Court Opinion

ID: 9728904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:18:54.975456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.935445
License: Public Domain

DANIELSON, J.
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to express my additional views since the purpose of this opinion is to discuss important issues which are likely to recur and, in my opinion, some of the issues would benefit from added discussion.
In this proceeding we considered a petition for a writ of mandate in which the People asked us to command the superior court to set aside an order for discovery made pursuant to the motion of the defendant supported by papers lodged and considered in camera, in a capital criminal case.

Scope and Character of Accused’s Discovery

As a general rule, an accused may have access to all evidence that can throw a light on the issues in the case, provided it is admissible and not confidential. The proper test for determining whether production must be granted is whether there is good reason to believe that the information when produced would be admissible in evidence for some purpose, e.g., for impeachment. (People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 586-587 [305 P.2d 1].)
An accused’s right to discovery is not without limitations, however, and “ ‘he does have to show some better cause . . . than a mere desire for the benefit of all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime.’ [Citations.]” (Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159 at p. 167 [49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416]; Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 at p. 537 [113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305].)
An accused’s request for discovery must describe the requested information with reasonable specificity and must be sustained by plausible justification. (Ballard, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 167; Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812 at p. 817 [112 Cal.Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353, 95 A.L.R.3d 820].)

Discovery by Prosecution

Discovery in criminal cases is not a two-way street. In contrast with discovery by the accused, discovery by the prosecution is very strictly and *1138narrowly limited. In People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776], our Supreme Court effectively terminated and prohibited prosecutorial discovery, with certain specific exceptions set forth in footnote 7, at pages 55-56 of that opinion. (For a review of the evolution of prosecutorial discovery see: People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 50-56; In re Misener (1985) 38 Cal.3d 543, 546-551 [213 Cal.Rptr. 569, 698 P.2d 637] (but see dis. opn. of Lucas, J.).)

Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Was Not Timely Made

In the case at bench the district attorney, in opposing defendant’s motion for discovery, raised the question of timeliness in making the motion. The trial court ruled that it did not think that lack of timeliness was a factor or a proper objection in this case.
Motions for discovery may be made at any time, before or during trial of a criminal case; however, in determining whether to grant the motion the trial court may consider the timeliness of the motion. A motion for discovery of records in possession of the prosecution, if made during the course of the trial, might delay the trial if the motion were granted. (Hill v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 812, 821.)
The granting of a motion for discovery in a criminal case is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order discovery in the interests of justice. (10 Cal.3d at p. 816.) Yet timeliness in making such motion is an important consideration. As the majority has pointed out (fn. 17, ante), the Legislature has declared the public policy of California that criminal cases be heard and determined at the earliest possible time.
In considering and ruling upon a motion for discovery made at the time of trial, or after trial has commenced, courts must exercise great care not to permit such motion to be used as a device or tactic to disrupt, or unduly to delay, the trial of the cause, while yet assuring the legitimate needs and rights of the defendant. Before such discovery is ordered the moving party should establish a sound justification for his lateness, by noticed motion, with fair opportunity for opposition by the adverse party, and not in an in camera proceeding.
Relevant factors which must be considered by the trial court in exercising its discretion to rule on a late motion for discovery include the moving party’s prior history of diligence in pretrial proceedings, the reasons for the late request, the length of time since the proceedings began, the present stage of the proceedings, the disruption and the delay reasonably expected *1139to ensue from the requested discovery and the perceived importance of that discovery.
In considering the question of timeliness trial courts must consider not only absolute time, i.e., the months or days since the prosecution was commenced, but, what may be more important, time as it relates to the present stage of the proceedings. A motion for discovery made as the trial is about to commence, or after the trial has commenced as in the case at bench, may create undesirable or prejudicial attendant circumstances which hamper the prosecution in performing its duties, cause disruption and delay, jeopardize an ongoing prosecution and, almost certainly, result in the unnecessary waste of judicial resources.
Discovery procedures should be conducted during the pretrial period, thereby providing all parties concerned with a fair opportunity to litigate whatever controversies may arise and avoiding the need to interrupt, stay, or compromise the trial. Even though the burden of producing the information sought may not itself be great, the very fact of being confronted with a discovery motion after the trial has commenced may jeopardize the prosecution and result in a serious interruption of the trial and harassment of counsel.
In the case at bench the original information was filed on June 6, 1985, charging defendant with several felonies, including two murders. Defendant filed a discovery motion on August 15, 1986; on August 22, 1986, that motion was granted and a continuing discovery order was entered. It is implicit from the record before us that the People have complied with that continuing order. Jury selection was commenced on December 15, 1987, and at a hearing of the motion, in February 1988, the trial judge stated that he was about to seat the jury.
The motion for discovery here in controversy was not filed until February 6, 1988—32 months after the information charging the defendant was filed; nearly 18 months after defendant’s original discovery motion was filed, resulting in the continuing order; and nearly two months after jury selection had commenced. The crime reports which defendant now seeks are for 12 crimes committed within the time span from June 27, 1984, until July 7, 1985—ending one month after the information was filed and more than a year before he filed his first discovery motion. The record before us does not disclose when defendant was arrested, but nine of those crimes took place before June 6, 1985, when the information was filed against defendant, and three occurred later, on June 28, July 5, and July 7, 1985. (See fn. 6, ante.)
The crime reports which defendant sought to discover all relate to a series of notorious, highly publicized crimes, which were of common knowledge *1140in the community and could not possibly have escaped the attention of persons such as defendant’s counsel, who are actively engaged in the practice of criminal law. In his declaration in support of the motion for discovery, as served on the district attorney and filed in the trial court, defendant’s counsel stated that the 12 requested reports pertained to the case of People v. Ramirez, pending in a different department of the superior court. Defendant’s delay of a year and a half in seeking discovery of those crime reports is unreasonable, and the requested discovery should not have been granted unless that delay was fully and satisfactorily explained and justified, or shown to be essential to the defense.
When the subject discovery order was made, on February 11, 1988, almost two months after jury selection had commenced, the People were confronted with a dilemma. They could either (1) seek an indefinite stay of the trial in order to obtain full judicial review of the trial court’s ruling, thereby jeopardizing the possibility of a successful prosecution, or (2) immediately comply with the discovery order, thereby rendering their request for relief moot and foregoing their right to full judicial review of a crucial issue. The People should not have been put to that choice; defendant’s late request had placed them in an untenable position. Because of the extreme emotional upset of one of their witnesses the People believed it important that the trial of the serious charges in this capital case be concluded as soon as possible and, under that compulsion, they complied with the order, rendering this cause moot. The dilemma was the product of the untimeliness of defendant’s motion which, on its face, was grossly prejudicial to the People. Such a circumstance is detrimental to the best interests of the administration of justice.

The Trial Court Erred in Considering, In Camera, Defendant’s Motion for Discovery Without First Finding That an In Camera Consideration Was Necessary to Protect Defendant’s Privilege Against Self-incrimination

The general rule as to discovery proceedings in criminal cases must be that they be open, not closed; secrecy is the exception, not the rule. Such discovery must be subject to notice, full litigation, judicial decision and, if necessary, judicial review, as are other proceedings in the administration of justice. The only exceptions to that rule must be those required by the need to safeguard constitutional rights or privileges, or such statutory rights or privileges as are consonant with our Constitutions.
The right of a defendant in a criminal case to use in camera proceedings in connection with discovery depends upon, and is required by, his privilege against self-incrimination. That privilege is guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that *1141“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...” and by article I, section 15, of the California Constitution which provides that “Persons may not... be compelled in a criminal cause to be a witness against themselves . . . .”
As interpreted by judicial decisions the privilege against self-incrimination protects persons from being compelled to testify as witnesses against themselves, and also from being compelled to produce documents (People v. Collie, supra, 30 Cal.3d 43, 55-56, but see fn. 7 at p. 55), or other information (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326-327 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673]) which may tend to incriminate them.
In People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, at page 770 [80 Cal.Rptr. 1, 457 P.2d 841], our Supreme Court adopted the language of the United States Supreme Court, “ ‘that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay. . . . Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against the accused out of his own mouth.’ (Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658-659 ...].) The People must ‘shoulder the entire load’ of their burden of proof in their case in chief, without assistance either from the defendant’s silence or from his compelled testimony. (Tehan v. Shott (1966) 382 U.S. 406, 415 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 459 . . .]; Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106 .. . ]; Murphy v. Waterfront Com. (1964) 378 U.S. 52 [12 L.Ed.2d 678 . . . ]; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) p. 317.)”
The scope of the privilege has been defined in opinions of our Supreme Court to forbid the compelled disclosure, by a defendant, of anything which “conceivably might lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief’ (Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 320, 326); or “which could serve as a ‘link in a chain’ of evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense” (ibid.); or that could “possibly have a tendency to incriminate the witness. [Citations.]” (Ibid.; see also, In re Misener, supra, 38 Cal.3d 543, 546 et seq.)
The privilege against self-incrimination strictly limits prosecutorial discovery against a defendant, and it also protects a defendant who seeks discovery from being compelled to disclose information which would tend to incriminate him.
It is established that when a defendant seeks discovery he may make a showing of his need for the discovery in camera, if necessary. (Pacific *1142Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 552, 558 [131 Cal.Rptr. 559]; People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 327, 330, fn. 1 [154 Cal.Rptr. 132].) But that does not mean that all defense discovery proceedings may be conducted in camera.
When the reason for an in camera proceeding is absent, there should be no in camera proceeding. Absent circumstances raising the privilege against self-incrimination, or other privilege provided by law, there is no reason to excuse the defendant from compliance, in open court, with the normal adversary procedures of criminal litigation. The defendant must then establish the necessary plausible justification for the requested discovery in open court and subject to opposition in an adversary proceeding. (Pacific Lighting Leasing Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 567.)
When the court does not find that in camera proceedings are necessary the papers should be ordered to be served and filed in the cause and openly and regularly litigated according to the normal procedures of criminal litigation.
In the case at bench no finding of justification for an in camera proceeding was made, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant’s right to utilize in camera procedures was ever separately considered. Insofar as the record discloses, the papers were simply lodged for in camera review, and thusly received and considered, without question, and as a matter of course.
In his return to the petition for writ of mandate in this proceeding, defendant has lodged with this court, under seal, “[a] copy of defense counsel’s declaration, marked exhibit ‘D’ ”, which we must assume is a true copy of the document which he had lodged with the trial court, for in camera inspection, in support of his motion for discovery. The writer has examined said exhibit D and notes that, in addition to the declaration of defense counsel, the exhibit contains a ten-page memorandum of points and authorities (which is not the same as the three-page memorandum which he served and filed as part of his in-court motion papers), and also copies of two court reporters’ daily transcripts which are matters of public record. With the exception of defense counsel’s declaration those documents should not have been received and considered in camera.
After examining the declaration of defense counsel, lodged in camera with the trial court in support of defendant’s motion for discovery, the writer finds that if the decision had been his to make, he would have found and ruled that an in camera proceeding was not necessary to protect the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and would have ordered *1143that all of the motion papers, including the declaration, be served and filed regularly in the cause and subject to full litigation as with any other motion. The writer recognizes that discovery in criminal cases rests in the sound discretion of the trial court; however, it is axiomatic that fair minds can differ. In the case at bench, as in similar cases, the court having exercised its discretion, and there being some substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision, I would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and the trial court’s implied decision to consider defense counsel’s declaration in camera should stand.
During the hearing before the trial court defendant’s reasons for requesting in camera consideration were not specifically stated but, in the colloquy among counsel and the court, it appeared to be mutually assumed and conceded that defendant wished to examine the requested crime reports in order to study the modus operand! of the perpetrator of those crimes. The implicit reason for this was to determine whether there was substantial commonality between the methods employed in the commission of the crimes described in the sought-after reports and the crimes with which the defendant is here charged. From that it can be inferred that defendant was seeking evidence or information from which it could be argued that a third party was the perpetrator of the crimes charged against defendant.
In that colloquy the trial court referred to the decision in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99], stating that Hall involved “discovery” and that he was “bound by it.” The trial judge misread Hall. Hall is not a discovery case. The questions decided in Hall were raised in an offer of proof. Hall does not deal with the privilege against self-incrimination. Hall relates to the admissibility of evidence of third party culpability. In Hall our Supreme Court ruled that: “[I]t is always proper to defend against criminal charges by showing that a third person, and not the defendant, committed the crime charged.” (People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 832.) “To be admissible, the third party evidence . . . need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. At the same time, we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible culpability. . . . [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant’s guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.” (Id. at p. 833.) “[C]ourts should simply treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if relevant it is admissible ([Evid. Code] § 350) unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion (§ 352).” (Id. at p. 834.)
*1144The sense of Hall is that evidence of third party culpability, when admissible, is essentially exculpatory in nature. Therefore evidence of third party culpability could not possibly have a tendency to incriminate the accused. (See Prudhomme v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d 320, 326.)
The crime reports which defendant sought to discover in these proceedings were discoverable, since they are not privileged,1 they probably meet the minimum degree of plausible justification that should be required by a court, and might lead to the discovery of evidence which might assist him in preparing his defense (see Ballard v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167). Nevertheless, the discovery motion should have been regularly served, noticed, and litigated. The search for evidence of third party culpability does not require or justify in camera procedure.

The Trial Court Erred in Citing and Relying on an Unpublished Opinion

Rule 977(a), California Rules of Court, provides: “An opinion that is not ordered published shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any other action or proceeding except as provided in subdivision (b).” The exceptions provided in subdivision (b) do not apply in this case.
At the hearing of the discovery motion on February 11, 1988, the trial court stated: “The record should reflect that I have been provided copies of an opinion and order for a peremptory writ of mandate in the matter of Richard Ramirez . . . out of Division VII of our Second Appellate District. There’s also an order modifying that opinion that was filed January the 21st that I’m in receipt of. I have read and considered the document.”
Later, during the same hearing, the court inquired of counsel: “How much weight can I give to the opinion and order for peremptory writ of mandate that was filed January the 6th with modifications January the 21st in the case of Richard Ramirez, which is a pending case in [a different department of] our court? . . . How much weight can I give that, if any?”
Defense counsel replied: “Your Honor, I think you can certainly use that opinion as a guide. I don’t believe it is published. So, it is not binding on you and, accordingly, under the rules of court it is not properly cited as authority. But it certainly serves as persuasive authority similar to a well-reasoned and compelled [sic] timely law review article on the subject.”
*1145Near the close of that day’s hearing, as the court was about to make its ruling, the court stated: “. . . and I have to give great weight to what happened in—as to our court insofar as that peremptory writ was issued to our very court in the matter of Richard Ramirez ... as [defense counsel] indicated is not a published report.”
In response to the court’s inquiry, defense counsel should have informed the court, pursuant to rule 977(a), that neither the court nor any party could cite or rely on that unpublished opinion. Defense counsel knew that the upublished opinion could not properly be cited as authority, and so informed the court.
It was error for the trial court to have received and to have read and considered that unpublished opinion, let alone to have given it “great weight” in arriving at its ruling on the discovery motion. The trial court, sua sponte, should have ordered that the unpublished opinion, and all references to it, be deemed stricken from the file.

The Requested Discovery Was Described With Adequate Specificity

Petitioner goes to some length arguing that defendant failed to describe the information sought with adequate specificity to justify the discovery order. That argument is without merit. The descriptions of the reports sought by the defendant are models of specificity. (See majority opn., fn. 6, pp. 1126-1127, ante.) There is no ambiguity whatsoever.
The petition of the People for review by the Supreme Court was denied February 23, 1989.

 No claim of privilege has been asserted by the People.