Court Opinion

ID: 9947501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 21:18:26.031454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:29.603555
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 LARRY D. CAMPBELL,                                  No. 85100-4-I

                           Appellant,

                  v.
                                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 AT&T, INC.; and THE DEPARTMENT
 OF LABOR & INDUSTRIES, State of
 Washington,

                           Respondents.

       BOWMAN, J. — Larry Campbell appeals a superior court order affirming a

Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (Board) decision denying his workers’

compensation claim for major depressive disorder (MDD). Campbell asserts that

the superior court failed to appropriately consider his testimony and medical

evidence, leading to an inequitable result. Because substantial evidence

supports the superior court’s decision, we affirm.

                                        FACTS

       On November 19, 2016, 57-year-old Campbell sustained an industrial

injury to his back while working for his employer, AT&T Inc. Prior to the accident,

Campbell led an active life and did not suffer from significant physical or mental

health problems. The Department of Labor and Industries (Department) allowed

his workers’ compensation claim, and in June 2017, Campbell underwent back

surgery. The surgery reduced his pain but did not resolve it. In 2018, Campbell
No. 85100-4-I/2

attended Pacific Rehabilitation Center, a multidisciplinary treatment clinic that

helps patients manage pain. Campbell found the treatment “somewhat helpful”

and it allowed him to improve his overall functioning. But Campbell continued to

experience “depressed mood” and “feelings of uselessness.”

         On August 20, 2020, the Department ordered AT&T “to accept [MDD] as

related to [Campbell’s] injury.” AT&T protested the order. On January 12, 2021,

the Department issued a superseding order stating AT&T was not responsible for

the condition of MDD “because it was not caused or aggravated by [Campbell’s]

industrial injury.” On March 16, 2021, the Department affirmed the order. On

April 19, 2021, Campbell appealed the Department’s March 16, 2021 order to the

Board.

         An industrial appeals judge (IAJ) held a telephonic evidentiary hearing on

January 5, 2022. Campbell testified at the hearing and presented the deposition

testimony of psychiatrist Dr. Cassie Yu, who conducted an independent medical

examination (IME) of Campbell to determine the presence or absence of

psychiatric illness.

         Campbell testified that he is still in constant pain and often feels

depressed and “useless” because the pain prevents him from functioning as well

as he did before the industrial injury. He said that he is “tired all the time,”

“miserable,” unmotivated in his daily activities and hobbies, “moody” with his wife,

and does not go fishing with his friends as often as he used to. He also said that

his wife and daughter told him that his memory is not as good as it used to be.

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No. 85100-4-I/3

Campbell admitted he was reluctant to reveal his depression to others but he

was open and honest with Dr. Yu because she made him feel comfortable.

       Dr. Yu testified about her IME report, issued June 6, 2020.1 Her initial

impression was that Campbell was doing well. He appeared “funny and

reserved” with “excellent eye contact” and “articulate [ ] speech and language.”

Campbell insisted that he did not have major depression and that his memory

was “very strong.” But after more questioning, Campbell reported insomnia, low

appetite, lethargy, feeling worthless, and “passive suicidal death wishes,” which

Dr. Yu viewed as “marked neurovegetative symptoms” consistent with MDD. As

part of a “mini mental status examination” (MMSE), Dr. Yu asked Campbell to

count backward by 7 starting with the number 100. She also asked him to recall

three words after three minutes of unrelated discussion. Campbell completed the

first test with one error and failed the second.

       Dr. Yu concluded that the MMSE results combined with Campbell’s

reports of depressed mood indicated the presence of “pseudodementia,” which

she could only explain as MDD. Dr. Yu stated that Campbell was positive for

eight of nine major depression symptoms2 in the DSM-53 and diagnosed him with

       1
           Dr. Yu also reviewed Campbell’s medical history as part of the IME.
       2
          Dr. Yu testified that the nine symptoms of MDD are (1) reports of depressed
mood most of the day, (2) marked disinterest or pleasure in previously enjoyed activities,
(3) significant weight loss or weight gain, (4) insomnia or hypersomnia, (5) fatigue or loss
of energy every day, (6) psychomotor agitation or retardation, (7) self-concept high to the
point of near delusion, (8) decreased ability to concentrate, and (9) recurrent thoughts of
death.
       AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
       3

DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).

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No. 85100-4-I/4

MDD proximately caused by his industrial injury on a more probable than not

basis.

         AT&T presented the deposition testimony of psychiatrists Dr. Paul

Ciechanowski, Dr. Jean Dalpe, and Dr. Michael Ward. Dr. Ciechanowski and Dr.

Dalpe performed IMEs of Campbell and Dr. Ward conducted a forensic records

review.4 None of the doctors found the presence of a psychiatric condition and

all three disagreed with Dr. Yu’s diagnosis of MDD.

         On April 8, 2022, the IAJ issued a detailed proposed decision and order

with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The IAJ concluded that as of March

16, 2021, the date the Department affirmed its order, Campbell “did not have the

psychiatric condition of major depression as a residual condition of his industrial

injury.” Because the Department issued its order based on the finding that

Campbell had MDD but the condition “was not caused or aggravated by the

industrial injury,” the IAJ reversed and remanded to the Department to reject the

claim on the basis that Campbell “did not have” MDD.

         Campbell petitioned the Board to review the IAJ’s decision and the Board

accepted review. On June 7, 2022, the Board issued an order denying

Campbell’s petition for review and adopting the IAJ’s proposed decision and

order as its own.

         Campbell appealed the Board’s decision to the superior court. On

February 10, 2023, the superior court issued an order on judicial review affirming

         All three doctors also reviewed Campbell’s medical history. Dr. Ward’s review
         4

included the three IMEs of Dr. Yu, Dr. Ciechanowski, and Dr. Dalpe and the depositions
of Dr. Yu and Dr. Dalpe.

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No. 85100-4-I/5

the Board’s decision because it “acted within its power,” “correctly construed the

law,” and “correctly found the facts.”

       Campbell appeals.

                                        ANALYSIS

       The Industrial Insurance Act (IIA), Title 51 RCW, governs judicial review of

workers’ compensation determinations. Rogers v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 151

Wn. App. 174, 179, 210 P.3d 355 (2009). The superior court acts in an appellate

capacity in an appeal from the Board’s decision and reviews the decision de

novo. RCW 51.52.115; Rogers, 151 Wn. App. at 179. The Board’s decision is

prima facie correct and the opposing party must support its challenge by a

preponderance of the evidence. RCW 51.52.115; Ruse v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,

138 Wn.2d 1, 5, 977 P.2d 570 (1999).

       We review the decision of the superior court, not the decision of the

Board. Birgen v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 186 Wn. App. 851, 856, 347 P.3d 503

(2015); see RCW 51.52.140. The superior court’s decision is subject to the

ordinary standard of review for civil appeals. RCW 51.52.140; Malang v. Dep’t of

Lab. & Indus., 139 Wn. App. 677, 683, 162 P.3d 450 (2007). We review the

record to determine “ ‘whether substantial evidence supports the findings made

after the superior court’s de novo review, and whether the court’s conclusions of

law flow from the findings.’ ” Rogers, 151 Wn. App. at 1805 (quoting Ruse, 138

Wn.2d at 5). Substantial evidence is enough evidence to persuade a fair-

minded, rational person of the truth of the declared premise. Potter v. Dep’t of

       5
           Internal quotation marks omitted.

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No. 85100-4-I/6

Lab. & Indus., 172 Wn. App. 301, 310, 289 P.3d 727 (2012). We review the

record in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in superior court.

Robinson v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 181 Wn. App. 415, 425, 326 P.3d 744 (2014).

And we do not reweigh or rebalance competing testimony and inferences.

Harrison Mem’l Hosp. v. Gagnon, 110 Wn. App. 475, 485, 40 P.3d 1221 (2002).

       Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to AT&T, we

conclude substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that Campbell did

not have the condition diagnosed as major depression as of March 16, 2021. Dr.

Ciechanowski, Dr. Dalpe, and Dr. Ward acknowledged that Campbell’s life was

altered by his industrial injury and that he sometimes experienced symptoms

such as depressed mood. But they agreed that his symptoms did not cross the

threshold to support a DSM-5 diagnosis of MDD. They testified that many of

Campbell’s symptoms were generated by his chronic pain from the industrial

injury, not due to a psychiatric condition. In this context, they noted the DSM-5

specifies that if symptoms are attributable to another condition like chronic pain,

those symptoms cannot be used to diagnose MDD. They also found that

Campbell’s demeanor and engagement during his IMEs indicated a level of

functioning not attributable to major depression and that sadness is a “normal”

part of life. All three doctors also disagreed with Dr. Yu’s assessment of

pseudodementia because the MMSE she administered is insufficient as a

diagnostic tool and she misinterpreted the results.

                                          6
No. 85100-4-I/7

       Campbell does not assert that the superior court’s finding was

unsupported by substantial evidence. Instead, he argues that the lower court

failed to provide the “appropriate weight” to his medical evidence based on its

assessment of the credibility of the independent medical examiners. He

contends that Dr. Yu’s testimony was more credible because her in-person IME

provided a more complete opportunity to assess his condition, while Dr. Dalpe

performed the IME remotely and Dr. Ward merely conducted a records review.

But Campbell effectively asks us to reweigh the evidence, make credibility

determinations, and construe the evidence in the light most favorable to him.

And as discussed above, we will not do so. See also McClure & Sons, Inc. v.

Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 16 Wn. App. 2d 854, 861, 487 P.3d 186 (2021) (appellate

court does not weigh the evidence but instead construes it in the light most

favorable to the prevailing party).

       Campbell’s reliance on Price v. Department of Labor and Industries, 101

Wn.2d 520, 682 P.2d 307 (1984), does not compel a different outcome. In Price,

the court addressed whether a claim for workers’ compensation for a

psychological disability may be awarded based on expert medical testimony

about wholly subjective symptoms or whether the medical testimony must include

at least some objective findings. Id. at 521. The court concluded that a jury

instruction on the distinction between objective and subjective evidence was

improper. Id. at 529. In so holding, the court noted that “[m]edical opinions

derived from psychiatric examination are primarily based on conversations with

the patient” and that “[s]ymptoms of psychiatric injury are necessarily subjective

                                         7
No. 85100-4-I/8

in nature.” Id. at 528. Price provides no support for the proposition that Dr.

Dalpe’s and Dr. Ward’s findings were of limited evidentiary value just because

the doctors did not interact with Campbell in person.6

       Campbell also argues that the superior court did not adequately consider

his own testimony about his condition, so it failed to defer to the IIA’s

presumption in favor of the worker. See RCW 51.04.010. He points out that

unlike the other three doctors, he felt comfortable being open and honest with Dr.

Yu about his depression. He further argues that the superior court’s decision is

inequitable because his symptoms fluctuate over time, yet he is forever barred

from the claim.

       The IIA is construed liberally in favor of injured workers to achieve the

legislature’s intent to provide compensation to all covered employees injured in

their employment. RCW 51.04.010; Dennis v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 109 Wn.2d

467, 470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). But this court applies the liberal rule of

construction to interpretation of the IIA, not to questions of fact. Value Vill. v.

Vasquez-Ramirez, 11 Wn. App. 2d 590, 595-96, 455 P.3d 216 (2019) (citing

Ehman v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 33 Wn.2d 584, 595, 206 P.2d 787 (1949)). And

because AT&T prevailed below, Campbell bears the burden of supporting his

challenge by a preponderance of the evidence. Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 5. As

discussed above, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that

Campbell did not have the condition diagnosed as MDD as of March 16, 2021.

       6
       Dr. Dalpe testified that the American Psychiatric Association allows psychiatric
examinations to be conducted via “telehealth” video conferencing.

                                           8
No. 85100-4-I/9

      We affirm the superior court’s order on judicial review affirming the

Board’s decision.

WE CONCUR:

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