Court Opinion

ID: 9587532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:19.677377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:35.067706
License: Public Domain

Townsend, J.,
concurring specially.  Enlarging slightly upon the first division of the opinion, the contention of the plaintiff in error is that the policy of insurance was void because of the following material misrepresentations: viz., (a) That plaintiff had no insurable interest because there was outstanding an unreported lien in the amount of $900, and (b) the plaintiff misrepresented the manner in which the purchase price of the automobile was arrived at (as shown by the conditional-sale contract) to make it appear that his equity in the automobile was greater than in fact it was. I think these contentions, under this evidence, are unauthorized as a matter of law because (a) the evidence, including the documents prepared at the time of sale, demand a finding that the $900 note was not a lien on the automobile in question but was a straight note, and (b) the sale contract correctly describes the 1955 8 cylinder Bel Air Tudor *16automobile and shows a “total time price” of $2727.92 and a “cash sale delivered price” of $2519.25; that the seller received $210.93 in cash and that the seller gave a, credit of $660.59 for the 1955 truck traded in on the purchase price. These figures constitute the contract between seller and buyer, and as to the latter they must be taken as correct. The seller, in the “dealer’s work sheet” showed he had arrived at this price by giving trade-in credits of $660.59 and! $210.93, whereas he showed on the car invoice figures representing total charges and credits in a different manner, by taking the dealer’s list price of $1866.00, adding thereto freight, extra equipment, and two unpaid balances on the truck traded in of $510.93 and $1578.23 to arrive at a total debit of $4381.81, and balanced this with the cash received of $210.93, the note of $210.93, the actual value of the truck in the sum of $1623.15, and the finance company loan (shown on the work sheet as “unpaid cash price balance”) of $1647.73. Obviously, if a total of $2089.16 was owed on the truck, and if its value when traded in was $1623.15, the trade-in credit allowed of $660.59 did not relate to the actual equities involved, but was a paper loss to the dealer compensated for, presumably, out of the profit represented in the actual selling price of this automobile, and the two previous trucks the dealer had sold the plaintiff and later traded back in. But the manner in which the dealer arrived at his selling price stated in the sale contract does not constitute a material misrepresentation on the part of plaintiff (who did not prepare the instruments) but on the part of the dealer, Mr. Franklin, who was, according to the defendant’s own testimony an agent for the defendant in procuring the insurance, and who determined the selling prices, trade-in credits, and information to be furnished to the insurance company. No material misrepresentation made by the plaintiff is shown by this evidence.
As to division 2, I agree that there appears to be no construction of Code § 56-819 as such by our appellate courts but the point was decided in Sandersville Oil Mill Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 32 Ga. App. 722 (1) (124 S. E. 728), holding as follows: “Although a loss by fire may result directly from the negligent act of the insured, the insurer is nevertheless liable under its policy of insurance, unless the policy otherwise provides, *17where the negligence does not amount to a fraud or is not in furtherance of an incendiary intent upon the part of the insured."
Code § 58-819 distinctly provides: “Simple negligence by . . the insured, unaffected by fraud or design in the latter, shall not relieve the insurer.” It also provides: “Gross negligence on his part shall relieve the insurer.” Therefore, the first part of the Code section as follows: “The insured shall be bound to ordinary diligence in protecting the property from fire” when construed with the other two provisions, can mean only that, while an insured should use ordinary diligence, nevertheless, lack of ordinary diligence or simple negligence will prevent recovery only when in conjunction with fraud or wilful acts, while gross negligence will prevent recovery without proof of fraud or design. Simple negligence combined with incendiary intent will defeat recovery, and gross negligence, without incendiary intent, will defeat recovery. Since no exception is directed to the charge on this ground, and it is merely contended that the court erred in charging that the burden would shift to the defendant to prove that the plaintiff was guilty of gross negligence when he should have charged “ordinary negligence,” and since there was no request to charge further on this subject, and no issue in the case as to fraud or incendiary intent prior to the outbreak of the fire, I do- not think any reversible error is shown.
As to division 3 of the opinion, the charge standing alone and lifted out of context carries the appearan'ce of error, but in point of fact it immediately follows a charge defining bad faith, and stating in substance that this is a jury question, that if the jury finds the defendant acted in good faith the plaintiff can recover nothing for damages or attorney’s fees, that if there is bad faith damages and/or attorney’s fees may be recovered, that the jury must look to the evidence and, if they find bad faith, determine these amounts in a certain way “remembering always the damages and attorney’s fees are only awarded in case you find that the defendant has acted in bad faith.” Under the charge as a whole there is no possibility that the jury could have been led to believe these sums could be awarded if the defendant were in good faith in refusing to pay the claim at the time the demand was made.