Court Opinion

ID: 9471652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:37:57.900117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:31.150011
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the defendant’s fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated when the state court admitted the psychiatrists’ testimony which recited inculpatory statements that went to the issue of guilt, I respectfully dissent.
It is rudimentary that a psychiatrist’s testimony is inadmissible against a defendant on the issue of guilt. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 530, 78 L.Ed.2d 712 (1983); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996, 99 S.Ct. 597, 58 L.Ed.2d 669 (1978). Both psychiatrists testified the defendant told them “I raped the woman.” The majority holds, however, that this testimony was admitted not to prove guilt, but rather to show the basis for the psychiatrists’ opinion that Watters was insane. I am unpersuaded by this argument. The psychiatrists’ statements to the jury were highly prejudicial and incriminating. In fact, these statements amounted to a confession. Certainly there were other ways to show a basis for the psychiatrists’ conclusions on sanity.
The incriminating statement concerning the commission of the crime should have been omitted from the psychiatrists’ testimony. It would have been possible to have shown a basis for the psychiatrists’ conclusions without including the confession, “I raped the woman.” As the court stated in United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S.Ct. 149, 50 L.Ed.2d 130 (1976):
We choose to permit ... compelled psychiatric examinations when a defendant has raised the insanity defense. Since any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed, a rule forbidding compelled examinations would prevent no threatened evil (emphasis added).
At the very least, fundamental fairness required a special cautionary instruction after the psychiatrists’ testimony was submitted into evidence. I disagree with the Court’s statement in Noggle v. Marshall, supra, which was relied upon by this panel, and in effect said that such cautionary instructions are of questionable effectiveness. 706 F.2d at 1417. The importance of giving a cautionary instruction to a jury cannot be overemphasized. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Gibson v. Zahradnick, supra:
[i]t may be necessary in some cases for the psychiatrist, in testifying on the issue of sanity, to disclose the criminal activity related to him by the defendant, but, in that event, prompt and strong cautionary instructions are required that such testimony must not be considered by the jury on the issue of guilt.
581 F.2d at 79.
The trial court’s failure to give such an instruction in light of the incriminating nature of the psychiatrists’ testimony, was an *388error of constitutional magnitude and violated defendant’s fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s decision and remand for a new trial.