Court Opinion

ID: 9682356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:09:51.441278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:38.866369
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
The majority opinion correctly holds that the Dallas Court of Appeals erred when it held, see Polk v. State, (Tex.App. — Dallas No. 5-82-01214-CR, Unpublished Opinion, January 12, 1984), that the trial judge did *399not err when he entered an affirmative finding in the judgment of conviction that John Allen Polk, appellant, used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense of attempted murder.
There are actually three legal reasons why the trial judge erred, namely: such allegation was not pled in the indictment; the jury, although the trier of fact, was not requested at the guilt stage of the trial to resolve the issue; and the verdict, “We, the jury, find the defendant guilty of the offense of attempted murder as charged in the indictment,” does not amount to an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon had been used or exhibited in the commission of the offense. But, did this Court not hold in Ex parte Thomas, 638 S.W.2d 905 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), that failure to satisfy one of the above requirements will cause a trial judge’s entry in the judgment of conviction, that the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense, etc., to be a null and void act?
Appellant was not given any notice in the charging instrument that in the event he was found guilty of attempted murder by the jury that the trial judge would make a finding in the judgment that he, appellant, used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense of attempted murder. The majority, however, advises us that today it is unnecessary to resolve the issue, whether appellant was entitled to notice that the State would seek a finding in the judgment of conviction, because such issue is not properly before us. In light of the fact that the majority opinion amounts only to an advisory opinion, I must ask: “Why not go ahead and answer the above question?”
But, does the majority opinion implicitly hold that such need not be pled in the charging instrument? See its fn. 4. It is at this point that I must register my dissent to the majority opinion.
It is axiomatic that the right of a defendant “to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof,” as guaranteed by Art. 1, Sec. 10 of the Texas Constitution, serves several important objectives, the most important of which is that it furnishes notice of the exact charge against the accused, and, by implication, what punishment might be assessed should the accused be found guilty, thus permitting preparation of a specific defense or mitigation of punishment.
However, because the use of a deadly weapon was not a necessary element of the offense of attempted murder, it was not necessary for the State to plead that allegation in the charging instrument — as an element of the offense. However, whether a deadly weapon was used in the commission of the offense was a fact issue to be decided by the jury, which was the exclusive trier of the factual issues in this cause. Ex parte Thomas, supra.
Although a finding that a deadly weapon or firearm was used or exhibited by the defendant during the commission of an offense does not enhance the punishment, nevertheless, if the issue is resolved against the defendant, such finding amounts to extending the time when the defendant will become eligible for discretionary parole. His punishment, however, is not changed. Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Tramunti, 377 F.Supp. 6 (U.S.N.Y.1974).
The majority opinion also suggests that “an affirmative finding may be made if the trier of fact responds to a special issue submitted during the punishment stage of trial.” I am unable to agree with this statement. Therefore, I must once again dissent.
If the issue is to be submitted, it should be submitted only at the guilt stage of the trial. The determination by the trier of the facts, whether a deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the commission of the offense by the accused, actually goes to the commission of the offense.
To the result the majority opinion reaches, I concur. To all of the unnecessary obiter dictum that is found in its advisory *400opinion, I must respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.