Court Opinion

ID: 9703904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:12:06.090941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.921076
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
I concur with the decision of the Court on the several issues dealt with in the opinion of the Court with one exception. I would not predicate reversal of the Court of Appeals on the basis of the inherently dangerous activity issue, but rather on the ground that even if the trial judge erred on that issue the error was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs because they obtained a judgment against an apparently collectible defendant for the amount of the damages that this jury was willing to award.
One might suspect that if the jury had also *754found Forsythe Development Company subject to liability, it might — there being two pockets rather than one — have been more generous. That would not, however, have justified a more generous award. It was the jury’s obligation to assess the damages without regard to whether there was one, two, or more pockets and without regard to the theories of liability or the bases on which the defendant or defendants were found subject to liability. Absent any suggestion that the Hurley Corporation is uncollectible, any error in failing to submit to the jury the inherently dangerous activity theory against Forsythe does not justify ordering a new trial.
I
The opinion of the Court reviews the inherently dangerous activity doctrine and makes a number of observations regarding the application of that doctrine. Although this Court and the Court of Appeals have applied the doctrine, there is no decision of this Court where the doctrine has been considered and applied, in an opinion signed by a majority of the justices, to allow recovery by an injured worker, in a third-party action, following the receipt of workers’ compensation from his employer.
As noted in the opinion of the Court, McDonough v General Motors Corp, 388 Mich 430; 201 NW2d 609 (1972), "produced four opinions, none of which had more than one co-signer.” Under our decisions, McDonough is "not an authoritative interpretation binding on this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis."1
In Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), this Court ordered a new *755trial because it concluded that the hazard there involved was not such as would justify the imposition of enterprise responsibility on the owner on the inherently dangerous activity theory.
The opinion of the Court quotes the black letter of §§ 416 and 427 of the Restatement of Torts, 2d. All the illustrations in the commentary accompanying the black letter, however, concern injuries caused to users of the public highway or sidewalk, or adjoining property resulting from damage to a party wall.2
It is one thing, on the basis of overriding social policy, to impose on the owner of land a nondele-gable duty to protect persons who are injured while they are on the public highway, street, or sidewalk, or on their own land, from loss resulting from activity emanating from the owner’s land, and quite another to impose on the owner a non-delegable duty to protect from loss persons injured on the owner’s land.
In two of the cases cited in the opinion of the Court, Inglis v Millersburg Driving Ass’n, 169 Mich 311; 136 NW 443 (1912), and Wight v H G Christman Co, 244 Mich 208; 221 NW 314 (1928), the plaintiffs were adjoining property owners who suffered loss as a result of sparks or fire emanating from activities on defendant’s land; those cases parallel the illustrations in the commentary following the black letter in the Restatement.
In Watkins v Gabriel Steel Co, 260 Mich 692, 695; 245 NW 801 (1932), the Court, declaring that "the record is not sufficiently complete to justify a holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover,” permitted the injured worker to maintain an action against the general contractor for injuries result*756ing from the alleged negligence, in a work area where the plaintiff was working and was injured, of employees of a subcontractor other than the subcontractor who employed the injured plaintiff; this parallels Funk, where this Court recognized that a general contractor may have supervisory responsibilities in such work areas.3
In Utley v Taylor & Gaskin, Inc, 305 Mich 561; 9 NW2d 842 (1943), the Court held that the inherently dangerous activity doctrine did not apply in an action by a general contractor, as subrogee of an injured worker, against the subcontractor. The remaining decision of this Court cited in the opinion of the Court, is Grinnell v Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp, 282 Mich 509; 276 NW 535 (1937); the plaintiffs action was for product liability, an explosion of cooking equipment on board a cruiser, at a time when the law of products liability was in its infancy.
II
I would defer further consideration and comment on the inherently dangerous activity doctrine until decision in the case makes it necessary for the Court to consider and apply the doctrine to resolve the dispute. As noted in n 6 of the opinion of the Court, the Court of Appeals is divided on the application of the doctrine where one defendant seeks indemnification from another. That difference of opinion implicates the question whether what constitutes an inherently dangerous activity is a question of law to be decided by the Court or a question ordinarily to be submitted for resolution by a jury. The opinion of the Court appears to suggest that it is appropriate to submit *757the question to a jury where "reasonable minds”4 might conclude that the activity is inherently dangerous.5 Recognizing that factual issues involved in the application of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine must be decided by the trier of fact, I question whether the policy questions should be left at large to be resolved by the trier of fact and submerged in its verdict.
There are a host of problems which the Court should most assuredly address,6 but this is not the case to begin to do so._

 See Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 109; 244 NW2d 98 (1976).

 See Smith v Allendale Mutual Ins Co, 410 Mich 685, 712-713; 303 NW2d 702 (1981); Roberts v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 422 Mich 594; 374 NW2d 905 (1985) (opinion of Levin, J.).

 Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 104.

 Aníe, p 728.

 The Court of Appeals has held that the question whether an activity is inherently dangerous is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury. Dowell v General Telephone Co, 85 Mich App 84, 91; 270 NW2d 711 (1978), lv den 405 Mich 803 (1979); Brown v Unit Products Corp, 105 Mich App 141, 149-150; 306 NW2d 425 (1981), remanded 414 Mich 956 (1982).
Contrast the Kansas Supreme Court and Tennessee Court of Appeals holdings that the question whether ditch digging is inherently dangerous is for the court, Balagna v Shawnee County, 233 Kan 1068; 668 P2d 157 (1983); Kemp v Knox County, 556 SW2d 546 (Tenn App, 1977), with the Missouri Supreme Court’s holding that the question was for the jury. Smith v Inter-County Telephone Co, 559 SW2d 518 (Mo, 1977).

 See Warren v McLouth Steel Corp, 417 Mich 941 (1982) (Ryan, J., dissenting).