Court Opinion

ID: 9859890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:55:24.088376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:09:17.398974
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the portion of the majority opinion holding that it was error to modify the trial court’s order so as to suppress all of defendant’s statements since there was no appellate jurisdiction over the oral and written statements she made to Krakausky. In arriving at that conclusion, the majority correctly recognizes that this case does not involve an appeal of a final judgment-, rather, it concerns the State’s interlocutory appeal in a criminal case. 208 Ill. 2d at 134. By this court’s constitutional authority to issue rules governing interlocutory appeals, we created Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604), to limit the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (“The Supreme Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of Circuit Courts”). In that rule, this court expressly mandated a limited State right to appeal in criminal cases that excludes the right to appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress. 208 Ill. 2d at 139-40. Here, the State filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s ruling suppressing the oral and written statements defendant gave to Rickert because she could not have knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to remain silent when she was unaware that retained counsel had called the station and advised her not to speak to the police. As the majority acknowledges, the trial court also denied defendant’s motion to quash arrest based on the absence of probable cause, but the State did not appeal that ruling, nor could it have appealed pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1). 208 Ill. 2d at 139-40. The result reached by the majority, however, indirectly permits what our rules prohibit, namely, interlocutory appeals from the denial of a motion to quash arrest. The majority’s reliance on our decision in People v. York, 29 Ill. 2d 68 (1963), in reaching this conclusion is misplaced. First, York did not purport to address a jurisdictional question. The only mention of jurisdiction explained why this court, rather than the appellate court, was hearing the interlocutory appeal. York, 29 Ill. 2d at 69. Second, York involved only a single motion seeking to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence seized pursuant to that warrant. That one motion asserted several “ ‘defects in the proceedings’ ” (Emphasis added.) 208 Ill. 2d at 130, quoting York, 29 Ill. 2d at 71. Under those circumstances, I agree with the majority that the appellate court could affirm the lower court’s ruling on any of the alleged defects supported by the record. 208 Ill. 2d at 129. This case differs, however, because here appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals is the primary issue. Moreover, defendant in this case filed two separate motions, each based on a different legal theory, covering two sets of statements. The first motion, seeking to suppress only defendant’s statements to Rickert, was based on an alleged violation of her right to counsel. The second motion sought to quash defendant’s arrest based on a lack of probable cause, a fourth amendment violation. If granted, that motion would have precluded the admission of any statements defendant made while at the police station. The critical distinction between this set of facts and York is that here no single motion incorporated both grounds. Consequently, in this case the trial court made two separate rulings, one suppressing the statements to Rickert and the other refusing to quash the arrest. Since this case involves an interlocutory appeal rather than an appeal from a final judgment, even the majority acknowledges (208 Ill. 2d at 139-40) that only rulings falling within the restricted scope of appellate jurisdiction imposed by Rule 604(a)(1) could be subject to review. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 307 (limiting interlocutory appeals as of right); 155 Ill. 2d R. 308 (listing the requirements for seeking an interlocutory appeal by permission); 188 Ill. 2d R. 604 (limiting the scope of State appeals in criminal cases). See also Murges v. Bowman, 254 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1080 (1993) (“ ‘An appeal under Rule 307 does not open the door to a general review of all orders entered by the trial court up to the date of the order that is appealed.’ [Citation.]”). Thus, only the ruling suppressing the statements to Rickert was, or even could have been, reviewed prior to issuance of the final judgment in the case. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). It is indisputable that the denial of defendant’s motion to quash arrest may not be the subject of interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1). The appellate court’s reliance on the fourth amendment rationale in defendant’s motion to quash to suppress the statements to Rickert is tantamount to a direct review of the denial of that motion. Such review is not permitted under the limited scope of interlocutory jurisdiction imposed by our own rules. Yet, here, in direct contradiction to this rule, the majority upholds the appellate court’s review of the order denying defendant’s motion to quash arrest on fourth amendment grounds as an alternative basis for suppressing her statements to Rickert. By ignoring our rule’s explicit restrictions, the majority expands appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory matters to include issues that could not otherwise be reviewed prior to the issuance of a final judgment. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1) (restricting appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory appeals brought by the State, in relevant part, to orders “quashing an arrest ***; or suppressing evidence”). While I agree that after entry of a final judgment, a reviewing court “ ‘can sustain the decision of a lower court for any appropriate reason, regardless of whether the lower court relied on those grounds and regardless of whether the lower court’s reasoning was correct’ ” (208 Ill. 2d at 129, quoting People v. Novak, 163 Ill. 2d 93, 101 (1994)), courts possess no such luxury in interlocutory appeals due to the strictures of Rule 604(a)(1). Even though early review of other matters may appear to promote the goal of judicial efficiency, “[principles of judicial economy may not trump the jurisdictional barrier erected by Rule 604(a)(1) in this case.” 208 Ill. 2d at 141. By refusing to enlarge the trial court’s suppression order to include defendant’s statements to Krakausky, the majority claims to uphold this fundamental principle. It fails, however, to apply this same principle, read in conjunction with the mandatory jurisdictional limitations of Rule 604(a)(1), to the statements defendant made to Rickert. Moreover, case law already provides a possible avenue for obtaining interlocutory jurisdiction over trial court rulings not expressly under appeal. In Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 433-36 (1979), this court considered the threshold question of whether the appeal of a judgment entered on a specific date also conferred appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise nonappealable prior order. We explained that: “When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment only, or from a part of a specified judgment, the court of review acquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts thereof not so specified or not fairly to be inferred from the notice as intended to be presented for review on the appeal. If from the notice of appeal itself and the subsequent proceedings it appears that the appeal was intended, and the appellant and the appellee so understood, to have been taken from an unspecified judgment or part thereof, the notice of appeal may be construed as bringing up for review the unspecified part of the order or judgment. Such a construction would be appropriate where the specified order directly relates back to the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.” Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 434. We then stated that a prior unspecified order is reviewable only “if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal. [Citation.]” Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435. Although Burtell involved the appeal of a final judgment, the same rationale logically, and even more forcefully, applies to interlocutory appeals since, by definition, they have a limited scope of review. See 188 Ill. 2d R 307 (limiting interlocutory appeals as of right); 155 Ill. 2d R 308 (listing the requirements for seeking an interlocutory appeal by permission); 188 Ill. 2d R 604 (limiting appeals by the State in criminal cases). See also Ericksen v. Village of Willow Springs, 279 Ill. App. 3d 210, 214 (1995) (“An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of all of the controversy between the parties”); Murges, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 1080 (“ ‘An appeal under Rule 307 does not open the door to a general review of all orders entered by the trial court up to the date of the order that is appealed.’ [Citation.]”). Since Burtell limits the appellate court’s jurisdiction in appeals from even final judgments, we may not broaden that court’s jurisdiction in the context of inherently narrower, interlocutory appeals. Under Burtell, the appellate court’s judgment in this matter must be reversed. The State’s requisite certificate of substantial impairment accompanying its notice of appeal specified that “the order suppressing evidence *** substantially impairs the People’s ability to prosecute said case and *** therefore, the People are taking an appeal from said suppression order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1).” (Emphasis added.) That order relied on only defendant’s inability to knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to remain silent since she was unaware that counsel had been retained and had called to advise her not to talk to the police. The State’s interlocutory appeal was limited, therefore, to the grounds for suppressing evidence alleged in that particular motion. Here, the motion to suppress asserted that defendant was not given proper access to counsel. It did not allege that her statements to Rickert should be suppressed because she was improperly arrested. That ground appeared only in defendant’s second motion, seeking to quash her arrest, that was ultimately denied by the trial court. 208 Ill. 2d at 123. Neither the State’s notice of appeal nor its certificate of substantial impairment raised the propriety of denying defendant’s motion to suppress on fourth amendment grounds, nor could they have done so under Rule 604(a)(1). Since the only judgment before the appellate court was the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to suppress, decided on grounds based on defendant’s restricted access to counsel, under Burtell we must determine whether the unspecified order denying defendant’s claim of improper arrest is either a “ ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the” specified judgment (Burtell, 76 Ill. 2d at 435, quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)) or whether the proceedings and the parties’ conduct demonstrate that the appeal was intended to include that denial. I conclude that the denial of the fourth amendment motion to quash was unrelated to the suppression of evidence on counsel grounds because the two issues do not involve similar factual or legal allegations. Defendant’s fourth amendment claim is based on her 10-hour detention in a locked interview room after voluntarily accompanying officers to the police station at 3:15 a.m. Her right to counsel claim concerns allegations that she was not properly informed that her family had retained legal counsel for her and that retained counsel had called with instructions not to speak to the police. Furthermore, these two claims are based on separate constitutional provisions and would, if accepted by the trial court, suppress different sets of statements. The trial court’s denial of defendant’s fourth amendment motion was not a procedural step leading to the grant of her motion to suppress based on access to counsel. Accordingly, the trial court’s order rejecting defendant’s fourth amendment claim was not reviewable as part of the State’s appeal of the separate ruling granting defendant’s motion to suppress. In addition, the appellate briefs and arguments of the parties demonstrate that the State, as appellant, did not intend its interlocutory appeal to incorporate the propriety of the trial court’s denial of defendant’s fourth amendment claim. Indeed, the State did not have the right to seek review of an order refusing to suppress evidence. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). Since the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress on fourth amendment grounds does not satisfy the criteria outlined in Burtell and could not have been reviewed on interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(a)(1), it was outside the appellate court’s scope of review. By prematurely reviewing the case on the fourth amendment grounds alleged in defendant’s motion to quash, that court violated Rule 604(a)(1) and acted outside the scope of its jurisdiction. Its order should not be permitted to stand. Thus, I believe the appellate court’s judgment should be vacated and the cause remanded to that court to consider the propriety of suppressing defendant’s statements to Rickert on the grounds stated in her motion to suppress. Because I believe that the majority opinion in this case unwisely and unjustifiably expands the scope of appellate jurisdiction in interlocutory criminal appeals by the State, in direct contravention of the constraints imposed by our own Rule 604(a)(1), I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion.