Court Opinion

ID: 9677623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:23.966033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.141224
License: Public Domain

BARHAM, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully suggest that the majority, in its concern that public interest requires this court to act with some immediacy upon the matter before us, has committed grave error which will haunt the court and perhaps do great harm to the State, its subdivisions, and its citizens in future litigation.
This suit is an attempt by the Parish of Jefferson to block the Louisiana Department of Correction’s purchase of the site *1095and facilities of the House of the Good Shepherd in Jefferson Parish for use as a juvenile training institution. The trial court held that Act No. 452 of 1970, which authorized the department’s purchase and use of the site and facilities, was unconstitutional, and also held two other statutes unconstitutional in certain respects.
The majority of this court has held that the Parish of Jefferson had standing in court to challenge the constitutionality of all three statutes, and has reversed the holding of the trial court by declaring all three statutes constitutional. I respectfully submit that the Parish of Jefferson has no right of action to challenge the constitutionality of legislative acts which do not affect it.
Although a municipal corporation or other political subdivision may in certain instances bring representative actions in behalf of its inhabitants to protect or to establish a common right, this is not such an instance. See Faris v. City of Caruthersville, 349 Mo. 454, 162 S.W.2d 237; Sioux City v. Western Asphalt Paving Corp., 223 Iowa 279, 271 N.W. 624, 109 A.L.R. 608; Washington County Water Co. v. Hagerstown, 116 Md. 497, 82 A. 826, 28 Ann. Cas. 1913C 1022 ; 28 Ann.Cas. 1913C Annotation 1028. In the absence of statutory provision or contractual right, a political subdivision is without power to maintain an action as the representative of the individual and private interests of its citizens. Mayor, etc., of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co. et al., 12 Peters 91, 9 L.Ed. 1012; City of New Haven v. New Haven & D. R. Co., 62 Conn. 252, 25 A. 316, 18 L.R.A. 256; City of St. Louis v. G. H. Wright Contracting Co., 202 Mo. 451, 101 S.W. 6. When citizens have distinct private rights, an adjudication in a proceeding where the citizens are not parties, individually or as members of a class, is not a bar to the private citizens’ action, and the adjudication is not res judicata as to them. Griffith v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 88 Miss. 371, 40 So. 1011, 8 Ann. Cas. 1130; James v. City of Louisville (Ky.Ct.App.), 40 S.W. 912; Board of Com’rs v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237; Price v. Gwin, 144 Ind. 105, 43 N.E. 5; Rork v. Smith, 55 Wis. 67, 12 N.W. 408.
Here the Parish of Jefferson does not sue in a representative capacity, nor may the suit be considered a class action. The Parish of Jefferson sues as a subdivision of the State of Louisiana seeking on its own behalf to have declared unconstitutional acts of the Legislature which do not affect the parish, its rights, its powers, its obligations. Actually, the persons who, as individuals or as members of a class, have a real interest in the suit at hand have not had their day in court, and they most assuredly are entitled to it.
Parishes, municipalities, and other political subdivisions can exercise only those powers delegated to them by the sovereign. *1097It is wise that these subdivisions should not be empowered to expend public money in litigation on behalf of private interests. And if the individuals in interest are actually a collective minority or even a collective majority of the subdivision’s inhabitants, the subdivision still does not possess the requisite power and interest to maintain an action by reason of that fact alone. What is so disturbing in this particular case is that while the parish attempts to strike down legislative enactments, individuals and groups — in fact, a large segment of that parish — have contrary interests, views, and desires, and would seek to uphold the legislation. Two wrongs would result if this action is allowed to be litigated by the Parish of Jefferson or if similar actions are allowed to be litigated by other political subdivisions. First, political subdivisions and the State may collude to bring what men of the law call “brother-in-law suits” in order to defeat the rights of the real parties in interest. Second, a political subdivision may expend the money of all to project, establish, or protect the private interests of only a portion of the population, to the prejudice of the remainder. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Tate has cited the following in his discussion of this issue: 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1265; 75 Harv.L. Rev. 255; 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1968), § 49.57; 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 2186b(2) and 2190. I adopt these authorities, in addition to the ones cited above, as supportive of the very position I state. See also 38 Am.Jur. Municipal Corporations §§ 711, 719, 720.
The majority does not comment upon the right or interest of the plaintiff to bring this action, which is the threshold question, and only the concurring opinion comments upon it. I will respond to two arguments urged in the concurrence. The concurrence’s conclusion that the act in question affects Jefferson Parish alone is fallacious, for the selection of a place of detention for the State’s juvenile delinquents is of vital interest to every parish and to every citizen of every parish. Moreover, if indeed Jefferson objects to the locating of the detention home there, might not other parishes also object to its being placed within their own boundaries ? And is it not possible that other parishes would desire the facility? The location of the detention facility for the juvenile delinquents of the State of Louisiana is a matter which concerns the entire State of Louisiana, and its determination is a legislative function. This determination is of no particular concern to Jefferson Parish unless it would violate some specific statutory authority or grant. The concurrence’s contention that we avoid a multiplicity of actions by attempting to declare the acts constitutional is an error, for, as I have indicated, the citizens of Jefferson have not had their day in court, the citizens of Louisiana have not had their day in court, and, as I will note *1099later, the residents immediately adjacent to the proposed detention home have not had their day in court. The majority has not disposed of the litigation, but has fomented future litigation.
Finally, I reject entirely the majority’s discussion of Specification of Error No. 4 .as a patently erroneous statement of the law. The citation of Code of Civil Procedure Article 2164 as authority for the judgment of this court in this matter is in total disregard of our Constitution and reflects a complete misunderstanding of the limited purpose for which that article was designed.
This court should never have reached the issue of constitutionality in the case before us. The only justiciable question between the Parish of Jefferson and the Louisiana Department of Corrections is whether the proposed purchase of the House of the Good Shepherd for a juvenile facility is in violation of the parish’s zoning ordinance. That question may be determined quickly upon the facts in the case. Although the parishi zoning ordinance had established special limitations of use upon the property surrounding this proposed facility, the existing facility had operated as a juvenile correction home before the zoning ordinance came into effect, and was therefore a permitted non-conforming use within the zone. The change from private to public ownership and operation for the same purpose maintains the facility within the permitted non-conforming use. It is for this reason that the Parish of Jefferson should be denied relief under its allegation that its zoning laws would be violated. The constitutionality of the legislative acts is not reached in the resolution of this question.
Moreover, in answer to the majority’s consideration of this last issue, the Legislature cannot with abandon and impunity violate valid zoning ordinances. The courts may be required to pronounce in certain cases that the legislative or the executive branch of state government is responsible at law for nuisances. The courts may be required to find that certain acts violative of zoning regulations or even customary use of a neighborhood constitute a damaging or taking of property without just compensation. However, those questions are not here present, but neither is the question of the “supremacy” of the Legislature.
I respectfully dissent.