Court Opinion

ID: 9848981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:31:44.514803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:55.963835
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) requires clear pre-trial notice to an accused of all previous convictions that the State intends to introduce during sentencing for recidivist purposes. I further agree that the requirement of the statute is not met simply because defense counsel knows of the existence of the prior convictions. Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 238 (2) (442 SE2d 759) (1994); Gates v. State, 229 Ga. 796, 797 (4) (194 SE2d 412) (1972). The undisputed evidence in this case, however, demonstrates that the State provided West’s lawyer with notice of more than the existence of his client’s prior convictions. Through plea negotiations prior to trial, West’s trial attorney learned of the State’s intent to use the prior convictions at sentencing. Because the prosecutor thereby fulfilled the notice requirement of OCGA § 17-10-2 (a), the trial court would not have been authorized to exclude West’s previous convictions on the ground of untimely notice even had counsel objected thereto. Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object on this meritless ground did not make his performance deficient. Accordingly, I dissent to the reversal of the habeas court’s judgment.
In relevant part, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) provides “that only such evidence in aggravation as the [S]tate has made known to the defendant prior to the defendant’s trial shall be admissible. . . .” This statute does not specify a particular method of giving the required notice. State v. Freeman, 198 Ga. App. 553, 556 (3) (402 SE2d 529) (1991). “Plea bargain negotiations can serve the same pur*595pose as the giving of notice under OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). That statute does not require written notice, only ‘clear notice.’ [Cit.]” Martin v. State, 207 Ga. App. 861, 862 (429 SE2d 332) (1993). See also Mullinax v. State, 242 Ga. App. 561, 563 (2) (530 SE2d 255) (2000). The State provides such clear notice when, in the course of plea negotiations, it either explicitly informs defense counsel that it will introduce prior convictions during sentencing or necessarily implies that it will do so. See Martin v. State, supra at 862. At the habeas hearing here, West’s trial attorney testified that he discussed the case with the assistant district attorney in an effort to negotiate a plea to a charge other than the sale of cocaine, so that West would not face the dire consequence of a life sentence. The majority correctly indicates that defense counsel independently determined that the State could seek a life sentence by introducing West’s prior convictions at sentencing. However, the majority erroneously asserts that the record fails to reflect “that the [S]tate made counsel aware of its intent. . . To the contrary, the transcript reveals that West’s law-. yer gained information regarding the State’s intent during the plea negotiations. He responded affirmatively when asked, “Now, in the context of that negotiation, was it clear to you . . . that if you pled guilty, he would be sentenced to life; am I correct?” (Emphasis supplied.) (T. 44. See also T. 47) Such certitude by defense counsel, especially in the context of plea negotiations, makes no sense unless the prosecutor made it clear that she intended to seek a life sentence, because West could have received such a sentence only through the State’s utilization of a prior conviction. OCGA § 16-13-30 (d); Armstrong v. State, supra at 238 (1).
Decided July 10, 2000.
Tony West, pro se.
Although Martin is not identical to this case, West knew from the plea negotiations prior to trial, just as clearly as did the defendant in Martin, that he faced the possibility of an enhanced sentence. See Martin v. State, supra at 862. Thus, OCGA § 17-10-2 (a) did not require that the State renotify West after the unsuccessful plea negotiations and before the trial began. See Martin v. State, supra at 862-863. Since defense counsel had no viable grounds to seek the exclusion of the prior convictions at sentencing, he did not render ineffective assistance by failing to do so. In my opinion, the habeas court correctly denied relief and, therefore, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.
*596Mark A. Gilbert, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.