Court Opinion

ID: 9699136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:11:25.817677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.778983
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring). I concur in affirmance for the reason that, as stated by my Brother Archer, the trial court made clear that the defendant’s assertion of innocence was not a factor which affected the length of the sentence imposed.
I concur separately to share my Brother Brick*727ley’s observation that the distinction between a defendant’s continued refusal to admit guilt and a lack of remorse is largely illusory. The separate opinions issued in this case attest to the difficulty presented in attempting to differentiate between them. I would not attempt to do so because reality and common sense require the sentencing judge to act upon the basis of the central presumption that the defendant is guilty. Following a plea of guilty or a trial, a convicted defendant stands before the sentencing judge no longer clothed with the presumption of innocence. While a defendant is certainly free to continue to assert innocence, a sentencing judge should not be required to tip-toe through the metaphysical distinctions required to separate that continued assertion from a lack of remorse.
To discharge the awesome responsibility of sentencing a defendant to a substantial loss of liberty, a sentencing judge surely must begin with an honest belief that the defendant is in fact guilty. Given the acceptance of defendant’s guilt as a premise, the sentencing judge’s perception of the defendant’s truthfulness (lack of credibility) or lack of remorse (refusal to acknowledge guilt) is, to a certain degree, predetermined. The logic is sophistic which would require that this perception merely be unstated on the record.
Boyle, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.