Court Opinion

ID: 9690942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:53:26.117156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:06.968112
License: Public Domain

Terry Crabtree, Judge, dissenting. I disagree with the majority that the exculpatory clauses in this case clearly set out what negligent liability appellees sought to avoid. The clauses do not mention the word “negligence” at all, nor do they state that the signator on the contract is waiving any rights or releasing any party from liability. Those omissions distinguish this case from the supreme court’s holdings in Plant v. Wilbur, 345 Ark. 487, 47 S.W.3d 889 (2001), and Edgin v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 331 Ark. 162, 961 S.W.2d 724 (1998). Further, I do not believe the clauses are saved by the use of the term “malfeasance or misfeasance.” The supreme court has always mandated that strong, clear language be used in seeking to absolve oneself of liability. Those words fall short of that mandate. Without more, they are not sufficient to inform a contracting party that he may be giving up his right to hold the other party liable for negligence. To hold that these contracts clearly set out what negligent liability is to be avoided is to impermissibly extend the holdings of Edgin, supra, and Plant, supra, beyond what the supreme court intended. I therefore respectfully dissent and am authorized to state that Judge Baker joins in this dissent. Baker, J., agrees.