Court Opinion

ID: 9690781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:42:19.527508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:04.290609
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 138. {concurring). The majority does not determine whether the warrantless entry into Sanders' home to make a war-rantless arrest was justified as an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Because this case is resolved on other grounds, we need not (and *314should not) decide whether the warrant requirement exception for warrantless entry into a home by police engaged in hot pursuit should continue to he limited to warrantless felony arrests or if it should be extended to warrantless serious misdemeanor arrests. While I join the majority opinion, I write separately to address Justice Prosser's concurrence's misreading of pertinent and controlling case law addressing the constitutionality of warrantless home entries.
¶ 139. This case involves one of the most fundamental liberties guaranteed by our federal and state constitutions: the right to privacy in the sanctity of one's home. The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[t]he Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)(emphasis added). The Supreme Court also affirmed the fundamental importance of jealously guarding the right to privacy against unwarranted invasions in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948), explaining:
We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a *315magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home.
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 455-56.
¶ 140. In a later case, the Supreme Court elaborated:
It is axiomatic that the "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." And a principle protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or arrest.
"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance."
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 & n.10 (1984) (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
¶ 141. Whether viewed in terms of the protections accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or by Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, warrantless entries into the homes of Wisconsin residents are presumptively unreasonable and unconstitutional, with a heavy burden on the government to justify such intrusions of personal liberty and the right to privacy and security in one's home and effects. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 581-86 (1980); State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, ¶¶ 16-21, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621 (citations omitted). In order to justify the lawfulness of such an entry, the *316State must establish both (1) probable cause to arrest or search, and (2) exigent circumstances sufficient to establish an exception to the warrant requirement. Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶ 24; Smith v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 226-28, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986). "Warrant-less entry is permissible only where there is urgent need to do so, coupled with insufficient time to secure a warrant." Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 228.
¶ 142. In Smith, this court described the exigent circumstances test as follows: "[wjhether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life or risk destruction of evidence or greatly enhance the likelihood of the suspect's escape." Id. at 230. As reinforced in later decisions such as Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶ 24, the Smith decision recognized
four factors which, when measured against the time needed to obtain a warrant, would constitute the exigent circumstances required for a warrantless entry: (1) An arrest made in "hot pursuit," (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk that evidence would be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that the suspect would flee. See Laasch [v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 592, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978)]. We recommended in Welsh, consistent with Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979), that a review of exigent circumstances be directed by a flexible test of reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances. [State v. ]Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d [319,] 328, 329[, 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982)].
Smith, 131 Wis. 2d at 229. The debate presented by Justice Prosser's concurrence comes down to the question of whether the first factor alone, hot pursuit, can constitute such sufficient exigent circumstances under *317Welsh's totality of the circumstances test to justify warrantless entry for any misdemeanor offense.
¶ 143. In its Welsh decision addressing the constitutional limitations on warrantless home entries, the United States Supreme Court emphasized its hesitation to find exigent circumstances "when warrantless arrests in the home are at issue," and particularly when the underlying offense giving rise to probable cause to arrest "is relatively minor." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50 (citing United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-299 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). The Welsh court further noted that exceptions to the warrant requirement are "few in number and carefully delineated." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 (citation omitted). The Court listed the emergency conditions it had previously recognized, and indicated that it had applied only the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon emergency condition to warrantless arrests in the home. Id. at 750, 753.
¶ 144. Welsh explained the difference between how courts should treat serious and minor offenses in the context of warrantless entry cases in the following terms: "When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750. The Court pointed out that "[e]ven the dissenters in Payton, although believing that warrantless home arrests are not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, recognized the importance of the felony limitation on such arrests. . . . ('The felony requirement guards against abu*318sive or arbitrary enforcement and ensures that invasions of the home occur only in case of the most serious crimes')." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 n. 12 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 616-17 (White, J., dissenting)). The Court ultimately held that the "application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense .. . has been committed." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (emphasis added).
¶ 145. Justice Prosser's concurrence recognizes that Welsh distinguishes between different types of offenses. The context in which that distinction was made in Welsh was limited, however, to noting that the Court "[did not have] to consider whether the Fourth Amendment may impose an absolute ban on warrant-less home arrests for certain minor offenses." Id. at 749 n. 11 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the decision allowing warrantless home arrests upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, Payton, was also "expressly limited to felony arrests." Id. (emphasis added).
¶ 146. The Court quoted Justice Jackson's concurrence in McDonald in discussing why a finding of exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted, if allowed at all, when a minor offense has been committed:
It is to me a shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it. While I should be human enough to apply the letter of the law with some indulgence to officers acting to deal with threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or security, it is notable that few of the searches found by this Court to be unlawful dealt *319with that category of crime... . While the enterprise of parting fools from their money by the "numbers" lottery is one that ought to be suppressed, I do not think its suppression is more important to society than the security of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. When an officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences if he postponed action to get a warrant.
McDonald, 335 U.S. at 459-60 (Jackson, J. concurring) (emphasis added). See also Welsh, 466 U.S. at 751 (quoting the above passage from Justice Jackson's McDonald concurrence). Thus, while the Court discussed the possibility that an argument could be made to extend the Payton limitation of felony home arrests upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to situations involving minor offenses where threats or crimes of violence were involved, the rule established in Payton remained in effect for the time being. Moreover, the Court never contemplated home arrests for any type of minor offense that did not involve threats or crimes of violence.
¶ 147. Justice Prosser's concurrence strives to go in a direction never adopted, nor even contemplated, by the Supreme Court. Justice Prosser's concurrence would establish a rule that police in hot pursuit can enter the sanctity of one's home without a warrant for any jailable misdemeanor offense, notwithstanding the fact that the Payton rule allowing warrantless entry into the home in some cases was expressly limited to felony arrests. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n. 11.
¶ 148. Welsh, while not a hot pursuit case itself, discussed hot pursuit along with the other exigent circumstances that may be factors in a warrantless entry analysis. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-53. Similarly, *320although Payton is not a hot pursuit case, its focus dealt with restrictions on warrantless entries into the home.
¶ 149. Justice Prosser's concurrence suggests that the distinction to be drawn in warrantless entry cases is between jailable and nonjailable offenses, completely ignoring the Payton limitation. Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶¶ 83-85. Justice Prosser's concurrence then boldly states that because all misdemeanors are potentially jailable in Wisconsin, then all crimes in Wisconsin are "serious" offenses, see id,., ¶¶ 92-94, leading to the necessary conclusion that warrantless entry during hot pursuit is justified for any type of crime whatsoever.
¶ 150. Justice Prosser's concurrence errs by completely misconstruing the case of Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). McArthur did not involve a war-rantless home entry by police based on probable cause and exigent circumstances for a jailable misdemeanor offense. To the contrary, the police in McArthur prevented a defendant from entering his home outside of their presence, precisely so the police could secure a warrant prior to entering the home. Id. at 328-29. The Court's holding was limited to justifying the restriction upon the defendant's entry into his home that the police imposed. Id. at 336. Of particular import is the distinction recognized by the Court that:
Temporarily keeping a person from entering his home... is considerably less intrusive than police entry into the home in order to make a warrantless arrest or conduct a search. Cf. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S., at 585 (the Fourth Amendment's central concern is the warrantless entry and search of the home).

Id.

¶ 151. In addition to misinterpreting Welsh and McArthur by concluding that warrantless entry is con*321stitutionally permissible for any misdemeanor as long as hot pursuit exists, the analysis in Justice Prosser's concurrence collapsing the distinctions between different types of crimes ignores language to the contrary in other controlling precedents as well. The majority of cases that have addressed the issue of exigent circumstances justifying warrantless home entries distinguish between different types of crimes.
¶ 152. Some cases have maintained the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. See, e.g., Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n.11 ("Our decision in Payton, allowing warrantless home arrests upon a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances, was also expressly limited to felony arrests."); State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, ¶ 17, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421 (interpreting Welsh as "limit[ing] Santana to the hot pursuit of fleeing felons"); see also State v. Sorenson, 590 P.2d 136, 139 (Mont. 1979)("The [hot pursuit] doctrine is unavailable to peace officers until a felony has been committed and the suspect is fleeing."); City of Seattle v. Altschuler, 766 P.2d 518, 520 (Wash. App. 1989)("Sa»iarea's facts limit its application to the 'hot pursuit' of a fleeing felon."). But cf. City of Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002)(holding "that when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor").
¶ 153. Other cases adopt what may be viewed as a "hot pursuit plus" approach that upholds hot pursuits for offenses of varying degrees of seriousness where there are other exigent circumstances present, for example threats of violence or destroyed evidence, or other emergencies or dangerous situations. See War*322den, 387 U.S. at 297-99 (upholding hot pursuit on the grounds that an armed robbery suspect who had entered a house might "gravely endanger" the lives of officers or other individuals, with speed being of the essence to ensure "that Hayden was the only man present and that the police had control of all weapons which could be used against them or to effect an escape"); Hughes, 233 Wis. 2d 280, ¶¶ 26-27, 33-35, 39 (The "immediate and compelling" exigent circumstances in that case included probable cause to believe that apartment occupants would intentionally destroy evidence of drug-related offense.); Butler v. State, 829 S.W.2d 412, 415 (Ark. 1992)(interpreting the Fourth Amendment as requiring an "exigent circumstance requiring immediate aid or action" beyond a mere hot pursuit where the suspected crime is a minor offense); State v. Bolte, 560 A.2d 644, 652-53 (N.J. 1989)(conclud-ing that hot pursuit alone was an insufficient justification for a warrantless arrest in the suspect's home, and describing a series of other cases in which hot pursuit alone was not sufficient without additional exigencies such as the alleged commission of a felony, the potential destruction of evidence, or concern for the safety of others); State v. Wren, 768 P.2d 1351, 1352, 1356 & n.5 (Idaho App. 1989) (holding in part "that if an arrest is not initiated in a public place, but is made after a warrantless entry into the home, it may not be justified solely upon a theory of 'hot' or 'fresh' pursuit. Other exigent circumstances must exist." The court, in rejecting a misdemeanor-felony distinction, also rejected hot pursuit as sufficient by itself to justify warrantless entry, explaining that "any simplistic equation of a hot pursuit with an exigent circumstance is conceptually unsound and is at variance with pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court."). See also Payton, 445 *323U.S. at 583 ("[W]e have no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situation, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would justify a warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search.").
¶ 154. Santana, relied upon by Justice Prosser's concurrence and described by that concurrence as a case that does not limit "hot pursuit" warrantless entries to felonies, involved a felony arrest upon probable cause of criminal heroin sales activity, with the Supreme Court holding that in such a context, a defendant cannot defeat an otherwise proper arrest that commenced in a public place by retreating into a private place. Santana, 427 U.S. at 39-40, 42-43. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750 (citing Santana as involving "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon"). The Court described the chase in that case as "a true 'hot pursuit'" because there was a realistic expectation that if the police did not follow Santana into her house, "any delay would result in a destruction of evidence." Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. As such, it was the likelihood of the destruction of drug evidence, rather than any actual chase,1 that caused the Court to conclude that warrantless entry was justified in that felony case.
¶ 155. However, Santana has not been applied to warrantless misdemeanor arrests inside a home by the Supreme Court; notwithstanding Santana,2 the Court in Welsh did emphasize that Payton was limited to *324felonies. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n. 11. Absent further action by the Supreme Court, this court lacks the constitutional authority to create a new rule of law that would abandon the precedent of Payton.
¶ 156. In denying all criminal suspects in Wisconsin the right to a warrant before being hotly pursued right into their own home, Justice Prosser's concurrence would accord fewer protections to individuals to be secure in their homes and persons than those recognized by the United States Supreme Court. Such denial of fundamental Fourth Amendment rights would be in clear contravention of the basic constitutional principle that the federal Constitution sets the floor, not the ceiling for individual rights, and states may not provide fewer constitutional protections than those guaranteed by the federal constitution, although we are always free to grant more rights under our state's constitution. See U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2; State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶ 30 & n. 9, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.
¶ 157. Finally, Justice Prosser's concurrence confuses and conflates "minor" with "petty" misdemeanors, in its analysis that our legislature "has determined that all misdemeanors, regardless of class, are 'serious' offenses" simply "because all misdemeanors are jailable offenses." Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 92. Justice Prosser's concurrence ignores the fact that the United States Supreme Court has already distinguished "serious" offenses from "petty offenses," not in terms of whether any jail time at all may be a penalty, but in terms of how much maximum jail time may be imposed. Specifically, the Supreme Court has explained that:
[i]n deciding whether an offense is "petty," we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with *325which society regards the offense, and we have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized penalty. Applying these guidelines, we have held that a possible six-month penalty is short enough to permit classification of the offense as "petty," but that a two-year maximum is sufficiently "serious" to require an opportunity for jury trial....
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970)(cita-tions omitted). Other cases in which the Court has explained that offenses are presumptively "petty," as opposed to "serious" offenses, if the maximum potential sentence is six months or less, include United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1993), and Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1989).
¶ 158. In closing, although the proposal of Justice Prosser's concurrence — denying the Fourth Amendment right to be protected from literally unwarranted intrusions into the sanctity of one's home in any misdemeanor involving hot pursuit — is contrary to established legal standards, I again emphasize that we need not decide whether a warrantless entry into a home by police officers in the context of hot pursuit should continue to be limited to warrantless felony arrests or if the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement should be extended to serious misdemeanor arrests. The majority correctly decided this case on narrower grounds.
¶ 159. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

 Indeed, there was no literal chase involved in Santana; as Justice Marshall's dissent points out, Santana was already standing in her doorway when the police approached her home to arrest her. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45-47 (1976)(Marshall, J., dissenting).

 Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), was decided subsequent to Santana.