Court Opinion

ID: 9556066
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 22:07:49.128611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:08.702460
License: Public Domain

08/15/2023

                                         DA 21-0616

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                        2023 MT 155N

STATE OF MONTANA,

              Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

ANTHONY THOMAS DISHON,

              Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
                      In and For the County of Richland, Cause No. DC-21-06
                      Honorable Katherine M. Bidegaray, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

               For Appellant:

                      James M. Siegman, Attorney at Law, Jackson, Mississippi

               For Appellee:

                      Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Cori Losing, Assistant
                      Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                      Charity McLarty, Richland County Attorney, Sidney, Montana

                                                Submitted on Briefs: July 12, 2023

                                                          Decided: August 15, 2023

Filed:
                                    r-6‘A•-af
                      __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Anthony Thomas Dishon appeals the Seventh Judicial District Court’s denial of his

motion to withdraw two guilty pleas. Dishon argues for the first time on appeal that he did

not enter voluntary pleas because the District Court did not tell Dishon the maximum

possible sentences at his change of plea hearing and did not allow him to withdraw his

pleas after it rejected the recommended sentence. Dishon further argues that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel and that the court abused its discretion by not holding an

appropriate hearing on his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶3     Review of the record persuades us that the court did not undermine the fundamental

fairness of Dishon’s proceedings. Dishon’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not

appropriate for review as it is not based on the record. We affirm, remanding only to fix

the Judgment to reflect the oral proclamation of Dishon’s sentence.

¶4     The State charged Dishon with a felony DUI on January 22, 2021. The State

charged Dishon separately on January 27, 2021, with felony possession of dangerous drugs.

The same attorney entered notices of appearance in both matters on behalf of Dishon. The

State submitted two plea agreements for these cases on June 9, 2021. For the DUI, the

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State and Dishon agreed to jointly recommend that Dishon receive a five-year suspended

sentence to the Department of Corrections (DOC) and that he enroll in the Montana

Seventh Judicial District DUI Treatment Court. The parties also recommended a $5,000

fine. This agreement, signed by Dishon and his counsel, acknowledged that the court was

not bound by any sentencing recommendations and that Dishon received effective

assistance of counsel.      For the possession charge, the State and Dishon jointly

recommended a three-year suspended sentence to the DOC and a “minimal” fine. The

parties recommended that the sentence run concurrently with Dishon’s DUI case. Like the

agreement in Dishon’s DUI case, the plea agreement for the possession charge stated that

Dishon waived certain rights upon pleading guilty, and it affirmed his satisfaction with the

services of his counsel. It also acknowledged that the District Court was not bound by the

sentencing recommendation. Neither agreement set forth the maximum penalties for each

offense.1

¶5     Dishon signed a waiver of his rights for each case on June 14, 2021. The waivers

included a list of Dishon’s rights, his expression of confidence in his attorney, and his

acknowledgment that the signed plea agreements did not bind the District Court at

sentencing. The waivers further included specific language that Dishon “underst[ood] the

1
  Dishon combined both his cases into a single appeal. The Court, however, received the District
Court record for only Dishon’s DUI case. The relevant parts of Dishon’s possession charge are
included in the District Court record for his DUI case because the court held one hearing and
sentencing for both of Dishon’s changes of plea. Dishon does not dispute the contents of the
documents associated with the possession charge as represented by the State in its statement of
facts that otherwise are not in the District Court record on appeal.
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maximum penalty, including the effect of any penalty enhancement or special parole

restriction[.]” The documents did not detail the potential maximum penalties that the court

could impose.

¶6     Dishon pleaded guilty to both charges that same day. The court confirmed that

Dishon did not suffer from any condition that prevented proceeding with the change of plea

hearing and was not under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or prescription medication. The

court also confirmed Dishon’s state of mind when he signed the plea agreements and the

waivers of his rights. For the DUI, the court asked whether Dishon understood the

maximum possible sentences available by law and that the court could impose the

maximum sentences regardless of the recommendations found in the plea agreements.

Dishon affirmed that he understood. The court asked whether Dishon understood that it

could sentence him to the maximum sentence allowable for the possession charge. Dishon

affirmed that he understood. The court then asked if it needed to repeat Dishon’s rights;

Dishon declined. The court accepted his pleas as voluntary. Dishon’s counsel did not

object to the manner of the hearing. Three days later, Dishon’s counsel entered her notice

of withdrawal due to her forthcoming retirement. Dishon was appointed new counsel.

¶7     Prior to sentencing, Dishon’s newly appointed counsel requested that the court

release Dishon from custody pending sentencing because he had been rejected from

treatment court and the only remaining option under statute was commitment to the DOC

for a thirteen-month residential alcohol treatment program. The court held a hearing on

this request. Dishon testified he understood that he could face commitment for a minimum

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of thirteen months and asked to be released so he could get his property and other affairs

in order. The District Court denied Dishon’s request.

¶8    On August 16, 2021, Dishon’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw Dishon’s guilty

pleas and proceed to trial based on a letter that Dishon sent to him representing that his

previous counsel misled Dishon into entering the plea agreements. The motion represented

that Dishon was unaware of the direct consequences of his pleas and that his “previous

counsel’s advice fell outside the range of competence.”

¶9    Following a hearing, the District Court rejected Dishon’s motion to withdraw. It

noted that Dishon signed waivers acknowledging his rights and affirming that he

understood his possible sentences.     The court also noted that Dishon verbalized his

understanding at his change of plea hearing. The court proceeded to sentencing on

September 13, 2021. For the DUI, the District Court sentenced Dishon to the DOC “for a

period of not less than 13 months or more than two years for completion of a residential

alcohol treatment program[,]” followed by a five-year suspended sentence, and it imposed

a $5,000 fine. It sentenced Dishon to three years for the possession charge, all suspended.

The written judgment, however, reflected that Dishon was sentenced to the Department of

Corrections for three years with “none suspended.”

¶10   We review de novo a court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty

plea to determine if the plea was voluntary. State v. Muhammad, 2005 MT 234, ¶ 12,

328 Mont. 397, 121 P.3d 521.     We decline to consider unpreserved claims of error,

however, unless we determine to invoke discretionary plain-error review. State v. Favel,

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2015 MT 336, ¶ 13, 381 Mont. 472, 362 P.3d 1126. “We review claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel de novo.” State v. Upshaw, 2006 MT 341, ¶ 13, 335 Mont. 162,

153 P.3d 579 (citation omitted).

¶11   Dishon argues that we should vacate his sentences “due to abuse of discretion,

ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error and/or cumulative error[.]” He divides his

issues into claims about his changes of plea proceedings and whether his initial counsel

provided ineffective assistance. We address these claims in turn.

Dishon’s Change of Plea Claims

¶12   When pleading guilty, “a defendant waives numerous afforded constitutional rights

and protections, and therefore the plea ‘must be a knowing and intelligent choice among

the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Muhammad, ¶ 14 (citation

omitted). Prior to entering the plea, the defendant “must be ‘fully aware of the direct

consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,

prosecutor, or his own counsel[.]’” Muhammad, ¶ 14 (quoting Brady v. United States,

397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1472 (1970)). Montana law directs a court to determine

that the defendant understands the maximum penalty provided by law before accepting a

guilty plea. Section 46-12-210(1)(a)(iii), MCA. When reviewing whether the court erred

in denying a motion to withdraw the plea because it was not voluntary, we examine

“case-specific considerations.” Muhammad, ¶ 14 (citation omitted).

¶13   Dishon maintains that the court’s failure to inform him of the possible maximum

penalties at his change of plea hearing rendered his pleas involuntary. The State counters

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that we should not consider this argument because Dishon did not raise this issue before

the District Court, arguing only that his counsel did not effectively communicate the

consequences of the pleas to Dishon.         “Unpreserved issues alleging violations of a

fundamental constitutional right are reviewable under the common law plain error

doctrine.” State v. Valenzuela, 2021 MT 244, ¶ 7, 405 Mont. 409, 495 P.3d 1061 (citation

omitted). Dishon must demonstrate that the alleged error implicated a fundamental right

and “firmly convince this Court that failure to review the claimed error may result in a

manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of

the trial or proceedings, or compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” State v. Akers,

2017 MT 311, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 531, 408 P.3d 142 (citations omitted).

¶14    Dishon claims that he was denied his fundamental right to a jury trial due to the

court’s failure to inform him of the maximum penalty. Our review of the record does not

convince us, however, that the claimed error undermined the fairness of his proceedings.

Although the District Court did not state the maximum sentences at the change of plea

hearing, Dishon’s waivers indicated that he understood the maximum penalties. See

§ 46-12-210(2), MCA (advising the defendant may be satisfied by the defendant “filing a

written acknowledgement of the information” detailed in § 46-12-210(1), MCA). The

court asked Dishon if he understood the penalties for the DUI and he said yes. The

maximums were accurately stated in both of Dishon’s Informations and in Justice Court

proceedings prior to his cases moving to District Court. At all relevant times, Dishon was

represented by counsel, who indicated no misunderstanding about the possible penalties.

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There is no indication that the court’s claimed error affected Dishon’s decision to enter

guilty pleas.

¶15    Dishon maintains that, regardless of his awareness of the maximum sentences by

these other means, our precedent in State v. Melone, 2000 MT 118, 299 Mont. 442,

2 P.3d 233, required the court to first recite the maximum penalties to Dishon before

accepting his changes of plea. In Melone, the defendant received notice from the State that

he was being charged as a persistent felony offender; at his change of plea hearing,

however, he was advised only of the penalties associated with his underlying offense,

which did not include the persistent felony offender enhancement. Melone, ¶¶ 17-18.

Although the prosecutor stated that the defendant “would still face the potential penalty as

a repeat offender,” neither the court nor the prosecutor informed the defendant of the

maximum penalty that he faced as a persistent felony offender. Melone, ¶ 18. Melone does

not demonstrate that failure to allow Dishon to withdraw his pleas because of the trial

court’s omission will result in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Dishon was not exposed

to an enhancement or additional penalty upon conviction and had been made aware of the

maximum sentence. Dishon was given an opportunity to be heard in court before he

entered his pleas and told the court he understood the maximum penalty he faced. The

record as a whole does not demonstrate that the District Court’s acceptance of Dishon’s

pleas as a “knowing and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to

the defendant” undermined the fairness of the proceedings. Muhammad, ¶ 14.

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¶16    Dishon also argues that the District Court should have let him withdraw his guilty

plea in his DUI case at sentencing because it deviated from the joint recommendation when

it sentenced him to the DOC for a residential alcohol treatment program rather than to a

suspended five-year term subject to completion of treatment court. Again, this is an

argument that Dishon makes for the first time on appeal. The District Court did not adopt

in full the joint recommendation for the DUI sentence because Dishon had been rejected

from treatment court. Under § 61-8-731(1)(a)(i), MCA (2019), the statute in effect at the

time of Dishon’s offense, the court was required to sentence Dishon to “an appropriate

correctional facility or program for a term of not less than 13 months or more than 2 years”

because he had multiple prior DUI convictions and had been rejected by treatment court.

¶17    Dishon has not demonstrated that the District Court compromised the integrity of

the judicial process when it sentenced him according to statute without giving him the

opportunity to withdraw his plea at sentencing. The plea agreement was clear that the

recommendation was not binding on the court, and Dishon confirmed his understanding

that the court could impose a different sentence. At the hearing for Dishon’s motion to

release prior to his sentencing, Dishon also confirmed his understanding that he likely

would be subject to commitment with the DOC because he had been rejected from

treatment court. Dishon was accompanied by counsel at this hearing who stated to the

court that he understood the only statutory option after his rejection from treatment court

was to sentence Dishon to the DOC. Dishon did not then argue in his motion to withdraw

that he had been unaware of the threat of incarceration under the maximum penalties

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available by statute in his DUI case. Dishon has not demonstrated that the fundamental

fairness of his proceedings was compromised by this alleged error.

Dishon’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

¶18    Dishon admits that he “legally entered his guilty pleas in his cases, if the pleas were

not due to ineffective assistance of counsel.” Dishon argues that his first counsel rendered

him ineffective assistance by failing to communicate the consequences of his changes of

plea and by not conveying what could happen if he was rejected from treatment court. He

contends that there are only two explanations for this miscommunication: (1) his counsel

did not know that Dishon would go to a resident program rather than treatment court and

could not advise Dishon on this possibility; or (2) his counsel knew he would go to the

resident program but did not advise him on this possibility. He argues that either reason is

sufficiently deficient and prejudicial because if his counsel “had been honest with [him]

about what the treatment program was, how it worked, probation, [and] the chance of not

being released after signing [the plea agreement],” then he would have gone to trial.

¶19    “[B]efore reaching the merits of an ineffective assistance claim, this Court must first

determine whether the allegations are properly before the Court on appeal or whether the

claim should be raised in a petition for post-conviction relief[.]” Upshaw, ¶ 33 (citation

omitted). When a claim is based on facts of record, it must be raised on direct appeal.

Upshaw, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). Conversely, if the record does not explain “why” counsel

did or did not provide a certain action in the defense, the claim “is best suited for

post-conviction proceedings.” Upshaw, ¶ 33 (citation omitted). There is an exception to

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this general rule if the record does not explain “why” counsel acted, but there is “no

plausible justification” for counsel’s actions. Upshaw, ¶ 34 (citation omitted).

¶20    At the District Court, Dishon argued that, but for his counsel’s deficient

performance in informing him of the consequences of his pleas, he would have proceeded

to trial. The record, however, contains no conversation between Dishon and his first

counsel regarding the maximum penalties in his cases, no evidence if she did or did not

sufficiently discuss the maximum penalties with him, and no explanation why she did not

object to the District Court omitting a recounting of the maximum penalties at Dishon’s

change of plea hearing. The record also fails to reflect whether counsel investigated

Dishon’s eligibility for treatment court or what discussions she may have had with Dishon

about it.

¶21    Dishon submitted a letter attesting that his counsel would not “give [him] answers

about what the DUI laws state”; she was not “familiar” with the DUI laws; her professional

opinion was that Dishon would not likely succeed at trial; and that she believed the plea

deal to be fair. Dishon maintains that she described a treatment program entirely different

from what Dishon experienced. Dishon represented that he believed his counsel “pushed

[him] to signing this plea by giving [him] false information about the details of the

agreement and what was going to happen after [he] did sign it.”

¶22    At his hearing to withdraw his changes of plea, the court asked why Dishon

“execute[d] the Acknowledgment of Rights in which he represented to the [c]ourt that he

understood everything,” Dishon’s new counsel answered, “I have no response. I wasn’t

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his counsel at the time . . . he must not have understood.” Dishon’s counsel explained that

“[i]t seem[ed] like him and his previous attorney had some issues regarding

communication . . . and it appears to me that he did not have full confidence in his previous

attorney.” Nothing in the record or at the hearing supported Dishon’s claims against his

first counsel. Further, there is a plausible explanation why Dishon’s counsel did not request

that the District Court review the maximum penalties with Dishon before accepting his

pleas, as the record indicates Dishon had been advised of the maximum penalties. We

decline to review the merits of this claim on direct appeal; it is not record-based and would

be more appropriate to raise in a petition for postconviction relief. See Upshaw, ¶ 33.

¶23    Dishon argues that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could be based on the

record if the District Court had held an evidentiary hearing on his claim. He relies on our

decision in State v. Lawrence, 2001 MT 299, 307 Mont. 487, 38 P.3d 809, to argue that the

court should “have had a hearing on his motion that, in turn, would have created a record

that left [this] Court with something more to review[.]” In Lawrence, we remanded a case

to District Court for an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Lawrence, ¶ 16. Lawrence had pleaded guilty to issuing a bad check in 1999. Lawrence,

¶ 1. In 2000, she filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel. Lawrence, ¶ 1. Without holding a hearing on the matter, the District

Court denied the petition. Lawrence, ¶ 1. Without a hearing, this Court could not review

Lawrence’s claim because there was no record to consult other than the allegations that she

made in her petition. Lawrence, ¶ 16. Dishon’s case is not like Lawrence. The court did

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hold a hearing on Dishon’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after he asserted ineffective

assistance of counsel. At this hearing, Dishon presented no evidence other than a letter to

his new attorney complaining about his previous attorney’s lack of communication.

¶24    Dishon argues that all these alleged issues amount to cumulative error. “Mere

allegations of error without proof of prejudice are insufficient to satisfy the cumulative

error doctrine.” State v. Grant, 221 Mont. 122, 137, 717 P.2d 562, 572 (1986). Because

we did not find plain error in the District Court’s acceptance of Dishon’s guilty pleas or in

its denial of his motion to withdraw these pleas, we cannot conclude that cumulative error

prejudiced Dishon’s right to a fair trial. See Grant, 221 Mont. at 137, 717 P.2d at 572.

Dishon’s claims of involuntariness rest on his allegations of ineffective assistance, which

are not appropriate for consideration on direct appeal.

¶25    Finally, the State concedes that the matter must be remanded to amend the Sentence

and Judgment to appropriately reflect the oral sentence. The sentence orally pronounced

from the bench is the legally effective sentence when it conflicts with the written judgment

and the written judgment imposes a harsher punishment. State v. Lane, 1998 MT 76, ¶ 40,

288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9. The District Court orally sentenced Dishon to three years, all

suspended, for his possession charge. The Judgment must be amended to reflect the oral

sentence, rather than three years, “none suspended.”

¶26    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

                                             13
applicable standards of review. Dishon has not established plain error in the District

Court’s acceptance of his pleas as voluntary or its rejection of his motion to withdraw his

pleas. We affirm his convictions, without prejudice to pursuing his ineffective assistance

claim in a postconviction petition. The case is remanded to amend the written Judgment

to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence.

                                                 /S/ BETH BAKER

We Concur:

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

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