Court Opinion

ID: 9929928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-05 19:02:34.772449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:52:52.828025
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/5/24 In re Juan S. CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

In re JUAN S., a Person Coming                                B316713
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                               (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP03764A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

              Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

GILMA D.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stephen C. Marpet, Juvenile Court Referee.
Dismissed as moot.
      Karen B. Stalter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Aileen Wong, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ________________________

                       INTRODUCTION

      Mother Gilma D. appeals from the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring her son,
Juan S. (born 2009), to be a dependent of the court pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code former section 300,
subdivision (b)(1),1 and ordering family reunification services.
Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the
juvenile court’s finding that Juan was at substantial risk of harm
due to her mental health and emotional issues. While this appeal
was pending, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction over
Juan, releasing him to Mother with no further orders. Because
we cannot grant effective relief to Mother, we dismiss her appeal
as moot.

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare
and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. Section 300
was amended effective January 1, 2023, after the juvenile court
issued its 2021 jurisdiction findings in this case. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 832, § 1.) The amendments do not impact our analysis.

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      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On August 12, 2021 the Department of Child and Family
Services (Department) filed a petition under former section 300,
subdivision (b)(1), on behalf of then 11-year-old Juan, alleging:
“The child[’s] . . . mother . . . has mental and emotional problems,
including a diagnosis of PTSD and Depression and has exhibited
auditory and visual hallucinations, which render the mother
unable to provide regular care of the child. On prior occasions,
the mother has failed to take the mother’s psychotropic
medications as prescribed. Such mental and emotional condition
on the part of the mother endangers the child’s physical health
and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm
and damage.” The petition did not seek to detain Juan from
Mother’s custody.
       The Department reported Mother told Juan and others she
had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. To prepare Juan for
her imminent death, she had him meet with two potential
adoptive families in 2019 for multiple extended visits. She also
created a Go Fund Me page in 2020, describing herself as a single
mother with cancer and a child with autism. Mother’s doctors,
however, had informed her in 2018 that her cancer was in
remission and she was stable. Further, Juan had not been
diagnosed with autism.
       When interviewed by the social worker, Mother blamed her
recently deceased male companion, whom Juan referred to as
“‘dad,’” for abusing her and manipulating her into lying about her
medical condition for his financial gain. Mother also denied
being “mentally present” during her medical visits due to her fear
of the male companion. Mother’s and Juan’s mental health

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providers reported Mother gave them similarly inconsistent
information and refused to share her medical records for a
comprehensive psychological evaluation. Mother also gave
conflicting information about what medication she was taking.
       On October 26, 2021 the juvenile court sustained the
petition as pleaded. The juvenile court noted Mother had
received mental health treatment for five years, but her mental
health issues continued and “really puts this child at risk.” At
disposition, the juvenile court declared Juan a dependent of the
court, ordered him removed from his father’s custody,2 ordered
him released to Mother’s custody, and ordered family
reunification services for Mother, including counseling and
parenting classes as well as an order to take all prescribed
psychotropic medication. Mother timely appealed.
       On May 30, 2023, during the pendency of this appeal, the
juvenile court terminated jurisdiction, noting Juan was doing
well in Mother’s home and releasing him to Mother.3 Mother did
not appeal from the order terminating jurisdiction.
       This court invited the parties to submit letter briefs
addressing whether this appeal is moot and whether this court
should exercise its discretion to reach the merits. (See In re D.P.,
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) The Department filed a letter brief

2      Mother advised the court and the Department that Juan’s
father likely resided in El Salvador but she was unsure of his
whereabouts. Juan’s father was never located. He is not a party
to this appeal.
3     On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile
court’s May 30, 2023 minute order terminating jurisdiction. (See
Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c)-(d), 459.)

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stating its position the appeal should be dismissed as moot.
Mother urged us to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of
her appeal.

                               DISCUSSION

       “An order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction generally
renders an appeal from an earlier order moot.” (In re Rashad D.
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 156, 163.) “However, dismissal of a
dependency appeal for mootness following termination of
jurisdiction ‘is not automatic, but “must be decided on a case-by-
case basis.”’” (Id. at p. 163.) “A case becomes moot when events
“‘render[ ] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in
favor of plaintiff, to grant [the plaintiff] any effect[ive] relief.’”
[Citation.] For relief to be ‘effective,’ two requirements must be
met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm.
Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being
rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks.” In other words,
“relief is effective when it ‘can have a practical, tangible impact
on the parties’ conduct or legal status.’ [Citation.] It follows that,
to show a need for effective relief, the plaintiff must first
demonstrate that he or she has suffered from a change in legal
status.” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 276-277.)
       Mother’s appeal from the October 26, 2021 jurisdiction
finding and disposition order is moot because the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and released Juan to her custody.
Mother argues her appeal is not moot because the juvenile court’s
findings in this case could prejudice her in future dependency
proceedings involving Juan or other potential children. This is
not the type of ongoing harm required to overcome mootness, and

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the Supreme Court rejected this precise argument in In re D.P.,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pages 277-278 (although, as discussed below,
the high court considered this argument in assessing whether
discretionary review of a moot appeal is warranted). Mother has
failed to identify what effective relief we may offer that “‘can have
a practical, tangible impact on [her] conduct or legal status.’”
(Ibid.)
       We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the merits
of her moot appeal. (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th 266; In re
Nathan E. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 114, 121; In re C.C. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1489.) “As a rule, courts will generally
exercise their discretion to review a moot case when ‘the case
presents an issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur,’
‘when there may be a recurrence of the controversy between the
parties,’ or ‘when a material question remains for the court’s
determination.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 282.) In In re
D.P., our Supreme Court identified additional factors a reviewing
court may consider in deciding whether to exercise discretionary
review of a moot dependency appeal. First, a court may consider
whether the challenged jurisdiction finding could impact current
or future dependency proceedings (for example, by influencing a
child protective agency’s decision to file a new dependency
petition or a juvenile court’s determination about whether to
order further reunification services). (Id. at p. 285.) Second, a
reviewing court may consider “whether the jurisdictional finding
is based on particularly pernicious or stigmatizing conduct.” (Id.
at pp. 285-286.) The “more egregious the findings against the
parent, the greater the parent’s interest in challenging such
findings.” (Id. at p. 286.) Third, a court may also consider “why
the appeal became moot”: “[p]rinciples of fairness” may favor

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discretionary review of cases rendered moot “by the prompt
compliance or otherwise laudable behavior of the parent
challenging the jurisdictional finding on appeal.” (Ibid.)
       In deciding whether to exercise our discretion to decide a
moot appeal, no single factor is dispositive and reviewing courts
“should be guided by the overarching goals of the dependency
system: ‘to provide maximum safety and protection for children’
with a ‘focus’ on ‘the preservation of the family as well as the
safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of the
child.’” (In re D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286; see § 300.2,
subd. (a).)
       Mother’s appeal does not present circumstances that
generally warrant discretionary review of a moot case, such as an
issue of broad public interest that is likely to recur, the likelihood
of a recurrence of the controversy between the parties, or a
material question that remains for the juvenile court’s
determination. Nor does Mother persuade us that any mootness
factors specific to dependency cases or this case exist to support
discretionary review in this case. Her assertion of speculative
future harm is insufficient to demonstrate her appeal is not moot,
and it is also insufficient to warrant discretionary review. She
makes no showing or particularized argument regarding how the
challenged jurisdiction findings could potentially impact a future
dependency proceeding. Even if she were faced with a future
dependency petition, Mother will have the opportunity to explain
that Juan remained in Mother’s custody throughout the
proceedings, reflecting the juvenile court’s determination that
release of Juan to Mother was not detrimental to his safety, or
his physical or emotional well-being. Mother does not argue any
other In re D.P. factors exist to support discretionary review.

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                       DISPOSITION

     The appeal is dismissed as moot.

                                   MARTINEZ, J.

We concur:

     SEGAL, Acting P. J.

     FEUER, J.

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