Court Opinion

ID: 9376597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:40.975973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.752197
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                        UNPUBLISHED
In re WARBLOW, Minors.                                                  March 2, 2023

                                                                        No. 360948
                                                                        Jackson Circuit Court
                                                                        Family Division
                                                                        LC No. 22-001310-NA

Before: HOOD, P.J., and JANSEN and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

                                          AFTER REMAND

        Respondent father appealed as of right the trial court order terminating his parental rights
to his two minor children, MW and HW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (g), and (j). He
argued that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights at initial disposition without first
finding that aggravated circumstances existed to excuse the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) from providing reasonable efforts, and that termination was not in the children’s
best interests. In our previous opinion, we vacated the order terminating respondent’s parental
rights and remanded for the trial court to make a finding of aggravated circumstances or order
reasonable efforts, and retained jurisdiction. In re Warblow Minors, unpublished per curiam
opinion of the Court of Appeals, entered November 17, 2022 (Docket No. 360948); pp 1, 5. The
remand has concluded in the trial court, and this matter returns to us on the merits.

                                    I. REASONABLE EFFORTS

        Reasonable efforts to reunify the child and family must be made in all cases except when
“[t]here is a judicial determination that the parent has subjected the child to aggravated
circumstances” as provided by MCL 722.638(1) and (2). MCL 712A.19a(2)(a). MCL 722.638(1)
requires DHHS to file a petition for authorization by the court if:

                (a) The department determines that a parent, guardian, or custodian, or a
        person who is 18 years of age or older and who resides for any length of time in the
        child’s home, has abused the child or a sibling of the child and the abuse included
        1 or more of the following:

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                                               * * *

               (ii) Criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration,
       or assault with intent to penetrate.

        DHHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights at initial disposition, MCL
722.638(2), because of allegations of sexual abuse by ES, the daughter of respondent’s wife.
Respondent’s parental rights were terminated, and he argued on appeal that the trial court erred by
failing to find that aggravated circumstances or reasonable efforts to reunify the family had
occurred, and moreover, aggravated circumstances did not exist. However, we concluded in our
previous opinion that the trial court did not make a judicial determination that respondent subjected
the children to aggravated circumstances, and we remanded this matter to the trial court to make
that determination. In re Warblow Minors, unpub op at 4-5.

        The trial court held a hearing, discussed the scope of the remand with the parties, and they
each filed briefs on remand. The court held a second hearing, and announced its findings on the
record, which were also included in a supplemental order of disposition entered on remand as
follows:

                This Court now judicially determines that aggravating circumstance[s] exist
       in this instant case. The testimony of the half-sibling[] of the children at issue was
       that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Respondent. She is now 15 (and an
       exceptionally credible witness) and testified that from the time she was in the 4th
       through 5th grades Respondent, her step-father, would call her into his bedroom
       where he would be on the bed wearing boxers (underwear). She further testified
       that he asked her to rub his leg above the knee and then his “private part” would
       (later referenced as his penis) pop out of his boxers (underwear). She also stated
       that he would tell her to rub his private part, which she did, not knowing at that
       young age, it was not right.

               Things got worse with time. She testified the last time it happened, it was
       similar in nature, i.e., the step-father called her into his room, he told her to rub his
       leg and then his private part. However, this time he asked her to take her pants off
       which she refused. She also testified that he tried to bribe her with more television
       and asked her to take her pants off again which she again refused and got off the
       bed and walked out the door. Certainly and simply the actions of the Respondent
       are at a minimum, attempts to penetrate.

               She testified that this happened 10-15 times and each time she had to rub
       his erect penis. Although there are some inconsistencies in her testimony, this
       Court still gives credence to her testimony given her young age at the time of the
       sexual assaults and the number of years that have gone by since.

               She also testified that she told her mom, but that her mom told her she was
       dreaming it and not to bring it up again. Her testimony continued that she did not
       tell the police or [Child Protective Services (CPS)] because she was afraid she
       would get in trouble. Furthermore, she testified that she has had to block a lot out

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       of her head so “I don’t feel it or have an emotional breakdown.” She went on to
       say that she had been hospitalized four times—twice for suicidal attempts and twice
       for suicidal thoughts. She testified that she just wanted to get out of that life with
       her step-father and believed suicide was an escape. [Emphasis added.]

       We review the trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. In re
Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 541; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). We accord deference to the special
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Under this standard, we
cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in its determination that aggravated circumstances
existed to excuse DHHS from providing respondent with reasonable efforts to reunify with the
children.

        In their supplemental briefs filed in this Court after remand, the parties dispute the meaning
of “attempted penetration” in MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii).1 The term is not defined in the statute. Most
of the circumstances listed as aggravating circumstances in MCL 722.638(1)(a) “are likely to be
the subject of criminal prosecutions. They represent demonstrably violent or indisputably abusive
conduct that causes long-lasting harm.” In re Simonetta, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___
(2022) (Docket No. 357909); slip op at 4. The parties indicate that no criminal charges have been
filed against respondent based on the allegations. “When a term is not defined in a statute, we may
consult the dictionary definition of the term.” People v Rogers, 338 Mich App 312, 322; 979
NW2d 747 (2021). “Penetration” is defined as “[t]he act of piercing or passing something into or
through a body or object,” and in the context of criminal law, as “[t]he entry of the penis or some
other part of the body or a foreign object into the vagina or other bodily orifice.” Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed).2 “Attempt” is defined as “[t]he act or an instance of making an effort to
accomplish something, esp. without success,” and in the context of criminal law, as “[a]n overt act
that is done with the intent to commit a crime but that falls short of completing the crime.” Id.
The finder of fact may infer a person’s intent from his words or actions; “[i]n other words, a
defendant’s intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence.” People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App
439, 458; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).

        With this in mind, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in determining that
aggravated circumstances existed because respondent attempted to penetrate ES. His repeated
actions of asking her to rub his penis and to take off her clothes constitute circumstantial evidence
of his intent. He even tried to bribe a very young ES with television to convince her to take off
her clothes. The fact that ES refused to remove her clothes and left the room, and that penetration
did not occur, is irrelevant. “MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) mandates that petitioner seek termination of
parental rights when the parents are suspected of perpetuating sexual abuse upon the minor
children or their siblings and when a parent fails to intervene to eliminate that risk.” In re HRC,

1
  Respondent argues that the trial court found that respondent assaulted ES with the intent to
penetrate, which is not what the court found, and will not be discussed herein.
2
  The Michigan Penal Code, in defining terms that apply to criminal sexual conduct, defines
“sexual penetration” as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal
openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL 750.520a(r).

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286 Mich App 444, 463; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Petitioner “is not required to provide reunification
services when termination of parental rights is the agency’s goal.” Id. Thus, on remand, the trial
court did not clearly err in its determination that aggravated circumstances existed to excuse DHHS
from providing respondent with reasonable efforts toward reunification.

                                       II. BEST INTERESTS

        Respondent initially argued on appeal that the trial court erred in determining that
termination was in the children’s best interests because it relied solely on the doctrine of
anticipatory neglect and failed to consider any other factors. Having initially concluded to remand
the matter on reasonable efforts, we declined to address this issue. In re Warblow Minors, unpub
op at 5. It is now ripe for adjudication.

        Once a statutory ground for termination is established, the court must find that termination
of parental rights is in the child’s best interests in order to terminate. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re
Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Whether termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In
re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews for clear error a trial
court’s determination that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests. In re Jones,
286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). “A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there
is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016) (quotation marks and
citation omitted).

         A trial court must weigh all of the evidence in making a best-interests determination. In re
White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). This encompasses many factors, including
“the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home,” as well as “a
parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan,
the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the
possibility of adoption.” Id. at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[T]he focus at
the best-interest stage has always been on the child, not the parent.”                        In re
Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 63; 874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks and
citation omitted, alteration in original).

        Respondent was a stay-at-home dad and took care of all of HW’s and MW’s needs. There
were never any complaints to CPS regarding respondent’s parenting of HW or MW. He
participated in supervised parenting time after he was removed from the home, and those visits
went well. However, there were serious allegations against respondent concerning MS and ES,
the children of respondent’s wife. There were years of complaints of physical abuse of MS by
respondent, and the last incident in 2019 of MS having to wait outside in the cold for the bus. The
trial court found SE, respondent’s sister-in-law, to be a credible witness, and concluded that
respondent lied when he denied ever striking MS. SE witnessed such an occurrence, as well as
respondent lying to his wife about it. A major issue for the court was the fact that respondent told
the children not to speak to CPS. This seriously concerned the court that the family would not be
forthcoming in the future should any future incidents of abuse occur to MW or HW. Additionally,

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there were ES’s allegations of sexual abuse by respondent when ES was very young in age. The
trial court found ES to be a credible witness, and did not find either parent credible.

        “[T]he doctrine of anticipatory neglect allows for an inference that a parent’s treatment of
one child is probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re Kellogg, 331 Mich App
249, 259; 952 NW2d 544 (2020). “However, the probative value of such an inference is decreased
by differences between the children, such as age and medical conditions.” Id. There are some
differences that decrease the probative value of the doctrine in this case. For instance, MS and ES
are respondent’s step-children, while MW and HW are his biological children. MS is the only
male child of the group. MS has autism, and ES has mental health issues including depression,
anxiety, and a history of hospitalizations for suicidal thoughts. There was no evidence that MW
or HW suffered from any mental health problems. See In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App
713, 730-731, 733; 858 NW2d 143 (2014) (the trial court erred in finding statutory grounds to
terminate existed for three older children under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect where the
youngest child had cerebral palsy, and there were no allegations of abuse against the older
children); see also In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 71; 472 NW2d 38 (1991) (“We do not
consider it appropriate to destroy a family’s relationship with five children if the major problem
appears to be the parents’ inability to cope with one of them. . . .”). However, ES testified that the
sexual abuse occurred when she was in fourth or fifth grade. Although MW and HW are younger
than that right now, they will fast approach that age.

       Although a close determination, the trial court considered the best interests of MW and
HW under the doctrine of anticipatory neglect in terms of the allegations of physical abuse against
MS and sexual abuse against ES, as well as several other factors, including but not limited to,
respondent’s failure to cooperate with CPS and instructing his children not to talk to the agency.
Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent’s
parental rights to MW and HW was in their best interests.

       The supplemental order entered on remand terminating respondent’s parental rights is
affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Noah P. Hood
                                                              /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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