Court Opinion

ID: 9649879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:12:12.439474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.656137
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice
(concurring).
My review of the evidence satisfies me that the police in making their initial investigatory stop of the appellant lacked sufficient grounds to do so under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry, the United States Supreme Court laid down this objective standard for determining when a stop is justified, even in the absence of probable cause for an arrest: “. . . would the facts available to the officer at the *82moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. Virtually all that Knowles did was to slouch down in the seat of his automobile as the police drove by. That is hardly sufficient to trigger a police stop. See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 455 Pa. 283, 314 A. 2d 317 (1974). It follows, therefore, that both the narcotics obtained from the dollar bill which the appellant abandoned on the roof of his car during the subsequent search, and the heroin seized from the apartment at 2301 Green Street, appellant’s key to which was found in his car after his arrest, must be suppressed as fruit of the primary illegality. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Accordingly, I concur in the grant of a new trial.
With regard to the suppression of the contraband narcotics seized from the codefendant Meadows, and which the Superior Court held to have been illegally seized, Commonwealth v. Meadows, 222 Pa.Super. 202, 293 A.2d 365 (1972), the principal question is that of Knowles’ standing to object. Here the majority places strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) in finding that the appellant had “automatic” standing to challenge that evidence. The Supreme Court in Jones held that where the same possession needed to establish standing to object to a search and seizure is also an essential element of the offense charged, a defendant who was present at a search and seizure of another has “automatic” standing to challenge its validity when its fruits are directed against him.
As the majority notes, see n. 11 and accompanying text, supra, the inequitable dilemma which Jones corrected by according standing to one who had no possessory interest was resolved in Simmons v. United States, 390 *83U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). In Simmons, it was held that a defendant’s testimony relative to his possessory interest in the seized evidence, given to establish his standing to object to the seizure could not thereafter be used against him at trial. In the recent case of Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973), Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous Court, stated that since Simmons, “[t]he self-incrimination dilemma, so central to the Jones decision, can no longer occur under the prevailing interpretation of the Constitution.” 411 U.S. at 228, 93 S.Ct. at 1568. “Our decision in Simmons,” said the Court at a later point, “has removed the danger of coerced self-incrimination.” Id. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 1569. The Court stated, however, that it was not necessary for it then to determine whether Simmons makes the “automatic” standing conferred by Jones “unnecessary”, 411 U.S. at 228, 93 S.Ct. 1565, or “warrants its continued survival.” Id. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 1565.
The clear implication of Brown is that when the issue is properly before it, the Supreme Court may be disposed to dispense with the concept of “automatic” standing. See e. g., United States v. Dye, 15 Cr.L. 2541 (6th Cir. 8/22/74). For this reason, the heavy reliance upon Jones is, I venture to think, of questionable wisdom.
That point aside, however, my review of the evidence convinces me that the Jones rule is inapplicable here, since Knowles was not charged with the possession of the heroin obtained from the illegal search of Meadows, his co-defendant, but that obtained as a result of the search of the appellant himself and an apartment over which he apparently exercised control. The indictment charged that “on or about May 18, 1970, in Philadelphia County, Deramus Knowles feloniously had in his possession and under his control a certain narcotic drug: Heroin and Cocaine.” As the Commonwealth in its brief admits, there was simply no direct evidence which would support *84an inference that Knowles possessed and controlled the heroin seized from Meadows.
In Simmons, supra, the Supreme Court explained its decision in Jones thusly: “. . .we held that when, as in Jones, possession of the seized evidence is itself an essential element of the offense with which the defendant is charged, the Government is precluded from denying that the defendant has the requisite possessory interest to challenge the admission of the evidence.” 390 U.S. at 390, 88 S.Ct. at 974, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1256-1257. Since the offense charged in the case at bar did not involve the possession of the drugs seized from Meadows, the appellant would have no automatic standing under Jones. And since at the suppression hearing, at which he did not testify, Knowles failed to establish any proprietary interest in the drugs seized from Meadows or any interest in the place of seizure (the public highway), he is precluded from objecting to the evidence seized from Meadows. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).
EAGEN, J., joins in this concurring opinion.