Court Opinion

ID: 9576955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:30:17.130277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:44.564248
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree that the Superior Court of Fulton County did not violate either the Georgia Constitution or the designation statute when it assigned part-time Magistrate Benjamin W. Spaulding to serve as a superior court judge for 58 days in 1992 and 119 days in 1993. I write *636separately to point out problems with the majority opinion’s reasoning and the superior court’s unhealthy reliance on the designation statute.
1. In Division 2, the majority opinion addresses whether the designation of the magistrate to preside over Massey’s criminal trial in superior court violates the constitutional requirement that superior court judges be elected. It concludes that a designation under OCGA § 15-1-9.1 is not an appointment; therefore, a magistrate is not a superior court judge. Although I agree that designating a magistrate to preside in superior court does not make the magistrate an unelected superior court judge, that conclusion begs the question.
The question is whether a county’s practice of repeatedly designating part-time magistrates to serve as superior court judges has created permanent part-time superior court judges who are not accountable to the public through the electoral process. I do not foreclose the possibility that the county’s method of continually designating magistrates to serve on the superior court bench could result in an indefinite or de facto permanent appointment that violates both the constitution and designation statute. I agree with the majority, however, that the assignment orders here, taken together, did not have the cumulative effect of indefinitely appointing a magistrate as a superior court judge.
Instead, the number of orders issued and judges assisted, length of time Spaulding served under each order, and total number of days he served on the superior court bench demonstrate that he served on a periodic, rather than permanent, basis. Spaulding assisted superior court judges for 58 days in 1992 and for 119 days in 1993. To obtain his help for matters other than bond hearings, the chief judge issued ten assignment orders to assist five judges in 1992 and eighteen orders to assist eight judges in 1993. Only one order requested Spaulding’s help for as many as ten consecutive days. Twenty orders sought his help for a day. Because Spaulding’s service did not amount to a permanent, part-time judgeship, his designation to the superior court bench did not violate the constitutional mandate of elected superior court judges.
2. Similarly, the assignment orders did not violate the designation statute. OCGA § 15-1-9.1 provides that the chief judge of any court may make a written request to the chief judge of any other court within the county when a majority of the requesting court’s judges determines that the court’s business requires the temporary assistance of an additional judge.4 The term “temporary assistance” means help for a limited time. We have held that it does not mean *637the indefinite appointment of a judge.5 I would now interpret “temporary assistance” to also prohibit a succession of assignment orders that, taken together, amounts to an indefinite appointment.6 Applying this definition, the superior court’s orders were sufficiently limited in time and scope to constitute temporary assistance under the statute.
3. Nevertheless, the state’s superior courts have abused the designation statute. The statute was enacted to provide a mechanism for courts to receive judicial assistance when a judge is disqualified, disabled, ill, or absent, or when a court’s business requires temporary help.7 It was never intended to convert part-time positions to full-time judgeships or to elevate magistrates to the superior court bench. As difficult as the crisis caused by the shortage of judges has been, it does not justify circumventing the constitutional and statutory safeguards placed on the state’s superior courts.
In the past two years, this court has seen an increasing number of appeals from trials in which part-time magistrates have presided. These appeals illustrate the problems when persons without sufficient judicial training or experience are assigned to preside over felony and domestic trials which our State Constitution reserves exclusively for superior courts.8
I am especially troubled by the potential conflict created when practicing attorneys, including part-time magistrates, are assigned to serve as judges.9 To avoid these conflicts, the General Assembly has prohibited superior court and full-time state court judges from practicing law10 and restricted the practice of part-time judges and magistrates.11 The Judicial Qualifications Commission points out that a judge who practices law “occupies a very sensitive position with reference to the Code of Judicial Conduct.”12 This dual role makes it more difficult for judges to avoid the appearance of impropriety and promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, as the *638commission’s many opinions on the subject illustrate.13
Decided July 10, 1995
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1995.
Ronald J. Scholar, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Henry A. Hibbert, Carl P. Greenberg, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Because of these problems and the serious consequences connected with felony and domestic trials, counties need to curb their practice of designating part-time magistrates to sit as superior court judges. At a minimum, superior courts should refrain from assigning part-time magistrates to preside over felony and domestic trials. Rather, the superior courts should restrict the magistrates’ work to presiding over bond hearings and other non-jury proceedings.

 OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b) (2) (C) (1994).

 See Cramer v. Spalding County, 261 Ga. 570, 572 (409 SE2d 30) (1991).

 See Dozier v. Wild,_S2d_(Fla. App. 1995).

 See OCGA § 15-1-9.1 (b).

 See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IV, Par. I.

 See, e.g., Formal Advisory Op. 86-2 (1989) (concluding that it is inappropriate for a judge who issues criminal warrants or presides over criminal trials to represent criminal defendants regularly or exclusively); see also Judicial Qualifications Comm. Op. No. 200 (1995) (noting the inherent conflict between the role of lawyer and judge).

 See OCGA §§ 15-6-5; 15-7-21 (b).

 See OCGA § 15-7-21 (b) (prohibiting part-time state court judges from practicing in their own court or in any matter where they have exercised jurisdiction); OCGA § 15-10-22 (b) (prohibiting magistrates who are attorneys from practicing in their own court or appearing in any matter where they have exercised jurisdiction); see also Georgia Court and Bar Rules, Application of the Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 13-17 (describing restrictions on the practice of law by part-time judges).

 Judicial Qualifications Comm. Op. No. 31 (1978).

 See Judicial Qualifications Comm. Op. Nos. 19, 31, 45, 48, 53, 59, 69, 87, 88, 91, 107, 109, 121, 134, 137, 142, 151, 154, 155, 157, 175, 177, 180, 183, and 185.