Court Opinion

ID: 9543602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:59.328426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:39.350185
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-13 authorizes the court to order that all support payments be made to the clerk’s office as immutable, indisputable proof of payment. I believe that, without judicial modification, an obligated parent should receive no credit for payments which do not conform to the order for child support. Isler v. Isler (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 416, rehearing denied, 425 N.E.2d 667; Whitman v. Whitman (1980), Ind.App., 405 N.E.2d 608. This rule barring credit for non-conforming payments derives from the following language in Stitle v. Stitle (1964), 245 Ind. 168, 197 N.E.2d 174. The obligated parent is
“required to make the payments in the manner, amount and at the time required by the support order embodied in the divorce decree, at least until such order (is) modified or set aside.”
Id. at 182,197 N.E.2d at 183. I believe that Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-13 promotes certain *369and predictable payments which insure that the best interests of the child remain paramount in the period of post-divorce strife between often embittered former spouses.
This “seemingly inflexible rule”1 does not exclude all equitable exceptions for the substantial compliance with the trial court’s support order. Where the obligated parent has made payments by personal check, money order, or cashier’s check and has maintained a record of such payments, the amount of support paid or the amount of arrearage due can be easily and accurately determined by the court. But, the mere undocumented assertions of payment by the obligated parent or the testimony of the obligated parent that the equivalent has been made through the giving of a toy, a suit of clothing, or a gift of cash is noncompliance with the support order. Such undocumented assertions of payment or substitute payments do not only foment confusion, uncertainty, and continued litigation in court between the parents, but it does not serve the best interests of the child. The custodial parent has the responsibility to determine the needs of the child in regard to food, clothing, and other necessities. Therefore, the only equitable exception that is compatible with the best interest of the child and at the same time substantial compliance with the court’s support order is documentary evidence which supplements the clerk’s records. No other equitable exception should be permitted.
The majority’s reasoning is specious. While the majority casts the “no-credit” rule as “contrary to the basic grain of American jurisprudence,” and as a meddlesome display of judicial arrogance, the majority surprisingly overlooks the statutory and public policy basis of the “no-credit” rule found in Ind.Code 31-1-11.5-13. The documentary evidence requirement insures the best interests of the child will be served expeditiously as well as promotes finality in litigation.2 Indeed, the documentary evidence requirement is central and fundamental to our law defining the payment of judgments. Ind.Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 67(B).
Where an arrearage is alleged, the trial court can take judicial notice of its own support records.3 A better practice would be the introduction of a certified copy of the court’s support records by the custodial parent claiming the arrearage.4 Once this was accomplished and an arrearage appeared according to the court’s records, a prima facie case of arrearage is established. The obligated parent would be permitted to show substantial compliance with the trial court’s support order by presenting documentary evidence which would establish current payments of support. This procedure was not followed in the present case, and there is no assurance that the best interests of the child have been protected nor is there any showing of substantial compliance with the court’s support order; therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this dissenting opinion.

. This terminology was used by the First District in Isler v. Jsler (1981), Ind.App., 422 N.E.2d 416, in its opinion denying the petition for rehearing, 425 N.E.2d 667, 668.

. The majority forgets that the obligated parent can seek modification of the support order under Ind.Code 31-l-11.5-17(a) and, thereby, prevent child support payment disputes.

. A court judicially notices its own records. Young v. State (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 1083; Starkie v. State (1943), 113 Ind.App. 589, 49 N.E.2d 968.

. A certified copy of the support payment record may be admitted to the trial court record as provided by Ind.Code 34-1-17-7.