Court Opinion

ID: 9701086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:03:52.742956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:19.105799
License: Public Domain

Roberts, J.,
dissenting. In denying the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, the trial justice relied primarily on his conclusion that the state of the evidence was such as to support a reasonable inference that the substance upon which the plaintiff alleges that he slipped was on the floor of the defendant’s garage at the time the plaintiff arrived at the loading platform with his truck. There is in the record evidence that it was the defendant’s practice to clean the garage floor twice daily, and when it was necessary to remove oily deposits, a chemical preparation was used for this purpose. It appears further from the evidence that when the plaintiff arrived at the defendant’s garage, he carried a basket of bread and rolls to the second floor of the building to malee a delivery thereof at the cafeteria. He then returned to the first floor and went to the loading platform and, after placing his basket in the truck, started to walk toward the driver’s seat. It was at this time that he slipped and fell.
*399It appears that the majority accepts defendant’s contention that this evidence is not sufficient to support a reasonable inference concerning the length of time that the deposit was on the garage floor and that the jury could only speculate as to the duration of that period of time. The majority, as I understand its position, characterizes the conclusion of the trial justice as speculative, finding that the evidence in the record is without probative force. I am of the opinion that in so- doing the majority is weighing the evidence contrary to our well-settled rule that when this court reviews a decision made on a motion for the direction of a verdict, we will not weigh the evidence. Vadnais v. Riskin, 77 R. I. 131.
It appears further from the opinion that the majority took the view that if the evidence relating to the time plaintiff was absent from his truck making the delivery established it to be of a sufficient duration to charge defendant with constructive notice, “it is likewise open to the proposition that the duration was sufficient in time for the arrival and departure of another and unidentified business invitee from whose truck the substance could have fallen, theoretically reducing to seconds the time in which defendant could have learned of it.” I find the conclusion inescapable that this amounts to the drawing of an inference from the evidence that is favorable to the moving party and is again contrary to our well-settled rule that on a motion to direct a verdict only those inferences are to be drawn which favor the non-moving party. Sylvester v. Buerhaus, 71 R. I. 335.
For these reasons I am constrained to dissent from the opinion of the majority.
Show Cause Hearing.
JUNE 21, 1962.
Per Curiam.
In the above-entitled case, pursuant to our opinion heretofore filed, the plaintiff through his at*400torney appeared to show cause why the case should not be remitted to the superior court with direction to enter judgment for the defendant. At that time the plaintiff presented reasons orally in support of his contention that the trial justice’s decision should not be disturbed, and later by leave of court he also filed a brief.
Gallogly, Beals & Tiernan, Robert O. Tiernan, David F. Sweeney, for plaintiff.
Boss, Conlan, Keenan, Bulman & Rice, James C. Bulman, James M. Shannahan, for defendant.
After careful consideration of the argument and brief, the majority of the court is of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to show cause why our conclusion should be changed. Therefore the case is remitted to the superior court for entry of judgment for the defendant as directed in the opinion.