Court Opinion

ID: 9797899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:41.379986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:47.776150
License: Public Domain

ROSENBLUM, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I join in Judge Armstrong’s opinion, but write separately to emphasize one of his points and to clarify my understanding of it — namely, that the proposed instruction was properly rejected because it would very likely have produced confusion in the minds of the jurors and misled them about the use they could make of evidence of out-of-state harms and of defendant’s out-of-state conduct. Under State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 US 408, 427, 123 S Ct 1513, 155 L Ed 2d 585 (2003), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996), in assessing punitive damages, a jury is permitted to consider out-of-state conduct in determining the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct. See Gore, 517 US at 574 n *8621; see also Campbell, 538 US at 419 (“ ‘[T]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.’ ” (Quoting Gore, 517 US at 575; brackets in Campbell.)). The proposed instruction stated, “You are not to punish a defendant for the impact of its conduct on individuals in other states.” That instruction would have misled the jury into thinking that it could not consider defendant’s out-of-state conduct for any purpose.
The majority questions whether that issue is properly before us. 206 Or App at 52. It notes that the trial court did not exclude the proposed instruction on the ground that it was misleading and suggests that plaintiff has not adequately advanced the argument on appeal as an alternative basis for affirmance. I disagree. Plaintiff argued to this court that the instruction was properly excluded because it did not reflect the principle that “out of state conduct and harms caused thereby are * * * relevant to reprehensibility.” Thus, the argument is properly before us. I turn to it now.
I find two serious interrelated flaws in the proposed instruction. The first lies in the word “punish.” I believe that, in the minds of the jurors in a case of this type, “punitive damages” and “punishment” are synonymous. Although, in Campbell, the Supreme Court distinguished between “punishing” a defendant directly for harms occurring out-of-state and using evidence of out-of-state conduct in assessing reprehensibility, the proposed instruction in this case made no such distinction. Had the jury been given that instruction without further guidance, it would not have been likely to draw that distinction for itself. Thus, had the jury been instructed that it could not “punish a defendant for the impact of its conduct on individuals in other states,” the jurors would likely have inferred that they could not consider such conduct at all in determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages. See White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F3d 998, 1016 n 69 (9th Cir 2002) (“In some cases the distinction between using the evidence as it bears on reprehensibility but not as a measure of damages might be so gossamer as to be difficult for a jury to apply * * *.”); see also Steven R. *87Hamlin, Punitive Damages after Campbell: The Role of Out-of-State Conduct, 28 Campbell L Rev 63, 75 (2005) (questioning how holding that out-of-state conduct may be used to determine reprehensibility can be squared with admonition that such conduct may not be used to punish the defendant).
The second flaw in defendant’s proposed instruction lies in the word “impact.” It appears from the instruction conference with the trial court that defendant intended to convey to the jury that it could not punish defendant for the harms that its out-of-state conduct wrought on people in other states. But that is not what the proposed instruction said. The proposed instruction said that the jury could not punish defendant for the “impact of its conduct on individuals in other states.” (Emphasis added.) “Impact” is not an especially precise word. It could mean, for example, “the act of impinging or striking (as of one body against another or of a stream squarely against a fixed or moving surface).” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1131 (unabridged ed 2002). Defendant might have intended its proposed instruction to convey that direct and immediate sort of impact — in other words, to inform the jury that it could not impose punitive damages as retribution for particular harms suffered by people in other states.
However, regardless of what defendant intended, the jury could have inferred that the instruction had a broader meaning. “Impact” can also mean “the effect or influence of one person, thing, or action on another.” The New Oxford American Dictionary 851 (1st ed 2001). Under that definition, the proposed instruction could have been understood to be even more restrictive. The jury may have understood the proposed instruction to prevent them from considering anything occurring out-of-state in assessing reprehensibility.
For example, the jury would have understood the proposed instruction to apply to the factors that were laid out in the punitive damages instruction,1 which provided, in part:
*88“Punitive damages, if any, shall be determined and awarded based on the following:
“No. 1, the likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from defendant’s misconduct;
“No. 2, the degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood;
“No. 3, the profitability of the defendant’s misconduct;
“No. 4, the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
“No. 5, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
“No. 6, the financial condition of the defendant;
“And, No. 7, the total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed on the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damages awards to persons in situations similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal penalties of the defendant [that have] been or may be subjected.”2
The impact of defendant’s out-of-state conduct is certainly relevant, for example, to defendant’s awareness of the likelihood of serious harm. The jury was permitted to conclude that defendant’s conduct was reprehensible because defendant was aware that it was likely to have an impact on people — that is, to cause serious harm — nationwide. Likewise, the jury could conclude that the conduct was reprehensible because defendant’s concealment activities were likely *89to have a nationwide impact. The impact of defendant’s conduct on all of those people — not just those who resided in Oregon — is relevant to the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct. It follows that using the word “impact,” like using the word “punish,” in the proposed instruction would have misled the jury into thinking that it could not impose punitive damages based on the reprehensibility of defendant’s conduct, as determined, in part, by its out-of-state conduct.3
The majority insists that it was not defendant’s burden to propose an instruction that would clarify for the jury how evidence of defendant’s out-of-state conduct should play into its assessment of punitive damages, because defendant was under no obligation to propose an instruction that would benefit plaintiff. 206 Or App at 57. In my view, however, it was defendant’s burden, in crafting a limiting instruction, to propose one that was not overly broad or misleading. Because defendant’s proposed instruction would have conveyed to the jury that it could not consider evidence that it was entitled to consider in assessing punitive damages, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction.
I respectfully dissent.
Armstrong, Wollheim, and Ortega, JJ., join in this dissent.

 At the very least, factors 2, 3,4, and 5 are measures of reprehensibility.

 To place this excerpt from the punitive damages instruction in context, I set forth the full punitive damages instruction given by the trial court as follows:
“If [plaintiff] prevails, on any of her three claims, then you must consider whether to award punitive damages. To recover punitive damages, [plaintiff] must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Philip Morris has shown a reckless and outrageous indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and has acted with the conscious indifference to the health, safety, and welfare of others. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes you believe that the truth of the claim is highly probable. If you decide that the defendant has acted as claimed by the plaintiff, you have the discretion to award punitive damages. [The quoted portion in the text above is omitted here.] The amount of punitive damages you may award may not exceed $300 million dollars. You may not allow your decision regarding punitive damages to be affected by the fact that Philip Morris’s principal offices are outside of this state or by its corporate status.”

 By way of contrast, the following instruction was given to a jury by a federal district court in Nevada:
“While the amount of punitive damages to be awarded lies within your discretion, the amount awarded must not exceed the amount that you find the plaintiffs have proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, is reasonably required to vindicate Nevada’s legitimate interest in punishment and deterrence, if any. In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, reasonably required to vindicate Nevada’s legitimate interest in punishment and deterrence, you may not add damages to protect people or to punish harm to people outside of Nevada. However, you may consider defendant’s out-of-state conduct in determining the reprehensibility, deliberateness, or culpability of the defendant in the acts for which it has been found liable in this case, provided that the out-of-state conduct is both connected to and similar to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiffs.”
Transcript of Jury Instructions, White v. Ford Motor Co., No CV—N—95—0279— DWH, 2004 WL 856525 (D Nev Mar 22, 2004).