Court Opinion

ID: 9528732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:26.410382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:15.804590
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: I believe the language of section 20 — 175 of the Property Tax Code is clear and unambiguous. The plain language of the statute applies only to tax payments based on erroneous assessments. Plaintiffs’ claims for a refund of their duplicate tax payments do not involve erroneous assessments. Therefore, section 20 — 175 does not apply to these circumstances, and the circuit court erred in dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. In this case, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint under section 2 — 619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619(a)(5) (West 2006)). Defendant asserted that plaintiffs’ request for a refund of their duplicate tax payments was untimely because the five-year limitations period in section 20— 175 of the Property Tax Code had expired. Thus, the only issue is whether section 20 — 175 applies in these circumstances to bar a refund of plaintiffs’ duplicate property tax payments. The issue presents a question of statutory construction. The primary goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Metzger v. DaRosa, 209 Ill. 2d 30, 34-35 (2004). The best indication of the legislature’s intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People ex rel. Ryan v. Agpro, Inc., 214 Ill. 2d 222, 226 (2005), quoting Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill. 2d 82, 87-88 (2003). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we must apply it as written without resort to aids of statutory construction. Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 553 (2006). We will not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. People ex rel. Department of Professional Regulation v. Manos, 202 Ill. 2d 563, 568 (2002). Section 20 — 175 provides in pertinent part: “If any property is twice assessed for the same year, or assessed before it becomes taxable, and the erroneously assessed taxes have been paid either at sale or otherwise, or have been overpaid by the same claimant or by different claimants, the County Collector, upon being satisfied of the facts in the case, shall refund the taxes to the proper claimant. *** A claim for refund shall not be allowed unless a petition is filed within 5 years from the date the right to a refund arose.” 35 ILCS 200/20 — 175 (West 2006). According to its plain language, section 20 — 175 applies only to the claims identified by the introductory clause, “[i]f any property is twice assessed for the same year, or assessed before it becomes taxable.” The plain language, therefore, applies only to erroneous assessments. The following word, “and,” indicates additional conditions for a refund of payments based on erroneous assessments. The remaining language provides, as additional conditions for a statutory refund, that the erroneously assessed taxes have been paid at sale or otherwise, or have been overpaid by the same claimant or different claimants. The majority appears to agree that the plain language of section 20 — 175 supports plaintiffs’ argument that it applies only to payments based on erroneous assessments. 229 Ill. 2d at 230. The majority even asserts that “[t]o give effect to the language of the statute, as written, would defeat the remedial purpose of the amendment.” 229 Ill. 2d at 233. When statutory language is clear, however, we are required to give effect to the statute as written. Krautsack, 223 Ill. 2d at 553. The majority’s failure to construe the statute according to its plain language is inconsistent with our rules of statutory construction. The plain language of section 20 — 175 is limited to the refund of erroneously assessed taxes. Plaintiffs’ claims do not involve erroneous assessments. Rather, they are based on the inadvertent duplicate payments of property taxes. The plain language of section 20 — 175 does not apply to this case. Accordingly, I believe that the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss based on section 20 — 175. Given the facts of this case and the majority’s view of the apparent ambiguity in the statute, the legislature may wish to amend section 20 — 175. The plaintiffs diligently paid their property taxes, and it may be viewed as fundamentally unfair to deny them a refund of the duplicate payments. The legislature may certainly wish to provide a mechanism for seeking a refund in these circumstances or alter the five-year limitation period in the statute. Those decisions are for the legislature, however. We are bound to construe the statute according to its plain language. The plain language of the statute shows that section 20 — 175 does not apply here. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.