Court Opinion

ID: 9684492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:59:04.926402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:56.428954
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge
(Dissenting).
For the first time, on motion for rehearing, appellant contends:
“The indictment is void for the reason that it charges an offense in the year ‘one thousand nine hundred’ which date is beyond the Statute of Limitations, and the facts fail to prove said date.”
The indictment reads, in part, as follows:
“ . . . the Grand Jurors . itpon their oaths do present in and to the Criminal District Court No. 5, of Dallas County, at the April Term, A.D. 1970, of said Court that one John Gerard Jackson on or about the 16th day of May in the year of our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and-in the County and State aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully possess a narcotic drug, to wit: marihuana, . . . ”
True, the last two digits of the year of the date of the offense were omitted from *568the indictment. However, there is no doubt that the omission was a clerical error.
The record reflects that although appellant plead not guilty, he agreed to a partial stipulation which was prepared by counsel for appellant, signed by the prosecutor, counsel for appellant and appellant himself. It was admitted into evidence and stated the date of the offense to be “on or about the 16th day of May, 1970 at approximately 12:30 p. m.”
The record also reflects that the prosecutor read the following stipulation into the record without objection:
“If Officer John M. Merten and Officer C. E. Etley were called to testify they could and would testify . . . that they stopped that vehicle for the violation of a state law . . . the exact date being May 16th of 1970.

“If Officers J. M. Merten and C. E. Et-ley were recalled, they could and would testify that all of their prior testimony and the testimony in the agreed stipulation of the person driving the automobile where this marihuana was found at 12:30 p. m. on the 16th day of May, 1970
Thus it is clear from the record that the date of the offense was May 16, 1970, and the prosecution is not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Article 12.04, V.A.C.C.P.
Although omissions and clerical errors are certainly not condoned, I would not reverse under the particular facts of this case where: (1) appellant did not object to the indictment pursuant to Article 27.02, Section 3, V.A.C.C.P.; (2) waived reading of the indictment; (3) stipulated to the date of the offense (the complained of date) ; (4) made no mention of the indictment in his motion for new trial; and, (S) did not question the indictment on appeal until his motion for rehearing.
Misdemeanor cases 1 where an information is prepared from a faulty complaint are distinguishable. For example, in Sandlin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 386 S.W.2d 537, the complaint alleged the date of the offense to have been on the “ . . . 4th day of October A.D.19 — .” The information, which was prepared from the complaint, alleged the date of the offense to have been the “ . . . 4th day of October A.D.1964.” The conviction was reversed for the reason that the complaint was insufficient to support the information.
The interest of the accused in such cases is not the same as the interest of the accused in the case at bar.
A statutory limitation is placed on the prosecutor’s authority to initiate prosecution. That limitation in a misdemeanor case is effectuated by the requirement that “(n)o information shall be presented until affidavit has been made by some credible person charging the defendant with an offense.” Article 21.22, V.A.C.C.P. It follows then, in order to protect the interest of the accused in the limitation placed on a prosecutor’s authority, the information which is prepared must track the complaint. Indeed, it has long been the law “ . . . that the affidavit and complaint should form and become not only a part of the information but a most important and fundamental part of it,” and:
“If the information must be based upon the affidavit, then the offense stated in the information must be characterized by and correspond with that as stated in the affidavit. Any other construction, it appears to us, would be senseless.” Davis v. State, 2 Tex.App. 184.
*569“Where the prosecution is begun by complaint and information, the allegation as to the date of the commission of the offense must be the same in both pleadings, and a variance in this respect will be fatal.” Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 50 S.W. 1015.
The limitation on the prosecutor’s authority to initiate prosecution in a felony case is effectuated by the requirement that an indictment be returned by a grand jury.2 Article 1.05, V.A.C.C.P.; Ex parte Krarup, Tex.Cr.App., 422 S.W.2d 173; Norton v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 577, 47 S.W.2d 610; Solis v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 418 S.W.2d 265.
That the date of the alleged offense be made part of the indictment (Article 21.02, V.A.C.C.P.) is required for two reasons: (1) to insure that the prosecution of the offense alleged is not barred by limitation, and (2) to insure that the accused is put on notice of the offense charged. Those cases reversed by this court for the reason that the date of the alleged offense set forth in the information did not conform to the date alleged in the complaint are inapplicable to the instant case.
I would hold that where, by reason of a clerical error, a part of the date of the alleged offense is omitted from the indictment, its omission does not per se require a reversal. And where it is clear from the record as a whole that the prosecution is not barred by limitation, and it is also clear that the accused was in fact put on notice as to the offense for which he is charged, then the conviction is not rendered infirm by reason of the omission. See, e. g., Hodge v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 69, 297 S.W.2d 138 (Dissenting Opinion).
To the extent that Bradford v. State, 62 Tex.Cr.R. 424, 138 S.W. 119, and other cases are inconsistent with this view, I would overrule them.
I dissent.

. See, e. g., Sandlin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 386 S.W.2d 537; McLaren v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 302, 320 S.W.2d 141; Suzuki v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 280 S.W.2d 744; Herron v. State, 150 Tex.Cr.R. 475, 203 S.W.2d 225; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 50 S.W. 1015; and Collins v. State, 5 Tex.App. 37.

. An indictment may be waived. Article 1.141, V.A.C.C.P.; King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 43.