Court Opinion

ID: 9643326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:25:53.313822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:59.436808
License: Public Domain

JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge
(concurring).
This is a difficult choice. But there are certain definite lines of force. We should not allow a moral reaction to prevent us from protecting all basic rights of petitioner, even in this civil case. On the other hand, we should not permit the enormity of the actual penalty—exile—to sway us in carrying out a plain mandate of the stat*401ute. As to the first, Judge Bone’s clear and well documented opinion shows that the administrative officers lived up to the letter of the statutes and regulations, although clumsily enough—as is often the case. Under more popular statutes, there would be no question about reaching some distance to support them1 Every right of petitioner was protected in the face of manifest perjury on his part and in the face of his contemptuous refusal to answer questions when a nonexistent privilege against self crimination was claimed by counsel, not by him.2 This criminal should not 'be pardoned because the record shows he is a Hebrew 'and the deportation is to Germany. There is no doubt as to the fact that petitioner committed and admitted the commission of two crimes, each involving moral turpitude. There is no doubt that petitioner did enter the United States after the commission of one of the offenses. The statute in language and intent then covered the exact situation. The findings of fact and the conclusions of the District Judge are binding upon us under these circumstances. This answers the two considerations posed above.
But other beacons attract our attention. In our opinion, the Act makes a foolish and untenable distinction between those aliens who have committed crimes and have thereafter made technical re-entry into the country and those aliens who 'have simply committed crimes of enormity, not political offenses in this country. If it had provided for deportation of the latter, the country would have been spared becoming in many instances a “cesspool of offscourings” instead of a “melting-pot,” as Zangwill movingly and truly portrayed it. But this is beyond the power of the judiciary by interstitial penetration or forthright amendation.
Notwithstanding the highly fortuitous incidence of such a re-entry, the Supreme Court of the United States, in United States, ex rel. Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422,3 held this type laid the basis for deportation. A fertile mind might suggest distinctions, but we will not chop logic. No obvious answer occurs to the query of how a man can make a re-entry as an alien from a foreign country, on which he has casually set foot, into a country in which he has already been permanently domiciled for more than twenty years.
Since we believe, as a policy, this alien and all others who have committed such crimes should be deported whether they have re-entered or not, we are content to rest concurrence on the authority of the ■highest court.
The District Court should be affirmed and the writ should be dismissed.

. National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., Inc., 337 U.S. 582, 69 S.Ct. 1173, 93 L.Ed. —. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 66 S.Ct. 1086, 90 L.Ed. 1332.

. Boyle v. Wiseman, 10 Exch. 647; U. S. v. Johnson, D. C., 76 F.Supp. 538, 540, affirmed 3 Cir., 165 F.2d 42, 50.

. Neither Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 68 S.Ct. 10, 92 L.Ed. 17, nor Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443, 89 L.Ed. 2103, have anything to do with the instant case.