Court Opinion

ID: 9524472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:53:02.774255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:29.117118
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree with the majority’s conclusion that there was no error which requires reversal of the murder conviction, but I cannot agree that the fact the trial judge did not give a cautionary instruction requires reversal of the death sentence. Illinois law does not require such an instruction, the defendant neither sought nor tendered such an instruction at trial, and he does not even now argue that the absence of such an instruction is error. Nevertheless, in what I believe to be an unprecedented holding, my colleagues now say the trial judge’s failure to volunteer an instruction which no one ever suggested or requested constitutes reversible error. In my judgment the law is clear that regardless of whether the defendant’s multiple claims of torturing and killing, as revealed by the testimony at the sentencing hearing, were true or not, the testimony regarding those claims was significant, relevant and appropriate — if not essential — to an adequate consideration of the sentencing question by the jury. No cautionary instruction was either necessary or proper. The majority indicates that the precautions taken to preclude the “contaminating influence” of improper information should be at least as great before a jury as in a bench trial. While such a statement is indisputable, the difficulty with the majority’s position is that no case cited in that opinion or found by me which considers the bounds of legitimate inquiry at a sentencing hearing suggests the need or use of a cautionary instruction when undisputed but uncorroborated testimony is considered. Instead, this court has approved consideration of a broad range of information from a wide variety of sources subject only to the sensible caveat that the judge must exercise care to ensure that the information is accurate. (See, e.g., People v. La Pointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482; People v. Meeks (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 524; People v. Kelley (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 315, cert. denied (1970), 398 U.S. 954, 26 L. Ed. 2d 297, 90 S. Ct. 1881, cert. denied (1971), 403 U.S. 906, 29 L. Ed. 2d 683, 91 S. Ct. 2212; People v. Adkins (1968), 41 Ill. 2d 297.) The decisions of this court indicate that the judge’s duty to ensure accuracy is met by compliance with the traditional dictates of the adversarial process — a fair opportunity to the opponent to rebut the testimony and offer evidence of his own. People v. LaPointe (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 482; People v. Crews (1967), 38 Ill. 2d 331; People v. Mann (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 135; People v. O’Neil (1960) 18 Ill. 2d 461; People v. Riley (1941), 376 Ill. 364, cert. denied (1941), 313 U.S. 586, 85 L. Ed. 1542, 61 S. Ct. 1118. Other jurisdictions also allow a wide range of information-including uncorroborated testimony unaccompanied by any cautionary instructions — to be considered during the sentencing process. The United States Supreme Court has strongly reaffirmed its stance that “ ‘ “a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” ’ ” Roberts v. United States (1980), 445 U.S. 552, 556, 63 L. Ed. 2d 622, 628, 100 S. Ct. 1358, 1362, quoting United States v. Grayson (1978), 438 U.S. 41, 50, 57 L. Ed. 2d 582, 589, 98 S. Ct. 2610, 2615, quoting United States v. Tucker (1972), 404 U.S. 443, 446, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592, 596, 92 S. Ct. 589, 591. See also Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), 428 U.S. 280, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 96 S. Ct. 2978; Williams v. New York (1949), 337 U.S. 241, 93 L. Ed. 1337, 69 S. Ct. 1079. Many of our sister States also require consideration of a broad range of information at the sentencing stage and, as do our opinions, regard the adversarial process as an adequate safeguard for the accuracy of information considered. See Nukapigak v. Slate (Alaska 1977), 562 P.2d 697; Fair v. State (1980), 245 Ga. 868, 873, 268 S.E.2d 316, 321, cert. denied (1980), 449 U.S. 968, 66 L. Ed. 2d 250, 101 S. Ct. 407, reh. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1104, 66 L. Ed. 2d 831, 101 S. Ct. 903 (approved consideration of testimony detailing defendant’s conversations with jailmates, gloating over his misdeeds); Lottie v. State (1980), _ Ind. _, 406 N.E.2d 632; Commonwealth v. Frank (1977), 372 Mass. 866, 362 N.E.2d 895; Williamson v. State (Miss. 1980), 388 So. 2d 168; State v. Aby (1980), 205 Neb. 267, 287 N.W.2d 68; Lucas v. State (1980), 96 Nev. 428, 610 P.2d 727; State v. Marzolf (1979), 79 N.J. 167, 398 A.2d 849; State v. Pearce (1979), 296 N.C. 281, 250 S.E.2d 640; Dickinson v. Mueller (N.D. 1977), 261 N.W.2d 787; State v. Blight (1977), 89 Wash. 2d 38, 569 P.2d 1129. As I understand the testimony in this case, defendant has said that in order to secure information from other Viet Cong prisoners he pushed Viet Cong officers out of high-flying helicopters in Viet Nam; that he also inserted, and then lighted, flares in the vaginas of Vietnamese women caught stealing; and that he spoke of various types of torture killing and indicated he enjoyed killing. The majority speculates that these things may only have been fantasized by defendant, and that a cautionary instruction (the content of which is left to the ingenuity of the judge and counsel) is required to avoid the otherwise prejudicial effect upon the jury of hearing evidence that the defendant claims to have committed these offenses. In my opinion the majority overlooks the fact that the psychiatrists who testified in this case characterized defendant as a sociopathic personality who would be likely to attempt to carry out the fantasies which he experienced. It is readily apparent from this testimony that whether defendant actually did what he claimed to have done or not, the likelihood that he will pursue his fantasies poses a serious threat to society, evidence of which is clearly admissible in the sentencing hearing. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment and sentence. CHIEF JUSTICE RYAN joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.