Court Opinion

ID: 9734064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:24:18.815937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.346511
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in allowing a defense witness to testify, on cross-examination, that both he and appellant were of the Muslim faith.
At approximately 9 a.m. on September 7, 1970, Philadelphia police officers John Kurtz and Lester Milby observed appellant driving west on Baltimore Avenue in an automobile bearing an expired license tag. The officers stopped the car in order to issue a summons. Officer Kurtz asked the appellant to step out of his car. Officer Kurtz testified that when appellant stepped out of the car, he noticed a large bulge on appellant’s hip under his jacket. He then frisked appellant, and seized a loaded .38 caliber revolver from appellant’s waistband. Officer Milby testified that he then frisked appellant’s passenger, Clayton Morrison, and found a .32 caliber revolver.1
At trial in the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, both appellant and Morrison testified as defense witnesses, and maintained that Morrison had brought both revolvers into the car. Morrison testified that the .38 revolver had been under the car seat, and not on appellant’s person, at the time of the stop.
On March 15, 1972, a jury found appellant guilty of a violation of the Uniform Firearms Act2 and carrying a *493concealed deadly weapon.3 Post-trial motions were denied; this appeal followed.
On cross-examination the Assistant District Attorney was allowed to ask Morrison the following questions:
“Q. Tell me, are you a good friend of Harry Mimms?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. You know him very well, would you say?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Are you both Muslims?
“A. Sir?
[Counsel for appellant] :
“Objection, sir. I move for withdrawal of a juror.
“THE COURT: Overruled.
[By the Assistant District Attorney] :
“Q. Are you both Muslims?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. ;In other words, when you say ‘Muslims,’ followers of the Islam faith, is that right?
“A. Yes.”
In Pennsylvania, the legislature has specifically provided that “[n]o witness shall be questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject, for the purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility.” Act of April 23, 1909, P.L. 140, §3, 28 P.S. §313.4 Here, the *494Commonwealth was clearly using the common religious affiliation of appellant and Morrison as a means of impeaching Morrison’s credibility. Indeed, the lower court states in its opinion that the testimony was introduced “to show the witness’ relationship with the defendant and put his credibility in issue.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Evidence concerning the religious beliefs of witnesses can be admitted only where its relevance to the issues of the case is so great as to outweigh any possibility of prejudice.5 Thus, in McKim v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 364 Pa. 237, 72 A. 2d 122 (1950), three plaintiffs in a personal injury action had specifically alleged in their complaints that their injuries had prevented them from performing their duties as ministers. On direct examination, one of the plaintiffs testified that she received an expense allowance when she was able to perform a certain amount of work as a minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. On cross-examination, however, the plaintiffs objected to all questions concerning the circumstances of their ordination or the duties which they performed as ministers. The lower court overruled these objections and the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that “[t]he purpose [of the questions objected to] was to obtain substantive information necessary to supply deficiencies in the testimony given by plaintiffs in direct examination; if the answers to these questions, properly allowed in cross-examination, played any part in judging credibility, that effect was incidental . . . .” 364 Pa. at 241, 72 A. 2d at 123. The Court added that “ [i]f the purpose of the cross-examination had apparently been to create prejudice against the parties because of their religious beliefs, the learned trial judge would undoubtedly have sustained the objections.” 364 Pa. at 241, 72 A. 2d at 123-124.
Here, the religious beliefs of appellant and his witness were completely irrelevant to any issue involved in the *495trial. They were never mentioned or alluded to anywhere on direct examination.6 If the Commonwealth wished only to demonstrate appellant’s friendship with Morrison, it could have done so without invading the privileged area of religion. Instead, it appears that the Commonwealth deliberately sought to place before the jury the fact that appellant and the only other defense witness belonged to a highly controversial religious group.
The blatant means by which the religious affiliation of appellant and his witness have been injected into this case bring to mind the words of former Chief Justice Maxey in O’Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 856 Pa. 307, 346-347, n. 5, 51 A. 2d 775, 793-794, n. 5 (1947) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766: “This is the first time the writer ever heard of any attorney injecting into a case the religious affiliations of either a litigant or a witness .... If a tvitness’ religious belief cannot properly be injected into a judicial proceeding, a litigant’s religious belief certainly cannot be ... . When plaintiff’s counsel asked [defendant’s chief executive] as to his knowledge of O’Donnell’s religious affiliation and stated that affiliation, the trial judge should have immediately declared a mistrial. No verdict which may have been brought about, or even influenced by a consideration of a litigant’s religious affiliations should be allowed to stand in a court of justice.” (Emphasis in original.)7
*496As appellant’s trial turned solely on the credibility of himself and his witness, and as their credibility was improperly impeached on religious ground contrary to the letter and intent of the Act of April 23, 1909, supra, I believe that appellant must be granted a new trial.
Jacobs and Spaeth, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Prior to appellant’s trial, Morrison had pleaded guilty to charges of violation of the Uniform Firearms Act and carrying a concealed deadly weapon.

. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, §628, as amended; former 18 P.S. §4628, repealed by the Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, §5(a), effective June 6, 1973; substantially reenacted by *493the Act of December 6, 1972, supra, §1, 18 Pa.C.S. §§6101 through 6119.

. Act of June 24, 1939, supra, n. 2, §416, as most recently amended February 25, 1972, P.L. 79, No. 27, §1, 18 P.S. §4416; repealed by the Act of December 6, 1972, supra, n. 2, §5(a), effective June 6, 1973; superseded by the Act of December 6, 1972, supra n. 2, §1, 18 Pa.C.S. §§907, 908.

. Pennsylvania’s statute had been described as “a model of clarity” which “settles most of the questions left unsettled in other states . . .” McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, §48 at 102 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). The various state statutes are collected and discussed in 3A Wigmore, Evidence §936 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).

. See McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence, supra, n. 4, §48 at 101.

. The fact that defense counsel on redirect examination had Morrison testify that Muslims were under an obligation to tell the truth could hardly amount to an opening of the door on the issue of religion. The Commonwealth introduced the issue of religion only after the defense had completed its last direct examination, and defense counsel’s question on redirect, after his motion for a mistrial had been denied, was only an attempt to minimize the effects of the Commonwealth’s improper cross-examination.

. Justices Stern and PattersON concurred in this dissent. The Majority in O’Donnell did not discuss this issue, perhaps because it had not been specifically raised on appeal as an assignment of error.