Court Opinion

ID: 9492570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:44:10.445071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:22.123797
License: Public Domain

TASHIMA, Circuit Judge,
with whom WARDLAW, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Rymer’s majority opinion. I write separately to address an additional point.
As the majority opinion points out, the so-called pretrial conference was presided over by a law clerk. I do not believe there can be any doubt that a law clerk cannot preside over a pretrial conference. Rule 16 specifically provides that “the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties ... to appear before it for a conference ... before trial_” Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(a) (emphasis added). The rule also recognizes that, where authorized by local rule, the conduct of the scheduling and planning conference may be delegated to a magistrate judge. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(b). No such comparable, specific delegation authority appears in Rule 16 with respect to the final pretrial conference. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(d).1 From this carefully constructed rule and its narrowly circumscribed delegation authority, it can be gathered that a pretrial conference is a judicial proceeding and a judicial proceeding can be conducted only by a judicial officer. Cf. Riley v. Deeds, 56 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir.1995) (convening of court by law clerk who directed court reporter to *1083read back testimony to jury in absence of judge was structural constitutional error requiring reversal). A law clerk is not a judicial officer and cannot conduct a judicial proceeding, including a final, Rule 16(d) pretrial conference.
Judge Ideman must have been aware of these strictures because he appears to have taken steps to ensure that the pretrial conference did not become a matter of record. There is no entry on the docket of this case, no Clerk’s Minute Order, that a pretrial conference was ever held. Nor, contrary to the requirement of the Court Reporters Act, which requires all proceedings of the district court to “be recorded verbatim,” 28 U.S.C. § 753(b), were the pretrial conference proceedings reported by a court reporter or recorded verbatim in any other way. There simply is no record in the district court that a pretrial conference ever took place.
Yet, in spite of the sub rosa nature of the pretrial conference, Sanders was visited with the ultimate sanction — dismissal of his case with prejudice — because his attorney failed to prepare for it. In my view, the pretrial conference was a nullity. A law clerk purported to preside (undoubtedly at the direction of the judge) over a proceeding from which, although held in a district court courtroom, the district judge completely absented himself, and which was not reported. Such a renegade, ultra vires procedure cannot be sanctioned.2
A final Rule 16(d) pretrial conference, presided over by a law clerk, from which the judge has deliberately absented himself, is not a pretrial conference within the meaning of Rule 16; therefore, counsel, or an unrepresented party, cannot be sanctioned for being unprepared for such a “conference.”
I therefore concur in the disposition reversing the imposition of sanctions and remanding the case to the district court.

. I note, however, that the Magistrates Act authorizes designated magistrate judges "to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,” with certain exceptions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Act also provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned to such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). We need not explore in this case whether these provisions authorize a magistrate judge to preside over a final pretrial conference under Rule 16(d).

. Understandably, no one objected to the law clerk presiding over the pretrial conference. At oral argument, it appeared that this was the customary manner in which Judge Ideman conducted his pretrial conferences. Whether a person who is not a judicial officer may preside over a judicial proceeding in the absence of all jurisdiction, however, is a jurisdictional issue. Cf. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (a judge loses judicial immunity when acting “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction”). And jurisdictional issues cannot be waived.