Court Opinion

ID: 9498480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:18:36.857959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:51.360233
License: Public Domain

MELLOY and HEANEY, Circuit Judges,
Concurring.
We concur in the majority’s opinion because we agree that United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir.1989), directly controls on the facts of the present case. We write separately to note our disagreement with Peterson. We do not believe a defendant should be subjected to multiple convictions and multiple punishments under § 922(g) for a single act of possession that involves a firearm and ammunition. Id. at 1115. We also do not believe a defendant such as Mr. Richardson, who satisfies more than one defendant characteristic subsection of § 922(g), should be subjected to multiple convictions for the possession of a single firearm. Id. Unless and until our en banc court overrules Peterson, however, we are bound to uphold multiple convictions and multiple punishments in cases such as these.
In United States v. Walker, 380 F.3d 391, 394 (8th Cir.2004), a panel of our court applied Peterson to hold that a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm and ammunition for that firearm comprised two separate offenses. In so holding, we noted a conflict between Peterson and two earlier Eighth Circuit cases, United States v. Powers, 572 F.2d 146 (8th Cir.1978), and United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665 (8th Cir.1975). In those earlier cases, panels of our court held that the simultaneous possession or receipt of multiple firearms could only result in a single conviction and punishment. Powers, 572 F.2d at 150-52; Kinsley, 518 F.2d at 670. In Walker, we concluded that we were bound to apply Peterson because Peterson was directly on point and the earlier cases had been decided under different firearms statutes. Walker, 380 F.3d at 395.
We noted in Walker that all other circuits had addressed the issue and reached the opposite result. Id. at 393. The conflict between Peterson and the earlier Eighth Circuit cases and the conflict between Peterson and the opinions from the other circuits arose largely because the court in Peterson had applied the “same elements” test from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), to find that § 922(g) permitted multiple convictions. The other circuits, like the panels in Powers and Kinsley had applied the “unit of prosecution” test from Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), to conclude that Congress intended the “allowable unit of prosecution” to be an incident of possession regardless of whether a defendant satisfied more than one § 922(g) classification, possessed more than one firearm, or possessed a firearm and ammunition. We believe that the po*1135sition adopted by the other circuits is correct and should be the law in our circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Romo, 989 F.2d 757, 759 (5th Cir.1993) (“We are satisfied that Congress intended to describe only a single crime that could be committed by seven types of offenders. Thus, the Blockburger rule is not controlling”).
Although the government today argues that multiple convictions are permitted for a single act of possession, it has taken the opposite position before other courts, including the Supreme Court. In United States v. Munoz-Romo, 947 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir.1991), the Fifth Circuit held that convictions under § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession) and § 922(g)(5) (illegal alien in possession) based on a single instance of possession were not multiplicitous. When the defendant in that case petitioned the Supreme Court to grant certiorari, the Solicitor General confessed error and asked the Supreme Court to remand to the Fifth Circuit to vacate one of the two convictions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded for further consideration.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit quoted from the Solicitor General’s brief to the Supreme Court. Munoz-Romo, 989 F.2d at 759. Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General argued that the structure and language of the statute demonstrated “Congress’s clear intent not to impose cumulative punishments when the same incident violates two subdivisions of subsection (g).” Id. (quoting the government’s brief to the Supreme Court).5 The Fifth Circuit adopted the position urged by the defendant and the government and directed the district court to vacate one of the convictions. Id. The government’s position and the result achieved in the Fifth Circuit are completely at odds with the government’s position in the present case.
Suffice it to say, we are concerned by the government’s inconsistent approach in its interpretation of § 922(g). While it is fundamental that a party may advance arguments in the alternative, we do not believe that, as a general matter, it is appropriate for the government to advance diametrically opposed theories as to the interpretation of a single criminal statute. This is especially true in the present context, where the government’s change of position effectively caused the Supreme Court to forgo the opportunity to review a circuit split on an issue of constitutional significance. Nevertheless, because our court has not addressed this issue en banc, we are bound by Peterson and we concur.

. The Solicitor General's position was essentially the same as that of the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601 (11th Cir.1990). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit noted that if a court were to permit multiple convictions for a single act of possession under. § 922, "a convicted felon who is also a fugitive from justice, a drug addict, a 'mental defective,’ and an illegal alien could be sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment for the same incident, namely the possession of a firearm.” Id. at 607. In the Eighth Circuit, because Peterson would also permit separate convictions based upon the possession of ammunition, a single incident of possession that involved a loaded weapon or a defendant in possession of a firearm with a single bullet in his or her pocket, could result in ten or more punishments for the same incident. We do not believe Congress intended such a result.