Court Opinion

ID: 9714261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:33:55.324144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.637922
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
The doctrine of "invited error" is not a necessary basis for affirmance. A more appropriate rationale is that the court correctly instructed the jury upon sexual battery as a lesser included offense.
The case which prompted the colloquy between defense counsel and Kemp and which led to Kemp's request to not object to the sexual battery instruction is Scrougham v. State (1991) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 564 N.E.2d 542. That case erroneously observed that Indiana double jeopardy considerations are identical to those present under federal constitutional analysis. This approach would appear to begin and end with application of the test established in Blockburger v. United States (1982) 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 806, as adopted in Indiana. In this state, however, we also look to the offense as charged for additional double jeopardy guidance, and as well, to whether the two offenses under consideration are in reality but a single act. See Stwalley v. State (1989) Ind., 534 N.E.2d 229. Indiana double jeopardy analysis is therefore not identical to the federal analysis. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, State and Federal Constitutional Law Developments, 27 Inp.L.Rev. 887, 888 (1994).
As noted in Griffin v. State (1991) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 583 N.E.2d 191, Scrougham, supra, was impliedly overruled by Watkins v. State (1991) Ind., 575 N.E.2d 624, relying upon Bowling v. State (1990) Ind., 560 N.E.2d 658.
The sexual battery covered by the instruction was an included offense in the rape charged. The instruction was proper.