Court Opinion

ID: 9763383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:43:43.259193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:42.152746
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it authorizes the State to introduce new evidence to prove Cobb’s status as a persistent offender. As I understand the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the double jeopardy clause in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), a remand for this purpose is unconstitutional.
*538To be sure, the Supreme Court has resisted attempts to apply the double jeopardy clause to sentencing proceedings, as opposed to determinations of guilt or innocence. As stated in Bullington, “[t]he imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an ‘acquittal’ of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed.” Id. at 438, 101 S.Ct. at 1857. In the absence of an ‘acquittal,’ the Court has not extended double jeopardy protection.
However, after acknowledging this general rule, the Supreme Court in Bullington distinguished earlier opinions on which the rule is based and applied double jeopardy principles to Missouri’s sentencing procedures in death penalty cases. The Court determined that the Missouri sentencing hearing “resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence,” and “[i]n contrast, the sentencing procedures considered in the Court’s previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence.” Id. at 438-39, 101 S.Ct. at 1858. Therefore, under Bullington, double jeopardy protection attaches to sentences imposed after a trial-like hearing.
The Supreme Court pointed to several features of Missouri’s death penalty scheme that imbued the sentencing proceeding with trial-like characteristics, the most important of which is the State’s obligation to prove certain aggravating circumstances in order to justify imposition of the death penalty. The Court explained:
In the usual sentencing proceeding, ... it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum “constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case.” ... By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has “proved its case.”
Id. at 443-44, 101 S.Ct. at 1860-61. (Citations omitted.) The Court then held that the imposition of a life sentence is, in effect, an acquittal of “whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence.” Id. at 445, 101 S.Ct. at 1861.
Missouri’s enhanced sentencing scheme for persistent DWI offenders is similar to the sentencing scheme in first degree murder (capital murder) cases. The State must prove three alcohol-related convictions within a ten-year period before a defendant may be classified as a persistent offender and subject to enhanced punishment, just as the State must prove, in the first degree murder context, certain aggravating circumstances before the defendant is subject to the death penalty. §§ 577.02S.1, 565.032, RSMo 1986. In each proceeding, the State’s proof must be established “beyond a reasonable doubt,” §§ 577.0234(2), 565.0304(1), RSMo 1986, and the defendant must be accorded rights of confrontation and cross-examination, with the opportunity to present evidence. §§ 577.-0234(7), 565.0304, RSMo 1986. That the sentence in Cobb’s case was imposed by the trial judge rather than the jury does not render the proceeding any less “trial-like.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 210, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2309-10, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). Applying the rationale in Bullington, I conclude that Missouri’s persistent DWI offender procedure is “trial-like” and that the State’s failure of proof in that procedure is, in effect, an acquittal on the question of persistent offender status.
The majority in this case tacitly assumes that the “trial-like” rationale applies only to death penalty cases. However, in the recent case of Bohlen v. Caspari, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994), the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether the Bullington rationale applies to sentencing procedures in noncapital cases as well as capital cases, thus leaving the question open for future litigation. Nevertheless, the majority relies on the following dicta from Bohlen:
Both Bullington and Rumsey were capital cases, and our reasoning in those cases were based largely on the unique circumstances of a capital sentencing proceeding ... ‘[T]he decisions of this Court clearly establish that a sentenc[ing in a noncapital *539case] does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.’
Bohlen, — U.S. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 954.
The majority’s reliance on Bohlen is mistaken. The Bullington rationale is that double jeopardy protection attaches because of “trial-like” sentencing procedures, and the fact that Bullington was a capital case does not have any bearing on the integrity of that rationale. The “unique circumstances” to which Bohlen refers are the “trial-like” aspects of the sentencing proceeding. The “qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal” pertain, most importantly, to the State’s failure to prove facts necessary to support a particular sentence or range of punishment. That failure of proof, in other words, gives rise to a double jeopardy-triggering acquittal on the sentence or range of punishment sought by the State.
As a general rule, sentencing proceedings in noncapital cases do not involve “trial-like” characteristics, the judge merely imposes a sentence within the designated range of punishment. Because the State is not required to prove any facts to support the sentence or range of punishment, there can be no failure of proof, and thus, no acquittal. On the other hand, persistent offender status is litigated, as explained above, in a “trial-like” hearing in which the State must prove the requisite prior offenses that support the status and the attendant increased range of punishment.
The Bullington rationale is not limited to ■death penalty cases. Had the' Supreme Court in Bullington intended to impose a special rule of double jeopardy to death penalty cases, just because they are death penalty cases, it could have done so. Instead, the Court fashioned a rationale that is not dependent on the fact that the death penalty might be imposed, a rationale that logically applies to all cases having “trial-like” sentencing procedures. I am unwilling, therefore, to join the majority in its unfounded limitation of Bullington.
The majority also misinterprets United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), by declaring that “[t]he DiFrancesco sentencing procedure is indistinguishable from the sentencing procedure here.” The issue in DiFrancesco is completely different from the issue before this Court. The defendant in DiFrancesco was adjudged to be a “dangerous special offender” under 18 U.S.C. § 3576 (repealed), thereby entitling the government to appeal the sentence. The defendant challenged the appellate review of his sentence on double jeopardy grounds. He did not challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence to support the “dangerous special offender” classification. Indeed, the government, in the first instance, proved that the defendant was a “dangerous special offender,” and there was no need for a second determination of the defendant’s status. In the case before this Court, however, Cobb claims that the double jeopardy clause prevents the State from retrying his status as a persistent offender. This is the same difference of issues that the Supreme Court used in Bullington to distinguish it from DiFrancesco. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 440, 101 S.Ct. at 1858-59.
Because Bullington controls the disposition of this case, I dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion remanding the case for a new persistent offender hearing. I would remand solely for the purpose of sentencing Cobb as a prior offender. I join the majority in all other respects.