Court Opinion

ID: 9810072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:55.238011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:21.046351
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOOD
delivered the Opinion of the. Court.
{1 This interlocutory appeal presents the first opportunity for this court to address whether an unauthorized driver of a rental car may have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search of personal packages within that rental car. ‘
T2 A state trooper pulled over the defendant while she was driving a rental car that she was not authorized to drive. While impounding the car at the rental car company's request, the trooper who stopped her discovered three suspicious gift-wrapped packages, one on the back seat and two in the trunk. At the tow yard, a K-9 police dog alerted the trooper that the trunk contained drugs. The trooper used this positive dog sniff to obtain a warrant, the execution of which revealed 57 pounds of marijuana.
*190T3 The trial court suppressed this marijuana evidence because the packages had been detained for an unreasonable amount of time-over 90 minutes-before the K-9 alerted and the trooper thus obtained probable cause for the search. The People now challenge the trial court's suppression order, arguing that the defendant did not have standing to contest the detention and search of the packages because she was not authorized to drive the rental car.
[ 4 We hold that under the totality of the cireumstances, the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the gift-wrapped packages that the trooper detained following her traffic stop. She therefore had standing to contest the search of those packages, even though she was not authorized to drive the rental car. Consequently, we affirm the suppression order.
I. Facts and Procedural History
15 On July 18, 2018, a Colorado State Patrol ("CSP") trooper stopped the defendant, Melissa Sotelo, on Interstate 70. The trooper informed Sotelo that she was driving too slowly in the left passing lane without making a left-hand turn or passing other vehicles.
16 Sotelo was driving a rental car with California license plates and was accompanied by a passenger, Janelle Mireles.1 During the traffic stop, Sotelo provided the trooper with a Hertz rental agreement indicating that Patrick Schooler had rented the car on July 11, 2018, in Fresno, California, with no additional authorized drivers, The rental agreement provided an estimate of charges based on a return date and time of July 18, 2018, at 10:05 p.m., with extra daily and hourly charges to be assessed if the renter returned the car after that date and time.2 The car had not been reported as stolen.
T7 Sotelo acknowledged that she did not know Schooler personally but stated that Mi-reles had been friends with him for a few months. The trooper contacted Hertz, and a company representative asked him to impound the rental car.
8 The trooper then questioned Sotelo and Mireles separately. Both women said they were driving from California to Maryland for the weekend to take birthday presents to Sotelo's daughter in Washington, D.C. But they gave varying accounts of the number and duration of stops along the way.
T9 The trooper called for a tow truck and, while awaiting its arrival, conducted a detailed inventory of the car's contents per CSP policy. Among other items, the inventory revealed three gift-wrapped packages. One box on the back seat measured about two-feet by two-feet by two-feet. Two identical-size boxes in the trunk measured about two-feet wide by three-feet long by one-foot tall.
110 When asked what was in the boxes, Sotelo said that they contained clothes and a microphone or singing machine, a large baby stroller with a car seat, and a baby bath. Mireles provided a similar description. The trooper became suspicious because, in his estimation, the size of the gift-wrapped packages did not match their purported contents. The trooper therefore asked the women for consent to open the gift-wrapped packages. They refused.
T11 Sotelo and Mireles accompanied the rental car to the tow yard. The trooper then allowed them to leave but would not let Sotelo take the packages until a K-9 police dog did a "free air search" around the car. Because no K-9 was immediately available, the trooper had to wait another 90 minutes *191for a handler to bring one from Greeley. Almost three hours after the initial stop, the K-9 alerted to the trunk of the car, indicating the presence of a controlled substance. Sotelo and Mireles returned after the K-9 conducted its search, at which time the trooper advised them that he was requesting a search warrant. Again, the women left.
T12 After CSP obtained the warrant, it conducted a search exposing that all three boxes simply camouflaged vacuum-sealed bags, the contents of which tested positive for marijuana (57 pounds in total).
13 When Sotelo returned the next morning to retrieve her belongings, CSP arrested her. The district attorney later charged her with possession with intent to distribute at least 5 pounds, but not more than 100 pounds, of marijuana.
14 The trial court found that the trooper had probable cause to search the packages after the K-9 alert. Nevertheless, the trial court granted Sotelo's motion to suppress them because CSP detained the packages too long. In reaching its decision, the trial court rejected the People's arguments regarding standing as "inapposite," emphasizing that "Itlhe defendant always took the position that the packages were in her possession and were gifts she was taking to her daughter." 3
T15 Later, in a supplement to its order granting the motion to suppress, the trial court refused to allow the People to introduce additional evidence concerning the car rental (including a copy of the rental car agreement) because "it would do no more than confirm facts which the court has already found to be true."
16 The People appealed the trial court's suppression order under section 16-12-102(1), C.R.S. (2018), and C.A.R. 4.1. The People ask this court to consider "[wlhether the trial court erred in finding that [the] defendant as the unauthorized driver of a rental car had standing to contest the detention and search of the gift wrapped packages which were in the car."
IIL Analysis
¶ 17 We evaluate for the first time whether the unauthorized driver of a rental car has standing to challenge a search of packages within that rental car. After articulating the applicable standard of review for a suppression order, we discuss standing under the Fourth Amendment. Next, we evaluate this standard in the rental car context and explain that standing exists when a defendant, under the totality of the cireumstances, has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the subject of the search-here, the gift-wrapped packages. Applying this legal standard, we agree with the trial court that Sotelo had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the packages, affording her standing to challenge the search and seizure. We therefore affirm the suppression order.
A. Standard of Review
118 When reviewing a suppression order, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent evidence in the record. People v. Quezada, 731 P.2d 730, 732 (Colo. 1987). We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo and reverse if the trial court applied an erroneous legal standard or came to a conclusion of constitutional law that is not supported by the factual findings. People v. Syrie, 101 P.3d 219, 222 (Colo. 2004).
B. Standing Under the Fourth Amendment
119 The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that may not be asserted on another's behalf. See Peres v. People, 231 P.3d 957, 960 (Colo. 2010); see also People v. Juarez, 770 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Colo. 1989) (explaining that standing exists only when the person challenging the legality of a search or seizure was the "victim" of that search or seizure). Therefore, Sotelo must establish that she has standing to challenge the search of the packages.
*192120 In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court explained that traditional standing inquiries (such as whether the proponent of a legal right has alleged an "injury in fact" and is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests) are subsumed by substantive law under the Fourth Amendment. The relevant inquiry is whether the disputed search has infringed an interest that the Amendment protects. Id. at 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, When a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or property searched, the Amendment is implicated. Id. at 143 & n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421 .
121 The touchstone of the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy standard is reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991); accord People v. Salaz, 953 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Colo. 1998) (characterizing a reasonable expectation of privacy as "the sine gua non of a challenge to the validity of a search and seizure"). First, a person must exhibit an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. Second, society must recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord Hoffman v. People, 780 P.2d 471, 474 (Colo. 1989); People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 814 (Colo. 1985). This court's analysis has focused primarily on the objective component. See People v. Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Colo. 1992); see also Juarez, 770 P.2d at 1289 ("Whether an asserted expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' depends on objective factors, not on the individual's subjective expectations."); People v. Tufts, T7 P.2d 485, 490 (Colo. 1986) (same).
122 Ultimately, whether a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy at the time of a search depends on the totality of the cireumstances. See People v. Galvadon, 103 P.3d 923, 930 (Colo. 2005) (explaining that judicial review of Fourth Amendment standing must be a "case-by-case" inquiry that looks to the totality of the cireumstances to assess whether a defendant's expectation of privacy was reasonable); People v. Curtis, 959 P.2d 434, 437 (Colo. 1998) (stating that "the question is whether the defendant demonstrates a sufficient connection to the areas searched or the items seized based on the totality of the cireumstances"); People v. Shorty, 731 P.2d 679, 681 (Colo. 1987) (referencing the need to examine "all the facts and cireumstances in a particular case"). Yet, the threshold requirement is unwavering: "The only person who can assert the right is a person with a pos-sessory or proprietary interest in the property or premises searched." Perez, 231 P.3d at 960.
C. Rental Car Context
1 23 We now apply these governing principles to the search and seizure of packages in a rental car with an unauthorized driver. We are mindful not to conflate standing to contest the search of the rental car itself with standing to contest the search and seizure of packages within the rental car. See generalty 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 11.3(e), at 257-59 & n.325 (5th ed. 2013); Forty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 48 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 119-20 & nn. 274-75 (2014). They are two different inquiries.
24 This case requires us to address only whether an unauthorized driver of a rental car may have standing to challenge a search of packages within the rental car, regardless of whether the driver has standing to challenge the search of the rental car itself.4
*193{25 We begin our analysis with Rakes. There, the defendants were passengers in a getaway car used to escape a robbery. 439 U.S. at 130, 99 S.Ct. 421. Although they did not own or lease the car, the defendants challenged the legality of a search and seizure of both the car and its contents. Id: at 148-49, 99 S.Ct. 421. They did not, however, assert a possessory or proprietary interest in the car or the property seized. Id. at 148, 99 S.Ct. 421. Consequently, the Court concluded that they did not have "a legitimate expectation of privacy" and were not entitled to challenge the search of either the car or the property within the car (namely, a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells). Id. at 148-50, 99 S.Ct. 421. The Court also rejected the defendants' assertion that they had standing because they were legitimately present in the car, driven by the owner:
[Tlhe phrase "legitimately on premises" has not been shown to be an easily applicable measure of Fourth Amendment rights so much as it has proved to be simply a label placed by the courts on results which have not been subjected to careful analysis. We would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate presence on the premises [here, the car] is irrelevant to one's expectation of privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling. >
Id. at 147-48, 99 S.Ct. 421 (emphasis added).
126 This court swiftly followed suit and implemented the legitimate-expectation-of-privacy standard enunciated in Rakas. See People v. Suttles, 685 P.2d 183, 190 (Colo.1984). In Suttles, we held that, for standing purposes, "the foeus is now on whether the proponent of a motion to suppress had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched or in the items seized." Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 190-91 (separately examining whether the defendant had a possessory interest in a car, or a gun or earring seized within the ear). Our use of the disjunctive "or" is consistent with our conclusion here that a defendant need not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle in order to have one in the property within it.
127 So how do we evaluate the legitimacy of a privacy interest when the focus is on personal effects, and not a place? Rakas instructs that a defendant may show a legitimate expectation of privacy "either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society." 439 U.S. at 143 n.12, 99 S.Ct. 421.
¶ 28 The Tenth Circuit addressed what this means in United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2001). The defendant in Edwards was arrested in connection with a bank robbery. When the police contacted him, the defendant stood near a car rented in his companion's name; he was not listed on the rental agreement as an authorized driver. Id. at 686-37. The police searched the car and found a clothing bag in the trunk that contained plastic bags full of stolen currency covered in dye, as well as another bag that contained a mask. Id. at 687. The police also found a sweatshirt and shoes belonging *194to Edwards. Id. The district court denied Edwards's motion to suppress this evidence. Id. at 641.
129 On appeal, the Tenth Cireuit considered whether Edwards had standing to challenge both the search of the rental car and the search of his bags. Id. at 641-42. The court found that Edwards did not have standing to challenge the search of the rental car because he was an unauthorized driver. Id. at 641 (citing United States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1499-1500 (10th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (10th Cir. 1984)). It reached a contrary conclusion with respect to the bags within the rental car. Id. at 642.
T 80 To explain why it found standing with respect to the bags themselves, the court referenced two cases that found a person can have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the content of luggage within another person's car. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 n.8, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the defendant unquestionably had standing to challenge a search where there was no dispute that he owned the luggage in question. Likewise, in United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit held that "(tlhe owner of a suitease located in another's car may have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of his suitease." Testimony by the defendant asserting an ownership interest in a shoulder bag sufficed to confer standing. Id.
T 81 Considering the totality of the cireum-stances, the court found that Edwards did have a subjective expectation of privacy in the bags and that society would recognize this expectation as reasonable. The bags were closed and stored in the trunk. Also, they contained clothing and toiletries in addition to contraband. Edwards, 632 F.3d at 642. Therefore, the court held that the evidence seized from the rental car should have been suppressed. Id. at 641.5
132 We agree with the Tenth Circuit's approach in Edwards. If, considering the totality of the cireumstances, an unauthorized driver of a rental car is able to satisfy the subjective and objective prongs of the reasonableness test, the driver has standing to challenge a search of his or her possessions within the rental car.
133 This approach tracks our precedent. Only "a person with a possessory or proprietary interest in the property or premises searched" can assert the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.6 Peres, *195231 P.3d at 960 (emphasis added). Thus, "[tlhis court has consistently 'held that the owner or possessor of a sealed container possesses a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents." Hillman, 834 P.2d at 1275 n.12 (quoting Oates, 698 P.2d at 816). We have also found that travelers generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their personal luggage or bags. People v. Ortega, 34 P.3d 986, 990 (Colo. 2001) (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336-37, 120 S.Ct. 1462, 146 L.Ed.2d 365 (2000) (holding that a bus passenger who places his luggage in an overhead bin retains an expectation of privacy)).
34 In addition, this conclusion comports with well-reasoned case law from other jurisdictions. Seq, eg., Buchner, 7 F.3d at 1154 (holding that a defendant in his girlfriend's rental car had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of a shoulder bag that he owned, which was within the car, and therefore had standing to contest a search of the bag); People v. Young, 363 Ill.App.3d 268, 300 Ill.Dec. 231, 843 N.E.2d 489, 490-92 (2006) (holding that a defendant, who was a passenger in a vehicle that was subjected to an inventory search, did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle because he had no ownership interest, but did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his closed suitcase in the trunk, which had a tightly wrapped and taped package containing marijuana inside it).
{ 35 We acknowledge that the Fourth Circuit has been unwilling to recognize an expectation of privacy in a bag within a car when the driver cannot assert a legitimate claim to the car itself. In United States v. Hargrove, 647 F.2d 411, 412 (4th Cir. 1981), that court stated, with respect to the driver of a stolen car, that "[a] person who cannot assert a legitimate claim to a vehicle cannot reasonably expect that the vehicle is a private repository for his personal effects, whether or not they are enclosed in some sort of a container, such as a paper bag." It summarily extended that rule to an unauthorized driver of a rental car in United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1994). But Hargrove involved a stolen car (a fact that the court in Wellons did not even try to reconcile) While Sotelo was not an authorized driver, there is no claim that the car was stolen.
36 Like other courts that have rejected Wellons, we conclude that an inflexible, bright-line rule denying standing to contest the search and seizure of packages within a rental car is inappropriate. See, e.g., State v. Bruski, 299 Wis.2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 510-11 (2007) (refusing to adopt a bright-line rule that a defendant who does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle cannot have an expectation of privacy relative to his travel case within the vehicle as a matter of law, even if he owns the case).
137 In summary, binding precedent of both the United States Supreme Court and this court makes clear that a defendant who has a possessory interest in a seized item may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that property. Reasonableness is assessed based on the totality of the cireum-stances-not on any single factor. Other courts throughout the country have expounded the same principle.
III. Application to Sotelo
188 Applying this precedent, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that Sotelo had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the gift-wrapped packages and *196thus had standing to challenge the trooper's search of those packages.
39 First, Sotelo exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy. She continually asserted that the packages were hers and that she was taking them to her daughter. And, by covering and sealing the packages with wrapping paper, Sotelo showed that she sought to preserve their contents as private. See Tufts, 717 P.2d at 490 (finding that the defendants' reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a bag supported standing, where the bag was closed when discovered by the detective); accord Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 n.3, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that whether the defendant took "some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance" is relevant to reasonableness of expectation of privacy), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 LEd.2d 572 (1982); United States v. Broadway, 580 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1187 (D. Colo. 2008) (finding that the defendant readily met the subjective reasonableness inquiry in light of his efforts to conceal his drugs in his locked apartment in well-wrapped packages).
140 Second, society would recognize Sotelo's expectation of privacy in the gift-wrapped packages as reasonable. Reasonableness "may be tested against the customs, values and common understandings that confer a sense of privacy upon many of our basic social activities." Oates, 698 P.2d at 816; see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 101, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that reasonableness depends upon "what expectations of privacy are traditional and well recognized"). Here, a legitimate expectation of privacy in gift-wrapped packages is consistent with historical notions of privacy. Indeed, the reason packages are gift-wrapped is to conceal their contents.
141 Of course, we now know that the packages contained marijuana, not birthday gifts. But courts may not use the benefit of hindsight in evaluating application of the Fourth Amendment. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 599, 111 S.Ct. 1982 ("Neither evidence uncovered in the course of a search nor the seope of the search conducted can be used to provide post hoc justification for a search unsupported by probable cause at its inception."); see, eg., Grassi v. People, 2014 CO 12, ¶ 15, 320 P.3d 332, 336 (applying this concept to the fellow officer rule); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 559, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[PJost Roc rationalizations have no place in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which demands that we 'prevent hindsight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure.'" (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976))).
1 42 Based on the cireumstances externally present, these were private packages which Sotelo claimed were gifts for her daughter. These cireumstances establish a legitimate expectation of privacy entitling her to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the packages.
IV. Conclusion
1 43 We hold that under the totality of the cireumstances, the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the gift, wrapped packages that the trooper detained following her traffic stop. She therefore had standing to contest the search of those packages, even though she was not authorized to drive the rental car.
4 44 We affirm the trial court's suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT dissents.

. The record and briefs contain three different spellings of the passenger's last name: Moreles, Mireles, and Mirales. We use the spelling in the police report, which is Mireles.

. The rental agreement was not part of the trial court record; however, it was included in the record on appeal. The agreement also specified that the renter had an additional two-day period in which to return the car before Hertz could assess an "overdue administrative fee" if the renter failed to contact the rental company:
You Are Required To Contact Us To Extend The Rental If The Car Will Not Be Returned By The Due Date On The Rental Record. If The Vehicle Is Overdue By More Than 2 Days, And You Fail To Contact Us, An Overdue Administrative Fee May Be Charged To Offset Our Administrative Efforts And Related Costs.

. The trial court also noted that under Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), "there is no right to search packages within the passenger compartment of a vehicle simply because of a traffic stop."

. Although this court has not yet addressed the issue, an overwhelming majority of courts apply a bright-line rule that denies an unauthorized driver standing to challenge a search of a rental vehicle because such a driver cannot have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself. Courts within the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits follow this approach. See, eg., United States v. Wellons, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. Seeley, 331 F.3d 471, 472 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 641 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. U.S. Currency Totaling $101,207.00, No. CV 101-162, 2007 WL 4106262, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 16, 2007); see also United States v. Kennedy, 638 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.2011) (agreeing with the majority position but recognizing that the inquiry must remain fact *193bound and that extraordinary circumstances could suggest an expectation of privacy); United States v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514, 516 (7th Cir.2003) (denying standing without choosing a side in the debate because unauthorized driver was also unlicensed); United States v. Crisp, 542 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1276-79 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle does not have a legally cognizable expectation of privacy in that vehicle, but declining to find standing based on the additional fact that the driver was unlicensed), aff'd, 355 Fed.Appx. 378 (11th Cir. 2009).
Other courts-including courts within the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits as well as some state courts-apply a modified bright-line rule that focuses on whether the renter granted the unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle permission to drive the vehicle. When the driver establishes "consensual possession," these courts are willing to find that even a driver who is not on the rental agreement can have standing to contest the search of the vehicle. See, eg., United States v. Smith, 263 F.3d 571, 586-87 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1197-99 (9th Cir. 2006); Parker v. State, 182 SW.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see also United States v. Virden, 417 F.Supp.2d 1360, 1368 n.8 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (diverging from the trend within the Eleventh Circuit and finding, in a footnote, that unauthorized driver had a legitimate expectation of privacy in rental car because it was procured for him and the lessee gave him permission to use it), aff'd, 488 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2007).

. Seven years later, in United States. v. Worthon, 520 F.3d 1173 (10th Cir. 2008), the Tenth Circuit again analyzed the reasonableness of a search of bags found within a rental car. There, the court referenced-and reaffirmed-Edwards. It once again distinguished between standing to challenge a search of the car itself and standing to challenge a search of its contents-noting that even where the ownership of a vehicle is uncertain, a non-owner driver or passenger "might have standing to challenge a search of the luggage stored in the trunk." Id. at 1182 (citing United States v. Martinez, 983 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 1992)). Ultimately, it concluded that the defendants in Worton had not established a legitimate expectation of privacy in the bags seized. Id. at 1182-83. Their subjective expectation of privacy was "not as well-defined" as in Edwards because the bags were not locked and were in an open compartment of a van. Id. at 1182. Furthermore, one defendant, Romero, disclaimed any ownership in the bags and attributed them instead to his co-defendant, Worthon. Id. While Worthon consistently maintained that the bags were his, the court noted that he was not in "'lawful possession or custody of the vehicle'" and thus could not have a " 'legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.'" Id. at 1183 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421). In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Edwards: "Mr. Wor-thon also lacks standing to challenge the search because unlike in Edwards, there was no authorized driver present." Id. To the extent the Tenth Circuit's decision in Worthon treats the absence of an authorized driver as dispositive, we disagree. Such an approach would ignore the possibility that an occupant of a vehicle might have a legitimate expectation of privacy as to the contents of the vehicle, even when not "legitimately present" in the vehicle itself. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. 421 (legitimate presence is not the controlling consideration).

. Conversely, an unauthorized driver's failure to assert a property interest in the item seized typically leads to a finding of no standing. See, eg., People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122, 1129 (Colo.1981) (finding no standing where defendant did not assert a property interest in the object *195seized); Suttles, 685 P.2d at 191 (same). So does a defendant's disavowal of a property interest in the item seized. See United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 359-60 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding no standing when defendant denied having any association with the evidence seized and had neither a property nor possessory interest in the evidence); United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding no standing when defendant denied even knowing whose car he was in and disclaimed any interest in the seized suitcase); see also United States v. Sanders, 130 F.3d 1316, 1318 (8th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment "does not immunize people who, finding themselves in a compromising situation, voluntarily trade their interest in privacy for a chance to escape incrimination, no matter how unwise that decision may seem in retrospect"). Neither of these circumstances is present here; as the trial court noted, Sotelo definitively asserted a property interest in the packages.