Court Opinion

ID: 9953475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 06:07:48.625573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:58:33.925633
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

MONIQUE JEWELL,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    March 21, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 363788
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
MGM GRAND DETROIT, LLC,                                             LC No. 21-012872-AV

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and K. F. KELLY and MURRAY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant, MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, appeals by leave granted the circuit court’s order
denying defendant’s application for leave to appeal the order of the district court that denied
defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), of plaintiff Monique Jewell’s complaint
alleging unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation. We vacate the circuit court’s order
and remand.

                                            I. FACTS

         The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On October 20, 2017 and October 21, 2017,
plaintiff gambled at defendant’s casino in Detroit after entering the casino with proper
identification. During that time, she placed bets at various tables and machines and lost money to
the casino. Eventually, plaintiff won a jackpot of approximately $17,000 while playing “Texas
Hold’em.” When she attempted to claim her winnings, however, defendant informed plaintiff that
she had been banned from the casino since 2011, that she therefore was trespassing in the casino,
and that as a result she was prohibited from claiming her winnings.

       On October 24, 2017, plaintiff submitted a Patron Dispute Form to the Michigan Gaming
Control Board (the Board). Plaintiff asserted that defendant did not inform her that she was banned
from the casino before October 21, 2017, that defendant allowed her to enter the casino and gamble
on October 20-21, 2017, as long as she was losing money to the casino, and that defendant claimed
she was trespassing only after she won the jackpot. In response to her dispute form, Board
Regulation Officer Robert Gambrell, by letter dated December 11, 2017, informed plaintiff:

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        A “Patron complaint” means a complaint a patron has regarding winnings and
        losses or the conduct of gambling at a casino, R 432.1106(b). The matters you
        describe are not subject to regulation under the Michigan Gaming Control &
        Revenue Act or the Administrative Rules promulgated pursuant thereto. This
        means that irrespective of the validity of your complaint, the matters you raise are
        beyond the powers of the Board to address. . . . The Board has no authority to award
        any money or other relief directly to a patron.

        Plaintiff thereafter initiated this action against defendant by filing a complaint in the district
court alleging unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation. Defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4), asserting that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the dispute, which defendant argued fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Michigan Gaming Control Board. The district court denied defendant’s motion, holding that it
had exclusive jurisdiction of the dispute alleged in the complaint under MCL 600.8301(1), in light
of the Board’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction.

        Defendant sought leave to appeal in the circuit court, challenging the district court’s order.
Defendant again argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over whether plaintiff was entitled
to collect winnings from the casino, which defendant argued fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Board. The circuit court denied defendant’s application, reasoning that the dispute presented
by plaintiff’s complaint was not whether she won the $17,000 but whether the casino was justified
in determining that she was a trespasser. This Court granted defendant’s application for leave to
appeal the order of the circuit court. Jewell v MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, unpublished order of the
Court of Appeals, issued April 25, 2023 (Docket No. 363788).

                                           II. DISCUSSION

        Defendant contends that the district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Defendant argues that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff’s claim, which defendant argues falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Michigan Gaming Control Board. We agree.

        Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.
Davis v BetMGM, LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 363116);
slip op at 3. We also review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition,
Meemic Ins Co v Fortson, 506 Mich 287, 296; 954 NW2d 115 (2020), and the interpretation of
statutes and legal doctrines, Estes v Titus, 481 Mich 573, 578-579; 751 NW2d 493 (2008). This
Court also reviews de novo the circuit court’s review of a district court’s order. Noll v Ritzer, 317
Mich App 506, 510; 895 NW2d 192 (2016).

         Subject matter jurisdiction describes a court’s “abstract power to determine a case of a
particular kind or character.” Zelasko v Charter Twp of Bloomfield, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 359002); slip op at 7. When a trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, summary disposition is warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Winkler v Marist Fathers
of Detroit, Inc, 500 Mich 327, 333; 901 NW2d 566 (2017). Summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(4) also is proper when a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies. See Citizens
for Common Sense in Gov’t v Attorney General, 243 Mich App 43, 50; 620 NW2d 546 (2000).

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        In Michigan, “[t]he district court has exclusive jurisdiction in civil actions when the amount
in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00.” MCL 600.8301(1). However, in Michigan, legalized
gambling is controlled by statute. See Taxpayers of Mich Against Casinos v Michigan, 478 Mich
99, 121; 732 NW2d 487 (2007) (MARKMAN, J., dissenting). Relevant to this case, the Michigan
Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA), MCL 432.201 et seq., regulates casino gambling in
Detroit. Parise v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 295 Mich App 25, 28; 811 NW2d 98 (2011). The
MGCRA established the Michigan Gaming Control Board, MCL 432.204a, and provides for the
Board’s jurisdiction as follows:

       (1) The board has jurisdiction over and shall supervise all gambling operations
       governed by this act. The board has all powers necessary and proper to fully and
       effectively execute this act, including, but not limited to, the authority to do all of
       the following:

                                               ***

       (b) Have jurisdiction over and supervise casino gambling operations authorized by
       this act and all persons in casinos where gambling operations are conducted under
       this act.

                                               ***

       (d) Investigate alleged violations of this act or rules promulgated by the board and
       to take appropriate disciplinary action against a licensee or any other person, or
       institute appropriate legal action for enforcement, or both. [MCL 432.204a.]

        The MGCRA and the rules issued by the Board “apply to all persons who are licensed or
otherwise participate in gaming under this act.” MCL 432.203(4). The Michigan Administrative
Code provides rules applicable to the Board and includes dispute procedures. A patron dispute is
defined by Mich Admin Code, R 432.1106(b) as “a dispute a patron has regarding winnings or
losses or the conduct of gambling at a casino.” Mich Admin Code, R 432.11502 provides for a
patron to file a patron dispute form with the Board, which then determines whether the dispute
requires investigation. Mich Admin Code, R 432.11503 provides:

       (1) Following receipt of a completed patron dispute form, the board will determine
       if a patron dispute requires investigation.

       (2) The board may decline to investigate the patron dispute for the following
       reasons:

       (a) The patron dispute form was not received within 28 days from the incident date.

       (b) The incident does not involve winnings or losses.

       (c) The incident does not involve the conduct of gambling.

       (d) Any other reason deemed appropriate by the board.

                                                 -3-
       (3) If the board determines that an investigation is necessary, then the board will
       conduct an investigation for the purpose of deciding whether to take disciplinary
       action.

        If the board decides to take disciplinary action against a licensee, Mich Admin Code, R
432.11108(2) provides that the board may suspend or remove the licensee’s license, impose a civil
penalty, and take “any other action deemed necessary by the board to ensure compliance with the
act or these rules.”

        The Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., provides that a party “aggrieved
by a final decision or order in a contested case” of a state agency may appeal that decision in the
circuit court. MCL 24.301. Similarly, the Revised Judicature Act, MCL 600.101 et seq., provides
for judicial review of “any order, decision, or opinion of any state board,” through appeal to the
circuit court. MCL 600.631.

        When the Legislature expresses an intent to make the jurisdiction of an administrative
agency exclusive, the courts are not permitted to exercise jurisdiction over that same area. Citizens
for Common Sense, 243 Mich App at 50. This Court has held that by enacting the MGCRA, the
Legislature intended to vest the Board with exclusive jurisdiction “over all matters relating in any
way to the licensing, regulating, monitoring, and control of the non-Indian casino industry,”
despite the term “exclusive jurisdiction” not appearing in the Act. Papas v Gaming Control Bd,
257 Mich App 647, 657-659; 669 NW2d 326 (2003). This Court also has determined that, as a
result of the Board’s exclusive jurisdiction, a litigant may not pursue common-law claims
inconsistent with the MGCRA. Kraft v Detroit Entertainment, LLC, 261 Mich App 534, 543-551;
683 NW2d 200 (2004); MCL 432.203(3) (Any other law inconsistent with the act does not apply
to casino gaming as provided in the act).

        In Kraft, this Court described the “expansive and exclusive authority” of the Board to
“regulate all aspects of casino gambling,” observing that the Board’s rules set forth the procedure
for a patron to file a complaint against a casino licensee. Kraft, 261 Mich App at 549-551, citing
Mich Admin Code, R 432.11501 to 432.11503. Under the rules, the Board decides whether a
patron dispute requires investigation, Mich Admin Code, R 432.11503(1), and whether to take
disciplinary action after completing an investigation, Mich Admin Code R 432.11503(3). In the
event that disciplinary action is required, the Board may revoke casino licenses and impose fines
for fraudulent conduct. Kraft, 261 Mich App at 551, citing MCL 432.204a(1).

         In this case, defendant contends that the Board had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claim, and further, that plaintiff was required to exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking
relief from the courts. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, when
an administrative remedy exists, a party must exhaust the administrative relief process before
bringing the claim to court. Connell v Lima Twp, 336 Mich App 263, 282; 970 NW2d 354 (2021).
The requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to avoid premature court
adjudication or review of administrative action. See Paragon Props Co v City of Novi, 452 Mich
568, 579 n 12; 550 NW2d 772 (1996). Here, plaintiff submitted a patron dispute form to the Board,
which responded by letter stating that plaintiff’s claim was “beyond the powers of the Board to
address” because the matters were not “subject to regulation” under the MGCRA or attendant
rules, and the Board lacked authority to “award any money or other relief directly to a patron.”

                                                -4-
Defendant contends that plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by appealing the
decision of the Board to the circuit court.

        The response of the Board in this case mirrors that of the Board in Davis v BetMGM, LLC,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 363116). In Davis, the plaintiff alleged
that an online gaming website operated by the defendant informed her she had won, but the
defendant thereafter would not pay her the winnings. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant
alleging fraud, conversion, and breach of contract. In Davis, the Board had determined that it
lacked the authority to resolve her dispute. Id. at ___; slip op at 2. This Court determined that the
Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA), MCL 432.301 et seq., provided the exclusive remedy for
plaintiff’s common-law claims that were inconsistent with LIGA. Davis, ___ Mich App at ___;
slip op at 6. This Court reasoned that the LIGA contains a provision similar to that of the MGCRA
discussed in Kraft, that “[a] law that is inconsistent with this act does not apply to internet gaming
as provided for by this act,” MCL 432.304(3). Id. This Court observed that the plaintiff’s claims
were like those in Kraft, because they alleged, in part, fraud and deceit, and they therefore “conflict
with the MGCB’s authority under LIGA to regulate all aspects of internet gaming.” Id. at 7. This
Court in Davis stated that “it is clear that the MGCB had the power under LIGA to investigate
disputes such as plaintiff’s, to determine whether a violation of LIGA or the rules promulgated
under it had occurred, and to require corrective actions from an internet gaming provider.” Id.

        In this case, defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim for unpaid winnings similarly was
preempted because the Board had exclusive jurisdiction and plaintiff failed to exhaust the
administrative remedy by direct appeal of the Board’s decision to the circuit court. Published
opinions of this Court issued on or after November 1, 1990, are precedentially binding, MCR
7.215(J)(1). In light of this Court’s holdings in Kraft and Papas, as well as this Court’s analogous
decision in Davis, we agree that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, despite the
Board’s letter advising plaintiff that it did not have authority to resolve her claim. Plaintiff’s
complaint alleged unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation, claims preempted by the
MGCRA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Board regarding patron disputes. See Kraft, 261
Mich App at 551; see also Davis, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 7. When the Legislature has
provided exclusive jurisdiction to a state agency, as in this case, “courts must decline to exercise
jurisdiction until all administrative proceedings are complete.” Papas, 257 Mich App at 657.

        We note with interest the observation in Davis, ___ Mich App at ___ (FEENEY, J.
dissenting), that under the Lawful Internet Gaming Act (LIGA), MCL 432.301 et seq., the Board
apparently has neither authority nor an obligation to resolve a patron’s claim that he or she is owed
winnings that are being wrongfully withheld by a licensee. Discussing § 9 of the LIGA, MCL
432.309, the dissenting opinion in Davis observed:

       The statute provides an exhaustive list [of the Board’s authority]. But a review of
       that list reflects extensive authority over the licensing of on-line casinos, an
       establishment of rules by which those licenses are obtained (and perhaps revoked),
       casino operations, and procedures for sanctioning on-line casinos that violate the
       statute and rules. What is not found in the list is the authority, much less the
       obligation, to resolve individual patron disputes such as that presented here.

                                                 -5-
       . . . [T]he Gaming Board has the authority and responsibility to investigate
       defendant over this incident and determine what, if any, licensing sanctions are
       appropriate. But plaintiff’s suit does not seek licensing sanctions against defendant;
       plaintiff seeks payment of the money that defendant’s gaming platform told her that
       she had won. [Davis, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 4-5 (FEENEY, J, dissenting)
       (footnotes omitted).]

       As in Davis, plaintiff in this case seeks payment from defendant of amounts allegedly won
from a defendant licensee. The Board determined that it has no authority to resolve plaintiff’s
claim for payment; a reading of the MGCRA supports the conclusion that although the Board has
exclusive jurisdiction of a patron dispute, the Legislature has given the Board no authority to
resolve a dispute by ordering a casino to pay a patron. As in Davis, plaintiff appears to be left
without a forum in which to pursue her claimed winnings from defendant. When the Legislature
has declined to address a concern by including a provision within a statute, however, courts are
not empowered to insert a provision into the statute to address the concern. LeFever v Matthews,
336 Mich App 651, 679; 971 NW2d 672 (2021). As a result, whether and how a patron might
pursue a claim for winnings from a casino is a question left to the authority of the Legislature.

        The district court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(4) because plaintiff’s claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board, and
the circuit court thus erred by denying defendant leave to appeal. We vacate the circuit court’s
order and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, directing
the circuit court to reverse the district court’s order. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray

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