Court Opinion

ID: 9636955
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:50:42.390609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:51.639500
License: Public Domain

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Wade, hereinafter called petitioner, and one Cooper were charged with rape in violation of the 92nd-Article of War.1 They •were tried jointly by a General Court-Martial constituted by the Commanding General of the 76th Infantry Division. The Court-Martial convened at Pfalzfeld, Germany, a town 22 miles from Krov, on March 27, 1945. Both the prosecution and defense presented testimony and rested.. After the arguments had been presented, the case was submitted. After the Court-Martial had entered upon a consideration of its verdict, it announced that the case *977would be reopened for the production of additional witnesses with respect to the identity of the accused.2
Thus, it will he seen that the sole reason for reopening and continuing the case was the-absence of witnesses.
Thereafter, on April 3, 1945, the Commanding General of the 76th Infantry Division dissolved the Court-Martial and transmitted the charges and allied papers in the case to the Commanding General of the Third United States Army with the recommendation that the charges be tried by General Court-Martial. In the letter of transmittal set forth below,3 the Commanding General of the 76th Infantry Division stated that the case had been previously referred for trial by General Court-Martial which had entered on the trial; that two witnesses were unable to be present and the case had been continued so their testimony could be obtained; that due to the tactical situation, the distance to the residence of such witnesses had become so great that the case could not be completed within a reasonable time. Thus, it will be seen that the reason the Court-Martial was dissolved and the case transferred was the inability to produce conveniently the absent witnesses. There is no suggestion in the letter of transmittal or in the record here that the members of the Court-Martial were unable to proceed with the trial or that, the trial could not be completed by such Court-Martial because of the tactical situation. Had the witnesses been there present, there seenis to be no doubt that the trial co.uld have been completed by such Court-Martial. Hence, its dissolution was due solely to the absence of witnesses for the prosecution.
No further action was taken until April 18, 1945, when the Commanding General of the Third United States Army transferred the charge to the Commanding General of the 15th United States Army. On April 26, 1945, the Commanding General of the 15th United States Army constituted a General Court-Martial at Bad Neuenalir, Germany, a town approximately 40 miles from Krov, on June 30, 1945. Petitioner interposed a plea of double jeopardy. It was overruled. The trial proceeded, resulting in the conviction of petitioner and the acquittal of Cooper.
The record in petitioner’s case was submitted for review to the Staff Judge Advocate, 15th Army, pursuant to Article of War 46.4 That reviewing authority, in a written opinion, held the record of trial legally sufficient, but recommended that the sentence be reduced, in view of petitioner’s combat record. The Commanding General, 15th United States Army, approved the sentence, but reduced the period of confinement to 20 years. In compliance with the provisions of Article of War 50-1/2,5 petitioner’s records were transmitted to the Branch Office of the Trial Judge Advocate in the European Theater of Operations for review. Board of Review No. 4 in that office concluded that the record of trial was legally insufficient on the ground that petitioners plea of double jeopardy should have' been sustained. The basis of that Bo.ard’s finding was that the absence of *978witnesses did not come within the purview of the “imperious necessity” rule.
In further compliance with Article of War 50-i/¿, the record was forwarded to the Staff Judge Advocate General of the Branch Office, who dissented from the holding of the Board of Review on the ground that the decision of the Commanding General of the 76th Infantry Division that “a tactical situation made the attainment of the witnesses impractical and precluded prompt disposition of the case,” was a determination which fell within the doctrine of imperious necessity. The case then passed to the Commanding General, United States Army, European Theater, under the provisions of Article of War 50-i^. He upheld the conviction.
Petitioner, being confined under the sentence in the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, filed his application for a writ of habeas corpus. The trial court granted the writ and discharged petitioner from custody.
Where a case is tried to a court, jeopardy attaches when the accused has been ■ indicted and arraigned, has pleaded, and the court has begun to hear evidence.6
Jeopardy undoubtedly attached unless the discontinuance of the trial, the withdrawal of the charges from, and the dissolution of, the first 'Court-Martial were justified under the “imperious necessity” rule.
To justify the discharge of a jury or other fact-finding body before verdict under the doctrine of imperious necessity, the reasons therefor must be emergent, urgent, and manifestly compelling.7 It is a power which should be exercised with caution and only under urgent circumstances.8
The causes for which a. jury may be discharged before verdict are stated in Wharton’s Criminal Law, 12th Ed., Vol. 1, § 395, as follows: “ * * * The only causes for which a jury impaneled and sworn to try an accused on a criminal charge can be discharged by the court without a verdict are: (1) Consent of the prisoner; (2) illness of (a) one of the jurors, (b) the prisoner, or (c) the court; (3) absence of a juryman; (4) impossibility of the jurors agreeing on a verdict; (5) some untoward accident that renders a verdict impossible; and (6) extreme and overwhelming physical or legal necessity. * * * ”
Under the weight of authority, the absence of a witness or witnesses for the prosecution does not constitute grounds for the discharge of the jury under the doctrine of imperious necessity.9
When a prosecutor enters upon a trial, knowing that material witnesses for the prosecution cannot be produced, he takes the chance that his proof may fail, and he is not entitled to have the jury discharged in order to afford him an opportunity to produce the witnesses at a second trial; and the court may not of its own motion discharge the jury because of the absence of witnesses for the prosecution.10
*979Since it is my opinion that the sole reason the trial was adjourned, the charges withdrawn, and the Court-Martial dissolved was the absence of witnesses for the prosecution, it is my conclusion that the Commanding General of the 76th Infantry Division was not justified in dissolving the Court-Martial under the doctrine of imperious necessity.
It follows that when petitioner was subjected to the trial before the second Court-Martial, he was placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense in contravention of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The denial of his plea of former jeopardy may be raised in a proceeding on habeas corpus.11
For the reasons indicated, I respectfully dissent.

 10 U.S.C.A. § 1564.

 “Law Member: The Court desires that further witnesses be called into the case, and to allow time to secure these witnesses, this case will be continued. We would like to have as witnesses brought before the Court, the parents of this person making the accusation, Rosa Glowsky, and also the sister-in-law that was in the room who could further assist in the identification or identity of the accused. The Court will be continued until a later date set by the T. [rial] J. [udge] A. [dvocate].
The Court then, at 1700 o’clock, p. m., 27 March, 1045, adjourned to meet at the call of the President.”

 “1. The charges and allied papers in the case of Pfc. Frederick W. Wade, 39208980, Co. K, 385th Inf., are transmitted Ixerewitb with a recommendation of trial by general court-max-tial. The case was previously referred for trial by general court-martial and trial was commenced. Two witnesses, the mother and father of the victim of the alleged rape, were unable to be present due to sickness, and the Court continued the case so that their testimony could be obtained. Due to the tactical situation the distance to the residence of such witnesses has become so great that the case cannot be completed within a reasonable time.”

 10 U.S.C.A. § 1517, and Par. 87(b), Manual for Courts-Martial.

 10 U.S.C.A. § 1522.

 McCarthy v. Zerbst, 10 Cir., 85 F.2d 640, 642, and cases there cited; Clawans v. Rives, 70 App.D.C. 107, 104 F.2d 240, 242, 122 A.L.R. 1436; Daniels v. State, 55 Okl.Cr. 298, 29 P.2d 997, 998.

 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165; Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148, 153, 12 S.Ct. 171, 35 L.Ed. 968 ; Klock v. People, 2 Parker Cr.R., N.Y., 676, 683, 684; People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, N.Y., 304, 308, 2 Am. Dec. 239; United States v. Watson, D.C.N.Y., Fed.Cas.No.16,651; Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109,15 A. 466, 467, 1 L.R.A. 451, 6 Am.St.Rep. 757; Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593, 120 Am.St. Rep. 188, 10 Ann.Cas. 1085; Baker v. Commonwealth, 280 Ky. 165, 132 S.W.2d 766, 767, 125 A.L.R. 691; State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So. 2d 484.

 In United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 165, the court said: “ * * the power ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and in capital cases especially, courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favor of the prisoner.”

 Cornero v. United States, 9 Cir., 48 F.2d 69, 73, 74 A.L.R. 797; Pizano v. State, 20 Tex.App. 139, 54 Am.Rep. 511; Allen v. State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593, 120 Am.St.Rep. 188, 10 Ann.Cas. 1085; United States v. Watson, D.C., Fed.Cas.No. 16,651; State v. Richardson, 47 S.C. 166, 25 S.E. 220, 35 L.R.A. 238; State ex rel. Meador v. Williams, 117 Mo.App. 564, 92 S.W. 151, 152; Note, 74 A.L.R. 803.

 State ex rel. Manning v. Himes, 153 Fla. 711, 15 So.2d 613, 615; People ex *979rel. Stabile v. Warden of City Prison, 202 N.Y. 138, 95 N.E. 729, 733; People v. Barrett, 2 Caines, N.Y., 304, 308, 2 Am.Dec. 239.

 Clawans v. Rives, 70 App.D.C. 107, 104 F.2d 240, 244, 122 A.L.R. 1436; Bens v. United States, 2 Cir., 266 P. 152, 157.