Court Opinion

ID: 9688281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:42:25.912781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.080358
License: Public Domain

FOURNET, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
In the-first place, I cannot subscribe to that part of the majority opinion expressing doubt as to the right of a sheriff, who is charged with the responsibility of the administration of the jail and the discipline and safe-keeping of the prisoners therein, to adopt rules and regulations requiring all persons visiting the jail, whether they be attorneys or not, to submit to search. Of *326course, by this I do not mean to imply that the sheriff has a right to search such parties without their consent, except with a search warrant.
However, this presents only an insignificant issue in the case, for the plaintiff himself says that if the illegal search alone was involved he probably would not have •gone to the newspapers or filed a suit, expressing his opinion thusly : “I would probably have had no lawsuit.” He says it was the fact that he was illegally arrested and locked up, a fact that is not, in my opinion, satisfactorily established by the record, that caused him to feel he had been damaged.
Nor can I subscribe to the meager amount awarded the plaintiff if the statement attributed to the sheriff is one that would per se damage the reputation of a practicing attorney, as held by the majority opinion, for the right to enjoy a reputation, unassailed, has been recognized to be an invaluable right and accorded the same dignity as man’s right to due process of law in the protection of his life, liberty, and property, Kennedy v. Item Co., Inc., 213 La. 347, 34 So.2d 886; 36 C.J. 1148, § 11, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 4, and this is particularly true with respect to the right of professional men to maintain their vocational standing free from prejudice and injury. Kennedy v. Item Co. Inc., supra; 36 C.J. 1184, § 79, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 38; 33 Am. Jur. 88, Section 76.
The conclusion in the majority opinion that the remarks of the defendant deBretton were “libelous per se” was obviously arrived at under the erroneous assumption that deBretton can be charged with the responsibility of the publication in the Baton Rouge State"Times of his oral remarks. (Emphasis added.)
Under our civil law, however, it is immaterial whether the alleged defamation was oral (slanderous) or written (libelous), if it has produced any preceptible injury to the reputation of the plaintiff. Fellman v. Dreyfous, 47 La.Ann. 907, 17 So. 422; Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La.Ann. 908, 19 So. 925; 36 C.J. 1166, § 29, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 14.
The statement attributed to the sheriff makes no specific charge against the plaintiff that might be said to be damaging per se. When read alone this statement is, in itself, susceptible of more than one construction; and when it is read in connection with all of the history of the plaintiff’s past hostility toward the sheriff and the information conveyed to the newspaper reporter, it is still susceptible of more than one construction. Only from the innuendo the plaintiff himself reads into the statement can the meaning be imputed to it that the plaintiff claims in his petition caused him damage, and, certainly, such an imputation even cannot be eked out of the statement without the story the plaintiff himself gave to the press and that was published by the State Times.
*328It therefore follows that in order to determine whether the statement attributed to the sheriff was slanderous in fact, it must be considered in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances, including the many events that led up to the incident that gave rise to the publication. Some of these are set out in the plaintiff’s petition as the motive for the sheriff’s action and statement. They are: The Plaintiff had (1) in November of 1939 charged the sheriff in affidavits presented to the grand jury with having illegally used labor and materials belonging to the state for the improvement of his personal property (a charge from which the grand jury entirely exonerated the sheriff); (2) in April of 1946 he instituted proceedings to enjoin the sheriff from enforcing certain rules with respect to the management of the jail the plaintiff felt were illegal (this suit was unsuccessful) ; and (3) in September of 1946 he (unsuccessfully) sought to obtain a court order to compel the sheriff to feed a prisoner allegedly placed on a bread and water diet by him. In addition, the record further reveals the plaintiff was then seeking the defeat of the sheriff for reelection and was, in fact, the campaign manager for one of the sheriff’s opponents.
All of these facts when taken into. consideration, particularly if fully explored, might well lead to the ultimate conclusion that the plaintiff in going to the newspaper with the story that brought about the statement attributed to the sheriff did so with the intention of using the story and bringing about the defeat of the sheriff in his campaign for re-election, and that this suit was not brought SO’ much with the hope of recovering damages as with the desire to accomplish just that end.
It is my opinion, therefore, that the case should he remanded to the lower court for the introduction of testimony with respect to the plaintiff’s activities against the defendant that the trial judge erroneously excluded. Such testimony should have been admitted for the purpose of further developing facts that would not only have thrown light on the alleged' slander as a whole but was clearly admissible for the purpose of establishing the extent to which the damage contended by the plaintiff was brought about by his own actions.
For these reasons I respectfully dissent.