Court Opinion

ID: 9714094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:30:30.714178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:23.394649
License: Public Domain

Black, J.
(dissenting). The distinctive facts of this case present anew the most recurrent of all questions arising under the workmen’s compensation law. Did plaintiff’s injury and resultant disablement arise “out of and in the course of” the scope of her employment? The appeal board, relying particularly on the early case of Punches v. American Box Board Co. (1921), 216 Mich 342, answered in the affirmative. Some of my Brethren, relying upon the much more recent case of Murphy v. Flint Board of Education (1946), 314 Mich 226,1 answer in the negative and consequently vote to reverse the board’s award to plaintiff. I in turn stand for affirmance, giving reasons introduced by the conclusion of that which was written in the Punches Case (p 350):
“To the point that decedent was doing something useful and helpful to his employer, see cases cited in Spooner v. Detroit Saturday Night Co., 187 Mich 125, 131, 132 (LRA1916A, 17, 9 NOCA 647). We are of opinion that there was evidence to support the findings of fact of the board.
“In Homan v. Boardman Power Co., 200 Mich 206, 208, speaking for the court, Justice Fellows said:
*629“ ‘If the finding of the ultimate facts upon which the award is based finds support in the testimony, it is our duty to accept such finding as final, in the absence of fraud.’ Citing cases.
“This holding has been announced by this Court, in similar but varying language, many times. Ward v. Heth Bros., 212 Mich 180, 197.”
The aforesaid phrasing of section 1 of part 2 of the statute having stood without change since the orignial enactment of 1912 (see CL 1915, § 5431; CL 1929, §8417; CL 1948 and CLS 1956, §412.1 [Stat Ann, Stat Ann 1950 Rev, Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.151]), it would seem that specially careful scrutiny of our earlier decisions, wherein such phrasing was interpreted and applied in factually similar circumstances, should lead to much greater accuracy of interpretive application of section 1 to the present facts as found. In truth we endeavor now to ascertain, from words employed by the legislature and by this Court more than 40 years ago, what the legislature of that generation intended should be done with a case of factual specifics shown as at bar.
“Presumably, they [the members of the Court seated at the time] knew more about the background and intended scope of the pivotal phrase — ‘arising out of and in the course of his employment’ — , found in original and present section 1 of part 2 of the workmen’s compensation act, than we do.” (Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 350 Mich 92, 95.)
The Justices seated during the second and third decades of this century “were there” indeed. Two of them, one after the other, were attorneys general of Michigan during the years of debate, enactment, and working in of Michigan’s workmen’s compensation law. All then members of the Court knew well the laws and decisions of Great Britain and of this country, which then were presumably adopted by *630the legislature when that body voted into the act the English wording which appears in said section 1. These great jurists, notably Justices Fellows, Steere, and Bird, tell us today, through the cases presently quoted and cited, the principles this Court should apply upon approach to and consideration of these “going and coming from work” cases; principles which seem to have endured unto national acceptance2 (if not recent acceptance in our quarters).
Larson, having declared the general rule that injuries sustained by employees when going to and from their regular place of work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment, goes on to consider the exceptions; the exceptions which indubitably have made the administrative and judicial tasks more difficult. Under the heading “Dual-purpose rule as applicable to going and coming” (1 Larson’s Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 18.21, *631p 247), the author states helpfully our immediate question:
“The question then becomes: was the business mission of such character or importance that it would have necessitated a trip by someone if this employee had not been able to handle it in combination with his homeward journey?”
The appeal board answered “yes” to this question, expressly (see quotation below). Now I do not say that the board was compelled to draw inference and make answer as it did. I simply say that the board upon the proof was legally' entitled to thus infer and answer. And if the board was so entitled, our reviewable function arrives inexorably at affirmance.
The authorities will come later, but first we should examine the facts, sifted for any evidence legally supportive of the appeal board’s conclusion.3 Accordingly, and in comparably convenient juxtaposition, I array the 2 sets of summarized findings found in the Baas and Murphy Cases:
*632Baas Case (Opinion of Appeal Board)
“Plaintiff at the time of injury was transporting hooks, test papers and formulated plans to school for use in school. The test papers were necessary to grade the students. The plans were necessary for the work of the day and coming week. ITer plan hook actually managed to reach the school and was ‘nice for the assistant teacher that had to step in.’ If the school had sent a messenger to get these papers as it might have, there would be no question raised about his being in the course of his employment. It is no different here.”
Murphy Case (Opinion of Court, per Care, J.)
“In the case at bar plaintiff, at the time she received her injury, was not engaged in performing any specific duty for defendant, at defendant’s direction or request. It was not incumbent on her to go directly to her rooming place if she had occasion or desire to go elsewhere. She was not charged with the duty of transporting or safeguarding property of the employer. It should be noted, also, that the accident happened on Monday; that the examinations, for which plaintiff wished to prepare questions, did not begin until the following Aveek, and there is no showing in the record that the preparation of such questions on the day of the injury was necessary.” (p 234.)
We are told regularly — in fact Avere told in the Murphy Case at 230 — that the proper determination of these out-of-and-in-course-of cases “rests on the particular facts and circumstances disclosed by the record.” Bearing that in mind, conjunctively with our aforesaid “any evidence” rule, let us review what is said to call for a matter-of-law holding that Mrs. Baas was not, at the time of injury, engaged in carrying out any mission for her employer.
*633Mrs. Baas’ homework — done that weekend — was imminently necessary to the proper conduct of school and performance of her teaching duties. When she started from home and proceeded toward the school, she had with her, not only the completed examination work done over the weekend, but also the home-prepared “lesson plan” for that school day which (regardless of where it was prepared) had to be ready when the morning bell tolled. She also carried her home-prepared “master 2-week plan,” according to prescribed duty. The day’s “lesson plan” was ready for the “ditto machine” and distribution to each pupil, and the class work was regularly conducted according to such plans.
That such work was done and ready, for use of the hurriedly summoned substitute teacher, is a fact which stands out from this record. That Mrs. Baas had done — at home — something “useful and helpful to [her] employer” can hardly be gainsaid. That the employer knew the practice — of precedent home preparation of such work — is conceded. And that Mrs. Baas thereby, directly as well as indirectly, ■did something which furthered her employer’s business, is something more than a fair conclusion upon this record. Is there, all this viewed fairly, no evidence that Mrs. Baas’ injury arose out of and in the ■course of her employment ? See authorities quoted at ■conclusion of this opinion.
If a schoolteacher’s work, taken home for necessary preparation and readiness for the next ensuing school day, is to be pronounced less beneficial to her employer than is the taking home by a teamster-employee of the employer’s team for feeding, care and rest for the next day’s work (Punches, supra), then I protest such dixit for want of supportive reasons. If the taking home by a store manager of his employer’s cash ($332) for safekeeping overnight and return to the store the next morning *634(Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 217 Mich 462), amounts legally to greater service to the employer than what Mrs. Baas carried home, for aforesaid work and readiness for the next school day, then I suggest that the taking home and safekeeping of cash overnight has somehow become more valuable to one’s employer than the doing of indispensably requisite educational work at home. Further, and if Murphy is supposed to constitute an overruling,, of Punches to any extent, then I reject such thought for want of evidence of intent to overrule Punches when Murphy was written (Punches was not even mentioned at the time). And if it is to be said that the legislature has “acquiesced” in Murphy’s rather obvious garroting of said section 1, then I must observe that the legislature has likewise “acquiesced,” for 40 years plus, in Punches’ application of said section 1. Finally, and if Murphy is supposed to be at variance with Punches and all of the presently quoted espousals thereof, then I suggest that Murphy should be overruled in favor of such earlier and — in my view — much more enlightened decisions of this Court. That, by the way, we have done on several occasions when previous section 1 cases were before us, notably as in Sheppard v. Michigan National Bank, 348 Mich 577, and Dyer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra. I see no reason, frankly, why school teachers should be treated differently, in the application of said section 1, than are teamsters, store managers, automobile salesmen, and traveling salesmen (see present quotations), provided of course the essential facts found in their cases disclose that each “was doing something helpful to his employer” while going home from work and then returning to work.
The line of cases just mentioned were written into our reports by the so-called Fellows Court, between 1922 and 1924. All were unanimous. All recognize *635the Punches Case. I quote them in succession as follows :
“We think defendants beg the question in the assertion that carrying the money home was a mere incident of plaintiff’s trip at which time his employer had no control over him but he was left free to go where he pleased, even to ‘have dined down town and then gone to the theater,’ that had he done so and ■‘fallen down the- theater stairs’ he could with like force claim he violated no duty and ‘but for the money he would have taken another stairway.’ So far as the duties of his employment are concerned, it can as well be said that his going towards home was an incident of the performance of his unfinished daily duties. In Punches v. American Box Board Co., 216 Mich 342, the injured party was at the same time returning to work from his home and as a duty of his employment was taking a team of horses back to the factory for his employer. Vide, also, Beaudry v. Watkins, 191 Mich 445 (LRA 1916F, 576); Kunze v. Detroit Shade Tree Co., 192 Mich 435 (LRA 1917A, 252).” Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 217 Mich 462, 468.
“Similar in principle is the recent case of Punches v. American Box Board Co., 216 Mich 342. There the employee as a part of his duties to his employer cared for a team, taking it home at night and bringing It back in the morning. While in the discharge of ■such duty of bringing the team back in the morning he received a fatal injury. It was held that the accident occurred when decedent was acting within the scope of his employment.” Lipinski v. Sutton Sales Co., 220 Mich 647, 651.
“In Punches v. American Box Board Co., 216 Mich 342, the workman at his home took care of the team used by his employer. While bringing the team to the employer’s place of business in the morning he apparently lost control of the horses and they ran away and he was killed. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employ*636ment. In Clifton v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 217 Mich. 462, the employee was required by the' employer to take to his home the money collected at the store and safely keep it at his home. He was-injured while on his way home, carrying with him a considerable amount of money. It was held that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, and it was there said (p 464) by Justice Steere, speaking for the Court:
“ ‘Broadly defined, it may be taken as authoritatively settled that “out of and in the course of his employment” covers those accidents which befall an employee while he is discharging some duty he is authorized or directed to perform for the furtherance, directly or indirectly, of his employer’s business.’ ” Derleth v. Roach & Seeber Co., 227 Mich 258, 261, 262 (36 ALR 472).
These quotations prompt, not a roguish but a fair-question. If this section 1 Baas case had been submitted before the Fellows Court, would any member of that Court have voted to reverse? Conscious of the only honest answer, I submit that there remains but 1 issue; whether our present membership shall or shall not accept the guide of an early series of unanimous and never challenged decisions of this Court, in each of which a long standing and yet standing statutory phrase was construed and applied to a like “dual-purpose” case, and in each of which the Court referred back for guidance to the first of the series (Punches aforesaid).
To conclude-. Here it cannot be said, as the Court was able to say in Murphy, that the plaintiff teacher “was not engaged in performing any specific duty for defendant, at defendant’s direction or request.”' Nor can it be said that she was “not charged with the duty of transporting or safeguarding property of the employer.” It can and should be said, as in Morse v. Pork Huron & D. R. Co., 251 Mich 309 (quoted in Murphy at 235), that the testimonially disclosed fact. *637of work taken home and done at home, without which school could not have proceeded as it should and did proceed that Monday, all such having been done with the knowledge and approval of plaintiff’s employer, fairly justified the hoard’s determination that plaintiff was carrying out “a prescribed duty” when she was injured.
More and more prevalent as time goes on, it becomes judicially noticeable that faithful employees are required, in order to keep abreast of ever more pressing work, to make home a regular and secondary place of performance of such work. This employer having had due notice thereof, and having not only approved but having expected that plaintiff would do at home such essential work, it seems to me that the rule which was written 40-odd years ago by the then industrial accident board, into the Punches Case record with declared approval of this Court, is brought to present decisive play. The rule {Punches at 349):
“Where an employer, with full knowledge of the circumstances, permits an employee to do part of his work outside of his regular hours, or off the employer’s premises, he should not be heard to say that he is not responsible for the work or for accidents that may arise out of the work.”
I would affirm, with costs to appellee.
Kavanagh and Souris, JJ., concurred with Black, J.

 Note liow Murphy completely ignores Punches. More of Punches seems to be in order.

 “The general rule is that injuries sustained by employees when going to or returning from their regular place of work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of their employment. Ordinarily the hazards they encounter in such journeys are not incident to the employer’s business. But this general rule is subjoet to exceptions which depend upon the nature and circumstances of the particular employment. ‘No exaet formula can be laid down which will automatically solve every case’ [eiting eases]. While service on regular hours at a stated place generally begins at that place, there is always room for agreement by which the service may be taken to begin earlier or elsewhere.” Vochl v. Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, 288 US 162, 169 (53 S Ct 380, 77 L ed 676, 87 ALR 245).
And see American Mercury Insurance Company v. Britton, 114 App DC 280 (314 F2d 285, 286), applying and following Voehl’s rule:
“While the general rule is that injuries occurring to employees traveling to and from their regular place of work are not deemed to arise out of and in the course of their employment, the instant case constitutes an exception in that here there was a consistent and recognized practice that some of deceased’s services to the company were carried on in his room, and such being true, the commissioner was justified in finding the injury to have arisen out of and in the course of the deceased’s employment. Vochl v. Indemnity Insurance Co. (1933), 288 US 162 (53 S Ct 380, 77 L ed 676, 87 ALR 245). We are unable to find a distinction of substance between the instant ease and that of Proctor v. Hoage (1935), 65 App DC 153 (81 F2d 555). Whether the agreement to do work at home is express or implied by the course of business should make no difference in the result.”

 For the applicable appellate rule, see Meyers (Meyers v. Michigan Central R. Co., 199 Mich 134) and reaffirmrtion thereof in Thornton (Thornton v. Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162).