Court Opinion

ID: 9716795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:51:14.377778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.018427
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
Achor, C. J.
— Appellees assert first as ground for rehearing the fact that this court did not decide the merits of the case. In support of this position they cite the fact that it is the policy of this court to decide cases wherever possible on the merits. Miller, etc. v. Ortman, etc., et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 641, 650, 651, 136 N. E. 2d 17; Flanagan, Wiltrout & Hamilton’s Indiana Trial and Appellate *650Practice §2115, ch. 40, p. 4. However, as heretofore considered, the case was never before us on the merits. Therefore, despite the policy of this court to consider cases on their merits where possible, as stated in the Miller case, supra, this court could not properly consider the merits of the case since neither this nor any other court can voluntarily decide issues which are not before it. Rules of procedure are established to protect citizens from such a voluntary assertion of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, when, as in this case, a party has closed the door to a decision on the merits by his own conduct, he may not be heard to complain of a failure to decide issues so foreclosed from the court’s consideration.
The second and third allegations of error assert that the following statement is improper:
“ . . . The case at bar stands on the records of the court as a mere cause number, with named parties, and a right to file an amended complaint, within the limitations of the order of the court, but the case stood unsupported by any pleading or issue to which the motion for change of venue could be addressed.”
It is asserted that the above statement contravenes both the ruling precedents of this court and statutory provisions. However, appellees, in making this assertion, misapprehend the meaning of the foregoing statement. It does not state that after the sustaining of the demurrer there was no pleading left in the case; it says there was none to which the motion for a change of venue could be addressed.
Doughty et al. v. State Dept. of Pub. Welf. et al. (1954), 233 Ind. 475, 121 N. E. 2d 645; Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart (1921), 190 Ind. 444, 129 N. E. 853; *651and Guthrie v. Howland (1905), 164 Ind. 214, 73 N. E. 259, are cited by appellees as being contravened by the above statement. Those cases are merely authority for the fact that a party against whose complaint a demurrer is sustained has an absolute right to amend within limits set by the court and his complaint is not taken out but stands as a defective pleading, subject to amendment or judicial review.
Bums’ Ind. Stat. Anno. §2-1010 (1946 Kepi.) is also cited in support of the same proposition, by appellees. However, the principle stated in the above passage contravenes none of these authorities since the statement does not negate the right to amend. It merely holds that a pleading held insufficient to state a cause of action is also insufficient to support a motion for a change of venue.
Appellees’ fourth allegation is based on the theories that the opinion erroneously stated that plaintiffs can be required to plead over after a demurrer to a complaint is sustained, and that this court erred when it stated that an amended complaint was the only pleading which could comply with the rule to “plead over.”
To support their proposition that a plaintiff may not be required to plead over when a demurrer to his complaint is sustained, appellees cite Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno. §2-1013 (1946 Repl.) and the cases of Jay v. The Indianapolis, &c. Railroad Co. (1861), 17 Ind. 262, and Mangeot v. Block (1858), 11 Ind. 244. However, while advancing this argument appellees concede that §2-1013, supra, applies only to cases in which a demurrer has been overruled. Therefore the statute cited is not applicable to their situation. Furthermore, appellees have overlooked §2-1010, supra, which does apply, however, in the following language:
*652“If the court sustains or overrules a demurrer, the party [adversely] affected by such ruling may plead over or amend, upon such terms as the court may direct, and on payment of the costs occasioned by the demurrer.” [Emphasis added.]
Under the circumstances a plaintiff (appellant) can be and is required either to “plead over or amend,” thereby asserting issues or conditions necessary to the statement of a cause of action, or suffer judgment on the basis of the issues he has asserted. Until he so pleads over or amends no other pleading by plaintiff (appellant) is contemplated. Language to the contrary in the Jay and Mangeot cases, supra, is inappropriate to support appellees’ proposition since both cases were decided before §2-1010 became part of our law in 1881.
•The second theory under the fourth allegation of error asserts that the decision of this case changes the meaning of the term “pleading” to exclude therefrom a motion for a change of venue and is therefore a deprivation of due process.
Gaddie v. Holloway (1957), 237 Ind. 382, 146 N. E. 2d 247, is cited to show that the term “pleading” includes a motion for change of venue. The decision of the court in the instant case makes no attempt to define the term “pleading”; it merely states that in order to give appellees standing on which to base a motion for change of venue some pleading must be filed of the type which either re-establishes the issues in the case or authorizes the court to enter judgment on the pleading, and the order of the court requiring appellees to “plead over” is so considered. Consequently there has been no change in meanings and no deprivation of due process.
*653The fifth allegation of error charges that the disposition of the case denies plaintiffs equal protection of the law because they are not allowed a change of venue absent further pleading when a demurrer to their complaint is sustained while defendants whose demurrers are overruled are allowed a change of venue without further pleading. See: Maley v. Citizens National Bank (1950), 120 Ind. App. 642, 92 N. E. 2d 727. This argument is ill conceived. It fails to consider the fact that the suggested decision of the court would leave the parties in diametrically opposite positions. After the demurrer to the one case had been sustained there remained, according to the court’s ruling, no valid. cause of action before the court. However, on the other hand the overruling of the demurrer constituted a determination that a valid cause of action, stating a justiciable issue, was before the court. A claim of prejudice can with propriety be addressed only when there is present a subsisting cause of action.
Appellees’ final contention is that the opinion of the court heretofore written erroneously denied to the court the right to exercise its discretion with respect to the filing of an amended complaint. For the reasons hereinbefore stated the appellant was not entitled to a change of venue under the existing state of pleadings. Therefore the respondent court, which purported to permit the filing of an amended complaint acquired no jurisdiction in the cause because change of venue to it was unauthorized.
The assertions of error on which appellees based their petition are without foundation. Their petition for rehearing should therefore be denied.
Petition denied.
*654Arterburn, J., not participating.
Jackson & Landis, JJ., concur in the result.
Myers, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 199 N. E. 2d 472. Rehearing denied 201 N. E. 2d 493.