Court Opinion

ID: 9616297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:45:25.910635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:52.329543
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. Applications for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence are not favored by the courts for the reason that the parties have ample opportunity to prepare the case carefully and secure all of the evidence before trial. It is manifest injustice to allow a party to defeat an adverse verdict by alleging what may be the consequence of his own neglect. Such a motion should be subjected to the closest scrutiny by the court and proof must be forthcoming that it could not have been discovered before the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The matter was fully explored by the trial court when the motion for new trial was denied. There was no abuse of discretion by the court. The alleged statement by Officer Raynor was made at a prior public hearing involving a co-defendant It was available at the time of the present trial, if inquiry had been made by defendant’s attorney.
It is well settled that a new trial will not be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence where it appears such new evidence can have no other effect than to discredit the testimony of a witness at the original trial, unless the evidence is so strong and convincing that a different result would necessarily follow were a new trial granted. (58 Am. Jur. 2d, New Trial, § 173, p. 388; Anno: 10 A. L. R. 2d 381, 384, § 3.)
The testimony of Officer Raynor at the hearing on the motion for new trial adequately explained the reason why the supposed dis*839crepancy arose. Both Zeller and the defendant Quinn made similar statements to the effect that if Hodge would not make the sale they would.
Attorney Littrell’s testimony was not so damaging when considered in light of his cross-examination at the hearing on the motion for new trial. Although he testified the prosecution file contained a police report of the incident which attributed the statement to Zeller alone, both the KRI report and the Manhattan police department report were produced at the hearing. On cross-examination he stated: “As far as I know. It’s my recollection that that statement was in 'there [referring to these two reports], but like I said, I haven’t looked at that in four months and I am mistaken about that.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The state should not be convicted in this case of withholding exculpatory evidence from the defendant. The failure to disclose exculpatory evidence rests largely on the shoulders of a former assistant county attorney, who did not hold that office when defendant was tried. There was no deliberate suppression of evidence by the state and testimony of Zeller, Littrell and Morrison attacking the credibility of Raynor will merely be explained on the ground that there was bad blood between Attorney Littrell and Raynor and that the same or similar statements urging a sale were made by both Zeller and Quinn.
This is not such strong evidence that a different result will necessarily follow at the new trial. The evidence was reasonably discoverable prior to the first trial. The oversight occurred as a consequence of defense counsel’s own neglect. The case should be affirmed.
Fatzer, C. J., and Schroeder, J., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.