Court Opinion

ID: 9399369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 18:04:08.785841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:14.731949
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/2/23 In re J.M. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      DIVISION EIGHT

 In re J.M., a Person Coming                                  B317841
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                           Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN                                       Super. Ct. No. 18CCJP01801B
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 H.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Reversed.
      Michelle L. Jarvis, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Principal
Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         **********
      Father, H.M., appeals orders of the juvenile court
(1) exercising jurisdiction over his daughter, J.M., under Welfare
and Institutions Code1 section 300, and (2) removing J.M. from
his custody pursuant to section 361. We reverse.
                          BACKGROUND
      The family is comprised of Father and J.M. Mother
abandoned the family when J.M. was one and a half years old.
Since mother left, Father has raised J.M. with help from paternal
grandmother. This appeal arises from the second of two
dependency proceedings.
      The first proceeding began in 2018 when J.M. was four
years old. Police were called to the family apartment following a
neighbor’s report that Father was inside yelling and screaming,
which included a statement that he was going to “kill.” When
police arrived, they heard Father “ranting and screaming” and
“making strange noises.” Father initially denied that he had
been ranting and screaming, and claimed that he had been
asleep. However, when the officers told him that they heard him
making noises from outside the apartment, Father “began
laughing and joking.” The officers entered the apartment and
found multiple open beer cans while J.M. was sitting on her bed,
clutching a blanket, and “ ‘scared out-of-her mind.’ ” Father was
placed on a psychiatric hold, and the referral was promoted to a
case with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS).
      The juvenile court found true and sustained the allegations
under section 300, subdivision (b), that Father had “exhibited
disruptiveness and uncontrollable behaviors which . . . resulted

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                2
in neighbor’s reports, law enforcement intervention and
involuntary hospitalization,” and that “father suffers from
anxiety and self-medicates with alcohol nightly while [J.M.] is in
his care.” The allegations continued, “father’s disruptive
behaviors, untreated anxiety and parenting under the influence
of alcohol place [J.M.] at risk of harm.”
        The juvenile court ordered services for Father that included
a substance abuse program, mental health services, and drug
testing. Father successfully completed all ordered services.
He stopped drinking, admitted that he had been drinking heavily
due to stress, and developed healthy coping mechanisms.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction at the end of 2019,
granting sole legal and physical custody to Father. Mother’s
whereabouts remained unknown.
        About two years later, in October 2021, DCFS received a
new referral about the family, which led to the current
proceedings. A neighbor reported hearing “several loud noises
and yelling” from the family’s apartment, and that it was “not the
first time.”2 The neighbor claimed to have heard J.M. telling
Father to “stop touching her and . . . her underwear” and asking
Father “[w]hy [are you] doing this?” The neighbor believed that
Father was under the influence of something because he
responded to J.M. with slurred speech and laughter. The
neighbor called 911, but police were unable to make contact with
the family.
        Two weeks after the referral, a social worker made an
unannounced visit to Father’s apartment. The social worker

2    A month earlier, the neighbor complained to the apartment
manager about the noise coming from Father’s apartment, after
which, Father quieted down.

                                 3
observed the home to be clean and tidy; adequately furnished;
stocked with sufficient food, age appropriate toys, and clean
linens; and found all utilities in working order. There were no
visible safety hazards and no indication of drug or alcohol abuse
in the home. While Father was upset that someone had called
DCFS, he was otherwise cooperative, easy to engage, presented
an appropriate affect, and displayed no visible signs of cognitive
impairment or substance use. Father explained that his family
was loud and that the apartment manager had expressed concern
about noise coming from his apartment. Father denied any drug
or alcohol use. Father also denied any criminal history, however,
a database search revealed Father’s criminal history included
evading law enforcement, possession of drugs and alcohol, two
DUI’s, and reckless driving, with the last conviction occurring in
2005.
       The social worker interviewed the apartment manager,
who stated that she had not witnessed any abuse or neglect from
Father, and that J.M. was always cheerful, talkative, and happy.
She reported that neighbors complain about Father because he is
loud and “can make a lot of noise.” However, she stated that she
had addressed that with Father and he is “trying to keep quiet.”
       The social worker next spoke with the principal of J.M.’s
school who reported Father had been “aggressive” with him and
his staff, but he had never observed any abuse or neglect with
respect to J.M. He reported that J.M. has low average grades
and average attendance, but that J.M. is “easy going and calm.”
       The social worker next spoke with J.M. who denied all
forms of abuse and said she had never seen Father under the
influence. She reported being well cared for in all respects and
stated that Father is a “nice guy.” J.M. reported that she always

                                4
has enough food to eat, is able to bathe and shower regularly, and
always has access to clean, well-fitting clothes and shoes. She
stated that she is never left unsupervised. The social worker
“observed no marks or bruises indicative of abuse or neglectful
parenting of the child.”
       The social worker spoke with J.M.’s pediatrician, who had
last seen J.M. less than a year prior. The pediatrician reported
no concerns of abuse or neglect, and that J.M. was up to date
with physicals and immunizations.
       About three weeks after the first social worker’s set of
interviews, another social worker reinterviewed Father. The
social worker asked Father if he was willing to drug test, and
Father said that he would. During this second interview, Father
admitted that he “drinks a few glasses of wine nightly after [J.M.]
goes to sleep but denie[d] any past or current alcohol or substance
use or abuse.”
       The social worker interviewed paternal grandmother, who
had no concerns about alcohol or substance abuse by Father.
Nor had J.M. ever disclosed anything concerning to her. Paternal
grandmother stated she sees the family every other night and
they come to her home for dinner twice a week.
       The social worker conducted a second interview with J.M.’s
principal and asked him what he meant when he told the first
social worker that Father was “aggressive.” The principal
explained he received five unrelated complaints about Father’s
behavior from other parents. The principal reported that, when
Father is in the valet line to pick up J.M., he honks at people,
plays his music very loud, and makes other parents feel
uncomfortable and threatened. He also reported that Father
makes “hand gestures in the car at people” and other parents had

                                5
complained that Father drives “erratically.” The principal
described the issues with Father as a “head scratcher,” and that
Father “presents as nervous and it appears like something is off
with him.” However, the principal was unsure if “it is just how
Father is or if Father is on something.” He had never gotten
close enough to Father to smell or observe any alcohol. The
principal also described Father as “obnoxious, irate, and an
intense person,” who “tries to create problems.” For example,
the principal got into an argument with Father about the school’s
policy, requiring parents to use a “QR code check-in process” to
track their children’s symptoms (presumably for COVID-19).
Father initially refused to participate in the program, but later
apologized for arguing with the principal over the matter.
The principal had no concerns about J.M., observing her to be
“well adjusted,” “always clean,” and “happy.”
       The social worker spoke to several of the family’s
neighbors, who lived in the same apartment complex. One
neighbor was “stunned” at the allegations against Father. That
neighbor considered him “loving and devoted” to J.M., had never
seen him under the influence, and had no concerns about the
family. She told the social worker that J.M. and Father appear to
have a “great relationship.”
       Another neighbor, whose apartment was right next to the
family’s, had heard Father and J.M. yelling at each other. She
reported the yelling “sound[ed] bad,” and that one time she heard
Father say, “I can’t do this anymore” and J.M. responded “Shut
up—[s]on of a bitch.” She recorded the yelling, but the words on
the recording were indiscernible. She had never heard anything
that sounded like physical abuse and had never seen marks or
bruises on J.M. aside from a small scratch. She had, however,

                               6
seen Father on multiple occasions in a state she described as
“drunk or ‘wasted’ ” and suspected Father might be driving
drunk.
       Another neighbor, who asked to remain anonymous for fear
of retaliation, said that “there is something wrong with [the]
Father” and J.M. needs “protection.” She said another neighbor
had told her she planned to “vouch for father” in the DCFS’s
investigation, but that neighbor lives farther from the family’s
apartment than the anonymous neighbor. The anonymous
neighbor said, from what she could hear from outside the family
apartment, “father uses a lot of profanity towards [J.M.] and
[J.M.] constantly . . . tell[s] father to stop.” She claims to have
heard J.M. tell Father “I hate you.” She reported the yelling
usually happens between midnight and 1:00 a.m.
       A few days after speaking with the neighbors, the social
worker interviewed J.M. a second time at her school. J.M.
reiterated that Father does not mistreat her in any way and that
he is a “nice guy.” She reported being well cared for at home and
having no fear of Father. She denied that she had ever seen
Father “drink anything that made him act different” or Father
“act unlike himself.” The social worker noted a “very tiny
scratch” on J.M.’s face. J.M. could not recall where it was from
but thought it happened at school. J.M. denied that Father ever
drove fast or played loud music in the car. She said they
sometimes walked to school.
       A social worker interviewed the principal for a third time.
The principal reiterated that he had had problems with Father’s
attitude, and something seemed “off” about him, but again denied
ever seeing Father mistreat J.M. To the contrary, the principal
said Father treats J.M. “well.” The social worker asked the

                                 7
principal if he had ever seen Father walk J.M. to school, and he
said no, indicating that Father is always in his car “with the
music blasting.”
       Father left a voicemail for the social worker later that day.
As transcribed in the social worker’s report, Father said: “You
went and saw [J.M.] today. I’m like disgusted with this, this is
[the most] disgusting thing I ever heard of and you’re doing it.
Okay, if you want to do it. Just come and hire an attorney.
I can’t take this anymore. You’re going somewhere that’s so
stupid, I’ve never seen embarrassing me in front of my school.
And doing all this so I’m ready to sue you, so let’s it.” (Sic.)
       Father submitted a urinalysis for drug testing on
Thursday, December 2, 2021, at 3:41 p.m. Father tested positive
for alcohol with a level of 71 mg/dL. The lab technician informed
the social worker that this was equivalent to a 0.07 blood alcohol
concentration (BAC), one hundredth below the per se impaired
level for driving under California law. (See Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (b).) Although there is no explicit statement in the record,
the parties do not dispute that Father drove to the testing site.
When confronted with the test results, Father told the social
worker he is “old enough to drink alcohol and . . . does not have
an issue with drinking alcohol. . . . [H]e was not willing to enroll
in any substance abuse program and was not willing to stop
drinking alcohol.”
       On these facts, DCFS obtained an order from the juvenile
court authorizing J.M.’s removal and detention. She was placed
in the home of paternal grandmother.
       DCFS filed this petition with the juvenile court, alleging
one count for failure to protect under section 300, subdivision (b).
The petition alleged: “[Father] has a history of substance abuse

                                 8
and is a current abuser of alcohol, which renders the [F]ather
incapable of providing regular care and supervision of [J.M.]. On
prior occasions, . . . [F]ather was under the influence of alcohol
while [J.M.] was in . . . [F]ather’s care and supervision. On
[December 2, 2021], . . . [F]ather had a positive toxicology screen
for alcohol. [J.M.] is a former dependent of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt,
due to the [F]ather’s substance abuse. The [F]ather’s substance
abuse endangers [J.M.’s] physical health and safety and places
[J.M.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and danger.”
       The juvenile court scheduled a combined adjudication and
dispositional hearing for January 2022. DCFS filed a combined
jurisdictional and dispositional report, detailing further
developments with the family since J.M. was detained. The
social worker again interviewed J.M., who reported that Father
was visiting her at paternal grandmother’s house. She repeated
that she had no “worries or concerns to report about father,” and
that she was “not afraid” of him. That being said, J.M. was
conflicted about whether she preferred to live with paternal
grandmother or with Father. She noted that Father “drinks
‘white wine . . . to make him feel better.’ ” When asked about this
statement, J.M. said she had heard paternal grandmother and
another person say at a court hearing that “[her] dad drinks
white wine.”
       The social worker interviewed paternal grandmother a
second time. She acknowledged Father drinks two glasses of
wine some nights after J.M. goes to sleep but denied he has an
alcohol problem. She also denied that he had an anger
management issue. She explained that he, like all men in his
family, is “loud,” attributing this to their Persian Iranian
heritage. She reported that Father was “really upset” and

                                 9
confused by the DCFS’s intervention with the family. Paternal
grandmother reiterated that Father does not mistreat J.M., and
that Father and J.M. have a loving relationship.
       Finally, the social worker spoke to Father shortly before
the hearing. Father was confrontational and argumentative,
refusing to discuss the sustained allegations in the prior petition
or Father’s positive test for alcohol. The social worker told
Father she was concerned about Father’s sobriety and that
Father should not have been drinking at all given the prior DCFS
case. Father maintained his legal right to drink. He refused
further drug tests, even though the juvenile court ordered
random testing on December 22, 2021. It is apparent from the
social worker’s report that Father was rude and combative as he
called the social worker names and spoke in a baby voice when
the social worker tried to discuss the current allegations.
       At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court sustained the allegations, and found that removal
was warranted by clear and convincing evidence. In stating the
factual basis for sustaining the allegations, the juvenile court
stated: “[F]ather has an anger management issue. [¶] He may
have an alcohol issue. [¶] He clearly has challenges regulating
his emotions. [¶] He has an explosive demeanor. [¶] He is
inappropriate with school officials, parents and the social workers
and neighbors. [¶] He refuses to cooperate. [¶] He refused to
cooperate with [DCFS], which gives the court no insurance that
he would make this child available or cooperate with family
maintenance.” The juvenile court noted: “I think the challenge
in this case is that the [F]ather has not cooperated, which might
be appropriate because he is mad about [DCFS] being involved,
but the fact that this is a petition that is very, very similar to the

                                 10
other petition, in spite of [F]ather having engaged in
programming, the fact that he appears to have a hard time
regulating his emotions, his language and behavior with [DCFS],
his refusing to cooperate with testing, his expressive behavior to
the school, his neighbors, to the social worker, all seem to
indicate that there is a problem. [¶] We might have had more
information that the [F]ather cooperated and we could have
determined this is an alcohol issue. [¶] It could be mental health
because he says he drinks alcohol to make himself feel better.”
       The juvenile court removed J.M. from Father’s custody and
placed her under DCFS supervision. It ordered reunification
services, mental health counseling, a psychological assessment,
anger management, individual counseling, and random drug
testing.
       Father appealed.
                            DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings under
section 300 for substantial evidence. (In re Natalie A. (2015)
243 Cal.App.4th 178, 184.) We will uphold the juvenile court’s
findings “ ‘unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving
all conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable
inferences in support of the judgment, we determine there is no
substantial evidence to support the findings.’ ” (In re J.N. (2010)
181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1022.) “ ‘ “We do not reweigh the evidence
or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there
are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court.” ’ ”
(In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
       We review the juvenile court’s dispositional findings and
order for substantial evidence, keeping in mind the heightened

                                 11
requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence. (In re V.L.
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 147, 154–155.) We must determine
“whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly
probable that the fact was true.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020)
9 Cal.5th 989, 995–996.)
II.    DCFS failed to meet its burden to show a nexus
       between Father’s conduct and any risk of harm to
       J.M.
       Section 300, subdivision (b)(1), subjects a child to juvenile
court jurisdiction if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the
child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child” or “[t]he inability of the parent or guardian to provide
regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental
illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(1)(A) & (D).)
       “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1), requires DCFS to demonstrate the following three
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful
conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and
(3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of
serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) Section 300 requires proof the child is
subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing. (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767, 775.) However,
the “ ‘ “court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or
injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to
protect the child.” ’ ” (In re S.R. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 204, 219.)

                                    12
       Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current
conditions, and may assist DCFS in meeting this burden. (In re
D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.) Nonetheless, DCFS
must still establish a nexus between the parent’s past conduct
and the current risk of harm. (See In re Roger S. (2018)
31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583). “To establish a defined risk of harm at
the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere
speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.’ ” (In re
D.L., at p. 1146.)
       Here, the juvenile court found Father had “an anger
management issue” and “may have an alcohol issue,” creating a
substantial risk to J.M.’s safety, protection, and emotional well-
being. Father contends that substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that he abuses alcohol or that
there was a current substantial risk that J.M. would suffer
serious physical harm or illness as defined by section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). We find this latter argument persuasive.
       As an initial matter, DCFS has not established a sufficient
nexus between Father’s purported anger management issue and
any harm or risk of harm to J.M. J.M. felt safe with Father and
told social workers that Father punished her appropriately.
While the school principal expressed concerns about Father’s
attitude towards him and other parents, he described J.M. as
easygoing, well-adjusted, and happy. The principal never
observed any concerning behavior with respect to Father towards
J.M. and reported that Father treats J.M. “well.” While some of
the family’s neighbors heard yelling coming from the family’s
apartment, they had never seen or heard anything that indicated
J.M. was subject to abuse or neglect.

                                13
       Next, even if we assume substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s finding that Father is a current abuser of alcohol,
there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that
Father’s conduct has resulted in an inability to provide regular
care to J.M. or that his behavior has caused J.M. substantial
harm or placed her at risk of suffering substantial harm.
       Our case law dictates that drug use or substance abuse,
without more, is an insufficient basis to assert dependency
jurisdiction . (In re L.W., supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 359; see
also In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 769 [drug use
without evidence that use has caused or will cause physical harm
is insufficient to support jurisdiction]; In re Rebecca C. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 720, 728 (Rebecca C.) [substance abuse without
more is insufficient to support jurisdiction].)
       Rebecca C. is instructive. (Rebecca C., supra, 228
Cal.App.4th 720.) After receiving a welfare referral that parents
were abusing drugs in the home, DCFS investigated the referral
and found that mother had a long history of drug abuse and was
a current abuser of drugs. (Id. at pp. 722–724.) Mother reported
that she had been using drugs since she was a teenager, and
tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and
marijuana on the day DCFS responded to the referral. (Ibid.)
However, with respect to the child, DCFS was only able to
conclude that she performed poorly at school but was otherwise
healthy and cared for. (Ibid.) The juvenile court sustained the
allegations that mother’s substance abuse endangered the child’s
physical health and safety, and placed the child at risk of
physical harm and damage. (Id. at p. 724.)
       The appellate court found that, while substantial evidence
supported a finding that mother was a current substance abuser,

                                 14
it reversed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders because
DCFS failed to meet its burden to show that mother’s substance
abuse had caused or was causing a substantial risk of harm to
the child. (Rebecca C., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 727.) It
rejected DCFS’s argument that a child is placed at risk when a
parent uses methamphetamine, amphetamine and marijuana
because those substances were “well recognized to be substances
which cause hallucinogenic or stimulant-driven behavior.” (Id. at
pp. 727–728.) The court reasoned that accepting DCFS’s
argument would mean that physical harm to a child is presumed
when a parent is a substance abuser. (Id. at p. 728.) The court
noted that this would essentially shift the burden to the parent to
prove a negative, which “is not what the dependency law
provides.” (Ibid.; see also In re Destiny S. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th
999, 1004–1005 [mother’s marijuana use, without more, was
insufficient to assert jurisdiction]; In re David M. (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 822, 830 [same]; In re L.C. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
646, 654 [father’s methamphetamine use, without more, was
insufficient to support jurisdiction].)
       Here, there is less evidence than in Rebecca C. and other
cases that held that a parent’s substance abuse without any
accompanying harm or risk of harm to the child is insufficient to
assert jurisdiction. When DCFS first contacted Father during an
unannounced visit, the social worker found that the family home
was clean and tidy, adequately furnished, stocked with sufficient
food, contained age-appropriate toys, and the utilities were in
working order. There was no indication of alcohol abuse or that
Father was exposing J.M. to his purported alcohol abuse.
Moreover, by all accounts, J.M. and Father had a good
relationship and there was no evidence that Father was failing to

                                15
adequately supervise or protect her or provide regular care.
J.M.’s pediatrician reported that J.M. was current on her
physicals and vaccinations, and had no concerns of abuse or
neglect.
      While J.M.’s school principal expressed concerns about
Father’s attitude, he was unable to describe any examples of
abuse or neglect and reported that Father was appropriate with
J.M. Indeed, the principal’s primary complaint about Father was
his conduct in the valet line when he was picking up J.M. from
school. Specifically, the principal was concerned because other
parents had complained that Father drove erratically, played
loud music, and made other parents feel uncomfortable.
      Likewise, two of the family’s neighbors observed that
Father had a good relationship with J.M. and had never seen any
signs of abuse. With respect to those neighbors who were
concerned about loud noises and yelling coming from the family’s
apartment, there was no evidence that Father’s disruptive
conduct was harming or creating a substantial risk of harm to
J.M.
      The dissent reasons that the neighbor who called law
enforcement, claiming to have heard J.M. telling Father to “stop
touching her underwear,” which led to the DCFS referral,
supports the juvenile court’s finding that J.M. was at a
substantial risk of harm. However, no other witness corroborated
that statement, and there was no evidence of sexual abuse that
would support an inference that the statement was accurate.
Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that it was reasonable to
assume that the neighbor misheard the statement through the
wall, and DCFS made no allegations of sexual abuse in any
event.

                              16
       DCFS argues that the jurisdiction and removal were
appropriate here because the record shows that Father lied about
the extent of his alcohol use, drank a few glasses of wine nightly
while J.M. was asleep but still in his care, and drove a vehicle
during the afternoon with a 0.07 BAC. Given these facts, and
Father’s prior history of alcohol abuse, DCFS argues that it is
reasonable to assume that Father could not refrain from drinking
alcohol during the day. While the fact that Father was not
forthcoming about his alcohol use and his positive test are
concerning, DCFS has not pointed to any evidence in the record
that Father’s alcohol use was harming or creating a substantial
risk of harm to J.M.
       DCFS appears to argue that Father’s positive test for
alcohol on a Thursday afternoon supports an inference that
Father may have driven drunk with J.M. in the car because he
dropped J.M. off with paternal grandmother just 40 minutes
before he submitted a urine sample, which showed a 0.07 BAC.
This inference assumes too much. First, it is undisputed that
Father was under the legal limit when he tested. Thus, there is
no evidence that Father was under the influence per se. (See
Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) Nor was there evidence that
Father was driving unsafely when he drove to the testing site or
earlier in the day when he drove J.M. to paternal grandmother’s
home. While it is unlawful for an individual to operate a vehicle
under the influence regardless of their blood alcohol
concentration, there was no evidence that Father was driving
unsafely before his test such that it can be inferred that he was
under the influence when he drove with J.M. earlier that day or
when he drove to the test. Second, we do not agree with the
dissent’s assumption that Father must have been driving above

                               17
the legal limit. While Father’s positive urine sample certainly
reflects that he drank alcohol, it is not necessarily reflective of
when Father drank. The only alcohol test here is below the legal
limit, and without further context, we cannot assume that he
drove above the legal limit just before his test.
       On the record before us, it appears that Father’s only issues
were that he was loud, obnoxious, disturbed his neighbors and
other parents at J.M.’s school, and then tested below the legal
limit for alcohol. None of these issues harmed J.M. or placed her
at a substantial risk of harm and were thus insufficient for
asserting jurisdiction.
       Because we find that the juvenile court erred in asserting
jurisdiction over J.M., Father’s challenges to the dispositional
orders are moot. (See In re Destiny S., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1005.)

                         DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders
are reversed.

                              VIRAMONTES, J.

      I CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                                18
B317841
In re J.M.; Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services v. H.M.
GRIMES, J., Dissenting.

       I respectfully dissent.
       I disagree with the majority that the evidence supporting
jurisdiction was insubstantial. In my view, substantial evidence
supports the conclusion that father H.M. abuses alcohol and that
his abuse puts his daughter J.M. at risk of physical harm. Our
responsibility on review of a jurisdictional order is to determine if
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports
the findings. (In re Natalie A. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 178, 184.)
We must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
juvenile court’s order, drawing every reasonable inference and
resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (In re
Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) I think the majority
disregards this fundamental principle and, instead, reweighs the
evidence; in some cases, disregarding substantial evidence
favorable to the juvenile court’s order.
       As to alcohol abuse, we have recognized that a parent’s
dishonesty about substance use is sufficient to support the
inference the parent is hiding substance abuse. (See In re K.B.
(2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 593, 601 [“The juvenile court was entitled
to conclude the mother had been transparently dissembling about
her drug use. A reasonable inference was the mother was trying
to hide her ongoing addiction. The trial court was entitled to
draw this reasonable inference.”].)
       Here, father repeatedly lied about his alcohol use. He
initially told the Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (Department) he “does not drink alcohol.” This
proved not to be true when later he admitted “he drinks a few
glasses of wine nightly.” But even this concession did not reveal
the whole story. When he underwent testing for drugs and
alcohol at 3:41 p.m. on a Thursday, he had the equivalent to a
0.07 percent blood-alcohol level. Whether father had residual
alcohol in his system from the night before or had been drinking
the day of his test, neither is consistent with his claim of drinking
just a few glasses of wine at night. Moreover, father refused
further testing and refused to stop drinking alcohol.
       On the afternoon that father tested positive for alcohol, he
had dropped J.M. off at paternal grandmother’s house about
40 minutes earlier. Father refused to explain his positive alcohol
test except to say he was “old enough to drink.” From the record,
the juvenile court was entitled to presume that father drove J.M.
to paternal grandmother’s house after drinking and then drove to
the testing center. It was further entitled to presume from his
0.07 percent blood-alcohol level test at 3:41 p.m. that it was
higher, and that he was under the influence when he drove J.M.
approximately 40 minutes earlier. Reports of erratic driving at
J.M.’s school and father’s irascibility in the school pickup line
that led the principal to question whether father was “on
something” further support the inference that father drives under
the influence.
       Father also has a history of DUI’s and other driving, drug,
and alcohol offenses. Father observes that his most recent
criminal conviction was in 2005—long before J.M. was born.
That father has not been more recently charged with or convicted
of DUI does not negate the substantial evidence supporting the

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inference that he drove under the influence on the day of his drug
test during the Department’s investigation.
       Finally, I must specifically disagree with the majority’s
contention that, “[w]ith respect to those neighbors who were
concerned about loud noises and yelling coming from the family’s
apartment, there was no evidence that Father’s disruptive
conduct was harming or creating a substantial risk of harm to
J.M.” The majority simply ignores that one neighbor reported
hearing J.M. telling father to “stop touching her and . . . her
underwear” and asking father, “[w]hy [are you] doing this?” And
it ignores a firsthand law enforcement account from the prior
case that Father’s yelling was connected to his drinking and
frightened the child. As the majority recites in its background
section, “[p]olice were called to the family apartment [when J.M.
was four years old] following a neighbor’s report that Father was
inside yelling and screaming, which included a statement that he
was going to ‘kill.’ When police arrived, they heard Father
‘ranting and screaming’ and ‘making strange noises.’ Father
initially denied that he had been ranting and screaming, and
claimed that he had been asleep. However, when the officers told
him that they heard him making noises from outside the
apartment, Father ‘began laughing and joking.’ The officers
entered the apartment and found multiple open beer cans while
J.M. was sitting on her bed, clutching a blanket, and ‘ “scared out
of her mind.” ’ ”
       It would not be unreasonable to infer the underwear
comment was unreliable—a neighbor mishearing things through
a wall. It would not be unreasonable to infer that J.M. was
“ ‘scared out of her mind’ ” when her intoxicated father yelled not
because he was ranting about killing but because of the presence

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of law enforcement in her bedroom late at night. But the
standard of review requires that we draw inferences from the
evidence that support the juvenile court’s judgment, however
much we might disagree with it, and conclude that father’s
alcohol use caused him to engage in behavior that endangered
J.M.

                          GRIMES, J.

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