Court Opinion

ID: 9573295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:51:49.265797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:07.346021
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,

concurring:

While I concur with most of the majority opinion, I have a considerable reservation over the unnecessary dictum regarding loss of administrative jurisdiction because of delay in the proceedings. The majority relies solely on Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe., _ W. Va. _, 220 S.E.2d 672 (1975), for the proposition that delay will result in loss of jurisdiction. The statement in Eastern was itself dictum, and suggested that a circuit court could lose jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding on a temporary injunction order if, where constitutional issues are involved, it fails to move with alacrity to hear a motion to dissolve the temporary injunction.
In my concurring opinion in Smoot v. Dingess, _ W. Va. _, 236 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1977), I expressed doubt as to the correctness of other portions of Eastern in regard to the scope of a jurisdictional attack available in contempt proceedings. Despite the suggestion in Eastern, *814my research has not disclosed any case where, in the absence of some specific statute or rule, an appellate court has held that a trial court lost jurisdiction over a case because of its failure to act promptly.
To utilize Eastern, as does the majority, for the further proposition that an administrative agency will lose jurisdiction to hear a proceeding because it does not move with alacrity, is contrary not only to our case law, but to the general thinking in this field. In Kanawha Valley Transportation Co. v. Public Service Commission, _ W.Va. _, 219 S.E.2d 332 (1975), a taxicab company appealed an order revoking its certificate of authority, contending that there had been an unreasonable delay in the administrative proceedings. We stated:
“[T]he mere delay in the disposition or decision of the case does not vitiate the order or judgment. If a decision is unduly delayed, a proceeding in mandamus may be instituted to compel a decision but not how to decide. Village of Bridgeport v. Public Service Commission, 125 W.Va. 342, 24 S.E.2d 285 (1943); Cf., State ex rel. Cackowska v. Knapp, 147 W. Va. 669, 130 S.E.2d 204 (1963).” [219 S.E.2d at 338]
A leading commentator in the field of administrative law summarized the various judicial remedies which are available to counteract administrative delay:
“The first of these is judicial acceleration, which can be achieved by enjoining agency activity that is purposeless, unduly oppressive, or repetitive, by a remand to the agency with directions to proceed with all deliberate speed, or by mandamus requiring the agency to approve party action or show cause why no approval should be forthcoming. A second possibility is judicial preemption of the power to decide the substantive issues. This remedy, since it precludes the agency from making the initial determination pursuant to its statutory mandate, should be employed sparingly, if at all.
“The third means of disposition is judicial termination of agency proceedings.” [Goldman, Ad*815ministrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1423, 1453 (1968)]
With this range of judicial options available, the remedy of termination obviously can only be considered in the most extreme cases. Moreover, the harshness of termination of agency jurisdiction, which vitiates all further inquiry both administrative and judicial, can hardly ever be justified where, as here, the agency is charged with administering statutory and regulatory violations which relate to the health, safety and welfare of employees and the public in general.
While there may be those rare occasions where protracted agency delay causes irreparable harm to the constitutional rights of a party, which would warrant judicial termination of the agency proceeding, this is not such an occasion.