Court Opinion

ID: 9550561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:37:10.824314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:47.579388
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frantz
specially concurring:
The services rendered in this case are such that their value is a matter of common knowledge and within the experience of a judge or jury, whichever is the trier of the facts; hence, I take the position that it is unnecessary to have experts, or non-experts, or laymen, give testimony as to their value. If the trier of the facts has before it all the circumstances respecting the character and extent of the work, and the value thereof is a matter of common knowledge, the trier should determine the question of value from its own knowledge without the aid of opinion evidence.
There are numerous instances in the law in which the trier of the facts draws inferences and conclusions from evidence, because of the knowledge, observation and experience common to men generally in relation to the matter; and courts have been quick to condemn the reception of opinions in such instances as an invasion of the province of the trier of the facts. This has been particularly true in jury cases.
A typical statement of this view of the law is to be found in In Re Hartle's Estate (Mo. App.), 236 S.W. (2d) 40:
“While evidence of reasonable value is ordinarily essential to recovery in a proceeding of this sort, yet there is a well-defined exception in cases where the value of the things furnished is a matter of common knowledge. In such an instance, when all the facts and circumstances are in evidence with respect to the character and extent of the things supplied, the trial court or the jury as the *581case may be may determine the question of value from its own knowledge without the aid of opinion evidence.”
See Hopkins v. Paradise Heights Fruit Growers’ Ass’n, 58 Mont. 404, 193 Pac. 389; Geisenhoff v. Mabrey, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 481, 137 P. (2d) 36, 98 C.J.S. 807, §57.
“Matters of common knowledge relating to the value of services * * * may be judicially noticed.” 31 C.J.S. 706, §101. Juries have been instructed that they have a right in considering testimony and arriving at a verdict to take into consideration any knowledge which they may have which is common to mankind generally, touching the matters about which testimony has been received. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 Pac. 305. See 88 C.J.S. 1053, §389.
The circumstances showing the nature and extent of the work performed in this case are indefinite and inconclusive, so that the court had no basis for determining the value thereof from its own knowledge, and for this reason I specially concur in the majority opinion. However, I maintain that the services indicated in the record are such that opinions concerning their value are unnecessary; such services fall within the rule hereinabove enunciated.
Mr. Justice Day concurs in the foregoing opinion.