Court Opinion

ID: 9676221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:18:25.872431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:44.660572
License: Public Domain

CRAHAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the disposition of Husband’s cross-appeal but must respectfully dissent *8from the holding that Wife’s claim is not barred by collateral estoppel.
In the dissolution proceeding, Wife testified that Husband struck her, producing the injury to her elbow for which she is now seeking compensation in the instant tort case. Husband denied striking Wife and offered evidence that Wife’s medical records reflected that she is suffering from “tennis elbow,” a chronic condition not caused by external blunt trauma. Neither party requested detailed findings on the issue. The dissolution court entered a written finding that neither party had engaged in marital misconduct.
Although Wife moved for reconsideration of the finding of no marital misconduct citing her testimony that Husband had physically abused her, her motion was denied and Wife did not appeal. Had Wife appealed, she clearly would not have been successful because we would have been required to presume that the trial court found the facts in accordance with the result reached. In re Estate of Froman, 803 S.W.2d 176, 179 (Mo.App.1991). Thus, because evidence on the point was conflicting, we would have been required to presume that the dissolution court found Husband’s testimony more credible and determined that Husband did not strike Wife as she claimed.1
It is absolutely irrelevant that nothing in the case law mandates that Wife proceed to trial on the tort claim before proceeding to trial of the dissolution case. It is difficult to conceive of an area of the law that does require claims to be tried in any particular order. The purpose of the doctrine of collateral estoppel is to ensure that, regardless of the order in which claims are tried, factual determinations made as a result of the first trial may not be relitigated in the second. Bresnahan v. May Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Mo. banc 1987).
In this case, Wife elected to proceed to trial in the dissolution case and did not even file her tort claim until the morning the dissolution case went to trial.2 Trial of the dissolution case resulted in an explicit finding of no marital misconduct by either party and, as explained above, an implicit finding that Husband did not strike Wife as she claimed in the dissolution case and *9asserts in the instant tort case. Factual findings implicit in a judgment are accorded preclusive effect. Dehner v. City of St. Louis, 688 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo.App.1985); Land Clearance for Redevelopment Auth. of the City of St. Louis v. United States Steel, 911 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Mo.App.1995). Accordingly, Wife should not be permitted to relitigate the issue whether Husband struck her. A finding in Wife’s favor on the tort claim would be inconsistent with the prior judgment.
Wife draws our attention to language in S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Mo. banc 1986), in which the Missouri Supreme Court observed that “there are distinct differences between the division of marital property between spouses and awards of damages by a jury.” While this is certainly true, it is essentially irrelevant to the determination of whether Wife’s claim is barred by collateral estoppel. S.A.V. is the Missouri Supreme Court decision abolishing the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Id. Collateral estoppel was not an issue in the case and the court’s observation about the differences between division of property and damages was made in the context of rejecting the husband’s contention that adequate redress for intentional torts was available in a dissolution case. Id. That discussion presupposes, of course, that an intentional tort actually occurred. In the instant case, the dissolution court found that the alleged intentional tort did not occur. The issue is whether that now bars wife from maintaining a cause of action which requires her to prove the opposite.
The fact that there may be different measures of damages available in the first and second actions has never been an impediment to the application of collateral estoppel. In Bresnahan, for example, a factual finding in an unemployment compensation case that an employee had violated her employer’s policy by attempting to remove merchandise from a store without proper documentation or authorization was held to preclude her recovery on her later claim that employer breached her employment contract by terminating her. 726 S.W.2d at 329, 330. The only similarity between the two actions was the issue of whether the employee had improperly attempted to remove the item from the store. The action which resulted in the finding that was given preclusive effect was an administrative proceeding to recover unemployment compensation benefits, not an action for “damages,” which the agency had no power to award in any event. Nevertheless, the factual determination made in the agency proceeding was held to preclude the subsequent action for breach of contract because a common issue, essential to recovery in the second action, had been resolved adversely in the first action. In the instant case, the common issue in Wife’s prior dissolution action and her tort action is whether Husband struck Wife, injuring her elbow. Having suffered an adverse judgment on that claim in the dissolution case, Wife should not now be permitted to relitigate it in a tort case.3
Wife also relies on State ex rel. M.D.K v. Dolan, 968 S.W.2d 740, 747 (Mo.App. *101998). In that case, we held that a judge did not abuse her discretion in severing a tort claim from a dissolution proceeding. Id. We noted, however, a number of potential problems trial judges should consider when faced with claims for marital torts and dissolution, including, inter alia, the potential effect of the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Id. We further pointed out that a number of these concerns could be eliminated if the tort claims were tried first. Id. In this ease, the dissolution case was tried first, resulting in an express finding that no misconduct occurred. Dolan does not resolve the issue of whether collateral estoppel applies.4
Horwitz v. Horwitz, 16 S.W.3d 599, 604 (Mo.App.2000), is more informative. In Horwitz, the husband filed a dissolution proceeding but intentionally delayed serving the action upon the wife. 16 S.W.3d at 601. After the wife learned of the filing, she filed a lawsuit against the husband asserting various intentional tort claims, allegedly arising out of the husband’s conduct during the marriage. Id. The husband then moved to join the two cases and the motion was granted over the wife’s objection. Id. Following a bench trial of the dissolution case, the trial court entered a judgment including detailed findings of fact concerning the couple’s marriage. The husband then moved to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and collateral es-toppel requesting the court to take judicial notice of the findings made in the dissolution proceeding. Id. at 601-02. The trial court sustained the motion, which was reviewed on appeal as summary judgment in view of the trial court’s consideration of matters outside the pleadings. Id. at 603.
On appeal, the wife first complained that the trial court erred in hearing the dissolution case before her tort claims, thereby depriving her of her right to a jury trial. In Horwitz, however, as in the present case, there was no indication in the record that the wife ever sought a ruling from the trial court that the tort claims should be tried first. 16 S.W.3d at 602. The wife was thus deemed precluded from complaining about the sequence of events on appeal. Id. The court further held that collateral estoppel was properly applied to bar the wife’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 603-04. Wife’s contentions concerning dismissal of her other tort claims were deemed abandoned on appeal. Id. at 605.
Although Horwitz may be distinguishable on its facts, it does squarely hold that factual findings made in a dissolution case will be given preclusive effect in a subsequent trial of a tort claim arising out of those facts. If facts necessary to sustain the tort claim have been decided adversely in the trial of the dissolution case, the tort action is barred on the basis of collateral estoppel. Id. at 604.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.5

. If the dissolution court had made a written finding that Husband had struck Wife with sufficient force to cause her injury, its finding of no marital misconduct by either party could not have been sustained on appeal because, as appellate cases have consistently recognized, physical abuse of one’s spouse constitutes marital misconduct. See, e,g., Hogan v. Hogan, 651 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Mo.App. 1983); Dodson v. Dodson, 904 S.W.2d 3, 9 (Mo.App. 1995); Carter v. Carter, 940 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Mo.App. 1997). Therefore, in view of the presumption that the dissolution court found the facts in accordance with the result reached, the trial court’s express finding that neither party engaged in marital misconduct must be deemed an implicit finding that the incident upon which wife predicates her present claim did not occur.

. Although there is authority in other states that condones this piecemeal approach to litigation, there are sound policy reasons to require that claims of intentional torts committed by a spouse during the marriage be joined with the dissolution action or asserted as a compulsory counterclaim. They dearly arise out of the very transactions and occurrences before the dissolution court and failure to resolve such claims prior to or concurrently with the rendition of the dissolution decree prevents the dissolution court from completely winding up all that has occurred by reason of the relationship. It also makes it far more likely that the plaintiff will recover more than one recovery because it is usually impossible to know precisely by what amount a finding of misconduct influenced the division of property. If the claims are required to be asserted in a single proceeding, with the tort claims tried first to a jury upon request of either party, these problems would be eliminated.

. Moreover, as noted by the dissent in Bresna-han, the administrative agency’s factual findings were accorded preclusive effect despite the fact that there was no provision for pre-hearing discovery, the agency was not obliged to follow common law rules of evidence and the Appeals Referee was not required to be a member of the bar. 726 S.W.2d at 332-33. (Blackmar, J., dissenting). Wife's dissolution action afforded her all of these procedural safeguards.

. It should be noted, however, that one of the cases discussed in Dolan was Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), in which the dissolution case was tried first. The dissolution case resulted in a finding that the husband shot his wife, permanently injuring her. Id. at 1370, 1372. The court explicitly took into account the wife's increased living expenses and decreased earning ability. Id. Another judge then dismissed the wife’s tort action on the basis of res judicata. Id. In a consolidated appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution case but remanded for more specific findings to enable the judge in the tort case to avoid a double recovery. Id. at 1373. The tort case was reversed and remanded. The court did, however, hold that collateral estoppel applied to prevent the husband from rélitigating the dissolution court's finding that he intentionally shot his wife. Id. at 1375.

. In her second point, Wife complains that Husband’s motion was procedurally deficient *11under Rule 74.04. The motion was not submitted under Rule 74.04. It was treated as a summary judgment motion by the court upon notice to the parties and with their consent. In any event, Wife suffered no prejudice.