Court Opinion

ID: 9491854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:25:34.233867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:58.691890
License: Public Domain

GRABER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent, because the majority has departed from proper methods of statutory construction and has created an opportunity for forum-shopping in Montana wrongful termination cases.
First, the majority uses an improper method of statutory interpretation when it relies on a proposed legislative amendment that failed, Op. at 1283-84, as a means to interpret the law that survived unchanged. There are many reasons why a proposed amendment fails. Some legislators may believe that the amendment is unnecessary, because the statute already means the same thing; some may oppose the amendment on the merits; some simply may be absent and not voting “aye.” As a matter of logic, we gain no information from what a given statute did not become. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Peterson, 263 Mont. 156, 866 P.2d 241, 244 (1993) (“[T]he legislature’s failure to enact a proposed amendment is of little value in interpreting legislative intent because an amendment may be defeated for many reasons.”); In the Matter of W.J.H., 226 Mont. 479, 736 P.2d 484, 487 (1987) (same).
My second difference with the majority concerns its interpretation of Montana law. By reading clarity into Montana law where there is none, the majority invites forum-shopping for parties who have a choice.
The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA) permits an employee to maintain a successful action for wrongful discharge “only if ... the discharge was not for good cause.” Mont.Code Ann. § 39-2-904(2) (emphasis added). “ ‘Good cause’ means reasonable job-related grounds for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the employer’s operation, or other legitimate business reason.” Mont.Code Ann. § 39-2-903(5). The Montana Supreme Court has defined “legitimate business reason” to mean a reason that has “some logical relationship to the needs of the business” and is “neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious.” Buck v. Billings Montana Chevrolet, Inc., 248 Mont. 276, 811 P.2d 537, 540 (1991). The question in this case is: When an employer conducts a proper investigation and, at the time it acts, fires an employee for a reason that bears a “logical relationship to the needs of the business” that is not “whimsical,” that is not “arbitrary,” that is not “capricious,” and that is not then known to be “false,” has the employer fired a person for “good cause,” or is it open to the employee to demonstrate after the fact that the reason given was erroneous?
The answer under the statutory terms, standing alone, is not entirely clear.1 The statute provides that “[a] discharge is wrongful only if ... the discharge was not for good cause.” Mont.Code Ann. § 39-2-904(2) (emphasis added). Although the statute’s use of the past tense suggests that the wrongfulness of the termination must be examined at the moment of termination, the statute is silent as to whether a plaintiff must prove “falsity” by showing that the reason given for termination was a pretextual one or was based on an incorrect assessment of the underlying facts.
Keeping in mind those two possible interpretations, the nature of a wrongful dis*1289charge claim under Montana law suggests that the plaintiff must make the tougher showing of pretext to establish a successful claim under the statute. The Montana Supreme Court has given us a blueprint for how to resolve uncertainties in the wrongful discharge statute. In Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488, 504 (1989), the court discussed a central feature of the legislation — its limit on the damages available to a successful employee-plaintiff. Unlike prior common law, the statute precludes, in a case such as the present one, damages for pain and suffering, damages for emotional distress, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and any lost pay and fringe benefits for more than four years. Id. (citing Mont.Code Ann. § 39-2-905). In examining that feature of the statute, the court observed that the genesis and purposes of the WDEA were pro-employer, not pro-employee:
The legislative history of the Act demonstrates that lawmakers perceived an unreasonable financial threat to Montana employers from large judgments in common-law wrongful discharge claims. Testimony in legislative hearings also indicated to legislators that large judgments in common-law wrongful discharge cases could discourage employers from locating their businesses in Montana. The Act’s limitation on damages is intended to alleviate these threats_ [Promoting the financial interests of businesses in the State or potentially in the State to improve economic conditions in Montana constitutes a legitimate state goal.
Id. at 504. The court further noted that another legitimate legislative aim was to provide “for greater certainty in defining an employer’s duties.” Id. at 505. In sum, the Montana Supreme Court has held that the legislature’s main aims in enacting the WDEA were (1) to provide for greater certainty in defining an employer’s duties toward its employees and (2) to reduce employers’ liability in wrongful discharge cases. See also Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp., 259 Mont. 518, 858 P.2d 3, 7 (1993) (observing that, in pre-WDEA eases, it was well settled that “courts should not intrude in the day-to-day employment decisions of business owners”). The majority’s interpretation of the statute is at odds with both aims.
Moreover, although the answer under Montana precedent is not entirely clear, precedent weighs against the majority’s understanding of the WDEA. The Montana Supreme Court has stated recently: “In order for an employee to defeat a motion for summary judgment on the issue of good cause, this Court requires the employee to prove that the given reason for the discharge, such as failure to perform the services the employee was hired to perform, is a pretext and not the honest reason for the discharge.” Mysse v. Martens, 279 Mont. 253, 926 P.2d 765, 770 (1996) (emphasis added). The majority seeks to minimize the importance of that holding, but the Montana court’s statement is plain, and it is consistent with other decisions as well. See, e.g., Kestell, 858 P.2d at 8 (an employee can prevail under the WDEA if the employee “presents evidence, and not mere speculation or denial, upon which a jury could determine that the reasons given for his termination were false, arbitrary or capricious, and unrelated to the needs of the business”) (emphasis added); Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 244 Mont. 405, 797 P.2d 232, 235 (1990) (“[The plaintiff] did not offer any other motive or reason for his termination. He merely denied that the reasons were legitimate business reasons.”); Koepplin v. Zortman Mining, Inc., 267 Mont. 53, 881 P.2d 1306, 1310 (1994) (“Since Defendant has the right to serve its own legitimate business interest in discharging the Plaintiff, the proper focus of the inquiry should not be on whether Plaintiffs attorney characterizes [Plaintiffs] statement as a threat, but whether the statement was heard as a threat by [Defendant’s employee].”). Those cases suggest that “false reason” within the meaning of Buck is to be considered as of the time of the termination itself and that it is insufficient for the plaintiff to prove “falsity” merely by showing later that her version of the facts is more believable than not by a preponderance of the evidence.
The facts of this case reveal the disquieting prospect of a court’s second-guessing of employers’ day-to-day personnel decisions, a prospect that is inherent in the majority’s *1290interpretation of the Montana statute. Here, defendant fired plaintiff for recording false time-sheet entries. Those entries claimed 14.5 hours of time that plaintiff had not worked; those hours, of course, would have translated into unearned wage payments. Plaintiff does not dispute that the entries were wrong. She does not claim that, in general, a firing for recording false time-sheet entries fails the “legitimate business reason” test established by the Montana statute. Plaintiff does not claim and did not prove that defendant fired her for some illegitimate reason or had any ulterior motive. Finally, and significantly, plaintiff did not prove that defendant failed to follow proper procedures in investigating or carrying out the termination.2 To the contrary, it is undisputed that defendant provided plaintiff with an opportunity to explain the false time-sheet entries. When she only said that she had made a “big mistake,” defendant discharged her. Defendant’s decision not to believe plaintiffs story was reasonable in the light of the fact that, on a prior occasion, plaintiff had admitted to falsifying company telephone logs. In these circumstances, I do not think that Montana law permits a jury to second-guess defendant’s decision to fire plaintiff by deciding that it would have credited her “big mistake” explanation.
At best, the majority’s interpretation of Montana law is plausible. Nonetheless, at a minimum, a different interpretation of “good cause,” Mont.Code Ann. §§ 39-2-903(5), 39-2-904(2), is equally plausible. In the circumstances, I would decline to guess at the meaning of Montana law and would submit a certified question to the Montana Supreme Court.

. For this reason, the principle that a Montana court looks to the plain meaning of a statute when its terms are clear, Op. at 1283, has no application.

. By the time of trial, the district court already had dismissed plaintiffs claim that defendant had violated its own written personnel policy, Mont.Code Ann. § 39-2-904(3), and that decision is not before us on appeal.