Court Opinion

ID: 9683179
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:23:51.061587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:45.905592
License: Public Domain

*337On Rehearing
MOISE, Justice
(dissenting).
The object of a criminal prosecution is not to convict; neither is it to acquit. The accused is entitled to a fair trial accompanied by due process and equal protection of the law — be he saint or sinner.
This case should have been considered in the light of the charges made, the peculiar set of facts and the applicable law. The charge was the possession of marihuana, denounced as a crime under LSA-R.S. 40:962, which reads:
“It is unlawful for any person to * * * possess * * * any narcotic drug * *
A motion was filed by the defendant for a Bill of Particulars, and in Answer the State said that the possession of marihuana was either on the defendant’s person or in his automobile.
On Page Seven of its brief, the State admitted that the “essential ingredient of this offense being that the accused possessed narcotic drugs contrary to the statutes.” The defendant did not invoke any exceptions to LSA-R.S. 40:962. State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604. He did not claim that the marihuana had been placed in his clothes by another, although there is some small amount of evidence in the record to that effect. Therefore, under the peculiar facts of the case, the State nailed itself down to the crime of possession of marihuana in its charge, answer to the Bill of Particulars, and proof. It is an axiomatic principle of law that the allegata and the probata must conform. This principle was enunciated by our Court as late as February 14, 1955, in the case of State v. Dore, 227 La. 282, 79 So.2d 309, 311, where we said:
“It is elementary that the evidence in a criminal case must correspond with the allegations of the indictment which are essential and material to charge the offense in order that the requirement may be fulfilled that an accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, and that he may be protected against another-prosecution for the same offense. See 27 Am. Jur., Verbo Indictments and Informations, Sec. 177, pp. 722-723; State v. Braxton, 47 La.Ann. 158, 16 So. 745; State v. Anderson, 136 La. 261, 66 So. 966.”
The State introduced evidence on trial of the case, tending to prove possession of marihuana on an occasion and at a time and place subsequent to that charged in the Information. This possession was not set forth in the Answer to the Bill of Particulars nor in the Information. The defendant objected to the admission of the evidence on the ground that it deprived him of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. The State argued that the evidence introduced was for the purpose of showing, guilty knowledge and intent. Articles 445 and 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The trial court per-*339nutted the evidence to go into the record, and oil original hearing we held that it was prejudicial to the defendant. The conviction and sentence were set aside.
The State argued on rehearing that the evidence was admissible because “Attempt” is a responsive verdict to the crime of possession ’ of marihuana, LSA-R.S. 40:962, State v. Broadnax, supra, Code of Criminal Procedure, LSA-R.S. 14:27, and under the crime of attempt, guilty knowledge and intent are necessary ingredients: ' Our original-decree was reversed, the majority opinion holding that guilty knowledge' and intent formed a part of the crime of possession of narcotics.
It is the writer’s opinion — as stated in his original opinion — that the evidence was prejudicial and deprived the defendant of due-, process and equal .protection of the law. The proceedings were contrary to Article I, Sec. 10, of the Constitution of Louisiana, LSA. During the trial the State was .endeavoring to prove the crime of possession of marihuana, as charged in the Information and set forth in the Answer to .the Bill of Particulars. At no time did the State try to prove the lesser crime of attempt. The jury brought in a verdict of possession, not attempted possession.
We need not delve along the shelves of antiquity to find authority and precedent for "the issues herein presented. The point that "the writer has made in this dissent hás application only to the peculiar facts of the instant case, and has been answered in the case of State v. Gardner, 198 La. 861, 5 So.2d 132, 134, where this Court said:
“ ‘The general rule is against the introduction of evidence of the commission of another offense than-that for which the defendant is being tried * * *.’ 2 Marr’s Criminal Jurisprudence 568. See, also, State v. Johnson, 38 La.Ann. 686; State v. Bates, 46 La.Ann. 849, 850, 15 So. 204; State v. Cavanaugh, 52 La.Ann. 1251, 27 So. 704; State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505; State v. Smith, 156 La. 818, 101 So. 209; Rice on Evidence, vol. 3, c. 25, § 153, and especially regarding larceny, chapter 42, § 453; 16 C.J. p. 574, § 1115, p. 586, §§ 1132, 1133, 1134, 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, §§ 663, 682, 683; 8 R.C.L. p. 198, No. 194. There are exceptions to this general' rule, however, one, where the evidence is introduced for the purpose of rebutting the inference that the act with which the accused is charged was not committed by accident or mistake but with a guilty knowledge or evil motive ; another, when the evidence shows a system of wrongdoing, as in cáses of forgery, making of false entries in books, etc. State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505; State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374; and State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433.
*341“In the instant case the question of intent or motive is not at issue and there being no connection between the previous sales of liquor and the sale with which the accused was charged in the indictment, it is our opinion therefore that the evidence of such previous sales was inadmissible.”
There are certain crimes in Louisiana that the Legislature placed in a class by themselves. They are classified as crimes malum in se, such as the possession of marihuana; such as the possession of intoxicating liquor in a dry territory; and such as the carrying of a concealed weapon.
In marihuana cases the defendant must rebut his possession by showing that he falls within the exceptions provided by statute. State v. Broadnax, 216 La. 1003, 45 So.2d 604. The same rule applies to charges of possessing intoxicating liquor in a dry territory.' Likewise, a person charged with carrying concealed weapons bears the burden of proving that he is one authorized to have such weapon on his person.
The confusion here is the application of rules which apply to another separate and distinct type of crimes, such as embezzlement, forgery, and the receiving of stolen property. Mere actual possession constitutes the offense of possession of narcotics, but in the case of embezzlement, forgery, etc., felonious intent and guilty knowledge are necessary ingredients. Proof of these ingredients are required to convict for the crime charged.
The question of attempt was raised for the first time on rehearing. It has always, been the policy of this Court not to notice, in application for rehearing, points which were not made in the argument of the cause. Succession of Broom, 14 La.Ann. 67; Cryer v. Cryer, La.App., 70 So.2d 747; Cabral v. Victor & Provost, Inc., 181 La. 139, 158 So. 821. The discussion of the question in. the present case does not obtain justice.,
A rehearing should be reserved, and the-conviction and sentence should be set aside.