Court Opinion

ID: 9884442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:57:28.046342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:38.559485
License: Public Domain

MATHIAS, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
I first acknowledge the. long-standing principle that a “judge may intervene in the fact-finding process and question witnesses in order to promote clarity or dispel obscurity.” Griffin v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. However, I believe there is a funda*1266mental difference between a judge intervening or participating in the fact-finding and a judge conducting the fact-finding.
In this proceeding, the trial court conducted the entire direct examination and the entire cross examination. I cannot agree with my colleagues that the trial court was merely attempting to “promote clarity” through these examinations. Rather, the trial court assumed the role of A.W.D.’s adversary by eliciting the evidence against A.W.D. A civil commitment constitutes a significant deprivation of personal liberty. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979). Therefore, I believe that our courts must afford persons subject to confinement the benefits and protections of due process through truly adversarial proceedings.
Indiana Code section 12-26-2-5(e) (2001) provides that “[t]he petitioner [in a civil commitment proceeding] is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (2) detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” By allowing the presiding judge to elicit all of the testimony on behalf of the petitioner, the trial court necessarily sought to carry the petitioner’s burden of proof required to commit the respondent to involuntary mental health treatment. Indiana Code and due process, however, require that the petitioner support the burden of proof in such a proceeding.
I further acknowledge that Indiana precedent sanctions the trial judge’s active participation in proving the petitioner’s case in a mental health commitment proceeding. See Jones v. State, 477 N.E.2d 353 (Ind.Ct.App.1985); In re Commitment of Roberts, 723 N.E.2d 474 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). However, I respectfully disagree.
The panel in In re Commitment of Roberts acknowledged that “a violation of due process occurs where a trial judge combines the role of judge and advocate” but sidestepped the impact of that well-settled principle by finding no evidence of improper behavior in the facts before them. Id. at 476. Yet, to this judge at least, it would seem that the courtroom dynamics of a trial judge calling, swearing in, and questioning witnesses presents precisely the prohibited combination of roles. This is especially so in the area of mental health proceedings where witnesses, who are often family members or friends of the respondent, are reluctant to testify and fearful of what might happen to the respondent as a result of their testimony. One need look no further than the issues surrounding the forced administration of anti-psychotic drugs in mental health cases to understand just how critical true due process protection for these respondents is. See J.S. v. Center for Behavioral Health, 859 N.E.2d 666 (Ind.2007) (Rucker, Justice, dissenting from the denial of transfer, with Justice Sullivan concurring).
“An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Canon 1(A) (2007). To preserve this independence, judges must “act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” Jud. Canon 2(A). No matter the actual, unimpeachable integrity of the judicial officer involved, requiring or allowing that officer to present the evidence upon which he will rule in a commitment proceeding is inconsistent with promoting public confidence in the inherent integrity and impartiality of our judicial system.
A better procedure in civil commitment hearings was recently adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in In the Matter of S.P., 719 N.W.2d 535 (IOWA 2006). Concerned *1267with the trial court taking on an adversarial role in civil commitment proceedings, the supreme court stated: “[W]hen faced with pro se applicants in a civil commitment proceeding, the referee or district court is advised to either appoint an attorney at the county’s expense ... or warn the applicant at the outset that the applicant will have to prove his or her case without assistance from the court.” Id. at 539.
I believe that to preserve patients’ due process rights in civil commitment proceedings, our courts should adopt a rule similar to that enunciated by the Iowa Supreme Court. Or, as is already the case in some Indiana counties, Indiana’s prosecuting attorneys should present the petitioner’s case for involuntary commitment to the court.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.