Court Opinion

ID: 9597278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:57:16.039054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:16.758730
License: Public Domain

*796Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The Disciplinary Board's recommendation of disbarment which is adopted by the majority is in my view "clearly excessive, weighing the nature of the misconduct against the hardships imposed on the attorney." In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 96, 667 P.2d 608 (1983). I dissent.
While ” [1] awyers must preserve the integrity of entrusted funds", In re Moynihan, 97 Wn.2d 237, 238, 643 P.2d 439 (1982), disbarment for failure to do so is not automatic. See In re Noble, supra. The appropriate sanction must be determined on a case-by-case basis after considering all the circumstances. In re Salvesen, 94 Wn.2d 73, 614 P.2d 1264 (1980). In making this determination, this court is committed to the proposition that the primary purpose of attorney discipline is not only to punish the attorney for his misconduct but to protect the public and deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. In re Smith, 83 Wn.2d 659, 521 P.2d 212 (1974).
The attorney in this case is a sole practitioner who was admitted to practice in this state in 1968. In well over a decade of practice, he never was the subject of a disciplinary proceeding other than the subject one. The action and charges relating thereto all arise from his mismanagement of a single estate. The probate of this estate was complex and beset with numerous problems unconnected with those of the attorney's own making. Nothing in the findings by the Board suggest that the attorney intended to deprive the estate of any funds.1 Despite these facts, the majority concludes that Vetter should be disbarred.
In Noble this court, in discussing the seriousness of the 90-day suspension, noted that the attorney must notify all his clients that he is being suspended, that a notice proclaiming his suspension would be published in the Washington State Bar News and a newspaper of general *797circulation, and that the attorney would suffer considerable financial loss. If a 90-day suspension, where the attorney failed to return the $25,000 he had stolen from his father's estate and never repaid, was appropriate in Noble, then a disbarment is most certainly out of line here.2
The majority, in adopting the Board's recommendation of suspension, states at page 795 that
Finally, we look at the degree of agreement among the Board members as to the recommended sanction. Here, the Board unanimously recommended disbarment of respondent. This court gives serious consideration to the Board's recommendations; we will only reject a unanimous decision when we can articulate specific reasons for doing so. In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d at 95.
I feel that if we take such a position we abdicate our responsibility for determining the ultimate sanction for attorney misconduct. See In re McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983); In re Clark, 99 Wn.2d 702, 663 P.2d 1339 (1983); In re Espedal, 82 Wn.2d 834, 514 P.2d 518 (1973). Further, the Board's recommendation is not always sound. In In re Noble, supra, the Board recommended a 90-day suspension on the condition that the attorney repay the misappropriated money within 90 days of its recommendation. The money ($25,000) was not repaid 4 years later and yet this court continued to honor the Board's recommendation. It would seem to me if restitution of the estate funds was the cornerstone of the 90-day recommendation, failure to do so should terminate the recommendation, or at least the Board should have had an opportunity to review the matter. We should be wary of automatically accepting the Board's recommendation especially when conditions on which it is grounded are flagrantly violated. We should carefully scrutinize each case and reach our own conclusions and discipline.
In the present action, I feel that the circumstances totally *798fail to warrant disbarment. A 1-year suspension, in my view, would be appropriate and fair, In re Noble, supra.
Goodloe, J., concurs with Dore, J.

Petitioner without a court order of authorization paid himself attorney's fees from estate moneys for accrued estate work. He later voluntarily paid the money back.

Noble's brother, a 50 percent beneficiary of his father's estate, had not received a dime 4 years after his father's death and at the time the Noble decision was released.