Court Opinion

ID: 9467395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:47:50.466302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:19.668379
License: Public Domain

*494SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the actions of the prison authorities violated Hayes’ due process rights and that he is therefore entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief. I must respectfully dissent, however, from that part of the opinion which holds the defendants to be immune from monetary damages under the doctrine of Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), and Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 98 S.Ct. 855, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). The prison officials are not entitled to immunity
if the constitutional right allegedly infringed by them was clearly established at the time of their conduct, if they knew or should have known of that right, and if they knew or should have known that their conduct violated the constitutional norm.
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562, 98 S.Ct. 855, 860, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). The facts in the record indicate that all three of these criteria are met in this case.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), predated the actions of the Institutional Adjustment Committee by ten months. That decision clearly established the right of a prisoner to a “ ‘written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons’ for the disciplinary action.” Id. at 564, 98 S.Ct. at 861, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972).1 The Illinois Department of Corrections incorporated this requirement in its Administrative Regulation No. 804 (II)(B)(9), which provided, inter alia, “it will not be sufficient for the committee’s decision to simply adopt and copy the exact wording of the Resident Information Report.”2 The majority admits that two of the three Committee members testified at the trial that they were familiar with Wolff and that all three knew the requirements of Regulation 804. They knew also that the regulation encompassed all relevant federal and state law. Nonetheless, they ignored the dictates of Wolff and their own regulation and provided Hayes only with a statement that he was guilty “based on the violation report as written and upon the report by the special investigator.”
The language of the quoted provision of the administrative regulation is quite clear that the Committee must state its own conclusions and not merely incorporate by reference previous internal reports. I can see little difference between reliance upon only Warden Wolff’s Resident Information Report and upon an outside investigator’s report — a distinction upon which the majority bases its entire decision not to award damages. Supra, p. 484. The Committee did not spell out on its own its reason for the decision; that is precisely the constitutional infringement against which Wolff and Regulation 804 were designed to protect. Similarly, the provision of a transcript of the hearing does little to inform the prisoner of the reasons for the decision. It is unreasonable to believe that the Committee did not know they were violating the regulation when it did no more than refer to others’ reports. Under the test enunciated in Navarette, they are therefore not entitled to immunity.
I must also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Warden Wolff is not liable for failing properly to supervise and to in*495struct the Committee members. The law in this circuit is clear that section 1983 liability extends to persons on the basis of the roles as supervisors. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1979), citing Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969). The warden appointed the members of the Committee, and it was his responsibility to ensure that they understood and complied with the requirements of Wolff. He testified at trial that he knew in May, 1975, that committee members had failed in the past to comply with procedural requirements. His failure to remedy this situation led to the deprivation of Hayes’ rights in this case, and the warden must therefore be held liable.3
The majority’s decision encourages official ignorance of the law. Prison authorities may claim, as they did in this case, that they mistakenly believed they were fulfilling the requirements announced in Wolff. It should be no defense to suggest, as defendants did at trial, that no one had explained Wolff to them. “A prison official may not take solace in ostrichism.” Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932, 98 S.Ct. 1507, 55 L.Ed.2d 530 (1978). The Supreme Court’s language in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), is as applicable to prison authorities as it was to school officials:
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right, but an act violating a student’s constitutional rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of settled, indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with supervision of students’ daily lives by the presence of actual malice.
Id. at 321, 95 S.Ct. at 994. Ignorance of the law is never an excuse, and the majority should not permit prison officials so to abdicate their responsibility to learn it.
The facts in the record indicate that the decision of the district court was clearly erroneous. The standard prescribed by the Supreme Court in Navarette is one of objective good faith. It is unreasonable for the Committee not to have known that they were denying Hayes his right to a meaningful statement of reasons for his disciplinary action. Their subjective intent to apply Wolff properly, upon which the district court based its decision,4 is irrelevant under an objective good faith standard. In view of the specific requirement in Regulation 804 not merely to refer to the prior investigative report, the Committee could not reasonably believe they were complying with the law when they did just that. Although courts of appeals should not redetermine facts de novo upon appellate review, when the facts in the record below themselves indicate that the decision of the district court was clearly erroneous, the decision must be overturned.
The Supreme Court held in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), that a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for violation of due process rights upon proof of injury, including mental and emotional distress. Hayes testified at trial regarding his mental and *496emotional distress resulting from the denial of his due process rights. Furthermore, he suffered damages as a result of confinement in segregation both prior to and following the hearing. Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22, 28 (7th Cir. 1978); Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 233 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916, 99 S.Ct. 1234, 59 L.Ed.2d 466 (1979). His transfer to State-ville Prison caused further injury.
I would therefore reverse the decision of the district court in toto and, in addition to the ruling of the majority, remand for a new trial on the question of damages.

. Our holding in Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959, 98 S.Ct. 491, 54 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977) (Hayes I), did not extend that of Wolff or require any more than did the Supreme Court. Both decisions required a statement of reasons that was meaningful both to the prisoner and to reviewing courts. At the time of the Committee’s actions in this case, it was “clearly established” that a cursory statement such as the one provided to Hayes was constitutionally insufficient. In contrast, the requirement of a detailed statement of reasons for the denial of a witness request was left open by the Supreme Court in Wolff and only established in this circuit in Hayes I. The defendants could not therefore be held liable for their failure to provide such a statement. 'Majority op., supra, pp. 490-491.

. The full text of this provision is quoted in the majority’s opinion, supra, n. 3 at p. 487.

. The cases of Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), and Chapman v. Pickett, 586 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1978), in which supervisory officials were held not liable, are clearly distinguishable from the present case. In those cases, no causal connection was shown to exist between the misconduct and any act or omission by the supervisors. Here, on the other hand, Warden Wolff’s failure to educate the Committee members on the rights of inmates at disciplinary hearings was a direct cause of the denial of due process to Hayes.

. The court below adopted virtually verbatim the findings proposed by defendants. Although the majority states that the same “clearly erroneous” standard is to be applied, supra, p. 490, the wholesale adoption of proposed findings creates a greater likelihood that the decision is erroneous. Such an action indicates a lack of adequate consideration by the court of all the issues involved in the case. The majority admits that such findings should be examined more critically to determine whether they are clearly erroneous, Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 731 (7th Cir. 1979); FS Services, Inc. v. Custom Farm Services, Inc., 471 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1972), but its opinion fails to do so. The majority opinion interprets every vague finding favorably towards the defendants. That is not the critical review of which we spoke in our earlier decisions.