Court Opinion

ID: 9365269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-23 17:00:51.731705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:44.297161
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12119    Document: 16-1     Date Filed: 01/23/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-12119
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       HAYWOOD JACKSON MIZELL,
                                                     Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
       PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

                                                 Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00569-ECM-SMD
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       2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12119

                              ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Haywood Mizell appeals the district court’s order granting
       Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s and PHH Mortgage Corporation’s mo-
       tions to dismiss his pro se complaint alleging wrongful foreclosure
       of two properties. We reverse.
              Mizell’s claims appear to revolve around two foreclosure
       sales—one by each defendant. Wells Fargo foreclosed on a loan
       obtained by Mizell’s wife. PHH foreclosed on a loan obtained by
       Mizell’s daughter and son-in-law. Both loans were secured by
       properties located in Ozark, Alabama, and each property was sold
       at a foreclosure sale. In his complaint, Mizell alleged that Wells
       Fargo and PHH weren’t entitled to the proceeds of these sales.
              Both defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the district
       court lacked jurisdiction because Mizell’s claims were barred by the
       Rooker–Feldman1 doctrine and that Mizell failed to state a claim.
       A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation. Upon
       finding that Mizell’s claims were inextricably intertwined with final
       judgments from state court involving the same parties and

       1
        Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals
       v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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       22-12119                Opinion of the Court                          3

       properties, the magistrate judge recommended that the district
       court dismiss Mizell’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
       under Rooker–Feldman. Mizell objected to the report and recom-
       mendation but raised no arguments about the Rooker–Feldman
       doctrine. The district court adopted the report and recommenda-
       tion and dismissed Mizell’s claims with prejudice on the sole basis
       that Rooker–Feldman stripped the district court of its subject mat-
       ter jurisdiction. Mizell timely appealed.
               On appeal, Mizell reiterates the arguments from his com-
       plaint but doesn’t challenge the district court’s dismissal of his com-
       plaint for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman. The defend-
       ants argue primarily that—as a result of Mizell’s failure to address
       the district court’s sole reason for dismissing his complaint, coupled
       with his failure to object to the report and recommendation on -
       Rooker–Feldman grounds—Mizell has waived any challenge to the
       district court’s dismissal. Indeed, issues not briefed on appeal by a
       pro se litigant ordinarily are deemed abandoned. Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). And, under the rules
       of this court, a party who fails to object to a magistrate judge’s find-
       ings contained in a report and recommendation generally “waives
       the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
       unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
             But “[t]he Rooker–Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional.”
       Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
       2010). And “arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction can-
       not be waived.” First Union Nat’l Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12119

       1374, 1378 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997). So, notwithstanding the deficien-
       cies of Mizell’s briefs, we’re compelled to review de novo the dis-
       trict court’s determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
       under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th
       1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2021).
               The Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars district courts from re-
       viewing or rejecting state court judgments rendered before the dis-
       trict court litigation began. Id. at 1210. The scope of the doctrine
       is narrow, confined to “cases brought by state-court losers com-
       plaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered be-
       fore the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
       court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
       Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
       Rooker–Feldman “does not prioritize form over substance,” mean-
       ing that it bars all appeals of state court judgments in district courts
       whether the plaintiff admits to filing a direct appeal or tries to call
       the appeal something else. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. The injury to the
       plaintiff must be caused by the judgment itself. Id. The question
       isn’t whether the whole complaint seems to challenge a previous
       state court judgment, but whether the resolution of each individual
       claim requires review and rejection of a state court judgment. Id.
       at 1213. In Behr, we warned that “district courts should keep one
       thing in mind when Rooker–Feldman is raised: it will almost never
       apply.” Id. at 1212.
             As the district court itself acknowledged, “[t]he injuries
       about which [Mizell] complains were caused by the underlying
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       22-12119               Opinion of the Court                       5

       foreclosure actions”—not by the state court judgments that upheld
       those actions. We also note that Mizell didn’t invite the district
       court to review and reject those judgments in his complaint. In-
       stead, he challenged the defendants’ power to conduct the nonju-
       dicial foreclosure sales and their entitlement to the proceeds.
       Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction over Mizell’s claims
       and erred in applying Rooker–Feldman.
              The defendants ask us to affirm the district court’s order on
       a number of alternative grounds, which were raised in their mo-
       tions to dismiss. But because the district court gave only one rea-
       son for dismissing Mizell’s complaint—the Rooker–Feldman doc-
       trine—we defer to the district court to decide in the first instance
       whether any or all of these grounds merit dismissal. See Behr, 8
       F.4th at 1214.
             REVERSED AND REMANDED.