Court Opinion

ID: 9778925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:26:06.925928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:15.998290
License: Public Domain

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. At common law, the discharge of one tortfeasor automatically discharged any other joint tortfeasor completely, regardless of the terms of the release. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. McFall, 178 Ark. 596, 12 S.W.2d 15 (1928). By enacting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, now codified as Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-204 (1987), the General Assembly departed from common law tradition. Section 16-61-204 provides in pertinent part: A release by the injured person of one (1) joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the release so provides. . . [Our emphasis.] Here, the release form discharged the driver of the car, Mary A. Richardson, by name, and included the following language releasing: . . . any and all other persons, associations and corporations, whether herein named or referred to or not, and who, together with the above named, may be jointly and severally, liable to the Undersigned, of and from any and all, and all manner of, actions and causes of action, rights, suits, covenants, contracts, agreements, judgments, claims and demands whatsoever in law or equity. . . [Our emphasis.] The majority holds that a release of “all persons, associations and corporations” is ineffective to release unnamed third persons not parties to the release, thereby ignoring the plain meaning of the release language. Yet, Arkansas law requires that when parties to a contract express their intention in clear and unambiguous language in a written instrument, it is the court’s duty to construe the writing in accordance with the plain meaning of the language employed. Green v. Ferguson, 263 Ark. 601, 567 S.W.2d 89 (1978). In addition, the majority ignores the rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed. Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 449 S.W.2d 952 (1970); Nancy v. Gunn, 221 Ark. 10, 253 S.W.2d 559 (1952). This statute departs from the common law in that a release of joint tortfeasors is no longer automatic upon the release of one of the tortfeasors. In order to release other joint tortfeasors the release must so provide. Strictly interpreting the words of the statute suggests that the general release satisfies the “unless the release so provides” requirement. Federal courts interpreting Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-204 (1987) [previously Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1004] have held that general releases satisfy the statutory requirement. Morison v. General Motors Corporation, 428 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1970). Twelve years after Morison,in Douglas v. United States Tobacco Co., 670 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1982), the Eighth Circuit held that a general release discharging “all other persons” was sufficient under the Arkansas Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to release joint tortfeasors who were not parties to the release. The Eighth Circuit stated that: We believe that Morison is a carefully considered opinion based upon sound reasoning. Also, we note that it was decided in 1970, and the legislature of the State of Arkansas has had ample opportunity to act if it thought that the Morison decision was inconsistent with Arkansas law. The majority opinion determines that it was the intent of the legislature in passing the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to abolish the common law rule that produced an involuntary discharge of joint tortfeasors upon the release of one tortfeasor. I agree. However, the majority extends this rationale further and determines that the language “unless the release so provides” does not adequately protect against involuntary discharge and adopts a specific identity rule. The majority requires that to satisfy the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-204, a release must name or otherwise specifically identify the tortfeasors to be discharged. Arguably, there are sound policy reasons for requiring that specific names be enumerated in the release, nevertheless, such arguments are best made to the legislature and not to this court. The intent of our legislature was to change the harsh common law rule of involuntary release. This was accomplished with the “unless the release so provides” language, and the legislature’s inaction since Morison confirms that this was their only intent. It is not for this court to construe the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-204 to best conform to the legislature’s intent, but merely to effectuate the plain intent expressed in the enactment. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. Hickman J., and Glaze, J., join.