Court Opinion

ID: 9645224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:16:52.011927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:25.403399
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Justice,
dissenting.
I feel that we erred in reversing the judgment of the trial court; consequently, I respectfully dissent from the order overruling the motions for rehearing of the defendants.
As noted in the original opinion, plaintiffs did not carry their burden of proof of procuring favorable answers to the special issues submitting strict liability in tort. We overruled and I concurred all of plaintiffs’ complaints except that which denied them a dual submission — on the same facts — of breach of an implied warranty in contract. As to the latter, we reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a new trial.
I adopt the language of Justice Pope in his “concurring” opinion in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320, 333 (Tex.1978):
“If this is, as the majority says, a tort case, then why is it being remanded for trial as a contract case? If it is a strict liability case, why is it remanded for retrial as a case for breach of an implied warranty? What the majority is really saying is that it is unimportant whether the plaintiff’s action is one in tort or contract. Whatever the case might be, the plaintiff can try it once, lose it, and then start over in a new trial. The ruling is basically unfair and affords a plaintiff two separate trials on the same set of facts.”
The plaintiffs had a shot at defendants under the strict liability theory with the relaxed standard of producing cause instead of the more onerous proximate cause issue. They avoided all the pitfalls accompanying submission under the implied warranty theory. See Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. §§ 2.313-2.315 (1968); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc., 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex.1978).
While I have not found a Texas case precisely in point, I note that the Court has discussed the possibility of conflict in the causation findings under the two theories. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, supra (572 S.W.2d at 326).
Defendants have called to our attention several out-of-state cases, noted in the margin,* which have, in effect, denied the dual submission. After my review of the authorities, I conclude that the trial court was correct in permitting only the single submission of the liability, issue. Under no circumstances have the plaintiffs established reversible error under Tex.R.Civ.P. 434.
I would sustain Ciba-Geigy’s second assignment in its motion for rehearing which was adopted by the other remaining defendant. I concur in the remainder of the *391original opinion but would affirm the judgment of the trial court for the reasons herein set forth.

 Defendants cite, inter alia, the following cases in support of their contention: Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440, 443 (1974); Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis.2d 628, 273 N.W.2d 233, 241 (1979); Hawk-eye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382 (Iowa 1972); Sansing v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 354 So.2d 895, 897 (Fla.App.1978).