Court Opinion

ID: 9405843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 15:08:01.96189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.219218
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED “NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.”
PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, RAP 40(D), THIS
OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE
CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER
CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER,
UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS,
RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED
OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE
BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN
UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A
COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG
WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE ACTION.
                                             RENDERED: FEBRUARY 16, 2023
                                                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2022-SC-0030-MR

LAYW THOMAS                                                          APPELLANT

                ON APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                 HONORABLE JOHN L. ATKINS, JUDGE
                     NOS. 06-CR-00110 & 06-CR-00142

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      In Thomas v. Commonwealth, 605 S.W.3d 545 (Ky. 2020), we concluded

the violent offender statute was inapplicable to youthful offenders for purposes

of consideration of probation even if they are sentenced after reaching the age

of eighteen years and five months. Because the Christian Circuit Court had

erroneously sentenced Layw Thomas, a youthful offender, to a term of

imprisonment on the assumption he was ineligible for probation, we remanded

this matter for resentencing.

      Following a hearing on remand, the Christian Circuit Court entered an

amended judgment on a plea of guilty on January 21, 2022, vacating its prior

holding Thomas was ineligible for probation but denying probation “due to the

risk of further crimes, the need for correctional treatment and the fact that

probation would unduly depreciate the seriousness of his criminal behavior.”
The trial court reimposed its previously levied sentence of life imprisonment

plus fifty years. Thomas appeals as a matter of right.1 Following a careful

review, we affirm.

      The historical factual and procedural background underlying this matter

was set forth in detail in our prior opinion, Thomas, 605 S.W.3d at 548-53, and

need not be fully repeated here. Thus, we will provide only a truncated version

necessary for resolution of the issues presented in this appeal.

      In 2006, then-seventeen-year-old Thomas committed a series of crimes

culminating in his being charged in two separate juvenile petitions with

robbery in the first degree, assault in the first degree, wanton endangerment in

the first degree, and murder. Thomas was deemed a youthful offender and his

cases were transferred to circuit court. Following plea negotiations, Thomas—

then nineteen-years-old—agreed to a sentence of twenty years on the murder

charge and a concurrent sentence of twelve years on the remaining charges.

Both plea agreements contained “hammer clauses” permitting the

Commonwealth to seek the maximum aggregate sentence allowed by law if

Thomas failed to appear for sentencing. Based on the plea agreements,

Thomas was released to home incarceration pending sentencing. Thomas

subsequently removed his electronic ankle monitor and disappeared. Following

his rearrest, Thomas was brought before the trial court who denied his pleas

      1   Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).

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for leniency and enforced the hammer clause provisions, imposing a sentence

of life plus fifty years.

       After Thomas unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief over a seven-

year period, the Court of Appeals ultimately found merit in Thomas’s argument

the trial court had improperly imposed the hammer clauses at sentencing as

punishment for his failure to appear, rather than for the underlying crimes.

Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court denied Thomas’s

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, found he was ineligible for probation, and

again imposed a sentence of life imprisonment plus fifty years based on the

hammer clauses.

       Thomas appealed and this Court again reversed the trial court upon

concluding it had erroneously found Thomas to be ineligible for probation. We

held Thomas’s other arguments to be without merit, including two challenging

application of the hammer clauses. The matter was again remanded for a new

sentencing hearing at which the trial court was directed to consider probation

and other forms of alternative sentencing. As stated earlier, the trial court

convened a new sentencing hearing, following which it entered an amended

judgment holding Thomas, although eligible, should not be probated and

reimposing its previous sentence. This appeal followed.

       For his sole allegation of error, Thomas contends the trial court erred in

failing to consider the developmental differences of juveniles vis-à-vis adults

when enforcing the hammer clauses relative to his sentence. He argues

juveniles should be treated differently from adults and that hammer clauses

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are particularly problematic when applied to youthful offenders. As noted by

the Commonwealth, although Thomas claims this argument was preserved for

appellate review, he fails to indicate where in the record such preservation can

be located. Our review of the record reveals no such argument was presented

to the trial court. Instead, the arguments made during Thomas’s resentencing

hearing were focused on leniency and mercy in seeking to be granted

probation. There was no argument made in opposition to imposition of the

hammer clauses. Thus, we deem this issue to be unpreserved. Though

Thomas has not sought palpable error review pursuant to RCr2 10.26, we

nevertheless deem his allegation of error to be without merit.

      First, Thomas makes only a passing reference to his claim of error and

offers no indication of what the trial court did—or did not—consider when

issuing its judgment. Instead, Thomas generally cites authority supportive of

his position that juveniles should receive different and more favorable

treatment than adults, especially relative to plea agreements containing a

hammer clause. However, he does not indicate how inclusion of hammer

clauses in his plea agreements was inappropriate nor how the cited caselaw

should apply to his situation.

      [I]t is not within the purview of the judiciary to tell prosecutors and
      defense counsel that a hammer clause may not be part of a plea
      agreement. While the courts have the authority to accept or reject
      a plea agreement, the making of an agreement whereby the
      Commonwealth binds itself to recommend a particular sentence is
      a power of the executive branch.

      2   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                          4
Knox v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 891, 899 (Ky. 2012) (citations omitted).

Hammer clauses may properly be included in plea agreements provided the

sentencing judge “accord[s] it no special deference, and . . . make[s] no

commitment that compromises the court’s independence or impairs the proper

exercise of judicial discretion.” Id. at 900.

      Here, there is no indication the trial court failed in its duty to properly

consider all of the underlying facts and circumstances before making its

sentencing decision to ensure the punishment fit the crime. In fact, the trial

court made explicit oral findings at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing

explaining the considerations and reasoning behind its decision to deny

probation and to impose the maximum sentence permitted. It cannot be

reasonably asserted the trial court improperly adhered to the hammer clauses

nor abandoned its judicial discretion.

      Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in his prior appeal to this Court,

Thomas raised multiple challenges to the hammer clauses which we concluded

were wholly without merit and did not warrant discussion.3 Thomas, 605

S.W.3d at 560. The law of the case doctrine prohibits Thomas from attempting

to relitigate the same issues previously presented and rejected. “A final

      3   Specifically, Thomas argued: 1) hammer clauses are inappropriate for
inclusion in plea agreements for youthful offenders; 2) hammer clauses are highly
disfavored by this Court; and 3) children develop differently and should be subject to
different sentencing procedures which do not include hammer clauses. He also
sought a declaration by this Court that any hammer clause resulting in a maximum
sentence for a youthful offender was violative of the United States and Kentucky
constitutions. His arguments relied on primarily the same cases cited in this appeal.

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decision of this Court, whether right or wrong, is the law of the case and is

conclusive of the questions therein resolved.” Williamson v. Commonwealth,

767 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Ky. 1989) (quoting Martin v. Frasure, 352 S.W.2d 817,

818 (Ky. 1961)). The law of the case doctrine is an “iron rule, universally

recognized, that an opinion or decision of an appellate court in the same cause

is the law of the case for a subsequent trial or appeal however erroneous the

opinion or decision may have been.” Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v.

Blackwell’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d 539, 542 (Ky. 1956). The doctrine is grounded

on the principle of finality and serves to prevent “the drain on judicial

resources that would result if previous decisions were routinely subject to

reconsideration.” Wright v. Carroll, 452 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Ky. 2014).

      The law of the case rule is a salutary rule, grounded on
      convenience, experience and reason. It has been often said that it
      would be intolerable if matters once litigated and determined
      finally could be relitigated between the same parties, for otherwise
      litigation would be interminable and a judgment supposed to
      finally settle the rights of the parties would be only a starting point
      for new litigation.

Blackwell’s Adm’r, 291 S.W.2d at 542. Our prior decision expressly rejected as

meritless the same assertions of error Thomas again brings before this Court.

While Thomas is plainly and understandably dissatisfied and disappointed with

the outcome of his resentencing, a “second bite at the apple” is patently

impermissible under the law of the case doctrine. In short, Thomas has failed

to show entitlement to relief.

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Christian Circuit Court is

affirmed.

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     All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Angela Slaton
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel J. Cameron
Attorney General

Kristin L. Conder
Assistant Attorney General

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