Court Opinion

ID: 9420195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:53:19.500264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:23.173236
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Jackson,
concurring.
I agree with the conclusion of the Court but arrive at it by a shorter and different route.
We have just had occasion to review and to decide, by a divided Court, cases involving the doctrine of jorum non conveniens. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S. 501; Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518. We there held that, in cases where the plaintiff was in court in an ordinary civil suit only by reason of the venue statutes that apply generally, the court could exercise discretion in dismissing complaints to prevent imposition on its jurisdiction if the circumstances of the particular case showed an abuse of the option vested in *598plaintiff by the general venue statutes. But we also pointed out that, where the choice of forum was authorized by a special venue statute, this discretion to dismiss would not be implied. The distinctions there made between general and special venue statutes may have been overly simple from the viewpoint of the dialectician. But as working tools of everyday craftsmen they do serve to point out a difference that I think governs here.
Congress made some rather unusual provisions as to venue in antitrust cases. Had it stopped there, it might have been permissible for the courts to devise their own limitations to prevent abuse of their process. But Congress did not stop there. Not only once but three times it has enacted almost identical provisions which check any abuse or oppression from compelling defendants to defend in places remote from their habitat. 15 U. S. C. § 5 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 10 (1894), 15 U. S. C. § 25 (1914).
The scheme of the statutes, as I see it, is that the Attorney General may lay the venue in any district where he may properly serve one or more of his defendants. He may . go ahead with his action against them, whether he is allowed to bring in others or not. Before he can bring in other parties than those properly served in the district, i. e., those “inhabitant,” “transacting business,” or “found” there, it must be made to appear to the court that the ends of justice require that they be brought before the court, in which case they may be summoned from any district.
Congress has here provided a practice by which any defendant, who has not subjected himself to suit in the district, may obtain the same protections which the jorum non conveniens doctrine would afford.
In this case, the defendants, who might be entitled to urge the doctrine, have not resisted or contested the *599order bringing them into the suit. It was by so doing that they could have shown that the ends of justice would not be served by such action. Instead, they desire to submit to being brought in and then use their position to throw the whole case out. This, I think, cannot be done.
The special provision Congress has made, both to establish venue and to protect against its abuse, whether the exact equivalent of jorum non conveniens or not, seems to me to preclude its application by the courts to this class of cases.
For this reason I concur in the result.