Court Opinion

ID: 9484156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:42:24.532981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:07.544440
License: Public Domain

FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that Higgins was sentenced to a term of imprisonment greater than that permitted by state law. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that habeas relief is unavailable and therefore I respectfully dissent.
I first part company with the majority when it intimates that the actual innocence exception to the exhaustion requirement is somehow doubtful in noncapital cases. Ante at 441. I see nothing in Sawyer that suggests the actual innocence exception is inapplicable in cases challenging sentences of incarceration.
My more fundamental disagreement arises from the majority’s conclusion that there has been no constitutional violation in this case. Though Higgins did fail to present this issue to the state courts, the majority seems to indicate (and I agree) that the sole barrier to reviewing his claim under the actual innocence exception is the lack of a constitutional violation. Thus, if there has been such a violation, Higgins would be entitled to relief. .
It is important to note that nobody has seriously contended that the correct statute was used to sentence Higgins. This conclusion is obvious from reading Mo.Rev. Stat. § 1.160(2) and the many state court decisions — including Freeman — construing this statutory provision.
It also appears obvious to me that it is a violation of due process for a court to impose a sentence greater than that authorized by the legislature. Cf. Marzano v. Kincheloe, 915 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1990) (A “court cannot constitutionally sentence a defendant to a sentence not authorized by law.”). The majority avoids confronting this premise by describing the error in this case as “nothing more ... than an error in the interpretation and application of state law.” Ante at 442. Of course, if the claimed error depended upon the resolution of a conflict as to a statute’s meaning, the matter would be wholly a matter of state law. However, there is no claimed error in interpretation; no construction of state law is required to make clear that at the time Higgins was sentenced, Missouri law allowed a maximum sentence of seven years — three years less than the sentence actually imposed. Moreover, the mere fact *443that the error can be characterized as a misapplication does not mean there has not been a violation of the Constitution. The majority ignores that a misapplication may be so clear, obvious, and fundamental that it does violate traditional notions of due process and is not just “a perceived error of state law.” Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984).1 I believe this to be such a case; the error is as clear as if the sentencing court had chosen to totally ignore the law and impose a twenty year sentence. This, too, would be a misapplication of state law which would constitute a fundamental violation of due process and equal protection.

. The possibility I espouse has been recognized, or at least not foreclosed, by both our court and the Supreme Court. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41, 104 S.Ct. at 874 (failing to reject the claim that “an error of state law could be sufficiently egregious to amount to a denial of equal protection or of due process of law_"); Jones v. Armontrout, 953 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir.1992) (“An incorrect application of state law, without more, does not establish that a prisoner is being held in violation of the laws or Constitution of the United States_”).