Court Opinion

ID: 86577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:00:39+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:28.395423
License: Public Domain

50 U.S. 501 (1850)
9 How. 501
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
JOHN S. ROBERTS AND JAMES F. REED, SURVIVORS OF JAMES ADAMS.
Supreme Court of United States.

*516 It was argued by Mr. Johnson (Attorney-General), for the United States, no counsel appearing for the defendants in error.
*517 Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
There cannot be either security or efficiency in the business of the Post-Office Department, unless its receipts and disbursements are made upon a fixed plan. It must be executed, too, with uniformity and rigor. The duties of its officers must be definitely prescribed, and enforced without relaxation. Nor will there be either safety or justice for the country, if the forms enjoined for receiving and paying money are permitted to be disregarded by its deputies. The establishment under our system must be made to support itself.
It is extended from day to day into territories, late wildernesses, and from place to place in and beyond them, through prairies, swamps, and marshes, without any other trail than those of the first wheels that passed over them. In the settled parts of the country, new routes, changes of routes, increase of speed in conveyances, and new conveyances, are daily demanded *518 to meet the conveniences and the wants of our almost incalculable internal commerce. Neither the cost of them nor the revenue can be anticipated. Sleepless vigilance in its chief, sleepless devotion to its business, aided by the unremitting industry and intelligence of his assistants in the Department, can only meet their responsibility, as that is estimated by public expectation.
Such is the conviction of every one who has ever had any connection with the Department, or of any one who has looked into its operations as a point of liberal inquiry. Its deputies and agents in every branch of its business see and feel the necessity of conformity to the rules prescribing their separate duties. Postmasters in the most limited offices, and contractors for the smaller or larger routes, have found that their best security for the preservation of their relations to each other and to the Department is a strict compliance with its instructions. Several of them, acting in this spirit of subordination, have honorably connected themselves with the Department, in the estimation of the public.
Congress has legislated in such a spirit. From the beginning of its legislation to the act of March, 1825, reducing into one act all that had been previously passed, large duties were imposed upon the Postmaster-General, and there was given to him a large discretion.
If looked at in detail, it is almost remarkable that any one could be found to undertake them with the hope of discharging both acceptably. It has been done, however, and the country enjoys the benefit.
But it became necessary, from the enlargement of the business of the Department, to change its organization, and to provide a more effectual system for the settlement of its accounts. It was done by the act of 1836. By the ninth section of that act, the Postmaster-General is authorized to give instructions to postmasters for accounting and disbursing. The thirty-second section of the act of 1825 is, that if any postmaster shall neglect to render his account for one month after the time, and in the form and manner, prescribed by law, and by the Postmaster-General's instructions conformable therwith, he shall forfeit double the value of the postages which shall have arisen at the same office in any equal portion of time, previous or subsequent thereto; or in case no account shall have been rendered at the time of the trial of such case, then such sum as the court and jury shall estimate as equivalent thereto.
In this case, Roberts was the postmaster; Adams and Reed were his securities. The Postmaster-General sent to the *519 former instructions how he was to account, and very precise directions for paying contractors. They were the same as are sent to all postmasters, except as to the contractor to whom money was to be paid. Blank forms of orders and receipts were annexed for every collection. The order in the instructions is,  "These forms, and no others, must be used in your payments to contractors." If the contractor called in person, no order was necessary. Two receipts, in that case, were to be kept in the form prescribed, one of which the postmaster was to keep, and the other is directed to be sent by the next mail to the Auditor for the Post-Office Department. Roberts was further instructed, that, if any other person calls for the money as the agent of the contractor, he must produce two orders in the prescribed form, signed by the contractor, with blank receipts annexed. After the agent was paid, both receipts were to be filled up and signed. Both were to be left with the postmaster, one of which was to be forthwith sent to the Auditor of the Department. He was told that these claims and orders could not be sold, negotiated, or transferred; that no credit would be allowed him for any payment to any other person than the contractor or the person named in his order, &c., &c., nor unless the receipt be dated on the day when the money is paid. In his official bond, among others,  and it is the first of his covenants,  he binds himself to execute the duties of his office according to law and the instructions of the Postmaster-General, and faithfully once in three months, or oftener if required, to render accounts of his receipts and expenditures as postmaster to the Post-Office Department; that he shall faithfully account, in the manner directed by the Postmaster-General, for all moneys, bills, bonds, notes, receipts, and other vouchers, which he shall receive as agent for the Department.
Thus instructed, forewarned, and bound, we can scarcely account for Mr. Roberts's disregard of his corresponding obligation otherwise than that it was wilfully done. He failed to account for the time stated in the record, and he claims in this suit, as an offset against the demand of the United States, payments which he says were made to Allen, the contractor, contrary to his instructions, which the Department had not any knowledge of for two years after the date of his receipt from Allen, and for which amount Allen gave no credit when his accounts were finally settled at the Department. Such is the proof in the case. Upon the trial, when the evidence on both sides had been closed, the counsel for the United States asked that the jury might be instructed, if they believed the evidence in the case, that the defendant was liable for the amount which he *520 said had been paid by him to Allen, and that the United States were entitled to double the amount of the postages which had accrued and been returned as the amount from the 1st of July to the 30th of September, for the next quarter, ending on the last day of December, for which Roberts did not make a return; and at that rate for so much of the next quarter as the defendant remained in office, for which also he had failed to make a return.
In respect to the money said to have been paid to Allen, there is not a fact in the cause which can raise even a remote equity for its allowance. The facts are all the other way. There was a violation of official duty in making them, if such payments were ever really made for the purpose stated, unfairness in dealing, no credit having been given for the amount when Allen's account was settled at the Department, and a very wrong apprehension of right by the defendant, in his claiming to be paid to him a sum for which he had subjected the United States to a loss by an inexcusable disregard of his instructions as to the manner alone in which he was permitted to pay money to a contractor. As to the double charge for postage in the account rendered against him, we think the calculation and the time for which it is made was properly done by Mr. Whittlesey, the then Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department. For the entire quarter unaccounted for, there cannot be a doubt. There ought not to be any for the portion of the next quarter. His obligation to account for and to pay both cannot be denied. It is admitted it was his duty to return for an entire quarter, under the instructions of the Postmaster-General. It is equally plain that, under the thirty-second section of the act of 1825, if a postmaster shall neglect to render his account for one month after the time, and in the form and manner, prescribed by law, he becomes liable to a double charge, according to the manner stated in that section. Then the only question is, whether that obligation to make a return is not as binding upon a postmaster who leaves office between the beginning and end of a quarter, as it is upon one who shall leave office at the end of a quarter. Is he not bound to make a return within one month after the expiration of the quarter, though he has been in office only for a part of it? By the instructions of the Postmaster-General, he ought to have done so within two days after the expiration of his quarter. Now whether the instruction or the law applies to the obligation is not material. Under the law, and without the instruction, the liability is incurred. But if the case is put under the instruction alone, we think the fair interpretation of it is, *521 that it comprehends any time less than a quarter, as well as an entire quarter. This construction may be made from its terms. The postmaster is required to have the balance due by him ready to be paid on demand at the end of each quarter. He is, by the instructions, to make a return of what that amount is two days after the expiration of the quarter. If he is not ready to pay, and neglects to make his return, and says he is not bound to do either because his office terminated before the expiration of a quarter, does he not disregard the instruction as to what he has received? If his neglect to render his accounts be omitted for one month after the time, and in the form and manner, prescribed by law, it cannot be said he has not subjected himself to the penalty of a double charge, to be proportioned by what may have been received at his office in any equal time previous or subsequent thereto. Nor can it be said, because no account was rendered in this instance, that there was no datum for such a calculation to be made, or that he was only liable to pay such an amount as a court and jury may find, upon other evidence, to be an equivalent to the penalty which he has incurred.
All of us think differently. The court below having refused to give to the jury the first, fifth, sixth, and seventh instructions which were asked by the counsel for the United States, the judgment is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings, in compliance with the opinion now given.

Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Illinois, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said Circuit Court, with directions to award a venire facias de novo, and for such further proceedings to be had therein as shall be in conformity to the opinion of this court, and as to law and justice shall appertain.