Court Opinion

ID: 9899805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 18:04:50.203447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:50.222033
License: Public Domain

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            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

ROBERT LEE GREEN III,
                                                     Court of Appeals No. A-12856
                           Appellant,              Trial Court No. 3AN-14-06428 CR

                    v.
                                                              OPINION
STATE OF ALASKA,

                           Appellee.                  No. 2765 — November 17, 2023

             Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District,
             Anchorage, Paul E. Olson, Judge.

             Appearances: Ariel J. Toft, Assistant Public Advocate, and
             James Stinson, Public Advocate, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
             Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal
             Appeals, Anchorage, and Clyde “Ed” Sniffen Jr., Acting
             Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

             Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Harbison,
             Judges.

             Judge WOLLENBERG.

             Following a jury trial, Robert Lee Green III was convicted of two counts
of felony furnishing alcohol to a person under the age of twenty-one, after the underage
person drove while under the influence of the alcohol, resulting in a fatal accident that
killed him and seriously injured two of his passengers.1 The superior court sentenced
Green to a composite sentence of 2 years with 1 year suspended.
                Green now appeals, raising several claims.
                Green’s primary claim is that the superior court misinstructed the jury on
the mental state elements of the crime of felony furnishing alcohol to a person under age
twenty-one. Typically, the crime of furnishing alcohol to a minor is a misdemeanor
offense. But the crime is elevated to a felony under certain circumstances, including (as
charged here) when the minor who receives the alcohol negligently causes serious
physical injury or death to another person while under the influence of that alcohol.
                On appeal, Green contends that the superior court misinstructed the jury in
two respects.
                First, Green argues that the court failed to instruct the jury that Green had
to be “criminally negligent” with respect to the possibility that the minor who received
the alcohol would negligently cause serious physical injury or death to another person.
The State concedes that the superior court erred in omitting this requirement from the
elements instruction. We agree with the parties, and we further conclude that this
omission requires reversal of Green’s convictions under Jordan v. State.2
                Second, Green argues that the court erred in instructing the jury that the
State needed to prove only that Green was “criminally negligent” with respect to the age
of the recipient of the alcohol. He argues that the State was required to prove that he
acted “recklessly” with respect to the circumstance of age. The State disagrees with
Green on this point and contends that the superior court was correct to instruct the jurors
that they needed to find only that Green was “criminally negligent” as to the age of the

   1
       AS 04.16.051(d)(2).
   2
       Jordan v. State, 420 P.3d 1143 (Alaska 2018).

                                             –2–                                        2765
alcohol recipient. We have closely examined the plain language and legislative history
of the statute, and after application of standard tools of statutory construction, we have
determined that the State is correct that criminal negligence, rather than recklessness, is
the mental state applicable to the defendant’s awareness of the age of the alcohol
recipient.
                Green also argues that the superior court erred in declining to dismiss his
indictment. Green raises two challenges to his indictment — first, that there was
insufficient evidence to support the indictment, and second, that the statute under which
he was charged is unconstitutional. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject
these claims.
                Finally, Green challenges the superior court’s rejection of (1) his request
to refer his case to the three-judge sentencing panel3 and (2) a sentencing agreement
between Green and one of the injured passengers calling for a wholly-suspended
sentence.4 Because we are reversing Green’s convictions, we need not address Green’s
sentencing claims.

       Background facts and proceedings
                On February 19, 2014, at around 11:00 p.m., seventeen-year-old B.M.
picked up his friend, eighteen-year-old Dallas Brown, from work.5 B.M. was driving,
and two other friends were in the vehicle. (These friends were also teenagers.)

   3
       AS 12.55.165.
   4
       AS 12.55.011(a) (providing that, with some exceptions, the court “may permit the
victim and the offender to submit a sentence for the court’s review based upon a negotiated
agreement between the victim and the offender”).
   5
       We have used initials to refer to minors under the age of eighteen at the time of the
incident in this case.

                                            –3–                                        2765
             The friends planned to drink alcohol and hang out together that night.
Brown texted his co-worker, twenty-nine-year-old Robert Lee Green III, and asked if he
would buy alcohol for him. Green agreed.
             B.M. drove with his friends to Green’s house. While Green was talking
with Brown through the open car window, the other occupants of the car discussed what
alcohol they wanted. Brown ultimately relayed to Green the group’s request — two
bottles of R&R whiskey and a Four Loko — and Brown handed Green the money he had
collected from the group. (Green had not previously met the other occupants of the
vehicle.)
             Green drove to the liquor store, with the others following behind him. After
Green purchased the requested alcohol, they all returned to Green’s house. Once there,
Green got out of his vehicle and handed Brown the liquor through the open window of
B.M.’s car. The group of teenagers then left to pick up another friend.
             The friends went to B.M.’s house to drink. Their plan was to stay at B.M.’s
house for a while, as they did not have a designated driver that night. Everyone drank
in a downstairs area of the house, with B.M. and another friend, eighteen-year-old
Damien Doctolero, drinking heavily.
             At some point, Doctolero started getting loud, and B.M.’s older brother
came downstairs, worried that their mother would wake up. B.M. said that he was going
to leave and take Doctolero home, and the group decided to call it a night at around 2:00
or 3:00 a.m. B.M., Doctolero, and a third friend, sixteen-year-old C.T., got in B.M.’s car
— with B.M. driving. The other two friends stayed behind.
             While driving down O’Malley Road in Anchorage in dark and snowy
conditions, B.M. lost control of the vehicle and flipped it into a culvert. Officer Steve
Dunn, a traffic fatality investigator for the Anchorage Police Department, testified that
the vehicle was traveling at around eighty miles per hour prior to the crash. Dunn

                                          –4–                                        2765
believed that the car hit a snow embankment, before rolling or vaulting into the air.
Following the crash, B.M. and Doctolero were found lying in the road, apparently
ejected from the vehicle. The teenagers were not wearing seat belts.
             B.M. died from head wounds at the scene of the accident. Doctolero and
C.T. were transported to the hospital with serious injuries. C.T. had a right temporal
skull fracture and spent several days in the hospital; she suffered headaches for several
months afterward. Doctolero, who also suffered a skull fracture, was initially placed in
a medically induced coma because of possible brain bleeding.
             Forensic Scientist Colleen O’Bryant testified that B.M.’s blood alcohol
content was .251 percent, three times the legal driving limit. According to the medical
records introduced into evidence, C.T.’s blood alcohol content was .131 percent and
Doctolero’s was .249 percent.
             A grand jury indicted Green on two counts of felony furnishing alcohol to
a person under age twenty-one under the theory that Green furnished alcohol to B.M.,
who then caused serious physical injury to Doctolero and C.T.6 Green’s case proceeded
to trial, and a jury convicted Green as charged.

   6
       AS 04.16.051(d)(2). Green was also charged with — and later convicted of —
driving with a suspended license. He does not challenge this conviction on appeal.

                                          –5–                                       2765
       The elements of the offense of furnishing alcohol to a person under age
       twenty-one and litigation of the jury instruction defining this offense
              Furnishing alcohol to a minor under AS 04.16.051 is generally a class
A misdemeanor.7 Subsection (a) provides, “A person may not furnish or deliver an
alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of 21 years.”8
              This crime is elevated to a class C felony when certain aggravating
circumstances are present. As stated in subsection (d):
              (d) A person acting with criminal negligence who violates
              this section is guilty of a class C felony if
                     (1) within the five years preceding the violation, the
                     person has been previously convicted under
                            (A) this section; or
                            (B) a law or ordinance of this or another
                            jurisdiction with elements substantially similar
                            to this section;
                     (2) the person who receives the alcoholic beverage
                     negligently causes serious physical injury to or the
                     death of another person while under the influence of
                     the alcoholic beverage received in violation of this
                     section; . . . or
                     (3) the violation occurs within the boundaries of a
                     municipality or the perimeter of an established village
                     that has adopted a local option under AS 04.11.491

   7
       AS 04.16.180(a). This provision — establishing the classification level for many
violations of Title 4 — was recently repealed by the legislature, effective January 1, 2024.
SLA 2022, ch. 8, §§ 164, 177.
   8
       AS 04.16.051(a).

                                           –6–                                         2765
                     and has not opted out of applying a class C felony to
                     violations of this section under AS 04.11.491(g).[9]
Green was charged and convicted under paragraph (d)(2) — based on the theory that he
furnished alcohol to B.M., a person under twenty-one years old, and B.M. negligently
caused serious physical injury to Doctolero and C.T. while under the influence of the
alcohol he received from Green.
              (We pause to note that, in 2022, the legislature amended this statute,
effective January 1, 2024.10 Throughout this opinion, when we discuss the statute under
which Green was convicted, we are referring to the pre-2024 statute in effect at the time
of the events in this case.)
              The crime for which Green was charged and convicted contains three
primary elements — conduct, circumstance, and result:
              •      Conduct: furnishing or delivering alcohol to a person
              •      Circumstance: the recipient of the alcohol was under
                     twenty-one years old
              •      Result: the recipient of the alcohol negligently caused
                     serious physical injury to or the death of another
                     person while under the influence of the alcohol

   9
        AS 04.16.051(d).
   10
        SLA 2022, ch. 8, §§ 103-04. Under the new law, the “criminal negligence” standard
applies to both the misdemeanor and felony offense of furnishing alcohol to a minor. The
amended subsection (d) provides, “A person who, with criminal negligence, furnishes or
delivers an alcoholic beverage to a person under 21 years of age in violation of (a) of this
section commits the crime of furnishing or delivering to a minor.” And a new subsection
(e) classifies the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony depending on whether any one of the
three aggravating circumstances exist. We express no view on these changes.

                                           –7–                                         2765
              In the superior court, the parties initially disputed the mental state that
applied to each element.11 After considerable discussion, the court gave the following
instruction to the jury regarding the elements of the offense:
              To prove that the defendant committed [the crime of
              furnishing or delivery of alcoholic beverages to persons
              under the age of 21], the state must prove beyond a
              reasonable doubt the following elements:
              (1) the defendant knowingly furnished or delivered an
              alcoholic beverage to another person;
              (2) the defendant was criminally negligent as to whether the
              person who received the alcoholic beverage was under 21
              years of age at the time of the incident; and
              (3) the person who received the alcoholic beverage caused
              through civil negligence serious physical injury to or the
              death of another person . . . while under the influence of the
              alcoholic beverage received from the defendant.

        Why we conclude that the court’s failure to instruct the jury on the mental
        state of criminal negligence as to the result element requires reversal of
        Green’s convictions
              In the superior court, Green argued that the mental state of criminal
negligence applied to the result element (element #3). On appeal, he renews this
argument, challenging the superior court’s failure to include this mental state
requirement. The State concedes error on this point.
              The parties’ position is based on the inclusion of “criminal negligence” as
the applicable mental state in the subsection elevating the base-level misdemeanor

   11
        The State ultimately agreed with Green that the mental state of “knowingly” applied
to the conduct element of furnishing or delivering an alcoholic beverage to a person.

                                           –8–                                        2765
offense to a felony (subsection (d)). Both parties agree that the statute should be read to
apply this mental state to the result element in paragraph (d)(2).
              We have reviewed the legislative history, and we accept the State’s
concession on this point.12 We note that many legislators were concerned with the
potential scope of liability under this provision,13 and they repeatedly discussed the need
for the adult furnishing the alcohol to act with “criminal negligence” and the recipient
of the alcohol to act with “civil negligence.”14

   12
       See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (appellate courts must
independently assess whether a State’s concession of error in a criminal case is
well-founded).
   13
       For example, one legislator noted the possibility that a person, at their own house,
might provide alcohol to minors who promised not to drive, and expressed concern about the
reach of the statute to that circumstance, should the minors leave the house against the
provider’s expectations. See Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement
of Representative John Davies, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 18:16 – 18:52 (Feb. 28, 2002).
Another legislator was concerned about creating felony exposure for an older sibling who
was just over the age of majority and provided alcohol to a slightly younger teenaged sibling.
See Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Representative Kevin
Meyer, Tape HJC-02, #15, at 1:03:57 – 1:05:43 (Feb. 11, 2002).
       We note that the statute that prohibits furnishing alcohol to a minor contains an
exception for furnishing an alcoholic beverage “by a parent to the parent’s child, by a
guardian to the guardian’s ward, or by a person to the legal spouse of that person if the
furnishing or delivery occurs off licensed premises.” AS 04.16.051(b)(1).
   14
        See, e.g., Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of
Representative Norman Rokeberg, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 18:59 – 19:29 (Feb. 28, 2002)
(discussing the need for the adult furnishing the alcohol to act with criminal negligence and
the recipient of the alcohol to act with civil negligence); Audio of House Finance Committee,
House Bill 330, statement of Representative John Davies, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 21:27 –
21:34 (Feb. 28, 2002) (clarifying that the alcohol “has to be provided with criminal
negligence” and “the [recipient] has to negligently cause physical, serious physical injury”);
Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Assistant Attorney
                                                                                 (continued...)

                                            –9–                                           2765
              The parties disagree, however, about whether this error requires reversal
of Green’s convictions. In Jordan v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court held that “the
failure to instruct the jury on a contested element of an offense is structural error”
requiring automatic reversal, without resort to harmless error review.15 Because the
mental state applicable to paragraph (d)(2) was a contested element of the offense, the
omission of that mental state from the jury instruction would appear to require automatic
reversal under the supreme court’s decision in Jordan.16
              But the State asserts that reversal is not required because the other jury
instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that Green acted with criminal
negligence with respect to the result.17 Specifically, the State points to the jury

   14
        (...continued)
General Anne Carpeneti, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 32:59 – 33:22 (Feb. 28, 2002) (stating that
the statute provides that “if you have given the alcohol to the child with criminal negligence,
and the person who receives it — the minor who receives it and drinks it — goes out, and the
minor acting with civil negligence, causes serious physical injury or death to another person,
the provider can be found guilty of a class C felony”).
   15
        Jordan v. State, 420 P.3d 1143, 1148 (Alaska 2018).
   16
        We note that, while Green argued in his initial briefing that the superior court erred
in omitting the mental state element applicable to the result, he did not cite Jordan or argue
that the error was structural and only did so for the first time at oral argument. Because we
are bound by the analysis in Jordan in assessing the omission of an essential element, we
invited the State to file supplemental briefing on the issue and gave Green an opportunity to
respond to the State’s brief. See Sweezey v. State, 167 P.3d 79, 80 (Alaska App. 2007) (“[A]s
an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow the decisions of the Alaska Supreme
Court.”).
   17
        See Geisinger v. State, 498 P.3d 92, 109-10 (Alaska App. 2021) (concluding that a
flaw in the jury instructions was not structural error under Jordan when the instructions
otherwise set out the missing element and the prosecutor correctly characterized the law in
closing argument); Brown v. State, 435 P.3d 989, 991-92 (Alaska App. 2018) (concluding
that the omission of an element in the jury instructions did not require reversal under Jordan
                                                                                  (continued...)

                                            – 10 –                                         2765
instructions on causation — instructions that made it clear that the jury could not convict
Green unless the results of his conduct were “reasonably foreseeable in light of ordinary
experience” — and argues that these instructions sufficiently conveyed the requirement
that Green act with criminal negligence with respect to the risk that one of the recipients
of the alcohol would negligently cause serious physical injury or death.
              But the criminal negligence standard requires a risk that is “of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”18 As the Alaska
Supreme Court has explained, “[T]he criminal negligence standard requires the jury to
find negligence so gross as to merit not just damages but also punishment.”19 It is not
enough that the result be “reasonably foreseeable.” Yet nothing in the causation jury
instructions provided in Green’s case captured the heightened proof required under the
criminal negligence standard, or tied that heightened standard to the result element set
out in the elements instruction.
              We therefore conclude that the failure to instruct the jury that Green had to
be criminally negligent with respect to the possibility that the recipient of the alcohol

   17
       (...continued)
when the element was uncontested and the instructions otherwise communicated the
requirement).
   18
       State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 877 (Alaska 1997) (quoting Hazelwood v. State,
912 P.2d 1266, 1278 n.16 (Alaska App. 1996)); see also AS 04.21.080(a)(1) (“[A] person
acts with ‘criminal negligence’ with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a
provision of law defining an offense when the person fails to perceive a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists; the risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation[.]”).
   19
        Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 878.

                                            – 11 –                                        2765
would negligently cause serious physical injury or death to another person while under
the influence of the alcohol requires reversal of Green’s convictions.
              Although this analysis is sufficient to determine that Green’s convictions
must be reversed, the parties also dispute the mental state applicable to the circumstance
of age. Because this issue may arise again if Green is retried, we must explain why we
conclude that the jury was properly instructed on this element.

        Why we conclude that criminal negligence, not recklessness, applies to the
        circumstance of age
              As we have explained, the parties disagree as to the mental state applicable
to the circumstance element of the recipient’s age (element #2). The State argues that
the applicable mental state is “criminal negligence,” while Green argues that the
applicable mental state is “recklessly.” More specifically, the State argues that the
mental state of “criminal negligence” in subsection (d) relates back to the element of age
set out in subsection (a). Green contends that criminal negligence does not relate back,
and that the applicable mental state is therefore “recklessly” — the default mental state
for circumstance elements for which no specific mental state is provided by statute.20
              Resolving this question requires us to interpret the statute, AS 04.16.051.
When we engage in statutory interpretation, we examine the plain language of the statute,
the legislative history, and the legislative purpose of the statute.21 Alaska has “rejected
a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule in favor of a sliding scale approach”

   20
       See Cole v. State, 828 P.2d 175, 178-79 (Alaska App. 1992) (holding that “recklessly”
should be the default mental state for a circumstance element, even for offenses outside of
Title 11, when the offense does not otherwise involve a highly regulated industry and there
is no demonstrated intent to employ a different mental state).
   21
        Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier, 332 P.3d 1, 7 (Alaska 2014).

                                          – 12 –                                       2765
to statutory interpretation.22 Under this approach, “[T]he plainer the language of the
statute, the more convincing any contrary legislative history must be.”23
              Beginning with the plain language, we agree with the State that it tends to
support the view that the mental state of “criminal negligence” applies to the
circumstance of age when a defendant is charged with a felony under the statute.
              As we have explained, the underlying elements of the crime are set out in
subsection (a), which provides: “A person may not furnish or deliver an alcoholic
beverage to a person under the age of 21 years.”24 A violation of subsection (a) becomes
a felony under subsection (d) if any of the enumerated aggravating factors is established.
Here again is the portion of subsection (d) under which Green was convicted, with the
critical portions italicized:
              (d) A person acting with criminal negligence who violates
              this section is guilty of a class C felony if
                      ....
                      (2) the person who receives the alcoholic beverage
                      negligently causes serious physical injury to or the
                      death of another person while under the influence of
                      the alcoholic beverage received in violation of this
                      section[.][25]
              As a matter of plain language, the word “section” refers to the entirety of
AS 04.16.051, including subsection (a) and the aggravating factors listed in
subsection (d), because under Alaska’s statutory scheme, “section” refers to the portion

   22
        Peninsula Mktg. Ass’n v. State, 817 P.2d 917, 922 (Alaska 1991).
   23
        Id.
   24
        AS 04.16.051(a).
   25
        AS 04.16.051(d)(2) (emphasis added).

                                          – 13 –                                     2765
of statutory law identified by the last three digits of the statute’s number — i.e.,
AS 04.16.051.26 Accordingly, when the statute refers to “a person acting with criminal
negligence who violates this section,” it is presumably referring to a person who violates
the entire statute with criminal negligence: both subsection (a) and one of the
aggravating factors listed in subsection (d).
              We note that this does not necessarily mean that criminal negligence applies
to every element and every aggravating factor, because statutory interpretation in Alaska
is not dictated solely by the plain language. Rather, under Alaska’s sliding scale
approach, the plain language of the statute may be rebutted by indication of a contrary
legislative intent in the legislative history and the statute’s underlying purpose. Thus,
for example, the parties agree that “knowingly,” not criminal negligence, is the mental
state for the conduct element of furnishing or delivering alcohol because “knowingly”
is the only mental state applicable to conduct under Alaska’s statutory scheme.27
              Because the plain language suggests that criminal negligence relates back
to the circumstance of age set out in subsection (a), Green must demonstrate some
contrary indication of legislative intent to show otherwise. But we have reviewed that
history at length and, although it is often confused and ambiguous, it also tends to
support the State’s position.

   26
        See AS 01.05.011 (distinguishing between titles, chapters, and sections).
   27
       See AS 04.21.080(a) (defining the mental states used in Title 4 — “criminal
negligence,” “knowingly,” and “recklessly” — of which only “knowingly” applies to
conduct); see also Smith v. State, 28 P.3d 323, 325 (Alaska App. 2001) (“When an offense
requires proof that a defendant engaged in a particular kind of conduct, the State invariably
will have to prove that the defendant acted ‘knowingly’ with respect to that conduct because
‘knowingly’ is the only culpable mental state that applies to conduct.”).

                                           – 14 –                                       2765
               Alaska Statute 04.16.051(a) was first enacted in 1980 as part of a
comprehensive rewrite of Title 4.28          In its final codification, the language of
AS 04.16.051(a) provided: “A person may not furnish an alcoholic beverage to a person
under the age of 19 years.”29 This original provision did not contain an explicit mens
rea, and at the time, the statute as a whole did not contain any of the felony-level
aggravating circumstances that the legislature later added.30
               The first felony provision — the recidivist provision — was enacted in
1994. As originally drafted, the 1994 bill would have elevated to a felony all instances
of furnishing alcohol to a minor. In particular, the initial version of the bill would have
added a penalty provision that read, “A person acting with criminal negligence who
violates this section is guilty of a class C felony.”31 As the bill sponsor explained, the
purpose of this legislation was to increase the penalty for the offense of furnishing
alcohol to a minor to a class C felony.32

   28
        SLA 1980, ch. 131, § 3.
   29
        Id.
   30
        For a brief period of time while the bill was pending in committee, the draft provision
included a mental state of “knowingly,” such that the language read: “A person may not
knowingly furnish an alcoholic beverage to a person under the age of 19 years.” H.C.S.
C.S.S.S.S.B. 239, 11th Leg., 2d Sess. (Version E) (as introduced by S. Jud., May 28, 1980)
(emphasis added); H.C.S. C.S.S.S.S.B. 239, 11th Leg., 2d Sess. (Version F) (as offered by
S. Fin., June 1, 1980) (emphasis added).
   31
        H.B. 28, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Version A) (as introduced, Jan. 11, 1993).
   32
       Sponsor Statement for H.B. 28 by Rep. William K. Williams, H. Jud. Comm., House
Bill 28 (Mar. 5, 1993).

                                            – 15 –                                        2765
              This categorical escalation in the penalty met resistence in the House
Judiciary Committee, including opposition by the Department of Law,33 and the bill was
subsequently amended to limit felony exposure to those, “acting with criminal
negligence,” who had a prior conviction for the same or substantially similar offense.34
As enacted, the provision stated:
              (d) A person acting with criminal negligence who violates
              this section is guilty of a class C felony if, within the five
              years preceding the violation, the person has been previously
              convicted under
                     (1) this section; or
                     (2) a law or ordinance of this or another jurisdiction
                     with elements substantially similar to this section.[35]
              This chronology of events — and in particular, the original version of the
bill, which did not contain a recidivist provision — suggests that “criminal negligence”
was intended to refer, in some form, to the base-level crime of furnishing alcohol. This
is particularly true in light of the fact that no mens rea is typically required with respect

   33
       See Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 28, statement of Assistant
Attorney General Margot Knuth, Tape 93-40, at 42:00 – 44:34 (Mar. 24, 1993) (stating that
the proposed elevation of the crime of furnishing alcohol to a minor to a felony was
“troublesome”).
   34
       C.S.H.B. 28, 18th Leg., 1st Sess. (Version B) (as offered by H. Jud., Apr. 15, 1993);
Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 28, Tape 93-60, at 5:25 – 5:34, 15:14-15:35
(Apr. 14, 1993) (adopting the proposed recidivist amendment); Written Testimony of Rep.
William K. Williams, H. Fin. Comm., House Bill 28 (Jan. 18, 1994).
   35
        SLA 1994, ch. 46, § 1.

                                            – 16 –                                      2765
to a defendant’s prior convictions when the underlying base-level crime is itself a
crime.36
              The felony provision at issue in this case was enacted in 2002.37 This
provision provides:
              (d) A person acting with criminal negligence who violates
              this section is guilty of a class C felony if
                      ....
                      (2) the person who receives the alcoholic beverage
                      negligently causes serious physical injury to or the
                      death of another person while under the influence of
                      the alcoholic beverage received in violation of this
                      section; in this paragraph,
                              (A) “negligently” means acting with civil
                              negligence; and
                              (B) “serious physical injury” has the meaning
                              given in AS 11.81.900[.][38]
              Strong support for the State’s position can be found in the legislative
history to the 2002 provision — in particular, in the House Judiciary Committee hearing,
where the bill, House Bill 330, was initially referred. At that committee hearing,
Representative Ethan Berkowitz directly inquired as to whether there was “any mens rea
. . . about knowing that the person was [under] twenty-one.”39 Assistant Attorney

   36
       See, e.g., Hoople v. State, 985 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Alaska App. 1999) (holding that the
crime of felony driving under the influence does not require proof of any culpable mental
state with respect to the prior convictions that aggravate the base-level offense to a felony).
   37
        SLA 2002, ch. 90, § 4.
   38
        AS 04.16.051(d)(2).
   39
        Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Representative
                                                                          (continued...)

                                            – 17 –                                        2765
General Anne Carpeneti, representing the Department of Law, responded that “the
culpable mental state is ‘acting with criminal negligence violates this section.’ So you’d
have to be criminally negligent about that.”40
              Unfortunately, however, subsequent discussions of the applicable mens rea
requirement significantly muddled the issue — and the discussions that followed in later
committee hearings were frequently confusing and unclear. On multiple occasions, the
mens rea of “knowingly” was not clearly distinguished from the mens rea of “criminal
negligence,” and the two mental states were used interchangeably — with little clarity
as to which elements they applied, and defining “criminal negligence” in terms that
suggested it required knowledge of the recipient’s age. In addition, the legislators often
explained that, in order to trigger the felony provision, the act of furnishing alcohol had
to be done with criminal negligence, while the adult had to “know” that the recipient was
a minor — seemingly reversing what the State is now claiming on appeal.
              We need not recount that history in full because both parties agree that the
legislative history surrounding paragraph (d)(2) does not provide a definitive answer to
the mental state issues with respect to the relevant conduct or circumstances in the
statute. Green acknowledges that “the legislative history does not shed light on the issue
of culpable mental state as it applies to the conduct and circumstance in

   39
      (...continued)
Ethan Berkowitz, Tape 02-15, at 1:30:41 – 1:31:03 (Feb. 11, 2002).
   40
      Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Assistant Attorney
General Anne Carpeneti, Tape 02-15, at 1:31:03 – 1:31:11 (Feb. 11, 2002).

                                          – 18 –                                      2765
AS 04.16.05l(a).”41 And the superior court similarly recognized the lack of clarity in the
legislative history, stating that it was not “overly persuasive.”
              At oral argument in this case, we brought to the parties’ attention a 2008
letter from Attorney General Talis Colberg to Governor Sarah Palin regarding proposed
amendments to AS 04.16.051 and a related statute, AS 04.16.052, governing the conduct
of servers and bartenders.42 These amendments sought to remove servers from liability
under AS 04.16.051 (the general furnishing statute) and instead capture their conduct
within the sister provision, AS 04.16.052 (related to furnishing alcohol by licensees).43
We subsequently requested supplemental briefing on the import of the letter.
              In the letter, Attorney General Colberg expressed the view that the
proposed amendments would serve two purposes. First, the proposed amendments
would “reduce[] the culpable mental state that must be proved for a conviction from
reckless as to the age of the person served alcohol to culpable negligence regarding the
age of the person served” for alcohol licensees and their agents and employees.44 This

   41
         After the initial briefing in this case, we requested supplemental briefing on the
legislative history of AS 04.16.051. In his supplemental briefing, Green repeatedly asserts
that the legislative history “indicates that the appropriate mental state as to the circumstance
of age is ‘recklessly.’” Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that Green does not mean
that there is anything specific in the legislative history to suggest that the applicable mental
state is “recklessly.” Rather, Green argues that the legislative history is ambiguous and thus
fails to demonstrate a clear intent to dispense with the default mental state of “recklessly” for
circumstance elements. That may be true, but as we have already explained, the plain
language demonstrates that intent, and Green must therefore point to something in the
legislative history or purpose rebutting the statute’s plain language.
   42
      Letter from Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, to Sarah Palin, Governor, regarding
Senate Bill 265, 2008 WL 4277527 (Apr. 25, 2008).
   43
        SLA 2008, ch. 75, §§ 6-7.
   44
        Letter from Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, to Sarah Palin, Governor, regarding
                                                                              (continued...)

                                             – 19 –                                         2765
indicates that Attorney General Colberg believed that the mental state applicable to the
circumstance of age in the general furnishing statute — at least the base-level furnishing
offense — was “recklessly.” Second, the amendments would mean that servers, while
working on licensed premises, would not be subject to a felony conviction, since
AS 04.21.052 does not contain a felony-level counterpart to AS 04.21.051(d).45
              We take seriously the considered opinion of the Attorney General, but our
analysis is ultimately guided by the legislative intent. The letter contains no explanation
for the Attorney General’s belief that the mental state of “recklessly” applied to the
circumstance of age in the general furnishing statute, and it is not clear whether the
attorney general was also expressing a view on the felony-level provision, in addition to
the base-level offense. Accordingly, we conclude that the Attorney General’s letter,
standing alone and without explanation, is not entitled to significant weight.46
              Finally, we note that the rule of lenity does not require us to construe the
legislative history in Green’s favor. Under the rule of lenity, “when a statute establishing
a criminal penalty is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning, the statute should
be construed so as to provide the most lenient penalty.”47 But “this rule of lenity or strict

   44
      (...continued)
Senate Bill 265, 2008 WL 4277527, at *1 (Apr. 25, 2008) (emphasis added).
   45
        Id.
   46
       See Basey v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Alaska State Troopers, Bureau of
Investigation, 408 P.3d 1173, 1178 n.36 (Alaska 2017) (noting that an appellate court
exercises independent judgment on matters of statutory interpretation, and “the weight . . .
accord[ed] an attorney general’s opinion is largely a matter of discretion” (citing Grimes v.
Kinney Shoe Corp., 938 P.2d 997, 1000 n.7 (Alaska 1997)) (alterations and internal
quotations omitted)).
   47
        Grant v. State, 379 P.3d 993, 995 (Alaska App. 2016).

                                           – 20 –                                       2765
construction comes into play only when, after employing normal methods of statutory
construction, the legislature’s intent cannot be ascertained or remains ambiguous.”48
                Employing the normal methods of statutory construction, the plain language
supports the conclusion that the legislature intended the mental state of criminal
negligence to apply to the circumstance of age, and the legislative history either tends to
support the same conclusion or is at most ambiguous. We therefore conclude that the
statute requires the State to prove that the defendant was criminally negligent with
respect to the age of the alcohol recipient.

        Why we reject Green’s arguments regarding his indictment
                Although we are reversing Green’s convictions, we must address his
contention that the superior court erred in declining to dismiss his underlying indictment
in this case.
                Green raises two claims.
                First, Green argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain
his indictment. In the superior court, Green’s attorney moved to dismiss the indictment
on the grounds that the State presented insufficient evidence to the grand jury that
(1) Green knowingly furnished alcohol to B.M., the driver of the vehicle, and (2) Green’s
conduct was a substantial factor in Doctolero’s and C.T.’s injuries, since (according to
Green) there was insufficient evidence that Green knew that he was furnishing alcohol
to anyone other than his co-worker, Brown. The superior court denied Green’s motion,
and he renews his arguments on appeal.
                Pursuant to Alaska Criminal Rule 6(r), a “grand jury shall find an
indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would

   48
        De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 (Alaska App. 1991).

                                            – 21 –                                      2765
warrant a conviction of the defendant.”49 When reviewing challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting an indictment, “every legitimate inference that may be drawn
from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the indictment.”50
               Viewing the grand jury evidence in that light, we conclude that a grand
juror could reasonably find that Green knowingly furnished alcohol to B.M. and that his
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the injuries. The State presented evidence to
the grand jury that the only alcohol the teenagers drank that night was from Green — and
that Green bought, and handed over, the alcohol (including two bottles of whiskey) to
Brown and his friends, with B.M. driving. The State also presented evidence that the
accident occurred within several hours of that exchange, after the teenagers drank the
alcohol. The Alaska Supreme Court has recognized that drinking and driving is within
the scope of reasonably foreseeable risk resulting from minors illegally consuming
alcohol.51 We therefore uphold the superior court’s denial of Green’s motion to dismiss
the indictment on this basis.
               Second, Green moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the
subsection of AS 04.16.051 under which he was charged violated his substantive due
process rights. In particular, Green contended that the provision under which he was
convicted did not require any nexus between the alcohol provided and the negligent act
that caused serious physical injury or death, and thus (according to Green) the provision

   49
        This provision was numbered as Criminal Rule 6(q) at the time of Green’s indictment.
   50
        State v. Williams, 855 P.2d 1337, 1346 (Alaska App. 1993).
   51
       Loeb v. Rasmussen, 822 P.2d 914, 920 (Alaska 1991) (affirming denial of summary
judgment on the ground that “[i]t is well within the scope of foreseeable risk that a minor
who purchases alcohol may drive an automobile, and that an alcohol-related accident may
result”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d
1134, 1140 (Alaska 2008).

                                           – 22 –                                      2765
bore no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. The superior court
denied Green’s motion, and Green now appeals that decision.
              On appeal, Green acknowledges that there is a “legitimate governmental
purpose” for AS 04.16.051(d)(2) — i.e., deterring an adult from providing alcohol to a
person under age twenty-one in order to promote public safety. However, he renews his
argument that this provision bears “no reasonable relationship to a legitimate
governmental purpose” because it “does not require any nexus between the alcohol and
the negligent act that caused serious physical injury or death.”52
              We disagree with the notion that the statute does not require a nexus
between the recipient’s intoxication and the negligent act. We acknowledge that the
plain language of the statute requires only that the recipient of the alcoholic beverage
cause serious physical injury or death “while under the influence” of that alcoholic
beverage. The provision does not explicitly require that the negligent act occur as a
result of the fact that the recipient was under the influence of the alcohol received.
              But during the legislative committee hearings on House Bill 330 in 2002,
multiple legislators expressed concern about the absence of a causal nexus between the
recipient’s impairment and the harmful act that resulted in death or serious physical
injury.53 In response, Assistant Attorney General Carpeneti stated that the conditions

   52
        See Concerned Citizens of S. Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d
447, 452 (Alaska 1974) (recognizing that “[s]ubstantive due process is denied when a
legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose”).
   53
       See, e.g., Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of
Representative Eric Croft, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 8:54 – 9:52 (Feb. 28, 2002) (expressing
concern that the plain language of the statute did not contain a “nexus” between the
recipient’s intoxication and the recipient’s negligence); Audio of House Finance Committee,
House Bill 330, statement of Representative John Davies, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 46:15 –
46:50 (Feb. 28, 2002) (proposing an amendment that would have clarified that the negligent
                                                                               (continued...)

                                           – 23 –                                       2765
were in fact connected — and that “the intent [of the new provision] was . . . to cover
situations where people furnish alcohol to minors and [the minors] go out and hurt
people because of their alcoholic intoxication.”54            Later in the same hearing,
Ms. Carpeneti reiterated that “the clear intent is that the injury is related to the [recipient
being] ‘under the influence.’”55 And at the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the
bill, both Ms. Carpeneti and Senator Robin Taylor, the chair of the committee,

   53
       (...continued)
actions of the recipient occurred “as a result of being” under the influence, thereby
“tighten[ing] the nexus” in the statute); Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill
330, statement of Representative Ethan Berkowitz, Tape 02-15, at 51:17 – 51:49
(Feb. 11, 2002) (proposing an amendment stating that the physical injury or death occurred
“because” the person under twenty-one years of age was under the influence of the alcoholic
beverage received). The proposed amendments were rejected, but not because the legislators
believed that there was no causal connection or nexus between the intoxicated state and the
negligent act. See Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of
Assistant Attorney General Anne Carpeneti, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 48:27 – 48:45
(Feb. 28, 2002) (expressing concern that Representative Davies’s proposed language would
require proof that a specific alcoholic drink caused the minor’s negligent actions in
circumstances where the minor received alcohol from multiple furnishers).
   54
        Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Assistant Attorney
General Anne Carpeneti, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 9:52 – 10:27, 25:42 – 25:55 (Feb. 28, 2002);
see also Audio of House Judiciary Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Assistant
Attorney General Anne Carpeneti, Tape 02-15, at 1:22:16 – 1:22:30 (Feb. 11, 2002) (noting
that a person could not be charged with a felony if the recipient of the alcohol gets into an
accident that was not his or her fault, despite being under the influence); Audio of House
Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Representative Norman Rokeberg, Tape
HFC-02, #33, at 11:47 – 12:20 (Feb. 28, 2002) (explaining that previous versions of the bill
connected the minor’s negligence and “under the influence” and that the intent was to
maintain a nexus).
   55
      Audio of House Finance Committee, House Bill 330, statement of Assistant Attorney
General Anne Carpeneti, Tape HFC-02, #33, at 25:40 – 25:49 (Feb. 28, 2002).

                                            – 24 –                                        2765
emphasized the existence of a nexus.56 Indeed, we agree with Green that, in order to hold
a defendant liable under these circumstances, such a nexus is very likely required by due
process.
              But the facts of Green’s case fall squarely within the statute’s purpose —
and Green has never disputed that the alcohol he provided played a crucial role in the car
accident and resulting injuries. Because the statute is constitutional as applied to
Green,57 and because the legislative history makes clear that the phrase “while under the
influence” is intended to establish the requisite nexus between the alcohol furnished and
the negligent act, we uphold the superior court’s decision denying Green’s motion to
dismiss the indictment on this ground.

        Conclusion
              We REVERSE Green’s convictions. If the State elects to retry Green, the
jury instructions shall reflect the appropriate mental state requirements set out in this
opinion.

   56
      See Audio of Senate Judiciary Committee, House Bill 330, statements of Assistant
Attorney General Anne Carpeneti and Senator Robin Taylor, Tape 02-26, at 17:39 – 18:34
(May 6, 2002).
   57
        See State v. ACLU of Alaska, 204 P.3d 364, 372 (Alaska 2009) (explaining that a
statute may be unconstitutional as-applied when it is unconstitutional “under the facts of the
case” but may be constitutional “[u]nder other facts”); Petersen v. State, 930 P.2d 414, 429
(Alaska App. 1996) (finding a criminal stalking statute constitutional as applied to the
defendants, despite potential constitutional problems if applied in other circumstances).

                                           – 25 –                                        2765