Court Opinion

ID: 9409261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:08:24.154846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.720808
License: Public Domain

J-S03044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ERIC WILLIAM                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 844 EDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 9, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0008144-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED JULY 17, 2023

        Eric William (“William”) appeals from the order dismissing his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We vacate

the order and remand for further proceedings.

        Given our disposition, a detailed factual recitation is unnecessary. In

2020, William filed a timely pro se PCRA petition collaterally attacking his

criminal conviction for, inter alia, murder. The PCRA court appointed counsel,

who filed an amended petition.           The PCRA court ultimately dismissed the

petition. William filed a timely notice of appeal.

        While the instant appeal was pending, William submitted a pro se

request for remand based on the ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel in failing to

raise several issues that counsel agreed to include in the amended petition.

____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S03044-23

William invoked Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381, 401 (Pa. 2021)

(holding that a PCRA petitioner may raise claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal). William

then submitted a pro se motion for the appointment of new counsel. Therein,

he again detailed PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and again requested remand

to raise PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness pursuant to Bradley, or for the

appointment of new counsel. William’s pro se submissions were forwarded to

PCRA counsel,2 who neither petitioned to withdraw nor sought a remand.

       Ultimately, PCRA counsel filed a patently deficient appellate brief on

behalf of William. Therein, PCRA counsel purported to identify multiple claims

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness; however, PCRA counsel failed to identify or

discuss any of the three factors necessary to establish an ineffectiveness

claim.    See Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 797 (Pa. 2008)

(holding that, where appellant fails to set forth and meaningfully discuss all

three prongs of the ineffectiveness test, such claims are waived for lack of

development).

____________________________________________

2 William’s pro se submissions were forwarded to PCRA counsel pursuant to
Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032, 1044 (Pa. 2011), abrogated on
other grounds by Bradley, supra (holding that the proper response to a pro
se pleading is to refer the pleading to counsel of record and take no action on
the pleading unless counsel forwards a motion). However, pursuant to
Bradley, a PCRA petitioner may raise pro se claims of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness. See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. Moreover, pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 121(g)(ii), a pro se request to change or remove counsel is an
exception to the general rule regarding pro se filings by a represented party.

                                           -2-
J-S03044-23

       Under these circumstances, we must remand to the PCRA court to

appoint new counsel.        William’s rule-based right to effective PCRA counsel

extends not only to proceedings in the PCRA court, but also throughout the

PCRA appeal process. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 965 A.2d 280, 283

(Pa. Super. 2009); see also Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401 (explaining that it is

essential that a petitioner possess a meaningful method by which to realize

his right to effective PCRA counsel). As William has raised PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the earliest opportunity, and PCRA counsel’s stewardship in

this Court is patently deficient, we vacate the order dismissing his petition and

remand for the appointment of new counsel to pursue any claims of PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness and, if warranted, to raise any of the other issues

that PCRA counsel purportedly failed to include in the amended petition. See

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401 (noting that claims of rule-based PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness spring from the original petition itself, and thus do not violate

the PCRA’s one-year time bar).3

       Order vacated.      Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

____________________________________________

3 While it is clear that PCRA counsel was ineffective in this Court, the certified
record is insufficient for this Court to resolve William’s claims of PCRA
counsel’s ineffectiveness in the PCRA court, thereby necessitating remand.
See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (explaining that “the appellate court may need
to remand to the PCRA court for further development of the record and for the
PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial matter).

                                           -3-
J-S03044-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/17/2023

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