Court Opinion

ID: 9856816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:59:24.388111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:40.882171
License: Public Domain

SADLER, Justice (dissenting). Now, for the first time in almost four decades elapsing since its enactment has this Court breathed life into a contract to convey community real estate in obvious disregard of L.1915, c. 84, 1941 Comp. § 65-403, declaring that any conveyance or attempt to convey the same, signed by the husband alone, “shall be void and of no effect.” This it has done by affirming a decree for specific performance of such a contract which admittedly the wife did not sign. We have repeatedly held any such contract, insofar as sought to be made the basis of specific performance, the relief here awarded, is absolutely void and of no effect. Adams v. Blumenshine, 27 N.M. 643, 204 P. 66, 20 A.L.R. 369; Terry v. Humphreys, 27 N.M. 564, 203 P. 539; Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327, and cases cited. In Adams v. Blumenshine, supra, we said [27 N.M. 643, 204 P. 68]: “If the premises were community property, then it became necessary for both husband and wife to join in any deed conveying the same under the provisions of chapter 84, Laws -1915, and any transfer or conveyance of the same attempted to be made by the hushand alone was void and of no effect. If a transfer or conveyance of the property by these husbands without their wives joining would be void and ■of no effect, then a contract to make such a transfer or conveyance would likewise be void and of no effect, at least so far as specific performance of the contract is concerned.” (Emphasis mine.) The utter invalidity and complete nullity of any conveyance, or attempt to convey, community real estate by either husband or wife alone is so exhaustively treated in Jenkins v. Huntsinger, supra, that it suffices merely to cite the case to demonstrate that the court here upholds relief by specific performance of a contract to convey which the whole rationale of that decision dis-affirms. The effort to find support for the result declared by the present majority in the cases of Conley v. Davidson, 35 N.M. 173, 291 P. 489, and Potter v. Connor, 38 N.M. 431, 34 P.2d 1086, by seeking to distinguish between deeds and mortgages of real estate on the one hand and a contract to convey real estate on the other evaporates into thin air when we realize that a contract may be void in part even though actionable in part. Adams v. Blumenshine, supra. That is the exact situation with which we are confronted here. The contract, or its breach, will support an action in damages against the husband. Conley v. Davidson and Potter v. Connor, supra. To that extent it is not void. So here would the wife’s conduct, as found by the court, support an action in damages for deceit against her. But to the extent the contract attempts or promises to convey community real estate, it is just as void as a conveyance itself would be. The prevailing opinion states: “We are in agreement with appellant’s position as to the effect of this statute on mortgages and conveyances, and further in agreement that a contract for the sale of community realty executed by the husband alone is unenforcible, but it does not follow such contract is void.” Now how does this language square with the language of Adams v. Blumenshine,which says: “If a transfer or conveyance of the property by these husbands without their wives joining would be void and' of no effect, then a contract to make such a transfer of conveyance would likewise be void and 'of no effect, at least so far as specific performance of the contract is concerned.” (Emphasis mine.) Neither Conley v. Davidson, nor Potter, v. Connor, recedes from the position that a contract to convey real estate, signed by the husband alone, may be valid in part and for stated purposes and wholly void in part for other purposes. Indeed, in the Conley case these characteristics of such a contract, as held in Adams v. Blumenshine, are noticed and expressly reaffirmed. As against the claim there made that such a contract was wholly void and would not support an action in damages against the husband for its breach, we said [35 N.M. 173, 291 P. 490]: “There is no merit in this contention, for the present suit is for damages resulting from a breach of contract and not for specific performance thereof. This distinction was suggested in the 'Adams Case.” (Emphasis mine.) The discussion of the question before us would be incomplete if it failed to take notice of our decision in McGrail v. Fields, 53 N.M. 158, 203 P.2d 1000, 1002. After reviewing our holding in Jenkins v. Hunt-singer, supra, at great length and in the light of some Texas decisions said to challenge the correctness of our conclusions in that case, yet not considered in reaching the result there announced, we said: “In that case it was determined that the husband had attempted to convey community real property by his deed alone. Subsequently the parties were divorced, and he became the sole owner of half of it. We held that the deed was absolutely void, and that it did not convey the part of the property allotted to the husband in the division as subsequently acquired property. We reviewed the authorities at great length, and concluded that the deed being absoliitely void, the grantor conveyed nothing by his deed and that he was not estopped to deny its validity. “It is contended that we should overrule the Jenkins case. * * * ■ “Our decision in the Jenkins case was handed down after a- most careful consideration of every question here advanced. We are entirely satisfied with it, and are not disposed to overrule. it. It has now become a rule of property and if we were doubtful of its . soundness we would not be inclined to disturb its doctrine.” Then, after the deliberation reflected by the foregoing language, what did we do? We took up a cross-assignment of error urged by appellee and reversed and remanded the cause to enable the trial court to determine an issue which, if what we had previously held was the law, became wholly immaterial. We introduced this sudden reversal of position in the following language, to-wit: “The defendant, by counter assignment, asserts that the trial court erred in failing to hold that the plaintiff was estopped from claiming title to this property by his laches.” It is difficult to' explain McGrail v. Fields. The opinion on its face strongly suggests one of two things, (1) either the disposition ordered arose from a compromise of views inadvisedly acquiesced in to end wearisome debate; or (2) to the same end, an overzealous mindfulness of our peculiar function to review the facts, not to find them, caused us in three short closing paragraphs, mistakenly to remand the cause for a finding on an issue rendered wholly immaterial by all that had been said in nine previous pages of an extensive discussion and review of Jenkins v. Huntsinger, supra. As a precedent to support the conclusion here announced, the case is quite 'iriocuous and without effect. The majority must feel the same way about it, since they do not even cite it. ■ The result announced in this case, affirming a decree that orders specific performance of a contract to convey community real estate, signed by the husband alone, unquestionably will be a matter of grave concern to every wife in New Mexico. Of course, a conveyance or attempt to convey community real estate by either spouse alone, whether it be the husband or the wife, is equally void. But as is generally understood and as we have gone so far as to recognize in some of our opinions, the protection afforded by this statute is primarily for benefit of the wife against efforts by the husband to appropriate her just and lawful share of community real estate. The broad powers of management and control given the husband over the community afford an ever present temptation to him to. do this very thing. But the legislature, some forty years ago, recognized the danger and by enacting this statute sought to fasten the door against it by pronouncing a declaration of nullity for any and all attempts to evade it. Doubtless, it was familiar with the doctrine that estoppel may not rest on a nullity. Mosley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 45 N.M. 230, 114 P.2d 740, Now it is proposed to open with the key of estoppel the door to this bulwark of protection so long afforded the wives of this state against efforts by any husband so disposed to rob them of it. It is my candid judgment if the majority opinion remains the law, another decade will see the ques-. tioned statute so whittled away by cases relying on estoppel as to rob it of any effectiveness for all practical purposes. Witness what has happened to the delinquent tax law since this Court in Scudder v. Hart, 45 N.M. 76, 110 P.2d 536, and Kershner v. Sganzini, 45 N.M. 195, 113 P.2d 576, 134 A.L.R. 1290, extended by interpretation the fraud declared sufficient to defeat a tax title to embrace “constructive fraud.” The flood of cases following demonstrates what can happen to a statute once the key of estoppel is turned in the door locked for its protection. What we said in Alford v. Rowell, 44 N.M. 392, 103 P.2d 119, 123, seems peculiarly pertinent to the majority effort to differentiate between an “attempt to convey” pronounced void by the statute and an “agreement to convey,” as being outside the same interdiction. While discussing the holding in an earlier decision that an oral conditional sales contract was no longer valid in New Mexico, we said: “If an oral conditional sales contract is no longer valid, it is difficult to comprehend how an oral agreement to enter into a conditional sales contract could be deemed valid.” It is just as difficult for me to understand how, if an “attempt to convey” community real estate is void, a promise to do the same thing is not also void. Our decisions affirm that the portion of any agreement so promising is void and may not be specifically enforced, the most pertinent of which is Adams v. Blumenshine, supra. In my opinion, this statute, enacted primarily to protect the wife against the husband’s perfidy, should bind the courts even more rigidly than it does the parties. We should so hold. Instead, the prevailing opinion affirms a decree directing the wife to do what the statute proscribes as a meaningless and void act. The majority seem to think some significance, fortifying- the result announced, flows from their characterization of the proceeding before us as one for declaratory judgment. What difference it could make is quite beyond- me. In attempting to define the nature of this action as one for a declaratory judgment, the majority find themselves again plagued by the same state of confusion as when they sought to draw a distinction, for purposes of decision, between an “attempt to convey” and a “promise to convey.” Compare Alford v. Rowell, supra. Where and what, pray tell me, is the distinction, as respects right to the relief, between a declaration that one is entitled to specific performance and a decree awarding one specific performance? Here we have it in double portion. The decree declares plaintiff “entitled to specific performance.” It “awards specific performance” of this very contract. Note its language: “It is ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: “1. That the defendant Marian Volney Henderson be, and she hereby is, ordered to execute and place in escrow with the defendant Rocky Mountain Finance Corporation a conveyance adequate to transfer merchantable title to the following described property (Description omitted) to the plaintiffs upon their full performance of their duties under the real estate contract attached to the Complaint herein as Exhibit ‘A’; * * * ” The majority lean on a slender reed, indeed, for support when they find any in this attempted distinction. In my opinion, the decree ordering sper cific performance of the contract to convey community real estate, signed by- the husband alone, is inherently and fundamentally ■' erroneous and should be reversed. The majority holding otherwise and affirming, ’T dissent. LUJAN, J., concurs.