Court Opinion

ID: 9444278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 20:55:02.182519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:47.715984
License: Public Domain

MAJOR, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
I would reverse on the ground that there was no substantial proof in support of the jury finding that defendant’s truck was responsible for the accident which caused plaintiff’s damages. Whether there was such proof depends entirely upon the testimony of plaintiff and two of his passengers, William F. Castle and Marie Castle, his wife, both of whom were seated at the time of the accident at the front end of the bus, near plaintiff.
*586The accident occurred about 8 p. m. on March 22, 1952. Plaintiff, driving his bus 25 or 30 miles per hour on a two-lane, highway which curved to the left, discovered the offending truck approaching on his side of the highway. For this reason plaintiff turned to his right and on to the shoulder of the highway. In bringing his bus to a stop he was thrown from the seat and sustained injuries. Both the bus and the offending truck had their headlights on. There was no proof, as to the speed of the offending truck, although the complaint alleged that it was traveling, $t a “fast and dangerous rate of speed,” and the testimony shows that it did not stop but went by like a flash. One witness stated that there was only an arm’s length between it and the bus. The night was dark, it had. been snowing and the highway shoulder was described as soft and muddy.
Shortly after the accident, a Mr. Harmon, claim agent for the Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., the same company by, which plaintiff was employed as a bus driver, commenced an investigation for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the .offending truck. On March 23, he procured from Mr. and Mrs. Castle detailed statements as to the circumstances surrounding the accident and, on June 3, 1952, he obtained a similar statement from the plaintiff. All of these statements bore the signatures of the respective parties and in their own handwriting the statement, “I have read the above and it is true.”
Plaintiff in his statement óf June 3 stated, “I cannot state what company the truck may havé belonged to' as I did not make out the name of the trailer,” and “The sole cause of the accident was the. fact this unknown truck was in the center of the highway and forced me off the highway.” On March 13, 1953, plaintiff testified in Peoria, Illinois, in a proceeding the exact nature of which the record, does not disclose. During that examination, which was taken by a reporter, the following questions were propounded and , answers given:
. “Q. Did you see black letters there [referring to the trailer] ?
A. Well, you know what I mean, a black streak. I couldn’t say that I read it.
“Q. But all you actually saw was the^black streak? A. That’s right.
“Q. Well, then, all you actually saw was the black streak as this truck went by you, isn’t that right?
A. Yes.
“Q. You didn’t, read any letters, did you? A. I said I visualized them by my eyes.”
At the trial plaintiff testified that the offending truck was that of defendant, that it was a red tractor and white trailer, with the word “Ruan” lettered in black on the side of the trailer. On cross-examination, the following appears:
“Q. You didn’t read any letters on the vehicle coming toward you or any words on it? A. I visualized.
“Q. You mean you imagined it?
A. No, I visualized it.
“Q.. You didn't actually read any lettering or any wording on the vehicle coming toward you ? A. Well, visualizing, yes.
“Q. You are not testifying as to what you actually saw? You are testifying to what you visualized, is that true?' A: Well, to a certain extent.
“Q. And when you testified on March 13 that you couldn’t read anything on the truck you were telling the truth, weren’t you ? A. Yes.”
..Plaintiff was cross-examined concerning his' statement to the claim agent made on June 3, 1952, in which he had positively stated that he “did not make out the name of the trailer.” At no time did he testify that he did not make that statement or that it was other than a voluntary statement. That statement when .introduced in evidence was in typewritten form, and plaintiff testified in an uncertain fashion that it was in longhand when he signed it. No explanation was offered as; to how his signature ■ and the *587statement in his own handwriting, “I have read the above and it is true,” could have been transformed from one form of statement to another.
The testimony of Castle and his wife follows the same pattern as that of plaintiff. The former in his statement to the claim agent, March 23, 1952, stated, “I was unable to determine the color of the truck or the name on the side.” Mrs. Castle at that time stated, “The truck was a Gasoline Transport but I could not say as to the name on the truck.” Castle at the trial testified that he saw the word “Ruan” on the side of the truck. The following questions and answers are significant :
“Q. Is it true from the entire time you went off the pavement until the bus came to a stop you had your eyes fixed on the right side of the highway? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. When you came to a stop, this vehicle going in the opposite direction had passed you ? A. Yes.”
He admitted making the statement to the claim agent on the day after the accident and offered no explanation as to why he had changed his testimony on the essential point of identity other than that he was not under oath when he made the statement the day after the accident. Mrs. Castle testified at the trial that she saw the name “Ruan” on the side of the offending truck. The following questions and answers are shown with reference to the statement previously given the claim agent:
“Q. And no compulsion or threats were exercised over you to sign it?
A. No, he told me it would be very confidential.
“Q. But, nevertheless, it was your statement and contained the truth, did it not, whether it was confidential or not ? A. Yes.
“Q. It was a truthful statement, wasn’t it? A. Yes, as near as I could.”
To my mind, the halting and evasive testimony of these witnesses on the critical issue of identity is so thoroughly contradicted and impeached by their cross-examination and by their previous contrary statements that it carries no' probative value. Furthermore, and of controlling importance, the circumstances were such that, in my opinion, it was physically impossible for these witnesses to have recognized a name or letters on the side of the offending truck or trailer. Plaintiff and his witnesses were suddenly confronted with an emergency and crowded off the highway by the offending truck. The two vehicles passed at close range, traveling in opposite directions, and it is preposterous to suggest that a person on the bus could or did recognize a word or letters on the side of the offending truck or trailer. The record clearly reveals that this testimony on the issue of identity was an afterthought, concocted to meet the exigencies of a law suit. This effort should not be crowned with success.
Reviewing courts are not bound to accept evidence that is inherently incredible or is plainly opposed to common sense and practical experience in the light of the physical facts involved. Fore v. Southern Ry. Co., 4 Cir., 178 F.2d 349, 351. Evidence contradicted by physical facts is not substantial because it is without probative value. Lovas v. General Motors Corp., 6 Cir., 212 F.2d 805, 808, These and similar principles announced in many cases are applicable in the instant situation. The jury might have believed, this court might believe, that the offending truck was that of defendant,, but the point is that there was no substantial proof in support thereof. To hold that plaintiff sustained the burden of proof upon the issue of the identity of the offending truck is to give credence to that which is incredible and I think impossible.