Court Opinion

ID: 9668107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:02:37.675354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:42.886407
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals but in doing so I would suggest an analysis and treatment of the applicable subsections of the Speedy Trial Act1 different than that contained in either the majority opinion or the dissenting opinion.
I agree with the dissent that subsection 6(A) is more appropriate to the resolution to the Speedy Trial Act question presented by appellant than is subsection 10.
“(6) a reasonable period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the state if the continuance is granted:
*531(A) Because of the unavailability of evidence that is material to the state’s case, if the state has exercised due diligence to obtain the evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe the evidence will be available within a reasonable time; or
[[Image here]]
“(10) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances.”
I cannot agree, however, that the evidentia-ry requirements under either of these subsections should be similar to those required in Chapter 29, Y.A.C.C.P., which is titled “Continuance”.
It should first be pointed out that had the legislature intended for the formal requirements of continuances to apply to the Speedy Trial Act, they could have easily done so. Close examination of subsection 6(A) and 10 reveals that this was no mere oversight. Since subsection 6(A) provides the correct criteria for deciding the particular question before us, I will be discussing it but the final legal analysis is equally applicable to subsection 10.
The thrust of subsection 6(A) is not can the State prove that what it believes is, in fact, true; rather subsection 6(A) concerns itself with what the State believes. There are two criteria in subsection 6(A): due diligence and reasonable belief. Both are intertwined. We decide whether diligence amounts to due diligence by measuring what the State has done against what we reasonably expect them to do. This is a subjective standard based upon what the State reasonably believes is true, not an objective standard based on what in reality is true. This being the case, it is not necessary for the State to live up to the objective type evidentiary criteria demanded in continuances.
Therefore, I disagree with the majority opinion’s pronouncement that the prosecutor’s statements referring to the hospitalization of the witness were not competent evidence. The prosecutor aptly demonstrated that the State believed the witness was material to their case, was unavailable because of necessary hospitalization, but would be available shortly.2 Both sides were given an opportunity to make whatever presentation to the Court they chose. Although the trial judge erroneously relied on subsection 10 in overruling the Speedy Trial Act motion for dismissal, uncontro-verted statements of the prosecutor support a finding that the State acted reasonably and with due diligence, the criteria in subsection 6(A).
For these reasons, I concur in affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals.

. Art. 32A.02, § 4(6)(A) and § 4(10), V.A.C. C.P. Unless otherwise indicated in this opinion all statutory references are to these subsections of the Speedy Trial Act.

. As pointed out by the dissent, the Court learned of the State’s belief via unsworn oral statements by the prosecutor. It should be pointed out that the prosecutor was an officer of the court and was subject to being called to the stand by appellant’s attorney, compelled to take an oath, and subject to virtual cross-examination. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex. Cr.App.1979). Since the appellant’s attorney declined to do so and otherwise did nothing to refute the statements of the prosecutor, the trial judge, in his discretion, had the right to rely upon the statements. He apparently did.