Court Opinion

ID: 9961209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 13:06:47.011016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:27.070646
License: Public Domain

State of New York                                                       OPINION
Court of Appeals                                         This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
                                                           before publication in the New York Reports.

 No. 29
 Ester Lelchook, &c., et al.,
         Appellants,
      v.
 Société Générale de Banque au
 Liban SAL,
         Respondent.

 Michael Radine, for appellants.
 Brian J. Leske, for respondent.

 HALLIGAN, J.:

       The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has certified two

 questions concerning whether an entity inherits the contacts of a predecessor for purposes

 of specific personal jurisdiction. The first question asks, “Under New York law, does an

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entity that acquires all of another entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that

entity, inherit the acquired entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction?”

(67 F4th 69, 71-72 [2d Cir 2023]). The second question asks, “In what circumstances will

the acquiring entity be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York?” (id. at 72).

We answer the first question affirmatively and decline to reach the second as unnecessary.

                                               I.

       Plaintiffs are 21 United States citizens who were harmed, and the estate and family

members of a U.S. citizen who was killed, in rocket attacks perpetrated in 2006 by the

Hizbollah terrorist organization in Israel (id.). Plaintiffs allege that in the years leading up

to the attacks, the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) provided extensive financial services to

Hizbollah, including millions of dollars in wire transfers that LCB facilitated through a

New York-based correspondent bank.

       In separate litigation commenced in 2008, many of the plaintiffs here sued LCB for

its alleged assistance to Hizbollah (see Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F3d 50,

55 [2d Cir 2012]). In response to two certified questions, we held that the pleadings

established the transaction of business in New York with a sufficient “nexus” or

“relationship” to give rise to personal jurisdiction over LCB under our long-arm statute,

CPLR 302 (see Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 NY3d 327 [2012]), and the Second

Circuit subsequently held that exercising jurisdiction over LCB comported with due

process (see Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F3d 161, 165 [2d Cir 2013]).

Years later, the Second Circuit also held that the plaintiffs’ complaint in that case

adequately stated an aiding-and-abetting claim against LCB under the Anti-Terrorism Act

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of 1990 (ATA) (18 USC § 2331 et seq.), as amended in 2016 by the Justice Against

Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) (18 USC § 2333 [d] [2]) (see Kaplan v Lebanese

Canadian Bank, SAL, 999 F3d 842, 847-848, 864 [2d Cir 2021]).

       While the above litigation was ongoing, the United States Department of Treasury

in February 2011 designated LCB a “primary money laundering concern” based on this

conduct (67 F4th at 72). In June 2011, LCB and respondent Société Générale de Banque

au Liban SAL (SGBL), a private company incorporated in Lebanon with headquarters in

Beirut, executed a purchase agreement that, according to plaintiffs, expressly provided that,

in exchange for a $580 million payment to LCB, “the Seller [LCB] shall transfer, convey,

and assign . . . to the Purchaser [SGBL], and the Purchaser shall receive and assume from

the Seller, all of the Seller’s Assets and Liabilities” (id.).

       In 2019, plaintiffs brought similar claims against SGBL, as LCB’s successor, in the

Eastern District of New York for damages stemming from the 2006 attacks (see id. at 74).

Plaintiffs alleged that SGBL inherited LCB’s jurisdictional status and is subject to personal

jurisdiction in New York because it “assumed and bears successor liability for LCB’s

liability to the plaintiffs” by virtue of the June 2011 deal between LCB and SGBL, and that

although LCB continues to exist at least for the purpose of defending litigation, it is

insolvent (id. at 72, 74). SGBL contended that under New York law, a theory of successor

jurisdiction may not be invoked to permit imputation of LCB’s jurisdictional contacts to

SGBL (see 2021 WL 4931845, *2 [ED NY 2021]).

       The federal district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over

SGBL (id. at *2-3). The court explained that it read several Appellate Division and federal

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decisions to allow imputation of jurisdictional status only in the event of a merger, not an

acquisition of all assets and liabilities (id. at *2).

       On appeal, the Second Circuit determined that New York courts have not addressed

whether successor jurisdiction lies when “a successor acquires all of a predecessor’s assets

and liabilities, but does not do so through either a statutory merger or a transaction that

meets established standards for a de facto merger” (67 F4th at 81). The circuit court

accordingly certified the two questions noted above, and reserved consideration of whether

exercising personal jurisdiction over SGBL under a successor jurisdiction theory would

comport with constitutional due process. This Court accepted the certified questions (39

NY3d 1146 [2023]).

                                                II.

       We begin with the first question: whether under New York law, an entity may inherit

another entity’s specific personal jurisdiction status when it acquires all of that entity’s

liabilities and assets, but does not merge with the entity.

       New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302, sets forth the acts of a non-domiciliary

that may give rise to specific personal jurisdiction. 1 As the Second Circuit noted in its

certification decision, it previously held that LCB is subject to specific personal jurisdiction

in New York under CPLR 302 for claims “materially identical” to those raised here (67

1
 Specific personal jurisdiction “permits a court to exercise jurisdiction only where the suit
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state” (Aybar v Aybar, 37
NY3d 274, 288-289 [2021], citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Superior Ct. of California,
San Francisco County, 582 US 255, 262 [2017]).
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F4th, at 74; see also Licci, 732 F3d at 168-174), and so we proceed on the assumption that

the predecessor entity here, LCB, is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New York.

       SGBL argues that plaintiffs must establish that SGBL independently had contacts

sufficient to satisfy CPLR 302, wholly apart from LCB’s contacts with New York. That

would be so if plaintiffs sought to exercise personal jurisdiction based on SGBL’s own

conduct, but plaintiffs’ theory of successor jurisdiction relies instead on the imputation of

a predecessor entity’s contacts. If we credit that theory, LCB’s jurisdictional contacts

would become SGBL’s jurisdictional contacts for purposes of the long-arm statute, and

requiring a showing that SGBL itself had sufficient contacts would render this proposition

irrelevant. For this reason, courts that have accepted successor jurisdiction have taken the

view that only the contacts of the predecessor, not the successor, must satisfy the long-arm

statute (see State ex rel. Stein v E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 382 NC 549, 556-558,

879 SE2d 537, 543-544 [2022]; Jeffrey v Rapid Am. Corp., 448 Mich 178, 195-197, 205-

206, 529 NW2d 644, 653-654, 657-658 [1995]; Williams v Bowman Livestock Equip. Co.,

927 F2d 1128, 1131-1132 [10th Cir 1991]; City of Richmond, Va. v Madison Mgmt. Grp.,

Inc., 918 F2d 438, 454-455 [4th Cir 1990]; Simmers v Am. Cyanamid Corp., 394 Pa Super

464, 488-489, 576 A2d 376, 389 [1990], appeal denied 527 Pa 649 [1991], cert denied 502

US 813 [1991]).

                                                III.

       That brings us to the question of whether the jurisdictional status of a predecessor

entity may be imputed to a successor who acquires all assets and liabilities. CPLR 302

does not resolve the question, contrary to what SGBL contends. SGBL argues that CPLR

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302 expressly provides that an agent’s acts may give rise to personal jurisdiction, and that

successor jurisdiction is available only where the successor and predecessor are “one and

the same” because they are alter egos, or via a merger or corporate reorganization.

Applying the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, SGBL contends that

CPLR 302 precludes successor jurisdiction in all other circumstances.           We are not

persuaded. However helpful canons of statutory construction might generally be, the text

of the long-arm statute cannot bear the weight SGBL places on it. Nor has SGBL shown

that the legislature even contemplated theories of successor jurisdiction, let alone meant to

preclude it in a sale of all assets and liabilities.

       Turning to precedent, this Court has not decided when, if ever, a successor

corporation may inherit a predecessor’s jurisdictional status (cf. Andrew Greenberg, Inc. v

Sir-Tech Software, Inc., 4 NY3d 185, 191 [2005] [successor’s own alleged contacts

satisfied CPLR 302]). The Appellate Divisions have addressed successor jurisdiction only

sparingly (see Gronich & Co., Inc. v Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 180 AD3d 541, 542 [1st Dept

2020] [determining without explanation that a merger imputes successor jurisdiction, but

“merely acquir(ing) the assets of the predecessor company” does not], citing U.S. Bank

N.A. v Bank of Am. N.A., 916 F3d 143, 156-158 [2d Cir 2019]; Semenetz v Sherling &

Walden, Inc., 21 AD3d 1138, 1140-1141 [3d Dept 2005] [broadly stating that “in certain

circumstances a successor corporation may inherit its predecessor’s jurisdictional status,”

but finding no such jurisdiction on “the facts of the subject case” (internal quotation marks

omitted)]; BRG Corp. v Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 163 AD3d 1495, 1496 [4th Dept 2018]

[confirming issue of successor jurisdiction is “novel and unsettled”]; Applied Hydro–

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Pneumatics v Bauer Mfg., 68 AD2d 42, 46 [1979] [holding that successor corporation’s

nunc pro tunc ratification and adoption of its predecessor’s acts in New York yields

personal jurisdiction over the successor without discussing imputation]). 2

       This Court, however, has considered the separate but related question of successor

liability on several occasions. Although liability and jurisdiction are distinct legal concepts

(see Kreutter v McFadden Oil Corp., 71 NY2d 460, 470 [1988]), the principles animating

one may inform the other. We have identified four exceptions to the general rule that a

purchaser of assets is not liable for the seller’s torts: when “(1) [a corporation] expressly

or impliedly assumed the predecessor’s tort liability, (2) there was a consolidation or

merger of seller and purchaser, (3) the purchasing corporation was a mere continuation of

the selling corporation, or (4) the transaction is entered into fraudulently to escape such

obligations” (Schumacher v Richards Shear Co., 59 NY2d 239, 245 [1983], citing Hartford

2
  The federal district court decisions addressing successor jurisdiction under New York law
do not resolve the question. Some involve theories not presented here (see Abbacor, Inc.
v Miller, 2001 WL 1006051, *4 [SD NY 2001] [“alter ego” theory]; Societe Generale v
Florida Health Sciences Ctr., 2003 WL 22852656, *4 [SD NY 2003] [de facto merger and
“mere continuation” theory]). Schenin v Micro Copper Corporation suggests in a cursory
fashion that an acquisition of all assets does not confer successor jurisdiction, but cites no
supporting New York precedent on this point (272 F Supp 523, 526 [SD NY 1967]). U.S.
Bank opined in dicta that under New York law, a merger, but not an acquisition of assets,
would confer successor jurisdiction, but that case did not address the express assumption
of all liabilities (see 916 F3d at 155-159; 67 F4th at 81-82). Bartlett v Societe Generale de
Banque Au Liban SAL presented a question of successor jurisdiction “nearly identical” to
that before us here, and although that court rejected successor jurisdiction, it did so
primarily in reliance on U.S. Bank and without clearly deciding whether assumption of
liabilities may confer jurisdiction (see 2020 WL 7089448, *16-17 [ED NY 2020]; 67 F4th
at 81-82).
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Acc. & Indem. Co. v Canron, 43 NY2d 823, 825 [1977]; see also Semenetz v Sherling &

Walden, Inc., 7 NY3d 194, 196-198 [2006]).

       We have not extensively probed the rationale for these four exceptions. The earliest

cases, Hartford and Schumacher, recite them with minimal analysis (see Hartford, 43

NY2d at 825; Schumacher, 59 NY2d at 245).              In Grant-Howard Assoc. v General

Housewares Corp. (63 NY2d 291 [1984]), we explained that successor liability is

motivated in part by principles of product liability, and as such is intended to ensure that a

“responsible source” (the manufacturer) is available to compensate an injured party and

can in turn “transfer the costs to the general public as a component of the selling price” (id.

at 296). We described the second and third exceptions (merger and “mere continuation”)

as “based on the concept that a successor that effectively takes over a company in its

entirety should carry the predecessor’s liabilities as a concomitant to the benefits it derives

from the good will purchased” (id. at 296). But because the question in Grant-Howard

was whether the successor had to indemnify the predecessor despite assuming no

contractual liability for the specific harm alleged, these policy considerations were

ultimately not dispositive (id.). Finally, although we noted that a sale of assets “may allow

an injured plaintiff to proceed against a successor corporation” (id. at 297), we did so

without explanation.

       In Semenetz v Sherling & Walden, Inc. (7 NY3d 194 [2006]), we rejected the

“product line” exception to successor liability adopted by several other jurisdictions, where

a successor acquires most of a manufacturing business’s assets and continues to produce

its line of products, but does not assume broad liabilities (see id. at 197-199). We

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considered three rationales for the proposed exception: the purported destruction of the

plaintiff’s remedies against the original manufacturer caused by the successor’s acquisition

of the business, which we concluded simply restated the problem; the successor’s ability

to spread the risk of injury, which we determined improperly assumed that the successor

manufacturer in fact had capacity to spread (and absorb) the risk of injuries; and the fairness

of imposing liability where the successor benefits from the predecessor’s goodwill by

continuing to operate the business, which we found ignored that the sale price already

incorporated goodwill (see id. at 199-200). We further noted that the proposed exception

could substantially harm small businesses, explained why it would improperly shift

responsibility away from the entity that created the risk to one that only remotely benefited

and could not have eliminated the risk, and noted that most courts had likewise declined to

adopt the exception (see id. at 200-201).

       These considerations are helpful touchstones in considering successor jurisdiction.

Relevant factors include the impact of our rule on parties to a potential acquisition, whether

imputing jurisdiction fairly reflects the reasonable assumptions and expectations of the

parties to such transactions, whether doing so induces responsible parties to internalize

responsibility for risks they create, and the impact of imputing jurisdiction on those injured

by a predecessor’s acts (see Grant-Howard, 63 NY2d at 296-297; Semenetz, 7 NY3d at

200-201; see also Kreutter, 71 NY2d at 471-472 [declining to adopt fiduciary shield limit

on personal jurisdiction where unnecessary as a matter of fairness and public policy]).

       Those factors tip in favor of allowing successor jurisdiction where a successor

purchases all assets and liabilities. An express assumption of all assets and liabilities is not

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akin to the limited acquisition in Semenetz, which involved only the purchase and

continuation of a product line.       Sophisticated corporate entities such as SGBL will

undoubtedly engage in robust due diligence before agreeing to acquire all assets and

liabilities of another entity. In doing so, they should understand where jurisdiction over

such liabilities may lie and the potential cost if ultimately found liable, and will presumably

negotiate a purchase price that is discounted by that prospect (see E.I. du Pont de Nemours

& Co., 382 NC at 559-561, 879 SE2d at 545-546, quoting Simmers, 576 A2d at 390).

       Indeed, the history of this case indicates that SGBL, as the successor, would have

been on notice when it made this acquisition of LCB’s potential exposure in New York in

connection with the terrorist attacks. Based on its support for Hizbollah, LCB had been

designated as a primary money laundering concern by the U.S. Department of Treasury

before SGBL agreed to assume LCB’s liabilities. The Licci litigation, which involves

allegations nearly identical to those in this case, was commenced against LCB in 2008,

well before SGBL acquired LCB’s assets and liabilities in 2011 (see Lelchook, 67 F4th at

73). And although the exact parameters of successor jurisdiction under New York law may

not have been settled in 2011, “[t]he great weight” of authority at the time permitted

imputation whenever the forum state’s law would hold the successor liable (see City of

Richmond, 918 F2d at 454 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Simmers, 394 Pa

Super at 480, 576 A2d at 385; see also 2 Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 7.03 [4] [d] [2022]

[“The basic test seems to gear the (personal) jurisdiction question to whether, as a

substantive matter, the successor corporation may be liable for the obligations of the

predecessor . . . . If it is liable for the predecessor’s obligations . . . , it will be subject to

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personal jurisdiction in a suit to enforce the obligation if the predecessor would have been

subject to such jurisdiction”]). Under these circumstances, SGBL should reasonably have

anticipated being subject to jurisdiction over LCB’s liabilities in New York.

       A contrary rule would give rise to unfortunate incentives. Allowing a successor to

acquire all assets and liabilities, but escape jurisdiction in a forum where its predecessor

would have been answerable for those liabilities, would allow those assets to be shielded

from direct claims for those liabilities in that forum. As the Second Circuit put it, a

predecessor could “decouple . . . its assets from its enforceable liabilities, for value” (see

67 F4th at 87). Injured parties would be left to directly sue the successor in a forum that

may well be less favorable, with respect to both the likely outcome and available

mechanisms to enforce a judgment. As a consequence, the value of plaintiffs’ claims

would likely be reduced, perhaps by a significant amount, leaving the injured parties to

absorb those costs themselves. That, in turn, would compromise the objective of having a

“responsible source” available to absorb the risk of liability and compensate injured parties

(see Grant-Howard, 63 NY2d at 296; Semenetz, 7 NY3d at 200).

       Additionally, while a predecessor’s assets should be available to satisfy a judgment

against it prior to a sale of all assets and liabilities, that may no longer be true afterwards,

depending on the terms of the deal. That risk appears to be borne out here: although

plaintiffs allege that LCB had substantial assets in 2010, LCB stated in 2017 that it was

“defunct, insolvent, and unable to pay any judgment rendered against it” (LCB’s Brief in

Opposition to Certiorari in Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, 2017 WL 712025, at *4 [U.S.,

filed Feb. 17, 2017]). SGBL’s response to this concern—that plaintiffs can sue SGBL or

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pursue its assets in other jurisdictions—encourages “catch me if you can” gamesmanship,

to the detriment of New York plaintiffs.

       We see no good reason to require plaintiffs to take an indirect and uncertain path to

recompense where a predecessor entity allegedly caused harm, subjecting it to jurisdiction

in New York, and then agreed to an acquisition of all of its assets and liabilities by a

successor, who in turn reaps the benefits of the predecessor’s business in New York while

evading jurisdiction here. Thus, we clarify that where an entity acquires all of another

entity’s liabilities and assets, but does not merge with that entity, it inherits the acquired

entity’s status for purposes of specific personal jurisdiction. 3

       Accordingly, the first certified question should be answered in the affirmative and

the second question not answered as unnecessary.

3
  Our conclusion that jurisdictional contacts may be imputed here accords with nearly all
decisions of other state appellate courts and federal circuit courts that have considered the
issue of successor jurisdiction (see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 382 NC at 560-564,
879 SE2d at 545-548; Jeffrey, 448 Mich at 206, 529 NW2d at 658; Simmers, 394 Pa Super
at 489-490, 576 A2d at 389-390; City of Richmond, 918 F2d at 454-455; Williams, 927 F2d
at 1132; Perry Drug Stores v CSK Auto Corp., 93 Fed Appx 677, 681 [6th Cir 2003];
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. v Superior Ct., 157 Cal App 4th 1101, 1120, 69 Cal Rptr 3d 202,
218 [2007]; see also Anotek LLC v Venture Exchange, 2021 WL 2577604, *2 [Del Sup Ct
2021] [“Court must deny (successor’s) Motion to Dismiss (for lack of personal jurisdiction)
if the Amended Complaint contains well-pleaded factual allegations as to any of these
(four) bases of successor liability”]). The few cases reaching a contrary holding offer no
persuasive counterpoints (see e.g. Johnston v Pneumo Corp., 652 F Supp 1402, 1406 [SD
Miss 1987]; Sullivan v Fellows Testagar & Co., 518 So 2d 1111, 1113 [La Ct App 1987]).
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Following certification of questions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and acceptance of the questions by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of this
Court's Rules of Practice, and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and
consideration of the briefs and record submitted, first certified question answered in the
affirmative and second certified question not answered as unnecessary. Opinion by Judge
Halligan. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman
concur.

Decided April 18, 2024

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