Court Opinion

ID: 9831105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:49:12.027372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:30.825798
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In their motion for rehearing, counsel for plaintiff earnestly insist that in the absence of any pleading By the defendant that the allegation in plaintiff's petition of cloud on his title by the unlawful levy of execution, was made for the fraudulent purpose of fixing venue of the suit in Harrison County, the trial court had no other alternative than to overrule the plea, and therefore there was no proper basis for our conclusion that plaintiff’s right to still maintain the suit in Harrison County had become moot; citing several decisions, including Farmers’ Seed & Gin Co. v. Brooks, 125 Tex. 234, 81 S.W.2d 675; Highway Motor Freight Lines v. Slaughter, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 533; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Harrison, Tex.Civ.App., 131 S.W.2d 742; Vitopil v. Gray, Tex.Civ.App., 111 S.W.2d 1202; 43 Tex.Jur. par. 119, page 862.
As shown in plaintiff’s petition, which was expressly made a part of his controverting affidavit, in reply to the plea of privilege, the gravamen of his suit was to remove cloud from his title, with specific allegations that after the levy defendant had refused to release the levy of the execution upon plaintiff’s request therefor. Nor did plaintiff object to the evidence introduced by defendant, showing the release of the levy on the ground that defendant had not challenged the good faith of plaintiff’s allegations of an unlawful levy of the execution in Harrison County.
In further support of our conclusions that plaintiff’s right to maintain venue in Harrison County had become moot, a multitude of other decisions might be added, including those cited in support of this announcement in 3 Tex.Jur. par. 25, page 69:
“A case is said to be moot when the question to be determined is abstract, that is, one which does not rest upon existing facts or rights, as when the right that was involved in the action no longer exists or has abated on the death’ of the defendant. A similar condition has been held to arise when the owner has sold premises alleged to have been kept as a nuisance or when the subject matter of the litigation has been disposed of by legislation. And where the sole relief sought is the cancellation of a lease which already has been canceled, the case is clearly moot.
“An appellate court may receive extraneous proof to the effect that the issues involved in an' appeal have become moot. And it is well settled that if, pending review of a judgment of the lower court, an event intervenes which renders it impossible to grant effectual relief, the court will not proceed to review the case but will dismiss the proceeding.”
Among the decisions noted in support of that text is Richmond v. Hog Creek Oil Co., Tex.Com.App., 239 S.W. 904, 905 That was a suit to cancel an oil and ga-lease. After it reached the Supreme Court, the defendant in the case, against whom cancellation was sought, filed a duly verified suggestion that the lease had been cancelled during pendency of the appeal. In the opinion of the court, the surrender and cancellation of the lease was noted, following which this was said: “Therefore, in brief, we have here a suit where the sole relief sought is the cancellation of a lease which has already been canceled. The case is now clearly moot.” Citing decisions in support of that conclusion, including several by the Supreme Court. See, also, a multitude of decisions to the same effect noted in 1 Tex. Jur.Supplement (1937), pages 118 to 120, inclusive.
The decisions cited by plaintiff, noted above, did not involve the question now under discussion, and therefore they are distinguishable from those cited by us in support of the conclusions we have reached.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.