Court Opinion

ID: 9398236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 17:01:45.844512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.745314
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11628    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 1 of 23

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11628
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JAMES THOMAS BUTLER, II,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00179-TJC-MCR-1
                            ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                22-11628

        Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               After a jury trial, defendant James Butler appeals the district
        court’s denials of his motions to suppress evidence obtained from
        a forensic examination of a Samsung Galaxy model SM-G935A
        smartphone (the “Samsung smartphone”). Butler consented to a
        search of the Samsung smartphone during the execution of a search
        warrant at his residence.
               On appeal, Butler argues that (1) the government’s forensic
        search of the Samsung smartphone exceeded the scope of his
        consent, and (2) the district court, in evaluating the reasonableness
        of law enforcement’s delay in conducting this forensic search, erred
        when it found that he did not have a significant possessory interest
        in the smartphone. After careful review of the record and the
        parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s denials of Butler’s
        motions to suppress.
                        I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
               On October 10, 2018, Butler was charged with (1) sexual
        exploitation of a minor for the purpose of producing child
        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e) (“Count 1”),
        and (2) possession of a black Samsung smartphone containing
        visual depictions involving the sexual exploitation of a minor, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2) (“Count 2”).
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        22-11628               Opinion of the Court                         3

              On March 4, 2019, Butler moved to suppress his statements
        made during the search of his residence on May 2, 2018, and any
        evidence obtained from the search of his Samsung smartphone.
        On December 11, 2019, Butler filed a second motion to suppress all
        evidence obtained from the forensic search of his Samsung
        smartphone.
              A magistrate judge held two hearings on Butler’s motions to
        suppress. The hearing testimony revealed the following details
        about the May 2, 2018, search at Butler’s residence and the June 26
        and August 15, 2018, forensic examinations of Butler’s Samsung
        smartphone.
        A.    May 2, 2018, Search of Butler’s Residence
               On May 2, 2018, federal and state law enforcement agents
        executed a search warrant at Butler’s residence in Jacksonville,
        Florida. The agents were investigating Paul Edward Lee, Jr., who
        lived in the residence, for soliciting child pornography. All
        occupants of the residence, including Butler, were registered sexual
        predators or sexual offenders.
               On the morning of May 2, 2018, the agents (1) entered the
        residence, (2) handcuffed all of the residents for officer safety, and
        (3) escorted the residents to a carport. While the residents were
        gathered in the carport, one of the agents told the residents that a
        federal search warrant was being executed at the property.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11628

        B.     Agents Interview Butler
               After clearing the premises, the agents began to interview
        the residents. Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Agent
        Nicholas Privette and Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office Detective Brent
        Ellis approached Butler and removed Butler’s handcuffs. The
        agents told Butler that (1) Butler was not under arrest, and (2) the
        agents wanted to speak with him if he was willing to be
        interviewed.
              Butler told the agents that he was “willing to help . . . in any
        way that [they] needed” but asked if he could make a call to let his
        employer know that he was going to be late for work that day.
        With the agents’ permission, Butler used the Samsung
        smartphone, which he kept on his belt holster, to call his employer.
               Agent Privette then showed Butler a folder containing
        sexually explicit text messages with a minor and told Butler that
        the agents were at the residence “because somebody was having
        contact with a minor.”
              The agents asked Butler some questions about Lee. In
        response to these questions, Butler told the agents that (1) he had
        not used Lee’s phone for any reason, and (2) he had not used Lee’s
        phone to engage in the types of criminal activity that the agents
        were investigating.
        C.    Butler Consents to a Search of the Samsung Smartphone
              Agent Privette then told Butler that the agents were
        executing a search warrant and were looking for vehicles and
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        22-11628                  Opinion of the Court                                5

        electronic devices.1 Agent Privette asked if Butler owned any
        phones other than the Samsung smartphone, and Butler said that
        the Samsung smartphone was the only phone he owned.
              Agent Privette asked if he “could take a look at” the
        Samsung smartphone.       Butler consented and handed the
        smartphone to Agent Privette.
               Immediately after handing over the phone, Butler retrieved
        a second phone from his pocket and handed that phone to Agent
        Privette. Butler told the agents that (1) the Samsung smartphone
        on his holster was his mother’s phone, (2) he used the Samsung
        smartphone to take photographs for work because the phone had
        a good camera, and (3) the second phone, which Butler had
        retrieved from his pocket, was Butler’s personal phone. Agent
        Privette testified that Butler was “cooperative” and willingly gave
        Agent Privette the phones.
             Next, Agent Privette asked Butler if he could “search” both
        phones, and Butler stated that he could do so.
               Agent Privette told Butler that he was going to take both
        phones to a table behind him so that other agents who handled
        technical matters could “take a look at them.” Agent Privette asked
        Butler if that was okay, and Butler said that it was.

        1 The  search warrant authorized law enforcement to search the residence, and
        the list of items to be “seized and searched” included “cellular telephones” and
        “‘smart’ phones.”
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11628

               After walking away with the phones, Agent Privette realized
        that the Samsung smartphone was locked, so he brought the phone
        back to Butler and asked: “If it’s okay with you, can you unlock it?”
        Butler consented and punched in the password to unlock the
        phone.
               Agent Privette asked if Butler could show him the password
        “so that if [the phone] locked back up, . . . the technical experts or
        [Agent Privette] would remember what it was.” Butler provided
        the password to Agent Privette and agreed that the agents could
        use that password to unlock the phone.
               After Agent Privette gave the two phones to the technical
        personnel, he asked Butler: “Should I have any questions based on
        the content of either of the phones, is it okay if I come back and we
        talk about that?” Butler responded: “No problem. If you have any
        questions, you let me know.” Butler never revoked his consent to
        the search.
        D.    Agent Privette Asks Butler about the Applications on the
              Samsung Smartphone
              After returning to the table with the technical personnel,
        Agent Privette learned that several applications were running in
        the background of the Samsung smartphone. These applications
        were (1) an adult pornography website, and (2) a text-based chat
        log on a program called Google Hangouts, containing a
        conversation of a sexual nature between an adult and a younger
        person.
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        22-11628              Opinion of the Court                        7

               Agent Privette first showed Butler the adult pornography
        website that was running on the Samsung smartphone and asked
        Butler if he had searched for the website. Butler said that the
        website “didn’t look familiar” but it was “probably something that
        he might look at.” Agent Privette told Butler that the girls in some
        of the pictures looked “pretty young” and warned him to be more
        careful.
              Agent Privette then asked Butler if he recognized the Google
        Hangouts chat or the name “Peanut the Unicorn,” which was the
        username associated with the chat. Butler stated that he did not
        know anything about the chat and did not recognize the username.
               Later, FBI Agent David Busick informed Agent Privette that
        a small white piece of paper with the handwritten words “Google
        Hangouts - Peanut the Unicorn,” “Dcups,” and “Kik” had been
        found in Butler’s room. When Agent Privette asked Butler about
        the note, Butler stated that (1) he did not recognize the note, and
        (2) he did not believe the note was found in his bedroom.
               Agent Privette escorted Butler back into the residence so
        Butler could see where the agents had found the note. Agent
        Privette introduced Butler to Agent Busick, who told Butler that
        the note was discovered in Butler’s room inside a grocery bag that
        contained receipts and other papers that appeared to be associated
        with Butler. Butler acknowledged that the room and the bag
        belonged to him.
              Agent Privette told Butler that the FBI would try to identify
        the person associated with the “Peanut the Unicorn” username.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11628

        Butler, who now appeared “frustrated,” raised his voice and
        reiterated that he did not know anything about the note or “Peanut
        the Unicorn.” When Agent Privette told Butler that he would try
        to identify and talk to the person with that username, Butler said,
        “that would be fine,” and added, “whatever they say, just
        remember that I was here and I told you the truth today.”
              The FBI agents subsequently entered the Samsung
        smartphone into evidence. The agents returned Butler’s personal
        phone to him after the interview ended because they saw nothing
        on that phone that required further investigation.
        E.    Butler’s Arrest and the Forensic Examination of the
              Samsung Smartphone
               Later that same day (May 2, 2018), state probation officers
        arrested Butler for violating the terms and conditions of his
        supervised release.
               On June 26, 2018, Christina Polidan, an FBI forensic
        examiner, completed a logical extraction of the Samsung
        smartphone. Polidan explained that a logical extraction is a “very
        basic extraction” that shows what the user can see, including “all
        text messages, videos, calendar, call logs, [and] items like that.”
               On August 15, 2018, Polidan conducted a physical extraction
        of the smartphone. Polidan testified that a physical extraction is “a
        much more detailed extraction” that “can get information such as
        deleted items, file system information,” and even “data from third-
        party applications.”
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        22-11628                 Opinion of the Court                              9

               Polidan testified that the delay between the May 2 seizure of
        the Samsung smartphone and the two extractions was due to
        administrative backlog. At the time of the seizure, Polidan and one
        other forensic examiner were covering all of North Florida.
        F.     Child Pornography            Is   Found      on    the    Samsung
               Smartphone
               On September 21, 2018, FBI Agent Abbigail Beccaccio
        reviewed the contents of the logical extraction of the Samsung
        smartphone. After reviewing this information, Agent Beccaccio
        applied for a federal search warrant for Butler’s residence, and this
        warrant was issued on October 1, 2018.
               The search warrant application included an affidavit from
        Agent Beccaccio, who stated that the logical extraction of the
        smartphone revealed (1) 65 videos that appeared to depict a minor
        in a bedroom, (2) 35 screenshots captured from these videos, and
        (3) 8 images of instructions from a user manual for a remote
        wireless hidden camera, which was connected to a router. 2 At least
        five of the videos captured the lascivious exhibition of the minor’s
        genitalia, and at least one recorded the minor as she masturbated.
        The minor in these videos did not appear to be aware of the
        camera. Agent Beccaccio stated that she (1) identified the
        individual in the images and videos, (2) confirmed that this
        individual was under the age of 18 years old, (3) learned that the

        2 The smartphone also contained a video of a minor in a two-piece bathing
        suit on a beach. Several portions of the video focused on the minor’s breasts
        and genitalia.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court                22-11628

        minor was living at a Jacksonville residence with Butler’s mother,
        and (4) discovered that, as of September 4, 2018, Butler had listed
        this address as his current residence.
        G.    Butler’s Testimony at His Probation Violation Hearings
              On June 7, 2018, and August 27, 2018, the Florida
        Commission on Offender Review held two probation violation
        hearings for Butler. The recordings and transcripts from these
        probation-violation hearings were introduced at Butler’s
        suppression hearings.
                At the June 7, 2018, probation-violation hearing, Butler
        testified that he “willingly” offered his phone and his mother’s
        phone to the officers.
               At the August 27, 2018, probation-violation hearing, Butler
        acknowledged that he handed over his personal phone willingly,
        but this time Butler stated that he felt he had no choice in handing
        over his mother’s phone. Butler also testified that (1) his personal
        phone was the phone on the belt holster on his hip, and (2) the
        smartphone in his pocket belonged to his mother. As discussed
        earlier, Agent Privette’s testimony was that Butler had the
        smartphone in his belt holster and Butler told him the phone in his
        belt holster was his mother’s and the phone from his pocket was
        his personal phone.
              At some point after the August 27, 2018, probation-violation
        hearing, Butler was released from state custody.
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        22-11628               Opinion of the Court                         11

        H.     Butler’s Testimony at the Suppression Hearings
               At the suppression hearings, Butler testified that he did not
        consent to the FBI taking his mother’s smartphone from the
        residence on May 2, 2018. Once again, Butler’s account was not
        consistent with (1) Agent Privette’s testimony that Butler willingly
        gave both phones to the agents, or (2) Butler’s testimony at the
        June 7, 2018, probation-violation hearing that he willingly offered
        his phone and his mother’s phone to the officers.
               Butler also testified that: (1) he was not aware that the agents
        were going to perform a forensic examination of the smartphone
        when it was seized; (2) he never was told how to revoke his consent
        to the search; and (3) he would have revoked his consent if he had
        known that the FBI intended to perform the forensic examination.
              Further, Butler testified that, after the Samsung smartphone
        was taken, Agent Beccaccio gave him a card with her name and
        number, and Privette’s name. Agent Beccaccio told Butler: “You
        can tell your mother that if she wants her phone back, she can
        contact us.”
               Butler was in state custody from approximately May 2, 2018,
        to August 31, 2018. Butler testified that during that time he was
        not allowed to call anyone who would not accept collect calls.
        I.     Magistrate Judge’s Reports
             On June 12, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a report and
        recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that Butler’s first
        motion to suppress be denied.          The magistrate judge
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11628

        (1) determined that Butler voluntarily consented to a search of
        both phones and never revoked his consent, (2) accepted Agent
        Privette’s testimony that the Samsung smartphone was holstered
        on Butler’s belt and his personal phone was in his back pocket, and
        (3) observed that there were “multiple inconsistencies” in Butler’s
        testimony.
               On February 13, 2020, the magistrate judge issued a second
        R&R, recommending that the district court also deny Butler’s
        second motion to suppress. As to the scope of Butler’s consent, the
        magistrate judge determined that (1) Butler had not placed any
        explicit limitations on the scope of the search, and (2) Butler “never
        requested the return of the smart phone.”
                The magistrate judge rejected Butler’s argument that he did
        not know how to reach the agents to revoke his consent. In that
        regard, the magistrate judge found (1) a person with Butler’s
        intelligence and experience would have figured out how to reach
        the agents, and (2) the agents gave Butler a card with their contact
        information and told him that if his mother wanted the
        smartphone back, she could contact them. The magistrate judge
        also found that (1) Butler could not have used the Samsung
        smartphone for work while he was in jail; (2) Butler was away from
        work until at least the end of August 2018, at which point the
        extractions had already occurred; and (3) Butler waived his
        possessory interest in the Samsung smartphone by consenting to
        the search of that smartphone.
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        22-11628              Opinion of the Court                      13

                Next, the magistrate judge determined that the eight-week
        and fifteen-week delays between the May 2 seizure of the Samsung
        smartphone and the June 26 logical and August 15 physical
        extractions of this phone were not unreasonable, given the credible
        testimony that the delays were due to backlog. The magistrate
        judge observed that, because Butler never requested the return of
        the Samsung smartphone, he could not argue that the delay
        adversely affected his Fourth Amendment rights. The magistrate
        judge concluded that, because Butler consented to the search of the
        Samsung smartphone without limiting or revoking his consent, the
        agents did not need to obtain a warrant before conducting the
        forensic examination.
        J.    District Court’s Orders
              Over Butler’s objections, the district court adopted both
        R&Rs, accepted the magistrate judge’s credibility findings, and
        denied Butler’s motions to suppress.
                As to the reasonableness of the eight-week and fifteen-week
        delays, the district court found that (1) there was no Fourth
        Amendment violation, but (2) “law enforcement should have
        nonetheless obtained a warrant after the passage of such a long
        time, especially given that this was a forensic search of a cell
        phone.” Citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. 2473
        (2014), the district court recognized that “[u]nder Fourth
        Amendment jurisprudence, cell phones are unique.” However, the
        district court explained that (1) Riley did not restrict consensual
        searches, and (2) Butler’s possessory interest in the Samsung
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-11628

        smartphone was “minimal,” citing the pages of the R&R stating
        that a defendant’s consent to a search of his property waives his
        possessory interest in that property.
               The district court also found that (1) Butler never revoked
        his consent to the search or requested the return of the Samsung
        smartphone, (2) the government had a legitimate interest in
        retaining that smartphone because Butler admitted to using it to
        view pornography, and (3) Butler had not shown that the delay
        caused him any prejudice.
        K.    Trial and Sentencing
                After the denial of his motions to suppress, Butler proceeded
        to trial. The jury found Butler guilty as charged.
               Because Butler had a prior sex offense conviction, the
        probation officer determined that Butler was a repeat and
        dangerous sex offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a)(1)(A) and
        increased his criminal history category from III to V. With a total
        offense level of 39, Butler’s advisory guideline range was 360 to 840
        months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Butler to
        concurrent terms of 420 months’ imprisonment as to Count 1 and
        240 months’ imprisonment as to Count 2, followed by 25 years of
        supervised release.
                               II.    DISCUSSION
               As an initial matter, while Butler challenged the
        voluntariness of his consent in the district court, he abandoned any
        challenge to the district court’s ruling on that issue by failing to
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        22-11628                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        brief it on appeal. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871
        (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). Additionally, Butler does not challenge
        the district court’s credibility determinations on appeal. Thus, we
        need address only the district court’s findings that (1) the
        government’s logical and physical extractions were within the
        scope of Butler’s consent, and (2) Butler had a “minimal”
        possessory interest in the Samsung smartphone.3
        A.      Consent to Search
              On appeal, Butler argues that the government’s forensic
        searches of the Samsung smartphone exceeded the scope of his
        consent.
               The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
        searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A search or seizure
        that is lawful at its inception may nonetheless violate the Fourth
        Amendment if the manner of its execution unreasonably infringes
        on a possessory interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
        See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1662
        (1984).

        3 “When considering a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we
        review factual findings for clear error and application of law to the facts de
        novo.” United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2018). “Clear
        error lies only where the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction
        that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Because
        the government was the prevailing party below, the district court’s factual
        findings are construed in the light most favorable to it. See id.
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11628

               “A consensual search is confined to the terms of its
        authorization. The scope of the actual consent restricts the
        permissible boundaries of a search in the same manner as the
        specifications in a warrant.” United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937,
        941 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Further, “[w]hen an
        individual gives a general statement of consent without express
        limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless.
        Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a
        police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to
        encompass.” Id.
                “Whether limitations were placed on the scope of consent,
        and whether the search conformed to those limitations, is a
        question of fact determined by the totality of the circumstances.”
        United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2018). A
        district court’s factual findings as to these two issues will not be
        overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Blake,
        888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989).
        B.     Scope of Butler’s Consent
              Here, the district court did not err in determining that the
        government’s logical and physical extractions of the Samsung
        smartphone were within the scope of Butler’s consent.
               First, Butler argues that (1) he agreed only to let law
        enforcement “take a look” at the Samsung smartphone, and (2) his
        consent did not extend to logical and physical extractions of the
        smartphone’s contents outside his presence almost five months
        later. Butler, however, did not merely agree to let Agent Privette
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        22-11628               Opinion of the Court                       17

        “take a look” at his phone. Rather, the record evidence shows that:
        (1) Butler consented when Agent Privette asked if he “could take a
        look at” and “search” the Samsung smartphone; (2) Butler allowed
        Agent Privette to take the Samsung smartphone to technical
        personnel; (3) Butler agreed to unlock the phone for Agent
        Privette; (4) Butler gave Agent Privette the phone’s password,
        allowing technical personnel to examine the Samsung smartphone
        outside his presence; and (5) Butler agreed to answer any questions
        from Agent Privette about the contents of the Samsung
        smartphone.
                Additionally, during the May 2, 2018, search, Butler was
        informed by Agent Privette that the agents were investigating
        sexually explicit communications with a minor. See Plasencia, 886
        F.3d at 1342–43 (observing that, in assessing the scope of a consent-
        based search, courts consider “what the parties knew at the time to
        be the object of the search” (quotation marks omitted)). Under
        these circumstances, a reasonable person would understand
        Butler’s statements that the agents could “take a look at” and
        “search” his phones as extending to a forensic search of the phone’s
        contents for sexually explicit communications, videos, and images.
        See id.
               Further, Butler did not place any time limit on the search.
        Over the next five months, Butler did not make any attempt to
        revoke, limit, or modify his consent in any way. Given the absence
        of a specific time limit or a revocation, the agents conducting the
        forensic search could reasonably interpret the original voluntary
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11628

        consent to encompass the administrative delays that occurred
        before the forensic examinations were conducted. See Strickland,
        902 F.2d at 941; see also United States v. Thurman, 889 F.3d 356, 361–
        62, 368 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding that a defendant’s verbal
        consent to a search of his cell phone extended to a forensic
        examination of the phone where (1) the purpose of the search was
        to investigate the defendant’s recent drug sales, (2) the defendant
        showed the agents names and numbers for drug-related contacts in
        the phone without placing any limitations on his consent, and
        (3) the defendant did not seek the return of the phone).
              Second, Butler contends that he could not have revoked his
        consent because (1) he did not know the FBI intended to search the
        phone, and (2) he was in state custody without “access to the
        normal channels of communication.” This contention lacks merit.
               For starters, the record shows Butler knew that the FBI
        intended to search the Samsung smartphone. Indeed, Butler
        consented to a “search” of this phone, provided the agents with the
        phone’s password, and allowed Agent Privette to take the phone
        to agents who handled technical matters. After that examination,
        Agent Privette informed Butler that (1) a pornographic website and
        a Google Hangouts chat were running on the Samsung
        smartphone, and (2) the FBI would try to identify the person
        associated with the “Peanut the Unicorn” username on the Google
        Hangouts chat found on the smartphone. After Butler’s interview
        with Agent Privette concluded, the agents returned Butler’s
        personal phone but kept the Samsung smartphone, and Butler did
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        22-11628                   Opinion of the Court                               19

        not object or withdraw his consent. These facts show that
        (1) Butler knew that FBI intended to search his Samsung
        smartphone and (2) Butler had reason to suspect that the agents
        would conduct a forensic search of the phone.
               After consenting to a search of the Samsung smartphone,
        Butler had multiple opportunities to revoke or limit his consent
        during his interview with Agent Privette on May 2, 2018, but Butler
        did not do so. Later that day, Agent Beccaccio gave Butler a card
        with her contact information so that his mother could request the
        return of the Samsung smartphone. Even if Butler lacked “access
        to the normal channels of communication” after he was arrested
        on May 2, 2018, there is no indication in the record that he ever
        attempted to contact Agent Beccaccio or ask another person to
        request the return of the Samsung smartphone on his behalf.
               Based on the record as a whole, we conclude that the
        forensic examinations of the Samsung smartphone did not exceed
        the scope of Butler’s consent.4

        4 Butler also argues that the government did not have probable cause to
        believe that a crime had been committed when it conducted a forensic search
        of his smartphone on September 21, 2018. However, because Butler
        consented to the search of his smartphone and because the forensic search did
        not exceed the scope of Butler’s consent, we need not address this argument.
        See United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991) (observing that
        “[a] search conducted pursuant to consent is a recognized exception to the
        requirements of probable cause and a search warrant”).
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11628

        C.     Violation of Possessory Interest
               Next, Butler contends that, in evaluating the reasonableness
        of the search, the district court failed to give sufficient weight to his
        substantial possessory interest in the smartphone, relying on Riley
        and United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2009).
                When evaluating the reasonableness of the government’s
        delay in obtaining a search warrant, we must carefully balance
        governmental and private interests. United States v. Laist, 702 F.3d
        608, 613 (11th Cir. 2012). In doing so, “rather than employing a per
        se rule of unreasonableness,” this Court “evaluate[s] the totality of
        the circumstances presented by each case.” Id. (quotation marks
        omitted). “The reasonableness of the delay is determined in light
        of all the facts and circumstances, and on a case-by-case basis.”
        Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351 (quotation marks omitted).
               In Riley, the Supreme Court observed that defendants have
        a heightened privacy interest in cell phones, which the Supreme
        Court described as “minicomputers.” 573 U.S. at 403, 134 S. Ct. at
        2494. The Riley Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception
        to the warrant requirement does not empower law enforcement
        officers to search the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone. Id. at
        385–86, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85. The Supreme Court noted that the
        typical search incident to arrest turns up a limited quantity of
        evidence—namely, those items that are on the arrestee’s person,
        such as a wallet—whereas the search of cell phone data could
        reveal more information than an “exhaustive search of a
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        22-11628               Opinion of the Court                        21

        house.” Id. at 393–97, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91. Riley, however, does
        not address searches where the defendant consents.
               More fundamentally, our Court has since identified a non-
        exclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether a post-
        seizure delay is unreasonable: (1) the significance of the
        interference with the person’s possessory interest; (2) the duration
        of the delay; (3) whether the person consented to the seizure; and
        (4) the government’s legitimate interest in holding the property as
        evidence. Laist, 702 F.3d at 613–14.
               Here, the district court properly found Butler’s possessory
        interest was minimal. The district court recognized that cell
        phones are entitled to “unique” Fourth Amendment protection but
        correctly explained that Riley did not restrict consensual searches.
               Butler relies heavily on our Mitchell decision, but that search
        was not consensual either and was a seizure of a computer hard
        drive based on probable cause. 565 F.3d at 1350–53. In Mitchell,
        our Court held that the government’s 21-day delay in securing a
        search warrant, while holding a computer hard drive based on probable
        cause, was unreasonable. Id. Our Court reasoned that
        (1) defendant Mitchell had a “substantial” possessory interest in the
        hard drive, given that “[c]omputers are relied upon heavily for
        personal and business use,” and (2) the government’s justification
        for the delay—that the case agent had to attend a training
        conference—was “insufficient.” Id. at 1351–52. Mitchell is
        inapposite here because the search in that case was based on
        probable cause, not consent. See id. at 1350–53.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                22-11628

               In contrast, Butler’s possessory interest in the smartphone
        was diminished for several reasons. First, and most importantly,
        Butler consented to the search of the smartphone, and he did not
        revoke or modify his consent. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d
        219, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]here a person consents to search and
        seizure, no possessory interest has been infringed because valid
        consent, by definition, requires voluntary tender of property.”).
        Second, Butler did not request the return of his smartphone before
        the forensic examinations were completed. See United States v.
        Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012) (observing that, if “the
        person from whom the item was taken ever asserted a possessory
        claim to it[,] . . . this would be some evidence (helpful, though not
        essential) that the seizure in fact affected [his] possessory
        interests”).
               Further, Butler told the agents that he used the Samsung
        smartphone for work, but he was in jail starting on May 2, and he
        could not have used that phone for work while he was in jail. In
        fact, Butler was not released from state custody until after the
        logical and physical extractions occurred on June 26, 2018, and
        August 15, 2018. Thus, the district court properly found that
        Butler’s possessory interest in the smartphone was “minimal.”
               Butler does not challenge the district court’s other findings
        concerning the reasonableness of the delay in searching the
        smartphone. Therefore, he has not shown any error in the district
        court’s determination that the government’s delay in searching the
        Samsung smartphone was not unreasonable.
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        22-11628             Opinion of the Court                   23

                            III.   CONCLUSION
               For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the denials of
        Butler’s motions to suppress.
              AFFIRMED.