Court Opinion

ID: 9364890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 16:04:02.562071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.104134
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            No. 123,495

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                              DAVE JENNINGS and EMILY MCLEOD,
                                         Appellants,

                                                      v.

                                       ELIZABETH SHAUCK,
                                            Appellee.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; WILLIAM P. MAHONEY, judge. Opinion filed January 20,
2023. Reversed and remanded with directions.

        Joseph W. Booth, of Lenexa, for appellants.

        Julie J. Gibson and Matthew J. Brooker, of Matteuzzi & Brooker, P.C., of Overland Park, for
appellee.

Before ISHERWOOD, P.J., GREEN and BRUNS, JJ.

        ISHERWOOD: Emily McLeod and Dave Jennings appeal from the district court's
order quieting title to a champion show dog named Oscar. Following a series of hearings
initially slated to address the motion for preliminary injunction filed by Oscar's breeder,
Elizabeth (Betsy) Shauck, the district court went several steps further and held that Betsy
was Oscar's sole, rightful owner. Emily and Dave assert this was erroneous because the
district court failed to provide them with notice of its intent to consolidate the preliminary
injunction proceeding with a trial on the merits. We agree. We also find that the court
erred as a matter of law by misapplying the common law rules related to ownership of

                                                      1
personal property. The court's flawed approach resulted in prejudice to Emily and Dave
by depriving them of their rightful ownership interest in Oscar.

       Because a proper application of the law regarding ownership illuminates Emily
and Dave's status as owners of Oscar with possessory and decision-making interests
equal to that of Betsy, this case must be remanded for enforcement of those rights.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       Emily and Dave filed a Petition to Quiet Title against Betsy in September 2019.
The subject of the petition was a Cane Corso show dog named Oscar. Emily and Dave
claimed title and ownership of Oscar but noted that Betsy similarly claimed ownership
over him. The couple requested the district court to issue an order finding title and
ownership of Oscar rested solely with them. Betsy responded and asserted that Emily and
Dave stole Oscar from her. She also counterclaimed for breach of contract, replevin,
conversion, and quiet title, sought a temporary restraining order, and asked the court to
issue a preliminary injunction ordering the immediate return of Oscar.

       Both sides agreed that they formed an agreement pertaining to Oscar's ownership,
but strongly disagreed as to the precise terms of that arrangement. Emily and Dave
claimed that Betsy asked them to care for Oscar and they agreed to do so with the
understanding that he would be their full-time pet, but Betsy could sometimes enter him
into shows. They acknowledged they agreed not to neuter Oscar "so that it would be
possible for [Betsy] to show Oscar if it turned out that showing him was a good option."
Emily and Dave then claimed that Betsy refused to return Oscar to them following a dog
show in 2019 and simply informed them Oscar would be living with someone in
Maryland for the next several years while she took him to dog shows whenever she
desired. Emily and Dave responded to the news by traveling a great distance to "re-
acquire possession of Oscar" in September 2019.

                                             2
        Not surprisingly, Betsy viewed the parties' arrangement through a different lens.
She claimed that Emily and Dave merely agreed to provide a "guardian" or pet home for
Oscar which simply ensured he received ordinary daily care. Under Betsy's interpretation
of the agreement, she retained ownership, control, and the decision-making authority over
all aspects of Oscar's training, boarding, showing, and breeding for the duration of his
potential "show" career. She also noted that she agreed to be responsible for the expenses
incurred in relation to that endeavor. Betsy further asserted that the parties agreed that
when Oscar's show career ended, he would retire as a pet to Emily and Dave and
ownership would transfer to them at that time. According to Betsy, Emily and Dave
adhered to the terms of this agreement for a couple of years but then began objecting to
how Oscar was handled when outside their care. Their discontent peaked in September
2019 and culminated in Dave's trek to Virginia to surreptitiously reclaim Oscar from a
show.

        In response to Betsy's filings, the court issued a notice of hearing specifically
advising the parties of its intent to address her request for a preliminary injunction in
April 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic required a continuance of the matter, so the
hearing did not ultimately begin until October 14, 2020, and was then heard over the
course of three separate days.

        Before the hearing, the parties exchanged detailed witness and exhibits lists, and
filed trial briefs devoted to the issue of Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction and
the analytical standards governing the same. Because a litigant pursuing such relief must
show a likelihood of success on the merits of his or her claim, the parties also discussed
the merits of Betsy's counterclaims. In their trial brief, Emily and Dave also argued that
the statute of frauds prohibited Betsy "from attempting to enforce her alleged agreement"
because it was not reduced to writing and would take more than one year to complete.

                                               3
       Throughout the case, the parties distinguished between "pet homes" and "guardian
homes." A pet home, also called a companion home or non-breeding home, is where a
dog goes to be a pet. By contrast, a guardian home, also called a show home, is a home
where a dog lives when it is not being used for some other purpose like showing or
breeding. Although guardian home agreements differ, they can involve co-ownership of a
dog with each party having different rights and responsibilities. A guardian home
arrangement may be beneficial for a person who could not otherwise afford a purebred
dog, or for a person who is interested in exploring participation with show dogs but
prefers to first work with and learn from someone with greater experience in the activity.
Finally, if a dog performs well at shows, it may be campaigned. Campaigns can involve
extensive travel and showing and may require a dog to be absent from its guardian home
for a year or two.

       Over the extended course of the hearing on Betsy's request, several people testified
that guardian and pet home agreements were common. They also asserted that every
situation was different; thus, such agreements were usually reduced to writing.

       By virtue of the testimony adduced, the court learned that Emily first became
acquainted with Betsy and her husband, Dennis, through her work as an animal
chiropractor. Betsy worked full time as a railroad engineer, but owned and bred Cane
Corso dogs, like Oscar, as a hobby. When Betsy's dog Gabby had a litter of puppies,
Emily provided chiropractic care for Gabby and the litter. Emily and Dave spent a lot of
time with the puppies so that in exchange for the chiropractic care, Betsy sold one of the
puppies, Gracyn, to the couple for the cost of her out-of-pocket veterinary expenses
related to Gracyn. Dave testified that Betsy intended for Gracyn to be a gift, but he and
Emily offered her money to cover her hard costs because they were not comfortable
receiving something for nothing. There was no written contract covering Betsy's transfer
of Gracyn to Emily and Dave.

                                             4
       Betsy acknowledged that she typically enters into written contracts with people
who purchase her dogs. Under the terms of her standard contract, female dogs must be
spayed and male dogs are required to carry a limited registration with the American
Kennel Club (AKC) and are not allowed to be bred. According to Betsy she deviated
from this practice with Emily and Dave for Gracyn because she trusted them.

       The friendship between Betsy, Dennis, Emily, and Dave continued to flourish.
Betsy had a big back yard, so Emily and Dave visited so that Gracyn could exercise and
play with Betsy's other puppies. Emily and Dave were present when Gabby had another
litter of puppies in May 2017; Oscar was one of the puppies born into that litter. The
couple continued visiting Betsy and Dennis after Oscar was born and Emily provided
chiropractic care for the litter.

       Unfortunately, 2017 also saw a marked decline in Dennis' health. By summertime,
it presented quite a challenge for Betsy to tend to his needs and provide adequate care for
all the dogs. Emily and Dave continued to lend their assistance and in the fall of that year
the subject of Emily and Dave assuming care of Oscar arose. The parties have varying
recollections of the conversation on this subject, so each will be summarized.

       Betsy testified that she and Dennis met with Emily and Dave when Oscar was four
months old and talked about them potentially taking the dog. She asserted that she
stressed to Emily and Dave that she wanted to show Oscar "to his maximum potential."
Betsy admitted that a dog's potential is not always known at such a young age but made
sure the couple understood every possible scenario that could happen with Oscar. She
also wanted them to understand that Oscar was potentially campaignable, and that such
an endeavor could entail long periods away from Emily and Dave so Oscar could reside
with a handler for at least a year. Betsy also claimed they covered breeding rights and the
couple's obligation to make the dog available to her for breeding.

                                             5
       According to the terms testified to by Betsy, she would cover Oscar's breeding,
handling, and showing costs and then Oscar would return to Emily and Dave as their
permanent pet once his show career ended. The parties also allegedly agreed to equally
split stud fees generated from breeding. Although Betsy entered into written contracts
covering the other dogs in Oscar's litter, she did not draw one up for Oscar. Rather, in this
instance, despite believing Oscar had remarkable potential, she simply asked whether
Emily and Dave wanted to reduce their agreement to writing. The couple allegedly
declined with the claim that such formalities were unnecessary. Emily and Dave did not
pay Betsy any money for Oscar.

       Dave offered a different version of events. According to him, Dennis and Betsy
asked him and Emily to take Oscar as a pet because their circumstances demanded that
they find a new home for him. Dave asserted that Betsy requested they not neuter Oscar
because she may opt to return to showing dogs in the future. According to Dave, Betsy
never communicated that his and Emily's relationship with Oscar was limited to that of a
guardian home. Rather, quite the opposite was true—Betsy looked him in the eye and
stated, "I just want you to know, he's your dog," and if her intent were otherwise the
couple never would have agreed to take Oscar in.

       Emily's recollection of events was much like Dave's. She testified that Betsy and
Dennis requested that they take Oscar and make him part of their family, and the couple
happily agreed to do so. When this discussion occurred, Emily had other clients with
show dogs so she understood the difference between pet homes and show homes and
never would have assented to simply providing a guardian home for Oscar. Emily
testified that Betsy asked them not to neuter Oscar because that would preserve her
ability to show him if she opted to resume those activities. Emily denied that breeding
rights were ever discussed but stated that had Betsy expressed a desire to breed Oscar she
and Dave would not have offered opposition.

                                             6
         Oscar went to live with Emily and Dave in October 2017, just a few days after
their conversation with Betsy and Dennis. That month also saw Betsy preparing Oscar for
shows which Dave and Emily freely allowed in order to support her as a friend. She often
visited Dave's office to train Oscar and took him to classes a couple of nights a week. In
anticipation of his first show, Betsy registered Oscar with the AKC in early 2018. She
entered Dave's name on the registration certificate alongside her own for what she
claimed was merely "a safeguard." Emily did not want to be on the certificate because
she feared to do so would create potential conflicts-of-interest with her other clients.
Betsy entered Oscar in his first show in January 2018 where he was handled by Paul
Catterson, a professional AKC-registered dog handler who worked under contract with
Betsy.

         Dennis died in August 2018 and Betsy gradually eased back into the show life,
entering Oscar only occasionally. A week was the longest stint he was ever absent from
Dave and Emily's home that year, and that only occurred twice. But his involvement was
not incident free. For example, while Oscar was staying with Catterson to train for his
first show, he swallowed a toy which then required surgery for its removal. Oscar also
brought home an intestinal parasite from his first show and returned to Dave and Emily
with a respiratory infection following his second show. He was also often plagued with
diarrhea after shows.

         Oscar experienced a marked increase in his participation in 2019. Between
February and May of that year Betsy registered him for two shows each month. In April
2019, Oscar came home after a stay with Catterson and was down around 15 pounds from
the 160 pounds he boasted before he departed. The couple was upset because Oscar's
weight loss was apparently a product of his refusal to eat, a condition the couple was
never apprised of. Oscar was registered for a show in Illinois at the end of May 2019, but
he was not eating, and Betsy believed he was too thin and in too poor a condition to
participate. She attributed this to the fact that Dave and Emily's other dog, Gracyn, was in

                                              7
heat and the couple inadvertently allowed Oscar to mate with her. Dave called it an
"unfortunate circumstance" but Betsy still insisted that Oscar stay with Catterson for a
few days to help address the situation.

       Oscar's next show was scheduled to take place in Ohio in June 2019. Emily and
Dave hesitated to give their blessing for his attendance because they were concerned for
his well-being. They eventually relented after Betsy suggested they transport Oscar and
remain with him at the show. Shawne Imler, an AKC-registered professional dog handler
and breeder from Maryland, handled Oscar because Catterson was unavailable.

       According to Betsy, Emily and Dave refused to adhere to the handler's instructions
during the show. For example, rather than allowing Oscar to rest in his crate alone as
directed, the couple either sat by his crate and fed him or took him out for walks. In
another instance, Emily was holding Oscar and Betsy was holding Sherman, Oscar's sire.
The dogs acted aggressively toward each other, so Imler directed Emily to separate them.
Rather than comply, Emily argued with Imler and told her it would be fine because the
dogs knew each other.

       Dave scheduled a meeting with Betsy in July 2019 to discuss Oscar's activities
because of Betsy's increased use of the terms "campaign" and "guardian home." During
the discussion, Betsy proposed campaigning Oscar alongside Imler which would have
Oscar absent from their lives for several months at a time. The couple asserted that this
idea was never previously mentioned and they were adamantly opposed to such a radical
shift in Oscar's lifestyle, what they characterized as "suddenly [taking] him from a life
where he has human interaction" to something entirely different. Their concern was
heightened by the fact that Imler seemingly failed to properly care for her own dogs, an
observation Betsy also independently made at one time.

                                             8
       Oscar's next show was scheduled for August 2019 in Colorado and Imler was once
again slated to be his handler. Given what Betsy and Imler viewed as objectionable
behavior on the part of Dave and Emily during the Ohio show, the two were not keen on
the couple attending the Colorado event, so Betsy asked them not to go. According to
Emily and Dave they only agreed to honor that request with the contingency that Betsy
promptly return Oscar home after the show. Their assertions differed from Betsy's who
testified that she discussed the breeding issue with Dave and Emily prior to the Colorado
show and proposed a dog named Valkyrie as a suitable mate that was also in season.
Betsy thought the best plan was to send Oscar to Maryland with Imler who could breed
Oscar with Valkyrie before his next show in Kentucky. Then, Emily and Dave could pick
Oscar up at the Kentucky show.

       According to Dave, they never agreed upon breeding Oscar with Valkyrie. To the
contrary, Dave recalled that when Betsy communicated that plan he responded with an
irate phone call laced with profanity and threats coupled with a demand for Oscar to be
returned immediately or he would pursue legal action.

       Dave's call prompted Betsy to contact an attorney in Colorado who purportedly
advised her to send Oscar to Maryland with Imler until she could reach a written
agreement with Dave and Emily. Betsy informed the couple that she intended for them to
remain a part of Oscar's life but, by the same token, it was time for Oscar to start
campaigning for a grand championship. The conversation did not go well so Betsy
terminated the discussion and informed the couple she was working with an attorney, so
any other questions needed to be directed to Imler.

       Emily and Dave were separated from Oscar for over a month. They were aware he
continued to compete because they followed his show entries online. But they also
noticed he was marked absent for several shows so they grew concerned and worried that
Imler was not caring for him properly.

                                              9
       During the last week of September 2019, Dave decided to drive to Hampton,
Virginia, to collect Oscar from a show. A friend of his entered the venue first to sleuth
out Oscar's precise location and after doing so, Dave slipped in, took Oscar from his
crate, and left. He called Imler about 20 minutes after he left to let her know the dog was
safe. Oscar and Dave made it back to Kansas the following day and promptly visited their
veterinarian. According to the veterinarian, Oscar had suffered noticeable weight loss,
had a hot spot under his right ear, and was plagued with ear infections, hookworms, and
hygromas on his elbows.

       Betsy countered with evidence that Oscar was in good condition at the time of the
Virginia show. Imler asserted that Oscar already had the hygromas when Emily and Dave
brought him to her in June 2019. She claimed she reduced their size and had the hot spot
on Oscar's head treated by a veterinarian before the Virginia show. Betsy also presented
the testimony of an AKC judge from the Virginia show who claimed that Oscar was
happy and "in beautiful shape" when she saw him. Her testimony was corroborated by a
fellow Cane Corso competitor who testified that there were no indications Oscar suffered
from improper care; rather, he was happy and appeared to be having a good time in
Virginia.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued a memorandum decision
intended to resolve the merits of the underlying issue, that is, which party could properly
claim ownership of Oscar, even though the purpose and scope of the hearing was to
analyze Betsy's request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the parties
entered into an oral agreement regarding Oscar and that under the terms of that agreement
Betsy had ownership rights to Oscar that afforded her unfettered latitude to determine the
appropriate training for Oscar, as well as whether he should show or campaign. The court
further found that Emily and Dave were simply intended to be a guardian home for Oscar
during his show years and a retirement home afterward. However, because their removal
of Oscar from the Virginia show adversely affected Betsy's interests and thereby

                                             10
breached the parties' agreement, they forfeited their guardianship and retirement rights to
Oscar. The court then held that any determination of whether Emily and Dave would act
as Oscar's guardianship or retirement home going forward was a matter left solely to
Betsy's discretion. Yet it then ordered that Emily and Dave "shall continue to be the
retirement placement of Oscar once his show career is over." The court did not award
Betsy any damages for the time she lost with Oscar as a result of the couple's purported
breach.

       Emily and Dave timely brought the matter to this court to analyze the propriety of
the district court's order.

                                           ANALYSIS

The district court impermissibly exceeded the parameters of the preliminary injunction
issue litigated by the parties to resolve the merits of the ultimate issue concerning Oscar's
ownership and misapplied the common law rules of ownership in designating Betsy as
Oscar's sole owner.

       Emily and Dave assert that the singular issue before the district court was Betsy's
request for a preliminary injunction and they tailored their litigation accordingly. Thus,
they were not afforded the opportunity to present evidence related to the ultimate issue of
Oscar's ownership before the district court entered a decision on that matter, resulting in a
violation of their right to due process.

       Betsy urges us to not take up the couple's claim, contending that it was not
properly preserved before the district court and cites the general rule that a constitutional
claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Gannon v. State, 303 Kan. 682,
733, 368 P.3d 1024 (2016). Yet she does not provide us with any authority to buttress the
proposition that a party must file a posttrial motion objecting to the district court's

                                              11
consolidation of a preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits to preserve the
issue for appeal.

       Not all claims that involve a constitutional issue require a party to object before
the district court. For example, cases challenging the sufficiency of evidence involve a
defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to due process, yet a party need not advance
a specific challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before the district court to preserve
it for appeal. See State v. Baumgarner, 59 Kan. App. 2d 330, 333-34, 481 P.3d 170
(2021); State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 545, 175 P.3d 221 (2008) (noting that the State
cited "no authority for the specific proposition that a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence before the district court is necessary to preserve it for appeal" and that there was
"no requirement that a criminal defendant challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
before the trial court in order to preserve it for appeal"). A defendant also need not make
an objection in the district court to preserve a claim of prosecutorial error, which likewise
implicates his or her due process rights to a fair trial. State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 406,
486 P.3d 551 (2021).

       Emily and Dave are challenging the district court's legal authority to issue a final
order. That makes this case much like one involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence. There is no statute, as there is with evidentiary objections, ordering a party to
make a contemporaneous objection to preserve an issue of this nature for appeal. See
K.S.A. 60-404. For these reasons, we reject Betsy's contention that review is foreclosed
due to a lack of preservation. See Paris v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Development, 713 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that appeal was "in effect, the
plaintiffs' first opportunity to object to the Rule 65 consolidation").

       As a secondary argument designed to erect a hurdle to Dave and Emily's pursuit of
review, Betsy contends the merits of the issues were tried as a product of the collective
consent of the parties. Specifically, she asserts that after the third day of evidence and in

                                              12
response to the district court's inquiry, "the parties advised the district court they did not
anticipate or need to present any further evidence on the issue of ownership or any of the
other issues in the case and agreed that the court had all of the evidence and testimony
needed to address these issues." She acknowledges that this conversation is not in the
record, but she attached affidavits from her own trial attorneys as appendices to her brief
on appeal in which they attest that such an exchange occurred. Emily and Dave do not
confirm whether this conversation took place, and the record does not contain any
affidavits from their attorneys.

       We are prohibited from affording the appended documents any measure of
consideration. "Material which is annexed to an appellate brief by way of an appendix is
not a substitute for the record itself and cannot be considered on appeal." In re Gershater,
270 Kan. 620, 633, 17 P.3d 929 (2001). Kansas Supreme Court Rule 3.04 (2022 Kan. S.
Ct. R. at 24) establishes a procedure for parties to follow when a transcript is unavailable,
and Betsy failed to follow it. Accordingly, we will only consider the facts contained
within the record and, as we will elaborate on later in this opinion, the record contains no
indication that the district court gave the parties notice of its intent to consolidate the
preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits.

       There are few cases in Kansas that address consolidation of a preliminary
injunction hearing with a trial on the merits. The Kansas Supreme Court has recognized
that at times a district court can consolidate a hearing on a motion for a preliminary
injunction with a trial on the merits of an injunction action. Omni Outdoor Advertising of
Missouri, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 241 Kan. 132, 138, 734 P.2d 1133 (1987). This
constitutes a discretionary decision, so whether the district court erred in pursuing such a
path is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A judicial action constitutes an abuse of
discretion if it is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on an error of law; or
(3) based on an error of fact. Biglow v. Eidenberg, 308 Kan. 873, 893, 424 P.3d 515
(2018).

                                               13
       In Omni, Omni Outdoor Advertising brought an action for injunctive and
declaratory relief against the City of Topeka after it enacted an ordinance regulating
billboards. Following a hearing on Omni's request for a preliminary injunction, the
district court shifted gears and decided the action against Omni on the merits. Omni
appealed, arguing that the district court denied it due process by deciding the case
without a trial on the merits. 241 Kan. at 132.

       Whether the district court could consolidate a hearing on a motion for a
preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits was a question of first impression. The
Omni court turned to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance and noted they
allowed for such consolidations. 241 Kan. at 135 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 65). It also
highlighted the "general rule followed in a majority of the circuits":

               "'If a consolidation of a trial on the merits with a hearing on a motion for a
       preliminary injunction is to be ordered, the parties should normally receive clear and
       unambiguous notice to that effect either before the hearing commences or at a time which
       will still afford the parties a full opportunity to present their respective cases. A litigant
       applying for a preliminary injunction should seldom be required either to forego
       discovery in order to seek emergency relief, or to forego a prompt application for an
       injunction in order to prepare adequately for trial. Different standards of proof and of
       preparation may apply to the emergency hearing as opposed to the full trial.'" 241 Kan. at
       137 (quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1057
       [7th Cir. 1972]) (Emphasis added.)

       Following this discussion, the court held that a district court can "consolidate a
hearing on a motion for a temporary injunction with a trial on the merits of an injunction
action, providing that no prejudice results to the parties." 241 Kan. at 138. In an effort to
provide some measure of guidance the court added:

       "Factors to be considered include but are not limited to the parties' preparedness for trial,
       including the completion of or the need for additional discovery, the availability at the

                                                     14
       hearing of evidence which either party proposes to introduce upon trial, the issues
       involved, and the adequacy of time which the parties have to prepare for the hearing. If
       the parties agree to consolidation, then with the court's consent consolidation may be
       ordered. If the parties do not agree, then the trial court must determine whether or not
       there is to be a consolidation. If the court determines to consolidate, all parties must be
       given adequate, clear, and unambiguous notice of the consolidation." (Emphasis added.)
       241 Kan. at 138.

       In Omni's case, the court found that the district court provided no notice of its
intention to consolidate the hearing and that Omni sustained actual prejudice as a result of
the consolidation. 241 Kan. at 138. A compelling factor in the court's conclusion on
prejudice was Omni's argument that "additional facts relevant to the legal issues would be
sought through discovery, and would be presented at trial." 241 Kan. at 136. Omni listed
several pieces of evidence it contended would have been disclosed by discovery and the
court deemed that evidence relevant to Omni's substantive claims. 241 Kan. at 136.

       In this case, there is similarly no evidence in the record that the district court
provided the parties with the requisite notification of its intention to consolidate the
preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits. The notice of the hearing
specified it was a preliminary injunction hearing. The parties' pretrial briefs outlined the
standards governing proceedings for preliminary injunctions. No statements were uttered
by the court at the outset of the hearing to clarify its intention to proceed with a resolution
of the merits on the underlying issue of ownership. As the hearing got underway, Betsy
presented her case first, consistent with her burden of proof as the party seeking a
preliminary injunction. Thus, all indications were that the litigation was confined to
Betsy's request for injunctive relief.

       The downfall in going forward with less than transparent intentions is that it
deprives both parties of the opportunity to thoroughly litigate the case in a manner that
advances their respective interests. At the trial level, the burden of proof in an injunction

                                                    15
action is upon the movant. U.S.D. No. 503 v. McKinney, 236 Kan. 224, 227, 689 P.2d 860
(1984). In defining this burden, it has generally been held that a party seeking a
temporary injunction must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of eventually prevailing on
the merits; (2) a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury
without an injunction; (3) the lack of an adequate legal remedy, such as damages; (4) the
threat of injury to the plaintiff outweighs whatever harm the injunction may cause the
opposing party; and (5) the injunction will not be against the public interest. Hodes &
Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 619, 440 P.3d 461 (2019); Wichita Wire, Inc. v.
Lenox, 11 Kan. App. 2d 459, 462, 726 P.2d 287 (1986). A temporary injunction preserves
the relative positions of the parties until a full decision on the merits can be made. Steffes
v. City of Lawrence, 284 Kan. 380, 394, 160 P.3d 843 (2007).

       By contrast, a quiet title action places the burden on the movant to establish the
strength of his or her own title rather than focus on the weakness of their adversary's title
as one would for an injunction proceeding. See Bucklin National Bank v. Hayse Ranch,
58 Kan. App. 2d 715, 721, 475 P.3d 1 (2020); see also K.S.A. 60-1002. Contextually, this
means that had the district court made Dave and Emily aware of the bifurcated nature of
the hearing, they could have presented their evidence and arguments accordingly,
revealing the weaknesses in Betsy's contentions while undergirding their own claims of
ownership. But as it was, the district court's approach denied them the opportunity to
advocate for their own interests.

       Although a district court has broad latitude in exercising its discretion, that
discretion is abused when the court renders a decision which disregards proper statutory
limitations or legal standards. State v. Ardry, 295 Kan. 733, 736, 286 P.3d 207 (2012).
That is precisely what occurred here when the court expanded the injunction proceedings
in direct contravention of notice requirements, leaving Dave and Emily unaware of and
unprepared for a trial intended to resolve the issue of Oscar's ownership.

                                              16
       Often this finding would mark the conclusion of our review of this matter, and we
would remand the case to the district court to afford both parties the opportunity to
present the evidence and obtain the corresponding analysis they were denied as a result of
the district court's failure to provide the required notice. But because Betsy contends that
she was aware that the injunction hearing encompassed the ultimate issue of ownership,
we find she took the opportunity to present all the evidence she believed enabled the
court to find in her favor which is then necessarily memorialized in the record before us.
Our review of the proceedings further assures us that the degree of evidence put forth by
Emily and Dave is enough to allow us to reach the propriety of the court's legal
conclusion about Oscar's rightful ownership.

       In reviewing the district court's ownership determination our role is not to
substitute our judgment for that of the district court. Rather, we are tasked with the
responsibility to review the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law to
determine whether the factual findings were supported by substantial competent evidence
and whether they are enough to support its corresponding legal conclusions. See Gannon
v. State, 305 Kan. 850, 881, 390 P.3d 461 (2017).

       This standard prohibits us from reweighing the evidence or making independent
credibility findings; we must defer to the district court's assessment of conflicting
evidence. Gannon, 305 Kan. at 881. We are also required to review the evidence
presented at trial in the light most favorable to Betsy as the prevailing party. See Unruh v.
Purina Mills, 289 Kan. 1185, 1195, 221 P.3d 1130 (2009). Even so, we exercise
unlimited review in determining whether that evidence warrants the ultimate legal
conclusions. Gannon, 305 Kan. at 881.

       Following receipt of evidence and arguments from the parties, the court
determined that Betsy successfully established herself as Oscar's rightful owner. It found

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that Dave and Emily's interest was limited to that of a guardian home, and they lacked
any authority to tell Betsy what she could or could not do with Oscar.

       In offering a foundation for its ruling, the district court relied heavily on the
relationship between the parties and the strong bond they once shared, which was more
like family than merely a friendship. The nature of that bond prompted the court to
conclude that there was no justification for a written agreement, despite the testimony
from several witnesses with significant expertise in the dog show culture who asserted
that the normal route under these circumstances is to enter into a written agreement to
preserve the parties' respective interests.

       The district court declined to find that the communications between the parties
offered any measure of guidance about what they thought their interests were when Oscar
went to live with Dave and Emily in 2017. It instead looked to Betsy's payment of all fees
related to Oscar's show obligations as compelling evidence of ownership while Dave and
Emily's financial commitment to Oscar's day-to-day existence and well-being were
simply indicative of a guardian home. The court did acknowledge that Dave's name was
listed as a co-owner alongside Betsy on Oscar's AKC registration but declined to assign
any significance to the document. It instead found that such paperwork is only necessary
to enable Oscar to enter shows and that AKC registration does not equate with
ownership.

       While there is substantial competent evidence in the record to generally support
these factual findings, in that they were not manifested of whole cloth, they nevertheless
fall short of providing adequate support for the court's conclusion that Oscar's ownership
properly lies with Betsy. Again, we review de novo the legal pathway the district court
traveled to arrive at its ownership determination and are under no obligation to follow in
its footsteps. Cady v. Schroll, 298 Kan. 731, 734, 317 P.3d 90 (2014). A fair review of
the record leads us to conclude that the district court erred, as a matter of law, through its

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misapplication of the common law rules related to ownership of personal property. That
flawed analytical framework yielded an erroneous result and, as such, its designation of
Betsy as Oscar's sole rightful owner cannot be permitted to stand.

       Both our judiciary and the Legislature have shared the view that dogs fall under
the heading of personal property. See State v. Rodriguez, 269 Kan. 633, 634-35, 8 P.3d
712 (2000) (viewing dog as personal property for purposes of arson conviction in
violation of K.S.A. 21-3718[a][1] which requires knowing damage by means of fire "any
. . . property in which another person has any interest without the consent of such other
person"); State v. Fenske, 144 Kan. 560, 562, 61 P.2d 1368 (1936) (A dog is personal
property and thus may properly be the subject of a larceny.); Burgess v. Shampooch Pet
Industries, Inc., 35 Kan. App. 2d 458, 463, 131 P.3d 1248 (2006) (The district court
properly found that a dog is personal property in determining the measure of damages.).

       Issues about personal property are resolved through the application of rules and
concepts found in the common law. In State v. Livengood, No. 122,241, 2021 WL
2388403 (Kan. App. 2021) (unpublished opinion), a panel of this court was tasked with
delving into such concepts to resolve who claimed rightful ownership to Hudson, a dog
that had purportedly been thieved. Livengood testified in his own defense and told the
jurors he bought Hudson, never made a gift of Hudson to his girlfriend, Dechant, and
considered himself to be Hudson's owner. Dechant testified to her continuous possession
of Hudson but never expressly characterized the dog as a gift from Livengood. The jury
convicted Livengood of both charges.

       Livengood appealed and argued the State presented insufficient evidence that
Dechant owned Hudson when the theft occurred. In rejecting that contention this court
started with the "general proposition, [that] continuous and undisputed possession of
personal property may be indicative of ownership. 2021 WL 2388403, at *2, citing
Alexander v. Logan, 65 Kan. 505, 510, 70 P. 339 (1902) ("The possession of personal

                                            19
property is some evidence of ownership."); Willcox v. Stroup, 467 F.3d 409, 412-13 (4th
Cir. 2006); 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 284.

       In attempting to identify the rightful owner of papers from two gubernatorial
administrations, the Fourth Circuit reiterated in Willcox that the common law has long
recognized that "actual possession is, prima facie, evidence of a legal title in the
possessor." 467 F.3d at 412, quoting William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries, *196. See,
e.g., Edward Coke, 1 Commentary upon Littleton 6.b. (19th ed. 1832) (strong
presumption of ownership created by "continuall and quiet possession"); Bradshaw v.
Ashley, 180 U.S. 59, 63, 21 S. Ct. 297, 45 L. Ed. 423 (1901) ("If there be no evidence to
the contrary, proof of possession, at least under a color of right, is sufficient proof of
title."); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 241 (1881) ("The consequences
attached to possession are substantially those attached to ownership, subject to the
question of the continuance of possessory rights . . . ."). The Willcox court then observed
that the presumption arising from possession spans the spectrum of personal property.
467 F.3d at 413 (citing Hammond v. Halsey, 287 S.C. 46, 49, 336 S.E.2d 495 [Ct. App.
1985] [ownership of canon]; Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, Inc. v. Harvin, 238 S.C. 352,
357, 120 S.E.2d 237 [1961] [ownership of automobile]).

       Notable for our purposes, the Willcox court also cited Nesbitt v. Lewis, 335 S.C.
441, 446, 517 S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App. 1999), which involved the determination of ownership
for establishing liability following a dog attack. The court ultimately found the
homeowner where the attack occurred had the requisite possession and control of the
dogs to be held accountable, as did her live-in brother, because he "tended the dogs,
taking them to the veterinarian, feeding them, and playing with them on occasion." 335
S.C. at 446.

       Turning to the facts before us, we first analyze the matter of Oscar's AKC
registration. Betsy completed the necessary paperwork which identifies her and Dave as

                                              20
Oscar's co-owners and provides Dave's address for the required residence. Betsy has
failed to put forth anything that shows this action to be ambiguous and so it is properly
viewed as evidence of the parties' intent to communicate they share a mutual interest in
Oscar.

         Kennel Club registrations may provide presumptive evidence of ownership but are
rarely dispositive. See Buczkowicz v. Lubin, 80 Ill. App. 3d 200, 202-03, 399 N.E.2d 680
(1980); Dubin v. Pelletier, No. WC 10-0825, 2012 WL 5983184 (R.I. Super. Ct. 2012)
(unpublished opinion). Contrasted with other highly regulated forms of personal property
such as motor vehicles or branded livestock, the law typically does not require similarly
formal measures to pass title to domestic companion animals. In any event, that
presumption of ownership may be overcome through clear and convincing evidence of a
contradictory claim. See Dufresne v. Cooper, 64 R.I. 120, 11 A.2d 3 (1940). Ownership
may be inferred from a calculus of each identifiable aspect of companion animal care
such as housing, feeding, grooming, training, exercise, and tending to the animal's health
through a significant devotion of one's time and financial resources. The circumstances
existing at the time of the inquiry must be examined, and the actions, attitudes, and
understanding of the suggested owner or owners must be considered, including sharing in
the burdens and the benefits of the dog and holding themselves out to the world as its
owner. Pippin v. Fink, 350 N.J. Super. 270, 274, 794 A.2d 893 (2002). Evidence
pertinent to establishing ownership may include ownership of the mother, certification of
registration, exclusive possession, or the exercise of control. See, e.g., Jones v. Office of
Finance of Baltimore County, 294 Md. 601, 604, 451 A.2d 926 (1982) (noting that
"offspring or increase of tame or domestic animals belongs to the owner of the dam or
mother"); Buczkowicz, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 202 (considering the payment of stud fees as
evidence of ownership); Beard v. Mossman, 144 Pa. Super. 508, 510, 19 A.2d 850 (1941)
(reasoning that one-year possession of a dog was presumptive evidence of ownership).

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       The AKC registration places the parties on equal footing as to Oscar, but it is not
dispositive proof of ownership, so our next step is to conduct an assessment of the other
factors each party brought before the court. Betsy and Dennis needed to relocate their
dogs because of Dennis' terminal illness and deteriorating condition. Emily and Dave
welcomed Oscar into their home in October 2017 and it was the only placement
arrangement Betsy made during that process which was not accompanied by a written
contract. In exchange for receiving Oscar, Emily and Dave simply agreed to keep the dog
intact so he would remain eligible for showing and breeding should Betsy opt to resume
her hobby. Three months later Betsy filed Oscar's AKC registration and soon after, she
gradually exposed Oscar to the show world. Oscar's initial limited exposure to that
lifestyle was consistent with what Emily and Dave understood Oscar's potential show
career might look like if Betsy opted to pursue one. But his participation quickly
intensified in the wake of demonstrated success and, over the span of the next two years,
Oscar competed in various locations, sometimes joining Betsy for extended periods of
time. Oscar otherwise lived at home with Emily and Dave and often accompanied Dave
to work. The couple provided for Oscar's day-to-day care including meals, exercise, and
veterinary care. The latter of which was all the more critical because Oscar often returned
home from shows with various health issues. Once in particular they covered the cost of a
surgery that was necessary because Oscar ate a chew toy while in the custody of his
handler, Catterson. When Oscar was absent from the home to participate in shows, Emily
and Dave initially often traveled to those venues to support him. Thus, it is without
question that Emily and Dave shared in the benefits and burdens accompanying a life
with Oscar and held themselves out as his owners.

       The role Oscar played in Betsy's life reflected the means to her desired end of
achieving success and notoriety in the dog show arena. That is, he is important to her in a
distinctly different, though no less meaningful, way than he is to Emily and Dave. In
furtherance of her goals, Betsy bore the financial responsibility for Oscar's training,
handling, and show enlistments. She also spent considerable periods of time with him

                                             22
along with those events then returned him home to Emily and Dave afterward where he
remained until the next scheduled event. She too embraced the blessing and the bane of
owning Oscar. To be sure, neither party ever disputed that the other possessed an
identifiable interest in Oscar. They simply parted ways in their respective perceptions of
the scope of the other's interest and who enjoyed a superior interest in the eyes of the law.

       A return to Willcox is imperative at this point for its recognition that the
presumption of ownership "will not always cut in one direction." 467 F.3d at 414. Rather,
instances of dual interest will arise, where one entity reveals ownership while another
puts forth compelling evidence to rebut that presumption. 467 F.3d at 414. The preceding
summary reflects a significant overlap about the parties' interests in and relationship with
Oscar. Both parties nurture and care for Oscar in ways that are necessary to satisfy their
respective goals and derive corresponding benefits from their considerable efforts. Not
only was Oscar a delightful addition to Emily and Dave's family, but he also proved
successful in the show ring. Thus, consistent with common law rules governing
ownership, neither party enjoys a greater right of possession than the other. This case is
illustrative of the concept of co-ownership identified by Willcox.

       Unfortunately, because of its misapplication of the governing legal principles, the
district court either did not recognize or failed to appreciate the existence of that co-
ownership. Its failure to do so requires that we reverse its finding that Betsy enjoys
solitary, full, and unfettered ownership of Oscar and remand the case back with the
directive that Dave's rights as a co-owner be enforced. Accordingly, any decisions about
Oscar's showing or breeding must be made collectively between the owners and once that
show career concludes and he is no longer a viable candidate for breeding, Oscar shall
enjoy retirement with Dave and Emily.

       Reversed and remanded with directions.

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