Court Opinion

ID: 9547401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:47:02.192876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:43.476565
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
concurring.
I join in Judge Bryner’s opinion for the court. I believe, however, that a few additional remarks are needed to clarify our holding in Lacquement v. State, 644 P.2d 856 (Alaska App.1982), and the interpretation we have given Mutschler v. State, 560 P.2d 377, 381 (Alaska 1977). I note that a substantial number of cases have arisen in which trial courts have apparently misunderstood Lacquement-Mutschler. I fear that the following language from the court’s opinion in this case will continue that confusion:
Where consecutive sentences exceed the maximum sentence for a single offense, the Alaska Supreme Court has consistently required sentencing judges to make an express finding that the length of the consecutive sentences is necessary for the protection of the public.
Brown v. State, 693 P.2d 324, 331 (Alaska App.1984) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
Misunderstanding centers on the meaning of the phrase “the length of the consecutive sentences is necessary for the protection of the public.” The majority correctly points out that a finding that a defendant is a worst offender does not, standing alone, establish that his confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term for his most serious offense is “necessary for the protection of the public.” Cf. State v. Wortham, 537 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Alaska 1975) (defining the “worst offender”). I agree that the appropriate sentence for a “worst offender” in almost every case, including one in which he is simultaneously sentenced for a number of separate crimes, is the maximum sentence for his most serious offense and no more.
I do not believe, however, that the court has set out sufficient guidelines to enable trial courts to identify the truly unusual case when a worst offender convicted of a series of offenses should receive a total sentence in excess of the maximum sentence for his most serious offense. It seems to me that that point is only reached where the trial court determines, based upon substantial evidence in the record, that the defendant cannot be deterred or rehabilitated within the period allowed as a maximum sentence for his most serious *332offense. Larson v. State, 688 P.2d 592 (Alaska App.1984); Bolkouse v. State, 687 P.2d 1166, 1175-76 (Alaska App.1984). In other words, the point is reached only in a case in which the primary Chaney sentencing goal is isolation and a period of isolation in excess of the maximum period for the most serious offense is necessary to protect the public. See State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970). Such a finding is analogous to the determination that a trial court must make before it waives a juvenile offender into superior court for trial, i.e., that the child is not “amenable ,to treatment” as a juvenile. See AS 47.10.060. See, e.g., State v. F.L.A., 608 P.2d 12 (Alaska 1980). The sentencing goals of rehabilitation, deterrence and affirmation of community norms will be satisfied, in all but the most unusual of cases, by a sentence within the guidelines established for the most serious offense. An explicit holding that Lacquement-Mutschler requires findings of fact that will justify primary reliance on isolation as a sentencing factor would clear up much of the confusion trial courts and litigants have faced in attempting to interpret our prior decisions.
Morris and Brown were convicted of misdemeanors. Their conduct does not present a substantial risk of physical injury to the persons of others. Nevertheless, as we recognized in Viveros v. State, 633 P.2d 289, 291 (Alaska App.1981), a finding of dangerousness necessary to emphasize isolation as the primary sentencing goal does not require a finding that the defendant is violent. Dangerousness, as we use the term, is equated with substantial risk of recidivism. Normally such a finding will be based on a history of repeated criminality. Id.; see also Leuch v. State, 633 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Alaska 1981) (first offenders convicted of nonviolent crimes should receive probation in the absence of aggravating circumstances).
In the instant case the trial court properly found that Morris and Brown were engaged in a highly lucrative commercial enterprise in which intentional violations of the fish and game laws played a substantial part in making their enterprise profitable. Under these circumstances Judge Hodges properly found Morris to be a worst offender, but made no factual findings that would justify primary reliance upon isolation as a sentencing factor. Given the lack of explanation for the sentences of Morris and Brown, I join in the majority’s decision to remand both cases for re-sentencing.