Court Opinion

ID: 9383640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:01:10.752599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.145967
License: Public Domain

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                                                  PUBLISHED

                                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                   No. 22-6495

        WEBSTER DOUGLAS WILLIAMS, III

                       Plaintiff – Appellant,

        v.

        MICHAEL CARVAJAL

                       Defendant – Appellee.

        ------------------------------

        ARC OF THE UNITED STATES; MENTAL HEALTH AMERICA; NATIONAL
        DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK

                       Amici Supporting Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina at
        Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge (5:20−ct−03189−FL)

        Argued: January 24, 2023                                           Decided: March 29, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and Max O. COGBURN, Jr., United
        States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge Diaz
        and Judge Cogburn joined.
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        ARGUED:        Jennifer A. Wedekind, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
        Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Holly Paxson Pratesi, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel K.
        Siegel, Michele Delgado, ACLU OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION,
        Raleigh, North Carolina; Kaitlin Banner, Jacqueline Kutnik-Bauder, Ashika Verriest,
        Margaret Hart, WASHINGTON LAWYERS’ COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS &
        URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United
        States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellee. Samuel Weiss, RIGHTS BEHIND BARS, Washington, D.C., for
        Amici Curiae.

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

               Webster Williams, a federal inmate, sued Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) staff

        alleging, inter alia, discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act. The district

        court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.

        According to the court, the Prison Litigation Reform Act required Williams to exhaust both

        the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program and an additional remedy, particular to prison

        discrimination claims, administered by the Department of Justice’s Director of Equal

        Employment Opportunity. Williams appeals, arguing that he was only required to exhaust

        the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.

        Williams asserts in the alternative that the Department of Justice remedies were not

        “available” to him. We disagree with both contentions and thus affirm the district court’s

        dismissal without prejudice for failure to exhaust.

                                                      I.

                                                      A.

               On February 28, 2019, Webster Williams was walking to his work assignment at

        the Butner Federal Correctional Complex in North Carolina when he developed a strong

        urge to urinate. Williams suffers from several medical conditions, including kidney

        disease, and takes a diuretic that causes excessive urination. As Williams headed to the

        restroom, an alarm was triggered elsewhere in the prison. BOP Unit Manager Willis

        responded by heading to the restroom entrance and telling inmates to return to their cells.

        Williams proceeded past Willis without addressing him and went into a stall.

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                While Williams was in the restroom stall, an unknown individual began rapping on

        the stall door and asked Williams to return to his cell. When Williams exited the restroom,

        Willis confronted him, asking why Williams disobeyed orders. Williams responded that he

        took “water pills, and [he] had to use the restroom.” J.A. 17. He then proceeded back to his

        cell.

                BOP officials issued a disciplinary action report charging Williams with refusal to

        obey Willis’s command. Williams requested a hearing before a Uniform Disciplinary

        Committee (UDC). Williams explained to the UDC that he disobeyed the order due to his

        overwhelming need to urinate arising from his medical conditions and argued that Willis

        “intentionally omitted” that fact from his report. J.A. 19. Williams also presented the

        officers conducting the UDC hearing with copies of the Americans with Disabilities Act,

        which they declined to review. The officers found Williams guilty of refusing to obey an

        order, allegedly responding “[w]ho do you think we’re going to believe, an inmate or one

        of our own?” Id. Williams was sanctioned with the loss of telephone privileges for one

        month. He is concerned that the disciplinary infraction will affect his chances for early

        home confinement when he becomes eligible.

                                                    B.

                Williams filed a grievance contesting the UDC decision, following the guidelines

        set forth in BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP). 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10–542.19.

        The ARP sets forth the BOP’s grievance process. This internal appeals process “allow[s]

        an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own

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        confinement.” Id. § 542.10(a). The ARP is fully completed when an inmate appeals to and

        receives a response from BOP’s General Counsel. Id. § 542.15(a).

               After Williams completed the final step of this administrative process, he filed a pro

        se complaint in federal court against various BOP officials. He alleged that the disciplinary

        charge and subsequent conviction were in violation of the disability protections of the

        Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). He also claimed that the UDC procedures violated

        his procedural due process rights. Williams sought compensatory and punitive damages,

        as well as injunctive relief directing defendants not to transfer him to another BOP facility,

        to accommodate his disability, and to expunge his disciplinary conviction.

               In a screening order, the district court allowed Williams’s discrimination and

        retaliation claims to proceed under the Rehabilitation Act and dismissed all other claims.

        The court also dismissed all defendants except Michael Carvajal, the BOP Director,

        reasoning that the Rehabilitation Act only allowed for suits against prison officials in their

        official capacities. J.A. 35 (citing Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 472 (4th Cir.

        1999)). According to the court, only Director Carvajal was properly named in his official

        capacity. The district court also dismissed Williams’s claim for damages under the

        Rehabilitation Act, as “such remedies are barred by sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Lane

        v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 200 (1996)). Williams moved for reconsideration.

               BOP simultaneously moved to dismiss Williams’s complaint for failure to exhaust

        under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The district court

        granted BOP’s motion, construed as a motion for summary judgment, and denied

        Williams’s motion for reconsideration. The court noted that the PLRA requires an inmate

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        to exhaust all “available” remedies. Williams v. Carvajal, No. 5:20-CT-3189-FL, 2022 WL

        945587, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 29, 2022). Though Williams properly exhausted the ARP,

        he did not exhaust the “additional procedure for exhaustion of administrative remedies

        when an inmate asserts discrimination or retaliation based on account of a disability.” Id.

        (citing 28 C.F.R. § 39.170). This additional process, administered by the Department of

        Justice’s Director for Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), “applies to all allegations of

        discrimination on the basis of handicap in programs or activities conducted by the agency.”

        28 C.F.R. § 39.170(a). The EEO process twice refers to complaints filed by BOP inmates

        in its implementing regulations. See id. § 39.170(d)(1), (3).

               The district court reasoned that the PLRA’s mandatory language required

        Rehabilitation Act claimants to exhaust both the BOP’s ARP and the EEO process. It

        further held that Williams had “not established that the EEO process is unavailable” under

        the standards delineated in Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642-44 (2016). Williams, 2022

        WL 945587, at *4. Williams’s failure to exhaust the EEO process led the court to dismiss

        the case, and this appeal timely followed.

               Williams appeals, arguing that the PLRA requires only the exhaustion of internal

        prison grievance procedures like the ARP, and not external grievance procedures like the

        EEO process. He further contends that even if he did have to exhaust the EEO process, that

        process was unavailable to him within the meaning of the PLRA. Last, he argues that the

        district court erred in dismissing all the defendants except for Director Carvajal.

               We hold that the PLRA requires Williams to exhaust both the ARP and the EEO

        process and that the EEO process was “available” to Williams. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

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        Since we affirm the dismissal without prejudice of Williams’s sole remaining claim under

        the Rehabilitation Act for failure to exhaust, we need not take up at this juncture the

        argument that the district court improperly dismissed the other defendants. We shall

        address the exhaustion issues in turn.

                                                      II.

               This court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s dismissal without prejudice

        under Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 796 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc). The district court

        construed Carvajal’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, which we

        review de novo. Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 621 (4th Cir. 2021). “Summary judgment

        is appropriate only if no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to

        judgment as a matter of law.” Griffin v. Bryant, 56 F.4th 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal

        quotations omitted). As the non-moving party, “we view the facts in the light most

        favorable” to Williams. Id.

               Williams claims that the PLRA requires exhaustion only of internal prison grievance

        procedures. He thus contends he complied with the PLRA in exhausting the ARP only and

        not the additional EEO process. We disagree for several reasons. First, Williams’s reading

        of the PLRA would require us to place our own gloss on the statute, one which is barred

        by both the plain language of its text and Supreme Court precedent. Second, a dual

        exhaustion requirement furthers the purposes of the PLRA. Third, to hold in Williams’s

        favor would be to upset established case law and to place a significant burden on district

        courts in adjudicating these suits.

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                                                       A.

               As always, an issue of statutory interpretation begins with the text. McAdams v.

        Robinson, 26 F.4th 149, 156 (4th Cir. 2022). The text of the PLRA’s exhaustion

        requirement reads: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under

        section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison,

        or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

        exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). This exhaustion requirement means

        what it says: “There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA[.]” Jones

        v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). “And that mandatory language means a court may not

        excuse a failure to exhaust, even to take special circumstances into account.” Ross, 578

        U.S. at 639.

               Over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has strictly interpreted this exhaustion

        provision. It applies to all “suits about prison life, whether they involve general

        circumstances or particular episodes,” and whether they fall “under § 1983 or any other

        Federal law.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 532 (2002) (internal quotations omitted).

        Exhaustion, moreover, must be “proper,” which means that “a prisoner must complete the

        administrative review process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including

        deadlines, as a precondition for bringing suit in federal court.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

        81, 88 (2006). The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies

        “regardless of the relief offered through administrative procedures.” Booth v. Churner, 532

        U.S. 731, 741 (2001).

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               The Court has also made it clear that it will not read “exceptions into statutory

        exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.” Id. at 741 n.6. The only

        exception Congress provided in the text of the PLRA is the mention of “such administrative

        remedies as are available.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (emphasis added). As such, the Supreme

        Court held in Ross v. Blake that the only exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement

        is when an administrative remedy is not “available.” 578 U.S. at 642. “Available,” in turn,

        means “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose, and that which is accessible

        or may be obtained.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). An inmate is therefore required to

        exhaust those “grievance procedures that are capable of use to obtain some relief for the

        action complained of.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Aside from this exception, “the

        PLRA’s text suggests no limits on an inmate’s obligation to exhaust[.]” Id. at 639.

               Despite the clear text, Williams seeks to add his own spin. Williams does not, and

        cannot, argue that claims brought by inmates under the Rehabilitation Act are exempt from

        the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (exhaustion

        requirement applies to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or “any other Federal law”); see

        also O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that

        the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing

        claims under the Rehabilitation Act in federal court). According to Williams, however,

        “[e]xhaustion of internal prison grievance procedures is all the PLRA requires.” Appellant

        Opening Br. at 16 (emphasis added). This would mean, he says, that he was only required

        to exhaust the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program (ARP), not the Department of

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        Justice EEO process specifically implemented to address complaints of discrimination

        under the Rehabilitation Act.

               Williams’s argument runs afoul of the PLRA’s text. The statute does not say “such

        internal administrative remedies as are available.” It says, “such administrative remedies

        as are available,” full stop. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The statutory text speaks to the

        availability of certain remedies, not who created them. We thus cannot accept Williams’s

        suggested limitation on the PLRA. It is our role to “enforce plain and unambiguous

        statutory language according to its terms.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560

        U.S. 242, 251 (2010); see also Triton Marine Fuels Ltd., S.A. v. M/V Pac. Chukokta, 575

        F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2009). The plain language of the PLRA requires exhaustion of all

        administrative remedies, so long as they are available.

               Williams’s claim here falls within the scope of two different administrative

        remedies: the BOP’s ARP and the DOJ EEO process. Both systems are set out in detail in

        their implementing regulations.

               To fully exhaust the ARP, prisoners must follow the guidelines set out in 28 C.F.R.

        part 542. First, they must attempt an informal resolution with prison staff. 28 C.F.R

        § 542.13(a). Second, they must request and file a formal written Administrative Remedy

        Request on the appropriate form with certain identifying information. Id. § 542.14(a). This

        step must be completed within 20 days of the incident that gave rise to the grievance, and

        the facility warden has up to 40 days to respond. Id. §§ 542.14(a), 542.18. After receiving

        the warden’s response, an inmate must submit an appeal to the appropriate BOP Regional

        Director within 20 days. Id. § 542.15(a). The Regional Director then has up to 60 days to

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        respond to the appeal. Id. § 542.18. Lastly, the “final administrative appeal” is to BOP’s

        General Counsel, which must be completed within 30 days of the Regional Director’s

        signed response. Id. § 542.15(a). The General Counsel then has up to 60 days to respond.

        Id. § 542.18.

               For most claims, federal inmates need only follow the rules of the ARP. For

        Rehabilitation Act claims, however, inmates must also follow the procedures laid out in 28

        C.F.R. § 39.170. These compliance procedures apply “to all allegations of discrimination

        on the basis of a handicap in programs or activities conducted by the” Department of

        Justice, of which BOP is part. Id. § 39.170(a). These procedures expressly apply to inmates

        and explain when and how to file a complaint. Id. § 39.170(d)(1)– (4).

               The regulation first requires exhaustion of the BOP’s ARP before an inmate can

        seek relief with the EEO, and a complaint must be filed with the EEO within 180 days of

        completing the ARP. Id. § 39.170(b)(1)(ii), (3). Within 180 days of receipt of a complaint,

        an official at EEO must complete an investigation into the claims alleged, attempt informal

        resolution, and if no informal resolution is achieved, issue a letter of findings. Id. at

        § 39.170(g)(1). Either party may appeal those findings to the EEO’s Complaint

        Adjudication Officer within 30 days. Id., § 39.170(i)(1). A party may also request a hearing

        before an administrative law judge. Id. at § 39.170(i),(k). The Complaint Adjudication

        Officer then has 60 days to resolve the appeal, measured either from receipt of the notice

        of appeal and investigative record, or if a hearing occurred, after the period for filing

        exceptions ends. Id. at § 39.170(l)(1). Once the Complaint Adjudication Officer issues a

        final agency decision, this administrative process is exhausted.

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               Inmates lodging Rehabilitation Act claims must follow both the ARP and the EEO

        process. While Williams exhausted the ARP, he failed even to initiate the EEO process.

        This proves fatal to Williams’s argument because the EEO remedies, to the extent that they

        are “available” to Williams, must have been exhausted pursuant to the plain language of

        the PLRA. See Ross, 578 U.S. at 642. The statute speaks of “available” administrative

        remedies. It does not seek to subdivide them. Williams’s attempt to distinguish between

        “internal” and “external” remedies thus falters upon first read of the statutory text.

                                                       B.

               Williams argues that this interpretation undermines the whole purpose of the PLRA.

        To the contrary, requiring exhaustion of both the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program

        and the EEO process serves the goals that the PLRA was enacted to achieve. Congress

        passed the PLRA “to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Nussle,

        534 U.S. at 524. The PLRA’s “invigorated” exhaustion requirement is the “centerpiece” of

        the legislation. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84 (internal quotations omitted). Such “[e]xhaustion

        of administrative remedies serves two main purposes.” Id. at 89 (citing McCarthy v.

        Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). First, it “protects administrative agency authority”

        by giving “an agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the

        programs it administers before it is haled into federal court.” Id. (internal quotations

        omitted). Second, “exhaustion promotes efficiency.” Id. Complaints can be resolved

        satisfactorily at the administrative level, thereby reducing litigation, and litigation that does

        occur is improved by an already compiled and vetted record. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 219.

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               Requiring an inmate alleging a Rehabilitation Act violation to exhaust both the EEO

        process and the BOP’s ARP fully serves these purposes. Such a scheme, as an initial matter,

        makes sequential sense. It initially gives the BOP the chance to correct its own mistakes

        through the ARP. It then allows the complaint to proceed to DOJ, the agency charged by

        the President to coordinate the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act across the federal

        government. See Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (Nov. 2, 1980). The EEO

        process, which is explicitly and specifically tailored to disability discrimination claims,

        then gets to properly address the alleged violations. See 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(a).

               Such a dual exhaustion requirement, then, allows BOP to avail itself of the expertise

        of the DOJ, and DOJ can then apply that expertise to correct BOP mistakes. It would make

        little sense to disqualify the administrative remedy which brings the greatest expertise and

        experience to the issue that plaintiff has raised. “The basic purpose of . . . exhaustion

        doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special

        competence— to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors

        so as to moot judicial controversies.” Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972).

               Despite this, Williams argues that “‘[f]iling a complaint with the DOJ, an external

        federal agency, does not allow correctional officers to respond directly to inmates’

        grievances nor does it allow them to remedy the issues raised in the grievance.’” Appellant

        Opening Br. at 21 (quoting Veloz v. New York, 339 F. Supp. 2d 505, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).

        Not so. The EEO procedures give BOP officials the opportunity to address claims directly

        to ensure that they are complying with the Rehabilitation Act. As we have noted, the EEO

        process requires as its first step investigation into the actions complained of and attempted

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        informal resolution of the claim. See 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(g)(1). The EEO official can also

        “require agency employees to cooperate in the investigation and attempted resolution of

        complaints.” Id. § 39.170(g)(2). With DOJ guidance, the EEO process provides additional

        time and resources for BOP officials to correct any mistakes within prisons themselves.

               Finally, a dual exhaustion requirement also promotes efficiency. Far from being

        “redundant bureaucratic entanglement” which “only acts to postpone and delay,” as

        Williams argues, see Appellant Opening Br. at 21, the EEO process can resolve claims

        “much more quickly and economically . . . than in litigation in federal court,” Woodford,

        548 U.S. at 89. Whereas the EEO process takes about a year to complete, the lifespan of

        the average civil case in federal court is much more variable and usually longer. Compare

        28 C.F.R. § 39.170, with Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts., Federal Court Management

        Statistics (Sept. 30, 2022) (for the 12-month period ending September 30, 2022, civil

        actions in U.S. district courts took on average 34.4 months from filing to the date trial

        began).

               Rather than delay a remedy for certain complaints, the DOJ is empowered to require

        immediate change within the BOP. The regulations require prompt action from any entity

        found to be in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(l). DOJ can also

        “require periodic compliance reports,” in which an entity like the BOP must demonstrate

        active compliance with any decision from the EEO. Id. § 39.170(l)(2). Had Williams

        followed the EEO process, the injunctive relief he now seeks might have been resolved

        without resort to federal litigation. See Nussle, 534 U.S. at 525 (exhaustion “obviate[es]

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        the need for litigation” by encouraging “corrective action taken in response to an inmate’s

        grievance”).

               As a last-ditch effort, Williams argues that a “double-exhaustion requirement would

        impose different and unequal burdens on plaintiffs with disabilities bringing Rehabilitation

        Act claims.” Appellant Opening Br. at 34. We disagree. Providing an additional

        administrative remedy in an agency with special expertise in disability discrimination is

        not discriminatory. Rather, it is intended to “channel claims into an appropriate forum,

        where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation obviated before

        resort to federal court.” Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). Requiring

        exhaustion of EEO processes gives Williams another shot at obtaining administrative relief

        before he must resort to often-protracted litigation. Far from discriminating against

        plaintiffs with disabilities, this ensures that their claims will be heard in a proper forum and

        that they may receive a proper remedy. Such a system is entirely lawful.

                                                      C.

               We further note that courts within our circuit that have confronted this issue have

        concluded that the PLRA requires exhaustion of the BOP’s ARP and the EEO process. See

        Wise v. C. Maruka, No. CV 1:20-00056, 2021 WL 1603819, at *11 (S.D.W. Va. Jan. 5,

        2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Wise v. Maruka, No. CV 1:20-00056,

        2021 WL 1146002 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 25, 2021); Peppers v. Moubarek, No. CV PWG-19-

        2346, 2020 WL 5759763, at *9 (D. Md. Sept. 25, 2020); Hopper v. Barr, No. 5:18-CV-

        01147-MGL-KDW, 2019 WL 3938076, at *6 (D.S.C. July 31, 2019), report and

        recommendation adopted, No. CV 5:18-1147-MGL, 2019 WL 3935181 (D.S.C. Aug. 20,

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        2019); Gambino v. Hershberger, No. CV TDC-17-1701, 2019 WL 1300856, at *10 (D.

        Md. Mar. 20, 2019); Zoukis v. Wilson, No. 1:14-CV-1041-LMB/IDD, 2015 WL 4064682,

        at *10 (E.D. Va. July 2, 2015).

               Many district courts around the country have likewise reached the same conclusion.

        See, e.g., Barrett v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 19-CV-3250, 2022 WL 93504, at *5

        (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2022) (collecting cases). The persistence before the district courts of the

        various issues presented in this case further underscores the importance of a rigorous

        exhaustion requirement. If we were to relieve prisoners like Williams of pursuing

        administrative remedies before the DOJ, we would be imposing a large burden on district

        courts to resolve many insubstantial claims that would not have survived the scrutiny of

        the EEO. This undermines the very purpose of the PLRA to “reduce the quantity and

        improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Nussle, 534 U.S. at 524. We agree with the vast

        majority of courts that find the PLRA requires exhaustion of both the BOP’s ARP and the

        EEO process for federal inmates alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act.

                                                     III.

               As exhaustion of the EEO process is required, Williams argues in the alternative

        that the EEO process was not “available” to him under the PLRA. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

        The Supreme Court held in Ross v. Blake that the sole exception to the PLRA’s exhaustion

        requirement is that the remedy must be “available.” 578 U.S. at 648. According to

        Williams, he was never informed about the EEO process, rendering it unavailable to him.

               Again we disagree. Although the record indicates that the BOP could have been

        clearer in its instructions to prisoners alleging Rehabilitation Act claims, we cannot

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        conclude that the EEO process was unavailable under the standards delineated in the Ross

        decision.

                                                    A.

              The Supreme Court instructed that “the ordinary meaning of the word available” in

        the PLRA is “capable of use for the accomplishment of a purpose and that which is

        accessible or may be obtained.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 642 (internal quotations omitted).

        Therefore, “if a prison grievance procedure’s provided avenues for recourse are not

        meaningfully ‘capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained of,’ the

        exhaustion requirement ‘does not come into play.’” Griffin, 56 F.4th at 335 (quoting Ross,

        578 U.S. at 642–43).

              Under this standard, the Supreme Court has identified three circumstances where an

        administrative remedy may be considered unavailable. First, an administrative procedure

        is unavailable when it “operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently

        unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates.” Ross, 578 U.S. at 643. Second, “an

        administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable

        of use.” Id. Such a scenario involves a situation in which “rules are so confusing that no

        reasonable prisoner can use them,” rendering the remedies “essentially unknowable.” Id.

        at 644 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Third, a remedy is unavailable “when

        prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through

        machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” Id.

              Williams cannot contend that the EEO process operates as a simple dead end.

        Instead, he essentially argues that since he was unaware of the EEO process, it was

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        unavailable to him. Simple unawareness, however, does not rise to the level of

        unavailability. An unavailable remedy is one “that was not discovered, and which could

        not have been discovered through reasonable effort, until it was too late for it to be used[.]”

        Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). And further,

        simple unawareness does not show that BOP played “hide-and-seek” with the EEO process

        so as to thwart Williams’s access to it. Ross, 578 U.S. at 644 n.3 (internal quotations

        omitted).

               Simply put, the EEO process was “capable of use to obtain some relief for the action

        complained of,” and thus is “available” within the meaning of the PLRA. Ross, 578 U.S.

        at 642 (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, Williams does not argue that other inmates

        have not used it. On appeal, the government presented evidence of BOP Program Statement

        5200.06. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Management of Inmates with Disabilities, Program

        Statement 5200.06 (Nov. 22, 2019). Although that policy was not promulgated until after

        Williams appealed to BOP’s General Counsel, at which time Williams still could have

        utilized the EEO process, its substantially similar predecessor policy was in force for all

        other relevant events. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Management of Inmates with

        Disabilities, Program Statement 5200.05 (Oct. 27, 2017). Either way, some BOP program

        statement governed the steps Williams needed to take after he completed the ARP. The

        Program Statements both have a section entitled “Administrative Remedies,” stating that,

        in addition to the ARP, “inmates alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act must also use

        additional procedures required by the [DOJ] in order to exhaust available administrative

        remedies.” Id. at 10; Program Statement 5200.06 at 11. The Program Statements also

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        explicitly directed inmates to the “DOJ procedures . . . found at 28 C.F.R. § 39.170.”

        Program Statement 5200.05 at 10; Program Statement 5200.06 at 11. Finally, the Program

        Statements were publicly available. See also Barrett, 2022 WL 93504, at *9 (finding that

        Program Statement 5200.06 was available to a BOP inmate through the Electronic Law

        Library).

              The EEO remedy was not only generally available to all inmates. Williams also

        could have discovered the Program Statements and the EEO process through reasonable

        effort. Indeed, Williams’s pro se complaint shows an understanding both of the case law

        involved in his complaint and his rights under the Rehabilitation Act. He even went so far

        as to cite in his complaint a magistrate’s recommendation on a preliminary injunction

        motion in a case where the same magistrate judge recommended that a Rehabilitation Act

        claim should be dismissed for failure to exhaust both the ARP and the EEO process.

        Compare J.A. 9 (citing Washington v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 5:16-CV-03913-BHH-

        KDW, 2018 WL 6499514 (D.S.C. Aug. 6, 2018)), with Washington v. Fed. Bureau of

        Prisons, No. 5:16-CV-03913-BHH-KDW, 2019 WL 2125246, at *7–8 (D.S.C. Jan. 3,

        2019). Moreover, after the district court dismissed all but Williams’s Rehabilitation Act

        claims in a screening order, he filed objections in which he referred to BOP Program

        Statement 5200.06. See Suppl. App’x 2. This was two months before the government’s

        motion to dismiss in which it asserted its exhaustion defense. See J.A. 43–44.

              In prison litigation as elsewhere, there are all kinds of statutes, regulations, and case

        law that may be helpful to any given claim. The government cannot be expected to make

        inmates aware of each and every legal authority that might be of use. See Lewis v. Casey,

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        518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (finding that the constitutional right of access to the courts “does

        not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into litigating engines”).

        Such a requirement would come uncomfortably close to requiring the government to

        assume a quasi-legal role in support of an inmate’s claim. Here, BOP issued a separate

        Program Statement requiring prisoners to exhaust the EEO process. In short, we cannot

        find that a plainly available administrative procedure was in some way unavailable as the

        Supreme Court in Ross has defined it.

                                                     B.

               Although we hold the EEO process was “available” to Williams, we observe that it

        would pain the BOP very little to make clearer to inmates filing Rehabilitation Act claims

        that they are required to exhaust both the BOP’s grievance policies and the EEO process.

        The administrative exhaustion process, with its various program statements and agency

        procedures, should, in short, be made clear to those who seek to utilize it. The fact that a

        process may in a strict sense be “available” does not entirely absolve the BOP of an

        obligation to inform inmates of what is required of them and where remedies may be found.

        For example, as the district court observed, “the administrative remedy program does not

        mention the EEO procedure for disability claims[.]” Williams, 2022 WL 945587, at *4. It

        would be a superior practice going forward to indicate within the ARP the administrative

        course that the PLRA requires Rehabilitation Act claimants to pursue. Clearer notice to

        Rehabilitation Act claimants in the future may assist with the PLRA’s aim in reducing

        prison litigation. It will at least spare district courts the need for innumerable dismissals

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        without prejudice for failure to exhaust, and it will spare inmates time wasted on unfruitful

        lawsuits and appeals.

                                                      IV.

               The PLRA’s exhaustion provision is plain. It requires prisoners to utilize all

        “available” administrative remedies. For Rehabilitation Act claimants, these remedies

        include both the BOP’s ARP and a separate EEO process administered by the DOJ.

        Williams failed to exhaust these remedies despite them being “available” to him under the

        PLRA. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Williams’s complaint

        without prejudice to his ability to exhaust the EEO remedies “available” to him within the

        meaning of the PLRA. * We trust that the administrative process will provide him the

        chance to fairly present his claims as he seeks to fulfill his statutory responsibilities.

                                                                                           AFFIRMED

               *
                We note that the EEO regulations allow an extension of the time to file a complaint
        “for good cause shown.” 28 C.F.R. § 39.170(d)(3).

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