Court Opinion

ID: 9772088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:07:04.93682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:42.021967
License: Public Domain

ONION, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
I concur only in the result reached by Judge Clinton-reversal of this cause. I would reverse because there was no proper evidence before the court to justify the revocation of probation. In my view the trial court could not have taken judicial notice of the testimony given in a prior trial and have used the same as the basis of a revocation of probation. See my dissenting opinions in Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
In Scott v. Clark, 38 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin, 1931), it was held that, while a court may take judicial notice of its own orders in a previous hearing between the same parties on the same subject, the court cannot take judicial notice of the testimony heard before him on another trial and enter independent judgment thereon. See also Texas Practice, 1 McCormick and Ray, 2nd Ed., Evidence, § 152, 172, and cases cited in the dissenting opinion in Barrientez.
The so-called “judicial notice” artificially fashioned in Barrientez was not judicial notice as known to the field of law. In devising the new rule, the majority simply borrowed the name for convenience and to put a stamp of approval on still another shortcut in revocation proceedings. In Bradley this writer in dissenting wrote:
“The chickens hatched by Barrientez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), are coming home to roost. Instead of putting an end to the mounting problems created by Barrientez and its progeny by overruling Barrientez, the majority warmly embraces this erroneous rule, and in an apologia, seeks to shore up the rule in the light of the circumstances of the instant case. It abates the appeal to allow the State to supplement the record by including the testimony from a prior trial record of which the trial judge took ‘judicial notice’ in this revocation proceeding but which was never included in the record in the first place. The State is thus allowed to re-open its case and to correct its mistake by abatement of appeal.”
While the record of the testimony of the prior trial and of which “judicial notice” was taken in the instant case is in the appellate record, Judge Clinton would reverse because the trial judge did not make specific findings in his order revoking probation concerning his acceptance or rejection of any or all of the principal witness’ testimony or of the witness’ credibility where in the prior trial, which resulted in a mistrial, the jurors ostensibly deadlocked over the credibility of the State’s principal witness.
In the past the majority of this court has argued that the so-called Barrientez rule of “judicial notice” was designed for judicial convenience and economy in revocation proceedings. Given Bradley and the instant *197case and the delays in the finality of revocation of probation now inherent under the Barrientez rule, one may well wonder how much longer it will take for the majority to realize the rule was ill-conceived in a number of ways. Revocation of probation proceedings are not complex or difficult legal proceedings. Evidence may be produced by calling witnesses, by stipulations (which frequently occur when there has been a prior trial and where the offense involved in such prior trial is the basis of the revocation motion and the trial judge and defense counsel are the same), by an agreed statement of facts, etc. It was never a real problem before Barrientez. If the majority of this court will not reconsider the Bar-rientez rule, perhaps our trial judges will avoid imposing upon this overburdened court any other questions under the Bar-rientez rule by refusing to use the “judicial notice” artificially fashioned in Barrientez.
For the reasons stated, I concur in the reversal.