Court Opinion

ID: 9479460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:19:18.028363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:03.591594
License: Public Domain

TANG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I agree that the economic layoff agreement was sufficient to waive Stroman’s Title VII claims. I dissent, however, from the majority’s factual determination that Stroman waived his Title VII rights knowingly and voluntarily.
When an appellate court determines that a lower court made findings based upon an erroneous view of the law, the appellate court may not make contrary findings but must remand for new findings to be made in the light of the correct rule of law. Pullman-Standard, v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982). This is not a game where an incorrect understanding of the law by the fact finder results in automatic granting of relief. Such a rule would require inefficient use of limited resources because the district court would have to make factual determinations in every case regardless of whether they are needed.
The only exception to that rule is if “the record permits only one resolution of the factual issue”. Id. citing Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 331-332, 95 S.Ct. 472, 479-80, 42 L.Ed.2d 498 (1974). The majority presumes that Stroman waived his Title VII rights knowingly and voluntarily but I do not believe that the record permits only one conclusion as to this matter.
I would therefore remand for a determination as to whether the waiver of Title VII rights was made knowingly and voluntarily. It is the fact-finder, not us, who should determine these issues in the first instance.