Court Opinion

ID: 9649060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:41:23.544762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.323528
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
GRACI, J.:
¶ 1 I am always most reluctant to disagree with my learned colleagues and, to the extent that I am able, I hasten to join them in matters brought before us for disposition. In the present case, I am in full agreement with the majority to the extent it affirms the trial court order of November 21, 2002. I also agree that a remand is necessary in order for the trial court to address what appears to be an oversight in not including in its final order *1099a credit to Husband in the amount of $9,708.65, which represents Wife’s portion of the marital debts as determined by the Master. Accordingly, I readily join the Opinion as it addresses those matters.
¶2 I am unable, however, to join my colleagues in the majority to the extent that they vacate the trial court’s order as it relates to the Stone Harbor property. It is clear to me that the learned trial court gave the master’s report the “fullest consideration” on this as well as all of the matters concerning equitable distribution, which as the majority observes, is obligatory. Opinion, at 1095. While, as the majority observes, the trial court did not explain “why economic justice could not be served under the master’s recommendations” relating to the Stone Harbor property, Opinion, at 1096, I am aware of no authority which requires such an explanation and the majority cites none. On the other hand, it seems, at least, implicit that in rejecting the master’s recommendations in this regard and devising her own distribution scheme, the learned trial court explained why economic justice was being served (although, again, I am not sure that such an explanation is mandated). Given our limited standard of review which the majority recognizes, Opinion, at 1095, I cannot agree that the learned trial court abused her discretion in directing that the Stone Harbor property immediately be sold or that such an abuse was “demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence” as the majority recites that our precedent requires. Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 3 As the trial court explained: “ ‘Although the master’s report is entitled to great weight, that final responsibility for making the [equitable] distribution [of property] rests with the Court.’ Tagnani v. Tagnani, 489 Pa.Super. 596, 600, 654 A.2d 1136 [, 1138] (1995).” Opinion, 11/24/02, at 8. This responsibility is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court which, as noted above, must give due consideration to the master’s recommendations. We review the trial court’s determination for abuse of that sizable discretion.
¶ 4 “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable exercise of judgment.” Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d 1178, 1186 (Pa.Super.2003) (discussing abuse of discretion standard in reviewing equitable distribution scheme). As we have explained,
[a]n abuse of discretion “is synonymous with a failure to exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion. It is a strict legal term indicating that [an] appellate court is of [the] opinion that there was commission of an error of law by the trial court. It does not imply intentional wrong or bad faith, or misconduct, nor any reflection on the judge but means the clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment — one that is clearly against logic and [the] effect of such facts as are presented in support of the application or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts disclosed upon the hearing; an improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law.” Myers v. Myers, 405 Pa.Super. 290, 592 A.2d 339 (1991), citing Commonwealth v. Powell, 527 Pa. 288 n. 8, 590 A.2d 1240 n. 8 (1991), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979).
Berrington v. Berrington, 409 Pa.Super. 355, 598 A.2d 31, 34 (1991). “Where there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order, the judgment is manifestly unreasonable and must be reversed.” Myers v. Myers, 592 A.2d at 341.
¶ 5 In my view, the evidence clearly supports the trial court’s order of equitable distribution in its entirety. The learned trial court exercised her discretion *1100soundly, reasonably, and legally. The order was not clearly against logic. That the master reached a different conclusion amounts to no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Nor does the fact that if we were sitting as the initial decision-makers we may have reached a contrary result. “Our review of the ... court’s distribution is necessarily limited to a determination of whether in light of the entire distribution, considering all the factors set forth by the legislature, an abuse of discretion occurred.” Diament v. Diament, 816 A.2d 256, 263 (Pa.Super.2003) (citation omitted).
¶ 6 Moreover, as the trial court recognized, “[ajlthough the master’s report is entitled to great weight, the final responsibility of making the distribution rests with the court. Our review is thus based on the court’s distribution of property.” McNaughton v. McNaughton, 412 Pa.Super. 409, 603 A.2d 646, 648 (1992) (citations omitted). Requiring a trial court to explain why, in its view, the master’s report did not achieve economic justice smacks of this court reviewing the master’s recommendation rather than the distribution ordered by the trial court.
¶ 7 Here, the trial court considered all of the factors which the legislature has directed in arriving at her equitable distribution scheme. Opinion, 11/24/02, at 26-29. Though I may have reached a different conclusion if I were the one exercising my discretion in the first instance, I cannot say on this record that the learned trial court abused her’s. Accordingly, I would resolve all of those issues which relate to the sale of the Stone Harbor property (including those which the majority did not address because of its resolution of Husband’s first issue) on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
¶ 8 Moreover, I agree with the trial court that Wife waived the claim that she should have been awarded equitable reimbursement. Nevertheless, as the trial court indicated, even if the merits of this issue were to be addressed, Wife would not be afforded any relief, for the proceeds from the sale of the Stone Harbor property are sufficient to compensate Wife for her contribution to the marriage. Accordingly, I would also resolve this issue on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
¶ 9 Based on the foregoing, therefore, I dissent from that portion of the Opinion which vacates the equitable distribution order to the extent that it requires that the Stone Harbor property be sold immediately. I further dissent from the Opinion to the extent that it does not address Wife’s claim that she should have been awarded equitable reimbursement and instructs the trial court to consider that claim upon remand. I would, instead, affirm the order of equitable distribution in its entirety.