Court Opinion

ID: 9850310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:55:06.08696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:34.945017
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(concurring in the result):
I join the Court in affirming the order of the trial court which vacated the condition imposed by the pleas of guilty. However, I do not join the Court in its interpretation of the scope of judicial participation in plea bargaining.
Judicial participation in plea bargaining is expressly prohibited by Rule 11(f), Utah R.Crim.P.,1 which reads in pertinent part as follows:
(f) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney, but once a tentative plea agreement has been reached which contemplates entry of a plea in the expectation that other charges will be dropped or dismissed, the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure to him of such tentative agreement and the reasons therefor in advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel whether he will approve the proposed disposition. Thereafter, if the judge decides that final disposition should not be handled in conformity with the plea agreement, he shall so advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw his plea.
(Emphasis added.)
The foregoing statute does not encompass or contemplate a role-change on the part of the judge. On the contrary, the statute precludes the judge from becoming a plea bargainer, a role wholly inconsistent and in conflict with the role exclusively reserved to one who must sit in judgment. This concept of the role the judge must play is further borne out by subsection (e)(6) of Rule 11. That rule provides that if recommendations as to sentence are allowed by the court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
*1308Utah’s Rule 11 is patterned after Rule 11, Fed.R.Crim.P., which has similarly been interpreted as prohibiting judicial participation in plea bargaining. In United States v. Werker;2 the court had this to say about the role of the judge in plea bargaining:
Rule 11 implicitly recognizes that participation in the plea bargaining process depreciates the image of the trial judge that is necessary to public confidence in the impartial and objective administration of criminal justice. As a result of his participation, the judge is no longer a judicial officer or a neutral arbiter. Rather, he becomes or seems to become an advocate for the resolution he has suggested to the defendant.
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... The Rule is based on the sound principle that the interests of justice are best served if the judge remains aloof from all discussions preliminary to the determination of guilt or innocence so that his impartiality and objectivity shall not be open to any question or suspicion when it becomes his duty to impose sentence.3
In State v. Jordan,4 the Arizona Supreme Court observed that under its rule5 the “court shall not participate” in plea negotiations. The court said that the sound reason for the rule was that set forth in Werker: that a judge who participates in plea bargaining is thereby deprived of judicial status and can no longer perform as a neutral arbiter.
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-206 provides that one “convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced in accordance with section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life imprisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with this section, shall determine.”
Predicated upon the rule that prohibits judicial participation in plea bargaining, U.C.A., 1953, § 76-3-207(1) (Supp.1985) mandates that a “sentencing proceeding” follow the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction of a capital felony. That section reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue of sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by a jury upon request of the defendant....
(2) In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant’s character, background, history, mental and physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.
(Emphasis added.)
It does not lie within the prerogative of the court to disregard the mandate of a sentencing hearing. The court is required to consider the evidence to determine whether the penalty to be imposed is that of death or life imprisonment. Furthermore, agreeing to be bound to impose a life sentence in advance of a sentencing hearing constitutes prejudgment of the issue of sentencing. It is an arbitrary and injudicious act which violates the holding in Fur-man v. Georgia6 that the decision to impose the death penalty shall not be left to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries.
In light of the explicit statutory procedures to be followed in capital felony cases, it clearly appears that the defendant led the trial judge into error by engaging him *1309in a unilateral plea bargain arrangement whereby pleas of guilty were exchanged for a promise of life imprisonment. The manifest error rendered the guilty pleas void ab initio and not merely voidable. The court was without power to accept the conditional pleas. The pleas were therefore void and without legal effect. The pleas were not binding, and either party was free to withdraw from them. Consequently, the acceptance of the pleas did not place the defendant in jeopardy within the meaning of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Not having been placed in jeopardy, the defendant may be tried on the charges to which the void pleas were entered. Of course, on remand, defendant has the option of proceeding with a sentencing hearing or standing trial on reinstated pleas of not guilty.
The main opinion boldly asserts, without documentation, that judicial involvement in plea bargaining is widespread in this jurisdiction. I am not so persuaded, particularly because no such instances of judicial impropriety have surfaced in any of the cases previously decided by this Court. However, even assuming that such impropriety is indeed prevalent, I deem it far more appropriate to squarely meet the issue rather than sanction the practice as “harmless error” and simply hope that the evil will go away.

. U.C.A., 1953, § 77-35-11 (1982 ed.).

. 535 F.2d 198 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926, 97 S.Ct. 330, 50 L.Ed.2d 296 (1976).

. Id. at 203.

. 137 Ariz. 504, 508-09, 672 P.2d 169, 173-74 (1983).

. 17 A.R.S. Ariz.R.Crim.P., Rule 17.-4(a).

. 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).