Court Opinion

ID: 5438378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-08 17:57:54.659127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:31:55.435286
License: Public Domain

Rhodes, J., dissenting:
The principal question to be determined in this case is, what is the real nature of the transaction .between Donner and Yontz on the one side, and Lander and Swazy on the other? Donner and Yontz wished to procure two witnesses to testify to a certain fact, and it was agreed between all the parties that, if the witnesses should be procured by Swazy, Donner and Yontz would pay therefor the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, and that the money would be paid to Lander, as Swazy was indebted to him.. In order to secure the payment of the money, an instrument, in form a deed of conveyance, was executed to Lander by Donner and Yontz; and thereupon Lander executed to Donner and Yontz the instrument in evidence, which may be called a defeasance. It is therein recited that Lander had received from Donner and Yontz the deed of conveyance as security for the payment of the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, to be paid as therein mentioned, provided that he (Lander) should procure the two witnesses before mentioned, and that if he should not procure such witnesses, then the deed should be null and void. These two instruments are to be read together, as forming parts of one transaction; and when so read, they clearly constitute a mortgage. The nature of the transaction is not *381changed by the fact that Donner and Tontz did not make an absolute promise to pay the money. If “A.” agrees with “B.” to perform a certain act, and “B.” agrees that upon the performance of the act he will pay “A.” a certain sum of money, and executes a conveyance to secure the payment of the money, there is no doubt that the instruments will be construed between the parties as a mortgage. And if “A.” promises to pay the money if “B.” shall perform the act, the construction is the same. In other words, the question whether an instrument amounts' to a mortgage does not depend upon whether the mortgagor absolutely or conditionally promises to make the payment.
In ascertaining whether the transaction amounts to a mortgage, the real nature of the stipulations between the parties must be looked into, and therefrom the intent of the parties is to be ascertained. And if the instrument, which is in form a deed of conveyance, was in fact intended to secure the performance of an agreement on the part, of the maker of the instrument, or of some person for whom he undertook to be responsible, it will be held to be a mortgage. So in this case Bonner, and Tontz promised to pay two thousand five hundred dollars should the two witnesses mentioned be procured, and the deed was given to secure the performance of that undertaking. When an instrument is once determined to be a mortgage, the familiar rule applies: “Once a mortgage, always a mortgage.” In determining whether it be a mortgage, the question is not whether the conditions are legal or illegal. It may be admitted that the agreement on the part of Lander or Swazy to procure the two witnesses was contrary to public policy, but that fact does not change the character of the instrument and make a deed of conveyance out of a mortgage. The question of the legality or illegality of the condition is important only when it is attempted to enforce the instrument as a mortgage. It may readily be admitted that if a condition in a deed of conveyance be illegal, the deed will take effect without regard to the condition; but that principle is not involved in this case. If the transaction be found to amount to a mortgage, there is no principle of law, *382so far as I am aware, that will convert.it into a deed, by striking out the defeasance, because it contains an illegal condition. I am therefore unable to concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice McKinstry.
Mr. Chief Justice Wallace, having been of counsel, did not participate in the decision of this case.