Court Opinion

ID: 9530517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:31.757239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.521954
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The facts in this case are much stronger for application of the language in Fretz v. Anderson, 1956, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642,1 since here there was no question but what the alleged tortfeasor predeceased the person whose death claim is the subject of this litigation.
Furthermore, it appears to me that the construction of the main opinion to the effect that the first half of one sentence of the statute prevents the pursuit of a death claim while the second half of the same sentence allows it, is quite inaccurate, and illogical.
It seems to the writer that the second half of the sentence over which the majority opinion labors grammatically simply modified the first half by telling us who may be parties plaintiff ( 1) the injured person or 2) the personal representative or 3) heirs of the decedent), depending on the facts prevailing and the applicability of the statute thereto.
I am unable to see any pertinency in this case of Secs. 78-11-6 and 7, U.C.A.1953, adverted to in the main opinion.

. “* * * The survival statute,.U.O.A. 1953, 78-11-12, provides that the cause of action shall not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer; thus the cause of action cannot arise at 'a time beyond the life of the tortfeasor.”