Court Opinion

ID: 9889607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 20:00:42.26357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:20.112524
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                  ___________

                       No. 22-3128
                       __________

                FRANCIENNA GRANT,
                         Appellant

                            v.

 MICHAEL ELIAS; STATE; STEPHEN MILLS, also known as
STEVEN MILLS; MUNICIPAL COURT CAPE MAY COUNTY
       ____________________________________

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of New Jersey
          (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-12065)
        District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
                       ___________

                      No. 22-3141
                      ___________

                FRANCIENNA GRANT,
                         Appellant

                            v.

WILLIAM HUNTLEY PANICO; WILLIAM H. PANICO D.M.D.
       ____________________________________

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of New Jersey
          (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-20535)
        District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
                                      ___________

                                      No. 22-3142
                                      ___________

                                FRANCIENNA GRANT,
                                        Appellant

                                             v.

                 DANILO G. YBANEZ; DANILO G. YBANEZ D.M.D.
                     ___________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of New Jersey
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-21201)
                       District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                    June 21, 2023
            Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges

                            (Opinion filed: October 10, 2023)
                                     ___________

                                       OPINION*
                                      ___________

PER CURIAM

       Pro se appellant Francienna Grant appeals from orders of the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey denying her motions for reconsideration, relief under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, recusal, and an emergency stay. For the following

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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reasons, we will dismiss the appeals in part for lack of jurisdiction, and to the extent that

we do have jurisdiction, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.

                                              I.

       These related appeals stem from three separate pro se actions that Grant initiated

in the District Court. Each action related to lawsuits she had filed and litigated in the

New Jersey State courts. Upon the defendants’ motions to dismiss and its own orders to

show cause, the District Court dismissed all three complaints with prejudice in a single

opinion and accompanying order filed on each docket on May 15, 2020. The District

Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over the cases because Grant sought to appeal

from the decisions of state courts.

       On June 8, 2020, Grant filed a motion for reconsideration in each case.1 The

following month, she filed a motion for entry of default. The District Court denied both

motions as to all cases in an order and opinion filed on September 8, 2020. The District

Court also ordered that Grant was precluded from filing further motions in any of the

cases without permission from the court. On October 2, 2020, Grant filed a letter

requesting permission to file a motion pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 60. After

receiving no response from the court, Grant filed a Rule 60 motion on September 9, 2021.

The District Court administratively terminated the Rule 60 motion on January 28, 2022,

noting that it appeared to reiterate matters already resolved by the court, and that Grant

did not obtain permission to file the motion. Grant subsequently filed a motion to recuse

1
 After the District Court disposed of the complaints in one opinion and order, all but one
of Grant’s subsequent filings were cross-filed in all three cases.
                                             3
the District Judge and, in D.N.J. Civ. No. 19-cv-12065 only, a motion to stay related

proceedings in state court. The District Court denied those motions in an order entered

on October 20, 2022.

       On November 7, 2022, Grant filed a notice of appeal, specifying the District

Court’s January 2022 order administratively terminating her Rule 60 motion and its

October 2022 order denying her motion for recusal and for an emergency stay.2 Grant

amended her notice of appeal on November 17, 2022, to also specify the District Court’s

September 2020 order denying her motions for reconsideration and default and imposing

the filing restriction.

                                             II.

       We will dismiss this consolidated appeal in part for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

The taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209 (2007). Grant had thirty days from the District

Court’s entry of its September 8, 2020, order in which to timely file a notice of appeal, or

until Thursday, October 8, 2020. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

Her November 9, 2022, notice of appeal was accordingly not timely filed as to that order.

The same is true with respect to any earlier order that Grant may seek to challenge in her

briefs, as well as the District Court’s later administrative termination of Grant’s Rule

60(b) motion, which was entered on January 28, 2022, several months prior to the filing

of Grant’s notice of appeal. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal in part.

2
 Her notice of appeal, like the earlier motions, was filed in all three cases. The three
appeals docketed here have been consolidated for disposition.
                                             4
           However, we exercise jurisdiction over the District Court’s order denying Grant’s

motion for recusal and emergency stay, as her notice of appeal was filed within thirty

days of the entry of that October 20, 2022, order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Ohntrup v.

Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986) (per curiam). We review both

denials for abuse of discretion. See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)

(per curiam) (regarding motions for recusal); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America Sales

Practice Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 363 (3d Cir. 2001) (regarding the denial of injunctive

relief).

                                                III.

           We cannot say that the District Court abused its discretion here. First, with respect

to Grant’s motion for recusal, she has not specified whether she was relying on

28 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455, so we will address both statutes. Under § 144,

recusal is warranted where a party files a “timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge

before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice against him or in

favor of any adverse party.” The affidavit “shall be filed less than ten days before the

beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be

shown for failure to file it within such time.” Id. Here, Grant did not file her motion for

recusal until August 2022, several years after she commenced her actions in the District

Court, and she has not shown good cause to excuse the delay. Her motion was

accordingly not timely filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144. See Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l

Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 1990). Further, construing her motion as an affidavit

for § 144 purposes, it is not “sufficient” because it contains only a conclusory assertion
                                                 5
that the District Judge was biased against her. See United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d

1328, 1340 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that conclusory statements and opinions need not

be credited). Similarly, Grant’s motion does not contain facts suggesting that the District

Judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” as is required under § 455. See

28 U.S.C. § 455(a). We accordingly conclude that, regardless of the statutory basis for

the request, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grant’s motion for

recusal.

       To the extent that Grant appeals from the District Court’s denial of her motion to

stay state court proceedings, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its

discretion. Federal courts are generally prohibited from granting injunctions to stay state

court proceedings under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and Grant provides

no basis for her motion, nor are there any circumstances evident in the record which

would warrant an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. See In re Prudential, 261 F.3d at

364.

       For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Grant’s

motion for recusal and her motion for an emergency stay and otherwise dismiss this

consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Grant's motion to vacate this Court's order

granting the Appellees leave to file a supplemental appendix and her motions for rulings

against Appellees for failure to prosecute pursuant to 3d Cir. L.A.R. Misc. 107.2 are

denied.

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