Court Opinion

ID: 9728645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:13:11.524831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.042162
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The law is well settled in this state that the Supreme Court will not disturb an award of alimony or a division of property unless it clearly appears that the trial court abused its discretion in entering its judgment. Guindon v. Guindon, 256 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1977); Stenberg v. Stenberg, 90 S.D. 229, 240 N.W.2d 100 (1976); Rock v. Rock, 89 S.D. 583, 236 N.W.2d 191 (1975). This general principle was reannounced in three different cases in this Court as recent as last year: Price v. Price, 278 N.W.2d 455 (S.D.1979); Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436 (S.D.1979); Kittelson v. Kittelson, 272 N.W.2d 86 (S.D.1978).
I am of the firm conviction that the trial court made a conscientious, studied and wise effort to reach an equitable property award and to provide adequate alimony for a mentally disturbed woman. Thus, I cam not bring myself to vote for a reversal of the trial court’s decision based upon the premise that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
The root of my dissent is that appellant cannot till, manage, or operate the farm. Appellee can. Thus, she should not be awarded a large acreage of the farm. Ap-pellee can keep this farm together so that it will produce income for both of these litigants. The majority opinion, in effect, kills the goose that lays the golden egg. If the majority opinion would have the trial judge below reallocate and readjudicate the farm acreage, and assuming that I am correct that she cannot manage the land, what will become of the land? Will she sell it? If so, and the unit is dissected, then how will appellant make a living on the farm for either himself or this mentally disturbed woman? An appreciable award of land unto appellant will rupture the only asset of the parties that produces income.
We are all entitled to be free from domestic violence. We are all entitled to domestic tranquility. Appellant, since 1961, created a domestic hell for appellee.
1. She contributed very little work, of any kind, in the past 15 years of married life.
2. She absented herself from home frequently and was often depressed.
3. She was a poor housekeeper.
4. She incurred huge medical bills.
5. She went out with other men.
6. She verbally attacked and abused the appellee.
7. She spent money erratically and beyond the means of the parties.
8. She slept in her own bedroom from 1973 until she finally left the farm.
Needless to say, appellant’s contribution to acquiring and working this farm was minimal, if not tortious. Approximately 560 acres were acquired between 1948 and 1961; the bulk of the farm, 920 acres, was acquired in 1968 and 1970 when appellant’s interest in the farm and her husband was virtually nil.
The trial judge observed these witnesses and heard their testimony. It was obvious to him that it would be far better for appellant to have a monthly income to care for her needs rather than land holdings to till, manage, or operate. He thus awarded appellant $800 alimony per month, a most generous award, and which appears to have been an effort on his part to be compassionate, considerate, and an effort to save the one real asset of the parties. Appellant was also awarded $3,000 cash to take care of her immediate needs. The farm, which she contributed little to, had virtually no interest in, and actively spurned, she now wants as it is settlement and litigation time. The parties agreed to a personal property settlement and the trial judge made an *716award exactly per that agreement. It is the land award which is at issue. The court did not cut appellant out of the land altogether: it awarded her a quarter of land valued at $47,000. Appellee was given a three-year option to rent that quarter and the right to meet any offer made for its purchase. When one computes the alimony, it is readily apparent that appellee will have paid $28,800 in alimony in three years, from 1980, until January 1, 1983, when he must convey the property to appellant. The trial judge considered appellant’s financial needs, knowing full well that he must provide for a mentally imbalanced individual. He wisely attempted to save the farm unit so that appellant could be provided for in the future. The majority opinion is attempting to finely tune the equities (as it visualizes equity) and in doing so has lost sight of appellant’s behavior patterns, erratic spending propensities, and her total mental incapability to cope with life. It is obvious that appellant is unable to cope with the management or ownership of a large parcel of the farm when the record reflects that she has been committed to our state mental hospital on five different occasions. Appellant needs cash, not a plow. I distinguish the Hanson case cited by the majority as the wife in that case enjoyed good mental health and contributed greatly to the acquisition of the ranch.
There are two points made by the majority opinion which I feel compelled to specifically address. I agree that appellant’s training, experience, and emotional state will not permit her to work in any vocation that will provide an adequate living. This is precisely why the trial judge saw fit to award appellant alimony so her daily needs would be met. The majority opinion holds that appellant should receive an award which more closely reflects her purported contributions and more closely approximates her needs. I must interpret this as land. Land will not approximate her needs. If the trial court now awards appellant a greater acreage, appellee and appellant are thrust into a hostile farm partnership, albeit a temporary one. The lower court wisely prevented such a partnership.
Rather than to reverse the trial court, I would affirm the alimony allowance, the award of the quarter section of land which is to be leased unto appellee, and all other aspects of the judgment with one exception: I would direct the trial court to modify its judgment by eliminating the reference that a conveyance of the quarter section would constitute a material change of circumstances requiring a full review of alimony with a possibility of total termination of alimony on January 1, 1983. A trial judge cannot make an anticipatory ruling-of any kind-and alimony is one subject in the law of domestic relations which can dramatically increase or decrease as the circumstances of the parties change. As applied to this case, when appellant is conveyed the quarter of land, the trial court surely may consider the income and health and financial circumstances of the parties, but it should not suggest a preordainment of a termination of alimony. This Court could properly affirm the trial court with a simple directive for a modification of the judgment. The division of property and the support awarded appellant is within the range of discretion that our state statutes and previous decisions allow the primary decision-maker. An outright reversal is unjustified. Appellee’s cause of justice is reposed in the hands of this Court. His domestic burden in life with appellant has been heavy. It should end. But he should be financially required to care for her, mentally imbalanced as she is, with an income that he can rely upon from the farm. To destroy the farm is to destroy the income; to destroy the income is to destroy the alimony; to destroy the alimony is to destroy the cash flow that appellant needs.
The fountain-the wellspring-of long-range financial security so needed by this mentally disturbed woman will eventually cease to flow under the majority opinion.