Court Opinion

ID: 9734413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:34:13.315557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:10.056408
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Acting P. J.
By information filed on July 14, 1967, defendant was charged in two counts with the commission of two murders, in violation of Penal Code section 187, and he pleaded not guilty. On November 27, 1967, the *878ease was called for trial and a jury trial was waived. By stipulation, the cause was submitted on the testimony contained in the transcript of the preliminary hearing, with each side reserving the right to offer additional evidence, and all stipulations entered into at the preliminary hearing were .deemed entered into for purposes of the trial. It was further stipulated that a part of the testimony given at the preliminary hearing (pages 117 through 184 of the clerk’s transcript) was not to be considered by the court. On December 6, 1967, the court found defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on both counts. Defendant was then sentenced to state prison for the term of- his natural life, and for purposes of sentence, count II was merged with count I. This is an appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The facts relating to the commission of the crimes which resulted in defendant’s conviction need not be discussed.  The sole issue to be considered on-this appeal is whether the admission made by defendant and tape-recorded during the course of police interrogations conducted on August 7 and August 8, .1967 were admissible.
Defendant was arrested at 4 p.m. on August 7, 1967, and taken to' the University detective bureau interrogation room for questioning concerning the murders with which he was subsequently charged and of which he was convicted. At the time he was taken into custody, the arresting officer advised defendant’s mother that an attorney should be obtained for defendant. At the outset, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], defendant was advised of his constitutional rights, and when asked if he wanted an attorney present during the interrogation, he said that he did.1 The police then informed defendant *879that an attorney from the public defender’s office would not be available until the next morning at 8 a.m. After defendant was told that no attorney would be available until the next morning, defendant agreed to be questioned by the officers. The interrogation was then resumed. The next morning, August 8, 1967, at approximately 10 or 11a.m., the police again interrogated defendant without further Miranda warn*880ing. During this investigation, defendant made significant incriminating admissions. No attorney was provided defend-ant at this time, though defendant had been told that counsel would be available at that time. No one told defendant he could make a phone call either to an attorney or to his mother. (People v. Johnson, 70 Cal.2d 469, 474 [74 Cal.Rptr. 889, 450 P.2d 265].) Defendant’s extrajudicial conversations with the police on the night of August 7 and on the morning of August 8 were admitted as evidence at the trial.
The facts of this ease are directly in line with the case of People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580], where the court, in reversing the conviction, stated (pp. 535-536) : “In the recent ease of People v. Fioritto (1968) 68 Cal.2d 714 [68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625], we emphasized that ‘A principal objective of [the Miranda] decision was to establish safeguards that would liberate courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences, psychological or -physical, had been employed to secure admissions or confessions.’ (68 Cal.2d at p. 717.) We then went on to indicate that this objective imposed upon us a constitutional responsibility to insure that extrajudicial statements of criminal defendants not be admitted at trial unless the full range of ‘protective devices’ [footnote reference omitted] prescribed by Miranda was in operation at the time when such statements were obtained. [¶] One of the primary ‘protective devices’ envisioned by Miranda is that requiring that custodial interrogation wholly cease when the suspect indicates in any manner that he wishes to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. A suspect may indicate such a wish in many ways. He may, as in Fioritto, refuse to sign a waiver of his constitutional rights; he may simply refuse to continue an interrogation already in progress; or he may, as in the instant case, ask for an attorney. ‘ Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.’ (Italics added.) (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 474 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723].) [¶]... Clearly defendant request manifests a desire to have the assistance of his attorney at the earliest possible moment. This, under Miranda, is an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege—and therefore ‘the interrogation must *881cease until an attorney is present.’ (384 U.S. at p. 474 [16 L.Ed.2d at p.723].)”
It seems beyond question that under the circumstances here present there existed a psychological persuasion at the time defendant, on the evening of August 7, consented to make a statement in the absence of an attorney. And, while it is true that the trial court meticulously stated its disbelief of defendant’s testimony as to why he agreed to make a statement, the intangible pressure condemned in Miranda remained. In People v. Hamilton, 268 Cal.App.2d 393-394 [74 Cal.Rptr. 29], the court considered the problem of a defendant first requesting an attorney and then agreeing to speak in the absence of such safeguard. There, the court stated: “The officers took defendant to an interrogation room and placed him under arrest. Deputy Sipe advised defendant of his constitutional rights by reading from a printed card containing what was described as the standard Miranda formula (Miranda v. Arizona, supra). He was asked whether he understood those rights and whether, having them in mind, he wished to talk to the officers. Defendant replied that he understood his rights as enumerated, and that he wanted a lawyer.
“Deputy Sipe then advised defendant that since he requested a lawyer, the officers could not talk to him at all, that ‘it just cut us off from having any conversation with him.’ Officer Sipe correctly analyzed the situation, but he nevertheless told defendant that the officers were of the opinion ‘that he had come to the Sheriff’s Office to clear a Charles McGriff of the charges that was [sic] against him, and to admit some burglaries that were committed in the Oildale area. ’ Officer Sipe testified that defendant then said he would talk to them. Sipe reread the Miranda rights from the card; defendant again said he understood them and that he would talk to them. After interrogation, estimated variously between one and two hours, the officers obtained a confession from defendant. . . .
“Viewing the evidence most favorably to respondent, continued questioning by the officers after defendant told them he wanted an attorney runs afoul of Miranda as explicated in Fioritto. While it is true, as the Attorney General points out, the interrogation by Deputy Sipe after defendant announced he wanted an attorney was not directly accusatory, nevertheless the officer’s leading and suggestive statements constituted psychological persuasion of the kind proscribed by the court in Miranda.
*882“. . . [I] t is just such tactics that are condemned in the language of Miranda, at page 1627: ‘ Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ’ In Fioritto the court gave this language strict and literal interpretation, characterizing it as ‘the didactic language of the United States Supreme Court, ’ and observed that such language ‘shows no disposition to permit subsequent interrogation in the absence of counsel even if authorities believe there has been a change of circumstances.’ (P.719).
‘ ‘ Since the officers continued to question defendant after he demanded an attorney, we are compelled, under the authority of Miranda and Fioritto, to hold the confession of defendant inadmissible. ’ ’
In the present case, defendant made the request to have the assistance of counsel immediately prior to the interrogation. This is all that is required to put a halt to custodial interrogation.2 The fact that defendant later agreed to be questioned by police does not negate his earlier assertion of his Miranda rights if his consent to be interrogated was upon the premise that no attorney would be made available to him for some 15 hours.
We also recognize that there is no requirement in Miranda which compels police officers to shut their ears or refuse to participate in general conversation volunteered by a defendant, but a fair reading of the record before us does not comport with the conclusion that the statements made by defendant were volunteered. The statements were given in the setting and form of an interrogation. As stated in People v. Fioritto, supra, 68 Cal.2d 714, 719: “We do not, of course, *883disapprove of the use of statements, whether admissions or confessions, voluntarily initiated by a suspect. Such statements have been repeatedly sanctioned in the decisions of this court (see e.g., People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555]), and are also expressly authorized in the Miranda opinion. ’ ’
The protective statement elicited by the sergeant from defendant in his effort to make effective the waiver of presence of an attorney was not nearly as strong as that in People v. Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d 469, 474, where the declarations of waiver were held to be ineffective.
The defendant’s extrajudicial statements.were erroneously admitted. The weapons involved in the crimes were found as the result of those statements, and therefore should have been suppressed as evidence.
The judgment is reversed.

 Questions by Officer Philip Alexander and answers by defendant, as testified by Officer Alexander:
‘ ‘ Question. That you have a right to speak with an attorney and have the attorney present during this questioning, do you understand that?
“Answer. Yes
“Question. That if you cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for you without charge before questioning, do you understand that?
“Answer. Yes
“Question. Now, do you wish to make a statement at this time regarding this double homicide case?
“Answer. Yes, I do.
“Question. All right. Do you understand your rights?
“Answer. Yes.
“Question. Do you wish to give up your rights and make a statement?
“Answer. I don’t understand you.
“Question. Do you wish to make a statement?
“Answer. Yes, I do.
*879“ Question. Giving up your rights to have an attorney present?
“Answer. I would like one present but since you say it [sic] isn’t one present, how long will it take to get an attorney present?
“Question. Well, we’ll have to find that out. Do you want an attorney present during this questioning session?
“Answer. Yes, I would.
“Question. All right. Fine.’’
Questions by the deputy district attorney and answers by Officer Roy C. Barclay:
“Q And do you recall if there was a statement made by you or by Sergeant Alexander to the effect that you want to see the defendant?
“A Yes. As I recall, I requested that he bring the defendant to me and I would talk with him.
“Q And for what purpose?
“The Court: When you say ‘5:00 o’clock,’ do you mean 5:00 p.m. [the time that Sergeant Alexander came to Lieutenant Barclay with this problem] ?
“The Witness: Yes, sir.
“The Court: Very Well.’’ [Resumption of questions by deputy district attorney]
‘ ‘ Q Could you please explain to us your purpose- in asking Sergeant Alexander to bring the defendant to you at this time?
“A Well, my purpose at the time was to explain to the—Mr. White [defendant] the availability of the Public Defender’s Office to represent him.
“I believe I explained to him that due to the hour of the day, that a Public Defender would not be available until 8:00 o’clock the following morning.
“Q Was there any further conversation along the lines of the defendant either himself or through some other person securing a private attorney?
“A I asked him if—oh, with regards to a private attorney-I believe he said something to the effect that his mother might possibly contact or be able to provide an attorney later.
“But at that particular time he had no attorney in mind, and this is when I asked him if he wished the services of a Public Defender’s Office.
“Q And what did the defendant say in this regard?
“A He stated that he would desire this.
“Q And was there some further conversation between you and the defendant or between Sergeant Alexander and the defendant in your presence?
“A Yes. I at that time informed him, as I stated previously, that it was possible to obtain the Public Defender for him. However, it wouldn’t be until 8:00 o’clock the following morning.
“Q And did the defendant respond to this?
“A Yes. He was silent for a few moments. Then he said, ‘Well, I don’t want to wait that long. I’d like to get this done tonight,’ or words to that effect, as I recall them.
“Q And did you make any reply to that?
“A I turned him back over to Sergeant Alexander at that time, as I recall. ’ ’

‘ ‘ Thus, while Miranda (id. at pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 722-723] ) dictates that if the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, the case draws a distinction between questions relating to a defendant’s understanding of his rights or waiver of them, on the one hand, and interrogation, developing the facts under investigation, on the other.
“By definition, ‘to interrogate’ is ‘to question typically with formality, command, and thoroughness for full information and circumstantial detail,’ and ‘interrogation’ is ‘the act of interrogating.’ (Webster’s Third New Int. Dictionary, p. 1182.)
“This appears from the direction given in Miranda, at page 485 [16 L.Ed.2d at p. 730], approving the E.B.I. practice set forth in a quoted letter: ‘When the person who has been warned of his right to counsel decides that he wishes to consult with counsel before making a statement, the interview is terminated at that point. ... If he is indecisive in his request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive counsel. ’ ’ (People v. Smith, 270 Cal.App.2d 715, 722-723 [76 Cal.Rptr. 53].)