Court Opinion

ID: 9880771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 16:08:24.68956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:31.310894
License: Public Domain

J-S05014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 RANDY SIMMONS                           :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 175 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 13, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0008799-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                 FILED: September 28, 2023

     Appellant, Randy Simmons, appeals from the judgment of sentence of

six months’ probation, imposed following his stipulated, non-jury trial

conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance, 35 P.S. §

780-113(a)(16). Appellant’s sole claim is that the suppression court erred in

holding that the arresting officer was authorized to perform a warrantless

search of his backpack as a search incident to the arrest. We affirm.

     The facts are straightforward, as the testimony from the suppression

hearing occupies roughly six pages of transcript. Sergeant Brian Turack of

the Harrison Township Police Department testified that on October 16, 2020,

at approximately 1 p.m., he was on routine patrol around a school when he

observed a male, later identified as Appellant, sitting on a bench. Appellant

appeared to be wearing dirty clothes, and Sergeant Turack believed that he
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may have been sleeping.      He and his partner approached Appellant, who

“began to growl. He had a hood over his head.” N.T. Suppression, 6/24/21,

at 6. “[Appellant] was talking about the Coronavirus and Taylor Swift and a

number of things." Id. Sergeant Turack conducted a records check and found

that Appellant had two active arrest warrants for probation violations.

Appellant was arrested and, during a search of his person, the officers

recovered a pocketknife from Appellant’s front left pocket.        “And in his

backpack, there was a prescription pill bottle containing what [the officer]

recognized to be Suboxone strips based on [his] past training and experience.

There was a name on the pill bottle that was not [Appellant]’s name.” Id. at

7-8. The backpack was described as “[r]ight beside him.” Id. at 8.

      The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress, and Appellant

proceeded to a stipulated, non-jury trial at the close of which he was convicted

of the above-stated offense.    Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and

complied with the court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The

trial court issued its responsive opinion. Appellant raises one claim for our

review:

      Were Appellant’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment to
      the United States Constitution and Article I[,] § 8 of the
      Pennsylvania Constitution violated when, after he was arrested on
      two arrest warrants and handcuffed, his backpack was opened by
      police, a prescription bottle inside that backpack was removed,
      the bottle was moved in such a way that its label could be read,
      the bottle was opened, and its contents inspected by the officers
      – all without a search-and-seizure warrant having been obtained?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

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      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      When we review the ruling of a suppression court, we must
      determine whether the factual findings are supported by the
      record. When it is a defendant who appealed, we must consider
      only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence
      for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a
      whole, remains uncontradicted. Assuming that there is support in
      the record, we are bound by the facts as are found and we may
      reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn
      from those facts are in error.

Commonwealth v. Bathurst, 288 A.3d 492, 496–97 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Brame, 239 A.3d 1119, 1126 (Pa. Super.

2020)).

      A   warrantless   search   is   presumptively   unreasonable,    and    the

Commonwealth is required to establish that an exception to the warrant

requirement applies. Commonwealth v. Martin, 253 A.3d 1225, 1228 (Pa.

Super. 2021). The exception relied upon by the Commonwealth is a search

incident to arrest. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United

States Supreme Court looked to its seminal decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1 (1968), which authorized a pat-down for weapons to protect officer

safety, to define the scope of a valid search incident to arrest:

      When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
      to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
      that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect
      his escape.     Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be
      endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is
      entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize
      any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its
      concealment or destruction. And the area into which an
      arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
      evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like

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      rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is
      arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
      concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample
      justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and
      the area ‘within his immediate control’—construing that phrase to
      mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a
      weapon or destructible evidence.

Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added). Thus, the search incident to arrest exception

is designed to protect officer safety and permit recovery of evidence. Only

the officer safety rationale is implicated here.

      This case requires a determination of whether Appellant’s backpack was

“within his immediate control” as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment and

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant conceded at

the suppression hearing that the backpack was within his control in terms of

physical proximity. N.T. Suppression, 6/24/21, at 12 (“I would agree this is

the   immediate    area.”).     The   more    difficult   question   is   whether,

notwithstanding that physical proximity, the fact that Appellant was in

handcuffs impeded his ability to access the backpack as a legal matter for

purposes of the exception. Id. (“He’s been placed in handcuffs and doesn’t

have the opportunity [to access] the bag.”). Id. According to Appellant, the

officers were authorized only to search his person:

      The testimony from the suppression hearing, it will be recalled,
      indicated that the prescription pill bottle was found inside
      Appellant’s backpack. Appellant was already in hand-cuffs when
      the backpack was searched, and nothing Appellant did before he
      was arrested indicated that he was about to extract a weapon or
      discard anything that existed within the backpack. All the police
      had to do was take Appellant in hand-cuffs into custody, and take
      the backpack, as is, along with them. If they wished to inspect

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      the contents of the backpack, they would need to secure a search
      warrant for it.

Appellant’s Brief at 18.

      At this juncture, discussion of bright-line rules concerning this warrant

exception is helpful.      The first rule was established in United States v.

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), which held that an arrest authorized a search

of the person regardless of whether the two principal justifications underlying

the Chimel exception were present.           The Robinson Court held it was

irrelevant whether the officer feared for his or her safety, and if the officer

had reason to suspect the individual possessed evidence, explaining:

      Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the
      authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not
      indicate any subjective fear of the respondent or that he did not
      himself suspect that respondent was armed. Having in the course
      of a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes,
      he was entitled to inspect it; and when his inspection revealed the
      heroin capsules, he was entitled to seize them as ‘fruits,
      instrumentalities, or contraband’ probative of criminal conduct.

Id. at 236 (footnotes omitted).

      Different rules apply when the search extends beyond the person. In

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the High Court addressed the

recurring problem of applying the search incident to arrest exception to the

interior of a vehicle after its occupants are arrested. “Although the principle

that limits a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest may be stated clearly

enough, courts have discovered the principle difficult to apply in specific

cases.” Id. at 458. The Court emphasized the need for a bright-line rule for

officers to apply in the field and held that “when a policeman has made a

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lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a

contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment

of that automobile.” Id.

      Automobile searches present distinct issues owing to the United States

Supreme    Court’s   view   of   the   automobile   exception   to   the   warrant

requirement. See generally Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177,

181–88 (Pa. 2020) (discussing the history of the automobile exception under

federal and Pennsylvania constitutional law). But the Belton holding did not

turn on notions of the federal view of a reduced expectation of privacy inherent

in an automobile but rather the Belton Court’s interpretation of Chimel. The

Belton Court explained that “[o]ur reading of the cases suggests the

generalization that articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the

passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not

inevitably, within ‘the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab

a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].’” Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel,

395 U.S. at 763) (bracketing in original)).

      Belton, however, has been largely overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 556

U.S. 332 (2009), and, as relevant here, whether an arrestee was in handcuffs

was important to the Gant analysis. The groundwork for Gant was laid in

Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), which addressed whether

Belton was limited to cases in which the officer first encounters an occupant

while the occupant was inside the vehicle.      The Thornton Court held that

Belton applied even if the officer first encounters the occupant after the

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occupant has already exited the vehicle. Justice Scalia authored a concurring

opinion, concurring in the result because he believed that the search was

authorized to recover evidence, but — unlike the Majority — he did not agree

that Belton and its interpretation of Chimel applied to justify such a search.

Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion identified and rejected “three reasons why

the search in this case might have been justified to protect officer safety or

prevent concealment or destruction of evidence.”         Id. at 625 (Scalia, J.,

concurring in judgment).      As relevant to this appeal, Justice Scalia was

skeptical that a handcuffed and secured suspect could access his or her car

for a weapon or evidence, saying that it “calls to mind Judge Goldberg’s

reference to the mythical arrestee ‘possessed of the skill of Houdini and the

strength of Hercules.’” Id. at 625-26 (citation omitted). He also noted that

the government could identify only one case in which a handcuffed arrestee

escaped from a patrol vehicle and retrieved a weapon from elsewhere. In

addition, Justice Scalia observed that the validity of an officer-safety rationale

need not depend on “specific instances in order to justify measures that avoid

obvious risks.   But the risk here is far from obvious….”      Id. at 626.    The

Chimel Court did not permit, as a matter of routine, a search of a room other

than the room in which an arrest occurs, and Justice Scalia argued that a

similar result should hold in the automobile context. In sum, he posited that

“if Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might grab a

weapon or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the car might

contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was arrested.” Id. at 629.

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       In Gant, the High Court significantly limited Belton. Until Gant, courts

had interpreted Belton to permit a vehicular search even when the arrestee

could not possibly access the passenger compartment.1              This result was

illogical, in light of the rationales justifying a search incident to arrest:

       To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every
       recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the
       justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly
       incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way alters
       the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case
       regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial
       arrests.” Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold
       that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle
       incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is
       unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
       compartment at the time of the search.

Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (citation omitted).

       While Gant and Belton involve automobile searches, both cases relied

in large part on Chimel, which governs searches of a person and nearby

effects, as in this case. This raises the question of whether Gant applies to

cases not involving automobiles.

       At the time of this writing, Pennsylvania appellate courts have cited

Gant only nine times, with none discussing this scenario.            We therefore

examine decisions from federal courts for their persuasive value. Shortly after

Gant, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed

____________________________________________

1 “Indeed, some courts have upheld searches under Belton ‘even when ... the

handcuffed arrestee has already left the scene.’” Gant, 556 U.S. at 342-43
(quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment)
(ellipsis in original)).

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whether Gant implicated searches, like this one, involving personal effects.

In United States v. Shakir, 616 F.3d 315 (3d Cir. 2010), federal officers

learned that Shakir, who was wanted for armed bank robbery, was staying at

a hotel. An arrest team went to the property and saw Shakir standing at the

end of a check-in line, holding a gym bag.      Shakir was detained without

incident and dropped the bag at his feet. The officer had difficulty placing

handcuffs on Shakir due to his girth. Within five minutes, two other officers

arrived with handcuffs that could accommodate Shakir.        After Shakir was

secured, officers searched the gym bag and discovered cash from a different

armed robbery.

      As an initial matter, the Shakir Court rejected the United States’

argument that Gant was irrelevant to cases involving the search of an

arrestee’s personal items.   The Court disagreed, because Gant “expressly

stated its desire to keep the rule of Belton tethered to the justifications

underlying the Chimel exception, and Chimel did not involve a car search.”

Id. at 318 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court explained that

Gant could be read “to prohibit the search of the bag unless at the time of the

search Shakir was both (1) unsecured and (2) within reaching distance of the

bag.” Id. at 320 (emphasis omitted). The panel declined to adopt this rule.

Instead, it acknowledged that Gant “makes clear that whether a suspect is

‘secured’ is an important consideration” in analyzing the search. The Shakir

Court described “the Court’s references to a suspect being ‘unsecured’ and

being ‘within reaching distance’ … [as] two ways of describing a single

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standard rather than independent prongs of a two-part test.” Id. Additionally,

it noted that the closing language of Gant stated that police may search “only

if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment” at

the time of the search. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351. To the Shakir Court, the

“conspicuous absence” of any mention of whether the suspect was “secured”

in that reference suggests that “the Court did not regard it as an independent

element that must be satisfied in order to justify a search incident to arrest.”

Shakir, 616 F.3d at 320. The panel in Shakir ultimately concluded that the

relevant standard is whether there “remains a reasonable possibility that the

arrestee could access a weapon or destructible evidence in the container or

area being searched.” Id. at 321. In meeting this burden, the government

must show “something more than a mere theoretical possibility,” but “it

remains a lenient standard.” Id. Other decisions take a narrower view of

Gant’s applicability to non-vehicular searches.       See United States v.

Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2010) (officers validly searched bag

after suspect arrested and another police officer had taken control of the item;

“While the explanation in Gant of the rationale for searches incident to arrest

may prove to be instructive outside the vehicle-search context in some cases,

we agree with the Government that this is not such a case.”).2

____________________________________________

2 Judge Lazarus “disagree[s] that the instant case is analogous” to these
precedents “as Simmons was neither in, nor operating, a vehicle.” Concurring
Statement at 2 n.2. Of course, we do not claim that the case is factually
analogous to an automobile search. As explained throughout, the relevance
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       With this backdrop in mind, we address the parties’ specific arguments.3

Appellant argues for a per se rule that he was completely secured by virtue of
____________________________________________

of the automobile search cases is that those precedents themselves address
and apply Chimel, which established the scope of the search incident to arrest
exception to the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we believe it worthwhile to discuss
whether the Gant case bears on searches outside of the automobile context.
See United States v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2019) (“At the
outset, we note that although Gant specifically addressed the search of an
automobile, its principles apply more broadly.”). Of course, we do not claim
that this is a universal proposition. See United States v. Gordon, 895 F.
Supp. 2d 1011, 1023 (D. Haw. 2012), aff'd, 694 F. App'x 556 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“Gant, which did not analyze a search of an arrestee’s person, does nothing
to change this binding circuit precedent regarding searches of wallets found
on a suspect.”).
3 In lieu of deciding the case based on the arguments presented, our learned

colleague concludes that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered
as an inventory search pursuant to Appellant’s arrest. Concurring Statement
at 1 n.1 (citing Commonwealth v. Bailey, 986 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 2009)).
We respectfully disagree.

        Judge Lazarus purports to affirm under the familiar principle that a court
may do so on any ground supported by the record, but the fact that the
Commonwealth did not raise this theory precludes this Court from relying on
it. The record does not support the finding that the officers inevitably would
have inventoried the contents of the bag, for the simple reason that nothing
in the record addresses that issue. It may well be the case that “once in
custody, the officers could have easily taken the proper steps to log Simmons’
bag into inventory,” Concurring Statement at 3, but this is pure speculation
that finds no record support. As Bailey indicates, the prosecution must
“establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegally obtained
evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means[.]” Bailey, 986 A.2d at 862. This Court cannot cite any evidence at
all, let alone a preponderance.

      Worse, declaring that the evidence was admissible under that theory
obviously prevents Appellant from challenging the validity of said policies.
Judge Lazarus claims to “make no determinations regarding the
constitutionality of the jail’s or police department’s specific inventory policies,”
Concurring Statement at 4 n.4., but this is not true: by invoking the rationale
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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handcuffs and, thus, there was no possibility he could access the backpack.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that there is no dispute that

the backpack was near Appellant and was therefore accessible. It cites as

instructive Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261 (Pa. 2001) (OAJC), a

case involving the search incident to arrest exception where the suspect was

in handcuffs at the time of the search.

       In Taylor, officers executed a search warrant at a convenience store.

After locating the target of the search warrant, two officers went to the

basement. There, officers observed Taylor sitting in a barber’s chair with an

apron over his torso, with John Mahone cutting his hair. Taylor moved his

hands under the apron, and he was frisked. An officer recovered a prescription

bottle containing what appeared to be crack cocaine. Taylor was placed under

arrest, and Mahone was handcuffed, apparently for officer safety at that point

in the encounter. Officers then “searched two coats, which were draped on a

chair ten feet from Taylor and Mahone.”            Id. at 1264.   More drugs were
____________________________________________

sua sponte, Judge Lazarus necessarily concludes that such a search would
indeed be constitutional under these circumstances. The Commonwealth
bears the burden of establishing that the challenged evidence was not
obtained in violation of Appellant’s rights. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H) (“The
Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence and
of establishing that the challenged evidence was not obtained in violation of
the defendant’s rights.”). Accordingly, asserting that the inevitable discovery
theory applies notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s failure to raise the
exception concludes that the policies (of which, it bears repeating, we know
nothing) may be constitutionally applied, thereby both relieving the
Commonwealth of its burden and depriving Appellant of the ability to respond.
It would be fundamentally unfair to deprive Appellant of the opportunity to
respond to this claim.

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discovered, and both men were charged. Our Supreme Court determined that

this search exceeded the scope of the search incident to arrest exception, as

the coats were too far away to be readily accessible.      The Commonwealth

notes that the Court did not rest its conclusion on the fact that both men were

handcuffed but rather the distance of the coats. Thus, in its view, Taylor is

instructive because, unlike the coats in Taylor, the backpack here was readily

accessible.

      We find Taylor to be of little value. The fact that the lead opinion in

Taylor did not base its analysis on the presence of handcuffs does not signal

that the Justices in the plurality would have upheld the search if the items had

been situated right next to Taylor and Mahone. Nothing in the Taylor opinion

even indicates that an argument concerning the effect of handcuffs was made.

Moreover, the Taylor decision pre-dates Gant. Thus, to the extent that the

Commonwealth maintains that mere physical proximity always justifies a

search, we cannot agree that this theory is compatible with Gant, assuming

arguendo that the case speaks to searches like this one. See United States

v. Knapp, 917 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2019) (holding that search incident to

arrest rationale did not permit search of purse located three to four feet behind

arrested suspect as the suspect’s hands were cuffed behind her back and

police officers maintained exclusive possession of the purse).

      We also reject Appellant’s per se rule that the Chimel rule cannot apply

if the suspect is handcuffed. Appellant has not directed our attention to any

case from any jurisdiction concluding that a handcuffed suspect is simply

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unable to access a backpack or some other type of personal effect that is near

the suspect. We have set forth our survey of the law in this area, and it is fair

to say that whether the suspect is handcuffed is certainly a factor in the

analysis. But it is not the only one. The Knapp case specified four factors to

determine whether an item is within what the panel called “an arrestee’s grab

area”: “(1) whether the arrestee is handcuffed; (2) the relative number of

arrestees and officers present; (3) the relative positions of the arrestees,

officers, and the place to be searched; and (4) the ease or difficulty with which

the arrestee could gain access to the searched area.” Id. at 1168-69. Other

decisions applying Gant to this type of fact pattern likewise emphasize the

specific facts. See United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2021)

(concluding that search incident to arrest of a backpack was not justified

because the suspect was lying face-down with his hands cuffed behind his

back, with three officers present, one of whom was pointing a gun at Davis).

We need not decide how those factors, or any others, apply in this case. We

conclude that it is sufficient to observe that Appellant relies on a per se rule

as the basis for reversing the suppression court.       We find his argument

unsupported and, therefore, we conclude that the search incident to arrest

exception applies.4

____________________________________________

4 Appellant raised his claim under both the Fourth Amendment and Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. His motion to suppress noted that
our Supreme Court rejected Belton in Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Finally, while Appellant has presented a single issue for our review, his

argument encompasses two distinct claims. We have addressed and rejected

the first of these. The remaining claim relies upon Arizona v. Hicks, 480

U.S. 321 (1987), which held that an officer performed a search by moving

some stereo equipment to look for its serial numbers on reasonable suspicion,

but not probable cause, that the equipment was stolen. The officers were in

an apartment due to a shooting, i.e., an exigency unrelated to the stereo

equipment. The High Court determined that “taking action, unrelated to the
____________________________________________

896 (Pa. 1995), and therefore our constitutional provision provides greater
protections in this area. As the White Court stated:

       Merely arresting someone does not give police carte blanche to
       search any property belonging to the arrestee. Certainly, a police
       officer may search the arrestee’s person and the area in which the
       person is detained in order to prevent the arrestee from obtaining
       weapons or destroying evidence, but otherwise, absent an
       exigency, the arrestee’s privacy interests remain intact as against
       a warrantless search. In short, there is no justifiable search
       incident to arrest under the Pennsylvania Constitution save for the
       search of the person and the immediate area which the person
       occupies during his custody, as stated above.

Id. at 902 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).

We do not interpret White to stand for the proposition that Article I, Section
8 provides greater protections in the sense that the search incident to arrest
exception cannot apply if the suspect is handcuffed. Moreover, aspects of the
White holding are more in line with the later decision in Gant. See Gant,
556 U.S. at 344-45 (“[T]he State seriously undervalues the privacy interests
at stake. … It is particularly significant that Belton searches authorize police
officers to search not just the passenger compartment but every purse,
briefcase, or other container within that space.”). Because White references
the “immediate area which the person occupies” standard, we do not find that
Appellant has preserved a claim that the Pennsylvania Constitution supports
the proposed per se rule.

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objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to view concealed

portions of the apartment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of

respondent’s privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated

the entry.” Id. at 325. In the case sub judice, Appellant argues that the

officers performed several searches, by (1) opening the backpack; (2)

removing a pill bottle; (3) manipulating the pill bottle; and (4) opening the

pill bottle to look inside.   Appellant argues that the Commonwealth must

establish that each of these searches satisfied an exception to the warrant

requirement.

      The Commonwealth argues that this claim is waived as Appellant did not

raise it as a basis to suppress. We agree. “[A]ppellate review of [a ruling on]

suppression is limited to examination of the precise basis under which

suppression initially was sought; no new theories of relief may be considered

on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 188 A.3d 478, 483–84 (Pa. Super.

2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 903 A.2d 1269, 1272–73 (Pa.

Super. 2006)).

      Appellant’s pre-trial motion did not raise this claim, and Appellant did

not raise it in any fashion at the suppression hearing. We also observe that

our conclusion that the backpack was properly searched under the Chimel

rationale authorized the search. In Hicks, the act of moving equipment to

see serial numbers was a search that was wholly unjustified, as it was

unrelated to the exigency that allowed the officers to enter the apartment

without a warrant. Here, the search incident to arrest exception authorized a

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search of the backpack. Appellant argued only that the police had no lawful

right of access to the backpack by virtue of his being handcuffed, not that the

officers exceeded the scope of an otherwise authorized search. We therefore

agree with the Commonwealth that this argument is waived.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

      Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.

      Judge Lazarus files a concurring memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2023

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