Court Opinion

ID: 9895543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 18:09:45.283936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:35.133494
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JAMES B. SMITH                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 198 EDA 2023

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 29, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0346561-1982

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2023

       Appellant James B. Smith appeals pro se from the order dismissing his

third Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition as untimely. Appellant argues

that he met the governmental interference exception to the PCRA time bar

and raises multiple claims concerning his underlying conviction and sentence.

We affirm.

       The underlying facts and procedural history of this matter are well

known to the parties. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 733 Philadelphia 1994

at 1-2 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 16, 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished mem.).

Briefly, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory aggregate term of

life imprisonment without possibility of parole after the jury convicted him of

first-degree murder and related offenses in 1983.          On appeal, this Court
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
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affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied

further review. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 3452 PHL 1983 (Pa. Super.

filed Mar. 15, 1985) (per curiam) (unpublished mem.), appeal denied, 439

E.D. Alloc. Dkt. 1985 (Pa. filed Mar. 10, 1986). Appellant subsequently filed

two   PCRA     petitions,    both   of   which   were   ultimately   denied.   See

Commonwealth v. Smith, 03023 Philadelphia 1991 (Pa. Super. filed April

23, 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished mem.); Commonwealth v. Smith, 733

Philadelphia 1994 (Pa. Super. filed Nov. 16, 1995) (per curiam) (unpublished

mem.).

       On December 3, 2016, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus, which the PCRA court properly treated as an untimely third PCRA

petition.2 Therein, Appellant raised multiple claims concerning trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness, due process violations, and challenges to both his conviction

and sentence.

       On August 4, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of

intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. The PCRA court issued

an order dismissing Appellant’s petition on December 29, 2022. Appellant

filed a timely pro se notice of appeal on January 12, 2023. The trial court did

not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.           The trial court
____________________________________________

2 We note that although labeled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
Appellant raised claims that are cognizable under the PCRA. Therefore, the
PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s habeas petition as a PCRA petition.
See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(stating that unless the PCRA cannot provide a potential remedy, “the PCRA
statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus” (citations omitted)).

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issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion concluding that it did not have jurisdiction

because Appellant failed to invoke an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional

time bar.

      On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the PCRA court erred in dismissing PCRA (habeas)
         petition where [Appellant] due to COVID-19 protocols
         hampered [Appellant] from properly perfecting [Pa.R.Crim.P.]
         907 opposition letter [or] memorandum to show how his claims
         of governmental interference denied [Appellant] right to raise
         his claims of actual innocence, cruel and unusual punishment,
         and the failure to disclose[?]

      2. Assuming arguendo that no matter how inartfully [Appellant]
         raised issues of actual innocence under the language of an
         illegal sentence as it relates to cruel and unusual
         punishment[?]

      3. Whether [the] trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
         eyewitness testimony and actual innocence as well as malice,
         intent, and conspiracy[?]

      4. Whether the claim of actual innocence is cognizable under [42
         Pa.C.S. §§] 9541-9546 and if so does such a claim meet the
         exceptions of [Section] 9545 since actual innocence can never
         be waived nor time-barred[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 2 (formatting altered).

      Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).

      “[T]he timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

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omitted). A PCRA petition, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall

be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” unless the

petitioner pleads and proves one of three statutory exceptions. 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final for PCRA purposes “at the

conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme

Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the

expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

      Courts may consider a PCRA petition filed more than one year after a

judgment of sentence becomes final if the petitioner pleads and proves one of

the following three statutory exceptions:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition invoking one of the exceptions

must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been presented.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

      It is the PCRA petitioner’s “burden to allege and prove that one of the

timeliness exceptions applies.”     Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d

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1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted and some formatting altered). If a

petition is untimely, and none of the timeliness exceptions are met, courts do

not have jurisdiction to address the substance of the underlying claims.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016).

      Further, any “exceptions to the time bar must be pled in the PCRA

petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” Commonwealth

v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).

      Here, it is undisputed that Appellant’s instant petition is facially

untimely, as it was filed more than thirty years after his sentence became

final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). In his brief, Appellant argues that he met

the government interference exception. Appellant’s Brief at 8. However, our

review of the record confirms that Appellant did not argue any timeliness

exception in his pro se PCRA petition.      Therefore, Appellant waived his

argument that he satisfied an exception to the PCRA time bar. See Burton,

936 A.2d at 525; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

      For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s petition is untimely and

that he failed to establish an exception to the PCRA time bar. See Albrecht,

994 A.2d at 1094; see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Accordingly, we

affirm.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Date: 11/7/2023

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