Court Opinion

ID: 9555676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 19:04:14.051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:17.802989
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/14/23 T.L. v. Superior Court CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 T.L.,                                                        2d Juv. No. B326173
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 22JV00363)
      Petitioner,                                           (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY,

      Respondent,

 SANTA BARBARA COUNTY
 CHILD WELFARE
 SERVICES,

      Real Party in Interest.

      T.L., the mother of 8-month-old Bella L., seeks
extraordinary writ relief from the juvenile court’s order bypassing
reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency
planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 We deny the petition.
                  Facts and Procedural Background
       Mother has a long history with the child dependency
system going back to 2011, including for neglect, chronic drug
abuse, and criminality. She had multiple drug-related referrals,
her parental rights to two of her children had been terminated in
two separate cases, and she had a voluntary family maintenance
case for a third child after testing positive for methamphetamine
during a prenatal visit in 2018.
       In November 2022, Santa Barbara County Department of
Social Services (the department) secured a protective custody
warrant and detained newborn baby Bella and her four-year-old
sister, S.H., after Bella tested positive for amphetamine at birth.
The department filed a dependency petition alleging, among
other things: (1) Bella’s positive test for amphetamine; (2)
mother’s positive test for methamphetamine during a prenatal
visit in August 2022; (3) mother’s admission to using
methamphetamine during her pregnancy; (4) mother’s
“substantial” child welfare history, including the removal and
subsequent adoptions of Bella’s half siblings, J.L. and M.L. in
2012 and 2018, respectively; and (5) mother’s criminal history.
       J.L.’s case involved mother’s failure to make substantial
progress with her substance abuse treatment program, drug
testing, visitation, and her failure to obtain suitable housing.
M.L.’s case involved mother’s arrest for outstanding warrants
and living in her vehicle with M.L. Mother was subsequently

      1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 2
bypassed for services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions
(b)(10), (b)(11), and (b)(13).
       In this case, the detention report indicated that during an
in-hospital interview with mother, she told a department social
worker that she had “slipped” and relapsed one time after she
found out she was pregnant at about four months along. The
social worker told mother she likely used recently as she had
tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother responded, “‘ok,
just those two times.’” But when the social worker asked mother
about the positive test in August 2022 during a prenatal visit,
mother became defensive and stated, “‘ok three times!’” Mother
stated that “she did not have any problems with substance use”
and that “she had been clean for years.” When asked if she would
be open to services, mother told the social worker she was not
willing to do inpatient treatment but would do outpatient
treatment “‘all day.’”
        The department’s amended jurisdiction and disposition
report recommended mother be bypassed for family reunification
services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11),
and (b)(13). The department cited mother’s chronic, long-
standing substance abuse, the prior loss of custody of J.L. and
M.L., and mother’s failure to comply with the court-ordered
substance abuse treatment services in J.L.’s case and mother’s
2015 criminal court case.
       As part of her formal supervision for the criminal case,
mother was referred to services at Recovery Point. However, she
was terminated unsuccessfully in 2015 when she failed to attend
the program. In 2016, mother was arrested and incarcerated for
violation of probation. After her release from jail, mother
completed approximately one year of substance abuse treatment

                                3
services. Mother reported that she relapsed after completing
treatment and used methamphetamine between October 2017
and early 2018.
       After Bella’s birth in November 2022, and following the
children’s detention, mother completed a 60-day inpatient
treatment program through Project Premie, enrolled in a six-
month outpatient program, attended group counseling, met with
her sponsor weekly, and attended 12-step Narcotics Anonymous
meetings daily.
       At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
January 2023, the department social worker and mother
testified. After hearing testimony and considering the evidence,
the juvenile court found by a preponderance of the evidence that
the allegations in the amended petition were true, ordered
reunification services to be bypassed for mother, and set the
matter for a section 366.26 hearing as to Bella.
                              Discussion
       Mother contends the juvenile court erred by denying her
reunification services because insufficient evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings that she met the required statutory
criteria pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11),
and (b)(13).
       We review an order denying reunification services for
substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 87, 96 (Cheryl P.).) Under that standard, “we
inquire whether the evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports the [juvenile] court’s determination. We resolve all
conflicts in support of the determination, indulge in all legitimate
inferences to uphold the findings and may not substitute our
deductions for those of the juvenile court.” (Georgeanne G. v.

                                 4
Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864-865 (Georgeanne
G.).)
        Generally, when a child is removed from parental custody
under the dependency laws, the juvenile court is required to
provide reunification services unless one of several statutory
exceptions applies. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For example,
reunification services shall not be provided to a parent described
in section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10), (b)(11), or (b)(13), “unless
the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that
reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (Id., subd.
(c)(2).) “‘[O]nce it is determined one of the situations outlined in
subdivision (b) applies, the general rule favoring reunification is
replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would
be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]’” (Renee
J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 744 (Renee J.).)
        Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) recognizes the problem of
recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts. (Renee J.,
supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 744-745; Cheryl P., supra, 139
Cal.App.4th at p. 96.) This subdivision applies if the juvenile
court previously ordered the termination of reunification services
for any siblings or half siblings of the child, and the parent “has
not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . . ” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(10)(A).)
        Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), authorizes the denial of
reunification services if “the parental rights of a parent over any
sibling . . . had been permanently severed” and the “parent has
not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” (Id., subd.
(b)(11)(A).)

                                   5
       There is no dispute the first prongs of section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) were established, i.e., the
termination of reunification services and the permanent
severance of mother’s parental rights over J.L. and M.L. in the
two prior dependency actions. However, mother contends
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding
that she had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems
that led to the removal of J.L. and M.L. We disagree.
       Here, in denying reunification services, the juvenile court
expressly considered mother’s “chronic history of drug abuse” and
her “fail[ure] to reunify” with two of her other children “for the
same problem.” Although the juvenile court commended mother
for her recent efforts, it explained that it did not believe “the
legislation is written in a way where the parent can defeat the
exception of reunification services by starting reunification
services once the petition is filed.”
       Mother contends the court’s reasoning was not appropriate
because the statute does not require the parent to have made the
effort before the filing of the section 300 petition. According to
mother, the juvenile court “failed to deem [her] prior and
subsequent efforts as reasonable.”
       But not every “effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to
address the problems leading to removal will constitute a
reasonable effort and as such render these provisions
inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to
consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts,
as well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of
those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And
while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a
parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long

                                 6
term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the
reasonableness of the effort made.” (In re R.T. (2012) 202
Cal.App.4th 908, 914.)
       Here, the juvenile court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that mother had not made reasonable efforts to treat
the problems that led to removal of the children’s sibling or half
sibling. In making its ruling, the juvenile court opined that it did
not believe there was “much evidence” that mother had done
“much” to treat the problem since the last time she was in front of
the juvenile court. It also did not believe mother was “being
candid about her drug use,” and there was “clear evidence” that
mother had “an ongoing problem with drug use.”
       The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. By
mother’s own admission, she had been “dipping and dabbing”
with methamphetamine since 2002. Her substance abuse issues
led to the loss of her parental rights to J.L. in 2012. Despite this,
mother continued to use methamphetamine, failed to comply
with her probation requirements in her drug-related 2015
criminal case, and ultimately lost custody of M.L. in 2018.
Although mother was able to complete one year of residential
treatment at Project Premie in 2017 and voluntarily participated
in another drug program through Project Premie in 2018, the
record shows mother used while pregnant with Bella on at least
one occasion. Even when confronted with this evidence, mother
attempted to minimize her drug use, and denied that she had a
substance abuse problem.
       The purpose of the reasonable effort prong of section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11), is not to create further delay for a
child by allowing a parent, who up to that point has not
reasonably addressed his or her problems, another opportunity to

                                  7
do so. (In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 843.)
Based on this record, the juvenile court did not err in denying
mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5,
subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11).
        The juvenile court also denied mother reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). That section
provides in part that the juvenile court may bypass services to a
parent where it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
parent “has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of
drugs or alcohol,” and “has failed or refused to comply with a
program of drug or alcohol treatment described in the case plan
required by Section 358.1 on at least two prior occasions, even
though the programs identified were available and accessible.” (§
361.5, subd. (b)(13).)
        Here, mother concedes that she satisfies the first condition,
i.e., that she has a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic
abuse of drugs. As to the second condition, mother acknowledges
she was ordered into drug treatment in 2011 when she was
granted family reunification services as to J.L. and failed that.
She also acknowledges the juvenile court was “not incorrect” in
considering her failure to complete the criminal court-ordered
probation program in 2015, which falls within the statutory
criteria of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). (See D.B. v. Superior
Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 197, 204.)
        Nevertheless, mother asks us to “deem” her “follow-up
compliance” with the probation requirement of substance abuse
treatment services in 2016 as “an act that supersedes her failure
to comply in 2015.” We decline mother’s request to do so. (See
Georgeanne G., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 865.)

                                 8
      Because we conclude substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s order bypassing services to mother on this basis,
we need not address the statute’s alternative basis for bypassing
services, i.e., that the parent “resisted prior court-ordered
treatment for this problem during a three-year period
immediately prior to the filing of the petition . . . .” (§ 361.5,
subd. (b)(13).)
                              Disposition
      The petition is denied.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     YEGAN, acting P. J.

We concur:

             BALTODANO, J.

             CODY, J.

                                 9
                 Gustavo E. Lavayen, Judge
           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
              ______________________________

     Jesse Frederic Rodriguez and Giselle Marie Achecar, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for petitioner.

     No appearance for Respondent.

      Rachel Van Mullem, County Counsel, Adam R. Crawford,
Snr. Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.