Court Opinion

ID: 9689725
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:44:22.045104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.746598
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant’s conviction for felony-murder. Although defense counsel did not object to it, the trial judge’s refusal to allow the jury to review vital testimony was a violation of MCR 6.414(H), and constituted error requiring reversal. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096; People v Howe, 392 Mich 670; 221 NW2d 350 (1974).
i
At the beginning of the proceedings, the judge told the jury that transcripts of the testimony would not be available during the trial. Also, she exercised her discretion not to permit the jury to take notes. MCR 6.414(C). Later, she refused to allow the jury to review the testimony of Norman Mackin and three police officers, leaving to its “collective memor[y]” the jury’s determination of Mackin’s credibility.
Mr. Mackin’s testimony, alone, occupied over one hundred pages of trial transcript. He often rambled and related tangential matters.1 He offered no fewer *221than five reasons, not all mutually consistent, why he had decided to testify against his former cellmate.2
The jury also requested the testimony of three of the officers involved with the case. Each had testified about matters relating to Mackin’s credibility.3 Without Mackin’s testimony, the police could not have presented a prima facie case.
As previous opinions of this Court have pointed out, during deliberations a jury may disagree about or fail to recall collectively how a particular witness testified. Howe, supra at 676; People v Smith, 396 Mich 109; 240 NW2d 202 (1976). MCR 6.414(H) assists in these situations, directing that a trial judge may not refuse a jury’s reasonable request for a review of the testimony.
In this case, the jury’s request was reasonable. Satisfying it would have helped the jury assess the numerous conflicts in Mackin’s long-winded testimony.
n
The trial court’s refusal to allow the jury to review the requested testimony violated MCR 6.414(H). The *222majority finds that defense counsel’s failure to object when the judge announced her decision foreclosed reversal by this Court. I disagree.
This Court can and should correct unpreserved error in pleadings and procedure when it has caused a miscarriage of justice. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. Upon occasion, we have found that a judge’s foreclosure of a jury’s review of testimony merits reversal, even if defense counsel has neglected to object. Howe, supra at 678. Although the majority cites Howe in a footnote, it fails to offer a convincing reason to depart from Howe’s result.4
In footnote 10 of its opinion, the majority recognizes the gravity of the error and the clear violation of the court rule. The footnote admonishes trial courts not to foreclose a jury’s review of trial testimony, as happened in this case. I join in that.
However, a truly meaningful admonition, one more likely to alter the course of future trials, would lie in finding that the error requires reversal. A miscarriage of justice is invited when a jury is pressed to arrive at a verdict, after indicating it has serious unanswered questions concerning key evidence presented. Also, I caution against the appearance of sending a message to trial courts that expediting matters on the court’s docket is paramount to assuring rehable jury verdicts.
*223m
The majority characterizes defendant’s failure to object as a waiver of the error, rather than a forfeiture. According to the majority, a waiver extinguishes appellate review, distinguishing this case from Howe.
This Court may review and correct even unpreserved trial error if, otherwise, a miscarriage of justice would result. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. In People v Dorrikccs, 354 Mich 303, 316; 92 NW2d 305 (1958), we explained:
Ordinarily where no timely objection was made to the introduction of such testimony and no request to charge was made, this Court would not examine the points relied upon for reversal, and except under unusual circumstances we have no disposition to relax this rule. Nevertheless, as in a number of previous cases, this Court, in the exercise of supervisory control over all litigation, has often asserted the right to consider manifest and serious errors although objection was not made by the party who appeals. The inherent power of this Court to prevent fundamental injustice is not limited by what appellant is entitled to as a matter of right.
Contrary to this principle, the majority asserts that defendant, acting through his attorney, relinquished his right to appellate review of this issue. In doing so, the majority relies on federal precedent relating to appellate procedure. It produces no Michigan law to support its assertion that, if defense counsel waives defendant’s right to trial error, this Court cannot review it, even if a fundamental injustice results. This conclusion improperly limits our power to ensure justice is done; it contradicts several of our earlier opin*224ions5 and the plain language of MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096.
When a judge instructs a jury in a manner that prejudices a defendant, the fact that defense counsel expresses satisfaction with the instruction given does not preclude review by this Court. People v Lenkevich, 394 Mich 117, 122-123; 229 NW2d 298 (1975). “ ‘Defendant has a right to have a properly instructed jury pass upon the evidence.’ ” Id. at 123. Similarly, if a judge prejudices a party by foreclosing review of a transcript in violation of MCR 6.414(H), a subsequent unreliable verdict should not stand, merely because of defense counsel’s acquiescence.
I would review the unpreserved error in this case under the standard we enunciated in People v Cannes, 460 Mich 750; 597 NW2d 130 (1999): “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error ‘ “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” independent of the defendant’s innocence.’ ” Carines at 763. Here, the trial court’s refusal of the jury’s request for clarification of evidence compromised the integrity and public reputation of the judicial proceedings.
IV
Refusing to allow the jury to review a witness’ testimony, in violation of MCR 6.414(H), when the outcome of the case hinges on the credibility of the wit*225ness, merits reversal. This pertains even if the error is unpreserved or if defense counsel acquiesces in the trial court’s error. Asking the jury to formulate a just verdict without assuring it access to all vital facts bodes against a reliable result.
The decision of the Court of Appeals reversing defendant’s conviction should be affirmed.

 The trial judge, herself, acknowledged that Mackin was “rather talkative.”

 At one point, Maekin indicated that he was testifying because the victiin’s family deserved justice. He wanted a retrial of the charges against him, pictures of the scene of the crime for which he was convicted, and protection in the federal prisoner system. He wanted a letter to the judge who sentenced him, requesting credit for good time on his current sentence.

 Lieutenant William Presley interviewed Maekin and took his initial statement. Officer Collins also spoke with him on several occasions, and was present when the family was allowed to plead with him to testify. Lieutenant William Rice testified that none of the facts of the murder were given to the Department of Corrections. He thereby rebutted defense counsel’s theory that Maekin saw defendant’s parole records and learned about the murder in that manner, rather than in discussions with Macldn.

 I do not propose a rule of automatic reversal in cases where a judge refuses to allow a jury to rehear testimony. However, the error in this case merits reversal because here, as in Howe, the jury’s decision pivoted on whether it found credible Macldn’s extensive and lengthy testimony. Id. at 678.

 See People v Snow, 386 Mich 586, 591; 194 NW2d 314 (1972); People v Harrison, 386 Mich 269, 275; 191 NW2d 371 (1971); People v Shirk, 383 Mich 180, 194; 174 NW2d 772 (1970).