Court Opinion

ID: 9897579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:16:22.537493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:34.787991
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0727-22

ARNOLD G. SHURKIN, ESQ.,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ELAR REALTY CO., LAWRENCE
H. RUDBART, DONALD RUDBART,
LINDA SIEGEL, EDWIN SIEGEL,
CINDY GOLDSTEIN, LORI MORAN,
GERAL RUDBART, ALECIA BLAKE
AND CURTIS RUDBART,

     Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________________

                   Argued October 17, 2023 – Decided November 13, 2023

                   Before Judges Sumners and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-0021-19.

                   Arnold G. Shurkin, Esq., appellant, argued the cause
                   Pro se.

                   Respondents have not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM
      In this attorney's fees dispute, Arnold G. Shurkin argues the trial court

erred in denying his summary judgment motion; sua sponte dismissing his

complaint with prejudice; and rejecting his recusal request. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

                                        I

      Shurkin, a licensed New Jersey attorney, sued Elar Realty Co., Lawrence

H. Rudbart, Donald Rudbart, Linda Siegel, Edwin Siegel, Cindy Goldstein, Lori

Moran, Gerald Rudbart, Alecia Blake, and Curtis Rudbart 1 for payment of

$52,062.05 for legal services rendered from 2016 through 2018.         Shurkin's

action was premised on breach of contract, book account, and quantum merit.

      After the trial court denied Shurkin's initial summary judgment motion,2

he filed another summary judgment motion. Defendants did not file a cross-

motion for summary judgment. The court denied the motion and sua sponte

dismissed Shurkin's complaint with prejudice.

1
   Because most of the individual defendants share last names, they will be
referred to by their first names to avoid confusion.

2
  The court denied Shurkin's initial motion for summary judgment because: (1)
"there was an ongoing legal malpractice matter involving ANIM Investment
Co.," a related company of Elar, and Shurkin; and (2) Shurkin "needed to 'pierce
the corporate veil.'"

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                                       2
        In its thoughtful written decision, the trial court stressed there were

various errors, omissions, and discrepancies in Shurkin's supporting documents.

Citing Seventy-Three Land v. Maxlar Partners, 270 N.J. Super 332, 336 (App.

Div. 1994), the court held Shurkin "[could not] show . . . liability [for individual

defendants] is possible . . . because [he] [did] not demonstrate[] that the assets

of the partnership are insufficient to be able to attach individual liability to the

partners." The court also noted Shurkin failed to meet the requirements of

N.J.S.A. 42:1A-20(a)-(b)3 to establish that Edwin Siegel was a partner of Elar

3
    N.J.S.A. 42:1A-20(a)-(b) provide :

              a. If a person, by words or conduct, purports to be a
              partner, or consents to being represented by another as
              a partner, in a partnership or with one or more persons
              not partners, the purported partner is liable to a person
              to whom the representation is made, if that person,
              relying on the representation, enters into a transaction
              with the actual or purported partnership. If the
              representation, either by the purported partner or by a
              person with the purported partner’s consent, is made in
              a public manner, the purported partner is liable to a
              person who relies upon the purported partnership even
              if the purported partner is not aware of being held out
              as a partner to the claimant. If partnership liability
              results, the purported partner is liable with respect to
              that liability as if the purported partner were a partner.
              If no partnership liability results, the purported partner
              is liable with respect to that liability jointly and

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and therefore liable for its legal fees. With respect to Elar's liability, the court

held Shurkin's billing "invoice[s] that span years" failed to provide Elar "the

ability to make . . . informed decision[s] concerning [his] representation," in

violation of RPC 1.3. 4

      Shurkin subsequently moved for reconsideration of the trial court's order

denying summary judgment and sua sponte dismissing his complaint as to all

defendants with prejudice. Shurkin also sought the court's recusal based on Rule

1:12-1(d).

             severally with any other person consenting to the
             representation.

             b. If a person is thus represented to be a partner in an
             existing partnership, or with one or more persons not
             partners, the purported partner is an agent of persons
             consenting to the representation to bind them to the
             same extent and in the same manner as if the purported
             partner were a partner, with respect to persons who
             enter into transactions in reliance upon the
             representation. If all of the partners of the existing
             partnership consent to the representation, a partnership
             act or obligation results. If fewer than all of the
             partners of the existing partnership consent to the
             representation, the person acting and the partners
             consenting to the representation are jointly and
             severally liable.

4
   RPC 1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client."
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                                         4
       On October 12, 2022, the trial court entered an order denying the requests.

In its written decision, the court stated reconsideration was not warranted under

Rule 4:49-2 because Shurkin merely rephrased his previous rejected arguments

and supplied previously omitted documents without justification. The court

found no merit in Shurkin's contention that his constitutional right to due process

was violated by the dismissal of his complaint with prejudice. The court held

that because Shurkin filed a motion for summary judgment, he was afforded a

"full opportunity to develop [his] legal and factual arguments, the ability to

respond to [d]efendants' opposition, and the opportunity to be heard a t oral

argument before the [court]," therefore, he "kn[ew] the evidence and contentions

advanced." Lastly, the court rejected Shurkin's recusal request because he failed

to identify "any 'reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and

judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so. '"

Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66 (App. Div. 2001) (citing R. 1:12-l(f)

(1994)5).

5
    Rule 1:12-1 was amended in 2012, changing subsection (f) to subsection (g).

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                                        II

      In his appeal, Shurkin raises both procedural and substantive concerns.

Shurkin claims our court rules do not allow a trial court to sua sponte dismiss a

complaint with prejudice under these circumstances. He asserts Rule 4:46,

which details the procedure for summary judgment dismissal of a compliant,

was not followed by the court. The court, according to Shurkin, did not give

him the "chance to rebut the facts and law asserted by the [c]ourt."6 Shurkin

maintains denying reconsideration was "another ex parte decision that

constituted a direct violation of [his] due process rights."

      Shurkin argues the trial court made three substantive errors in its decision.

First, the court misinterpreted established general partnership law by

disregarding defendants' admission that Elar is a New Jersey general

partnership, instead relying on "its own erroneous version of the law of general

partnerships."    Second, the court wrongfully dismissed his fee claim,

considering his long-standing representation of defendants and their regular

6
  In support of this argument, Shurkin cites an unpublished opinion from this
court. Rule 1:36-3 makes clear that absent certain exceptions not relevant here,
"[n]o unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any
court." Thus, we will not consider that opinion.

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                                         6
payments of his bills satisfied RPC 1.5(a)(6), which provides that "the nature

and the length of the professional relationship with the client" is a factor "to be

considered in deciding the reasonableness of a [lawyer's] fee." Third, the court

erred in requiring him to provide a separate retainer agreement for three unpaid

bills.

         The merits of the trial court's dismissal are not at issue, rather the court's

failure to employ the minimal procedural requirements of due process form the

basis of our decision. Our Supreme Court has recognized that "[t]he minimum

requirements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to be heard."

Klier v. Sordoni Skanska Constr. Co., 337 N.J. Super. 76, 84 (App. Div. 2001)

(citing Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 106 (1995)). The court failed to abide by these

requirements in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. The

record bears no mention of the court's efforts to notify Shurkin of its pending

sua sponte consideration, thus depriving Shurkin of his right to be notified—

which inherently deprived him of the right to be heard on the matter. We cannot

endorse the trial court's "swift disposition of [the case] at the expense of fairness

and justice." Id. at 83. Although Shurkin indeed raised factual contentions and

legal arguments in support of his summary judgment motion, he was given no

opportunity to address the court's contemplation that it was considering

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                                            7
dismissing his complaint with prejudice.          Given defendants, who were

represented by counsel, did not cross-move for summary judgement, the court

should not have acted without notifying Shurkin of its intentions.

      The trial court's ruling conflicts with the principles espoused in Klier,

where we reversed the trial judge's sua sponte summary dismissal of the

plaintiffs' complaint without giving the plaintiffs sufficient notice or a

meaningful opportunity to respond to the judge's motion. Id. Despite "giv[ing]

[the] plaintiffs' attorney two days to produce his expert's report and further argue

against the motion," we held

            that opportunity was insufficient to remedy the defect
            in the judge's procedure. Had plaintiffs' attorney been
            given sufficient advance notice of the application for
            dismissal, he would have had a meaningful opportunity
            to contact his expert and supply a supplemental report,
            as he did on his motion for reconsideration. We cannot
            condone a procedure whereby a judge sua sponte,
            without notice to a party, resorts to a "shortcut" for the
            purposes of "good administration" and circumvents the
            basic requirements of notice and opportunity to be
            heard.

            [Id. at 84-85.]

      Even though defendants opposed Shurkin's summary judgment motion,

they did not cross-move for summary judgment. Reversal of the trial court's sua

sponte dismissal order is appropriate because Shurkin did not have a full

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                                         8
opportunity to address the trial court's concerns. Remand is appropriate for

further proceedings to resolve this dispute.

      We, however, will not disturb the trial court's denial of Shurkin's summary

judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary

judgment. See Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing

R. 4:46-2(c)). In particular, there is a genuine issue of whether individual

defendants are liable for the debt of Elar because they were partners at the time

the legal services were performed.

                                         III

      Finally, we conclude it is best that remand for further proceedings be

conducted by a different trial court. We agree with Shurkin that the court should

be disqualified under Rule 1:12-1(d) because it "has given an opinion upon a

matter in question in the action." Moreover, remanding to a different trial court

avoids the potential taint or concerns due to the initial court's prior determination

that Shurkin's compliant should be dismissed. See Luedtke v. Shobert, 342 N.J.

Super. 202, 219 (App. Div. 2001) (recognizing the "time and effort the court put

into the case" but expressing concern that the original court would be in

"untenable position" on remand). We take no position on the outcome of this

matter on remand.

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                                         9
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

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                                10