Court Opinion

ID: 9454902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:03:21.082925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:22.293633
License: Public Domain

O’SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge,
with whom WEICK, CELEBREZZE and McCREE, Circuit Judges, concur.
The question of law which divides us in this case is whether Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106, requires that all elements of a cause of action for antitrust violation must be made out by “clear proof” where a labor union is a defendant, as my brother Edwards holds, or whether the “clear proof” standard of Section 6 is limited to the determination of the authority of “individual officers, members, or agents” to act for a labor union or other organization, as I contend. Such Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia provides;
“No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”
This is plain language which, in my view, clearly exposes the Section’s limitation. While not controlling, this is the meaning of the Section as it appeared to the compilers. The black letter title of the Section reads:
“Responsibility of officers and members of associations or their organizations for unlawful acts of individual officers, members, and agents.”
The chief assertion of the opinion for affirmance is that in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965), the United States Supreme Court announced a rule that Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act controls the standard of proof as to all issues in any antitrust action against a labor union. That it did not do so is, in my view, made clear by the fact that nowhere in the opinions filed in that case (by Justices White, Douglas and Goldberg) is Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act even mentioned or discussed.
The opinion for affirmance places subsidiary reliance on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966), and United Bhd. of Car*668penters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775 (1947). Gibbs, however, had nothing to do with an antitrust action and considered only the question of a union’s authorization of acts of violence committed by its members. Carpenters was a criminal case which considered Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia only in dealing with the authority of an agent to act for a principal, whether that principal was a labor union or an employer. It did not construe Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia as providing a special rule for labor unions. In this ease the District Judge apparently considered that such a special rule existed. He said:
“Were this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U.M.W. did so impliedly agree. However, the standard of proof where a labor union is involved is ‘clear proof,’ as required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a standard different from the ordinary civil burden of persuasion.” Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265 F.Supp. 388, 412 (E.D.Tenn.1967). (Emphasis supplied.)
Such also was District Judge Taylor’s view in Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. 815 (E.D.Tenn.1966), aff’d 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 983, 89 S.Ct. 450, 21 L.Ed.2d 444 (1968).
“It seems apparent that the Court in the Gibbs case by interpretation of the statute, [Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia] has placed a heavier burden of proof upon a plaintiff in this type of case.” 257 F.Supp. at 829. (Emphasis supplied.)
Carpenters clearly limits the “clear proof” rule to the matter of proving the authority of an alleged agent. I consider that these District Court opinions, as well as the opinion of my brothers here, fail to properly limit the “clear proof” rule as in Carpenters.
Plaintiffs-appellants are, or were, coal mining companies operating in southeastern Tennessee. They appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Southern Division, which dismissed their joint action against the United Mine Workers of America, defendant-appellee. Plaintiffs’ action sought damages claimed to have been suffered by them as a consequence of alleged violations by the United Mine Workers of Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. This is one of the many lawsuits that have grown out of the substantially successful organization by the UMW of coal mining operations in the southeastern part of Tennessee. Plaintiffs charge that the United Mine Workers had long sought to forbid anyone from carrying on coal mining in the involved territory except those who would pay the wages and meet other conditions imposed by the United Mine Workers. It is their claim that this objective was ultimately accomplished by an illegal combination and conspiracy between a few big coal companies, who formed the Bituminous Coal Operators Association, and the United Mine Workers. Appellants further assert that the plan of the conspiracy was that only those who signed and adhered to the terms of a contract identified as the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950 and its 1958 supplement, the Protective Wage Clause,1 would be permitted to carry on *669coal mining in southeastern Tennessee. It is claimed that the terms of these illegal undertakings were, when needed, implemented by violence visited upon anyone, including the plaintiffs, who essayed to operate independently. Success ultimately marked the United Mine Workers’ campaign. We need not here consider the good or evil of the economic and social philosophy which holds that only those industries which, by size and profits, are able to pay wages that are considered adequate by the Unions of their employees, are fit to survive in today’s economy.
The history of which this lawsuit is a part will be better learned by reading the District Court opinion in this case, reported as Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 265 F.Supp. 388 (E.D.Tenn.1967), and the opinions in related cases: Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965); Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. 815 (E.D.Tenn.1966); and Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 983, 89 S.Ct. 450 (1968). The above-mentioned opinions and related opinions shall be referred to herein as Pennington I, II, III and IV, respectively. All of these refer to an action by Pennington and others against the United Mine Workers to recover damages for the claimed Mine Workers’ violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Pennington I was our affirmance of a District Court judgment entered upon a jury verdict which found the Mine Workers guilty of such violation. Pennington II was the Supreme Court’s reversal of Pennington I, remanding the case for a new trial. Pennington III was a District Court judgment, entered after trial upon the remand, and Pennington IV is this Court’s affirmance in part and reversal in part of Pennington III.
In the case at bar, the District Judge, in dismissing plaintiffs’ action, held that although plaintiffs had made out a ease of the Mine Workers’ violation of the antitrust laws by a preponderance of the evidence, a labor union cannot be convicted of such violation except by the “clear proof” rule of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 106 2 Testing the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ proofs by such rule, he exonerated the Mine Workers of liability. We consider that such ruling was the product of the District Judge’s misreading and misapplication of two Supreme Court decisions, viz: United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); and United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947). He concluded that these cases announced a rule that labor unions, as distinguished from all others who might be so accused, cannot be convicted of violation of the Sherman Act unless such violation be established by the so-called “clear proof” rule of Norris-LaGuardia. We would reverse.
It is clear that had the District Judge considered that the ordinary preponderance of the evidence rule applied, he would have found that the United Mine Workers were guilty of Sherman Act violations. The critical question was whether the United Mine Workers and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association had agreed to control wages and *670working conditions. On this, the District Judge said:
“Having concluded that the Protective Wage Clause does not constitute an express commitment upon the part of the U.M.W. to the B.C.O.A. not to bargain with any other coal operator upon any terms other than the national contract, this does not conclude the issue of whether the U.M.W. did in fact, though not expressly, so contract with the B.C.O.A. Were this case being tried upon the usual preponderance of the evidence rule applicable to civil cases, the Court would conclude that the U.M.W. did so impliedly agree. However, the standard of proof where a labor union is involved is ‘clear proof’, as required by Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, a standard different from the ordinary civil burden of persuasion. United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973; United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218.” 265 F.Supp. at 412. (Emphasis supplied.)3
In Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963)— Pennington I—this Court affirmed a judgment, entered upon a jury verdict, finding the United Mine Workers guilty of violating the Sherman Act. The jury awarded plaintiff $90,000 damages, which sum was trebled by the District Court. As will be discussed later herein, the District Judge had advised the jury that plaintiffs’ burden was to make out their case by a preponderance of the evidence. In our affirmance, we followed the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939 (1945), that the exemption granted labor unions from the provisions of the Sherman Act by Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17,
“does not exist in cases where a labor union combines with a non-labor organization to restrain competition in, or to monopolize the marketing of, goods in interstate commerce.” 325 F.2d at 809.
While we cannot say that the facts of Pennington I parallel the case at bar in all respects, we are satisfied that the plaintiffs’ evidence in that case did not portray with more probative force a violation of the Sherman Act than does the record here. We there held that United Mine Workers were not entitled to a directed verdict and that there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find that the United Mine Workers had, to the damage of the plaintiffs — a group of small mine operators — violated the Sherman Act. We affirmed the judgment which was entered on the verdict.
The United States Supreme Court reversed us, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 85 S.Ct. 1585 (1965)—Pennington II—not, however, on the ground that a case of violation of the Sherman Act had not been made out, but remanded for a new trial because of some instructions which the Supreme Court held should not have been given. The criticized instructions had nothing to do with the standard of proof which governed plaintiffs’ burden. They affirmed our holding that Pennington, et al., had made out a case to go to the jury. This is made plain by the Court’s disposition of the Mine Workers’ claim that a verdict should have been directed.
“We first consider UMW’s contention that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, since a determination in UMW’s favor on this issue would finally resolve the controversy. The question presented by this phase of the case is whether in the circumstances of this case the union is exempt from liability under the antitrust laws. We think *671the answer is clearly in the negative and that the union’s motions were correctly denied.” 381 U.S. at 661, 85 S.Ct. at 1589. (Emphasis supplied.)
Therefore, we consider that the Supreme Court has said that the evidence in the case at bar — legally equivalent to Pennington — would permit a factfinder —jury or judge — to find the United Mine Workers guilty of violating the Sherman Act. The accused agreement here, as well as in Pennington I, was the so-called National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, with the 1958 addition to it of the Protective Wage Clauses under which (as charged by plaintiff) “the Union bound itself not to enter into, be a party to, or permit any other kind of labor contract in the industry except the National Agreement which it signed with Bituminous Coal Operators Association.” Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. at 820.
In Pennington I, the charge of antitrust violation against the Mine Workers was made in the cross-complaint of Pennington, et al. In his general submission of the case to the jury, the District Judge charged that,
“before it [the cross-complainant] can recover on its cross-claim, it is required to make out its case substantially as alleged in the cross-claim by a preponderance of the evidence * * *. In order to recover * * * upon the conspiracy, Phillips Brothers [Pennington] must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy * * * existed during the period of the case * * *. The burden of proof and the preponderance of the evidence ordinarily have reference to direct evidence and indirect or circumstantial evidence. * * * Indirect evidence is that knowledge that is inferred from known facts.4” (Emphasis supplied.)
It should be noted that in the Mine Workers appeal from the verdict in Pennington I, none of its five Questions Involved attacked the style of the above instruction. They did question the instructions which the Supreme Court found erroneous, but those did not relate to standard of proof. In their appeal to us, in urging that a verdict should have been directed for insufficient proof, the Mine Workers contended that Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia should have been applied in testing whether there was any sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find the Mine Workers guilty of Sherman Act violations. In our opinion in Pennington I, 325 F.2d 804, we rejected such contention by finding that the District Judge correctly submitted the case to the jury and by sustaining the District Judge’s denial of the Mine Workers’ motion for new trial which, inter alia, again asserted that Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia was the controlling rule.
In their brief to this Court in Pennington I, the Mine Workers asserted:
“As already observed, Phillips’ [Pennington] burden was not only to prove the unlawful conspiracy but, as the trial court charged, to prove it by ‘clear proof’.5 Not only is ‘clear proof’ lacking, there is absolutely no proof whatsoever.”
*672In their petition to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari to review Pennington I, the United Mine Workers included in its Questions Presented the following:
“Where a labor union is charged with having conspired with employer groups in violation of the Sherman . Anti-trust Act when it executed an industry-wide, multi-employer collective bargaining agreement in conformity with injunctive orders of a federal district court, union denials of the conspiracy are uncontradicted, and there is no direct evidence proving the conspiracy, may a court or jury infer the existence of a conspiracy from union activities either sanctioned under law or within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, in light of the antitrust immunity of labor unions and the clear proof requirement of Section 6 of the NorrisLaGuardia Act?” (Emphasis supplied.)
We read the Supreme Court’s holding in Pennington II, as rejecting the assertion presented by that question.
District Judge Taylor’s opinion upon retrial — Pennington III — was the first announcement by any court that labor unions are insulated from liability under the Sherman Act unless their violations are made out by the “clear proof” standard of Norris-LaGuardia. He stated:
“The standard of proof necessary to show predatory intent is governed by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs (C.A.6, March 28, 1966), 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218.” 257 F.Supp. at 829. (Emphasis supplied.)
and further that:
“It seems apparent that the Court in the Gibbs case by interpretation of the statute, has placed a heavier burden of proof upon a plaintiff in this type of case.” 257 F.Supp. at 829. (Emphasis supplied.)
The quotations from Justices Brennan and Harlan set out by Judge Taylor immediately preceding the above are both from the Gibbs case. Judge Taylor did not cite the Supreme Court opinion in Pennington II as support for the new “clear proof” rule that he announced. His reliance was on Gibbs, but the Gibbs case had nothing whatever to do with the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.
Gibbs had sued the United Mine Workers and recovered damages for secondary boycott and a state common law tort. The relevant question was whether UMW could be held liable for violence committed by some of its members in stopping Gibbs’ effort to begin a mining operation. The Supreme Court merely held that Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act required Gibbs to make “clear proof” that the UMW had authorized, approved or ratified the violence. This is the case’s holding:
“What is required is proof, either that the union approved the violence which occurred, or that it participated actively or by knowing tolerance in further acts which were in themselves actionable under state law or intentionally drew upon the previous violence for their force.” 383 U.S. at 739, 86 S.Ct. at 1146.
It found that Gibbs’ evidence did not, by “clear proof,” establish the union’s authorization of or participation in the violence committed. In the case at bar, except as to responsibility for violence, there was no issue as to whether what was done by the Mine Workers’ officers or agents had the approval of the union. No such question was raised. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and the 1958 Protective Wage Clause made between the Bituminous Coal Operators Association and the United Mine Workers were admittedly executed by the proper authorities of the union and Norris-LaGuardia was in no way involved in these critical matters.
The application of the Norris-LaGuardia “clear proof” rule as the standard of proof in Sherman Act suits against labor unions had its genesis in Lewis v. Pennington, 257 F.Supp. 815 *673(.Pennington III). A reading of the opinion of Judge Taylor in that case will disclose that he did not rely upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pennington II for the rule he announced — Gibbs was his authority. The first intimation that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pennington II contained such a rule came in Judge Wilson’s opinion in the case at bar and in this Court’s opinion in Pennington IV, 400 F.2d 806 (1968), affirming Judge Taylor’s Pennington III. Our opinion in that case emphasizes the words “clearly shown” in quoting from one of the sentences in Mr. Justice White’s Pennington II opinion, where he said:
“ ‘But we think a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining units.’ 381 U.S. at 665, 85 S.Ct. 1585. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added.)” 400 F.2d at 813.
This is followed by this Court’s language :
“We thus understand Pennington to teach that:
“1) a conspiracy between employers and labor formed with the intention of driving competitors out of business is a violation of the Sherman Act;
“2) ‘predatory intent’ (as used by Mr. Justice White (381 U.S. at 668, 85 S.Ct. 1585) and by Judge Taylor) is merely shorthand, employed to describe this anti-competitive conspiracy; and
“3) such an anti-competitive conspiracy must be established by ‘clear proof’. See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130 (1966). “While the jury by its verdict in the first trial of this case had found a conspiracy between the UMW and large mine operators to put smaller mine operators out of business by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Taylor found such a conspiracy not to have been shown by ‘clear proof’ at the second trial. Judge Taylor properly concluded that a degree of proof less than the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ requirement in criminal cases but greater than the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard of civil actions is necessary. 257 F.Supp. at 829. The District Court’s determination that judged by this standard evidence of sufficient probity had not been offered is supported by a review of the record and is not clearly erroneous. Rule 52 F.R.Civ.P.” 400 F.2d at 814.
We are not persuaded that the context of Mr. Justice White’s use of the words “clearly shown” in the sentence quoted justifies their being read as announcing a new rule giving labor unions special treatment in defending suits under the Sherman Act. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Clark, does not even discuss the subject. Neither does Mr. Justice Goldberg, who was joined by Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart in dissenting form Pennington II.
That the words “clearly shown” were not employed by Justice White to announce the rule claimed by Judge Taylor in Pennington II and by Judge Wilson in this ease is made clear by the fact that neither in Justice White’s opinion nor in any of the others in Pennington II is Section 6 of Norris-LaGuardia even mentioned. It is that statute which is the sole basis for the claim that “clear proof” is the standard applicable to the burden of proving all elements of a labor union’s violation of the Sherman Act.
Congress has been attentive to the needs of organized labor. Lest, in serving their own ends, labor unions be swept into the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act came into being in 1914 to protect the unilateral activities of a labor union from antitrust condemnation. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 65 S.Ct. 1533 (1945), however, forbade labor unions from joining hands with management in conduct proscribed by the Sher*674man Act. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted in 1932 as a restraint upon the then-increasing intrusions of federal court injunctions into genuine labor disputes; its Section 6 (29 U.S.C. § 106) provided that the participants in labor disputes, whether employer or a union of employees, could not be cast in damages, or be made otherwise liable for unlawful acts of their agents, except by clear proof of the authority of such agents to act for their principals. The “clear proof” rule was created by Congressional Act, with clear definition of its limited application. We are not at liberty to do violence to its plain language by reading into it new and special antitrust insulation of labor unions not contained in the exemption granted them by the Clayton Act. Certainly the Gibbs case did not do so, and we are not persuaded that two words included in a general observation by one of the Justices in Pennington II did so.
Judge Wilson specifically found that, by preponderance of the evidence, plaintiffs had established that the joint action of the BCOA and the Mine Workers in entering into and using the National Bituminous Coal Wage agreement with its Protective Wage Clause, and the implementing of them, established an agreement violating the Sherman Act. While he did not express himself as to how he would have found as to all of the other issues of fact had he adhered to the traditional preponderance of evidence rule, he made it plain that he followed the “clear proof” rule in passing on responsibility for violent conduct by agents or members of the union. The Gibbs rule was correctly applied to that issue.
The other case relied upon to support the “clear proof” rule was United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 L.Ed. 973 (1947). In that criminal case, unincorporated trade unions and their officials were alleged to have conspired with some manufacturers and dealers and their incorporated trade associations to monopolize and restrain trade in the manufacture of and dealing in, millwork and patterned lumber. The only holding relevant to the Norris-LaGuardia Act was that, wherein the government sought to hold the involved trade associations or parent unions responsible for acts done by their individual officers, members, or local unions, the authority to so act for their principals had to be made out by clear proof. This is the totality of the case’s relevant holding:
“We hold that its [Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act] purpose and effect was to relieve organizations, whether of labor or capital, and members of those organizations from liability for damages or imputations of guilt for lawless acts done in labor disputes by some individual officers or members of the organization, without clear proof that the organization or member, charged with responsibility for the offense, actually participated, gave prior authorization, or ratified such acts after actual knowledge of their perpetration.” 330 U.S. at 403, 67 S.Ct. at 780. (Emphasis supplied.)
This, indeed, is not a holding that the “clear proof” rule has, in antitrust cases against labor unions, replaced the substantive rule of preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court in Carpenters was careful to express the limit of the rule:
“There is no implication in what we have said that an association or organization in circumstances covered by § 6 [Norris-LaGuardia] must give explicit authority to its officers or agents to violate in a labor controversy the Sherman Act or any other law or to give antecedent approval to any act that its officers may do.” 330 U.S. at 409-410, 67 S.Ct. at 783. (Emphasis supplied.)
Had adherence to or establishment of a rule that plaintiffs had to establish their entire case by the “clear proof” of Norris-LaGuardia been decisive of our Pennington IV, stare decisis would forbid this early a departure from it. But the adoption or approval of such a rule was dictum in Judge Taylor’s opinion and in *675our affirmance.6 He concluded his finding on Sherman Act violation as follows:
“The Court is of the opinion and finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove, either by a preponderance of the evidence or by the standards of evidence established by the Supreme Court in UMW v. Gibbs, supra, that the defendant engaged in a combination or conspiracy so as to unreasonably restrain trade or to monopolize commerce among the several states as alleged in the complaint. In this connection, the Court observes that the extensive evidence introduced by plaintiffs of violence in the coal fields is consistent with the Union’s determination to unionize the units of the entire area, and, in the light of the Court’s conclusion just noted, is insufficient to show a Sherman Act antitrust violation.” 257 F.Supp. at 864. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it is clear that Judge Taylor’s exoneration of the Mine Workers was not dependent upon application of the clear proof rule of Norris-LaGuardia. He found that plaintiffs had not made out a case under the traditional rule of preponderance of the evidence.
Plaintiffs’ evidence in this case generously portrayed how propitious was the setting for the victory achieved by the BCOA and the Mine Workers in implementing their agreement. The District Court opinion at length sets out the relevant facts. Among other things, it was shown that the Mine Workers loaned to one Cyrus Eaton some $25,000,000 to enable him to acquire for them control of the capital shares of West Kentucky Coal Company — the biggest of the members of BCOA — and its subsidiary, Nashville Coal Company. By having Eaton so invest the union’s money, the Mine Workers acquired the voting rights of West Kentucky Coal Company and Eaton became Chairman of the Board, and:
“Immediately after Mr. Eaton assumed control, West Kentucky signed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, the first time in its history that it had signed a contract with the U.M.W.” 265 F.Supp. at 414.
Judge Wilson further observed:
“Furthermore, the reasons for which loans and investments were made in West Kentucky and its subsidiary, Nashville Coal Company, must likewise largely be inferred, as the reasons given by the U.M.W. for doing so will not bear scrutiny.” 265 F.Supp. at 414. (Emphasis supplied.)
It would indeed be over kind to accord credence to the asserted claim that the making of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and the Protective Wage Clause between the United Mine Workers and their controlled West Kentucky Coal Company was an arm’s length” transaction, free of conspiratorial and predatory purpose. The Mine Workers lost eight of the twenty-five million dollars which it invested in the management side of the accused transactions. For its victory, it was apparently willing to pay this bill as well as the many hundreds of thousands of dollars which it paid for the depredations and violence — the reign of terror — which it employed in driving out of coal mining those who could not live with the terms of the National Bituminous Wage Agreement. See Flame Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 303 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1962); United Mine Workers of *676America v. Osborne Milling Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 881, 81 S.Ct. 169, 5 L.Ed.2d 103 (1960); Gilchrist v. United Mine Workers, 290 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1961). District Judge Wilson described the Mine Workers’ conduct in this language:
“The evidence in this case reflects once again that the ‘history of the bituminous coal industry is written in blood as well as ink.’ Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263.” 265 F.Supp. at 428.
and further,
“A great deal of violence, bloodshed and destruction of property has accompanied the strike [discussed in the opinion]. Much suffering, deprivation and want has occurred. The Southeastern Tennessee coal field remains a blighted area.” 265 F.Supp. at 428.
He sums up the situation as follows:
“In the period since 1960 the coal operators in the Southeastern Tennessee coal field have been unable to compete and survive in the T.Y.A. coal market under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. While in many instances this appears to have been due to antiquated mining methods and equipment or other causes, the fact nevertheless remains that since 1960 there has not been a single instance of a successful coal mining operation in the Southeastern Tennessee coal field under the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and this in spite of the fact that the only feasible alternative facing most coal operators in the area was to operate under the national contract or go out of business.” 265 F.Supp. at 430. (Emphasis supplied.)
There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that the conception and prosecution of the grand plan we deal with was the work of irresponsible underlings. The total enterprise was directed from high echelons of authority. Top people of the United Mine Workers and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association did not need the protection of Norris-LaGuardia when they negotiated and signed the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and its Protective Wage' Clause, nor when the Mine Workers invested $25,000,000 to aid the big coal companies to fulfill the promise of the plan.
Peace has indeed come to Southeastern Tennessee’s part of Appalachia, but it is the peace of obedience to the overlords of big business and big labor. Of this situation, Mr. Justice Douglas, in his Pennington concurrence, appropriately observes:
“Congress can design an oligopoly for our society, if it chooses. But business alone cannot do so as long as the antitrust laws are enforced. Nor should business and labor working hand-in-hand be allowed to make that basic change in the design of our so-called free enterprise system.” 381 U.S. at 674, 85 S.Ct. at 1595-96.
We would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent herewith.

. The National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement set out the wages to be paid and the other working conditions applicable to the mining of coal in the region involved. The Protective Wage Clause provided:
“During the period of this Contract, the United Mine Workers of America will not enter into, be a party to, nor will it permit any agreement or understanding covering any wages, hours or other conditions of work applicable to employees covered by this Contract on any basis other than those specified in this Contract or on any applicable District Contract. The United Mine Workers of America will diligently perform and enforce without discrimina*669tion or favor the conditions of this paragraph and all other terms and conditions of this Contract and will use and exercise its continuing best efforts to obtain full compliance therewith by each and all the parties signatory thereto.”

. “No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.)

. We should make it clear that we need not and do not reach consideration of whether the District Judge’s findings were “clearly erroneous.” We hold only that the “clear proof” standard which the Judge applied in making his findings was improper.

. It should be mentioned that the District Judge did instruct the jury that “clear proof” was required in the jury’s consideration of whether particular acts of union members had been authorized by the United Mine Workers. He instructed the jury as follows:
“Similarly, unions act through their officers, agents, employees and member’s and no union participating or interested in a labor dispute may be held responsible or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of individual officer, members or agents, except upon clear proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of, such act, or of ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof.”
This was a correct charge upon the limited application of Norris-LaGuardia, Section 6.

. As set out earlier, the District Judge, in his instruction as to “clear proof,” correctly limited application of such rule to the matter of authorization of acts by agents, etc.

. We should mention that although Judge Taylor found no Sherman Act violation in Pennington III, he gave judgment to two plaintiffs for $311,787 as compensatory and punitive damages for the Mine Workers’ depridations against these small mine operators in its drive to put out of business any operator attempting to carry on without signing the Uniform National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement. He held the conduct violative of the law of Tennessee. This Court’s latest Pennington decision, Pennington IV, remanded the case to the District Court for reconsideration and more specific findings concerning the award of damages for the United Mine Workers’ violation of Tennessee law.