Court Opinion

ID: 9706019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:29:49.125234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.462066
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
What has troubled me since the emergence of disputes and appeals regarding the ever increasing number of agreements like the one presented here is the conclusion that seems almost automatically reached upon a finding that the agreement was meant to survive the entry of a divorce decree, this conclusion being that a specification regarding support is thus rendered non-modifiable simply by its inclusion in the agreement. I don't believe the courts should be so quick to conclude that the support obligation is rendered non-modifiable by inclusion in a surviving agreement.
The majority indicates that the governing factor in the determination is intent of the parties as to modification. (Majority Opinion, p. 530.) In fact, the majority states:
Applying this principle to the instant facts, we have no difficulty in concluding that the parties intended the Agreement to survive their divorce and that the child support provision would not be modifiable downward on a showing of changed circumstances.
I can agree with the majority that the parties likely intended that the agreement be in force after the divorce. The rather easy conclusion reached regarding modifiability comes as a surprise to me, especially when my reading of the clause in question reveals absolutely no mention whatsoever of modifiability.
*533The clause neither expressly calls for, nor expressly rejects modifiability. Yet, in this contractual climate, the majority states, rather boldly I believe, that “[t]his intent [non-modifiability] is unambiguously expressed in the various provisions quoted above, both when read separately and in the context of the entire agreement.” Perhaps this is what is meant when it is said that what is crystal clear to one is opaque to another.
When parties embark upon settling economic claims by agreement they are, more than anything else, substituting arms length negotiation for litigation in court. By negotiation they can derive a settlement they can tolerate without subjecting themselves to the potential risk of a far less desirable award of the court. Certainly, there is benefit in negotiation, to both the payor and payee of support.
It escapes me why it should automatically be concluded that when parties sit down to negotiate the economic issues in lieu of litigation they intend to materially alter the nature of the claim being negotiated. That is, support obligations are generally modifiable upon a showing of changed circumstances. If the parties sit down to negotiate an appropriate sum for support why is it automatically assumed that they wish to change the modifiable nature of the obligation? Isn’t it more likely that they have the same generally accepted concept of support in mind and are merely negotiating an acceptable support obligation rather than accepting the risk of an adverse award by the court, or perhaps, are attempting to limit the litigation costs, which, as we are all aware, can amount to substantial sums rather quickly.
Courts appear to routinely conclude that the negotiated sum cannot be modified unless explicitly stated so in the agreement, even though the more readily conceived concept of support is that it is a modifiable obligation. This is the more readily conceived concept of support if for no other reason than that is what it generally is in common experience, unless of course, the modifiable nature is bargained away. This approach is, therefore, very biased against the party agreeing to pay support.
*534Bias can be seen in this very case. Although, the clause says absolutely nothing about modifiability, the majority concludes that it is unambiguously non-modifiable. I believe this conclusion is suspect for several reasons. First of all, the majority finds this unambiguous intent in part, from the absence of modification language, even though it is difficult to conclude, on a logical level, that the absence of language on modifiability indicates a positive intent to have a non-modifiable obligation. It seems rather absurd to assert that parties would choose to express a conscious intent to provide a non-modifiable obligation through a mechanism of including language in a non-related clause and excluding it in the clause of import.
If the parties had a true conscious intent to establish a non-modifiable obligation it would seem that they would have indicated so explicitly, rather than relating this through some convoluted inclusion/exclusion approach. This would seem even more likely as the subject agreement became more comprehensive, for then there would be even greater reason to assume that if the parties possessed such an intent it would have been included in the document. Rather, the absence of the language more probably indicates that it was not given a great deal of thought either way. Of course, if modifiability was not really within the contemplation of the parties at all, then we have another question or issue altogether and it would be patently incorrect to contend that the intent was unambiguously expressed.
Secondly, when one considers the very significant difference between classifying the support obligation modifiable or non-modifiable, it becomes even more suspect that the parties would indicate their intent to have a non-modifiable obligation by simply neglecting to include such language in the clause in question. The majority indicates that intent can be deduced from the failure to include a modification provision in the support clause when it is considered that comments regarding court review are included in the custody and visitation clause. However, the mere fact that an *535issue was contemplated as to one aspect of the agreement does not necessarily mean that it was contemplated as to another aspect of the agreement. There are many things going on in the lives of those going through divorce proceedings which could lead to distraction or, perhaps, disrupt the normal thought processes. Furthermore, as already discussed above, it is logically faulty to infer positive intent from a non-act. I look to the same circumstance and wonder why, if the parties had truly contemplated the issue and had a positive intent on the matter, the parties did not express it in the support clause when they did elsewhere in the agreement.
It seems to me that if they took the trouble to express their intent on court review or modifiability as to one aspect of the agreement, custody and visitation, they would do so as to another aspect of the agreement, support, as well. Assuming, of course, that it was their intent to do so. Consequently, I find it more plausible that the absence of modification language in the support clause signifies a lack of consideration by the parties of the modification issue in the support context than a conscious understanding of the parties that the obligation would be non-modifiable.
Returning to the point that modifiability or non-modifiability of the obligation is a significant issue, and can have drastic consequences to the individual assuming the obligation, I am further skeptical that appellant would have knowingly and gratuitously agreed to a non-modifiable obligation without gaining something in return. If the obligation is deemed non-modifiable, appellant would have been agreeing to an obligation beyond that which could have been imposed upon him by law. It is logical to assume that he would not have done such a potentially risky act without gaining something in return. However, the agreement does not explicitly indicate that he received anything in return for such a concession and it would likely require parole evidence to establish that he did.
Thirdly, the majority’s attempts to divine intent from the parties usage of terms such as merger and incorporation is *536likewise unconvincing simply because up until just very recently this very court had been struggling with the meaning and effect of these terms. It is my view that nobody, including the members of the bar or the courts, have really understood the significance of these terms, if for no other reason than because there was no consensus opinion on their effect. This is the very reason several of these cases have been considered by this court sitting en banc. I find it extremely unlikely that the attorneys, much less the parties, completely understood what significance this terminology would be given or signified.
This brings me to what I feel are the key points in this case. First, I suspect that in many of these cases where the language is silent as to modifiability there has, in fact, been no conscious contemplation or negotiation of the point by the parties. This, I believe, is a reasonably inferred conclusion from the fact that the agreement is silent on such a potentially very important issue. Further, I believe that my colleagues in the majority, if put to the task, would likely concede this point. After all, their own opinion, when all is said and done, does not really find an explicit intent on modification, their conclusion is reached through inference and deduction.
Second, we need to establish how these clauses should be dealt with in light of the fact that, in all probability, there has been either no contemplation or negotiation of the modification issue. Third, and perhaps more importantly, it would seem manifestly unfair to construe the obligation as non-modifiable unless it was, in fact, knowingly agreed to.
A change of circumstances can transform an affordable support obligation into a tremendous financial burden, and a finding of non-modifiability can transform an equitable obligation into a fast lane to financial ruin. Particularly when it is considered that court ordered support obligations are modifiable under appropriate circumstances, I do not believe non-modifiable obligations should be imposed by judicial construction of a separation agreement, but only upon a finding that it was knowingly and voluntarily as*537sumed or bargained for. Otherwise, we are simply imposing an unconscionable term upon an unsuspecting party to the agreement. This, I fear, may be what has been transpiring, as courts seem to have been inclined to view the obligation as non-modifiable simply because it has been expressed in a written contract as opposed to a court order. Of course, now that the recent en banc decisions have established that intent of the parties is to be the deciding factor, we can concentrate on that issue. I believe we must be careful not to read in intent where it is not present. I would be reluctant to find a form of implied or implicit intent favoring non-modifiability.
In light of the above discussion, I would be considerably more comfortable in considering agreements silent on modification ambiguous as to that point and allowing parole evidence on this issue, than I would be in engaging in a mind reading demonstration and pretending that certain inclusions and/or exclusions of language in other clauses somehow signify an intent as to modifiability. In this context, evidence of whether or not modification was contemplated, discussed or bargained for could be properly considered. If, in consideration of parole evidence, it is found that, in fact, the support obligation was understood to be a non-modifiable obligation then it could be given that effect.
Where it appears or is determined that modifiability of a support obligation was neither discussed nor negotiated or where it appears that non-modifiability was not consciously agreed to, I would construe such a clause as modifiable since support is generally a modifiable obligation and thus, the more reasonable nature to impute to the agreement as the parties understanding.1
*538Thus, in the present case, I would remand for the allowance of parole evidence on the issue of modifiability and a redetermination of the issue in light of this opinion.
POPOVICH, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Of course, if there was not an express understanding as to a certain matter, contract law calls for the "reasonable expectation” of the parties to prevail. I would contend that in similar circumstances as those presented here, and in the absence of countervailing evidence, the reasonable expectation of the parties should be concluded to be a modifiable obligation because that is the general nature of support obligations in common experience, and, thus, the most reasonable expectation to impute as the parties understanding.