Court Opinion

ID: 9789159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:29:07.290148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.200614
License: Public Domain

GEORGE, C. J., Concurring.
I wholly agree that Welfare and Institutions Code, section 15610.17 does not include a professional or occupational limitation on, or a preexisting personal friendship exception to, the definition of “care custodian” provided by the statute. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 808-809.) That section and the statutory scheme inclusive of Probate Code sections 21350, subdivision (a)(6) and 21351, subdivision (d), presumptively disqualifying care custodians as beneficiaries of testamentary transfers, do not contain or imply “an exception for preexisting personal friends of a dependent adult to whom they provide health care services.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 810.)
I also observe that the circumstances of the present case illustrate the Legislature’s well-founded concern—reflected in its adoption of statutory language sufficiently broad to encompass uncompensated caregivers—that individuals acting as unpaid care custodians of a dependent adult and not related to that adult potentially may exercise undue influence over their charge as readily as professional or occupational care custodians.1
At the same time, it appears to me that in other, fairly common factual circumstances involving uncompensated caregivers, application of these statutory provisions may disserve the legislative goals implicit in their enactment. Accordingly, notwithstanding our customary and proper reticence in encouraging legislative action, in the present context I believe the Legislature would do well to consider modifying or augmenting the relevant provisions in order to more fully protect the interests of dependent adults and society as a whole, by according separate treatment to longer term care custodians who undertake that role as a consequence of a personal relationship rather than as an occupational assignment.
*817I
The matter before us presents, in the words of plaintiffs’ attorney at oral argument, “a classic case of what the Legislature was trying to protect against.” As explained in the majority opinion, relatives of the decedent filed suit to invalidate the seventh and final amendment to Carmel Bosco’s trust, executed three days prior to her death, that for the first time made defendants her sole residual beneficiaries. As is apparent from evidence received at the trial, several amendments closely preceding (and apparently anticipating) the final amendment to the trust belie the conclusion that Bosco acted merely out of personal preference. Considered in light of the statutory presumption that we have held applicable to uncompensated care custodians who become beneficiaries of a testamentary instrument, these amendments (including the final amendment) together with the other evidence in the record do not constitute substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s alternative finding—premised upon its assumed application of the statutory presumption—that defendants had rebutted the presumption.
Carmel Bosco died childless on September 28, 2001, at 97 years of age, leaving an estate valued at approximately $448,000. Bosco had created the trust in 1991. Apparently to ensure the payment of expenses associated with the continuing care of Bosco’s youngest sister, Ann Cassell (one of the plaintiffs herein), as an Alzheimer’s patient, Bosco designated Ann to receive one-third of the trust estate. Bosco named other relatives as co-equal beneficiaries of the residual estate, and named a successor trustee (succeeding Bosco) and an alternate trustee. In the first three amendments, made between 1991 and early 2001, Bosco named different successor trustees. Erman and Foley, longtime personal friends of Bosco’s, were not mentioned in the original trust or in the first three amendments.
Within several months preceding her death, however, Bosco amended the trust four times. The fourth amendment, dated June 12, 2001, was the final amendment executed in the presence of Bosco’s attorney, Marc Eagan, who drafted the original trust and all seven amendments. The fourth amendment for the first time named defendant Foley as a successor cotrustee with Patricia Tally (a relative of Bosco’s who had assisted her with her daily needs during the preceding four years), changed Ann Cassell’s one-third interest in the estate from an outright distribution to a life estate, to be held in the trust and used for Cassell’s care in amounts deemed reasonable by the trustees in light of other available income and resources, and provided that, of the 11 relatives named equal residual beneficiaries, Michael Coica (who had become disabled) would receive distributions of his share in the trustee’s “absolute discretion.”
*818At the repeated urging of defendant Erman, Bosco moved from her own residence in Alhambra on July 26, 2001, into a house shared by Foley and Erman in Riverside. Erman and Foley, having learned that Bosco had lung cancer, assumed the administration of Bosco’s financial and investment affairs. The fifth trust amendment, dated August 12, 2001, for the first time named defendant Foley as the sole successor trustee, declared that Foley was entitled to reimbursement of expenses and a reasonable trustee’s fee, and further specified that any third person dealing with the successor trustee “shall accept, and shall be absolutely entitled to rely upon,” the successor trustee’s statement that he or she is successor in accordance with provisions of the trust. Between August 20 and September 6, 2001, Foley listed Bosco’s Alhambra residence for sale and sold it for $265,000.
The sixth amendment to the trust, dated September 11, 2001, deleted the names of Michael Coica and two other relatives, so that eight relatives remained as beneficiaries of the residual estate. The seventh amendment, dated September 25, 2001, deleted the name of an additional residual beneficiary, and eliminated entirely Ann Cassell’s one-third life estate interest in the trust estate. In explanation, Foley testified that Bosco had been informed that Cassell would be supported by Cassell’s husband, Alvin, although Alvin testified such a conversation did not take place. For the first time, it was provided (in the seventh amendment) that the seven remaining relatives, formerly designated equal beneficiaries of the residual estate, instead would receive $25,000 each. For the first time, defendants were designated sole residual beneficiaries, giving them, in view of the estate’s estimated value of $448,000, the “lion’s share” of the estate. In drafting the amendment, Marc Eagan, Bosco’s attorney, did not inform Bosco that Foley and Erman would receive the majority of the estate.
II
The circumstances underlying the present case illustrate the Legislature’s wisdom in including, within the meaning of the statutes presumptively disqualifying a care custodian from becoming a testamentary beneficiary of the dependent adult, uncompensated friends or acquaintances who provide substantial, ongoing health or other services to a dependent adult. (Prob. Code, §§ 21350, subd. (a)(6), 21351, subd. (d).) In adopting the broad definition of a care custodian required to report elder abuse (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.17) for purposes of defining those persons and entities subject to the presumption of undue influence under the Probate Code, the Legislature implicitly recognized that an individual acting in a caregiving capacity on behalf of a dependent adult who requires substantial, if not total care, assumes a role uniquely susceptible of exerting substantial influence over the dependent person, regardless of the formality of the arrangement.
*819That having being said, it is not difficult to imagine circumstances in which an unrelated individual, motivated by long-standing friendship, moral obligation, or other personal incentive, undertakes without compensation to provide substantial, ongoing health care services on behalf of a dependent adult—for an extended period. In such a case, the recipient of those services eventually may decide to recognize those acts by modifying his or her testamentary disposition of property to include the caregiver as a beneficiary. In the event the dependent adult modifies the instrument but thereafter expires prior to obtaining certificated independent review pursuant to Probate Code section 21351, subdivision (b), the uncompensated long-term caregiver in that example, no less than the defendants in the present circumstances, would be presumptively disqualified from receiving that beneficial bequest.
In my view, it is questionable whether the uncompensated individual who in a nonoccupational capacity provides substantial, ongoing health services to a dependent adult for an extended period and eventually is made his or her beneficiary, should be subject to the identical presumptive disqualification and burden of proof imposed upon an individual who assumes the role of an unpaid caregiver for a relatively brief period preceding the dependent adult’s favorable modification of a testamentary disposition, at a time that is fairly proximate to death.
As a practical matter, the justification for presuming an exercise of undue influence is less compelling when an individual having a preexisting personal relationship with the dependent adult renders health care and other services over a relatively lengthy period of time. First, the likelihood is less that a personal friend gratuitously providing substantial, ongoing health care services over a lengthy term is motivated by the prospect of obtaining undue economic benefit by coercing a testamentary modification. Second, an uncompensated but well-established caregiving relationship affords greater opportunity to the donor’s relatives and other interested parties to observe the course of the relationship and to resolve any concerns occasioned by the caregiver’s position of trust and potential ability to exert undue influence.
As a matter of policy, it is of doubtful social efficacy to apply the statutory presumption and evidentiary burden to an individual who in a nonprofessional capacity undertakes the serious responsibilities attending the long-term care of a dependent adult. To do so is counterintuitive to our sense that the uncompensated efforts of such an individual, benefiting the dependent adult in question and society in general, should be recognized and encouraged.
Our most basic judicial task in the case before us consists of construing the statutory enactment in its present form and not in crafting or recommending its modification. Manifestly, the majority has accomplished the former task, *820interpreting Probate Code section 21350, subdivision (a)(6) to apply equally to professional, compensated persons and nonprofessional, uncompensated persons who act as care custodians in providing substantial, ongoing health services to a dependent adult. Although I believe our statutory construction is correct and have no reservation regarding its application in the present case, applying the statute to those persons who have undertaken the long-term care of a dependent adult without compensation does not appear to take full measure of the importance to the individual or the benefits to society of such efforts bom of preexisting personal relationships.
Accordingly, I would suggest legislative modification of the relevant statutes to exempt or otherwise limit application of the statutory presumption of undue influence in the case of uncompensated care custodians who provide long-term health care and other services for dependent adults. Such an exemption or limitation might resemble a standard originally applicable in the federal taxation of estates. Formerly, a decedent’s estate was required to include in the gross estate all gifts made “in contemplation of death,” a description that presumptively included the value of all gifts made by the decedent within three years of his or her death. (See 26 U.S.C. former § 2035(a); United States v. Hemme (1986) 476 U.S. 558, 563 [90 L.Ed.2d 538, 106 S.Ct. 2071]; Wheeler v. U.S. (5th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3d 749, 760 [the former “ ‘contemplation-of-death’ provision” was replaced by the rale set forth in 26 U.S.C. § 2035(a) providing that transfers within three years of death are included in the gross estate]; Hutchinson v. C.I.R. (7th Cir. 1985) 765 F.2d 665, 669 [to forestall litigation seeking to ascertain whether a decedent made a transfer in contemplation of death, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 converted the statutory presumption into a mandatory rule that the value of all gifts made by the decedent within three years of death must be included in the gross estate].)
In similar fashion, for purposes of testamentary transfers, the language in California’s statutes conditionally disqualifying donative transfers to a care custodian—subject to rebuttal of the presumption of undue influence (Prob. Code, §§ 21350, 21351)—could be amended to provide that a change in testamentary disposition made by a dependent adult designating the care custodian as a beneficiary, within one year following the commencement of a new nonprofessional caregiving relationship or within one year preceding the death of the dependent adult, will be subject to the presumption of undue influence. In the situation where the donative transfer to an individual precedes his or her assumption of responsibilities as a care custodian or is made prior to the time that the donor assumes the status of a dependent adult, the statutory presumption would not apply. Similarly, where the donative transfer to a care custodian who provides uncompensated health care and other services to the dependent adult is made more than one year following *821the commencement of those caregiving services, the statutory presumption would not apply under such a proposed change.

 To fairly distinguish the present situation from circumstances that may well warrant a different legislative response, I set forth below additional factual background supplementing what is provided in the majority opinion.