Court Opinion

ID: 9530645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:02:01.258807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:12.538333
License: Public Domain

BLACKBIRD, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I cannot agree with the Majority opinion. I can find nothing that gives this court appellate jurisdiction of this case.
As I see it, the only way authority for our assuming jurisdiction of the case may be found is by reading it into Tit. 12 O.S. 1961 § 962.
In all previous cases in which we have considered whether an appeal may be lodged in this court later than the 20-day period immediately after settling of the case-made, prescribed by Tit. 12 O.S.1961 § 972, we have considered said 20-day provision as absolute, and have resisted all efforts to escape its effect. See Video Independent Theatres, Inc. v. Walker, Okl., 308 P.2d 958, followed in Jordan v. Snakard, Okl., 320 P.2d 396; Smith v. Independent School District Number Sixteen, Okl., 321 P.2d 430; Curry, Adm’r, v. Haynes, Okl., 326 P.2d 816; Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Bumpers, Okl., 326 P.2d 1064; In re Stock District No. 2 of Adair County, Okl., 330 P.2d 597; City of Chandler v. Farley, Okl., 338 P.2d 885; Mitchell v. Great Western Oil and Gas Company, Okl., 347 P.2d 1039; Wanner v. Wanner, Okl., 350 P.2d 241; and Auto Convoy Co. v. Smith, Okl., 351 P.2d 1053.
By attempting to demonstrate that there are three “limits” of time contemplated in our statutes for the filing of an appeal, the Majority opinion reaches the conclusion that the proscription contained in sec. 962, supra, against said section’s provisions for extensions of time, being construed as affecting the “limit” of time for such filing, could not include, or refer to the 20-day period. Always before, we have construed the law as contemplating one dead-line, or limit, viz., the end of 20 days after the case-made is settled, within the statutory three-month period (or any extension thereof up to six months) following “ * * * rendition of the judgment or final order complained of * * * ..(Sec. 972, supra). .And we have consistently held .that court orders extending the three-montjis, a litigant has the statutory, right to use for compiling and completing, á .case-made and then filing it in this court, does not alter the statutory requirement, tha.t -this, last step must he taken-within 20..days, after settling of the case-made. See cases, .supra..
The Twenty-Second Legislature amended Tit. 12 O.S.1941 § 972, with' its House Bill No. 161 (S.L.1949, p. 97) by reducing from six, to three, months the overall time lapse between the trial court’s ruling, soúght to be appealed, and the commencement of the appeal in this court. This law tempered *838the effect of its reduction of time for the compiling of the case-made and the doing of all the necessary things leading up to its settlement, by authorizing the extension, or enlargement, of the new (reduced) three-month period to as much as the old six-month period, in the “discretion” of the court.
At that time and through 1954, there was no cause for the problem that has arisen in this case. Never before 1955 was there a law connecting the filing of an appeal in this court (by any prescribed statutory period) with the date, or event, of settling the case-made. Consequently, statutory provisions for extensions of time could apply to nothing but the three-month period for commencing appeals in this court (or an extension thereof), and the periods for making and serving case-mades. The pertinent part of sec. 972 (Tit. 12 O.S.1951) merely provided :
“All proceedings for reversing, vacating or modifying judgments, or final orders shall be commenced within three (3) months from the rendition of the judgment or final order complained of; provided, however, that the trial Court may in its discretion extend period of time not to exceed six (6) months. ⅜ « *»
Omitting some of its words not material here, sec. 962 (Tit. 12 O.S.1951) provided:
“The court in which any case has been tried and finally determined may, from time to time make orders extending the time for the making and serving of a case, or the filing of the proceedings in error, for good cause shown, but not beyond the period in which the proceedings in error may be filed in the appellate court; and in case of accident or misfortune * * *, the said court or judge, * * * may make such orders after the expiration of the time fixed in the previous order, or time allowed by statute, but this section shall in no manner be construed as affecting the statutes fixing the limit of time within which an appeal or proceeding in error may be begun in the appellate court.” (Emphasis mine).
To what did the above-quoted words “ * * limit of time within which an appeal or proceeding in error may be begun in the appellate court * * * ” in sec. 962, supra, and the words “ * * * extend period of time not to exceed six (6) months” in sec. 972, supra, refer? Obviously, the only period, to which the quoted wording in both statutes could have referred, was the period for beginning, commencing, or filing, an appeal in this court.
Any confusion in the interpretation of the present law had its origin in the 1955 Amendment, i. e., Senate Bill No. 44 of the Twenty-Fifth Legislature (S.L.1955, p. 140) which engrafted new wording (shown below, enclosed by parenthesis marks) into the first provision of the above quoted sec. 972, to make it read as follows:
“All proceedings (by case made) for reversing, vacating or modifying judgments or final orders shall be commenced within (twenty (20) days from the date the case made is settled; provided, however, that such proceedings must be commenced within) three (3) months from the rendition of the judgment * * * (etc.).” (Emphasis mine).
To me, it is clear that the Legislature, by leaving the rest of the wording of both sections 962 and 972 unchanged, and undisturbed, from what it had been previous to the passage of Senate Bill No. 44 in 1955, intended to make this new requirement, pertaining to settlement of the case-made, independent of and unaffected by, the provisions for time extensions that had never applied to anything except making or serving case-mades and the six or three month periods, the most of which latter periods had been most generally used, and frequently needed, in getting case-mades ready for settlement.
To me, the appending of this 20-day requirement to the first provision of section 972, supra, not only shows its draftsmen’s *839understanding of the process of preparing appeal records, but it also exhibits a deliberate effort on the part of the Legislature to prohibit the delay and procrastination, that had heretofore often occurred, in the filing of case-mades in this court, after they had been settled and should have been ready for filing, except for the routine matters of the execution of the trial judge’s certificate to it, and its filing in the lower, or trial, court.
If section 972 or 962, supra, is to be changed, or amended, the task must await undertaking by the Law-Making Body. Such an operation cannot be lawfully accomplished by this Court, even though its members may feel that section 972’s 1955 appendage works hardship, or injustice, under some circumstances.
I think the Legislature, and the public generally, were aware in 1955 (and perhaps for several years before) of the long period that had usually elapsed between the entry of trial court judgments in civil cases, and their appellate disposition; and believing in the maxim that “Justice delayed is (frequently) justice denied”, perceived of one particular in which it could restrict, for the future, that part of the period which followed settling of the case-made.
I verily believe the majority opinion will relegate litigants, who have successfully prosecuted their cases in the trial courts, to the old uncertainty that existed previous to the 1955 amendment, supra, as to when they could expect appeals in their cases to be filed in this court, or could feel assured that they had been finally filed, and were ready for briefing or submission to this court. I do not think the Legislature was unwarranted in fixing a definite terminus for this, as, in my opinion, it did by inserting the 20-day provision in sec. 972, supra.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice HALLEY concurs in the views herein expressed.