Court Opinion

ID: 9476829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:06:40.24485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:32.038908
License: Public Domain

WILL, Senior District Judge,
concurring.
I agree that, given the fact that the ultimate question the jury determined in this case was one of the credibility of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s witnesses and that the trial judge’s errors, if any, on the admissibility of evidence and instructions were not material, the jury’s verdict should be affirmed. I write separately, however, because I believe some of Judge Posner’s opinion is erroneous dictum.
As the opinion recognizes, a literal reading of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence would be absurd in civil cases in that it would allow counsel for a defendant, but not for a plaintiff, to object to the admissibility of his or her clients or witnesses’ criminal records for impeachment purposes. It would, as he says, load the dice in favor of defendants in civil cases even though it is often fortuitous who is the plaintiff and who is the defendant. He suggests that it needs some “judicial patchwork.” To that end, he concludes that, given its background and legislative history, Rule 609(a) should be read, though it is not expressly so limited, to apply only in criminal cases. This, he finds, eliminates the patent absurdity which would follow if it applied in civil cases as well.
He then goes on to conclude that, since Congress dealt specifically in Rule 609(a) with the question of the admissibility of prior convictions, Rule 403 which permits the exclusion of any relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues or misleading the jury, ...” is inapplicable to prior conviction evidence in civil, as well as in criminal, cases. If Rule 609(a) is read, through judicial patchwork, to apply only to criminal cases, I find it illogical, as well as unnecessary, to conclude that Rule 403 is never applicable to prior conviction evidence in civil cases. That conclusion is inconsistent with what some members of Congress clearly intended as Judge Posner’s opinion points out, as well as a number of prior decisions. Shows v. M/V Red Eagle, 695 F.2d 114, 118-119 (5th Cir.1983); Czajka v. Hickman, 703 F.2d 317, 318 (8th Cir.1983).
Moreover, since Rule 403 specifically provides for the balancing of other potentially less prejudicial evidence, it seems logical that, in civil cases, it should require balancing with respect to prior convictions whether of parties or witnesses. This is no great burden on the trial judge and obviates the certainty that, in cases where the prejudice clearly outweighs the probative value, the evidence will nevertheless be admitted since the trial judge, under Judge Posner’s analysis, has no discretion in civil cases to exclude it.
In support of this conclusion, Judge Posner finds it an “unacceptable implication” that Rule 403 would permit a district judge or magistrate to exclude in a civil case even convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statement if convinced that their probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. This, he points out, would give the trial judge in civil cases broader discretion than Rule 609(a)(2) does in a criminal case. As a result, he concludes that Rule 403 is never applicable in a civil case.
This, I believe, is throwing the baby out with the bath. Rule 609(a)(1) provides for balancing probative value only against “prejudicial effect to the defendant” not “to the defendant or anyone else” as Judge Posner asserts. I find it an “unacceptable implication” that so narrow a specific rule should be generalized to foreclose *709application of the broad provisions of Rule 403 in all cases. Rather the only acceptable implication to me is that Rule 609 forecloses application of Rule 403 only to those specific circumstances to which Rule 609 is applicable.
I have confidence that trial judges exercise their discretion under both Rule 609 and Rule 403 in an effort to deal fairly with all parties and witnesses. I believe the trial judge did so in this case although the defense counsel, as Judge Posner suggests, exceeded fair comment over the limited probative value of the prior conviction evidence. If Rule 403 is totally inapplicable in civil cases, this problem of misuse will undoubtedly be exacerbated.
What particularly concerns me is that such a sweeping conclusion is unnecessary to the decision in this case. The trial judge permitted the rape conviction evidence to be received, finding that its probative value as to plaintiff’s credibility was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. That was a judgment call which was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, affirmance does not require that we write into Rule 403 a novel blanket prohibition against its applicability to prior conviction evidence in all civil and criminal cases making such evidence automatically admissible regardless of its prejudicial potential and opening the door to abuse by counsel. Nor does it require that we find Rule 609 applicable only in criminal cases.
In sum, I agree that Rules 609(a) and 403 in their present form are unclear so far as both criminal and civil trials are concerned. Being generally opposed to “judicial patchwork” on congressional enactments, I am reluctant to hold that Rule 609(a) is applicable only to criminal cases although I agree its language leads to absurd conclusions in civil cases. Moreover, as with the majority’s holding that Rule 403 does not apply to prior conviction evidence in civil cases, it is unnecessary to our decision to hold that Rule 609 applies only to criminal cases. I agree, however, that Rule 609 should be so limited and would urge that the rule be amended. Rule 403, amended if deemed necessary, would then, as I believe it should, be applicable in both criminal and civil cases with the burden on the person opposing the admission of the prior conviction to establish that the potential prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
Even when admitted in a civil case, however, evidence of a prior conviction may not, as it may not in a criminal case, be used as a tail to wag the dog, as an effort to prejudice the jury on the merits rather than being simply one element in the determination of credibility. The trial judge has a responsibility to see that it is not. I believe the proper limits of such use were exceeded by defense counsel here but for the reasons stated in Judge Posner’s opinion I do not believe a new trial is warranted. Accordingly, I concur.