Court Opinion

ID: 9848275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:15:48.40696+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:10.845192
License: Public Domain

Boyles, C. J.
(dissenting). I do not concur in reversal.
In the case now before us, the employee continued to work and receive usual wages without any loss of time, for about 2i years after his injury. Then finding that surgical and hospital care was necessary as a result of the injury to his knee, he filed an application with the compensation commission asking that he “be granted such relief as he is entitled to,” and “that the parties hereto may have a determination of their rights under the compensation law.” The commission considered it as an application for *639compensation, under the act, and also as an application for an extension of the time within which the employer should be required to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services. The commission denied compensation to the plaintiff and from such denial no appeal has been taken. The defendants have appealed from that part of the order granting plaintiff an extension of time within which they are required to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services.
Hence, the sole question before us is whether medical, surgical and hospital benefits provided for in part 2, § 4, of the act * are “compensation” within the meaning of the act. More particularly, the precise question is whether the benefits provided in part 2, § 4, are “compensation” within the meaning of part 2, § 15. For comparison here, those parts of said sections essential to decision and in effect when this case arose were as follows:
Part 2, § 4: *
“The employer shall furnish, or cause to be furnished, reasonable medical, surgical, and hospital services and medicines when they are needed, for the first 6 months after the injury and thereafter for not more than an additional 6 months in the discretion of the commission, upon written request of the employee to the commission and after the employer or his insurer has been given an opportunity to file objections thereto and to be heard thereon.”
Part 2, § 15: †
“No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained, unless * * * the claim for compensation * * * shall have been made within 6 months after the occurrence of the *640same (with, certain exceptions) * * * but no such claim shall be valid or effectual for any purpose unless made within 2 years from the date the personal injury was sustained.”
Summarized, section 4 requires that the employer shall furnish medical, surgical and hospital services; section 15 provides that no proceedings for compensation for an injury under the act shall be maintained unless such claim is made within 2 years from the date of the injury. Did the commission, by its order extending the time during which the defendants are required to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services to the plaintiff, grant compensation to the plaintiff for the injury?
In the recent case of Cline v. Byrne Doors, Inc., 324 Mich 540 (8 ALR2d 617), the same question came before us — whether an extension of time for an additional 6 months during which the employer is required to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services is an award of compensation within the meaning of the act. In that case, the employee, a resident of Michigan, had been voluntarily paid compensation in Florida for disability arising out of an injury which occurred in that State. Later, the Florida industrial commission entered an order di-' recting his employer to furnish him medical, surgical and hospital services for an additional 6 months under a comparable section of the Florida statute. Subsequently, the employee made application to the Michigan workmen’s compensation commission for compensation during disability arising out of the injury. As to that, the Court said:
“However, the plaintiff is not here seeking payment for medical, surgical and hospital care. He seeks an award for workmen’s compensation, the amount of which weekly compensation is fixed by the Michigan act. In that respect the instant proceeding differs from the action taken by the Florida *641commission, where no award of compensation was made. There is no constitutional requirement that the Michigan commission be required to recognize and give full faith and credit to the order of the Florida commission for a different recovery. The Magnolia Petroleum Case, * while barring an award of compensation by the Louisiana commission after an award of compensation for the same disability had been made by the Texas commission, does not apply to the case at bar.”
Cases which hold that an employer can recover from an indemnitor or a subcontractor in an action of assumpsit for the amount which the employer has been required to pay to or for the employee by an award of the commission, including funeral expenses (Michigan Boiler & Sheet Iron Works, for use and benefit of American Mutual Liability Co., v. Dressler, 286 Mich 502), do not control decision under the circumstances of the instant case.
In its opinion the compensation commission found:
“We do not think the limitation in section 15 is a bar to an injured employee’s right to medical, surgical and hospital service as provided by part 2, I 4 * # #
“We think the employer and its carrier if the risk is insured, are liable for the benefits provided by section 4 irrespective of whether the injured employee is entitled to weekly compensation benefits. There are any number of cases in which an injured employee continues to receive regular wages and is in no position to make a demand for weekly compensation but nevertheless is entitled to receive the benefits provided by section 4. We think that an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment is the only prerequisite for the benefits provided by section 4. In the instant case the employer and carrier have had an *642opportunity to object to the request for additional medical care and have been heard on their objections. The record definitely establishes the need for an additional 6 months of medical, surgical and hospital care.
“We find that the plaintiff sustained an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by Bloch & G-uggenheimer, Inc., in the latter part of January, 1945. "We further find the employer had notice of the injury within the statutory period and that a report of the injury to the commission was not required. We further find that plaintiff is barred from weekly compensation for failure to make a demand for compensation within 2 years from the date of the injury. We further find that plaintiff is entitled to an additional 6 months of medical, surgical and hospital care for the injury he sustained.”
The order of the commission in the instant case was in accordance with our recent decision in the Cline Case, supra, and should be affirmed.
Reid and North, JJ., concurred with Boyles, C. J.

 CL 1948, § 412.4 (Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp § 17.154). The changes by PA 1945, No 325, and PA 1949, No 238, do not apply here.

 CL 1948, § 412.15 (Stat Ann 1949 Cum Supp § 17.165).

 320 US 430 (64 S Ct 208, 88 L ed 149, 150 ALR 413, 15 NCCA NS 529).