Court Opinion

ID: 9412741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 15:09:44.460075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:12.628711
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                           San Antonio, Texas
                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                              No. 04-22-00256-CV

                                                Robert KOEPKE,
                                                   Appellant

                                                          v.

                     TEXAS STATE SENATE and Texas House of Representatives,
                                       Appellees

                        From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
                                     Trial Court No. 2021-CI-25237
                                Honorable Martha Tanner, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:         Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Sitting:            Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
                    Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                    Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.) 1

Delivered and Filed: July 31, 2023

AFFIRMED

           Robert Koepke appeals the trial court’s order, which granted the plea to jurisdiction filed

by the Texas State Senate and Texas House of Representatives (collectively “the Legislature”) and

dismissed his petition for writ of mandamus. We affirm.

           On December 9, 2021, Koepke filed in the trial court a petition for writ of mandamus,

complaining that the Legislature had violated the United States and Texas Constitutions. Koepke’s

complaints in his petition stemmed from various COVID-19 related emergency orders and

1
    Sitting by assignment pursuant to section 74.003(b) of the Texas Government Code
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legislation, which he argued violated civil liberties. He also sought “a full independent audit of the

2020 general election.” In his live petition, he requested that the Legislature

       be compelled to uphold the Constitution of Texas that they swore to uphold and
       defend against all enemies, foreign and domestic; The Texas State Legislature be
       compelled to perform within the duties vested in them to enforce and uphold the
       Constitution of the state of Texas by immediately conducting a full independent
       forensic audit of the 2020 general election (including down-ballot races); this court
       nullify fraudulent election results (Daniels v. Mack 2020. Orange County Circuit
       Court – judge overturned fraudulent election); issue a return to hand-counted paper
       ballots; order the return of CARES act, America Rescue Plan, and CSLFRF funds;
       and prevent any federal, state, or local – public or private – entity within the
       jurisdiction and or operating in state of Texas compelling citizens of Texas directly
       or indirectly to participate in health care data collection, health care services,
       biometric surveillance, and force to provide healthcare information by mandamus
       from this court.

In response to Koepke’s petition, the Legislature filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that his

petition was barred by sovereign and legislative immunity. The trial court granted the plea to the

jurisdiction and dismissed Koepke’s petition.

       On appeal, Koepke argues the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because the

Legislature “waived immunity from liability and suit both retrospectively and prospectively.” He

further argues that he “maintains constitutional standing—not only as a petitioner for mandamus

relief, but as an injured plaintiff in a lawsuit where immediate dangers continue to threaten harm

against [him].” He argues that he met the elements necessary for writ of mandamus.

       In response to Koepke’s brief, the Legislature points out that “[i]nstead of identifying a

waiver of sovereign immunity, [Koepke] seemingly challenges the very existence of sovereign

immunity.” Further, the Legislature argues that Koepke “cannot rely on the ultra vires exception

to sovereign immunity because he has failed to allege the necessary elements of a mandamus

claim.” That is, the Legislature contends that his “claims do not implicate this Court’s enforcement

of its jurisdiction, except insofar as the judicial branch lacks jurisdiction to compel the legislative

branch to pass or rewrite specific laws.” “Nor do [Koepke’s] claims seek to compel the

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performance of purely ministerial acts.” The Legislature emphasizes that “the lawmaking

[Koepke] seeks to compel necessarily requires [and] involves discretionary decision-making by

lawmakers.” The Legislature further argues that Koepke’s claims are barred by legislative

immunity, as Koepke “seeks to compel the Legislature to pass laws he favors,” which “falls

squarely within the sphere of legislative activity and matters of general concern protected by

legislative immunity.” We agree with the Legislature.

       Mandamus proceedings are subject to sovereign immunity. See League v. De Young, 2 Tex.

497, 500, (1847), aff’d, 52 U.S. 185 (1850) (explaining that “mandamus is not a process that can

be resorted to against a state, without her consent”). Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of

subject-matter jurisdiction over an action against the state unless the party suing the state

establishes “the state’s consent, which may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express

legislative permission.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). Koepke

has not pointed to a statute that waives sovereign immunity for his mandamus proceeding.

       Pursuant to article V, section 8 of the Texas Constitution, along with section 24.011 of the

Texas Government Code, a district court “has mandamus jurisdiction only to enforce its own

jurisdiction.” Williams v. Davis, 628 S.W.3d 946, 952 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no

pet.); see TEX. CONST. art V, § 8 (“District court judges shall have the power to issue writs

necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 24.011 (“A judge of a district court

may, either in termtime or vacation, grant writs of mandamus . . . necessary to the enforcement of

the court’s jurisdiction”). In his petition, Koepke requested that the trial court compel the

Legislature to enact legislation favored by Koepke. However, his requested relief does not

implicate the trial court’s mandamus jurisdiction. See Thompson v. Velasquez, 155 S.W.3d 551,

553 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.); Morath v. Tex. Taxpayer & Student Fairness

Coalition, 490 S.W.3d 826, 887 (Tex. 2016) (Guzman, J., concurring) (explaining that the

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Legislature has “great discretion” in passing laws and that the court has the authority to “review,

but not rewrite the Legislature’s enactments”).

       Further, we note the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity does not apply in this

case. “To fall within this ultra vires exception, a suit . . . must allege, and ultimately prove, that

the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” City of El

Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009). “‘Ministerial acts’ are those ‘where the law

prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave

nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.’” City of Houston v. Houston Mun. Emps.

Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. Emmett, 459 S.W.3d

578, 587 (Tex. 2015)). “Conversely, ‘discretionary acts’ are those that ‘require the exercise of

judgment and personal deliberation.’” Id. (quoting Sw. Bell Tel., 459 S.W.3d at 587). Koepke’s

petition does not complain that individual legislators are failing to perform purely ministerial acts.

Instead, his complaints center on legislation relating to the pandemic and the resulting election—

legislation that necessarily involved the exercise of discretion by legislators. See In re Nestle USA,

387 S.W.3d 610, 623 (Tex. 2012) (holding that “the Legislature must have discretion in structuring

tax laws”); Moore v. Bell, 95 Tex. 151, 157, 66 S.W. 45, 48 (1902) (“The discretion which is thus

placed in the Legislature is beyond judicial control, so long as the law is confined to the subject

matter and the purpose for which the constitution authorized it to be enacted”). Koepke thus has

made no showing that the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity applies in this case.

       In addition to sovereign immunity, legislative immunity also applies. “Texas and federal

courts have recognized that individuals acting in a legislative capacity are immune from liability

for those actions.” In re Perry, 60 S.W.3d 857, 859 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). “An action is

legislative in nature when it reflects a discretionary, policymaking decision of general application,

rather than an individualized decision based upon particular facts.” Id. at 860. “No act is more

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fundamentally legislative than lawmaking itself.” Id. Legislative immunity “shields individual

legislators from litigation challenging the substance of a decision.” Hays Cty. v. Hays Cty. Water

Planning P’ship, 69 S.W.3d 253, 260 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (emphasis in original).

Koepke’s complaints in his petition challenge the substance of the Legislature’s lawmaking; his

complaints relate to discretionary, policymaking decisions of general application. Accordingly,

legislative immunity also bars the requested relief sought by Koepke.

         For the above reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in granting the Legislature’s plea

to the jurisdiction and dismissing Koepke’s petition. 2

                                                           Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

2
 We note that in his brief, Koepke complains that the Texas e-file system refused to permit him to file his original
petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court and instead forced him to file his petition in the trial court.
This complaint is not preserved for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

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