Court Opinion

ID: 9352612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-09 00:00:39.202958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:58.868498
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60411        Document: 00516601695            Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/06/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                         January 6, 2023
                                      No. 22-60411                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                    Summary Calendar                           Clerk

   Gwendolyn Gray; Clell O. McCurdy,

                                                                 Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                            versus

   Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                USDC No. 3:21-cv-710

   Before Davis, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff-Appellants, Gwendolyn Gray and Clell McCurdy, appeal the
   dismissal of their Title VII race-discrimination claims against Defendant-
   Appellee, Mississippi Department of Rehabilitation Services (“MDRS”).
   We conclude that the district court did not err and AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60411     Document: 00516601695           Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/06/2023

                                    No. 22-60411

                               I. BACKGROUND
          MDRS is a state agency that provides services to individuals with
   disabilities. Plaintiff Gwendolyn Gray, an African American woman with a
   master’s degree in counseling psychology, began working at MDRS in 2016.
   Gray was hired as a DRS-Counselor II with a starting salary of $29,415.81. In
   2019, Gray was promoted to a DRS-Counselor III, increasing her salary to
   $32,392.14. Also in 2019, the state legislature approved a salary increase for
   state employees that raised Gray’s salary by three percent. Later in 2019,
   MDRS recommended Gray for a five percent salary increase, which raised
   her salary to $35,032.09.
          Plaintiff Clell McCurdy, an African American man with a master’s
   degree in rehabilitation counseling, began working at MDRS in 2017.
   McCurdy was also hired as a DRS-Counselor II with the same starting salary
   as Gray. In 2018, McCurdy was promoted to a DRS-Counselor III, with a
   salary of $32,392.14. Also in 2018, McCurdy received a five percent salary
   increase after reaching an educational benchmark.            Finally, in 2019,
   McCurdy’s salary was raised to $34,983.50 as a result of the legislative
   adjustment.
          In 2018, MDRS Executive Director Chris Howard hired John
   Williamson, a white male with a bachelor’s degree.             Howard had a
   relationship with Williamson and his family that predated Williamson’s
   employment with MDRS. Howard testified that he recruited Williamson
   because he already “knew” him, and believed that Williamson’s passion of
   working with high school kids would benefit the “greater emphasis” that
   MDRS placed on providing high school students with preemployment
   transition services. Howard hired Williamson as a “DRS-Performance
   Auditor I,” with a starting salary of $39,930.            Although Williamson
   performed the same duties as plaintiffs, Howard testified that he gave

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                                              No. 22-60411

   Williamson a different title and salary because he knew Williamson would not
   accept a pay cut from his prior job at another state agency where he was
   earning $36,176.62.
           In 2019, plaintiffs filed charges of discrimination with the Equal
   Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiffs thereafter
   filed the instant Title VII1 action asserting that MDRS discriminated against
   them on the basis of race by paying Williamson a higher salary for the same
   work even though plaintiffs had superior qualifications. The district court
   granted summary judgment for MDRS. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
                                          II. DISCUSSION
           We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. 2
   Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law.”3                Because plaintiffs rely solely on circumstantial
   evidence, we evaluate their claims of discrimination under the McDonnell
   Douglas4 burden-shifting framework.5 Under that framework, to make out a
   prima facie case of pay discrimination, “a plaintiff must show that he was a
   member of a protected class and that he was paid less than a non-member for
   work requiring substantially the same responsibility.”6                      If the plaintiff

           1
            Plaintiffs also brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted
   MDRS’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims, and plaintiffs do not
   challenge that decision on appeal.
           2
               Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2021).
           3
               Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
           4
               McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
           5
               Ross, 993 F.3d at 321.
           6
             Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Uviedo
   v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984)).

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   establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer “‘a
   legitimate non-discriminatory reason’ for the pay disparity.”7 At this stage,
   the defendant’s burden is one of “production, not persuasion,” and
   “involve[s] no credibility assessment.”8 If the employer meets its burden,
   “the presumption of discrimination dissipates,” and the burden shifts back
   to plaintiff to show that the employer’s rationale is merely a pretext for
   discrimination.9         “To carry that burden, the plaintiff must produce
   substantial evidence of pretext.”10 A plaintiff may do so by showing that a
   discriminatory motive more likely motived her employer’s decision, or that
   her employer’s “explanation is unworthy of credence.”11
           The parties do not dispute that each plaintiff established a prima facie
   case of discrimination. Therefore, the burden shifted to MDRS to come
   forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay discrepancy.
   To meet this burden, MDRS relied on their Executive Director’s testimony
   that he awarded Williamson a higher salary because of his preexisting
   relationship with Williamson, his belief that Williamson’s interests would
   make him a good recruit for a transitional counselor position, and because he
   knew that Williamson could not take a salary cut from his prior salary at

           7
               Id. (quoting Ross v. Univ. of Tex. at San Antonio, 139 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1998).
           8
             Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955,
   958 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The employer need only articulate a lawful reason, regardless of what
   its persuasiveness may or may not be.”).
           9
                Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 219 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
   omitted).
           10
             Id. at 220 (quoting Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402 (5th
   Cir. 2001).
           11
             Id. (quoting Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th
   Cir. 1998).

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   another state agency. The district court correctly concluded that these are
   legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the pay disparity.12 Specifically,
   MDRS’s proffered reasons are facially nondiscriminatory.
           The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to rebut these legitimate reasons.
   To meet this burden, plaintiffs assert that summary judgment is
   inappropriate because MDRS’s proffered reasons are based on Howard’s
   state of mind, and that a jury, not the court, must weigh the credibility of
   Howard’s testimony to determine whether his justification is pretextual.
           Plaintiffs’       conclusory      assertion,    absent      any     evidence      of
   discrimination, is insufficient to carry plaintiffs’ burden that the reasons
   offered by MDRS are a pretext for discrimination.13 As stated above,
   plaintiffs must show that their employer’s decision was more likely motivated
   by discrimination, or that their employer’s explanation is unworthy of
   credence.14 Here, plaintiffs have provided no evidence to cast doubt on the
   veracity of Howard’s testimony, nor have they pointed to any evidence that

           12
              See McDaniels v. Plymouth-Canton Cmty. Schs., 755 F. App’x 461, 470 (6th Cir.
   2018) (“An employer may also make hiring decisions based on its familiarity and personal
   relationships with candidates.”); Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th
   Cir. 1997) (“Favoritism, unfair treatment and unwise business decisions do not violate
   Title VII unless based on a prohibited classification.” (citing EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d
   1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1992))); see also Penney v. AIG Domestic Claims, Inc., 04-9071, 2007
   WL 541711, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2007) (finding that plaintiff could not rebut her
   employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reason that it paid her co-worker a higher salary
   based on his previous salary).
           13
             Plaintiffs’ reliance on Reeves is inapposite. Unlike the plaintiff in Reeves who
   “made a substantial showing that [his employer’s] explanation was false” by offering
   “evidence that he had properly maintained the attendance records,” plaintiffs have
   presented no evidence that would cast doubt on the reasons given by MDRS. See Reeves,
   530 U.S. at 144-46 (finding that plaintiff presented evidence at trial that cast doubt on his
   employer’s assertion that plaintiff was fired because of his poor work performance and
   recordkeeping).
           14
                Wallace, 271 F.3d at 220.

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   MDRS’s salary decisions were racially motivated.15 Absent such evidence of
   pretext, the fact that an employer relied on specific “subjective reasons for
   its personnel decisions” is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material
   fact regarding pretext.16
           Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment in
   favor of MDRS.

           15
             See EEOC v. Exxon Shipping Co., 745 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[P]retext
   cannot be established by mere ‘conclusory statements’ of a plaintiff who feels he has been
   discriminated against.” (quoting Elliott v. Grp. Med. & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 566 (5th
   Cir. 1983)).
           16
              See Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that an employer
   may “rely on subjective reasons for its personnel decisions” as long as the employer
   “articulate[s] in some detail a more specific reason than its own vague and conclusional
   feelings about the employee”); Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 616 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (“It is inconceivable that Congress intended anti-discrimination statutes to deprive an
   employer of the ability to rely on important criteria in its employment decisions merely
   because those criteria are only capable of subjective evaluation.” (quoting Chapman v. Al
   Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000)).

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