Court Opinion

ID: 9782614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:00:16.914187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:06.573058
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEWART, specially concurring: I concur in the majority decision in this case. Respectfully, I write separately, however, to explain my reasons for concurring and to reconcile my concurrence in this case with my partial dissent in City of Chicago v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 409 Ill. App. 3d 258 (2011). In City of Chicago, the majority, applying a de novo standard of review, held that the claimant, who asserted separate claims for two back injuries at a consolidated hearing, could only obtain one recovery for permanent partial disability (PPD) under section 8(d) of the Act. 820 ILCS 305/8(d) (West 2008). In doing so, the majority found that the claimant in that case had only proved one condition of ill-being resulting from both injuries. The Commission had found otherwise and ordered separate PPD awards for each injury. The point of my dissent was that whether a claimant has proved that he sustained separate conditions of ill-being from two injuries is a factual determination to be made by the Commission which should not be overturned unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. As detailed in my dissent, the decision of the Commission to give the claimant separate PPD awards in City of Chicago was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In other words, although the legal principle espoused by the majority may have had application to a case with different facts, the record in City of Chicago did not support the result. In this case, the Commission specifically addressed the issue of whether the claimant proved a separate condition of ill-being resulting from separate injuries to the same body part. Here, the Commission specifically found that the claimant’s condition of ill-being was solely causally related to the second accident and declined to give the claimant a separate PPD award for the first injury. Appropriately, in this case, the majority has analyzed the Commission’s decision using the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and has concluded that there is sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s decision. Based upon the record in this case, I agree with that conclusion. In my view, the issue of whether a claimant asserting separate claims for injuries to the same body part in a consolidated hearing is entitled to separate PPD awards is a factual determination to be made by the Commission. If the Commission determines that separate accidents have caused one indivisible injury justifying a single PPD award, and that factual determination is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, the decision should be affirmed. On the other hand, if the Commission determines that a claimant has proved separate compensable injuries from separate accidents and awards PPD for each accident, and that decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, it should also be affirmed. I disagree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that a different analysis applies when multiple claims for injuries to the same body part are tried at a consolidated arbitration hearing. Whether they are tried separately, or in a consolidated hearing, a claimant is entitled to separate consideration of multiple claims. By suggesting that the Commission should only consider the claimant’s condition of ill-being at the time of the arbitration hearing, the majority tilts the analysis in favor of a single PPD award. In order to determine whether a claimant sustained separate compensable injuries in two accidents, the Commission must consider his condition of ill-being prior to the second accident. The result should not be different solely because multiple claims have been consolidated for hearing. See Consolidated Freightways v. Industrial Comm’n, 237 Ill. App. 3d 549, 604 N.E.2d 962 (1992) (An employer is not entitled to a credit for a prior PPD award to the same part of the back.). However, in this case, because the decision of the Commission is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, I concur in the result reached by the majority.