Court Opinion

ID: 9555256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:09:58.140781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:02.779016
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                    Court of Appeals

                      NO. 2022-CA-0870-MR

JEFFREY ALLEN KAY                                  APPELLANT

             APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 19-CR-00029

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE

AND

                      NO. 2022-CA-0871-MR

HEATHER ASHLEY KOST                                APPELLANT

             APPEAL FROM LYON CIRCUIT COURT
v.          HONORABLE JAMES R. REDD, III, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 19-CR-00030

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                            APPELLEE
                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, COMBS, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Jeffrey Allen Kay and Heather Ashley Kost bring these

appeals from the Lyon Circuit Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

order denying their motions to suppress evidence recovered in a traffic stop.

Because Kay and Kost’s arguments for suppression are identical and arise from the

same factual nexus, their appeals are being heard together by the same panel of this

Court. Upon careful review, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress in both

cases.

                       Factual and procedural background

             At the suppression hearing, State Trooper Lewie Dodd testified that

he was working the criminal interdiction patrol when he observed an older RV

with South Carolina registration traveling eastbound on I-24. The RV was having

trouble maintaining its lane and it crossed the center line and the fog line several

times. Trooper Dodd followed the RV for approximately one mile before turning

on his blue lights. According to the transcript of his conversation with the police

dispatcher, the RV slowed down to about fifty-five miles per hour, but Dodd was

not sure if the driver had seen him or was planning to stop. The RV did eventually

pull over after travelling approximately two miles. Dodd approached the

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passenger side door and asked the driver, Kay, to get out of the RV. He testified

that for safety reasons he would usually get the driver of an older RV outside to

talk to him because he could not see who was in the back of the vehicle. Kay told

Dodd he was not wearing pants. Dodd allowed him to go to the back of the RV to

get dressed and get his wallet.

             When Kay got out of the RV, Trooper Dodd saw that his entire body

was shaking. He described Kay as having a “literal come-apart” by the side of the

road, so he tried to set him at ease by talking to him. Meanwhile, Trooper T.J.

Williams arrived and began talking to the passenger in the RV, Kost. Dodd took

Kay back to his police car in order to check his driver’s license. He explained to

Kay the reason he turned the blue lights on in the first place was because the RV

was having trouble staying between the lines. Kay told Dodd he had been having

mechanical problems with the RV and was learning to do work on it. They chatted

on this topic briefly. Kay told Trooper Dodd that they were heading back to South

Carolina from Minnesota, where they had been visiting Kost’s cousin.

             Trooper Williams testified that when he arrived at the scene Trooper

Dodd was talking to Kay in front of the police car. Kay’s whole body was

shaking, and Trooper Williams thought it might be due to a medical condition, but

it was just that Kay was nervous. He described Kost as also very nervous. She

told him they had just been “driving around” which made Williams suspicious

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because the high price of gas made it unlikely they would just “drive around” in a

big RV. He asked where they were coming from, and she told him Kansas and

before that Colorado.

             Trooper Williams came back and told Trooper Dodd that Kost had

told him they were coming from Colorado. Trooper Dodd asked Kay if he had

marijuana in the vehicle and if that was why he was shaking so badly. Kay said he

had a couple of quarters, which Dodd took to mean two quarter-ounce packages.

Dodd ordered Kost out of the vehicle. Meanwhile, Williams spoke to Kay who

told him they had four pounds of marijuana in a storage box under the RV. The

troopers searched the RV and recovered the marijuana as well as approximately

one pound of THC gummies in the back bedroom of the RV and $770 in cash.

             Trooper Dodd testified that he believed the swerving of the RV was

due to an equipment problem with the vehicle and that Kay was not impaired. He

also believed, however, that it was not normal to shake the way Kay was and

therefore he continued talking to him. Upon questioning by the trial court, Dodd

testified that he never asked consent to search and that he had probable cause to

search based on Kay’s uncontrollable shaking; the inconsistency of Kay and Kost’s

stories of where they were traveling from; the fact that they were actually coming

from Colorado, a “source state” for marijuana; Kay’s failure to divulge they were

coming from Colorado; and Kay’s admission that he had two quarters.

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             The trial court found the initial traffic stop was reasonable because it

believed Trooper Dodd’s testimony that the RV crossed the center line at least

twice. It concluded that the troopers had a reasonable articulable suspicion to

extend the stop and probable cause to search the vehicle considering the totality of

the circumstances, which included Kay’s extreme nervousness and noticeable

shaking, the discrepancy in itinerary related by Kay and Kost, the fact that Kay

admitted to having a couple of quarters of marijuana, and the fact they had been to

Colorado, a known source state for marijuana.

             Following a trial, at which they renewed their objection to the

introduction of any evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, Kay and Kost

were each convicted of complicity to trafficking in marijuana (more than eight

ounces and less than five pounds) and complicity to possession of drug

paraphernalia. They each received a sentence of two years. These appeals by Kay

and Kost followed.

                                Standard of review

             An appellate court’s standard of review of the trial
             court’s decision on a motion to suppress requires that we
             first determine whether the trial court’s findings of fact
             are supported by substantial evidence. If they are, then
             they are conclusive. Based on those findings of fact, we
             must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
             application of the law to those facts to determine whether
             its decision is correct as a matter of law.

Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky. App. 2002) (footnotes omitted).

                                         -5-
                                        Analysis

                Kay and Kost raise two arguments on appeal: (1) that Trooper Dodd

did not have probable cause to initiate the traffic stop; and (2) the stop was

impermissibly prolonged.

i. The traffic stop was supported by probable cause

                A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

Commonwealth v. Bucalo, 422 S.W.3d 253, 258 (Ky. 2013). The Fourth

Amendment permits a police officer to conduct a traffic stop “if he or she has

probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. As long as

probable cause exists, the officer’s subjective motivations for the stop are not

relevant. Id.

                The appellants argue that the trial court’s finding that Kay committed

a traffic violation that justified the initial stop by Trooper Dodd is not supported by

substantial evidence. The trial court expressly stated that the stop was justified

because it believed Trooper Dodd’s testimony that he saw the RV cross the center

line at least twice. The appellants argue that Dodd’s in-car video clearly

contradicts his testimony because it does not show the RV crossing the center line

or the fog line. Our review of the video shows the RV swaying from side to side in

its lane and it does appear to cross the fog line several times. Trooper Dodd

testified that he activated his blue lights only after following and observing the RV

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for at least a mile and this is confirmed by the transcript of his radio conversation

with the police dispatcher. The in-car video did not begin filming until after he

activated the blue lights. Trooper Dodd’s observation that the RV was swaying

back and forth is confirmed by the following exchange between Dodd and Kay in

their recorded conversation:

             Trooper Dodd: Okay. Let’s get over here a little where I
             can talk to you. I got – the reason I turned the lights on
             in the first place is you’re having trouble keeping this
             thing between the lines. I’m guessing the wind blowing
             you around.

             Kay: Yeah, the wind blows me around. It’s a little
             wobbly. I do the best I can.

Trooper Dodd testified that after talking to Kay, he did not believe he was impaired

and that the swerving was due to mechanical issues with the RV.

             Although the video shows the RV swerving over only the fog line, the

video does not record the entire period that Trooper Dodd followed the vehicle,

only the period after he activated his blue lights. The trial court stated that it

believed Dodd’s testimony that the RV crossed the median line at least twice. “At

a suppression hearing, the ability to assess the credibility of witnesses and to draw

reasonable inferences from the testimony is vested in the discretion of the trial

court.” Sowell v. Commonwealth, 168 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Ky. App. 2005). It was

well within the trial court’s discretion to decide that Dodd was a credible witness.

Dodd’s testimony is confirmed by Kay’s own statements in his conversation with

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Dodd, when he agreed that it was difficult to keep the RV on course and he was

doing the best he could. Substantial evidence in the record supports the trial

court’s conclusion that the initial stop was supported by probable cause.

ii. The traffic stop was not unreasonably extended

              Next, the appellants argue that the traffic stop was unreasonably

extended beyond its original purpose of investigating why the RV was having

difficulty staying in its lane. In Rodriguez v. United States, the United States

Supreme Court held that “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the

matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against

unreasonable seizures.” 575 U.S. 348, 350-51, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1612, 191 L. Ed.

2d 492 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When, as in this

case, a seizure is “justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, [it] . . .

become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to

complete th[e] mission of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id.

              The Kentucky Supreme Court has set forth the following standards by

which to gauge the permissible length and scope of a traffic stop:

              While officers may detain a vehicle and its occupants to
              conduct an ordinary stop, such actions may not be
              excessively intrusive and must be reasonably related to
              the circumstances justifying the initial seizure. . . . An
              officer’s ordinary inquiries incident to traffic stops do not
              impermissibly extend such stops. Included in such
              ordinary inquiries are an officer’s review of the driver’s
              information, auto insurance and registration, and

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             performing criminal background checks of the driver and
             any passengers during the otherwise lawful traffic stop.

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 610 S.W.3d 263, 269 (Ky. 2020).

             A police officer is permitted to extend the stop “beyond the time

required to complete its initial purpose,” but only if something occurs during the

stop to create a “reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is

afoot.” Id. “Once the purpose of a traffic stop is completed, a police officer ‘may

not further detain the vehicle or its occupants unless something that occurred

during the traffic stop generated the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a

further detention.’” United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th Cir. 2008)

(some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d

363, 370 (6th Cir. 2006)).

             The appellants argue that no new facts emerged after the stop, with

the exception of Kay’s nervousness, that would have given the troopers an

independent reason to extend the stop beyond the time necessary to issue a citation

for the traffic violation. The trial court concluded that the troopers had a

reasonable, articulable suspicion to extend the stop and probable cause to search

the vehicle considering the totality of the circumstances, including Kay’s extreme

nervousness and noticeable shaking, the discrepancy in the itinerary provided by

Kay and Kost, the fact that Kay admitted to having a couple of quarters of

marijuana, and the fact they had been to Colorado, a known source state for

                                          -9-
marijuana. The trial court also stated that the troopers detected the smell of

marijuana, but this is unsupported by any evidence in the record.

             “When considering the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court

should take care not to view the factors upon which police officers rely to create

reasonable suspicion in isolation. Courts must consider all of the officers’

observations, and give due weight to the inferences and deductions drawn by

trained law enforcement officers.” Greene v. Commonwealth, 244 S.W.3d 128,

133-34 (Ky. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

             “[N]ervousness – even extreme nervousness – is an unreliable

indicator of someone’s dangerousness, especially in the context of a traffic stop.”

United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation

marks omitted). But nervousness can be “a pertinent factor in determining

reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S. Ct. 673,

676, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).

             The appellants argue that, with the exception of Kay’s nervousness,

the additional facts relied upon by the trial court emerged as a result of improperly

prolonged questioning. They contend that the discrepancy between Kay and

Kost’s accounts of their itinerary did not become known to Trooper Dodd until

after Dodd had impermissibly questioned Kay about matters unrelated to the

                                        -10-
reason for the stop, arguing that Dodd appeared to make no effort to determine if

the swerving of the RV was due to an impairment from drugs or alcohol.

             Trooper Dodd suspected that the driver of the RV was impaired or

that the RV itself had mechanical problems. Upon speaking with Kay, he was able

to determine that his shaking was due to extreme nervousness, not impairment. He

then asked about the condition of the RV in order to determine if the swerving was

due to a mechanical problem. The appellants argue that this conversation was an

attempt to stall the proceedings in order for Trooper Williams to question Kost

separately about the conflicting itinerary evidence and they point out that Trooper

Dodd never even issued a citation for the traffic violation.

             But Trooper Dodd’s questioning of Kay was well within the scope of

the stop in attempting to determine why the RV was having trouble staying in its

lane. His subsequent questions about Kay’s travel plans were also permissible.

“[Q]uestions about [a motorist’s] travel plans are ordinary inquiries incident to a

traffic stop.” Carlisle v. Commonwealth, 601 S.W.3d 168, 177 (Ky. 2020)

(citations omitted). “[T]ravel-plan questions ordinarily fall within the mission of a

traffic stop. In fact, every [federal] circuit to address the issue post-Rodriguez has

reached the same conclusion.” United States v. Cole, 21 F.4th 421, 430 (7th Cir.

2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1420, 212 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2022) (collecting cases).

                                         -11-
             Trooper Dodd’s conversation with Kay was well within the scope of

the traffic stop; Trooper Dodd ascertained that Kay’s shaking was not due to

impairment by chatting with him, questioned him about the roadworthiness and

condition of the RV, and about his travel itinerary. The traffic stop was not

unreasonably prolonged and did not violate Rodriguez.

                                    Conclusion

             The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial

evidence, and it did not err as a matter of law in denying Kay and Kost’s motions

to suppress. The final judgments and sentences in both their cases are affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:                    BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:

Matthew E. Schalk                         Daniel Cameron
Princeton, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Todd D. Ferguson
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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