Court Opinion

ID: 9739429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:44.594021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.169916
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TULLY, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that defense counsel’s failure to obtain written permission to allow a law student acting under the authority of Supreme Court Rule 711 (c)(1) (134 Ill. 2d R. 711 (c)(1)) to assist defense counsel is not a per se violation of the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel for the reasons articulated in the opinion. However, I must respectfully dissent with my colleagues that defendant was rendered ineffective assistance by his counsel which resulted in an unjust trial. The foundation of my concurrence on this issue is the rule of law established in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052. Strickland issued a double-pronged mandate that counsel’s behavior must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and counsel’s behavior must fall to a level of deficiency such that the eventual outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s actions. (466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) Both prongs of the Strickland mandate must be met to reach a conclusion of unreliable trial results. I am of the opinion that defense counsel’s actions, viewed in the totality of circumstances surrounding the case, did not meet the criteria established in Strickland. The defendant argues that a subpoena of certain hospital records would have validated his claim that he was incapacitated at the time the robbery occurred. Yet, defendant admitted to Officer Smith that two days after his period of “incapacitation” he freely walked into the site of the robbery and demanded protection money. What, in effect, would the hospital records have established? Could the hospital records have conclusively established the condition of the patient at the time of the robbery or would they have established the defendant’s condition during the time he was under hospital supervision for his wound? Even assuming arguendo that defendant needed the assistance of a cane to ambulate, the golf club which he carried on the day he entered the robbery site to demand extortion money could have served this function. Thus, defense counsel’s claim that the defendant’s medical records were not relevant and had no bearing on the case is entirely credible and falls within the scope of counsel’s trial strategy. Defendant’s argument that his counsel’s failure to interview witnesses who could have established his alibi to the crime also fails to meet the criteria set forth in Strickland. (466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.) Defense counsel did not simply ignore defendant’s request to contact certain witnesses. Counsel made the effort to contact the requested witnesses but was unsuccessful. Counsel discussed trial strategy with the defendant. It was only after the defendant made the decision to go to trial without the benefit of the information the witnesses could or could not have provided that counsel proceeded. The defendant did not request counsel to ask for a continuance to pursue the location of the witnesses. Therefore, defense counsel cannot be said to have failed to investigate or act upon his client’s information but rather counsel clearly proceeded with a trial strategy that was implicitly sanctioned by the defendant. Accordingly, no finding of unreliability in the trial process has been substantiated due to the actions of defendant’s counsel.