Court Opinion

ID: 9635334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:47:25.307935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:24.236222
License: Public Domain

*653RAKER, J.,
dissenting, with whom HARRELL, J., joins:
I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on the grounds of harmless error. Although the court formulated an incorrect response to the jury note as to whether the State has the burden of proving that the defendant did not have a gun license in Maryland, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I.
The jury obviously had determined that the defendant was in actual possession of the handgun and was thus wearing, carrying or transporting the gun. Since he raised no defense that he was licensed or permitted to carry, wear or transport this gun, he in fact received more than he was entitled to receive. See Parker v. State, 7 Md.App. 167, 181-82, 254 A.2d 381, 389 (1969) (finding that in considering the propriety of an instruction, “even if it be so construed, there was no error in the instruction requiring reversal, as the defendant received more than that to which he was entitled”). It made no difference as to who had the burden on this issue, because there was absolutely no evidence to suggest that he lawfully could carry or transport this handgun. When a defendant has a defense before the jury, even though he did not raise it, and it is one that could exonerate him, he can hardly complain about the instruction. “[A] defendant who has received more than he is entitled to is in no position to complain.” United States v. Seavey, 180 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir.1950); United States v. Nutter, 22 M.J. 727, 729 (A.C.M.R.1986). See also People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640, 681 (1996) (holding error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant received more than he was entitled to when the jury was instructed on the “specific intent” to commit the underlying felony of rape). There was no reasonable possibility that the jury could have misunderstood the burden of proof as to the other counts. Accordingly, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
*654The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Curtis, 417 Mass. 619, 632 N.E.2d 821 (1994). The defendant complained on appeal of an erroneous instruction as to self-defense. The court pointed out that “[t]he defendants’ arguments fail because neither was entitled to any instruction on self-defense. Thus, whatever the judge said about self-defense, and the use of excessive force in self-defense, was more favorable to the defendants than they deserved and could not have prejudiced their positions.” Id. at 830. See also Commonwealth v. Doucette, 430 Mass. 461, 720 N.E.2d 806, 812 (1999) (concluding that “The judge’s instructions permitting the jury to consider self-defense by the use of deadly force on the armed home invasion charge granted the defendant a benefit to which he was not entitled”); Commonwealth v. Torres, 420 Mass. 479, 651 N.E.2d 360, 368 (1995) (noting that “the defendant was not entitled to any instruction on self-defense or defense of another. Therefore, whatever the judge said ... was more favorable to the defendant than he deserved and could not have prejudiced his position”); Commonwealth v. Toon, 55 Mass. App.Ct. 642, 773 N.E.2d 993, 998 (2002) (noting that “Whether an allegedly erroneous instruction on self-defense (and excessive force in self-defense) is prejudicial (or creates a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice) necessarily involves examining first whether self defense was raised sufficiently. If not, the defendant received more than he was entitled to”).
II.
As to the propriety of the supplemental jury instruction, I agree with the views expressed in the concurring opinion of Judge Wilner. The court’s response to the jury inquiry should have been that wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun without a permit is unlawful, that the defendant has not claimed that he had a permit, that it is not an issue in the case, and that the defendant is not required to produce or offer any evidence whether he had one or not.1
*655Ordinarily, it is within the discretion of the trial court as to how, and when, to respond to a note from the jury. It has been held, however, that it is reversible error “where a jury shows confusion about a central aspect of applicable law, and the general instruction did not provide the legal information needed, [and] ... the court does not respond to the jury’s note.” Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C.1987). See also United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301, 1308 (D.C.Cir.1975) (citing Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 11 (D.C.Cir.1957) (en banc) for the proposition that “when a jury shows confusion, a trial judge is under an obligation to respond and is not, in responding, bound by the standard instruction”); Wright, 250 F.2d at 11 (holding that the trial judge’s refusal to answer a juror’s question constituted reversible error, because “it is the duty of the judge to fill in the sketch, as may be appropriate on the basis of the evidence, to provide the jury with light and guidance in the performance of its difficult task”). The majority’s assertion that the discretion to give supplemental instructions “is only within the ambit of the trial judge’s discretion in the first instance if the supplemental instruction actually related to an issue presented at trial,” maj. op. at 641, is unsupported by any authority, is wrong, and is simply a bald assertion.
Judge Harrell has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion.

. The substance of an instruction as to who has the burden of persuasion on the issuance of a permit to carry or transport a firearm is best *655left to another day. That issue should be decided in a case in which it is raised properly, and then fully briefed and argued.