Court Opinion

ID: 9707697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:19:05.835033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:45.177458
License: Public Domain

Corrigan, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s holding that defendant General Motors Acceptance Corporation may be found liable pursuant to the owner’s liability statute, MCL 257.401; MSA 9.2101, as an owner of the 1986 Buick Somerset leased to Rodderick Toliver. I would affirm the circuit court’s ruling that gmac is not legally responsible under the amended provisions of the Vehicle Code. See Barksdale v Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 186 Mich App 286; 463 NW2d 258 (1990). I cannot agree that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this record.
I acknowledge that 1988 PA 125, effective May 23, 1988, controls the outcome of this case. MCL 257.401(2); MSA 9.2101(2) now provides:
A person engaged in the business of leasing *517motor vehicles, who is the lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days shall not be liable at common law for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from the operation of the leased motor vehicle.
MCL 257.401a; MSA 9.2101(1) excludes from the definition of owner "a person engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles who is the lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days.” 1988 PA 125 and 126 established that a person in the business of leasing motor vehicles who leases a vehicle for more than 30 days is not an owner for purposes of the Vehicle Code and the Insurance Code.1
To defeat gmac’s status as a lessor for longer than 30 days, the majority finds the 1985 lease agreement between Rodderick Toliver and gmac inoperative. It arrives at this result principally *518because the 1987 product substitution agreement between Toliver and gmac termed the 1985 lease a "conditional sales contract (chattel mortgage)” rather than a lease with option to purchase. The substitution agreement otherwise clearly identified the October 31, 1985, transaction between Toliver and gmac. We should not treat an immaterial misnomer in a later written instrument as a device to defeat the discernible intent of the parties in both written instruments to enter and perform under a long-term automobile lease. Even if To-liver did not sign the lease, the record reflects a valid long-term lease between gmac and Toliver.
Rodderick Toliver and gmac performed their respective obligations under the lease for nearly four years. In his responses to requests for admissions, Toliver admitted that (1) on October 31, 1985, he intended to lease a 1986 Buick Skylark from John Rogin Buick (gmac’s agent) for forty-eight months; (2) he obtained exclusive use and possession of the 1986 Buick Skylark described in the lease on October 31, 1985, the same date as the lease agreement; (3) he insured the Buick Skylark, naming gmac as an additional insured, just as the 1985 lease required. Toliver also acknowledged that he continuously made monthly payments in the specific amount of $282.18, as set out in the 1985 lease.
Toliver also admitted that after the Buick Skylark was totaled in an August 1987 accident, on September 17, 1987, he signed a product substitution agreement with gmac. The 1985 lease allowed Toliver to elect to substitute another vehicle if the first vehicle was destroyed. Toliver took immediate possession of a used 1986 Buick Somerset in place of the Buick Skylark. He continued to make monthly payments of $282.18 on the Buick Somerset. His insurance was also transferred to the *519substitute vehicle. Finally, he admitted that his vehicle registration stated that the substituted 1986 Buick Somerset was insured by Farmers Insurance Group, as required in the original lease agreement.
Both Toliver and gmac fully complied with and ratified the terms and conditions of the lease agreement and the agreement of substitution from October 31, 1985, through September 17, 1987, the date of the substitution agreement, through the June 5, 1989, accident. Full performance by both parties in accord with the agreement has the same legal effect as if the agreement had been in writing. 2 Corbin, Contracts, § 285, p 40¡ The course of dealing and course of performance by these parties during the nearly four-year period of compliance with the lease agreement precludes any question of fact regarding the scope of the parties’ mutual promises or representations. See, e.g., State Bank of Standish v Curry 442 Mich 76; 500 NW2d 104 (1993) (language and conduct should be understood in light of the circumstances, including course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage).
The substitution agreement erroneously labeled the October 31, 1985, transaction between Toliver and gmac as a "conditional sales contract (chattel mortgage)” rather than a lease with option to purchase. The agreement otherwise clearly identifies the earlier transaction. The agreement of substitution specifically makes reference to the earlier agreement between Toliver and gmac dated October 31, 1985, and provides that the substituted vehicle is subject to the same terms, provisions, and conditions as the October 31, 1985, transaction. The mislabeling did not affect the substantial rights of either party. The misnomer should not serve to invalidate both documents or preclude a *520finding as a matter of law that gmac and Toliver were parties to a lease in excess of thirty days.
A misnomer in a later written instrument does not render the earlier instrument void. Instead, if a written instrument refers to another instrument, and makes the terms of that other instrument a part thereof, both instruments should be construed together as the agreement of the parties. Boyd v GMAC, 162 Mich App 446, 453; 413 NW2d 683 (1987); Culver v Castro, 126 Mich App 824, 826; 338 NW2d 232 (1983); Charles J Rogers, Inc v Dep’t of State Hwys, 36 Mich App 620; 194 NW2d 203 (1971). 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 106, p 476 advises courts to ascertain the true common intent of the parties at the time a contract is consummated, despite the presence of conflicting assertions in subsequent litigation.
I do not disagree with the assertion that leases, conditional sales contracts, and chattel mortgages are separate and distinct transactions. However, where documents contain simple errors of description, we should construe the written documents in light of the true intention of the parties.
In other contexts, we would not hesitate to overlook mislabeling where the substantial rights of the parties have not been affected. See, e.g., Lyons v Grand Rapids, 305 Mich 309; 9 NW2d 552 (1943) (misnomer in pleading); Hiner v State Hwy Comm, 96 Mich App 497; 292 NW2d 709 (1980) (misnomer of defendant).
I also question the reference to Uniform Commercial Code principles governing the sale of goods. Whitcraft v Wolfe, 148 Mich App 40; 384 NW2d 400 (1985), held that where the specific goods involved are automobiles, the ucc’s provisions must be reconciled with the Vehicle Code. Further, the Vehicle Code preempts the ucc with regard to questions relating to the transfer of *521ownership. Under these circumstances, the Vehicle Code provisions defining ownership should be our sole point of reference.
I cannot agree that plaintiffs, as third parties to the lease, have standing to void the lease by invoking the statute of frauds. Third parties lack standing to enforce the provisions of the statute of frauds. Hoehner v Western Casualty & Surety Co, 8 Mich App 708; 155 NW2d 231 (1967). The application of the statute of frauds is an affirmative defense. MCR 2.111(3)(a); R G Moeller Co v Van Kampen Construction Co, 57 Mich App 308, 311; 225 NW2d 742 (1975). Just as in Hoehner, plaintiffs were not parties to the lease they seek to void, nor were they in privity with Toliver or gmac. They are strangers to the lease agreement between gmac and Toliver. Plaintiffs’ arguments that the 1985 lease was not signed by Toliver and that the substitution agreement was not signed by gmac arise under the statute of frauds. Plaintiffs accordingly lack standing to present them. 2 Cor-bin, Contracts, § 289, p 54.
Finally, the majority concludes that the appropriate remedy in this case is to treat the arrangement as a month-to-month lease. The circuit court permitted the parties to brief the question whether a lease found void should be treated as a month-to-month lease, but did not rule on that issue. This Court does not consider issues not ruled on below, unless it finds a miscarriage of justice. Kamalnath v Mercy Memorial Hosp Corp, 194 Mich App 543, 551; 487 NW2d 499 (1992). I see none here.
I would affirm.

 At the same time 1988 PA 125 amended the Vehicle Code, the Legislature amended the Insurance Code in 1988 PA 126. The acts would not take effect unless both were enacted. MCL 500.3101(2)(g); MSA 24.13101(2)(g) defines "owner” as:
(ii) A person who holds the legal title to a vehicle, other than a person engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles who is the lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days.
MCL 500.3103(h); MSA 24.13103(h) excludes lessors as described, supra, from the definition of registrant.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, the amendments were not designed to cure a split of authority in this Court. Both the informal Senate Fiscal Agency and House Legislative analyses state that the amendments were designed to remove impediments to banks and credit unions engaging in the automobile-leasing business. The amendments would permit these institutions to compete with subsidized financing arrangements sponsored by the automobile companies by allowing these entities to forego the purchase of contingency and excess automobile insurance coverage.