Court Opinion

ID: 9729484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:37:49.88556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.149522
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, specially concurring: The majority appears to hold that, absent some objective, visible injury to the defendant, the State does not bear the burden of coming forward with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s confession was not the product of improper coercion. Although that appears to comport with the rule recently laid down in People v. Woods, 184 Ill. 2d 130 (1998), People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987), People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272 (1994) (Hobley I), and People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404 (1998) (Hobley II), this ought to be known as “the reasonable and prudent torturer rule” since it provides a premium for one who tortures with care. While the majority is correct that stains of blood, if they exist at all, are not enough to raise the bar on the State’s burden, here there is other evidence that corroborates the defendant’s suppression hearing testimony of improper police conduct and, in the real world, that should be sufficient. In People v. Cannon, 293 Ill. App. 3d 634 (1997), the court found that the newly discovered evidence — the incidence of systematic abuse of suspects — came within the ambit of “special circumstances” so as to allow reconsideration of the issues decided at the suppression hearing. Insofar as I am able, I would follow the Cannon holding, which speaks to our duty to insure that a defendant’s fifth amendment rights are observed and protected; however, People v. Maxwell, 173 Ill. 2d 102 (1996), arises out of the same efforts by a defendant to rely upon the newly discovered investigations of Area 2 which disclose the pattern of brutality directed at suspects in custody. Our supreme court found that without some evidence of injury, evidence of the treatment of other suspects could not, by itself, be the basis for a new evidentiary hearing. Although Cannon discusses the fact that the officers checked out shotguns on the day defendant was questioned and defendant claimed that a shotgun had been placed in his mouth, there is little else to distinguish these cases. Moreover, Cannon is further compelling because the interrogation of the defendant in the case at bar is cited there as evidence of improper police conduct, Hinton being arrested only 23 days after the defendant in Cannon. One of the important things that I have learned in life is the importance of knowing one’s place. We are an intermediate court of review and are bound to follow the decisions of our supreme court. Accordingly, I must reluctantly follow Maxwell. This case has another interesting twist. At trial, the defendant took the stand and testified to most of the matters set out in his forced confession. I do not believe this to be a waiver of his rights since the use of a defendant’s forced confession as substantive evidence can never be harmless error. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 506 N.E.2d 571.