Court Opinion

ID: 9743586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:37:25.001095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:42.265625
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, defendant, Henry Griffin, was found guilty of murder, solicitation to commit murder and conspiracy to commit murder. He was sentenced to death. Defendant’s execution was stayed pending direct review by this court in cause No. 62397. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which was granted by the trial court. The dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition was appealed directly to this court in cause No. 69286 (111. Const. 1970, art. VI, §4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rules 603, 609(a)). We affirm. FACTS The body of Carl Gibson was discovered near the 73rd Street exit ramp off of the Chicago Skyway on the morning of June 21, 1984. He had been shot four times at close range several hours earlier. A homicide investigation ensued. At the time of the Gibson murder, the Chicago police department and the State’s Attorney’s office of Cook County were involved in “Operation Camelot” — an investigation of a major drug operation located on Chicago’s south side. The investigation targeted the narcotics network of Charles Ashley, a drug dealer whose activities yielded an estimated $3 million annually. The victim was employed in Ashley’s drug operation. Also employed by Ashley’s drug operation was Darryl Moore, who was arrested in August 1984 on drug and unlawful use of weapons charges. While in jail, Moore contacted Michael Pochordo, a detective with the Violent Crimes Division of the Chicago police department. Moore informed Pochordo that he had information concerning the Gibson murder and Pochordo set up a meeting with Moore and representatives of the State’s Attorney’s office. At a meeting on August 7, 1984, Moore supplied the State’s Attorney’s office with information concerning defendant’s involvement in the murder. The information was sufficient for them to request permission for a consensual overhear device for use in Moore’s contact with defendant. Application for the overhear device was approved by the circuit court of Cook County .on August 8, 1984. On August 9, 1984, a tape-recording device was assembled at the State’s Attorney’s office, and Moore was instructed to call defendant. Moore recognized defendant’s voice because he had known him through their “enforcer” work, and had spoken to him at least 100 times. During his taped conversation with Moore, defendant implicated himself in the murder of Carl Gibson. Defendant was subsequently arrested and transported to the Violent Crimes Division in Area I. James Allen was also arrested in connection with the incident, and the men were placed in separate interview rooms. Assistant State’s Attorney Neil Cohen was introduced to defendant and read defendant his Miranda warnings. Defendant inquired as to whether Cohen had talked to Allen and, upon hearing that Allen had made a statement, waived his Miranda rights and confessed to his participation in Gibson’s murder. Defendant’s confession revealed the following facts. Ashley approached defendant and asked him if he would kill Gibson for $2,500. Ashley said that he wanted Gibson eliminated because he suspected that Gibson was secretly passing information to police. The offer was made and accepted in the presence of James Allen. Defendant and Allen then proceeded to the apartment of Darryl Moore, to obtain a gun. Moore was a fellow “enforcer” for Ashley and he and defendant had worked together in the past. Moore gave defendant a .38-caliber revolver, and defendant and Allen left the apartment and dropped off members of defendant’s family at home. Defendant returned from the family home to the car accompanied by Carl Gibson. Allen drove the car, Gibson sat in the passenger seat, and defendant sat in the back seat. Allen drove onto the Chicago Skyway at 89th Street, proceeding southbound. When he reached a toll plaza, he turned the car around and proceeded northbound. While driving northbound on the Skyway, defendant shot Gibson four times in the back of the head with a .38-caliber revolver. Allen then exited the Skyway at 73rd Street and stopped the car on the exit ramp. Defendant then pulled the body out of the car. The next day, defendant gave the murder weapon to Ashley. The rental car used in the slaying was disposed of by defendant and Allen. Defendant was paid by Ashley in cash and cocaine. Subsequent to his confession, defendant was indicted with his codefendants Charles Ashley and James Allen, for conspiracy to commit murder, solicitation to commit murder and murder. Prior to trial, the court found defendant fit to stand trial and denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant. The case was tried before a jury in June 1985. Moore testified as part of the State’s evidence against defendant. Additionally, Assistant State’s Attorney Cohen testified regarding the defendant’s oral and written confessions. The taped telephone conversation between Moore and the defendant was also admitted into evidence. Following presentation of the State’s evidence, the defense called its only witness, Detective Pochordo. Pochordo testified that he was initially contacted by Moore and that Moore had been an informant in 10 previous homicide cases, six of which had resulted in murder convictions to date. The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant raises numerous issues on appeal, none of which have merit. POST-CONVICTION PETITION On November 17, 1989, defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging that “substantial perjury” was employed to convict defendant and that the State’s Attorney’s office knew or should have known of the perjured evidence. Specifically, the petition alleged that Darryl Moore was paid $25,000 by the State’s Attorney’s office to lie at defendant’s trial, and that Detective Pochordo’s affidavit which supported the taped conversation was also a lie. Attached to the petition was a transcript of a video recording wherein Moore recanted his trial testimony and an excerpt of Moore’s testimony at an unrelated trial. The petition requested an evidentiary hearing. The video recording was taken on August 20, 1986, by defense attorney, Sam Adam. On the recording, Moore stated that his testimony at the defendant’s trial was a lie. He further stated that his testimony was based on information he had received from Detective Pochordo and members of the State’s Attorney’s office. In particular, Moore had received a copy of James Allen’s 16-page statement made subsequent to his arrest for the murder. In return for his testimony, Moore stated that he was housed in a Holidome hotel with his fiancee, that his living expenses were paid for, and that he was provided with money to purchase a catering truck from which he could sell hot food. Moore testified that the money for his “lavish lifestyle” came from the State’s Attorney’s office. On August 10, 1987, Moore was a key witness in another Cook County homicide case, People v. Freeman, No. 86 — CR—2090. During his testimony, Moore stated that he had lied at defendant’s trial, and had been paid to do so by Detective Pochordo and members of the State’s Attorney’s office. The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition on September 27, 1989, arguing that the petition failed to raise any constitutional questions within the scope of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122 — 1 et seq.). On September 28, 1989, Judge Earl Strayhorn of the circuit court of Cook County heard argument on the motion to dismiss and granted same, finding “no constitutional imperfections as to petitioner’s rights in the trial of the case.” At the outset, we note that the trial court properly proceeded on the motion to dismiss pursuant to section 122 — 5 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122 — 5). Defendant contends that Moore perjured himself by his trial testimony and that the trial court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s post-conviction petition for relief. The line of cases cited by defendant for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing is necessary is not persuasive, as each case is distinguishable on its facts. The Post-Conviction Hearing Act does not require a trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Act gives the post-conviction judge broad discretion as to the type of evidence he may consider in ruling on the allegation of the petition. Section 122 — 6 of the Act provides: “The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence.” (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 122 — 6.) In People v. Derengowski (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 476, this court held that “an evidentiary hearing is not always necessary ‘since the circuit court, upon a motion to dismiss a post-conviction petition, may render its decision on the basis of what is contained in the pleading to which the motion is directed, considered with the transcript of trial or other proceedings.’ ” (44 Ill. 2d at 478-79, quoting People v. Morris (1969), 43 Ill. 2d 124, 128.) The trial court was provided with transcripts of Moore’s recantation as well as trial transcripts from the unrelated trial in which Moore once again testified that he had lied in defendant’s trial. Additionally, Judge Strayhorn presided over defendant’s jury trial as well as the hearing on the post-conviction petition. In People v. Humphrey (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 88, this court held that when considering whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition that alleges the knowing use of perjured testimony against defendant, the trial judge who presided at the trial may determine the credibility of the person alleging the perjury by reviewing the documents supporting the defendant’s petition. Oral testimony of defendant and informant is not necessary. (46 Ill. 2d at 91-92.) Measuring by the established standards of this court and the language of the statute, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the allegations of the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. ALLEGED TRIAL ERRORS Having determined that the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s post-convictión petition for relief, we now address defendant’s allegations of trial errors. Opening Statement Defendant contends that the State in its opening statement improperly discussed Charles Ashley’s drug operation. Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence was never introduced at trial because the testimony of witness Sherman Overstreet was subsequently prevented by the trial court. Overstreet was to testify regarding Ashley’s drug activities. A review of the record reveals that ample evidence of Ashley’s drug network was presented by the testimony of other witnesses. The discussion of Ashley’s business in opening statement resulted in no prejudice to defendant. Defendant next argues that codefendant James Allen’s post-arrest statement was improperly discussed in the State’s opening argument. The record discloses no mention of Allen’s post-arrest statements during opening statements. The State outlined the planning and execution of the murder by defendant and Allen, details of which were presented at trial through the testimony of prosecution witnesses and defendant’s taped confession. A purpose of opening argument is to inform the fact finder of what the evidence will show. (People v. Warmack (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 112, 125.) No prejudice to defendant resulted by the opening remarks. Taped Conversation Defendant next challenges the admissibility of the taped conversation between Moore and himself, arguing that the State failed to lay an adequate foundation for its admission. Defendant alleges that the State did not establish the identity of the speakers on the tape. The record includes an identification of defendant’s voice by Moore, who testified that he had spoken to defendant more than 100 times in person and recognized his voice. In addition, Assistant State’s Attorney Cohen testified that he recognized the defendant’s voice to be the speaker on the telephone after he spoke to the defendant and took his statement at the police station. Cohen had been listening with an earphone as the telephone conversation was taped. Finally, defendant admitted that he had received a telephone call from Moore on the day of his arrest and acknowledged that he had talked about the Gibson “hit” during that conversation. The State moved for admission of the taped conversation after the presentation of all the evidence. Defendant objected and the trial court discussed the legal standards for admission and held that a proper foundation had been laid. An adequate foundation can be established for a tape-recorded telephone conversation when a witness to the conversation recorded on tape testifies that the tape, as presented in court, accurately portrays the conversation in question. (People v. Williams (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 327.) The State’s evidence was adequate to establish a proper foundation for admission of the tape-recorded telephone conversation between Moore and defendant. Moore accurately identified defendant as the speaker and testified that the tape accurately portrayed the conversation between him and defendant. Defendant also challenges the admissibility of the tape recording by asserting that the tape was inaudible. The trial judge is accorded wide discretion in imposing conditions upon the admissibility of taped evidence. (People v. Ash (1974), 16 Ill. App. 3d 633.) In the instant case, the trial judge examined the tape and listened to it before allowing its admission. At the time of admission, defendant made no objection to its admission on audibility grounds and no discussion of the sound quality took place. The trial court, within its discretion, found the tape properly admissible. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his counsel’s failure to: (1) file a motion challenging the voluntariness of his confessions; (2) present a challenge to the admissibility of the tape recording under Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667, 98 S. Ct. 2674; (3) investígate the defendant’s alleged history of mental illness; and (4) present sufficient mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing. None of defendant’s contentions have merit. A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel must meet the requirements enunciated in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052, which requires that defendant show: (1) that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there was a reasonable probability that were it not for the prejudicial errors committed by counsel, the outcome of the proceedings might have been different. Illinois adopted the Strickland standard in People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504. The record reflects that defendant made a knowing waiver of his Miranda rights prior to his confession. During his initial interview at the police station, defendant waived his Miranda rights and made an oral confession to police. He subsequently gave the statement to a court reporter. Assistant State’s Attorney Cohen testified that defendant was alert and lucid throughout the proceedings. The court reporter was able to understand defendant and take his statement. Although defendant contends that he was under the influence of narcotics at the time he made the confession, the record offers no evidence of such influence. A motion challenging defendant’s post-arrest statement on voluntariness grounds would have been futile, and failure to make such an attempt cannot serve as a basis for alleging inadequate representation. People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437. Additionally, defense counsel challenged the admissibility of the tape recording at trial, requested a fitness hearing and had defendant examined by a psychiatrist, and presented evidence in mitigation at the sentencing hearing. Defendant has failed to make the necessary Strickland showing. Constitutionality of Illinois Death Penalty Act Defendant asserts that the death penalty statute is unconstitutional in that it: (1) has been determined to be unconstitutional by a majority of this court; (2) denies equal access to post-conviction review; and (3) does not sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentences. Defendant’s arguments have previously been considered and rejected by this court, and we continue to adhere to those stated position on these issues. See People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 342; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 504; People v. Kubat (1983), 94 ILl. 2d 437. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and sentence of death. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Tuesday, September 15, 1992, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the circuit court is to be executed. The defendant shall be executed in the manner provided by law (111. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 119— 5). A certified copy of the mandate in this case shall be delivered by the clerk of this court to the Director of Corrections, to the warden of Stateville Correctional Center, and to the warden of the institution wherein defendant is confined. Affirmed.