Court Opinion

ID: 9548362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:02:19.809593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:51.214243
License: Public Domain

ERICKSON, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The record here denies us an opportunity to review fairly the important issue which the majority addresses. Carol K. Stuckey, appearing pro se, filed an ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order on December 5, 1986, asserting that her former husband, Charles L. Stuckey, has suffered from a mental illness described as Organic Brain. Syndrome for several years. The motion described several incidents of Charles’s behavior that caused her to be very fearful' of him. The events allegedly occurred in December 1974, January 1975, August 1982, and in 1985. She also averred that Charles had been involved in an incident which resulted in physical violence. Her motion, which was sworn to before the clerk, may have been supported by testimony, but the testimony, if such exists, was never transcribed, was not before the district court on appeal, and is not before this court. Nothing further appears in the record to show that an emergency existed which required a temporary restraining order to be entered on December 5, 1986.
Following the entry of the temporary restraining order, the Stuckeys appeared without counsel on December 19, 1986, at a hearing to determine whether the restraining order should be made a permanent injunction. Charles Stuckey subpoenaed three witnesses for the hearing. After he pitifully attempted to call witnesses to establish the reasons why a permanent injunction should not be issued, the county judge took limited testimony and then issued a permanent injunction. The only brief in this court was filed by Charles Stuckey, pro se, which is of little assistance in resolving a difficult issue. Carol Stuck-ey has not filed a brief or entered an appearance.
In my view, the county court had authority to issue the temporary restraining order pursuant to section 14-4-102, 6B C.R.S. (1987), but does not have authority to enter a permanent injunction depriving the father of any visitation rights he might have had. The Domestic Abuse Act, sections 14-4-101 to -105, 6B C.R.S. (1987), cannot be construed under the facts before us to permit the county court to issue a permanent injunction that modifies and changes the district court’s visitation and custody orders. As such, I would interpret the phrase “restraining orders” in section 14-4-102(1) to refer only to temporary restraining orders to be issued in an emergency situation for a brief duration.
Under section 13-6-105, 6A C.R.S. (1987 & 1988 Supp.), the county court is denied jurisdiction over “[mjatters affecting children, including custody, support, guardianship, adoption, dependency, or delinquency.” § 13-6-105(l)(d). In my view, this express exclusion of jurisdiction cannot be reconciled with the majority's conclusion that county courts have jurisdiction to enter both temporary and permanent injunctions. Permanent injunctions frequently implicate “matters affecting children,” such as parental visitation and custody rights. These rights deserve the utmost protection and should not be permanently *701altered by a court that was neither designed nor intended to do so. Whether the term “restraining orders,” as contained in section 14-4-102, refers to temporary restraining orders or permanent injunctions must be interpreted in view of the fact that county courts are not designed to entertain cases involving the parent/child relationship. § 13-6-105(l)(d). Because an order permanently barring a father from seeing his son is a matter “affecting children,” the county court does not, under the facts before us, have jurisdiction to issue a permanent restraining order. Id. I would limit the county court’s jurisdiction accordingly.
Here, the fourteen-year-old son rubber stamped his mother’s allegations in the motion for a restraining order by stating that they were true, but testified that his father had never threatened or abused him. The mother claimed that she was in fear for her and her son’s safety. The permanent injunction prohibits the father from contacting his son. Therefore, if the father were to obtain an order from the district court that entered the custody order, and presumably visitation orders, he would then have to seek an order from the county court modifying the injunction before he could again seek to contact his son. In this case, the county court’s order permanently deprived the father of visitation rights. In my view, the majority opinion improperly permits section 14-4-102 to be utilized by a county court to modify visitation and custody rights established by the district court in dissolution proceedings.
I would reverse and remand to the district court for a hearing on the permanent injunction.
I am authorized to say that KIRSH-BAUM, J., joins in this dissent.