Court Opinion

ID: 9403627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 15:07:39.860573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:08.418216
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1069
                              Filed June 21, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

KRISTLE CAY CURTIS,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Michelle M.

Wagner, District Associate Judge.

      A defendant appeals her conviction for operating while intoxicated, first

offense. AFFIRMED.

      Stuart G. Hoover, East Dubuque, Illinois, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.

       Kristle Curtis was found guilty of operating while intoxicated, first offense, in

violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (Supp. 2021). Before trial, Curtis moved to

suppress portions of the State’s video evidence where she directed racial slurs and

other insults towards the arresting officers. The district court denied her motion,

and the jury heard the full videotape evidence, including the racial slurs. On

appeal, Curtis argues the evidence was unfairly prejudicial—because Curtis failed

to preserve error, we affirm her conviction.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.

       Just before midnight on November 20, 2021, Officer Nicholas Weber saw a

white car pull into the parking lot of a retirement community in Waterloo. Because

this was uncommon in his experience with the location, he followed the vehicle

until it parked and then drove by it slowly to see the license plate number and who

was driving. Based on the driver’s longer hair, Officer Weber assumed it was a

woman. Then Officer Weber drove out of the parking lot and waited at a nearby

intersection; about fifteen minutes later, the car drove past him again. Officer

Weber followed the vehicle to an intersection, where the vehicle stopped. There,

he testified, “it appeared that a subject was thrown from the driver’s side of the

vehicle, and there was a brief altercation of sorts between the two people next to

the driver’s side of the vehicle.” One occupant of the car who had exited on the

driver’s side of the vehicle, Curtis, had shoulder-length hair. The other, a man with

short hair, exited the passenger side door of the car, then he got back inside1—the

1Officer Weber testified he did not see the man reenter the car, but did see him
exit again.
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car’s brake lights came on, indicating someone was pressing the brakes, before

he exited the passenger side door again and sat on the curb. The male passenger

admitted to driving at least part of the way between the retirement community and

the car’s final resting place.

       After seeing the occupants leave the vehicle, Officer Weber next observed

Curtis vomiting and slurring her speech, so he believed she was impaired. After

Curtis requested medical care, an ambulance was called to the scene and she was

transported to the hospital.     Once Curtis was discharged from the hospital,

Sergeant John Koontz transferred her from the hospital to the Waterloo Police

Department. Eventually, because Officer Weber maintained Curtis was the one

driving the car into the retirement community parking lot, she was arrested and

transferred from the police department to the jail.

       Ahead of trial, Curtis moved in limine to suppress three discrete parts of

body camera footage from the police officers that showed Curtis arguing with

officers and using a racial slur;2 she argued those specific portions of the footage

were unfairly prejudicial. A hearing was held on the motion, and Curtis argued

that, because the instances where she used racial slurs were only portions of

longer videos, the footage was unnecessary to meet the State’s purpose of

showing her impairment and would only inflame the jury. Though there was no

evidence of Curtis’s blood alcohol level, Curtis was willing to stipulate that she was

intoxicated, but not that she drove the car; so, she argued the challenged portions

2 Curtis used the “n word” as she wished harm on the officers’ families, but we see
no reason to repeat the full context of the statements because it is the term rather
than the context of its use that she challenges as prejudicial.
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of the footage had no probative value. The State declined her stipulation, and

argued:

       Officer Weber indicates he sees her driving. But when we’re
       assessing credibility I think one thing that sticks out to me is the
       witness’s or the presenter’s appearance, conduct, age, intelligence,
       memory, and knowledge of the facts. And that prong, her conduct,
       her appearance, her memory those statements would go towards her
       credibility when they're assessing whether or not to believe her
       testimony if she chooses to testify or believe her statements that will
       be played for them that she denies driving when Officer Weber
       indicates he saw her driving.
              So the State’s position is that these statements should be
       submitted for the jury to consider, both to ascertain whether or not
       they believe the defendant is under the influence of alcohol or to
       assess her credibility under the credibility instruction.

The State also asserted the evidence of her impairment was necessary to show it

was alcohol-related and not due to any injury. The district court did not grant

Curtis’s motion in limine, finding the evidence was probative and not unfairly

prejudicial. After noting that there was no stipulation as to the intoxication, the

district court ruled:

       If the Court—I don’t really like to do limiting instructions but if the
       defense has asked for an instruction of only what they can consider
       it for, I would be happy to factor some jury instruction that they can
       only consider it to determine if she was under the influence. But at
       this time I do not believe that if [the jury] hear[s] that statement it
       would unfairly prejudice the defendant because I do believe it is
       needed for the jury to make a determination as to if Ms. Curtis was
       under the influence of alcohol.
                So at this time I am going to overrule Defendant’s motion in
       limine . . . I will allow the State to play the video with the statements
       and the defense can talk about if they would like some instruction
       prior, when we do instructions, to state that it is only to be used for
       determining if a person is under the influence.

(Emphasis added.)

       In her opening statement, Curtis conceded her intoxication and indicated

she was only contesting that she was the one driving. Over no objections, the jury
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heard the video evidence, including the sections with Curtis’s racial slurs. As for

the instructions to the jury, Curtis requested no limiting instruction to address its

use of the evidence containing the racial slurs.        After deliberations, the jury

returned a guilty verdict against Curtis. She filed a motion for a new trial, arguing

the video evidence should not have been shown to the jury; the district court denied

the motion. Curtis appeals that ruling, but first we determine if Curtis preserved

error on the admission of the video evidence.

II. Error Preservation.

       The State argues Curtis did not preserve error because she did not lodge

an objection contemporaneous to the evidence’s introduction. Our supreme court

recently explained that:

              Generally, denial of a motion in limine does not preserve error
       for appellate review. Motions in limine are procedural rulings that
       “serve[] the useful purpose of raising and pointing out before trial
       certain evidentiary rulings the court may be called upon to make
       during the course of the trial.” If denied, the resisting party must
       object at the time the evidence is offered at trial to preserve a
       challenge to the evidence on appeal. If sustained, the ruling
       “excludes reference or introduction of this evidence until its
       admissibility is determined by the trial court, outside the presence of
       a jury, in an offer of proof.” Error arises when the evidence is
       introduced at trial, not from ruling on the motion in limine.
              As with most rules, there is an exception. “[I]f the ruling [on
       the motion in limine] reaches the ultimate issue and declares the
       evidence admissible or inadmissible, it is ordinarily a final ruling and
       need not be questioned again during trial.”

State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620–21 (Iowa 2022) (alterations in original)

(citations omitted). Here, given the context of the district court’s ruling, the answer

comes down to whether the ruling was a final ruling that reached the ultimate issue

and declared the evidence admissible. See State v. Alberts, 722 N.W.2d 402, 406

(Iowa 2006). So,
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       where a motion in limine is resolved in such a way it is beyond
       question whether or not the challenged evidence will be admitted
       during trial, there is no reason to voice objection at such time during
       trial. In such a situation, the decision on the motion has the effect of
       a ruling.

State v. Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1975).            Put another way, was it

necessary to take the additional “procedural step [an objection and ruling] to the

introduction of allegedly objectionable evidence”? Quad City Bank & Tr. v. Jim

Kircher & Assocs., P.C., 804 N.W.2d 83, 89–91 (Iowa 2011).

       Advocating that Curtis had to object to the videos, the State points to the

district court’s use of the phrase “at this time” to show it was not a final ruling. True,

at the motion stage, the district court determined the evidence was coming in and

even suggested the possibility of a limiting instruction for the jury. See Alberts,

722 N.W.2d at 407 (noting “the plain language of the court’s ruling—‘I’m not going

to permit testimony or evidence concerning [R.M.’s] mental health or past sexual

comments or activities’—rings of a final ruling” even when “the district court did not

specifically state the evidence was ‘inadmissible’”). But the use of the term “at this

time” suggests that there might have come a time during the trial where the ruling

could be reconsidered. See Quad City Bank, 804 N.W.2d at 90–91 (finding a

motion-in-limine ruling was final when “[t]he court did not equivocate or state it

would reconsider its ruling at trial”); State v. Bassett, No. 21-0923, 2022 WL

16630788, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2022) (“[T]he court concludes by merely

noting, ‘[T]he Court will not grant the motion in limine at this time as to any such

evidence.     Rather, the Court will treat the motion in limine as a cautionary

statement.’    The court’s apparent final ruling on the motion in limine would

ordinarily preserve Bassett’s claims for appeal despite the lack of objections at
                                          7

trial.”); State v. Debettignies, No. 18-2061, 2019 WL 5790900, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Nov. 6, 2019) (finding the ruling not final because “during the motion in limine

hearing, the court said that, ‘at this point,’ the evidence is ‘going to be excluded

from the trial.’     But the court also said, ‘Maybe there’ll be additional

information . . . that will come in during the trial that would cause me to reevaluate

the relevance of this evidence.’”).

       This case falls somewhere in between the cases where it is clear that the

limine ruling is final and those where the district court might rule differently given

the evidence during the trial. Compare Wailes v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 861 N.W.2d 262,

264 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (holding error was not preserved as the court did not

issue a final ruling and there was no objection made to the evidence), with State

v. Daly, 623 N.W.2d 799, 800 (Iowa 2001) (reiterating that after the district court

confirmed at the motion stage that the ruling was final there was no question the

issue was resolved, so no objection at trial was required to preserve error). We

endorse the following guidance:

       The best practice is to avoid speculation on whether a particular
       ruling will be viewed as a final, unequivocal one. If possible to do so
       without prejudicing the client, counsel in most cases should renew
       the objection at trial. Otherwise, counsel should inquire of the court
       whether its ruling in limine is final and unequivocal. Unless the
       response is a positive one, failure to object and obtain a ruling during
       trial may constitute a waiver.

4A B. John Burns, Iowa Practice Series: Criminal Procedure § 10:3(h) (2022)

(footnotes omitted). So, returning to the issue here, we note the words of the

district court must be given due consideration to evaluate the unequivocal intent of

the ruling. “At this time,” used twice by the district court in reference to the ruling

on the motion in limine, must have some meaning. Because that language can
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mean the ruling could be reconsidered at a later time during the trial, the ruling was

not unequivocal. No one asked the district court what those references meant nor

if the ruling was indeed final. See James v. Miller, No. 07-1098, 2008 WL 2522119,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2008) (finding that the court’s repeated phrases

excluding evidence “at this point” indicate that the court’s ruling was not final as

the court noted it still had to review the documents). Thus, Curtis had to object to

the evidence at trial and make any arguments that supported her theory of

exclusion. Error was not preserved.

       Even so, because we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion,

on this record we would not find the district court abused its discretion. See

Thoren, 970 N.W.2d at 620. “A district court abuses its discretion when it bases

its decisions on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or to an extent that is clearly

unreasonable . . . [or] if it bases its conclusions on an erroneous application of the

law.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). “[Iowa Rule of Evidence] 5.403

allows a court to exclude ‘relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.’” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792,

807 (Iowa 2021). “‘Unfair prejudice’ is the ‘undue tendency to suggest decisions

on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one.’” State

v. Huston, 825 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 2013) (citation omitted). We follow a two-

part test to determine if evidence should be excluded under this rule: “First, we

consider the probative value of the evidence. Second, we balance the probative

value against the danger of its prejudicial or wrongful effect upon the triers of fact.”

State v. Einfeldt, 914 N.W.2d 773, 784 (Iowa 2018). “Because the weighing of

probative value against probable prejudice is not an exact science, we give a great
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deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make this judgment call.” State v.

Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 20–21 (Iowa 2006).

       As the case was submitted, the jury had to determine if Curtis was

intoxicated. And we agree with the district court that Curtis’s rantings during her

arrest was probative of Curtis’s intoxication3 because, as the court put it, the State

had to show Curtis was intoxicated by “show[ing] that her reason or mental ability

ha[d] been affected, her judgment was impaired, and her emotions [were] visibly

excited.” While Curtis regrets what she said and argues the jury would be inflamed

by her language, her demeanor and lack of judgment provides evidence indicative

of intoxication, just as slurred speech, vomiting, and her general belligerence might

support that element of proof.

       Our rules against unfair evidence recognize that evidence which “appeals

to the jury’s sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish,

or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause a jury to base its decision

on something other than the established propositions in the case.” State v. Plaster,

424 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1988). This is charged language, which both parties

agree is “uniquely vicious” and likely to elicit an emotional response. But the

behavior of intoxicated persons often fit that category. Here, the district court made

a judgment call as is its role, and we do not find it abused its discretion. See id. at

232 (noting the district court made the judgment call which “calls for a large

measure of individual judgment about the relative gravity of the imponderables.”).

3While the State argued at trial that it was also relevant to her credibility, the district
court ruled only that the evidence was relevant to her intoxication. The State does
not further the credibility argument on appeal.
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III. Conclusion.

      Because Curtis failed to preserve error on the admissibility of the evidence

she seeks to challenge on appeal, we affirm the conviction.

      AFFIRMED.