Court Opinion

ID: 9896090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 16:00:48.236324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:57.128739
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1984    Document: 23     Page: 1    Filed: 11/09/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                  ______________________

                MARY ANN L. GLOBOKAR,
                       Petitioner

                             v.

       NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
               ADMINISTRATION,
                    Respondent
              ______________________

                        2023-1984
                  ______________________

    Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
 Board in No. CH-0839-16-0596-I-1.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: November 9, 2023
                  ______________________

    MARY ANN LUPICA GLOBOKAR, Strongsville, OH, pro se.

     ERIC JOHN SINGLEY, Commercial Litigation Branch,
 Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
 ington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRIAN M.
 BOYNTON, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY, FRANKLIN E. WHITE, JR.
                   ______________________

  Before TARANTO, CLEVENGER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 23-1984    Document: 23      Page: 2    Filed: 11/09/2023

 2                                           GLOBOKAR v. NASA

 PER CURIAM.
     Mary Ann L. Globokar worked at the National Aero-
 nautics and Space Administration (NASA) for over 30
 years. Shortly before she retired, she initiated a proceed-
 ing before the Merit Systems Protection Board in which she
 alleged that NASA had erroneously assigned her to the
 Federal Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) instead of
 the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). She asked
 the Board to take corrective action under the Federal Erro-
 neous Retirement Coverage Corrections Act, 5 U.S.C.
 § 8331 note. The Board denied her request, finding no er-
 ror in the initial assignment. Ms. Globokar appeals, argu-
 ing only that the Board erred when it denied her request to
 add evidence to the already-closed record. We affirm the
 Board’s decision.
                               I
     Ms. Globokar worked at NASA as a student-trainee in
 a cooperative work-study program from September 28,
 1981, to December 23, 1982, when she left to pursue her
 education full-time. SAppx. 2. 1 In a memorandum dated
 May 9, 1983, several NASA employees recommended that
 Ms. Globokar be rehired as a student-trainee effective June
 20, 1983. SAppx. 2. That was merely a recommendation.
 We note the 1981-82 employment and the mid-1983 recom-
 mendation letter as background; they are not the focus of
 the specific issue here on appeal.
     NASA did eventually offer Ms. Globokar reemployment
 and she accepted. When it did so, NASA scheduled the em-
 ployment to begin January 9, 1984, SAppx. 36, and the em-
 ployment in fact began that day or the previous day.

     1 “SAppx.” refers to the supplemental appendix filed
 by the United States in this court with its brief as respond-
 ent.
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 GLOBOKAR v. NASA                                          3

 SAppx. 2. She continued to work for NASA in various roles
 through at least 2017. SAppx. 2.
      In May 2016, Ms. Globokar contacted NASA human re-
 sources, asserting that the agency had erred when, long
 ago, it had assigned her to FERS instead of CSRS. SAppx.
 3, 16. Congress established FERS in 1986 as a successor
 to CSRS, which had been the primary retirement system
 for federal employees. See Federal Employees’ Retirement
 System Act, Pub. L. No. 99-335, 100 Stat. 514 (codified as
 amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8401–8479). Both systems remain
 in effect, but individuals whose initial date of federal em-
 ployment was on or after January 1, 1984, were automati-
 cally placed into FERS unless covered by a statutory
 exception. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8401(11), 8402; see also Fitzger-
 ald v. Department of Homeland Security, 837 F.3d 1346,
 1348 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In August 2016, NASA deter-
 mined that Ms. Globokar had been properly assigned to
 FERS. SAppx. 3.
     In September 2016, Ms. Globokar filed an appeal with
 the Board. SAppx. 3. On December 8, 2016, after her coun-
 sel withdrew from representing her, Ms. Globokar sought,
 and was granted, one additional week in which to file her
 opposition to NASA’s opening submission. SAppx. 90–91.
 The evidentiary record in the proceeding closed on Decem-
 ber 23, 2016. SAppx. 27–28.
     The Board administrative judge to which the matter
 was assigned issued a decision on January 23, 2017, affirm-
 ing NASA’s determination. SAppx. 1–14. The notice to Ms.
 Globokar noted that the full Board lacked a quorum to act
 and explained her right to appeal directly to this court.
 SAppx. 9–10, 12–13. Nevertheless, on February 25, 2017,
 Ms. Globokar petitioned for review by the full Board.
     On July 23, 2017, Ms. Globokar filed a motion for leave
 to submit supplemental evidence, seeking to establish that
 her relevant employment began before January 1, 1984.
 SAppx. 30–35. Ms. Globokar attached a December 30, 1983
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 4                                          GLOBOKAR v. NASA

 letter sent to her by a NASA personnel director. Besides
 “confirm[ing Ms. Globokar’s] . . . acceptance of a[n] Elec-
 tronics Systems Mechanic Student Trainee position,” the
 letter states that NASA “ha[s] scheduled [her] employment
 to begin on January 9, 1984 at 8 a.m.” SAppx. 36. Ms.
 Globokar argued to the Board that the letter provided evi-
 dence that she was rehired before January 1, 1984, which
 she argued is the “effective date” for purposes of applying
 the FERS provision at issue. SAppx. 33–35.
     The next day, the Board, through its Clerk, notified Ms.
 Globokar of regulatory requirements she had to meet to
 justify her request. SAppx. 79 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114).
 Specifically, the Board pointed to requirements that she (1)
 describe the nature and need for the additional “pleading,”
 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a), and (2) show that the evidence was
 not readily available before the record closed, 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.114(k). SAppx. 79. The Board struck the filings but
 stated that Ms. Globokar could resubmit her request with
 the required explanations. SAppx. 79–80.
      Ms. Globokar resubmitted her request the same day,
 arguing that the supplemental evidence should be accepted
 because her previous counsel was not diligent in research-
 ing her claim and had abruptly withdrawn from her case.
 SAppx. 83–85. Ms. Globokar alleged that, following her
 former counsel’s withdrawal, the burden had fallen on her
 to conduct research related to her claims. SAppx. 84–85.
 She asserted that she had “recently found an additional
 document, which supports her claim for retirement reclas-
 sification,” and argued that the evidence “was not readily
 available . . . until [she] researched and examined [the
 matter] . . . herself, when she had formerly relied on legal
 counsel, to her detriment.” SAppx. 85. In the revised fil-
 ing, Ms. Globokar removed her earlier explanation of why
 the letter supported her case on the merits, instead assert-
 ing simply that the letter was “compelling evidence to
 prove her claim for being enrolled in CSRS.” SAppx. 85.
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 GLOBOKAR v. NASA                                            5

 The Board confirmed receipt of the submission on July 25,
 2017. SAppx. 87.
     The Board issued its final decision on April 7, 2023.
 SAppx. 15–26. In that decision, the Board denied the mo-
 tion filed July 24, 2017, deeming insufficient the justifica-
 tion offered for the late offering of evidence. SAppx. 18 n.5.
 And the Board rejected Ms. Globokar’s request for correc-
 tive action concerning her FERS assignment on the merits.
 SAppx. 18–21.
     Ms. Globokar timely filed her appeal on June 1, 2023,
 as permitted by 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(A). We have jurisdic-
 tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
                               II
      We will affirm the Board’s decision unless it is “(1) ar-
 bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
 in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures re-
 quired by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or
 (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”            5 U.S.C.
 § 7703(c). In the present appeal, Ms. Globokar challenges
 only the Board’s decision to deny her the opportunity to
 supplement the record with additional evidence. “Proce-
 dural matters regarding discovery and evidentiary issues
 ‘fall within the sound discretion of the [B]oard and its offi-
 cials.’” Rueter v. Department of Commerce, 63 F.4th 1357,
 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (quoting Curtin v. Office of Personnel
 Management, 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). We
 “will not overturn the [B]oard on such matters unless an
 abuse of discretion is clear and is harmful.” Id. at 1364
 (quoting Curtin, 846 F.2d at 1378). In particular, any error
 justifying relief must be such that it “could have affected
 the outcome of the case.” Id. at 1371 (quoting Curtin, 846
 F.2d at 1379); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(A).
      Even if we view Ms. Globokar’s appeal as challenging
 the denial of the initial request as well as the denial of the
 re-filed request, we see no basis for setting aside the
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 6                                           GLOBOKAR v. NASA

 Board’s decision. The initial ruling by the Board reasona-
 bly relied on the Board’s regulations governing additional
 pleadings, 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5), and submission of
 new evidence after closure of the evidentiary record, 5
 C.F.R. § 1201.114(k), to reject the initial filings while giv-
 ing Ms. Globokar a full opportunity to provide needed jus-
 tifications for what she sought, namely, acceptance of the
 December 30, 1983 letter as evidence. Nothing in that rul-
 ing foreclosed Ms. Globokar from presenting all her argu-
 ments for acceptance of the letter under the familiar
 standards governing evidentiary submissions after the ev-
 identiary record has closed.
     We also will not disturb the Board’s denial of the refiled
 motion. The Board determined that there was an insuffi-
 cient explanation provided of the “nature of and need for”
 the December 30, 1983 letter, as required by 5 C.F.R.
 § 1201.114(a)(5). SAppx. 18 n.5. We need not and do not
 decide if that conclusion was a clear error. It is enough to
 conclude that Ms. Globokar has not met the requirement of
 showing prejudice from any such error. Specifically, we
 conclude, even if the Board had considered the additional
 document offered by Ms. Globokar, such consideration
 could not have changed the Board’s conclusion about the
 merits of her claim of improper assignment to FERS.
     Under the Federal Employees’ Retirement System Act,
 federal employees are covered by FERS unless a specific
 statutory exclusion applies. 5 U.S.C. § 8402; see also 5
 U.S.C. § 8331 note; Conner v. Office of Personnel Manage-
 ment, 104 F.3d 1344, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1997); King v. Merit
 Systems Protection Board, 105 F.3d 635, 636 (Fed. Cir.
 1997). Two exclusions can be relevant for individuals who,
 like Ms. Globokar, return to federal employment after a
 break in service. But neither applies to Ms. Globokar.
 First, “any employee having at least 5 years of civilian ser-
 vice performed before January 1, 1987, creditable under
 [CSRS]” is excluded from automatic FERS coverage. 5
 U.S.C. § 8402(b)(2). The Board correctly noted that—even
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 GLOBOKAR v. NASA                                           7

 if Ms. Globokar had begun her employment on the earliest
 date that she alleges she was effectively hired—she would
 still have lacked the requisite five years of creditable ser-
 vice. SAppx. 19 n.6. Ms. Globokar does not dispute that
 finding. Second, 5 U.S.C. § 8402(b)(1) excludes enumer-
 ated categories of federal officials. The Board concluded
 that Ms. Globokar does not fall into this additional statu-
 tory exclusion, and Ms. Globokar does not challenge that
 determination here.
      Ms. Globokar instead points to language from the Fed-
 eral Employees’ Retirement Contribution Temporary Ad-
 justment Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-168, 97 Stat. 1106
 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 8331 note). She highlights a provi-
 sion stating that employees “who are first employed in ci-
 vilian service by the Government or first take office in
 civilian service in the Government on or after January 1,
 1984, become subject to [FERS].” § 202(6), 97 Stat. at 1106.
 She suggests that the provision should be understood to ex-
 empt persons who were employed before January 1, 1984,
 from FERS. But even if we assume (without deciding) the
 exemption premise, we conclude that the provision cannot
 help Ms. Globokar because she was not such a person.
     Mere acceptance of an offer of employment to begin
 later does not constitute being “employed” in the position.
 Even as a general matter, employment begins only on the
 actual entry-upon-service date. See 5 U.S.C. § 2105 (defin-
 ing a federal employee); Parkin v. Merit Systems Protection
 Board, 120 F. App’x 349, 350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting
 petitioner’s argument that his date of employment in the
 federal service should be the date he was originally sched-
 uled to report for duty). And here, the December 30, 1983
 letter itself stated that Ms. Globokar’s employment was “to
 begin on January 9, 1984.” SAppx. 36. The December 30,
 1983 letter thus no more made her an employee as of that
 letter’s date than the May 1983 NASA-staff recommenda-
 tion made her an employee as of its date.
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 8                                           GLOBOKAR v. NASA

     Accordingly, Ms. Globokar has not shown that the ex-
 clusion of the additional document was prejudicial or could
 have changed the Board’s decision on the merits of the case.
                             III
    For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Merit Sys-
 tems Protection Board is affirmed.
     The parties shall bear their own costs.
                        AFFIRMED