Court Opinion

ID: 9779406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:49:50.951202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:26.164368
License: Public Domain

CHAPA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur.
The dissent is based on the contention that the court’s definition of “defamatory statement” in Issue No. 2 was erroneous because it was “not the required definition of slander per se under § 573 of [RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND)].”
However, this contention is not properly raised before this Court. We initially note that in addition to violating TEX.R.APP.P. 74(d) by multifariously co-mingling several points of error, appellant’s brief does not complain that an instruction in the charge was improper. Rather, appellant’s argument on appeal is sounded on a “no evidence” complaint. Ironically, we note in the record that at the trial, appellant’s objection to the charge was also sounded on a “no evidence” complaint as to this and most other issues. Appellant cannot assert error for the first time on appeal as to an alleged improper instruction and expect this Court to grant relief. State v. Lackey, 576 S.W.2d 685, 688-89 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Ramsey, 542 S.W.2d 466, 476 (Tex.Civ.App — Tyler 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Therefore, appellant certainly should not expect relief as to an alleged improper instruction without having complained at the trial or on appeal. The record reflected evidence to support the jury’s finding of injury.
The judgment should be affirmed.