Court Opinion

ID: 9524941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:58:42.073495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:21.810732
License: Public Domain

ROBB, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent because the majority's analysis of Nye's third argument appears to elevate form over substance, which goes against Indiana's record of decrying legal arguments that do so in various contexts. Seq, e.g., State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Lake Superior Court, 820 N.E.2d 1240, 1252 (Ind.2005) (Indiana Supreme Court explains it was "unwilling to fortify the armory of those who attack the law as famous for its ability to elevate form over substance" in a matter regarding assessment of county property taxes); Azania v. State, 730 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ind.2000) (declining to elevate form over substance of argument that death penalty was based on *779invalid indictment); Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ind.1986) (declining to elevate form over substance by interpreting the statutory definition of felony murder as requiring the commission of the homicide before the elements of robbery are met); Kocher v. Getz, 844 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (refusing to elevate form over substance on a question of standing); Nienaber v. Marriage of Nienaber, 787 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (refusing to elevate form over substance with respect to the use of the term "cireumstance" rather than "factor" for purposes of custody modification); Key v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1190, 1192 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (refusing to elevate form over substance in determining that evidence obtained from breath test could be admitted); Brenneman Mechanical & Elec., Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Logansport, 495 N.E.2d 233, 241-42 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) (refusing to elevate form over substance in question of renewal of pre-existing debt where bank was conferred lien priority); Glennar Mercury-Lincoln, Inc. v. Riley, 167 Ind.App. 144, 154, 338 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1975) (refusing to elevate form over substance where service of process was sufficient to satisfy due process and obtain in personam jurisdiction).
I acknowledge Indiana's recognition of the difference between conditions and limitations, as well as the importance of classifying language in an instrument transferring property as either a limitation, marking the period that determines an estate, or a condition, rendering an estate liable to defeat. However, the distinction is only drawn where it is logical to do so, which is not presently the case. Here, the clause "or until he remarries" is a restraint of marriage, and void in light of public policy against such restraints. Regardless of how the instrument is worded, or whether the restrictive language is classified as a condition or a limitation, Lynn gets only a life estate. The language of the bequest allowing Lynn "to Continue to live at said real estate as if he had been devised a life estate in said real estate, or until he remarries" makes it clear he does not receive an interest in fee simple. Brief of Appellant at 2. No matter whether he receives a life estate unless he remarries (void as a condition), or whether he may live on the property so long as he does not remarry (a permitted limitation), the "measuring stick" is the life of Lynn, and in either case his interest in the property is shortened by remarriage. Thus, either language produces the same result.
Clearly then, under the present cireum-stances, it should make no difference whether this language is classified as a condition or a limitation because the substance of the clause acts as a restraint of marriage. In other words, the intent behind the use of such a clause-whether to penalize remarriage or to demarcate the period of time an estate shall exist-cannot alter the consequential disincentive to remarry. Under the present cireum-stances, either both versions of the provision are a restraint on marriage, or neither one is. But having two interpretations here, one considered acceptable and the other invalid, makes no sense.