Court Opinion

ID: 7820946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:54:33.928959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:44.263115
License: Public Domain

Ernie E. Wright, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse the judgment of the court entered August 16, 1978, imposing a one year sentence upon appellant on the stated finding, ‘ ‘ The defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with the conditions of his suspended sentence.” The judgment then enumerates certain actions of the defendant constituting misdemeanor offenses. My dissent is not on the basis appellant’s conduct does not warrant additional punishment, but rather is on the grounds the original sentence, as to the suspended portion, was not authorized by law, and therefore not a valid basis upon which to predicate further sentence. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-803, a part of the new Criminal Code adopted in 1975, details the only sentences authorized and specifies no defendant convicted of an offense shall be sentenced otherwise than as authorized by the Criminal Code. § 41-803(4) provides if a defendant pleads or is found guilty of an offense other than capital murder, the court may sentence the defendant to pay a fine and suspend imposition of sentence as to imprisonment or place him on probation, or sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspend imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment. The section expressly prohibits sentencing a defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary and placing him on probation except as authorized by § 41-1204. The latter section does not authorize sentencing a defendant to confinement in the penitentiary and also providing for probation. In this case the court sentenced appellant to five years in prison and suspended four years. There was an imposition of a five year sentence and an authorized provision suspending, four years, rather than a sentence of one year and reserving jurisdiction for imposition of an additional sentence as authorized by § 41-803. The original judgment imposing sentence dated August 16, 1976 did not.set out any. conditions imposed upon the defendant as mandated by § 41-1203 in the case of suspension of imposition of sentence or probation; and the record is silent on any conditions attached to the suspended sentence other than a statement in the report of the probation officer dated after the judgment imposing the additional one year of confinement stating, “Upon his release from prison he was to work steadily and stay out of any and all trouble for the next few years.” The cases cited in the majority opinion either involve sentencing prior to the date of the new Criminal Code or do not address the question here raised of a sentence not authorized by law. In my view the judgment of August 16, 1978 sentencing appellant to one year in prison is unauthorized by law. It is based upon a suspended sentence not authorized by present law. I am unable to equate suspended sentence with suspension of imposition of sentence. I am authorized to say Newbern, J., concurs in this dissent.