Court Opinion

ID: 9854928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:17:06.411327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.493923
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 58. (concurring). I agree with the majority's conclusion that the circuit court (the branch having juvenile court jurisdiction, hereinafter the "juvenile court") does not have jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver order after a complaint has been filed in the criminal court. Majority op. at ¶ 33.1 further agree that the juvenile court may reconsider its waiver order before the commencement of criminal proceedings. Majority op. at ¶ 35. I write separately, however, because I cannot join the majority's judicially created remedy for review of the waiver order after the criminal court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction.
¶ 59. I respectfully disagree with the majority's judicially created additional means of seeking review of the juvenile court's waiver decision after the criminal *164court assumes exclusive jurisdiction.1 The majority concludes that in many cases interlocutory appeal and direct appeal, though available, are inadequate remedies, and consequently creates a new procedure that asks the criminal court to relinquish jurisdiction. Majority op. at ¶ 49. While I believe that there must be a remedy available, I respectfully disagree with this judicially created remedy, because the current remedies are adequate in this case. Furthermore, if another remedy is desired, it is most appropriately provided by the legislature or by following this court's rule-making procedures to amend the Criminal Procedure Code and/or the Juvenile Justice Code.
¶ 60. The majority concludes that interlocutory appeal and direct appeal are in some cases inadequate remedies for reviewing a juvenile court's waiver order. Majority op. at ¶ 49. Specifically, the majority points to a situation, such as here, where the juvenile claims that there is new evidence not considered at the waiver hearing. Id. I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion because the majority completely overlooks the court of appeals' power to reverse a circuit court's order not only for error, but also in the interest of justice.
*165¶ 61. Wisconsin Stat. § 752.352 explicitly gives the court of appeals authority to examine the record and in the interest of justice, reverse the order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record. See State v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶ 40, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 N.W.2d 175 (granting a new trial in the interest of justice on the issue of mental responsibility). Section 752.35 certainly applies on interlocutory or direct appeal of a juvenile court's waiver decision. In the interest of justice, therefore, the court of appeals may, in my opinion, consider the proposed new evidence and decide if there is a substantial probability that the new factor would produce a different result. See Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶ 31 (citing State v. Darcy N.K., 218 Wis. 2d 640, 667, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998)); see also Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) (citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), and discussing the court of appeals' discretionary reversal power). If so, the court of appeals has authority to reverse the juvenile court's waiver decision or remit the case to the juvenile court for entry of the proper order. See § 752.35. Based on the court of appeals' statutory power to reverse the juvenile court's waiver decision in the interest of justice, therefore, I conclude that the *166majority's judicially created remedy is unnecessary.3 Interlocutory appeal and direct appeal appear to be adequate remedies for review of the juvenile court's waiver decision.
¶ 62. Assuming that I were to agree with the majority, however, I would still take the position that an opinion by this court is not the proper avenue to create a new procedure for review of a juvenile court's waiver decision. This is a remedy properly provided either by *167legislative enactment or .by following this court's established rule-making procedures.
¶ 63. The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. ch. 938. If a new remedy in that chapter is desired, therefore, the legislature most appropriately should provide it. The majority opinion acknowledges that the legislature enacted a statutory procedure for reverse waiver, see Wis. Stat. § 938.183, and a statutory procedure for a waiver hearing when a juvenile has absconded, see § 938.18(7). Majority op. at ¶ 53. Significantly and correctly, the majority then notes that neither statute applies here. Still, however, the majority uses those statutes to create a new remedy because "a reverse waiver concept is not unprecedented." Majority op. at ¶ 53. Essentially the majority creates a new procedure out of whole cloth, and attempts to justify it by analogy to other legislatively enacted statutory remedies that do not apply.
¶ 64. I cannot join such reasoning. The majority plainly ignores that the legislature is the proper branch of government to enact statutes. This is evidenced by the fact that the majority opinion seems to me to be more like a statutory enactment rather than a judicial decision. As demonstrated by Wis. Stat. § 938.183 and § 938.18(7), the legislature has provided for remedies other than interlocutory and direct appeal in certain situations. Tellingly, however, the legislature has not provided for a remedy, other than interlocutory and direct appeal, in the situation we are faced with today.
¶ 65. Moreover, if this court feels that it must provide an additional procedural remedy, a judicial opinion is not the appropriate way to do so. See Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 Wis. 2d 159, 173, 306 N.W.2d 71 (1981) ("If the court claims the power to amend the statute as a rule of practice and procedure, case law is not the way to do it.") (Coffey, J., dissenting). Pursuant *168to Wis. Stat. § 751.124 and this court's Internal Operating Procedures, the proper avenue to create or amend rules governing procedure in judicial proceedings, such as the one under review, is through a petition and public hearing. The majority's decision today clearly amends Chapter 938 and the judicial procedure for review of a juvenile court's waiver decision. This kind of significant amendment to juvenile court and criminal court procedure should, if not addressed by the legislature, appropriately be the subject of a rules petition, and not enacted by judicial fiat. Consistent with established procedures, we should hold a public hearing and engage in open discussion about the proposed amendment. Wis. S. Ct. IOP (May 24, 1984). We should engage in informed, open discussion regarding whether there should be a remedy other than interlocutory appeal and direct appeal, and if so, then adopt the new remedy for reviewing the waiver decision, in accord with § 751.12 and our Internal Operating Procedures. At the same time, we should address whether there is a need for a *169procedural rule, in future cases, for supplementing the record to include the new evidence offered.5 By creating an avenue of judicial review here that asks the criminal court to relinquish jurisdiction to the juvenile court, the majority seems to be ignoring established rule-making procedures; consequently, I cannot join that portion of the opinion.
¶ 66. In conclusion, I agree with the majority's holding that the juvenile court may reconsider its waiver order before commencement of proceedings in the criminal court. I cannot join the majority's opinion in its entirety, however, because I object to the creation of a new remedy, such as the one here, by judicial fiat. Whether to provide an additional remedy is a policy choice most appropriately left to the legislature, or to this court, but only by following established procedures involving a petition and public hearing. Moreover, I conclude that interlocutory appeal and direct appeal are adequate remedies for review of the juvenile court's waiver decision. Even where the juvenile is claiming significant new evidence, the court of appeals may consider that claim, and decide if there is a substantial probability of a different result. If so, the court of appeals can reverse the juvenile court's waiver order in the interest of justice. For the reasons stated, therefore, I respectfully concur.
¶ 67. I am authorized to state that Justices JONE WILCOX and DIANE S. SYKES have joined this concurrence.

 The majority opinion is inconsistent. At paragraph 6, the majority concludes "that a juvenile seeking prompt review of a waiver order, after the criminal court has assumed jurisdiction, has two options" one of which is interlocutory appeal. Later, however, the majority concludes that it must create an additional remedy because interlocutory appeal is not meaningful.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 states in full:
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears from the record that the real controversy has not been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or remit the case to the trial court for entry of the proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the making of such amendments in the pleadings and the adoption of such procedure in that court, not inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.

 1 further disagree with the majority's judicially created remedy because it reminds me of judicial review by a court of co-equal jurisdiction. See State v. Schroeder, 224 Wis. 2d 706, 721, 593 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that after court reorganization the term 'juvenile court" means the circuit court adjudicating a case under the juvenile code). Prior to the 1977 constitutional amendment restructuring the Wisconsin Court System, the legislature had authority to establish courts of limited jurisdiction inferior to circuit courts. The constitutional amendment created the intermediate court of appeals and eliminated the distinction between county and circuit courts. See Dane County v. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 711, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992). The majority's new procedure here seems contrary to the current structure of the court system, because it essentially creates review of the juvenile court's decision in the criminal court.
Furthermore, although the majority discusses the impact of requiring a juvenile to appeal a waiver decision in a single-judge county, see majority op. ¶ 49, the majority ignores the practical effect of its new remedy in that same situation. In a single-judge county, the judge acting as the criminal court judge will, himself or herself, consider new factors. Then, based on review of the new factors, the judge will grant or deny the motion. The practical impact is that the majority's procedure asks the judge, acting in the criminal court, to relinquish jurisdiction to himself or herself, acting in the juvenile court.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12 states in relevant part:
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant.. .. All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by rules promulgated under this section. No rule modifying or suspending such statutes may be adopted until the court has held a public hearing with reference to the rule. . .. This section shall not abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify or repeal statutes or rules relating to pleading, practice or procedure. The judicial council shall act in an advisory capacity to assist the court in performing its duties under this section.
(Emphasis added.)

 Supplementing the record is not an issue here because the juvenile court, the Honorable Diane M. Nicks, presiding, addressed the proposed new evidence in this case in the context of the motion to reconsider.