Court Opinion

ID: 9925410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 18:02:51.338636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.387058
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/19/24 P. v. Black CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Siskiyou)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096897

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. SCCR-CRF-
                                                                                         2021-320-1)
           v.

 SIVA BLACK,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Appointed counsel for defendant Siva Black filed an opening brief that sets forth
the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there
are any arguable issues on appeal. (Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529.)
After considering defendant’s supplemental brief, we conclude there are no arguable
issues that would result in a more favorable outcome to defendant and affirm.

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                                      BACKGROUND
       In March 2021, defendant was charged in Siskiyou County case No. SCCR-CRF-
2021-320-1 with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); statutory
section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated);
exhibiting a deadly weapon to a peace officer with the intent to resist and prevent arrest
and detention (§ 417.8); and resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1)). The complaint alleged a prior 2013 Massachusetts conviction for assault to
commit murder with a knife as a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and a prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12).
       In May 2021, the trial court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competency
pursuant to section 1368 and suspended criminal proceedings. Defendant appealed the
court’s order, and in case No. C094429 this court dismissed the appeal after finding the
order nonappealable.
       In July 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s Marsden (People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal. 3d 118) motion. Defendant appealed in case No. C094612; this court
dismissed the appeal after concluding defendant appealed from a nonappealable order.
       In September 2021, the trial court denied defendant’s request to be heard on a
motion to suppress given that criminal proceedings remained suspended.
       In October 2021, the trial court found defendant incompetent to stand trial.
Defendant appealed in case No. C095200, and, after examining the notice of appeal, this
court dismissed the appeal as premature.
       In November 2021, the trial court committed defendant to Napa State Hospital for
treatment for no more than two years. At that time, the court found defendant had the
capacity to accept or refuse medication. Defendant appealed the order in case No.
C095417. Because defendant was later restored to competency and the matter was

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resolved by plea, this court dismissed the appeal from the court’s November commitment
order.
         After some initial delay, by June 2022, defendant had been transported to Napa
State Hospital. During a medication review hearing in July 2022, an administrative law
judge found by clear and convincing evidence that defendant lacked the capacity to make
decisions regarding antipsychotic medication, that his mental disorder required treatment
with antipsychotic medication, and without such treatment it was probable that serious
physical or mental harm would result. The administrative law judge ordered that the
hospital could involuntarily medicate defendant until August 16, 2022, but that any
involuntary medication beyond that date required a court order.
         In an August 4, 2022, report under section 1370, subdivision (b)(1), a forensic
psychologist opined that defendant was not yet competent to stand trial and should be
retained for further treatment; defendant repeatedly declined to be interviewed.
According to the report, defendant met the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders – Fifth Edition (DSM V) criteria for having unspecified schizophrenia
spectrum and other psychotic disorder. He suffered from a history of delusions and
paranoid ideation. The role of substance abuse in exacerbating defendant’s symptoms
was unclear. He admitted regularly using cannabis, alcohol, and ecstasy for extended
periods of time since his youth, and stated he had experimented with cocaine and
Vicodin, but denied using Ayahuasca and became guarded in his response. More
information was needed to diagnose him with a substance use disorder.
         The report detailed previous evaluations, which found defendant repeatedly denied
having any mental health issues and concluded that he did not appear to have the capacity
to discuss the alleged offenses in a rational or coherent manner; his ongoing psychotic
processes continued to impair defendant’s ability to engage in a reality-based, organized,
meaningful discussion about his legal case and decisional considerations. Defendant’s
numerous writings to the court exhibited persecutory delusions, including that he had

                                              3
been targeted by a white supremacist military and Christian cartel, that he believed the
judge falsely imprisoned him based on his refusal to interview, and that the public
defenders were colluding to keep him locked up, and grandiose delusions, including that
he is an “independent regulator of Ayahuasca temples in the U.S., and is exempt from
following the law.”
       The Department of State Hospitals subsequently petitioned the court for an
involuntary antipsychotic medication order under section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(D)(iv).
The petition similarly alleged that defendant required the administration of antipsychotic
medication because he lacked the capacity to make medication decisions, his mental
disorder required medical treatment with antipsychotic medication, and without such
treatment serious harm to defendant’s mental or physical health was probable.
       At the hearing on the petition, Dr. Ahmed, a Napa State Hospital psychiatrist who
had worked with defendant for about six weeks and had treated defendant with
antipsychotic medication for approximately 10 days to two weeks following the
administrative law judge’s temporary order, testified defendant was currently diagnosed
as schizophrenic with an unspecified psychosis disorder. Defendant’s symptoms
included paranoid ideation; he believed that the judge and his attorney had conspired
against him, and he refused to be evaluated for treatment or engage in therapy sessions.
He also refused to meet with an assigned social worker with the name “Christian.”
       Dr. Ahmed had assessed approximately 500 patients for involuntary medication
orders over the past seven years. He opined that defendant was not aware of his
psychiatric illness, and that he was unable to evaluate the benefits and risks of taking
antipsychotic medication. Defendant lacked the capacity to make antipsychotic
medication decisions, and, in Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, there were no other treatment options
available to treat paranoia.
       At a continued hearing on August 18, 2022, Dr. Ahmed testified that defendant’s
paranoia impacted his mental health by causing him to isolate and not engage in any

                                              4
treatment or evaluations, or to utilize any mental competency material. Defendant
exposed himself to other patients that were more severely mentally ill, which concerned
Dr. Ahmed because defendant seemed unable to stop himself which could lead to
dangerous situations. Defendant distrusted his treatment team, the nurses, and refused to
communicate with a staff member named Christian. In Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, defendant
would refuse to take the needed medication unless court ordered.
       Treating defendant with antipsychotic medication, according to Dr. Ahmed, would
reduce his mental health symptoms, improve his insight and judgment, and allow him to
regain competency; without treatment, defendant’s symptoms would continue to worsen.
Medication would also improve defendant’s daily living and his interactions with his
peers and treatment staff.
       Defendant was currently being treated with a small dose of antipsychotic
medication, and although Dr. Ahmed had not seen a huge improvement, defendant was
able to better tolerate longer conversations. It generally took about 90 days to reach
therapeutic levels that helped alleviate mental health symptoms.
       Because the medicine could have adverse side effects such as constipation,
stomach pains, and weight gain, patients were routinely monitored to manage potential
effects. While defendant claimed the medication caused high blood pressure, Dr. Ahmed
testified that defendant’s blood pressure was normal and would be monitored.
       Defendant allegedly objected to being involuntarily medicated based on religious
grounds. Dr. Ahmed, however, testified that defendant had never told him that the reason
he did not want to take the medication was based on his religion, nor had defendant ever
talked to Dr. Ahmed about his religious beliefs.
       Defendant testified on his own behalf. He had been sadhu, or a self-appointed
monk, since 2005, which is why he isolated from others. He studies Kabbalah literature.
He testified that his objection to taking medication was because he could only be
dependent on “the deity.”

                                             5
       When asked whether his exercise of free religion included not having mind-
altering substances, defendant responded, “no.” He explained that he already used
psychotropic substances as part of his religion, which connected his mind to the
“godhead” or “super soul,” the “higher deity.” The drugs that defendant took worked like
peyote, expanding defendant’s mind and “invad[ing] [his] free will.”
       Defendant had been taking the oral antipsychotic medication after the temporary
order because he did not want to be forcibly injected. He believed the medication was
harming his short-term memory and killing his brain cells. According to defendant, he
was not required to participate in therapy, and he was not incompetent. Defendant denied
having schizophrenia.
       During closing remarks, defense counsel argued the People failed to satisfy the
Sell (Sell v. United States (2003) 539 U.S. 166) factors for involuntarily medicating a
defendant for the purpose of restoring him or her to competency. The court took the
matter under submission.
       The next day, the trial court granted an order authorizing involuntary medication.
The court found, pursuant to section 1370, subdivision (a)(2)(B)(i)(I), that defendant
lacked the capacity to make decisions regarding antipsychotic medication and if his
mental disorder was not treated, serious harm to his physical or mental health would
probably result.
       Based on Dr. Ahmed’s testimony, the court found that the purpose of the
medication was not only to restore defendant to competency but also to improve his daily
living, interactions, and insight, including participation in therapeutic programs. Thus,
the court rejected defense counsel’s argument based on Sell. In any event, even if the
only reason for the medication was to restore competency, the court found the People had
met their burden of satisfying the Sell factors, including that (1) defendant was charged
with a serious crime against a person; (2) involuntary medication of antipsychotic
medication was substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial;

                                             6
(3) the medication was unlikely to have side effects that interfere with the defendant’s
ability to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the
conduct of a defense in a reasonable manner; and (4) that less intrusive treatments were
unlikely to have substantially the same results and antipsychotic medication was in the
patient’s best interest in light of his medical condition. Defendant timely appealed the
involuntary medication order.

                                       DISCUSSION
       Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and
asking this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable
issues on appeal. (Conservatorship of Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th 529.) Defendant was
advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of
filing the opening brief.
       Defendant filed a supplemental brief. As best we can understand, defendant
claims he was raised inside of a government-police syndicate or cult that engaged in
Aryan catholic abuse. His first key memory at age five, which was installed by the
parens patriae syndicate in Simi Valley, locked his brain “to Mikal high priest and to
greyskull,” defendant’s name in the “God-circuit,” and since then, his mind was
permanently chained to the memory, and consequently, “susceptible to it as an inroad on
the security of his mind and his God-circuit, and to create a mind-war cycle in the brain
that goes on and on, an intended eventual schism of the brain—crossed [third] eye, to
make a caduceus, all-seeing eye, occult doctrine.” He alleges that a government project
known as “ ‘project stargate’ ” makes “puppet-ziggurats, including with Ayahuasca
which was introduced to [defendant] in 2005 by the syndicate, and is engaged nationally
in a ‘mind-war’ ” somehow involving defendant’s religion “cult of Santo Daime” and the
“ ‘God Shiva.’ ”

                                             7
       As best we can discern, defendant’s supplemental brief raises numerous issues that
are not cognizable in this appeal from the involuntary medication order, and we do not
address them. Such matters include issues related to the following: a 2009 criminal
prosecution in Massachusetts and a previous schizophrenia diagnosis in that case; alleged
Internal Revenue Service claims of charity fraud against two Ayahuasca-based charities
in Oregon and what defendant characterizes as “federal government stalking”; a
discontinuation of “PUA funds” and ordered repayment of funds previously disbursed;
the propriety of an alleged warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment and being
locked out of three consecutive locations in Mount Shasta; an attack by armed persons on
his campsite in February 2021; whether the state willfully prosecuted defendant under a
different name other than his monk’s moniker and correct name “Siva de Simon
Greyskull Black”; violation of the 13th Amendment, which generally prohibits slavery
and involuntary servitude; whether state actors or governmental departments exercised a
government-orthodoxy religion; and the validity of his plea.
       Furthermore, to the extent defendant failed to appeal from the underlying
judgment following his plea, defendant “cannot now be permitted to make a direct attack
upon his convictions” or the plea. (People v. Webb (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 401, 410; see
also § 1237, subd. (a) [an appealable judgment is generally rendered at the time of
sentencing]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a) [a notice of appeal must be filed within 60
days after the judgment or order being appealed to confer appellate jurisdiction].) Thus,
issues that could have been raised in an appeal from the judgment on his criminal
convictions, but which were not because defendant failed to timely appeal, are also not at
issue in defendant’s present appeal.
       Turning to the involuntary medication order on appeal, defendant argues the order
is void because it violated his religious beliefs. We disagree.
       The United States Constitution and California Constitution prohibit involuntary
medication that burdens a patient’s free exercise of religion, unless a compelling state

                                             8
interest outweighs the patient’s interests in religious freedom. (U.S. Const., 1st Amd. &
14th Amd.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 4; People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 718; State
Dept. of State Hospitals v. A.H. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 441, 446-447 (A.H.).) We review
the court’s order for substantial evidence. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701;
People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
       Defendant bore the burden of showing that; (1) he sought to engage in the exercise
of religion and (2) that the involuntary psychotropic medication order substantially
burdened the exercise of his religion. (A.H., supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445-446.)
Here, there is no credible evidence that defendant’s objection to the involuntary
medication order was based on a sincerely held religious belief or substantially burdened
defendant’s exercise of his religion.
       Dr. Ahmed testified that defendant never told him that the reason he did not want
to take the medication was based on his religion, nor had defendant ever talked to Dr.
Ahmed about his religious beliefs. When asked whether his religious beliefs precluded
him from taking mind-altering substances like antipsychotic medication, defendant
replied that they did not. Instead, he testified that he already used psychotropic
substances as part of his religion, which connected his mind to the “godhead.” Based on
Dr. Ahmed’s and defendant’s testimony, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that defendant could still practice his religion while simultaneously
taking antipsychotic medication, even if the medication was a different psychotropic
substance than the one he readily admitted ingesting as part of his religion.
       To the extent defendant contends the trial court made the involuntary medication
order to punish him for not participating in mental health evaluations at Napa State
Hospital, essentially resulting in slavery, or that the judge simply wanted to “wear [his]
spirit” like he was “a god,” nothing in the record supports such speculation. Dr. Ahmed,
who had assessed nearly 500 patients for involuntary medication orders over a seven-year
period, testified that defendant suffered from schizophrenia and an unspecified psychotic

                                              9
disorder, which resulted in significant delusions and paranoia that led defendant to act in
dangerous ways. Dr. Ahmed explained that the only treatment for defendant’s diagnosed
mental illness, which defendant refused to acknowledge, was antipsychotic medication,
and in the absence of such medication, defendant’s symptoms would worsen over time.
Defendant, in Dr. Ahmed’s opinion, lacked the capacity to make antipsychotic
medication decisions.
       In granting the involuntary medication order, the trial court carefully considered
the case files and the moving papers as well as Dr. Ahmed’s and defendant’s testimony at
the hearing on the petition. After weighing the benefits and risks of taking the currently
prescribed Zyprexa (Olanzapine), the court found, pursuant to section 1370, subdivision
(a)(2)(B)(i)(I), that defendant lacked the capacity to make decisions regarding
antipsychotic medication, that his diagnosed mental disorder required treatment with such
medication, and if his mental condition was left untreated, it was probable that serious
harm to defendant’s mental health would result. On this record, we cannot conclude the
court erred in so finding.
       Finally, we reject defendant’s argument that sections 1369 and 1370
unconstitutionally violate his right to defend himself or to a speedy trial. The claim is
forfeited because defendant did not raise these specific objections below. (See e.g.,
People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 691 [defendant forfeited his claim that
prosecutor’s actions constituted an improper attempt to interfere with defendant’s ability
to exercise his constitutional right to ‘compulsory process’ by failing to raise a claim of
compulsory process violation in the trial court].)

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                                   DISPOSITION
     The order permitting involuntary antipsychotic medication is affirmed.

                                              HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

MESIWALA, J.

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