Court Opinion

ID: 9378211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 19:00:32.772014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:19.566344
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60276        Document: 00516671000             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/09/2023

                                REVISED 03/09/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                     March 7, 2023
                                       No. 22-60276
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                          Clerk

   Robert Ward,

                                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Wilkinson County School District,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 5:20-CV-206

   Before Jones, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Plaintiff Robert Ward (“Ward”) sued Wilkinson County School
   District (the “School District”), asserting that he was not given adequate
   time to review and sign his employment contract, in violation of due process
   pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment
   in favor of the School District. Ward appeals.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60276      Document: 00516671000           Page: 2     Date Filed: 03/09/2023

                                     No. 22-60276

                          I. Facts and Procedural History
          From 2019 to 2020, Ward worked part-time as a Lead Teacher for the
   School District. His contract stated that his employment began on August 5,
   2019, and ended on May 13, 2020. When the School District decided to make
   the Lead Teacher position a full-time role, Ward expressed interest in the
   position, and on June 10, 2020, the School Board approved offering Ward the
   full-time Lead Teacher position.
          With regard to employment contracts, Mississippi law provides in
   relevant part:
          If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal,
          licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed
          position who has been elected and approved shall not execute
          and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been
          tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school
          board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract
          tendered to him shall be void and of no effect.
   Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). The statute has also been adopted by the
   School District, almost in its entirety, as part of the District Policies.
          On June 22, 2020, Ward was informed that his contract for the 2020–
   21 school year was ready to be signed. On June 29, 2020, Ward was reminded
   that his contract was ready to be reviewed and needed to be signed by July 1,
   2020; Ward was out of town but stated that he would come in as soon as he
   was able. On July 6, 2020, Ward went to the school office and reviewed the
   contract; he was told that he needed to sign the contract that day, because
   the relevant ten-day period had expired. Ward felt that he did not have
   enough time to consider the contract, and did not sign it before leaving that
   day. On July 8, 2020, the School Board voided Ward’s contract. Ward filed
   suit against the School District, arguing that the School District violated the
   due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On dueling motions for

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                                     No. 22-60276

   summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of the
   School District.
                              II. Standard of Review
          We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de
   novo. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016).
   Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact is
   ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
   for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540
   (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.
   1994) (en banc) (per curiam)).
                                   III. Discussion
          The threshold inquiry in a due process challenge is “whether the
   plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in property or liberty.”
   Edionwe v. Bailey, 860 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Am. Mfrs. Mut.
   Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999)). “To have a property interest in
   a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for
   it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead,
   have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
   564, 576 (1972).
          On appeal, Ward argues that the district court erred in granting
   summary judgment on his due process claim, because he had a protected
   property interest in the position of full-time Lead Teacher that was offered
   to him. Ward argues that a public employee’s entitlement may be shown
   through reference to a statute, written contract, or mutually explicit
   understanding enforceable as an implied contract. See King v. Newton Cnty.
   Bd. Of Sup’rs, 144 F. App’x 381, 384 (5th Cir. 2005). Specifically, however,

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   we have held that “a public employee has a property interest in her continued
   employment if she can prove a claim of entitlement to such a property
   interest by reference to a (1) statute; (2) written contract; or (3) mutually
   explicit understanding enforceable as an implied contract.” Id. (citing
   Johnson v. Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center, 878 F.2d 856, 858
   (5th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)). Ward fails to cite any case, however, that
   recognizes a property interest in prospective employment under Mississippi
   law.   And as the district court recognized, Ward’s previous part-time
   contract with the School District ended on May 13, 2020, and he was not
   employed by the School District when the School Board approved offering
   him the full-time position (June 10, 2020), when he was notified that his
   contract was ready to be reviewed and signed (June 22, 2020), or when he
   reviewed the contract (July 6, 2020). He therefore had no protectable
   property interest in continued employment with the School District after his
   previous contract ended. 1 See Frazier v. Garrison I.S.D., 980 F.2d 1514, 1529-
   30 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that Texas teachers employed under fixed term
   contracts did not have a property interest in continued employment beyond
   the terms of their contracts).
           Ward also argues that Mississippi Code Section 37-9-23 gives him “a
   property right to consider and enter into an employment contract with the
   school district.” But “[b]efore a property interest would exist, [the statute]

           1
             Ward also argues that because “Mississippi teachers have a due process right to
   appeal hearings when they are terminated, they also have a due process right to have
   reasonable time to consider their contracts for employment per state statute.” But this is
   merely another attempt to construe his case as one of continuing employment rather than
   of prospective employment. At the time when Ward was considering the full-time Lead
   Teacher contract, he was not employed by the School District, and he therefore had no
   protectable property right to continued employment. The existence of a protected property
   right to continued employment does not impliedly create a protected property right to
   consider prospective employment contracts.

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                                       No. 22-60276

   would have to constrain the [School Board] in a meaningful way.” Stem v.
   Gomez, 813 F.3d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 2016). The statute Ward cites to establish
   a property right provides the following:
            If any superintendent, other than those elected, principal,
            licensed employee or person recommended for a licensed
            position who has been elected and approved shall not execute
            and return the contract within ten (10) days after same has been
            tendered to him for execution, then, at the option of the school
            board, the election of the licensed employee and the contract
            tendered to him shall be void and of no effect.
   Miss. Code § 37-9-23 (2018). Although the statute permits the School Board
   to rescind the contract after ten days, it does not forbid the Board from
   rescinding it before ten days have passed. The statute therefore does not
   constrain the School Board’s discretion so as to create a protected property
   interest in a ten-day firm offer.
            In sum, Ward has failed to demonstrate that he had a protected
   property interest in prospective public employment with the School District.
                                   IV. Conclusion
            Based on the foregoing, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
   court.

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