Court Opinion

ID: 9698573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:54:24.006296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.995799
License: Public Domain

*752Levin, J.
(concurring). I agree with the majority that the sentence credit statute1 does not require "that a defendant receive credit for time spent incarcerated in other jurisdictions, for offenses committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which he seeks such credit, from the time that a detainer or hold either was or could have been entered against him by authorities in the jurisdiction where the defendant is to be sentenced.”2 (Emphasis supplied.)
I also agree that this Court’s decision in People v Prieskorn, 424 Mich 327; 381 NW2d 646 (1985), supports that conclusion. There, as here, "[t]he issue presented for consideration is whether defendant is entitled to sentence credit in this case for time spent incarcerated under sentence for an unrelated offense committed while he was free on bond for the offense for which he now seeks sentence credit.” Id., p 330. (Emphasis supplied.) The Court held that Prieskorn was not entitled credit.
In a separate concurring opinion in Prieskorn, I said that I agreed "with the reasoning of the opinion insofar as it states that Prieskorn is not entitled to sentence credit for time served for an offense committed while he was free on bond: 'To attribute to the Legislature the intention that the defendant be given credit in this case for the fifty-one days served under the traffic sentence offense, committed while he was free on bond in this case, is to attribute to the Legislature an intent to afford a defendant a "free” misdemeanor — one for which no sentence of confinement need be or could be served.’ It is beyond the spirit and intendment of the sentence credit statute to grant credit on a felony sentence for time spent incarcerated for a *753ninety-day misdemeanor that the defendant could not have committed if he had not been free on bond.” Id., p 345.
The conclusion that sentence credit should not be granted for time served for an offense committed while the defendant is free on bond is supported by this Court’s decisions in People v Patterson, 392 Mich 83; 219 NW2d 31 (1974), and Brinson v Genesee Circuit Judge, 403 Mich 676; 272 NW2d 513 (1978).3
*754I wrote separately in Prieskorn to express my disagreement
with the opinion of the Court insofar as it seeks to construe the sentence credit statute as it has been applied by the Court of Appeals in factual situations not now presented or properly before us. It is not appropriate to seek to enunciate a rule of law, in the words of the opinion of the Court, to "be applied in the countless cases not yet litigated upon myriad factual scenarios yet to develop.”3 The common-law tradition, both in the development of the common law and in the construction of statutes, so many of which are elaborations of practices and rules developed at common law, is to decide only the case at hand.
We are not omniscient. We cannot appropriately, on the basis of the facts of this case, enunciate a rule applicable, again in the words of the opinion of the Court, "to cases presenting facts quite beyond our imagination today.”4
[Id., pp 345-346.]
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in the instant case is unpublished.4 This appeal, therefore, could appropriately be decided by an order reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals citing Prieskorn, Patterson, and Brinson. There is no need to repeat and possibly elaborate5 on the obiter dictum in the opinion of the Court in Prieskorn. Obiter dictum remains obiter dictum when repeated in a subsequent case where not necessary to decision.
Cavanagh and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J. ___

 MCL 769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2).

 Ante, p 734.

 In Patterson, the defendant stabbed another inmate in the prison where they were confined and was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment commencing at the expiration of the sentence he was serving at the time of the stabbing. A statute provides that the judge may, in his discretion, impose a consecutive sentence where the offense is committed while the offender is incarcerated in a penal institution. This Court held that the defendant was not entitled to credit on the sentence imposed for the offense committed in prison for the time spent in prison between his arraignment and conviction of that offense even though the sentence credit statute literally provides for credit in all cases where a person is "denied or unable to furnish bond for the offense of which he is convicted,” because to grant credit would defeat the purpose of the statute authorizing a trial judge to impose a consecutive sentence where the offense is committed while the defendant is in prison.
In Brinson, the defendant absconded while on bond awaiting trial on false pretense charges. He was arrested in Pennsylvania and spent thirty-eight days in Pennsylvania jails awaiting extradition. This Court held, pursuant to Patterson, that Brinson was not entitled to credit on the absconding sentence either for time spent in a Michigan jail after his extradition from Pennsylvania until his conviction on the false pretense charges or for time served following his conviction on the false pretense charges, but that he was entitled to credit for the thirty-eight days spent in Pennsylvania jails for which he had not received credit against the false pretenses sentences. This Court said:
"The statute mandates the grant of credit in appropriate circumstances and is to be read to benefit defendants, People v Havey, 11 Mich App 69, 82; 160 NW2d 629 (1968), unless the intent of a consecutive sentencing statute would be frustrated by such a reading, Patterson, supra.’’ [People v Prieskorn, 424 Mich 327, 351-353; 381 NW2d 646 (1985) (opinion of Levin, J.). Emphasis in original.]

 Ante, p 340.

 Ante, p 340.

 People v Adkins, unpublished opinion per curiam, decided December 2, 1987 (Docket No. 88132).

 I have not parsed the opinion of the Court in the instant case to determine whether there are elaborations.