Court Opinion

ID: 9615125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:31:31.611954+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:41.921566
License: Public Domain

PARKS, Judge,
concurring in result:
While I agree that appellant’s conviction was not obtained in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, I cannot concur in the majority’s analysis concerning this issue. The majority bases its holding, at least in part, upon the fact that the record fails to show “Appellant gave notice or made a demand for trial as required by Section 1347, art. 111(a).” Majority at 1051. However, Article III is applicable only where the prisoner makes the request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint. Conversely, Article IV applies where the receiving state makes a request to obtain the prisoner for trial. In the present case, the State made the request, via two writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, for appellant to be delivered to face the charges at issue. Therefore, Article IV, which does not require a prisoner to give notice and make a demand for trial, would be applicable if this case fell under the IAD.
However, as the majority recognizes, there is nothing in the present record to indicate that a detainer was ever filed. A detainer must be filed before the IAD is triggered and the State bound by its provisions. See Article 111(a), Article IV(a). See also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 361, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 1848, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978). In Gilbreath v. State, 651 P.2d 699, 700-701 (Okl.Cr.1982), this Court held:
Under the Act a detainer is vaguely defined as a “written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated ...” 22 O.S. 1981, § 1347, Art. IV(a). A detainer is generally any written notice to prison authorities, in the sending state, advising them that charges are pending against the prisoner in another jurisdiction.
While I agree with the later statement, I find that the former statement was a misinterpretation of the Act.
In analyzing the federal counterpart to Oklahoma’s IAD, the Supreme Court defined a detainer as “a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.” *1052Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). As set forth above, a detainer must be filed before the provisions of the IAD are triggered. Then, either the receiving state files a written request for temporary custody or availability, see Article IV(a), or the prisoner files written notice and a request for trial, see Article 111(a). Thus, it is readily apparent that two different documents were contemplated by the drafters of the IAD. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360, 98 S.Ct. at 1847. The first document advises authorities of the sending state that charges are pending against the prisoner in another jurisdiction and the second document is either a request for temporary custody or availability of the prisoner filed by the State, or notice and a request for trial filed by the prisoner. Accordingly, I would overrule Gilbreath insofar as the definition of “detainer” announced therein is inconsistent with this discussion.
It should further be noted that the two writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum filed in this case did not substitute as a “detainer” within the meaning of the IAD. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 360-61, 98 S.Ct. at 1847-48. Because the instant record does not indicate that a detainer was ever filed, this case falls outside of the scope of the IAD. Therefore, I agree that appellant’s conviction should be affirmed.