Court Opinion

ID: 9952045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 16:15:15.323756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:44:44.827324
License: Public Domain

J-S09039-23

                                   2024 PA Super 51

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  EMIRE SALEM ROSENDARY                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 207 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 13, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000932-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.:                            FILED March 19, 2024

       Emire Salem Rosendary (“Rosendary”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered following his jury convictions for one count each of robbery,

aggravated assault, terroristic threats, possessing an instrument of crime, and

reckless endangerment.1 After careful review, we affirm.

       Because of the posture of this case, we need not detail the underlying

facts of the crime. We briefly note, on March 19, 2020, Rosendary entered

the vehicle of his victim, lay in wait for him for nearly two hours, robbed him

at gunpoint, and then physically assaulted him.         See Trial Court Opinion,

5/11/22, at 3-6. At the time of the March 2020 robbery, Rosendary had been

on parole for less than six months from a prior robbery conviction. See id. at

3. Rosendary was on electronic monitoring (“EM”) and was wearing a GPS

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 2702(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 907(b), and 2705.
J-S09039-23

ankle monitor (“GPS”) when he committed the March 2020 robbery. After his

apprehension and prior to trial, Rosendary filed a motion to suppress.

Following an evidentiary hearing, the suppression court denied the motion,

and made the following findings of fact:

     1.    [Rosendary] was on parole and under the supervision of
           Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole Agent Beth Ann
           Servidio [(“Agent Servidio”)] beginning in October of 2019
           and continuing through March of 2020.

     2.    At the time of his initial release, [Rosendary] was placed on
           a GPS . . . for 45 days as a special condition of his parole.

     3.    The [first GPS] was removed in mid-December 2019.

     4.    In . . . January of 2020, [Rosendary was] charged with new
           crimes . . . .

     5.    The imposition of new criminal charges while on supervision
           is a serious noncompliance with parole conditions which
           requires a serious sanction such as monitoring by [GPS].

     6.    [Because] of the new charges, [Rosendary] was placed on
           [GPS] for a second time[.]

     7.    [] Parole Agent Servidio reviewed the [GPS] Special
           Condition contract (GPS Contract) with [Rosendary], and he
           signed the [GPS] contract that same day.

     8.    By signing the GPS Contract, [Rosendary] acknowledged in
           writing that he understood he was required to wear the GPS
           . . . 24 hours a day and was not permitted to remove or
           otherwise tamper with [it].

     9.    [Rosendary] was required to be in his approved residence
           from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. daily.

     10.   At the evidentiary hearing . . . [Rosendary] acknowledged
           reviewing and signing the GPS Contract.

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       11.    [Rosendary] also testified at the hearing that he knew he
              would be required to wear the GPS . . . 24 hours a day.

       12.    As part of her duties in supervising [Rosendary] while on
              [GPS] and pursuant to department policy, Agent Servidio
              was required to review [Rosendary’s] GPS movements at
              least once a week.

       13.    On or about March 23, 2020, Detective Patrick Ginkel
              [(“Detective Ginkel”)] of the Erie Police Department
              contacted Agent Servidio and asked if she was supervising
              [Rosendary] and if he was on [GPS].

       14.    Detective Ginkel informed Agent Servidio that [Rosendary]
              was a suspect in an armed robbery.

       15.    Agent Servidio asked Detective Ginkel where and when the
              alleged crime had occurred.

       16.    Agent Servidio reviewed [Rosendary’s] GPS information for
              that date and time.

       17.    Agent Servidio turned over screen[]shots of [Rosendary’s]
              GPS movements to Detective Ginkel.

       18.    Detective Ginkel did not have a warrant for [Rosendary’s]
              GPS information.

Suppression Court Order, 10/1/21, at 1-3 (unnumbered) (citations to the

record omitted).

       A jury convicted Rosendary of the above-cited offenses. The trial court

sentenced Rosendary to an aggregate term of twenty and one-half to fifty-

two years in prison. Rosendary filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial

court denied. The instant, timely appeal followed.2

____________________________________________

2 Rosendary and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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      Rosendary raises a single issue on appeal:

      Whether the [suppression] court err[ed] in failing to suppress the
      evidence which was illegally obtained when the police utilized
      [Rosendary’s] state parole agent as a ‘22
      stalking horse’ in order to circumvent the requirement of a search
      warrant?

Rosendary’s Brief at 3 (capitalization regularized).

      Rosendary challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the GPS

location data from his EM.     See Rosendary’s Brief at 12-18.      The issue of

whether police are required to obtain a warrant prior to obtaining GPS location

data from a parole agent is a matter of first impression.          We begin by

recognizing that our standard of review over the denial of a motion to

suppress:

      is limited to determining whether the findings of fact are
      supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are in error. In making this determination, this
      Court may only consider the evidence of the Commonwealth’s
      witnesses, and so much of the witnesses for the defendant, as
      fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, which remains
      uncontradicted. If the evidence supports the findings of the trial
      court, we are bound by such findings and may reverse only if the
      legal conclusions drawn therefrom are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Gindraw, 297 A.3d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation

omitted, bracket removed). Further, our review is limited to the suppression

hearing record. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1085 (Pa. 2013). “With respect to

a suppression court's factual findings, it is the sole province of the suppression

court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the suppression court
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judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence presented.”

Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 499 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   Lastly, when a defendant

files a suppression motion, he has “the preliminary burden of establishing

standing and a legitimate expectation of privacy.”        Commonwealth v.

Burton, 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc).

     Both the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.        The Fourth

Amendment provides:

     [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
     papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
     shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
     probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
     describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
     be seized.

U.S. Const. Amend. IV.

     Similarly, the Pennsylvania constitution provides:

     [t]he people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
     possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no
     warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall
     issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without
     probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by
     the affiant.

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Pa. Const. Art. I, § 8.3

       With respect to the rights of parolees, this Court has explained:

       [t]he aim of probation and parole is to rehabilitate and reintegrate
       a lawbreaker into society as a law-abiding citizen. The institution
       of probation and parole assumes a probationer or parolee is more
       likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. Consequently,
       probationers and parolees have limited Fourth Amendment
       rights because of a diminished expectation of privacy.

Commonwealth v. Parker, 152 A.3d 309, 316 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

omitted, emphasis added); see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843,

852 (2006) (parolees have a “severely diminished expectation [] of privacy”).

Moreover, law enforcement “has an ‘overwhelming interest’ in supervising

parolees because parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal

offenses.” Id. at 853 (citation omitted); see also Parker, 152 A.3d at 316.

Nevertheless, while probationers and parolees have “a more narrowly

protected privacy interest than that afforded a free individual . . . the

government’s interest in enforcing the terms of parole and probation cannot

____________________________________________

3 In the argument section of his brief, Rosendary does not set forth a separate

analysis of whether the Pennsylvania constitution provided him with greater
protection than the federal constitution. See Rosendary’s Brief at 12-18. To
assert a claim that Article I § 8 provides greater protection than its federal
counterpart, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991), directed a party must brief and
analyze at least the four factors set forth in that decision. Since Rosendary
did not undertake this separate analysis in his brief, we consider his claim
solely under the Fourth Amendment and its relevant case law.
                                      -6-
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entirely displace a parolee’s protected privacy rights.” Commonwealth v.

Arter, 151 A.3d 149, 167 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

       The Pennsylvania Supreme Court summarized state parole agents’

authority and duties with respect to parolees as follows:

       state parole agents’ authority and duties with respect to parolees
       are prescribed by two sections of the Prisons and Parole Code.
       Section 6152 [(repealed)4] declares agents to be peace officers
       and provides them with police power to arrest without warrant any
       parolee under supervision for violating parole conditions. See 61
       Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6152 [(repealed)].       Section 6153 [(repealed)]
       deems parole agents to be in a “supervisory relationship with their
       offenders,” aimed at assisting parolees in rehabilitation and
       reassimilation and protecting the public.         Id. § 6153(a)
       [(repealed)]. This section further outlines the procedures and
       requirements for agents to search the person and property of
       offenders . . . and provides that such searches must comport with
       the protections of the United States and Pennsylvania
       Constitutions. . . . . Another provision prevents the exclusion of
       evidence from parole or criminal proceedings based solely on a
       violation of the statute.

Commonwealth v. Mathis, 173 A.3d 699, 701–02 (Pa. 2017) (footnote and

some statutory citations omitted; footnote added).

       Rosendary argues the trial court erred in denying his suppression

motion. Specifically, he argues he “maintained a legitimate expectation of

privacy in the record of his physical movements.” Rosendary’s Brief at 10.

He further avers Agent Servidio became a “stalking horse” for the police by

____________________________________________

4 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6152 and 6153, in effect at the time of the March 2020
robbery, were repealed and replaced by 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6181 and 6182. The
former and current statutes are materially identical as applied to this case.
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acting at their behest and searching his GPS movements. See id. at 10-11.

Rosendary concludes the police violated his rights under the United States and

Pennsylvania Constitutions by not obtaining a search warrant. See id. at 11.

Rosendary relies on the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in United

States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) and Carpenter v. U.S., 585 U.S. 296

(2018). See Rosendary’s Brief at 12. Rosendary claims he had a “legitimate

expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements.” See id. at

13. He maintains “the tracking of an individual’s physical movements provides

an intimate window into a person’s life revealing not only particular

movements but through those movements, familiar, political, professional,

religious, and sexual associations.” Id.

       The suppression court noted Rosendary agreed to GPS monitoring after

he violated his parole by incurring new criminal charges. See Suppression

Court Order, 10/1/21, at 2 (unnumbered); N.T., 9/30/21, at 8-9; EM – Special

Conditions Contract, 2/5/20, at 1 (unnumbered). The court found Rosendary,

“testified . . . under oath that he was aware that his travels outside the home

would be monitored by parole.”            Suppression Court Order, 10/1/21, at 4

(unnumbered).5       The suppression court thus determined Rosendary had a

____________________________________________

5 While acknowledging parolees had a “reduced” expectation of privacy, the

suppression court nonetheless concluded as a threshold matter that
Rosendary had a “reasonable” expectation of privacy in his EM data and
analyzed his Fourth Amendment claims under that standard. Suppression
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
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“reduced” expectation of privacy. Id. at 3 (unnumbered). It further held once

Agent Servidio was “on notice” Rosendary was being investigated for a crime

it was “reasonable for her to believe [Rosendary] was . . . in violation of his

parole.”   Id. at 4.     The court concluded it was also “reasonable for Agent

Servidio to provide the GPS tracking data to [Detective Ginkel].” Id.

       The record supports the suppression court’s ruling.         Agent Servidio

placed Rosendary on GPS monitoring, not at the behest of the police, but as

an alternative to incarceration favorable to Rosendary even after he was

charged with committing new crimes, which constituted a “high-level [parole]

violation(s)”. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 8. The record shows Rosendary signed a

contract stating he was required to “wear the GPS Device 24 hours a day for

the duration of GPS Monitoring.” EM ─ Special Conditions Contract, 2/5/20,

at 1 (unnumbered).6 Further, at the suppression hearing, Rosendary agreed

____________________________________________

Court Order, 10/1/21, at 3 (unnumbered). This Court does not agree, and,
thus, our reasoning differs from that of the trial court. However, we may
affirm on different grounds than those enunciated by the trial court. See
Commonwealth v. Lehman, 275 A.3d 513, 520 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(stating it is well-settled where the result is correct, we may affirm a lower
court’s decision on any ground whether relied upon by that court);
Commonwealth v. Elliott, 249 A.3d 1190, 1193 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 2021), (“It
is well-settled that this Court may affirm the decision of the [trial] [c]ourt if it
is correct on any basis”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

6 We note the signed agreement provided a process by which Rosendary could

file a written complaint if he believed the GPS monitoring was “inappropriate.”
EM ─ Special Conditions Contract, 2/5/20, at 1 (unnumbered). There is
nothing of record to indicate Rosendary ever did so.
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this was his second time on GPS monitoring, less than six months after

release. He admitted he signed the contract, and Agent Servidio explained

everything to him. See N.T., 9/30/21, at 29. Thus, Rosendary understood

the purpose of the GPS monitoring was to keep track of what he was doing in

the community and to prevent him from committing further crimes. See id.

at 9. Rosendary acknowledged he was required to wear the GPS twenty-four

hours a day and would “get in trouble” if he removed the device. Id. at 30.

He understood the device was “basically a tracker[.]”         Id.   Rosendary

consented to the tracking of his movements, did not complain the conditions

were inappropriate, and he did not have an expectation of privacy in the

monitoring data. As the suppression court found, regulations required Agent

Servidio to monitor Rosendary’s whereabouts twenty-four hours a day, seven

days a week, and review Rosendary’s GPS tracking points at a minimum of

once per week.       See N.T., 9/30/21, at 6-7.    Agent Servidio stated when

Detective Ginkel informed her Rosendary was a suspect7 in armed robbery, a

second and potentially serious parole violation, she questioned Detective

Ginkel about when the robbery occurred, then went into the system and

____________________________________________

7 While Agent Servidio did not testify as to why Rosendary was a suspect, her

testimony makes clear Detective Ginkel was not engaged in a fishing
expedition but was already in possession of information which pointed to
Rosendary as the perpetrator and Detective Ginkel sought only data to
confirm Rosendary’s presence at the scene of the robbery or exculpate
him.

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looked up Rosendary’s location on that day. See id. at 13. Agent Servidio

then told Detective Ginkel “what I was seeing on the screen during that time

frame”8 and complied with his request for “screenshots” for that specific time

period. Id. at 14 (emphasis added). Agent Servidio stated it was the parole

unit’s/office’s policy “to cooperate with law enforcement agencies whenever

trying to identify, apprehend, or detain offenders who are suspected of or

involved in criminal activity.” Id. at 13.

       Here, Agent Servidio had a legitimate reason to search Rosendary’s GPS

location data for that date and time and provide that limited information to

police to use, confirm or rebut Rosendary’s presence at the scene of the

robbery. Any intrusion the disclosure of Rosendary’s location at the time of

the crime caused was narrow and focused.           Further, the data had limited

____________________________________________

8 Rosendary takes issue with Agent Servidio’s testimony that she volunteered

the information to Detective Ginkel. See Rosendary’s Brief at 15-17. The
record reveals although Detective Ginkel was present at the suppression
hearing, neither party called him as a witness. See N.T., 9/30/23, at 25-26.
In his brief, Rosendary relies on Joint Exhibit B, which consists of an extract
of page 25 of a 126-page Erie Police Department Field Case “Supplemental
Report.” The portion is not signed nor sworn. See Supplemental Report,
3/26/20 at 25. Of pertinence, Detective Ginkel, who is listed as the “reporting
officer” states “I requested Agent Servidio examine [Rosendary’s] electronic
monitoring records . . . Agent Servidio supplied me with screen shot images
on [sic Rosendary’s] location[.]” Id. The suppression court chose to credit
the sworn testimony of Agent Servidio over the out-of-court unsworn extract
of a report from Detective Ginkel. See Suppression Court Opinion, 10/1/21,
at 5 (unnumbered). We have no basis to disturb this credibility finding. See
Heidelberg, 267 A.3d at 499.

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privacy implications: it simply showed Rosendary’s travels on public streets

and revealed nothing about his activities. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/22,

at 3-4.

       On similar facts, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected

the argument Rosendary advances concerning a parolee’s right of privacy in

GPS data. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 119 N.E.3d 669 (Mass. 2019),9

Johnson violated probation and asked to be placed on an ankle monitor in lieu

of incarceration. See id. at 674-75. Following the expiration of his probation,

the police arrested Johnson at the scene of a break-in. See id. at 675, 681.

The police suspected Johnson had been involved in a series of break-ins while

on probation. They contacted the probation department and asked them to

review Johnson’s historical GPS data at the dates and times of the robberies.

See id. Probation services later shared, without a warrant, GPS data location

showing Johnson had been at the scene of the break-ins.           See id.   In

upholding the denial of suppression, the Johnson Court held the police and

probation services had statutory duty as a matter of Massachusetts law to

share information, and Johnson had no reasonable expectation of privacy in

the GPS data. See id. at 682. The Court explained,

            [t]he defendant here was of course not just on probation;
       he was on probation with the added condition of GPS monitoring
____________________________________________

9 “This Court may cite to the decisions of other states for persuasive
authority.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 302 A.3d 780, 787 n. 3 (Pa. Super.
2023) (citation omitted).
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      because he had stipulated to violating his original sentence of
      probation after he was charged with breaking and entering and
      larceny while on probation. The defendant was thus on notice that
      GPS monitoring was imposed as a result of the defendant’s
      criminal activity while on probation and the judge’s concern over
      the defendant’s demonstrated risk of recidivism.        Any such
      defendant-probationer would therefore objectively understand
      that his or her person and movements were being recorded by the
      GPS device and monitored by the Commonwealth to ensure
      compliance with probationary conditions and to deter him or her
      from committing future crimes while wearing the GPS device. This
      understanding further diminished any objective expectation of
      privacy he might have had in his whereabouts, at least during the
      probationary period.

Id. at 682 (citation omitted).

      The Court also focused on the extremely limited nature of the intrusion,

stating:

            [t]he record does not describe law enforcement engaged in
      an effort to map out and analyze all of the defendant’s movements
      over the six-month probationary period. . . . Rather, . . . the
      Commonwealth reviewed the defendant’s historical GPS location
      data to determine whether he was present at the general times
      and locations when various unsolved break-ins may have
      occurred. . . . . [T]he GPS location data actually accessed and
      reviewed by the Commonwealth was targeted to the task at hand.
      Simply comparing subsets of the defendant’s GPS location
      data recorded while he was on probation to the general
      times and places of suspected criminal activity during the
      probationary period is not a search in the constitutional
      sense.

                                     *****

            We also understand that even a targeted review of GPS data
      directed at times and locations of suspected criminal activity
      during a probationary period will likely expose the police to some
      other information concerning the defendant’s whereabouts during
      the relevant time periods. This is, however, quite different from
      either mapping out and reviewing all of the defendant’s
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       movements while on probation or rummaging through the
       defendant’s historical GPS location data indiscriminately. So long
       as the review is targeted at identifying the defendant’s
       presence at the time and location of particular criminal
       activity during the probationary period, it is not a search,
       as such review is consistent with a probationer’s limited
       expectations of privacy. Police action necessary to deter and
       detect criminal activity during the probationary period is
       reasonably expected.

Id. at 684-85 (citations and footnote omitted; emphases added).10

       Here, as in Johnson, Rosendary chose to be placed on EM as an

alternative to incarceration after he committed serious parole violations.

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10 As noted above, this is a matter of first impression.  We have uncovered
few cases, either published or unpublished in either federal court or in our
sister states, addressing this issue. However, in unpublished decisions,
federal courts have agreed with our conclusion that a parolee has a severely
diminished expectation of privacy in GPS location data. See United States
v. Lenhart, 2023 WL 5524851, at *2 (6th Cir., 8/23/23) (affirming district
court’s denial of appellant’s motion to suppress real-time location data
regarding the location of a car being used by a fugitive parolee subject to
electronic monitoring and holding “a parolee who was subject to electronic
monitoring as a condition of his parole[] had no reasonable or legitimate
expectation of privacy in his location”); United States v. Gaines, 2021 WL
4263375, at **7-8 (D. Conn., 9/20/21) (denying defendant’s motion to
suppress GPS location data gathered by parole agent and shared, without a
warrant, with police as part of an investigation into defendant’s participation
in a conspiracy to commit murder because as a parolee, defendant had “a
substantially diminished expectation of privacy in his location at any given
time”); Mackey v. Hanson, 2019 WL 5894306, at **4-6 (D. Colo., 11/12/19)
(denying habeas corpus relief and rejecting defendant’s Fourth Amendment
challenge to suppress GPS location data turned over from pre-trial monitoring
services to the police where the Colorado Court of Appeals made a “colorable
application of the correct Fourth Amendment standard” in holding the
defendant “did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the GPS data
collected by the ankle monitor he agreed to wear as a condition of his pretrial
release in another case.”).

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Rosendary was thus on notice that the parole system received information

about his locations twenty-four hours a day to ensure he did not engage in

further prohibited activity. Agent Servidio had a legitimate reason to search

Rosendary’s GPS location data for the date and time of the robbery and

provide that limited information to police. It was reasonable for the police to

receive Rosendary’s GPS location data to confirm or rebut his presence at the

scene of the robbery. Further, any intrusion in the disclosure of Rosendary’s

location at the time of the crime was brief and targeted. The data simply

showed Rosendary’s travels on public streets and showed nothing about his

activities at these locations. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/22, at 3-4.

      We take instruction from this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Dunkins, 229 A.3d 622 (Pa. Super. 2020), affirmed, 263 A.3d 247 (Pa.

2021), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 142 S.Ct. 1679 (2022).        In Dunkins,

campus police at Moravian College (“college”) who were investigating an on-

campus robbery by two men, requested that the Director of Systems

Engineering access the college’s Wi-Fi network to compile a list of students

logged into the nearest Wi-Fi access point to the robbery. See Dunkins, 263

A.3d at 625. They discovered, at the time of the robbery, Dunkins was the

only male non-resident of the dorm logged into the network at that location.

See id.   The campus police provided this information to the local police

department.    See id. at 625-26.     In affirming the trial court’s denial of

suppression, this Court highlighted that Dunkins consented to the college’s
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collection and dissemination of cell site location information (“CSLI”) by

signing and accepting the college’s internet policy, which allowed it to collect

internet data. See id. at 629-30.

       Rosendary knowingly and voluntarily consented to have his movements

monitored by a third party in exchange for the benefit of avoiding

incarceration. The GPS data at issue here and CSLI data at issue in Dunkins

are similar.    Rosendary was on parole, consented to have his movements

monitored, and he lost any expectation of privacy in those movements when

he knowingly and voluntarily signed the GPS contract. See id.

       Moreover, we find Rosendary’s reliance on Jones, supra and

Carpenter, supra misplaced.11 Neither Jones nor Carpenter involved an

individual on parole who consented to share his location data with the

government as an alternative to incarceration after he violated parole.

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11 In Jones, the police, acting without a warrant, installed a GPS tracker on a

suspect’s car. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402-03. The United States Supreme
Court held this constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 404. The Court summarized what took place as
“[t]he Government physically occupy[ing] private property for the purpose of
obtaining information.” Id. In Carpenter, the government obtained, without
a warrant, CSLI from several wireless carriers to track the long-term
movements of a suspect in multiple robberies. Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 301-
03. The Supreme Court held that, because of the “the unique nature of cell
phone location records,” an individual “maintains a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through [CSLI],”
and, accordingly, CSLI obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the
product of a search. Id. at 2217 (footnote omitted).

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Moreover, Detective Ginkel did not request Agent Servidio turn over the

volumes of data collected in both Jones and Carpenter but rather asked for

screenshots following her independent decision to review Rosendary’s GPS

data; and this request was limited to a particular time on a single date while

Rosendary, whom he already suspected of involvement with the

robbery, was traveling on public streets.      See Jones, 565 U.S. at 403;

Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 301-02. Furthermore, it is well settled law that a

person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in their movements on public

streets. See U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).

      Thus, for the reasons discussed above, the findings of fact are supported

by the record, and the suppression court did not err in denying Rosendary’s

motion to suppress. See id. at 281; Dunkins, 263 A.3d at 255-56; Johnson,

119 N..E.3d at 682-85.

      Moreover, even if Rosendary had a legitimate expectation of privacy in

his GPS data, and Agent Servidio’s action in turning the information over to

the police constituted a warrantless search, Rosendary would nevertheless be

due no relief because the record clearly demonstrates the search was

reasonable.   The statute in place at the time of the March 2020 robbery

allowing a search by a parole officer provides, in relevant part:

      (b) Searches and seizures authorized.—

      (1) Agents may search the person and property of offenders in
      accordance with the provisions of this section.

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J-S09039-23

     (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit searches
     or seizures in violation of the Constitution of the United States or
     section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.

                                   *****

     (d) Grounds for personal search of offender.—

     (1) A personal search of an offender may be conducted by an
     agent:

        (i) if there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that the
        offender possesses contraband or other evidence of
        violations of the conditions of supervision[.]

                                   *****

     (6) The existence of reasonable suspicion to search shall be
     determined in accordance with constitutional search and seizure
     provisions as applied by judicial decision. In accordance with such
     case law, the following factors, where applicable, may be taken
     into account:

        (i) The observations of agents.

        (ii) Information provided by others.

        (iii) The activities of the offender.

        (iv) Information provided by the offender.

        (v) The experience of agents with the offender.

        (vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances.

        (vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the
        offender.

        (viii) The need to verify compliance with the conditions of
        supervision.

61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6153(b), (d) (repealed).

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J-S09039-23

      We have stated, “parolees agree to ‘endure warrantless searches’ based

only on reasonable suspicion in exchange for their early release from prison.”

Commonwealth v. Curry, 900 A.2d 390, 394 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted). Thus, “agents need not have probable cause to search a parolee or

his property; instead, reasonable suspicion is sufficient to authorize a search.”

Id.   A search will be deemed reasonable “if the totality of the evidence

demonstrates: (1) that the parole officer had a reasonable suspicion that the

parolee had committed a parole violation, and (2) that the search was

reasonably related to the parole officer’s duty.” Commonwealth v. Gould,

187 A.3d 927, 935 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Parole officers may

form reasonable suspicion based on personal observations, their history with

the parolee, the parolee’s behavior while on parole, and third-party

information.    See Commonwealth v. Colon, 31 A.3d 309, 314–16 (Pa.

Super. 2011).

      Here, as noted above, Rosendary was on parole for armed robbery.

Rosendary was placed on GPS monitoring because he violated his parole by

allegedly committing additional crimes while on parole and he consented to

GPS monitoring.     Detective Ginkel, a reliable third party, informed Agent

Servidio that Rosendary was a suspect in an armed robbery, the very same

crime that led to Rosendary’s placement on parole. Looking at the totality of

the evidence, this was sufficient to allow Agent Servidio to search Rosendary’s

GPS location information for the day and time of the robbery and disseminate
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the information to Detective Ginkel.     See Commonwealth v. Smith, 302

A.3d 123, 127 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding parole officer had reasonable

suspicion for a warrantless search of parolee’s residence where parolee had

failed a drug test, his GPS showed visits to known drug spots, and parole

agent received tips regarding parolee’s drug activities); Commonwealth v.

Kuhlman, 300 A.3d 460, 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2023) (holding a probation

officer had reasonable suspicion to search Kuhlman’s computer where

Kuhlman was on probation for computer-related crimes, the probation officer

was aware Kuhlman had unmonitored internet access, Kuhlman’s therapist

expressed concerns about his lack of remorse, and Kuhlman had consented to

warrantless searches of his person and home); Gould, 187 A.3d at 936-37

(holding parole agent had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and search

his person and vehicle, where police informed parole agent defendant was not

residing at his designated residence, was seen in known drug spots, and parole

agent had previously put defendant on notice for parole violations); 61

Pa.C.S.A. § 6153(b), (d) (repealed).

      Lastly, Rosendary argues even if Agent Servidio had reasonable

suspicion, she was acting as a “stalking horse” for the police. Rosendary’s

Brief at 13-18.    “[P]ennsylvania courts historically invalidated probation

officers’ searches and subsequent seizures of evidence where the probation

officers essentially ‘switched hats,’ and, in all relevant respects, became police

officers.” Parker, 152 A.3d at 320. This is referred to as the “stalking horse”
                                     - 20 -
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doctrine. See id. The rationale behind the rule is to prevent a parole officer

from aiding the police “by statutorily circumventing the warrant requirement,

based on reasonable suspicion, instead of the heightened standard of probable

cause.”    Id.   In determining which “hat” the parole agent is wearing, the

determinative element is the purpose of the search. See Commonwealth v.

Brown, 361 A.2d 846, 850 (Pa. Super. 1976).

       We find United States v. Lambus, 897 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2018)

elucidating.12 There, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

held that a state parole agent who passed GPS monitoring data to police for

several years as part of on-going state and federal investigations into

Lambus’s drug dealing did not violate the “stalking horse” doctrine. See id.

at 402-12. The Second Circuit stated state parole officials had not become

“mere conduits for federal law enforcement or that GPS monitoring . . . was

continued at the behest of the federal agents.”      Id. at 406.    The Court

particularly noted it was the parole agent’s decision, not that of federal

authorities, to place and continue Lambus on GPS monitoring.          See id.

Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded a parolee had a diminished

expectation of privacy in his movements; GPS monitoring of the parolee was

____________________________________________

12 “We recognize [federal court] decisions are not binding precedent on this

Court. Nevertheless, we may consider federal court decisions, and opinions
of other states, as persuasive authority.” Commonwealth v. Lang, 275 A.3d
1072, 1083 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).

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reasonable, as was the turning over of the GPS monitoring location data to

federal authorities. Lambus, 897 F.3d at 412.

      Here, there is nothing in the record which supports Rosendary’s claim

that Agent Servidio was acting as a “stalking horse.”     Rosendary was not

placed on GPS at Ginkel’s (police) request. Rather, he was placed on GPS a

second time for incurring new criminal charges, which is a parole violation.

Nothing in the record indicated Agent Servidio regularly shared information

with or contacted police. When contacted by the police and informed by them

of her parolee’s status as a suspect in yet another crime, Agent Servidio

checked the GPS location data for a single date and time and shared that

limited and relevant information with police. Moreover, Rosendary did not

provide contradictory evidence of either an explicit or tacit agreement between

Detective Ginkel and Agent Servidio for Agent Servidio to monitor Rosendary

for the purpose of aiding a police investigation. See supra note 6. Thus,

Rosendary has not demonstrated that Agent Servidio was acting as a “stalking

horse.” See Lambus, 897 F.3d at 412; see also Gould, 187 A.3d at 938-39

(rejecting “stalking horse” doctrine where, after being informed by police of

defendant’s suspected drug activities parole agent, with police as backup,

detained and searched defendant for suspected parole violations); Parker,

152 A.3d at 323 (rejecting “stalking horse” doctrine where there was no

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evidence of any express or tacit agreement between probation officers and

police).13

       As none of Rosendary’s arguments merit relief, we affirm his judgment

of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 03/19/2024

____________________________________________

13 Even if the trial court erred in denying Rosendary’s suppression motion, he

would be due no relief because the error is harmless. Once a reviewing court
has decided admitted evidence should have been suppressed, it must
determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the error was harmless. Where
the error is harmless, a new trial is not warranted. Our Supreme Court has
explained that “[h]armless error exists if the reviewing court is convinced from
the record that[, inter alia,] the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
cumulative of other untainted evidence . . . .” Commonwealth v. Petroll,
738 A.2d 993, 1005 (Pa. 1999). Here, the GPS location monitoring data was
merely confirmatory, and, thus, cumulative. A private security camera at the
location of the robbery showed Rosendary entering the victim’s car and lying
in wait for the victim for over two hours. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/11/22,
at 3. Moreover, two Erie Police Department officers observed Rosendary in
the vicinity immediately prior to the robbery and provided a detailed
description of him; their description matched that of the individual seen on
the security camera. See id. at 5-6. Accordingly, if the trial court’s ruling
were erroneous, it would be harmless.
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