Court Opinion

ID: 9919228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:00:51.849141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.464611
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13782    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 01/17/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13782
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        COLE ALLAN PEACOCK,
        a.k.a. Cole Watson,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20335-JLK-1
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                22-13782

                            ____________________

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Cole Peacock appeals his 37-month above-guideline sen-
        tence for making false entries and creating false documents. On
        appeal, he argues that his sentence is both procedurally and sub-
        stantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.
            I.    FACTUAL       BACKGROUND           &    PROCEDURAL
                  HISTORY
                In 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Peacock with one
        count of making a materially false statement in a matter within the
        jurisdiction of the executive branch of the United States Govern-
        ment by denying prior convictions on his student pilot application,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (“Count 1”); three counts of making
        false entries in documents within the jurisdiction of the U.S. De-
        partment of Transportation by making false endorsements in his
        pilot logbook, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (“Counts 2, 3, and
        4”); and one count of falsifying a document in a matter within the
        jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Transportation by falsifying
        an aircraft bill of sale, again, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519
        (“Count 5”).
              Peacock was released on bond pending the resolution of the
        case. Thereafter, in 2022, the government moved the court to re-
        voke Peacock’s bond and imprison him pending resolution of his
        charges. It noted that Peacock had been arrested by the Monroe
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        22-13782               Opinion of the Court                        3

        County Florida’s Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce for criminal mischief and tamper-
        ing or damaging a sewer system, and after arrest, he confessed to
        police. Peacock responded, noting he was already in state custody
        and that he did not oppose the government’s motion. A magistrate
        judge granted the government’s motion and revoked Peacock’s
        bond.
                Shortly thereafter, Peacock appeared at his change of plea
        hearing. There, Peacock pled guilty to Counts 2 and 5 in the indict-
        ment, and the government and Peacock put forth the following fac-
        tual proﬀer. With respect to Count 2, he admitted that, over a six-
        month period, he knowingly made a false entry into his pilot log-
        book to impede or obstruct the proper administration of pilot li-
        censing. He admitted that, while he was only in possession of a
        student pilot certiﬁcate, he had unlawfully ﬂown with a passenger
        from a Miami airport to the Orlando International Airport. He
        then created a fraudulent endorsement in his ﬂight logbook, pur-
        portedly issued and signed by his ﬂight instructor, which he then
        presented to Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) oﬃcials. He
        also admitted that he had falsiﬁed one other endorsement in the
        past. With respect to Count 5, he admitted that he had falsiﬁed an
        aircraft bill of sale he submitted to the FAA concerning a plane that
        had been reported stolen and found in his possession. Speciﬁcally,
        in February 2021, an individual reported a plane bearing a Venezue-
        lan tail #YV3343 stolen. Investigators located the missing aircraft,
        but discovered the tail number had been changed and was now pur-
        portedly owned by Peacock. Peacock had submitted a forged bill
        of sale to the FAA, and he admitted to painting over the plane’s
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13782

        original tail numbers. After making this factual proﬀer, the magis-
        trate judge recommended the district court accept Peacock’s guilty
        plea to Counts 2 and 5. The district court later accepted the guilty
        plea.
               Peacock’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) summa-
        rized the oﬀense conduct in largely the same manner as the proﬀer
        statement. It added that Peacock had forged a third endorsement
        in his ﬂight logbook and provided false information on his stu-
        dent-pilot-certiﬁcate application to the FAA. Its discussion of
        Count 5 only included additional details describing the FAA’s and
        Department of Transportation oﬃcials’ investigations of the stolen
        aircraft and falsiﬁed sale documents. It concluded that Peacock
        “used fraudulent documentation submitted to the FAA to steal a
        Venezuelan Lear jet aircraft.”
                The PSI then calculated Peacock’s guideline sentencing
        range. The PSI grouped Counts 2 and 5 and calculated a base of-
        fense level of 14, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(a). The PSI increased
        the score by two levels because the oﬀense involved the alteration
        and fabrication of a substantial number of records or documents.
        Although Peacock pled guilty, the PSI did not decrease the calcula-
        tion by three levels for acceptance of responsibility because it con-
        sidered Peacock’s intervening arrest to constitute a failure to with-
        draw from criminal conduct. Thus, the PSI set the total oﬀense
        level at 16.
              The PSI then listed Peacock’s criminal history, which in-
        cluded (1) two convictions of grand theft, based on the use of
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        22-13782              Opinion of the Court                        5

        counterfeit checks; (2) one conviction of resisting an oﬃcer with
        violence; (3) one conviction of creating a false report of a bomb to
        a sheriﬀ’s oﬃce; (4) one conviction of impersonating a law enforce-
        ment oﬃcer; and (5) one conviction of larceny, based on imperson-
        ating a board member of a multimillion-dollar company. Based on
        these convictions, the PSI determined that Peacock fell within
        criminal history category IV. The PSI ultimately calculated Pea-
        cock’s guideline range to be 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment, with
        both counts holding a statutory maximum of 20 years.
               Peacock objected to the PSI’s calculations, arguing that he
        should be granted the three-level reduction for acceptance of re-
        sponsibility. The probation oﬃcer and the government both op-
        posed Peacock’s objection. Peacock then provided supplemental
        information describing his history with mental illness, including
        that he had been diagnosed with multiple mental disorders at a
        young age, had spent time in a psychiatric unit as a youth, and had
        been prescribed various medications. He made no additional ob-
        jections.
               Before sentencing, Peacock submitted letters in support of
        mitigation from his mother, grandfather, and grandmother. The
        government submitted a sentencing memorandum in which it ar-
        gued that Peacock should be sentenced to at least 37 months’ im-
        prisonment because his falsiﬁcation of the documents concerning
        the stolen plane eﬀectively constituted theft, rather than mere ob-
        struction of a regulatory agency. It stated that, if the probation
        oﬃcer had calculated the guideline range under the section
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13782

        covering theft crimes, the guideline range would have been 37 to
        46 months’ imprisonment. It also attached a valuation of the rele-
        vant plane, which was calculated to be worth $174,960.65.
               At the sentencing hearing, the district court sustained Pea-
        cock’s objection regarding the acceptance-of-responsibility reduc-
        tion and recalculated the applicable guideline range to be 24 to 30
        months’ imprisonment. Peacock made no further objections to the
        PSI.
                 The district court then stated its intention to sentence Pea-
        cock within the guideline range, subject to further argument from
        the parties. The government restated its request that the court sen-
        tence Peacock to 37 months’ imprisonment. To Count 5 speciﬁ-
        cally, it stated that, “essentially, the defendant, through his false pa-
        perwork, stole a Learjet,” and if the guideline section covering theft
        crimes had been used, the bottom of the guideline range would
        have been 37 months. It explained, “the Government feels that he
        stole an airplane and that’s what his fraudulent documents really
        did, and that’s what he should be held responsible for, not just sub-
        mitting false paperwork.” It emphasized that this oﬀense was seri-
        ous by pointing to the high cost of the plane.
               The government also argued that Peacock showed a pattern
        of theft and fraud in his criminal history, and that this history, com-
        pounded with his present conviction and intervening arrest, indi-
        cated that he was “a career thief.” The government argued for an
        upward variance because of Peacock’s persistence in engaging in
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        22-13782               Opinion of the Court                          7

        criminal activity and the high likelihood of him committing further
        crimes.
               In response to the government’s position, Peacock high-
        lighted that he was not charged with a theft, nor did he plead guilty
        to any theft charges. He further pointed out that, even if the court
        were to use the theft guideline section, with the reduction for ac-
        ceptance of responsibility, the guideline range would be 27 to 33
        months, which was still below the government’s recommendation
        of 37 months. He also maintained that the court should not vary
        upward due to his criminal history because the guidelines already
        took it into account in determining his criminal history category of
        IV and guideline range. Next, Peacock asked the court to consider
        the mitigation letters from his family and his history of mental ill-
        ness and requested that he receive mental health treatment and
        counseling as a special condition of supervised release. Lastly, Pea-
        cock’s ﬁancée and father testiﬁed on his behalf, after which Peacock
        himself apologized to the court and expressed his hopes for the fu-
        ture.
               The government then argued that Peacock needed to be
        punished to deter him from future criminal conduct and because
        of the seriousness of his oﬀense. It stated that the facts “essentially
        indicate[d] the theft of an airplane,” and that while Peacock may
        not have been charged with theft, the factual proﬀer indicated that
        a theft occurred, and that Peacock was the culprit. Peacock re-
        sponded that he was genuinely remorseful and wanted to ﬁx his
        situation through counseling and treatment. He acknowledged the
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                   22-13782

        seriousness of his criminal history but asked the court “to give him
        a chance” considering his support system, and he requested a 24-
        month sentence.
               Ultimately, the district court varied upward from the guide-
        line sentencing range and sentenced Peacock to a 37-month total
        sentence. The court explained that it had considered each party’s
        arguments, the PSI, the sentencing guideline range, and the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. It further stated that it consid-
        ered the documentary evidence, the letters Peacock submitted, and
        the witness’s testimonies. The court then explained that this case
        was an “unusual” one that called upon him to impose a sentence
        that departed from the guidelines range due to the importance in
        establishing that the conduct Peacock engaged in could not be con-
        doned or allowed in the future. It then sentenced Peacock to 37
        months’ imprisonment for both counts, to run concurrently, fol-
        lowed by 3 years’ supervised release, and it dismissed Counts 1, 3,
        and 4. It also recommended that Peacock be placed in an institu-
        tion with access to mental health treatment. Peacock objected to
        the reasonableness of the upward variance and ﬁled the instant ap-
        peal.
            II.   ANALYSIS
                  A. Peacock’s Sentence is Procedurally Reasonable.
               We review for an abuse of discretion the procedural reason-
        ableness of a sentence. United States v. Waters, 937 F.3d 1344, 1258
        (11th Cir. 2019). A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it crafts
        “a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts.” Id. (internal
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        22-13782               Opinion of the Court                          9

        quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38,
        51 (2007)).
               We review factual ﬁndings for clear error. United States v.
        Philidor, 717 F.3d 883, 885 (11th Cir. 2013). “A fact ﬁnding is clearly
        erroneous when, after reviewing all the evidence, the court ‘is left
        with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that a mistake has been com-
        mitted.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gupta, 572 F.3d 878, 887 (11th
        Cir. 2009)). Importantly, a district court can rely on any undisputed
        facts within the PSI, id., because the failure to object to those facts
        serves as an admission to those facts for the purposes of sentencing,
        United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006). However,
        when a defendant objects to a factual basis of his sentence, “the
        government has the burden of proving the disputed fact by a pre-
        ponderance of the evidence.” Philidor, 717 F.3d at 885. Although
        the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is less rigorous than
        others, the district court must still “ensure that the Government
        carries [its] burden by presenting reliable and speciﬁc evidence.”
        United States v. Lawrence, 47 F.3d 1559, 1566 (11th Cir. 1995).
                Once a district court decides its sentence, it “must ade-
        quately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appel-
        late review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall,
        552 U.S. at 50. In doing so, however, “the district court does not
        need to discuss or state each factor explicitly.” United States v. Gon-
        zalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). In fact, “[a]n acknowl-
        edgment the district court has considered the defendant’s argu-
        ments and the § 3553(a) factors will suﬃce.” Id. Additionally, the
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-13782

        sentencing court does not have to explicitly discuss all of the miti-
        gating factors when explaining its decision. United States v. Amedeo,
        487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007).
              However, where a sentence is outside of the guideline range,
        the court has a greater duty to explain its reasoning. 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(c)(2). We have vacated sentences outside of the guideline
        range where “the district court did not provide any reason for [the]
        sentence.” United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 2016)
        (emphasis in original). Thus, district courts must state the speciﬁc
        reason it imposed a non-guideline sentence in such a way that this
        Court can engage in a meaningful appellate review. Id.
              On appeal, Peacock contends the district court imposed a
        procedurally unreasonable sentence because the upward variance
        was based upon conduct that he had not been formally charged
        with or proven by a preponderance of the evidence, speciﬁcally, the
        ﬁnding that he stole a plane. He also asserts that the district court
        insuﬃciently explained the reason for the upward variance.
               Here, Peacock’s sentence is not procedurally unreasonable.
        In determining Peacock’s sentence, the district court did not rely
        on any extraneous facts that were not included in the factual proﬀer
        in support of the plea or the PSI. The facts contained in both
        proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Peacock used
        fraudulent documentation to illegally obtain the plane. While Pea-
        cock argued below that he was not charged with theft and should
        not be sentenced based on the alleged theft, he never objected to
        the speciﬁc fact that he stole the plane. Thus, the theft was
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        22-13782                Opinion of the Court                         11

        admitted for the purposes of its consideration during sentencing.
        Wade, 458 F.3d at 1277 (“It is the law of this circuit that a failure to
        object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts for sentenc-
        ing purposes.”).
               Additionally, the district court clearly explained each of the
        factors it considered in imposing an upward variance and why it
        ultimately chose to impose an above-guidelines sentence. Parks,
        823 F.3d at 997. As such, the district court did not abuse its discre-
        tion and imposed a procedurally reasonable sentence.
                   B. Peacock’s Sentence is Substantively Reasonable.
               We also review for an abuse of discretion the substantive rea-
        sonableness of a sentence. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953
        (11th Cir. 2020). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden
        of showing it “is unreasonable in light of the record and the
        § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322
        (11th Cir. 2008). A district court abuses its discretion in this context
        when it (1) fails to consider “relevant factors that were due signiﬁ-
        cant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an improper or irrele-
        vant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment” by balancing
        the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
        1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted)
        (quoting United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1174 (11th Cir. 2006)
        (en banc)).
               Section 3553(a) mandates that the district court “shall im-
        pose a sentence suﬃcient, but not greater than necessary,” to “re-
        ﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, to promote respect for the law,
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13782

        and to provide just punishment for the oﬀense;” “aﬀord adequate
        deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further
        crimes of the defendant;” and “provide the defendant with needed
        educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc-
        tional treatment in the most eﬀective manner.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D). In addition, the court must consider “the na-
        ture and circumstances of the oﬀense and the history and charac-
        teristics of the defendant;” “the kinds of sentences available;” the
        guideline sentencing range; any applicable policy statements; “the
        need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
        ants with similar records who have been convicted of similar con-
        duct;” and the need to provide restitution to oﬀense victims. Id.
        § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
                Our review involves “examining the totality of the circum-
        stances” and whether the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence.
        Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. We will only vacate a sentence as un-
        reasonable if “we are left with a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that
        the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
        the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
        range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
        Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
        United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir. 2008)).
               District courts have “discretion to decide how much weight
        to give each § 3553(a) factor.” Williams, 526 F.3d at 1323. While
        the district court is required to consider all § 3553(a) factors, it “is
        permitted to attach ‘great weight’ to one factor over others.”
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        22-13782               Opinion of the Court                         13

        United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
        Gall, 552 U.S. at 57). Moreover, district courts are permitted to con-
        sider a wide array of information related to a defendant’s back-
        ground and character in imposing an upward variance. United
        States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he district
        court, in imposing a variance, may consider conduct that a proba-
        tion oﬃcer already had considered in calculating the defendant’s
        advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 983
        (11th Cir. 2015). Further, “variances from the advisory guidelines
        range can sometimes be based on the sentencing judge’s disagree-
        ment with whether a guideline properly reﬂects the § 3553(a) fac-
        tors.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.
        2015).
                A sentence outside of the guideline range is not presumably
        unreasonable, but we may consider the extent of a variance in our
        review of the reasonableness of a sentence. Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1237.
        A court selecting a sentence outside the guideline range must have
        a justiﬁcation “suﬃciently compelling to support the degree of the
        variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. We give weight to a district court’s
        decision to vary, because the district court has substantial discretion
        “in deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the
        extent of one that is appropriate.” Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238. “A sen-
        tence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an in-
        dicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d
        1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021).
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-13782

               On appeal, Peacock argues his sentence is substantively un-
        reasonable because the district court’s reasoning did not justify the
        upward variance. He asserts that the district court improperly con-
        sidered the plane theft, while discounting his mental health history
        and the applicable guideline range.
               Here, Peacock’s sentence is also substantively reasonable.
        The district court considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors, as evi-
        denced by its explicit statement during sentencing. It also consid-
        ered the mitigating evidence Peacock submitted, the record as a
        whole, the PSI, and the guideline range. As explained previously,
        the district court did not improperly consider the plane theft.
        Moreover, the district court explained why it varied upwards, de-
        spite the advisory guideline recommendation, noting that Pea-
        cock’s continued history of criminal conduct and general deter-
        rence justiﬁed the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Finally, Peacock’s
        sentence is well below the statutory maximum of 20 years, further
        supporting the sentence’s reasonableness. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272,
        1278. For these reasons, the district court did not abuse its discre-
        tion and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence.
             III.   CONCLUSION
               For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM Peacock’s sen-
        tences.