Court Opinion

ID: 9654897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:54:19.781045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.583098
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Judge,
concurring.
My initial view of this case, handed down as' a dissenting opinion, was that I agreed that respondent should be punished, but I would issue a public reprimand rather than impose a suspension from practice. As a rationale for the dissent, I said the following:
This case does not involve the more serious violations regarding attorney-client relations such as theft or other fraud, or aggravating circumstances such as a history of public or private reprimands, that *386have warranted a suspension in prior cases. None of these circumstances is involved in this case.
On the other hand, respondent’s violations of the conflict of interest provisions are mitigated in a number of ways. 'First, the conflicts involve nothing more than respondent’s attempts to secure payment of fees, the bulk of which were unquestionably due to him for successfully representing his clients in two very serious criminal matters. These kinds of conflicts are a far cry from the more conventional and more serious kinds of conflicts to which Rule 4-1.8(a) is addressed, such as acquisition of business interests in competition with a client, or even in co-ownership with a client. Second, regarding count one, the applicability of the conflict of interest provisions used to prosecute respondent was not altogether clear. As noted, a conveyance of property in payment of a fee is expressly allowed under Rule 4-1.5, and this appears to be the first case to hold that a conflict of interest arises, nonetheless. Third, and again as to count one, it appears that the client was not prejudiced by the conflict of interest that manifested in the dispute over the sale of the property. On this point, there is persuasive evidence in the record that the client knew that he had no means to pay the fees he owed to respondent without selling the property, and that the parties contemplated a sale of the property all along. Fourth, as to count two, it may be punishment enough that the federal courts imposed severe monetary sanctions against respondent for the frivolous appeals of the conflict of interest ruling. Fifth, it may be punishment enough that through all of the litigation, and perhaps because of it, respondent has not been paid the thousands of dollars owed to him for successfully representing his clients in either of the two criminal cases. Finally, respondent is no repeat offender. He has practiced 25 years without any disciplinary action taken against him until now.
Despite these mitigating factors, having now considered respondent’s motion for rehearing and reconsidered his voluminous briefs and motions, I agree that a suspension is the appropriate sanction. Respondent’s motion for rehearing, like his earlier briefs and motions, is replete with mis-characterizations of the facts and misapplications of the law. That concern, along with his refusal to concede even the most inconsequential point and his uncompromising persistence in pressing trivial points to pursue his innocence makes apparent that it may take a suspension from practice to gain his attention and reform his conduct.