Court Opinion

ID: 9587063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:43.992339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:00.774996
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
Although the majority correctly acknowledges that “prior case law ... provides that a PSR need not be ordered in every case,” and that “the sentencing court may have sufficient information before it to properly come to a decision as to an appropriate sentence,” ante at 395, 775 P.2d 1237, it then errs when it concludes that “[i]n the case at bar, by contrast, the record shows that the sentencing court had no independent information to vitiate the need for a PSR.” Ante at 395, 775 P.2d at 1237. Assuming, arguendo, that Romero has raised the PSR issue,81 would hold that it was not error for the sentencing judge to not order a PSR under the particular facts of this case.
Idaho Criminal Rule 32, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
Rule 32. Standards and procedures governing presentence investigations and reports. — The following standards and procedures shall govern presentence investigations and reports in the Idaho courts:
(a) When presentence investigations are to be ordered. The trial judge need not require a presentence investigation report in every criminal case. The ordering of such a report is within the discretion of the court. With respect to felony convictions, if the trial court does not require a presentence investigation and report, the record must show affirmatively why such an investigation was not ordered. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the ordering of a presentence investigation is not mandatory in every case, as the Court’s opinion infers, but is within the discretion of the trial court. If the court does not require a presentence report in a felony case, the record need only show affirmatively why such was not ordered.9 I.C.R. 32 was further explained and applied in State v. Goldman, 107 Idaho 209, 687 P.2d 599 (Ct.App.1984). In Goldman, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the trial court should not have dispensed with the PSR without making an affirmative showing on the record of a valid reason for doing so. In that case, the trial judge made no affirmative showing on the record of his reasons for dispensing with the PSR. Had he done so, however, the Court of Appeals recognized that it could not later set the sentence aside. As the Court of Appeals stated:
We turn first to Rule 32. As noted above, this rule would afford us no basis to set aside a sentence if the trial judge had dispensed with the report in the sound exercise of judicial discretion and the record affirmatively showed why he did so.
107 Idaho at 210, 687 P.2d at 600.
By way of contrast, the Court of Appeals in this case acknowledged that the trial judge dispensed with the PSR in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, and the record before this Court affirmatively shows that he did so because the PSR would have shed no additional light favor*398ing Romero. In fact, rather than bolstering Romero’s status, a PSR would probably have diminished it. At the sentencing hearing the very first thing Judge Hargraves did was go on the record as follows:
Before we proceed with the actual sentencing, I’m going to make a couple of observations. A pre-sentence investigation was not ordered in this case, and that has been discussed with counsel. But I want it to appear on the record that the Court heard all of the testimony;....
The primary purpose of a PSR is to give the sentencing judge adequate information about the defendant before handing down the sentence. Idaho Judge’s Sentencing Manual § 5.1 (1986). Although the in camera discussions between Judge Hargraves and counsel were not recorded, at the hearing before this Court defense counsel explained why Judge Hargraves stated that he had heard all of the testimony and that the lack of a presentence report had been discussed with counsel prior to sentencing. At oral argument before this Court, when asked if he really wanted a presentence report, defense counsel answered, “Frankly, the best mitigation evidence that I am going to be able to put on I did with my client when he took the stand... I I would urge that ... really not much more can be fleshed out in the record____” At the sentencing hearing Judge Hargraves knew, pursuant to his in camera discussions with counsel, that he was already in possession of all pertinent information and that a presentence report would not shed any additional light or expose any new mitigating evidence. This fact was echoed by defense counsel himself at the sentencing hearing when he said, “I recognize that a pre-sentence really wouldn’t enlighten the Court much more about certainly what happened in this incident.” Accordingly, in compliance with I.C.R. 32 and State v. Goldman, 107 Idaho 209, 687 P.2d 599 (Ct.App.1984), at the sentencing hearing Judge Hargraves immediately went on the record and affirmatively explained why, in his discretion, the PSR was not ordered in this case.
On this record the trial judge did not abuse his discretion.
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
Associates Northwest, Inc., v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App. 1987). All three tiers are met in the instant case. First, the trial judge rightly perceived that the ordering of a PSR was within his discretion and, in choosing not to order one, he acted within the bounds of his discretion. Second, the trial judge acted consistently with the legal standards set out in I.C.R. 32 by showing affirmatively on the record that the PSR was not ordered because he already possessed all the pertinent information regarding Romero. And third, the trial judge reached his decision by an exercise of reason, his reasoning being that he was already in possession of all pertinent information necessary to sentence Romero and that a presentence report would not shed any additional light or expose any new mitigating evidence. Where the trial judge properly identifies the law and applies the law to the facts, then the trial judge’s discretion has not been abused. Both prongs of the I.C.R. 32 analysis have been met — the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and the trial judge went on the record showing affirmatively why a PSR was not ordered. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming the trial judge’s decision not to order a PSR in this case. As stated in Goldman, “[T]his rule [I.C.R. 32] afford[s] us no basis to set aside a sentence [where] the trial judge ... dispensed with the report in the sound exercise of judicial discretion and the record affirmatively show[s] why he did so.” 107 Idaho at 210, 687 P.2d at 600.
Even if it was error for the trial judge not to order a PSR in this case (which it was not, as has been established above), it was harmless error because defense coun*399sel admitted, at the hearing before this Court, that he was able to get all of his available mitigating evidence in during the trial. As noted above, defense counsel told this Court, “Frankly, the best mitigating evidence that I am going to be able to put on I did with my client when he took the stand____ I would urge that ... really not much more can be fleshed out in the record____” Further, earlier in the hearing defense counsel stated, “A remand would not shed ... as I suggested to the Court of Appeals, I believe it would bring a lot more heat and little additional light.” In short, defense counsel was able to get all the mitigating evidence in during the trial and sentencing hearing, and, in fact, he was concerned that a PSR or a remand for resentencing would hurt, rather than help, defendant Romero. Again at the hearing before this Court, defense counsel stated, “I am concerned that on remand, in what would likely be an aggravation/mitigation hearing, that the incredible popularity of the victim would override any scrutiny of Mr. Romero’s circumstance____ I am concerned ... that [a remand] could set him back____” Thus, even if the lack of a PSR was error, it was harmless error under the facts of this case.
The trial court did not err in not ordering a presentence report. Neither did the Court of Appeals err in its review of the other issues raised by Romero in his appeal before that tribunal. State v. Romero, 114 Idaho 92, 753 P.2d 828 (Ct.App.1988). Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court in its entirety.
SHEPARD, J.,* concurs.

. Although not denominated by appellant as a formal issue on appeal, the absence of a presentence report (PSR) was discussed in appellant’s brief.

. The Idaho Judge’s Sentencing Manual § 5.2 (1986) seems to be in conflict and reads, in part, as follows:
It is suggested by the ABA Standards Relating to Probation, Section 2.1(b), that a presentence investigation and report should be made in every case where incarceration for one year or more is a possible disposition, where the defendant is less than 21 years old, or where the defendant is a first offender.
The suggested ABA probation standards are not binding on this Court and the inclusion of the ABA suggestion in the Idaho Judge’s Sentencing Manual does not override the superior authority of the Idaho Criminal Rules, here specifically I.C.R. 32.