Court Opinion

ID: 9778261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:57:24.052302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:06.130073
License: Public Domain

David Newbern, Justice, dissenting. Justice Roaf’s dissenting opinion expresses my views on this case, and I join in that opinion. I wish to add only that the majority has now given us a prime example of the error we made in Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991). There we placed the burden of proof on the juvenile rather than the State with respect to whether the juvenile should be tried as an adult. That has allowed us to permit the trial courts, time and again, to sanction adult trials for children solely on the basis of a charge of a violent crime. No doubt some people below the age of 18 are tough, hardened, and incorrigible. In my view, the transfer provisions should be interpreted so that such persons wind up being treated as adults. The State, however, in a case such as this one, should be required to show more than that a youngster who was aged 14 has been charged with committing one act of violence. I respectfully dissent. Roaf, J., joins in this dissent.