Court Opinion

ID: 9918692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 15:06:06.69072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:40.128673
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

     William DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (A-37-22) (087891)

Argued September 26, 2023 -- Decided January 10, 2024

FASCIALE, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

       The Court considers whether the refund provision contained in N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2.11 provides relief for all violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA),
or whether it is limited solely to the food-related misrepresentations expressly
proscribed in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9, which codified another section of the same
legislative act -- L. 1979, c. 347 (Chapter 347) -- that created the refund provision.

        Plaintiff William DeSimone and the class of plaintiffs he represents brought
suit against defendant Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (Springpoint). Alleging in
relevant part that Springpoint violated the CFA with regard to representations about
its entrance fee refund policy, plaintiffs sought the return of “all monies received or
collected from” them by Springpoint. Plaintiffs relied on N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 in
seeking that relief.

       Springpoint moved to dismiss, arguing that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 applies only to
misrepresentations regarding food, as outlined in Chapter 347, and not to violations
of other CFA provisions. The trial judge denied the motion, citing cases that had, in
the court’s view, “broadly appl[ied] the refund provision.” The Appellate Division
denied leave to appeal. The Court granted leave to appeal. 253 N.J. 457 (2023).

HELD: The refund provision is limited in scope: N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 provides relief
only to victims of food-related fraud as identified in Chapter 347 and does not
extend to all CFA violations. Because the allegations in this matter are unrelated to
misrepresentations of the “identity of food,” plaintiffs are not entitled to a full
refund under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

1. From its enactment in 1960, the CFA has imposed liability upon those who
engage in certain “unlawful practice[s].” See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2. As consumer
practices have evolved, the CFA has been repeatedly amended and expanded. In
furtherance of its mission to protect consumers, the Legislature enacted Chapter 347
in 1979. Codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 to -2.13, Chapter 347 broadened protections
for New Jersey consumers by expanding what constitutes an “unlawful practice” to
                                           1
include misrepresentations of the identity of food. See N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9. And
Chapter 347 created a refund remedy whereby “[a]ny person violating the provisions
of the within act shall be liable for a refund of all moneys acquired by means of any
practice declared herein to be unlawful.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. (pp. 11-14)

2. Chapter 347’s refund provision contains key language suggesting its scope is
limited: “Any person violating the provisions of the within act shall be liable for a
refund of all moneys acquired by means of any practice declared herein to be
unlawful.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 (emphases added). The plain meanings of “within”
and “declared herein” suggest that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 is limited in application to the
provisions of Chapter 347. In other supplementary CFA statutes, the Legislature has
used similar language to that found in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 -- “the within act” -- to
explicitly distinguish those supplementary acts from the CFA in its entirety.
Furthermore, Chapter 347 is not the only conduct-specific supplementary statute to
provide additional rights and remedies, including consumer refunds. If the refunds
authorized in each supplementary statute applied to the CFA at large, there would be
no need for multiple refund provisions. The Court explains how any lingering
ambiguity as to the scope of Chapter 347’s refund provision is unmistakably settled
by the statute’s legislative history. And the Court notes that construing N.J.S.A.
56:8-2.11 to apply only to violations of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 and not to the entire CFA
avoids awarding damages in an amount disproportionate to the harm suffered, in
keeping with the Court’s duty to interpret a statute to avoid running afoul of
constitutional protections. (pp. 15-19)

3. Plaintiffs allege that Springpoint engaged in deceptive advertising practices and
provided misleading disclosure statements regarding Springpoint’s return policy of
resident entrance fees under its “90% refundable plan.” Those allegations pertain
entirely to misrepresentations about fees charged by a senior living facility. None of
plaintiffs’ allegations are related to misrepresentations of food. Thus, the claims are
not governed by N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 and the refund provision in -2.11 does not apply.
The Court reviews the cases on which plaintiffs rely in arguing that N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2.11 applies to the entire CFA. Noting that the cases focus on other issues and that
their references to N.J.S.A 56:8-2.11 were background statements or dicta, the Court
finds that none of the isolated references to Chapter 347’s provisions in its previous
cases suggest that the food-related refund remedy applies broadly to all CFA
violations. And the Court expressly holds here that it does not. (pp. 20-22)

      REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
FASCIALE’s opinion.

                                           2
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-37 September Term 2022
                        087891

           William DeSimone, as Executor
          of the Estate of Evelyn DeSimone,
       deceased, individually in such capacities
               and on behalf of all others
                   similarly situated,

                 Plaintiff-Respondent,

                           v.

           Springpoint Senior Living, Inc.,
         Springpoint at Monroe Village, Inc.,
          Springpoint at Montgomery, Inc.,
           Springpoint at Crestwood, Inc.,
         Springpoint at Meadow Lakes, Inc.,
         and Springpoint at the Atrium, Inc.,

                Defendants-Appellants.

         On appeal from the Superior Court,
                Appellate Division .

      Argued                         Decided
 September 26, 2023              January 10, 2024

Bruce W. Clark argued the cause for appellants (Clark
Michie and Morgan Lewis & Bockius, attorneys; Bruce
W. Clark, Christopher J. Michie, Stephanie R. Feingold,
and Jamie Huffman, on the briefs).

Eric S. Pasternack argued the cause for respondent
(Cohen, Placitella, & Roth and Mayer Law Group,
attorneys; Eric S. Pasternack, Christopher M. Placitella,

                           1
            Michael Coren, William L. Kuzmin, and Carl Mayer, on
            the briefs).

            Alex R. Daniel argued the cause for amicus curiae New
            Jersey Civil Justice Institute (New Jersey Civil Justice
            Institute, attorneys; Anthony M. Anastasio, of counsel,
            and Alex R. Daniel, of counsel and on the brief).

            Edward J. Fanning, Jr., argued the cause for amici curiae
            New Jersey Business & Industry Association, New Jersey
            Chamber of Commerce, and Commerce and Industry
            Association of New Jersey (McCarter & English,
            attorneys; Edward J. Fanning, Jr., David R. Kott, and
            Leroy E. Foster, of counsel and on the brief).

           JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In 1960, the Legislature enacted the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act

(CFA) to protect New Jersey consumers from unconscionable and deceptive

commercial practices. Over time, to achieve that goal, the Legislature has

expanded consumer protections through various supplemental statutes, one of

which is central to this appeal.

      Striving to combat food-related fraud, the Legislature enacted L. 1979, c.

347 (Chapter 347), codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 to -2.13. In this class action

case, we address whether the refund provision contained in Section Three of

Chapter 347, codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11, provides relief for all CFA

violations, or whether it is limited solely to the food-related misrepresentations

                                        2
expressly proscribed in Section One of Chapter 347, codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-

2.9.

       We hold that the refund provision is limited in scope: N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11

provides relief only to victims of food-related fraud as identified in Chapter

347 and does not extend to all CFA violations. Here, the alleged conduct deals

with misrepresentations of a senior living facility’s entrance fee, not food.

Because those allegations are unrelated to misrepresentations of the “identity

of food,” plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their entrance fees under

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

       We therefore reverse the order under review and enter partial summary

judgment in defendants’ favor, dismissing with prejudice the part of plaintiffs’

complaint that seeks refund damages under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. We remand for

further proceedings.

                                         I.

                                        A.

       We derive the pertinent facts from the allegations contained in plaintiffs’

amended complaint.

       In February 2009, plaintiff William DeSimone and his siblings moved

their mother, Evelyn DeSimone, into Springpoint Monroe Village, one of the

“Continuing Care Retirement Communities” owned and operated by defendant

                                         3
Springpoint Senior Living, Inc. (Springpoint). In addition to monthly service

fees and “other fees” relating to activities, incidentals, and medical care,

Springpoint charges an entrance fee for residents. The amount of the entrance

fee varies from $84,000 to over $700,000, depending on the Springpoint

facility and living accommodation unit.

      Springpoint offers two different “entrance fee refund” plans -- a

“traditional plan” and the plan relevant to this appeal, a “90% refundable

plan.” The “90% refundable plan” is available upon election to pay a higher

entrance fee. Through oral statements, marketing, and sales materials,

Springpoint represented that under the “90% refundable plan,” 90% of the

entrance fee a resident paid, minus applicable deductions for medical care

provided, would be refunded to the resident’s estate when the resident dies or

moves out of the facility. In its disclosure statements, Springpoint likewise

stated that the “90% refundable plan” “allows for up to 90% of the entrance

fee to be refunded.”

      Those disclosures, however, also stated that the entrance fee refund

policy is explained in greater detail in an attached “Residence & Care”

agreement. Plaintiffs allege that the additional information is found “buried”

on page 20, in Section VI of that agreement. They assert that, “contrary to all

other prior representations and descriptions by Springpoint, including the

                                         4
Disclosure Statement,” the language on page 20 provided “that the 90% refund

would be paid without interest based on the lesser of the original entrance fee

paid or the subsequent resident’s entrance fee,” subject to certain additional

deductions. (emphasis added).

      The DeSimone family paid an entrance fee totaling $159,000 and

selected the “90% refundable plan.” According to the complaint, the

DeSimone family believed that, if Evelyn moved out of the facility or passed

away, 90% of the $159,000 paid entrance fee would be refunded, minus

incurred medical costs. After Evelyn passed away in April 2010, Springpoint

sent William a check for $80,136, accounting for approximately 50% of the

entrance fee paid. When William inquired about the amount of the refund,

Springpoint responded that the refund had been calculated based on the

entrance fee paid by the resident who subsequently moved into Evelyn’s unit.

That resident paid an entrance fee of $127,000, and Springpoint calculated the

refund based on that lesser amount in keeping with Section VI of the

“Residence & Care” agreement.

      Plaintiffs allege that the DeSimone family was unaware of the “highly

material ‘lesser than’ caveat” limiting the entrance fee refund policy because it

was “buried on page 20 in the lengthy Residence and Care Agreement.” They

assert that had they known of the limiting provision, the DeSimone family

                                        5
would not have moved Evelyn into Springpoint Monroe Village. Plaintiffs

further allege that Springpoint failed to disclose that it actively offered

substantial entrance fee discounts to attract prospective residents -- discounts

that, in turn, could affect the prior resident’s refund under the “90% refundable

plan.” They contend that the circumstances alleged by the DeSimone family

are common to the class.

      Relevant to the present appeal, plaintiffs asserted two counts of CFA

violations: (1) “Misleading Advertisements/Marketing Collateral Materials”

and (2) “Misleading Disclosure Statement[s].” On those two counts, and

relying on N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11, plaintiffs sought damages from Springpoint “to

disgorge and make restitution . . . by repaying all monies received or collected

from” plaintiffs. Based on this language, plaintiffs sought to recover not only

the full refunds that they claim they were entitled to receive under the “90%

refundable plan,” but also all money that each resident paid for the rental of a

unit and for the services that Springpoint provided.

      In June 2021, the trial judge certified the class and appointed plaintiff

William DeSimone as a class representative.

                                        B.

      In June 2022, Springpoint moved for judgment on the pleadings under

Rule 4:6-2, and/or partial summary judgment under Rule 4:46, to dismiss

                                         6
plaintiffs’ claims for a full refund under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. Springpoint

argued that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 applies only to misrepresentations regarding

food, as outlined in Chapter 347, and not to violations of other CFA provisions.

The trial judge denied Springpoint’s motion, stating that she could not “ignore

the precedential cases” that plaintiffs cited -- Lemelledo v. Beneficial

Management Corp. of America, 150 N.J. 255 (1997), Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.,

173 N.J. 233 (2002), and Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24 (2017).

According to the trial judge, those cases “broadly appl[ied] the refund

provision.”

      Springpoint moved for leave to appeal from the order denying its motion

for partial dismissal of the complaint. The Appellate Division denied the

motion, concluding that interlocutory “review [was] not necessary in the

interests of justice.”

      This Court granted leave to appeal. 253 N.J. 457 (2023). We also

granted motions from the New Jersey Civil Justice Institute (NJCJI), and from

the New Jersey Business and Industry Association, the New Jersey Chamber of

Commerce, and the Commerce and Industry Association of New Jersey

(collectively, NJBIA), to appear as amici curiae.

                                        7
                                        II.

      Springpoint asks us to reverse the trial judge’s order and grant partial

summary judgment in its favor. Springpoint argues that the words “within”

and “herein” found in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 limit the refund provision to acts

proscribed in Chapter 347 and not to violations of the broader CFA.

Springpoint further contends that the legislative history surrounding N.J.S.A.

56:8-2.11 supports that limited reading. In Springpoint’s view, the trial judge

relied on dicta contained in Lemelledo, Weinberg, and Dugan -- cases that did

not address the scope of the refund remedy at issue in this appeal.

      Plaintiffs argue that the word “act” in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 refers to the

entire CFA, relying on Lemelledo and Sun Chemical Corp. v. Fike Corp., 243

N.J. 319 (2020). Plaintiffs contend that, in those cases, this Court held that the

phrase “this act” referred to the CFA generally when construing the cumulative

remedies provision found in Section Five of Chapter 347, codified at N.J.S.A.

56:8-2.13. Plaintiffs also assert that Lemelledo, Weinberg, and Dugan

constitute binding precedent and that the Legislature’s implicit acquiescence to

those decisions confirms that the refund provision applies to all violations of

the CFA. Lastly, plaintiffs maintain that, so long as a CFA plaintiff pleads an

ascertainable loss that can withstand a motion for summary judgment, other

CFA remedies (like refunds) are available.

                                        8
      NJCJI supports Springpoint’s legal contentions and argues that Chapter

347 did not create a “generally applicable” refund remedy for all CFA

violations. NJCJI asserts that allowing otherwise would lead to results where a

plaintiff would receive a “windfall unmoored from their actual losses.” NJCJI

emphasizes that New Jersey has adopted a comprehensive statutory and

regulatory framework to monitor and regulate retirement communities. It

asserts that the Legislature, in enacting a refund remedy and self-help cause of

action to combat misrepresentations in the food industry, eliminated the need

for the State to inspect menus and kitchens. That policy rationale, according to

NJCJI, does not extend to the heavily regulated retirement communities in

New Jersey.

      NJBIA also supports Springpoint, echoing many of Springpoint’s

arguments, specifically that the “within” language in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 limits

the scope of the refund remedy. NJBIA contends that interpreting the refund

provision to apply beyond the food industry to claims under the entire CFA

could impose monetary penalties wholly removed from a plaintiff’s actual

damages and thereby run afoul of clear constitutional protections against

excessive damages.

                                       9
                                        III.

                                        A.

      We review the denial of summary judgment de novo. Samolyk v. Berthe,

251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Summary judgment should be granted “if the

discovery and any affidavits ‘show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or

order as a matter of law.’” Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388,

405 (2013) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)). When “only a question of law remains, this

Court affords no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial

court.” Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 199 (2016).

      We also review the interpretation of a statute’s meaning de novo,

Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013). We utilize our “established

rules of statutory construction” in interpreting the CFA, and “[o]ur goal ‘is to

determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.’” Perez, 215 N.J. at 399

(quoting Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009)).

      In doing so, “we first examine the statute’s plain language, giving its

‘words their ordinary meaning and significance,’ and reading those words in

the context of ‘related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a

whole.’” Ibid. (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). If the

                                        10
statutory language is ambiguous and “leads to more than one plausible

interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, ‘including legislative history,

committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.’” DiProspero, 183 N.J.

at 492-93 (quoting Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75

(2004)).

      Turning to the CFA, we construe it “in light of its objective to greatly

expand protections for New Jersey consumers.” D’Agostino v. Maldonado,

216 N.J. 168, 183 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The CFA is remedial

legislation, which the “courts liberally enforce . . . to fulfill its objective to

protect consumers from prohibited unconscionable acts by sellers.” All the

Way Towing, LLC v. Bucks Cnty. Int’l, Inc., 236 N.J. 431, 434 (2019). “But

while liberality of construction of remedial legislation is desirable, we cannot

ignore the plain meaning of the language employed by the Legislature . . . .”

Wormack v. Howard, 33 N.J. 139, 142 (1960).

                                          B.

      The Legislature enacted the CFA in 1960, Perez, 215 N.J. at 399, “to

‘combat sharp practices and dealings that victimized consumers by luring them

into purchase through fraudulent or deceptive means,’” D’Agostino, 216 N.J.

at 183 (quoting Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 16 (1994)). From the

outset, the CFA imposed liability upon those who engaged in certain “unlawful

                                          11
practice[s].” See L. 1960, c. 39 (codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2). In its present

form, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 provides:

            The act, use or employment by any person of any
            commercial practice that is unconscionable or abusive,
            deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise,
            misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment,
            suppression, or omission of any material fact with
            intent that others rely upon such concealment,
            suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale or
            advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with
            the subsequent performance of such person as
            aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been
            misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be
            an unlawful practice . . . .

            [N.J.S.A. 56:8-2 (emphasis added).]

      As consumer practices have evolved, the Legislature has amended and

supplemented the CFA to provide additional protections to consumers,

including what is arguably the greatest expansion of the CFA -- a 1971

amendment authorizing a private right of action. See L. 1971, c. 247 § 7

(codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-19); see also Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA,

LLC, 183 N.J. 234, 245-46 (2005) (explaining how “[i]t is a well-known fact

that the CFA initially conferred enforcement power exclusively on the Attorney

General” but was amended to add a private right of action “[t]o augment . . .

enforcement efforts”).

      In addition to a private cause of action, the CFA has “been ‘repeatedly

amended and expanded . . . often by adding sections to address particular areas
                                       12
of concern.’” Sun Chem. Corp., 243 N.J. at 330 (omission in original)

(emphasis added) (quoting Czar, Inc. v. Heath, 198 N.J. 195, 201 (2009)). The

Legislature has broadened the definition of an “unlawful practice” under the

CFA to address specific practices as they arise or become prevalent, including

the following: wrongfully implying association with a department or agency

of the federal or state government, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.1; false advertising,

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.2; selling expired non-prescription drugs, infant formula, or

baby food, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.27(a); placing unsafe children’s products “in the

stream of commerce,” N.J.S.A. 56:8-53.2(a); labeling food as kosher without

disclosing the basis for that representation, N.J.S.A. 56:8-63; and falsely

presenting oneself as a certified industrial hygienist, N.J.S.A. 56:8-84.

      In furtherance of its mission to protect consumers, the Legislature

enacted the supplemental statute at issue in this appeal, L. 1979, c. 347,

codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 to -2.13. Chapter 347 broadened protections for

New Jersey consumers by expanding what constitutes an “unlawful practice”

to include misrepresentations of the identity of food:

            It shall be an unlawful practice for any person to
            misrepresent on any menu or other posted information,
            including advertisements, the identity of any food or
            food products to any of the patrons or customers of
            eating establishments including but not limited to
            restaurants, hotels, cafes, lunch counters or other places
            where food is regularly prepared and sold for
            consumption on or off the premises . . . .
                                       13
                [N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 (emphases added).]

Chapter 347 defines when an act constitutes a misrepresentation of the identity

of food or food products. For example, a food product is misrepresented if

“served, sold, or distributed under the name of another . . . food product.”

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.10(c).

      Importantly, Chapter 347 created a refund remedy whereby “[a]ny

person violating the provisions of the within act shall be liable for a refund of

all moneys acquired by means of any practice declared herein to be unlawful.”

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. The refund may be recovered in a private action, id.

at -2.12, and may be awarded “in addition to and cumulative of any other right,

remedy or prohibition accorded by the common law or statutes of this State,”

id. at -2.13.

      Our focus in this case is the scope of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. Specifically,

we must determine whether the refund it authorizes applies only to violations

of the concurrently enacted rules concerning misrepresentations of the identity

of food, or whether -2.11 fundamentally expands the remedies available for

any violation of the CFA to include a refund.

                                         14
                                        IV.

      We hold that the refund provision in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 is limited and

provides relief only to victims of the unlawful acts dealing with food-related

misrepresentations proscribed in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9. The refund remedy does

not apply to other unlawful acts under the CFA, and it does not apply to the

CFA generally. Thus, plaintiffs are not entitled to the full refund of their

entrance fees, or to a refund of the money that they paid for the rental of a unit,

or for services provided to them during their residence at a Springpoint facility

under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

                                        A.

      Chapter 347’s refund provision contains key language suggesting its

scope is limited: “Any person violating the provisions of the within act shall

be liable for a refund of all moneys acquired by means of any practice declared

herein to be unlawful.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 (emphases added).

      The term “within” is typically used “to indicate [a] situation or

circumstance in the limits of or compass of,” or “not beyond the quantity,

degree or limitations of,” a particular matter. Webster’s New Collegiate

Dictionary 1347 (8th ed. 1973). The plain meaning of “within” therefore

implies that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 is limited in application to the provisions of

Chapter 347. The same is true of the phrase “declared herein.” N.J.S.A. 56:8-

                                        15
2.11. “Declare” means “to make clear” or “to make known formally or

explicitly.” Webster’s at 294. “Herein” is defined as “in this.” Id. at 535.

Thus, the plain meaning of “declared herein,” when read in the context of

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 -- “any practice declared herein to be unlawful” -- suggests

that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 refers to any practice whose illegality was declared, or

made known, in the provisions adopted within Chapter 347.1

      In other supplementary CFA statutes, the Legislature has used similar

language to that found in N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 -- “the within act” -- to explicitly

distinguish those supplementary acts from the CFA in its entirety. See, e.g., L.

1966, c. 39, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-13) (“Any person who violates any

of the provisions of the act to which this act is a supplement shall . . . be liable

to a penalty . . . .”); L. 1969, c. 131, § 2 (codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.3) (“the

act to which this act is a supplement”); L. 1971, c. 247, § 3 (codified at

N.J.S.A. 56:8-15) (“under this act and the act hereby amended and

supplemented”); L. 1971, c. 247, § 8 (codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-20) (“of this

act, or the act hereby amended or supplemented”); L. 1973, c. 308, § 2

1
  We also note that the plain language of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 appears to include
a causation requirement that limits the refund allowable under N.J.S.A. 56:8 -
2.11 to “all moneys acquired by means of any practice declared herein to be
unlawful.” Thus, a consumer would be entitled to a refund only for the money
that was “acquired by” or obtained through any unlawful practice that was
“declared herein.”
                                       16
(codified at N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.6) (“For the purposes of this act, each day for

which the total selling price is not marked in accordance with the provisions of

this act for each group of identical merchandise shall constitute a separate

violation of this act and the act of which this act is a supplement.”).

      Furthermore, Chapter 347 is not the only conduct-specific

supplementary statute to provide additional rights and remedies, including

consumer refunds. See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.18 (“A retail mercantile

establishment violating any provision of this act shall be liable to the buyer,

for up to 20 days from the date of purchase, for a cash refund or a credit, at the

buyer’s option . . . .” (emphasis added)); N.J.S.A. 56:8-71(a) (“If, within the

periods specified in section 3 of this act, the dealer or his agent fails to correct

a material defect of the used motor vehicle . . . the dealer shall repurchase the

used motor vehicle and refund to the consumer the full purchase price . . . .”

(emphasis added)); N.J.S.A. 56:8-95(i)(1) (regarding pet purchase protections,

a consumer can select a number of different remedies, including “[t]he right to

return the animal and receive a full refund of the purchase price” (emphasis

added)). If the refunds authorized in each supplementary statute applied to the

CFA at large, there would be no need for multiple refund provisions.

      Although the plain language of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 indicates that the

refund remedy applies to the practices proscribed in Chapter 347 relating to the

                                         17
misrepresentation of food products, it does not completely resolve whether

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 is limited to those practices. Any lingering ambiguity as to

the scope of Chapter 347’s refund provision is, however, unmistakably settled

by the statute’s legislative history.

      In conditionally vetoing the proposed bill, Governor Brendan Byrne

expressed concern that it could require state agencies “to inspect menus and

commercial kitchens or to taste test products at a time when other budgetary

priorities exist.” Governor’s Veto Statement to S. 1408 (Dec. 10, 1979).

Governor Byrne “recommend[ed] a different approach i.e. a self help remedy

which would provide restitution to the defrauded customer or patron.” Ibid.

(emphasis added). Specifically, he recommended that the Senate insert a

refund provision containing the following language: “Any person violating the

provisions of the within act shall be liable for a refund of all monies acquired

by means of any practice declared herein to be unlawful.” Ibid. That language

is identical to the codified refund provision, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

      After the bill passed, a press release reaffirmed Governor Byrne’s

recommendation “that defrauded consumers be entitled to a refund if the eating

establishment is found to be in violation of the act.” Office of the Governor,

Press Release: Statement upon Signing S. 1408 (Jan. 24, 1980) (emphasis

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added). Significantly, the unlawful practices proscribed in Chapter 347 all

deal with food-related misrepresentations.

      A statement by the Assembly Commerce, Industry and Professions

Committee makes clear that the phrase “this act” in the cumulative remedy

provision, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.13 -- which was part of Chapter 347 -- refers only

to that bill, not the entire CFA. See A. Com., Indus. & Pros. Comm. Statement

to S. 1408 (June 11, 1979) (“[T]he rights, remedies and prohibitions accorded

by the bill are in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or

prohibition . . . .” (emphasis added)). The statement also provides that “[t]his

legislation is very specific,” ibid., proving that “the within act” language in

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 refers solely to Chapter 347.

      Finally, we note that construing N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 to apply only to

violations of N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 and not to the entire CFA avoids awarding

damages in an amount disproportionate to the harm suffered. To the extent

plaintiffs seek a refund under -2.11 of all monies paid to Springpoint,

including their entrance fees, monthly fees, and “other fees,” such an award

would be vastly disproportionate to the harm alleged -- deceptive entrance fee

disclosure statements. And it is our duty to interpret a statute to avoid running

afoul of constitutional protections. See Whirlpool Props., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of

Tax’n, 208 N.J. 141, 151 (2011).

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                                        B.

      Against that backdrop, an analysis of the facts of this case is

straightforward. We hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief under

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11.

      Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint that Springpoint engaged in

deceptive advertising practices and provided misleading disclosure statements

regarding Springpoint’s return policy of resident entrance fees under its “90%

refundable plan.” Those allegations pertain entirely to misrepresentations

about fees charged by a senior living facility. None of plaintiffs’ allegations

are related to misrepresentations of food. Thus, the claims are not governed by

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.9 and the refund provision in -2.11 does not apply.

      Moreover, any reliance on Lemelledo, Weinberg, Dugan, and Sun

Chemical to support the proposition that N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 applies to the

entire CFA is misplaced.

      In Lemelledo, the principal issue was “whether the [CFA] applies to

lenders who engage in ‘loan packing.’” 150 N.J. at 260. In providing a

background discussion of the CFA, this Court noted that the CFA “provides

individual consumers with a cause of action to recover refunds,” citing

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 to -2.12 for that proposition. Id. at 264. N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11

was not otherwise discussed, nor was that provision relevant to our holding in

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Lemelledo. The single background statement cannot reasonably be read to

support the proposition that, because the Legislature provided for a refund

when an individual misrepresents the identity of food, it intended to include a

refund for every type of transaction that falls under the ambit of the CFA.

      Similarly, our focus in Weinberg was not on N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. In that

case, we reaffirmed that a private party must plead an ascertainable loss to

have standing under the CFA. 173 N.J. at 237. In our discussion of the CFA’s

history in that case, this Court noted that the CFA “was amended to permit

individual consumers to bring private actions to recover refunds, N.J.S.A.

56:8-2.11 to -2.12, and treble damages for violations, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.” Id. at

248 (citing Lemelledo, 150 N.J. at 264). We continued by explaining that the

CFA “focuses on allowing individual consumers to recover refunds for losses,”

citing again to N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 to -2.12. Id. at 249. However, our citations

to the refund provision were included in our background discussion of the

CFA; the statement was dicta, as those provisions were not necessary to the

holding.

      In Dugan, we focused on class certification issues in relation to CFA

claims. 231 N.J. at 34-35. Similar to Lemelledo, as background, we noted that

“the Legislature amended the CFA ‘to permit individual consumers to bring

private actions to recover refunds, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 to -2.12, and treble

                                       21
damages for violations, N.J.S.A. 56:8-19.’” Id. at 50-51 (quoting Weinberg,

173 N.J. at 248). N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11 was not further discussed and was not

relevant to the outcome in Dugan.

      And in Sun Chemical, a case dealing with an alleged defective

“explosion isolation and suppression system,” the primary issue was whether

CFA claims can co-exist with claims under the Products Liability Act. 243

N.J. at 324-26. The Court in Sun Chemical did not specifically analyze

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11. We instead referenced the cumulative remedy provision,

N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.13, enacted alongside the refund remedy in Chapter 347.

      In short, none of the isolated references to Chapter 347’s provisions in

our previous cases suggest that the food-related refund remedy applies broadly

to all CFA violations. We expressly hold here that it does not.

                                       V.

      We reverse the denial of Springpoint’s motion for partial dismissal of the

amended complaint, enter partial summary judgment dismissing with prejudice

plaintiffs’ claims seeking refund damages under N.J.S.A. 56:8-2.11, and

remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

    CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, SOLOMON,
PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE
FASCIALE’s opinion.
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