Court Opinion

ID: 9905970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 17:10:13.98178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:01.723861
License: Public Domain

J-S35007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ROY MICHAEL HOGAN, JR.                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 5 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000616-2018,
                           CP-54-CR-0000617-2018

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                       FILED: NOVEMBER 30, 2023

       Roy Hogan appeals the judgment of sentence imposed by the Schuylkill

County Court of Common Pleas after a jury convicted him of two counts of

attempted murder, burglary, and related offenses at Criminal Docket CP-54-

CR-0616-2018 and criminal trespass at Criminal Docket CP-54-CR-0617-

2018. Hogan argues on appeal that the sentencing court erred by applying the

deadly weapon-used sentencing enhancement, as opposed to the deadly

weapon-possessed sentencing enhancement, to his burglary conviction at

docket number 0616. Both the sentencing court and the Commonwealth agree

with Hogan, as do we. We therefore vacate the judgment of sentence for the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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burglary conviction and remand for resentencing consistent with this

memorandum.

      The trial court provided a detailed recitation of the factual background

of this matter, but for purposes of this appeal, we recount only a general

summary of the relevant facts. On March 18, 2018, Hogan entered the

residence of his former girlfriend, Brook Ditzler, though Ditzler was not home.

When Ditzler arrived home later with her boyfriend, Michael Seltzer, and her

friends Andrew Matlock and Mallory Grieger, Ditzler found Hogan upstairs on

her bed with a knife. Ditzler called 911, but Hogan left the residence before

the police arrived.

      Ditzler, Seltzer, Matlock and Grieger went to sleep in Ditzler’s living

room. They awoke to find Hogan in the living room. An altercation ensued

between Matlock and Hogan, and Matlock was cut from his ear to his chin with

a knife and stabbed in the shoulder. Seltzer was also stabbed eight times.

After police once again arrived at the residence, Hogan ran out. He was

ultimately arrested and charged with a slew of offenses related to the incident,

including two counts of attempted murder, burglary, and possession of an

instrument of crime (“PIC”) at docket number 0616 and criminal trespass at

docket number 0617.

      The matters proceeded to a jury trial. Ditzler, Matlock, Seltzer and

Geiger all testified for the Commonwealth. Hogan testified in his own defense.

He stated that on March 18, 2018, he first went to Ditzler’s house and, without

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her permission, entered through her basement door, thinking she would be

home alone. See N.T., 2/11/2019, at 308-309. According to Hogan, he went

upstairs and fell asleep on Ditzler’s bed with a knife in his pocket. See id. at

309-310. He stated he knew Ditzler would call the police, and that he planned

to pull the knife out in the presence of the police and have the police shoot

him. See id. at 321.

      Hogan maintained that when Ditzler came home and woke him up, he

left the house. He testified he then entered Ditzler’s residence a second time

through an unlocked back door. See id. at 323. He recounted he still had the

knife in his pocket, but he essentially maintained that he used that knife in

self-defense. See id. at 324-328.

      The jury nonetheless found Hogan guilty of two counts of attempted

murder, burglary, and PIC, among other offenses, at docket number 0616. It

also found him guilty of criminal trespass at docket number 0617.

      The trial court sentenced Hogan to an aggregate term of 35 to 70 years’

imprisonment. Hogan ultimately filed a PCRA petition, arguing that his

sentence was illegal. The PCRA court agreed and ordered a new sentencing

hearing.

      The matter was reassigned to a different sentencing court due to the

trial judge’s retirement, and a new sentencing hearing was held on September

16, 2022. At the hearing, defense counsel essentially argued that the deadly

weapon-used enhancement provision was not applicable to either the burglary

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conviction at docket number 0616 or the criminal trespass conviction at docket

number 0617. The sentencing court agreed that only the deadly weapon-

possessed enhancement provision applied to the trespass conviction, and

sentenced Hogan to the standard range of three to six months for that

conviction. However, the court applied the deadly weapon-used enhancement

provision to Hogan’s burglary conviction, which prescribed a standard

sentencing guideline range of 40 to 54 months’ imprisonment. The court

sentenced Hogan to 54 to 108 months’ imprisonment for the burglary

conviction.

      The court also sentenced Hogan to 96 to 192 months’ imprisonment on

each of the two attempted murder convictions, to be served consecutively.

The court ordered the sentence on the burglary conviction to be served

concurrently to Hogan’s sentence for the second attempted murder conviction.

In total, the court sentenced Hogan to an aggregate term of imprisonment of

253 to 506 months.

      Hogan filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied in an order

entered on December 9, 2022. Hogan then filed a single notice of appeal listing

both criminal docket numbers in the caption. The court ordered Hogan to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. In the

statement, Hogan raised five alleged errors, including a claim that the

sentencing court erred in applying the deadly weapon enhancement to both

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the burglary conviction at docket number 0616 and the criminal trespass

conviction at docket number 0617.

      In its responsive opinion, the court disagreed with Hogan that it had

improperly applied the deadly weapon-possessed enhancement to the criminal

trespass conviction at docket number 0617. However, it agreed with Hogan

that it had erred by applying the deadly weapon-used enhancement to the

burglary conviction at docket number 0616. The sentencing court found that,

pursuant to this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 174 A.3d 7

(Pa. Super. 2017), the court should only have applied the deadly weapon-

possessed enhancement to the burglary conviction.

      On appeal, Hogan abandons his claim regarding the deadly weapon

enhancement as applied to his criminal trespass conviction at criminal docket

0617. He raises only one issue, namely, that the sentencing court erred by

applying the deadly weapon-used enhancement to the burglary conviction at

docket number 0616.

      Before we are able to reach the merits of Hogan’s sole issue on appeal,

we acknowledge, as an initial matter, that Hogan’s filing of a single notice of

appeal from an order involving two separate docket numbers implicates

Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), reversed in part by

Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2021). In Walker, our

Supreme Court held that appellants are required to file separate notices of

appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower

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court docket. See Walker, 185 A.3d at 976. Walker announced a prospective

bright-line rule that a failure to file separate notices of appeal in these

circumstances would result in the quashal of the appeal. See id. at 977.

     However, this Court carved out several exceptions to the rule announced

in Walker, one of which applies to this case. In Commonwealth v. Larkin,

this Court held that we would overlook the requirements of Walker and

decline to quash a single notice of appeal from an order resolving multiple

lower court docket matters where a breakdown occurs in the court system,

and a defendant is misinformed or misled regarding his appellate rights. See

Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 354 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc).

     Here, the December 9, 2022 order denying Hogan’s post-sentence

motion failed to provide notice to Hogan of his appellate rights in

contravention of Pa.R.Crim.P. 720 (B)(4). As we conclude this constitutes a

breakdown in the court system, we can proceed to the substance of Hogan’s

appeal pursuant to Larkin.

     Hogan maintains on appeal that the sentencing court properly applied

Tavarez and determined that it had erred by applying the deadly weapon-

used enhancement, rather than the deadly weapon-possessed enhancement,

to Hogan’s sentence for the burglary conviction. The Commonwealth concedes

Tavarez controls and mandates the conclusion advocated by Hogan. We

agree.

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      Under the deadly weapon enhancement provisions of the Sentencing

Guidelines, an enhancement “shall apply to each conviction offense for which

a deadly weapon is possessed or used.” 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(4). The

sentencing court may not disregard an applicable enhancement when

determining the appropriate sentencing ranges. See Tavarez, 174 A.3d at

10. Moreover, a sentencing court must always determine the correct starting

point for the sentencing range under the guidelines, and if it errs in doing so,

this Court will vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

See id. at 11.

      The deadly weapon-possessed enhancement provides that when a court

determines the offender possessed a deadly weapon during the commission

of   the   offense,   the    court   shall   consider   the   Deadly   Weapon

Enhancement/Possessed Matrix in Section 303.17(a). See 204 Pa. Code §

303.10(a)(1). Under Section 303.10(a)(1), an offender possesses a deadly

weapon if he has any of the listed weapons on his person or within his

immediate control. See id.

      Meanwhile, the deadly weapon-used enhancement provides that when

a court determines the offender used a deadly weapon during the commission

of the offense, the court shall consider the Deadly Weapon Enhancement/Used

Matrix in Section 303.17(b). See 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2). Under Section

303.10(a)(2), an offender uses a deadly weapon if the offender employs one

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of the listed weapons in a way that threatened or injured another individual.

See id.

      In Tavarez, the defendant, like Hogan here, complained that the

sentencing court erroneously applied the deadly weapon-used enhancement

to his burglary conviction because he had not used a deadly weapon to enter

the victims’ residence but rather, had only used the weapon once he

encountered the victims inside their residence.

      This Court agreed with Tavarez. In doing so, the Court noted that to

establish the use of a deadly weapon under the language of Section

303.10(a)(2), the record must show that the defendant used the weapon to

threaten or injure the victim while committing the particular offense. See

Tavarez, 174 A.3d at 11. The particular offense at issue in Tavarez was

burglary, which Tavarez explained is “complete at the moment of entry into

an occupied structure with the intent to commit a crime therein.” Id. at 12.

As such, “whatever felony is committed in the building broken into is separate

and distinct from the offense of breaking and entering into that [structure].”

Id. (citation omitted). Applying those principals to the facts at hand, the

Tavarez Court stated:

      We conclude that the record did not establish Tavarez’s “use” of a
      [deadly weapon] during the commission of the burglary under 204
      Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(2)… [T]he burglary was complete at the
      moment Tavarez unlawfully entered the residence with the intent
      to commit the crime of robbery therein. The facts placed on the
      record … established only that Tavarez possessed a [deadly
      weapon] when he entered the residence; there was no showing
      that he used the [deadly weapon] to gain entry into the residence

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      or to threaten the victims while entering the residence. Tavarez
      did not encounter the victims until he and his co-conspirators went
      upstairs to rob them. Thus, … the record does not support a
      finding that he employed the [deadly weapon] in a way that
      threatened or injured the victims during the commission of the
      burglary.

Id. at 13.

      The Tavarez court therefore determined that the sentencing court erred

by applying the deadly weapon-used enhancement rather than the deadly-

weapon-possessed     enhancement     and   vacated    Tavarez’s   judgment   of

sentence.

      Applying Tavarez to the facts here, the sentencing court stated:

      We have a similar factual scenario [to that in Tavarez] where
      Hogan testified that he intended to use the knife to commit suicide
      by cop, but did not actually employ the knife in a way that
      threatened or injured any of the victims during the commission of
      the burglary of Ditzler’s home. This court is of the opinion that we
      should have applied the “possession” enhancement rather than
      the “use” enhancement for the burglary based on the testimony
      and record.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/2023, at 19.

      The Commonwealth agrees, as do we, that pursuant to Tavarez, the

sentencing court erred by applying the deadly weapon-used enhancement

provision and the matter must once again be remanded for a new sentencing

hearing. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 3 (Hogan “did not employ the knife to

make entry into the home … [as he] encountered no resistance in his efforts

to enter the home. [The] facts are nearly identical [to] the facts in Tavarez

and are not distinguishable” and the sentencing court therefore erred in

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applying the deadly weapon-used enhancement as opposed to the deadly

weapon-possessed enhancement under Tavarez).

     Finally, we conclude that because the sentence for the burglary

conviction is entirely subsumed by the consecutive sentences for attempted

murder, vacation of the burglary sentence does not impact the trial court’s

sentencing scheme. We therefore vacate only the burglary sentence and

remand for resentencing consistent with this memorandum.

     Judgment of sentence vacated. Matter remanded for resentencing

consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2023

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