Court Opinion

ID: 9389971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 16:07:50.076906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:30.828656
License: Public Domain

J-S10010-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    LOUIS ROY ZERUTH                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2172 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 11, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-45-CR-0000611-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                             FILED APRIL 26, 2023

       Louis Roy Zeruth appeals the judgement of sentence entered by the

Monroe County Court of Common Pleas on July 11, 2022. Specifically, Zeruth

claims the sentencing court abused its discretion by relying on the uncertain

assumption that Zeruth would be accepted into the state drug treatment

program and failing to weigh the legislative intent of DUI sentencing

guidelines.

       For purposes of this appeal, the following factual and procedural history

is undisputed. The Commonwealth charged Zeruth with driving a lawnmower

on a public road while under the influence of narcotics.1 Zeruth entered into a

____________________________________________

1Testing revealed the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and
marijuana in Zeruth’s blood.
J-S10010-23

negotiated guilty plea agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, Zeruth pleaded

guilty to driving under the influence (“DUI”) - general impairment in exchange

for the Commonwealth dismissing all associated charges. While this was

Zeruth’s fourth conviction for DUI, for sentencing purposes it was treated as

a second offense.

      In preparation for sentencing, the court ordered that a Pre-Sentence

Investigation (“PSI”) report be prepared and Zeruth undergo a drug and

alcohol evaluation. However, Zeruth failed to appear for the PSI interview and

did not complete the evaluations. See Id. at 2. After Zeruth failed to appear

for the sentencing hearing, the court issued a bench warrant and Zeruth was

arrested.

      The PSI report and drug and alcohol evaluations were performed while

Zeruth was in custody, and he appeared for sentencing on July 11, 2022. The

court sentenced Zeruth to 15-60 months of incarceration. See Order-

Sentencing, 7/11/22, at 1. Additionally, Zeruth was ordered to pay $1,950 in

fines plus court costs, undergo DUI multiple offender program, complete drug

and alcohol treatment, and undergo an 18-month driver’s license suspension.

                                    -2-
J-S10010-23

       Zeruth filed for reconsideration of the controlled-substances sentence

which was denied after a hearing on July 26, 2022. See Order-Reconsideration

of Sentence, 7/26/22. He now appeals.2

       On appeal, Zeruth raises two separate challenges to the sentence

imposed. First, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing

because the sentencing court assumed that Zeruth would be accepted into the

state drug treatment program when such enrollment was not assured.

Second, Zeruth claims the trial court abused its discretion by failing to weigh

the legislature’s intent by providing for a mandatory minimum sentence of

thirty (30) days in DUI sentencing guidelines. Zeruth concedes that both of

his issues raise challenges to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See

Appellant’s Brief at 9, 16.

       We therefore review the sentence imposed for an abuse of discretion.

See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007). “Sentencing

is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a

sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super.

2006)(citations omitted). The right to appeal from the discretionary aspects

____________________________________________

2The court sentenced Zeruth on a charge that he possessed narcotics when
he was a passenger in a friend’s truck at trial court docket number 1248 CR
2021. Zeruth did not file an appeal from the sentence imposed at 1248 CR
2021. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/7/22, at 4.

                                           -3-
J-S10010-23

of a sentence is not absolute. See Id. at 1274. To challenge the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, an appellant must invoke a four-part test:

      We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
      Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
      that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
      Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation

and brackets omitted). While a failure to include the Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

statement does not automatically waive an appellant’s argument, “we are

precluded from reaching the merits of the claim when the Commonwealth

lodges an objection to the omission of the statement.” See Commonwealth

v. Roser, 914 A.2d 447, 457 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

      Applying the four-part test, it is apparent that Zeruth failed to meet the

third requirement because his brief has a fatal defect. Specifically, Zeruth

failed to include in his appellate brief the separate concise statement required

by rule Pa.R.A.P 2119(f):

      (f) Discretionary aspects of sentence. An appellant who
      challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence in a criminal
      matter shall set forth in a separate section of the brief a concise
      statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
      respect to the discretionary aspects of a sentence. The statement
      shall immediately precede the argument on the merits with
      respect to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.

The Commonwealth objected to the fatal defect in Zeruth’s brief: “At no point

does [Zeruth] set forth a Rule 2119(f) concise statement of a colorable claim

                                     -4-
J-S10010-23

alleging that his sentence is inconsistent with a provision of the Sentencing

Code    or   a   fundamental   norm    underlying    the   sentencing    process.”

Commonwealth’s Brief, 2/6/2023, at 7. Recognizing the Commonwealth’s

objection, we are precluded from addressing the merits of Zeruth’s claim on

appeal and therefore, his issue is waived.

       However, in reviewing Zeruth’s claim, we noted the sentence imposed

by the trial court included an 18-month driver’s license suspension. See

Order-Sentencing, at 1. In imposing the suspension, the court acted outside

its authority and, therefore, that aspect of the sentence is illegal. Although

Zeruth did not raise this issue in his appeal, we may raise the issue of

sentencing legality sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d

358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013).        “If no statutory authorization exists for a

particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal

sentence must be vacated.” Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227, 230

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted).

       While the judiciary’s role is “limited to determining guilt” of DUI, the

Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Code grants the executive branch, through the

Department of Transportation, the authority to issue, regulate and suspend

motor vehicle licenses. Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 500-

501 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). “Under our statutory scheme, actual

imposition of a license suspension has been vested in an administrative

agency over which the criminal judge has no control and for which he has no

                                       -5-
J-S10010-23

responsibility.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, section

3804 of our Motor Vehicle Code, which became effective November 8, 2022,

grants the Department of Transportation the exclusive authority to impose

suspensions:

       The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an
       individual . . . upon receiving a certified record of the individual’s
       conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for:

              (i)       an offense under section 3802 [relating to DUI
                        offenses.]

75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(1)(i).

       Pennsylvania law grants the Department of Transportation, not the

courts, the authority to impose license suspensions. Therefore, the trial court

in this case lacked the authority to suspend Zeruth’s license and, in that

respect, the sentence is illegal. As a result, we vacate the license suspension

aspects of the July 11, 2022 sentence.3 We affirm all other aspects of his

judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, vacated in part.

____________________________________________

3 To be clear, our holding does not preclude the Department of Transportation
from suspending Zeruth’s license in accordance with its legal duties.

                                           -6-
J-S10010-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/26/2023

                          -7-