Court Opinion

ID: 9488194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:38:57.828495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:45.109269
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree -with the panel majority that Mr. Jones has asserted a cognizable property interest in his continued employment as a firefighter for the City of Gary. I also agree that the recognition of that property interest requires that we inquire whether he has been afforded the process that is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As my brothers note, this inquiry is governed by the holding of the Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Under Loudermill, one of the required elements of due process is a pre-deprivation hearing that, although not necessarily elaborate, affords the public worker an opportunity to receive notice of the reasons for the adverse action and an opportunity to respond. Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495. As my brothers note, there are circumstances in which the need for swift action on the part of those who exercise governmental authority and responsibility for the safety and security of others can justify the elimination or truncation of even the bare-bones pretermination hearing required by Loudermill. See FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 108 S.Ct. 1780, 100 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64-66, 99 S.Ct. 2642, 2649-50, 61 L.Ed.2d 365 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 1727-29, 52 *1446L.Ed.2d 172 (1977). Usually the asserted substantial public interest is a direct threat to the safety and security of the citizenry if the public employee is permitted to stay at his post. Nevertheless, there have been circumstances when considerations of administrative efficiency have been considered sufficient to justify abrogation of the usual Loud-ermill analysis. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 1728 (upholding state regulation requiring the immediate suspension of a driver’s license upon a certain number of driving-related convictions within one year).
The maintenance of a ready and efficient firefighting force in an urban community is no small responsibility. As my brothers strongly emphasize, we should give significant weight to the need of those who assume that responsibility to ensure that every shift at every fire station is adequately staffed. I do not believe, however, that the record supports adequately a need for an absolute abrogation of the pretermination hearing, and I agree that we ought to be cautious before accepting such a representation. Although an officer in the position of the Gary Fire Chief can hardly wait for too long before replacing an AWOL firefighter, the record hardly supports the conclusion that he cannot at least make an effort to ensure that the individual has an opportunity to give him a meaningful explanation. Here, as my brothers point out, such an opportunity was afforded Mr. Jones. He well knew that the sole issue was whether he was physically disabled. He was afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that he could not fulfill the duties of a firefighter at the disability evaluation. It was only after that opportunity had been given him and he had then refused to return to duty that the Chief acted. The Supreme Court has noted that, when expeditious action is required by the public interest, opportunities other than a pretermination (or presuspension) hearing can suffice to meet the requirements of Loudermill. See Mallen, 486 U.S. at 241, 108 S.Ct. at 1788 (holding that an indictment by grand jury was sufficient, given the necessity for quick removal of a bank official).
My only difference with my brothers is one of emphasis. The majority does point out that Mr. Jones had an opportunity for an evaluation of his disability before he was suspended. As Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller, Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146, 68 S.Ct. 421, 425, 92 L.Ed. 596 (1948), suggests, Judges of the Third Article ought to view, with a healthy degree of skepticism, assertions by government officials that the demands of their positions require that they treat those they govern in a manner different from that usually required by the Due Process Clause. Here, however, we have no such bald assertion. The Chief acted in a common sense fashion after Mr. Jones had been given an opportunity to show that he was not disabled. The judgment of the district court ought to be affirmed.