Court Opinion

ID: 9662345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:06:36.509508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:38.832803
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, dissenting. I believe I can make my point of dissent more readily understood by using a series of illustrations and by substituting letters for names. 1. In the case under consideration we have a devise by T [denoting testator] to L [denoting taker of life estate] and then another devise to F [denoting here the step-daughter, or first taker] and the “heirs of her body.” 2. Notes: (a) The quoted words are not the ones used in the will under consideration, hut I agree with the majority that their meaning is the same, (b) I have divided the will into two distinct and separate devises as follows: first, from T to L for life; second, from T to F and the heirs of her body. 3. Thus we see that in the ‘‘ second” devise we have a perfect example for the application of Ark Stats. § 50-405. Applying this statute we then have the will conveying (a) a life estate to L, (b) a life estate to F [beginning at the death of L, as provided in the will], and; (c) a fee in the children of F. 4. It is perfectly legal and proper for T to convey a life estate to L and, at her death, a life estate to F. See Henderson v. Richardson, 213 Ark. 532, 211 S. W. 2d 436. 5. I must concede that [for all practical purposes] the language in the will under consideration is exactly like the language in Bowlin v. Vinsant, 186 Ark. 740, 55 S. W. 2d 927, one of the cases relied on by the majority. I also must concede that the Bowlin case is contrary to the results I reached in paragraph 3 above. My dissent then amounts to a plea that the Boivlin ease be overruled [as of this date]. I believe there are good reasons for my view, as I shall now attempt to show. 6. The Bowlin decision was based on the decisions in Bell v. Gentry, 121 Ark. 484, 218 S. W. 194, and Pletner v. Southern Lumber Company, 173 Ark. 277, 292 S. W. 370, also relied on by the majority. But a careful reading of these two cases discloses a fundamental difference between them and the Bowlin case relative to the essential facts or language. In the former two cases there was only one devise in the wills construed, and this was considered to be the pivotal point in the case. It is hard for me to follow the logic employed in these cases, but I do see the basis upon which the result was obtained. This is the reasoning, in effect,' there used: Ark. Stats, could not apply because then there would be a life estate in L [created by the will], and a life estate in F [created by the statute], both existing at the same time — -an impossible situation. It seems that in the Bowlin case the court just assumed that the same impossible situation existed. It is perfectly obvious, however, that no such impossible situation did exist in the Bowlin case and that it does not exist in the case under consideration, where the wills specifically provide that the second life estate [created by statute] shall not begin to run until the first life estate is extinguished. Since I feel sure that this court would like to give effect to Ark. Stats. § 50-405 in applicable situations, and since the Bowlin case amounts to a revocation of that statute in certain applicable situations, it appears to me advisable to use this first opportunity to set the record straight, effective as of this date. 7. In addition to the two cases cited above the majority also rely on Adams v. Eagle, 194 Ark. 171, 106 S. W. 2d 192, and Cox v. Danehower, 211 Ark. 696, 202 S. W. 2d 200. I purposely refrained from discussing these two cases for the following reasons: In the Adams case apparently, though it is not clear, there was only one devise by the testator which puts it in the same classification with the Pletner case. If this be true then the Pletner case which was cited in the opinion was properly cited. In that event however the Bowlin case which was cited in the opinion was, I submit, improperly cited. In the Cox ease somewhat the same situation appears. Apparently there were two devises under the will although this does not appear as clearly as it does in the case under consideration. If we assume this to be true then the Pletner case which is cited in the opinion is improperly cited, but the Bowlm case which was cited in the opinion was properly cited causing the court to repeat the same error that has heretofore been pointed out in the Bowlin case and it should likewise be overruled as of this date.