Court Opinion

ID: 9762519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:25:50.803472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:35.248491
License: Public Domain

WARREN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding that the language is unambiguous. “Ambiguous” in construing insurance contracts is defined as being susceptible of more than one reasonable construction. Glover v. National Ins. Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex.1977). While the majority’s interpretation of the passage that the word “injury” refers only to the primary claim, not derivative claims, is reasonable, this interpretation is far from clear and is susceptible to the construction that “injury” encompasses financial injury.
When the language of a policy is susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, the courts will apply the construction that favors the insured and permits recovery. Ramsay v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Tex.1976). The *409fact that the insurer's construction may be more reasonable is not controlling. Even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent, the court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as that construction is not itself unreasonable. Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761.
Because the services and earnings of an unemancipated minor belong to his parents, an infant may not recover for diminution of his earning capacity during the period intervening between the injury and the child’s attainment of majority. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex.1983). The right to recover for medical costs incurred on behalf of the minor is a cause of action belonging to the parents, unless such costs are a liability of the minor’s estate. Id. Thus, in this case, the parents suffered a separate injury from their child.
When the insurance policy language chosen is susceptible of more than one construction, it should be construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex.1987). Furthermore, when a case involves an exception or limitation on the insurance company’s liability under the policy, an even more stringent construction is required. Glover, 545 S.W.2d at 761 (Tex.1977). In our case, St. Paul’s had language available to it that would have clearly and plainly excluded from coverage injuries other than bodily injuries. In determining that the word “flight” was ambiguous, the court in Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters, noted that the insurer could have “clearly and plainly excluded from coverage” the type of flight that was in dispute. 545 S.W.2d at 764. In our case, the contract could have clearly and plainly excluded other types of injury by using the phrase “bodily injury” rather than “injury.”
The term “injury” could encompass economic injury. This construction is not unreasonable, even though the construction urged by St. Paul’s appears more reasonable and a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent. Thus, I would hold that the contract language is ambiguous, and that the rules of construction then require the court to adopt the construction that the injury referred to in the policy encompasses the economic injury of the parents. I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment granting the Tumlinson’s motion for summary judgment.