Court Opinion

ID: 9900513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 23:01:51.593116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:06.934771
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to administrative correction before final disposition.

                                 Before
                       KISOR, KIRKBY, and DALY
                        Appellate Military Judges

                        _________________________

                          UNITED STATES
                             Appellant

                                     v.

                       Brandon K. FLANNER
                Staff Sergeant (E-6), U.S. Marine Corps
                                Appellee

                             No. 202300134

                        _________________________

                         Decided: 10 October 2023

        Appeal by the United States Pursuant to Article 62, UCMJ

                             Military Judges:
                    Yong J. Lee (arraignment, motions)
                       Andrea C. Goode (motions)

 Arraignment 28 February 2023 before a general court-martial convened
 at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California.

                             For Appellant:
                      Captain Tyler W. Blair, USMC

                              For Appellee:
              Lieutenant Zoe R. Danielczyk, JAGC, USN

 Judge KIRKBY delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior
 Judge KISOR and Judge DALY joined.
               United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                             Opinion of the Court

                              _________________________

           This opinion does not serve as binding precedent, but
                may be cited as persuasive authority under
                 NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.

                              _________________________

KIRKBY, Judge:
    This case is before us on an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Article
62(a)(1)(B), Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ]. 1 Appellee is charged
with one specification of larceny, one specification of making a false claim, and
one specification of using a forged signature in connection with a claim, in vio-
lation of Articles 121 and 124, UCMJ. 2
    On 18 April 2023, trial defense counsel moved to suppress Appellee’s sec-
ond interview with agents of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service [NCIS]
that occurred on 15 September 2021. Appellee concedes here that his waiver of
right to counsel at this interview was voluntary. 3 However, Appellee argued
this waiver was neither knowing nor intelligent. 4 In her ruling, the military
judge suppressed the interview on the grounds that Appellee had an inaccurate
belief that he could not get an attorney until charges were preferred and would
not have acquiesced to an interview without having a lawyer present but for
that inaccurate belief. 5
    On interlocutory appeal, the Government asserts that the military judge
abused her discretion when she suppressed Appellee’s non-custodial, pre-pre-
ferral, self-scheduled interview with law enforcement in which Appellee
waived his right to counsel and later claimed he had a right to detailed military
counsel. We disagree.

   1 10 U.S.C. § 862(a)(1)(B).

   2 10 U.S.C. §§ 921, 924.

   3 App. Ex. XXI at 1.

   4 Id.

   5 R. at 89-90.

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                  United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                                Opinion of the Court

                                I. BACKGROUND

   In February 2020, Appellee was one of two contracting officers located in
Kuwait who managed all of the contracts for the United States Marine Corps
[USMC] operating in that region. Between 14 February and 25 February 2020
Appellee submitted four purchase vouchers, two on 18 February 2020 and two
on 23 February 2020. On 16 May 2020 it was discovered these four purchase
vouchers, representing more than $30,000 in government funds, were allegedly
fraudulent. Appellee’s charges stem from this alleged theft of over $30,000
through the processing of fraudulent purchase voucher claims in Bahrain. 6
    On 19 May 2020, NCIS opened an investigation into the fraudulent vouch-
ers. In May 2021, NCIS agents attempted to interrogate Appellee during their
investigation into the suspected voucher fraud. 7 Prior to the interrogation, the
NCIS agent, Special Agent (SA) Charlotte, advised appellee of his rights, in-
cluding his right to counsel. 8 On the written rights advisement form, Appellee
indicated he “would like to have a lawyer present during questioning,” prompt-
ing the NCIS agent to end the interrogation. 9 After leaving that interrogation,
Appellee visited the Defense Services Office [DSO] on Camp Pendleton. 10
    After several months passed without Appellant seeing any apparent pro-
gress on the investigation, Appellee, who was on legal hold past the end of his
enlistment, sought an update from Master Gunnery Sergeant (MGgSgt) Char-
lie asking if he would receive military counsel at an NCIS interview. 11 The
Master Gunnery Sergeant consulted the command Staff Judge Advocate and
later informed Appellee that he “would only receive counsel if charges were
preferred.” 12 The Master Gunnery Sergeant’s advice that Appellee would only
receive counsel if charges were preferred gave Appellee the mistaken under-
standing that he “could not do an interview with military counsel present.” 13

   6 The charge sheet dtd 21 November 2022.

   7 App. Ex. XXII at 2.

   8 Id.

   9 Id.

   10 Id. at 4.

   11 Id.

   12 Id.

   13 Id.

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                  United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                                Opinion of the Court

    Based on this belief and wanting to resolve his case since his family had
already moved to Indiana, Appellee contacted the NCIS case agent requesting
an interview. 14 At that time, the NCIS agent specifically noted that Appellee
was given “incorrect info on lawyer by CMD [command]” and “explained pre-
ferral of charges=lawyer.” 15
    Appellee went in for an interview with SA Charlotte 16 on 15 September
2021. 17 SA Charlotte started the interview by asking Appellee if he wanted to
speak with her, since the last time he came in he had requested the presence
of a lawyer. 18 Appellee told SA Charlotte that his enlisted leader explained his
right to counsel to him and so he now understood he could not be appointed a
lawyer until charges were preferred. 19 SA Charlotte then reviewed a rights ad-
visement form with Appellee, and Appellee then signed. 20 According to the
form, Appellee indicated that he understood he had the right to a “retained
civilian lawyer and[/]or appointed lawyer present during [the] interview.” 21 Ap-
pellee then participated in an interview with SA Charlotte. 22 The charges were
preferred against Appellee on 18 November 2022.
   Prior to trial, the defense moved to suppress Appellee’s statements made
during the September 2021 interview on the grounds that his rights waiver,
while made voluntarily, was not knowing or intelligent. 23 After hearing evi-
dence and argument, the military judge found that Appellee had been given
“an inaccurate belief that he could not be appointed a lawyer until charges
were preferred.” 24 Furthermore, the judge found that Appellee “went forward
with the interview without a lawyer present,” even though “[h]is actions

   14 R. at 49.

   15 App. Ex. XXXI at 17.

   16 All names used in this opinion, with the exception of the counsel and judges, are

pseudonyms.
   17 App. Ex. XXII at 4.

   18 App. Ex. XXI at 3.

   19 Id.

   20 App. Ex. XXIV at 18.

   21 Id.

   22 App. Ex. XXII at 17.

   23 App. Ex. XXI.

   24 R. at 89.

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                United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                              Opinion of the Court

showed that he truly desired to have an attorney,” based on his inaccurate be-
lief. 25 Therefore, the military judge concluded that “the interview, although
voluntary, was not based on a knowing and intelligent understanding of the
right that he abandoned when he acquiesced to proceed without having an at-
torney present” and granted the motion to suppress. 26

                                  II. DISCUSSION

    “We review a military judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress—like other
decisions to admit or exclude evidence—for an abuse of discretion. In reviewing
a military judge’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review fact-finding under
the clearly-erroneous standard and conclusions of law under the de novo stand-
ard. Thus, on a mixed question of law and fact as in this case, a military judge
abuses his [or her] discretion if his [or her] findings of fact are clearly erroneous
or his conclusions of law are incorrect.” 27 To be “clearly erroneous” a finding of
fact “must be more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must strike us with
the force of a five-week-old unrefrigerated dead fish.” 28
    “The abuse of discretion standard is a strict one, calling for more than a
mere difference of opinion. The challenged action must be arbitrary, fanciful,
clearly unreasonable, or clearly erroneous.” 29 “In an Article 62, UCMJ, appeal,
[the] Court reviews the military judge’s decision directly and reviews the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the party which prevailed at trial,” which,
in this case, is Appellee. 30 “It is an abuse of discretion if the military judge: (1)
predicates his ruling on findings of fact that are not supported by the evidence;

    25 Id.

    26 R. at 89-90.

    27 United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296, 298 (C.A.A.F. 1995). “On matters of fact with

respect to appeals under Article 62, UCMJ, this Court is ‘bound by the military judge’s
factual determinations unless they are unsupported by the record or clearly errone-
ous.’” United States v. Becker, 81 M.J. 483, 489 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting United States
v. Pugh, 77 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 2017)).
    28 United States v. Cooper, 80 M.J. 664, 672 n.41 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2020) (fur-

ther citations omitted).
    29 United States v. Lloyd, 69 M.J. 95, 99 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

    30 Becker, 81 M.J. at 488 (quoting Pugh, 77 M.J. at 3).

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                United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                              Opinion of the Court

(2) uses incorrect legal principles; (3) applies correct legal principles to the facts
in a way that is clearly unreasonable; or (4) fails to consider important facts.” 31
   In this case, the key issues before us are whether Appellee had a Fifth
Amendment right to counsel during his second NCIS interview and whether
the military judge applied the correct legal principles in making her ruling.
The question presented to the military judge related to whether the Govern-
ment proved, by a preponderance, 32 that Appellee’s statement was voluntary. 33

A. The Military Judge Did Not Abuse Her Discretion Considering the
Totality of the Circumstances

        The military judge made the following findings of fact:

               [1] The actions of various actors in this case, to include
        the DSO, left the accused with an inaccurate belief that he could
        not be appointed a lawyer until charges were preferred.

                [2] [T]he accused went forward with the interview with-
        out a lawyer, based on that misunderstanding.

               [3] His actions showed that he truly desired to have an
        attorney.

               [4] He first invoked his right to have an attorney present
        with him during his first interview.

               [5] He then made two separate attempts to get an attor-
        ney by visiting the Defense Services Office, where he was turned
        away.

               [6] He also asked his chain of command a number of ques-
        tions about how he could get an attorney. 34
    The CAAF has clearly stated that “[m]ilitary officials and civilians acting
on their behalf are required to provide rights warnings prior to interrogating

    31 Id. at 489 (quoting United States v. Commisso, 76 M.J. 315, 321 (C.A.A.F. 2017))

(additional citation omitted).
    32 Mil. R. Evid. 304(f)(6-7).

    33 Mil. R. Evid. 305.

    34 R. at 89-90. Numbered here for ease of reference.

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                United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                              Opinion of the Court

a member of the armed forces if that servicemember is a suspect, irrespective
of custody.” 35 It is also clear that the specific rules and Articles applicable to
unique situations must be assessed and in this case the unique circumstances
of Appellee’s interactions with NCIS, the DSO and his chain of command must
be considered in applying the law. Military Rule of Evidence 305(c) lays out
specific situations that implicate a suspect’s right to counsel either under the
Fifth or Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. In this case, that Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel was implicated during the first interrogation; where it
was honored by the SA Charlotte. The applicability of the Fifth Amendment
during the second interview is less clear despite the NCIS Agent again provid-
ing the “right to counsel” warning. 36
    Appellee concedes that the second interview was voluntary, however he ar-
gues that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. On the other hand, the
Government argues that by voluntarily appearing for the second interview it
was non-custodial and therefore Appellee had no right to counsel. We find the
Government’s reliance on Edwards 37 and Mathiason 38 unpersuasive under the
unique circumstances of this case. If the second interview was the sum of the
interactions influencing Appellee, then the question before this court is far dif-
ferent and Edwards is binding precedent. But, the intervening events are facts
of consequence in this case. Appellee’s initial request for counsel, 39 the two at-
tempts to seek services from the DSO, 40 the inaccurate advice provided by his
chain of command, 41 and the interactions between Appellee and NCIS prior to

    35 United States v. Delarosa, 67 M.J. 318 citing Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.

831(b) (2000); Mil. R. Evid. 305(b)(1), 305(c).
    36 Appellant conceded during the motion that “obviously the accused rated coun-

sel...” R. at 89. The Government does not argue that Appellee’s right to counsel did not
attach in the first interrogation and therefore we do not evaluate the basis of that
position.
    37 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (espousing the general proposition that

even after requesting counsel a subject can initiate communication with authorities).
The Government here suggests Appellee’s initiation of the second interview proves
there was no custodial interrogation.
    38 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). Here, the Supreme Court overturned

the lower court’s finding of a Miranda violation where the appellant went voluntarily
to the police station, was told he was not under arrest and was allowed to leave.
    39 Finding of Fact (4).

    40 Finding of Fact (3).

    41 Finding of Fact (6).

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                United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                              Opinion of the Court

and during the second interview are relevant for the military judge to consider
for the issue at hand. Thus rendering her findings of fact supported by the
evidence in the record and reasonable. We conclude, therefore, that the mili-
tary judge’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous.

B. The Military Judge Did Not Abuse Her Discretion When She Found
Appellee’s Rights Waiver Was Not Given Knowingly and Intelligently
    We next turn to the issue of whether Appellee’s waiver of his right to coun-
sel was sufficient. 42 “An involuntary statement from the accused, or any evi-
dence derived therefrom, is inadmissible at trial.” 43 “Involuntary statement”
means a statement obtained in violation of the self-incrimination privilege or
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 44 The Fifth Amendment states
that “[n]o Person....shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.” 45 Supreme Court precedent, based on ensuring individual rights
under the Fifth Amendment, contemplates a right of counsel to be present dur-
ing custodial interrogations if the accused requests to have counsel there. 46 If
a right to counsel exists, as conceded by the Government for the first interro-
gation in this case, then...a judge advocate or individual certified in accordance
with Article 27(b) will be provided at no expense to the person and without
regard to the person’s indigency and must be present before the interrogation
may proceed. 47 Furthermore, if a person “chooses to exercise the right to coun-
sel, questioning must cease until counsel is present.” 48
   It is axiomatic that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel can be waived,
but it is no less obvious that any waiver of a right to counsel must be made

    42 Assuming, without deciding, that Appellee had a Fifth Amendment right to coun-

sel in the first interrogation, then under the narrow facts of this case, Appellee’s invo-
cation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel in the initial interrogation reasonably
carried over, through the intervening events, to the second interview.
    43 Mil. R. Evid. 304(a).

    44 Mil. R. Evid. 304(a)(l).

    45 U.S. Const. amend. V.

    46 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Mil. R. Evid. 305(c)(2),
305(c)(4), 305(d).
    47 Mil. R. Evid. 305(d).

    48 Mil. R. Evid. 305(c)(4).

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                 United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                               Opinion of the Court

freely, knowingly, and intelligently. 49 This is a two-part test. First, the Court
must determine if the waiver was voluntary. 50 The Court must next determine
whether the inquiry was knowing and intelligent. 51 The knowing and intelli-
gent analysis requires an accused to have “full awareness of both the nature of
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.” 52 Furthermore, myriad cases discuss that any waiver must be intelligent
and understood by the accused, which depends on the particular facts and cir-
cumstances of the case. 53
    The Government asserts on appeal that the military judge failed to consider
that Appellee was advised of his rights and waived them, and that his belief
that counsel would only be appointed upon preferral of charges was not a mis-
take. 54 We disagree. As the Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps has
recognized, while the Marine Corps Legal Support and Administration Manual
“requires the detailing of defense counsel once charges are preferred,” 55 there
are a wide variety of situations in which defense counsel may be detailed prior
to the preferral of charges including, “servicemembers pending investiga-
tion….by any law enforcement agency, when the detailing authority reasona-
bly believes that such an investigation may result in court martial, nonjudicial
punishment, or adverse administrative action.” 56 The Government’s assertions
regarding the ability for an accused to obtain detailed military counsel prior to

    49 Mil. R. Evid. 305(e)(l).

    50 United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319 (C.A.A.F. 2013).

    51 Id.

    52 Id. at 330.

    53 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938); Berghuis v. Thomp-

kins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010); United States v. Mott, 72 M.J. 319 (C.A.A.F. 2013). Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has held that while a talismanic recitation of Miranda warn-
ings are not required, law enforcement cannot link the reference to appointed counsel
to a future point in time after police interrogation. See, e.g., California v. Prysock, 453
U.S. 355, 360 (1981).
    54 The Government relies on the specific language of Mil. R. Evid. 305 suggesting

that because the second interview was non-custodial, Appellee had no Fifth Amend-
ment right to counsel.
    55 App. Ex. XXIV at 6.

    56 App. Ex. XXIV at 9.

                                            9
                  United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                                Opinion of the Court

preferral of charges is contrary to the language of Mil. R. Evid 305(d) and ex-
actly the same premise that the military judge identified as Appellee’s source
of government-induced confusion. 57
    The military judge correctly recognized that while the waiver in this case
was voluntary, that did not end the analysis. As discussed above, given the
totality of the circumstances, she did not err in finding that the waiver analysis
for the Fifth Amendment needed to be completed.
      As to that second step, whether Appellee’s waiver was made knowingly and
intelligently, the military judge considered the situation Appellee was faced
with when making his decision to sign the rights waiver, including his desire
to move the investigation forward since he was past the end of his active duty
service and had already moved his family. She also properly considered the
steps Appellee took prior to agreeing to the interrogation, like visiting the DSO
and talking to his chain of command in an effort to exercise his rights. 58 The
military judge also considered the evidence presented about the advice Appel-
lee was given regarding whether he could be detailed military counsel and Ap-
pellee’s “inaccurate belief that he could not get an attorney until charges were
preferred.” 59 Given this evidence, we find that the military judge, quite reason-
ably, found that Appellee’s waiver of his right to counsel was not made know-
ingly or intelligently because he did not have “full awareness of both the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon
it.” 60 Therefore, the military judge’s decision to suppress Appellee’s statements
to NCIS was well within the range of choices reasonably arising from the facts
and the law.

   57 Mil. R. Evid. 305(d) mandates that an attorney will be provided to an individual

under these circumstances “and [the attorney] must be present before the interroga-
tion may proceed.” Any action undermining this rule, especially limitations on access
to counsel, cannot be considered in compliance with the rule.
   58 R. at 89-90.

   59 R. at 89.

   60 Mott, 72 M.J. at 330 (further citations omitted).

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              United States v. Flanner, NMCCA No. 202300134
                            Opinion of the Court

                              III. CONCLUSION

   After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we
have determined that the military judge did not abuse her discretion.
   The military judge’s ruling is AFFIRMED. The case is returned to the
Judge Advocate General for remand to the military judge for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.

                                FOR THE COURT:

                                MARK K. JAMISON
                                Clerk of Court

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