Court Opinion

ID: 9772166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:09:10.41096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.394457
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice.
Billy Douglas Lantrip was convicted of two counts of rape of his adopted daughter, Amanda Lantrip. One count related to an act committed while Amanda was under twelve years of age. The other related to an act committed after her twelfth birthday.
Amanda testified that appellant had sexual intercourse with her repeatedly from September, 1983, until sometime in the latter part of January, 1984, when she first reported the incidents. She testified that she did not report these incidents immediately because she was afraid of the appellant and was afraid that he would carry out a threat that he would beat her mother if she told on him. It is not contended that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict.
Appellant does contend, however, that it was prejudicial error to admit into evidence the testimony of two female witnesses concerning improper sexual advances made to them by appellant, on separate occasions within the period from September, 1983, to January, 1984. His conduct on those occasions, as described by the witnesses, was not so similar to those exhibited towards Amanda as to establish a method or pattern of operation which in itself would identify appellant as the perpetrator of the acts in question. In fact, there is no question of identity present in this case.
The testimony of these two witnesses was admitted to show lustful inclination of the appellant under the authority of Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 482 S.W.2d 584 (1972). Russell was overruled in this regard by Pendleton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 685 S.W.2d 549 (1985), and prior acts are no longer admissible for the purpose of *817showing lustful inclination. The admission of this evidence was prejudicial to the defendant for the reason as stated in Pankey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 485 S.W.2d 513 (1972). A defendant is entitled to be tried solely on the question of his guilt of the offense charged in the indictment.
Appellant also contends the trial court erroneously permitted Richard Welch, who holds a Masters Degree in Clinical Social Work, to testify concerning statements made to him by Amanda and also erred in admitting his testimony concerning what he denominated as “sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.” Amanda was referred to Richard Welch by the Commonwealth Attorney for an evaluation. He testified that she told him her father engaged in repeated acts of intercourse with her and that she did not report this fact immediately because she was afraid. As indicated, Amanda had previously testified in a similar vein. We find nothing in the record to establish or indicate that the history given to Richard Welch by Amanda was for the purposes of treatment. Instead, it appears she was referred for evaluation. Welch’s testimony goes to establish the truth of the matters stated to him because he testified:
“Her behavior subsequent to the incident fulfills the guidelines of the Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. Few children have been found to exaggerate or invent crimes of sexual molestation.”
Welch listed five distinct elements of the sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. They were, (1) secrecy, (2) helplessness, (3) entrapment and accommodation, (4) delay in disclosure, and (5) retraction. He said that Amanda fit all of the categories except that she had not retracted her story.
There was no evidence that the so-called “sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” has attained a scientific acceptance or credibility among clinical psychologists or psychiatrists. Even should it become accepted by the scientific community that a child who has been sexually abused is likely to develop certain symptoms or personality traits, there would remain the question of whether other children who had not been similarly abused might also develop the same symptoms or traits. If so, the development of these symptoms or traits characteristic of the alleged “syndrome” would not suffice, per se, to prove the fact of sexual abuse. Under the circumstances of this case it was error to permit the testimony of Richard Welch concerning the statements made to him by Amanda of the testimony that she fulfilled the criteria of the “sexual abuse accommodation syndrome.”
Appellant also contends the court erred by overruling his motion to require the Commonwealth Attorney to elect which of the several particular instances it would rely upon, or in the alternative, to instruct the jury that the act about which evidence was first heard was the one upon which the Commonwealth must rely. We do not consider the motion to have been timely made.
Other errors alleged by the appellant are not of sufficient merit to warrant extension of this opinion. The judgment is reversed for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STEPHENS, C.J., and WHITE, GANT, LEIBSON, STEPHENSON and VANCE, JJ., concur.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate attached opinion.