Court Opinion

ID: 9795260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:24:00.608519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:28:24.263176
License: Public Domain

*424BARRON, J.
pro tempore, concurring.
I agree with the majority’s resolution of Northwest’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error. In its second assignment of error, Northwest argues that the trial judge provided “a legally incorrect answer to the jury’s written question during deliberations without first notifying counsel.” Iron Horse argues that the error is not preserved,1 but the majority finds it unnecessary to address the preservation issue because it finds harmless error based on State v. White, 55 Or App 729, 639 P2d 1291 (1982).2 Although I agree with the majority that the error was harmless based on the circumstances present in this case, generally a trial judge communicating with a jury about issues in a case during deliberations, without the presence of or without making an attempt to notify counsel, is not harmless.
As the majority notes, after the jury in this case retired to deliberate, it submitted a written note to the trial judge. 193 Or App at 414. The judge responded in writing to the note, and his response to the note and the note were saved. He did not attempt to notify counsel and did not disclose the communication to the parties and counsel until after the jury was discharged and had dispersed.
ORCP 59 D states:
“After retirement for deliberation, if the jury requests information on any point of law, the judge may require the *425officer having them in charge to conduct them into court. Upon the jury being brought into court, the information requested, if given, shall be given either orally or in writing in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or their counsel.”
In Huntley v. Reed, 276 Or 591, 556 P2d 122 (1976), the jury submitted a written question after it had began to deliberate. The trial judge answered the question in writing, but neither the note nor the answer was retained. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that it was error for the trial judge to have instructed the jury out of the presence of and without notice to counsel. In discussing the claim, the Oregon Supreme Court noted that, “[t]he giving of the instruction in the above-described manner was in direct violation of [the predecessor statute to ORCP 59 D.]” Huntley, 276 Or at 593.3
Huntley points out the real problem with not following the dictates of ORCP 59 D. Because the note and answer to the note were not retained in Huntley, the judgment was reversed, even though the trial judge had stated, after the fact, what his recollection of the note and answer was. 276 Or at 594-95. The Supreme Court stated, “No one’s memory should be the basis of the record of instructions given to a jury. The obvious purpose of the statute is to relieve parties from the very dilemma presented here.” Id. To the same effect is Hastings v. Top Cop Cut Feedlots, Inc., 285 Or 261, 263-64, 590 P2d 1210 (1979), in which the trial judge put his recollection of his oral answer to a written jury inquiry on the record after the fact but failed to make a record at the time that he actually answered the jury inquiry.
Although the trial judge in this case saved the jury’s note and his response, notes can be lost, misplaced, or destroyed, and, more importantly, the procedure used by the *426judge meant that the parties were not given an opportunity to address the jury’s question. When a jury requests further information during deliberations, the words from Oien v. Bourassa, 221 Or 359, 351 P2d 703 (1960), a case involving a communication between a bailiff and a jury, should be kept in mind. The court wrote that “[t]he sanctity of the jury and its freedom from outside influence must be jealously guarded by the court.” Id. at 370. That admonition applies equally to a trial judge communicating with a jury without the presence of or without attempting to notify the parties or their counsel.4
I concur for the reasons stated above.

 As pointed out by the majority, the trial judge did not notify the parties ofhis action until after the jury was discharged. When something occurs after a case is submitted and a party could not have reasonably foreseen the action, the matter should be considered on appeal. See Ruckman v. Ormond, 42 Or 209, 212, 70 P 707 (1902).
Further, disclosing the communication after the jury was discharged and had dispersed meant that, even if there had been error, it could not be corrected. Once a jury is discharged and has dispersed, the court loses control over the jury. See State v. Vann, 158 Or App 65, 73-74, 973 P2d 354 (1999).

 The quotation from White in the majority opinion refers to communicating with a jury as a “technical error.” 193 Or App at 418 (quoting White, 55 Or App at 732). In Grammer v. Wiggins-Meyer Steamship Co., 126 Or 694, 703, 270 P 759 (1928), a case similar to White, the phrase “technically erroneous” is used. A technical error is mechanical in nature, apparent on the face of the record, and does not involve the exercise of the judicial function. City of Canby v. Rinkes, 154 Or App 364, 370, 961 P2d 291 (1998). A judge communicating with a jury without the presence of counsel or without attempting to notify counsel is not a technical error.

 The predecessor to ORCP 59 D, former ORS 17.325 (1975), repealed by Or Laws 1979, ch 284, § 199, provided:
“After the jury have retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed of any point of law arising in the case, they may require the officer having them in charge to conduct them into court. Upon their being brought into court, the information required shall be given in the presence of or after notice to the parties or their attorneys.”
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Huntley interpreted language nearly identical to that in ORCP59 D.

 That is not to say that parties or their counsel may not acquiesce, prior to deliberations, in a trial judge’s stated intention to use discretion in determining whether to notify them of jury inquiries. See Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 170 Or App 336, 357, 357 n 15, 13 P3d 130 (2000), rev’d and rem’d on other grounds, 335 Or 130, 60 P3d 530 (2002).