Court Opinion

ID: 9582264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:24:21.993169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:35.628179
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, because I believe that no reversible error occurred below and that both convictions should be affirmed.
1. The majority opinion errs in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support Sarper’s conviction. Initially, I note that in his brief, Sarper’s argument on this issue consists solely of his adoption of Agan’s argument on the sufficiency of the evidence. As Agan’s argument is silent as to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Sarper, pursuant to Rule 15 (c) of our court, Sarper has abandoned any enumeration of error regarding this point. Nevertheless, even considering the merits of this contention, sufficient evidence authorized a rational trier of fact to find Sarper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
The majority opinion reaches the opposite conclusion seemingly by accepting Sarper’s testimony at face value. However, plenty of circumstances shown during the trial provided sufficient basis for the jury to make an opposite finding as to Sarper’s credibility. For example, the jury could have found patently incredible Sarper’s testimony that he sat through the meeting between Agan and Lanier as they discussed the variance at length and yet had no idea what they were talking about. When asked on cross-examination about the purposes of making political contributions to the commissioners, Sarper answered, “I presume that when you make political contributions to politicians, they do something to expedite the process. Everybody knows that.” Sarper further replied, when asked if he knew that a politician will help you if you contribute to his campaign, “I have previously experienced it . . .” From these statements and circumstances, the *101jury could have rejected Sarper’s claim of innocence and found instead a corrupt intent. “If something looks like [a bribe], sounds like [a bribe], and acts like [a bribe], it probably is [a bribe], regardless of whether or not one uses the magic word itself.” State v. Hughes, 189 Ga. App. 671, 676 (377 SE2d 192) (1988). (Deen, P. J., dissenting.)
“Left to exercise their common-sense in their own way, the jury will generally determine correctly what is well proved and what lacks further support . . . What shall come to the jury as evidence, is for the court. What it is worth when it arrives, is for the jury . . . The judge may well assume that they have a fair aptitude for their share of the common business.” Moughon v. State, 57 Ga. 102, 106-107 (1876).
2. The trial court’s jury charge on the definition of “entitled” under OCGA § 16-10-2 (a) was incomplete and somewhat confusing. Even the State concedes that. However, I cannot agree with the majority opinion that this minor confusion misled the jury. The jury charge informed the jury of the essential elements of the offense of bribery, and the evidence certainly proved those elements. Under these circumstances, the incomplete definition of “entitled” was inconsequential and harmless error.
I also cannot agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court erred in refusing to give the appellants’ requested jury charges on the law and definition of campaign contributions. Compar - Iison of the requested jury charges to the jury charge given by the trial court shows that the trial court did adequately inform the jury on that subject matter. Failure to give requested charges in the exact language requested where the charge given substantially covers the same principles, is not grounds for reversal. Woods v. State, 187 Ga. App. 105 (369 SE2d 353) (1988).
3. The majority opinion is in error in concluding that the admission of cash, obtained when the commissioners presented the checks given to them by the appellants, was highly prejudicial and inflammatory and reversible error. The proper resolution of this enumeration of error simply is that the appellants waived any objection at trial. The cash from the $3,000 check was specifically admitted without objection by counsel for both Agan and Sarper. When the cash from the $3,370 worth of checks was tendered, Sarper’s attorney stated that he had no objection, and counsel for Agan stated that he had his objection on the record, when there was, in fact, no objection on record. Only when the $800 cash from the check written by Mohammed Hassan to one of the commissioners was tendered, was there an objection. Counsel for Agan stated that he had the same objection, and counsel for Sarper merely objected on the grounds of relevance. Noting that there had been no objections before, the trial court admitted the cash into evidence. Under these circumstances, the appel*102lants’ waiver of any objection is clear. Even if the only objection to this evidence were considered, the district attorney’s explanation that the cash was offered to show that the checks were good, was a sufficient showing of relevance.
Decided March 16, 1989
Rehearing denied March 29, 1989
Cook & Palmour, Bobby Lee Cook, Meals, Kirwan, Goger, Winter & Parks, P. Bruce Kirwan, Jake Arbes, for appellants.
4. Assuming, arguendo, that, as advised by the majority opinion, the appellants would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their selective prosecution defense upon their showing a “colorable entitlement” to that defense, it is clear that the appellants failed in this regard. In support of their motion to dismiss for selective prosecution, the appellants submitted some evidence that other real estate developers had made some campaign contributions to county commissioners while zoning matters concerning the developers’ properties were under consideration by the commission, and an affidavit in which a person recalled the county’s chief executive officer’s reference to Agan as a “g.. d.. sand nigger.”
As noted by the majority opinion, “[i]n order to prevail in a selective prosecution defense, a defendant must meet the heavy burden of (1) making a prima facie showing that he has been singled out for prosecution although other similarly situated persons who have committed the same acts have not been prosecuted; and (2) demonstrate that the government’s selective prosecution was unconstitutional because actuated by impermissible motives such as racial or religious discrimination. [Cit.]” United States v. Silien, 825 F2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1987). In the instant case, the appellants made no showing whatever of similarity between the other developers and themselves. Considering the fact that the county’s chief executive officer does not vote on zoning matters and does not even attend zoning meetings, and that it was the district attorney, and not the chief executive officer, who decided to prosecute the appellants for bribery, any derogatory ethnic remark attributable to the chief executive officer is irrelevant. The appellants thus made no showing of “colorable entitlement” to the defense, and the trial court properly denied both the request for an evidentiary hearing and the motion to dismiss.
5. Although the majority opinion does not address the issue because of its conclusion that the evidence did not support Sarper’s conviction, I note also that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sarper’s motion to sever. Rivers v. State, 178 Ga. App. 310 (342 SE2d 781) (1986).
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this dissent.
*103Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, R. Stephen Roberts, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.