Court Opinion

ID: 9948984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 16:00:55.234285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:26.565340
License: Public Domain

23-542
     Scuderi-Hunter v. Merklen

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                        SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 8th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6                RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 7                MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8                ALISON J. NATHAN,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   __________________________________________
11   Dana Scuderi-Hunter,
12
13                               Plaintiff-Appellant,
14
15                     v.                                                  23-542
16
17   Amy B. Merklen, in her official capacity as the
18   Delaware County Attorney, Tina B. Mole, in her
19   official capacity as Chairperson of the Delaware
20   County Board of Supervisors, The Delaware
21   County Board of Supervisors, The County of
22   Delaware,
23
24                     Defendants-Appellees.
25   ___________________________________________
26
27   FOR APPELLANT:                                     RONALD G. DUNN, Gleason, Dunn, Walsh & O’Shea,
28                                                      Albany, NY.
29
30   FOR APPELLEES:                                     GIANCARLO FACCIPONTE (Frank W. Miller, on the
31                                                      brief), Hancock Estabrook LLP, Syracuse, NY.
32
 1          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

 2   New York (Kahn, J.).

 3          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 4   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 5          Appellant Dana Scuderi-Hunter was the Delaware County Commissioner of Social

 6   Services. In her capacity as Commissioner, Scuderi-Hunter testified in a family-court proceeding

 7   involving placement of a child in her custody who was under probation supervision, in which she

 8   advocated for the child’s placement in an alternative foster care setting. The Department of

 9   Probation took a different position, opining that the child should remain in secure detention. The

10   family court decided the child should be placed in supervised foster care.

11          Not long after the proceeding, Defendants Amy B. Merklen, the Delaware County

12   Attorney, and Tina B. Mole, Chairperson of the Delaware County Board of Supervisors, sent a

13   letter to Scuderi-Hunter, reprimanding her for providing testimony that conflicted with the

14   Probation Department’s testimony. Scuderi-Hunter responded with her own letter, accusing

15   Merklen of unethical conduct in the family-court proceeding. Scuderi-Hunter was placed on paid

16   leave of absence and given an opportunity to resign, which she declined. The County then

17   initiated an investigation into various allegations of misconduct by Scuderi-Hunter. A hearing

18   was held on Scuderi-Hunter’s conduct; the hearing officer found the evidence supported the

19   charges and recommended that Scuderi-Hunter be terminated. The Delaware County Board of

20   Supervisors adopted most of the misconduct findings and terminated Scuderi-Hunter’s

                                                     2
 1   employment; in doing so, however, it expressly declined to rely on Scuderi-Hunter’s family court

 2   testimony in reaching its decision.

 3          Scuderi-Hunter commenced an Article 78 proceeding in the New York Supreme Court,

 4   seeking review of the Board’s decision.        The proceeding was transferred to the Appellate

 5   Division, Third Department, which confirmed the Board’s determination to terminate Scuderi-

 6   Hunter. The Third Department concluded that Scuderi-Hunter’s role in the family court hearings

 7   could not have “serve[d] as the basis for any finding of misconduct” based on the Board’s

 8   disclaimer. See Scuderi-Hunter v. Cnty. of Delaware, 163 N.Y.S.3d 664, 667 (N.Y. App. Div.

 9   2022). It also noted that, in any event, Scuderi-Hunter’s testimony would not have constituted a

10   breach of loyalty under state law. Id. But the Third Department nevertheless found “substantial

11   evidence in the record to sustain other misconduct findings made by the Hearing Officer” and

12   upheld Scuderi-Hunter’s termination as not “so disproportionate to the charged offenses as to

13   shock one’s sense of fairness.” Id. at 671, 673 (quotation marks omitted). Scuderi-Hunter then

14   sued in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, bringing claims of retaliation for her constitutionally

15   protected testimony in the family-court proceeding and statements made in her letter against

16   Merklen. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss under the doctrine of collateral

17   estoppel. Scuderi-Hunter now appeals. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

18   facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

19          “We review the district court’s dismissal of [an] action on collateral estoppel grounds de

20   novo.” Johnston v. Arbitrium (Cayman Islands) Handels AG, 198 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1999).

21          “Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars ‘successive litigation of an

22   issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to [a]

                                                       3
 1   prior judgment.’” Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 6 F.4th 361, 374 (2d Cir. 2021). “[A] federal court

 2   may be bound to recognize the claim- and issue-preclusive effects of a state-court judgment even

 3   if there is jurisdiction to hear the merits of the claim, and the claim is otherwise properly

 4   presented.” McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). “In

 5   determining whether claim or issue preclusion applies, our inquiry is governed by New York state

 6   law.” Id.

 7           “Under New York law, issue preclusion will apply only if ‘(1) the issue in question was

 8   actually and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, and (2) the party against whom [issue

 9   preclusion] is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first proceeding.’”

10   Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 94 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, Defendants have

11   the “burden of showing that the issues are identical and were necessarily decided in the prior

12   action,” while Scuderi-Hunter bears “the burden of showing that the prior action did not afford a

13   full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues.” Proctor v. LeClaire, 715 F.3d 402, 414 (2d Cir.

14   2013) (quoting Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 1996)).

15           Scuderi-Hunter’s claims of First Amendment retaliation are barred by collateral estoppel.

16   Scuderi-Hunter argued before the Third Department that she had been unconstitutionally fired in

17   retaliation for exercise of her First Amendment rights. And while the Third Department did not

18   specifically address this argument, it stated at the end of its opinion that it had “considered

19   [Scuderi-Hunter’s] remaining contentions and [found] them to be unavailing.” Scuderi-Hunter,

20   163 N.Y.S.3d at 673. This decided the issue of whether Scuderi-Hunter’s termination was in

21   retaliation for constitutionally protected speech, and she is precluded by collateral estoppel from

22   relitigating the issue. See Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 350 (1999).

                                                        4
1    Even though the Third Department did not discuss Scuderi-Hunter’s retaliation claim, “[t]he prior

2    decision of the issue need not have been explicit . . . [i]f by necessary implication it is contained

 3   in that which has been explicitly decided.” Postlewaite v. McGraw-Hill, 333 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir.

 4   2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 5          We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

 6   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court granting Defendants’ motion to

 7   dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds is AFFIRMED.

 8
 9                                                 FOR THE COURT:
10                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
11

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