Court Opinion

ID: 9370674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 16:00:44.320479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.042874
License: Public Domain

22-58
   Barone v. Laws.’ Fund for Client Prot.

                                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                            SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

                At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square,
   in the City of New York, on the 14th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:
              AMALYA L. KEARSE,
              DENNIS JACOBS,
              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _____________________________________

   JOSEPH S. BARONE,

                                Plaintiff-Appellant,

                      v.                                                       No. 22-58

   THE LAWYERS’ FUND FOR CLIENT
   PROTECTION, SUPREME COURT OF NEW
   YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD
   DEPARTMENT,

                    Defendants-Appellees.*
   _____________________________________

   * The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
    For Plaintiff-Appellant:                     Joseph S. Barone, pro se, Myrtle
                                                 Beach, SC.

    For Defendants-Appellees:                    Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor
                                                 General, Victor Paladino, Senior
                                                 Assistant Solicitor General, Brian
                                                 Lusignan, Assistant Solicitor General,
                                                 for Letitia James, Attorney General for
                                                 the State of New York, Albany, NY.
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          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

    District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge).

          UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,             IT   IS   HEREBY    ORDERED,

    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

    AFFIRMED.

          Joseph Barone, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s dismissal

    of various claims he brought against the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (the

    “Lawyers’ Fund”) and the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate

    Division, Third Department (the “Third Department”; together with the Lawyers’

    Fund, the “Defendants”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

    facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

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       Having served as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the

“FBI”) for approximately twenty years, Barone was arrested in January 2009 for

conduct that he claims the FBI itself had authorized.1 After his arrest, Barone

hired an attorney, Roy Kulcsar, to represent him. When Kulcsar told Barone that

prosecutors would freeze his assets and thus deny him legal counsel of his

choosing, Barone transferred personal liquid assets to Kulcsar. But after Barone

fired Kulcsar and obtained new representation, Kulcsar failed to return all of

Barone’s funds. Barone was ultimately acquitted and released from custody in

July 2010; Kulcsar was disbarred in June 2012.

       In June 2012, Barone filed an application with the Lawyers’ Fund – which

has the power to reimburse clients for “losses caused by the dishonest conduct of

attorneys admitted to practice in [New York] state,” N.Y. Jud. Law § 468-b(2) – for

reimbursement of the assets Kulcsar had stolen from him. The Lawyers’ Fund,

however, denied Barone’s claim, principally because it found he had voluntarily

1 Certain facts recited herein are drawn from Barone’s federal complaint, which we accept as true
for the purposes of this order. See, e.g., M.E.S., Inc. v. Snell, 712 F.3d 666, 671 (2d Cir. 2013).
Other facts recited herein are drawn from state-court documents – of which the district court
permissibly took judicial notice – submitted with the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Fed. R.
Evid. 201; Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir.
1998).

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transferred the funds to avoid having them seized by prosecutors. Barone then

commenced an Article 78 proceeding in New York Supreme Court, Albany

County, to annul the determination of the Lawyers’ Fund, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801

et seq., which the court denied, finding that the Lawyers’ Fund’s determination

was neither arbitrary and capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. Barone filed a

notice of appeal with the Third Department, but failed to perfect his appeal,

resulting in dismissal.

      In February 2021, Barone filed a federal action against the Lawyers’ Fund

and the Third Department, asserting claims for (1) “judgment obtained by fraud”;

(2) “denial of due process”; (3) “denial of equal protection”; and (4) “violations of

the American with Disabilities Act,” presumably related to the post-traumatic

stress disorder (“PTSD”) from which Barone suffers. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 1 at 19–

25 (capitalization standardized).    The Defendants moved to dismiss Barone’s

complaint on various grounds. The district court granted that motion, construing

Barone’s complaint to have raised claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II

of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et

                                         4
seq., but principally concluding that judicial immunity and quasi-judicial

immunity barred the claims against the Defendants. Barone timely appealed.

      We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on

judicial immunity. See Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020). We are,

however, “free to affirm on any ground that finds support in the record, even if it

was not the ground upon which the trial court relied.” Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC

v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 396 n.2 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). We do so

here, affirming on the basis that Barone’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, and that he has failed to state a claim on which relief

can be granted under Title II of the ADA.

      The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity from suit in federal court to

states, as well as to “state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively,

arms of a state.” See Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Loc. Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 151–52

(2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In determining whether an entity is an arm of

the state, we consider many factors, including:

      (1) how the entity is referred to in its documents of origin; (2) how the
      governing members of the entity are appointed; (3) how the entity is
      funded; (4) whether the entity’s function is traditionally one of local
      or state government; (5) whether the state has a veto power over the

                                          5
      entity’s actions; and (6) whether the entity’s financial obligations are
      binding upon the state.

Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Eleventh

Amendment immunity, however, can be waived by the state or abrogated by

Congress. Id.

      Both of the Defendants qualify as state entities eligible for Eleventh

Amendment immunity, subject to waiver or abrogation.              As to the Third

Department, we have squarely held that the New York State Unified Court

System – of which the Third Department is a part – is an arm of the state. Id.

at 366–68; see also Napolitano v. Saltzman, 315 F. App’x 351, 351 (2d Cir. 2009).

Similarly, we conclude that the Lawyers’ Fund is an arm of the state because it was

created by state law, its trustees are appointed by the New York Court of Appeals

and considered state employees, and its assets are held in the custody of the state

Comptroller. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 468-b; N.Y. State Fin. Law § 97-t. Furthermore,

regulations regarding the Lawyers’ Fund signal that it is an “Ancillary Agenc[y]”

to the state court system, similar to the Board of Law Examiners – an entity we

have previously determined to be an arm of the state. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R.

                                         6
& Regs. tit. 22, § 7200 et seq.; T.W. v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Exam’rs, 996 F.3d 87, 92 (2d

Cir. 2021).

      Having determined that the Defendants are state entities, we see no basis

for concluding that the Defendants’ Eleventh Amendment immunity has been

waived or abrogated as to Barone’s claims under section 1983. Congress did not

abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). And while a claim

under Title II of the ADA could in theory escape Eleventh Amendment immunity,

Barone cannot state a Title II claim. See Mary Jo C., 707 F.3d at 152.

      To make out a prima facie case under Title II of the ADA, Barone must show,

among other things, that he was “denied the opportunity to participate in or

benefit from [D]efendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by [D]efendants, by reason of [his] disability.”           Dean v.

Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 187 (2d Cir. 2015)

(citation omitted). But Barone’s complaint contains no plausible allegations that

either of the Defendants’ actions were taken by reason of his PTSD, or even that

they were aware of his PTSD. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

                                            7
(2007). As a result, we conclude that dismissal of Barone’s claims against these

Defendants was proper.

      We have considered Barone’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                    FOR THE COURT:
                                    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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