Court Opinion

ID: 9747556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:20:46.430466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.521923
License: Public Domain

Opinion
KRIEGLER, J.
Without filing a motion for summary judgment or mandatory separate statements of undisputed facts, and for the purpose of creating appellate review of pretrial rulings, the parties to an action in a complex litigation case stipulated that the court would have granted summary judgment based upon its ruling on certain “threshold issues” in favor of defendant. The stipulation also included a dismissal, without prejudice, of class action allegations.
We disapprove of the unauthorized procedure utilized to create appellate review without compliance with the mandatory requirements of a summary judgment, and reverse. The requirements of a motion for summary judgment and the supporting separate statements of undisputed facts are expressly mandated by statute and court rules. In the absence of such documents, the stipulated judgment cannot stand. The convenience of the parties in a complex litigation case, and their desire to be spared the expense of a summary judgment motion, do not warrant deviation from the procedural requirements of summary judgment applicable to litigants who do not have the benefit of appearing in the complex litigation court. In addition, the stipulated judgment in this case violates an express agreement between the parties and the trial court that rulings on the threshold issues would not be a substitute for a motion for summary judgment that complies with the Code of Civil Procedure. We also conclude there is nothing about this action that warrants an exception to the foregoing rules promulgated by the Legislature and Judicial Council in a case which, in its current posture, involves a potential penalty of $500 and treble damages.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff and appellant Magaña Cathcart McCarthy (Magaña), as an individual law firm and on behalf of a class of others, filed a first amended complaint alleging that defendant and respondent CB Richard Ellis, Inc. (CBRE), engaged in a course of conduct sending hundreds of thousands of unsolicited faxes to persons and entities whose telephone numbers were *111contained in databases maintained by CBRE. It was alleged that a fax sent to Magaña on or about June 18, 2005, was representative of the faxes sent by CBRE. Magaña alleged CBRE’s conduct violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) (47 U.S.C. § 227), as amended in 2005 by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 (JFPA). Magaña’s action sought injunctive relief, statutory damages in the amount of $500 for each unsolicited fax, and treble damages as provided in the statute.
The cause of action was screened for the complex litigation court, but initially was not designated as a complex litigation case. (Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 7.3(k)(2).) At a hearing on objections to the designation, counsel for Magaña orally advised the court “on information and belief’ that “class members number well into the tens of thousands.” Based upon that representation, the court designated the action as complex and a trial court was assigned.
With the assistance of the complex litigation court, the parties stipulated that it would be helpful to manage the litigation (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400(a)) by determination of three threshold issues: (1) the effective date of the opt-out provisions of the JFPA—either the date of enactment of the statute (July 9, 2005) or the date of the adoption of implementing regulations by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (Aug. 1, 2006); (2) whether the fax received by Magaña on its face complied with the opt-out notice requirements of the JFPA, including determination of issues of “materiality” and “substantial compliance” with the opt-out notice requirements; and (3) whether an express invitation or permission to send a fax may be given orally.
The parties stipulated that consideration of these issues prior to class certification was an efficient means of narrowing the litigation. In addition, “[t]he parties recognize that the Court’s determination of these issues is not meant as a substitute for any future summary adjudication motions as to specific facts” and if any party wished to use the court’s mling on threshold issues, “an appropriate [motion] may be made in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and any future Case Management Orders by this Court.” (Italics added.) The trial court orally stated: “This is not in lieu of a motion for summary judgment or in lieu of summary adjudication of issues.”
Simultaneous briefs on the merits were filed by the parties on the threshold issues. In addition, Magaña filed a motion to strike factual assertions in *112CBRE’s briefs, arguing the parties had agreed to seek “a pure legal determination” of the threshold issues, but that CBRE raised multiple factual issues in its brief.1
The trial court resolved the threshold issues as follows: (1) the opt-out notice provisions of JFPA became effective only when the FCC promulgated regulations on August 1, 2006, and prior to that, entities with an established business relationship with fax recipients could not be held liable for failure to adhere to the opt-out notice requirements; (2) substantial compliance is a defense to a claim of failure to comply with the opt-out mechanisms of the statute; and (3) express permission to receive a fax under the JFPA need not be in writing. The court denied Magaña’s motion to strike but did not consider the factual assertions of CBRE.
After the trial court’s resolution of the threshold issues, Magaña petitioned for writ relief in this court, which was summarily denied. (Magaña Cathcart McCarthy v. Superior Court (June 20, 2007, B197675).)
After denial of the writ petition, the parties and the trial court discussed resolution of the action. The court again noted the parties’ stipulation that its rulings on threshold issues would not be in lieu of a motion for summary judgment. The court suggested the issues be tendered as a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the court would grant. Instead, the parties entered into a stipulation for judgment.
I. The Stipulation for Judgment
A. Factual Stipulations
In a document entitled “Stipulation for Judgment,” the parties stipulated to the following facts:
(1) CBRE sent a fax advertisement to Magaña on July 18, 2005, a copy of which was attached to the complaint. At that time, Magaña had an established business relationship with CBRE pursuant to the TCPA;
*113(2) On March 14, 2006, Magaña commenced this action for violation of the TCPA, as amended by the JFPA, asserting an individual claim for receipt of the fax and claims on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated fax recipients;
(3) No motion for class certification had been made and discovery had been stayed;
(4) On January 24, 2007, the trial court issued its ruling on the threshold issues and found “[a]mong other things,” that the FCC regulations recognized an established business relationship exception to unsolicited faxes, applicable to the fax received by Magaña, the exception applied to both business and residential telephone subscribers, and the opt-out notice requirements of the JFPA were not in effect on the date Magaña received the fax;
(5) The trial court’s order was issued pursuant to a written stipulation of the parties that the ruling would not substitute for a summary adjudication motion, and if a party wished to file a subsequent motion applying the court’s ruling, it would do so in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the court issued its ruling, Magaña has not requested leave to file an amended complaint;
(6) A petition for writ of mandate, filed by Magaña challenging the trial court’s rulings, was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal;
(7) The parties “desire that the Court of Appeal review the merits of the [trial] court’s January 24 Order. The parties make this Stipulation in order to put the case in a position for immediate appeal to the Court of Appeal and to minimize additional proceedings in the trial court”; and
(8) Neither Magaña nor Magaña’s counsel received any consideration in connection with the stipulation, including the dismissal of the claims of the putative class.
B. Additional Stipulations
The parties further stipulated that if CBRE brought a motion for summary judgment on Magaña’s individual claim, the trial court would grant summary judgment because the JFPA’s opt-out notice requirements were not in effect on the date CBRE sent the fax, CBRE had an established business relationship with Magaña, and as a result of that relationship, Magaña is deemed to have invited or given permission to CBRE to send the fax.
*114Because the trial court ruled on these threshold issues, “a formal motion asserting these dispositive grounds would be time-consuming and expensive, and a waste of limited judicial resources. For purposes of entry of judgment in this case, the Court shall be deemed to have granted summary judgment [for the reasons set forth above] and on no other basis.” The judgment resolves all claims in the first amended complaint between Magaña and CBRE, and if affirmed on appeal, the judgment shall be final as to all claims of Magaña as an individual.
In addition, Magaña voluntarily dismissed without prejudice all claims in the first amended complaint on behalf of the putative class. The dismissal does not prejudice the putative plaintiffs as to class certification, or CBRE’s position that class certification is improper. Magaña intends to appeal the judgment dismissing its individual claim, and nothing in the stipulation “shall prejudice or moot the appeal.” Detailed preservation of rights was set forth as to the putative class.
C. The Judgment
The trial court entered judgment in accordance with the stipulation. Magaña appeals from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Issues Relating to the TCPA and the JFPA in the Trial Court
For purposes of the proceedings in the trial court, the relevant portions of the TCPA and JFPA are the effective date of the JFPA and its regulations (either the date of enactment of the statute or the date of adoption of the FCC regulations), and whether the established business relationship exception applied at the time CBRE sent the fax to Magaña. As we do not reach the merits of the parties’ contentions, only a brief summary of the legal principles is necessary.
Enacted in December 1991, the TCPA makes it unlawful to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone fax machine. (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).) An unsolicited advertisement is defined as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” (Id., § 227(a)(5); see Kaufman v. ACS Systems, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 886, 894 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 296] (Kaufman).)
*115An individual has the right to bring a state court action for violation of the TCPA or the regulations promulgated by the FCC pursuant to the TCPA. Available remedies include recovery of actual monetary loss or recovery of $500 in damages for each violation, whichever is greater. (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A)-(C).) Treble damages may be awarded for willful or knowing violations. (Id., § 227(b)(3); see Kaufman, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 896.)
Congress authorized the FCC to adopt regulations to implement the TCPA. (47 U.S.C. § 227, subd. (b)(2).) Initially, the FCC interpreted the act to provide that a fax from a person or entity with an established business relationship with the recipient can be deemed to be invited or permitted by the recipient. (Gottlieb v. Carnival Corp. (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 595 F.Supp.2d 212, 216-217 (Gottlieb).) However, this interpretation was not incorporated into the FCC’s final regulations implementing the TCPA in 1992. “The rules regarding fax advertisements stated simply that ‘[n]o person may . . . use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine.’ ” (Gottlieb, supra, 595 F.Supp.2d at pp. 216-217.)
In July 2003, the FCC declared it was reversing its prior determination that the existence of an established business relationship constituted express permission to send faxes to a customer. Because Congress was considering amendments to the TCPA, the FCC delayed implementation of its revised interpretation. (Gottlieb, supra, 595 F.Supp.2d at p. 217.)
On July 9, 2005, Congress amended the TCPA by enactment of the JFPA, which codified the existing business relationship exception for advertisements by fax. (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) [amended to read to make it unlawful for any person “to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement, unless—F0 (i) the unsolicited advertisement is from a sender with an established business relationship with the recipient”]; Gottlieb, supra, 595 F.Supp.2d at p. 217.)
Under the JFPA, a sender of a fax advertisement is required to provide notice and contact information on the fax explaining how to opt out of future fax transmissions from the sender. (47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2)(D).) The circumstances which comply with the opt-out provision are specified in the amended statute. (Ibid.)
*116As with the TCPA, Congress empowered the FCC to promulgate implementing regulations within 270 days after enactment of the JFPA. The regulations took effect on August 1, 2006.
II. Failure to Comply with the Summary Judgment Law
A. Requirement of Separate Statements of Undisputed Facts
The stipulated judgment in this action reflects that the trial court would have granted summary judgment in favor of CBRE, although no summary judgment motion was on file and the parties had stipulated that the ruling on threshold issues was not a substitute for a proper summary judgment motion. We requested the parties to address whether the procedure in the stipulated judgment conflicts with the statute and rule governing summary judgment. The parties’ responses acknowledge the stipulated judgment does not comply with the summary judgment statute and court rule. We conclude the procedure impermissibly conflicts with the mandatory requirements of summary judgment, requiring reversal of the judgment.
Neither the parties nor the dissent cites any authority which even remotely supports deviation from mandated rules of procedure applicable to motions for summary judgment. As described in clear terms in Monarch Healthcare v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1285-1286 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 619], courts are not free to ignore the Legislature’s procedural requirements for the convenience of the parties: “Notwithstanding the parties’ express or tacit agreement, the court had a responsibility to act in accordance with the statutory procedures set out by the Legislature. (People v. Mendez (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1773, 1782-1783 [286 Cal.Rptr. 216] [‘ “waiver of procedural requirements may not be permitted when the allowance of a deviation would lead to confusion in the processing of other cases by other litigants” ’]; People v. Silva (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 538, 549 [170 Cal.Rptr. 713] [‘Where a statute requires a court to follow a particular procedure, an act beyond those limits is in excess of the court’s jurisdiction.’].) Parties cannot stipulate to circumvent a legislatively designated code section as the exclusive statutory vehicle. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1501 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 626].) The court would have been derelict in its duty had it put aside its disquiet regarding ‘what the code says’ and allowed the litigants to freely rewrite the discovery statutes.”
The parties’ attempt to create appellate review, by stipulating the trial court would have granted summary judgment based upon its ruling on threshold issues, fails at the outset as there is nothing before this court that remotely complies with the requirements for summary judgment motions found in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c or rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of *117Court. The parties do not dispute the complete absence of a motion for summary judgment and separate statements of undisputed facts, which are made mandatory by statute and court rules. The record presented is inadequate for the type of review of a motion for summary judgment contemplated in the law. Moreover, there is nothing about this particular action which creates a compelling argument to abandon the Code of Civil Procedure in favor of the expediency of the parties.
“Summary judgment, although a very useful tool in litigation, is also a drastic remedy. Because of this, it is important that all of the procedural requirements for the granting of such a motion be satisfied before the trial court grants the remedy.” (Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1256 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 681].)
“California’s [summary judgment] procedure requires the moving party to support its motion with evidence in the relatively elaborate form of separate statements. The court is neither permitted to act sua sponte nor solely upon the basis of argument: ‘In determining whether the papers show . . . there is no triable issue as to any material fact the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, . . . and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence . . . .’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (c), italics added.) [Code of Civil Procedure s]ection 437c also provides that ‘the plaintiff . . . may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show ... a triable issue of material fact exists but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists . . . .’ (Id., subd. (o)(2).) The statute itself thus implies the corresponding need for concrete evidence from the moving party and expressly requires the moving party to supply more than the bare assertion, whether alleged in a pleading or by way of argument, that the opposing party has no evidence to support a particular claim.” (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 75-76 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 360].)
“The separate statement is not merely a technical requirement, it is an indispensable part of the summary judgment or adjudication process. ‘Separate statements are required not to satisfy a sadistic urge to torment lawyers, but rather to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for . . . summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are disputed.’ (United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 327, 335 [282 Cal.Rptr. 368].)” (Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 896, 902 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 679].)
*118“ ‘The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. [Citation.]’ (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].) To that end, the rules dictating the content and format for separate statements submitted by moving and responding parties ‘permit trial courts to expeditiously review complex motions for . . . summary judgment to determine quickly and efficiently whether material facts are disputed.’ (United Community Church v. Garcin[, supra,] 231 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 335 . . . .)” (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 72 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 149].) As our review on appeal is de novo, the same considerations that allow a trial court to expeditiously review a summary judgment motion are applicable to appellate review.
The goal of expeditious review of summary judgment motions “is defeated where, as here, the trial court is forced to wade through stacks of documents, the bulk of which fail to comply with the substantive requirements of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 437c, subdivision (b)(3), or the formatting requirements of [former] rule 342, in an effort to cull through the arguments and determine what evidence is admitted and what remains at issue. The realization of this goal is so important that the Legislature has determined ‘[fjailure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)” (Collins v. Hertz Corp., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 72-73.)
The mandatory requirements for summary judgment are explicit. “A party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with ‘a separate statement setting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material facts stated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(1) [motion for summary judgment]; see § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [motion for summary adjudication ‘shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment’].) The party opposing the motion must file with the opposition papers ‘a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. The statement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Each material fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.’ ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 437c, subd. (b)(3).)” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 411], fn. omitted.)
*119Additional detailed procedural requirements of the moving papers and opposition are found in rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of Court. None of the procedures mandated by court rules were complied with in this case.
Not only was there no separate statement of undisputed facts in this case, there was no moving party, a requirement for the granting of a summary judgment. Case law is clear that a court may not grant summary judgment in favor of a party who has not filed a summary judgment motion. (Dvorin v. Appellate Dept. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 648, 650 [125 Cal.Rptr. 771, 542 P.2d 1363]; Village Nurseries v. Greenbaum (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 26, 46-47 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 555]; Sierra Craft, Inc. v. Magnum Enterprises, Inc., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1254-1256.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 are clear and unambiguous. Summary judgment motions require separate statements of undisputed facts with appropriate citations to supporting evidence. None are present in this case. There was no basis for a stipulated judgment that the trial court would have granted summary judgment, when none of the summary judgment rules were complied with below. The parties can cite to no case which allows for such a drastic departure from the mandatory rules of summary judgment practice, and the law is to the contrary. (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 645, 655 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 501].)
The record in this case illustrates why it is inappropriate for this court to accede to the procedure urged by the parties: there was no motion for summary judgment; there was no moving party as to the threshold issues; instead of the responsive pleadings required by law, the parties filed simultaneous opening and reply briefs; and the formatting of the briefs in no way complied with the requirements for summary judgment.
The simultaneous briefing in the trial court does not lend itself to the expeditious review contemplated by the standard summary judgment motion. Briefing in the trial court on the threshold issues included a 25-page opening brief by Magaña on one issue with 123 pages of attachments and 259 pages of federal and out-of-state authorities. Magaña filed a 16-page opening brief on a second issue, along with 144 pages of federal cases. Magaña filed a document conceding a third issue.
CBRE filed a 29-page opening brief on two issues, supported by an appendix of authorities consisting of 390 pages. CBRE then filed a corrected opening brief of 29 pages.
*120Magaña filed objections to CBRE’s factual assertions and a motion to strike. Magaña filed a 37-page reply brief on one issue and a 26-page reply brief on a second issue. Attachments of 61 pages were filed with Magaña’s reply briefs along with an additional 339 pages of federal and out-of-state authorities. CBRE filed a 16-page reply brief.
The record pertaining to the threshold issues fails to provide this court with the expeditious means of ruling on a summary judgment motion. To the contrary, it is comprised of simultaneously filed opening and reply briefs, along with over 1,000 pages of attachments and citations to federal and out-of-state authorities. This record is inadequate for review on the basis the trial court would have granted summary judgment.
B. The Exception to the Rule Against Appeal from a Consent Judgment
The parties rely on an inapposite line of cases which recognizes that an appellate court may review a stipulated judgment in order to obtain appellate review of a dispositive ruling. Typical of these authorities is Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 400 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 453, 981 P.2d 79] (Norgart), which permitted an appeal from a judgment entered by agreement of the parties, which would otherwise lack appellate jurisdiction under the rule prohibiting an appeal from a “consent judgment”—“a judgment entered by a court under the authority of, and in accordance with, the contractual agreement of the parties [citation] . . . .” While normally a party may not appeal from a consent judgment, there is “at least one ‘exception,’ namely, that ‘[i]f consent was merely given to facilitate an appeal following adverse determination of a critical issue, the party will not lose his right to be heard on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Where the intent of the parties is not merely to settle their dispute, but to “hasten its transfer from the trial court to the appellate court,” the consent judgment rule does not bar appellate jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 401.)
However, examination of the cases typified by Norgart reveals in each instance there was a proper summary judgment motion for review. In Norgart, the defendant filed two motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed that the court would grant summary judgment on the basis of a statute of limitations defense (although the tentative ruling was to deny summary judgment) and enter judgment accordingly, in order to obtain appellate review of the issue. (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 393-394.) Our Supreme Court determined that the parties’ intent was to bring the issue immediately to the attention of the appellate court. (Id. at pp. 401-403.) With this procedural history, the court determined the merits of the duly filed motions for summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 404-410.)
*121Other authorities are in accord in allowing appellate review of a stipulated judgment where the intent of the parties is not to resolve the action by stipulation, but instead to obtain appellate review of a dispositive adverse ruling. However, unlike the instant case, the appeals in these actions all followed a dispositive ruling on a properly litigated motion for summary judgment. (Building Industry Assn. v. City of Camarillo (1986) 41 Cal.3d 810, 815-817 [226 Cal.Rptr. 81, 718 P.2d 68] [“partial summary judgment” in favor of defendant was effectively dispositive of the action; a stipulated judgment to allow plaintiff to obtain review of the merits of summary judgment was not barred by the rule against appeal from consent judgments]; Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1437 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 534] [defendant’s summary adjudication motion granted and plaintiff dismissed remaining claims; intent was to obtain appellate review rather than settle the action]; Aloha Pacific, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 297, 306 [93 Cal.Rptr.2d 148] [plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied and parties stipulated to judgment for defendant; appeal proper because consent given to facilitate an appeal]; Holmes v. Roth (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 931, 934, fn. 1 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 315] [after defendant’s summary judgment motion was denied, parties stipulated to judgment against defendant; rule against appeal from consent judgment inapplicable].)
Accordingly, the issue is not whether parties may stipulate to a judgment in order to secure appellate review. The above cited authorities clearly permit the practice. However, there must be a properly filed motion for the appellate court to review. We simply cannot review the merits of a motion that was never made and which is in direct contravention of the mandated rules of procedure. The stipulated judgment providing the trial court would have granted summary judgment, had one been made, must be reversed.
C. Other Considerations
The parties contend we should reach the merits of the judgment because to require them to comply with the summary judgment procedure would have been time consuming, expensive, and wasteful of judicial resources. The contention is without merit for multiple reasons.
First, and most obviously, the Legislature has determined the procedure for summary judgment. It is not the place of the parties, even if assigned to the complex litigation court, to rewrite the Code of Civil Procedure for their own convenience and economic interests. The summary judgment rules apply to the complex litigation court. (First State Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 324, 331 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 104] [“ ‘[Code of Civil Procedure section] 437c does not categorize summary judgment motions *122depending on their difficulty and assign different timing requirements to more difficult motions’ ”].) The statutory procedure for summary judgment may not be altered by local rule or general orders of the trial court. (Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp., supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 651-655 [statutory requirements for summary judgment may not be altered in asbestos actions by order of the trial court].) Complex litigation cases cannot be moved to the front of the line in the appellate courts by circumventing the law of summary judgment by stipulation.
Second, there is nothing about this action that compels disregard of the rules of civil procedure. To the contrary, in its present posture the value of this case involves one alleged violation of the JFPA, which carries with it a $500 penalty with the possibility of treble damages.
Third, while the issue presented is an interesting one, it is no more challenging than the issues this court considers on a regular basis from the general jurisdiction civil courts, whose litigants are required to fully comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. The circumstance that the superior court deemed the action complex on the basis of an oral “information and belief’ representation of the potential size of the class, with no documentary showing to support the assertion, does not mean the parties were thereafter excused from compliance with the rules applicable to other civil litigants. No doubt, the complex litigation courts have broad authority to manage cases, as a complex case is defined as one “that requires exceptional judicial management.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.400.) But when it comes to the requirements for summary judgment, the Legislature and the Judicial Council determine the procedure to be followed.
Fourth, there was an express agreement between the trial court and the parties that any ruling on the threshold issues would not be used for purposes of summary judgment or summary adjudication. The parties stipulated to this in writing, and the court at least twice orally stated on the record that its rulings were not a substitute for a proper motion for summary judgment. This stipulation expressly required that if a party sought to apply the court’s ruling on a threshold issue in a dispositive motion, a proper motion would be filed in compliance with the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties offer no explanation for why they should not be held to their own agreement.
Fifth, the parties argue that the appeal raises merely issues of law that are subject to de novo review, so this court should ignore the procedural rules of summary judgment and render an opinion based on what has been presented. It does not follow from the fact that summary judgments are reviewed de novo that the parties may stipulate that a summary judgment *123would have been granted, when none has been made, and when case law, the summary judgment statute and court rule provide otherwise. In addition, it is not clear exactly how much of the more than 1,500-page record of pleadings and authorities submitted on the threshold issues the parties wish us to review in order to conduct the de novo review they desire. To the extent the parties rely on all the briefing in the trial court on the threshold issues, it bears emphasis that there are unresolved factual issues contained in CBRE’s trial briefs that Magaña believed were serious enough to warrant the filing of a motion to strike. (See fn. 1, ante.) With these factual issues unresolved, and their materiality unsettled, this court cannot affirm a judgment speculating that the trial court would have granted summary judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the Code of Civil Procedure. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
Turner, P. J., concurred.

 Magaña complained of the following factual allegations by CBRE in the motion to strike: that the fax to Magaña was sent only nine days after passage of the JFPA; that CBRE is not a “junk faxer” but is a “legitimate” 100-year-old public company; that Magaña does not dispute the existence of an established business relationship between CBRE and all putative class members; that Magaña did not complain of the fax and waited eight months to file this action, and Magaña did not receive any additional faxes from CBRE; that a Magaña attorney (Peter Cathcart) visited CBRE’s Web site using his own user profile, where he had the option of opting out of future faxes, and that Cathcart was not misled as to how to opt out of receiving faxes; and that damages, if awarded, would be extensive.