Court Opinion

ID: 9388952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-22 21:00:19.024435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.453453
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                                UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1189

        MARIO ERNESTO AMAYA; JOSE NORLAND GONZALEZ,

                   Plaintiffs – Appellees,

        and

        JOSE AMADEO CASTILLO,

                   Plaintiff,

        v.

        DGS CONSTRUCTION, LLC, d/b/a Schuster Concrete Construction,

                   Defendant – Appellant,

        and

        WHITING-TURNER CONTRACTING COMPANY,

                   Defendant.

                                              No. 22-1232

        MARIO ERNESTO AMAYA; JOSE NORLAND GONZALEZ,

                   Plaintiffs – Appellants,

        and
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        JOSE AMADEO CASTILLO,

                     Plaintiff,

        v.

        DGS CONSTRUCTION, LLC, d/b/a Schuster Concrete Construction,

                     Defendant – Appellee,

        and

        WHITING-TURNER CONTRACTING COMPANY,

                     Defendant.

        Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland at Greenbelt.
        Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:16−cv−03350−TDC)

        Argued: March 10, 2023                                            Decided: April 21, 2023

        Before WILKINSON, HARRIS, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion, in which Judge
        Harris and Judge Rushing joined.

        ARGUED: Christopher Curtis Dahl, BAKER DONELSON, Baltimore, Maryland, for
        Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Steven Michael Pavsner, JOSEPH GREENWALD AND
        LAAKE, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants. ON BRIEF:
        Stephen M. Silvestri, Mary M. McCudden, JACKSON LEWIS P.C., Baltimore, Maryland;
        Jennifer L. Curry, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ,
        PC, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Erika Jacobsen White, Brian J.
        Markovitz, JOSEPH GREENWALD AND LAAKE, P.A., Greenbelt, Maryland, for
        Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

                  Mario Ernesto Amaya and Jose Norland Gonzalez represent a class of construction

        workers who sued DGS Construction, LLC, also known as Schuster Concrete Construction

        (Schuster). They alleged that Schuster unlawfully withheld benefit payments on overtime

        hours the class worked while constructing the MGM Grand Hotel and Casino in Prince

        George’s County, Maryland. A jury found that Schuster was unjustly enriched under

        Maryland law by withholding these payments. Schuster appeals, arguing primarily that the

        district court committed reversible error in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of

        law because the evidence was insufficient to establish unjust enrichment. Schuster

        additionally asserts that the district court erred in certain evidentiary rulings and its jury

        instructions. Amaya and Gonzalez cross-appeal, positing that the district court erred in

        granting summary judgment to Schuster on the class’s claim alleging a violation of the

        Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm

        the district court.

                                                      I.

                                                     A.

                  DGS Construction, LLC, is a Maryland-based concrete contractor doing business as

        Schuster Concrete Construction. Schuster entered into a subcontract with the Whiting-

        Turner Construction Company, which had received a general contract to build the MGM

        resort.

                  As the general contractor on the MGM project, Whiting-Turner executed a Project

        Labor Agreement (PLA) with various trade unions whose members would work on the

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        construction of the resort. The PLA sought to have all subcontractors who worked on the

        project denote their agreement with the PLA and agree to be bound by its terms. The PLA,

        however, also allowed non-union subcontractors to work on the MGM project and

        exempted them from its requirements if less than three qualified union subcontractors bid

        on any aspect of the construction.

               Even those subcontractors exempted from the PLA had certain baseline

        requirements. The PLA provided that:

               Exemption from this Agreement shall not automatically relieve the
               successful bidder from complying with Project based requirements . . . . For
               all contractors working on the project, payment of prevailing wages and
               fringe benefit rates of the project as indicated on the Maryland Department
               of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation Informational Wage Rate for Prince
               George’s County determined at the commencement of the Project, which
               Developer has voluntarily adopted for the Project, shall be a minimum
               requirement and contractors are free to provide wages and fringe benefits at
               rates in excess of such prevailing rates.

        J.A. 5483. The PLA therefore incorporated as a floor for all contractors the wage rates set

        by the Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) for state-funded

        projects for Prince George’s County. 1

               In December 2014, when Schuster executed a subcontract with Whiting-Turner to

        perform concrete work on the MGM project, it did not assent to the PLA because only one

        union subcontractor had bid on that aspect of the work. Schuster, however, agreed within

               1
                 In 2019, the DLLR was renamed the Maryland Department of Labor. For purposes
        of this appeal, we will refer to the agency as the DLLR.

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        its subcontract to be bound by a “Project Manual” from Whiting-Turner, which outlined

        additional requirements.

               The Project Manual included a wage rate schedule, labeled as “S.3: Project Labor

        Minimum Wage Rates” (S.3). J.A. 5389–91. The S.3 stated that, consistent with the PLA,

        Schuster must pay its workers pursuant to a designated schedule consisting of wage rates

        that “were voluntarily adopted for the Project by [the] Developer” and were “derived from

        those listed by the [DLLR] for Prince George’s County.” J.A. 5389. The S.3 further

        required Schuster to certify that the wages paid to its employees were “not less than those

        established as set forth in the Contract Documents.” Id. Importantly, the S.3 clearly stated

        that the MGM project was “not subject to State law regarding the payment of prevailing

        wages or the Davis-Bacon Act.” Id.

               The S.3 thus listed wages which mirrored those set by the DLLR. It had two columns

        labeled as “Basic Hourly Rate” and “Fringe Benefit Payment.” J.A. 5390. Workers earned

        fringe benefit payments only if they opted to receive cash in lieu of actual fringe benefits,

        such as health insurance. For example, a carpenter who opted to take the fringe benefit

        payment in lieu of in-kind benefits would receive the “Basic Hourly Rate” of $26.81 and

        the “Fringe Benefit Payment” of $8.19. Id.

               This appeal involves the lack of fringe benefit payments on overtime hours. The S.3

        did not specify whether fringe benefit payments were due for overtime hours. Whereas the

        “Basic Hourly Rate” was calculated at time and a half after 40 hours worked, Schuster took

        the position that it was not required to make fringe benefit payments on overtime hours.

        Thus, the carpenter would earn $40.22 for each overtime hour worked but zero dollars in

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        fringe benefits. Schuster’s reasoning for not making benefit payments on overtime was that

        the costs it pays for in-kind benefits, like health insurance premiums, are fixed at monthly

        levels and do not increase when an employee works overtime. Moreover, it did not read

        the project documents as requiring fringe benefit payments on overtime. It therefore

        concluded that it need not pay Appellees fringe benefits for overtime hours.

                                                     B.

               Mario Ernesto Amaya and Jose Norland Gonzalez were at-will employees of

        Schuster who worked on the MGM project and chose to receive cash in lieu of in-kind

        benefits. Like other Schuster employees, they received no written employment contract but

        were repeatedly told that the MGM project was a “scale” job. See, e.g., J.A. 165, 167–73.

        According to Gonzalez, he understood “scale” to mean “the highest rate paid by the state

        or federal government.” J.A. 4322.

               Amaya and Gonzalez later sued Schuster and Whiting-Turner for the lack of fringe

        benefit payments on overtime hours on behalf of a class of approximately 1,600 similarly

        situated employees. 2 They asserted five causes of action, but relevant to this appeal are the

        claims against Schuster for violations of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law

        (MWPCL), Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §§ 3-501– 3-509, and unjust enrichment under

        Maryland law.

               2
                This case was initially filed in state court in Prince George’s County, Maryland,
        but was removed to federal court by Schuster and Whiting-Turner. The district court
        asserted jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because it involved
        questions concerning section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
        § 185.

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                                                     1.

               In August 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to Whiting-Turner on

        all claims and granted summary judgment to Schuster in part and denied it for the unjust

        enrichment claim. For the MWPCL claim, the district court noted that a “violation of the

        MWPCL occurs when an employer fails to pay ‘all wages due for work that the employee

        performed before the termination of employment,’ including overtime pay and fringe

        benefits.” J.A. 3628 (quoting Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-505(a)).

               Appellee workers insisted that Schuster had promised to make fringe benefit

        payments on overtime hours based on the Project Manual “voluntarily adopt[ing]”

        government-listed wage rates. J.A. 3629. According to Appellees, “Maryland prevailing-

        wage law . . . requires payment of fringe benefits for all hours worked,” and that

        requirement was embedded in the Project Manual. Id. (emphasis added) (internal

        quotations omitted). Schuster was allegedly aware of this requirement, according to the

        class, and thus the S.3 constituted an enforceable promise by Schuster to pay fringe benefits

        on overtime hours.

               The district court, however, found a salient difference between wage rates and wage

        law. According to the court, “the Project Manual not only fail[ed] to explicitly incorporate

        the requirements of the Maryland prevailing wage law, but also specifically disavow[ed]

        the applicability of the Maryland prevailing wage law to the Project[.]” Id. Moreover, the

        court noted that the Project Manual never stated whether the “Fringe Benefit Payment”

        would be made on overtime hours. Thus, the court found that Schuster had not made an

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        explicit promise to pay its employees fringe benefits on overtime hours worked, and

        Appellees had no viable claim under the MWPCL.

               The district court distinguished the MWPCL claim, which relied on an express

        agreement to make fringe benefit payments on overtime hours, from the unjust enrichment

        claim, which does not require any existing contract. It allowed the latter to proceed to trial,

        reasoning that even without an express promise to pay fringe benefits on overtime hours,

        there remained questions of fact over whether “it would be unjust for Schuster to be

        allowed to benefit from paying lower wages to [Appellees] on a project for which it was

        agreed that all workers would receive the prevailing wage rate.” J.A. 3633.

                                                      2.

               The unjust enrichment claim thus proceeded to a jury trial. The district court

        conducted a pre-trial conference, during which it denied Schuster’s motion in limine to

        preclude Appellees from offering evidence that Schuster’s subcontract with Whiting-

        Turner required it to make fringe benefit payments on overtime. At that time, Schuster also

        objected to the district court’s proposed jury instructions on unjust enrichment.

               The trial took place over four days in June 2021. Schuster raised further objections

        during trial to the district court’s proposed jury instructions. At the end of both Appellees’

        case-in-chief and the presentation of the evidence, Schuster moved for judgment as a matter

        of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). The district court denied these motions. The jury later

        returned a verdict in favor of Appellees on unjust enrichment. Schuster then filed a renewed

        motion for judgment as a matter of law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The district court

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        denied this motion, finding there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that

        Schuster was unjustly enriched under Maryland law.

                Schuster timely appealed. It now argues that the district court erred in denying its

        motions for judgment as a matter of law, as Appellees did not introduce sufficient evidence

        to establish the elements of their unjust enrichment claim. Schuster additionally renews its

        arguments regarding the denial of its motion in limine and the court’s allegedly erroneous

        jury instructions. Appellees lodge a conditional cross-appeal, arguing that if we find that

        their unjust enrichment claim fails, then we should rule that the district court erroneously

        granted Schuster summary judgment on the MWPCL claim. We need not address this

        conditional cross-appeal for we affirm the district court on the unjust enrichment issue. We

        thus focus on Schuster’s unjust enrichment arguments, taking each of its contentions in

        turn.

                                                      II.

                The gravamen of Schuster’s argument on appeal is that the district court erred in

        concluding that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict against it on

        unjust enrichment.

                The trial court denied Schuster’s Rule 50(b) motion on this issue below. We review

        this holding de novo. First Union Com. Corp. v. GATX Cap. Corp., 411 F.3d 551, 556 (4th

        Cir. 2005). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Amaya and Gonzalez

        as the prevailing parties. Id. Schuster “bears a hefty burden in establishing that the evidence

        is not sufficient” to support the jury’s verdict. Price v. City of Charlotte, N.C., 93 F.3d

        1241, 1249 (4th Cir. 1996). Though we cannot merely “rubber stamp” a jury verdict, “we

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        are compelled to accord the utmost respect to jury verdicts and tread gingerly in reviewing

        them.” Id. at 1250. In sum, “[e]ntry of judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if

        the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict.” Bresler v. Wilmington Tr.

        Co., 855 F.3d 178, 196 (4th Cir. 2017).

                                                      A.

                To prevail on a claim of unjust enrichment under Maryland law, a plaintiff must

        show:

                1. A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 2. [a]n
                appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and 3. [t]he
                acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
                circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit
                without the payment of its value.

        Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 936 A.2d 343, 351 (Md. 2007). As Maryland

        courts recognize, however, a claim for unjust enrichment “may not be reduced neatly to a

        golden rule.” Id. In general, a “successful unjust enrichment claim serves to deprive the

        defendant of the benefits that in equity and good conscience he ought not to keep, even

        though he may have received those benefits quite honestly in the first instance, and even

        though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstrable losses.” Id. at 352 (internal

        quotations omitted).

                Unjust enrichment, moreover, is a remedy “to provide relief for a plaintiff when an

        enforceable contract does not exist but fairness dictates that the plaintiff receive

        compensation for services provided.” Cnty. Comm’rs of Caroline Cnty. v. J. Roland

        Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747 A.2d 600, 607 (Md. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). In an

        unjust enrichment case, “there has been no agreement, the defendant has no prior

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        expectations either as to value or as to risk, and so the law of restitution simply returns the

        defendant to the status quo by disgorging the value of the benefit actually received.” Dolan

        v. McQuaide, 79 A.3d 394, 403 (Md. App. 2013). Accordingly, a defendant may be

        unjustly enriched even if “a plaintiff is mistaken as to the duties or rights that he or she

        owes another and because of his mistake confers a benefit upon another[.]” Hill, 936 A.2d

        at 355 (internal quotations omitted).

                                                      B.

               With these principles in mind, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the

        jury to determine that Schuster was unjustly enriched by failing to pay Appellees fringe

        benefits on overtime hours worked.

                                                      1.

               We start with the evidence presented as to the “benefit conferred” on Schuster. A

        benefit “denotes any form of advantage,” including the “advantage for which a person

        ordinarily must pay” or where a plaintiff “saves” a defendant “from expense or loss.”

        Restatement (First) of Restitution § 1 cmt. b (1937); see also Hill, 936 A.2d at 353 (citing

        the First Restatement with approval). A benefit can be, inter alia, money or the

        performance of a service. See, e.g., Hill, 936 A.2d at 354 (paying a debt is a benefit

        conferred); Dolan, 79 A.3d at 403–04 (genuine dispute of material fact over whether

        consultant, who had allegedly helped plan opening of a gas station, provided a benefit to

        owner); Everhart v. Miles, 422 A.2d 28, 31 (Md. App. 1980) (making repairs and

        improvements on defendant’s property constituted a benefit).

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               Appellees presented sufficient evidence at trial that they conferred a benefit on

        Schuster in the form of their services as workers on the MGM project. Although they

        received a basic hourly wage for overtime hours, they did not receive fringe benefits on

        those hours. Schuster conceded that the company “did not pay the fringe rate for any

        overtime hours worked by the plaintiffs or class members on the project.” J.A. 4470. This

        concession shows a benefit conferred.

               Schuster also admitted that “no member of the overtime fringe benefit class worked

        2,080 or more regular straight time hours in a year.” Id. This shows a benefit conferred, as

        Schuster computed the hourly benefit payments by calculating the annual value of the

        premiums it normally pays an employee’s in-kind benefits, and then dividing that value by

        2,080 hours—or 52 weeks of 40 regular time hours. Therefore, for an employee to receive

        the full annualized value of the cash benefit payments in lieu of in-kind benefits, he would

        had to have worked all 2,080 regular hours across the year. Given that none of the class

        worked 2,080 regular time hours, a jury could reasonably conclude that the class saved

        Schuster an expense it would otherwise bear—the normal cost of paying premiums on its

        employees’ benefits. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of a benefit conferred.

                                                     2.

               As for the second element—whether a defendant has “appreciation or knowledge”

        of the benefit conferred—the “essence” of this requirement is that “the defendant ha[s] an

        opportunity to decline the benefit.” Hill, 936 A.2d at 354. Thus, the defendant need not

        have had knowledge of the benefit precisely at the time it was received if he could still

        decline or return the benefit when he became aware of it. See id. at 354–55. Moreover,

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        even if a plaintiff confers a benefit by mistake, this element can be satisfied as long as that

        mistake at some point dawns on the defendant and he “retains a choice of keeping or

        returning it.” Id. at 355 (internal quotations omitted).

               Appellees presented sufficient evidence that Schuster had knowledge and

        appreciation of the benefit conferred in multiple respects. First, we reiterate that Schuster

        conceded that its payments to workers did not include fringe benefit payments. Schuster

        was therefore aware that it had received the benefits of Appellees’ services without having

        included the overtime fringe benefit amounts. Indeed, Schuster’s Chief Financial Officer

        and its corporate designee, Lorraine Burns, testified that Schuster pays fringe benefit

        amounts on overtime hours for federal prevailing wage projects. As the district court noted,

        Schuster was thus “fully aware that contractors, under certain circumstances, pay overtime

        fringe benefit amounts, and that being able to refrain from paying overtime fringe benefit

        amounts reduces its labor costs and thus provides it with a financial benefit.” J.A. 3723.

               Second, a jury also reasonably could have concluded that Schuster knew or

        appreciated the benefit conferred upon it by Appellees because it tried to justify the lack of

        fringe benefit payments on overtime hours to Whiting-Turner. Burns testified that in March

        2016, while the project was ongoing, a Whiting-Turner representative asked why Schuster

        was not paying fringe benefits on overtime hours worked. In response, Burns provided

        several supporting documents for Schuster’s position that it was not required to pay fringe

        benefits on overtime. As Burns put it, “I was trying to indicate that what we do is a

        reasonable practice.” J.A. 4594. Based on this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude

        that Schuster would not have tried to justify its practice of denying fringe benefit payments

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        on overtime if it did not know or appreciate that it was retaining some benefit by avoiding

        these payments.

               Third, there was further evidence presented that, even if they did not constitute an

        enforceable promise, the PLA and the Project Manual contemplated the payment of fringe

        benefits on overtime, and that Schuster knew this. As discussed above, these documents

        established that Whiting-Turner had committed to pay all contractors working on the MGM

        project the prevailing wage rates for Prince George’s County set by the DLLR. The S.3

        schedule then mirrored those rates. James Tudor, a DLLR Program Administrator

        responsible for the enforcement of state prevailing wage laws, testified at trial that it was

        the long-standing interpretation of the DLLR that on state prevailing wage projects,

        Maryland law requires the payment of fringe benefits on all hours worked, including

        overtime.

               Even if Schuster was unaware of the DLLR’s interpretation at the commencement

        of the project, evidence presented raises a plausible inference that it became aware while

        the project was ongoing. Burns attended a presentation during the MGM project in which

        Tudor discussed the requirement to pay fringe benefits on overtime hours. Although Burns

        vociferously denied during her testimony that she learned this information, a jury

        reasonably could have found that, in light of all the evidence, she knew of the requirement

        to pay fringe benefits on overtime. Such “credibility determinations” are the jury’s to make.

        Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000).

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                                                      3.

               The last element of unjust enrichment—whether it would be inequitable for

        defendants to retain the benefit conferred without payment—necessitates “a fact-specific

        balancing of the equities.” Hill, 936 A.2d at 355. “The balancing of equities and hardships

        looks at the conduct of both parties and the potential hardships that might result from a

        judicial decision either way.” Royal Inv. Grp., LLC v. Wang, 961 A.2d 665, 685 (Md. App.

        2008) (internal quotations and alteration omitted). Though any misconduct or fault by one

        of the parties may be considered under this element, a finding of fault is unnecessary to

        find a defendant unjustly enriched. See Hill, 936 A.2d at 352. Whether a party is legally or

        otherwise entitled to the benefit may also factor into the weighing of the equities. See Plitt

        v. Greenberg, 219 A.2d 237, 241 (Md. 1966).

               There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Schuster’s

        failure to pay fringe benefits on overtime hours was inequitable. We begin by noting that

        such an inherently fact-specific question is the province of the jury, for the “very essence”

        of a jury’s fact-finding function “is to select from among conflicting inferences and

        conclusions that which it considers most reasonable.” Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co.,

        321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944). We highlight some of the evidence below.

               First, and as discussed above, evidence was presented that Schuster’s failure to

        make fringe benefit payments to certain employees deprived them of the full value of their

        benefits when compared to those employees who received their benefits in-kind. Whereas

        employees who received their benefits in-kind gained the total value of their benefits

        irrespective of how their hours were split between regular and overtime hours, none of the

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        class members received the full value of their benefits. A reasonable jury could have found

        this disparity inequitable.

               Second, a jury could have believed that the overall context of Schuster’s subcontract

        made it inequitable for Schuster to withhold fringe benefit payments. The S.3 shows that

        Schuster agreed to pay the wage rates “voluntarily adopted” for the MGM project by

        Whiting-Turner, which mirrored the “Informational Wage Rates for Prince George’s

        County” established by the DLLR. J.A. 5389. Moreover, testimony presented at trial

        showed that Schuster was aware of the PLA when it bid on the MGM project. Schuster

        therefore knew that it was working on a project which explicitly tied its wage rates for all

        contractors, both union and non-union, to that of the state prevailing wage. That state

        prevailing wage, according to Tudor, requires fringe benefits to be paid on overtime hours.

               Third, there was evidence presented throughout trial that Schuster advertised that

        the MGM project was “scale” to its workers and touted the S.3 as exemplative of the wages

        being “scale.” Nothing on the S.3 denoted to employees that fringe benefits would not be

        paid on overtime hours. As Appellee Gonzalez testified, he understood “scale” to mean

        “the highest rate paid by the state or federal government.” J.A. 4322. Schuster employees

        recognized that the terms “scale” and “prevailing wage” are “interchangeable.” J.A. 4130.

        And, as discussed, Tudor testified that the DLLR believed the state prevailing wage to

        include fringe benefit payments on overtime, a requirement which Burns and Schuster

        arguably learned during the MGM project. A jury could reasonably have concluded that

        Schuster gave workers the false impression that they would receive fringe benefits on

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        overtime by repeatedly advertising it as a “scale” project, and thus it was unjust for Schuster

        to have refused to make such payments.

               In response, Schuster primarily argues that it could not have been unjustly enriched

        because Appellees had no legal entitlement to fringe benefits on overtime. It cites the

        Supreme Court of Maryland’s recent decision in a sister case to this action, Amaya v. DGS

        Constr., LLC, 278 A.3d 1216, 1250–51 (Md. 2022), to argue that “Appellees’ claim would

        be viable only to the extent that they were entitled to be compensated for fringe benefits on

        overtime.” Appellant’s Response and Reply Br. at 5.

               We do not think Maryland Supreme Court’s decision in Amaya worked a sea-change

        in the law of unjust enrichment. Although entitlement to compensation may well factor

        into the weighing of the equities, see Plitt, 219 A.2d at 241, unjust enrichment under

        Maryland law contemplates a situation “when an enforceable contract does not exist but

        fairness dictates that the plaintiff receive compensation for services provided.” Dashiell,

        747 A.2d at 607 (internal quotations omitted). A jury must therefore consider the

        reasonable expectations of the parties and its own sense of fairness in determining whether

        a defendant was unjustly enriched. As the district court noted, the “fact that there was no

        contractual agreement” between Schuster and Appellees on the fringe benefit payments for

        overtime hours “does not bar recovery” nor does it serve as a “complete defense” to such

        an action. J.A. 3729.

               Ultimately, there was evidence that Schuster benefitted from a contract which

        incorporated the state prevailing wage rates as a floor for non-union employees. It assented

        to those wage rates by agreeing to abide by the Project Manual, and it then advertised those

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        wage rates to prospective employees in the S.3. It repeatedly touted the project as “scale,”

        and there was evidence to suggest that “scale” would include fringe benefit payments on

        overtime. Schuster then unilaterally withheld such payments despite evidence that it knew

        of and appreciated the benefit it was receiving. It also reaped cost savings from employees

        in the class who opted for cash benefits payments when compared to those employees who

        elected to receive benefits in-kind. A jury could thus conclude that it would be inequitable

        for Schuster not to make fringe benefit payments on overtime. We cannot conclude that

        the evidence was legally insufficient to prove unjust enrichment. Accordingly, we shall

        uphold the jury’s verdict.

                                                    III.

               Schuster also argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury on unjust

        enrichment and in denying its motion in limine to exclude testimony that the S.3 obligated

        Schuster to pay fringe benefits on overtime hours. We review both contentions under an

        abuse of discretion standard. See Noel v. Artson, 641 F.3d 580, 586 (4th Cir. 2011) (jury

        instructions); United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296, 309 (4th Cir. 2012) (motions in

        limine).

                                                    A.

               The district court instructed the jury on each of the three elements of unjust

        enrichment. Schuster’s primary argument is that the instructions did not account for the

        nature of its relationship with Appellees—namely, that Appellees were at-will

        employees—which Schuster argues changes the nature of their unjust enrichment claim. It

        faults the district court for charging the jury “with little more than the hornbook elements

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        of an unjust enrichment claim,” which neglected the different nature of its relationship with

        Appellees. Opening Br. at 36.

               Schuster’s argument boils down to little more than a disagreement with the law of

        unjust enrichment. The district court was not required to address the at-will nature of the

        parties, but, even so, it did instruct the jury to consider “whether one party was legally or

        otherwise entitled to” the benefit under the third element. J.A. 4741. Schuster’s primary

        issue seems to be that the district court did not go far enough in massaging the elements of

        unjust enrichment to suit its theory of the case.

               The refusal to give a requested jury instruction is reversible error only if the

        instruction “(1) was correct, (2) was not substantially covered by the charge that the district

        court actually gave to the jury, and (3) involved some point so important that the failure to

        give the instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s defense.” Ward v. AutoZoners, LLC,

        958 F.3d 254, 272 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted). Schuster makes no effort

        to argue that its requested instructions fit these criteria. The instructions tendered by the

        district court correctly explained the applicable law and related that law to the

        circumstances of the case. See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 34 (4th Cir. 1995). We

        thus see no merit in this assignment of error.

                                                      B.

               Schuster also argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying

        Schuster’s motion in limine to preclude testimony that the S.3 obliged it to pay fringe

        benefits on overtime hours. According to Schuster, this ruling was inconsistent with the

        court’s summary judgment conclusion that the S.3 “not only fails to explicitly incorporate

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        the requirements of Maryland prevailing wage law, but actually specifically disavows the

        applicability of the Maryland prevailing wage law.” J.A. 3629.

               We disagree. As the lower court summarized, though the S.3 may not have created

        a contractual right to fringe benefit payments on overtime hours, the S.3 was clearly

        relevant to determining the “intentions and expectations of the plaintiffs and other relevant

        actors” and “whether the failure of Schuster to pay was inequitable.” J.A. 3775. And in an

        action for unjust enrichment, such evidence is admissible. District courts are necessarily

        closer to the evidence at trial, and we accordingly respect their discretion in regulating its

        admissibility. See Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008). We

        decline to disturb the district court’s sound judgment here.

                                                     IV.

               Last, the class cross-appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

        Schuster on their claim under the MWPCL. At oral argument, Appellees conceded that the

        cross-appeal was conditional and only viable to the extent that we reversed the jury’s

        verdict on unjust enrichment. See Oral Arg. at 2:50:12. Because we affirm the jury’s unjust

        enrichment verdict, we likewise shall not disturb the district court’s grant of summary

        judgment to Schuster on the MWPCL claim.

                                                     V.

               For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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