Court Opinion

ID: 9427175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:57.793452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.777920
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
with whom The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun join,
dissenting.
Although the majority lucidly states the issue in this case, it plainly errs in deciding it.
Section 5 (a) of the Submerged Lands Act excepted from its general cession of land to the States those “rights the United States has in lands presently and actually occupied by the United States under claim of right.” 1 Actual title to the lands was not required; lands to which the United States held title were already excepted by the previous language in § 5 (a). The reference to claims of right was critical for the United States’ stake in submerged lands, since United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), and 332 U. S. 804 (1947), did not actually vest the United States with title to the submerged lands. While specifically denying California title, the Court fell short of declaring title in the United States, recognizing instead the federal “paramount rights” in the lands. Id., at 805.
Section 5 (a) was added at the suggestion of the Attorney General. His purpose was to guarantee “that all installations and acquisitions of the Federal Government within such area [as was to be ceded] belong to it.” 2 Senator Holland’s original Joint Resolution No. 13 had provided:
“There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Act—
“(a) all specifically described tracts or parcels of land *43and resources therein or improvements thereon title to which has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the decisions of the courts of such State, or their respective grantees, or successors in interest, by cession, grant, quitclaim, or condemnation or from any other owner or owners thereof by conveyance or by condemnation, provided such owner or owners had lawfully acquired the title to such lands and resources in accordance with the statutes or decisions of the courts of the State in which the lands are located ....” Hearings 14.
The Attorney General’s substitute read as follows:
“There is excepted from the operation of section 3 of this Joint Resolution:
“(a) all tracts or parcels of land together with all accretions thereto, resources therein, or improvements thereon, title to which has been lawfully and expressly acquired by the United States from any State or from any person in whom title had vested under the law of the State or of the United States, and all lands which the United States lawfully holds under the law of the State; all lands expressly retained by the United States when the State entered the Union; all lands acquired by the United States by eminent domain proceedings; all lands filled in, built up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use; and all lands presently occupied by the United States under claim of right. . . Id., at 935.
The clearest, most observable difference between the original draft and the language proposed by the Attorney General is this final statement about “lands presently occupied by the United States under claim of right.” 3 The conclusion is that *44some lands to which the United States did not possess outright title might be part of federal installations, and, if so, they were to be preserved in federal control. This inference is strongly supported in further legislative history.
The Acting Chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs explained to the Joint Resolution's author why the Committee had added the phrase concerning claim of right:
“I should like to add that the last language quoted, namely, 'any rights the United States has in lands presently and actually occupied by the United States under claim of right,’ came into the bill at the request of the Department of Justice. It was presented to the committee and explained by the Department of Justice as being for the purpose of reserving to the Federal Government the area of any installation, or part of an installation — and I use the term 'installation' to distinguish a specific area, used for a specific purpose, from any vast area that might be claimed under the paramount right doctrine — actually occupied by the Government under a claim of right.” 99 Cong. Rec. 2619 (1953) (Sen. Cordon).
The resolution’s author, Senator Holland, asked the Acting Chairman:
“Am I correct in understanding that under that particular provision the mere fact that the Supreme Court might have held that the United States has paramount rights in submerged lands beyond mean low water, and within State boundaries, would not in any way give the United States the right to claim exceptions of such lands from the joint resolution, in view of the fact that such *45lands ivould not be ‘'presently and actually occupied by the United States’? Am I correct in that understanding?
“Mr. CORDON: The Senator is correct in his understanding.” Ibid, (emphasis added).
Hence, the test is whether the lands held under some claim of right are “actually occupied” by the Federal Government. If so, they are not relinquished.
The same issue arose in the hearings, with identical resolution. The Acting Chairman explained:
“[A]ny land occupied by the United States under claim by the United States that it has a right there, is excluded from this conveyance or quitclaim or assignment. . . . It is general language that . . . protects every installation of every kind.” Hearings 1322.
Senator Long summarized, to the Acting Chairman’s agreement:
“That, in effect, says that this act does not at all affect any land which the United States is actually occupying. And that means that a representative of the United States Government in one capacity or another is occupying that land.” Ibid.
Senator Long was concerned that the definition of occupied lands might be stretched to include submerged lands over which the Federal Government had been given dominion in United States v. California, 332 U. S. 19 (1947), by reason of the fact that the United States Navy from time to time might sail across them. It was in response to that suggestion that the Acting Chairman made the statement quoted by the majority that “ 'the claim of right’ [is] 'other than the claim arising by virtue of the decision in [that case] ....’”4 Such a construction was, of course, barred, for it would eviscerate the purpose of returning any sub*46merged lands. Ante, at 39. But this ignores the much narrower meaning of “submerged lands occupied by the United States under claim of right” which was intended: the submerged lands that were actually occupied as part of a federal “installation,” meaning “a specific area, used for a specific purpose.” The distinction is between a general claim under United States v. California to paramount rights, and a very specific claim associated with a federal installation actually occupied. Recalling the Acting Chairman’s words: “Occupancy to me is some type of actual either continuous possession or possession in such way as to indicate that the individual claims some special right there different from a vast unoccupied area.” 5 “[The language is] for the purpose of reserving to the Federal Government the area of any installation, or part of an installation — and I use the term 'installation’ to distinguish a specific area, used for a specific purpose, from any vast area that might be claimed under the paramount right doctrine . .. .” 6
The Channel Islands National Monument includes the submerged lands within a one-mile radius of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands.7 The parties have stipulated that “the United States 'presently and actually occupied’ the areas within one nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and Santa
*47Barbara Islands for purposes of Section 5 of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U. S. C. § 1313.” 8 The federal occupation is to fulfill the specific purpose of providing for “the proper care, management, and protection of the objects of geological and scientific interest located' on lands within the said monument.” Presidential Proclamation No. 2825, 63 Stat. 1253. The federal occupation is under claim of right, since only federally “owned or controlled” property can be made into a national monument. 16 U. S. C. §431 (1976 ed.).
The majority opinion stresses that the United States’ occupation of the submerged lands within the Channel Islands National Monument9 was originally premised on federal control of those areas as granted in United States v. California, supra. This is true. The paramount rights of the United States to these submerged lands, and the absence of California title to them, were recognized in that 1947 decision. In 1949, President Truman allocated a small portion of all the submerged lands within the Federal Government’s paramount rights to become part of the Channel Islands National Monument. And in 1953, all the submerged lands not actually occupied by the Federal Government were ceded to the States. But the Channel Islands National'Monument remained.
Submerged lands for which the federal claim rested “solely upon the doctrine of 'paramount rights’ ”10 were given up by the Federal Government. The majority’s quotation of that statement comes from that part of the Senate Report explaining why the Attorney General’s language was accepted, the language that included for the first time’ “rights ... in *48lands presently and actually occupied by the United States under claim of right It says “any claim resting solely upon the doctrine of 'paramount rights' ” (emphasis added) is lost to the Federal Government, but the majority holds that any claim originating in the doctrine of paramount rights is lost. The majority does not recognize that some rights can originate in the paramount-rights doctrine, yet rest on actual occupation under claim of right as part of a federal installation, annexed before the doctrine of paramount rights was waived in 1953.
That, I respectfully submit, is an erroneous interpretation of even that one bit of legislative history.11 It is also contrary to the dominant theme in the legislative history that general, amorphous paramount rights claims were lost, but specific claims coupled with actual occupation of an installation were not. And most critically, the majority view is without support in the statute's plain language that “all lands presently occupied by the United States under claim of right” were preserved. It is stipulated that the lands were occupied, and a claim of right certainly arises when a President treats property in a manner to which only United States property is subject.12
I respectfully dissent.

 43 U. S. C. § 1313 (a).

 Letter of Attorney General Brownell, Hearings on S. J. Res. 13 et al. before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 935 (1953) (hereafter Hearings).

 There is no quarrel that the use of the word “lands” in this context extends to submerged lands. The Act concerns submerged lands in its sec*44tion ceding the area to the States, 43 U. S. C. § 1311, and similarly in this section concerning exceptions to that cession.

 Ante, at 39, quoting Hearings 1322.

 Ibid.

 99 Cong. Rec. 2619 (1953).

 Although the point is contested, there is little left to decide upon reading in President Truman’s Presidential Proclamation No. 2825 of February 9, 1949, 63 Stat. 1258, that “the areas within one nautical mile of the shoreline of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands” were added to the National Monument. The parties have stipulated that “the acreage figures shown on the diagram accompanying Presidential Proclamation No. 2825 are figures which approximate the total surface area of Anacapa and Santa Barbara Islands and one nautical mile of waters surrounding those islands.” App. 2. This leaves no force at all to defendant’s reliance on the Proclamation’s preamble which refers to "certain islets and rocks” but not specifically to submerged lands or water.

 Id., at 1. The stipulation was made contingent upon a finding that the submerged lands and waters within the one-mile radius were found to be part of the National Monument.

 The majority does not reach whether the submerged lands are actually within the Monument.

 S. Rep. No. 133, 83d Cong.; 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 20 (1953).

 The purpose of the Attorney General’s proposed amendment was to preserve federal control over “all installations and acquisitions of the Federal Government within such area.” Hearings 936. The submerged lands within a one-nautical-mile radius became an “acquisition” of the Channel Islands National Monument “installation” in 1949.

 On the face of the statute, it might be asked how any claim of right could arise more clearly than for a President to incorporate the property within a national monument. If President Truman did not act under claim of right, it is hard to surmise how he did act.