Court Opinion

ID: 9376738
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 18:01:45.362298+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.836506
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 3, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0525
                                _________________________

                             Ex parte Lester Lee Thomas

                     PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                              (In re: Jennifer Dell Peach

                                                  v.

                               Lester Lee Thomas et al.)

                      (Mobile Circuit Court: CV-18-901977)
SC-2022-0525

PER CURIAM.

     Jennifer Dell Peach sued, among others, Lester Lee Thomas in the

Mobile Circuit Court ("the trial court"), asserting claims arising from a

multivehicle accident that took place after Thomas, a State trooper with

the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, allegedly blocked both lanes of a

highway to perform traffic stops of speeding drivers. Thomas moved for

a summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that he was entitled

to State-agent immunity. The trial court denied that motion. Thomas

petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to

enter a summary judgment in his favor on the ground of State-agent

immunity. For the following reasons, we deny the petition.

                      Facts and Procedural History

     At approximately 10:00 a.m. on August 13, 2016, Thomas initiated

a traffic stop of a speeding driver ("the first speeder") traveling north on

Interstate 65 ("I-65") near mile marker 22. Thomas initiated the stop

along a stretch of I-65 that has two northbound travel lanes ("the left

inside lane" and "the right outside lane") with a speed limit of 70 miles

per hour.

                                     2
SC-2022-0525

     Thomas was parked in his police vehicle on the right shoulder of I-

65 when his radar recorded the first speeder drive past him at 83 miles

per hour in the left inside lane. Thomas activated his vehicle's emergency

lights, merged into the left inside lane, and began to pursue the first

speeder.   As Thomas accelerated his vehicle in pursuit of the first

speeder, he noticed, in his rearview mirror, another speeding driver ("the

second speeder") traveling behind him in the left inside lane. The first

speeder pulled his vehicle off the highway, coming to a stop on the right

shoulder of I-65 near mile marker 33. Shortly thereafter, Thomas stopped

his police vehicle, in the right outside lane next to the first speeder's

vehicle, obstructing access to one of only two travel lanes, and

disembarked from his vehicle.

     After exiting his police vehicle, Thomas walked into the left inside

lane and, facing the second speeder's oncoming vehicle, gestured for the

second speeder to stop and pull over. 1 The second speeder applied his

     1Whether    Thomas stepped into the left inside lane is disputed. At
his deposition, Thomas denied stepping into or doing anything to obstruct
the left inside lane. Other witness testimony, however, indicated that
Thomas stepped into the left inside lane, trying to physically wave down
cars to get them to stop or slow down, and that had the second speeder
not stopped he would have struck Thomas. For the purposes of our
analysis, we must assume that Thomas stepped into the left inside lane.
                                    3
SC-2022-0525

vehicle's brakes and came to a sudden halt in the left inside lane. Upon

seeing the blockade of both travel lanes ahead, the five motorists

traveling behind the second speeder applied their vehicles' brakes to

avoid colliding with the vehicles in front of them. The driver in the first

vehicle behind the second speeder diverted his vehicle to the left and into

the grass median, while the driver in the second vehicle behind the

second speeder came to a halt. Peach was a passenger in the third vehicle

behind the second speeder when her daughter, the driver of that vehicle,

hit her vehicle's brakes in response to the sudden stop in traffic flow but

lost traction and control of her vehicle, which then slid and crashed into

the vehicles ahead. Peach suffered serious injuries in the crash.

     In August 2018, Peach sued Thomas in the trial court, alleging that

Thomas had negligently or wantonly caused the chain-reaction collision

that led to her injuries. Thomas filed a motion for a summary judgment,

asserting, among other things, that he was entitled to State-agent

See Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002) (citing Ex parte Rizk,
791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000)) ("[C]ourts, both trial and appellate, must
view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accord
the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the
evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party
....").
                                     4
SC-2022-0525

immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975, and Ex parte

Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala. 2000) (plurality opinion), 2 as modified by

Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala. 2006). The trial court

denied the summary-judgment motion. Thomas now petitions this Court

for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary

judgment in his favor on the basis of State-agent immunity.3

                           Standard of Review

     The denial of a motion for a summary judgment grounded on a

claim of immunity is reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus. Ex

parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794 (Ala. 1996). Mandamus is a drastic and

extraordinary remedy, and it will be issued only when there is "(1) a clear

     2Cranman,    a plurality decision, was adopted by a majority of this
Court in Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173 (Ala. 2000), and was later codified
at § 36-1-12, Ala. Code 1975.

     3In his petition, Thomas alternatively claims that he is entitled to
a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary
judgment in his favor based on other, nonimmunity grounds. However,
although this Court "will consider a challenge to a denial of a summary-
judgment motion that is 'grounded on a claim of immunity,' " we "will not
consider secondary arguments that a summary judgment was
appropriate on other grounds." Ex parte Smith, 327 So. 3d 184, 187 (Ala.
2020). For this reason, we address only matters relevant to the issue of
Thomas's entitlement to a summary judgment based on State-agent
immunity.
                                    5
SC-2022-0525

legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty

upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)

the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked

jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Horton, 711 So. 2d 979, 983 (Ala. 1998)

(citing Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501 (Ala. 1993)).

"In determining, on mandamus review, whether the trial court exceeded

the limits of its discretion, 'the appellate courts will not reverse the trial

court on an issue or contention not presented to the trial court for its

consideration in making its ruling.' " Ex parte Ebbers, 871 So. 2d 776,

786 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1073 (Ala.

1999)).

     When reviewing the denial of a summary-judgment motion

asserting State-agent immunity, this Court asks whether there is a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether the movant is entitled to

immunity. Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). In making

that determination, we "view the record in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable

inferences from the evidence, and resolve all reasonable doubts against

the moving party." Id. (citing Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala.

                                      6
SC-2022-0525

2000)). If a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether

the movant is entitled to State-agent immunity, summary judgment is

not appropriate. Id.

                                      Discussion

     Thomas contends that Peach's claims against him are barred by the

doctrine of State-agent immunity. In Ex parte Cranman, this Court

restated   the        doctrine   of   State-agent   immunity.   The   Cranman

restatement, as modified by Hollis v. City of Brighton, provides, in

pertinent part:

           " ' A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in
     his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis
     of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

           " ' ....

           " ' (4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the
     criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-
     enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest
     persons, or serving as peace officers under circumstances
     entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a),
     Ala. Code 1975. ' "

950 So. 2d at 309 (second emphasis omitted). Thomas also asserts "peace-

officer immunity" pursuant to § 6-5-338(a). In Hollis, this Court modified

category (4) of the Cranman restatement to incorporate the immunity for

peace officers set forth in § 6-5-338(a). Accordingly, this Court now
                                          7
SC-2022-0525

recognizes that the restatement of State-agent immunity as set out by

this Court in Cranman, and as modified by Hollis, "governs the

determination of whether a peace officer is entitled to immunity under

§ 6-5-338(a)." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 99 So. 3d 282, 292 (Ala.

2012); see also Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 204 (Ala. 2003)

and Ex parte Kennedy, 992 So. 2d 1276, 1281-82 (Ala. 2008).

     There are two exceptions to the immunity recognized in Cranman:

           "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the
     foregoing statement of the rule, a State agent shall not be
     immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity

           "(1) when the Constitution or laws of the United States,
     or the Constitution of this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
     of this State enacted or promulgated for the purpose of
     regulating the activities of a governmental agency require
     otherwise; or

          "(2) when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously,
     fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
     under a mistaken interpretation of the law."

792 So. 2d at 405.

     Furthermore, this Court has established a "burden-shifting"

process when a party raises the defense of State-agent immunity. Ex

parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 452 (Ala. 2006). A party who

asserts the defense of State-agent immunity bears the burden of

                                    8
SC-2022-0525

demonstrating that the plaintiff's claims arise from a function that would

entitle the State agent to immunity. Id. If the State agent satisfies that

initial burden, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must

demonstrate that one of the two exceptions to State-agent immunity

applies. Id. "One of the ways in which a plaintiff can show that a State

agent acted beyond his or her authority is by proffering evidence that the

State agent failed ' "to discharge duties pursuant to detailed rules or

regulations, such as those stated on a checklist. " ' " Kennedy, 992 So. 2d

at 1282-83 (quoting Giambrone v. Douglas, 874 So. 2d 1046, 1052 (Ala.

2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000)).

A State agent also acts beyond his or her authority by violating a rule or

statute that imposes a mandatory duty upon the State agent and is " ' so

specific that it removes the [S]tate agent's discretion and puts him on

notice that certain, specific acts are unacceptable. ' " Odom v. Helms, 314

So. 3d 220, 229 (Ala. 2020) (quoting King v. Archer (No. 2:17-CV-174-

KOB, Sept. 6, 2018) (N.D. Ala. 2018) (not reported in F. Supp. 3d)); see

also, e.g., Norris v. City of Montgomery, 821 So. 2d 149, 155 (Ala. 2001)

(holding that police officer was not entitled to discretionary-function

                                    9
SC-2022-0525

immunity under § 6-5-338(a) because evidence demonstrated that officer

had violated statute imposing a mandatory duty).

     We conclude that Thomas met his initial burden of demonstrating

that he was engaged in law-enforcement activities for which State-agent

immunity would be available. It is undisputed that Thomas was acting

generally within the line and scope of his law-enforcement duties and

was attempting to enforce the traffic laws of the State when he initiated

the double traffic stop giving rise to this action. See, e.g., Kennedy, 992

So. 2d at 1283 (holding that police officers met initial burden under

Cranman upon showing that, while serving warrant, they were

attempting to generally enforce the criminal laws of the State and were

performing a function within the line and scope of their law-enforcement

duties). The question then becomes whether Thomas's conduct fell within

an exception to State-agent immunity.

     Peach contends that Thomas acted beyond his authority in

performing the traffic stops at issue, because, she argues, his conduct

violated various provisions of the Alabama Rules of the Road Act, § 32-

5A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, Peach contends that Thomas

violated §§ 32-5A-212(a), 32-5A-215(b), and 32-5A-215(d), Ala. Code 1975

                                    10
SC-2022-0525

(collectively referred to as "the pedestrian statutes"), when he allegedly

walked into the left inside lane of I-65 to stop the second speeder. The

relevant portion of § 32-5A-212(a) provides that "[e]very pedestrian

crossing a roadway … shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the

roadway." (Emphasis added.) Section 32-5A-215(b) provides, in relevant

part, that "any pedestrian walking along and upon a highway shall walk

only on a shoulder …." (Emphasis added.) Finally, § 32-5A-215(d)

mandates that "any pedestrian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-

way to all vehicles upon the roadway." (Emphasis added.) We agree that

a "pedestrian" who suddenly steps into a lane of fast-moving interstate

traffic, as Thomas is alleged to have done, has at least violated § 32-5A-

215. Furthermore, § 32-5A-215(d) imposes a mandatory duty on all

pedestrians -- i.e., "[a]ny individual afoot," § 32-1-1.1(43), Ala. Code 1975

-- to yield to vehicles on the roadway.4 Thus, if that section applies to

Thomas, its violation would indicate that Thomas acted beyond his

authority by failing to yield to oncoming traffic. See Norris v.

Montgomery, 821 So. 2d at 155 (holding that discretionary-function

     4As  noted in several of the special writings, at the time of the
collision made the basis of Peach's claims, former § 32-1-1.1(41), Ala.
Code 1975, defined "pedestrian" as "any person afoot." (Emphasis added.)
                                   11
SC-2022-0525

immunity under §6-5-338(a) "evaporates upon the violation of a statute

imposing a mandatory duty"). The question, however, is whether the

pedestrian statutes applied to Thomas at the time he attempted the

double traffic stop. Thomas contends they did not.

     In the trial court, Thomas made two arguments as to why the

pedestrian statutes did not apply to him. First, he argued that § 32-5A-

7, Ala. Code 1975, excused his noncompliance with the pedestrian

statutes. That section exempts drivers of authorized emergency vehicles

who are responding to an emergency or pursuing a suspected law violator

from complying with certain traffic laws -- such as those concerning

speeding, illegal parking, and obeying traffic signals. Section 32-5A-7

provides:

           "(a) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle,
     when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit
     of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when
     responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
     exercise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to
     the conditions herein stated.

            "(b) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:

                 "(1) Park or stand, irrespective of the
            provisions of [the Alabama Rules of the Road Act];

                                    12
SC-2022-0525

                 "(2) Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop
           sign, but only after slowing down as may be
           necessary for safe operation;

                 "(3) Exceed the maximum speed limits so
           long as he does not endanger life or property;

                 "(4) Disregard  regulations  governing
           direction of movement or turning in specified
           directions.

           "(c) The exemptions herein granted to an authorized
     emergency vehicle shall apply only when such vehicle is
     making use of an audible signal meeting the requirements of
     Section 32-5-213[, Ala. Code 1975,] and visual requirements
     of any laws of this state requiring visual signals on emergency
     vehicles.

           "(d) The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the
     driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to
     drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall
     such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of
     his reckless disregard for the safety of others."

Section 32-5A-7, however, provides no exemption, express or implied, to

the pedestrian statutes. Moreover, even if such an exemption could be

read into that statute, there is a question of fact in this case regarding

whether Thomas was "making use of an audible signal," which also

precludes entering a summary judgment in his favor. See Kendrick v.

City of Midfield, 203 So. 3d 1200, 1206 (Ala. 2016) (holding that existence

of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether officer used siren

                                    13
SC-2022-0525

precluded entering a summary judgment in favor of officer on peace-

officer-immunity grounds).

     Thomas also argued that § 32-5A-4, Ala. Code 1975, generally

exempted him from having to comply with the pedestrian statutes. That

statute provides that "[n]o person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply

with any lawful order or direction of any police officer or fireman invested

by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic." That statute,

however, regulates the conduct of members of the public who interact

with peace officers; it does not appear to give officers extra authority to

act contrary to otherwise applicable traffic laws, and Thomas made no

specific arguments explaining why that statute exempted him from

having to comply with the pedestrian statutes.

     At oral argument, Thomas proffered several new arguments as to

why his conduct was not controlled by the pedestrian statutes.          For

example, Thomas contended that he was not a "pedestrian" within the

meaning of the pedestrian statutes. As noted earlier, § 32-1-1.1(43)

defines a pedestrian as "[a]ny individual afoot." Thomas noted, however,

that § 32-1-1.1 also provides that the definitions in that statute will not

apply "when the context otherwise requires" and contended that, in the

                                    14
SC-2022-0525

context of this case, he was not a "pedestrian" under the pedestrian

statutes. Because this argument was not made below, we may not now

consider it. See, e.g., Ex parte Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc., 954 So. 2d 583,

587 (Ala. 2006) (quoting State v. Reynolds, 887 So. 2d 848, 851-52 (Ala.

2004)) ("It is well settled that we 'will not … issue a writ of mandamus

commanding a trial judge to rescind an order, based upon a ground

asserted in the petition for the writ of mandamus that was not asserted

to the trial judge, regardless of the merits of a petitioner's position in the

underlying controversy. ' " ) .

      Thomas also invoked the predicate-act canon of statutory

construction by asserting for the first time at oral argument that certain

statutes granting general law-enforcement powers to State troopers --

see, e.g., Ala. Code 1975, §§ 32-2-22 and 32-5-310 -- implicitly authorized

his conduct, notwithstanding the prohibitions of the pedestrian statues.

Under the predicate-act canon, whenever a power is given by a statute,

everything reasonably necessary to effectuate that power is also granted.

See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation

of Legal Texts 192 (Thomson/West 2012). Again, because this argument

                                     15
SC-2022-0525

was not raised before the trial court, we may not consider it. Volvo

Trucks, 954 So. 2d at 587.

                                Conclusion

     In short, based solely on the arguments and evidence presented to

the trial court, Thomas has not established a clear legal right to an order

granting his motion for a summary judgment based on State-agent

immunity. Therefore, Thomas's petition for the writ of mandamus must

be denied. In denying the petition, we do not address arguments that

were not specifically presented to the trial court.

     PETITION DENIED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Stewart, and Mitchell, JJ., concur.

     Shaw and Cook, JJ., concur in the result, with opinions.

     Bryan, J., concurs in the result.

     Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion, which Mendheim, J., joins.

                                    16
SC-2022-0525

SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result).

     I am not convinced that the petitioner, State Trooper Lester Lee

Thomas, is not immune from suit. Specifically, I do not believe that a

driver subject to a lawful stop by a law-enforcement officer on foot has

the right-of-way over that officer.      My rationale for that conclusion,

however, is not raised in the petition; thus, the petition cannot be granted

on that ground. I therefore reluctantly concur in the result.

     This Court's formulation of State-agent immunity provides, among

other things, that law-enforcement officers like Thomas are entitled to

immunity from tort claims when those claims are based upon those law-

enforcement officers' " 'exercising judgment in the enforcement of the

criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, … arresting or

attempting to arrest persons, or serving as peace officers under

circumstances entitling such officers to immunity pursuant to § 6-5-

338(a), Ala. Code 1975.' " Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309

(Ala. 2006) (quoting and modifying restatement of State-agent immunity

set forth in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000) (plurality

opinion; see note 2, supra)) (emphasis omitted). Clearly, Thomas, in

                                    17
SC-2022-0525

attempting to effectuate a stop of one who was speeding, was exercising

judgment in the enforcement of the laws.

     A State agent is not immune "when the State agent acts willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or

under a mistaken interpretation of the law." Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405

(emphasis added). The allegation that Thomas was acting negligently or

wantonly does not demonstrate that he acted beyond his authority:

"[N]egligent or wanton conduct will not support the conclusion that a

police officer has acted beyond his or her authority when he or she is

exercising discretion in the discharge of his or her law-enforcement

duties." Ex parte City of Montgomery, 272 So. 3d 155, 168 (Ala. 2018).

     However, it is argued in this case that a violation of the law shows

an act "beyond [one's] authority."      Specifically, the plaintiff below,

Jennifer Dell Peach, argues that Thomas violated Alabama's Rules of the

Road, see § 32-5A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975 -- namely, certain Code

sections regulating the conduct of pedestrians. Section 32-5A-212(a),

Ala. Code 1975, provides: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any

point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked

crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles

                                   18
SC-2022-0525

upon the roadway."     (Emphasis added.)     This Code section appears

inapplicable; the facts do not suggest that Thomas was attempting to

"cross" the road.   Section § 32-5A-215(b), Ala. Code 1975, provides:

"Where a sidewalk is not available, any pedestrian walking along and

upon a highway shall walk only on a shoulder, as far as practicable from

the edge of the roadway." (Emphasis added.) This Code section appears

inapplicable; the facts do not suggest that Thomas was "walking along

and upon a highway" in such a manner that he should have used a

sidewalk or walked on the shoulder. Instead, he was, according to Peach,

standing in the lane attempting to stop traffic.

     Peach further contends that Thomas violated § 32-5A-215(d), which

provides: "Except as otherwise provided in [the Alabama Rules of the

Road Act], any pedestrian upon a roadway shall yield the right-of-way to

all vehicles upon the roadway." This Code section is more troublesome.

The ultimate issue, in my view, hinges on whether Thomas was a

pedestrian and whether he was required to "yield the right-of-way" to a

driver he was stopping because of a criminal violation.

                                    19
SC-2022-0525

      Former § 32-1-1.1(41), Ala. Code 1975, the applicable Code section

that existed in 2016 (the Code section has since been amended; see note

4 and accompanying text, supra), stated:

            "The following words and phrases when used in this title
      shall, for the purpose of this title, have meanings respectively
      ascribed to them in this section, except when the context
      otherwise requires:

            "….

            "(41) Pedestrian. Any person afoot."

(Emphasis added.) See also Pruitt v. Oliver, 331 So. 3d 99, 111 (Ala.

2021) ("The definition of 'pedestrian' in the applicable Alabama Code

section is '[a]ny person afoot.' ").

      Thomas was "afoot"; he was standing upon the road as opposed to

occupying a vehicle. I am not convinced, however, that the "context" of

this case requires the legal conclusion that he was a pedestrian.5

      Under § 15-5-30, Ala. Code 1975, "any highway patrolman or state

trooper may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably

suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a … public

      5Thomas    stated in his deposition, when questioned, that he was a
pedestrian, but it does not appear that he was conceding the legal point
in relation to § 32-1-1.1.
                                     20
SC-2022-0525

offense." This includes stopping a traveling vehicle. Manning v. State,

612 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); see also White v. State, 479

So. 2d 1368, 1375 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that "a public roadway

is a public place within the meaning of § 15-5-30"). Section 32-5A-4, Ala.

Code 1975, provides that drivers must obey orders from law-enforcement

officers directing or controlling traffic. Drivers may even violate certain

Rules of the Road at the direction of law-enforcement officers. § 32-5A-

137, Ala. Code 1975. Thomas had the lawful authority to stop the second

speeding vehicle; the driver of the vehicle had a duty to comply. In

allegedly stepping into the road to effectuate that stop, Thomas was

exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws regarding

speeding.

     However, Thomas was not one simply "afoot" while traveling on,

near, or across a road. He was not using the road on foot as opposed to

using the road while driving a vehicle. He was not merely present upon

the road. The context of the pedestrian statutes involves the regulation

of vehicles and those on foot in the normal course of traffic interaction. I

find it difficult to conclude that the context of the pedestrian statutes

includes regulating the manner in which law-enforcement officers, on

                                    21
SC-2022-0525

foot, enforce traffic laws or otherwise stop persons committing public

offenses, the authority for which is specifically provided by law. The

legislature, in specifying that the meaning of the term "pedestrian" may

change depending on the context, clearly indicated that its definition of

the term is not always applicable; the definition provided by § 32-1-1.1

does not always control.

     Further, § 32-5A-215(d) provides that pedestrians "shall yield the

right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway."      "Right-of-way" was

defined in former § 32-1-1.1(54), the applicable Code section that existed

in 2016, as follows:

     "The right of one vehicle or pedestrian to proceed in a lawful
     manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian
     approaching under such circumstances of direction, speed,
     and proximity as to give rise to danger of collision unless one
     grants precedence to the other."6

     The context of this section is governing the safe movement of

vehicles verses pedestrians. Again, Thomas was performing a lawful stop

of a speeder, which he had the power to do; he "may stop any person

abroad in a public [road] whom he reasonably suspects is committing …

     6Section  32-1-1.1 was amended in 2021. Although the definition of
"right-of-way" has not changed, that definition is now located in § 32-1-
1.1(56).
                                  22
SC-2022-0525

[a] public offense," § 15-15-30, and the Rules of the Road require drivers

to obey his directions. § 32-5A-4. When an officer, on foot, attempts to

exercise a lawful stop of a vehicle, can it be said that the offending driver

nevertheless has the "right-of-way" to proceed in preference to the officer?

Does this section deem that drivers who are, as in this case, speeding or

who are, possibly in other situations, driving while intoxicated or fleeing

arrest have the right-of-way to proceed in the face of an officer on foot

attempting to perform a lawful stop? Do the Rules of the Road give

"preference" to violators of those rules over those who are enforcing them

against those violators?

     The idea that an officer on foot attempting to control traffic or to

effectuate the stop of a criminal suspect driving a vehicle must yield the

right-of-way to that suspect is troubling. In contrast, drivers must yield

the right-of-way to pedestrian highway road workers and garbage

collectors. § 32-5A-116(a) and § 32-5A-58.3(a), Ala. Code 1975. But

apparently there is no specific Code section affording law-enforcement

officers who happen to be on foot in the road the right-of-way when

stopping criminal suspects. Either this is a serious gap in the law or the

legislature thought, given the "context," no such special provisions were

                                     23
SC-2022-0525

required. I believe it is the latter: the context of Thomas's actions shows

that the meaning of the terms "pedestrian" and "right-of-way" as defined

in § 32-1-1.1 do not apply in this case. Thomas was not violating the

Rules of the Road.

     The above analysis is not advanced in the petition, and so it cannot

form a basis to issue the writ. Ex parte Wilcox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., [Ms.

1200775, June 10, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.9 (Ala. 2022) (refusing to

consider an issue not raised in a petition for a writ of mandamus).

Although Thomas's motion for a summary judgment and various follow-

up filings questioned whether he should be considered a pedestrian, the

issue whether he fit the statutory definition of "pedestrian" was not

submitted to the trial court. State v. Reynolds, 887 So. 2d 848, 851-52

(Ala. 2004) (holding that this Court will not issue a writ of mandamus

based upon a ground that was not asserted to the trial court). I therefore

concur in the result. This issue must await further litigation in the trial

court or on appeal.

                                    24
SC-2022-0525

COOK, Justice (concurring in the result).

     Like Justice Shaw, I reluctantly concur in the result. As explained

in the main opinion, the key issue in this case is whether there is

sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that State Trooper Lester Lee

Thomas violated Alabama law when he allegedly blocked both

northbound lanes of Interstate 65 to perform traffic stops of two speeding

drivers. Trooper Thomas contends that he was entitled to State-agent

immunity for his discretionary actions as a peace officer. Plaintiff

Jennifer Dell Peach argues, however, that Trooper Thomas was not

entitled to State-agent immunity because he became a "pedestrian" when

he exited his vehicle and was, therefore, subject to Alabama's Rules of

the Road, see § 32-5A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Specifically, she argued

that Trooper Thomas "could not have been 'exercising judgment in the

enforcement of the criminal laws of the State' because he violated three

statutes found in the Rules of the Road that 'remove[d] the discretion on

which the immunity is based' " -- §§ 32-5A-212(a), 32-5A-215(b), and 32-

5A-215(d), Ala. Code 1975 ("the pedestrian statutes").

     In 2016, the applicable definition of "pedestrian" was "[a]ny person

afoot." Former § 32-1-1.1(41), Ala. Code 1975 (see note 4 and

                                   25
SC-2022-0525

accompanying text, supra). First, Peach argues that §§ 32-5A-212(a) and

32-5A-215(d)7 required Trooper Thomas, as a pedestrian, to "yield" to the

right-of-way to the oncoming traffic, including the speeding vehicle at

issue, on Interstate 65 rather than stepping into the middle of the left

lane to stop the alleged second speeder. 8

     As I see it, the problem with applying these two "shall yield"

statutes to Trooper Thomas is that doing so ignores a more specific

statute applicable to law-enforcement officers in Alabama -- § 32-5A-4,

Ala. Code 1975. That statute provides that "[n]o person shall willfully fail

or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer

… invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic"

(emphasis added), meaning that everyone must yield to the law-

enforcement officer. The speeder must yield to the State trooper -- not

     7Section   32-5A-212(a) requires that pedestrians "shall yield the
right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway." (Emphasis added.)
Likewise, § 32-5A-215(d) requires that "any pedestrian upon a roadway
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway." (Emphasis
added.)

     8I note briefly that the evidence is disputed as to whether, and how
far, Trooper Thomas stepped into the left-hand lane. For the purposes of
summary judgment, however, we must view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmovant.
                                    26
SC-2022-0525

the other way around. The main opinion dismisses the applicability of

this statute because it is directed to the public and not peace officers.

This is a mistake in logic. If the public must "comply" with a police

officer's "lawful order," then, in the case of a traffic stop, the officer is not

the one who must "yield" the right-of-way; it is the speeder who must

yield the right-of-way. The specific statute governing the public's

adherence to lawful orders from police officers necessarily must govern

over the general pedestrian statutes. See Ex parte Jones Mfg. Co., 589

So. 2d 208, 211 (Ala. 1991) (noting that, "[i]n the event of a conflict

between two statutes, a specific statute relating to a specific subject is

regarded as an exception to, and will prevail over, a general statute

relating to a broad subject").

      However, I come to a different conclusion as to the claim that

Trooper Thomas violated § 32-5A-215(b). The most significant arguments

asserted by Trooper Thomas as to this claim were made for the first time

at oral argument.9 Specifically, he argued that he was not a "pedestrian"

      9Thomas  also argues that § 32-5A-7, Ala. Code 1975, provides an
exception to the pedestrian statutes. This statute provides exemptions
from following certain Rules of the Road to emergency vehicles under
certain circumstances. However, as the main opinion correctly notes, it
                                  27
SC-2022-0525

as that term is defined in § 32-1-1.1 because, he said, that statute states

that the definitions therein do not apply "when the context otherwise

requires." Trooper Thomas also claimed for the first time at oral

argument that two statutes dealing with the general police powers

granted to Alabama's State troopers -- Ala. Code 1975, §§ 32-2-2210 and

32-5-31011 -- authorized (or at least implicitly authorized) his conduct and

thus constitute specific exceptions to the Rules of the Road. Neither of

these statutes are even mentioned in Trooper Thomas's mandamus

petition or his reply brief.

      As the main opinion correctly notes, because these arguments were

not raised until oral argument, we may not consider them at this point.

There are good reasons that, normally, entirely new arguments

does not mention the pedestrian statutes, and there is also a factual
dispute over one of the preconditions for that statute's application.
      10Section
              32-2-22 provides: "Members of the state highway patrol,
when duly appointed, shall have the powers of peace officers in this state
and may exercise such powers anywhere within the state."

      11Section 32-5-310 provides: "Any peace officer, including state
troopers, … shall be authorized, and it is hereby made the duty of each
of them to enforce the provisions of this chapter and to make arrests for
any violation or violations thereof …."

                                    28
SC-2022-0525

introduced during oral argument should not be considered. These reasons

are even stronger in the mandamus context, when additional

development of those arguments is still possible later at the trial-court

level and before this Court (as opposed on appeal from a final judgment

at the end of the case). It is also true that fundamental fairness requires

that the opposing party not be surprised at oral argument and, thus,

deprived of the opportunity to research and respond to entirely new

arguments being made. Given that this case is before this Court on a

mandamus petition -- in which the petitioner bears of burden of showing

a "clear" right to the relief sought -- this Court should not consider these

entirely new arguments in these particular circumstances.

     Although I do not agree with how the main opinion reached the

ultimate result in this case, I nevertheless agree that Trooper Thomas's

mandamus petition is due to be denied and, thus, concur in the result.

                                    29
SC-2022-0525

SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

     I respectfully dissent. Lester Lee Thomas, a State trooper with the

Alabama Law Enforcement Agency, has petitioned this Court for a writ

of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in

his favor based on peace-officer immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), Ala.

Code 1975, and the restatement of State-agent immunity set forth in Ex

parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2002) (plurality opinion; see note 2,

supra), as modified in Hollis v. City of Brighton, 950 So. 2d 300, 309 (Ala.

2006). It is undisputed that, at the time of the accident giving rise to this

litigation, Thomas was performing a law-enforcement duty for which

State-agent immunity would be available. Therefore, the burden shifted

to the plaintiff, Jennifer Dell Peach, to demonstrate that one of the two

categories of exceptions to State-agent immunity recognized in Cranman

is applicable. As the main opinion points out, one such exception is when

a State agent acts beyond his or her authority by violating a statute that

imposes a mandatory duty upon the State agent; this is so because such

a statute removes the discretion upon which the immunity is based.

Odom v. Helms, 314 So. 3d 220, 229 (Ala. 2020). Peach contends that

Thomas acted beyond his authority by allegedly violating the Alabama

                                     30
SC-2022-0525

Rules of the Road Act ("the Act"), § 32-5A-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975,

specifically those statutes regarding a pedestrian's use of roadways. See

§ 32-5A-212(a), Ala. Code 1975 (A pedestrian crossing a roadway "shall

yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway."); § 32-5A-215(b),

Ala. Code 1975 (A pedestrian "shall walk only on a shoulder" of a

roadway.); and § 32-5A-215(d), Ala. Code 1975 (A pedestrian "upon a

roadway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway.").

However, Peach has offered no authority to indicate that those specific

statutes are applicable to the facts presented. In fact, it appears that the

statutes upon which Peach relies relate merely to a pedestrian's duty to

use reasonable care for his or her own safety and, thus, bear no relation

to a law-enforcement officer's attempting to enforce the traffic laws of the

State. I point out that other statutes under the Act include qualifying

language regarding police officers, further indicating that the Act, when

read as a whole, operates to regulate the actions of pedestrians, and not

to constrain the actions of police officers. See, e.g., § 32-5A-4, Ala. Code

1975 ("No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful

order or direction of any police officer … with authority to direct, control

or regulate traffic."); § 32-5A-31(a), Ala. Code 1975 ("The driver of any

                                    31
SC-2022-0525

vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traffic-control device …

unless otherwise directed by a police officer …."); and § 32-5A-137(a), Ala.

Code 1975 (prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking in specified places,

"[e]xcept when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in

compliance with law or the directions of a police officer …."). Based on

the foregoing, I conclude that Peach has failed to meet her burden of

presenting substantial evidence to show that Thomas acted beyond his

authority by violating any statute designed to regulate his actions in

stopping speeding motorists. I also conclude that Peach has presented

no substantial evidence indicating that Thomas acted willfully,

maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad faith in attempting to stop the

speeding motorists. Accordingly, I would issue the writ of mandamus

directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Thomas

on the basis of State-agent immunity.

     Mendheim, J., concurs.

                                    32