Court Opinion

ID: 9785099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 21:03:15.778691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:05.438140
License: Public Domain

*597Justice EAKIN,
concurring.
My colleagues agree that more than 500 signatures remained unaffected by appellants’ challenge. Farnese, therefore, was properly retained on the ballot. I agree. Beyond that, I refrain from engaging in any discussion concerning the objectors’ extrapolation theory.
The principles on which this matter turns are not unique to election law — the case turns on principles of evidence and not on recitation of electoral law distinctions. Appellants contend there was so much fraud in the withdrawn and disallowed signatures that one must conclude there was fraud in the remaining ones. The court below deemed fraud irrelevant, which is reasonable if one merely counts the signatures not assailed individually, to see if they total 500.
Fraud, however, is relevant, though not in the “global sense” appellants would have. When one circulator is found to have committed significant fraud, this may affect the finder of fact’s assessment of the credibility of other acts or affidavits by the same circulator in the same election. Conversely, there may be reasons not to disregard or reject such other acts or affidavits. It is largely a question of fact, which in the end is not for this Court to second guess, so long as the record and reasoning below support the finding. See In re Nomination of Flaherty, 564 Pa. 671, 770 A.2d 327, 331 (2001) (standard of review is whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether there was an abuse of discretion, or whether errors of law were committed).
Furthermore, I continue to agree that a “false in one, false in all” principle should be rejected in these cases, see, e.g., In re Payton, 596 Pa. 469, 945 A.2d 162, 163 (2008) (plurality); if that is to be the law, it is for the legislature to accomplish. Short of that, a fact-finder should not be made to artificially ignore significant fraud when assessing the credibility of any witness, circulator, or signator; fraud should not be a presumptive total disqualification, but a permissible consideration.
I therefore concur in the result.
Justice BAER joins this concurring opinion.