Court Opinion

ID: 9660610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:16:51.904404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.914772
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Agreeing with the ultimate decision of the Court, I write to explicate my reasons for concurring in its grant of relief.
In his application for writ of habeas corpus filed August 21,1987, applicant alleged that he “is illegally restrained of his liberty by virtue of his conviction ... on January 14,1987, of the felony offense of theft over $750.00, in Cause No. 48455.” He then recounted posttrial and appellate developments summarized at the outset in the opinion of the Court; he invoked certain *560rules of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure against the actions and omissions of the court of appeals. Finally, applicant asserted:
“Applicant is entitled to one appeal as of right, as mandated by the Supreme Court of the United States. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811] (1963). Further, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution mandate that Applicant receive effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right, and that, should an appeal be dismissed for failure to comply with a State Appellate Rule, such appeal must be remanded to the State Court of Appeals for a full and fair hearing of the merits of the appeal. Evitts v. Lucy [Lucey ], 469 U.S. 387 [, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821] (1986).”
Petition, at 5-6 (All emphasis throughout this opinion is mine unless otherwise indicated.).
The judge of the habeas court convened a hearing on the application September 10, 1987; the State appeared through counsel and evidence was taken.
In support of his application applicant submitted a posthearing brief directing attention to the opinion of this Court in Renier v. State, 734 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and pointing out that he was seeking an out of time appeal “so that he may have the appeal to which he is entitled as of right.” He discussed applicable authorities for granting an out of time appeal and that he is entitled to “one appeal as of right,” particularly Evitts v. Lucey, supra; Vicknair v. State, 702 S.W.2d 304 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1985), no PDR; Black v. State, 677 S.W.2d 150, at 154 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st] 1984) (effect of granting ha-beas relief because of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal is to set aside mandate of affirmance), reversed on other grounds, 739 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
Thus it is clear that applicant based his prayer for relief by way of granting an out of time appeal on the proposition that he suffered a dismissal of his initial appeal because of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The habeas court entered a written order finding, inter alia, that the court had jurisdiction and that applicant was entitled to the relief for which he prayed; accordingly, the court granted applicant an out of time appeal.
In Ex parte Renter, supra, confronting an applicant “who is at large but claims he may suffer ‘restraints’ from collateral consequences of a prior felony conviction,” the Court found such an applicant is not barred from seeking relief by way of habe-as corpus, viz:
“Accordingly, along the lines of Ex parte Crosley, [548 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1977)], we hold that the constitutional and statutory provisions combine to provide a procedure for seeking, and jurisdiction, power and authority in district courts under Article Y, § 8, to grant relief and failing there, for appeal to a court of appeals, subject to discretionary review by this Court.”
Id., at 353.
Today the Court applies that holding to an applicant who also is at large but claims that he is suffering “restraints” from consequences of being on probation following dismissal of an appeal challenging the order placing him on probation.
Under Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P., every defendant in any criminal action has a right of appeal under rules specified in Chapter Fortyfour, V.A.C.C.P. The State may not defeat that right where, e.g., appellate counsel is so ineffective that the purported appeal is dismissed. Evitts v. Lucey, supra.
A court with jurisdiction and power to determine an application for habeas corpus claiming denial of the valued constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal also possesses authority to sustain that claim and grant appropriate relief. A District Court finds all that in Article V, § 8. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Onion, 741 S.W.2d 433 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).*
*561For those reasons, I join the judgment of the Court.

 Whether the court of appeal correctly dismissed the "purported appeal,” as the Presiding Judge opines in his dissenting opinion, at 3, is irrelevant. And for Judge Teague colloquially to call *561this a "turf war,” concurring opinion, at 1, 2, is irreverent. Those kinds of implications only distract attention from the rather simple problem before the Court.
Dismissal of the "purported appeal" is a fait accompli, creating the status of "restraint” about which applicant complains and from which he seeks relief. To grant an out of time appeal does not impugn or entrench on prior exercise by the court of appeals of its jurisdiction, power and authority to order the dismissal; without at all faulting the court of appeals, it merely provides a remedy for a right denied by defaulting circumstances resulting in dismissal.
Paradoxically, the Presiding Judge concedes that applicant has a right of action via habeas corpus, but he insists, sans justification or explication, that “only this Court has the authority to grant relief to this petitioner [sic],” id., at 2. That suggests honoring some notion of "judicial hierarchy."
A proceeding pursuant to Article 11.07, §§ 2 and 3, aside, issuing the writ of habeas corpus to restore the right of appeal to one who lost it through procedural misadventure of counsel is not an exclusive province of any court, state or federal, in this State. Such is the imperative of The Great Writ.