Court Opinion

ID: 9853729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:53:13.576919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:03.348526
License: Public Domain

HOWARD, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority opinion in two respects. First, I do not believe that the note sent to the jury poses any possibility of a coercive effect. I do not believe we need follow Brasfield v. United States, supra, and am unable to agree with its rationale. I cannot understand how a mere inquiry as to the numerical nature of the jury’s division or as to the number of ballots taken, or both, has a tendency to be coercive. Courts which follow Brasfield permit the judge to inquire of the jury whether it believes it might reach a verdict after further deliberations. See Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn.1975). I am unable to perceive the difference between such an inquiry and that of asking the jury as to how they stand numerically. In either situation the jurors themselves know how they stand. In the former situation, however, although the jurors know the extent of their division, the judge does not. How this changes the situation and results in coerciveness is inexplicable. There are situations when further comment by the trial judge does tend to be coercive upon the jury. For example, in People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973) the trial court, after hearing that the jury divided 11 to 1, stated, “Well, that is not very far from a verdict.” The court rightly held that the trial court’s characterization of the jury as being “not very far from a verdict” was impermissibly coercive with respect to the single reluctant juror. In Taylor v. State, 17 Md.App. 41, 299 A.2d 841 (1973) the jury informed the judge that it was divided 11 to 1 and a juror commented “It’s up to the 1.” The judge then stated that he agreed and that it was up to the one juror to change. The appellate court correctly held that the remarks of the trial judge were patently coercive upon the minority juror. However, that is not the situation here. To me the court in Sharplin v. State, 330 So.2d 591 (Miss.1976) made sense when it stated:
“We conclude that Brasfield was not grounded in a specific constitutional provision that has subsequently been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but was announced as a rule of procedure to be followed in the federal courts. We decline to follow this federal procedural rule because we believe that receipt of the jury’s numerical division serves a legitimate purpose consonant with the trial judge's broad powers of control over the conduct of a trial: it enables the trial judge to ascertain the likelihood of agreement among the jurors. We hold therefore that the mere request and receipt of the jury’s numerical division without reference to guilt or innocence does not coerce the jury and is not error. We believe that the possibility of coercion, if any, lies in the trial judge’s conduct and comments after he receives the division, that is, whether the judge merely affords the jury additional time to deliberate or whether he attempts to force a verdict by suggestive comments or coercive measures.” 330 So.2d at 596.
*611I believe that our holding in State v. Davis, supra, applies and that although the trial court should not have communicated to the jury without the presence of the defendant, such communication does not constitute reversible error.1
I also disagree with the majority’s analysis of the meaning of the word “gun” as used in A.R.S. Sec. 13-643(B). I am convinced that the term “gun” as used in the statute refers to a firearm. I do not believe that the case of State v. Alexander, supra, is of any value since the question in that case was whether or not the gun had to be loaded and the statute obviously does not make such a requirement. The reason that the legislature does not require the gun to be loaded is the inordinate burden it would place upon the state to prove that the gun was in fact loaded. A.R.S. Sec. 13-643 states:
“A. Robbery shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than five years.
B. Robbery committed by a person armed with a gun or deadly weapon is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, for the first offense, for not less than five years, for a second offense, not less than ten years, for a third or subsequent offense, not less than twenty years nor more than life imprisonment, and in no case, except for a first offense committed by a person armed with a deadly weapon other than a gun, shall the person convicted be eligible for suspension or commutation of sentence, probation, pardon or parole until such person has served the minimum sentence imposed.
C. Any person convicted of robbery armed with'a deadly weapon other than a gun who is placed on probation in accordance with the terms of this section shall upon sentencing, be committed to the department of corrections for not less than thirty nor more than sixty days. . .” (Emphasis added)
It seems clear that the legislature considered a robbery committed with a gun to be the most serious armed robbery of all, since it prohibited the giving of probation for first offense robbery by a person armed with a gun, whereas if it is a first offense and the person is armed with a deadly weapon other than a gun, there can be probation. Therefore, the legislature balanced the dangerous character of the gun against the requirement that it be loaded and opted for no requirement that it be loaded. It also seems clear, from perusal of the statute, that the gun to which it refers is one which is a deadly weapon, and that its wording is cast in the terms of “gun or deadly weapon” in order to allow probation for first offenders who are armed with deadly weapons other than a gun. The result of the majority decision is that a person who uses a popgun in a robbery is guilty of robbery while armed with a gun. I do not conceive a popgun or a BB gun to be a “gun” within the meaning of the statute. The legislature was equating “gun” with a deadly weapon and this does not include a BB gun. There was no proof here that the BB gun was a deadly weapon.
I would therefore modify the judgment of guilt on Count One of Cause # A-31571 to a conviction of robbery only. Since the trial court sentenced appellant to concurrent prison terms on all three counts of robbery for a term of not less than five nor more than 12 years, I do not believe that it is necessary to remand Count One for resentencing and would therefore affirm the judgments and sentences as modified.

. The judge’s inquiry here is infinitely less coercive than the “Baumgartner” or dynamite instruction which is sanctioned by the federal courts. See Shaffer v. Field, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973).