Court Opinion

ID: 9684293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:52:42.665096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:54.419342
License: Public Domain

STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR., Chief Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment must be reversed for lack of standing. I write separately, however, because the majority addresses other issues, particularly sever-ability under section 1.140, RSMo, that are unnecessary for resolution at this point in the proceedings and that were not raised, briefed, or argued by the parties. Standing on the other hand, is jurisdictional in nature and may be addressed sua sponte. See State ex rel. Mathewson v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of St. Louis County, 841 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Mo. banc 1992) (“Standing is akin to jurisdiction over the subject matter, in li-mine. As such, the question of a party’s standing can be raised at any time, even sua sponte by this Court.”).
When considering standing issues, courts must rely on uncontested facts. See Hinton v. City of St. Joseph, 889 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Mo.App.1994) (“In determining the issues related to standing, we will consider not only plaintiffs’ petition but also the additional non-contested facts which all parties accepted as true at the time of argument on the motion to dismiss. Thus, we will engage in a summary judgment mode of analysis, seeking to determine whether the issue of standing is resolved as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed facts.”) (emphasis added); Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis, Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 32 S.W.3d 612, 614 (Mo.App.2000); Switzer v. Hart, 957 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Mo.App.1997); Paul Londe, Inc. v. Carlie, 743 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Mo.App.1987) (“[Plaintiff] was entitled to bring suit to enforce the note only if it was entitled on undisputed facts, to standing as a holder of the note.”).
Worlledge v. City of Greenwood, 627 S.W.2d 328 (Mo.App.1982) demonstrates this proposition more fully, and is particularly instructive as it involved a situation similar to that presented in the instant case. In Worlledge, the trial court issued a temporary injunction but denied the plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction. Although lack of standing was not the basis of the trial judge’s decision, the appellate court, sua sponte, questioned the plaintiffs’ right to challenge defendant’s expenditure of tax dollars and ultimately concluded as follows:
A further and fatal impediment to plaintiffs’ standing remains. The petition alleged that the five plaintiffs were “residents and taxpaying citizens of the City of Greenwood.” Of the five, however, only Worlledge, the former police chief, testified. No evidence was introduced to establish that Worlledge or any of the other plaintiffs were Greenwood taxpayers, an allegation denied in defendants’ answer. The burden was upon plaintiffs to prove this essential element of the case and this they failed to do.
Id. at 331 (emphasis added). Under Worl-ledge and the other cases cited, the mere fact that plaintiffs had made the requisite allegations, where these allegations were denied by the defendants in their answer, was not sufficient to support a finding of standing.
The case at hand is no different. Although plaintiffs have alleged facts that would support standing, defendants have denied each and every allegation in plaintiffs’ petition. Until those preliminary *548facts have been established, the trial court has no jurisdiction to enter a judgment.