Court Opinion

ID: 9555062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 17:04:11.292759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:04.179104
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/10/23 In re Duane D. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re DUANE D., JR., a Person                                B323312
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                    (Los Angeles County Super.
 Court Law.                                                   Ct. No. 22LJJP00186A)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 DUANE D.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Robin R. Kesler, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed in part,
vacated and remanded in part for further proceedings.
     Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                ******
       Duane D. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s order
exerting dependency jurisdiction over his son as well as the
related dispositional order. Father does not challenge the
substance of those orders; instead, he argues that the juvenile
court’s implied finding that the Department of Children and
Family Services (the Department) fulfilled its duty of further
inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.1) (ICWA) is incorrect. The
Department concedes that father’s challenge has merit. As
explained below, the appropriate remedy is to affirm the court’s
jurisdictional and dispositional orders, but to vacate its implied
finding of ICWA compliance and remand.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Father shares one child with Anita A. (mother)—Duane D.,
Jr. (born July 2021).
I.     The Petition and ICWA Findings at the Detention
Hearing
       After the Department received a referral that mother used
methamphetamine, including in Duane’s presence, and became
“violent,” it filed a petition in May 2022 asking the juvenile court
to exert dependency jurisdiction over Duane. In an amended

1     All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
petition filed the next month, the Department alleged that
jurisdiction was warranted due to (1) mother’s conduct in
subjecting Duane’s half sister (whom mother had by another
father) to severe physical abuse when the half sister was two
years old, (2) mother’s substance abuse and father’s failure to
protect Duane from that abuse, and (3) the parents’ history of
domestic violence; the Department alleged that this conduct
“places [Duane] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger,
and failure to protect,” thereby rendering jurisdiction appropriate
under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1) and (j).
       Prior to filing the petition, the Department asked the
parents whether Duane may have any Native American heritage.
During an interview, mother stated she has Mohegan ancestry.
In a “Parental Notification of Indian Status” form, mother
reaffirmed that she “may have Indian ancestry,” and
recommended that the Department contact maternal
grandmother for additional information. Father also filled out
that form, but indicated he had no Indian heritage.
       Based on these responses, the Department along with its
petition filed an “Indian Child Inquiry” form stating that the
Department had “reason to believe [Duane] is or may be an
Indian Child.” Based on this information, the juvenile court at a
May 2022 detention hearing found that it had no “reason to know
that ICWA applies as to [f]ather,” but found that “there may be
some . . . Native American/Indian heritage in . . . mother’s
background” and ordered the Department “to investigate” that
claim.

                                 3
II.    The Department’s Further Inquiries of the Parents
and Their Families
       The Department conducted several interviews of mother’s
and father’s families, and learned that:
       ●     Mother has 10 siblings or half siblings—eight on her
mother’s side and two on her father’s side—with whom she is in
contact and who are a “support system” for her. She reported
that maternal grandfather lives in St. Louis, Missouri, and she
does not speak to him.
       ●     Maternal grandmother reported that her family has
both Mohegan and Cherokee heritage.
       ●     Father has three siblings and is in contact with them,
but he is not in contact with paternal grandfather.
       ●     Paternal grandmother said the family has Iroquois
and Cherokee heritage.
III. The Department’s Further Inquiries of Pertinent
Tribes
       Based on the information obtained from the parents and
their families, the Department in June 2022 sent inquiries—but
not formal notices—to (1) three Cherokee tribes (namely, the
Cherokee Nation, the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, and the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians), (2) the
Mohegan Tribe, (3) two Iroquois tribes (namely, the Tuscarora
Nation and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe), and (4) the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA). Although the inquiries themselves are not
in the record, the return receipts are as well as the tribes’
responsive letters stating:
       ●     As to the Cherokee Nation, the information provided
by the Department was “not complete” and the tribe needed
additional information—namely, the middle name and date of

                                4
birth for maternal grandfather—“[i]n order to verify Cherokee
heritage.”
       ●     As to the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee
Indians, the tribe was “unable to establish . . . heritage” “[b]ased
on the information . . . provided.”
       ●     As to the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Duane
“is neither registered nor eligible to register as a member of th[e]
tribe” “based on the information received.”
       ●     As to the Mohegan Tribe, it had “no record” of the
family members identified.
       ●     As to the Tuscarora Nation, enrollment “follows the
mother’s lineage (matrilineal)” and mother “is not an enrolled
member” so Duane also is “not . . . enrolled” and is “not eligible
for enrollment.”
       ●     As to the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the tribe “was
unable to find any link of tribal affiliation” after it “researched
the names of the biological parents, as well as other listed
relatives.”
IV. The Department’s Further Inquiries and the Tribe’s
Response
       To gather the information that the Cherokee Nation
requested regarding maternal grandfather, the Department
“attempted to inquire” of mother, but was “unable to receive
further information from” her.2 Maternal grandmother told the
Department that she has not seen or spoken to maternal

2    This language makes it unclear whether (1) mother did not
respond at all to the Department’s inquiry, or (2) mother
responded, but denied knowledge of maternal grandfather’s
middle name and date of birth.

                                 5
grandfather (her ex-husband) for many years, and did not recall
his middle name or date of birth.
      The Department informally transmitted this information to
the Cherokee Nation, which responded that “none of the names
provided for direct biological relatives can be found” and that
“[u]nknown relations are not researched.” It concluded that
Duane is “not an ‘Indian child’ [for purposes of ICWA] in relation
to the Cherokee Nation,” but that “[a]ny incorrect or omitted
information could invalidate this determination.”
V.    The Jurisdictional and Dispositional Orders
      At the jurisdictional hearing in August 2022, the juvenile
court sustained the allegations under subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) of
section 300 regarding the physical abuse of Duane’s half sibling,
mother’s substance abuse, and father’s failure to protect Duane
from that abuse; the court dismissed the allegations under
subdivisions (a) and (b) regarding the parents’ domestic violence.
      At a contested dispositional hearing in September 2022, the
juvenile court removed Duane from his parents and ordered
reunification services. The minute order does not contain any
further ICWA findings; the court also made no oral ICWA finding
at the hearing other than to comment that it “know[s] the
Department is given [sic] notice for American Indian heritage.
I’m not sure, though I saw a notice to the Iroquois.”
VI. Father’s Appeal
      Father filed a timely appeal.
VII. Post-Appeal Events3
      In March 2023, the juvenile court (1) ordered the
Department to “interview” or “attempt to interview all extended

3     We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (c), 459.)

                                 6
family members about whether” Duane is an Indian child, and to
“document all its efforts,” and (2) stated that it would “review[]
the report” and “make a finding regarding the ICWA’s
applicability.” In early May 2023, the Department filed a report
indicating that (1) it spoke to one of mother’s siblings, who
relayed that mother’s family has Choctaw, “Barefoot,” and
Cherokee heritage; (2) it spoke to another of mother’s siblings,
who reported that the family’s Mohegan and Cherokee heritage
derive from the maternal great grandmother, who was dead; and
(3) it spoke to maternal grandmother who confirmed maternal
great grandmother’s death; all three relatives refused to provide
contact information for other maternal relatives. The
Department’s report also indicated that it spoke with paternal
grandmother, who confirmed possible Iroquois, Cherokee, and
Mohawk heritage but refused to give contact information
regarding paternal grandfather or other paternal relatives. A
few days later, the juvenile court held a six-month status review
hearing, and ordered the Department to “notice all appropriate
tribes and the [Bureau of Indian Affairs]” prior to the 12-month
status review hearing set for November 2023.
                           DISCUSSION
        Father argues that the Department did not comply with its
duties under ICWA; specifically, he asserts that (1) the
Department did not comply with its duty of further inquiry, and
(2) the juvenile court erred in making an implied finding at the
dispositional hearing that ICWA does not apply because the
Department’s communications with the tribes were not filed with
the court for it to review before making that finding. Father asks
us to “reverse” the court’s “orders finding that [the Department]
satisfied its duty of inquiry” and to “remand” for the court to

                                7
make a “proper finding under” ICWA. The Department concedes
that father’s “contentions have merit,” but nevertheless has
moved this Court to dismiss the appeal as moot in light of the
post-appeal events enumerated above.
       These competing arguments present two issues: (1) Was
there error under ICWA, and (2) if so, what is the appropriate
remedy at this point in time?
I.     Was There ICWA Error?
       A.     Pertinent law
       ICWA was enacted “out of concern that ‘an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often
unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and
private agencies,’” and “aims to keep Indian children connected to
Indian families.” (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) __ U.S. __, __ [143
S.Ct. 1609, 1623, 216 L.Ed.2d 254].) To that end, under ICWA
and the corresponding statutes the California Legislature
enacted to implement it (§§ 224-224.6), a juvenile court and the
Department have duties aimed at assessing whether a child in a
dependency action is an “Indian child.” (§§ 224.2, 224.3.) An
“Indian child” is a child who (1) is “a member of an Indian tribe,”
or (2) “is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. §
1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a) [adopting federal law definition].) By
its terms, this definition turns “‘on the child’s political affiliation
with a federally recognized Indian Tribe,’” not “necessarily” “the
child’s race, ancestry, or ‘blood quantum.’” (In re Austin J. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882 (Austin J.), quoting 81 Fed.Reg. 38801-
38802 (June 14, 2016).)
       The Department and juvenile court have “three distinct
duties” under ICWA. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041,

                                  8
1052 (D.S.); Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 883-
884 [same].) The initial “duty” of the Department and the court
is “to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian child.” (§ 224.2,
subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges this duty by
“asking” family members “whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).) This includes inquiring of not only
the child’s parents, but also others, including but not limited to,
“extended family members.” (Ibid.) For its part, the juvenile
court is required, “[a]t the first appearance” in a dependency
case, to “ask each participant present” “whether the participant
knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child.”
(Id., subd. (c).)
        The second duty is the duty of the Department or the
juvenile court to “make further inquiry regarding the possible
Indian status of the child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) This duty is
triggered if the Department or court “has reason to believe that
an Indian child is involved” (ibid.), and, once triggered, obligates
the Department to conduct a “more robust investigation” and to
undertake “‘meaningful effort’” through further interviews aimed
at gathering information, through contacting the BIA and state
department of social services for assistance, and through
contacting the relevant Indian tribe(s). (Id., subd. (e)(2); In re
M.M. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 61, 70, review granted Oct. 12, 2022,
S276099; In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744 (K.T.); In re
D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566-567.) The Department or
court “has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved” if
the Department or court “has information suggesting that either
the parent of the child or the child is a member or may be eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe,” including information
“indicat[ing]” but not “establish[ing]” the existence of any of the

                                 9
six circumstances satisfying the “reason to know” a child is an
Indian child, detailed next. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).)
       The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian
tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is
triggered if the Department or the court “knows or has reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved” based on the inquiries
performed under the second duty. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).) The
Department or juvenile court has “reason to know a child
involved in a proceeding is an Indian child” in one of six
statutorily defined circumstances—namely, when (1) “[a] person
having an interest in the child . . . informs the court that the
child is an Indian child” (§ 224.2, subd. (d)(1)); (2) “[a]ny
participant in the proceeding . . . informs the court that it has
discovered information indicating that the child is an Indian
child” (id., subd. (d)(3)); (3) “[t]he child . . . gives the court reason
to know that the child is an Indian child” (id., subd. (d)(4)); (4)
the child or the parents reside, or are domiciled, “on a reservation
or in an Alaskan Native village” (id., subd. (d)(2)); (5) “the child is
or has been a ward of a tribal court” (id., subd. (d)(5)); or (6)
“either parent or the child possess an identification card
indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe” (id.,
subd. (d)(6)).
       In assessing whether ICWA has been violated, we review
any questions of law de novo, but review the court’s ICWA
findings for substantial evidence. (Dwayne P. v. Superior
Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 254; In re Rebecca R. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1430.)
       B.     Analysis
       The parties seem to agree that the Department’s duty of
further inquiry under ICWA was triggered and that the

                                   10
Department did not meaningfully discharge that duty by the time
of the dispositional order that is before us on appeal. We also
agree.
       The Department’s duty of further inquiry was certainly
triggered. Based on mother’s initial interview, the Department
reported prior to the detention hearing that “Native American
Indian ancestry does or may apply.” (See In re Rylei S. (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 309, 319 [agency’s report that ICWA “‘does or may
apply’” indicates it had reason to believe an Indian child may be
involved, triggering duty of further inquiry].) Although the
juvenile court initially found—based on father’s initial disavowal
of any Indian heritage—that it had no “reason to know that
ICWA applies as to [f]ather,” the Department’s interviews of
father’s relatives uncovered reason to believe that father also
may have Indian heritage. (In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
388, 404 [paternal grandmother’s statement that she had
Cherokee ancestry triggered duty of further inquiry]; In re T.G.
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 292 [mother’s statement indicating
possible Indian ancestry through her paternal grandfather
triggered duty of further inquiry]; In re Dominic F. (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 558, 569 (Dominic F.) [further inquiry required
where court orders agency to “‘look into it’”].)
       Yet the Department did not meaningfully satisfy its duty of
further inquiry. Contrary to what father argues, the
Department’s inquiry to the BIA and the six different tribes
identified by the maternal and paternal relatives was not the
Department discharging its duty to give formal notice to the
tribes (that is, the third duty under ICWA); rather, it was the
Department informally contacting the tribes as part of its duty of
further inquiry (that is, the second duty under ICWA). Thus, the

                               11
Department satisfied a portion of its duty of further inquiry when
it contacted the BIA and the tribes. Where the Department fell
short, however, was in its further interviews of the maternal and
paternal relatives. The Cherokee Nation informed the
Department that it needed maternal grandfather’s middle name
and date of birth in order to determine Duane’s Cherokee
heritage, but all the Department did was ask mother and
maternal grandmother; it did not try to ask any of mother’s other
10 siblings and half siblings who were part of her “support
system” and did not even use maternal grandfather’s name and
residence in St. Louis to run a simple online search for the
information requested by the Cherokee Nation. This was not a
“‘meaningful effort.’” (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) The
Department also knew that Duane may have Iroquois and
Cherokee heritage through father, but did not make any effort to
contact paternal grandfather or any of father’s three siblings.
(See K.T., at pp. 743-744 [agency failed to satisfy duty of further
inquiry by failing to, among other things, contact grandparents
and aunt].) Again, the Department’s limited interviews failed to
discharge its duty of further inquiry.
       Although the juvenile court did not expressly find, as part
of its dispositional order, that ICWA did not apply to Duane, we
infer an implied finding to that effect because the court did not
explicitly order any further inquiry or the giving of formal notice
to the tribes, leaving the Department nothing further to do.
Although implied ICWA findings are generally permissible (In re
Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 506), father urges us not to
rely on the court’s implied finding in this case because the
Department never filed the inquiries it sent to the tribes with the
juvenile court, thereby depriving the court of the ability to assess

                                12
whether the Department discharged its duty to give notice to the
tribes. To be sure, father is correct that an implied finding that
the Department complied with its duty to give notice is
inherently defective if the Department does not provide the
notices it sent to the tribe to the juvenile court. (Asia L., at pp.
507-509.) But the Department here was not contacting the tribes
in order to fulfill its duty to give formal notice; it was conducting
the informal inquiry that is part of its duty of further inquiry.
Although both duties are similar (and hence “sometimes
conflated” (In re A.M. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 303, 315),4 they are
distinct duties (compare § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) with § 224.3,
subds. (a)(1) & (c); In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 678, 686-688;
Dominic F., supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 570; D.S., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 1049 [“The sharing of information with tribes at
this inquiry stage is distinct from formal ICWA notice . . . ”]).
Here, the Department never developed the “reason to know”
Duane was an Indian child that would trigger the duty to give
notice; as a result, its inquiry of the tribes was part of its further
inquiry and the cases invalidating implied ICWA findings due to
the failure to file the formal notices given to tribes are inapt.
Moreover, father’s reliance on In re Louis S. (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 622, which applied a “‘reason to believe’” standard as
the trigger for the duty to give notice, is misplaced because the
trigger for giving notice has since been tightened to “reason to

4     The danger of conflation is even greater where, as here, the
Department mistakenly uses the word “notices” in its reports to
describe its informal communications with the tribes. Read in
context, however, it is clear the Department was not referring to
the formal notice required when the Department knows or has
reason to know an Indian child is involved.

                                 13
know.” (See D.S., at pp. 1048-1051 [noting enactments and
amendments].)
      Because the Department’s duty of further inquiry was
inadequate, its implied ICWA finding as part of the dispositional
order is not supported by substantial evidence and must be
vacated. (K.T., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [because agency
did not conduct “adequate[]” further investigation, the court
“should not have found that ICWA did not apply”]; D.S., supra,
46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1050 [court may make finding that ICWA
does not apply only if agency’s further inquiry was “‘proper and
adequate’” but no “reason to know” the child is an Indian child
was discovered]; § 224.2, subd. (i)(2) [same].)
II.   What Is the Appropriate Remedy?
      In light of our analysis, the next question we confront is:
What is the appropriate remedy when an appellate court
determines, on appeal from an order prior to termination of
parental rights, that the ICWA duty of further inquiry has not
been satisfied?5
      By our count, the California appellate courts have thus far
provided five different rules in answering this question when it
comes to the duty of initial inquiry. The first rule is to affirm the
juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings, to vacate
the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply, and to remand for
the Department to comply with its ICWA duties. (In re Dominick

5      This is a different question than what the remedy is when
the appellate court determines, on appeal from an order
terminating parental rights, that the ICWA duty has not been
satisfied. The California appellate courts are similarly fractured
about how to answer this question as well, but we need not delve
into that morass here.

                                 14
D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 563-564, 567-568.) The second rule
is to affirm the juvenile court’s findings in their entirety, on the
rationale that the issue of ICWA compliance remains before the
juvenile court at all times and the Department will have time to
correct any deficiencies. (In re T.R. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1140,
1154; In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166, 171, 173, 175-179.)
The third rule is to dismiss the appeal as moot, on the theory that
“no effective relief” may be granted because any ICWA
deficiencies can be cured in future proceedings. (In re Baby Girl
M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 638-639 & fn. 2.) The fourth rule
is to treat an appeal from a finding that ICWA does not apply as
premature (and hence not yet “ripe”) because such a finding can
necessarily be altered prior to the termination of parental rights.
(J.J. v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 447, 461.) And the
fifth and (thus far) final rule is to construe the appeal as a writ
petition, and to evaluate the merits of the Department’s
compliance with ICWA. (D.S. v. Superior Court (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 383, 386, 388-389, 390-391.)
       We conclude that it is proper to apply the first rule here—
that is, to affirm the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional findings (because father does not attack those
findings), to vacate the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does
not apply (because this includes an “implied finding” that the
Department complied with its duty of further inquiry which is
not supported by substantial evidence), and to remand for the
Department to continue to comply with that duty. (See In re
Emma C. (March 16, 2023, B318281) [nonpub. opn.] [this
Division applied the first rule in an initial inquiry case]; see also
In re E.C. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 123, 155 [for purposes of
prejudice, “distinction” between “deficiency with the duty of

                                 15
initial inquiry” and “failure to conduct a further inquiry” “does
not result in a different outcome”].) In our view, to unequivocally
affirm leaves intact a judicial finding of ICWA compliance that is
not—as the parties concede here—supported by substantial
evidence; that the juvenile court may make a different finding
regarding the Department’s compliance with ICWA at some
different and later point in time does not, in our view, render the
finding before us now sufficiently valid to affirm (under the
second rule), or moot (under the third rule), or unripe (under the
fourth rule). And where a dispositional order is separately
appealable, we see no point in severing the court’s ICWA finding
and construing just part of the appeal as a petition for writ
review (under the fifth rule).
       We also conclude that the appeal is not moot. The
Department urges that the appeal is moot because the ICWA
finding father attacks is from a dispositional order, and some
courts have found such appeals to be moot; as explained above,
we have opted not to follow that precedent. The appeal is also
not moot on the theory that the Department has, since this
appeal was filed, fully discharged its duties of further inquiry and
notice. It has not. Even the Department’s post-appeal efforts do
not reveal that it has attempted to contact all of mothers siblings
or half siblings regarding the missing information regarding
maternal grandfather, that it has undertaken other searches to
track him down, that it has attempted to contact paternal
grandfather or father’s siblings, or that it has undertaken efforts
to informally contact the two new possible tribes that have

                                16
popped up—namely, the “Barefoot” and Choctaw tribes.6 And
although the juvenile court’s post-appeal order requiring further
inquiry by the Department and specifying that it will make an
ICWA finding at the 12-month status review hearing indicates
the court’s willingness to revisit the ICWA issue, that order does
not expressly state that the court made no ICWA finding at the
dispositional hearing or vacates that finding. And even if it were
moot, we would exercise our discretion to resolve this appeal to
provide further guidance on what the Department has yet to do
before it has discharged its duties under ICWA.

6     We accordingly deny the Department’s motion to dismiss
this appeal as moot.
      We note that the reference to “Barefoot” tribal heritage in
the Department’s report either is not accurate or is not to a
recognized tribe.

                                17
                           DISPOSITION
       The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are affirmed in
part; the juvenile court’s implicit finding that Duane is not an
“Indian child” is vacated, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings in which (1) the Department shall make reasonable
efforts to inquire of all known and available family members—
including maternal and paternal aunts and uncles, maternal
grandfather, and paternal grandfather—whether Duane is or
may be an Indian child; (2) the Department shall document these
efforts to the juvenile court; (3) the juvenile court shall make an
express finding regarding ICWA’s applicability; and (4)
depending on the court’s finding, the court and the Department
shall proceed in accordance with sections 224.2 and 224.3.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                                     ______________________, J.
                                     HOFFSTADT

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.
LUI

_________________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST

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