Court Opinion

ID: 9829920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:43:49.050854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:08.905949
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing and Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
[7] Since rendition of the judgment reforming and affirming this case in favor of appellant, appellees William D. and Nathaniel T. Blackburn have filed two motions herein, one for rehearing, and the other to dismiss the appeal. If we grant the latter motion, it necessitates, of course, the granting of the former.
The motion to dismiss is predicated on the fact that the appeal bond is made payable only to W. D. and Nathaniel T. Blackburn, executors of the estate of Annie L. Blackburn, deceased, and was not also made payable to the Hoch Hardware Company, one of the *223parties defendant in the court below, and whose interest it is claimed was adverse to that of appellant in said cause. Appellant brought suit against the Blackburns as independent executors of the estate of Annie L. Blackburn, deceased, to recover damages on account of the breach of a rental contract for a certain storehouse, the possession of which, it was alleged, was withheld from it by appellees, whereby ’ appellant claims to have been damaged on account of loss of profits, and for money it was compelled to pay its manager, as well as sundry other items of expense. The Blackburns interplead-ed the Hoch Hardware Company, alleging that said last-named company had unlawfully and wrongfully withheld from them said building after the expiration of their rental contract, for which reason they were unable to give possession thereof to appellant, in accordance with their contract, and praying that, in the event any judgment should be rendered in favor of appellant as against them, they recover a like amount against said Hoch Hardware Company. The Hoch Hardware Company answered, making a similar defense to appellant’s action as was made by the Blackburns. The trial resulted in a judgment in favor of appellant against the Blackburns for $37, and in favor of appellees for a similar amount against the Hoch Hardware Company. There was also a judgment in favor of appellant against the Blackburns for $220, but no judgment against the Hoch Hardware Company for said last-named amount.
It will be seen, therefore, that it was as much to the interest of the Hoch Hardware Company to defeat appellant’s claim as it was to the interest of the Blackburns to do so; it is true, however, that it was only a conditional liability. If the Hoch Hardware Company was an adverse party to appellant, then it became necessary for appellant, in order to perfect its appeal, to make the appeal bond payable, not only to the Blackburns, but to that company as well, and a failure so to do would be fatal to its right of appeal.
The party taking an appeal is called the “appellant,” and the adverse party is called the “appellee.” See article 1384, R. S. 1895. By article 1400, Id., the appellant, or Ijlaintift in error, as the case may be, is required to execute a bond, with two or more good and sufficient sureties, to be approved by the clerk, payable to the appellee or defendant in error, etc., in a sum at least double the amount of the costs of suit, etc.
In 1 Words & Phrases, p. 224, it is said: “An adverse party entitled to notice of appeal is every party whose interest in relation to the judgment and decree appealed from is in conflict with the modification or reversal sought by the appeal; every party interested in sustaining the judgment or decree” — citing a long line of cases in support thereof. Again, it is said in the same volume, same page: “Every party whose interest in the subject-matter of an appeal is adverse to and will be affected by the reversal or modification of the judgment or order from which the appeal has been taken is an ‘adverse party’ and entitled to notice of appeal, irrespective of the question whether such party appears on the face of the record in the attitude of plaintiff, defendant, or in-tervener” — citing cases.
In Millikin v. Houghton, 75 Cal. 539, 17 Pac. 641, it is said that “notice of appeal by one of several codefendants should be served, not only on the plaintiff, but also on the non-appealing eodefendants; they having an interest in the judgment to be affected by a reversal.”
In Seattle Trust Co. v. Pitner, 17 Wash. 365, 49 Pac. 505, it is held that a garnishee is an adverse party on an appeal by a plaintiff from a judgment declaring defendant in the principal action not indebted. This was on the ground, of course, that in the event the judgment was set aside against the principal defendant the garnishee on another trial might be held liable, provided judgment should go in the second case against the principal defendant. It is also said in Commercial Nat. Bank v. U. S. Savings, Loan & Bldg. Co., 13 Utah, 189, 44 Pac. 1043, that: “The term ‘adverse party’ means every person whose interests require that the order, judgment, or decree appealed from be sustained, and if such party must be served with notice of appeal. This is so regardless of whether he appeared as one of the original parties to the action or was brought in by order of the court. * * * A person who has once appeared in an action is a necessary party to the appeal, unless, after his appearance, he has ceased to have an interest in such action.” See, also, Moody v. Miller, 24 Or. 179, 33 Pac. 402; Kosminsky v. Hamburger Bros. & Co., 20 Tex. Civ. App. 291, 48 S. W. 1107; Smith & Williams v. Parks, 55 Tex. 82; Young v. Russell, 60 Tex. 684.
[8] This matter was not called to our attention by counsel for appellees, either in the brief or on the hearing; but, the question being jurisdictional, it is never too late to present it. Young v. Russell, supra. In Kosminsky v. Hamburger Bros., supra, Mr. Chief Justice Key, then Associate Justice, delivering the opinion, said: “If a party to a suit is, upon appeal, adversely interested to the party appealing, such party must be made an obligee in the appeal bond, whether he be plaintiff, defendant, or intervener in the trial court. In this case, judgment might have been rendered against the defendant Gus Less for the costs, as well as for the debt owing to Hamburger Bros. & Co., and as judgment was not so rendered, but was rendered against appellant Kosminsky for the costs, it is to Less’ interest that the question of costs should not be reopened, and he is adversely interested to Kosminsky to the extent of the costs in the court below. It fol*224lows therefore that the bond should have been made payable to him, as well as to Hamburger Bros. & Co., and on account of this fatal defect, the motion to dismiss the appeal must be sustained.”
So in the present case, under the pleadings and evidence, whatever judgment might properly be rendered in favor of appellants against the Blackburns, the Blackburns were entitled to judgment over against the Hoch Hardware Company for like amount; for which reason said company was materially interested in the cause of action asserted by appellant against appellees, thereby becoming an adverse party to appellant in said cause of action, notwithstanding it may not be regarded technically as such. See Senter v. De Bernal, 38 Cal. 637.
Believing that the motion to dismiss the appeal is well taken, it is therefore necessary, irrespective of the merits of the motion for rehearing, to grant same, and dismiss the appeal, which is accordingly done.
Motions for rehearing and to dismiss appeal granted.