Court Opinion

ID: 9632837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:26:03.765707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:16.337959
License: Public Domain

McFarland, J.,
dissenting: The Court of Appeals decision in this case (5 Kan. App. 2d 584) unequivocally states:
“Where proceedings are brought for an adjudication that a child is deprived, due process requires that the parent or parents, if indigent, must have counsel appointed to represent them at a deprived child hearing.” Syl. ¶ 4.
The majority opinion of this court, in ostensibly reversing said opinion, holds:
“Constitutional due process requires the State to appoint counsel for an indigent parent in a deprived child hearing under K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 38-817 whenever the parent, unable to present his or her case properly, faces a substantial possibility of loss of custody and permanent severance of parental rights or of prolonged separation from the child.” Syl. ¶ 4.
This syllabus appears to dilute or condition the absolute pronouncement of the intermediate appellate court, but knowledge of juvenile court proceedings and careful reading of the opinion reveals both decisions have the same practical result — judges presiding over deprived child proceedings will feel compelled to appoint counsel for parents in all such proceedings. Deprived child proceedings are seldom “one shot” actions. Occasionally, there is a case such as a factual situation involving a badly injured *70child and witnesses to testify they saw the parents intentionally injure the child — but this is the exception. Generally, severance cases are cumulative with nonseverance deprived child cases.
A more common scenario is the following: (1) An SRS social worker sees a child who is not advancing physically or mentally; (2) the social worker counsels parents on how to care for the child, but time passes and the child does not improve; (3) the social worker turns the matter over to the court and the child is placed in foster care while the court investigates; (4) the court ultimately finds the child deprived and a program is set up for parental counseling, psychiatric treatment, etc., in order for the parents to again have the child; (5) the child improves in foster care — is now walking, speaking, and toilet trained; (6) the child is returned to parents; (7) the social worker notices the child’s progress has stopped and disintegration has set in — after a while the child is no longer speaking, walking, or toilet trained; (8) the child is put back in foster care where it dramatically improves, and parents are counseled; (9) the child is returned to parents where it again disintegrates; (10) the child is put back in foster care where it rapidly improves; (11) severance proceedings are commenced and an attorney is appointed for parents; (12) at the trial, of necessity, virtually all the evidence consists of the parents’ past failures and their effect on the child; and (13) severance is granted on the previously established facts and the realistic future prognosis.
The majority opinion herein states:
“Under our statutory scheme, there are no assurances that a determination that a child is deprived will not later be used to support a decree to permanently sever parental rights, if the parents were afforded due process rights at the initial hearing. Indeed, in the present case, the journal entry contains an admonition to respondent that such proceedings would be initiated if the mother did not improve her conduct. The determination that the child is deprived and the evidence underlying that determination under certain circumstances may not be admissible against the parents in a severance proceeding, if the parents were not afforded due process rights. The parents’ representation by counsel at a termination proceeding will not alone satisfy due process or equal protection requirements if the trial court relies on evidence introduced at a deprived proceeding at which the indigent parent had not been afforded counsel. A proceeding to determine whether a child is deprived, as the Court of Appeals concluded, may be a ‘critical stage’ in the ultimate determination of the parents’ rights in a severance proceeding. The potential impact of the ‘deprived hearing’ on the parents’ rights should be considered by the court in assessing the extent and nature of the *71parents’ interest in the proceeding, and the extent of the due process requirements necessary to protect the interest.”
What message does the majority opinion send to juvenile court judges? Appoint counsel in all deprived child cases in order to be sure children will not suffer later from your failure to do so.
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 38-820 requires the appointment of counsel in deprived child cases if severance is sought. No statutory requirement exists for the appointment of counsel in deprived child cases where severance is not sought. Unless some constitutional provision requires the appointment of counsel in such cases, any change is a matter of policy to be determined by the legislature. The majority based its modifications of the statutory law on the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as did the Court of Appeals.
The interpretation placed on the Constitution and laws of the United States by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States is controlling upon state courts and must be followed. Murray v. State, 226 Kan. 26, Syl. ¶ 1, 596 P.2d 805 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has recently spoken on the issue before us in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981). In Lassiter the mother’s parental rights were terminated (comparable to a severence proceeding), while she was not represented by counsel. Bear in mind that Kansas by statute requires appointment of counsel in termination proceedings and that we are concerned in this case with appointment of counsel in a nonseverance deprived child proceeding.
The rationale of the Lassiter court was as follows:
“In sum, the Court’s precedents speak with one voice about what ‘fundamental fairness’ has meant when the Court has considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that all the other elements in the due process decision must be measured.
“The case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, propounds three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires, viz., the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions. We must balance these elements against each other, and then set their net weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.” (pp. 26-27.)
The court went on to discuss the various elements in consider*72able detail, noting that in termination proceedings the State has sought not simply to infringe upon interest (parental interest in the child), but to end it. The Lassiter opinion is lengthy and may be summarized as follows:
(1) The due process clause does not establish an absolute right to the appointment of counsel for representation of indigent parents who are parties to termination proceedings;
(2) In a particular case where complex expert medical or psychiatric testimony is introduced and the parents are severely handicapped in their ability to comprehend same, due process might require appointment of counsel; and
(3) Absent such a unique combination of circumstances, appointment of counsel in termination cases is a matter of legislative policy and not constitutionally mandated.
The Lassiter court noted in its conclusion:
“In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial proceedings are fundamentally fair. A wise public policy, however, may require that higher standards be adopted than those minimally tolerable under the Constitution. Informed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings as well. [Citations omitted.] Most significantly, 33 States and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. The Court’s opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasingly urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by the States are other than enlightened and wise.” (pp. 33-34)
It follows that even in the strongest case the “net weight” of considerations affecting appointment of counsel for indigent parents in deprived nonseverance proceedings would not “tip the scales” against the presumption of appointed counsel.
The issue of whether counsel should be appointed for indigent parents in deprived child nonseverance cases is unquestionably a matter of policy to be determined by the legislature — not a constitutional requirement to be engrafted upon our law by judicial fiat.
The majority’s incorrect decision has enormous potential for harm. It affects severance cases to be tried in the future, which are based on old nonseverance deprived child facts. Perhaps even more importantly, it casts long shadows of invalidity on many closed severance cases and their resulting adoptions.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals and hold there is no *73constitutional right for appointment of counsel in nonseverance deprived child cases.
In closing, it is noted that appointment of a guardian ad litem for the juvenile in juvenile court proceedings is mandatory by statute in Kansas. Such an attorney is independent of the prosecutor and is charged with protecting the child’s interest in the proceedings. This provides an additional safeguard against error.
Schroeder, C.J. and Miller, J., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.