Court Opinion

ID: 9710544
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:11:42.710677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.668818
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING OPINION
Mote, J.
I am unable to concur in various expressions contained in Judge Smith’s opinion, which seems to be predicated on the theory that a contract between a builder and the owner of a lot has no relativity in respect to the cost of the construcion of a house and garage. In answer to such a proposition as between the contracting parties, if there are no variations in the specifications for construction, it is my view that the parties are bound by the contract price for said construction, including material and labor.
In Finding No. 4 of the trial court is the following:
“4. That during the construction of said dwelling house and garage, the defendant Albert M. Prewitt stated to plaintiff that plaintiff should comply with all of the requests of the defendant Pauline Prewitt concerning said construction and that he, Albert M. Prewitt, would pay the costs thereof.” In Judge Smith’s opinion we find these statements:
“The appellants are attempting to draw a distinction between a ‘contractual theory of recovery’ and a ‘rescission theory of recovery.’ However, there is nothing in the decision of the trial court to lead anyone to believe that the court was awarding any damages for ‘rescission,’ nor have the appellants maintained that the court made such an award. In fact the undisputed evidence does not evidence the fact that the special contract was ever rescinded. If the contract had been rescinded there would be no basis for an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. It is quite clear that the award to appellee was for labor and materials provided at the special instance ánd request of appellants. In discussing what the appellants designate as the ‘contractual theory of recovery’ they are recognizing that phase of mechanic’s lien actions which is not based upon a contractual relationship.”
*316Whatever the quoted part of the majority opinion may mean generally, it is perfectly clear to me that one remark therein is not in .consonance with Finding of Fact No. 4 above quoted, from which the trial court in its conclusions of law No. 2 stated the following:
“(2) That the statement of defendant Albert M. Prewitt as mentioned in Paragraph 4 of the Findings of Fact herein as a matter of law amounted to a rescission of the written .contract theretofore entered into by plaintiff and defendants, and further amounted to an implied promise on the part of said defendant to pay the reasonable value of labor and materials furnished by plaintiff in the construction of the dwelling house and garage now situated on the real estate described in the above Findings of Fact.”
Obviously the trial court reached the conclusion that there were so many alterations in the construction contract that it was not reasonably possible to enforce the same, as a result of which appellants should be required to' pay the reasonable .cost and value of the material and labor used in the construction of the house and garage. If this is true, as we think it must be, we have no objection to the decision and the amount of money awarded by the trial court to the appellee. If this were not true and, in fact, if there were no rescission the parties to this record, in my opinion, should be bound by the contract price for the construction, which would include all materials and labor, and if there were some changes at the request of the appellants, either for elimination of some of the detail work prescribed by the contract or for additions thereto, adjustments would have to be made therefor. In such event I think there should be a diminution of the contract price for the items not required, and additions to the contract price for such items as were added thereto, all based upon reasonable value or cost thereof.
It is my opinion that the parties should be bound by the contract price, the diminutions and the additions, unless, as here, there apparently were so many alterations that it would *317not be feasible to determine the amount owing for the construction based upon the “upset” or contract price.
Inasmuch as the trial court heard the evidence and reached a conclusion, as evidenced by its conclusions of law No. 2 above set forth, we find nothing wrong with the award by the trial court. For the record we must state that as between the contracting parties they should be held to- the contract price until and unless there were so many alterations that it was not reasonably possible to use the agreed figure for the construction. To permit the majority opinion to stand without critical examination and comment, in my judgment, would lead to confusion and, indeed, make useless a contract for construction at a given price. There are several earlier cases which pronounce the legal principle upon which this concurring opinion is predicated.
In Garver v. Daubenspeck (1864), 22 Ind. 238, it was held that:
“. . . The house, it appears, was built under a special contract, with perhaps some alterations made by the consent of the parties; and on the trial the Court permitted evidence to be given by the plaintiff of the reasonable value of the entire work and materials. Exception was taken to the ruling. It would seem that the contract price should have governed, so far as the work was done under the special contract. . . .”
In my opinion the legal principle pronounced in Garver still exists, regardless of amendments to the Mechanic’s Lien Statute, § 43-701, et seq., Burns’ Indiana Statutes Annotated, 1965 Replacement. This principle has been adhered to in numerous later cases but I think it is unnecessary to cite the same.
Bierly, J. concurs with concurring opinion.
Note. — Reported in 216 N. E. 2d 724.