Court Opinion

ID: 9699941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:59:24.466575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:00.939834
License: Public Domain

*580Souris, J.
Ordinarily, compensation under our workmen’s compensation act* is awarded for incapacity to work because of tbe crushing of a hand or foot, the inhalation of silicotic dust, or other similar injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Benefits are not awarded for the injury as such, but rather for the loss of earning capacity. Hence, even this Michigan Court, years ago, recognized the right of a claimant under the act to compensation for loss of such earning capacity caused by a mental or emotional disability resulting from a physical injury to claimant or even resulting from observing a physical injury to a fellow employee of claimant. In due course we shall examine the authorities so holding, including decisions of this Court made venerable by age and by the compelling logic of their reasoning, for it is upon those past decisions .of this Court that our decision in this case is .firmly ‘planted. Our decision is that workmen’s compensation benefits are payable for incapacity to work because of a claimant’s paranoid schizophrenia arising 'out of and in the course of employment.
Plaintiff had worked as a machine operator for defendant, General Motors Corporation, with intermittent layoffs, since 1953. On October 8, 1956, he was recalled to work after a 5-month layoff and worked for 4 days on a “brace job” and then was transferred on October 12th to a “hub job”. This operation required him to take a hub assembly (consisting of a case and cover) from a nearby fellow employee’s table to his own workbench, remove burrs with a file and grind out holes in the assembly with a drill, and place the assembly on a conveyor belt. Plaintiff was unable to keep up with the pace of the job unless he took 2 assemblies at a time to his workbench, and he feared another layoff should he prove *581unable satisfactorily to do the work. He wás instructed repeatedly by his foreman not to take 2 assemblies at a time because the assembly parts became mixed up on the conveyor belt when he did so. However, plaintiff continued having trouble “getting on to the job” as it was supposed to be performed. Thus, when he took only 1 hub assembly at a time, he fell behind; when he fell behind, he took 2 assemblies; but, when he took 2 assemblies, he got the assemblies mixed up and was berated by the foreman.
We are told that the dilemma in which plaintiff found himself resulted on October 24, 1956, in an 'emotional collapse variously described as paranoid schizophrenia and schizophrenic reaction residual type. He was subsequently hospitalized for a period 'of 1 month, during which time he received shock therapy. In July of T957 he filed an application'for' hearing and adjustment of claim for compensation under the workmen’s compensation act. 1
It should be noted that there is not involved in this 'case a psychosis resulting from a single fortuitous, event nor is there involved a psychosis resulting from a direct physical blow to plaintiff’s body. Instead,, there is involved a psychosis claimed to be the result, -of emotional pressures encountered by plaintiff daily, in the performance of his work.
The referee entered an award of workmen’s com-l pensation for a disability described as “traumatic neurosis, traumatic psychosis, functional disability .and sequelae thereof”. The workmen’s compensation appeal board, by a divided vote, affirmed the award for total disability from October 24,1956, until January 7, 1957, plus reimbursement for medical and hospital care. The appeal board, in addition, allowed to plaintiff continuing compensation from and after January 7, 1957.
Pertinent quotations from the 3 opinions filed by jmembers of the appeal board follow:
*582(1) ■ Chairman McLaughlin:
“Plaintiff sustained a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment and due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of his employer. * * * As the result of the injury plaintiff has been totally disabled since October 24, 1956, from doing the work he was performing for defendant prior to that date. Plaintiff cannot safely be subjected to pressures or strains. He is not able to perform work which is highly competitive or requires a certain production rate. Plaintiff is and has been since October 24, 1956, disabled from earning full wages at the work in which he was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability.”
(2) Member Storie:
“The disability is due to an aggravation of a preexisting condition by more than one nonfortuitous event. I hold the disability is compensable under the provisions of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act and concur with Chairman McLaughlin in granting compensation.”
(3) Member Ryan:
“I do not agree that the plaintiff’s disability is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the defendant’s business. * * *
. “There is nothing in this case identifiable as an occupational risk.
“The job was a simple job and the foreman’s instructions were even simpler. Nothing more emanated from the employment.
“The disability arose out of the plaintiff’s own feelings and misapprehension and from within himself completely.”
The order of the appeal board is attacked, among other reasons, because no 2 members of the 3-member board found plaintiff’s disability compensable under .the same section of the act. Nevertheless, the de-*583cisión of 2 of the 3 members of the board was that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury. Section 11 of chapter 1A of the act creating the workmen’s compensation appeal board (CLS 1956, § 408.11 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp, § 17.6(17)]) provides that the “decision of a majority of the board shall be the decision of the board”. It is not unusual for members of a body performing a judicial function to arrive at the same conclusion via diverse reasoning. (See, for example, Samels v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 317 Mich 149, where 6 justices of this Court voted to affirm an award of compensation, 3 justices grounding their decision on part 2 and 3 justices on part 7.) The decision of the board is within the statutory mandate.
However, in order to uphold the board’s decision awarding any compensation, this Court must be satisfied, first, that there is competent evidence to uphold the finding of causal connection made by a majority of the board, and second, that plaintiff suffered a disability which is compensable under the act.
As to the first point, the only medical testimony! offered is that of the treating physician. He testified.1 as follows:
“The patient saw himself as in an impossible situation in which he couldn’t win. He couldn’t please, the foreman operating the machine in his job the' way he was. If he attempted to do it the foreman’s; way he would fall behind in his work and the men onj the line would complain and the foreman would get’ after him for this. So he really felt himself caught in an impossible situation which.had,no solution. # * *
“My feeling is that Mr. Carter showed some evidence of instability earlier in his life. Namely, this episode in the service where he went absent without leave relatively frequently and was discharged for ithat reason. That apparently subsequent to this he *584was able to make a fairly satisfactory .adjustment, but that he managed to avoid situations wherein he felt trapped. For instance, he mentioned that on his construction job he was all over, that he worked in many different places. And apparently in his experience with General Motors, too, he was never on a job where he felt he could not meet the demands of the job. Now, I feel that here we had an unhappy combination of circumstances, that after a period of a layoff the man comes into a new job which for somebody, I think with the relative inflexibility of personality that this man had, required some adaptation. So that already he was working in a new position with which he was not familiar and he found himself in a — as I believe I described it before, in .what to him was an impossible situation. Namely, that he could not meet the foreman’s demands and ■stay on the work and doing it the way the foreman .wanted him to do, and on the other hand, if he did keep up, then his job was threatened in that fashion. ¡So that he actually felt that the job 'which he had .described to his wife as liking very much was threatened in either way. We frequently see a situation of this type where the person feels himself trapped in a situation that has no solution, at least to them, precipitating a schizophrenic breakdown. And I think the indications are that this is what occurred here. "* * *
' “I think that he has had the personality predisposition towards the development of this illness for a number of years. This is what usually happens, but then this is the straw that breaks the camel’s back, and they develop the actual psychosis in which they are out of touch with reality. Now, we have no reason to believe that he was before out of touch with reality.”
This was competent expert opinion testimony, upon which the board could and did base a finding of causal connection. Such a factual determination is .binding upon this Court, there being competent evi*585dence to support it. McVicar v. Harper Hospital, 313 Mich 48; Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., 353 Mich. 286; and CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.186). It may be noted that the defendant offered no.medical testimony to rebut that given in behalf of claimant by Dr. Lawrence P. Tourkow, a specialist in the field of psychiatry and psychiatric consultant to the public schools and the board of health of the city of Highland Park. The record discloses that Dr. Tourkow’s professional' qualifications as an expert witness were not challenged by defendant.
The second point, whether or not plaintiff suffered a disability compensable under the act, presents a more difficult question. This Court has previously held that emotional disabilities are compensable under the act. Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich 485; Karwacki v. General Motors Corporation, 293 Mich 355; Hayes v. Detroit Steel Casting Co., 328 Mich 609; and Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., supra. Whether the cause of such emotional disability is a direct physical injury (Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co.) or a mental shock (Klein v. Len H. Darling Co.), we have held the disability compensable. What distinguishes the case at bar from our other decisions which recognize the compensability of such disabilities is that this plaintiff’s disability was caused by neither a single physical injury to plaintiff nor by a single mental shock to him. Instead, his disability was caused by emotional pressures produced by production line employment not shown by him to be unusual in any respect, — that is, not shown by him to be any different from the emotional pressures encountered by his fellow workers in similar employment. As noted above, the finding of causal relationship between plaintiff’s disability and the pressures of his employment was supported by the evidence. The question then becomes, must industry, under our laws, bear the economic burden of *586such disability? Implicit in the question as stated is the further question: Is a worker unable to work because of a mental injury caused by his employment to be treated differently from a worker unable to work because of a physical injury caused by his employment? Our answer may be found in this Court’s prior decisions and in the decisions of other courts in other jurisdictions with comparable laws which have considered the problem.
■ We make no claim that it is universaly held that a mental disorder which is precipitated solely by a mental stimulus, as opposed to a physical impact, is considered a compensable personal injury. There are those jurisdictions in which no nervous disorder is compensable. For example, Star Publishing Co. v. Jackson, 115 Ind App 221 (58 NE2d 202), was a 1944 Indiana case-involving a linotype operator who developed a recurring spasm in his left hand. Diagnosed, and proved, as an occupational neurosis caused by the antagonistic relationship between the claimant and his foreman, this disability was held not compensable. See, also, McGill Manufacturing Company, Inc., v. Dodd, 116 Ind App 66 (59 NE2d 899), for a similar holding.
• In New Jersey, a stenographer was called an “idiot” by a coworker when she misunderstood what she was supposed to do. This incident upset her, and she was subsequently treated for a nervous disorder. Her petition was dismissed by a referee in a proceeding under the New Jersey workmen’s compensation act, for the following reason:
“I am satisfied that the petitioner did not meet with an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment; in fact, there was not one iota of testimony to even suggest an accidental occurrence.” Voss v. Prudential Insurance Co., 14 NJ Misc 791 (187 A 334). (Emphasis supplied.)
*587The referee’s reason for denying compensation is inapplicable in Michigan in the light of our recent holdings in Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577, and Coombe v. Penegor, 348 Mich 635. The following holding by the appellate division of the supreme court in New York may be distinguished in the same manner:
“The record here discloses that claimant became angry which resulted in an emotional strain and superimposed upon a pre-existing mental condition resulted in the claimant’s disability.
“It may be logically argued that claimant here is just as disabled as someone suffering from a physical disability. This we do not dispute but it does not, at present, constitute an accident as defined by the workmen’s compensation law. It is not within our province to decide otherwise.” Chernin v. Progress Service Co., 9 App Div 2d 170, 172 (192 NYS2d 758). (Emphasis supplied.)
In Nebraska, whose statute requires violence to the physical structure of the body, compensation was denied to an elevator operator for shock occasioned by seeing a passenger killed. Bekeleski v. O. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb 657 (4 NW2d 741).
In Texas, however, where an injury is defined as damage or harm to the physical structure of the body, compensation was allowed a structural steel and iron worker whose anxiety state, which prevented him from doing his regular work, was precipitated by a “psychic trauma”, viz., fright occasioned by the collapse of a scaffold, 8 stories up, from which his coworker thereon fell to his death. The court said damage to the nervous system constituted damage to the physical structure of his body, since the physical structure no longer functioned properly due to the nervous system disorder. Bailey v. American General Insurance Co., 154 Tex 430 (279 SW2d 315). In any event, neither the Nebraska case nor the *588Texas case turned on the cause of the damage to the nervous system. Both were primarily concerned with the result, due to their peculiar statutory definitions. In the Texas case, however, that a mental stimulus caused the disability was not considered a bar, and that is the significant point with respect to the case at hand.
This was true as well in West Virginia in 1935. A miner became lost, and remained alone in the mine until found 7 days later. For several weeks thereafter he couldn’t return to work as a result of shock and exhaustion. Compensation was affirmed in Montgomery v. State Compensation Commission, 116 W Va 44 (178 SE 425).
Ahother case with a purely nonphysical impact stimulus involved a young lady who was frightened by the flash from a short circuited motor and fainted. She returned to work, but some weeks later when she saw the fellow worker who had caught her when she first fainted, she fainted again. She could not thereafter return to work because of this neurosis, and an award of compensation was affirmed, notwithstanding the fact that she was merely frightened without physical contact or harm. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va 204 (13 SE2d 291).
The Massachusetts court allowed recovery for paralysis of an employee’s left side caused solely by fright when lightning struck machines near which she was sitting while eating lunch. Charon’s Case, 321 Mass 694 (75 NE2d 511). Construing statutory language comparable to our own,* the court said (pp 696, 697):
“This statute does not in terms or by implication exclude, an injury causally connected with the employment merely because the injury was not occa*589sioned by physical impact or the application of some form of external violence to the body. * * *
“The principle enunciated in the Spade Case [Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. Co., 168 Mass 285 (47 NE 88, 60 Am St Rep 393, 38 LRA 512), a common-law negligence action for damages] cannot be extended to cases arising under the workmen’s compensation act. The present proceeding is not one brought for an assessment of damages for pain and suffering due to a personal injury as was the Spade Case, but is a .proceeding created by our statutes enacted for the purpose of ameliorating the economic plight of an employee injured in the course of and on account of his employment, or of his dependents if death ensues from his injury, by imposing upon industry the obligation to pay to him weekly payments at rates based upon his wages during the period he is disabled or, if his injuries were fatal, to his dependents in the amounts and during the period prescribed by the act. Ordinarily compensation is awarded for incapacity to earn and not for the injury as such. [Cases cited.] Liability to make payments is not based upon negligence of the employer, and negligence- of the employee not amounting to serious and wilful misconduct is no bar to an award of compensation. [Cases cited.] The amount of payments is- fixed by the workmen’s compensation act and is different from the measure of damages prevailing at common law. [Cases cited.] The special reasons assigned in the Spade Case for denying recovery have no application to workmen’s compensation cases. The weight of authority even in jurisdictions where "compensation is limited to personal injury caused by accident is to the effect that a personal injury due entirely to nervous shock, fright or terror is a compensable injury. [Cases cited, including Monk v. Charcoal Iron Co. of America, 246 Mich 193.]”
There is Michigan precedent also, long established precedent at that. It .was in January of 1920 that Otto Klein died. Just a few weeks earlier he had let *590a piece of machinery slip from his hands. It fell to the floor below, striking a fellow employee. Though the injury to his coworker was not serious, Otto Klein thought he had caused his death. The mental and nervous shock caused by this accident to his fellow employee, at his hands, resulted in a neurotic condition, causing Mr. Klein’s death. His injury and .death were held compensable notwithstanding that (as this Court said in La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich 604, 605 [LRA1916D, 1277]) no “visible accident occurred and no event causing external violence to applicant’s body” occurred. Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., supra. The philosophy expressed by Justice Weist, concurring (p 495), is worth repeating here:
“At first I was inclined to disagree with Mr. Justice Moore, but upon reflection I am convinced he is right. An accident happened in which the deceased was an actor, and the shock to him was so acute, and so depressed his vital forces as to kill him. We must not overlook man’s nervous system and mental makeup and their intimate relation to his vital forces.
“This man died because his vital forces could not meet and withstand the acute depression occasioned by what he had done in the course of his employment. The injury to him was no less real, and fatal in its consequences, than a mortal wound. ‘Accidents’, within the comprehension of the workmen’s compensation law, include all accidents actionable at law and all former nonactionable accidents, except in case of intentional and wilful misconduct on the part of the employee.”
In 1943, in Rainko v. Webster-Eisenlohr, Inc., 306 Mich 328, this Court said that it is not necessary to establish physical injury resulting in outward evidence of violence or trauma to justify an award of compensation. Plaintiff was one of 30 women victims of “mass hysteria” caused by an odor from gas*591oline vapor of less than, toxic concentration in the area where the women worked in a cigar factory. The women collapsed, one after another, and plaintiff was left with dizzy spells, nausea, rash, hyperactive reflexes, an epigastric tenderness, anemia, and loss of weight. The Court sustained an award of compensation.
This Court’s most recent statement respecting compensability of a neurotic condition may be found in Redfern v. Sparks-Withington Co., supra, at p 299:
“In this State, the rule is well established by a line of authority dating from 1922 that where occupationally-incurred injury to the body and/or shock to the nervous system produces a neurosis resulting in disability or death, it is compensable.”
In Redfern, plaintiff while at work was struck on the back by a steel weight and was thereafter disabled from working by what the medical witnesses described as “conversion hysteria”. There was no organic cause for her loss of feeling and strength in her right hand and arm, swelling and pain in the right shoulder and neck area, and general fatigue. Compensation was allowed.
It would be well to note that, in the case at bar, although there was no evidence of psychosis prior to October, 1956, the expert testimony did indicate that plaintiff had a personality disorder all his life and that he had a predisposition to the development of a schizophrenic process.
There was also evidence that the plaintiff had been examined in the emergency room of the Highland Park General Hospital 1 days before the last day he worked, and that his condition at that time was described as “bronchial asthma and anxiety”. An exhibit submitted by the defendant was a report from a doctor examining the claimant just prior to October *59224, 1956, wherein Mr. Carter was advised to take a leave-of absence for 2 or more weeks because of a severe state of anxiety and tension. It would appear, therefore, that the series of events in the instant case served to aggravate a pre-existing latent mental disturbance. That such is not a bar to compensation may best be pointed out by quoting from the Court’s opinion in Karwacki v. General Motors Corporation, supra, from pp 356 and 357:
“The testimony * '* ’* supports the Sliding of the department that the accidental injury aggravated a pre-existing latent mental disturbance, resulting in a disabling condition. The result is comparable to situations wherein an accidental injury has aggravated and precipitated a pre-existing latent physical ailment, resulting in disability. Awards of compensation in such cases have been sustained in a multitude of instances.”
Appellant contends that there was no single event which precipitated plaintiff’s psychotic breakdown and that, therefore, there can be no award of compensation under part 2 of the act. Appellant recognizes that for an award under part 2, no longer is it necessary to find an “accident” or a fortuitous event, citing Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, supra, and Coombe v. Penegor, supra, but appellant further states that it appears from these cases that part 2 applies only to single event injuries. However, it does not appear from the Sheppard and Coombe cases that injuries not attributable to a single event are not covered by part 2.
This Court in the past has sustained an award of compensation under part 2 where the physical injury was not occasioned by a single event. In La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich 604 (LRA 1916D, 1277), the plaintiff’s paralysis was attributed to a cerebral hemorrhage caused by prolonged work *593in á heated kitchen. In affirming an award, the Court said, at p 610:
“According to the testimony of some of the physicians that result could he traced to the unusual hours of work and the unusual conditions. It was an unexpected consequence from the continued worlc in the excessively warm, room.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, to relegate the applicability of part 2 solely to single event injuries, would be to ignore express statutory language referring to multiple event injuries. Section 1 of part 2 (CLS 1956, § 412.1 [Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 17.151]), provides for a “ ‘date of injury’ * * * in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event”, evidencing a legislative intent that such injuries should be compensa-ble.
The case at bar involves a series of mental stimuli or events — the pressure of his job and the pressure of his foreman — which caused an injury or disability under the act, causal connection in fact having been found by the board, supported by competent evidence. We find further that Mr. Carter’s disabling psychosis resulting from emotional pressures encountered by him daily in his work is compensable under part 2 of the act. Such conclusion renders uni necessary any discussion of the applicability of part 7 to the facts of this case.
Appellant further contests the portion of the appeal board’s order awarding continuing compensation based on its finding of a continuing disability. The existence or extent of an injury or disability is a finding of fact and will not be disturbed where supported by competent evidence. Finch v. Ford Motor Co., 321 Mich 469, Walding v. General Motors Corporation, 352 Mich 372. The testimony of the only medical witness was.to the effect that the plaintiff could be employed again, but not on this same type of *594job, where it is necessary to keep up with a production line.
If there were testimony that claimant’s inability to work on a production line was caused by the paranoid schizophrenic condition for which we have held he is entitled to compensation benefits, he would be entitled to continuing payment of such benefits. However, Dr. Tourkow testified that as of September 11,1957, Mr. Carter no longer showed any symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia or other psychosis. He testified that Mr. Carter should not be employed again in production work, not because of his paranoid schizophrenia, but for the same reason he should not- have been employed in such work in the first place: Mr. Carter has a personality configuration that makes him more susceptible than others to psychotic breakdowns when subjected to pressures such as are encountered in production line employment. Under the circumstances, we find no evidence to support the appeal board’s award continuing compensation benefits beyond September 11, 1957.
The order of the appeal board should have terminated payment of benefits to Mr. Carter on September 11,1957, and upon remand to the appeal board it shall be so modified. In all other respects the order is affirmed. No costs.
Smith, Black, Edwards, and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.

 CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 411.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1957 Cum Supp § 17.141 et seq.).

 CLS 1956, § 412.1 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 17.151).