Court Opinion

ID: 9959533
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 22:10:55.499143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:49.025436
License: Public Domain

04/11/2024
                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                            AT NASHVILLE
                                December 5, 2023 Session

 ROBERT MADDEN ET AL. v. METROPOLITAN BOARD OF FIRE AND
BUILDING CODE APPEALS OF THE METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT
     OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
                     No. 22C273 Clifton David Briley, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                            No. M2023-00113-COA-R3-CV
                        ___________________________________

This case concerns the denial of a variance by the Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals
of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“the
Board”). Landowners applied for a building permit to construct an auto repair shop on
undeveloped property. The local fire code required new buildings of this type and size to
have, inter alia, a water source that could supply 180,000 gallons at 1,500 gallons per
minute for two hours. The property at issue did not have the requisite water supply. Thus,
as a variance to the fire code, the landowners proposed to construct a 20,000-gallon water
tank on the property and to install a “dry” fire suppression system inside the building. When
their plan was rejected by the fire marshal, the landowners appealed to the Board and asked
for approval of a variance. The Board denied the variance request, citing concerns over the
safety of people, including firefighters and first responders. The owners then petitioned for
a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Board misapplied the law by failing to consider whether
strict enforcement of the fire code would result in “manifest injustice.” Finding that the
Board failed to distinguish the landowners’ request for a variance from an appeal, the trial
court vacated the Board’s ruling and remanded the matter to the Board for review of the
variance request. This appeal followed. For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully
disagree with the trial court’s conclusion, reverse its judgment, and remand with
instructions to affirm the decision of the Board.

        Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court
                             Reversed and Remanded

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D.
BENNETT and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.
Wallace W. Dietz, Christopher M. Lackey, and Breanne N. Hataway, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Metropolitan Board of Fire and Building Code Appeals of the
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

Dominic J. Leonardo, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Robert and Dannette
Madden.

                                           OPINION

       Robert and Dannette Madden (“Petitioners”) own and operate RDR AutoWorks,
LLC, an automotive repair shop. The business is currently located at 108 Old Trinity Lane
in Nashville, Tennessee. In 2019, Petitioners bought property located at 4788 Jennie Brown
Lane in Nashville with the plan to construct a new 5,000-square-foot steel building to
relocate their business. The property is undeveloped, zoned for industrial use, and lies in
the Urban Services District of Nashville.

       In 2020, Petitioners applied for a building permit from the Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”). At the time, the
Metropolitan Fire Prevention Code (“the Fire Code”) required all building premises to have
“an approved water supply capable of supplying the required fire flow for fire protection.”
See Int’l Fire Code § 507.1–2 (Int’l Code Council 2012) (emphasis omitted).1 Based on
their building’s size and type, Petitioners needed a water source that could supply 1,500
gallons per minute for two hours—a total of 180,000 gallons. See id. § B105.

       Per the Fire Code, water supplies could be in the form of “reservoirs, pressure tanks,
elevated tanks, water mains or other fixed systems capable of providing the required fire
flow.” Id. § 507.1. Petitioners wanted to connect the property to a water main, but the
closest was 2,500 feet away, and extending it would cost $280,000. For this reason,
Petitioners developed and submitted a fire suppression plan that varied from the Fire
Code’s requirements: Petitioners proposed a 20,000-gallon water tank outside the building
and a “dry suppression” system inside for chemical fires. Petitioners believed this plan was
adequate given the property’s location and the planned construction type. Moreover, the
arrangement would cost less than $90,000.

     Petitioners’ fire suppression plan, was considered and rejected—first by Fire Plan
Examiner Jim Rummage and then by Assistant Fire Marshal Joseph Almon, the latter of
whom explained his decision via email:

       Based on the minimum fire-flow requirements listed in Appendix B of the
       2012 IFC and building construction information provided on the submitted

       1
          At the time, Metro used the 2012 edition of the International Fire Code. See Metro. Gov’t
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tennessee Code § 10.64.010 (Dec. 2019).

                                               -2-
      plans, the total capacity required to meet manual fire suppression needs is
      180,000 gallons. The proposed 20,000-gallon tank is far short of this
      capacity.

      A reduction in the required fire-flow rate is allowed when the building is
      protected throughout by an NFPA 13 compliant automatic fire sprinkler
      system. It would be necessary to consult with a Fire Protection Engineer on
      the design of the sprinkler system to determine the minimum tank capacity
      required and [if] any additional equipment, such as pump systems, might be
      required.

      Based on the information above, I concur with Mr. Rummage’s evaluation
      of the requirements and do not support the proposed alternative water supply
      tank as an equivalent to the requirements listed in the fire code.

      Assistant Fire Marshal Almon then gave Petitioners three possible solutions to gain
approval:

      1. Extend water mains to and provide fire hydrant coverage to the property
         meeting the minimum fire-flow requirement and duration. (1,500 GPM x
         2 hours)

      2. Install an engineer designed NFPA 13 compliant automatic fire sprinkler
         system with all components necessary to meet system demand and
         duration.

      3. [Install an o]n-site tank and accessory components of sufficient size and
         capacity to meet fire-flow demand as noted in IFC Appendix B Section
         105.2.

       Petitioners appealed the Fire Marshal’s decision to the Board and asked for a
variance on the ground that a 180,000-gallon tank would cost at least $130,000—
approximately four times the cost of the proposed 20,000-gallon tank. Petitioners
acknowledged that the Fire Code was intended to protect the safety of first responders and
the public. Still, they claimed their plan was “adequate” because the building was to be
made mostly of steel, all vehicles would be parked outside while not undergoing repair,
and a fire “wouldn’t really spread to anywhere else” because their property was between a
highway and a vacant lot. Petitioners added that they had “plenty of insurance.”

        After hearing from Petitioners, board members expressed concern about hazardous
materials on the property, and they questioned whether Petitioners’ plan aligned with the
spirit and purpose of the Fire Code. Chairman Rich McCoy noted that the Board was not
“worried about the buildings as much as the people that are in them.” Board members also
stated that the fire department knew what it needed to fight a fire. In the end, the Board

                                          -3-
unanimously voted to deny Petitioners’ variance request. The Board sent Petitioners
written notice of the denial, stating, “Based on the minimum fire-flow requirements listed
in Appendix B of the 2012 IFC and building construction information provided on
submitted plans, the total capacity required to meet manual fire suppression needs is
180,000 gallons.”

        Petitioners then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Circuit
Court. Petitioners asserted that the Board did not apply the correct standard of review
because it did not consider whether enforcement of the Fire Code would result in “manifest
injustice.” The Board filed the administrative record, including a transcript of the
proceedings before the Board. Thereafter, Petitioners filed their brief, and then the Board
filed its brief. The trial court held a hearing on the merits on October 5, 2022, during which
no other evidence was introduced.

        The trial court held that the Board failed to fulfill its duties because it “simply
decided whether it would override [the Fire Marshal]’s determination of whether
Petitioners met the [Fire Code] requirements” rather than “whether strict enforcement of
the [Fire] Code would result in ‘manifest injustice.’” In its final order, the court
distinguished between “a variance pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080” and “an appeal of
the [fire marshal’s] decision, pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.090”:

       Petitioners’ use of language directly from Metro Code § 2.80.080, indicates
       Petitioners intended the Board to decide the appeal under the review standard
       it would apply to an applicant seeking a variance.

       In this Court’s view, it is reasonably deduced from the record that Petitioners
       desired and sought a variance pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080. It is not
       equally clear, however, the Board also understood this to be the case. The
       record lacks any indication the Board made a distinction between an appeal
       of the decision of Asst. Fire Marshal Almon, pursuant to Metro Code §
       2.80.090, and a request for a variance, pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080,
       in its deliberations. The Board makes no mention of the language in Metro
       Code § 2.80.080. Specifically, the Board does not mention “manifest justice”
       or “spirit and purpose” of the Code in any manner, and the word “variance”
       is never used by the Board.

                                    .       .         .    .

       From the record, it appears the Board simply decided whether it would
       override Asst. Fire Marshal Almon’s determination of whether Petitioners
       met the 2012 IFC requirements. The Board’s task was broader than that,
       however. Because Petitioners were seeking a variance, the Board was
       obligated to consider whether strict enforcement of the Code would result in

                                                -4-
       “manifest injustice.” Thus, this Court holds the Board’s decision relies upon
       a misrepresentation and/or misapplication of legal standards for a variance,
       amounting to illegal, arbitrary, and/or fraudulent action.

       On this basis, the trial court granted the writ and remanded the matter to the Board
“for review of the Petitioner’s request for a variance, pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080.”

       This appeal followed.

                                           ISSUES

       The Board presents two issues for our review:

       1. Did the trial court err by substituting its judgment for that of the Board in finding
          that the Board misapplied Metro Code § 2.80.080 when it denied Petitioners’
          variance request after Board members opined that two of the three required
          elements were not met?

       2. Did the trial court err when it failed to determine whether the Board’s decision
          to deny Petitioners’ variance request was supported by substantial and material
          evidence?

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

      At issue is the propriety of the Board’s decision to deny a variance from the Fire
Code’s requirement.

        Local boards are administrative bodies whose decisions are subject to judicial
review by petition for common law writ of certiorari. See Harding Acad. v. Metro. Gov’t
of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 222 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tenn. 2007). A petition for writ of
certiorari is “not a vehicle which allows the courts to consider the intrinsic correctness of
the conclusions of the administrative decision maker.” State ex rel. Moore & Assocs., Inc.
v. West, 246 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, when reviewing such petitions,
“courts may not (1) inquire into the intrinsic correctness of the lower tribunal’s decision,
(2) reweigh the evidence, or (3) substitute their judgment for that of the lower tribunal.”
Id. (citations omitted). We are limited to “determining whether the board exceeded its
jurisdiction, followed an unlawful procedure, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently, or
acted without material evidence to support its decision.” Harding Academy, 222 S.W.3d at
363.

        When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, courts are limited to determining
whether there is “substantial and material evidence” in the administrative record. Harding
Academy, 222 S.W.3d at 363. But, as we have explained before, courts should not apply
this standard mechanically:

                                             -5-
       [A] reviewing court should not apply [the] “substantial and material
       evidence” test mechanically. Instead, the court should review the record
       carefully to determine whether the administrative agency’s decision is
       supported by “such relevant evidence as a rational mind might accept to
       support a rational conclusion.” The court need not reweigh the evidence, and
       the agency’s decision need not be supported by a preponderance of the
       evidence. The evidence will be sufficient if it furnishes a reasonably sound
       factual basis for the decision being reviewed.

Jackson Mobilphone Co., v. Tennessee Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 876 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted) (quoting Clay Cnty. Manor, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Health
& Env't, 849 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tenn. 1993); S. Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 682
S.W.2d 196, 199 (Tenn. 1984)).

       Illegal, arbitrary, or fraudulent actions include (1) failing to follow minimum
standards of due process; (2) misrepresenting or misapplying legal standards; (3) basing a
decision on ulterior motives; and (4) violating applicable constitutional standards. Hoover,
Inc. v. Metro Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 924 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). We
review the Board’s application of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. See
Harding Academy, 222 S.W.3d at 363.

       While findings of fact promote an understanding of the basis of a board’s decision,
administrative bodies such as the Board do not have to make specific findings of fact unless
a statute or ordinance requires them. See Moore v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 205
S.W.3d 429, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Weaver v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 122 S.W.3d 781, 785 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). And there was no requirement for
the Board to make findings of fact in this case.

                                             ANALYSIS

                                                  I.

        Petitioners maintain that the Board erred because it did not consider whether strict
application of the Fire Code would be manifestly unjust. For its part, the Board contends
that it did not have to consider that issue because it determined that the requested variance
was contrary to “the spirit and purposes” of the Fire Code.2

       2
         The Board’s brief raises a second issue: “Did the Trial Court err when it failed to make a
determination on whether the Appellant Board’s decision to deny Appellee’s variance request was
supported by substantial and material evidence?” But the Board preempts its own question in a footnote,

                                                 -6-
       Under Chapter 2.08 of the Metro Code, landowners may appeal to the Board when
the Fire Marshal rejects “the mode or manner of construction proposed to be followed or
materials to be used in the erection or alteration of a building or structure.” Metro Code §
2.080.80 (Dec. 2019).3 As is relevant here, § 2.080.80 allows landowners to appeal a
decision of the Fire Marshal when “an equally good or more desirable form of construction
can be employed in any specific case.” Id. Furthermore, Chapter 2.08 grants the Board
authority to “vary the application of any provision of [the Fire Code] to any particular
case,” but only if it finds that “strict enforcement” would (1) “do manifest injustice”
and (2) “be contrary to the spirit and purposes of [the Fire Code] or public interest.”
See id. § 2.08.090 (emphasis added).

        Thus, as Chapter 2.08.090 expressly provides, the Board may grant a variance from
the Fire Code provided it finds that strict enforcement would do manifest injustice and that
strict enforcement would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Fire Code or public
interest. Stated another way, if either factor is not proven, then the Board is without
authority to grant the variance.

       Here, it is clear from the Board members’ questions and stated concerns about the
safety of the firefighters, first responders, and others who may be exposed to a fire at
Petitioners’ property, that the Board found that Petitioners had not proven that strict
enforcement would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of the Fire Code or public interest.

       The Fire Code’s purpose is two-fold: (1) “to establish the minimum requirements
consistent with nationally recognized good practice for providing a reasonable level of life
safety and property protection from the hazards of fire, explosion or dangerous conditions
in new and existing buildings, structures and premises”; and (2) “to provide safety to fire
fighters and emergency responders during emergency operations.” See Int. Fire Code
§ 101 (ICC 2012) (emphasis added). As is relevant here, new buildings must have a “water
supply capable of supplying the required fire flow for fire protection.” Id. § 507.1.4

       As the parties asking for a variance, Petitioners had the burden to persuade the Board
(1) that the 20,000-gallon tank was “equally good or more desirable”; (2) that strict

noting that Petitioners did not “contest that there was sufficient and material evidence to support the Board’s
decision.” Thus, we pretermit the issue.
        3
          The Board may also “vary the application” of the Fire Code if it finds “the interpretation of the
director of codes and/or the metro fire marshal should be modified.” Metro Code § 2.080.90. There is no
dispute over the Fire Marshal’s interpretation in this case.
        4
             The only exception in the 2012 IFC is for buildings with “an approved automatic sprinkler
system,” in which case the Fire Marshal may reduce the required fire-flow rate by up to 75%. See 2012 Intl.
Fire Code § B105.2. But regardless, “[t]he resulting fire-flow shall not be less than 1,500 gallons per minute
. . . for the prescribed duration.” Id.

                                                    -7-
enforcement would “do manifest injustice”; and (3) that strict enforcement would “be
contrary to the spirit and purposes of [the Fire Code] or public interest.” See id. § 2.8.080–
090. But Petitioners did not develop an argument or present any evidence to show that
enforcement of the Fire Code here would be contrary to its spirit and purposes or public
interest. See id. Instead, they argued that allowing the variance would not be contrary to
the purpose of the Fire Code or public interest.

        The Board was not persuaded by this argument for obvious reasons. At the
prescribed rate of 1,500 gallons per minute, Petitioners’ 20,000-gallon tank would last just
over 13 minutes. Yet Petitioners reasoned that this system was “adequate” because their
property was located between a vacant lot and a highway in an industrial part of town.
Petitioners even pointed out that they had “plenty of insurance.” In other words, if it burned,
let it burn.

      However, multiple board members noted that the Fire Code’s purpose is to protect
not only buildings but also people including firefighters and first responders. These
comments indicate that the Board found Petitioners’ plan inconsistent with the spirit and
purpose of the Fire Code, and we agree.

                                              II.

       In closing, we wish to address the primary concern of the trial court. That is whether
the Board recognized that Petitioners were requesting a “variance” from strict enforcement
of the Fire Code rather than “appealing” from the Fire Marshal’s interpretation of the Fire
Code.

      As an initial matter, we note that Chapter 2.80 of the Metro Code provides only one
procedural mechanism for relief from an adverse decision of the Fire Marshal—whether
based on an alleged misinterpretation of the Fire Code, an alleged misapplication of the
Fire Code, or the principal that another form of construction would be equally as good or
more desirable:

              Whenever the director of codes administration and/or the metro fire
       marshal shall reject or refuse to approve the mode or manner of
       construction proposed to be followed or materials to be used in the erection
       or alteration of a building or structure, or when it is claimed that the
       provisions of [the Fire Code] do not apply, or that an equally good or more
       desirable form of construction can be employed in any specific case, or
       when it is claimed that the true intent and meaning of [the Fire Code] have
       been misconstrued or wrongly interpreted, the owner of such building or
       structure . . . may appeal from the decision of the director of codes
       administration and/or the metro fire marshal to the board of fire and
       building code appeals. Notice of appeal shall be in writing and filed within
       thirty days after the decision is rendered by the director and/or metro fire

                                             -8-
        marshal. A fee of two hundred and fifty dollars ($250.00) shall accompany
        such notice of appeal.

Metro Code § 2.8.090.

       Accordingly, § 2.80.80 empowers the Board to grant such appeals by varying from
the Fire Marshal’s enforcement or interpretation of the Fire Code:

            The board of fire and building code appeals, when so appealed to and
    after a hearing may vary the application of any provision of [the Fire Code] to
    any particular case when, in its opinion, [1] the strict enforcement thereof would
    do manifest injustice and would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of [the
    Fire Code], or public interest, and when [2] in its opinion the interpretation of
    the director of codes administration and/or the metro fire marshal should be
    modified.

Id. § 2.80.080.5

       At the commencement of the case, Chairman Rich McCoy asked counsel for the
parties to “explain to us your hardship and what alternat[ive] means of protection is
proposed in lieu of literal code compliance.” Then Chairman McCoy recited the applicable
fire code requirements for Petitioner’s proposed building based on its size and type. He
also identified Petitioner’s variance request, noting that, rather than having a fire hydrant
within 500 feet of the proposed building, Petitioners proposed to install a dry chemical-fire
suppression system inside the building and a 20,000-gallon above-ground water storage
tank outside. We also find it significant that Petitioners’ counsel stated the standard that

        5
         The trial court erroneously construed Chapter 2.80 of the Metro Code as distinguishing between
an “appeal” and a “variance request.”

        In this Court’s view, it is reasonably deduced from the record that Petitioners desired and
        sought a variance pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080. It is not equally clear, however, the
        Board also understood this to be the case. The record lacks any indication the Board made
        a distinction between an appeal of the decision of Asst. Fire Marshal Almon, pursuant to
        Metro Code § 2.80.090, and a request for a variance, pursuant to Metro Code § 2.80.080,
        in its deliberations. The Board makes no mention of the language in Metro Code §
        2.80.080. Specifically, the Board does not mention “manifest justice” or “spirit and
        purpose” of the Code in any manner, and the word “variance” is never used by the Board.

Although Chapter 2.80 distinguishes between the Fire Marshal’s interpretation and enforcement of the Fire
Code, it creates only one method of appeal. See Metro Code § 2.80.090.

                                                   -9-
governs a variance request, that being the standard in Metro Code § 2.80.080 and Board
Rule IX.6

       Later, Board members asked questions related to the variance request. Chairman
McCoy asked, “Are there any alternatives with that well? Is there the ability to pump from
the well for water service?” Assistant Fire Marshal Almon answered the question, stating
that the well on Petitioners’ property was “not considered a reliable fire suppressant
source.”

       Then an unidentified Board Member asked if the water for the 20,000-gallon above-
ground tank would come from the well. After being advised that it would not, that same
Board Member queried: “[I]f you did have a fire, and you expended all of the 20,000
gallons, how are you going to get more water to fill it back up fast? You won’t be able to
do that. And obviously, if you’ve got repair work there, you’re going to have vehicles that
are having volatile material in them, a fuel for fire.”

        As for the dry chemical system to be installed inside the new building, another
Board Member asked: “Is this system better than a water system for putting out these
kind[s] of fires?” Assistant Fire Marshal Almon answered that “the dry chemical system,
with the amount of agent it has and the duration, would not meet the normal requirements
for this size of a structure.” Then Board Member Marina Ntoupi asked if there was “an
option to upgrade the dry chemical [system] to meet [the] size of this infrastructure.”
Assistant Fire Marshal Almon answered, “[T]he material that I was presented for the dry
chemical system, it does not carry a listing for this type of (inaudible) for an entire building.
It’s more of a specific purpose extinguishing system, such as for spray [booths or] for
basically a smaller defined area.”

       Admittedly, the Board could have done a better job of clarifying that the hearing
concerned a request to vary from the Fire Marshal’s enforcement of the Fire Code rather
than the Fire Marshal’s interpretation of the Fire Code. Still, Petitioners have the burden
to prove that the Board followed an unlawful procedure by treating the appeal for a variance
from the Fire Marshal’s enforcement as an appeal for a variance from the Fire Marshal’s
interpretation. See Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Pub. Educ., 380 S.W.3d 715, 729–30
(Tenn. 2012) (stating that parties using a common law writ of certiorari to challenge an
administrative decision have the burden of presenting evidence showing that the officials,
inter alia, “followed an unlawful procedure”). And we find that Petitioners failed to
establish that the Board followed an unlawful procedure by treating the hearing appeal as
one for a variance from the interpretation of the Fire Marshal. In our view, the transcript

       6
           Board Rule IX mirrors the language in Metro Code § 2.80.080.

                                                 - 10 -
from the hearing before the Board reveals that the Board knew that it was considering an
appeal for a variance from the Fire Marshal’s strict enforcement of the Fire Code rather
than an appeal from the Fire Marshal’s interpretation of the Fire Code because the Board
asked questions to determine whether the variance proposed satisfied the elements of Metro
Code § 2.80.080 and, particularly, whether strict enforcement would be contrary to the Fire
Code’s spirit and purposes. See Int’l Fire Code § 101 (Int’l Code Council 2012).7

      Accordingly, we respectfully disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the
Board applied the law incorrectly.

                                          IN CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter
is remanded with instruction for the trial court to affirm the decision of the Board. Costs of
appeal are assessed against the appellees, Robert and Dannette Madden.

                                                          ________________________________
                                                          FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

        7
          As noted earlier, the purpose of the 2012 IFC is two-fold: (1) “to establish the minimum
requirements consistent with nationally recognized good practice for providing a reasonable level of life
safety and property protection from the hazards of fire, explosion or dangerous conditions in new and
existing buildings, structures and premises”; and (2) “to provide safety to fire fighters and emergency
responders during emergency operations.” 2012 Intl. Fire Code § 101.

                                                 - 11 -