Court Opinion

ID: 9634990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:31:38.190761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:26.858920
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice JOHNSTONE.
Respectfully, I dissent. Bonita Clarke and her son were allegedly assaulted by the Appellee, Robert Sowell, on August 2, 1999. Ms. Clarke filed a criminal complaint on September 15 and a warrant for Appellee’s arrest was issued. After successfully avoiding apprehension for eight months, Appellee was arrested on May 17, 2000. After arraignment, the case was set for trial on May 30, 2000, and continued on that date for a trial date of June 9, 2000. On June 9, the district judge denied the Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance and dismissed the case without prejudice over the prosecutor’s objections. The majority opinion states that the reason for the dismissal was that Ms. Clarke “did not respond to the subpoena for her attendance or appear for either trial date.” In fact, however, Ms. Clarke and her child had been living at the Center for Women and Families, an agency designed to assist victims of domestic violence, and as such she was not available for service of process.
After discovering that Ms. Clarke was in the shelter, the Commonwealth requested that the case be redocketed for July 12, 2000. On that date the district court continued the case until August 7, in order to have the Appellee transported from the county jail where he was incarcerated on other charges. Thereafter, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that the statute of limitations for a misdemeanor had run. The district court granted the motion, the circuit court reversed the district court, and the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court. We now consider the case on discretionary review.
The majority opinion first addresses the meaning of a dismissal “without prejudice” and concludes that it is a final order. CR 54.01 defines a final order as an order “adjudicating all the rights of all the parties in an action or proceeding....” It cites as precedent for this holding, Wood v. Downing’s Adm’r.,1 a 104 year old civil case, in which it was determined that the *620circuit court had no jurisdiction due to a medical malpractice action having been filed in the wrong county.
With all due deference to the past, I choose to rely upon the case of Commonwealth v. Hicks,2 cited by the dissenter in the Court of Appeals opinion. In Hicks, Chief Justice Lambert stated:
CR 41.02(3), relating to involuntary dismissals and the effect thereof, is as follows:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this rule, and any dismissal not provided for in Rule ⅛1, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for want of prosecution under Rule 77.02(2), or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. (Emphasis in original.)
Unmistakably, this means that without a notation to the contrary, i.e. “without prejudice” or “with leave to refile,” any dismissal, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, lack of prosecution under CR 77.02(2), or failure to join a party under CR 19, results in an adjudication upon the merits. Polk v. Wimsatt, Ky.App., 689 S.W.2d 363 (1985). Said otherwise, a judgment or order of dismissal, except on the grounds noted in the Rule, must be construed as being with prejudice unless it says otherwise. This construction is entirely consistent with the views expressed in 7 Bertelsman and Philips, Kentucky Practice, CR 41.02, emt. 6 (4th ed.1984), and serves the purpose of finality. Parties should be forewarned that unless one of the four exceptions clearly applies, one who wishes to preserve the viability of a dismissed claim should see that the proper notation is affixed by the trial court or seek appellate relief. (Emphasis added.)
In my opinion, it is patently clear that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final order or judgment for purposes of the finality rule of CR 59.05, and no authority cited in the majority opinion compels a conclusion otherwise. A dismissal without prejudice, as we are dealing with in the case at bar, does not adjudicate all of the rights of the parties. Indeed, it does not adjudicate any rights.
Thus, we are finally confronted with the issue of whether, for purposes of KRS 500.050(2), the prosecution of the misdemeanor offenses at hand were commenced within one year after they were committed. As noted above, once the location of the prosecuting witness and her child were obtained, the Commonwealth moved to “redocket” the case and noticed the Appel-lee of its intention to prosecute the misdemeanor charges. I agree with the seasoned circuit judge below who concluded:
[Tjhis case was “commenced” within the one (1) year time period set out in KRS 500.050(2). The fact that it was dismissed without prejudice and later “re-docketed” does not mean that the statute has run. The intention of the statute was fulfilled in that Mr. Sowell had notice of the charges against him within the one (1) year time period. In fact, he was aware that the Commonwealth was re-docketing the action within the one (1) year time frame for misdemeanors. This Court can find no significant difference in bringing a new action versus moving the court to re-docket the ease.
Legal precedent, public policy, or common sense do not persuade otherwise. I would reverse the Court of Appeals and *621affirm the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. 110 Ky. 656, 62 S.W. 487, 488 (1901).

. 869 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Ky.1994).