Court Opinion

ID: 9951633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 16:11:17.040407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:50.992107
License: Public Domain

J-S28022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARKESE DENASHAWN LAMPLEY                    :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 693 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0000597-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                             FILED: MARCH 18, 2024

       Appellant, Markese Denashawn Lampley, appeals from the August 18,

2021 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie

County that imposed an aggregate sentence of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole to be followed by 13 to 44 years’ incarceration.    After

careful review, we are constrained to remand this case for an evidentiary

hearing, limited in scope, in accordance with this memorandum.

       We previously noted the procedural history as follows:

       On April 15, 2020, the Commonwealth by way of information,
       charged Appellant with numerous criminal offenses under the
       Crimes Code and several summary offenses under the Vehicle
       Code for events occurring on January 25, 2020. On August 7,
       2020, Appellant through appointed counsel, Bruce G. Sandmeyer,
       Esquire (“Attorney Sandmeyer”) filed an omnibus pre-trial motion
       seeking a change of venue, a change of venire, a motion for
       dismissal, and a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Appellant's
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28022-23

     motions were denied on August 31, 2020. On November 2, 2020,
     Appellant privately retained Jason E. Nard, Esquire (“Attorney
     Nard”). On June 16, 2021, a status conference was held to discuss
     the motion in limine that was filed by Attorney Nard, on behalf of
     Appellant, seeking to exclude photographs of the deceased victim,
     photographs taken at the victim's autopsy, and a letter written by
     Appellant to a magisterial district judge. Prior to the hearing, the
     Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant's motion in limine
     regarding the letter to the magisterial district judge. The trial
     court determined that the letter was admissible under
     Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) and incorporated the
     Commonwealth's legal arguments in its order. On June 17, 2021,
     the Commonwealth filed a motion to amend information[,]
     seeking to withdraw several criminal charges and also to amend a
     spelling error of the last name of the deceased victim. That same
     day, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion.

     With the jury trial quickly approaching, on June 16, 2021, Attorney
     Nard informed the trial court that Appellant unexpectedly decided
     he wanted to proceed pro se at trial. On June 21, 2021, the trial
     court held a Grazier1 hearing. At the hearing, the trial court
     provided a brief summary of the history of the case. Attorney
     Nard stated he met with Appellant on Wednesday, June 16, 2021,
     and was informed Appellant no longer wished to retain his
     services. Appellant provided the trial court with a “Pro Se Notice”
     and requested he be addressed as “Mileage Galor Bey”. Attorney
     Nard stated that Appellant had been cooperative throughout the
     entirety of the proceedings since Attorney Nard was retained in
     November 2020, until June 16, 2021. Four days before the start
     of his trial, Appellant proclaimed himself to be a sovereign citizen
     and incorrectly stated the trial court lacked authority and
     jurisdiction over him. After an exhaustive colloquy with Appellant,
     the trial court found that Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and
     intelligently, relinquished his right to be represented by counsel.
     Appellant even stated to the trial court that: “it's my choice.”
     Once satisfied with Appellant's waiver, the trial court appointed
     Attorney Nard to act as standby counsel. Appellant agreed with
     the appointment of Attorney Nard as standby counsel. The trial
     started with jury selection on June 24, 2021.

        [Footnote 1:] Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81
        (Pa. 1998).

     On July 2, 2021, after a four-day jury trial, Appellant was found
     guilty of murder [of] the second degree (Count 2), 3 counts of

                                    -2-
J-S28022-23

     aggravated assault - serious bodily injury (Counts 3 - 5),
     robbery - inflicts serious bodily injury (Count 6), possessing
     instruments of crime (Count 11), 2 counts of simple assault - fear
     of imminent serious bodily injury (Counts 13 and 14), 6 counts of
     recklessly endangering another person (Counts 15 - 18, 20[,] and
     21)[,] and fleeing or attempting to elude police officer (Count
     10).2 Additionally, the trial court found Appellant guilty of 10
     summary motor vehicle offenses.3

        [Footnote 2:] 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 2702(a)(1),
        3701(a)(1)(i), 907(b), 2701(a)(3), 2705, as well as 75
        Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a), respectively.

        [Footnote 3:] The 10 summary offenses were unauthorized
        transfer or use of registration (Count 22), traffic-control
        signals - steady red indication (Count 24), driving on right
        side of roadway (Count 25), driving on roadways laned for
        traffic - driving within single lane (Count 26), stop signs and
        yield signs - duties at stop signs (Count 27), turning
        movements and required signals (Count 28), driving vehicle
        at safe speed (Count 29), careless driving (Count 30),
        reckless driving (Count 31), and windshield obstructions and
        wipers - sun screening and other materials prohibited
        (Count 32).       75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1372(3), 3112(a)(3)(i),
        3301(a), 3309(1), 3323(b), 3334(a), 3361, 3714(a),
        3736(a), and 4524(e)(1), respectively.

     On August 18, 2021, after consideration of the pre-sentence
     investigation report, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) regarding
     rehabilitation potential, the gravity of the offense, the impact on
     the community and the victims, the need to protect the public,
     and the sentencing guidelines, the trial court imposed, inter alia,
     a sentence of life in prison without parole and 13 to 44 years’
     incarceration, with the aggregate term of incarceration imposed
     at Counts 3 - 6, 10, 11, 13 - 18, 20, and 21 set to run
     consecutively to the sentence of life in prison imposed at Count 2.

     On August 30, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion
     claiming that because he was a sovereign citizen, the trial court
     lacked jurisdiction over him, and asserted what the trial court
     gleaned as challenges to the judgment of sentence imposed by
     the trial court on August 18, 2021. On September 2, 2021, the
     trial court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion. In so doing,
     the trial court held that Appellant's sovereign citizen claim was
     frivolous and his other claims lacked legal merit. On September

                                     -3-
J-S28022-23

     7, 2021, Appellant filed pro se a “Notice Requesting Leave to
     Supplement Post-Sentence Notice for New Trial” dated September
     6, 2021. Appellant alleged the Commonwealth never filed a
     motion to amend the criminal information and added additional
     charges, violating Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 564.
     The trial court found Appellant's claims to be “factually inaccurate”
     as the Commonwealth did file a motion to amend the information
     on June 17, 2021, and no new charges were added. In fact, the
     Commonwealth withdrew several charges.                Consequently,
     Appellant's motion was denied.

     On May 6, 2022, Appellant filed a “Motion to Reinstate Appellate
     Rights Nunc Pro Tunc.” Due to the unique facts surrounding this
     case (Appellant proceeding pro se at trial and claiming sovereign
     citizenship) and out of deference to Appellant, the trial court
     granted Appellant's motion. Appellant filed his “Statement of
     [Errors] Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule
     of Appellate Procedure 1925(b)” and alleged the weight and
     sufficiency of the evidence were insufficient to support the
     verdicts. During this time, Appellant was proceeding pro se.
     Under directive from this Court, the trial court held a Grazier
     hearing in order to determine whether Appellant wished to
     continue his appeal pro se. Appellant immediately requested to
     be assisted by counsel, and on July 20, 2022, the trial [court]
     appointed Jessica A. Fiscus, Esquire (“Attorney Fiscus”).

Commonwealth v. Lampley, 2023 WL 8234316, at *1-*2 (Pa. Super. filed

Nov. 28, 2023) (non-precedential memorandum) (original brackets and

footnote omitted).

     Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

     [1.]   Did the trial court err when it permitted Appellant to proceed
            pro se at the time of trial where the waiver colloquy does
            not reveal that Appellant made a knowing, voluntary, and
            intelligent waiver of counsel?

     [2.]   Did the trial court violate Appellant's federal and state
            constitutional right to self-representation when it adopted a
            practice of standby counsel acting as a "liaison" for
            Appellant at multiple sidebars and in-chambers discussions
            rather than allowing Appellant to speak for and represent

                                     -4-
J-S28022-23

              himself as, on many of these occasions, the trial court
              received evidence, heard argument, [or] made decisions on
              evidentiary issues [or] issues affecting Appellant's
              fundamental rights as an accused person?

       [3.]   Is the evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions for
              aggravated assault, as to [two of the victims], where the
              evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
              Commonwealth, did not demonstrate that Appellant had the
              specific intent to inflict serious bodily injury on either of
              them?

Appellant’s Brief at 11 (extraneous capitalization omitted).1

       In his first issue, Appellant asserts that his waiver of counsel was not

knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently provided because the “trial court clearly

did not comply with the minimum, mandatory requirements of [Pennsylvania

Rule of Criminal Procedure 121]” in conducting the waiver of counsel colloquy.

Id. at 46. In particular, Appellant contends that (1) “the trial court never

outlined the elements of the crimes [for which he was charged] in the

colloquy” as required by Rule 121(A)(2)(b); (2) the trial court “never indicated

that Appellant had the right to have free counsel appointed if he [were]

indigent” as required by Rule 121(A)(2)(a); (3) trial court failed to advise

Appellant that he may lose many rights permanently if not timely asserted as

required by Rule 121(A)(2)(f); and (4) “the trial court did not identify with

any particularity the summary offenses charged, incorrectly stated that

[Appellant] faced ten rather than eleven [summary offenses], and did not

____________________________________________

1 For ease of disposition, Appellant’s issues have been reorganized.

                                           -5-
J-S28022-23

identify the maximum fine[s permitted] by statute” as required by Rule

121(A)(2)(b).

     Because Appellant’s claims require us to interpret Rule 121 and its

colloquy requirements, these claims present a question of law for which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 141 A.3d 512, 518 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 161 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2016). It is well-established that

     an accused has a constitutional right to counsel during trial. While
     an accused may waive his constitutional right, such a waiver must
     be the free and unconstrained choice of its maker[] and also must
     be made knowingly and intelligently[.] To be a knowing and
     intelligent waiver[, the] defendant must be aware of both the right
     and of the risks of forfeiting that right.

Commonwealth v. Tyler, 360 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1976) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

     The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
     United States Constitution and Article [I], Section 9 of the
     Pennsylvania Constitution. When a defendant wishes to waive the
     right to counsel, the trial court is ultimately responsible for
     ensuring that the defendant is questioned about the six areas
     specified in Rule 121 and for determining whether the defendant
     is indeed making an informed and independent decision to waive
     counsel. Specifically, it is incumbent on the [trial] court to fully
     advise the accused of the nature and elements of the crime before
     accepting waiver of counsel. A penetrating and comprehensive
     colloquy is mandatory, regardless of the defendant's experience
     with the system. Failure to conduct a thorough, on-the-record
     colloquy before allowing a defendant to proceed to trial pro se
     constitutes reversible error on direct appeal.

Commonwealth v. Isaac, 205 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations,

footnote, original brackets, and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 217

                                    -6-
J-S28022-23

A.3d 795 (Pa. 2019). The appointment of standby counsel does not cure a

trial court’s failure to conduct an effective waiver of counsel colloquy.

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 257 A.3d 13, 18 (Pa. Super. 2020). Waiver of a

constitutional right, such as the right to counsel, cannot be presumed from a

silent record as it is well-established that the presumption must always be

against the waiver of a constitutional right. Commonwealth v. Norman,

285 A.2d 523, 526 (Pa. 1971); see also Commonwealth v. Murphy, 214

A.3d 675, 679 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating, “waiver cannot be presumed in a

silent record”); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 158 A.3d 117, 121 (Pa. Super.

2017) (stating, “[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against

waiver of fundamental constitutional rights”).

      Rule 121(A)(2) states in pertinent part that

      To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is
      knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the judge or issuing authority,
      at a minimum, shall elicit the following information from the
      defendant:

         (a) that the defendant understands that he or she has the
         right to be represented by counsel, and the right to have
         free counsel appointed if the defendant is indigent;

         (b) that the defendant understands the nature of the
         charges against the defendant and the elements of each of
         those charges;

         (c) that the defendant is aware of the permissible range of
         sentences and/or fines for the offenses charged;

         (d) that the defendant understands that if he or she waives
         the right to counsel, the defendant will still be bound by all
         the normal rules of procedure and that counsel would be
         familiar with these rules;

                                     -7-
J-S28022-23

         (e) that the defendant understands that there are possible
         defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of,
         and if these defenses are not raised at trial, they may be
         lost permanently; and

         (f) that the defendant understands that, in addition to
         defenses, the defendant has many rights that, if not timely
         asserted, may be lost permanently; and that if errors occur
         and are not timely objected to, or otherwise timely raised
         by the defendant, these errors may be lost permanently.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2)(a-f).

      When reviewing a trial court's basic compliance with the
      requirements of Rule 121, we do not first apply a “totality of the
      circumstances” test. In this context, we look at the totality of the
      relevant circumstances only after we decide the trial court
      has met the minimum requirements of Rule 121, to
      determine whether the defendant's waiver of the constitutional
      right to counsel was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 93 A.3d 847, 853-854 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(citations and footnote omitted; emphasis added). The trial court must make

a “probing inquiry” into whether a defendant is knowingly, voluntarily, and

intelligently waiving his or her right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Clyburn,

42 A.3d 296, 299 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also Commonwealth v. Houtz,

856 A.2d 119, 125 (Pa. Super. 2004) (reiterating that, a trial court must

formally and searchingly inquire into the six areas covered by Rule 121);

Isaac, 205 A.3d at 363 (stating, a “penetrating and comprehensive colloquy

is mandatory” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)). “The ‘probing

colloquy’ standard requires Pennsylvania trial courts to make a searching and

formal inquiry into the questions of (1) whether the defendant is aware of his[,

or her,] right to counsel or not and (2) whether the defendant is aware of the

                                     -8-
J-S28022-23

consequences of waiving that right or not.” Commonwealth v. Starr, 664

A.2d 1326, 1335 (Pa. 1995).

      It is incumbent upon the trial court to ensure that a defendant is aware

of both the nature of his or her right to counsel and the risks and consequences

of forgoing that constitutional right before finding that a defendant knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently waived his or her right to counsel. Phillips, 93

A.3d at 852. In addition to the six inquiry factors enumerated in Rule 121,

the trial court must also inquire about a defendant’s age, educational

background, and basic comprehension skills in order to ensure that the

defendant possesses the ability to understand the questions posed to him or

her during the waiver colloquy. Commonwealth v. McDonough, 812 A.2d

504, 507 n.1 (Pa. 2002); see also Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853.

      Regarding   the   Rule   121(A)(2)(b)   factor – whether    a   defendant

understands the nature of the charges against the defendant and the elements

of each of those charges – the trial court must go beyond a mere inquiry of

the defendant’s understanding of the offenses. Phillips, 93 A.3d at 853. In

order to satisfy Rule 121(A)(2)(b), the trial court must “fully advise the

[defendant] of the nature and elements of the crime before accepting the

waiver of counsel.”     Id. (citation, original quotation marks, and original

brackets omitted); see also Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 299. The failure to fully

advise a defendant of the elements of the crime constitutes reversible error.

Phillips, 93 A.3d at 854-855 (holding that, the failure to advise a defendant

of the elements of the offenses constitutes error); see also Clyburn, 42 A.3d

                                     -9-
J-S28022-23

at 301 (stating that, Rule 121(A)(2)(b) requires the trial court to elicit from

the defendant that he or she understands, inter alia, the elements of the

offenses); Commonwealth v. Lasko, 14 A.3d 168, 173 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(stating that, a “full [waiver] colloquy was not conducted on the record as the

trial court did not explain the elements of the crimes” but, rather, only orally

explained    the   charges    and      the      possible   sentencing       exposure);

Commonwealth v. Floyd, 257 A.3d 13, 18 (Pa. Super. 2020) (stating that,

the waiver colloquy was deficient because the trial court did not advise the

defendant of the elements of the charged offenses); Isaac, 205 A.3d at 363

(noting that, a trial court’s failure to inform a defendant of the elements of the

charged offenses constitutes a deficient waiver colloquy); Commonwealth v.

Hood,    2022   WL   4090008,     at   *6    (Pa. Super.    filed   Sept.   7,   2022)

(non-precedential decision) (stating, the minimum requirements of Rule 121

are not satisfied when the trial court fails to, inter alia, ensure the defendant

understood the elements of each charge). Moreover, a signed waiver form

containing a perfunctory statement that the defendant agreed he or she was

informed of the nature and elements of the crime but fails to list the charges

and elements of each crime, does not cure an insufficient oral colloquy.

Clyburn, 42 A.3d at 301. Strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of

Rule 121 is of import because a defendant may change his or her mind as to

self-representation based upon the disclosures made, and information gained,

during the waiver colloquy. Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d 695, 703

(Pa. Super. 1999).

                                       - 10 -
J-S28022-23

       In the case sub judice, Appellant was charged with 21 criminal offenses

under the Crimes Code and 11 summary offenses under the Vehicle Code.

See Amended Information, 6/17/21. During his Grazier hearing on June 21,

2021, Appellant, having been presented with a waiver of counsel form that

stated he had the right to counsel or to have counsel appointed if indigent,2
____________________________________________

2 As part of the colloquy, Appellant executed a right to counsel waiver form in

which he answered affirmatively (“yes”) to the following questions:

       1. Do you understand you have a right to be represented by an
       attorney, and a right to a free attorney if you can't afford one and
       you meet the eligibility requirements of the Erie County Public
       Defender's Office?

       2. Do you know the nature and the elements of the charges
       against you?

       3. Are you aware of the possible range of sentences, including
       fines and the maximum possible penalty that can be imposed, if
       you are found guilty or plead guilty?

       4. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you will still
       be required to follow all the rules of criminal procedure and
       evidence?

       5. Do you understand that an attorney will be more familiar with
       these Rules than you?

       6. Do you understand there may be defenses to these charges
       which counsel would be aware of?

       7. Do you understand that if these defenses or other rights are
       not raised at the right time, they may be permanently lost?

       8. Do you understand if errors or rule violations occur and you
       don't object to them at the right time you will lose your right to
       object permanently?

                                          - 11 -
J-S28022-23

acknowledged that he understood his right to counsel. N.T., 6/21/21, at 25.

Appellant further acknowledged that he understood that he had certain rights,

including the right to object to errors or rule-based violations during trial that

would be lost if not timely raised. Id. at 26. The trial court informed Appellant

of the 21 offenses for which he was charged under the Crimes Code.3 N.T.,
____________________________________________

       9. Are you voluntarily giving up your right to be represented by
       an attorney?

Right to Counsel Waiver Form, 6/21/21. To the question - “Have you been
forced or pressured in any way, or have promises been made to you that have
influenced your decision to waive your right to be represented by an
attorney” - Appellant answered “no.” Id.

3 The trial court misspoke when it indicated to Appellant that he had been
charged with only 10 summary offenses under the Vehicle Code when, in fact,
Appellant had been charged with 11 summary offenses. N.T., 6/21/21, at 24
(stating, “[t]here are ten violations of the [V]ehicle [C]ode charged as
summaries” (emphasis added)).

When a defendant has been charged with summary offenses, neither the
United States Constitution nor the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees the
defendant an absolute right to counsel. Commonwealth v. Smith, 868 A.2d
1253, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 877 A.2d 462 (Pa. 2005).
Rather, “[t]he right to counsel in summary cases attaches only to those
defendants who are unable to employ counsel when there is a likelihood
that imprisonment will be imposed.” Smith, 868 A.2d at 1256 (citation
and original quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). When the only
sentence provided for in a summary offense violation is a fine and costs, a
defendant does not have a right to counsel. Id. Ergo, if no right to counsel
attached, the trial court does not need to conduct a waiver of counsel colloquy
before permitting a defendant to proceed pro se in defending against the
summary offenses.

Here, the trial court indicated that Appellant's 11 summary charges were
punishable by fines and costs. Therefore, Appellant had no right to counsel in

                                          - 12 -
J-S28022-23

6/21/21, at 23.       The trial court then proceeded to explain the potential

penalties Appellant faced if convicted.4 Id. at 23-24. The trial court did not,

however, orally advise Appellant of the elements of each offense under the

Crimes Code that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt

to convict Appellant.5 Instead, the trial court asked Attorney Nard whether
____________________________________________

defending against those charges. As such, Appellant's challenge to the trial
court's failure to satisfy the colloquy requirements of Rule 121 with regard to
the summary offenses is without merit.

4 The trial court identified the potential penalties according to the classification

of the felony or misdemeanor, i.e., felonies of the first degree carry a
maximum penalty of 20 years’ incarceration and a $25,000.00 fine, and
misdemeanors of the first degree carry a maximum penalty of 5 years’
incarceration and a $10,000.00 fine, rather than identifying the potential
penalty Appellant faced with each offense, i.e., a conviction for robbery carries
a maximum penalty of 20 years’ incarceration and a $25,000.00 fine and a
conviction of possessing instruments of crime carries a maximum penalty of
5 years’ incarceration and a $10,000.00 fine.

5 The trial court explained the nature of Appellant’s criminal charges as
follows:

       [W]e want to make sure [] that you understand you're charged
       with two forms of murder, murder of the first degree, murder of
       the second degree, aggravated assault as a felony of the first
       degree. There are three counts of those.

       Robbery, felony of the first degree. There are three counts of
       those. Firearms not to be carried without a license, fleeing or
       attempting to elude police officers, felonies - both felonies of the
       third degree. Possessing instruments of crime as misdemeanors
       of the first degree. Simple assault at Counts 12, 13[,] and 14,
       misdemeanor of the second degree, and recklessly endangering
       another person at [Counts] 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 as
       misdemeanors of the second degree.

N.T., 6/21/21, at 23.

                                          - 13 -
J-S28022-23

he “explained the substance of these charges” to Appellant, to which Attorney

Nard replied affirmatively. Id. at 24.

      Upon our initial review of the record, we found that it was unclear what

was meant by the term “substance” as it related to Appellant’s criminal

charges. Lampley, 2023 WL 8234316, at *11. In particular, we found that,

based upon the record then-before us, we were unable to discern “whether

Appellant was appropriately and sufficiently advised of the elements of each

crime.” Id. at *12. As such, we remanded the case to the trial court so it

could “conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine what, if anything, was

explained by Attorney Nard to Appellant regarding the elements of the

crimes.”   Id. (stating, “the trial court shall determine what Attorney Nard

meant when he stated he ‘explained the substance of [the charges]’ to

Appellant”).

      Upon remand, the trial court, after conducting an evidentiary hearing on

December 15, 2023, made the following findings of fact:

      1.       Attorney Sandmeyer, who was appointed on February 14,
               2020[,] to represent Appellant, reviewed the criminal
               complaint and the affidavit of probable cause with Appellant
               including emphasis on the most serious charges of murder
               of the first degree, murder of the second degree, []
               aggravated         assault[ - serious      bodily      injury,]
               robbery[ - inflicts serious bodily injury,] firearms not to be
               carried without a license, and fleeing or attempting to elude
               police officer.

      2.       Attorney Sandmeyer represented Appellant at the
               preliminary hearing [on February 28, 2020,]·wherein the
               Commonwealth presented extensive testimony from
               Pennsylvania State Trooper Adam Blashock regarding the

                                        - 14 -
J-S28022-23

          conduct engaged by Appellant which encompassed the
          criminal activity charged in the criminal complaint.

     3.   The magisterial district judge read the charges on the record
          at the outset of the preliminary hearing.

     4.   Attorney Sandmeyer further testified at the [December
          2023] evidentiary hearing that he explained the burdens of
          proof to Appellant and the differences between a prima
          facie/probable cause burden of proof and the much more
          difficult burden of beyond a reasonable doubt.

     5.   All charges from the preliminary hearing were bound over
          to [the trial] court[,] and the Commonwealth formally filed
          the [criminal] information which enveloped the entirety of
          the charges enumerated in the criminal complaint.

     6.   Attorney Sandmeyer testified that he reviewed and
          discussed with Appellant the criminal complaint, [the
          criminal] information, and all discovery material.

     7.   Following Appellant's formal arraignment [on June 1, 2020,]
          Attorney Sandmeyer filed an omnibus pretrial motion and
          motion for writ of habeas corpus to dismiss several of the
          counts, including all three [] simple assault charges.
          Attorney Sandmeyer testified that in preparing [the]
          motion[s], he discussed the substance of the charges that
          he sought to have dismissed and his theory of legal
          insufficiency.

     8.   Attorney Sandmeyer testified that, throughout his
          representation, he [] explained the nature of [] the charges
          to Appellant and at no time did Appellant ever indicate he
          did not understand the charges.

     9.   Attorney [] Nard testified he was privately retained in
          November 2020.         Attorney Nard specifically recalled
          reviewing the elements of the charges with Appellant during
          his first meeting with Appellant. Although Attorney Nard did
          not read the elements of each charge verbatim, he
          explained the substance of the charges and the elements to
          Appellant by using common sense language that was able
          to be understood by Appellant. Attorney Nard stated that it
          is his practice to explain the elements of the charges in
          simple and conversational terms to his criminal
          defendant[-]clients because this practice enables them to

                                  - 15 -
J-S28022-23

           more readily understand the nature and elements of the
           charges.

     10.   Attorney Nard testified he could not specifically recall
           discussing the elements of the simple assault charges with
           Appellant.     First, with respect to simple assault at
           [C]ount 12[], this charge was withdrawn following the
           request of the Commonwealth and by [trial] court order
           dated June 17, 2021. Thereby, any contention Appellant
           was deprived of the elements of [C]ount 12 is moot because
           it no longer existed at the time of the Grazier hearing held
           on June 21, 2021.         The simple assault charges at
           [C]ounts 13 and 14 of the amended information pertained
           to [two additional] victims[.] These counts were again
           nearly synonymous with the charging language asserted in
           the robbery counts ([Counts] 7 and 8) that, in the course of
           committing a theft, Appellant did hold the victims at
           gunpoint and put them "in fear of imminent serious bodily
           injury." Attorney Nard's testimony emphasized that he did
           explain the nature and elements of the entirety of the
           charges to Appellant.        The criminal information also
           illustrates the conduct charged in the "physical menace"
           simple assault at [C]ounts [13 and 14, which] was
           encompassed in the language of the robbery charges at
           [C]ounts 7 and 8 involving the same two victims[.]
           Consequently, Attorney Nard was confident that he
           explained the substance of the charges to Appellant.

     11.   Additionally, Attorney Nard's testimony revealed that there
           was never a question of whether Appellant understood the
           charges. Both Attorney Sandmeyer and Attorney Nard were
           clear that Appellant understood the nature and substance of
           the charges he faced and the Commonwealth's burden of
           proof.

     12.   Attorney Nard stated and explained to Appellant that the
           [Commonwealth] had to prove each of the crimes and their
           elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

     13.   When specifically asked by the [trial] court what Attorney
           Nard meant when he explained the substance of the charges
           to Appellant, Attorney Nard testified he explained the
           elements of each of the charges in his initial meeting with
           Appellant.

                                   - 16 -
J-S28022-23

        14.   Finally, Attorney Nard testified that Appellant was steadfast
              in his commitment to represent himself and at no time did
              Appellant ever change his mind or equivocate in his decision
              to represent himself.

Trial   Court   Opinion,   1/24/24,   at   3-6   (record   citations,   extraneous

capitalization, and footnotes omitted).     In finding that Appellant had been

advised of the elements of the criminal charges, the trial court stated,

        Based on the testimony of Attorney Sandmeyer and the testimony
        of Attorney Nard that they explained the nature and elements of
        the charges to Appellant, in addition to the trial court's colloquy
        and exhibits from the Grazier hearing [on June 21, 2021], the
        trial court finds that the minimum requirements of Rule 121 were
        clearly met to warrant an examination of the totality of the
        relevant circumstances.

Id. at 8 (citation and extraneous capitalization omitted).

        As discussed supra, the trial court, at the June 21, 2021 Grazier

hearing, reviewed with Appellant the charges filed against Appellant and the

potential penalties Appellant could receive. N.T., 6/21/21, at 23-24. At the

conclusion of the charges and potential penalties review, the trial court asked

Attorney Nard if he “explained the substance of these charges [to Appellant,]”

to which Attorney Nard responded in the affirmative.         Id. at 24.    Shortly

thereafter, the trial court asked Appellant

        And you know the nature and elements of the charges against you
        as you've had a preliminary hearing. You've had an information,
        a complaint, discussions with Attorney Sandmeyer and Attorney
        Nard, and as well, I just read the charges to you; is that correct?

Id. at 25. Appellant responded in the affirmative. Id.

                                      - 17 -
J-S28022-23

       At the evidentiary hearing on December 15, 2023, Attorney Nard was

asked what he meant when he informed the trial court that he reviewed the

“substance of the charges” with Appellant. N.T., 12/15/23, at 83. Attorney

Nard stated that his explanation of the “substance of the charges” was his

“review of what was required to establish each of those [charges.]” Id. at 83.

Attorney Nard explained that, after being retained by Appellant on November

2, 2020, he met with Appellant in either late 2020 or early 2021. Id. at 56-58,

87.   Attorney Nard stated that, at their initial meeting, he reviewed the

charges with Appellant, and “the discussion [of] the elements would have

happened [at] that first meeting[.]” Id. at 57-58, 87. Attorney Nard recalled

going over the elements of the charges of murder, robbery, aggravated

assault, possess of a firearm, fleeing or eluding police, and reckless

endangerment. Id. at 59-64. Attorney Nard stated he “did not go over the

elements of simple assault” or review the Vehicle Code summary offenses with

Appellant.6 Id. at 58-59. Attorney Nard stated that in explaining the elements

of the charges to Appellant, he did not recite verbatim the statutory definition

of each charge but, rather, explained the elements of each charge based upon

his review of the information, the criminal complaint, and his “collective

____________________________________________

6 At the time of Attorney Nard’s initial meeting with Appellant, Appellant was

charged with, inter alia, two counts of simple assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2701(a)(1) and two counts of simple assault pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2701(a)(3). See Information, 4/15/20, at Counts 13 – 16; see also
Amended Criminal Complaint, 2/28/20, at Offense #9 and Offense #22.

                                          - 18 -
J-S28022-23

experience” as a criminal defense attorney in a way that Appellant could

understand the elements of the charges. Id. at 87-99, 104.

       Upon review, we discern no error in the trial court’s determination that,

at the June 21, 2021 Grazier hearing, Appellant was aware of the elements

necessary to prove each criminal charge. As Attorney Nard explained, at his

initial meeting with Appellant he reviewed, in a colloquial manner, the

elements of the criminal charges with the exception of the simple assault

charges.     Appellant was, however, aware, based upon his review of the

information with Attorney Nard and his attendance at his preliminary hearing,

that he was charged with several counts of simple assault. See N.T., 2/28/20,

at 3-4. Appellant, having reviewed the information and criminal complaint

with Attorney Nard and Attorney Sandmeyer, would have been aware of the

elements of, inter alia, the simple assault charges based upon the description

of those charges set forth in the information and criminal complaint.7
____________________________________________

7 To convict an individual of simple assault under Section 2701(a)(1) of the

Crimes Code, the Commonwealth must establish that the individual had the
specific intent to cause bodily harm and took a substantial step towards
causing bodily harm or intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly did cause
bodily injury to another. Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 94
(Pa. Super. 2018); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).

To convict an individual of simple assault under Section 2701(a)(3) of the
Crimes Code, the Commonwealth must establish that the individual
“intentionally plac[ed] another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury
through the use of menacing or frightening activity.” Commonwealth v.
Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 726 (Pa. Super. 2003); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2701(a)(3).

                                          - 19 -
J-S28022-23

____________________________________________

In the information, the charges of simple assault were defined as follows

       Count Thirteen:

       And the district attorney further charges that on the day and year
       aforesaid in the said County of Erie and State of Pennsylvania,
       [Appellant] did attempt to cause or intentionally, knowingly[,] or
       recklessly caused bodily injury to another, to-wit: [Appellant] did
       shoot [the deceased victim] in the back and leg occurring at
       Wendy’s, 102 Washington Towne Boulevard, Washington
       Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania; thereby [Appellant] did
       commit the crime of simple assault, a misdemeanor of the second
       degree.

       Count Fourteen:

       And the district attorney further charges that on the day and year
       aforesaid in the said County of Erie and State of Pennsylvania,
       [Appellant] did attempt to cause or intentionally, knowingly[,] or
       recklessly caused bodily injury to another, to-wit: [Appellant] did
       discharge a firearm in the immediate vicinity of [one of the
       victims] during an active robbery, occurring at Wendy’s, 102
       Washington Towne Boulevard, Washington Township, Erie
       County, Pennsylvania; thereby [Appellant] did commit the crime
       of simple assault, a misdemeanor of the second degree.

       Count Fifteen:

       And the district attorney further charges that on the day and year
       aforesaid in the said County of Erie and State of Pennsylvania,
       [Appellant] did attempt by physical menace to put another in
       fear·of imminent serious bodily injury, to-wit: [Appellant] did hold
       [another victim] at gunpoint and demand money from the
       victim[,]occurring at Wendy’s, 102 Washington Towne Boulevard,
       Washington Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania; thereby
       [Appellant] did commit the crime of simple assault, a
       misdemeanor of the second degree.

       Count Sixteen:

                                          - 20 -
J-S28022-23

       Having found record support that the trial court satisfied Rule 121 in its

colloquy of Appellant, we concur with the trial court that the totality of the

circumstances supports a finding that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to counsel at the June 21, 2021 Grazier hearing.

       In his second issue, Appellant claims the trial court violated his right to

self-representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

by appointing his former-trial counsel, Attorney Nard, as standby counsel and

____________________________________________

       And the district attorney further charges that on the day and year
       aforesaid in the said County of Erie and State of Pennsylvania,
       [Appellant] did attempt by physical menace to put another in fear
       of imminent serious bodily injury, to-wit: [Appellant] did hold [a
       third victim] at gun point and demand money from the victim[,]
       occurring at Wendy’s, 102 Washington Towne Boulevard,
       Washington Township, Erie County, Pennsylvania; thereby
       [Appellant] commit the crime of simple assault, a misdemeanor of
       the second degree.

Information, 4/15/20, at 4-5 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

In the amended criminal complaint, the charges of simple assault were defined
as follows:

       In that, on or about said date, [Appellant] did attempt to cause or
       did intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly cause bodily injury to
       another.

       In that, on or about said date, [Appellant] did attempt by physical
       menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

Amended Criminal Complaint, 2/28/20, at Offense #9, citing 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2701(a)(1), and Offense #22, citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3) (extraneous
capitalization omitted).

                                          - 21 -
J-S28022-23

having standby counsel act as a “liaison” at various stages of the trial.

Appellant’s Brief at 46-55. Appellant alleges 11 instances in which the trial

court violated his constitutional right to self-representation by having standby

counsel present but excluding Appellant from the discussions. Id. at 50-52.

In particular, Appellant asserts that the trial court permitted standby counsel

to be present, and participate in one instance of voir dire of an empaneled

juror, nine instances of sidebar discussions with the Commonwealth and the

trial court, and one instance of an in-chambers discussion of the proposed

verdict slip and jury instructions. Id. Appellant contends that “the practice

employed by the trial court effectively abridged or curtailed his right to

self-representation.”     Id. at 52.      Appellant avers that, at one point, even

standby counsel “expressed concern that his questioning of a witness at a

sidebar might blur the lines of his role.” Id. at 53.

       It is well-established that pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, a defendant, such as Appellant, has a constitutionally protected

right to self-representation in a criminal trial.8 See Faretta v. California,
____________________________________________

8 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that

       In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
       speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
       district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
       district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
       informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
       confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory

                                          - 22 -
J-S28022-23

422 U.S. 906, 816 (1975); see also Commonwealth v. Payson, 723 A.2d

695, 700 (Pa. 1999). Because Appellant’s claim, asserting violations of his

constitutional right to self-representation, raises a question of law, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.9

Commonwealth v. Lucarelli, 971 A.2d 1173, 1178 (Pa. 2009).

       In accord with a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation,

a trial court may appointment standby counsel to assist the defendant.
____________________________________________

       process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
       Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees

       In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard
       by himself and his counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
       the accusation against him, to be confronted with the witnesses
       against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
       in his favor, and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a
       speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage; he cannot
       be compelled to give evidence against himself, nor can he be
       deprived of his life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of
       his peers or the law of the land. The use of a suppressed voluntary
       admission or voluntary confession to impeach the credibility of a
       person may be permitted and shall not be construed as compelling
       a person to give evidence against himself.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.

9 Appellant frames his claim within the context of the Sixth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution but does not assert that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides
him heightened protection of his right to self-representation. As such, we
evaluate Appellant’s claim under the assumption that the protections afforded
by each constitutional provision are co-extensive.

                                          - 23 -
J-S28022-23

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 170 (1984); see also Faretta, 422

U.S. at 834 n.46 (stating, the trial court may appointment standby counsel

“to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available

to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant’s

self-representation is necessary”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 121(D) (stating, “When the

defendant's waiver of counsel is accepted, standby counsel may be appointed

for the defendant. Standby counsel shall attend the proceedings and shall be

available to the defendant for consultation and advice.”); Commonwealth v.

Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 82 (Pa. 2012) (permitting the trial court to appoint

standby counsel).     When standby counsel has been appointed and “a

defendant elects to proceed at trial pro se, the defendant - and not standby

counsel - is in fact counsel of record and is responsible for trying the case.”

Spotz, 47 A.3d at 83, relying on Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d 1137,

1138-1139     (Pa. 1993) (prohibiting      hybrid representation);   see also

McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183 (stating, “Faretta does not require a trial [court]

to permit ‘hybrid’ representation”).

      To preserve a defendant’s right to self-representation, “[t]he pro se

defendant must be allowed to control the organization and content of his[, or

her,] own defense, to make motions, to argue points of law, to participate in

voir dire, to question witnesses, and to address the [trial] court and the jury

at appropriate points in the trial.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174. While the trial

court is permitted to appoint standby counsel, the trial court may impose

limitations on standby counsel’s role. Spotz, 47 A.3d at 82-83 (permitting

                                       - 24 -
J-S28022-23

the trial court to limit standby counsel to answering the accused’s legal

questions; prohibiting standby counsel from taking notes concerning trial

testimony, volunteering instructions to the accused on what to do or say next,

or suggesting that an objection may be warranted); see also McKaskle, 465

U.S. at 177 (stating, the unsolicited and excessively intrusive participation by

standby counsel may undermine the objectives underlying the right to

self-representation).

      In assessing whether a defendant’s right to self-representation has been

violated, “the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair

chance to present his[, or her,] case in his[, or her,] own way.” McKaskle,

465 U.S. at 177. The High Court in McKaskle explained,

      First, the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control
      over the case he[, or she,] chooses to present to the jury. This is
      the core of the [] right [to self-representation]. If standby
      counsel's participation over the defendant's objection effectively
      allows counsel to make or substantially interfere with any
      significant tactical decisions, or to control the questioning of
      witnesses, or to speak instead of the defendant on any matter of
      importance, the [] right [to self-representation] is eroded.

      Second, participation by standby counsel without the defendant's
      consent should not be allowed to destroy the jury's perception that
      the defendant is representing himself[, or herself].            The
      defendant's appearance in the status of one conducting his[, or
      her,] own defense is important in a criminal trial, since the right
      to appear pro se exists to affirm the accused's individual dignity
      and autonomy. . . . Appearing before the jury in the status of
      one who is defending himself[, or herself,] may be equally
      important to the pro se defendant. From the jury's perspective,
      the message conveyed by the defense may depend as much on
      the messenger as on the message itself. From the defendant's
      own point of view, the right to appear pro se can lose much of its

                                     - 25 -
J-S28022-23

      importance if only the lawyers in the courtroom know that the
      right is being exercised.

Id. at 178. Standby counsel’s involvement in the trial cannot destroy the

appearance that a defendant is acting pro se. Id. at 181.

      Nevertheless, “[o]nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any

substantial participation by [standby] counsel, subsequent appearances by

[standby] counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's acquiescence,

at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews his[, or her,]

request that standby counsel be silenced.” Id. at 183. A defendant’s right to

self-representation is

      not infringed when standby counsel assists the pro se defendant
      in overcoming routine procedural or evidentiary obstacles to the
      completion of some specific task, such as introducing evidence or
      objecting to testimony, that the defendant has clearly shown he
      wishes to complete. Nor are they infringed when counsel merely
      helps to ensure the defendant's compliance with basic rules of
      courtroom protocol and procedure.

Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 196 A.3d 1021, 1030-1031 (Pa.

2018) (explaining that, an agreement by a defendant to standby counsel’s

collaborative role and the defendant’s reliance on counsel precludes an

assertion   that   standby   counsel     usurped   the   defendant’s   right   to

self-representation).

      In the case sub judice, Appellant alleges 11 instances in which the trial

court violated his right to self-representation. Appellant’s Brief at 50-52. Nine

of those instances involve discussions at sidebar where the trial court, the

Commonwealth, and standby counsel were present but Appellant was not,

                                       - 26 -
J-S28022-23

remaining, instead, at counsel table. Id. at 51-52. Another instance occurred

on the first day of trial, where the trial court conducted voir dire of an

empaneled juror in the jury room with the Commonwealth and standby

counsel present but Appellant was not present.           Id. at 50-51.   The final

instance involved an in-chambers discussion where the trial court, the

Commonwealth, and standby counsel gathered to discuss the proposed verdict

slip and jury instructions but Appellant was not included in that discussion.

Id. at 52.

       A review of the record reveals that on June 28, 2021, prior to the start

of trial and outside the presence of the jury, the following conversation

occurred:10

       [Trial Court:]       All right. So I still will have Attorney Nard as
                            standby counsel.         And that's what you
                            [(Appellant)] would like, correct?

       [Appellant:]         Correct.

       [Trial Court:]       In other words, he'll be sitting next to you. If
                            you have questions for him, you could consult
                            with him and the other - go ahead. You want to
                            ask him something?

       [Appellant:]         Under [the Fourth Amendment -]

       [Trial Court:]       Slow down because, remember, [the court
                            reporter is] taking everything down.

       [Appellant:]         Right.    [The Fourth Amendment right - ]the
                            right of accused in criminal prosecutions. I have
____________________________________________

10 This conversation between Appellant and the trial court occurred after the

voir dire of the empaneled juror, as discussed infra, but before the jury was
sworn in.

                                          - 27 -
J-S28022-23

                         the right to have an assistant counsel for my
                         defense[,] right?

      [Trial Court:]     Well, he's standby, and I made sure he's there.

      [Appellant:]       Same as assistant, right?

      [Trial Court:]     I don't know if it's the same. He's available for
                         you to ask and consult [on] legal questions. So
                         you can - he's there for you.        He's your
                         resource.

      [Appellant:]       Right.

      [Trial Court:]     And to that end, if there's ever a
                         meeting - sometimes we meet at what we call a
                         sidebar. It's actually right here (indicating).
                         [Standby counsel] may come up for you as your
                         representative, but then he'll go back and tell
                         you everything.

      [Appellant:]       Okay.

      [Trial Court:      Is that acceptable to you?

      [Appellant:]       That's acceptable.

N.T., 6/28/21, at 15-16.

      As evidenced by this conversation, Appellant agreed to utilize, and rely

on, standby counsel for purpose of sidebar discussions.        Appellant has not

cited to, nor has our review of the record revealed, an instance whereby

Appellant revoked his agreement to allow standby counsel to participate in

sidebar discussions on his behalf. As such, having agreed to permit standby

counsel to participate in sidebar discussions on his behalf, Appellant cannot

now   validly   assert     that   standby      counsel   usurped   his   right   to

self-representation. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 183; see also Williams,

196 A.3d at 1030-1031. Therefore, we find Appellant’s nine allegations of a

                                      - 28 -
J-S28022-23

violation of his right to self-representation concerning sidebar discussions to

be without merit.

      With regard to Appellant’s assertion that his right to self-representation

was violated when he was excluded from an in-chamber discussion of the

proposed verdict slip and jury instructions, the record reveals that on July 1,

2021, the following discussion occurred in Appellant’s presence but outside

the presence of the jury:

      [Trial Court:]          I should note that for purposes of jury
                              instructions, I was provided a very
                              exhaustive list at that time by then
                              counsel [now standby counsel], Attorney
                              Nard, because it was [submitted] at our
                              deadline for proposed jury instructions.
                              And I also received them from the
                              [Commonwealth]. So, Attorney Nard, at
                              that time did you review with [Appellant]
                              what those proposed instructions would
                              be?

      [Standby Counsel:]      Your Honor, I did review the evening of
                              our conference what I [] submitted. Yes.

      [Trial Court:]          Okay. My intention is to - now that we've
                              had testimony, I can sort of more focus in
                              on what I feel is appropriate or has been,
                              at least, a basis for the legal jury
                              instructions. Because at [the time the
                              proposed      jury     instructions    were
                              submitted], obviously, we didn't have any
                              predicate to go on, and I think it was just
                              more of an idea of where it was going, but
                              now we do. But I will fairly let both sides
                              know - of course, you, as the defendant,
                              will know that, and then that will give you
                              the benefit for closing argument.

      [Commonwealth:]         Yes, Your Honor.

                                    - 29 -
J-S28022-23

     [Trial Court:]          Anything on that?

     [Commonwealth:]         Is that being done now, Your Honor?

     [Trial Court:]          No. I would think first thing tomorrow
                             morning, but I would give you an
                             opportunity of where I think I'm going on
                             it.

     [Commonwealth:]         In chambers, Your Honor?

     [Trial Court:]          Pardon me?

     [Commonwealth:]         In your chambers, Your Honor.

     [Trial Court:]          Probably, if we would have a charge
                             conference. Maybe in my courtroom, to
                             allow [Appellant] to be present for that.
                             And he always has been privy to every
                             piece of information. If I haven't told him,
                             I think the record's reflected it, but I know
                             Attorney Nard has continually updated us
                             on that status. And then I would just
                             confirm it with [Appellant] to assure that
                             he has been informed at every stage of
                             this trial. Okay.

N.T., 7/1/21, at 209-211.

     After closing arguments on July 2, 2021, the trial court conducted an

in-chambers discussion of, inter alia, the proposed verdict slip and the jury

instructions. N.T., 7/2/21, at 43-52. A review of the July 2, 2021 transcript

pertaining to this in-chambers discussion does not reveal that Appellant was

present during this discussion. Id. Instead, the trial court, upon concluding

the in-chambers discussion and reconvening in the courtroom, noted that

“Attorney Nard is reviewing the proposed verdict slip with [Appellant.]” Id.

at 53. The trial court then asked Appellant if the proposed verdict slip was

acceptable, to which Appellant replied in the affirmative.      Id.   Although

                                   - 30 -
J-S28022-23

Appellant agreed to permit, and to rely on, standby counsel for purpose of

sidebar discussions with the trial court and Commonwealth, Appellant’s

agreement did not extend to discussions involving the proposed verdict slip

and the jury instructions. As both the verdict slip and the jury instructions

are key components utilized by the jury in determining a defendant’s guilt or

innocence, we find a pro se defendant’s participation in a discussion

concerning the proposed verdict slip and the jury instructions to be essential

to the preservation of a pro se defendant’s right to self-representation.

Nonetheless, after the in-chambers discussion concluded, standby counsel

reviewed the proposed verdict slip with Appellant, and Appellant agreed that

the verdict slip was acceptable and correct.      Appellant did not lodge an

objection to the proposed verdict slip or his exclusion from the in-chambers

discussion.   As such, Appellant accepted standby counsel’s role as his

representative in these discussions.    Therefore, we discern no violation of

Appellant’s right to self-representation.

      Finally, Appellant asserts that his right to self-representation was

violated when the trial court conducted a voir dire of an empaneled jury

member prior to the start of trial outside Appellant’s presence. Appellant’s

Brief at 50-51.

      “[C]ounsel’s presence is required at every stage of a criminal proceeding

where substantive rights of the accused may be affected.” Commonwealth

v. Johnson, 828 A.2d 1009, 1014 (Pa. 2003). “A critical stage in a criminal

proceeding is characterized by an opportunity for the exercise of judicial

                                     - 31 -
J-S28022-23

discretion or when certain legal rights may be lost if not exercised at that

stage.”    Id.   “[V]oir dire is a critical stage of [a] criminal proceeding[.]”

Commonwealth v. Hunsberger, 58 A.3d 32, 37 (Pa. 2012); see also

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 902 A.2d 419, 423 (Pa. 2006) (stating, “[a]

criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury is explicitly granted by Article

[I], Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of

the United States Constitution[, and t]he jury selection process is crucial to

the preservation of that right”); Commonwealth v. Le, 208 A.3d 960, 972

(Pa. 2019) (stating, “[t]o enable a [defendant] to enforce his[, or her]

constitutional right to an impartial jury, he[, or she,] must be afforded an

adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors” (original brackets omitted)).

As such, counsel’s presence is required at voir dire.11 Hunsberger, 58 A.3d

at 37; see also Johnson, 828 A.2d at 1014. Therefore, logically, in the case

of a pro se defendant, the defendant’s presence, as his own legal

representative, is required at all stages of voir dire in order to properly

____________________________________________

11 While a defendant, who is represented by counsel, has a constitutional right

to observe the voir dire process, the defendant has a constitutional right to
have his or her counsel present at, and participate in, all stages of the voir
dire process, including in-chambers discussions and sidebars. Hunsberger,
58 A.3d at 38-40 (stating that, “although a defendant has the clear right to
participate in the jury selection process, that right is not compromised where[]
the defendant, [] was in the courtroom[ but] was not present at sidebar where
his[, or her,] counsel was questioning several venirepersons outside the range
of [the defendant’s] hearing”). A defendant’s subsequent consultation with
his or her counsel upon conclusion of the sidebar precludes a finding that the
defendant’s constitutional right to be present during jury empanelment has
been violated. Id. at 40.

                                          - 32 -
J-S28022-23

vindicate the defendant’s right of self-representation in the process of

selecting a fair and impartial jury. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174 (stating

that, a defendant’s right to self-representation “plainly encompasses” the right

to, inter alia, participate in voir dire); see also Hunsberger, 58 A.3d at 37;

Johnson, 828 A.2d at 1014; Spotz, 47 A.3d at 83 (stating that, “[w]hen a

defendant elects to proceed at trial pro se, the defendant – and not standby

counsel – is in fact counsel of record and is responsible for trying the case”).

      The record reveals that, on June 24, 2021, the trial court began the voir

dire process by introducing Appellant and stating that he was choosing to

represent himself. N.T., 6/24/21, at 36; see also id. at 46 (stating that,

Appellant was dressed appropriately and afforded the first chair at counsel

table). The trial court also introduced standby counsel and explained that

standby counsel was “there for the interest and convenience of [Appellant.]”

Id. at 37. Thereupon, the trial court began the questioning of the individual

venirepersons to which Appellant had the opportunity to fully participate. Id.

at 44, 49, 53, 60, 67, 70, 74, 78, 83-85, 95, 101, 110, 112, 114, 116,

120-121, 127-128, 133, 142, 157, 159-160, 165, 169, 176, 182, 184-185,

193, 195, 198, 202, 204, 208, 219-220, 224, 227, 231, 234, 238. At the

conclusion of the voir dire process on June 24, 2021, a jury of 12 members,

with two alternates, was empaneled.

      On June 28, 2021, prior to the jury members being sworn in, and prior

to the start of trial, the trial court conducted voir dire of an empaneled juror,

alternate juror #1, to determine whether the juror knew one of the law

                                     - 33 -
J-S28022-23

enforcement officers that was expected to testify at trial on behalf of the

Commonwealth.12 N.T., 6/28/21, at 4-9. At the outset of this voir dire, the

trial court represented that the Commonwealth and standby counsel were

present in the jury room. Id. at 4. Appellant was not present. Id.

        The trial court began by explaining the need for further voir dire as

follows:

        Last night [(June 27, 2021,)] our tip staff[] had connection with
        [alternate juror #1. Alternate juror #1] expressed concern that
        there was a name that she may have been familiar with and I'll
        let her explain and the name was Cody Krahe. I have the spelling
        as K-R-A-H-E.

        Now, I spoke informally with [alternate juror #1] this morning in
        the presence of my law clerk, [] and we had looked at the witness
        list - the lay witness list not knowing that Cody Krahe[ is] a
        [Pennsylvania] State Trooper. So on our lay witness list, there is
        no Cody Krahe. There is a Cody, but it's [a different last name].

        We then dismissed [alternate juror #1]. I informed counsel, but
        then it was bought to my attention that there was a Trooper Cody
        Krahe. So I thought it was prudent that we put this on the record
        with those of us assembled here and now just follow it up. Okay.

Id. at 4-5. The trial court then proceeded to inquire of alternate juror #1

regarding her connection with Trooper Krahe.13 After the trial court concluded

____________________________________________

12 The voir dire of alternate juror #1 occurred in the jury room.   N.T., 6/28/21,
at 4.

13 Alternate juror #1 explained that she did not know Trooper Krahe personally

but, rather, knew his wife, who was the owner of the gym where alternate
juror #1 belonged. N.T., 6/28/21, at 5-6. Alternate juror #1 stated that she
did not socialize with the wife and “probably [has not] seen her in person in
probably years.” Id. at 6.

                                          - 34 -
J-S28022-23

its questioning of alternate juror #1, the Commonwealth declined to ask any

additional questions. Id. at 7. Standby counsel, however, asked the juror

several questions “out of an abundance of caution on behalf of [Appellant.]”14

Id. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the trial court did not excuse alternate

juror #1 from serving on the jury, stating,

       I don't think there's any reason why [alternate juror #1] should
       be disrupted or removed. She's absolutely - actually, she did
       everything we want her to do. She went out of an abundance of
       caution. You're to be commended for that. She knew the name
       was in her mind, not knowing where. Now I think we do know
       what refreshed your recollection from that Thursday and seeing it
       in this questionnaire. But based on those responses and your
       commitment to be fair and impartial, I'm satisfied with that.

Id. at 9.

       Upon returning to the courtroom where Appellant was waiting, the trial

court did not explain to Appellant on the record the supplemental voir dire of

alternate juror #1 or the trial court’s decision following the voir dire. Id. at

9-10. Instead, the trial court reaffirmed Appellant’s commitment to represent

himself at trial. Id. at 10-18. Thereafter, the jury entered the courtroom and

was sworn in prior to the start of trial. Id. at 19.

       Based upon the record currently before us, it is clear that Appellant did

not participate in the supplemental voir dire of alternate juror #1. What is

unclear, however, is whether standby counsel conferred with Appellant after
____________________________________________

14 Prior to questioning alternate juror #1, standby counsel stated, “I’m kind of

in an odd position[,]” to which the trial court responded, “I know.”       N.T.,
6/28/21, at 7.

                                          - 35 -
J-S28022-23

the supplemental voir dire process and Appellant agreed to the trial court’s

decision to retain alternate juror #1.         Whether Appellant was advised by

Attorney Nard as to what occurred during the supplemental voir dire of

alternate juror #1 and whether Appellant, if so advised, lodged no objection

to what took place is critical to the analysis of whether Appellant is entitled to

relief. Therefore, we are constrained to remand this case for the sole purpose

of determining whether Attorney Nard, as standby counsel, conferred with

Appellant about the events surrounding the supplemental voir dire process

and, if he did so confer, whether Appellant ratified standby counsel’s

participation in the supplemental examination of alternate juror #1 on

Appellant’s behalf, and whether Appellant had no objection to the trial court’s

decision to retain alternate juror #1.

       In his final issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support his convictions of two counts of aggravated assault.15        Appellant’s

Brief at 29-36. Specifically, Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to

sufficiently demonstrate that Appellant had the requisite intent to inflict

serious bodily injury on the two victims. Id. at 36.

       Our standard and scope of review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence is well-settled.

____________________________________________

15 Appellant was convicted of three counts of aggravated assault stemming
from his involvement with three separate victims. In his final issue, Appellant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault
convictions as they relate to two of the three victims.

                                          - 36 -
J-S28022-23

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
      addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
      the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
      innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
      resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
      inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
      drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the [fact-finder] while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      Section 2702(a)(1) of the Crimes Codes states that

      A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he[, or she,] attempts
      to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury
      intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly under circumstances
      manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1) (formatting modified).      In order to establish a

conviction   for   aggravated   assault   under   Section   2702(a)(1),     the

Commonwealth must demonstrate that “a person, under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, [] (1) attempt[ed]

to cause serious bodily injury to another, or (2) cause[ed] such injury

intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 229

A.3d 298, 313 (Pa. Super. 2020).

                                    - 37 -
J-S28022-23

      For aggravated assault purposes, an “attempt” is found where an
      accused who possesses the required, specific intent acts in a
      manner which constitutes a substantial step toward perpetrating
      a serious bodily injury upon another. Intent ordinarily must be
      proven through circumstantial evidence and inferred from acts,
      conduct[,] or attendant circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Miller, 217 A.3d 1254, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations, brackets, and some quotations marks omitted), appeal denied, 226

A.3d 562 (Pa. 2020).     “An attempt under Subsection 2702(a)(1) requires

some act, albeit not one causing serious bodily injury, accompanied by an

intent to inflict serious bodily injury.” Commonwealth v. Fortune, 68 A.3d

980, 984 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 78 A.3d 1089 (Pa.

2013).

      To determine if a defendant acted with the requisite intent for a

conviction of aggravated assault under Section 2702(a)(1), a totality of the

circumstances test is applied. Miller, 217 A.3d at 1257. Under the totality

of the circumstances test, courts may consider, inter alia, “evidence of a

significant difference in size or strength between the defendant and the victim,

any restraint on the defendant preventing him[, or her,] from escalating the

attack, the defendant's use of a weapon or other implement to aid his[, or

her,] attack, and his[, or her,] statements before, during, or after the [attack]

which might indicate his[, or her,] intent to inflict injury.”       Id., citing

Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. 2006).

      In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated

assault convictions pertaining to two of the three victims, Appellant asserts

                                     - 38 -
J-S28022-23

that “the evidence reveals that Appellant drew a handgun, pulled on the slide

to chamber a round, and gestured around with the [hand]gun while

attempting to get [one of the victims] to open the safe.” Appellant’s Brief at

33-34.   Appellant further asserts that the “video [surveillance recording]

showed the [hand]gun mostly pointed in a downward direction, but [the

second victim] also recalled [the handgun] being pointed in her direction.” Id.

at 34. Appellant further contends that the evidence establishes that “neither

[victim] heard Appellant [] utter any threat.”     Id.    Appellant argues that

evidence demonstrating that he pointed a handgun at the victims absent

specific threats to cause the victims serious bodily injury is insufficient

evidence to support his convictions. Id. at 34-35.

      At trial, the first victim testified that she was working at the front

counter and dining area of the restaurant on the day of the incident. N.T.,

6/28/21, at 55. When Appellant entered the restaurant, the first victim was

near the front door. Id. at 56. Appellant grabbed the first victim and pushed

her towards the front counter. Id. at 57. The first victim stated that she

believed Appellant wanted her to open the cash register located at the front

counter so she stopped moving near the front counter. Id. at 60. Appellant,

however, told the first victim to keep moving, and the two individuals

continued to move towards the manager’s office.          Id.   Upon entering the

office, the first victim stated that the second victim was present and watching

a training video. Id. at 69. The first victim testified that Appellant asked her

to open the safe, but the first victim explained she was unable to do so

                                     - 39 -
J-S28022-23

because only a manager could open the safe. Id. It was at this moment, the

first victim stated, that Appellant pulled out a handgun and held it level with

the first victim. Id. at 70. The first victim stated that Appellant “cocked” the

gun to “start it,” thereby chambering a bullet for firing purposes. Id. The

first victim, who was standing at this point, “got down” near the safe and put

her hands up. Id. at 71. Thereafter, Appellant left the office, and the second

victim shut the office door while the first victim called 911 emergency services.

Id. The first victim stated that while in the office, Appellant talked to her, but

that the first victim could not hear or understand what Appellant was saying.

Id. at 76. The first victim testified that she was focused on the handgun and

that Appellant got angrier when the handgun appeared and he became

frustrated because he could not gain access to the money in the safe. Id. On

cross-examination by Appellant, the first victim stated that she did not hear

Appellant say anything about harming her, but admitted that she could not

understand or hear a “single thing” Appellant said after the initial encounter

in the lobby of the restaurant. Id. at 79, 85. The first victim indicated that

Appellant was taller than her, but she could not say, for certain, how tall

Appellant appeared. Id. at 75, 82. The first victim also stated that at one

point, after chambering a live round of ammunition in the handgun, Appellant

pointed the handgun at her. Id. at 80.

      The second victim stated that the day of the incident was her first day

of employment at the restaurant. Id. at 88. The second victim was watching

a training video in the office when Appellant and the first victim entered. Id.

                                     - 40 -
J-S28022-23

at 89-90. The second victim stated that she could not hear anything Appellant

was saying but his voice seemed to be “angry and deep.” Id. at 91. The

second victim recalled the first victim explaining that only a manager could

open the safe and that the first victim kneeled near the safe after Appellant

“cocked” the handgun. After Appellant exited the office, the second victim

closed the office door and kneeled next to the door in order to secure it

because it could not be locked.      Id. at 93-94.   On cross-examination by

Appellant, the second victim stated that she did not hear Appellant threaten

anyone, but admitted that she could not “really hear him at all.” Id. at 98.

The second victim saw Appellant moving the handgun around, at one time

pointing the handgun at the safe, and at another time pointing the handgun

at the two victims. The second victim stated that she felt like she was in

danger because Appellant had a gun and that he cocked the gun for firing

purposes. Id. at 99-100. Finally, the second victim described Appellant as

being taller than her. Id. at 103.

      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, we find sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s

convictions for aggravated assault pertaining to the two victims.       It is

well-settled that the act of pointing a handgun at a person, without more, is

insufficient to prove a defendant intended to cause the victim serious bodily

                                     - 41 -
J-S28022-23

harm.16    See Commonwealth v. Alford, 880 A.2d 666, 671 (Pa. Super.

2005), appeal denied, 890 A.2d 1055 (Pa. 2005). In the case sub judice,

however, Appellant did more than point a handgun at the two victims. Both

victims testified that Appellant “cocked” the handgun, which is the act of

chambering a handgun in preparation of firing the handgun, and then pointed

the handgun at the victims. See Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d

1244, 1249 (Pa. Super. 2005) (explaining that, the act of “cocking” a handgun

and chambering a round prepares a handgun for firing). The act of preparing

the handgun for purpose of firing the weapon and then pointing the handgun

at the victims constitutes a substantial step toward perpetrating a serious

bodily injury upon the victims. The only step left to cause serious bodily injury
____________________________________________

16 In charging the jury, the trial court explained, in pertinent part, that

       any particular action by a defendant, although serious such as
       pointing a loaded weapon at another, is not in and of itself
       sufficient evidence from what you may find that he intended to
       cause serious bodily injury. This is so because any such action
       may also be evidence of some less serious outcome the defendant
       actually intended such as simply to scare the alleged victim or to
       cause only some less serious injury.

       It is only when after consideration of the evidence that you
       conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's action
       was a substantial step in a chain of events that he consciously set
       in motion with his intended result being that the alleged victim or
       victims would actually suffer serious bodily injury that you should
       find the defendant guilty of this count. Otherwise, you should find
       the defendant not guilty of aggravated assault attempt at serious
       bodily injury.

N.T., 7/2/21, at 78-79.

                                          - 42 -
J-S28022-23

would have been for Appellant to have pulled the trigger and discharged the

handgun. See Fortune, 68 A.3d at 986-987 (stating, the only remaining step

Fortune would have to take to inflict serious bodily injury was to pull the

trigger).   As such, we find sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s two

convictions of aggravated assault under section 2702(a)(1).

      Although we find that Appellant validly waived his right to assistance of

counsel and that there was sufficient evident to support Appellant’s

convictions of aggravated assault, we are, nevertheless, constrained to

remand this case for an additional evidentiary hearing. The sole purpose of

the remand is to determine whether Attorney Nard, as standby counsel,

conferred with Appellant after the supplemental voir dire of alternate juror #1

and, if he so conferred with Appellant, whether Appellant ratified standby

counsel’s participation at the supplemental examination on Appellant’s behalf,

and whether Appellant made no objection to the trial court’s decision to retain

alternate juror #1. The trial court shall conduct an evidentiary hearing on this

limited issue and return the certified record to this Court within 60 days of the

date of this memorandum.

      Case remanded. Jurisdiction retained.

                                     - 43 -