Court Opinion

ID: 9728493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:09:27.150601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:49.140564
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in those portions of the majority opinion which conclude this is not a proper case for issuance of a writ of prohibition and that abatement of the enforcement of the Maryland decree pending Carol’s appeal of the dismissal of her action in Nelson County was neither necessary nor appropriate. I cannot, however, agree with that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Chapter 28 — 20.1, N.D.C.C., is applicable to the enforcement of a foreign custody decree under Chapter 14-14, N.D.C.C., the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
Section 14-14-15, N.D.C.C., contains a provision for the filing and enforcement of a custody decree of another State. A similar provision is found in Section 28-20.1-02, N.D.C.C., governing the filing of foreign judgments. As the majority opinion notes, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its comment to what is codified in North Dakota as Section 14-14-15, N.D.C.C., indicates the section “provides a simplified and speedy method of enforcement. It is derived from section 2 *894of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1964, . . . ” But if the National Conference of Commissioners intended the notice provisions required under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act to apply, why did it not also incorporate that provision into the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act? I submit the reason is obvious — it did not intend the notice provision to apply. I believe that by not incorporating the notice provision of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act into the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, the National Conference of Commissioners gave a strong indication that the notice provision is not applicable to child-custody decrees. Furthermore, if a child-custody decree of another State is to be governed by the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, as any other foreign judgment, provisions in the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act concerning the enforcement of a foreign child-custody decree are useless statutes because provisions for enforcement are already contained in Chapter 28-20.1.
A short examination of the reasons for the enactment of a Uniform Enforcement of Child Custody Jurisdiction Act should suffice to indicate that child custody is a special situation requiring special procedures different from those governing ordinary judgments affecting such things as property or money damages. Section 14-14-01, N.D.C.C., states the purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act are, among others, to:
“e. Deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
“f. Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as feasible;
“g. Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states; . . . ”
Subsection 2 of Section 14-14-01 requires us to construe the provisions of Chapter 14-14 to promote the general purposes stated in that section. I cannot conclude that imposing the notice requirements of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act on the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act promotes any of the general purposes set forth in Section 14-14-01, particularly those quoted above. Requiring the same notice required for the enforcement of any other foreign judgments does not facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other States. If the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act is applicable to foreign child-custody decrees, enforcement of child-custody decrees is facilitated as much as it is going to be, without the provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The conclusion by the majority does not deter a parent who is required to relinquish custody of a child under a foreign decree from retaining custody of that child contrary to the provisions of that decree. A parent who has custody of a child and relinquishes that child to the custody of the other parent in North Dakota for visitation purposes pursuant to the requirements of the custody decree must now be wary. Unless that custody decree has been filed in this State and unless the notice is given that such decree has been filed as required by Section 28-20.1-03, N.D.C.C., the parent may, with impunity, ignore the custody decree and retain the child beyond the time permitted in the decree. If the parent having permanent custody is not wary and does not give the required notice of the filing of the foreign decree until the other parent refuses to return the child, the majority opinion guarantees the parent who is ignoring the custody decree a minimum of ten days in which he or she may continue to retain custody of the child in violation of the decree.
The other purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act which I have quoted above is to avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other States in this State insofar as feasible. The majority opinion does not define in detail the purpose of the notice of the filing of the foreign decree. I assume the notice is more than a matter of form and that its purpose is to permit the noncustodial parent to object to the enforcement of that decree for procedural or substantive reasons. I fear, however, that the requirement will merely be an addition*895al route to seek modification of the foreign decree. Where, as here, the trial court has dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction a petition for change in custody, the procedure required by the majority opinion will permit the petitioner to have yet another day in court, perhaps before a different judge, to plead for a modification of the foreign custody decree. Such procedure encourages rather than avoids relitigation of custody decisions of other States in this State.
It appears the concern of the majority may be that it is contrary to fundamental due process to issue an ex parte order requiring a parent to relinquish custody of her child even if that custody is contrary to a valid foreign custody decree. I might agree that ex parte orders do not provide fundamental due process. But as applied to the particular facts of this case, the requirements of the majority opinion appear unnecessary. Although Phaon obtained an ex parte order requiring Carol to relinquish custody of the children to him, Judge Smith, sitting as the Nelson County district court, also presided in Nelson County over Carol’s action to modify the Maryland custody decree. The majority opinion concedes that at the Nelson County hearing on the petition for modification of the Maryland custody decree, Carol was represented by counsel and Judge Smith heard legal arguments and evidence by both Carol and Phaon which were pertinent not only to Judge Smith’s determination that the courts of this State lacked jurisdiction to modify the Maryland decree but to his determination to issue the ex parte order enforcing the Maryland custody decree as well. Thus there can be no contention that this was an ex parte order issued by a judge who was unfamiliar with the issue or who had heard only one side of the issue.
Carol has argued that because Phaon intends to remove the children from the United States to the Philippines, where he is to be employed, the children and Phaon would be removed from the jurisdiction of our courts; that if, on appeal, this court were to reverse Judge Smith’s decision that the courts of this State lacked jurisdiction to modify the Maryland custody decree, Phaon and the children would no longer be in this country and Phaon would not have to abide by any possible modification in the custody decree made by the courts of this State. This same argument was considered and rejected in Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 271 N.W.2d 546 (N.D.1978). The record does not disclose that Phaon has refused to abide by custody awards made by the courts of this country. Rather, it is Carol who has taken matters into her own hands and refused to return the children to Phaon’s custody as required by the only valid existing custody decree, the Maryland decree. Her refusal to return the children to Phaon’s custody as required by the Maryland decree resulted in Phaon’s seeking the ex parte order to which Carol now objects.
I would deny the stay of the ex parte order.