Court Opinion

ID: 9755418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:37:40.350819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:07.212145
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
DONOHUE, J.:
¶ 1 Our standard of review in cases where the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order is to ascertain whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and then to determine whether the suppression court’s inferences and legal conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 883 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa.Super.2005). In this case, the suppression court fairly considered the testimony of Trooper Walton and reached a reasonable decision to suppress the evidence that is fully supported by the record and prior decisions of this Court. Accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 2 The majority correctly identifies the issue before us as the classification of the initial interaction between Trooper Walton and the Appellee Christopher Collins (“Collins”) as either a mere encounter or an investigative detention8. The test for distinguishing between these two types of situations is whether “the demeanor and conduct of the police would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201-02 (Pa.Super.2002).
¶ 3 Trooper Walton testified that he had no information to suggest that there was any illegal activity occurring in the vehicle in which Collins was a passenger. N.T., 7/11/06, at 11. To the contrary, the vehicle was merely parked at a scenic overlook specifically designed for such use. N.T., 7/11/06, at 9. It was not damaged or in disrepair, and it was not parked unusually, illegally, or on a roadway. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10-11. Trooper Walton positioned his vehicle so that his headlights would shine directly into the passenger compartment of *1049the car, and as he approached (leaving his headlights on) he also shone a flashlight inside the car. N.T., 7/11/06, at 4-6. To leave, the occupants of the car in which Collins was a passenger would have had to ignore Trooper Walton’s approach and back out of the parking space. N.T., 7/11/06, at 14-15.
¶4 Based on these facts, and as the suppression court found, a reasonable person in Collins’ position would not, as the majority’s concludes, have considered himself “free to terminate the encounter.” Trooper Walton, in uniform, got out of a marked vehicle and, while shining multiple lights into the passenger compartment, began asking Collins questions. A reasonable person would not think that he/she was free to simply ignore the trooper and to instead back out of the parking space and leave. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mulholland, 794 A.2d 398, 401-02 (Pa.Super.2002) (investigative detention found where officer approached the occupants of a legally parked van and, after shining the police cruiser’s lights in the direction of the van, began asking questions); Commonwealth v. DeHart, 745 A.2d 633, 636-38 (Pa.Super.2000) (investigative detention found where troopers approached a legally stopped vehicle and began asking questions, concluding that “The overwhelming majority of lay people do not feel free to simply ignore a police officer’s questions and continue driving along.”).
¶ 5 The majority likewise lacks any support in the evidentiary record for its conclusion that a reasonable person “would have interpreted Trooper Walton’s actions as an act of official assistance and not an investigative detention”. Trooper Walton freely admitted that he did not observe anything to indicate that the car in which Collins was a passenger was in any distress or disrepair, or that its occupants otherwise required any assistance. N.T., 7/11/06, at 10-11. As such, the majority’s rebanee on Judge Stevens’ prior opinion in Commonwealth v. Conte, 931 A.2d 690 (Pa.Super.2007) is misplaced. In Conte, the police officer responded to a radio call regarding a possibly disabled vehicle and was advised by the defendant that he had a flat tire. Id. at 691.
¶ 6 In other cases, this Court has routinely held that a police approach to a vehicle to lend assistance may form the basis for a “mere encounter” only where the occupants of the vehicle would reasonably expect the officer to be rendering assistance. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 480 (Pa.Super.2007) (investigative detention found where “Ap-pellee did not engage in any conduct that would suggest to the police that he needed assistance”); Commonwealth v. Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa.Super.2005) (“Appellee did nothing more than pull his truck to the side of the road in an effort to allow another motorist to pass. Appellee had no reason to expect that a police officer would stop to render aid.”).
¶ 7 The issue in this case is not whether police officers should be allowed to lend assistance to the occupants of parked vehicles or people in general. Such safety checks are laudable and appropriate. Instead, the issue here is whether evidence of crimes must be suppressed when pobce encounters with citizens proceed without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. As a result, I would affirm the well-researched and eminently reasonable decision of the suppression court below.

. I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s unnecessary discussion of the much debated "limited automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of Art. I § 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Indeed, the Majority’s disputable interpretation of the status of the law in Pennsylvania concerning warrantless seizures of articles from motor vehicles in general and the "lawful right of access” prong of the analysis in particular is entirely gratuitous. The sole issue on appeal is “[whether] the lower court err[ed] in finding that the officer did not have the requisite suspicion necessary to approach Appellee's vehicle and ask to speak to the occupants.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. Given the ongoing debate in our Supreme Court on the proper application of the plain view doctrine to automobile searches and seizures, see Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238, 255-60, 924 A.2d 621, 632-34 (Cappy, C.J., concurring); id. at 260-61, 924 A.2d at 634-35 (Castille, J. (now C.J.) concurring), and the fact that this Court, in this case, has not been asked to address the issue, footnote # 4 of the majority opinion is, in this Judge’s opinion, imprudent.