Court Opinion

ID: 9965834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:06:49.952384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:45.230456
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              Nos. 126,189
                                                   126,190
                                                   126,191

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                   NATHANIEL M. MEJIA-KESTER,
                                           Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; ERIC WILLIAMS, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed May 3, 2024. Appeal dismissed.

        Kasper Schirer, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Kristi D. Allen, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before COBLE, P.J., GREEN, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: Nathaniel M. Mejia-Kester entered into a plea agreement with the
State to resolve three different criminal cases. The agreement included the parties'
bargained-for sentencing recommendation, which would have run some sentences
concurrent with one another and resulted in a total of 87 months' imprisonment. The
district court accepted Mejia-Kester's plea but did not impose the recommended
sentences. On appeal, Mejia-Kester complains the district court erred by imposing all
sentences to run consecutive to one another—resulting in a controlling sentence of 139

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months' imprisonment—rather than running some counts concurrent as suggested by his
plea agreement. After reviewing the record, we find that we lack jurisdiction to consider
this appeal and are compelled to dismiss it.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Mejia-Kester faced multiple charges in three criminal cases—21-CR-1769 (Case
1), 22-CR-62 (Case 2), and 22-CR-1615 (Case 3)—for incidents occurring between June
2021 and March 2022. The State and Mejia-Kester entered into a global plea agreement
in which he pleaded no contest to several charges that included eight felonies and two
misdemeanors. The State agreed to dismiss remaining charges in all three cases.

       The plea agreement recommended a sentence of the high number in the
corresponding revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA) grid box for each
charge. The parties also agreed the sentences for all counts would run concurrent with
one another, except one count in Case 2, which would run consecutive pursuant to law.
This recommended sentence would result in a total of 87 months' imprisonment. Mejia-
Kester acknowledged by signing the agreement that the sentencing judge was not bound
to follow the plea agreement, could impose any lawful sentences including the maximum
penalties and fines, and the sentences he would receive were solely in the control of the
judge. He also acknowledged if the district court rejected the agreement, he would not be
provided the opportunity to withdraw his plea for that reason.

       At the plea hearing, the district court verified Mejia-Kester had read, understood,
and agreed to signing the plea agreement and the plea document. The court also orally
confirmed that Mejia-Kester understood the rights he would be forfeiting and that the
court was not bound by the plea agreement. The district court accepted Mejia-Kester's
no-contest plea and found Mejia-Kester guilty of the charges in all three cases.

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       At sentencing, both parties agreed to the district court's finding that Mejia-Kester's
criminal history score was A and requested the court follow the sentencing
recommendations in the plea agreement. But rather than running the sentences for each
count concurrent with one another, the district court imposed a sentence in which all
counts would run consecutive to each other and any other case, resulting in a 139-month
sentence.

       Mejia-Kester timely appeals his sentence.

                   WE LACK JURISDICTION OVER MEJIA-KESTER'S APPEAL

       On appeal, Mejia-Kester argues that the district erred by rejected the sentencing
recommendation set forth in the plea agreement without affording him the chance to
reassess his plea, and he will spend many more months in prison as a result. But before
we address the substance of his argument, we must first decide whether we have
jurisdiction—or power—to consider his appeal. Whether jurisdiction exists is a question
of law subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Hillard, 315 Kan. 732, 775, 511
P.3d 883 (2022).

       We note that Mejia-Kester did not file a postsentence motion to withdraw his plea
under K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(2). See K.S.A. 22-3602(a) (broadly prohibiting an appeal "from
a judgment of conviction before a district judge upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,"
unless it is an appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea under
K.S.A. 22-3210[d]); see also State v. Smith, 311 Kan. 109, 122, 456 P.3d 1004 (2020)
(Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider appeal from the district court's denial of
defendant's motion to withdraw plea.). In fact, Mejia-Kester admits he is not seeking to
withdraw his plea but simply wants the district court to impose the sentences on which he
and the State agreed.

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       Instead, his argument raised for the first time on appeal is a challenge to how
Kansas courts interpret the law. Mejia-Kester asks us to abandon a half-century of
precedent and create a new standard under which district courts should conduct plea
proceedings.

       Generally, as the State points out, K.S.A. 22-3602(a) allows an appeal of the
district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea, but as described, this is not the
situation before us. The jurisdictional hurdle Mejia-Kester must overcome is found in
K.S.A. 21-6820(c), which prevents an appellate court from reviewing a sentence for a
felony committed after July 1, 1993, that is either within the presumptive KSGA sentence
for the crime or the result of a plea agreement which the district court approved on the
record. See State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 640, 487 P.3d 750 (2021) (appellate court
ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to review presumptive sentences); State v. Quested, 302 Kan.
262, 264, 352 P.3d 553 (2015) (no jurisdiction to review sentences agreed to by parties
and approved by the sentencing court). Here, Mejia-Kester admits the sentence imposed
by the district court falls within the presumptive KSGA guidelines as contemplated by
K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1).

       And, since the Kansas Supreme Court decided State v. Byrd, 203 Kan. 45, 50, 453
P.2d 22 (1969), Kansas trial and appellate courts have adhered to the maxim that
sentencing recommendations made pursuant to a plea bargain are not binding on trial
courts. See also State v. Beck, 307 Kan. 108, 110, 406 P.3d 377 (2017) ("'[I]n Kansas
both parties to a plea agreement assume the risk the sentencing court will impose a
sentence different than the sentence recommended as part of the plea agreement because
sentence recommendations made pursuant to a plea bargain are not binding on the trial
court.' [Citation omitted.]"). Although Mejia-Kester concedes the intersection of K.S.A.
21-6820(c)(1) and Byrd would bar consideration of his claim, he asks us to reconsider
this longstanding precedent.

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       But we are duty-bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent unless there is
some indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous position. State v.
Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022). We have no such indication, and Mejia-
Kester offers none. So, according to the longstanding rule laid out in Byrd, the district
court was not bound by the plea agreement's recommended sentence. And based on
K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1), we lack jurisdiction to consider the guidelines sentences imposed
by the district court on Mejia-Kester's felony convictions.

       One more thing—K.S.A. 21-6820(c)(1) only applies to felony sentences. Mejia-
Kester was also sentenced for two misdemeanors but does not suggest the district court
abused its discretion or acted with vindictiveness in its imposition of the sentences for
those charges. See State v. Brown, 309 Kan. 369, 375, 435 P.3d 546 (2019) (nongrid
sentences imposed within the statutory guidelines are not to be disturbed on appeal absent
a showing of abuse of discretion or vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing court);
State v. Huff, 277 Kan. 195, 197-98, 83 P.3d 206 (2004) (the presumptive felony sentence
statute is inapplicable to misdemeanor sentences); State v. Cooper, 275 Kan. 823, 827, 69
P.3d 559 (2003) (a sentence within statutory limits will not be disturbed on appeal
without a showing of abuse of discretion or vindictiveness by the sentencing court).
Because he did not brief the issue of his misdemeanor sentences, that issue is deemed
abandoned. See State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021).

       Because we lack jurisdiction to review the sentences on Mejia-Kester's felony
convictions and he offers no argument on his misdemeanor sentences, we dismiss this
appeal.

       Appeal dismissed.

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