Court Opinion

ID: 9755260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:32:27.848962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:05.740334
License: Public Domain

Peck, J.,
dissenting. The urgent need to reduce the backlog of decisions already argued before the Court persuades me, almost against my better judgment, to abbreviate my dissent. The result reached by the majority, and the tortuous rationale which supports it, cry aloud for a far more extensive and detailed analysis of the sophisms and other flaws with which the opinion is replete. Excessive activism and a preconceived conclusion are manifest between every line.
Although thé majority attempts to downplay In re Gage, 137 Vt. 16, 398 A.2d 297 (1979), the opinion here is a clear repudiation of that case and overrules it by implication. The conduct of the grievant in Gage, notwithstanding its casual and somewhat arrogant nature was, speaking idiomatically, “small potatoes” when measured by the conduct of the grievant here. Yet, in that case, we did not hesitate to examine the whole record and reverse the Board’s order which had set aside the dismissal of grievant Gage. The full Court, as then constituted, applying the common sense for which today’s majority substitutes arcane legalese, said: “[W]e find from the record before us, that just cause for dismissal existed as a matter of law. ” Id. at 20, 398 A.2d at 299 (emphasis added).
Gage is a clear precedent for a like reversal here if, for no other reason than that grievant’s misconduct was far more serious and extensive. Moreover, two items on the calendar of reasons for grievant’s dismissal in the present action, the furnishing of agency material to outside officials and programs without required prior supervisory review and approval, are analogous to certain employee conduct in In re Morrissey, 149 Vt. 1, 538 A.2d 678 (1987), acknowledged by this Court as proper grounds for dismissal. Consistent? I think not.
Based on the record, the Board clearly substituted its own preference and judgment for that of the employer. This is a practice we condemned emphatically in Gage, 137 Vt. at 19, 398 A.2d at 299. The dismissal procedure, including, inter alia, warnings and *278notice, were without fault. The grievant’s conduct was intolerable, many-faceted, and fully documented; it was tolerated as long as could be fairly expected of any employer. There is not the slightest evidence that his dismissal was arbitrary in any respect.
Secondly, notwithstanding an attempted disclaimer contained in the opinion, the Board, with the imprimatur of the majority, has established at last what it has been attempting intermittently for years, at least since In re Brooks, 135 Vt. 563, 382 A.2d 204 (1977). It is a successful powerplay, establishing entirely new standards for review of dismissals, which will make it unreasonably difficult to terminate even the most incompetent and recalcitrant employees. Indeed, it appears that the new standard is so limiting that job performance has little relevance. For all practical purposes, the Board has arrogated to itself the exclusive power to retain or terminate employees, regardless of either conduct or competency. The right of the employer has been reduced to little more than an intermediate step; something, as it were, in the nature of a recommendation.
To say, as the majority does, that this new standard falls within the “letter and spirit” of prior decisions is a statement which, as a matter of politesse, I will call inaccurate. It is not justified; this new standard sanctions substitution of judgment. It is an extreme and radical departure from our precedential decisions.
A final observation. The majority notes, very cleverly, that the grievant apparently had no problems with his prior supervisor. Because of the obvious, albeit sly, implication of that comment, I cannot let it pass without notice. Assuming such to be the fact, it is irrelevant to any issue here. Anyone with even a limited experience with personnel work knows very will that there are supervisors and supervisors, with styles and competence as varied as the individuals who act in that capacity. Some actually supervise very little if at all; some will determine employee performance ratings based only on merit; others, simply to be popular or to escape unpleasant confrontations, will grant “excellent” ratings to virtually all subordinates regardless of merit. Some supervisors are more diligent or strict, or both, than others. There is nothing to suggest that grievant’s supervisor was incompetent or unfair to him. To suggest otherwise by unsupported innuendo is unworthy of the majority.
In any event, regardless of what may have been a different style of supervision, grievant received notices of his shortcomings and *279ignored them. The majority’s statement is unfair in its implications and out of place in the opinion.
The record here, as it did in Gage, clearly shows the existence of just cause. The dismissal should be reinstated as it has been in our prior- decisions in similar cases.
I am authorized to say that Justice Mahady joins in this dissent.