Court Opinion

ID: 9352511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:01:41.961788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:38.248250
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                       File Name: 23a0004p.06

                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                             ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                             │
                                    Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                              >        No. 22-3073
                                                             │
        v.                                                   │
                                                             │
 AARON LOINES,                                               │
                                 Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                             ┘

  Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
                  No. 1:20-cr-00293-2—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.

                                   Argued: October 27, 2022

                               Decided and Filed: January 6, 2023

                     Before: COLE, CLAY, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

                                      _________________

                                            COUNSEL

ARGUED: John J. Spellacy, JOHN J. SPELLACY & ASSOCIATES, CO., Cleveland, Ohio,
for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John J. Spellacy, JOHN J. SPELLACY & ASSOCIATES, CO.,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
                                      _________________

                                             OPINION
                                      _________________

       CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Aaron Loines appeals the district court’s denial of his
pretrial motion to suppress preceding his guilty plea to controlled substance offenses in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C); and a firearm offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
 No. 22-3073                              United States v. Loines                                      Page 2

§ 924(c)(1)(A). For the reasons set forth below, the Court REVERSES the district court’s
denial of Loines’ motion to suppress, VACATES his conviction, and REMANDS the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                            I. BACKGROUND

                                         A. Factual Background

        In 2020, Detective Donald Kopchak of the Cleveland Police Department was aiding in an
investigation into potential drug trafficking activities by Mekhel Rivers, who was subsequently
charged as a co-defendant. Police investigators suspected Rivers of distributing heroin and
fentanyl. During the investigation, on April 21, 2020, Kopchak observed Rivers leaving a house
on East 221st Street, in Euclid, Ohio, driving a red Nissan Ultima to a meeting place to sell drugs
to an informant, and then returning to the same Euclid house.                      After numerous days of
surveillance, investigators determined that Rivers lived at the East 221st Street house, obtained a
search warrant for the house, and executed the warrant on April 30, 2020.

        After arrving at the house, while executing the search warrant, Kopchak again observed
the red Nissan Ultima parked on the street near the residence, bearing the same license plate
number he previously observed. Kopchak walked up to the passenger side of the car, cupped a
hand to the tinted window,1 and leaned in to attempt to see into the vehicle. While leaning
against the vehicle and looking through the window, Kopchak allegedly observed a Black and
Mild cigar wrapper and “a folded piece of paper” in the center console of the car. (Tr. of Mot. to
Suppress Hr’g, R. 142, Page ID #729). From this vantage point, Kopchak claims he was also
able to view a small plastic bag that he immediately identified as “a bag of dope.” (Id. at Page
ID ##726, 729). Lieutenant Charles DiPenti approached the car’s passenger side, looked through
the window, and verbally indicated that he also saw the “bag of dope.” (Id. at Page ID #728).

        After Kopchak purportedly saw the “bag of dope” in the vehicle, he went into the East
221st Street residence. Officers found Loines in Rivers’ residence, along with other individuals

        1InOhio, side windows may be tinted, but they must permit fifty percent of the light through. Ohio Admin.
Code § 4501-41-03(A)(3). The government does not argue that Loines’ tinted windows were in violation of Ohio
law.
 No. 22-3073                               United States v. Loines                                        Page 3

implicated in this case. Kopchak read the individuals their Miranda rights and inquired about car
keys found in the home. In response, Loines volunteered that the keys were his. Kopchak then
confirmed that the car keys belonged to the Nissan by using the key to sound the car alarm.

        The car was then towed for an inventory search. During the inventory search of the
inside of the car, the officers took a picture of the car’s center console from the driver’s seat.
That picture showed a small plastic bag underneath a cigar wrapper, with a lottery ticket placed
beside it. Law enforcement searched the vehicle after it was towed and found a firearm, the bag
of suspected narcotics, a larger bag of purported narcotics,2 a press,3 and a scale. Police did not
obtain a warrant to search the automobile before or during the investigation.

        Loines moved to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, and during the motion to
suppress hearing, Kopchak sought to justify the warrantless search by averring that he had
probable cause to search the vehicle based on the “plain view” of the “bag of dope.” Kopchak
was the only witness called to testify at the hearing. To support Kopchak’s testimony that he
saw the “bag of dope” in plain view and thus had probable cause to search the vehicle, the
government relied upon: (1) videos of Kopchak and other officers walking around and peering
into the car; and (2) a photo taken while inside the car from the vantage point of one sitting in the
driver’s seat.

        Based on Kopchak’s testimony, the videos provided evidence of where the car was in
proximity to the East 221st Street residence, Kopchak’s position looking into the passenger side
window of the car, and Kopchak’s claim that he saw a “bag of dope.” (Tr. of Mot. to Suppress
Hr’g, R. 142, Page ID # 721–26). The videos also provide Lieutenant DiPenti’s perspective

        2The    government has not provided information as to whether the bags found in the vehicle contained
controlled substances. The only information found on the record as to whether a controlled substance was found in
the vehicle is by the government in its response to the Defendant’s motion to suppress in the court below. The
government contends that approximately “70+ of heroin” appeared in the bags and includes a footnote stating that
“[t]he lab tests on this substance showed no scheduled controlled substance.” (Resp. to Mot. to Suppress, R. 61,
Page ID # 338). There is no additional information offered as to what “70 + of heroin” means, or if any lab test was
performed to confirm that the bags found in the car contained controlled substances. However, this issue is not on
appeal. Because the Court finds that the vehicle was not lawfully searched, we need not address whether officers
actually found narcotics in the vehicle.
          3Kopchak defines a press as an object used by drug traffickers to combine, by means of compacting,
different substances together, to prepare the finished product for sale.
 No. 22-3073                         United States v. Loines                               Page 4

when looking through the passenger side window, without pressing his hands against the
window, confirming Kopchak’s observation. The photograph taken from the inside of the
vehicle illustrates a lottery ticket, cigar wrapper, and beneath the cigar wrapper, a small plastic
bag. At issue, however, is whether Kopchak and DiPenti could actually see the small plastic bag
from outside of the car.

       The government claims that the officers’ body camera footage and associated screenshots
“show[] that a person standing next to the car could see through the window, even though it was
partially tinted.” (Resp’t’s Br., ECF No. 15, 14). Furthermore, the government contends that
while no cameras were “positioned at the proper angle to show the suspected drugs,” the videos
establish that an officer could see inside the car. (Id. at 15). Neither proposition is convincing.
The videos themselves do not establish that Kopchak, from his vantage point outside the vehicle,
had a sufficiently clear view to identify the presence of drugs inside the car. Instead, the videos
show only the position of the officers when peering into the vehicle. In an attempt to provide a
better illustration of what was seen from outside the car, screenshots of the video were provided
by the government in their appellate briefing; however, those screenshots are dark to the point of
being indecipherable. Besides conclusory statements as to what officers saw, the government
has furnished no evidence to establish that the photo taken from inside the car was an accurate
depiction of what was seen from outside the vehicle.

                                     B. Procedural History

       A grand jury indicted Loines in the underlying matter on June 11, 2020. The grand jury
charged Loines with the following: one count of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with
Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count of
Possession with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(C); and one count of Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking
Crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

       Loines filed a motion to suppress on December 22, 2020, contending that the
investigating officers conducted an unlawful warrantless search of his vehicle and any inventory
search of the vehicle in question was done improperly. After the government filed its response,
 No. 22-3073                           United States v. Loines                               Page 5

and Loines filed his reply, the district court conducted a suppression hearing on May 17, 2021.
Kopchak was the only witness in the hearing; and the government introduced, without objection,
three videos and one picture. After listening to the testimony and considering the evidence, the
court orally denied Loines’ suppression motion.

          On September 13, 2021, Loines pleaded guilty to all three counts pursuant to a plea
agreement, and reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
The district court sentenced Loines to 93 months’ imprisonment, after which Loines filed this
timely appeal.

                                          II. DISCUSSION

                                       A. Standard of Review

          The Court reviews a district court’s decision on a suppression motion for clear error as to
factual findings and de novo as to conclusions of law. United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751,
757 (6th Cir. 2005). Because the appeal of the district court’s denial of Loines’ suppression
motion is based on factual findings, this Court reviews the decision for clear error. See id.
“Clear error will be found only when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Max Trucking, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Corp.,
802 F.3d 793, 808 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573
(1985)).

          “Whether a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law
which is reviewed de novo.” United States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 747 (6th Cir. 2008)). “When a district court has denied the
motion to suppress, we must ‘consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)).

                                             B. Analysis

          The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
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violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of [the Supreme] Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City &
Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (internal citations omitted). The government
bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).

        Kopchak’s entrance into the car to obtain evidence necessary to indict Loines was subject
to the Fourth Amendment protections. The interior of a vehicle is a constitutionally protected
area, into which a government official is not permitted to intrude without probable cause. See
New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1986) (“[A] car’s interior as a whole is [ ] subject to
Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police.”); United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“It is beyond dispute that a vehicle is an ‘effect’ as that term is
used in the [Fourth] Amendment.”) (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
Officers found the evidence used to indict Loines inside of Loines’ vehicle and without a
warrant. Accordingly, for the search to be reasonable, an exception to the warrant requirement
must apply. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. The government asserts that Kopchak’s conduct was
permissible under two exceptions: the “plain view doctrine” and the “automobile exception.”
See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466–67 (1999) (per curiam); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 374–75 (1993). Neither asserted exception applies in this case.4

        4Loines   argues that the inventory search exception does not apply in this case. However, the inventory
search exception is not properly before this Court. The government explicitly waived the inventory search exception
argument, stating “the government . . . is not relying on [the inventory search exception] directly in this appeal.”
(Resp’t.’s Br., ECF No. 15, 18). To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must develop its argument in its
appellate briefing; a requirement that the government does not meet on this issue. Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb.
Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 610–11 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Bolden v. City of Euclid, 595 F. App’x 464, 468 (6th
Cir. 2014).
 No. 22-3073                          United States v. Loines                              Page 7

1. Plain View Doctrine

       The government argues that the bag with the narcotics was in plain view. This claim has
not been substantiated.

       “Warrantless seizures presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment, but under certain
circumstances an officer may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant.” United States v.
Mathis, 738 F.3d 719, 732 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27
(1987)). “[O]bjects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.” Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968) (citations omitted). Under the plain view doctrine, four factors
must be satisfied: “(1) the item seized must be in plain view, (2) the item’s incriminating
character must be immediately apparent, (3) the officer must lawfully be in the place from where
the item can be plainly seen, and (4) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the item.”
Mathis, 738 F.3d at 732 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)). Loines
argues that the first three elements of the standard are not met; because the Court finds that the
plain view doctrine does not apply in this case, it does not need to reach a determination as to the
fourth factor, which is not argued by either party.

       a. Plain View

       Officer Kopchak testified that he looked through the red Nissan’s passenger side window
and saw a “bag of dope” in plain view in the car’s center console. To support Kopchak’s
testimony, the government points to the photograph taken from inside the vehicle, body camera
footage, and screenshots taken from the body camera footage. However, Kopchak provides no
testimony or evidence as to what was seen of the small, partially obstructed bag from outside the
vehicle. Instead, he simply asserts that he saw a “bag of dope.” (Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Hr’g,
R. 142, Page ID #731–32).

       For the object to be in plain view, Kopchak’s view of the bag must have been from his
vantage point outside the passenger side window. Moreover, he “must discover incriminating
evidence ‘inadvertently’. . . he may not ‘know in advance the location of [certain] evidence and
 No. 22-3073                          United States v. Loines                                Page 8

intend to seize it,’ relying on the plain view doctrine only as a pretext.” Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971)).

         The government’s evidence purported to establish that the plastic bag was plainly visible
from outside the vehicle is deficient, and instead, leads to the opposite conclusion. First, a
photograph taken inside the vehicle from the vantage point of the driver, is insufficient to
demonstrate the bag was visible from outside the car. The only objective evidence provided by
the government illustrating the view from outside the vehicle are three videos from body camera
footage, and two screenshots from those videos. The body camera videos simply provide the
position of the car and each officer, but do not provide the Court with what Kopchak saw when
observing the inside of the vehicle. The screenshots of the footage are dark, the center console is
barely visible, and there is no clear view into the interior of car through the passenger side
window. The screenshots display no small plastic bag, no lottery ticket, and no cigar wrapper.

         Kopchak’s testimony provides support for the Court’s observation: he states that the
twisted plastic was not apparent in the “still frame . . . but there’s another picture that was taken
of the center console with the bag of dope . . . . packaged . . . in those small plastic bags with the
tie off.” (Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Hr’g, R. 142, Page ID #729, 731). This other picture
referenced in Kopchak’s testimony is the photograph taken during the inventory search from
inside the car. Kopchak did not provide testimony as to what he saw from outside the vehicle,
except for the simple statement that he saw a “bag of dope.” (Tr. of Mot. to Suppress Hr’g, R.
142, Page ID #731–32).

         Accordingly, the only evidence supporting the government’s position is Kopchak’s own
unsupported testimony that he saw a bag of narcotics. Simple statements from the officers
contending that they saw “a bag of narcotics” in the car are not enough to establish that an object
was in plain view when the screenshots that the government presented contradict the officers’
statements. This Circuit recognizes that when evaluating an application of the plain view
doctrine, an officer’s testimony can be “sufficient to establish that the [incriminating evidence]
was visible from outside the car.” United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 356–57 (6th Cir.
2011).    In Galaviz the government provided photographic evidence that the incriminating
evidence was visible from outside the car; however, the photo was taken from inside the car at a
 No. 22-3073                          United States v. Loines                               Page 9

position below the window. Id. The court acknowledged that the photo provided by the
government was insufficient to show that the incriminating evidence was visible from outside the
car, but ultimately found that the testimony provided by the officer was enough to prove the
object was in plain view. Id. However, in Galaviz, no evidence contradicted the officer’s
statement. This case is distinguishable in that the photos provided by the government illustrate
that it was implausible for an individual to view the “bag of dope” from outside the car, thereby
directly contradicting the officer’s testimony. The government offers no plausible explanation as
to how the officers could see the “bag of dope” through the tinted window, but the cameras could
not capture any view into the interior of the car.        Had the photo corroborated Kopchak’s
testimony, Galaviz would apply.

       Kopchak, based on his prior observations of the vehicle at issue, may have had a strong
suspicion about the contents of the car, but without any incriminating evidence being in plain
view from outside of the car, Kopchak did not have lawful access to the contents of the car. See
Brown, 460 U.S. at 737. In sum, from the vantage point of an individual looking through the
passenger side window from outside the vehicle, the plastic bag was not in plain view. We
acknowledge that under the clear error standard, if “the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though [the court may be] convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74. But even given the great
deference afforded to the district court under the clear error standard, the photographic evidence
provided by the government does not establish that the “bag of dope” was in plain view. In fact,
the photographs plainly and directly contradict the officer’s testimony.

       We find that the district court’s account of the evidence is not plausible in light of the
record viewed in its entirety. Accordingly, the Court reverses the district court’s holding as to
the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.
 No. 22-3073                          United States v. Loines                            Page 10

       b. Incriminating Nature is Immediately Apparent

       The government argues that “the way that the powder was packaged and its proximity to
a folded lottery ticket—commonly used to deliver drugs—made the powder’s incriminating
character obvious.” (Resp’t’s Br., ECF No. 15, 20). We disagree.

       To determine whether an object’s incriminating nature is “immediately apparent,” the
Court looks to four instructive factors:

       (1) a nexus between the seized object and the items particularized in the search
       warrant; (2) whether the ‘intrinsic nature’ or appearance of the seized object gives
       probable cause to believe that it is associated with criminal activity; (3) whether
       the executing officers can at the time of discovery of the object on the facts then
       available to them determine probable cause of the object’s incriminating
       nature; . . . . [and (4) whether the officer can] recognize the incriminating nature
       of an object as a result of his immediate or instantaneous sensory perception.

United States v. Garcia, 496 F.3d 495, 510–11 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (quotations
and citations omitted). “Requiring that evidence be ‘immediate’ and ‘apparent’ constrains the
expansion of the limited search authorized by the warrant into a generalized search, and it
prevents officers from having an opportunity to create a reason to expand the search.” United
States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. McLernon, 746
F.2d 1098, 1125 (6th Cir. 1984)). In considering whether evidence was “apparent” to the
executing officers, courts “should be duly mindful of the executing officers’ particular,
subjective training and experiences.” United States v. Szymkowiak, 727 F.2d 95, 98 (6th Cir.
1984) (first citing Brown, 460 U.S. at 745–46 (Powell, J., concurring); and then citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)); see also United States v. Pacheco, 841 F.3d 384,
395–96 (6th Cir. 2016). Probable cause “merely requires that the facts available to the officer
would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ . . . that certain items may be
contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime . . . .” Brown, 460 U.S. at 742
(first quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); and then citing Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).

       Applying the first factor articulated in Garcia, neither Loines nor the vehicle were subject
to the search warrant in this case.        See Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510 (“Requiring particular
 No. 22-3073                         United States v. Loines                             Page 11

descriptions in search warrants prevents police officers from engaging in general exploratory
searches[.]” (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465)). Therefore, there is no nexus between Loines’
vehicle, parked away from the house, and the items particularized in the search warrant. Even
though the intention of the warrant was to locate controlled substances, the warrant did not
permit law enforcement to search beyond the geographical location described within. This is
especially true considering the officers had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant for the
vehicle. See Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465. “An overbroad reading of the
immediately apparent requirement subverts and jeopardizes fundamental Fourth Amendment
principles.” Garcia, 496 F.3d at 510.

       As to the remaining Garcia factors, the government relies on two cases to support its
claim that the bag containing the alleged heroin was “immediately apparent.”             First the
government analogizes to Brown, where an officer conducting a routine driver’s license
checkpoint saw narcotics in plain view after the defendant removed his hand from his pocket to
retrieve his license, and dropped on the floor an “opaque, green party balloon, knotted about one
half inch from the tip.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 733. The officer alleged that his previous experience
making arrests for drug offenses informed him that the dropped substance was a narcotic. Id. at
734. The officer’s knowledge of how narcotics are packaged, and the appearance of the balloon,
without knowledge of the contents, were enough to establish that the officer properly seized the
narcotics under the plain view exception. Id. at 743–44. Second, the government references
Pacheco, where an officer conducting a protective frisk of an individual during a traffic stop felt
a solid “brick-like object protruding approximately one inch out of [the defendant’s] cargo
pocket” and determined that the object was “around six-to-eight inches long.” Pacheco, 841
F.3d at 395. The court found that because the object’s incriminating nature was readily apparent,
the seizure was appropriate under the plain view exception. Id. at 396.

       The government argues that that Kopchak was able to identify the “bag of dope”
immediately as the twisted end of the bag resembled items from earlier in the investigation, and
the lottery ticket’s presence corroborated his belief that the plastic he could see was a bag of
narcotics. Further, the government asserts that given Kopchak’s extensive experience in the
field, and that Kopchak had participated in a controlled buy on April 21, 2020, during which
 No. 22-3073                          United States v. Loines                            Page 12

time Rivers used the vehicle to sell drugs to an informant in a package almost identical to the one
seen in this search, the incriminating nature of the plastic bag was readily apparent.

       However, as discussed above, from the vantage point of the street, or through the
Nissan’s tinted windows, the purported bag of narcotics is not visible. What Kopchak saw of the
plastic bag from outside the vehicle, besides a simple statement that he saw a “bag of dope,” has
not been established on the record. However, assuming Kopchak could see inside the car, he
testifies that he could see a Black and Mild cigar wrapper and a lottery ticket from outside the
vehicle. Neither are “intrinsically incriminating.” McLevain, 310 F.3d at 442–43. Officers are
not authorized to seize items “merely because [they are] in ‘plain view.’” Id. at 441 (emphasis in
original) (quoting McLernon, 746 F.2d at 1125). “[L]awful and innocuous items” cannot be
seized under the plain view exception without an immediately apparent association between the
items and the purported criminal activity. Garcia, 496 F.3d at 511; see also McLernon, 746 F.2d
at 1125 (The officer’s immediate perceptions must produce more than “visual images of . . .
‘intrinsically innocent’ items.” (citations omitted)). Innocuous items that could be used for
criminal activity are not enough to establish probable cause. See United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d
574, 577 (6th Cir. 1987).

       Kopchak does not claim to have seen narcotics or any residue on the lottery ticket, makes
no claim that the cigar wrappers could be contraband, and provides no description of the plastic
bag from outside the vehicle. It was not until the officers entered the vehicle and closely
inspected the center console, that the “bag of dope” was observed to be apparently incriminating.
This close inspection of the inside of the car constituted a further search unsupported by probable
cause. See United States v. Tatman, 397 F. App’x 152, 175 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen an item
appears suspicious to an officer but further investigation is required to establish probable cause
as to its association with criminal activity, the item is not immediately incriminating.”(quoting
McLevain, 310 F.3d at 443)); see also Beal, 810 F.2d at 577. In Pacheco, the officer felt a solid,
brick-like object that was six to eight inches long, whereas in this case, the purported bag of
narcotics is not seen, or descriptively identified, except for the photograph taken inside the
vehicle. See Pacheco, 841 F.3d at 395–96. Similarly, in Brown, the officer, with the aid of a
flashlight, clearly saw an opaque, green party balloon drop from the defendant’s hand. See
 No. 22-3073                        United States v. Loines                             Page 13

Brown, 460 U.S. at 733–34. In this case, by contrast, the purported bag of narcotics was not
apparent when officers looked into the car from the tinted windows.

       The objects purportedly seen by Kopchak were not immediately and apparently
incriminating. Accordingly, the officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. See Beal,
810 F.2d at 578 (“[T]his circuit has vigorously adhered to the requirement that probable cause
must be both immediate and apparent.”).

       c. Legally Present

       Loines argues that Kopchak committed trespass when he cupped his hand or hands
against the Nissan’s tinted windows to see inside Loines’ vehicle, and therefore, Kopchak’s
touching of the car is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Because we find that
the objects claimed to be seen by Kopchak were not in plain view, the Court need not determine
whether he was legally permitted to place his hand on the car window to facilitate or enhance his
view of the inside of the car.

2. Automobile Exception

       Under the automobile exception, officers may search a vehicle without a warrant if they
have “probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United States v.
Smith, 510 F.3d 641, 647 (6th Cir. 2007) (first quoting United States v. Lumpkin, 159 F.3d 983,
986 (6th Cir. 1998); and then citing Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir.1998)).
Traditionally, this exception was based on the “ready mobility” of the automobile, which created
“an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to
conduct the search [was] clear.” Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (quoting
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1985)). More recent cases no longer require that
the automobile exception rest on an independent showing of exigency, because “[e]ven in cases
where an automobile was not immediately mobile, the lesser expectation of privacy resulting
from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justified application of the vehicular exception.” Smith,
510 F.3d at 647 (quoting Carney, 471 U.S. at 391).
 No. 22-3073                         United States v. Loines                          Page 14

       The government argues that Kopchak’s belief that the vehicle contained evidence of a
crime was based on the “bag of dope” seen in plain view.           Therefore, according to the
government’s argument, Kopchak was only legally permitted to search the inside of the vehicle
under the automobile exception if the plain view exception applied. As indicated above, because
the “bag of dope” was not in plain view, there was no probable cause to search the vehicle, and
thus, the government does not properly satisfy the automobile exception.

                                      III. CONCLUSION

       For the reasons set forth above, this Court REVERSES the district court’s denial of
Defendant’s motion to suppress, VACATES his conviction, and REMANDS the case for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.