Court Opinion

ID: 9964498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 13:02:52.704285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:33.686432
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: April 30, 2024

                          S24A0399. PLATT v. THE STATE.

        PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

        Rodrigues Platt 1 appeals his convictions related to the shooting

death of David Jones, Jr. 2 On appeal, Platt argues that the trial

        1 Platt’s first name is spelled “Rodriguez” in some court filings and in his

brief, but most of the court filings below use “Rodrigues.”
       2 The crimes occurred on June 16, 2009. In February 2010, a Liberty

County grand jury indicted Platt, Jedediah Duncan, and Steven Bond for
malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated
assault, armed robbery, burglary, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime. The court severed the co-defendants’ trials, and the
record does not show the status of those cases. A jury found Platt guilty on all
counts at an August 2011 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in
prison for malice murder, two concurrent twenty-year terms for armed robbery
and burglary, and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense. The
other counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Platt filed a motion
for new trial in August 2011 and amended it in 2019. The trial court denied
the motion in September 2023. Platt timely filed a notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2023 and
submitted for a decision on the briefs.
       The record does not reveal why it took well over a decade to resolve
Platt’s motion for new trial. Platt asserts no claim about the post-conviction
delay, but we nevertheless remind trial courts and attorneys of their duty
diligently and efficiently to resolve pending motions for new trial.
court should have granted a mistrial due to the State’s failure to

disclose the inconclusive test results of a hair sample from a critical

witness against him who was also a possible suspect in the timely

manner required by OCGA § 17-6-4 and Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10LE2d 215) (1963). He also argues that the

court should have granted a mistrial based on the State’s belated

disclosure that Platt’s initial custodial interview had been recorded

despite previously representing otherwise. Platt also argues that the

trial court should have taken some curative action when the

prosecutor improperly identified him for testifying witnesses, and

that the cumulative prejudice of these errors warrants a new trial.

We conclude that Platt has failed to establish that a mistrial was

necessary to preserve his right to a fair trial, that any curative

action was necessary based on the prosecutor’s identification of him,

or that any errors cumulatively prejudiced him. Therefore, we

affirm.

      The evidence at trial showed the following. Jones lived in the

Tapco Mobile Home Park in Liberty County. He sold drugs and kept

                                  2
his money in a small, black travel safe. On June 16, 2009, Jones was

shot multiple times in his mobile home, leading to his death. Jarius

Wilson lived in a mobile home close to the victim’s and heard a noise

on the day of the shooting that sounded like firecrackers. After he

heard the sound, Wilson looked out his window and saw “some guys”

wearing masks running from the victim’s home and toward a

“grayish-greenish” SUV.

     Monique Hendry, Platt’s sister, testified that on the day of

Jones’s death, Platt, Steven Bond, and Jedediah Duncan were at

Hendry’s mother’s house. Bond and Duncan were wearing

camouflage, had gas masks, and were playing with a black gun. The

three men left in a “goldish” SUV driven by Duncan.

     Miriam Brown testified that on the day of the shooting, Duncan

picked her up and drove her to Hinesville, driving a tan or gold SUV.

Bond was also in the vehicle, and the two men were wearing army

fatigues, jeans, and black shirts. On the drive to Hinesville, Bond

and Duncan showed her a gas mask and a bulletproof vest, and

Duncan passed a black gun to Bond. Duncan and Bond dropped off

                                 3
Brown. When they picked her up later that day, she heard one of

them say, “I can’t believe it,” that they had killed someone, and that

they had shot “him” three times because “he had seen his face.”

Duncan and Bond said that they had gone to the victim’s house to

“kick in the door” and that they took a safe that was full of “eight

balls,” which Brown said meant crack cocaine.

     Bruce Coleman testified that he was at Tapco on the morning

of the shooting and went to the store with Duncan and Bond in

Duncan’s gold SUV. Before dropping Coleman off at the Pineland

Apartment complex where Coleman’s girlfriend lived, Duncan and

Bond talked about “a lick,” which Coleman described as a robbery,

and Coleman declined their invitation to join them. Later that day,

Coleman saw Duncan drop off Platt and Bond at Pineland. Bond

said they had robbed and shot someone, possibly killing the victim.

Coleman did not believe Bond, so he went to ask Platt, who had

walked away. Platt said that “they” probably had killed “him” and

showed Coleman a gun that Platt said was used during the robbery.

     Steve Plair, Bond’s older brother who also lived at Tapco at the

                                  4
time of the shooting, said that on the morning of the shooting,

Duncan and Bond were outside the mobile home discussing robbing

someone. Plair said that Platt, Bond, and Duncan were at his mobile

home later that night, and Platt had a revolver. Plair testified that

the three men left, and 35 to 45 minutes later, Plair heard gunshots.

Plair saw Platt a few days later, and Platt admitted to shooting

someone called “Little Dave.” Platt said that when he was in the

victim’s mobile home, Platt’s face covering slipped, so he guessed the

victim saw him. Platt said he shot the victim three times, while

Duncan retrieved the safe. Plair admitted that on the night of the

shooting, he hid from police but later turned himself in. Plair was

arrested because someone identified him as being involved in the

shooting, but he denied being involved and said he knew nothing.

Plair later told police about Platt’s statements, admitting that he

did so only after being charged with murder in this case — charges

that were ultimately dismissed.

     During the investigation, Duncan led police to a field where

they found, among other things, a stocking cap that had hairs inside,

                                  5
a camouflage shirt and pants, a gas mask, and a safe that had “3A2”

written on it. The same inscription — “3A2” — was also written on

a key found in the victim’s pocket. Police also found one 9mm shell

casing at the bottom of the steps to the victim’s mobile home and

another in Duncan’s vehicle, and a firearms expert testified that

they were fired from the same weapon.

     Platt was interviewed by police on two different days. During

the second interview, which was recorded and played for the jury at

trial, Platt admitted participating in the armed robbery and that

Jones was shot during the crime. He denied shooting Jones. Platt,

Duncan, and Bond were charged with several crimes, and following

a jury trial, Platt was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery,

burglary, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

crime.

     1.   Platt argues that the trial court should have granted a

mistrial based on the State’s untimely disclosure that it had

compared the hairs found in the recovered stocking cap against

Plair’s hair and found the results inconclusive. We disagree.

                                 6
     Platt filed a pretrial discovery motion, requesting, among other

things, the results of all scientific tests and all Brady material. Two

weeks before trial, defense counsel met with the prosecutor, the lead

investigator Detective Snider, and other police officers, to review

every exhibit the State intended to introduce at trial. The State did

not at that time disclose to Platt that it had tested Plair’s hair with

inconclusive results.

     During opening statements, Platt’s counsel told the jury that,

although the State had compared the hair recovered from the

stocking cap to the defendants in the case and did not find a match,

the State never compared those hairs to hair samples from Plair. In

fact, that was not true: unbeknownst to trial counsel, the State had

made that comparison, although the results were inconclusive. After

opening statements and during a recess, the State disclosed to Platt

for the first time that it had tested Plair’s hair with inconclusive

results. Platt moved for a mistrial and called Detective Snider in

support of that motion. Detective Snider testified that a few weeks

before trial, he talked to the GBI agent who conducted the test on

                                  7
Plair’s hair, and was told that the initial comparison was

“tentatively” inconclusive, the agent would prepare a final report

after peer review, and the agent would submit samples for DNA

testing, which Detective Snider understood to mean that the agent

had only looked at the hair samples under a microscope. Detective

Snider confirmed that, although testing results for Platt and other

defendants were provided to Platt as part of discovery, no

information about the testing of Plair’s hair was provided. Detective

Snider said he had not talked to the GBI agent since being informed

of the inconclusive results.

     The court denied the mistrial motion, concluding that the

results did not “help or hurt either side.” The court allowed Platt’s

counsel to reopen opening statements. Counsel told the jury that he

made a misstatement about Plair’s hair never having been tested

and this was caused by the State’s failure to disclose this

information. Counsel insisted that the State was “hiding evidence,”

that he had been subjected to “trial by ambush,” that he had been

unable to prepare the defense adequately or conduct independent

                                 8
testing of the hair given the last-minute disclosure, and that this

was “all the reasonable doubt” the jury needed.

     On appeal, Platt argues that the untimely disclosure impaired

his defense and that a mistrial was therefore warranted. A trial

court is vested with broad discretion as to whether to grant a

mistrial, and a court’s decision not to grant one will not be disturbed

on appeal unless there is a showing that a mistrial was essential to

preserve a party’s right to a fair trial. See Jordan v. State, 305 Ga.

12, 15 (2) (823 SE2d 336) (2019); Ragan v. State, 299 Ga. 828, 833-

834 (3) (792 SE2d 342) (2016).

     Platt argues primarily that a mistrial was necessary to remedy

the State’s violation of Brady. Under Brady,

     the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
     to an accused upon request violates due process where the
     evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
     irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
     prosecution. This includes the suppression of
     impeachment evidence that may be used to challenge the
     credibility of a witness.

Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 863 (1) (860 SE2d 432) (2021) (citations

and punctuation omitted); see also Chavez v. State, 307 Ga. 804, 813

                                  9
(3) (837 SE2d 766) (2020) (to be entitled to a new trial, a defendant

must show that the evidence is “material to his guilt or punishment”

(citation and punctuation omitted)). Evidence is “material” in this

context when “there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result is one

in which the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the

outcome of the trial.” Chavez, 307 Ga. at 813 (3) (citations and

punctuation omitted). “In the case of an untimely disclosure, a

defendant must show that an earlier disclosure would have

benefited the defense and that the delayed disclosure deprived him

of a fair trial.” Anglin v. State, 312 Ga. 503, 510 (2) (b) (863 SE2d

148) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). Platt has failed to

make this showing.

     Platt first argues that the untimely disclosure affected his

opening statement, and that the entire defense, as reflected by the

opening statement, became “unsupported” by the late disclosure.

Although the untimely disclosure undermined his statement about

                                  10
a lack of testing, Platt was able to argue to the jury that the State

was “hiding evidence,” creating doubt as to the thoroughness of the

State’s investigation.

     Platt also argues that the untimely disclosure hampered his

defense, but he does not show how he would have altered his defense

if given the information sooner. Platt claims that he could have

procured independent DNA testing of the hair had he been made

aware of the inconclusive results sooner, and that he could have used

this information to impeach Plair and establish his motive for saying

that Platt confessed to him that Platt shot Jones. Platt’s arguments

are meritless. Platt knew about the hair recovered from the stocking

cap. Although he thought the hair had not been compared to Plair’s

hair, as reflected by his initial opening statement, there is no

evidence in the record that he ever sought to secure independent

DNA testing of the recovered hair prior to trial. And Platt’s claim

about what the DNA testing would reveal is purely speculative, as

there is no evidence of such testing. Platt argues in his appellate

brief that “[i]t could have been [Plair’s] hair in the stocking cap[,]”

                                  11
but further testing could have alternatively revealed that the hair

belonged to Platt. In any case, whatever the results of DNA testing

would have revealed, Platt has not shown that any further

impeachment of Plair would have made a meaningful difference.

Moreover, Platt was able to impeach Plair about his motive for

saying that Platt confessed to the crime, suggesting that Plair

named Platt only after Plair himself was charged in the case. See

Hood v. State, 311 Ga. 855, 864-865 (1) (860 SE2d 432) (2021)

(although full scope of witness’s “possible incentives to cooperate

with the State was not made known to the jury, the jury was

nonetheless aware there was reason to regard his testimony with

skepticism[,]” and witness’s testimony was largely cumulative of

other evidence, so defendant was unable to establish materiality).

Because Platt has shown only a mere possibility that additional

testing would have been favorable to his defense, he has failed to

show a Brady violation. See Mitchell v. State, 307 Ga. 855, 862 (2)

(b) (838 SE2d 847) (2020) (rejecting Brady claim as not establishing

materiality because defendant offered no evidence in support of his

                                12
speculation that had he been provided with information about

fingerprints lifted from a taxi where the victim was found dead, he

could have procured independent testing that would have helped his

defense).

     Platt also argues that the State’s failure to disclose the

inconclusive results violated statutory disclosure rules. Specifically,

Platt argues that the State violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) by failing

to reduce to writing the GBI agent’s oral report and failing to provide

him with a copy of the same. By its terms, however, the statute

imposes a duty on the State to provide the results of scientific

testing, including if a report is “oral or partially oral,” only “if the

state intends to introduce [the results of the testing] in evidence in

its case-in-chief or in rebuttal[.]” See OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4). 3 There

     3 The subparagraph provides:

     The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to
     trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at
     a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect
     and copy or photograph a report of any physical or mental
     examinations and of scientific tests or experiments, including a
     summary of the basis for the expert opinion rendered in the report,
     or copies thereof, if the state intends to introduce in evidence in its

                                       13
was no indication that the State intended to introduce into evidence

the “inconclusive results” of the testing of Plair’s hair, so Platt has

failed to demonstrate a violation of OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4). Because

the untimely disclosure did not violate Brady or OCGA § 17-16-4 (a)

(4), Platt’s claim that the trial court erred in failing to remedy such

violations necessarily fails.

     2.    Platt argues that the trial court should have also granted

a mistrial, or at least a continuance, due to the State’s untimely

disclosure that Platt’s first custodial interview had been recorded

when it had previously represented otherwise. We disagree.

     At a Jackson-Denno 4 hearing before trial, the investigator who

had interviewed Platt, Detective Howard, testified that he

     case-in-chief or in rebuttal the results of the physical or mental
     examination or scientific test or experiment. If the report is oral or
     partially oral, the prosecuting attorney shall reduce all relevant
     and material oral portions of such report to writing and shall serve
     opposing counsel with such portions no later than ten days prior to
     trial. Nothing in this Code section shall require the disclosure of
     any other material, note, or memorandum relating to the
     psychiatric or psychological treatment or therapy of any victim or
     witness.

OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (4) (emphasis added).
    4 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).

                                      14
interviewed Platt on two different days, the second interview a full

day after the first. Detective Howard testified that although he

proposed recording the first interview, he did not actually do so. He

testified that the second interview was recorded and that Platt’s

statements during the first interview were consistent with those

given at the second interview.

     Apparently based on this testimony, Platt argued during

opening statements that the jury was not going to hear what

happened during the first interview because it was not recorded; the

jury would hear only what a police officer says happened; and the

jury would hear only Platt’s statements that were recorded after he

had spent a night in a jail where the victim’s father worked, which

would have instilled fear into Platt.

     During the lunch break on the second day of the trial, the State

informed defense counsel that Platt’s first interview had, in fact,

been recorded. Defense counsel listened to the recording once over

the lunch break and asked for a mistrial because the “new evidence

. . . contradicts a good bit of what I’ve been saying and the way I’ve

                                  15
tailored the defense in this — you know, during this trial for the past

day and a half.” Defense counsel alternatively asked for a

continuance “at least for the rest of the day” to allow counsel to

review the recording more thoroughly and incorporate the evidence

into Platt’s defense.

     The prosecutor stated that she did not know about the

recording until the second day of trial when Detective Howard

mentioned it during a conversation; the prosecutor said she

immediately let defense counsel know and suggested as a remedy

that the recording not be played. Defense counsel noted in response

that Platt’s statements were not the same during the two interviews,

as he did not inculpate himself in the first interview. Defense

counsel later observed that this was the second piece of evidence

that was not timely disclosed. In response, the prosecutor said she

did not want to “start all over again. But if the Court feels that’s the

thing to do out of fairness, the State’s really not . . . .” The trial court

denied the motion before the prosecutor finished her statement.

     Responding to the continuance request, the prosecutor did not

                                    16
object to giving defense counsel the rest of the day to review the

recording, but preferred to break for just three hours because the

prosecutor had planned to call a witness who was travelling that day

and wanted to get her “in and out.” The court asked if the jury

should hear “the truth about all this,” and defense counsel said, “we

have to . . . I don’t see how we can’t tell them, you know, that there’s

two pieces of evidence.” After confirming that counsel had listened

to the recording, the trial court denied a continuance.

     The recordings of both interviews were ultimately played for

the jury during Detective Howard’s testimony. As captured in the

recording of the first interview, Platt admitted to being in Tapco

during the robbery and seeing parts of it from a nearby mobile home,

but he denied being involved or knowing who shot Jones. During

cross-examination, Platt elicited testimony that Detective Howard

had previously testified at the Jackson-Denno hearing that Platt

never denied being involved in the robbery.

     Platt argues on appeal that the State’s failure to advise him

that his first interview was recorded and provide him a copy of that

                                  17
recording violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1), and that a mistrial was

warranted under the remedies available under OCGA § 17-16-6

because he showed that the State acted in bad faith and he was

prejudiced as a result. For its part, the State does not dispute that

it violated OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (1) by failing to advise Platt that the

first interview was recorded and allow him to inspect or copy it in

advance of trial. Instead, the State argues that the trial court’s

remedial actions were adequate under OCGA § 17-16-6.

     As stated above, a trial court has broad discretion to grant or

deny a mistrial. This discretion also applies to whether to grant a

mistrial as a remedy under OCGA § 17-16-6. See Tubbs v. State, 276

Ga. 751, 753-754 (3) (583 SE2d 853) (2003). A court also has the

discretion to grant a continuance as a remedy for a violation of

OCGA § 17-16-6. Id. at 753-753 (2), (3). As explained above, we will

not overturn a trial court’s decision to deny a mistrial unless a

mistrial was essential to preserve the right to a fair trial. And to

obtain a new trial from the improper denial of a continuance request,

a defendant must show harm. See Harris v. State, 309 Ga. 599, 609

                                 18
(3) (847 SE2d 563) (2020). Platt has failed to make these showings.

     (i)      A mistrial was not essential to preserve Platt’s right to
     a fair trial.

     Platt argues that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure

because he had referenced the fact that the first interview was not

recorded in his opening statement. But Platt does not show how the

late disclosure harmed him.

     He first argues that he was prejudiced because he referred to

the first interview in his opening statement and it formed the basis

of his defense. But he referred to that interview to suggest that he

did not initially admit participating in the crime and made his

admission during the second interview only as a result of fear after

spending a night in jail. The recording of that first interview only

bolstered this argument. In that recording, Platt admits to being in

Tapco during the robbery and knowing about it, but he denied being

involved or knowing who shot Jones. The recording thus supported,

rather than undermined, Platt’s opening statement where he

suggested that his confession in the second interview was not

                                  19
truthful.

      Platt next argues that he was prejudiced because Detective

Howard testified at the motions hearing that Platt’s statements in

the two interviews were consistent. But Platt was able to use the

recording to impeach Detective Howard’s credibility by showing that

Detective Howard’s prior testimony was not accurate, and he has

not shown how an earlier disclosure would have made any difference

in this respect.

      Platt also argues that he was prejudiced by the untimely

disclosure because he had to question three of the State’s most

important witnesses without a “correct” version of events as relayed

in the first interview. But this claim is vague and unsupported. Platt

does not identify which witnesses he considers to be “most

important.” But more importantly, he does he show how he would

have examined these witnesses differently had the recording been

disclosed sooner.5

      5 In one part of his brief, Platt notes that the State called five witnesses

after lunch (after he listened to the recording), lists four witnesses (“Detective

                                       20
      Platt contends that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s

failure to “remedy the situation with the jury” despite having

“promised” to do so.6 In support of this argument, Platt relies on Lee

v. State, 306 Ga. 663 (832 SE2d 851) (2019), where this Court stated

that a trial court acts within its discretion to deny a motion for

mistrial “when it provides adequate curative instructions to the jury

to cure any prejudice stemming from the introduction of the

improper evidence.” Id. at 669. But as already made clear, Platt has

demonstrated no prejudice resulting from the late disclosure of the

recording; instead, the recording seemed to help his defense and he

has not shown any harm from the delayed disclosure.

      Platt next relies on the State’s apparent lack of opposition to a

mistrial as evidence that the trial court should have granted one.

Snider, a GBI crime lab tools examiner, Plair, and Detective Howard”), and
then states “the newly-disclosed recording impacted all three.” Even assuming
Platt was referring to Detective Snider, Detective Howard, and Plair as the
“three most important” witnesses, he does not explain what line of questioning
he would have pursued had he known about the recording sooner. And as
discussed, he was able to use the recording to impeach Detective Howard.
       6 In his brief, Platt cites the trial court’s question about whether it should

tell the jury the “truth” about the recording, but there is nothing in this
exchange to show that it promised some sort of curative instruction.
                                         21
Platt seems to focus on the prosecutor’s response to whether it

requested the court deny the motion for mistrial. The prosecutor did

not finish her sentence before the trial court denied the motion, so it

is not entirely clear what position the prosecutor was taking. But

even if the prosecutor’s statement is read as an apparent lack of

objection, this does not establish that a mistrial was necessary. At

most, the prosecutor’s statements show her acknowledgement of the

fact that the court could grant a mistrial; those statements fell short

of showing that the court was required to grant one. See Hightower

v. State, 315 Ga. 399, 404 (2) (883 SE2d 335) (2023) (simply because

“reasonable” minds may differ about whether other alternatives are

proper is not dispositive of whether a trial court abused its discretion

in deciding whether to grant a mistrial). We conclude that Platt has

failed to show that a mistrial was necessary to preserve his right to

a fair trial.

      (ii)    Even if the court abused its discretion in denying Platt
      a continuance, he has not shown harm to warrant a new trial.

      Platt alternatively argues that the trial court should have at

                                  22
least granted his unopposed request for a continuance. But even if

the trial court abused its discretion in denying that request, Platt

cannot obtain a new trial unless he shows harm. See Harris v. State,

309 Ga. 599, 609 (3) (847 SE2d 563) (2020). Platt argues that he

needed more time to study the recording and prepare, but he makes

no showing how additional time would have benefitted him. See

Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785, 789 (2) (822 SE2d 195) (2018) (“To

show harm, a party is required to specifically identify what other

evidence or witnesses he would have put forth in his defense if his

counsel had been given more time to prepare; speculation and

conjecture are not enough.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

Moreover, as discussed above, Platt demonstrated no prejudice from

the untimely disclosure of the recording, as the recording seemed to

help, rather than harm, Platt’s defense. Because Platt has failed to

show how any additional time to prepare harmed him, this

argument fails. 7

      7 Although the claims of untimely disclosure do not warrant reversal, we

do not condone the State’s failure to comply with its legal obligations.
                                       23
     3.   Platt argues that the prosecutor violated OCGA § 17-8-75

by “identifying” him for three witnesses, and the trial court erred by

failing to take some curative action. From a review of the record, it

appears that the witnesses had an obstructed view of the defense

table where Platt was sitting, and the prosecutor attempted to point

out Platt’s location in the courtroom. The prosecutor did nothing

more than say where Platt was located.

     OCGA § 17-8-75 provides:

     Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements
     of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the
     duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same. On
     objection made, the court shall also rebuke the counsel
     and by all needful and proper instructions to the jury
     endeavor to remove the improper impression from their
     minds; or, in his discretion, he may order a mistrial if the
     prosecuting attorney is the offender.

     We are dubious that the prosecutor’s actions were “statements

of prejudicial matters” triggering a requirement for the trial court to

take curative action under OCGA § 17-8-75. The jury was no doubt

well aware that Platt was on trial and was sitting at the defense

table. There is no indication that the prosecutor did anything more

                                  24
than to make sure witnesses knew where Platt was.

     But even if this amounted to a violation of OCGA § 17-8-75,

any error in failing to prevent the prosecutor from making continued

“identifications” of Platt or issuing a curative instruction was

harmless.

     [A] trial court’s error in not fulfilling its duty under OCGA
     § 17-8-75 is subject to harmless error analysis. For
     nonconstitutional harmless error, the State has the
     burden to show that it was highly probable that the error
     did not contribute to the verdict.

Caldwell v. State, 313 Ga. 640, 648 (2) (872 SE2d 712) (2022)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

     Here, any error was harmless given the strong evidence of

Platt’s guilt. Even setting aside Platt’s second recorded interview in

which he admitted participating in the armed robbery, other

evidence showed that Platt shot Jones or, at the very least,

participated in the armed robbery. Plair testified that Platt said he

shot the victim during a robbery when Platt’s face covering fell off

and allowed him to see Platt. Bruce Coleman also heard Duncan and

Bond talk on the day of the shooting about a planning a “lick,” or

                                  25
robbery, and when he saw them afterward, he heard from Platt and

Bond that they carried out the robbery and “probably” killed

someone. Miriam Brown and Platt’s sister testified that on the day

of the shooting, Platt, Duncan, Bond, and Plair were playing with a

gun and wearing clothing that was later recovered from the same

field where a safe appearing to belong to the victim was also found.

Given the strength of the evidence, and the jury’s awareness that

Platt was on trial and was sitting at the defense table, it is highly

probable that the prosecutor’s actions in pointing out Platt as the

defendant to witnesses did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

     4.   Platt next argues that the cumulative prejudice from the

trial court’s errors warranted a new trial. We disagree.

     To establish cumulative error, Platt must establish that “at

least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and

considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors

so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied [him] a

fundamentally fair trial.” Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 567-568 (6) (883

SE2d 773) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Above, we

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assume, without deciding, that the trial court may have erred in

failing to grant Platt a continuance related to the State’s untimely

disclosure that Platt’s first custodial interview had been recorded

and in failing to take some curative action with respect to the

prosecutor’s identification of Platt to witnesses. As explained above,

these errors produced very little, if any, harm. Therefore, given the

strength of the evidence, even if these assumed errors could be

considered cumulatively, the cumulative prejudice did not deny

Platt a fair trial.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

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