Court Opinion

ID: 9734068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:24:30.021153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:45.370266
License: Public Domain

DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The Conex version of events, accepted by the jury, is straightforward. Fina did not pay Conex for some extra work involved in post-weld heat treatment — work costing Conex over $2 million. There is evidence Fluor told Fina the extra work was required because post-weld heat treatment provided by a Conex subcontractor caused “very high residual stresses” in a concentrated area, likely leading to “loss of creep life.” Understandably, Fina did not want to accept loss of design life. From the email exchange, it appears Fluor helped draft emails explaining to Fina’s management that the additional work was required because, despite “expectations,” heat treaters “and the constructors that use them” do not always “keep up with the technical requirements and developments in that industry” or “have the expertise to implement them.” Some vendors “may have ignored the evaluation requirement,” the writer explained. The evidence indicates the email writer, a Fina employee, was quoting or paraphrasing statements made by Fluor to him. Before sending an October 24, 2001, email, the Fina employee asked Fluor for assurance he had not “misquoted” Fluor, and he also asked Fluor about a draft, “Did I get it right?” In the final version of his email, he asked Fluor to “please advise if I have misquoted any of this[.]” He was told, in effect, the quotes were correct: that he “hit the nail on the head”; and that his “response was exactly correct.” The jury reasonably could conclude the disparaging statements were Fluor’s, and were reported by the Fina employee to his management to explain “why we are doing this.”
The record supports a conclusion that the statements were about Conex — the “constructor” and one of the blamed “vendors” — and the heat treatment just performed. Considerable evidence establishes Fluor’s calculations were incorrect.
Proof that the false statements resulted from negligence would be insufficient to impose liability on Fluor. Hired by Fina to evaluate the work, Fluor was entitled to criticize the work, though mistakenly. However, Fluor had no privilege to maliciously make false statements disparaging Conex, even if those statements were made in an attempt to protect Fina from the cost of paying for the extra work Fluor said was required. The tort of business disparagement is an action for special damage resulting from an injurious falsehood maliciously made. See Hurlbut v. Gulf Atl. Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 766, 768 (Tex.1987)(“[T]he tort itself incorporates malice as an element of recovery; hence, if the plaintiff carries his burden, he likewise defeats any conditional privilege.”). Fluor crossed a line in maliciously and falsely attributing the need for the extra work to incompetence by Conex.
The evidence is conflicting, and the jury is the judge of witness credibility. On this record, a reasonable jury could conclude that Fluor proceeded with reckless disregard for the truth in maligning Conex.
*450Proof of special damages is an essential element of the business disparagement tort. Id. at 767. “Special damage” means pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated, as in the case of specific lost contracts. See id. From the evidence, the jury reasonably could conclude Fluor’s misconduct resulted in a realized pecuniary loss to Conex of more than $2 million over the amount Conex was obligated to perform under the contract. On this record, the jury reasonably could conclude that to justify this expenditure of money, Fluor falsely disparaged Conex, and did so with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the disparaging remarks. The jury apparently believed that because Fluor falsely ascribed incompetence to Co-nex, Fina did not honor its contract to pay for the extra work. The jury heard the context in which the statements were made, and the statements cannot be fully understood outside the somewhat complex circumstances. Considering the evidence supporting and contrary to the jury’s answer to question 2, the finding does not appear clearly wrong, nor does it seem manifestly unjust. The jury reasonably could conclude Fluor’s misconduct caused the special damage found by the jury in answer to question 5. The Court should affirm the $1.8 million award of damages caused in the 2001 turnaround, because the evidence supports the jury’s answers to question 2 (business disparagement) and question 5 (the 2001 turnaround damages).
However, the Court should reverse the remainder of the judgment and render a take-nothing judgment as to all other damages, because the evidence is legally insufficient to support damages beyond the $1.8 million. Generally, lost profits not tied to a specific contract are not recoverable in a business disparagement claim, because they are not the type of special damage for which this tort action provides a remedy. Id. (“The requirement goes to the cause of action itself and requires that plaintiff ‘establish pecuniary loss that has been realized or liquidated as in the case of specific lost sales.’ ”) (quoting W. Keeton, PROsser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 971 (5th ed.1984)). Even the “Deep Conversion Project” is insufficient evidence; the project is only speculative evidence of lost profits. Evidence of a decline in profits unconnected to a specific lost contract is no evidence of the special damages necessary for this tort cause of action. A general loss of profits is not recoverable based only on the jury’s answer to question 2 (business disparagement).
The jury’s findings in response to question 3 (interference with prospective relations) are essentially business disparagement liability findings, like question 2, because the alternative of fraud, embedded in question 3, is not supported by any pleading. Plaintiff did not plead fraud. As a result, the “lost profit” damages found in response to question 6 are not recoverable on the jury’s answer to question 3, for the same reason they are not recoverable on the jury’s answer to question 2.
There is legally insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding in answer to question 11 — that Fluor had “a specific intent to cause substantial injury to Co-nex.” Sufficient evidence supports the jury finding that Fluor acted with reckless disregard for truth or falsity, but other than speculation of intent by some witnesses, that is all that was shown. Because the punitive damage award in response to question 12 is conditioned on a “yes” finding to question 11, the award of punitive damages has no basis.
The Court should affirm the judgment in part, and reverse and render judgment in part. I respectfully dissent from this *451Court’s judgment remanding the cause for a new trial.