Court Opinion

ID: 9373336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:16.742965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.967430
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BETTIE M. FORD,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-0831-16-0647-I-1

                  v.

     OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: October 11, 2022
       MANAGEMENT,
                   Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Bettie M. Ford, Washington, D.C., pro se.

           Karla W. Yeakle, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed the final decision of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
     denying her request for a full Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) survivor
     annuity. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
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     review, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the Washington
     Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant’s late husband retired from Federal service under CSRS,
     effective April 27, 2007. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 48. He submitted
     Standard Form 2801-2 (SF-2801-2), a Spouse’s Consent to Survivor Election,
     with his application for retirement.    Id. at 45.   On the SF-2801-2, a person
     purporting to be the appellant consented to a partial survivor annuity equal to
     55% of $3,090.81 per year. IAF, Tab 5 at 45, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID) at 2.
     The appellant’s husband died on March 1, 2015, and the appellant submitted an
     application for death benefits. IAF, Tab 5 at 15; ID at 2. OPM awarded the
     appellant a partial survivor annuity in the amount of $161.00 per month. ID at 2.
     The appellant submitted a request for reconsideration, claiming that her late
     husband filled out the SF-2801-2 in a hurry, and he mistakenly elected as an
     annual partial survivor annuity the monthly amount that he was receiving at that
     time. IAF, Tab 5 at 14. She also contended that her late husband died suddenly,
     without getting his affairs in order, and he did not inten d for her to receive only
     $161.00 per month. Id. at 13. The appellant further asserted that the signature on
     the notarized Spouse’s Consent to Survivor Election form was not hers. Id. at 14,
     45.
¶3         OPM responded by informing the appellant that the monthl y computed rate
     of her survivor annuity was correct based on the election made by her late
     husband when he retired.     Id. at 6, 9.   OPM stated that it had no reason to
     question the validity of the appellant’s notarized signature, attesting that she
     freely and irrevocably consented to her late husband’s election of a partial
     survivor annuity. Id. at 7. OPM also observed that her late husband’s annuity
     commenced on May 1, 2007, and therefore he had until December 1, 2008, to
     increase her survivor election but did not do so. Id. OPM further stated that it
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     had no administrative discretion in this matter and denied the appellant’s request
     for reconsideration in a final decision issued on April 28, 2016. Id. at 6-8.
¶4         The appellant filed the instant appeal with the Board, challenging OPM’s
     final decision. IAF, Tab 1. On appeal, the appellant repeated the same arguments
     that she raised to OPM. IAF, Tab 5 at 3-4, Tab 10 at 3. She did not request a
     hearing. Based on the written record, the administrative judg e issued an initial
     decision affirming OPM’s final decision. ID at 4. He found that the appellant
     failed to prove by preponderant evidence that her husband elected a full survivor
     annuity and that the agency demonstrated that she consented to a partial
     survivor’s annuity. Id. at 3-4.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, reiterating the arguments she
     made before the administrative judge and OPM. Petition for Review File, Tab 1
     at 1-2. She reasserts that the signature on the notarized form was not hers and
     that her late husband mistakenly elected as her annual annuity the amount of his
     monthly annuity. Id. The appellant asks the Board to compare her signature in
     the appeal file to the notarized signature on the SF-2801-2 and see that the
     signatures do not match because she cannot afford a handwriting expert or a
     lawyer. 2 Id. at 2. The appellant also reasserts that she would never have agreed
     to receive only $161.00 per month because she cannot survive on this amount. Id.
     The appellant further states that her husband wanted more for her, and he always
     provided for his family but he made a mistake. Id.

                                          ANALYSIS
¶6         Under the CSRS, the surviving spouse of a retired Federal employee is
     entitled to an annuity equal to 55% of the retiree’s annuity unless the survivor
     consented in writing to receive no such annuity or a reduced annuity at the time

     2
       On appeal, the appellant provided examples of her signature on photocopies of her
     driver’s license, her Social Security card, a lease form, and a tax record. IAF, Tab 10
     at 3-9.
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     of the employee’s retirement. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8339(j)(1), 8341(b)(1); Hathaway v.
     Office of Personnel Management, 118 M.S.P.R. 678, ¶ 7 (2012); 5 C.F.R.
     § 831.614.    Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8339(j)(1), the election must be made in
     accordance with the requirements that OPM prescribes by regulation and that the
     election is irrevocable. OPM’s regulations provide, in pertinent part, that “[a]
     married employee may not elect . . . a partially reduced annuity . . . without the
     consent of the current spouse,” 5 C.F.R. § 831.614(a), which must be filed on a
     form prescribed by OPM, 5 C.F.R. § 831.614(b). The form prescribed by OPM
     “require[s] that a notary public or other official authorized to administer oaths
     certify that the current spouse presented identification, gave consent, signed or
     marked the form, and acknowledged that the consent was given fre ely in the
     notary’s or official’s presence.” IAF, Tab 5 at 45; 5 C.F.R. § 831.614(c). The
     burden of proving entitlement to a survivor annuity is on the applicant for
     benefits. Cheeseman v. Office of Personnel Management, 791 F.2d 138, 140-41
     (Fed. Cir. 1986).
¶7        There is only one dispute of material fact in this appeal, namely whether the
     signature appearing on the SF-2801-2 Spouse’s Consent to Survivor Election is
     genuine.     The administrative judge found, and we agree, that the signature
     appearing on the SF-2801-2 does not appear to be identical to the appellant’s
     signature as it appears on various other documents in the record. ID at 3; IAF,
     Tab 1 at 7, Tab 5 at 13, 21, 23, 45, Tab 10. Nevertheless, we also agree that these
     signatures are not so different that a layperson could say with any confidence that
     they were made by different people. ID at 3-4. Furthermore, we observe that the
     signature on the SF-2801-2 was notarized by one Sham Robertson and that the
     notarization of a signature creates a strong but rebuttable presumption of validity.
¶8        The Board is not bound, but may be guided by the Federal Rules of
     Evidence.     Social Security Administration v. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 10
     (2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 526 (Fed. Cir. 2011).             Under Federal Rule of
     Evidence 302, “[i]n a civil case, state law governs the effect of a presumption
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     regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.” In
     this case, the SF-2801-2 reflects that the notarial act occurred in the District of
     Columbia and was made by a notary commissioned under the laws of the District.
     IAF, Tab 5 at 45.     We therefore find that the effect of the notarization is
     determined under the laws of the District of Columbia.               See Butler v.
     Encyclopedia Brittanica, Inc., 41 F.3d 285, 295 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
     state law to determine the effect of the notarization of a signature on an Empl oyee
     Retirement Income Security Act spousal waiver form).             Under District of
     Columbia law, “to overcome the presumption arising from [the notary’s]
     certificate there must be proof of gross concurrent mistake or fraud, through
     strong and disinterested evidence.” Lewis v. Estate of Lewis, 193 A.3d 139, 144
     (D.C. 2018) (quoting Marden v. Hopkins, 47 App. D.C. 202, 206-07 (D.C. 1918)).
¶9         Although we agree with the administrative judge that the existing record
     does not contain sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed validity created by the
     notarization, ID at 4, we find that, in the interest of justice, the appeal should be
     remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, we find that the appellant was
     not fully apprised of the presumption created by the notarization or the type of
     evidence that might be sufficient to overcome it. Consequently, she may not have
     fully appreciated the importance of retaining a handwriting expert or requesting a
     hearing during which she would have the opportunity to testify as to genuineness
     of the signature on the SF-2801-2 or subpoena the notary or any disinterested
     witness to testify. Because this pro se appellant was not fully apprised of her
     burden on the dispositive issue and because the instant appeal concerns an
     application for civil service retirement benefits, see Irvine v. Office of Personnel
     Management, 83 M.S.P.R. 643, ¶ 9 n.1 (1999) (finding that the interest in
     reaching the correct result warranted some deviation from the strict adv ersarial
     model of adjudication in an OPM benefits case), w e remand the appeal to the
     Washington Regional Office to give the appellant an additional opportunity to
     prove her claim in light of this Order.
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                                           ORDER
¶10         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.
      On remand, the appellant will be afforded an opportunity to rebut the presumption
      of validity created by the notarization, including an additional opportunity to
      elect a hearing if she so chooses.

      FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                              Jennifer Everling
                                              Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.