Court Opinion

ID: 9758641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:38:54.250434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:53.530225
License: Public Domain

DAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellants’ claims against Bowie Memorial Hospital (Bowie) because Appellants’ expert report illustrated a good faith effort to comply with section 13.01(r)(6)’s definition of an expert report. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01(0 (Vernon Supp.2001).
As the majority explains, we review a trial court’s order to dismiss a cause of action brought pursuant to article 4590i because of the failure to provide an adequate expert report under an abuse of discretion standard. Hart v. Wright, 16 S.W.3d 872, 875 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied); Estrello v. Elboar, 965 S.W.2d 754, 757-58 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1998, no pet.). The majority concludes the trial court abused its discretion because they feel that Appellants Barbara and P.L. Wright attempted in good faith to satisfy the requirements of section 13.01(r)(6); however, merely because a trial court may decide a matter within its discretion in a different manner than an appellate court would in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159, 106 S.Ct. 2279, 90 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). Furthermore, section 13.01(0 itself provides that:
A court shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report only if *449it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent a good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection (r)(6) of this section.
Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. ÁNN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(i) (emphasis added).
Section 13.01(r)(6) provides that an expert’s report is a report written by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert’s opinions as of the date of the report regarding: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the manner in which the care rendered by defendant failed to meet the standard of care; and (3) the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed. Id. § 13.01(r)(6). The majority concludes that Appellants’ expert report sufficiently satisfied the first two elements, but that it failed to provide a fair summary of a causal relationship under the third element. However, the majority holds that it was a good faith effort to comply. The majority reasons that the adequacy of the expert’s report should not be based solely upon the claimant’s failure to use magical words, like “reasonable probability.”
The majority, however, does conclude that the use of the word “possibility” does satisfy the good faith effort to comply requirement. The trial court held two hearings to determine whether the expert report was adequate and whether Appellants made a good faith effort to comply. The court heard arguments from both sides and reviewed the expert report. The trial judge indicated that he had to research the issue, and he questioned Appellants’ counsel about how the expert report affected Bowie. While I agree that a court should not find a lack of good faith merely because the expert report failed to include the magical words “reasonable probability,” I also believe that we should be restrained in concluding that the report’s bare statement that there was a “possibility” that Ms. Wright might have had a better outcome indicated a good faith effort to comply with section 13.01(r)(6) in contradiction to the trial court’s determination.
The record suggests that the trial court could not find a connection between the expert report and Bowie. The trial court specifically stated that “I’m still having a hard time seeing why we have to hold the hospital. I mean ... where is their goof?” Appellants’ counsel argued that Bowie’s “goof’ was in the fact that it saw Barbara Wright with enough of an injury to order an X-ray, it did not adequately look at the X-ray to diagnose her broken foot, and it sent her to another hospital with a report that she had only a broken knee. However, Appellants’ counsel conceded that the doctor at the subsequent hospital had an independent duty to verify Michael Layne’s report.
Although we may decide that we would have ruled differently than the trial court, we cannot substitute our decision for that of the trial court. See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. Therefore, after a review of the record, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellants failed to comply with section 13.01(r)(6). Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.