Court Opinion

ID: 9522775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:12.891288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:54.960118
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 35. dissenting. I join the dissent of Chief Justice Reiber. To me, this is a classic case where the common tension between doing justice for the individuals before the court, and *366developing and applying a sound rule of law, is resolved in a way that gives far too little weight to the need for predictable, ascertainable and fair legal principles. Essentially, the theory of the majority is that equity can do anything as long as it is “reasonable and proper under the circumstances of the particular case.” Ante, ¶ 19. In Lariviere v. Larocque, 105 Vt. 460, 466, 168 A. 559, 562 (1933), the case relied upon by the majority, this language was used in a traditional area of equity jurisdiction — rescission of a deed based on a mutual mistake of fact — to make clear that even if a mutual mistake is found, the chancellor has discretion in determining what remedy to impose. Here, it is being used to intervene into a wholly statutory procedure — not in an area of traditional equity jurisdiction, and to create a new and amorphous rule of law with no discernible limits, not just a remedy for a clear wrong.
¶ 36. Like Chief Justice Reiber, I am very concerned about the effect of this decision on the validity of title conveyed under a license to sell. If James had managed to hide his plan to resell until after title passed to him, or he had developed the plan to resell only after title passed, the result would be the same and some of the other heirs would likely be unhappy enough to litigate, as they did here. The majority’s rationale of fairness and justice would apply equally to that situation, and as the majority says, the effect would be to return “the parties to the position they were in before the auction.” Ante, ¶ 19 n.3. By that time, others may have relied upon the valid deed to their detriment.
¶ 37. I appreciate the response by the majority that the result might be different if the issue were whether to protect the interests of a bona fide purchaser from James. Ante, ¶ 19 n.2. But persons, government agencies, and others rely upon record title in myriad ways, and our policy should be to avoid hidden limitations on title whenever possible.
¶ 38. The short and sweet answer to James’s actions is that the other heirs should have sought a limitation on the license to sell that prevented resale, or defined the conditions under which it would be allowed. In the absence of such a limitation, there is no ground to interfere with a bona fide sale under the license. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins in this dissent.