Court Opinion

ID: 9459708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:29:14.902091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:17.693741
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
In this criminal case we are presented with three procedural defaults in the Selective Service administrative process. Two of these, by the Selective Service authorities, are excused by the majority. One, by the registrant, is enforced so as to exact a forfeiture of a possible defense, resulting in criminal conviction and sentence. The approach to the Selective Service System administrative process which puts the federal courts in the position of enforcing such anomalous results makes me decidedly uncomfortable. My discomfort could be avoided in this case, however , because there is authority, which we should follow, justifying a reversal of the conviction.
*630In the district court, Judge Weiner excused the fact that the local board had not considered the defendant’s claim for conscientious objector status. He reasoned :
“Finally, it is not disputed that the defendant did not apply for a conscientious objector’s status until after he had received his notice of induction. Since Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 [91 S.Ct. 1319, 28 L.Ed.2d 625] (1971) a local board is not required to consider Conscientious Objector claims first made after an induction order is issued. To avoid the Ehlert rule the defendant asserts that he had formed beliefs prior to the time that he received his notice of induction. He argues that Ehlert applies solely to situations where the belief arose between the mailing of a notice of induction and the scheduled induction date and therefore does not rule out the defendant’s contention-. We disagree. It is our opinion that a conscientious objector’s claim lodged with'a local board after receipt of a notice of induction comes within the Ehlert decision and the fact that there is an allegation that the belief was solidified prior to the mailing of the notice will not furnish a base for distinction.”
In United States v. Ziskowski, 465 F.2d 480, 484-485 (3d Cir. 1972), and in United States v. Shomock, 462 F.2d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1972), we rejected the construction of Ehlert adopted by Judge Weiner because under AR 635-20 ¶ 3(b)(1) the post induction administrative procedure for consideration of a conscientious objector claim, upon which the Ehlert opinion relies in approving rejection by the Selective Service System of late claims for conscientious objector classification, actually would be unavailable. Both in Ziskowski and in Shomock the convictions were reversed, without prejudice to reprocessing by the Selective Service System. The only distinction between this case on the one hand and Ziskowski and Shomock on the other is that here the registrant filed his claim not only after receipt of a notice of induction but also after his indictment. The issue, then, is whether some compelling governmental interest would be interfered with were we to apply the Ziskowski-Shomock rule to a case where the claim is both post notice and post indictment.
Appellant claims that he did not raise, his conscientious objector claim sooner because, although he held such beliefs, he was under the erroneous impression that Roman Catholics could not qualify for a I-O classification. The reasons for imposing the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies before the defense of erroneous classification will be considered in a Selective Service Act criminal prosecution are twofold. First, it is considered desirable that the agency develop and then apply its expertise to a factual record in reaching a discretionary result. Conscientious objector claims are particularly appropriate for such expert agency consideration. Second, the doctrine contributes to the orderly working of the administrative process. McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484-486, 91 S.Ct. 1565, 29 L.Ed.2d 47 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). Neither of these reasons militate against applying the Ziskowski-Shomock rule to this case. If the district court finds that a registrant was genuinely mistaken as to his eligibility for a I-O classification it can return the case to the local board and allow it to develop the facts and exercise its expertise. There is no more reason in the post indictment than in the preindietment post notice .situation why this cannot be done. The approach would not lead to any wholesale bypassing of the administrative process, because before a district court returned a case to a local board it would have to find that there had been a genuine misunderstanding as to eligibility under the law for the classification.
This approach was taken in United States v. Fargnoli, 458 F.2d 1237 (1st Cir. 1972). As the majority points out, Fargnoli has the additional factor of a *631change in the law announced in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970). But the First Circuit drew no distinction between an appellant whose mistaken belief as to the law was shared by the lower federal courts and an appellant whose mistaken belief was his alone. The Selective Service System has no compelling interest in inducting those persons eligible for exemption or deferments who through ignorance only learn of their eligibility at the eleventh hour. The relationship between the System and the registrant is not supposed to be adversary. United States v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1251, 1254-1255 (3d Cir. 1970). Other cases have remanded to the local board for consideration of post indictment claims. United States v. Shields, 416 F.2d 935 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam), vacated on other grounds, 401 U.S. 1007, 91 S.Ct. 1247, 28 L.Ed.2d 542 (1971) (per curiam) (change of law situation); United States v. Anderson, 4 S.S.L.R. 3661 (N.D.Cal.1971); United States v. Grochowski, 3 S.S.L.R. 3380 (E.D.Wis.1970), appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, 454 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1971), dismissal affirmed on rehearing, 454 F.2d 657 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Hansen, 314 F.Supp. 91 (D.Minn.1969). Nothing in the opinion in United States v. Noonan, 434 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981, 91 S.Ct. 1190, 28 L.Ed.2d 333 (1971), is contra to Fargnoli, and I do not consider myself bound by what is in appellant’s brief in that case and not in the opinion.
I would follow the Ziskowski, Shomock and Fargnoli cases. Since the question of whether appellant was genuinely mistaken as to his eligibility for a conscientious objector classification was never submitted to the trier of fact I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. If the trier of fact found that appellant was in fact genuinely mistaken as to eligibility the district court should dismiss the indictment without prejudice to reprocessing by the Selective Service System.