Court Opinion

ID: 9382725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 16:11:31.38872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.344978
License: Public Domain

J-S45027-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MICHAEL MCKINNON                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1722 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 15, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
               Criminal Division at No.: CP-51-CR-0001240-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED MARCH 28, 2023

        Appellant Michael McKinnon appeals from the February 15, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia

County (“trial court”), following his bench conviction for strangulation, simple

assault, and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 Upon review,

we affirm.

        The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. As detailed

by the trial court:

        On December 11, 2020, [Appellant] and his intimate partner of
        three years, [G.B.], began to argue after they were involved in a
        car accident. [G.B.] was the driver and [Appellant] was a
        passenger in the car on the way to pick up their two friends when
        they were involved in the accident. After the accident, [G.B.],
        [Appellant], and the two friends drove to [G.B.’s] home at [] South
        Bembrey Street in Philadelphia. [G.B.] attempted to arrange
        picking up a rental car. While [G.B.] made these arrangements,
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2718(a)(1), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
J-S45027-22

     [Appellant] went around the block to a corner store that sells
     liquor shots. He came back to the house from the corner store
     with a “grisly” look on his face, indicating to [G.B.] that he had
     recently drank liquor.

     [Appellant] called [G.B.] a bitch and said he was going to tell the
     insurance company the accident was her fault. [G.B.] called
     [Appellant] a drunk and then drove, with [Appellant] in the car,
     her two friends back to their house. During the car ride back to
     her house on Bembrey Street, [G.B.] called her sister and spoke
     with her through a Bluetooth device, telling her sister that
     [Appellant] had been drinking and that she was going to go to her
     bedroom when she arrived at home because she “knew where this
     [was] heading.” Upon their return to [G.B.’s] house, [Appellant]
     went inside ahead of [G.B.]. Shortly after, [G.B.] followed
     [Appellant] inside. She locked the door, turned around, and
     [Appellant] punched her once in the chest. [G.B.] was still on the
     phone with her sister when this happened.

     Next, [Appellant] grabbed [G.B.’s] shirt and threw her to the floor.
     [G.B.’s] wallet fell from her back pocket when [Appellant] threw
     her down. [G.B.] testified that [Appellant] took her phone and
     threw it across her living room, with the phone landing in between
     her sofa and her table. [G.B.] and [Appellant] grabbed for the
     wallet at the same time. [G.B.] testified that while attempting to
     get the wallet from [G.B.’s] hands, [Appellant] dragged [G.B.] by
     her arms from the front door to the kitchen area.

     [G.B.] testified that [Appellant] sat on her back and pressed his
     forearm around her throat and neck. [G.B.] started to see spots
     and was afraid [Appellant] was going to kill her. [G.B.], despite
     being choked, was able to tell [Appellant] three times that she
     could not breathe. During the struggle, [Appellant] threatened to
     bite [G.B.] causing her to drop the wallet. Eventually, [Appellant]
     stopped choking [G.B.].       Knowing that [G.B.] has asthma,
     [Appellant] retrieved her inhaler, and tossed it on the ground next
     to her. [Appellant] obtained the wallet and took $200 out that he
     had given her earlier that day. [Appellant] left the house with
     [G.B.] still on the ground.

     [G.B.] testified that her sister called the police who arrived after
     [Appellant] left. [G.B.] testified that paramedics arrived after the
     police and gave her a “breathing treatment.” After, she went to
     the police district and gave a statement to detectives about the
     incident. She did not go to the hospital or photograph her injuries,

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J-S45027-22

       but she testified that she had some bruising on her chest area.
       [G.B.] explained that she did not want to be photographed or seek
       medical treatment because it was upsetting and embarrassing.

       The next day, [Appellant] came back to [G.B.’s] house to bring
       back the $200 and a pair of shoes that she had gifted him. Two
       days after that, [Appellant] called [G.B.] complaining that he was
       struggling because he did not have access to his medication and
       that he was hungry. [G.B.] testified that, despite what [Appellant]
       had done to her, she did not want to see him suffer so she dropped
       off a bowl of spaghetti for him at his house.

       [G.B.’s] sister, [J.W.], testified that she was on the phone with
       [G.B.] during this altercation. She testified that the phone call
       went from a calm conversation to stressful after [Appellant] began
       to curse at [G.B.] and call her a bitch. Eventually, the call ended
       and [J.W.] dialed 911 because of what she was hearing over the
       phone.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 1-3 (record citations omitted). Appellant was

charged with and convicted of the above-referenced crimes.2 On February 15,

2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three and one-half to seven years’

imprisonment       for   strangulation,        followed   by   consecutive   two-year

probationary terms for simple assault and REAP.                On February 24, 2022,

Appellant post-sentence motions, which were denied by operation of law June

27, 2022. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Appellant timely appealed. The

trial court directed Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors

complained of on appeal. Appellant complied. In response, the trial court

issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court found Appellant not guilty of theft by unlawful taking –
movable property (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a)) and receiving stolen property (18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a)).

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      On appeal, Appellant argues only that his conviction for strangulation

was not supported by sufficient evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 3. In particular,

he argues that “there was insufficient evidence that he impeded [G.B.’s]

breathing either knowingly or intentionally, the requisite mens rea under 18

Pa.C.S.A. § 2718.” Id.

      “A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law.”

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000).

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 756 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

      Section 2718(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code states, “[a] person

commits the offense of strangulation if the person knowingly or intentionally

impedes the breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by []

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applying pressure to the throat or neck.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2718(a)(1). The

“[i]nfliction of a physical injury to a victim [is] not [] an element of the

offense.” Id. at § 2718(b) (stating, “[t]he lack of physical injury to a victim

shall not be a defense in a prosecution under this section”).

      The Crimes Code defines the terms “knowingly,” and “intentionally” as

follows:

                § 302. General requirements of culpability

       ...

      (b) Kinds of culpability defined.--

      (1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element
      of an offense when:

             (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
             a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in
             conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and

             (ii) if the element involves the attendant
             circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
             circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.

      (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of
      an offense when:

             (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
             the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his
             conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
             exist; and

             (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he
             is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
             will cause such a result.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1-2).          “[I]ntent can be proven by direct or

circumstantial evidence; it may be inferred from acts or conduct or from the

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J-S45027-22

attendant circumstances.”        Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 641

(Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and original quotation marks omitted), appeal

denied, 183 A.3d 970 (Pa. 2018).

       Based on our review of the record, as detailed above, and given the

totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that,

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence

establishes that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Appellant was guilty of strangulation. As the trial court reasoned:

       [T]here was sufficient evidence to convict [Appellant] of
       strangulation beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court
       determined that [G.B.’s] testimony was credible. This credible
       testimony described an intentional choke.[3] Appellant was sitting
       on [G.B.’s] back, pressuring his forearm against her throat and
       neck area. The Commonwealth and [G.B.] both explicitly used
       the word “choke” or “choking” numerous times during [G.B.’s]
       direct examination. [G.B.] began to see spots during the choke
       and felt as if she was going to die. [G.B.] told Appellant that she
       could not breathe three times. [She] recalled that she was unable
       to protest loudly because she “didn’t have much breath.” [G.B.],
       during her testimony, questioned why her partner would choke
       her in this manner when Appellant knew [G.B.] had asthma.
       Appellant impeded [G.B.’s] breathing to the point that she needed
       to use her inhaler and receive breathing treatment from
       paramedics. Appellant’s choke was not merely incidental to the
____________________________________________

3 To the extent Appellant invites us to accept his preferred version of the
events (that because he eventually ceased choking her after she told him
thrice she could not breathe, he merely acted recklessly), we decline the
invitation. It is settled that we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the factfinder—whether a jury or the trial court—because it is the province of
the factfinder to assess the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. See
Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 668 A.2d 97, 101 (Pa. 1995) (“an appellate
court is barred from substituting its judgment for that of the finder of fact.”);
see also Antidormi, supra.

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      struggle for the wallet. Appellant’s conduct was not negligent or
      reckless, but rather an intentional impediment of [G.B.’s]
      breathing.      There is sufficient and credible evidence
      demonstrating that Appellant’s conduct was intentional, fulfilling
      the requisite mens rea in the strangulation statute.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/22/22, at 5-6 (record citations omitted). The record is

clear that Appellant sat on G.B.’s back and pressed his forearm around her

throat and neck. G.B., whom Appellant knows to be asthmatic, started to see

spots and was afraid that Appellant was going to kill her.           Despite being

choked, and with what breath she could muster, G.B. had to tell Appellant

three times that she could not breathe. Accordingly, we agree with the trial

court’s   conclusion   that,   viewed   in    a   light   most   favorable   to   the

Commonwealth, the evidence establishes that the Commonwealth proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant committed strangulation. Appellant

obtains no relief.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/28/2023

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