Court Opinion

ID: 9532859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:25:36.070455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:51.336327
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting
I do not disagree with the majority’s reading of Faver v. Bayh (1997) Ind.App., 689 N.E.2d 727, and in the distinction drawn between disparate treatment between prisoners confined in different parts of the same penal facility, as in Faver, and treatment or programs which are available to prisoners in one facility but not to those confined in another, as in the case before us. Nevertheless, I believe that the underlying thrust of Faver with regard to provision of educational programs to DOC inmates remains undiluted. In this regard, the majority’s conclusion renders *352meaningless the clear and unmistakable import of I.C. 11-10-5-1.
That provision requires DOC to “implement [educational programs] for committed offenders.” There can be no doubt that DOC Jail Prisoners are “committed offenders.” If DOC utilizes a facility which has not implemented such a program or programs or if DOC fails to do so itself with regard to that detention facility, the Department has violated the clear provisions of the Act. There must be at least some minimal educational program or programs implemented in every facility to which an offender has been committed, whether temporarily or for the term of one’s sentence.
It is possible, if not probable, that the General Assembly, in mandating educational programs for DOC offenders, did not contemplate placement in alternative custodial jail facilities. These placements have taken place of necessity. The administrative realities of making space available for offenders, however, does not abrogate DOC’s duty o provide educational programs. DOC Jail Prisoners are DOC “committed offenders”. They are, therefore, entitled to access to education programs under the auspices of the DOC as are other DOC prisoners.
This is not to say that every possible educational program must be provided at each and every penal facility; nor do I conclude that every committed offender in a particular facility be afforded the opportunity to participate in every program offered nor even to participate in a particular program of the inmate’s choosing. I do conclude, however, that the DOC may not escape the dictates of the statute by putting in place an educational program in one institution and ignoring all others; nor may it avoid the clearly stated legislative intent by housing its committed offenders in facilities which do not offer such programs, unless the DOC takes measures to “implement” such a program or programs in the particular facility.
My analysis is not altered by Ratliff v. Cohn (1998) Ind., 693 N.E.2d 530, which according to the majority here, dilutes the implication, if not the precise holding of Faver. In Ratliff our Supreme Court made much of the fact that in requiring that “institutions for the correction and reformation of juvenile offenders” be provided, the drafters of our Constitution did not use an inclusive adjective such as “all” or “every” or “each” to describe the juvenile offenders to be covered. More importantly, however, the Court noted that at the time in question, the resulting statutes made it discretionary with the court to commit a juvenile, otherwise subject to confinement in a “jail [or] penitentiary,” to the legislatively created Juvenile “House of Refuge.” Thus, it does indeed appear, as held by our Supreme Court, that neither the specific language of the Constitutional provision nor the enabling legislation adopted by the General Assembly, contemplated that each and every juvenile subject to confinement would necessarily be housed in a facility separate and apart from facilities in which adults are held.
The same construction, however, is not applicable to I.C. 11-10-5-1. Although the General Assembly could have been more explicit with regard to providing educational advantages to inmates, the import of the provision is clear. The DOC is required to make such programs available for committed offenders. The members of the Class in this litigation are committed offenders. Therefore, no matter to what facility an offender is committed, there must be some form of educational programming provided.
DOC argues that plaintiffs seek unlimited and immediate educational program participation. Clearly such is not the case. The members of the class do' not contend that inmates in transition or being temporarily confined for a brief period in a particular facility must be enrolled in an educational program which may be satisfactorily completed only by a longer period of time. Nor do they contend, for *353example, that a master’s degree program must be afforded to an inmate who has not even achieved a GED. They do contend, and correctly so, that they are entitled to reasonable access to educational programs which the statute requires the DOC to provide.5
Similarly, I would hold that members of the class must be afforded opportunity to participate in substance abuse treatment programs and counseling, where indicated by the particular inmate’s history. In this regard it appears that the rationale used by the majority to hold otherwise is self defeating. The majority holds that because the legislature used phrasing in other provisions which reflects an intention to include treatment for substance abuse as “medical, psychiatric, or psychological treatment” as in I.C. 11 — 10—8—2(a)(4), the failure to use such inclusive language in I.C. ll-10-3-2(c) demonstrates a legislative intention to exclude such substance abuse treatment from the required “medical care and mental health care.” To the contrary, it is my interpretation that the phrasing by the legislature in I.C. 11-10-8-2(a)(4) constitutes recognition that substance abuse treatment is medical and mental health treatment so that it is unnecessary to state the obvious in every statutory provision dealing with medical or mental health care.
The majority implies that to adopt the reasoning of the trial court would be to require substance abuse treatment and counseling to all inmates whether or not they have a substance abuse problem. Clearly, as noted by the majority, such would be an absurd construction of the statute. Clearly, also however, that is not the dictate of the trial court’s judgment nor is it the position of the plaintiffs. Once again, however, as with the matter of educational programs, my position is not reached through application of constitutional principles but rather solely as a matter of statutory interpretation.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to plaintiffs.

. The "reasonableness” caveat with regard to availability and access to educational opportunities while incarcerated is part and parcel of the constitutional discussion by the majority in Part II. While I do not agree with all of the factors which the majority utilizes to justify somewhat disparate treatment between DOC prisoners and DOC Jail Prisoners, in essence, I agree that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a violation of the U.S. or Indiana Constitution. Such conclusion, however, does not detract from my opinion that the result is statutorily mandated.