Court Opinion

ID: 9363107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:09.685676+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:28.846603
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAN MATIAS RAUDA,                    No. 21-16062

              Plaintiff-Appellant,      D.C. No. 3:21-
                                        cv-03897-CRB
 v.

DAVID JENNINGS, in his official         ORDER AND
capacity, Field Office Director of       AMENDED
San Francisco Field Office, U.S.          OPINION
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; TAE D. JOHNSON,
Acting Director of U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement;
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General; ALEJANDRO N.
MAYORKAS, Acting Secretary of
Department of Homeland Security,

              Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
         for the Northern District of California
       Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
2                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

         Submitted to Motions Panel July 13, 2021 *

                   Filed August 13, 2021
                 Amended December 12, 2022

Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Consuelo M. Callahan, and
           Lawrence VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

                            Order;
                  Opinion by Judge VanDyke

                          SUMMARY **

                Immigration / Habeas Corpus

    The panel filed: 1) an order amending the opinion filed
August 13, 2021; and 2) an amended opinion affirming the
district court’s denial of Willian Matias Rauda’s request for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the
government from removing him.
    In the amended opinion, the panel: (1) concluded that the
district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction
under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); (2) concluded that neither the
Suspension Clause nor the Due Process Clause preserve
judicial review; and (3) directed the district court to dismiss

*
 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                     MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS               3

Matias’s petition.
    In 2018, Matias, a native of El Salvador, was detained by
immigration authorities. An immigration judge (IJ) denied
bond, and an IJ later denied him relief under the Convention
Against Torture and ordered his removal. The Board of
Immigration Appeals dismissed his appeal, and this court
denied his petition for review. In April 2021, Matias moved
the BIA to reopen, and the BIA denied a stay of removal. In
May 2021, Matias filed a habeas petition with the district
court, which denied his motion to enjoin his removal until
his motion to reopen and habeas petition were decided. On
June 14, 2021, the district court denied Matias’s
subsequently-filed motion for a TRO, and the government
voluntarily agreed to stay removal up to and including
August 13, 2021.
    The panel concluded that the district court correctly
determined that jurisdiction was barred by 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g), which provides that “no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any alien.” The panel
explained that the execution of his removal order was
precisely what Matias challenged here, and that Congress
could have chosen to provide petitioners like Matias with
access to judicial review of non-final immigration orders,
but did not do so.
    The panel explained that the conclusion that it lacked
jurisdiction was reinforced by the consideration that, as
explained in Shaboyan v. Holder, 652 F.3d 988 (9th Cir.
2011), this court may only review final orders, and the BIA’s
interim order denying a stay of removal pending resolution
4                  MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

of a motion to reopen is not such an order. Noting that
Shaboyan involved a petition for review, while this case
involved a habeas petition, the panel explained that
Shaboyan foreclosed review (direct or indirect) of the BIA’s
denial of his stay request.
    The panel rejected Matias’s claim that the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause preserves judicial review here. The
panel relied on DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959
(2020), in which the Supreme Court determined that habeas
relief applies to petitioners seeking release from executive
detention, not to those seeking to remain in the United
States. Because Matias was not seeking a remedy for
unlawful detention, the panel concluded that only an extreme
and unwarranted expansion of the habeas writ would
encompass his requested relief.
    The panel also rejected Matias’s argument that § 1252(g)
violates due process by denying review of his claims. The
panel explained that § 1252(g) does not immunize his claims
from review—it merely prevents him from filing a habeas
petition challenging the discretion to execute a valid order of
removal while his motion to reopen is pending. Instead, he
must wait to raise his claims in a petition for review of a final
order. Noting that an alien is entitled to file a motion to
reopen and seek a stay of removal from the agency until that
motion is decided, the panel explained that this court lacks
jurisdiction to intervene if the stay is denied precisely
because an alien’s presence in the United States is not
required for adjudication of the motion to reopen. The panel
concluded that this statutorily provided process satisfies any
demands of the Due Process Clause when an alien subject to
a valid, final order of removal seeks to reopen his removal
proceedings.
                  MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                5

     Addressing Matias’s request that the court grant him a
stay because he would be severely harmed or killed if
removed to El Salvador, the panel explained that, if a court
could inject itself into the agency’s process and force
(another) stay because a removable alien newly represented
that he would be severely injured or die when removed, all
similarly situated petitioners would be incentivized to
demand a stay. The panel explained that, if that were case,
it seems foreseeable that this would become the new norm
and courts would essentially grant automatic stays of
removal pending the BIA’s consideration of motions to
reopen.

                       COUNSEL

Sean L. McMahon and Etan Z. Newman, Pangea Legal
Services, San Francisco, California; Francisco M. Ugarte
and Genna E. Beier, Attorneys, San Francisco Public
Defender’s Office, San Francisco, California; Lee P.
Gelernt, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New
York, New York; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Mary L. Larakers, Trial Attorney, Civil Division/Office of
Immigration Litigation, United States Department of
Justice,Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.
Ethan D. Dettmer, Eli M. Lazarus, Sean Howell, and Ryan
Azad, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, San Francisco,
California; Joshua S. Lipshutz, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Scholars of
Immigration Law.
6                 MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

Kristin Macleod-Ball and Trina A. Realmuto, National
Immigration Litigation Alliance, Brookline, Massachusetts;
Lindsay Nash, Kathryn O. Greenberg Immigration Justice
Clinic, New York, New York; for Amici Curiae National
Immigration Litigation Alliance and Kathryn O. Greenberg
Immigration Justice Clinic of the Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law.

                         ORDER

    The opinion filed on August 13, 2021, and published at
8 F.4th 1050, is hereby amended by the opinion filed
concurrently with this order. With this amended opinion, the
panel has voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing
en banc. A judge requested a vote on whether to rehear this
case en banc, but later withdrew that request. Fed. R. App.
P. 35. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing en banc is
DENIED. Further petitions for panel rehearing or rehearing
en banc may be filed.
    DENIED.

                        OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:
    Petitioner Willian Matias Rauda appeals the district
court’s order denying his request for a temporary restraining
order to prevent the government from removing him from
the United States. In the district court, Matias argued that
                  MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                 7

deportation prior to a ruling on his motion to reopen would
violate his due process rights, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Immigration & Nationality Act. In denying
his motion, the district court concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to reach Matias’s claims. We agree with the
district court and affirm.
  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Matias is a native of El Salvador and unlawfully entered
the United States in February 2014. El Salvadoran
authorities considered him a member of MS-13, a violent
gang.
     Leaving his partner and child, he moved to Maryland
from the San Francisco Bay Area in October 2015. While
residing in Maryland, Matias pleaded guilty to assault in the
first degree after being involved in a gang shooting where
two victims were shot. Authorities determined that the
shooting was in retaliation for MS-13 gang activity, and
identified Matias as an “affiliate” of MS-13.            The
government claims Matias admitted his status as an MS-13
gang member while he was imprisoned at Prince George’s
County Detention Center in Maryland. He was sentenced to
twenty years in prison but was released from custody on a
deferred sentence, after which he moved back to the Bay
Area.
    U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detained Matias in November 2018, seeking to remove him.
While in ICE custody, Matias requested to be housed with a
gang aligned with MS-13. An immigration judge (IJ) denied
him bond in January 2019, finding he was a danger to the
community. In June 2019, an IJ denied Matias relief under
the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and ordered him
removed to El Salvador. Matias unsuccessfully appealed to
8                     MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed
his appeal in November 2019. On January 28, 2021, this
court likewise denied his petition for review, determining
that the evidence supported the IJ’s findings. See Matias
Rauda v. Wilkinson, 844 F. App’x 945 (9th Cir. 2021).
    On April 22, 2021, Matias moved the BIA to reopen his
case so that it could consider “new developments” regarding
his request for CAT relief. The new developments that
Matias contends undermine the BIA’s previous decision are:
(1) claimed political changes in El Salvador, and (2) an
alleged text from an MS-13 gang member labeling him a
“snitch” and saying he will be killed if he returns to El
Salvador. 1 On May 14, 2021, after the Ninth Circuit’s stay
of removal terminated, Matias moved the BIA for an
emergency stay while his motion to reopen was being
considered. One week later, on May 21, 2021, the BIA
denied his request for a stay.
    Because he could not immediately file a direct petition
for review with this court (which, as discussed below, is
foreclosed by precedent), Matias filed a habeas petition with
the district court on May 24, 2021, asking the court to enjoin
the government from removing him until the BIA ruled on
his motion to reopen and the court ruled on his habeas
petition. The district court denied his motion.
   ICE initially scheduled Matias’s removal for the first
week of June 2021, but that deadline has repeatedly slipped.
On June 14, 2021, the district court denied Matias’s
subsequently filed motion for a temporary restraining order

1
  The text is alleged to have come from a sender within the United States,
but Matias has never authenticated the text, nor did he provide copies to
the district court.
                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                   9

(TRO), determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional
limits barred his claims. But the district court granted a five-
day administrative stay so that this court could hear Matias’s
appeal. Subsequently, the government voluntarily agreed to
stay removal up to and including August 13, 2021. Matias
appeals the district court’s order denying his TRO and
argues that this court has jurisdiction to consider his claims.
                STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “We have jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction
exists.” Shaboyan v. Holder, 652 F.3d 988, 989 (9th Cir.
2011) (per curiam). In the immigration context, “[w]e may
review only final orders of removal.” Id.
                       DISCUSSION
I. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Matias’s Claims.
   A. Section 1252(g) Deprives Us of Jurisdiction.
    Matias argues that the district court erred in determining
that § 1252(g) bars judicial review of his claims challenging
the government’s execution of his removal order. The
statute’s plain language, however, bars review of his claims.
Per § 1252(g), “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders
against any alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added).
    The execution of his removal order is precisely what
Matias challenges here. Matias seeks to enjoin the
government from removing him—or in other words, enjoin
“action by the Attorney General to ... execute removal orders
against [Matias].” Id. Congress has explicitly precluded our
review of this claim.
10                 MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

    Beyond its plain text, legislative action (or inaction)
corroborates that § 1252(g) was meant to preclude judicial
review over claims like Matias’s. While Congress could
have chosen to provide Matias and other petitioners like him
with access to judicial review of non-final immigration
orders, it did not do so. Cf. DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S.
Ct. 1959, 1983 (2020); Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 424
(2009) (explaining Congress’s amendments to immigration
procedures). Limiting federal jurisdiction in this way is
understandable because Congress wanted to streamline
immigration proceedings by limiting judicial review to final
orders, litigated in the context of petitions for review. See
Nken, 556 U.S. at 424 (“Congress … ‘repealed the old
judicial-review scheme … and instituted a new and
(significantly more restrictive) one in 8 U.S.C. § 1252.’ The
new review system substantially limited the availability of
judicial review and streamlined all challenges to a removal
order into a single proceeding: the petition for review.”
(citation omitted)).
    Matias asserts that applying the plain text of § 1252(g)
and refusing to enter a stay of removal pending the resolution
of his motion to reopen “would deprive a noncitizen [of] his
statutory right to file a motion to reopen.” But that’s not true.
Matias’s motion to reopen has already been filed, and is
currently pending before the BIA. Once the BIA decides
that motion, Matias will be able to file a petition for our court
to review that final agency action—including review of the
BIA’s denial of his request for a stay of removal pending its
decision. See Shaboyan, 652 F.3d at 991. Matias has taken
full advantage of his statutory rights and will continue to
have access to the process guaranteed to him under the
statute even if he is removed. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 424.
                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                 11

    Matias also attempts to avoid § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional
bar by arguing that his challenge pertains not to the Attorney
General’s discretionary authority, but rather to the Attorney
General’s allegedly unlawful decision to “remov[e] him
now.” But § 1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar on “claim[s] …
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General
to … execute removal orders” does not include any temporal
caveats. As the Third Circuit has observed, “the discretion
to decide whether to execute a removal order includes the
discretion to decide when to do it. Both are covered by the
statute.” Tazu v. Att’y Gen. United States, 975 F.3d 292, 297
(3d Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
    Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also determined that
§ 1252(g) strips courts of jurisdiction in this instance. In
Hamama v. Adducci, petitioners sought a stay while they
argued that changed country conditions required
reconsideration of their removal orders. 912 F.3d 869, 873
(6th Cir. 2018). The court held that, “[u]nder a plain reading
of the text of the statute, the Attorney General’s enforcement
of long-standing removal orders falls squarely under the
Attorney General’s decision to execute removal orders and
is not subject to judicial review.” Id. at 874; see also E.F.L.
v. Prim, 986 F.3d 959, 964–65 (7th. Cir. 2021) (rejecting the
argument that jurisdiction remained in similar circumstances
because petitioner was challenging, not “DHS’s
‘discretionary decisions,’” but rather “DHS’s ‘legal
authority’”).
    We agree with our sister circuits. No matter how Matias
frames it, his challenge is to the Attorney General’s exercise
of his discretion to execute Matias’s removal order, which
we have no jurisdiction to review. See Camarena v. Dir.,
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 988 F.3d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir.
2021) (“[W]e do not have jurisdiction to consider ‘any’
12                MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

cause or claim brought by an alien arising from the
government’s decision to execute a removal order. If we
held otherwise, any petitioner could frame his or her claim
as an attack on the government’s authority to execute a
removal order rather than its execution of a removal order.”).
The district court correctly concluded that § 1252(g)
deprived it of jurisdiction to hear Matias’s claims.
     B. We May Only Review Final Orders.
    That we lack jurisdiction over Matias’s claims is
reinforced by another consideration. As explained in
Shaboyan, we may only review final orders. 652 F.3d at
989. While Matias is asking us to review the denial of a TRO
that he filed alongside a habeas petition in district court,
what he fundamentally seeks is a stay of removal pending
the BIA’s resolution of his motion to reopen. Because
Matias asks us to review an interim order and not a ‘“final
order of removal’ that may … give rise to a petition for
review,” we lack jurisdiction to consider his claim. Id. at
989–90.
    In Shaboyan, just as in this case, the petitioner was
ordered removed. Shaboyan filed a motion to reopen with
the BIA, and the BIA denied her request for a stay of removal
pending its consideration of that motion. Instead of filing a
habeas petition in the district court seeking review of the
BIA’s denial of a stay like Matias did here, Shaboyan filed a
petition for review with this court asking us to directly
review the BIA’s stay decision. Id. at 989. Applying § 1252,
we determined that “[w]e may review only final orders of
removal,” and that “the BIA’s interim order denying a stay
of removal pending resolution of [petitioner’s] motion to
reopen cannot qualify as a final order of removal.” Id. at
989, 990 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching that
                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                 13

conclusion, we recognized that the petitioner was not
without recourse because the BIA’s order denying the stay
could be reviewed as part of its final order denying her
motion to reopen. Id. at 991. But where a petitioner “seeks
review of the denial of a stay as an independent matter…. we
lack jurisdiction.” Id.
    When one door is locked, it’s natural to try another.
Presumably recognizing that he was foreclosed by Shaboyan
from seeking our direct review of the BIA’s denial of a stay,
Matias is attempting to obtain the same relief sought by
Shaboyan, just by a different route: through the district court
via a habeas petition. But Shaboyan’s rationale applies
equally to this attempt. Congress has intentionally (and
unequivocally) stripped us of jurisdiction to review non-final
orders. The IJ ordered Matias removed, like the petitioner
in Shaboyan. Although he cannot contend that he is entitled
to direct review of that removal order—because such review
is squarely foreclosed by § 1252(g) and Shaboyan—Matias
also cannot argue that he is seeking review of any other final
order properly the subject of a petition for review. Shaboyan
forecloses our review (direct or indirect) of the only thing
Matias is ultimately challenging—the BIA’s denial of his
stay request.
II. The Suspension Clause Does Not Preserve Judicial
    Review.
    Recognizing the problem that § 1252 poses to his
attempt to secure immediate review of the BIA’s stay denial,
Matias attacks that statute. He argues that the Constitution’s
Suspension Clause gives what § 1252 purports to take away,
and thus Congress cannot have properly removed our
14                    MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

jurisdiction over his habeas claim. 2 But the Suspension
Clause does not preserve judicial review in this case because
only an extreme and unwarranted expansion of the habeas
writ would encompass Matias’s requested relief.
    Applying Thuraissigiam, the district court determined
that “the scope of the writ protected by the Suspension
Clause … does not extend to the type of claim at issue here.”
After noting that the “historic role of habeas is to secure
release from custody,” Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970, the
district court pointed out that “Matias … is not challenging
his deportation order or any ruling that he is ineligible for
relief from removal. Instead, he is challenging the
government’s imminent execution of his removal order.” As
a result, the district court concluded “Matias’s claims do not
‘call for traditional habeas relief’ even under an evolving
understanding of the writ, [and] applying § 1252(g) to bar
his claims does not implicate the Suspension Clause”
(quoting Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1970).
    In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court determined that
habeas relief applies to petitioners seeking release from
executive detention but not to petitioners seeking to remain
in the United States. Id. at 1969–71. There, the petitioner
argued that Congress unconstitutionally “placed restrictions
on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain review under the
federal habeas statute.” Id. at 1963. The Court pointed out
that “[r]espondent and amici … have not unearthed evidence
that habeas was … used [before and around the time of the
adoption of the Constitution] to obtain anything like what is
sought here, namely, authorization for an alien to remain in

2
 The Suspension Clause states that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                 15

a country other than his own or to obtain administrative or
judicial review leading to that result.” Id. at 1971. The Court
explained that the “core” of habeas relief is release from
unlawful executive detention, not the right to remain in a
country. Id. at 1975. Where “respondent did not ask to be
released,” but rather sought relief from removal, respondent
was seeking relief that fell “outside the scope of the
common-law habeas writ.” Id. at 1969–70. The Supreme
Court determined that the Suspension Clause was not
triggered by § 1252(g)’s limit on habeas relief. Id. at 1983.
    Like the petitioner in Thuraissigiam, Matias is not
seeking “a remedy for unlawful executive detention,” and
his claims are thus outside of the scope of habeas relief. Id.
at 1970–71, 1975 (citation omitted). Rather than seeking the
traditional use of habeas, Matias specifically wants to avoid
being released (into El Salvador). As the Court noted, the
common law reserves habeas relief for remedies from
unlawful custody. Id. at 1969. But Matias seeks to remain
in the United States, even if that requires staying in custody.
Matias is not using habeas in anything like the traditional
sense, and therefore, as the Supreme Court held in
Thuraissigiam, the relevant statute limiting habeas review
does not violate the Suspension Clause. Id. at 1983; see also
Hamama, 912 F.3d at 880 (“There is no Suspension Clause
violation because the Suspension Clause can only be
triggered when a petitioner is requesting relief from
custody.” (emphasis added)).
    Finally, Matias points to INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289
(2001), as supporting his argument that judicial intervention
is constitutionally necessary. But St. Cyr did not expand the
scope of judicial review in immigration proceedings. Cf.
Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. at 1966 (noting that “a major
objective of IIRIRA” was to prevent “undue interference by
16                     MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

the courts”). While the Court in St. Cyr acknowledged that
“some judicial intervention in deportation cases” is required,
533 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted), that is a far cry from saying that
judicial intervention is required at every step. 3 Ultimately,
Matias has had (and will have) access to judicial review
where Congress provided for it, such as this court’s previous
consideration of his petition for review, and its likely future
consideration of the BIA’s final decision on his motion to
reopen. Nken, 556 U.S. at 424 (citing § 1252).
III.     The Due Process Clause Does Not Preserve
         Judicial Review.
    Matias also attacks the statute by arguing that § 1252(g)
violates the Due Process Clause by denying review of his
claims. But § 1252(g)’s limit on judicial review does not
immunize his claims from review—it merely prevents him
from filing a habeas petition challenging the Attorney
General’s discretion to execute a valid order of removal
while his motion to reopen is pending. Instead, he must wait
to raise the claims in a petition for review of a final order.
    This should come as no surprise. Our immigration laws
allow an alien to challenge an order of removal before it’s

3
  Citing St. Cyr and Thuraissigiam, Matias also asserts that we must
construe § 1252(g) narrowly to avoid a constitutional concern, and that
limits on review “must overcome … [a] strong presumption in favor of
judicial review” (citation omitted). But where Congress has provided a
clear statement in favor of limiting judicial review, as it did in § 1252(g),
we must follow the language of the statute. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298–
99. Further, there is no “constitutional concern” here because, as
explained above and in the following section, neither the Suspension
Clause nor the Due Process Clause require judicial review of Matias’s
habeas petition.
                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS                   17

executed and—as Matias did here—request a stay of
removal during judicial proceedings reviewing the agency’s
removal decision. But once the removal order has withstood
challenges before the IJ, the BIA, and our court, the
government has discretion to decide when to remove an alien
from a place he has no legal right to remain. See, e.g., Tazu,
975 F.3d at 297. And although the alien is entitled to file a
motion to reopen and seek a stay of removal from the agency
until that motion is decided, our court lacks jurisdiction to
intervene if the stay is denied, Shaboyan, 652 F.3d at 990–
91, precisely because an alien’s presence in the United States
is not required for adjudication of the motion to reopen to
take place. This statutorily provided process satisfies any
demands of the Due Process Clause when an alien subject to
a valid, final order of removal seeks to reopen his removal
proceedings. See Tazu, 975 F.3d at 299–300 (concluding
that because petitioner could “raise all his claims in a petition
for review … [t]here is not constitutional problem with
funneling them there”).
    Matias asks us to grant him a stay because he contends
that he will be severely harmed or killed if removed to El
Salvador. He urges us to balance the equity of entering a
stay against the potential future harm upon removal. With
respect to the latter, Matias essentially asks us to take his
word for it and assume “the allegations contained in his
declaration are true.”
    If a court could inject itself into the agency’s process and
force (another) stay because a removable alien—whose
petition for review had already been denied by our court—
newly represented to us that he would be severely injured or
die when removed, all similarly situated petitioners would
be incentivized to demand a stay and make similar claims to
keep themselves in the country while the BIA considers their
18                   MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS

motions to reopen. And without records from the agency to
review, we would be presented with just the petitioners’
untested claims of possible future harm. That this would
become the new norm, and that courts would essentially be
granting automatic stays of removal pending the BIA’s
consideration of motions to reopen, seems foreseeable
enough.
    Congress, at least, seems to have anticipated this
problem in its decision to limit judicial review in a way that
does not permit this court to review interim, non-final orders
like motions to stay pending the resolution of motions to
reopen—even if petitioners present their requests dressed as
petitions for habeas relief. Congress has already balanced
the amount of process available to petitioners with the
executive’s prerogative to remove individuals, and this
balance struck by Congress and recognized by this court in
Shaboyan is not unreasonable. Cf. E.F.L., 986 F.3d at 964–
66 (concluding that petitioner’s “habeas petition falls
directly in § 1252(g)’s path,” notwithstanding the
“seriousness” of petitioner’s allegations of claimed harm
resulting from removal).
    Even if removed, Matias’s motion would remain
pending until its adjudication, and he may challenge the
BIA’s decision in our court once a final order has been
issued. He is not stripped of any process due him by being
removed. 4

4
  Matias’s alternative arguments in support of jurisdiction under Article
III of the Constitution and 18 U.S.C. § 1331 are without merit because
the Constitution does not entitle him to any more process than what is
already provided to him by statute in these circumstances.
                  MATIAS RAUDA V. JENNINGS               19

                     CONCLUSION
    The district court correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear Matias’s claims under § 1252(g).
Neither the Suspension Clause nor the Due Process Clause
preserve judicial review. Matias’s requested relief falls
outside of the scope of habeas. And the statutorily provided
process satisfies any demands of the Due Process Clause.
The district court’s denial of the TRO is affirmed, and the
district court is directed to dismiss Matias’s petition.
   AFFIRMED.
   All pending motions are denied as moot.