Court Opinion

ID: 9516292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:39:51.605505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:33:23.318536
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I find I cannot agree with the majority’s *497treatment of appellant’s right under CR. 4(B) and I therefore dissent from that opinion.
This record reveals that appellant filed a motion for early trial on November 24, 1971, which put into effect the fifty day provision of CR. 4 (B). This requires the prosecutor to bring appellant to trial within that period unless the court calendar is too congested to do so or appellant himself causes a delay before trial. If appellant is not brought to trial both the rule and case law mandate that he be discharged. Small v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 349, 287 N. E. 2d 334.
On January 19, 1972, appellant was arraigned in the Criminal Court of Marion County. Appellant’s retained counsel was not present, and the court had temporarily assigned counsel for purposes of this proceeding only. The record of that arraignment shows the following exchange:
“THE COURT: Well, feel free to move to set aside the plea if you feel that it is appropriate before you file any motions. Alright. Any preference on trial date ?
MR. TAYLOR: Do you want an early trial or do you want to wait until I talk to Mr. Samper?
MR. MARTIN: Wait until you talk to Mr. Samper.
MR. TAYLOR: No your honor.
THE COURT: Alright I will show the matter set for trial in due course. Now if you find afterwards that your client would like to have a trial date earlier than that, let me know privately and I will try to accommodate you on the day.”
Appellant filed his Motion for Discharge on February 7, 1972, and, after a hearing on the motion, the trial court overruled it on the grounds that appellant had waived his right to an early trial at the January 19th arraignment. The majority opinion affirms that decision.
I do not believe that the exchange set out above can be construed as a waiver. We need not decide at this juncture which standard of proof we would require to show an ade*498quate waiver of a CR. 4(B) early trial right. If we were to consider this right a fundamental constitutional right we would require the State to overcome a basic presumption against a waiver and show that it was made voluntarily, knowingly, intelligently and with full awareness of its consequences. Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L. Ed. 1461; Nacoff v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 97, 267 N. E. 2d 165; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37, 262 N. E. 2d 638. However, I do not believe there is any need for us to decide if we should require this higher standard of proof or whether we might accept the less stringent standard accorded to other rights since, in my opinion, the exchange at the arraignment cannot be deemed a waiver under any standard.
The appellant clearly asserted his rights to an early trial by filing his notice in November. A trial judge’s question concerning a preference for trial date cannot be reasonably construed to be calling for a decision on whether or not appellant wished to pursue his CR. 4(B) rights, nor can appellant’s response that he would want to talk to his lawyer be deemed a waiver of any rights created by his previous notice. It should be pointed out also that in this situation we cannot indulge in the assumptions that arise when appellant is represented by counsel and there is a failure to assert a right, which is then construed as a waiver of that right. Appellant here had no opportunity to consult with either his retained or appointed counsel. Furthermore since the counsel at the arraignment was appointed for such a short period and only for a particularly perfunctory proceeding a distinct possibility exists that counsel was not even aware that a CR. 4(B) notice had been filed.
Since there is nothing in this record to indicate that appellant caused a delay during the fifty days of the CR. 4(B) period, or to demonstrate that a congested court calendar prohibited the prosecutor from bringing appellant to trial, and because I cannot conclude that the exchange at the arraign*499ment can be deemed a waiver under any standard, I must dissent from the majority.
Note.—Reported in 296 N. E. 2d 793.