Court Opinion

ID: 9673530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:12.205383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.715261
License: Public Domain

TERNUS, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Iowa Code section 335.18 (1995) clearly provides that a challenge to a decision of a board of adjustment “shall be presented to the court within thirty days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board.” (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari was taken before the decision of the board was filed. An examination of the common meaning of the words “after” and “before” should convincingly demonstrate that the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the statutory requirements for a challenge to the board’s decision. Compare Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 38 (1993) (“after” defined as “later than a particular time”) with id. at 197 (“before” defined as preceding a point in time). Nevertheless, the majority concludes the plaintiffs have complied with the statute. This conclusion is based on an unsupportable “interpretation” of section 335.18.
Although section 335.18 requires any challenge to be “presented to the court within thirty days after filing of the [board’s] decision,” the majority interprets the statute “to allow a challenge to the board’s action by filing a petition for certiorari anytime until thirty days after filing of the board’s decision.” (Emphasis added.) My first disagreement with the majority is the way it characterizes its rationale. If the majority were really interpreting section 335.18 based on the meaning of the words used in the statute, one would assume the statute would have the same meaning under various factual scenarios. The statute either allows challenges “anytime until” thirty days after the board’s decision has been filed or it does not. But the majority has limited its “interpretation” to cases in which the “two peculiar circumstances” present in this case exist. Consequently, the majority is really creating an exception to the statutory requirements for eases like this one. The majority apparently believes the statute means what it says under any other set of circumstances — namely, that a challenge to the board’s action must be taken “within’-’ thirty days after the record of the board’s action has been filed.
Regardless of whether the majority has interpreted the statute or created an exception, the rationale employed does not withstand scrutiny. The majority claims its “interpretation” of section 335.18 “is demanded” by “two special circumstances” “peculiar to the present case.” These circumstances are (1) the board’s records were filed in a private residence, and (2) the plaintiffs were entitled to rely on the board secretary’s compliance with the statutory duty to file records of the board’s official actions “immediately.” See Iowa Code § 335.12. I remain unconvinced that these circumstances justify an exception to the statutory requirements for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
The location of the board’s records cannot excuse the plaintiffs’ noncompliance with the statute. Whether the board’s decision was filed in the zoning administrator’s office, in the county recorder’s office, or with the clerk of court, it was the plaintiffs’ obligation to determine when the decision was filed. The plaintiffs merely claim “there was no way to determine when the appeal date would run.” Yet they could have contacted the zoning board members or the zoning administrator to make this determination. The plaintiffs make no claim that any action of the county officials prevented them from learning when the decision was filed.
The fact is the premature filing of the plaintiffs’ petition did not result from any ambiguity in the statutory time for presenting the petition or from the location of the records in a private residence. The plaintiffs’ failure to comply with section 335.18 arose from their assumption that the board’s decision was filed shortly after the board voted on the conditional use permit. Notwithstanding the board’s duty to record its decision “immediately,” the decision was not filed for several weeks while county officials drafted the resolution setting forth the board’s findings and detailing the conditions to which the permit was subject. To rely on the board’s tardy filing of its decision to excuse the premature filing of the plaintiffs’ petition is in reality an estoppel-type rationale. In the past, we have never allowed a *323party to avoid the requirements for challenging agency action on a theory of estoppel. Rather, we have conditioned such challenges on substantial compliance with the applicable statutes. See Sharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 492 N.W.2d 668, 669 (Iowa 1992) (holding a timely petition for judicial review is a prerequisite for review of agency action); Neumeister v. City Dev. Bd., 291 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Iowa 1980) (dismissing appeal of agency action because the plaintiffs did not comply with statutory procedures for such an appeal); Ford Motor Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp. Regs. Bd., 282 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Iowa 1979) (holding untimely petition for judicial review must be dismissed despite fact plaintiff “might have been misled” by agency’s filing of its ruling contrary to the governing statute). We should adhere to these cases and avoid the temptation to develop a special rule to save the plaintiffs in this case from their own lack of diligence. As we said in the Ford case,
[w]e [concede] that the operation of the statute might seem harsh, especially where, as here, a party might have been misled by the nullity of a later filing [by the agency]. Nevertheless, we believe that the statutory scheme is neither absurd nor unfair....
... The legislature obviously had the broader public interest in mind in adopting the statute.
Ford Motor Co., 282 N.W.2d at 703.
We also should have the broader public interest in mind because there are serious problems in allowing appeals from or challenges to agency action that is not yet final. Clearly, the governing statutes contemplate that the board will make a written record of its decision that will be filed for public review. If an appeal is taken before this written decision is filed, what agency action is to be reviewed on appeal — the simple vote taken at the board’s meeting, or its written decision, supported by factual findings and legal conclusions? And does the agency even have jurisdiction to issue a written decision once an appeal on the very subject of its decision has been perfected? These concerns illustrate the legitimate, practical reasons supporting the legislature’s decision to compute the time for a challenge of the board’s action from the date of the board’s final decision. We should honor the legislature’s intent and give effect to the statute as written.
I would affirm the district court and dismiss the plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certio-rari.
LAVORATO, J., joins this dissent.