Court Opinion

ID: 9774994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:40:28.005597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:18.610939
License: Public Domain

ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
State's motion for rehearing denied.
MILLER, J., dissents with opinion joined by McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE, J.
MILLER, Judge,
dissenting to denial of State’s Motion for Rehearing
This Court determined in Mallory v. State, 752 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), that Tex.R.App.Proc. 81(b)(2)1 was the rhetorical and semantic equivalent of the harmless error standard for constitutional errors announced by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), this Court, speaking through Judge Duncan, reviewed Supreme Court precedent and established for the first time a coherent standard by which to judge harmless error under Rule 81(b)(2). Noting the inherent subjectivity in an harmless error analysis, the Court stated that the most it “[could] do in guiding future harmless error analysis is to state a general formulation of what 81(b)(2) requires, set out general considerations which may be relevant, and trust individual judges to use these observations in their personal calculus.” Id. at 587.
The predominant concern of the appellate court in conducting a harmless error analysis is of course the error itself. The appellate court must determine to the extent possible the impact of the error upon the trial process. Id. This determination necessarily requires a review of the entire record at trial, especially the other evidence presented at trial. The Court was quick to caution, however, that an error is not rendered harmless merely because there is overwhelming evidence of the guilt of the accused, but “[i]f overwhelming evidence dissipates the error’s effect upon the jury’s function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict then the error is harmless.” Id. Thus, we turn our focus to “the error” and its effect upon the jury, if any.
To focus upon the error, the appellate court should first determine the source and nature of the error committed. As noted above, the impact of the error will turn partly upon the facts of the particular case, but it will also be affected by the State’s emphasis upon the error, e.g. in its jury argument. Since the appellate court is determining the impact of the error on the jury, id. at 587, the court must consider how much weight a juror would probably place upon the error. The court must also consider probable collateral implications of the error within the unique facts of each case. Id. Finally, whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat the error with impunity must be considered by the reviewing court. Id. See also discussion in Belyeu v. State, 791 S.W.2d 66, 74 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).
The Harris decision then explained the proper procedure utilizing these considera*608tions to calculate the harmfulness, or lack thereof, of the error. The Court stated:
General consideration having been set out, we are left only to provide a skeleton on which to place them. A procedure for reaching this determination should: first, isolate the error and all its effects, using the considerations set out above and any other considerations suggested by the facts of an individual case; and second, ask whether a rational trier of fact might have reached a different result if the error and its effects had not resulted.
Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588. With these principles in mind, I address the majority opinion. See Cook v. State, 821 S.W.2d 600 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (Opinion on Rehearing after Remand from the United States Supreme Court).
The most glaring error in the majority opinion is its failure to conduct a harmless error analysis in light of Harris. Although the majority gratuitously cites to the Harris opinion at p. 602, thus implicitly recognizing the validity of its 81(b)(2) standard, the majority nevertheless engages in a comparative analysis of this case with Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988). The State is correct in its brief that this Court simply relied on the superficial similarities between the facts of this case and the facts of Satterwhite in conducting its harmless error analysis. Such analysis ignores the principles of Harris which instruct the reviewing court to consider the impact of the error on the appellant’s trial in light of the “considerations suggested by the facts of an individual case.” Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588 (emphasis added). Appellant is also denied a meaningful appeal of his individual case.
Utilizing the proper harmless error analysis under Rule 81(b)(2), as sanctioned by this Court, I conclude the error in admitting Dr. Grigson’s testimony at punishment was harmless. The error in this trial stems from the use of evidence obtained in violation of appellant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as set out in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). Using this evidence, Dr. Grigson was allowed to testify and express his opinion as to appellant's probability of future dangerousness, a critical punishment issue. Art. 37.071(b)(2), Y.A.C.C.P. As expected, Dr. Grigson testified that in his opinion appellant was a sociopath and represented an extremely severe threat to society. Besides Dr. Grigson’s testimony, the State also presented testimony at the punishment phase from a learned psychologist, Dr. Landrum, whose testimony largely mirrored that of Dr. Grigson’s.2 Landrum testified appellant had an extensive drug abuse problem and a sexual deviation which manifested itself in violence and aggression against humans. Landrum also opined appellant would constitute a continuing threat to society, had a high probability of acting out in an aggressive and harmful manner, and was incapable of rehabilitation.3 In its jury argument at punishment, the State referred to the testimony from both of the doctors, calling Dr. Grigson by name twice and clearly referring to Dr. Landrum as “a professional psychologist with ten years experience” and distinguishing his testimony from Dr. Grigson’s by referring to him as “that young psychologist.” The majority opinion attaches great significance to these references, but it is equally plausible the State made this distinction between the two for the sake of keeping its summation of the evidence easier to understand and follow. See Op. at p. 604.
Other evidence was also admitted at the punishment phase of the trial. The State presented testimony from no less than thirteen witnesses who testified to appellant’s bad reputation for being a peaceable and law-abiding citizen. This testimony came not only from law enforcement personnel but also from personal acquaintances who *609had known appellant for years. The State also introduced appellant’s previous conviction for felony theft.
The evidence at punishment, however, is not all that a reviewing court considers in its harmless error analysis. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 586. The Court must review the entire record, and in this cause, the record from guilt/innocence is particularly illuminating of appellant’s propensity for violence. The facts of this offense are more than adequately summarized in this Court’s opinion on direct appeal. Cook, 741 S.W.2d 928. This offense was committed in an extremely brutal and vicious manner. The mere facts of the offense present appellant as an abhorrent character. The jury must have wondered why this innocent victim should die such a horrifying death at the hands of a stranger. Although all murders are senseless and cruel, appellant’s crime was particularly reprehensible as he cut away pieces of the victim’s body, which pieces were never found. The jury did not need any specialized knowledge from an expert witness to determine appellant would be a continuing threat to society. The facts of this case alone could convince someone of that. Nevertheless, the testimony from both doctors was available for the jury’s consideration in answering the special issues. Given the entire record in this cause, i.e. the facts of the offense, the cumulative nature of Dr. Landrum’s testimony, and the remaining punishment evidence, I conclude the impact of the error in admitting Dr. Grigson’s testimony was nil. Any impact at all was dissipated by the other evidence in this case. In other words, I conclude a rational trier of fact would not have reached a different result in this cause had the error not resulted. Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 588. The conviction in this cause should be affirmed.
In reaching this conclusion, I echo Judge Campbell’s concerns in his concurring opinion that the Supreme Court’s harmless error analysis in Satterwhite, supra, has left “inconsistency and uncertainty ... in its wake" which leads to confusion among appellate judges. See Cook v. State, 821 S.W.2d at 607 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (Opinion on Rehearing after Remand from the United States Supreme Court) (Campbell, J., concurring). This Court, with its harmless error analysis in this cause, has surely only contributed to the inconsistency. The majority opinion fails to utilize this Court’s harmless error analysis from Harris, and as a result, also reaches the wrong conclusion in this cause. Accordingly, I dissent to the denial of the State’s motion for rehearing in this case.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE, J., join this opinion.

. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(2) states in pertinent part:
If the appellate record in a criminal case reveals error in the proceedings below, the appellate court shall reverse the judgment under review, unless the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or to the punishment.

. On direct appeal, this Court determined Dr. Landrum’s testimony was properly admitted. Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928, 945 (Tex.Crim.App.1987).

. See the facts as set out in Cook, 741 S.W.2d at 945.