Court Opinion

ID: 9951145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 17:03:21.625573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:17.994246
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/15/24 ACMC Finance and Trade v. Khachatryan CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

ACMC FINANCE AND TRADE LLC,                                         B321981

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. 19LBCV00725)
         v.

SARGIS KHACHATRYAN et al.,

         Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Mark C. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
      Grand Park Law Group and Armand J. Jaafari; Thomas
Vogele & Associates, Thomas A. Vogele and Timothy M. Kowal
for Defendants and Appellants.
      Kluewer Law and Joshua T. Kluewer for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                ________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       Sargis Khachatryan (a.k.a. Sam Saryan), Sona Apikian
(a.k.a. Sona Saryan), and Gianni Saryan1 (collectively,
Appellants) appeal the trial court’s order denying their motions
to set aside default and default judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473.5.2
       In September 2017 Energy Product Company LLC and
Energy Trading Company LLC (Energy Trading)—two oil
companies allegedly controlled by Appellants and their family—
received a $2,450,000 loan from OSA Finance and Trade. This
loan was never repaid.
       In 2019 ACMC Finance and Trade (ACMC), an affiliate of
OSA Finance and Trade, sued Energy Trading, Appellants, Jack
Khachatryan (a.k.a. Jack Saryan), and others seeking repayment
of the loan. ACMC attempted to serve Appellants personally, but
could not locate Appellants even after hiring two private
investigative firms. ACMC’s investigators both independently
concluded Appellants were “intentionally hiding their
whereabouts.” ACMC ultimately served Appellants by
publication. When Appellants’ immediate relative, Jack
Khachatryan, answered ACMC’s complaint in February 2021,

1     Gianni Saryan’s first name is spelled “Gianna” in this
court’s case caption, but most of the record reflects the spelling
“Gianni.” We use “Gianni” as it is the predominant spelling in
the record.
2    Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                  2
ACMC requested discovery of Appellants’ addresses, but Jack
refused to provide them.3
      ACMC requested entry of Appellants’ default in March
2021 and then obtained a default judgment against them in
October 2021. Appellants appeared and moved to set aside the
default in March 2022, asserting they lacked actual notice under
section 473.5. The trial court denied their motion, among other
reasons, because Appellants had failed to demonstrate any lack of
actual notice had not resulted from their avoidance of service of
process or their inexcusable neglect.
      Appellants argue the trial court erred. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.    The Complaint
      On December 20, 2019 ACMC sued Energy Trading
Company LLC; Jack; Appellants Apikian, Sargis, and Saryan;
John Davids, and Dennis Rogers Jr. According to the complaint,
Jack and Appellants are the owners of Energy Trading. Jack is
the father of Saryan and husband of Apikian; Sargis is Jack’s
brother.
      ACMC alleged its predecessor, OSA Finance and Trade
LLC, loaned $2,450,000 to Energy Product Company LLC in
September 2017.4 The loan was executed via a “Joint Finance

3      Since Jack and Appellant Sargis Khachatryan share the
same last name, we refer to them by their first names. Our use
of first names is for clarity only and we intend no disrespect.
4      OSA Finance and Trade LLC assigned to ACMC Finance
all claims in connection with the Energy Trading loan
agreements.

                                3
Agreement,” signed by “Jack Saryan / Gianni Saryan” with “the
authority to bind Energy Product Company, LLC.” Davids and
Rogers “acted as intermediaries” in the negotiation of the loan.
Return of the principal was due in 30 days, along with 2 percent
interest.
       As the loan became due, ACMC alleged, Jack and Saryan
claimed the signature on the loan agreement was a forgery and
asked for more time to repay the loan. The parties executed
another loan agreement in December 2017, allowing another of
Jack’s companies, Energy Trading Company LLC, to assume
responsibility for the loan and repay it over a longer period of
time. Under the second loan agreement, the loan was to be paid
in full by September 2018. According to ACMC, Energy Trading
soon stopped making payments on the loan.
       The complaint alleged “[Jack] Khachatryan and
Khachatryan’s family members—Sargis, Sona and Gianni—own
and/or control Energy Product and Energy Trading and have
participated in a scheme to strip these entities of their assets
while misappropriating the relevant loan proceeds for
themselves.” ACMC alleged 12 causes of action: breach of
contract, money had and received, unjust enrichment, common
count for money lent, promissory fraud, fraud through intentional
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, conversion,
intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional
fraudulent transfers and constructive fraudulent transfers under
the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, and civil conspiracy. The
complaint requested damages “in the amount of $2,450,000 plus
costs, fees, punitive damages and interest.”

                               4
B.     Service of Process by Publication
       On May 7, 2020 ACMC filed an application to serve the
individual defendants—Jack and Sargis Khachatryan, Apikian,
and Saryan—by publication. The application stated that ACMC
“first attempted to serve the summons and complaint on all four
of the [individual] Defendants at Energy Trading Company LLC’s
(“Energy Trading”) principal place of business,” in Long Beach,
“an address with which all four [individual] Defendants are
associated.” Process servers, however, were unable to locate any
of the Appellants at this address. “Thereafter, ACMC engaged
two separate private investigative firms to locate all four of the
[individual] Defendants.” Both investigative firms conducted
background checks and identified potential addresses for each of
the Appellants but were unable to locate Appellants at any of the
addresses.
       Attached to the application were declarations from the
private investigators hired by ACMC. The first declaration was
from Sarah Byrnes, a licensed private investigator and the head
of the Investigation Practice at Mega Group Investigations,
which ACMC retained in January 2020. Byrnes personally
visited five recent potential addresses for Appellants in Beverly
Hills, Los Angeles, and Long Beach but could not locate
Appellants. Byrnes noted Sargis “uses three social security
numbers and has comingled social security numbers and dates of
birth with other individuals.” Based on her efforts, Byrnes
concluded that Appellants “are all intentionally hiding their
whereabouts and are intentionally making themselves difficult or
impossible to locate.”
       The second declaration was from Paul Dryman, another
licensed private investigator and the president and CEO of

                                5
Informed Decision, an investigation corporation ACMC hired in
December 2019. Dryman “conducted several database searches
utilizing privileged sources not available to the public, and used
public records and social media resources in order to attempt to
locate Jack, Sona, Sargis, and Gianni.” From this research,
Dryman learned Appellants “were each potentially associated
with . . . three addresses” in Beverly Hills and Long Beach.
Dryman’s process servers were unable to serve Appellants at any
of these addresses and learned “these addresses were no longer
good addresses for [Appellants].” Dryman believed Appellants
were “intentionally hiding their whereabouts.”
       On this basis, ACMC asserted it exercised “reasonable
diligence” in attempting to personally serve Appellants and thus
service by publication was proper. The trial court agreed and
granted ACMC’s motion to serve Appellants by publication on
May 13, 2020. On July 2, 9, 16, and 23, 2020 ACMC served
Appellants by publication in the Grunion Gazette, a newspaper
based in Long Beach.

C.     The First Amended Complaint and Service by Publication
       In August 2020, after defendant Rogers demurred to the
allegations against him, ACMC filed a first amended complaint
(FAC). As relevant here, the FAC contained three changes from
the original complaint. First, the FAC omitted a claim for unjust
enrichment. Second, the FAC added a new cause of action for
“Common Count to Recover Money Paid by Mistake and Fraud”
against all defendants. Third, the introductory paragraph in the
FAC alleged the defendants “agreed to a common plan to take
OSA’s money” and “are all liable for each other’s torts and
liabilities per the doctrine of civil conspiracy.” The original

                                6
complaint contained these allegations in the cause of action for
civil conspiracy.
       After filing the FAC, ACMC obtained a second summons
and again served Appellants by publication in the Grunion
Gazette on October 29, November 5, November 12, and
November 19, 2020. ACMC republished the summons in the
Grunion Gazette on February 4, 11, 18, and 25, 2021. The
February publication included a statement of damages against
each Appellant.

D.     Communications Between Counsel About the Lawsuit and
       Appellants’ Addresses
       In late January 2021 counsel for Jack, Paul Fine, contacted
counsel for ACMC by email about the case. Fine wrote: “I have
been retained by Jack Saryan and Gianni Saryan to represent
their interests in the subject litigation. I will speak with Sona
Saryan and Sam Khachatryan to determine if I will additionally
be representing their interests.”
       ACMC’s counsel responded: “[I]f you could please send us
home addresses for each Jack Khachatryan a/k/a Jack Saryan,
Gianni[] Saryan, Sona Apikian a/k/a/ Sona Saryan and Sargis
Khachatryan a/k/a Sam Saryan that would be much
appreciated. . . . [W]e would like to respect their due process
rights and having their addresses such that we can hand deliver
documents will allow us to do that.”
       Fine replied: “I will request authority to provide that
information to you. At present, I need to make sure that I will
not have a conflict of interest in representing the individuals.”
ACMC did not receive any further information, although the
record before us does not reflect ACMC followed up with Fine.

                                7
      Shortly after this exchange, Jack and Energy Trading
entered an appearance on February 16, 2021 and answered
ACMC’s complaint. ACMC sought discovery from Jack
pertaining to Appellants’ home addresses, but he refused to
disclose any information about where his wife, son, or brother
were living. The court eventually imposed terminating sanctions
against Jack “due to [his] ongoing failure to provide basic
responses about, among other things, his family’s whereabouts.”

E.    The Default Judgment
      On March 29, 2021 ACMC filed a request for entry of
default against Appellants using Judicial Council form CIV-100.
Where form CIV-100 asked for the date of “the complaint,” ACMC
indicated December 20, 2019, the date of the original complaint,
rather than the FAC. The clerk entered default for ACMC.
      On October 13, 2021 ACMC requested a default judgment
against Appellants. After a default prove-up hearing, the trial
court entered judgment for ACMC against Appellants on
October 18, 2021. The default judgment awarded ACMC
$2,450,000 in damages, $405,626.03 in prejudgment interest, and
$1,275.45 in costs. The trial court held Appellants jointly and
severally liable for the judgment.

F.     Appellants’ Motions to Set Aside the Default Judgment
       On March 24, 2022 Appellants, through counsel, each filed
a motion to set aside the default and default judgment. As
relevant here, Appellants argued the judgment was void under
section 473, subdivision (d); they lacked actual notice of the
action under section 473.5 because the summons was published
in a “locale . . . inadequate to provide notice;” and they did not file

                                  8
an answer because of their “attorney’s mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect.” They also asserted ACMC
improperly requested entry of default on the original complaint,
rather than the FAC. Finally, they argued ACMC failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in attempting personal service
before serving Appellants by publication.
       Appellants filed separate, identical declarations stating: “I
have been a resident in the City of Los Angeles for over five (5)
years and have never been a resident in the City of Long Beach.
[¶] I do not live with Jack Saryan [a.k.a. Jack Khachatryan] and
was unaware of this action. [¶] There were no communications
ever made to me that there were any attempts to serve me in this
action. [¶] Upon receiving a notification that Plaintiff moved for
default judgment, I promptly retained counsel.”
       The trial court denied Appellants’ motions on March 25,
2022 “for numerous reasons.” The court first denied the motions
as “confusing, often meandering between code sections in a way
that is not conducive to analysis.” As to relief under
section 473.5, the court observed “a motion brought per § 473.5
must be accompanied by an ‘affidavit showing under oath that
the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was
not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable
neglect.’ [Appellants] filed no such declaration.” While the
motion asserted relief for defense counsel’s “excusable neglect,”
the court “reviewed Counsel’s declaration in this regard,” noting
it was “a mere four paragraphs long” and “says absolutely
nothing about neglect, and therefore cannot support relief.”
       Considering Appellants’ challenge to publication in the
Grunion Gazette, the court reaffirmed “its prior decision to
permit service by publication” and noted Appellants “do[] not cite

                                 9
any authority for the position that, if a publication order was
issued in error, the resulting default and default judgment are
void.” The court further observed Appellants “suggest[] [ACMC]
should have ascertained [their] whereabouts by ‘simple discovery’
propounded on Jack Saryan and/or Energy Trading,” but
Appellants disclaimed any relationship to Energy Trading and
Saryan had refused to disclose Appellants’ addresses.
       Finally, the court rejected Appellants’ argument that the
default judgment was erroneously entered on the original
complaint, rather than the FAC. The court further explained
that “Plaintiff’s FAC only changed allegations as to Rogers, who
had demurrer, and not as to [Appellants], who had not
appeared. . . . [W]hen the complaint and FAC contain the same
substantive allegations against a defendant, any failure to
specifically note ‘first amended’ on the default form is not
material.”
       The court ordered ACMC to give notice of its ruling. ACMC
served Appellants on April 14, 2022 with a “Notice Pertaining to
Ruling on [Appellants’] Motion to Vacate the Default and Default
Judgments.” Attached was a file-stamped and signed copy of the
trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motions to set aside the
default and default judgment. ACMC attached a proof of service
indicating Appellants’ counsel was served with the “Notice
Pertaining to Ruling.”

G.   Appellants’ Motions for Reconsideration
     On April 12, 2022, pursuant to section 1008, Appellants
moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying their
motions to set aside the default judgment.

                                10
       Accompanying the motions was a new declaration from
Paul Fine, Jack’s attorney. Fine declared: “On or around
January 22, 2021, counsel for [ACMC] and I spoke regarding the
representation of Jack Saryan, Gianni Saryan, Sona Apikian and
Sam Khachatryan. To the best of my recollection, I told [ACMC’s
counsel] that I had been retained by Jack Saryan and the
company, but that I would speak with Gianni Saryan, Sona
Apikian and Sam Khachatryan about possible representation.
However, I never spoke with Gianni Saryan, Sona Apikian and
Sam Khachatryan and instead informed Jack Saryan shortly
after our January 22, 2021 meeting that I could not represent
Gianni Saryan, Soan Apikian and Sam Khachatryan in this
matter and that they needed to locate separate counsel. I never
spoke with Gianni Saryan, Sona Apikian and Sam Khachatryan
about this matter.”
       In addition, Appellants attached a declaration from their
attorney stating that any deficiencies in Appellants’ prior
declarations and any “confusion” between legal arguments were
the result of counsel’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and
excusable neglect.” Appellants also included updated individual
declarations, adding the following language: “I did not have any
actual notice of this action. The lack of notice was not caused by
my inexcusable neglect or deliberate avoidance of service by me.”
       The trial court summarily denied Appellants’ motions on
June 21, 2022 “on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction
to reconsider its prior ruling in light of the fact that judgment has
already been entered.”
       Appellants filed notices of appeal on July 7, 2022.

                                 11
                           DISCUSSION

      Appellants raise two primary arguments on appeal. First,
Appellants challenge service by publication and contend that the
FAC made substantive amendments that “re-opened” the default,
which in their view required a new attempt at personal service.5
Second, they argue the court erroneously denied their motions to
set aside the default judgment and their subsequent motions for
reconsideration.6 But first, we address the timeliness of the
appeal.

A.    Timeliness of Appeal
      ACMC argues we lack jurisdiction over this case because
Appellants did not file a timely notice of appeal. (See Hollister
Convalescent Hospital, Inc. v. Rico (1975) 15 Cal.3d 660, 670
[“[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal . . . is an

5      On reply, but not in their opening brief, Appellants argue
the default judgment is void under section 473, subdivision (d).
“We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief.” (Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 636, fn. 8; Aptos Council v. County of
Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not
raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or
abandoned.”].)
6      Appellants also seem to challenge the trial court’s personal
jurisdiction over them. The trial court does not appear to have
made any ruling on the matter, nor does the record before us
reflect Appellants filed a motion to challenge personal
jurisdiction. For this reason, we need not address this argument
on appeal, including whether Appellants’ post-default
participation in the litigation waived any such objection.

                                  12
absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.”].)
ACMC’s argument is unpersuasive. Under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B) and (C): “a notice of appeal must be
filed on or before the earliest of: 60 days after the party filing the
notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document
entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or 180 days after
entry of judgment.”7 ACMC argues it served Appellants on
April 14, 2022 with notice of the trial court’s order denying their
motions to set aside the default judgment, triggering Appellants’
deadline to file the notices of appeal within 60 days.
       ACMC did not serve a proper notice commencing the
60-day deadline because it did not serve Appellants with “a
document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment,” but instead
served a “Notice Pertaining to Ruling on [Appellants’] Motion to
Vacate the Default and Default Judgments.” (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B); Alan v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 903 [“[C]ourts have consistently held
that the required ‘document entitled “Notice of Entry”’ must bear
precisely that title.”] [citation omitted]; 20th Century Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 666, 671-672 [document
titled “‘notice of ruling,’ not ‘notice of entry’” was insufficient].)
Nor did ACMC serve Appellants with “a filed-endorsed copy of
the judgment, accompanied by proof of service.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) Although ACMC’s notice included a
filed-endorsed copy of the trial court’s order, ACMC’s proof of

7     For purposes of this rule, “‘judgment’ includes an
appealable order if the appeal is from an appealable order.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(e).)

                                 13
service reflected that it had served Appellants with its “Notice
Pertaining to Ruling,” but did not indicate service of the court’s
order. (See Thiara v. Pacific Coast Khalsa Diwan Society (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 51, 56 [rule 8.104(a)(2) not satisfied without an
adequate proof of service “setting forth specified information” in
the rule]; see also In re Marriage of Lin (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
471, 474 [“[W]e strictly construe statutes and rules concerning
the time in which to file a notice of appeal.”].)
      Accordingly, Appellants’ notices of appeal were timely filed
within 180 days of the order appealed under California Rules of
Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).8

B.    The Trial Court Did Not Err by Authorizing Service by
      Publication
      Appellants contend they were improperly served by
publication because ACMC failed to attempt personal service
with reasonable diligence, and because publication was in a Long
Beach newspaper.9

8     Although neither party raised California Rules of Court,
rule 8.108(e), the appeal is also timely under that rule, which
governs the time to appeal when a “valid motion to reconsider an
appealable order” is filed. Appellants moved for reconsideration
on April 12, 2022 and the court denied their motions on June 21.
Appellants’ notices of appeal were filed 16 days later on July 7,
well within all applicable deadlines provided by rule 8.108(e).
9     The trial court’s publication order did not include language
required by section 415.50, subdivision (b), “direct[ing] that a
copy of the summons, the complaint, and the order for publication
be forthwith mailed to the party if his or her address is
ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for

                                14
       1.    Legal Background and Standard of Review
       “Section 415.10 et seq. governs the manner of service of a
summons. A summons may be served by various methods. If
service of a summons by other means proves impossible, service
may be effected by publication, upon the trial court’s approval.
[Citation.] Section 415.50 governs this method of service.”
(Rios v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 871, 880 (Rios).)
Section 415.50, subdivision (a), provides for service by publication
“if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in
which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot
with reasonable diligence be served in another manner.”
Subdivision (b) mandates that “[t]he court shall order the
summons to be published in a named newspaper, published in
this state, that is most likely to give actual notice to the party to
be served.” (§ 415.50, subd. (b).)
       We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s
determination that ACMC exercised reasonable diligence and
that the Grunion Gazette was the newspaper most likely to give
notice. (See Giorgio v. Synergy Management Group, LLC (2014)
231 Cal.App.4th 241, 248-249; accord, Rios, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 880-881.)

publication of the summons.” Appellants did not challenge this
omission in the trial court or on appeal, forfeiting any objection.
(See In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 [“a person who
fails to preserve a claim forfeits that claim”]; see also Golden
Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020)
50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554-555 [review on appeal “‘“is limited to
issues which have been adequately raised”’”].)

                                 15
       2.     ACMC Exercised Reasonable Diligence
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s ruling that
ACMC demonstrated reasonable diligence in attempting methods
of service other than publication. “‘The term “reasonable
diligence” . . . denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and
inquiry conducted in good faith by the party or his agent or
attorney.’” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743, 749, fn. 5.)
“A number of honest attempts to learn the defendant’s
whereabouts through inquiry and investigation generally are
sufficient. . . . The question is whether the plaintiff took the
steps a reasonable person who truly desired to give notice of the
action would have taken under the circumstances.” (Rios, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 880.) The detailed declarations ACMC filed
demonstrated it attempted to serve Appellants at Energy
Trading’s principal place of business but did not succeed.
       Substantial evidence also supports ACMC’s reasonable
diligence in attempting to obtain additional addresses for
Appellants. ACMC hired two different private investigation
firms, both of which conducted “extensive background searches”
across “several database[s],” including “public records,” “social
media resources,” and “privileged sources not available to the
public.” Once all potential addresses associated with Appellants
were ascertained, the investigators “personally visited” these five
addresses in an attempt to effect personal service. These efforts
were sufficient to show reasonable diligence. (See Rios, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 876, 881 [reasonable diligence established
where plaintiff hired two differed private investigators “to locate
and serve” the defendant “and they made numerous attempts to
effectuate service”]; Giorgio v. Synergy Management Group, LLC,
supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 248-249 [reasonable diligence

                                16
where plaintiff “conducted a search for any addresses associated
with [defendant]” and attempted personal service on that
address].)

      3.     Substantial Evidence Also Supports the Trial Court’s
             Order Authorizing Service by Publication in a Long
             Beach Newspaper
      Substantial evidence supported publication in a Long
Beach newspaper because it was “most likely to give actual
notice” to Appellants. (§ 415.50, subd. (b).) Appellants argue
that they have no connection or nexus to Long Beach, so
publication in a Los Angeles or Beverly Hills newspaper was
most likely to convey actual notice.10 We are unpersuaded.
      In its application for service by publication, ACMC included
a declaration attesting that Appellants were “associated with
Energy Trading, whose principal place of business is [in]
Long Beach.” Additionally, the declarations from ACMC’s
private investigators confirmed that each of the Appellants was
associated in public records, private databases, and social media
resources with Energy Trading’s principal place of business in
Long Beach. While the investigation revealed Appellants had
previously been associated with addresses in Beverly Hills and
Los Angeles, the investigation further confirmed that Appellants
were no longer located at those addresses. (See Giorgio v.
Synergy Management Group, LLC, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at
p. 249 [affirming newspaper was most likely to give actual notice

10   Appellants do not argue that a different Long Beach
newspaper other than the Grunion Gazette was more likely to
convey actual notice.

                               17
where plaintiff “had reason to know [defendant] resided at” a
Los Angeles address, so “substantial evidence supported . . .
election of a newspaper in Los Angeles”].)
       Appellants rely on Olvera v. Olvera (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d
32, where service by publication was improper because “[n]othing
in the affidavit, or in the more detailed facts before the trial
court, supported the election of th[e] newspaper” where the
summons was published. (Id. at p. 43.) There, plaintiffs
“repeatedly” acknowledged the defendant “was no longer in
Riverside and admitted . . . that she received mail in Pismo
Beach,” but they served the defendant with publication in a
Riverside paper. (Ibid.) By contrast, here the affidavits
established Appellants’ connection with their business’s address
in Long Beach and supported the choice of a Long Beach
publication. Although a major regional newspaper might have
been preferable, we cannot say that no substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s order authorizing service by publication
in Long Beach.

      4.    ACMC Was Not Required To Obtain a Second Order
            Authorizing Service by Publication of the FAC
      Appellants assert ACMC “re-opened the default” by filing
the FAC because it contained material changes to the complaint
on which the default was purportedly entered. “After a
defendant’s default has been entered, if ‘“a complaint is amended
in matter of substance as distinguished from mere matter of
form, the amendment opens the default, and unless the amended
pleading be served on the defaulting defendant, no judgment can
properly be entered on the default.”’” (Paterra v. Hansen (2021)

                                18
64 Cal.App.5th 507, 529.) This argument lacks merit for a
number of reasons.
       First, we agree with ACMC that Appellants forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See Baxter
Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 371, fn. 8
[arguments not raised in the trial court are deemed waived].)
But even if the argument were preserved, contrary to Appellant’s
steadfast representations, the FAC was filed before the entry of
Appellants’ default, not after.
       Appellants argue they were entitled to personal service of
the FAC, citing Engebretson & Co. v. Harrison (1981)
125 Cal.App.3d 436. But Engebretson merely held that an
amended complaint must be served “in the manner provided for
service of summons.” (Id. at p. 443.) And indeed Appellants were
served by publication after the FAC was filed: in November 2020
and again in February 2021. Appellants cite no authority that
ACMC was required to obtain a second publication order to serve
the FAC after the trial court had already determined that service
by publication was proper.
       What is more, we agree with the trial court that “the
complaint and FAC contain the same substantive allegations
against [Appellants],” and any error in designating the correct
filing date of the complaint on the request for default judgment
was not prejudicial. (See Rodriguez v. Henard (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 529, 536-538 [affirming default judgment
because incorrect zip code in default packet did not prejudice
defendant]; In re Marriage of Harris (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 98,
102-103 [declining to set aside default judgment where error in
default packet was not prejudicial].)

                               19
C.    The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellants’ Motions to
      Vacate the Default and Default Judgment
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellants’ motions to set aside the default and default judgment
or their subsequent motions for reconsideration. Appellants
specifically challenge denial of relief under sections 473.5 and
473, subdivision (b).

      1.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In
            Denying Appellants’ Section 473.5 Motion
              a.    Legal background and standard of review
       Section 473.5, subdivision (a), provides: “When service of a
summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to
defend the action and a default or default judgment has been
entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and
file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment
and for leave to defend the action.” The section 473.5 motion
must “be accompanied by an affidavit showing under oath that
the party’s lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was
not caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable
neglect.” (Id., subd. (b).) The moving party bears the “burden of
showing that [its] lack of actual notice was not caused by . . .
avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.” (Rios, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 885.)
       We review the trial court’s ruling on a section 473.5 motion
for abuse of discretion. (See Luxury Asset Lending, LLC v.
Philadelphia Television Network, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 894,
907; accord, Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852,
861.)

                                 20
            b.      Appellants failed to meet their burden under
                    section 473.5
       The trial court denied Appellants’ section 473.5 motion
because Appellants “filed no . . . declaration” asserting their “‘lack
of actual notice in time to defend the action was not caused by his
or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.’” Appellants
appear to read this statement to mean that the trial court did not
review their declarations, but the more reasonable reading is that
the trial court determined that Appellants filed no declarations
meeting the statutory standard.
       And indeed the declarations do not meet Appellants’
burden of demonstrating facts supporting their contention that
any “‘lack of actual notice in time to defend the action was not
caused by [their] avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect.’”
Appellants filed separate identical declarations: “I have been a
resident in the City of Los Angeles for over five (5) years and
have never been a resident in the City of Long Beach. [¶] I do
not live with Jack Saryan [a.k.a. Jack Khachatryan] and was
unaware of this action. [¶] There were no communications ever
made to me that there were any attempts to serve me in this
action. [¶] Upon receiving a notification that Plaintiff moved for
default judgment, I promptly retained counsel.”
       As Appellants’ counsel conceded at oral argument, these
declarations failed to state any supporting facts about when and
how Appellants learned about the case or how diligently
Appellants responded to this knowledge. Appellants argue that
reciting the statutory language is all that is required to obtain
relief, but the case law is clear that “conclusory” declarations
without supporting facts cannot support relief. (See Rios, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at pp. 885-886 [affirming denial of § 473.5 motion

                                 21
where movant’s “conclusory declaration does not satisfy his
burden” without stating “any supporting facts”]; Sakaguchi v.
Sakaguchi, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 861-862 [affirming
denial of § 473.5 motion where affidavit did not “show that any
lack of knowledge was caused by excusable neglect”]; Anastos v.
Lee (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1319 [“declaration of counsel
failed to show that any inferred lack of notice was not caused by
defendants’ avoidance or inexcusable neglect. . . . Absent a proper
affidavit or declaration that the defendants’ lack of actual notice
was not caused by inexcusable neglect or avoidance of service, the
trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion”].)
       Further, the declarations were deficient given the evidence
before the trial court that Appellants had actual notice of the
lawsuit in time to defend. ACMC introduced communications
suggesting Appellants were seeking counsel for the case in
January 2021, two months before default was entered, nine
months before entry of the default judgment, and 14 months
before they filed to set aside the default in March 2022. (See
Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540, 548 [§ 473.5 motion
properly denied where movants had communicated with an
attorney about the case before default was entered against them,
because they possessed “actual notice of the action in time to
defend” and “their failure to answer was a result of inexcusable
neglect”]; accord, Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 885 [affirming
denial of § 473.5 relief where movant communicated with
opposing counsel about litigation, showing his actual notice “in
time to file an answer or other response to the complaint and
avoid the entry of a default”].)
       Appellants’ declarations provided no facts that rebutted
evidence before the trial court that Appellants avoided service.

                                22
(See Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 885 [affirming denial of
§ 473.5 motion where movant’s “declaration did not state any
supporting facts” showing “his lack of actual notice was not
caused by his avoidance of service” and movant “did not reference
evidence that he avoided attempts to serve him”].) There was
evidence that each of the Appellants had vacated their last
known personal and business addresses at the time of the
lawsuit, leading two separate private investigators to conclude
Appellants were “intentionally hiding their whereabouts.” (See
Tunis v. Barrow (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1069, 1079 [movant who
moved out of state showed lack of actual notice was not caused by
avoidance of service because he “did not conceal his
whereabouts”].) And there was evidence, noted by the trial court,
that Jack Khachatryan withheld their current addresses from
ACMC.

      2.     The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellants Relief
             Under Section 473(b)
      Section 473, subdivision (b), provides for relief from a
default judgment due to “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect.” The statute “‘mandates relief from a
judgment of dismissal or default when the motion is based on an
attorney’s affidavit of fault . . . . In all other cases, relief is
discretionary.’” (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
15, 25-26.) The trial court denied Appellants relief under
section 473, subdivision (b), because Appellants’ counsel’s
declaration “sa[id] absolutely nothing about neglect, and
therefore cannot support relief.” The trial court did not err. To
warrant relief, counsel’s affidavit must include an “admission by
counsel for the moving party that his error resulted in the entry

                                23
of a default.” (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001)
90 Cal.App.4th 600, 609; accord, Martin Potts & Associates, Inc.
v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 438.) Here, counsel’s
declaration did not mention any error at all.

      3.      The Trial Court Did Not Err By Denying Appellants’
              Motions for Reconsideration
      Appellants also challenge the trial court’s denial of their
motions to reconsider its order denying relief from the default
judgment. The trial court did not err by denying Appellants’
motions for reconsideration.11
      Section 1008 “governs reconsideration of court orders” and
provides, as relevant here: “[A]ny party affected by [an] order
may, . . . based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law,
make application to the same judge or court that made the order,

11     The trial court denied the motions because it believed it
had “no jurisdiction to reconsider its prior ruling in light of the
fact that judgment has already been entered.” But courts have
entertained motions for reconsideration of an order denying relief
under section 473.5, where a default judgment has been entered.
(See, e.g., Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 879; Tunis v. Barrow,
supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1075; see also Northridge Financial
Corp. v. Hamblin (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 819, 825 [“‘The motion to
reconsider has also been recognized by the reviewing courts
where it is in the nature of a motion seeking relief under the
provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 473.’”].) Although
the trial court denied reconsideration on incorrect grounds, we
affirm its denial on different grounds. (See Little v. Los Angeles
County Assessment Appeals Bds. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 915,
925, fn. 6 [“A decision correct in law ‘“will not be disturbed on
appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.”’”].)

                                24
to reconsider the matter.” (§ 1008, subd. (a).) If the movant
asserts “‘new or different facts,’” they “must provide a satisfactory
explanation for failing to present the evidence sooner.”
(California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. Virga (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 30, 46, fn. 15; accord, Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 674, 690.) We review for abuse of discretion.
(Torres v. Design Group Facility Solutions, Inc. (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 239, 243.)
      Appellants’ opening brief does not address how they met
the section 1008 standard. (See Benach v. County of Los Angeles
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [“mere assertion that the
judgment is wrong,” “without pertinent argument or an attempt
to apply the law to the circumstances of th[e] case,” waives the
issue]; accord, In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779,
808.) Even if we reached the issue, Appellants did not meet their
burden to show “new or different facts [or] circumstances”
supporting reconsideration. (§ 1008, subd. (a).) The trial court
observed that Appellants’ motions for reconsideration “are
premised largely on the same arguments made in connection with
their motions to vacate default and default judgment.”
      Appellants’ “new or different facts”—supplied by revised
declarations from Appellants and a new declaration from Paul
Fine—also did not support reconsidering the denial of
section 473.5 relief. Although Fine’s declaration stated that Fine
“never spoke with Gianni Saryan, Sona Apikian and Sam
Khachatryan” about the matter, his declaration also suggested
Appellants were seeking representation in January 2021,
14 months before the default judgment was entered. Appellants
updated their individual declarations to state that their “lack of
notice was not caused by [their] inexcusable neglect or deliberate

                                 25
avoidance of service,” but Appellants did not provide any facts
supporting these bare recitations of the statutory language. Nor
did they address the evidence before the trial court, which ACMC
had put into its opposition briefs, that they had avoided service
and delayed responding to the complaint until the default
judgment was entered. (See Rios, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 885
[affirming denial of § 473.5 relief where movant “did not state
any supporting facts” or “reference evidence that he avoided
attempts to serve him”]; Anastos v. Lee, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1319 [§ 473.5 movant who may have provided plaintiff with an
“incorrect” address failed to declare how his lack of notice was
“not caused by [his] avoidance or inexcusable neglect”]; Trujillo v.
Trujillo (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 257, 259-260 [court properly denied
motion to set aside default where evidence showed “defendant
attempted to avoid service of process,” despite defendant’s
affidavit denying this account].)
       Similarly, the new declaration from Appellants’ attorney
did not warrant reconsideration of the court’s denial of relief
under section 473, subdivision (b). Appellants assert the trial
court did not properly consider their attorney’s “declaration
under section 473(b), explaining that any deficiencies in the
earlier declarations were the fault of counsel and should not
result in prejudice to [Appellants].” Counsel declared, “I
presumed [Appellants’] 473.5 affidavit was adequate based on
context rather than the exact language,” and “any confusion
caused by [Appellants’] motion or reply—such as identifying
Section 473(b) rather than 473.5” was caused by his excusable
neglect or mistake. But “[a] mistake based on (1) ignorance of the
law or (2) imprecision in drafting . . . is not a proper basis for
reconsideration.” (Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc.

                                26
(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 658, 670.) In any event, an attorney’s
“‘[c]onduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as
failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument,’” is
not excusable neglect or mistake within the meaning of
section 473, subdivision (b). (Zamora v. Clayborn Contracting
Group (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258; accord, Garcia v. Hejmadi,
supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 682.)

                         DISPOSITION

      The trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motions to set
aside the default and default judgment is affirmed. The order
denying Appellants’ motions for reconsideration is also affirmed.
ACMC is entitled to recover its costs on appeal.

                                      MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.                  RAPHAEL, J. *

*     Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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