Court Opinion

ID: 9751240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:15:48.971822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:40.322643
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Chidsey:
I am obliged to dissent for I am of the opinion that the lower court clearly erred in setting aside the verdict of the jury. The reason assigned for the grant of a new trial appears in the following portion of the lower court’s opinion: “. . . Montague stated that he stopped at the intersection and then proceeded to cross after having looked to his left, the direction in which defendant Keller’s car was proceeding. He said that he did not see the Keller car when he looked, the reason being that it had been obscured by a truck proceeding North on 25th Street and that the plaintiff’s car came from behind the truck and collided with defendant’s car. It is the opinion of the court that Montague’s testimony convicted him of negligence and that therefore the verdict was against the evidence and against the weight of the evidence and a new trial should be *280granted the plaintiff as to Montague.”. It thus appears that the court found Montague guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Before such a conclusion could be reached, Montague was entitled to have the testimony considered in the light most favorable to him, especially in view of the jury’s verdict in his favor. See Satterwhite v. National Powder Company, 362 Pa. 133, 66 A. 2d 278. Thus considered, when Montague proceeded to cross the intersection, the truck travelling in the opposite direction on 25th Street not only obscured his view but constituted a barrier against vehicles travel-ling west on the north side of Norris Street. Under these circumstances Montague was not required to wait until the truck cleared his car. The duty imposed upon the driver of a motor vehicle is care under the circumstances. Upon entering an intersection he must look for vehicles approaching from the left that might cross his path. However, if another vehicle or vehicles travelling parallel with his course make it impossible for cars approaching from his left to cross Ms path, the law is not so unreasonable as to require him to remain stationary and stop the movement of other automobiles in his lane of travel. In Rea v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 344 Pa. 421, 25 A. 2d 730, Mr. Justice Brew stated: “It is well-settled that ‘The law only makes obligatory the rule of common sense regarding the duty of a driver at the intersection of streets, where traffic is very dangerous because conflicting. . .’ ”.' It has been repeatedly held that the driver of an automobile may not be declared negligent as a matter of law because he entered an intersection when his view to the left is obstructed by' a vehicle travelling on the same street. See Myers v. Funk, 111 Pa. Superior Ct. 17, 169 A. 400; Pellegrini v. Coll, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 294, 2 A. 2d 491; Borisoff v. Penn Fruit Company, Inc., 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 572, 69 A. *2812d 167; Rea v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, supra; McGavern v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 378 Pa. 13, 105 A. 2d 342. Of course the driver must be vigilant and continue across the intersection cautiously. Whether or not the driver was negligent depends upon the circumstances of each case and is a matter for ilie jury.
Montague testified that he proceeded across the intersection in low gear from 5 to 8 miles an hour, that when the front of his car got past the truck and ‘was three-quarters of the way across Norris Street, he saw Keller’s car when it was 6 feet away from him, coming from the rear of the truck. This placed Keller’s car which was travelling west, on the eastbound lane of Norris Street and therefore on his wrong lane of travel. The two vehicles collided and together struck a pole at the southwest corner of the intersection. It was undisputed that the accident happened in the southwest quadrant of the intersection. When Montague reached the middle of the street he was of course obliged to look for traffic that might be approaching from his right. A motor vehicle driver is not under a duty to continue to keep his attention directed to his left, when crossing a two-way street, after he has passed the traffic lane in which vehicles coming from his left belong: Randich v. Arena & Sons, Inc., 156 Pa. Superior Ct. 99, 39 A. 2d 458. The testimony of Keller and his passenger (the plaintiff) shows that neither of them saw Montague’s car until it was 10 feet away in its proper lane of travel. Keller testified that he did not notice any truck travelling • north on 25th Street but he admitted that after the accident he made a statement to the police in which he said: “. . . 1 didn’t notice any truck traveling north before I entered the intersection. There might have been, I cannot say for sure. I thought it was clear, to go across. I don’t *282know why I didn’t see this other car in time.”. He testified that he had been travelling on the north side of Norris Street. It is obvious that he would not have crossed to the south side of the street unless because of the presence of the truck he changed his course to avoid and pass around it.
Montague did not testify in defense, all of his testimony having been adduced after being called by the plaintiff. The trial judge expressly instructed the jury that the testimony of the plaintiff and of Keller did not permit any inference of negligence on the part of Montague. In plaintiff’s brief it is admitted that Montague was the only witness in a position to testify to the operation of his car prior to and at the time of the occurrence. Neither plaintiff nor Keller took any exception to the charge of the court or the above instructions. Whether Montague was negligent in the operation of his car depended on his own testimony. The court below expressed no disbelief of Montague’s testimony. It accepted his testimony in its erroneous ruling that he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Because of its ruling in this regard it concluded that “. . . therefore the verdict was against the evidence and against the weight of the evidence . . .”. (Emphasis supplied).
The question whether Montague was negligent was clearly for the jury and their verdict placing sole responsibility for the accident upon Keller is supported by the overwhelming weight of thé evidence.
Plaifitiff assigned as reasons in support Of her motion for new trial, that the verdict was against the law, the evidence, the weight of the evidence and was inadequate. The court held the verdict to be adequate, refused a new trial as to Keller, but awarded a new trial for the reason above stated as to Montague. After the present- appeal was taken by Montague, the. court *283below also granted a new trial as to Keller, stating in a short memorandum opinion: “In order to prevent the possibility of there arising two judgments from the one injury wherein a satisfaction of either would act as a release of the other, the court awarded the plaintiff a new trial against the additional defendant Keller in addition to the new trial previously granted her against the defendant Montague.”.
The record in this case discloses a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. The verdict of the jury should not be disturbed and the orders granting a new trial should be reversed.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this dissenting opinion.