Court Opinion

ID: 9599169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:15:26.664844+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:44.244866
License: Public Domain

*202Grady, C. J.
(dissenting)—I am in accord with the majority opinion except that part relating to the amount of the award made by the jury. I can also agree that the nature of this case does not permit an exact mathematical computation of damages. However, the statement that if damages are to be substantial, rather than merely nominal, the law must recognize that they lie in the realm of opinion, is too broad. I fear it may be thought we are adopting a rule that the opinion of a jury is without limitation in a case of this kind. I do not believe in the light of the record we can properly meet the claim of excessive damages by just saying we are not prepared to find a verdict of seventy-five hundred dollars is excessive if we have in mind that the damages to be allowed must be compensatory and not punitive.
At the time of the taking of the indecent liberties of which complaint was made, the child was of the age of approximately six and one-half years. She was seven years of age at the time of the trial, but lacked sufficient understanding to take an oath as a witness and did not testify, although under questioning by the trial judge she seemed to understand the difference between truth and falsity. The acts of appellant fell clearly within the term “indecent liberties.” No physical injury to the body of the child was done. The effect upon her of the acts done was to cause her to be unstrung and nervous, to cry easily, to have dreams while sleeping, and an appearance of being afraid of appellant on occasions when she saw him. She had told her mother and others of the acts done by appellant, and the memory of them remained with her at the time of the trial.
• There is nothing in the record to indicate that the child was of sufficient mental maturity to have a sense of shame or humiliation brought about by the acts of appellant. Her reaction seemed to be that of fright. The probability of her fright being overcome by the passage of a comparatively short time, if she is permitted so to do, is much greater than its existence continuing during the years to follow.
It is quite clear to me from a reading of the record and visualizing the reaction of the jurors to all they heard and *203observed during the trial' of the action, that they yielded to natural human impulses and sought to penalize the appellant in a monetary way rather than having carefully and dispassionately considered the question of damages from a strictly compensatory standpoint. This view is fortified when a comparison is made between some awards for serious bodily injury, or those made where the affected person can be said to have suffered humiliation and disgrace, and the award in this case based upon what the record discloses. It is my view that the award made was excessive.
In Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wn. (2d) 894, 246 P. (2d) 853, we made reference to the fact that this court had early committed itself to the view that the doctrine of exemplary or punitive damages was unsound in principle, and that such damages could not be recovered except when explicitly allowed by statute. We also made reference to our cases in which damages have been regarded as excessive, but not necessarily involving passion or prejudice, and to those cases in which damages have been regarded as excessive and as having been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. The latter would include a situation where it was apparent that the feelings of the jurors engendered by the evidence had prompted them to award damages which would be excessive from a compensatory standpoint and were exemplary or punitive in character.
The judgment should be reversed and the cause remanded for the entry of an order granting a new trial on the question of the amount of damages only, unless within a time to be fixed by the court respondent files a written consent that judgment may be entered for the sum of thirty-five hundred dollars.
Don worth, J., concurs with Grady, C. J.
April 14, 1953. Petition for rehearing denied.