Court Opinion

ID: 9865689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:36:24.215015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:50:13.494513
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
KEETON, Justice.
Rehearing was granted in the above case and the issues reargued on December 7, 1949. Respondent contends that the sale of liquor charged having occurred “outside of the incorporated limits of any city, or village, it follows that the defendant (respondent) could not under any circumstances have obtained or had in his possession a license at .the time of the commission of the act charged, and if he shall be con*7victed of a felony he will be drastically punished for not having that which he could not obtain”. And further “that in' the (■rime of selling liquor without a license, that the failure to have the license at the time of making such sale is the 'Gist’ of the offense; and, therefore, if it was impossible for him to obtain a license, he could be convicted of a misdemeanor only and be punishable under the provisions of the 1939 Act.” Section 23-602, I.C.
In support of respondent’s contention, he cites: Moore v. State, 126 Ga. 414, 55 S.E. 327 and Mitchell v. Dixon, 140 Tex. 520, 168 S.W.2d 654.
These cases, even if considered in point, are contrary to the great weight of American authority.
In 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors, § 132, page 241, the rule is stated as follows: “It is no justification to one selling liquor without a license, and no defense to a prosecution for unlicensed selling, that it was impossible for him to obtain a license, either because there was no provision for granting licenses in the particular district, or no officer competent to issue it, or for other reasons.”
The rule is stated in 30 Am.Jur. 470, paragraph 405, as follows: “ * * * according to the great weight of authority, the impossibility of securing a license [to sell intoxicating liquor] * * * is no excuse, although a few cases take the contrary view. In the cases taking the view that the defense is not good, the impossibility of obtaining a license may be due to a variety of causes, such as legislation forbidding traffic in liquors or the issuance of licenses, the absence of an officer or tribfinal authorized to grant licenses, or the absence of a statute authorizing their issuance M= * * »
The same contention made here was urged in the case of People v. Minter, 73 Cal.App.2d 994, 167 P.2d 11, 13. The defendant in that case had sold a bottle of whisky during hours that the sale of liquor "was prohibited. The defendant argued that as the sale took place at an hour when a licensee could not legally make a sale, it follows that he had not done an act which a holder of a license might perform, hence no crime had been committed. The court disposing of the matter said: “ * * * to place the interpretation upon section 3 contended for by the defendant would result in permitting an unlicensed person to sell intoxicating liquor with impunity during the hours a licensed person is expressly forbidden to do so. * * * In construing a statute it must be remembered that no law is to be construed in such a manner as to result in a palpable absurdity.”
In the case of State v. Ely, 22 S.D. 487, 118 N.W. 687, 688, 18 Ann.Cas. 92, the defendant was charged with engaging in the business of selling brewed, malt, fermented and intoxicating liquors at retail without having paid to the said County of Kingsbury the license fee required by law. The de*8fendant demurred to the information on the ground it charged no public offense in that it failed to show that the business could be engaged in in said city and county, and the offense charged being engaging in a business without paying the fee.
The territory in which the information charged the offense was committed was territory in which no license could be secured. The court held: “The offense was selling liquor without a license, and it was immaterial upon that question whether or not Spink county had voted for or against the sale, or whether ‘local option’ was in force when the indictment was presented. The penalty for selling liquor without a license remained the same through all changes regarding ‘local option’.”
In an annotation to this case, found at 18 Ann.Cas. at page 95, the author, citing cases from Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska and Vermont, states the rule as follows: “The great weight of authority favors the rule, as laid down in the reported case, that the impossibility of securing a license is no defense in a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquors without a license.” The author recognizes a minority rule in Georgia.
To follow the construction contended for by respondent, would, in effect, authorize the indiscriminate sale of intoxicating liquors in a “dry territory” subjecting the offender to a lesser penalty than in an area where the sale under license could be lawfully made. Such an interpretation cannot be upheld.
Other contentions advanced by respondent on rehearing were sufficiently discussed and decided in the original opinion filed.
We therefore adhere to the ruling made in the decision filed October 5, 1949.
HOLDEN, C. J., and GIVENS and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
PORTER, J., concurs in the conclusion reached.