Court Opinion

ID: 9550958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:45:45.417204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:49.431943
License: Public Domain

LEWIS, District Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent.
Plaintiff and defendant, in the year 1944 and in contemplation of a divorce, entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff deeded her interest in certain real property to defendant in reliance upon his promise to sell the property and divide the proceeds. Thereupon, a day or so later, she obtained a divorce receiving from the divorce court the complete relief for which she prayed, including an award of all the household'furnishings. She did not ask the divorce court to approve her agreement relative to the real estate nor did she disclose to the court the existence of her agreement or the property in question. She now, years later, alleges that the defendant refuses, to recognize her interest in the property and applies to the court in the original divorce action for relief. She seeks an order to show cause why a constructive trust should not be delcared under the claim that the divorce court has continuing jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter. She also seeks an award of attorney fees under the same claim.
*369The majority opinion holds that under these circumstances the divorce trial and decree were tainted with extrinsic fraud and now subject to direct attack by plaintff. The majority holding, although indicating that extrinsic fraud exists when the unsuccessful party is 'prevented from presenting his case, applies the doctrine when the successful party chooses not to disclose the facts. Inasmuch as the record discloses that defendant’s alleged fraud occurred after plaintiff had verified her divorce complaint, his promissory fraud, if any, could not, in the writer’s opinion, be the basis for modification of a decree based upon that complaint. The true effect of the ruling in the instant case is to have the divorce court enforce an independent property settlement made by the parties. The rule has always been otherwise. Howarth v. Howarth, 81 Cal. App. 2d 266, 188 P. 2d 670.
The majority opinion recognizes the fact that plaintiff could properly bring a separate action and have her claims fully adjudicated. I do not believe that substantive law should ever be strained in order to justify erroneous procedure and consequently plaintiff should be required to pursue her independent cause of action.
CROCKETT, J., being disqualified, did not participate herein.