Court Opinion

ID: 9384413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 19:01:26.225141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:53.324207
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                        T.C. Summary Opinion 2023-13

                  MAGDY A. GHALY AND LAILA RYAD,
                             Petitioners

                                          v.

              COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                          Respondent

                                    —————

Docket No. 27901-21S.                                          Filed April 3, 2023.

                                    —————

Magdy A. Ghaly and Laila Ryad, pro se.

Ryan J. Lonergan and Thomas A. Deamus, for respondent.

                             SUMMARY OPINION

       CHOI, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to the
provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in effect when
the Petition was filed. 1 Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be
entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this Opinion shall not
be treated as precedent for any other case.

      In a notice of deficiency dated June 14, 2021, the Internal
Revenue Service (respondent) determined a deficiency in petitioners’
federal income tax of $38,213 and a section 6662(a) accuracy-related
penalty of $4,797 for taxable year 2018.

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal

Revenue Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

                                 Served 04/03/23
                                          2

       After concessions, 2 the issues for decision are

            1. whether petitioners’ gross income includes unreported
               retirement income of $115,325 paid to Magdy Ghaly
               during 2018; and

            2. whether petitioners are liable for the 10% additional tax
               on premature distributions of $11,533 from a qualified
               retirement plan.

                                    Background

       The facts have been fully stipulated and are so found. The
stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated by this
reference. Petitioners were residents of New York when they timely filed
the Petition.

       In 2018 Mr. Ghaly submitted a withdrawal request for $71,147 to
his retirement company, Great-West Trust Co., LLC (Great-West),
which Great-West processed on May 11, 2018. Great-West, therefore,
issued a 2018 Form 1099–R, Distributions From Pensions, Annuities,
Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc., to
Mr. Ghaly, indicating a distribution of $71,147 and withholding of
$14,229. This same year, Mr. Ghaly defaulted on a loan he had taken
from his Great-West retirement account in 2015, resulting in Great-
West’s issuing Mr. Ghaly a second 2018 Form 1099–R indicating a
distribution of $44,178, the balance remaining on the loan. Mr. Ghaly
had not attained the age of 59½ at the time of these distributions.

       Mr. Ghaly withdrew funds from his retirement account in 2018 to
provide for his family while he was laid off from work, including to pay
for surgery for his son. He was laid off from work in 2018 and thereafter
defaulted on the loan he had taken from his retirement account in 2015.
Mr. Ghaly did not dispute that he received the funds from his retirement
account nor that he received the funds in the amounts respondent
alleged. Instead, in order to restore the distributions from his retirement
account in 2018, Mr. Ghaly opened two new retirement accounts in 2020
and made the maximum contribution allowed for each account.

        2 Respondent conceded the section 6662(a) substantial understatement penalty

in a status report filed November 9, 2022, in response to the Court’s October 13, 2022,
Order.
                                         3

                                   Discussion

I.     Burden of Proof

       Generally, the Commissioner’s determinations in a notice of
deficiency are presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden of
proving that the Commissioner’s determinations are erroneous. See
Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). However, in
unreported income cases, the Commissioner must establish an
evidentiary foundation connecting the taxpayer with the income-
producing activity or otherwise demonstrate that the taxpayer actually
received income. See Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 152, 156 (2d
Cir. 1981), aff’g in part, rev’g and remanding in part 74 T.C. 260 (1980).
The presumption of correctness for the Commissioner’s determinations
does not apply if the notice of deficiency is unsupported by any
significant evidence. Schaffer v. Commissioner, 779 F.2d 849, 858 (2d
Cir. 1985), aff’g in part, remanding in part Mandina v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1982-34. Once the Commissioner makes the required
threshold showing, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Commissioner’s determination
is arbitrary or erroneous. See Williams v. Commissioner, 999 F.2d 760,
763 (4th Cir. 1993), aff’g T.C. Memo. 1992-153. The record shows, and
Mr. Ghaly admitted, that in 2018 Great-West distributed funds from his
retirement account and he defaulted on the 2015 loan, generating a
deemed distribution. Consequently, the presumption of correctness
attaches to respondent’s notice of deficiency, and petitioners bear the
burden of proving that the determination is incorrect. 3

II.    Unreported Income

      Section 61(a) provides that “gross income means all income from
whatever source derived.” Gross income includes, but is not limited to,
items such as compensation, annuities, income from life insurance and
endowment contracts, and pensions. § 61(a)(1), (8), (9), (10).

       3 The parties did not address whether section 6201(d) applies to this case.

Under section 6201(d), if a taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect to an
item of income reported on an information return filed by a third party and the
taxpayer meets certain other requirements, the Commissioner bears the burden of
producing reasonable and probative evidence, in addition to the information return,
concerning the deficiency attributable to the income item. Assuming arguendo that
respondent bears the burden of production under section 6201(d), we find that
respondent has satisfied it.
                                    4

       Section 402(a) provides the general rule that “any amount
actually distributed to any distributee by any employees’ trust described
in section 401(a) which is exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be
taxable to the distributee, in the taxable year of the distributee in which
distributed, under section 72 (relating to annuities).” An amount
distributed as a loan is not taxable when distributed if the loan meets
certain requirements but will become taxable as soon as the loan fails to
satisfy any of the requirements and will be deemed a distribution. See
§ 72(p); Owusu v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-186, 2010 WL
3322502, at *3–4. Mr. Ghaly does not dispute that his retirement plan
trust was a qualified trust under section 401(a). Thus, subject to certain
exceptions, see, e.g., § 402(c)(1) (excluding certain “rollover”
distributions from income), any amount actually distributed to
petitioners normally would be subject to federal income tax pursuant to
section 72, see § 402(a).

       Mr. Ghaly requested the withdrawal resulting in the $71,147
distribution from his Great-West retirement account. Mr. Ghaly also
defaulted on the outstanding loan from his Great-West retirement
account, which resulted in a deemed distribution of $44,178. He has
neither argued nor established the applicability of an exception to the
taxability of either the distribution or the deemed distribution. Instead,
he asserts that in 2020 he opened two new retirement accounts and
deposited funds in them to replace those he withdrew from his Great-
West retirement account, which is not sufficient to show that the
distributions he received in 2018 are not included in gross income.
Respondent properly included the distributions in petitioners’ gross
income.

III.   Additional Tax Under Section 72(t)

       Section 72(t)(1) imposes a 10% additional tax on the taxable
amount of an early distribution from a qualified retirement plan (as
defined in section 4974(c)) unless certain enumerated exceptions apply
under section 72(t)(2). The term “qualified retirement plan” includes a
section 401(k) plan and an ESOP. Uscinski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2005-124, 2005 WL 1231826, at *2; see also §§ 72(t)(1), 401(a), (k)(1),
4974(c)(1), 4975(e)(7). A distribution is early if it is made before the
recipient attains the age of 59½. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i). However, the 10%
additional tax does not apply to certain distributions, such as those
attributable to the taxpayer’s disability or made for the payment of
certain medical expenses. See § 72(t)(2)(A) and (B). Generally, the
taxpayer has the burden of proving his or her entitlement to any of these
                                         5

exceptions. See Rule 142(a); El v. Commissioner, 144 T.C. 140, 148–49
(2015).

       Mr. Ghaly was not 59½ years old when he received either of the
distributions in 2018. The distribution and deemed distribution from his
retirement plan are considered early distributions for purposes of
section 72(t) unless an exception applies. Mr. Ghaly testified during trial
that he used the distributions to repay loans he had taken from family
for his education expenses, medical expenses of $34,000 for his son’s
surgery, and property taxes. During trial he produced a medical bill from
Luis Zapaich, M.D., for $34,077, but no evidence that he had paid it. 4 He
also produced bank statements showing four payments to Columbia
University in 2013 and 2014, each approximately $6,000, but no
evidence that he had borrowed these funds from relatives or that he
repaid them in 2018. Finally, Mr. Ghaly produced documents showing
he paid $6,238 in property taxes in 2018, which is irrelevant. 5 We find
that petitioners did not use the funds from the distributions in 2018 to
pay any expense that would allow them to avoid the 10% additional tax
on early withdrawal. The withdrawal does not fit within any of the
statutory exceptions, and the entire distribution is subject to the 10%
additional tax.

       We have considered all of the arguments made by the parties, and
to the extent they are not addressed herein, we find them to be moot,
irrelevant, or without merit.

       To reflect the foregoing,

       Decision will be entered for respondent as to the deficiency and for
petitioners as to the accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a).

       4 The invoice is dated December 19, 2018, and shows that the entire $34,077

balance was outstanding at that time. Mr. Ghaly did not produce receipts, bank
statements, canceled checks, or any other proof of paying the $34,077.
        In addition to the medical bill for $34,077, Mr. Ghaly produced various other
medical bills, some for Laila Ryad and Adam Ghaly, which show petitioners made
copayments of $10 to $25 for medical visits in 2018. He also produced a letter from a
law firm showing that he entered into a payment plan for an outstanding Hackensack
University Medical Center medical bill, which showed that petitioners had made a
$195 payment toward the bill.
        5 The Internal Revenue Code provides a deduction for taxes paid on real

property, but not an exception to the 10% penalty on early withdrawal for taxes paid
on real property. See §§ 164, 72(t).