Court Opinion

ID: 9558124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:03:12.234593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:20.585178
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (dissenting). I dissent. The majority opinion is based upon the fact that “The attorney’s fee awarded by the court was not supported by sufficient findings or substantial evidence as required by Fryar I.” It is not based upon the doctrine of an abuse of discretion by the district court in its award of attorney fees. A. The district court did not abuse its discretion. Fryar I is Fryar v. Johnsen, 93 N.M. 485, 601 P.2d 718 (1979). A question has arisen whether Fryar I, by providing guidelines, has disposed of the doctrine of abuse of discretion in an award of the amount of an attorney fee. I think not. Heretofore, it has been summarily stated that the amount to be allowed for services of attorneys was a matter of discretion and that the district court abused or did not abuse its discretion. Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690 (1953); Mascarenas v. Kennedy, 74 N.M. 665, 397 P.2d 312 (1964); Ortega v. New Mexico State Highway Department, 77 N.M. 185, 420 P.2d 771 (1966); Waymire v. Signal Oil Field Service, Inc., 77 N.M. 297, 422 P.2d 34 (1966); Genuine Parts Co. v. Garcia, 92 N.M. 57, 582 P.2d 1270 (1978); Gallegos v. Duke City Lumber Co., Inc., 87 N.M. 404, 534 P.2d 1116 (Ct.App.1975); Gearhart v. Eidson Metal Products, 92 N.M. 763, 595 P.2d 401 (Ct.App.1979); Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., 93 N.M. 9, 595 P.2d 1204, 597 P.2d 1178 (Ct.App.1978); Lamont v. New Mexico Military Institute, 92 N.M. 804, 595 P.2d 774 (Ct.App.1979). Fryar II, Johnsen v. Fryar, 96 N.M. 323, 630 P.2d 275 (Ct.App.1980), Lopez, J., dissenting. None of the above cases determined whether the trial court did or did not act “beyond the bounds of reason.” The meaning of “abuse of discretion” was shown in State v. Kincheloe, 87 N.M. 34, 528 P.2d 893 (Ct.App.1974), Sutin, J., dissenting; and Hernandez v. Brooks, 95 N.M. 670, 625 P.2d 1187 (1980), Sutin, J., dissenting. Its meaning will not be re-stated. In this area of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Fryar I did not abolish the doctrine of “abuse of discretion.” For over 60 years we have consistently said that “An abuse of discretion is said to occur when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all the circumstances before it being considered.” Acme Cigarette Services, Inc. v. Gallegos, 91 N.M. 577, 580, 577 P.2d 885 (Ct.App.1978). “All the circumstances before it being considered” means “all of the facts before it being considered.” Relative to the amount of plaintiff’s attorney fee, the facts considered by the trial court are found in Finding No. 9 set out in the majority opinion. The facts considered were: (1) the relative success of plaintiff’s attorney; (2) the extent to which the issues were contested; (3) the complexity of the issues; (4) the ability, standing, skill and experience of plaintiff’s attorney; (5) the rise in the cost of living; and (6) the time and effort expended by the attorneys. Neither the evidence nor the value of each of these factors are essential as findings. The evidence shows that plaintiff’s attorney spent approximately 25 hours prior to the time the claim was filed, 28 hours to the time of preparation for trial, 30 hours preparation for trial, 5 hours trial time and 8 hours post trial time. The total time spent was about 96 hours. The hourly fee normally charged for this type of work in the community was $70.00 an hour. The value of time and effort expended was about $6,720.00. The trial court awarded plaintiff an attorney fee of $7,500.00. To value each of the other factors considered by the court would raise plaintiff’s attorney fee beyond this amount. The majority opinion in Fryar II states: The “fee normally charged” factor means the fee normally charged for services. The services are identified in Fryar v. Johnson, supra. Thus, the fee normally charged factor means — how much is normally charged for filing a one page complaint, how much is normally charged for filing requests for admissions, how much is normally charged for a trial of less than one day, etc. [630 P.2d 280.] This statement seems to say that an amount to be awarded a plaintiff for services rendered begins with the filing of the complaint. Fryar I identified the services as “6. the time and effort expended by the attorney in the particular case.” [93 N.M. 487, 601 P.2d 718.] I do not read any of the cases cited to hold that plaintiff is not entitled to an attorney fee for services rendered prior to the filing of the complaint. Section 52-1-54(D) provides that “the compensation to be paid the attorney * * * shall be fixed by the court * * * in such amount as the court may deem reasonable and proper * * *." No reference is made to services rendered in the case from the time of filing the complaint. Essential in the determination of the amount of an award is “the time and effort expended by the attorney.” To hold otherwise is to discourage competent lawyers from “time and effort expended” in research, conferences with client and witnesses, and negotiations with insurance carriers and opposing lawyers. It would encourage lawyers to file the complaint immediately and, thereafter, strive diligently to obtain compensation for the workman. Settlement of cases would decline. Litigation would be fostered. This policy should not be adopted. It would not serve the best interests of the workman. If the implications stated in Fryar II are correct, it should be overruled. In the instant case the trial court did not act beyond the bounds of reason. It did not abuse its discretion in the amount of the award of plaintiff’s attorney fee. B. Fryar I “guidelines” are not mandatory requirements. The majority opinion states that “the trial courts must follow [the guidelines in Fryar Í] in determining the proper attorney fees to be awarded * * * ” “The guidelines are not advisory but mandatory.” These statements in the opinion mean to me that trial courts are mandated to follow all of the guidelines in Fryar I to determine the amount of the attorney fee to be awarded. I disagree. Fryar I said: Our trial court needs more definite guidelines to determine the amount to award for attorney fees in workmen’s compensation cases. We hold therefore that, in addition to the statutory requirements, the following factors are subject to consideration: [Set forth in majority opinion.] [Emphasis added.] [93 N.M. 488, 601 P.2d 718.] “Guidelines” are lines by which a trial court should be guided in arriving at the amount of an attorney fee to be awarded plaintiff. There are 11 guidelines, not one. They run in various directions. “Subject to” has a variety of definitions, dependent upon the subject matter. The words usually indicate a condition of one party’s duty to perform. Scafidi v. Puckett, 118 Ariz. 589, 578 P.2d 1018 (Ct.App.1978). “The word ‘consider’ in this connection means ‘to think about; reflect upon; give close attention to; ponder.’ ” Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Holmes, 223 Ala. 188, 134 So. 875, 876 (1931). Factors “subject to consideration” as guidelines of the trial court means that the trial court has a duty to think about the various factors which assist the trial court to arrive at the amount of the award. It does not mean that the trial court has a duty which mandates the trial court to take each factor, value it in money, and, from the total money value of the 11 guidelines, determine the amount to award as an attorney fee. To do so may inflate the size of attorney fees to cause á return to the summary statement made: “The trial court abused its discretion.” If this analyzation does not express the intention of the Supreme Court in Fryar I, clarification is necessary. By reversal of this case, the trial court may find that plaintiff is entitled to an award far in excess of $7,500.00. The purpose of this discussion is not to diminish the amount of awards made but to allow the trial court to arrive at a reasonable fee. We should respect the amount of an award fixed by the trial court even though it may vary from judge to judge and from case to case. Only when an appellate court is convinced from the cold record that the trial court acted beyond the bounds of reason, should the amount of an award be disturbed and the reasons therefore stated. C. The attorney fee awarded was supported by sufficient findings or evidence. Finding No. 9 set forth six factors considered in making the award of the attorney fee. The attorney presented the evidence upon which the finding was made. The attorney fee award was supported both by sufficient findings and evidence. The award should be affirmed.