Court Opinion

ID: 9846714
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:46:34.332964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:45.990799
License: Public Domain

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
Plaintiff Karyn Risch complains that the Royal Oak Police Department’s denial of her promotion to detective in 2005 was based upon an unlawful reason — sex discrimination. However, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In opposing a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must submit admissible evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that she has met her burden. Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493-94 (6th Cir.2001); see also Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394, -, 2009 WL 2851351, 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 20058, at *8 (6th Cir.2009); Macy v. Hopkins Cty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 371 (6th Cir.2007). Because Risch has not done so, the district court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
I.
The majority concludes correctly that the Department articulated a legitimate, non-sex-based reason for denying her the promotion. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).1 Police Chief Theodore Quisenberry swore in his affida*395vit that he promoted officers based upon their “service and performance as demonstrated by their performance evaluations, test scores, initiative and leadership qualities” and that Risch was not among those he promoted “because the other officers in the eligibility list had better test scores, better performance evaluations and demonstrated more initiative and leadership qualities than [Risch].”
My colleagues also acknowledge that Chief Quisenberry’s explanation rebuts the presumption of discrimination raised by the prima facie case of discrimination so that it “ ‘drops from the case.’ ” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 & n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089). In other words, the burden falls upon Risch, not upon the Department, to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Chief Quisenberry’s reason was a lie contrived to conceal his true reason for denying her the promotion — that she is a woman. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (“[T]he plaintiff must then ... prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.”). Because Risch cannot do so, her case requires dismissal. See Chen, 580 F.3d at-, 2009 WL 2851351, 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 20058, at *10; Braithwaite, 258 F.3d at 494-97; and Macy, 484 F.3d at 366-71.
Although the district court ruled that Risch failed to show that the Chiefs explanation was a pretext for discrimination, the majority reverses the district court’s judgment. In support of its decision, the majority: (1) characterizes Risch’s qualifications as equal or “arguably superior” to two of the male candidates (Moore and Spencer) who were promoted to the detective position in 2005; (2) highlights the lack of women in command positions; and (3) finds persuasive the allegedly “discriminatory atmosphere” at the Department, specifically, sexist remarks purportedly made by nondecisionmaking male officers.
II.
None of the grounds cited by the majority creates a triable question of fact on the issue of pretext.
In this regard, “ ‘[t]he jury may not reject an employer’s [nondiscriminatory] explanation ... unless there is a sufficient basis in the evidence for doing so.’ ” Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir.1994), abrogated in part on other grounds, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351-52, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009)). “To allow the jury simply to refuse to believe the employer’s explanation would subtly, but inarguably, shift the burden of persuasion from the plaintiff to the defendant, which we must not permit.” Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089).
In opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating pretext by submitting admissible evidence showing that the proffered reason: (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the defendant’s action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the defendant’s action. Hedrick v. W. Resene Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 460 (6th Cir.2004).
A.
It is undisputed that the ultimate decision to promote officers was a discretionary one that rested exclusively with Chief Quisenberry. Based upon the evidence before Chief Quisenberry, Risch’s qualifi*396cations were not equal or “arguably superior” to the male candidates who were promoted, as the majority inaccurately asserts. In 2005, when Risch applied for the promotions, her performance and written evaluation scores were the lowest of all three of the male employees who were promoted. Both scores constituted ninety percent of Risch’s total score for ranking purposes. Risch neither disputes the accuracy of her written examination score (seventy percent of her total score) nor complains that the examination was biased against women. Indeed, if not for her seventeen-year employment experience with the Department (ten percent of her total score), Risch would have been ranked fifth, not third, on the 2005 eligibility list. Although the majority recounts other instances prior to 2005 in which Risch was denied promotions, it acknowledges that “she may recover only for the alleged discriminatory acts committed by the Department in 2005.” Moreover, those previous denials do not demonstrate a pattern of unlawful discrimination against Risch because she suffered from the same performance deficiencies in those years as she did in 2005.
Obviously, an employee’s experience alone does not justify a promotion. In fact, we recently held that a complaining employee’s seniority, coupled with less favorable performance evaluations than newer employees, justified the employer’s negative treatment of him. See Cameron v. State of Ohio (Dep’t of Youth Servs.), No. 08-4403, 2009 WL 2610986, at *4, — Fed. Appx. —, -, 2009 U.S.App. LEXIS 19100, at *11 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2009) (unpublished) (stating that the employer “could have been less willing to forgive an employee’s inability to complete reports in a timely fashion given extensive experience, than to forgive a similar deficiency in an employee just learning the ropes.”). Contrary to Risch’s assertion at oral argument, no employee should have a “legitimate expectation” of receiving a promotion merely because that employee’s name appears on an eligibility list. Promotions are earned, not given. Title VII prevents unlawful discrimination; it does not mandate entitlement. Cf. Meyer v. City of Joplin, 281 F.3d 759, 760-62 (8th Cir.2002) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging that a city denied the plaintiff a “constitutionally protected property interest in a promotion to lieutenant” because, although the plaintiffs examination score and military service made him one of the top three candidates eligible for the promotion and “gave him a preference over the other two candidates if all other ratings were equal[,]” his “unilateral expectations of being promoted ... were substantially diminished by the police chiefs ability ... to consider the candidate’s more subjective qualifications” and the chiefs discretion “to appoint any of the three qualified applieants[.]”).
B.
The lack of evidence demonstrating a history or a pattern of unlawful discrimination also undermines Risch’s claim of pretext. The undisputed evidence shows that Chief Quisenberry promoted women officers during his tenure. In 2002, a year after he was hired and before this conflict arose, Chief Quisenberry promoted female Officer Lynne Barron to the rank of sergeant. Although Risch argues that Barron retired after serving one year in her elevated position and speculates that sexism was the reason for her departure, Risch revealingly did not depose Barron, and the evidence shows that Barron served as a sergeant for three years, not one year, before retiring. Moreover, Barron left because she received an early retirement buyout (a legitimate, non-sex-based economic incentive offered by many employ*397ers to their employees), hardly an aberration from the “[Considerable” amount of turnover that normally occurred among all supervisory personnel Avithin the Department. In 2003 or 2004, Chief Quisenberry offered another female officer, Robin Stuart, a promotion to sergeant. However, Stuart declined the offer, which also was not unusual. Chief Quisenberry also promoted Officer Cynthia Hill to detective in 2007, while this lawsuit was pending.2 In short, the Chief promoted women officers. Apart from herself, Risch identifies no female officer who applied for, and was denied, a promotion during Chief Quisenberry’s tenure.
C.
Nor does the evidence support Risch’s contention that her performance scores “began to plummet” Avith Chief Quisenberry’s appointment. In fact, her scores started declining in 1998, three years before Chief Quisenberry was hired. Risch’s scores fell from 91 in 1997 to 86 in 2000. When the Chief commenced his employment in 2001, the doAvnward trend merely continued, with Risch’s scores descending from 85 in 2001 to 81 in 2005. The four-point drop in Risch’s score during the four-year period of 2001 to 2005 (coinciding with Chief Quisenberry’s tenure) was less than the five-point decrease in the three years (1997 to 2000) preceding Chief Quisenberry’s appointment. Far from permitting an inference of discrimination, this data demonstrates a consistent decline in Risch’s performance ratings over a lengthy nine-year period, lending further support to the Department’s performance-based reasons for denying her the promotion.
Notwithstanding the numbers themselves, mere variations in Risch’s evaluations before and during Chief Quisenberry’s employment are not evidence of unlawful discrimination. Police chiefs, like all upper management personnel, have vastly distinct management styles. For this reason, in the analogous context of determining whether the complaining employee is “similarly situated” to an employee outside the protected class such that an inference of discrimination may arise when both employees are treated differently, we have required that those employees “have dealt Avith the same supervisor” and “have been subject to the same standards[.]” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992). Risch’s complaints about her negative evaluations are better explained by a combination of her own performance deficits and a possible change in management style than by a nebulous, allegedly invidious Department-Avide plot to discriminate against her.3
*398D.
In reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department, the majority relies upon inadmissible, non-probative evidence. See Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir.2009) (stating that Rule 56(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “leaves no doubt about the obligation of a summary judgment opponent to make her case with a showing of facts that can be established by evidence that will be admissible at trial.”). Risch testified in her deposition that Chief Quisenberry never made a sexist remark to her and conceded that no employee relayed any sexist comments to her by the Chief. The majority nevertheless concludes, based solely upon Risch’s opinion and sheer speculation by other officers who lacked personal knowledge about Chief Quisenberry’s actual decision-making process, that Risch may be a victim of sex discrimination. However, our law is well-established that “rumors, conclusory allegations and subjective beliefs ... are wholly insufficient evidence to establish a claim of discrimination as a matter of law.” Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584-85 (numerous citations omitted).
Further, simply because some employees within the Department may have made sexist comments does not permit a reasonable inference that Chief Quisenberry’s decision to deny Risch a promotion was sex-based. See Noble v. Brinker Int'l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir.2004) (“Unless the statements or conduct of nondecisionmakers can be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker, such statements or conduct can not suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden of demonstrating animus.”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted); McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir.1990) (“[A] statement by an intermediate level management official is not indicative of discrimination when the ultimate decision ... is made by an upper level official.”). To be sure, sexist comments by other officers may have greater relevance if Risch were alleging sexual harassment, but she is not; rather, she alleges an unlawful discrete act — denial of a promotion based upon sex. To impute allegedly discriminatory comments and conduct by non-decision making employees within the Department to Chief Quisenberry and conclude *399that discriminatory animus may have infected his denial of Risch’s request for a promotion requires an inference upon inference — untethered to any proper evidentiary foundation.
Finally, the inadmissible gossip upon which the majority improperly relies is non-specific. For example, while characterizing the “general tenure [sic]” and “a majority of the men” in the Department as sexist, Risch revealingly was unable to remember the names of the officers whom she claims said: “women don’t belong in law enforcement”; “the chief [will] never have a female in the command staff’; and “[n]one of you [female officers] will ever go anywhere[.]” Moreover, Officer Teichow, who allegedly heard male Sergeant Kowalski make a “general statement” that was negative about women during a meeting to consider whether Risch and female Officer Kathy Szydiowski would be promoted to the Field Training Officer (“FTO”) position, admitted during his deposition that “[y]ou know what? I honestly cannot recall 100 percent [Sergeant Kowalski] saying that the women are not going to be a part of this. It was more inferring to those two [Risch and Szydiowski] are not going to be — -those women, being the two of them, are not going to be part of the FTO program.” Significantly, that meeting followed Risch’s removal from another program because of her “unwillingness to work as a team player[,]” and Officer Teichow was “certain that was brought up” at the meeting. Further, Officer Teichow testified in his deposition that he neither heard Chief Quisenberry say he would never promote a woman to his command staff or anything similar nor did Officer Teichow himself believe that the Chief would exclude women from such a position. In fact, Officer Teichow testified that “you know what? I don’t know that I would say the Chief will never have a woman in the command. Sergeant Lynn Barron was a female and was promoted. So to say that I believe that the Chief never would have one, it’s not true.”
III.
Time and again we have emphasized that “ ‘[o]ur role is to prevent unlawful hiring practices, not to act as a “super personnel department” that second guesses employers’ business judgments.’ ” Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1330 (10th Cir.1999)). The majority’s decision, based upon inadmissible opinion, speculation, and conjecture, contravenes that principle. The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Department because no reasonable juror could find, based upon admissible evidence, that the Department’s lawful reason for denying Risch a promotion in 2005 was a pretext for sex discrimination. For this reason, I would affirm and therefore respectfully dissent.

. Risch does not allege direct evidence of unlawful discrimination, but relies upon the circumstantial, burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas.

. The majority is selective regarding its recitation of inadmissible evidence.

. According to the published job announcement, the detective position required “independent judgment” and the abilities to follow directions and “establish and maintain effective working relationships with citizens, subordinates, peers and supervisors.” Yet, during her employment with the Department, numerous supervisors, although praising Risch in several areas, also commented in their written evaluations of her performance that she was "unwilling[ ] to work as a team player[,j” "received a written reprimand for writing demeaning comments about a coworker[,]” was "not very motivated and too vocal with her negative opinions of the department!,]” "need[ed] reminders to maintain acceptable levels of performance!,]” "received an oral reprimand for missing court!,]” was "[c]ounseled about padding her logs, low productivity, malingering about the station,” had an "[u]nfortunate continued documented history of sub-par performance and articulation of unhappiness with [the Department,]” used "[o]ver average sick time use[,]” needed to "work on maintaining a neater appearance!,]” displayed a “negative attitude toward the department [that] prevents her from *398reaching her full potential!,]” and "was counseled ... about making inappropriate comments in the dispatch center.” Moreover, Risch's supervisors counseled her for tardiness, "displaying] an unacceptable work ethic!,]” "uncooperativeness and bad attitude[,]” and "being at fault in [an] accident while driving ... and not reporting it to [her] supervisor.”
Numerous supervisors — ten in all — rotated every six months to review Risch's performance. Revealingly, Risch makes no attempt to dispute the particular facts underlying their negative appraisals of her and the counseling she received. These facts alone vitiate her claim of a Department-wide conspiracy to discriminate against her. See, e.g., Spearmon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 662 F.2d 509, 512 (8th Cir.1981) (no discrimination where "several supervisors” evaluated the plaintiff unfavorably); Hairston v. AK Steel Corp., 162 Fed.Appx. 505, 510 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished) (no cognizable claim of pretext where the plaintiff was repeatedly cited for performance failures and required numerous counseling sessions by several supervisors); Evans v. Toys R Us Ohio, Inc., No. 99-3233, 2000 WL 761803, at *9, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 14076, at *27-28 (6th Cir. June 2, 2000) (unpublished) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that his poor performance reviews were motivated by his employer’s "disdain for minorities and men” because "he was evaluated by several supervisors”). In fact, the evaluations, which comprised twenty percent of Risch’s score for the short-list of candidates eligible for the promotion, were somehow good enough to place Risch on that list. Had Risch's supervisors harbored sex-based animus against her, they could have "fixed” her performance scores so as to render her ineligible for the promotions.