Court Opinion

ID: 9701397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:18:21.435011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:23.499252
License: Public Domain

Howard, District Judge,
concurring in part and, in part, dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s treatment of the jointly held property, but I can find no oral agreement supporting the award of the value of a life estate in the home. When plaintiff moved in with defendant in 1972, his only statement concerning her future was, “There is money enough out there to take care of all three of us for the rest of our lives.” It was agreed that if plaintiff became unhappy with the situation, she could go back to Fremont and defendant would help her find a job. There was no discussion concerning plaintiff’s life use of the new home until 1974, when it was under construction. The defendant, not the plaintiff, according to plaintiff’s own testimony, introduced the idea that he would make a will leaving her a life use of the home and $1,000 or $1,200 per month, insurance proceeds, funds in the checking accounts, and the contents of the safe deposit boxes. Meanwhile, the parties were both performing and receiving consideration under their original arrangement. Plaintiff pressed defendant to proceed with making the will on several occasions, and he never declined to do so, according to plaintiff’s testimony, until an altercation which occurred the day before she moved out.
*706This court has held that a declaration of intention to make a testamentary disposition of property does not tend to support the conclusion that any oral contract exists concerning the property or its disposition. Diez v. Rosicky, 145 Neb. 242, 16 N.W.2d 155 (1944); Gerdes v. Omaha Home for Boys, 166 Neb. 574, 89 N.W.2d 849 (1958). The existence of such a contract must be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, as this court has never failed to say. More to the point, such a contract is void as within the statute of frauds even though proved by such clear evidence, unless performance by the claimant is such as is referable solely to the contract sought to be enforced, and not such as might be referable to some other and different contract. Gerard v. Steinbock, 169 Neb. 828, 101 N.W.2d 194 (1960); O’Neal v. First Trust Co., 160 Neb. 469, 70 N.W.2d 466 (1955). In my view, the plaintiff has failed to establish that her performance was referable solely to any agreement by defendant to make a will in her favor. And I cannot find in the evidence that any other bargain was struck for life use of the home, notwithstanding defendant’s stated reasons for building it.
Colwell, District Judge, joins in this concurrence and dissent.