Court Opinion

ID: 9384578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 13:10:22.739306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.820981
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Friedman
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia

            ABU JALLOH
                                                                               OPINION BY
            v.     Record No. 0920-22-4                            CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
                                                                              APRIL 4, 2023
            S.W. RODGERS AND
             ARCH INSURANCE COMPANY

                        FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

                           Andrew S. Kasmer for appellant.

                           Kathryn Lea Harman (Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, on brief), for
                           appellees.

                   Abu Jalloh (the claimant) appeals a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission.

            He suffered a compensable injury while working for S.W. Rodgers,1 and the Commission found

            that his treating physician of choice was not authorized under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

            It reasoned that the employer satisfied its obligation under Code § 65.2-603 by making a good

            faith effort to provide a panel of physicians to the claimant and, therefore, that he was not

            authorized to choose his own physician. On appeal, the claimant first argues that the

            Commission erred in concluding that an employer meets its statutory obligation to provide a

            panel if it makes a good faith effort to do so. Second, he challenges the Commission’s finding

            that he was not totally disabled after October 27, 2021. Based on the statutory language, we

            agree with the claimant’s first assignment of error. As a result of this conclusion, we reverse the

                   1
                    S.W. Rodgers’s insurance carrier, Arch Insurance Company, is also a party to this
            appeal. We refer to both appellees collectively as “employer.”
Commission’s decision and remand the case. On remand, the Commission should revisit its

evaluation of the medical evidence of the claimant’s period of disability.

                                          BACKGROUND2

       On June 10, 2021, the claimant fell off a ladder and suffered back, neck, and shoulder

injuries. He promptly notified his supervisor and went home. He did not return to work, and the

employer treated his continued absence as a resignation.

       On June 14, 2021, the company safety officer, Wayne Haight, spoke with the claimant by

telephone. During that conversation, Haight explained that he was trying to get the claimant to

seek medical attention. The claimant stated that he planned to see “his own doctor.” Haight

followed up by visiting the claimant’s home with two copies of a panel list of

employer-approved physicians. The claimant was not home, so Haight spoke with the claimant’s

wife. The wife then called the claimant on the telephone, and Haight spoke to him. Haight told

the claimant he was at the home in order to provide him with a panel of physicians so that he

could choose one from which to seek medical treatment, as required by Code § 65.2-603. The

claimant angrily demanded that Haight leave. Haight offered to meet him in order to provide the

list of physicians, but the claimant declined. Haight left without leaving a copy of the panel list.

It is undisputed that the claimant never received the document providing a panel of physicians.3

       2
         On appeal from a decision of the Commission, “the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below,” on the issues before us, the employer. City of Charlottesville v.
Sclafani, 70 Va. App. 613, 616 (2019) (quoting Anderson v. Anderson, 65 Va. App. 354, 361
(2015)).
       3
          Haight testified that it was not his responsibility to mail a copy of the physicians panel
to the claimant or his counsel, suggesting instead it was the responsibility of the “main office.”
Christopher Butler, a company safety manager, likewise did not provide a panel to the claimant.
Butler testified that he was unsuccessful in contacting the claimant despite calling and emailing
him. Butler further explained that he did not mail or email the claimant a panel of physicians.
Nor did he mail the list to the claimant’s attorney.
                                                  -2-
       The claimant saw his orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Mehrdad Malek, on June 15, 2021, and

continued in his care. Malek diagnosed him with various sprains, strains, and a contusion. In

order to address these injuries, Dr. Malek referred him to physical therapy and prescribed

medication. In addition, Malek ordered the claimant to abstain from work until November 30,

2021. At the employer’s request, the claimant also saw Dr. Paymaun Lotfi. Dr. Lotfi evaluated

the claimant in October 2021 and similarly assessed him with various sprains to the neck, back,

and shoulder. Unlike Malek, however, Lotfi concluded that the claimant could return to

medium-duty work.

       The claimant sought benefits for his injuries under the Workers’ Compensation Act. At

the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the employer stipulated that the claimant had

suffered compensable injuries. However, the employer defended on two grounds. First, the

claimant’s treatment was unauthorized because he went to his own physician. Second, he was

not disabled to the extent alleged. The deputy commissioner decided that the employer was

responsible for Dr. Malek’s treatment because it failed to provide the claimant with a panel of

physicians despite “ample opportunity” to do so “within a reasonable time after the accident.”

He also held that based on Malek’s opinion as the claimant’s treating physician, the claimant was

entitled to continuing temporary total disability benefits beginning June 15, 2021.

       The employer filed a request for review by the Commission. In a split decision, the

Commission reversed the decision of the deputy commissioner in part and affirmed it in part.4 In

doing so, the Commission held that “the employer made a good faith effort to present the

claimant with a [physicians] panel, which the claimant effectively refused by engaging in a

course of conduct designed to frustrate the employer’s effort to provide a panel.” The

       4
         The Commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s finding that the claimant was not
terminated for cause on June 15, 2021. That issue is not before this Court on appeal.
                                              -3-
Commission concluded that therefore the employer was not responsible for the unauthorized

treatment provided by Dr. Malek. Adopting Dr. Lotfi’s medical opinion, it also held that the

claimant was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits after October 27, 2021.

                                              ANALYSIS

       The claimant argues that the Commission erred by finding that the employer met its

statutory obligation to offer him a panel of physicians, improperly applying a good faith

exception to that requirement. He also argues the Commission erred by denying his claim for

continuing wage loss after October 27, 2021. As the appellant in this case, the claimant bears the

burden of showing that the Commission committed reversible error. See Burke v. Catawba

Hosp., 59 Va. App. 828, 838 (2012).

                                       I. Panel of Physicians

       The claimant contends that the employer failed to provide him a panel of physicians from

which to choose a doctor for his medical care in compliance with Code § 65.2-603. Based on

this failure, the claimant argues that the Act permitted him to receive covered treatment from his

own physician. The employer believes the Commission did not err in applying a good faith

standard because to hold otherwise would encourage claimants to evade contact from employers.

       For the purposes of workers’ compensation, there are specific requirements in place.

When an employer must furnish medical care for a compensable injury suffered by an employee,

it is required to provide a “panel of at least three physicians selected by the employer” from

which the employee can choose the treating physician. Code § 65.2-603(A)(1) (“[T]he employer

shall furnish or cause to be furnished . . . a physician chosen by the injured employee from a

panel of at least three physicians selected by the employer . . . .”); (B) (explaining that an

employee’s “unjustified refusal” to accept “medical service . . . when provided by the employer

shall bar the employee from further compensation”); (F) (referencing “the panel provided”). The

                                                 -4-
employer must demonstrate that it has fulfilled this obligation. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Pierce (Goodyear II), 9 Va. App. 120, 129 (1989). “[I]f the employer fails or refuses to provide

a panel of physicians,” the injured employee can select his own treating physician. Southland v.

Welch, 33 Va. App. 633, 637-38 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 3

Va. App. 123, 126 (1986)).

       Here, there is no question that the employer did not provide a list of physicians to the

claimant. There is no evidence that the employer sent it by regular mail or email to the claimant

or his attorney, nor is there evidence that Haight left it at the claimant’s house when he was

there. The Commission did not make a factual finding that a panel of physicians was provided.5

Instead, it found that the employer “attempted . . . to provide” the claimant with a panel.

       The Commission determined that because the employer made a “good faith effort” to

provide a panel to the claimant, it met the requirement of Code § 65.2-603(A). The issue for

resolution on appeal is whether a good faith effort is sufficient to fulfill the statutory obligation

to provide a panel of physicians to an injured employee.

       Interpreting a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See Paramont

Coal Co. Va. v. McCoy, 69 Va. App. 343, 352 (2018). Appellate courts “assume that the General

Assembly chose, with care, the words it used in enacting the statute” at issue. See City of

Richmond v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 292 Va. 70, 75 (2016) (quoting Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton

Co., 285 Va. 12, 19 n.2 (2013)). For this reason, courts are bound by the plain meaning of a

       5
         Code § 65.2-603 does not specify how an employer must satisfy its obligation to make a
panel of physicians available to an employee, but it can do so in a variety of ways. See, e.g.,
Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm’n v. Gibbs, 228 Va. 614, 618 (1985) (in person); Turner Gilbane
JV v. Guzman, 59 Va. App. 128, 132 (2011) (by letter); Southland, 33 Va. App. at 636 (by
letter). Whether an employer provided a panel is a question for the Commission to decide and
can be reviewed by an appellate court under the proper standard of review. See Goodyear II, 9
Va. App. at 129-30 (reviewing whether the employer met its statutory obligation to provide a
panel of physicians to the injured employee).
                                              -5-
statute unless it “would lead to an absurd result.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 497, 502

(2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536 (2008)). “Consistent with this

standard, ‘[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any

curious, narrow, or strained construction.’” Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 282

(2017) (quoting Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802 (2007) (alteration in original)).

And, “[a] court may not ‘add to the words’ of a statute.” Berglund Chevrolet, Inc. v. Va. Dep’t

of Motor Vehicles, 71 Va. App. 747, 753 (2020) (quoting Baker v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 656,

660 (2009)). Further, with regard to the statutory scheme at issue, a reviewing court “construe[s]

the Workers’ Compensation Act liberally for the benefit of employees to effectuate its remedial

purpose of making injured workers whole.” Vital Link, Inc. v. Hope, 69 Va. App. 43, 53 (2018)

(quoting Advance Auto & Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Craft, 63 Va. App. 502, 514 (2014)).

       In order to fulfill its obligation under Code § 65.2-603 to provide a panel to a claimant,

an employer must meet certain objective standards. See, e.g., Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm’n v.

Gibbs, 228 Va. 614, 618 (1985) (holding that an employer must offer a claimant a panel within a

reasonable amount of time following the injury); Turner Gilbane JV v. Guzman, 59 Va. App.

128, 134 (2011) (holding that “[t]he panel provided by [the] employer was defective” because it

did not meet certain statutory requirements). An employer’s subjective intent to comply with the

statute is simply not relevant. See Code § 65.2-603; Gibbs, 228 Va. at 618; Turner Gilbane, 59

Va. App. at 132. The express and clear wording of the statute does not permit an employer to

make only a good faith effort to provide a panel of physicians to the employee. For comparison,

it is useful to look to other parts of the Workers’ Compensation Act that use the phrase “good

faith.” See, e.g., Code §§ 65.2-526 (governing death benefit payments to junior

dependents); -604(B) (limiting repeat diagnostic tests or procedures unless a good faith effort is

first made to use the existing ones); -1006(A) (pertaining to payroll reports). These examples

                                                -6-
illustrate that the General Assembly can and does allow for good faith exceptions when it intends

to do so. And, in fact, it did so in the very act at issue here. See generally AV Auto., LLC v.

Gebreyessus, __ Va. __, __ n.5 (Sept. 15, 2022) (“[W]hen the General Assembly has used

specific language in one instance[] but omits that language or uses different language when

addressing a similar subject elsewhere in the Code, we must presume that the difference in the

choice of language was intentional.” (quoting Zinone v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 282

Va. 330, 337 (2011))). Consequently, the omission of a good faith provision from Code

§ 65.2-603 controls the outcome of this case.

       We recognize the record contains no evidence that the employer intended to circumvent

its obligation to provide a panel of physicians to the claimant. Nonetheless, the fact that Haight

attempted to deliver a copy of the panel of physicians but felt that his efforts were obstructed by

the claimant did not relieve the employer of its obligation to provide a panel list to the claimant.6

Cf. Goodyear II, 9 Va. App. at 129 (holding that the employer’s offer to make an appointment

for the employee with an orthopedic clinic did not fulfill its obligation under the statute to

provide a panel). There were legitimate, straight-forward ways in which the employer could

have complied with the requirement to provide a panel list, despite the claimant’s behavior.7

       Simply put, “[w]e will not judicially create a good faith exception or other savings

provision to the statute when the legislature has clearly expressed itself” by not doing so.

Weston v. B.J. Church Constr. Co., 9 Va. App. 283, 287 (1989) (holding that the workers’

       6
         The Court is not unsympathetic to the position taken here by a majority of the
Commission. Employees should not be encouraged to engage in obstructionist behavior or be
rewarded for doing so. However, the injured employee was entitled to appropriate medical care,
and the law governing the requirements for providing a panel of physicians is clear.
       7
         We do not hold that the statute requires proof that a claimant personally received the
list. Haight could simply have left a copy of the panel with the claimant’s wife or at his house.
The employer could have mailed or emailed it to the claimant or his counsel.
                                                -7-
compensation penalty provision, former Code § 65.1-75.1, now Code § 65.2-524, did not contain

a good faith exception). We next consider the impact of our conclusion on this case.

       The Commission made the factual finding that the employer did not provide a panel of

physicians to the claimant, although the employer attempted to do so.8 See generally Layne v.

Crist Elec. Contractor, Inc., 64 Va. App. 342, 350 (2015) (noting that on appellate review,

factual findings are “‘conclusive and binding’” if “supported by credible evidence” (quoting

Mills v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 197 Va. 547, 551 (1955))). The employer’s good faith effort to

do so does not exempt it from this obligation. See Code § 65.2-603(A)(1). Therefore, the

claimant was entitled to select his own physician, which he did by seeking treatment from

Dr. Malek. See Goodyear II, 9 Va. App. at 128.

                                    II. Continuing Wage Loss

       The claimant contends that the Commission also erred by denying his claim for

continuing wage loss after October 27, 2021.

       “A party seeking workers’ compensation bears the burden of proving his disability and

the periods of that disability.” Vital Link, Inc., 69 Va. App. at 64. “[T]here is no presumption in

the law that once a disability has been established, a claimant will be assumed to remain disabled

for an indefinite period of time.” Id. (quoting Hoffman v. Carter, 50 Va. App. 199, 216 (2007)).

The period of a claimant’s disability is a question of fact. See id. And, “[w]e are bound by the

[C]ommission’s factual findings supported by credible evidence,” even when the record contains

“evidence to support a contrary finding.” Id. (quoting Hoffman, 50 Va. App. at 209); accord

City of Waynesboro v. Griffin, 51 Va. App. 308, 317 (2008).

       8
        The Commission found that the evidence proved the employer “attempted . . . to
provide” the panel list.
                                           -8-
       Dr. Malek and Dr. Lotfi both evaluated the claimant’s condition but came to different

conclusions about his ability to work. Malek ordered the claimant to abstain from work through

at least November 30, 2021. In contrast, Lotfi concluded that the claimant could return to

medium-duty work on October 28, 2021. The Commission accepted Lotfi’s opinion that the

claimant was no longer fully disabled, noting that his “report was thorough and well-reasoned.”

While the Court would normally give this finding deference on appeal, appellate review of this

issue is complicated by our legal conclusion that the claimant was entitled to be treated by

Dr. Malek.

       Typically, the Commission affords the treating physician’s opinion great weight. See,

e.g., Berglund Chevrolet, Inc. v. Landrum, 43 Va. App. 742, 753 n.4 (2004). Accordingly, our

ruling reversing the holding that Malek was not an authorized treating physician requires us to

remand the case to the Commission to weigh the competing medical opinions anew in light of

this legal ruling. Dr. Malek evaluated the claimant in his role as the treating physician. Dr. Lofti

conducted an independent medical examination of the claimant as authorized by Code

§ 65.2-607(A). Therefore, the Commission should revisit its factual finding that the claimant

was not totally disabled following October 27, 2021.

                                           CONCLUSION

       The Commission erred in its interpretation of Code § 65.2-603. Under the statute, the

employer’s good faith effort does not excuse it from its obligation to provide a panel of

physicians to the employee. Consequently, the Commission’s conclusion that Dr. Malek was not

the claimant’s authorized treating physician was also error. Based on our ruling that Malek was,

in fact, the claimant’s authorized treating physician, the case is remanded for the Commission to

reconsider the claimant’s period of disability.

                                                                          Reversed and remanded.

                                                  -9-