Court Opinion

ID: 9809123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:01:22.058986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:03.283434
License: Public Domain

Clark, C. J.,
dissenting. It is not controverted that the defendant E. C. Ebbs, guardian, converted the funds of his ward to his own use, nor is there any dispute over the finding as to the amount of such defalcation. The only contested fact is whether when the bond, which is in the regular form, was signed by three of the sureties, 13,000 was not written after $. Upon this omission (if true) and the subsequent filling in of the blank with 13,000 by one of the sureties, who carried the bond to the Clerk to be filed, the sureties now seek *363to avoid their obligation, which is set out in the bond distinctly, to be responsible for any failure of F. 0. Ebbs, as guardian, to safely keep and account for the property of his ward. The evidence of the Clerk is uncontradicted that the bond was handed to him by I. N. Ebbs, one of the sureties, and that it was then complete, the $13,000 being filled in, and his deputy, who copied it, testifies to the same effect. I. N. Ebbs, one of the sureties, certified as notary public that the other sureties appeared before him and justified to the amount set opposite their respective names. These amounts, together with the sum he himself justified to before the Clerk, aggregate $13,000, the sum which was written in the bond when handed in by him to the Clerk and recorded.
The jury found in response to the first issue that “the defendants I. N. Ebbs, M. L. Duckett, D. P. Plemmons, J. M. Eector and Jasper Ebbs made and delivered their bond in writing to the State of North Carolina for the benefit of James Blaine House, as alleged in paragraph three of the complaint;” and in response to the ninth issue that it “was the purpose and intention of the defendants at the time of-signing the paper-writing introduced in evidence that the same should be used and filed as a guardian bond by F. C. Ebbs, as guardian of James Blaine House.”
If, upon the facts above set forth and which were uncontro-verted, the filling in of 13,000 in the blank to total up the several justifications by the surety who was entrusted by them to bring the bond to the Clerk (an addition in nowise changing the nature of the obligation), can vitiate the bond, which was perfect when handed to the Clerk by one of their number, then no guardian or administrator’s bond is safe unless the sureties shall all sign and justify before the Clerk.
The Code, sec. 1891’, was intended to prevent just such defects in obligations of this nature and to avoid trivial and technical objections. It provides that “whenever any instru*364ment shall be taken or received * * * by any person or persons, acting under or in virtue of any public authority, purporting to be a bond executed to the State for the performance of any duty belonging to any office or appointment, such instrument, notwithstanding * * * any variance in the penalty or condition of the instrument from the provision prescribed by law, shall be valid and may be put in suit in the name of the State for the benefit of the person injured by a breach of the condition thereof, in the same manner * * * as if the penalty and condition of the instrument had conformed to law.”
It would seem that as the bond contained the figures 13,000 after the $ mark when handed to the Clerk by one of the sureties, who had taken the justification of the other sureties and who had been entrusted by them to deliver the bond to the Clerk, and as the jury has found that “it was the purpose and intention of the defendants at the time of signing the paper-writing that it should be used and filed as a guardian bond of E. C. Ebbs,” that if the 13,000 was written in by said co-surety before handing the bond to the Clerk it was immaterial, and the defendants cannot protect themselves by the act of their agent of which the Clerk had no knowledge. They impliedly, at least, authorized him to fill in the blank, and cannot be permitted now to deny such authority to the detriment of the ward.
But if the instrument could be taken as filed, with $- blank, as the defendants allege it was when signed by them, the above section 1891 provides that “any variance in the penalty or in the condition of the instrument from the provision prescribed by law” shall not invalidate it. A smaller variance than this could scarcely happen. The penalty named merely limits the liability of the sureties, and the insertion of 13,000 after $ merely restricted their liability to that sum, whereas without it their liability by the tenor of the bond *365extended to responsibility for tbe safe-keeping of any funds or property of tbe ward, wbicb might have come into tbe hands of the guardian without limit as to tbe amount.
Independent of our curative statute it is held that the bond “may be executed by the sureties while the penal sum is still blank; and although the principal may have informed them that the sum is to be a certain amount, and he afterwards inserts a larger amount by direction of the judge of probate, yet the bond holds the sureties.” Croswell on Executors and Administrators, 190; White v. Duggan, 140 Mass., 18, 54 Am. Rep., 437. Such bonds are unlike bonds for the payment of money (in which the amount is material), in that in these bonds the honest and faithful performance of duty by the fiduciary is the obligation and the amount of the penalty is simply a form, and at most merely restricts the extent of the liability. Here the amount ($13,000), even if inserted without knowledge of the defendants, aggregates exactly the sums for which they severally justified.
In 2 Parsons on Contracts, 120, it is said: “An alteration which only does what the law would do, that is, expresses what the law implies, is not a material alteration and therefore would not avoid an instrument.” All the authorities hold that an alteration, to be material, must change the legal effect of the instrument; this is true even as to obligations for payment of money, as negotiable bills and the like. 2 Daniel Neg. Instr., sec 1373a. When a fiduciary “receives money or property upon the faith of a bond he and his sureties are estopped to deny the validity of the bond.” Pritch-ard, Wills & Adm., sec. 586, construing a statute similar to our Code, sec. 1891. Here the money was paid over by the Federal Court to the guardian upon a certified copy of this bond.
“The insertion of the penal sum of a bond left blank will not vitiate the instrument.” Brown v. Colquitt, 73 Ga., 59, *36654 Am. Rep., 867; South Berwick v. Huntress, 53 Me., 89 87 Am. Dec., 535; State v. Young, 23 Minn., 551. In the case from 53 Maine, 89 Kent, J., says: “When the instrument is a sealed instrument, when signed by the party, the filling in of the blanks afterwards by another is not, strictly speaking, the execution of a sealed instrument. That has already been done by the party himself. The third party does not make it a specialty by his acts. It Avas one before. The filling up merely perfects an imperfect sealed deed or bond.” “If one signs an instrument containing blanks, he must be understood to entrust it to the person to whom it is so delivered to be filled up properly, according to the agreement betAveen the parties, and, when so filled, the instrument is as good as if originally executed in complete form.” 2 Cyc., 159, and cases cited thereto in note 74.
“An alteration of an instrument which merely supplies an omission therein and conforms it to the intention of the parties will not vitiate the writing, especially if a naked blank is left for the insertion of the omitted words.” 2 A. & Eng. Ency. (2 Ed.), 212; Hunt v. Adams, 6 Mass., 519; Bank v. Slirling, 13 Nova Scotia, 439; Conner v. Routh, 7 How. (Miss.), 176, 40 Am. Dec., 59; Boyd v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. (N. Y.), 93 Chute v. Small, 17 Wend. (N. Y.), 238. “If a party to an instrument intrusts it to another for use, with blanks not filled, such instrument so delivered carries on its face an implied authority to fill up the blanks necessary to perfect the same; and as between such party and innocent third person, the person to whom the instrument is so intrusted must be deemed the agent of the party who committed the instrument to his custody.” 2 Cyc., 159. This is not only on the ground of implied agency, but because when one of two innocent persons must suffer, the loss must fall upon him who has put it in the poAver of another to do the injury. *367Fisher v. Dennis, 6 Cal., 577, 65 Am. Dec., 534; Spitler v. James, 32 Ind., 202, 2 Am. Rep., 334; Fullerton v. Sturges, 4 Ohio St., 529.
It is not contended bere that there was any fraud practiced on defendants, and the jury find that the instrument is of the purport and effect the signers intended. Rut had it been otherwise, the sureties having committed the bond, with the blank unfilled, to I. N. Ebbs to file with the Clerk, not only gave him implied authority to fill it, but they are estopped to claim any protection from an act which they put it in their co-surety’s power to commit, and which was unknown to the Clerk. The same principle would apply if the sureties handed the bond to E. 0. Ebbs or Tainter who delivered it to I. N. Ebbs, the other surety, who handed it to the Clerk.
The tenth, eleventh and twelfth findings were that the 13,000 was “not inserted in the- paper-writing at the time” each of three of the sureties respectively named signed it. But taking this to mean that the 13,000 was not “in the writing” when respectively signed by them, the status is presented which we have discussed above. The first and ninth findings are not in conflict with such findings, for they are simply to the effect that, notwithstanding the 13,000 was filled in after such signing and before the bond was handed to the Clerk, the bond was valid. If this was a conclusion of law submitted to the jury, the error was cured by the jury answering it correctly and the judgment of the Court to the same effect.
There are but two exceptions in the record; first, to the submission of issues 1, 6, 8 and 9. Issues 6 and 8 were not answered and were harmless, even if erroneously submitted; and 1 and 9 arose on the pleadings. The other exception, that judgment upon the verdict should have been entered for the defendants, is discussed above.