Court Opinion

ID: 9478598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:52:53.46395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:30.696470
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but on a different ground.
As the majority points out, in January 1987 the attorneys for the parties negotiated a settlement and reported it to the court by telephone, apparently in a conference call just before the case was to go to trial. The district judge thereafter entered an order which dismissed the action with prejudice, but provided that
It having been reported to this Court that the above entitled action has been settled, it is hereby
ORDERED, that this action be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with preju*504dice but without costs; provided, however, that within sixty days of the date of this order any party may apply by letter for restoration of the action to the calendar of the undersigned.
Such “60-day” orders are obviously common in the district courts and facilitate settlement of civil actions.
The purpose of the 60-day period in which to apply for restoration of the action to the calendar and the conditions to be satisfied in making such application were described by the district judge. On June 16, 1987, when he ruled on appellant’s request for such restoration, the judge commented on the 60-day order, as follows:
These orders are entered as a matter of routine in appropriate circumstances, and they serve a useful function of allowing parties to agree on the terms of a settlement and to perform the paperwork involved in completing a settlement, that is usually the exchange of releases and the exchange of cash, while retaining access to the court in case there should be a difficulty with the consummation of the settlement, and if the settlement should not be approved or be illusory, the immediate access or re-access to the court for purposes of trial, (emphasis added).
Thus, from the judge’s own words, it is reasonable to assume that if the settlement was “not approved” and turned out to be “illusory,” there would be immediate “access to the court ... for purposes of trial.” Moreover, absent some limiting language, this construction of the judge’s January “60-day order” is a reasonable one, even if he had said nothing in explanation of it in June.
What occurred here is precisely the sort of event referred to by the judge. The “settlement” turned out to be illusory because the client, plaintiff-appellant, would not accept it, and the attorney reapplied within 60 days for restoration to the calendar. Under the circumstances, the refusal to restore the case to the calendar was an abuse of discretion since the expressed conditions were met.
Of course, the district judge must have had something else in mind when in June 1987 he used the words quoted above in explanation of the 60-day order, because he immediately went on to hold that, in view of the timely application before him, the issue was:
whether a binding agreement was made to settle the case for $10,000, in which event this case should be dismissed and the plaintiff relegated to whatever rights he may have against his former attorney for breach of the instructions in that agency relationship, or whether on the other hand the settlement is not a binding contract, in which event this case should go forward for trial.
But that more limited meaning was certainly not clear from the language of the 60-day order itself or from the judge’s explanation of it. And, absent clearer language in the order, plaintiff is entitled to his day in court rather than being required to accept a settlement to which he never agreed.
Under the circumstances, I do not find it necessary to consider the broader issues of apparent authority discussed in the majority opinion. On this more limited basis, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for further proceedings.