Court Opinion

ID: 9947373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 18:04:46.657857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:23.768732
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24 P. v. Ervin CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081105

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. CS313050)

JURON DWITTY ERVIN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Enrique E. Camarena, Judge. Affirmed.
         Elisa A. Brandis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Daniel Rogers and Vincent Paul
LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      A jury convicted Juron Dwitty Ervin of robbery (Pen. Code,1 § 211).
The trial court sentenced him to a one-third midterm prison term of one year
consecutively to a separate term, ordering him to pay a $200 section 1202.4,
subdivision (b) fine and staying a $200 section 1202.45 fine. On appeal,
Ervin contends the court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for
new trial in which he argued the court improperly excluded testimony of a
doctor relevant to his defense of involuntary intoxication, which Ervin
claimed was caused by a prescribed medication. He alternatively contends
his counsel was prejudicially ineffective for failing to hire an expert witness
on the medication and its potential side effects. He further contends the
court improperly instructed the jury regarding involuntary intoxication and
unconsciousness as a complete defense. Ervin argues the cumulative effect of
these errors prejudiced him such that we should reverse the judgment. We
affirm.
               FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
People’s Evidence
      On January 30, 2020, Ervin walked into a Chula Vista bank with a
skateboard and backpack and approached a teller who offered to assist him.
The first thing he told the teller was that he wanted to go home and asked for
the nearest bus station. Ervin’s body language seemed abnormal to the
teller; he was just staring at her, he seemed “lost” or “a little off,” and he “just
didn’t seem there.” Another customer gave Ervin directions to the nearest
bus stop. About a minute later, Ervin leaned toward the teller and said, “I
am robbing the bank. Give me all your hundreds.” The teller was able to
clearly understand him; he was speaking calmly and coherently. She gave
Ervin $5,500 in hundred dollar bills. Ervin did not use a weapon.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                         2
      Another teller felt it was strange that Ervin stood not saying anything
after they had assisted him; when she saw him slowly reach into his
backpack, she put her finger on the silent alarm, then pressed it when she
saw Ervin lean over the barrier to the other teller to say he was robbing the
bank. Ervin, whose demeanor was serious, calmly left the bank.
      A responding police officer stopped Ervin in the bank’s shopping center
after seeing he matched the suspect’s description. Ervin had a large amount
of cash, all of the hundred dollar bills he had taken, in his hand.
Ervin’s Testimony
      Ervin testified at trial. He denied committing the robbery, saying he
did not recall telling the teller “this is a robbery,” was not feeling well at the
time, and had a “like a blackout moment” while at the teller counter. Ervin
testified he was homeless and living at a downtown shelter but was an
engineering student at Southwestern College at the time of the incident.
According to Ervin, he had opened an account at the bank that went inactive,
and had reopened the account about a week before January 30. On the day of
the robbery, he had taken both of his daily medications for high blood
pressure and migraines, but started to feel unwell, experiencing nausea and
double vision. He felt he was suffering side effects from taking the
medications together, which he usually did not do. Ervin thought he should
eat so he went to the bank to withdraw money. Ervin testified that inside, he
was stuttering, could not breathe, and felt he was going to pass out at the
counter. He was slurring his words and could not get out what he was trying
to say. He received money and walked out of the bank, experiencing “low key
hallucinations” and “confused with what was all going around me at the
time.” He decided to roll his skateboard out into the traffic to see if cars
would swerve around it, but a car hit and broke it. According to Ervin, this

                                         3
told him “what was going on with me was real.” Two to three minutes after
he left the bank, Ervin realized he had the sum of money in his hand. He
started walking back to the bank but was stopped by police.
Evidence Code Section 402 Hearing
      During trial, the court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing
on whether to admit testimony from Dr. Robert Searles, who had worked as
an attending physician at St. Vincent de Paul’s medical clinic. Dr. Searles
testified based on his review of defense-provided medical records that he had
treated Ervin on January 3, 2020. He testified that on that day, Ervin was
seen for migraines and prescribed Depakote. Dr. Searles testified he had a
long history of prescribing Depakote and medications in that class, and was
familiar with common and uncommon side effects of that drug. Some of the
uncommon side effects included hallucinations and psychosis, as well as
aggression and hostility. The records showed Ervin discontinued the
medication on January 13, 2020. The court excluded as irrelevant Dr.
Searles’s opinion about whether Ervin had a particular mental state on the
day of the robbery. Dr. Searles confirmed that the medical records did not
show Ervin suffered any effects of being angry, violent, or acting on
dangerous impulses due to the drug. He also confirmed he was not testifying
about Ervin’s mental state on the day of the robbery.
      During argument on the admission of Dr. Searles’s testimony, defense
counsel acknowledged Dr. Searles could not comment on Ervin’s behavior on
the day of the robbery, but argued his testimony was pertinent to Ervin’s
honesty: “So the purpose of his testimony would be to shine light on a fact
that Mr. Ervin’s testimony will—I guess, I should say Mr. Ervin will testify
and the doctor’s testimony will clarify a fact which I otherwise anticipate the
People would attack, which is whether or not Mr. Ervin is being honest about

                                       4
whether or not he was prescribed this medication. So it’s for the purpose of
clarifying the testimony of my client and describing whether or not these side
effects exist.” Counsel continued: “And . . . because one of the side effects is
that somebody may act on a dangerous impulse, that is relevant to my
arguments to the jury. And it’s relevant to the jury’s understanding of my
client and the medicines that he took on that date.”
      The trial court excluded Dr. Searles’s testimony, finding any testimony
about aggression or hostility not relevant to intent to deprive, the mental

state for robbery.2
      Defense counsel continued to argue that excluding Dr Searles’s
testimony eliminated Ervin’s defense, and offered to clarify her position in
chambers: “[T]here are arguments to be made about whether or not acting on
a dangerous impulse could vitiate the necessary intent required for this case,
if the court were to exclude it they would be effectively obliterating a defense
that Mr. Ervin is constitutionally entitled to have. He’s entitled to put on a
defense. And this is a specific intent crime. And the court by deciding
whether or not my arguments are correct about whether or not it applies to
the specific kind of intent that is required in this case is the court making a
determination that the jury should make, and I think that would be
reversible error.” The court again ruled there was no relevance. It stated,

2     The court reasoned: “. . . I think I mentioned this before, robbery has a
specific intent to deprive. So anything that affects Mr. Ervin’s mental state
has to be relevant to the specific intent to deprive, not the use of violence. So
any testimony about aggression or hostility that is caused by a medicine is
inappropriate and excluded. [¶] The question is: Is the testimony from Dr.
Searles that highly and probable or a common side effect of psychosis or
acting on a dangerous impulse [sic]? And I don’t know what that means
because it wasn’t defined for me in this hearing whether that is sufficient to
have any relative [sic] to the mental state. Based on the state of the evidence
I cannot so find.”
                                        5
“[A]cting on a dangerous impulse has no bearing on the intent to deprive. . . .
And even more so, this was, essentially, a nonviolent robbery. So acting on a
dangerous impulse, if that relates to violence, I think there is less of a
connection here.” The parties moved on once defense counsel tried to clarify
that her argument was not about violence but “relates as to whether or not
Mr. Ervin committed an act that he otherwise wouldn’t when he was not
under the influence of an intoxicating substance.” The court reiterated there
was no connection between Ervin’s symptoms and the legally required mental
state.
Jury Instructions
         Following the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury on
voluntary intoxication: “You may consider evidence, if any, of the defendant’s
voluntary intoxication only in a limited way. You may consider that evidence
only in deciding whether the defendant acted with the intent to permanently
deprive the owner of his or her property. [¶] A person is voluntarily
intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any
intoxicating drug, drink or other substance knowing it could produce an
intoxicating effect or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.”
         The court also instructed the jury that as to robbery or its lesser
included crimes, the People had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that Ervin acted with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of
his or her property, and, “If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of robbery, grand theft and petty theft.”
Defense Closing Argument
         During closing argument Ervin’s counsel emphasized that the “largest
issue” was the issue of Ervin’s intent. She told the jury that the evidence
showed Ervin acted “in a state of crisis”; in what he described as a “blackout”

                                          6
or “psychosis” that was impacted by the medications that he took on that day.
She asked the jury to consider the voluntary intoxication instruction: “The
voluntary intoxication instruction is included in your packet. The People
have argued that you can disregard it. I’m arguing that you should not. And
that is because it’s relevant to your determinations as it relates to whether or
not Mr. Ervin had the intent to permanently deprive the bank of the money.
His testimony is: That he took the medication and then he started acting
weird in a way that he never had before. And because you have that
information, you can use it to assist you in determining whether or not Mr.
Ervin formed the necessary intent. [¶] The People have the burden of
proving that Mr. Ervin had the intent to permanently deprive [the bank].
And if they have not met that burden because of this information, you must
find Mr. Ervin not guilty.”
Motion for New Trial
      Ervin later unsuccessfully moved for a new trial on the ground the
court erred by excluding Dr. Searles’s testimony. Asserting the People’s case
rested entirely on his own statements and actions, Ervin argued the doctor’s
testimony concerning the type of medication Ervin had been prescribed and
the medication’s side effects would have “assist[ed] the jury in understanding
. . . Ervin’s actions and state of mind at the time of this incident.” In a
declaration submitted in connection with a request for juror information,
Ervin’s counsel averred that after the verdict one juror stated the jury was
unable to consider Ervin’s prescription drugs and their effect on state of mind
“ ‘without more information.’ ” The trial court denied the motion on the same
grounds it had excluded Dr. Searles’s testimony.

                                        7
                                 DISCUSSION
                        I. Denial of New Trial Motion
      Ervin contends the court erred by denying his motion for new trial. He
maintains its exclusion of Dr. Searles’s testimony deprived him of his
constitutional right to present his only defense. In particular, pointing to the
doctor’s testimony about the possible side effects of the prescribed drug that
he assertedly took on the day of the robbery, Ervin maintains the testimony
was “clearly relevant to the issue of [his] mental capacity to commit the
crime” and denied him the opportunity to present relevant evidence
supporting his testimony. Ervin further contends the error prejudiced him
under any standard in that it left the jury with only his own testimony
regarding his prescriptions and their effect on his state of mind, which the
jury rejected; he was unable to pursue a planned defense of involuntary
intoxication and unconsciousness; and defense counsel was unable to argue
Ervin’s symptoms were known side effects of the drug, that unconsciousness
from involuntary intoxication was a complete defense, or that the People had
the burden to prove consciousness.
      Pointing out Dr. Searles did not discuss the possibility of
unconsciousness or define the terms “hallucinations” and “psychosis,” the
People respond that the court properly denied the new trial motion because
Ervin did not offer Dr. Searles’s testimony in furtherance of an involuntary
intoxication defense. They point out Dr. Searles was not offered as an expert
and thus did not opine on whether Ervin’s conduct during the robbery was
consistent with someone experiencing hallucinations or a psychotic episode.
Thus, they argue, the court did not “mislead the jury on involuntary
intoxication by excluding evidence not offered for that purpose . . . .” They
argue the court’s ruling did not prevent Ervin from asserting a defense

                                       8
because he did not offer the evidence in support of a claim of involuntary
intoxication. According to the People, the court correctly would have rejected
any such defense given the absence of evidence regarding the effect of
hallucinations or psychosis on Ervin’s ability to form the requisite specific
intent for robbery.
A. Standard of Review
      “ ‘ “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” [Citations.] “ ‘A trial court’s ruling
on a motion for new trial is so completely within that court’s discretion that a
reviewing court will not disturb the ruling absent a manifest and
unmistakable abuse of that discretion.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Lightsey (2012) 54
Cal.4th 668, 729; see also People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1108.)
Likewise, the court’s decision to exclude evidence is committed to its
discretion, so we will not disturb a lower court’s decision “ ‘ “ ‘except on a
showing [it] exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
(McCurdy, at p. 1108.)
B. Ervin Has Not Demonstrated the Court Abused its Discretion
      On this record, Ervin cannot demonstrate the court manifestly abused
its discretion in denying his new trial motion based on the court’s exclusion of
Dr. Searles’s testimony, or the asserted elimination of a viable defense.
Ervin’s counsel did not offer Dr. Searles’s testimony on a defense of
involuntary intoxication or unconsciousness; counsel argued the testimony
would bolster Ervin’s credibility as to the medications he had taken, and the
types of side-effects so as to show one side effect was that “somebody may act
on a dangerous impulse . . . .” After the court made its ruling, defense
counsel offered that the testimony would relate to whether Ervin “committed

                                         9
an act that he otherwise wouldn’t when he was not under the influence of an
intoxicating substance.” This vague and unspecific proffer did not constitute
a claim that Dr. Searles’s testimony would have supported a defense of
involuntary intoxication or unconsciousness. Even Ervin’s new trial motion
did not raise any issue of unconsciousness; it merely argued the testimony
about the type of medication and its side effects would have assisted the jury
in “understanding . . . Ervin’s actions and state of mind” during the robbery
and permitted his counsel to “seek instructions, including involuntary
intoxication, they otherwise would have sought.”
      Further, the trial court reasonably concluded by adopting its prior
reasoning in ruling on the new trial motion that Dr. Searles’s testimony
about Depakote’s uncommon side effects of hallucinations or psychosis—
terms that Dr. Searles did not define or explain—had no tendency to prove
Ervin lacked the requisite mental state for robbery. And because Dr. Searles
was not designated as an expert, he did not testify concerning Ervin’s mental
state. The court thus did not abuse its discretion by concluding the testimony
was not material to any defense, including involuntary intoxication or
unconsciousness, that might have bore on Ervin’s mental state. This
evidentiary ruling did not impact Ervin’s Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense. Generally speaking, “ ‘the ordinary rules of evidence do not
impermissibly infringe on the accused’s [constitutional] right to present a
defense. Courts retain . . . a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise
discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly
procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.’ ” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th
585, 611.) “It follows, for the most part, that the mere erroneous exercise of
discretion under such ‘normal’ rules does not implicate the federal

                                       10
Constitution.” (Ibid.; see also People v. Smith (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 297, 305,
fn. 4.)
          Finally, the court instructed the jurors on the impact of intoxication
(albeit voluntary) on Ervin’s mental state, and counsel argued the point to
the jury, asserting that Ervin’s “state . . . was impacted by the medications
that he took on that day.” He advanced an intoxication defense, which the
jury resolved against him under correct instructions. “Although completely
excluding evidence of an accused’s defense” might rise to the level of a
constitutional violation, preventing a defendant from presenting “evidence on
a . . . subsidiary point does not impair an accused’s due process right to
present a defense.” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1103.) In sum,
the record does not support Ervin’s claim that the court’s ruling excluding Dr.
Searles’s testimony violated his federal constitutional right to present a
defense.
                    II. Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
          Ervin alternatively contends his counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance by failing to present a qualified expert regarding
Depakote and its side effects. He maintains “there was simply no reason for
defense counsel not to have introduced evidence of the drug’s side effects or
[his] lawfully obtained prescription fo[r] the drug.” He relies on his new trial
arguments to establish prejudice, that is, he argues it is reasonably probable
absent the error he would have received a better result had he presented
other more qualified witnesses regarding the drug and his prescription.
          “To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, [Ervin] ‘must show
that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced

                                          11
the defense.’ [Citations.] On direct appeal, a finding of deficient performance
is warranted where ‘(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was
asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here counsel’s trial tactics or
strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will
not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no
conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.’ ” (People v. Johnsen
(2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 687.) In evaluating Ervin’s claim, we “ ‘defer[ ] to counsel’s
reasonable tactical decisions’ and presume that ‘counsel acted within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.’ [Citation.] Thus,
defendant ‘ “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,
the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” ’ ” (People
v. Arredondo (2019) 8 Cal.5th 694, 711.)
      Ervin cannot overcome that presumption. The decision about what
witnesses should testify, including experts, is an inherently tactical decision
for trial counsel. (See, e.g., People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 989
[decisions about whether to call a particular witness is a matter of trial
tactics and strategy “ ‘which a reviewing court generally may not second-
guess’ ”].) The record does not affirmatively disclose that Ervin’s counsel had
no rational tactical purpose for electing to not call a qualified expert, and we
are not convinced there could be no satisfactory explanation for such a
decision. Dr. Searles’s proffered testimony demonstrated that Depakote’s
side effects of psychosis and hallucinations, undefined conditions on which
Ervin sought to rely, were not common. Unconsciousness or black-outs were
not identified as side effects. Ervin’s medical records, at least according to

                                       12
Dr. Searles, did not show that he ever experienced anger, violence or acted on
dangerous impulses due to the drug. Dr. Searles testified it would be “highly
unusual” for Depakote to have an effect on someone robbing a bank. These
circumstances, and the fact Ervin was able to recount what happened both
immediately before and after the actual robbery and engaged in the
purposeful conduct of asking only for hundred dollar bills, makes it
reasonable to conclude Ervin’s counsel elected to not call an expert because
his or her testimony may have been unfavorable to Ervin.
      And we agree with the People that Ervin could not establish prejudice
in any event. The record does not disclose what expert witness Ervin’s
counsel would have called at trial, or what opinions such an expert would
have testified to, and we “are therefore unable to infer anything about its
existence, probative force, or the probable consequences at trial, had such
evidence been presented.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926,
1033.) “ ‘A defendant must prove prejudice that is a “ ‘demonstrable reality,’
not simply speculation” ’ ” as to the effect of counsel’s omissions. (People v.
Henderson (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 533, 549-550, quoting People v. Fairbank
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241; see also In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 974, 1016.)

                                       13
                       III. Claim of Instructional Error
      Ervin contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury with

modified versions of CALCRIM Nos. 34253 and 34274 regarding
unconsciousness or involuntary intoxication. He points out the defense is
recognized in situations where a defendant knowingly ingests legally
prescribed medications that result in unforeseen side effects causing
unconsciousness. According to Ervin, the evidence that he took his
prescription drugs before the robbery, his strange behavior at the time as
recounted by himself and the tellers, and the fact he made no effort to flee the
scene was sufficient to require the instructions. He maintains the error is
reversible per se because it prevented the jurors from considering his defense
against the charges. He also maintains the error is not harmless under

3      CALCRIM No. 3425 provides that “[t]he defendant is not guilty of [a
crime] if [he or she] acted while unconscious. Someone is unconscious when
he or she is not conscious of his or her actions. [ ]Someone may be
unconscious even though able to move.” It further provides that
“[u]nconsciousness may be caused by [ ]a blackout[,] an epileptic seizure [or]
involuntary intoxication . . . [¶] [But t]he defense of unconsciousness may
not be based on voluntary intoxication.” (Ibid.) The instruction provides that
“[t]he People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
conscious when [he or she] acted. If there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant acted as if [he or she] were conscious, you should conclude
that [he or she] was conscious, unless based on all the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt that [he or she] was conscious, in which case you must find
[him or her] not guilty.” (Ibid.)

4     CALCRIM No. 3427 provides: “Consider any evidence that the
defendant was involuntarily intoxicated in deciding whether the defendant
had the required [intent or mental state] when [he or she] acted. [¶] A
person is involuntarily intoxicated if he or she unknowingly ingested some
intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance, or if his or her intoxication is
caused by the [force or duress or fraud or trickery of someone else], for
whatever purpose[, without any fault on the part of the intoxicated person].”

                                       14
either the Chapman (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18) or Watson
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818) standards of prejudice.
      We cannot agree with Ervin’s contentions. At trial, Ervin did not
advance any defense based on involuntary intoxication or unconsciousness.
He does not demonstrate whether his counsel requested such instructions.
Accordingly, the court was not required to give the instructions sua sponte
absent substantial evidence supporting the defense. In People v. Saille (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1103, the California Supreme Court stated that “[i]ntoxication is
. . . relevant only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether the
defendant actually had the requisite specific mental state” and thus
instructions on the theory are now “more like the ‘pinpoint’ instructions” as to
which a defendant is entitled upon request. Thus, such instructions “are
required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the
theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte.” (Saille, at p. 1119;
see People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 887 [“A trial court must instruct
on unconsciousness on its own motion if it appears the defendant is relying
on the defense, or if there is substantial evidence supporting the defense and
the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case”].)
      Assuming Ervin’s own testimony about having a blackout moment at
the teller counter constitutes substantial evidence to support involuntary
intoxication or unconsciousness instructions (see People v. Rogers, supra, 39
Cal.4th at p. 887 [citing case law that instruction was warranted where
defendant testified he did not remember shootings and was distraught and
mentally exacerbated by events before shootings]), we would conclude any

error in omitting such instructions was harmless.5

5     Jury instruction errors are structural or reversible per se when they
                                       15
      In People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, the defendant argued that
instructional error occurred because the trial court failed to instruct on the
complete defense of unconsciousness. (Id. at p. 468.) The California Supreme
Court did not address whether instructional error had occurred, finding any
instructional error “was harmless by any applicable standard.” (Id. at p.
470.) First, strong evidence suggested the defendant had killed his victims
while the defendant was conscious. (Ibid.) Further, the jury had been
instructed that voluntary intoxication warranted a verdict of involuntary
manslaughter rather than murder, but it convicted the defendant of murder,
found true a special circumstance allegation that rendered him eligible for
the death penalty, and sentenced him to death. (Id. at p. 471.) “The only
logical inference [was] that the jury rejected the defendant’s claim of
unconsciousness entirely. Hence, an instructional failure to explain the jury’s
duty in the event it found involuntary unconsciousness can have caused no
prejudice.” (Ibid.)
      Here, the evidence that Ervin committed the robbery in an unconscious
state is weak. His own testimony shows he recalled his actions immediately
before and after the robbery, and the sole evidence of an asserted blackout
moment at the teller counter was Ervin’s self-serving statement. The teller
described Ervin as demanding only one hundred dollar bills, volitional and
purposeful conduct that contradicts any indication Ervin was not conscious of
his actions. (See People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 313 [“a person is

“ ‘categorically “ ‘vitiat[e] all the jury’s findings’ ” ’ ” (People v. Mil (2012) 53
Cal.4th 400, 412) and the effect on the verdict is “ ‘ “necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminate.” ’ ” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th
342, 364.) Omission of the unconsciousness and involuntary intoxication
instructions in this case, even if they had been required, would not rise to the
level of structural error; like most instructional errors, it is not the type of
error that is necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.
                                         16
deemed ‘unconscious’ if he or she committed the act without being conscious
thereof,” italics added]; see also People v. Mathson (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
1297, 1315 [unconscious act is one committed by a person who is not
conscious and “ ‘whose act therefore cannot be deemed volitional’ ”].) The
circumstances counter any inference of unconsciousness. (Accord, People v.
Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 418 [evidence of defendant’s “actions during
the course of the offenses,” including “[t]he complicated and purposive nature
of his conduct” did not support an inference that he was unconscious while he

committed the crimes].)6
      Further, given evidence that Ervin knowingly took his prescription
medications before the robbery, the trial court instructed the jury on
voluntary intoxication and its effect on Ervin’s mental state, which was
sufficient to apprise the jury about the relation between intoxication and
Ervin’s ability to form the requisite state of mind, an essential element of
robbery. Thus, as in People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th 412, the jury already
considered Ervin’s intoxication and asserted blackout moment in the context
of his ability to formulate the specific intent required for robbery. The “only
logical inference” is that the jury rejected his claim of unconsciousness
entirely. (Id. at p. 471.) The failure to give an instruction is harmless where

6      The weakness of Ervin’s evidence would permit us to find no prejudice
under the harmless error test of People v. Watson (supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836).
“In evaluating what a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error
we ‘ “may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the
existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a
different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable
probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.”
[Citation.] “There is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result
within the meaning of Watson when there exists ‘at least such an equal
balance of reasonable probabilities as to leave the court in serious doubt as to
whether the error affected the result.’ ” ’ (People v. Speck (2022) 74
Cal.App.5th 784, 793.)
                                       17
“ ‘the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily
resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions.
In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the
jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there
can be no prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ ” (People v. Wright (2006) 40
Cal.4th 81, 98; accord, People v. Lujano (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 187, 195-196
[“Omission of an instruction is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if ‘ “the
factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved
adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions” ’ ”].)
                             IV. Cumulative Error
      Ervin contends the cumulative impact of the errors requires reversal of
his convictions. Our rejection of Ervin’s claims of substantive error and
conclusion that any assumed error was harmless necessarily disposes of his
claim of cumulative error. (See People v. Hensley (2014) 59 Cal.4th 788, 818;
People v. Coulthard (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 743, 775.)

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                             DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.

                                           O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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