Court Opinion

ID: 9638704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:51:26.187351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:09.085065
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge,
concurring:
While I find much of my distinguished colleague’s opinion thorough and correct in application of the law, I can concur only in the result that defendant’s inculpatory statements were properly admissible under the Mosley decision. See ante, at pp. 4-7. My concern lies with the Majority’s characterization of the holding in Mosley in a manner which distracts the inquiry from where it rightfully belongs, viz., whether the defendant’s “ ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Owing to the need for particular clarity in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, disturbing in the Majority opinion are the following statements:
In Mosley, the defendant stated that he did not want to talk about his involvement in the offenses that the police were discussing with him. He cut off questioning absolutely. The second interrogation related to a different crime, which the Court considered significant due to the fact that defendant absolutely invoked his right to remain silent as to those first offenses.
*217In the present case, appellant did not absolutely invoke his right to remain silent.
Ante, at p. 6 (emphasis added).
The Majority cannot be faulted for their reliance on the “separateness” of the subject matters of questioning. To be sure, the significance of this “separateness” to the Mosley decision is not simply a matter of literary happenstance, but rather fits neatly into the test offered by the Court to preserve a defendant’s right to cut off questioning. Where the police, as in Mosley, question the arrestee about a crime that he has not previously declined to discuss, this can be viewed as less like an attempt to wear down the arrestee and to persuade him to change his mind about confessing. But to conclude further that Mosley invoked “absolutely” his right to silence as to the robberies—but not the murder—appears an unwarranted extension of the Court’s holding.
Instantly, while the Majority ascribes particular importance to the circumstances obtaining during defendant’s invocation of his right to silence, namely, that it was the defendant who had suggested to the police that he might wish to speak about certain matters at a later date, this has no talisman-like quality. The police might still coerce an arrestee to comply with his or her implication that a statement will be forthcoming in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The contrary would seem equally true. If a defendant states unequivocally that he wishes to remain silent, the police may still attempt to resume questioning subsequently so long as this can be seen as nothing more than affording defendant the opportunity to make a voluntary confession as he clearly has a right to do. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109, 96 S.Ct. at 329 (White, J., concurring) (to deny defendant the right to make a voluntary confession would be to entrap him in his own privilege). To focus exclusively on the circumstances of defendant’s invocation of the right, and whether it was “absolute,” distracts the inquiry, for the question is not whether the invocation was “absolute” in some abstract sense, but rather whether through the re*218sumption of questioning, defendant’s rights were scrupulously honored.
The principles behind Mosley suggest that the judicial inquiry is not so narrowly confined, nor limited, as the Majority suggests, to an exercise in absolutes. Rather, judicial inquiry in each instance should focus on the circumstances attending the defendant’s invocation of his or her right to silence, as well as the circumstances attending any further attempt at questioning. Hence, the test should ask whether the official purpose of resuming questioning was to entice the arrestee to abandon his right to remain silent, or simply to find out whether he or she had a change of mind. Only then can it be concluded whether, in fact, the defendant’s “ ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’ ” Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326; see also Vujosevic v. Rafferty, 844 F.2d 1023 (3rd Cir. 1988).
Instantly, as Judge Hester properly concludes, the facts clearly indicate that questioning was resumed merely as an effort to establish whether the defendant had changed his mind. The circumstances attending defendant’s invocation of his right to silence suggested that defendant might desire to waive his right at a later date. This can be seen as bolstering the claim that defendant’s subsequent statement was derived absent official coercion. But most importantly, as a whole the police tactics attending the subsequent attempt at questioning were irreproachable and can be seen as nothing more than affording defendant the opportunity to make a voluntary confession. Thus, while the case sub judice does not technically fit the Mosley factual paradigm, i. e., the suspect herein involved was questioned about the same offense after invocation of his right to silence, the court can and does remain faithful to the principle and spirit of both the Mosley and Miranda decisions in sanctioning the resumption of questioning on the instant facts. Any reference to the possibility that a defendant might “absolutely” invoke his or her right to silence is unnecessary to the Majority’s position and serves to send improper signals to our law enforcement officers.
Thus, I concur in the result only.