Court Opinion

ID: 9642961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:13:50.075959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.342570
License: Public Domain

OPINION
LARSEN, Justice.
Appellee, Regis Schultz, was arrested and charged with robbery, recklessly endangering another person and three weapons offenses after attempting to hold up a grocery store. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, appellee pled guilty to robbery and recklessly endangering and the Commonwealth nol prossed the weapons charges. A guilty plea colloquy was conducted before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following which the court accepted the plea and sentenced appellee to ten to twenty years imprisonment for robbery; the court suspended the sentence for recklessly endangering another person.
Appellee subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that the guilty plea colloquy did not contain an explanation that theft is an element of robbery,1 *191and thus his plea did not constitute a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a trial on the merits. After a hearing on appellee’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the lower court found that it had, in fact, been knowingly and intelligently entered and therefore denied appellee’s motion to withdraw the plea. Appellee appealed to the Superior Court which, relying on Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) (herein Ingram), held that “[appellee] was never informed that theft or attempted theft is a necessary element of the crime, and, thus, the court could not determine whether [appellee] knowingly and intelligently entered the plea.” Commonwealth v. Schultz, 309 Pa.Super. 392, 395, 455 A.2d 667, 668 (1982). The Superior Court therefore reversed the judgment of sentence and granted appellee a new trial. We granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal to this Court.
It is well established that after sentence has been imposed, a defendant seeking to withdraw his guilty plea must demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred justifying withdrawal. Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 490, 301 A.2d 592, 595 (1973). In Commonwealth v. Rosmon, 477 Pa. 540, 542, 384 A.2d 1221, 1222 (1978), we recognized that a manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is entered by a defendant who lacks full knowledge and understanding of the charge against him. Under Ingram, a defendant’s knowledge and understanding of the charge was tested solely by reference to the on-the-record guilty plea colloquy.2 If the colloquy did not demonstrate that all of the elements of the crime charged had been outlined in understandable terms, and that the defendant had, in fact, understood the charge, the guilty plea was deemed to be invalid. Thus, applying Ingram, the Superior Court held *192that appellee’s guilty plea was rendered invalid by the absence from the guilty plea colloquy of an explanation that theft is an element of robbery.
The per se approach of Ingram, however, has been abrogated by subsequent decisions of this Court. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 350, 446 A.2d 591, 595 (1982) (herein Shaffer), held that even if the guilty plea colloquy lacks an explanation of the elements of the crime charged, no manifest injustice occurs if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea indicate that the defendant understood the nature of the charge against him. Although Shaffer had been decided prior to the Superior Court’s decision in this case, the Superior Court read Shaffer as creating only a limited exception to Ingram’s per se approach; i.e., to be applied only in fact situations similar to that in Shaffer (the defendant pled guilty after the Commonwealth had presented its entire case).
The Superior Court’s restrictive reading of Shaffer is erroneous. Commonwealth v. Martinez, 499 Pa. 417, 420, 453 A.2d 940, 942 (1982), makes it clear that the “totality of the circumstances” test adopted in Shaffer is to be applied in every case in which a defendant asserts that his guilty plea was entered without knowledge and understanding of the charge against him. Therefore, in addressing appellee’s claim that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently, a court must review all of the circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.
The evidence presented by counsel for the Commonwealth at the plea proceeding revealed the following. Armed with a gun, appellee attempted to rob a grocery store. A struggle arose and appellee was subdued by a bystander and arrested at the scene of the robbery. That bystander, and a number of other eyewitnesses, were prepared to testify against appellee at trial. Because of the overwhelming nature of the evidence against him, appellee pled guilty pursuant to the advice of counsel.
*193Appellee’s assertion that he did not have knowledge of the charge against him is belied by his own testimony. During the plea proceeding, appellee answered in the affirmative when asked by counsel:
Do you understand the government is charging at CC7804611 the crime of robbery. The government is alleging that on or about July 22 of 1978 you entered the A & P store and put store employees in threat of immediate serious bodily harm at the A & P store in the South Hills Village. Do you understand that that is a felony of the first degree and if found guilty you could receive a sentence of up to ten to twenty years on that.
N.T., April 15, 1980 at 3. Further, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, appellee testified that he had entered the grocery store with the “intention of securing money.” N.T., March 18, 1981 at 7. Appellee also testified that he knew at the time he entered the plea that he was accused of trying to hold up a grocery store. Id. at 13. Moreover, the record reveals that appellee had three prior convictions for robbery.
Considering all of the circumstances disclosed by the record, it is apparent that appellee understood the nature of the charge against him and that, therefore, his guilty plea was entered knowingly and intelligently. Thus, no manifest injustice has occurred and the Common Pleas Court did not err in refusing to allow appellee to withdraw his plea.
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and the judgment of sentence is reinstated.
McDERMOTT, J., joins this Opinion and filed a separate concurring opinion.
NIX, C.J., filed a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a) defines robbery as follows:
(a) Offense defined.—
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he:
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another;
(ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury;
(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury____
*191(2) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight after the attempt or commission.

. An on-the-record colloquy is required by Rule 319(a), Pa.R.Crim.P., which precludes acceptance of a guilty plea unless an inquiry appears on the record which establishes that the defendant’s plea is “voluntarily and understanding!/’ entered.