Court Opinion

ID: 9948832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 00:02:34.40576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:04.448097
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/22/24; pub. order 3/7/24 (see end of opn.)

             COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION ONE

                                   STATE OF CALIFORNIA

RYNOLD DWAYNE JACKSON,                               D081549

        Plaintiff and Appellant,

        v.                                           (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1919245)

MARIO LARA et al.,

        Defendants and Respondents.

        APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Janet M. Frangie, Judge. Affirmed.

        Law Office of Zulu Ali & Associates, Zulu Ali and Lance Kennix for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
        Murchison & Cumming, James O. Eiler, Paul W. Burke, and
Matthew E. Voss for Defendants and Respondents.
        Rynold Dwayne Jackson (Jackson) appeals the entry of summary
judgment against him on his complaint for malicious prosecution and unfair
business practices, arguing that there are triable issues of fact on both causes
of action. We disagree because both causes of action fail as a matter of law;
therefore, we affirm the judgment.
                                        I.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        On April 2, 2016, Jackson went to Misty’s Lounge (Misty’s), which is a
nightclub located within the Doubletree by Hilton Ontario Airport (Hotel).
After approximately an hour and a half, during which time Jackson
consumed food and alcohol, a bartender refused to serve Jackson additional
alcohol on the purported basis that Jackson was intoxicated. Jackson
believed he was refused service based on his race, and he requested to speak
to a supervisor. Mario Lara (Lara), the director of security for the Hotel,
responded to Jackson’s complaint. Jackson and Lara initially discussed the
matter inside Misty’s but then continued the discussion in the lobby of the
Hotel. Lara confirmed the bartender’s decision and did not allow Jackson to
re-enter Misty’s on the purported grounds that Jackson was intoxicated, and
that Misty’s was closing at that time, which was the early morning of April 3,
2016.
        While Lara and Jackson were in the lobby, they came into physical
contact with each other. Jackson believed that Lara initiated that contact,
while Lara believed Jackson struck him. Lara then called the police and
informed the responding officer that he wanted to press charges, resulting in
a criminal prosecution against Jackson for battery.
        During his criminal trial in 2019, Jackson moved for acquittal pursuant

to Penal Code section 1118.11 after the close of the prosecution’s case. The

1      Both Jackson’s counsel and the trial court referred to Penal Code
section 1118, which authorizes a motion for acquittal in a case tried without a
jury. Penal Code section 1118.1, on the other hand, authorizes such a motion
in a case tried before a jury. Because Jackson was tried before a jury, the
motion and the court’s ruling are more accurately characterized as being
under section 1118.1.

                                        2
trial court found that there was substantial evidence of battery and therefore
denied the motion. Trial resumed and the jury ultimately found Jackson not
guilty.
      On July 1, 2019, Jackson filed a civil complaint regarding the incident
on April 2 and 3, 2016. The operative complaint, which is the second
amendment complaint filed on January 13, 2020 (SAC), contains two causes
of action. The first is for malicious prosecution against Lara, under which
Jackson alleges that he was criminally prosecuted based on Lara’s false
accusation of assault. The second is for a violation of the Unfair Competition
Law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) against DT Management,
LLC (DT), which is the company that managed Misty’s and the Hotel. Under
that cause of action, Jackson alleges that DT denied African Americans equal
access, allowed discriminatory behavior by its employees, and deleted footage
of the incident except for footage that appeared to inculpate Jackson.
      On December 16, 2021, Lara and DT (collectively Respondents) filed a
motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, of the
SAC. Jackson filed a written opposition, but after the court issued a
tentative ruling granting the motion, he failed to appear at the motion
hearing on April 22, 2022. The court interpreted Jackson’s failure to appear

                                      3
as a submission on the tentative and granted the motion.2 The trial court
then entered judgment in favor of Respondents on April 28, 2022. Jackson
timely appeals from that judgment.
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
      A. Standard of Review

      “A defendant moving for summary judgment must show the plaintiff’s
causes of action have no merit. It may do so by negating an element of a
cause of action or showing it has a complete defense to a cause of action. The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a triable issue of material fact as to
the cause of action or defense.” (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 171, 182.)
      “We review a summary judgment ruling de novo. [Citation] ‘In
practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules
and standards which govern a trial court’s determination of a motion for
summary judgment.’ ” (Perry v. City of San Diego (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 172,
178.) “Though summary judgment review is de novo, review is limited to

2     The order granting summary judgment does not contain any reasons
other than deeming Jackson’s failure to appear as a submission on the
tentative ruling, and the tentative ruling is not in the record. Nonetheless,
our independent review establishes the validity of the judgment as discussed
below, so any failure by the trial court to state its reasons would be harmless
and would not require reversal. (Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc.
(2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1146.) Additionally, the parties had an
opportunity to present their views on the issues discussed herein, as those
issues were raised by the parties in the trial court and on appeal. (Bains v.
Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 471, fn. 39.)

                                        4
issues adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s brief.” (Christoff v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125.)
      B. Malicious Prosecution
      Jackson argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on the malicious prosecution cause of action because there is a
factual dispute as to who was the initial aggressor in the altercation with
Lara. He thus claims there are triable issues of fact on the elements of
probable cause and malice.
      “ ‘[T]o establish a cause of action for malicious prosecution of either a
criminal or civil proceeding, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the prior
action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the defendant and was
pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor [citations]; (2) was
brought without probable cause [citations]; and (3) was initiated with malice
[citations].” ’ ” (Greene v. Bank of America (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 922, 931
(Greene).)
      The tort of malicious prosecution is disfavored and has therefore been
limited for policy reasons. (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28
Cal.4th 811, 816–817 (Wilson), superseded by statute on another point as
recognized in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 547–550.) One
such limitation is the interim adverse judgment rule. (See Wilson, at p. 817.)
“California courts have long embraced the so-called interim adverse judgment
rule, under which ‘a trial court judgment or verdict in favor of the plaintiff or
prosecutor in the underlying case, unless obtained by means of fraud or
perjury, establishes probable cause to bring the underlying action, even
though the judgment or verdict is overturned on appeal or by later ruling of
the trial court.’ [Citation.] This rule reflects a recognition that ‘[c]laims that
have succeeded at a hearing on the merits, even if that result is subsequently

                                         5
reversed by the trial or appellate court, are not so lacking in potential merit
that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necessarily have recognized their
frivolousness.’ ” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 776
(Parrish).)
      “Although the rule arose from cases that had been resolved after trial,
the rule has also been applied to the ‘denial of defense summary judgment
motions, directed verdict motions, and similar efforts at pretrial termination
of the underlying case.’ ” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 776–777.) “Denial
of a defense summary judgment motion on grounds that a triable issue exists,
or of a nonsuit, while falling short of a determination of the merits,
establishes that the plaintiff has substantiated, or can substantiate, the
elements of his or her cause of action with evidence that, if believed, would
justify a favorable verdict.” (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 824.) “The
determination arises, moreover, not because the same issue was litigated in
the prior case, but because the result in the prior case (whether a verdict or
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor, or denial of a defense summary judgment or
SLAPP motion) establishes the existence of probable cause as a matter of
law, absent proof of fraud or perjury.” (Id. at p. 825.)
      We are not aware of any published decisions applying the interim
adverse judgment rule to a motion for acquittal pursuant to Penal Code
section 1118.1, but as argued by Respondents, we find it appropriate in this
case. While the probable cause standard for initiating a civil case discussed
in Parrish and Wilson is not the same as that in a criminal case, both
standards are comparatively low. In the civil context, “ ‘A litigant or attorney
who possesses competent evidence to substantiate a legally cognizable claim
for relief does not act tortiously by bringing the claim, even if also aware of
evidence that will weigh against the claim. Plaintiffs and their attorneys are

                                        6
not required, on penalty of tort liability, to attempt to predict how a trier of
fact will weigh the competing evidence, or to abandon their claim if they
think it likely the evidence will ultimately weigh against them. They have
the right to bring a claim they think unlikely to succeed, so long as it is
arguably meritorious.’ ” (Parrish, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 777–778.)
      Similarly, in the criminal context, “ ‘It is not necessary that [the
malicious prosecution defendant] shall institute an investigation of the crime
itself, or seek to ascertain whether there are any other facts relating to the
offense, or try to find out whether the accused has any defense to the charge.
He is not required to exhaust all sources of information bearing upon the
facts which have come to his knowledge.’ . . . . ‘The facts within his knowledge
may not in point of law constitute a crime; but, if they are of such character
as to induce in the mind of a reasonable man the honest belief that a crime
has been committed, he is justified in seeking to have the crime punished.’ ”
(Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co. (1910) 157 Cal. 333, 338.)
      More importantly, the standard for a motion for acquittal is higher
than that for probable cause to initiate a criminal action. “In ruling on a
motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, a trial court
applies the same standard an appellate court applies in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is, ‘ “whether from the
evidence, including all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is
any substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the offense
charged.” ’ ” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212–1213 (Cole).)
Substantial evidence is defined as “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and
of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 1212.) As for a claim
of malicious prosecution based upon initiation of a criminal case, “ ‘ “the

                                        7
question of probable cause is whether it was objectively reasonable for the
defendant . . . to suspect the plaintiff . . . had committed a crime.” ’ ” (Greene,
supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 931.) Accordingly, a motion for acquittal is
based on an objective assessment of guilt of a crime, whereas the probable
cause determination is based on an objective assessment of suspicion that a
crime was committed.
      When Jackson moved for acquittal at the close of the prosecution’s case,
the only evidence that had been admitted was Lara’s testimony and
surveillance footage of the altercation in the lobby. At the time Lara decided
to pursue the criminal charges against Jackson, his knowledge of the incident
was limited to that same evidence, namely, his own perception of the incident
and his observation of the surveillance footage. When the court ruled on
Jackson’s motion for acquittal, it stated, “I think in terms of an 1118, is there
enough evidence for this, as [defense counsel] correctly pointed out,
substantial evidence? I do think there is.” In so ruling, the trial court found
that Lara’s testimony and the surveillance footage was “evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Cole,
supra, 33 Cal.4th 1158 at p. 1212.) This finding necessarily encompasses a
determination that the evidence was sufficient to meet the probable cause
standard of an objectively reasonable suspicion that Jackson committed a
crime, as suspicion of a crime is a lower standard than guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
      As for the exception for interim adverse rulings obtained by means of
fraud or perjury, “This concern is generally not triggered by dishonesty or
malfeasance that is merely intrinsic to an adversary proceeding, such as
reliance on alleged untruths or fabricated evidence that a litigant has had a

                                         8
full and fair opportunity to meet and test.” (Roche v. Hyde (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 757, 810.) Prior to the court’s ruling on the motion for acquittal,
Jackson’s defense counsel extensively cross-examined Lara and used the
surveillance footage to test Lara’s testimony. Thus, while Jackson disputed
Lara’s credibility, he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue, and
the court implicitly found Lara credible when it determined there was
substantial evidence of battery.
      Accordingly, under the interim adverse judgment rule, the denial of
Jackson’s motion for acquittal establishes that Lara had probable cause as
matter of law. Because the lack of probable cause is a required element of
malicious prosecution, there was no error in granting summary judgment on
that cause of action.
      C. Violation of the UCL
      Jackson asserts two UCL violations under which he claims the trial
court should have found triable issues of fact. First, he claims that “DT’s
practice of excluding [him] from its establishment based on race, a false
accusation of assault, ensuing arrest without probable cause and sufferance
of physical assault by one of its employees clearly indicates a violation of
public policy and an unfair business practice in violation of [section] 17200.”
He contends “there’s a public policy against consumers being subject to
violence and unwarranted contact by employees at a business establishment.”
Second, Jackson claims DT’s actions were unlawful because they violated
Civil Code section 51.5, which prohibits businesses from discriminating based
on race. (Civ. Code, §§ 51.5, subd. (a), 51, subd. (b).)
      Unfair competition under the UCL includes “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) “Because
the statute ‘ “is written in the disjunctive, it establishes three varieties of

                                         9
unfair competition—acts or practices which are unlawful, or unfair, or
fraudulent.” ’ ” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
594, 610 (Graham).)
      The UCL does not define the term “unfair.” As a result, a few earlier
appellate decisions “attempted a definition” by stating that “ ‘[a]n “unfair”
business practice occurs when it offends an established public policy or when
the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially
injurious to consumers,’ ” or by requiring the court to “ ‘ “weigh the utility of
the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged
victim.” ’ ” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone
Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 184 (Cel-Tech).) In Cel-Tech, the California
Supreme Court criticized these earlier definitions as “too amorphous.” (Id. at
pp. 184–185.) The Cel-Tech court concluded “that any finding of unfairness to
competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to some legislatively
declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition”
and, in actions challenging a direct competitor’s “ ‘unfair’ ” act, it defined the
term as “conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or
violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are
comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly
threatens or harms competition.” (Id. at pp. 186–187.)
      The holding in Cel-Tech was expressly limited to actions involving a
competitor alleging anticompetitive practices (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at
p. 187, fn. 12), and appellate courts have split regarding the definition of
“unfair” business practices in a consumer action. Nonetheless, “[t]his court
has consistently followed” the line of cases finding that Cel-tech narrowed the
definition of “unfair” in consumer actions, and “has held a plaintiff alleging
an unfair business practice must show the ‘defendant’s “conduct is tethered to

                                        10
an[ ] underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it
threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of an antitrust law.” ’ ” (Graham, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 613; see
also, Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1008; Aleksick v.
7-Eleven, Inc. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1192–1193; Durell v. Sharp
Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1365–1366 (Durell).) We continue
to follow that approach in this case.
      For his first theory under the UCL, Jackson refers to a “public policy
against consumers being subject to violence and unwarranted contact by
employees at a business establishment.” He does not provide any argument
or legal authority showing that this claimed public policy exists, nor does he
identify the basis for this claimed public policy; therefore, we may disregard
this point. (Holden v. City of San Diego (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 404, 418
[“ ‘[w]here a point is merely asserted by [appellant] without any [substantive]
argument of or authority for its proposition, it is deemed to be without
foundation and requires no discussion’ ”].) Further, Jackson improperly
relies on the earlier definitions of “unfair” that were criticized in Cel-Tech,
and an unsupported claim of public policy is insufficient to establish “unfair”
conduct under the UCL. For example, in Durell, the plaintiff alleged that a
hospital overcharged uninsured patients and used improper collection tactics.
(Durell, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356–1357.) Although he alleged these
practices violated public policy, he failed to state a claim for unfairness under
the UCL because he did not allege these practices were tethered to antitrust
law or any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision. (Id.
at p. 1366.) Jackson’s reliance on an unsupported claim of public policy is
similarly untethered to any law or regulation. His UCL claim based on a
violation of public policy therefore fails as a matter of law.

                                        11
      As for his second theory alleging a violation of Civil Code section 51.5,
Jackson did not raise this claim in the trial court. It was not asserted in his
written opposition to the motion, and he did not appear at the hearing on the
motion. Jackson may not raise this theory for the first time on appeal;
therefore, we will not consider it. (Expansion Pointe Properties Limited
Partnership v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2007) 152
Cal.App.4th 42, 54 [“ ‘Generally, the rules relating to the scope of appellate
review apply to appellate review of summary judgments. [Citation.] An
argument or theory will . . . not be considered if it is raised for the first time
on appeal.’ ”].)
      Based on the foregoing, Jackson has not shown any error regarding his
UCL cause of action.
                                        III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on
appeal.

                                                                       KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                        12
Filed 3/7/24

                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

               COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION ONE

                           STATE OF CALIFORNIA

RYNOLD DWAYNE JACKSON,                       D081549

       Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                             (Super. Ct. No. CIVDS1919245)
       v.
                                             ORDER CERTIFYING
MARIO LARA et al.,                           OPINION FOR PUBLICATION

       Defendants and Respondents.

THE COURT:

       The opinion in this case filed February 22, 2024, was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
       IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
      ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports"
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.

                                                    O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties

                                      2