Court Opinion

ID: 9778094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:32:27.089432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:03.705044
License: Public Domain

DRAUGHN, Justice,
concurring.
I reluctantly concur with the majority’s decision. However, I wish to record my opinion that the amended jury misconduct rules, although well intentioned, represent something of a backward step in our continual pursuit of an improved judicial system.
In every jury trial the judge is required to admonish the jury that in rendering a verdict they must not consider (1) any evidence other than that admitted; (2) attorney’s fees unless evidence about attorney’s fees is admitted; (3) whether either party is protected in whole or in part by insurance, and (4) personal experiences or special information. The judge further instructs the jury that Texas law permits proof of any violation of the jury conduct rules and that a juror may be called upon to testify in open court about acts of misconduct. These admonishments are furnished to the jurors in writing and read aloud to them by the trial judge. TEX.R.CIV.P. 226a.
Prior to the adoption of the new rules of evidence, to obtain a new trial on the basis of jury misconduct, the complaining party had to show:
(1) that the misconduct occurred,
(2) that it was material, and that
(3) based on the record as a whole, the misconduct probably resulted in harm.
Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex.1985); TEX.R.CIV.P. 327 (Vernon 1977) (amended April 1, 1984). In determining whether the complaining party had met his burden, only the overt acts of the jury could be considered, and any testimony concerning the mental processes of the *134jury had to be disregarded. Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex.1980).
Although the three prong test does not appear harsh, a large majority of complaining parties were not successful in obtaining new trials. One reason for this was that Rule 327 required courts to examine the record as a whole before determining whether the misconduct necessitated reversal. See, e.g., Triangle Cab Co. v. Taylor, 144 Tex. 568, 192 S.W.2d 143 (Tex.1946); Sanchez v. Texas Employer’s Ins. Assoc., 618 S.W.2d 837 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1981, no writ); Albertson’s Inc. v. Mungia, 602 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
Critics of the rules charged that the abstract distinctions between overt acts and mental processes made the rule difficult to administer. Pope, The Mental Operations of Jurors, 40 Texas L.Rev. 849, 853 (1962). Additionally, as allegations of jury misconduct became a favorite strategy for unvic-torious attorneys to obtain a retrial, the goal of verdict finality grew elusive. See generally Boyd, The Current State of Jury Misconduct Claims in Texas Civil Cases, 21 S.TEX.L.J. 23 (1980). Critics also pointed out that the Supreme Court rarely reversed cases on the basis of jury misconduct and when appellate courts did reverse, the reasoning was obscure and the cases difficult to reconcile. Black, Article IV: Witnesses, 20 HOUS.L.REV. 1, 419-421 (1983).
Effective September 1, 1983 and April 1, 1984 the jury misconduct rules were amended. See TEX.R.EYID. 606(b) and TEX.R.CIV.P. 327(b) quoted in full by the majority. The amended rules prohibit jurors from testifying about matters or statements which have occurred during the course of jury deliberations. The only exception to the prohibition of jury testimony regarding the deliberation process is testimony as to “outside influence.” It is my contention that the rules are inadequate for two reasons:
(1) ‘outside influence’ is not defined rendering the rule vague and susceptible to varying interpretations, and
(2) it precludes judicial inquiry from weighing the impact of inappropriate and impermissible jury discussion.
The Advisory Note to the Federal Evidence Rules, upon which 606(b) is modeled, makes an effort, albeit weak, to define by example ‘outside influence’:
[A] juror is recognized as competent to testify to statements by the bailiff or the introduction of a prejudicial newspaper account into the jury room ...
The glaring defect of the amended rules, even supplemented by the Federal Advisory Notes, is that no meaningful definition of ‘outside influence’ has been proposed. The significance of this omission is best illuminated through example. If a bailiff tells a juror, “Attorney ‘X’ consistently charges his clients one third of their recovery,” the Federal Advisory Committee would permit judicial inquiry. If a juror, who has a sister who practices personal injury law, informs his fellow jurors that attorneys routinely take a one-third share of their clients recovery, inquiry into this discussion is probably precluded. Situations may arise where the event is more difficult to categorize. For example, in many cases the jury has the authority to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party. If the court reporter grins when one party is introducing evidence on the fees incurred, but grimaces when opposing counsel offers similar evidence, is this communication admissible under the amended rules? I submit that the present rules, at the very least, need to be revised to include some instruction on what constitutes an ‘outside influence.’
Proponents of the amended statutes contend that the new rules represent an improvement over prior Texas practice. They submit that 606(b) and 327(b) will promote verdict finality and operate as an obstacle to the wholesale review of jury deliberations. Black, Article VI: Witnesses, 20 HOUS.L.REV. 1, 424-421 (1983). I entertain no doubt that the amended rules will accomplish that objective; I do question the *135worthiness of the goal. The importance of the right to a fair trial should not be subordinated to the desires for judicial economy and easy administration of the law.
In the case at bar the jury discussed prejudgment interest, a matter outside the evidence but not considered to be an “outside influence.” They then added $11,-691.73, calculated as interest, to the verdict. As no inquiry may be made into this impermissible jury discussion, we are forced to affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for new trial. Had previous law been in effect, the three prong test probably would have been satisfied and a new trial granted.
Every trial judge instructs the jury to consider only the evidence. The amended rules tend to render this instruction meaningless. A rule not enforced is not a rule; it is merely a suggestion. The amended misconduct rules incorrectly focus on the source of the impermissible discussion, rather than on the impact of the same. There is no quarrel with the fact that the old law led to inconsistent results. However, at the very least, the old law authorized inquiry. In short, I suggest that the solution may be worse than the problem.