Court Opinion

ID: 9658098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:46:30.693431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:51.474432
License: Public Domain

WUEST, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree the trial court made a procedural error.
Tri-State’s motion for summary judgment was scheduled for hearing on Monday, June 25, 1990, at 11:00 a.m. Bollinger prepared various motions, a memorandum of law and an affidavit in response. These documents were mailed to the clerk of courts on Friday, June 22nd, the Friday before the hearing. Consequently, they were not received by the clerk of court until Monday morning, the day of the hearing.
Realizing the trial judge might not receive these documents sufficiently in advance of the hearing, Bollinger’s counsel hand-delivered “work copies” of the documents to the courthouse early Monday morning. However, the trial judge still did not receive the documents in time to review them before the hearing. At the hearing, the trial judge expressed his displeasure with the late delivery of the responsive pleadings and struck them on the grounds they had not been timely served under SDCL lS-G-Gid).1 Bollinger contends his affidavit and memorandum of law were timely served and the trial court erred in striking them.2
SDCL 15-6-56(c) provides a motion for summary judgment:
shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits.
(Emphasis added). SDCL 15-6-5(b) provides for service by mail and states: “Service by mail ... is complete upon mailing.” See Madsen v. Preferred Painting Contractor, 89 S.D. 397, 233 N.W.2d 575 (1975). Clearly, Bollinger’s affidavit and memorandum were timely served prior to the day of the hearing and the trial court erred in striking them as untimely. However, that error was harmless.
Bollinger’s homeowner’s insurance policy provided under “Section II — Liability Coverages,” and the subsection titled “Coverage E — Personal Liability:”
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury ... caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages which the insured is legally liable. Damages include pre-judgment interest awarded against the insured; and
2. Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.]
Under the subsection titled “Coverage F— Medical Payments To Others,” the policy provided:
We will pay the necessary medical expenses that are incurred or medically ascertained within three days of an accident causing bodily injury.
1. To a person on the insured location with the permission of an insured.... Under “Subsection II — Exclusions” of the policy, it is stated:
1. Coverage E — Personal Liability and Coverage F — Medical Payments To Others do not apply to bodily injury or property damage:
A. Which is expected or intended by the insured.
*704Bollinger’s affidavit averred, inter alia, that he did not intend or expect any injury to result from his striking Townsend in the face and did not intend or expect Townsend’s leg or ankle to break when he struck him. Bollinger contends the exclusion for bodily injury “expected or intended by the insured” should be interpreted under a subjective standard; thus, the subjective expectations or intentions of the insured control. Summary judgment is authorized only when the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no genuine issue of material fact. SDCL 15-6— 56(c); Trapp v. Madera Pacific, Inc., 390 N.W.2d 558 (S.D.1986); Wilson v. Great Northern Railway Co., 83 S.D. 207, 157 N.W.2d 19 (1968). Bollinger submits his affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact (his expectations or intentions), precluding summary judgment. Under such an analysis, the trial court’s striking of Bollinger’s affidavit would be prejudicial. However, I would decline to adopt the subjective standard approach urged by Bollinger, and for the following reasons, the refusal to consider his affidavit was harmless error.
As a general rule, an insurance contract is to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer; however, this rule only applies when the language of the insurance contract is ambiguous. Strong v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 76 S.D. 367, 369, 78 N.W.2d 828, 829 (1956). In Klatt v. Continental Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 369-70 (S.D.1987), we held a similarly worded provision excluding coverage for intentional acts was clear and unambiguous, making construction of the contract unnecessary. The policy in Klatt defined “occurrence” as an accident which results in bodily injury neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured. Id. at 369-70. Although the policy at issue here is organized and phrased slightly differently, it is substantially similar in substance to the policy in Klatt. We acknowledged in Klatt that numerous jurisdictions consider intentional act provisions to be clear and unambiguous. Id. at 370, n. 4. I find Tri-State’s intentional act exclusion to be clear and unambiguous.
The duty to defend and the duty to pay under an insurance policy are independent and several duties. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Clifford, 366 N.W.2d 489, 490 (S.D.1985). The duty to defend is much broader than the duty to pay:
if it is clear or arguably appears from the face of the pleadings in the action against the insured that the alleged claim, if true, falls within policy coverage, the insurer must defend. The review then ends, even though the pleadings are ambiguous or reveal other claims not covered in the policy, and notwithstanding that extraneous facts indicate the claim is false, groundless, or even fraudulent. (Footnotes omitted).
Id., at 491-492. Accord City of Fort Pierre v. United Fire and Cas. Co., 463 N.W.2d 845, 847 (S.D.1990); Bayer v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 383 N.W.2d 858, 860 (S.D.1986). Thus, we should examine Townsend’s pleadings in light of the policy coverage.
Townsend’s initial complaint alleged assault and battery. His amended complaint framed three causes of action: (1) assault and battery; (2) negligent assault; and (3) malicious assault, negligently inflicting personal injury. Although the amended complaint alleges negligence,
mere allegations of negligence in a transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage by characterizing intentionally tor-tious conduct as negligent will not persuade [this] court to impose a duty to defend.
Iowa Kemper Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 172 Mich.App. 134, 137, 431 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1988) (citation omitted). Accord Linebaugh v. Berdish, 144 Mich.App. 750, 376 N.W.2d 400, 405-06 (1985).
Bollinger’s assault and battery were intentional as a matter of law. Assault and battery result from an intentional act, while negligence is unintentional. 6 Am. Jur.2d, Assault and Battery § 2; 6A C.J.S. Assault and Battery § 7(a). The two are mutually exclusive and there can be no such cause of action as negligent assault. State Farm Fire and Cas. v. van Gorder, *705235 Neb. 355, 455 N.W.2d 543, 545 (1990); 57A Am.Jur.2d Negligence, § 35. Indeed, the intent to do harm is the essence of assault and battery. 6 Am.Jur.2d, Assault and Battery § 2, 3, 5. Therefore, one may not negligently inflict harm in the course of an assault and battery. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Freyer, 89 Ill.App.3d 617, 44 Ill.Dec. 791, 411 N.E.2d 1157 (1980). As a matter of law, the only material allegation in Townsend’s amended complaint is the assault and battery claim, which, for the following reasons, clearly falls outside of policy coverage.
This case turns on whether the bodily harm suffered by Townsend was “intended or expected” by Bollinger within the meaning of the exclusion. Bollinger urges this court to adopt a subjective standard in that his subjective intent and expectations would govern. However, this approach would place complete control of insurance coverage in the hands of the insured and has been rejected. See Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Waisanen, 653 F.Supp. 825 (D.S.D.1987) (applying South Dakota law); van Gorder, 455 N.W.2d 543 (identical exclusion provision); Mutual Service Cas. Ins. Co. v. McGehee, 219 Mont. 304, 711 P.2d 826 (1985); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 656, 355 N.W.2d 413 (Minn.1984); Freyer, 411 N.E.2d 1157; Steinmetz v. Nat’l Amer. Ins. Co., 121 Ariz. 268, 589 P.2d 911 (1979).
The intentional exclusion is necessary to the insurer to enable it to set rates and supply coverage only if losses under policies are uncertain from the standpoint of any single policyholder, and if a single insured is allowed through intentional or reckless acts to consciously control risks covered by policy, the central concept of insurance is violated.
Transamerica Ins. Group v. Meere, 143 Ariz. 351, 694 P.2d 181 (1984) {quoting 7A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 4492.01, at 21 (1979)).
We have in two prior cases intimated that the exclusionary language “intended or expected” will be interpreted under traditional, common law tort analysis; that being, an insured intends or expects the natural and probable consequences of his or her actions. Klatt, 409 N.W.2d at 370; Taylor v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 82 S.D. 298, 144 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1966). Numerous jurisdictions apply this approach. See, e.g., Butler v. Behaeghe, 37 Colo.App. 282, 548 P.2d 934 (1976); Steinmetz, 589 P.2d 911; Ryan, 431 N.W.2d at 436; Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D.1977). I would, here, expressly adopt it.
Applying this approach to Bollinger’s actions, we may infer that Bollinger intended to harm Townsend by striking him in the face with his fist.
[T]he act of striking another in the face is one which we recognize as an act so certain to cause a particular kind of harm that we can say a person who performed the act intended the resulting harm, and his statement to the contrary does nothing to refute that rule of law.
Jones v. Norval, 203 Neb. 549, 279 N.W.2d 388, 391 (1979) (quoting Clark v. Allstate Ins. Co., 22 Ariz.App. 601, 529 P.2d 1195 (1975)). Accord McGehee, 711 P.2d at 828; CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (1984). The broken ankle that resulted is a harm which is the natural or probable consequence of the struggle Bollinger’s blow precipitated. Since, as a matter of law, Bollinger intended to inflict bodily injury upon Townsend, any damage caused by his actions is excluded from coverage under his homeowner’s policy whether different or more severe than was intended. Jones, 279 N.W.2d at 392. See also Rodriguez v. Williams, 107 Wash.2d 381, 729 P.2d 627 (1986); Van Gorder, 455 N.W.2d at 546; McGehee, 711 P.2d at 828; Meere 694 P.2d at 185; Oakes v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 137 N.J.Super. 365, 349 A.2d 102, 103 (App.Div.1975). The factual allegations of Bollinger’s affidavit are of no consequence. Thus, the improper striking thereof by the trial court was not prejudicial error. There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case, and Tri-State is *706entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
Because Tri-State is not obligated to provide a defense or coverage, Bollinger is not entitled to attorney’s fees in connection with this declaratory judgment or the underlying action brought by Townsend. I would affirm.
MILLER, C.J., joins this special writing.

. SDCL 15-6-6(d) provides:
A written motion, other than one which may be heard ex parte and notice of the hearing thereof or an order to show cause shall be served not later than five days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period is fixed by this chapter or by order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion and, except as otherwise provided in § 15-6-59(b), opposing affidavits may be served not later than one day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some other time.

. He does not challenge the striking of his various motions.