Court Opinion

ID: 9766082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:31:20.897663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:19.301640
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the reversal of Manley’s conviction and the affirmance of Allen’s conviction. I write specially because I do not agree that the trial court committed any error at all in this case when it exercised its discretion to preclude appellants from cross-examining witness Alex Phillips about her parole eligibility.
1. In its Division 2, the majority holds that it was error to prevent appellants from cross-examining Phillips about her parole eligibility because it “might have provided Phillips with bias in favor *349of or motivation to assist the State.” Maj. Op. p. 343. The majority then finds this error “harmless” because appellants were allowed to cross-examine Phillips “about her potential bias flowing from her plea deal with the State which reduced her possible sentence of life imprisonment to only a six-year sentence.” Id. at p. 343. However, it is precisely because the reduced-sentence evidence established Phillips’ potential bias in favor of the State that there can be no error in the limitation placed by the trial court on appellants’ cross-examination into parole eligibility. The jury heard that Phillips faced a life sentence yet received only a six-year sentence and that this plea agreement was the reason why she was testifying for the State. Under these circumstances, how could the parole eligibility evidence in this case have demonstrated that Phillips would be “more” biased in favor of the State such that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence constituted error?
Trial courts are granted wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned “to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, ... or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” State v. Vogleson, 275 Ga. 637, 639 (1) (571 SE2d 752) (2002). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 679 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986). “‘(T)he Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.’ ” [Cits.]” (Emphasis omitted.) United States v. Owens, 484 U. S. 554, 559 (108 SC 838, 98 LE2d 951) (1988). I would recognize that, in those situations where the discrepancy between the potential sentence faced by the witness and the plea agreement sentence the witness actually obtained is sufficient, in and of itself, to enable a jury to assess the witness’ bias, there can be no abuse of the trial court’s discretion when it limits cross-examination on the marginally relevant parole eligibility aspects of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 434 (2) (689 SE2d 286) (2010) (no error in restricting cross-examination of witness regarding parole eligibility where witness’ guilty plea reduced maximum sentence exposure from multiple life sentences to a single life sentence).
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, my recognition of the marginal relevance of the parole eligibility evidence in this case is neither forced nor unreasonable. No juror, after learning about the sweet deal the State offered Phillips for her testimony — even without her candid admission that the deal was the very reason for her testifying — would have needed to hear anything about mandatory minimum imprisonment terms and statutory parole eligibility provisions in order to fully and fairly assess her credibility as a *350witness. The only thing that “defies reason” in this case is the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by barring defense counsel from questioning Phillips about parole eligibility. Where is the “wide latitude” trial courts are accorded insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination? The answer, as clearly demonstrated by the majority’s holding in light of the facts in this case, is simple: there is none anymore. Every trial judge in this State needs to recognize the true import of the majority’s opinion: it is always error to exclude any parole eligibility evidence on cross-examination of State’s witnesses who have received plea deals. Bearing this in mind, trial judges should understand the gamble they are taking should they dare to place any limitation on defense counsel in regard to such questioning because only an appellate court can decide whether the trial court’s per se error was ultimately “harmless.”
2. Because the majority’s opinion reaches beyond the resolution of the issue before us to address hypothetical instances where a parole-eligibility limitation on a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness may constitute harmful error, I also write specially to note that any potential for witness bias that might arise from parole eligibility is because of the impact of some particular statutory provision addressing when an offender may first be eligible for parole, rather than the effect of any exercise of that discretion vested solely in the State Board of Pardons and Paroles (“Board”) to grant parole to eligible offenders. See Art. iy Sec. II, Par. II (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983; OCGA § 42-9-1 et seq. See also Vargas v. Morris, 266 Ga. 141 (2) (465 SE2d 275) (1996). Mandatory minimum sentences, automatic initial parole consideration statutes, recidivism statutes and the “serious violent felony” punishments set forth in OCGA § 17-10-6.1 are examples of the statutory provisions that provide objective, ascertainable standards that may affect a witness’ potential sentence or any plea agreement or both so as to justify exploration on cross-examination into a witness’ potential bias in those very rare cases when the discrepancy between the potential sentence and the plea agreement sentence is insufficient to enable a jury to assess the possible self-interest motivating a witness’ testimony. In contrast to these concrete statutory standards, and as a result of the complete discretion vested in the Board, it is a matter of pure speculation whether or not the Board will choose to exercise its discretion so as to grant parole when any offender becomes statutorily eligible for parole consideration. It is well established Georgia law that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by limiting cross-examination into speculative matters. E.g., Dempsey v. State, 279 Ga. 546 (2) (a) (615 SE2d 522) (2005); Taylor v. State, 272 Ga. 744 (2) (534 SE2d 67) (2000); White v. State, 268 Ga. 28 (3) (486 *351SE2d 338) (1997); Sams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 715 (4) (521 SE2d 848) (1999). See also Goger, Daniel’s Georgia Handbook on Criminal Evidence, § 1-27, p. 42 (2003 ed.). Accord Vogleson, supra, 275 Ga. at 639-642 (1), in which it was “the failure to permit Vogleson to cross-examine the accomplice about. . . objective evidence of a benefit [that] violated Vogleson’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Howard v. State, 286 Ga. 222, 225 (2) (686 SE2d 764) (2009). Thus, unlike the majority, I would maintain that trial courts do not abuse their discretion by limiting cross-examination into a matter as speculative as any inquiry must be about a parole-eligible offender’s hopes regarding when parole might be granted by the Board.
Decided April 9, 2010
Reconsideration denied June 28, 2010.
Gerard B. Kleinrock, for appellants.
Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Christopher R. Johnson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
3. Finally, because no reasonable person could possibly interpret Hewitt v. State, 277 Ga. 327 (2) (588 SE2d 722) (2003) as the majority does in its Division 3, i.e., as supporting the proposition that a trial court “never” errs by prohibiting cross-examination on eligibility for parole, there is no basis whatsoever for the majority’s insistence on overruling that case and Mikell v. State, supra, 286 Ga. at 434 (2), “[t]o the extent” they might be so completely misinterpreted. Our case law should not be overruled without valid reason.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Carley and Justice Hines join in this special concurrence.