Court Opinion

ID: 9925813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 07:05:01.424289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:36.843872
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                                STATE OF MINNESOTA
                                IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                      A23-1023

                      In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:
                                 M. S.-I. and J. J., Parents.

                                  Filed January 22, 2024
                                         Affirmed
                                       Gaïtas, Judge

                              St. Louis County District Court
                                 File No. 69DU-JV-22-258

Benjamin Kaasa, Benjamin Kaasa Law Office, PLLC, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant-
mother M.S.-I.)

Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Sara Jankofsky, Assistant County Attorney,
Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services)

Kirsten Hambleton, Superior, Wisconsin (guardian ad litem)

       Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge;

and Gaïtas, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

GAÏTAS, Judge

       In this termination-of-parental-rights (TPR) appeal, appellant-mother M.S.-I. argues

that the record does not support the district court’s determinations that: (1) respondent

St. Louis County Public Health and Human Services (the county) made reasonable efforts

toward reunification, (2) a statutory basis exists to involuntarily terminate her parental

rights, and (3) termination is in the best interests of the children. Because we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother’s parental rights, we

affirm.

                                             FACTS

          Father J.J. and mother are the parents of two minor children, aged 3 (child 1) and 2

(child 2). Following a TPR trial, the district court terminated father’s and mother’s rights

to the children in June 2023, determining that three statutory bases supported termination,

the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and termination was in the

children’s best interests. Mother challenges each of these determinations on appeal. 1 A

summary of the proceedings follows.

          CHIPS Petition

          In November 2021, the county received a report that child 2 was in the newborn

intensive care unit (NICU) after a premature birth. The hospital reported that child 2’s cord

blood tested positive for THC and the parents had only visited the NICU four times in a

three-week period. According to the hospital, child 2 would be ready for discharge soon

and medical providers were concerned about mother’s mental health and her ability to care

for the child. The hospital ultimately considered child 2 to be abandoned “due to the lack

of any parental involvement with the child or in learning his cares and how to meet the

special needs related to his prematurity.”

          Based on the hospital’s report, social workers for the county located and met with

father and mother, who lived together. They believed that mother was “suffering from

1
    Father is not a party to this appeal.

                                               2
severe post-partum depression” and showed “a lack of observable attachment” with child 1,

which, the social workers noted, was “common when mothers are experiencing post-

partum depression.” They also learned that father was using methamphetamine. Based on

concerns about the parents’ ability to care for the children, the county decided that it would

also seek custody of child 1 for placement if mother did not obtain therapy to address her

mental-health and suicidal ideation. Child 1 eventually was placed with a relative, and

child 2 was discharged from the hospital into the care of a different foster parent with

experience caring for premature babies.

       The county petitioned the district court in December 2021 to adjudicate the children

as being in need of protection or services (CHIPS). Following a hearing, the children were

placed in emergency protective care. Mother subsequently entered a limited admission to

the CHIPS petition based on her mental health and the district court adjudicated the

children in need of protection or services.

       Mother’s Compliance with the County’s Reunification Case Plan

       Following the CHIPS adjudication, the county worked with the parents to develop

a case plan designed to address the issues that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.

The case plan required mother to: (1) complete a full psychological evaluation with a

parenting component and follow all recommendations; (2) maintain “absolute sobriety”

and submit to urinalysis tests to monitor sobriety; (3) complete a chemical-use assessment

and follow all recommendations, including aftercare; (4) complete a diagnostic assessment

and follow all recommendations to address concerns of historical trauma, post-partum

depression, and grief; (5) attend visitations with the children; (6) maintain safe and stable

                                              3
housing; (7) attend and complete parenting classes; and (8) maintain contact with the

county and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL). The district court approved this case

plan and ordered mother to comply with its provisions.

       Mother initially “made significant progress” on her case plan. She met with a

psychologist and completed a psychological evaluation. Mother also began participating

in mental-health services, obtained a chemical-use assessment, and successfully completed

parenting classes through the Circles of Security parenting program. Given mother’s

progress, the county agreed to expand the parents’ visits with the children to allow for

unsupervised visitation in mother’s home. However, shortly before the scheduled trial

home visit in June 2022, the county learned that father had stopped following his case plan,

and it could not confirm that the children would be safe in the parents’ home. The home

visit was ultimately canceled, and visits returned to a supervised setting.

       After the canceled home visit, the county reported that mother stopped complying

with her case plan.

       First, mother failed to engage in services to address her mental-health needs.

Following mother’s psychological evaluation, the psychologist made specific

recommendations for mother, which were incorporated into mother’s case plan. Although

mother initially complied with these recommendations, she stopped cooperating in June

2022. Mother stopped working with a therapist and did not explore other interventions

recommended by the psychologist, such as eye movement desensitization and

reprocessing, cognitive behavioral therapy, and accelerated resolution therapy, to address

her psychological health. The county social worker assigned to the family testified that, at

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the time of TPR trial, the psychologist had discharged mother for nonattendance and

mother was no longer receiving therapy. Mother similarly declined to participate in

dialectical behavior therapy or couple’s therapy, as recommended. The county also

referred the family for intensive family-based services, but these services were formally

withdrawn in the summer of 2022 because the parents declined to participate.

       Second, mother did not maintain sobriety and abstain from alcohol or nonprescribed

mood-altering chemicals. The case plan required mother to submit to random urinalysis

tests to monitor her sobriety. Mother complied with the urinalysis requirement when the

case plan was first developed. However, mother stopped submitting to urine tests in June

2022 for approximately two-and-one-half months. Mother reengaged with testing in the

fall of 2022 and tested positive for THC from the fall of 2022 until January 2023. She

provided negative samples in January and February 2023. But after February 2023, mother

stopped attending urinalysis appointments. Additionally, mother did not participate in

outpatient treatment, as recommended by her chemical-use evaluator, to address her

diagnosed chemical-use disorder, severe cannabis-use disorder.

       Third, and finally, mother did not maintain regular contact with the county and the

GAL. Mother regularly communicated with the family’s social worker until the summer

of 2022. After then, however, mother had only “limited contact” with the social worker.

Mother reengaged briefly in the fall of 2022, but only had “a few” meetings with the social

worker. As of the date of the TPR trial, the social worker testified that she had not heard

from mother in about a month. The GAL also testified that “there was a long period of

time . . . where the parents weren’t in contact with social services.”

                                              5
       TPR Proceedings and the District Court’s Order Terminating Parental Rights

       In August 2022, the county petitioned to involuntarily terminate the parent’s

parental rights to both children. The petition alleged that the parents: (1) neglected to

comply with the duties imposed by the parent and child relationship, (2) failed to correct

the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts

by the county to reunite the family, and (3) neglected the children in foster care. Minn.

Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2022). 2

       The district court held a two-day trial and heard testimony from mother, father, four

county social workers, the psychologist who evaluated and initially treated mother, the

GAL, and mother’s cousin. Following trial, the district court terminated father’s and

mother’s parental rights to both children. With respect to mother, the district court

concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that she neglected to comply with

the parent and child relationship, failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s

out-of-home placement despite reasonable efforts by the county, and neglected the children

in foster care. See id. The district court further concluded that the county made reasonable

efforts to reunify the family and that termination was in the children’s best interests.

       Mother appeals.

2
  The county also alleged that termination was warranted on two additional grounds. See
Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(a) (permitting termination with the written consent of a
parent), (b)(7) (pertaining to an unknown father’s lack of entitlement to notice of TPR)
(2022). The district court determined that these bases were not applicable to this case, and
therefore we do not address them here.

                                              6
                                        DECISION

       Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. Minnesota courts presume

that “a natural parent is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of his or her

child.” In re Welfare of A.D., 535 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. 1995). Thus, parental rights

may only be terminated for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462

N.W.2d 370, 375 (Minn. 1990). A district court may involuntarily terminate parental rights

if: (1) the county made reasonable efforts toward reunification; (2) there is clear and

convincing evidence that a statutory condition exists to support termination under

Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b); and (3) the proposed termination

is in the child’s best interests. See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.301, subds. 1(b), 7, 8, .317, subd. 1

(2022); see also In re Welfare of Child. of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008). The

county bears the burden of proving these grounds for termination, In re Welfare of Child

of H.G.D., 962 N.W.2d 861, 869-70 (Minn. 2021), and must do so by clear and convincing

evidence, Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.03, subd. 2(a). Evidence supporting TPR “must relate

to conditions that exist at the time of termination and it must appear that the conditions

giving rise to the termination will continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period.” In re

Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 2011).

       Whether to terminate parental rights is discretionary with the district court. In re

Welfare of Child of R.D.L., 853 N.W.2d 127, 136-37 (Minn. 2014). “[An appellate court]

review[s] the termination of parental rights to determine whether the district court’s

findings address the statutory criteria and whether the district court’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous.” S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d at 385. In

                                              7
doing so, we “review the district court’s findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear

error, but we review its determination of whether a particular statutory basis for

involuntarily terminating parental rights is present for an abuse of discretion.” In re

Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.

Jan. 6, 2012). The appellate court defers to the district court’s decision “because a district

court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F.,

554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). Thus, the appellate court does not engage in fact-

finding, reweigh the evidence, or “reconcile conflicting evidence.” In re Civ. Commitment

of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); see In re Welfare

of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 601 n.6 (Minn. App. 2021) (applying Kenney in a TPR

appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021). “Consequently, an appellate court need not go

into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the

findings of the trial court.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222 (quotation omitted). Rather, an

appellate court’s “duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and

has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision.” Id. (quotations

omitted).

I.     The county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children.

       Mother challenges the district court’s determination that the county made

reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. Before terminating parental rights, a

district court must find that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the child and the

parent, or the district court must absolve the county from having to make those efforts.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a) (2022). Reasonable efforts are “services that go beyond mere

                                               8
matters of form so as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of Child. of S.W.,

727 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Minn. App. 2007) (quotations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28,

2007). Reasonable efforts consist of those that are:

              (1) selected in collaboration with the child’s family and, if
              appropriate, the child;
              (2) tailored to the individualized needs of the child and child’s
              family;
              (3) relevant to the safety, protection, and well-being of the
              child;
              (4) adequate to meet the individualized needs of the child and
              family;
              (5) culturally appropriate;
              (6) available and accessible;
              (7) consistent and timely; and
              (8) realistic under the circumstances.

Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2022). The district court also weighs “the length of the time the

county was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d

529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. July 6, 1990).

       The district court found that the county provided reasonable efforts to correct the

conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement and promote reunification. As

to mother, these services included:     (1) mental-health treatment, (2) cell phones and

payment for service, (3) relative foster care, (4) sobriety testing, (5) psychological

evaluations, (6) public-health nursing, (7) comprehensive assessments, (8) coordination

with mental-health service providers, (9) parenting classes, (10) intensive family-based

services, (11) bus passes, (12) domestic-violence evaluations, (13) coordination with the

NICU, (14) safety planning, (15) letters to the housing authority, (16) child-protection

investigations, (17) offers for voluntary services through the Parent Support Outreach

                                             9
Program, (18) ongoing child-protection case management, (19) supervised visitation,

(20) a trajectory to a trial home visit, and (21) transportation. The district court found that

the social workers documented their “noteworthy efforts to engage both parents throughout

this case, even when the parents were not willing to communicate.” Based on these efforts,

the district court found:

              These services have been selected in collaboration with the
              children’s family and tailored to the individualized needs of the
              children and children’s family; relevant to the safety,
              protection, and well-being of the children, adequate to meet the
              individualized needs of the children and family, culturally
              appropriate, available and accessible, consistent and timely,
              and realistic under the circumstances.

       Clear and convincing evidence in the record supports the district court’s findings

that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with the children. The family’s

primary social worker testified regarding her efforts to provide mother with mental-health

services. The county arranged for a psychological evaluation with a psychologist who

recommended, among other things, that mother explore therapy, therapeutic interventions,

monitoring for borderline personality disorder, and couple’s counseling. Mother either did

not participate in, or fully complete, these services. The county also provided mother with

a chemical-use assessment and attempted to engage her in outpatient treatment services to

address her diagnosed cannabis-use disorder. Mother received parenting classes through

Circles of Security. To assist mother with maintaining sobriety, the county provided

urinalysis tests, transportation, and a phone and paid phone service to help facilitate her

appointments and urinalysis tests. The county also arranged supervised visits with the

children. This evidence supports the district court’s reasonable-efforts determination.

                                              10
       Mother argues that the district court’s findings are clearly erroneous because the

district court did not adequately address each factor under section 260.012(h). And she

further contends that the county ceased reunification efforts in August and September 2022

and shifted its focus to separating father and mother. We are not persuaded by these

objections. The district court’s 78-page order shows a careful consideration of the family’s

needs and the county’s efforts to offer assistance. See Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h). And, after

reviewing the reasonable-efforts factors, the district court concluded that “[r]easonable

efforts have been made to reunify the family, and those efforts have proved unsuccessful.”

The district court outlined the services offered to the family, including mental-health

services, child-care services, bus passes, offers of transportation, and supervised visitation.

Furthermore, as to mother’s second argument, the record evidence does not support her

contention that the county stopped providing efforts in 2022. When mother stopped

complying with the terms of her case plan in June 2022 by missing urinalysis appointments,

the county attempted to reengage mother. The social worker testified that she told mother

that “it was important to get back on track with [her case plan requirements] to be able to

reunify with her children.” This testimony supports the district court’s finding that the

county attempted to provide services and assistance to the family “throughout this case.”

       We recognize that “[t]he nature of the services which constitute ‘reasonable efforts’

depends on the problem presented.” In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 N.W.2d 886, 892 (Minn.

1996). As such, “[t]he county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the conditions that

gave rise to out-of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems presented.”

In re Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 88 (Minn. App. 2012), rev. denied (Minn.

                                              11
July 17, 2012). Here, the record contains ample evidence that the services provided—

including mental-health services, chemical-dependency programs, and family therapy—

were targeted toward mother’s unique circumstances and conformed to the problems

presented. Thus, given the record evidence, we are satisfied that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify

mother with the children.

II.    A statutory basis exists to support termination of mother’s parental rights.

       Having determined that the county provided reasonable efforts to reunify mother

and the children, we next review the district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights

for clear and convincing evidence. See In re Welfare of Child. of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656,

661 (Minn. 2008). The district court determined that the county proved three statutory

bases for termination because: (1) mother failed to comply with the parent and child

relationship, (2) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-

home placement, and (3) the children were neglected and in foster care. Mother challenges

each of these conclusions. We determine that clear and convincing evidence in the record

demonstrates that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-

home placement under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5). Based

on this determination, we need not address the remaining two statutory bases for

termination. See J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92 (recognizing that a reviewing court “need only

one properly supported statutory ground in order to affirm a termination order”).

       Under section 260C.301, a district court may terminate a parent’s rights if

“reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions

                                              12
leading to the child’s placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A reviewing

court presumes that reasonable efforts have failed if: (1) the “child has resided out of the

parental home under court order for a cumulative period of 12 months,” (2) “the court has

approved the out-of-home placement plan,” (3) the “conditions leading to the out-of-home

placement have not been corrected” as shown by the parent “substantially [complying] with

the court’s orders and a reasonable case plan,” and (4) “reasonable efforts have been made

by the social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.” Id., subd.

1(b)(5)(i)-(iv).

       Mother does not contest—and the record supports—that the first and second factors

are satisfied because the children had been in out-of-home placement for 560 days as of

the time of trial, and the district court approved a case plan designed to reunite the family.

Moreover, as discussed above, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite mother with the children.

Therefore, we need only address whether mother failed to correct the conditions leading to

the children’s placement out of the home. Upon review, we determine that the record

supports the district court’s findings that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to

the children’s removal, and those findings support the district court’s ultimate conclusion

that a statutory basis supports termination.

       The district court found that “[t]he conditions that [led] to the out-of-home

placement have not been corrected because neither parent has substantially complied with

the Court’s Orders or their respective reasonable case plans.” It acknowledged that mother

made initial progress at the beginning of the case. But the district court found that mother

                                               13
was not complying with her case plan at the time of trial. It noted that, although the “case

was initiated due to significant and serious concerns” about mother’s mental health, she

had not “demonstrated sobriety or engaged in any of the mental health services required to

be stable enough to parent her children.”

       The record supports these findings. The county became involved with the family

after learning that child 2 was born prematurely and was in the NICU and the parents were

not visiting the child. After meeting with the family, social workers believed that mother

was suffering from post-partum depression. The county worked with mother to develop a

case plan to address the issues that led to the children’s placement out of the home

following the CHIPS adjudication. This plan required mother to participate in mental-

health treatment, attain sobriety, submit to urinalysis tests, and maintain contact with the

county. The psychologist who conducted mother’s psychological evaluation diagnosed

mother with major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and provisionally,

borderline personality disorder. To address these concerns, the psychologist recommended

that mother work with a psychotherapist, explore interventions to address her

psychological heath, attend couple’s counseling, and create a safety plan, among other

interventions.

       Despite these recommendations, mother failed to comply with her court-ordered

case plan to address her mental-health issues. During the TPR trial, the family’s primary

social worker testified that mother was discharged from therapy when she missed too many

appointments and was not in therapy at the time of trial. Mother also declined to explore

                                            14
other interventions to address her psychological health. She also declined to participate in

couple’s counseling or monitoring for borderline personality disorder.

       Mother also failed to follow the requirement to remain sober and abstain from

alcohol or nonprescribed mood-altering chemicals. Although mother initially complied

with urine testing, she stopped participating in June 2022 and did not reengage for several

months. Mother took her last test in February 2023 and did not submit to urine testing

thereafter.   Additionally, the case plan required mother to complete a chemical-use

assessment and follow recommendations.            The evaluator recommended that mother

participate in an intensive outpatient treatment program, and the social worker discussed

community-based options with mother to assist her in completing this treatment. The

social worker testified that mother did not enter a treatment program. The witness

testimony supports the district court’s findings that mother has not corrected the conditions

that led to the children’s out-of-home placement.

       On appeal, mother argues that she substantially complied with her case plan. Like

the district court, we commend mother for her initial progress toward meeting her case plan

requirements.    But sufficient evidence in the record supports the district court’s

determination that mother did not substantially comply with her case plan or remedy the

conditions that led to the children’s removal. As previously noted, at the time of the TPR

trial, mother was not in compliance with her case plan because she had not followed

through with the recommendations of her psychological evaluation, was not receiving

therapy to address her mental-health needs, had not demonstrated sobriety, and was not

maintaining regular contact with the county.

                                             15
       Moreover, a parent’s compliance with a case plan does not invalidate a district

court’s termination of parental rights under Minnesota Statutes section 260C.301,

subdivision 1(b)(5). In J.K.T., the appellant-mother asserted that, because she completed

her case plan, clear and convincing evidence did not support termination under section

260C.301, subdivision 1(b)(5). 814 N.W.2d at 89. We rejected this argument, reasoning

that while certain conditions can generate a statutory presumption that reasonable efforts

failed to correct the conditions leading to out-of-home placement, “there is no converse

presumption that completion of [a] case plan amounts to a correction of those conditions.”

Id. Thus, “[t]he critical issue is not whether the parent formally complied with the case

plan, but rather whether the parent is presently able to assume the responsibilities of caring

for the child.” Id. Here, as noted, the district court identified numerous services offered

to mother. But the district court found that, despite these efforts, mother failed to correct

the conditions leading to the children’s removal from the home by the time of the TPR

trial. The record amply supports these findings. Thus, even if mother complied with some

of the conditions of her case plan, that does not compel reversal of the district court’s

termination decision, which is otherwise supported by the record.

       Our scope of review on appeal is “limited to determining whether the findings

address the statutory criteria, whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence,

and whether they are clearly erroneous.” In re Welfare of D.D.G., 558 N.W.2d 481, 484

(Minn. 1997). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings,

which are not clearly erroneous. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its

                                             16
discretion in determining that reasonable efforts by the county failed to correct the

conditions leading to the children’s placement out of the home.

III.   The children’s best interests support termination.

       Mother challenges the district court’s determination that termination is in the best

interests of the children. Even if a statutory basis for termination exists, the child’s best

interests are the “paramount consideration” in a termination proceeding. Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 7; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a) (2022) (stating that the

“paramount consideration” in all juvenile proceedings is the best interests of the child).

The district court must explain its rationale “for concluding why the termination is in the

best interests of the children.” In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. App. 2003). In

determining a child’s best interests, the district court balances: (1) the child’s interest in

preserving the parent and child relationship, (2) the parent’s interest in preserving the

parent and child relationship, and (3) any competing interests of the child. Minn. R. Juv.

Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing interests include such things as a stable environment,

health considerations, and the child’s preferences.” In re Welfare of R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d

1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992). We review a district court’s best-interests determination for an

abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. Because this analysis requires credibility

determinations, a reviewing court gives “considerable deference to the district court’s

findings.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92. Thus, a “determination of a child’s best interests is

generally not susceptible to an appellate court’s global review of a record, and . . . an

appellate court’s combing through the record to determine best interests is inappropriate

                                             17
because it involves credibility determinations.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D., 771

N.W.2d 538, 546 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations omitted).

       Here, after considering the best-interests factors, the district court determined that

“the balance overwhelmingly favors termination.” It acknowledged the testimony from

the social workers, father, and mother “that the parents deeply love their children and that

their visits go well.” The district court then considered the competing interests of the

children. It noted that the children are placed together in the same foster home, where they

are “receiving all needed services” including “mental health services, numerous NICU

follow-up appointments, and physical therapy.” The district court found that “[t]he

children deserve safety and stability.” On balance, the district court concluded that the

children’s “interests in severing the parent-child relationship distinctly outweigh the

parents and children’s [interests] in preserving the relationship.”

       We find ample support for these findings in the record. The social worker testified

about the children’s placement and noted that the children are together in the same foster

home. The foster parents are committed to being a permanency option for the children.

The social worker described the children as “excelling” and “doing wonderful,” and noted

that they have “bonded with their . . . foster family.” Further, the evidence supports the

finding that the children are receiving the care and services they need. Child 1 is receiving

ongoing services for his mental health. And child 2, who was born prematurely, is

developmentally on track.

       The social worker testified that she believes the parents love their children and want

to parent them. However, she testified that she does not believe the children would be safe

                                             18
in their care at this time. The social worker confirmed that, in her belief, it is in the

children’s best interests that parental rights be terminated. The GAL echoed the social

worker’s opinion. She testified that she believes TPR is in the children’s best interests. In

forming that opinion, the GAL testified about her observations of the supervised visits and

the children’s progress in their current foster placement. She testified that there were often

long gaps between the visits when the parents were not in contact with the county. The

GAL stated that the parents did not seem to be “looking out for the best interests of their

children long term.” She testified that, by contrast, the children were doing well in their

foster placement. According to her, the foster parents are helping the children with

behavioral concerns, special needs, and mental-health needs. Based on the testimony

presented, which the district court credited, it concluded that the children’s needs are being

met in their current placement.

       The record demonstrates that the district court balanced the children’s interests in a

safe, sober, and stable living environment against mother’s interest in maintaining the

parent and child relationship. Considering all the factors together, the district court

concluded that the interests weighed in favor of terminating mother’s parental rights. We

conclude that the district court’s decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion because

the court carefully weighed the competing interests of mother and the children, and the

testimony supports these best-interests findings.

       Affirmed.

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