Court Opinion

ID: 9528500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:39.889126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:19.452544
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(dissenting).
The simple fact that an illegal drug is found in an automobile should not supply grounds to forfeit the vehicle when the illegal activity is possession of a controlled substance. “Forfeitable property ” includes property “which has been used or is intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense.... ” Iowa Code § 809.1(2)(6) (1989). We have stated that there must be a “substantial connection” or “sufficient nexus” between the crime and the seized property. In re Kaster, 454 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Iowa 1990). I would conclude that this test is not met when the illegal activity is possession of a controlled substance and the controlled substance is present in an automobile, building, or home.
I believe that the majority opinion ignores a basic tenet of statutory construction that requires the reasonable interpretation of a statute to avoid an absurd result. Applying the reasoning of the majority opinion, we would allow forfeiture of the vehicles and homes of shoplifters who place pilfered items in their vehicles or homes, regardless of the value of the stolen items. Also important to ask is whether we would allow forfeiture of the homes of employees who take employer-issued pencils home with them, or the homes of parents who permit their children to illegally possess tobacco in their rooms.
I conclude that the vehicle in this case was no more than a large container used to temporarily store the illegal drug. I cannot ascribe to the wide brush used by the majority. Rather, I would find that only storage containers that are primarily used to store illegal substances should satisfy the sufficient nexus test in Raster. The primary uses of vehicles and homes do not include storage of illegal substances. In this case, there was no evidence that the automobile was obtained or used for the purpose of storing illegal drugs. Consequently, I would reverse the district court’s order forfeiting defendant’s automobile.
CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ., joins this dissent.