Court Opinion

ID: 9407664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 21:01:15.965568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:39.485673
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 21-4343      Doc: 32           Filed: 07/06/2023   Pg: 1 of 10

                                              UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 21-4343

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                     Plaintiff – Appellee,

               v.

        KYMONETHY JAQUAY WALKER,

                     Defendant – Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:20-cr-00475-BO-1)

        Submitted: October 18, 2022                                         Decided: July 6, 2023

        Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: G. Alan Dubois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief
        Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
        Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Kymonethy Jaquay Walker pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted

        felon and was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals his sentence,

        arguing that the district court erred (1) in applying a cross-reference to robbery when

        calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, and (2) by failing to address his

        nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a reduced sentence and inadequately explaining its

        chosen sentence. We disagree as to the first argument and thus affirm the district court’s

        application of the robbery cross-reference. As for the second argument, however, the

        Government concedes that the district court did not adequately respond to Walker’s

        nonfrivolous mitigation arguments or otherwise explain its sentence; we agree and

        therefore vacate Walker’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

                                                     I.

               As recounted in the Presentence Report (“PSR”), in the late-evening hours of

        January 3, 2020, Walker met Emersonsue Dale in Dale’s motel room and sold her drugs.

        Before Walker could leave, Dale’s friend TG, a 17-year-old female who was staying in the

        room with Dale, arrived at the motel. Supposing that TG would disapprove of Walker’s

        being in the room, Dale asked Walker to hide in the bathroom. Walker initially agreed, but

        he later exited the bathroom after concluding that TG had stolen some of his cocaine.

        Walker then ordered Dale into the bathroom at gunpoint and confronted TG. The encounter

        soon turned physical. After choking TG, Walker racked his handgun and pistol-whipped

        her in the head several times, causing severe lacerations that required hospitalization.

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               Walker doesn’t dispute any of these facts, but he does dispute the PSR’s account of

        what happened next. According to the PSR, after Walker hit TG repeatedly in the head

        with his handgun, Walker told TG “to give him everything she had.” J.A. 45. TG complied,

        “hand[ing] over her cell phone, bank card, and room key.” J.A. 45. Walker then threatened

        to shoot TG if she reported the incident to the police.

               On January 5, law enforcement searched Walker’s residence and found the handgun

        used to hit TG, among other illicit items. A grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of

        North Carolina later indicted Walker on one count of possessing a firearm as a convicted

        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Walker pleaded guilty without a written plea

        agreement.

               In calculating Walker’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, the PSR applied the

        cross-reference to the robbery guideline. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)

        §§ 2K2.1(c), 2X1.1(a), 2B3.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). As a result, Walker

        ultimately received a total offense level of 30, which, when paired with his criminal history

        category of IV, yielded an advisory Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment,

        restricted by the statutory maximum of 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2018);

        USSG § 5G1.1(a). 1 Without the robbery cross-reference, Walker would have received a

               1
                When Walker was sentenced, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) provided for a statutory
        maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment for a violation of § 922(g)(1). Today, the statutory
        maximum is 15 years. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159,
        § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022).

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        total offense level of 23, which would have resulted in an advisory Guidelines range of 70

        to 87 months’ imprisonment.

               Walker filed a one-page letter objecting to the PSR’s robbery allegation, stating in

        relevant part:

               In paragraph 6 [reciting the offense conduct], please add a footnote:
               “WALKER disputers [sic] aspects of TG’s account of events. He does admit
               that an altercation occurred and that he did strike her with a weapon. He
               contends that there was no robbery.”

               With respect to the guideline calculations, Mr. Walker respectfully objects to
               the robbery cross-reference, as there was no robbery. He did not take [TG’s]
               belongings. Her belongings were not recovered from him during the search.

        Objections to Presentence Report, United States v. Walker, No. 5:20-cr-475-BO-1

        (E.D.N.C.), ECF No. 38.

               In an addendum to the PSR, the probation officer maintained that the robbery cross-

        reference was appropriately applied based on TG’s account of the incident, namely, that

        Walker pistol-whipped TG and directed her at gunpoint to give him everything she had,

        after which TG handed over her cell phone, bank card, and motel room key.

               At sentencing, Walker, through counsel, renewed his objection to the robbery cross-

        reference, contending that no robbery occurred. Walker’s counsel again pointed out that

        none of TG’s belongings were discovered at Walker’s residence when it was searched “just

        hours later.” J.A. 21. 2 Counsel posited that the cell phone “was allegedly a pretty nice

               2
                According to Walker’s counsel, the search of the residence occurred essentially on
        “the same day” as the offense. J.A. 21. Counsel apparently misunderstood the record,
        which demonstrates that the offense was committed on the night of January 3, 2020; that
        law enforcement responded shortly after midnight on January 4; and that law enforcement
        searched Walker’s residence on January 5, well over 24 hours after the offense.

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        iPhone, . . . so I don’t think it would have been thrown away.” J.A. 21. Counsel further

        noted that discovery in the case revealed that Dale “actually gave the phone back to [TG].”

        J.A. 22. All these facts, counsel contended, supported Walker’s consistent representation

        that “he never took the phone or the bank card or the room key out of the room.” J.A. 22.

        Moreover, counsel mused that the fact that Walker admitted to “the more serious conduct

        of assaulting [TG]” lent “some credibility to the fact that he didn’t take these items out [of

        the room].” J.A. 22. Walker did not testify or otherwise put on any evidence to rebut the

        PSR’s recitation of TG’s statement supporting the robbery cross-reference.

                  Thereafter, the district court inquired as to whether TG, who was present at the

        sentencing, wished to allocute. The Government indicated that TG did not want to allocute

        but that it was “happy to speak on her behalf.” J.A. 24. It then summarized the offense

        conduct. As to the alleged robbery, the Government reiterated the PSR’s findings that

        Walker repeatedly hit TG in the head with a handgun before ordering her to give him

        everything she had, and that TG then handed over her phone, bank card, and room key.

        The Government emphasized that, because the robbery occurred at the moment Walker

        forcibly took TG’s items from her, it did not matter whether those items were later returned

        to her.

                  After hearing from both sides, the district court overruled Walker’s objection to the

        robbery cross-reference and adopted in full the PSR’s factual findings.

                  Aside from the robbery cross-reference objection, Walker raised several

        nonfrivolous mitigating factors involving his upbringing and other family circumstances

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        that he believed justified a downward variance somewhere in the range of 70 to 87 months’

        imprisonment.

               Without addressing those arguments or otherwise providing any explanation, the

        district court sentenced Walker to 108 months’ imprisonment, representing a downward

        variance of 12 months.

               This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.

        § 3742(a).

                                                    II.

               We begin with Walker’s contention that the district court clearly erred in applying

        the cross-reference to the robbery guideline. According to Walker, because he specifically

        objected to the robbery allegation, the Government had an affirmative obligation to put on

        evidence at sentencing to support the robbery cross-reference. And because the

        Government failed to do so and instead relied only on the PSR’s disputed factual findings,

        Walker argues that the district court lacked a sufficient factual basis to apply the robbery

        cross-reference.

               “We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s application of a

        Guidelines cross-reference for clear error and the court’s legal conclusions de novo.”

        United States v. Lynn, 912 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2019).

               At sentencing, the Government has the burden to prove a cross-referenced offense

        by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir.

        2019). To carry that burden, the Government may rely on the PSR’s factual findings

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        without the need to put on additional evidence, unless the defendant affirmatively

        demonstrates that those findings are unreliable. See United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157,

        162 (4th Cir. 1990). Importantly, however, a defendant cannot make this affirmative

        showing by offering nothing more than a “mere objection” to the PSR’s findings. Id.

        Rather, the defendant must specifically “articulate the reasons why the facts contained [in

        the PSR] are untrue or inaccurate.” Id. Absent such a showing, “the court is free to adopt

        the findings of the [PSR] without more specific inquiry or explanation.” Id. (cleaned up).

               Having fully reviewed the record, we conclude that Walker failed to sufficiently call

        into question the reliability or accuracy of the PSR’s findings. As a result, the district court

        did not clearly err in adopting those findings and applying the robbery cross-reference.

               In his presentence written objections to the PSR, Walker stated in conclusory

        fashion that “there was no robbery,” that “[h]e did not take [TG’s] belongings,” and that

        “[TG’s] belongings were not recovered from him during the search.” Objections to

        Presentence Report, supra. The first two of these statements are nothing more than bald

        denials of the robbery allegation, which are wholly insufficient to satisfy Walker’s

        affirmative duty to demonstrate the PSR’s unreliability or inaccuracy. See Terry, 916 F.2d

        at 162. The third statement is of little probative value. That TG’s belongings were not

        recovered from Walker’s residence more than 24 hours after the offense does not materially

        undermine the PSR’s finding that Walker assaulted TG with a handgun and took her

        belongings at gunpoint in the motel room on the night of January 3, 2020—the conduct

        amounting to robbery under North Carolina common law. See State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d

        264, 270 (N.C. 1982) (defining common-law robbery as “the felonious, non-consensual

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        taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of another by means of

        violence or fear”); see also United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 177, 182 (4th Cir. 2012) (“A

        sentencing court may apply a Sentencing Guidelines cross-reference to conduct amounting

        to a violation of state law.” (cleaned up)).

               Similarly, at sentencing, Walker presented no evidence rebutting the robbery

        allegation. Rather, his attorney echoed his general denial of the robbery allegation, again

        stressing that none of TG’s belongings were found at Walker’s residence and citing

        Walker’s consistent averment that “he never took the phone or the bank card or the room

        key out of the room.” J.A. 22. Counsel further pointed to discovery in the case indicating

        that “[Dale] actually gave the phone back to [TG].” J.A. 22. Again, however, whether the

        belongings were found at Walker’s residence or whether Walker even took those items out

        of the motel room does not answer the central question whether he effected “the felonious,

        non-consensual taking of money or personal property from the person or presence of

        another by means of violence or fear.” Smith, 292 S.E.2d at 270. Indeed, once these

        elements are satisfied, the offense is complete; whether the robber actually keeps the items

        is irrelevant. See State v. Sumpter, 347 S.E.2d 396, 401 (N.C. 1986) (stating that the offense

        of common-law robbery is complete once “the thief succeeds in removing the stolen

        property from the victim’s possession”). Thus, those factual assertions, even if true, are

        unavailing. 3 Counsel’s remaining remarks on this issue at sentencing amount only to

               3
                If anything, the fact that Dale “gave the phone back to [TG],” J.A. 22 (emphasis
        added), is consistent with the robbery allegation as it suggests that someone took TG’s
        (Continued)
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        argument and speculation, neither of which suffices to undercut the veracity of the PSR’s

        findings.

               Because Walker did not present any evidence to contradict or otherwise undermine

        the PSR’s findings but merely noted his disagreement with them, we hold that he failed to

        make an affirmative showing that the PSR’s findings were untrue or inaccurate, and the

        district court did not err in adopting those findings.

                                                     III.

               Walker next argues, and the Government concedes, that the district court failed to

        adequately respond to his nonfrivolous mitigation arguments or otherwise explain its

        selected sentence, thus warranting remand and resentencing. On this point, we agree.

               As we have explained, “[r]egardless of whether the district court imposes an above,

        below, or within-Guidelines sentence, it must place on the record an individualized

        assessment based on the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564

        F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). In doing so, the “court must address the parties’

        nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular sentence, and if the court rejects those

        arguments, it must explain why in a sufficiently detailed manner to allow this Court to

        conduct a meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 519 (4th Cir.

        2017). A district court’s failure to adequately explain its sentence or its failure to provide

        phone to begin with, and there’s been no suggestion that Dale or any other person besides
        Walker was responsible for that parting.

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        some indication that it gave reasoned consideration to a party’s nonfrivolous arguments

        constitutes procedural error. Carter, 564 F.3d at 328–29; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d

        572, 581 (4th Cir. 2010); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (stating that a district court must “state

        in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence”).

               Here, the district court failed not only to respond to any of Walker’s nonfrivolous

        mitigation arguments but also to provide any explanation whatsoever for its sentence. In

        those circumstances, we agree with the parties that the proper course is to vacate Walker’s

        sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing to be conducted consistent with this

        opinion.

                                                     IV.

               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s application of the robbery cross-

        reference, but we vacate Walker’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid in the

        decisional process.

                                   AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED

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