Court Opinion

ID: 9588072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:29:35.579431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:00.492645
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.*
While I concur with the majority, I have one caveat to add to my agreement with regard to section II of the opinion. I join in that part of the opinion under authority of Ault v. International Harvester Co. (1974) 13 Cal.3d 113 [117 Cal.Rptr. 812, 528 P.2d 1148, 74 A.L.R.3d 986]. However, I am to some degree persuaded by the position of other courts which, in interpreting statutes similar to Evidence Code section 1151, have held that the exclusion of evidence under such provisions should be extended to postaccident corrective measures in strict liability cases. These cases conclude that the policy of encouraging actions to improve products applies equally in product liability and negligence cases, and that relevancy cannot be presumed because in some instances postaccident alterations may be made for reasons wholly unrelated to the cause of the accident in question. (See, e.g., Cann v. Ford Motor Co. (2d Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 54, 60; Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc. (4th Cir. 1980) 628 F.2d 848, 856-858, cert, den. 449 U.S. 1080 [66 L.Ed.2d 804, 101 S.Ct. 862]; Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co. (1978) 89 Wn.2d 474 [573 P.2d 785, 791, 93 A.L.R.3d 86].) However, we are not provided here with any evidence tending to prove or disprove the assumptions upon which our decision in Ault was based.
In any event, I wish to emphasize a point implicit in the majority opinion that merely because section 1151 may not bar introduction of evidence regarding postaccident warnings, such evidence is subject to the court’s complete discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352; see 2 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence (1975) ¶ 407[03] at p. 407-14 & fn. 7 [“The most desirable approach is to treat products liability cases as governed by Rule 403 [analogous to § 352] rather than Rule 407 [analogous to § 1151], thereby giving the judge *460discretion to admit the evidence of subsequent repairs when relevance exceeds prejudice to the defendant.”].)
On February 7, 1984, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.