Court Opinion

ID: 9382015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 16:00:45.793978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.530291
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-9535    Document: 010110832154        Date Filed: 03/24/2023       Page: 1
                                                                    FILED
                                                        United States Court of Appeals
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 24, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  JOSE ANTONIO GALLARDO VALDEZ,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                           No. 22-9535
                                                           (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner Jose Antonio Gallardo Valdez’s

 application for cancellation of removal and granted him voluntary departure. The

 Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his appeal. Petitioner has filed a

 petition for review. We dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and,

 exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), deny the remainder of the

 petition.

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-9535     Document: 010110832154        Date Filed: 03/24/2023     Page: 2

                                 I.     BACKGROUND

        Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 2018, the Department of

 Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings, alleging he was removable

 as a noncitizen who entered the United States at an unauthorized time and place.

 Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under

 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely

 unusual hardship to his eleven-year-old daughter, I.A., who is a United States

 citizen.1

        At a hearing before the IJ, Petitioner testified that I.A. was intelligent, a good

 student, had many friends, does not require special education classes or tutoring,

 spoke Spanish at home, and has no medical conditions. Petitioner also testified,

 however, that when DHS detained him for a month, I.A. became very sad and could

 not eat, and he was unsure how I.A. would react to a long-term separation. He

 explained that if he was removed, I.A. would move to Mexico with him because he is

 the family’s primary provider. He added that five of his brothers and four of his

 other children live in Mexico, and upon removal he would initially live in the city of

 Durango, where most of them lived.

        Petitioner’s wife, Maria, testified before the IJ. She stated she has been with

 Petitioner for thirty-five years and the two live together with I.A. and their

        1
        The other prerequisites for cancellation (ten years of physical presence in the
 United States, good moral character, and the lack of a disqualifying conviction, see
 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(C)) are not at issue in this case.
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 eighteen-year-old daughter. Maria has no legal status in the United States. I.A. is a

 very good student, speaks some Spanish, can read and write Spanish, and is in a

 Spanish class. After Petitioner was detained, I.A. became very sad, withdrawn, and

 distant, and Maria started working part-time as a dishwasher. If Petitioner is

 removed, she would remain in the United States, but she would have to work more,

 and her eighteen-year-old daughter might also have to work while continuing her

 studies. However, if Maria and I.A. were struggling, they would also move to

 Durango, where Maria’s parents live. Although Maria has two brothers in Colorado,

 they are unable to help her. In Mexico, I.A. might not be put in the same grade

 because she would have to improve her Spanish, school was more expensive, and it

 would be harder for her to move on past high school. Maria said she was concerned

 about crime in Durango and added that I.A. has never been to Mexico.

       The parties stipulated that I.A. would testify consistent with her signed

 statement, where she praised Petitioner as a father, stated she would struggle to

 afford college without his assistance, and could not visit Durango, where Petitioner

 likely would live, because it is dangerous and a two-day bus ride from her home here.

       The IJ denied cancellation. After finding Petitioner and Maria credible, the IJ

 found that if Petitioner was removed, I.A. would experience some sadness, related

 emotional disturbances, and financial limitations, but such hardships are typical of

 what happens “when a close family member leaves the household and the country,”

 not the sort of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” the law requires.

 R. at 90. The IJ also found the financial impact of losing Petitioner’s income could

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 be offset by Maria working more and by her eighteen-year-old daughter’s efforts to

 work. The IJ further found I.A. would not experience the requisite hardship if she

 moved to Mexico because of the large family network there, particularly in Durango,

 and I.A. speaks, reads, and writes Spanish with some proficiency, although “it is

 likely she would have to work hard to improve her fluency.” Id. at 91. Any

 limitations on educational and financial opportunities in Mexico, the IJ said,

 including fear of criminal elements, were neither exceptional nor extremely unusual

 in this case.

        Petitioner appealed to the Board, arguing the IJ committed a legal error by

 applying only In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001), to the facts

 at issue and ignoring two later cases, In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319

 (B.I.A. 2002) and In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002)

 (together, “three cases”). He also argued he had demonstrated his removal would

 result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to I.A.

        The Board dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Adopting and affirming the IJ’s

 decision, the Board cited the three cases in support of its agreement with the IJ’s

 reasoning that Petitioner failed to show the required level of hardship. The Board

 wrote “separately” to reject Petitioner’s argument that the IJ ignored relevant case

 law. R. at 3. The Board explained that although the IJ had not addressed all three

 cases “in the body of his decision,” the Board could identify no clear factual error or

 any legal error in the IJ’s determination that Petitioner had not demonstrated his

 removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to I.A. Id. at 4.

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                                  II.    DISCUSSION

       Because a single Board member issued a brief order affirming the IJ’s

 decision, we review the Board’s decision and any parts of the IJ’s decision the Board

 relied on. See Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). “We lack

 jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary decision, based on the facts of the

 case, whether [I.A.] will suffer an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”

 Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing

 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). But under “§ 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction over

 questions of law that arise from the Board’s hardship determination.” Id. at 1184.

 We review questions of law de novo. Dallakoti, 619 F.3d at 1267.

       Petitioner contends the IJ “ignored relevant case law because he did not

 analyze and apply” In re Andazola-Rivas or In re Gonzalez Recinas to the facts.

 Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 12. Petitioner argues that although the IJ’s decision

 incorporated a written addendum containing statements of law,2 the IJ did not

 meaningfully apply the relevant caselaw. Petitioner contends the Board did not

 adequately account for this “omission” and therefore its decision was a

 “misapplication of the legal standard for exceptional and extremely unusual

 hardship.” Id. at 11.

       “[W]e have jurisdiction to review a claim that the Board departed from its own

 adopted hardship standard, by ignoring it or favoring some other inapplicable

       2
           The addendum cited all three cases. See R. at 95.
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 standard.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184. But Petitioner’s argument overlooks

 that the Board’s concurrence in the IJ’s decision was based on the Board’s record

 review and consideration of all three cases, and in Petitioner’s case, it is the Board’s

 decision that we review. As the Board explained in In re Gonzalez Recinas, “any

 hardship case ultimately succeeds or fails on its own merits and on the particular

 facts presented,” but In re Andazola-Rivas and In re Monreal-Aguinaga “are the

 starting points for any analysis of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”

 23 I. & N. Dec. at 469. Because the Board considered all three cases, it did not

 ignore its own applicable standard or favor an inapplicable standard.

       To the extent Petitioner argues the Board misapplied the legal standards set out

 in the three cases to the facts of his case or should have compared the facts of those

 cases with the facts of his, we lack jurisdiction. We have held we lack jurisdiction if

 “the Board acknowledges its standard and exercises its discretion within the bounds

 of its precedents’ cabining of such discretion.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183.

 The Board did so here. By citing the three cases, the Board identified the proper

 standard. And the Board concurred in the IJ’s denial of cancellation for the reasons

 the IJ articulated. Those reasons were based on consideration of relevant hardship

 factors drawn from the three cases—financial burden, family support in Mexico, a

 child’s familiarity with the Spanish language, poor economic conditions in Mexico,

 and reduced educational opportunities in Mexico. See In re Gonzalez Recinas,

 23 I. & N. Dec. at 470–71 (listing “significant” hardship factors as cancellation

 applicant’s children’s ability to speak, read, and write Spanish; financial and

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 emotional difficulties arising from removal of provider of support; and family

 support in Mexico); In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 323–24 (considering

 economic consequences, educational opportunities, family help in Mexico, and

 ability of non-petitioning parent to provide support); In re Monreal-Aguinaga,

 23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64 (listing relevant considerations as “the ages, health, and

 circumstances of qualifying . . . United States citizen relatives,” such as “a qualifying

 child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school,” and

 “[a] lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return”).

 Because the Board acknowledged its controlling standards and exercised its

 discretion within the bounds of those standards, we lack jurisdiction to consider

 Petitioner’s argument despite his attempt to frame it “as a challenge to the application

 of a legal standard to established facts.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

       The petition for review is dismissed in part and denied in part.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                             Circuit Judge

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