Court Opinion

ID: 9628257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:14:43.32878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:47.121460
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting:
The opinion of the majority, as I view it, is so heavily weighted in the direction of unrestrained exercise of totalitarian and potentially tyrannical power by those in positions of governmental authority, and so repugnant to the letter and spirit of specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of governmental power that I must dissent. A wholesome respect for the judgment of the bar and the public at large requires that I set forth the broad outline of my objections to the majority opinion. While volumes might be written in justification of my position I shall attempt to do no more than pinpoint a few of the many valid objections which I find in the court’s conclusions and the arguments advanced in support thereof.
I am primarily interested in the protection of constitutional limitations upon the power of any man, or group of men, to govern the people. This involves the preservation of individual' freedom of action, and individual liberty, of which we talk so much and concerning which we .do .so little. With every passing year, by judicial opinions, of the kind to which I now dissent, we nibble *244upon and whittle away the freedoms of the people; subjecting them more and more to unreasonable restraints, compelling compliance with governmental commands which are far in excess of any powers constitutionally authorized.
On March 4, 1939, at a solemn ceremony in Washington, D. C., in commemoration of the 150th Anniversary of the convening of the First Congress under the Constitution, the then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Charles Evans Hughes, said, concerning the purpose of the constitution:
“We protect the fundamental rights of minorities, in order to save democratic government from destroying itself by the excesses of its own power. The firmest ground for confidence in the future is that more than ever we realize that, while democracy must have its organization and controls, its vital breath is individual liberty”
With this significant thought in mind I direct attention to some of the provisions of the Colorado Constitution which I think are violated and are to be frittered away by the court’s opinion in this cause.
Article II, Section 3: “All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right * * * of acquiring, possessing and protecting property * *
Constitutional qualifications of this inalienable right are to be found in Article II, Section 15, and Article II, Section 14, as follows: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation; * * * and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.” (2) “Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or *245across the lands of others, for agricultural, 'mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.” (Article II, Sec. 14.) (In the instant case no one contends that any of the above exceptions are applicable.) (3) “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
In the instant case there can be no question concerning the “use” which will be made of the property in dispute. It is undisputed that it will be turned over forthwith to new private ownership for promotion and exploitation. The property may even be continued in operation, under the new forced ownership, as it is at present, or it may be devoted to other private uses as determined by the new owners. The “contemplated use” within the meaning of Article II, Sec. 15, most certainly does not include the right of the public to make use of the property in any manner whatever, and it may not be expanded to include its sale to new private owners for the operation of private uses.
Under the act being considered the Urban Renewal Authority is given discretionary power of the most fantastic nature which could be exercised in a most arbitrary manner. To acquire without the consent of the owner the private property of untold thousands of citizens. And this may be accomplished notwithstanding that the “contemplated use” to be made of the property completely excludes the public, and on the contrary involves a private use and development of a kind to be bargained for, said use to be carried on for private profit! Vast amounts of public funds are to be expended in forcing unwilling owners of real estate to convey their property, even though such property in no way whatever threatens to the public health, safety or morals. The Urban Renewal Authority then conveys the property to private interests who undertake to create an atmosphere in the area purchased which is more to the liking of those who occupy the seats of power in the new dictator agency. These private interests, introducing new, or con*246tinuing the old private uses, anticipate a profit. Thus the state plunges into the business of underwriting and financing private transactions in real estate and land development as a partner of those who speculate in real estate ventures, and in land development, for profit.
If the above-quoted provisions of the constitution are impotent to prevent this socialistic plunge by the state into financial partnership with specially selected real estate promoters and developers of subdivisions who thereby acquire privately owned property without the consent of the owners, with the avowed purpose of putting to private uses for profit, then the constitution is dead in so far as it purports to assure the citizens that they have the “inalienable” right “of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.” If countless thousands of property owners in practically any section of the city which happened to be conveniently “old” can thus be compelled to surrender their property to new purchasers for uses strictly private, we should discontinue the pretense that individual freedom of choice in matters pertaining to property has any constitutional protection against a tyrannical exercise of governmental power. If, as the majority opinion holds, the constitution is impotent in the instant situation then there is no point at which extreme encroachments upon rights guaranteed by the constitution can be stopped, since no grandiose multimillion dollar project can be conceived which would not carry with it some incidental or colorable public purpose.
It is usual and customary for those who seek to water down the effectiveness of the constitution as a bulwark of strength protecting individual freedom of action to claim some benefit to the public if the loss of individual liberty is sustained. It is true that no rights are absolute. However, I insist that “nothing is better settled than that the property of one individual cannot, without his consent, be devoted to the private use of another, even when there is an incidental or colorable benefit to the
*247public.” Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333 (342), 1 N.E. (2d) 153, 105 A.L.R. 905.
The police power of the state is altogether adequate if properly employed to remove, or to abate a “slum area” or a “blight area.” By express constitutional provision it is provided that unless the use to be made of slum area property acquired through condemnation is a use by the public, or an agency of the public, resort to the police power is the only constitutional method by which the “slum” or the “blight” can be cured. In the instant case the police power has not been resorted to, and it is in no way involved in the controversy. It should not be confused with the power under which private property may be condemned for public use, or for private uses in the very narrow field specifically mentioned in the constitution. The police power affords an adequate constitutional remedy to state government to protect the public health, safety and morals of the people from the evils of “slum” or “blight” areas. This power has not been used in the area here involved, and it is admitted that much of the property included in the area involved is being occupied and maintained in conformity with all requirements of the law which are specifically designed to protect the public health, safety and morals.
Under the holding of the majority there are few areas in the city of Denver which would not be subject to aggregate acquisition by the all-powerful Urban Renewal Authority, whether the owners of homes or business property located therein consented to being dispossessed or not. Thus, area by area, the homes and small businesses of property owners would be turned over to private real estate developers and put to a private use for profit upon the spurious claim that the public would reap some colorable benefit from such operations, conducted under the super-intelligence of those occupying the positions from which the decrees are issued, the effect of which is to dispossess thousands of citizens of privately owned property. Every property owner and
*248small businessman in those very large, but nonetheless substantial, areas of the city occupied by the middle and lower income groups of our population, are to be immediately vulnerable to the dictates of a very small group of men who purport to act (as claimed by the majority opinion) to serve a “public purpose” in bringing about the removal of a “slum” area. The language of the Constitution of Colorado cannot be construed to include anything other than that which the words employed, when given their generally accepted interpretation, will imply. At no place in the constitution can the authority be found for taking of private property for private use upon the supposition that some incidental or colorable “public purpose” may be served thereby. The constitution uses the term “contemplated use” and says that this must be a public use, and a public use cannot mean anything other than a use by the public. The words “purpose” and “use” are not synonymous terms. “Purpose” has to do with motivation and is an intangible thing. “Use” has nothing whatever to do with motivation but refers to the direct means employed in carrying out an objective and is a tangible thing. “Contemplated use” in this case can only refer to that which will actually be done with the property itself.
I respectfully submit that the majority opinion in this case has, by judicial action, amended Article II, Section 14, to read as follows:
“Private property shall not be taken for private use, unless an authorized governmental agency shall decree that some incidental or colorable public purpose will be served by the contemplated private use of the property * * *.”
The only escape from this conclusion would be to conclude that all the dictionaries should be rewritten to make the words “purpose” and “use” synonymous.
The Constitution of Colorado was created for the protection of minorities, for the protection of the individual against tyrannical rule. The fact that there may be a
*249substantial clamor (largely contributed to by those who expect to profit from the scheme) for the sacrifice of individual liberty to advance private interests, does not mean that the constitution is ineffective to prevent the sacrifice.
Progress in this field should be and can be achieved within the framework of the constitution. The failure of local authorities to use the police power to eradicate “slums” adversely affecting the public, health, safety or morals does not warrant a judicial abandonment of the constitutional guaranties relating to property rights. As stated by Chief Justice Hughes, the “vital breath” of our way of life is the individual freedom of the citizen to act with a minimum of governmental compulsion.
I can have no part in tightening the screw of the garrote choking off this “vital breath” so essential to our way of life, whether the process is accomplished by inches at a time, or by the headlong plunge toward repudiation of constitutional limitations upon power to govern which I sincerely believe will result from the majority opinion in this case.
Mr. Justice Frantz concurs in the views hereinabove expressed.
Mr. Chief Justice Hall, who did not participate in the original hearing, joins in the dissent of Mr. Justice Moore.
Mr. Justice Frantz dissenting:
My first impressions of this controversy, admittedly amorphous and indefinite, have become, after considerable research and reflection, convictions. These convictions constrain the adoption of the view that the Urban Renewal Law, as applied to this case, is invalid as being in contravention of the Constitution of Colorado.
Those of this court who deem the law consonant with the Constitution of this state and those who believe it
*250sets the authority of this fundamental document at naught are equally in favor of progress and advancement. Our differences arise from considerations of the general good as opposed to those of the individual as they are expounded and made the subjects of rights and duties in the Constitution. The collision of doctrinal thought involves the primacy of the majority and the subordination of the individual, and, as in this case in some of its phases, a minority.
The Preamble to the Constitution mentions a number of purposes for forming a state government. Among these purposes we find that in order to “promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity” we “do ordain and establish this constitution for the ‘State of Colorado.’ ” Here is an admixture of the general good and the liberty of the individual cherished as an attainable goal in the formation of a government.
Article I describes the boundaries of the state. It is followed by the Bill of Rights, which in part reads as follows:
“In order to assert our rights, acknowledge our duties, and proclaim the principles upon which our government is founded, we declare:
“Section 1. Vestment of political power. — All political power is vested in and derived from the people; all government, of right, originates from the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole.
* * *
“Section 3. Inalienable rights. — All persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and of seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness.
“Section 14. Taking private property for private use. *251— Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or sanitary purposes.
“Section 15. Taking property for public use — compensation, how ascertained. — Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation. * * * whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.

XXX

“Section 25. Due process of law. — No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.
* m= *
“Section 28. Rights reserved not disparaged. — The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, the framers of this document, in declaring that government “is instituted solely for the good of the whole,” envisioned the “good of the whole” as recognizing and preserving certain rights of individuals as inherent and inalienable, among which is the right “of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.” This right to acquire, possess and protect property is so fundamental that it gives way only where property is needed for a public use, and in specific instances for a private use, but the taking in such cases requires that the owner be justly compensated. The fee simple of the individual’s right to acquire, possess and protect property transcends all the powers of the majority, or of the government, to abridge or deny it, and only where eminent domain is properly exercisable must the individual’s power yield.
*252Placing the Bill of Rights immediately after Article I, defining the boundaries of the state, establishes the pre-eminence of these rights in the order of constitutional commands. Before other provisions were formulated for adoption, it must be made certain that the individual rights of man be recognized and preserved. Investiture of governmental power and of the rule of the majority shall be made only after certain natural, essential and inalienable rights of the individual are indelibly inscribed in the Constitution in such manner as will assure that their integrity remains intact.
“The term ‘Bill of Rights’ is derived primarily from the 2 St. W. & Mary, ch. 2, and it was so called because that statute declared the true rights of the British subject. * * * The object of that statute as well as of other British statutes of a like kind subsequently passed from time to time, and also of the charters of the same caste obtained from the king, was avowedly that, at the same time that they should operate as a limitation upon the powers of the crown, they should effectually secure from encroachment from any quarter the ascertained and declared rights of the subject. Thus these give the original of the true idea of the legitimate office of a Bill of Rights.” (Emphasis supplied.) Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481.
“An American bill of rights is a declaration of private rights reserved in a grant of public powers, — a reservation of a limited individual sovereignty, annexed to and made a part of a limited form of government established by the independent, individual action of the voting class of the people. The general purpose of such a bill of rights is, to declare those fundamental principles of the common law, generally called the principles of English constitutional liberty, which the American people always claimed as their English inheritance, and the defense of which was their justification of the war of 1776.” (Emphasis supplied.) Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590.
In 1958 the Legislature enacted the Urban Renewal *253Law. By Section 2 it found and declared “that there exist in municipalities of the State slum and blighted areas which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the State in general and of the municipalities thereof.” Section 2 concludes with the finding and declaration “that the powers conferred by this Act are for public uses and purposes for which public money may be expended and the police power exercised; and that the necessity in the public interest for the provisions herein enacted is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Urban Renewal Law provides for the removal of slum and blighted areas “and for the prevention of the development or spread of slums and blight.” Secs. 3 and 5. A “slum area” involves the predominance of certain buildings or improvements in an area which are of a condition or combination of conditions as constitute a detriment “to the public health, safety, morals or welfare.” Sec. 3 (8). A “blighted area” involves a substantial number of certain structures, and the presence of other conditions, all of which “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of the municipality, retards the provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a menace to the public health, safety, morals or welfare in its present condition and use.” (Sec. 3 (9).
Property may be acquired in any of the usual ways by which the acquisition of property is accomplished, including condemnation under the power of eminent domain. Sec. 5. The property so acquired as a part of an urban renewal project may be transferred to a private land developer. Sec. 6.
Police powers and the power of eminent domain are commingled in the Act without due regard to their differences in the causation that moves their exercise or the effects proceeding from the exertion of these powers.
*254Under the exercise of the right of eminent domain private property is taken for public use and the owner is invariably entitled to compensation therefor. Eminent domain is a reserved right, an expressed attribute of sovereignty, which, however, recognizes the right of the owner by compensating him for the taking.
The police power arises from a different source, and is part of the unwritten law. It is founded in the maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,” — that every property owner must so use his own as not to endanger the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the community in which he lives.
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205; Belleville v. St. Clair County Tump. Co., 234 Ill. 428, 84 N.E. 1049, 17 L.R.A.N.S. 1071; Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Connersville, 170 Ind. 316, 83 N.E. 503, are decisions which clearly outline the distinctions between eminent domain and police power. These distinctions have an important bearing on this case, and particularly in view of this fundamental difference: a taking in eminent domain proceedings contemplates compensation; a destruction of property under the police power leaves the owner uncompensated. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 212 Ill. 103, 72 N.E. 219.
Noting that the owner is entitled to compensation in eminent domain proceedings, the Illinois Supreme Court in the last cited case continued:
“ * * * While the police power is usually exerted merely to regulate the use and enjoyment of property by the owner, or, if he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use, but rather destroyed in order to promote the general welfare of the public, and in neither case is the owner entitled to any compensation for an injury which he may sustain in consequence thereof, for the law considers that either the injury is damnum absque injuria or the owner is sufficiently compensated by sharing in the general benefits *255resulting from the exercise of the police power.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Urban Renewal Law and the project proposed to be undertaken thereunder in the present instance contemplate that a predominance of properties in the area fall within the definition of structures and improvements making slum or blighted areas; that a number of properties therein are unoffending; that some are approaching the degenerative state which eventually would bring the area nearer to being slum or blighted in character. “There’s the rub.”
Vindication for the Urban Renewal Law is expressly found in the police power. But police power cannot be exercised in respect of unoffending property. The measure of the right to exercise the police power is the right to regulate the use of property or to destroy it because either in the use or existence thereof it has a detrimental effect on the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. In this respect, properties must be considered individually. Individual properties which are not harmful to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare are not, and cannot be, the proper subjects of regulation or destruction in the exercise of the police power.
Lawful, harmless properties may not be destroyed under a police power measure because located in an area containing properties which may be so treated, or nestled between such properties as are or may be proper subjects for exerting the police power. What becomes of the natural, essential and inalienable right to acquire, possess and protect property if lawful, harmless buildings and improvements can be razed because so located? Lawful, harmless structures are the proper subjects of acquisition, possession and protection. To hold otherwise would render empty and meaningless declarations of rights in the Constitution which have been considered precious to and inherent in man.
There are other disturbing elements in this case which provoke comment in view of the right of persons, re*256gardless of their station in life, to acquire, possess and protect property inoffensive from the standpoint of health, safety, morals and welfare of the public. How are the great masses of the people to realize their aspirations of acquiring and possessing property, pursuing happiness, and enjoying life and liberty unless they are permitted to acquire and hold property, however humble in character? Are persons in extremely humble circumstances to be denied the opportunity to acquire and possess a home?
The effect of the Urban Renewal Law is to foreclose the purchase and possession of a home in certain areas which the administrative agency may deem to be potentially blighted or slum in character. And yet innate in every person is the urge to own and possess property — to have a home which he can call his own. This urge inheres in the man of meager means as well as in the well-to-do. May it not be said that so long as the public health, safety, morals or welfare are not endangered by the man who starts in humble beginnings, his right to own and possess property should not be thwarted? Is not this more in keeping with the tradition of this country?
And where do the persons of meager means in the area involved go if this project becomes reality? Probably they can do no better than seek the equivalent of that which they presently have. In all probability that means the removal to an area having the same characteristics as the one from which they are evicted. Continuing with probabilities, they would eventually face the same fate that will befall them in this case. An alternative would be to become renters, for it is not likely that they can afford homes of better quality. Thus, their constitutional right to acquire and possess property becomes a mirage — expressed in ghostly words with only a semblance of substance.
Compulsory mass migration accomplished in an aura of legality under circumstances here present should be *257deprecated as being out of harmony with fundamental law. Such migration excites feelings of compassion, particularly since most people in this area probably are of a certain economic level and will by reason thereof seek the same level in removing from the present area, only to be the subjects of another compulsory mass migration as the area to which they move comes under the operation of the Urban Renewal Law.
Families and merchants are uprooted, notwithstanding some, and possibly a substantial number of them, own and possess structures presently inoffensive to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. Only in recognized greatly emergent situations should the government exercise such power, and this is not one of them.
Some of the lamentable pages of history relate to instances of forced mass transplantation of human beings. These events stir the sensibilities of mankind. That the removal of persons from their homes and business places in this case is not on so large a scale does not soften the effect.
The Urban Renewal Law does not bestow the first option to the persons divested of property in the area to gain it back. Nor does it provide that such persons shall have the privilege of being active participants in the land development to follow the taking of the property. Perhaps such a provision would fall afoul of the constitutional prohibitions that property shall not be taken for a private use and that relief in any form shall not be afforded persons for certain purposes. Art. V, Sec. 34. If such acts or purposes are vulnerable to attack in these respects, then surely the proposal before us is vulnerable to the same degree.
It is contended that a public use is accomplished by eliminating a blighted or slum condition, and that it is a matter of indifference in a constitutional sense what happens to the property thereafter. Bottomed in the exercise of the police power, resort is had to condemnation to raze structures and improvements, the majority *258of which are said to be dangerous to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the public, but conceivably a substantial portion of which do not so offend. Because there may be more offensive than inoffensive structures in a selected area, even by a percentage point, the inoffensive must go with the bad.
Such is a circumvention of the proper exercise of the police power to which we may not be indifferent. Nor may we construe the eminent domain provision in such sense as to say it is a matter of indifference what happens to the property after the area is levelled. “Public use” is not an instrument for the exercise of the police power, nor does police power contemplate regulation or destruction of property for “public use”; to hold otherwise is dangerous doctrine. To so construe it is a garbling of terms and concepts which opens new vistas the ends of which may do untold harm.
What I once said warrants repeating. “There is a proneness to regard constitutions as instruments of boundless accommodation, taking on so many shapes as in truth to be shapeless, and all because of the seductive notion that constitutions are Protean. That their generalities make for living documents covering changes in a developing society, no one will deny; but there are ‘no trespass’ signs in these constitutions, effective against encroachment by the executive, legislative and judicial departments in certain areas, and among these areas are the natural rights of man enumerated in the Bill of Rights.” Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P. (2d) 851, dissenting opinion.
History is monotonously repetitive. History in essence is little more than a chronicle of the struggle for the recognition and preservation or the abridgment of certain rights. In recent years the fortunes of the struggle have swung toward abridgment.- The Urban Renewal Law is another effort to- curtail individual rights in disregard of constitutional protections. At least the strug*259gle should be in the forum of elections, to ascertain if the people desire to surrender these rights.
In addition to the foregoing, I join in the views expressed by Mr. Justice Moore.