Court Opinion

ID: 9763503
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:47:53.443329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:45.034801
License: Public Domain

Wacheiteeld, J.
(dissenting). Plaintiff lessor had operated the premises in question as a laundry. Defendant lessees initially intended to convert them for the purpose of conducting a “quick-service” laundry. The lease was executed on October 30, 1953, but the lessees were not entitled to enter into possession until January 1, 1954. In order that the lessees might expeditiously proceed with their plans for conversion, the lease provided:
“The tenants are hereby granted permission immediately upon the execution of this lease to enter into and upon the premises for the purpose only of completing plans and making measurements in connection with the alterations which they contemplate.”
The only function of the quoted clause was to enable the lessees or their agents to come upon the premises during the period between October 30, 1953 and January 1, 1954 and to define the limited purposes for which such entry might be effected.
*329The lease contained a typewritten insertion that the premises might be used and occupied:
“as a retail and commercial laundry, dry cleaning plant, and any other sundry and kindred enterprises which might be considered an adjunct of a laundry business, or such other lawful purpose as the tenant or any sub-tenant may require %ohether related to the laundry or dry-cleaning business, or not.” (Emphasis supplied)
This clause makes it obvious the parties either contemplated the lessees might change their minds and decide to use the premises during the term of the lease for a business other than a “quick-service” laundry or, if a specific change was not then in contemplation, that they nevertheless intended the lessees should have the right to use the premises for another business under the terms incorporated in the lease.
Did the parties intend that the lessees might make substantial alterations or improvements beyond those necessary for the establishment of a “quick-service” laundry? It is evident that they did.
A printed clause in the lease form providing that “no alterations, additions or improvements shall be made in or to the premises without the consent of the landlord in writing” was excised. Under the terms of the lease, the lessees were empowered, in their own unrestricted discretion, to devote the premises to any “lawful purpose,” regardless of whether such purpose could or could not “be considered an adjunct of a laundry business.” There are very few business uses, not allied to the laundry industry, which are nevertheless compatible with the organization and equipment of buildings for a laundry. Thus, it must have been realized by both the lessor and the lessees that if the lessees, as was their right, decided to go into another business, the premises might have to undergo substantial changes. Therefore, the provision requiring the landlord’s permission for such changes was eliminated from the lease.
It is with this in mind that the lease clause allocating the responsibility for payment of taxes should be considered. This clause clearly and unambiguously provides:
*330“Landlord agrees to pay promptly municipal real estate taxes * * * and upon demand of the tenant to submit for inspection receipted bills for the same or adequate proof of payment.”
One of the fundamental tenets of contract law forbids a court from rewriting a harsh agreement in order to make it comport with judicial ideals of fairness. What is sought is the intention of the parties. The meaning to them of the words they used may be clarified but new terms may not be added to an instrument unless there is proof of fraud or mutual mistake justifying reformation.
Here, the lease explicitly states that the plaintiff is to pay the real estate taxes on the property. Plaintiff’s affidavit reveals that both lessor and lessees thought the premises would initially be used for a “quick-service” laundry, but nowhere does plaintiff expressly or impliedly say that at the time of the making of the contract it intended the defendants should pay any increase in taxes allocable to improvements made by them. Nor is it asserted anywhere that the defendants themselves ever entertained any such idea. In fact, what occurred was a failure to provide against a contingency which has now arisen, and not being willing to pay the penalty, the plaintiff now asks to be relieved of the unexpected burden.
“Hard cases make bad law.” nevertheless the majority refuses to uphold the contract as written and grants the relief it thinks is equitable under the circumstances, thus creating for the plaintiff a new contract foreign to the one agreed to by the parties.
If written contracts are not to be upheld as written, then contractual rights and obligations will never be stabilized and certain and the business and financial world will face chaos. Every party who makes an agreement which subsequently proves to be economically undesirable can still hope to receive judicial relief upon the theory that the unexpected development was not within the contemplation of the parties at the signing of the agreement.
The solemnity of a written contract, the cornerstone of our commercial law, is thereby jeopardized and partially *331destroyed. The majority has, in my view, ventured beyond the bounds of “interpretation” or “construction” and into the realm of “creation” and “substitution.”
I would affirm the summary judgment rendered below.
For reversal—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Heher, Burling, Jacobs, Erancis and Proctor—6.
For affirmance—Justice Wachenfeld—1.