Court Opinion

ID: 9777434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:11:06.996999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:05:38.463922
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220125-U
                                              No. 1-22-0125
                                             August 29, 2023
                                                                                      Second Division

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                                 IN THE
                                  APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                            FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                             )   Appeal from the
                                                                  )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                    )   Cook County.
                                                                  )
     v.                                                           )   No. 19 CR 60021
                                                                  )
 ROBERT WALLACE,                                                  )   Honorable
                                                                  )   Ursula Walowski,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                   )   Judge Presiding.

           JUSTICE HOWSE delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER

¶1        Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for first degree murder. No preliminary Krankel
                inquiry was required where defendant did not claim he received ineffective
                assistance of trial counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a
                45-year sentence.

¶2        Following a jury trial, defendant Robert Wallace was convicted of first degree murder (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues

that the trial court erred in failing to perform a preliminary inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel,
No. 1-22-0125

102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). He also argues his sentence is excessive as he was 25 years old at the time

of the offense, lacked criminal history, and has schizophrenia. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

¶3        Defendant was charged by indictment with multiple counts relating to the death of his

mother, Betty Wallace, sometime between December 18, 2018, and December 24, 2018. 1 The

State ultimately nol-prossed all but two counts of first degree murder, premised on defendant’s

intentional or knowing killing of Betty or infliction of sharp wounds upon her knowing his act

created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to her.

¶4        At a hearing on September 10, 2020, defendant requested leave to file a pro se motion for

a new attorney. The court declined as defendant was represented by the Public Defender’s office,

which selected the attorneys.

¶5        On October 6, 2020, the court held a fitness hearing. The parties entered a stipulation that,

if called, a psychologist would testify that she examined defendant and reviewed, inter alia, police

reports, videos, and defendant’s psychiatric-social history. Relevant here, defendant had a history

of psychiatric hospitalization and had been diagnosed in 2015 with bipolar disorder and schizoid

affective disorder, bipolar type. He was interviewed by a psychiatrist several times in late

December 2018, following his arrest in this case, and appeared to be delusional but not grossly

disorganized or responding to internal stimuli. He reported being diagnosed with schizophrenia

but did not believe he had schizophrenia. In 2019 he refused medication; but in 2020 he requested

          1
         As defendant and his mother share a surname, we refer to defendant’s mother by her first name.
We note that, at a pretrial hearing, defendant testified and referred to Betty as his foster mother. This is the
only such reference in the record, which also shows Betty was married to defendant’s father and raised
defendant.

                                                     -2-
No. 1-22-0125

to restart medications to help with anxiety, sleep problems, and mood swings. The psychiatrist

opined defendant was fit to stand trial. The court found defendant fit.

¶6     On September 29, 2021, defendant requested leave to speak in court. The court said no and

instructed him to talk to his lawyer and not speak on the record. Defendant stated he mailed the

court a form, which counsel explained was an untimely pro se motion for substitution of judge.

The court told defendant the motion was improper.

¶7     On the day of trial, before jury selection, counsel informed the court that, earlier that day,

defendant stated he had sent counsel a letter regarding a witness that was “crucial to his defense.”

Defendant told the court he did not know the witness’s name but defendant believed the person

was the murderer and had been living “at that place.” Defendant offered the name of a person in

jail who might be related to the suspect and stated he knew an address where the suspect might

live. Defendant repeatedly interrupted the court until the court threatened to put him “in back”

during trial. The court denied a continuance as the jury was “waiting outside,” and an investigation

would be “a wild goose chase.”

¶8     At trial, Daniel Unold testified that, the afternoon of December 24, 2018, he was working

on a garbage truck. In an alley on the 10800 block of South Prospect Avenue, in Chicago, Unold

and his partner emptied a garbage cart into the truck. He then observed part of a body in the truck.

The driver of the truck called it into dispatch and police officers arrived.

¶9     Chicago police detective Donald Clark testified that he responded to the alley. He observed

what he later learned were Betty’s “cut or mutilated” remains in the garbage truck, wrapped in

blankets or towels. Half her face and some of her teeth were missing.

                                                 -3-
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 10   Clark was then called to Betty’s home on the 10500 block of South Church Street, about

three blocks away. Betty’s family members had entered and observed blood. Clark searched the

home and observed what appeared to be dried blood in the connected living and dining rooms.

Some of the blood was covered with a white powder which Clark believed was boric acid. Boric

acid is used to clean stains, and a bottle of boric acid was nearby. Officers further discovered a

human tooth and a book on removing stains.

¶ 11   While Clark and other officers searched the house, defendant arrived around 9 or 9:30 p.m.

in a silver Ford Taurus. Defendant stated the vehicle was Betty’s. He wore a black and white

striped jacket that smelled of blood and appeared to have blood on the sleeve. Officers handcuffed

defendant and he stated he had a knife. Officers discovered two small knives on his person. They

walked him to a squad car and searched him again, recovering two four-inch knives in sheaths

underneath his outer clothes. On cross-examination, Clark testified that the bottle with boric acid

was bedbug killer.

¶ 12   The State entered a stipulation that, if called, an assistant medical examiner would testify

that Betty died of homicide. She suffered four “chop” wounds to her head, three of which were

more than three inches long; a five-inch by four-inch gaping wound on her face; several incise

wounds on her left arm and hand; stab, incise, and gaping wounds to her left leg; a gaping wound

on her right thigh; and, a four-inch incise wound and a stab wound on her right arm. She also

suffered blunt force trauma injuries on her right hand, a fractured clavicle, and three fractured ribs

“associated with right chest muscle hemorrhage.” The medical examiner submitted a sample of

Betty’s DNA to the Chicago Police Department.

                                                -4-
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 13   Paul Presnell, a Chicago police forensic investigator, testified that he examined a silver

Ford Taurus. There were red stains on the inner panel of the driver’s side rear door and driver’s

side rear seatbelt. A presumptive test for blood on the stain from the door panel was positive.

Presnell removed and inventoried a portion of the seatbelt strap and clip.

¶ 14   Veronica Jackson, a forensic scientist for the Illinois State Police, testified that she

examined a jacket, four knives, and a seatbelt strap. Tests indicated the presence of blood in stains

on one of the knives, the jacket’s sleeve, and seatbelt. The other three knives did not have blood

stains. Jackson preserved samples of the blood-stained evidence for DNA analysis.

¶ 15   Stephanie Plazibat, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, testified that she

performed DNA analysis on samples of the blood-stained evidence. Samples of the jacket and

knife had a mix of two DNA contributors. The major profile on each item was a full female profile.

A sample of the seatbelt had only a full female profile. Betty could not be excluded from being the

contributor of the female profile on each item, and only 1 in 290 nonillion unrelated individuals

could not be excluded. On cross-examination, Plazibat testified that she did not receive a standard

of the suspect’s DNA to compare to the minor profiles from the jacket and knife.

¶ 16   The State rested. The defense entered a stipulation to the foundation of body-worn camera

footage from police officers in the alley and at Betty’s house. The defense published clips of that

footage which are included in the record on appeal and have been reviewed by this court. The clips

depict, inter alia, officers searching the house, handcuffing defendant, and recovering the knives.

¶ 17   Following argument, the jury found defendant guilty first degree murder.

¶ 18   Counsel filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. Relevant here, counsel

asserted that the court erred in denying a continuance to investigate the possible suspect defendant

                                                -5-
No. 1-22-0125

mentioned before trial. Counsel argued that, by doing so, the court denied defendant a fair trial,

due process, and the effective assistance of counsel as the denial prevented counsel from

sufficiently investigating the other suspect.

¶ 19   At a hearing on the motion, counsel stated he was resting on the motion. He noted that

defendant had raised his hand. Counsel informed the court that defendant was “objecting to

[counsel] even doing this motion. He doesn’t want me to do it, but I’m doing it *** to protect his

rights. But that’s the reason he’s raising his hand.” The court responded, “Okay,” and counsel

continued, “Just so you have on the record he’s opposing me doing a motion for new trial or a

motion for judgment of acquittal.” The court again responded, “Okay,” and then prompted the

State to argue the motion.

¶ 20   Regarding the court’s denial of a continuance to investigate the possible suspect, the State

argued that defendant raised the suspect on the day of trial and offered no real information. After

the State concluded, counsel clarified that he and his partner received defendant’s information

about the other possible suspect “as the potential jurors were outside the courtroom.” Although the

court denied the defense a continuance, counsel’s partner sought the person whom defendant

named but did not find him, and counsels “continued to look into it.” When counsel finished, the

court told defendant to put his hand down. The court denied the motion.

¶ 21   The cause proceeded directly to sentencing. Defendant’s presentence investigative report

(PSI) noted that the investigator twice tried to interview defendant to prepare the PSI but defendant

did not cooperate. However, counsel submitted to the investigator several documents regarding

defendant’s education and mental health history, which were appended to the PSI.

                                                -6-
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 22   The appended documents include, inter alia, school records showing defendant was not

disciplined for any violent incidents in school but was bullied and the victim of a “battery and

robbery” by other students. The records indicate that throughout 2011 and 2012 he often broke

school rules by refusing to remove his hat and disrupting class. He graduated high school in 2012.

A psychosocial history compiled by Forensic Clinical Services through an interview with

defendant’s cousin indicated that there was domestic violence between defendant’s parents and

defendant may have been physically abused.

¶ 23   Medical records showed defendant was admitted to a hospital on February 28, 2015, when

he was 21 years old. Betty had noted he had delusional thoughts and started a fire outside his

apartment. He had not been taking medication and was hearing voices and responding to internal

stimuli. He had a history of bipolar disorder. A doctor found defendant’s thoughts extremely

disorganized. He was placed on psychotropic medication, diagnosed with bipolar disorder and

acute psychosis, and discharged from the hospital on March 4, 2015.

¶ 24   Defendant was readmitted for four days in May 2015, when the police brought him to the

hospital “for exhibiting inappropriate behavior at home.” He was unkempt and had disorganized

thoughts. After responding to medication and therapy, he was diagnosed with schizoaffective

disorder, bipolar type, and instructed to follow-up at a mental health clinic. The final diagnosis

was schizophrenia. Betty requested defendant receive a Haldol shot. He returned to the hospital on

June 14, 2015, and was discharged the same day. Betty had brought him after a neighbor observed

him appear anxious and confused and he told Betty he had seen “a fog” in his room. The final

diagnosis was acute psychosis and schizophrenia.

                                              -7-
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 25   At the sentencing hearing, the court noted that counsel had tendered to the court the

materials he gave the investigator for the PSI. The court noted that defendant had been found fit

before trial, and counsel stated that nothing had changed regarding defendant’s fitness since that

hearing.

¶ 26   In aggravation, the State argued that defendant was a danger to society as he killed his

mother in a “horrific way,” inflicting “grotesque” wounds and dumping her body in a garbage can.

The State requested a sentence of “several decades.” The State confirmed that defendant had no

criminal history.

¶ 27   In mitigation, counsel noted that defendant was 25 years old when he committed the

offense and requested the court consider the factors provided in People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327,

and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). Defendant experienced domestic violence in the

home and likely suffered physical abuse. He graduated high school and attended some college.

The changes in defendant’s diagnoses indicated that his schizophrenia had been worsening over

time. His mental illness prevented him from working. Schizophrenia tended to become “full-

blown” around age 26, and imprisonment would impact his condition as the Department of

Corrections was not equipped to handle defendant’s condition. He had a good jail record. Counsel

recited that the statutory mitigation factors included whether defendant suffered from a serious

mental illness which was insufficient to establish an insanity defense but nevertheless substantially

affected his ability to understand the nature of his acts or conform his conduct to the requirements

of the law. Counsel requested a recommendation for counseling or treatment, a minimum 20-year

sentence, and a modification to find defendant guilty but mentally ill.

                                                -8-
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 28   The court then informed defendant it was his turn to speak in allocution, and he could say

anything he wanted. Defendant told the court to impose whatever sentence the court felt so he

could leave, as he was “not about to debate with the devil.” He continued:

                “I feel like we not about to—What’s it called, acquit, what’s it called when you

       come back? We not about to do all that s***. Just give me the sentence. Let’s just go to the

       NRC. We trying to do this within a week. You got Corona going on. If it’s going to take

       you a while, let’s get the sentencing today or whatever or you going to call your bluff,

       whatever. I’m not about to keep doing this s***.”

¶ 29   The court stated it had reviewed the facts of the case, and noted Betty had been stabbed

numerous times and “gruesome[ly]” recovered in a garbage can. The nature of the crime was

aggravating. The court had considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation, counsels’

arguments, the PSI and reports from defense counsel, and defendant’s mental health. Defendant

needed mental health treatment but his mental health did not preclude him from being fit for trial

or understanding the proceedings. The court merged the strong probability murder count into the

intentional murder count (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2018)) and sentenced defendant to 45 years’

imprisonment, recommending mental health treatment.

¶ 30   On January 18, 2022, counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence. Pertinently, counsel

argued that the sentence was excessive given defendant’s background and that the court failed to

properly consider mitigating evidence, including defendant’s mental health. Counsel cited a

number of authorities to provide information about schizophrenia, including online sources for

which counsel provided links and other sources for which counsel provided the International

Standard Book Number (ISBN). Among the latter, counsel cited to the Diagnostic and Statistical

                                              -9-
No. 1-22-0125

Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic

and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition, DSM-5 (2013)), and Ferri’s Clinical

Advisor (Fred F. Ferri, Ferri’s Clinical Advisor 2019 (Elsevier 2019)).

¶ 31   Counsel explained that schizophrenia usually develops in a person’s late teens to early 30’s,

and peaks in males in the early to mid-20’s. According to counsel’s sources, schizophrenia

decreases a person’s life expectancy by 20 years due to its association with obesity, poor diet,

smoking, a sedentary lifestyle and, to a lesser extent, an increased rate of suicide. It may cause,

inter alia, delusions; hallucinations; the feeling that one’s impulses, actions or thoughts are not

generated by oneself; disorganized thinking; disorganized behavior such as unpredictable or

inappropriate emotional responses; and extreme agitation. At least one-third of people with

schizophrenia experience complete remission of symptoms, while others see their schizophrenia

worsen over time or experience periodic worsening and remission.

¶ 32   The same day, the court held a hearing on the motion. Counsel requested the court reduce

the sentence and consider finding defendant guilty but mentally ill. The State argued that counsel

was speculating about the potential worsening of defendant’s schizophrenia. The court found there

was insufficient evidence to find defendant guilty but mentally ill. The court noted that it

considered the “important and relevant” mitigating evidence in imposing sentence, including

counsel’s argument about defendant’s mental health. As defendant was 25 years old when he

committed the offense, the juvenile sentencing arguments counsel raised did not apply. The court

denied the motion.

¶ 33   Defendant now appeals. He first argues that the court erred in failing to perform a

preliminary Krankel hearing.

                                              - 10 -
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 34   Pursuant to Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim that

he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the court must examine the claim’s factual basis

and determine whether there was possible neglect by counsel. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142,

¶ 29. If the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy the court may deny the

pro se motion. Id. If the allegations show possible neglect, however, the court should appoint new

counsel. Id. The court’s inquiry may involve a discussion of the allegations with the defendant or

counsel, and the court may also consider its own knowledge of counsel’s performance at trial.

People v. Jones, 2019 IL App (1st) 170478, ¶ 36 (citing People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12;

Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 30).

¶ 35   To trigger the court’s duty to perform a preliminary inquiry, the defendant must bring his

claim “to the trial court’s attention.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ayres, 2017 IL 120071,

¶ 11. He may do so orally and need not file a written motion. Id. However, he must bring a “clear”

claim. Id. ¶ 18. Further, although the procedure is intended to facilitate the consideration of pro se

claims, the defendant’s counsel may raise the issue of his own ineffectiveness “if he does so clearly

and at the direction of the defendant,” and alerts the court that he is raising the claim at the

defendant’s direction. People v. Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 33.

¶ 36   The issue here is whether defendant triggered the court’s duty to perform a preliminary

Krankel inquiry. That is a legal question we review de novo. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 75

(2010). We conclude that defendant did not make a clear claim of ineffective assistance, and the

court therefore did not err in failing to perform a preliminary Krankel inquiry.

¶ 37   Defendant argues he brought a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to the court’s

attention where he twice raised his hand during argument on the motion for a judgment of acquittal

                                                - 11 -
No. 1-22-0125

or new trial: first when counsel rested on the motion, at which point counsel informed the court

defendant raised his hand because he objected to counsel “doing” the motion; and again when

counsel asserted that he and his partner had attempted to investigate the potential suspect despite

the court’s denial of a continuance. Neither time did the court allow defendant to speak.

¶ 38   The State notes that, when told he could say anything in allocution, defendant indicated

only that he wanted the proceedings to end. Defendant counters that it was reasonable for him to

merely raise his hand and remain silent when the court did not prompt him to speak as the court

previously prohibited him from speaking on the record or filing pro se motions. Moreover, he

contends his statement in allocution is irrelevant to what he might have said about counsel’s

performance. He maintains that by not allowing him to speak when he raised his hand, the court

short-circuited the purpose of the Krankel proceeding, which is to make a record and allow the

trial court to hear claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Johnathan T., 2022 IL

127222, ¶ 43 (Krankel procedure is intended to establish facts underlying the ineffective assistance

claim, create a record, and limit the issues on appeal).

¶ 39   We find that defendant did not clearly raise a pro se claim of ineffective assistance by

raising his hand. Counsel’s statement that defendant raised his hand because he did not want

counsel to file the posttrial motion is open to multiple interpretations. As the State argues, it could

mean that defendant did not want any posttrial motion filed on his behalf. Or, as defendant argues,

it could mean that defendant did not want trial counsel, specifically, to file the posttrial motion on

his behalf because he had taken issue with counsel’s representation. Likewise, when defendant

raised his hand a second time it may have been to disagree with counsel that counsels had tried to

investigate the suspect. It may also have been to offer more information about the suspect, or

                                                - 12 -
No. 1-22-0125

bolster counsel’s argument that a thorough investigation had been impossible without a

continuance, or anything else.

¶ 40   Defendant argues that the absence of information regarding what defendant would have

said if allowed to speak shows that the court erred in failing to perform a Krankel inquiry. But

courts are not required to conduct Krankel inquiries where a claim is subject to different

interpretations. People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 26 (citing Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d at

77). Moreover, defendant’s statement in allocution bolsters the State’s interpretation of

defendant’s conduct—that he did not want any posttrial motion filed. In allocution, defendant

urged the court to “[j]ust give [him] the sentence,” as he did not want to “come back” but wanted

the sentence imposed that day.

¶ 41   Defendant contends that, as his statement came at sentencing after the court denied his

posttrial motion, he had no reason to explain what he wanted to say earlier. However, the court

told defendant it was his turn to speak and he could say anything he wanted. Nevertheless, he did

not comment on counsel’s performance. See People v. Zirko, 2012 IL App (1st) 092158, ¶ 72

(finding defendant failed to bring claim of ineffective assistance to court’s attention where he made

a brief statement at sentencing but did not mention the claim).

¶ 42   Defendant asserts he did not need to use the words “ineffective assistance” or explicitly

state he was dissatisfied with counsel’s performance to trigger a Krankel inquiry. See Johnathan

T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶¶ 7, 54 (minor-defendant raised claim in sex offender evaluation by telling

evaluator he and his lawyer did not talk, he was not prepared for the stand, and his lawyer did not

answer calls, as that indicated the lawyer “was not doing something that he should have been

                                               - 13 -
No. 1-22-0125

doing”). While we agree that defendant did not have to use these specific terms, here, he made no

statement implicating counsel’s performance. Johnathan T. is therefore distinguishable.

¶ 43   Further, we find that counsel did not clearly raise a pro se claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel on defendant’s behalf. See Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 33 (for counsel to bring pro se

claim on a defendant’s behalf, counsel must raise the issue “clearly and at the direction of the

defendant”). Counsel filed a motion arguing that the court erred by denying the continuance to

investigate the other suspect defendant referenced, which denied defendant effective assistance of

counsel by precluding counsel from conducting a sufficient investigation. However, counsel did

not argue that he and his partner had performed deficiently under the circumstances. See People

v. Ramirez, 2018 IL App (1st) 152125, ¶ 16 (in determining whether counsel was deficient, court

considers all the circumstances and evaluates conduct from counsel’s contemporaneous

perspective). Moreover, as counsel indicated that defendant did not want counsel to litigate the

motion, the claim was not brought at defendant’s direction. We therefore cannot say that defendant

brought a pro se complaint about counsel’s performance through counsel to trigger the court’s

duty to perform a preliminary Krankel inquiry.

¶ 44   In conclusion, a court’s duty under Krankel is only triggered upon a clear claim of

ineffective assistance. Bates, 2019 IL 124143, ¶ 33. Here, because defendant did not raise such a

claim and counsel did not raise one on his behalf, the court was not required to make any inquiry.

¶ 45   Next, defendant contends that his 45-year sentence is excessive. He argues that a 45-year

term is essentially a life sentence given the low life expectancy of incarcerated persons and that

his schizophrenia will likely decrease his life expectancy by approximately 20 years. He claims

the court inadequately considered his rehabilitative potential as he had no criminal history,

                                              - 14 -
No. 1-22-0125

completed high school, and has schizophrenia. Defendant asserts that, although he was not a minor,

the combination of his age and schizophrenia indicate he has similar rehabilitative potential as a

minor for purposes of Miller. Further, while horrible, the nature of his crime indicated it was a

“chaotic crime committed by a 25 year old suffering delusions” rather than “a well-planned, cold-

blooded murder.”

¶ 46   The Illinois Constitution requires courts, when imposing sentence, to balance the

seriousness of the offense with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The sentencing court has broad discretion and its decisions are entitled to

great deference as it is better positioned than the reviewing court to weigh factors like the

defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits,

and age. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13 (2010). Thus, we may not substitute our

judgment for the trial court’s merely because we would have weighed those factors differently. Id.

at 213. Rather, when a sentence is within statutory limits, we will not disturb it absent an abuse of

discretion, i.e., unless it greatly varies with the spirit or purpose of the law or is manifestly

disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209-10 (2000); see

also People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46 (sentences within statutory range are

presumptively proper and only disturbed if there is an affirmative showing that it varies with the

law or is manifestly disproportionate).

¶ 47   While a sentence may be excessive if it fails to adequately reflect mitigating evidence and

the defendant’s rehabilitative potential (see People v. Margentina, 261 Ill. App. 3d 247, 249-50

(1994)), the presence of mitigating factors does not require a court to impose the minimum

sentence (People v. Towns, 2020 IL App (1st) 171145, ¶ 48). The seriousness of the crime is the

                                                - 15 -
No. 1-22-0125

most important factor (id.), and the court may weigh it more heavily than the defendant’s

rehabilitative potential (Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214). Absent some affirmative indication

otherwise, we presume the trial court considered the mitigating evidence presented. People v.

Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011).

¶ 48   As a threshold matter, we note that defendant has included in the appendix of his brief the

pages of the DSM-5 and Ferri’s Clinical Advisor that he cited in his motion to reconsider the

sentence. There, he cited them for the proposition that schizophrenia typically onsets between a

person’s teens and early-30’s, and peaks in males in the early-20’s. Here, he cites them for that

point and several others, including that: the treatment of schizophrenia may be pharmacological or

not; most people who suffer from schizophrenia often switch between medications due to adverse

side effects or to find the medication which works best for them; most who suffer from

schizophrenia are not aggressive; aggression is most common in younger males; and, the

symptoms of schizophrenia usually diminish over time. In addition to those sources included in

his appendix, he cites the online sources that were also cited in the motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 49   The State argues that we should strike or disregard the materials included in defendant’s

appendix and the portions of his brief referencing those materials as they were not included in the

record on appeal. Defendant counters that, as trial counsel cited the materials before the trial court,

they were before the trial court and we may consider them. We agree with the State. The issue is

not whether citing the materials in the motion to reconsider put them in front of the trial court, but

whether defendant may supplement the record on appeal, which does not include the materials, by

appending them to his brief. We find that he may not.

                                                - 16 -
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 50   The appendix to an appellant’s brief must include “pleadings or other materials from the

record which are the basis of the appeal.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 342 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).

An appellant may not include in the appendix a document absent from the certified record on

appeal, which he is obligated to compile and present. Insurance Benefit Group, Inc. v. Guarantee

Trust Life Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162808, ¶ 44; see also People v. Wright, 2013 IL App

(1st) 103232, ¶ 38 (“The inclusion of evidence in an appendix is an improper supplementation of

the record with information dehors the record.”); Zimmer v. Melendez, 222 Ill. App. 3d 390, 394-

95 (1991) (“[A]ttachments to briefs not included in the record are not properly before the reviewing

court and cannot be used to supplement the record.”).

¶ 51   Defendant argues that our courts regularly cite books and treatises, citing In re Detention

Of New, 2014 IL 116306, ¶ 42, where our supreme court discussed the contents of DSM-5. There,

however, the issue was whether scientific evidence presented at trial was generally accepted, which

allowed the court to “consider not only the trial court record but also *** sources outside the

record, including legal and scientific articles ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 39.

That is not the case here. Thus, we will not consider the materials defendant appended to his brief.

Oruta v. B.E.W. & Continental, 2016 IL App (1st) 152735, ¶ 32 (where party appends materials

to brief that are not taken from record, reviewing court may strike the brief or disregard the

inappropriate material).

¶ 52   Ultimately, however, our disposition does not turn on our independent review of the

secondary sources defendant relies on. We are tasked with evaluating whether the trial court

appropriately considered the evidence presented to it, not with weighing that evidence ourselves.

                                               - 17 -
No. 1-22-0125

See Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213 (reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for the trial

court’s merely because it would have weighed sentencing factors differently).

¶ 53   We turn to the merits of defendant’s claim. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree

murder. First degree murder carries a term of imprisonment between 20 and 60 years. 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2018). The trial court sentenced defendant to 45 years’ imprisonment. As his

sentence is within the statutory sentencing range, we review it for an abuse of discretion. Stacey,

193 Ill. 2d at 209-10. Moreover, as the sentence is within the statutory range, it is presumptively

proper unless defendant affirmatively shows otherwise. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.

Defendant does not make that showing here.

¶ 54   First, we find defendant’s arguments related to Miller and Buffer unavailing. Miller

established that mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders violate the eighth amendment.

Miller, 567 U.S. at 469-80. Buffer established that a 40-year sentence is a de facto life sentence for

a juvenile. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶¶ 40-41. Defendant, however, was not a juvenile when he

committed the offense. He was 25 years old. Even though our courts have extended protections

under Miller and its progeny to young adult offenders older than 18 years old, we have not

extended them to offenders as old as defendant. See People v. Robinson, 2021 IL App (1st) 192289,

¶ 48 (24-year-old offender was “well past both the juvenile cutoff for eighth amendment Miller-

based claims and the 18-to-21-year-old group of defendants who have asserted as-applied Miller-

based claims under the proportionate penalties clause”).

¶ 55   Moreover, Miller did not render all life sentences or de facto life sentences for a young

adult offender improper. Rather, it rendered mandatory life sentences for juveniles

unconstitutional because they prevented courts from considering factors such as the offender’s

                                                - 18 -
No. 1-22-0125

immaturity, impulsivity, and increased vulnerability to negative influences. Miller, 567 U.S. at

471-80. Nor did Buffer render sentences greater than 40 years unconstitutional for a youthful

offender; it rendered them unconstitutional if imposed without consideration of the offender’s

“youth and attendant characteristics.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 42. Here, defendant was not

subject to a mandatory life or de facto life sentence and, as will be discussed below, the court did

not fail to consider defendant’s relative youth or mental health issues. Rather, the record shows

that the court explicitly considered these factors. Thus, Miller and Buffer are inapplicable.2

¶ 56    Defendant argues that the court focused too heavily on the nature of his crime at the

expense of adequately considering his rehabilitative potential, including his age, lack of criminal

history, and schizophrenia, which typically onsets in the early 20’s but may diminish over time.

He cites People v. Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d 899 (1985), in which the court halved the defendant’s

sentences for attempted murder and armed violence. Although the trial court had found the

offenses were heinous, brutal, and indicative of wanton cruelty, this court found potential for

rehabilitation demonstrated by, inter alia, the 24-year old defendant’s minor criminal history,

history of being abused, drug and alcohol problem, and his commission of the offenses in a

“fleeting moment of intoxicated rage upon a stranger.” Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 905; see also

People v. Smith, 178 Ill. App. 3d 976, 985 (1989) (murder sentence excessive where court did not

        2
         Although not cited by defendant, we note that this court has, in one instance, applied Miller to an
offender older than 21. See People v. Savage, 2020 IL App (1st) 173135 (reversing summary dismissal of
postconviction petition arguing that 85-year sentence violated proportionate penalties clause where
defendant was 22 years old at the time of the offense and claimed his long-term drug addiction and youth
rendered him the functional equivalent of a juvenile). However, defendant here was three years older than
the defendant in Savage, and, unlike in Savage, the court here considered the relevant sentencing factors as
discussed infra.

                                                  - 19 -
No. 1-22-0125

adequately weigh rehabilitative potential of minor who suffered from intellectual delays and had

no prior criminal history).

¶ 57   However, the court was not required to weigh defendant’s rehabilitative potential more

heavily than the seriousness of his offense. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 214. Here, the record

demonstrates the trial court considered the rehabilitation potential defendant raises. First, the

mitigation evidence was set forth in the PSI and counsel’s supporting documents, and counsel

vigorously argued that evidence. Counsel’s arguments included that defendant was 25 years old at

the time of the offense, was physically abused as a child, and did well in school until he neared

graduation. Counsel detailed defendant’s history of mental illness, argued his schizophrenia

affected his ability to understand the nature of his acts or conform his conduct to the requirements

of the law, noted that schizophrenia tended to become “full-blown” in a person’s mid-20’s, and

argued that imprisonment would negatively impact defendant’s condition. The court is presumed

to have considered all mitigating evidence and argument presented. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d at

763.

¶ 58   Further, in imposing sentence, the court specifically stated it had considered the factors in

mitigation, the PSI and reports from defense counsel, defendant’s “mental health,” and counsel’s

arguments, demonstrating it did in fact consider all the mitigating evidence. The court also stated

it considered the factors in aggravation, and found the nature of defendant’s crime aggravating

where Betty had been stabbed numerous times and “gruesome[ly]” recovered in a garbage can.

After counsel filed and argued a motion to reconsider the sentence, the court again noted it

considered the “important and relevant” mitigating evidence, including counsel’s argument about

defendant’s mental health.

                                               - 20 -
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 59   Thus, the record demonstrates the court considered the mitigating evidence, including

defendant’s schizophrenia, in imposing his sentence. We cannot disturb his sentence merely

because we may have weighed the mitigating evidence differently. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213.

And, as the trial court noted and defendant readily admits, the nature of his offense was extremely

aggravating where he inflicted numerous, gruesome wounds on his mother and the evidence

suggests he then drove her remains to an alley and deposited them in a garbage can. The

seriousness of the crime is the most important factor (Towns, 2020 IL App (1st) 171145, ¶ 48),

and here that crime included breaking Betty’s clavicle and three ribs, knocking her teeth out, and

stabbing her approximately 20 times, inflicting not only multiple inches-long chop wounds but a

five-inch-by-four-inch gaping wound to her face. The detective testified that half her face was

missing when her body was recovered. Unlike in Treadway, relied on by defendant, where the

evidence showed the defendant committed his offenses “in a fleeting moment of intoxicated rage

upon a stranger” (Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 905), nothing in the record shows the

circumstances of Betty’s murder beyond that she was defendant’s mother, and we will not

speculate as to those circumstances.

¶ 60   Ultimately, the record shows the court considered defendant’s rehabilitative potential and,

despite the aggravating nature of the murder, imposed a 45-year sentence, which is near the

midpoint of the applicable sentencing range and 15 fewer years’ than the maximum. 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2018) (sentence for first degree murder is to be between 20 and 60 years’

imprisonment). We cannot say that defendant’s sentence is manifestly disproportionate to the

nature of his offense or greatly varies with the spirit or purpose of the law. Thus, we affirm the

sentence.

                                              - 21 -
No. 1-22-0125

¶ 61   In sum, the court did not err by failing to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry or abuse

its discretion when imposing the 45-year sentence. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the

judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 62   Affirmed.

                                                - 22 -