Court Opinion

ID: 7811129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:12:57.232059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:25.630057
License: Public Domain

Hart, J. (dissenting). The Road Improvement District was first established by the county court, and that •court held that the lands in question were not benefited by the improvement of the road on account of their topographical location. No appeal was taken from the decision of the county court, and its judgment became final. Subsequently the Legislature attempted to provide for a reassessment of the land and to validate such additional reassessment. The county court acted within its jurisdiction, and after its judgment became final the Legislature had no right or power to set aside or impair the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. The Legislature could not validate the assessment of benefits held void by the county court or authorize a new assessment after the county court had held that the assessment on the lands in question was invalid ¡and its judgment had become final. To so hold is to give the Legislature power to reverse a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. The rule is based upon the principle that the co-ordinate departments of government are independent and should be kept separate and distinct from each other. In Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 59, the court held that the Legislature could not, by legalizing an invalid tax roll, set aside or impair a judgment against the collectors for trespass in attempting to collect the tax. Judge Campbell, speaking for the court, said: “That act does, in terms, purport to heal all the defects which have been pointed out. But the plaintiff’s judgment was obtained before the justice before tbis act was passed. If regular when obtained, it could not be reversed. The Legislature has no authority to reverse judgments, directly or indirectly. The effect of the act must be so limited as not to interfere with an existing judgment, or it would be necessary to declare it void on principles too elementary to be discussed. The case bad already been tried, and there was to be no further trial to determine the merits. The judgment had fixed the question of fact, and the only matter open in the circuit court was whether, in so doing, any legal error had been committed. To allow such a judgment vacated when there had been no error committed would be a plain invasion of a private right, and a usurpation of judicial powers which cannot be justified.” After the judgment of the county court, holding in the first instance that the lands in question were not benefited by the improvement of the road, had become final, the fruits of the judgment became rights of property, and no longer in that same proceeding could the Legislature validate that which the court had held void or reassess lands, or provide for the reassessment of lands, which the court had held were not benefited by the improvement. The Legislature attempts to avoid the effect of the judgment of the county court, not by directly setting it aside, but by a direction to a board of assessors which, in its effect, must be of equivalent import. The line which separates judicial from legislative authority is clear and distinct, and the Legislature cannot set aside, directly or indirectly, a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. It is apparent that the zone system of assessing benefits in road improvement districts frequently leads to inequalities, and in the hill sections of the State, like the one in question, the zone system is for the most part arbitrary and discriminatory. It is undoubtedly'true, that the assessment of benefits is a question of fact, and, like other questions of fact, the verdict of a jury or the finding of a circuit court is binding on appeal where the conclusion is reached by giving credence to the witnesses on the one side or the other, however improbable or unreasonable we might believe the testimony to be. It is equally well settled, however, that this court will not allow the verdict or finding of the circuit court to stand where it is opposed to the physical facts, the well-known laws of nature or other matters of which the court takes judicial cognizance. Here the voice of nature speaks and will not be denied. The topography of the land may be learned from the maps. The hills and hollow®, the ridges and ravines, the mountains and valleys, and the accompanying water courses do not vary or change except in rare instances, and for very unusual causes. In the hills, fertile fields and rocky and barren lands lie side by side. The heights of the ridges and mountains and the depths and width of the ravines and streams all constitute natural barriers which are not changed or overcome by the improvement of the roads. A farm which has an impassable ridge or ravine, or a stream difficult or impracticable to cross between it and a public road, is not rendered more accessible to the road by reason of the improvement of the road itself. We must not forget that the assessment of benefits proceeds upon peculiar benefits to the lands from the improvement, and not from the general good common to all the lands. The benefits must be peculiar to the lands assessed and must arise directly and immediately from the construction of the improvement, and must not proceed from some supposed or shadowy benefit to be derived in the dim and distant future. It is true that the assessors in the case at bar testify that in their opinion the lands in question were benefited. But, when their testimony is weighed in the light of the uncontroverted evidence, showing the situation of the lands with respect to the road, and the natural barriers which render it impracticable for the lands to be served by the road, our common experience leads us to the con-elusion tliat no special benefits will accrue to tbe lands in question from tbe improvement of tbe road. Judge Wood and myself therefore respectfully dissent.