Court Opinion

ID: 9475227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:20:42.101657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:35.089861
License: Public Domain

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
It is a firmly established and settled principle of criminal law that an oral sentence controls over a judgment and commitment order when the two conflict. This rule is *1554recognized in virtually every circuit1 and has been the law in this circuit since the 1980’s.2 The majority concedes that a conflict is present in this case. Precedent, therefore, would dictate that the sentence pronounced from the bench should be the sentence served by the defendant. This predictable outcome is reversed, however, by the elimination of the rule and the fashioning of a test based on intent. Because I believe the “conflict” rule is correct and proper, I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that whenever there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the sentence as described in the written judgment, the court must attempt to discern the sentencing judge’s intent. Apart from the problems associated with ascertaining intent from the appellate record, the court’s ruling affects important principles that underlie the traditional rule. The legal status of the oral sentence and the right to be present at sentencing are diluted by the court’s ruling.
The sentence orally pronounced from the bench is the sentence. One of the purposes of the written judgment and commitment order is to provide evidence of the sen-fence. The majority implies that the promulgation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1)3 changed the rule that the judgment in a criminal case is the sentence pronounced from the bench. Majority Opinion at 1549 (“Before Rule 32, ‘the “judgment” in a criminal case was the sentence pronounced from the bench____’ ”). While I agree with Judge Murrah’s comment in Baca v. United States, 383 F.2d 154, 157 (10th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929, 88 S.Ct. 868, 19 L.Ed.2d 994 (1968), that Rule 32(b) has “enhanced the prestige of the written judgment,” I cannot conclude that it has abrogated the rule that the judgment in a criminal case is the sentence pronounced from the bench.
Rule 32(b) became effective in 1946, 327 U.S. at 821 (1946), and is a restatement of Rule I of the Criminal Appeals Rules of 1933, 292 U.S. 661 (1934). Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. Despite the existence of Rule 32(b), however, the law continues to be that the legally effective sentence is the oral sentence and the judgment and commitment order is mere evidence of the sentence.4 The Supreme Court has also *1555adhered to the principle that the sentence is the final judgment. Bateman v. Arizona, 429 U.S. 1302, 1306, 97 S.Ct. 1, 3, 50 L.Ed.2d 32 (1976). The majority changes the relative status of the oral sentence and the written document by making the two equal. The true function of the written sentence, however, is to help clarify an ambiguous oral sentence by providing evidence of what was stated. The effect of the majority’s holding is to permit the evidence of the sentence to replace the sentence when there is a conflict. This is contrary to the purpose of the written sentence and changes the legal status of the oral sentence.
The majority’s ruling also endangers the right to be present at sentencing. Fed.R. Crim.P. 43(a) mandates that “[t]he defendant shall be present ... at the imposition of sentence____” Rule 43 has its source in the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484-85, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). Although it is not an absolute right, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1060, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), it is fundamental to the entire law of criminal procedure. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372, 13 S.Ct. 136, 137, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892) (dictates of humanity require defendant’s presence). A defendant is present only when being sentenced from the bench. Thus, a defendant is sentenced in absentia when the written sentence is allowed to control when there is a conflict.
The imposition of a sentence affects the most fundamental rights: life and liberty. Sentencing should be conducted with the judge and convict facing each other and not in secret. It is incumbent upon a sentencing judge to choose his words carefully so that the convict is aware of his sentence when he leaves the courtroom. The rule that the oral sentence controls when there is a conflict is an easy rule to apply and avoids the murky area of determining intent. Because I do not believe this rule should be changed except for the most compelling reasons, which are not present in this case, I dissent.

. In addition to the second, fifth and ninth circuits identified by the majority, the rule is recognized in the following circuits: United States v. Gloss, 720 F.2d 21, 22 n. 2 (8th Cir.1983); United States v. McDonald, 672 F.2d 864, 867 (11th Cir.1982) (per curiam); United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C.Cir.1980); and United States v. Morse, 344 F.2d 27, 29 n. 1 (4th Cir.1965).

. Watkins v. Merry, 106 F.2d 360, 361 (10th Cir.1939).

. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(1) provides as follows:
A judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, and the adjudication and sentence. If the defendant is found not guilty or for any other reason is entitled to be discharged, judgment shall be entered accordingly. The judgment shall be signed by the judge and entered by the clerk.

. United States v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C.Cir.1980) (“The oral sentence constitutes the judgment of the court and is the authority for the execution of the court's sentence. The written commitment is mere evidence of such authority.”); Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433, 440 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 916, 89 S.Ct. 1765, 23 L.Ed.2d 230 (1969) (“It was the pronouncement of sentence ... that constituted the judgment of the court."); Gilliam v. United States, 269 F.2d 770, 772-73 (D.C.Cir.1959) ("the order of judgment and commitment is merely evidence of this sentence [the oral sentence]____”); Kennedy v. Reid, 249 F.2d 492, 495 (D.C.Cir.1957) (“The pronouncement of sentence constitutes the judgment of the court.”); Rowley v. Welch, 114 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C.Cir.1940); United States v. Marquez, 506 F.2d 620, 622 (2d Cir.1974) ("the written judgment and commitment being nothing more than mere evidence of the sentence imposed orally by the judge.”); Sasser v. United States, 352 F.2d 796, 797 (6th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 883, 87 S.Ct. 174, 17 L.Ed.2d 111 (1966) (“the pronouncement of sentence represents the judgment of the court and that the order of judgment is merely evidence of the sentence____"); Wilson v. Bell, 137 F.2d 716, 720 (6th Cir.1943) ("the judgment in a criminal case is the pronouncement by the judge from the bench, not the entry of the judgment by the clerk. The actual authority for execution of the judgment is the sentence, and the commitment functions to make the judgment of the court effective."); United States v. Weir, 724 F.2d 94, 95 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam) ("the oral sentence and not *1555the written order constitutes the actual judgment of the court____Johnson v. Mabry, 602 F.2d 167, 170 (8th Cir.1979) ("the oral sentence pronounced by the sentencing judge constitutes the judgment, and anything inconsistent with the judgment which is included in a commitment order is a nullity.”); Buie v. King, 137 F.2d 495, 499 (8th Cir.1943); United States v. Munoz Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir.1974) (“The only sentence that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.”); Spriggs v. United States, 225 F.2d 865, 868 (9th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954, 76 S.Ct. 342, 100 L.Ed. 830 (1956) ("The journal entry or signed document is not the order of the court. The order of the court is the pronouncement made by the judge in open court."); Walden v. Hudspeth, 115 F.2d 558, 559 (10th Cir.1940) ("[t]he judgment is the pronouncement of the court from the bench. The clerk’s entry is not the judgment by merely the formal evidence thereof.’’).