Court Opinion

ID: 9428453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:53.11301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:13.470093
License: Public Domain

Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
When should a person injured by a violation of federal law be allowed to recover his damages in a federal court? This seemingly simple question has recently presented the Court with more difficulty than most substantive questions that *23come before us.1 During most of our history, however, a simple presumption usually provided the answer. Although criminal laws and legislation enacted for the benefit of the public at large were expected to be enforced by public officials, a statute enacted for the benefit of a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members of that class injured by violations of the statute. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 39-40.2 Applying that presump*24tion, our truly conservative federal judges — men like Justice Harlan,3 Justice Clark,4 Justice Frankfurter,5 and Judge Kirkpatrick 6 — readily concluded that it was appropriate to allow private parties who had been injured by a violation of a statute enacted for their special benefit to obtain judicial relief. For rules are meant to be obeyed, and those who violate them should be held responsible for their misdeeds. See Rigsby, supra, at 39. Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs.7
In recent years, however, a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the *25quality of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66, the Court cut back on the simple common-law presumption by fashioning a four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in that case.8 Although multi-factor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative answers, more recently some Members of the Court have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod to the Cort v. Ash factors. See, e. g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287, 302 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). The touchstone now is congressional intent. See ante, at 13. Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention,9 that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private remedies.
Although I agree with the Court’s disposition of the implied-private-right-of-action question in these cases, I write separately to emphasize that the Court’s current approach to the judicial task of fashioning appropriate remedies for violations of federal statutes is out of step with the Court’s own *26history and tradition. More importantly, I believe that the Court’s appraisal of the intent expressed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U. S. C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), with respect to the availability of private remedies under other federal statutes or the federal common law is palpably wrong.
In the present context of these cases, we of course know nothing about the ultimate merits of the claims asserted by respondents. As the cases come to us, however, we must make certain assumptions in analyzing the questions presented. First, we must assume that the complaint speaks the truth when it alleges that the petitioners have dumped large quantities of sewage and toxic waste in the Atlantic Ocean and its tributaries, and that these dumping operations have violated the substantive provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77, 80, n. 3. Second, we must also assume that these illegal operations have caused an injury to respondents’ commercial interests. Third, because some of the petitioners are “persons” who allegedly acted under color of state law, as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 19, and n. 29, we must assume that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III)10 provides an express remedy for their violations of these two federal statutes, unless Congress has expressly withdrawn that remedy. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1. Finally, *27we must assume that, apart from these two statutes, the dumping operations of petitioners would constitute a common-law nuisance for which respondents would have a federal remedy. The net effect of the Court’s analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclusion that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately deprived respondents of effective federal remedies that would otherwise have been available to them. In my judgment, the language of both statutes, as well as their legislative history, belies this improbable conclusion.
I
The Court’s holding that Congress decided in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to withdraw the express remedy provided by 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III) seems to rest on nothing more than the fact that these statutes provide other express remedies and do not mention § 1983. Because the enforcement mechanisms provided in the statutes are “quite comprehensive,” the Court finds it “hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action . . . .” Ante, at 20. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. First, the question is not whether Congress “intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action,” but rather whether Congress intended to withdraw that right of action.11 Second, I find it *28not at all hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve, or, more precisely, did not intend to withdraw, the § 1983 remedy because Congress made this intention explicit in the language of both statutes and in the relevant legislative history.
I agree with the Court that the remedial provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA are “quite comprehensive.” I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s implicit conclusion that this determination ends the inquiry under Maine v. Thiboutot, supra. The question that must be answered in determining whether respondents may pursue their claims under § 1983 is whether Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statutes be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 28. Because Congress did not expressly address this question in the statutes, the Court looks elsewhere for an answer and finds it in the comprehensive character of the express statutory remedies. I have no quarrel as a general matter with the proposition that a comprehensive remedial scheme can evidence a congressional decision to preclude other remedies. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, at 93-94. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that our evaluation of a statute’s express remedies is merely a tool used to discern congressional intent; it is not an end in itself. No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute’s remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial avenues open. Express statutory language or clear references in the legislative history will rebut whatever presumption of exclusivity arises from comprehensive remedial provisions. In my judgment, in these cases we are presented with both express statutory language and clear references in the legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend the *29express remedies in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to be exclusive.
Despite their comprehensive enforcement mechanisms, both statutes expressly preserve all legal remedies otherwise available. The statutes state in so many words that the authorization of an express remedy in the statute itself shall not give rise to an inference that Congress intended to foreclose other remedies. Thus, § 505 (e) of the Clean Water Act states:
“Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).” 33 U. S. C. § 1365 (e).
And, § 105 (g)(5) of the MPRSA states:
“The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency).” 33 U. S. C. §1415 (g)(5).
Respondents’ right to proceed under § 1983 in light of these statutory provisions could have been made more plain only had Congress substituted the citation “42 U. S. C. § 1983” for the words “any statute” in the saving clauses.
The legislative history of both statutes makes it clear that the saving clauses were intended to mean what they say. The Senate Report on the Clean Water Act states:
“It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a com*30mon law action for pollution damages.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, p. 81 (1971).
See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 134 (1972). And the corresponding Report on the MPRSA similarly states that the authorization of citizen suits shall not restrict or supersede “any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law.” S. Rep. No. 92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971). See also H. R. Rep. No. 92-361, p. 23.(1971).
The words “any other law” in the former Report and “any other statute” in the latter surely encompass 42 U. S. C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III), as do the words “any statute” in the saving clauses themselves. It therefore seems little short of remarkable that unambiguous expressions of legislative intent such as these can be read to express a purpose to withdraw the express statutory remedy provided by § 1983.
The Court, of course, discusses the saving clauses and this legislative history elsewhere in its opinion. See ante, at 15-17, and n. 26. In rejecting the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, based in part on the saving clauses, that respondents may invoke implied rights of action under the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, the Court finds it “doubtful” that the phrase “any statute” in the saving clauses refers to the very statutes in which the clauses appear. See ante, at 15-16. The Court’s doubt is reinforced by use of the word “other” in the passages from the Senate Reports quoted above. See ante, at 16, n. 26. Thus, the Court holds that the statutory phrase “any statute” does not refer to the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA; the Court apparently also holds that it does not refer to § 1983, even though that statute clearly qualifies as “any other statute” or “any other law,” within the meaning of the legislative history.12
*31In my judgment, the Court has failed to uncover “a clear congressional mandate”13 to withdraw the § 1983 remedy otherwise available to the respondents. Moreover, the statutory language and the legislative history reveal the exact opposite: a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies, including a private right of action under § 1983. I therefore respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court’s decision.
II
The effect of the Court’s holding in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S. 304, was to make the city of Milwaukee’s compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act a complete defense to a federal common-law nuisance action for pollution damage. It was, and still is, difficult for me to reconcile that holding with the excerpts from the statutes and the Senate Reports quoted above — particularly the statement:
“Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 81.
Today, the Court pursues the pre-emption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois to its inexorable conclusion and holds that even noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA is a defense to a federal common-law nuisance claim.14 Because Justice Blackmun has al*32ready exposed in detail the flaws in the Court’s treatment of this issue, see Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 333-347 (dissenting opinion), I merely note that the reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Milwaukee applies with special force in this case.15
III
Although I agree with the Court’s holding that neither of these statutes implicitly authorizes a private damages remedy, I reach that conclusion by a different route. Under the traditional common-law analysis discussed supra, at 23-24, the primary question is whether the statute was enacted for the special benefit of a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S., at 39-40. As we have held in the past, "[t]hat question is *33answered by looking to the language of the statute itself.” Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 689.
The language of neither the Clean Water Act nor the MPRSA defines any such special class. Both the substantive provisions of these statutes and the breadth of their authorizations of citizen suits indicate that they were “enacted for the protection of the general public.” Cannon, supra, at 690.16 Thus, even under the more liberal approach to implied rights of action represented by Rigsby and its antecedents, respondents cannot invoke implied private remedies under these statutes. See generally California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S., at 294-296.
The conclusion required by the statutory language is fortified by the legislative history on which the Court relies. I agree that the legislative deliberations about civil remedies under the Clean Air Act, see ante, at 17-18, n. 27, illuminate the meaning of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA — since these statutes were enacted only a short time later and had similar environmental objectives — and that those deliberations reveal a conscious congressional choice not to authorize a new statutory damages remedy. Accordingly, I agree with the conclusion reached by the Court in Part II-A of its opinion, but I respectfully dissent from the remainder of its judgment.

 Indeed, in recent Terms a significant portion of our docket has been occupied by cases presenting this question with respect to a variety of federal statutes. See, e. g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U. S. 287; Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677. Cf. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630; Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U. S. 77.

 In the unanimous decision in Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, this presumption was plainly stated:
“A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the common law .... This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.” 241 U. S., at 39-40.
As the Rigsby Court noted, the presumption was firmly established at common law, see California v. Sierra Club, supra, at 299-300 (Stevens, J., concurring), and it had been recognized on numerous prior occasions by this Court. See, e. g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (“ '[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit, or action at law, whenever that right is invaded’ ”); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524, 623 (“[T]he power to enforce the performance of the act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be shown to exist”); Pollard v. Bailey, 20 Wall. 520, 527 (“A general liability created by statute without a remedy may be enforced by an appropriate common-law action”); Hayes v. Michigan Central R. Co., 111 U. S. 228, 240 (“[E]ach person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his individual com*24pensation, and to an action for its recovery”); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1, 176-177 (“If there be an admitted wrong, the courts will look far to supply an adequate remedy”).

 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 402 (concurring in judgment) (“[I]n suits for damages based on violations of federal statutes lacking any express authorization of a damage remedy, this Court has authorized such relief where, in its view, damages are necessary to effectuate the congressional policy underpinning the substantive provisions of the statute”).

 See J, I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (“[I]t is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose”).

 See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U. S. 246, 261 (dissenting opinion) (“If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized”).

 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-514 (ED Pa. 1946) (“The disfegard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort. . . . [T]he right to recover damages arising by reason of violation of a statute ... is so fundamental and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied the intention to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly”).

 Although the federal courts do not possess the full common-law powers of their state counterparts, see, e. g., Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, at 95, the cases cited in n. 2, supra, nonetheless indicate that the fashioning of remedies for wrongs has traditionally been a part of the business of the federal courts.

 The unanimous opinion in Cort v. Ash adopted the single-factor test of Rigsby, see n. 2, supra, and combined it with three additional inquiries:
“In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff ‘one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,’ — that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?” 422 U. S., at 78 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

 See Cannon, supra, at 694; Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, at 94.

 Section 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”

 This is more than merely a semantic dispute. As the Court formulates the inquiry, the burden is placed on the § 1983 plaintiff to show an explicit or implicit congressional intention that violations of the substantive statute at issue be redressed in private § 1983 actions. The correct formulation, however, places the burden on the defendant to show that Congress intended to foreclose access to the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing the substantive statute. Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express private remedy that is, on its face, applicable anytime a violation of a federal statute is alleged, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 4, the burden is properly placed on the defendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive statute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A defendant may carry this burden by identifying express statutory language or legislative *28history revealing Congress’ intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 28.

 In a remarkable departure from the “plain language” rule of statutory-construction that has dominated our recent statutory decisions, the Court disregards the plain language not only of the two saving provisions, but *31also of § 1983. Just last Term, we emphasized the plain language of that statute:
“The question before us is whether the phrase 'and laws,’ as used in § 1983, means what it says, or whether it should be limited to some subset of laws. Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents’ claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.” Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S., at 4.

 Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14, 23.

 I recognize, of course, that under the pre-emption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois, a defendant’s compliance or noncompliance with the *32requirements of the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA is technically irrelevant. However, I point out that the petitioners in these cases allegedly failed to comply with the requirements of the statutes merely to emphasize the anomalous nature of the Court’s holdings today and in Milwaukee, particularly in light of the statutory language and legislative history discussed in the text.

 In his brief for the federal parties, the Solicitor General notes:
“The plain language of the savings clause of the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. 1365 (e), indicates Congress’ intent to preserve all common law remedies, and the legislative history makes clear that Congress understood that the federal common law would be preserved as well.” Brief for Federal Petitioners 37.
In support of this conclusion, the Solicitor General cites a statement in the legislative history by Congressman Dingell, one of the cosponsors of the Clean Water Act in the House, specifically referring to nuisance litigation under the federal common law. See 118 Cong. Rec. 33757 (1972), 1 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. 93-1, p. 252 (1973). In his statement, Congressman Dingell cited H. R. Rep. No. 92-1401, pp. 31-33 (1972), which quoted with approval from Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, and discussed two federal common-law nuisance actions then being pursued by the Department of Justice against alleged polluters. See also Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U. S., at 343-344 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

 Both statutes contain general statements of policy that indicate that they were enacted to serve a broad range of interests. Section 101 (a) of the Clean Water Act, as set forth in 33 U. S. C. § 1251 (a), provides, in part:
“The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”
Section 2 (b) of the MPRSA provides:
“The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to regulate the dumping of all types of materials into ocean waters and to prevent or strictly limit the dumping into ocean waters of any material which would adversely affect human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, or economic potentialities.” 33 U. S. C. §1401 (b).