Court Opinion

ID: 9483179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:13:37.994054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:28.585482
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join fully in the judgment and the opinion of the court. I write separately to note why I agree with the court’s decision to afford counsel an opportunity to reply as to the appropriateness of sanctions.
On December 19, 1991, the court amended Circuit Rule 38 to read as follows:
The court may, on its own or on motion of a party, impose sanctions on a party or an attorney as otherwise authorized by law. Before imposing sanctions the court will give reasonable notice to the person or persons that it is contemplating sanctioning and give those persons an opportunity to respond.
Nevertheless, six months later, a panel of this court decided that our handiwork was vague and interpreted the Rule as follows:
Since the question whether to award sanctions was fully discussed in the briefs on the merits, compliance with our recently promulgated Circuit Rule 38 does not require that we allow further briefing on that question, as distinct from the question of the amount of the sanctions. The second sentence of the new rule states, it is true, that “before imposing sanctions the court will give reasonable notice to the person or persons that it is contemplating sanctioning and give those persons an opportunity to respond.” But this uncompromising-seeming language must be read against the background of the preceding sentence: “The court may, on its own or on motion of a party, impose sanc-tions_” (Emphasis added.) If the court is minded to impose sanctions not requested by the appellee it must give the appellant a chance to explain why sanctions should not be imposed. But where as in this case the appellee requests sanctions in his brief, with a full statement of the reasons for the request, the appellant has reasonable notice that he may be sanctioned and an opportunity in his reply brief to explain why he should not be. The provision of additional notice by this court would be superfluous in such a case and is not required by the rule as we read it.
Colosi v. Electri-Flex Co., 965 F.2d 500, 505 (7th Cir.1992).
As our decision makes clear today, whatever the merits of Colosi when sanctions are imposed on a party, it does not apply when, as here, the appellee requests sanctions on counsel. Colosi deals with a situation where the appellee suggests sanctions against an appellant who has at least the theoretical opportunity to reply directly in a reply brief. Here, the appellee (the government) did not ask for sanctions against the appellant but against counsel. Requiring counsel to defend himself against a charge of professional misconduct in a pleading on behalf of a client creates a significant conflict of interest. By attacking personally the lawyer in its brief, the appellee is able to “divide and conquer” the opposition. The lawyer’s best position against sanctions may well be that the position taken on behalf of a client, while perhaps a loser, was not so bad that he ought to be sanctioned for it. Hardly zealous advocacy on behalf of a client.
The court’s sensitivity to the problem demonstrates a pragmatic awareness of the ethical responsibility of lawyers and will help preserve a salutary bench-bar relationship in our circuit. Accordingly, I am pleased to join the court’s opinion.