Court Opinion

ID: 9834093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:17:09.956213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.498045
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In view of the fact that- the trial court concluded as matter of law that the recital in the deed from E. J. Delano to appellee was contractual, establishing the title thereby conveyed as one of purchase, and that such recital was conclusive on the issue of advancement, appellee contends in his_ motion for rehearing that, since we failed to sustain the eighth assignment, complaining of such conclusion of law, we were in error in reversing the case on the ground of newly discovered testimony, since this testimony, by virtue of such conclusion, would become immaterial and not admissible.
 Believing that .the trial court erred in such conclusion of law, we sustain the eighth assignment, and hold that the recitals in the deed are not contractual. The recital referred to reads thus:
“That I, Mrs. E. J. Delano, for and in consideration of the sum of $4,300.00 to me in hand paid by J. R. Delano (my son), the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the further consideration that Annie Roberson, a child of the wife of said J. R. Delano by her former marriage, and who is a half-sister to the children of the grantee herein, shall receive an equal and exact share of the property hereby conveyed, the same as if she were a daughter of my said son, have granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, sell, and convey, unto the said J. R. Delano, of the county of Milam,” etc., the following described land, etc. “To have and to hold the above-described, premises, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any wise belonging unto the said J. R. Delano, his heirs and assigns forever.”
It will be observed that the recital does not bind the grantee to do or not to do anything. It merely recites that Annie Roberson shall receive such an interest in the land as the children of J. R. Delano should receive. And it further appears from such conveyance that his own children did not receive anything, but that he himself took the fee-simple title to the land in question, without remainder to any one. Hence Annie Roberson could take nothing under this stipulation, and such recital had no binding legal effect. The court was therefore in error in finding, as a conclusion of law, that such recital was contractual. It is well settled in this state that the recital of a paid consideration in a deed is not conclusive on the parties thereto, but may be disproved by parol. See article 2467, R. S.; Lanier v. Foust, 81 Tex. 186, 16 S. W. 994; Garrett v. Robinson, 43 S. W. 288; Taylor v. Merrill, 64 Tex. 494; McLean v. Ellis, 79 Tex. 398, 15 S. W. 394; Morrison v. Morrison, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 339, 96 S. W. 100; Johnson v. Elmen, 24 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 59 S. W. 605; Id., 94 Tex. 168, 59 S. W. 253, 52 L. R. A. 162, 86 Am. St. Rep. 845; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. 779; Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn. 383; Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 353, 4 S. E. 692; Sadler v. Huffhines (Ky.) 12 S. W. 715; Barbee v. Barbee, 109 N. C. 299, 13 S. E. 792.
Appellant’s object in assaiiihg this deed was not for the purpose of avoiding it, but for the sole purpose of showing that the land conveyed by it was intended as an advancement to appellee, and that he should be charged with it in the partition of his mother’s estate. Evidence of this character, we think, was admissible, and should have been heard under the authorities above cited.
Believing that the court erred in both the respects indicated, the motion for rehearing is overruled.
Motion overruled.