Court Opinion

ID: 9632436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:14:51.128824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:08.013633
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR:
Plaintiffs have filed a petition for rehearing wherein they challenge the jurisdiction of the district court of Gallatin county to render judgment on the cross-complaint contending “that a cross-complaint may not properly be presented in an action of this type.”
As to type, this is a civil action at law sounding in tort wherein the plaintiffs seek redress against the defendants for the claimed forcible entry and unlawful detainer of certain described premises situate in Gallatin county.
Statutory Proceedings. In Montana actions for forcible entry  and unlawful detainer are purely statutory civil proceedings.
The governing statutes comprise Chapter 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being sections 93-9701 to 93-9720, both inclusive, of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947.
Sections 93-9708, 93-9714 and 93-9716 govern the complaint. Section 93-9711 authorizes the. defendant to appear and answer *299or demur, while section 93-9716 requires that the complaint and answer be verified.
Chapter 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure fails to set forth the rules of practice which are to govern either the demurrer or answer mentioned in such chapter. No section in said chapter says when or on what grounds a defendant may demur nor how he shall specify or state his objections to the complaint. No section in said chapter says what the answer must contain nor what may be incorporated therein. However, section 93-9718 provides that except as otherwise provided in Chapter 97, the provisions of sections 93-2301 to 93-8717 are applicable to and constitute the rules of practice mentioned in Chapter 97. Thus does section 93-9718 make Chapter 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Demurrer to Complaints”, being sections 93-3301. to 93-3306, inclusive, and Chapter 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure, entitled “Answer”, being sections 93-3401 to 93-3415, inclusive, applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in actions and proceedings for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, said sections being encompassed by and included within “sections 93-2301 to 93-8717” specified in section 93-9718, supra.
Section 93-9706 relates to the parties to the proceedings provided for in Chapter 97, supra, and provides: Who must be made parties defendant; who need not be made defendants; that none of the proceedings shall abate nor shall the plaintiff be nonsuited for the nonjoinder of any person who might have been made a party defendant; that the failure to serve the statutory notice upon a subtenant who became such after service of notice upon the tenant of the premises shall be no defense to the action and that coverture shall be no defense should the tenant or subtenant be a married woman. Section 93-9706 also provides the method for enforcing an execution upon a personal judgment issued against a married woman and designates those who shall be bound by the judgment in addition to the persons made parties to the action.
Section 93-9707 provides that except as provided in section *30093-9706, supra, “the provisions of sections 93-2301 to 93-8717, relating to parties to civil actions, are applicable to this proceeding. ’ ’
No provision of section 93-9706, supra, denies to any defendant in any action brought under the provisions of Chapter 97 the permissive right accorded by section 93-3415, to “any defendant to an action” to file a cross-complaint against all parties to such action against whom he desires relief.
Section 93-3415, in part, provides: “Whenever any defendant to an action desires any relief against any party relating to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, or subject-matter upon which the action is brought, or affecting the property to which the action relates, or whenever the judgment in such action may determine the ultimate rights of defendants to an action as between themselves, any defendant may, in addition to and in his answer, file at the same time, or subsequently by permission of court, a cross-complaint against all parties to such action, and may make as additional parties to such action, and ask relief against, any person, firm, association, or corporation, necessary or required to permit the court to make a full determination of and to adjudicate all rights of any person, firm, association, or corporation, relating to or dependent upon the contract, transaction, or subject-matter, or affecting the property to which the action relates.”
Irrespective of how the statutes of other states may read, the  provisions of sections 93-9707 and 93-9718 specifically make certain designated sections of our Code of Civil Procedure, which includes section 93-3415, applicable to actions and proceedings for forcible entry and unlawful detainer and authorize a defendant therein to file a cross-complaint under the facts and circumstances here shown.
A cross-complaint is in the nature of an original action, the only real difference between a complaint and a cross-complaint being that the former is filed by the plaintiff and the latter by the defendant.
“The purpose of allowing a cross-complaint is to enable all *301matters in dispute between tbe parties relating to or depending upon the contract, transaction or subject matter upon wbicb tbe action is brought, or affecting tbe property to wbicb tbe action relates, to be determined in a single action and by a single judgment wbicb shall give to a defendant seeking it such affirmative relief as be is entitled to, — in other words, to avoid a multiplicity of suits and thereby save vexation and expense. For all practical purposes tbe situation resulting from tbe filing of a cross-complaint involves a consolidation of two independent actions arising out of, or related to, tbe same transaction.” 1 Bancroft’s Code Pleading, see. 447, p. 648.
Jurisdiction. Tbe Constitution of Montana provides: “Tbe  district court shall have original jurisdiction * * * of actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer * * Art. VIII, sec. 11.
R. C. M. 1947, sec. 93-9705, provides: “Tbe district court of the county in which tbe property, or some part of it, is situated, shall have jurisdiction of proceedings under this chapter; provided, that justices’ courts, within their respective towns, townships, or cities, shall have concurrent jurisdiction.”
Thus by tbe Constitution and laws enacted pursuant thereto was jurisdiction over tbe subject matter conferred upon tbe district court.
Tbe allegations of tbe cross-complaint set forth all tbe ultimate  facts essential to tbe statement of a good cause of action under R. C. M. 1947, secs. 93-3201 to 93-3203, 93-3415, and 93-9701 to 93-9720, and are sufficient to challenge tbe attention of tbe court and invoke its action in a determination of tbe claim of tbe cross-complainants for judgment against tbe cross-defendants. Tbe trial court bad jurisdiction of tbe subject matter of the litigation,- — -the proper parties were before it, tbe action of tbe court was invoked by appropriate pleadings, issue was joined and tbe case was tried upon its merits and determined by a jury’s verdict. Hence we find no merit in tbe plaintiffs’ contention that tbe trial court bad no jurisdiction to render judgment herein based upon tbe cross-complaint and tbe jury’s *302verdict. Compare Haggerty v. Sherburne Mercantile Co., 120 Mont. 386, 389, 390, 186 Pac. (2d) 884; Horstman v. Bowermaster, 90 Okl. 262, 217 Pac. 167; Howard v. Duncan, 163 Okl. 142, 21 Pac. (2d) 489.
Section 93-2301 provides: “There is in this state but one form of civil action for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the redress or prevention of private wrongs.”
Section 93-2303 provides: “A question of fact not put in issue by the pleadings may be tried by a jury or court, upon an order for the trial, stating distinctly and plainly the question of fact to be tried; and such order is the only authority necessary for a trial. ’ ’ Compare Horstman v. Bowermaster, supra.
Thus in this state there is but one form of civil action for the  enforcement or protection of private rights, whether such private rights be those of a landlord or those of a tenant. Likewise there is but one form of civil action for the redress or prevention of private wrongs whether they be suffered by the landlord or by the tenant. The same remedies and the same redress are available to a tenant wronged by his landlord as are available to a landlord wronged by his tenant.
From what has been said, it follows that the petition for a rehearing should be denied. Such is the order.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICES FREEBOURN, METCALF and BOTTOMLY, concur.