Court Opinion

ID: 9856138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:39:03.153197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:26:08.485504
License: Public Domain

McGRAW, Justice,
dissenting:
The question before us in this proceeding involves the language of W.Va.Code §§ 62-3-1 (Cum.Supp.1981) and 62-3-21 (1979 Replacement Vol.). The former statute simply and plainly provides that “[wjhen an indictment is found in any county, against a person for a felony or misdemeanor, the accused, if in custody, or if he appears in discharge of his recognizance, or voluntarily, shall, unless good cause be shown for a continuance, be tried at the same term _” In State ex rel. Holstein v. Casey, 164 W.Va. 460, 265 S.E.2d 530 (1980), we read this language and determined that the Legislature had mandated by enactment of the statute, “that a defendant be tried in the same term as his indictment unless good cause is shown for a continuance .... ” 164 W.Va. at 465, 265 S.E.2d at 533.
W.Va.Code § 62-3-21 provides:
Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony or misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment or indictment is found against him, without a trial, unless the failure to try him [was the result of certain enumerated causes].
In Holstein we read this language and determined that it “provides specifically for discharge from prosecution of a defendant whom the state has failed to try within three terms of court following the term of indictment.” 164 W.Va. at 465, 265 S.E.2d at 533.
We further stated in Holstein that these two statutes, when read together, formulate the legislative determination of what constitutes a speedy trial within the meaning of article 3, section 14 of the state constitution, and held that failure of the State to abide by the statutes bars prosecution of a criminal defendant. Syllabus Point 2, State ex rel. Holstein v. Casey, supra*
*259The majority, in tacit acquiescence to the disfavor accorded the statute and our holding in Holstein by prosecutors, circuit judges and media commentators, now reads W.Va.Code § 62-3-1 and says the language of the statute does not mean what it clearly says, and in effect, permits trial courts to disregard the law enacted by the Legislature. The majority rule removes any incentive for trial courts to see that criminal defendants are tried within one term of their indictment. Apparently the mandatory language of W.Va.Code § 62-3-1 is not mandatory, but merely directive.
We often hear it said, and I bet every member of this Court has repeated the exhortation in his election campaign, that justice should be swift and sure. However, When the time comes to apply this concept in a factual context that interferes with vacations and other judicial pleasures, this Court is inclined to say that justice should not be quite that swift and sure.
The purpose of the rule enunciated by this Court in Holstein was to require prosecutors and judges to perform their duties expeditiously in a manner consistent with the state constitution and the statutory law of this jurisdiction. I venture to say that if a prosecutor has enough evidence to convince a grand jury to indict, he ought to have sufficient evidence to go to trial. Of course, if good cause is shown by the defendant or the State for a continuance, the motion therefor should be granted. But trial judges should not be permitted, under the guise of “judicial discretion” or the “inherent power of the courts,” to obstruct the swift rendering of justice for reasons that do not constitute good cause.
The public is entitled to the benefits of the constitutional provisions which guarantee speedy trials. U.S.Const. amend. VI; W.Va.Const. art. 3, § 13; see State ex rel. Skinner v. Dostert, 166 W.Va. 743, 278 S.E.2d 624 (1981); Ex parte Santee, 2 Va. Cas. 363, 4 Va. 271 (Va.Gen.Ct.1823). The Legislature has determined “that a delay without good cause beyond the term of an indictment is a denial of the speedy trial right-” State ex rel. Holstein v. Casey, supra, 164 W.Va. at 467, 265 S.E.2d at 534. A congested docket is not “good cause” for continuance beyond the one-term rule, see State v. Mack, 89 Wash.2d 788, 576 P.2d 44 (1978); American Bar Association, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial at 27-28 (Approved Draft 1968), much less the desire of the trial judge “to attend a seminar and then take a vacation.” Majority opinion, supra, at 54.
The majority opinion proves that the rule of law and not of men is a difficult proposition for lawyers and judges to obey, especially in “hard” cases where public opinion is panting. Those who speak of swift and sure justice and speedy trials in political rhetoric, but who, on the other hand, when faced with public pressure, decline to adhere to the philosophy of Rule of Law in deference to a philosophy of unbridled judicial discretion, are sactioning unlawful loopholes. I would grant the writ of prohibition.
I am authorized to state that Justice HARSHBARGER joins me in this dissenting opinion, and says further:
“Perhaps that tenet should be, we are a nation that adheres to the rule of law and not of men — except when the men become a mob led by the press and prosecutors.”

 Although W.Va.Code § 62-3-1 provides no stated penalty for the failure to comply with its terms, we found it necessary to impose the remedy of discharge from prosecution because *259no lesser relief exists "that would give effect to and maintain respect for the statute.” 164 W.Va. at 466, 265 S.E.2d at 533.