Court Opinion

ID: 5163126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-02 03:07:16.054039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:36.908302
License: Public Domain

[1] Defendant, Robert Van Patrick, appeals from the aggravated sentence imposed upon him following his conviction of second degree assault. We reverse.
[2] Following an incident in which the defendant hit the victim in the head with a golf club, the defendant was charged with both first degree assault involving the use of a deadly weapon, and crime of violence based upon alleged use of a gun in the commission of the crime. During a trial to the *Page 200 
court, the crime of violence charge was dismissed after the prosecution failed to produce evidence that a gun had been used. The court found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of second degree assault, under § 18-3-203(1)(b), C.R.S (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) (use of a deadly weapon) and § 18-3-203(1)(g), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) (causing serious bodily injury).
[3] In connection with sentencing, the court concluded that an aggravated sentence was mandated by virtue of the former version of § 18-3-203(2)(c), C.R.S. (Colo. Sess. Laws 1985, ch. 145 at 647) even though the crime of violence charge was dismissed. The current version of the statute appears as § 18-3-203(2)(c), C.R.S. (1988 Cum. Supp.) (Colo. Sess. Laws 1988, ch. 125 at 717). The defendant contends, and we agree, that the trial court erred in its construction of § 18-3-203(2)(c).
[4] Both versions of § 18-3-203(2)(c) provide that if the defendant is convicted of second degree assault which causes serious bodily injury or which causes bodily injury by means of a deadly weapon, "the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section16-11-309, C.R.S." The version of § 16-11-309(1)(a) then in effect (Colo. Sess. Laws 1985, ch. 145 at 647) required that, upon conviction of a crime of violence, the court shall impose a sentence greater than the maximum in the presumptive range, but not more than twice the maximum term provided for in § 18-1-105(1)(a). The current version of §16-11-309(1)(a), C.R.S. (1988 Cum. Supp.) (Colo. Sess. Laws 1988, ch. 116 at 679) reduces the minimum term of incarceration to a term of at least the mid-point in the presumptive range set forth in § 18-1-105(1)(a).
[5] Based upon an analysis of the statutory scheme adopted by the General Assembly relative to enhanced sentences, we conclude that, before the enhanced sentence may be imposed under § 16-11-309(1)(a), the procedural safeguards contained in § 16-11-309(4) and (5) must be satisfied. These subsections require a separate charge of crime of violence and a specific finding by the trier of fact as to that charge.
[6] The initial basis for our conclusion is that § 16-11-309(1)(a) requires imposition of an enhanced sentence under § 18-1-105 for a "person convicted of a crime of violence." In order to be "convicted," it necessarily follows that there must be a charge made. See Crim. P. 7(b)(2)(IV); see also People v. Goodwin, 197 Colo. 47, 593 P.2d 326 (1979). Here the crime of violence charge was dismissed.
[7] Further support for this conclusion appears in the statutes adopted by the General Assembly in which an enhanced penalty has been included under § 18-1-105 without reference to proof of an additional charge.See, e.g., § 18-3-402(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) (class 2 felony of sexual assault in the first degree); § 18-3-412(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) (second conviction for unlawful sexual offense); § 18-6-401.2(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) (second conviction for class 3 or class 4 felony child abuse). The fact that the General Assembly adheres to a distinction between enhanced penalties imposed under § 18-1-105 and §16-11-309 appears in the language of § 18-3-402(4) (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B) where the court is directed to impose sentence under § 18-1-105(9)(e) and not under § 16-11-309(2).
[8] Thus, because the requirements of § 16-11-309(4) and (5) were not met in this case, imposition of a sentence under § 16-11-309(1)(a) was improper. The defendant must be sentenced in conformity with §18-1-105(1)(a)(IV), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8B).
[9] Because of this disposition, it is unnecessary to consider defendant's other contentions concerning his sentence.
[10] The sentence is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for sentencing consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. *Page 201 
[11] JUDGE STERNBERG and JUDGE ENOCH concur.