Court Opinion

ID: 9793663
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:51:16.653476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:31.863403
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur with the holding on point 5 of the majority opinion but dissent on other matters discussed below.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint before the District Court for Salt Lake County that he was an individual with his principal residence in Salt Lake County, Utah. He did not allege (or show) any direct interest or injury as a basis for commencing this action. In my opinion that is fatal. In State v. Kallas et al., 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (1942), it was stated:
This court is committed to the rule that an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute. [Citations omitted.]1
The majority opinion cites State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974) as authority for granting “ . . . standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are concerned” when the legal prerequisites for standing are absent. Kirkpatrick does not persuade me. First, in Kirkpatrick the Court stated:
Petitioner is a citizen, an elector, a taxpayer, a State Senator, a member of the Senate Finance and Rules Committee, and a member of the Legislative Finance Committee. By failing to predicate our holding as to standing on one or more of these facts, we in no way suggest that one or more thereof would not be sufficient to give petitioner standing in these proceedings. We simply elect to confer standing on the basis of the importance of the public issues involved. [At 524 P.2d 979],
It seems to me that the Court in fact believed petitioner therein did have a legal basis for standing without conferring it on the ground of the importance of the public issues involved. But, I won’t pursue this point further. Second, Kirkpatrick is contrary to Utah law in my opinion on the proposition that a court can grant standing if the normal legal prerequisites are absent just because it wants to demonstrate its capacity to perform a grand gesture of grace. Third, even assuming, arguendo, there is a basis for conferring standing because of the importance of the issue, I am not persuaded it ought to be conferred in this case.
Also, I do not believe this Court in this case has jurisdiction to rule that the Forty-Second Legislature is, at least, a de facto legislature because that issue, which plaintiff lost below, was not appealed by him to this Court. Art. VIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution of Utah states, in relevant part, that this Court:
. shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas cor*445pus. ... In other cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and power to issue writs necessary and proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction. . . . [Emphasis added.]
We cannot rule on a matter not before us. In short, there is no jurisdiction for this Court to affirm a matter below when that matter has not been appealed.
This Court in properly structured and jurisdictionally sound cases can — and does— decide issues of great public interest but the ruling of this Court today on matters other than point 5 in the majority opinion is in my opinion infirm and unwise for reasons noted ante.

. See also the discussion of standing in Baird v. State of Utah, Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 716-717 (1978) where this Court commented: “The general rule is applicable that a party having only such interest as the public generally cannot maintain an action. In order to pass upon the validity of a statute, the proceeding must be initiated by one whose special interest is affected, and it must be a civil or property right that is so affected. ... In his allegations, plaintiff neither asserted a legally protectible interest in the subject matter of the action nor did he plead any facts indicating he would be directly affected by enforcement of the act. The wrong of which he complained was public in character, and his complaint disclosed no special injury affecting him differently from other citizens. He, therefore, had no standing to urge the unlawfulness of the governmental action.”