Court Opinion

ID: 9476095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:47:12.553548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:07.348538
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
It undoubtedly will come as a surprise to many that two hundred years after we threw out King George III, the rule that “the king can do no wrong” still prevails at the federal level in all but the most trivial of matters. After the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982) (FTCA), many people, as well as the lower federal courts, assumed that the old governmental immunity from responsibility for negligent conduct that injures individual citizens was gone. Many endorsed what appeared to be the FTCA’s policy that if the citizens at large benefited from a government program, that collective citizenry, not the isolated individual injured by the negligent conduct of the program, would bear the economic burden of that injury. This case dramatically illustrates that, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air*1425lines), 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984), the FTCA (and for that matter Congress’ injunction that a program be carried out safely) is largely a false promise in all but “fender benders” and perhaps some cases involving medical malpractice by government doctors.
When Congress decided to employ above-ground testing, it repeatedly evinced the general intent that the tests should be conducted so as not to jeopardize the health and safety of the population downwind.1 However, it did not delineate the health and safety measures to be taken. No mention is made of how fallout from open-air testings should be monitored or how the public should be educated regarding the effects of fallout — the two issues litigated in this case. The responsibility for developing defined health and safety plans and for disseminating information was instead delegated to the AEC.
Based on ample evidence, the trial court found that the people who designed the downwind safety program deviated from optimum practices based on the best available scientific knowledge. On a fully supported record, the trial court found the following deviations in the plans which would clearly support liability for injury under standard tort analysis as applied by the trial court: the decision to monitor randomly rather than on a “comprehensive, person-specific basis,” Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, 374 (D.Utah 1984); decisions not to use thyroid or whole body counters, id. at 375; decisions regarding the limited extent of urine, fecal, and blood sampling, id. at 374; the decision not to test milk samples “in order to avoid arousing public concern,” id. at 375; the decisions to forego internal fallout assessment from inhalation of fallout particles, id. at 376; decisions regarding the extent of follow-up monitoring in downwind communities, id. at 379; the decision to distribute film badges and pocket dosimeters to a select number of residents rather than to every resident, id. at 379-81, 384-85; the decisions regarding duration of monitoring, id. at 381; the decisions with respect to the quantum of personnel and equipment committed to the monitoring program, id. at 381-82; and the decisions concerning the content and appropriate tone of the information given the public as well as the decisions to use pamphlets and films as the education media, id. at 385-404.
Again, on a fully supported record, the trial court found that these departures from accepted safety standards were the proximate cause of suffering and death from cancer in many of the plaintiffs. Under the then-available legal precedents, the trial court reasonably concluded that the FTCA showed Congress’ intent that the Government, which benefited from the testing, should bear these particular costs. The critical analysis dealt with Congress’ decision in the FTCA to exempt from liability those government acts broadly and vaguely described as “discretionary functions.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
At the time of the trial court’s decision, the leading construction of that provision by the Supreme Court was Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). Language in Dalehite invited some courts to focus on the bureaucratic level of the decision maker in determining whether the ensuing decision or action was clothed with immunity under the discretionary function exception. Cabinet-level actions were considered clearly of a “planning” nature and thus immune. A vehicular collision resulting from driver negligence involved “operational” action and was not immune. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 28, 37, 73 S.Ct. at 964, 969. Struggling to give meaning to the elusive terms “discretionary function,” and noting particularly the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354 (1957), and Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955), some courts thought *1426the Supreme Court intended to narrow the sweep of its Dalehite interpretation of that exception. See, e.g., Relf v. United States, 433 F.Supp. 423, 427 (D.D.C.1977), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C.Cir.1979). Following that pattern, the trial court in this case focused on the decisions made at the operational level. It concluded they were not immune.
Since the appeal was lodged in this case, the Supreme Court decided Varig Airlines. That opinion removed all doubt as to whether the discretionary function exception is to be construed broadly or narrowly. In Varig the Court explicitly denounced both the increasingly narrow construction given the exception since Dalehite and the interpretation of Dalehite that focused on the bureaucratic level of the decision maker. The Court stated, “[I]t is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function applies in a given case.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813, 104 S.Ct. at 2764. It breathed vitality into Dalehite by selectively quoting language other than the planning/operational language most often cited previously: “Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion.” Id. at 811, 104 S.Ct. at 2763 (quoting Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968). The Court thus shifted the discretionary function inquiry back toward examining the nature and character of the governmental action to determine whether it is of the type intended to be protected from tort liability by Congress. Those decisions “grounded in social, economic, and political policy,” id. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 2764, are insulated from our review, regardless of who the decision maker happens to be or how negligent the decision or action may be.
The majority opinion fully deals with the Supreme Court’s focus in Varig Airlines. It is sufficient here to note that the focus is on the nature of the planning or decision making rather than on the level at which that planning or its implementation takes place. While that may create analytical problems even in automobile accident cases where the driver is left to “plan” how to drive and carry out his mission in the most economic fashion, both the facts and language of Varig easily cover the facts of this case. Varig involved an allegedly faulty safety inspection program for aircraft. The factual parallel to the safety programs at issue here cannot be distinguished on a principled basis. Varig Airlines gives little help to lower courts applying the new standard to specific facts — if the FTCA waiver of immunity indeed applies to anything but trivial government failures, such as automobile accidents. Nonetheless, it removes all doubt that the discretionary function exception swallows the negligent decisions before us.
The AEC devised safety and information plans prior to every open-air detonation, tailoring the plans to the demands of each specific project. None of the trial court’s documented list of failures represents an instance of deviation from, or negligent implementation of, the safety and information plans adopted.2 Rather, the court’s extensive criticisms and ultimate conclusions of negligence were directed at the substance and failures of the plans themselves.
On appeal, plaintiffs do assert that “the evidence clearly demonstrates negligent and wrongful failure to execute and deviation from ... the plans approved by the Commission.” Brief for the Appellee at 22 (emphasis in original). However, the evidence does not support this allegation. *1427Not one example is given of a failure to monitor or distribute information as prescribed in the plans.3 Rather, plaintiffs’ challenge, mirroring the trial court’s concerns, goes toward the failure of the plans to specifically prescribe greater monitoring or more diffuse and in-depth information distribution. Plaintiffs’ statement that “test site personnel negligently and wrongfully failed to implement basic radiological protection measures which were common at the time, ” id. at 24 (emphasis added), demonstrates the true character of their allegations. Plaintiffs concede as much by stating that the trial court “determined that the fallout monitoring program and information program which coincided with the 1951-1962 open-air testing at the Nevada test site did not comport with the ‘best available scientific knowledge.’ ” Id. at 42-43 (emphasis added).
In arguing that the safety and information plans themselves are not immune from our review under the discretionary function exception, plaintiffs contend:
Where Congress has placed a mandatory duty upon the government to protect public health and safety, such as it did upon the Commission, it left no room for further policy-making regarding public safety. Where there is not policy-making there is no “discretion” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) and no immunity.
Id. at 13. Essentially, they assert that because the two Atomic Energy Acts demonstrate a concern for public health and safety, even though no specific health and safety measures are mandated therein, the safety plans devised to address that concern involved no social, economic, or political policy making.
On the contrary, the broad safety language of the Atomic Energy Acts had to be translated into concrete plans, and that translation involved the very essence of social, economic, and political decision making — the precise policy choices protected by the discretionary function exception. See General Pub. Util. Corp. v. United States, 745 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir.1984) (means chosen by Nuclear Regulatory Commission to fulfill its broad statutory duty to review safety of nuclear facilities protected by discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1228, 105 S.Ct. 1227, 84 L.Ed.2d 365 (1985). These decisions concerned choices involving the social psychology of how best to inform without alarming residents, the most cost-effective way of using public funds to monitor fallout levels, and how best to use a finite number of personnel. In short, they required the AEC “to establish priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding.” Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. at 2767. While those choices deviated from the standards against which liability is measured where liability is available, Congress’ determination to retain government immunity for “discretionary functions,” as understood post-Varig Airlines, puts those choices beyond our ability to review and puts compensation for injury to individuals stemming from those choices beyond our power to order.
While we have great sympathy for the individual cancer victims who have borne alone the costs of the AEC’s choices, their plight is a matter for Congress. Only Congress has the constitutional power to decide whether all costs of government activity will be borne by all the beneficiaries or will continue to be unfairly apportioned, as in this case. Until Congress amends the discretionary function exception to the FTCA or passes a specific relief bill for individual victims, we have no choice but to leave them uncompensated. I must therefore concur in the majority opinion which *1428has carefully reviewed and applied the controlling law to the facts of this case.

. See The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755 and The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985)). For detailed discussion of the two act's safety provisions, see Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247, 348-50 (D.Utah 1984).

. If the evidence had demonstrated such deviation or negligent implementation, neither Varig Airlines nor Dalehite would bar our review. Both those cases confirm that conformity to a discretionary plan insulates the governmental action from review. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968 ("It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.”); Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. at 2767 (acts of FAA employees immune from review because dictated by immune policy-based program). Deviation from an immune plan or negligent implementation of an immune plan, however, can strip the action of the discretionary function exception, for such governmental action does not involve the type of social, economic, or political policy considerations at the core of the exception.

. At one point in their brief,- plaintiffs state that the test manager “authorized [the radsafety] officers to go beyond the information radsafety plans.” Brief for the Appellee at 57. In other words, the test manager authorized the officers to deviate from the plan. Plaintiff argues that because the officers were so authorized, their failure to deviate from the plan subjects the Government to liability. This reasoning is at direct odds with Varig Airlines and Ddlehite. See supra note 2. It is just such deviation from a discretionary plan that can deprive the action of the protection of the discretionary function exception.