Court Opinion

ID: 9456838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:03:47.839537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:07.052736
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I am constrained to disagree with the majority’s finding “that with regard to nationality ‘no genuine issue of material fact is presented’.”1 To my way of *1256thinking the petitioner claims to be a national of the United States, his claim is not frivolous, and a genuine issue of material fact as to his nationality is presented. Accordingly, this Court should not render “summary judgment,” but should transfer the proceedings to the United States District Court for the district where the petitioner has his residence for hearing de novo of the nationality claim pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (a)(5):
“(5) whenever any petitioner, who seeks review of an order under this section, claims to be a national of the United States and makes a showing that his claim is not frivolous, the court shall (A) pass upon the issues presented when it appears from the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties that no genuine issue of material fact is presented; or (B) where a genuine issue of material fact as to the petitioner’s nationality is presented, transfer the proceedings to a United States district court for the district where the petitioner has his residence for hearing de novo of the nationality claim and determination as if such proceedings were originally initiated in the district court under the provisions of section 2201 of Title 28. Any such petitioner shall not be entitled to have such issue determined under section 1503(a) of this title or otherwise.”
I agree with the dissenting member of the Board of Immigration Appeals that “this record fails to establish by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that respondent voluntarily and meaningfully renounced his United States citizenship, acquired by reason of his birth here * * The majority treats the issue too narrowly when it inquires simply whether petitioner’s formal renunciation was made under duress. That attaches undue importance to the Act of Congress providing for loss of nationality by making a formal renunciation,2 whereas the vital question is the intention on the part of the citizen himself. Afroyim v. Rusk, 1967, 387 U.S. 253, 264, 87 S.Ct. 1660, 18 L.Ed.2d 757. As Afroyim teaches, the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship, he has “a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.” (387 U.S. at 268, 87 S.Ct. at 1668.) The issue is much broader than a question of whether the petitioner voluntarily made a renunciation of nationality in the form prescribed by Congress. The issue is whether petitioner truly intended to relinquish his citizenship.
Resolution of that issue depends not only on the formal renunciation, but upon all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. When those are examined, it becomes apparent that petitioner’s paramount intention was to avoid being inducted into the armed forces. That much was conceded by the majority of the Board of Immigration Appeals: “Even though the respondent did not testify as to the circumstances which led him to execute the renunciation, we agree that it is clearly inferable that respondent’s action was motivated by his desire to avoid induction in our armed forces.” Again, I agree with the views so well expressed by the dissenting member of the Board:
“It would seem that in all such cases, including renunciation, the person involved should be given, to the extent possible, an opportunity to state fully all the facts and circumstances, and the motives and purposes surrounding the expatriative act, with emphasis on ascertaining the intent in performing such act. While respondent gave very limited testimony, the other evidence of record appears clear on this important aspect of the case.
“Whatever else may emanate from respondent’s conduct in violating the draft laws, criminal proceedings or otherwise, his continued attempts at reclassifications, both before and after he left the United States, his stated *1257reasons a„ the time of renunciation and his letter to the draft board the following day, all concerned with his prospective status in the military, evince a clear intent that his act was involuntary. While renunciation cannot be used as ‘on again, off again’ to justify a change of mind, respondent’s act was not a normal act of renunciation. He, did not acquire a new nationality but became a ‘man without a country.’ The possibility of deportation is remote if not indeed, improbable.”
In Afroyim, the Court commented: “In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man is left without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world—as a man without a country.” (387 U.S. at 268, 87 S.Ct. at 1668.) This is such an instance. There is no indication that petitioner intended to become a citizen of Canada. Did he truly intend to become a man without a country ? His acts of marrying a United States citizen and of re-entering the United States, albeit illegally, are strong indications that he did not truly intend to relinquish his citizenship. There is, I submit, more than a genuine issue of material fact as to the petitioner’s nationality.
As both the majority and the dissenting member of the Board of Immigration Appeals recognized, and as is implicit in the majority opinion of this Court, what the petitioner was really trying to do was to evade or avoid being drafted. For that act he was subject to the prosecution which was begun and subsequently dismissed.3 True, a successful prosecution would be difficult so long as the petitioner could claim that he had voluntarily renounced his citizenship, but that difficulty might be obviated by the hearing de novo of petitioner’s claim to be an American citizen provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5).
It would be unworthy of our Government simply to elect the much harsher penalty of deportation, which will leave
the petitioner “without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world” (387 U.S. 268). Petitioner will be an outcast for the rest of his life, beyond the pardoning power even of the President. Such an election on the part of the Government should not receive the sanction of this Court—certainly not without the thorough hearing de novo of his claim to be an American citizen provided by 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(5). I respectfully dissent.

. Footnote 5 to majority opinion.

. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6).

. See footnote 4 to majority opinion.