Court Opinion

ID: 9756947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:10:42.423311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:33.643709
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Justice
(concurring).
While I agree with Mr. Justice Roberts that the absence of counsel during the contempt proceedings below renders the adjudication of contempt null and void, I believe it necessary to set forth these additional observations.
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that “absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether clas*274sified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.” Id. at 37, 92 S.Ct. at 2012. Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Abrams, 461 Pa. 327, 336 A.2d 308 (1975), this Court interpreted Argersinger as mandating an absolute right of counsel to any criminal defendant facing the possibility of imprisonment. Despite this, the dissent would permit the imposition of sentence upon Geiger for his allegedly contemptuous behavior although he was without representation by counsel during the contempt proceedings below.
The dissent relies upon Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), in support of the proposition that the Argersinger principle is not applicable to criminal contempt proceedings. However, neither decision lends support to the dissent’s position.
In Gagnon, the United States Supreme Court held that, while due process rights must be accorded the probationer at probation revocation proceedings (see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)), there exists no absolute right to be represented by counsel at such proceedings. Reasoning that revocation of probation (and parole) proceedings are not part of the criminal prosecution arising, rather, after the termination of the prosecution and the imposition of sentence,1 the Supreme Court was able to distinguish Argersinger, stating: “We do not, however, draw from Gideon and Argersinger the conclusion that a case-by-case approach to furnishing counsel is necessarily inadequate to protect constitutional rights asserted in various types *275of proceedings: there are critical differences between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the probationer or parolee have stakes in preserving these differences.” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at 788-789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763.2
However, the Gagnon Court expressly recognized the continued vitality of Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court, after noting that sentencing is a critical part of the criminal prosecution, held that a probationer is entitled to be represented by counsel at a combined revocation and sentencing hearing.2 3 Because of this specific reaffirmance in Gagnon of the Mempa decision, it is evident that the holding in Gagnon must be limited to those situations where the proceedings are not part of the criminal prosecution.4
It, therefore, follows that for those proceedings which are part of the criminal prosecution process the rationale of Argersinger is applicable with the concomitant mandatory right to be represented by counsel. Inasmuch as *276criminal contempt proceedings are part of the prosecution process, see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), this dissent’s position that there exists no absolute right to counsel in such proceedings is clearly unwarranted.
The dissent further contends that the right to counsel is incompatible with the nature of the summary contempt proceeding. This reasoning is without either support or merit. As the dissent readily concedes, counsel could assist and advise the contemner as to considerations which might mitigate a charge of contempt or the sentence thereunder. This factor alone, is sufficient to demonstrate the vital role which counsel could have in the summary contempt proceedings. See United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, 421 U.S. 309, 95 S.Ct. 1802, 44 L.Ed.2d 186 (1975).

. In Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, the Supreme Court, in the context of parole revocation proceedings noted:
"Parole arises after the end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence. . . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.”
Id. 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600.

. In appraising these “critical differences”, the Supreme Court stated:
“In a criminal trial, the State is represented by a prosecutor; formal rules of evidence are in force; a defendant enjoys a number of procedural rights which may be lost if not timely raised; and, in a jury trial, a defendant must make a presentation understandable to untrained jurors. ... In a revocation proceeding, on the other hand, the State is represented, not by a prosecutor, but by a parole officer with the orientation described above; formal procedures and rules of evidence are not employed; and the members of the hearing body are familiar with the problems and practice of probation or parole.”
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763.

. In Gagnon, the probationer, Scarpelli, had been sentenced at the time of his trial and then placed on probation. In Mempa, the probationer’s sentencing had been deferred subject to probation. Therefore, in Mempa, the revocation proceedings included the initial imposition of sentence.

. Similarly, in Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, relied upon by the dissent, the Supreme Court based its conclusion, that the right to counsel is not mandatory in prison disciplinary proceedings upon the fact that such proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution. Id. 418 U.S. at 556, 94 S.Ct. at 2974.