Court Opinion

ID: 9589260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:43:01.517709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:56.130465
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
I am unable to read into the pertinent statute, Code, 31-1-84, the intent on the part of the Legislature to relieve *844foreign corporations, licensed to do business in this State, from liability of certain torts for which domestic corporations must answer in damages. Most certainly, the language of the statute does not expressly do so. After providing the method whereby a foreign corporation may be licensed to do business in this State, and after providing that “The secretary of state shall * * * issue to such corporation a certificate of withdrawal” upon the doing of certain acts by the corporation, the statute provides: “The issuance of such certificate of withdrawal shall not relieve the corporation of any debt or obligation due from it to the State or any resident thereof.” Notice the use of the words “debt or obligation”. Notice also the absence of any word or phrase limiting liability to cases wherein causes of action have accrued, as are contained in some statutes of other jurisdictions.
The majority opinion concedes that as to a liability arising out of contract, such a corporation is not relieved of liability by withdrawal, even though no cause of action has accrued, but refuses to apply the same rule where the liability arises out of tort. There exists no reason why such a corporation should not be held liable in the courts of this State for its unlawful or tortious acts, committed by it before withdrawal, even though damages resulting from such acts do not result until after withdrawal. The wording of the statute, as well as its spirit and purpose, compels this conclusion.
As above noticed, the statute continues the liability of such a corporation after withdrawal as to “any debt or obligation”. The word “obligation” is of very broad meaning and embraces tort claims. It includes “That which a person is bound to do or forbear; any duty imposed by law, promise, contract, relations of society, courtesy, kindness, etc.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. “The obligation is the bond or chain with which the law joins together persons or groups of persons in consequence of certain voluntary acts. The acts which have the effect of attracting an obligation are chiefly those classed under the heads of Contract and Delict, of agree*845ment and crime.” ' Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Rawle’s Third Revision. “That which a person is bound to do or forbear, any duty imposed by law, promise, or contract, by the relations of society, or by courtesy, kindness, etc.” Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition. In none of the definitions is there any indication that there must exist a “cause of action” before there can exist an “obligation”. Is it not clear that the Legislature, by using the word “obligation”, after using the word “debt”, intended to continue liability of such a corporation after withdrawal as to all liabilities not necessarily embraced in the word “debt”? Had the Legislature intended to limit such continued liability to cases where causes of action had accrued before withdrawal, would it not have said as much instead of using the all inclusive words “debt or obligation”? If it had intended one rule as to obligations relating to contracts, and another as to torts, would it not have said as much?
In Lynchburg Colliery Co. v. Gauley and Eastern Railway Co., 92 W. Va. 144, 114 S. E. 462, the plaintiff sought damages done to its lands by the defendant in construction of a railroad. Action was instituted subsequent to withdrawal of defendant. This Court held: “1. Besides the jurisdiction in equity to wind up the affairs of a dissolved corporation, given by section 59 of chapter 53 of the Code, said section properly construed extends the life of a corporation for all purposes of suits, at law or in equity, to vindicate the rights of third persons against it respecting its contracts or torts. The ruling on this subject in Stiles v. Laurel Fork Oil & Coal Company, 47 W. Va. 838, interpreted.” In the opinion, the Court said: “The old rule of the common law has been changed in most, if not all, of the states; and under most of them a corporation may be made liable for torts committed before or after the expiration of its charter. 14A C. J. 1151, section 3804. And this authority says this rule is applied generally when the statute, as in this state, continues the existence of corporations for the purpose of winding up and settling their affairs * *
*846I think it can not be disputed with any force that' the Legislature intended, and attempted to provide, for the citizens of this State, the same rights with reference to actions against foreign corporations doing business in this State as exist against domestic corporations. “1. Foreign building associations legally doing business in this State have the same rights, powers, and privileges, and are subject to the same regulations, restrictions, and liabilities as domestic associations.” Archer v. Baltimore Building & Loan Ass’n, 45 W. Va. 37, 30 S. E. 241, 26 L. R. A., N. S., 1138n. See Toledo Tie & Lumber Co. v. Thomas, 33 W. Va. 566, 11 S. E. 37, 25 Am. St. Rep. 925, 24 L. R. A. 317n. The State Code, 31-1-71, constituting the auditor of this State attorney in fact for the purpose of accepting service of process, makes no distinction between those corporations organized under the laws of this State and corporations organized under the laws of other jurisdictions, or as to actions based on contracts and actions arising out of torts. I can not read either such distinction into the statute, and believe none was intended. Neither can I find any support for the view adopted by the majority opinion in the numerous cases cited therein. Those cases relate merely to causes of action arising out of contract, or are controlled by statutes materially different from our own. The quotations contained in the majority opinion, in so far as applicable, most of them having relation only to cases arising on contract, I think, support the view expressed in this dissent. For example, the majority rule quoted from 45 A. L. R. 1447, Ha, says that “the withdrawal of the corporation from the state does not revoke the authority of the agent to receive service in an action on a liability arising in the state out of business done by the foreign corporation therein”. Notice that the authority to accept service of process rests upon the existence of “liability”, not the accruing of a cause of action. Can it be questioned that the “liability” of defendant in the instant action, resulting from its wrongful and negligent manner of strip mining, did not arise in connection with the business done by it in the State? As pointed out above, the majority concedes that under our statute service on *847the auditor as to a contract liability, where the cause of action did not accrue until after withdrawal, as where a note representing indebtedness would not become due until after withdrawal, would be good service. In this respect, is there any basis for a different rule as to tort liabilities? It has been suggested that if such a rule existed as to tort liabilities, foreign corporations could not determine the extent of their liabilities upon withdrawal. But is not the foreign corporation withdrawing charged with knowledge of its own wrongful and negligent acts and its liability as to such acts?
The majority would also rely upon public policy to support its conclusion, in that such a policy would induce the investment of foreign capital within the State. But can we imagine our Legislature adopting a policy which would permit foreign corporations to exploit, by tortious acts, the property and rights of the citizens of this State, and escape liability by the simple means of withdrawal, an act wholly within the power of the foreign corporation, in so far as citizens are concerned, while requiring domestic corporations to respond in damages for the same type of liability? Would not such a policy tend to injure, if not destroy, domestic corporations? The inherent danger in the conclusion is not imaginary. According to allegations of the declaration in the instant action, the twenty one farms were severely and permanently injured by the unlawful methods employed by defendant in its strip mining operations. Defendant breached its duty or obligation in connection therewith and should be required to respond in damages, in the courts of this State, to the same extent and in the same manner as domestic corporations would be held liable.
Being of the views indicated, I respectfully dissent. I would hold the acceptance of service of process by the auditor valid.