Court Opinion

ID: 9733843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:18:47.478572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:35.589560
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s holding that the admission into evidence of Whitmore’s response concerning ownership of the keys was, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless error. There was ample evidence beyond that response which identified the Valiant as the automobile discussed by White and Whitmore and, therefore, to connect Whitmore with the Valiant. It is that evidentiary consideration which, pursuant to Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. *460Ed. 2d 705 (1967), permits us to affirm the district court’s judgment. Accord State v. Andersen, 213 Neb. 695, 331 N.W.2d 507 (1983).
I write separately, however, because I cannot agree with the majority’s obiter dictum that Whitmore’s Miranda rights were not violated.
As noted in the majority’s opinion, the prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a criminal defendant unless it demonstrates that the Miranda warnings were first given and waived. Since the State admits Whitmore was in custody when he was questioned about ownership of the keys, the relevant issue becomes whether such questioning constituted interrogation.
Interrogation has been variously defined in our cases. State v. McNitt, 207 Neb. 296, 299, 298 N.W.2d 465, 466 (1980), noted that “[t]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Interrogation occurs, according to State v. Weinacht, 203 Neb. 124, 130, 277 N.W.2d 567, 571 (1979), “when the subject is placed under a compulsion to speak.” See, also, In re Interest of Durand. State v. Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980). The following language from Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980), shows up frequently in our decisions: “[T]he term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” See, also, State v. Sutton, 207 Neb. 778, 301 N.W.2d 335 (1981); In re Interest of Durand. State v. Durand, supra.
In State v. Thunder Hawk, 212 Neb. 350, 322 N.W.2d 669 (1982), we held that statements made by the defendant after he had been placed under arrest violated Miranda and were inadmissible. The defendant in Thunder Hawk had been involved in an automobile accident and, before being transported to a hospital, was arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. At the hospital a police officer questioned Thunder Hawk about the accident *461without first informing him of his rights under Miranda. Among other questions, Thunder Hawk was asked if he was driving, to which he replied yes, and was also asked who owned the vehicle, to which he replied that he did not know. At the time of this questioning the officer had in his possession the vehicle’s registration, which indicated the vehicle .was titled to a third party. The defendant was subsequently charged with theft of movable property. The questioning officer testified that he asked the questions solely for assistance in filling out his accident report. The officer’s explanation was quickly rejected by this court, which determined that the interrogation was clearly aimed at soliciting incriminating statements. Even though the type of questioning which occurred in Thunder Hawk was found not permissible, we did note that “[v]olunteered and general on-the-scene questioning is not prohibited” by Miranda. Id. at 355, 322 N.W.2d at 672.
In the present case Whitmore was not subjected to some general on-the-scene questioning. Rather, he was asked whether he owned a specific set of keys. Just as in Thunder Hawk, the police officer’s reason for asking the question does not withstand scrutiny. Why it was necessary to determine ownership of a set of keys before such could be used to lock an already locked door which had been partially destroyed in gaining entrance is far from readily apparent. The officer knew of the earlier successful search of the Plymouth Valiant and of the need to connect Whitmore with that vehicle. The officer surely knew that people usually carry their car keys on some type of chain even if he did not notice the Chrysler Corporation keys until after he had questioned Whitmore — a fact which is not clear from the evidence. The officer should have known that his questioning was “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Indeed, the officer’s failure to give a plausible reason for his question inescapably leads to the conclusion that an incriminating response is exactly what he wanted and got.
This conclusion is also compelled by the Thunder Hawk decision itself. The relevant question in that case involved ownership of a vehicle, whereas in this case it involved ownership of a set of keys. How the one constitutes *462interrogation and the other does not cannot be explained on any rational basis. Furthermore, State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 252 A.2d 398 (1969), cited by the majority to support its conclusion, on close examination does not do so. In Barnes the defendant was stopped and arrested on an escape charge, at which time the police noticed numerous checks on the floor of the automobile. Several persons other than the defendant were also in the automobile. The police asked to whom the checks belonged, and the defendant’s response that they were hers was admitted in her later trial for receiving stolen goods. In finding no interrogation had occurred, the Barnes court noted that “the question was open-ended in its form, not focusing on any particular suspect, and unrelated to the cause of her arrest as an escapee.” Id. at 6, 252 A.2d at 401. The same cannot be said of the question asked in the present case.
Krivosha, C.J., and Shanahan, J., join in this concurrence.