Court Opinion

ID: 9722204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:20:08.480339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:31.868111
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN dissenting: Upon reinstatement of the products liability count, this appeal involves both negligence and products liability. The general verdict of the jury, returned pursuant to instructions relating thereto given at the behest of the defendant, is sufficient to sustain the judgment on both counts. The majority opinion seems to hold that the judgment on the negligence count cannot be affirmed because the negligence of the defendant, even if it is established by the evidence, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. As I view this record, that issue was properly submitted to and resolved by the jury. I read the majority opinion to at least imply that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. In any event, one of the main contentions of tire defendant in this appeal is to the effect that the plaintiff, 12 years old at the time of the occurrence, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. This is premised upon the assertion that the danger from this machinery was patent and that the minor plaintiff was equally chargeable with the knowledge of the danger. Such knowledge is said to constitute contributory negligence as a matter of law. The Illinois Supreme Court disposed of such contention with finality when it said: “The law is clearly established by the great weight of authority that between the ages of seven and fourteen the question of culpability of a child is an open question of fact and must be left to the jury to determine, taking into consideration the age, capacity, intelligence and experience of the child.” Maskaliunas v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co., 318 Ill. 142, 149 N.E. 23, and quoted with approval in Dickeson v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co,. 42 Ill.2d 103, 245 N.E.2d 762. The majority opinion exonerates the defendant from liability under the products liability count upon the theory that there was no product, or if there was a product, it was a product with a shield by reason of the availability of the shield as a component part of the machine shipped by the manufacturer to the retailer. The concurring opinion seems to state that even if there was a product, tire defect in the product was patent and the knowledge of the user of the defective condition insulates the manufacturer from liability to the plaintiff. I cannot concur. The fact that the machinery here involved was broken down and shipped as component parts to the dealer does not preclude the existence of a defective product. A manufacturer cannot escape liability for defective products by shipping component parts. Such would make for easy circumvention of the policy and philosophy underlying responsibility in product cases. The fact that the dealer subsequently assembled the parts within certain limited variables in order to satisfy the purchaser’s specific order is of no consequence. This record shows us that the variables relate only to the length of the conveyor and the motor assembly if one was desired, or power take-off equipment if that was desired. The fact that the manufacturer supplied the dealer with a detached shield as “standard equipment” but at extra cost seems irrelevant. The evidence in this case is that a shield as an integral part of the machinery would have kept this machine from being unreasonably dangerous. The expert testimony is to that effect. It is my understanding that the duty of the manufacturer is to place into the stream of commerce only those articles which are not unreasonably dangerous when used for their intended purpose. (Rivera v. Rockford Machine & Tool Co., 1 Ill.App.3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828.) As the court observed in Rivera: “* * * Resolution of the question of whether defendant’s machine was unreasonably dangerous for failure to incorporate certain safety devices which plaintiff’s evidence shows were available at the time the Hijector left defendant’s control was the function of the jury as the trier of fact. Their finding as to this question, when considered in connection with defendant’s duty, determines the issue of liability. Evans v. General Motors Corp. 359 F.2d 822, * * *”. The notion expressed in the concurring opinion that the knowledge of the user precludes the manufacturer’s liability to the plaintiff in this case, whether considered a non-user, a bystander, or in some other category, has been discussed in the concurring and dissenting opinions in Lewis v. Stran Steel Corp., 6 Ill.App.3d 142, 285 N.E.2d 631. Such is also discussed in Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill.App.3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869, leave to appeal in that case having been granted by the Supreme Court on May 23, 1972. As I view this record, the judgment of the circuit court of Coles County should be affirmed.