Court Opinion

ID: 9683638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:34:00.631268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.329293
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The instructions given by the court could not have confused an average jury; and, in reference to this particular jury, the trial court declared in its order granting a new trial that “ . . . the court does not believe that the jury was misled . . . .” However, a new trial was ordered on the predicate that the “Notes on Use” reference MAI 4.01 were not complied with. Such notes call for modification of the printed instruction, where there is evidence of “two different occurrences,” by adding “some descriptive term” to limit the jury’s consideration to the specific occurrence from which the alleged damages flowed. For purposes of this dissent, it will be assumed that compliance would have necessitated only the addition of the date of November 9, 1966, under any view of the facts. However, such a modification is not mandatory in all cases involving claimants that might have had some pre-exist-ing condition or have suffered some traumatic experience, as is true of most plaintiffs, but only where there is reason to believe a jury may be confused as to the issue it must decide. The record makes it abundantly clear that the cause was fairly tried by skilled counsel on both sides. Each of them, from voir dire to closing statement, precisely delineated the question, i. e., what damage did plaintiff suffer on November 9, 1966? In fact, the trial court in its order specifically found that the “issue was sharply drawn throughout the case.”
This case does not involve an unauthorized deviation from a mandatory instruction as was done in Brown v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 421 S.W.2d 255 (Mo. Banc 1967), nor does it involve a “Notes on Use” that would be compulsory in certain well defined circumstances. To the *851contrary, the notes following MAI 4.01 allow for alternative possibilities, dependent upon the facts. The propriety of the alternative chosen must he resolved on a basis of prejudice or no prejudice. The trial court, as noted, found that there was none.
Furthermore, the adoption of approved instructions did not abolish all of the existing law pertaining to instructions. The MAI approved book under the caption “Annotations To How To Use This Book,” has a sub-title “Old Principles Still In Force” at page LIX. Thereunder, sub-paragraph No. 9, entitled “Clarifying Instructions” reads:
“Party deeming instruction insufficient should offer clarifying instruction at trial. State v. Campbell, 433 S.W.2d 606 [7, 8] [Mo.].
Where instruction (Modified MAI 13.05, defining agency) was unclear, but not erroneous, opponent should offer clarifying instruction to preserve error. Tietjens v. General Motors Corp., 418 S.W. 2d 75 [9] [Mo.].
Generality in plaintiff’s MAI 4.01 cured by defendant’s failure to offer a more specific damage instruction. Miller v. Ranson & Co., 407 S.W.2d 48 [11] [Mo.].”
See also Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 93 [11-13] (Mo.1970), and Crawford v. Smith, 470 S.W.2d 529, 533 [9] (Mo. Banc 1971).
The instruction given by plaintiff, which was MAI 4.01, did not misdirect the jury; and, if defendant thought it should have been more specific, the law clearly placed the burden on it to request a clarifying instruction. Its failure to make such a request constituted a waiver of any right to make a later complaint.
In addition, it appears that defendant elected to give its own limiting instruction (No. 3) to specify the date of November 9, 1966. Instructions are to be read together, and defendant had the benefit of any limiting instruction thought necessary. Technical errors, if one reasonably did occur in this case, should not call for the expense of retrial of a cause fairly tried and fairly submitted in the first instance.
Since the majority opinion will be the law, I would recommend that MAI 4.01 be corrected to require the date of the event in question in all damage instructions. Only by doing that can we avoid placing all plaintiffs in the quandry of fearing an unlawful deviation by adding a date or reversal if they do not.