Court Opinion

ID: 9554110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:41:52.92884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:02.452079
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
*188Howard K. Beebe, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Maguire, Shields, Morrison, Bailey & Kester, Portland.
Don 8. Willner, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Lenon & Willner, Portland.
Before McAllister, Chief Justice, and Rossman, Warner, Perry, Sloan, O’Connell and Goodwin, Justices.
On Rehearing
GOODWIN, J.
Following the decision in this case we granted rehearing. As will be seen from the former opinion, the principal controversy Was whether an action for malpractice against a physician must be commenced within the period of limitations for personal wrongs not arising out of contract, or within the longer period permitted for actions upon contracts.
We held, in accordance with the great weight of authority, that an action for personal injuries resulting from the failure of a physician to exercise due care *189in treating Ms patient must be commenced within the period of limitations for torts. We adhere to that rule.
We also held that the failure of the defendant to interpose the defense of limitations by demurrer constituted a waiver of the defense. As a general proposition, the rule is sound. Spaur v. McBee, 19 Or 76, 23 P 818. However, in Dixon v. Schoonover, 226 Or 443, 359 P2d 115, decided February 8, 1961, we later noted that the strict rule of Spaur v. McBee is not inflexible. There can be cases in which the rule of waiver by failure to demur would have no proper application. Dixon v. Schoonover was such a case, and the case at bar is another.
The plaintiff, in an evident attempt to avoid the two-year statute of limitations, stated a cause of action based upon an express contract allegedly entered into with the defendant. The allegations of the complaint make it clear that plaintiff carefully avoided stating a cause of action based on the breach of the duty resting on every physician to use due eare.
As noted in the original opinion, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff had performed her part of the contract and that the defendant had breached his. In order to induce a favorable ruling on the plaintiff’s demurrer to an amended answer in which the defendant tendered the defense of limitations, the plaintiff elected in open court to prove the contract pleaded in the complaint. Under the practice followed in Multnomah County, the presiding judge rules upon motions and demurrers. An election made during the pleading stage becomes a part of the record and is as binding as an election made upon trial.
The plaintiff’s election to prove the contract alleged in the complaint was also an admission in open *190court that the defendant could not have raised the defense of limitations by demurrer. Her argument thereafter, in this court, that the defense had been waived by failure to demur was accordingly misleading and inconsistent.
The judge who tried the case was apparently unaware of the plaintiff’s election to prove a contract. This election has been called to our attention upon rehearing. There was no evidence to prove the contract alleged in the complaint. This failure of proof was called to the trial court’s attention. The trial judge ruled that it was not necessary to prove a contract because the case was tried before him as a negligence case, and there was sufficient evidence of negligence to go to the jury. The motion for a judgment of nonsuit was, however, in the record, and its denial was error. The error was preserved by a motion for a directed verdict which should have been granted.
As we held in the original opinion, the unspoken contractual relationship between a physician and patient is a matter of inducement in a malpractice action. It is not this contractual relationship which gives rise to the cause of action for malpractice. Failure to exercise due care in the treatment of a patient is a breach of a legal duty which arises, not out of contract, but out of the relationship of physician and patient. It was not this bare legal relationship which the plaintiff undertook to prove after she elected to stand upon the contract described in her complaint. She undertook to prove an express contract. This she failed to do.
Under the circumstances of this case, the failure to direct a verdict for the defendant was reversible error. The former opinion is withdrawn.
Eeversed.