Court Opinion

ID: 9619889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:34:39.278322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:02.555979
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Robb, J.:
This is an appeal by defendant from a conviction of the offense of driving an automobile on the highways of the state of Kansas while his operator’s license was suspended and revoked by the motor vehicle department of the state highway commission, and from the trial court’s order overruling his motion for new trial.
On July 13, 1961, complaint was filed by the county attorney of Ness county charging that on or about June 17, 1961, defendant unlawfully drove and operated a certain motor vehicle, namely, a 1961 Ford country sedan bearing 1961 Kansas license number NS-2162, upon a public highway while his operator’s license was suspended and revoked by the vehicle department of the state of Kansas.
A full jury trial was had and after the introduction of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury. We should perhaps pause to note that defendant’s third and fourth contentions of error in regard to such instructions cannot be considered by this court on appeal for the reason that all of the instructions were not brought before us either in the abstract or in the counter abstract.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty and the trial court entered judgment accordingly under G. S. 1961 Supp., 8-262, and this appeal followed. The statute in pertinent part reads:
*582“(a) Any person who drives a motor vehicle on any public highway of this state at a time when his privilege so to do is canceled, suspended or revoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months and there may be imposed in addition thereto a fine of not more than five hundred dollars ($500).”
The record before us explains how it was discovered that defendant had driven his automobile. He reported to his insurance company that while he had been driving his car approximately four miles east and seven miles south of Ness City the car caught fire and he wanted to file a claim to recover on his insurance policy. During the trial an exhibit marked No. 3 was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. One of the grounds for the objection was that the exhibit was improperly certified and defendant urges that same point here as reversible error. The exhibit now before us consists of six sheets of photostat reproductions of certain documents which have all been stapled together. The first, or top sheet, appears to be a letterhead of the motor vehicle department of the state highway commission dated July 24, 1961, and bears the heading “certificate.” In the body thereof L. A. Billings, superintendent of the motor vehicle department of the state highway commission certified that the attached photostat copies of “Letters of Revocation” and “Abstracts of Convictions” relative to Myron Russell Harkness were true and correct copies of the originals on file in the records of the department. His signature affixed thereto was verified by a notary public.
The second attached sheet of the exhibit had a state highway commission heading with “Vehicle Department” printed thereunder and beneath this the title read “order of suspension of privileges to operate motor vehicle in Kansas” and in the body appeared the following:

The license was suspended on March 14, 1960, and could not be reinstated until September 30, 1961.
The third sheet was likewise on a state highway commission motor vehicle department form and was entitled, “abstract of record of conviction.” It showed:
*583Date of offense, March 2, 1960
Date of hearing, March 14, 1960
Date of sentence, March 28, 1960
Nature of offense committed, driving while license suspended and revoked.
The signature of Clyde E. Rurns, city judge of Ness City, was at the bottom thereof and this judge suspended and revoked the license of defendant (NS-1861) for the year 1960. We should perhaps explain at this point that sheet 2 in the exhibit is a copy of the notice sent to defendant based on this abstract of the record of conviction. Sheet 3 also contains a notation written in ink describing defendant’s station wagon and then written beneath are these words: “Check pink sheet for registration.”
The fourth sheet, like the second, appears to be a copy of a notice sent to Myron Russell Harkness wherein he was ordered to surrender his license because it had been revoked from September 30, 1959, due to his having been convicted in the police court of Eureka, Kansas, of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This interpretation is further borne out by a letter dated October 12, 1959, (sheets 5 and 6) in regard to the same offense which had been sent from the motor vehicle department to Myron Russell Harkness. It showed that his driver’s license had been revoked at that time and that under no circumstances could he drive his car until a new driver’s license had been issued.
Defendant admits that under the certificate (sheet 3) the abstract of record of conviction was probably properly certified, as was the letter dated October 12, 1959, from the department to Harkness (sheets 5 and 6). It is apparent the sheets attached to the certificate are in reverse order to the sequence in which the incidents occurred.
Technically speaking, it would probably have been better for tihe superintendent of the motor vehicle department to have certified each sheet rather than stapling them together and making one overall certification. At least there could then have been no question whatsoever that the certificate covered each and every page. However, the five sheets were all properly stapled securely to the certificate and since the two orders of suspension of privileges to operate a motor vehicle (sheets 1 and 3) are notices to Harkness of the status of his operator’s license, we are unable to say that their inclusion was in any way prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant in this case so long as the record actually certified to and the admissions of the parties was sufficient, competent, substantial *584evidence for the jury to find and conclude that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended and revoked at the time he was driving the car immediately prior to the time it was destroyed by fire.
Defendant argues that because certain evidence was allowed in the case as to previous convictions, an inference of his guilt was created with the jury so as to prejudice the jury against him. We think this contention is not well taken for the reason that the crimes of which he had been convicted involved only infractions of the law causing his license to operate a motor vehicle on the highways of the state to be suspended or revoked. In order to show proper sequence of circumstances and conditions prior to the date defendant was charged, June 17, 1961, it was necessary to prove that his license had been revoked and for what reasons. This was part of the burden of the state in the prosecution of an offense of this kind and were we to follow defendant’s theory, the statute (G. S. 1961 Supp., 8-262 [a]) would be made meaningless and therefore of no force and effect.
A current Missouri license in defendant’s possession is of no benefit whatsoever to him under G. S. 1961 Supp., 8-258, which, in substance, provides that while a driver’s license is suspended and revoked under our act, a resident or nonresident cannot use a driver’s license issued by a foreign jurisdiction to operate a motor vehicle in this state.
We can find nothing in the record whereby defendant has sustained the burden which devolves upon him to make it affirmatively appear that his substantial rights have been prejudicially affected (G. S. 1949, 60-3317) and for that reason we are constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in any of the particulars complained of.
Judgment affirmed.