Court Opinion

ID: 9821125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:49:40.802258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:14.612154
License: Public Domain

JUDGE HAWTHORNE,
dissenting.
\ 425 This appeal presents us with a narrow question: whether plaintiff, Roy Esquibel, was "found guilty of a felony" under section 22-81-129(1)(e), C.R.8.2015, when the court accepted his guilty plex under a deferred sentencing agreement. Because I believe he was not, I respectfully dissent. I first address why I disagree with the majority's analysis, and then I examine the two sections in title 22 (the education title), that contain the phrase "found guilty of a felony": section 129 of article 81, which governs school board director qualifications, and section 109 of article 60.5, which governs educator licensing.
I. "Found Guilty of a Felony"
26 The majority conchides that "found guilty of a felony" includes deferred sentencing agreements because courts have found, in other contexts, that when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea, the defendant has been "convicted." ' See Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court," 674 P.2d 375, 877-78 (Colo.1984) (a court's acceptance of a guilty plea under a deferred sentencing agreement was a "conviction" for purposes of the bail bond statute); Jeffrey v. Dist. Court, 626 P.2d 631, 635 *799n. 4 (Colo.1981) (a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea under deferred sentencing statute constitutes a “conviction” for purposes of Double Jeopardy Clause). But the. phrase we must interpret is not “convicted of a felony,” rather, it is “found guilty of a felony.” For this reason, while the majority relies on authorities interpreting the phrase “conviction,” I find those cases minimally persuasive in this context.
¶27 Additionally, the majority’s analysis focuses not on the plain and ordinary meaning of “found guilty of a felony,” but rather on the plain and ordinary effect of a guilty plea. Because, it reasons, a court must make certain findings in order to accept a guilty plea,1 the court’s acceptance of the plea is a finding of guilt. But finding a factual basis for a plea (a requirement that a defendant may waive), and finding that a defendant understands the crime with which he has been charged is not the same as finding that a defendant is guilty. Therefore, I believe the proper focus remains the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase in question, and I look, to other sections of the education title for guidance. See, e,g., Bob Blake Builders, Inc. v. Gramling, 18 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo.App.2001) (all general terms must be construed in the context of the entire title or article); Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Tollefson, 961 P.2d 1150, 1153 (Colo.App.1998) (“[T]he rule of consistent usage requires that, when the General Assembly uses the same words or phrases in different parts of a statute, then, in the absence of any manifest indication to the contrary, the meaning attributed to the words or phrases in one part of the statute should be ascribed to the same words or phrases found elsewhere in the statute.”).
¶ 28 The phrase “found guilty of a felony” appears in one other section of the education title: section 107 of article 60.5, which governs educator licensing. See § 22-60.5-107(2)(d), C.R.S.2015. There, however, the General Assembly included additional language that encompasses guilty pleas entered under a deferred judgment agreement. See id. (“When the applicant or -holder is found guilty of a felony ..; or upon the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere to a felony[.]”).' - Section 107 therefore distinguishes “found guilty of a felony” from the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea and illustrates that where the legislature wished to include the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea entered' under .a deferred judgment agreement as a disqualifying event, it knew how to do so. See Well Augmentation Subdistrict v. City of Aurora, 221 P.3d.399, 419 (Colo.2009).
¶ 29 By including “or upon the court’s acceptance of a guilty plea” in section 107, but omitting that phrase from section 129, the legislature must have intended to exclude a court’s acceptance of a guilty plea, including those accepted as part of a deferred judgment agreement, from those events that trigger the vacancy of a school board member’s seat. See, e.g., Cody Park Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harder, 251 P.3d 1, 9 (Colo.App.2009) (“When the General Assembly includes a provision in one statute but omits that provision from another similar statute, the omission is evidence of its intent.”).
¶ 30 While one may disagree with the outcome of this construction, it is not our role to rewrite or eliminate clear and unambiguous statutes merely because we do not believe the General Assembly would have intended the consequences of its enactments. People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348, 360 (Colo.2001) (Goats, J., dissenting). To conclude that acceptance of a guilty plea under a deferred judgment agreement results in the vacancy of a school board member’s seat would require reading language into section 129 that simply is not there, see Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mosher, 22 P.3d 531, 534 (Colo.App.2000) (“We are not at liberty to read additional terms into, or to modify, the plain language of a statute_”), or would render superfluous the .language in section 107, see City & Cnty. of Denver v. Denver Firefighters Local No. 858, 2014 CO 15, ¶ 10, 320 P.3d 354 (our interpretation must not render any statutory provisions absurd or unreasonable).
*800{31 I would therefore conclude that Es-quibel has not been "found guilty of a felony" as contemplated by section 22-31-129, and that the district court erred in denying Es-quibel's motion for prehmmary injunction on that basis.
II. Conclusion
$32 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the district court's order and remand the case for further proceedings.

. Some of those findings include that a defendant understands the nature of the charge, that he understands the possible penalties, and that there is a factual basis for the plea. Crim. P, 11(b)(1), (6).