Court Opinion

ID: 9634503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:15:10.544283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:04.082582
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
I, too, remain convinced that the Bureau of Correction is not subject to municipal zoning ordinances and regulations. City of Pittsburgh v. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 187, 360 A.2d 607, 614 (1976) [Eagen, J. (now Chief Justice), dissenting, joined by Jones, C. J. and Nix, J.]. Additionally, I disagree with the majority’s holding that because of the *46availability of an exclusive statutory remedy, here section 7 of the Act March 81, 1927, P.L. 98, No. 69, 53 P.S. § 25057 (1957), the Bureau’s constitutional defenses to the City’s suit in equity were not properly within the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction. In my view, the rule requiring the pursuit of exclusive statutory remedies is proper only when applied to a plaintiff who has selected the wrong forum in which to raise a challenge to a zoning ordinance. In such a case it is appropriate to put plaintiff out of court and compel him to pursue the statutory remedy, because, at least at that stage, plaintiff is in exclusive control of the lawsuit. In fact, the case cited by the majority as direct authority for its holding, Pittsburgh Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Clairton, 390 Pa. 1, 9-10, 133 A.2d 542 (1957), applied the rule to exactly that procedural posture. But see Honey Brook Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968). In the instant case, the Bureau had no control over the choice of forums. It was hailed into the court of equity by the City to defend itself against the claim for injunctive relief. The effect of the majority’s present application of the rule requiring pursuit of statutory remedies prevents defendants from asserting all available defenses in an equitable proceeding. I do not think the rule was intended to have such an effect, nor do I consider such a result to be proper.
I dissent.