Court Opinion

ID: 9648596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:29:13.348227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:03.663750
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge
(concurring) :
To the extent that one might think a logical extension of the court’s last remarks may carry over to some aspects of the criminal law, I hasten to add that interlocutory rulings on pretrial motions to suppress evidence fall into a somewhat different category. Consistent with statutory command,1 the criminal rules of the Superior Court require that motions to suppress be made before trial.2 Such timing is essential to the statutory right of appeal by the prosecution from grants of such motions.3 This mandatory requirement is additionally intended to obviate the necessity of intratrial prosecution appeals under subsection (b) of D.C.Code 1967, § 23-104 (Supp. IV, 1971). Those appeals must be decided within 96 hours of adjournment of the trial for appeal. I conclude, therefore, that the latter general observation in the main opinion is not to be construed as permitting trial judges to inquire de novo into motions to suppress evidence previously ruled upon unless the defendant “was not aware of [new] grounds for the [second] motion.” D.C.Code 1967, § 23-104(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971). Prior to this recent legislation, the concept was phrased somewhat differently. The “privilege” of reasserting a motion to suppress at trial is “sometimes accorded” the defendant “if ‘new facts, new light on the credibility of government witnesses, or other matters appearing at trial * * * cast reasonable doubt on the pretrial ruling.’ ” McRae v. United States, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 80, 84, 420 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1969) quoting from Rouse v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 350, 359 F.2d 1014, 1016 (1966).
In light of the new right of appeal by the prosecution under D.C. Code 1967, § *69123-104 (Supp. IV, 1971),4 it would seem that while in trial reconsideration of suppression motions may still be appropriate in extreme cases, the statutory scheme contemplates greater finality to such pretrial rulings. This court can always review the correctness of a harmful pretrial denial of a motion to suppress, as well as whether new grounds for a second such motion were sufficiently presented during trial to raise the question again. Therefore, mere disagreement with a pretrial ruling on a motion to suppress should not lead a trial judge into concluding that this decision relegates that ruling to tentative or advisory status.

.D.C.Code 1967, § 23-104(a) (2) (Supp. IV, 1971 states:
“A motion for return of seized property or to suppress evidence shall be made before trial unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the grounds for the motion.”

. Superior Court Criminal Rules 12(b) (3), 41(g), 41-1(l).

. D.C.Code 1967, § 23-104(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1971).

. D.C.Code 1967, § 23-105 (Supp. II, 1969) also enlarged the prosecutor’s right of appeal from suppression orders.