Court Opinion

ID: 9628249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:14:16.554431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:01.893330
License: Public Domain

*106Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with both the conclusion and the reasoning of the majority opinion in this case as to the defendant Marshall. I concur in the disposition of the Penney case. I shall briefly outline the basis of my disagreement.
The fundamental weakness of the majority opinion is found in its inability to demonstrate that the prejudice of the trial judge, if it existed, had anything whatsoever to do with the verdict of guilty and of sanity at the time of the commission of the offense. The state of mind of the trial judge was not and is not now in issue and we can concede for the present purpose that the trial judge indicated that he was not unaffected by the atrocious crime the record discloses, the circumstances of which I deem it unnecessary to detail since my reasoning does not relate thereto.
The first inquiry is whether the trial court displayed bias in connection with the appointment of additional psychiatrists which requires us to hold that the accused was deprived of a fair and impartial trial. Some analysis of the facts leading up to the trial court’s decision to appoint a third psychiatrist is here important.
The staff psychiatrists of the Colorado State Hospital reached the same conclusion that the accused was insane. However, these two physicians gave different reasons in support of this conclusion. One of them reported that Marshall was unable to distinguish between right and wrong, whereas, the other concluded that he could make such a distinction but was unable to refrain from doing the wrong. This was the background for the court’s action in first questioning these psychiatrists privately, in calling the parties together and finally in commissioning a third psychiatrist to make an examination. The judge’s motives are apparent from his remarks:
“* * * The court could not reconcile in its own mind the conclusion, or finding by the commission, that the *107defendant was insane in view of the examinations that were conducted.”
Under these circumstances, the court might very well have been confused rather than biased and could very logically have been seeking further enlightenment on the questions before it. It is true that the district attorney at first evidenced no particular enthusiasm for a further investigation, but in view of the nature of the proceedings and the interest which the court was advancing, I fail to see any invalidity in this conduct.
The pertinent statute, C.R.S. ’53, 39-8-2, not only authorizes the court to perform certain administrative tasks, it requires it to perform them. In addition to committing one who has pleaded insanity to the state hospital, “* * * The judge may also appoint a commission of one or more physicians, specialists in mental diseases, to examine the defendant during such period. Any physicians so appointed by the court may be called by either party to the action or by the court itself, and when so called shall be subject to all legal objections as to competency and bias and as to qualifications as an expert.”
Other sections of this chapter make it very clear that the trial judge is expected to interest himself in the subject of criminal insanity, both before trial, during trial and after conviction. Thus the policy implicit in the statutes themselves throw an entirely different light on the conduct of the trial judge. He was not inter-meddling in something which was not his concern. Rather he was engaged in the discharge of his statutory duties. Are we now to hold that a judge dare not display interest in these proceedings and that the penalty for seeking the truth on this subject of criminal insanity is reprimand and ouster from the case?
Quite apart from the special statutory character of the proceedings here under consideration, my philosophy is that the judge at the trial is not a mere referee who remains aloof and allows opposing counsel to formulate *108trial policies. He also has an interest in achieving justice. This idea was lucidly expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a special dissenting opinion in the case of Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 46, 53, 54, a proceeding in which the Court also had administrative obligations, wherein it was said:
“While a court room is not a laboratory for the scientific pursuit of truth, a trial judge is surely not confined to an account, obviously fragmentary, of the circumstances of a happening, here the meagre testimony of Johnson, when he has at his command the means of exploring them fully, or at least more fully before passing legal judgment. A trial is not a game of blind man’s buff; and the trial judge ■ — ■ particularly in a case where he himself is the trier of the facts upon which he is to pronounce the law — need not blindfold himself by failing to call an available vital witness simply because the parties, for reasons of trial tactics, choose to withhold his testimony.
“Federal judges are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice. See Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95; Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469. As such they have a duty of initiative to see that the issues are determined within the scope of the pleadings, not left to counsel’s chosen argument. See New York Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310, 318. Just as a Federal judge may bring to his aid an auditor, without consent of the parties, to examine books and papers, hear testimony, clarify the issues, and submit a report, in order to ‘render possible an intelligent consideration of the case by court and jury,’ Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 306, and in so doing has the power to tax the expense as costs ‘necessary to the true understanding of the cause on both sides,’ Whipple v. Cumberland Cotton Co., 3 Story, 84, 86, he has the power to call and examine witnesses to elicit the truth. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 82. He surely has the duty to *109do so before resorting to guesswork in establishing liability for fault.”
The comments of the trial judge which are quoted in the majority opinion do not show in and of themselves prejudice on his part. These appear to be reserved, detached, fair statements of one interested in the ultimate triumph of justice and not statements of one bent on conviction of the accused. The fact that the judge conducted private interrogation of the psychiatrists after he received their reports does not point to prejudice. This is explainable in the fact that the opinions of the two psychiatrists were in conflict and had to be reconciled. Moreover, this interrogation did not have the effect of changing the opinions of these doctors. They continued steadfast in their opinions that the accused was insane, testifying to this at the trial. The appointment by the court of a third psychiatrist did not result in prejudice because the accused did not submit to examination. This third physician obtained the information forming the basis for his opinion from observations which he made during the trial. He testified on hypothetical questions only. Had the accused been subjected to a compulsory examination or if it could be shown that his rights suffered in any way the present approach would have merit.
In view of the conflict between the two state psychiatrists and in the light of the duties imposed on the court by statute and considering the inherent obligations of the trial judge, and in view of the lack of showing of any demonstrable prejudice, I disagree with the conclusion of the majority that the trial judge exceeded his powers or conducted himself in any manner invalid or prejudicial to the accused.
The second inquiry is whether the scope of cross examination and the rulings of the court with respect thereto operated to prejudice the defendant.
The majority discusses at length the broad scope of cross examination of Dr. Carson allowed by the court *110as against the relative ease with which the district attorney was able to conduct his questioning. The rulings of the court are set forth in full. Obviously these rulings do not constitute prejudicial error. If so, the majority would certainly specify the error and reverse the case. The rulings are intended to show a prejudicial atmosphere of the case and in my opinion they fall short of the mark. For example, Dr. Carson was asked whether he felt that Marshall would have acted differently had a half dozen citizens been standing around the car at the time. The purpose of this question was to test Dr. Carson’s opinion that Marshall had acted under an irresistible impulse. A question put to Dr. Conde was whether he had ever known or heard of reports where delinquent men preyed upon known homosexuals for the purpose of robbery or stealing. While this question might conceivably have been asked as bearing upon the issue of guilt, it had no relationship to the sanity of the accused. Nevertheless, the case ought not to be reversed on this ground in view of the fundamental and salutary doctrine that the trial court has a discretion as to scope and extent of cross examination. See Martinez v. People, 124 Colo. 170, 235 P. (2d) 810; Melville, Manual of Criminal Evidence. The other question, namely, that the hypothetical question did not contain sufficient facts, was also a matter within the discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed. Martinez v. People, supra.
There is good reason for the rule that the trial judge has a broad discretion in dealing with questions of evidence and especially with hypothetical questions. For an appellate court to try to govern this kind of thing with rigid rules is highly impractical. Furthermore, that which appears erroneous when spotlighted assumes a different complexion when presented in full context. This makes the job of rigid supervision an impossible one.
Needless to say, from the above discussion I disagree *111with the conclusion of the majority that the defendant was denied a fair trial resulting from an attitude of bias on the part of the trial judge because there is not sufficient showing of bias from which the defendant can demonstrate that the trial was tainted. We should not condemn the work of the trial judge merely because counsel argues unfairness. Undoubtedly to defense counsel the trial appeared unfair. Even assuming that the trial court was subjectively prejudiced, the cases are uniform in holding that the court’s state of mind does not furnish a basis for a reversal. We cannot demand pure unadulterated minds in trial judges. The question is whether or not the judge’s state of mind was translated into conduct prejudicial to the defendant. See Bashford v. People, 110 Colo. 479, 135 P. (2d) 516; Rogers v. People, 104 Colo. 594, 94 P. (2d) 453; King v. People, 87 Colo. 11, 285 Pac. 157; Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 142, 98 Pac. 608. See also Baker v. People, 72 Colo. 68, 209 Pac. 791; Jones v. People, 6 Colo. 452.
Being of the opinion that the defendant has not succeeded in showing that he was prejudiced but on the contrary that the indications point to adequate protection of his rights, I would affirm the judgment.
Mr. Justice Moore joins in this dissent.