Court Opinion

ID: 9699906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:55:54.846364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:59.796326
License: Public Domain

*189
Eldridge, J.,

dissenting:

As a result of the trial court’s proceedings in the instant case, the guilt of the defendants has been determined, and they have been subjected to a probation order, described by the Supreme Court as “an authorized mode of mild and ambulatory punishment, the probation intended as a reforming discipline.” (Emphasis supplied.) Korematsu v. United States, 319 U. S. 432, 435, 63 S. Ct. 1124, 87 L.Ed.2d 1497 (1943).
The defendants desire appellate review of the proceedings which led to the imposition of this probation order, but the majority concludes that the rights of the defendants are not sufficiently “settled” to give the judgment the finality requisite for the purposes of appeal. The majority relies on the fact that after the defendants have undergone the punishment and discipline of the probation order for the required period of time, the proceedings against them will be dismissed without a “judgment of conviction,” and on the fact that a violation of the terms of the order may result in an entry of a “judgment of conviction” and the imposition of still harsher penalties.
I fail to understand how these subsequent events to which the majority refers change the posture of this case with regard to the bringing of an appeal. Guilt has been determined and discipline imposed. To fasten upon the fact that the proceedings will be dismissed upon what the majority euphemistically refers to as “successful completion of probation” ignores the reality that the probation order itself restricts freedom and imposes discipline, and that “when discipline has been imposed, the defendant is entitled to review.” Korematsu v. United States, supra, 319 U. S. at 434.
The test for finality relied upon by the majority is that set forth long ago by the Court in Boteler & Belt v. State, 7 G. & J. 109, 112-113 (1835):
“[N]o appeal can be prosecuted to this Court, until a decision has been had in the Court below, which is so far final, as to settle and conclude the rights of *190the party involved in the action, or denying to the party the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit.”
And later (7 G. & J. at 113):
“It is time enough for a party to apply to this Court for redress when it is ascertained that he is to be injured by the judgment of which he complains.”
In the instant case, the entry of the order of probation has “settle[d] and conclude[d]” the matter of the defendants’ guilt and whether a sanction should be imposed upon them. Instead of continuing to defend against the State’s charges, the defendants must undergo the penalty of probation. At the present time, they are “injured by the judgment” of probation. Consequently, the standard for finality enunciated in Boteler & Belt v. State, supra, and in the subsequent decisions by this Court, is clearly met here. The determinations of guilt and the orders imposing the obligations and restrictions incident to probation constitute, within the meaning of Code (1974), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, “final judgments” from which appeals may be taken.
The majority also relies on what it perceives to be the legislative intention embodied in the language of controlling statutes. Section 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides that appeals only lie from final judgments entered in the District Court, while Code (1957, 1976 Cum. Supp.), Art. 27, § 292 (b) stays “the entering of the judgment of guilt.” (Emphasis supplied.) The majority concludes that if this “entering of the judgment of guilt” has been stayed, there has been no judgment entered from which an appeal can be taken. This conclusion, however, ignores the fact that the order of probation, which is also a “final judgment,” is duly entered.
An examination of the statutory scheme shows that the statutory language relied upon furnishes no basis for the majority’s conclusion. The defendants were determined to have committed an act in violation of Code (1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 287 (a). For such violation, § 287 (e) provides for *191the imposition of a sentence of up to one year’s imprisonment or a fine of up to $1,000, or both. The effect of Code (1976 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 292 (b), is to authorize the staying of an entry of a judgment of guilt under § 287 (e), and, instead, enter a judgment under the terms of § 292 (b), providing for the lesser punishment of probation and, in some circumstances, treatment for drug abuse. Section 292 (b) merely provides for an alternative penalty or punishment. Under the terms of § 292 (b), if the probation order is violated, a judgment of guilt under § 287 may then be entered, but there can be no question that the probation order entered by the court, statutorily possible only upon a determination of guilt by the trial court, constitutes a judgment “entered” by the court.
An analogous statutory scheme was before this Court in Pritchett v. State, 140 Md. 310, 117 A. 763 (1922), and the Court held that an appeal would lie from the imposition of the lesser alternative penalty. That case involved an appeal from a conviction for non-support under then Art. 27, § 75. The statute provided in pertinent part that upon conviction of non-support, a defendant
“shall be punished by a fine ... or imprisonment . . . provided, that ... after conviction, instead of imposing the punishment hereinbefore provided . . . the court in its discretion . . . shall have the power to pass an order . . . directing the defendant to pay a certain sum weekly for the space of one year to the wife, and to release the defendant from custody on probation for the space of one year. ... If the court be satisfied . . . that the defendant has violated the terms of such order, it may forthwith . . . sentence him under the original conviction.”
In Pritchett, a defendant was convicted under this statute, and an order to make weekly payments and releasing the defendant on probation was entered. The defendant took an appeal, and the Court, denying a motion to dismiss the *192appeal on the ground that there was no final judgment, stated (140 Md. at 316, emphasis supplied):
“The obligation imposed upon the defendant, by the order of the court, to pay to his wife a certain sum of money weekly for the space of one year, instead of the imposition of a fine or imprisonment, or both, as first provided in the act, is in the nature of an alternative penalty or punishment . .. and it would be going very far, we think, to hold that the defendant had no right of appeal from the order or judgment of the court, imposing upon him such pecuniary obligation on the ground that it was not a final judgment, when no other punishment could thereafter have been imposed upon him, unless he had failed to comply with the terms of the order.”
The issue in Pritchett v. State, supra, seems to me indistinguishable in principle from that in the instant case, and we should adhere to the holding in that case.
Although not relied on by the majority, it was also argued by the State that even if the judgment is final, the defendants are nonetheless estopped from an appeal inasmuch as they “consented” to the entry of the order of probation.
While there is authority in other states for the proposition that consent to a probation order, when the alternative is incarceration, constitutes a concession of the correctness of the trial court’s judgment, courts have recently moved away from this theory, noting the obvious coercion under the circumstances. A leading case holding that no appeal lies from the entry of a probation order, Brooks v. State, 51 Ariz. 544, 78 P. 2d 498, 117 A.L.R. 925 (1938), was recently overruled in State v. Heron, 92 Ariz. 114, 115, 374 P. 2d 871 (1962), the court stating:
“The policy . . . seems to be that the defendant should be grateful he is not behind bars .... This Court does not take so harsh an attitude.”
*193In similar circumstances, in State v. Longmore, 178 Neb. 509, 514, 134 N.W.2d 66 (1965), the Nebraska court stated:
“Historically, the attitude was that a defendant who asked for and accepted probation, had conceded his guilt and thrown himself on the mercy of the court. Under modern probation provisions and procedures, and our present judicial administration, it would be straining logic to the utmost to assume that where the accused asked for probation, he received it only because of the request. It is almost more difficult to contend that after probation is granted and the order entered, it was not really a judicial determination by the court, but was, instead, inspired by the defendant, and was made with an implied condition that he waives his right to appeal by accepting. Such an historical position ignores the realities of the situation.”
Consent to a judgment in a civil case has often been held to bar an appellant from maintaining an appeal, and this principle was recently applied to the State’s attempted appeal in a criminal case where the State had deliberately and voluntarily consented to the judgment. Lohss and Sprenkle v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118-119, 321 A. 2d 534 (1974), and cases there cited. However, the circumstances where this principle has been applied are much different from those in the instant case. Here, the “consent” is routinely mandated in all cases involving a judgment of probation under Art. 27, § 292 (b), by the statutory language itself. It is clearly not a voluntary consent but one coerced by the alternative of fine and imprisonment. Therefore, I would reject the State’s argument that the statutorily required consent bars the appeal.
In sum, the District Court’s determination that the defendants were guilty of a criminal act and the court’s imposition of the penalty of probation, constituted “final judgments” for purposes of appeal. The entry of these probation orders under Art. 27, § 292 (b), being one of the *194alternative punishments provided by the criminal code, fully met the statutory requirement that an appeal be “from a final judgment entered in the District Court.” Section 12-401 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Nothing in the statutory language warrants the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature intended that criminal defendants be denied a right to appeal a judgment of probation under § 292 (b). Under the majority’s holding, a defendant who is found guilty and placed on probation under § 292 (b), who must pay the court costs as the instant defendants did, and who successfully complies with the numerous conditions of probation which interfere with his rights as a free citizen, can never have appellate review of the trial court’s proceedings and judgment. I cannot believe that the Maryland General Assembly, which has consistently provided defendants with one absolute right of appeal in criminal cases, intended any such result.