Court Opinion

ID: 9646513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:01:40.498077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:38.746799
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that the Commonwealth committed reversible error, requiring grant of a new trial, when it questioned Clayton Morrison concerning his religious affiliations. I believe, however, that the preferable ground for resolution of this case is the search and seizure issue which prompted our original reversal. To the opinion we filed originally, I would add only, “Our discussion of the Fourth Amendment is equally applicable to the state constitutional provision.” Commonwealth v. Platou, 455 Pa. 258, 260 n. 2, 312 A.2d 29, 31 n. 2 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 3183, 41 L.Ed.2d 1146 (1974) (certiorari denied, “it appearing that judgment below rests upon an adequate state ground”).
The search and seizure issue is preferable to that now addressed by the majority for several reasons. Most impor*560tant, we deemed the result of Mimms a sound one when rendered. It is equally sound today. We held, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), that a contrary result “would invite intrusion upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulable hunches.” Commonwealth v. Mimms, 471 Pa. 546, 553, 370 A.2d 1157, 1160 (1977), rev’d. and remanded sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978). This rule is for Pennsylvania no less sound today, even though the United States Supreme Court has declined to impose it upon all the states and the Federal government. If we have found a constitutional principle sound and salutary, we should not hesitate to endorse it as a matter of state law. See Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 341 A.2d 62 (1975) (forbidding impeachment by means of unconstitutionally obtained statement); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.3d 528, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975)., This view is particularly true where the principle advances important individual freedoms generally favored by both the state and federal constitutions. See generally, Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977) . The wisdom of both our holding in Mimms and the approach I suggest here was recently recognized by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which adopted on both state and federal constitutional grounds a rule similar to that we announced in Mimms. State v. Prouse, Del., 382 A.2d 1359 (1978) (holding unconstitutional random auto stops where police had no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing; following Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973)).
Disposition on state grounds also preserves a body of state law independent of decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Platou, supra (certiorari denied because judgment rested on independent state ground). Where so many of our decisions concerning individual rights reflect considerations of local conditions, a decision founded on state grounds is appropriate.
*561The majority avoids addressing the Pennsylvania Constitution by resort to the principle that a reviewing court should not consider issues “not properly placed before it by the litigants.” 477 Pa. at 556, n. 5, 385 A.2d at 335 n. 5. In my view, this principle does not apply here. Both parties framed the issue in Mimms as one of search and seizure. We have often passed upon this issue under both the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Knowles, 459 Pa. 70, 73 n. 3, 327 A.2d 19, 20 n. 3 (1974); Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 322 n. 2, 312 A.2d 398, 399 n. 2 (1973); Commonwealth v. Platou, supra. The language of the Fourth Amendment and our relevant state provision differ in no significant respects,* the issue was well briefed, the Court carefully considered the facts and arguments presented, and it is highly unlikely that the parties could, if granted an opportunity, direct toward the state Constitution new arguments concerning search and seizure of which we are not now aware.
When the state constitution is so strongly implicated in a federal constitutional challenge, sound judicial practice requires that we regard the state constitutional question as properly presented. A contrary view would force us to decide issues upon federal constitutional grounds whenever the parties do not specifically address other grounds adequate to dispose of the appeal. Control of our scope of review should reside in this Court. Wyman v. James, 400 *562U.S. 309, 345 & n. 7, 91 S.Ct. 381, 401 & n. 7, 27 L.Ed.2d 408 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.); see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341, 56 S.Ct. 466, 480, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandéis, J., concurring). Thus, that the parties focused on the federal constitution does not necessarily extinguish our inherent power to measure the propriety of a Pennsylvania search and seizure according to the Pennsylvania Constitution.
I therefore believe the question whether the search and seizure violated the state constitution is properly before us. In my view, this Court should simply add to our original opinion a statement that our holding is based equally on the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Platou, supra.
EAGEN, C. J., and MANDERINO, J., join in this concurring opinion.

 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
“The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.”
Pa.Const. art. I, § 8.