Court Opinion

ID: 9724546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:00:52.535697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.238855
License: Public Domain

Thornton, J.
— I respectfully dissent. In this action a father seeks the return of his children, six and eight years of age, from his brother. In the time of both mental and financial stress he requested the brother and his wife to care for his two *1139babies, ages three years and 13 months. At the time of trial the children were six and eight years of age.
The brother and his wife have performed, and are willing to continue to perform, a fine charitable act. During most of the five and a half years they have had the children the father has been single. Since his marriage he has improved his position to where he has adequate facilities and a wife willing and in all respects able to care for the children.
In this case it should be remembered the father of the children made the arrangements for their adequate care when he was unable to do so. He did not abandon themv It is true he did not contribute to their support, and on one occasion he should have, but at all other times the brother and his wife intended to support the children and made no attempt to obtain support for the children. They were performing a charitable act and knew it.
It is true the father did not visit the children except when they were brought to Detroit by the brother. Apparently the majority concludes because he did not contribute to their support, did not frequently visit the children and now they do not know him and his wife, coupled with the affection the children now have for the uncle and aunt, the father has lost the preference inherent in him as a father.
Paragraph 18 of the trial court’s findings of fact, not quoted in the majority opinion and apparently the trial court’s reason for decision, is:
“The Court finds that to uproot these children after five and one-half years in the only home that they can recollect and to return them to the custody of their father, Hollice Childers, who together with his wife, Ruby, are actually total strangers to them would be very detrimental to the children and that the best interests of the children require that they be not removed from the home of the defendants and the custody remain in the defendants.”
The majority adopted some of the above when it says:
“We are convinced that the children are in good hands. We are not so sure if their custody is changed.
“We are not inclined to interfere in a situation that is all right.”
*1140No reason for the lack of assurance is given. Neither the trial court nor this court has found the father and his wife unfit persons to care for the children. These children were not removed from the father’s custody, he made this arrangement.
Both sides, the father and his brother, are in all respects capable and able to adequately care for the children. It is also true a parting of the children from their uncle and aunt undoubtedly would be a tearful occasion. Is this enough to offset not only the inherent right of a father to live with his children but of the children’s inherent right to live with their father ? I think not.
It should be remembered that God placed these children with the father and we should not, except for a compelling reason, change such plan. Wealth and position are not sufficient reasons to deny parent and child the inherent right to live together. If they are, we are all in danger of losing our children.
Rule 344(f) 15, Rules of Civil Procedure, provides, “In child custody cases the first and governing consideration of the courts must be the best interest of the child.” Properly applied the rule is right. As applied here it deprives the child of an inherent right without reason.
The case should be reversed.
Stuart, J., joins in this dissent.