Court Opinion

ID: 9401093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-10 00:01:14.809345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:50.590921
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50118        Document: 00516781797             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                FILED
                                                                              June 9, 2023
                                       No. 21-50118                         Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Saul Baez-Adriano,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:20-CR-77-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Engelhardt, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Baez-Adriano challenges the district court’s imposition of conditions
   of supervised release. For the reasons set forth below, the district court
   satisfied the oral-pronouncement requirement and its written judgment did
   not conflict with the oral pronouncement. We therefore AFFIRM.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-50118         Document: 00516781797              Page: 2       Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                          No. 21-50118

                                                I.
           Baez-Adriano pleaded guilty to drug offenses and assaulting or
   impeding U.S. Border Patrol agents. The district court sentenced him within
   the guidelines range to a total of 46 months of imprisonment, three years of
   supervised release, and a $225 special assessment. Although Baez-Adriano’s
   presentence report (“PSR”) listed no conditions of supervised release, the
   district court, at sentencing, specifically imposed “[t]he standard and
   mandatory conditions of supervision … includ[ing] the conditions that the
   defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the
   term of supervision.”1 Baez-Adriano made no objection to the impositions
   of the “standard and mandatory” conditions. Nor did he seek clarification
   or recitation of the specifics of those conditions. In addition to the standard
   and mandatory conditions, the court pronounced the following two
   discretionary, or special, conditions:
           [1] And if the defendant is excluded, deported, or removed
           upon release, the term of supervision shall be nonreporting. [2]
           The defendant shall not illegally reenter the United States.
           Should the defendant lawfully reenter the United States during
           the term of supervision, the defendant shall immediately report
           to the nearest U.S. Probation office.
   The court’s written judgment included the above-listed special conditions as
   well as the nine mandatory and seventeen standard conditions listed in the
   Western District’s standing order. Baez-Adriano timely appealed.

           _____________________
           1
             These “standard and mandatory conditions” are listed in a court-wide and public
   standing order, amended on November 28, 2016. United States District Court,
   Western District of Texas, Conditions of Probation and
   Supervised Release (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/wp-
   content/uploads/2022/12/Conditions-of-Probation-and-Supervised-Release.pdf.              The
   court referenced, but did not read, the conditions at sentencing. And it did not explain that
   these conditions were from the court’s standing order.

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                                          II.
          Baez-Adriano presents two arguments. First, he contends that the
   court’s imposition of the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the
   court-wide standing order was invalid because the conditions were never
   properly pronounced. Second, he argues that the two special conditions (i.e.,
   those not included in the court’s standing order) in the written judgment are
   more burdensome than, and therefore conflict with, the court’s oral
   pronouncement.
          The parties initially dispute the standard of review.        When “a
   defendant objects to a condition of supervised release for the first time on
   appeal, the standard of review depends on whether he had an opportunity to
   object before the district court.” United States v. Martinez, 47 F.4th 364, 366
   (5th Cir. 2022) (“Alexander Martinez”) (internal quotation marks and
   citations omitted). “The opportunity to object exists – and thus a district
   court satisfies the pronouncement requirement – when the court notifies the
   defendant at sentencing that conditions are being imposed.” Id. at 367
   (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the defendant had the
   opportunity to object, we review for plain error; if the defendant did not, we
   review for abuse of discretion. See id. at 366.
          Regarding Baez-Adriano’s challenge to the pronouncement of the
   standard conditions, our review is for plain error. “A standing order provides
   advance notice of possible conditions …. And the in-court adoption of those
   conditions is when the defendant can object.” United States v. Diggles, 957
   F.3d 551, 561 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc). A court’s “‘shorthand reference’ to
   its ‘standard conditions of supervision’ at sentencing ‘[i]s adoption all the
   same.’” United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526, 528 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting
   United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2020)). For the reasons
   explained below, the Western District’s court-wide standing order and the

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   court’s oral, shorthand reference to “standard and mandatory conditions of
   supervision” gave Baez-Adriano advance notice of the possible conditions.
   See Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352 (citation omitted). Because Baez-Adriano did
   not object when the district court pronounced that it was imposing the
   standard and mandatory conditions, Baez-Adriano forfeited his objection.
   See United States v. Martinez, 15 F.4th 1179, 1181 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Joshua
   Martinez”) (“Because the court told Martinez it was imposing ‘standard
   conditions,’ he had notice and an opportunity to object (or, at a minimum, to
   ask for more specificity about the conditions).”). So, Baez-Adriano must
   show “an obvious error that impacted his substantial rights and seriously
   affected the fairness, integrity, or reputation of judicial proceedings.”
   Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559 (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135
   (2009)). This plain-error-review standard “is ‘difficult’ to overcome.” Id.
   (citing Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).
          Regarding Baez-Adriano’s challenge that a conflict exists between the
   oral pronouncement and written judgment as to the two discretionary, or
   special, conditions, we apply a different standard of review. This challenge
   is raised for the first time on appeal “for the simple reason that [Baez-
   Adriano] had no opportunity at sentencing to consider, comment on, or
   object to the special conditions later included in the written judgment.”
   United States v. Bigelow, 462 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 2006). So, because the
   alleged error appears for the first time in the written judgment, such that
   Baez-Adriano did not have the opportunity to object in the district court, we
   review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Tanner, 984 F.3d 454, 455-56
   (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Bigelow, 462 F.3d at 381).
                                            III.
          We begin with the court’s imposition of the conditions listed in the
   standing order. The district court must orally pronounce a sentence to

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   respect the defendant’s right to be present for sentencing. Diggles, 957 F.3d
   at 556 (citations omitted). Conditions of supervised release are part of a
   defendant’s sentence and must be pronounced unless their imposition is
   required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). See id. at 556-59. “[O]ral pronouncement
   does not mean that the sentencing court must recite the conditions word-for-
   word.” Grogan, 977 F.3d at 352. To satisfy the pronouncement requirement,
   the district court may, among other things, reference a list of recommended
   supervised release conditions from a court-wide or judge-specific standing
   order. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 560-63 & n.5.
          So, “[o]ral in-court adoption of a written list of proposed conditions
   provides the necessary notice.” Id. at 560. However, “the mere existence
   of such a document is not enough for pronouncement.” Alexander Martinez,
   47 F.4th at 367 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Rather, the
   court “must orally adopt that list of conditions within the document when
   the defendant is in court and can object.” Id. And it must ensure that the
   defendant had a chance to read and review that list with counsel. Diggles, 957
   F.3d at 560-63 & n.5 (citations omitted). “If the in-court pronouncement
   differs from the judgment that later issues, what the judge said at sentencing
   controls.” Id. at 557.
          Post-Diggles, our jurisprudence has devolved into only requiring the
   court make a “shorthand reference” to standard conditions of supervision
   found in a court-wide standing order and later imposed in the written
   judgment. See, e.g., Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528. In Vargas, we affirmed a court’s
   imposition of the standard conditions listed in a court-wide standing order
   where the court merely stated that “the Court’s mandatory, standard, and
   special conditions” would be imposed. Vargas, 23 F.4th at 527. There, the
   district court “confirmed with Vargas that he and his counsel had reviewed
   the presentence report (PSR), which had recommended ‘the mandatory and
   standard conditions of supervision.’” Id. at 527. But it never expressly

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   adopted the PSR. Id. at 528. Then, “[t]he district judge went on to explain
   to Vargas that ‘supervised release will be for a period of four years under the
   Court’s mandatory, standard, and the special conditions’ to be ‘outlined
   momentarily,’ but did not expressly cite the Western District [of Texas]’s
   standing order.” Id. (original alterations omitted). We affirmed on the
   grounds that, “it should have been clear to defense counsel in this case that
   the ‘standard’ conditions of supervised release mentioned by the sentencing
   judge were the same standard conditions referenced in Vargas’s PSR and set
   forth in the Western District’s standing order.” Id.
            In doing so, we relied on our observations in Joshua Martinez for the
   proposition that the coupling of the oral reference to “standard conditions”
   and the existence of the Western District of Texas’s standing order satisfied
   the court’s pronouncement requirement. See Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528 (stating
   that the “key observations” were the court’s reference to the standard
   conditions and the standing order) (citing Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1181).
   In Joshua Martinez, we concluded that the defendant had “in-court notice of
   the conditions being imposed and ample opportunity to object” when the
   district court: (1) adopted the PSR, which recommended standard
   conditions;2 and (2) “announced it would impose ‘standard’ conditions.”
   Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1181. “Given the longstanding existence of the
   Western District’s standing order,” we reasoned that “defense counsel
   certainly knew that the standard conditions being imposed were the ones
   listed in the standing order and included in the judgment form created by the
   Administrative Office of the United States Courts.” Id. (citation omitted).
   From this, we derived the rule in Vargas: that oral reference to “standard
   conditions” where there exists a standing order imposing said conditions is
            _____________________
            2
                The PSR, however, did not cite to or append the Western District’s standing
   order.

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                                          No. 21-50118

   sufficient. Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528.3           It mattered not that Vargas’s PSR
   referenced standard and mandatory conditions. Id. Vargas’s constitutional
   rights were not violated because the court referred generally to “standard
   conditions” and had a standing order in place. Cf. United States v. Aguilar-
   Cerda, 27 F.4th 1093, 1095 (5th Cir. 2022) (observing that parties agreed the
   district court did not plainly err because its pronouncement that “Defendant
   shall comply with the standard conditions contained in this judgment”
   sufficiently referenced the court’s standing order).
           The Vargas court was right to conclude that satisfaction of the
   pronouncement requirement centers on the court’s oral reference to and
   imposition of the standing order, not the contents of the PSR. Absent an oral
   reference by the court to “standard and mandatory” conditions while
   imposing the sentence, we vacate the judgment and remand the case if only
   the written judgment imposed the standard and mandatory conditions listed
   in the court’s standing order. While it is always helpful if the PSR sets forth
   suggested conditions for supervised release, including the standard and
   mandatory conditions, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls,

           _____________________
           3
            See also United States v. Carrasco, 2022 WL 16657170, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022)
   (Western District of Texas) (affirming, under plain-error review, district court’s judgment
   where PSR recommended “the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision adopted
   by the Court,” confirmed that the defendant and counsel reviewed the PSR, adopted the
   PSR, and imposed “the standard and mandatory conditions of supervision); United States
   v. Timpson, 2022 WL 4103256, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 7, 2022) (Western District of Texas)
   (affirming, under plain-error review, district-court judgment where PSR recommended
   “the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision adopted by the Court,” the court
   adopted the PSR, and the court stated that it was imposing the “standard and mandatory
   conditions of supervision”); United States v. Rodriguez, 830 F. App’x 445 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (Western District of Texas) (concluding that the court appropriately referenced a court-
   wide standing order when, according to the transcript, court merely stated “[t]he standard
   and mandatory conditions of supervision are imposed”).

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   whether or not the PSR makes reference to the standard conditions listed in
   the court’s standing order.
          Take, for example, the situation where the PSR refers to the standard
   and mandatory conditions and the court adopts the PSR, yet the court fails
   to orally refer to the mandatory conditions at sentencing. In United States v.
   Chavez, the PSR proposed “the mandatory and standard conditions of
   supervision adopted by the Court.” 2022 WL 767033, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar.
   14, 2022). It, however, “did not specifically identify the standing order or
   include an appendix listing the challenged conditions.” Id. At sentencing,
   the court adopted the PSR without objection after confirming that Chavez
   had reviewed it. Id. According to the transcript, the district court never
   referred to the standing order or confirmed that Chavez had reviewed it with
   his counsel. Id. In fact, the transcript reflects that the court neglected to
   refer to any conditions of supervised release at all – let alone those imposed
   by the standing order.         Unconvinced that the court satisfied the
   pronouncement requirement, we vacated the judgment and remanded the
   case. Id. at *4-*5.
          Next, take the situation where the PSR refers to the standard and
   mandatory conditions, but the court both fails to adopt the PSR and neglects
   to orally refer to the mandatory and standard conditions at sentencing. Same
   result. In Garcia-Marcelo, the PSR recommended imposing “the mandatory
   and standard conditions adopted by the Court.” Garcia-Marcelo, 2022 WL
   3684613, at *1, *3. But, at sentencing, the district did not adopt the PSR.
   And it failed to make any oral reference to “standard” or “mandatory”
   conditions generally, or to the standing order, id. at *3; see also United States
   v. Griffin, 2022 WL 17175592, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022) (vacating written
   judgment and remanding case where district court made no oral reference to
   standard conditions of supervised release and failed to adopt the PSR, which
   recommended the conditions). Finding that the defendant did not have fair

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   notice that the court was imposing the conditions listed in the standing order
   and that the court’s imposition of said conditions was an abuse of discretion,
   we vacated the judgment and remanded the case. See Garcia-Marcelo, 2022
   WL 3684613, at *3, *5.
          We reached the same result in United States v. Jackson. 2022 WL
   738668 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 2022). There, the PSR had a “generic reference”
   to “the mandatory and standard conditions of supervision adopted by the
   [district c]ourt,” but neither listed the mandatory conditions nor expressly
   referred to or attached the Western District’s standing order. Id. at *2
   (alteration in original). At sentencing, the court failed to adopt the PSR. Id.
   And, according to the sentencing transcript, it neglected to orally refer to any
   “standard” or “mandatory” conditions. Again, we found that the defendant
   did not have adequate notice that the conditions listed in the court’s standing
   order were being imposed and, accordingly, vacated the judgment and
   remanded the case.
          Finally, take the situation where the PSR does not refer to the standard
   and mandatory conditions and the court, while adopting the PSR, does not
   orally reference the conditions. Again, same result. In United States v. Paz-
   Mejia, the district court adopted the PSR, “but the PSR did not include an
   appendix, reference the standing order, or set forth any standard conditions
   of supervised release.” 2022 WL 1165645, at *1 (5th Cir. Apr. 20, 2022). At
   sentencing, the district court failed to: (1) “mention that Paz-Mejia would be
   subject to any ‘standard’ conditions of supervised release”; (2) reference the
   court’s standing order; or (3) confirm that Paz-Mejia reviewed that order
   with counsel. Id. (emphasis added). Upon reviewing the defendant’s
   challenge to the court’s imposition of standard conditions in the written
   judgment, we vacated the sentence and remanded the case to excise those
   conditions that conflicted with (and went beyond) the oral pronouncement.
   Id. at *1-*2.

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           Accordingly, when the court imposes standard conditions of
   supervised release sourced from a standing order, the PSR’s inclusion or
   exclusion of said conditions is irrelevant.4 It is the court’s reference to and
   oral imposition of the court-wide standard conditions that is dispositive. See
   Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528. Put differently, if the conditions imposed in the
   written judgment match those in the standing order, a district court need only
   orally reference the standard conditions to satisfy the pronouncement
   requirement. In that instance, a simple reference to “standard conditions”
   is sufficient. See id.
           One caveat: the conditions in the written judgment must mirror those
   in the court-wide order imposing conditions of supervised release. In
   Alexander Martinez, we vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded
   the case for amendment of the written judgment by removing the
   unpronounced standard conditions. Alexander Martinez, 47 F.4th at 368. At
   sentencing, “the district court affirmatively stated that it was requiring
   Martinez to ‘comply with the standard conditions that will be set forth in the
   judgment of conviction and sentence.’” Id. at 367. But we said that it was
   “unclear” “what the district court meant by ‘the standard conditions,’”
   even though the court’s website that included a page titled “Standard
   Conditions of Probation or Supervised Release (AO 245B (9/19)).”5 Id.
   Importantly, the conditions imposed in the written judgment did not track
   the online conditions verbatim – but there was substantial overlap. Id. To
   vacate and remand the judgment was necessary, we concluded, because “the

           _____________________
           4
            It is always helpful for the Probation Office to explicitly include all proposed
   supervised-release conditions, both in full in the body of the PSR and with a copy attached
   to the PSR. And, of course, the court should verify on the record that counsel and the
   defendant have reviewed and understand these conditions.
           5
               It is unclear for how long the website provided these specific conditions.

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   district court erred in failing to clarify ‘the standard conditions’ to which it
   referred at the sentencing hearing or to expressly locate, identify, and adopt
   by reference a specific written list of conditions.” Id.
          In sum, it is imperative for the district court to reference the applicable
   standing order’s “standard and mandatory” conditions of supervised
   release, lest the imposition of said conditions in the written judgment conflict
   with the oral pronouncement. And here, the district court did just that. Like
   the court in Vargas, the court here stated that “[t]he standard and mandatory
   conditions of supervision are imposed.” This shorthand reference, coupled
   with the “longstanding existence of the Western District’s standing order,”
   Joshua Martinez, 15 F.4th at 1181, was sufficient. That Baez-Adriano’s PSR
   was silent as to the conditions of supervised release is irrelevant. Compare
   Chavez, 2022 WL 767033, at *4-*5, with Jackson, 2022 WL 738668, at *2,
   and Paz-Mejia, 2022 WL 1165645, at *1-*2.
          The court did not commit plain error. Plain-error review involves four
   prongs:
          First, there must be an error or defect – some sort of “deviation
          from a legal rule” – that has not been intentionally relinquished
          or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant.
          Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than
          subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have
          affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the
          ordinary case means he must demonstrate that it “affected the
          outcome of the district court proceedings.” Fourth and finally,
          if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has
          the discretion to remedy the error – discretion which ought to
          be exercised only if the error “‘seriously affects the fairness,
          integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’”

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   Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alterations and citations
   omitted) (emphasis in original). All four prongs must be met. Puckett, 556
   U.S. at 135.
          Likely because Baez-Adriano contends that review is for abuse of
   discretion, and not plain error, he does not brief the four plain-error prongs.
   Importantly, however, “the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that
   the error affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” United States v. Andaverde–Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 523 (5th Cir.
   2013). Even assuming the court made an error, Baez-Adriano has not met his
   burden to persuade us that the error resulted in a serious injustice. That’s
   because if Baez-Adriano could show that the first three prongs were met, we
   would decline to remedy the error. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. “In analyzing
   the fourth prong, we look to the degree of the error and the particular facts of
   the case to determine whether to exercise our discretion.” United States v.
   Prieto, 801 F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Avalos–
   Martinez, 700 F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 2012)) (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          The public would not perceive any grave injustice when: (1) a district
   court orally imposes the conditions listed in a court-wide standing order, and
   two other special conditions that largely mirror those in the written judgment
   conditions, at sentencing; and (2) the defendant forewent his opportunity to
   object to said conditions. Cf. Prieto, 801 F.3d at 554; Henderson v. United
   States, 568 U.S. 266, 279 (2013) (observing, on plain-error review, that failure
   to object weighed against relief). Because Baez-Adriano has not met his
   burden to persuade us that the alleged error resulted in a serious injustice, we
   decline to exercise our discretion to correct the purported error.

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                                              IV.
           Next, we review Baez-Adriano’s challenge to the court’s imposition
   of two special conditions on the grounds that there is a conflict between the
   written judgment and the oral pronouncement. If a term or condition of a
   sentence in the court’s written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence, the
   oral sentence controls. Diggles, 957 F.3d at 557. “The key determination is
   whether the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement and the written
   judgment is a conflict or merely an ambiguity that can be resolved by
   reviewing the rest of the record.” United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 558
   (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935-36
   (5th Cir. 2003)). A conflict exists when the written judgment “broadens the
   restrictions or requirements of supervised release from an oral
   pronouncement.” Id. (citing United States v. Wheeler, 322 F.3d 823, 828 (5th
   Cir. 2003)). “If, however, there is ‘merely an ambiguity’ between oral and
   written sentences, ‘then “[this court] must look to the intent of the
   sentencing court, as evidenced in the record,” to determine the defendant’s
   sentence.’” United States v. Vasquez-Puente, 922 F.3d 700, 703 (5th Cir.
   2019) (quoting United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934, 935 (5th Cir.
   2003)).
           During sentencing, the district court orally pronounced the following
   special conditions of supervised release:
           (1) “[T]he defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local
   crime during the term of supervision.6 And if the defendant is excluded,

           _____________________
           6
             In his briefing, Baez-Adriano contends that the district court’s mandate that “the
   defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime during the term of
   supervision,” is part of this first special condition. Baez-Adriano acknowledges that “[t]he
   condition related to criminal offenses” – i.e., that “the defendant shall not commit another
   federal, state, or local crime during the term of supervision” – “is the same as mandatory

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   deported, or removed upon release, the term of supervision shall be
   nonreporting”; and
          (2) “The defendant shall not illegally reenter the United States.
   Should the defendant lawfully reenter the United States during the term of
   supervision, the defendant shall immediately report to the nearest U.S.
   Probation office.”
   In the written judgment, the district court defined the special conditions as:
          (1) “The defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local
   crime during the term of supervision. If the defendant is excluded, deported,
   or removed upon release, the term of supervision shall be non-reporting”;
   and
          (2) “The defendant shall not illegally reenter the United States. If the
   defendant is released from confinement or not deported or lawfully reenters
   the United Sates during the term of supervised release, the defendant shall
   immediately report in person to the nearest U.S. Probation Office.”
          With respect to the first condition, Baez-Adriano argues, without
   explanation, that “the written version is more burdensome.” Considering
   that the oral pronouncement and the written judgment are identical, we find
   no conflict.
          With respect to the second condition, Baez-Adriano contends that the
   written judgment requires him to report to the nearest U.S. Probation Office
   “not only if Baez lawfully reenters the country but also if he ‘is released from
   confinement or not deported.’” The “additional obligation to immediately
   report to the nearest Probation Office upon ‘release[] from confinement’ or

          _____________________
   condition number 1,” which is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). To the extent he objects
   against its imposition, his objection is futile. See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559.

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   upon ‘not [being] deported’ is more burdensome,” says Baez-Adriano, “and
   thus conflicts with the court’s oral pronouncement of sentence.” Putting
   that observation aside, Baez-Adriano admits that “this condition is
   somewhat consistent with the court’s pronouncement” – and we agree.
            This is merely an ambiguity that can be resolved by looking to the
   intent of the district court. See Mireles, 471 F.3d at 559. It is clear from the
   record that the district court sought to prevent Baez-Adriano’s presence in
   the United States without a duty to immediately report to the nearest U.S.
   Probation Office.         Since the written judgment          effectuates the
   pronouncement’s function, the judgment is not broader than the
   pronounced. See United States v. Rivas-Estrada, 906 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir.
   2018).     The slightly different wordings between the oral and written
   pronouncements are reconcilable and, therefore, inconsequential.           The
   district court did not abuse its discretion.
                                          V.
            Although the district court had the benefit of Diggles at the time of
   Baez-Adriano’s sentencing, its loose procedure is unfortunately not rare. We
   would be remiss if we failed to mention our frustration at the amount of post-
   Diggles cases that ignore Diggles’s dictates. While our jurisprudence reflects
   that the court satisfies its pronouncement requirement when it merely makes
   oral reference to the court’s standard and mandatory conditions detailed in a
   standing order, see Vargas, 23 F.4th at 528, we do not encourage this
   procedure.
            The well-grounded and legally-sound procedure for imposing
   “standard” and “mandatory” conditions of supervised release listed in a
   court’s standing order is:
            1. The probation officer should either include the court’s standing
   order in or append it to the PSR, or preferably both.

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                                           No. 21-50118

          2. Defense counsel must review and explain the conditions in the
   court’s standing order with the defendant before sentencing.
          3. The district court must (a) confirm with the defendant that he or
   she saw the standing order and had the opportunity to review it with defense
   counsel; (b) ask the defendant whether he or she has any questions about the
   conditions listed in the standing order; (c) orally pronounce that it is
   imposing the conditions detailed in a specific standing order; 7 and (d) provide
   the defendant with an opportunity to object.
          Nonetheless, in this case, the district court did not plainly err in
   imposing the standard and mandatory conditions detailed in the court-wide
   standing order and two special conditions. Moreover, that there are the
   slightly different (but reconcilable) wordings between the district court’s oral
   and written pronouncements did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
   Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          7
              The district court must identify the specific standing order.

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Case: 21-50118     Document: 00516781797            Page: 17   Date Filed: 06/09/2023

                                     No. 21-50118

   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
          I take no issue with the way my esteemed colleagues apply our court’s
   precedent in this case. But our precedents are deeply flawed. See United
   States v. Griffin, 2022 WL 17175592, at *4 (5th Cir. 2022) (Oldham, J.,
   dissenting). Amongst our myriad errors, we elevate spoken words over
   written judgments—in direct contravention of legal rules that date back
   centuries. Id. at *6–7. We should reevaluate that approach as an en banc court
   because, as the majority opinion ably illustrates, this is a recurring problem.

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