Court Opinion

ID: 9596652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:51:59.290551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:32.249263
License: Public Domain

Sears, Justice,
dissenting.
This case presents the dilemma of fashioning an appropriate equitable remedy for Thorn Woode’s failure to submit its construction plans for approval by the association before Thorn Woode built its 41 units. The trial court found it equitable to permit Thorn Woode to vote for approval of its design after it had incurred the expense of building the units. The majority now approves that remedy as equitable, citing Prime Bank v. Galler, 263 Ga. 286 (430 SE2d 735) (1993), for the proposition that a trial court should find the least oppressive means of remedying a defendant’s violation. The majority, however, omits an important aspect of the foregoing principle. Fully stated, the principle is that a trial court should find the least oppressive means of remedying the violation “while still protecting the valuable rights of the plaintiff.” (Emphasis supplied.) Prime Bank, 263 Ga. at 289. Permitting Thorn Woode to submit the design for approval after it built the units strikes me as being particularly inequitable, as it fails to protect the valuable right of the appellants to have the vote taken before construction, and permits Thorn Woode to remedy its own wrong in a manner detrimental to the appellants. Although I recognize that Thorn Woode could have voted in favor of design conformance on a vote taken before it built the units, the appellants would have had significant leverage at that point to obtain concessions on the designs or to have them changed completely. After Thorn Woode incurred huge expenses building the units, all hope of that disappeared, and the vote ordered by the trial court was a pointless exercise, the result being known to all beforehand. In sum, permitting the vote to be taken after construction fails to protect the valuable right of the appellants to have it done before construction. Moreover, the remedy approved by the majority is unnecessary given that the trial court had options that were not oppressive to Thorn Woode but yet were fair to the appellants. For instance, the court could have appointed an independent factfinder to determine the issue of design compliance or could have done so itself. If it were ultimately determined that the 41 units did comply, then the case would be at an end. If it were ultimately determined that the 41 units were not in compliance, then the court would have to consider various equitable reme*706dies, including whether renovations should be ordered to bring the 41 units into total or partial compliance. As a part of this latter determination, the court could consider whether the appellants complained timely about Thorn Woode’s failure to submit its plan for design approval.
Decided October 2, 1995.
Ronald S. Stevens, Michelle F. Bergman, Randy S. Sabatini, for appellants.
Benjamin P. Erlitz, for appellees.
I have one further concern with the majority opinion. It cites Winslette v. Keeler, 220 Ga. 100 (2) (137 SE2d 288) (1964), for the proposition that the appellants are not entitled to judicial review of the design conformance decision of the association based on the allegation that the design was not in fact in conformance. Winslette, however, supports the appellant’s right to judicial review. Winslette is the reverse of this case in that the appellant had submitted a design that he alleged conformed to the applicable covenants, and the appel-lee had voted not to approve the design. We held that the appellant was entitled to judicial review of the design issue.
Accepting the allegations as true, which must be done on general demurrer, the plaintiff has submitted plans for the building of a residence on his lot which meet all the requirements of the covenant and the defendant refuses to approve them. This being accepted as true, the refusal of the defendant to approve the plans submitted would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious as alleged.
Id. at 103.
In this case the appellants have alleged that the appellees have approved a design that does not conform to the covenants. Under the reasoning of Winslette, the approval of that design would then be “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,” id., and the appellants are entitled to judicial review of that approval.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.