Court Opinion

ID: 9950251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 17:00:27.485944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:17.505718
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-2386
                                       __________

                                  W. SCOTT PEDDER,
                                        Appellant

                                             v.

                        COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
                       ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Western District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 3-21-cv-00153)
                        District Judge: Honorable Alan N. Bloch
                      ____________________________________

                 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                March 12, 2024
      Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 13, 2024)
                                     ___________

                                       OPINION*
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
       W. Scott Pedder appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellee’s motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s

judgment.

       In July 2013, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Pedder disabled based on

a leg injury from a motorcycle accident. Because the injury was expected to improve, the

ALJ recommended that Pedder’s case be reviewed in two years to determine whether he

was still disabled. To this end, Pedder was examined by Dr. James Frommer in July

2017. At the initial administrative review, Dr. Diane Fox determined that Pedder’s

disability had ceased. Pedder sought reconsideration of that decision, and Dr. Nghia Van

Tran agreed with Dr. Fox. Pedder appealed that determination to an ALJ.

       After a hearing, the ALJ performed the five-step analysis for determining whether

Pedder was disabled, including, inter alia, evaluating Pedder’s physical impairments and

his residual functional capacity. See Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d

Cir. 2019) (describing five-step analysis). The ALJ determined that Pedder was capable

of medium work with some limitations and that suitable jobs existed in significant

numbers in the national economy. The ALJ concluded on December 4, 2018, that

Pedder’s disability ended on August 31, 2017, and that he had not become disabled again

since that date. Pedder requested review from the Appeals Council, but it denied review.

Pedder then filed a complaint in the District Court. The District Court affirmed the ALJ’s

decision, and Pedder filed a timely notice of appeal.

       We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291. Because the Appeals Council denied

review, the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision. See Matthews v. Apfel,

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239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). We review agency factfinding under a substantial

evidence standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, the reviewing court

looks to whether sufficient evidence, i.e., “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate,” supports the factual determination. See Biestek v. Berryhill,

139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation omitted). We are not permitted to re-weigh the

evidence or impose our own factual findings. See Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667

F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).

       In his brief, Pedder requests a hearing so that he can provide evidence that Dr.

Frommer was dishonest in his opinion. Evidence that was not before the ALJ cannot

support a determination that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence. Id. A District Court may remand a case for further action if there is new,

material evidence and good cause for the failure to incorporate the evidence into the

record at the prior proceeding. See § 405(g). Pedder, however, has not shown good

cause for failing to provide this evidence at his hearing. Likewise, the fact that Pedder

was later found disabled based on more recent medical evidence is not material to the

ALJ’s determination that Pedder was not disabled in August 2017. The District Court did

not err in not remanding the matter.

       Pedder complains that the ALJ gave more weight to Dr. Frommer’s opinion and

not the records from Pedder’s treating doctor, Dr. Fowler. While the agency generally

gives more weight to medical opinions from treating sources, see 20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(2), Pedder does not point to any medical opinion evidence by Dr. Fowler in

the administrative record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (defining medical opinion as

                                             3
“a statement from a medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [his]

impairment(s) and whether [he has] one or more impairment-related limitations or

restrictions”).

       Pedder disputes Dr. Frommer’s statement that Pedder did not use a cane at his

examination. However, he does not explain how this undermines the evidence supporting

the ALJ’s decision, which is the decision we are reviewing. In concluding that Pedder

had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work, the ALJ noted that Pedder

needed a cane to walk long distances on an occasional basis. A.R. at 14.

       Pedder also challenges Dr. Frommer’s opinion that he had full grip of his hands

and no arthritis in his leg. We note that the ALJ described Pedder’s capacity as limited to

occasional fine fingering with the upper left extremity, A.R. at 14, and explained that the

limited medium residual functional capacity accounted for the osteoarthritis of the left

knee. A.R. at 17. In describing Pedder’s fine motor activity skills, Dr. Frommer stated,

“[h]and and finger dexterity intact. Grip strength 5/5 bilaterally. He was able to zip,

button, and tie, although there was some difficulty due to his inability to flex his index

fingers bilaterally.” A.R. at 578. Thus, there was substantial evidence in the record to

support the ALJ’s conclusions with respect to Pedder’s fine motor skills. See also A.R. at

745-46 (Dr. Kaufman describing the condition of Pedder’s left hand). In addition to this

and other medical records and opinions, there was evidence supporting the ALJ’s

conclusions with respect to Pedder’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., A.R. at 16-17

(noting that Pedder was able to dress and bathe himself, care for his elderly mother,

                                              4
prepare meals, do laundry, mow the lawn, pull weeds, trim hedges, hunt, fish, and change

the oil in his car).

       Pedder suggests that, in denying review, the Appeals Council did not read his

evidence. As noted above, however, we review the ALJ’s decision and not that of the

Appeals Council. Moreover, that the Appeals Council denied review does not mean that

it did not consider Pedder’s evidence.

       We agree with the District Court that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that Pedder was not disabled. There is sufficient evidence in the

administrative record to support the ALJ’s determinations regarding Pedder’s

impairments, his residual functional capacity, and the jobs available in the national

economy. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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