Court Opinion

ID: 7811587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:13:27.442264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:28.591798
License: Public Domain

McCulloch, C. J., (dissenting.) But for the language quoted by the majority from the opinion delivered by Judge Riddick in Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, the question involved in the .present case would give me little pause in reaching a conclusion contrary to the views expressed by the majority. As much, however, as I hold in respect the great ability of the learned judge from whom the majority have quoted, I feel compelled to characterize the language as mere dicta and unnecessary to the decision of the case then in hand; and, as I think it was clearly erroneous, I do not feel bound to follow it. The question in that case was narrowed to the power to create an improvement district coextensive with the boundaries of a municipality. It was held (correctly, I think) that there was nothing in the Constitution which, either expressly or impliedly, restricted the creation of improvement districts inside of municipalities to territory less in extent than the municipality itself. The language quoted from Judge Riddick's opinion was used as a mere illustration in determining whether or not the construction and establishment of a system of waterworks could be made the subject of a local improvement district. It was contended in that case that, because the district comprised the whole of the territorial limits of the municipality, the improvement was necessarily general in its nature and not local, but the court held to the contrary. The fallacy of 'the argument appears clear when we see the intimation in the opinion that because the statute authorizes the municipality itself to construct waterworks, the improvement would necessarily be general in its nature so as to exclude the power to create an an improvement district, except for the fact that the statute itself, in express terms, authorized the creation of that kind of improvement through the agency of a local improvement district. That argument is obviously unsound, for it has never been considered in our decisions as a test of power in the creation of local improvement districts whether or not legal authority to make the improvement exists in the county or municipality in which the district is created. On the contrary, exclusive authority over roads and bridges is conferred upon the county court, and yet we have repeatedly held that, notwithstanding that fact, such improvement may be the subject of a local improvement. In testing the question whether or not a given improvement is local or general, we have never been controlled by the fact that the authority to make such improvement is, or is not, vested in the county or municipality, and we have steadily adhered to the rule that, even though the improvement is general in its nature, if adjacent property receives special and peculiar benefits therefrom, it may be treated as a local improvement to that extent. The correct rule is, I think, stated in the case of Shibley v. Fort Smith & Van Buren Bridge District, 96 Ark. 410, as follows: “Whilst it may be true that the benefits which flow from almost all local improvements, which are usually authorized to be constructed at the expense of local property-owners — street pavements, sewers, public parks, waterworks, in cities and towns, levees bnilt for the protection of overflowed lands — all inure bo the benefit of the general public to a greater or less extent, yet it is not true that a bridge, any less than improvements of the other kinds mentioned above, does not produce special benefits to adjoining lands so as to justify special assessments to defray the expenses of such improvements. A bridge for the use of the public, like a street in a city or a highway in the country, is undoubtedly of great benefit and convenience to the traveling public; nevertheless, it may be also of special benefit to adjoining lands and a fit subject for construction from the proceeds of local assessments. It is settled that improvement districts ‘are based and sustainable only upon the theory that the local assessments levied to sustain them are imposed upon the property of persons who are specially and peculiarly benefited in the enhancement of the value of their property by the expenditure of the money collected on the assessment.’ ******* Note the words, ‘specially and peculiarly benefited. ’ The benefits need not be exclusive. The general public may also derive benefits in more remote degree, yet, if there is a special and peculiar benefit inuring to the adjoining property, local assessments aré justified. ’ ’ The above was quoted with approval .by this court in the recent case of Solomon v. Wharf Improvement Dist. No. 1, 145 Ark. 126, where we held that a floating wharf at the landing, on the Mississippi River,- in the city of Helena, with the necessary approaches, warehouses, a loading barge and freight handling and loading machinery, was a local improvement within the meaning of the Constitution. I can see no reason why a courthouse or any other public building may not be the subject of a local improvement, if, under the circumstances, a “special and peculiar benefit” inures to the adjoining property, even though it is a public building, and the general public also derives a benefit from its construction and maintenance. The fact that the improvement is public and open to thé use of the public does not prevent its being a local improvement, for all local improvements are of a public nature, like roads, bridges, parks, etc. The county-site is located by public authority, and of course the location of the site itself could not be controlled by an improvement district any more than the opening of a public road could be so controlled. But when the county-site is located under proper legal authority, the building of the courthouse may be a local improvement, just like a public road is improved after it has been laid out and established by the county court. The character of the building gives permanency and value to the location of the county-site, and thus the benefit to adjacent property is, to a great extent, enhanced. For this reason there accrues to the adjacent property a special and peculiar benefit. Where the improvement district has been created by legislative authority, we should indulge the presumption that the facts have been ascertained and that it was found that special benefits would accrue. Courts should respect the legislative determination of the character of the improvement, unless the determination was arbitrarily and demonstrably erroneous. Bennett v. Johnson, 130 Ark. 507. The following appropriate language is found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Callam v. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7: “No one doubts the fact that the existence and occupation of good public buildings in a municipality is profitable and directly advantageous to it by making it a more important business and social center, and by stimulating private improvements which add directly to its revenues. ’ ’ ■So it is that the construction of a handsome and pretentious public building at Stuttgart will confer peculiar benefits upon the real property inside of the district, at least the Legislature so determined, and we should respeot that determination. My conclusion, therefore, is that the creation of the district was valid and should be upheld.