Court Opinion

ID: 6412339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:53:38.283689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:24.820607
License: Public Domain

Bigelow, J.
The correctness of the instructions given to the jury in this case can be readily ascertained by considering the nature of the contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendants, and the respective rights and duties of the parties under it. On entering the cars of the defendants at Boston, the plaintiff had a right to be carried thence to his place of destination in that train on paying the usual rate of fare. This fare he was bound to pay, according to the regulations of the company, or on a reasonable demand being made therefor; if he failed to do so, then his rights under the contract ceased; he had forfeited them by his own act; and having himself first broken the contract, he could not insist on its fulfilment by the defendants. This is the rule of common law. It is also expressly enacted in St. 1849, c. 191, § 2, that no person, who shall not upon demand first pay the established toll or fare, shall be entitled to be transported over a railroad. The defendants therefore were not bound to transport him farther, but were justified in ejecting him from the cars by the use of all lawful and proper means. Angell on Carriers, §§ 525, 609. Redfield on Railways, 26, 261 *24Stephen v. Smith, 29 Verm. 160. Nor could he regain his right to ask of the defendants to perform their contract by his offer to pay the fare after his ejection. They were not bound to accept performance after a breach. The right to demand the complete execution of the contract by the defendants was defeated by the refusal of the plaintiff to do that which was either a condition precedent or a concurrent consideration on his part, and the non-performance of which absolved the defendants of all obligation to fulfil the contract. After being rightfully expeled from the train, he could not again enter the same cars and require the defendants to perform the same contract which he had previously broken. The right to refuse to transport the plaintiff farther, and to eject him from the train, would be an idle and useless exercise of legal authority, if the party, who had hitherto refused to perform the contract by paying his fare when duly demanded, could immediately re-enter the cars and claim the fulfilment of the original contract by the defendants. Besides, the defendants are not bound to receive passengers at any part of their route, but only at the regular stations or appointed places on the line of the road, established by them at reasonable distances for the proper accommodation of the public. Angell on Carriers, § 527 a. March v. Concord Railroad, 9 Foster, 39. The plaintiff had therefore no right to enter the cars at the place where the train was stopped for the purpose of ejecting him. A person who had committed no breach of contract could not claim any such right; a fortiori the plaintiff could not. It follows that, on the facts stated in the exceptions, the plaintiff proved no just claim for damages against the defendants, and- the instructions given to the jury, under which the verdict was rendered, were clearly erroneous.
The court also erred in rejecting the evidence of the regulations established by the defendants concerning passengers who refused to pay their fare. The right to establish all needful and proper regulations is vested in the defendants by law. Rev. Sts. c. 39, § 83. Commonwealth v. Power, 7 Met. 602. And they should have been permitted to prove them as part of their justification. Exceptions sustained.