Court Opinion

ID: 9699312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:19:07.507127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:48.681814
License: Public Domain

STREIT, Justice
(dissenting).
I disagree. The Miranda warning read to Luis Ortiz conveyed the key requirements of Miranda, specifically the right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning. Ortiz’s waiver and subsequent confession were voluntary considering the totality of the circumstances. I would affirm the court of appeals and reverse the district court.
I. Background Facts.
The majority does not take into account some key facts. At the police station, Officer Bertrand took Ortiz to an interview room and gave Ortiz a ‘Waiver of Rights” form2 written in Spanish and asked him to *255read it. The form was not by any means a valid Miranda waiver. Although it acknowledges the right to an attorney, it did not mention the right to remain silent or have an attorney appointed if you cannot afford one. Officer Salvador Sanchez, of the Sioux City Police Department, was present as an interpreter. Sanchez asked Ortiz if he could read the form, and Ortiz responded that he could. Sanchez then left the room for a moment, and Ortiz signed the waiver of rights form. After Ortiz signed the form, Bertrand asked him, “Do you understand your rights?” Ortiz responded, “But what are my rights?” Bertrand waited for Sanchez to return. When Sanchez returned, he asked Ortiz, “Do you understand what you read?” Ortiz responded, “He is telling me the rights, but what are they, what are they?” This was a direct question as to what this form meant when it said “I completely understand what my rights are.” If anything, this demonstrated Ortiz knew exactly what was going on. He had not been told his rights. He asked with clarity what they were. Sanchez then began reading out loud the waiver of rights form that Ortiz had signed. Sanchez stopped reading (perhaps realizing the Waiver of Rights form would not adequately tell him his rights) and instead read Ortiz the Spanish Miranda advisory card used by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration.3 The following is a translation by the defendant’s expert of the advisory Sanchez recited to Ortiz:
Before asking some questions, you have to understand the following. Okay? You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in the court. You have the right to consult with an attorney before asking questions and have this attorney present during the questioning. If you cannot pay for the services of an attorney, one will be [unintelligible] to you, if you so desire. You understand you?4
*256(Emphasis added.) Ortiz responded that he had no questions. He then confessed to making the girl touch his penis.
II. Knowing and Intelligent Waiver.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the police to inform a suspect he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel during custodial interrogation. A defendant can waive these rights “provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707. “The State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that constitutional rights were knowingly waived and that statements of an inculpatory nature were voluntarily given.” State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Iowa 1997). Absent Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of those rights, statements made during an interrogation are inadmissible. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726.
In determining whether a defendant has validly waived his Miranda rights, we must consider the following:
First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 420-21 (1986) (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212 (1979)).
Ortiz does not assert that his waiver was coerced. Rather, he contends because the recitation of his rights did not properly explain a lawyer would be available to him before answering questions, he did not fully understand the rights he was waiving. Ortiz argues informing him he has the right to consult with an attorney before “asking questions”5 is significantly different from having the right to consult with *257an attorney before “answering questions” and does not satisfy the requirements of Miranda.
Miranda does not require that a “precise formulation of the warning [be] given to a criminal defendant.” California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L.Ed.2d 696, 701 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has “never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, 176 (1989). We have adopted the federal standard and have determined that Miranda warnings need only “reasonably relay to an accused his rights as required by the Miranda decision.” State v. Schwartz, 467 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Iowa 1991).
The fact that Miranda rights are translated into the suspect’s native language does not change the analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Perez-Lopez, 348 F.3d 839, 848-49 (9th Cir.2003). As the Tenth Circuit has noted,
Although language barriers may inhibit a suspect’s ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights, when a defendant is advised of his rights in his native tongue and claims to understand such rights, a valid waiver may be effectuated. The translation of a suspect’s Miranda rights need not be a perfect one, so long as the defendant understands that he does not need to speak to police and that any statement he makes may be used against him.
United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1990) (citations omitted).
In Prysock and Duckworth, the United States Supreme Court found the Miranda warnings given were adequate where they apprised the individual of the following rights: (1) the right to remain silent, and anything the individual says can be used against him or her in a court, (2) the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, and (3) the right to have an attorney appointed at no cost if the individual cannot afford one. Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203, 109 S.Ct. at 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d at 177; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct. at 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d at 702.
In determining whether a warning fully conveys the Miranda rights, federal courts are split on whether it is necessary to inform the individual that he has the right to an attorney present during questioning as opposed to a general advisement of the right to have an attorney present. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the suspect is entitled to be expressly informed that he has the right to an attorney present during questioning. See United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140-41 (6th Cir.1992) (holding “the right to the presence of an attorney” did not adequately inform suspect of the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning); United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir.1984) (constitutional rights violated where defendant only informed of right to presence of attorney before questioning and not during questioning); Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530, 533 (5th Cir.1968) (“Merely telling [defendant] that he could speak with an attorney ... before he said anything at all is not the same as informing him that he is entitled to the presence of an attorney during interrogation and that one will be appointed if he cannot afford one.”).
In contrast, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have determined a general advisement that the suspect has a right to the presence of an attorney was adequate, and it was not necessary to expressly inform the suspect he has the right to an attorney present during questioning. See United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 82 (4th Cir.1996) (general warning “you have the *258right to an attorney” satisfied Miranda requirements); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d 496, 502 (8th Cir.1992) (general warning that defendant has the right to an attorney sufficient and no strict requirement that “a defendant be explicitly advised of his right to an attorney before and during questioning”).
Advising the suspect he has a right to the presence of an attorney during questioning more precisely conveys the key requirements of Miranda than simply informing the suspect he has a right to the presence of an attorney in general. Here, the warnings given to Ortiz “touched all aspects and requirements of Miranda.” Schwartz, 467 N.W.2d at 246. It contained the essence of the Miranda warnings. Sanchez informed Ortiz of his right to speak to a lawyer during questioning, and that a lawyer would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. He also informed Ortiz he had the right to remain silent and anything he said could be used against him in court. Assuming the translation offered by the defendant’s expert to be correct,6 Sanchez’s statement that Ortiz could speak to a lawyer before asking questions (as opposed to before answering questions) does not make a substantive difference in Ortiz’s rights since the translation conveyed the key requirement of having counsel present during questioning. Given the context of the sentence, it is unfair to conclude Ortiz understood he had a right to an attorney only while he asked the officers questions. Furthermore, in the written waiver of rights Ortiz signed, he “agreed to answer ... questions and to make ... [a] statement.” Ortiz was not misled about his rights. Exchanging one word (“asking” for “answering”) did not change the substance of the rights con-, veyed. Sanchez informed Ortiz, “You have the right to consult with an attorney before asking [or making] questions and have this attorney present during the questioning [or interview].” Further, federal courts have recognized DEA Form 13A, the Spanish Miranda advisory Sanchez read to Ortiz, provides the Miranda warning in Spanish. See, e.g., United States v. Labrada-Bustamante, 428 F.3d 1252, 1257 n. 3 (9th Cir.2005) (“A DEA Form 13A states the Miranda warnings in both English and Spanish.”).
Ortiz was “clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at 722. In addition, Sanchez asked Ortiz a few times whether he understood his rights and whether he had any questions. Ortiz’s waiver was made “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141, 89 L.Ed.2d at 420-21.
Even though Ortiz was told he had the right to an attorney before asking questions, he received information of no consequence. In the context of the warning, this advisement was superfluous. There was no confusion created by this phrase. We have not come across any cases where the defendant complains his warning was inadequate because he was informed only that he had a right to counsel during questioning but not before questioning. *259The core right, as set forth in Miranda, is the right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. at 1626, 16 L.Ed.2d at 722 (“Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation. ...”).
I agree with the court of appeals that Ortiz’s confession was voluntary. The district court, in concluding Ortiz’s waiver and confession were involuntary, relied on a written translation of the interview. Upon reviewing the video-recorded7 waiver of rights and confession (and the accompanying interpretation), it is clear Ortiz’s statements were “the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice, made by the defendant whose will was not overborne or whose capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired.” State v. Payton, 481 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 1992). The interview lasted about an hour. The officers did not intimidate, deceive, threaten, or promise anything to Ortiz to induce him to waive his rights or confess. Although the transcript reads somewhat choppy and suggests the officers cut off Ortiz on a few occasions, the video recording reveals the officers allowed Ortiz time to both answer and ask questions. There was no haste. Ortiz was even allowed to call his wife (or girlfriend) on his cell phone.8 The tone of the questioning was neither harsh nor coercive. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Ortiz’s waiver and subsequent confession were “made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 707.
As the Miranda warnings given to Ortiz conveyed the key requirements of Miranda, specifically the right to consult with an attorney and have the attorney present during questioning, and his confession was voluntary, his confession should be admissible.
CADY, J., joins this dissent.

. The defendant’s expert translated the waiver of rights form as follows:
VOLUNTARY WAIVER OF RIGHTS
(WAIVER OF RIGHTS)
I have read the declaring [sic.] of the [non-word] upon which I am noticed of my *255rights on [sic.] the constitution and the legal [sic.] and I completely understand what my rights are. I have received the opportunity to use the telephone to notify an attorney or individual from my family. I agree to answer an [sic.] questions and make an [sic.} statement. I know exactly what I am doing and I am doing so as a volunteer [sic.] and underneath [sic.} my own [sic.] will. I do not want to consult with an attorney and I don’t want to have an attorney be witnessed [sic.] here to inform me of my rights. I have not received any promise of immunity of any other type and they have not used any physically [sic.] force or pressionment [sic.] of any to force me to make a statement.
The original Spanish reads:
RENUNCIA VOLUNTARIA DE LOS DEREC-HOS
(WAIVER OF RIGHTS)
He leído el declaración de advertiso en que estoy avisado de mis derechos del constitución y del jurídico y entiendo com-pletamente cuales son mis derechos. He recibido la oportunidad de usar el telefone para notificar un licenciado o una persona de mi familia. Estoy de acuerdo a contes-tar cualquier preguntas y hacer un declara-ción. Se exactamente lo que estoy hacien-do y eso lo hago de voluntario y debajo mi propira voluntad. No quiero consultar con un licenciado y no quiero tener un licencia-do presenciarse aqui para avisarme de mis derechos. No he recibido ninguna prome-sa de inminudad ni de cualquier otro tipo y no han usado ninguna fuerza físicamente ni presura de cualquier tipo para forzarme de hacer una declaración.

. Sanchez works on a joint drug task force. He testified that he is more comfortable with the Miranda form used by the Drug Enforcement Administration, form 13A, a card which includes a Miranda warning in English on one side and a Spanish version on the other side.

. The original Spanish advisory Sanchez recited to Ortiz is as follows:
Antes de hacer algunas preguntas, usted tiene que entender de lo siguiente: Okay, usted tiene el derecho de permanecer calla-*256do. Cualquier cosa que usted diga se pue-de usar en su contra en la corte. Usted tiene el derecho de consultar con abogado antes de hacerle algunas preguntas y tener dicho abogado presente durante el interro-gatorio. Si usted no puede pagar por los servicios de un abogado, uno será nombra-do para usted, antes de cualquier interroga-tirio, si usted desea. Entiendes usted?
Sanchez read the federal DEA Miranda advisory correctly, without any word substitutions. The translation cited in the text above is from the defendant’s expert, Michael D. Powers, Ph.D. and United States Certified Court Interpreter in Spanish. The state's interpreter, Giovanna Canet, a certified Spanish interpreter for the State of Iowa, translates the key phrase “Usted tiene el derecho de consultar con abogado antes de hacerle algu-nas preguntas y tener dicho abogado presente durante el interrogatorio” slightly differently than the defendant's expert. Her translation, in State's Exhibit 5, reads “You have the right to consult with an attorney before making any questions [and] have said attorney present during the interview.”
DEA Form 13A includes both an English and a Spanish Miranda advisory to be read to the suspect prior to interrogation. The English version on the form reads "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during questioning.” DEA Form 13 A.

. As noted above, the State’s interpreter translated the phrase "antes de hacerle algu-nas preguntas” as "before making any questions.”

. Only the defendant’s interpreter translated the phrase "usted tiene el derecho de consul-tar con un abogado, antes de harcele algunas preguntas” as "you have the right to consult with an attorney before asking questions.” The State's interpreter translated the phrase "antes de hacerle algunas preguntas” as "before making any questions,” and the English version on DEA Form 13A reads "you have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions.”

. This case is an excellent example of the value of electronically recorded police interrogations. See State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006) ("We believe electronic recording, particularly videotaping, of custodial interrogations should be encouraged-”).

. During this call, he admitted there was a problem with the daughter and that "she touched me.” These statements are not an issue in this appeal.