Court Opinion

ID: 9958352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 00:00:37.42457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:13.273298
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-60118            Document: 54-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/08/2024

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                   ____________                              FILED
                                                                          April 8, 2024
                                     No. 23-60118
                                                                        Lyle W. Cayce
                                   ____________
                                                                             Clerk

Sabino Zuniga-Ayala,

                                                                                 Petitioner,

                                          versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                              Respondent.
                   ______________________________

                  Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals
                            Agency No. A074 370 720
                   ______________________________

Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Graves and Wilson, Circuit
Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       An immigration judge found Sabino Zuniga-Ayala removable from the
United States due to his Texas conviction for delivery of less than one gram
of cocaine. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed Zuniga-Ayala’s
appeal. He now petitions this court for review of that dismissal, arguing that
his conviction did not render him removable. We disagree and DENY his
petition.

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-60118       Document: 54-1           Page: 2     Date Filed: 04/08/2024

                                  No. 23-60118

                          I. BACKGROUND
       Zuniga-Ayala is a lawful permanent resident born in Mexico and
admitted to the United States in 1996. In 2022, he was convicted of delivery
of less than one gram of cocaine in violation of Texas Health & Safety Code
§ 481.112(b). Less than a month later, he was served a notice to appear for
removal proceedings. The notice charged him with removability under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which requires removal of a lawfully admitted
non-citizen who “has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law . . . of a
State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [the federal
Controlled Substances Act])[.]”
       At Zuniga-Ayala’s first removal hearing, he admitted to the
conviction but argued that it did not subject him to removal because Texas
criminalizes a broader range of cocaine-related offenses than corresponding
federal law. The immigration judge (“IJ”) found Zuniga-Ayala removable
but granted him a month to apply for cancelation or for withholding of
removal based on his overbreadth argument. At the next hearing, however,
Zuniga-Ayala’s attorney failed to present an application. The IJ rescheduled
the hearing; again, Zuniga-Ayala failed to apply for relief. The IJ ordered
Zuniga-Ayala removed from the United States.
       Zuniga-Ayala appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”). He again argued that “Texas’ definition of cocaine is broader than
the federal definition” because it includes position isomers of cocaine and
the federal Controlled Substances Act does not. Thus, he argued, his
conviction did not satisfy the criteria for removability under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(i).   To    show     that       Texas     actually   prosecutes   for
possession/delivery of position isomers of cocaine, he submitted three sets
of Texas criminal judgment documents. The documents pertained to
defendants who were convicted under Texas law for possession of a

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                                 No. 23-60118

controlled substance. Each set included the defendants’ confessions,
wherein each defendant confessed to having possessed position isomers.
       Two of the three confessions concerned the same defendant and
showed that the typed word “cocaine” had been crossed out and “cocaine
position isomers” had been written in by hand. In the third confession,
concerning a second defendant, the words “cocaine position isomers” were
typed out; on a separate page titled “Admonishment,” someone had
handwritten: “[B]y accepting this plea, client may remain eligible to request
relief if an attorney in immigration court argues that this offense is not a
controlled substance offense.”
       The BIA construed Zuniga-Ayala’s submission of the documents as a
motion to remand to the IJ to present new evidence. The BIA declined to
remand and dismissed Zuniga-Ayala’s appeal. It concluded that the
documents would not make a difference in Zuniga-Ayala’s case because they
did not demonstrate a realistic probability that Texas actually prosecutes for
possession of position isomers. Specifically, the BIA concluded, the evidence
“does not show that Texas prosecuted three cases for possession of cocaine
position isomers in 2019 and 2020, but rather the way the defendants chose
to enter their guilty plea.” Zuniga-Ayala petitioned our court for review.
     II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
       We have jurisdiction to review whether a petitioner’s status makes
him removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Nehme v. INS, 252 F.3d
415, 420 (5th Cir. 2001). We review such questions of law de novo. Ponce v.
Garland, 70 F.4th 296, 299 (5th Cir. 2023).
                           III. DISCUSSION
                   a. The realistic probability standard

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                                     No. 23-60118

        Zuniga-Ayala first challenges the standard applied in this circuit for
determining whether a drug offense subjects the offender to removal under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). As stated above, Section 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) requires
the removal of a lawfully admitted person who “has been convicted of a
violation of . . . any law . . . of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance (as
defined in [the federal Controlled Substances Act]).” To determine whether
a state offense “relat[es] to” an offense under the Controlled Substances
Act, we consider whether the state defines the offense in a way that is the
same as federal law, or whether the state’s definition is broader. Alexis v.
Barr, 960 F.3d 722, 726 (5th Cir. 2020). Even if the state’s definition is
broader on its face, we then look to see whether there is a realistic probability
that the state would actually prosecute for the broader conduct—that is,
conduct falling within the state law but outside the Controlled Substances
Act. Id. To make that realistic probability showing, a petitioner must “point
to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the
statute in the [broader] manner.” Id. at 727 (quoting Vazquez v. Sessions, 885
F.3d 862, 873 (5th Cir. 2018)).
        We have already determined that Texas law on its face defines cocaine
more broadly than federal law because it includes position isomers. Id. at 726.
Thus, for Zuniga-Ayala to show that a Texas prosecution for delivery of
cocaine is not an offense that subjects him to removal under Section
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), he must point to an actual case where Texas prosecuted
someone specifically for delivery of cocaine position isomers.
        First, however, he argues that this actual case requirement is not
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. He argues that the Supreme
Court has never required an actual case when a state statute on its face
criminalizes more conduct than federal law.

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                                No. 23-60118

       To accept Zuniga-Ayala’s argument would be to ignore binding circuit
precedent, such as our en banc decision in United States v. Castillo-Rivera,
where we emphasized that “[t]here is no exception to the actual case
requirement . . . where a court concludes a state statute is broader on its
face.” 853 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Zuniga-Ayala argues that
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845
(2022), foreclosed the actual case requirement, but we have rejected that
argument already, most recently in United States v. Kerstetter, 82 F.4th 437,
441 (5th Cir. 2023). Our rule of orderliness requires us to follow those
decisions. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir. 1999).
Zuniga-Ayala must point to an actual Texas case involving position isomers.
                           b. Three confessions
       Next, Zuniga-Ayala argues that he satisfied the actual case
requirement before the BIA when he pointed to three criminal judgments
involving defendants who confessed to possessing position isomers. The BIA
rejected that argument because the confessions did not show that the
defendants were prosecuted for possessing position isomers—only that the
defendants admitted to doing so. We agree.
       Kerstetter—a decision that postdated the parties’ briefing in this
case—lends support to the BIA’s conclusion. There, the appellant
challenged the district court’s application of a sentencing enhancement,
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), that applies to prior
convictions for “serious drug offense[s].” Kerstetter, 82 F.4th at 439. The
appellant had a prior Texas conviction for delivering cocaine under Texas
Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a). Id. at 441. Even though Kerstetter arose
in the criminal context instead of the immigration context, the question of
whether the appellant’s conviction subjected him to the ACCA enhancement
depended on whether, under the same realistic probability standard, the state

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                                      No. 23-60118

offense of which he was convicted was broader than the analogous offense
under the Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 440.
        The appellant, the record in Kerstetter reveals, relied on two of the
same sets of documents that Zuniga-Ayala relies on here to argue that there
was a realistic probability that Texas would prosecute a Section 481.112
offense based on position isomers. Id. at 441. We concluded that the appellant
failed to satisfy the realistic probability standard because he “did not identify
any actual cases where Texas brought charges against someone under Section
481.112(a) for delivery of position isomers of cocaine.” Id. (emphasis added).
        Here, Zuniga-Ayala’s evidence only shows that Texas defendants
have confessed to possessing position isomers. It does not, on its own,
indicate that those defendants were prosecuted for possessing position
isomers. Nor did Zuniga-Ayala provide any other evidence, such as charging
documents, that would allow that conclusion.1
        Zuniga-Ayala argues that cases such as Monsonyem v. Garland indicate
that we would allow judicial confessions to satisfy the reasonable probability
standard. 36 F.4th 639 (5th Cir. 2022). But Monsonyem is inapposite. When
we looked at a confession in that case, which also concerned removability, we
viewed it as one piece of evidence among others we used to determine
whether a criminal statute was divisible into separate offenses. Id. at 644–45.
Here, the inquiry is not whether Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.112(b) is

        _____________________
        1
         Nor do we doubt that such evidence is difficult to come by. As we have explained,
Texas simply does not charge cocaine offenses in that manner. Alexis, 960 F.3d at 728 (“[A]
Texas ‘indictment need only allege the name of the substance; it need not go further and
describe the offense as a salt, isomer, or any other qualifying definition.’”) (quoting
Michael B. Charlton, Tex. Prac., Texas Criminal Law, Controlled
Substances § 30.1 (2019)).

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divisible, but whether Texas actually prosecutes certain offenses that Section
481.112(b) ostensibly criminalizes.
       In sum, Zuniga-Ayala failed to show that Texas “brought charges
against someone . . . for delivery of position isomers of cocaine.” Kerstetter,
82 F.4th at 441. The BIA did not err in dismissing his appeal.
                          IV. CONCLUSION
       We DENY the petition for review.

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