Court Opinion

ID: 9916008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 15:13:09.619846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:23:32.827184
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and White
              Argued at Richmond, Virginia

              JEFFREY ANTONIO BARLOW
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.      Record No. 1133-22-2                                   JUDGE CLIFFORD L. ATHEY, JR.
                                                                                   JANUARY 9, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
                                               Phillip L. Hairston, Judge

                               Abigail L. Paules (David Whaley LLC, on briefs), for appellant.

                               J. Brady Hess, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General; Leanna C. Minix, Assistant Attorney General, on
                               brief), for appellee.

                      Jeffrey Antonio Barlow (“Barlow”) pled guilty in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond

              (“trial court”) to one count of possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of Code

              § 18.2-248(C) and one count of failure to appear in violation of Code § 19.2-128. His guilty pleas

              were expressly conditioned on the outcome of his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his

              suppression motion. Barlow assigns error to the trial court’s determinations that: 1) there existed

              reasonable articulable suspicion that Barlow was engaging in criminal activity justifying the seizure

              of his person; 2) there existed a reasonable articulable suspicion that Barlow was armed and

              dangerous justifying a pat-down search of his person; and 3) a strip search that violated Barlow’s

              Fourth Amendment rights did not occur. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the

              trial court.

                      *
                          This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                                           I. BACKGROUND

       On October 3, 2019, Richmond police officers responded to an anonymous 911 call

concerning drug activity and firearm possession. No information identifying the caller was either

provided by the caller or transmitted to the officers by the police dispatcher. The initial computer

automatic dispatch (“CAD”) report transmitted to the officers by the dispatcher indicated that a

male in a white Nissan sedan possessed drugs and a firearm and was currently present at a specific

address in the City of Richmond. The CAD report also alleged that there were four subjects

standing near the white Nissan sedan, which was parked next to the building located at the specified

address. A black male wearing a white t-shirt “around his head” was also identified as being near

the Nissan.

       An updated CAD report indicating a “drug-armed” and “drug/narcotics offense,” including a

black male last seen in a white shirt who “has a gun on his hip,” was received ten minutes after the

initial report. The updated report indicated that the suspect’s name was Jeffrey and that there was a

firearm inside the white Nissan sedan.

       Based on the officers’ “understanding [of] how the call-taker inputs that [information] into

[the police] computer,” they concluded there were two black males and possibly two other

individuals near a white Nissan sedan parked at the reported address. The officers further surmised

that the individual with the t-shirt wrapped around his head was named Jeffrey. In addition, the

officers interpreted the updated CAD report as identifying a second black man located near the

Nissan and indicating that one of the individuals present there had a firearm on his hip.

       Officer Levi Manns (“Officer Manns”) and Officer Seth Layton (“Officer Layton”)

subsequently arrived at the scene in their police cruiser, in uniform, armed, and displaying their

badges of authority. The white Nissan sedan was parked where indicated in the CAD report, and a

no trespassing sign was posted on the wall of the building adjacent to where the Nissan was parked.

                                                 -2-
Upon law enforcement’s arrival, two black males dressed in white shirts were standing near the

white Nissan sedan. The officers later learned that the black male also wearing a white shirt on his

head was Barlow and the second black male was James Taylor (“Taylor”). Initially, as the officers

were driving toward the Nissan, the two men “immediately started walking toward[] the left . . . of

the building[,] toward the backside of that building.” When the officers exited their police cruiser to

approach the men, they stopped, whereupon Officer Manns asked, “What’s up y’all? Y’all live

over here?” Officer Manns then approached Barlow while Officer Layton approached Taylor. At

this point, Barlow was smoking a cigar and holding one cell phone to his ear and another cell phone

in his hand.

       Officer Layton observed a bulge at Taylor’s waistline that he believed to be a concealed

firearm. Officer Layton then asked Taylor if he possessed a firearm, which Taylor denied. Taylor

then began moving his left hand toward the bulge on his waistline, and in response, Officer Layton

grabbed Taylor’s wrists, turned him around, conducted a pat-down search, and then found and

seized a handgun concealed under the bulge. At the same time, Officer Manns seized Barlow’s

phone and turned him around. After Officer Manns saw Officer Layton find the firearm on Taylor,

Officer Manns conducted a pat-down search of Barlow. When Officer Manns felt a bulge under

Barlow’s right pant leg, he asked what the item was. Barlow answered that it was marijuana, which

was subsequently seized.1 Officer Manns’s body-worn camera captured these interactions.2

       The recording shows Barlow and Taylor standing on the sidewalk as Officer Manns exits his

police cruiser. Officer Manns then approaches Barlow while Officer Layton is simultaneously

approaching Taylor. Officer Layton appears to be looking downward in the direction of Taylor’s

       1
         At the time of the encounter and seizure, possession of marijuana in the Commonwealth
was illegal. See Code § 18.2-250.1 (2019).
       2
           The recording was made part of the record at the hearing on Barlow’s motion to suppress.
                                                 -3-
right hip. Officer Layton first grabs Taylor’s right hand, then his left wrist, as Taylor begins moving

his left hand toward his right hip. Officer Manns then seizes Barlow’s cell phone (the seizure

occurs out of frame), with the phone first becoming visible on the video in Officer Manns’s hand.

Taylor is then spun around by Officer Layton as Officer Manns also begins turning Barlow around

by his wrist. Officer Manns then tells Barlow, “hey,” and “chill,” several times before finally

directing Barlow to “spread your legs for me.” Officer Layton and Taylor then briefly come back

into frame with a handgun tucked into Taylor’s waistband becoming visible. Officer Layton then

proceeds to seize the gun from Taylor’s waistband. Officer Manns also appears, visibly searching

Barlow’s person and discovering marijuana.

       Barlow was subsequently arrested and placed in the back of a transport van. The driver of

the transport van advised law enforcement that she saw Barlow “digging inside of his waistband

while his hands were behind his back” and “digging in the back of his pants.” As a result, officers

removed Barlow from the van. Since a portion of Barlow’s stomach and the top of his underwear

were visible, the officers formed a line to screen Barlow from the view of bystanders while Sergeant

Scarborough searched underneath the back of Barlow’s pants.

       Sergeant Scarborough testified that he initially intended to pull the top of Barlow’s pants

back to permit access to look in the rear of his pants and that his purpose in doing so was to ensure

there were no weapons or dangerous substances hidden under the pants. He further testified that he

did not intend to pull the pants down or otherwise remove them and expose Barlow’s buttocks. He

also testified that, upon looking down the back of Barlow’s pants, he saw what appeared to be part

of a plastic bag. Sergeant Scarborough’s body camera video of this search was made part of the

record and clearly shows that a significant portion of Barlow’s buttocks was visible to Sergeant

Scarborough when he pulled Barlow’s pants and underwear away from his body. He further

testified that when he attempted to seize the bag, Barlow began to struggle and attempted to grab his

                                                 -4-
pants with his cuffed hands. In the course of the ensuing struggle, which involved Barlow jumping

and smacking the bag out of Scarborough’s hands, officers attempted to control Barlow by placing

him on the ground. However, Barlow continued to struggle, and his pants dropped lower during the

struggle exposing the top of his buttocks. On cross-examination, Sergeant Scarborough agreed that

Barlow’s buttocks were visible before Barlow began resisting. Subsequent testing indicated the

baggies retrieved from the back of Barlow’s pants contained cocaine and heroin.

        Barlow was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and

possession of heroin with intent to distribute, both in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C).3 Prior to

trial, Barlow moved to suppress the evidence against him, alleging that the evidence was collected

in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights since there had been no reasonable articulable

suspicion of criminal activity justifying either the seizure or the initial search. Barlow also

contended that he had been subjected to an unconstitutional strip search when Sergeant Scarborough

searched under his pants and exposed his buttocks.

        The trial court held a hearing on the suppression motion before denying the motion by

written order accompanied by a letter opinion. The trial court explicitly found that “[a]s Officer

Layton approached . . . Taylor, he immediately noticed through . . . Taylor’s t-shirt and just above

his waistband, a bulge not consistent with human anatomy.” “Officer Layton asked . . . Taylor if he

had a firearm” and “Taylor responded ‘no’ and began to reach for the firearm. Upon seeing . . .

Taylor reach toward his waistband, Officer Layton grabbed . . . Taylor’s arm, removed the firearm

from underneath his t-shirt and conducted a pat down of his person.” The trial court continued,

“[a]round the same time, Officer Manns, while observing Officer Layton’s interaction with . . .

Taylor, asked . . . Barlow if he had identification.” (Emphasis added). “Officer Manns then

        3
         Barlow was also charged with two counts of felony failure to appear in violation of Code
§ 19.2-128.
                                             -5-
removed a cellphone from . . . Barlow’s hand and placed it on the hood of the vehicle beside him.

Officer Manns then began to pat down . . . Barlow. During the pat down, Officer Manns felt a

bulge inside of . . . Barlow’s pants and asked . . . Barlow what was on his person,” to which

“Barlow responded[,] ‘weed.’”

        The trial court concluded that Barlow was seized when “Officer Manns removed . . .

Barlow’s cellphone and conducted a pat down of his person.” The trial court further disagreed with

Barlow’s contention that Officer Manns lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to search and seize

him. The trial court further concluded that the anonymous tip was sufficiently corroborated to

support a search and seizure because “Officer Layton upon approaching . . . Taylor immediately

observed what the Officer believed to be a firearm. This was consistent with and further

corroborated the information provided by the anonymous caller. Almost simultaneously, Officer

Manns seized [Barlow] in order to check him for weapons.” The court held that “[o]n the evidence

presented,” it was “also satisfied that the information provided by the anonymous caller to the

Officers was sufficiently corroborated.” Finally, the trial court also concluded that “Barlow was not

subjected to a strip-search.”

        Barlow subsequently entered a guilty plea conditioned upon an appeal of the trial court’s

denial of his motion to suppress.4 This appeal followed.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

                                       A. Standard of Review

        “Under our standard of review of the denial of a motion to suppress, the burden is on the

appellant to demonstrate reversible error.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 548, 555 (2008)

        4
          The sentencing order contains a clerical error; it incorrectly categorizes Barlow’s
possession of heroin with intent to distribute as a violation of Code § 18.2-246(C). Such conduct
is a violation of Code § 18.2-248(C), and it is listed as such on the indictment, sentencing
guidelines, and the plea agreement, which was signed by Barlow, Barlow’s counsel, the
Commonwealth, and the trial court.
                                                 -6-
(quoting Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 272 (2004)). “On appeal of a ruling on a

motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this

case the Commonwealth, granting to the evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible

therefrom.” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 412 (2016) (citing Jackson v.

Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672 (2004)). “[W]e are bound by the trial court’s findings of

historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to

the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.” Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198 (1977) (en banc)).

“However, we review de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards, such as

whether the police had reasonable suspicion or probable cause for a search or seizure.” Id. (citing

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). The “review of the existence of . . . reasonable

suspicion involves application of an objective rather than a subjective standard.” Id. (citing Whren

v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996)).

     B. The seizure and search of Barlow was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

        Barlow first argues that Officer Manns did not have reasonable articulable suspicion that he

was engaged in criminal activity justifying his seizure. Further, Barlow argues that even if Officer

Manns did possess reasonable articulable suspicion justifying a seizure of his person, Officer Manns

lacked any reason to believe he was armed and dangerous, and thus Officer Manns’s patting him

down was unconstitutional. We disagree.

        “Police officers are free to engage in consensual encounters with citizens, indeed, it is

difficult to envision their ability to carry out their duties if that were not the case.” Jones, 52

Va. App. at 555 (quoting Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 169 (2008)). “The

consensual encounter becomes a seizure . . . ‘when the officer, by means of physical force or show

of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’” Id. at 556-57 (quoting

                                                   -7-
Malbrough, 275 Va. at 169). “A person is ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if,

under the circumstances presented, a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave the

scene of an encounter with the police.” Id. at 557 (quoting McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483,

490 (2001)).

        Here, the trial court found that Barlow was seized when “Officer Manns removed . . .

Barlow’s cellphone and conducted a pat down of his person.” At oral argument, the parties agreed

that Officer Manns seized Barlow when he took his cell phone from his hand. We too find that

Barlow would not have considered himself free to disengage from Office Manns or leave the scene

after Officer Manns took his cell phone. The question remains whether that seizure was permissible

under the Fourth Amendment.

        “A police officer may elevate a consensual encounter with a citizen into an investigatory

detention only if the officer has a ‘reasonable suspicion supported by articulate facts that criminal

activity “may be afoot,” even if the officer lacks probable cause.’” Jones, 52 Va. App. at 559

(quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). “Reasonable suspicion is a ‘particularized

and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.” Id. at 559-60 (quoting

Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696). “In determining ‘whether a police officer had a reasonable suspicion to

justify the seizure, we must consider the “totality of the circumstances and view those facts

objectively through the eyes of a reasonable police officer with the knowledge, training and

experience of the investigating officer.”’” Id. at 560 (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40

Va. App. 412, 421-22 (2003)). Further, “[r]easonableness is judged from the perspective of a

reasonable officer on the scene allowing for the need of split-second decisions and without regard to

the officer’s intent or motivation.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727 (1995) (citing

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1985)).

                                                 -8-
       “[A] law enforcement officer is justified in relying upon information from an anonymous

tipster in order to briefly detain a suspect for inquiry and investigation only if the anonymous

information is ‘sufficiently corroborated’ to provide it some indicia of reliability.” McGee, 25

Va. App. at 202 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)). “[A]lthough the police do

not have to verify every detail provided by an anonymous informant, ‘[s]ignificant aspects of the

informer’s information must be independently corroborated.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Gregory v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 100, 106 (1996)). An anonymous tip’s accurate

description of a subject’s appearance and location, standing alone, is not the sort of information,

even when independently corroborated, that can render a seizure reasonable. Florida v. J.L., 529

U.S. 266, 272 (2000). Instead:

               An accurate description of a subject’s readily observable location and
               appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the
               police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to
               accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has
               knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion
               here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality,
               not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.

Id. Generally, an anonymous tip must provide “predictive information” that allows law

enforcement “to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility,” for that tip, when corroborated, to

provide reasonable articulable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop. Id. at 271; see also

Jackson, 267 Va. at 678.

       At the moment Barlow was seized, Officer Manns was aware of the information related by

the tip, the presence of two men near the Nissan, and the first few seconds of Officer Layton’s

interaction with Taylor. That interaction, up to the instant Barlow was seized, consisted of Officer

Layton looking in the direction of Taylor’s right hip or side and asking Taylor if he had a firearm.

Officer Layton, after receiving Taylor’s answer in the negative, grabbed Taylor’s right wrist. The

sequence concluded when Taylor reached across toward his right hip with his left hand and Officer

                                                   -9-
Layton grabbed Taylor’s left hand and began to turn Taylor around. Although Officer Manns likely

could not see the bulge on Taylor’s hip, he could observe Taylor and Officer Layton’s interaction.

He heard Officer Layton ask Taylor if he had a firearm and observed that despite the negative

answer, Taylor began to reach for his waistline, prompting Officer Layton to seize Taylor.5 Upon

seeing Taylor reach for his waistband when asked if he was carrying a firearm, and then seeing

Officer Layton focus upon something on Taylor’s right hip, it was reasonable for Officer Manns to

seize Barlow to investigate whether he too was involved in criminal activity.

       Officer Manns had more than an unspecified hunch of criminal activity. Rather, the

particular fact was that Barlow’s companion reached for his waistband when asked if he was

carrying a gun and Officer Layton, an experienced police officer, responded by physically seizing

and frisking him. Taylor’s reaching for his waistband when asked by a police officer if he was

carrying a gun, created a reasonable belief that Taylor was armed and engaged in criminal behavior

as reported by the anonymous tip and thus corroborated the anonymous tip. Thus, Officer Manns

had reasonable articulable suspicion to briefly detain Barlow at that moment and investigate his

involvement in criminal activity as well as to ensure the safety of himself and Officer Layton.

While an anonymous tipster’s mere physical description of suspects is not enough to create

       5
          The legality of the seizure and subsequent search of Taylor is not an issue in this appeal.
See, e.g., DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 589 (1987) (noting that defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his companion’s “person” and therefore “lack[ed]
standing to contest the arguably illegal search” of the companion).
        That being said, this Court has recognized that a defendant’s reaching towards an area
where a weapon might be secreted after being instructed by law enforcement to keep his hands
visible can create reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to justify a Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), stop. See Jones, 52 Va. App. at 560-62. Reaching towards a bulge on the waistline in
response to an inquiry regarding a firearm is closely analogous. We note this not because the
legality of Taylor’s seizure presently concerns us, but because the reasonable conclusion that
Taylor was armed is relevant to Officer Manns’s formation of reasonable articulable suspicion
that Barlow was engaged in criminal activity. This is because Taylor’s being armed corroborates
the anonymous tip, and until that tip was corroborated, Officer Manns could not seize or search
Barlow. However, once the tip was corroborated, Officer Manns could seize Barlow to
investigate the allegations.
                                               - 10 -
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, Taylor’s actions reasonably created the belief

that he was armed, thus corroborating the tip.

          Under the totality of the circumstances, once Officer Manns had corroborated criminal

details of the anonymous tip, he not only had reasonable articulable suspicion to seize Barlow, but

also to pat him down for weapons.6 See generally McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 554

(2008) (recognizing that reasonable suspicion to conduct a weapons frisk must involve suspicion

that the particular person frisked may be armed). This is so for two primary reasons. First, the tip

also reported drug activity, and once the accuracy of the tip was corroborated with regard to the

firearm in Taylor’s possession, the report of drug activity could also be considered by Officer

Manns in evaluating whether or not Barlow might be armed and dangerous. The connection

between drug transactions and guns is well recognized. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692,

701 n.3 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous

when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction . . . .” (quoting United

States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005))). Further, beyond these general

concerns, the tip was ambiguous as to whether there were one or two guns present, and once the

tip proved credible with regard to one gun, it was reasonable for Officer Manns to ensure safety

by checking that Barlow was not also carrying a firearm. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

denying Barlow’s motion to suppress the evidence on grounds of an illegal seizure and pat-down

search.

          6
          We note that Officer Manns did not escalate his seizure of Barlow into a pat-down search
until after he observed Officer Layton and an assisting officer recover the handgun from Taylor.
Thus, while a reasonable officer could believe that Taylor was armed based upon his reaching
toward his waistline in response to being asked if he was armed, Officer Manns had this reasonable
belief confirmed by discovery of the actual firearm; Manns did not pat down Barlow until all chance
of mistake was eliminated, despite the standard of reasonable articulable suspicion not requiring that
degree of certainty.
                                                - 11 -
                    C. Any strip search of Barlow was justified and reasonable.

        Barlow contends that he was subjected to an unjustified strip search. We assume without

deciding that he was subjected to a strip search but find that any such search was reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment.

        We find that the best and narrowest grounds upon which we can render a decision is to

conclude that even if Barlow was subjected to a strip search, the search was justified; thus we

affirm the decision of the trial court despite relying upon a different reason than that upon which

the trial court based its decision. See Vandyke v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 723, 731 (2020).

“Under the right-result-different-reason principle, an appellate court ‘do[es] not hesitate, in a

proper case, where the correct conclusion has been reached but [a different] reason [is] given, to

sustain the result [on an alternative] ground.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Banks v.

Commonwealth, 280 Va. 612, 617 (2010)). This principle is applicable when two conditions are

met: (1) the record demonstrates that “all evidence necessary to” support the “alternate ground

was before the trial court,” and (2) such evidence was “undisputed” or any dispute was resolved

by the factfinder. Id. at 732. Here the record contains sufficient facts regarding the search for us

to conclude that even if it did rise to the level of a strip search, it was justified.

        While “[a] lawful custodial arrest authorizes a full search of the person[,]” a “strip

search[] require[s] special justification since they are peculiarly intrusive.” Taylor v.

Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 638, 642 (1998). “In each case we must balance the need for the

particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). “Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in

which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”

Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).

                                                  - 12 -
       Here, the special justification for the search was Barlow’s reaching into his pants. It was

perfectly reasonable for officers to believe Barlow possessed either contraband or a weapon. He

had already been found to be in possession of marijuana, and the tip had indicated the presence

of guns and drugs. Officers were justified in believing a search of the back of Barlow’s pants

was necessary to negate any danger to themselves or Barlow. Weighed against this

particularized need is the minimally intrusive nature of the search. This was at most only a strip

search, not a visual body cavity search nor a manual body cavity search. Even considered as a

strip search, this search was much less invasive than a full disrobing. Officers merely pulled

Barlow’s waistband down and back from his body revealing part of his buttocks. Neither his

genitals nor his anus were exposed. Barlow alleges that the place of the search was

inappropriate, but the record clearly indicates that despite the search being conducted on a public

street with several people in the area, police officers formed a line between Barlow and the

bystanders to shield him from view. Thus, we find nothing unreasonable about the place and

manner of the search.

       Because there was a specific justified need to search the back of Barlow’s clothing, the

intrusion was minimal relative to the need for the search, and because the time, place, and

manner of the search were reasonable, we find the strip search did not constitute a violation of

Barlow’s Fourth Amendment rights.

                                          III. CONCLUSION

       Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the search and seizure of

Barlow was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, and because the search of the back of

Barlow’s pants was reasonable in time, place, and manner in response to a specific justified need,

we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand this matter to the trial court solely

                                               - 13 -
for the limited purpose of correcting the sentencing order to reflect that Barlow was convicted for

possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C).

                                                                             Affirmed and remanded.

                                                - 14 -