Court Opinion

ID: 9881926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:20:04.947941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.767436
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                   )
                                     )
                  Plaintiff,         )
                                     )
                                     )
      v.                             )    Cr. ID No. 9911016961
                                     )
DARREL PAGE,                         )
                                     )
                  Defendant.         )
                                     )

                         Submitted: July 12, 2023
                         Decided: October 2, 2023

 COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT
  DEFENDANT’S EIGHTH MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION
      RELIEF SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED
                        AND
   DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF
  COUNSEL, DISCOVERY, AND AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
                 SHOULD BE DENIED.

Abigail E. Rodgers, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of
Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Darrel Page, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro
se.

PARKER, Commissioner
      This 2nd day of October, 2023, upon consideration of Defendant’s

eighth Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court as

follows:

           BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Defendant Darrel Page was tried before a Superior Court jury and

convicted on June 17, 2003 of three counts of Murder in the First Degree,

robbery, conspiracy and weapons charges. On February 24, 2006, Page was

sentenced to life imprisonment, without the possibility of parole, for each of

the three counts of Murder in the First Degree plus a term of years on the other

convictions.

      Following Page’s convictions and sentences, Page filed a direct appeal.

On October 10, 2007, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions

and sentences Thereafter, Page filed seven Rule 61 motions, all of which have

been unsuccessful.1 He has also filed two unsuccessful petitions for federal

habeas corpus relief.2 On May 23, 2023, Page filed the subject Rule 61

motion, his eighth Rule 61 motion.3

1
   See, State v. Page, 2019 WL 1013738, *2, ftnt. 10 (Del.Super.)(Superior Court
Commissioner’s report and recommendation denying Page’s seventh Rule 61 motion
detailing the prior six Rule 61 motions and the denials thereof).
2
   See, State v. Page, 2019 WL 1013738, *2, ftnt. 11 (Del.Super.)(Superior Court
Commissioner’s report and recommendation denying Page’s seventh Rule 61 motion
detailing the federal petitions for habeas corpus relief and the denials thereof).
3
  State v. Page, 934 A.2d 891 (Del. 2007).

                                        1
                      PAGE’S SUBJECT RULE 61 MOTION

         In the subject motion, Page claims that he was only present for a small

portion of the February 20, 2002 hearing on his trial continuance request and

therefore did not hear the Court’s comments regarding violations of his speedy

trial rights. He is now seeking to raise claims stemming from the Court’s

comments at that hearing which he contends amounts to “actual judicial

misconduct” somehow creating a strong inference of his actual innocence due

to his alleged speedy trial rights violations.

         Before Page is entitled to proceed with the subject Rule 61 motion, his

eighth, he must first satisfy the pleading requirements.        For second or

subsequent postconviction motions, like the subject motion, in order to

overcome the procedural bars warranting the summary dismissal of the

motion, the defendant must plead with particularity: 1) that new evidence

exists to establish the movant’s actual innocence in fact of the charges for

which he was convicted, or 2) that the existence of a new, retroactively

applicable constitutional rule applies to the movant’s case and renders a

conviction invalid.4

         Page has not satisfied the pleading requirements for proceeding with

this motion. Page does not raise any new facts, let alone, new facts that would

4
    Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(d)(2) & (5); and Rule (i).

                                              2
create a strong inference that he was actually innocent of the charges for which

he was convicted. In fact, the evidence of Page’s guilt was overwhelming at

trial.5 Page has not alleged the existence of any newly discovered factual

evidence, let alone exculpatory evidence that could not have been discovered

ever before.6 Moreover, Page has not alleged the existence of a new rule of

constitutional law made retroactive which would render his convictions

invalid. This motion should be summarily dismissed.

       The hearing that forms the basis of Page’s subject motion occurred on

February 20, 2002.7 Seven days before Page’s capital murder trial was

scheduled to begin, Page’s counsel informed the trial judge that one of his

experts and one of his investigators were unwilling to perform further services

absent an advanced retainer fee.8 The trial judge informed counsel that the

requested funds would not be available for the balance of the fiscal year which

ended June 30, 2002. Page’s counsel then moved for a continuance on the

grounds that there were insufficient funds to pay for the needed experts.9

5
  See, State v. Page, 2011 WL 1213841, *4-5 (Del.Super.), aff’d, 2012 WL 11615 (Del.).
6
  See, State v. Clay, 2022 WL 893744, *3 (Del.Super.)(when defendant was aware of
factual evidence and already raised it in a postconviction motion, and the evidence was
formerly adjudicated in a postconviction proceeding, it cannot constitute newly
discovered evidence).
7
  D.I. 293: February 20, 2002 Transcript of Continuance Request, attached to Defendant’s
Eight Rule 61 Motion as Appendix pages A1-8.
8
  D.I. 293, Appendix pages A1-8; Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, *895 (Del. 2007).
9
  Id.

                                           3
       The trial judge stated that it was being placed in a difficult position of

balancing the 6th Amendment right of a defendant to effective representation

by competent counsel which necessarily included the proper retention of

experts with the interests of the State and Defendant in proceeding to trial

promptly.10 The trial judge noted that it was regrettable to both the Defendant

and to the victims’ family that the trial needed to be delayed. The trial judge

noted that in order to afford Page a fair trial he must be permitted to retain

expert witnesses routinely provided to other defendants in capital murder

cases.11 The trial judge continued Page’s trial “until such time as defense

experts and investigators can be paid.” Page’s trial was then set for September

10, 2002.12

       For the sake of completeness of the speedy trial issue, Page’s trial was

again delayed. While Page’s trial was pending, the United States Supreme

Court decided Ring v. Arizona,13 and in response to that decision, the

Delaware General Assembly promptly amended the law defining the

procedure in capital cases. Because of the legal issues raised by these

developments, the Superior Court certified 16 questions in two capital cases

10
    February 20, 2002 Transcript of Continuance Request, at * 25-28.
11
   Id.
12
   February 20, 2002 Transcript of Continuance Request, at * 25-28; Page, 934 A.2d at
895.
13
    536 U.S. 584 (2002).

                                           4
that were pending trials.14 Four days later, all pending trials and penalty

hearings in capital first-degree murder cases were temporarily stayed pending

the determination by the Delaware Supreme Court of the certified questions.15

The Delaware Supreme Court accepted four of the certified questions and

answered them on January 16, 2003.16 The temporary stay was lifted on

January 27, 2003. Page proceeded to trial on May 20, 2003.17

       In this motion, Page seeks to raise violations of his constitutional

speedy trial rights stemming from the February 20, 2002 continuance request

hearing.

       First, contrary to Page’s representation that he was only present at the

continuance hearing for a small portion of the proceeding, the transcript of the

February 20, 2002 hearing reveals that Page was, in fact, present during the

entire proceeding.

       The hearing transcript reflects that Page’s counsel presented the

grounds for the continuance request from pages 3-23. After presenting the

grounds for the continuance request, Page’s counsel stated: “I think [Page]

understands the purpose of what we are doing here today. . . I don’t think we

14
   Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, *895 (Del. 2007).
15
   Id.
16
   Id.
17
   Id.

                                            5
get any prejudice from this. I think [Page] would concur with that. If Your

Honor wants to hear him affirm that, I think he is willing to do that. . .”18

       The Court then addressed Page and asked, “[I]s that your position?” To

which Page responded: “Yes, I understand.”19

       The transcript does not reflect any break in the proceeding in order to

get Page and bring him to the hearing and thereafter to get him up to speed on

the representations made by his counsel during the hearing. To the contrary,

the transcript reveals that immediately upon the Court’s confirmation that it

would like to hear from Page personally, Page immediately confirmed his

understanding of his counsels’ representations. This establishes that Page was

present in the courtroom throughout his counsels’ presentation.

       The Court then continued to address Page, and inquired: “Do you

understand that your counsel on your behalf has requested a continuance, and

that would, in effect, toll your ability to raise . . . the issue of [your] speedy

trial rights. Do you understand that?” To which Page responded: “Yes.”20

18
   February 20, 2002 Continuance Trans. at pgs. 22-23.
19
   February 20, 2002 Continuance Trans. at pg. 23.
20
   Id.

                                           6
       The Court then inquired:            “Anything about it that you don’t

understand?” To which Page responded: “He explained it to me. I understand

that.”21

       The transcript reflects that the hearing continued, without any recess,

until its conclusion.22      There is no indication in the transcript that the

proceeding stopped at any point to bring Page in to or out of the proceeding.

From the transcript it can be inferred that Page was sitting next to his counsel

during the entire proceeding.

       Since the foundation on which this motion is based, that Page was not

present for much of the continuance request hearing, is incorrect, this motion

should be summarily dismissed.

       Moreover, irrespective of whether Page was or was not present during

the February 20, 2002 continuance hearing, Page’s present claim is

procedurally barred because it was already fully considered and adjudicated

by the Delaware Supreme Court on direct appeal.23 The Delaware Supreme

Court on Page’s direct appeal already adjudicated Page’s claims of alleged

21
   Id.
22
   February 20, 2002 Continuance Trans.
23
   Page v. State, 934 A.2d 891, *895-898 (Del. 2007).

                                           7
violations of his constitutional speedy trial rights due to the February 2002

continuance request stemming from the lack of funding for his experts.24

       The Delaware Supreme Court, after considering the facts and

circumstances of the trial delay in this case, held that Page suffered no

prejudice by the delay, that his defense was not impaired, and that his speedy

trial rights were not violated.25

       Page’s attempt to reraise alleged violations of his speedy trial rights at

this late date is procedurally barred as previously adjudicated.26

       Furthermore, after a full, thorough, and careful consideration of the

claims raised by Page in his direct appeal, and thereafter in his first Rule 61

motion, the Superior Court opined, and the Delaware Supreme Court

affirmed, that Page had suffered no deprivation of constitutional rights, by

counsel, the Superior Court, the State, or otherwise.27

       Page has already been advised that he had more than ample opportunity

to raise claims of deprivations of his constitutional rights during the

proceedings leading to his conviction, direct appellate proceedings, and

during his first motion for postconviction relief.28 In the denial of Page’s third

24
   Id.
25
   Id.
26
   Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(4).
27
    See, State v. Page, 2014 WL 4348286, *2 (Del.Super.), aff’d, 2015 WL 428107 (Del.).
28
   Id.

                                           8
motion for postconviction relief in 2013, the Superior Court further held, and

the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, that any claim for postconviction relief

which Page has not asserted by that point was barred by Rule 61(i)(3).29

          Page has not overcome the procedural hurdles of proceeding with this

motion. The factual predicate for this motion, that Page was not at much of

the February 20, 2002 continuance hearing is incorrect, and the motion should

be dismissed on this basis alone. However, irrespective of whether Page

attended the February 20, 2002 continuance request hearing, his alleged

constitutional speedy trial violations stemming from that continuance request

was already formerly adjudicated by the Delaware Supreme Court on direct

appeal and is now procedurally barred. Moreover, at this late date, any claim

for postconviction relief not previously asserted is barred by Rule 61(i)(3).

          This motion should be summarily dismissed.

                       RELATED MOTIONS ARE DENIED

          In accordance with the mandates of Rule 61, Page’s Rule 61 motion

should be summarily dismissed as it failed to meet the pleading requirements

for proceeding with the motion and is otherwise procedurally barred. As such,

Page’s request for the appointment of counsel, discovery and for an

evidentiary hearing are likewise denied.

29
     State v. Page, 2013 WL 4828600, *5 (Del.Super.), aff’d, 2013 WL 6389595 (Del.).

                                             9
      For all of the foregoing reasons, Page’s Motion for Postconviction

Relief should be summarily dismissed. His request for the appointment of

counsel, discovery and for an evidentiary hearing should be denied.

      IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

                                      Lynne. M. Parker
                                      Commissioner Lynne M. Parker

cc:   Prothonotary
      James E. Liguori, Esquire

                                     10