Court Opinion

ID: 9843161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:29:00.786821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:39.566747
License: Public Domain

RADER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Donald Henke’s breach of contract claim as barred by the statute of limitations. Henke v. United States, Civ. No. 93-702C (Fed. Cl. May 10, 1994) (order dismissing complaint). Because Mr. Henke did not file his claim within the statutory time period and did not show a contract with the Government, I would affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Henke occasionally worked as a pilot for the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Around June 5, 1987, the Resident Agent in charge of DEA’s Tampa, Florida office asked Mr. Henke to assist DEA in an undercover drug smuggling investigation. Mr. Henke was to retrieve from Colombia and deliver to México a shipment of marijuana. This assignment was part of an effort to apprehend a drug trafficking organization. In exchange, DEA allegedly offered to pay Mr. Henke $250,000. He completed the flight on November 14, 1987. Upon his return to Florida, Mr. Henke requested, but was not paid, the $250,000 fee.
On May 14, 1992, Mr. Henke sued the Government for $250,000 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. On October 19, 1992, the district court dismissed Mr. Henke’s complaint without prejudice and informed him that the Court of Federal Claims was the proper forum for his suit. Henke v. United States, Civ. No. 92-0048-C (W.D.Va. Oct. 19, 1992) (order dismissing complaint).
Over a year later, on November 16, 1993, Mr. Henke filed his suit in the Court of Federal Claims. On May 10,1994, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed Mr. Henke’s claim as untimely. Henke v. United States, Civ. No. 93-CV-702C (Fed.Cl. May 10, 1994) (order dismissing complaint).

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DISCUSSION

This court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo. Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1992); Dehne v. United States, 970 F.2d 890, 892 (Fed.Cir.1992).
I.
Mr. Henke did not file his claim with the trial court within the limitations period. The statute of limitations for fifing a claim in the Court of Federal Claims is six years from the accrual date. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Accrual occurs when “all events have occurred which fix the government’s liability and entitle the claimant to institute an action.” Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358, 178 Ct.Cl. 630 cert. denied, 389 U.S. 971, 88 S.Ct. 466, 19 L.Ed.2d 461 (1967).
A breach of contract claim accrues, “at the latest,” when the contract is “completed.” Mulholland v. United States, 361 F.2d 237, 239-40, 175 Ct.Cl. 832 (1966). Mr. Henke’s claim against the Government therefore accrued, at the latest, when he completed his mission on November 14, 1987. Mr. Henke did not file his claim until November 16, 1993. By that date, the statute of limitations had already expired. The trial court properly dismissed Mr. Henke’s claim as untimely.
Mr. Henke raises on appeal, for the first time, the notion that his mission was not complete until a post-operation debriefing that allegedly occurred on November 28, 1987. Like Mr. Henke’s claim itself, this argument comes too late to be credited. Courts of appeal generally will not entertain arguments or consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. This court does so only in rare cases to avoid injustice. See Brook-tree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1575, 24 USPQ2d 1401, 1415 (Fed.Cir.1992).
This court risks no injustice by refusing to credit Mr. Henke’s new assertions, however. Mr. Henke had ample opportunity to raise his allegation before the Virginia district court and the Court of Federal Claims. Yet he made no allegation that he in fact met with the DEA for a debriefing on November 28, 1987. Instead Mr. Henke generally asserted to the trial court in general terms:
if discovery could be had in Plaintiffs ease, it would surely point out that a DEA clandestine air operation was not complete for payment purposes until the After-action reports and DEA Form 6s were completed, along with a full debriefing of the air crews and undercover informants.
Plaintiffs Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 2, Henke v. United States (Fed.Cl. Feb. 25, 1994) (No. 93-702). Mr. Henke’s passing assertion about clandestine air operations in general made no mention of a meeting on November 28, 1987 or any other facts about his alleged post-mission debriefing. Thus, the trial court had no opportunity to address Mr. Henke’s belated allegation about events on November 28, 1987.
On appeal, this court “will not find the facts de novo ” or “fill gaps left by counsel at trial.” Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1570, 7 USPQ2d 1606, 1608 (Fed.Cir.1988). By allowing Mr. Henke to supplement the record with factual allegations about November 28, 1987 at this point, however, this court does both.
On the factual record before the trial court and this court, Mr. Henke completed his mission on November 14, 1987, when he delivered his cargo. His breach of contract claim therefore accrued on November 14, 1987. Mr. Henke did not file his complaint in the trial court until after the six-year statute of limitations had expired. Therefore, the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed his complaint.
II.
The record also does not support tolling the limitations period. Equitable tolling may not operate where the failure to timely file springs from a “garden variety claim of excusable neglect.” Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96, 111 S.Ct. 453, 458, 112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990). The district court dismissed Mr. Henke’s suit in October 1992, with specific directions about the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive jurisdiction over the claim. Mr. Henke then wait*803ed nearly thirteen months to file in that court. He has offered no explanation for this delay. Equitable tolling does not apply where the plaintiff does not heed advice to preserve his legal rights. Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151, 104 S.Ct. 1723, 1725-26, 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984). Mr. Henke’s unexplained thirteen-month delay does not deserve the reward of a tolling of the limitations period. Therefore, the trial court properly rejected Mr. Henke’s request for tolling.
III.
The trial court also lacked jurisdiction over Mr. Henke’s breach of contract claim. It is incumbent upon this court, in conducting a review de novo, to make such a determination sua sponte.
For the Court of Federal Claims to have jurisdiction over his claim, Mr. Henke must have had a contractual relationship with the Government. He never did. None of the DEA agents with whom Mr. Henke dealt had authority to bind the Government. DEA agents do not possess the authority to create such obligations. See Howard v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 297, 313-14 (1994).
Title 28 of the United States Code authorizes appropriations to the Department of Justice (Justice), of which DEA is a part. 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Title 28 does not grant Justice any funds to hire private citizens to transport illegal drugs. 28 U.S.C. § 524(a). The Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund does permit the Attorney General, at his discretion, to pay a reward to an individual who helps the Government uncover a violation of criminal drug laws. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(B), (c)(2). The Attorney General may delegate this authority to the Administrator of the DEA. Id. § 524(c)(2). Mr. Henke, however, did not show that he entered into an agreement with an authorized representative of either the Attorney General or the Administrator of the DEA. Instead Mr. Henke urges this court to infer such authorization from his allegation that he dealt with the agent in charge of a regional branch of the DEA. Mr. Henke offers no further evidence of authorization. Without a showing of proper authority, Mr. Henke could have no contract.
In any event, Mr. Henke did not show either an express or implied-in-faet contract for his services. An implied-in-faet contract with the Government requires: (1) mutuality of intent to contract; (2) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance; and (3) authority to bind the Government residing in the officer whose conduct was relied upon. City of El Centro v. United States, 922 F.2d 816, 820 (Fed.Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230, 111 S.Ct. 2851, 115 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1991). At the very least, the third factor was absent. As already noted, Mr. Henke presented no evidence that any of the individuals at DEA with whom he allegedly dealt possessed actual authority to bind the Government. To create a binding implied-in-fact contract with the Government, an agent of the Government must possess actual authority to do so. Heckler v. Community Health Servs., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63, 104 S.Ct. 2218, 2225, 81 L.Ed.2d 42 (1984); Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947).
Anyone who bargains with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that the agent purportedly acting for the Government does so within the bounds of his authority. See Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384, 68 S.Ct. at 3. Mr. Henke did not ascertain that the DEA agents possessed the requisite authority. Indeed these DEA agents did not possess it.
Because the DEA agents lacked actual authority, Mr. Henke did not have a contract with the Government. The trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction over his breach of contract claim ab initio. Thus, the Court of Federal Claims properly dismissed Mr. Henke’s claim, albeit not on jurisdictional grounds.
In sum, the Court of Federal Claims correctly disposed of Mr. Henke’s claim. I must respectfully dissent.