Court Opinion

ID: 9705514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:09:51.74948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.121662
License: Public Domain

STEIN, J.,
dissenting.
The Court’s disposition of this appeal is wrong, not only as a matter of statutory interpretation, but also because respect for a coordinate branch of government would dictate a different result.
*593The background is both relevant and brief. In a series of decisions, this Court abolished the ancient common-law rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi (no time runs against the king). See Holloway v. State, 125 N.J. 386, 397, 593 A.2d 716 (1991); New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen Partnership, 125 N.J. 66, 69, 592 A.2d 559 (1991) (Gruzen); Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 124 N.J. 570, 579, 592 A.2d 199 (1991). Under the rule of nullum tempus, a governmental entity could assert its rights at any time without regard to the failure of a public employee or official to assert a claim within the period set forth in a statute of limitations. In Gruzen, this Court abrogated the rule of nullum tempus, effective December 31, 1991, but commended “the matter to the consideration of the Legislature for any modification of this disposition in light of the special needs of governmental agencies.” 125 N.J. at 69, 592 A.2d 559. Directly in response to the Court’s invitation, the Legislature enacted and the Governor signed L. 1991, c. 387, § 2, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2. The law provides:
Except where a limitations provision expressly and specifically applies to actions commenced by the State or where a longer limitations period would otherwise apply, and subject to any statutory provisions or common law rules extending limitations periods, any civil action commenced by the State shall be commenced within ten years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1.2(a).]
The Senate Judiciary Committee statement accompanying the bill corroborates the bill’s otherwise explicit meaning:
Under the common law doctrine of nullum tempus, the State and its agencies were exempt from statutes of limitations generally applicable in civil actions. In a series of recent decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has abolished the nullum tempus rule. The. effect of these decisions is to subject the State to the same limitations periods applicable to private litigants. This bill proposes to establish a uniform ten-year statute of limitations for actions commenced by governmental entities.
The ten-year period would apply unless another statute expressly provides a different period for actions commenced by the State. As in the case of private litigants, statutory provisions extending limitations periods under particular circumstances would extend the ten-year period where applicable. The bill would also provide that in no case would the ten-year period be deemed to have begun prior to January 1, 1992.
[Senate Judiciary Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 3711, at 1 (Dec. 12, 1991) (emphasis added).]
*594The narrow issue is whether New Jersey Transit Corporation’s (Transit) tax appeals, untimely under the general tax-appeal statute, are preserved by N.J.S.A 2A:14-1.2. The tax-appeal statute, N.J.S.A 54:3-21, provides in part:
A taxpayer feeling aggrieved by the assessed valuation of his property, or feeling that he is discriminated against by the assessed valuation of other property in the county, or a taxing district which may feel discriminated against by the assessed valuation of property in the taxing district, or by the assessed valuation of property in another taxing district in the county, may on or before April 1 [August 15 for year's prior to 1992] appeal to the county board of taxation by filing with it a petition of appeal____
Transit contends that because the tax-appeal limitations period does not “expressly and specifically” apply to “actions commenced by the State,” N.J.S.A 2A:14-1.2, the ten-year statute of limitations recently enacted by the Legislature necessarily is controlling. The Borough of Somerville (Somerville) argues that although, read literally, the ten-year statute applies to Transit’s appeals, the Legislature could not have intended so extended a limitations period to apply to tax appeals, because of its potentially disruptive impact on municipal tax rates. The Attorney General responds that the Legislature intended precisely what the statute provides, and that because virtually all state property is tax exempt, tax appeals by the State and its political subdivisions usually are filed to correct erroneous assessments. In that context, the Attorney General argues, the ten-year limitations period provides an appropriate safeguard against improper assessments of exempt property.
The Attorney General’s position obviously is correct. Because State property generally is tax-exempt, the legislative determination to apply a ten-year limitations period to tax appeals clearly is plausible. In addition, the meaning of the newly enacted ten-year limitations statute, passed at this Court’s specific invitation, is crystal clear: the only exceptions to the ten-year limitations period are those established by statutes that “expressly and specifically” refer to the State and its political subdivisions. Among the most basic principles of statutory construction is that if the statutory language is clear and the result not inconsistent with obvious legislative intent, a court should apply the statute as *595written. See Midland Ins. Co. v. Colatrella, 102 N.J. 612, 621, 510 A.2d 30 (1986) (Stein, J., dissenting); State v. Maguire, 84 N.J. 508, 528, 423 A.2d 294 (1980).
The majority strays from that settled rule of statutory interpretation. The Court justifies its determination that the ten-year limitations period should not apply to tax appeals by the State by its eonelusory observation that “[fjiling deadlines in actions contesting local property tax assessments have long been applied to taxpayer governmental entities.” Ante at 589, 656 A.2d at 426. However, all but one of the cases cited by the majority to support that proposition involve the application of filing deadlines to public bodies in their capacities as taxing districts, and do not involve imposition of filing deadlines to preclude a public body from challenging an assessment of its own exempt property. Thus, F.M.C. Stores Co. v. Borough of Morris Plains, 100 N.J. 418, 424, 495 A.2d 1313 (1985), Rabstein v. Township of Princeton, 187 N.J.Super. 18, 24-25, 453 A.2d 553 (App.Div.1982), and Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Borough of Wood-Ridge, 2 N.J.Tax 143, 147-48 (Tax 1981), relied on by the majority, ante at 589, 656 A.2d at 426, all involved municipalities that had sought to increase assessments under appeal by taxpayers but had failed to file counterclaims or appeals within the time prescribed. (The only case cited by the majority involving exempt public property held simply that public bodies must file tax appeals rather than rely only on statements of exemption filed pursuant to N.J.S.A 54:4-4.4. See New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Township of Monroe, 2 N.J.Tax 371, 379 (Tax 1981)). See also County of Bergen v. Borough of Paramus, 79 N.J. 302, 310, 399 A.2d 616 (1979) (holding that because of County’s failure to file timely tax appeal to challenge assessment of property used for public purposes, and in view of involvement of public bodies and public funds, appeal would be deemed filed nunc pro tunc and matter remanded to Division of Tax Appeals).
The majority also expresses its concern that application of a ten-year limitations period to tax appeals by state agencies would be disruptive to the budgets of local governments dependent on the revenues generated from local taxation, concluding that the Legislature “did not intend such an absurd and chaotic result.” *596Ante at 591, 656 A.2d at 426. As noted, the Attorney General sharply disagrees, expressing confidence that application of the ten-year limitations period would not disrupt municipal budgets and that the Legislature intended the new statute to apply to all civil actions by the State and its political subdivisions, including tax appeals.
Because the Appellate Division concluded that Transit’s property was exempt from local taxation under federal law, 45 U.S.CA. § 581(e)(5) retroactively to October 1, 1981, a holding undisputed by the Court’s opinion, ante at 592, 656 A.2d at 427, Somerville would be deprived of only a nominal sum if the Court were to hold that the ten-year limitations period applies to tax appeals by State entities. That result would have minimal financial consequences for the parties, would apply as written the Legislative response to the abolition of nullum tempus enacted at the Court’s specific request, and would permit the Court to afford the Legislature an opportunity to amend the statute if indeed the Legislature did not intend for it to apply to tax appeals. On reflection, the Legislature might agree that tax appeals by the State should be governed by N.J.SA. 54:3-21; it might conclude that a three-year limitations period would be adequate; or it might adopt the Attorney General’s view that a ten-year limitations period is appropriate. I am uncertain about the choice the Legislature would make if the issue were posed, but I am convinced that this appeal presents little if any justification for the Court to assert a clairvoyance that it surely does not possess.
I would reverse the Appellate Division judgment to the extent that it holds that N.J.S.A 2A:14-1.2 does not apply to tax appeals by the State and its political subdivisions.
For affirmance — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN — 6.
For reversal — Justice STEIN — 1.