Court Opinion

ID: 9965716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 14:02:20.086564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.410714
License: Public Domain

Rel: May 3, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

                   Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024
                                _________________________

                                         CR-2023-0278
                                   _________________________

                                 Deanta Antwon Lavender

                                                      v.

                                         State of Alabama

                       Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court
                                   (CC-20-1344)

McCOOL, Judge.

        Deanta Antwon Lavender appeals his convictions for murder, see §

13A-6-2, Ala. Code 1975; attempted murder, see § 13A-4-2 and § 13A-6-

2, Ala. Code 1975; and discharging a firearm into an unoccupied vehicle,

see § 13A-11-61, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced Lavender to
CR-2023-0278

life imprisonment for his murder and attempted-murder convictions and

sentenced him to 10 years' imprisonment for his discharging-a-firearm-

into-an-unoccupied-vehicle conviction. Those sentences are to run

concurrently.

                                 Facts

     In the early morning hours of July 5, 2020, Kevin Matthews was

shot and killed in the parking lot of an apartment complex in Tuscaloosa.

Three witnesses for the State -- Jarodrick Nelson, Jamarcus Shaw, and

Lavender's brother Antonio -- testified that they saw Lavender

repeatedly shoot Matthews. Nelson further testified that Lavender shot

him twice after shooting Matthews, and Shaw further testified that he

saw Lavender shoot at another person who was hiding behind an

unoccupied truck during the melee. The State's evidence indicated that

two of the shots Lavender fired at that person hit the unoccupied truck.

                               Discussion

     The only claim Lavender raises on appeal is that the trial court

erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal because, he says,

the State's evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. In

support of that claim, Lavender argues that the testimony of the three

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CR-2023-0278

eyewitnesses were "fraught with inconsistencies and should be

discounted," that neither Shaw nor Nelson identified him as the shooter

at the time of the offenses, that Antonio admitted on cross-examination

that he "was drunk and high" at the time of the offenses and that there

was "bad blood" between Lavender and him, and that "there was no

physical evidence connecting [him (Lavender)] to the shooting."

(Lavender's brief, p. 7.)

      In reviewing the sufficiency of the State's evidence, this Court

      " ' "must accept as true all evidence introduced by the State,
      accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and
      consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the
      prosecution." ' Ballenger v. State, 720 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala.
      Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485,
      488 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), aff'd, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985))."

Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 809 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).

      Section 13A-6-2(a)(1) provides that "[a] person commits the crime

of murder if[,] … [w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he or

she causes the death of that person or of another person."

      Section 13A-4-2(a) provides that "[a] person is guilty of an attempt

to commit a crime if, with the intent to commit a specific offense, he or

she does any overt act towards the commission of the offense."

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CR-2023-0278

     Section 13A-11-61(a) provides that "[n]o person shall shoot or

discharge a firearm, explosive or other weapon which discharges a

dangerous projectile into any occupied or unoccupied dwelling or building

or railroad locomotive or railroad car, aircraft, automobile, truck or

watercraft in this state."

     This Court has explained that " '[t]he testimony of an eyewitness,

standing alone, is sufficient to support a defendant's conviction.' " Yancey

v. State, 65 So. 3d 452, 473 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Lopez v.

State, 415 So. 2d 1204, 1206 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982)). Here, the State

presented three eyewitnesses who testified that they saw Lavender

repeatedly shoot Matthews, who died as a result of his gunshot wounds,

and Lavender's intent to kill Matthews could be inferred from his use of

a deadly weapon. Henderson v. State, 248 So. 3d 992, 1007 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2017). In addition, Nelson testified that Lavender shot him twice,

and, again, Lavender's intent to kill Nelson could be inferred from his use

of a deadly weapon. Id. Finally, Shaw testified that he saw Lavender

shoot at a person who was hiding behind an unoccupied truck, and the

State's evidence indicated that two of the shots Lavender fired at that

person hit the truck.

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CR-2023-0278

     The State's eyewitnesses clearly provided a sufficient basis upon

which to convict Lavender of the murder of Matthews, the attempted

murder of Nelson, and discharging a firearm into an unoccupied vehicle.

Thus, the trial court did not err by denying Lavender's motion for a

judgment of acquittal and submitting those charges to the jury. The

arguments Lavender makes -- that the State's eyewitnesses were not

credible and that there was no physical evidence to connect him to the

crimes -- are arguments that address the weight of the evidence, not its

sufficiency. See Harris v. State, [Ms. CR-2022-0934, Feb. 9, 2024] ___ So.

3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (noting that the defendant's arguments

regarding a witness's credibility and the lack of physical evidence

connecting him to the crimes were arguments that addressed the weight

of the evidence). To the extent Lavender has attempted to raise a weight-

of-the-evidence claim, he failed to preserve that claim for appellate

review because he did not raise it in a motion for a new trial. Adams v.

State, 336 So. 3d 673, 686 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).

     The only claim Lavender has raised on appeal lacks merit. Thus,

we affirm Lavender's convictions. However, we must remand this case

to the trial court for that court to correct a sentencing error. Neither

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CR-2023-0278

party raises an issue regarding Lavender's sentences, but it is well

settled   that   " '[m]atters   concerning   unauthorized   sentences   are

jurisdictional' " and that this Court therefore " 'may take notice of an

illegal sentence at any time.' "      Harris ___ So. 3d at ___ (quoting,

respectively, Hunt v. State, 659 So. 2d 998, 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994),

and Austin v. State, 864 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)).

     One of Lavender's convictions was for the offense of discharging a

firearm into an unoccupied vehicle, which is a Class C felony. § 13A-11-

61(c). At the time of Lavender's offenses, § 13A-5-6(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975,

provided that the sentence for a Class C felony had to be "not more than

10 years or less than 1 year and 1 day and must be in accordance with

subsection (b) of Section 15-18-8[, Ala. Code 1975,] unless sentencing is

pursuant to Section 13A-5-9[, Ala. Code 1975]," i.e., the Habitual Felony

Offender Act. At the time of Lavender's offenses, § 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code

1975, provided, in pertinent part:

           "Unless a defendant is sentenced to probation, drug
     court, or a pretrial diversion program, when a defendant is
     convicted of an offense that constitutes a Class C … felony
     offense and receives a sentence of not more than 15 years, the
     judge presiding over the case shall order that the convicted
     defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution,
     treatment institution, or community corrections program for
     a Class C felony offense … for a period not exceeding two years

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CR-2023-0278

     in cases where the imposed sentence is not more than 15
     years, and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence
     be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the
     contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for a
     period not exceeding three years and upon such terms as the
     court deems best." 1

(Emphasis added.)

     In short, then, at the time of Lavender's offenses,

     "§§ 13A-5-6(a)(3) and 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code 1975, d[id] not
     allow a trial court to impose a 'straight' sentence for a Class
     C felony when the Habitual Felony Offender Act does not
     apply. Instead, under §[§] 13A-5-6(a)(3) and 15-18-8(b), once
     the trial court impose[d] on a defendant a sentence length
     between 1 year and 1 day and 10 years, the trial court [had
     to] either:

           "(1) Sentence the defendant to probation, drug court, or
     a pretrial diversion program; or

          "(2) 'Split' the confinement portion of the defendant's
     sentence to a period not exceeding two years, suspend the
     remainder of the defendant's sentence, and impose a term of
     probation on the defendant that does not exceed three years.

           "Here, [Lavender] … was not sentenced under § 13A-5-
     9, Ala. Code 1975. Yet the trial court sentenced [Lavender] to

     1Effective July 1, 2023, the Alabama Legislature amended § 13A-5-

6(a)(3) and § 15-18-8. See Act No. 2023-461, Ala. Acts 2023. Under the
amended statutes, § 13A-5-6(a)(3) does not require that a sentence for a
Class C felony must be in accordance with § 15-18-8, and § 15-18-8 does
not require a trial court to split a sentence for a Class C felony. However,
the amended statutes do not apply retroactively to Lavender's 2020
offenses. Cosper v. State, [Ms. CR-2022-1168, Dec. 15, 2023] ___ So. 3d
___, ___ n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023).
                                     7
CR-2023-0278

     a 'straight' 10-year sentence in the Alabama Department of
     Corrections [for his Class C felony offense], which, as
     explained above, [was] impermissible under § 13A-5-6(a)(3),
     Ala. Code 1975[, at the time of Lavender's offenses]. Thus, we
     must remand this case to the trial court to impose a sentence
     on [Lavender] for his conviction for discharging a firearm into
     an unoccupied vehicle that complies with [the versions of] §§
     13A-5-6(a)(3) and 15-18-8(b) [that were in effect at the time of
     his offenses].

           "In so doing, however, we note that [Lavender's] 10-year
     sentence is valid; thus, the trial court cannot change the
     underlying sentence. See generally Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d
     106, 110 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (recognizing that, when the
     base sentence imposed by the trial court is valid, the trial
     court cannot alter it on remand)."

Born v. State, 331 So. 3d 626, 637-38 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (footnote and

citation to record omitted). Lavender's sentences of life imprisonment for

his murder and attempted-murder convictions are also valid and may not

be changed. The trial court shall take all necessary action to ensure that

the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court within 35 days from the

date of this opinion, and the return to remand shall include the transcript

of the new sentencing hearing and a copy of the new sentencing order.

                               Conclusion

     Lavender has not demonstrated that any reversible error occurred

in his trial.   Thus, we affirm Lavender's convictions.      However, we

remand the case to the trial court for that court to hold a new sentencing

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CR-2023-0278

hearing at which it imposes a sentence for Lavender's discharging-a-

firearm-into-an-unoccupied-vehicle conviction that complies with the

version of § 15-18-8(b) that was in effect at the time of his offenses.

     AFFIRMED        AS    TO   CONVICTIONS;         REMANDED         WITH

INSTRUCTIONS AS TO SENTENCING.

     Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.

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