Court Opinion

ID: 9897259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:21.60562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.905195
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                               Oct 17 2023, 8:48 am

                                                                                    CLERK
                                                                                Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                                     and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Kay A. Beehler                                             Theodore E. Rokita
      Terre Haute, Indiana                                       Indiana Attorney General
                                                                 Courtney Staton
                                                                 Deputy Attorney General
                                                                 Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      Russell G. Finnegan,                                       October 17, 2023
      Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                 23A-MI-442
              v.                                                 Appeal from the Pulaski Circuit
                                                                 Court
      State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable David Chidester,
      Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Special Judge
                                                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                 66C01-2110-MC-168

                                         Opinion by Judge Crone
                                     Judges Riley and Mathias concur.

      Crone, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Russell G. Finnegan appeals the trial court’s finding that he was in indirect

      criminal contempt of court. He contends that the trial court abused its
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023                               Page 1 of 11
      discretion in failing to act on his notice of intent to file an insanity defense and

      appoint medical personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his

      criminal contempt hearing. We agree and therefore reverse and remand.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On June 17, 2021, Finnegan was charged with indirect criminal contempt of

      court under cause number 66C01-2106-MC-99 and ordered to show cause at a

      hearing as to why he should not be held in contempt. Special Judge John Potter

      was selected to preside over the hearing. Following a hearing, Judge Potter

      issued an order finding Finnegan in indirect criminal contempt. Thereafter, “the

      Court began to receive vulgar, misogynistic, inappropriate, and harassing

      correspondence” from Finnegan that was “in blatant disrespect of the Court’s

      authority.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 12. On October 12, 2021, Judge Potter,

      sua sponte, initiated proceedings under cause number 66C01-2110-MC-168 and

      ordered Finnegan to show cause at a hearing as to why he should not again be

      held in indirect criminal contempt of court. Special Judge David Chidester was

      selected to preside over the hearing.

[3]   During a hearing on January 3, 2023, Finnegan’s counsel alerted the trial court

      that there is a “mental health issue with [Finnegan]” and that counsel was in

      the process of having mental health evaluations completed in an unrelated

      criminal case also pending in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Tr. Vol. 2 at 7. On

      January 19, 2023, Finnegan filed a notice of intent to raise the defense of

      mental disease or defect and requested the trial court to appoint medical

      personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at the contempt hearing. In
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023         Page 2 of 11
      the notice, defense counsel again informed the trial court that evaluations were

      still pending in the unrelated criminal case. Counsel also filed a motion for

      continuance to allow for more time to obtain results. Judge Chidester never

      ruled on Finnegan’s notice but denied the motion for continuance. Following

      the final contempt hearing held on January 27, 2023, Judge Chidester issued an

      order finding Finnegan in indirect criminal contempt pursuant to Indiana Code

      Section 34-47-3-1. 1 The trial court imposed a sanction of 170 days in the

      Department of Correction. 2 This appeal ensued.

      Discussion and Decision
[4]   Finnegan challenges the trial court’s finding that he was in indirect criminal

      contempt of court. As a general matter, our supreme court has explained,

                 Contempt of court generally involves disobedience of a court or
                 court order that undermines the court’s authority, justice, and
                 dignity. There are two kinds of contempt: direct contempt and
                 indirect contempt. Indirect contempt, which is at issue in this
                 case, involves those acts committed outside the presence of the

      1
          That section provides:
               A person who is guilty of any willful disobedience of any process, or any order lawfully issued:
                 (1) by any court of record, or by the proper officer of the court;
                 (2) under the authority of law, or the direction of the court; and
                 (3) after the process or order has been served upon the person;
               is guilty of an indirect contempt of the court that issued the process or order.
      2
        A trial court “may impose a maximum sentence of six months ‘for criminal contempt [ ] without guilt or
      innocence being determined by a jury.’” Gerber v. State, 167 N.E.3d 792, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting
      Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d 1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)), trans. denied.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023                                 Page 3 of 11
               court which nevertheless tend to interrupt, obstruct, embarrass or
               prevent the due administration of justice.

      Reynolds v. Reynolds, 64 N.E.3d 829, 832 (Ind. 2016) (citations and quotation

      marks omitted). It is within the trial court’s discretion to determine whether a

      party is in contempt, and we review the judgment under an abuse of discretion

      standard. Id. This Court will reverse a trial court’s finding of contempt only if

      there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding. Id.

[5]   Finnegan raises two issues for our review, one of which we find dispositive. He

      asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to appoint medical

      personnel to evaluate his mental health and testify at his criminal contempt

      hearing. 3 Specifically, he argues that a trial court “abuses its discretion when it

      improperly denies a defendant the evaluations contemplated by statute when a

      Notice of Mental Disease or Defect has been filed.” Appellant’s Br. at 16. We

      agree.

[6]   Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2 provides:

      3
        Finnegan also asserts that the trial court’s application of Indiana Code Section 34-47-3-1 infringed upon his
      constitutional right to free expression pursuant to Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. While we
      need not address this issue because we reverse the court’s contempt finding on other grounds, we note that
      Finnegan waived this claim because he did not raise this issue below and raises it for the first time on appeal.
      It is well established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal, even ones based upon constitutional
      claims, are waived. State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied; see Ellis v. State, 194
      N.E.3d 1205, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (failure to invoke Article 1, Section 9 of Indiana Constitution in
      argument before trial court resulted in waiver on appeal), trans. denied.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023                                    Page 4 of 11
              (a) At the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant intends
              to interpose the defense of insanity, evidence may be introduced
              to prove the defendant’s sanity or insanity at the time at which
              the defendant is alleged to have committed the offense charged in
              the indictment or information.

              (b) When notice of an insanity defense is filed in a case in which
              the defendant is not charged with a homicide offense under IC
              35-42-1, the court shall appoint two (2) or three (3) competent
              disinterested:

              (1) psychiatrists;

              (2) psychologists endorsed by the state psychology board as
              health service providers in psychology; or

              (3) physicians;

              who have expertise in determining insanity. At least one (1) of
              the individuals appointed under this subsection must be a
              psychiatrist or psychologist. The individuals appointed under this
              subsection shall examine the defendant and testify at the trial.
              This testimony shall follow the presentation of the evidence for
              the prosecution and for the defense, including the testimony of
              any mental health experts employed by the state or by the
              defense.

[7]   Here, well before the final criminal contempt hearing, Finnegan’s counsel

      alerted the trial court that there is a “mental health issue with [Finnegan]” and

      that he was in the process of having mental health evaluations completed in an

      unrelated criminal case also pending in the Pulaski Circuit Court. Tr. Vol. 2 at

      7. In response, Judge Chidester remarked that he personally did not believe that

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023          Page 5 of 11
      Finnegan was mentally ill based upon prior observations of and interactions

      with him. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court scheduled the final

      criminal contempt hearing for January 27, 2023. On January 19, 2023,

      Finnegan’s counsel filed a notice of his intent to raise the defense of mental

      disease or defect along with a request for the appointment of medical personnel

      to examine Finnegan pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Defense

      counsel informed the court that one of the evaluations had been completed in

      the unrelated criminal matter and that the other evaluation was still pending.

      The trial court never ruled on Finnegan’s notice or request, and the criminal

      contempt hearing proceeded on January 27, 2023, after which Finnegan was

      found in contempt and sentenced to just under six months of jail time.

[8]   The State’s sole response to the trial court’s “fail[ure] to act upon Finnegan’s

      request to assert an insanity defense” is its claim that Finnegan was simply “not

      entitled” to file that notice and obtain the statutory mental health evaluations

      because a contempt proceeding is not a “trial of a criminal case” as

      contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Appellee’s Br. at 17-18. The

      State likens contempt proceedings to “other civil matters[,]” see id., and directs

      us to case law in which Indiana courts have recognized the general proposition

      that contempt is a “sui generis proceeding neither civil nor criminal in nature,

      although both of those labels are used to describe certain categories of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023        Page 6 of 11
      contempt.” Buford v. State, 139 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting

      State v. Heltzel, 552 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. 1990)). 4

[9]   It is well established that contempt proceedings are categorized as either civil or

      criminal, according to the nature and purpose of the sanction imposed. Gerber v.

      State, 167 N.E.3d 792, 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

               A civil contempt is a violation of a court order resulting in a
               proceeding for the benefit of the aggrieved party. As such, any
               type of penalty in a civil contempt proceeding must be coercive
               or remedial in nature. By contrast, a criminal contempt is an act
               directed against the dignity and authority of the court that
               obstructs the administration of justice and tends to bring the
               court into disrepute. Accordingly, a criminal contempt sanction
               is punitive in nature because its purpose is to vindicate the
               authority of the court, and it benefits the State rather than the
               aggrieved party.

      4
        In likening contempt proceedings to “other civil matters,” the State relies on Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d
      220, 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), in which this Court rejected the defendant’s argument that, during probation
      revocation proceedings, the trial court abused its discretion in not appointing two or three psychiatrists or
      psychologists to examine him and testify pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. Specifically, we
      concluded that the insanity defense statute was inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings, stating that
      the statute “concerns a ‘criminal case’” while “[a] revocation proceeding is in the nature of a civil case.” Id.
      However, we based our decision in part on prior holdings that a probation revocation hearing was not a
      criminal proceeding for purposes of double jeopardy. Id. (citing Ashba v. State, 570 N.E.2d 937 (Ind. Ct. App.
      1991), aff’d, 580 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied (1992). Unlike a probation revocation, however, our
      courts have repeatedly recognized that criminal contempt proceedings and the punitive sanctions imposed
      implicate double jeopardy. See Buford, 139 N.E.3d at 1080 (vacating criminal contempt finding: “[h]aving
      found that the contempt sanction was punitive and thus that the sanction of ninety days in the Marion
      County jail constituted a punishment, we find that the State’s filing [of a count for invasion of privacy] on the
      same day as the contempt hearing … constitutes double jeopardy concerns.”); see also Hunter v. State, 802
      N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (noting test for determining whether a sanction, other than a criminal
      sentence, constitutes jeopardy is whether the sanction constitutes a punishment), trans. denied. We are not
      persuaded by the State’s attempt to equate criminal contempt proceedings with probation revocation
      proceedings.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023                                 Page 7 of 11
       Id. (citation omitted).

[10]   Indeed, this Court has recognized that “[o]ne who is subject to criminal

       contempt is afforded many of the same constitutional safeguards that a

       defendant in a criminal trial enjoys because of the penalties that may be

       imposed.” Wine v. State, 147 N.E.3d 409, 415-16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.

       denied. “Criminally contemptuous conduct may violate other provisions of the

       criminal law; but even when this is not the case convictions for criminal contempt

       are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for their impact on the

       individual defendant is the same.” Id. at 416 (emphasis in Wine) (quoting Bloom v.

       Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968)). That is to say, “the role of criminal contempt

       and that of many ordinary criminal laws seem identical—protection of the

       institutions of our government and enforcement of their mandates.” Id. (quoting

       Bloom, 391 U.S. at 201). Simply put, criminal contempt is “a crime in every

       fundamental respect” as it “is a violation of the law, a public wrong which is

       punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.” Id. (quoting Bloom, 391 U.S. at

       201).

[11]   We conclude that a criminal contempt proceeding is a “trial of a criminal case”

       as contemplated by Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-2. 5 Accordingly, defendants

       5
         We acknowledge that a criminal contempt is not categorized as a felony or a misdemeanor as those terms
       are used in the prior subsection, Indiana Code Section 35-36-2-1, regarding the time for filing a notice of
       intent to interpose an insanity defense. See Holly, 681 N.E.2d at 1177 (noting that a criminal contempt is
       categorized as a “petty” contempt or a “serious criminal contempt” based upon the penalty actually
       imposed). This does not change our opinion that a criminal contempt proceeding is a “criminal case” in
       which a notice of insanity defense may be filed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023                              Page 8 of 11
       like Finnegan, who are held to answer for criminal contempt and face the same

       array of punishments as do other criminal defendants, are entitled to the same

       statutory protections afforded other criminal defendants, including the right to

       file a notice of insanity defense and obtain the appointment of appropriate

       experts to testify at the contempt proceedings. Therefore, the trial court here

       abused its discretion in failing to act upon Finnegan’s notice and thereby

       denying him the mental health evaluations required by Indiana Code Section

       35-36-2-2.

[12]   We reject the State’s alternative assertion that, even assuming that Finnegan

       was improperly denied the required mental health evaluations, any such error

       was harmless. “An error is harmless when it results in no prejudice to the

       ‘substantial rights’ of a party.” Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 652 (Ind. 2018)

       (citation omitted). A criminal defendant who raises an insanity defense bears

       the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from a

       “mental disease or defect” that rendered him “unable to appreciate the

       wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-

       6(a). Our supreme court has recognized that defendants generally rely on expert

       testimony to meet this evidentiary burden because “[o]pinion testimony from

       psychiatrists, psychologists, and other mental-health experts is central to a

       determination of insanity.” Barcroft v. State, 111 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. 2018).

       “Unlike lay witnesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe might

       be relevant to the defendant’s mental state, mental-health experts can identify

       the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of insanity and tell the [factfinder]

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023       Page 9 of 11
       why their observations are relevant.” Id. (citation omitted). “In short, their goal

       is to assist factfinders, ‘who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to

       make a sensible and educated determination about the mental condition of the

       defendant at the time of the offense.’” Id. (citation omitted).

[13]   The State suggests that Judge Chidester did not need assistance from experts

       because he was essentially able to and did determine, based upon his prior

       observations and familiarity with Finnegan, that Finnegan did not suffer from a

       mental disease or defect that rendered him incapable of appreciating the

       wrongfulness of his conduct. However, we emphasize that criminal contempt is

       a specific intent offense, as it requires that the defendant’s conduct be “willful.”

       Ind. Code § 34-47-3-1. Accordingly, the only relevant mental condition is

       Finnegan’s condition at the time of this offense.

[14]   We recognize that “even when experts are unanimous in their opinion, the

       factfinder may discredit their testimony—or disregard it altogether—and rely

       instead on other probative evidence[,]” such as lay testimony or demeanor

       evidence, “from which to infer the defendant’s sanity.” Barcroft, 111 N.E.3d at

       1003 (citing Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699, 710 (Ind. 2010)). Be that as it

       may, Finnegan should have had the opportunity to obtain and offer the

       requested expert evaluations, and it would have then been the trial court’s

       prerogative to disregard that testimony if it was unpersuasive or inconsistent

       with other probative evidence. Under the circumstances presented, we simply

       cannot say with confidence that the absence of expert opinion testimony had no

       bearing on the outcome of this case. See Durden, 99 N.E.3d at 652 (noting basic

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023       Page 10 of 11
       premise of harmless error analysis that criminal conviction may stand when

       error had no bearing on outcome of case). Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s

       finding of indirect criminal contempt and remand for further proceedings

       consistent with this opinion.

[15]   Reversed and remanded.

       Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-442 | October 17, 2023    Page 11 of 11