Court Opinion

ID: 9396816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:25.879402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.104089
License: Public Domain

J-S03020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GERARD GETHERS                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :    No. 912 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000845-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                                 FILED MAY 23, 2023

        Gerard Gethers (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas following his jury

conviction of first-degree murder1 and related charges for the November 3,

2020, shooting death of Jerry White.               On appeal, he challenges three

evidentiary rulings, as well as the sufficiency and weight of the evidence

supporting his convictions.        As we discuss infra, we vacate the sentence

imposed on Appellant’s firearms conviction and remand for resentencing on

the offense; in all other respects, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).
J-S03020-23

                     I.     FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      The trial court summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s jury

trial as follows:

            [Appellant] shot and killed Jerry White on November 3,
      2020, at approximately 3:35 p.m., in front of West Cali Tattoo at
      518 West Marshall Street in Norristown, Montgomery County. At
      the time, White was the sole eyewitness against [Appellant] in a
      pending[, unrelated] aggravated assault case, a fact known to
      [Appellant] when he killed White.

             In the aftermath of the shooting of White, law enforcement
      collected video surveillance from more than a dozen nearby
      businesses and residences, constituting hours of footage from
      both before and after the shooting. The footage, when viewed in
      chronological order, showed [Appellant] leave a residence at 518
      West Lafayette Street in Norristown at approximately 3:24 p.m.
      He was wearing a black Nike jacket with a zipper front. He had
      the hood pulled tight around his face and was wearing a “Covid”
      mask. He also wore black pants with three stripes down the side
      and white high top sneakers.3
      __________
             3Further analysis of the surveillance video footage would
      reveal that [Appellant] wore a large-faced watch on his left wrist
      and had a distinctive tattoo on his left hand.
      _________

             The surveillance footage showed [Appellant] walk from West
      Lafayette Street to the corner of Chain and Marshall Streets. At
      the time, White and four other males4 were standing nearby,
      outside of West Cali Tattoo. Rather than continue to walk toward
      them, thereby being seen, [Appellant] turned around and went
      back down Chain Street, then up Haws Alley, which runs behind
      West Marshall Street. [Appellant] came back around to West
      Marshall Street at 3:35 p.m., such that the was able to approach
      the males more surreptitiously.5 He then pulled out a .380 caliber
      pistol and fired three shots in the direction of White. The four
      other males standing nearby scattered, but White, having been
      hit by at least two of the bullets, took a few steps before collapsing
      into the street, almost being struck by a passing vehicle. White
      suffered gunshot wounds to his left armpit, left forearm and back.

                                      -2-
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     The bullet that entered White’s back pierced several organs and
     his aorta, resulting in White’s rapid death.
     __________
           4Jayden Guidici, Quadir Miller, Stephon Windbush and an
     unidentified bystander.
           5  Norristown Police Detective Brian Saxon testified that he
     is familiar with the route [Appellant] walked from West Lafayette
     Street to the tattoo shop and that it is reasonable given the pace
     observed that . . . it would take approximately 11 minutes.
     __________

           After firing the fatal shots, [Appellant] returned on foot to
     the West Lafayette Street residence he had left earlier in the
     afternoon. Nearby surveillance footage showed him follow a
     woman into the residence at 3:41 p.m.6

     __________
           6  Detective Saxon testified that [Appellant] took a more
     direct route back to West Lafayette Street and that it was
     reasonable for this return trip to take about six minutes. The
     woman who entered the residence with [Appellant] would be
     identified as Jackie McNelly, who lives at the property. She
     testified that [Appellant] is a family friend who came to her house
     on the afternoon of the day of the shooting. [Appellant] left for a
     while and returned later that afternoon. She identified [Appellant]
     as the man who followed her into her house. At some point during
     her encounter with [Appellant] that day, McNelly saw him sitting
     in a black four-door vehicle, which was parked in an alley near her
     house. Surveillance video of [Appellant] outside of McNelly’s
     house, compared with footage of the shooter, not only showed
     similar clothing but also revealed an identical scuff mark on the
     right sneaker and identical sneaker tread.
     __________

           No one at the scene of the shooting identified the shooter.
     Detective Charles Leeds of the Norristown Police Department
     immediately thought of [Appellant], however, upon hearing that
     White had been killed. Detective Leeds had known White for many
     years and knew he was an eyewitness against [Appellant] in
     connection with [Appellant’s] alleged non-fatal shooting of Rodney
     Harris on May 12, 2019, in Norristown.7 Because Harris had
     refused to cooperate with police after he had been shot, White
     was the lone witness against [Appellant]. Indeed, [Appellant] was

                                    -3-
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     charged with aggravated assault for the shooting of Harris after
     White had identified [him] from a photo array and had given a
     statement to police. [Appellant] was arrested in that case in
     October 2019 and held on cash bail. At his preliminary hearing
     on November 6, 2019, he learned that White, whom [Appellant]
     knew as “Spider,” was a witness against him.
     __________
           7  A subsequent check of law enforcement databases
     indicated that White, at the time of his death, was not involved as
     a party or a witness in any other criminal cases pending in
     Norristown or Philadelphia.
     __________

           The following day, during a recorded prison telephone call,
     the person speaking with [Appellant] asked when [Appellant]
     would get his discovery so he could find out who was snitching.
     [Appellant] responded that he had found out the day before and
     that he was going to “pin” that person. In a second prison.
     telephone call that same day, [Appellant] referenced “Spider,” and
     described him as hanging out at the tattoo shop all the time. He
     also said that the person “would be gone” if [Appellant] ever
     caught him.

            At a bail hearing on July 31, 2020, [Appellant’s] then-
     attorney argued in favor of his release by suggesting the case was
     weak because, inter alia, someone identified as “Spider” was the
     only witness against [Appellant]. [Appellant] was released on bail
     that day, but reincarcerated on September 1, 2020. He was
     released again, this time on house arrest with electronic
     monitoring, on October 8, 2020, and eventually began working at
     a local Wendy’s restaurant. He did not appear for his scheduled
     shifts, however, on November 2 and November 3, 2020.
     Electronic monitoring also showed [Appellant] did not return to his
     residence by the approved time of 2:00 a.m., on November 3.8
     _________
           8   [Appellant] subsequently removed his electronic
     monitoring device and was not wearing it when he was arrested
     in this case.
     __________

           Instead, [Appellant] arrived at some point on November 2
     to the Lafayette Hill, Montgomery County, home of Demesha
     Bruce, the mother of his young child. Bruce saw [Appellant]
     driving a black car that day and believed it to be a Cadillac.

                                    -4-
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      [Appellant] left Bruce’s house on the morning of November 3 and
      arrived at McNelly’s house at approximately 2:52 p.m. He then
      left McNelly’s house on foot at 3:24 p.m. The shooting occurred
      at 3:35 p.m., and [Appellant] reentered McNelly’s house at
      approximately 3:41 p.m. The black Cadillac drove away from the
      area at 3:46 p.m. [Appellant] then returned in the vehicle9 to
      Bruce’s house around 5:50 p.m.10

      __________
            9 Law enforcement subsequently located the black Cadillac
      in Bucks County. The vehicle was registered to Todd Green, who
      previously had agreed to sell the vehicle to [Appellant] and had
      allowed [Appellant] to have possession of it. A subsequent search
      of the vehicle revealed [Appellant’s] Wendy’s uniform.
            10During police questioning, Bruce identified [Appellant]
      from still photos of surveillance footage and indicated that
      [Appellant] had a similar looking jacket, pants, sneakers and
      watch. Law enforcement obtained a video Bruce had received on
      her cell phone from [Appellant] on October 13, 2020, which
      showed [him] wearing a similar jacket as the shooter and bearing
      a similar tattoo on his left hand.        They were aware from
      [Appellant’s] arrest in the underlying aggravated assault case that
      [Appellant] had a distinctive tattoo on his left hand. A still photo
      of [Appellant] taken in August 2020 and retrieved from Bruce’s
      cell phone depicted him wearing pants and sneakers similar to
      those worn by the shooter.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/2/22, at 1-6 (record citations & some footnotes omitted). The

Commonwealth also presented the following evidence regarding Appellant’s

actions after the shooting:

      [Appellant] walked out of Bruce’s residence in Lafayette Hill in the
      early morning hours of November 4 and the Cadillac is seen
      driving away. At approximately 5:45 a.m. that same morning, a
      black Cadillac is seen parked in front of 1225 Route 313 in Bucks
      County. Around the same time and near the same location,
      [Appellant] got into a white van and drove to the Cadillac. He
      stopped briefly to retrieve some items before getting back in the
      van and driving to Norristown. At approximately 6:45 a.m.,
      [Appellant] parked the van in the same general area as where the

                                     -5-
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       Cadillac had been parked in Norristown the day before and entered
       McNelly’s house.

Id. at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

       Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree

murder, third-degree murder, intimidation of a witness (two counts),

retaliation against a witness, persons not to possess firearms, possession of a

firearm without a license, possessing an instrument of crime (PIC), and

recklessly endangering another person (REAP) (four counts).2

       On May 24, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking

to introduce, at trial, evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts pursuant to Pa.R.E.

404(b).3 First, the Commonwealth sought to present evidence Appellant was

charged with aggravated assault for an unrelated shooting, and that the victim

herein, White, was the sole witness against Appellant in that pending

proceeding.      It requested the court admit the following evidence:         (1)

testimony of a witness who heard Appellant state he intended to “get even”

with White;4 (2) White’s written police statement in the unrelated case; (3)

testimony by detectives in the aggravated assault case confirming that White

____________________________________________

218 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c), 4952(a)(1), (3), 4953(a), 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1),
907(a), and 2705, respectively.

3 Pa.R.E. 404(b) prohibits admission of a defendant’s prior bad acts to prove
the defendant’s character, unless such evidence is admitted for other
purposes. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2).

4 Although the trial court subsequently ruled this evidence was admissible, the
witness in question died of an overdose before trial. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 57-
60; N.T., 1/31/22, at 12-13. Therefore, this testimony was not presented at
trial.

                                           -6-
J-S03020-23

identified Appellant as the shooter; and (4) testimony from Appellant’s bail

hearing in the aggravated assault case that his attorney stated the only

witness   against   Appellant   was   “Spider,”   White’s   nickname.     See

Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce Evidence of Appellant’s Other

Bad Acts, 5/24/21, at 15-16. The Commonwealth argued the evidence was

necessary to prove the witness intimidation and retaliation charges, and

admissible to establish Appellant’s motive for the murder and to present a

complete story of the incident, i.e., res gestae evidence. Id. at 14-15, 17.

      Second, the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence that Appellant

was incarcerated on the unrelated aggravated assault charge from October

17, 2019, until October 8, 2020, when he was released on house arrest, and

that he absconded from supervision on November 3, 2020, the day of White’s

shooting. See Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce Evidence of

Appellant’s Other Bad Acts at 20-21.        It maintained this evidence was

admissible pursuant to the “identity, opportunity, absence of mistake or

accident, and ‘res gestae’ exceptions under Rule 404(b).” Id. at 21.

      Four days later, Appellant filed a motion in limine, seeking to preclude

certain evidence, including, inter alia: (1) White’s verbal and written

statements to police in the unrelated aggravated assault case; and (2) the

Commonwealth’s edited version of the surveillance video purporting to show

the shooter’s movements, which included zooming, pausing, and captions.

See Appellant’s Motion in Limine, 5/28/21, at 2-3 (unpaginated). With regard

to White’s statements, Appellant argued that the statements constituted

                                      -7-
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hearsay, and their admission would violate his Confrontation Clause rights

under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See id.

      The trial court conducted a pretrial hearing on June 9, 2021, to consider

the competing motions in limine. With regard to the surveillance video, the

parties agreed that the zooming and pausing of the video was admissible, so

long as the Commonwealth also showed the video at full speed and removed

all captions. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 12-13; see also Order, 1/18/22. Appellant

also orally objected to the admission of dash cam video from a van he

allegedly drove on the day after the murder. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 71-72. He

maintained the video depicted the van being driven recklessly throughout the

night. See id. The court ruled that evidence Appellant abandoned a Cadillac

(the vehicle purportedly driven by the shooter) in Bucks County, and drove

the van back to Norristown “with some of his possessions in it . . . seem[ed]

relevant and appropriate[.]” Id. at 98. However, the court questioned the

relevancy of video allegedly showing Appellant’s reckless driving and indicated

that the Commonwealth could edit out that part of the video. See id. at 97-

98.

      With regard to the evidence establishing White was a witness against

Appellant in the unrelated aggravated assault case, the court found this

evidence   was   “extremely   relevant”    to   establish   Appellant’s   motive,

identification and absence of mistake, as well as to show the “natural

development of the facts” of the case. See N.T., 6/9/21, at 96-97. The court

also determined the probative value of the evidence “highly outweigh[ed] any

                                     -8-
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prejudicial impact[.]”      Id. at 96.         Thus, the court stated it intended to

“generally admit[ ]” that evidence, but wanted to further consider Appellant’s

“confrontation issue.” Id. at 97.

       The case proceeded to a jury trial commencing on January 31, 2022.

Prior to the start of testimony, Appellant again challenged the relevancy of the

video evidence showing him retrieving items from the Cadillac, parked in

Bucks County, and driving back to Norristown in the van. See N.T., 1/31/22,

at 5-7. Appellant’s counsel argued that the Cadillac did not need to be a part

of the case because none of the video or witness testimony established

Appellant drove the Cadillac on the day of the shooting. See id. at 7-8. The

Commonwealth asserted, however, that the evidence concerning the Cadillac

helped corroborate the testimony of their other witnesses. Id. at 8. The court

agreed, and admitted the evidence a trial. Id.

       On February 3, 2022, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charges

of first-degree murder, intimidation of a witness (two counts), retaliation

against a witness, PIC, possession of a firearm without a license, and REAP

(four counts). The charges of third-degree murder and persons not to possess

are firearm were nol prossed by the Commonwealth.

       The trial court sentenced Appellant that same day to the mandatory

minimum term of life imprisonment.5 Appellant filed a timely post-sentence

____________________________________________

5 The court also imposed concurrent sentences of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment
for the witness intimidation charges, 2 to 4 years’ imprisonment for retaliation
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -9-
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motion challenging the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his

convictions. The trial court denied the motion on March 2, 2022, and this

timely appeal follows.6

                                 II.    ISSUES ON APPEAL

       Appellant presents five issues for our review:

       1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it
          granted the Commonwealth’s Motion in Limine to Introduce
          Evidence of Appellant’s Prior Bad Acts, including evidence of
          written and verbal statements of . . . White from the May 12,
          2019 alleged [a]ggravated [a]ssault charges, pursuant to
          Pa.R.E. 404(b)[?]

       2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it denied
          Appellant’s Motion in Limine to preclude the written and verbal
          statements of . . . White in reference to the May 12, 2019
          alleged [a]ggravated [a]ssault charge as hearsay in that the
____________________________________________

against a witness, 4 to 8 years’ imprisonment for the firearms offense, and 6
to 24 months’ imprisonment for each of the REAP charges.

      As the trial court notes in its opinion, the sentence of 4 to 8 years’
imprisonment imposed on the charge of possession of a firearm without a
license is beyond the statutory maximum term permitted by law. See Trial
Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. Because that crime is graded as a third-degree felony, the
maximum permissible sentence is seven years’ incarceration. See 18 Pa.C.S.
§§ 1103(3), 6106(a)(1). The trial court requests this Court “amend by
agreement” the sentence imposed on the firearms offense to a term of 3 to 6
years’ imprisonment, concurrent to the life sentence for first-degree murder.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. Appellant “joins in this specific request of the trial
court.” Appellant’s Brief at 21 n.1. Thus, we vacate the sentence on the
firearms offense, and remand for the court to impose the new, agreed-upon
sentence.

6Appellant complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

                                          - 10 -
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          Commonwealth did not prove that said statements met the
          hearsay exception of Pa.R.E. [ ] 806(b)(6)[?]

       3. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion when it denied
          Appellant’s Oral Pre-trial Motion to exclude a portion of the
          Commonwealth’s proposed video exhibit which showed a van
          being driven by Appellant from Bucks County to Norristown, PA
          on the day after the alleged murder as irrelevant as said portion
          of the video failed to establish a material fact, make a fact at
          issue more or less probable, or support a reasonable inference
          supporting a material fact and the probative value of its
          inclusion was outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice
          against Appellant[?]

       4. Whether the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
          support a conviction on all charges in that there was not proof
          beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual
          who shot . . . White[?]

       5. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt abused its discretion in denying
          Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion requesting a new trial as the
          jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence in that
          there was not proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
          was the individual who shot . . . White[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.7

                              III. EVIDENTIARY RULINGS

       In his first three issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary

rulings. When considering these claims, we must bear in mind the following:

       [The a]dmission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
       trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
       court clearly abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not
       merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or
       misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is

____________________________________________

7  Despite being granted two extensions of time, the Commonwealth has not
filed an appellee brief in this matter.

                                          - 11 -
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      manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or
      partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Commonwealth v. Dula, 262 A.3d 609, 626 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 273 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2022).

      We begin with the general rule that “[a]ll relevant evidence is

admissible[.]” Pa.R.E. 402. Evidence is deemed relevant if: “(a) it has any

tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the

evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

Pa.R.E. 401(a)-(b). Regardless of relevancy, however, the Pennsylvania Rules

of Evidence generally preclude the two types of evidence alleged to be at issue

herein: (1) evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or bad acts and (2) hearsay.

See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1), 802.

      Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits evidence of a defendant’s prior crimes or

bad acts simply to prove their bad character.           See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1).

However, such evidence may be admissible when offered for another purpose,

such as to prove motive, intent, identity, or absence of mistake, or pursuant

to the res gestae exception, that is, where it is “part of the history of the case

and form[s] part of the natural development of the facts.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2);

Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241, 251 (Pa. Super. 2016). “In a criminal

case, this evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the evidence

outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id.

      Rule 802 generally precludes the admission of hearsay testimony. See

Pa.R.E. 802. Hearsay is defined as “an out of court statement offered for the

truth of the matter asserted[.]” Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d

                                     - 12 -
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472, 482 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). See also Pa.R.E. 801(a)-(c).

However, an out-of-court statement that is not offered for its truth, but rather

for another reason ─ such as to “establish motive” or to “complete the story”

─ is admissible as non-hearsay.      See Manivannan, 186 A.3d at 482-83

(citations & quotation marks omitted).         Moreover, Rule 804 provides

exceptions to the rule against hearsay when, as here, the declarant is

unavailable as a witness. See Pa.R.E. 804(a)(4) (stating “[a] declarant is

considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant . . . cannot be

present or testify . . . because of death”).     Rule 804(b)(6) sets forth the

exception known as “forfeiture by wrongdoing.”          See Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6);

Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 94 (Pa. 2014).              It permits the

admission of an unavailable declarant’s statement when it is “offered against

a party that wrongfully caused . . . the declarant’s unavailability as a witness,

and did so intending that result.” Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6).

                    (a)   Evidence related to May 2019 shooting

      With these general rules in mind, we consider Appellant’s first two issues

on appeal.   Both claims challenge the trial court’s pretrial ruling admitting

prior bad acts evidence related to Appellant’s purported involvement in a May

2019 shooting, including oral and written statements victim White provided to

police implicating Appellant in that crime.

      First, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it

granted the Commonwealth’s motion in limine to introduce evidence of the

unrelated aggravated assault case when the Commonwealth failed to produce

                                     - 13 -
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any evidence at the pretrial hearing to support that ruling. See Appellant’s

Brief at 27. Indeed, he contends that the Commonwealth sought to present,

inter alia, the following evidence at trial to prove his motive for the murder of

White was retaliation for White’s cooperation with police in the aggravated

assault case: (1) White’s written statement to police implicating Appellant as

the May 2019 shooter; and (2) the testimony of a detective confirming White

identified Appellant as the May 2019 shooter.       See id. at 26.     However,

Appellant argues the Commonwealth “never produced a copy of [White’s]

written statement . . . as an exhibit at the June 9, 2021, hearing[,]” nor

presented testimony from the police detective who recorded White’s

identification of Appellant.8 Id. at 27. Thus, he insists there was “insufficient

evidence presented . . . for the trial court to weigh, examine or consider”

before rendering its decision to admit this Rule 404(b) evidence. See id. at

30.

       Appellant also contends the trial court abused its discretion when it

determined that this prior bad act evidence was admissible pursuant to the

“identity” and res gestae exceptions. See Appellant’s Brief at 30, 32-33. He

insists the “identity” exception requires proof that the prior and present crime

were “so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of
____________________________________________

8 In fact, the only prior bad acts “evidence” the Commonwealth presented at
the pretrial hearing related to the proposed testimony of the witness who
heard Appellant state he wanted to get even with White. See N.T., 6/9/21,
at 17-48. Unfortunately, as noted above, that witness died before trial and
none of the evidence concerning her proposed testimony was admitted.

                                          - 14 -
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the accused[,]” and here there was no evidence of a “signature” crime. Id.

at 30-32 (citation & quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Appellant maintains

the Commonwealth failed to establish that the May 2019 shooting “was part

of a chain, sequence, or natural development of events which formed the

history of the case” so as to satisfy the res gestae exception.        Id. at 33

(quotation marks omitted). He argues the inclusion of White’s statements in

the prior shooting case was “highly prejudicial” considering “the weakness of

[White’s] identification of Appellant in [that case] and the lack of supporting

evidence to conclude he was the shooter on May 12, 2019.” Id.

      In his second, related claim, Appellant contends the trial court abused

its discretion when it denied his motion in limine to preclude White’s prior

statements as hearsay. Appellant’s Brief at 33. He insists the statements

were not admissible pursuant to the “forfeiture by wrongdoing” exception at

Pa.R.E. 804(b)(6) because the Commonwealth “failed to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that [he] was involved in, or responsible, for

the procuring the unavailability of [ ] White and that [he] acted with the intent

of procuring [ ] White’s unavailability as an actual or potential witness.” Id.

at 35-36.

      We conclude Appellant is entitled to no relief. First, we reject Appellant’s

argument concerning the “lack of an evidentiary record” at the pretrial

hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at 30. Appellant was well aware of White’s

written police statement implicating him in the May 2019 shooting, as well as

White’s identification of Appellant in a police photo array ─ in fact, he sought

                                     - 15 -
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to preclude this same evidence in his competing motion in limine.         At the

pretrial hearing, the Commonwealth detailed the evidence it sought to

introduce at trial, which included “the written statement that . . . White gave

to Norristown Police in reference to the aggravated assault case[, and]

testimony from detectives regarding . . . White picking [Appellant] out of a

photo array . . . and identifying him as the man who shot the victim” in May

2019. N.T., 6/9/21, at 78. Appellant provides no authority for his assertion

that the Commonwealth was required to introduce the statement at issue into

evidence or present the testimony of the detective at the pretrial hearing.

Further, he does not argue that the evidence the Commonwealth later

produced at trial was different than the evidence described at the pretrial

hearing.    Indeed, Appellant lodged no objection when White’s written

statement was read to the jury, or when Detective Leeds testified that White

identified Appellant as the May 2019 shooter from a photo array. See N.T.,

2/1/22, at 95-105. Thus, his first argument fails.

      Next, while Appellant challenges the admission of evidence concerning

his involvement in the May 2019 shooting pursuant to the identity and res

gestae exceptions, he fails to address the primary reason this evidence was

admitted ─ to establish his motive for the murder of White. At the conclusion

of the pretrial hearing, the trial court opined:

      [T]he fact that [ ] White was a witness in a potential aggravated
      assault case, pending aggravated assault case, is extremely
      relevant and the probative value highly outweighs any prejudicial
      impact to [Appellant]. Clearly, there is the importance of the
      motive, to establish his motive, to establish his identification, and

                                      - 16 -
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       to establish absence of mistake or accident. It really is the basis
       for this case in the sense that it really is the keystone of the whole
       case. And the jury must hear the natural development of the facts
       in this case to understand it and the res gestae part of that is
       extremely important. So I’m generally admitting that.

N.T., 6/9/21, at 96-97.

       We agree. White’s identification of Appellant as the May 2019 shooter,

combined with evidence           that Appellant was    aware     White   was the

Commonwealth’s only witness in that case, was relevant to establish

Appellant’s motive to murder White on the day in question.                      See

Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2013) (prior bad

acts evidence that defendants in murder prosecution were rival drug dealers

of victims relevant to establish motive and “link[ ]” victims to defendants).

Appellant does not challenge this ruling ─ which we agree was correct ─ and,

thus, he is entitled to no relief.9

       Moreover, we emphasize that Appellant was also charged with both

intimidation of a witness and retaliation against a witness because White was

a witness against Appellant in the aggravated assault case. See 18 Pa.C.S.

§§ 4952(a)(1), (3), 4953(a); Bill of Information, 4/22/21, Counts 3-5. Thus,

White’s statements to police implicating Appellant in the May 2019 shooting

were clearly relevant to prove these other charges.

____________________________________________

9 We note Appellant emphasizes the “weakness of [White’s] identification” of
him as the shooter in the May 2019 aggravated assault case. See Appellant’s
Brief at 33. However, the strength or weakness of White’s identification is
irrelevant ─ the fact that White named Appellant as the culprit provides a
motive for Appellant to seek retribution against White.

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      Appellant’s hearsay argument also fails.         White’s written and oral

statements to police identifying Appellant as the May 2019 shooter do not

constitute hearsay. “Generally, our appellate courts have held that out-of-

court statements by homicide victims are admissible when the statements are

relevant for some other purpose, such as proof of motive or malice.”

Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc).

Here, the statements were not offered for their truth ─ that is, to establish

that Appellant was, in fact, the May 2019 shooter. Rather, White’s statements

were offered to establish that Appellant had a motive to murder White ─

whether true or not, White identified Appellant as the shooter in the May 2019

case and was the Commonwealth’s sole witness in that case. Thus, White’s

out-of-court statements are not hearsay.

      Lastly, we note that the trial court provided the following limiting

instruction to the jury:

           You have heard evidence to the effect that [Appellant] was
      charged with aggravated assault in connection with . . . [a May
      2019] shooting in Norristown.

            . . . [H]e is not on trial for that. Is that understood? . . .

             This evidence is before you for a limited purpose. That is,
      for the purpose of tending to show motive, intent, and
      identification.

             This evidence must not be considered by you in any other
      way that for the purpose I just stated. You must not regard this
      evidence as showing that [Appellant] is a person of bad character
      or criminal tendencies from which you might be inclined to infer
      guilt. Is that understood?

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N.T., 2/3/22, at 75-76. A jury is “presumed to follow the court’s instruction[.]”

Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1273 (Pa. 2016).                           Thus,

Appellant’s first two evidentiary challenges fail.

                          (b)   Video evidence regarding Cadillac

         In his third issue, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary ruling

admitting the Commonwealth’s video exhibit showing Appellant retrieving

items from a black Cadillac in Bucks County, putting them in a van, and driving

the van back to the area of the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. He

maintains the video was “irrelevant” because the Commonwealth failed to

prove the Cadillac was used in the commission of the murder ─ there was no

video showing Appellant driving the Cadillac to or from the murder scene. See

id. at 37-38. Appellant also insists this evidence was unfairly prejudicial. Id.

at 40.

         Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s issue as framed in his brief is

different from the claim he raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In the

Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant asserted the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied his oral motion “to exclude a portion of the

Commonwealth’s proposed video exhibit which shows a Cadillac being

driven from Buck County to Norristown, PA on the day after the

alleged murder as irrelevant[.]”              Appellant’s Statement of Matters

Complained of on Appeal, 4/19/21, at 1 (unpaginated) (emphasis added). As

the trial court noted in its opinion, it “scoured the trial record and [did] not

recall evidence of a Cadillac being driving from Bucks County to Norristown on

                                         - 19 -
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the day after the shooting.” Trial Ct. Op. at 10. As explained above, Appellant

does not elaborate on this claim in his brief, but rather, addresses a different

issue entirely, focusing on video of him retrieving items from the abandoned

Cadillac in Bucks County, putting them in a van, and driving the van back to

Norristown on the day after the murder. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. Thus,

because Appellant’s present claim was not preserved in his court-ordered Rule

1925(b)    statement,      it   is   waived    for   our   review.10   See   Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or raised in

accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).

       Nevertheless, we note the trial court addressed the relevancy of the

evidence Appellant now challenges in its opinion. The court opined:

       [E]vidence presented by the Commonwealth demonstrated that
       [Appellant] walked out of Bruce’s residence in Lafayette Hill in the
       early morning hours of November 4 and the Cadillac is seen
       driving away. At approximately 5:45 a.m. that same morning , a
       black Cadillac is seen parked in front of 1225 Route 313 in Bucks
       County. Around the same time and near the same location,
____________________________________________

10 We note, too, that the issue raised in Appellant’s brief cannot be
characterized as a subsidiary issue of the claim he raised in his Rule 1925(b)
statement. See Commonwealth v. Price, 284 A.3d 165, 171 (Pa. 2022)
(explaining that in determining whether one issue is a subsidiary of another,
“the question is whether resolution of the two issues is sufficiently connected
to each other such that the resolution of one may depend in some respect
upon resolution of the other”). Indeed, in the Rule 1925(b) statement, he
challenged video evidence of “a Cadillac being driven from Bucks County to
Norristown . . . on the day after the alleged murder[,]” while in his brief, he
challenges video of him retrieving items from a Cadillac in Bucks County,
entering a van, and driving the van back to Norristown. See Appellant’s
Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 1 (unpaginated); Appellant’s
Brief at 37.

                                          - 20 -
J-S03020-23

      [Appellant] got into a white van and drove to the Cadillac. He
      stopped briefly to retrieve some items before getting back in the
      van and driving to Norristown. At approximately 6:45 a.m.,
      [Appellant] parked the van in the same general area as where the
      Cadillac had been parked in Norristown the day before and entered
      McNelly’s house.

            This evidence plainly is relevant to demonstrate
      [Appellant’s] connection to the Cadillac seen in Norristown on the
      day of the shooting. Additionally, and although not raised in the
      oral pre-trial motion made before this court, the evidence was not
      unfairly prejudicial to [Appellant] and he received a fair trial.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11 (record citations omitted).

      We agree with the court’s analysis. Appellant asserts that any evidence

regarding the Cadillac is irrelevant because there was no video footage or

witness testimony placing him as the driver of the black Cadillac seen on

surveillance video arriving in the area of McNelly’s residence just before the

murder and leaving shortly after the murder. However, direct evidence is not

required.   Rather, the Commonwealth provided circumstantial evidence

connecting Appellant to the black Cadillac, including testimony that he arrived

and left the area of the murder in a black Cadillac, and corroborating

surveillance video of that black Cadillac.   See N.T., 2/1/22, at 34, 42-43

(McNelly testified Appellant was operating a black four-door car on the day of

the murder, which was parked in the alley next to her house); 168-69 (Bruce

testifying Appellant drove a black Cadillac to her residence on November 2,

2020, the day before the murder); N.T., 2/2/22, at 46-49, 54-55 (surveillance

video of the black Cadillac in the area of the murder and Bruce’s home).

Moreover, we emphasize the actual evidence Appellant now contests was

admitted via stipulation. The parties stipulated that: (1) before 6:00 a.m. on

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J-S03020-23

the morning after the murder, Appellant retrieved items from a black Cadillac

parked in Bucks County; (2) that Cadillac was registered to Todd Green, who

stated he agreed to sell it to Appellant and allowed Appellant to take

possession of the car; and (3) a search of the Cadillac uncovered Appellant’s

work uniform. See N.T., 2/1/22, at 232-33. Accordingly, we conclude the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the evidence at issue.

                     IV.   SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

      Appellant’s fourth claim presents a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions. Rather than addressing the individual

elements of each offense, Appellant broadly asserts there was insufficient

evidence for the jury to conclude he was the perpetrator of the crime. See

Appellant’s Brief at 41-42. He emphasizes the following: (1) the shooter,

who was masked at all times, was never positively identified by any witness;

(2) none of the shooter’s clothes, or any firearm, was recovered from

Appellant’s home or car; (3) there was no video of Appellant driving the black

Cadillac to or from Norristown on the day of the shooting; (4) the

Commonwealth’s FBI analyst could not positively match any of the evidence

from the shooting to Appellant; and (5) the only link between Appellant and

White was the May 2019 shooting, and Appellant denied his involvement in

that case.   See id. 42-44.    Appellant also noted that there was evidence

presented at trial that “someone else besides Appellant may have had a

motive” to harm White. See id. at 50.

                                     - 22 -
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      Preliminarily, we note the trial court found Appellant’s sufficiency claim

waived because his Rule 1925(b) statement did not specify “the elements of

the offenses he is challenging on appeal.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 12. Rather,

Appellant simply asserted the evidence “was insufficient to support the jury’s

verdict of guilty” on all of his charges, without providing any detail.    See

Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal at 2 (unpaginated).

      This Court has consistently held:

      [T]o “preserve a sufficiency claim, the Rule 1925(b) statement
      must specify the element or elements upon which the evidence
      was insufficient.” Commonwealth v. Widger, 237 A.3d 1151,
      1156 (Pa. Super. 2020). If the appellant does not specify such
      elements,     the  sufficiency   claim   is  deemed     waived.
      Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072 (Pa. Super.
      2017).

Commonwealth v. McFarland, 278 A.3d 369, 381 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal

denied, 2023 WL 368601 (Pa. Jan. 24, 2023).       Moreover, “[s]uch specificity

is of particular importance in cases where, as here, [A]ppellant was convicted

of multiple crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the

Commonwealth      must    prove   beyond     a   reasonable   doubt.”      See

Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339, 344 (Pa. Super. 2013). See also

Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa. Super. 2016) (Appellant

waived sufficiency argument challenging two counts of first-degree murder

and two firearms offenses when Rule 1925(b) statement claimed convictions

were based on “insufficient evidence because the circumstantial inferences

drawn from the evidence were unwarranted and unreliable”).

                                    - 23 -
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        In the present case, Appellant’s generic Rule 1925(b) statement failed

to specify which of his 10 convictions he was challenging, and, more

importantly, which elements of those convictions the Commonwealth failed to

prove. To the extent he asserts the claim he intended to raise was “clear from

both his defense put forth at trial as well as his Post-Sentence Motion[,]”11 we

remind Appellant that compliance with a court-ordered Rule 1925(b)

statement is mandatory, and the trial court is not required to scour the record

to determine Appellant’s specific claim on appeal.12 Thus, we agree with the

trial court that this issue is waived.

        Nevertheless, as Appellant asserts, he did argue in his post-sentence

motion that the evidence was insufficient to prove he was the person who

shot and killed White. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 2/11/22, at 2-

3 (unpaginated). However, even if we were to consider this claim, we would

conclude he is entitled to no relief.

        Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-

settled:

        [We must determine] whether viewing all the evidence admitted
        at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
____________________________________________

11   See Appellant’s Brief at 42 n.2.

12 We note that in his statement of questions presented in his brief, he properly
framed his sufficiency argument, claiming “there was not proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual who shot [ ] White.”
Appellant’s Brief at 6. Had he presented this claim in his Rule 1925(b)
statement, the trial court could have properly addressed the issue in its
opinion.

                                          - 24 -
J-S03020-23

      sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element
      of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [this] test,
      we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for
      a fact-finder.     In addition, we note that the facts and
      circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
      preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
      defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
      evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
      probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
      circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
      proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
      means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
      the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
      evidence received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of
      fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
      weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
      of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 578–79 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted).

      As noted above, Appellant insists there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s determination that he was the person who murdered White.

With regard to identification evidence, we must bear in mind the following:

            In addition to proving the statutory elements of the crimes
      charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth must
      also establish the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of
      the crimes. Evidence of identification need not be positive and
      certain to sustain a conviction.        [A]ny indefiniteness and
      uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its weight.
      Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not necessary and a
      defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Strafford, 194 A.3d 168, 175–76 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citations, quotation marks & paragraph break omitted; emphasis added).

      Appellant’s argument focuses on the lack of a positive identification that

he was the masked shooter, the lack of any evidence definitively connecting

                                     - 25 -
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him to the crime, and the possibility of an alternate suspect. See Appellant’s

Brief at 42-44, 50. However, as summarized by the trial court in its opinion,

the circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth was more than

sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions.    See Trial Ct. Op. at 1-6.

Appellant had a motive to shoot White, was identified by witnesses as being

near the scene of the crime at the time of the crime, generally matched the

description of the masked shooter and was known to have a tattoo similar to

the shooter’s, failed to report to work on the day of the shooting and was

subsequently arrested without his ankle monitor, and was connected to a

black Cadillac similar to a vehicle present near the scene of the crime.

Moreover, we note Appellant emphasizes that the Commonwealth’s FBI

forensic analyst, George Skaluba, could not definitively match the jacket worn

by the shooter, the tattoo on the shooter’s arm, or the Cadillac seen on

surveillance video to a jacket owned by Appellant, Appellant’s tattoo, and the

Cadillac recovered in Bucks County. See Appellant’s Brief at 48. However,

he fails to acknowledge that the analyst was unable to do so based on the

quality of the images he examined, and, in fact, testified he also could not

eliminate any of the matches.       See N.T., 2/1/22, at 269-72, 279-80.

Furthermore, the evidence suggesting another person may have had a motive

to murder White was rejected by the jury, as was its prerogative.        See

Williams, 255 A.3d at 579. Thus, even if Appellant’s sufficiency claim was

not waived, we would conclude he is entitled to no relief.

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                            V.     WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

       In his final claim, Appellant contends the verdicts were against the

weight of the evidence presented at trial.13 He argues the evidence identifying

him as White’s murderer was “tenuous, vague and uncertain.” Appellant’s

Brief at 52. He details testimony and evidence supporting his assertion that

he was not the shooter, which he claims the trial court “failed to adequately

address.” Id. at 52-53. See also id. at 53-63 (none of the witnesses to the

shooting identified Appellant, or saw a tattoo on his hand; the detective who

compiled the video of the shooter’s path thought the shooter was not wearing

a mask when he left the West Lafayette residence; the evidence demonstrated

the shooter could have been aiming at any of the witnesses and not White;

McNelly’s testimony was “filled with contradictions;” White’s identification of

Appellant as the May 2019 shoot was “extremely weak;” Bruce did not

recognize Appellant in any photos obtained from the video footage; no

firearm, or clothing worn by the shooter was recovered from the Cadillac; the

Commonwealth’s expert analyst could not conclude definitively that the jacket

worn by the shooter matched a jacked owned by Appellant, the tattoo seen

on the shooter matched Appellant’s tattoo, or that the Cadillac in the videos

matched a Cadillac sold to Appellant; and there was evidence White’s murder

____________________________________________

13Appellant preserved his weight of the evidence claim in a timely filed post-
sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3).

                                          - 27 -
J-S03020-23

could have been related to his drug dealing or threatening texts he had

received a month before the murder).

      Our review of a weight of the evidence claim is well-established:

      The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
      of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
      and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
      not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
      must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
      credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
      determine that notwithstanding all the fact[s], certain facts are so
      clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
      weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

      On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
      verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
      weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
      discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Williams, 255 A.3d at 580 (citation omitted & paragraph break added).

      In rejecting Appellant’s weight of the evidence claim, the trial court

opined:

      [T]he evidence . . . amply supports the jury’s verdict and does not
      shock the conscience of this court, which presided over the jury
      trial.  Rather, the overwhelming evidence presented by the
      Commonwealth demonstrates [Appellant] went to the tattoo
      parlor on West Marshall Street where he knew White hung out,
      and killed White by shooting him in vital areas of the body with an
      unlicensed firearm. At the time, [Appellant] knew White was the
      lone eyewitness against him in a pending aggravated assault case.
      As a result of [Appellant] killing White, the charges in that
      underlying case remain unresolved. [Appellant] also recklessly
      endangered the four others who were standing near White when
      [Appellant] fired three bullets at him.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13.

                                     - 28 -
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      Upon our review, we detect no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

ruling denying Appellant’s weight of the evidence challenge.       As explained

supra, our review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion in

determining the jury’s verdict did not shock the court’s conscience.        See

Williams, 255 A.3d at 580. Appellant fails to convince this Court otherwise.

His summary of the evidence focuses solely on testimony which appears to

support his assertion that the identity of the shooter could not be determined

beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.      However,   he   ignores   the   substantial

circumstantial evidence connecting him to the crime. The jury, as fact finder,

was the sole judge of credibility, and was free to believe all, some or none of

the evidence presented. See id. at 578-79, 580. In its discretion, the jury

credited the circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth which

led to the identification of Appellant as the culprit. See Strafford, 194 A.3d

at 175-76 (“Direct evidence of identity is, of course, not necessary and a

defendant may be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence.”). Neither the

jury’s verdict, nor the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s weight claim, shock’s

the conscience. Thus, Appellant is entitled to no relief.

                                VI.    CONCLUSION

      As noted supra, both Appellant and the trial court agree that the

sentence imposed on Appellant’s firearms offense is illegal. See supra n.5.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence imposed on Appellant’s

conviction of possession of a firearm without a license, and remand for

                                      - 29 -
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resentencing on that offense. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment

of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part.      Case

remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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