Court Opinion

ID: 9399201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 14:08:41.482094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.069195
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Midkiff, 2023-Ohio-1835.]

                                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                   SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         CLARK COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :
      Appellee                                      :   C.A. No. 2022-CA-62
                                                    :
 v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 22-CR-0442
                                                    :
 DUSTIN MIDKIFF                                     :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                    :   Court)
      Appellant                                     :
                                                    :

                                               ...........

                                               OPINION

                                         Rendered on June 2, 2023

                                               ...........

IAN A. RICHARDSON, Attorney for Appellee

LUCAS W. WILDER, Attorney for Appellant

                                              .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Dustin Midkiff appeals from his conviction in the Clark

County Court of Common Pleas after pleading guilty to one count of robbery, one count

of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of failure to comply. In support of his

appeal, Midkiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motions

for continuance. Midkiff also contends that his sentence was contrary to law because, at
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the sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to provide the statutorily required notices set

forth in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). For the reasons outlined below, we conclude that Midkiff’s

guilty plea functioned as a waiver of any alleged error in the trial court’s denial of his

motions for continuance, but that his sentence was contrary to law due to the trial court’s

failure to provide the notifications required under R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). Therefore, the

judgment of the trial court will be affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause will

be remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of resentencing Midkiff.

   I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings

        {¶ 2} On May 23, 2022, a Clark County grand jury indicted Midkiff on one count of

robbery, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(3); one count of aggravated

robbery, a first-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); one count of failure to

comply, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(4); and one count

of failure to comply, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5).

        {¶ 3} A jury trial was scheduled for August 9, 2022.        A plea agreement was

attempted the morning of August 8, 2022, but the trial court rejected it. That afternoon,

Midkiff filed a motion requesting that the trial judge either recuse himself or continue the

trial so that Midkiff could “consider filing an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio

Supreme Court.” Later that afternoon, the trial court denied both the recusal request and

the motion for a continuance. On the day of trial, Midkiff filed a motion to compel

production of video and photo evidence and to continue the trial. The trial court granted

the motion to compel but denied the motion for continuance.
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         {¶ 4} After the jury was empaneled, Midkiff entered into a revised plea agreement

with the State, whereby the State agreed to amend count two to attempted aggravated

robbery and to dismiss count three as well as the gun specification on count two.

Pursuant to the agreement, Midkiff agreed to plead guilty to count one, amended count

two, and count four. In return, Midkiff would receive an agreed sentence of two years in

prison on count one, six to nine years in prison on count two, and two years in prison on

count four, with all three prison terms to run consecutively. The trial court accepted the

plea agreement and sentenced Midkiff accordingly. Midkiff filed a timely notice of appeal.

   II.      Midkiff Waived Any Error in The Trial Court’s Denial of His Motions for a

            Continuance of The Trial

         {¶ 5} Midkiff’s first assignment of error states “Whether the trial court erred in

denying Midkiff’s requests for continuance.”

         {¶ 6} Midkiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying two

separate requests for a continuance. According to Midkiff, the first request was made the

day before trial when Midkiff “requested a continuance to allow him the ability to file an

affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 3. The

second request, filed the morning of trial, “was made because Midkiff was not in

possession of discovery[.]” Id. The trial court granted the request for discovery but denied

the request for a continuance.

         {¶ 7} The State counters that Midkiff’s guilty plea effectively waived any potential

issues regarding the trial court’s denial of his motions to continue. The State concludes
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that “Defendant’s guilty plea was made intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily; the trial

court’s denial of the motions to continue did not affect the voluntariness of his plea, and

Defendant’s guilty plea has waived any argument regarding his motions to continue.”

Appellee’s Brief, p. 3-4.

          {¶ 8} “ ‘A criminal defendant who enters a voluntary plea of guilty while represented

by competent counsel waives all nonjurisdictional defects in prior stages of the

proceedings.’ ” State v. Cruse, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 01AP-1074, 01AP-1075, 2002-

Ohio-3259, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Durst, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 11384, 1989 WL

150797, *1 (Dec. 13, 1989). Once a defendant enters a guilty plea, he waives any error

in the trial court's refusal to grant a requested continuance. State v. Rice, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 24932, 2010-Ohio-1825, ¶ 9. “The only exception would be if the denial of the motion

for a continuance of the trial date effectively coerced [the defendant’s] plea, i.e., made it

other than voluntary.” State v. Lane, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2001-CA-91, 2002 WL 626164,

*5 (Apr. 19, 2002). Midkiff does not allege that the denial of his requested continuances

coerced his guilty plea or made it other than voluntary. Therefore, his first assignment of

error is overruled.

   III.      The State Concedes Error Due to the Trial Court’s Failure to Provide The

             Required Notifications in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)

          {¶ 9} Midkiff’s second assignment of error states “Midkiff’s sentence is contrary to

law because the trial court did not advise him of all the 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications.”

          {¶ 10} When a trial court imposes a non-life felony indefinite sentence pursuant to
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the Reagan Tokes Law, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires that the trial court provide the

following notifications to the defendant: (1) it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will

be released on the expiration of the minimum prison term imposed; (2) the department of

rehabilitation and correction may rebut the presumption at a hearing by making

determinations regarding the offender's conduct while confined, the offender's

rehabilitation, the offender's threat to society, the offender's restrictive housing, and the

offender's security classification; (3) if the presumption is rebutted, the department may

maintain the offender's incarceration for the length of time the department determines to

be reasonable; (4) the department may make the specified determinations and maintain

the offender's incarceration more than one time; and (5) the offender must be released

no later than the expiration of the maximum prison term. R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v).

       {¶ 11} According to Midkiff, “[a] sentence is contrary to law if a trial court imposes

an indefinite prison term pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Act and fails to orally advise the

defendant of all of the R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) notifications at disposition.” Appellant’s

Brief, p. 9, citing State v. Massie, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-50, 2021-Ohio-3376. Citing

to the transcript, Midkiff contends that “the trial court did not fully advise Midkiff of the

notifications under 2929.19(B)(2)(c).” Appellant’s Brief, p. 9.

       {¶ 12} The State concedes error on this assignment of error. According to the

State, “[a]lthough the trial court briefly explained indefinite sentencing and the

presumption that Defendant would be released after the minimum term, it did not fully

restate the notifications prescribed by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2(c).” Appellee’s Brief, p. 4.

Therefore, the State concludes that “this Court should remand the case solely for the
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purpose of providing Defendant with the required sentencing notifications.” Id.

         {¶ 13} The trial court in this case generally advised Midkiff at the sentencing

hearing that there was a presumption that he would be released after serving the

minimum term of his sentence, but this presumption could be rebutted based on Midkiff’s

conduct while in prison. August 9, 2022 Transcript, p. 10-11, 14-15. However, the trial

court neglected to advise him of the remaining notifications set forth in R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c). Accordingly, Midkiff’s sentence was contrary to law, and his second

assignment of error is sustained. See Massie at ¶ 23.

   IV.      Conclusion

         {¶ 14} The judgment of the trial court is reversed as it pertains to Midkiff’s

sentence; in all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The matter shall be remanded

to the trial court for the sole purpose of resentencing Midkiff in accordance with R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c).

                                     .............

WELBAUM, P.J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.