Court Opinion

ID: 9563777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:46:54.69231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:04.497604
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the reversal of the trial court order, but strongly disagree with the manner in which the majority reach that result—especially their tacit and far from candid overmling of In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725 [157 Cal.Rptr. 383, 598 P.2d 36, 3 A.L.R.4th 1028], and their denial of needed protection to an entire class of children solely because custody was not originally established by judicial decree.
In Carney a unanimous court held that regardless of how custody was originally established, a child will not be removed from the custody of one parent and given to the other unless the noncustodial parent shows that material facts and circumstances occurring subsequently are of a kind to render a change essential or at least expedient for the welfare of the child. (Id., at pp. 730-731.) Put simply, the rule requires the proof of two ultimate facts: (1) a change in circumstances and (2) the present necessity for a change in custody.
In its two requirements the changed-circumstances rule serves two distinct objectives: the finality of judgments and the best interests of the child—in particular, his well recognized right to stability and continuity. (Ibid.; Connolly v. Connolly (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 433, 436 [29 Cal.Rptr. 616].) In *547the general common law the rule appears to have its historical roots in principles of res judicata. (Sharp, Modification of Agreement-Based Custody Decrees: Unitary or Dual Standard? (1982) 68 Va.L.Rev. 1263, 1264, fn. 9 [hereafter Sharp].) But in California it has for many years been understood to have as its primary and indeed controlling purpose the furtherance of the child’s best interests. (See Crater v. Crater (1902) 135 Cal. 633, 634-635 [67 P. 1049]; Carney, supra, at pp. 730-731; Washburn v. Washburn (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 581, 587 [122 P.2d 96].)
The majority’s reading of Carney as not extending the protection of the changed-circumstances rule to so-called “de facto” as well as “de jure” custody is sheer sophistry. In Carney we expressly held that the rule applied “regardless of how custody was originally decided upon . . . .” (24 Cal.3d at p. 731, fn. 4.) We imposed on the noncustodial mother the burden of proving that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. (Id. at p. 731.) And we concluded that she had not carried her burden. (Id. at p. 740.) It is difficult for me to conceive how we could have established the point more clearly. While I welcome the majority’s generous quotations from the text of the Carney opinion, family law would have been better served if they had followed the principle declared therein.
More troubling, the majority’s tacit overruling of Carney and its consequent limitation of the changed-circumstances rule to cases in which custody was originally established by judicial decree have untoward consequences and are unsound.
First, the limited application of the changed-circumstances rule that the majority adopt is in conflict with the primary purpose of the rule. The child whose custody was established by means other than judicial decree has the same need for and right to stability and continuity—and accordingly the same entitlement to the protection the rule is intended to provide—as the child whose custody was established by judicial decree. Because it is not unreasonable to assume that the children of two-parent and relatively more affluent families are disproportionately represented in the class of children whose custody was originally established by judicial decree, the majority’s holding, I fear, will effectively deny needed protection disproportionately to children of single-parent and less affluent families.
Second, most states—including, until today, California—appear to require “changed circumstances” to modify custody regardless of how custody was originally established. (See Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at pp. 1265, 1268-1271, and cases and other authorities cited.) The rationale for this position was explained in Carney, “regardless of how custody was originally decided upon, after the child has lived in one parent’s home for a significant period *548it surely remains ‘undesirable’ to uproot him from his ‘established mode of living,’ and a substantial change in his circumstances should ordinarily be required to justify that result.” (24 Cal.3d at p. 731, fn. 4; accord, Sharp, supra, at p. 1270.) That the cases—with the notable exception of Carney— involve a custody decree is plainly fortuitous: the fundamental question they all address is not whether to modify a decree but whether to change custody. No state, so far as I have ascertained, declines to apply the changed-circumstances rule when custody was not originally established by judicial decree. The majority, alone in the country, take that retrogressive step.
The majority claim that the Carney rule is “unsound, unworkable, and potentially harmful.” Their argument in support, however, is hollow.
Their first point is that the Carney rule “is unsound because, absent some prior determination of the child’s best interests as of some past date, the courts have no warrant to disregard facts bearing upon that issue merely because such facts do not constitute changed circumstances.” But if the Carney rule is unsound for this reason, so is their newly created rule: even in cases in which custody is established by judicial decree, such a determination is seldom made.
In virtually all cases, it appears, the parents decide on custody in a negotiated settlement and thus do not dispute the question at a hearing. (See Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at pp. 1263-1264; accord, Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 950, 951, fn. 3 [hereafter Mnookin & Kornhauser]; Kirshner, Child Custody Determination—A Better Way! (1978-1979) 17 J. Fam. L. 275, 286; Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy (1975) 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226, 232, fn. 22.) And in these cases “courts usually ‘rubber-stamp’ such agreements . . . .” (Sharp, supra, at p. 1279; see Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra, at p. 955, fn. 22; Kirshner, supra, at p. 286; Hansen, The Role and Rights of Children in Divorce Actions (1966) 6 J. Fam. L. 1, 2.) The percentage of cases in which a trial court initially determines custody in a contested manner is minuscule.
But the fact remains that even when custody is not adjudicated and indeed even when it is not established by judicial decree, we may nevertheless presume that such custody is in the child’s best interest and as a result require the noncustodial parent to show that a material change of circumstances has subsequently occurred.
Such a presumption is justified when custody is established by agreement. “First, most parents genuinely love their children, and it is reasonable to *549assume that the children’s welfare is a vital consideration in the parents’ decision to resolve their dispute by agreement. . . . Second, parents have a better informational base upon which to make a decision about custody. The adversarial process is an inadequate means to assemble sufficient ‘facts’ to resolve custodial disputes satisfactorily. Third, it is difficult to protect a child from the painful pull of divided loyalties when his parents fail to agree. Parental agreements help to preserve an atmosphere of at least superficial peace between parents and thereby facilitate a much easier and more meaningful future relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent.” (Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at p. 1280, fn. omitted.)
Such a presumption is also justified when, as here, custody is established by default rather than by decision. First, as between the parent who undertakes to provide care and the parent who fails or refuses to do so, custody with the former must be deemed to serve the child’s best interests. Thus, it is altogether reasonable to require the latter to demonstrate changed circumstances should he subsequently attempt to obtain custody. Second, as Dr. Andrew Watson, psychiatrist and professor of law, has observed, stability is “practically the principal element in raising children” and “a child can handle almost anything better than he can handle instability.” (Proceedings of Special Com. on U. Marriage and Divorce Act, Nat. Conf. of Comrs. on U. State Laws 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16, 1968); accord, Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws (1969) 22 Vand.L.Rev. 1207, 1208-1209; see Watson, Psychiatry for Lawyers (1968) pp. 159,197; Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at pp. 1280-1281; see also Clark, Law of Domestic Relations (1968) § 11.5 at p. 326 [“if [a child] is continually being transferred from one parent to the other ... he may be a great deal worse off than if left with one parent, even though as an original proposition some better provision could have been made for him”].)
The majority’s second point is that the Carney rule “is unworkable because, . . . absent such a prior determination the courts have no established basis on which they can assess the significance of any change.” But “Identification of a base line against which to measure a subsequent change of conditions is not as difficult as the [majority] suggest. The simple fact is that a demonstration of changed conditions does not normally require a preexisting record of all the facts that prevailed at the time [custody was originally established] .... [1Í] It is plausible therefore to suggest that the . . . concern about the necessity for a prior record is somewhat of a red herring.” (Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at pp. 1285, 1287.)
The majority’s final point is that the Carney rule “is potentially harmful because it could compel the court to make an award inconsistent with the *550child’s best interest.” But the concern that application of the changed-circumstances rule in cases in which custody was not judicially established might leave a court helpless to intervene where there was no change in circumstances but the welfare of the child required a change in custody does not justify a limitation of the rule such as the majority have adopted. To begin with, the rule could theoretically leave the court helpless in any case in which it is applied—whether or not custody was originally established by judicial decree. The concern, therefore, is rooted not in the use of the rule in any particular class of cases but rather in a mechanical and formalistic use of the rule itself. In any event, “Nothing in the case law of the majority states, or in any of the literature in this area, suggests such a rigid application of the changed circumstances standard. . . . Clearly, courts can easily accommodate the ‘worst case’ hypothetical within existing law.” (Sharp, supra, 68 Va.L.Rev. at p. 1288, fn. omitted.)
We ourselves have recognized that such an accommodation is possible. In Munson v. Munson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 659, 666 [166 P.2d 268], we stated: “This court has recognized [citation] that generally ‘until some change of circumstances arises which makes a modification of the former order of custody advisable from the point of view of the welfare of the child, the court will give effect to the former order and will refuse to make any modification of such order,’ but that there may be cases ‘in which, despite the fact that there was apparently no change of circumstances, nevertheless, the welfare of the child might require that the previous order of custody be changed’ . . . .”
In any case in which it is used, the changed-circumstances rule, if applied mechanically, might serve to lock a child into a bad situation. To prevent such a result—the goal the majority strive for but miss—I would adopt, in the proper case, the following limited exception: when the noncustodial parent shows that custody has remained unchanged but inadequate since its inception, he need prove only that a change is essential or at least expedient for the welfare of the child in order to obtain custody. Such an exception is of course consistent with the primary purpose of the rule, furthering as it does the child’s best interests. It is also compatible with the flexible nature of the changed-circumstance rule. (See Foster v. Foster (1937) 8 Cal.2d 719, 728 [68 P.2d 719]; accord, Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 666.)1
*551In sum, the Camey rule rightly protects all children against needless change in custody and against the threat of such change. Whatever harm a mechanical application of the rule poses in unusual circumstances—which are not present here—can readily be prevented by permitting a pragmatic exception. The rule therefore should not be discarded; it should simply be modified if and when the need arises.
Lucas, J., concurred.

More radical would be a modification of the rule itself—the removal of the first or “changed-circumstances” requirement. Such a modification would evidently be proper when the rule is applied to cases in which custody was not originally established by judicial decree: the first requirement, which reflects principles of res judicata and serves the finality of judgments, is strictly inapplicable to such cases. This modification, however, would also be proper even where custody was originally so established. In practice the first requirement *551has no independent effect and thus may be eliminated without adverse consequences. Where there is neither (1) change in circumstances . nor (2) present necessity to change custody for the child’s welfare, the renewal of litigation is as effectively deterred by the second requirement as by the first. Where, by contrast, there is no change in circumstances but change in custody is essential, under longstanding precedents the first requirement may simply be dispensed with. (See Munson v. Munson, supra, 27 Cal.2d at pp. 666-667; Foster v. Foster, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 728; Bogardus v. Bogardus (1929) 102 Cal.App. 503, 506 [283 P. 127].)