Court Opinion

ID: 9497897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:03:03.822109+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:29.441355
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I readily join the judgment of the court. In addition to joining the majority’s discussion of the denial of Cincinnati’s Rule 60(b) motion, I also join that part of the opinion holding that Leighton’s obligation to indemnify under the 1997 agreement was discharged because the renewal of the bond agreement in 2000 acted as a novation that terminated his liability. I would affirm the district court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of Leighton on that basis. I thus feel there is no need to opine whether Illinois would find that language in the indemnity agreement could sustain Leighton’s liability after Cincinnati increased, without notice, the amount of the bond from $40,001 to $100,000. Cf. Disher v. Info. Res., Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 141 (7th Cir.1989) (“We are reluctant to opine unnecessarily on questions of state law.”); Graphic Sales, Inc. v. Sperry Univac Div., Sperry Corp., 824 F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir.1987) (“As a federal court whose jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, we are particularly hesitant to decide unsettled questions of state law unnecessarily.”).
Illinois law remains unresolved on this issue, and although it might ultimately be settled as prescribed by the majority, Illinois may also decide that general language such as that agreed to by Leighton does not constitute consent to responsibility for more than double the amount stated in an agreement. See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Penn Paving, Inc., 557 Pa. 439, 734 A.2d 833, 837-40 (1999) (finding surety did not con*891sent to change in bonding line from $200,000 to $5 million by agreeing to be responsible for “any said Bond or Bonds, or any other bonds, which may be already or hereafter executed on behalf of the Contractor” and agreeing that “no ... change or extension in the terms of any Bond” would release the signator); Bank of Terrell v. Webb, 177 Ga.App. 715, 341 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (1986) (signing note stating holder could “compromise or extend or renew ... for any period ... any indebtedness evidenced thereby” did not constitute consent to increase in interest rate, reasoning that the language “cannot be construed as being a general consent to all modifications”). Although the majority cites several Illinois cases, none holds a signator who agreed to be responsible for a definite amount liable for more than that amount. Cf. Bank One, Springfield v. Roscetti, 309 Ill.App.3d 1048, 243 Ill.Dec. 452, 723 N.E.2d 755, 764 (1999) (defendant signed unconditional, unlimited guaranty); Brzozowski v. Northern Trust Co., 248 Ill.App.3d 95, 187 Ill.Dec. 814, 618 N.E.2d 405, 411 (1993) (holding plaintiff responsible for amount explicitly agreed in the guaranty, “$38,000 plus the interest on such amount and plus all expenses herein-before mentioned”); Jacobson v. Devon Bank, 39 Ill.App.3d 1053, 351 N.E.2d 254, 254-56 (1976) (holding that broad language in a guaranty did not discharge the plaintiff from his obligations under the guaranty, but not holding guarantor responsible for more than the amount of the original guaranty). Therefore, I respectfully decline to join that part of the opinion that discusses this issue.