Court Opinion

ID: 9479373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:15:59.159865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:59.035104
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
As the majority aptly notes, this case comes to us with a convoluted procedural history. Eight years after appellant Wors-ham filed his original complaint, and seven years after a $400,000 judgment in Wors-ham’s favor, the majority now affirms a dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Worsham’s ease may lack merit, and I agree that Judge Bue did not abuse his discretion in ordering a new trial. But since I do not agree that Worsham cannot possibly recover under any set of facts which might be proved, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), I dissent from the majority’s affirmance of Judge Hoyt’s dismissal under F.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Worsham should be given an opportunity to prove that the Pasadena City Council had absolutely delegated final policymaking authority to Mayor Clark when Clark indefinitely suspended Wors-ham on February 2, 1981. If Worsham could not make such a showing, he would lose on summary judgment, but such concerns are not before us today.1
My disagreement with the majority concerns the role of fact in locating “final policymaking authority” for purposes of determining municipal liability in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The majority holds that because local positive law — the City Charter and a municipal ordinance— provided for the City Council’s review of *1342Worsham’s suspension, and because the Council ultimately reinstated Worsham, neither the mayor nor the public works director could possibly have held final poli-cymaking authority at the time of suspension so as to subject the city to § 1983 liability.
The majority states that its result is “compelled” by “Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion” in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). First, I do not believe that Praprotnik’s three opinions send a message sufficiently clear to compel the majority’s result. Second, I do not believe that Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion can hold all of the meaning imputed to it by the majority.
Recently, the Court explicated the meaning of the Praprotnik plurality decision in a five-justice majority opinion. Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). Although Jett does not resolve all of Praprotnik’s uncertainties, the case clarifies important aspects of Praprotnik, and I address Jett below in the course of sketching the framework of municipal liability constructed by the Court.
I.
A municipality is liable under § 1983 for acts violating federal law “which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). A city may face § 1983 liability in two situations. First, a city may be liable if a city employee violates federal law, and a city policy, whether enshrined in positive law or resulting from practice, custom or usage, proximately causes the violation of federal law. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).2
Second, if an official who has final policy-making authority in the area at issue violates federal law either by promulgating a rule of general applicability, or by ordering or undertaking a particular action on a single occasion, the municipality is subject to § 1983 liability for the acts of the official. Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 924; Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. at 1299-1300; but see Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1304 (Powell, J., dissenting) (policies are usually rules of general applicability, and Court improperly focuses on status of decisionmaker in determining liability).
A plaintiff may recover from a city on either the custom/policy or status theories because Monell, at its core, “is a case about responsibility.” Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. at 1297. While the use of the term “policy” is sometimes problematic, the notion of municipal responsibility is not.
Whether a particular official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law. Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. at 1300; Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 924. The role of state law appears to divide the Court severely in Praprotnik. Justice Brennan (the author of the Pembaur plurality opinion on this issue) in a three-Justice concurring opinion in Praprotnik, states that “state law will naturally be the appropriate starting point” for determining the actual location of final policymaking authority, 108 S.Ct. at 934, but that “any assessment of a municipality’s actual power structure is necessarily a factual and a practical one.” Id. at 935. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion states that “a federal court *1343would not be justified.in assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it” (emphasis added). Id. at 925.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion in Praprotnik. He would hold cities liable for “single acts by high officials” that violate federal law. Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens’ vote is certainly more consistent with Justice Brennan’s fact-specific views than with Justice O’Con-nor’s positive law orientation. Because Justice Kennedy did not participate in Pra-protnik, the decision “settles very little.” Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 879 F.2d 1573, 1581 (8th Cir.1989) (Lay, C.J., dissenting).
The role of review in a governmental structure, in determining the location of final policymaking authority, is central in Praprotnik, and is central in this case. The Praprotnik plurality states that “when a subordinate’s decision is subject to review by the municipality’s authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official’s conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 926.
Justice Brennan’s concurrence reads the plurality opinion to suggest that “whenever the decisions of an official are subject to some form of review — however limited— that official’s decisions are nonfinal.... ” Id. at 935. After reading the two opinions in Praprotnik, it would appear that, as Justice Brennan contends, the plurality holds that a positive law right of review may subordinate contrary facts: “ad hoc searches for officials possessing ‘de facto ’ policymaking authority would serve primarily to foster needless unpredictability in the application of § 1983.” 108 S.Ct. at 928 (plurality opinion).
The Praprotnik plurality indeed states that “the identification of policymaking officials is not a question of fact in the usual sense ” 108 S.Ct. at 924 (emphasis added). Five Justices, however, recently clarified this rather cryptic statement in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, — U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989):
As with other questions of state law relevant to the application of federal law, the identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury. Reviewing the relevant legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well as “ ‘custom and usage’ having the force of law,” Praprotnik, [108 S.Ct. at 924 n. 1], the trial judge must identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymak-ing authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue.
Jett clarifies that the Praprotnik plurality uses the phrase “custom or usage” in two contexts in the municipal liability area. First, the plurality uses the phrase — which appears in the text of § 1983 — in its original meaning: that a city policy giving rise to liability, although not authorized by written law, may exist in the form of a cüstom, usage or practice having the force of law. 108 S.Ct. at 926. In this regard, the focus is upon whether a custom, usage or practice by formally nonpolicymaking officials — as distinguished from a formal, written policy — allows a factfinder to infer that the city’s policymakers have acquiesced in such conduct so as to give rise to municipal liability.
The Praprotnik plurality also uses the phrase “custom or usage” in a transforma-tive manner as a method of proof. By proving a “custom or usage,” a plaintiff may demonstrate as a matter of fact that an official is invested with final policymak-ing authority. This method of proof concerns the official’s status, which implicates the basis for municipal liability in the executive context addressed in both Praprot-nik and Pembaur. Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 924 n. 1 (plurality opinion); Jett, — U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. Thus, if a city’s *1344formal policymakers delegate final policy-making authority to formally nonpolicy-making officials, even in the face of positive law — for example, by abdicating a formal power of review over otherwise discretionary acts of formally nonpolicymaking officials — the city may be liable for the delegatee’s act on a single occasion that violates federal law.
Jett also characterizes the “final policymaker” determination as a threshold question of law for the trial judge. Because facts concerning custom or usage may play a role in such a determination, the trial judge, after Jett, is empowered to resolve factual disputes in its threshold inquiry. Jett thus envisions a role for the trial judge in this context similar, for example, to the role a judge plays in determining admissibility of certain evidence, or whether a matter is of public concern in the First Amendment context. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690-92, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). These inquiries may involve disputed factual issues that the judge is empowered to resolve. Jett rejects Justice Brennan’s position that the “final policymaker” determination is a jury question, Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 934 (Brennan, J., concurring).
There is an apparent tension between the Praprotnik plurality’s positive law emphasis and, as Jett clarifies, the plurality’s recognition of the role of custom and usage — a fact-bound inquiry — in determining the location of final policymaking authority. As a practical matter, if a city council has the final power of review over a may- or’s decisions to terminate or suspend, a plaintiff is not likely to prove that the mayor exercises final policymaking authority in suspending a salaried employee. The mayor will likely have the discretion to terminate or suspend, but a single exercise of such discretion will not subject the city to liability. Pembaur, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 n. 12.
Whatever the positive law, however, if a plaintiff can prove as a matter of custom, usage or practice that a city council, for example, has never exercised its positive law power of review, and has accepted as a matter of course the decisions of the formally nonpolicymaking official, then the plaintiff may convince the trial judge that the council has actually and absolutely delegated final policymaking authority to the formally nonpolicymaking official by abdicating its power of review. If a city council subsequently exercises its substantive power of review for the first time after an unconstitutional suspension or termination by the delegatee, then at the moment of substantive review, the city council in fact retracts the authority that the council had given away (delegated) previously, in effect changing city policy by relocating the locus of actual final policymaking authority by its act of substantive review.
Municipal policymakers must be accountable, either through the political process or the judicial process. By delegating final policymaking authority, city policymakers can avoid political pressure. If factual proof cannot fill the gap, accountability through the judicial process will dissipate as well. The resulting political and legal insulation benefits no one — except the insulated governmental figures. Positive law, then, cannot reasonably act as the sole determinant of the location of final policy-making authority in every circumstance. While a federal court is not justified in “assuming that municipal policymaking authority lies somewhere other than where the applicable law purports to put it”, Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. at 925 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added), courts must entertain proof of a custom or usage in the face of positive law.
II.
The majority focuses on the Praprotnik plurality’s positive law emphasis, and on Worsham’s reinstatement by the City Council, in holding that the mayor was not a final policymaker who could subject the city to § 1983 liability by violating federal law in a particular instance. On the record before us, the majority’s holding is certainly appealing. Mayor Clark, on the recommendation of the public works director, indefinitely suspended Worsham on February 2, 1981 (Defendant’s Exhibit 4). Pursuant to a Pasadena Ordinance (Defendant’s Exhibit 2) and the City Charter (Plaintiff’s *1345Exhibit 2), Worsham appealed his suspension to the City Council. The Council is constituted by six Councilmen and the May- or. Under Section 13 of the Charter, the six Councilmen have the power to remove an indefinite suspension by a two-thirds vote. The Charter provides that the “action of the Councilmen on the question of the removal of such suspension and reinstatement shall be final.” At a regular Council meeting on March 3, 1981, the Councilmen voted, four to two to reinstate Worsham.
Although its holding is quite sensical on this record, the majority — except to the extent that the council in fact acted to reinstate Worsham — ignores the role of fact in determining the location of final policymak-ing authority.3 Certainly under Justice Brennan’s view, and apparently under Justice O’Connor’s view concerning the role of custom and usage, Worsham should be given the opportunity to prove that before the Councilmen exercised their final positive law power of review over Worsham’s suspension on March 3, 1981, the Councilmen had in fact absolutely delegated final deci-sionmaking authority concerning suspensions to the mayor, at the time of the suspension, by abdicating their substantive power of review. If Worsham could make such a showing to the trial judge under Jett, Worsham could recover from the city for any legally cognizable injuries flowing from Mayor Clark’s suspension of Wors-ham on February 2, 1981. Even if Wors-ham could not prove actual damages, he could recover nominal damages for retaliation against the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978).
Proof of delegation would likely be exceptionally difficult for Worsham to adduce. Because suspended employees, under local positive law, have a right to appeal their suspensions, Worsham would be required to prove that the City Council had failed substantively to exercise its power of review in the past (custom and usage), or under Justice Brennan’s view, that some particular fact gave rise to a permissible inference of an absolute delegation of final policymaking authority to the mayor.
However unlikely Worsham’s ultimate chances of success may be, the majority, I believe, errs by denying him an opportunity to make the attempt. As I have noted, a city council may ignore its positive grant of power, then absolutely delegate such power to a formally nonpolicymaking city official, and as a result of, for example, a lawsuit’s threat, take back what it gave away in an attempt to purge itself of its juridical sins. I do not suggest that the Pasadena City Council acted with such redemptive intent; the present record suggests otherwise. Likely success, however, is not necessary for a plaintiff to avoid a dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Judge Bue granted appellant Worsham leave to file his third amended complaint on October 19, 1984, after Judge Bue granted a new trial solely to determine municipal liability, and before Judge Hoyt dismissed the case. In the complaint, Worsham alleges that Mayor Clark “is a city officer who is the final authority or ultimate repository of city power” and that the mayor, public works director and city attorney “made and executed city policy and custom ... in depriving [Worsham] of his constitutional rights” (R. 104).
I agree that the record before us does not support liability under the reasoning of the plurality opinions in either Pembaur or Praprotnik. But Worsham’s allegations in his third amended complaint are sufficient to state a claim under the theory of municipal liability addressed in Pembaur, Praprotnik and Jett, based on the factual possibilities, however unlikely, that I discuss above. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, *134678 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Since Pembaur, Praprotnik and Jett were decided long after trial in this case, and since we cannot expect Worsham to have anticipated the Court’s decisions, Worsham should be given an opportunity to prove the theory of liability addressed in the Court’s decisions. See note 1 supra. Because I believe that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is unwarranted in this case, I dissent in part from the Court’s decision today.

. After the completion of the fact-finding process in this case, and before Judge Hoyt’s dismissal, the Supreme Court issued its opinions that address the theory of municipal liability concerning us today. Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 924, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988); Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). We cannot expect Worsham to have anticipated these cases. Thus, although this case has already been to trial, the record before us is not exhaustive on the 12(b)(6) issue we face.

. The majority cites McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180, 1184 (5th Cir.1989) in footnote 6, stating that in McConney "we held that isolated instances of unconstitutional conduct by officials who are not policymakers 'are inadequate to prove knowledge and acquiescence by policymakers.’ ” In fact, in McConney we simply held that evidence existed to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a § 1983 action against the city. 863 F.2d at 1187. The facts sufficient to prove the existence of a city policy will vary according to the circumstances of a particular case. Thus, for example, in Grandstaff v. City of Borger, we held that "the disposition of the policymaker may be inferred from his conduct after [a rampage, in several episodes, by police officers on the city’s night shift]- [T]he subsequent acceptance of dangerous recklessness by the policymaker tends to prove his preexisting disposition and policy.” 767 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir.1985), reh'g denied, 779 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1369, 94 L.Ed.2d 686 (1987).

. The majority's reliance on Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1402 (8th Cir.1989) (en banc), is misplaced. In Williams, the five-judge opinion quoted by the majority held that the defendant was vested with final policymaking authority because the city, as a matter of fact, had absolutely delegated such authority to him. Id.; see id. at 1399 ("at the time of his election in 1969, Butler was given carte blanche authority to hire and fire his employees.... 'it had always been traditional’").