Court Opinion

ID: 9497504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:52:40.179352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:13.714159
License: Public Domain

McKEE, Circuit Judge,
Concurring.
I join the opinion of my colleagues because I agree that admitting evidence of Johnson’s prior theft conviction constituted error under Rule 609(a)(2). I write separately because, in remanding for further proceedings, we are allowing the District Court discretion to open the record for additional testimony on the admissibility of the 1995 theft conviction (purse snatch) under Rule 609(a)(1). At oral argument, defense counsel did not object to a remand to allow the District Court an opportunity to balance the potential prejudice against the probative value, although she did strenuously argue that admitting the prior conviction on this record would be reversible error. My colleagues state that “the record in this case does not permit us to assume that admission of the prior conviction evidence would have been justified under a Rule 609(a)(1) balancing analysis.” Maj. Op. at 102. I agree. However, I do not think that this record, absent more, could support a conclusion that the probative value of Johnson’s conviction for a purse snatching outweighs the prejudicial value of that conviction.
Carjacking is, of course, a particularly shocking crime because we can all relate to an innocent victim who is suddenly snatched from his/her car at gunpoint while in the midst of some daily routine. Johnson’s prior purse snatch involved the theft of $15.00 three years before the instant offense. Nothing about it suggests the kind of callous violence that is endemic in carjacking. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (defining “carjacking” as the use of force, violence or intimidation to take a vehicle transported in interstate or foreign commerce from the person of another with “intent to cause death or serious bodily harm”).
Unlike an armed carjacking, a purse snatch is frequently an “impulse crime” devoid of the viciousness that so often characterizes a carjacking. See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C.Cir.1983) (referring to purse snatching and shoplifting as impulse crimes). Nevertheless, a purse snatch is similar to a carjacking insofar as both are crimes that jurors can readily relate to given the familiar precautions that must be employed to guard against one’s purse being stolen. However, it suggests neither the force nor the confrontation involved in a carjacking. Given the three years that lapsed between the two crimes, the extent to which the two crimes differed, and the potential for jurors to doubt Johnson’s testimony because they could so easily relate to the victim of the prior offense and the victims of the carjacking, I do not think that this record would allow a court to conclude that the probative value of the purse snatch outweighed its prejudicial effect.
In balancing prejudice against probative value under Rule 609(a)(1) a court must consider the nature of the prior crime, the age of the prior conviction, the importance *104of the defendant’s testimony, and the importance of the defendant’s credibility. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir.1982). Having urged the District Court to admit Johnson’s prior offense under an incorrect theory, the government now argues that “the evidence against Johnson was consistent and persuasive, in contrast to which Johnson’s testimony was dubious on its face.” Br. at 22 (emphasis added). In contrast, the government argues that “the testimony of [the prosecution witnesses] was consistent, and at odds with Johnson’s seemingly contrived account.” Id. Thus, Johnson’s prior conviction was not crucial to the government’s case. Yet, it was crucial to the defense. The only evidence of Johnson’s innocence was Johnson’s own explanation of his presence at the scene of this carjacking. Nevertheless, the government argues that “the defendant’s credibility was central to the case.” Br. at 19. It was certainly central to the defendant’s case, but the government’s brief suggests that it was not very important to the government’s case. Given the government’s contentions regarding Johnson’s “seemingly contrived account” that was “dubious on its face,” and the “consistent and persuasive” evidence against him, it is difficult to understand why the government insisted on eliciting problematic testimony under Rule 609 in the first place.
Therefore, I doubt that a proper balancing of prejudice and probative value can tip in favor of admission without more being placed on the admission side of the scale. However, inasmuch as defense counsel did not object to our remanding for further proceedings when that was suggested during oral argument, that possibility is not foreclosed. If the District Court decides to allow additional testimony before making a ruling under Rule 609(a)(1), the record may, at that point, support a determination that the probative value of the 1995 purse snatch outweighs its prejudicial impact.