Court Opinion

ID: 9884537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:00:55.550789+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:39.292151
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: The jury was not instructed that it had to find that defendant passed the check with the intent to defraud. The majority rightly concludes that this is error, and I agree. However, I cannot reach the conclusion, as does the majority, that the jury made a finding of intent to defraud. 91 Ill. App. 3d 26, 32. I agree with the majority that a properly instructed jury could have found from the evidence presented that the defendant committed the offense charged. However, I do not consider that the evidence precluded an acquittal, based upon want of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant’s intent to defraud. The inquiry here is not whether the jury could have found him guilty, it is whether they could only have found him guilty. If it is possible that a properly instructed jury could acquit, then, when we decide that a jury was not properly instructed, we must reverse and remand for a new trial. The majority argues that defendant “clearly issued a bad check intending to overcome a valid garageman’s lien in favor of Mitchell. See III. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 82, pars. 40, 72a.” (91 Ill. App. 3d 26, 29.) The majority creates this argument itself, as it was not presented by either party. I note that under the first statütory provision cited, the lien may be possessory or nonpossessory; in other words, the garageman is not defrauded of his lien if defendant induces him to release physical possession of the automobile. Under the second provision cited, the lien is a possessory one. However, case law holds that “the mechanic’s lien in paragraph 47(a) survives the mechanic’s surrender of actual possession of the specified chattel in return for the owner’s check until the draft is honored.” (Leavitt v. Charles R. Hearn, Inc. (1974), 19 Ill. App. 3d 980, 984, 312 N.E.2d 806, 809.) Mitchell thus did not lose his lien, could not have lost his lien, and defendant could not have been defrauding him, or intending to defraud him. (All of this even assumes that any chancellor would have enforced a lien in favor of this apparently overreaching mechanic in the first instance.) The majority misapprehends the testimony of Mitchell. I agree that Mitchell stated that he could not recall telling the defendant that he would not get his car back until he paid for repairs. But here is his full statement on this point in response to an inquiry: “I am sure I probably said that [he wasn’t going to get his car] as a standard to anybody. He didn’t object. I can’t say that I did. I don’t know if I did or not.” From this statement, and other evidence, a jury could have found that defendant was merely attempting to retrieve his property as best he could. I agree that his conduct is not to be condoned. However, it was still for the jury to determine whether or not defendant had the requisite intent. Without that intent there is no offense.