Court Opinion

ID: 9685226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:26:41.415946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:03.381645
License: Public Domain

*228Danhof, C. J.
Plaintiff alleges that on June 7, 1976, he was injured in the course of his employment while driving his employer’s truck which was covered under a no-fault motor vehicle insurance policy issued by the defendant to the plaintiffs employer. As a result of the injury, plaintiff received workers’ disability compensation benefits paid by the employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier (not the defendant). On May 9, 1977, plaintiff filed suit against defendant seeking to recover no-fault personal protection insurance benefits, MCL 500.3114(3); MSA 24.13114(3). Based on the contention that § 131 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237[131]), provided that plaintiffs exclusive remedy was through that act, defendant moved for and was granted accelerated judgment. GCR 1963, 116.1(2).
Section 131 of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act reads:
"The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer. As used in this section and section 827 'employee’ includes the person injured, his personal representatives and any other person to whom a claim accrues by reason of the injury to or death of the employee, and 'employer’ includes his insurer, a service agent to a self-insured employer, and the accident fund insofar as they furnish, or fail to furnish, safety inspections or safety advisory services incident to providing workmen’s compensation insurance or incident to a self-insured employer’s liability servicing contract.”
The defendant in the instant case, unlike the defendant in Mathis v Interstate Motor Freight System, 73 Mich App 602; 252 NW2d 842 (1977), is not plaintiffs employer as defined in § 131. Conse*229quently, that exclusive remedy provision does not operate to bar the instant circuit court action. Therefore, accelerated judgment, based on § 131, was improper and must be reversed.
The statutory schemes of workers’ disability compensation and no-fault motor vehicle insurance provide an employee, such as the plaintiff, who is injured in the course of employment while occupying an employer-owned motor vehicle covered by a no-fault policy issued by an insurance company, at least two potential avenues of recovering compensation. The employee may obtain workers’ disability compensation benefits and also may obtain no-fault benefits. During oral arguments before this Court, plaintiff’s attorney stated in part: "There is an offset proviso within the statute * * * that offset permits the no-fault carrier to not have to double pay * * * We’re certainly not intending to double dip.” This author thoroughly agrees with the view that the plaintiff should not obtain a double recovery. Both of these potential sources of recovery are creatures of the Michigan Legislature and both are paid for by the employer. The Legislature was aware of the possibility of duplicative recovery when it enacted the no-fault motor vehicle insurance act. The problem was addressed in §3109(1) (MCL 500.3109[1]; MSA 24.13109[1]) which reads:
"(1) Benefits provided or required to be provided under the laws of any state or the federal government shall be subtracted from the personal protection insurance benefits otherwise payable for the injury.”
In Pollock v Frankenmuth Mutual Ins Co, 79 Mich App 218; 261 NW2d 554 (1977), § 3109(1) was held to be void where it operated to reduce, by the amount of workers’ disability compensation bene*230fits received, the no-fault benefits payable under a no-fault insurance policy purchased by the employee. The opinion reads in part at 224-225:
"If the subtraction rule functions as intended, it denies recovery on no-fault policies for the purpose of lowering premiums. * * * [W]orker motorists are forced to purchase insurance on which the law denies them a right of recovery, so that other insureds may enjoy lower premiums for insurance on which they can recover.
"We perceive no way in which this allocation increases premium savings. Forcing a given class to purchase. insurance upon which they cannot recover will tend to reallocate wealth, but will do so in a manner unrelated to any identifiable legislative policy. We do not regard the random redistribution of wealth as a legitimate legislative objective, sufficient to justify the discriminatory effect of § 3109(1).”
The holding and rationale of Pollock do not apply to the situation in the instant case where an employee seeks recovery of benefits provided by a no-fault policy purchased by the employer.
In O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 70 Mich App 487; 245 NW2d 801 (1976), lv granted 397 Mich 848 (1976), § 3109(1) of the no-fault act was declared unconstitutional where its application resulted in deduction of Federal Social Security benefits from no-fault personal injury protection benefits otherwise payable. O’Donnell reads in part at 496:
"Section 3109(1) is very broad—it covers any collateral governmental source. No-fault systems in other states include collateral source set-off provisions, but in Illinois and Florida, for example, the set-off provisions apply only to workmen’s compensation benefits. It might be argued that the latter type of set-off provision is reasonable because the workmen’s compensation ben*231efits are provided without cost to the beneficiary, while private collateral source benefits are not.1 Cf. Grace v Howlett, supra, [51 Ill 2d 478; 283 NE2d 474 (1972)], Chief Justice Underwood, dissenting. The argument is persuasive.
This analysis applies to the facts of the instant case. Application of § 3109(1) in the instant case would be valid. Therefore, if on remand plaintiff succeeds in establishing an entitlement to no-fault personal protection benefits, in my view an off set for worker’s disability compensation benefits recovered should be made as provided for in § 3109(1).
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Costs to plaintiff.

 "This type of no-fault set-off provision (reducing no-fault benefits by workmen’s compensation benefits received) has been upheld by the Florida Supreme Court. Lasky v State Farm Insurance Co, 296 So 2d 9, 21 (Fla, 1974).”