Court Opinion

ID: 9628422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:20:08.995043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:02.282937
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, J.
I concur in the majority’s holding that the district may be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to the action. I dissent from its additional holding that the district may not, as a matter of law, be held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of its *463employee in this case. I would agree it is the rare case in which a sexual assault by a teacher against a student should give rise to liability on the part of his employing school district. Nevertheless, as I shall explain below, this is such a case.
To recover under respondeat superior, plaintiff bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that the employee’s tortious acts were committed within the scope of his employment. (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 962, 968 [227 Cal.Rptr. 106, 719 P.2d 676].) Generally, the issue of scope of employment is a question of fact. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 722 [159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755].) The issue only becomes a matter of law when the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences are possible. (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 956, 963 [88 Cal.Rptr. 188, 471 P.2d 988].)
The determination as to whether an employee committed a tort in the course of his employment turns upon whether or not the act was required by or incident to his duties, or could reasonably be foreseen by the employer in any event. (Martinez v. Hagopian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1223, 1228 [227 Cal.Rptr. 763]; Avila v. Standard Oil Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 441, 447 [213 Cal.Rptr. 314]; Clark Equipment Co. v. Wheat (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 503, 520 [154 Cal.Rptr. 874].)
“Foreseeability” in this context must be distinguished from foreseeability as a test for negligence. “In the latter sense ‘foreseeable’ means a level of probability which would lead a prudent person to take effective precautions whereas ‘foreseeability’ as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co. (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 608, 618-619 [124 Cal.Rptr. 143], quoted with approval in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968, italics added.) “Accordingly, the employer’s liability extends beyond his actual or possible control of the employee to include risks inherent in or created by the enterprise.” (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 968.)
In keeping with these principles, courts have long held that an employer may be vicariously liable for the intentional as well as the negligent torts of its employees. (See, e.g., Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 969; Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 652, 654-656 [171 P.2d 5].) As this court explained in Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 969: “There is no requirement that an employee’s act benefit an employer for respondeat superior to apply. In fact, an *464employer can be liable for his employee’s unauthorized intentional torts committed within the scope of employment despite lack of benefit to the employer.” (Original italics.) If an assault is motivated by personal malice and is totally unrelated to the employment, the act is outside the scope of employment and the employer is not vicariously liable; otherwise, liability may be found if the assault results from circumstances generally “arising out of the employment” (Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 654) or as an “outgrowth of the employment.” (Martinez v. Hagopian, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 1229; see also Rodgers v. Kemper Const. Co, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pp. 618-621.)
A sexual assault by a teacher against a student, indeed a sexual assault by anyone under any circumstances, strikes the normal sensibility as so extreme and abhorrent that it would indeed be “unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer’s business.” (Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at pp. 618-619.) As noted earlier, the courts of this state have long acknowledged that intentional torts, including assault and battery (Ruppe v. Los Angeles (1921) 186 Cal. 400 [199 P. 496]), harassment and coercion (Ramos v. County of Madera (1971) 4 Cal.3d 685 [94 Cal.Rptr. 421, 484 P.2d 93]) and false imprisonment (Allison v. County of Ventura (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 689 [137 Cal.Rptr. 542]), are unfortunate but not altogether unexpected occurrences. Yet there remains an understandable reluctance to recognize that sexual assaults may, in certain situations, also reasonably be “expected.”
Sadly, however, we have learned that sexual harassment and assaults—in the home as well as the workplace—are not uncommon occurrences. This is a hard truth to accept. But putting our collective heads in the sand will not make it go away. And clinging to a less “pessimistic” view of human nature (lead opn., p. 450, fn. 9) will not compensate the victims of such outrages. On the contrary, indulging such illusions merely deepens and perpetuates the injustice.
Thus, the courts of this and other jurisdictions have recognized that there are circumstances where an employee’s sexual misconduct cannot, in all candor, be deemed so “unusual or startling” that it would be unfair to impose vicarious liability upon the employer. (See, e.g., White v. County of Orange (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 566, 571-572 [212 Cal.Rptr. 493] [liability of county for deputy sheriff’s threats to rape motorist]; Simmons v. United States (9th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2d 1363, 1369 [liability of federal agency for mental health counselor’s sexual involvement with client]; Turner v. State (La.App. 1986) 494 So.2d 1292, 1295-1296 [liability of state for National Guard recruiter’s sexual misconduct with applicants]; Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry (Minn. 1982) 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-311 [liability of *465clinic for therapists’ sexual relations with patient]; Lyon v. Carey (D.C. Cir. 1976) 533 F.2d 649, 651 [174 App.D.C 422] [liability of employer for deliveryman’s rape of customer].)
The case before us falls within this narrow category. The sexual assault by the teacher against the minor occurred in the teacher’s home, in the course of an official educational program known as Instructional Work Experience (IWE). The district affirmatively sanctioned IWE work at teachers’ homes as an acceptable feature of the program. The assault was further facilitated by the teacher’s representations to the minor that a sexual relationship would enhance his educational experience in the IWE program.
The district did not require that a student obtain the written permission of his parents to participate in the IWE program at the teacher’s home, nor did it require that other students or adults be present during the home instruction. In effect, the district-sanctioned IWE program virtually guaranteed that the teacher could act with impunity, free from the fear of interruption or discovery, fully assured of complete privacy and secrecy. Under these circumstances, it is not so “unusual or startling” that a teacher might seize the opportunity created by the program to make improper sexual advances toward one of his students. Under these circumstances, it is unjust not to require that the district share in the liability for the injuries which resulted.
Rather than address these compelling facts head on, however, the majority cites certain “policy” reasons which appear, in its view, to trump both law and equity.1 It is suggested, for example, that the imposition of vicarious liability would “deter” school districts from sponsoring extracurricular school activities. I do not believe that such would result from a decision adverse to the district in this case. Respondeat superior is a fact-specific determination; a holding adverse to the district would necessarily be limited to the uniquely compelling facts of this case. Indeed, as noted earlier, vicarious liability for sexual assaults should be recognized as the exception, not the rule.
The IWE home-instruction program contained none of the usual safeguards incident to most normal extracurricular activities, i.e., a public set*466ting (as opposed to the private seclusion of the teacher’s home) and the presence or or knowledge of other persons (in contrast to the isolation and secrecy inherent in the IWE program). Such reasonable safeguards would normally act to deter such misconduct, or, failing that, to limit the district’s exposure to claims based on vicarious liability.
Indeed, “public policy” militates strongly in favor of vicarious liability in this case. One of the “policy” bases of respondeat superior is said to be its tendency to act as a “spur toward accident prevention.” (Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 967.) If that is the case, and incidents of the nature at issue here are, as I believe, a foreseeable result of such ill-advised programs, then the imposition of vicarious liability in this case might ultimately prove to be an inducement, not a deterrent, to well planned and properly executed extracurricular school programs.
It is further suggested that the underlying purposes of respondeat superi- or—the assurance of fair compensation for tort victims by spreading the risk of losses through insurance carried by the responsible enterprise as a cost of doing business (Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 959-960)—would not be furthered in this case.2 On the contrary, these considerations amply justify the imposition of vicarious liability. The sexual assault against the minor was the direct result of the home-instruction program conceived and sponsored by the district. The district’s employee persuaded the minor that sexual relations would legitimately contribute to his educational experience in the IWE program, and capitalized on the secrecy and seclusion created by that program to perpetrate the assault without fear of interruption or discovery. There is a clear and direct nexus between the teacher’s misconduct and the risks inherent in the district-sanctioned program. It is fair and just—and entirely consistent with the underlying purposes of the doctrine of respondeat superior—that the district be required to bear the cost of the resulting losses.
*467For these reasons, I would allow plaintiffs to proceed against the district on its claims based on vicarious liability. I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order sustaining the district’s demurrer to these claims.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 14, 1989.

 The only evidence that the majority has considered these compelling facts is a footnote observation that the absence of “prudent safeguards’’ in the IWE program might be “relevant” to plaintiffs’ direct claim against the district for negligent supervision. (Lead opn. at p. 451, fn. 10.) Unless the majority is implying that facts may be applied to no more than one legal theory of recovery in any given case (a patently nonsensical proposition), I am at a loss to understand the pertinence of this observation. Plaintiffs’ direct claims against the district are simply not before us.

 As to the availability of insurance to cover such claims, it is well settled that Insurance Code section 533 (insurance for willful acts void as against public policy) does not preclude coverage for liability based upon respondeat superior for the intentional torts of an employee. (Arenson v. Nat. Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 81, 84 [286 P.2d 816]; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Turlock (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 988, 1000-1001 [216 Cal.Rptr. 796].) In the rare case where vicarious liability is appropriate, the distribution of costs is clearly consistent with the policy underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior. Should the minor or his parents have to bear the expense of psychiatric or psychological treatment in addition to the trauma resulting from the sexual assault?