Court Opinion

ID: 9680986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:42:03.671832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:31.725662
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s reversal on the unassigned error. However, I respectfully dissent to the overruling of point of error one. As to a “de novo” review of the search warrant affidavit or a “great deference” standard, the majority, at page 8, believes the “great deference” standard should apply since Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), is silent on the issue, but Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), on which Guzman relies, contains language indicating a de novo review is appropriate only in war-rantless searches and the “great deference” standard should continue to apply in the review of search warrants. Guzman allows for a “de novo” review of mixed questions of law and fact in determining probable cause unless the resolution of ultimate facts turns upon an evaluation of credibility and demean- or, Guzman at 89, and specifically overruled DuBose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); State v. Carter, 915 S.W.2d 501 (Tex.Crim.App.1996); and Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), all of which required deference to a trial court’s ruling. Guzman does not mention Johnson v. State, 803 S.W.2d 272, 289 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)3 which contains the following language:
Appellate court review of the sufficiency of an affidavit is not a de novo review. The magistrate’s determination of probable cause should be given great deference by the reviewing court. Gates, supra 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331.4 “[T]he traditional standard for review of an issuing magistrate’s probable cause determination has been that so long as the magistrate had a ‘substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]’ that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more.” Id. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, citing Jones v. *141United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), overruled on other grounds, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). Nonetheless, “courts must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued.” Id. 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2333.
The issue in this case is strictly one of law: did the affidavit supporting the search warrant establish probable cause? On this issue, I do not find there was sufficient evidence, even under the totality of the circumstances test, for the magistrate to determine the credibility of the informant and consequently for the affidavit to establish probable cause. The majority, at page 9, states:
Under the much less rigid standards announced in Gates, and affording the proper deference to the magistrate’s decision to issue the search warrant, we find that the probable cause affidavit in the instant case contained appropriate facts and circumstances which provided the magistrate with a “substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing[.] Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547. The fact that the informant’s “veracity” was not explicitly noted in the affidavit is not fatal to the ultimate determination of probable cause to search appellant’s property. The informant’s “basis of knowledge” was more than sufficient to make up for any “veracity” deficiency.
There is no doubt the informant asserts a “basis of knowledge,” but that basis was not verified by any independent police activity other than a “field test” of the contraband. Significantly, the police affiant does not make any conclusory statements that the confidential informant is credible nor did the police affiant verify, in the affidavit, that the informant resided at the location.
The majority quotes extensively from Gates, 462 U.S. at 213, 103 S.Ct. at 2317 76 L.Ed.2d at 527, and presents their analysis of the Gates holding as if our Court of Criminal Appeals and other courts of appeal had never considered the issue. E.g., Coats v. State, 815 S.W.2d 715, 716-17 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). In Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1988),5 the court stated:
It is to be remembered that adoption of the analysis of Gates does not mean abandoning Aguilar-Spinelli.6 Gates did not dispense with the two requirements used in the Aguilar-Spinelli test. Rather, in Illinois v. Gates, supra, the United Sates Supreme Court criticized the strict application of the two prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli, stating that although the veracity and basis of knowledge of the informant are highly relevant factors:
“These elements are not to be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case. (462 U.S. at 228-29, 103 S.Ct. at 2327).
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“Instead they are better understood as relevant considerations in the totality of circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some indicia of reliability. (462 U.S. at 231-33,103 S.Ct. at 2329).”
See also, Whaley v. State, supra;7 Hennessy v. State, supra.8
In conclusion, Aguilar was not followed in Texas in order to satisfy Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution or Article 18.01, V.AC.C.P.; it was followed because federal law demanded it. Federal law no *142longer demands it. In this area, the laws and constitution of the State of Texas impose no greater restrictive standard, leaving the Texas courts free to follow the lead of the Supreme Court of the United States. There being no binding authority to the contrary, today’s opinion is made to stay in step with the federal constitutional model for probable cause determinations.
The duty of the reviewing court is to look to the totality of the circumstances to determine if there exists a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed at the time of the questioned action. Angula v. State, supra, at 278.9
Later, in Johnson, 803 S.W.2d at 288-89, the court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is to make a practical common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. The affidavit must be more than a “mere conclusory statement that gives the magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause.” The magistrate must be presented with “sufficient information” to allow that individual to determine probable cause; “his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).
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The reliability of the affiant and his sources of information are part of the “totality of the circumstances” that the magistrate should evaluate in making his probable cause determination.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Avilez v. State, 796 S.W.2d 240 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. dism’d) stated:
The informant’s “basis of knowledge” is not contested, but the affidavit is challenged for failure to meet the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test which requires that sufficient facts be shown in the affidavit to establish the informant’s “veracity” or the “reliability” of his report. It is properly pointed out that a later holding in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), adopts a less restrictive “totality of the circumstances” standard but does not overrule the two prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli, and the combined standards of all three U.S. Supreme Court cases are used in Texas:
It is to be remembered that adoption of the analysis of Gates does not mean abandonment of Aguilar-Spinelli. Gates did not dispense with the two requirements used in the Aguilar-Spi-nelli test.
Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848, 109 S.Ct. 127, 102 L.Ed.2d 101.
Id. at 242 (footnote omitted).
In Lowery v. State, 843 S.W.2d 136, 140 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) the court stated:
Although the informant’s veracity and reliability no longer are separate and independent requirements for each case, they are still “highly relevant” considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances review. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. There still must be some indicia of the reliability of the tip. Knight v. State, 814 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet,).
Thus it is clear to me, that even under “the totality of the circumstances” test there must be some indicia of the reliability or veracity of the informant. This can be shown in a variety of ways: unnamed informant had given true and correct information on several past occasions, Elliott v. State, 687 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.Crim.App.1985); where an anonymous tip is relied on for a search and seizure, additional facts are required to establish probable cause under the totality of the circumstances test, Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 416 (Tex.Crim.App.1991)(citing Rojas v. State, 797 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Crim.App.1990)); while information from unnamed informant alone did not establish probable cause, and information from named informant alone might not establish probable cause, the two sources together with appel*143lant’s criminal background combined to produce a substantial basis for probable cause, Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 818, 825 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); a police officer is presumed to be reliable and no special showings are required, Marquez v. State, 725 S.W.2d 217, 233 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); where a named informant is a private citizen whose only contact with the police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act committed by another, the credibility and reliability of the information is inherent, Esco v. State, 668 S.W.2d 358, 360-61 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); an informant’s declarations against the informant’s own penal interest may be used to corroborate the reliability of information in an affidavit, Abercrombie v. State, 528 S.W.2d 578, 583-85 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (op. on reh’g); credibility and reliability of a first time informer established by underlying circumstances of lack of a criminal record, reputation in the neighborhood, and that informer was well thought of by fellow associates, Adair v. State, 482 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). This affidavit contains none of these ways. I would sustain point of error one and remand on that issue also.

. Overruled by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), only to the extent Johnson conflicted with its holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals would not be bound by United States Supreme Court decisions when analyzing and interpreting the search and seizure provision of the Texas Constitution.

.Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

. Overruled by Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), only to the extent Ei-senhauer conflicted with its holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals would not be bound by United States Supreme Court decisions when analyzing and interpreting the search and seizure provision of the Texas Constitution.

. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

. Whaley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 950 (Tex.Crim. App.1985).

. Hennessy v. State, 660 S.W.2d 87 (Tex.Crim. App.1983).

. Angulo v. State, 727 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).