Court Opinion

ID: 9963121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 17:00:55.982982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.259769
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JANEL N. SMITH,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
               Appellant,                       CH-1221-22-0137-W-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,                          DATE: April 23, 2024
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Richard R. Renner , Esquire, Silver Spring, Maryland, for the appellant.

      Elaine Fitch , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

      Jennifer A. Weger , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).             After fully
considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                 BACKGROUND
      The appellant is employed as a GS-9 Investigative Analyst at the agency’s
Kansas City Field Division in Fairview Heights, Illinois.        Initial Appeal File
(IAF), Tab 9 at 4. On January 17, 2022, the appellant filed the instant IRA appeal
alleging that the agency failed to provide her training and select her for a new
position in retaliation for her protected whistleblowing disclosures and activities,
and she requested a hearing on her appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, 5, 8, Tab 9 at 6.
With her initial appeal, the appellant provided a copy of a Board appeal rights
letter from the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) dated November 19, 2021. IAF,
Tab 1 at 8.
      The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order in which she apprised
the appellant of the applicable law and burden of proof requirements for an IRA
appeal and ordered her to submit evidence and argument establishing Board
jurisdiction over her appeal. IAF, Tab 3. The administrative judge also directed
the appellant to file a statement detailing the specific elements of her claim. Id.
In response, the appellant provided a sworn declaration asserting that she made
                                                                                   3

protected disclosures, engaged in protected activity, and further described the
actions she alleged were taken in retaliation for the same. IAF, Tab 9 at 4-8. She
also included a copy of her OSC complaint. Id. at 9-29, 98-105.
      In an initial decision based on the written record, the administrative judge
found that the appellant exhausted her claims with OSC but failed to make a
nonfrivolous allegation that her protected disclosure or protected activity was a
contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against her.
IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 10. Specifically, she found it undisputed
that the appellant made a protected disclosure in 2010 and engaged in protected
activity when she filed a Board appeal in 2013 and a petition for review in 2015
relating to her protected disclosure. ID at 5. She also found that the agency
subjected her to a personnel action when it failed to select her for an Industry
Operations Investigator (IOI) position, but she concluded that the appellant failed
to demonstrate that her disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to not select her for the IOI position. ID at 7-10. Therefore,
the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction without
holding the requested hearing. ID at 1, 10.
      The appellant has timely filed a petition for review of the initial decision.
Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.        The agency has filed a response in
opposition. PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant has filed a reply. PFR File, Tab 8.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant exhausts her
administrative remedies before OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that she
made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in
protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),
and the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s
decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Chambers v. Department of
Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14; see Hessami v. Merit Systems Protection
                                                                                         4

Board, 979 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020). The Board’s regulations define a
nonfrivolous allegation as an assertion that, if proven, could establish the matter
at issue.   5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s). 2     The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has found that, in the context of an IRA appeal, a nonfrivolous allegation
is an allegation of “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that
is plausible on its face.” Hessami, 979 F.3d at 1364, 1369. Once an appellant
establishes jurisdiction over her IRA appeal, she is entitled to a hearing on the
merits of her claim, which she must prove by preponderant evidence. Rebstock
Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶ 9
(2015). For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the administrative judge
that the appellant has shown that she exhausted her administrative remedies
before OSC but failed to nonfrivolously allege that her protected disclosure or
protected activity was a contributing factor in her nonselection.

The appellant exhausted her administrative remedies with OSC.
       To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an
appellant must have provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an
investigation into her allegations of whistleblower reprisal.                  Chambers,
2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10.        Generally, exhaustion can be demonstrated through the
appellant’s initial OSC complaint, evidence the original complaint was amended
(including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from
OSC referencing any amended allegations), and the appellant’s written responses
to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Mason v. Department of Homeland
Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). Alternatively, exhaustion may be proved

2
   The regulation further provides that an allegation generally will be considered
nonfrivolous when, under oath or penalty of perjury, an individual makes an allegation
that: (1) is more than conclusory; (2) is plausible on its face; and (3) is material to the
legal issues in the appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s) . Vague, conclusory, unsupported, and
pro forma allegations of alleged wrongdoing do not meet the nonfrivolous pleading
standard needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal. El v.
Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d, 663 F. App’x 921 (Fed.
Cir. 2016).
                                                                                     5

through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration
attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in her
appeal. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
      Here, the appellant submitted her OSC complaint in which she stated that
the agency engaged in nepotism, did not select her for a position, and denied her
training in retaliation for her protected disclosure and activity.      IAF, Tab 9
at 10-29.   She also submitted her Board appeal rights letter wherein OSC
characterized her complaint as alleging that agency officials retaliated against her
by failing to provide her training and refusing to promote her. Id. at 106. OSC’s
correspondence also characterized her whistleblowing and protected activity as a
report that her supervisor inflated inspection numbers and harassed her as well as
her filing “an EEO complaint, an OSC complaint, a[n] MSPB appeal, a federal
tort claim, a federal case against the agency, made reports to Congress, and
appealed the MSPB’s final findings.”        Id.   Accordingly, we agree with the
administrative judge that the appellant exhausted her administrative remedies
before OSC.

The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant nonfrivolously
alleged that she made one protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      2010 Disclosure.
      Protected whistleblowing occurs when an appellant makes a disclosure that
she reasonably believes evidences a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross
mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to public health and safety. Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 17.
The proper test for determining whether an employee had a reasonable belief that
her disclosures were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge
of the essential facts known to, and readily ascertainable by, the employee could
reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced a violation of a law, rule, or
regulation, or one of the other conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id.
                                                                                  6

      Here, the administrative judge found it undisputed that the appellant made
a protected disclosure in 2010 regarding inflated inspection numbers. ID at 5.
The parties do not challenge this finding on review, and we discern no basis to
disturb it. To the extent that the appellant argues that the administrative judge
failed to assess her reasonable belief as to her 2010 disclosure, this was
unnecessary as the Board previously found the disclosure at issue to be a
protected disclosure within the meaning of the Whistleblower Protection Act.
Smith v. Department of Justice, MSPB Docket No. CH-1221-13-0304-W-2, Initial
Decision at 6 (Oct. 30, 2015).

      Federal Lawsuit for Assault and Harassment.

      The appellant alleges on review that the administrative judge erred in not
finding that her Federal lawsuit for assault and harassment was a protected
disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15. Specifically,
she argues that her lawsuit “is a disclosure of a violation of law because ‘assault
and harassment’ are legally prohibited.” Id. at 15. In support of her argument,
the appellant cites the Board’s opinions in Lewis v. Department of Commerce,
101 M.S.P.R. 6 (2005), and Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
113 M.S.P.R. 469 (2010). We are not persuaded and find that the appellant’s
reliance on these cases is misplaced.
      In Lewis, the Board found that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation
that she disclosed a violation of law, rule, or regulation when she alleged that
she disclosed to an agency official that her department head cursed at her and
assaulted her. Lewis, 101 M.S.P.R. 6, ¶ 11. Similarly, in Baldwin, the Board
found that the appellant made a protected disclosure when he reported threats of
an assault by his coworkers to agency officials.     Baldwin, 113 M.S.P.R. 469,
¶¶ 16-21. However, in this case, the appellant fails to provide any details beyond
her vague assertion that she reported to her former supervisor that she was
assaulted and filed a Federal lawsuit. IAF, Tab 9 at 104. As previously noted,
                                                                                    7

vague, conclusory, and pro forma allegations do not meet the nonfrivolous
allegation standard needed to establish the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA
appeal.   El v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6 (2015), aff’d,
663 F. App’x 921 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant
failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure under
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) in connection with her Federal lawsuit.

The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant nonfrivolously
alleged that she engaged in some protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9).
      The administrative judge found it undisputed that the appellant engaged in
protected activity when she filed a Board appeal in 2013 and a petition for review
in 2015 relating to her 2010 protected whistleblower disclosure. ID at 5-6. The
parties do not dispute this finding on review, and we discern no basis to disturb it.
      However, the administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s Federal
lawsuit was not a protected activity because it did not fall within the purview of
an IRA appeal. ID at 6. We agree. Section 2302(b)(9)(A) covers the protected
activities of “the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by
any law, rule, or regulation – (i) with regard to remedying a violation of
paragraph (8); or (ii) other than with regard to remedying a violation of
paragraph (8).”   However, the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal includes
claims arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), but does not include claims
arising under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(ii); thus, the appellant’s Federal lawsuit
may only be the subject of an IRA appeal if she sought therein to remedy a
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Mudd v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 7 (2013). In this case, the appellant’s Federal lawsuit was
not to remedy a violation under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Thus, we find that the
appellant failed to allege that she engaged in protected activity under 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(9)(A)(i) in connection with her Federal lawsuit.
      The appellant also challenges the administrative judge’s finding that she
failed to nonfrivolously allege that she engaged in protected activity when she
                                                                                  8

alleged that she filed equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 15-18. She also argues that the administrative judge erred by not finding
that she made a protected disclosure when she filed her EEO complaints.         Id.
at 16. We disagree. The Board recently reaffirmed that filing an EEO complaint
is a matter relating solely to discrimination and is not protected by 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(b)(8).   Edwards v. Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶¶ 10-13, 20,
22-23, aff’d, No. 2022-1967, 2023 WL 4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023); see
Williams v. Department of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 554 (1991). Further, there
is no indication in the record that the substance of her EEO complaints sought to
remedy a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).       The appellant did not provide
copies of the EEO complaints or a detailed description of the contents of the
complaints below, and what little information she did provide about the
complaints indicates that they do not concern remedying a violation of
whistleblower reprisal under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Instead, the EEO complaints,
as described by the appellant, concerned violations of civil rights laws. PFR File,
Tab 1 at 16. Consequently, the administrative judge correctly determined that the
appellant has failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure
or engaged in protected activity in connection with this claim.

The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant nonfrivolously
alleged that her nonselection constituted a personnel action, but failed to
nonfrivolously allege that the agency denied her training opportunities pursuant
to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).
      As an initial matter, it is undisputed that the agency did not select the
appellant for the IOI position. IAF, Tab 9 at 113, Tab 10 at 18-19, 42. Decisions
to not promote or to not appoint an applicant, otherwise known as nonselections,
are enumerated personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).       The
administrative judge found, and the parties do not dispute on review, that the
appellant’s nonselection was a personnel action. ID at 7. We agree and discern
no basis to disturb this finding.
                                                                                      9

         On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s finding that
she did not meet her burden of nonfrivolously alleging that the agency denied her
training opportunities.     PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-22; ID at 7-8.          We are not
persuaded. “[A] decision concerning . . . training” is a personnel action if it “may
reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance
evaluation, or other [personnel] action [as described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)
(A).]”     5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix).    Thus, the plain wording of the statute
explicates that not all denials of training opportunities are covered personnel
actions. Id.; see Simone v. Department of the Treasury, 105 M.S.P.R. 120, ¶ 9
(2007). Here, the appellant failed to identify any training opportunities that may
have reasonably led to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or
similar action. As the administrative judge properly noted below, the appellant
“provide[d] nothing more than a few vague and conclusory statements that the
agency did not provide training.” ID at 7. Thus, we agree that she failed to
nonfrivolously allege that her alleged lack of training constitutes a personnel
action.
         Regarding   the   appellant’s   argument   that   the   administrative   judge
erroneously overlooked that the agency subjected her to other personnel actions,
including rescinding vacancy announcements to which she applied, reclassifying
her position in 2010, subjecting her to multiple background checks, posting
vacancy announcements while she was out of the office, and not selecting her for
a different position in 2018 or 2019, there is nothing in the record indicating that
she exhausted these personnel actions with OSC.            PFR File, Tab 1 at 21-22.
OSC’s letter clearly identifies only the lack of training and nonselection as the
contested personnel actions, and the Board is limited to considering only those
personnel actions that the appellant raised before OSC. 3 Mason, 116 M.S.P.R.
135, ¶ 8.
3
  Although it appears that the appellant made scant references to these alleged actions
below, as previously noted, vague and conclusory statements are insufficient to
establish a nonfrivolous allegation. See El, 123 M.S.P.R. 76, ¶ 6.
                                                                                  10

The administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to
nonfrivolously allege that her protected disclosure or activity was a contributing
factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against her.
      To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage, an
appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of, or content of,
the protected disclosure or activity was one factor that tended to affect the
personnel action in any way.      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 14.          One way to
establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under which an employee
may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor
in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the
official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure or activity, and that the
personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
could conclude that the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
personnel action. Id., ¶ 15; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If an appellant fails to
satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board must consider other evidence, such
as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking
the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the
proposing or deciding official, and whether those individuals had a desire or
motive to retaliate against the appellant.
      As previously noted, the appellant’s prior disclosure and protected
activities occurred between 6 and 11 years before the agency failed to select her
for the IOI position. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that such
a gap in time is too remote to satisfy the knowledge/timing test. See Salinas v.
Department of the Army, 94 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 10 (2003) (finding that a disclosure
made 2 ½ to 3 years before the relevant personnel actions was too remote for a
reasonable person to conclude the disclosure was a contributing factor to the
actions). Regarding the motive to retaliate, the record does not reflect that the
appellant’s disclosures or protected activities were personally directed at the
official who failed to select her for the position. IAF, Tab 9 at 9-29, 98-105.
                                                                                     11

Other than her own conclusory assertions, the appellant identifies no specific
evidence or argument that, if true, could show that the selecting official for the
position at issue had any knowledge of her protected disclosure or activities. Id.
For example, the appellant concedes that she is unaware of the selecting official
for the IOI position. Id. at 19. Therefore, we find that the appellant failed to
raise nonfrivolous allegations that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in
protected activity that was a contributing factor in the agency’s nonselection
decision. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.            5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
4
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       12

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
                                                                                13

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     14

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             15

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                        ______________________________
                                      Gina K. Grippando
                                      Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.