Court Opinion

ID: 9845702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:26:32.269578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:18.816993
License: Public Domain

Pope, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree that the evidence of the independent offense in this case was harmless error but for a reason different than that relied upon in the majority opinion. For an independent offense to be admissible, the evidence must show “a sufficient connection or similarity between *285the independent offense or act and the crime charged so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter.” (Emphasis supplied.) Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642 (2) (b) (409 SE2d 649) (1991). “The test of admissibility of evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant is not the number of similarities between the two incidents. Rather, such evidence may be admitted if it is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that (the defendant) committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. . . .” (Emphasis supplied; citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 203 Ga. App. 3, 4 (416 SE2d 129) (1992).
The majority opinion focuses only on the lack of similarity between the two offenses but does not address the issue of the connection between the defendant’s aggravated assault of Harold Hall, at issue in this case, and the independent act of defendant’s beating his wife. The evidence shows the independent act involving defendant’s wife, like the assault at issue in this trial, arose out of defendant’s belief that Hall was having an affair with his wife. Thus, the independent act clearly is connected to the offense at issue in this case and is relevant to show plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. Dissimilar but connected acts have frequently been held admissible to prove motive for the act at issue in the trial. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. 457, 458 (2) (396 SE2d 888) (1990) (in which evidence that defendant was a drug dealer and had sold drugs to the victim was relevant to prove motive for killing the victim); Armfield v. State, 259 Ga. 43, 44 (2) (376 SE2d 369) (1989) (in which evidence of prior criminal charges for selling drugs was admissible to show motive for the murder of an undercover informant with the drug-suppression team); Tucker v. State, 249 Ga. 323, 329 (6) (290 SE2d 97) (1982) (in which evidence concerning the defendant’s prior illicit sexual relationship with the murder victim was admissible to show motive or intent). Likewise, in this case, the defendant’s beating of his wife because of his belief she was having an affair with the victim of the assault at issue in this case is dissimilar, but connected, to the crime charged and is admissible to show plan, bent of mind and course of conduct.
At the hearing on the admissibility of the independent offense held prior to the commencement of the trial, the State neglected to prove the connection between the beating of defendant’s wife and the assault of the victim. No evidence was presented that both offenses arose out of defendant’s belief that his wife and the victim were having an affair. Evidence of the connection was presented at trial, however, before the indictment containing defendant’s guilty plea was introduced into evidence when defendant’s wife testified defendant beat her after discovering she had called the victim on the telephone. Moreover, the defendant testified and admitted that he struck his wife after discovering a tape of the wife’s telephone conversation with *286the victim in which she told him she loved him. Thus, even though no connection between the two offenses was shown at the hearing on admissibility as required by Williams and the trial court erred in ruling the evidence to be admissible at the conclusion of the hearing, the required connection was established at trial and the admission of the evidence, even if erroneous, was harmless.
Decided February 5, 1993.
Xavier C. Dicks, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Vivian D. Hoard, Sylvia A. Martin, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.