Court Opinion

ID: 9634376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:09:41.655653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:01.207098
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is of course true that we may provide through our state constitution independent guarantees of procedural rights more expansive than their federal counterparts. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). I would decline to exercise that power in the present case, and would adopt the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), abolishing the doctrine of “automatic standing” to raise Fourth Amendment challenges to searches in cases involving possessory crimes, first enunciated in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960).
The majority has not shown, nor can I discern, a textual distinction between Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution which would justify the significant dif*70ference in meaning between them which the majority opinion entails. In addition, I am persuaded that the reasons which led to the adoption of the Jones analysis are no longer valid. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out:
The “dilemma” identified in Jones, that a defendant charged with a possessory offense might only be able to establish his standing to challenge a search and seizure by giving self-incriminating testimony admissible as evidence of his guilt, was eliminated by our decision in Simmons v. United States, [390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968)].
... This Court has identified the self-incrimination rationale as the cornerstone of the Jones opinion. See Brown v. United States, [411 U.S. 223,] at 228, 36 L ED 2d 208, 93 S Ct 1565 [at 1568] [1975]. We need not belabor the question of whether the “vice” of prosecutorial contradiction could alone support a rule countenancing the exclusion of probative evidence on the grounds that someone other than the defendant was denied a Fourth Amendment right. The simple answer is that the decisions of this Court, especially our most recent decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 US 128, 58 L Ed 2d 387, 99 S Ct 421 (1978), clearly establish that a prosecutor may simultaneously maintain that a defendant criminally possessed the seized good, but was not subject to a Fourth Amendment deprivation, without legal contradiction.
448 U.S. at 89-90, 100 S.Ct. at 2551-2552.
The reasons for the “automatic standing” rule having lost their vitality, I would hold that the rule itself “has outlived its usefulness.” Id. at 95, 100 S.Ct. at 2554. Moreover, absent compelling reason, textual or otherwise, I believe the interests of this nation are best served by maintaining common standards of constitutional law throughout its separate jurisdictions. I would adopt the reasoning of Salvucci, overrule Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70, 327 A.2d 19 (1974), to the extent inconsistent herewith and affirm Superior Court.