Court Opinion

ID: 9733049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:51:36.263339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:38.032129
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The lower court in a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion correctly applied Michigan’s objective entrapment test. Because the ruling below was not clearly erroneous, I would affirm._
*534I
In my view, People v Juillet, 439 Mich 34; 475 NW2d 786 (1991), is not binding precedent because a majority of the justices were unable to agree on a new rule of law. Under such circumstances, only the parties in that case and its companion case of People v Brown are bound by the decision. As the Michigan Supreme Court has stated:
Since there is no agreement by a majority of the United States Supreme Court regarding the limitation of right to counsel in Kirby [v Illinois, 406 US 682; 92 S Ct 1877; 32 L Ed 2d 411 (1972)], we are not permitted to follow Kirby as authoritative precedent on the question of counsel. The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases. If there is merely a majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment but the case is not authority beyond the immediate parties. [People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 170; 205 NW2d 461 (1973).]
Also see Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 661, n 7; 455 NW2d 699 (1990), and Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105, 108-109; 244 NW2d 98 (1976).
ii
In the present case, the majority concludes that the opinions in Juillet by Chief Justice Cavanagh (joined by Justices Levin and Mallett) and by Justice Boyle agree upon a ground for decision and thereby establish a new rule of law with respect to a reprehensible-conduct test for entrapment. I do not agree. A careful reading of the two opinions reveals a fundamental disagreement be*535tween the Chief Justice and Justice Boyle regarding a new test for entrapment that is based solely on reprehensible police conduct.
Justice Boyle expressly acknowledges this disagreement as follows:
Fourth, Chief Justice Cavanagh and I would recognize, to different degrees, a reprehensible-conduct test for entrapment. [.People v Juillet, supra, p 87; emphasis added.]
Not only do the Chief Justice and Justice Boyle disagree on the nature of necessary reprehensibility under their respective tests, they also disagree on the constitutional basis for such a defense. The Chief Justice writes:
I disagree with the limited reading thus far given to the concept of due process by the United States Supreme Court in this area, and I would find that the entrapment doctrine, as applied in this state through the prevailing objective test, is properly rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution. See Const 1963, art 1, § 17. [Id., pp 85-86.]
In a footnote, Justice Boyle distances herself from the constitutional ground relied on by the Chief Justice:
I wish to make clear, in connection with the misconduct question, that I disassociate myself from the unnecessary dicta of the Chief Justice that the entrapment doctrine is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Michigan Constitution. [Id., p 109, n 30.]
In response, Chief Justice Cavanagh writes:
Justice Boyle opines that my discussion in this *536section constitutes "unnecessary dicta.” Post, p 109, n 30. It is odd indeed, in my view, to suggest that an articulation of the underlying legal basis of the dispositive analysis applied by a court or judge to decide a case constitutes "unnecessary dicta.” [Id., p 86, n 6.]
Most importantly, the result in the application of the two respective tests is significantly different. As Juillet indicates, under the reprehensible-conduct test advocated by Justice Boyle, defendant Juillet was not entrapped as a matter of law. In marked contrast, defendant Juillet was entrapped under the test proposed by Chief Justice Cavanagh. In light of the fundamental disagreements outlined above, I cannot conclude that a majority of the Supreme Court has agreed on a "ground for decision,” thereby establishing a new rule of law for entrapment.
hi
The majority in the present case further concludes that a remand is necessary because the objective entrapment test employed by the lower court has been changed by Justice Brickley’s opinion in Juillet. Justice Brickley, however, denies that Juillet alters the objective test and would find a remand unnecessary:
In response to Justice Boyle’s claim that we are altering the objective test for entrapment in these cases, we respectfully note that Justice Boyle signed an opinion, only one year ago, which not only endorsed continued adherence to the objective test, but stated "that there is some overlapping in application between the two tests [objective and subjective] and that the best of each can, to some extent, be utilized.” Jamieson at 79. Similarly, the assertion that we have, in these cases, adopted the *537"defendant’s circumstances” as a new standard for evaluating the claim of entrapment is simply not true. In Jamieson we stated:
"When applying the objective test, consideration is given to the willingness of the accused to commit the act weighed against how a normally law-aiding person would react in similar circumstances.” [Id. at 74.]
Therefore, we are clearly not departing from the current jurisprudence which this Court has espoused; any implication to the contrary by Justice Boyle is an incorrect characterization or interpretation of our opinion. [People v Juillet, supra, pp 59-60.]
Chief Justice Cavanagh also disagrees with Justice Boyle’s conclusion that Juillet changes the objective test:
I disagree with Justice Boyle that the test established today is a "new test]] for entrapment not encompassed in the objective test.” Boyle, J., post, p 87. While I myself have some problems with Justice Brickley’s analysis, his opinion in People v Jamieson, 436 Mich 61; 461 NW2d 884 (1990), represented a logical development in entrapment law, faithful to our precedents, and Justice Brickley’s analysis in the instant cases, whatever its problems, is perfectly consistent with his Jamieson analysis. [Id., p 70.]
In Juillet, the remand of Brown occurred only because Chief Justice Cavanagh concurred in the result:
Because the justices signing this opinion do not constitute a majority, however, I reluctantly concur in the result reached by Justice Boyle, insofar as she would reverse the erroneous analysis of the lower courts and remand for a new entrapment hearing .... [Id., p 83; emphasis added.]
*538Justice Boyle is clearly the only justice who believes that Justice Brickley’s lead opinion alters the objective test. She is the lone justice who would find a remand necessary. The remand ordered in the present case is therefore unnecessary and not compelled by Juillet.
Until and unless a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court agree on a new rule of law concerning entrapment, the previously established objective test remains binding precedent. In my view, the lower court applied the correct legal standard. Further, its finding that entrapment did not occur was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, I would affirm.