Court Opinion

ID: 9483070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:09:40.593256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:23.729214
License: Public Domain

McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of the statute of limitations under the FDCPA, I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, when a statute states “[a]n action ... may be brought ... within one year from the date on which the violation occurs,” its plain meaning is that an action may be brought on or before the one-year anniversary of the date on which the violation occurred. For example, if the violation occurred on January 1, 1991, a claimant must file on or before January 1, 1992. Likewise, a six-month limitation period would end on the six-month anniversary date of the triggering event. Under this approach, sometimes referred to as the “modern doctrine,” federal statutes of limitations are interpreted by following the principles set forth in Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
*263The modern doctrine has been widely adopted by federal courts in interpreting federal statutes of limitations. See Gervais v. United States, 865 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir.1988) (six-month limitations period under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) statute of limitations4 ends on six-month anniversary date of mailing of denial of claim); Maahs v. United States, 840 F.2d 863, 866-67 (11th Cir.1988) (“joining the majority of circuits that have dealt with this issue,” Rule 6(a) applies to FTCA statute of limitations; general policy is that Rule 6(a) applies to federal statutes enacted or amended after promulgation of the rule5); Monkelis v. Mobay Chemical, 827 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir.1987) (“In determining the final date of the limitations period, we follow the method of calculation used in Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) at least in nondiversity cases.”); Tribue v. United States, 826 F.2d 633, 635 (7th Cir.1987) (FTCA six-month limitations period runs from the day after the triggering event occurs through the day before the same calendar date six months later, i.e., ends on anniversary date or, in some cases, one day after6); In re Gotham Provision Co., 669 F.2d 1000, 1014 (5th Cir.) (“[t]his court has consistently used Rule 6(a)’s method for computing federal statutory time limitations”) (citing Lawson v. Conyers Chrysler, Plymouth, & Dodge Trucks, Inc., 600 F.2d 465, 466 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that Truth in Lending Act’s one-year statute of limitations7 begins to run on day after triggering event and ends on one-year anniversary of date of triggering event)), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 858, 103 S.Ct. 129, 74 L.Ed.2d 111 (1982); Kollios v. United States, 512 F.2d 1316, 1317 (1st Cir.1975) (Kollios) (under “modern doctrine,” computation of six-month statute of limitations under FTCA excludes initial or trigger day and includes last day of six-month period, i.e., anniversary date); Winters v. United States Postal Service, 721 F.Supp. 1388, 1389 n. 2 (D.D.C.1989) (noting that courts are in agreement that six-month limitation period under the FTCA begins to run the day after the triggering event, but are split as to whether the period ends on the six-month anniversary date or one day after); Murray v. United States Postal Service, 569 F.Supp. 794, 796 (N.D.N.Y.1983) (Murray) (limitation period under FTCA began to run the day after the mailing of the agency notice and ended on six-month anniversary date); Yedwab v. United States, 489 F.Supp. 717, 719 (D.N.J. 1980) (Yedwab) (FTCA statute of limitations, “like Rule 6(a), excludes the day of the event and includes the last day of the specified period”).
By contrast, Rust v. Quality Car Corral, Inc., 614 F.2d 1118 (6th Cir.1980), cited by the majority, is the only case interpreting a federal statute of limitations so that the limitation period expires on the day before the pertinent anniversary date.
The majority opinion also rejects McDuffee v. United States, 769 F.2d 492 (8th Cir.1985) (McDuffee), involving the six-month statute of limitations under the FTCA, as support in this circuit for the modern doctrine. I agree that McDuffee, strictly limited to its holding, merely rejects an “anniversary date plus one” rule. However, when read in its entirety, I believe that McDuffee certainly favors application of the modern doctrine. We stated in McDuffee “[w]e have no doubt that Mur*264ray, Yedwab, and Kollios, are correct.” Id. at 494. As we recognized in McDuffee, each of those cases applied the modern doctrine and held that the six-month statute of limitations under the FTCA ends on the six-month anniversary date. In fact, our statement of agreement with Murray, Yedwab, and Kollios directly followed this quote from Kollios:
Appellants’ administrative claims were denied by letter dated July 23,1973. The district court applied the so-called “modern doctrine” for the computation of the six-month period, excluding the initial or trigger day and including the last day of the period. Using this method of calculation and taking July 23 as the trigger day, it is clear that the six-month statute ended on January 23, 1974.
512 F.2d at 1316-17 (cited in McDuffee, 769 F.2d at 494). Similarly, in the present case, if the triggering event occurred on November 27, 1989, the one-year limitation period under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) should have ended on November 27, 1990, the date the complaint was filed. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court insofar as it dismisses Mattson’s claims arising out of the letter dated November 27, 1989.8

. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.

. Rule 6(a) was adopted in 1937; 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(k) was enacted in 1977 and became effective in 1978.

. Under this rule, the limitations period will always end on the anniversary date, unless the triggering event occurred on the last day of the month, in which case, the limitations period may end one day after the anniversary date. Tribue v. United States, 826 F.2d 633, 635 (7th Cir.1987).

. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) provides in pertinent part: "Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation.”

. Under this approach, it would be unnecessary to reach the issue of whether, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), the violations occurred on the dates of mailing or the dates of receipt of the allegedly unlawful letters. Under either approach, claims arising out of the letter dated November 10, 1989, would be time-barred and those arising out of the letter dated November 27, 1989, would not.