Court Opinion

ID: 9542437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:26.580909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:54.801861
License: Public Domain

*573MATTHEWS, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In my view the property division ordered by the trial court is not an abuse of discretion or clearly unjust. Further, I see no reason to conclude that the property division contradicts the court’s objective of awarding a property division in Mary’s favor. I would therefore affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Mary received assets with a net equity of $327,170, plus one half of the marital property in retirement plans, another $174,742 according to her brief. Eric received net assets of $293,701, plus the other half of the marital property in retirement plans. The trial court stated that Mary was relatively economically disadvantaged when compared to Eric and “that an unequal division of the marital estate is warranted in this case as follows: [the court then listed the assets awarded Mary including their fair market value and net equity].” The court did not state that any specific division in terms of percentages was intended.
The majority opinion concludes that the trial judge mis-valued the real estate awarded Mary because it did not account for the cost of necessary repairs.1 The majority further concludes that the court should also have deducted closing costs and sales commissions from these properties.2
In my view the trial judge cannot fairly be faulted for determining net equity as he did. Several reasons support this conclusion.
First, the net values found by the trial court were exactly those listed in a document Mary submitted during the trial. If deductions were necessary for repairs and sales costs she should have so indicated. Her failure to assert the alleged inaccuracy of these values or their need of further adjustment until after the trial (when the properties were awarded to her) should preclude her from making this claim on appeal.
Second, fair market value represents an “as is, where is” concept. The fair market value of a house in need of repair will be lower than that of an otherwise identical house needing no repairs. Because fair market value is the value of property in its present condition, I see no reason to assume that the values submitted by Mary and determined by the trial court were not already discounted because the properties needed repairing. Indeed, Eric stated in the trial court, “the house was appraised ‘as is’ and the ‘as is’ value was used at trial.” I do not read his brief on appeal as contradicting this position and I am unaware of any agreement that does so.
Third, Eric also received substantial real estate under the property division. He received three properties with a net value of $243,756, whereas Mary received four properties having a net value of $270,627. All the properties were valued in accordance with Mary’s in-trial submission. The trial court found that two of the properties awarded Eric (valued together at $166,256) required repairs before they could be sold. If the majority’s assumption that the fair market value of the properties did not reflect their repair needs is correct, repair costs would also have to be deducted from the values assigned to the properties awarded Eric. Likewise, if values for Mary’s properties are to be net of sales costs, Erie’s properties should be valued on the same basis. Would deducting costs of needed repairs and costs of sale from Eric’s properties as well as Mary’s achieve the trial court’s objective of a property division favoring Mary? That depends on the costs of repair and sale for each property. We lack this information and it apparently was not presented at trial. Thus we cannot conclude that the distribution failed to achieve the trial court’s objective of awarding property to Mary having a greater value than that awarded to Eric.
Any quest for exactitude in valuing real estate will necessarily fail. Value is at best a matter of informed opinion, and informed opinions differ, sometimes substantially. About all one can expect is that values will fall within a reasonable range and, when *574numerous properties are being valued for comparative purposes, that the same criteria for value are used for each property. The trial court’s decision meets these expectations. I would not disturb it.

. Op. at 571.

. Op. at 572.