Court Opinion

ID: 9613850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:21.774511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:32.443068
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority that the Motor Transportation Act is the controlling law, I think that defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s first cause of action should have been sustained on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.
Plaintiff’s complaint contained two causes of action, the first of which related to services performed during a period ending June 17, 1974, for which plaintiff claimed it undercharged defendant the sum $4,168.74, with interest from June 17, 1974, until paid. Defendant’s demurrer related only to the first cause of action, it being conceded that the second cause of action is not barred even if the statute of limitations enacted in 1975 is construed to apply retroactively.
Defendant contends that if plaintiff has a claim on its first cause of action, it accrued on or about June 17, 1974, and it is conceded that at that time the general *434statute of limitations for contract actions was controlling. ORS 12.080. However, in 1975, the legislature amended ORS chapter 767, and added subsection (3) to ORS 767.410,1 as follows:
"Any action against common carriers for recovery of overcharges or by common carriers for the collection of undercharges shall be commenced within two years from the time the cause of action accrued. As used in this subsection, overcharges or undercharges shall mean charges assessed for transportation service different from those applicable under the tariff lawfully in effect and on file with the commissioner.”
This period of limitations is included in the section of the act which makes it unlawful for a carrier to "charge, demand, collect or receive a greater, less, or different remuneration for the transportation * * * of property * * * than the rates which have been legally established and filed with the commissioner.” The amendments were adopted July 8,1975, and filed with the Secretary of State on that day; however, the entire chapter, by express language, did not become effective until January 1, 1976. Since plaintiff’s complaint was not filed until September 7, 1976, the period of limitations will have run if the new limitation period is held to be applicable.
I agree with the majority’s statement of the general rule that a change in a statute of limitations acts prospectively only, unless a contrary legislative intention appears. However, I think it is reasonably clear that the legislature intended that the new period of limitations be applicable to claims for undercharges which had accrued prior to the passage of the act, but which had not expired under the then existing period of limitations. In this case, the first cause of action accrued in July, 1974, and on July 8, 1975, when the new period of limitations was enacted, plaintiff had reasonable notice that it must assert its claim prior to *435June 17, 1976. The legislature intentionally allowed approximately six months’ notice to any preexisting claimant that all claims which had accrued prior to January 1,1974, but were not then barred, would have to be asserted on or before January 1, 1976, or be barred.
I think such a delay in the effective date of the new period of limitations manifests an intention of the legislature that the new period of limitations be applied retroactively as well as prospectively. See Fullerton v. Lamm, 177 Or 655, 163 P2d 941, 165 P2d 63 (1946); McLaughlin v. Hoover, 1 Or 31 (1853).
In addition, and perhaps more importantly, this case is not the ordinary situation where the plaintiff is asserting a right under a contract. To the contrary, the contract between plaintiff and defendant was for a stated amount, which plaintiff has been paid. It is only by virtue of an audit by the Public Utilities Commissioner, which disclosed that plaintiff had undercharged defendant and had advised plaintiff that it must collect the undercharge, that this action was commenced. If it were not for the overriding public policy, plaintiff would be bound by the contract price. In other words, we are not dealing with a private right in any normal sense, but with an obligation imposed by public policy. Since it is the public policy which is being enforced (the maintaining of tariff rates), the legislature may shorten the time within which even a pre-existing public right must be asserted, or be forever barred. The legislature has done that in this case.
Accordingly, I would hold that defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s first cause of action should be sustained.

This section was amended in Oregon Laws 1977, chapter 253, section 20, page 192.