Court Opinion

ID: 9372796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:42.015398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.641029
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                         2022 MSPB 3
                               Docket No. SF-0752-15-0702-I-6

                                   Chong U. McClenning,
                                          Appellant,
                                               v.
                                 Department of the Army,
                                            Agency.
                                        March 31, 2022

           David Weiser, Esquire, Austin, Texas, for the appellant.

           Ryan K. Bautz, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, for the agency.

           Brandon Iriye, USAG Daegu, South Korea, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan A. Leavitt, Member

                                   OPINION AND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed her removal.     For the following reasons, we DENY the petition for
     review and AFFIRM the initial decision. We find that the appellant’s argument
     regarding the appointment of the administrative judge, which she raised for the
     first time on petition for review, is not timely raised.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed by the agency as an Information Assurance
     Manager, GS-0301-12, in Daegu, South Korea. McClenning v. Department of the
                                                                                      2

     Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0702-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6
     at 76. In April 2015, the agency proposed the appellant’s removal for conduct
     unbecoming a Federal employee (six specifications), unauthorized possession of
     Government property (one specification), and lack of candor (six specifications).
     Id. at 76-87. The appellant responded to the proposed removal both orally and in
     writing.   Id. at 21, 34-75.   On May 19, 2015, the agency issued a decision
     sustaining all of the charges and specifications against her and removing her
     effective June 18, 2015. Id. at 21-32.
¶3         The appellant timely filed this appeal challenging her removal. IAF, Tab 1.
     She requested a hearing. Id. at 2. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal
     without prejudice five times between August 2015, and May 2017, pending the
     resolution of criminal proceedings in South Korea. McClenning v. Department of
     the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0702-I-5, Appeal File, Tab 4, Initial
     Decision (May 25, 2017).       On June 13, 2018, after holding the appellant’s
     requested hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming
     the appellant’s removal. McClenning v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket
     No. SF-0752-15-0702-I-6, Appeal File (I-6 AF), Tab 52, Initial Decision (I-6 ID).
     The administrative judge found that the agency proved four of the six
     specifications of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee and all six
     specifications of lack of candor, but that it failed to prove either the remaining
     two specifications of conduct unbecoming a Federal employee or the charge of
     unauthorized possession of Government property. I-6 ID at 3-32. He further
     found that the agency established a nexus between the sustained charges and the
     efficiency of the service, id. at 32, and that the appellant failed to prove her
     affirmative defenses of a due process violation, harmful procedural error,
     whistleblower reprisal, or discrimination based on race, national origin, or sex,
     id. at 33-42. Finally, the administrative judge found that the penalty of removal
     was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness for the sustained misconduct.
     Id. at 42-46.
                                                                                            3

¶4         The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision on
     July 15, 2018. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. On petition for review, she
     argues for the first time that the initial decision should be reversed because the
     administrative judge was not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause
     of the U.S. Constitution. 1 Id. at 3. In support of that argument, she cites the
     decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucia v. Securities & Exchange
     Commission, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), which was issued a few days after the initial
     decision in this case.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 3.       As to the merits of the initial
     decision, the appellant resubmits the closing brief she filed before the
     administrative judge. Id. The agency has responded in opposition to the petition
     for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

                                           ANALYSIS
     The appellant did not timely raise her argument regarding the appointment of the
     administrative judge.
           Recent Supreme Court precedent does not preclude the Board from
           applying timeliness and issue exhaustion requirements to Appointments
           Clause claims.
¶5         In Lucia, the Supreme Court held that administrative law judges (ALJs) of
     the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) qualify as Officers of the United
     States subject to the Appointments Clause, rather than as mere employees.
     138 S. Ct. at 2049, 2052-55. Because SEC ALJs were appointed by SEC staff
     members, rather than the Commission itself, the Court held that the appointment
     of those ALJs violated the Appointments Clause.           Id. at 2050-51.    The Court
     further held that because Lucia had made a timely challenge to the constitutional

     1
       Under the Appointments Clause, the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
     Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . .
     but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
     think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
     Departments.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
                                                                                        4

     validity of the appointment of the ALJ who adjudicated his case, he was entitled
     to relief in the form of a new hearing before a different, properly appointed
     official. Id. at 2055. 2
¶6         The Court in Lucia did not specifically define what constitutes a timely
     challenge to an appointment, but it cited Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177,
     182-83 (1995), in this regard. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055. In Ryder, the Court held
     that a challenge concerning the appointment of judges was timely because the
     challenging party raised it “before those very judges and prior to their action on
     his case.” Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182. In so finding, the Court distinguished the facts
     of Ryder from those of three other cases in which the challenges to the judges’
     authority were untimely because they were raised after the judges had decided
     those cases and the complaining parties had not objected to the judges’ authority
     during the proceedings before them. Id. at 180-82.
¶7         Since the Supreme Court issued its Lucia decision, a number of Federal
     courts have considered what constitutes a timely Appointments Clause challenge
     regarding an administrative adjudication. Several courts have held that parties
     forfeit Appointments Clause claims that are not timely and properly raised before
     the adjudicating administrative agency.     For example, courts have rejected as
     untimely claims that were not raised before the Department of Labor’s Benefits
     Review Board, as well as claims that were raised before the Bene fits Review
     Board but that had not been raised in accordance with that entity’s regulations.
     Joseph Forrester Trucking v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation
     Programs, 987 F.3d 581, 587-93 (6th Cir. 2021) (rejecting as untimely an
     Appointments Clause claim that was raised before the Benefits Review Board , but
     not in earlier proceedings before a Department of Labor ALJ, contrary to Benefits

     2
       The holding in Lucia applied only to SEC ALJs and therefore did not address whether
     the Board’s method of appointing administrative judges violated the Appointments
     Clause, and we do not reach that question here.
                                                                                            5

     Review Board regulations); David Stanley Consultants v. Director, Office of
     Workers’ Compensation Programs, 800 F. App’x 123, 127-28 (3d Cir. 2020)
     (nonprecedential) (holding that the employer forfeited its Appointment s Clause
     claim when it failed to raise the claim in its opening brief to the Benefits Review
     Board, which is required by that entity’s regulations); Zumwalt v. National Steel
     & Shipbuilding Company, 796 F. App’x 930, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2019)
     (nonprecedential) (holding that the claimant forfeited his Appointments Clause
     claim when he raised it for the first time in a second reconsideration motion to the
     Benefits Review Board, contrary to the relevant regulations); Energy West Mining
     Company v. Lyle, 929 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 2019) (rejecting as untimely an
     Appointments Clause claim that was not raised before the Benefits Review
     Board); Island Creek Coal Company v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 750-54 (6th Cir.
     2019) (rejecting for failure to exhaust Appointments Clause claims that were
     raised for the first time in motions for reconsideration of decisions of the Benefits
     Review     Board,   contrary   to   its   regulations   and   interpretation   thereof ).
     Multiple courts also have rejected Appointments Clause claims that were not first
     raised before the SEC. Gonnella v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 954 F.3d
     536, 544-46 (2d Cir. 2020); Malouf v. Securities & Exchange Commission,
     933 F.3d 1248, 1255-58 (10th Cir. 2019); Cooper v. Securities & Exchange
     Commission, 788 F. App’x 474, 474-75 (9th Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential).
¶8         Many of the post-Lucia Appointments Clause cases have involved claims
     before the Social Security Administration (SSA). In Carr v. Saul, 141 S. Ct.
     1352 (2021), the Supreme Court resolved a split among the circuits and held that
     claimants are not required to exhaust Appointments Clause claims before SSA to
     preserve them for judicial review.        Id. at 1362. Although Carr is controlling
     precedent for claims arising out of Social Security disability adjudications, we
     find for the reasons set forth below that it does not control in the context of Board
     appeals.
                                                                                        6

¶9          The Court has recognized that the doctrine of administrative remedy
      exhaustion requires parties to first raise an issue before the appropriate
      administrative agency prior to seeking judicial review on that topic. Id. at 1358.
      It noted that, usually, rules of issue exhaustion are governed by statute or
      regulation.    Id. (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107-08 (2000)).
      Further, proper exhaustion of claims before an administrative agency “demands
      compliance with [that] agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules
      because no adjudicative system can function effectively without imposing some
      orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.
      81, 90-91 (2006).

            The Board’s regulations require that issues first be raised before the
            administrative judge before they may be raised with the full Board on
            petition for review.
¶10         The issue in Carr was whether the Federal courts should recognize an issue
      exhaustion requirement in Social Security disability proceedings when none is
      specifically imposed by statute or regulation. Id. at 1358. In the instant matter,
      by contrast, the issue is whether an Appointments Clause claim should be subject
      to the Board’s existing regulations and precedent requiring parties to timely raise
      issues during Board adjudications.     Proceedings before the Board are a key
      element in the “comprehensive system” established by the Civil Service Reform
      Act of 1978 (CSRA) “for reviewing personnel action[s] taken against [F]ederal
      employees.” Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5 (2012) (quoting
      United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 455 (1988)). “The statutory provisions [in
      the CSRA] for appeals to the [B]oard give the [B]oard broad discretion in
      handling appeals and controlling its own docket by requiring that appeals be
      processed in accordance with” its regulations.    Phillips v. U.S. Postal Service,
      695 F.2d 1389, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
¶11         Under the authority granted to it by Congress in the CSRA, see 5 U.S.C.
      § 1204(h), the Board has prescribed regulations governing the proceedings before
                                                                                     7

it. Pursuant to those regulations, the Board generally does not accept arguments
raised after the close of the record before the administrative judge.        5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.59(c).   In addition, the Board generally will not consider an argument
raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based
on new and material evidence not previously available d espite the party’s due
diligence.    Clay v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016);
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Our reviewing court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit), has consistently upheld the Board’s regulatory
requirement that parties must raise arguments before the as signed administrative
judge, or the full Board may properly decline to review those arguments.
E.g., Carson v. Department of Energy, 398 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(finding that the Board properly declined to review a claim that was not
adjudicated by the administrative judge); Bosley v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, 162 F.3d 665, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that a party in a Board
proceeding was required to raise an issue before the administrative judge to
preserve it for court review and that the court would not consider an issue raised
for the first time in a petition for review to the full Board); Meglio v. Merit
Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 1576, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming
the Board’s decision to deny a petition for review when the appellant failed to
raise the salient issue before the administrative judge). As the Federal Circuit
determined:
      the [B]oard has promulgated its regulations in accordance with the
      law and Congress’ desire to streamline and prevent duplicative
      efforts in processing employee complaints. Where petitioner fails to
      frame an issue before the presiding official and belatedly attempts to
      raise that same issue before the full [B]oard, and the [B]oard
      properly denies review of the initial decision, petitioner will not be
      heard for the first time on that issue in the Federal Circuit. 3

3
  Even when the Federal Circuit has exercised its discretion to allow a claim to be
raised for the first time on judicial review after the completion of an administrativ e
                                                                                              8

      Meglio, 758 F.2d at 1577.
¶12         Here, the appellant does not allege that she discovered new and material
      evidence that was previously unavailable. Rather, her argument appears to be
      that she discovered a new legal argument when the Supreme Court decided Lucia.
      In a few cases, the Board has cited intervening legal precedent as good cause for
      an untimely filed petition for review. 4         For example, in Duft v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 33 M.S.P.R. 533 (1987), the Board found good cause for
      an untimely petition for review in light of new decisions from the Supreme Court
      and the Federal Circuit holding that successful appellants in retirement appeals
      could obtain attorney fees.      In denying the appellant’s request for fees, the
      administrative judge had relied upon the prior binding Federal Circuit precedent
      holding that fees were not available in retirement cases. The Board determined
      that the appellant reasonably understood that it would be fruitless and costly for
      him to appeal that ruling at that time. Id. at 535. Thus, because the appellant had
      filed his petition for review shortly after learning of the change in the controlling
      precedent, the Board found good cause for the filing delay. Id.
¶13         In this matter, by contrast, there was no binding precedent regarding the
      appointment of Board administrative judges at the time the record before the

      adjudication, it has nevertheless required that those claims be timely raised in
      accordance with its procedural rules. Compare Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
      941 F.3d 1320, 1326-27 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (considering an Appointments Clause claim
      regarding Administrative Patent Judges of the Patent and Trademark Appeals Board
      (PTAB) even though that claim was not raised before PTAB itself because PTAB had
      not and could not correct the problematic appointments itself ), vacated and remanded
      on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970 (2021),
      with Immunex Corporation v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, 977 F.3d 1212, 1223 n.10
      (Fed. Cir. 2020) (rejecting as untimely an Appointments Clause claim regarding PTAB
      that was raised for the first time in a reply brief filed with the Federal Circuit, rather
      than in the opening brief), cert denied, 141 S. Ct. 2799 (2021).
      4
        Although the good cause standard itself does not apply to arguments presented for the
      first time on petition for review, we find that the relevant standards are sufficiently
      similar that the Board’s precedent regarding good cause is useful to our analysis here.
                                                                                         9

      administrative judge closed in April 2018. I-6 AF, Tab 34 at 12. Therefore, the
      appellant did not have grounds to believe that raising an Appointments Clause
      claim would have been fruitless. See Island Creek Coal Company v. Wilkerson,
      910 F.3d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the argument that Appointments
      Clause challenges lacked merit until the Supreme Court decided Lucia). By the
      time the record closed before the administrative judge in this appeal , one court of
      appeals had already held that SEC ALJs are inferior officers subject to the
      Appointments Clause, Bandimere v. Securities & Exchange Commission,
      844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, 855 F.3d 1128
      (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018), and the Supreme Court had
      granted certiorari to address that issue in Lucia v. Securities & Exchange
      Commission, 138 S. Ct. 736 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2018) (No. 17-130). Thus, we hold
      that the appellant’s purported discovery of a new legal theory is insufficient to
      justify her failure to raise the Appointments Clause argument bef ore the
      administrative judge. See In re DBC, 545 F. 3d 1373, 1377-79 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
      (rejecting a newly discovered Appointments Clause argument raised for the first
      time on judicial review because the party failed to raise it first before the
      administrative board).
¶14        In addition to the general standards for raising new arguments after the
      close of the record, the Board’s regulations impose particular requirements on
      litigants who wish to challenge the qualifications of the individual assigned to
      hear their cases. Specifically, a party seeking to disqualify a judge must file a
      motion to disqualify as soon as the party has reason to believe there is a basis for
      disqualification and, if the administrative judge denies that motion, the party must
      request certification of an interlocutory appeal or the disqualification issue is
      considered waived. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42(b)-(c); see Thomas v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 350 F. App’x 448, 451 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding that the appellant
                                                                                          10

      had waived her request for recusal of the administrative judge by failing to
      comply with the provisions of 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42). 5         In the absence of this
      requirement, a party before a Board administrative judge who believed there was
      a basis for disqualification could wait until after the initial decision was issued
      and then seek disqualification on petition for review if the initial decision was
      unfavorable. Allowing such gamesmanship by parties would waste the Board’s
      resources to the extent that disqualification of an administrative judge after the
      initial decision would result in relitigation of the appeal.        The same policy
      considerations that support the Board’s regulation regarding the procedures for
      raising disqualification claims also support our decision here regarding the
      appellant’s Appointments Clause claim.             As recognized in       Freytag v.
      Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
      concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), the trial phase of a case is
      when the litigants’ arguments first must be raised and considered; permitting an
      Appointments Clause claim to be raised for the fir st time on appeal would
      encourage “sandbagging,” i.e., for strategic reasons, allowing the trial court to
      pursue a certain course only to argue on appeal that it constituted reversible error
      if the outcome of the case was unfavorable.
¶15         We acknowledge that courts have on occasion considered Appointments
      Clause claims even if those claims were not timely raised under normal standards.
      See, e.g., Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878-89 (considering an Appointments Clause
      challenge regarding Special Trial Judges of the Tax Court even though the litigant
      failed to raise that challenge before the Tax Court itself). However, the courts
      have never held that an Appointments Clause challenge must be heard in any case
      regardless of when it is raised; to the contrary, the courts h ave used language

      5
        The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the Federal Circuit when, as here,
      it finds its reasoning persuasive. Morris v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 662,
      ¶ 13 n.9 (2016).
                                                                                         11

      suggesting that consideration of an untimely Appointments Clause claim should
      be done only in “rare cases.”      See id. at 879; In re DBC, 545 F.3d at 1380
      (concluding that the Supreme Court never stated that Appointments Clause
      challenges must be heard regardless of waiver).           Under the circumstances
      presented in this matter, we are not convinced that this qualifies as one of those
      “rare cases.”
¶16         The Board’s regulations reserve to it the authority to consider any issue in
      an appeal before it. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(e). Pursuant to that authority, we may
      exercise our discretion to consider an untimely Appointments Clause claim in an
      appropriate case. However, we find no basis to exercise that discret ion on the
      facts of this case.

             The issue exhaustion requirements set forth in the Board’s regulations are
             justified based on the adversarial nature of its proceedings.
¶17         In declining to require Social Security claimants to exhaust Appointments
      Clause claims before the agency, the Court in Carr noted several characteristics
      about Social Security disability adjudications that make an issue -exhaustion rule
      inappropriate in that context.      First, the Court noted that whereas typical
      administrative review schemes have issue-exhaustion requirements imposed by
      statute or regulation, SSA was asking the Court to impose a judicially-created
      requirement.    Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1358.     The Court held that whether a court
      should impose a requirement of issue exhaustion “depends on the degree to which
      the analogy to normal adversarial litigation applies in a particular administrative
      proceeding.” Id. (quoting Sims, 530 U.S. at 109).
¶18         The Court in Carr relied on the nonadversarial nature of Social Security
      disability adjudications in determining that an issue exhaustion requireme nt was
      inappropriate in that context. It explained that the justification for requiring issue
      exhaustion is greatest when it is expected that the parties will develop the issues
      in an adversarial administrative proceeding, but that the rationale for requiring
      issue exhaustion is much weaker when the administrative proceeding is not
                                                                                        12

      adversarial in nature. Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing Sims, 530 U.S. at 110).
      The Court noted that in proceedings before SSA, the ALJ is responsible for
      developing the factual record and arguments both for and against granting
      benefits, and the Commissioner has no representative before the ALJ opposing
      the benefits claim. Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1359 (citing Sims, 530 U.S. at 111).
¶19         The Board’s regulations establish a procedure that is much more
      adversarial.    The parties are responsible for developing the factual record and
      presenting their evidence and arguments to the administrative judge. Unlike SSA
      disability proceedings, both parties may be represented before the Board.
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.31. Further, the parties each must meet their respective burdens
      of proof in establishing their claims and defenses.      5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.56-.57.
      An appellant initiates a Board proceeding by filing an initial appeal that must
      include a statement of the reasons why the appellant believes the agency action at
      issue is wrong. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.24(a)(4). The agency’s response to the appeal
      must include a statement of the reasons for the action and all documents
      contained in the agency’s record of the action.             5 C.F.R. § 1201.25(b).
      The parties are expected to start and complete discovery with minimal
      intervention from the Board.      5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.71-.75.      The appellant may
      generally raise additional claims or defenses before the end of the conference(s)
      held to define the issues in the case; after that point, the appellant may raise
      additional claims or defenses only upon a showing of good cause.            5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.24(b).    The appellant generally has a right to a hearing at which both
      parties present their cases. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.24(d), 1201.51, 1201.58. Once the
      record in an appeal closes, either after the hearing or , if the appellant waived the
      hearing, on the deadline set by the administrative judge for written submissions,
      the Board will not accept additional evidence or argument unless there is a
      showing that it was not readily available before the record closed or that it is in
      rebuttal to new evidence or argument submitted by the other party just before the
      close of the record. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(a)-(c). A petition for review of an initial
                                                                                         13

      decision must state the party’s objections to the initial decision supported by
      references to applicable laws and regulations and specific references to the
      factual record.    A party submitting new evidence or argument on petition for
      review must explain why such evidence or argument was not presented before the
      close of the record below. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(b).
¶20         The Board’s regulations make clear that, unlike Social Security disability
      proceedings, Board appeals are adversarial in nature. In such circumstances, “the
      rationale for requiring issue exhaustion is at its greatest.”      Carr, 141 S. Ct.
      at 1359 (quoting Sims, 530 U.S. at 110).

            The circumstances of the instant case are otherwise distinguishable from
            those set forth in Carr.
¶21         The Court in Carr noted two additional factors in support of allowing
      Social Security claimants to raise Appointments Clause claims for the first time
      in Federal court. First, the Court noted that “agency adjudications are generally
      ill suited to address structural constitutional challenges, which usually fall outside
      the adjudicators’ area of technical expertise.”        Carr, 141 S. Ct. at 1360.
      Second, the Court recognized a futility exception to exhaustion requirements
      when agency adjudicators would be powerless to grant the relief requested.
      Id. at 1361. The Court specifically highlighted the fact that SSA’s administrative
      review scheme did not afford claimants access to the Commissioner, “the one
      person who could remedy their Appointments Clause challenges.” Id. We find
      that neither of these factors apply to Board proceedings.
¶22         First, consideration of constitutional claims, such as the Appointments
      Clause claim at issue here, is consistent with the Board’s role in adjudicating
      appeals.   The comprehensive system under the CSRA applies to constitutional
      claims, whether facial or as-applied. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 12-23. Thus, parties are
      required to bring even their facial constitutional challenges to the Board, despite
      the fact that the Board “has repeatedly refused to pass u pon the constitutionality
      of legislation.”     See id. at 16 (citing Malone v. Department of Justice,
                                                                                          14

      14 M.S.P.R. 403 (1983)). A party’s failure to raise a constitutional claim before
      the Board generally precludes the party from raising that claim for the first time
      when seeking judicial review of the Board’s decision. See Hansen v. Department
      of Homeland Security, 911 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (declining to address
      a Fourth Amendment claim not raised before the Board). The requirement that a
      party exhaust his administrative remedies by first raising a constitutional claim
      during an administrative agency’s proceeding before raising it i n court has two
      main purposes: (1) to provide the administrative agency with the opportunity to
      correct its own errors regarding the programs it administers before being brought
      into Federal court, and thereby “discourage[] disregard of the agency’s
      procedures”; and (2) to promote judicial efficiency because claims typically are
      resolved faster and more economically during administrative agency proceedings
      than they are in Federal court litigation. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89-90. Thus, the
      “unnecessary expenditure of the administrative resources of the original Board
      panel, the judicial resources of th[e] court, and the substantial delay and costs
      incurred” in the litigation may be avoided. In re DBC, 545 F. 3d at 1378-79. 6
      As explained previously, for similar reasons, the Board’s regula tions provide that
      all issues must first be raised before the administrative judge before the full
      Board will consider them.     5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.59(c), 1201.115(d); see Freytag,
      501 U.S. at 895 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgement).
¶23        Additionally, it would not have been futile for the appellant to timely raise
      an Appointments Clause claim before the administrative judge. Had the appellant
      raised the Appointments Clause issue to the administrative judge before the close
      of the record, the administrative judge could have certified the question for

      6
        Our reviewing court has recognized the value in having the Board address a
      constitutional claim before the court considers it. See, e.g., Helman v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 856 F.3d 920, 936 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding that whether the
      Board’s administrative judges are inferior officers for purposes of the Appointments
      Clause is “more appropriately dealt with by the [Board] in the first instance”).
                                                                                           15

      interlocutory appeal to the Board.       See 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.42(b)-(c), 1201.91.
      The interlocutory appeal process permits the Board members, who are appointed
      by the President and confirmed by the Senate, 5 U.S.C. § 1201, to address an
      issue while an appeal is still pending before an administrative judge. 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.91.   Thus, the interlocutory appeal process permits a party raising an
      Appointments Clause claim to present that claim to the Board’s principal officers.
¶24         Indeed, by the time the record closed before the administrative judge in this
      appeal, another litigant before the Board had raised an Appointments Clause
      claim before the administrative judge in his appeal.             Flynn v. Securities
      & Exchange Commission, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-14-1124-M-1, Motion to
      Vacate (Feb. 14, 2018). After initially dismissing the appeal without prejudice,
      the administrative judge issued an order in April 2019, certifying the
      Appointments Clause issue for interlocutory appeal.              Flynn v. Securities
      & Exchange Commission, MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-14-1124-M-4, Order and
      Certification for Interlocutory Appeal (Apr. 23, 2019). 7 Thus, there is reason to
      believe that, if the appellant here had timely raised her Appointments Clause
      claim before the close of the record before the administrative judge, the
      administrative judge issue would have certified the issue for interlocutory a ppeal

      7
         Another appellant before the Board raised an Appointments Clause claim in
      two separate initial appeals filed shortly after the initial decision was issued in this
      appeal.     Jolley v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, MSPB
      Docket No. AT-4324-18-0576-I-1, Initial Appeal (June 25, 2018), MSPB Docket No.
      AT-4324-19-0041-I-1, Initial Appeal (Oct. 15, 2018). The administrative judge also
      certified the Appointments Clause issue for interlocutory appeal in both of those
      matters. Jolley v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, MSPB Docket Nos.
      AT-4324-18-0576-I-2 & AT-4324-19-0041-I-1, Order and Certification for
      Interlocutory Appeal (Apr. 23, 2019). Parties that have timely raised the Appointments
      Clause issue in other appeals have generally had their appeals dismissed without
      prejudice to refiling once the Board decides the interlocutory appeals or oth erwise
      addresses the Appointments Clause issue. See, e.g., Alvarez v. Department of Health
      & Human Services, MSPB Docket No. DC-0432-19-0122-I-4, Initial Decision
      (June 23, 2021).
                                                                                           16

      and the Board would have had an opportunity to address the administrative
      judge’s appointment before he issued an initial decision on the merits of the
      appeal.
¶25         For the foregoing reasons, the instant appeal is dissimilar to Carr.
      Because the appellant failed to comply with the Board’s regulations by first
      raising the Appointments Clause issue before the administrative judge, we will
      not address the merits of the appellant’s Appointments Clause claim raised for the
      first time on petition for review.

      The appellant has not provided any basis to disturb the initial decision.
¶26         As to the merits of the initial decision, the appellant resubmits the closing
      argument she submitted to the administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 8 -58.
      However, the administrative judge considered the appellant’s closing argument
      and addressed it throughout his initial decision. A petition for review that merely
      repeats arguments made below does not meet the criteria for Board review,
      and we find no basis to disturb the explained findings of the administrative judge.
      See Tigner-Keir v. Department of Energy, 20 M.S.P.R. 552, 553 (1984);
      5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. We therefore deny the petition for review.

                                             ORDER
¶27         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such

      8
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      17

review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
                                                                                    18

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If s o, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
                                                                                19

      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and you wish to challenge the Board’s rulings on your whistleblower claims
only, excluding all other issues, then you may file a petition for judicial review
either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of
                                                                                     20

appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9      The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       21

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.