Court Opinion

ID: 9665780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:00.210271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.880951
License: Public Domain

TUNKS, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority for two reasons.
First, I would hold that it is error for a Texas court to lend its equitable powers to the enforcement of a contract, such as that involved in this case, which unquestionably is in violation of the public policy of this State as expressed in its anti-trust laws. Schnitzer v. Southwest Shoe Corporation, 364 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.Sup.1963). The fact that the federal government has preempted the field of regulation of antitrust features of interstate contracts, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972), does not mean that a Texas court is obliged to use its equitable powers to enforce such a contract that is in violation of Texas’ public policy.
Second, the contract which the Houston Oilers seek to have enforced by the court’s use of its equitable powers was procured under circumstances where Matuszak had no freedom of choice. As a result of the combination and agreement between the twenty-six teams in the National Football League, Matuszak could deal with and play for only the Houston Oilers. The evidence shows that many of the terms of the standard contract tendered him were not negotiable. He was given only the option of accepting them or not playing professional football in the United States. Standing in such a position of overwhelmingly’ superior bargaining power, the Oilers compelled Matuszak to sign a contract which is grossly unfair to him. A court should not lend its equitable powers to the enforcement of a contract so termed and so procured. Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.1974); Crowell v. Housing Authority of City of Dallas, 495 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Sup.1973); Paxton v. Spencer, 503 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi, 1973, no writ); Steves v. United Services Automobile Association, 459 S.W.2d 930 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1970, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Inman v. Parr, 311 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1958, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
For the above reasons I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and dissolve the temporary injunction.