Court Opinion

ID: 9942592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 16:06:03.37851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:15.594328
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                          TRAVIS PALMER and
                          COFFEY TRIAL LAW,
                              Appellants,

                                     v.

                 THE FELICETTI LAW FIRM, PLLC, et al.,
                             Appellees.

                             No. 4D2023-0493

                            [February 21, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Keathan B. Frink, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE-19-
025931.

  Samuel Coffey of Coffey McPharlin Trial Lawyers, Fort Lauderdale, for
appellants.

  Jason Tenenbaum of Tenenbaum Law Group, PLLC, Coral Gables, for
appellee The Felicetti Law Firm, PLLC.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

    Appellants, Travis Palmer (“the client”) and Coffey Trial Law (“successor
counsel”), appeal the final order awarding The Felicetti Law Firm, PLLC
(“former counsel”) a charging lien in the amount of $110,000. Appellants
raise several arguments on appeal, only one of which warrants reversal.
Appellants argue the trial court awarded former counsel a charging lien in
excess of the amount provided for in former counsel’s retainer agreement.
We agree and reverse for the limited purpose of reducing the charging lien
amount.

    Former counsel initially represented the client in the underlying
personal injury lawsuit. Per the retainer agreement, the client agreed to
pay former counsel “40% of any recovery up to $1 million through the time
of the trial of the case.” The retainer agreement also included the following
provision regarding payment in the event former counsel was discharged:
       I reserve the right to discharge my attorney at any time. If I
       discharge my attorney, I agree to compensate him for his
       services rendered through the date of discharge, as well as
       reimburse him for the costs expended in handling my case. If
       I discharge my attorney, he shall be entitled to the same
       percentages of any recovery as noted above based on the last
       settlement offer prior to his discharge, or based on the verdict
       or award if a verdict or award has been rendered prior to the
       attorney’s discharge. If no settlement offer has been made or
       no verdict or award been rendered, then the attorney shall be
       entitled to an attorney’s fee based on the reasonable value of
       his services rendered through the date of discharge.

(emphasis added).

   The personal injury case proceeded to mediation during which the
defendants offered a $200,000 settlement. The client rejected the offer. A
few weeks later, the client sent former counsel a termination letter. Former
counsel then promptly filed a charging lien.

   The client thereafter hired successor counsel pursuant to another
contingency fee agreement. A few months later, the parties in the
underlying personal injury case settled for $550,000. From that amount,
the trial court determined successor counsel was entitled to a net
contingency fee of $220,000.

    Following the charging lien hearing, the trial court awarded former
counsel a $110,000 charging lien. The court also ordered the charging
lien be paid out of the $220,000 contingency fee award secured by
successor counsel, thereby leaving successor counsel with a contingency
fee of $110,000. 1 This appeal follows.

    As we recently reiterated in Perlman, Bajandas, Yevoli & Albright, P.L.
v. Atlas Holding Corp., “[d]ischarged attorneys hired under a contingent fee
contract are entitled to recover quantum meruit for their services, limited
by the maximum fee allowable under the [the discharged attorney’s] fee

1 One of Appellants’ arguments on appeal is that the trial court erred in reducing
successor counsel’s contingency fee to allocate for former counsel’s fees.
Although we agree that was error, see Perlman, Bajandas, Yevoli & Albright, P.L.
v. Atlas Holding Corp., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1791, D1794 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 6,
2023) (“In the absence of an agreement to split successor counsel’s contingency
fee, the trial court could not reduce successor counsel’s fee to allocate it to former
counsel.”), the issue is not preserved for appellate review.

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agreement.” 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1791, D1793 (Fla. 4th DCA Sept. 6, 2023)
(emphasis added) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lubell v. Martinez,
901 So. 2d 951, 952–53 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005)); see also Levin v. Rosenberg,
372 So. 2d 956, 958 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (holding, in the context of a
quantum meruit fee award, that “in no event can [an attorney] recover
more for his services than the maximum amount he himself has set on
those services by contract”).

   In the present case, former counsel’s retainer agreement entitled it to
40% of the last settlement offer obtained prior to discharge. As the only
settlement offer obtained by former counsel prior to discharge was for
$200,000, the maximum fee allowable under former counsel’s retainer
agreement was $80,000, not $110,000 as awarded. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand for the limited purpose of reducing the charging lien
amount to $80,000.

   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

WARNER and FORST, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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