, City of Houston, testified that the place where the accident happened is not a stairway, and that about 8½ inches would be the maximum approved riser in a stadium such as the Astrodome. He further testified, however, that over 7½ inches would be a violation of the 1942 and 1963 codes for a stairway, and that the place of the accident was not a stairway. He testified that 81/2 inches is permitted in this case.
We must, of course, view the competent testimony from appellee’s standpoint. An issue of fact is raised if, discarding all adverse evidence, and giving credit to all evidence favorable to plaintiff, and indulg*751ing every legitimate conclusion favorable to plaintiff which might have been drawn from the facts proved, the jury might have found in favor of appellee, Mrs. Russell.
The doctrine applicable here is most elusive and difficult. Some cases seem to indicate that there is a tendency to be sparing in the use of the concepts of “no duty” and volenti non fit injuria. The doctrine of assumed risk embodies two separate concepts. Assumed risk is thought of as negativing the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, particularly the duty of an owner-occupier to persons coming upon his premises. Such concept is known as no duty. The plaintiff must show the existence of a duty and its breach, and the no duty rule is a part of plaintiff’s case and is not termed a defense. Volenti non fit injuria is a defense, and in its application the plaintiff assumes the risk when he deliberately chooses to encounter a risk created by the defendant’s breach of duty toward him. The doctrine embodies the element of an intelligent choice and presupposes the existence of a duty. In a volenti situation, the burden of pleading, proof and submission of issues is upon the defendant. See Halepeska v. Callihan Interests, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 368 (Tex.Sup.).
“No duty” is the term given to assumed risk in Texas in situations where the plaintiff is injured on the defendant’s premises. The doctrine is that the occupier of land owes his invitees a duty to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition or to warn them of dangers. But the occupier owes no duty if the invitee knows about the condition and appreciates the danger, or if the dangerous condition is so open and obvious that the invitee will be charged in law with knowledge and appreciation of the danger.
In the present case the appellee admits that the step was open and obvious and that there was nothing concealed. She could see the place where she stepped, and the step was not defective. Her eyesight was good, and she stated that she simply misjudged the depth of the step after looking at it. The fact that the witness Green testified that the depth of the step was not readily apparent to him from where he stood because the color of the concrete was the same on the steps on both landings, does not alter the rule which we should apply here. Variations in color could as easily and logically be given as an excuse. The owner-occupier of premises is not an insurer, and he has no duty to protect an invitee against dangers which are well known and obvious. Hall v. Medical Bldg. of Houston, 151 Tex. 425, 251 S.W.2d 497; Delhi-Taylor Oil Corporation v. Henry, 416 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex.Sup.); McElhenny v. Thielepape, 155 Tex. 319, 285 S.W.2d 940; A. C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, 223 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref. Appellant had a right to assume that its invitees on the premises would exercise ordinary circumspection as to their footing and would not be oblivious to a static condition or volunteer an act such as the one involved whose danger was so open and obvious to anyone who looked. See Marshall v. San Jacinto Bldg., 67 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref. An occupier owes no duty to the invitee if the condition is so patently open and obvious that the plaintiff must have seen and appreciated it. Under such circumstances the court will charge the plaintiff with knowledge of the condition, and with such knowledge and appreciation the plaintiff nevertheless proceeds, the duty of the occupier is zero. Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex.Sup.); Robert E. McKee, General Contractor Inc. v. Patterson, 153 Tex. 517, 271 S.W.2d 391, 393-394 (Tex.Sup.).
But the appellee urges that we should apply the rule that negligence is a question of fact for the jury, resolved by the jury in favor of appellee in this case, when the evidence shows that the appellee, with knowledge or chargeable with knowledge of the danger, exercised some care. See Lang v. Henderson, 147 Tex. 353, 215 S.W.2d 585, 587; Dunlap v. Executive Inn Motor Hotel Corp., 404 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.Civ.App.), *752writ ref., n. r. e.; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gascamp, 69 Tex. 545, 7 S.W. 227. The application of such a rule is not entirely unappealing. I feel, however, that the plain facts proven in the case at bar, under the decisions of our Supreme Court, require that we apply the “no duty” rule discussed above. In attempting to step down upon a surface which was clearly visible to her and which surface was not in any respect defective, but which she admitted was open and patently obvious, I believe the law requires that we hold that Houston Sports Association, Inc. owed no duty to Mrs. Russell under the circumstances.
I do not believe that what I have said conflicts with such cases as Wesson v. Gillespie, 382 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Sup.), where a relatively minor and unlighted condition existed, where the injured party had encountered the condition many times, and where the injured party admitted that she knew of the condition, knew it was dangerous, and appreciated the particular danger; Ellis v. Moore, 401 S.W.2d 789, 792-793 (Tex.Sup.); Hausman Packing Co. v. Badwey, 147 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref.; J. & W. Corporation v. Ball, 414 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.Sup.); Acme Laundry Company v. Ford, 284 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e.; Stephenson v. Camp, 311 S.W.2d 512 (Tex.Civ.App.), writ ref., n. r. e., and other decisions. There is no evidence that appellee was entrapped or that she was injured as a result of any hidden defect in the step. Nor do I believe that appellee’s first encounter with this particular step under the circumstances should alter the rule when the condition was so open and obvious to her and when “the hall of dangers” was in fact not more dangerous than any other similar step to a person with ordinary circumspection. The condition was static and part of the permanent construction.
The only exception might be that appel-lee’s age alone alters the rule. Under the circumstances, I do not believe that age alone should alter it. If a person is not charged as a matter of law with knowledge and appreciation of an ordinary danger under these facts, I believe the “no duty” rule in similar situations might effectively be abolished so far as realities are concerned. I believe the same rule applies insofar as the handrailing is involved.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment in favor of the appellant.