Court Opinion

ID: 9850362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:56:11.177025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:35.880253
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in result).
1. Intervening cause defense.
I believe the majority’s statement of the law regarding an intervening cause defense is incomplete and too restrictive.
The majority’s statement of the law is incomplete because it does not explain that its analysis is applicable only to dangerous wounds designed to destroy life. The Sau-ter opinion, upon which the majority relies, specifically addresses situations where the wound inflicted upon the victim was “calculated to endanger his life.” State v. Sauter, 120 Ariz. 222, 223, 585 P.2d 242, 243 (1978). We should make it clear that non-life-threatening wounds are not within the scope of the decision.
The majority’s decision is too restrictive because it allows an intervening cause defense on the basis of medical malpractice “only if [the malpractice] constitutes the sole cause of death.” (Emphasis in original). Such a standard will likely prevent a defendant from ever being allowed to raise an intervening cause defense. If medical malpractice is the sole cause of death it is unlikely the defendant would even be charged with murder. On the other hand, a “sole cause of death” standard would deny the defense in situations where it is justified. For example, consider a situation where grossly negligent medical care allows a person to bleed to death from a stab wound that would not be fatal with proper treatment. How could the medical treatment be deemed the “sole cause of death” when the person died because of a stab wound? Yet, death would not have occurred but for the gross negligence.
The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that a “sole cause of death” standard is inadequate and has adopted a “but for” test. People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). The Calvaresi court rejected a jury instruction that would not allow medical malpractice as a defense to a homicide charge unless “death results solely from erroneous treatment by another.” Id., 188 Colo, at 282, 534 P.2d at 319. The court concluded that the instruction was “not a sufficiently complete statement of the law,” because a conviction for homicide requires that the death be the natural and probable result of an unlawful act and not the result of an unforeseeable intervening cause in which the accused did not participate. Id. Instead, the court held that grossly negligent medical treatment “would constitute a defense, if, but for that gross negligence, death would not have resulted.” Id.; cf. People v. Clark, 171 Mich.App. 656, 431 N.W.2d 88 (1988) (If it appears that, but for the act of another, death would not have occurred, such supervening cause is a good defense to the charge of homicide).
The reason the “but for” rather than the “sole cause of death” standard should be adopted is evident upon consideration of our treatment of attempted crimes. The legislature has decreed that someone who attempts to commit a crime shall be punished less severely than someone who succeeds in committing the crime. See SDCL 22-4-1. Yet, under a “sole cause of death” standard, identical attempted homicides could be punished differently depending upon actions outside the control of the defendant. Consider a situation in which two assailants inflict identical stab wounds on two victims — the first victim receives normal medical treatment and lives, the second victim receives grossly negligent treatment and bleeds to death. The criminal responsibility of the two assailants should be the same because they committed the same *849wrongful act. Yet under the majority’s decision, the first assailant could be convicted only for attempted murder while the second assailant, denied an intervening cause defense, would be convicted for murder. The assailants should not be punished differently simply because of the gross negligence of medical personnel. Allowing the second assailant to raise the grossly negligent* medical treatment as an intervening cause defense would correct the disparity.
Under the facts of this case, Bennis would not have been entitled to present an intervening cause defense even if a “but for” standard were used. Bennis offered no evidence of improper medical treatment that would rise to the level of gross negligence. At best, the evidence suggested that different treatment may have prevented the death. The evidence simply did not allow an intervening cause defense.
2. Autopsy photographs.
I also object to the manner in which the autopsy photographs were admitted into evidence. The majority concludes the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs because “an expert testified that the photographs would aid him in testifying.” Whether to admit a photograph should not depend simply on whether it will aid an expert’s testimony. Additional factors must be considered.
The photographs in this case are of a different nature than those in State v. Novaock, 414 N.W.2d 299 (S.D.1987), and State v. Ashker, 412 N.W.2d 97 (S.D.1987), because the photographs in those cases were necessary to show the wound entries, the blood-spatter pattern, and that two assailants were required to effect the wounds. Why were the photographs needed here? The State’s expert testified in chambers that he could also use a chart or his own person to aid his testimony. In other words, the photographs were not necessary, merely useful. However, inflammatory photographs are not to be admitted unless they are “necessary to aid [an] expert’s presentation.” Novaock, supra at 302. The autopsy photographs were inflammatory because they showed extensive surgical wounds in addition to the stab wound. Therefore, since the photographs were not necessary for the expert’s testimony, their inflammatory nature required that they not be admitted into evidence.
The trial court’s error was nevertheless harmless. Although the autopsy photographs were inflammatory, they were only marginally so, unlikely to arouse the jury’s passion in any significant manner. In contrast, the other evidence supporting the verdict was extensive. As a result, it is clear “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless and did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 819 (S.D.1987).

 Mere negligence would be insufficient to justify an intervening cause defense because negligence, while not common, is foreseeable and falls within the realm of "normal" treatment. See Calvaresi, supra, 188 Colo, at 282, 534 P.2d at 319. In addition, it could be difficult to determine whether a death would not have resulted but for the medical treatment if the treatment is merely negligent.