Court Opinion

ID: 9491841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:25:11.52656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:58.279769
License: Public Domain

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part:
Thirty years have passed since Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in reaction to Miranda. We are nearing the end of the seventh consecutive Administration that has made the judgment not to use § 3501 in the prosecution of criminal cases. Now, after all this time, the majority supplants the Departs ment of Justice’s judgment with its own and says that § 3501 must be invoked. After making that judgment call, the majority holds that the section is constitutional, without the benefit of any briefing in opposition. In pressing § 3501 into the prosecution of a case against the express wishes of the Department of Justice, the majority takes on more than any court should. I therefore respectfully dissent from the parts of the majority opinion that deal with § 3501. As for the search warrant, I would uphold it under Leon’s good faith exception, but I dissent from the holding that the warrant is sufficiently specific.
I.
The majority begins its reach to inject § 3501 into this case with an overstatement. It says that the § 3501 issue is “squarely presented.” Ante at 671; see also ante at 672 (“the question of whether § 3501 governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court is squarely before us today”). In its brief to us the government has said plainly, “we are not making an argument based on § 3501 in this appeal.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 34. The defendant, of course, does not mention § 3501. Thus, we are not being urged to inject § 3501 into this case by anyone except the amici, the Washington Legal Foundation and the Safe Streets Coalition. That is not enough to put the issue of § 3501’s constitutionality and application squarely before us. Perhaps the majority recognizes as much, for it quickly moves to an argument about why the court itself should force § 3501 into this case.
The majority’s argument for taking up § 3501 is as follows. First, the Department of Justice will not defend the constitutionality of § 3501, so the question whether the statute or Miranda governs the admission- of federal confessions will not be decided unless we act on our own. Second, Dickerson’s confession in this case is admissible under § 3501 but not under Miranda. “As a result,” the majority concludes, “we are required to consider the issue now.” Ante at 683 (emphasis added). One thing I am sure *696of is that we are not required to consider a § 3501 issue when it is raised only in an amicus brief. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994) (“deelin[ing] the invitation of some amici to consider” § 3501). Indeed, the only issues not raised by the parties that we are required to consider are those of subject matter jurisdiction and justiciability. See e.g., Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (“we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction”); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 331, 97 S.Ct. 1211, 51 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977) (“Although raised by neither of the parties, we are first obliged to examine the standing of appellees, as a matter of the case-or-controversy requirement associated with Art. Ill”); LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394-95 n. 9 (4th Cir.1987) (concluding that whether a claim is moot “is a jurisdictional question that the court is obliged to consider sua sponte whenever it arises”) (citations omitted). We have jurisdiction in this case, and it is fit for adjudication. The real question, therefore, is whether we should exercise our discretion and consider § 3501, when no party has invoked the statute. I believe that the situation calls for the exercise of judicial restraint; we should stay away from the § 3501 issue.
To start with, I cannot agree with the majority’s accusation that the Department of Justice “elevat[ed] politics over law” when it prevented the United States Attorney from invoking § 3501 in an effort to save Dickerson’s confession. See ante at 672. A move to admit more confessions could be touted as aggressive prosecution, so I would think it might be better politics to invoke § 3501. In any event, I see no evidence that the Department of Justice is putting politics over law when it comes to § 3501. The Department’s view — that § 3501 cannot be used to admit confessions that Miranda would exclude — is a view that I accept as genuine.
I believe that Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), remains sound authority for us to decline consideration of § 3501 on the invitation of an amicus. In Davis the Court did not take up § 3501 because “the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal statute on which the Department of Justice expressly declines to take a position.” Id. at 457 n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2350. Our panel majority says that everything has changed since Davis because the Attorney General has now written Congress, saying that the Department of Justice will not defend the constitutionality of § 3501. See ante at 671-72, 683. I do not think the Attorney General’s letter changes anything. It simply confirms what the Supreme Court already knew in Davis, that is, that the Department of Justice was not going to invoke the statute to try to salvage confessions. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 463, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“This is not the first case in which the United States has declined to invoke § 3501 before us — nor even the first case in which that failure has been called to its attention.”). The majority also contends that Davis is distinguishable because the Supreme Court saved that confession on another ground, making consideration of § 3501 unnecessary. That is not why the Court declined to consider § 3501. The Court said specifically “that the Government has not sought to rely in this ease on 18 U.S.C. § 3501, ... and we therefore decline the invitation of some amici to consider it.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 457 n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2350. See also id. at 463 n. *, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“the Court today bases its refusal to consider § 3501 not upon the fact that the provision is inapplicable, but upon the fact that the Government failed to argue it”) (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, we are faced with essentially the same situation that the Supreme Court confronted in Davis when it refused, to take up § 3501: the government has expressly declined to “mak[e] an argument based on § 3501 in this appeal,” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 34, and we are free to reject amici’s call for its consideration.
It is a mistake for our court to push § 3501 into this case for several reasons. First, courts as a general rule do not interfere with the executive’s broad discretion in the initiation and conduct of criminal prosecutions. See generally United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 *697L.Ed.2d 687 (1996); United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir.1998). Forcing the use of § 3501 upon a United States Attorney gets uncomfortably close to encroaching upon the prosecutor’s routine discretion. I recognize, of course, that courts have a large measure of control over the course of a case once it is filed. But a decision not to invoke § 3501 in response to a motion to suppress a confession is a matter of prosecutorial strategy. We should leave that to the executive. There is also a related point. In invoking § 3501, the majority overrides 30 years of Department of Justice prosecutorial policy. Any change in this policy should come from Justice.
Second, it is “a sound prudential practice” for us to avoid issues not raised by the parties. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 464, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (Scalia, J., concurring). This is because “[t]he premise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Scalia, J.). We perform our role as neutral arbiter best when we let the parties raise the issues, and both sides brief and argue them fully. That did not happen here. By invoking § 3501, the majority injects into this case the overriding constitutional question of whether § 3501 can supersede Miranda. It then decides the question against the defendant, when the only briefing we have on the issue is about two pages from amici that the majority agrees with. The majority holds that § 3501 governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court because Miranda is not a constitutional rule. I don’t know whether it is or not, but before I had to decide, I would want thoughtful lawyers on both sides to answer one question for me. If Miranda is not a constitutional rule, why does the Supreme Court continue to apply it in prosecutions arising in state courts? See. e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (per curiam); see also Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991) (noting that with respect to cases tried in state court, the Supreme Court’s “authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution”). This question illustrates that the § 3501 issue is so sweeping that we should not be delving into it on our own. In this case, we should follow our usual practice of deciding only the issues raised by the parties.*
The majority’s fallback position is that if we do not press the use of § 3501, no one else will. See ante at 684. This overlooks Congress. If another branch is to question and investigate the executive’s 30-year policy of not using § 3501, it should be Congress. After all, Congress — consistent with separation of powers principles — uses the public hearings process to examine the policies and conduct of the executive. That process has been used on occasion to question the executive’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion and the formulation of litigation strategy. See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 809 F.2d 979, 991 n. 8 (3d Cir.1986). Congress therefore may legitimately investigate why the executive has ignored § 3501 and what the consequences are. The legislative branch is better equipped than we are to investigate, for example, the question raised by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Davis: whether the government’s failure to invoke § 3501 “may have produced ... the acquittal and the non-prosecution of many dangerous felons.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 465, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (emphasis added). Whether the answer to that question or other considerations should be used to prod the executive into changing its *698policy with respect to § 3601 is a matter that I would leave to Congress.
Because I would not invoke § 3501, I would affirm the district court’s order denying the government’s motion to reconsider the admissibility of Dickerson’s confession for the reasons stated in part II.A. of the majority opinion.
II.
As for the physical evidence seized from Dickerson’s apartment, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that it should have been admitted under the good faith exception. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that a warrant permitting a search for “evidence of the crime of bank robbery” is sufficiently particular under the Fourth Amendment.
A warrant must guide the executing officer with a particular description of the items to be seized. See United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir.1982) (“A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.”) (citation omitted). Thus, a warrant authorizing seizure of “address books, diaries, business records, documents, receipts, warranty books, guns, stereo equipment, [and] color television which are evidence of violation of Georgia State Statute 16-8-2 Theft by Taking” is sufficiently particular because it identifies the universe of items to be seized. See United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir.1986). On the other hand, a warrant for seizure of “ ‘any other evidence relating to the commission of a crime’ plainly is not sufficiently particular with respect to the things to be seized.” United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir.1992).
I recognize that courts on occasion have upheld warrants authorizing the seizure of the “instrumentalities” of certain distinctive crimes. Nevertheless, I believe “evidence of the crime of bank robbery” is far too general. That description does nothing to confine the discretion of an executing officer, especially if the warrant is relayed for execution by an officer who has never served on a bank robbery squad. A search for evidence of bank robbery would surely include a search for guns, masks, and cash. But what else? It might be construed to allow a search through all financial records, as well as a search for any items purchased. Under this interpretation, virtually no piece of paper or property would be beyond the bounds of a search. The description in the warrant here was simply too general to satisfy Fourth Amendment standards.

 The majority misses my point when it erroneously suggests that I have examined all of the relevant authority and cannot conclude that Miranda renders § 3501 unconstitutional. See ante at n. 21, 692. My point is that we should not be examining the question at all, much less deciding it. For the record, however, not everyone agrees with the majority. See 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 76 (2d ed. 1982) ("Unless the [Supreme] Court overrules Miranda, or holds that the 1968 statute [§ 3501] has successfully accomplished this, lower courts must follow the decision rather than the statute."); 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.5(e) (1984) (§ 3501 "is unconstitutional to the extent that it purports to repeal Miranda.").