Court Opinion

ID: 9705924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:26:46.786708+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:17.622594
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the State Horse Racing Commission’s order granting Pres-que Isle a license to conduct thoroughbred horse racing without requiring a review of the application of Presque Isle Downs, Inc. pursuant to the Commission’s newly adopted comparative review process. I note the majority’s conclusion that Pittsburgh Palisades failed to preserve any right to participate in an administrative *68hearing addressing only the merits of Presque Isle’s application and that the Commission’s denial of Pittsburgh Palisade’s motion to intervene in that proceeding was a proper exercise of discretion. However, because this Court’s order in MEC Pennsylvania Racing, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Horse Racing Commission, 827 A.2d 580 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003), vacated the Commission’s order granting Presque Isle’s license, and because the Commission adopted a mandatory procedure for reviewing all pending license applications before the remand order, I believe that the Commission should have included Presque Isle’s application in the comparative review process.1
First, after vacation of the Commission’s order granting Presque Isle’s license, Presque Isle’s legal status regarding its application for a license was no different than that of the other corporations which had submitted applications subsequent to the one submitted by Presque Isle. Pres-que Isle did not retain any residual right to a license by virtue of having gone through the administrative review process when that process was found to be lacking with regard to due process requirements and the hearing that was to be held after this Court’s remand never occurred. The operative fact in this case is not that Pres-que Isle submitted its application before the adoption of the comparative review process or that the Commission previously approved Presque Isle’s application; rather, it is that after vacation of the Commission’s order and remand of the case Pres-que Isle only held a pending application before the Commission.2
Second, by its own terms the Commission’s adopted policy defining the comparative review process is mandatory and should have been applied to the then pending application of Presque Isle.3 Had the *69policy for comparative review not been adopted, after remand and MEC Racing’s withdrawal of its hearing request, this matter would have been settled. However, the statement of policy was adopted effective May 3, 2008, or before the Court’s vacation and remand order, and that policy establishes mandatory procedures for applicants seeking a horse racing license.
The Application Notice, by which the public is to be informed that applications for racing licenses have been submitted, states that the Commission will consider any and all pending or new applications made pursuant to Section 209 of the Race Horse Industry Reform Act, Act of December 17, 1981, P.L. 435, as amended, 4 P.S. § 325.209, the section under which Presque Isle made its application, in accordance with the new comparative review process. See 7 Pa.Code § 133.4 (In Considering the Present Pending Applications). Furthermore, although I agree with the general distinction between the “binding norm” of a regulation and a policy’s announcement of nonbinding “tentative intentions for the future,” in certain circumstances a policy not promulgated as a regulation may nevertheless be deemed binding on an administrative agency.4 See Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 680 A.2d 1209 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). While it is within the Commission’s discretion whether to adopt and to proceed with the comparative review process, having decided to do so, I do not believe that it has the discretion to treat differently applicants that have applications pending before the Commission.
Third, and finally, its does not appear that submitting Presque Isle’s application through the comparative review process will require an inordinate duplication of effort by the Commission or by Presque Isle. The information required to consider Presque Isle’s application as part of the comparative review process has already been compiled, and any additional or more current information that may be required to complete the process can be accomplished through further hearings. Moreover, nothing would prevent the Commission from again approving Presque Isle’s application and granting a license if in fact the comparative review directs such a result. The fundamental premise, however, is that the comparative review process should be followed and that all pending applications should be reviewed in accordance with that process. Thus my dissent.
*70Judge COHN joins in this dissent.
Judge PELLEGRINI joins in this dissent.

. Inasmuch as Palisades Park is one of several corporations seeking what would be one of the only two remaining thoroughbred racing licenses in Pennsylvania, it has standing to assert this claim. It has an interest “distinguishable from the interest shared by other citizens ... immediate rather than remote ... [and there is] a sufficient causal connection between the challenged action and the asserted injury.” Cashdollar v. State Horse Racing Commission, 143 Pa.Cmwlth. 650, 654, 600 A.2d 646, 648 (1991).

. Thus, because of the intervening vacation and remand, this case is not one in which a policy, regulation or statute is being applied retroactively to a previously concluded transaction. For example, compare the procedural posture of this case to that in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection, 819 A.2d 148 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (procedural regulation adopted after landfill permit issued not applicable to that permit); and Shenango Township Board of Supervisors v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 686 A.2d 910 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996) (policy governing cost allocation for extending water service, adopted in August 1992, not applicable to contract signed in September 1991). Procedural policies, regulations or statutory provisions that do not impair substantive rights may be applied retroactively, although what constitutes retroactive application is oftentimes uncertain. Jaquay v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Central Property Services), 717 A.2d 1075 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).

.The most relevant sections of the Statement of Policy provide, in part:
§ 133.3 Application requirements.
The following procedures and requirements are established for license applications:
(1) Applications shall be submitted using the Commission's application form.
(2) Applications shall be submitted by the application closing date, which is published by the appropriate Commission....
(3) An applicant shall follow the procedures and requirements of the Application Notice for the application to be considered.
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§ 133.5 Procedure.
(a) All applications received by the application closing date set forth in the Application Notice shall be placed into a single group for comparative consideration by each respective Commission.
*69(b) No license will be issued until all applications in the respective consideration groups have been examined and considered by the appropriate Commission.
(c) A Commission may hold a hearing and provide for public comment under § 133.6....
7 Pa.Code §§ 133.3, 133.5 (New or Amended Pari-Mutuel License Applications — Statement of Policy).

. The cases enunciating the distinction between a binding regulation and a nonbinding statement of policy seem to deal primarily, although not exclusively, with policies that interpret a statutory provision or an existing regulation and that allow an agency much discretion in applying the policy. See Home Builders Association of Chester and Delaware Counties v. Department of Environmental Protection, 828 A.2d 446 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003); Moyer v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals, 803 A.2d 833 (Pa.Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 571 Pa. 711, 812 A.2d 1232 (2002); R.M. v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency, 740 A.2d 302 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999); Department of Environmental Resources v. Rushton Mining Co., 139 Pa.Cmwlth. 648, 591 A.2d 1168 (1991). In this case, the Commission’s statement of policy is not interpreting a statutory provision or regulation, but rather it is establishing a new procedure for the submission and consideration of license applications and by the policy’s own language it is mandatory.